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The Discourse of Political Freedom in Ancient Greek Historiography

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Trinity College, Dublin

2012

Jessica Evans

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Jessica Evans

Summary

This thesis examines the discourse of political freedom in ancient Greek historical texts. In Chapter One, I examine evidence for 'freedom' from the Near East and Greece before the outbreak of the Persian Wars. Although most scholars agree that political 'freedom' and 'slavery' did not exist in the East, and that it did not emerge in Greece until the fifth century, in this chapter I conclude that the Cyrus Cylinder and poem 36 of Solon provide evidence demonstrating that the language of 'freedom' and 'slavery' had been used in a political context before the Persian Wars.

Chapters Two and Three focus on Herodotus' *Histories*, and how the historian was able to bring the past into dialogue with contemporary fifth-century politics through the language of 'freedom' and 'autonomy'. This chapter examines how Herodotus considers the relevancy of 'freedom' from a Persian perspective in order to deliver a warning to the Persians at the end the *Histories*. For Herodotus, 'freedom' could only be understood by examining it within the context of a society's νόμοι.

Chapter Four examines how Thucydides created a metanarrative on language through his statement regarding the meaning of words at 3.82.4. Words, or rather the names/labels (ὄνομα) which people assigned to their actions, were not in accord with reality. By using the word ὄνομα (name/label) to signal to the reader that the action being described did not correspond to reality, Thucydides reveals to the reader how language itself and arbitration—the one means of avoiding conflict—in fact precipitated it. An analysis of the relationship between ὄνομα (name/label) and 'freedom' in the text indicates that the concept of 'freedom' was exploited by politicians in order to gain support for campaigns which more often resulted in the enslavement of people and states than in their freedom. Through his metanarrative on language, Thucydides showed not only that 'freedom' served as a justifiable pretext for war, but that language itself was a catalyst for armed conflict.

In Chapter Five, the Mytilenean debates and the conflict between Plataea, Thebes and Sparta are examined. An analysis of the speeches in these episodes reveals that Thucydides is engaged in a philosophical examination of the limits of autonomy in a world where the stronger are able to manipulate justice or disregard it altogether. Thucydides has described Plataea and Mytilene as 'autonomous' in order to engage in a philosophical exercise which explored the relationship between νόμος and φύσις, and the role it played in determining the actions of men and states at war.

Chapter Six is an analysis of Sophocles' singular use of 'autonomy' in light of the debate between νόμος and φύσις in the *Antigone*. The tragedy of the play is underpinned by the language of νόμος and φύσις: both Antigone and Creon believed that their actions were just because they were in accordance with νόμος. Sophocles' description of Antigone as

'autonomous' creates a parallel between the character of Antigone and the allies of Athens in Thucydides' history, who, like Plataea, were described as 'autonomous' but ultimately suffer the consequences of acting in accordance with what they deem 'right' just as Antigone does.

Chapters Seven and Eight examine the relationship between Xenophon's philosophical and historical works with regard to the language of 'freedom'. An examination of how Xenophon reconstructed 'freedom' in order to make it relevant for aristocrats, whom he called *kaloi kagathoi*, reveals how Xenophon aimed to tackle the problem of moral ambiguity by carving a niche for aristocrats in society. Although Xenophon's intentions may have been well placed, in deconstructing morality, Xenophon has essentially reconstructed the reality which allowed states to subvert 'justice'. The way in which Xenophon has used the language of 'freedom' to frame historical events suggests that Xenophon believed that 'freedom' was a divisive word which could only be used for the 'good' of Greece in Panhellenic crusades against the barbarian.

Although historians provide valuable information about the past, an examination of how the language of 'freedom' was used by historians to frame historical events reveals that these historians' treatment of 'freedom' was informed as much by the past as it was by the historians' present intellectual and political environments. While previous attempts have been made by scholars to define 'freedom' using Herodotus', Thucydides' and Xenophon's histories as evidence for historical 'freedom', my analysis reveals that passages in these histories where 'freedom' played an historical role were often influenced by the historians' political and intellectual milieu. Understanding how contemporary politics and intellectual trends have influenced these historians' representations of 'freedom' allows the modern historian to draw meaning from specific passages which have previously been overlooked, and which contribute to the overall meaning garnered from the structure of the work.

Acknowledgements

Throughout the process of writing this thesis there were many people who helped along the way. I thank the members of the Department of Classics for their time and support, especially Martine Cuypers, Ashley Clements, Claire Taylor, and my supervisor, Brian McGing. During my time in Ireland there were many people who welcomed me, and without whose encouragement the days would have been much more gray: Jo Day, Siobhan Hargis, Emmett Tracy, Amanda Kelly, Winifred Ryan, Emily Lefevbre, and Maria McGloughlin. While I was in Ireland I was fortunate enough to have received support from Trinity College's Postgraduate Teaching Award, the Centre for Mediterranean and Near Eastern Studies, and the Irish Research Council on Humanities and Social Sciences.

In August 2009 I returned home to Vermont after the untimely passing of my first Latin teacher, Karen Knapp, whose love of Latin inspired me to pursue the language in college, and without whom this thesis would not have been. In September I returned to Stowe High School to teach Latin and pick up where she had left off. During my time at home I could not have completed this project without the help and support of my family, who will be pleased to finally have me in attendance at family events upon completion of this project. I thank them for being so understanding, and I especially thank my mother, who has read every word of this thesis. In addition I thank my Blue Wave Taekwondo family, Gordon White, and the members of the Classics' Department at the University of Vermont. John Franklin and Barbara Saylor Rodgers were kind enough to meet with me and read chapters. Several members of the faculty from Stowe High School provided helpful suggestions after reading early versions of chapters: Tom Curtin, Joe Ritzo and Norm Williams. All found themselves reading work by a student who had already graduated from their classrooms twelve years ago, and I thank them for indulging me once again. Laurie Essig and Rebecca Tiger each provided invaluable support, trips to Middlebury, and encouragement in the final stages of this project. I thank Emily Lefebvre, who was not only my sounding board in Ireland, but graciously hosted me on my return to Dublin (thank you to Pádraig too!). Emily has played an integral role in the submission of this thesis. Lastly, I thank the Skunk, Candyflip, Monkey, and Linus Van Pelt (aka Lynn Owens) for always being ready with tea and chocolate. Without Linus' critical eye and inquisitive mind—why does any of this matter? why is this important?—this thesis would have taken an altogether different shape.

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Introduction

Does freedom mean the same thing to everyone? This is undoubtedly a pertinent question for the current political climate, consumed as it is by rhetoric extolling personal freedom and by international campaigns which claim to be 'freeing' nations suffering from tyrannical rule.[1] Every generation witnesses a new field of thinkers, scholars, academics, writers, and now bloggers, who are compelled by the circumstances of their own times to question not only what it means to be free, but to what extent we, as individuals and as citizens of a state or nation, are free. Because every state, both ancient and modern, conceptualises 'freedom' within the framework of its individual culture, the individuality of these cultures and their various constitutions engender a plurality of 'freedoms'. We may all speak about 'freedom', but we do not all mean the same thing by it. Moses Finley notes that 'freedom' itself cannot be defined: not only can freedom only be understood in terms of what it means to be unfree, but the rights and privileges that constitute freedom are too vast and vary too much between societies for them to be limited to a single, all-encompassing definition.[2]

Political theorists from the time of Machiavelli have been inspired by Greek and Roman texts and have sought ancient precedents for their particular conceptualisations of 'freedom'. From the time of the Renaissance. Roman *libertas* has played a pivotal role in shaping how political theorists understand the freedom of the state, and the role that individuals play in shaping and securing this freedom. However, there is a difference between examining Greek *eleutheria* and Roman *libertas* to better understand the role played by freedom in the Greek and Roman world, and seeking to understand ancient conceptualisations of freedom in order to use them to strengthen one's own political theories. In the case of the latter, one's contemporary political situations often leads to misinterpretations of ancient conceptualisations of freedom. The importance of the former was first recognised by Benjamin Constant, who noted that the 'excesses of the [French] revolution and the institution of terror by the Jacobins was the result of the misconceived wish to restore in modern conditions an ancient form of liberty'.[3]

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[1] Lakoff (2006:133-225) discusses various ways in which 'freedom' is used by politicians with regard to the freedom of the individual, religious freedom, economic freedom and foreign policy.
[2] Finley (1981: 77).
[3] Vlassopoulos (2010: 40); Liddel (2007: 4-5).

Constant felt that during the French Revolution the ideas of Rousseau had been distorted to justify the right of society to impose liberties on others for their own benefit.[4] Drawing out the fundamental differences between ancient and modern ideas of liberty, Constant demonstrated that the differences between ancient and modern societies have led to diverse conceptualisations of liberty.[5]

Since his speech in 1819, those discussing the concept of freedom have recognised the dangers of conflating ancient and modern freedom. Although Constant's warning has been recognised, especially among modern academics who seek to understand the role of freedom in antiquity independent of any greater theorising, modern political theorists, such as Quentin Skinner, continue to create theories of 'liberty' based on notions of freedom from disparate times and places.[6] Such theorists have appropriated the past without considering the discursive qualities of 'freedom' portrayed in the works of ancient historians. A brief examination of the role of ancient freedom—both *eleutheria* and *libertas*—in political theory, and modern scholarship on 'freedom' in ancient Greece will demonstrate the methodology of this thesis, which aims to explore how the concept of freedom, specifically ἐλευθερ- in its various forms, was used by ancient historians in fifth-century Greece as a narrative tool, and how Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon do not simply describe how historical protagonists talk about freedom, but subject the concept of 'freedom' to frameworks, antitheses and discourses as a means of understanding the past. Consequently, when historians write about 'freedom', they are not only presenting a characterisation of the role played by 'freedom' in reality, but they are often considering more generally what it means to be 'free' within the context of the narrative they have created by subjecting the past to interpretive frameworks.

Past Appropriations of Greek and Roman Freedom

Although the focus of this thesis is Greek 'freedom', an examination of Roman republicanism during the Renaissance and its role in the English Civil War demonstrates how ancient conceptualisations of 'freedom' enjoyed a long history of appropriation by political theorists, who sought to bolster their own

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[4] Murray (1995: 40).
[5] For a more complete discussion of these differences, see pages 8-11, 27 n. 103.
[6] See below for a more complete discussion of Skinner.

positions through ancient precedent. Such appropriation, however, did not begin until the Middle Ages in Italy. In the intervening years the discourse of 'freedom' was not as important for intellectuals and theologians who were more concerned with the 'good life' and virtue.[7] Machiavelli's interest in empire lay in republican Rome, where the structure of the state allowed for an expansion of power. The struggle of the Greeks against consolidation of power is a testament to their commitment to the polis, but it did not provide a coherent theory of empire for Machiavelli. The *imperium* of Rome was an established institution, which meant that there was also an established understanding of state sovereignty. For Machiavelli, a free state must be independent of external control and ruled by the citizen body, both of which were Roman republican ideals.[8] Machiavelli's revival of Roman republicanism is preserved in the *Discorsi*, a commentary on Livy's first ten books, which he hoped would reveal how Rome successfully created a 'perfect republic'. Drawing from Polybius' distinction between the Spartans, who sought to preserve power, and the Romans, who sought to expand, Machiavelli argued that the pursuit of power was the best way to ensure that an organised society not be enslaved. The example of Rome had shown that a state which aimed to preserve its power was ultimately forced by defensive measures to expand. Machiavelli believed that a free state was one which, as Livy noted, is able 'to stand upright by means of one's own strength without depending on the will of another' (35.32.11).[9]

Machiavelli's investigations into Roman history led him to believe that Rome's success lay in the conflict of orders, which eventually led to the protection of the individual from the power of the magistrates, an essential component of Roman *libertas*: through *provocatio*, the right of the citizen to appeal to the Roman people, and *auxilium*, the right of the tribune to intervene on behalf of a citizen against whom a magistrate might use his power, the freedom of the lower classes was secured.[10] Drawing from the Roman example of the power of the tribunes, Machiavelli believed that freedom lay in the protection of the masses from their rulers. He preferred citizen militias to mercenary armies, as paid armies

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[7] Morrow (1998: 74-75); Vlassopoulos (2010: 51-52); McClelland (1996: 130-47).
[8] Skinner (1978: 157-58).
[9] Skinner (1998: 46).
[10] Rubinstein (1991: 48-49).

ultimately paved the way for the fall of the Roman Republic.[11] But Machiavelli's interest in the freedom of the masses did not stem from any underlying interest in the rights of the individual. Athens and Rome had demonstrated to Machiavelli that for an empire to be successful in war, its citizens must be free, as the masses were necessary to create an army. Since states preserve their capacity to act according to their will by expanding, free citizens were a necessary prerequisite of a free state. As Vlassopoulos notes '[f]reedom, in giving every citizen an incentive for caring for his community and its preservation, made free communities invincible in war and offered them the opportunity to rule over others'.[12] Machiavellian freedom depended on the participation of the masses, for, without them, they would fall prey to 'aggressive neighbours and power-hungry domestic elites'.[13] Thus the best way to preserve the liberty of the state was to pursue power through expansion in order to prevent the community from becoming dependent on the will of a more powerful governing body.

Whereas classical political philosophy was more concerned with 'the role of justice in the state, the nature of law, and the limits of political obligation', Machiavelli was more interested in the 'institutions (*ordini*) of republics and of kingdoms, the preservations of the political regimes, military organisation and judicial administration, and territorial aggrandisement'.[14] Machiavelli's adoption of ancient forms of freedom served as a means of controlling the masses, who provided a fighting machine to act in the interests of the state. For Machiavelli, *libertas* was not an ideal to be emulated for its own sake or because he felt that individuals were entitled to live without fear of those endowed with power, but because the success of an empire depended on the cooperation of the masses who would fight. Thus Machiavelli was not so much interested in what the ancients believed about freedom, but felt that it would be beneficial 'to imitate those who had been the rulers of the world'.[15] Although Skinner regards Machiavelli as one of the forerunners of the neo-roman movement, Sullivan argues that Machiavelli has been inappropriately deemed a classical republican. Machiavelli was not so

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[11] Vlassopoulos (2010: 52-54).
[12] Vlassopoulos (2010: 50).
[13] Maddox (2002: 188).
[14] Rubinstein (1991: 47).
[15] Rubinstein (1991: 43).

much concerned with republican virtue as he was with how the model of republican Rome was conducive for creating an empire.[16]

Machiavelli's ideas concerning the relationship between liberty and the state continued to influence political theorists and those opposed to the consolidation of power from the fifteenth through the eighteenth century.[17] Machiavelli's understanding of ancient freedom provided those who resisted the monarchical movement of the sixteenth century with a language of opposition. Foremost among those whose writings were appropriated by the supporters of the monarchy during the English Civil War was Hobbes, who proposed a different conceptualisation of freedom. He argued that opponents of monarchy were wrongly led to believe by the writers of antiquity that liberty and monarchy were incompatible.[18] Hobbes' position on the relationship between law and liberty is summarised by Skinner:

> One of the prime duties of the state is to prevent you from invading the rights of action of your fellow-citizens, a duty it discharges by imposing the coercive force of law on everyone equally. Provided that you are neither physically nor coercively constrained from acting or forbearing from acting by the requirements of law, you remain capable of exercising your powers at will and to that degree remain in possession of your civil liberty.[19]

In *Leviathan*, Hobbes explains that his position on liberty stems from his belief that freedom was the condition of all men by nature: in his natural state man was free to use his power for his own preservation (*Leviathan* 1.16). The right to self-preservation was a natural 'liberty'. This meant that men were equal, and that no one was superior. Man is naturally disposed to competition for honour, he takes interest in his own affairs over those of the collective, and he is inclined to show off his superiority. Consequently there was perpetual war. In order to safeguard

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[16] Skinner (1990: 121-41); Sullivan (2004: 58-64).
[17] For a more complete discussion see Skinner (1998: 10-16); Vlassopoulos (2010: 54-55).
[18] Vlassopoulos (2010: 55-56). As Oswyn Murray has noted, there is no difference in English between 'freedom' and 'liberty' (1995: 36). Both words are used as translations of the ancient Greek concept of ἐλευθερία.
[19] Skinner (1998: 5).

man's right to self-preservation, all men surrendered their freedom to a sovereign, thereby creating an obligation to obey this authority. The sovereign is endowed with power by those who have surrendered their freedom to him. It is the sovereign's duty to protect men through the force of law, which requires that men abandon their natural state. Since men have given power to the sovereign, they may not, even if the desire for reform is unanimous, alter the form of government.[20] Hobbes' thoughts on the natural state of man were undoubtedly influenced by Thucydides' history—a work which Hobbes himself translated—for whom it was the nature of the stronger to rule the weaker, and that it was the purview of the stronger to disregard justice or establish standards of justice that rendered actions which were in the interest of the stronger just. Although one might argue that man has ceded to the sovereign his right to act freely, Hobbes explained that the law did not limit an individual's will, but rather induced deliberation so that one might see that it was one's will to obey the law.[21] Thus a monarchy might offer its subjects more freedom than a democracy.[22] So long as one's will was not forced to conform to law, one was in possession of liberty. Furthermore, subjects were free to act in situations where no law restricted action.

The parliamentary response to such theories drew heavily from Machiavelli's *Discorsi*, which gave 'renewed prominence to what is perhaps best described as the neo-roman element in early-modern political thought'.[23] Livy provided theorists with a working definition of what it meant to be 'free': a self-governing community was one in which 'the *imperium* of the laws is greater than that of any man' (2.1.1). Those who opposed the monarchy resurrected the classical understanding of liberty, which had been best preserved by Machiavelli, who, Harrington and Neville both note, played an essential role in ensuring that the Roman republican understanding of freedom not be lost.[24] Political theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries such as Marchamont Nedham, Algernon Sidney, James Harrington, and Henry Neville looked to republican Rome to understand under what constitution the civil liberties of the individual may best be protected. They were mainly concerned with civil rights such as the equal

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[20] McClelland (1996: 193-96); Morrow (1998: 258-63).
[21] Skinner (1998: 8); Hobbes (1996: 120); Malcom (1991: 531).
[22] Vlassopoulos (2010: 57).
[23] Skinner (1998: 10-11).
[24] Harrington (1992: 10, 20, 30); Neville (1969: 81, 97, 126).

enjoyment of life, liberty, and estate, even though neither the Romans nor the neo-roman theorists of the Renaissance had mentioned the enjoyment of civil rights as a component of liberty.

These theorists, influenced by Roman republicanism, developed intricate ideas based on Roman writers concerning what constituted the 'freedom' and 'enslavement' of the state. Skinner traces the neo-roman theorists' ideas back to the writers of ancient Rome.[25] According to Justin's *Digest*, slaves and children were *in potestate domini*, or under the jurisdiction not of themselves, but of another.[26] Thus even if one was a slave to a benevolent master, such as Tranio in Plautus' *Mostellaria* (78-79)—even if he did not consider himself oppressed—he was still a slave by virtue of the fact that he was dependent on the will of another, or *obnoxius*, liable to harm or punishment at the will of another.[27] Whether or not a state was 'free' was understood by these theorists through the analogy of the body politic: a free state was one which, like a freeman as opposed to a slave, acted according to its will without influence or coercion. The will of the state was represented by the will of the people which was determined by the majority.

The inclusive nature of the 'will' may have made it optimal, however the neo-roman theorists recognised that it was flawed: if all were to participate in the process of determining the 'will', then the opinions of the masses who were unable to properly partake in self-governance must also be considered. Consequently they considered the best form of government to be an assembly chosen by the people to legislate on their behalf. So long as the body politic was able to exert its will, even if the will was represented by a few elected officials, then the community, and thus the state, was free. While all agreed that some form of a mixed constitution was best—an aristocratic senate combined with a democratic assembly—Neville believed that the body politic could not function without a head; for Neville, monarchy and liberty were compatible. As Neville notes, so long as the king is subject to the laws agreed upon by the body, a state governed

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[25] Skinner (1998: 38-46). Skinner examines Justin's *Digest* and the works of Livy, Plautus, Sallust and Seneca to better understand the theories of the British activists he discusses, even though he does not mention which—if any—of the passages from the ancient authors were cited by writers during the English Civil War. Vickie B. Sullivan questions whether these writers, Harrington in particular, were in fact republicans, given that their theories seem more influenced by the liberalism of Hobbes (2004: 128-143).

[26] See also Livy 5.20.3; 8.19.12.

[27] Skinner (1998: 43-44) notes that Sallust, Tacitus and Seneca use *obnoxius* to describe the 'condition of dependence suffered by those who forfeit their liberty.

by a king may be 'free'.[28] This is a departure from Roman conceptions of *libertas*, which was founded, according to Livy's introduction to Book Two, on the expulsion of the Tarquins. Neville's thoughts on liberty and monarchy have led some, such as Sullivan, to argue that he was more influenced by Hobbesian liberalism than republican Rome.[29]

A state which was free by virtue of its ability to act in accordance with the will of the body politic can be enslaved in two ways. First, a state can be enslaved if the body politic, like a natural body, is not able to act according to its will. A state may be prevented from acting according to its will if anyone or anything other than the body politic determines the will of the people. Thus even a single ruler who acts in accordance with the laws would render the state enslaved since the state must act according to his will rather than the collective will. Furthermore, a state which has been subjugated through colonisation or conquest is deemed enslaved, since, like the American colonies in the eighteenth century, its interests are not represented in the will of the people. As Richard Price notes, any country 'that is subject to the legislature of another country in which it has no voice, and over which it has no control, cannot be said to be governed by its will. Such a country, therefore, is in a state of slavery'.[30]

The second way a state may lose its freedom is significant for those writers who, unlike their Roman republican predecessors, believe that a state may be free under the rule of a king, so long as the king acts in accordance with the will of the people represented in a parliament. As Machiavelli argued in the *Discori*, a community can be ruled by a republic or by a prince while being self-governing at the same time.[31] However, if the king, or single 'head' of state, is endowed with veto power, then the people are effectively enslaved by the threat of veto power. Not all neo-roman theorists believed that monarchy and freedom were compatible. For John Hall and Francis Osborne, monarchy was slavery; a free state must be governed by a republic.[32]

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[28] Neville (1969: 174-75).
[29] See note above.
[30] Price (1991: 30), as cited by Skinner (1998: 50).
[31] Machiavelli *Discorsi*, I.2.
[32] For a more complete discussion of neo-roman theorists see Skinner (1998: 1-57). My brief analysis has been taken from these pages.

The English Civil War is just one example of how ancient conceptualisations of freedom were used to justify each party's beliefs either for or against the monarchy. The conflicts caused by misappropriations of the past, and, more specifically ancient conceptualisations of 'freedom', were noted by Constant, whose speech emphasised the importance of recognising the differences between ancient and modern notions of 'freedom'. For Constant, ancient 'freedom' was firmly rooted in the idea of civic liberty: 'as a citizen, he decided on peace and war; as a private individual, he was constrained, watched, and repressed in all his movements'.[33] Constant argues that, with the exception of Athens, the concept of liberty was limited to the freedom of the individual to take part in and influence the constitution of the state.[34] Modern liberty, on the other hand, was relatively unparalleled in the ancient world.[35] Modern freedom was manifest in several forms: freedom of expression, vocation, property, movement, association, religion, the right 'to be neither arrested, detained, put to death or maltreated in any way by the arbitrary will of one or more individuals'.[36] Furthermore, it is everyone's right to exert some influence on the administration of one's government. As Constant notes, in antiquity '[t]he laws regulated customs, and as customs touch on everything, there was hardly anything that the laws did not regulate'.[37]

In his *History as the Story of Liberty,* Benedetto Croce accepted Constant's argument that there were fundamental differences between ancient and modern liberty, but he argued that Constant's thesis, which equated ancient liberty with political liberty and modern liberty with civic liberty, was too strict.[38] In 1958 Isaiah Berlin, in his essay 'Two Concepts of Liberty', assessed 'freedom' by breaking it down not into 'ancient' and 'modern' conceptualisations, but 'positive' and 'negative'. Negative freedom, what John Locke called 'natural liberty', was defined as the right to live without being interfered with or coerced by others. Positive freedom, or in Locke's terms 'the liberty of man in society', or 'civil

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[33] Constant (1988: 311).
[34] Constant (1988: 312).
[35] See page 10 and page 27 n. 103 for further discussion on Constant's treatment of modern and ancient liberty. See pages 13-15 for an assessment of more modern research concerning the parallels between ancient and modern conceptions of freedom.
[36] Constant (1988: 309-310).
[37] Constant (1998: 311).
[38] Croce (1941: 245-46); Liddel (2007: 9).

liberty', was the right of men to participate in government and influence it. Berlin argues that a man may become 'unfree' if he does not have the resources necessary to act, or he may be rendered 'unfree' by his own 'inner conflicts or enslaving desires'.[39]

Gray notes that Berlin's theory of positive and negative freedom is more nuanced: freedom may be limited by intrapersonal relationships which would impinge on one's negative freedom, or by intrapersonal factors such as neuroses and prejudices which would limit one's ability to positively act.[40] Skinner has shown that an individual's ability to act depends on the individual being free from constraint. Consequently there seems to be little difference between positive and negative freedom. However, Skinner notes that Berlin made a more convincing argument regarding the relationship between self-mastery and positive freedom, which he argues hearkened back to the work of Bernard Bosanquet and T. H. Green: positive freedom can only be achieved through the process not so much of self-mastery, but self-realisation; 'whatever is the true goal of man...must be identical with his freedom'.[41] In this sense Berlin's conceptualisation of positive freedom, with its emphasis on self-mastery is different than Constant's ancient freedom, in which the individual is free to exert his influence in government.[42] But Berlin's notion of 'freedom' as self-mastery is not entirely without precedent, as both Plato and Xenophon considered 'freedom' to be a quality possessed by the individual similar to self-discipline or control.[43] Berlin's emphasis on inaction and self-enslavement is foreshadowed in Xenophon's own appropriation of the political concept of 'freedom' to the inner 'freedom' of the individual.[44]

Constant's argument concerning the differences between ancient and modern freedom focused primarily on ancient freedom as the right of man to take part in politics, and modern freedom as the right of man to enjoy civil liberties. There is, however, one conceptualisation of freedom shared by both ancient and modern societies, as evidenced from the works of ancient historians: the freedom

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[39] Gray (1984: 5).
[40] Gray (1984: 5).
[41] Skinner (2002: 16-18). Berlin is quoted by Skinner.
[42] Vlassopoulos (2010: 42).
[43] Stalley (1998: 145-58).
[44] See Chapter Eight, page 289, for a greater discussion of positive and negative 'freedom' in Xenophon's works.

of the community to govern itself without external interference. This sort of freedom was recognised as the absence of influence or coercion, or, to put it in Berlin's language, 'negative freedom'. Herodotus has both the Persians and the Athenians fight for 'freedom' from a more powerful state, where the right of the community to govern itself and determine its own foreign policy is threatened by assimilation by a more powerful governing body. Likewise, Thucydides' Spartans fight for the Greek city-states whose right to act without influence or coercion has been violated by Athens.

Despite Constant's warning of the dangers inherent in appropriating ancient conceptualisations of freedom, modern theorists continue to build arguments in favour of particular forms of liberty by appealing to ancient precedent. More recently, Skinner's historical forays into neo-roman theory have led him to consider how republicanism, with its emphasis on active participation, might be useful for a modern state. Skinner has criticised traditional conceptions of negative liberty by promoting a republican alternative. Negative liberty is the absence of interference, and as Hobbes noted, the 'greatest liberty of subjects, dependeth on the silence of the law'.[45] For Hobbes, individual freedom was 'the zone of action in which the individual is left alone by the state.' Positive freedom, on the other hand, was championed by Rousseau and Hegel as the ability to achieve potential through action.[46] Since Rousseau the main criticism of positive liberty has been that creating social institutions to ensure that people reach their potential is an infringement of negative liberty: government, given the power to demonstrate to those less educated or unaware that a better life exists, can hinder one's freedom to be left alone.[47]

According to Skinner, liberty which exists in spite of the law rather than existing under the protection of the law could easily become slavery. If freedom is not protected by the law, then an individual's freedom is as secure as a slave's, who, under the control of benevolent master enjoys some freedom, but constantly lives in fear of becoming a slave to a more overbearing master.[48] Skinner's theory of liberalism includes social institutions that allow for active self-government of

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[45] Hobbes *Leviathan* II, 21, 143.
[46] Taylor (1979: 179).
[47] Murray (1995: 37-38); Maddox (2002: 188).
[48] Kukathas (1993: 543).

which citizens may be forced to partake. He argues that liberty is threatened by contemporary liberalism, and more specifically those in the libertarian movement, who are mainly concerned with self-interest and individual rights, which are themselves obstacles to rights and liberties. The best liberty, therefore, is the liberty which exists under the protection of the laws, a form of liberty at odds with Berlin's conception of negative liberty. By living 'a relatively strenuous life of republican involvement' one may enjoy what Berlin defined as 'negative' freedom. As West notes, Berlin's conceptualisation of the measures necessary for protecting negative liberty requires that the individual partake of practices and obligations similar to those necessary in Skinner's model. Furthermore, the political activism which Skinner describes is similar to that which Rousseau endorsed, even though Skinner seldom mentions Rousseau.[49]

Greek and Roman Freedom

While in the past theorists' interest in 'freedom' was driven by a desire to seek ancient precedents for political agendas, modern scholars, whose interests were and are undoubtedly piqued by the contemporary language of politics, seek to examine ancient 'freedom' on its own terms. The prominence of democracy and the language of 'freedom' in politics has led to a renewed interest in ancient conceptualisations of 'freedom'. Mogens Herman Hansen has argued that the same models of liberty, equality and democracy can be seen in ancient and modern societies, but that the architects of modern democracy were not influenced by Athenian precedents. Furthermore, he argues that individual liberty is evidenced from the fact the Athenians lived as they wished.[50] Orlando Patterson has argued that both personal and civic freedom existed in the ancient world.[51] Patterson posits a third type of freedom—'sovereignal freedom'— which he defines as the power to do as one pleases regardless of the wishes of others.[52] However, as Murray points out, Patterson has conflated freedom with power.

Mulgan has shown that there were several ways that the *eleuther-* root could be used. 'Free' was used to denote the social status of the individual. A slave

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[49] West (1993: 84-85).
[50] Murray (1995: 42); Hansen (1992: 14-30).
[51] Murray (1995: 42); Patterson (1991).
[52] Patterson (1991: 3); Murray (1995: 42-43).

was one who did not have control over his own person; one could be a slave compared to a master, who had power over the slave, or to a freeman, who, unlike a slave, controlled himself. By analogy it was applied to the state to describe a polis which was not under the control of another state or a despot who treated his citizens like slaves. It was used by democrats to describe the control they exercised over their own affairs. Lastly, the concept of 'freedom' was used by philosophers to describe a state of being in which one was free from the passions and motivations which would enslave one.[53] As Kostas Vlassopoulos has noted, the polarity of 'free' and 'slave' typically only refers to the social status of the individual; unlike most historical societies, Greece was one of the few to transfer a social condition to a political status.[54]

The study of 'freedom' in antiquity is often paired with democracy, as in the fifth century the language of 'freedom' came to be associated with political institutions. Aristotle notes that those who defend democracy argue that 'freedom' can only be found in a democracy, since 'freedom' is the foundation of its constitution. Aristotle writes in the *Politics* that there are two types of liberty enjoyed by those living in a democracy (1317a40–b17). The first is the right to rule and be ruled in turn, as it allows all men to have an equal share. The second is to live as one likes. In the funeral oration Pericles states that the Athenians are 'free and tolerant in their private lives'; they live as they like, and if a neighbour enjoys himself in his own way, they do not give him looks which might hurt his feelings (2.37).[55] In this sense the Athenians enjoy the sort of freedom which is described by Constant as modern, individual freedom.[56] Aristotle notes that even better than ruling and being ruled would be to not be governed at all, or, in other words, anarchy (*Pol.* 6.2.1317a40-b17).[57] Although Hansen uses this passage concerning Athens to argue that there are few differences between ancient and modern forms of liberality, Murray rightly notes that the Athenians' individual rights were not protected from interference by the community, as the institution of ostracism and the trial of Socrates have demonstrated.[58] The rights which the

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[53] Mulgan (1984: 7-26); Vlassopoulos (2010: 42-44).
[54] Vlasoloulos (2010: 42).
[55] Andrews (2004: 539-61).
[56] Vlassopoulos (2010: 45).
[57] Murray (1995: 47); Vlassopoulos (2010: 45-46).
[58] Hansen (1989: 8).

Athenians enjoyed did not form the basis of any fundamental theory of personal rights, and the Athenians' own personal freedom was less important than the institutions of the city which protected their political rights.[59]

Constant's claim that individual freedom in antiquity was curtailed to suit the interests of the state continues to be reassessed. According to Constant, the ancients, while in possession of freedom to exert influence over government, were limited in terms of individual freedom.[60] Condorcet argued that the Greeks had no conception of individual rights,[61] however Mulgan asserts that this claim is extreme. Individuals had rights within the framework of their social status. For example, a master may exert his rights over his slaves. On the whole, the rights of the individual were not grounded in a commitment to personal freedom, but in the welfare of the community. Thus an individual may exert his right to honour the dead or to own property, so long as his claims did not interfere with the interests of the community.[62] Ostracism, which required no charge, nor provided the accused with the right of defence or appeal, was the ultimate right of the community over the individual.

Playwrights in antiquity were far more limited in terms of the severity of attacks made against the state than against the individual; '[i]ndividuals were fair game, but not the community'.[63] Aristophanes, in the *Acharnians* recounts how he was prosecuted for damaging the reputation of Athens in the presence of foreigners (377-82, 502-3). Unlike modern notions of liberality, Constant argued, the ancients placed little value on individual freedom; the individual in antiquity was subjected to the authority of the community, a circumstance faced by Sophocles' Antigone, whose right to bury her brother—a freedom of religion—was denied by Creon on the grounds that it was not in the interest of the community. Mulgan argues that '[i]t was recognised that the state, in exercising power, might transgress the wishes of the gods, and the citizens therefore do wrong in obeying the state'.[64] Although Mulgan asserts that individuals enjoyed less freedom when it came to attacks against the community, Murray argues that

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[59] Murray (1995: 48).
[60] Constant (1998: 236).
[61] Williams (2004: 45-68).
[62] Mulgan (1984: 17).
[63] Mulgan (1984: 14-15).
[64] Mulgan (1984: 16).

this control was far less restricted in Ancient Greece than it is today. Rather than seeing Antigone as an example of an individual's actions being limited by the interests of the state, Murray argues that the fact that such a play was performed reveals the Athenians' tolerance for debate regarding conflict between civil and higher laws.[65] As I shall examine in Chapter Six, the story of Antigone's struggles becomes a platform for examining what happens when the interests of the community are at odds with those of the city-state. In this light, Antigone's struggle provides evidence not only of the limits of personal liberty, but of the conflict between the interests of the stronger, which prevailed in accordance with φύσις, and the νόμοι of the community.

While modern liberalism aims to limit the control exerted by the government on the lives of individuals, in antiquity the rights of the individual did not exist independent of an individual's membership and participation in a community.[66] In other words, whereas modern liberalism seeks to protect individuals from government, the liberty of the individual in antiquity was secured through the constitution. Although, as Murray notes, positive freedom may best be enjoyed under the guidance of philosopher kings or priests, and negative freedom through anarchy, it was widely recognised in antiquity that some form of government was necessary in order to 'civilise man'. As the chorus in Sophocles' *Antigone* notes, one of the developmental stages in the 'civilising' of man included the acquisition of ἀστυνόμοι, the customs necessary for man to come together to live as a community. Similarly, though much later, social contract theorists believed that individuals could not enjoy freedom on their own, but at one point in the distant past it was the general will of the people to come together to enjoy a more limited form of freedom. This too can become a form of control, as the 'general will' is used as an argument to justify the subjugation of the minority, or the will of the community. Rousseau reconciled this flaw by advocating for direct democracy, whereby the will of each individual would be heard, as opposed to a representative democracy.[67]

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[65] Murray (1995: 45-46).
[66] Vlassopoulos (2010: 46).
[67] Murray (1995: 39).

A Different Approach to 'Freedom'

Past approaches and interests in ancient conceptualisations of 'freedom' have been dominated by those seeking to support their political theories and agendas, the danger of which was recognised by Rousseau, and by those seeking to understand the ancient precedents for modern democracy. While, as noted above, modern scholarship seeks to understand the freedom of the individual and the state within the context of antiquity, such research does not take into account that the process of recording 'what happened' is an intellectual process that entails synthesis, and, quite often, theorising or subjecting interpretations of the past to theoretical frameworks. Consequently when historians use the language of 'freedom', their decision to include such language may reflect an historical reality in which 'freedom' (ἐλευθερία) and 'autonomy' (αὐτονομία) played a role, but it may also be the case that they are considering more generally what it means to be 'free' or 'autonomous' by examining 'freedom' and 'autonomy' through theoretical frameworks, such as relativism or the νόμος-φύσις debate. Any candid reader of Herodotus and Thucydides is able to detect the importance of freedom as an ideological tool during the fifth century. A TLG search for ἐλευθερ- reveals that it is used 80 times by Herodotus, 101 by Thucydides, but only 38 times in Xenophon's *Anabasis* and *Hellenica*, and 29 times in the *Memorabilia*. A search for δουλ- (slavery) reveals the following: Herodotus 96, Thucydides 78, Xenophon's historical works 25, *Memorabilia* 32. αὐτονομ- (autonomy): Herodotus 2, Thucydides 48, Xenophon's historical works 40. While there are many variables at play that can affect the results, such as the length of the history, the fact that autonomy occurs only twice in Herodotus, but 48 times in Thucydides, is significant: 'autonomy' was a term which arose from the circumstances of the interaction between members of the Delian League. It was not a term which was relevant for the Persian Wars and therefore appears only twice in Herodotus' history, but, as I discuss in Chapter Three, its presence intensifies the ironic tone of the passages in which it is used. Xenophon is much more reserved in his use of 'freedom' and 'slavery' in his historical narratives than in the *Memorabilia*. This is due to his philosophical reconceptualisation of 'freedom', which he proposes as a solution to the problem of moral ambiguity. Xenophon has been omitted from my discussion of 'autonomy' due to the fact that he does not engage with the term philosophically. 'Autonomy' is entirely absent

from his philosophical works, and his application of 'autonomy' in the historical works indicates that he uses the term solely as a political term.

This thesis will examine how Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon engage the language of 'freedom' and 'autonomy' in ways that are more philosophical than historical. This, I argue, is due to the fact these historians did not simply relay what happened, but rather use the past to consider not only how the customs and conventions of a society inform one's understanding of 'freedom', but also how culturally embedded ideologies, such as 'freedom' can be abused when a society's νόμοι are either subverted or ignored by the interests of the stronger, a circumstance arising from unbridled nature. While Herodotus uses the language of 'freedom' to deliver a subtle warning to the Athenians of his own time, Thucydides exposes how language itself, and specifically the language of freedom, had become a tool of war. For Thucydides, 'autonomy' was powerless to defend the weaker from the interests of the stronger in a world in which men behave in accordance with φύσις instead of νόμοι. Herodotus and Thucydides use the language of 'freedom' as a narrative tool to create meaning in their texts precisely because 'freedom' was a value-laden concept that was intrinsic to the νόμοι of the Greeks and essential for preserving their right to live in accordance with these νόμοι. Xenophon, on the other hand, rejects traditional conceptualisations of 'freedom' and instead considers how one who is 'free' in the sense of self-control might be useful politically. This new conceptualisaion of 'freedom' is essential for understanding Xenophon's position concerning the relevancy of 'freedom' in the political arena. As I shall demonstrate, freedom and autonomy are as much subjected to the interpretive lens through which the historian intellectualises the past as the past itself is.

Examinations of Greek 'freedom' have been limited to either understanding what 'freedom' and 'autonomy' meant in an historical context or in a philosophical context. Kurt Raaflaub has conducted the most comprehensive analysis of freedom in the Greek world, but his focus is primarily political, nor does he consider the philosophical theorising which shaped both Herodotus' and Thucydides' engagement with freedom.[68] Pohlenz examines the history of freedom as an ideal with regard to the individual, and while he does include Herodotus' and

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[68] Raaflaub (2004).

Thucydides' histories in his evaluation, their texts are regarded as historical, while his philosophical interests are limited to Socrates.[69] Ehrenberg, who likewise examines freedom as an ideal, is more concerned with freedom in a contemporary context than with understanding freedom in either a Greek or Roman context.[70] As discussed above, scholarship on political freedom from an historical perspective abounds, yet none of these assessments include a discussion of how an historian's representation of 'freedom' is shaped by the frameworks used by the historian to process and present the past.[71]

Finley notes that '[c]hanges in the matrix of rights that prevail in any society normally begin in a struggle over specific issues, not over abstract concepts or slogans. The rhetoric and the abstractions come later, and then are reified'.[72] Although ancient writers such as Thucydides and Aristotle both warned against the dangers of stasis, Finley suggests that those who read these authors failed to heed their warnings on account of their desire for *kerdos*, or profit, and *time*, honour; *stasis* was just one of the means of achieving *kerdos* and *time*.[73] Finley notes that conflicts in Greek history were the result of tensions regarding specific issues, rather than 'abstract theories about rights or freedom'.[74] While the language of 'freedom' may have played a role in the historical reality narrated by the historians, often ἐλευθερ- and ἀυτονομ- appear in situations where such language is in dialogue with intellectual/philosophical frameworks and debates underpinning the historians' narrations. As I shall demonstrate, historians engage the concept of 'freedom' to create meaning in the text precisely because of the value accorded the word for what it represented in terms of identity and history. By subjecting 'freedom' and 'autonomy' to interpretive frameworks such as relativism, the antithesis between νόμος and φύσις, and the destabilisation of language caused by φύσις, historians are able to not only consider the role played by 'freedom' in facilitating conflict, but they are also able to send subtle messages to the reader and warnings concerning the dangers of rhetoric.

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[69] Pohlenz (1966).
[70] Ehrenberg (1974).
[71] More specific and limited studies on freedom which are either historical or philosophical in their approach will be discussed throughout this thesis where relevant.
[72] Finley (1981: 80).
[73] Finley (1981: 80).
[74] Finley (1981: 84).

The complexity of the role played by 'freedom' in ancient politics is exemplified in a speech reported by Thucydides given by the Spartan general Brasidas to the Acanthians. Here Brasidas persuades the Acanthians that an alliance with Sparta is in their interest:

> If, now that I have made my position plain, you are going to say that you are unable to help, but have friendly feelings and so ought not to be made to suffer for rejecting me; that you regard freedom (τὴν ἐλευθερίαν) as a risky thing to have, that it is right to offer it only to those capable of receiving it and not to force it on anyone against his will, then I shall call upon the gods and heroes of your country to witness that I came here to help you and could not make you understand it. I shall lay waste your land and try to bring you over by force...We Spartans are only justified in freeing (ἐλευθεροῦν) people against their own will, because we are acting for the good of all alike. We have no imperialistic ambitions; our whole effort is to put an end to imperialism, and we should be doing wrong to the majority, if we were to put up with your opposition to the autonomy (αὐτονομίαν) which we are offering to all (Thuc. 4.87).[75]

The Acanthians would certainly have argued that the use of force limited their 'freedom' to make decisions in their own interest. The Spartans justified the use of force through the rhetoric of 'freedom'. The threat of force used by the Spartans to persuade the Acanthians that an alliance would benefit them might even constitute 'enslavement' from the Acanthians' perspective. However, embedded within Thucydides' ostensible claim to be writing an account of the conflict between Athens and Sparta is his desire that his work be useful for those seeking to avoid similar conflicts in the future.[76] In describing the process through which he wrote his history, Thucydides explains that he has relied on both his own memories as well as those of others, whose accounts were difficult to reconcile on account of partiality or forgetfulness. With regard to speeches, Thucydides states that 'some were delivered before the war began, others while it was going on; some I heard

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[75] Translation Warner (1972a).
[76] See Chapter Four, pages 125-29, for a more complete discussion of Thucydides' speeches.

myself, others I got from various quarters; it was in all cases difficult to carry them word for word in one's memory, so my habit has been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of what they really said' (1.22.1).[77] Thucydides claims to have reproduced as true an account of the speeches as possible, but the act of listening and processing what one has heard entails interpretation. While his intent may have been to recreate speeches that reflect what was actually said, it cannot be denied that one's memory is subject to the interpretative framework through which the past is judged in hindsight. Consequently I regard the speeches, as well as the use of value laden language in narrative portions of the historian's text, as a reflection of the historian's processing of the past. Such language, more specifically the language of 'freedom', was used by historians as a narrative tool precisely because it was ascribed value. However, it is my position that historians are not so much relaying how the language of 'freedom' was actually used in politics—even though undoubtedly there are occasions where historical narratives accurately reflect the role played by the language of 'freedom'—but that they are using the language of 'freedom' as narrative tool. The prevalence of 'freedom' in the works of Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon may, therefore, accurately reflect the role of freedom in an historical reality, but just as it was used by political agents to manipulate individuals, so too was it used by historians to expose the danger of employing emotive language such as freedom in rhetoric.

By 'political freedom' I do not mean the 'freedoms' afforded by an oligarchic or democratic constitution, but rather how historians narrate political events and wars through the language of 'freedom'. The aim of this thesis is to examine how and why 'freedom' was meaningful in the context in which it was used, rather than to identify concrete definitions of oligarchic or democratic 'freedom'. Modern scholars have sought to understand the circumstances which paved the way for 'freedom's' emergence from an historical rather than historiographical perspective. Kurt Raaflaub argues that by the collapse of Athens in 404, freedom was a definable status which was readily used by advocates and politicians alike. For this reason Raaflaub terminates his case study in 404,

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[77] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).

primarily focusing on the development of ideology rather than its implementation.[78] He does not consider that Thucydides may be implementing a concept which had already developed into an ideology. Martin Ostwald, in seeking to define 'autonomy', investigates the role this political concept played in history.[79] Bosworth has argued, in much the same vein as Raaflaub, that it is possible to identify different meanings for 'autonomy' from different perspectives.[80] While it may be possible to identify such perspectives, none have considered that the historian, like the politician, may be using the language of 'autonomy' and 'freedom' because of its rhetorical power. It is the prerogative of the historian as much as the politician to give the public his own perspective of past events.

Even if the historian believes that his method is 'objective', the very process of selecting which events to chronicle requires an interpretive framework. Recent scholarship has shown that the historicity of ancient historical narratives only becomes clear once these works are freed from the constraints of modern expectations.[81] In his work on Herodotus' sources, Fehling does not consider the intellectual and political climate which influenced Herodotus' reproduction of the past. As a consequence, Fehling is critical of Herodotus as an historian and contributes to the corpus of scholarship which sees Herodotus as the father of lies.[82] Thomas notes that Fehling's work shows 'little attempt...to ask what might have been acceptable or "true" to fifth-century Greeks, and comparisons are made with ancient literature of a much later date and later stage of cultural development'.[83] Passages which deviate from chronology or which are proven incorrect by either the physical evidence or by other historians are regarded as errors. In the past such 'errors' have invalidated the work of the historian. Likewise, passages in which 'freedom' and 'autonomy' are used anachronistically have been attributed to carelessness on the part of the historian. Rather than discredit the historian, one should ask why the historian has chosen to tell the

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[78] Raaflaub (2004: 18).
[79] Ostwald (1982).
[80] Bosworth (1992: 122-23).
[81] Thompson (1996: 61-68); Rood (1998: 14-18); Thomas (2000: 8-9).
[82] Fehling (1989: 152).
[83] Thomas (2000: 8).

story in this way, and why he has chosen to use the language of 'freedom' and 'autonomy' even though the application of these concepts was anachronistic.

Recent studies on the narrative structure of ancient histories have shown the benefits of employing literary theory. The theoretical frameworks set forth by Gérard Genette in *Narrative Discourse* as well as Mieke Bal's *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative* provide the tools necessary for conducting this assessment. By applying literary theory to Thucydides' history, Tim Rood, in *Narrative and Explanation*, has shown that literary methods, which had successfully been used by de Jong in her work on Homer, *Narrators and Focalizers*, could be used in analyses of historical works.[84] Although I have not explicitly employed the language of narratology in my thesis, the results of Rood's research, which demonstrate the benefits of reading historical works as literature, have informed my thesis throughout.[85] Reading historians as literature rather than 'history' distances the modern reader from prejudices regarding what makes a good history. Read in this way, what are historical inaccuracies by modern standards are the tools for understanding the structure of the history.[86] When these inaccuracies are examined within the overall structure of the narrative, histories which were previously considered unreliable become valuable commentaries on the process of conceptualising and interpreting the past. Elizabeth Irwin and Emily Greenwood's collection of essays on Book Five of Herodotus' *Histories* has demonstrated the value of reading Herodotean *logoi* in context. The significance of particular stories can only be truly understood when these passages are read in relationship to the larger text.[87] As Caroline Dewald notes, 'the structure of a historical narrative...is not...by definition a sign of its separation from the truth of the past, but is rather one of the most important vehicles by which the working historian both understands the past and tries to convey something of its particular realities to others'.[88]

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[84] For Rood's analysis of Genette's and Bal's respective theories on focalization, see Rood (1998: 9-14, 20-21, 294-96).
[85] My decision not to include focalisation was a conscious one. As Rood himself has noted, focalisation, which is effective in literature, is less so when dealing with historical texts (Rood 1998: 294-96). Instead my reading of the historical texts is informed by contemporary literature and by the theories which are drawn from the structure and language of the texts themselves.
[86] Rood (1999: 15-16).
[87] Irwin and Greenwood (2007: 9-19).
[88] Dewald (2005: 14).

Since Near Eastern states, and more specifically Persia, figure prominently in Herodotus' *Histories*, the role which the concept of 'freeing' and 'slavery' played in Near Eastern states will be examined in the first chapter. In addition to Herodotus' *Histories*, Thucydides' and Xenophon's historical works will be examined. Since Xenophon was the last of the extant Greek historians to write before Roman conceptualisations of 'freedom' began to influence Greek perceptions of 'freedom', my analysis ends with Xenophon and does not include Polybius. Historical assessments of political freedom are often based on passages in which the language of 'freedom' or 'autonomy' is being employed as a literary device. In analysing the function of 'freedom' and 'autonomy' I have taken a literary, as well as an historical, approach. In recording the past, historians are influenced by the political and social circumstances of their own times. Both Raaflaub and Ostwald have noted examples where Herodotus and Thucydides used the language of 'freedom' and 'autonomy' to frame their narrations of events that happened before these concepts were coined. Rather than dismiss these passages on anachronistic grounds, or argue that the concepts were used simply because they were apt, I examine why the author has chosen to use these terms, and how such anachronisms made the passage meaningful to a contemporary audience.

While the influence of philosophical and intellectual trends on the genre of history has received recognition in recent years, the seminal scholarship on 'freedom' and 'autonomy' in historical works has largely ignored the relationship between these two genres. Darien Shanske, in *Thucydides and the Philosophical Origins of History,* dismisses Herodotus as a philosophical historian on the grounds that his work was 'original', but not 'foundational'. Herodotus is useful because the remarkable nature of Thucydides' history can only be understood when his text is compared to that of Herodotus'; unlike Herodotus' themes, which are more traditional, the themes which frame Thucydides' history were entirely new. I suggest that Herodotus' engagement with intellectual frameworks such as relativism and νόμος-φύσις shaped the way that he engaged with 'freedom' and 'slavery' in his history. Thus Herodotus, who is the earliest and most prolific writer to employ the language of 'freedom', may have been thinking philosophically about 'freedom' when he used it in political contexts. Rosalind Thomas has demonstrated that Herodotus frequently alludes to novel ideas in his

histories, most notably those of the Ionians, and ideas of relativism.[89] Herodotus' engagement with the philosophical debate between νόμος and φύσις indicates that his *Histories* was not a 'less radical break from the oral tradition',[90] but was in fact something altogether unprecedented. Written history, as opposed to oral history, allowed the historian to engage with an interpretative framework which was informed by popular intellectual trends.

Frequently Herodotus refers to his methods through a metanarrative in which he speaks about his own techniques as an historian. As Munson notes '[w]ith the metanarrative, however, the author of the narrative emerges from the text. As an explicit mediator between reality and the audience, he communicates to the audience about his record of reality and its reason for being'.[91] For the purposes of this thesis, Chatman's distinction between story and discourse will be useful: story forms the content of a narrative which an author transmits through mimesis; discourse refers not to the content of a narrative but how the narrative is transmitted.[92] The relevance of discourse analysis rests on the coherence of the work and on the assumption that an author has made use of some sort of structural framework in the organisation of the work. As Henry Immerwahr, Charles Fornara and, most recently, Elizabeth Irwin and Emily Greenwood have shown, understanding the structure and organisation of Herodotus' *logoi* provides insight into Herodotus' views on history.[93] As I shall examine, one of the structural frameworks used by both Herodotus and Thucydides to make sense not only of the present but also the past is the antithesis between νόμος and φύσις. Rather than simply relay the role played by 'freedom' in an historical reality, historians examine the possibility that there are diverse conceptualisations of 'freedom', since 'freedom' itself existed in accordance with νόμοι. Furthermore, they examine how the rhetoric of 'freedom' no longer reflected reality, as culturally embedded values which existed in accordance with νόμοι had been destabilised by φύσις, thereby allowing men to deem acts of enslavement 'just' and to argue that such acts were carried out in the name of 'freedom'.

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[89] Thomas (2006: 60-74).
[90] Shanske (2007: 11).
[91] Muson (2001: 16-17). Luraghi (2006: 76-89).
[92] Chatman (1978: 19).
[93] Dewlad and Marincola (2006: 3); Immerwahr (1966); Fornara (1971); Irwin and Greenwood (2007).

Thucydides' metanarrative is implicit and therefore more difficult to extract. Tim Rood has demonstrated the benefits of employing narratology to demonstrate the structural coherence of Thucydides' narrative, which often seems disjointed, rife with omissions, and incomplete. Drawing upon this recent scholarship which seeks to understand the works of these historians without imposing our own expectations, I focus on how the lens through which Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon shaped their respective histories was influenced by their contemporary political and intellectual environments. By metadiscourse I mean the commentary provided by an historian concerning the role of language in politics. Herodotus frequently alludes to his historical methods, but a separate narrative on the value-laden concept of freedom is created through anachronisms in order to provide a critique of contemporary Athenian behaviour. Commenting on what they deem to be Genette's incorrect application of 'meta', Bal and Tavor note that this type of metanarrative must be distinguished from metadiscourse, which is a discourse on discourse.[94] While Herodotus uses the language of 'freedom' to demonstrate how his narrative of the conflict between Persia and Greece provides a second narrative, or metanarrative, on contemporary Athenian behaviour, Thucydides uses the language of 'freedom' to create a discourse on the language of freedom itself. This discourse takes the shape of a commentary on the meanings of words and the abuse of value-laden concepts such as 'freedom' which are employed at decisive moments to demonstrate the failure of language to provide an alternative to armed conflict. Xenophon's appropriation of the language of 'freedom' in a non-political context is itself a sign that he, and perhaps others, were questioning what it meant to be free, but this only becomes apparent when his philosophical works are read alongside his historical ones.

Herodotus', Thucydides', and Xenophon's use of the language of 'freedom' in their historical narratives may reflect an historical reality in which politicians spoke of 'freedom'. Unfortunately the independent evidence necessary for verifying this claim does not exist. However, the prevalence of the language of 'freedom' in the works of the playwrights and the logographers suggests that those living in the fifth century were often exposed to this language, and that these historians are reflecting a pervasive ideology in their narratives. By identifying

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[94] Bal and Tavor (1981: 41-42); Genette (1972: 239).

signposts in the texts of these historians—such as anachronisms, key words, and independent philosophical treatments of key themes—it becomes clear how these historians use the language of freedom to comment on the concept of freedom itself and the role it plays in their respective political spheres, and for understanding the themes which shaped their histories.[95]

While I am not suggesting that these historians would benefit from the sort of metahistorical analysis posited by Hayden White,[96] I am suggesting that Herodotus' and Thucydides' contemporary intellectual environments and past literary and oral traditions provide a framework for interpretation.[97] While much research has been done on the influence of Homer on Herodotus and the relationship between Sophocles' plays and Herodotus' and Thucydides' histories, these investigations do not explain how the historians' intellectual environment shaped the presentation of 'freedom' in their respective texts.[98] Thucydides was so interested in human nature and principles underlying or motivating the behaviour or actions of men that at times it seems that history was the vehicle through which he engaged with these ideas;[99] recording the past almost seems secondary. Darien Shanske's examination of Thucydides as an historian is philosophical in approach, but his treatment of the historian is based on the following premise: 'The Greeks thought about logos, about ordering the world, not language, and their supposedly naive conflation may instead reflect a profound insight into the connectedness of notions that we moderns have torn asunder'.[100] Plato's dialogues, the fragments of the sophists, and the works of Gorgias are a testament to the precise treatment given words by those living in the latter half of the fifth and the early fourth century. In the *Phaedrus*, Plato addresses the ambiguity of words, such as 'just', 'good' and 'love', which allow one to deceive more easily (*Phdr.* 259e-263e).[101] In Thucydides' history, it is possible to identify moments where the historian

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[95] Inherent within my interpretative framework is the dilemma of using only historical sources—independent of material evidence—as representative of discourse rather than of an historical reality. When the works of these historians are reduced to discourse, that discourse becomes meaningless as it no longer has a comparative control grounded in an historical reality. However, the act of reporting in itself results in a discourse which, despite its claims to accurately represent reality, can never fully convey 'what happened'.

[96] White (1973: 1-42).

[97] Dewald (2005: 13-15).

[98] Dewald and Kitzinger (2006: 122-27); Greenwood (2006: 98-107); Marincola (2006: 13-24).

[99] Cogan (1981a: 233-54).

[100] Shanske (2007: 10).

[101] For a more complete discussion of this passage see Chapter Seven, pages 247-48.

interacts with the problems posed by the ambiguity not just of arguments (λόγοι), but of words (ὀνόματα). This distinction indicates that Thucydides was conscious of the power of words, and not just arguments, as Shanske asserts.[102] Moments in Thucydides' history where the language of 'freedom' figures prominently suggest that Thucydides may have framed his history and political speeches through this language not because 'freedom' was in fact used or even 'apt', but because he was making a statement concerning the role of 'freedom' in rhetoric.

Historians, and more specifically Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, the historians which will be the focus of this thesis, frame the past through the language of 'freedom'. The following thesis questions the underlying assumption that Greeks believed that 'freedom' was 'good' and 'slavery' was 'bad', or that an analysis of how these historians use of the language of 'freedom' will lead to concrete definitions of it. Modern scholars have defined 'freedom' from the perspective of the Spartans or the Athenians, but they do not consider that the historian was employing 'freedom' not because the Spartans or Athenians used it this way, but because it fits within his own interpretative framework.[103] Herodotus' use of the language of 'freedom' and 'autonomy' allows the reader to compare the Athenians' glorious past with their present atrocities. Attempts to identify whether Thucydides was pro-Athenian or pro-Spartan result in little consensus, primarily because Thucydides used language to show that language itself could be subverted. Inconsistencies between speech and narrative in Xenophon's *Hellenica*

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[102] Shanske (2007: 10).

[103] The differences between Spartan and Athenian conceptualisations of 'freedom' have been recognised since the time of Constant, who noted that ancient notions of liberty centered on the individual's right to take part in government. The ancients were not as concerned with the notion of personal liberty, with the exception of the Athenians', whose commercial success allowed them to be less dependent on government for meeting their needs (Murray 1995: 41; Liddel 2007: 6-7). More recently Raaflaub has argued that the institutions of Athenian democracy could only be preserved by protecting their power thereby ensuring the freedom of Athenian citizens. Spartan 'freedom' was not so much defined by its role in internal politics as it was by its role in providing the Spartans with a justification for intervention in the relations between Athens and her allies. This type of freedom was based on the sovereignty of city-states in interstate affairs (Raaflaub 2004: 166-202). However, Mulgan argues that equality rather than freedom was the important political principle for the Athenians. He bases this argument on the fact that Athenian rights such as *isegoria* and *isonomia* contain within them the notion of equality, and that the concept of 'freedom of speech', *parrhesia*, is not etymologically related to the notion of 'freedom' (Mulgan 1984: 12-13). Murray notes that whereas the Spartans were concerned with *eunomia*, the Athenians were concerned with *isonomia* (Murray 1995: 36). The democratic ideal—an ideal not shared by the Spartans—of living as one likes was unique to the Athenians and was often met with criticism, by Aristotle in particular, who argues that the desire to live as one likes is tantamount to anarchy (Hansen 2010: 6, 13-18; Muray 1995: 47-48; Hdt. 3.83.3, Thuc. 2.37.2, 7.69.2, Pl. *Resp.* 557B, Isoc. 7.20, 12.131, Arist. *Pol.* 1310a32-34, 1316b24, 1317b11-17, 1318b39-41, 1319b30).

reveal how the language of 'freedom' and 'slavery' become the domain of those trying to deceive the listener, while his use of the language of 'freedom' in the *Anabasis* shows how this language could be appropriately used in historical *exempla*. Xenophon's own speeches and those of Cyrus in the *Anabasis* include allusions to past events meant to encourage the Ten Thousand (*An.* 1.7.3, 3.2.13). Likewise, Plato, in the *Menexenus*, parodies contemporary logographers who abuse the past in order to achieve goals which may or may not be in the intended audience's interest (Pl. *Mn.* 234a-236d).[104]

Throughout this thesis, knowledge of the historians' time will be accessed through the comedies, tragedies, poetry, philosophy and inscriptions of the period in which the historian wrote. My primary methodological approach is to treat the historian within the context of his intellectual and political environment: an historian's conceptualisation of 'freedom' will be examined in light of the intellectual and literary discourse popular during his own time. Inscriptions will also be examined where relevant in order to gain a better perspective of the historian's political climate. My analysis of 'freedom' will begin with an examination of the Mycenaean and Near Eastern evidence for 'freedom', followed by an analysis, in Chapters Two and Three, of Herodotus' use of 'freedom' and 'autonomy' within the context of Persian history and fifth-century politics. Chapter Four will examine how Thucydides establishes a metanarrative on language and the implications of this narrative on his approach to 'freedom'. Chapter Five focuses on Thucydides' conceptualisation of 'autonomy' as a political concept, and as a philosophical term which is engaged in the debate between νόμος and φύσις. In Chapter Six I examine how Sophocles' singular use of 'autonomous' can also be viewed within the context of νόμος and φύσις, and how Thucydides' and Sophocles' interactions with this concept can be viewed as complementary. Chapter Seven is an analysis of Xenophon's solution for the flaws of rhetoric by establishing that the one who persuades the state regarding what is best must be a *kalos kagathos*, a title typically reserved for aristocrats in the fifth century,[105] but used by Xenophon to refer to an individual in possession of particular qualities

[104] For a more complete discussion of the *Menexenus* see Chapter Eight, section 4.
[105] Roscalla (2004: 115).

that allow one to do good towards one's family and state.[106] Xenophon's appropriation of 'freedom' as a quality which the *kalos kagathos* must possess in order to do what is best and to the advantage of the state suggests that Xenophon was influenced by the rhetoric of 'freedom' in his reconceptualisation of the concept. Chapter Eight will be an examination of the role of 'freedom' in historical *exempla* and the relationship between the emergence of *exempla* and Xenophon's panhellenic ideology.

[106] Referring to an individual as a *kalos kagathos* is a convention among modern academics. Xenophon does not use the adjectival form, but prefers to speak of individuals as exhibiting the character of καλοκἀγαθία. Because Xenophon speaks of individuals attaining the qualities of those belonging to the order of the καλοκἀγαθία, those writing on this topic speak of these individuals using the adjectival form *kalos kagathos* (Waterfield 2004: 79-114; Roscalla 2004: 115-124).

Chapter 1: Pre-Persian War 'Freedom'

The following chapter will consist of an introduction to the concept of 'freedom', ἐλευθερία. There are several ways in which the language of 'freedom' appears in the historical works. It can be used to describe the right of a state to govern itself unimpeded by a foreign power, the right of the individual to act politically without constraint, and it can refer to the physical status of the individual. Kurt Raaflaub has shown that the notion of political freedom is a fifth-century development in Greek thought stemming from notions of personal freedom.[1] Before the Persian Wars 'free' and 'slave' were adjectives referring to the personal status of the individual. Conflicts between city-states consisted of border conflicts and did not involve missions of conquest; what was feared was not the subjugation of the state, but the enslavement of the individual. A sixth-century statement of Heraclitus makes this all too clear: 'War is the father of all and the king of all, and some he shows as gods, others as men; some he makes slaves, others free' (πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους)'.[2]

The aim of this chapter is to show that before the Persian Wars the concept of 'being free' was used solely in reference to an individual's status in society, and that when the concept of 'freedom' was used in reference to war, it was used to describe the physical 'enslavement' or 'freedom' of an individual resulting from either a win or loss in battle. Persian and Greek evidence for the existence of these concepts will be examined in order to determine what role, if any, Persia's history played in shaping how the Greeks spoke about political freedom. This analysis will be based on the Persian evidence. Limited though it may be, physical remains, such as the Cyrus Cylinder, suggest that the Persians exploited a platform of 'freeing' or 'loosening' a people from oppression in order to gain power by attributing the physical status of 'slavery' or 'being free from physical oppression' to a group of individuals. The metaphorical application of a physical state of being to a group demonstrates that the concept of 'being loosened from slavery' was used metaphorically as a rhetorical tool in the campaigns of the Persians. If the idea of 'loosening' or 'freeing' had already been used by the

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[1] Raaflaub (2004: 14-17).
[2] Raaflaub (2004: 24); Heraclitus DK B53, tr. Kirk. For further discussion of this fragment, see Chapter Three, section 2.

Persians, as the Cyrus Cylinder demonstrates, then Herodotus could have easily adopted and adapted this ideology, also common among the Greeks, from a Persian perspective in a way which was, at the same time, both believable and consequently more powerful by virtue of the fact that it was not a fabrication. The examination of the evidence for 'freedom' in both Greece and the East, and 'autonomy' in Greece, will provide a context for my analysis of these terms in Herodotus' *Histories* in Chapters Two and Three.

1.1 Pre-Persian War ἐλευθερία: Personal Freedom vs. Freedom of the State

A discussion of the Homeric works and lyric poetry is necessary in order to understand the transition of freedom from a literal to metaphorical state. Although forms of ἐλευθερός and δουλός appear on Linear B tablets from the Bronze Age, such references are essentially left out of Raaflaub's discussion of 'freedom' as a political concept, since Mycenaean society was so similar to Near Eastern power structures, where, according to Raaflaub, 'freedom' did not exist.[3] While this may be the case, by creating an 'other' which the Greeks rejected, the Persians played an implicit role in shaping how the Greeks perceived 'freedom'. In order to understand Greek attitudes towards 'freedom' and why Herodotus framed Near Eastern history through the language of 'freedom', not only must the Persian evidence for 'freedom' be examined, but also how Near Eastern 'freedom' is similar to Mycenaean era 'freedom'.

Although slaves served a fundamental role in the structure of Mycenaean society, the only time that the language of 'freedom' appears in the Linear B tablets from Knossos and Pylos is in an economic context and not a political one.[4] In the tablets, linen which was not turned over to the palace was deemed *ereutero* or 'free' from palace control. Thus *ereutero* describes the status of produce or men who were not subject to palace control. However, there were few in Mycenaean society who were 'free' from the palace structure, in which nonslaves were subjects. As Garlon notes '[t]he whole mass of nonslaves thus appears to be normally situated in a state of dependency vis-à-vis the palace, a position which, from a modern point of view (or from that of the classical *polis*), would appear to

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[3] Raaflaub (2004: 17).
[4] Palmer (1963: 307).

lie somewhere in between slavery and liberty'.[5] The tablets from Knossos and Pylos suggest that there was a hierarchy within the social category of 'slave' (*doero/doera*) in which those who were slaves of a deity were more privileged than others, while some slaves who were blacksmiths, weavers, and artisans could own property. Records for slaves typically identify the slave's profession and place of origin, indicating that many became slaves after being conquered and subsequently brought back to the palace. Not all slaves were bound by the same customs. Some are recorded as having contributed to the revenue of their master's estate, and for this reason it is thought that 'slave' in this context would be equal to a serf.[6]

The next extant evidence of 'freedom' and 'slavery' occurs in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.[7] While the overall lack of sources from the Mycenaean period to the writing down of the Homeric works makes it difficult to identify trends in thought which would have contributed to an ideology of 'freedom', several observations may be drawn from the contrast between Mycenaean evidence for 'freedom' and the period in which Homer wrote. The blend of Mycenaean, Dark Age, and Classical era motifs—with respect to institutions such as funerary practices, weaponry, battle strategies, and dialect—makes the dating of the Homeric works a difficult task. Based on his analysis of the oral tradition, the emergence of writing, and the content and language of the *Iliad*, Kirk suggests the epic was produced in the eighth century. Despite the overall lack of evidence for the Dark Ages, Kirk notes that the Homeric works offer a link between the Mycenaean past and the poet's own present.[8] One of those elements from the Mycenaean era preserved in the Homeric works is the use of the language of 'free' and 'slave'.[9] A comparison between the language of 'free' and 'slave' in the Mycenaean tablets to this language in the Homeric works demonstrates that by the production of the Homeric works the freedom or slavery of the individual could be described through metaphor by referring to nouns such as 'day' or 'bowl' as 'free' or 'slave'.[10] Previously, in the Mycenaean tablets, linen described as 'free' was exempt from palace control, and

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[5] Garlon (1988: 29).
[6] Palmer (1963: 95, 127-128), Ventris and Chadwick (1973: 123-24); Garlon (1988: 28-29).
[7] ἐλευθερ- does not appear in the works of Hesiod.
[8] Kirk (1985: 1-16).
[9] Kirk (1990: 221).
[10] Regardless of whether or not the description of objects as 'free' or 'slave'—a description which served as a metaphor for the individual's free or slave status—emerged during the eighth century or earlier, the fact remains that this particular usage of 'free' and 'slave' represents a deviation from how these adjectives were used in the Linear B tablets.

the description of linen as 'free' did not stand in as a metaphor for the freedom or slavery of the individual who produced the linen. While slaves captured in war are referred to as δμωή/δμώς in the Homeric works, δρηστήρ and δρήστειρα describe workmen and workwomen. In both Mycenaean society and in Homeric society, some came into slavery after being conquered in war, and in Homeric society, as in Mycenaean society, nonslaves were still not considered 'free', since both slaves and nonslaves were subject to the more powerful nobility.[11] For the Homeric heroes slavery was a natural consequence of losing a war. Depending on the outcome of the battle, one will enjoy either a 'day of freedom' or be forced to endure the 'day of slavery'. Hector describes his fears for Andromache's fate through the language of 'freedom' and 'slavery':

> But it is not so much the pain of the Trojans
> that troubles me, not even of Priam the king nor Hekabe,
> nor the thought of my brothers who in their numbers and valour
> shall drop in the dust under the hands of men who hate them,
> as troubles me the thought of you, when some bronze-armoured
> Achaian leads you off, taking away your day of freedom,
> in tears; and in Argos you must work at the loom of another
> and carry water from the spring Messis or Hypereia,
> all unwilling, but strong will be the necessity upon you;
> and some day seeing you shedding tears a man will say of you:
> 'This is the wife of Hektor, who was ever the bravest fighter
> of the Trojans, breakers of horses, in the days when they fought
> about Ilion.'
> So will one speak of you; and for you it will be yet a fresh grief,
> to be widowed of such a man who could fight off the day of your
> slavery.[12]
>
> ἀλλ' οὔ μοι Τρώων τόσσον μέλει ἄλγος ὀπίσσω,
> οὔτ' αὐτῆς Ἑκάβης οὔτε Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος
> οὔτε κασιγνήτων, οἵ κεν πολέες τε καὶ ἐσθλοὶ
> ἐν κονίῃσι πέσοιεν ὑπ' ἀνδράσι δυσμενέεσσιν,

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[11] Garlon (1988: 26-27, 31, 37).
[12] Translation Lattimore (1951).

ὅσσον σεῦ, ὅτε κέν τις Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων
δακρυόεσσαν ἄγηται ἐλεύθερον ἦμαρ ἀπούρας·
καί κεν ἐν Ἄργει ἐοῦσα πρὸς ἄλλης ἱστὸν ὑφαίνοις,
καί κεν ὕδωρ φορέοις Μεσσηΐδος ἢ Ὑπερείης
πόλλ' ἀεκαζομένη, κρατερὴ δ' ἐπικείσετ' ἀνάγκη·
καί ποτέ τις εἴπῃσιν ἰδὼν κατὰ δάκρυ χέουσαν·
Ἕκτορος ἥδε γυνὴ ὃς ἀριστεύεσκε μάχεσθαι
Τρώων ἱπποδάμων ὅτε Ἴλιον ἀμφεμάχοντο.
ὥς ποτέ τις ἐρέει· σοὶ δ' αὖ νέον ἔσσεται ἄλγος
χήτεϊ τοιοῦδ' ἀνδρὸς ἀμύνειν δούλιον ἦμαρ
(Hom. *Il.* 6.450-63).

Hector describes Andromache's inevitable enslavement as a loss of a 'free day'. The consequences of this loss is forced labour, which can only be brought to an end by warding off the 'slave day'. As Kirk notes, ἐλεύθερον ἦμαρ is a formulaic phrase that appears in two other passages of the *Iliad* (16.831, 20.193).[13] In both of these passages the phrase is used to describe women being led off as captives of war. A reference to the 'wine bowl of liberty' confirms that the Greeks viewed 'freedom' and 'slavery' in terms of the status of the individual rather than the status of the state. Shortly after Hector's speech, at 6.528 Hector exclaims that they will set up 'the wine bowl of liberty/ after we have driven out of Troy the strong-greaved Achaeans'.[14] While the Trojan city will be 'free' of the threat posed by the Greeks, the 'freedom' which Hector is referring to is the 'freedom' of the individual who has skirted death and escaped enslavement at the hands of the Achaeans.

Although incorporation into either the Trojan or Greek society was never a threat for either side during the war, what was to be feared was a loss of individual rights in the form of physical enslavement. Homer's account of the Trojan War makes it clear that the slavery or freedom of the individual is at stake. While the physical preservation of the city is also in danger, the 'freedom' of the city itself is

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[13] Kirk (1990: 221). Hector chooses to focus on the demeaning domestic labour that Trojan women would have been forced to endure, rather than the fact that they would also have been forced to sleep with their Greek captors (*Il.* 2.355).

[14] Translation Lattimore (1951). ἀλλ' ἴομεν· τὰ δ' ὄπισθεν ἀρεσσόμεθ', αἴ κέ ποθι Ζεὺς / δώῃ ἐπουρανίοισι θεοῖς αἰειγενέτῃσι / κρητῆρα στήσασθαι ἐλεύθερον ἐν μεγάροισιν / ἐκ Τροίης ἐλάσαντας ἐϋκνήμιδας Ἀχαιούς. Like the Trojans, the Greek also set up mixing bowls on celebratory occasions (*Il.* 9.202). Kirk notes that the 'mixing bowl of freedom' is a unique figurative phrase (1990: 228), while Bassett suggests that these phrases were characteristic of Hector (1938: 78).

not spoken of in the Homeric works. Although the adjective is used to describe a 'day', the day is described as 'free' because this day marks the day on which those who are being led away will no longer be 'free' but slaves. Similarly 'slave' is used to modify 'day' because it is the day on which one becomes a 'slave'. The day itself, rather than the individual, is 'slavish' or 'free'. The use of the adjectival form in these examples, rather than the more common genitive form which is used to closely connect two nouns, suggests that the idea of being 'free' had not yet become an abstraction to be fought for. As Raaflaub notes, 'given the outlook typical of the epic, which focuses on the part, the individual, or the moment instead of the whole, the collective or the enduring, we should not interpret *eleutheron ēmar* simply as the equivalent of a permanent state of freedom and hence as a paraphrase of the noun *eleutheria*, which did not yet exist'.[15] The language of 'freedom' appears in the Homeric works and in the Linear B tablets, but conceptually the idea of being 'free' or 'enslaved' was limited to adjectival forms which could be used to describe the status of a person, a day, or a mixing bowl. The concept of 'freedom', limited as it was to adjectival forms, had not yet acquired the prescriptive power necessary for a concept to become an ideology.

In the poems of Solon the quality of being 'free' or 'enslaved' was attributed to the state for the first time, when debt bondage was associated with the end of slavery. Until quite recently Solon's poems have been regarded as authentic—written by Solon himself—and as fitting within the historical framework set forth in the *Athenaion Politeia*. However, with greater understanding of the oral tradition, some have begun to question the authenticity of Solon's work.[16] While in the past it was generally accepted that these poems were written to be performed at symposia, the discord between the historical Solon and his first person persona in the poems have caused some to question Solon's audience and the tone of his poems, and even to question whether the poems themselves should be attributed to Solon, or whether these poems are the product of the demands of social memory in the fourth century.[17] However, those

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[15] Raaflaub (2004: 23-24). Although Raaflaub does not believe that Mycenaean 'freedom' played a role in the emergence of political freedom, he does include a brief examination of the pre-Herodotean evidence for words with the ἐλευθερ- root.

[16] Block and Lardinois (2006: 2-3).

[17] For the role of social memory in shaping the persona of Solon see Eva Stehle (2006: 102-111). For the transgressive qualities of Solon's poetry see Irwin (2006: 36-75) who discusses the tension between Solon's role as one who wards off tyranny while at the same time takes up the goad associated with it. This tension was recognised in the *Athenaion Politeia* as well (6.3, 8.4).

who believe that Solon's poems were not composed by the historical Solon are in the minority. While it may be the case that the various personae surrounding the historical Solon were a later fabrication resulting from the demands of social memory, as Stehle argues, Maria Noussia-Fantuzzi, in her review of Solon's fragments, notes that there is 'no evidence to suppose large-scale misattribution, since the poems preserved under Solon's name are not vexed by the same problems of origin we find in the case of the corpus of 'Theognis''.[18] Consequently I regard the poems of Solon as offering evidence for the emergence of 'freedom' as a rhetorical tool in politics. In poem 36, those who had been sold abroad, forced to roam in far away places, and speak a foreign tongue are called back to Athens through the *seisachtheia*. The occurrences of 'freedom' and 'slavery' as concepts in Solon's poem are more abstract than earlier uses of this language.

> I brought the people together for these reasons,
> How did I stop before I accomplished them?
> In the court of Time these things will be witnessed
> by the testimony of the great mother of the Olympian
> gods, the Black Earth, from whom I drew
> up the boundary stones stuck in everywhere;
> earlier she was enslaved, now she is free.
> Many men I brought up to their divinely-founded
> fatherland, men sold, one illegally,
> another legally, and others fleeing
> by forcible necessity, no longer speaking an Attic-tongue,
> as men wandering everywhere;
> and others holding a shameful slavery,
> now trembling before their masters,
> I set them free.[19]

> ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὕνεκα ξυνήγαγον
> δῆμον, τί τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην;
> συμμαρτυροίη ταῦτ' ἂν ἐν δίκηι Χρόνου
> μήτηρ μεγίστη δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων

[18] Stehle (2006: 109); Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 48).
[19] Translation John Lewis (http://www.classicalideals.com/Solon%20Poetry.htm).

ἄριστα, Γῆ μέλαινα, τῆς ἐγώ ποτε
ὅρους ἀνεῖλον πολλαχῆι πεπηγότας,
πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρη
πολλοὺς δ' Ἀθήνας πατρίδ' ἐς θεόκτιτον
ἀνήγαγον πραθέντας, ἄλλον ἐκδίκως,
ἄλλον δικαίως, τοὺς δ' ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ
χρειοῦς φυγόντας, γλῶσσαν οὐκέτ' Ἀττικὴν
ἱέντας, ὡς δὴ πολλαχῆι πλανωμένους·
τοὺς δ' ἐνθάδ' αὐτοῦ δουλίην ἀεικέα
ἔχοντας, ἤθη δεσποτέων τρομεομένους,
ἐλευθέρους ἔθηκα (36.1-15).[20]

In this passage the 'earth' is enslaved, but 'free' once the boundary stones have been removed. In another fragment (3 G. -P.^{2} = 4 W.^{2}), Solon describes the citizens' hubristic behaviour as leading to an 'inescapable wound' that results in 'slavery' for the entire city (lines 17-18). Noussia-Fantuzzi notes that the reference to 'slavery' in this fragment may refer to either the slavery of the city and individuals ruled by a tyrant, to debt bondage, or to the 'aristocracy's political subjection of the masses—subjection which likely fueled the social revolt'.[21] However, as Kurt Raaflaub has argued, 'freedom' only became the antithesis of tyranny after the Persian Wars, even though, as this fragment attests, tyranny itself was considered 'slavery'.[22] Solon's use of the language of 'slavery' may be metaphorical if it is referring to enslavement under a tyrant, but it does not offer evidence that the language of 'freedom' was being used in a metaphorical sense for political purposes.

