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PROTESTANT IRELAND AND THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, 1641-1647.

Thesis submitted by

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for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in the University of Dublin, Trinity College

Department of Modern History

October, 1995.

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Summary.

This thesis considers the relations between the Protestants of Ireland and the Long Parliament from the outbreak of the 1641 Rising until mid-1647. It aims to show that Ireland was a central concern of Parliament's throughout these years, as being an element in the self-definition of the parliamentary 'cause' of one of religious and national defence; and that the eventual accommodation of Irish Protestants and Parliament was founded on a compatibility of objectives, based on victory in the Irish war, strong enough to overcome constitutional scruples if not pressed too hard. The principal sources used are the records of Parliament and of its Irish committees, and collections relating to Irish Protestant figures, most notably the Carte collection of Ormond papers. Newsletters have been sampled where it seemed most appropriate and contemporary pamphlets and other works have been consulted.

Chapters 1-3 discuss the emergence of a practical and theoretical framework for intervention in Ireland based on established criteria, and its breakdown through the pressure exerted, by the King and the more militants, on the tension between legal and religious imperatives. Chapter 4 points to the collapse of bipartisan efforts in 1643, though Irish Protestants retained a hope of a combined King - Parliament position on Ireland, the former providing legitimacy for the policies of the latter. Instead the drift at Westminster in 1643 was towards seeing 'one war' throughout Charles's kingdoms, of a religious type. In Ireland, the effects of English conflict were felt in a limited manner and as a polarising of existing tendencies taking their rise in opinions on the future of Ireland. Logistics played a greater part in determining the general acceptance of the 1643 cessation but, as chapter 5 suggests, logistical weakness also tilted Protestants away from the cessation in 1644. Their primary quest, in the light of the events of 1641, was for future security and the King's initiation of a treaty with the confederates

may be considered the moment when a tilt towards Parliament began. In Ulster popular pressure safety in renewed war to victory and this, together with the considerable impact of Scottish national and religious sentiment in the province mediated an alignment with Parliament.

The peace negotiations discussed in chapter 6 offered the alternatives of a 'Covenanter Britain' where security was available at the price of autonomy, and an Ormondist 'Protestant Kingdom', very much in line with the King's general preferences, but perceived as implying the reverse. The lack of appeal of the Ormondist settlement led to the alternatives described in chapter 7, with Ormond's focus lying in the construction of a middle 'party', but with increasing alienation among provincial Protestants the result. Meanwhile chapters 7 -9 consider the renewed impetus given to parliamentary involvement and the extent to which it was hampered by financial crisis and growing political tension. The gradual movement of Irish Protestants into Parliament's camp only added further factional difficulties.

In the final two chapters the 1647 Lisle expedition is considered in its contexts; of the limited degree of 'party' conflict within a consensus on Ireland and in terms of the regional and military considerations necessary to effective co-operation between Parliament and Irish Protestants. These were better approached through the 'Presbyterian' reliance on devolution to regional commanders and reliance on Protestant émigrés. As commissioners in Ulster and Dublin such men played a key role in retaining Protestant cohesion in alignment with Parliament. Even in mid- 1647 a real possibility of mutual victory could be said to be present, if defeated by the persistent inability to find resources for a war of conquest and the onset of political pressure too great to allow continued consensus. Both had of course been crucial to the failure to secure a quick victory in 1641-2.

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Abbreviations.

Note: All abreviations follow the listings given in 'Rules for contributors to *Irish Historical Studies'*, of 1968, witht he following additions.

Carte MSS	Carte MSS in the Bodleian Library, Oxford (consulted on microfilm in the National Library of Ireland, Dublin)
Carte, *Ormonde*	Carte, Thomas, *History of the life of James, 1st Duke of Ormonde* (2nd edition; 6 vols., Oxford, 1851)
Cal. C. C.	*Calendar of the proceedings of the Committee for Compounding 1643-1660,* ed. M. A. E. Green (5 vols., London, 1889-92)
Cal. S.P. Clarendon	*Calender of the Clarendon state papers* ed. O. Ogle, W. H. Bliss & W. D. Macray (3 vols., Oxford, 1869-76)
CBK	Committee of Both Kingdoms
CIA	Commission[ers] for Irish Affairs
Clarendon S.P.	*State papers collected by Edward, earl of Clarendon* (3 vols., Oxford, 1757)
D'Ewes (C)	*The journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes from the first recess of the Long Parliament to the withdrawal of King Charles from London* ed. W. H. Coates (New Haven, Conn., 1942)
DHCI	Derby House Committee for Irish Affairs
Egmont MSS	H.M.C. Egmont MSS (1905)
Letter-book	*Letter-book of the earl of Clanricarde 1643-1647,* ed. John Lowe (I.M.C., Dublin, 1983)

Montereul correspondence

The diplomatic correspondence of Jean de Montereul and the brothers Bellievre, French ambassadors in England and Scotland, 1645-8 ed. J. G. Fotheringham (2 vols., Scottish Record Scoiety, vols. xxix, xxx, Edinburgh, 1898)

P.J., i, ii. Coates, W. H., Young, Anne Steele & Snow, V. F. (eds.) *The private journals of the Long Parliament* (2 vols., New Haven, Conn., 1982, 1987)

Rushworth Rushworth, John, *Historical collections of private passages of state...* Part iii, volumes (1) - (2) (London, 1692)
Part iv, volumes (1) - (2) (London, 1701)

Introduction.

The relationship between the Protestants of Ireland and the Parliament of England in the 1640s is one of those questions which makes the history of the 'Three Kingdoms' inescapably entwined, if yet distinct. Each was of considerable concern to the other. Parliament[1] made success in the war in Ireland one of the core elements in its cause, a part of its self-image as the defender of English national security. This consideration could override any doubts about the jurisdiction of the Parliament of England in a Kingdom with its own Parliament.[2] In 1621, indeed, Sir Edward Coke had given it as his opinion that when the writ which summoned MPs to assemble had called on them to consider the 'defence of the realm' this necessarily meant Ireland could come up, for the safety of England had 'great dependence... upon the peace of Ireland'.[3]

As retained in the 1640s, this was a stance with significant implications. In the 1620s, as in 1641, the threat to Protestant England was widely regarded as coming from Catholic Europe; in Catholic Ireland there was thus a standing temporal, as well as spiritual, danger as an outpost of a wider threat.[4] Thus the question of Ireland's religion was not an unnecessary complication but, in the eyes of many MPs, a simplification of their uncertain international position by the enforcement of a uniformity lawfully established between the realms.[5] England and Ireland had, after all, been the domains of a shared sovereign long before James brought Scotland within that orbit. It was not only Irish MPs (of both religions) who perceived the older bond to be one of 'brethren' in an 'ethnic' sense, though for Parliament the bond of religion seems to have been at least as strong.[6] Taken together, they could help shake the

---

[1]Except where the Irish (or Scottish) Parliament is specified 'Parliament' will be used to indicate the English Parliament, and specifically the Long Parliament which assembled in 1640.

[2]For recent discussion of the legislative rights of the two Parliaments, see Aidan Clarke, 'Colonial constitutional attitudes in Ireland, 1640-60', in *R.I.A Proc.*, xc (1990), pp. 357-75; Conrad Russell, *The fall of the British Monarchies, 1637-1642* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 384-6, 391-2.

[3]For the 1621 debate, see Stephen D. White, *Sir Edward Coke and the grievances of the commonwealth* (Manchester, 1979), pp. 170-1; Robert Zaller, *The Parliament of 1621. A study in constitutional conflict* (Berkeley & London, 1971), pp. 118-9.

[4]Aidan Clarke, 'The 1641 Rebellion and anti-popery in Ireland', in Brian Mac Cuarta (ed.), *Ulster 1641. Aspects of the Rising* (Belfast, 1993), pp. 144, 146; L.J. Reeve, *Charles I and the road to personal rule* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 7-8, 27-9. For the need to place Irish Protestants within a European context, see T. C. Barnard, 'Crises of identity among Irish Protestants 1641-1685', in *Past & Present*, 127 (1990), pp. 44-5.

[5]In the 1620s Pym, among others, had campaigned in Parliament for greater uniformity between the Churches of England and Ireland, with an inclination towards the Irish interpretation in both doctrine and ceremony. Russell, *Fall of the British Monarchies*, pp. 36-7.

[6]D'Ewes (C), pp. 97-8. For citations from statements issued by the Irish Parliament 1640-1 on English ancestry, see Russell, *Fall of the British Monarchies*, pp. 383, 386.

normally parochial English Parliament into a wider 'British' vision and, as English tensions grew, into a 'one war' syndrome which could embrace Scotland also.[7] The early designations of Parliament's enemies as 'favourers of the Irish rebellion' was not mere rhetoric but a conviction of a shared drive to subvert and destroy the English Church and State.

In the event the MPs who reacted to the news from Ireland together in Nov., 1641 could not maintain their consensus. A 'national' response foundered not only on internal Protestant religious differences but on the words and deeds of the King himself. But this does not make insincere the efforts of Parliament, first to coax, then to force, the King to take up his duties as defender of Protestant England *and Ireland.*[8] If anything, Irish Protestants were even more driven to see in such a conjunction the first step to their deliverance. Recent years had seen them undergo considerable political differences[9] but 1641 would push forward a common self-perception for them also, one partly excavated and partly invented in crisis conditions. Yet the persistence and spread of the 1640s crisis produced common dilemmas also, over their specific goals for a future settlement in Ireland, and their relations with the fractured polity in England.

Any common 'ideology' for Protestant Ireland (specifically for the 'New English'[10]) had to take its rise from two planks fashioned elsewhere. The idea of the English as the agents of 'civility' in Ireland was not only old but shared with the Old English[11] in a way the 'anti-popery' of Elizabethan England obviously could not be.[12]

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[7]In the 1620s Ireland was much more of a mediator between international and domestic fears than Scotland (Reeve, *Charles I*, pp. 7-8, 189); if it was the Scottish crisis which gave rise to the wider collapse of 1641-2 this is not to say that Ireland was not almost as prominent in MPs' minds in 1640-1.

[8]For the perception by parliamentarians that the King had 'abdicated' as protector of the Church and Kingdom of England, enhancing the need for Parliament to take this role, see John Morrill, *The nature of the English revolution* (London, 1993), chapter 3 & 15.

[9]In the months following the overthrow of Strafford the most notable division appears to be that between the 'constitutionalists' standing on the rights of the Irish Parliament and the new executive whose letters show concern for the strength (especially financial) of the government and a willingness to interpret politics in religious terms. See Michael Perceval-Maxwell, *The outbreak of the Irish rebellion of 1641* (Dublin, 1994), pp. 122-5 (for 'constitutionalists'), 157-61 (the new executive), 162-78.

[10]Though the term 'Irish Protestants' has been generally preferred here to New English so as to encompass Protestants of other backgrounds, it is unclear whether many of those so designated would have used the term 'Irish' for themselves as opposed to 'of Ireland'. The term 'British' appears as self-description in Ulster (as well as being Parliament's usual term for English and Scottish Protestants there), but was not unknown to the Irish Parliament. (The term 'Old Protestant' is confined mainly to the 1650s and beyond to distinguish those in Ireland before the Cromwellian conquest).

[11]Aidan Clarke, 'Colonial identity in early seventeenth-century Ireland', in T. W. Moody (ed.), *Nationality and the pursuit of national independence* (Belfast, 1978), p. 69. For the early 17th century development of a 'colonial identity' by the Old English, with a distinctive Tridentine religion 'enabling the traditional resumption of the cultural inferiority of the Irish to be continued in a new context' see Clarke, 'Colonial identity', pp. 58, 70-1.