What is remarkable about poem 36 is that the language of 'slavery' is used rhetorically as a political metaphor. Elizabeth Irwin notes that in this poem, Solon 36, Solon has appropriated the language of 'slavery' in order to gain support for his measures.[23] In this passage the imagery of the 'enslaved' members of the

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[20] c.f. Xen. *HG* 4.4.6 where a state is abolished as a separate entity once the boundary markers have been removed.
[21] Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 247).
[22] Raaflaub (2004: 29, 96-102). See also 12 G. –P.^{2}=9 W.^{2} lines 1-4 and 15 G. –P.^{2}=11 W.^{2}. Noussia-Fantuzzi suggests that 'slavery' in these passages refers either to the inability of the Athenians to govern themselves under a tyrant, or to the loss of independence suffered by one not willing to submit to a αἰμύλος ἀνήρ (2010: 333).
[23] Irwin (2005: 96-100).

demos is similar to that of slaves of war. The members of the *demos* wander in foreign lands, speaking a foreign tongue. They tremble before masters. Comparing this image to that of Tyrtaeus 10, Irwin notes that Solon's description of 'slavery' evokes the image of captives of war being sold as slaves. She notes that Solon 'uses the concept of slavery in civic contexts, applying it both to the state of the land before his measures and also to the citizen'.[24] Solon's description of the land and the people being 'enslaved' through political measures is the first time that the concept of 'slavery' is used in the metaphorical sense rather than the literal for political purposes. Once the language of 'slavery' is used not to refer to actual 'enslavement', but to political conditions which are, by analogy, similar to physical enslavement, a literal state becomes a metaphor which is exploited for its persuasive power. For Tyrtaeus, leaving one's land and wandering is worse than being killed in war (Tyr.10).[25] Through the metaphor of slavery Solon is able to equate a condition deemed by the community to be worse than death with the measures he has overturned. Although Solon does not argue that he is fighting for 'freedom' in an abstract sense, his attribution of a physical state to the earth and to those in debt bondage is the first step towards the emergence of an ideology of 'freedom' and 'slavery'.

According to Raaflaub, 'the mainland Greeks rarely witnessed the destruction of a city or extinction of a polis and the enslavement or expulsion of its population. All this justifies the conclusion that the contemporaries of the Persian Wars were not accustomed to associating war among Greek poleis with political freedom or servitude'.[26] The Greeks may have rarely experienced a threat on the scale of that offered by Persia, but Solon's poem suggests that the language of 'free' and 'slave' being used in a political context was not unprecedented. In his conclusions regarding the emergence of 'freedom', Raaflaub argues that the Greeks only conceptualised their struggle with the Persians as one for freedom after the fact, when they realised that their usual methods of understanding and explaining wars fought between neighboring poleis would no longer suffice. Raaflaub's conclusion is called into question by Irwin's assessment of Solon 36.[27] According to Irwin, 'Solon uses war itself and its poetic depictions as the means of

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[24] Irwin (2005: 99).
[25] Irwin (2005: 103).
[26] Raaflaub (2004: 74).
[27] Raaflaub (2004: 86).

prioritising what he considers the more significant threats to the city, stasis';[28] according to Raaflaub, if too many members of the community become enslaved through debt bondage, then 'a predictable chain of escalating factors can lead to civil strife (*stasis*), tyranny, and thus to servitude to all'.[29] Included among those poetic depictions that Solon appeals to is the language of 'freedom' and 'slavery', which had previously been used in the Homeric epics to describe the consequences of war. Although Raaflaub notes that there is no evidence to suggest that Solon's reforms raised the political awareness of 'freedom',[30] they do indicate that the language of 'freedom' was being used metaphorically in a rhetorical sense. Solon 36 indicates that there was a precedent for conceptualising domestic conflicts through the language of 'freedom' and 'slavery'. Raaflaub does not regard Solon 36 as evidence for 'political freedom' because there was no evidence that the Greeks used this language as an ideology to support their causes in internecine conflicts. Although the conflict which Solon frames through the language of 'freedom' and 'slavery' concerns factions within the city rather than a conflict between cities, the rhetorical use of such language before the Persian Wars was not unprecedented.

After the Persian Wars Greek authors begin to speak of the subjection and freedom of the state. In Aeschylus' play the *Persians*, first performed in 472, Aeschylus recounts the invasion of Greece by Persia.[31] This play provides the earliest evidence that the Greeks conceptualised their struggle against Persia as one for 'freedom'. This play is unique in that it is a tragedy about contemporary events rather than mythological ones. Although Herodotus is the main source for the Persian Wars, he himself was not present. Aeschylus, on the other hand, fought at both Salamis and Marathon. 'Freedom' is invoked on two occasions in this play. At lines 402-405 it is used as an exhortation to the Greeks: 'O Greek / Sons advance! Free your fathers' land, / Free your sons, your wives, the

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[28] Irwin (2005: 104).

[29] Raaflaub (2004: 56); see West (1992) fr. 4 for evidence that Solon is addressing the Athenians who live in 'our city'. According to Raaflaub, Solon's reforms, which include the language of freedom, are significant because it was the first time that the free status of citizens was recognised as a 'precondition for the polis's well-being'. While this is significant, what concerns my argument even more is that the language of 'free' and 'slavery' is attributed to the earth and to a group of individuals in order to garner support for Solon's political agenda.

[30] Raaflaub (2004: 53).

[31] Many of the events about which Herodotus wrote occurred well before the 420s when he was writing. Consequently Herodotus' *Histories* will be discussed after Aeschylus' works, even though Herodotus writes about historical events which happened before many of the stories told by Aeschylus.

sanctuaries / Of paternal gods, of sepulchers / Of ancestors (ὦ παῖδες Ἑλλήνων, ἴτε ἐλευθεροῦτε πατρίδ', ἐλευθεροῦτε δὲ παῖδας γυναῖκας θεῶν τε πατρώιων ἕδη θήκας τε προγόνων).[32] The Greeks are urged to free their fatherland, their wives, the temples of their ancestral gods, and the graves of their ancestors. This is certainly a metaphorical application of the concept of 'freedom', since only one grouping in the above list, their wives, would endure servitude if the Greeks should be defeated. Like Solon, who freed the earth and those enslaved through debt, the language of 'freedom' and 'slavery' is invoked not because the state or temples or graves would be enslaved, but because the Greeks themselves would be subject to Persia just as a slave would be subject to a master. Furthermore, those institutions which bind Greeks living in disparate communities and those living within the same community—the temples of their gods and the graves of their ancestors—would become subject to Persia; the right of the Greeks to recognise and pay homage to these elements would be subject to Persia's consent.

The threat posed by Persia to the Greek gods and their common way of life is echoed by Herodotus at 8.144. Here the Athenians explain that they would never accept Xerxes' offer for a treaty on the grounds that they are bound by a heritage shared among the Greeks not to make peace with Xerxes and to avenge the burning of statues and of the homes of the gods.[33] In both the *Persians* and in the Athenians' response to the Spartans, the bonds that unite Greeks are given as justification for fighting for freedom, or for fighting against one who would threaten these bonds, a threat that is framed in the language of slavery by Herodotus. At lines 591-594 the Chorus describes the state of affairs in Persia following the Persian retreat abstractly in terms of 'freedom': 'Nay, no longer is the tongue / Imprisoned kept, but loose are men / When loose the yoke of power's bound / To bawl their liberty (οὐδ' ἔτι γλῶσσα βροτοῖσιν / ἐν φυλακαῖς· λέλυται γὰρ / λαὸς ἐλεύθερα βάζειν, / ὡς ἐλύθη ζυγὸν ἀλκᾶς).[34] At lines 402-405 of the *Persians* the verb 'to free' appears in Greek literature for the first time, signifying the transition of 'freedom' as a quality of an individual or land, to something for which one fights.

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[32] Translation Bernardete (1991).
[33] For more on this passage see Chapter Three, section 1.
[34] Translation Bernardete (1991).

The birth of freedom as an ideology in the ancient world is a progressive development mirroring the social history of the ancient Greeks. Before the Persian Wars, battles between Greek city-states were confined largely to conflicts between neighbours. Moshe Berent has suggested that the polis functioned as a stateless community.[35] Gerner, following Max Weber, defines the state as 'that institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order (whatever else they may also be concerned with). The state exists where specialized order-enforcing agencies, such as police forces and courts, have separated out from the rest of social life. They *are* the state'.[36] In Athens, the power to rule was not undertaken by a few who exploited a population for the purposes of production, nor was ability to use force consolidated and controlled by a bureaucracy. Individuals were responsible for 'policing' themselves through a self-help policy, offices were chosen by lot, and policy making decisions were made not by individuals backed by state institutions, but by charismatic individuals. Consequently, as Berent notes, it would be incorrect to consider the ancient polis—with the rare exception—a state by modern standards.[37] Through war egalitarian stateless communities 'maintain their cohesion'.[38]

After the Persian Wars, there was a new consequence to be feared: subject status within a greater empire. Although Greek city-states would not have been completely destroyed, incorporation into Persia would have resulted in a loss of administrative control. Towards the end of the Persian Wars the Greeks lament the outcome of peace with Persia: 'it is quite clear that we shall become the King's allies, and we shall join him in marching against any land to which the Persians direct us' (Hdt. 9.11).[39] For the Greeks, freedom of movement—the ability of the community to determine against whom and with whom one would march—was paramount. As Raaflaub has argued, freedom was associated with the Persian Wars, since rule by Persia reminded the Greeks of rule by a tyrant, an institution which closely resembled slavery.[40] The highly efficient administration of the Persians required that subject states not be razed and destroyed, for the success of the Persian government lay in exacting tribute from subject states. As Finley

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[35] Berent (2000: 257-89).
[36] Gellner (1991: 4).
[37] Berent (2000: 257-68).
[38] Berent (2000: 258).
[39] Translation Purvis, Strassler edition (2007).
[40] Raaflaub (2004: 101-102).

notes, state sanctioned coercion was not common in the ancient polis; standing militias were only enforced by tyrants.[41] Thus the Greeks would have perceived an institutionalised coercive force such as the Persian military apparatus, or the taxation system—also a trademark of tyrannies[42]—as a threat to their 'stateless' way of life. The Greeks were faced with a war which, if lost, would result in a retribution far different than anything they had known before, one which would result not in complete annihilation or assimilation, but in incorporation into a stratified society, 'where the means of coercion are centralized or monopolized by a ruling class'.[43] The Greeks would not have comprised this ruling class. Once the Greeks were presented with circumstances which made incorporation and a loss of political control a reality, freedom as a political concept became important for understanding the magnitude of the struggle which they had overcome, as incorporation would have meant that the Greeks would be forced to obey the edicts of the Persian administration in much the same way that a slave obeys a master.

The Linear B tablets indicate that the concept of 'free' and 'slave' were used to describe the status of individuals; they were not used by politicians on account of their rhetorical power. Although Kirk notes that ἐλεύθερος and δούλιος, as they appear in the *Iliad*, are Mycenaean terms restricted to technical usages,[44] the application of these adjectives to 'day' and 'cup' suggest that these words were beginning to be conceptualised as abstractions. The emergence of the language of 'free' and 'enslaved' as political metaphors taken advantage of by politicians for their persuasive power is evidenced by the poems of Solon. The transition of the adjectival form 'free' to the verbal form 'to free' to the noun form 'freedom' can be observed in the works of Homer, Solon, and Aeschylus. The gradual emergence of political 'freedom' as a concept which was used metaphorically to describe the condition of a community that possessed the ability to defend itself against threats can be seen in the increased use of non-adjectival forms of 'freedom'. This indicates that the Greeks had begun to think about 'freedom' as something which could be fought for rather than a state of being.

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[41] Finley (1983: 18-20).
[42] Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977: 121).
[43] Berent (2000: 258).
[44] Kirk (1990: 221).

Raaflaub has argued in his study on 'freedom' that its emergence may be attributed to the abolition of tyranny among the Greek states and the threat of foreign tyranny.[45] But events are just events until they are thought about, debated, and conceptualised. As Max Weber has noted '[e]vents are not just there and happen, but they have a meaning and happen because of that meaning'.[46] In other words 'an event is not just a happening in the world; it is a *relation* between a certain happening and a given symbolic system. And although as a happening an event has its own "objective" properties and reasons stemming from other worlds (systems), it is not these properties *as* such that give it effect but their significance as projected from some cultural scheme. The event is a happening interpreted—and interpretations vary'.[47] The historical events which Raaflaub cites as evidence for the conditions which facilitated the emergence of 'political freedom' may have led people to apply, by metaphorical extension, the physical enslavement and freedom of the individual to the state. The statuses of 'free' and 'slave' were already, by the time of the Persian Wars, being used metaphorically in political contexts. According to the extant sources, the major threats to a community and its members were enslavement through debt and enslavement through war. It would follow that the status of 'free' and 'enslaved' would become a structural schema that would inform the Greeks' interpretations of happenings, thereby rendering them events. However, Raaflaub argues that initially the Persian Wars were not viewed as a struggle for 'freedom'. Because the magnitude of the wars fought against the Persians was so far beyond the scope of anything previously suffered, new ways of defining the war had to be concocted; for the first time, wars were memorialised as freedom wars.[48] The Persian Wars constitute a crisis that precipitated a new paradigm for thinking about conflict: 'Crises—the sparks that ignite a scientific revolution—occur when attributions of meaning based on the established and familiar paradigm are no longer perceived as reliable. As the revolution takes its course, these meanings change, and "...the scientist with a new paradigm sees differently from the way he had seen before"'.[49]

The crisis of the Persian Wars necessitated a new scheme for thinking about the conflict, and the language of 'freedom' and 'slavery' filled this void. But

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[45] Raaflaub (2004: 58-89).
[46] As quoted by Sahlins (1985: 153).
[47] Sahlins (1985: 153).
[48] Raaflaub (2004: 65).
[49] Nathanson (2009) paragraph 2.2, citing Kuhn (1970: 115).

Herodotus did not confine this new paradigm solely to the events of Greek history. Instead, through the frameworks of relativism and the conflict between νόμος and φύσις Herodotus considers the relevancy of this paradigm for different societies and whether or not people were free by nature, or whether freedom itself was a social construction. Herodotus' own interest in this new paradigm mirrors the popularity of this language in society, and, to a certain extent, helped codify its place, a place and prominence that is criticised by Thucydides. This phenomenon—that the interpretation of a happening renders a happening an event—can affect the course of history itself as much as what really happened.

Raaflaub's conclusion that 'freedom' was only associated with the Persian Wars after the wars had ended is based on the fact that there is no evidence from the period of the Persian Wars to suggest that such language was used as an ideology. It may be the case that Solon, in 594 BC, framed his policies as a 'freeing' of the 'enslaved' in order to make them more appealing. This demonstrates how deeply rooted slavery, and all of its associations—'enslaved', 'slave'—were as a negative concept or status. However, it is unclear to what extent the language of 'freedom' figured in the rhetorical campaign of the Greeks during the Persian Wars. By Solon's time the language of 'freedom' had been appropriated by politicians. Regardless of whether or not 'freedom' was part of the ideological platform of the Greeks during the war, the war itself was the impetus—the crisis—which led to the emergence of a new historical paradigm. As I briefly mentioned above, the process of historicising may be oral, and it may be as simple as a general narrating a battle from the previous week. Due to the lack of evidence, it is impossible to know for sure whether the language of 'freedom' figured into the rhetorical campaigns and exhortations of generals during the Persian Wars. Whether or not 'political freedom' played a role depends on at what point the Greeks understood the magnitude of the crisis and created new paradigms for conceptualising it. What can be said is that based on the evidence it is likely that by Herodotus' time the paradigm of 'free' and 'slave' were used commonly enough that Herodotus was able to construct, order and interpret past and present conflicts through the language of 'freedom' in ways which are meaningful because, as I shall investigate in Chapters Two and Three, the reader recognised the function or role attributed to the struggle for 'freedom' during the Persian Wars.

The role which the Persians played in providing an 'other' to Greek 'freedom' should not be underestimated. Only by comparison to the Persians, whose obeisance to a king reminded them of tyranny, could the Greeks understand what it meant to be 'free' politically. Despite the fact that the Persians represented 'slavery' for the Greeks, Herodotus frequently attributes the language of 'freedom' to Persia. Before examining key passages where Persian history is contextualised through this language, it is necessary to examine the evidence which may have led Herodotus to consider the relevancy of 'freedom' from a Persian perspective. This analysis will be based on Persian sources and evidence.

1.2 Persian Administration and Ideology

The following section explores the Persian or Eastern evidence for the 'freeing' or 'loosening' of a people from oppression, and the practice of integrating subject groups into the empire. Both of these aspects of Persian history and imperial institutions are portrayed as characteristics of Persia. Unfortunately, little can be said with any certainty regarding the Persian empire when one attempts to construct Persian history using only Persian sources. Unlike the Assyrians, the Persian kings left behind no annals of great deeds, and before the reign of Cyrus, the Greek sources are relatively silent about the activities of the Persians.[50] Both modern academics and ancient commentators have noted that Herodotus' treatment of the 'barbarian' does not conform to contemporary 'vilifying' trends. Flower notes that 'Herodotus did not write what we might call "triumphalist" history, nor are the Persians depicted as weak and despicable rulers of an evil empire, who got their just deserts at the hands of morally and physically superior Greeks'.[51] Plutarch criticizes Herodotus in his essay *On the Maliciousness of Herodotus* for praising the barbarian and criticizing Greeks (12-14).[52]

Herodotus' portrayal of Persia itself is problematic. He states that Cyrus' mother was the daughter of the king of the Medes, while his father, Cambyses, was a Persian from a non-royal family (1.107).[53] However, the Babylonian and Persian documents indicate that Cambyses was the king of Ashan, a territory that

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[50] Briant (2002: 5-6).
[51] Flower (2006: 275).
[52] Munson (2001: 7).
[53] Munson suggests that Herodotus' portrayal of Cyrus as the son of a non-royal Persian is based on the Persian tradition that focuses on Cyrus as one of the Persians' own rather than a noble (2009: 462).

survived the collapse of Elam. Rather than focusing on Cyrus' 'Persian' past, Herodotus focuses on his relationship to the Medes, who were far more imperialistic, according to tradition, than the Persians. For this reason, when the Greeks speak of the Persians as a powerful threat, they refer to them as Medes.[54] This, too, is problematic, since it is doubtful that the Medes existed as a unified state.[55] However, Briant and Munson both note that Herodotus most likely based his depiction of the Medes on his knowledge of Persia.[56] Even if this is the case, as Flower, in his analysis of Herodotus' presentation of Persia suggests, 'Herodotus' literary portrait is based, to judge from Persian inscriptions, on their own self-projection as an imperial people'.[57] Rather than depicting the Persians as 'servile and effeminate' as they are in Aeschylus' *Persians*, Herodotus' narrative questions these assumptions, thereby reminding the Greeks that the Persian threat still loomed.[58]

Not only has Herodotus' use of Near Eastern evidence been the subject of much scrutiny, but the extant to which he allowed his depiction of Persia to be influenced by Greek perceptions has also been fervently debated. Historians such as Maria Brosius and Amélie Kuhrt lament the necessity of using Greek historians to reconstruct Persian history, while Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg has argued that Herodotus' presentation of Persia is not authentically Persian.[59] However, Rosaria Munson suggests that Herodotus' Persian history was based on Iranian oral sources, and preserves authentic Persian discourse.[60] Ian Moyer has demonstrated that Herodotus presents valid and well-supported information concerning other societies, rather than using these societies as mirrors of identity.[61] Herodotus presents neither an entirely objective portrait of Persia, nor does he create an image of Persia which served simply as a mirror. The portrait of Persian freedom painted by Herodotus is carefully couched in Persian ideology, but presented in such a way that the Athenians' present behaviour and ideology are reflected in Herodotus' presentation of Persia. Although Herodotus seems to impose a Greek perspective of 'freedom' in his analysis of Persian history, an examination of

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[54] Munson (2009: 458-60).
[55] Sancisi-Weerdenberg (1988: 205); Helm (1981: 85-88).
[56] Briant (2002: 26).
[57] Flower (2006: 278).
[58] Flower (2006: 274-287).
[59] Brosius (2000: 2-3, 76-78); Kuhrt (1995: 647-48); Sancisi-Weerdenburg (2002: 579-90).
[60] Munson (2009: 457-470).
[61] Moyer (2002: 70-90).

Persian ideologies regarding nobility and royalty suggest that Herodotus' application of the concept of 'freedom' reflects Persian society as much as Greek society. By understanding the relationship between Herodotus' Persians and the Persian evidence, grounds will be established for evaluating Herodotus' presentation of Persian ideology with regard to 'freedom'.

The Old Persian word for 'free' or 'noble', **āzāta*, is derived from *zāta-* meaning 'to give birth to'. The Persian word **āzāta* literally means 'born in' or 'born into'.[62] This word is reconstructed from an Aramaic document found in Elaphantine in 427 BCE. Hesychius, in the fifth century CE, lists ἀζάτη as ἐλευθερία, and ἀζῆται as the 'intimates of the (Persian) king' (Hsch. 1442). According to Briant, the status of being 'noble' was determined through two hierarchies: the clan hierarchy and the royal hierarchy. Status in Persian society was determined by ethnicity, family name, and clan or tribe. One's status in the royal hierarchy depended on the Persian king's estimation: the more highly one is esteemed by the king, the more noble one is.[63] This royal hierarchy formed the basis of Hesychius' definition of ἀζῆται as the 'intimates of the (Persian) king' (Hsch. 1442). One's place in the clan hierarchy was established through birth. This manner of determining nobility can be seen in the etymology of **āzāta*. François de Blois has argued that defining **āzāta* as 'noble' does not preclude the possibility that **āzāta* also meant 'free' as opposed to 'slave'.[64] If a concept of 'free' existed in Persia, it would have been defined according to the slave-free social model, in which one's place was determined by either a royal or clan hierarchy.

Although Briant relies heavily on later sources for evidence of the two hierarchies, he does provide some Persian evidence for his claims.[65] Briant offers an inscription from Naqš-e Rustam, located six kilometers north of Persepolis, as evidence of a 'rich/poor' power structure. This inscription, written in Elamite, Babylonian and Old Persian, was found inside a structure which housed the tombs of Darius I, Xerxes, Artaxerxes I and Darius II. Only the tomb of Darius I has

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[62] Blois (1985: 5); Benveniste (1973: 262, 267).
[63] Briant (2002: 331-32).
[64] Blois (1985: 5-7).
[65] Later sources used by Briant for this argument include: Hdt. 1.206, 1.133, 3.30, 3.68, 3.127, 3.144, 5.32, 4.167, 7.8, 7.41, 7.53, 7.62, 7.117, 8.126, 9.15, 9.16, 9.24, 9.41; Curt. 10.1.22-23; Str. 15.3.19; Ath. 7.514c; Ael., *NA*. 12.21.

inscriptions.[66] Briant describes Darius as a mediator between the weak and the powerful, which he argues is comparable to 'rich' and 'poor'.[67] It may be the case that 'weak' and 'strong' are synonymous with 'rich' and 'poor', but the wording of the inscription suggests that Darius is referring to his role as a judge in ensuring that those with less power, whether this be financial power, nobility, or strength, are not unjustly treated by the 'strong' and vice versa: 'By the favour of Ahura Mazda I am of such a kind that I am a friend of the Right, and not a friend of the Wrong; it is not my desire that the weak man should suffer injustice at the hands of the strong, it is not my desire that the strong man should suffer injustice from the weak' (103.2).[68] Later Darius states 'what a man says against a man, does not convince me, until I hear testimony of both.' Twice Darius speaks of his 'understanding and judgement' (103.7, 8). This inscription provides valuable evidence of Darius' image as a protector of 'justice' and the Persian ideology of 'justice', but to assert that the language of the inscription provides evidence of a 'rich' and 'poor' dichotomy is untenable. There is no reason that the references to 'weak' and 'strong' should preclude those who are nobles according to the clan hierarchy by assuming that 'weak' and 'strong' are comparable to 'rich' and 'poor'.

The Greeks believed that the Persians were 'slavish' on account of their unyielding loyalty to one man. The more loyal or 'noble' a Persian was, the more 'slavish' he was from a Greek perspective. Evidence for the language of 'trust' and 'faithfulness' is preserved in the Behistun inscription and may explain how the idea of 'nobility' came to be interpreted as 'slavery' by the Greeks. This inscription was carved on a cliff at Behistun on the road from Babylon to Ecbatana. Carved in three languages, Old Persian, Elamite and Akkadian, the inscription provides justification for Darius' usurpation of the throne. It is likely that the inscription was circulated around the empire on papyri in Aramaic, and that Herodotus may have used one of these copies for the story of Darius' rise to power.[69] One who exhibited the qualities of 'faithfulness' and 'trust' could achieve the status of nobility, or **āzāta*, through the royal hierarchy, but all persons, regardless of class, were deemed *bandaka* if they were loyal subjects. Persons who sent aid against rebels of the Persian empire were called *bandaka* as well. This word is

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[66] Brosius (2000: 42).
[67] Briant (2002: 331).
[68] DNb 103, Brosius (2000: 64).
[69] Mieroop (2004: 290).

used to describe those who were highly esteemed by the Persian king, and would have included **āzāta,* nobles or 'freemen' within the Persian empire. The Greek word which best describes *bandaka* is πιστότατος, since the quality of being 'trustworthy' was one of most essential traits a loyal subject must have. This is the word used by many Greek writers to describe loyal subjects of the Persian empire: Herodotus (3.30), Xenophon (*An.* 1.8.28, 1.9.30, I.6.3; *Cyr.* 8.5.8; *Oec.* 4.6), Diodorus (17.59.1), Aelian (*VH* 6.14), and Aeschylus (*Pers.* 2).[70] The Akkadian version of this word in the Behistun inscription, *qallu,* comes from the vocabulary of slavery or dependence. Briant suggests that the subtle discrepancies between *bandaka* and *qallu* may explain why the Greek word δοῦλος is used as a translation for *bandaka* in a letter sent to the satrap of an Ionian province by Darius. This letter was preserved as an inscription dating to the Roman imperial period, but the letter, which is stylistically similar to letters from the Achaemenid period, was originally written during the time of Darius.[71] In the letter, which is a translation of the original letter written in Old Persian, Gadatas is described as a 'slave'.

> King of Kings,
> Darius the son of Hystaspes
> says the following to his slave Gadatas.
>
> βασιλεὺς [β]σιλέ-
> ων, Δαρεῖος ὁ Ὑσ-
> τάσπεω Γαδάται
> δούλωι τάδε λέγε[ι] (12.1-4).[72]

It is believed that the letter is derived from a Greek translation of a letter from Darius, in which Gadatas would have been referred to as *bandaka*, a word corresponding more or less to the Greek notion of πίστις.[73] Unable to find the

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[70] Briant (2002: 324).
[71] Briant (2002: 491). This letter provides the only evidence of Persian activity in Asia Minor between Otanes' conquest of Samos (520-519) and Darius' stop at Sardis on his way to Greece. Consequently it has been the subject of much debate (Briant 2002: 491). Although attempts have been made to discredit the letter, those who defend it argue that the grammatical errors support the fact that it was not originally written in Greek (Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 21).
[72] According to Meiggs and Lewis (1969: 20), the language which is reminiscent of the Achaemenid writing style are the phrases βασιλεὺς βασιλέων and τάδε λέγει.
[73] In the letter Gadatas is praised for cultivating the fruit trees in Syria, but is reprimanded for taxing the gardeners of Apollo and ordering them to till sacred soil.

Greek word for *bandaka* the translator had recourse to the Akkadian translation of the word, *qallu*, which led him to δοῦλος in Greek.[74] This letter was inscribed during the Roman period on a wall found at Deirmendjik, on the road from Magnesia on the Maeander to Tralles in Asia Minor.[75] During the Roman conquest in the first century BC cities and temples had to prove that they were eligible for certain privileges based on the prior existence of such treatment. It is likely that this inscription comes from this period.[76] Therefore the translation of *bandaka* as δοῦλος is evidence that the Greeks in Asia Minor in the first century BCE felt that one loyal to the king was a slave, but it cannot be used as evidence for such beliefs in the fifth century, even though the original letter dates from this period. What it does signify is that Herodotus resisted translating *bandaka* as δοῦλος even though popular criticism of the Persian empire led many of his contemporaries to denigrate loyal Persians by calling them δοῦλοι.[77] Despite this, Herodotus is consistent in his depiction of the Persian ideology of 'trust'.

Herodotus was keenly aware of the differences between what constituted 'free' and 'slave' from a Persian and Greek perspective. The relationship between 'trust' or 'loyalty' to the king and 'slavery' is exemplified by the Scythian reaction to the failure of the Ionian revolt.

> They [Scythians] judged the Ionians as free men to be the most worthless and cowardly of the whole human race; but as slaves, to be the most fond of servility and the least likely to flee from their masters.[78]
>
> καὶ τοῦτο μέν, ὡς ἐόντας Ἴωνας ἐλευθέρους, κακίστους τε καὶ ἀνανδροτάτους κρίνουσι εἶναι ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων, τοῦτο δέ, ὡς δούλων Ἰώνων τὸν λόγον ποιεύμενοι, ἀνδράποδα φιλοδέσποτά φασι εἶναι καὶ ἄδρηστα μάλιστα (Hdt. 4.142).

The Scythians represent a third-party perspective of the interplay between Persian 'nobility' and Greek 'freedom'. Hartog's monumental work on Herodotus' presentation of 'barbarian' or 'foreign' practices has become the fundamental framework for understanding how Herodotus' foreign ethnographies were filtered

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[74] Meiggs and Lewis (1969: 12); Briant (2002: 324-325).
[75] Meiggs and Lewis (1969: 20).
[76] Briant (2002: 491).
[77] Missiou (1993: 377-391).
[78] Translation Purvis, Strassler edition (2007).

through a Greek lens and are, therefore, key to understanding the Greek conceptualisation of self. This 'mirror' emerges when the Greeks encounter the Persians, or even when the Persians encounter the Scythians, a scenario resulting in the Persians seeming more 'Greek' compared to the Scythians' 'otherness'.[79] Both Pelling and Cartledge note that there is also an 'internal Greek other', a part often played by the Spartans, a dichotomy that, in Pelling's words, is 'firmly on the path to Thucydides, where the important national polarity is Athenian/Spartan rather than Greek/Persian'.[80] Pelling notes that frequently the Scythians appear 'normal' compared to the 'otherness' of the Amazons, even though the Scythians themselves seem 'other' when compared to the Persians.[81] In the passage above, the Scythians appear as defenders of 'freedom', urging the Ionians to free their land of the Persians by helping them. While Miltiades encourages the Ionians to help the Scythians, Histiaios argues that the Ionian tyrants owed their own positions of power to Darius, and that if they were to oppose Darius, their own power would be diminished (4.138). The Ionians, therefore, pretend to help the Scythians, but in reality side with the Persians. Thus the Scythians observe that the Ionians are the 'most worthless and cowardly' of free men, but as slaves, the 'most fond of servility and the least likely to flee from their masters'. It would seem, then, that whether or not the Ionians are to be considered the worst and most cowardly or the best slaves depends on whether the Ionians are categorised according to the 'slave/free' Greek construct, or according to the 'slave/noble' construct of the Persians in which the most loyal servants of the king are rewarded. Herodotus demonstrates at 4.142 that he has faithfully presented the Persian ideology of 'trust': the Ionians have remained faithful to the Persians, but in doing so they have lied to the Scythians. The Scythians'—or even Herodotus'—recognition that one's estimation of the Ionians would differ based on which construction was used in evaluating them suggests that the Ionians themselves were caught between two vying frameworks or ways of ordering the world—one Persian, the other Greek—neither of which existed by nature, but rather by convention.

Unlike the Greeks of mainland Greece, the Greeks of Asia Minor occupied a unique place: although they shared a common language, religion and customs

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[79] Hartog (1988: 49-57, 173-92); Pelling (1997: 51-52).
[80] Pelling (1997: 54); Cartledge (1993: 51-77).
[81] Pelling (1997: 51-55).

with the Greeks, their proximity to the Persians would have brought them into closer and more frequent contact with the Persians, thereby rendering them more liable to Persian aggression, and more likely to side with or adopt Persian customs. At 1.134 those people living closest to the Persians are held in the highest esteem, while those living farther are less honoured by them; 'the reason for this is that they regard themselves as by far the best people in the world in all respects, and others as gradually decreasing in goodness, so that those living farthest away from them are the worst people in the world'. Kuhrt notes that Herodotus' ordering of the world according to the Persians is accurate: the lists of subject peoples in royal inscriptions always begin with those nearest the seat of the empire, which 'makes for a ripple effect, with Persia as the perfect, still centre'.[82] The fact that the Persians refer to the Greeks as Ionians, and that the Ionians are divided into Greeks often indistinguishable from Carians and Lydians, suggests the relatively minor place occupied by the Greeks in the Persian imperial scheme.[83] In fact, sometimes the Ionians/Greeks are entirely omitted in lists of territories forming the compass points of the Persian Empire.[84] Although the Persians figured prominently in Greek perceptions of 'self', the Greeks played a less significant role in the Persian ideology of empire.

Herodotus' characterisation of the Persians and Scythians, as examined above, and the Scythians' evaluation of Ionian Greeks through the lens of Persian and Greek conceptions of slavery suggests that Herodotus is not simply relaying 'what happened' or 'what was said', but is instead examining how people's judgements are informed by their culture, or their νόμοι. Herodotus does not describe the nobles of the Persian empire as slaves, even though, from a Greek perspective, obedience to one ruler not checked by the laws or νόμοι of a society was tantamount to slavery. Although the Scythians' statement regarding the Ionians is more traditionally Greek in that those loyal to the Persians are deemed the best 'slaves', Herodotus does not use the language of 'slavery' to speak about the Persian nobles in his narrative, but instead portrays the Persians as having their own notion of what it means to be 'free' in accordance with their νόμοι.[85] The Scythians engage in a 'relativistic' assessment of the Ionians from a Greek

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[82] Kuhrt (2002: 20); Root (1979: 63-65).
[83] Kuhrt (2002: 9, 21); Rollinger (1999: 167-72).
[84] Kuhrt (2002: 22); DPh2 DH2.
[85] For a more complete discussion of Herodotus' relativism see Chapter Three, section 2.

perspective: as 'free' men they were the most cowardly, but as 'slaves' they were the most loving of their masters. From a Persian perspective the Ionians would be praised for being the most loyal subjects, while, from a Greek perspective, the Persians would be looked down upon for being not worthy of 'freedom'.

Rosalind Thomas notes that Herodotus engages with relativism and νόμος and φύσις, and that 'he gathered and described his material with such sophistic ideas at least partly in the background'.[86] Although sophists such as Protagoras, Prodicus, Gorgias, Hippias, Antiphon, Thrasymachus and Critias have been traditionally categorised as sophists who must be distinguished from more reputable philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, Kerferd notes the 'sophists', when examined in their own right rather than against the more traditional philosophical schools of Plato and Aristotle, made significant contributions to the world of thought and discourse.[87] Part of the difficulty in assessing the sophists' contributions is that not all sophists subscribed to a particular doctrine or even the same doctrines, though they were, for the most part, concerned with man as a social being and his place in society rather than the natural world or objective truths.[88] As Guthrie notes 'they shared the general philosophical outlook...of empiricism, and with this went a common skepticism about the possibility of certain knowledge, on the grounds both of the inadequacy and fallibility of our faculties and of the absence of a stable reality to be known'.[89] The sophists were attacked for their emphasis on empiricism which their attackers argued resulted in knowledge based on subjectivity rather than objective truths. What they did have in common was the manner in which they presented themselves: they were travelling 'educators' who prepared men for the world of politics, and more specifically rhetoric, after young men had completed their formal education.

One of the main obstacles in trying to understand the sophists is that so little of their actual writings remain. Modern reconstructions of the sophists rely heavily on the works of Plato, whose depiction of them is often hostile, as the sophists themselves are attacked for being more concerned with the phenomenal world.[90] Kerferd asks '[b]ut what if the sophists were the equivalent of modern

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[86] Thomas (2006: 70).
[87] Kerferd (1981: 1-3).
[88] In the extant literature the only 'sophist' to ever call himself a sophist was Protagoras (Plat. *Protag*. 317b).
[89] Guthrie (1969: 47-48).
[90] Kerferd (1981: 4-23).

journalists or publicists at their worst—not interested in transcendent reality to be sure, but equally not interested in empirical truths either, but concerned simply with what can be given through appearance of truth to persuade or deceive an audience?'[91] By recognising the unique qualities and diverse—and often opposing—doctrines of the sophists, Kerferd hopes to restore the image of the sophists as philosophers in their own right, and, in some sense, as ancient sociologists. The sophists 'taught and discussed grammar, linguistic theory, moral and political doctrines, doctrines about gods and the nature and origin of man, literary analysis and criticism, mathematics, and at least in some cases the elements of physical theory about the universe'.[92] Thus, even though they were not concerned with 'objective truth', they played an essential role in the emergence of the philosophical principles of Plato, asking questions which previously had not been asked. Susan Jarratt, drawing from Guthrie's assessment of how the Greeks used the concept of 'sophist' prior to Plato's and Xenophon's condemnation of the concept, analyses the role of the sophists in the transition from mythic to logical culture by comparing the function of the poet and sophist as educator.[93]

Wallace notes that the confidence and resources that Athens acquired after the Persian Wars, coupled with the need for acute speaking skills for success in the assembly, drew many teachers of these teachers of rhetoric to Athens. Furthermore the democratic ideologies of personal freedom and freedom of speech made Athens even more welcoming to those who professed to teach the art of rhetoric and persuasion.[94] The convergence of all of these elements in Athens and its influence on the shaping of historiography has not gone unnoticed. Elizabeth Irwin's examination of Herodotus and Thucydides' treatment of Minos leads her to suggest that the historians may have been working closely at Athens, and that, consequently, the emergence of historiography itself was influenced by the culture that emerged from Athenian imperialism.[95] Furthermore, Herodotus' reference to *logopoioi* (2.134, 143) and a comparison of the historian's work to that of medical treatises and the sophists suggests that his 'history was primarily an intellectual endeavor, part of an increasingly critical interrogation of the

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[91] Kerferd (1981: 175).
[92] Kerferd (1981: 174).
[93] Guthrie (1969: 27-34); Jarratt (1991: 31-62).
[94] Wallace (1998: 204-205).
[95] Irwin (2007b: 188-223).

natural world and what men said about it'.[96] Those who were considered sophists used frameworks such as the debate between νόμος and φύσις and relativism in order to bolster their arguments. Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias* explains how νόμος and φύσις may be useful:

> And these, nature and law, are for the most part opposed to each other, so if a person is ashamed and doesn't dare to say what he thinks, he's forced to contradict himself. This is in fact the clever trick you've thought of, with which you work mischief in your discussions: if a person makes a statement in terms of law, you slyly question him in terms of nature; if he makes it in terms of nature, you question him in terms of law.[97]
>
> ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντί' ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἥ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος· ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν. ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου (482e-483a).

Guthrie notes that even though the sophists could not be considered a 'school', 'all alike believed in the antithesis between nature and convention. They might differ in their estimate of the relative value of each, but none of them would hold that human laws, customs and religious beliefs were unshakable because rooted in an unchanging natural order'.[98] The Scythians while being essential players in the field of action in Herodotus' narrative, also serve as objective observers of the conflict between vying frameworks. What constituted 'slavery' from a Greek perspective was a prerequisite for inclusion in the 'nobility' or **āzāta,* but from a Greek perspective to be a Persian 'noble' was to be a 'slave'. While from a Greek perspective the Persians were 'slavish', they were not slavish because they were so by 'nature', but rather because the Persians' conceptualisation of 'freedom' constituted 'enslavement' from the perspective of the Greeks, whose understanding of what it meant to be 'free' was shaped by their own rejection of tyranny. Of the

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[96] Osborne (2007: 18).
[97] Translation Zeyl (1997).
[98] Guthrie (1969: 48).

fourteen times that the concept of 'freedom' appears in discussions of Athenian history, seven of those times concerns the expulsion and possible reinstatement of Hippias.[99] As Raaflaub has noted, the concept of 'political freedom' for the Greeks was deeply rooted in the overthrow of tyranny, and, for this reason, the struggle against the Persians came to be conceptualised as a struggle for 'freedom'.[100] Herodotus, however, does not simply narrate the Persian Wars as a struggle for 'freedom', but he reconsiders the relevancy of 'freedom' not only to events predating the emergence of 'freedom' as an ideology, but also to societies and people who do not share this ideology. One of the ways he is able to accomplish this is by thinking about 'freedom' as a relative term, and one which existed in accordance with νόμος. For Herodotus, the Persians were not 'slavish' by nature or φύσις, but 'slavish' from the perspective of the νόμοι of the Greeks.

In conceptualising 'freedom' from a Persian perspective Herodotus considers how royal ideologies may inform Persian 'freedom'. The relationship between 'faith' or 'trust' in the king and 'slavery' was a common motif among the empires of the Near East, which shared ideologies manifested by the Persian empire. The similarities between Persia and other Near Eastern empires means that a short digression on these motifs in Near Eastern empires will be beneficial. The Near Eastern ideology of 'trust' and 'slavery' is exemplified in the account of Gyges, the Lydian king, and his son's dealings with the Assyrian king, Assurbanipal. This account was recorded in the royal annals of Assurbanipal on two tablets.[101] Having been sent a dream by the Assyrian god, Assur, Gyges sent a message to Assurbanipal relating his dream. In his dream Gyges was told to lay hold of the feet of Assurbanipal and conquer his enemies by invoking the name of the king. From that day forward Gyges was able to defeat the Cimmerians, a troublesome troop that had been plaguing the Lydians. The Assyrian king is repaid by the delivery of two Cimmerian chieftains shackled with fetters of iron along with rich gifts. But the Lydian king's faith in Assubanipal did not last. Eventually he ceased heeding the words of Assur, and instead Gyges 'trusted in his own strength, and hardened his heart'. Soon after, Gyges sent aid to Tushamilki, the king of Egypt, who had thrown off the yoke of Assyrian sovereignty. The Cimmerians, by calling upon the name of Assurbanipal, were

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[99] Hdt. 5.55, 5.62 (twice), 5.63, 5.64, 5.91 (twice).
[100] Raaflaub (2004: 58-59).
[101] Luckenbill (1989: 784).

able to invade Lydia. Having become cognisant of his error, Gyges' son, presumably Ardys, paid a visit to the Assyrian king and proclaimed the following: 'Thou art the king whom the god favored. Thou didst curse my father and evil was visited upon him. I am (thy) slave, who fears thee, be gracious unto me and I will bear thy yoke'.[102]

Two different forms of slavery are preserved in this passage. The first is that of a prisoner of war, shackled with fetters and treated as an object, a gift to the king. Such gifts would have increased the estimation of the giver in the eyes of the king. The second form of slavery is more metaphorical in nature and clearly distinguishable from the first: that of a slave to the empire, one whose faith in the king and the king's god Assur is precipitated by fear, and who bears the yoke of his rule. The Persian evidence, like the Assyrian evidence, suggests that the king was chosen by god, as the Behistun Inscription and inscriptions at Naqš-e Rustam which describe Darius' kingship as divinely ordained by Ahura Mazda indicate. Such evidence may have been the impetus for Herodotus' description of Cyrus' kingship (Hdt. 1.122, 126). The presence of both types of slavery among Near Eastern empires and Persia suggests that slavery itself was used rhetorically to instill 'fear' among subjects whose faithfulness was questionable. The rhetorical yoke of the king's rule could easily become a reality, as those who were not loyal to the king were forced to endure the yoke of servitude in the form of forced labour. Persian society was arranged according to 'noble/slave' model which was perpetuated by an ideology of 'trust' and the 'truth'.

Persian and Near Eastern motifs of servitude would have provided Herodotus with ample reasons to present the Persians as 'slavish', but, for the most part, he does not. At times he even uses the language of 'freedom' to frame Persian history. Given how entrenched 'freedom' was in the Greek identity, Herodotus' attribution of 'freedom' may seem inaccurate. But Persian evidence suggests that the language of 'freeing' or 'loosening' a people was employed in their rhetorical campaigns. The Cyrus Cylinder, an inscription commemorating the capture of Babylon by the Persian king, Cyrus, in 539 BC offers evidence of such rhetoric. This rhetoric allowed the Persians easily to incorporate the population and local officials into their empire. The inscription describes the welcoming of Cyrus by the Babylonian god Marduk, who had been threatened with extinction by the

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[102] K 2675, K 228; Luckenbill (1989: 784-785).

previous ruler, Nabonidus. According to the inscription 'without battle and fighting he [Marduk] let him [Cyrus] enter his city Babylon. He [Cyrus] saved Babylon from its oppression'. Having been destroyed by an unending yoke, a common metaphor throughout antiquity for servitude, the inhabitants of Babylon are described as rejoicing in Cyrus' kingship which ended the era of servitude. Cyrus, in the first person, claims to have entered Babylon peacefully, and to have daily cared for the worship of Marduk. 'My numerous troops marched peacefully through Babylon, their servitude I loosened'. Amélie Kuhrt points out that the proclamation made by Cyrus in the Cyrus Cylinder, which vilifies the previous king, Nabonidus, should not be seen as a declaration of liberation or a reversal of existing policies. Such declarations were 'part of the traditional rhetoric of Babylonian conquerors after triumph'.[103]

The Cyrus Cylinder is not the only evidence for praise of Cyrus during this period. A poem, written in Akkadian and distributed for public reading, disparages the former king of Babylon and praises Cyrus for having liberated the people of Babylon from prison.[104] From the Persian perspective such proclamations may not have held importance for the words contained therein, but for that which they stood, that is, a justification for Persian presence. For the citizens of Babylon, who may in fact have been oppressed by their previous leader, the proclamation was a testament to their having been freed from political and religious servitude. Even this must be questioned, as some scholars have argued that Cyrus' intervention was carefully planned in collaboration with the priests of Babylon, who were being neglected by Nabonidus.[105] This, combined with the fact that such evidence was written after the fall of Babylon and most likely at the command of the new king or his followers, casts some doubt on how accurate the depiction is. This being said, unlike his Babylonian and Assyrian predecessors, he did not deport citizens from the city. The Persian king displayed reverence for the Babylonian religion by giving offerings to Marduk, and by rebuilding the temples which had been ruined in Babylonia, Elam, and Assyria. In addition, he ordered the reconstruction of the temple of Jerusalem, as well as the return of foreigners who had been forced to settle in Babylonia.[106] Although the

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[103] Kuhrt (1995: 649).
[104] Dandamaev (1989: 51).
[105] Dandamaev (1989: 53).
[106] Dandamaev (1989: 54).

Cyrus Cylinder presents evidence for the existence of a 'freedom' rhetoric, there is a notable difference between the act of freeing a people from oppression, and offering them absolute freedom to govern and manage themselves; just because a people are freed from the oppression of a overbearing ruler does not mean that they are free from the influence of their liberators. The Cyrus Cylinder offers testimony for the former, but certainly not the latter, as Babylon became a province of the Persian empire, and even revolted unsuccessfully from Persia shortly after Darius ascended the throne in 522 BC (Hdt. 3.150-160).

The account of Cyrus' invasion of Babylon found in the Cyrus Cylinder is at odds with the accounts of the Babylonian Chronicle, a prose narration of events written in chronological order in the third person.[107] The discrepancies between these accounts indicates that the language preserved in the cylinder was meant to be rhetorically persuasive, and even deceptive. According to the Babylonian Chronicle the capture of Babylon was marked by a battle between the Babylonians and the Persians, and was followed by the destruction of Opis, the scene of the battle, after which Cyrus 'carried off the plunder (and) slaughtered the people'.[108] This is a departure from the account in the Cyrus Cylinder, which states that Cyrus marched into the city peacefully.

Herodotus' account also deviates from the peaceful intervention of Cyrus described in the Cylinder. Herodotus' description of the siege at the end of Book One and the capture of Babylon resembles a city exchanging religious oppression for that of an imperial nation: 'besides paying a fixed tribute', the city was required 'to supply food to the great king and his army during different portions of the year' (Hdt. 1.192). In addition to such demands, Persian satrapies, or provinces, lost all independence in foreign policy.[109] According to general practices of Near Eastern kings during this period, treaties with subject nations required that such nations harmonise their foreign policy with that of the empire, as well as refrain from communication and alliances with enemies of the empire.[110] Although Cyrus could claim to be liberating, freeing, or loosening the city of Babylon from a previous ruler who had oppressed a portion of the community, one would be pressed to argue that he was fighting for the absolute freedom of the city. What was offered

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[107] Grayson (1975: IX)
[108] Grayson (1975: 109); Kuhrt (1995: 659).
[109] Dandamaev (1989: 56).
[110] Westbrook (2003: 1058).

to Babylon was freedom from one form of oppression in exchange for a different type of oppression.

Persian evidence suggests that the notion of 'freeing' or 'loosening' the people from 'servitude' provided the Persians with a rhetorical platform to win over the people with words, even though their invasion was hostile. The inhabitants of Babylon were not physically 'enslaved' by the previous king, but were oppressed. Like Solon, Cyrus has appropriated the language of 'slavery' in order to liken his political measures to one who has released the citizens from physical enslavement. But unlike Solon's reforms, which paved the way for social reform on a mass scale, Cyrus' intervention resulted in an exchange of power, but did not alter the status quo: conquered states continued to be ruled by Mesopotamian theocracies. Social reform on a grand scale rarely, if ever, happened in the Near East.[111] 'Freedom' or the language of 'loosening from oppression' provided the means for gaining power, but was not itself the end. By 'loosening' the oppressed faction of the city which they were invading, the Persians already had a group in place which would support their rule. A loyal ruling party within a newly conquered territory was essential, since the success of the Persian empire depended on faithful subjects who supported and maintained the empire.

The Cyrus Cylinder is not proof that the Persians popularised the notion of 'political freedom', but is instead evidence that it was not beyond the imagination for Herodotus to attribute some notion of 'freedom' to the Persians. The Old Persian word for 'nobility', **āzāta*, was used in reference to the status of the individual and not the state, in much the same way that 'free' described the individual before the Persian Wars in Greece. Furthermore, the manner in which the Persians implemented a metaphorical conceptualisation of 'slavery' indicates that the language of 'loosening from servitude' was used to gain goodwill, in much the same way that Solon appropriated this language to compare his reforms to the overthrow of tyranny. Raaflaub has argued that the social and political structures of Mycenaean civilization 'seem closely related to those of the Near Eastern states of the second millennium in which, apparently, freedom was of no significant value'.[112] While the lack of rhetoric from the East concerning positive notions of

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[111] The only exception to this is the case of the Israelites whose struggle for social reform and 'freedom' has been examined by Daniel Snell (2001: 117-136).
[112] Raaflaub (2004: 17).

what it means to be politically 'free' from monarchical or tyrannical rule validates this hypothesis, the Cyrus Cylinder demonstrates that liberating or loosening a people from oppression and slavery was used as a justification for intervention and subversive subjugation. Evidence such as this may have led Herodotus to frame his narrative of Persian history in terms of 'freedom' and to consider how the Persian νόμοι might give shape to an ideology of 'freedom'.

Chapter 2: Athens, Liberator or Enslaver?

The previous chapter examined the evidence for 'freedom' as a rhetorical tool in the Greek world prior to the Persian Wars, as well as the Persian sources for a rhetoric of 'freeing' and 'slavery' in military campaigns. Cyrus and Solon framed their actions in terms of 'loosening' or 'freeing' from servitude in a metaphorical sense. Solon did not actually 'free' the earth from 'slavery'. Nor did Cyrus literally 'loosen' the people of Babylon from 'slavery'. Both the Greeks and the Persians exploited the language of 'slavery' in order to gain support for political measures. Since no evidence exists from the time of the Persian Wars to suggest that the Greeks used the language of 'freedom' as a rhetorical tool during the conflict with Persia, Raaflaub argues that it was not until 480 that the Greeks began to see the war with Persia as a struggle for freedom.[1] Although Herodotus is the main source for the period of history which led to the emergence of 'freedom' as an ideology, Herodotus' treatment of the language of 'freedom' suggests that he did not simply use the language of 'freedom' in contexts where it would have been relevant historically, but instead the manner in which he employs the language of 'freedom' has been shaped by the strife he witnessed in his own time.

The Athenian role as leader in a league meant to preserve the 'freedom' of Greece from Persia after the Persian retreat might lead one to expect that a history of the Persian Wars would be laden with references to the Athenians' role in securing the 'freedom' of the Greeks.[2] Or one might expect that this uniquely Greek concept would be applied solely to the Greeks. But this is not the case. Of the eighty references to ἐλευθερ- in its various forms in Herodotus' *Histories*, only fourteen of these references are uttered from the mouth of an Athenian. Out of those fourteen instances five occur in the narrative of the expulsion of tyrants from Athens, for which Sparta is responsible, and has, effectively, freed Athens from tyranny (5.55, 5.62 (twice), 5.63, 5.64). Three occur in the debate between the Spartans and the Corinthians about whether or not Hippias should be reinstated as tyrant of Athens (5.91, twice), and two occur in a speech given to the polemarch of Aphidnae, Callimachus, by Miltiades, the Athenian dissident who persuades the Athenians to take up arms against the Persians at Marathon (6.109). In his speech Miltiades remarks that Athens can either be free or enslaved, but that

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[1] Raaflaub (2004: 65).

[2] For evidence that the Persian Wars were conceptualised as a struggle for 'freedom' independent of Herodotus' *Histories*, see pages 39-40.

if Athens chooses to rise up against the Medes the city will become the first city in Greece. Two occur in a statement made by Herodotus where he argues that the Alcmaeonids are responsible for freeing Athens from tyranny, since they may have bribed the Pythia to persuade the Spartans to free Athens (6.123).

With the exception of Miltiades' speech, that leaves one example in which the Athenians, as a citizen body, state that they will fight for their own freedom and that of the Greeks from Persia (8.142). It is the only instance where the Athenians are portrayed as being actively engaged in securing their own freedom, a decision that, according to Herodotus, effectively delivered the Greeks from the threat of Persian enslavement. But Herodotus cautiously expresses this opinion.

> At this point I feel impelled to express an opinion which I am not going to keep to myself, despite the fact that it will offend a great many people, because I believe it to be true. If the Athenians had taken fright at the danger that was bearing down on them and had abandoned their country, or if they had stayed put where they were but had surrendered to Xerxes, no one would have tried to resist Xerxes...Once they had decided that their preference was for Greece to remain free, it was they who aroused the whole of the rest of Greece...and, with the help of the gods, repelled the king's advance (Hdt. 7.139).[3]

According to Herodotus, the Athenians had two opportunities to side with Persia, but they rejected the Persians' offer both times (8.140-44, 9.4-5). Thucydides' Athenians make similar claims when they argue that they have come about their power rightly on account of their efforts in the Persian Wars, and that, if they had not abandoned Attica and fled to their ships, or if they had sided with Persia from the beginning, 'there would be no point then in your [Spartans] attempting a sea-battle with your inadequate navy, and Xerxes would have gone on to achieve his object at leisure' (Thuc. 1.74).[4] The abandonment of Attica for ships and the ensuing battle is one which is described by Aeschylus in the *Persians* as a fight for 'freedom'.[5] Thus by the time of Herodotus the story of the Athenians' struggle

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[3] Translation Waterfield (1998).
[4] Translation Hammond (2009).
[5] See pages 39-40.

for the 'freedom' of the Greeks and the debt owed by the rest of the Greeks to the Athenians was already a common theme.

The discomfort Herodotus expresses at 7.139 was due to the growing resentment many Greeks felt towards the Athenians, who, as Hermocrates notes in Thucydides' history, have substituted their own empire for that of the Persians (Thuc. 6.76.4).[6] Regardless of whether or not Thucydides actually quotes Hermocrates, this statement reflects sentiments that were likely shared by many, as the Athenian imperial apparatus, as I shall show, bore some similarities to that of Persia's. The following section will be an examination of Thucydides' Athenians, the allies responses to them, as well as independent epigraphic and literary evidence. While I am not suggesting that there is grounds for intertextuality between Herodotus and Thucydides, I argue that the discontent expressed by the allies in Thucydides' history reflects a general response to the emergence of Athenian *arche* in the fifth century. There is evidence to suggest that Athens' allies may have felt that their treatment at the hands of the Athenians differed little from that of the Persians, and that, for this reason, the language of 'slavery' was used to describe Athenian actions in Thucydides. The language of slavery and 'ruling' that came to be associated with Athens may have led Herodotus to consider the similarities between Athens and Persia, and that, if the Athenians could claim to offer 'freedom' to their own citizens while 'enslaving' their allies, then perhaps the Persians too had their own conceptualisation of 'freedom'.

2.1 On Reading Herodotus

The first written work in Greek literature which provides an historical narrative of a struggle for 'freedom'—not just the physical 'freedom' of the individual, but the 'freedom' of individuals collectively to make decisions in their interest and align themselves as they choose[7]—occurs in Herodotus' *Histories*, a narration of the Persian invasion of Greece, the factors which contributed to the cultural conflict between East and West, and the events leading up to the what are now referred to as the Persian Wars, a struggle which began when the Athenians

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[6] For a more complete discussion of this passage in the context of the Peloponnesian War, see pages 69-70.

[7] At 9.11 the Athenian envoys threaten to make peace with Persia, which will result in having to march wherever the king orders them to march. The fear expressed in this passage is that allies of the king are forced to have the same friends and enemies as the king.

burned the Persian city of Sardis in 499 and ended with the Persian retreat in 479. In order to understand how Herodotus used the concept of 'freedom', one must have a clear picture of the text in context. Having written in the mid-fifth century—some even posit a date as late as 414—Herodotus and his audience would have witnessed the internal strife that enveloped the Greek world: after the Persian retreat the Athenians assumed leadership of a league created to secure the freedom of the Greeks from the threat looming in the East.[8] What was once a defensive alliance became an empire, with Athens at its head, and members which formerly enjoyed a status of equality found themselves coerced into complying with Athenian demands; by the 430s there were no longer any meetings of member states.[9] The Athenians claimed that they had borne the burden of liberating Greece from Persia, thereby justifying what the allies referred to as their 'enslavement'. No one would argue that initially the decision to continue the league after the Persian retreat was unwarranted: the Persians had retreated, but the Greeks feared that the return of Persian forces was imminent (Thuc. 1.90).

The context having been set, is there evidence that fifth-century affairs shaped Herodotus' narration and interpretation of the Persian Wars? And even if authorial intent cannot be shown, how would a person, living during the fifth century and witnessing the Peloponnesian Wars, have interpreted Herodotus' presentation of 'freedom'? According to tradition, Herodotus was 'an itinerant lecturer, an Ionized Dorian, possibly half Carian, born of a distinguished family but perhaps not an aristocrat, politically active, but not a military man'.[10] Studies which aim to understand the relationship between Herodotus' narration and the historian's own political and cultural milieu are becoming increasingly popular. Elizabeth Irwin, in her examination of Thracian history and ethnography in Book Five, noting the similarities between his description of the Paeonians and the Athenians, argues that Herodotus' narration of the Athenians exhibits characteristics typical of late fifth-century discourse on Thrace.[11] Irwin's examination of Herodotus' treatment of Samos reveals that Herodotus' interest in the island may have had as much to do with contemporary Periclean politics as with his own personal experiences.[12] Irwin has even suggested that Herodotus and

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[8] For Herodotus' dates see Hornblower (1996, vol. 2: 29); Munn (2000: 363 n. 78, 315-23).
[9] Ryder (1965: 21); Hornblower (1991: 145-46, 395).
[10] Munson (2001: 267); Brown (1988: 4-8); Evans (1982: 2-6).
[11] Irwin (2007b: 41-87).
[12] Irwin (2009: 395-416).

Thucydides were working side by side.[13] However, Shanske asserts that 'more of the features of his [Herodotus] text point backwards rather than forwards'.[14] Shanske's conclusion that Thucydides was looking for a 'cure' precludes the possibility that Thucydides' history engages with a Herodotean past just as much as Herodotus' history engages with Thucydides' own present. In making such claims Shanske has overlooked Tim Rood's assessment of the Sicilian Expedition.[15]

Such intertextuality assumes that Thucydides had access to a published, or nearly published manuscript, of Herodotus' *Histories*. Even if one is not convinced that the historians were working together, one would be hard pressed to deny the parallels between the texts. Whether such parallels were intentional or whether they were the result of two historians working in similar political and intellectual worlds, the fact that Herodotus engages with the present as much as the past means that the influence of the present on his selection and presentation of his enquires is becoming an increasingly popular phenomenon. According to Munn, Herodotus' work was published between 425-415 BC, while Thucydides' work would have been published 396-95 BC.[16] Even if Herodotus and Thucydides were not working 'side by side', it is possible that Thucydides may have had access to Herodotus' work. Munson notes that recent scholarship that aims to understand Herodotus' relationship to the present demonstrates a recognition of the complexity of reading his work, and how his *logoi* and the overall text as a coherent whole become more meaningful with regard to both the multiplicity of meanings and their relationship to fifth-century politics.[17]

Despite Herodotus' reputation for being a weak political thinker, Kurt Raaflaub has demonstrated that Thucydidean echoes in Herodotus are a testimony to the opposite.[18] Herodotus' immediate audience, those living during the fifth century, would have understood and read (or heard) his presentation of imperialism and freedom within the context of their own culture and politics. Since Charles Fornana's *Herodotus: An Interpretative Essay*, there has been growing interest in how the conflict between Athens, Sparta, and their allies

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[13] Irwin (2007a: 188-223).
[14] Shanske (2007: 11).
[15] Rood (1999: 141-68).
[16] Munn (2000: 363 n. 78, 315-23).
[17] For summaries on the implications of reading Herodotus in light of fifth-century politics see Irwin (2007b: 86-87; 2009: 416).
[18] Raaflaub (1987: 221-48).

influenced the composition of the *Histories*.[19] Fornara suggests that Herodotus' silence on the present creates an irony within the text. John Moles notes that Herodotus is writing with an eye towards present politics as much as past history. In this sense, he argues, the *Histories* serve as a warning to the Athenians.[20] More recently Moles has suggested that Herodotus himself speaks through Socles in his speech concerning the dangers of tyranny, in this case the imposition of tyranny on Athens by the Spartans. Moles suggests that Socles' speech is meant to 'jolt contemporary listeners and readers into reflection on their own situations and on the connections between those situations and the historical period down to 479'.[21] Moles considers the speech a 'meta'-speech for the *Histories* as a whole.[22] Similarly, John Henderson draws parallels between Herodotean history commencing at 5.67 and the events of the Peloponnesian War, though without the moralizing tendency of Moles' interpretation of Socles' speech.[23]

As the results of Herodotus' investigations demonstrate, he was as much concerned with the present as he was the past. A reading which aims to interpret Herodotus' *Histories* within the context of the historian's contemporary culture will shed light on the reader's response to the text, since Herodotus and his audience would have shared a similar cultural and political environment. This type of analysis hinges on a comparison between statement (i.e. Herodotus' narration) and the knowledge shared between the historian and his audience.[24] As Iser and Dewald have both noted, for modern readers to be able to understand the structure of a text, such as Herodotus' *Histories*, it is necessary to read the text multiple times. The process of rereading allows one to garner meaning from the text that one living closer to Herodotus' time would have been able to achieve with more ease.[25] Because the knowledge shared between the author and the reader is internal to the text, historians must examine literature external to the text to understand what knowledge Herodotus may have expected his audience to have. Consequently, this chapter examines responses to Athenian *arche* during the time when Herodotus was writing in order to better understand how the

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[19] Fornara (1971: 56, 81).
[20] Moles (1996: 259-84).
[21] Moles (2007: 265).
[22] Moles (2007: 266).
[23] Henderson (2007: 289-310).
[24] Hartog (1988: 7-8).
[25] Iser (1989: 10); Dewald (1997: 69).

political turmoil of this time shaped the way he uses the language of 'freedom' in his *Histories*.

2.2 A Fifth-Century Perspective on Athens

Although Herodotus' *Histories* concerns events which happened at least sixty or seventy years before he was writing, there are brief moments in the text where the historian steps away from his narration and offers a commentary on the current political climate. At 8.142 the Spartans remind the Athenians of their role as liberators.[26] As I shall argue in Chapter Three, this is a role which would only make sense to the post-Persian War reader who would have been aware of the Athenians' role in forcing a Persian retreat. As noted above, at 7.139 Herodotus states that the Athenians were responsible for freeing the Greeks from Persia, a statement which he prefaces by admitting that it will not be pleasing to his reader. This is a statement meant for a reader who knew that the Athenians were losing popularity as they began to act more like an empire than a Greek city-state. In each of these passages Herodotus does not directly make reference to events in his own time, but in a subtle way adds a second narrative, or metanarrative, to the text, which invites the reader to compare the previous actions of Greek city-states to their current ones.

References to fifth-century politics in the *Histories* are, on occasion, more explicit. At 8.3 Herodotus states that there was talk of entrusting the sea command to the Athenians, but that the Athenians knew there were many who did not support this plan and so abandoned it.

> But when the allies protested, the Athenians gave way, because what was important to them was the survival of Greece and they knew that if they made leadership a point of dispute, Greece was lost. And they were right, because internal dissension is worse than a united war effort to the same degree that war is worse than peace. So it was appreciation of this fact that made the Athenians give way without making a fuss—but, as they later demonstrated, only for as long as they badly needed the rest of the Greeks. Once Xerxes' invasion had been repulsed and they were fighting for his territory rather than their own, they deprived the Lacedaemonians of the

[26] This passage will be discussed in Chapter Three.

> leadership, using Pausanias' arrogant behaviour as a pretext. But all this happened later (Hdt. 8.3).[27]

In this passage Herodotus explicitly compares Athenian actions during the Persian War with those after.[28] By doing so, Herodotus asks the reader to consider the differences between the united Greek front during the Persian invasion and the fragmented nature of Greek politics in his own day. More generally Herodotus is asking the reader to read about the past with eye on the present.

Passages from Thucydides' history suggest that some felt that a comparison between Athens and Persia was warranted. At the debate at Camarina, Hermocrates, the Syracusan statesman, urges the Sicilians to take immediate action against the Athenians, whose fleet has landed in Sicily and who have sent their own embassy to Camarina to persuade the people of Camarina to side with them. According to Hermocrates the Athenians have established a trend of fighting on behalf of weaker city-states as a means of gaining power. This is exactly what they have done in coming to the aid of Leontini. Similarly, in the Persian Wars, they claimed to be fighting on behalf of the Ionians:

> This front against the Persians was not, then, the Athenians fighting for Greek freedom, nor the Greeks fighting for their own: the Athenians were looking to replace Persian enslavement with theirs, and the Greeks to make a change of slave-master--to one just as clever, but clever for the worse.[29]

> καὶ οὐ περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἄρα οὔτε οὗτοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὔθ' οἱ Ἕλληνες τῆς ἑαυτῶν τῷ Μήδῳ ἀντέστησαν, περὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν σφίσιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκείνῳ καταδουλώσεως, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ δεσπότου μεταβολῇ οὐκ ἀξυνετωτέρου, κακοξυνετωτέρου δέ (Thuc. 6.76.4).

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[27] Translation Waterfield (1998); ἀντιβάντων δὲ τῶν συμμάχων εἶκον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, μέγα τε ποιεύμενοι περιεῖναι τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ γνόντες, εἰ στασιάσουσι περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίης, ὡς ἀπολέεται ἡ Ἑλλάς, ὀρθὰ νοεῦντες· στάσις γὰρ ἔμφυλος πολέμου ὁμοφρονέοντος τοσούτῳ κάκιόν ἐστι ὅσῳ πόλεμος εἰρήνης· ἐπιστάμενοι ὧν αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀντέτεινον ἀλλ' εἶκον, μέχρι ὅσου κάρτα ἐδέοντο αὐτῶν, ὡς διέδεξαν· ὡς γὰρ διωσάμενοι τὸν Πέρσην περὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἤδη τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῦντο, πρόφασιν τὴν Παυσανίεω ὕβριν προϊσχόμενοι ἀπείλοντο τὴν ἡγεμονίην τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὕστερον ἐγένετο.

[28] Moles (2002: 33-52); Forsdyke (2005: 224-41).

[29] Translation Hammond (2009).

In the above passage the Athenians are compared to the Persians; according to Hermocrates, the Athenians were not fighting for freedom, but using freedom as a pretext for imperial endeavours.

Comparisons between Athens and Persia in the narrative passages of Thucydides are often not as explicit as those which occur in the speeches, but are powerful on account of their subtlety. Such passages offer evidence that there was dialogue concerning the similarities between Athens and Persia during the time that Herodotus was writing. In the following passage, Thucydides analyses the evolution of warfare in Greece before the Persian Wars by comparing past tactics to the tactics of empires.

> Wars by land there were none, none at least by which power was acquired; we have the usual border contests, but of distant expeditions with conquest the object we hear nothing among the Hellenes. There was no union of subject cities round a great state, no spontaneous combination of equals for confederate expeditions; what fighting there was consisted merely of local warfare between rival neighbours.[30]

> κατὰ γῆν δὲ πόλεμος, ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένετο, οὐδεὶς ξυνέστη· πάντες δὲ ἦσαν, ὅσοι καὶ ἐγένοντο, πρὸς ὁμόρους τοὺς σφετέρους ἑκάστοις, καὶ ἐκδήμους στρατείας πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐπ' ἄλλων καταστροφῇ οὐκ ἐξῆσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες. οὐ γὰρ ξυνειστήκεσαν πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις ὑπήκοοι, οὐδ' αὖ αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης κοινὰς στρατείας ἐποιοῦντο, κατ' ἀλλήλους δὲ μᾶλλον ὡς ἕκαστοι οἱ ἀστυγείτονες ἐπολέμουν (Thuc. 1.15.2).

The contrast drawn is decisive: relations between city-states and warfare had drastically changed. The method of presentation in this passage further elicits a contrast with Persia. Rather than stating positively how Greece had changed, Thucydides has illustrated pre-Persian Wars Greece by stating what it was not, all of which are elements present in Greece during the Peloponnesian Wars: with the Sicilian Expedition, Athens sent fleets far from home, the purpose of which was

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[30] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).

land acquisition, with the hope of moving onto Carthage and Italy (Thuc. 6.15.2, 90.2). The alliance of small states under the leadership of a great power was the original dynamic of the Delian League (Thuc. 1.97; 3.10.3-4); the references to leagues formed by smaller states on the basis of equality echoes what the Greeks originally set out to do in response to the Persian invasion (Hdt. 7.145, Thuc. 1.91.6).

The description of Greece through negative rather than positive illustration serves another purpose: that which Greece was formerly not is exactly what Persia is and what Athens became. Rood notes that Thucydides often uses the 'negative' as a 'forceful contradiction of characters' expectations'.[31] Just as the Athenians went abroad in order to conquer, so too did Xerxes,[32] and it is the imperial nature of such expeditions by eastern powers which is described by Herodotus as impinging on a city-state's freedom (Hdt. 1.6). During the Persian Wars the fear among Greeks that an alliance with Persia would force them to march wherever the king chose (Hdt. 9.11) indicated that the alliance offered to Greece by Persia was not one of equality among members (Hdt. 8.140).

Thucydides' history demonstrates that there is ample evidence for a dialogue which compared Athens and Persia circulating during the latter half of the fifth century. Explicit comparisons, such as that of Hermocrates, invited the reader to consider Athenian policy in light of Persian history. Tim Rood has demonstrated that Thucydides' portrayal of the Sicilian expedition mirrors Herodotus' narration of Xerxes' expedition to Greece, thereby eliciting a reading of Thucydides which renders the Athenians an imperial power like the Persians, moving west beyond the boundaries of their empire to enslave the conquered.[33] Even if such similarities were not intentional, the parallelism between Xerxes' and the Athenians' expansionist efforts would have led some to consider the similarities between these two imperial powers. Although arguments proposing Persian influence on the Athenian imperial model are tenuous at best, evidence may be found from sources besides Herodotus and Thucydides which may have led some to associate Athenian imperialism with Persian despotism.

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[31] Rood (1998: 19-20).
[32] For an intertextual analysis of Thucydides' description of the Sicilian expedition and Herodotus' portrayal of Xerxes' expedition see Rood (1999: 141-68).
[33] Rood (1999: 141-68).

There are several similarities between the Persian and Athenian imperial model. The Persian institution of the 'eye and ear of the king' was similar enough to Athenian ἐπίσκοποι to warrant comparison. Herodotus tells of the story of young Cyrus who, while playing a pretend game with his playmates, appointed one of his friends to be his Eye (Hdt. 1.144). In Aeschylus' *Persians*, the king's eye is described as 'trustworthy in all things' (τὸν σὸν πιστὸν πάντ' ὀφθαλμόν),[34] while Aristophanes includes the Eye Pseudartaban among his cast of characters in the *Acharnians*.[35] The distinction between the faithful Eye and the false Eye in Greek literature, and in the *Acharnians* in particular, is an accurate reflection of the importance of the truth versus the lie in Persian ideology as exhibited by the Behistun Inscription and by Herodotus (1.136).[36] Jack Martin Balcer argues that the Athenians adopted the Persian imperial model, but his argument lacks the necessary evidence to support this claim.[37] It is more likely that that whatever institutions the empires shared were the result of a cultural *koine* rather than direct borrowing.[38] According to Balcer 'the King's Eyes conducted political and administrative surveillance of the satrapal regions, and communicated that information to the King'.[39]

Although the evidence for the institution of the King's Eye is primarily Greek, it does not matter whether such an institution actually existed, since, if the Greeks believed that it did, this belief would have led them to draw comparison to Athenian ἐπίσκοποι.[40] Sometime after the subjugation of Naxos in 468 states began to rebel from Athens and a means of 'keeping an eye' on the allies became necessary. Included among the duties of an ἐπίσκοπος was the selection of the local βουλευταί to supervise the examination of new counselors. If anyone failed to meet the criteria for running for this office such persons could be prosecuted by the ἐπίσκοπος and the φρούραρχος. The ἐπίσκοποι were responsible for overseeing the collection of tribute to ensure that there was no malpractice in the collection process.[41] While the ἐπίσκοποι could not try or convict persons

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[34] Aesch. *Per.* 979.
[35] Balcer (1977: 257).
[36] Brosius (2000: 29-41); Sancisi-Weerdenberg (1993: 23-31).
[37] Balcer (1977: 252).
[38] I have adopted the phrase 'cultural *koine*' from Kurt Raaflaub (2000a).
[39] Balcer (1977: 260).
[40] Besides the *Acharnians*, the King's Eye is also described by Xenophon in the *Cyropaedia* 8.2.10.
[41] ML 40, 12-16. Although this fragment is almost entirely reconstructed, an independent inscription (*IG* 1^3 14) suggests that ἐπίσκοποι were sent to Erythrae. For a more complete

themselves, they did have the power to summon and bring allies to trial at Athens.[42] Citing the *Constitution of the Athenians* (1.14, 16), Forsdyke notes that it was a 'generalized principle of Athenian imperial rule' to remove 'power over the decision of death, exile, disenfranchisement, and the confiscation of property from the allied cities'.[43] However, there is much debate concerning the official judicial decree stipulating Athens' policies regarding the summoning and indicting of individuals from allied city-states. While Balcer argues that there was a judicial decree for the entire Athenian empire dating as far back as 450, de Ste. Croix only suggests that such a decree existed towards the end of the Athenian empire.[44] Forsdyke places the judicial decree in the 440s around the time of the Chalcis decree on the grounds that this was a period of time in which there were several revolts against Athens. Furthermore, Forsdyke, like Figueira who has argued that the decree forcing the allies to use Athenian coinage was not as overbearing as some have suggested, argues that the judicial decree was not meant to be a means of asserting control, but was instead meant to reassure allies that the highest penalties would only be enforced through proper judicial proceedings.[45] Even if it is the case that measures such as the adoption of Athenian coinage and the judicial decree were not meant to be oppressive, the fact remains that the allies on whom such measures were imposed may have regarded them as oppressive.

The presence of the Athenian representatives, whether ἐπίσκοποι or other, in the allied states would have served as a constant reminder of Athenian power. The referral of court cases to Athens under the supervision of the ἐπίσκοπος was just one of the many laws passed by the Athenians which limited the cultural sovereignty and administrative control of Greek city-states. Such legislation included: decrees protecting Athenian citizens and honorary consuls or

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discussion concerning the relationship between ML 40 and *IG* 1^3 14 see Meiggs and Lewis (1969: 92-93) and Walbank (2008: 64).

[42] Balcer (1977: 252-5).

[43] Forsdyke (2005: 225).

[44] Balcer (1978: 119-42); de Ste. Croix (1961: 270-71). See Meiggs (1972: 225) for an argument in favour of a later late for the judicial decree. Meiggs argues that a judicial decree was only in existence by 424, which is his date for the *Constitution of the Athenians*, and he warns against taking the Chalcis decree as representative of greater decree imposed on all allies. For problems dating such a decree see Meiggs (2008, reprint of 1943: 65-66). For the decree concerning Chalcis see ML 52. This decree may have applied to Eretria (Forsdyke 2005: 225 n. 71). Raaflaub (2004: 327 n. 127) notes that Chalcis and Eretria, if ML applies to Eretria, were forced to pay tribute not to the league, but the Athenian demos.

[45] For the decree enforcing Athenian coinage see ML 45; Figueira (1998: 15); Forsdyke (2005: 225-26).

πρόξενοι[46]; the decree prohibiting the Megarians from access to Athenian ports[47]; standardisation of the assessment and collection of tribute[48]; imposition of Athenian standards of measurements, weights, and currency[49]; obligatory contributions to the Panathenaea[50]; the institution of religious cults in allied states and participation in religious festivals.[51] Meiggs notes that after 'the end of fighting against Persia removed the common cause which had bound the allies together under Athenian leadership, positive steps had to be taken to prevent the disintegration of the League'.[52] By imposing a common identity, the Athenians were able to create a sense of unity. However, such efforts were not always well received. As Rhodes argues, 'by prescribing a form of constitution, transferring major lawsuits from local courts to Athenian courts, and forbidding cities to issue their own silver coins and to use their own weights and measures, Athens had imposed forms of submission to which states which aspired to be independent had not previously been subjected'.[53] The exaction of tribute, mandatory military support, and the office of the overseer were common, or believed to be common, to both the Persian and Athenian imperial models.

Just how oppressed the allies really were has been questioned by Osborne, who has examined the archaeological evidence for building activity in the fifth century. He interprets the lack of such activity in Ionia and in the Athenian empire in general as indicative of 'Athenian popularity rather than Athenian oppression'.[54] Hölscher suggests that political monuments erected in Athens and abroad were

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[46] Meiggs (1972: 171-72); *IG*^{2} 28a; *IG* ii^2 38; Ar. *Peace* 164-72.
[47] de Ste. Croix (1972)
[48] *IG* i^3 34; ML 46; *ATL* 2.D7; Meiggs (1972: 165-67); Fornara and Samons (1991: 180-81).
[49] *IG* i^3 1453; *ATL* 2.D14; ML 45; Meiggs (1972: 167-71);
[50] ML 40, 69; Meiggs (1972: 292-95). ML 40 deals solely with Erythrae after the city had revolted. This inscription has been dated to the 450s, suggesting that initially only Ionian cities would be expected to honor Athens as a mother city. However, by 425 all members of the league are required to bring a cow and a panoply to the Panathenaea (ML 69, lines 55-58). At lines 57-58 the allies must escort their offerings at the Panathenaea 'like colonists' (Meiggs 1972: 293; Boedeker 2007: 56; Maurizio 1998: 297-317).
[51] Delos was the focal point of the Delian League, as it was the site of an Ionian sanctuary. This suited the image of the league, which was founded as an Ionian league (Thuc. 1.96). Smarczyk (1990: 464) suggests that Delos was chosen for its religious significance as the center of Ionianism, and that the choice of Delos was more religious propaganda. The treasury was most likely moved in 454 when the tribute lists began to be inscribed at Athens (Hornblower 1991: 146). The tribute which was brought was displayed in Athens at the Great Dionysia, which had become an imperial festival (Ar. *Ach.* 504; Isoc. *Peace* 82; ML 46, 68). In the 430s allies were required to send offerings to the Eleusinian mysteries (ML 73), while *horoi* in allied cities suggest the imposition of cults honoring Athena, or the confiscation of land by Athens which was offered to Athenian deities (*IG* i^3 1481-99).
[52] Meiggs (1972: 293).
[53] Rhodes (2007: 35).
[54] Osborne (1999: 331)

more influenced by the Athenians' need for 'legitimation', and that building programs were more stimulated by empire than democracy.[55] Furthermore, the Athenians did not typically erect monuments in other cities; monuments in honour of Athena were most likely built by pro-Athenian parties, such as in the case of a monument on Samos from the 440s commemorating Athens' suppression of a revolt. Ephesus, on the other hand, had a proactive building campaign, rivaling that of the Athenians, which, Hölscher suggests, was an 'act of self-assertion against overpowering Athens'.[56]

While Forsdyke, Figueira, and Rhodes suggest that Athenian leadership was not as overbearing or as oppressive as it may have seemed, and that the rich would have suffered more from Athenian demands than the poor, who would have benefited from a democratic constitution, it is significant that Thucydides' history often defies attempts to locate an authorial voice due to the contradictions and opposing viewpoints throughout his history.[57] Responses to Athenian leadership—whether to support it or to revolt on account of its overbearing nature—are diverse and contradictory, just as are the opinions expressed by speakers in Thucydides' narration. Athenian legislation limited a city-state's cultural identity by forcing them to conform to Athenian practices, thereby denying the unique cultural and political heritage of individual city-states. For some, Athenian hegemony may have been even more overbearing than Persian rule which allowed states to administer themselves according to their own traditions, and where the imperial administration relied on the positive relationship between the Persian elite and local authorities.[58] Although there are similarities between the Athenian and Persian imperial models, these similarities are not proof of influence, but aspects of empire which may have been part of the cultural milieu of the fifth century.

Forsdyke notes that modern responses to the Athenian empire are shaped in large part by Thucydides' negative depiction of Athenian behaviour at 1.98.4-99.2.[59] Thucydides' narrative of these events may be hostile, but his characterisation of Athens is as valid as the Athenians' own characterisation of their empire. Just because the Athenians did not intend to be overbearing does not

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[55] Hölscher (1998: 182-83).
[56] Hölscher (1998: 173).
[57] Forsdyke (2005: 223-36); Figueira (1998: 15); Rhodes (2007: 35-39), especially page 36 for a discussion of contradictory views found in Thucydides' speeches.
[58] Kuhrt (1995: 696-701); Cawkwell (2005: 61-86) suggests that the Greeks were not so much opposed to the institutions of the Persian empire as they were to the very idea of being ruled itself.
[59] Forsdyke (2005: 226).

mean that their actions were not regarded as such. And even if some did not find the demands overbearing, this does not necessarily mean that everyone did not. It is likely that there were various responses to Athenian demands. Since Thucydides portrays Athenian behaviour as hostile, and since Herodotus hesitates to praise Athens at 7.139, I am concerned with the views of those who found the Athenian *arche* oppressive. Regardless of whether the similarities between institutions of Athens and Persia are due to conscious adoption or because the system is one which both Athens and Persia, independent of one another, established because it 'works', the similarities were significant enough that likening Athens to Persia would not be a stretch of the imagination.

Understanding the context in which Herodotus wrote enriches the experience of reading. It allows the modern reader to see that Herodotus was not only influenced by the political turbulence of his own times, but was, at times, consciously commenting on later fifth-century politics through his narrative of the Persian Wars. Sometimes comparisons between Athens and Persia are made explicit by Herodotus and Thucydides, while at other times these comparisons are implicit. The epigraphic evidence preserves measures taken by the Athenians to maintain control over their allies. Many of these measures bore a resemblance to Persian imperial institutions, and may have led some to believe that a comparison between Athens and Persia was warranted. The following section will be an analysis of the language used by Thucydides to talk about the Athenians. Although the Athenians 'freed' Greece from the Persians, Thucydides' Athenians are more often referred to as 'enslavers', an epithet commonly attributed to the Persians. The frequency and ease with which the concept of 'slavery' appears in reference to the Athenians suggests that accusations of 'enslavement' on the part of Athens were common in the fifth century. Such accusations may have led Herodotus to consider how a city-state like Athens, which had once fought for the 'freedom' of the Greeks, could then evolve into an imperial power which 'enslaved' rather than 'liberated'. As I shall demonstrate in Chapter Three, Herodotus investigates this transition by considering how the Persians, who during the Persian Wars represented 'slavery' with regard to both the treatment of subjects and other nations, may have, at one time, also fought for their own 'freedom'.

2.3 Thucydides' Athenians: Athens the Enslaver

Understanding Athenian imperial language is problematic. The idea that

pinpointing the moment that 'language of alliance mutates into the language of domination' in the epigraphic record has been pervasive in attempts to fill in Thucydidean gaps regarding the growth of Athenian power.[60] Polly Low notes that this in itself is problematic, as the interpretation of epigraphic evidence is based on assumptions about the Athenian empire that are themselves based on Thucydides.[61] Examining epigraphic evidence independent of a Thucydidean model of Athenian power, Low concludes that the image one draws from inscriptions is one of 'cooperation rather than coercion', and that the Athenians may be offering a means of engaging in a great Panhellenic culture rather than being forced to conform to an Athenian model. She does, however, note that, whatever tone is established in the inscriptions by the relationship between author and audience, the outcome is the same: 'the Athenians get the power, and the allies get what they're given'.[62] The Athenians, she concludes, might be more diplomatic than they are given credit for by Thucydides.[63]

Even if it is the case that the Athenians' relationship with their allies was more based on reciprocity and consensual, the fact remains that in Thucydides' history the Athenians are more often enslaving than engaging in positive interactions with allies. With the exception of Plataea, where the Spartans enslave the women and children (Thuc. 3.68), ἀνδραποδ-, a word referring to physical enslavement, is used to describe Athenian actions a total of seventeen times. Although the more common word for slavery, δουλ-, occurs throughout both Herodotus (96 times) and Thucydides (78), δουλ-is more ambiguous; it can refer either to restrictions on political freedoms such as *parrhesia* or *isegoria*, the subjugation of a state by a greater power, or the physical enslavement of an individual. It is significant that Thucydides describes the Athenians' actions in terms of ἀνδραποδ- ; Herodotus only uses this concept to describe the physical enslavement of prisoners or nations conquered in war. It is used thirty times in Herodotus' *Histories*, and of those thirty times it is used, twelve are in reference to Persians enslaving conquered peoples; four times it refers to slaves as the property of their owner; five times it is used in reference to prisoners of war being carried off; only three times is it used to describe the behavior of Greeks towards one

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[60] Low (2005: 94).
[61] Low (2005: 93-95).
[62] Low (2005: 108).
[63] Low (2005: 108-109).

another, and, of those, two refer to Samos (3.125, 6.23; 1.66, Tegea). Thucydides' description of Athenian actions through the language of 'slavery', either because the Athenians physically 'enslaved' people, or metaphorically 'enslaved' the city-state, suggests that he was contrasting their behaviour with that of the Persians, who had historically been famous for 'enslaving', as Herodotus' *Histories* attests. By contrasting Thucydides' description of Athenian leadership in the Delian League to Herodotus' description of Persian rule, it is possible to see how the language of 'slavery' plays a subtle, yet powerful role in conveying Athens' transition from a league to an empire.

The transition of the Delian League from a defensive alliance to an empire displays the simultaneous deterioration of equality among the allies and the growth of Athenian power. According to Thucydides, shortly after the Persian retreat and not long before assuming leadership in the Delian League, the Athenians began to rebuild their fortification walls, but the Spartans objected on the grounds that the Athenians should join them in pulling down the walls around cities outside of the Peloponnese. By pulling down fortification walls, the Spartans argued that the Persians, should they invade again, would not have a base from which to operate; the Peloponnese would serve as a place of refuge for all Greeks. Thucydides informs the reader that in reality the Spartans were afraid of the Athenians' wall-building enterprise (1.89-90). The Athenians continue to build their walls arguing that they

> now thought it fit that their city should have a wall, and that this would be more for the advantage of both the citizens of Athens and the Hellenic confederacy, for without equal military strength it was impossible to contribute fair or equal counsel to the common interest. It followed, he [Themistocles] observed, either that all the members of the confederacy should be without walls, or that the present step should be considered a right one (Thuc. 1.91. 6-7).[64]

Shortly after this passage, Thucydides describes how the Athenians assumed

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[64] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996); δοκεῖν οὖν σφίσι καὶ νῦν ἄμεινον εἶναι τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν τεῖχος ἔχειν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ τοῖς πολίταις καὶ ἐς τοὺς πάντας ξυμμάχους ὠφελιμώτερον ἔσεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' εἶναι μὴ ἀπὸ ἀντιπάλου παρασκευῆς ὁμοῖόν τι ἢ ἴσον ἐς τὸ κοινὸν βουλεύεσθαι.

leadership in the league, which Thucydides states (1.97.1) consisted of 'allies who were originally autonomous and reached their decision in general congress' (ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων).[65] As autonomous allies, the states lived according to custom, literally according to their own customs or laws. Many members of the Delian League provided ships instead of facing military service. Consequently 'while Athens was increasing her navy with the funds which they [allies] contributed, a revolt always found them without resources or experience for war' (1.99.3).[66] The success of the Persian empire hinged on the symbiotic and reciprocal nature of the relationship between the royal administration and the local governments of subject states, which were expected to pay taxes to the Persian empire, supply food for the Persian satraps, as well as provide soldiers for military garrisons. Good relations between local authorities and their Persian satraps served as a method of control over local citizens, and such allowances for the perpetuation of local culture did not, as some have argued, contribute to the overall decline of the Persian empire.[67] The actions of the Athenians as described by Thucydides were more similar to an eastern empire like Persia than an independent Greek city-state.

Once allies failed to meet Athenian demands they were 'enslaved'. At 1.98.1 the town of Eion was enslaved: 'the Athenians besieged and captured Eion on the Strymon from the Persians, and made slaves of the inhabitants' (πρῶτον μὲν Ἠιόνα τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι Μήδων ἐχόντων πολιορκίᾳ εἷλον καὶ ἠνδραπόδισαν).[68] Next, at 1.98.2, the Athenians invaded Scyros: '[n]ext they enslaved Scyros the island in the Aegean, containing a Dolopian population, and colonized it themselves' (ἔπειτα Σκῦρον τὴν ἐν τῷ Αἰγαίῳ νῆσον, ἣν ᾤκουν Δόλοπες, ἠνδραπόδισαν καὶ ᾤκισαν αὐτοί).[69] Carystus surrendered on terms, and, after besieging Naxos, the Athenians brought the island back into the alliance (Thuc. 1.98.3-4). At 1.98.4 Thucydides states that '[t]his was the first allied state to lose its freedom—something quite contrary to Greek norms which would subsequently happen to the others one by one' (πρώτη τε αὕτη πόλις ξυμμαχὶς παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ἐδουλώθη, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἑκάστῃ

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[65] Translation mine. For a greater discussion of 'autonomy' in this passage see pages 170-71.
[66] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[67] Kuhrt (1995: 696-701).
[68] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[69] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).

ξυνέβη).[70] In 465 the Thasians were defeated by the Athenians. Their walls were demolished, their navy surrendered, and they were forced to pay an indemnity and tribute to the league in the future. In addition, they surrendered their rights on the mainland as well as their rights to the mines (Thuc. 1.01.3). At 1.108 Thucydides describes Athenian actions towards Aegina: after a long battle the island finally surrendered, the fortification walls were torn down, the fleet handed over, and the people of Aegina were forced to pay tribute in the future.

Thucydides' narration indicates that the Athenians increasingly exhibited behavior similar to an imperial power such as Persia. Although disputes arose between members of the Hellenic League regarding leadership (Hdt. 8.2-3), decisions were made in congress, and, even after leadership was transferred to Athens after the Persian Wars, member states were 'autonomous' and decisions were made in a common assembly (Thuc. 1.97). Slowly, Athens began increasing control over the allies, forcing them to provide troops for her cause, as well as destroying fleets, fortification walls, and exacting tribute. In the Pentecontaetia, Thucydides' narration of the events from the end of the Persian Wars to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (479-435), the historian recounts the growth in Athenian power and the fear that this provoked in the Spartans, which he considers the most true reason for war (1.23.6). Thucydides states 'the Athenians were not the old popular rulers they had been at first; and if they had more than their fair share of service, it was correspondingly easy for them to reduce any that tried to leave the confederacy' (Thuc 1.99.1).[71]

By the outbreak of war in 432, Athenian rhetoric differs little from that of Xerxes, who claimed that the Greeks were weak because they did not serve a master. In 432 the Spartans deliver their ultimatum to Athens.[72] A full account of Spartan demands is revealed in Pericles' response to the Spartan ultimatum: the siege of Potidaea must be abandoned, the decree concerning Megara must be revoked, autonomy must be given to Aegina, and to the Greeks as well (1.140.3-4). In what follows Pericles makes an argument which is similar to one given by Xerxes, arguing that the Spartans will never be able to overcome the Athenians, since they have no central deliberative body. Xerxes, in his conversation with Demaratus, asks '[h]ow could a thousand men—or ten thousand or fifty thousand,

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[70] Translation Hammond (2009).
[71] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[72] For more on the Spartan ultimatum see page 90, n. 24 and page 192.

for that matter—when every single man among them is as free as the next man and they do not have a single leader, oppose an army the size of ours?' (Hdt. 7.103).[73] Similarly Pericles states

> In a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies may be able to defy all Hellas, but they are incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power different in character from their own, by the want of the single council chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous action, and the substitution of a congress composed of various peoples, in which every state possesses an equal vote, and each presses its own ends—a condition of things which generally results in no action at all (1.141.6).[74]

From Pericles' perspective the strength of the Athenians lies in the power garnered from their allies, who are governed by a central deliberative body, which acts in the interest of Athens. Sparta and her allies, on the other hand, operate as a league; members of the Peloponnesian League have equal votes which they cast in their own interests. In the early years of the Delian League the 'autonomy' of Greek city-states was guaranteed through their right to vote in the assembly. This vote ensured that equal and fair discussions were held on the basis of equal strength.[75] Once Athens began to withdraw voting power from the allies, city-states began to feel that their voices in discussions had been silenced.

From a Greek perspective the inherent problem with the Persian empire is that Persians and their subjects obeyed the Persian king, whose authority, much like that of a tyrant, was not checked by the νόμοι of the society.[76] The Spartans, on the other hand, were 'slaves' to their own νόμοι, as Demaratus points out (Hdt. 7.104), while according to Pericles, '[o]ur constitution is called a democracy because we govern in the interests of the majority, not just the few. Our laws give equal rights to all in private disputes...We are tolerant in our private dealings with one another, but in all public matters we abide by the law: it is fear above all which keeps us obedient to the authorities of the day and to the laws, especially those laws established for the protection of the injured and those unwritten laws

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[73] Translation Waterfield (1998); Forsdyke (2005: 224-41).
[74] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[75] This will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Five, sections 1-3.
[76] See Chapter Three, section 3 for more on the discussion between Xerxes and Demaratus and for Persian νόμοι in Herodotus.

whose contravention brings acknowledged disgrace' (Thuc. 2.37.1).[77] Unlike the 'law', policies of the Persian king were divinely dictated and could therefore be easily changed.[78] While the Athenians may have governed themselves in accordance with νόμοι, when it came to determining what actions should be carried out by the league, decisions were not made by members who exercised equal voting rights. Thucydides offers evidence that Athenian actions were conceptualised through the language of 'slavery', and that the allies believed their 'autonomous' condition constituted 'enslavement'. The Mytileneans make the following statement in their speech to the Spartans concerning their revolt.

> But the object of the alliance was the liberation of the Hellenes from Persia, not the subjugation of the Hellenes to Athens. So long as the Athenians in their leadership respected our independence, we followed them with enthusiasm. But when we saw that they [Athenians] were becoming less and less antagonistic to Persia and more and more interested in enslaving their own allies, then we became frightened. Because of the multiple voting system, the allies were incapable of uniting in self-defence, and so they all became enslaved except for us and Chios. We, supposed to be independent and nominally free, furnished our own contingents in the allied forces.[79]

> ξύμμαχοι μέντοι ἐγενόμεθα οὐκ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μήδου τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἡγοῦντο, προθύμως εἱπόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἑωρῶμεν αὐτοὺς τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας, τὴν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων δούλωσιν ἐπαγομένους, οὐκ ἀδεεῖς ἔτι ἦμεν. ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες καθ' ἓν γενόμενοι διὰ πολυψηφίαν ἀμύνασθαι οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐδουλώθησαν πλὴν ἡμῶν καὶ Χίων· ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι ξυνεστρατεύσαμεν (Thuc. 3.10.3-5).

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[77] Translation Hammond (2009); καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ' ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται· μέτεστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὰ ἴδια διάφορα πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον . . . ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσομιλοῦντες τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσιν.

[78] See Chapter 3, section 3.

[79] Translation Warner (1972a).

Although originally league members were 'autonomous', the Athenians slowly limited the voting rights of the allies, thereby limiting their ability to exercise their voice in the assembly and hastening their enslavement.[80] By applying the language of 'slavery', language which Herodotus uses to describe the physical enslavement of subjects by the Persians, Thucydides conveys the emergence of Athens as an empire through his use of rhetorically charged words. By describing Athenian actions through the language of 'slavery' Thucydides invites the reader to consider the value of 'freedom', when a city-state which had fought for the 'freedom' of the Greeks took advantage of its 'liberator' reputation in order to 'enslave' its allies.[81]

As I have shown, there is sufficient evidence from Thucydides' history to suggest that there was a general rhetoric or belief that Athens was 'enslaving' the allies and that treatment at the hands of the Athenians differed little from what they would have suffered at the hands of the Persians. Thucydides' characterisation of Athens as an 'enslaver' and comparisons between Athens and Persia in his history represent general sentiments circulating during Herodotus' time which may have led him to compare Athens and Persia in his own history. As I shall argue in the next chapter, one of the ways that Herodotus draws a comparison between the Persians and the post-Persian Wars Athenians is by examining how 'freedom' did not have a fixed definition, but was instead culturally embedded and prone to shifts in meaning as the νόμοι of different groups change in accordance with growth. In order to elicit the irony of the situation—that Athens the liberator had become Athens the enslaver—Herodotus considers what it might mean to be 'free' according to the νόμοι of the Persians. By simultaneously engaging with Persian notions of 'freedom' and the 'freedom' for which the Greeks fought during the Persian Wars, Herodotus demonstrates that 'freedom' itself is not a quality or condition that exists by nature, but rather a concept which is culturally embedded and therefore not absolute.

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[80] Alternatively Cleon, at 3.37, argues that democracy is ill-equipped to run an empire since listening to the complaints of the allies has led to the decision concerning Mytilene being debated again, which only makes the Athenians seem weak. However, this is the perspective of an Athenian, and not of the allies, who would have felt that the ability to address the Athenians on such an occasion as this was a far cry from equality in the assembly.

[81] See Chapter Four for a more thorough analysis of 'freedom' in Thucydides' history.

Chapter 3: Herodotean Freedom

The previous chapter examined the extent to which Herodotus was thinking about contemporary politics while writing the *Histories* and the evidence—both literary and epigraphic—that those who were dissatisfied with Athenian rule may have compared Athens to Persia. The aim of the following chapter is to examine how the political turmoil of Herodotus' own time and the emergence of Athenian power in the fifth century may have led him to consider how a society's priorities and νόμοι may engender different conceptualisations of what it means to be free. Although the Athenians had fought to free the Greeks from the Persians during the Persian Wars, as the Athenians' own power grew, the institutions of their rule began to resemble that of the Persians, against which they had fought in their struggle for freedom. An examination of 'freedom' from a Persian perspective suggests that Herodotus was not only concerned with how 'freedom' may be relevant to an imperial power, but also how empire's and city-state's νόμοι change in accordance with their own successes and failures, and that, consequently, so too do their conceptualisations of what it means to be free. As Herodotus states, 'I will cover minor and major human settlements equally, because most of those which were important in the past have diminished by now, and those which were great in my own time were small in times past. I will mention both equally because I know that human happiness never remains long in the same place' (1.5).[1] 'Freedom' was closely tied to the Greek identity and to the Athenians, who had fought for the freedom of the Greeks during the Persian Wars. By considering 'freedom' from a Persian perspective, Herodotus is able to draw a comparison between the Persians and the fifth-century Athenians, two groups dissonant with regard to both time and place, and, in doing so, he is able provide a warning to the Athenians regarding their present behaviour.

Unlike Fornara and Moles, who do not address the role that intellectual trends may have played in eliciting irony, I suggest that the manner in which Herodotus creates irony is shaped by frameworks and modes of discourse such as relativism and the debate between νόμος and φύσις. In her analysis of the ethnographies in Herodotus, Rosaria Vignolo Munson approaches the text through

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[1] Translation Waterfield (1998); τὰ γὰρ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν σμικρὰ γέγονε· τὰ δὲ ἐπ' ἐμέο ἦν μεγάλα, πρότερον ἦν σμικρά. Τὴν ἀνθρωπηίην ὧν ἐπιστάμενος εὐδαιμονίην οὐδαμὰ ἐν τὠυτῷ μένουσαν, ἐπιμνήσομαι ἀμφοτέρων ὁμοίως.

discourse 'to understand what the text says by examining how it says it'.[2] Similarly, I shall focus specifically on how Herodotus engages in a discourse of 'freedom' through frameworks, such as relativism and the νόμος-φύσις debate, in order to compare fifth-century Athens to Persia. For Herodotus 'freedom' was a concept which was not 'fixed' by nature. In other words, it did not exist by nature, but rather what it meant to be 'free' was determined by a community's νόμοι—what was deemed right, both in terms of customs and the laws. Consequently, for Herodotus, there were multiple ways of defining what it meant to be 'free', and these definitions shifted in accordance with the culturally embedded values of a society. Furthermore, what was deemed 'freedom' from one group's perspective could constitute 'slavery' from another's, thereby opening discussions of 'freedom' to relativistic analyses.[3]

My own approach to Herodotus has been influenced by recent scholarship which aims to read Herodotus not only as an historian, but as a writer whose understanding of the world and whose methods were influenced by intellectual frameworks and politics of the fifth century. It has not always been the case that Herodotus' *Histories* were viewed as a product of an intellectual pursuit that aimed to make sense of the world—the present world—as well as the past. Munson notes that the ethnographies in Herodotus were previously viewed as *disiecta membra* that were 'artfully but somewhat pointlessly inserted into the historical narrative'.[4] While Jacoby has suggested that Herodotus' work consisted of *logoi* that were originally independent, with the ethnographic *logoi* being inserted into the historical narrative at a later date, both Immerwahr and Lateiner argue against an 'analyst' approach in favour of the conceptual unity of Herodotus' work.[5] Those who adopt this approach, as Lateiner argues, 'explain more adequately...the pervasive intellectual concerns of the author and the literary skills which shaped his narrative techniques'.[6] Munson notes that inconsistencies and omissions in texts provide as much information to the reader as the text itself, but despite this, the issue of temporal dissonance in the ethnographic and historical *logoi* is problematic: while the historical *logoi* create a chronological narrative of the past, the ethnographic *logoi* describe 'permanent conditions and

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[2] Munson (2001: 266).
[3] For a more complete discussion of relativism in Herodotus' *Histories*, see pages 50-55.
[4] Munson (2001: 2).
[5] Jacoby (1913: 327-34, 341-55); Lateiner (1989: 3-6); Immerwahr (1966: 46-78).
[6] Lateiner (1989: 5).

customary actions in the present'.[7] In the past, the historical narratives and the ethnographic narratives dealing more with the way things are have been viewed as separate entities. However, Munson suggests that the ethnographies complement Herodotus' historical narrative of the Persian Wars by questioning what it means to be Greek, thereby offering commentary on Herodotus' own fifth-century world through the past. In this sense, Herodotus' investigations into the past and the present are complementary, and, if one is to understand Herodotus' 'message', one must understand how disparite elements of his work in fact work together.[8]

3.1 The Problem: One Word, Two Freedoms

While words formed from the ἐλευθερ- root are used fourteen times in reference to Athens, only once do the Athenians actually claim that they are fighting for the 'freedom' of the Greeks.[9] One would expect the Athenians to be depicted touting the slogan of 'freedom' as they defend Greece, especially after their triumph at Marathon. As Sahlins has argued 'an event is a happening interpreted',[10] and the language which the Greeks used to interpret the crisis of the Persian Wars was the language of 'freedom'. As I examined in Chapter One, evidence independent of Herodotus suggests that the Greeks began to conceptualise the struggle against the Persians as one for freedom shortly after the retreat of the Persians. Often crises require new paradigms of meaning when previous paradigms are not able to capture the magnitude of the crisis. The Persian Wars precipitated the emergence of a new type of 'freedom'.[11] Whereas previously 'free' and 'slave' had been used to describe the status of an individual and as a metaphor for political reforms, from the crisis of the Persian Wars emerged an ideology of 'freedom' in the sense of being free from the control of another. This new ideology or paradigm of 'freedom' was used to describe the overthrow of tyranny in Herodotus' *Histories*. One would expect, given how frequently this word appears in the context of Persian history and tyranny, that this language would also be used to narrate the actions of the Athenians during the war, since Herodotus believes them to be largely responsible for securing the

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[7] Munson (2001: 2).
[8] Munson (2001: 230-31, 272-73).
[9] See pages 61-62 for specific examples.
[10] Sahlins (1985: 153).
[11] See pages 39-42.

freedom of the Greeks (7.139).[12] However, the first time that the Athenians say that they will defend the 'freedom' of the Greeks occurs after Salamis, when Mardonius, a Persian general, sends a message from Xerxes through his ambassador, Alexander the Macedonian, to the Athenians offering them an alliance. The passage begins with Alexander speaking.

> Men of Athens, Mardonius says the following: 'a messenger has come to me from King Xerxes speaking thus: 'I [Xerxes] forgive the Athenians all wrong-doings committed by them against me. Now, Mardonius, do the following: give back their land to them, but also let them add to it, let them, being autonomous, take for themselves another land, whichever one they want, in addition to this one. If they are willing to come to terms with me, rebuild as many temples of theirs as I have burnt'.[13]
>
> ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Μαρδόνιος τάδε λέγει· ἐμοὶ ἀγγελίη ἥκει παρὰ βασιλέος λέγουσα ὧδε· Ἀθηναίοισι τὰς ἁμαρτάδας τὰς ἐς ἐμὲ ἐξ ἐκείνων γενομένας πάσας μετίημι. Νῦν τε ὧδε, Μαρδόνιε, ποίεε· τοῦτο μὲν τὴν γῆν σφι ἀπόδος, τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλην πρὸς ταύτῃ ἐλέσθων αὐτοί, ἥντινα ἂν ἐθέλωσι, ἐόντες αὐτόνομοι· ἱρά τε πάντα σφι, ἢν δὴ βούλωνταί γε ἐμοὶ ὁμολογέειν, ἀνόρθωσον, ὅσα ἐγὼ ἐνέπρησα (Hdt. 8.140).

Mardonius adds his own advice: the forces of Persia are too great for the Greeks to defeat, and even if they do, another greater force will follow. His message ends at 8.140 with the following statement: 'Be free, making a defensive alliance with us without treachery and deceit' (ἔστε ἐλεύθεροι, ἡμῖν ὁμαιχμίην συνθέμενοι ἄνευ τε δόλου καὶ ἀπάτης).[14]

The Spartans, having heard that a possible peace deal might be struck between the Athenians and the Persians, send envoys to Athens to dissuade the Athenians from making peace with Persia. The Spartan message was one which would be more apt if applied to the Peloponnesian Wars than the Persian:

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[12] For evidence independent of Herodotus' *Histories* that the Persians Wars were conceptualised as a struggle for 'freedom', see pages 39-40.
[13] Translation mine.
[14] Translation mine.

> Besides all of these things, it is in no wise tolerable that the Athenians, you who in the past appeared to be freeing many men, be the cause of slavery for the Greeks.[15]
>
> ἄλλως τε τούτων ἀπεόντων αἰτίους γενέσθαι δουλοσύνης τοῖσι Ἕλλησι Ἀθηναίους οὐδαμῶς ἀνασχετόν, οἵτινες αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ πάλαι φαίνεσθε πολλοὺς ἐλευθερώσαντες ἀνθρώπων (Hdt. 8.142).

This is surely a statement that looks forward to the Athenian role as liberator during the Persian Wars and enslaver thereafter. The language which Herodotus uses in Xerxes' message serves to strengthen the admonishing tone of the passage. Xerxes stated that the Greeks would be 'autonomous', but there is no epigraphic or literary evidence for 'autonomy' prior to Sophocles' *Antigone* in 442.[16] Figueira notes that 'autonomy' was commonly used during the era of the Delian League to describe relations between city-states.[17] Raaflaub goes one step further by arguing that 'free' was used to describe the lack of external interference, while 'autonomous' described the sovereignty exerted by a people over domestic policies.[18] Words which are formed from the αὐτονομ- root are often translated into English as 'autonomy'/'autonomous' and 'independence'/'independent'. Although many translators of Greek texts render both αὐτονομία and ἐλευθερία as 'freedom', αὐτονομία does not mean 'freedom'. While Hansen notes that a state is no longer deemed autonomous if it is ruled by a tyrant, Athens, Persia, a Spartan harmost, or the Peloponnesian league, he notes that there is a degree of subjectivity in interpreting what it means to be autonomous, which is why the

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[15] Translation mine.

[16] The concept of autonomy was complex and frequently used. It appears as an adjective twice in Herodotus, once in Sophocles' *Antigone*, and four times in the works of Hippocrates (thrice in *Airs, Waters and Places*; once in *de morbis popularibus*). In Thucydides' history it occurs thirty-nine times as an adjective, five times in verbal form, three times as a noun, and once as an adverb. Of the thirty-nine times it is used as an adjective, it is used only six times to describe the condition of a city-state, but thirty times in reference to the inhabitants of city-states; twice it describes an οἰκήσις, and once an individual. In Xenophon's *Hellenica* αὐτονομ- appears thirty-two times as an adjective. It occurs six times in noun form. In the rhetorical works of the fourth century there is an increased use of the noun form: eleven out of the nineteen times the concept is invoked by Isocrates it is in noun form. Andocides' references to autonomy are sparse: he uses it six times, all in *de pace*, all as adjectives, except for once when it appears as a noun. Demosthenes only uses the word as an adjective, and one of those instances is a participle. Furthermore, Hansen (1998: 78) notes that the assumption that a polis must be autonomous is incorrect, as 500 city-states deemed poleis by contemporary sources would not be considered autonomous.

[17] Figueira (1990: 63-88).

[18] Raaflaub (2004: 147-60).

term was politically useful for those asserting that their sovereignty was being interfered with by a more powerful body.[19] Despite the ambiguity of how the concept of 'autonomy' could be used, Low notes the close relationship between intervention and autonomy; the concept is typically invoked in instances of political interference.[20]

In his monograph on autonomy, Ostwald concludes that 'autonomy' entered the political scene as a concept by 432 BC, since the citizens of Aegina complained that they had lost the αὐτονομία guaranteed them by Athens in the Thirty Years' Peace (446-445 BC). According to Ostwald, the concept of 'autonomy' best described the circumstances of Athens' violation of Aegina's rights as a state, and therefore Herodotus consciously decided to use the term anachronistically, since the situation described at 8.140 fit the circumstances of its use. As this is not the first instance in which Athens exerted influence over Greek city-states in the post-Persian War period, it is entirely conceivable that αὐτονομία as a concept became prevalent earlier, most likely around 468/467 BC when the Greek city-states began to feel that they were being deprived of their basic political rights by Athenian hegemony.[21] Drawing from the earlier research of Ostwald, Raaflaub argues in favour of a later date for the origin of αὐτονομία due to the lack of epigraphic evidence for the term before 427-426 BC.[22]

Regardless of when 'autonomy' actually emerged as a concept, both Herodotus and Thucydides used the concept anachronistically. The term, having emerged from the escalating tensions between Athens, Sparta, and their respective allies, was associated with the politics of the Peloponnesian War. Rather than attribute Herodotus' and Thucydides' anachronistic uses of 'autonomy' to the aptness of the vocabulary for the narrative, one should ask how anachronistic use of this vocabulary gives meaning to the text. Ostwald suggests that Herodotus uses 'autonomy' because it accurately describes the situation, but that it was not used at the time of the event.[23] While I agree that Herodotus chose to use the term because it fits the context of his narrative, I believe that the decision to include an anachronistic concept was not one which was taken lightly by the historian. This term appears only twice in the *Histories*, suggesting that Herodotus chose to use

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[19] Hansen (1995: 34-35); Ostwald (1982: 42); Bosworth (1992: 122-52); Rhodes (1999: 40).
[20] Low (2007: 187-98).
[21] Ostwald (1982: 40).
[22] Raaflaub (2004: 148).
[23] Ostwald (1982: 1).

the term only in particular contexts. Additionally it brings the reader forward to the Peloponnesian War when 'autonomy' becomes a controversial political status.[24] In using a term associated with the politics of the Peloponnesian War, the reader is led to contrast the Athenian fight to 'free' the Greeks (Hdt. 7.139), and their subsequent 'enslavement' of their Greek allies.

What is significant about Herodotus' use of 'autonomy' at 8.140 is not so much what 'autonomy' means in the context of the Persian Wars, but what it signifies for the reader.[25] As a concept which emerged during the escalating tensions between Athens, Sparta and their respective allies, the mention of 'autonomy' at 8.140 would have signified to the reader that Herodotus is using the past to engage with the present, and, more specifically, drawing a comparison between the Athenians' claim to be fighting for the 'freedom' of the Greeks at 8.143, and their behaviour during the Peloponnesian Wars when the Athenians were accused of 'enslaving' city-states and violating their 'autonomy'. The advice of the Spartans prevailed and the Athenians declined the Persian offer. The Athenians state that they are well aware of the disparity between Persian and Greek forces.[26] Despite this disparity, at 8.143 the Athenians argue that they will never enslave Greece to Persia: 'but nevertheless we, striving after freedom, we will defend ourselves in whatever way we can' (ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐλευθερίης γλιχόμενοι ἀμυνεόμεθα οὕτω ὅκως ἂν καὶ δυνώμεθα).[27] Instead they will fight the Persians since it is not a good thing that in making a treaty with Persia, Athens be responsible for enslaving those with whom she shares a language, temples, gods, religious rites, and a common way of life (Hdt. 8.143-44).

The use of 'autonomy' as a narrative tool at 8.140 brings the past into dialogue with the politics of the latter half of the fifth century. Athens, having promised never to enslave Greece, had become the 'enslavers' of Greeks after the

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[24] Although one could argue that Herodotus' reference to 'autonomy' would remind the reader of the Spartan ultimatum which led to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian Wars, the only evidence for this ultimatum is in Thucydides' history (Thuc. 1.139.3). Thucydides' account of the role of 'autonomy' in the war is complicated by his representation of the term. Consequently Herodotus' mention of 'autonomy' would have led the reader to consider the similarities between Athens' relationship with her allies, in which 'autonomy' played a role, and the Persian offer of 'autonomy'. Herodotus' use of 'autonomy' would bring the reader forward to fifth-century politics in general, rather than to the Spartan ultimatum specifically. For more on Thucydides' 'autonomy' see Chapter Five.

[25] For present purposes, 'autonomy' serves as a signifier in the narrative. The concept of 'autonomy' will be dealt with at greater length and in more depth in Chapter Five.

[26] This is another forward-looking statement. The calculation of military strength was a common feature of Athenian military ideology (Raaflaub 2001: 307-41).

[27] Translation mine.

Persian Wars. Embedded within the irony is a warning to the Athenians not to forget the means by which they attained their empire in the first place: by freeing Greece from Persia. Sara Forsdyke has noted that Herodotus often criticises contemporary Athenians by referring to noble actions in the past. She argues that criticism is the point of his statement at 8.3 where he relates that the Athenians yielded to those who objected to their leadership, having recognised that if they continued to argue Greece would perish. In case the message was not clear, Herodotus continues: 'for internal strife is a thing as much worse than war carried on by a united people, as war is worse than peace' (Hdt. 8.3).[28] This mode of criticism is used by the Spartan ephor, Sthenelaidas in Thucydides' history.

> And yet if they behaved well against the Persians in the past, but ill toward us now, they deserve double punishment for having ceased to be good and for having become bad.[29]
>
> καίτοι εἰ πρὸς τοὺς Μήδους ἐγένοντο ἀγαθοὶ τότε, πρὸς δ' ἡμᾶς κακοὶ νῦν, διπλασίας ζημίας ἄξιοί εἰσιν, ὅτι ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν κακοὶ γεγένηνται (Thuc. 1.86.1).

The inclusion of such forms of criticism by Thucydides suggests that this opinion expressed by Sthenelaidas was popular during Herodotus' lifetime and must be considered when appeals to noble deeds are made at moments where the protagonist has the opportunity to do either great harm or good. The statement made by the Spartans at 8.142 is double edged: not only does it refer to the noble deeds of the Athenians, it also draws attention to their imperial designs after the Persian Wars by reminding the reader at one and the same time what Athens formerly was and no longer is.

The use of freedom at 8.140 poses a problem: Mardonius interprets Xerxes' offer of 'autonomy' as 'freedom', but the Greeks reject this offer on the grounds that they are so focused on 'freedom' that they will fight for it in whatever way they can (Hdt. 8.143). The Athenians have essentially rejected an offer of 'freedom', and of 'autonomy', by claiming that they are fighting for 'freedom'. This dilemma can only be resolved if the Persians and the Greeks mean something

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[28] Translation mine.
[29] Translation Forsdyke (2006: 235).

different by 'freedom'. Many have argued that Herodotus used the language of 'freedom' anachronistically and haphazardly. In the following section I shall examine the intellectual trends popular during Herodotus' lifetime that provided him with a framework for thinking about what it means to be 'free'. By attributing the language of 'freedom' to Persia, and, as I shall show, establishing a conceptualisation of 'freedom' that is shaped by the νόμοι of the Persians, Herodotus is suggesting in a subtle, yet powerful way, that 'freedom' may be culturally embedded, or rather shaped by a society's cultural and political νόμοι.

Although there is little evidence to suggest that there was a Persian ideology of 'freedom' comparable to Greek 'freedom', evidence such as the Cyrus Cylinder, in which the Persians 'loosen' those suffering 'from oppression', may have led Herodotus to consider that, at one time, the Persians themselves struggled to 'free' themselves from the Medes, but that, at some point, the struggle to free themselves from the Medes ultimately made the Persians powerful enough to rule over others. Herodotus examines the emergence of Persia as a dominant power in the Near East and how its νόμοι, which shift as they grow more powerful, affect the Persians' conceptualisation of 'freedom'. He does this in order to better understand how the Athenians, who had once liberated the Greeks from Persia, could become the enslavers of Greeks.

3.2 Herodotus and Contemporary Intellectual Trends

Herodotus was as influenced by contemporary intellectual trends as he was by the political developments of the fifth century. Thomas has shown that Herodotus was influenced by Ionian thinkers such as Xenophanes, Pythagoras, Heraclitus and Hecataeus, by Presocratics such as Anaxagoras, and by sophists such as Protagoras. Herodotus may even be considered a *sophos*, 'a sage or man of wisdom'.[30] The very phrase used by Herodotus to describe his endeavor, ἱστορίης ἀπόδειξις, is itself a 'scientific undertaking', and one that is comparable to 'the process of inquiry in cases of judicial arbitration'.[31] Asheri notes that it was not until the fourth century that ἱστορίη, or 'enquiry', came to be associated with investigations into the past.[32] Herodotus' methodology relies primarily on first-hand knowledge, ὄψις, and reasoning or opinion, γνώμη (2.99). The term was

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[30] Thomas (2000: 6-7).
[31] Munson (2001: 7); Thomas (1997: 128-48).
[32] Asheri (2007: 8).

used by the Presocratics to refer to their investigations, and by Socrates' own time it was used to describe a branch of knowledge known as περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία.[33] Both Connor and Nagy have noted that in the process of carrying out his investigations, Herodotus acts as an ἵστωρ, or arbitrator in a dispute, who passes judgments after collecting the evidence or the results of his enquires.[34] At times, however, Herodotus' engagement with his text suggests that he asserted a role that exceeded the limits of arbitrator, such as at 7.139 where he expresses his own opinion.[35]

According to Plutarch (*Per.* 4.3) and Plato (DK 29 A4), Pericles, along with others in his circle such as Herodotus, Phidias and Sophocles, attended lectures by Zeno the Eleatic.[36] Rosalind Thomas suggests that Herodotus' own personal conditions may have led him to conceptualise his enquiries through sophistic precepts:

> Perhaps too, as a Greek from Asia Minor, he was acutely aware that it was not enough to be Greek in the fight against the Persians, and while ethnography was important, the Asiatic Greeks could hardly accept that as inhabitants of Asia they were different by nature from the mainland Greeks. The new sophistic stress on *nomoi* perhaps offered Herodotus conceptual terms in which to express some reasons for the longer-term conflict between Greeks and Persians and the surprising success of the Greeks.[37]

As I shall argue, Herodotus considers how 'freedom' is understood within the context of a particular society's νόμοι, and how, while one group may view a particular action or behaviour as 'slavish', another will view it the mark of a 'free' individual. Through the frameworks of νόμος-φύσις and relativism Herodotus considers what it means to be 'free'. For Herodotus, 'freedom' was defined in accordance with the νόμοι of particular societies, and, therefore, value judgments concerning other group's perceptions of what is 'free' or 'slavish' are informed by these νόμοι. Consequently what constitutes slavishness from a Greek perspective,

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[33] Pl. *Phd.* 96a8; Connor (1993: 4).
[34] Nagy (1990: 315-20); Connor (1993: 4).
[35] Connor (1993: 15.)
[36] Kerferd (1981: 19). For an introduction to those considered to be 'sophists', see pages 53-55.
[37] Thomas (2006: 71).

namely loyalty to a king, is deemed the mark of a nobleman from a Persian perspective. One of the best preserved examples of relativism is the *Dissoi logoi*, or the 'Twofold Argument', written at the beginning of the fourth century, and comprised of nine chapters with opposing arguments such as good and evil, justice and injustice.[38] In each of these arguments, by arguing from both sides of a moral debate, the author proves that actions can either be good or evil depending on one's perspective.[39] Guthrie provides a definition of relativism as applied to values:

> There is nothing to which the epithets good, bad or the like can be applied absolutely and without qualification, because the effect of everything is different according to the object on which it is exercised, the circumstances of its application and so on...When a speaker says that good and bad are only relative, he may mean that 'there is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so'. Any investigation of the *nomos-physis* antithesis turns up plenty of examples of this: incest abominable in Greek eyes, normal in Egyptian and so on.[40]

Herodotus' own use of relativism differs from the relativism engaged in by the sophists. At 3.38 Herodotus makes the following statement regarding νόμοι:

> If one were to order all mankind to choose the best set of rules in the world, each group would, after due consideration, choose its own customs; each group regards its own as being by far the best. So it is unlikely that anyone except a madman would laugh at such things.[41]

> Εἰ γάρ τις προθείη πᾶσι ἀνθρώποισι ἐκλέξασθαι κελεύων νόμους τοὺς καλλίστους ἐκ τῶν πάντων νόμων, διασκεψάμενοι ἂν ἑλοίατο ἕκαστοι τοὺς ἑωυτῶν· οὕτω νομίζουσι πολλόν τι καλλίστους τοὺς

[38] Gera (2000: 22). See pages 50-52 for Herodotus' Scythians, who engage in relativism.
[39] López Eire (2007: 337); Pownall (2004:, 13); DK 90 1.8.
[40] Guthrie (1971: 166).
[41] Translation Waterfield (1998).

> ἑωυτῶν νόμους ἕκαστοι εἶναι. Οὐκ ὦν οἰκός ἐστι ἄλλον γε ἢ μαινόμενον ἄνδρα γέλωτα τὰ τοιαῦτα τίθεσθαι.[42]

To prove that it is the case that each group gives primacy to or prefers its own νόμοι, Herodotus describes two groups of people, neither of whom could be persuaded by any sum of money to abandon for another's their own customs for dealing with the dead; 'So these practices have become enshrined as customs just as they are, and I think Pindar was right to have said in his poem that custom is the king of all' (3.38). This sentiment, Gera notes, is similar to a thought experiment set up in the *Dissoi Logoi*.[43] While Heinimann has suggested that 3.38 is so sophistic that it must have been borrowed from the writings of the sophists, Thomas notes that Heinimann's conclusion does not explain why this passage has been inserted into the text.[44] According to Munson, Herodotus' comment that no one except a 'madman would laugh at such things', that is, that men regard their own νόμοι to be best, is a reference to Cambyses, who sets out to determine whether practices, common beliefs, and cultural institutions will be able to sustain objective examination. In the process of his examination, Cambyses violates several νόμοι and is driven mad by illness, and thus his transgressions 'coincide with an impairment of the mind that clearly belongs in the sphere of *physis* (nature)'.[45] While the sophists employed relativism to argue from both sides of argument, Herodotus used relativism to explain that one's value judgements are culturally embedded, the result being that one must be mad, like Cambyses, to deny the cultural primacy of a particular group's νόμοι. As Munson argues, 'the lack of objective validity in people's perception that their own *nomoi* are καλοί only goes to show that all *nomoi* are καλοί'.[46] For Munson, Herodotus is a relativist only in the sense that he believes that individuals' value judgements are determined by their νόμοι. Humphreys rejects the traditional assessment that νόμος refers to 'custom' at 3.38 and to 'law' at 7.102-104, but instead argues that the same principle is being invoked.[47] She suggests that Herodotus was not

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[42] Similarly at 7.52 Herodotus notes that 'if everyone in the world were to bring his own problems along to market with the intention of trading with his neighbours, a glimpse of his neighbours' problems would make him glad to take back home the ones he came with'.
[43] Gera (2000: 36-37).
[44] Heinimann (1945: 81); Thomas (2000: 126).
[45] Munson (2001: 168-69).
[46] Munson (2001: 170).
[47] For more on 7.102-104 see Chapter Three, section 3.

concerned with the debate between νόμος and φύσις, but was instead making the point that one must not act beyond the boundaries set by νόμοι regardless of the variation of νόμοι between cultures; one must suffer the consequences if one does so, as the madness of Cambyses revealed. For Humphreys, νόμος in Herodotus is an answer and an endpoint; Herodotus does not ask why people observe particular νόμοι, but views νόμοι as a stopping point in his enquiry.

Humphreys concludes that Herodotus' thinking is closer to the Presocratics than to the sophists, who believe that there is no reason to live in accordance with νόμοι since they are man-made; the only reason men obey them is fear of punishment.[48] Herodotus appeals to νόμος in both passages (3.38, 7.102-104) in order to explain something that is unpredictable. In the case of 3.38 νόμος is used to explain the different burial customs, while at 7.102-104 it is used to explain why the Greeks would dare to oppose the Persians when they are so greatly outnumbered.[49] Interpretation of 3.38 depends on the meaning of νόμοι. It is simple enough to assert that Herodotus has used νόμοι as an explanatory 'last resort'. However, based on Herodotus' own interaction with the concept of νόμοι at 3.38, it would make sense that Herodotus is engaging with νόμος on another level.

However, a more subtle distinction is being drawn here: νόμος is the king of all in that it sets the parameters of justice within a society, whereas in war the victor determines what is just and unjust. Herodotus does not argue from an absolute position of relativism: he does not suggest that what was deemed detestable to one group was an established practice deemed good by another, but that the principles in accordance with which a group lives will result in different culturally embedded notions of acceptable behaviour, and that based on these notions value judgements are made concerning what it good and bad, just and unjust. That this is the case can be seem by a comparison of Herodotus' statement regarding νόμος at 3.38 and the context of the original Pindar fragment that Herodotus quotes. At 3.38 Herodotus states, 'I think Pindar was right to have said in his poem that custom is king of all' (ὀρθῶς μοι δοκέει Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι, νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας εἶναι).[50] Humphreys notes the parallelism of

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[48] Humphreys (1987: 213-214).
[49] Humphreys (1987: 218); Evans (1965: 142-53).
[50] Translation Waterfield (2009).

3.38 and Heraclitus fragment B53, 'war is the father and king of all'.[51] However, Herodotus is making a statement concerning νόμοι that is fundamentally different than Heraclitus' position on νόμος. In fragment B114, Heraclitus makes the following statement:

> Speaking with understanding they must hold fast to what is shared by all, as a city holds to its law, and even more firmly. For all human laws are nourished by one divine one. It prevails as it will and suffices for all and is more than enough.[52]
>
> ξὺν νόωι λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῶι ξυνῶι πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμωι πόλις, καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται.[53]

Kahn connects Heraclitus' comment on νόμος to another fragment, B44: 'The people must fight for the law as for their city wall'. Based on these two passages, Kahn suggests that νόμος is the only defense that the weak have against the interests of the stronger.[54] Furthermore, connecting this fragment to B43, in which Heraclitus likens violence or lawlessness to a house on fire, Kahn argues that Heraclitus may have been influenced by Solon's image of public disaster in fragment 3.26-37, but he notes that Heraclitus takes Solon's 'enlightened leadership' of one individual further by arguing that all obey the advice of one person (B33). This advice is grounded in the 'divine', as all human laws—laws that are common to all—are nourished by one divine law.[55] Although Herodotus' quoting of Pindar seems parallel to Heraclitus—νόμος is king of all just as war is the king of all—Herodotus rejects the notion that there is one divine νόμος that unifies everyone, by providing examples where different νόμοι—νόμοι regarded as divine by those who practice them—are valued otherwise by those whose νόμοι are different.

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[51] DK B53.
[52] Translation Kahn (1979: 43).
[53] See pages 207-208.
[54] Kahn (1979: 118, 179).
[55] Kahn (1979: 180).

In order to understand Herodotus' position on νόμος as δεσπότης or βασιλεύς, it will be necessary to examine the Pindar quote in the context of the original fragment. Pindar begins fragment 169 by stating that '[n]omos, king of all, mortals and immortals, brings on with sovereign hand what is most violent and makes it just' (1-4).[56] As evidence in support of this statement he provides examples from the life of Heracles, but rather than depicting Heracles as 'liberator *par excellence* from monsters that trouble mankind', Ostwald notes that Heracles is presented as acting unjustly, while those who suffer at the hands of Heracles are presented as victims of 'violence unjustly perpetrated'.[57] Ostwald recognises the difficulty of determining which νόμος is being referred to by Pindar, and, more specifically, which νόμος would justify Heracles' actions, described as they are as being carried out by force.[58] According to tradition, Heracles was a hero whose actions were heroic and valiant, the justice of whose actions was not questioned. By presenting Heracles as acting unjustly, Pindar was able to prove his point that νόμος is able to make the most violent acts just. This νόμος is different than νόμος as it is presented by Heraclitus in B114: whereas νόμος in Pindar is a conventional attitude or belief regarded as valid, νόμος in Heraclitus is derived from one divine law. Pindar's assessment of νόμος is based on his own observations of the traditional tales of Heracles, and undoubtedly by his own world in which acts of violence were regarded as just.

Heraclitus' assessment of νόμος is more idealistic in that he regards νόμοι as the common bonds that unite men and serve to protect them; they are common to all men, regardless of where men are from, and they are derived from one divine νόμος. There is, however, still a parallelism between Heraclitus' statement that 'war is the father of all and king of all' and Pindar's statement that νόμος is king of all, both mortals and immortals, a relationship that was not lost on Herodotus. Heraclitus asserts that some men are revealed by war to be gods, others men; some are made slaves, others free. War itself may have tested men and determined their fate by rendering them free or enslaved, but the replacement of 'war' with this particular use of νόμος suggests that it is not war that makes men 'free' or 'enslaved', but rather acts of violence that are regarded as 'just', as it is ultimately the victors who set the standard of justice: Heracles was the victor,

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[56] Translation Ostwald (1965: 117).
[57] Ostwald (1965: 118).
[58] Ostwald (1965: 124).

and therefore his actions are deemed just, in much the same way that the winning side in a battle exacts justice on its enemies. The justice dealt out is undoubtedly 'unjust' from the perspective of the victim, but it is regarded as just nonetheless, since justice serves the interests of the stronger.

For Herodotus, war did not determine whether men were 'slaves' or 'free', but rather νόμοι, deep-seated convictions that led men to engage in acts of violence regarded as 'just', even though such acts might not seem so to others. In this respect νόμος is like a tyrant or a king: for the Spartans νόμος is a δεσπότης because, like slaves, they are forced by their beliefs that these norms are 'right' to uphold and defend them. The irony, of course, an irony that is exposed by Herodotus at 3.38, is that the νόμοι that men feel compelled to defend are not νόμοι that are divine, but rather manmade.

The relationship between Herodotus' statement that νόμος is 'king' and Pindar's quote in reference to Heracles suggests that 'justice' itself is not fixed, but is culturally embedded: what a society deems 'right' or 'wrong' is determined by its νόμοι. Consequently, νόμος—a conviction or belief held by the community—has the power to make even the most violent acts 'just'. Similarly, Herodotus' position on the concept of 'freedom' is informed by his belief that 'freedom' itself is defined by the νόμοι of a society, and thus different νόμοι can lead to contradictory assessments and judgements of what it means to be 'free'. For Herodotus, νόμος is king because societies determine what is 'right' and 'wrong', 'just' or 'unjust' in accordance with it, and, consequently it can make even the most violent acts 'just'.

An examination of 'Persian freedom' in the *Histories* will demonstrate that Herodotus' use of 'freedom' may not have been an oversight, but in fact corresponds to a Persian rhetoric of 'loosening from servitude' and royal ideologies in general. Intellectual trends such as the debate between νόμος-φύσις may have inspired Herodotus to consider how a Persian perspective of what it means to be 'free' was shaped by the νόμοι of the Persians. Furthermore, this examination will reveal that Herodotus' own discussions of the constitutional νόμοι of the Persians with regard to 'ruling' and 'being ruled' mirrors the transformation of Persia from a relatively small band of individuals to a more powerful empire, a universal pattern recognised by Herodotus at 1.5. While there is little evidence to suggest that the Persians framed their own past in terms of 'freedom', the similarities between fifth-century Athens and the Persians may have led Herodotus to consider how freedom might be relevant for an imperial power

like Persia.[59] The Persians freed themselves from the Medes in much the same way that Greeks, led by the Athenians, freed themselves from the threat of Persia. Upon 'freeing' themselves from the Medes, Persia became a powerful empire, just as the Athenians, upon freeing themselves from tyranny, became vastly superior (5.78). At 6.109, on the eve of Marathon, Miltiades notes that if the Athenians choose to fight the Persians, Athens will become the leader of Greece. This statement makes more sense if one knows already that the Athenians have assumed a leadership position in the Delian League. This statement suggests that Herodotus is thinking about the relationship between 'freedom' and growth of societies, and how, as city's grow, their νόμοι change, thus altering their perception and relationship to what it means to be 'free'.

3.3 Freedom in Accordance with Persian νόμοι

An examination of how Herodotus uses the language of 'freedom' in his narrative of Persian history illustrates that Herodotus is considering how an imperial power like the Persians might define 'freedom' within the context of their own νόμοι, and how, at various moments in a society's history that society has the opportunity to shape or alter its νόμοι, thereby affecting its relationship to 'freedom'.

The first reference to Persian freedom occurs during the story of Cyrus' childhood. Ten years after the failed exposure of the infant Cyrus, a dispute between the young Cyrus and his playmates was brought before Astyages, Cyrus' father and king of the Medes, for arbitration. One day Cyrus and his peers played a game in which Cyrus was chosen to be the king. When one of the boys refused to obey Cyrus' orders, he whipped the insolent youth into obedience. The beaten boy complained to his father who presented the case before Astyages, arguing that the son of a cowherd, and slave of Astyages, had insulted a nobleman's son (Hdt. 1.114).[60] Upon meeting the child, the king asked Cyrus if he dared to behave rudely to one who was the son of a prominent man in his court. In response Cyrus explained that the boy was treated as he deserved. All the boys, the whipped boy included, had chosen him to be king because they thought he was best suited for the job. 'All the other boys did what I told them to do, but he went on refusing to

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[59] For a more complete discussion of these similarities see Chapter Two, section 2.

[60] Artembares, the father of the boy whipped by Cyrus, states the following: ὦ βασιλεῦ, ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ δούλου, βουκόλου δὲ παιδός, ὧδε περιυβρίσμεθα (Hdt. 1.14).

do what he was told and ignoring me, until he was punished for it. If that was wrong and I deserve to get into trouble for it, here I am' (1.115).[61]

After his meeting with the boy, Astyages became suspicious of the boy's identity; not only did the boy's features resemble his own, but his answer was rather like that of a free man: ἡ ὑπόκρισις ἐλευθεριωτέρη εἶναι (Hdt. 1.116). A better definition for ἐλευθεριωτέρη in this instance is 'noble'. Asheri notes that Herodotus has described Cyrus as 'free' because his response demonstrates 'freedom of speech'.[62] However, this explanation does not take into account Herodotus' characterisation of Persians as 'free' in the sense of 'noble'. While the antithesis of 'slave' for the Greeks was 'free', for the Persians the structural antithesis of 'slave' was noble. According to Hesychius' Greek lexicon ἐλεύθερος is a definition for the Old Persian word, **āzāta*, which, as we saw in Chapter One, from a Greek perspective, was interpreted as 'free'.[63] Herodotus could have chosen from a selection of Greek words more commonly used to describe the Persian nobility,[64] but his use of ἐλευθεριωτέρη allows the reader to consider that the Persian equivalent of 'freedom' would be 'nobility'. Herodotus rejects the Greek perception of the nobles as 'slaves' on account of their loyalty and obedience to one man, but instead considers what it might mean to be 'free' within the structure of Persian society.

Some time after his audience with the Median king, Cyrus returned to Persia and raised a revolt against the Median kingdom, a revolt inspired by Harpagus who resented the king for his harsh treatment in the Cyrus fiasco.[65] In the following speech Cyrus uses the Persians' fear of personal enslavement to incite a rebellion against the Medes; the freedom of the individual was the impetus of a political act which allowed the Persians to rule over themselves.

> Men of Persia, thus is your predicament: these and a myriad of other good things are for those who are willing to obey me without having slavish

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[61] Οἱ μέν νυν ἄλλοι παῖδες τὰ ἐπιτασσόμενα ἐπετέλεον, οὗτος δὲ ἀνηκούστεέ τε καὶ λόγον εἶχε οὐδένα, ἐς ὃ ἔλαβε τὴν δίκην.
[62] Asheri, Lloyd and Corcella (2007: 161).
[63] See Chapter One, page 47.
[64] Briant (2002: 331-32).
[65] Having been dealt the duty of exposing young Cyrus many years earlier, Harpagus, unable to do the deed himself, passed the duty onto the herdsman Mithradates. Harpagus paid for his failure to commit the crime himself with the death of his own son, whose body was served to him at the dinner table. His eternal hatred for the king resulted in a revolt.

> work. For those of you not willing to obey me there will be countless labours similar to yesterday's. So obey me and be free.[66]
>
> ἄνδρες Πέρσαι, οὕτως ὑμῖν ἔχει· βουλομένοισι μὲν ἐμέο πείθεσθαι ἔστι τάδε τε καὶ ἄλλα μυρία ἀγαθά, οὐδένα πόνον δουλοπρεπέα ἔχουσι· μὴ βουλομένοισι δὲ ἐμέο πείθεσθαι εἰσὶ ὑμῖν πόνοι τῷ χθιζῷ παραπλήσιοι ἀναρίθμητοι. Νῦν ὦν ἐμέο πειθόμενοι γίνεσθε ἐλεύθεροι (Hdt. 1.126).

The slavish toil to which Cyrus refers is the manual labour imposed on the soldiers the day before. Having cleared land with reaping hooks, the following day Cyrus provided a feast for the Persians and asked them which they prefer. Having opted for the feast rather than the labour, the Persians obeyed Cyrus and revolted against Astyages. Cyrus likens living under Median rule to slavery. Although the Persians were not actually 'slaves', Cyrus has drawn a parallel between the status they currently occupy and slavery. By choosing to enjoy a feast instead of the labour imposed on them the day before, the Persians decide to obey Cyrus, and since they had long hated Median rule, they 'freed' themselves (Hdt. 1.127), thereby securing their own status as nobles within this new society. Their endeavours were met with success. The Persian revolt against the Medes led to the capture of the Median king, Astyages, and once again freedom becomes the central theme of a dialogue between eastern kings. Harpagus, the renegade Median general responsible for inciting the Persian revolt against the Medes, interrogated Astyages. Their discussion provides further evidence that Herodotus plays with ideas of 'freedom' when he uses the Greek word for 'free' (ἐλευθερ-) to describe Persian nobles. Harpagus, angry with Astyages for having served him his own son's body at the dinner table, asked the former king how he enjoys being a slave instead of a king (ὅ τι εἴη ἡ ἐκείνου δουλοσύνη ἀντὶ τῆς βασιληίης). While this, in and of itself, would not indicate that slavery was the antithesis of nobility in Persia, Astyages responded by accusing Harpagus of having acted unjustly. For if he had incited a revolt merely in order that he might avenge the death of his son, it was surely an unjust thing that

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[66] Translation mine.

> now the Medes, who were not at all responsible for this, were made slaves instead of masters, and the Persians who had before been slaves of the Medes had become their masters.[67]
>
> νῦν δὲ Μήδους μὲν ἀναιτίους τούτου ἐόντας δούλους ἀντὶ δεσποτέων γεγονέναι, Πέρσας δὲ δούλους ἐόντας τὸ πρὶν Μήδων νῦν γεγονέναι δεσπότας (Hdt. 1.129).

While 'freedom' may be the expected antithesis of 'slavery', for the Near Eastern states 'nobility', or **āzāta*, is the antithesis of 'slavery'.[68] Initially what concerned the Persians was that they secure their freedom from the Medes. However, once they have secured their freedom, they are no longer concerned with freedom, but are instead concerned with maintaining their rule, as their rule is what allows them to maintain their position as nobles within the society. As the Cyrus Cylinder demonstrates, the Persians themselves claimed to be loosening from oppression those on whose behalf the Persians intervened, which may have led Herodotus to attribute notions of fighting for freedom from the interference of the oppressor.

Once the Persians free themselves from Median rule, the dominant paradigm that structures Persian hierarchy is not 'free-slave' but 'ruling-being ruled'. When Cyrus expressed his fear that he was being plotted against by Darius, Darius' father reassured him that there was no one who would plot against Cyrus for the following reason:

> O King, let no Persian plot against you, but if one does, may he be killed as quickly as possible. Instead of slaves you have made the Persians free men, and instead of being ruled by others, they rule over all.[69]
>
> ὦ βασιλεῦ, μὴ εἴη ἀνὴρ Πέρσης γεγονὼς ὅστις τοι ἐπιβουλεύσει, εἰ δ' ἔστι, ἀπόλοιτο ὡς τάχιστα· ὃς ἀντὶ μὲν δούλων ἐποίησας ἐλευθέρους Πέρσας εἶναι, ἀντὶ δὲ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἁπάντων (Hdt. 1.210).

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[67] Translation mine.
[68] For a more complete discussion see Chapter One, page 47.
[69] Translation mine.

Darius points out, just as Cyrus did earlier by making the Persians work (1.126), that before Cyrus encouraged the Persians to rebel, they were slaves. The Persians themselves were not actually 'slaves', but by occupying the lowest tiers of society they were considered 'slaves'. By 'freeing' themselves from the Medes, the Persians were able to establish a hierarchy in which they dominated the top tier and were therefore closest to the king. The importance of being ruled over by one's 'own people' in Near Eastern societies is highlighted by the Magi who, advising Astyages, note that '[i]f it devolves to this boy, who is Persian, we Medes will be enslaved by the Persians and will become worthless. But you are one of us. As long as you are king, then, power is partly ours too, and we have important standing in society thanks to you. We are bound to do all we can to look out for you and your rule (1.120).[70] The shift in language from 'freeing' to 'ruling' also functions on another level, as it reveals the connection between being 'free' or being a 'noble'; Persians were deemed 'free' or 'noble' on account of their relationship to the king, who ruled over them. For the Persians, their noble status was secured through the obedience to one man in a struggle to free themselves from the ruling power of the Medes. This struggle results not only in their 'freedom', but the 'enslavement' of the Medes, a scenario which earlier the Medes feared might happen should Cyrus rise up against them. Once they have 'freed' themselves, they are no longer ruled by the Medes, but instead, as Darius' father points out, rule over others, and are ruled by one of their own, thus securing their own nobility. Once the Persians have 'freed' themselves, the more relevant framework for conceptualisng their rule is not 'freedom' and 'slavery', but rather 'ruling' and 'being ruled'.

For the Persians 'freedom' not only meant ruling over those conquered in their struggle to be 'free', but it also entailed 'being ruled over' by one who shares their νόμοι. When the Persians have an opportunity to consider under what constitution they might be best governed, Herodotus describes the debate concerning whether the Persians should be governed by a democracy, an oligarchy, or a monarchy. This passage, known as the Constitutional Debate, has

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[70] Translation Waterfield (1998); κείνως μὲν γὰρ ἀλλοτριοῦται ἐς τὸν παῖδα τοῦτον περιοῦσα ἐόντα Πέρσην, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐόντες Μῆδοι δουλούμεθά τε καὶ λόγου οὐδενὸς γινόμεθα πρὸς Περσέων, ἐόντες ξεῖνοι· σέο δ' ἐνεστεῶτος βασιλέος, ἐόντος πολιήτεω, καὶ ἄρχομεν τὸ μέρος καὶ τιμὰς πρὸς σέο μεγάλας ἔχομεν. Οὕτω ὦν πάντως ἡμῖν σέο τε καὶ τῆς σῆς ἀρχῆς προοπτέον ἐστί.

been the subject of much enquiry.[71] Munson has argued that Herodotus' assertion twice that the Persians met to discuss their constitution indicates that Herodotus must have had Persian evidence for this meeting (Hdt. 3.80, 6.43).[72] However, Fehling has suggested otherwise.[73] The structure of the debate, a contest of thesis and antithesis, has led some to believe that it was a sophistic treatise inserted by Herodotus, and various individuals identified as sophists have been suggested as authors, such as Protagoras, Hippias, Antiphon, and Prodicus. However, the manner of speaking attributed to the protagonists of the debate is consistent with their characters, and Darius' speech is rife with references to Persian customs and ideology, such as opposition to injustice and the 'wise king'; the debate itself may even reflect Iranian 'contests of eloquence held in the king's court'.[74] The debate may have been more relevant, as Asheri notes, to an Athenian audience in 511 attempting to decide between the constitutions advocated by Cleisthenes, Isagoras, and the Peisistratids, but the Persians themselves may have engaged in a similar discussion concerning their government after the death of Cambyses. As Asheri notes, Herodotus tries to recreate a 'Persian' debate 'within the limits of his own frame of reference: the constitutional changes of the Greek *poleis*'.[75] Asheri argues that Herodotus does not 'take sides' in the debate, and yet, as I shall demonstrate, when Herodotus' response to Otanes' decision at the end of the debate is considered, it becomes clear that Herodotus does claim a position for himself.

Since it is impossible to know for certain whether or not such a debate happened, it becomes necessary to examine the debate within its narrative context. After the seven conspirators have overthrown the pretender to the throne, Bardiya or the pseudo-Smerdis, three opinions are given regarding under which sort of government the Persian state would be best administered. Otanes argues in favour of entrusting the people with the command, Megabazus for an aristocracy, and Darius for a monarchy. According to Otanes, a monarch may set out to rule in accordance with custom, but envy and hubris will lead him to 'subvert a country's ancestral customs':[76] 'make a man a monarch, and even if he is the most moral

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[71] Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella (2007: 471-73). For a history of scholarship concerning the constitutional debate see Brannan (1963: 427-29).
[72] Munson (2009: 461, n.2).
[73] Fehling (1989: 194).
[74] Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella (2007: 472). For a discussion of the role of the king in establishing 'justice' see Chapter One, pages 47-48.
[75] Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella (2007: 473).
[76] Translation Waterfield (1998); νόμαιά τε κινέει πάτρια.

person in the world, he will leave his customary ways of thinking' (3.80).[77] According to Otanes, the Persians should abandon monarchy and instead surrender rule to the people, a form of government he refers to as *isonomia*.

> what about majority rule, on the other hand? In the first place, it has the best of all names to describe it—equality before the law. It is a government by lot, it is accountable government, and it refers all decisions to the common people.[78]

> Πλῆθος δὲ ἄρχον πρῶτα μὲν οὔνομα πάντων κάλλιστον ἔχει, ἰσονομίην. Δεύτερα δὲ τούτων τῶν ὁ μούναρχος ποιέει οὐδέν· πάλῳ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὰς ἄρχει, ὑπεύθυνον δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει, βουλεύματα δὲ πάντα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀναφέρει (3.80).

Although Otanes is advocating for democracy, he does not use the language of democracy here. Brennan suggests that Herodotus has chosen to use *isonomia* to describe the constitution instead of 'democracy' in order to distinguish a government in which individuals are equal before the law and all are given a share from democracy, which, according to Thucydides, although being a 'democracy in name', was in fact 'the domination of the leading man' (2.65.10).[79] Similarly, Thucydides' Pericles notes that 'the empire you possess is by now like a tyranny—perhaps it was wrong to acquire it, but certainly dangerous to let it go' (2.63.2).[80] Herodotus carefully avoids using the term 'democracy' in order to distance the idea 'in theory' to its actual execution by the Athenians, whose superior strength—a strength acquired from the expulsion of the tyrants (5.78)—allowed them to rise up against the Persians and become the leaders of the Greeks (6.109). However, they did not manage the rest of the Greeks in accordance with democratic principles or on a basis of equality, but instead city-states were managed in

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[77] Translation Waterfield (1998); καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἄριστον ἀνδρῶν πάντων στάντα ἐς ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκτὸς τῶν ἐωθότων νοημάτων στήσειε.
[78] Translation Waterfield (1998).
[79] Translation Hammond (2009); ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή.
[80] Brannan (1963: 432-34); translation Hammond (2009); ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον.

accordance with the interests of the Athenians.[81] Otanes uses *isonomia* to describe not just any non-monarchic constitution, but to emphasize, as Vlastos suggests, that not only were all equal before the laws, but that citizens share the control of the state equally.[82] By describing this form of government as *isonomia*, Herodotus emphasizes that all will live in accordance with νόμοι and distances this form of government from democratic Athens, which, in Herodotus' own time had come to resemble the νόμος breaking rule of a tyrant.

After Megabyzus gives his speech in favour of oligarchy, in which he argues that one cannot know what is right without have been taught it or having an innate awareness of it (3.81), Darius gives his position on monarchy, in which he argues that even under the best government in which either the people or the few rule, ultimately one leader will emerge who will become monarch (3.82). In his final statement regarding monarchy Darius poses a question to the conspirators.

> To sum up everything in one word, from where and from whom did we get our freedom? From the people, from an oligarchy or from a monarchy? My opinion, then, is that since we were freed by one man we maintain our system, and that in addition we not destroy our ancestral customs which work well.[83]

> ἑνὶ δὲ ἔπεϊ πάντα συλλαβόντα εἰπεῖν, κόθεν ἡμῖν ἡ ἐλευθερίη ἐγένετο καὶ τέο δόντος; κότερα παρὰ τοῦ δήμου ἢ ὀλιγαρχίης ἢ μουνάρχου; ἔχω τοίνυν γνώμην ἡμέας ἐλευθερωθέντας διὰ ἕνα ἄνδρα τὸ τοιοῦτο περιστέλλειν, χωρίς τε τούτου πατρίους νόμους μὴ λύειν ἔχοντας εὖ (Hdt. 3.82).

When Otanes, who argued for rule of the people, realised that the argument in favour of monarchy would most likely win instead of his bid for *isonomia*, he stated (3.83) that he would 'like to neither rule nor be ruled' (οὔτε γὰρ ἄρχειν οὔτε ἄρχεσθαι ἐθέλω).[84] Flower and Marincola argue that the choice between 'ruling' and 'being ruled' would have resonated with fifth-century Athenians who

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[81] For a more complete discussion of management of Athens in accordance with democratic principles versus management of the Delian League, see pages 79-81.
[82] Vlastos (1953: 352).
[83] Translation mine.
[84] Translation mine.

were faced with the choice of maintaining their empire or being ruled by others (Thuc. 2.63.1-2).[85] Otanes rejects this choice and instead withdraws his name from the running for king under the condition that neither he nor his family and descendants would ever be ruled over (3.83): 'However, I renounce my claim to the kingdom on one condition—that I and my descendants should never be ruled by any of you' (ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὲ ὑπεξίσταμαι τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐπ' ᾧ τε ὑπ' οὐδενὸς ὑμέων ἄρξομαι, οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οὔτε οἱ ἀπ' ἐμέο αἰεὶ γινόμενοι). Otanes' speech ends, but Herodotus adds his own thoughts on the matter.

> And even now this family is still the only free family in Persia and obeys only those things which it wants to obey, but does not transgress the laws of the Persians.[86]
>
> καὶ νῦν αὕτη ἡ οἰκίη διατελέει μούνη ἐλευθέρη ἐοῦσα Περσέων καὶ ἄρχεται τοσαῦτα ὅσα αὐτὴ θέλει, νόμους οὐκ ὑπερβαίνουσα τοὺς Περσέων (Hdt. 3.83).

The relationship between this passage and Herodotus' narrative only becomes apparent when one examines Herodotus' use of νόμος in this passage. The difference between Darius' πατρίους νόμους at 3.82 and Herodotus' νόμους at 3.83 is subtle, but significant, and ties in with Herodotus' overall treatment of 'freedom' as a term which can only be understood within the context of individual groups' νόμοι. Although the Persians have the opportunity to change their constitution, they decide to maintain a monarchy since it was a monarch who freed them from the Medes, a 'freedom' which was only secured by obeying Cyrus (1.126). In addition, their conception of nobility was linked to the office of the king. Those considered 'noble' in the past on account of their relationship to the royal house would not want to compromise their position by implementing a system whereby all were equal before the laws.[87] Not only was their 'freedom' secured by being 'ruled over', but their own 'free' or 'noble' status depended on the continuance of a structure organised around the office of the king. Darius advocates for adhering to their ancestral customs by maintaining the monarchy,

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[85] Flower and Marincola (2002: 314).
[86] Translation mine.
[87] At 1.134 Herodotus discusses the importance of rank within Persian society as a Persian in his discussion of Persan νόμοι beginning at 1.131. See page 52.

and, by this, he means not only maintaining their freedom from external rule, but also their right to occupy the upper tiers of society. Otanes, however, desires to neither rule, nor be ruled, but Herodotus has added that even in his own time the family of Otanes was the only free family in Persia. Otanes' family is 'free' from a Greek perspective, but not from a Persian one. For Herodotus, Otanes is 'free' because he lives in accordance with the νόμοι of the Persians, but not the will of the king. However, as Darius asserts, the decision to maintain a monarchy is in accordance with the ancestral νόμοι of the Persians. To live in accordance with the νόμοι of the Persians would mean taking part in monarchy, and, although it is not stated explicitly, the benefits that come to one in terms of status due to one's relationship with the king. Otanes' rejection of the 'ruling/being ruled' structure means that he has removed himself from the Persian imperial apparatus and is instead abiding by the laws or conventions of Persia. Unlike the rest of the Persians who are subject to the king of Persia, who, from Otanes' perspective, will inevitably break the νόμοι of the Persians, Otanes has created a space for himself in which he and his family exist in accordance with νόμοι, the opposite of monarchy. Herodotus' perspective that Otanes' family is the only 'free' family is, however, inherently Greek, as it turns out that the only constitution which the Persians deem in accordance with their νόμοι and worthy of maintaining their 'freedom' in monarchy.

With the argument that 'freedom' can only be maintained through a monarchical constitution, Herodotus acknowledges that people who have different νόμοι than the Greeks may have a different idea of what would constitute or preserve their 'freedom'. The Constitutional Debate describes a pivotal moment in 'Persian history' when the Persians confirm the relationship between the νόμος of monarchy and 'freedom'. Although Herodotus considers that, from a Persian perspective, 'freedom' is identified with the νόμος of being ruled, he ultimately asserts his own conceptualisation of 'freedom' when he notes that Otanes' family, because it lives in accordance with νόμοι, is the only free family in Persia. At the same time Herodotus is also commenting on Athenian conceptualisation of what it means to be 'free', which had become synonymous with tyranny and rule over others. While the Athenians themselves are governed in accordance with the principles of democracy, the institutional apparatus which was implemented to secure and maintain their 'freedom', the Delian League, was not governed in accordance with the principles of equality, but instead governed by the Athenians,

whose management had come to resemble a monarchy. Herodotus' own perspective on 'freedom' suggests that 'freedom' can only exist if all have an equal share in the governing apparatus which operates in accordance with νόμοι.

By attributing 'freedom' to monarchy Herodotus not only considers how imperial powers might view 'freedom' in accordance with their νόμοι, but he is reminding the reader that the arguments made by the Persians regarding the relationship between monarchy and freedom could also be made by the Athenians. As Thucydides' Athenians note (1.74), and as Herodotus himself notes (7.139), had the Athenians chosen not to fight, Xerxes would have succeeded in his mission; 'We did not acquire this empire by force. It came about because you [Spartans] were not prepared to stay on to deal with the remnants of Persian power, and the allies approached us of their own accord and asked us to become their leaders'.[88] As it was the leadership of the Athenians which led to the 'freedom' of the Greeks from the Persians, leadership of the league was transferred to the Athenians. Soon the institutional body which was created to defend 'freedom' became a means of 'enslaving', and Athens' leadership in the league came to resemble the imperial apparatus of the Persians, who maintained a monarchy to defend their 'freedom' in much the same way that the Delian League was created to defend the 'freedom' of the Greeks. Although one might argue that the Delian League's mission was to defend the 'freedom' of the Greeks, Herodotus draws a subtle comparison between the conceptualisation of 'freedom' as it might be conceived by the Persians and the defence of 'freedom' by the Delian League. Ultimately, in rejecting the Persian conceptualisation of 'freedom', Herodotus is also rejecting the defence of 'freedom' by the Delian League, as it had come to represent a conceptualisation of 'freedom' at odds with his own, which he presents as a more traditionally Greek form of 'freedom'.

The Constitutional Debate represents a moment in Persian history when the relationship between monarchy, or being ruled over, and 'freedom' is recognised and established through its preservation. As I have suggested, Herodotus is examining what it means to be 'free' by considering how groups of people with different νόμοι might conceptualise 'freedom' differently. For the Persians 'freedom' was secured by being ruled over, which, in turn, allowed them to rule over others, which secured their noble status. At the beginning of Book Seven,

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[88] Translation Hammond (2009).

Xerxes defends his decision to invade Greece by noting that it is the νόμος of the Persians to expand, a νόμος which only strengthens their status as rulers and reinforces their 'freedom' from being ruled over by others. At 7.8 Xerxes summons a meeting of the leading men in Persia in order to discuss the invasion of Athens.

> Men of Persia, I am introducing no new custom here; I am simply drawing on traditional Persian ways. After all, as far as I can gather from our elders, there has never been a time when we have not been at war, ever since Cyrus deposed Astyages and we took over from the Medes...There would be no point in recounting all the victories Cyrus, Cambyses, and my father won, and all the people they annexed. But what about me? When I became the king of Persia, I began to wonder how to avoid being left behind by those who preceded me in this position of honour, and how I might increase the Persian empire just as much as they did. And after a lot of thought I found a way for us not only to win glory and gain land, which, so far from being smaller and meaner than what we currently have, is in fact more fertile, but also to exact retribution and compensation from our enemies.[89]

> Ἄνδρες Πέρσαι, οὔτ' αὐτὸς κατηγήσομαι νόμον τόνδε ἐν ὑμῖν τιθείς, παραδεξάμενός τε αὐτῷ χρήσομαι· ὡς γὰρ ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, οὐδαμά κω ἠτρεμίσαμεν ἐπείτε παρελάβομεν τὴν ἡγεμονίην τήνδε παρὰ Μήδων, Κύρου κατελόντος Ἀστυάγεα...Τὰ μέν νυν Κῦρός τε καὶ Καμβύσης πατήρ τε ὁ ἐμὸς Δαρεῖος κατεργάσαντο καὶ προσεκτήσαντο ἔθνεα, ἐπισταμένοισι εὖ οὐκ ἄν τις λέγοι. Ἐγὼ δὲ ἐπείτε παρέλαβον τὸν θρόνον τοῦτον, ἐφρόντιζον ὅκως μὴ λείψομαι τῶν πρότερον γενομένων ἐν τιμῇ τῇδε μηδὲ ἐλάσσω προσκτήσομαι δύναμιν Πέρσῃσι. Φροντίζων δὲ εὑρίσκω ἅμα μὲν κῦδος ἡμῖν προσγινόμενον χώρην τε τῆς νῦν ἐκτήμεθα οὐκ ἐλάσσω οὐδὲ φλαυροτέρην παμφορωτέρην δέ, ἅμα δὲ τιμωρίην τε καὶ τίσιν γινομένην.

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[89] Translation Hammond (2009).

For Xerxes, '[i]t is the *nomos* of Persia to expand'.[90] Mardonius argues in favour of attacking the Greeks on the grounds that their manner of fighting amongst themselves is ridiculous considering the fact that they all speak the same language (7.9). Artabanus, on the other hand, argues that it would not be wise for the Persians to invade Greece, since '[i]t is the god's way to curtail anything excessive. And so even a massive army may be destroyed by a small force if it attracts the god's resentment and he sends panic or thunder, until they are shamefully destroyed' (7.10).[91] Xerxes recognises that it is the Persian νόμος to expand. This νόμος of the Persians is king, or master, since it determines what is right for the Persians, and renders any act in accordance with it 'just'.[92] Herodotus' quoting of Pindar suggests that Herodotus believed that 'justice' itself was not absolute, but that individuals determine what it 'just' in accordance with their νόμοι. Since it was a νόμος for the Persians to expand, Xerxes argues that the Persians should invade Greece, despite the warnings of Artabanus. 'Freedom', from a Persian perspective, could only be maintained through a monarchical constitution. Not only was their 'freedom' from the Medes secured by the rule of one, but their nobility or status as 'freemen' was linked to the office of the king. However, Xerxes is also exercising the 'freedom' of the Persians by acting in accordance with the νόμος of expansion. In this sense city-states and empires which are 'free' are those which make decisions based on their own νόμοι and, therefore, determine what it 'just'.

At 7.101-104 Xerxes and Demaratus engage in a discussion which highlights the differences between Greek and Persian perspectives concerning νόμοι, 'freedom', and military strength. Sara Forsdyke notes that Demaratus' discussion with Xerxes is marked by the conflation of civic strength and democratic principles despite Demaratus' Spartan ties. Furthermore, the dialogue is presented in such a way as to contrast tyranny with democracy. Skeptical that the Greeks will oppose the Persians, given the smaller scale of their forces, Xerxes asks Demaratus if they will actually oppose him (7.101). Demaratus' response—'would you like a truthful answer, my lord, or a comforting one?'—evokes, according to Forsdyke, the principles of free speech, a characteristic of democratic

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[90] Evans (1961: 109).
[91] Translation Waterfield (1998).
[92] See page 98-99.

ideology.[93] Xerxes asks him to speak truthfully. In response to Xerxes' question, Demaratus states that '[t]here has never been a time when poverty has not been a factor in the rearing of the Greeks, but their courage has been acquired as a result of intelligence and the force of law (νόμος ἰσχυρός). Greece has relied on this courage to keep poverty and despotism at bay' (7.102).[94] A similar sentiment is expressed by Democritus: 'Poverty in a democracy is as preferable to so-called prosperity among dictators as freedom is to slavery'.[95] In response to Demaratus' conviction that the Greeks will fight, Xerxes laughs. As Forsdyke notes, Xerxes' question comes in the form of boast, a type of behaviour associated with tyranny in Athenian tragedy.[96] Furthermore Demaratus' fear of speaking freely only emphasises Xerxes' tyrannical stance and the democratic tenor of Demaratus' own speech.[97] Overall, Forsdyke notes the characteristically Athenian tone of Demaratus' connection between strength and democracy, and she suggests that Herodotus has generalized his characterisation of democracy to fit a panhellenic context.[98] According to Murray, despotism formed a key opposition to democracy,[99] and it 'indicates the rule of one man and a whole set of associations and oppositions that formed a central nexus in Athenian political thought'.[100]

Ultimately Xerxes rejects the notion that the Greeks will be able to oppose the Persians. At 7.103 Xerxes argues that the Greek army is weak by virtue of its freedom: 'How could a thousand men—or ten thousand or fifty thousand, for that matter—when every man among them is as free as the next man and they do not have a single leader, oppose an army the size of ours?' (κῶς ἂν δυναίατο χίλιοι ἢ καὶ μύριοι ἢ καὶ πεντακισμύριοι, ἐόντες γε ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἑνὸς ἀρχόμενοι, στρατῷ τοσῷδε ἀντιστῆναι). As the example of Cyrus has shown, military strength, and 'freedom', is associated with the rule of one man. Persian strength comes from being ruled. Furthermore,

> if they were ruled by one man according to our custom, they would become better than they are by nature since they fear this man and they

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[93] Translation Waterfield (1998); Forsdyke (2001: 343-44).
[94] Translation Waterfield (1998).
[95] DK B251; translation Procopé (1989: 314).
[96] c.f. Aesch. *Pers.* 827-31.
[97] Forsdyke (2001: 343-44).
[98] Forsdyke (2001: 347).
[99] Forsdyke (2001: 345); Murray (1988: 475).
[100] Raaflaub (1983: 522-23).