[12]Theological 'anti-popery' had come 'much closer to being the official position of the Church of Ireland and her hierarchy', than was the case in England, R. G. Asch, 'Antipopery and ecclesiastical policy in early seventeenth century Ireland', in *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* lxxxiii (1992), p.

But since 1603 Irish Protestants had put a fair amount of legal, historical and theological scholarship to work to construct a fuller consideration of their position in Ireland. With 'conquest theory' (in the sense of a 'progressive' conquest, now completed) acting as a filter they had distilled their own 'Jacobean consensus' which, while not discarding the older aspects, gave a veneer more appropriate to a 'settled' kingdom.[13] As both a Protestant Kingdom[14] and one which the rule of law made 'as well political as regal'[15] internal rights and liberties were secured and an 'Imperial' crown fended off external, principally papist, threats.[16]

Events in the Irish Parliament of 1640-1 called forth argument on the reality of both these securities,[17] but the debate was temporarily submerged beneath the wave of palpable danger which arose in late 1641. In its surprise effect[18], and rapid spread[19] the insurrection wrought an untold effect on Protestant vulnerability and ensured a conviction of the untrustworthiness of the Irish. In the reality of atrocity, hardly

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260. For a full discussion of the theological implications, see Alan Ford, *The Protestant reformation in Ireland, 1590-1641* (Frankfurt, 1985), especially pp. 193-242.

[13]Sir John Davies is the key figure here. A comparison of his England and Irish writings show that he held a complex notion of 'conquest' which indeed included the idea of a 'complete' conquest whereby laws were changed and imposed, but also of 'progressive' conquest where 'imperial' and legal continuity was assured where the royal writ ran at any time. See Sir John Davies, *A Discovery of the true causes why Ireland was never entirely subdued...*, ed. James S. Myers (Washington, D.C., 1988), pp. 71-2, 74-6, 123, 135,137, 144, 151, 197-9, 204; Hans S. Pawlisch, *Sir John Davies and the conquest of Ireland. A study in legal imperialism* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 8-12, 105-21; Glenn Burgess, *The politics of the Ancient Constitution. An introduction to English political thought, 1603-1642* (London, 1992), pp. 26-7, 44-5, 145-7 (all on Davies), 101-5 (on conquest).

[14]The distinction between the ideas advanced here as 'anti-popery' and the 'Protestant kingdom' is partly in terms of sources, the former being theological-historical, based on ideas of idolatry, superstition or even heresy and displayed mainly in sermons or religious polemic. The latter is legal-historical, an effort to deploy the notion of an 'Imperial Crown' to make Irish history safe for Protestants by fending off papal claims and utilising the medieval Irish statute and canon law for the defence of the Protestant Church. If Ussher's thinking dwelt on both, Clotworthy is much more a proponent of 'anti-popery', Ormond a defender of the Protestant Kingdom.

[15]The phrase is from the 1644 'Declaration', probably by Sir Richard Bolton, in Walter Harris (ed.), *Hibernica*, part ii (Dublin, 1770), p. 31. Works in the 1630s, by Sir James Ware, Sir Maurice Eustace, and especially Bolton, suggest a now 'settled' kingdom. See e.g. Bolton, *The Statutes of Ireland* (Dublin, 1621), 'Dedicatorie' on the incorporation of the Irish as full subjects under law. All three men were among Ormond's closest associates in the 1640s.

[16]See K. Fincham & P. Lake 'Ecclesiastical policies of James I and Charles I' in Kenneth Fincham (ed.), *The early Stuart Church, 1603-1642* (London, 1993), especially pp. 28-9; Pawlisch, *Sir John Davies*, pp. 105-21. Lacking the range of English Elizabethan legislation on recusancy, Ireland had to make do with medieval *Praemunire* legislation, which would be deployed in the 1640s negotiations. See Sir Richard Bolton, *A Iustice of Peace for Ireland* (Dublin, 1638), i, 186; B.L. Add. MS 4 798, ff. 3-11; R. Dudley Edwards, 'Conflict of papal and royal jurisdiction in fifteenth century Ireland', in *Irish Catholic Historical Committee Proceedings*, 1960.

[17]Perceval-Maxwell, *Outbreak of the Irish rebellion*, chapter 7. The external threat now came from England.

[18]See e.g. Raymond Gillespie, 'Destabilising Ulster, 1641-2', in Mac Cuarta (ed.), *Ulster 1641*, pp. 110-1. Attacks, though rarely murders, could be perpetrated on 'Protestants with whom Catholics had previously lived amicably as neighbours', surely enhancing the surprise effect, Nicholas Canny, 'What really happened in Ireland in 1641?', in Jane H. Ohlmeyer, (ed.), *Ireland. From independence to occupation, 1641-1660* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 31-2.

[19]Perceval-Maxwell, *Outbreak of the Irish rebellion*, pp. 222, 223-5, 247-9, 252-4.

universal or one-sided but massive in a land of peace,[20] it nurtured a quest for punishment, not only for revenge, but also as a means to justice. In its clear religious dimension,[21] it fostered not only growing conviction, in both camps, that only in an effective uniformity of religion was religion safe,[22] but also, for some Protestants, more 'apocalyptic' perceptions of the spiritual danger of popery[23] or even the need to set their own house in order by further reformation.[24]

In sum, 1641 set older notions tearing to the forefront of consciousness.[25] But with the passing years, it was clear that newer ideas had not been forgotten. Ulster, with its distinctive religious and 'national' make-up, edged towards incorporation in a 'Covenanter Britain' formulated across the water, with popular sentiment trading the distinctions of an Irish Kingdom for the civil guarantees and church reforms promised from London and Edinburgh. But the 'English Protestants of Ireland', especially their political elite, generally faced hard internal and external choices. In the Irish Council itself, the pre-existing disposition of some to see the 'completion' side of conquest as primarily geared to a (non-geographical) 'Protestant Pale' beyond which the 'progressive' civilisation of Ireland must proceed now moved to a virtual discard of the idea of a 'settled' kingdom and to a demand for a new conquest more certain than any before. For the 'Ormondists' commitment to the Jacobean settlement remained unshaken; the future resolution for Ireland was restoration by submission to the King and to the established order, and resolution by established mechanisms.[26]

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[20]See Hilary Simms, 'Violence in County Armagh, 1641', in Mac Cuarta (ed.), *Ulster 1641*, pp. 123-38 for events in one county, where perhaps 17% of the British population 'died in violence in 1641-2'. See also Gillespie, 'Destabilising Ulster', pp. 107-9, 112-3; Canny' What happened in 1641', pp. 33-6. For the type of animosity unleashed see Perceval-Maxwell, *Outbreak of the Irish rebellion*, pp. 231-3.

[21]See Gillespie, 'Destabilising Ulster', pp. 115-7; Canny' What happened in 1641', pp. 39-40; Perceval-Maxwell, *Outbreak of the Irish rebellion*, pp. 230-1,247-9, 255, 258-60 for examples of a religious dimension, if only one aspect of the rising.

[22]The insurgents of 1641 were motivated in part by fear of the extirpation of Catholicism (if not Catholics) while there is evidence that Catholic clergy sought to purge the community of Protestant taints by symbolic action and conversion, though not massacre, even of lay insurgents 'represented their action as an undisguised attempt to eradicate Protestants as well as Protestantism from the land', Canny' What happened in 1641', pp. 39-40. See also Gillespie, Destabilising Ulster', 115-7, 119.

[23]See the perception that the events of 1641 were a punishment for past toleration, Clarke, '1641 and anti-popery', pp. 155-6.

[24]See the 'Humble Petition' to the Scottish General Assembly in 1642, in *A view of the present condition of the three Kingdomes* (1642), E 239 (11), pp. 18-20.

[25]Ireland was seen again as an outpost of barbarism and international Catholicism, as in the tense years of the 1620s. See Clarke, '1641 and anti-popery', pp. 150-7. Anti-popery had last been such a live issue in the tense years 1628-32, see Asch' Antipopery and ecclesiastical policy', pp. 276-86; Clarke, '1641 and anti-popery', pp. 147-8.

[26]Thus a mode of thinking not unlike that of the constitutional royalists was adapted to Irish conditions, with royal sovereignty set before all, but spaces made for the institutions of a settled kingdom. See David L. Smith, *Constitutional royalism and the search for a settlement, c. 1640-1649* (Cambridge, 1994), especially chapter 6 for the interwoven bases of this position, including the legal situation of the Church (pp. 154-6) and of Parliament (pp. 174-5) within a 'legally limited monarchy' (pp. 178-82). In practice, Hyde had shown himself willing to see defectors wooed to the King, in a manner reminiscent of Ormond (pp. 115-6).

It was with these rifts already opening, that the need to decide on the English Question had to be faced. In England itself, communities had been dragged one way or another by 'activists', whether those zealous for religious reform or 'loyalists' whose devotion to the King came first.[27] Protestant Ireland was not lacking in either,[28] but the pull of a middle course always remained stronger. In one sense this was a result of the resilience of the 'consensus' mentioned. The King was the keystone of the legal and ('independent') institutional arch for religion, liberty and property, the English Parliament no constituent part; yet Parliament was offering to shore up those structures in so far as Irish Catholicism threatened to topple it. What was wanted was Parliament's policy blessed with legitimacy by Charles. If that was not going to happen voluntarily, by 1646-7 it seemed like royal assent could be forcefully appropriated. Until then, treating with confederates, institutionally or individually, was a second best security, skirting a cliff edge where Ormond's concessions might cede disaster.

Yet issues of principle could not alone determine the direction of Protestant Ireland. Politics in wartime can never be conducted free of the pressures of war. All aims and schemes in wartime Ireland were qualified by access to the resources needed to make them enforceable. Throughout the chapters that follow[29], emphasis will be placed on the qualifications which logistics placed on policy, for every grouping was aware that only armed could they be sure to hold their own, let alone press their ambitions. More than that, finer military considerations placed a spin on all politics in a situation where social elites had fused with military commands to the downgrading of civilian power structures and where matters such as the treatment of soldiers, the rights of commanders and the honour of armies could not be ignored.

The first three chapters describe the response of Parliament, and the King, to the outbreak of the Irish rising in the months before the arrival of armed conflict in England. Four themes emerge, the breakdown in unity of attitude, based on 'national' defence; the emergence of the issue of control of military force as pressed on King and

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[27]Anthony Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English civil war* (London, 1981) pp. 405-6; Morrill, *English revolution*, pp. 67-8.

[28]The most obvious examples are Clotworthy and Ormond respectively. Clotworthy's career in the 1640s can be seen to have placed the highest priority in religious reform. His actions in 1641 include his presentation of an Ulster petition against bishops to the English Commons (on a par with English county petitions) and his request the Root and Branch legislation apply to Ireland, as well as his outrageous demands about the punishment of priests. See Perceval-Maxwell, *Outbreak of the Irish rebellion*, pp. 113-4; B. L. Harl. MS 5047, f. 30; Russell, *Fall of the British Monarchies*, p. 340. (He later moved the inclusion of Ireland within the religious clauses of the Solemn League and Covenant).

[29]In particular, the appendices are provided as a first step towards a quantitative basis for consideration of the Irish war, specifically the financial and military input made by Parliament, showing the limitations imposed by shortages and the massive cost of the most temporary assistance for the Protestant and English war effort.

Parliament by developments in Ireland; the nature of structural obstacles to an active intervention in Ireland, and of attempted resolutions; the emergence of a parliamentarian vision for Ireland, not unappealing to some Irish Protestants. Of the three chapters, chapter 1 concentrates on the first splintering of consensus and the appearances of problems. Chapter 2 discusses the practical and theoretical sides of the parliamentarian vision, and chapter 3 the legal- dynamic tensions produced by the military issue, and the subversion of the 1642 edifice, which would remain the parliamentarian goal of the 1640s, by royal and radical action.