> would go forward into battle forced by a whip, although they are fewer facing more. But since they are free they would do neither of these things.[101]

As Forsdyke notes, this objection by Xerxes seems odd, considering that the Spartans themselves were led in battle by one of their kings. What Xerxes is shocked by is the pairing of the 'force of the law' and military strength made by Demaratus at 7.102, a pairing which is more apt if taken in reference to democratic Athens where men are not ruled by one leader and are 'free'.[102] The pairing of military strength resulting from the overthrow of tyranny was noted by Herodotus: 'while the Athenians were ruled by tyrants, they were no better at warfare than any of their neighbours, but once they had got rid of the tyrants they became vastly superior' (5.78). Furthermore, Xerxes' allusion to fear and the use of a whip is reminiscent of tyrannical behaviour, as a tyrant and his subjects fear one another; the whip represents the overall slavishness of his subjects.[103] In response, Demaratus gives a synopsis of Spartan political theory.

> The point is that although they're free, they're not entirely free: their master is law, and they're more afraid of this than your men are of you. At any rate, they do whatever the law commands, and its command never changes: it is that they should not turn tail in battle no matter how many men are ranged against them, but should maintain their positions and either win or die'.[104]

> ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ· ποιεῦσι γῶν τὰ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ἀνώγῃ· ἀνώγει δὲ τὠυτὸ αἰεί, οὐκ ἐῶν φεύγειν οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐκ μάχης, ἀλλὰ μένοντας ἐν τῇ τάξι ἐπικρατέειν ἢ ἀπόλλυσθαι (7.104).

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[101] Translation Forsdyke (2001: 350); ὑπὸ μὲν γὰρ ἑνὸς ἀρχόμενοι κατὰ τρόπον τὸν ἡμέτερον γενοίατ' ἂν δειμαίνοντες τοῦτον καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἐωυτῶν φύσιν ἀμείνονες, καὶ ἴοιεν ἀναγκαζόμενοι μάστιγι ἐς πλέονας ἐλάσσονες ἐόντες· ἀνειμένοι δὲ ἐς τὸ ἐλεύθερον οὐκ ἂν ποιοῖεν τούτων οὐδέτερα.

[102] Δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ κατ' ἓν μοῦνον ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὡς ἐστὶ χρῆμα σπουδαῖον, εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνονες, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο.

[103] Forsdyke (2001: 351-52).

[104] Translation Waterfield (1998).

Although it may seem simple enough that Demaratus is invoking a 'custom' of censure and shame that compels men in Sparta to fight, Spartan obedience is the product of 'despotic compulsion', and therefore a subtle comparison is being made between 'Athenian natural courage' and 'Spartan state-induced courage', a comparison that is also made by Pericles in the funeral oration, when he states that when they encounter danger they rely not on laws, but on natural courage (Thuc. 2.39.4).[105] Although Raaflaub has suggested that the restrictions placed on 'freedom' by νόμος is a Spartan variation of 'freedom', Forsdyke argues that Demaratus is presenting a critique of Sparta from an Athenian perspective.[106] While the Athenians fight to preserve a constitution which is 'free' from tyranny, the Spartans fight because they are compelled to do so. The Athenians may not rely on νόμοι, but their desire and strength in battle comes from a desire to defend their right to live in accordance with these νόμοι. Consequently, Herodotus' portrayal of 'freedom' in this passage serves to strengthen the differences between tyranny and democracy,[107] and the differences not only between Persian and Greek perceptions of how νόμος informs 'freedom', but also how Athenian and Spartan νόμοι differ as well. For the Greeks generally, the strength of νόμος has given them the courage 'to keep poverty and despotism at bay'. Xerxes cannot understand how νόμος itself can make the Greeks a formidable enemy, since they do not practice the same νόμοι as the Persians. For the Persians strength comes from the νόμος of 'ruling', while for the Greeks strength comes from the desire to protect the right to live in accordance with νόμοι instead of a tyrant.

Rosalind Thomas has shown that the debate between νόμος and φύσις provided Herodotus with a framework for thinking about differences between Persian and Greek strength. While 'fear' makes the Persians stronger than their nature (Hdt. 7.103.4), the tyrant νόμος, which binds the Greeks, makes the Greeks stronger.[108] While this is certainly the case, Herodotus is also commenting on the relationship between political systems and strength. Demaratus notes that the courage of the Greeks comes from the force of νόμος (7.102). While for the

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[105] Forsdyke (2001: 249).
[106] Raaflaub (2004: 193-202); Forsdyke (2001: 349).
[107] Forsdyke (2001: 252).
[108] Thomas (2000: 109-110). While 'fear' emboldens the Greeks in their struggle against the Persians in the moment of fighting, Herodotus is more interested in the relationship between constitutions and military strength, and the role played by these constitutions in securing the 'freedom' of the Greeks from the Persians.

Spartans this is the shame or censure that is inflicted on hoplites for fleeing in battle, for the Athenians strength comes not from being forced by a law or custom to fight, but from a desire to live in accordance with νόμοι instead of under the rule of one man. Xerxes, on the other hand, argues that if the Greeks followed the Persian νόμος, then the Greeks would be stronger than φύσις allows them to be. In order for men to face such extreme odds they must be under the rule of one man, and they must be whipped. For the Persians it is a νόμος that strength in battle is derived from a political system in which one leader rules over his subjects in order to make them stronger than they might otherwise be by nature. For the Persians this was just one of the νόμοι which shaped their political system, a political system from which emerged a conceptualisation of 'freedom' at odds with characterisation of 'freedom' given by Demaratus, in which the Spartans are, in a sense, slaves to their own νόμοι, and the Athenians defend their right to *isonomia*, which prescribes that all are equal before the law and which emerged after the overthrow of the tyrants from Athens.[109] As the Constitutional Debate has shown, 'freedom' was closely identified with 'being ruled' for the Persians. When Xerxes uses the language of 'freedom' in his discussion with Demaratus he is not thinking of 'freedom' in the Persian sense, but rather the Greek sense of not being ruled. Although Xerxes recognises that for the Greeks being 'free' means not being ruled over, he does not fundamentally understand how this would make the Greek a formidible foe. This misunderstanding does not so much lie in a misunderstanding of what it means to be 'free', but rather a misuderstanding of νόμοι, as it was the Persian custom that strength comes from treating soldiers likes slaves, whereas the Greeks' strength came from strength of νόμος itself, which is that they are ruled over not by a tyrant but by νόμοι.

For both Herodotus' Persians and the Greeks, 'freedom' meant living in accordance with νόμοι, but for the Persians 'being ruled over' and being 'free' were not only compatible, but linked. The Athenians' decision to be governed in accordance with νόμοι instead of by tyranny led to their constitutional 'freedom'. Just as the Athenians' maintained a constitution in accordance with νόμοι, a constitution which led to their 'freedom', so too do the Persians decide to maintain a constitution that allowed for the rule of one, since their 'freedom' from the Medes was secured by the rule of one. Furthermore, Persian νόμοι such as their

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[109] Raaflaub (2004: 99-101); Vlastos (1953: 358-59).

constitution, their strength in battle, and their hierarchy all depended on the agency of the king. The constitutional debate reveals that the opposite of tyranny was *isonomia*, living in accordance with νόμος rather than a tyrant who was not subject to νόμοι. This, for Herodotus, is what makes Otanes' family free. Although Herodotus recognises that the Persians have their own culturally embedded conceptualisation of 'freedom', Herodotus' assessment of Otanes' family is based on a conceptualisation of 'freedom' informed by Greek νόμοι, namely that 'being free' means living in accordance with νόμοι as opposed to tyrant. Herodotus carefully avoids using the language of democracy in the constitutional debate and, by doing so, contrasts fifth-century Athenian democracy, which had come to resemble tyranny with regard to its treatment of its allies, to *isonomia*.

3.4 The Ending of the *Histories*: Freedom and νόμος

An examination of Persian νόμοι with regard to being ruled and expansion suggests that Herodotus has constructed a conceptualisation of Persian 'freedom' in accordance with these νόμοι. This 'freedom' is not stagnant, but rather shifts as the νόμοι and priorities of the Persians shift. When the Persians were 'slaves' of the Medes, their main concern was securing their 'freedom from the Medes. Once this 'freedom' was acquired, the Persians maintain a monarchical constitution, since 'freedom' was acquired through the leadership of one man, and since individuals were only nobles and not 'slaves' in accordance with their relationship with the king. While the Constitutional Debate describes a moment in time when the connection between 'being ruled' and 'freedom' is codified, Herodotus' treatment of *isonomia* in this passage suggests that he is distancing the concept of living in accordance with νόμοι and sharing in rule from democracy. By doing so he is making a greater comparison between the Athenians, who governed themselves in accordance with democratic principle, and their administration of the Delian League, which had come to resemble a tyranny, and whose conceptualisation of 'freedom' had come to resemble Persians conceptualisations of 'freedom', whereby 'freedom' could only be maintained by the rule of one, a conceptualisation of 'freedom' which was at odds with the 'freedom' which they sought to defend during the Persian Wars. For Herodotus, 'freedom' can only be understood within the context of a society's νόμοι. As Herodotus has demonstrated both in the Constitutional Debate and in Xerxes' debate concerning

the νόμος of expansion, at particular moments societies are given the opportunity to change their νόμοι, thereby altering their conceptualisation of 'freedom'.

Herodotus ends his *Histories* with a flashback to a moment when the Persians are presented with an opportunity to alter their νόμοι. Although, as I shall discuss, some have found this passage problematic, I suggest that Herodotus is subtly encouraging the Athenians to consider that their own conceptualisation of 'freedom' is at odds with the 'freedom' they sought to defend in the Persian Wars. At the end of Book Nine, Artembares proposes that the Persians, now that they have defeated the Medes, emigrate to another country that is less rugged than their own. According to Artembares, 'This is a perfectly reasonable thing for people with power to do. Will we ever have a better opportunity than now, when we rule over so many peoples and the whole of Asia?'[110]

> Cyrus was not impressed with the proposal. He told them to go ahead—but he also advised them to be prepared, in that case, to become subjects instead of rulers, on the grounds that soft lands tend to breed soft men. It is impossible, he said, for one and the same country to produce remarkable crops and good fighting men. So the Persians admitted the truth of his argument and took their leave. Cyrus' point of view had proved more convincing than their own, and they chose to live in a harsh land and rule rather than to cultivate fertile plains and be others' slaves.[111]

> Κῦρος δέ, ταῦτα ἀκούσας καὶ οὐ θωμάσας τὸν λόγον, ἐκέλευε ποιέειν ταῦτα, οὕτω δὲ αὐτοῖσι παραίνεε κελεύων παρασκευάζεσθαι ὡς οὐκέτι ἄρξοντας ἀλλ' ἀρξομένους· φιλέειν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν μαλακῶν χώρων μαλακοὺς ἄνδρας γίνεσθαι· οὐ γάρ τι τῆς αὐτῆς γῆς εἶναι καρπόν τε θωμαστὸν φύειν καὶ ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς τὰ πολέμια. Ὥστε συγγνόντες Πέρσαι οἴχοντο ἀποστάντες, ἐσσωθέντες τῇ γνώμῃ πρὸς Κύρου, ἄρχειν τε εἵλοντο λυπρὴν οἰκέοντες μᾶλλον ἢ πεδιάδα σπείροντες ἄλλοισι δουλεύειν (9.116).

Jacoby and Pohlenz have both found the ending of the *Histories* less than satisfactory. Pohlenz finds it problematic that Herodotus makes no mention of the

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[110] Translation Waterfield (1998).
[111] Translation Waterfield (1998).

Greek struggle for freedom, while Jacoby wonders why there is no mention of the Athenians' role in preserving the freedom of the Greeks.[112] These are the last lines of Herodotus' *Histories*, and, as Dewald has noted, these lines are not typical of closures for Herodotus, who usually inserts a 'formulaic end sentence' at the conclusion of an episode.[113] Noting the ring structure of the *Histories*, the ending of which with its mention of Protesilaus brings the reader back to the beginning, Dewald argues that this is in fact the ending that Herodotus intended, but she notes the inconsistency inherent in Cyrus' recommendation, which is a flashback. The reader knows that the Persians did not heed Cyrus' advice, but in fact the Persians have spent significant time, energy and resources expanding. Dewald asserts, '[i]t is the historian's choice of an ending (and thus of a plot) that sets the reader some basic limits on the meanings the historian sees in the plethora of data belonging within the chosen limits of his or her investigation, and it is for this reason a particularly important pointer to the patterns and underlying coherence of the work and to the individual and idiosyncratic understanding of the historian who wrote it'.[114] By ambiguously ending with the Athenians in Sestos in 479 and with Cyrus' warning of expansion, Herodotus leaves it to the reader to draw conclusions regarding the 'meaning' of the ending.

Even though Dewald recognises the irony inherent in Cyrus' warning about expansion for the Athenians reading his work, she argues that the ambiguous message at the end is a 'tacit acknowledgement of his [Herodotus'] own intellectual limits'; at the time Herodotus was writing he could not have known what the outcome of the conflict between Athens and Sparta would have been, or how the Athenians' decision to stay in Sestos rather than return to the Greek mainland would have been meaningful in the context of contemporary events.[115] Dewald notes that the final passage of the *Histories* involves a decision-making process in which the Persian way of life is established, thus joining seemingly disparate topics of ethnography and political narratives.[116] As Thomas has noted, Herodotus' treatment of νόμοι, especially at 5.78 and in the Constitutional Debate, suggests that societies have a hand in choosing their νόμοι, and, consequently, how they conceptualise 'freedom'. Herodotus does not just

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[112] Jacoby (1913: 376); Pohlenz (1937: 165).
[113] Dewald (1997: 64-65).
[114] Dewald (1997: 76).
[115] Dewald (1997: 74-75, 81).
[116] Dewald (1997: 68).

describe Persians' νόμοι, but instead shows how the Persians themselves at critical moments establish these νόμοι. The Athenians of the fifth century, like the Persians of Cyrus' time, are at a critical moment when they can set their νόμοι with regard to their allies. That this message is really for the Athenians only becomes clear once one realises that the rise of Athens as an imperial power mirrors that of the Persians; Herodotus achieves this parallelism by collapsing the temporal boundaries that separate the Persians and the Athenians of Herodotus' own time. Herodotus is not so much considering how 'freedom' is relative—that what is 'noble' behaviour from a Persian perspective is 'slavish' from a Greek one—but rather he engages in a discourse of relativism by considering that 'freedom' itself is determined by the νόμοι of particular groups, and that, while all conceptualisations of 'freedom' are equally valid, by comparing Persian and Athenian conceptualisations of 'freedom' with regard to ruling and being ruled, he asks the Athenians to consider that the 'freedom' offered by the Delian League is at odds with the 'freedom' they professed to be defending at 8.144. By attributing 'freedom' to the Persians, Herodotus not only draws a comparison between the Persians and the Athenians, whose struggle for the 'freedom' of the Greeks had come to be recognised as an historical trope, but he also exposes how the fortunes of city-states and empires are not merely the work of the gods, but that νόμοι play a hand in determining these fortunes; city-states and empires choose these νόμοι and, consequently, play a role in precipitating their own successes and failures.

Herodotus' narration of Persian history indicates that Cyrus' advice was not heeded. Initially the Persians are concerned with 'freeing' themselves from the Medes. However, once this has been achieved, and once they are 'free' to exercise their right to live in accordance with their own νόμοι, they maintain a monarchy, since they acquired their 'freedom' under the leadership of one. The poignancy of this passage lies in the readers' knowledge that not only did the Persians reject Cyrus' advice, but that the Athenians, it seems, are on track to do so as well. Herodotus does not include the language of 'freedom' at the end of the *Histories* not because 'freedom' was not relevant, but because 'freedom' itself was understood within the context of a society's νόμοι. While the Persians opt to rule instead of becoming slaves, and therefore abandon any plans to expand, the reader knows that this is not the case. Ultimately the Persians do not heed Cyrus' warning that expansion into less rugged territories will result in them becoming subjects rather than rulers. Instead they adopt a νόμος of expansion, in accordance with

which Xerxes argues that they should invade Greece, a land which is more fertile than their own (7.8), an argument which is not in fact true. In acting in accordance with the νόμος of expansion, the Persians are defeated by the Greeks, whose strength of νόμος has kept 'poverty and despotism at bay' (7.102).[117] Persians' conceptualisations of 'freedom' include the νόμος not only of being ruled by a monarch, but their exercise of this νόμος results in their rule over others. The Athenians' management of the Delian League had come to resemble the Persians' own management of their empire, and their defence of 'freedom' was at odds with the 'freedom' for which they had originally fought. Herodotus, therefore, ends the *Histories* at a moment when the Persians choose to adopt different νόμοι, thereby maintaining their rule, or their 'freedom', by remaining in rugged lands. For the Athenians, it is not too late to change their own νόμοι with regard to their administration of the Delian League, and defend the 'freedom' for which they had fought, a freedom, the defence of which was secured through the strength of their νόμος.

The Athenians reject the Persians' offer of 'freedom' for the sake of 'freedom' at 8.144. The Persians interpret their offer to the Athenians as one of 'freedom', but 'freedom' from whose perspective? By having Mardonius describe this offer as one which will ensure that the Athenians be 'autonomous', Herodotus suggests that what the Athenians are really rejecting is not so much Persian 'freedom', but rather living in accordance with Persian νόμοι which, although constituting 'freedom' from a Persian perspective, would constitute slavery from their own, since inherent in their own conceptualisation of 'freedom' is being ruled not by one individual, but by νόμοι. The relationship between 'freedom' and 'monarchy' is not uncommon in the *Histories*. At 1.95 the Medes free themselves from the Assyrians who ruled over them, thereby becoming 'autonomous' (1.96). They then establish a monarchy and rule over others, a pattern that is repeated by the Persians.[118] For Herodotus, living in accordance with νόμοι does not preclude the νόμοι of being ruled. Thus at both 1.96 and at 8.144 Herodotus is not using

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[117] Translation Waterfield (1998).

[118] Assyrian dominance of inland Asia had lasted for 520 years when the Medes first rebelled against them. In fact, their war of independence against the Assyrians improved them; they cast off the yoke of slavery and became free men. Their example was later followed by all the rest of the peoples who made up the Assyrian empire; Ἀσσυρίων ἀρχόντων τῆς ἄνω Ἀσίης ἐπ' ἔτεα εἴκοσι καὶ πεντακόσια, πρῶτοι ἀπ' αὐτῶν Μῆδοι ἤρξαντο ἀπίστασθαι· καί κως οὗτοι περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίης μαχεσάμενοι τοῖσι Ἀσσυρίοισι ἐγένοντο ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀπωσάμενοι τὴν δουλοσύνην ἐλευθερώθησαν (Hdt. 1.95).

'autonomy' as a political status even though, in Herodotus' own time, it had become one, but rather he is exposing how the language of 'freedom' had come to be closely identified with the struggle against Persia and tyranny. However, the language of 'freedom' only disguises the real issues that lead to 'enslavement': that those who are more powerful carry out actions in accordance with their own understanding of what is 'right', thereby forcing those who are weaker to live in accordance not so much with their own νόμοι, but in accordance with the νόμοι of those more powerful. For Herodotus, νόμος was king (3.38), not only because it explained the differences between societies, but because groups of people were rendered 'enslaved' or 'free' in accodance with the νόμοι of the powerful, who believed that any action carried out in accordance with νόμοι, such as Xerxes' νόμος of expansion, is 'just'.

Evidence of Athenian encroachment on city-states' independence and the allies' response to Athenian *arche* were examined in Chapter Two. Although it has been suggested that not everyone viewed Athenian leadership in the Delian League to be as oppressive as Thucydides has described, the response to Athenian *arche* need not be singular, nor is one response more valid than another. Accusations that Athenian rule constituted enslavement may have led Herodotus to consider how a city-state like Athens, which had fought for its own 'freedom' from tyranny, and which had fought against the Persians on behalf of the 'freedom' of the Greeks, could become the 'enslaver' of Greeks. Herodotus notes at 1.5 that he will 'cover minor and major human settlements equally, because most of those that were important in the past have diminished in significance now'. Herodotus is not concerned simply with the rises and declines of settlements. He is also concerned with the relationship between these changes in fortune and a society's understanding of what it means to be 'free'. Herodotus considers how the νόμοι of particular groups might engender different conceptualisations of 'freedom' in order to understand how city-states which once were 'liberators' had become the 'enslavers'. He does this by considering how 'freedom' might have been relevant for the Persians before they had become an 'enslaving' empire.

For Herodotus, 'freedom' is not absolute and can only be defined in accordance with the νόμοι of a particular culture. However, as one who identifies with Greek νόμοι, Herodotus gives his own assessment of what it means to be 'free' when he states that Otanes' family is the only 'free' family in Persia. Those who are truly 'free' neither rule nor are they ruled by others, but instead live in

accordance with νόμοι. True 'freedom', in its most basic sense, means living in accordance with νόμοι, which for the Greeks did not include being ruled by a greater body not checked by the νόμοι of the Greeks. This, however, was what the Delian League had become. By ending the *Histories* at a pivotal moment when the Persians are presented with an opportunity to alter their νόμοι, and, consequently their conceptualisation of 'freedom', Herodotus is reminding the Athenians that it is not too late for them to reassess their own νόμοι, which had come to resemble those of the Persians.

Chapter 4: 'Freedom' and Thucydides' Metanarrative on Language

The previous chapter examined how Herodotus' relationship to the concept of 'freedom' was influenced by relativism, and how he was able to make use of relative forms of 'freedom' to create irony within the text. The following chapter will examine how Thucydides uses the word ἐλευθερ- to create a commentary on the role of language in conflict. Rather than interpreting Thucydides' presentation of 'freedom' through the lens of fifth-century intellectual discourse, a discourse which informs his history throughout, modern scholars analyse Thucydidean 'freedom' as if Thucydides' interpretation of 'freedom' is representative of what was actually presented in fifth-century politics.[1] In the introduction to his investigation on the emergence of 'freedom', Raaflaub states that by the fall of Athens in 404 the 'spectrum of meanings and functions of freedom in both the individual-private and public-political spheres was, with few exceptions, fully developed'.[2] Raaflaub seeks to define 'freedom from' the Athenian/democratic and Spartan/oligarchic perspective without considering that his main source, Thucydides, may have been exploiting an already codified concept as a rhetorical tool to frame his history.[3]

Words formed from the ἐλευθερ- root appear frequently enough in fifth-century literature that it is safe to conclude that such words were rhetorically powerful. Had they not been, they would not have been used as pervasively as they were.[4] While it may be the case that the language of 'freedom' figured prominently in the rhetorical campaigns of the Greeks during the Peloponnesian War, an examination of how Thucydides uses words formed from the ἐλευθερ- root suggests that he has created a second narrative commenting on the role of language in conflict through the vocabulary of 'freedom'. As the last chapter has shown, Herodotus was 'playing' with 'freedom' by considering 'freedom' from the perspective of different cultures whose νόμοι would have led to different culturally embedded notions of the value and meaning of 'freedom'. Herodotus does not simply record the role that the concept of 'freedom' actually played in past events. The process of recording the past presupposes an interpretive framework, which, for Herodotus, was shaped by intellectual trends such as

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[1] Raaflaub (2004: 160-249); Larsen (1962: 230-34); Edmunds and Martin (1977: 187-93).
[2] Raaflaub (2004: 18).
[3] Raaflaub (2004: 181-202).
[4] Pohlenz (1966: 10-44).

relativism and the νόμος-φύσις debate. During Herodotus' time the invocation of 'freedom' had become a popular trope in literature, and the idea of being 'free' an integral part of the Greek identity.[5] The uncertain state of Greek affairs during Herodotus' own lifetime led him to question the meaning of 'freedom', a concept that had become associated with the Persian Wars, as Aeschylus' *Persians* and Simonides' epigram attest.[6] The Persian Wars had put an end to the threat of domination by Persia, but ultimately led to the emergence of a new power, the Delian League, the institutions of which closely resembled those of Persia.[7] If Herodotus was using his ethnographic and historical inquiries to question what 'freedom' meant, then it may be the case that Thucydides was engaging with the concept of 'freedom' in ways that do not necessarily reflect what actually happened or was said. Pohlenz notes that in addition to Herodotus and Thucydides, authors such as Pindar, Aeschylus and Euripides were writing about the concept of political freedom for the first time.[8] 'Freedom', therefore, was being spoken of in political ways independent of Herodotus and Thucydides. Thucydides' decision to treat the abuse of 'freedom' represents an historical reality even if the actual language in his speeches does not.

Rhetoric in Thucydides has been the subject of contentious debate with regard to the historical accuracy of the speeches he recounts. It is worth examining his methodology concerning speeches briefly:

> With references to the speeches in this history, some were delivered before the war began, others while it was going on; some I heard myself, others I got from various quarters; it was in all cases difficult to carry them word for word in one's memory, so my habit has been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of what they really said.[9]
>
> Καὶ ὅσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον ἕκαστοι ἢ μέλλοντες πολεμήσειν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη ὄντες, χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων

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[5] Pohlenz (1966:17); Isaac (2006: 492-93).
[6] For Aeschylus see pages 37-38; Simonides 8 FGE; Edmunds and Wallace (1997: 21-22).
[7] See Chapter Two, section 2.
[8] Pohlenz (1966: 10-44).
[9] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).

> διαμνημονεῦσαι ἦν ἐμοί τε ὧν αὐτὸς ἤκουσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν· ὡς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ' εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται (1.22.1).

Thucydides' audience, accustomed to epic, Herodotus, and logographers, for whom accuracy in reporting speeches was not a concern, would have been surprised by the mere concern for first-hand accounts in speech reporting.[10] Thucydides' speeches may be based on what he, himself, has heard; reconstructions of speeches that he never could have heard (such as Nicias' final speech at Syracuse); a combination of several speeches for which he had written accounts; or an account of a dialogue between several individuals.[11] Thucydides' statement that he has 'speakers say what was' in his opinion 'demanded of them by the various occasions' while 'adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of what they really said' has been subject to much interpretation.[12] As Rood points out, Thucydides has kept as close as possible to what was said, but 'the limitations of evidence were such that Thucydides supplemented what he could discover with a subjective input—'what was required (τὰ δέοντα)', and, and for this reason, there are speeches where opposing views are posited.[13]

While de Ste. Croix, among others, has argued that Thucydides' statement that he adhered 'as close as possible to the general sense of what was really said' means that he has recounted what was actually said whenever possible,[14] Macleod sets forth a plausible motive for speeches, which may account for Thucydides' decision to include speeches such those of Cleon and Diodotus in Book Three, whose speeches, by Thucydides' own admission, are not the most influential, but the most opposite (3.49.1): the speeches represent 'different levels of thinking in military and political strategy, rather than the actual arguments of individuals'.[15] For Pelling, Thucydides' decision to provide a brief synopsis of the Athenians' speech to the Spartans at 1.72.1, and instead give the Athenians a speech (1.73-78) that focuses more on their character and matters related to expansion

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[10] Cole (1991: 104-11).
[11] Pelling (2009: 180).
[12] Hornblower (1991: 59-62); Wilson (1982: 95-103); Marincola (1989: 226).
[13] Rood (1999: 46).
[14] de Ste. Croix (1972: 8-10); Debnar (2001: 14-18); Wilson (1982:99); Badian (1992: 189); Schneider (1974: 153).
[15] Macleod (1983: 88).

exemplifies a moment when the historian has taken certain liberties in reconstructing speeches to demonstrate the real cause of the conflict, which Thucydides states was 'most formally kept out of sight' (1.23.6).[16] According to Pelling, '[n]o sentence in the Greek language can have been taken quite so variously as that on the speeches here', though, he notes, one should not be bothered by the fact that Thucydides is deliberately ambiguous in his statement regarding methodology in speech writing: Thucydides has either reconstructed speeches keeping as close to possible to what was actually said, or, failing that, reconstructed what would have been said given the circumstances.[17]

The idea that Thucydides has used the speeches at various points to make manifest, in a subtle way, the least apparent cause of the war is one that will be investigated in this chapter. As Dewald has noted, an historian's reconstruction of the past reflects his own assumptions about reality, 'so that the text becomes in its narrative rules also a kind of *mise en abyme*, retracing in the way the narrative works the rules that also operate in the larger outside world that each author is trying realistically to convey in his text'.[18] My investigation of the language of 'freedom' in the speeches will demonstrate the decisive nature of language itself, which often goes unrecognised as precipitating conflict, since language, or arbitration, had traditionally been viewed by the Greeks as a means of avoiding armed violence. Thucydides' speeches may reflect what was said, but they also expose the role that language itself played in the escalating tension between Athens, Sparta, and their respective allies.

Thucydides' speeches, and his representation of 'freedom' in them, are a reflection of contemporary rhetoric to the extent that Thucydides reports what was actually said, or keeps to the general line of what was said. On the topic of Thucydides' history Hendrickson notes: 'The author of any speech must be both Thucydides and someone else, a historical agent. The speeches, in other words, like other historical sources, are both the objective record and historical interpretation of the event...The essential truth of the speeches cannot be abandoned without invalidating the history that is being written; Thucydides cannot simply fabricate them. The speeches are also, however, incomplete and

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[16] Pelling (2009: 183 -84).
[17] Pelling (2009: 177, 179).
[18] Dewald (2009: 144-45).

modified in accordance with the historian's reason'.[19] It is impossible to say for certain whether the speeches are a reflection of what was said or a reconstruction of what was likely to have been said, especially given the ambiguity of 1.22.1. However, it is certain that the speeches preserve both elements of contemporary discourse and what Thucydides thought needed to be said in order to make sense of the prevailing, and often contrary, political and military opinions and themes. The process of selection and of determining what was necessary presupposes an interpretive framework, the identification of which is complicated by the presence of contradictory elements in the speeches. Had Thucydides provided some sort of first person analyses of the speeches, locating authorial voice or intention would be less complicated.[20] As it is, attempts to locate such a voice are thwarted by the plurality of views and opinions embedded within the text: '[e]ach focalized speaker...makes argumentative points that matter to himself, and is himself embedded in a political world he is trying to shape with his own intelligent arguments'.[21] Such variant views, Rood suggests, are the product of an historian's attempt to create an historical narrative that will also tell something about wars in the future.[22]

Scholars have conducted thorough investigations into the relationship between speech and narrative as well as the influence of contemporary intellectual trends on Thucydides' history.[23] At 1.22.4 Thucydides makes the following statement, which signals his influence by contemporary trends.

> The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the understanding of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content. In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time.[24]
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> καὶ ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον

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[19] Hedrick (1993: 17).
[20] Gribble (1998: 41-67).
[21] Dewald (2009: 145).
[22] Rood (2006: 225-49).
[23] Rood (1999); Stahl (2006: 301-34); Morrison (2006: 251-277).
[24] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).

> φανεῖται· ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἕξει. κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται (1.22.4).

The prominence given the idea of 'human nature' in his methodological statement 'places Thucydides immediately in connection with the sophistic movement'.[25] Thucydides' speeches convey an awareness and structuring based on sophistic techniques such as arguments from expediency, the antithesis between λόγος and ἔργον and between νόμος and φύσις, and his general experimentation with antitheses and argumentation.[26] Finley even goes so far as to suggest that Thucydides' own understanding and historicising of the past was a product of the sophistic era.[27] Thucydides' first and final statements in this passage situate the text intellectually: his account will be marked by the absence of τὸ μυθῶδες which was characteristic of Herodotus and poets, and it will be a possession for all time rather than an ἀγώνισμα, an essay for competition or display prominent among the sophists.[28] Thucydides' rejection of ἀγώνισμα is echoed by Cleon, who, although not portrayed favourably by Thucydides, nonetheless makes the observation at 3.37.4 that men ought to conduct themselves as 'fair judges rather than rival athletes (ἀγωνισταί)'; 'these', he states, 'we ought to imitate, instead of being led on by cleverness and intellectual rivalry to advise the people against our real opinions' (3.37.5).[29] This statement is aimed at his audience, whom, at 3.38.7, he accuses of listening to political debates like spectators of the sophists (σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς), who are conquered by the pleasures of the ear.[30] According to Plato (*Phaed.* 257d4-8), the written as opposed to spoken speech was associated with the sophists.

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[25] Thomas (2006: 87). See pages 53-55 for more on the sophists and the theories associated with them.
[26] Thomas (2006: 89-90); Hornblower (2009: 70-86); Denniston (1952: 10-13); Finley (1967: chapter 2).
[27] Finley (1942: 43-46).
[28] Thomas (2006: 89); Thomas (2000: 267); Solmsen (1975: 84); Hornblower (1991: 61-62); Guthrie (1971b: 43).
[29] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[30] ἁπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ ἡσσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις.

Even though Thucydides seems to reject sophism by stating that he is not writing an ἀγώνισμα, by awarding himself the ultimate prize, a possession for all time, he is partaking in a 'model of competitive rivalry'.[31]

Connor has noted that traditionally Thucydides has been viewed as a cool, objective historian who, as a pupil of the sophists made use of scientific methods to convey what happened. But, as Connor added, more recently scholars have begun to see Thucydides as a passionate writer whose intense emotion has influenced his narrative.[32] Speaking of Thucydides as a 'sophistic' writer is itself problematic. Even though the composition of his history displays an awareness of and influence by sophistic trends, different sophists often espoused theories and ideas which were at odds with one another.[33] Rather than thinking of the sophists as espousing particular worldviews, trends associated with the sophists might be better characterised as modes of thinking and enquiry, or theoretical frameworks, which, depending on the content subjected to them and the context in which they were employed, might result in different arguments or positions corresponding to the interests of the person employing such methods. As Thomas notes, Thucydides' analysis of the Corcyrean stasis displays the dangers of the relativity of values, an idea found in Plato's characterisation of Protagoras (Pl. *Tht.* 167c, 172b). However, awareness of a particular school of thought does not make one a proponent of it; Thucydides cannot be deemed a sophist on these grounds alone.[34] As Macleod has argued, Thucydides makes use of the rhetorical style and strategies of the sophists in order to undermine them.[35] My aim in this chapter is to examine the role of 'freedom' in Thucydides' narrative in light of his views on language. By examining Thucydides' methodological—even scientific—approach to language, Thucydides' treatment of words becomes a means of conveying a fifth-century audience's emotionally charged response to the language of 'freedom'.

Of the forty speeches reported directly or indirectly by Thucydides twenty-seven of these speeches contain discussions of freedom and slavery: the Spartans claimed that they are freeing Greece from Athens; the Athenians spoke of the freedoms offered by democracy and the valiant struggle for freedom during

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[31] Greenwood (2004: 175-76, 178-81).
[32] Connor (2009: 29).
[33] For more on those considered 'sophists', see pages 53-55.
[34] Thomas (2006: 90)
[35] Thomas (2006: 108).

the Persian Wars; the Spartans encouraged their soldiers to fight for the freedom of the Greeks; the Athenians defended the freedom which they enjoy, the freedom which was passed down to them by their ancestors.[36] Over two thirds (66/101) of the references to freedom in Thucydides' history occur in speech, while forty-three out of the seventy-eight times slavery (δοῦλος in its various forms) occurs it is in the speech sections.

An examination of these passages reveals that the concept of freedom is invoked most often by the Spartans who defined their struggle as one for the freedom of the Greeks. Once the war has commenced Thucydides notes that much of the goodwill was on the side of the Spartans, since they were claiming to be freeing the Greeks (Thuc. 2.8.4): 'Men's feelings inclined much more to the Spartans, especially as they proclaimed themselves the liberators of Hellas' (ἡ δὲ εὔνοια παρὰ πολὺ ἐποίει τῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προειπόντων ὅτι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν).[37] In fact, so solid was their campaign for 'freedom' that the Athenians feared they would lose even more allies. For Brasidas issued statements wherever he went that his mission was to 'free' the Greeks (Thuc. 4.108.2): 'The Athenians also feared that more allies would revolt, particularly because Brasidas displayed such moderation in all his conduct, and declared everywhere that he had been sent out to free Hellas' (ὁ γὰρ Βρασίδας ἔν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις μέτριον ἑαυτὸν παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πανταχοῦ ἐδήλου ὡς ἐλευθερώσων τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐκπεμφθείη).[38] 'Freedom' becomes an identifying feature of Archidamus' rhetoric in the Spartan attack of Plataea (Thuc. 2.72.1).[39] Brasidas' ultimatum to the Acanthians was steeped in the rhetoric of 'freedom', and his speeches of encouragement to soldiers offered reminders of Sparta's mission: to 'free' the Hellenes from Athens.[40] At 8.43.3 Lichas objected to Sparta's treaties with Persia on the grounds the treaties would require that all territories which were or had been formally part of the King's

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[36] Euphemus says he will not mention the struggle for freedom (Thuc. 6.83.2). Most often the Athenians avoid the rhetoric of freedom in their discussion of the Persian Wars. For further discussion of their evasive tone see below. References for speeches pertaining to 'freedom' from an Athenian and Persian perspective can be found in the paragraph below.

[37] Translation Warner (1972a). The verb used to describe the act of 'claiming' or 'saying' in this passage is προεῖπον, which is typically used in public declarations, suggesting that what was publically claimed may not represent the actual agenda of the Spartans.

[38] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).

[39] The conflict between Sparta, Thebes and Plataea will be examined in Chapter Five.

[40] See Introduction for a complete quote of Brasidas. Thuc. 4.85.1, 5, 6, 86.1, 4, 87.2, 5, 6 (Brasidas); 4.114.3 (Brasidas); 4.120.3 (Brasidas); 5.9.1 (Brasidas); 5.9.9 (Brasidas); 5.9.10 (Brasidas).

territory would be ceded to the Persian empire. By agreeing to this treaty, Lichas argued that the Spartans would be 'offering to the Hellenes not liberation but Persian domination' (καὶ ἀντ' ἐλευθερίας ἂν Μηδικὴν ἀρχὴν τοῖς Ἕλλησι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους περιθεῖναι).[41] Alcibiades' advice to the Persians echoed that of Lichas' (Thuc. 8.46.3-5): it would be a better plan for the Persians to ally themselves with the Athenians, as an alliance would suit both their interests, whereas it was unlikely that the Spartans would not also try to free the Greeks from Persia after they had fought for the 'freedom' of the Greeks from Athens. Thucydides later states that Lichas' argument regarding Sparta's claim to be 'freeing' the Greeks was proven correct by Alcibiades' advice to the Persian king (Thuc. 8.52.1).

Athenian rhetoric, on the other hand, was relatively devoid of any claims to be fighting for or defending 'freedom'. As discussed above, Thucydides' speeches are a combination of what was actually said and what was required by the narrative and circumstantial demands of the text. Although the Athenians at 1.73-75 recount their actions during the Persian Wars, they do not frame their actions through the language of 'freedom', even though the language of 'freedom' was essential in the historical tradition of the Persian Wars.[42] When the concept of 'freedom' does occur in Athenian speeches, it is either in reference to democracy as a 'free' political institution, or to the status of the allies.[43] Instead of arguing that their right to rule came from their role in 'freeing' the Greeks from Persia during the Persian Wars, the Athenians defended their actions using arguments based on probability and either their own interests or those of their allies', which often confounded those listening.

'Freedom' was seldom voiced by the states which suffered 'enslavement' at the hands of Athens, and who enjoyed the 'freedom' offered to them by Sparta and the allies.[44] An exploration into Thucydides' thoughts on the concept of language may help explain this anomaly. One passage in particular provides some insight

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[41] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).

[42] Raubitschek (1973: 36-38). See pages 39-40 for evidence that the Persian Wars were conceptualised as 'freedom' wars.

[43] The following are instances when an Athenian speaks of freedom in Thucydides' history: 2.36.1 (Pericles); 2.37.2, 40.5, 43.4, 62.3, 63.1 (Pericles); 3.39.7 (Cleon); 3.45.6, 46.5, 6 (Diodotus); 4.95.3 (Hippocrates); 6.20.2 (Nicias); 6.83.2, 84.3, 85.2, 87.2 (Euphemus); 6.20.2, 7.63.4, 69.2 (Nicias); 8.48.5 (Phrynichus).

[44] The Plataeans lament their treatment at the hands of Sparta and Thebes in the name of freedom: 2.71.2 (twice), 3.54.4, 59.4; the Mytileneans make a case for their defection from Athens: 3.10.4, 5, 12.1, 13.1, 7; the Melians engage in a struggle between pragmatism and realism: 5.99.1, 100.1, 112.2.

into Thucydides' thoughts on the power of rhetoric. After narrating the turmoil which consumed Corcyra Thucydides provides the reader with a statement regarding the power of words:

> And they changed the customary opinion of names to make their actions consistent with their claims of justice (Thuc. 3.82.4).[45]
>
> καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει.

The word which Thucydides used to talk about 'names' in this passage was ὄνομα, a word which can mean 'name' or 'expression/phrase'.[46] Thus Thucydides was speaking about the words which are used to 'name' or label actions. Thucydides' choice of words in this sentence is revealing: it was not so much the case that people began describing their actions with different words as it was that they began calling their behaviour by different names or labels on account of the value accorded the particular name or label. In other words, acts which might be called or labelled as 'harmful' were instead called or labelled as 'helpful' in accordance with the speaker's judgement. People would exploit the value of 'helpful' in order to harness the goodwill that this word conveyed, even though the act itself was not 'helpful'. Thucydides suggests at 3.82.4 that words or names no longer reflected the situations which they were labelling. John Wilson points out that Thucydides does not mean to say that the definitions of words themselves changed; the words which were used to describe situations reflected the speaker's judgment of what is being described.[47] Wilson writes that '[t]hose who used the new description wished precisely to cash in on the *usual* meanings of "courage for the sake of the party", "specious cowardice"...in order to justify behaviour hitherto regarded as odious or discourage behaviour hitherto regarded as admirable.'[48] Ian Worthington notes otherwise. He states that the word which is used to describe the action is influenced by its use.[49] Wilson provides a critique of the words Thucydides uses at 3.82.4 with the exception of ὄνομα, the key word in this

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[45] Translation mine.
[46] *LSJ* ὄνομα.
[47] Wilson (1982:18-20).
[48] Wilson (1982: 18).
[49] Worthington (1982: 124).

sentence. John Hogan examines each word in the sentence in relation to other instances of its use by Thucydides, but, like Wilson, he excludes ὄνομα.[50] Loraux, in her examination of 3.82.4 adopts Hogan's and Wilson's interpretation of the passage, and, while she does stress the importance of ὄνομα, she does not connect Thucydides' use of this term to other key passages where ὄνομα appears.[51] An examination of how Thucydides uses ὄνομα in his history provides the key to interpreting his statement at 3.82.4. This statement is essential for understanding the historian's views on language, which shaped his engagement with the concept of 'freedom'.

In Book One Thucydides engages in a discussion concerning the meaning and power of words. The extreme circumstances of the conflict necessitated that certain actions and behaviour be assigned different labels, for which, as Wilson notes, there were already established meanings. At 1.122.4 the Corinthians noted that someone might argue that, while the Athenians brought freedom to all of Greece, they, the Corinthians, failed to protect their own freedom, and even allowed a dictator to be set up in Greece, even though they made it a principle to overthrow despots in other states:

> Such a policy, in our view, cannot be held to be exempt from three of the greatest mistakes that can be made—lack of intelligence, lack of resolution, or lack of responsibility. Nor do we imagine that you can escape these imputations by claiming that you are superior to your enemies. This feeling of superiority has done much harm before now; indeed, from the number of the cases where it has proved disastrous it has come to be known as the opposite name—not superiority, but plain stupidity.[52]
>
> καὶ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅπως τάδε τριῶν τῶν μεγίστων ξυμφορῶν ἀπήλλακται, ἀξυνεσίας ἢ μαλακίας ἢ ἀμελείας. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πεφευγότες αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τὴν πλείστους δὴ βλάψασαν καταφρόνησιν κεχωρήκατε, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πολλοὺς σφάλλειν τὸ ἐναντίον ὄνομα ἀφροσύνη μετωνόμασται.

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[50] Hogan (1980: 139-50).
[51] Loraux (2009: 270, 292).
[52] Translation Warner (1972a).

The vocabulary used in this sentence is problematic. Thucydides' Corinthians use the word μετονομάζειν in asserting that the Spartans' superiority should be called folly. The Spartans cannot escape from a lack of intelligence, resolution or responsibility, by claiming that they are superior. When one is informed and when the consequences could be so disastrous, the three faults which are the product of superiority make the condition of superiority stupidity. In the past καταφρόνησις, or superiority, served as an apt guise for these faults, but the magnitude of the situation at hand requires a more severe vocabulary; the ὄνομα, the name, for being ignorant, weak and indifferent is no longer accurately captured by καταφρόνησις. Now such mistakes are stupidity, or ἀφροσύνη. The circumstances or events have necessitated a shift in language: words are not redefined, but the name or word assigned to a situation has changed. Thucydides' use of the verb μετονομάζειν, a compound of ὄνομα, in this passage suggests that the extreme circumstances of the Peloponnesian War have magnified the consequences of a lack of intelligence, resolution and responsibility so that to partake in one of these is sheer stupidity.

What is most interesting in this passage is the way that Thucydides has used μετονομάζειν. This is the only passage in the history where this word occurs, and it is scarcely found in any of the extant literature from the fifth and early fourth centuries. Among the fragments of the late sixth-century logographer, Hecataeus of Miletus, it is found twice, while in the writings of Epimenides it is found once.[53] Herodotus used the word four times.[54] In all of the above examples μετονομάζειν was used in reference to the etymology of a word or the changing of names, either of people or places. Thucydides' history presents the first case where it has been applied to a concept or an abstract idea. According to Price, Thucydides' statement at 3.82.4 reflects what happens to language during times of internal conflict: 'culturally determined values, like honor or reputation...may, as society changes, be used to describe different behaviours without undergoing any semantic shift'.[55] Language, like all other conventions, undergoes a shift in times of crisis. The praise of actions formerly deemed nefarious, a situation typical in

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[53] There is some debate regarding Epimenides' date. He is generally placed in the seventh century. Plato places him a century later (*Leg*. 642d).
[54] Hecataeus, *FGrH* 1 F10, F84; Epimenides *FGrH* 457 F16; Hdt. 4.155, 4.189, 5.69, 8.44. Other examples include Hellanicus *FGrH* 4 F15; Plato, *Tht*. 180a6; Ctesias 688 F15.
[55] Price (2001: 39-43).

stasis, represents the transformation of values within society. As a consequence, words are used in different ways precisely because actions are judged differently.[56]

Thucydides' use of μετονομάζειν suggests that he was engaged with a common fifth-century debate concerning language. While Heraclitus had recognised that language, which was supposed to serve as an account of the world, was full of contradiction, Parmenides divided the world into a world of appearance, which he deemed a fiction, and a world of being. According to Parmenides, 'all that mortals posited in the belief that it was true will be name only, coming into being and perishing, to be and not to be, change of place and interchange of shining colour'.[57] For Parmenides, the process of naming reflects opinion rather than truth; if 'names' did in fact reflect the truth, then a rainbow would not be wrongly called 'Iris', as Xenophanes notes.[58] Democritus too recognised that language failed to represent reality in his assessment of the multiplicity, the changing, and the deficiency of names.[59] Overall there was a prevailing belief among Presocratics that language could not adequately describe reality. The sophists, recognising the unease expressed by the Presocratics concerning language and reality, also consider the relationship between the words and reality. Such discussions were framed through νόμος and φύσις, and whether the names of things exist by convention or by nature, a topic which is pivotal in Plato's *Cratylus*. This discussion is often confused with, though distinctly separate from, discussions concerning the origin of language and whether it existed by 'nature' or by 'convention'.[60] Whereas Democritus, noting the inconsistencies of language, regarded it as existing by convention, Prodicus supported a 'naturalist thesis' and opposed the idea that relativism played a role in the defining of words.[61] Gorgias, on the other hand, 'claimed that nothing exists; if it exists, it cannot be known; and that if it both exists and can be known, it cannot be communicated to others'.[62] For Gorgias, 'the role of language is reduced to that of

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[56] Price (2001: 42).
[57] Translation Kerferd (1981: 71); τῶι πάντ' ὄνομα ἔσται, ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί, καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διά τε χρόα φανὸν ἀμείβειν (DK 28B8.38-41).
[58] DK 21B32; de Jonge and Ophuijsen (2010: 487).
[59] DK 68B26; Sluiter (1997: 172-73).
[60] Gera (2003: 169-70).
[61] de Jonge and Ophuijsen (2010: 488); Heinimann (1945: 156).
[62] DK 82B3; translation de Jonge and Ophuijsen (2010: 489).

a magic wand that can be used at will to impress and manipulate an audience'.[63] While Gorgias was more concerned with language as it applied to rhetoric, Protagoras emphasised speaking correctly rather than the correctness of words or names for things.[64]

The concern expressed by the Presocratics over the relationship between reality and language is taken up by the sophists, who either take advantage of the shortcomings of language to speak persuasively or engage in discussions regarding the place of language—both its origin and the meanings of words—in the debate between νόμος and φύσις. Thucydides' statement at 3.82.4 suggests that he regarded language as fixed by convention, but that the 'social value assigned to it, its societal manifestation in human action' can change as circumstances change.[65] Thucydides' use of μετονομάζειν at 1.122.4 and of ὄνομα at 3.82.4 suggests that he is engaging in an intellectual discourse on language itself, one that began with the Presocratics who discussed the ability of 'names', or ὀνόματα to accurately reflect reality. For Thucydides, meanings of words were fixed by convention, but some words, especially words that are assigned value, were used in extreme circumstances such as civil strife, to describe situations that would otherwise not be deemed as such. Thucydides' belief that language could be used to describe behaviours not usually associated with a particular action without that word undergoing any sort of shift in meaning was not recognised by the sophists.[66] In this sense, Thucydides' philosophy of language is not indebted to the sophists, but is instead a reaction to the sophists and is embedded in a fifth-century trend of thinking critically about language. As I shall show, Thucydides' presentation of 'freedom' indicates that it had become a word which was used as a label or name for actions which bore little semblance to 'freeing'. In other words, it was an ὄνομα, or a label assigned to an action based on the judgement of the speaker. Because of the value accorded 'freedom' by the audience, politicians and rhetoricians made use of the term, as they hoped to sway the audience or gain support by framing speeches through positively charged words. In order to verify this hypothesis it is necessary to explore the other instances in which ὄνομα appears.

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[63] de Jonge and Ophuijsen (2010: 489).
[64] Kerferd (1981:73-74); de Jonge and Ophuijsen (2010: 490).
[65] Price (2001: 43).
[66] Price (2001: 43).

Before doing this, it will be helpful to see how Thucydides' intellectual environment informed his writing and his conceptualisation of 'freedom', since many of these contemporary trends concern language. Thucydides lived in the age of the sophists who were engaged in antilogic, the creation of contrasting arguments on any topic, and who questioned the inherent value of morals through relativism.[67] Although Thucydides does not explicitly make use of relativism, antilogic, or the idea of contrasting two opposing positions, such theoretical principals and modes of enquiry structure the speech sections of his history.[68] Thucydides never overtly makes his position regarding the sophists known, and, in fact, only mentions one individual, Antiphon, who may or may not have been the sophist Antiphon. In Book Eight Thucydides states that Antiphon was so well versed in speaking that he never spoke at assembly meetings. He was generally mistrusted on account of his reputation for cleverness, but his aid was eagerly sought in lawsuits, and when points were to be made in the assembly (Thuc. 8.68). Regardless of which Antiphon this is,[69] it is important to note the pernicious power accorded to him by the people, and possibly by Thucydides himself, for his skill with words.

The only other reference to sophists in Thucydides comes in Cleon's speech in the debate regarding the fate of Mytilene (3.38.7). In the Mytilenean debate Cleon argued that bad laws that are fixed are better than good laws which are always changing. States are better managed by the man on the street than by intellectuals schooled in cleverness. These people want to seem wiser than the laws and argue to get their way in debates, which can do great harm to the political community. People who are not confident in their intelligence lack the ability to dissect speeches. Consequently, unlike their counterparts who behave as if they are performing in a competition, they are unbiased. Cleon advised that rather than being carried away by their own cleverness they should try to be like these men (Thuc. 3.37.3-5).[70]

Virginia Hunter, in analysing Thucydides' characterisation of fear, has noted the similarities between Thucydides' use of fear in his history and Gorgias'

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[67] See pages 53-55; Striker (1996: 7-9); Kerferd (1981: 59-78).
[68] Yunis (1998: 234-39).
[69] Pendrick (2002: 1-26); Gagarin (2002: 39-40).
[70] c.f. Thuc. 3.82.7: ῥᾷον δ' οἱ πολλοὶ κακοῦργοι ὄντες δεξιοὶ κέκληνται ἢ ἀμαθεῖς ἀγαθοί, καὶ τῷ μὲν αἰσχύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἀγάλλονται.

theory of fear in his *Encomium of Helen*.[71] While the psychology of 'fear' is, for both Thucydides and Gorgias, based in the sense of sight, that is to say, one is afraid by the sight of something or the memory of that sight, hearing is the 'corresponding sense-organ' for λόγος, which has the capacity to alter men's mental state through persuasion and deception.[72] Poets are identified as culprits in this sense, as they enter the listener's consciousness by making them feel the joy and pain of others, a feat that is accomplished through the power of words. The inadequacy of 'men's rational faculties' and 'their inability to remember the past, evaluate the present critically, and have foreknowledge of the future' makes them reliant on opinion.[73] Diodotus notes that the Athenians might make better decisions if the audience faced the same consequences rather than just blaming the speaker, who either through deception or lies has provided counsel (3.43.2-5). Cleon, on the other hand, accuses the Athenians of being 'spectators of words and listeners of deeds' (3.38.4); the Athenians watch speakers but do not demand more than hearsay as evidence.[74] A similar idea is set forth by Gorgias in *On Not Being*. Here he argues that if something does exist, it would be impossible to comprehend or think it, and that if one could, it would not be possible to communicate it.[75] More specifically Gorgias argues that 'just as sight has the visible as its object, and not the audible, so too when a speaker speaks, what he says is *logos* rather than a colour or a thing or a thought'.[76] Furthermore Cleon argues that the Athenians place more trust in what they have heard than what they have seen and experienced themselves in the past. Cleon concludes his speech by accusing the Athenians of being slaves to the ear and of behaving more like spectators of the sophists than counsellors of the city (3.38.7). In his analysis of the Mytilenean Debate, Macleod notes that Cleon's speech is representative of Thucydides at his most Gorgianic, for, even though Cleon condemns sophistry, thereby destroying the possibility for debate, he still proceeds by giving a sophistically styled speech on the consequences of future action.[77] Noting the parallels between Gorgias' theory of λόγος in the *Encomium of Helen* and that set

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[71] DK 82B11; Hunter (1962: 419-29); Segal (1962: 108).
[72] Hunter (1986: 420-24); Verdenius (1981: 116-28).
[73] Hunter (1986: 422).
[74] Hunter (1986: 424).
[75] S.E. *M* 7.65-87; *De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia* 79a11-80b21; Barney (2006: 92).
[76] Translation Barney (2006: 93).
[77] Macleod (1978: 70-71). For a more complete discussion of Cleon's speech see Chapter Five, section 2.

forth by Diodotus and Cleon, Hunter concludes that not only do Diodotus' and Cleon's concerns over rhetoric resonate with those of Gorgias, but that Thucydides himself has embraced Gorgias' theory of λόγος, and the 'link between Gorgias and Thucydides seems incontrovertible'.[78]

Thucydides was not the only fifth-century writer to comment on the power of words to sway an audience. Fifth-century writers frequently acknowledged that actions were called by different 'names' in accordance with the judgement of the speaker. In a fragment of Euripides the speaker asks, 'What action is shameful if it seem not so to the actor?'.[79] Similarly, in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, we find 'What action is shameful if it seem not so the audience? (1475). And Eteocles, in the *Phoenissae*, laments the subjective nature of justice and wisdom: 'If everyone defined justice and wisdom the same way, there would be no quarrelling or strife among men. As things stand, the only similarity or equality mortals show is in their use of words: the reality to which these refer is not the same' (499-502).[80] Once again the reader is reminded of the danger which can ensue when words, or ὀνόματα, are applied unconventionally. Like Eteocles, Thucydides reveals that the only recourse for avoiding quarrelling and strife, language, or arbitration, has been subverted through the use of words which do not depict reality consistently. Socrates noted this too and adamantly opposed the scepticism of those, such as Protagoras, who argued that morality was subjective; in order to practice morality, Socrates believed that there must be an agreement on the meaning of moral terms.[81] As Guthrie writes, 'From this theoretical soil grew the pride of youthful rhetoric in its ability to sway men to or from any course of action by mastery of the persuasive use of words'.[82]

The litigious nature of the Athenians, as described by Thucydides, and their deceptive cleverness facilitate the outbreak of war. Following the speech of the Corinthians, the Athenians ask that they be given the opportunity to respond to the complaints made by the allies against them at the meeting in Sparta. They state that they do not intend to respond directly to the attacks made, since the assembly meeting is not a court of law.[83] They then proceed to demonstrate to

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[78] Hunter (1962: 425-26).
[79] Eur. *TGrF* 1 F19.
[80] Translations Guthrie (1971b: 165). See also Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.8.
[81] Guthrie (1971b: 165-66). *Phaedr.* 263a; c.f. *Euthyphro* 7c-d, *Alc. I* 111e-112a.
[82] Guthrie (1971a: 111).
[83] For more on courtroom politicking and its implication on arbitration see Chapter Five, section 5.

those gathered that they are not unreasonably in possession of the things that they have acquired and that it is only right that their views be consulted (Thuc. 1.73.1). They begin their λόγος by asking the audience to indulge them by hearing their record during the Persian Wars, even though it is a story based more on hearsay than eyewitnesses—a danger brought to the fore by Cleon (3.38.4)—and they admit that their audience is probably tired of hearing the story.

The history of the Persian Wars would have been the perfect setting for Thucydides to have the Athenians portray themselves as the liberators of Greece, as Herodotus briefly discusses at 7.139 and 8.144.[84] Rather than discuss their role in securing the 'freedom' of the Greeks from Persia, the Athenians use the history of the Persian Wars to show that their empire came to them because they were the only ones who were willing to defend the Greek city-states from the Persian threat. 'Freedom' never comes into play in their argument, which is logical, but lacking in the sort of vocabulary which would have engaged the pathos of the listener or reader. They argue that they have done nothing deviating from human patterns of behaviour in receiving power which was given to them. It has always been a rule that the weak be ruled by the strong,[85] a message which echoes Plato's protagonist in the *Gorgias*, Callicles, who argued that in accordance with the laws of nature the stronger should be allowed to trample the weak: the stronger determine the parameters of justice, therefore the triumph of the stronger is just and in accordance with nature.[86] Socrates resisted this thesis, asserting until the very end of the dialogue that it is worse to act unjustly towards others than be treated unjustly, and that men should be good rather than just seem to be so.[87] The Athenians make an argument similar to that of Callicles when they appeal to the nature (φύσις) of power. They state that 'praise is due to all who, if not so superior to human nature (τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει) as to refuse dominion, yet respect justice more than their position compels them to do'.[88] Although the Athenians note that the Spartans 'are not judges' before whom it is possible to plea (1.73.1), it is clear that they are engaged in courtroom practices when they offer

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[84] See pages 64-65, 67-68, 89.

[85] ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἧσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι (Thuc. 1.76.2). Note that Thucydides states that it is a rule that the weaker be hemmed in or pressed hard by the more powerful, but not necessarily ruled.

[86] de Romilly (1992: 120).

[87] Schofield (2010: xviii).

[88] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996); ἐπαινεῖσθαί τε ἄξιοι οἵτινες χρησάμενοι τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει ὥστε ἑτέρων ἄρχειν δικαιότεροι ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δύναμιν γένωνται (Thuc. 1.76.3).

their counterargument.[89] They avoid issues of policy and instead defend themselves. Their defense consists of logical arguments based on φύσις and justice, a common theme in nearly all the writings of the sophists.[90]

After the Spartan king, Archidamus, responds to the Athenians' speech at Sparta, Sthenelaidas, an ephor, indignantly remarks that he does not understand the long speeches that the Athenians make; the conflict at hand, he argues, is not one that can be settled through speeches and lawsuits, but one which requires immediate action (Thuc. 1.86). After the ephor's comments, Thucydides stated that the Spartans agreed that the Athenians were the aggressors and had broken the treaty (Thuc. 1.87). Arbitration, the means by which violent action was to be avoided, had been rendered ineffectual by the Athenians, whose reaction to the assembly was based more on the νόμοι of law courts than determined by the νόμοι of the treaty.

Thucydides' Athenians never speak of 'freedom', even when discussing the Persian Wars, because it would not be in their interest to do so. While the Athenians are pragmatic and use logic and argumentation to reveal the motives behind their actions, the Spartans react by appealing to emotive concepts such as 'freedom' and 'slavery' which incite anger and enthusiasm. The rhetorically skilled Athenians knew better than to frame their defense in terms of 'freedom'. Any mention of 'freedom' would have led to the logical attack that the Athenians were behaving no differently than the Persians who tried to enslave them, a point made by Hermocrates in Book Six (Thuc. 6.76).[91] Thucydides' Spartans, on the other hand, have no qualms about using the language of 'freedom'. Because Sparta's goal in the war was to free the Hellenes from the Athenians, any act which the Spartans felt promoted this cause could be carried out in the name of 'freedom', even though it may not have entailed the actual act of freeing. The Spartans themselves have used a different name, or ὄνομα, to justify actions which might otherwise be considered 'enslavement'.

A comparison between Plato's and Thucydides' treatment of ὄνομα suggests that Thucydides was engaged philosophically with the concept of 'naming' things, and the implications of incorrectly 'naming' an act in speech.

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[89] οὐ γὰρ παρὰ δικασταῖς ὑμῖν οὔτε ἡμῶν οὔτε τούτων οἱ λόγοι ἂν γίγνοιντο.
[90] de Romilly (1992: 114).
[91] For a more complete discussion of this passage in the context of the Peloponnesian War, see pages 69-70.

Although ὄνομα and λόγος may seem interchangeable, an examination of Plato's treatment of these two words suggests that Thucydides, who is also thinking in a more philosophical than pragmatic way about language, may be making similar distinctions. Plato, in the *Cratylus* and in Letter Seven, described names (ὀνόματα) as being distinct from words (λόγοι). While name (ὄνομα) was the word which the concept was called, words (λόγοι) served as a description of the concept which consisted of names and phrases (ἐξ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων συγκείμενος).[92] In the *Cratylus*, Plato focused on the correctness of names, ὀνόματα, as an essential component of speaking correctly. His investigation was limited to nouns, since these were typically the subjects of sentences. He asserted that the act of speaking is only successful if one speaks in accordance with the natural instrument (Pl. *Cra.* 387b11-c3). Names are then able to instruct and separate how things are (Pl. *Cra.* 388b10-11).[93] Traces of the distinction between ὄνομα and λόγος can be found in Thucydides. I contend that by ὄνομα Thucydides did not mean word, but name, or rather what something is called. A statement made by Pericles at 2.37.1 offers evidence in favour of a 'Platonic' reading of ὄνομα. Pericles, in the funeral oration, stated that 'with respect to the name it is called a democracy on account of the fact that it is managed not for the few but for the majority.'[94] The name or ὄνομα is democracy; the description, or λόγοι, is that it is governed in the interest of the majority rather than the few. Thucydides did not say that the word or λόγος was democracy, but rather the name, the ὄνομα, is democracy.

Thucydides signals to the reader that 'freedom' was a concept which did not adequately characterize the situations in which it was applied through two antitheses: λόγος/ἔργον and ὄνομα/ἔργον. A search for ὄνομα in Thucydides' history reveals that the word was typically used in passages where he was discussing the names for people and places, thereby excluding the possibility that Thucydides simply used it as another word for λόγος. He clearly did not. Of the forty-one times it was used, twenty-five times it was used for the name of a place,

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[92] Pl., *Ep.* 342a-d. Rachel Barney (2001: 163-164) discusses the authenticity of the letter, but concludes that even if it is not authentic it still presents an accurate picture of Plato's ideas as expressed in the *Cratylus*.

[93] Sedley (2003: 59-61). Similar sentiments can be found in Thucydides (3.42.2).

[94] καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ' ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται.

a person, or the reputation of a city.[95] The remaining examples suggest that Thucydides used ὄνομα to show that what he, or a speaker in his history, has stated is not true, or a deviation from his narrative. Examples of ὄνομα from Euripides' *Helen* demonstrate that questioning the relationship between the name of a thing and the thing itself was a sophistic trend in the fifth century.[96] In Euripides' play Helen stated that it was not for her that the Greeks were fighting, but only her name.[97] When Menelaus and Helen finally meet, Helen, persuading Menelaus that it is she, states that names can exist in many places, but the body only in one.[98] Menelaus refuses to believe her, as the magnitude of the conflict which he has seen at Troy prevents him from believing the reality before him, that Helen was in Troy in name only.[99] The *Helen* shows that Greeks during this time were questioning the ability of words to convey reality. This is made clear in Thucydides' history by the unease which was displayed over people trained in speaking taking part in the assembly (Thuc. 8.68) and from Cleon's speech (Thuc. 3.38).

Thucydides' comment on the value of words changing at 3.82.4 indicates that words often reflected the perspective of the individual and his judgment more than an objective reality. The result is two parallel worlds, one of speech which is seen through the lens of the speaker's judgement, and one of reality. The metanarrative on language encourages the reader to consider that the words chosen by a speaker do not necessarily represent reality, but are merely the speaker's interpretation, manipulation and reconstruction of events which are shaped by the speaker's perceptions.

Despite the fact that these subjective 'interpretations' may not suffice by modern standards of what constitutes 'history', such perspectives provide insight into what were perceived to be the origins and factors which exacerbated the conflict. Although there is much debate regarding *prophasis* and whether it comes from προφαίνω or πρόφημι, I agree with Pearson who defines *prophasis* as

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[95] Thuc. 1.3.4, 132.3; 2.29.3, 37.1, 64.3, 68.3; 3.102.1; 4.64.3, 70.1, 87.6, 133.3; 5.16.1, 20.2; 6.4.1, 4.4, 4.5, 33.6, 64.2, 80.4; 7.64.2, 69.2, 70.8; 8.85.2, 92.2. At 1.34 Thucydides states that before the Greeks called themselves Hellenes they refrained from calling one another barbarians, as this word did not exist before the invention of the Hellenes.

[96] Solmsen (1934: 120); Segal (1971: 559).

[97] Φρυγῶν δ' ἐς ἀλκὴν προυτέθην ἐγὼ μὲν οὔ, / τὸ δ' ὄνομα τοὐμόν, ἆθλον Ἕλλησιν δορός (Eur. *Hel.* 42-43).

[98] οὔνομα γένοιτ' ἂν πολλαχοῦ, τὸ σῶμα δ' οὔ (Eur. *Hel.* 588).

[99] τοὐκεῖ με μέγεθος τῶν κακῶν πείθει, σὺ δ' οὔ (Eur. *Hel.* 593).

'explanation' on the grounds that this definition is 'logically satisfactory'.[100] According to Thucydides, the truest pretext (πρόφασις) of the conflict was the growth of Athenian power and fear this instilled in Sparta and her allies.[101] This pretext, Thucydides stated, was least manifest in speech (Thuc. 1.23.6),[102] as it had been overshadowed by the causes of the conflict which each side presented. Rather than discussing the growth of Athenian power and the fear this incited in the allies, each side presented arguments and speeches in which their actions were presented as being just. Darien Shanske argues that the distinction made between cause (αἰτία) and pretext (πρόφασις) is not helpful because Thucydides does not present Athenian behaviour as aggressive. Thus it does not seem logical that the growth of Athenian power was the pretext for war.[103] Lawrence Tritle notes that Thucydides downplays Athenian aggression, but, given the limitations of time and his own perspective, does an admirable job explaining the causes.[104] The use of word πρόφασις at 1.23.6 is far more subtle and much more in line with Thucydides' metanarrative on language. For Thucydides, Athenian aggression was to be found in the ability of the Athenians to persuasively argue so that any action which was taken seemed just. The truest pretext for going to war was the Athenians' ability to put forth arguments, like the one examined above, which justified the actions carried out in the Pentecontaetia, thereby undermining the arbitration clause in the Thirty Years' Truce.

Following his statement at 3.82.4 regarding the customary uses of language, Thucydides provides a list of actions which were redefined according to judgment, an example, according to Price, of people in civil strife assigning different values to actions.[105] People began calling acts of aggression courage, a delaying weakness, self-control an excuse for cowardice. The list continues. As Wilson points out, Thucydides did not mean that ξυνετόν (understanding) came to mean ἀργόν (laziness), but that ξυνετόν was deemed (ἐνομίσθη) ἀργόν.[106] In addition people began playing upon preconceived notions or ideas in order to

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[100] Pearson (1972: 294).
[101] Rood (1998: 208-9); Cawkwell (1997: 20-39); de Romilly (1956:114); Huart (1968: 122-23).
[102] ἣν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν.
[103] Shanske (2007: 158-59).
[104] Tritle (2007: 174).
[105] Price (2001: 39).
[106] τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθὴς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν (3.82.4).

persuade others.[107] This is made clear by the final example in the list begun at 3.82.4:

> The leaders in the cities made the fairest professions: on the one side with the cry of political equality of The People [*sic*], on the other of a moderate aristocracy; but they sought prizes for themselves in those public interests which they pretended to cherish and, stopping at nothing in their struggles for ascendancy, engaged in direct excess.[108]

> οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες μετὰ ὀνόματος ἑκάτεροι εὐπρεποῦς, πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει, τὰ μὲν κοινὰ λόγῳ θεραπεύοντες ἆθλα ἐποιοῦντο, παντὶ δὲ τρόπῳ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ἀλλήλων περιγίγνεσθαι ἐτόλμησάν τε τὰ δεινότατα ἐπεξῆσάν τε τὰς τιμωρίας ἔτι μείζους (3.82.8).

This example demonstrates the complexity of the concept of 'name' (ὄνομα). Following the statement that the leaders used appealing words, Thucydides mentions ἰσονομία, a political buzzword of democracy and σωφροσύνη, a catchword of aristocrats.[109] Politicians appealed to popular language, or, in a sense, spoke the language of the people by using political catchphrases that their constituents would find pleasing.[110] By using ὄνομα, Thucydides is warning the reader that these words, or ὀνόματα, ἰσονομία and σώφρων, may only be pretence. Immediately after stating that politicians made appeals to equality and moderation, he states that by serving the common good they were winning prizes for themselves. He concludes this sentiment by stating '[t]hus neither side had any use for conscientious motives; more interest was shown in those who could produce attractive arguments to justify some disgraceful action' (3.82.8).[111]

The antithesis in this passage is between what is done in consideration of piety versus that which is done because it is made to seem better. Thucydides

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[107] Wilson (1982: 18-19).
[108] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[109] Marchant (1909); Rademaker (2005: 200-201).
[110] Debnar (2001: 226-27).
[111] Translation Warner (1972a); ὥστε εὐσεβείᾳ μὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνόμιζον, εὐπρεπείᾳ δὲ λόγου οἷς ξυμβαίη ἐπιφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι, ἄμεινον ἤκουον.

emphasised the role of speech in deceiving when he stated that they 'hear' that plan to be better even though it may not have been in their interest. Although the argument as whole was persuasive, it was through words such as ἰσονομία and σώφρον that politicians were able to win favour among the people. Politicians and speakers took advantage of the rhetorical gravitas of words in order to persuade listeners sympathetic to such vocabulary.

The opening of the Melian Dialogue reinforced the notion that advantage could be taken of value-laden words to create a persuasive speech. This dialogue is commonly considered more epideictic than historical.[112] The pervasive language of 'freedom', 'slavery' and 'autonomy' is almost entirely absent from the Melian Dialogue. The language used in this passage is devoid of any emotive or persuasive words typical of Sparta and her allies. Its tone is more logical, a style which was a trademark of the rhetoric of Thucydides' Athenians.[113] The Athenians provided the following warning to the Melians regarding their speech:

> Then we on our side will use no fine phrases saying, for example, that we have no right to our empire because we defeated the Persians, or that we have a right to our empire because we defeated the Persians, or that we have come against you now because of the injuries you have done us—a great mass of words that nobody would believe.[114]
>
> Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν οὔτε αὐτοὶ μετ' ὀνομάτων καλῶν, ὡς ἢ δικαίως τὸν Μῆδον καταλύσαντες ἄρχομεν ἢ ἀδικούμενοι νῦν ἐπεξερχόμεθα, λόγων μῆκος ἄπιστον παρέξομεν (5.89.1).

Gomme notes that the Persian Wars were not included in the argument because it held some rhetorical weight.[115] That being said, the power of *praeteritio* cannot be denied, and although the very mention of the Persian Wars would have been sufficient to make their point, their discussion was typically Athenian. It lacked the tour de force of the rhetoric characteristic of the Spartans who relied on persuasive language; the strength of the Athenian arguments lay not in fine

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[112] Cogan (1981a: 88).
[113] c.f. 1.73-78.
[114] Translation Warner (1972a).
[115] Gomme, *HCT* 4.161.

phrases, or rather labels, or in Price's words 'culturally determined values'[116] (ὀνόματα), but in arguments (λόγοι), which reveal that their actions were 'just'. Although the Athenians stated that they would leave aside arguments that they rule justly or that they attack justly because they have been wronged, they then proceeded to outline their own thoughts on justice.

As Hunter has noted, 'the Athenians at Melos add a new dimension to the way in which words work, at least in the usual λόγος, which does not permit of interruption. Here words deceive the listeners by being both seductive and unfalsifiable...That is, while they appeal to the emotions, they do not permit the rational faculties to come into play (cross-examination, refutation, etc.)'.[117] The mention of ὄνομα at the beginning of the dialogue served as a latent warning to the reader, and to the Melians, to be wary of the power of words, especially if a word which was deemed an ὄνομα appeared in the dialogue. The word ὄνομα was spoken of a second time by the Athenians. At 5.111.3 the Athenians warned the Melians not to be tempted into action by the name, or ὄνομα, of 'shame'.

> For in many cases men have still been able to see the dangers ahead of them, but this thing called dishonour, this word, by its own force of seduction, has drawn them into a state where they have surrendered to an idea, while in fact they have fallen voluntarily into irrevocable disaster, in dishonour that is all the more dishonourable because it has come to them from their own folly rather than their misfortune.[118]

> οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπί γε τὴν ἐν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς καὶ προύπτοις κινδύνοις πλεῖστα διαφθείρουσαν ἀνθρώπους αἰσχύνην τρέψεσθε. πολλοῖς γὰρ προορωμένοις ἔτι ἐς οἷα φέρονται τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλούμενον ὀνόματος ἐπαγωγοῦ δυνάμει ἐπεσπάσατο ἡσσηθεῖσι τοῦ ῥήματος ἔργῳ ξυμφοραῖς ἀνηκέστοις ἑκόντας περιπεσεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνην αἰσχίω μετὰ ἀνοίας ἢ τύχῃ προσλαβεῖν (Thuc. 5.111.3).

The word or concept which Thucydides called an 'alluring word' was αἰσχύνη, which has the power to persuade men who are subjected to persuasive speech to

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[116] Price (2001: 42).
[117] Hunter (1986: 423).
[118] Translation Warner (1972a).

commit acts that are not in their interest. Even if the word 'shame' was not used in these persuasive speeches, Thucydides' Athenians have called this concept which has the power to persuade someone to act contrary to their own interests an ὄνομα, when in fact, or in reality, the shame or dishonour which resulted from reacting to a fear of shame was even greater. The concept of 'shame' served as pejorative rhetorical tool. The language of 'freedom' and 'slavery', on the other hand, was used not to dissuade someone from an action which would be contrary to the speaker's interests, but in order to encourage people towards a course of action which served the interests of the speaker rather than the audience. The Athenians have just argued that it is in both the interest of the Melians and of the Athenians that the Melians join the Athenian alliance as a tribute-paying state. Gaining another ally was certainly in the interest of the Athenians, but not necessarily in the interest of the Melians, who have espoused the cause of 'freedom' for the Greeks. While ideologically submitting to Athens would be counterproductive, the Athenians argued that pragmatically it would be in the best interest of Melos to surrender rather than be defeated by the greater forces of Athens. By suggesting that such opposition would result in even a greater shame than the fear of shame which compels people not to surrender, Thucydides has essentially shamed the Melians into compliance. By framing their argument through the concept of 'shame', the Athenians have taken advantage of the Melians fear of 'shame' in order to persuade them to commit actions not in their interest.

Although initially the Athenians stated they would not use ὀνόματα in their dialogue, they fail to fulfill this promise. By calling this situation, whereby a smaller state opposes the forces of a larger state with hope as their only weapon, shameful, a concept which the Athenians said compelled many to yield to the power of its alluring name, the Athenians were in fact using the power of its alluring name to persuade the Melians to commit an act of shame by surrendering. The Athenians openly acknowledged the danger of 'shame' as an ὄνομα which did not correspond to the action, but then took advantage of its power. In doing so they rely on the very tool they set out to avoid in the beginning. The Athenians openly admitted that they would use arguments rather than 'words' to persuade the audience at the opening of the Melian Dialogue. Thucydides' programmatic statement regarding ὀνόματα in the Corcyra episode establishes the function of ὄνομα in the text. When this word appears in the text it serves as a cue to the

reader that the speaker or narrator may be using words which have a relative value. By calling actions names such as 'shameful', 'courageous' or 'liberation' the speaker is able to exploit the audience's preconceived notions regarding the value of these culturally embedded concepts. Even though such labels are not in accord with the actions described, the speaker, by mentioning them, is able to play with the audience's emotional response to them. The Spartans were infamous for using such words. The Athenians seemed to use them less, but the words were ensconced so deeply in the argument that the audience heard the ὀνόματα, but did not necessarily follow the logic.

A comparison of statements made by an Athenian regarding the concept of 'shame' provides further evidence that an ὄνομα was a word which served as a persuasive tool that did not correspond to reality. In the funeral oration Pericles argued that the Athenians must conduct themselves with the same spirit as the men who died in battle because they avoided the 'shame' of what one would be expected to do when faced with the reality of battle. Rather than flee and save themselves they stood their ground.

> [A]nd while committing to hope the uncertainty of final success, in the business before them they thought fit to act boldly and trust in themselves. Thus choosing to die resisting, rather than to live submitting, they fled only from dishonor, but met danger face to face, and after one brief moment, while at the summit of their fortune, left behind them not their fear, but their glory.[119]

> ἐλπίδι μὲν τὸ ἀφανὲς τοῦ κατορθώσειν ἐπιτρέψαντες, ἔργῳ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἤδη ὁρωμένου σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἀξιοῦντες πεποιθέναι, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἡγησάμενοι ἢ [τὸ] ἐνδόντες σῴζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν αἰσχρὸν τοῦ λόγου ἔφυγον, τὸ δ' ἔργον τῷ σώματι ὑπέμειναν καὶ δι' ἐλαχίστου καιροῦ τύχης ἅμα ἀκμῇ τῆς δόξης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ δέους ἀπηλλάγησαν (Thuc. 2.42.4).

Pericles stated that these were the men who were worthy of the city, whose daring spirit the Athenians must imitate. This daring spirit came from placing trust in

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[119] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).

hope (ἐλπίς) even in the most inopportune times. By trusting hope they were able to escape reason or logic, which would have forced them to commit the shameful act of fleeing. In the Melian Dialogue the Athenian representative recommended the opposite advice, that the Melians avoid submitting to shame, that is, the shame that arises from not being brave enough to stand their ground, and thereby save themselves by making an alliance with Athens. In each of these passages, one from the Funeral Oration, the other from the Melian Dialogue, 'shame' was defined by context.[120]

The Athenians' interpretation of 'hope' also depends on context. When the Athenians themselves were threatened they encouraged soldiers to take strength from 'hope'. However, when they were trying to persuade a smaller state to join their alliance, they warned the state not to place too much stock in 'hope. 'Hope' was mentioned frequently by Pericles and by the Athenians in both the Melian Dialogue and in events surrounding the expedition to Sicily.[121] For Pericles 'hope' was the means by which men were able to overcome the shameful act of fleeing in battle and stand their ground, and in a similar context 'hope' is spoken of by Nicias. In the Melian Dialogue the Athenians warned the Melians that 'hope' is only beneficial if one has solid advantages, which the Melians did not have, and that, by trusting 'hope', the Melians would lose the opportunity of saving themselves (Thuc. 2.42.4; 5.103.1-2). The Melians, according to the Athenians, were more consumed by their hope for the future than by assessing reality and making informed decisions to ensure their preservation. Thus the concept of 'hope' may be added to the list of persuasive tools or ὀνόματα that serve the interest of the speaker and are defined by context.

Remarks made by Diodotus provide further evidence that ὀνόματα serve the interests of the speaker. Diodotus stated that those who argue that words cannot be the teachers of deeds were either foolish or had their own interests in mind. According to Diodotus, 'he is a fool, if he imagines that it is possible to deal with the uncertainties of the future by any other medium, and he is personally

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[120] The concept of 'shame' is not always used as an ὄνομα in Thucydides' history. The idea of shame first appears at 1.5.1 when Thucydides is describing the actions of the pirates. This is an example of a normative use of the concept before it was co-opted by Peloponnesian War politics as a persuasive tool and applied to situations where the 'shamefulness' of action or thought was contingent on one's perspective. The fact that Thucydides uses 'shame' in an 'objective' way makes its use as a manipulative tool stand out in the text even more.

[121] The role or function of 'hope' in Thucydides' narration has been examined by Avery (1973: 1-13); Cornford (1965: 209-220).

interested if his aim is to persuade you into some disgraceful action, and, knowing that he cannot make a good speech in a bad cause, he tries to frighten his opponents and his hearers by some good-sized piece of misrepresentation'.[122] Diodotus' comments on rhetoric was a warning that the Athenians, when they speak of 'shame', might have ulterior motives. This, combined with the fact that the Athenians introduced the name of 'shame' in order to persuade the Melians that Athenian interests served the interests of the Melians, demonstrates that 'shame' was an ὄνομα by virtue of the fact that it was not used consistently.

When Thucydides stated that the value or estimation of words has changed (Thuc. 3.82.4), he was alerting the reader to be wary of taking what someone says at face value. Thucydides' use of ὄνομα at the end of the Corcyra passage (Thuc. 3.82.8) suggests that by ὄνομα he meant catchwords used to label actions. These labels, or names, were used not because they accurately described actions, but because of their rhetorical power. Consequently when Thucydides said that the situation was described by an ὄνομα he was warning the reader that words were being used subversively.

A survey of the concept of shame, αἰσχύνη, in Thucydides' text reveals that the word only appeared in speech. It was never used in narrative sections, and only once, in indirect speech, was it voiced by a Spartan. Of the twenty-three times that the adjectival form was used, it appeared only four times in the narrative: once in Book One, dealt with above; twice in the description of the plague; and once in Book Eight. The fact that Thucydides seldom used the concept in narrative sections suggests that this concept had fully emerged as an abstract persuasive tool by the time he was writing. The adjectival/nominal/verbal forms of 'freedom', on the other hand, appeared in both speech and narrative, although mostly in speech. By asking the reader to compare the rhetoric of 'freedom' to its actual implementation in the narrative, Thucydides presents the gradual emergence of 'freedom' as an abstract rhetorical tool in his history.

The persuasive power of freedom is exemplified by Sparta's rhetorical platform. While the Spartans maintained a consistent campaign of freedom in speech, their actions suggest otherwise. Thucydides stated at the beginning of

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[122] Translation Warner (1972a); τούς τε λόγους ὅστις διαμάχεται μὴ διδασκάλους τῶν πραγμάτων γίγνεσθαι, ἢ ἀξύνετός ἐστιν ἢ ἰδίᾳ τι αὐτῷ διαφέρει· ἀξύνετος μέν, εἰ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἡγεῖται περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐμφανοῦς φράσαι, διαφέρει δ' αὐτῷ, εἰ βουλόμενός τι αἰσχρὸν πεῖσαι εὖ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἂν ἡγεῖται περὶ τοῦ μὴ καλοῦ δύνασθαι, εὖ δὲ διαβαλὼν ἐκπλῆξαι ἂν τούς τε ἀντεροῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους (Thuc. 3.42.2).

Book Two that his narrative has arrived at the outbreak of war. The Thebans have marched into the city of Plataea demanding that the city return to its traditional place in the Boeotian League (Thuc. 2.1-6).[123] After a series of mishaps involving miscommunications and hostages, Thebes and Plataea appealed to their respective allies, Sparta and Athens. Thucydides stated that goodwill was generally on the side of the Spartans, who proclaimed publicly that their aim was to 'free' the Greeks (Thuc. 2.8.4; 4.108.2). Thucydides returned to Plataea later in Book Two. Here he presented short speeches of both the Plataeans and the Spartan King, Archidamus. The Plataeans asked that Archidamus respect the 'autonomy' promised to them by Pausanias after the Persian retreat.[124] The Plataeans ended their appeal by accusing the Spartans of joining forces with the Thebans for the purpose of their 'enslavement' (Thuc. 2.71.2-4).

In his response Archidamus remained true to the Spartan cause. He stated that the army of the allies has been raised to 'free' the Hellenes who are suffering from Athenian rule. These are the very same allies who took oaths with the Plataeans after the Persian Wars promising to defend the 'freedom' of the Greeks. Archidamus asserted that the Plataeans, despite their alliance with Athens, must abide by the oath and take part in the 'freeing' of the Greeks. The dilemma for the Plataeans was exacerbated by the hostages who had been sent to Athens after the Theban invasion. The Plataeans explained their situation to the Athenians, who stated that no changes should be made to the existing alliance between them, as the Athenians had done nothing to violate the terms of the alliance. Upon learning that the Plataeans had no intention of breaking their alliance with the Athenians, the Spartans declared that they would invade Plataea, but that this was not an act of aggression, since it was the fault of the Plataeans who had broken their engagement with the Spartans (Thuc. 2.71-74). Ultimately the Spartans, claiming to be fighting for 'freedom', killed the men of Plataea and physically enslaved the women, after a lengthy legal process. Sparta and her allies razed the city and built a hotel, while the land was leased to the Thebans for ten year periods (Thuc. 3.53-68). The Samians noted the irony of Sparta's behaviour when they stated that massacring people was no way to go about the 'freeing' of a people (Thuc. 3.32.2).[125] In the name of 'freedom' the Spartans enslaved and destroyed a state

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[123] For more on the Theban invasion of Plataea see Chapter Five, section 4.
[124] For a more complete discussion of Plataean 'autonomy' see Chapter Five, section 4.
[125] καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἔφεσον καθορμισαμένου αὐτοῦ Σαμίων τῶν ἐξ Ἀναίων ἀφικόμενοι

which had been the symbolic centre of 'freedom' after the Persian Wars.

The inconsistency of speech and action on the part of the Spartans in the destruction of Plataea suggests that the concept of 'freedom' was rapidly becoming a word which was exploited. This word was closely identified with the Persian Wars, a period from which emerged both the notion of a Greek identity and an awareness of the role played by 'freedom' in securing the conditions necessary for the awareness of such an identity; the Persian Wars were conceptualised as wars which united the Greeks in their struggle for 'freedom' (Hdt. 8.144).[126] Thucydides' representation of 'freedom' as an ὄνομα reflects an historical reality to the extent that it was used in actual rhetorical campaigns,[127] but he has constructed a secondary narrative on the role of language in conflict to comment on the dangers of employing culturally determined, value laden words, which he considers not necessarily words, but qualitative labels employed on account of their meanings, which do not necessarily reflect reality.

Although the word ὄνομα does not appear in the narration and speeches pertaining to Plataea, examples taken from the speech of the Mytilenean envoys' appeal to Sparta concerning the city's revolt suggest that the concept of 'freedom' was increasingly being viewed as a word which was used for its rhetorical value, but which had a questionable relationship to the situation it described. In their appeal to Sparta the Mytileneans claimed that originally the Athenian alliance was not for the 'enslavement' of the Hellenes, but for their 'freedom' from Persia (Thuc. 3.10.3).[128] They stated that eventually all the allies became 'enslaved', except for themselves and the Chians (Thuc. 3.10.5).[129] In the very next sentence the concept of 'freedom' appeared again, but this time it was qualified (Thuc.3.10): 'we, autonomous, as is evident, and free in name, joined in expeditions' (ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι ξυνεστρατεύσαμεν).[130] Thucydides' use of the particle δή immediately following αὐτονόμοι suggests that the 'autonomous' status of Mytilene was common

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πρέσβεις ἔλεγον οὐ καλῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν αὐτόν, εἰ ἄνδρας διέφθειρεν οὔτε χεῖρας ἀνταιρομένους οὔτε πολεμίους, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ξυμμάχους.

[126] See pages 38-39; Isaac (2006: 257-303); Hall (2002: 172-204); Pohlenz (1966: 10-44).

[127] See pages 123-28 for a discussion of Thucydides' speeches.

[128] ξύμμαχοι μέντοι ἐγενόμεθα οὐκ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μήδου τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.

[129] ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες καθ' ἓν γενόμενοι διὰ πολυψηφίαν ἀμύνασθαι οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐδουλώθησαν πλὴν ἡμῶν καὶ Χίων. For a more complete discussion of autonomy and equality of voting rights see Chapter Five, sections 1-3.

[130] Translation mine.

knowledge shared between the representative of Mytilene and his Spartan audience.[131] What may be surprising to the audience was that they were still considered 'free', the irony of which was emphasized by ὀνόματι, 'free in name'. The ambassadors from Mytilene argued that they were only left 'autonomous' because such a status suited Athenian interests. This policy was confirmed later by Euphemus, the Athenian representative at Camarina, who stated that in Hellas, 'we treat our allies as we find them useful. The Chians and Methymnians are autonomous and furnish ships' (Thuc. 6.85.1-2).[132] The 'freedom' of the subject status was contingent upon complicity to Athenian demands.

The Mytileneans argued that their revolt was incited on account of a lack of trust in the 'freedom' which was extended to them by the Athenians. This lack of trust was inspired by the fact that the equality afforded to them, rather than being a gesture of goodwill, served Athenian interests. As soon as measures were taken by subject states to ensure their sovereignty, these subject states suffered Athenian intervention, thereby losing their 'freedom'.

Four different types of freedom were used in the Mytileneans' speech to the Spartans. The first reference to 'freedom' occurred in a noun form. It was used to describe the process of 'freeing' (Thuc. 3.10.3): the allies joined forces not for the enslavement of the Hellenes to Athens, but for the liberation of the Greeks from the Medes (ξύμμαχοι μέντοι ἐγενόμεθα οὐκ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μήδου τοῖς Ἕλλησιν).[133] The second time that 'freedom' was used the Mytileneans stated that they were not 'free', but 'free' in name only. The qualifier ὀνόματι was used in this case to reinforce the fact that the Mytileneans themselves did not see themselves as 'free', but that this was what the Athenians called them, because it suited their interests. In much the same way the Athenians spoke of the concept of 'shame', referred to directly as an ὄνομα, to persuade the Melians to act in the interest of the Athenians. Furthermore, ὀνόματι distinguished the sort of 'freedom' enjoyed by the Mytileneans from the idea of being 'free' from some greater power, or of 'freeing'. The latter was the type of 'freedom' referred to in the first example from the Mytileneans' speech. The third time the Mytileneans speak of 'freedom', they argued that the 'freedom' they enjoy was not trustworthy

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[131] Sicking and van Ophuijsen (1993: 52).
[132] Χίους μὲν καὶ Μηθυμναίους νεῶν παροκωχῇ αὐτονόμους.
[133] Thucydides uses more –σις nouns than any other author (Greenwood 2006: 5).

because it would only exist so long as it served Athenian interests.[134] Here the noun form, ἐλευθερία, was used to explain why the Mytileneans' 'freedom' existed in name only. So long as Mytilene's 'freedom' served Athenian interests the Mytileneans could not trust that the Athenians would not take it away when it suited them.

The Mytileneans concluded their speech by stating that they would help Sparta 'free' the Hellenes (Thuc. 3.13.1). Furthermore they encouraged the Spartans to come forward as 'liberators' and accept them into their alliance, thereby increasing their own strength by assuming the role of 'liberator' (Thuc. 3.13.7).[135] The Mytileneans did not suggest that the Spartans 'free' the Greeks, but rather that they appear, or rather present themselves, as taking part in the act of 'freeing'. By claiming 'liberator' status the Spartans would have assumed a role which was rhetorically impossible to oppose. The concept of 'freedom' had become part of the Greek identity due to the value, or one might say ἀξίωσις, of 'freedom'; to oppose a fight for 'freedom' would have been tantamount to opposing an attribute intrinsic to the Greek identity. The power accrued by this word was exemplified by Brasidas' speech to the Acanthians. In this speech 'freedom' was appealed to eight times. At the end of the speech the Acanthians voted to accept a Spartan alliance, due, according to Thucydides, to the fact that Brasidas said things which were alluring.[136] The word which was used to describe the things Brasidas said, ἐπαγωγά, was the very same word used by the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue when they spoke of 'shame' as an alluring ὄνομα.[137] 'Freedom', as it was used by Brasidas, had become an irrefutable slogan for the Spartans.[138]

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[134] τίς οὖν αὕτη ἡ φιλία ἐγίγνετο ἢ ἐλευθερία πιστή, ἐν ᾗ παρὰ γνώμην ἀλλήλους ὑπεδεχόμεθα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδιότες ἐθεράπευον, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκείνους ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐποιοῦμεν (Thuc. 3.12.1); Winton (1998: 294-97).

[135] νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ Βοιωτοὶ προυκαλέσαντο εὐθὺς ὑπηκούσαμεν, καὶ ἐνομίζομεν ἀποστήσεσθαι διπλῆν ἀπόστασιν, ἀπό τε τῶν Ἑλλήνων μὴ ξὺν κακῶς ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς μετ' Ἀθηναίων ἀλλὰ ξυνελευθεροῦν, ἀπό τε Ἀθηναίων μὴ αὐτοὶ διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἐν ὑστέρῳ ἀλλὰ προποιῆσαι (Thuc. 3.13.1); ἦν δ' ἐλευθεροῦντες φαίνησθε,τὸ κράτος τοῦ πολέμου βεβαιότερον ἕξετε (Thuc. 3.13.7).

[136] οἱ δὲ Ἀκάνθιοι, πολλῶν λεχθέντων πρότερον ἐπ' ἀμφότερα, κρύφα διαψηφισάμενοι, διά τε τὸ ἐπαγωγὰ εἰπεῖν τὸν Βρασίδαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ καρποῦ φόβῳ ἔγνωσαν οἱ πλείους ἀφίστασθαι Ἀθηναίων, καὶ πιστώσαντες αὐτὸν τοῖς ὅρκοις οὓς τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὀμόσαντα αὐτὸν ἐξέπεμψαν, ἢ μὴν ἕσεσθαι ξυμμάχους αὐτονόμους οὓς ἂν προσαγάγηται, οὕτω δέχονται τὸν στρατόν (4.88.1). References to freedom in Brasidas' speech: 4.85.1, 4.85.5, 4.85.6, 4.86.1, 4.86.4, 4.87.2, 4.87.5, 4.87.6.

[137] At 5.111.3 the Athenians speak of the power of an alluring word, ὀνόματος ἐπαγωγοῦ.

[138] By framing their debate in terms of 'freedom', Brasidas has formulated an argument with which it is nearly impossible to disagree, in much the same way that Republicans in America speak of 'tax relief'. Even though the policies which are enacted in the name of tax relief may not be in the interest of voters, people vote against their own interests because it is a nearly insurmountable task

While the Athenians and Spartans spoke frequently of 'freedom', whether of the allies or of their own city-states, subject city-states such as Mytilene and Plataea, which suffered from Sparta's freedom 'platform', did not speak of the role of 'freedom' in the current conflict without qualifying it, or, in the case of Samians, objecting to it. Thucydides characterises them as speaking without restraint about the fight for 'freedom' during the Persian Wars, but with reservation about the role of 'freedom' in the present situation. The emergence of 'freedom' as an ὄνομα, a persuasive tool, the definition for which largely depended on context, and which consequently came to be used in situations which in reality bore little resemblance to 'freedom', led to the abandonment of such rhetoric among the allies of Sparta and Athens, unless they were speaking of 'freedom' from the perspective of Athens or Sparta. While Thucydides' depiction of the role played by 'freedom' in the rhetorical campaigns of the Athenians and the Spartans, and the response to such language by the allies, may reflect reality, Thucydides has reconstructed a reality which reflects the forces at play in exacerbating conflict among and within city-states: namely the destabilising of language that results when the norms which regulate behaviour among men are thrown into confusion. These norms, or νόμοι, not only regulate behaviour among men, but they also are the means by which culturally embedded concepts such as 'justice' are defined. When these have been overturned, what is 'just' is determined not by shared νόμοι, but by the interests of the stronger, who then label their actions as 'liberation' in accordance with their claims of 'justice', even though, in fact, they are enslaving in the name of liberation. The emergence of widespread faction in the Greek world and of rhetorical exercises that allowed individuals to use language to deceive—such as making the weaker argument the stronger by appealing to νόμος-φύσις and relativism—may have led Thucydides to consider the role played by language in conflict, as men began to ascribe value-laden labels to make their actions seem more just, courageous or more for the sake of 'freedom' than they actually were.

Through a metanarrative, Thucydides reveals to the reader the process by which 'freedom' evolved from a concrete concept to a persuasive metaphor, or ὄνομα. The more the Spartans defended the 'enslavement' of people and the destruction of cities through the language of 'freedom', and the more the

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for the Republican opposition to argue against 'tax relief' without sounding like they are for higher taxes (Lakoff 2004: 1-34).

Athenians claimed that their allies were 'free' despite restricting their 'freedoms', the more it becomes clear that 'freedom' was being used as a rhetorical tool to persuade city-states to commit actions which were not in their interest by giving them no 'freedom' to make a choice which was in their interest. The relationship between ὄνομα and the concept of 'freedom' provides a commentary on the relationship between the events which happened, described by Thucydides in the narrative portion of his text, and the language used to describe those actions in the speeches. The language used in the speeches bears little semblance to the actions of the speakers, who 'enslave' in the name of 'freedom'.

Marc Cogan notes that the Corcyra episode is significant because it provides a paradigm of the stasis which ensued in many Greek city-states as the Spartans and Athenians meddled with the constitutions of city-states.[139] While I agree that this is true, the Corcyra episode also plays an essential role in establishing a metanarrative on language, which was just as divisive as constitutional conflicts. For Thucydides, the written word, as opposed to the spoken word, provided the opportunity to critique the 'irrational climate of the culture of public speaking in 'Athens'.[140] As Cawkwell suggests, statesmen might be deemed good or bad depending on how well they advance the interests of the state,[141] but passages such as the Corcyra episode suggest that Thucydides is equally considering the role played by language, and, more specifically, λόγοι and ὀνόματα in persuading people to place the interests of state above the welfare of the community and the individuals comprising the community.

Herodotus' appropriation of the language of 'freedom' for a rhetorical purpose, the meaning of which depended on the reader's knowledge of freedom's role in the traditional narration of the Persian Wars, provides evidence that 'freedom' was traditionally associated with the Persian Wars. The Cyrus Cylinder and Solon 36 suggest that the concept of 'freedom' had been used metaphorically to gain support for political and military campaigns long before the Persian Wars. Herodotus' conceptualisation of 'freedom' is meaningful not in spite of anachronisms, but because of them, and through these anachronisms Herodotus is able to compare Athens and Persia. Through the language of 'freedom' Thucydides provided a narrative on the role of language in exacerbating conflict.

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[139] Cogan (1981b: 20-21).
[140] Greenwood (2004: 177); Ober (1998: 52-121).
[141] Cawkwell (1997: 19); Hunter (1973: 177-84).

He revealed how the Greek people's praise and support for 'freedom' was being exploited by exposing the flaws of rhetoric through rhetoric. Thucydides' speakers manipulate language to deceive their audiences, and, by exposing the failure of value-laden and culturally embedded concepts to accurately represent reality, Thucydides reveals, through what is essentially a rhetorical exercise, the dangers of rhetoric. The emphasis which Plato placed on the correct naming of things is a reaction to those who, like Thucydides' speakers, used words to describe situations not because they accurately described the circumstance or event, but because of the inherent value or ἀξίωσις of the word. While the Presocratics debated the ability of language to accurately reflect reality, the sophists, while recognising this and the inherent dilemma of using one sense organ to perceive and another to communicate, were able to take advantage of failures of language in order to manipulate men through speech. Thucydides' interaction with the concept of 'freedom' demonstrates an awareness of such dangers, dangers which were not expressed by Herodotus, who relies on culturally embedded notions of and estimations of 'freedom' in order to create irony.

Despite the fact that the Persian Wars were remembered as a struggle for 'freedom', a struggle in which the Athenians played a pivotal role, neither Herodotus nor Thucydides attributes the language of 'freedom' to the Athenians in a way that reflects the role played by them in the struggle to be free of the Persian threat. In order to compare the Athenians' past history in the Persian Wars with their present treatment of their allies, Herodotus rarely portrays the Athenians speaking of 'freedom'. Thucydides' Athenians abandon the language of 'freedom' in policy disputes and instead resort to more logical and less emotive language. Although the Athenians may be responsible for the failure of arbitration, the means by which they achieve this—language—is the real culprit. In the process of writing about the conflict between Athens, Sparta and their respective allies, Thucydides provides a commentary on the role of language, the medium through which arbitration was conducted and armed conflict was meant to be avoided. While it is impossible to know whether the speeches which Thucydides writes reflect what was actually said—that is, whether the Athenians were as dispassionately logical and the Spartans as ideological as they are portrayed, Thucydides was doubtless influenced by the failure of language and diplomacy in his narration of the war, and has chosen to reconstruct a reality which draws attention to the dangers of rhetoric. Thucydides' concern with the destabilisation

of language, which he described in his narration of the stasis of Corcyra, was not unique to Thucydides, as the relationship between language and reality had been previously addressed by the Presocratics and was a topic of debate among individual sophists, who were accused of taking advantage of the ambiguity of words to deceive an audience. Although Thucydides provided valuable information about the war itself, he also demonstrates how contemporary intellectual debates—that it, the relationship between reality and language—provided a lens through which to analyse the war, and means by which to provide a commentary on role of language in facilitating conflict. When the speeches of Thucydides are examined in light of these intellectual pursuits his proposed goal of setting forth the truest πρόφασις in the war seems to be as much about words as it is about deeds.

Chapter 5: Thucydidean Autonomy

With Thucydides, a new political term conceptually related to the idea of 'freedom' entered the historiographic tradition. This concept, 'autonomy', was used only twice by Herodotus, but appeared forty-eight times in Thucydides. The coinage of 'autonomy' during the 'golden age' of Greek literature in the fifth century ensured that it be a focal point of modern research on political 'freedom' in the Greek world. The ease with which ancient historians described citizens and states as 'autonomous' has frustrated those seeking to define the specific conditions of an autonomous state. Martin Ostwald and Elias Bickerman have argued that there was a predetermined set of conditions which constituted the autonomous status of the state or the citizen body.[1] Most recently Polly Low has examined the relationship between the rhetoric of autonomy and intervention.[2] All of these investigations have been driven by the belief that knowing 'what happened' will lead to a coherent and consistent definition of 'autonomy'. States and populations described as 'autonomous' by ancient historians did not often share similar circumstances; some city-states lost walls, some paid tribute, while others were free of indemnity, and others still had access to their navies. Academic research on 'autonomy' has focused on identifying the criteria for its emergence in the belief that understanding why the concept was needed would provide a definition for the term encompassing all of its uses by both Thucydides and later writers. Such research is more pragmatic than philosophical.

The difficulties of attempting to define what constitutes an autonomous city-state have led to more general, all-encompassing definitions of autonomy. For some time, it was assumed that being 'autonomous' was a quality possessed by every city-state.[3] Recently, Mogens Hansen has suggested that was not the case when the term initially emerged, but that, by the fourth century, autonomy became increasingly associated with characteristics constituting the polis.[4] Raaflaub and Karavites have examined the fundamental relationship αὐτονομία and ἐλευθερία. Raaflaub notes that 'freedom' describes the external freedom of the city-state, 'autonomy' describes the internal sovereignty of the city-state.[5] Karavites suggests that, while this distinction may have been true for the fifth

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[1] Ostwald (1982: 5-8); Bickerman (1958: 313-43).
[2] Low (2007: 127-97).
[3] Low (2007: 188).
[4] Hansen (1995: 38-43).
[5] Raaflaub (2004: 147-60).

century, by the fourth century autonomy represented a weaker form of complete freedom.[6] Bickerman has argued that 'autonomy' was asserted by weaker states against the claims of stronger ones, or was granted to weaker states by those more powerful.[7]

An examination of political terminology requires that the reader distinguish between contemporary and anachronistic usages of those terms. The absence of 'autonomy' and 'autonomous' in the Homeric works and in the works of the lyric poets, combined with the remarkable scarcity of this term in Herodotus, points towards an emergence in the mid-fifth century. Martin Ostwald, in his monograph on 'autonomy', posits a later date for its emergence than his predecessor, Elias Bickerman, who believed that the term was coined to describe the status of Greeks living under Persian rule.[8] Noting that 'autonomy' was nearly always used by weaker states trying to assert their independence against stronger ones, Ostwald argues that the term was coined by Athenian allies who were protesting against imperial rule.[9] He sets the date for its inception between 468 and 467 when the Greek city-states began to feel that they were being deprived of their basic political rights by Athens.[10] However, epigraphic evidence for words formed from the αὐτονομ- root cannot be found before 427-26.[11] The earliest testimony for the language of 'autonomy' is Sophocles' *Antigone* in 442. Noting that the guarantee of Aegina's autonomy in the Thirty Years' Peace would have occurred not long before the production of the *Antigone*, Raaflaub sets the *terminus ante quem* at 446.[12]

To all intents and purposes, both Raaflaub and Ostwald agree that the concept of 'autonomy' emerged during the period when the allies began to feel that the missions carried out by the Delian League were directed at them rather than at Persia. Ostwald, like Raaflaub, argues that 'autonomy' was originally and primarily a political concept.[13] Raaflaub suggests that αὐτόνομος and αὐτονομία were applied to the individual so rarely that 'we can safely assume that the words

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[6] Karavites (1984: 167-91).
[7] Bickerman (1958: 336-37).
[8] Bickerman (1958: 339-41).
[9] Ostwald (1982: 1.)
[10] Ostwald (1982: 40). For further discussion of the circumstances which precipitated the emergence of 'autonomy', see Chapter Two, section 1.
[11] *IG* I^3 66.11-12.
[12] Raaflaub (2004: 148).
[13] Ostwald (1982: 11), Raaflaub (2004: 147).

were primarily political in nature and probably in origin'.[14] In a later article on Samian autonomy, Ostwald suggests that the status of autonomous was not contingent on a state's constitution. Once again, his analysis excludes any philosophical approach.[15]

A. B. Bosworth argues that αὐτόνομος and αὐτονομία can only be defined by their negative or by what they are not. For Bosworth, 'autonomy' was a political catchword, the meaning of which was as versatile as 'freedom'.[16] From his investigation of 'autonomy' in Thucydides' and Xenophon's histories, Bosworth determines that the definition of 'autonomy' or 'autonomous' depended on the context in which these words appeared, and that it could only be understood in terms of what would violate a city-state's autonomy, an approach adopted by Hansen.[17] Bosworth's and Hansen's belief that 'autonomy can only be defined by what it is not means that 'autonomy' could take on a whole range of meanings. The unfixed nature of 'autonomy' is one reason that Ostwald regards it as a 'political football', as it could be used in a variety of contexts to the advantage of any party.[18] Low notes that even though the concept has been regarded as positive in nature, Cleon regards it as 'negative'.[19]

The prevailing assumption that 'autonomy' was political rather than philosophical has meant that research has been focused on 'autonomous' as a political condition. In a political context, 'autonomy' is defined as living in accordance with one's own 'laws' or 'political conventions'.[20] The focus on νόμος as 'law' has precluded philosophical considerations, and the possibility that Thucydides, who is the earliest writer to make use of the concept with any frequency, is using it philosophically rather than politically. Given Thucydides' tendency to employ theoretical framework which render his interaction with 'freedom' more philosophical than political, it is possible that Thucydides may also be thinking more generally about what it means to be 'autonomous' rather than using it as a political term. Furthermore, the etymological relationship of 'autonomy' to νόμος may have led Thucydides to examine the meaning of

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[14] Raaflaub (2004:147).
[15] Ostwald (1993: 51-66)
[16] Bosworth (1992: 122-23).
[17] Hansen (1995: 34).
[18] Ostwald (1982: 42).
[19] Low (2007: 191).
[20] Low (2007: 190); Ostwald (1982: 10-11); Alonso (2007: 216).

'autonomy' in the sense of living in accordance with 'convention' as opposed to nature or φύσις.[21]

Although Thucydides' description of allies as 'autonomous' may reflect an historical reality in which the status of 'autonomous' played a role, Thucydides engages 'autonomy' on multiple levels. He uses it to describe relations between allies before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and in his pre-war history in general.[22] These instances are 'anachronistic' in that he has applied the concept of 'autonomy' to circumstances predating its emergence. He uses 'autonomy' in narrative portions of the text to describe the status of allies in leagues both Greek and foreign, as well as the terms of treaties.[23] Lastly, he uses it as a status claimed and discussed by allies,[24] and discussed by Spartans and Athenians.[25] In each of the instances where an ally speaks of 'autonomy' with regard to relationship with Athens or Sparta, there is a corresponding passage where the status is discussed by either a Spartan or Athenian representative.

The following chapter will examine Thucydides' presentation of the debates concerning the Mytileneans, whose fate is to be determined by the Athenians, and the Plataeans, whose fate is in the hands of the Spartans. Both the Mytileneans and the Plataeans claim to be 'autonomous', however the context in which their claims are to be interpreted result in different attitudes toward and expectations of 'autonomy'. The problem which comes to the fore in both these cases is the relationship between 'nature' and 'justice' and how the relationship between these two concepts creates different attitudes toward one's autonomy. While it may have been the case that Thucydides was inspired to think philosophically about what it means to be 'autonomous' on account of the unfixed nature of the term as it was applied in politics, the particular perspectives found in the Plataea and Mytilene episodes are not the product of Thucydides reproducing a political reality in which autonomy served as a 'political football', but rather are

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[21] See pages 125-29 for a discussion of Thucydides and the sophists. For a greater discussion on the sophists in general see pages 53-55.
[22] 1.97.1; 2.16.1.
[23] 1.113.4; 2.96.2, 4; 2.98.3, 4; 2.101.3; 5.18.2, 5; 5.27.2; 5.31.4; 5.33.3; 5.77.6; 5.79.1; 6.69.3; Hermocrates 6.77.1; 6.88.4; 7.57.3, 4; 7.57.7; 7.58.3; 8.21.1; 8.91.3.
[24] Aegina 1.67.2; Plataea 2.71.2; 2.71.4; Mytilene 3.10.5; 3.11.1; 2.11.3; Acanthus 4.88.1.
[25] Sparta demands that Aegina's autonomy be respected 1.139.1; Sparta demands autonomy for the Hellenes 1.139.3; Athenians state that Sparta is demanding autonomy for Aegina and the Hellenes 1.140.3; the Athenians say that they will respect the autonomy of their allies if they were autonomous when the treaty was made, but only if the Spartans let their allies be autonomous; 2.63.3; Archidamus on Plataea 2.72.1; Cleon on Mytilene 3.39.2; Diodotus on Mytilene 3.46.5; Brasidas to the Acanthians 4.86.1; 4.87.5; Euphemus 6.85.1.

the result of Thucydides' philosophical engagement with a political concept. By engaging with the term philosophically Thucydides is able to expose the underlying cause of the conflict.

The question raised in both the Mytilenean and Plataean episodes concerns the nature of 'justice'. Epigraphic evidence indicates that 'autonomy' was a political status used in official decrees. However, in debates concerning Mytilene and in the trial of the Plataeans, Thucydides' description of the Mytileneans and Plataeans as autonomous addresses the problematic nature of the conflict between what is 'just' in accordance with νόμος and what is 'just' in accordance with φύσις. The question raised in both these passages is this: is there a fixed standard of 'justice', or is it a law of nature that the stronger rule the weaker and, therefore, either disregard 'justice' altogether or establish 'justice' in accordance with their own interests? In both the Mytilenean and Plataean episodes, Thucydides engages in a subtle critique of the limits of autonomy and what it means to be autonomous, and more specifically to live in accordance with νόμοι. More generally, he examines whether it is even possible for a city-state to be autonomous in a world where the interests of the stronger prevail.

While there are multiple ways and contexts in which the concept of νόμος appears in fifth-century literature,[26] each type of νόμος has one common characteristic: each represented or was based on an order which was binding for or valued by the particular group to which the νόμος belongs; νόμος was an expression of what the people as a whole regarded as right.[27] Kerferd in his study of the sophists provided a similar definition of νόμος: 'The term νόμος and the whole range of terms that are cognate with it in Greek are always prescriptive and normative and never merely descriptive—they give some kind of direction or command affecting the behaviour and activities of persons and things. The nearest modern term for νόμος is 'norm'—the establishment or promulgation of νόμοι is

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[26] Thucydides himself used νόμος in a variety of contexts. He used νόμος to refer to specific norms which regulate human life (3.56.2, 66.2); law-and-order (3.82.6; 1.77.3; 3.62.3-5); a way of life for mankind (1.41); customs (2.97.4; 5.70, 69.2; 1.24.2; 4.98.2; 2.34.1); a belief or opinion (6.16.2); religious practices or customs (2.52.4, 3.82.6); judicial or political νόμοι (2.35.1; 3.70.5-6; 4.133.3; 5.49.1; 6.38.5; 2.37.3; 2.37.1; 2.39.4; 1.77.1; 3.37.3; 6.14).[26] For Thucydides, νόμοι could inhibit or restrain human action (2.53.4; 3.45.3,7; 3.46.4), and they were usually written, otherwise no distinction between written and unwritten νόμοι would have been made at 2.37.3. As the aim of this chapter is to examine the relationship between νόμος and φύσις in passages where the Athenians, the Spartans, and their respective allies discuss 'autonomy', I will not be conducting an extensive examination of which type of νόμος is being referred to in specific passages. Such an examination would require a more historical analysis of 'autonomy'.

[27] Ostwald (1969: 54-55).

the setting up of norms of behaviour. So νόμος as law is legally prescribed norm, and νόμος as convention is norm prescribed by convention.'[28] While νόμοι may have regulated behaviour within the polis, they were less effective in regulating behaviour between city-states, as the case of the Plataeans demonstrates. Furthermore, νόμοι themselves became tools for city-states such as Athens to establish a pretence of 'justice'. While νόμοι may have been useful for monitoring and establishing 'justice' within the city-state, the transfer of the city-state model to relations between city-states was less effective.

Realist approaches to international law are premised on the assumption that there is a clear distinction between domestic and international arenas. As Low notes, if the international arena is one which exists as a Hobbesian state of nature, then in international law there is no true justice or injustice; law and justice belong to the realm of civil society.[29] Those who reject the Hobbesian approach argue that international law is based on the model of civil society, and that states interact with one another as individuals do. This approach is itself problematic, as 'even if it were enforceable, the moral framework which is appropriate to relations between individuals should not be thought to be appropriate between states.[30] The tension inherent in applying moral frameworks on an individual level to interstate relations was, according to de Ste. Croix, identified first by Thucydides.[31] As I shall discuss below, the stronger often determined what was just by aligning justice with their own interests, or they disregarded justice entirely.

Since the status of 'autonomous' was used to discuss the status of allies by Thucydides in discussions between Sparta, Athens, and their respective allies, it is necessary to examine briefly the role of νόμος in interstate relations. There existed no formal code of international law, and what evidence of relations between states does exist is primarily Athenian.[32] Low suggests that it is possible to come to some understanding of international law by examining law as it is understood in the domestic sphere. She notes the general overlap between the language and procedure used in international law found in treaties, and domestic law: 'interstate agreements, once formulated, are drawn up in form of a resolution,

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[28] Kerferd (1981: 112).
[29] Low (2007: 130).
[30] Low (2007: 131).
[31] Ste. Croix (1972: 23-4); Low (2007: 131). For Xenohon, the gods establish both 'justice' and νόμοι. Consequently what is lawful is also just (Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.17).
[32] Low (2007: 84-85); Adcock and Mosley (1975: 121); Ostwald (1986: 119).

proposed, and, if all goes according to plan, passed by the assembly'.[33] Resolutions concerning interstate relations were described as both νόμοι and ψηφίσματα before 403, and they were implemented and enforced by the *polis* which passed the resolution.[34] Low's assessment of epigraphic evidence suggests that interstate relations were regulated by νόμοι passed by individual states. As a consequence, relations between states were often in flux, as νόμοι were 'always subject to creation, recreation and reinterpretation'.[35] Low notes that treaties were agreements between equal and consenting parties, and that when one side has broken the oaths, the other party no longer feels obligated to abide by the terms of the treaty. As Low notes, '[a]ctions within the society of states are, to an extent, constrained by *nomoi*, but those *nomoi* rely in turn on the willingness of members of the interstate society to accept them'.[36]

The competing interests of league members engendered a plurality of frameworks for constituting what was just. However, Thucydides' Athenians, as a stronger power, dominated the weaker, and disguised their own disregard for what was just by establishing their own interests as just, a feat accomplished by offering the Mytileneans 'autonomy'. Thucydides' Spartans, on the other hand, disregard justice by ignoring claims of the Plataeans to have acted in accordance with the νόμοι of the Greeks. Both the Mytilenean and Plataean episodes demonstrate that 'autonomy' itself is an impossible status to achieve when 'interest' and 'expediency' rather than 'justice' based on νόμοι motivate and determine one's actions, a scenario arising from an unequal balance of powers. These passages serve a second function in the text: they demonstrate that 'autonomy', as much as 'freedom' and the various other value-laden concepts written about in the Corcyraean stasis, has been destabilised by the circumstances of war. A comparison of Thucydides' description of pre-war history with his treatment of Mytilene's autonomy in the speeches of the Mytileneans, Cleon and Diodotus, exposes the limits of 'autonomy'. In these speeches, and in the speeches concerning the fate of the Plataeans, Thucydides is not simply speaking about 'autonomy' as a political status, but rather he is exploring the limits of 'autonomy', caught in the tension between justice in accordance with φύσις and νόμος.

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[33] Low (2007: 85).
[34] For a more complete discussion of the distinction between νόμος and ψήφισμα see Hansen (1978: 315-30); Ostwald (1969: 1-5); Ober (1998: 145-47); Stockton (1990: 80).
[35] Low (2007: 127).
[36] Low (2007: 127).

When one considers the influence of contemporary intellectual trends on Thucydides' history, it seems impossible not to consider that 'autonomy' may be used as a technical term, as well as a concept which was philosophically engaged in a dialogue with φύσις, and, more specifically, human nature, as this was one of Thucydides' main concerns.[37] Thucydides' treatment of 'autonomy' as a concept that was in dialogue with φύσις may explain why it has been impossible to identify a concrete meaning of the word as political concept in Thucydides' history. This investigation will show that passages in Thucydides' history which have been regarded as 'historical' are in fact interpretations of historical events in which Thucydides has subjected the past to a philosophical examination in order to identify the underlying root of conflict.

5.1 Autonomy in Thucydides' Pre-Peloponnesian War Narrative

When the Mytileneans decide to revolt, they are told to send ambassadors to Olympia in order that Sparta and the rest of the Greek allies may hear their case. Here they try to persuade the Spartans to receive them as allies. The Mytileneans argue that 'the alliance between ourselves and the Athenians began when you [Spartans] withdrew from the war against the Persians, and they remained to finish the business...as long as the Athenians led us fairly (ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἡγοῦντο) we followed them loyally; but when we saw them relax their hostility to the Mede, and try to make the allies their subjects, then our apprehensions began' (3.10.2, 4).[38] They then explain that even though they have been granted a status in the league equal to the Athenians, their equality is not real: 'unable, however, to defend themselves, on account of the number of confederates that had votes, all the allies were enslaved, except ourselves and the Chians, who continued to send out contingents as autonomous and nominally free'

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[37] Ober (1998: 67-69). While Reinhold (1985: 21-40) suggests that Thucydides view of 'human nature' is rigid, and that humans will always act out of interest, Farrar (1988: 135-37) suggests otherwise. Colin Macleod notes that Thucydides is 'intensely aware of human nature, a force more powerful than reason'. Macleod recognises a common element of 'human nature' that underlies both the Mytileneans' and Athenians' policies. He notes that the Mytileneans' revolt is ultimately driven by the necessity of safety (3.13.1), a necessity that also drives the Athenians own growth (1.75.3-4; 5.97; 6.18.2-4, 83.2-4). This, however, is not openly admitted as a force of 'human nature' motivating men by either the Mytileneans, Cleon, or Diodotus (1978: 75).

[38] ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ξυμμαχία ἐγένετο πρῶτον ἀπολιπόντων μὲν ὑμῶν ἐκ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου, παραμεινάντων δὲ ἐκείνων πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τῶν ἔργων... καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἡγοῦντο, προθύμως εἱπόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἑωρῶμεν αὐτοὺς τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας, τὴν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων δούλωσιν ἐπαγομένους, οὐκ ἀδεεῖς ἔτι ἦμεν.

(3.10.5).[39] The equality afforded them by their 'autonomous' status is meaningless since they were only left 'autonomous' because it suited Athenian interests (3.11.1).

Exactly what the Mytileneans are referring to when they speak of 'autonomy' may be explained by passages in which Thucydides uses the language of 'autonomy' to describe the past. In his narrative of Athens before *synoikism*, Thucydides examines how the Athenians organised themselves politically before Theseus merged the scattered settlements of Attica.

> Under Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign of Theseus, Attica had always consisted of a number of independent cities, each with its own town hall and magistrates. Except in times of danger, the king of Athens was not consulted.[40]
>
> ἐπὶ γὰρ Κέκροπος καὶ τῶν πρώτων βασιλέων ἡ Ἀττικὴ ἐς Θησέα αἰεὶ κατὰ πόλεις ᾠκεῖτο πρυτανεῖά τε ἐχούσας καὶ ἄρχοντας, καὶ ὁπότε μή τι δείσειαν, οὐ ξυνῇσαν βουλευσόμενοι ὡς τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ ἕκαστοι ἐπολίτευον καὶ ἐβουλεύοντο (Thuc. 2.15.1).

From the time of Cecrops until the time of Theseus, the inhabitants of Attica dwelt in city-states where each had their own πρυτανεῖα[41] and ἄρχοντες. Thucydides stated that Theseus dissolved the deliberative bodies and the leaders of the small cities, and produced instead one deliberative body and one πρυτανεῖον, which existed in his own time. After discussing the physical evidence for the feast of the union of Attica, Thucydides resumed his narrative by stating that for a long time the Athenians had lived in autonomous dwellings throughout Attica (κατὰ τὴν χώραν αὐτονόμῳ οἰκήσει μετεῖχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι), and that even after the unification of Attica, people continued to live in the country as it was their custom (διὰ τὸ ἔθος), until the present war when people

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[39] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996); ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες καθ' ἓν γενόμενοι διὰ πολυψηφίαν ἀμύνασθαι οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐδουλώθησαν πλὴν ἡμῶν καὶ Χίων· ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι ξυνεστρατεύσαμεν.

[40] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).

[41] Hansen (2006: 103, 115) notes that every *polis*, whether dependent or independent, had a *prytaneion* which served as a dining room. In the *prytaneion* magistrates met with dignitaries from other city-states and the victors in pan-Hellenic games. There would also be an altar to the goddess Hestia with a hearth and a burning flame; smaller subdivisions of the *polis* did not have a *prytaneion*.

were forced to abandon their homes and their temples and move to Athens (Thuc. 2.16).[42] This passage suggests that an 'autonomous' body governed itself and only participated in coalitions of its own accord. Regardless of whether that 'body' was in fact a *polis* is irrelevant for present purposes, since it is clear that an 'autonomous' body governed itself and voluntarily participated in coalitions.

Thucydides' description of the beginning phases of Athens' leadership in the league is similar to his description of pre-synoecic Athens, and it confirms the Mytileneans' own assessment of the Athenians' management of the league. Thucydides stated that when Athens assumed leadership in the league, the allies were autonomous and decisions were made together. Some of the actions of the league were carried out against Persia, some against allies who had revolted, and some against Peloponnesian powers.

> The leadership of the Athenians began with allies who were originally autonomous states and reached their decision in general congress. I shall now describe the use they made of it, both in war and in their management of the league, during the period from the end of the Persian until the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Some of these actions were against the Persians, some against their own allies when they revolted, some against the Peloponnesian powers with whom on various occasions they became involved.[43]

> ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων τοσάδε ἐπῆλθον πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ, ἃ ἐγένετο πρός τε τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς σφετέρους ξυμμάχους νεωτερίζοντας καὶ Πελοποννησίων τοὺς αἰεὶ προστυγχάνοντας ἐν ἑκάστῳ (1.97.1).

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[42] τῇ τε οὖν ἐπὶ πολὺ κατὰ τὴν χώραν αὐτονόμῳ οἰκήσει μετεῖχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ξυνῳκίσθησαν, διὰ τὸ ἔθος ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς ὅμως οἱ πλείους τῶν τε ἀρχαίων καὶ τῶν ὕστερον μέχρι τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου γενόμενοί τε καὶ οἰκήσαντες οὐ ῥᾳδίως πανοικεσίᾳ τὰς μεταναστάσεις ἐποιοῦντο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἄρτι ἀνειληφότες τὰς κατασκευὰς μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά.

[43] Translation Warner (1972a).

Thucydides' application of 'autonomy' predates its emergence, but this passage cannot be ignored on these grounds. Thucydides has described the allies as 'autonomous', and in doing so has drawn a comparison between pre-synoecic Athens and her leadership in the league. During this period, Athens changed from a member of an egalitarian coalition to a tyrant ruling over subject states (Thuc. 2.63).[44] Thucydides' presentation of 'autonomy' at 1.97 and the Mytileneans' argument suggest that a loss of voting privileges constituted loss of 'autonomy' from the perspective of the allies.

A statement by the Mytileneans at 3.10.5 highlights the relationship between 'autonomy' and voting rights.[45] The Mytileneans argued that the allies were incapable of uniting in defense due to the multiple votes (διὰ πολυψηφίαν), presumably of the Athenians (Thuc. 3.10.5): 'they [the allies] could not unite and defend themselves because they [Athenians] had a large number of individual votes'.[46] As a result of this voting system, all the allies became enslaved, except for Mytilene and Chios (οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐδουλώθησαν πλὴν ἡμῶν καὶ Χίων): 'we, autonomous, as is evident, and free in name, joined in expeditions' (ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι ξυνεστρατεύσαμεν).[47] The particle δή demonstrates that the autonomous status of the Mytileneans was evident based on the preceding statement: the Mytileneans were autonomous by virtue of their voting status. The other allies, who no longer had an equal vote, had been enslaved.

The ambassador continued by noting that if all were still autonomous, they would feel more sure that they, the Athenians, would not alter affairs, but this was not the case: the majority were subjects and the Athenians were conferring with them, the Mytileneans, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου.

> Had we all been still autonomous, we could have had more faith in their [Athenians] not attempting any change; but the greater number being their subjects, while they were treating us as equals, they would naturally chafe

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[44] 'Your empire is like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go' (ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον), translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).

[45] ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες καθ' ἓν γενόμενοι διὰ πολυψηφίαν ἀμύνασθαι οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐδουλώθησαν πλὴν ἡμῶν καὶ Χίων. ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι ξυνεστρατεύσαμεν.

[46] Translation Hornblower (1991: 394).

[47] Translation mine.

> under this solitary instance of independence as contrasted with the submission of the majority; particularly as they daily grew more powerful, and we more destitute.[48]
>
> καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτόνομοι ἔτι ἦμεν ἅπαντες, βεβαιότεροι ἂν ἡμῖν ἦσαν μηδὲν νεωτεριεῖν· ὑποχειρίους δὲ ἔχοντες τοὺς πλείους, ἡμῖν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὁμιλοῦντες, χαλεπώτερον εἰκότως ἔμελλον οἴσειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ πλέον ἤδη εἶκον τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἔτι μόνου ἀντισουμένου, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅσῳ δυνατώτεροι αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐρημότεροι (3.11.1).

According to the Mytileneans there is a correlation between being treated ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου and being autonomous. Shortly after this, at 3.11.4, ἰσοψήφους appears. Here it is meant literally: the Mytileneans, like the Athenians, have one vote in a unicameral chamber.[49] While this vote may have given the Mytileneans a say in determining what was right for the league, this vote also served another purpose:

> We [Mytileneans] were useful to them [Athenians] because they could point to us and say that we, who had votes like themselves, could not possibly have joined them unwillingly in their various expeditions and could only be doing so because the people against whom we were being led were in the wrong.[50]
>
> ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρίῳ ἐχρῶντο μὴ ἂν τούς γε ἰσοψήφους ἄκοντας, εἰ μή τι ἠδίκουν οἷς ἐπῆσαν, ξυστρατεύειν (3.11.4).

According to the Mytileneans, their right to take part in determining the νόμοι of the league was being used to justify the Athenians' actions against the Greeks. Furthermore, the Athenians were only carrying out such expeditions against these

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[48] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[49] Hornblower (1991: 395). The Chians and Lesbians helped the Athenians quell an uprising in Samos (Thuc. 1.116.1, 117.2). The synod must have been meeting at the time of the Samian uprising, otherwise the Mytileneans would have argued that their vote was worthless since meetings were no longer held (Hornblower 1991: 395).
[50] Translation Warner (1972a).

cities and not the Mytileneans because, as they argue, the Athenians were not yet strong enough to oppose them. Therefore the Athenians attacked the less powerful city-states, while leaving the Mytileneans as their last target. 'Autonomy', for the Mytileneans', was not a positive status. There may have been a meeting in 440 to discuss the rebellion of Samos, but meetings of allied states seem to have ceased in the 430s.[51] By the time of the Mytilenean revolt, the allies would have felt that they had little say in the decisions made regarding league actions. An 'autonomous' state, from the perspective of the Mytileneans, is a state which has the power to make its voice and interests heard in the assembly. The Athenians, by giving them a vote equal to theirs, made them believe that they were 'autonomous', but this vote allowed the Athenians to present their policies as just, thereby increasing their own power, which the Mytileneans fear will be used against them.

Macleod has noted that the Mytileneans' speech is full of inconsistencies and contradictions, the most significant of which is their argument that their revolt was necessary on account of the Athenians' growing power and the fear that this inspired in the Mytileneans, who had only been allowed to remain autonomous because it suited Athenian interests (3.11.6, 12.1). The Mytileneans, as they themselves admit, have chosen the present moment to revolt in order to exploit the Athenians' weakness (3.13.2-7). This point undermines their argument that their revolt was inspired by their fear of Athenian growth, and the fact that an alliance must be based on an equality of power between allies (3.9.1).[52] Their revolt cannot, at one and the same time, be due to both the Athenians' superior power and their weakened condition.

If they have revolted because the equality of their alliance, an equality based on their 'autonomy', is not in fact equality but merely a way for the Athenians to argue that their expeditions are 'just' (3.11.3-4), then there is no equality and the Mytileneans are just in their revolt. However, the Mytileneans' argument that they have chosen the present moment to revolt since the Athenians have been weakened means that they are revolting because it is expedient. As Macleod notes, this contradicts the Mytileneans' argument that their revolt is just because they are weaker.

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[51] Hornblower (1991: 146).
[52] Macleod (1978: 64-66).

For the Mytileneans, autonomy was a means of masking Athenian power, thereby establishing a pretence of equality that would undermine their argument that they are revolting on account of oppression (3.9). Cleon himself makes this very same argument—that the Mytileneans' revolt is one of aggression on account of their autonomy—at 3.39.2. The Mytileneans' persistence in establishing their revolts as 'just' suggests their own insecurities regarding the matter (3.10).[53] This fear is matched by Cleon's argument that Mytilene's 'autonomy' meant that a revolt would be an act of aggression. The Mytileneans must, therefore, not only prove to the Spartans that their revolt is 'just', but also 'expedient' since the Athenians are weaker, thereby providing them with a reason besides 'justice' to accept them as allies.

5.2 Mytilenean Debate: Cleon and Diodotus on Autonomy

After the revolt in Mytilene has been suppressed, the Athenians decide that all the men in Mytilene should be killed and the women and children made slaves, since 'Mytilene had revolted without being, in the same way as the rest, subjected to the empire' (3.36.2).[54] The next day the Athenians begin to regret their decision and decide to have a second vote on the fate of the Mytileneans. Thucydides presents the speeches of two individuals, Cleon, who had been an advocate of the initial sentence, and Diodotus, who argues in favour of leniency, not because the Mytileneans' revolt was just, but because a degree of leniency would be in the interest of the Athenians.[55] Cleon and Diodotus both consider the relationship between what is 'just' and what is expedient in determining the best punishment for the Mytileneans. In doing so, each presents a seemingly different view of what it means for a city-state to be 'autonomous'.

In the speech of Cleon, the fears of the Mytileneans—that their autonomy was only allowing the Athenians to grow strong enough to subdue them—is realised. Previously the Mytileneans had argued that their 'autonomous' status was merely a way for the Athenians to make their own actions seem more just than they actually were until the time came when they, the Athenians were powerful enough to oppose them. However, Cleon argues that the Mytileneans' 'autonomy' renders their revolt even more of an affront to Athenian power than if they were

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[53] Macleod (1978: 65).
[54] ἐπικαλοῦντες τήν τε ἄλλην ἀπόστασιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀρχόμενοι ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐποιήσαντο.
[55] Price (2001: 91-100); de Romilly (1963: 156-71); Winnington-Ingram (1965: 70-71).

enslaved, and that, therefore, they deserve to be punished even more harshly. Thus the Mytileneans' 'autonomy' is used by Cleon to justify their punishment and final subjugation. Cleon makes the following argument for viewing the Mytileneans' action as aggression rather than revolt:

> I can make allowances for those who revolt because they cannot bear our empire, or who have been forced to do so by the enemy. But for those who possessed an island with fortifications; who could fear our enemies only by sea; who were autonomous and held in the highest honour by you—to act as these have done, this is not revolt—revolt implies oppression; it is deliberate and wonton aggression.[56]

> ἐγὼ γάρ, οἵτινες μὲν μὴ δυνατοὶ φέρειν τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀρχὴν ἢ οἵτινες ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀναγκασθέντες ἀπέστησαν, ξυγγνώμην ἔχω· νῆσον δὲ οἵτινες ἔχοντες μετὰ τειχῶν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν μόνον φοβούμενοι τοὺς ἡμετέρους πολεμίους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ τριήρων παρασκευῇ οὐκ ἄφαρκτοι ἦσαν πρὸς αὐτούς, αὐτόνομοί τε οἰκοῦντες καὶ τιμώμενοι ἐς τὰ πρῶτα ὑπὸ ἡμῶν τοιαῦτα εἰργάσαντο, τί ἄλλο οὗτοι ἢ ἐπεβούλευσάν τε καὶ ἐπανέστησαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπέστησαν ἀπόστασις μέν γε τῶν βίαιόν τι πασχόντων ἐστίν (3.39.2).

This status of 'autonomous' allowed the Athenians to maintain a pretence of equality among league members, even though their power meant that there was, in reality, little equality. As Missiou points out, although agreements between states frequently are made on basis of equality, ἐξ ἴσου, claims of equality often do not reflect reality.[57] The Mytileneans note that they are still autonomous (3.10.5, 11.1), as all members of the league were (1.97.1), and that members of the league were originally led fairly (3.10.4, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου), but now they are the only ones endowed with a vote equal to the Athenians, who are still being treated as equals (3.11.1).

For both Cleon and the Mytileneans, 'autonomy' is a means of control that allows the Athenians to argue that the Mytileneans' revolt is 'unjust'. The pretence of equality meant that, unlike the other allies who were ruled by the Athenians,

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[56] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[57] Missiou (1987: 336-45).

the Athenians could argue that their equal power meant that the idea of 'justice' was still relevant (3.36.2, 39.2), and that expeditions would still seem 'just' since the Mytileneans are taking part as willing allies (3.11.4). The status of 'autonomous', while it represented the voting rights and representation in the assembly, became, for the Athenians, a means of disguising their own disregard for justice, as Athenian strength meant that Athenian interests superseded those of others.

Diodotus also discusses 'autonomy', but rather than talking about Mytilene specifically, he discusses the behaviour of city-states generally:

> When a free community, held in subjection by force, rises, as is only natural, and asserts its independence, it is no sooner reduced than we fancy ourselves obliged to punish it severely.[58]
>
> ἤν τινα ἐλεύθερον καὶ βίᾳ ἀρχόμενον εἰκότως πρὸς αὐτονομίαν ἀποστάντα χειρωσώμεθα, χαλεπῶς οἰόμεθα χρῆναι τιμωρεῖσθαι (3.46.5).

Lévy has noted the inconsistencies between the Mytileneans' claim to be autonomous and free, Cleon's claim that they are 'autonomous', and Diodotus' claim that the Mytileneans are free, but not 'autonomous'.[59] Hornblower's solution to the inconsistencies of Mytilene's status is that Thucydides is not being 'universally strict in his use of technical terms'.[60]

There is, however, another way that these inconsistencies can be reconciled. The Mytileneans state that their status of 'autonomous' allowed the Athenians to argue that they were seizing power through policy rather than force (3.11.3). The vote of the Mytileneans, a vote equal to those of the Athenians, provided the Athenians with evidence that their expeditions were just, since the

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[58] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).

[59] A state that is autonomous cannot also revolt in order to achieve autonomy. Lévy (1983: 249-70). Lévy argues that the Mytileneans, at 3.10.5 are asserting that they are 'autonomous' but only nominally free, which Hornblower (1991: 427) finds unconvincing.

[60] Hornblower (1991: 427). Cleon makes no mention of the 'freedom' of the Mytileneans, which is not a problem, since 'freedom' itself is not a technical term, but is being used to make the arguments of both the Mytileneans and Diodotus that much stronger: by presenting themselves as nominally 'free' the Mytileneans are able to create a contrast between their current 'free' status and the limited reality of their freedom to make decisions in their own interest. Diodotus calls the Mytileneans 'free' to emphasise to his audience that the current policy toward city-states in revolt is not a proper or expedient treatment.

Mytileneans, who voted on the matter with the Athenians, also were marching with them. If the autonomy of the Mytileneans was ever questioned, the Athenians could point to their equal vote in the assembly.

Diodotus' statement that states assert their 'autonomy' when they rebel is not necessarily at odds with Cleon's argument that the Mytileneans' 'autonomy' renders their revolt an act of aggression rather than a rebellion by the oppressed. Although the Athenians claimed that the Mytileneans were 'autonomous', Mytileneans themselves did not view themselves as such, since they could not act in accordance with what they deemed 'right', or, in other words, in accordance with their own νόμοι. The actions carried out by the league were not in accordance with what was 'right' for the Mytileneans, but rather for the Athenians. In arguing that rebellion is an assertion of their 'autonomy', Diodotus recognises that Mytileneans' were 'autonomous' in name, but in reality their 'autonomous' status served Athenian interests rather than their own.

The Mytileneans', Cleon's and Diodotus' attitude toward the autonomy of the Mytileneans seem contrary, but they are not. The Mytileneans' claim that even though they were autonomous, this was no guarantee that the Athenians would not subject them as well. Voting in the assembly was a way for the allies to participate in the process of determining which policies or actions were right for the assembly. Living in accordance with νόμοι, or being autonomous, meant living in accordance with what was agreed upon by the people. Even though the Mytileneans were 'autonomous' by virtue of having a vote, they were not necessarily living in accordance with what was deemed best by the Mytileneans. The expeditions carried out against the allies would allow the Athenians to gather enough strength to oppose them. In the meantime, the Mytileneans' vote in the assembly served to justify such expeditions through 'paths of policy' until such time when the Athenians would be strong enough to oppose the Mytileneans (3.11). Their autonomy, their vote, made expeditions against the allies seem 'just', and to this effect, their vote was being used against them, as it allowed the Athenians to grow strong enough to oppose them.

Although 'autonomous' states were those which had a say in determining what was best for themselves and their interests with regard to their allies, it merely served as a means of 'justifying' unjust acts. Diodotus does not admit that the Mytileneans are 'autonomous', but instead describes them as revolting for their autonomy. While this may seem contrary to what both Cleon and the Mytileneans

assert, namely that Mytilene is autonomous, Diodotus is referring not to their voting rights, but rather to what their voting rights represent: the Mytileneans' right to take part in the process of determining what it right for their own community. The fundamental problem with 'autonomy' is that, even though initially the league was created to carry on the war against the Persians, eventually its expeditions were directed at other Greeks, as both the Mytileneans and Thucydides point out. By the time the Mytileneans had revolted, the assembly was concerned not with the interests of the league and the safety of the Greeks, but rather the interests of the Athenians. 'Autonomy' was a state's right to have say in what was right or in the interests of the community. Once the Athenians were strong enough that they no longer needed the support of the allies, it was no longer possible for allies to be 'autonomous', as the 'voice' of the autonomous only served the interests of the Athenians which were contrary to their own.

5.3 Mytilenean Debate: Justice and Human Nature

The Mytileneans are less concerned with 'human nature' or the prevailing forces that motivate the actions of men for obvious reasons: they are only concerned with their present situation, whereas Cleon and Diodotus dissect the revolt of the Mytileneans in order to determine a punishment that would suit their interests. The Mytileneans' punishment must deter future revolts, which means that it is imperative that Cleon and Diodotus examine why the Mytileneans and others like them choose to oppose the Athenians. To find a necessary deterrent they must understand the forces compelling men to act.

Cleon believes that the nature of men is such that future revolts can only be prevented by the most severe penalties, and that this course is also the most 'just'. Diodotus, however, is not as concerned with what it 'just' as he is with what is expedient (3.44.1-2). Diodotus' lenient stance toward the Mytileneans is premised on his belief that it is not possible to do what is both 'just' and 'expedient' (3.47.5), for as biased judges, the Athenians would surely deem the Mytileneans' revolt 'unjust', yet punishing them all would not be in the interest of the Athenians. Although Cleon's proposal regarding Mytilene may seem more 'just', Diodotus reminds the Athenians that 'we are not in a court of justice, but in a political assembly; and the question is not justice, but how to make the

Mytileneans useful to us' (3.44.4).[61] Both Diodotus and Cleon agree that the Mytileneans' revolt is 'unjust',[62] but their opposing advice stems from their different perceptions of 'human nature'. An examination of the perceptions of 'human nature' suggest that even this is subjective, or 'unfixed', as arguments based on 'human nature' are used to promote policies regarding the Mytileneans, whose own behaviour resembles the conceptualisation of 'human nature' the Athenians describe as underlying their own actions.

From Cleon's perceptive, it is 'human nature' for men to behave arrogantly when they are treated well, but to show respect to those who are strict. The Athenians could have prevented a revolt had they treated Mytilene differently:

> Our mistake has been to distinguish the Mytileneans as we have done: had they been long ago treated like the rest, they never would have so far forgotten themselves, human nature being as surely made arrogant by consideration, as it is awed by firmness.[63]
>
> χρῆν δὲ Μυτιληναίους καὶ πάλαι μηδὲν διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ὑφ' ἡμῶν τετιμῆσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐς τόδε ἐξύβρισαν· πέφυκε γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως ἄνθρωπος τὸ μὲν θεραπεῦον ὑπερφρονεῖν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὑπεῖκον θαυμάζειν (3.39.5).

Cleon argues that the elements of human nature that made the Mytileneans believe that a revolt would be possible could have been prevented had they treated the Mytileneans with a firmer hand. Whether the Mytileneans behave arrogantly or are awed depends on the Athenians' treatment of the Mytileneans. Consequently Cleon argues that the most expedient plan would be the harshest penalty, since treating them well—presumably by making them autonomous—only gave them the hope and ambition to carry out an act of aggression.

For Diodotus, men are compelled to commit acts of rebellion by 'necessity' and 'ambition', but 'hope' and 'greed' are the invisible agents that allow men first to attempt and then to believe that such attempts are possible, while 'fortune', by

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[61] ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ δικαζόμεθα πρὸς αὐτούς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπως χρησίμως ἕξουσιν.
[62] Price (2001: 91-92).
[63] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).

helping men when they least expect it, 'tempts men to venture with inferior means'. According to Diodotus, there is no νόμος that can prevent men from making mistakes, since human nature, being what is, compels them to do so. Macleod has noted that despite the fact that Cleon and Diodotus recommend different courses of action regarding Mytilene, they both recognise that the Mytileneans were compelled to rebel by the same factors: poverty, plenty, hope, greed and fortune (39.3-4; 45.4-6).[64] Diodotus recognises these factors as elements of 'human nature':

> It is impossible to prevent, and only great simplicity can hope to prevent, human nature doing what it has once it has set its mind upon it, by force of law or by any other deterrent force whatsoever.[65]

> ἁπλῶς τε ἀδύνατον καὶ πολλῆς εὐηθείας, ὅστις οἴεται τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὁρμωμένης προθύμως τι πρᾶξαι ἀποτροπήν τινα ἔχειν ἢ νόμων ἰσχύι ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ δεινῷ (3.45.7).

Diodotus' argument 'undermines a position based on legality or morality by recourse to what men are really like'.[66] By doing so, Diodotus is able to identify the most expedient plan. While Diodotus argues that there is no νόμος that can prevent men from making mistakes when compelled by 'human nature' (3.45.3), Cleon takes a different stance by making the Athenians the agent manipulating their allies through their understanding of human nature.

These interpretations differ from the way in which the Athenians understand their own actions through 'human nature'. Such differences suggest that 'human nature' itself is subject to the rule of stronger. Just as the stronger reserve the right to interpret or disregard what is just, so too are their own actions perceived through different frames of 'human nature'. It is the 'human way' to accept power when it is offered on account of fear, honour, and interest, which are the principles of 'human nature' that compel men to accept power, and which tempts men to disregard 'justice' when it is in their interest. These principles are at odds with those discussed by Cleon and Diodotus as motives in their allies'

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[64] Macleod (1978: 75).
[65] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[66] Macleod (1978: 75).

revolts: poverty, plenty, hope, greed and fortune. It would seem then, that there are multiple ways in which 'human nature' may be defined, and the elements of 'human nature' motivating the allies to revolt are not the same as those motivating the Athenians.

At 1.76.2 the Athenians note that 'it is not surprising that, acting in the way that human beings always will...constrained by three all-powerful motives, honour, fear, advantage...it has always been the rule that the weaker is held down by the stronger' (οὕτως οὐδ' ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου ὑπὸ τριῶν τῶν μεγίστων νικηθέντες, τιμῆς καὶ δέους καὶ ὠφελίας αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἧσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι).[67] Hornblower notes that this is a 'clear statement of the doctrine that "might excludes right", but that this should not be confused with the sophistic argument that "might makes right"'.[68] The argument that 'justice is nothing other than that which benefits the stronger' is posited by Thrasymachus in the *Republic* (338c1-2). For Thrasymachus 'justice' is created to serve the interests of the stronger. In the following lines Thrasymachus makes a slightly different, if not contradictory, statement regarding justice (343a-344c): justice means acting in another's interest; injustice is, therefore, the only path to happiness and success. Callicles, in the *Gorgias*, also agrees that acting justly means acting in the interest of others rather than oneself. Consequently he suggests that nature, φύσις, provides an alternative conceptualisation of 'justice', that right has been judged to consist in the rule and advantage of the stronger (483c9-d6), as is evident from the animal world and the behaviour of states, races and men. 'Natural justice', therefore, is 'equated to the wishes of the strong'.[69]

Conceptualisations of 'justice' found in Plato's works resonate, to some extent, with Thucydides' Athenians' attitude towards 'justice'. At 5.89 the Athenians state that 'justice, in human affairs, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must'.[70] Although the Athenians recognise that 'justice' exists, it only plays a role when there is equality of power. Otherwise 'justice' is irrelevant. As the Melians

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[67] Translation Hornblower (1991: 121).
[68] Hornblower (1991: 121).
[69] Low (2007: 162).
[70] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996). Low notes that it is implied that Thucydides' Athenians are referring to interstate relations rather than relations within the polis. This distinction—that the rights of city-states are determined by a hierarchy of the strong and weak—is made by Demosthenes, *For the Liberty of the Rhodians* 15.29 (2007: 163).

themselves note, when 'justice' is not a factor in decision making, then decisions are made based on what is expedient (5.90).[71] Later, at 5.105.2, the Athenians state that it is a νόμος that 'by a necessary law of their [men's] nature, they rule wherever they can...all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do' (ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν...χρώμεθα αὐτῷ, εἰδότες καὶ ὑμᾶς ἂν καὶ ἄλλους ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει ἡμῖν γενομένους δρῶντας ἂν ταὐτό).[72] It is a law of nature that men rule whatever they can. This is similar to the Athenians' statement at 1.76.2 that it is the human way for the weaker to be held down by the stronger on account of fear, anger and advantage.

Both of these statements (1.76.2, 5.105.2) convey the idea that it is a norm of nature that the stronger prevails when the opportunity presents itself. 'Justice' plays a role when decisions are made among equals, otherwise considerations of expediency dominate. However, Mara has presented an alternative view of these passages. He suggests that the 'consolidation and exercise of power' by the strong does not exist in accordance with nature, but rather is an attempt to create order from the chaos that is φύσις. The way in which the strong are able to consolidate such power is through culturally embedded precepts such as love of power and gain (1.8.3).[73] While this may be true, Mara's assertion that the rule of the strong over the weaker as an attempt to create coherence out of flux might also be interpreted as man's attempt to create order in a disordered world through power structures that exist in accordance with 'human nature'. Men are disposed to such an ordering on account of three motives: honour, fear and advantage. These motives are elements of 'human nature' that result in an ordered world in which the stronger prevail; thus the rule of the stronger is simply a product of 'human nature' and man's natural desire for structure.

At 1.76.2, Thucydides is merely speaking of a 'human way' of behaving without engaging in the tension between νόμος and φύσις. However, shortly after, at 1.76.3, Thucydides' Athenians state that 'praise is due to all who, if not so superior to human nature as to refuse dominion, yet respect justice more than their position compels them to do' (ἐπαινεῖσθαί τε ἄξιοι οἵτινες χρησάμενοι τῇ

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[71] Low (2007: 163).
[72] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[73] Mara (2008: 156-59).

ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει ὥστε ἑτέρων ἄρχειν δικαιότεροι ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δύναμιν γένωνται);[74] those who are to truly to be praised are those who are not so superior to 'human nature' that they, as a stronger power, rule the weak, and yet, even though it is not necessary, still respect what is 'just'. Claims that they are concerned with what is 'just' are confirmed by the Mytileneans, who argue that their own 'autonomy' allowed the Athenians to claim that their actions were 'just'. And yet the Athenians themselves openly admit in the Melian Dialogue that 'justice' only plays a role when there is equal power to compel. Raaflaub notes that the average Greek would not view justice as only being possible among equal powers, but rather that justice was a way of leveling unequal power.[75] 'Autonomy', the Mytileneans' right to take part in determining the policies of the league, seemed to render them equal and therefore allowed the Athenians to maintain the pretence of 'justice' despite 'human nature'. Although 'human nature' compels them to disregard what is 'just', the Athenians deserve to be praised, since they are still concerned with right and wrong.

While the Athenians may claim to be concerned with what is 'just', the Mytileneans offer their 'autonomy' as proof that they are not. Furthermore, once the Mytileneans have been subdued, their unequal power opens the floor to a discussion of expediency.[76] Diodotus advises the Athenians to disregard what is 'just' so that whatever decision is made will be expedient; the idea of doing what is 'just' and what is 'expedient' are at odds with one another. Even though Cleon argues that it is possible to do what is both 'just' and 'expedient', Diodotus disagrees. While also believing that the Mytileneans' actions are 'unjust', Diodotus argues that the expedient course would be one of leniency, which is not the 'just' course since justice demands that they be punished. Both agree that the Mytileneans' revolt is 'unjust', but they differ regarding what is expedient, and these differences stem from their understanding of 'human nature', but not from what it 'just'. Both Cleon and Diodotus admit that the standard of what is just is determined by the Athenians' own interest and right to rule, which is itself an act in accordance with 'human nature' (1.76.2): Cleon argues that if the Mytileneans were right to revolt, then the Athenians must be wrong to rule (3.40.4), while

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[74] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[75] Raaflaub (1996: 140).
[76] Low notes that actions which are expedient most often benefit a smaller group than actions that are not expedient (2007: 172-73).

Diodotus notes that the Athenians are 'judges to the offenders of our own interest' (3.46.4).[77]

Although the Athenians claim to be not so superior to human nature that they completely disregard what is just, their measure of 'justice' and their decision to carry out what they deem is just is determined by their own interests. 'Justice', therefore, does not exist in accordance with 'nature', but is the product of 'human nature'. The 'autonomy' of the Mytileneans served as ostensible evidence of the 'justness' of the Athenian actions despite the forces of 'human nature' which would force them to disregard what is 'just'. Their manipulation of 'autonomy' served as a disguise of their own dismissal of what is 'just' regarding their allies, and it ultimately allowed them to dominate the weaker, as men are prevented from yielding power once they have achieved it on account of fear, honour, and advantage. 'Autonomy' itself was a tool of 'human nature', just as the very idea of 'human nature' became a tool for determining what was the most expedient course for the Athenians to take regarding Mytilene. Thucydides' Athenians fail to attribute to the Mytileneans the same forces of human nature underlying their own actions. For the Mtyileneans, their revolt was expedient on account of the Athenians' own weakness. If the Athenians were to recognise the similarities between the forces of human nature in the Mytileneans' revolt and their own rule, then they would be forced to recognise that, if their own actions are 'just' in pretence, while in reality their power precluded consideration of what was just, then the same must be true for the Mytileneans. Justice itself is irrelevant in these circumstances, as the vying power of each side ultimately means that 'nature' and the interests of the stronger prevail.

Although Bickerman asserts that 'autonomy' was a status claimed by weaker states against the stronger, this assumes that 'autonomy' was good for a state. While, in the abstract, the status of 'autonomous' was beneficial for the state possessing it, for the Mytileneans it had become a way for the Athenians to claim that their actions were 'just'.[78] The Athenians' actions may have been just if justice is equated with the interests of the stronger, but from the perspective of the allies some of these actions would have threatened their safety, as the Mytileneans argue. Such actions were not in their interest and were, therefore, in their perspective unjust. The Athenians' manipulation of autonomy as a means of

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[77] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[78] Bickerman (1958: 336-37).

making their actions seem just and their disregard for competing interests of league members resulted in competing standards of justice. Yet over all of these competing interests, the Athenians' own were first and foremost. Living in accordance with νόμος may have been attainable at the city-state level. However, on a larger scale the conflicting interests of city-states meant that some interests were undoubtedly underrepresented and some policies were viewed as 'unjust' when measured against their own interests. While certainly not everyone at the city-state level was content to live in accordance with particular νόμοι, the stakes were higher when it came to relations between states, as the consequences of the revolt of a city-state were that much greater. The status of 'autonomous' was meant to remind league members to accept responsibility for policies on account of their own token vote in establishing policy, even though in reality it served as a means of quelling unrest by making all responsible for decisions made. Thucydides' engagement with autonomy suggests that in a world where the interests of the stronger prevailed, the protections implemented to ensure that city-state's interets were represent could be subverted to serve the interests of the stronger. Considerations of what was 'just' belonged to a world where men acted in accordance with νόμος instead of φύσις. Although the Athenians claimed to be concerned with 'justice', such claims only served their own interests, as 'justice' itself had become a tool for making 'unjust' actions seem more just than they really were. Rhetorically 'justice' itself had become a pretense for actions in which the stronger prevailed over the weaker in accordance with nature. States which were 'autonomous' may have had a vote in the assembly, but ultimately they served the expansionist νόμος and the restless way of life of the Athenians.

5.4 Plataea

The trial of the Plataeans is not only a test of the Spartans' 'cry of justice', but also, as Ostwald points out, a test of the Spartans' claim to be defending the 'autonomy' of the allies.[79] Although Figueira has argued that the Spartans did not discern between autonomy and freedom, such interpretations of autonomy are based on the fact that the Spartan ultimatum demanding that the Athenians respect the 'autonomy' of the Greeks was followed by their subsequent claims to be

[79] Ostwald (1982: 22).

fighting for 'freedom'.[80] The invocation of autonomy by the Plataeans is an altogether different type of 'autonomy' than that of the Mytileneans, whose interests in the assembly were represented by their vote, thereby rendering them, from an Athenian perspective, autonomous. For the Plataeans, being autonomous meant living in accordance with the traditional status bestowed by Pausanias. The Spartans' rejection not only of the Plataeans' autonomy but also their right to a trial where what is 'just' is determined by the νόμοι of the Greeks serves as a narrative marker indicating that for Thucydides' Spartans, as much as for his Athenians, the status of autonomy was a rhetorical, persuasive tool that served the interests of the stronger.

The many references to violations of νόμοι common to all the Greeks in both the Theban and Plataean speeches suggests that Thucydides was commenting on the role of language or rhetoric in rendering powerless the νόμοι which preserve justice in the Spartans' interactions with their allies. At 1.76.2 the Athenians note that the Spartans only speak in terms of right and wrong because it suits their interests: 'It has always been a rule that the weak should be subject to the strong; and besides, we consider that we are worthy of our power. Up until the present moment you, too, used to think that we were; after calculating your interest, you are beginning to talk in terms of right and wrong (τὰ ξυμφέροντα λογιζόμενοι τῷ δικαίῳλόγῳ νῦν χρῆσθε). Considerations of this kind have never yet turned people aside from the opportunities of aggrandizement offered by superior strength'.[81]

The incident in Plataea and their subsequent trial demonstrates that the Spartans' claim to be fighting for the 'autonomy' of the Hellenes—that is, their right to live in accordance with what is deemed right by not only their own community, but in accordance with the νόμοι that had previously moderated behaviour among the Greeks—is a false claim, as the Spartans themselves determine what is 'just' by measuring the Plataeans' actions not by whether or not they were in accordance with νόμοι, but whether they serve their own interests. Whereas initially, as the Athenians point out, the Spartans' concern for justice coincided with what was expedient, the trial of the Plataeans exposes the Spartan

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[80] Figueira (1990: 63-99; 1998: 249).

[81] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996); ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι, ἄξιοί τε ἅμα νομίζοντες εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν δοκοῦντες μέχρι οὗ τὰ ξυμφέροντα λογιζόμενοι τῷ δικαίῳλόγῳ νῦν χρῆσθε, ὃν οὐδείς πω παρατυχὸν ἰσχύι τι κτήσασθαι προθεὶς τοῦ μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀπετράπετο.

rhetoric of 'justice' as a disguise for their real motive: their own interests. To this extent, the Spartans, no less than the Athenians, are motivated by the same forces outlined at 1.76.2. Once again, the question of a state's autonomy is caught between the tension created in the struggle between φύσις—in accordance with which the interests of the stronger prevail—and νόμοι which serve to protect to protect the weaker. This time the tensions serve to demonstrate that, while the Athenians pretend to be concerned with the appearance of justice, all the while professing a policy of 'might excludes right', the Spartans prefer a more gentle and therefore manipulative policy of 'might is right'.[82]

At the beginning of Book Two, Thucydides describes the conflict between Thebes and Plataea that brought Sparta and Athens into conflict with one another.[83] In the fifteenth year since the truce, three hundred armed Thebans enter the city of Plataea. These men were invited by a party within the city of Plataea, which desired to gain power by ousting political opponents and bringing Plataea over to the Theban alliance. Upon entering the city, the Thebans announce that all who desire that Plataea return to its place in the Boeotian League, a place which was in accordance with ancestral custom, κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, should join them in the market-place (2.2.4). Thucydides states that those who agreed to such terms did so out of fear, as the Thebans had entered the city at night, and the Plataeans could not ascertain how many Thebans were present. Once they realise that there were fewer Thebans in the city than they had previously thought, the Plataeans carry out a successful night raid against the Thebans, taking many of them prisoner. The reason for this night raid, according to Thucydides, was that the majority of the Plataeans were not in favour of forsaking their Athenian ties (2.5).

Once the Thebans learned of the attack against their men in Plataea they send a second expedition to the city, where they try to capture Plataean hostages from an area on the outskirts of the city for a prisoner exchange. By taking Plataean prisoners, they hoped that they would be able to make an exchange for the Thebans taken in the night raid. The Plataeans circumvent this catastrophe and remind the Thebans that seizing cities during times of peace is not acceptable. According to the Thebans, the Plataeans promise to return the prisoners which they have taken, if they, the Thebans, leave Plataea peaceably. If the Thebans

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[82] Price (2001: 91).

[83] Price (2001: 287-88) notes that Plataea was not in fact the incident that led to the outbreak of the war, but rather an incident that brought Athens and Sparta into conflict with one another.

refuse to withdraw from Plataea, the Plataeans will kill the Theban prisoners. These terms were agreed to by an oath, though the Plataeans deny that this ever happened. According to the Plataeans, they promised to return the prisoners only after negotiations. In the end, the Thebans withdraw from the city, and the Plataeans put to death the Theban prisoners.