As King and Parliament move further apart in their views on Ireland, attempts to sustain a bipartisan approach collapsed. Parliament may be seen to have inclined more to a religious based interpretation of one war encompassing all Charles's realms, a stance making the move to alliance with the Scots easier. Simultaneously, a cessation with Catholic forces in Ireland had been agreed. The King's authorisation of negotiations to this end had not only effected Parliament but caused the first open rifts among Irish Protestants. Despite the dabbling of both Irish camps, these were more the result of differences over the future of Ireland, and the general Protestant acceptance of the cessation relegated the disputants to the margins. Such acceptance was more a result of the limitations on the nature of the war in Ireland by 1643, than of politics. The decline in parliamentary sustenance just as it reached acceptable levels was a necessary consequence of the outbreak of war in England, but did not mean Ireland was forgotten, only placed on a par with other fronts and forced to fight for its share of a small pie.

These issues are discussed in chapter 4. Chapter 5 moves forward from the cessation to argue that questions of resources were as likely to pull Protestants away from the ceasefire as earlier they had inclined them towards it. The great bank of distrust accumulated since 1641 not only undermined confidence in the arrangement but meant that if the cessation was a resting place on the path to a negotiated settlement, rather than renewed war, that would be acceptable only if it provided security commensurate with that achieved by victory. Ulster's drift to Parliament required more than alienation with the position taken in Dublin on royal instructions, but was dependent on the peculiar religious and Scottish identity present in the province. This popular pressure, despite elite efforts to sustain Protestant unity beyond Ulster, was assisted by the Covenanter alliance in Britain, but in London the arrival of the Scots prompted the first open divisions there over Ireland. As in years ahead, too much can be read into differences over the Scottish army in Ulster; as later, it is argued, questions of resources and of the effect on the local population coloured perception as much as in the like case in northern England.

The Scottish dimension, alongside the evolution of the King's plans, shifted the ideological balance by 1644-5. Chapter 6 provides a detailed discussion of the peace

negotiations in Dublin and Uxbridge and suggests common principles employed by royal representatives, with an appeal for Irish Protestants in emphasising a 'Protestant Kingdom' of Ireland, and in upholding the rule of law and the institutions of parliament and courts. In its 1644 form the offer was unacceptable at Kilkenny, but it also held less appeal in some Protestant quarters than the alternative 'Covenanter Britain' offered at Uxbridge, with little offer of Irish (Protestant) autonomy but promises of security and religious reformation. For the 'English Protestants of Ireland' the options appeared polarised between trusting to alignment with the Irish or the Scots. Chapter 7, however, considers other angles. Though Parliament had cranked up its machinery to provide a greater output for Ireland, this can be seen to be accompanied by growing dispute over who would control it, of as yet a clash on interest groups rather than 'parties'. In Ireland, Ormond attempted to get over the talks failure of 1644 by more tenuous constructs still unwilling and unable to shed the principles earlier defended. His, probably preferred, alternative was to try to filch support from confederate and Covenanter for a loyalist coalition.

The final three chapters concentrate on the general move of Irish Protestants to Parliament in 1646-7 but also on the manner in which Parliament's best opportunity yet to act decisively in Ireland was spoiled. Chapter 8 sets the scene for parliamentary tensions, grounded in a financial crisis which showed the shaky basis of earlier edifices. It notes that the Lisle lieutenancy was part of an attempt to press the old agenda in Ireland, now despite the King. In Ireland, Ormond's efforts continued but it looked more likely that defections would occur away from his camp rather than into it. In chapter 9 it is suggested that his discomfiture at Kilkenny so challenged his personal sense of honourable behaviour as to signal the end of his attempt at formal negotiation, though not his Old English strategy for a middle party. More New English moved to London, and their support for Lisle's plans can be seen as part of a consensual backing among MPs for the best chance of late 1646. Already, though, transplanted factional rivalries can be seen to have taken root, in contrast to the successes of Parliament's (New English) Ulster commissioners in keeping the northern elite sweet to the Houses.

Chapter 10 posits the idea of a Westminster breakdown over Ireland in April 1646 with the fusion of Army discontent in England and the aftermath of the Lisle's 1647 Munster fiasco. It is suggested that outside the 'juntoes' of grandees and the very specific questions of control which divided them, the mass of MPs continued to pursue the drive for a vigorous war in Ireland planned in early 1647. Regional as well as military matters had been crucial to the Irish dimension of the 1647 crisis but most Irish Protestants remained persistent in their efforts for the cohesion of their community. Ormond's definitive switch to Parliament was the product of Irish developments primarily, including a fair amount of disillusionment about those outside his core constituency. If the countdown to the reversals in position of 1648-51 was begun in

August 1647, as it clearly was, so was the longer term accommodation of Irish Protestants and the parliamentary cause accomplished, driven by the position held within the former by victory in Ireland, and the quest for security undertaken by the latter.

Chapter 1
Responses to the Rising:
November - December 1641

I

News of the events of the last week of October in Ireland were officially communicated to the English Parliament on the morning of 1 November by the Lord Lieutenant, the Earl of Leicester, and a body of 16 other Privy Councillors. With the House of Lords not in session they took the unusual step of directly approaching the House of Commons, notifying them 'of certain Intelligences, that were lately come, of a great Treason, and general Rebellion, of the *Irish* Papists in *Ireland*, and a design of cutting off all the Protestants in *Ireland*, and seizing all the King's Forts there'.[1] The language of nation-wide rebellion was present, but it was not yet universal. The Lords Justices' letter balanced the effects of statements pointing towards a 'universal' conspiracy with the limited news of actual revolt which had reached them by the Oct. 25, from counties Monaghan and Down. They thus allowed for two possibilities, of a regional and sectional 'conspiracy' limited to Tyrone's kindred and associates in south Ulster, or such a widespread plot as to leave 'the kingdom in the greatest extremity it ever underwent.'[2]

Clarendon records the immediate response in the House of Commons as 'a deep silence ... and a kind of consternation, most men's heads having been intoxicated ... with imaginations of plots and treasonable designs throughout the three kingdoms.'[3] For the news from Ireland had followed hard on the heels of reports of the Incident in Scotland and of the second Army Plot in England. Both were suitably vague and sinister and 'it was the popish ramifications which Pym sought to impress on the Commons'.[4] The immediate response of Parliament to the first news from Ireland was

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[1]*Commons' jn., ii,* 300. For the documents presented to the Commons, see Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-52,* i, 354-5; *Lords' jn.,* iv, 412-6; D'Ewes (C), pp. 61-2.

[2]Irish Council to Leicester, Oct. 25, in *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 1-6. Nonetheless they reported that they had 'cause to suspect' the latter course, 'the rather because we have pregnant cause to doubt the combination hath taken force by the incitement of jesuits, Priests and Friars'.

[3]Clarendon, *Rebellion*, i, p.398; see also D'Ewes (C), p. 63.

[4]Anthony Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English Civil War* (London, 1981), p.135. See also the letter of John Dillingham, 6 Nov., as an example of the perceived links between the three plots, H. M. C. *Montagu MSS*, pp. 132-3.

thus active, consensual and predictably 'anti-popish', reactions largely conditioned by the information presented, and the manner in which it was controlled, in early November. Moves against a Catholic 'fifth column' were a 'traditional' response to such threats to national security. For the moment they could retain the support of 'moderate' MPs like sir John Culpepper.[5]

But this does not mean that attention was diverted from Ireland. The Dublin authorities had signified the crying need to be money, adding that the sending of troops would also be necessary should the rising prove extensive. The Commons voted to approach the City for a £50 000 loan for Ireland, to appoint a committee to oversee the despatch of Leicester with men and munitions and to open correspondence coming from, or going to Ireland. The Lords' approval was obtained.[6] The committee approach was no opt out. MPs agitated for it to meet and it is mentioned as having sat almost every day in these early weeks, and sometimes (as on Nov. 5) as having met both in the evening and the early morning.[7] Its detailed proposals on money, troops, supply magazines, a sea guard and posts were ready for adoption by the Commons and Lords on Nov. 3 & 4 respectively.[8] Agreement was reached to send £20 000 to Ireland at once, though only £11 000 was actually found to hand.[9] With the City loan in progress by Nov. 3[10], Parliament also considered that the Council in Dublin should fix 'rewards' for such as would voluntarily give service in the expedition.[11] The Nov. 3 report envisaged the establishment of magazines for munitions and victuals, a naval guard and the despatch of 6 000 infantry and 2 000 cavalry to Ireland. These were to be volunteers, but provision was to be made for impressment if necessary.[12] The

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[5]*Commons' jn., ii,* 304; D'Ewes (C), p. 77; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p.140; Conrad Russell, *The Fall of the British Monarchies 1637-1642* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 418-21. For Culpepper's record of support for measures to curb Catholicism combined with a limited definition of a papist (i.e. a recognised adherent of the Roman Church) see Russell, *British Monarchies,* pp. 229, 262; Conrad Russell, *The causes of the English civil war* (Oxford, 1990), p. 75.

[6]*Commons' jn., ii,* 300-1; D'Ewes (C), pp 62-5; *Lords' jn., iv,* 412, 416-18.

[7]*Commons' jn., ii,* 302-3; D'Ewes (C), pp 67, 71, 72-3, 91, 95. Nor are all meetings necessarily recorded.

[8]*Commons' jn., ii,* 304; *Lords' jn., iv,* 421-2.

[9]Even this money was already assigned, being due to the northern counties of England as part of their costs during the Scottish occupation. It was to be replaced as soon as loan money was available. D'Ewes (C), p. 110; Hugh Hazlett, 'The financing of the British armies in Ireland, 1641-9', in *I. H. S.*, i, no. 1 (Mar. 1938), p. 25.

[10]For early response to the request for a loan see *Lords' jn., iv,* 420-1; J. Nalson, *An impartial collection of the great affairs of state...,* (London, 1682), ii, 597; Valerie Pearl, *London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution: City Government and National Politics 1625-1643* (Oxford, 1961), pp. 124-5. The Lord mayor gave instructions to begin collections for the loan, but to hold the money in the City Chamber until satisfactory security for repayment was given, D'Ewes (C), p. 71, note 25; L. A. Harpur, 'Public borrowing 1640-1660, with special reference to the City of London between 1640 and 1650 (M.Sc. thesis, University of London, 1927), pp. 40-1.

[11]*Lords' jn., iv,* 421; *Commons' jn., ii,* 304; D'Ewes (C), p. 77. Dillingham also reported 'that if any volunteers should go they should have large encouragement and what they could get from the rebels'. To Lord Montagu, 6 Nov., H. M. C. *Montagu MSS*, p. 134.

[12]*Commons' jn, ii,* 304; *Lords' jn., iv,* 421. It must be remembered that no forces were available for sending at once. The lengthy process of disbanding the English army from the Bishops' Wars had ended by Sept 18. and even the related garrisons had been dispersed by October, Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 54. Of

appointment of officers was left to the Lord Lieutenant's 'discretion' though with parliamentary 'approbation'.[13] The immediate response had been swift but comprehensive.

Beneath the unity hints of future tension can be uncovered. Preparation for the examination of Owen O'Connolly, original informant of the Irish 'plot', was committed to a small 'close Committee' of Clotworthy, Holles, St. John and Pym. The import of the four 'interrogatories' to be put to O'Connolly before the full assembled committee was clear. Not only was O'Connolly to be asked about how he learned of the 'design', he was also to respond to 'What have you heard any priests, or others, say, concerning the promoting of the Romish religion?' and 'Have you heard of any design of the like nature in England or Scotland?' His answers were calculated to place the broadest possible interpretation on events, alleging that 'all the places of strength in Ireland' were aimed at; that aid was expected from Spain; that like events were expected in England and Scotland; that the Irish had their favourers in high places in England.[14] With these answers the full gamut of 'popish plot' dangers were placed before Parliament, the very definition of 'popery' being stretched from identifiable Catholic recusants to all who could be implicated in the threat to the religion and laws of England.[15]

Even so, the declaration approved by both Houses for despatch to Ireland (Nov. 4) bore the hallmarks of a compromise formulation. Though it suggested a priest-instigated rebellion to deprive the King of his governance of Ireland it still portrayed the Old English Catholics as victims; while positing rewards for service in land it also placed the power of pardon in the hands of the Dublin authorities and positively sought that they utilise this to win back insurgents. While Bishop Williams delivered the document to the Lords, it was Pym who read it in the Commons and

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the new forces, 2 500 were to be sent over at once, D'Ewes (C), pp 76-7; Nicholas to the King, Dec. 4, *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641*, p. 156.

[13]*Commons' jn., ii*, 304; Lords' *jn., iv*, 421. The Privy council had already discussed the idea of sending officers on ahead to take commands in Ireland, *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641*, p.154. By Nov. 11 Captain Robert Fox was able to correctly identify a number of officers, both of the first horse units and of Leicester's own regiment, though adding that nothing could be determined until the King's return to England, Cal. *S.P. dom., 1641*, p. 164. Indeed, the question of the control of the armies in Ireland through the appointment of their officers was to dog relations between King and Parliament over the coming months. See appendix 1, section (i) for a discussion of recruitment of forces.

[14]*Commons' jn., ii,* 302; Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-52, i,* 356; D'Ewes (C), pp 67, 70-1, 73-5. Among those implicated were (unnamed) bishops, councillors, MPs and London aldermen, while the Queen was 'a nursing mother'. It is hard to tell from D'Ewes's account what O'Connolly said he believed from what he claimed MacMahon to have believed. Nor is it clear what he means by stating that O'Connolly's written answers 'weere farr shorte of what he had related'.

[15]See Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 138 for the dimensions of the 'plot' as set out in Pym's Nov. 8 speech (paralleling the queries out to O'Connolly); Russell, *Causes*, pp. 75-81 for the flexibility of the charge of popery.

Clotworthy who pressed for it to be sent.[16] Parliament was not acting with unmitigated ignorance and prejudice, but was willing, for the moment, to be guided by Dublin.[17]

Instead disunion emerged with the arrival of news from the third of Charles's kingdoms, official accounts from the King himself and from Parliament's commissioners in Edinburgh being received on Nov. 4, along with communications forwarded by the King which had been addressed to him from Ulster. Together these confirmed fears of the widespread nature of the threat to English authority and lives in Ireland- 'a general defection of all the papists and native Irish'- and carried the King's request for advice on the subject.[18] Three consequences followed. The seriousness of what was happening in Ulster being apparent, the Commons gave the Impressment Bill two readings, despite the potential for suspicion, on the grounds of 'liberties', inherent in the issue, and Holles's motion to vote for Leicester's speedy departure was accepted.[19] When he further moved to accept Scottish assistance in Ireland he was opening the first breach in parliamentary unity.[20] At a joint meeting of the Houses' Irish committees the Lords refused to countenance Scottish aid as 'dishonourable'.[21] In the lower House tactical opposition was used, Falkland not wishing to see Scottish troops deployed unless it become more clear that they were essential, though thereby giving credence to strategic considerations, based on Scotland's geographical location

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[16]*Lords' jn., iv,* 422; *Commons' jn., ii,* 305; D'Ewes (C), pp. 82, 103.

[17]The explicit wording of the Declaration goes against Bottigheimer's argument that , as early as Nov. 1, Parliament's response to news from Ireland was to effect 'a semantic transformation, in which the specifics of uprising in Ulster, together with the allegedly grand intentions of the malefactors, were converted into a crime on the part of the entire Irish nation'. Throughout the first months their response had been weak, in part because information was 'unbelievably muddled' leaving it 'impossible to determine' what was happening in Ireland - which areas were affected, how many Catholics were involved, how the Old English had reacted - K. S. Bottigheimer, *English Money and Irish Land: the 'Adventurers' in the Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland*, (Oxford, 1971), pp 32, 34. In fact the information received by Parliament in November was consistently specific, unlike the pamphlets launched on the public (*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 1-17 for letters received in November, cf. pp 22-4, 48-9, 51-2). The Dublin authorities were not disposed to minimise the 'conspiracy' and Pym and his allies exploited the examination of O'Connolly to the same end. But the former could distinguish the plot from its fulfilment and remained, officially, at least hopeful of some Old English loyalty to the end of November. Parliament followed their line. Moreover, although a high degree of knowledge of Irish geography need not be assumed for most English MPs they had enough sense to direct their efforts specifically towards Dublin and Ulster, the areas immediately at risk. Munster was allocated minimal relief for the moment and of Connacht there remained grounds for confidence.

[18]*Commons' jn., ii,* 305; D'Ewes (C), p. 83. *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 342, 344 for the letters to the King from Viscount Chichester (Oct. 28) and Archibald Stewart (Oct. 29). For developments in Edinburgh, see David Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters and Irish confederates. Scottish-Irish relations in the mid-seventeenth century* (Belfast, 1981), pp. 43-5.

[19]*Commons' jn., ii,* 305; D'Ewes (C), pp 83-4; Russell, *British Monarchies*, p. 417. The 'liberties' argument was raised by Marten and Sir John Hotham. As to Leicester's going, Culpepper wanted him to wait until he had gathered an army. D'Ewes's response, in favour of immediate departure, reveals the Irish Committee opinion that troops go over as soon as even a few hundred could be raised.

[20]D'Ewes (C), pp. 84-5 & note 25. Explicit reference was made to using the Act of Pacification to secure Scottish aid, cf. p.91. For the ability of the Scots to 'polarise' English opinion in 1640-1 see Russell, *British monarchies,* pp. 83-4, 198, 334-5, 417 & note 70.

[21]D'Ewes (C), pp. 90-2. Russell, *British Monarchies*, p. 186 shows 'dishonour' to have been a potential stumbling block over the payment of Brotherly Assistance in January 1641.

as well as to the idea of the morale effect of Anglo-Scots co-operation; Culpepper introduced the question of payment .[22]

Meanwhile a third consequence of Charles's letter ran in a different direction. For, while he told Speaker Lenthall that he expected the Commons to provide 'present advice, by what ways and means best to suppress this dangerous rebellion' he opened the door to wider powers when he added that the Lords had also been so informed 'that, by joint counsels, some vigorous and speedy course may be taken for suppressing this great evil and relieving his loyal subjects in Ireland'.[23] On the question of executive military action Charles had, if unwittingly, sold the pass. Both Houses accepted ordinances enabling the Earl of Newport to issue munitions, and the Earl of Leicester to nominate officers to raise volunteers, both for Irish service, the peers adding an amending clause stating that they did so not only because of the King's absence but '"for that his Majesty hath especially recommended the Care of the Preservation of that Kingdom unto both Houses of Parliament"'. When Leicester proved scrupulous, doubting whether he could act without a Commission under the Great Seal, both Houses voted on Nov. 9 that their ordinance was sufficiently valid, the Lords grounding their claim specifically on the royal 'order'.[24]

Further news from Ireland dominated proceedings in the Commons on Nov. 11. Now it was clear that the Dublin government had committed themselves to the idea that the kingdom of Ireland and the Protestants there 'were never in so great danger to be lost as at this instant'. Later in the day the House heard a letter from the Irish Council to their English counterparts which clearly stated that the aim of the insurgents was for the establishment of Catholicism and for Irish control of the lands and government of Ireland. Immediate requirements were now specified, at 10 000 infantry, 1 000 cavalry, arms and £100 000.[25] The troop levels requested were acceded to at once, and the Commons further agreed that recruiting must begin immediately, although there is no evidence that commissions had been issued or officers nominated. Instead Sir Simon Harcourt, veteran of Dutch service and a Council of War member, was voted directly to Cheshire where, with the assistance of local MP Sir William Brereton and £2 000 he was to levy volunteers for Dublin.[26]

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[22]D'Ewes (C), pp. 90-5; *Commons' jn., ii,* 306. It is worth noting that those in favour of payment for the Scots used the argument that if the Scots were not paid they would surely seek compensation in increased power in Ireland.

[23]*H. M. C. rep. 4,* p. 104.

[24]The ordinances specified the raising of 3500 infantry and 600 cavalry at once, and the issue of 100 cavalry arms, 8 000 infantry arms and 10 lasts of gunpowder. *Lords' jn., iv,* 424-5, 429; *Commons' jn., ii,* 306, 308; D'Ewes (C), pp. 86-7, 90-1, 95, 109. Leicester continued to raise queries. On Nov. 17 the Lords agreed to approach the king on his behalf and to aver his actions on their authority. *Lords' jn., iv,* 444.

[25]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 12-13, 7-10; *Lords' jn., iv,* 431.

[26]*Lords' jn., iv,* 437; *Commons' jn., ii,* 313; D'Ewes (C), pp. 119, 120-1, 124, 128-9.

Financially the Commons had also agreed to the Dublin request as a target figure, though the Irish committee raised the sum to be voted to £200 000, albeit also to cover English defence and repayment of debts; the explicit aim was to encourage the City loan. If any lack of realism still prevailed among parliamentarians as to costs, it ought to have been expelled by the Council of War's fuller estimates of military costs, as high as £19 201 p.a. for one foot regiment.[27] Though the London government had begun collecting its loan, it had done so on a provisional basis. Repeated calls were made for security to be given for the credit extended, a result of failure to repay earlier loans. The regularity of the calls for adequate guarantees, whether accompanied by a 'political' agenda or not, suggests that the pleas reflect genuine difficulties and not just a smokescreen for reluctance to lend. The loan was formally granted after the reading of the correspondence from Ireland to the municipal authorities, but too much reliance could not be placed the London government, however willing, given the growing financial predicament of the metropolis.[28] In the interim, Parliament agreed to a suggestion to despatch £20 000 to Dublin in Spanish currency, placing speed above the financial loss involved.[29]

Funding had been voted, if only in the abstract. Over Scottish assistance even general votes were hard to agree. No further progress having been affected by Nov. 11, John Hampden's immediate response to the news heard that day was to inform the Commons of a Scottish offer of 10 000 soldiers for Ireland. Yet D'Ewes's belief that both Lords and Commons committed themselves to sending 10000 Scottish soldiers to Ireland was altogether too sanguine, being hedged about with qualifications.[30] A proposal on Nov. 12 for a definite contingent of 3 000 was defeated by 112 votes to 77, as was the alternative that the Scottish Parliament be free to add to this number in case of need, thus by-passing the delays involved in negotiating possible reinforcements.[31] By the following day, however, the ability of the pro-Scots to utilise both incoming correspondence and the committee structure was made apparent. Pym

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[27]*Commons' jn., ii,* 313; D'Ewes (C), pp. 120-1, 128-9.

[28]*Commons' jn., ii,* 312, 314; D'Ewes (C), pp. 120-1, 121& note 12, 123 & note 19, 127-8, 129, 133, 138; Pearl, *London*, pp. 206-7.

[29]*Commons' jn., ii,* 309, 310-1; D'Ewes (C), pp. 109-110, 114-6. The proposal was made by two merchants, George Henley and John Hawkeridge, and involved repayment of £20 000 in English coin from the London loan. It is clear that Parliament were willing to pay the price of allowing private profit through the variable exchange rates. This £20 000 included the first vote of £11 000. See also appendix 1 (ii).