When the Athenians, who were allies of Plataea, are informed of the situation in Plataea, they do not know that the Plataeans have already killed the Theban prisoners. The Athenians advise the Plataeans not to do anything with the prisoners until they are able to consult with them. When the Athenians arrive in Plataea they leave a garrison in the city and take away with them all of the women, children, and men not of fighting age. At this point Thucydides states that the Thirty Years' Peace has clearly been broken (2.7.1), since Plataea was an ally of Athens and Thebes was an ally of Sparta (2.9). As Price points out, Plataea was not in fact the moment that the truce was broken, but rather it had been already broken in the conflict over Potidaea and Corcyra; Plataea was merely an event contributing to the tension between Athens and Sparta by engaging their allies in hostilities. Furthermore, it is not certain that Thebes even took part in the Thirty Years' Peace. The arrangement of the Plataean episode as a significant incident in the outbreak of hostilities allows Thucydides to emphasise the principles underlying the conflict: the tensions between νόμος and φύσις and the role of rhetoric in disguising the 'unjustness' of actions in which the interests of the stronger prevail.[84] The Plataean incident stands not only as a set piece on his narrative on stasis, but also stands as a general commentary on the powerlessness of νόμοι.

Nothing more is mentioned of the conflict between Thebes and Plataea until 2.71, when Thucydides describes how the Spartan king, Archidamus, and the Spartan allies invaded Plataea. After the Spartans have encamped outside Plataea and begun laying waste to the land, Plataean representatives make an appeal to the Spartans. The Plataeans ask the Spartans to be mindful of Plataea's symbolic role in bringing the Persian Wars to a close: Pausanias had granted the Plataeans the right to be autonomous, having their own land and city. In addition he had promised that no one should ever march against them unjustly or for the purpose of enslavement.

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[84] Price (2001: 283-88); Powell (1988: 114); Hammond (1967: 349).

> Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, your countryman, after freeing Hellas from the Medes with the help of those Hellenes who were willing to undertake the risk of the battle fought near our city, offered sacrifice to Zeus the Liberator in the agora of Plataea, and calling all the allies together restored to the Plataeans their city and territory, and declared it autonomous and inviolate against aggression and slavery.[85]
>
> Παυσανίας γὰρ ὁ Κλεομβρότου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐλευθερώσας τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀπὸ τῶν Μήδων μετὰ Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἐθελησάντων ξυνάρασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον τῆς μάχης ἣ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, θύσας ἐν τῇ Πλαταιῶν ἀγορᾷ ἱερὰ Διὶ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ξυγκαλέσας πάντας τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀπεδίδου Πλαταιεῦσι γῆν καὶ πόλιν τὴν σφετέραν ἔχοντας αὐτονόμους οἰκεῖν, στρατεῦσαί τε μηδένα ποτὲ ἀδίκως ἐπ' αὐτοὺς μηδ' ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ (Thuc. 2.71.2).

The Plataeans in this instance ask for nothing more than that their status according to tradition—that they be inviolate against aggression and slavery—be respected. But now the Spartans have joined forces with the Thebans to enslave them. In response, Archidamus argues that what the Plataeans say is just, but that they could still join the Spartan cause of liberating the Greeks (2.72.1), while remaining 'autonomous'. While Debnar sees Archidamus' recognition of Plataean autonomy as generous, Mara notes the uncharacteristic nature of the Spartans' response as evidence of the opposite: rather than respecting the Plataeans' autonomy promised by Pausanias, Archidamus reinterprets the oaths sworn so that their own behaviour might seem just.[86] According to tradition, the Plataeans had sworn an oath to defend the freedom of the Greeks, so Pausanias may be suggesting that the Plataeans could, at the same time, join the cause of the Spartans while maintaining their oath to defend the freedom of the Greeks. This is confirmed when Pausanias advises the Plataeans to work toward the cause of freeing the Greeks, which Pausanias had intended for them to do, and defend the freedom of the Greeks. If they are not able to do this, they should live in leisure enjoying their own affairs. Essentially, the Plataeans should keep to themselves

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[85] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[86] Debnar (2001: 101); Mara (2008: 165-66).

and remain neutral (2.72.1-2).[87] For Pausanias, the oath to defend freedom, or rather the ideology of freedom, is more important than the Plataeans' alliance with the Athenians which was also part of the oath. What Pausanias does not consider is that siding with Sparta would result in an invasion of Plataea by the Athenians, with whom the Plataeans were allied, and in this sense his request, which Debnar sees as generous, is in fact not.

The Plataeans' request that the Spartans respect their autonomy not only represents their right to exist without fear of unjust intervention or slavery, but also their right to live in accordance with their alliance with Athens. The Plataeans' claim to 'autonomy' in this instance is a plea that the Spartans respect their alliance with Athens. As Low points out, the language of νόμος used in treaties in the Greek world suggests that 'interstate agreements are themselves instantiations of some more fundamental interstate *nomos*—one which might be described as the (familiar) obligation *pacta sunt servanda*, and which, although never explicitly formulated, is no less strongly felt or frequently invoked'.[88] Isocrates' speech of the Plataean ambassadors' request for assistance characterises the Athenians as defenders of autonomy, a position that is nowhere found in Thucydides' narrations. As my analysis of the Mytilenean episode has suggested, the Athenians are abusers of autonomy rather than defenders of it.[89]

In keeping with their alliance with Athens, the Plataeans reply that they must first consult the Athenians, since their wives and children are in Athens. Furthermore, they are worried that the Athenians or the Boeotians will invade their city once the Peloponnesians withdraw. Archidamus suggests that the Plataeans hand over the city of Plataea in order for it to be held in trust by the

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[87] 'Plataeans, what you say is fair enough, so long as you act up to what you say. For you may do just as Pausanias wished you to do—that is, you may enjoy your independence and also join the work of liberating those other Hellenes who shared in the dangers of the past with you, who took the oaths together with you, and who are now under Athenian domination. It is to free them and others like them that this army has been raised and this war has broken out. The best thing of all would be for you to take your part in the work of liberation and so to abide by the oaths yourselves. But if this is impossible, then do what we have already asked you to do: remain neutral and live independently; do not join either side; allow both parties to enter your city, but do not allow either party to make use of it in war. And this will satisfy us' (Tanslation Warner 1972a); δίκαια λέγετε, ὦ ἄνδρες Πλαταιῆς, ἢν ποιῆτε ὁμοῖα τοῖς λόγοις. καθάπερ γὰρ Παυσανίας ὑμῖν παρέδωκεν, αὐτοί τε αὐτονομεῖσθε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνελευθεροῦτε, ὅσοι μετασχόντες τῶν τότε κινδύνων ὑμῖν τε ξυνώμοσαν καὶ εἰσὶ νῦν ὑπ' Ἀθηναίοις, παρασκευή τε τοσήδε καὶ πόλεμος γεγένηται αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθερώσεως. ἧς μάλιστα μὲν μετασχόντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐμμείνατε τοῖς ὅρκοις· εἰ δὲ μή, ἅπερ καὶ πρότερον ἤδη προυκαλεσάμεθα, ἡσυχίαν ἄγετε νεμόμενοι τὰ ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν, καὶ ἔστε μηδὲ μεθ' ἑτέρων, δέχεσθε δὲ ἀμφοτέρους φίλους, ἐπὶ πολέμῳ δὲ μηδετέρους. καὶ τάδε ἡμῖν ἀρκέσει.

[88] Low (2007: 99).

[89] Isoc. 14; Low (2007: 74-76).

Spartans for the duration of the war. Once the war has come to a close, it will be returned. The Plataeans send representatives to the Athenians, who ask the Plataeans not to break the oaths which their fathers swore by ending their alliance with Athens. Shortly after the Plataean representatives return, Archidamus delivers the following speech.

> Gods and heroes...of the land of Plataea, bear witness with me that from the beginning it was in no spirit of aggression, but only because these people had first broken their engagement with us, that we invaded this land in which our fathers offered their prayers to you before they defeated the Persians and which you made a place of good omen for the warfare of the Hellenes; nor, in our actions now, shall we be acting aggressively. We have made a number of reasonable proposals, but these have not been accepted. Grant us your aid, therefore, and see to it that the punishment for what has been done wrong may fall on those who were the first to do evil, and that we may be successful in our aim, which is a just revenge.[90]
>
> θεοὶ ὅσοι γῆν τὴν Πλαταιίδα ἔχετε καὶ ἥρωες, ξυνίστορές ἐστε ὅτι οὔτε τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδίκως, ἐκλιπόντων δὲ τῶνδε προτέρων τὸ ξυνώμοτον, ἐπὶ γῆν τήνδε ἤλθομεν, ἐν ᾗ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν εὐξάμενοι ὑμῖν Μήδων ἐκράτησαν καὶ παρέσχετε αὐτὴν εὐμενῆ ἐναγωνίσασθαι τοῖς, οὔτε νῦν, ἤν τι ποιῶμεν, ἀδικήσομεν· προκαλεσάμενοι γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ εἰκότα οὐ τυγχάνομεν. ξυγγνώμονες δὲ ἔστε τῆς μὲν ἀδικίας κολάζεσθαι τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι προτέροις, τῆς δὲ τιμωρίας τυγχάνειν τοῖς ἐπιφέρουσι νομίμως (Thuc. 2.74.2).

Ostwald has argued that it was unlikely that Plataea, which was a symbolic centre of freedom, would have been awarded autonomy instead of full freedom after the Persian retreat, as the Plataeans asserted at 2.71.2. In addition 'the situation in Greece was not yet such that αὐτονομία had to be coined to define a status different from ἐλευθερία'.[91] Thus it must be assumed that 'what we get from the speeches in Thucydides is a biased version of the facts tailored by Spartans and

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[90] Translation Warner (1972a).
[91] Ostwald (1982: 22).

Thebans to fit a situation which was in 429 and 427 B.C. not what would have been in 479 B.C.; they give us reliable information about views held on the Hellenic League in the early 420s, but they tell us little about the actualities of 479 B.C.'.[92] Ostwald posits that the Plataeans' plea of autonomy was a test of Sparta's claims to be fighting for the autonomy of the Greek city-states.[93] Although the Spartans' platform of fighting for the 'freedom' of the Greeks ensured that goodwill was on the side of Sparta and her allies (2.8.4), the Spartan ultimatum which instigated the rhetorical war between Athens and Sparta concerned 'autonomy'. At 1.139.3, the Spartans delivered the following ultimatum: 'Sparta wishes the peace to continue, and there is no reason why it should not, if you would let the Hellenes be autonomous (Λακεδαιμόνιοι βούλονται τὴν εἰρήνην εἶναι, εἴη δ' ἂν εἰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖτε).

Although Raaflaub admits that the Plataeans may have used the language of autonomy in their plea to the Spartans, his conclusion overlooks and even undermines the role played by Thucydides in constructing the Plataeans' response.[94] Ostwald, on the other hand, has suggested that the Plataeans' request that the Spartans respect their 'autonomous' condition was a test of Sparta's claims to be fighting for 'autonomy'.[95] While all of these may be true, Raaflaub's and Ostwald's conclusions regarding Plataean autonomy are premised on the fact that 'autonomy' was in fact a decisive factor in the Plataeans' case, and that it was negotiations concerning the 'autonomy' of the allies that led to the outbreak of war. Thucydides' history may reflect a reality in which 'autonomy' played a role, and epigraphic evidence indicates that autonomy was relevant during the Peloponnesian Wars.[96] However, Thucydides construction of 'autonomy' in both the Mytilenean revolt and the conflict and trial of the Plataeans suggests that he is just as interested in how the condition of 'autonomy' is abused and manipulated by the prevailing forces of nature as he is the historical reality of autonomy and the role it actually played in the war. The trial of the Plataeans, as much as the

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[92] Ostwald (1982: 21).
[93] Ostwald (1982: 22).
[94] Raaflaub (2000b: 252).
[95] Ostwald (1982: 22).
[96] ML 87, Tod 63. Although this is inscription has been reconstructed, the fact that 'autonomy' continued to be used as a political term well into the fourth century suggests that its use in the fifth-century was also political, with the exception of specific passages examined in this chapter in which Herodotus uses the work in a philosophical context.

Mytilenean episode, demonstrates that the language itself could be used as a tool of the stronger to subdue the weaker by allowing the stronger to make arguments in which actions that serve their interests rather than their allies' seem more just than they actually are. While the case of Plataea may be a test of the Spartans' claim to be defending 'autonomy', it is, in fact, a test of their claim to be fighting for 'justice' (1.76.2). Not only have the Spartans disregarded the wishes of an already 'autonomous' city-state, now they demonstrate that they are only concerned with justice or what is 'right' in so far as it suits their interests.

The siege of Plataea begins after the Plataeans reject the Spartans' demands. Once the Plataeans have run out of provisions, the Spartans, knowing that any city taken by force would have to be returned to Athens in future truces, ask the Plataeans if they would be willing to surrender the city to Sparta voluntarily and stand trial before the Spartans. No one, the Spartans promised, would be punished unjustly (3.52). After the Plataeans surrender, five judges arrive from Sparta. Rather than accusing the Plataeans directly, the Spartans ask each Plataean male whether or not they have done anything to benefit the cause of Sparta (3.52.4).[97] Having asked the Spartans for permission to speak, the Plataeans proceed to defend themselves arguing that they were not at fault for attacking the Thebans, who invaded their city during a religious festival.

In their defence, the Plataeans appeal to νόμοι among the Greeks four times. While Thucydidean commentators such as Gomme have argued that international law only appears in treaties in Thucydides, George Sheets has offered a convincing argument for the contrary: the expectation that parties to a treaty will adhere to it arises 'from the parties' mutual acceptance of a customary legal order which imposes the reciprocal obligation'.[98] Furthermore the many references to legal arbitration as opposed to force in Thucydides are evidence for international norms of behavior, customs, or precedents upon which the adjudicatory process was based;[99] 'when...nomos is invoked for the purpose of suggesting not what the parties usually have done in the past, but what they were, or are, obligated to do in the future, it obviously purports to be a normative rule of behavior'.[100] The way in which the Plataeans and the Thebans use νόμος as a

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[97] ἠρώτων δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐπικαλεσάμενοι τοσοῦτον μόνον, εἴ τι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ καθεστῶτι ἀγαθόν τι εἰργασμένοι εἰσίν.
[98] Gomme, *HCT* 1.172; Sheets (1994: 54).
[99] Low (2007: 102-28); Sheets (1994: 55).
[100] Sheets (1994: 58).

rhetorical, defensive tool suggests that the norms of international law no longer applied in war.

If the trial of the Plataeans is to be taken as evidence of an historical reality, Sheets' assessment of νόμος would stand. However, the trial of the Plataeans and the speeches presented by Thucydides do not so much reflect an historical reality—even though speeches may have been given—but rather the impossibility of preserving an 'autonomous' status in a political climate where the interests of the stronger prevail. 'Autonomy' is most often used to describe the status of allies, and yet the competing interests of allies were often overshadowed by the interests of the more powerful, as the Mytilenean episode demonstrates. Consequently city-states were not living in accordance with their own νόμοι, but rather the νόμοι of the stronger which served the stronger's interests, often to the detriment of the weaker, 'autonomous' city-state. The Plataean episode, on the other hand, addresses a different type of 'autonomy': the right of city-states to make claims to justice in accordance with the accepted norms of Greek society.

According to Macleod, the Plataean debate and the stasis in Corcyra demonstrate 'how traditional values and restraints collapse in war before the thought of immediate and material advantage, although—or indeed because—people profess to uphold them'.[101] Although the Spartans express concern for what is 'just', their subversion of the standard of 'justice' suggests otherwise. As Price notes, it is remarkable that the Thebans even attempt to make claims to justice when it is so obvious that assisting the Thebans would have been in the strategic interest of the Spartans.[102] The first time the Plataeans appeal to a νόμος, they argue that all were bound to it: 'In seizing our city in time of peace, and what is more at a holy time in the month, they justly encountered our vengeance, in accordance with the universal law which sanctions resistance to an invader; and it cannot now be right that we should suffer on their account' (3.56.2).[103] The Plataeans argue that they acted in accordance with νόμος when they sought revenge for the Theban invasion. The notion of seeking revenge in accordance with νόμος is likewise invoked by Archidamus at 2.74.2 when he states that

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[101] Macleod (1978: 65).
[102] Price (2001: 123-24).
[103] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996); πόλιν γὰρ αὐτοὺς τὴν ἡμετέραν καταλαμβάνοντας ἐν σπονδαῖς καὶ προσέτι ἱερομηνίᾳ ὀρθῶς τε ἐτιμωρησάμεθα κατὰ τὸν πᾶσι νόμον καθεστῶτα, τὸν ἐπιόντα πολέμιον ὅσιον εἶναι ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ νῦν οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως δι' αὐτοὺς βλαπτοίμεθα.

despite the Spartans' offer to allow the Plataeans to make right their failure to side with them, they were unwilling, and therefore, the vengeance he seeks is in accordance with νόμος.[104]

At 3.56.3 the Plataeans argue that if the Spartans use a standard of justice which serves their own interests, they would not be acting as true judges of what was right. In this sense they are appealing to a standard of justice determined by impartial judges as opposed to justice which serves the interests of the stronger.

> By taking your own immediate interest and their animosity as the test of justice, you will prove yourselves to be servants of expediency rather than judges of right.[105]
>
> εἰ γὰρ τῷ αὐτίκα χρησίμῳ ὑμῶν τε καὶ ἐκείνων πολεμίῳ τὸ δίκαιον λήψεσθε, τοῦ μὲν ὀρθοῦ φανεῖσθε οὐκ ἀληθεῖς κριταὶ ὄντες, τὸ δὲ ξυμφέρον μᾶλλον θεραπεύοντες (3.56.3).

Next the Plataeans appeal to the νόμος which exists for the Greeks that suppliants are not to be killed (3.58.3). Since the Plataeans surrendered voluntarily to Sparta it is only right that they be spared. Third, they remind the Spartans that each year they brought those Spartans who were buried in their land the traditional offerings (νόμιμα) as allied comrades (3.58.4). Lastly they made an appeal to glory: there will be no glory for the Spartans if they break the established νόμοι of the Greeks (3.59.1).

The Thebans, for their part, also make claims in the name of νόμος. They argue that their alliance with Persia was the decision of a few men who held power, a form of government more similar to a dictatorship and removed from νόμοι than either an oligarchy or democracy (3.62.3). The decision to make Thebes an ally of Persia was a mistake, one made when Thebes was ruled without νόμοι (3.62.5). The Thebans make appeals based on νόμοι two more times in their speech. First they claim that the Plataeans' actions against the Theban prisoners, whom they killed, were contrary to νόμος (3.66.2). Pity, they argue, is not evoked when those who have acted wrongly, like the Plataeans, suffer in

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[104] Low (2007: 97).
[105] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).

accordance with νόμος (3.66.2).[106] Lastly, the Thebans plead that the Spartans defend the νόμος of the Greeks which was transgressed by the Plataeans (3.67.3).

In each of these two accounts, the Thebans and Plataeans appeal to different νόμοι as standards for determining whether an action was just or unjust. Both the Plataeans and the Thebans justify their actions through νόμοι, some of which are νόμοι or 'norms' common to all. The Plataeans refer to this sort of νόμος when they argue that it was right for them to seek revenge for the Theban invasion of their city. The remaining references to νόμοι in the Plataeans' speech are reminders to the Spartans that they, the Spartans, would be breaking the νόμοι of the Hellenes if they put to death suppliants. The Theban speech is rife with νόμοι. Some of these νόμοι are the product of human nature, while others were agreed upon conventions. The Thebans compare the decisions made by their government, which were not governed by νόμοι during the Persian Wars, with that of the Plataeans. Both the Plataeans and Thebans appeal to the νόμος that it was wrong to kill suppliants and prisoners.

Accusations that they invaded Plataea during a religious festival, an act which the Plataeans argue was contrary to νόμος and therefore unjust, are carefully skirted by the Thebans, who remind the Plataeans that initially they were invited into the city by some of the leading men of Plataea. These men only wanted the Plataeans to end their alliances with outside powers and return to the common ancestral customs of the Boeotians (ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια καταστῆσαι).[107] The Thebans suggest that if the entire city-state of Thebes was to be blamed for the alliance made with Persia during the Persian Wars, when only a few men were ruling, as the Plataeans have argued, then it only made sense that the Theban march into Plataea not be considered hostile, since the leading men of Plataea invited them in.

The Thebans have essentially used the logic or reasoning of the Plataeans to make their argument stronger by proving that their own intervention in Plataea was not hostile, since they were invited. In the final segment of the Theban speech, a cloaked reference is made to the dangers of oratory, which is a cue to the reader that the Thebans themselves have just used rhetoric, and in this case,

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[106] Macleod (1977: 237, 245-46); Lateiner (2005: 84-86).

[107] εἰ δὲ ἄνδρες ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει, βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἔξω ξυμμαχίας ὑμᾶς παῦσαι, ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια καταστῆσαι, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἑκόντες, τί ἀδικοῦμεν;

the logic of the Plataeans, to make their position stronger. They advise the Spartans to judge them by their actions, not their words, since good deeds do not require long speeches. For

> good deeds can be shortly stated, but where wrong is done a wealth of language is needed to veil its deformity. However, if leading powers were to do what you are doing now, and putting one short question to all alike, were to decide accordingly, men would be less tempted to seek fine arguments to cover unjust actions.[108]

> ὧν ἀγαθῶν μὲν ὄντων βραχεῖα ἡ ἀπαγγελία ἀρκεῖ, ἁμαρτανομένων δὲ λόγοι ἔπεσι κοσμηθέντες προκαλύμματα γίγνονται. ἀλλ' ἢν οἱ ἡγεμόνες, ὥσπερ νῦν ὑμεῖς, κεφαλαιώσαντες πρὸς τοὺς ξύμπαντας διαγνώμας ποιήσησθε, ἧσσόν τις ἐπ' ἀδίκοις ἔργοις λόγους καλοὺς ζητήσει (Thuc. 3.67.6-7).

Thucydides' description at 3.82.4 of language may equally apply to νόμος, as both the Plataeans and Thebans interpret their own actions as being in accordance with νόμοι.[109] As Price points out, 'the reader' who 'may momentarily have hoped for a return to linguistic regularity and order finds by the end of the speech a wider chaos in how key terms are understood and used'.[110] The Plataeans' appeal, which is based more on universal principles than the exact circumstances of their situation, is unsuccessful. While it would seem that the Thebans have won, the Thebans' own argument was not effective, as the Spartans ultimately disregard both speeches in favour of their previous standard of justice. While Debnar argues that the Thebans' failure is due to rhetorical incompetence, the Plataeans are equally unsuccessful.[111] Thucydides' presentation of the trial, which, as Macleod notes, invokes pity for the Plataeans,[112] is framed in such a way as to expose not only the limits of νόμοι in protecting the interests of the weaker, but also the limits of 'autonomy' itself. Thucydides himself calls the Spartans' actions 'unfeeling', as the entire Plataean affair was 'adopted to please the Thebans

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[108] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[109] Macleod (1977: 232).
[110] Price (2001: 113).
[111] Debnar (1996: 95-110).
[112] Macleod (1977: 245-46).

(ἀποτετραμμένοι), who were thought to be useful in the war at that moment raging' (3.68.4).[113] The trial of the Plataeans is, as Macleod notes, 'a travesty of legality'.[114]

From the Thebans' perspective, the leading men of Plataea represented the wishes of the entire citizen body just as, according to the Plataeans, the entire citizen body of Thebes was held responsible for the Theban alliance with Persia. The Thebans strengthen their argument by an appeal to φύσις: 'Who then merit the detestation of the Hellenes more justly than you [Plataeans], you who sought their ruin under the mask of honor? The former virtues that you allege you now show not to be proper to your character; the real bent of your nature has been at length damningly proved: when the Athenians took the path of injustice you followed them' (3.64.4).[115] If the Athenians' rule is unjust, which it must be if the Spartans' campaign is to be considered just, then the Plataeans' decision to side with Athens must also be unjust. Their own appeal to φύσις masks the prevailing force of φύσις motivating the Spartans' own actions. The fact that φύσις is only mentioned once during the trial of the Plataeans does not necessarily mean that Thucydides has not framed the case of Plataea as a conflict between νόμος and φύσις. In fact, the overwhelming absence of φύσις is a testament to its importance for understanding why the Spartans are behaving as they are behaving. While they assert that they are defending the 'autonomy' of the Hellenes and that they are concerned with what it just, they use justice itself to disguise their own actions which have little to do with 'justice' and everything to do with their own interests.

Ultimately, the Spartans decide that the justice of their intentions released them from the provisions of the treaty made by Pausanias after the Persian War. According to the Spartans, they had counted on Plataean neutrality as stipulated by the treaty, and they had offered the Plataeans the same conditions of neutrality just before the siege, but the Plataeans rejected this offer (3.68). From the Spartans' perspective the Plataeans had broken the treaty, which released the

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[113] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996); Lateiner (2005: 85).
[114] Macleod (1977: 223).
[115] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996); τίνες ἂν οὖν ὑμῶν δικαιότερον πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι μισοῖντο, οἵτινες ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκείνων κακῷ ἀνδραγαθίαν προύθεσθε; καὶ ἃ μέν ποτε χρηστοὶ ἐγένεσθε, ὡς φατέ, οὐ προσήκοντα νῦν ἐπεδείξατε, ἃ δὲ ἡ φύσις αἰεὶ ἐβούλετο, ἐξηλέγχθη ἐς τὸ ἀληθές· μετὰ γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ἄδικον ὁδὸν ἰόντων ἐχωρήσατε. A similar argument is made by the Spartan ephor Sthenelaidas at 1.86.1 regarding the Athenians. Hornblower notes that the effectiveness of an opponent's argument can be reduced by noting their past behaviour which was deemed good compared to the present (1991: 130, 459).

Spartans from being obligated to its terms. Therefore the Spartans resorted to the question which they had asked originally in order to determine whether the Plataeans were guilty or innocent: 'have you done anything to help the Spartans and their allies in the present war?' (3.52).[116] The Plataeans who responded that they have not helped Sparta and her allies were put to death and the women were made slaves. The city was destroyed. The Spartans ultimately let their own interests prevail rather than the νόμοι of the Greeks, and their claim to be defending the 'autonomy' of the Hellenes does not prevent them from violating the 'autonomy' of city-states whose alliances are not in the interest of Sparta. Low notes that the Spartans' standard of 'justice' confirms the Athenians' own accusations regarding the Spartans' relationship to their own interests and justice in the Melian Dialogue.[117]

> The Lacedaemonians, when their own interest or their domestic laws are in question, are the worthiest men alive; of their conduct towards others much might be said, but no clearer idea of it could be given than by saying, in summary, that of all the men we know they are most conspicuous in considering what is agreeable, and what is expedient.[118]
>
> λακεδαιμόνιοι γὰρ πρὸς σφᾶς μὲν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐπιχώρια νόμιμα πλεῖστα ἀρετῇ χρῶνται· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους πολλὰ ἄν τις ἔχων εἰπεῖν ὡς προσφέρονται, ξυνελὼν μάλιστ' ἂν δηλώσειεν ὅτι ἐπιφανέστατα ὧν ἴσμεν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα καλὰ νομίζουσι, τὰ δὲ ξυμφέροντα δίκαια (5.105.4).

The Spartans' refusal to respect Plataea's autonomy suggests that the platitude to be defending the 'autonomy' of the Greeks does not apply to those city-states whose interests do not align with Sparta's. Furthermore, as Price has pointed out, Thucydides has placed the Plataea episode at the outbreak of the war in order to set the 'tone and thematic agenda' of his narrative, that it would be marked by brutal acts and massacres.[119] There is, however, another reason for the placement

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[116] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[117] Low (2007: 231).
[118] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[119] Price (2001: 289).

of the Plataean episode. The choice of the Plataeans, to remain an ally of Athens and suffer the vengeance of the Spartans or to side with Sparta and risk angering the Athenians, was undoubtedly a choice faced by many city-states. Thucydides' description of the events in Plataea and the subsequent trial of the Plataeans exposes the fact that once city-states had set aside the common νόμοι which protected the interests of the weaker from the stronger, the interests of the stronger ultimately rendered the status of 'autonomous'—a status meant to protect city-states not only from the interests of the stronger, but also guaranteed them the right to make appeals based on the common νόμοι of the Greeks—meaningless, as the status of 'autonomous' failed to protect the Plataeans. Epigraphic evidence suggests that it was a political term used during the Peloponnesian Wars. Thucydides' focus on the failure of νόμος to protect the Plataeans would have raised questions concerning what it means to be 'autonomous' in the most basic sense of the term, as νόμοι failed to protect an autonomous city-state from the standards of justice that were determined by the interests of the stronger.

On one level, Sparta's subjugation of Plataea undermines the Spartans' claim to be fighting for autonomy. On another, Thucydides reveals the impossibility of being autonomous when φύσις guides the behaviour of men. But there is another way in which the Plataeans' autonomy may be interpreted. In its most basic sense, autonomy means living in accordance with one's own νόμοι. In the context of the debate between νόμος, φύσις and justice, it could be argued that living in accordance with νόμος means living in a community or partaking in a society where νόμος rather than φύσις—that is, the rule of the stronger—is the standard by which justice is established. The failure of the Spartans to consider the Plataeans' claims to have acted in accordance with νόμος and the Athenians' subversion of 'autonomous' as a tool which served their own interests suggests that νόμος itself had been replaced by the interests of the stronger. For the Spartans, this means establishing standards of justice based on their own interests rather than the νόμοι of the Greeks, thereby denying the 'autonomy' of the Plataeans. For the Athenians this meant subverting a status that was meant to ensure that city-states were given a voice in the assembly. Although city-states which were 'autonomous' did have a voice, they were not powerful enough to protect their interests. Furthermore their 'autonomy' provided evidence that their own actions were 'just', since their allies had a say in league actions. For the Spartans 'might' was 'right' as is evidenced from the standard of justice that is

established at Plataea. For the Athenians, on the other hand, 'might excluded right'. The Athenians do not try to prove that their actions are in fact just, but instead are only concerned with seeming to be just, and therefore manipulate their own actions through language in order to seem just to the allies. As the Athenians themselves argue, they are more concerned with 'justice' than others with a power matching their own would be. In other words, while the Spartans openly admit that their own interests determine what is just and therefore deny the pleas of the 'autonomous' Plataeans, the Athenians are more concerned with seeming just and therefore manipulate 'autonomy' to serve their own interests. Regardless of whether the position taken is 'might excludes right' or 'might is right', the status of 'autonomous' is either ignored or manipulated, and fails to protect the interests of the weaker. 'Autonomy', therefore, is only effective in a world which is ordered in accordance with νόμοι and is rendered powerless in preventing the interests of the stronger from prevailing.

5.5 The Court of Law and the Failure of Arbitration

The importance of arbitration is never a question in Thucydides' history. The Spartans believe that the Athenians were the first to break the treaty, even though they had been more at fault for the initial outbreak on account of their refusal to submit to arbitration: 'In the former war, they [Spartans] considered that the offense had been more on their side, both on account of the attack of the Thebans on Plataea in time of peace, and also of their own refusal to listen to the Athenian offer of arbitration, in spite of the clause in the former treaty that where arbitration should be offered there should be no appeal to arms' (7.18.2).[120] Earlier, in a speech before the outbreak of war, Pericles notes that it was laid out in the treaty, presumably the treaty marking the Thirty Years' Peace, that differences were to be settled by arbitration, and that, until matters were settled, each side was to keep what it had (1.140.2). An arbitration clause had been mentioned earlier by Athenian ambassadors who asked that their differences with Sparta be settled through arbitration as was outlined by the treaty (1.78.4).[121] An arbitration clause was again mentioned by Pericles at 1.141.1.[122] As Price has noted the Athenians have a peculiar way of speaking that alienates their audience

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[120] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996).
[121] de Ste. Croix (1972: 259).
[122] George (2005: 139, more generally 130-140).

and undermines the ability of language to successfully circumvent conflict: 'the inability to communicate stems from a fundamental disharmony and collapse of shared values and world views in Hellas'.[123] This 'fundamental disharmony' also means that the ways in which the Spartans and Athenians abuse and manipulate culturally embedded ideals and concepts also differ. While the Athenians maintain the pretense of 'autonomy', the Spartans altogether abandon the language of 'autonomy' once it becomes apparent that a platform of 'freedom' served their interests more than 'autonomy' (2.8.4). After the subjugation of Plataea the Spartans would be hard pressed to persuade potential allies that they were fighting for autonomy. Consequently they adopt the more ambiguous and therefore more malleable concept of freedom.

Each time Thucydides speaks about arbitration in detail, the word δικαστής appears and arbitration ultimately fails. Thucydides is commenting on the dangers of employing courtroom rhetorical tactics in conflicts between city-states on account of competing interests. In Book One, arbitration fails once the Athenians have used logic to rationalise and justify their actions. The language of the courts, specifically the language of jurors, appears seldom in Thucydides, but where it does occur it suggests that language inadequately defends the interests of the weaker. At 1.73.1, the Athenians state that they will not respond directly to accusations (οὐ γὰρ παρὰ δικασταῖς), since the assembly is not a court of law. Originally outlined in the treaty as a means of avoiding conflict, arbitration itself is riddled with bias. This first becomes apparent in the case of the Corcyraeans who, due to their geographic isolation, are not able to import impartial judges to try cases of interstate conflict. At 1.37.3, the Corinthians argue that the neutrality of Corcyra was a farce: when Corcyra was accused of injuring another nation, the Corcyraeans used their own judges. At 3.46.4, in the debate concerning Mytilene, Diodotus states that the Athenians should not injure themselves by acting like judges who examine a case, but instead should look out for their own interests. In the case of Plataea, the judges are responsible for enslaving a state in the name of 'freedom' (3.52.2, 3; 3.53.1; 3.68.1). All of the passages cited are examples of situations which irrevocably altered the arena of war and suggest the detrimental effect of implementing law court practices in international conflicts. The Athenians, who frequently used language to serve their own interests, recognised

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[123] Price (2001: 195; more generally 190-204).

the failure of diplomacy and arbitration at 1.77.1, when they stated that where force could be used there was no need to resort to law.

Thucydides' treatment of the episode of Plataea through the interpretive framework of νόμος and φύσις suggests that Thucydides is considering the value or effectiveness of being able to assert one's 'autonomy' in a world where νόμοι have been destabilised by the interests of the stronger, or, in other words, by φύσις. As the Plataean and Mytilenean episodes reveal, a city-state can only be 'autonomous' when affairs among men are ordered in accordance with νόμος and not φύσις; political terminology itself has been destabilised by the conflict. The Plataean plea that the Spartans respect their 'autonomy' may be a retrojection by Thucydides meant to test the Spartans' claim to be fighting for 'autonomy', as Ostwald has argued. I suggest that he was not just testing this claim, but showing that it was impossible to be engaged in armed conflict while fighting for and respecting 'autonomy'. Had the Spartans actually acknowledged the Plataeans' plea, they would have respected their wishes to remain allied with Athens. The standard of justice chosen by the Spartans to try the Plataeans reveals the failure of city-states to resort to the νόμοι which had regulated behaviour among city-states previously. When the interests of the stronger prevail νόμοι are either ignored or manipulated, the exact circumstance which was so poignantly described in Thucydides' description of the stasis in Corcyra (3.84.2). When the Plataeans made appeals to their 'autonomous' condition, they were not speaking of their right to live in accordance with their own laws and customs, but the right of all Greeks to be protected by the νόμοι which prevented justice from serving the interests of the stronger.

At the outset, the use of autonomy in the Plataea passage seems technical, but upon closer examination the Plataean situation becomes a philosophical paradigm for the struggle between νόμος and φύσις, a framework which Thucydides engages in order to understand the principles underlying the root of conflict. Instead of seeing 'autonomy' as an anachronism, in light of its philosophical context, the anachronistic use of the word becomes a signpost for the reader that Thucydides was using an event to examine what was happening on a larger scale in the Greek world. By examining one case in depth, Thucydides is able to engage his reader in questions and moral dilemmas, which the reader's own interests prevented him from seeing as a force in present reality.

Conclusions

As Hornblower notes, the Plataean and Mytilenean episodes are 'juxtaposed in a way which makes some comparison by the reflective reader or listener inevitable'.[124] While Hornblower notes the significance of these episodes in terms of exploring the limits of freedom, I suggest that these episodes also explore the limits of autonomy, and that the relationship of the word 'autonomy' to νόμος allowed Thucydides to consider the value of such a status relative to the power wielded by states in accordance with φύσις.

The Mytileneans view their 'autonomy' as a form of control. They assert that the Athenians have only let them be 'autonomous', which for them means having an equal vote in the assembly of the allies, because they are a valuable ally, but that the unequal power renders their 'autonomy' meaningless. For the Mytileneans, being autonomous means having one's interests represented in the league. The status of 'autonomous' granted allies by the Athenians, therefore, is nothing more than a means of control for the Athenians. Even though the Mytileneans have a vote equal to that of the Athenians, the unequal vote of the other allies means that they are unable to secure a majority vote. The Plataeans, on the other hand, view 'autonomy' as a positive status, and they ask that the Spartans respect their 'autonomy' and their neutrality by not forcing them to side with the Spartans, thereby breaking their alliance with Athens to defend the 'freedom' of the Greeks, an alliance created after the Persian retreat.

The question now becomes, what role, if any, does 'autonomy' play in the conflict between 'human nature' which produces circumstances resulting in the disregard for and subversion of justice? Thucydides' narrative framing of his history through the conflict between νόμος and φύσις means that even though 'justice' and 'laws' or 'conventions' played a role in an historical reality, he is engaging with this antithesis in a theoretical way in order to understand the principles underlying the conflict, namely the role played by men, and, more specifically, human nature, in conflicts between city-states. Does justice exist by nature? Is there a fixed notion of 'justice'? The contradictions in the Mytileneans' claims to be acting justly, combined with the Athenians own measure of what is 'just' suggest that 'justice' itself was not fixed, but could rather be manipulated to serve the interests of the stronger—the Athenians as the head of the Delian

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[124] Hornblower (1991: 462).

League, and the Mytileneans during a brief moment when the Athenians had been weakened by the plague. Thucydides' description of the alliance at 1.97.1 and the Mytileneans' description of their voting rights suggest that 'autonomous' allies held equal representation in the assembly. This meant that policy was established in accordance with what was deemed right by the members, and was, therefore, just. Once the voting rights of the allies had been restricted or eliminated, the Mytileneans' felt that their vote, which was equal to that of Athens, and which, therefore, made them 'autonomous', was simply a means of disguising policy which was, in fact, executed by force as 'just'. 'Autonomy', the right of city-states to live in accordance with what was deemed 'right'—their right to establish the parameters of what is 'just'—disguised the fact that such policy was possible not because it was deemed 'just' by the allies, but because Athens, being more powerful, dominated the weak. Once again, the Athenians' power meant that they did not need to consider what was 'just', but they at least pretended to do so by making the Mytileneans autonomous.

The Plataean episode reveals that the Spartans' claim to be concerned with what was just is true, but only to the extent that it served Spartan interests. By describing the Plataeans as autonomous, Thucydides is able to expose the limits of autonomy, and the irony inherent in the claims of the Spartans to be fighting for autonomy while, at the same time, denying autonomous city-states the right to due process. The incidents concerning Mytilene and Plataea serve as a warning to the reader that 'autonomy', much like 'freedom', has been destabilised. Before the outbreak of war the Athenians state that they would be willing to let their allies be 'autonomous' if the Spartans also agree to do the same. The ultimatum, according to Thucydides, that led to the outbreak of war concerned the 'autonomy' of the allies. While the language of 'autonomy' may reflect an historical reality, Thucydides is engaging the concept of 'autonomy' on another level by considering the effectiveness of 'autonomy' in a world where power or might rather than νόμοι motivate and check the actions of men. 'Autonomy', like the other culturally embedded concepts described as being destabilised by Thucydides in the stasis of Corcyra, has also been destabilised. The concept's close relationship to νόμος made it a relevant topic of discussion in the debate between νόμος and φύσις. Thucydides' interest in 'human nature' and 'nature', as well as the relationship between these concepts in determining what is just, or if justice is even relevant, means that 'autonomy', or rather a state's plea to be dealt with in

terms of 'justice' is intrinsically linked to the νόμος-φύσις antithesis. Thus when Thucydides is speaking of 'autonomy' he is often engaging in an enquiry into the fundamental antithesis of νόμος and φύσις that underlies conflicts between men.

The question to which he draws attention is this: is there a place for νόμοι, or standards of 'justice' in accordance with νόμοι, in a world ordered in accordance with nature instead of the laws and conventions of society? For Thucydides' Athenians 'justice' has no place in such a world, while for his Spartans, the stronger determines what it 'just' and therefore 'justice' serves their interests. In such a world, language itself and words, the values of which are culturally embedded, are destabilised once a society no longer is structured in accordance with νόμοι. Consequently words can be used to describe circumstances which meet the needs of the speaker and reflect the speaker's own manipulation of 'justice', a phenomenon which explains the language of 'freedom' being used to justify enslavement or even killing. Thucydides is, therefore, exposing how language, and specifically the language of 'freedom', has been destablised by the war, and he is questioning the value of being 'autonomous' in a world ordered by nature instead of νόμοι. Not only does Thucydides provide an account of 'what happened', but he is also exposes the principles of human nature that underlie the conflict, and he does this by framing his account as a conflict between νόμος and φύσις.

Chapter 6: Sophocles' *Antigone*

The previous chapter demonstrated that Thucydides appropriated the concept of autonomy for reasons that were not purely political, but rather philosophical. The compound nature of the word itself, formed from αὐτο- and νόμος, led Thucydides to consider the value of autonomy in light of the forces of 'nature'. While 'autonomy' may have been a political term, in the Mytilenean and Plataean episodes Thucydides considers the limited value of autonomy relative to justice, which is either altogether disregarded or manipulated to serve the interests of the stronger. Although the primary concern of this thesis is the discourse of 'freedom' in historiography, this chapter will focus on Sophocles' singular use of 'autonomous' to describe Antigone.

Because Sophocles uses the adjective 'autonomous' to describe Antigone, the consensus has been that the concept of 'autonomy' was being used philosophically by Sophocles to describe Antigone as living in accordance with her own νόμος.[1] The prevalence of the νόμος-φύσις antithesis in the play suggests that this was a prominent theme in the play, and it is through the lens of this dynamic that the singular use of 'autonomous' in the text should be interpreted. Had Sophocles used the concept of autonomy with any degree of frequency it might be argued that the concept was sufficiently well-established to stand on its own. But since its appearance in the *Antigone* is the earliest evidence for the term, it must be assumed that it was heard and interpreted within the context of the debate between 'convention' (νόμος) and 'nature' (φύσις), which figured prominently in the narration of the *Antigone*.[2] As I have argued in the last chapter, Thucydides' conceptualisation of 'autonomy' is not just political, but is also philosophical. Since Sophocles uses 'autonomous' in a philosophical context, I shall evaluate the relationship between Thucydides' and Sophocles' treatment of this concept, which has hitherto been regarded as negligible.

The concept of νόμος was a common topos in ancient tragedy. Among the works of the ancient tragedians the representation of νόμος differs greatly. In Aeschylus' *Supplices* 'justice', or δίκη, is described as sitting beside the ancient

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[1] For bibliography see below.

[2] Given how rare the term 'autonomous' is in Herodotus' *Histories*, it may seem logical that the two instances in which the word appear should be interpreted within the framework of the νόμος-φύσις debate. But unlike the singular occurrence in the *Antigone*, where the word is attributed to an individual in a philosophical sense, it is used by Herodotus to describe politically organised groups of people. Herodotus' use of the term is explicitly political, while Sophocles' is only implicitly so.

νόμοι of Zeus (*OC* 1382), while in the *Oedipus* the father of lofty νόμοι, from which purity in word and deed emanates, was Olympus (863-71). In contrast to νόμοι established by the gods is the depiction of νόμοι set by men, which were characteristic of tyranny in Euripides' *Suppliants* (431-32).[3] In Sophocles' *Antigone*, the antithesis central to the conflict between Creon and Antigone concerns 'human' and 'divine' νόμοι. Echoes of the debate between Creon and Antigone can be found in the ideas of the Presocratics and those regarded as sophists. In the late sixth century, Heraclitus of Ephesus, in an attempt to find an immutable standard on which to base human νόμοι, argued that the majority of men live as though they each had their own understanding. Heraclitus believed that all human νόμοι stem from one divine νόμος, which would serve as a standard for determining which νόμοι among men should be credited and which should be rejected.[4]

> Speaking with understanding they must hold fast to what is shared, as a city holds to its law, and even more firmly. For all human laws are nourished by a divine one. It prevails as it will and suffices for all and is more than enough.[5]

> ξὺν νόωι λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ
> τῶι ξυνῶι πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμωι πόλις, καὶ πολὺ
> ἰσχυροτέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι
> νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον
> ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται.[6]

Kahn notes that Heraclitus' statement that all νόμοι are nourished by 'one divine' (ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου) could be translated either as 'by one divine νόμος', or as 'by one divine cosmic principle'. The ambiguity, he suggests, is deliberate, as Heraclitus hints at but does not commit to the idea of a 'divine law'. Instead what is common is the divine.[7] According to Heraclitus, all physical phenomena stem

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[3] Ostwald (1969: 29).
[4] DK 114; Granger (2004: 5-6); Kerferd (1981: 112-113).
[5] Translation Kahn (1979: 43).
[6] See pages 87-88.
[7] Kahn (1979: 117-18).

from this one supreme νόμος.[8] A city, and even a tyrant, should be governed by one law code drawn from what was common to all; no one should be above the law.[9]

Hippias presents a different position that parallels the discussion of νόμος in the *Antigone*. In the *Protagoras* (337c6-d2), Hippias states,

> Gentlemen, I regard all of you here present as kinsmen, intimates, and fellow citizens by nature, but convention, which tyrannizes the human race, often constrains us contrary to nature'.[10]
>
> Ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας ἅπαντας εἶναι φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται.

Although these two ideas, one from Heraclitus and the other from Hippias, seem at odds with one another, they may be reconciled. Heraclitus argued that nature, or φύσις, was itself a product of one divine νόμος; by living in accordance with the νόμοι which stem from this one νόμος, men are in fact living in accordance with nature. The νόμοι which Hippias objected to are those which were not in accord with 'nature' and which were not common to all, but which divided men.

The subtle distinctions between Heraclitus' and Hippias' ideas on νόμοι are echoed in the *Antigone* and prove to be one of the most contentious antitheses in the play. Antigone, appealing to divine νόμοι, believes that her actions are 'right' and that she is acting justly. In the opening lines of the play, the audience/reader learns that Creon has allowed the burial of one of Antigone's

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[8] The idea that everything stems from one divine νόμος may sound similar to Herodotus' statement that Pindar was correct when he said that νόμος is king. However, Herodotus' has referenced a quote from Pindar in which he argues that 'Nomos, king of all, mortals and immortals, brings on with sovereign hand what is most violent and makes it just' (SM fr. 169.1-4). While for Heraclitus, 'War is the father and king of all', for Herodotus and Pindar νόμος is. Since νόμος is derived from one divine source, 'war' instead of νόμος makes some men slaves and others free. Herodotus' and Pindar's substitution of νόμος suggests that νόμος, like war, belongs to the world of men instead of gods, and therefore is derived from a divine source, but instead determines what is 'just' and 'unjust' and, in this sense, has a hand in justifying a society's decision to makes some men slaves and others free. For a more complete discussion of these passages see Chapter Three, section 2.

[9] Naddaf (2005: 133). In the *Laws* (4.715d) Plato notes that even a tyrant must be a slave to the laws.

[10] Translation Lombardo and Bell (1997).

brothers, Eteocles, in accordance with νόμος, but has forbidden the burial of the other brother, Polyneices, who had betrayed the city of Thebes. Anyone who disobeys Creon's decree will be stoned in the streets on Thebes (21-38).[11] Antigone states that Creon buried Eteocles, 'thinking it right to make right use of custom (σὺν δίκηι / χρῆσθαι δικαιῶν τῶι νόμωι).[12] While Antigone agrees that the burial of Eteocles is 'right' or 'just' and in accordance with νόμος, her compliance with Creon on this matter has nothing to do with Eteocles' staunch defence of Thebes. Antigone makes this clear at lines 450-455, when she states that δίκη, who dwells with the gods below, did not issue the edict prohibiting the burial of Polyneices, nor does a mortal's proclamation have the power to override the unwritten νόμιμα of the gods. For Antigone, what is 'right' is determined by the νόμοι of the gods. Although Creon may believe that he is acting in accordance with the will of the gods, who would not permit that one who disgraced their temples and offerings be honoured, Antigone rejects Creon's conviction that the brothers are due different burials. 'Indeed I am not disposed by my nature to join in hating, but to love mutually' (523).[13] Nature, or φύσις, requires that Antigone love her brothers as they have loved her.[14] For Antigone, the bonds of birth and nature supersede the interests of the state and the νόμοι which protect those interests at the cost of the community.

At lines 450-55, Antigone makes clear what she perceives to be the role of νόμος in her current dilemma. Antigone states that it was not Zeus who proclaimed the decree forbidding the burial of her brother, nor has δίκη, who dwells with those below, laid down such laws among men. Nor does she think

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[11] At lines 58-60 Ismene, Antigone's sister, considers the consequences of burying Polyneices: 'Now consider, when we are the only two remaining, how much worse our death will be, if we transgress the decree or power of the tyrants contrary to νόμος' (νῦν δ' αὖ μόνα δὴ νὼ λελειμμένα σκόπει / ὅσῳ κάκιστ' ὀλούμεθ', εἰ νόμου βίᾳ / ψῆφον τυράννων ἢ κράτη παρέξιμεν). The νόμος which Ismene is concerned with in this passage is the 'custom' or 'convention' that one must obey the decree of an absolute ruler. Ismene is not equating Creon's decree, which she calls a ψῆφος, with νόμος. In fact, by using νόμος in an entirely different sense, she seems to be 'going out of her way' not to call it a νόμος. The decree to prohibit burial was not voted on by an assembly, but was issued instead by an absolute ruler. The 'convention' which Ismene, the daughter of the former king Oedipus, is worried about violating is not the decree itself, but the 'norm' which regulates Theban life: following the orders of the ruler.

[12] Several emendations have been made in this passage. I have followed the text of Griffith (1999) for this passage.

[13] Translation mine; οὔτοι συνέχθειν, ἀλλὰ συμφιλεῖν ἔφυν. Griffith (1999: 211) notes that Antigone 'coins special terms to describe her own φύσις and its inextricable involvement in "family"': συνέχθω and συμφιλέω are found nowhere else in classical Greek.

[14] Jebb (1900: line 523) summarises Antigone's sentiment: 'Even if my brothers hate each other still, my nature prompts me, not to join Eteocles in hating Polyneices, but to love each brother as he loves me'.

that a decree from a man has the power to transgress the unwritten and immovable laws of the gods, νόμιμα θεῶν. According to Martin Cropp, 'competing attitudes to νόμος and its relationship to human authority lie at the heart of the play's dialectic'.[15]

Creon's behaviour, on the other hand, is driven by the belief that his actions are in line with what he believes to be 'right' or 'just' for the city. Creon's standard for what is 'right' is determined by the νόμοι, or principles, which guide his rule. At lines 175-210 Creon describes these principles. He states that 'it is impossible to know thoroughly the soul (ψύχην), thought (φρόνημα), and intellect (γνώμην) of every man until he has been proven in both his rule and the principles of administering' (175-177).[16] The man who rules but does not say what he thinks on account of fear is worthless, and he scorns the man who places a friend above the city. He would never consider as a friend one who threatened his city, which protects everyone. This last νόμος is at odds with Antigone's own position, when she states that she loves her brothers because they love her (523), the implication being that it matters little whether their actions benefited their native land. These are the principles by which Creon states he 'increases the power of the city': τοιοῖσδ' ἐγὼ νόμοισι τήνδ' αὔξω πόλιν (191).[17] These ruling guidelines explain why Creon does not let familial relations interfere with his resolution to punish by death anyone who does not obey his orders (486-490). Creon's decision not to allow the burial of Polyneices, despite his familial relation,

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[15] Cropp (1997: 150).

[16] Translation mine; ἀμήχανον δὲ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐκμαθεῖν / ψυχήν τε καὶ φρόνημα καὶ γνώμην, πρὶν ἂν / ἀρχαῖς τε καὶ νόμοισιν ἐντριβὴς φανῇ. Jebb notes that ἀρχαῖς τε καὶ νόμοισιν should be translated as 'duties of administration and law-giving'. At line 191 Creon describes the principles which guide his rule as νόμοι. Since the intervening lines concern the principles which shape Creon's administration, it would make more sense to translate ἀρχαῖς τε καὶ νόμοισιν as 'his rule and the principles of administering'. Furthermore, nowhere in the *Antigone* does Creon speak of his own decrees as νόμοι, or of himself as a 'law-giver'. Ultimately Creon's γνώμη fails him, since he fails to heed Haemon's advice, which he says will be useful if he has any γνώμη (719). This advice is that it is good to learn things from those who have good counsel. Haemon advises Creon to set Antigone free, since the decisions he makes as ruler of Thebes ought to be made for the πόλις rather than himself. Creon fails to follow this advice, and suffers as a result.

[17] Translation mine. At lines 211-214 the Chorus states that 'these things are pleasing to you, son of Menoeceus, to act this way to the one that is hostile and the one that is kind to the city. You have the power to use every νόμος concerning the dead and as many concerning those alive'. The Chorus does not state that Creon has created the νόμος that those who love the city should be honoured, and those who are enemies of the state punished. The Chorus has simply stated that it is Creon's 'right' to enjoy such νόμοι. These νόμοι are not the decrees themselves, but the principles which guide Creon's rule and which informed his decision to prohibit the burial of an enemy and punish anyone who has disobeyed this edict.

is based on the νόμοι which have allowed him to increase the power of the state, which has endowed him with power.

When Antigone finally emerges as the 'doer of the deed', she engages in a dialogue with Creon, which reveals how their respective interpretations of νόμοι have led them to believe that their actions are just. At line 447 Creon asks Antigone if she knew of the proclamations made prohibiting the burial. She states that she knew, which prompts the following response from Creon, who equates his own proclamations with νόμοι for the first time in the text: 'And yet you dared to transgress these νόμοι?'[18] In response to this statement Antigone states that it was not Zeus who made this proclamation, nor was it δίκη, who lives with the gods below, who established these νόμοι among men, nor does she think that Creon's proclamations, being mortal, have the power to override the unwritten and steadfast νόμιμα of the gods (450-455).[19] Antigone has rejected Creon's equation that his proclamations are νόμοι. To Antigone, Creon's decrees are simply edicts issued by a man. They cannot override the νόμοι set by the gods or δίκη who dwells with the gods.

Creon's interest is not in protecting the νόμοι of the community, which would have required the burial of one of its own, but the νόμοι which safeguard the power of the city-state and his own rule. Although Creon is convinced that his decision was in the interest of the Thebes, the community, in whose interest Creon was supposed to be acting, becomes critical of Creon. In the stichomythia between Creon and Haemon at lines 726-65, the audience and reader learn that Creon is losing support for his edict prohibiting the burial of Polyneices. In Creon's diatribe on the evils of insubordination he states that it is necessary to obey the one whom the city sets up in power with respect to small things, as well as justice and its opposite (666-667). He would never praise one who transgresses the laws or does violence to them, or who would dictate to the one ruling.[20] In response to Creon's vitriolic attack on Antigone, Haemon deferentially asks that his father consider the public's opinion of the measures he has taken. The city, he states, weeps for the girl, saying that no one was less worthy of this treatment, and

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[18] Translation mine; καὶ δῆτ' ἐτόλμας τούσδ' ὑπερβαίνειν νόμους;

[19] οὐ γάρ τί μοι Ζεὺς ἦν ὁ κηρύξας τάδε, / οὐδ' ἡ ξύνοικος τῶν κάτω θεῶν Δίκη / τοιούσδ' ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ὥρισεν νόμους, / οὐδὲ σθένειν τοσοῦτον ὠόμην τὰ σὰ / κηρύγματ' ὥστ' ἄγραπτα κἀσφαλῆ θεῶν / νόμιμα δύνασθαι θνητά γ' ὄντ' ὑπερδραμεῖν.

[20] This might be compared to Socrates' counterargument to Thrasymachus' claims that justice is in the interest of the stronger at 338c. This point may be compared to note 11.

that she perishes miserably for her glorious actions, not allowing her own brother's body to be torn by dogs and birds (663-668). He frames his argument through the language of intelligence or intellect (γνώμη), thought or sense (φρόνημα), and the soul (ψυχή), the very same attributes which Creon argues cannot truly be known in a man until he has been tested in his rule and his νόμοι. Haemon finishes his speech with two pieces of advice:

> 'For whoever thinks that he alone is wise, or that he has eloquence or the soul which no other has, these men, having been revealed as such, are seen as empty...for if I, young as I am, have some intelligence, I say that it is best by far if a man is altogether full of knowledge; but that, since things are not accustomed to go that way, it is also good to learn from those who give good counsel (707-709, 719-723).[21]

> ὅστις γὰρ αὐτὸς ἢ φρονεῖν μόνος δοκεῖ,
> ἢ γλῶσσαν, ἣν οὐκ ἄλλος, ἢ ψυχὴν ἔχειν,
> οὗτοι διαπτυχθέντες ὤφθησαν κενοί (707-709).
> γνώμη γὰρ εἴ τις κἀπ' ἐμοῦ νεωτέρου
> πρόσεστι, φήμ' ἔγωγε πρεσβεύειν πολὺ
> φῦναι τὸν ἄνδρα πάντ' ἐπιστήμης πλέων·
> εἰ δ' οὖν, φιλεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο μὴ ταύτῃ ῥέπειν,
> καὶ τῶν λεγόντων εὖ καλὸν τὸ μανθάνειν (719-723).

Haemon's criticism of Creon is grounded in his conviction that the one who believes that he alone possesses wisdom or has a soul that no other has is empty. Haemon, on the other hand, believes himself possessed of good judgement. These qualities—wisdom, soul, and judgement—are the very same qualities which Creon argues cannot be truly known in a man 'until he has been proven in both his rule and the principles of administering' (175-177).[22] In the lines that follow (719-723), it becomes clear that Creon's νόμοι have been tested, and that Haemon rather than Creon possesses good judgement. Creon's intellect (γνώμη), thought or sense (φρόνημα), and soul (ψυχή) have led him to the false convictions regarding his role as ruler and whose interests he protects as ruler. In response to

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[21] Translation mine.
[22] Translation mine.

Creon's question '[m]ust I rule this land for another and not for myself?'[23] Haemon states '[y]es, there is no city that belongs to a single man' (736-37).[24] Creon then asks '[i]s it not thought that the city belongs to its ruler?',[25] to which Haemon retorts that Creon would be an excellent ruler of a deserted city (738-39). After accusing Haemon of acting contrary to what is right (743), Creon states that he is only saying such things out of respect for the gods. The interaction between Creon and Haemon indicates that Creon's edicts had fallen out of line with the νόμοι of the community, which believes that Antigone has acted gloriously in burying her brother, and that she is not worthy of punishment. Creon's defence of his actions suggests that the decisions he made were not in the interest of the community, but in the interest of the political institution.

Creon's adamance that his convictions are 'right' lies in an underlying commitment to the city, and his belief that the gods determine whether an action is 'right/just' and 'wrong/unjust' by its relationship to the 'good' or 'interest' of the state: actions which harm the state are 'wrong'; actions which benefit the state are 'good'. At line 208, Creon states that 'the bad will never surpass the just in honour' (τιμῇ προέξουσ' οἱ κακοὶ τῶν ἐνδίκων).[26] According to Creon, he has denied Polyneices a burial because he intended to burn the ground and gods of his native land, consume kindred blood, and to enslave them (199-202). The 'just ones' which Creon refers to, the ones who deserve a proper burial, are those who died fighting for the city (194-95). The just are those who defend Thebes, the unjust those who commit acts against it; the just should be honoured, but the unjust should not. At lines 284-287 Creon equates his edict with the will of the gods, thereby attributing his own belief that what is 'just' is determined by one's relationship with the native land: the gods would not honour with burial one who had come to destroy their temples and treasures, devastate the land and overturn their νόμοι.[27] Once Creon learns that someone has buried Polyneices, the Chorus suggests that perhaps the gods are responsible for the burial. Creon is outraged at

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[23] Translation mine.
[24] Translation mine.
[25] Translation mine.
[26] Translation mine.
[27] πότερον ὑπερτιμῶντες ὡς εὐεργέτην / ἔκρυπτον αὐτόν, ὅστις ἀμφικίονας / ναοὺς πυρώσων ἦλθε κἀναθήματα / καὶ γῆν ἐκείνων καὶ νόμους διασκεδῶν; The phrase which is used to describe the overturning of νόμοι is νόμους διασκεδῶν. Jebb notes that the verb διασκεδ- is used only twice by Sophocles in the extant works. Each time it refers to the dissolution of a treaty (*Oed. Col* 620) or the power of a king (*Oed. Col.* 1341). Creon feared that the νόμοι, or the mutually agreed upon norms or general apathy, which facilitated his continued rule, would be questioned and possibly reversed with the invasion of Polyneices.

the Chorus' anxiety over the matter. The gods would not, in his judgment, bury someone who sought to destroy the political and cultural institutions of the state. Creon notes that people have been murmuring and shaking their heads that they hold their necks under the yoke unjustly in order to acquiesce (289-92). Creon believes that what he is doing is just because he believes that the standard of justice administered by the gods is the same as his own. The metaphor of the yoke at 289-92 suggests that a state which places its own preservation above the protection of the community's νόμοι is enslaved.

Creon and Antigone differ with respect to their views on νόμος, and consequently with respect to what is just as well. Antigone argues that she cannot be expected to hate Polyneices, whom she is disposed by nature to love (523). It is nature which requires her to perform the rites due to a loved one, the same rites, or νόμοι, required by the gods. Unlike Creon, who believes that the gods require that one who has committed acts against them be dishonored, Antigone does not let her brothers' actions towards Thebes alter her love for them. The gods, even the god of death, require these νόμοι, namely that Antigone bury Polyneices, even though he died trying to destroy the land (519). Antigone, like Heraclitus, believed that the νόμοι of the gods are common to all. Antigone's love for her brother and the νόμοι which she invokes in defence of the burial exist in accordance with φύσις. The idea that men are alike by nature but divided by νόμοι, an idea expressed by Hippias (Plat. *Protag*. 337c6-d2), can be drawn from the struggle between Antigone and Creon: the νόμοι which shape Creon's rule divide Polyneices and Eteocles. But for Antigone, the honours accorded the two brothers should be the same, since they are both loved by her by 'nature'. 'Nature' and the νόμοι, which exist in accordance with φύσις, unite the brothers, but the νόμοι of Creon, which are determined by the interests of the 'state' rather than 'nature', divide them. With respect to νόμοι, Antigone stands on the side of nature: 'she defends those relations and aspects of life that man possesses by the given conditions of his birth against those which he creates by strength and force'.[28]

Antigone's struggle was commented upon by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (1373b). According to Aristotle there were two types of laws, one particular and the other common. Particular νόμοι fell into two categories: written and

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[28] Segal (1999: 155).

unwritten. Common laws (κοινοὶ νόμοι) were those which existed in accordance with nature. Aristotle notes that all men have a common idea of what was just and what was unjust even if there was neither sharing nor agreement between them.[29] Thucydides also referenced 'common laws' in his summary of the stasis of Corcyra. At 3.84.2: '[i]ndeed men too often take upon themselves in the prosecution of their revenge to set the example of doing away with those general laws to which all alike can look for salvation in adversity, instead of allowing them to subsist against the day of danger when their aid may be required'.[30] Both Thucydides and Aristotle agree that men have a common idea of what is just, even if men dispute the justness of actions. For Thucydides, conflicts concerning what is 'just' emerge when the interests of the 'state' are given priority, a situation which arises when men act in accordance with a νόμος that 'by a necessary law of their [men's] nature, they rule wherever they can' (5.105.2).[31] In such situations, men either subvert the standards of justice, as Thucydides' Spartans do, in order to claim that their actions are 'just', even though their actions are contrary to the common νόμοι of the Greeks. Or they deny the relevance of justice altogether, as Thucydides' Athenians do, even though, at the same time, by making the Mytileneans 'autonomous' they feign a concern for justice. Creon, in seeking vengeance for Polyneices' betrayal of the city, has repealed the κοινοί νόμοι of the Greeks by forbidding his burial. As predicted by Thucydides, the one who has sought revenge and repealed these νόμοι has recourse to them once he realises the error of his ways. But Creon is too late, and his desire for revenge has left him bereft of a family. It is the 'common laws' (κοινοὶ νόμοι), according to Aristotle, which Antigone uses to support her argument that it is just to bury Polyneices, as, in Aristotle's own words, it is just to do so by nature. Kerferd rightly points out that Antigone does not speak of nature as a criterion for justice, but rather speaks

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[29] λέγω δὲ νόμον τὸν μὲν ἴδιον, τὸν δὲ κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν τὸν ἑκάστοις ὡρισμένον πρὸς αὐτούς, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν μὲν ἄγραφον, τὸν δὲ γεγραμμένον, κοινὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν. ἔστι γάρ τι ὃ μαντεύονται πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, κἂν μηδεμία κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾖ μηδὲ συνθήκη, οἷον καὶ ἡ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνη φαίνεται λέγουσα, ὅτι δίκαιον ἀπειρημένου θάψαι τὸν Πολυνείκη, ὡς φύσει ὂν τοῦτο δίκαιον.

[30] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996); ἀξιοῦσί τε τοὺς κοινοὺς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους, ἀφ' ὧν ἅπασιν ἐλπὶς ὑπόκειται σφαλεῖσι κἂν αὐτοὺς διασῴζεσθαι, ἐν ἄλλων τιμωρίαις προκαταλύειν καὶ μὴ ὑπολείπεσθαι, εἴ ποτε ἄρα τις κινδυνεύσας τινὸς δεήσεται αὐτῶν.

[31] Translation Crawley, Strassler edition (1996); ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν. For a more complete discussion of this passage see Chapter Five.

of νόμμα, especially those which are unwritten.[32] For Antigone the νόμοι which are common to all and are derived from φύσις are the familial bonds which require that she honour all members alike.

The relationship between νόμος and φύσις is not always so implicit. An 'objective' perspective, but 'objective' only in the sense that the perspective is neither Antigone's nor Creon's, is given by the Chorus in the Second Song, often referred to as the 'Ode to Man'. In these lines (332-383) the Chorus delves into an excursus on the relationship between νόμος and φύσις. Some have suggested that the divergence of ideas expressed in this passage indicates that Sophocles is giving the reader his own insights rather than those of the elderly men of Thebes who comprise the Chorus. For Griffith this ode invites the audience to explore themes elicited by the play; it matters little whether these ideas are Sophocles' own, or whether they were intended for the Chorus.[33] The greater theme in this passage is the role of νόμος and φύσις in the emergence of 'man' as a social being. In the first strophe and antistrophe the Chorus describes how man has conquered nature and gained control over animals: he can sail the sea, he works the oxen to plough the fields, he can trap birds and snare wild animals, and he can catch fish with nets. He subdues horses with the yoke and bulls too.

In the second strophe and antistrophe the theme of the Chorus switches from scenes of nature to scenes of domesticity. Whereas previously man's task was to tame nature, now man must tame himself in order to be 'civilised'. Man has learned speech, thought and the temper of mind to dwell in cities so that he not be subject to the forces of nature, such as frost, rain, and sickness.[34] The only force of nature which man cannot escape through skill is death, which is inevitable. The Chorus then acknowledges that man can use his 'civilising skills', especially the skills of language, thought, and temperament to dwell in cities, for either good or bad. It is at this point that the Chorus states that he is honoured in the city who respects the νόμοι of the land and the justice which men swear to observe by oaths to the gods; without a country is the one to whom evil is linked for the sake of daring (368-71).[35]

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[32] Kerferd (1981: 113).
[33] Griffith (1999: 11, 180).
[34] καὶ φθέγμα καὶ ἀνεμόεν φρόνημα καὶ ἀστυνόμους / ὀργὰς ἐδιδάξατο (355-56). Jebb (1900: line 355) defines ἀστυνόμους ὀργὰς as ' those feelings which lead men to organise social life, and to uphold the social order by their loyalty'.
[35] I have borrowed the translation of θεῶν ἔνορκον δίκαν from Jebb (1900).

The 'temper of mind to dwell in cities', which the Chorus lists as one of the skills acquired by man, resides in man's adherence to the νόμοι of the community which protect and bind or unite it. More specifically, the νόμος which Antigone refers to as justification for her actions is the following: if her husband had died she could have married again, and she could have had more children if a child had died, but a brother cannot be replaced since both her parents are dead (909-912).[36] This νόμος is the bond of familial love which exists by 'nature'. Observance of burial νόμοι, which one would, under normal circumstances, feel obligated to follow from an unconditional, reciprocal love is intensified by Antigone's dire family situation. The task of the 'state' or any political institution is to protect the right of the community to live in accordance with these νόμοι. But when the νόμοι of the community are at odds with the νόμοι of the state there is civil unrest. This is the antithesis which frames the conflict between Antigone and Creon. In the 'Ode to Man', the audience and reader learn that one who lives in accordance with the νόμοι of the community is not subject to exposure on inhospitable hills and the sharp arrows of rain. Antigone, by acting in accordance with the divine νόμοι, is acting in accordance with the νόμοι which bind the community, but in doing so she has defied the νόμοι of the state issued by Creon.[37] Ismene, equating Creon's edict with νόμος (59), points this out to Antigone (43). Antigone herself realises this when she states that she is acting contrary to the will of the citizens (908). In the end, Antigone likens herself to Niobe, who turned to stone on a mountaintop and was subjected to pelting rain (823-833). Paradoxically, by obeying the νόμοι of the land and justice sworn by oaths to the gods, Antigone has failed to dispose herself of a temperament necessary for dwelling in cities, and, as a consequence, she suffers the very fate that such a temperament is meant to circumvent. By choosing to be αὐτονόμος—to live in accordance with the νόμοι of nature—Antigone has failed to have the temperament to dwell in a city (ἀστυνόμος, line 355). Had Creon not subverted the νόμοι of Thebes to serve the interest of the leader rather than the community, Antigone's 'autonomous' behaviour would have been ἀστυνόμος.

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[36] τίνος νόμου δὴ ταῦτα πρὸς χάριν λέγω; / πόσις μὲν ἄν μοι κατθανόντος ἄλλος ἦν, / καὶ παῖς ἀπ' ἄλλου φωτός, εἰ τοῦδ' ἤμπλακον, / μητρὸς δ' ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πατρὸς κεκευθότοιν / οὐκ ἔστ' ἀδελφὸς ὅστις ἂν βλάστοι ποτέ.

[37] Creon believes that he is acting in the best interests of the 'state' by prohibiting the burial of Polyneices whose acts violated the gods and the native land of Thebes. But Creon has failed to consider that though his actions may defend the 'land' or the 'state', they are not in the best interests of the community, which is comprised of individuals, bound by birth.

The failure to comply with the message of the Chorus extends not only to Antigone, but to Creon. By prohibiting the burial of Polyneices, who has burned the temples and the offerings of the gods, Creon believes that he is 'honouring the νόμοι of the land' and 'justice sworn by oaths to the gods'. But he is wrong. He has failed to observe the νόμοι of the land by hastening the death of Antigone, and he has failed to abide by 'justice sworn by oaths to the gods' by not allowing the burial of Polyneices.[38] Creon ultimately recognises that his 'civilising skills' have brought bad tidings after a visit from Tiresias, who warns Creon that his 'will' has brought a plague to the city (1015-1023) and a curse upon his family. Creon's edict has brought κακόν to both the πόλις and the οἶκος.[39] The edicts which Creon passes, which are sometimes equated with νόμοι, and the νόμοι, or principles, which inform his rule, serve to protect the interests of the state, the very same state which validates Creon's rule. The fact that Creon believes that his decisions are in the interest of the 'land and therefore 'just' makes him more sympathetic as a character than one who whose rule was guided solely by self-interest, such as Thucydides' Athenians.

At lines 368-71 the Chorus states that without a country is the one to whom evil is linked for the sake of daring. Presumably, the one whose daring has led to a 'bad' or 'evil' act is Antigone, whose actions are described as an act of daring throughout the play, and whose behaviour may bring ruin to Thebes. Creon, on the other hand, is the 'civiliser' who is 'high in the city' through his loyalty to the laws and gods of Thebes. But by the end of the play it is clear that this is not the case. After Antigone has gone to her death asking all to see what she suffers at the hands of men for having shown reverence, Tiresias, the blind seer enters. He informs Creon that a plague has befallen Thebes: the altars and sacred hearths are polluted with dogs and birds that have been feasting on the body of Polyneices, and heaven will not hear their prayers. He advises Creon to mend his ways, and, after a short dialogue where Tiresias refutes Creon's charge that he has been bribed to say such things, he reports that a curse will befall his family.[40] After Tiresias' visit, Creon decides that he must follow his advice, since

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[38] In hastening the death of Antigone one might argue that Creon is exerting control over the one aspect of nature which has not been tamed by man's skill.

[39] Saïd (1998: 287-89).

[40] Taking money in exchange for lectures were common accusations brought against the sophists. Creon has already stated that he believed that someone has buried Polyneices for money.

the seer has never been wrong before. He decides that he should free Antigone and follow the 'established laws' by burying Polyneices.

The tragedy of the play is that Creon believes so strongly that what he is doing is best for the city that he forsakes the 'laws of the land' and the 'oaths sworn by oaths to the gods'. His downfall ultimately lies in his belief that whether a person's actions are deemed 'just/right' or 'unjust/wrong' depends on whether the action has benefited or harmed the state. These νόμοι do not protect the interests of the community over which the state rules, and, consequently, the νόμοι enacted by Creon defend the interests of the state, but they are not in accord with the interests of the community, which is concerned with the νόμοι which exist in accordance with φύσις. This is the case with the burial of Polyneices, who was an enemy of the state, but who is bound by nature to a member of the community. This play asks the reader to consider how competing standards of what is 'just' emerge when two groups determine what is 'just' by appealing to two different sets of νόμοι, one of which serves to protect the interests of the city-states, while the other binds the community. This trend or polemic is best paraphrased by Aristotle in the *Sophistic Elenchi* (173a7-18): 'A widespread *topos* causes men to utter paradoxes in the application of the standards of nature and law, as Callicles is represented as doing in the Gorgias, and which all the ancients regarded as valid; for according to them Nature and Law are opposites, and justice is a fine thing according to law, but not so according to nature'.[41] Aristotle continues by giving advice for counterarguments and refutation, indicating that he is referring to the *Dissoi Logoi*. For present purposes what is significant about this passage is that no distinction is made between 'human' and 'divine' νόμοι. For Antigone, the νόμοι which she defends are the νόμοι which exist in accordance with the gods, and which recognise the bonds of nature which bind a community. These νόμοι—that she bury her brother—exist in accordance with a familial bond which exists by nature. Creon does not subvert what is just as Thucydides' Spartans do, nor does he argue that he has no need to consider what is just since he is stronger, as Thucydides' Athenians do. Instead Creon believes that what is just is determined by the gods, who have Thebes' best interests in mind when establishing standards of justice.

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[41] Translation Kerferd (1981: 113).

As discussed in the previous chapter, Thucydides is engaging in a discussion of 'justice' by considering whether what is 'just' is determined by the νόμοι—both laws and conventions, or even culture—or by φύσις. Both Sophocles and Thucydides are concerned with what is 'just', a concern which would have occupied many who witnessed the events of the Peloponnesian War. And Sophocles, like Thucydides, frames the story of Antigone in terms of νόμος and φύσις. Ismene sees her own ability to act as determined by the rule of the strong: 'Since they who rule us now are stronger than we, in this and worse than this we must obey them' (63-64).[42] This might be interpreted as a case of 'might makes right' or 'might excludes right' were it not for the fact that Creon seems to truly believe that his actions would be condoned by the gods whose temples were ravaged by Polyneices. The tragedy lies not in the devastating family losses suffered by both Antigone and Creon, but in the fact that both Antigone and Creon believed that justice was on their side, and both believed that they were acting rightly by acting in accordance with their own νόμοι, Antigone with the νόμοι of religious institutions which reaffirm the bonds which exist by nature, and Creon with the νόμοι or principles which give power to his authority.

Sophocles' singular use of 'autonomous' in the *Antigone* draws its meaning from the tragedy of the play: Creon and Antigone both believe that their actions are 'just'. Creon believes that his actions are 'just' because they are in accordance with his own beliefs, or νόμοι, that what is in the interest of the state is 'just'. He believes that the gods adhere to the same standard of 'justice'. Antigone believes that her actions are 'just' because they are in accordance with the νόμοι of the gods which exist by nature. As Antigone is led to the cave, the Chorus makes the following statement:

> Yet a glorious death, and rich in fame
> Is yours; you go to the silent tomb
> Not smitten with wasting sickness, nor
> Repaying a debt to the sharp-edged sword;
> But autonomous you go to the home
> Of the dead while yet you are living.[43]

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[42] Translation Kitto (1994).
[43] Translation Kitto (1994). It has been modified.

ὔκουν κλεινὴ καὶ ἔπαινον ἔχουσ'
ἐς τόδ' ἀπέρχῃ κεῦθος νεκύων;
οὔτε φθινάσιν πληγεῖσα νόσοις
οὔτε ξιφέων ἐπίχειρα λαχοῦσ',
ἀλλ' αὐτόνομος ζῶσα μόνη δὴ
θνητῶν Ἀίδην καταβήσῃ (817-22).

The modern consensus of the Chorus' description of Antigone as 'autonomous' is that this adjective simply meant that she went to her death of her own free will. While Jebb has argued that Antigone is deemed autonomous because she was the mistress of her own fate, Knox argues that the Chorus calls her autonomous because she has chosen to live by her own law, and is therefore fully responsible for her death.[44] The description of Antigone as 'autonomous' may simply be an observation by the Chorus that she is 'observing her own law'.[45] As Jebb notes, 'the word is fitting, since she has set her laws (the "θεῶν νόμιμα") above Creon's. The implied contrast is with the helpless victims of disease or of war'.[46] Although it may seem that Sophocles has used 'autonomous' simply because she is living in accordance with her own 'law', the prevalence of words with the αὐτο- prefix supports the hypothesis that Antigone's 'autonomous' state should be interpreted within the structural antithesis of the plot: the struggle between divine and manmade νόμοι. Like Thucydides, whose framing of the underlying causes of conflict with the antithesis between νόμος and φύσις shaped the way in which he engages with 'autonomy', Sophocles' interactions with νόμος and φύσις suggest that he could not have used 'autonomous' without thinking about the relationship of 'living in accordance with νόμοι' to this debate. Words prefixed by αὐτο- occur fifteen times in the text.[47] For Griffith, the use of these words reminds the audience that Antigone is 'a daughter who belongs in all respects to a uniquely inward-turned, self-fixated family, a family characterised in this play as hopelessly involved in *āte*'.[48] Although Campbell suggests that the αὐτο- prefix in the works of Sophocles serves an emphatic force, Loraux notes that the prefix

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[44] Jebb (1900: note on line 821); Knox (1964: 66, n.8, 9).
[45] Griffith (1999: 268.
[46] Jebb (1900: note on line 821).
[47] αὐτάδελφον (1, 503, 696), αὐτοφώρων (51), αὐτουργῷ (52), αὐτοκτονοῦντε (56), αὐτόχειρ- (172, 306, 900, 1175, 1315), αὐτόπρεμν- (714), αὐτόνομος (821), αὐτογέννητ- (864), αὐτόγνωτος (875).
[48] Griffith (2005: 94).

'speaks of the blood-tie as a place of incest, of parricide [and fratricide], and of suicide'.[49] As Griffith, Campbell and Loraux have shown, Sophocles was attentive in his use of compound words formed from the αὐτο- prefix, and as Loraux suggests, they are suggestive of a greater meaning in the text. Rather than assume that Sophocles has described Antigone as 'autonomous' because she is living in accordance with her own 'law', it may be the case that Sophocles has situated Antigone as a character caught in the conflict between νόμος and φύσις.

Ostwald points out that this passage poses its own problems: it is the only instance in fifth-century literature where the adjectival form is attributed to an individual, as opposed to a group of people or a state.[50] Ostwald concludes that the original meaning must have been a political one, and that by 441 it was common enough that the poet was able to use it metaphorically. Ostwald compares this use of αὐτόνομος to Thucydides' pejorative reference to ἀπράγμονες, those who do not take part in politics (2.40.2). Those who live contrary to the practices of the majority pose a threat to the state even if they were to live in isolation: 'The αὐτονομία of these ἀπράγμονες, conceived as conceded to them by the state, is treated as every bit as asocial as Antigone's defiance of Creon's νόμοι, and the use of the adjective emphasizes their isolation from the rest of the patriotic community'.[51]

A comparison between Thucydides' use of 'autonomous' in the narration of Plataea's destruction and Sophocles' description of Antigone as 'autonomous' provides insight into structural themes, such as how one determines what it 'just', which shape each author's interpretation of what it means to be 'autonomous'. Antigone's decision to act in accordance with the 'unwritten νόμοι' of the gods ultimately leads to her tragic demise. Although initially the community sides with Creon, by the end of the play the majority sides with Antigone. Creon's support may be attributed to the yoke which Creon himself admits the majority believes is a burden on them. The community would not have felt sympathetic to Antigone's cause if they did not identify in some way with Antigone's struggle. They, like Antigone, would feel that familial bonds which exist by nature override any edicts

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[49] Campbell (1879: 1.101.6); Loraux (1986: 167); Griffith (1999: 120).
[50] Ostwald (1982: 10-11).
[51] Ostwald (1982: 14). The *apragmones* defy characterisation as a particular social class, but are generally recognised as individuals who practice a policy of quietude rather than active participation in government. Connor (1992: 175-98); Christ (1998: 66, 166); Carter (1986: 99-130).

of the state. Thus Antigone's 'unwritten νόμοι' are the νόμοι which bind the community and which exist by nature. When Sophocles describes Antigone as 'autonomous' he is exposing the real tragedy of 'autonomy': to act in accordance with what one deems 'right' ultimately leads to the inversion of the natural order; had Antigone not acted in accordance with what she considered 'right', she would not have died at an early age contrary to nature.

Furthermore, Antigone's tragic fate, brought about by her decision to live in accordance with her own νόμοι, allows Sophocles to subtly comment on the tragedy inherent in living in accordance with νόμοι that do not serve the interests of the stronger. This theme is also addressed by Thucydides, as autonomous city-states such as Plataea and Mytilene, in asserting their autonomy, must make a choice between two paths, both of which are equally devastating. For the Plataeans, this means either remaining loyal to Athens and angering Sparta, or siding with Sparta and angering Athens. For Mytilene, the choice was to continue assisting in the league's missions, thereby facilitating their own eventual subjugation, or revolt and incur the anger of Athens. The Athenians, like Creon, were more concerned with the interests of the 'league' and protecting its 'power' than protecting the νόμοι of the communities which was the task for which they were endowed with power in the first place.[52] The tragedy of 'autonomy' was that living in accordance with the interests and νόμοι of the community led to an unnatural death.

Like Antigone, many Greek city-states would have suffered tragic ends once they asserted their own 'autonomy' contrary to the interests of Athens. Although Athenian comedy and tragedy was performed for Athenian audiences, this does not mean that all plays must necessarily support an Athenian ideology. Plays such as Aeschylus' *Persians* and the *Eumenides* glorified Athens' victory over Persia and the rise of the civilised city.[53] However, Goldhill notes that the plays themselves often question the ideology that the ceremonies associated with dramatic festivals promote.[54] Furthermore, Segal suggests that tragedy 'calls the normative codes and the familiar institutions into question'.[55] For Konstan, there is a political 'undercurrent or subtext to the surface narrative of tragedy.[56] Pity is

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[52] c.f. Chapter 3, section 2.
[53] Lattimore (1943: 83-93); Loraux (1980: 229-30); Macleod (1982: 124-44); Saïd (1983: 97-121).
[54] Goldhill (1987: 73).
[55] Segal (1986: 47).
[56] Konstan (2007: 191).

evoked in both the *Antigone*, as the community eventually sides with Antigone, and in Thucydides' narration of the Plataeans. As Konstan notes, pity for the Plataeans becomes a political consideration as pity itself is intensified and politically charged once the Plataeans base their case on violations of religious νόμοι. Thucydides was not unaware of the possibility of pity playing just as much of a role in policy as considerations of interest or justice, as Cleon himself warns the Athenians not to reverse their decision against the Mytileneans on account of pity (Thuc. 3.40.2). While pity is not explicitly invoked by the Plataeans as a defence, Macleod, like Konstan, notes that pity is the prevailing sentiment by the end of the Plataean episode, even though the Thebans, like Cleon and Diodotus, try to discourage it.[57] Similarly, pity is evoked for Antigone, who claims to be defending the νόμοι of the gods.[58] According to Konstan, '[t]he Athenian theater thus showed that pity as a personal sentiment did indeed affect politics: if it was not itself a basis for policy, its implicit influence might nevertheless be manifested in a judgment favorable to the unfortunate'.[59] Although the νόμος concerning the Mytileneans is reversed, the judgement against the Plataeans was not.[60] The Plataeans, like Antigone, both suffer the consequences of asserting their 'autonomy'.

Although there is little evidence that the Athenians sympathised with their allies, the recent movement to recognise in Athenian tragedy a critique of Athenian ideology and civic institutions suggests that tragedy, while providing entertainment, also encouraged the audience to consider alternative relationships to civic institutions. The description of Antigone as 'autonomous' suggests that Sophocles, like Thucydides, may have been considering the relative value and consequences of living in accordance with νόμοι in the face of the harsh realities of φύσις, which led to the structuring of society where the interests of the stronger prevail. By attributing the concept of 'autonomy' to Antigone, the Mytileneans and the Plataeans, Thucydides and Sophocles consider the limits of νόμοι in preventing the weaker from becoming a casualty of the stronger's

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[57] Macleod (1977: 245-55); Konstan (2005: 49-50).
[58] Konstan (2005: 49-50)
[59] Konstan (2005:65).
[60] At 3.37.4 Cleon refers to the Athenians' decision regarding Mytilene as a νόμος. While Winnington and Ingam (1965: 72) find it problematic that Thucydides refers to what should be a ψήφισμα as a νόμος, Hansen (1978: 316) notes that the distinction between the two was not explicit until the fourth century. Hornblower, therefore, suggests that Cleon's reference to the Athenian decree is not problematic (1991: 423-24).

interests. However, Sophocles offers a different interpretation of φύσις, as, for Antigone, living in accordance with φύσις means honouring familial bonds, which requires that she respect the νόμοι of the gods, as the gods themselves determine what is 'just'. Creon, too, believes that his actions are 'just', as the gods, like Creon, have equated what is 'just' with the interests of the city-state. The real tragedy of the play is that everyone believes that what he or she is doing is 'just' without recognising the power dynamic between the stronger and weaker that ultimately skews their perception of what is just. While Thucydides' Athenians recognise this, the Spartans, like Creon, fail to see that their own standard of 'justice' conforms more to φύσις than νόμος.

I am not suggesting that these texts have influenced one another, or that there is evidence of intertextuality. Like Emily Greenwood, who argues that Sophocles' *Philoctetes* and Book Eight of Thucydides are parallel texts,[61] I am suggesting that Thucydides' and Sophocles' interpretation and treatment of 'autonomy' are parallel, and that this 'parallelism' only becomes apparent when 'autonomy' is considered in light of the tension between νόμος and φύσις. Both Thucydides' and Sophocles' presentation of the past and of the dynamics that underly the conflict are framed through the antithesis between νόμος and φύσις. Both examine the limited reality and dangers of living in accordance with νόμοι when such νόμοι do not serve the interests of the stronger. Although Thucydides' use of 'autonomy' may seem political, when read against Sophocles earlier reflections of the relationship between νόμος, φύσις and autonomy, it becomes clear that Thucydides' description of the Mytileneans and Plataeans as autonomous may reflect an historical reality, but that he is using or has constructed this reality in order to examine in detail the greater forces of φύσις than νόμος which both affect the behaviour and determine the actions of men.

Conclusion

While epigraphic evidence suggests that 'autonomy' or 'autonomous' was used in a political context towards the end of the fifth and fourth centuries, Sophocles did not explicitly use 'autonomous' in the political sense. Given the number of times Sophocles used words with the αὐτο- prefix, it seems impossible that he would not have considered the relationship between 'autonomy' and the

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[61] Greenwood (2006: 83-108).

debate between νόμος and φύσις. The centrality of the conflict between the νόμοι which govern Creon's actions and the νόμοι of the gods provide the structural lens through which 'autonomous' should be interpreted.

An analysis of 'autonomy' in light of the antithesis between 'justice' as it exists in accordance with νόμος versus 'justice' in accordance with φύσις suggests that Sophocles and Thucydides were both considering the relative value of what it means to 'autonomous' in a world structured by nature, in which the interests of the stronger prevail. For both Sophocles and Thucydides, thinking about the past was a philosophical enterprise which allowed them to consider not necessarily 'what happened' but rather 'why things happen'. This process was intrinsic to the 'craft' of the historian, and to deny philosophical influences would be to deny the intellectualism of the historical process. Both Thucydides' and Sophocles' philosophising of a political concept like 'autonomy' demonstrates how inextricable philosophy and historiography were in the fifth century. The earliest occurrence of 'autonomy' is often mistaken as being more philosophical than political. Although Sophocles' treatment of νόμος and φύσις does render his engagement with 'autonomy' more philosophical than political, when the political context of the mid-fifth century is considered in light of 'autonomy's' own history as a political concept, it seems that Sophocles may have scaled the conflict between more powerful states and weaker ones that he witnessed during his own time to a level which would personalise the struggle for many: he attributes the same forces he saw at play in the relationship between stronger and weaker states to the dynamics of the city-state and household. In this sense, Sophocles' *Antigone* is a commentary on the dynamics underlying conflict during the fifth century, and the powerlessness of living in accordance with νόμοι when the interests of the stronger prevail.

Chapter 7: 'Freedom' and the *Kalos kagathos*

The following chapter will examine Xenophon's conceptualisation of 'freedom' and the relationship of this conceptualisation to his philosophical works. Relativism and the νόμος-φύσις antithesis shaped Herodotus' presentation of 'freedom' by providing a framework for considering 'freedom' from a Persian perspective, which, in turn, encourages the reader to compare contemporary Athenian behaviour in light of Persian practices. Thucydides, on the other hand, considers the failure of language to prevent violence, when value-laden and culturally embedded vocabulary such as 'freedom' was attributed to actions that bear little semblance to the words used to describe them. Thucydides frames the forces motivating the actions of men through the antithesis of νόμος-φύσις. By doing so he exposes the dangers of rhetoric, and more specifically the rhetoric of freedom and the failure of 'autonomy' to protect city-states when language has been destabilised, a situation which occurs act in accordance with φύσις instead of νόμοι. As I have shown, both Herodotus and Thucydides make use of 'freedom' and 'autonomy' in ways which seem to reflect an historical reality. However, both Herodotus' and Thucydides' interaction with these concepts reveals the extent to which both historians engaged these concepts in a philosophical exercise in order to comment on the contemporary politics, or to expose the role played by nature, and, more specifically 'human nature', in exacerbating conflict. Consequently, such terms may be regarded as more philosophical than historical. The concepts of 'freedom' and 'autonomy' were used as tools to examine the principles which underlie not only the conflict of the Peloponnesian War, but conflict among men in general.

In the final two chapters I shall examine how Xenophon's own philosophical position regarding 'freedom' influenced his use of the concept in his historical writings. As I shall demonstrate, Xenophon may have been led by the political turmoil in Athens following its surrender to consider the 'freedom' enjoyed by the elite who felt disenfranchised by the democracy. Xenophon reconceptualises what it means for an individual to be 'free', and, in doing so, creates a space for the elite, or the *kaloi kagathoi*, by prescribing that these individuals possess the wisdom and skills necessary for management and for doing what it best for the state. While Socrates serves as the best example of a *kalos kagathos* in terms of being 'free' from vice and in possession of wisdom and virtue, Xenophon presents Agesilaus as an example of how the *kalos kagathos*

might be useful for the state. The decisions made by Agesilaus regarding the enslavement of other Greeks and his enthusiasm for waging war against Persia, as well as the examples of other generals who either promoted such enslavement or warned against it, suggests that Xenophon felt that the *kalos kagathos* might best serve Greece by promoting war not against fellow Greeks, but against Persians. In this context the language of 'freedom' may be rehabilitated as useful in the promotion of unification.

Few have assessed the role of 'freedom' in the narratives of fourth-century historians. This, in part, is due to the fact that the evidence for freedom in the fifth century makes that of later centuries seem scant. In *Lessons from the Past*, Frances Pownall demonstrates that, even though fourth-century historians have been disregarded for their unscientific approach to history, these historians, being products of the sophistic movement, deserve attention, despite the moralising tendencies for which they are often faulted.[1] According to Pownall, the attitudes and beliefs of fourth-century historians, Xenophon in particular, were shaped by their intellectual environment, and the emergence of 'moralising history' was in large part due to a contemporary philosophical discourse.[2] Xenophon was as much a philosopher as he was an historian, and while he was always conscious of genre, at times he wore the hat of the philosopher while writing history and vice versa. History and philosophy can be so indistinguishable in Xenophon's works that some, such as C. H. Grayson, cite Xenophon's penchant for moral exempla as grounds for questioning Xenophon's intent to write history at all. Grayson sees Xenophon's 'historical' works as more didactic than purely historical, an observation which favours a more traditional Thucydidean interpretation of the historical genre.[3] Robin Waterfield suggests that Xenophon was so deeply entrenched in philosophical discourse that he has been justly considered more a philosopher than an historian.[4] Those who argue that Xenophon was a less sophisticated thinker than Plato read Xenophon through the lens of Plato's

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[1] Pownall (2004: 1-4).
[2] Pownall (2004: 5).
[3] Grayson (1975: 35-38). Although, as I have shown, in the process of identifying the causes of conflict between men through the antithesis of νόμος and φύσις, Thucydides was equally engaged in a philosophical exercise as an historical one.
[4] Waterfield (2006: 189).

Socrates rather than through the lens of 'wisdom literature which adopts a rhetorical process'.[5]

Scholarship is divided on whether Xenophon was a reputable historian and a poor philosopher, or a reputable philosopher but a poor historian. Rather than discredit Xenophon for his focus on morality, his philosophical and historical works should be seen as complementary. Whereas in the previous chapters of this thesis it was necessary to gain insight into the historian's intellectual environment from evidence external to the historian's work, Xenophon provides the reader, in works such as the *Memorabilia*, with a guidebook for 'Xenophontic philosophy'. As Seager and Tuplin note, between 400 and 386 freedom came to be regularly exploited as a slogan in political and military campaigns in Asia Minor.[6] Although Xenophon himself provides evidence for such sloganeering, his own interaction with 'freedom' in his historical texts is influenced by his philosophical relationship to what it means to 'free'. This chapter will investigate how Xenophon reconceptualises 'freedom'.

Xenophon's new understanding of what it means to be 'free' concerns the private individual, and is central to understanding Xenophon's definition of what it means to be a *kalos kagathos*. Steven Johnstone has shown that Xenophon's redefining of the *kalokagathos*, a title typically reserved for aristocrats, as one who engages in virtuous toil was not new; historically elites had always looked for ways to distinguish themselves from other classes of society, whether through birth, dress, or engagement in institutions such as symposia or hunting.[7] The concept of the *kalos kagathos* was itself an invention of the mid-fifth century. During the second half of the fifth century the term was associated with young aristocrats such as Alcibiades, and by the end of the fifth century it came to be associated with the oligarchy of Theramenes.[8] By Aristotle's time, *kalokagathia* was regarded as a type of moral excellence that could only be achieved through a leisurely lifestyle (*Eth. Eud.* 1249a). As Cairns has pointed out, while a variety of authors describe individuals as *kaloi kagathoi*, the contexts in which an individual is described as such do not necessarily contribute to an overall definition of what constitutes a *kalos kagathos,* as different writers and different historical contexts

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[5] Gray (1998: 24). For a more detailed discussion of the scholarship which has dismissed Xenophon's philosophical works see Gray (1998: 1-7).
[6] Seager and Tuplin (1980: 141, 144-146).
[7] Johnstone (2010: 141-42).
[8] Bourriot (1995: 97-111).

will lead to different conceptualisations of what it means to be a *kalos kagathos*.[9] Once it became clear that the aristocratic model was no longer acceptable in democratic Athens following the expulsion of the Thirty, Xenophon created his own definition of what it meant to be an aristocrat, or a *kalos kagathos*, through the teachings of Socrates.[10] Xenophon's Socrates is himself a *kalos kagathos*, and, as such, he provides a model of an aristocratic noble living in a democratic society.[11]

The freedom which Xenophon is most concerned about in the context of the *kalos kagathos* is not so much freedom relative to the city-state and the institutions of the Athenian democracy, but rather the freedom of the individual. As Christ has noted, there was a discourse of discontent among the wealthy that the liturgies required of them were a form of slavery.[12] In Xenophon's *Symposium*, Charmides complains that a rich man is a slave in a democracy on account of the liturgies required of the wealthy (4.32), and that, in a democracy, the poor are the ones who are free (4.29, 31). Callias makes a similar argument at 4.45 when he congratulates Antisthenes for not being a slave to the city. The equation of nobility with slavery represented an inversion of social statuses which may have led Xenophon to consider on a more individual level what it meant to be 'free', and how the 'free' or 'noble' individual might be useful to the state independent of the obligations of democracy. Kroeker has suggested that even though Xenophon has traditionally been considered a supporter of oligarchy, Xenophon maintains support for a fundamental ideology of democracy, which is reflected in his concern for public speaking.[13] Similarly, Roscalla suggests that Xenophon's purpose in creating an educated order of *kaloi kagathoi* is to restore some elements of the oligarchic model in the democracy, but not necessarily to undermine it.[14] Being free, for Xenophon, is equated with being free from the vices which hinder one's ability to correctly define moral concepts and categorise matters and positions accordingly, a quality which is essential for one to be a good public speaker and provide the best advice for the state.

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[9] Cairns (1997: 75-76).
[10] Wellman (1976: 312-13).
[11] Roscalla (2004: 117-18).
[12] Christ (2006: 188-89); Liddel (2007: 262-82).
[13] Kroeker (2009: 197-228). Although Vlastos (1982: 495-515) has argued that Xenophon's Socrates is more committed to oligarchy than Plato's, Waterfield (2004: 107) notes that Xenophon's Socrates is not entirely critical of democracy.
[14] Roscalla (2004:115-23); Seager (2001: 385-97).

According to Xenophon's Socrates, one must be engaged in philosophical exercise in order to be a *kalos kagathos*. An analysis of the relationship between the person who has attained 'freedom' from vices, a prerequisite for becoming a *kalos kagathos*, indicates that Xenophon has redefined 'freedom' from an aristocratic perspective in order to preserve aristocratic elements in a democratic society. Furthermore, the role which the *kalos kagathos* would ideally play in politics suggests that Xenophon has provided this new concept of 'free' as a remedy for the flaws of rhetoric. Thucydides exposes how language is destabilised when when νόμοι themselves have been destabilised, thereby allowing men to act in accordance with φύσις and disregard 'justice' or establish standards of justice not in accordance with νόμοι, but their interests. In situations such as this, the destabilisation of language allows politicians to abuse the language of freedom to serve their own interests. Xenophon, on the other hand, redefines what it means to be 'free', and in doing so rehabilitates rhetoric and the language of 'freedom' by prescribing that the one who possesses the capacity for persuasion be able to define moral terms, such as 'justice', and understand whether an action is just or unjust. Passages in Xenophon's philosophical works where Socrates discusses whether 'freedom' and 'slavery' are just or unjust suggest that Xenophon has rejected the notion that 'freedom' is inherently 'good' and 'slavery' inherently 'bad'. In rejecting such beliefs Xenophon has rejected conventional attitudes towards 'freedom' and 'slavery'. This rejection has allowed him to consider how these concepts might be useful for the individual and, by proxy, the state.

By Xenophon's time the Persian Wars had become symbolic of unity among the Greeks, as this was the last time in Greek history that the Greeks united for a common cause. Since the common cause, 'freedom', only existed so long as the Persian threat was looming, there was a tendency in the fourth century to vilify Persia with arguments that the Persians were different by 'nature' rather than 'convention'. Passages from Xenophon's historical words in which 'freedom' was used rhetorically suggest the historian felt that 'freedom' was divisive, a rabble-rousing concept, which served to incite conflict rather than prevent it. For Xenophon, the concept of political 'freedom' was powerless to promote unification. But Xenophon does not entirely abandon the rhetoric of 'freedom'. In his philosophical works, Xenophon defined 'freedom' as 'self-control'—the ability to resist temptations and vices which enslave a person. The education of one who

wanted to enter the ranks of the *kaloi kagathoi* stressed the importance of self-control and 'freedom' from vices. Xenophon considered how one who was 'free' could be useful for the state, and how one who was useful might employ 'freedom' in rhetoric without deceit. By emphasising the relationship between 'freedom' and the Persian Wars, Xenophon played an integral role in the emergence of historical exempla for moralising purposes. 'Freedom' could be used for positive purposes in rhetoric, but it must be carefully contextualised so as to avoid polemic.

Xenophon's treatment of 'freedom' indicates that there was a growing awareness in the fourth century that 'freedom' could be used for negative purposes. Xenophon's response to the rhetorical exploitation of 'freedom' differs from Herodotus' and Thucydides' in that he redefines what it means to be free. He does not 'play' with 'freedom' as Herodotus, who considers how societies with different νόμοι might define 'freedom' in different ways, does. Nor does he expose the limits and dangers of 'freedom' or rhetoric in general when it has been destabilised as Thucydides does. While Herodotus' and Thucydides' seek to understand the principles underlying conflicts between men by engaging in frameworks popular in the fifth century such as relativism, νόμος-φύσις, and questions concerning the ability of language to reflect reality, Xenophon redefines what it means to be free. As I shall demonstrate, Xenophon's response to language, and more specifically 'freedom' reflects a philosophy which was rooted in opposition to the sophists. The following chapter will examine the relationship between Xenophon's historical and philosophical works, and, more specifically, how Xenophon reconceptualises 'freedom' for political purposes through the philosophical education of the *kaloi kagathoi*, and the model of Socrates' own lifestyle.

7.1 Anti-sophistry and Xenophon's Socrates

Before beginning an analysis of 'freedom' and 'slavery' in Xenophon's philosophical works, it is necessary to examine the intellectual climate which gave shape to Xenophon's ideas. Xenophon wrote in the *Anabasis* that Proxenus the Theban, an old friend who was responsible for Xenophon's participation in the expedition of the Ten Thousand, was educated by Gorgias (2.6.16).[15] In addition to Proxenus, Xenophon interacted with many considered to be sophists who

[15] Proxenus promised to make Xenophon a friend of Cyrus if he accompanied him on the campaign. For a discussion of the sophists see pages 55-55, 125-29.

appear in dialogue with Socrates in *Memorabilia*, such as Antiphon, Aristippus, Antisthenes, Prodicus, and Hippias who undoubtedly influenced and shaped his thoughts on language and morality.[16] The sophists were empiricists who believed that concepts such as 'good' varied between individuals and societies, and could, therefore, be used as persuasive tools if one were to take advantage of the ambiguity arising from the use of such terms.[17] Xenophon aimed to tackle the problem which he saw exacerbated by the sophists by providing concrete definitions for moral concepts, the subversion of which had infected speech.

Xenophon was not only an acquaintance of Socrates, but also spent a substantial portion of his writing career immortalising the philosopher's ideas. Although some have argued that he cannot be a reliable source for Socrates, Gray has noted that he was in Athens up until the trial of Socrates, and that Socrates was most likely at his peak while Xenophon was in Athens. Furthermore, Xenophon's exile in Scillus was not really an exile from philosophy, since there were schools of philosophers throughout the Peloponnese.[18] In Plato's dialogues Socrates attacked the sophists on the grounds that their teachings undermined and devalued morality. Like Socrates' teachings and Plato's dialogues, Xenophon's ideas and writings were shaped by his dislike for the methods of the sophists. Xenophon made no effort to hide his disdain:

> I have written the way I have, however, because my purpose is to produce a sound treatise, and one which is designed to increase people's knowledge and virtue, not their Sophistic skills. I want it to be useful, not just to seem useful, because then it will never be refuted. The Sophists' intention in lecturing and writing is to deceive others for their own gain; they do no one any good at all. There has never been in the past nor does there exist now a knowledgeable Sophist; in fact, they are all perfectly happy to be called Sophists, which to a right-thinking man is a term of reproach. My advice, then, is to be wary of the instruction offered by Sophists, but not to disregard the considered opinions of philosophers (*Cyn.* 13.6-9).[19]

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[16] Gray (1998: 5).
[17] See pages 50-52. Guthrie, *Sophists* (1971: 187, n.3).
[18] Gray (1998: 5).
[19] Although the authenticity of this work has been questioned, Gray has demonstrated that there is no reason not to include it among the corpus of Xenophon's writings (1985: 162-72). Translation Waterfield (2004: 83-84). καίτοι γέγραπταί γε οὕτως, ἵνα ὀρθῶς ἔχῃ, καὶ μὴ σοφιστικοὺς

Although both Xenophon and Plato inherited a common goal of defending traditional morality, Xenophon's objective was to preserve the memory of Socrates by making his teachings accessible to a wider audience. Xenophon only reported as much Socratic philosophy as was necessary to create a work which would be useful, and, at the same time, combat moral decline. Unlike Plato, whose mission was to create a new discipline of philosophy, one clearly distinguishable from its predecessors, Xenophon's goal was to popularise the teachings of Socrates. In keeping with his belief that his works should be useful, Xenophon chose to portray Socrates as a teacher rather than a philosopher.[20] Although Socrates himself was not political by the standard of Plato, the role of Xenophon's Socrates was to prepare others for a role in politics (*Mem.* 1.6.15).[21]

Xenophon openly espoused contempt for the sophists, yet in the passage below (*Mem.* 1.2.10-11) he appeared as an advocate for persuasion, which was one of the trademarks of the sophists, who could make any argument or position seem to be the stronger one.

> But I hold that they who cultivate wisdom and think they will be able to guide the people in prudent policy never lapse into violence: they know that enmities and dangers are inseparable from violence, but persuasion

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ποιῇ ἀλλὰ σοφοὺς καὶ ἀγαθούς· οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν αὐτὰ βούλομαι μᾶλλον ἢ εἶναι χρήσιμα, ἵνα ἀνεξέλεγκτα ᾖ εἰς ἀεί. οἱ σοφισταὶ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ ἐξαπατᾶν λέγουσι καὶ γράφουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἑαυτῶν κέρδει, καὶ οὐδένα οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ σοφὸς αὐτῶν ἐγένετο οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρκεῖ ἑκάστῳ σοφιστὴν κληθῆναι, ὅ ἐστιν ὄνειδος παρά γε εὖ φρονοῦσι. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν σοφιστῶν παραγγέλματα παραινῶ φυλάττεσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐνθυμήματα μὴ ἀτιμάζειν.

[20] Waterfield (2004: 83-86); Scott (2000: 13-15); Nehamas (1992: 293-94); Morrison (1987a: 119-35).

[21] Waterfield (2004: 105. See also 2.2.39, 47); Morrison (1994: 181-208). In popularising Socrates, Cooper (1999:8) notes that Xenophon abandoned more esoteric questions concerning epistemology and ontology in favour of practical wisdom. Xenophon went to great lengths to show that despite Socrates' sparse and frugal lifestyle (1.2.1-8; 1.3.5-9; 1.6.2-3), he, like everyone else, abided by the gods and did his duty to the state (1.3.1-4). In fact, upon asking the oracle at Delphi what his duty was concerning sacrifice, Socrates received the answer that he should follow the custom of the state, for this was the way to act piously (1.3.1). By presenting Socrates as someone with whom a reader could easily identify Xenophon distanced him from the charges commonly brought against the sophists. As Gray (1998: 25) notes, the '[t]he question was not whether Xenophon was capable of understanding Socratic process or doctrine, but why he chooses to present it as he does'. For Gray (1998: 177) the rhetorical pieces in the *Memorabilia* are themselves an argument, even though the individual conversations seem disparate; Xenophon has chosen this particular medium, a more traditional medium of wisdom literature, in order to reach a 'hostile audience' who had little sympathy for Socrates. Furthermore, as Cooper (1999: 3-28) notes, Xenophon, as an historian himself, provides much evidence of an historical Socrates.

> produces the same results safely and amicably. For violence, by making its victims sensible of loss, rouses their hatred: but persuasion, by seeming to confer a favour, wins goodwill. It is not, then, cultivation of wisdom that leads to violent methods, but the possession of power without prudence. Besides, many supporters are necessary to him who ventures to use force: but he who can persuade needs no confederate, having confidence in his own unaided power of persuasion. And such a man has no occasion to shed blood; for who would rather take a man's life than have a live and willing follower?[22]

Although Xenophon made no attempt to hide his scorn for the sophists, in this passage he argued that rhetoric was a viable alternative to violence, despite the fact that the ambiguity of words was one of the methods employed by the sophists as a persuasive tactic. The following sections will be an exploration of Xenophon's Socratic philosophy. This philosophy, which establishes the criteria for becoming a *kalos kagathos*, redefined what it meant to be 'free' or 'enslaved'. By personalising the concepts of 'freedom' and 'slavery', Xenophon was able to rehabilitate rhetoric as a useful tool for political purposes. Furthermore, the relationship between rhetoric and the *kalos kagathos* demonstrates that he was thinking about historical themes when he redefined 'freedom' and 'slavery' from a philosophical perspective, and in doing so, he has made an argument for the usefulness of the *kaloi kagathoi*, or those who formerly occupied aristocratic circles, in politics.

7.2 Self Control and *Kalos Kagathos*: Redefining Individual Freedom

Xenophon's definition of the *kalos kagathos* formed the foundation of his philosophical writings. His belief that his writing should be useful was exemplified by his portrayal of Socrates' pedagogy, which aimed at teaching men to be *kaloi kagathoi,* or members of the 'elite', through philosophy. This word, typically reserved for Athenian gentlemen estate owners, was redefined by Xenophon as a word to describe those who possess particular knowledge, the acquisition of which was Socrates' ultimate goal of his teaching.[23] Although many,

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[22] Translation Marchant (2002).
[23] Waterfield (2004: 96). He argues that Xenophon tweaks the meaning of the *kalos kagathos* in order to make it fit Socrates.

including Critias and Alcibiades, came to Socrates to gain knowledge of politics, Socrates' true aim was to teach men, not so that they might shine in the courts or assemblies, but in order that they might become *kaloi kagathoi*. The defining feature of the *kalos kagathos* was doing one's duty to friends, family, city and fellow citizens, with regard to both the house and household (*Mem.* 1.2.47-48). In order to be considered a *kalos kagathos* and meet these goals, one must be able to correctly define and categorise virtues and things (πράγματα). Once one can do this, one is able to do what is best and advantageous. Thus one who cannot correctly define what 'enslavement' is cannot correctly determine whether it is to be categorised as a 'just' or 'unjust' action.[24] If one cannot determine whether 'enslavement' is 'just' or 'unjust', one cannot offer advice on the best course of action. And if one cannot do this, one cannot persuade people to do what is in their interests.

In Xenophon's philosophical works, the reader encounters an altogether new interpretation of what it means to be 'free'. This novel form of 'freedom' plays an integral role in Xenophon's philosophical agenda: one must be 'free' from temptation and in control of one's self in order to define and categorise. Robin Waterfield's exploration of intertextuality in Plato's and Xenophon's *Apology* not only provides evidence for their respective agendas, but, for present purposes, underpins the role of 'freedom' in Xenophon's philosophical writings.[25] Rather than responding that there was no one wiser than Socrates, as the oracle in Plato's *Apology* responded (Plat. *Ap.* 21a), the oracle in Xenophon's *Apology* responded that there was no one more free, prudent or upright than Socrates: Χαιρεφῶντος γάρ ποτε ἐπερωτῶντος ἐν Δελφοῖς περὶ ἐμοῦ πολλῶν παρόντων ἀνεῖλεν ὁ Ἀπόλλων μηδένα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἐμοῦ μήτε ἐλευθεριώτερον μήτε δικαιότερον μήτε σωφρονέστερον. These features, according to Waterfield, were virtues which Xenophon frequently associated with the *kalos kagathos*. As an exemplar of the virtues of the *kalos kagathos*, Xenophon offered Socrates.[26] In Xenophon's *Apology*, Socrates asked if the jurors knew anyone less a slave to the desires of the body than himself (Xen. *Ap.* 16). The novelty of Xenophon's philosophy concerning 'free' in the sense of being 'free' from vices was his recognition that these vices prevented a person from making decisions not in one's

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[24] Morrison (1987b: 329-47).
[25] Waterfeld (2004).
[26] Waterfield (2004: 95-97).

interest.

Plato's version of the trial of Socrates made no mention of Socrates being 'free'. The inclusion of 'free' in Socrates' list of qualities in Xenophon's version signifies the importance of this concept for Xenophon's philosophical interpretation of the historical Socrates' teachings. While Stalley notes that 'freedom' is not typically a virtue associated with Plato, he suggests that Plato did indeed recognise some value in freedom, but that Plato's conceptualisation of 'freedom' differs from more political ideologies of freedom current in his time.[27] For Plato, only the just man is truly free: 'the contrast between justice and injustice is that between those who are free because they are ruled by reason and those who are totally unfree because they are slaves to their passions'.[28] Xenophon's conceptualisation of 'freedom' differs from that of Plato's regarding 'justice'. While Plato equates the 'just' man with the 'free' man, Xenophon equates justice with νόμοι, and acting justly with acting in accordance with νόμοι. For Xenophon, 'justice is what is lawful in connection with men'.[29] One can only be a *kalos kagathos* if one is 'free' from the appetites, desires or emotions which dominate the behaviour of man and prevent him from leading a virtuous life. According to Xenophon, the only way to control these passions was to practice self-control (ἐγκράτεια). Self-control was the basis of rational choice when it came to activities which could easily become indulgences.[30] At the centre of Xenophon's philosophy was the idea that 'self-control' was the means by which one could attain freedom from the vices which would otherwise prevent someone from doing what is best.[31] 'Should not every man hold self-control (ἐγκράτεια) to be the foundation of all virtue, and first lay this foundation firmly in his soul? For who without this can learn any good or practice it worthily?' (*Mem.* 1.5.4). While democratic freedom meant doing and living as one likes, freedom in the sense of 'self-control' meant that this conceptualisation of freedom was at odds with

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[27] Stalley (1998: 145).
[28] Stalley (1998: 148).
[29] Cooper (1999: 25); Xen. *Mem.* 6.6.
[30] Natali (2006: 9), c.f. *Protagoras* 355e-357e.
[31] Xenophon goes to great lengths to show that Socrates was in control of his passions and appetites. According to Xenophon Socrates could endure any kind of toil, including heat and cold. Socrates believed in moderation and disapproved of over-eating followed by over-exercise. He disliked 'foppery and pretentiousness' and discouraged a love for money. Xenophon wonders, then, how one like Socrates, who taught by example (*Mem.* 1.5.6), could have passed on to his followers the virtues of impiety, crime, gluttony, lust and sloth (1.2.1-5). Xenophon himself notes that Socrates was assiduous in his own self-discipline in order to show that one must have self-control to do honourable work.

democratic principles of freedom.[32]

Xenophon's theory on the relationship between 'freedom' and 'self-control' was radical for his own time. In the past, if a *kalos kagathos* were asked if he considered himself 'free', he would assume that the question concerned his social status as a freeman or slave; *kaloi kagathoi,* often translated as 'gentlemen', were the elite in society. According to Johnstone, the traditional ways that the elites distinguished themselves no longer sufficed in a state, such as Athens, which had become increasingly hostile to aristocratic factions after the expulsion of the Thirty. Consequently, Xenophon has redefined what it meant to be an aristocrat by insisting that one be educated in philosophy and be 'free' from vice in order to be one of the noble elite.[33] But in creating a new standard of nobility, Xenophon has, in fact, reaffirmed the elitism that the democratic ideology of equality rejected: 'By insisting on acquired capacities as the basis of the elite position, Xenophon reintroduced birth and wealth in a mediated form: although the elite lifestyle could be represented as ideally open to all, in actual practice it was almost entirely elites who had access to the education'.[34]

While Johnstone's historical analysis of Xenophon's redefining of the *kalos kagathos* is undoubtedly correct, I suggest that Xenophon has altered the conventional meaning of the *kalos kagathos* in order to suit his objective of providing paradigms of traditional Greek morality. By doing this, Xenophon was able to make the *kaloi kagathoi,* or aristocrats, useful politically. The freedom achieved through self-discipline was paramount, as it allowed one to attain the virtues frequently associated with the *kalos kagathos* in Xenophon's works. At 1.1.16, after listing qualities that must be defined and categorised according to virtue, Xenophon states that knowledge is equated with being a *kalos kagathos,* but ignorance is described as slavishness.[35] As Waterfield notes, 'since all traditional virtues are knowledge, and ignorance is slavish, then a free person is a virtuous person, and a virtuous person is a free. Freedom depends on self-discipline and it is a refrain throughout *Memorabilia* that Socrates was the most

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[32] Hansen (2010: 8).
[33] Johnstone (2010: 143-44).
[34] Johnstone (2010: 144).
[35] 'Knowledge made a gentleman, in his estimation, while ignorance should involve the reproach of slavishness' (ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας ἡγεῖτο καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλῆσθαι).

self-disciplined of men'.[36] Similarly, Cooper recognises the uniqueness of Xenophon's emphasis on freedom as a defining characteristic of Xenophon's Socrates and his philosophy: 'Xenophon's intent was to show Socrates inspiring the young men to become proper gentlemen, and for Xenophon, who counted himself one of those, that meant freedom from subjection to one's own desires, the refusal to get money by submitting oneself to anyone else's direction, physical and mental self-discipline'.[37] These virtues included the acquisition of knowledge, the ability to make friends and do good to them while harming enemies, the ability to manage one's estate and one's country, the ability to do good to one's country, and the possession of wisdom, justice, self-control and piety (1.5, 2.6, 4.2.22, 4.5; *Oec.* 1.16-23).[38]

Xenophon's appropriation of the language of 'freedom' to describe the inner freedom of the individual requires a brief examination of contemporary views of personal freedom. The only defence of individual liberty in Ancient Greece may be found in Pericles' Funeral Oration, where freedom is defined as living as one likes.[39] As Andrews has noted, inherent in Pericles' statement regarding democracy at 2.37 is an attempt to reconcile critics of the freedoms—to borrow Berlin's terminology, both positive and negative liberty—offered by democracy which are twofold: citizens enjoy both the right to live without interference (2.37.2-3), but also the right to participate in democracy, which itself could be viewed as an impediment to one's freedom.[40] Interestingly, although Plato believed that democratic ideology rendered 'freedom' tantamount to anarchy (Pl. *Rep.* 560e), he does not offer an alternative definition of what it means to be 'free' as a member of a community; in the *Laws* 'freedom' is a characteristic of democracy rather than an absolute idea existing independent of constitutions (*Leg.* 700a-701d). For Plato, democratic conceptions of equality were more dangerous than freedom. While the oligarchic model of equality took into account differences in merit, democratic equality did not.[41]

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[36] Waterfield (2004: 96-97).
[37] Cooper (1999: 8).
[38] Waterfield (2004: 96-97). These qualities are exactly those which a tyrant does not possess. These are also the qualities which make a good Hellenistic king. The purpose of estate management is to create wealth.
[39] Hansen (2010: 5-7).
[40] Andrews (2004: 239-61).
[41] Mulgan (1984: 19-20).

Although Plato did not reconceptualise 'freedom' in a political sense, by applying it to the individual he defines the 'free' person as one who was in control of his desires and passions.[42] Aristotle, on the other hand, does address alternative conceptualisations of what it means to be 'free' as a political person. He argued that not living as one likes should not be seen as slavery, but as security (Aristot. *Pol.* 1310a 35-36). For Aristotle, obedience and freedom were not mutually exclusive.[43] Furthermore, Aristotle reconceptualises freedom: to be free means not belonging to another, or being in control of one's own person (*Politics* I, 4, 1254a 14-15; *Metaphysics*, A.2, 982b 25). The slave serves the interests of the master, but the individual acts in his own interest.[44] By analogy, free rule is rule in the interests of the ruled, while despotic rule is rule in the interests of the ruler.[45]

To be free means acting in one's interests, and the ability to act on those interests was secured through obedience to the state. This new rendering of what it means to be a 'free' member of a community bears some similarities to Xenophon's reconceptualisation of what it means for an individual to be 'free', who is only 'free' if restraints are imposed upon him so that he may participate in state affairs in a positive way. As Mulgan notes '[f]reedom as a personal ideal...developed among philosophers who were sceptical about accepted social and political institutions and values, including the distinction between slave and free. They highlighted their criticisms by reapplying the distinction between slave and free to what was for them a more fundamental difference'.[46] Furthermore, '[o]nly when the more radically antisocial philosophers had divorced the concept of freedom from its traditional social context and used it as a metaphor to describe the difference between the wise and the unwise was freedom applied psychologically to the absence of internal interference'.[47] On the whole, Plato and Aristotle did not apply freedom in this way, though Plato does mention this type of freedom occasionally (Pl. *Thae.* 174c-175e; *Resp.* 589b).[48] Although Xenophon certainly makes this distinction, his ultimate aim in doing so is political in nature: the city-state must be led by one who is *kalos kai agathos*. In this sense,

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[42] Vlassopoulos (2010: 48); Stalley (1998: 45-58); Hansen (2010: 7-9).
[43] Mulgan (1984: 18).
[44] c.f. Hdt. 5.78 where Herodotus connects democracy with acting in one's interest, Vlassopoulos (2010: 50).
[45] Mulgan (1984: 17-18).
[46] Mulgan (1984: 20).
[47] Mulgan (1984: 23-24).
[48] Pohlenz (1966: 95).

Xenophon's moral philosophy borders on Plato's philosopher kings, whose education is depicted as a process of liberation.[49]

7.3 Refutation in the Memorabilia and the Anabasis

Xenophon's Socratic method was comprised of three parts: refutation, or *elenchus*, defining πράγματα, and categorising πράγματα in accordance with virtues. In order for one to categorise and define, one must be 'free' from the vices which would enslave. For Xenophon, the process of defining and categorising led to the acquisition of knowledge, which was a prerequisite for the ultimate goal of his philosophical discourse: to teach men to be *kaloi kagathoi* in order that they may do what is best with respect to the household and state. Before one could even begin the process of defining and sorting, Socrates must first encourage his interlocutors towards the study of philosophy by undermining their convictions through argument and refutation. Only once they have passed this process could they move on to the more pressing matter of defining and categorising.[50] Passages from the *Memorabilia* where Socrates engaged his interlocutors in a refutation concerning 'freedom' suggests that Xenophon felt that the term was sufficiently abused in rhetoric, and therefore ambiguous, to warrant discussion.

The concept of 'being free' or 'freedom' most often occurs in discussions concerning how wealth affects those considered 'free men' versus those numbered among the lower ranks of society, who are 'slaves'. At 2.7 and 2.8 Xenophon's aim is to show that the commonly held prejudices regarding slavery and freedom are false, and that by adhering to a lifestyle which promotes these common prejudices free people are actually enslaving themselves. At 2.7 Aristarchus explains that after the exodus to the Piraeus he was left with a crowd of female relatives, so that there were fourteen free people living in his house (4.2.2). He explains that there is little money to be found in his land, since his enemies have seized it, and that there is no value in his property since there are so few residents. Socrates asks Aristarchus how it is possible that he is unable to provide for his family, when Ceramon not only provides for the needs of his family, but saves enough to make him a wealthy man. The explanation, according to Aristarchus, is simple: Ceramon's dependants are slaves (δούλους), while his own are free (ἐλευθέρους). Socrates asks him which he thinks are better (βελτίους), slaves or

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[49] Pl. *Resp*. 514a-519b; Stalley (1998: 147).
[50] See *Mem*. 4.6.13-14 where Xenophon's Socrates engages *elenchus* as a technique.

freemen? Upon answering that his free relatives are better, Socrates asks him whether it is not shameful that his free relatives are in difficulty, while those who are slaves are 'kept in affluence'. Aristarchus answers by explaining that Ceramon's relatives are artisans, while his own are educated liberally (ἐλευθερίως πεπαιδευμένους). Socrates points out that those who are artisans know how to produce things which are useful, such as bread and clothing, the excess of which can be sold for a profit. Although Aristarchus concedes that his family does possesses knowledge of such skills, he argues that most people, like the Megarians who make a living by producing smocks, buy foreign men who do most of the labour; he and his family, he insists, are free.

Socrates then asks him whether others who are free are better off and live more happily than those who are usefully employed in work which they understand. After asking which makes men more prudent, idleness or useful employment, Socrates suggests that if Aristarchus were to exert his authority and make the women work doing the things which they know how to do, Aristarchus, feeling his relatives to be less of a drain on his expenses, would be more fond of them, and they, in turn would be more fond of him, knowing that he was pleased with them; traditionally women were able to be as productive as males when it came to the work of slaves.[51] Upon implementing Socrates' plan, Aristarchus finds that 'they loved him as a guardian and he liked them because they were useful' (2.7.12).[52] Socrates' advice to Aristarchus reveals how common prejudices regarding the 'slave' and 'free' prevents men from doing what is advantageous. Aristarchus is prevented from doing what is to his advantage because of his prejudice concerning what is fitting for 'free' women. Through refutation Socrates reveals the error in Aristarchus' thinking, which allows him to 'rule' his household in way which suited the interests of all.

Immediately following this passage is a discussion between Socrates and Eutherus, who has been forced by poverty to make a living with his hands (*Mem.* 2.8). Once again, Socrates reveals that one is better off performing tasks which are commonly considered slavish, than to be in want. Socrates suggests that Eutherus, in order to ensure that he has wages in his old age, find employment as a bailiff for someone who is better off than he. Protesting against this suggestion, Eutherus states that he would rather not put himself into slavery (δουλείαν

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[51] Pomeroy (2010: 35).
[52] Translation Marchant (2002).

ὑπομείναιμι). By comparing an estate manager to those who control the city and take charge in public affairs, Socrates persuades Eutherus that becoming a bailiff is the best course of action. These people, Socrates states, are thought more respectable and not more slavish on that account. When Eutherus responds by saying he has no desire to expose himself to another man's censure, Socrates reminds him that he must only undertake duties which he can perform and must be aware of his own limitations.[53] Knowing one's limitations is essential not only for a bailiff, but also for city-states. At 4.2.24 Socrates argues men and city-states must heed the advice of the Delphic Oracle and come to know their own limitations. Xenophon's comparison between an estate manager and those who take charge in public affairs, and his comparison between men and city-states at 4.2.24, indicates that men and city-states might both benefit from the same advice. In providing men with a philosophy on how to be *kaloi kagathoi* and do what is best and in their interest, Xenophon was also providing city-states with guidelines on how to govern.

Although both Thucydides' Athenians and Spartans and Xenophon were concerned with doing what was in one's interest, Xenophon, unlike the sophists, was more concerned with the relationship between 'interest' and morality, and more specifically, justice. Xenophon, like Plato, believed that moral concepts were not relative. Consequently, what was in one's interest must also be morally virtuous. If what is in one's interest is morally virtuous, then it must be in everyone's interest. But unlike Plato's Socrates, whose approach to morality is more esoteric, the format Xenophon has chosen to relay Socrates' teachings was one already familiar to his audience.[54] As the chapters on Herodotus and Thucydides have shown, the ways in which historians engage the language of 'freedom' through contemporary frameworks vary. Xenophon's response to the language of 'freedom' is altogether different than either Herodotus' or Thucydides'.[55] While for Thucydides rhetoric itself was a tool of war due the

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[53] c.f. *Mem.* 4.2.24 where Socrates argues men and city-states must heed the advice of the Delphic oracle and come to know their own limitations.

[54] Gray (1998: 160-77).

[55] By showing how the concept of 'freedom' is culturally embedded Herodotus considers how Persian νόμοι might engender a different conceptualisation of 'freedom', and in doing so he is able create irony within his text; for Herodotus people are not 'free' by 'nature', but whether a society considers one 'free' or 'enslaved' depends on the νόμοι of that particular culture. For this reason what the Persians consider 'noble', the Greeks consider 'slavish'. Thucydides exposes how competing standards of 'justice' or interpretations of what is 'just' emerge when 'justice' is aligned

destabilisation of language, Xenophon's philosophy provides a solution for the problems he felt were exacerbated by rhetoric: those with the power to persuade must be *kaloi kagathoi* who understand what is best and can persuade people to do what is best and in the interests of the household and state. Socrates, as a *kalos kagathos*, is able to do just that. He is able to persuade men that even if they themselves are not members of the 'elite' they can still help themselves by doing the next best thing: commit themselves to the rule or enslavement of one who embodies the principles of the *kalos kagathos* (*Oec.* 1.22-23).[56] Socrates himself embodies Xenophon's conceptualisation of 'freedom' in the sense of 'self-control': 'In the first place, apart from what I have said, in control of his [Socrates'] passions and appetites he was the strictest of men; further in endurance of cold and heat and every kind of toil he was most resolute; and besides, his needs were so schooled to moderation that having very little he was yet very content' (*Mem.* 1.2.1-2).[57] Socrates embodies 'freedom' not only because he is in control of himself and is therefore in a better position to lead by example, but also because he is not in a position where he must labour. These two attributes—the possession of qualities necessary for leadership which are secured through self-control, and the freedom from labour—are the two qualities which Johnstone points out distinguish oligarchic conceptions of 'freedom' from democratic ideologies of 'freedom'.[58] As a truly 'free' *kalos kagathos*, Socrates is able to advise Eutherus and Aristarchus that is in their interest to 'enslave' themselves either by being compelled to work, or by becoming a servant; being a slave to an aristocrat, a *kalos kagathos*, is preferable to being a slave to temptation or vice.

In both passages from *Memorabilia* examined above, *Mem.* 2.7 and 2.8, Xenophon, through the voice of Socrates, reveals that those who consider themselves 'free' suffer from poverty out of their own reluctance to take on tasks they deem slavish. By questioning these prejudices, Socrates undermines the 'free/slave' societal structure of the Greeks, many of whom were suffering under social upheaval after the surrender of Athens. By undermining this structure Socrates demonstrates that social status is secondary to well-being, and, in doing

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with the interests of the state instead of νόμοι, the result being that 'freedom' is used rhetorically not because it is apt, but because of its rhetorical cachet.

[56] Similarly in the *Republic* 590c-d Plato suggests that those whose reasoning powers are weak should be enslaved to those who possess stronger skills.

[57] Translation Marchant (2002).

[58] Johnstone (2010: 156).

so, undermines the democratic ideology of 'freedom' and equality. For what was democratic 'freedom' really worth if a 'free' man was prevented from doing what was best and in the interest of the state because he was enslaved to vices? In each of these passages, *Mem.* 2.7 and 2.8, the illusion of wealth and the pretence of nobility is an impediment to one's ability to be useful. By dismissing false notions of what it means to be 'free', Xenophon reveals the fallacy of prejudices concerning 'free' and 'slave'. Xenophon's critique of what it meant to be 'enslaved' or 'free' demonstrates that he was thinking about what constituted such statuses in a society where an ideology of 'freedom' reigned. Furthermore, the emphasis on 'freedom' or 'slavery' in the philosophical works suggests that Xenophon has rejected political ideologies of 'freedom' and 'slavery' as being pertinent to the moral virtue of the individual. Such ideologies were used in the past, and during Xenophon's own time, to persuade people to do what was not in their interest. Rather than focusing on the ideological implications of 'freedom' and 'slavery', Xenophon focuses on the physical status of the individual, which would have had more bearing on a person's ability to be *kalos kagathos*.

7.4 Defining/Categorising

Once Socrates has prepared his interlocutor by undermining traditional notions of 'freedom' and 'slavery', he can begin the process of defining and categorising. The importance of 'correctly' defining words was discussed by Plato in the *Phaedrus*. Although Plato and Xenophon often differed in their accounts of Socrates, Plato's *Phaedrus* provides evidence for how intellectuals during Xenophon's time were thinking about language. Since these ideas were intimated by Xenophon, it will be helpful to examine a passage from Plato, who explicitly states what Xenophon only implies. In the *Phaedrus,* Socrates posits that the one who speaks well and nobly must have 'in mind the truth about the subject he is going to discuss' (259e).[59] Phaedrus responds by saying that he has heard that it is not necessary for an orator to say what is just, but to say what will please the crowd, which acts as judges. This is where persuasion comes from, not from the truth. Later Socrates and Phaedrus agree that nothing good can come from a rhetorician who studies what the people believe and persuades them to do bad instead of good: 'unless he pursues philosophy properly he will never be able to

[59] Translation Nehamas and Woodruff (1997).

make a proper speech on any subject either' (261A).[60] Plato's account of Socrates in this passage indicates that Socrates, like Xenophon, believes that persuasion should only be employed as a tool if the one persuading urges people towards right actions. The one persuading must pursue philosophy in order to know what the 'good' is so that he may encourage them to act in accordance with the 'good'.

Later in the *Phaedrus*, Socrates argues that it is easier to deceive the audience if one commits small, incremental acts of deception rather than large ones. In order to deceive the audience the speaker must understand what a thing truly is and understand how things are similar and dissimilar to one another. This knowledge allows the speaker to deceive the audience by making them think that something which is dissimilar is similar and vice versa. Rhetoric is an art which requires philosophical training, for one who does not know what each thing is cannot 'lead others little by little through similarities away from what is the case on each occasion to its opposite' (262b).[61] Successful deception lies in truly knowing what things are. Phaedrus follows Socrates' logic, but asks for clarification. The opening segment of Socrates' clarification offers insight into an intellectual trend during this period which led writers and philosophers to consider the meaning of words.

> SOCRATES: When someone utters the word 'iron' or 'silver', don't we all think of the same thing?
> PHAEDRUS: Certainly.
> SOCRATES: But what happens when we say 'just' or 'good'? Doesn't each one of us go in a different direction? Don't we differ with one another and even with ourselves?
> PHAEDRUS: We certainly do.
> SOCRATES: Therefore, we agree about the former and disagree about the latter.
> PHAEDRUS: Right.
> SOCRATES: Now in which of these two cases are we more easily deceived? And when does rhetoric have greater power?
> PHAEDRUS: Clearly, when we wander in different directions.

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[60] Translation Nehamas and Woodruff (1997).
[61] Translation Nehamas and Woodruff (1997).

> SOCRATES: It follows that whoever wants to acquire the art of rhetoric must first make a systematic division and grasp the particular character of each of these two kinds of things, both the kind where most people wander in different directions and the kind where they do not.[62]

> ΣΩ. Ὅταν τις ὄνομα εἴπῃ σιδήρου ἢ ἀργύρου, ἆρ' οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες διενοήθημεν;
> ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.
> ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὅταν δικαίου ἢ ἀγαθοῦ; οὐκ ἄλλος ἄλλῃ φέρεται, καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;
> ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
> ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς συμφωνοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὔ.
> ΦΑΙ. Οὕτω.
> ΣΩ. Ποτέρωθι οὖν εὐαπατητότεροί ἐσμεν, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐν ποτέροις μεῖζον δύναται;
> ΦΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅτι ἐν οἷς πλανώμεθα.
> ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνην ῥητορικὴν μετιέναι πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ ταῦτα ὁδῷ διῃρῆσθαι, καὶ εἰληφέναι τινὰ χαρακτῆρα ἑκατέρου τοῦ εἴδους, ἐν ᾧ τε ἀνάγκη τὸ πλῆθος πλανᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν ᾧ μή. (263a-b).

Socrates and Phaedrus agree that 'love', which is the topic of Lysias' speech, is a thing to which people ascribe different meanings. 'Love', like the 'good' and the 'bad', is a topic which lends itself to deception. Similarly, 'freedom'/'slavery' and the status of 'free'/'slave' were common tropes in persuasive speech precisely because people held different ideas of what it meant to be 'free' and 'enslaved'. Following the logic of Socrates, the rhetorician must have a clear understanding of these terms in order to deceive the people gradually by toying with their belief that 'freedom' is inherently 'good' and 'slavery' inherently 'bad'. For Thucydides the uprooting of νόμοι by φύσις leads to the destabilisation of language, and more specifically those words the meanings of which are culturally embedded. In the passage above, Socrates exposes how rhetoricians manipulate these culturally

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[62] Translation Nehamas and Woodruff (1997).

embedded words such as 'justice' and 'good', the definitions of which are determined by the νόμοι of a particular people.

Defining and categorising were essential parts of Xenophon's dialectic. At *Mem.* 4.5.12 Socrates describes dialectic as the practice of meeting together in common deliberation and sorting things out in accordance with their kind.[63] This is just one part of the dialectic, the other being the ability to correctly define things, a process which is described at 4.6. Based on these two passages, Carlo Natali shows that the Socratic dialectic, as it is presented by Xenophon, is unique in that it is comprised of two processes: defining and categorising. Examples of virtues and things which must be categorised and defined are listed at 1.16: what is godly and what is ungodly; what is beautiful and what is ugly; what is just, what is unjust; what is prudence (σωφροσύνη), what is madness; what is courage, what is cowardice; what is a state, what is a statesman; what is a government, what is a governor. The first step in the dialectic is the defining of πράγματα, or things: what is a governor, what is a government, what is a state, what is a statesman. Second, πράγματα must be sorted into the good and the bad in accordance with particular virtues: what is just, what is unjust; what is prudence, what is madness.[64] Only when a thing has been correctly defined is it possible to know whether that thing falls under the category of the 'good' or the 'bad'.

The concept of 'slavery' frequently appears in discussions which involve the categorising of πράγματα. At *Mem.* 4.2 Socrates engages in a discussion with Euthydemus, Critias' lover, concerning the relationship between ignorance and slavery. Socrates aims to show Euthydemus that the knowledge which he possesses from his library collection has not really endowed him with wisdom at all. Many of the more intriguing points concerning 'freedom' and 'slavery' which are made in this argument are not made for their own sake, but in order to draw out the youth's ignorance through refutation. That they are not the main points of the argument should not detract from their value. Socrates and Euthydemus agree that acts can be either just or unjust, depending on whether these acts are done to friends or enemies. As an example of such an act Socrates offers enslavement, ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι, which Euthydemus agrees is an unjust act, except when an

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[63] This process is best displayed at 4.2 in a discussion between Socrates and Euthydemus, a passage which will be discussed in more detail below.
[64] Natali (2006: 19).

elected general enslaves an unjust and hostile city (4.2.14-15).[65] The act of enslaving, ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι, can fall under the category of the 'just' or the 'unjust', depending on the circumstances. It is not the 'just' or the 'unjust' which are considered relative, but the act of enslavement. To put it in terms of Xenophon's Socratic dialectic, ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι is a πρᾶγμα which must be defined and categorised according to moral virtues, which are fixed terms. The fact that 'enslaving' is a πρᾶγμα which must be categorised presupposes that the act of enslaving is not always 'bad' or 'unjust'. If this is the case, the opposite of 'slavery', 'freedom', must not always be 'good' or 'just' either. When Virtue remarks that men are able to 'free' friends and 'subdue' enemies through hard work (*Mem.* 2.1.28), the act of 'freeing' and 'subduing' are relative terms. Just as 'subduing' a friend would be unjust, so too would 'freeing' an enemy. Once again, Xenophon avoids discussions of 'freedom' as an ideology. Instead he focuses on the physical enslavement of the citizens of the state.

Passages from the *Hellenica* and the *Anabasis* indicate that whether the enslaving of fellow Greeks was 'just' or 'unjust' was a contentious topic. In the *Anabasis* the only time that the Greeks were physically enslaved was at the hands of Anaxibius, the Spartan admiral at Byzantium (*An.* 7.2.6). Fearing that the Ten Thousand might take Byzantium by force, Anaxibius ordered the Spartan governor of the city, Aristarchus, to sell all the soldiers of Cyrus that he found. Apparently, he had also ordered the previous governor, Cleander, to do likewise, but Cleander had been negligent in carrying out the admiral's commands. Aristarchus sold at least four hundred soldiers as slaves. Although the act itself may not be contentious from the perspective of Aristarchus, the enslavement of Greeks by Greeks occurred just as the Ten Thousand reached a Greek city. While the Ten Thousand were in the East, the threat of Persia had a unifying effect; here, more than anywhere else in the narrative, the Greeks manage themselves with a harmony uncharacteristic of a Greek city-state.[66] As the Ten Thousand were reunited with other Greeks, they were threatened with physical enslavement by the Greeks. At this point in the narrative the unity of the Ten Thousand began to crumble. While Aristarchus may have chosen to enslave the Greeks, Xenophon's decision to structure his narrative so that the Greeks encounter 'enslavement' just

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[65] Socrates makes a similar argument at 2.2.2 in a discussion with his son.
[66] Dillery (1995: 93).

as they re-enter Greek territory suggests that Xenophon himself felt that the enslavement of Greek by Greek was morally and strategically wrong.

In the *Hellenica* the only mention of Greeks physically enslaving other Greeks occurred during one of the final episodes of the Peloponnesian War. The tone captures the polemical nature of the debate surrounding slavery and ethnicity. Callicratidas, a Spartan general, having been urged to sell the Methymnaeans and the Athenian garrison as slaves, proclaimed that 'while he was in command no Greek should be sold as a slave (ἀνδραποδισθῆναι), if he could help it' (*HG* 1.6.14).[67] The following day he let the Methymnaeans go free (τοὺς μὲν ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε), but he sold the men in the Athenian garrison as slaves, as well as the Methymnaeans who were already slaves (*HG* 1.6.15). Later (2.1.19), Lysander, another Spartan general, released all the prisoners in Lampsacus, an Athenian ally, who were free men (τὰ δὲ ἐλεύθερα σώματα πάντα ἀφῆκε Λύσανδρος). Callicratidas' political decision to sell the garrison and pre-existing slaves was informed by his own thoughts on what circumstances warrant enslavement. Although he refused to sell the Methymnaean citizens as slaves, he had no qualms about selling off the Athenians whose domineering presence had restricted the rights of the citizens and who, therefore, deserved to be enslaved.

Xenophon presented a different perspective on 'slavery' in his biography of Agesilaus. Xenophon wrote that Agesilaus believed that Greek cities ought not to be enslaved, for if they were enslaved, then there would be fewer men to help with the conquest of the barbarian:

> And when the Corinthian exiles told him that the city was about to be surrendered to them and pointed to the engines with which they were confident of taking the walls, he would not make the assault, declaring that Greek cities ought not to be enslaved, but chastened (λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι δέοι Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἀλλὰ σωφρονίζειν). 'And if,' he added, 'we are going to annihilate the erring members of our own race, let us beware lest we lack men to help in the conquest of the barbarians' (*Ages.* 7.6).[68]

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[67] Translation Warner (1979).
[68] Translation Marchant (1925).

According to Xenophon, Agesilaus possessed self control in situations where he was tempted to be greedy (*Ages.* 4.3) and in affection (*Ages.* 5.4). In his summary of Agesilaus' 'goodness', ἀνδραγαθία, which all should imitate, Xenophon made the following statement:

> The man who is foremost in endurance when the hour comes for toil, in valour when the contest calls for courage, in wisdom when the need is for counsel—he is the man, I think, who may fairly be regarded as the perfect embodiment of goodness...I think that the virtue of Agesilaus may well stand as a noble example for those to follow who wish to make moral goodness a habit. For who that imitates a pious, a just, a sober, a self-controlled man, can come to be unrighteous, unjust, violent, wanton?[69]
>
> ὁ δὲ καρτερίᾳ μὲν πρωτεύων ἔνθα πονεῖν καιρός, ἀλκῇ δὲ ὅπου ἀνδρείας ἀγών, γνώμῃ δὲ ὅπου βουλῆς ἔργον, οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ δικαίως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς παντελῶς ἂν νομίζεσθαι. εἰ δὲ καλὸν εὕρημα ἀνθρώποις στάθμη καὶ κανὼν πρὸς τὸ ὀρθὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, καλὸν ἄν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ Ἀγησιλάου ἀρετὴ παράδειγμα γενέσθαι τοῖς ἀνδραγαθίαν ἀσκεῖν βουλομένοις... καλὸν ἄν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ Ἀγησιλάου ἀρετὴ παράδειγμα γενέσθαι τοῖς ἀνδραγαθίαν ἀσκεῖν βουλομένοις. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἢ θεοσεβῆ μιμούμενος ἀνόσιος γένοιτο ἢ δίκαιον ἄδικος ἢ σώφρονα ὑβριστὴς ἢ ἐγκρατῆ ἀκρατής;
> (*Aeg.* 10.1-2).

Given that Agesilaus' lifestyle, from Xenophon's perspective, matches that of the description of the *kalos kagathos*, Agesilaus' position on matters such as enslavement must be the moral position of one possessing good judgement and wisdom. Enemy cities which were hostile must be enslaved, but cities which were Greek and which had the same customs and religion could not be hostile. If these cities made poor decisions, they must be chastised and shown the correct path, but they must not be enslaved. The position of Agesilaus, a *kalos kagathos*, provides further evidence that the threat of 'enslavement' faced by the Ten Thousand upon approaching Greek territory fits within the structural narrative of the *Hellenica*.

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[69] Translation Marchant (1925).

Once the Greeks have reached Byzantium, their harmonious unity was broken by the threat of enslavement by fellow Greeks. Agesilaus' refusal to enslave Greeks on the grounds that they would be needed someday in a conflict with Persia reveals Xenophon's own position. Xenophon believed that the threat of Persia could and should be used as an incentive for unification and deterrent for enslavement of fellow Greeks, an agenda which was consistent both in his historical works and his philosophy of the *kalos kagathos*.

These passages demonstrate that Xenophon's treatment of 'slavery' was influenced by issues which he found problematic in his own time, namely Greek enslaving Greek. It is impossible to know whether Xenophon's historical account of the above events was accurate. As a result it is unclear whether Xenophon's philosophical ideas concerning the relative nature of 'enslavement' influenced his explanation of historical events, or whether he used 'enslavement' as an example of a πρᾶγμα which could either be 'just' or 'unjust' because he saw it being played out in history. Either way, Xenophon's discussion of 'enslavement' in the *Memorabilia* and in the *Hellenica* indicates that his historical and philosophical positions were complementary. Furthermore, it indicates that Xenophon was thinking philosophically about historical events in order to find remedies for the future. One of these remedies was the character of Agesilaus, the *kalos kagathos*, whose self-control led him to the conclusion that no Greek cities could justly be enslaved. For Xenophon, a leader must understand whether 'freedom' and 'slavery' are just or unjust in specific circumstances, and, in order to make such distinctions, a leader must have a clear understanding of the 'just'.

The comparison elicited by Herodotus' presentation of 'freedom' hinged on the reader's belief that 'freedom' was an absolute 'good'. Thucydides, on the other hand, demonstrated through his metanarrative on language, that the politicians and generals were taking advantage of the moral fixity of 'freedom' as a concept in order justify actions which were, in reality, actions carried out not in the name of 'freedom' but in their own interests. Xenophon, recognising that this was a problem, prescribed that the 'elite' be morally 'free' from vices in order to determine what was best for the state by being able to correctly determine what is 'just' and 'unjust'. The *kalos kagathos,* in possession of a philosophical education, was able to persuade audiences of what was best without taking advantage of moral ambiguity. Thus the idea of the *kalos kagathos*, as prescribed by Xenophon, was the solution for the flaws of rhetoric. The person with power who persuades

must understand whether an act such as 'freeing' or 'enslaving' is just or unjust. Once he has engaged in the dialectic process to determine the virtuosity of 'freeing' or 'enslaving' in specific circumstances, then he is able to persuade the audience using such language. Xenophon has removed the moral ambiguity of concepts such as 'freedom' and 'slavery' by allowing the leader of the state, one who possesses the qualities of the *kalos kagathos*, to define morality. For Xenophon, the 'enslaving' of Greeks only led to strife among city-states. Consequently the language of 'freedom' and 'slavery' was best relegated to the arena of conflicts between Greeks and Persians, as the the Greeks are most united when there was a foreign threat.

7.5 The Analogy Between State and Household

The fact that 'freedom' had, at the time Xenophon began employing the concept in new circumstances, already enjoyed a long history with manifold associations in the Greek world suggests that this new concept of being 'free', which depended entirely on the individual's commitment to self-sufficiency and discipline, must have been, in some small way, related to its political predecessor. Xenophon's philosophy regarding freedom as 'self-sufficiency' was created in a climate which was heavily saturated with the rhetoric of political freedom. Consequently it is necessary to examine how Socrates' teachings benefit not only the individual, but the state as well. Some of Socrates' lessons which apply to the individual could just as easily be applied to the state. Other lessons regarding the proper management of the household suggest that the household was being used as an analogy for the state. Still other lessons in which the character of the *kalos kagathos* was discussed suggest that one who was a *kalos kagathos* was being prepared for a life in politics. The following section will examine how Xenophon's representation of Socrates' teachings was politically motivated.

Xenophon was not the first to note the analogous condition of the individual and the state. Early testimony for the relationship between the individual and the state can be found in the analogy between the human body and the 'body politic', the idea that the illnesses of society are like human illnesses. As Cuomo notes, 'these parallels ran deep because they inscribed political and ethical values onto the body and onto nature itself'.[70] Thus the movement in the fourth

[70] Cuomo (2007: 8).

century, which offered remedies for politics on a grand scale through the analogy of the household on a smaller one, was not entirely unprecedented. There was a strong movement in the fourth century to see the master of the house as analogous to the ruler of a state, and the management of a household as analogous to the management of the state. Ferrari has shown the city and the soul are analogous throughout Plato's *Republic*.[71] A state can only be healthy if those at the helm are as well. This emphasis on the individual as being responsible for the well-being of the household on a smaller scale, and for the state on a larger one led philosophers to consider the virtues which would ensure the efficient and prosperous management of both the estate and, by analogy, the state. Xenophon's concern with the virtue of the individual was not one which was unconcerned with political affairs. Quite the contrary: in order for a state to prosper or for an army to win in battle, the state's leaders, generals and politicians had to exhibit the qualities of the *kalos kagathos*. The analogy between the individual and the state offered insight into the emergence of Xenophon's radical rendering of what it meant to be free, and how a state's well-being was contingent on the virtuosity of those ruling.

Socrates often likens the individual to the state. Socrates' dialogue with Euthydemus at 4.2 evolves into a discussion of the necessity of knowing oneself, one's capacity for knowledge and power, as well as one's limitations. The same is true for city-states, according to Socrates, for whenever states, not having knowledge of their own capacity, go to war with stronger states, they are ruined and free men are made slaves (4.2.29). A state, like an individual, must adhere to the principle of the Delphic oracle: know yourself, γνῶθι σαὐτόν (2.2.24). Similarly, at 2.8 Socrates advises his comrade, Eutherus, to be mindful of his limitations in order to live at ease and escape censure from his boss. At 4.5.10 self-control (ἐγκράτεια) is connected with the ability to rule over oneself, a household and a city, suggesting that it is necessary not only for an individual to be 'free' from vices, but also for the state to be 'free' as well. Teachings and lessons which are useful for the individual can also be useful for the state.

One of the most obvious analogies between the state and the individual comes in the *Oeconomicus* in a passage where the qualities of the *kalos kagathos* are introduced. In the opening of the *Oeconomicus*, Critobulus and Socrates

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[71] Ferrari (2005: 59-82).

engage in a discussion concerning what constitutes one's estate. Upon reaching the conclusion that whatever is useful should be reckoned as one's property (*Oec.* 1.7), the discussion turns to the relationship between the usefulness of wealth, which is not useful to the one who does not know how to use it (*Oec.* 1.12). Critobulus raises the issue of those who possess the skills of war and peace and who have no despots ruling over them, yet they are still not able to bring about prosperity due to idleness, moral cowardice and negligence, the vices which lead one to engage in activities such as gambling and unprofitable friendships (*Oec.* 1.17-20).[72] Then there are those that are eager to work, but, like those who are idle and negligent, they exhaust their estates. These too, according to Socrates, are slaves, δοῦλοι, to gluttony, lechery, drink and foolish ambitions (*Oec.* 1.21-22). It is necessary, Socrates says, to fight for freedom against these with the same persistence as if they were armed men trying to enslave us.[73] Socrates' exhortation suggests that Xenophon thought there was an analogy between his own ideas concerning individual freedom and slavery and the 'freedom' and 'ensalvement' that can result from conflict. For Xenophon, vices such as gluttony, lechery, drink and foolish ambitions enslaved men just like armed soldiers physically enslaved people. The struggle against slavery in both these situations is conceptualised as a struggle for 'freedom'.

The discussion between Critobulus and Socrates suggests that Xenophon has applied the language of political 'freedom' to the individual in order to show that there is no such thing as 'freedom' as it is defined by politics, especially in a city-state such as democratic Athens, where there are no restraints imposed on individuals to prevent them from becoming slaves to vices. In a discussion between Aristippus and Socrates, Aristippus argues that 'states claim to treat their rulers just as I claim to treat my servants' (*Mem.* 2.1.9).[74] Aristippus recognises that rulers are slaves to the state just as house-servants are slaves to their masters. Socrates suggests that they consider whether the rulers or the ruled live the more pleasant life. Socrates lists a series of nations which rule and are ruled: the Persians rule the Syrians, the Lydians and the Phrygians; the Scythians rule and the Maeotians are ruled; the Carthaginians rule and the Libyans are ruled.

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[72] c.f. Thuc. 1.122.4 where the Corinthians argue that moral cowardice and negligence are stupidity.

[73] ἀλλὰ δεῖ, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐχ ἧττον διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἢ πρὸς τοὺς σὺν ὅπλοις πειρωμένους καταδουλοῦσθαι (*Oec.* 1.23).

[74] Translation Marchant (2002).

Socrates continues by asking Aristippus whether he thinks that the controlling or controlled states in Greece live a more pleasant life (2.1.10). Aristippus fails to answer Socrates' question and provides instead an oblique response, in which there is a shift in metaphor from ruling and being ruled/controlled and being controlled to freedom and slavery. He states that he would not chose slavery, but instead a middle path through neither rule nor slavery (δι᾽ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας). For Aristippus, both the 'ruler' and the 'ruled' are enslaved: one is enslaved to the state, the other is enslaved to the master.[75] Instead, Aristippus choses freedom which most of all leads to happiness (2.1.11). By choosing 'freedom', which he believes to be an alternative to 'ruling' and 'being 'ruled' Aristippus has removed himself from politics; to be truly 'free' one must be neither 'rule' nor 'be ruled', since both are 'slavery'. Socrates retorts that the stronger have a way of making the weaker 'rue their lot' in both public and private and treating them like slaves. The stronger harass the weaker if they refuse to submit until they are persuaded to accept slavery as an escape from war with the stronger. According to Socrates, Aristippus' belief that there is an alternative to 'ruling' and 'being ruled' is naive, as 'in private life do not brave and mighty men enslave and plunder the cowardly and feeble fold?' (*Mem.* 2.1.13).[76] Socrates has brought the discussion back to the arena of world politics in a way that reveals the analogous condition of the individual in both public and private life with the citizen body in world affairs.

Aristippus rejects the proposition that 'ruling' is synonymous with 'free'. Aristippus' solution to the dilemma presented by Socrates is to become a foreigner in every land, being 'free' from the paradigm of power politics and social hierarchies. For Aristippus being 'free' means neither 'ruling' nor 'being ruled', and, essentially, means being detached from politics, much like Thucydides' autonomous beings who live by their own customs and deny those of the community (Thuc. 2.63). While Connor suggests that *apragmones* who live by themselves in isolation are 'peaceful men', Christ notes that these people are not identifiable as a social group, despite Carter's argument that they are.[77] Quietism

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[75] Stalley (1998: 148). Similarly, a tyrant is not only a slave to his passions, but also a slave to the people (Pl. *Resp.* 579).
[76] Translation Marchant (2002).
[77] Connor (1992: 175-98); Christ (1998: 66); Carter (1986: 27). Christ notes that the reluctance of the *apragmon* to respond aggressively in a suit is a reflection of their 'uncontentious nature' rather than weakness (1998: 166).

was an alternative lifestyle to the demands of democracy which required active participation.[78] Antisthenes wrote a treatise on freedom and slavery, where he argued that one's social standing, whether free or slave, was irrelevant.[79] Diogenes, a cynic, believed that through training and exercise one could learn to live with as few needs as possible. He coined the term 'cosmopolitan', a term which described his status as a citizen of the world, as an act of defiance against the traditional norms of society. Like Antisthenes, Diogenes used the concepts of 'freedom' and 'slavery' to criticise social customs.[80] Aristippus' belief that neither the 'ruling' nor the 'ruled' are truly 'free' suggests that the value of being 'free' was questioned by those who felt that government, by requiring the participation of citizens, was an infringment of their 'freedom'. In other words, 'freedom' itself, in a democratic context, came to be associated with obligation, which led some, including Xenophon, to reconceptualise what it means to be 'free' as an individual, and to consider the relevancy of 'freedom' in terms of the city-state. For Xenophon, one who was 'free' from vices could be useful by encouraging the Greeks to abandon their conflicts with one another and instead unite in a struggle against Persia. In this context the language of 'freedom' served to unite rather divide men from different city-states.

The discussion between Aristippus and Socrates reveals two separate antitheses which appear throughout the *Memorabilia*. The first is that of ruling and being ruled (2.1), the second that of being free and being a slave as a social status (2.7). Then there is the metaphor of political freedom and slavery (3.5.26), which is extended to city-states and the citizens of city-states as a collective unit. The relationship between political freedom and personal freedom is manifest in Xenophon's Socratic mission. Upon being asked how he can claim to be making politicians even though he avoids politics, Socrates states that he could play no greater role in politics than producing competent politicians (*Mem.* 1.2.47). Although Xenophon's *Memorabilia* seems removed from the political arena in its focus on the personal choices of the individual, Socrates' discussions with Euthydemus, Eutherus, Critobulus and Aristippus indicate that Xenophon's theory of personal 'freedom' is not entirely detached from political 'freedom'. Xenophon's discussions with Euthydemus and Eutherus indicate that the advice given by

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[78] Carter (1986: 99-130).
[79] Mulgan (1984: 20).
[80] Mulgan (1984: 20-21).

Socrates which concerns the individual can also be good for the state. As Johnstone notes, the skill required to manage a household or lead a chorus is the same skill required to govern a state.[81]

Individuals and states could each benefit from the advice of Socrates. Socrates' discussion with Critobulus draws a comparison between the forces which result in the physical enslavement of the individual with the vices which enslave one. Both must be opposed in order to secure 'freedom'. For Aristippus, being 'free' means taking no part in the political game which inevitably pigeonholes one into one of two categories: ruling and being ruled. Although Xenophon's reconceptualisation of 'freedom' may seem detached from politics, it is not. For a general or political leader to be morally good, he must be free from the vices which would enslave. In considering the education of those fit to rule, Socrates shows Aristippus that the one fit to rule must have supreme powers of self-control and must be able to withstand the demands of hunger, thirst and fatigue from toil. He must also be able to function on little sleep and be able to control whatever passions may hinder his ability to rule, as well as be indifferent to the heat and cold. Aristippus concludes that he is not among those fit to rule, as he prefers the life of pleasure, and he knows that most states treat their rulers as he treats his slaves: he expects his slaves to provide the necessities of life just as citizens expect their rulers to do the same (2.1.9).

An ideal ruler, one who is a *kalos kagathos*, one whose 'freedom' is secured by the rejection of vices which would enslave, is Agesilaus. As the main objective for the *kalos kagathos* is to be useful to one's family, friends, and state, this person is not entirely 'free'. At *Mem.* 2.1.9 Aristippus notes that 'states claim to treat their rulers just as I claim to treat my servants'. Thus the *kalos kagathos*, in many respects, is subjected to a lifestyle which bears more similarities to slavery than freedom. But the *kalos kagathos* is also 'free' in the sense that his judgement is not impaired by vices which control one. An ideal ruler, a *kalos kagathos*, is able to manage the state just as master rules his estate, and each must ward against the vices and forces which would enslave the individual. An individual who is a slave to vices is not able to make decisions in the interest of the state. Furthermore, one who is a slave cannot properly discern what is 'good/just' or

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[81] Johnstone (2010: 153).

'bad/unjust' for the state. Consequently this person cannot persuade the citizens of the right course of action for the state.

The conditions in Athens after the overthrow of the oligarchs may have led Xenophon to consider what it meant to be 'free' in a society where the elite, through the obligations imposed on them by democracy and their marginalised status, seemed enslaved by the masses of 'free' citizens. Passages from speeches in the *Hellenica* suggest, as I shall show in the next chapter, that Xenophon believed that the concept of 'freedom' had become a term which no longer represented reality. Xenophon's withdrawal from the political arena and the unpopularity of the oligarchic model after the fall of the Thirty in Athens compelled those forced from politics to consider the value of virtues traditionally associated with public politics.[82] One of these virtues was 'freedom'. Rather than asking what it means for a state to be 'free', Xenophon instead asked what it meant for the individual to be 'free', and in doing he redefines the usefulness of the elite in society.

That Xenophon was more concerned with the individual should come as no surprise: Xenophon felt that the state could only be properly administered if those guiding it were *kaloi kagathoi*. Most important among the skills and virtues mastered by a *kalos kagathos* was 'self-control'; only a person having 'self-control' was free from vices and passions which otherwise enslave. And only the person who was 'free' was able to correctly define and categorise things and, based on this analysis, do what was best. Socrates frequently asserts that a ruler or general should be able to resist temptations in order that he may judge what is best and act accordingly. This person, free from the vices which make man a slave to fleeting pleasures, is the person who is 'able to guide the people in prudent policy [and] never lapse into violence' (*Mem.* 1.2.10-11).[83] The means by which he does this is persuasion.

Xenophon's reconceptualisation of 'freedom' reveals how he was able to reconcile his contempt for the sophists with his belief that persuasion was a valid alternative to armed conflict. In addition, an investigation into 'freedom' in *Memorabilia* suggests that Xenophon was dissatisfied with contemporary discourse of 'freedom', leading him to consider the value of 'freedom' for the individual rather than the state. Applying a political ideology to the individual created a new role for 'freedom' in the political realm, one which provided a

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[82] Badian (2004: 33-52).
[83] Translation Marchant (2002).

remedy for the conflicts in diplomacy and arbitration which the rhetoric of 'political freedom' had exacerbated.