[30] *Commons' jn., ii,* 312; D'Ewes (C), pp. 123-5 & note 21. If, as Coates suggests, the original resolution that 10 000 Scots should be accepted 'under such Conditions, and upon such Cautions, as shall be honourable and safe for this Kingdom' was to be amended by the clerk, its replacement that 10 000 men should be asked for 'in such manner, and at such times, as the Parliament shall think fit' uses less suspicious language but was actually more cagey about eventual negotiation. It was in any event also agreed 'That, unless the Scotts should condescend to be commanded by the Government of English settled in Ireland, that there is no intention that any should go at all'. The Lords seem to have received the vote in the second form, and to have agreed to 1 000 soldiers now 'with an Intimation of Desire' to have 9 000 more 'if Occasion be', on Articles to be agreed, *Lords' jn., iv,* 435.

[31]D'Ewes (C), pp. 130-1.

presented a letter sent by Sir Adam Loftus, an Irish Privy Councillor in Dublin to Sir Robert King (Nov. 5). Loftus's picture of the threat to the lives of 100 000 Protestants as well as loss of control of Ireland conveniently mentioned that there was 'Nothing soe terrible to the apprehensions off the Rebels as a considerable force from the Scotts'.[32] Immediately, Hotham was able to report the opinion of the committee for Ireland that 6 000 Scots be called for, doubtless strengthened by his own earlier opposition to the idea. In the wake of the Loftus letter, and with the pre-secured support of the Irish committee, it was 'Resolved, upon the Question, That, upon this new Advertisement, this House shall again debate concerning a farther Assistance now to be desired of the Scotts, notwithstanding the former Order'.[33] After a 'long debate' it was agreed that 5 000 men be sought.[34]

During the last two weeks of November there was a reduced intensity in the progress of Irish affairs at Westminster. Yet the framework was already in place for intervention. Later Irish committee reports led to the issue of formal commissions for regiments to go to Ireland and the appointment of officers for these forces; to an ordinance securing the City loan, and the issue of money therefrom to allow for recruitment[35]. Letters from Ireland contained little that was new. When correspondence from Ulster was heard on Nov. 28, presenting a bleak picture of conditions in the province, the response was appropriate to the message delivered.[36] The votes in Parliament had, in fact, kept pace exactly with the requests of the Dublin authorities and would continue to do so. Despite disputes over the Scots, there was no reluctance to send a large English army, nor did Pym advocate delays in favour of the Grand Remonstrance.[37]

What was beginning to emerge was the extent to which funding was a practical limitation on action. Without ready money, and relying on a shaky civic fiscal system,

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[32]D'Ewes (C), p.137 & note.

[33]*Commons' jn., ii,* 314-5

[34]*Commons' jn., ii,* 314-5; D'Ewes (C), pp. 137-8 7 note 20. Opponents had tried to use the procedural device of the earlier vote to block discussion. Otherwise logistical arguments were used on both sides - there is no record of directly anti-Scots speeches.

[35]*Lords' jn., iv,* 444; *Commons' jn.,* ii, 318-21; D'Ewes (C), pp. 159-160, 164-6, 167-170. For the progress of the ordinance to secure the City loan, see D'Ewes (C), pp. 164& note 5, 170, 210-11, 229, 236; *Commons' jn., ii,* 314, 319-20, 323, 331; *Lords' jn., iv,* 456-7. The need for an ordinance may have been prompted by the delay in the King's return since the earliest requests were for what may be described as an order promising an Act of Parliament. The ordinance in its final form was only presented for the Speaker's signature on Dec. 6.

[36]Letters sent to secretary Vane described losses of territory and lack of munitions, but no real shortage of manpower. The Irish committee recommended the recruitment of regiment sin the province, with officers and munitions from England. (The formation of the regiments assigned to Sir John Clotworthy and Lord Conway are thus presaged). D'Ewes (C), p. 209.

[37]Bottigheimer, *English Money*, p. 36. Pressure to put the Remonstrance ahead of Ireland had been exerted by William Strode from the beginning of Nov., but it was only on Nov. 19 - 20 that it secured priority over Irish affairs, by which time the main developments had been set in motion, D'Ewes (C), pp. 106-7, 111, 115-16, 121, 144-5, 149, 150-2, 181; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 181-2; Clarendon, *Rebellion*, i, 400.

imaginative measures were required from MPs whose record on English financial matters was a poor augury for Ireland. It was not that they were unaware of the facts - Pym's reports on the costs of an Irish war were precise and backed by the experts. It was rather a refusal to face up to reality, evident when English finances were discussed, and as in the like case tending to a desire to shift any remaining burden over to those seen as the cause of the problem.[38] In Irish terms, this could only be the rebels themselves. Thus the question of land as a reward was accepted almost immediately. For the moment it was not seen as an alternative to other revenue; only as the haemorrhage of funds became obvious in Dec. - Jan. did confiscated land move to centre stage.[39] On a political level, however, November had seen unity among MPs largely maintained. The concept of national defence could encompass security arrangements, responses to Catholic threats and intervention in Ireland by Parliament. All could be justified as emergency measures, though given legalistic strength by a convenient reading of the King's letter of Oct. 30, a convenient conjunction which could not survive the King's return.[40]

II

The King's return to London has been recognised as a turning point, bringing to an end a month in which 'the two Houses came nearest to being an effective government'.[41] The impact of the royal presence was felt both institutionally and politically. Both Houses had acted, in Charles's absence, through explicit reference to his letter of 30 Oct.[42] Now it remained to be seen what part Charles would wish to take in the execution of measures for Ireland. Even more pressing was concern for any policy alterations he might aim to implement. A letter read by Clotworthy, on Nov. 30, had described the cruelties committed by the Irish and added 'that they report that they have done nothing but by Warant or directions from the Kinge'. It seems likely that this laid the grounds for the Commons' decision that its Irish Committee prepare 'Heads' for a conference to clear the King of false reports made by the insurgents, but also to secure 'a Provision to be made, that there may be no Conclusion of the War

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[38]See Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 167 for discussion of finances in Parliament; cf. Russell, *Causes*, p. 162 for the problems of royal finance in Dec. 1641.

[39]Pearl, *London*, p. 207; Bottigheimer, *English Money*, pp. 36-7. The idea of 'rewards' was envisaged as at first applicable by the Dublin government for private initiatives by 'English' and 'Irish'.

[40]See Russell, *British Monarchies*, pp. 298-9 for emergency initiatives in May 1641.

[41]Russell, *British Monarchies*, p. 402.

[42]Thus, the Lords, on 27 November, voted that he be given an account of all that had been done by Parliament concerning Ireland since the King had committed the matter to them, *Lords' jn., iv,* 454. In the Commons on Dec. 2, Falkland claimed that the King had given authority to Parliament to proceed over Ireland as a counter to demands for explicit royal approval of actions to date, but a reading of the Oct. 30 letter showed that 'hee did onlie require our advice', D'Ewes (C), pp. 223-4.

there, to the Prejudice of this Kingdom'. It looked suspiciously like condemning Charles while purporting to save him.[43] Three days later Herbert Morley announced a letter from Alexander Rigby, MP, with the testimony of the ex-prisoner, Edward Briers. Here the news was given of the use by Sir Phelim O'Neill of a supposed commission from the King and his claims to have support from the 'state' in England and Ireland as well as of Catholics in England and Scotland.[44]

The King addressed the Houses on Dec. 2, mentioning Ireland 'for which, though I doubt not your Care, yet methinks the preparations *for it go but slowly on.*' He noted the arrival of the first of the Scottish commissioners the previous day and urging the appointment of a select committee to meet with them.[45] In the last few days the Commons had finished work on their impressment ordinance[46] and both Houses had approved the ordinance to secure the London loan.[47] But within the accepted framework of 10 000 - 12 000 troops and £100 000 very little had been constructively produced. Small sums from the London coffers had enabled Harcourt to begin assembling volunteers, and Leicester was also voted money, on Dec. 6, to recruit a regiment of 1 500 infantry with 400 firelocks.[48] His legalistic scruples had probably only been overcome by the issue of a royal warrant for him to levy soldiers for Ireland, on Dec. 3.[49]

Impressment and the deployment of a Scottish army would emerge as the key proposals for by-passing the slow processes of military intervention. On Dec. 8 Pym delivered, from the Irish committee, a whole batch of documents centred around three letters from the Dublin authorities.[50] Again the physical threat to their control of Ireland was elaborated upon - 'some of the rebels ... have dared to come within four miles of this city' - and corresponding demands made, now reaching £200 000 and urging the

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[43]*Commons' jn., ii,* 328; D'Ewes (C), p. 219. There is no evidence that the Conference was actually held. The letter, dated Nov. 22, was sent from Dublin by Justice Mayart ('Mayern').

[44]Most of the response was channelled into action against English Catholics, though it also fuelled Pym's assault on the Lords, D'Ewes (C), pp 228-9; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p.170; Gardiner, *Eng.*, x, 94.

[45]Rushworth, iii (1), 454; Gardiner, *Eng.* x, 89. Commissioners were duly named by the two Houses the following day, D'Ewes (C), p.183 & note ; *Commons' jn., ii*, 330-2. Charles was eager to conciliate the Scottish commissioners (Russell, *British Monarchies*, pp. 417-8), perhaps a sign of his 'conviction that he had secured a personal triumph in Scotland' (Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p.159).

[46]News that Harcourt was having difficulty in recruiting troops probably helped the passage of the bill. D'Ewes (C), pp. 207, 220 & note, 224, 232; *Commons' jn., ii*, 326-7, 328, 330-2.

[47]D'Ewes (C), pp. 210-1, 217, 229; *Commons' jn., ii,* 331; *Lords' jn., iv*, 456-7.

[48]Together these units, plus 500 soldiers for Munster and 600 cavalry, constituted the first phase of the expedition. Arms were reported available, and Harcourt recruiting the first 1100, by Nov. 26, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1641*, p. 181. Neither impressment nor commissions for officers were yet available to aid the process. See appendix 1 (i) for details.

[49]*Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 353. The warrant left to Leicester's discretion how many men he wished to levy.

[50]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 22-4, 24-7, 29-31. The letters of 24, 26 and 27 Nov. seem most likely from the descriptions by D'Ewes and Holland. The reports they sent of the spread of the rising may be verified from accounts in the depositions, see M. Perceval-Maxwell, *The outbreak of the Irish Rebellion of 1641*, (Dublin, 1994) pp. 252-4.

need for 10 000 Scots as well as 12 000 English soldiers.[51] Pym made an attempt to link the letters with military estimates but gained only a very limited response.[52] Instead the House responded much more readily to news relayed in a letter not signed by the group of councillors normally associated with the regular 'public despatch' but by an inner group writing a 'private advertisement' to Leicester 'under that secrecy which from a person of so great honour we have reason to expect'. [53]

The letter made mention of the journey of Thomas, 4th Viscount Dillon to the king with a document 'signed by many of Papists of the nobility and gentry of the kingdom', offering 'of themselves by their power to repress this rebellion without the aids of men forth of England...'. This was without the approval of the Council. Indeed, the letter claimed, were Dillon to persuade the King that such aid from England was unnecessary, the few remaining English and Protestants would be overwhelmed. The authors did not deny that 'when we have an army of some strength, many of the old English here may be fit to be put into it and will doubtless fight well with us' in suppressing the rebellion, but as yet 'we cannot judge whom we may trust'.[54] The signatories were able to send two oaths of the insurgents and a copy of the letter of the O'Farrells of Longford to Dillon, seeking to lay their grievances before the Irish Council and hence the King.[55] Lord Dillon had received these Longford terms and transmitted them to the Irish peers in a brief meeting of Parliament, where it was resolved to open negotiations and send Dillon to England. There he would inform the King of the support of Catholic peers in return for liberty of religion and Parliamentary independence.[56]

The authors of the 'private' despatch instead showed themselves persuasive of the advantages of English aid. The letter noted that the opportunity was there for 'a more firm and established peace' (and thus English security), 'reducing this kingdom to

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[51] *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 22, 30. See also Sir Adam Loftus's letter, D'Ewes (C), p. 253. The Commons accepted terms for negotiation with the Scottish Commissioners, *Lords' jn., iv*, 463, 464, 466-7; *Commons' jn., ii*, 336.

[52] D'Ewes (C), pp. 253-4.

[53] *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 24-5. It should be noted that the letter itself was not read by Pym, only an 'extract' or 'Abstract'. Despite calls fro a full reading, Pym defended the practice since the 'chiefe Justices' had asked Leicester 'to conceale them; and it might much advance the Rebels designes to discover them, D'Ewes (C), p. 251 & note 6. Those excluded, as against letters written the day before and the day after, were the two Viscount Dillons (Dillon of Costello - Galen and Dillon of Kilkenny West); Sir Pierce Crosby; Archbishop Lancelot Bulkeley of Dublin; Bishop Anthony Martin of Meath and, significantly, Lord General Ormond. Cf. *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 24, 28, 31 for letters signed on 25 and 27 Nov.

[54] *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 24-7.

[55] D'Ewes (C), pp 251-3; Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-52*, i, 367-8. Recounting their loyalty and the disabilities laid upon them as Catholics, they made request for 'an act of oblivion and general pardon without restitution or account of goods taken in the time of this commotion, a liberty of our religion, a repeal of all statutes formerly made to the contrary, and not by proclamation, but by parliamentary way; A charter free denizen in ample manner for meer Irish'. See Perceval-Maxwell, *Irish rebellion*, pp. 225-6 for discussion of Longford.

[56] See Russell, *British monarchies*, pp. 396-8.

civility and religion, but also in raising a greater and far more considerable revenue here to the Crown than formerly, out of the estates of those who were actors in the present general mischiefs...'. The timing of the letter was perhaps as crucial as its contents. Dillon himself was still in Dublin - he signed the next official letters of Nov. 27 / 30 - making his mission effectively abortive even before his departure if it was condemned at Westminster. In the Commons it was resolved that a declaration be drawn up to the effect 'that wee should never consent that a toleration of the Romish Religion should be in Ireland.' Culpepper opposed the motion since it would cause loyal Catholics to join those in rebellion. D'Ewes argued that it was only non-toleration, and not extirpation that was at issue, 'it will witnes our moderation to all the Christian world seing they have not only sworne to extirpate our Religion but have with fire and sword destroyed the professours thereof'. Moreover, it would counter the assertion in the letter to the Lords Justices that the King's officers had opposed a toleration which the King himself was prepared to grant. The resultant debate was long, Holles arguing that any such declaration be extended to all three kingdoms.[57] By Dec. 10 'Heads' of just such a declaration were readied for presentation to the Lords at a conference.[58]

The Declaration was liable to prise open the delicate consensus still holding over Ireland. It tied together two non-negotiable aims of the 'junto'; the view, shared by Parsons and his allies, that the Rising must be suppressed not pardoned,[59] (a demand that the insurgents be made 'rebels' by open declaration, thus distancing them from the King and the Queen) and the demand that no ground be given to Catholicism in England. This second point needed stating out loud as, the same day as Pym read the calls for toleration from the Irish, the Lords heard the French ambassadors' pleas to show clemency to convicted Catholic priests 'the rather for it may concern the settling of Affairs in *Ireland*'.[60]

Over the next few days the accretion of clauses by the declaration reflected the religious dynamic which propelled it. The Irish committee successfully recommended a statement to 'vindicate' the Queen, by her condemnation of 'all those that shall engage ther lives for the meyntenance off the popysh Religion by insurrection', while pressure from the floor secured calls for public prayers and fastings tied to relief measures (the future 'Contribution'). A rebuff from the Lords in matters ecclesiastical preceded the inclusion of an Irish committee condemnation of the bishops 'and looser clergie' for their loud denunciations of 'the King's good subjects of Scotland' and their silence

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[57]D'Ewes (C), pp. 254-5. Rudyerd remarked that 'When we deny the Irish a Toleration, we do not withdraw the eases and favours they have heretofore enjoyed, Greater, I am sure then they would afford us, if we were in their power, wherefore Mr. Speaker, let us uphold our Religion and trust God with the success'. Rushworth, iii (1), 456.

[58]*Commons' jn., ii,* 338; D'Ewes (C), p. 266 & note.

[59]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 42-4, a letter of 14 December signed by the inner group.

[60]*Lords' jn., iv,* 466. In his speech on Dec. 14, the King cautiously upheld the convicted clergy. For delays over other anti-Catholic legislation, Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 164-5.

over Ireland's rebels. The declaration went through the Commons and on to the Lords, apparently with a blisteringly anti-episcopal speech from Holles.[61] Only the attempt to persuade the house to explicitly declare that 'it was to noe end to give anye monie till the King had made declaration that hee would grant noe Toleration to any Papists in any of his Majesties dominions' failed.[62]

Having wrapped their Declaration in anti-episcopal garb they could not expect an easy passage for it in the Lords. Toleration, the reprieve of the condemned priests and the attack on the bishops led to frayed tempers in the upper house, as between the Earl of Warwick and Archbishop Williams. For the moment the peers' greater compromising instincts held good. Their heterogeneous committee on the documents scrapped the preamble but postponed an attempt to insist on the toleration of the 'established' religion. Archbishop Williams was to accompany Ussher in the preaching of the sermons to the Lords at the Fast.[63] Religious divisions had not yet split a unity of action on Ireland.

Meanwhile the linkage of political and religious demands with money was neither new[64] nor, in its application to Ireland, merely a fortuitous attempt to further a 'party' agenda. It was a recognition of the way policy must affect financial stability. The declaration had edged forward surrounded by fresh news of massacre in Ireland[65] and another letter of Clotworthy's announcing the government defeat at Julianstown as well as 'horrible cruelties'. In its light the Commons were persuaded to reopen discussion on the moribund £400 000 Bill, in an effort to find a more solid basis for the many demands for money pressing in on Parliament.[66] If an infinite regress of credit was to be avoided then some concrete collateral was needed. In such circumstances, the prospect of using confiscated Irish lands to stave off some of the costs of the war could not but seem attractive. In statements on this matter, it is not

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[61]D'Ewes (C), pp. 276, 277-88 & notes 11-12, 281-2; Fletcher, *Outbreak,* pp. 168-9. Cf the comment of William Montagu (to Lord Montagu, Dec. 9), that the anti-toleration declaration was 'the best act they have done since the Parliament began, if they prosecute it'. H. M. C. *Buccleuch MSS*, i, 288.

[62]D'Ewes (C), pp. 283-5.

[63]*Lords' jn., iv,* 473, 476, 479 480; Fletcher, *Outbreak,* pp .168-9. H. M. C. *Buccleuch MSS*, i, 289 seems a more accurate account of events in the Lords than H. M. C. *Montagu MSS*, p. 35 unless two such debates occurred. Yet, observing the debates, William Montagu remarked that 'It is dangerous to suppose parties in either House, but the bloods of men severall[y] affected are up, you may see by their catching...', H. M. C. *Buccleuch MSS*, i, 289. It was also rumoured that the Scots were pressing for a declaration of the Irish as rebels, Sidney Bere to Sir John Pennington, Dec. 16, *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3,* pp. 201-2.

[64]Cf. Russell, *British Monarchies*, pp. 345-6 for the 'linkage of reformation and revenue' pursued as 'a settled strategy' from May 1641, as for example linking Tonnage and Poundage with Root and Branch; *British Monarchies*, p. 428 for Pym's persistence in linking royal revenue to anti-catholic measures.

[65]A letter from Brereton announced the deaths of 30 000 English in Ireland, D'Ewes (C), p. 276.

[66]D'Ewes (C), pp. 256-8, 283-5, 286 & note 6, 288. Since 1640 the pressure of taxation in England had been the greatest in living memory, yet when the Bill for £400 000 was revived in February-March 1641/2 it was not only for Ireland but had to include the paying off of debts going back to the army disbandment in England. D'Ewes (C), p.285; Gardiner, *Eng.*, x, 9; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 250; Hazlett, 'Financing of British Armies', p. 32.

always clear if what was being proposed was a granting of lands in a manner somewhat like what finally emerged in the 'Adventure' or merely that the King provide for the future secure revenue of the Crown from the lands in question. Perhaps of course the drafters themselves were not totally clear about the matter. The Lords Justices' first statement on the subject appears to be that in their letter of November 26, read in the Commons on December 8 and noted above. But this was three weeks after the Declaration issued by Parliament had mooted the idea of land as a reward for assistance over the Rising. The petition accompanying the Grand Remonstrance had put the dominant position in the Commons clearly, asking the King to suspend alienation of forfeited lands in Ireland for the better support of the Crown and the 'satisfaction' of the subjects of England. Charles's reply (Dec. 23), doubting 'whether it be seasonable to declare resolutions of that nature before the events of a war be seen' was hardly calculated to appeal to a hard-pressed and at this stage avenging House of Commons.[67]

Speaking to Parliament on Dec. 14 Charles had stated that 'it was a fitter time for Actions than for Declarations'[68] In the main his speech had been an attempt to unblock the congestion in the raising of an army in England caused by the failure to procure an agreement on impressment.[69] The issue was already setting the two Houses at odds, and would only further do so as it became entangled with the Scottish Question'. The Bill's failure to pass was not so much a matter of the subject's as of the King's rights. The problem was not with the raising of soldiers but with the 'Declaratory Preamble'.[70] Having debated various other, technical, amendments the Houses had reached a compromise on most issues within the legislation by Dec. 14, but not on the thorny prerogative issues.[71] Charles himself then stepped in, offering to

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[67]S. R. Gardiner, *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution*, (1979 reprint of 3rd ed., Oxford, 1906), pp. 205, 236.

[68]The King's motives in these declaratory statements cannot be seen as disinterested. After all, it was vital for him to stress his own interest in the subjugation of Ireland. Since the news of the Rising had reached England, there had been a surge of provincial panics accompanied by disorder, and a welter of pamphlets ostensibly reporting Irish events. Popular interest in the events in Ireland was high, as well as a tide of opinion seeking reasons for the delays in sending aid. Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 136; Brian Manning, *The English People and the English revolution* (London, 1976), chapter 2. For the circulation of news about Ireland see K. J. Lindley, 'The impact of the 1641 rebellion upon England and Wales, 1641-5', in *I. H. S.*, xviii (1972).

[69]*Lords' jn.*, iv, pp 473-4; Rushworth, iii (1), 457; Nalson, *Impartial collection*, ii, 738; D'Ewes (C), p. 286.

[70]In its final form the Act 17 Car. I, cap. 28, after recounting the present dangers, stated that 'by the laws of this realm none of His Majesty's subjects ought to be impressed or compelled to go out of his county to serve as a soldier in the wars, except in case of necessity of the sudden coming in of strange enemies into the kingdom...'. Gardiner, Constitutional *Documents*, pp. 243-5. The impressment bill first introduced into the Commons in November had faced opposition on the grounds of the 'liberties of the subject', and later amendments over technical matters of the scope of impressment. These appear to form ¶ 2-3 of the final Act.

[71]*Lords' jn., iv*, 462, 463, 466, 469, 472; Commons' *jn., ii*, 334-5, 341; D'Ewes (C), pp. 249, 261-3, 275. See Russell, *British Monarchies*, pp. 434-5 for a discussion of the issues invoked by the impressment bill.

pass the Bill without any preamble.[72] The King's action precipitated a clash over alleged breach of privilege, which was hardly conducive to the furtherance of the plans for Ireland.[73] The peers proved as protective of their privileges (that the King should not take notice of a Bill under discussion) as their counterparts, but this did not necessarily win them to the Bill itself. The King's intervention had hinted that he was less than impressed either with the limitations on 'policy' or the statutory curbs on military prerogative supported by the majority in the lower House.