Xenophon's representation of Socrates and his presentation of Socratic dialectic suggest that Xenophon's writing was deeply influenced by his reaction to the sophists. His forays into *elenchus* indicate that Xenophon's philosophical works are not only useful, but applicable in the political arena. In order for one to be a *kalos kagathos*, one must be able to categorise the action (πρᾶγμα) in accordance with its virtue: is the action just/unjust, good/bad? The virtues under which πράγματα are sorted, such as 'just' and 'unjust', were the very concepts or names which had been destabilised during the Peloponnesian War. These names or labels which people deemed their actions did not always correspond to reality, and consequently they were called ὀνόματα by Thucydides. 'Justice' was not defined by the acts which were deemed 'just'. Instead 'justice' had a fixed value independent of actions. The difference between Thucydides' and Xenophon's responses to 'freedom' and 'justice' stem from the principles underlying the intellectualising process: while Thucydides is concerned with the 'nature' and, more specifically 'human nature' as a structuring element for understanding the behaviour and actions of men, Xenophon is more interested in finding remedies for the conflicts between Greeks. For Xenophon, the *kalos kagathos* was a means not only of rehabilitating the elite as useful members of society, but one who was a *kalos kagathos* understood that the enslavement of Greeks was never 'just'. However, on a personal level 'enslavement' was not always a 'bad' thing but was sometimes 'good', especially when one was enslaved to vices. For Thucydides 'freedom' and 'autonomy' were ὀνόματα, which were morally ambiguous. This was demonstrated by the case of Plataea, where citizens were enslaved in the name of 'freedom', and by the Mytilenians' argument that they were 'free' in name, but that they are only 'free' because it served the interest of Athens, which benefited from their contributions. For Xenophon the acts of 'freeing' and 'enslaving' were concepts which must be defined and categorised in order to avoid ambiguity. Once an act of 'freeing' or 'enslaving' had been deemed just or unjust by the *kalos kagathos*, the *kalos kagathos* could use these concepts rhetorically in a persuasive speech to promote unification rather than divisions among citizens.

Chapter 8: Rhetorical 'Freedom' in Xenophon's Historical Works

The previous chapter examined Xenophon's philosophical conceptualisation of 'freedom', which was a quality essential for being a *kalos kagathos*. This chapter will examine how Xenophon's philosophical rendering of 'freedom' allows the *kalos kagathos* to be useful in politics and how his own engagement with freedom in the historical works was influenced by his philosophical reconceptualisation of 'freedom'. Discussions between Socrates and his interlocutors demonstrated that Socrates' teachings and his lifestyle, which was 'free' from vice, provided examples which would allow one to do good to one's family, friends, and state. Although Xenophon's concept of personal 'freedom' seems not at all related to political freedom, passages in which the metaphor of 'political freedom' appears in discussions of personal 'freedom' suggest that the metaphor of 'political freedom' has influenced his theory of personal 'freedom'. 'Freedom' from vices which impaired one's judgement was essential for one to be able to make persuasive speeches which were in the interests of the state.

Although Xenophon openly criticises the sophists, he suggests that rhetoric was a viable, and in fact the only, alternative to war. While this may seem to be a paradox, an examination of speeches in Xenophon's historical works suggests that persuasion can only be an alternative to war if the one persuading was 'free' from vice, or a *kalos kagathos*. A comparison of Xenophon's moral intellectualism to speeches made in the *Anabasis* and the *Hellenica* demonstrates how the language of freedom could be used to deceive people, and how freedom could be used to persuade others to act in their interests by those engaging in dialectic. Three speeches from Xenophon's historical works provide examples of 'incorrect' and 'correct' methods for incorporating the language of 'slavery' and 'freedom' in speeches. The first two are examples of how to use language to deceive, while the last is an example of how language can be used successfully as an alternative to violence. These examples indicate that Xenophon was thinking philosophically about language in his recording of the past, and that unlike Thucydides, who exposes how the language of 'freedom' had been destabilised by conflict, Xenophon's account of the past provided remedies for the future in the form of paradigms. The second section will examine how Xenophon used the language of 'freedom' in historical exempla to encourage unification among the

Greeks. By establishing 'fixed' definitions of value-laden terms such as 'justice' and 'free', Xenophon is able to rehabilitate language as a tool in diplomacy.

8.1 Thebes

Shortly before the outbreak of the Corinthian War, the Thebans made a speech to the Athenians. This speech reveals how the language of 'freedom' and 'slavery' could be used to incite conflict. Agesilaus' rejection of the peace offered by the Persian King engendered suspicion in many Persians who feared that Agesilaus, who had been in the East for some time, was plotting to kill the King of Persia (3.5.1). For the King of Persia, the solution was simple: incite an uprising in Greece against Sparta large enough to have Agesilaus recalled. In accordance with this plan. Tithraustes sent Timocrates of Rhodes to several cities in Greece on the understanding that they were to make war with Sparta in exchange for money.[1]

Many leading men in Greece received money from the Persians via the Rhodians: the Thebans, Corinthians and Argives all took part in the scandal; the Athenians, thinking that empire was their right, needed no enticement to make war with Sparta (3.5.2). The instigation of the war lay largely with the Thebans who understood that the Spartans would never make war on the allies without being provoked first. Therefore they convinced the Opuntian Locrians to levy a tax from some territory which both they and the Phocians claimed to own. As the Thebans expected, the Phocians countered by invading the territory of the Locrians. The ringleader of the Theban enterprise convinced the Thebans that the Phocians had invaded Locris and a Theban counter-invasion followed.

In response to the Theban invasion of Phocis, the Phocians requested help from the Spartans, who, according to Xenophon, welcomed a pretext for war against the Thebans.[2] Once it became clear to the Thebans that the Spartans were

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[1] The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* names Pharnabazus as the one who sent Timocrates to Greece with money rather than Tithraustes (*Hell. Oxy.* 7.2). Rung (1994: 423-33) shows that even though Xenophon and the Oxyrhynchus historian differ in their accounts of the money distribution they do not necessarily contradict one another, as was previously thought. Sending unofficial diplomats to foreign states was common practice in Persia and should not be considered out of place, or as a fabrication by Xenophon.

[2] οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἄσμενοι ἔλαβον πρόφασιν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους (*HG* 3.5.5). Xenophon lists several reasons for the Spartans' eagerness to go to war with Thebes. First, the Thebans claimed the tithe which was due to Apollo at Decelea; the Spartans, along with help from the Thebans, fortified Decelea during the Peloponnesian War. This action, according to

planning an invasion of their territory, the Thebans turned to the Athenians as potential allies. But before the Thebans could convince the Athenians that they were worthy allies, they first revised history. Xenophon has stated earlier in his work that the Thebans voted against any form of mercy for the Athenians during their surrender (*HG* 2.2.19). In a bid for forgiveness the Thebans argue that 'it was not the city of Thebes that voted then; it was just one man who happened at that time to have a seat at the council of the allies' (*HG* 3.5.8).[3] This is the exact argument that the Thebans gave in Thucydides' history as to why they medized during the Persian Wars (Thuc. 3.62). The argument made in Thucydides was contradicted by Herodotus in his narration of how events unravelled in the city of Thebes (Hdt. 9.87), suggesting that there was a tradition among historians to attribute falsehoods to Thebans.

In their speech, the Thebans suggest that they will be able to regain their empire if they come to the aid of those who had been wronged by Sparta.[4] The Theban ambassadors make a case for rebellion against Sparta by comparing the current situation in Greece to the political climate during the Peloponnesian War. The Theban ambassador notes that in the previous war Athens' own subjects were afraid to rebel until they, the subjects, were offered support by Sparta. This allowed the subject states to reveal their real feelings towards Athens. If the Athenians were to join together with the Thebans, those who hated the Spartans would make their real feelings known (2.5.10-11).[5] The analogy of the two wars placed Athens and Thebes in a position comparable to that of Sparta during the Peloponnesian War. This analogy leads the reader to consider that if the Athenians become allies of Thebes, they too will be campaigning for the 'freedom' of the Greeks, while the Spartans will be on the side once occupied by Athens.

Thucydides, was mainly responsible for the decline of power at Athens (Thuc. 7.27). Second, the Thebans refused to assist the Spartans in the invasion of the Piraeus. The Spartans claimed that they persuaded the Corinthians to abstain as well, yet another reference which draws the reader back to the previous war. The third reason which is given is more immediate: the Thebans had prevented the Agesilaus from sacrificing at Aulis before his campaign in the East (3.4.3-4), a campaign in which the Thebans refused to take part.

[3] Translation Warner (1979).

[4] καὶ μὴν ὅτι μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, βούλοισθ' ἂν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν πρότερον ἐκέκτησθε ἀναλαβεῖν πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα· τοῦτο δὲ πῶς μᾶλλον εἰκὸς γενέσθαι ἢ εἰ αὐτοὶ τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀδικουμένοις βοηθοῖτε; (Xen. *HG* 3.5.10).

[5] c.f. Thuc. 2.8.

Next the Thebans identify the stakes of the war for any who may not have been convinced by the Peloponnesian War allusion.

> The Spartans, now that things have gone well for them, think it perfectly proper to set up their own helots as governors, and meanwhile treat their free allies as though they were slaves. And as for the people whom they got to revolt from you [Athens], they made their deception quite clear. What they gave them was not freedom but a double measure of servitude. These people are now under the absolute authority not only of governors but also of the [c]ommittees of [t]en which Lysander set up in each city.[6]

> ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εἵλωτας ἁρμοστὰς ἀξιοῦσι καθιστάναι, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων ἐλευθέρων ὄντων, ἐπεὶ ηὐτύχησαν, δεσπόται ἀναπεφήνασιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὓς ὑμῶν ἀπέστησαν φανεροί εἰσιν ἐξηπατηκότες· ἀντὶ γὰρ ἐλευθερίας διπλῆν αὐτοῖς δουλείαν παρεσχήκασιν· ὑπό τε γὰρ τῶν ἁρμοστῶν τυραννοῦνται καὶ ὑπὸ δέκα ἀνδρῶν, οὓς Λύσανδρος κατέστησεν ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει (*HG* 3.5.12-13).

By accusing the Spartans of enslaving the Greek city-states, the Thebans advocate a positive role for themselves as liberators of Greece. This is the first divisive speech in the *Hellenica* regarding relations among Greek city-states after peace has been established in Athens. The extent to which this speech is deceitfully inflammatory is revealed by what may be regarded as an inconsistency in the narration. Shortly before this speech at 3.4.2, Xenophon noted that the councils of ten had been dissolved by the ephors at Sparta and a proclamation had been issued allowing all cities to return to their traditional constitutions.[7] Following the decree Xenophon stated that there was much confusion in the cities regarding their ancestral constitutions since 'there were no longer democracies, as there had been

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[6] Translation Warner (1979).

[7] After Iphicrates' invasion of Phlius the citizens hand over the city to the Spartans for protection. When the threat of a Corinthian invasion passes the Spartans return the city to the Phliasians and allow them to live under their own laws (4.4.15). According to Diodorus (14.10) *harmosts* and oligarchic governments were ubiquitous in Greece, but these were disbanded between 403 and 402 when Lysander and his proxies began to lose administrative control in Athens and in the East (Hornblower 1991: 184).

when Athens was in control, nor were there the committees of ten, as under Lysander' (3.4.7).[8] At one and the same time Xenophon has stated that the committees of ten had been dissolved, but that it was the councils of ten that constituted enslavement at the hands of Sparta. Rather than question Xenophon's aptitude as an historian, these contradictions should be examined, as they become meaningful in light of Xenophon's position regarding the usefulness of rhetoric and the *kalos kagathos*.

Had the Thebans simply stated that they were fighting for the 'freedom' of the Greeks, their speech would have evoked images of the Persian Wars, when heroic men and cities, most notably not Thebes, defended the freedom of the Greeks and the identity of the Greek people; to be Greek was to defend freedom. Anyone who failed to take up arms in the name of freedom would have feared accusations of being 'ungreek', a reputation the Thebans had carried for some time, having medized in the Persian Wars.

The metaphor of freedom and slavery invoked by Thebes was clearly not apt: as the situation stands, Sparta had already 'freed' the city-states from the committees of ten. George Lakoff notes that when metaphors appear in debate it is often a sign that the argument is weak.[9] Not only have the Thebans lied, but they themselves provoked the war. Framing the cause of the conflict in terms of 'freedom' and 'slavery', which had become metaphors for 'good/just' and 'bad/unjust', allowed the Thebans to give a 'just' cause for the war even though none existed. By playing upon the emotions and attitudes shared by all Greeks, namely that 'freedom' was good and 'enslavement' was bad, the Thebans persuaded potential allies that their cause was the 'right' one. The language of 'freedom' and 'slavery' had become a means of justifying the precipitation of a war without a defendable cause, especially in this case, as the war had been incited by the Persians. Xenophon reveals to the reader that the Thebans' claims to be 'freeing' are not to be trusted. He does this by having the Thebans lie about the Spartan harmosts in their speech, a fact which is proven false in the narrative.

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[8] Translation Warner (1979).
[9] Lakoff (2004: 22).

8.2 Apollonia and Acanthus versus Olynthus

The last references to political freedom in the *Hellenica* all refer to paradigms of subordination involving a conflict of the Olynthians with the Apollonians and Acanthians. Fearing that the Olynthians would force them into an alliance, a fear which was later realised (*HG* 5.3.1), ambassadors from Acanthus and Apollonia asked the Spartans to help them stop the spread of Olynthian power. The ambassador from Acanthus, Cligenes, began his speech by listing the crimes committed by Olynthus.

> The Olynthians induced other cities to combine with them on the basis of one system of laws and a common citizenship; they then went on to take over some of the larger cities. The next objective was the liberation of the cities of Macedonia from the Macedonian king, Amyntas, and as soon as the nearest cities had come over to them they were quick to take the next step and proceed against the more distant and larger ones.[10]

> οὗτοι τῶν πόλεων προσηγάγοντο ἐφ' ᾧτε νόμοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι καὶ συμπολιτεύειν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν μειζόνων προσέλαβόν τινας. ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐπεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου τοῦ Μακεδόνων βασιλέως. ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰσήκουσαν αἱ ἐγγύτατα αὐτῶν, ταχὺ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς πόρρω καὶ μείζους ἐπορεύοντο (5.2.12-13).

When the representatives from Acanthus and Apollonia appealed to Sparta for help, it was not because they were concerned about their own 'freedom', even though they could have easily made this claim. Instead the argument which was posited placed the liberators, the Olynthians, on the side of injustice. For the Acanthians and Apollonians being freed meant being coerced into an alliance. On the eve of the Corinthian War, the Thebans successfully persuaded the Athenians to join their cause by accusing the Spartans of enslaving free allies. But those very same allies which were enslaved by Sparta were states which had been freed from

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[10] Translation Warner (1979).

Athens during the Peloponnesian War. If the Olynthians were wrong in garnering support through liberation, then so too must the Thebans.

In case the Spartans were still unwilling to help the Acanthians, Cligenes gave the Spartans a reason to help which would also serve their own interests: ambassadors from Athens and Thebes were already consorting with the Olynthians (5.2.15). The Spartans surely would have felt that an alliance between former enemy states with an emerging superpower was a threat, especially if the superpower claimed to be 'freeing' city-states from Macedon.[11] Although Cligenes had argued that the Thebans and Athenians had already sent ambassadors to the Olynthians, Leontiades contradicted this statement in a speech before the Spartan assembly justifying Phoebidas' invasion of Thebes. He stated that 'in the full knowledge that you [Sparta] were making war on the Olynthians, Thebes was arranging an alliance with Olynthus' (5.2.34). The Theban and Athenian alliance with Olynthus was used to persuade the Spartans to send aid to the smaller states in Thrace; after the Spartans sent troops to Thrace, it was the Spartan war against Olynthus which was given as explanation for Thebes' alliance with Olynthus. Both cannot be true. These contradictions were not mistakes on Xenophon's part, but instead demonstrated that Cligenes and Leontiades were using language to persuade those listening to act in the interest of the speaker, which was not necessarily in their own interests.

Similarly, in a later speech Polydamus of Pharsalus, seeking help from Sparta in an imminent war with Jason of Pherae, provided a quote from Jason:

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[11] The Spartans decide to send out an army to Thrace as quickly as possible so that cities which were not part of the Olynthian alliance would not be forced to join, and so that those who were already members would be less reliable allies (5.2.23). The appointed general, Eudamidas, convinces the ephors to allow his brother, Phoebidas, to take part in the invasion. Instead of marching straight to Thrace, Phoebidas makes a detour in Thebes, where he becomes involved in a conflict between two political parties, led on one side by Ismenias, and on the other by Leontiadas. While Leontiadas supported friendly relations with Sparta, Ismenias was the Theban responsible for accepting the Persian bribe that initially led to the Corinthian War. After helping Phoebidas gain control of the acropolis, Leontiades delivers a speech to the Theban council in which he claims that the Spartans have come with no intention of starting a war. Calling upon a law that stated that it was right to arrest any man who has committed acts worthy of the death penalty, Leontiades called for the arrest of Ismenias on charges of being a war-monger (5.2.30). Thus those responsible for inciting the war against Sparta were punished and the Thebans have atoned for their role in precipitating the Corinthian War by punishing Ismenias, the Theban leader who was responsible for taking the Persian bribe and inciting the hostilities which led to the Corinthian War (5.2.35).

> Boeotia and all other states now at war with Sparta are allies of mine, and I can assure you that they would accept my leadership, too, if only I freed them from the Spartans.[12]
>
> καὶ μὴν Βοιωτοί γε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι Λακεδαιμονίοις πολεμοῦντες ὑπάρχουσί μοι σύμμαχοι· καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν τοίνυν ἀξιοῦσιν ἐμοί, ἂν μόνον ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐλευθερῶ αὐτούς (*HG* 6.1.10).

Polydamus mentioned Jason's intent to 'free' the Greeks from Sparta in order to persuade the Spartans that Jason was as much a threat to them as he was to Pharsalus. Like the Acanthians and Apollonians, who viewed Olynthus' 'freeing' of city-states as a threat, Polydamus and Sparta both recognised that Jason's 'freeing' was a means of gaining allies, and therefore a threat. Not only has 'freedom' become a rhetorical tool of persuasion, as the Thebans' speech to the Athenians shows, but its alignment with false pretence makes it a dangerous rhetorical tool. To free a state no longer belonged to the realm of positive political rhetoric. As freedom had become a means of securing alliances and even 'enslavement', the line between 'freedom' and 'slavery' had become blurred. The speeches of the Thebans, Cligenes, and Polydamus demonstrate how the language of 'freedom' and 'slavery' was used in speeches where the speaker was persuading the audience to commit acts which were in the interest of the speaker, but not necessarily in the interest of the intended audience. Passages in the narrative portion of *Hellenica* in which the evidence given by the speakers is contradicted demonstrate that the speaker was engaged in deception and therefore invoked words which were ambiguous in order to garner support. These words, which Thucydides called ὀνόματα, were the very sorts of words like 'love' which Socrates, in the *Phaedrus* (263a-b) argued were used to deceive the audience in small increments.[13]

Discussions in the *Memorabilia* concerning 'slavery' and whether it could ever be 'just' suggest that there were times that 'freeing' could be 'unjust', but as

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[12] Translation Warner (1979).
[13] See pages 247-49.

Xenophon's biography of Agesilaus revealed, the enslavement of Greek cities was never just. The persuasiveness of the Thebans' speech before the Athenians was strengthened by their appeal to emotive language like 'freedom' and 'slavery'. Ultimately this language helped them instigate the first violent conflict among the Greeks since the fall of Athens. Through the speech of the Thebans, Xenophon revealed the power of 'freedom' to incite violence. These passages show that the rhetoric of 'freedom' served to divide and was a means of making diplomacy a tool of war rather than an alternative to violence. This was at odds with Xenophon's statement in the *Memorabilia* that persuasion was the most powerful means of avoiding violence.

Xenophon's statement regarding persuasion at *Mem.* 1.2.10-11 and passages in which speakers used deception to incite violence may seem contradictory, but they are consistent with Xenophon's solution to the flaws of rhetoric: the one speaking must embody the virtues of the *kalos kagathos*. Xenophon's description of Agesilaus' lifestyle indicates that he would be deemed a *kalos kagathos*. A passage from the *Hellenica* in which Agesilaus must determine whether someone's actions are 'just' or 'unjust' suggests that Xenophon has removed the moral ambiguity of concepts frequently used as persuasive tools by prescribing that the one who leads the city-state and advises what is best be a *kalos kagathos*.

When the Spartans learned that Phoebidas, on his way to Olynthus, invaded Thebes and aligned himself with the faction leader Leontiades, Agesilaus stated that whether Phoebidas' actions were 'just' should be determined by the established νόμμον: actions which are bad for Sparta are 'unjust'; actions which are good for Sparta are 'just' (*HG* 5.2.32). The standard of 'justice' set by Agesilaus was nearly identical to that of the Spartans who determined whether the Plataeans were guilty or innocent by asking them if they have done anything to help the cause of the Spartans (Thuc. 3.52.4).[14] Any action which was deemed useful and just with respect to one's city was deemed just. However, because Xenophon equates 'justice' with acting in accordance with νόμοι, and given that different city-states establish different νόμοι to serve their particular interests, different city-states will produce different standards of what is 'just'. Rather than

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[14] See Chapter Five, section 4.

'fixing' standards of justice, Xenophon allows for competing interests that result in competing standards of justice.

These passages demonstrate how speakers used the language of 'freedom' and 'slavery' as a deceptive, persuasive tool. To 'free' was good, while to 'enslave' was bad, and therefore these words could be used to persuade people to do things which were not in their interest. Thucydides noted this through his use of 'freedom' as an ὄνομα. Discussions in the *Memorabilia* concerning whether 'enslavement' was 'just' or 'unjust', and the conclusion that it could be either, indicates that whether 'freeing' or 'enslaving' were 'right' or 'wrong' depended on the context. By describing 'slavery' as a 'thing' which must be categorised, Xenophon recognised that 'freedom' and 'slavery' were not always synonymous with 'good/just' and 'bad/unjust'. Speeches from the *Hellenica* demonstrate how the language of 'freedom' could be used to persuade people to act. By making these speeches inconsistent with narrative, Xenophon reveals the deceptive nature of the speaker's intent, which was couched in the language of 'freedom'. The Thebans' speech to the Athenians was laden with metaphors of 'freedom' and 'slavery'. Ultimately the Athenians were persuaded to side with the Thebans in a war which the Thebans had provoked. 'Freedom' was used in this case not because the Thebans think it was 'just' or 'right' to 'free' people, but because the language of 'freedom' roused people to arms and incited violence. Cligenes' and Polydamus' speeches demonstrate how the framing of persuasive speeches through the language of 'freedom' could be negative: both speakers expressed fears that another city was 'forcing alliances' by 'freeing' them (5.2.23). In each of these cases 'freedom' was used because it either provoked violence, or because it could be used to show that an enemy was to be feared: the language of 'freedom' was a divisive tool rather than one which unified. None of these speeches portray 'freedom' positively.

Although both Thucydides and Xenophon were critical of how 'freedom' was used rhetorically, their approaches to this critique were quite different. The Athenians subverted justice in order to persuade others that what was in their interest was 'right', while the Spartans took advantage of morally ambiguous acts such as 'freeing' in order to garner goodwill and support for their cause, which in reality resulted in the enslavement or killing of citizens. Thucydides engages in a narrative on language throughout his history by revealing how value-laden

concepts which are culturally embedded are destabilised when men act in accordance with φύσις rather than νόμος. Thucydides exposes this principle as one of the underlying causes of the *stasis* and strife between city-states, and, at the same time, reveals how language, as much as armed conflict, fails to mitigate hostilities. Xenophon, on the other hand, provides a remedy for the destabilisation of language by establishing guidelines for an individual to determine whether an action was 'good/just' or 'bad/unjust'. The standard of justice set by Agesilaus in the trial of Phoebidas indicates that whether or not actions were just was determined by their relationship to the good of the city and the citizens. Agesilaus believed that justice could be determined by the interest of the state. From Xenophon's perspective, what was good for the city was good for the citizens. Unlike Thucydides and Sophocles, whose works demonstrated a keen awareness of how the actions of the state affected and were often at odds with the interests of the citizens, Xenophon believed that ultimately what benefited the state benefited the citizens. The irony of Xenophon's solution is that he has reconstructed a scenario which allows for competing conceptualisations of justice.

8.3 Agesilaus and Pharnabazus

A discussion between Pharnabazus, a Persian satrap, and Agesilaus provides an example of how the concept of 'freedom' could occur in speech not in order to deceive, but in order to achieve one's goal without deception. While in Dascylium, Agesilaus received an audience with Pharnabazus. In Pharnabazus' dialogue with the Greek King, Pharnabazus expressed to Agesilaus that he felt he had been treated unjustly by the Greek forces: having supplied money and having fought beside the Spartans in the previous war, he was living like a fugitive in his own land (4.1.32-33). Pharnabazus conceded that the injustice he felt might be due to a misunderstanding of honour and justice. If this was the case, Pharnabazus asked Agesilaus to show that this sort of behavior was the 'right behavior for men who are repaying kindness that they have received' (4.1.33). This is one of the rare instances where an historian discusses openly the ambiguity of words. Even

though people may speak the same language or use the same words, they might not mean the same thing.[15]

The Spartans were filled with shame by Pharnabazus' request for clarification and silence ensued. Agesilaus reassured the king that he was being treated no differently than any other Greek during a time of war. When the Greeks were at war with one another men often fought against their fatherlands and friends killed friends. Since the Greeks were at war with Persians, Agesilaus explained that everything and everyone belonging to the king of Persia would be treated as hostile. He advised Pharnabazus that if being an ally of the Greeks meant simply changing one master for another, then he should remain loyal to the king. But since loyalty to the king prevented him from fully enjoying his own possessions and forced him to pay homage to a master, he might want to consider shifting his loyalties. Agesilaus continued:

> And, as I see it, it is better to be free than to have all the money in the world. This, however, is not what we are advising—that you should be free and at the same time poor. What we suggest is that you should, by using us as your allies, add, not to the King's empire, but to your own, and that you should bring into subjection to yourself those who are now, like you, slaves of another. And so, if you become free and rich at the same time, what else could you desire to make you completely happy?[16]
>
> καίτοι ἐλεύθερον εἶναι ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι ἀντάξιον εἶναι τῶν πάντων χρημάτων. οὐδὲ μέντοι τοῦτό σε κελεύομεν, πένητα μέν, ἐλεύθερον δ' εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν συμμάχοις χρώμενον αὔξειν μὴ τὴν βασιλέως ἀλλὰ τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀρχήν, τοὺς νῦν ὁμοδούλους σοι καταστρεφόμενον, ὥστε σοὺς ὑπηκόους εἶναι. καίτοι εἰ ἅμα ἐλεύθερός τ'εἴης καὶ πλούσιος γένοιο, τίνος ἂν δέοις μὴ οὐχὶ πάμπαν εὐδαίμων εἶναι; (*HG* 4.1.35-36).

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[15] Similarly Mardonius argues that the Greeks should use messengers and heralds to settle their differences rather than go to war, especially since they all speak the same language (Hdt. 7.9). However, even though they speak the same language the conflicts arise not from misunderstandings, but from conflicts between νόμοι which render all actions 'just'.
[16] Translation Warner (1979).

At the very beginning of Book Four, Xenophon stated that Agesilaus had long been wanting to win over a nation of Persia as an ally (4.1.2), and his speech to Pharnabazus aimed to do just that. In an attempt to win over the Persian, Agesilaus defined freedom as the ability to enjoy one's possessions fully, while adding to them by ruling over others, rather than being a subject to the king. However, these terms of 'freedom' do not preclude 'ruling' over others. Consequently this conceptualisation of 'freedom' is not one which is entirely Greek. Its 'Greekness' has been mitigated by emphasising not absence of a single ruler, but rather the rights accorded to Pharnabazus which would be appealing to him if he were to choose an alliance with Agesilaus.

In this passage Agesilaus recognised that 'freedom' from a Greek perspective would not be appealing to a Persian, who would lose his possessions in order to be 'free' from the Persian king. Although it would have been ideologically useful for Agesilaus to capitalise on the Persian idea of 'nobles' as 'slaves',[17] Agesilaus' objective was not to promote the panhellenic cause of war against Persia, but to create an alliance with Pharnabazus. This was nearly the opposite scenario presented by Herodotus at the end of Book Eight, when the Persians claimed that the Athenians would still be 'free' even if they joined the Persian Empire. Despite the similarities between these passages, there are some significant differences. In the passage from Herodotus, Herodotus has given a Persian perspective of 'freedom' in order to compare the Athenians' actions after the Persian Wars to their past glory, and to reveal that 'freedom' offered by a more powerful state to weaker ultimately only serves to confirm and strengthen the principles by which the greater power administers its rule.[18] Agesilaus' appeals to 'freedom' lacked the rhetorical gravitas of the Thebans' speech to the Athenians precisely because he knew that the language of 'freedom' did not have the same emotive draw for the Persians as it did for the Greeks. Consequently he only spoke of 'free' in the sense of not being ruled by the Persian King, and instead focused on the number of subjects he would acquire through an alliance with Sparta. Even though Agesilaus was using speech to persuade Pharnabazus that an alliance was in his interest, this sort of persuasive speech was acceptable.

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[17] Missiou (1993: 390-91).
[18] See Chapter Three, section 4.

Whereas the speeches of the Thebans, Cligenes and Polydamus all relied on the language of 'freedom' as persuasive tools, Agesilaus abandoned this rhetoric because it would not have been helpful for his cause. Furthermore, a comparison of Xenophon's narrative sections with the speeches of the Thebans, Cligenes and Polydamus reveals that all of these speeches are deceptive. The main difference between these speeches and Agesilaus' was that the Thebans, Cligenes and Polydamus used the language of 'freedom' to deceive the Greeks. Agesilaus' speech, on the other hand, was deceptive, but he was deceiving Persians rather than Greeks.

8.4 Freedom in Rhetoric: Historical *Exempla* and Xenophon's *Anabasis*

In addition to the example of Agesilaus' speech, the language of 'freedom' could be invoked for positive aims through historical exempla. While Thucydides engaged with the past in order to examine the underlying principles motivating the actions of men, and Herodotus used the past to engage with the present to create irony, Xenophon engaged with the past in order to provide examples to be imitated. This novel form of reproducing the past was a product of Xenophon's moralisation of history which was meant to aid the reader in his quest to be a *kalos kagathos*. As I shall demonstrate, Xenophon addresses the conflict inherent in equating justice with the interests of the state by advocating the creation of a foreign enemy against whom all unite for a common cause.With this increased focus on morality there was a rise in the use of historical exempla, both in speeches to soldiers before battle, and in the narration itself; in the case of the former the primary audience was the army before battle and the reader a secondary audience; in the case of the latter the reader was the primary target. The emergence of historical exempla was the product of viewing history as having a moralising purpose: by recounting memories which exemplified 'good' or 'just' acts, the study of history could be useful. The following section will analyse how examples from the past could be used to achieve goals in the present, and how the language of 'freedom' was used in these exempla.

Evidence independent of Xenophon's works indicates that the language of 'freedom' and the appropriation of the past had become common motifs in persuasive speeches. Xenophon's treatment of 'freedom' was influenced not only by past exploitations of 'freedom', but by the abuse of this language which he

witnessed in his own time. The over-exuberance for 'freedom' displayed in Aspasia's funeral oration in Plato's *Menexenus* indicates that Xenophon was not the only one in the Socratic circle to feel that the term had become trite. While some have argued that the *Menexenus* is not an authentic work by Plato, others, such as Frances Pownall, have argued in favour of authenticity on the grounds that Plato criticises the immoral use of the past, which was being abused by logographers.[19] As Loraux and Henderson have both noted, the funeral oration of the *Menexenus* is satiric, a parody of the funeral orations, and quite possibly a parody of Pericles' funeral oration, which, unlike most orations, is surprisingly factual.[20] Regardless of whether or not the *Menexenus* is authentic, it provides evidence of how commonplace it had become to narrate the past through the language of 'freedom'. Furthermore, the *Menexenus* offers a critical account of the devices used by rhetoricians from the perspective of one who belonged to the same philosophical circles as Xenophon. By offering an exaggerated account of a funeral oration, it exposes how historical exempla and the language of freedom could be used as persuasive tools.

In the *Menexenus*, Socrates recounts a funeral oration given by Aspasia, whom Socrates claimed was his rhetoric teacher (Pl. *Mn.* 236a-b). In the following section, Plato's *Menexenus* will be examined, as this work provides valuable evidence for contemporary criticism of rhetorical language, most notably 'freedom', and the use of historical exempla in speeches. This examination will be followed by an analysis of historical exempla in Xenophon's historical works. Although Plato was highly critical of the 'gimmicks' employed by rhetoricians, Xenophon effectively uses them by moulding them to fit the agenda of the *kalos kagathos*.

At 240e the speaker explains how the past can be used to encourage, and to influence the future through exempla.[21] The speaker states that when the Greeks fight they draw inspiration from the men at Marathon who fought for their freedom: men on the field became disciples of their forefathers (Pl. *Mn.* 240e). Just how the past can be used to inspire confidence is elaborated shortly after:

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[19] Pownall (2004: 2).
[20] Loraux (1986: 143, 304-327); Henderson (1975: 33).
[21] I shall refer to the speaker of Aspasia's speech, which is delivered by Socrates, as the 'speaker'.

> And so the soldiers of Marathon and the sailors of Salamis became the schoolmasters of Hellas; the one teaching and habituating the Hellenes not to fear the barbarians at sea, and the others not to fear them by land. Third in order, for the number and valour of the combatants, and third in the salvation of Hellas, I place the battle of Plataea. And now the Lacedaemonians as well as the Athenians took part in the struggle; they were all united in this greatest and most terrible conflict of all; wherefore their virtues will be celebrated in times to come, as they are now celebrated by us.[22]
>
> ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων δὴ συμβαίνει, τῶν τε Μαραθῶνι μαχεσαμένων καὶ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχησάντων, παιδευθῆναι τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν κατὰ γῆν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν μαθόντας καὶ ἐθισθέντας μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς βαρβάρους. τρίτον δὲ λέγω τὸ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς ἔργον καὶ ἀριθμῷ καὶ ἀρετῇ γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς σωτηρίας, κοινὸν ἤδη τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων. τὸ μὲν οὖν μέγιστον καὶ χαλεπώτατον οὗτοι πάντες ἠμύναντο, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν νῦν τε ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἐγκωμιάζονται καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὑπὸ τῶν ὕστερον (Pl. *Mn.* 241b-c).

This passage stresses the importance and value of Persian War motifs for motivating soldiers in battle and setting the example of their forefathers for emulation. Like his contemporaries, Xenophon used images from the Persian Wars to motivate the soldiers, but as a *kalos kagathos* he was always careful to mention that Persians, not Greeks, were the enemy.

The importance of 'freedom' in a speech which was meant to be rhetorically persuasive and glorify the past is evident throughout the *Menexenus*. The speaker tells of the brave actions of the Greeks, and their courage and daring to fight on behalf of the 'freedom' of the Greeks. The struggles encountered by the Greeks are contextualised as ones between the forces of 'freedom' and 'slavery': the Persians were enslaving Europe, and the whole of Asia was eventually

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[22] Translation Ryan (1997).

enslaved to the third king of Persia (239d); the Athenians fought the Lacedaemonians for the freedom of the Boeotians (242a); the Athenians fought for the freedom of the Greeks against other Greeks (242b) and then fought for freedom on behalf of the people of Leontini (243a); once the Athenians, the champions of freedom, surrendered, the Spartans believed that they would be able to enslave Greeks cities (244c); the Athenians made the Greeks free from Sparta, until they enslaved themselves once again in the Corinthian War (245a). While the rest of the Greeks, the Corinthians, Argives and Boeotians, were prepared to make a treaty of alliance with the King of Persia, the Athenians alone refused his offer (245c).

According to the speaker, the reason for the Athenians' rejection of an alliance with Persia during the Peloponnesian War lies in the innate hatred of Athenians towards the barbarians. These platitudes based on ethnicity suggest that the speaker is appealing to a common belief among the Greeks that their hatred for the Persians was by nature and not a learned or conditioned hostility.

> That is how firm and sound the high-mindedness and freedom of our city are, how much we are naturally inclined to hate the barbarians, through being purely Greek with no barbarian taint. For people who are barbarians by birth but Greeks by law—offspring of Pelops, Cadmus, Aegyptus, Danaus and many others—do not dwell among us. We dwell apart—Greeks, not semibarbarians. Consequently, our city is imbued with undiluted hatred of a foreign nature.[23]

> οὕτω δή τοι τό γε τῆς πόλεως γενναῖον καὶ ἐλεύθερον βέβαιόν τε καὶ ὑγιές ἐστιν καὶ φύσει μισοβάρβαρον, διὰ τὸ εἰλικρινῶς εἶναι Ἕλληνας καὶ ἀμιγεῖς βαρβάρων. οὐ γὰρ Πέλοπες οὐδὲ Κάδμοι οὐδὲ Αἴγυπτοί τε καὶ Δαναοὶ οὐδὲ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ φύσει μὲν βάρβαροι ὄντες, νόμῳ δὲ Ἕλληνες, συνοικοῦσιν ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ Ἕλληνες, οὐ μειξοβάρβαροι οἰκοῦμεν, ὅθεν καθαρὸν τὸ μῖσος ἐντέτηκε τῇ πόλει τῆς ἀλλοτρίας φύσεως (Pl. *Mx.* 245c-d).

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[23] Translation Ryan (1997).

After stating this, the speaker proceeds to describe the defeat of the Spartans at sea by the Athenians in the East as the freeing of the king of Persia (246a). The act of freeing and slaving, it would seem, is not limited by race. Although earlier in the speech Cyrus was described as freeing the Medes (Pl. *Mn.* 239d-e), this act was confined to the East where upheavals of rulers by the ruled were typically described through the paradigm of freedom and slavery. The concept of 'freedom' is used at 246a in the most basic sense of the meaning: the Athenians released the Persian king from Spartan aggression.

Sacrificing accuracy in order to give the more popular version of historical events was a successful method of persuading an audience in the fourth century. As Loraux has noted funeral orations often omit events that do not glorify the city, or portray the city's defeats as being brought about by the city's own failures rather than through the greatness of the enemy.[24] Emphasis on the relevancy of these arguments and their ability to glorify, rather than their veracity, prevailed. In order to make themselves more appealing to the masses, orators often presented the popular version of events.[25] Studies in social memory have shown that a society's historical record, or social memory, is often shaped by its reaction to contemporary events.[26] Events are generalised and details are omitted in order to make history more pleasing to the masses.[27] The funeral oration of the *Menexenus* is unique in that the speaker does not avoid topics which may be unsettling to an Athenian audience. The speaker raises the point that Cyrus had freed the Persians and enslaved the Medes. The speaker goes on to enumerate the imperialist exploits of the Persians, forcing an Athenian audience to consider, as Pownall points out, the similarities between Athenian and Persian designs.[28] Similarly the speaker does not shy away from mentioning facts unflattering to Athens, such as the burning of Sardis during the Ionian Revolt, which could be considered justification for Darius' invasion. Plato, like Herodotus, used history to force his audience to reconsider Athenian imperialism in light of the Persian evidence. Pownall demonstrates that the speaker's attempt to use hatred of the barbarian, a common *topos* in Greek oratory, as justification for their actions is inept. Pownall

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[24] Loraux (1986: 133-34).
[25] Pownall (2004: 3, 38-39); Ober (1989: 190-91).
[26] Forsdyke (2006: 226).
[27] Pownall (2004: 40-45).
[28] Pownall (2004: 50-51); Lysias 2.21.

suggests that Plato was showing his disapproval of the revisionist histories of the orators by stating that the Athenians freed the king of Persia, when it had already been argued that the Athenian hatred of the barbarian was part of their nature (245c-d), and that it was right to wage war with the Greek until victory, but with the barbarian until they were destroyed (242d). By subverting a common *topos*, Plato was able to criticise the revisionist histories of the orators.[29]

Funeral orations tend to focus less on the Peloponnesian Wars than the Persian Wars.[30] Plato displays his contempt for the genre of funerary narrative by juxtaposing Athenian claims to have always fought for freedom and opposed the barbarian with evidence to the contrary. This combined with the fact that Plato has Socrates relay a speech with events from the Corinthian War in which the Athenians were responsible for enslaving Greece, an event which took place years after the death of Socrates, is 'a reminder to the reader to look beneath the surface of the verbal sophistries contained in the oratorical tradition for the underlying moral truth.'[31] While in the *Menexenus* Plato critiques the use of the past by logographers who revise history in order to make it suit their needs, the exempla in Xenophon's historical works serve to unify the Greeks. The *Menexenus* offers evidence of the sort of criticism of oratory to which Xenophon, belonging to similar circles, would have been exposed. Indeed, Xenophon himself offers criticisms through the construction of his narrative of those, such as the Thebans, who revise the past in order to persuade an audience. Xenophon, however, prescribes a solution to this flaw through historical exempla which emphasises not the difference between Greeks, but rather the differences between Greek and Persian. Isocrates' utopian vision served Athens' interests, but Xenophon's version of a utopian community was inclusive and its benefits not restricted to Athens alone.[32] To this end, Xenophon's historical exempla resonated with his utopian agenda, and his biography of Agesilaus, who opposed the enslavement of Greeks on the grounds that the numbers available to oppose the barbarian would be diminished. A panhellenistic crusade against Persia is lauded by Xenophon in the *Agesilaus*. He remarks that when the Greeks were fighting among themselves

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[29] Pownall (2004: 55-57); for the *topos* of freedom see also Thuc. 2.40.5; Lysias 2.14-15, 34, 42, 44, 47, 55, 68; Demosthenes 60.23; Hypereides 6.10, 16, 19, 24, 40.
[30] Pownall (2004: 57); Lysias 2.54-57; Demosthenes 60.11.
[31] Pownall (2004: 59).
[32] Dillery (1995: 98); Isoc. *Paneg*. 19-20.

Agesilaus was the only one who bothered not to neglect the common good by doing what harm he could to the Persians (*Ages.* 7.7).

Although the past could be used subversively, Xenophon shows how the past could be used by a *kalos kagathos* to do good to one's family, friends and state, which was the ultimate goal of the *kalos kagathos*. The only historical exemplum found in the *Hellenica* in which a struggle for 'freedom' was invoked in order to foster reconciliation occurred towards the end of the Peloponnesian War. After the battle, as Thrasybulus' men combed the field for arms, Cleocritus reminded the Athenians of their kindred blood and common traditions, and that they had braved together the 'dangers of land and sea in defence of...common safety and freedom (*HG* 2.4.20).[33] Cleocritus invoked the common bonds shared as grounds for ending the struggle. The fight for freedom alluded to in this passage was that of the Persian Wars when the Athenians united to defeat Persia, and not the Peloponnesian Wars, which, though offering plenty of examples of unification among Sparta, Athens and their respective allies, represented a dark period for the Hellenic world and would not have inspired reconciliation. During the Persian Wars, the concept of 'freedom' was described as a 'watchword' (σύνθημα) in the historical narratives of the war.[34] During the Ten Thousand's march home a different σύνθημα was adopted: Ζεὺς σωτὴρ καὶ νίκη (Zeus the saviour and victory) became the σύνθημα of the Greeks (*Anab.* 1.8.17); σωτηρία, or salvation, which occurs twenty-three times in the text, rather than ἐλευθερία, which occurs nine times becomes the dominant ideology.[35] As I shall argue, to speak of fighting for 'freedom' in the present led to conflict; therefore, the watchword of the Ten Thousand was σωτηρία. The concept of 'freedom' could be evoked for positive purposes only through historical exempla in which 'freedom' was being used in the context of the Persian Wars.

Historical exempla appear in the *Anabasis* when the Persian Wars were being appealed to as an encouragement to the soldiers. In each of the examples, when the Persian Wars were mentioned, freedom played a central role, but not because freedom itself was a virtue, but because the Persian Wars had been

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[33] Translation Warner (1979); καὶ πολλὰ μεθ' ὑμῶν κεκινδυνεύκαμεν καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς ἀμφοτέρων ἡμῶν σωτηρίας τε καὶ ἐλευθερίας.
[34] Flower and Marincola (2002: 274).
[35] The single reference to autonomy in the *Anabasis* occurs in a summary at the end of the text and is thought to have been added by later editors.

contextualised through the language of 'freedom'.[36] The struggle which had come to be understood in terms of 'freedom' represented for Xenophon, as it did for Herodotus, a period of unprecedented unity in the Greek world. As the first half of this chapter has shown, Agesilaus was opposed to the enslavement of Greeks on the grounds that it would diminish the number of people available to fight the barbarian. Exempla from the *Anabasis* suggest that Xenophon's solution for the fragmentation of the Greek world was twofold: the leaders must be *kaloi kagathoi*, and military campaigns must be directed towards the barbarian whose 'otherness' reminded the Greeks of the common qualities which united them, and which would force the Greeks to act not in the interests of individual city-states, but in the interests of a united Greece fighting a foreign enemy.

After the battle of Cunaxa and the death of Cyrus, Xenophon entered the scene as a leader in the march homewards. In a speech to the soldiers encouraging them to fight for their safety (σωτηρία), Xenophon reminded them of the glorious deeds of the past, when the Persians invaded Greece and the Athenians defeated the Persians. Xenophon urged the Greeks to be mindful of their struggle for freedom in the Persian Wars, an image which was meant to give the Ten Thousand confidence that they could defeat whatever obstacles the Persians might offer on their march home. In his speech to the soldiers, Xenophon reminded them of their struggle during the Persian Wars.

> Then, when Xerxes later on collected his innumerable army and came against Greece, there was another occasion when your fathers defeated the fathers of these people both on land and on sea. You can find proof of all this in the trophies we have, but the greatest piece of evidence of all is the freedom of the cities in which you have been born and brought up. For you worship no man as a master, but only the gods.[37]

> ἔπειτα ὅτε Ξέρξης ὕστερον ἀγείρας τὴν ἀναρίθμητον στρατιὰν ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τότε ἐνίκων οἱ ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι τοὺς τούτων προγόνους καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν. ὧν ἔστι μὲν

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[36] See pages 39-40.
[37] Translation Warner (1972b).

> τεκμήρια ὁρᾶν τὰ τρόπαια, μέγιστον δὲ μαρτύριον ἡ ἐλευθερία τῶν πόλεων ἐν αἷς ὑμεῖς ἐγένεσθε καὶ ἐτράφητε· οὐδένα γὰρ ἄνθρωπον δεσπότην ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς προσκυνεῖτε (*Anab.* 3.2.13).

When Xenophon spoke of freedom in this passage he attributed freedom to the cities and not to the individual. In order to encourage the soldiers to work together for their survival Xenophon drew from the unifying power of the Persian Wars rather than the Peloponnesian Wars. The Theban ambassador, on the other hand, made reference to the Peloponnesian War in a speech to the Athenians in order to incite strife (*HG* 3.5.10-11, 14-15). While the Persian Wars were used to promote unity among the Greeks, the Peloponnesian Wars were used in speeches to sow disagreement.

Xenophon's comparison between the worship of man as master and the gods in the passage above served a didactic purpose. Isocrates expressed his own disdain for mortal worship when he complained that the Persians prostrated themselves before men, 'thinking more lightly of the gods than of men' (*Pan.* 151).[38] When the soldiers around Cyrus at Cunaxa prostrated themselves before him, the word which was used is προσκυνεῖν (1.8.21), the very same word used by Xenophon above at 3.2.12 to describe the worship of man instead of gods. By alluding to the Persian defeat at the beginning of the fifth century as well as expressing contempt for the Persian practice of prostrating before the king, Xenophon was making the best of a very bad situation. Cyrus, the man whom they had followed and obeyed, was dead. No longer could they bow before a man; now they must behave as proper Greeks and bow before the gods. In situations such as this one, invoking the glorious past of one's ancestors provided an example for the soldiers to follow.

Xenophon also must remind the soldiers that even though they do not bow before their generals, they must obey them. Such emphasis on discipline may seem gratuitous, but necessary when one recalls the Ionians of Herodotus' *Histories* who claimed that they were free men and therefore did not have to obey military commanders. They paid heavily for their disobedience; having lost in

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[38] Isocrates and Xenophon were peers and friends according to Diogenes Laertius (2.55) who composed an encomium for Xenophon's son, Gryllus, when he died in 362 (Gray 1998: 5).

battle to the Persians, they were enslaved (Hdt. 6.9-18). Throughout the *Anabasis*, Xenophon must remind the soldiers that being free and Greek citizens did not exempt them from obedience. After the Ten Thousand stormed the gates of Byzantium, Xenophon, fearing that proximity to the homeland would lead to disunity,[39] delivered the following admonishment: 'My advice to you is that, since you are Greeks yourselves, you should try to get justice by obeying the leaders of the Greeks' (7.1.30).[40] Presumably these generals were *kaloi kagathoi*, whose knowledge of wisdom and morality would be able to guide the soldiers. Xenophon's speech recounted the horrors of the Peloponnesian War, images which were meant to deter the Ten Thousand from making war on their native cities, friends and kinsmen. The exempla which Xenophon used in his speeches served to remind the soldiers that freedom and the worship of gods was intrinsic to the Greek identity, but that σωτηρία could only be achieved through obedience to generals.

Howland suggests that even though the *Anabasis* is an historical text, its philosophical underpinnings and resonances with Plato's *Republic* render it equally philosophical.[41] In what follows, I suggest that Xenophon's *Anabasis* is philosophical to the extent that he uses the march of the Ten Thousand as the model of a panhellenic crusade to demonstrate how the Greeks might be unified when faced with a common enemy.[42] By creating a common enemy Xenophon is able to reconcile the conflicting interests and competing standards of justice among the Greeks. John Dillery's narrative analysis of the expedition of the Ten Thousand suggests that the *Anabasis* itself is a model for how the Greeks are most united when faced with a common enemy. The *Anabasis*, according to Dillery, can be divided into two sections. The end of the first section is marked by Cyrus' death, while the second phase consists of the march back to Greece. The first two references to political freedom occur during the first phase of the expedition before Cyrus has died (1.7.3; 2.5.33). During the second phase of the expedition Xenophon formally entered the scene as a leader. He delivered a speech to the soldiers which included the last reference to political freedom in the *Anabasis*

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[39] Dillery (1995: 91-95).
[40] Translation Warner (1972b); καὶ ὑμῖν δὲ συμβουλεύω Ἕλληνας ὄντας τοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων προεστηκόσι πειθομένους πειρᾶσθαι τῶν δικαίων τυγχάνειν.
[41] Howland (2000: 875-89).
[42] Flower (2000: 65-101).

until the Ten Thousand reached the sea (3.2.13). For the duration of the march to the sea there was no mention of political freedom. This is the period in which the army was most efficient and most successful, and, as Dillery notes, least like a polis.[43] Few if any meetings of the general assembly were called; decisions were not made jointly, but were made by a charismatic leader of an extraordinary command, called a demagogue by the Spartans (*An.* 7.6.4).[44]

That unity was the most important factor for the survival of troops is made clear from the disastrous consequences of disunity in the *Hellenica*.[45] Dillery has noted that this emphasis on unity may have led Xenophon to suggest a settlement in the East; if the desire to return home was causing disunity among the soldiers, then a utopian community would be the most obvious solution.[46] This community would be comprised of citizens from a variety of states, as many as those which took part in the expedition, and would represent the ultimate act of panhellenism: the colonisation of Persia. A Panhellenic crusade against Persia was lauded by Xenophon in the *Agesilaus*. He remarked that when the Greeks were fighting among themselves Agesilaus was the only one who bothered not to neglect the common good by doing what harm he could to the Persians (*Ages.* 7.7). Agesilaus, Xenophon's *kalos kagathos*, who exemplified 'freedom' and who made wise and informed decisions in the interest of the state, not only opposed the enslavement of Greek by Greek, but chose to fight the barbarian instead of his fellow Greeks. Thus one who was a *kalos kagathos* recognised that it was in the interest of the Greeks to campaign against Persia and to restrict mention of 'freedom' to 'freedom from' Persia. Since each of Xenophon's speeches has some mention of the struggle for 'freedom' from Persia, one might infer that Xenophon believed himself to be a *kalos kagathos*.

It is significant that freedom was entirely absent from Xenophon's narration of the march to the sea. Up to this point in the historiography of the Greek word, panhellenism has been portrayed as being closely aligned with the concept of 'freedom'. In Herodotus' *Histories*, Bias of Priene suggested that the Ionians set sail and found a city in order to avoid being enslaved by Persia (Hdt.

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[43] Dillery (1995: 93).
[44] This is the first extant use of 'demagogue'; in the negative sense (Dillery 1995: 93).
[45] Wencis (1977: 44-49) notes that suspicion also functions as a narrative theme in the march of the Ten Thousand.
[46] Dillery (1995: 87).

1.170). Thales of Miletus argued that Teos ought to be established as the seat of a governing council for all of Ionia (Hdt. 1.170). The Athenians in Herodotus' *Histories* argued that all Greeks share a common culture and therefore would not surrender to Persia (Hdt. 8.144). The Greek city-states joined together in one league after the Persian Wars in order to facilitate defensive measures against Persia. The era of the Peloponnesian Wars marked an end to the reality of panhellenism as power politics and the interests of individual states made it impossible for city-states to live in harmony. In the utopian vision of the *Anabasis,* Xenophon considered the conditions necessary for the emergence of a peaceful, if not unified, Greek world; the absence of freedom during the march to the sea suggests that the polarising language of freedom had no place in Xenophon's utopian vision. Although freedom may have served as a unifying feature of the Persian Wars, in a post-Peloponnesian War era freedom was a divisive word which threatened whatever unity may have existed. Consequently its use by Xenophon wishing to seem unbiased was restricted to historical exempla.

It cannot be denied that identity-affirming language such as political freedom would be most apt for a Greek contingent trapped in the East, but the only time that freedom was mentioned in the *Anabasis* was through historical exempla. The Ten Thousand were a band of mercenaries who acted in defiance of the Spartans, who were, at the time, loosely aligned with Persia. The political freedom of the Ten Thousand was not a relevant issue for the soldiers, who were more concerned with the monetary rewards of their service. Instead the greed of the soldiers was contrasted with the relative poverty of the Greeks who won their freedom in the Persian Wars. False notions concerning one's status as a 'freeman' or 'slave' and wealth was a common motif in the *Memorabilia*, suggesting that Xenophon was engaging philosophically with notions of wealth and freedom at the beginning of the *Anabasis*.

It is not a coincidence that the majority of references to 'freedom' in a political context in the *Anabasis* occur in exempla. The exempla in the historical works which involve 'freedom' are abundant: Cyrus invoked the Persian War and Greek freedom in order to persuade the Greeks to fight for him (1.7.3);[47]

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[47] See Appendix.

Xenophon encouraged the Ten Thousand to fight by reminding them that they are the descendants of men who fought in the Persian Wars; Cleocritus spoke of the Persian Wars in order to foster reconciliation; the Thebans at the start of the Corinthian War reminded the Athenians of the Peloponnesian War in order to gain allies for their war with Sparta. Such references are historical metaphors which were not meant to explain the cause of the conflict, but were persuasive tools. As the Thebans' speech to the Athenians demonstrated, the concept of 'freedom' could divide just as easily as unify men. Consequently, when 'freedom' was invoked, it was the 'freedom' of the Persian Wars which was mentioned, which reminded the Greeks of the struggle of their forefathers against the barbarian. The very mention of the barbarian reminded the Greeks of the 'otherness' of Persia and of the common customs, religion, and language which unified them.

Passages from the *Menexenus* in which the Athenians were described as harbouring a hatred towards the barbarian based on their 'foreign nature' is a testament to the popularity of such sentiments. The fact that the harmony among the Ten Thousand became more and more fragmented the closer they come to Greek cities suggests that Xenophon himself recognised the benefits of portraying the Persians as 'other'. However, this 'otherness' is a contrived otherness. As Herodotus reveals the Greeks were capable of adopting νόμοι, or institutions of ruling, that were comparable to those of the Persians, which, from a Greek perspective, constituted enslavement. Even if Xenophon did not believe that the Persians were 'other' by nature, his speech at Byzantium in the *Anabasis* indicates that he was aware that the Greeks were most unified when Persia posed a threat. Although the tone of the *Menexenus* suggests that it was written as a parody of contemporary rhetoric which abused concepts such as 'freedom' and the popular myth that the Persians were different by nature, φύσις, unlike the *Menexenus*, Xenophon's works, and the antagonism of Agesilaus towards Persia, were meant to be useful. The very fact that Xenophon went to great lengths to show how the Persian and Greek conceptualisations of 'freedom' differed suggests that Xenophon did not believe that Persians and Greeks were different by nature, even though he felt that employing such rhetoric could be used for the ultimate goal of

unifying the Greeks. Xenophon is fairly accurate in his description of Persian vassalage.[48] That being said, he does routinely compare Persian 'servitude' or 'nobility' to Greek 'freedom' in order to promote a panhellenic ideology.

Wars and conflicts fought in the name of 'freedom' could only be mentioned if the purpose of the speech served the interest of Greece and its goal of unification, or if it was used in an historical exempla which reminded the Greeks that there was a greater enemy to fear than a Greek one. While Plato was more interested in establishing a school of philosophy through Socrates' teachings, Xenophon was more concerned with making Socrates accessible and useful. Even if Xenophon himself did not believe that the Persians were foreign by 'nature' rather than by 'convention' one who was a *kalos kagathos*, one who was able to discern what was in the interest of the state—or rather a unified Greece—could employ such rhetoric for the purpose of unification. So long as the advice of the *kalos kagathos* served the interest of the state and the interest of Greece, whatever the *kalos kagathos* deemed 'good' was just. By creating a common enemy, Xenophon is able to reconcile the competing interests of city-states and the competing standards of justice as well.

In an attempt to put an end to conflicts which were exacerbated by rhetoricians who took advantage of moral ambiguity, Xenophon established the state and the *kalos kagathos* who guided the state, as the controller of morality. Even though inconsistencies in Xenophon's *Hellenica* suggest that he believed that 'freedom' was a dangerous rhetorical term, it could reasonably be used so long as its use did not incite violence among the Greeks. Since the act of 'freeing' and 'enslaving' could be good or bad depending on how the act affected the interests of the state and unity of Greece, only one who was a *kalos kagathos* could properly discern the right time, context and the manner in which such emotionally charged rhetoric could be employed.

Although the Athenians played a critical role in securing this 'freedom', Xenophon reconceptualises what it means for an individual to be 'free' due to what he felt were the limitations of 'freedom' imposed on aristocrats in Athens, namely that those endowed with the knowledge of 'right' and 'wrong' enjoyed a role in government no greater than the masses. Those living in a democracy enjoyed the

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[48] Brock (2004: 255-56).

'freedom' to participate in the government, and, in this sense, democracy offered its citizens 'positive freedom'; men were given the right to participate in and have an influence on government. However, because positions were chosen by lot, those managing the government were not necessarily in possession of moral virtue and could not, therefore, make decisions which were in the interest of the state. Xenophon provides the example of the Ten Thousand, who were most efficient, yet operated least like a polis, as an example of how men might be organised best under the leadership of one who was a *kalos kagathos*. This person, free from inner conflicts and desires, a person who was in possession of 'self-mastery', might best lead the people themselves in a crusade against Persia, thereby eliminating conflicts arising from diverse standards of justice.[49] For Xenopon the struggle for 'negative freedom' through the guidance of one who embodies 'positive freedom' was the only remedy for the conflicts between city-states which had swept the Greek world.

Xenophon's moral intellectualism explains what appears to be a paradox in his thought. As one schooled in a philosophical discourse which emerged in response to those who offered rhetorical education, one would think that Xenophon would be opposed to the use of persuasion as a valid means of conducting business. But *Mem.* 1.2.10-11, quoted above, makes it clear that this is not the case. While Xenophon encourages the use of rhetoric as an alternative to violence, Thucydides' metanarrative on language exposes the danger of rhetoric as a tool in a climate in which language had been destabilised. In light of Thucydides' exposure of the flaws of language and diplomacy, Xenophon's proposal at 1.2.10-11 almost seems naive. But Xenophon's argument must be considered in light of his theory of moral intellectualism, which is the lens through which he presents the past in order to provide remedies for the future. It was the possession of power without prudence that cultivated violence. In other words, persuasion could only serve as an alternative to violence if the one persuading had the wisdom to support his ideas. This wisdom could only be attained through true knowledge of how things were defined, and whether those

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[49] Although Berlin defines 'positive liberty' as the ability to take part in and influence government, Skinner notes that there is another conception of liberty inherent in Berlin's 'positive freedom'. This type of 'freedom' is 'positive freedom' in the sense of self-mastery (2002: 16-18). For more on Berlin, see pages 9-10.

things were good or bad. This, according to Xenophon, was the failure of diplomacy: that those who were in possession of power and were able to persuade were ignorant, no better than slaves. In Xenophon's eyes, persuasion was a valid means of politicking, and a favourable one at that, so long as the person who was persuading possessed the qualities of a *kalos kagathos*. The problem lay not with the art of persuasion itself, but with the ability of those persuading to define and identify moral concepts and use them correctly. Xenophon's appropriation of 'freedom' as an inner quality possessed by the individual provides a place for the elite, who have the knowledge necessary to rehabilitate not only language, but also the language of freedom as rhetorical tool. As practical as his philosophy may be, its successful implementation is impossible, as it would require a panhellenic crusade. Although the Socrates of Plato's *Menexenus* may have faulted Xenophon for revising history in order to provide moral paradigms through generals such as Agesilaus, Xenophon's works were not meant to be historical. Rather his historical works use the past as a vehicle for displaying how one who possessed the qualities of the *kalos kagathos* could behave and contribute in a meaningful and useful way in a democratic society, and how freedom itself could be used as a political tool for unification rather than decisiveness.

Conclusion

Historians, like the politicians whose speeches they relate, use 'freedom' and 'autonomy' as tools. Whereas politicians use this language as a tool of persuasion, historians use this language as a tool of narration. Rather than ask what the meaning of 'autonomy' is, or what 'freedom' means from a Spartan or Athenian perspective, modern historians should be asking how historians use the language of 'freedom' and 'autonomy' as a tool to create meaning in the overall narrative. Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon provide valuable information about historical events. However, the interpretive frameworks and contemporary debates—such as relativism, νόμος-φύσις, the relationship between language and reality, and concerns over moral ambiguity—which historians use to understand the principles underlying conflict often render what appear to be historical uses 'of freedom' and 'autonomy' philosophical. Passages which Raaflaub uses as evidence for 'historical' freedom, that is to say, events in which the language of 'freedom' was 'actually' used, cannot be taken as reliable evidence either for the meaning of 'freedom' or for the date of its emergence.

Scholars, most notably Kurt Raaflaub, have argued that Near Eastern societies were similar enough to Mycenaean Greece, where there was no concept of 'political freedom', that there was no need to examine the role that 'freedom' played in the politics of the Near East. Given the role which the Near East and Persia played in creating the conditions necessary for facilitating the emergence of 'freedom' as a rhetorical tool, dismissing the Near East from discussions of 'freedom' would be unsound. In Chapter One, I examined evidence from the Cyrus Cylinder and poem 36 of Solon. This evidence suggests that the language of 'freedom' and 'slavery' had been used in a political context long before the Persian Wars. Although neither of these pieces of evidence used the language of 'freedom' to describe the rights of 'free' citizens, both the Cyrus Cylinder and the poem of Solon used the language of 'freedom' and 'slavery' as metaphors for political acts. For both Solon and Cyrus the metaphor of 'slavery' provided a means of persuading their respective audiences that their methods and acts were in the interest of the citizens; neither were speaking of physical enslavement, but instead were referring to the political oppression of people and the earth. These metaphors were successful precisely because 'slavery' was deemed an odious state by both the Persians and the Greeks. Furthermore, relativism and the debate between

νόμος and φύσις provided an intellectual framework for Herodotus to consider how the Persians might conceptualise freedom, thereby allowing him to draw a subtle yet powerful comparison between contemporary Athenian politics and the Persians.

By examining how historians make use of frameworks in order to create meaning from the past, it becomes clear that they are not simply concerned with how historical protagonists speak about 'freedom', but are equally as concerned with the relationship between 'freedom' and 'justice'. This connection only becomes clear by analysing how historians' treat the relationship between 'freedom' as it exists in accordance with νόμος and φύσις. Language can serve as a peaceful alternative to conflict, but when the norms of society have been subverted, and men deem their actions to be 'just' not in accordance with the agreed upon norms of society, but in accordance with their own interests, then acts, such as enslavement, are described as being carried out in the name of 'freedom', in accordance with their claims of 'justice' rather than νόμοι. Thucydides exposes the dangers of rhetoric and the abuse of language which ensues when the interests of the stronger prevail, thus destabilising language which is culturally embedded. Thucydides was not the first to recognise that language and the meanings of words could only be understood within the context of a particular set of νόμοι, as Herodotus exposes how Athenian νόμοι had come to resemble those of the Persians. In order to warn the reader, and the Athenians, that it was not too late to adopt more traditionally 'Greek' νόμοι with regard to their relationship to their allies, Herodotus considers how the Persians might have conceptualised 'freedom' in accordance with their νόμοι. Herodotus was undoubtedly influenced by contemporary politics and the trend to compare Athens and Persia, and consequently he constructs a discourse of relativism by showing how Persian 'freedom' differs from Greek 'freedom' on account of νόμοι, and, in doing so, he exposes how 'ungreek' the Athenians' actions had become. For both Herodotus and Thucydides, the language of 'freedom' existed within the context of a particular set of νόμοι. While Herodotus constructs conceptualisations of 'freeedom', Thucydides reveals how 'freedom' had come to be abused as the νόμοι which determined what was 'just' and 'unjust' had been overturned, thereby allowing men to deem 'unjust' actions as acts of liberation. Herodotus is not as concerned with the relationship between 'freedom' and 'justice', but his reference

to Pindar at 3.38 regarding νόμος as king suggests that, even if the relationship between 'freedom' and 'justice' was not his primary interest, he too recognised that city-states and empires which had fought for their 'freedom' from oppression or enslavement exercised the right to live in accordance with their own νόμοι. The context of original Pindar fragment (fr. 169, lines 1-4) that '[n]omos, king of all, mortals and immortals, brings on with sovereign hand what is most violent and makes it just'[1], suggests Herodotus' tacit recognition that city-states and empires which governed in accordance with their own νόμοι established standards of justice which served their interests, thereby making even the most violent acts 'just'. In this sense, both Herodotus and Thucydides agree that 'autonomy' described a condition of 'freedom' which was defined not by one's own νόμοι, but with the νόμοι which protected the rule and legitimacy of the stronger. For both Herodotus and Thucydides, the meaning of 'freedom' was culturally embedded, and value judgements and perceptions are informed by the culture of those making them.

Although Thucydides is considered the best source for evidence concerning 'autonomy', his engagement with this concept was as philosophical as it was historical. As I examined in Chapter Five, Thucydides' framing of 'autonomy' in the Mytilenean and Plataean episodes suggests that he has used this term to draw out the tension inherent in the relationship between νόμοι and the Athenians and Spartans, whose strength allowed them to subvert the standards of justice to suit their interests, or disregard justice altogether. When Thucydides used 'autonomy' anachronistically, he was referring to the condition of city-states before they were forced to become allies of Athens and Sparta. For Thucydides' Mytileneans, 'autonomy' represented the traditional alliance structure which existed before Athens and Sparta emerged as superpowers and inhibited a state's right to live in accordance with what they deemed 'right', or the 'norm', for the community. When city-states, such as the Mytilenians, complained that their 'autonomy' had been violated, they were referring to the loss of voting privileges which had been the right of every ally when the league was created and they were still autonomous. Although it has been argued that Plataea's claims to have been granted 'autonomy' by Pausanias were anachronistic, the defensive appeals made

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[1] Translation Ostwald (1965: 117).

by the Plataeans and the Thebans through νόμοι suggest that Thucydides was using the conflict of Plataea to question whether a state could truly be 'autonomous' when being forced to chose between either side would result in the destruction of the state regardless of the choice. Despite the fact that the earliest evidence for the concept of 'autonomy' occurred in a philosophical context, scholars have rejected the idea that 'autonomy' may have been philosophical in origin. Regardless of whether 'autonomy' was first and foremost a philosophical or political term, Thucydides' use of 'autonomy' in these episodes suggests that he was considering the limited nature of living in accordance with one's laws, or living 'autonomously' in a world where the interests of the stronger, who either established standards of 'justice' which served their interests or disregarded justice altogether, prevailed.

In Chapter Six, I examined Sophocles' *Antigone*, which provides the earliest written evidence of 'autonomy'. In the *Antigone*, the concept of 'autonomy' acquired meaning through the debate between νόμος and φύσις which framed the central conflict between Antigone and Creon. Antigone, powerless to act in her own interests without consequence, ultimately accepted those consequences and acted in accordance with what she deemed right by the νόμοι of nature. Similarly, the allies of Athens and Sparta, by acting in accordance with their own νόμοι, were punished by these more powerful states. The tragedy of the play, which the language of νόμος and φύσις draws out, was that both Antigone and Creon believed that their actions were just; Creon, because he believed that whatever was in the interest of the state was just; and Antigone, because she believed that Creon's decree, which had made the burial of her brother illegal, was contrary to the νόμοι of the gods. Both believed that their actions were just and both could be deemed 'autonomous' by virtue of acting in accordance with their own νόμοι. But Sophocles has restricted the language of 'autonomy' to Antigone, who, like the allies of Athens, was not permitted to live in accordance with the νόμοι of the community.

Thucydides' history, by exposing how Athens and Sparta exploited language, logic, and the rhetoric of 'freedom', exposed the underlying principles of power motivating men to act. In this context, language was a tool for the powerful and, as a consequence, it failed to provide an alternative to armed conflict. Sophocles' *Antigone*, on the other hand, showed how both the ruler and those

'ruled' become the victims of 'justice': both sides believed that they 'rightly' deemed justice to be on their side. Interpreted within a political context, Athens and her allies both become sympathetic. The language of 'autonomy' provided a convenient intersection between philosophy and politics, rooted as it was in the philosophical debate between νόμος and φύσις. But it is precisely because of this convenience—because it is used in both political and philosophical contexts—that attempts to ascertain a precise meaning which fits every context have failed.

Both Herodotus and Thucyides use contemporary frameworks in their historical narratives to create meaning or establish patterns, in the case of Herodotus to provide a warning to the reader, and in the case of Thucydides to expose the role played by the fundamental conflict between νόμος and φύσις in exacerbating conflict. These new trends provided Herodotus with novel, conceptual frameworks for interpreting the past, and engaging the reader. Thucydides, on the other hand, exposes how language, the only alternative to armed conflict, is destabilised when φύσις rather than νόμος structures the relations between men. In Chapter Seven, I examined how Xenophon rejected sophism in his historical works. While Herodotus and Thucydides seek to understand the past and provide warnings for contemporary and future readers, Xenophon provides remedies, or at least tries to. Through moral intellectualism Xenophon attempts to rectify the problem of moral ambiguity, a problem which informed both Thucydides' and Sophocles' treatment of 'justice' and the language of 'freedom'.

For Xenophon, the leaders of the state who have the power to persuade must be *kaloi kagathoi*, who are 'free' from vices and able to discern which actions are in the interest of the state. The *kalos kagathos*, therefore, was the primary arbiter of justice. One who was a *kalos kagathos* does what is best for the family, friends and state. Therefore what was in the interest of the state was 'just'. In order to eliminate the relativism of morality and justice, which Thucydides exposed as one of the factors facilitating conflict, Xenophon deconstructs morality: only those who have had proper training and are *kaloi kagathoi* are able to do what is best and use persuasive rhetoric to urge people towards what is right for the state. In order for one to be a *kalos kagathos*, one must be free from vices such as excessive consumption, alcohol and lust. As one who exhibited the qualities of the *kalos kagathos*, Agesilaus provides a paradigm for how a general should behave.

Although Xenophon's intentions may have been well placed, in deconstructing morality, Xenophon has essentially reconstructed the reality which allowed states to subvert 'justice'. In the trial of Phoebidas, Agesilaus decided that Phoebidas' guilt or innocence would be determined by the following standard: have Phoebidas' actions helped or harmed Sparta? This standard of justice was nearly identical to that which was used by the Spartans in the trial of the Plataeans. By establishing the 'state' as the primary beneficiary in determining morality, Xenophon's reconstruction of morality differs little from that of Athens or Sparta during the Peloponnesian War, or Sophocles' Creon.

In Chapter Eight I explored how 'freedom' would be employed in rhetoric within the framework of Xenophon's philosophical precepts concerning morality. For Xenophon, 'freedom' was a negatively charged, divisive word, and its use must be restricted to situations where it served the interests of the state which was acting according to the common goal of unification. He was first in a series of historians who believed that the writing of history should include explicitly didactic elements. In the course of writing his history, Xenophon showed how the language of 'freedom' could be used positively through historical exempla, and, in addition, how 'justice' itself and the language of 'freedom' could be rehabilitated by creating a common enemy: Persia. By appealing to the Persian Wars, generals were able to establish examples meant to be imitated. The evocation of Persian War exempla continued well into the Roman Era: Persian War motifs were a present force when Flamininus championed Greek freedom with his proclamation in 197.[2] Although Xenophon himself may not have believed the Persians were different by 'nature', the otherness of Persia was emphasised in his historical works in order to remind the Greeks of the 'freedom' which they fought for during the Persian Wars. Ultimately, 'freedom from' Persia was more germane to the cause of Greek unification than oligarchic or democratic conceptualisations of 'freedom'.

Although Herodotus, Thucyides, and Xenophon are often cited as the main sources for the emergence of 'freedom' as an ideology, and as the main sources for understanding the role played by the language of 'freedom' in politics, historians often employ the language of freedom in contexts which are often more

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[2] Spawforth (1994: 242); Walbank (1942: 136); Ferrary (1988: 86).

philosophical than historical. In order to understand the past and derive meaning from it, historians interpret the past through theoretical frameworks and debates popular in their own times. For Herodotus, this meant examining universal patterns concerning the rise and fall of human settlements, and the relationship between these patterns and culturally embedded perceptions of what it means to be 'free'. Thucydides, on the other hand, examines the relationship between rhetoric and reality by exposing how language rarely reflected reality, especially the language of 'freedom', when νόμοι, in accordance with which men understood and defined what it meant to be 'free', had been destabilised by φύσις. Both Thucydides and Sophocles examine the limitations of being 'autonomous' in a world where the interests of the stronger prevailed in accordance with nature. Although Xenophon recognises that conflicts are exacerbated by the moral ambiguity of concepts such as 'justice' and 'freedom', Xenophon reconceptualises what it means to be 'free' in order to provide a solution to the conflicts which had riddled the Greek world. Although these historians seem to relate 'what happened' and the role of 'freedom' in past conflicts, often historians employ the language of 'freedom' in order to make their histories useful for present and future readers by identifying patterns in the rise and fall of empires, the princples of human nature underlying conflict, and the remedies for the future.

Appendix: Wealth and the Ten Thousand

The role of 'wealth' in the expedition of the Ten Thousand echoes Socrates' discussions of 'wealth' in the historical works. In addition it shows how 'wealth' can affect the 'freedom' of the individual. The first two references to freedom in the *Anabasis* occur in a speech given by Cyrus just before the battle of Cunaxa. In this passage the antithesis between 'freedom' and 'slavery' is replaced by that of 'freedom' and 'wealth'. Aware of the fact that the Greeks were unhappy about being deceived regarding the purpose of the expedition, Cyrus asked them to show themselves worthy of the freedom which they had won in the Persian Wars.

> Greek men, I lead you as allies not because I lack barbarian men, but because I think you better and stronger than many barbarians, for this reason I took you. So see to it that you be men worthy of the freedom which you have acquired and on account of which I consider you lucky. For you know well that I would choose freedom instead of all the other many things which I possess.[1]

> ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀπορῶν βαρβάρων συμμάχους ὑμᾶς ἄγω, ἀλλὰ νομίζων ἀμείνονας καὶ κρείττους πολλῶν βαρβάρων ὑμᾶς εἶναι, διὰ τοῦτο προσέλαβον. ὅπως οὖν ἔσεσθε ἄνδρες ἄξιοι τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἧς κέκτησθε καὶ ἧς ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ εὐδαιμονίζω. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε ὅτι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἑλοίμην ἂν ἀντὶ ὧν ἔχω πάντων καὶ ἄλλων πολλαπλασίων (1.7.3).

Cyrus ended his speech by promising that, if they were victorious, those of the Greek who returned to Greece would be envied by their friends at home. In fact, many Greeks may even prefer what he has to offer than what they have at home (1.7.4). Gaulites, an exile from Samos, asked Cyrus if he truly intended to follow through with his promise of rewards, to which Cyrus made the following response: 'But if we should win, we must make our own friends lords over this' (1.7.7).[2] Cyrus' fear is not that he will not have enough to give, but that there will

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[1] Translation mine.
[2] Translation mine.

not be enough friends to accept what he offers.[3] The promise of lordship over a region by a Persian was a common trope in Greek historiography. The Spartans were offered by Hydarnes rule over land as a reward for submission to the king of Persia (Hdt. 7.135), and Alexander enticed the Athenians to submit to Persia by offering them sovereignty over a land (Hdt. 8. 140). The reward which Cyrus offered the Greeks was to rule over others. In addition he promised them gold crowns. The Greeks responded with enthusiasm.

Two different interpretations of freedom, one Persian, the other Greek, were displayed in the exchange between Cyrus and the Greek troops. In fifth-century historiography, Herodotus in particular, the concept of freedom was presented from the perspective of Persia. Playing upon his audience's stereotypes of Persia, Herodotus exposed how un-Greek the behaviour of the Athenians was by applying words associated with fifth century politics to Persia. By portraying Persia in Greek terms and showing how 'Greek' the Persians could be in passages such as the Constitutional Debate, Herodotus exposed the irony of contemporary Athenian policy. In the passage from Xenophon cited above, Xenophon seems to be suggesting that the conflict between differing notions of freedom was not between a Persian and Greek model, but between the choice of freedom and wealth, which enslaved rather than freed.

An example from Herodotus' *Histories* may clarify this position. In the exchange between Demeratus and Xerxes, the Persian king laughed at the prospect of the Greek troops defeating his own army. Foremost among the reasons Xerxes underestimated the Greeks was the fact that the Greeks served no master; they were free men and as free men they obeyed the law (Hdt. 7.104).[4] While Xerxes found it ridiculous that an army smaller than his own and which obeyed laws rather than one man could defeat him, Cyrus, playing upon the Greek soldiers' pride in having defeated the Persians, used flattery as a means of manipulation. Rather than underestimating the Greeks like Xerxes, Cyrus agreed that it was freedom which made the Greeks such formidable soldiers, thereby making the Ten Thousand more amenable to his equivocal demands and rewards.

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[3] ἢν δ' ἡμεῖς νικήσωμεν, ἡμᾶς δεῖ τοὺς ἡμετέρους φίλους τούτων ἐγκρατεῖς ποιῆσαι. ὥστε οὐ τοῦτο δέδοικα, μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι δῶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν φίλων, ἂν εὖ γένηται, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἱκανοὺς οἷς δῶ. The concept of becoming lords over others is a common theme in the portrayal of Persians. See Hdt. 1.129.

[4] ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ.

In the dialogue between Cyrus and the Greek soldiers which ensued, Cyrus offered the Ten Thousand wealth and nobility, and he persuaded them to accept this offer through flattery and bribery. It is not immediately clear whether Cyrus promised the Greeks land in Persia if they were successful when he stated that he would make his friends satraps of the Persian Empire (1.7.7), but a later passage provides clarification. In his eulogy of Cyrus Xenophon stated that in the war against the Pisidians and Mysians Cyrus made those who were willing to risk their lives governors of the conquered territories, 'making it clear that the brave men were going to be the most prosperous while the cowards only deserved to be their slaves (δούλους)'. Those who were made governors would be nobles, yet from a Greek perspective they would be slaves, since they would be answerable to one man instead of laws. From a Persian perspective those who were cowards and therefore unworthy of nobility were slaves. As was previously discussed in Chapter One on Herodotus, the Greek convention of describing one who was loyal to the king of Persia as a slave captured the disdain for the model of the Persian Empire; blind faith in one ruler who was not constrained by law qualified one as a slave.[5] What the Ten Thousand were fighting for was not freedom, but wealth and the right to rule over others. But this reward was one which was double-edged: if the Greeks were to defeat the king, they would become satraps, and like Cyrus, who was described by Xenophon as a slave of the king (1.9.29),[6] become nobles in the eyes of the Persians, but from a Greek perspective slaves of the new king of Persia, Cyrus.

Had Cyrus not been killed, and had the Greeks been rewarded for their victory, they would, no doubt, have prostrated themselves before Cyrus as the king of Persia, as those around Cyrus did before the tides had turned in favour of Artaxerxes' forces at the battle of Cunaxa.[7] The compliance of the Ten Thousand to Persian customs stood in sharp contrast to the reaction of the Greek soldiers in 480 BC who, having received an audience with the Persian king, refused, declaring that they would rather hurl themselves headlong on the ground than bow

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[5] And yet it should be noted that Thucydides rarely describes the allies of Athens as subjects. States which are forced into compliance or which suffer under Athenian reprisals are described as 'enslaved' but once subjects they are not 'slaves' per se.

[6] παρὰ μὲν Κύρου δούλου ὄντος οὐδεὶς ἀπῄει πρὸς βασιλέα, πλὴν Ὀρόντας ἐπεχείρησε.

[7] For the Greek troops bowing to Cyrus at the battle of Cunaxa see *Anab.* 1.8.21. The act of proskunei'n is acceptable to the Greeks if the object of worship is a divinity or temple: 'In Greek eyes, *proskynesis* was reserved for the gods' (Briant 2002: 223). To bow before a man is not acceptable and becomes symbolic of political enslavement by virtue of it being the act which subjects carry out to show their subservience to the king. See also Xen. *Cyr.* 5.3.18.

before the king (Hdt. 7.136).[8] An examination of the exchange between Cyrus and the Greek soldiers reveals that recognising and understanding how the 'other' views freedom has allowed for a greater degree of manipulation in dialogue. The manner in which freedom was presented in this passage suggests the inextricable relationship between personal and political freedom. This conflict, more than that between freedom and slavery, dominates in the works of Xenophon and is shaped by his own philosophical background.

[8] For a further discussion of the Persian prostration see Briant (2002: 222-23). Briant notes that the Persian reliefs represent subjects as bending forward towards the king and blowing a kiss. The typical Greek portrayal, on the other hand, consists of a full bow before the feet of the king.

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