There, concern for the minutiae of logistical arrangements re-surfaced periodically. By Dec. 16 commissions for subordinate officers had been issued and the Commons voted £10 000 pay for the soldiers then being mustered, and raised the matter of the issue of munitions for new forces.[74] In terms of the bigger picture frustration was evidently running high in some quarters. Perhaps in consequence of the slow progress over the Scottish negotiations, Sir Philip Stapleton, the usual spokesman on the issue, successfully proposed that the Commons debate requesting the King 'to grant a Commission to some Persons, agreed uppon by both Houses, for the Considering and Disposing the Affairs of *Ireland*, according to such Instructions as shall likewise be agreed upon by both Houses, with his Majesty's consent'.[75] It was symptomatic of the growing concern that delays had political as well as structural causes. On Dec. 18, even while the privilege matter of the impressment bill was under discussion, Holles was sent to protest to the Lords that by their failures over impressment and the Scottish negotiations Ireland may be lost, but the Commons held themselves innocent of such an outcome.[76] The bulk of the Scottish proposals had been accepted in the Commons on Dec. 15, but the Lords had balked at Scottish insistence that it was not feasible to send less than a 10 000-strong army.[77] Holles delivered his

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[72]H. M. C. *Montagu MSS*, pp. 134, 135; *Lords' jn., iv*, 473-4; *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, p. 199. Clarendon's attribution of the move to the advice of St. John, while part of an implausible conspiracy theory, is not unlikely in itself. The proposal echoes very closely St. John's own speech which sought to break the deadlock in the Commons over the wording of the preamble by dropping it altogether, an effort overruled by Speaker Lenthall on procedural grounds. The whole episode bears a close resemblance to the Solicitor's fence-straddling efforts over the Militia Bill of Dec. 7, a problem-solving by legal shorthand approach to the lack of an effective military structure. Clarendon, *Rebellion*, i, 444-7; D'Ewes (C), pp. 262-3.

[73]Clarendon, *Rebellion*, i, 439-42; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 166-7; Gardiner, *Eng.*, x, 103.

[74]*Commons' jn., ii*, 346; D'Ewes (C), pp. 159, 253-4, 301-02, 305, 306-07. The votes were to give one month's pay to the Lord Lieutenant's regiment, two companies of firelocks, Harcourt's 1 100 and Dungarvan's horse troop; for advance pay to officers to command 500 men at Carrickfergus, 1 000 in Munster, 500 in Connacht, 300 dragoons and 300 horse; to raise the horse and dragoons, and 500 men each for Munster and Carrickfergus; and £200 to the Ordnance for transport costs. Once again royal authorisation survives for local officials in England to assist Leicester in raising the 500 volunteers intended for Munster, *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 354. For fuller discussion see appendix 1.

[75]*Commons' jn., ii*, 348; D'Ewes (C), p. 309. No subsequent debate is recorded but the plan would be revived. D'Ewes says the commission would be 'only to take the advice of the howse in waightie matters'.

[76]D'Ewes (C), p.315.

[77]*Lords' jn., iv*, 471, 472, 476, 478-9, 480; *Commons' jn., ii*, 339-40, 341, 343-4, 346; D'Ewes (C), pp. 274 & note 32, 279, 291-4, 301; Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters*, pp. 55-6.

message on 20 December; that day one of the motions in favour of the Scots attempted to get round the issue by allowing 10 000 Scottish soldiers to go over in advance of the passage of the Impressment Bill, but this was rejected along with two similar proposals.[78] On Dec. 21, the Lords did agree to 10 000 Scottish troops being sent to Ireland, on condition that 10 000 English also go.[79] It had taken careful utilisation of supporting pleas, from a variety of directions, in both Houses, to ensure even this. On Dec. 20, Stapleton introduced a letter from the Scots' commissioners, urging an immediate response to their terms; the next day he put forward the considered opinion of Leicester himself 'that there was no Way to succour Dublyn but by Diversion in the North; which can no way be so well done as by the Scotts'. The same day a petition was produced from 'Lords and Gentlemen' fled from Ireland (including such notables as Ely, Loftus and Mountnorris) which made much of possible assistance from the Scots.[80]

The process of negotiation still had a long way to run. The argument that English honour was at stake was not an obscure or irrelevant issue, rather it was the expression of a fear that the Scots 'meant to make their fortunes by a new conquest in Ireland... so that, according to their rules of good husbandry, they might expect whatsoever they got from the rebels to keep for themselves.[81] The Scots admitted as much themselves; they wished that 'our service and hazard may be rewarde with the like recompence as sall be granted to the English or Irish;...and if we sall with hazard of our lyffes doe good service to his Majestie and Crowne of England, we aucht to be sharers of the fruits of our paines and recompence of our service with the English, being always subject to his Majestie and the Crowne of Ingland as the English are and salbe'.[82] The last clause of this statement was not reassuring enough.[83] Yet

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[78]*Lords' jn.*, iv, 474, 475, 476, 481, 482, 483, 485. The 'sense' of the upper House was that 10 000 Scots could go if the same number of English were sent and (perhaps remembering events in early 1641) money was to be specifically allotted to the latter. The Lords held on to their position though the Scots raised the stakes on Dec. 20 by demanding an immediate answer after such long delays, citing the otherwise inevitable disbandment of troops still under arms. *Lords' jn., iv,* 481, 482, 483; *Commons' jn., ii,* 350; D'Ewes (C), pp. 315, 324-5; Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters*, pp. 56-7.

[79]At first the peers agreed to 10 000 Scots 'if it may be ascertained' that the 10 000 English would go. They thus put to the Commons two propositions, i.e. to have the Commons give some certainty that the 10 000 English would speedily follow the Scots and that the lower House would pass a vote, with royal consent, for the English soldiers. The Commons' response, the same day, was that they were 'not used to be capitulated withall'. They claimed the earlier vote of 10 000 men was quite sufficient and asked for the Scottish vote to be taken in isolation since no movement was possible on the English without impressment. The Lords, *nemine contradicente*, voted the sending of 10 000 English soldiers but followed it with a vote (on the question) that the 10 000 Scots be sent on terms acceptable to Parliament. *Lords' jn.*, iv, 484-5, 486.

[80]D'Ewes (C), pp 331-2; *Commons' jn.*, ii, 343-4, 349. For the role of Protestant Irish in London cf. Perceval-Maxwell, *Irish rebellion*, pp. 273-4, 275, including their support for adjournment of the Irish parliament.

[81]Clarendon, *Rebellion,* i, 382.

[82]*Reg. privy council Scot., 1638-43*, pp. 508-9.

[83]Both houses agreed to interim payment of 2 500 Scots still in arms and the Lords had given broad agreement to all 6 of the preliminary proposals by 24 Dec. The new terms were unveiled by the Scots

throughout the debate the King had proved himself more willing to accede to Scottish requests than the English Lords, an attitude which falls in with his readiness to urge the Scottish Parliament to action over Ireland in October - November. Perhaps he felt more confident of Scotland in the aftermath of his recent visit.[84]

The convergence of logistical and political concerns increased throughout December. Action was taken to invigorate the moribund commissariat for the English soldiers now assembling, with a mercantile committee set up to meet the need for clothing[85], while City MPs were to consider how to provide two months food supplies of the 10 000 men. (Repeated pleas from Dublin for the despatch of foodstuffs had previously won little response.[86]) More promising was the latest fillip to the finances of the operation. With the City loan almost all collected by mid Dec. Sir Henry Mildmay mooted the possibility of a loan from the company of Merchant Adventurers. Despite suspicions among some MPs about the price of support from the trading body, wider considerations won out and a loan of £20 000, later upped to £30 000, agreed.[87] Politically, there remained apprehension in the Commons that the King might fall back on some variant of the Dillon scheme. Fears were expressed about the Irish Parliament, whose upper House had approved of overtures to the rebels. Though nothing came of it for the moment, there were resolutions passed to void the meeting of the Dublin Parliament set for January, since Catholic dominance was feared; and to secure the succession to the chief governorship in the event of Leicester's death, lest nomination fall into the hands of the Irish Lords.[88]

Fresh news once again heightened awareness and hastened action. On Dec. 21 word had been received of defections among the lords of the Pale and of disturbances

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on Dec. 27 and, though debated by the Commons, were not discussed in the upper house in December. *Lords' jn., iv,* 486, 488, 491-2; *Commons' jn., ii,* 353, 363; D'Ewes (C), pp 336-7, 354, 368, 370-1.

[84]For Charles's efforts in Scotland in Oct. - Nov. 1641, see Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters,* pp. 44, 51-2.

[85]*Commons' jn., ii,* 340; D'Ewes (C), pp. 277-8 & note 10. The necessary clothing was to be paid for from local (Cheshire) poll money, a reflection of the lack of available finance.

[86]*Commons' jn., ii,* 322; *Lords' jn., iv,* 448-50; D'Ewes (C), pp. 178-9, 347-8; *Ormonde MSS,* New Series, ii, 16.

[87]The motion for the loan was preceded by Sir Robert Pye's response to the petition of merchants trading into Ireland on their losses, suggesting that they should lend money. The incongruity of such a course was not lost even on the impecunious Commons. Instead Mildmay indicated that they had 'some ground to hope' that £50 000 could be borrowed from the Merchant Adventurers. By the time he was able to report the actual sum of £30 000 on 31 December, he had to add that the Merchant Adventurers also now required an Ordinance for security, and that the money be 'kept intire' until agreement with the Scots had been obtained. D'Ewes (C), pp 342, 348, 352; *Commons' jn.,* ii, 357, 358, 362-3. The Merchant Adventurers had offered a loan in June 1641 to help pay off the armies. Though Pym was sympathetic the offer was not taken up - Russell, *British Monarchies,* p. 336. Mildmay had spoken in the Merchant Adventurers' favour in the 1620s also - Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution. Commercial Change, Political Conflict and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653,* (Princeton, NJ, 1993), p. 213. See appendix 1 for fuller discussion of financial and logistical issues.

[88]The two resolutions were delivered at conference and reported to the Upper House, but no action seems to have been taken, *Lords' jn.,* iv, 483, 484; Commons' *jn.,* ii, 349-51; D'Ewes (C), pp. 315-6. Cf. the fears expressed concerning the defection of the Irish parliament to the rebels, in Slingsby's letter to Pennington, Dec. 30, *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47,* p. 218.

in hitherto peaceful Munster.[89] Three days later Clotworthy raised the question of what to do with the newly apprehended Dillon and Pym responded by having the assignment of the task put to a 7 strong committee dominated by his allies. Their report showed that the rebels demands (toleration, non-prorogation of Parliament) were those which had been opposed to date, and that they carried the implication of evil counsel. It was delivered on Monday 27 December alongside a plethora of correspondence, perhaps the largest consignment to date, concentrating on the prospects of calamity in Munster and ill tidings from Connacht. In what seems to have been a carefully co-ordinated effort the spur to action and the threat of betrayal from within were neatly dovetailed.[90] The following day a whole spate of proposals were put forward. Large numbers of soldiers and munitions were voted for Munster, to be co-ordinated by a new committee. A further expansion in troop numbers was designed to safeguard the western province via Dublin, while a 'general' warrant was now to be sought to expedite all necessary issues of arms.[91]

But with the King at Whitehall the issue was to be less straightforward than it had been in November. Charles might have acquiesced retrospectively in Parliament's earlier encroachments as the first news of rebellion reached Great Britain but in the last week of December he had clearly begun his counter-offensive to regain all such military powers as he had, temporarily, conceded. Perhaps the matter was sparked by control of the munitions in the Tower, a foretaste of the more graphic struggle of 1642 over the magazine at Hull. Leicester had already sought a 'warrant dormant' to issue munitions without a response from the Commons. But the request for one now was apparently rejected by Charles, even though he consented to the issue of specified arms and ammunition sought by Culpepper on behalf of the Munster committee.[92]

The King was not willing to allow direct control of the military resources of England to fall from his hands. With impressment still stalled, he offered (Dec. 28) to

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[89]D'Ewes (C), p. 329.

[90]*Commons' jn.*, ii, 357-9; D'Ewes (C), pp. 349, 350-2, 354-5; Russell, *British Monarchies*, p. 364. Despite efforts to the contrary, examination of the documents remained with the small committee, with the addition of Jephson who, with Clotworthy, had been responsible for the presentation of that day's news. When Holles sought to return the letters to the Lords, who had read them first, Holland claimed that he had received his letter from Clotworthy - *Lords' jn., iv,* 495. It may also be conjectured that the apparent coincidence in date between the 'evil counsel' implicated via Dillon's examination and the attack on the Kensington meeting launched in the Lords was not accidental. For this latter see *Lords' jn., iv,* 497; Rushworth, iii (1), 465; *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, pp. 215-6.

[91]Munster's contingent went up from 500 to 2 500 (later 3 000) infantry plus 200 cavalry; an extra 3 000 infantry and 300 cavalry were to be raised and sent to Dublin, of which 1 000 and two troops were to move on to Connacht, *Commons' jn., ii,* 359, 360-1, 365, 380; *Lords' jn., iv,* 495-6, 500; D'Ewes (C), p. 360; *P. J.*, i, 45, 68. Of some importance was the fact that on Dec. 28 a Commissary of Victuals, Gualter (or Walter) Frost, was appointed for Chester with instructions to be drawn by the Irish committee, Commons' *jn., ii,* 362. See appendix 1 for details.

[92]*Commons' jn., ii,* 353, 357, 360, 361; D'Ewes (C), pp. 332-3, 363; *Lords' jn., iv,* 495-6, 500. Pym and Clotworthy had been sent to Newport to enquire about the range of such warrants as he held, but no other action was recorded prior to Dec. 28.

grant commissions for the raising of 10 000 volunteers for Irish service.[93] In doing so he had staked a claim in the disputed territory that was to be the occasion of English conflict. Much more than control of the domestic 'trained bands', the power (even more than the authority) to raise active troops was to stretch the fragile bonds of trust among the constituent members of the English body politic. Charles presented his request as conventional, and the similarity to the warrants issued to Leicester show his persistence with the procedure.[94] But if he were to have the nomination of officers, perhaps including the 'cavaliers' gathering at Westminster, then the growing fears for their safety expressed by some MPs would be boundless.[95] This, more than the increasingly marginal issue of impressment, was the danger point of the incoming months.[96] The King's 'offer' on the troops was accompanied by a pertinent concession. By Jan. 1 a royal proclamation was ready, condemning the Irish insurgents as 'rebels and traitors'.[97] It was one of those demands which had joined the 'popular' party at Westminster and the more rigorous members of the Dublin government. The latter had argued that their own proclamations were inadequate, given rumours of royal support for the uprising, though they were careful to note that they did not seek an offer of pardon on the laying down of arms, lest this promote future restiveness.[98] Charles was foreclosing a political option which he had as yet left open. For the moment he had retreated on 'policy' towards Ireland accompanied by a hardened position on the potent question of the control of military force.

Parliament's first responses to the Irish rising had been active and consensual, yet by the end of Dec. 1641 unity had begun to splinter and the practical effects of interventionist votes were limited. Persistent attention to Ireland in the Houses suggest that of the two obstacles, lack of political will or structural failings, the latter was more to blame for poor results.[99] In particular, the lack of an adequate financial basis for a

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[93]*Commons' jn., ii,* 361; *Lords' jn., iv*, 494, 496; Clarendon, *Rebellion*, i, 441-2.
[94]*Cal S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 353.
[95]Gardiner, *Eng.*, x, 120-1. For the officers, see Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 166, 172, 176.
[96]See chapter 3 for a fuller development of aspects of the military clashes.
[97]*Cal. S. P. Clarendon*, i, 222 provides a copy of the offer for 10 000 with the proclamation 'subjoined'. Even without such a necessary link, the coincidence in time is striking.
[98]Rushworth, iii (1), 472-3; *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 43-5.
[99]The two were of course inter-connected but the failures, in 1640-1, to create an agreed and adequate framework for England in either financial or military terms was a matter of political division over solutions, whereas the problems were inherited ones.

war effort was a problem which went beyond, though not helped by, the ignorance or reluctance of MPs.[100] Those who were emerging as the King's opponents recognised that logistical and political matters could not be rigidly demarcated[101], but placed at the forefront of their programme for circumventing 'remoras' three proposals which were to cause division within, and between, the Houses - impressment, Scottish intervention in Ireland and the diagnosis of a religious base for the problems of Ireland and England which in turn precluded compromise with the rebels.

On these three matters the King, by the end of Dec., had taken his stance principally in the question of military control, from where he would make counter-concessions on the Scots and on suppression. He would pursue this combination, a useful way of continuing to woo the middle ground by appearing as a proponent of national defence. Yet tactical skills deployed by Pym and his allies, in particular the use of committees and the control of Irish news, meant the persuasion of numbers of MPs to stick with their programme, and by extension their analysis of the crisis. It also began the building of an alliance with prominent Irish Protestants, who could not necessarily have been selected as compatible allies a few months earlier.[102] Their bond could be strengthened by the deployment of 'ideological' (or 'religious') argument, not in the sense of reform of the Protestant churches, but of the older, apocalyptic dynamic which could inspire ideological (anti-Catholic) crusade and visions of national revival.[103] The elaboration, institutional as well as theoretical, of such a vision was to dominate proceedings in Parliament for the next three months.

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[100]This is of course not unlike the situation in the 1620s. For details of logistical problems see appendix 1. The willingness of the Houses to vote money for Ireland was not matched by the existence of a means of actually supplying this money, given the credit weakness *vis-a-vis* London.

[101]A new committee set up on Dec. 29 to investigate 'obstructions' to the relief of Ireland considered political reasons (e.g. evil counsel or the pressure of crowds) as well as practical ones, *Commons' jn., ii*, 360-1.

[102]Perceval-Maxwell, *Irish rebellion*, pp. 157-8 shows Sir Adam Loftus for one apparently did not look to the English Parliament in the summer of 1641.

[103]Fletcher, *Outbreak,* provides an ongoing presentation of the visionary dimension of Pym's ambitions in particular e.g. pp. 138 (pre-eminency of the Protestant - Catholic struggle), 145-6 (international crusade), 151 ('national revival') - all the examples come form the months in question.

Chapter 2:
Parliament's Irish policy,
Jan.- April 1642

Early January was perhaps the moment when 'political crisis' reached Westminster.[1] To those who reasoned as did Pym the condition of Protestant Ireland was not only desperate in itself but presaged the like for Protestant England. Yet all their efforts had been in vain. Without impressment and access to adequate royal munitions effective military intervention was impossible; the generous interim offer of the Scots, backed by the Irish lobby in London and by Leicester as militarily decisive, had likewise been stalled; efforts to halt the spread of treason by clarifying to potential rebels the total impossibility of their attaining their ends had been diluted. Thus it was easy to overlook genuine 'royalist' concerns about encroachment on the prerogative or fears of Scottish expansionism in the light if Irish need. For the King and his supporters Pym and his clique were using the crisis, to which a military response would be made, to steal prerogative powers, while simultaneously aborting the combination of repression and negotiation by trespassing on royal powers in enforcement and dispensation and royal rights over the Kingdom of Ireland.[2] The moment of collision for the two trajectories of policy was the last week of January 1642. At that point all the streams of discord, accumulating in volume over the previous weeks, flowed together.

Early January was not a propitious time for activity in the Houses.[3] But recent reports from Ireland had been so full of threatened peril[4] that Clotworthy managed to

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[1]The title of Fletcher's chapter (*Outbreak*, pp. 158-190) covering Nov. 1641 to Jan. 1642. He points out how Charles's actions and the repudiation of them by a majority in Parliament can be seen as exemplifying 'two competing myths', that of a 'settled conspiracy by a small clique to bend Parliament's will' and that of a 'popish plot' against constitution and religion abetted by the King. As will be seen much in the development of responses to Ireland would feed both myths. (Cf. Russell, *British monarchies*, p. 453).

[2]For the situation after the King's abortive coup in early Jan., see Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 181, 183; Russell, *British monarchies*, pp. 444, 446, 449, 451.

[3]For an example of MPs anxieties see Moore's account of January 12 which sees discussion of events on Jan. 4; arms being taken to the Tower; Digby at Kingston and Dunkirk arms for Ireland. *P. J., i*, 46-52.

[4]The letter form the Irish government read on Jan. 1 lamented that the fall of Dublin was imminent, a view circulated to the provinces by London correspondents. [Dillingham] to Lord Montagu, Jan. 7, H.

have orders for the despatch of munitions approved even if 'in such haste as they woulde not permit the Clarke to reade them for wee had new Alarums given us of the comming downe of armed persons upon us...'.[5] No less then three committees with some Irish responsibilities were authorised to meet from January 6 - 10 during the adjournment of the House.[6] Action was taken on the issue of money to keep the assembly of troops in operation, and Leicester was prevailed upon to offer to submit a list of officers for the new forces.[7] Clotworthy, meanwhile, was engaged in activities suggestive of the future direction of parliamentary policy over Ireland, namely, reliance on allies in London. The seizure of power in the City in early January by those antagonistic to the King has long been recognised as a crucial development in English politics, but it had profound implications for Ireland also.[8] In its petition criticising the King's actions (Jan. 5) the new City Committee of Safety found room to complain of delays relating to Ireland.[9] In turn, the adjourned Commons, in seeking a guard from London, used as an argument for protection of continued sittings the need to act to preserve Ireland. They delegated negotiations to the Irish committee, where a sub-committee headed by Clotworthy successfully worked out an arrangement allowing the return in triumph to Westminster by Jan. 11. The process of tying intervention in Ireland to the City radicals had begun.[10]

With Parliament re-assembled, limited co-operation with the King over matters Irish was still possible. Warrants for the issue of munitions were approved in response to the motions of Clotworthy, on behalf of local Ulster regiments, and of Culpepper for the new English-raised forces for Munster. Charles's only quibble was that the rapidly dwindling royal magazines be replenished. The Irish committee under Pym, which had earlier called for a blanket issue of munitions, now proved willing to settle for a

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M. C. *Montagu MSS*, p. 140; Thomas Coke to Sir John Cole, Jan. 3, H. M. C. *Cowper MSS*, ii, 302; *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 41-2, 52.

[5]*Commons' jn., ii,* 369; D'Ewes (C), p. 387. Also allowed were the despatch of £2 000 to pay the cavalry at Chester and £5 000 for victuals for Ireland. The munitions were of the regiments voted to be raised in Ireland, notably those of Clotworthy himself and of Lord Conway.

[6]The select recess committee (with power to issue money); the committee for Irish affairs; the recent Munster committee. Commons' *jn., ii,* 369; D'Ewes (C), p. 387; *Notes of proceedings in the Long Parliament, temp. Charles, by Sir Ralph Verney...* (ed.) John Bruce (Camden Soc., London, 1845), p. 140.

[7]D'Ewes (C), pp. 393, 399-400, 401-2; *P. J., i,* 23, 29-30, 32. The repayment of merchants Henley and Hawkeridge was also at issue.

[8]Perez Zagorin, *The Court and the Country. The beginning of the English Revolution*, (London, 1969), pp. 289-91; Pearl, *London*, pp 139-146; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 182-3; J. R. MacCormack, 'The Irish Adventurers and the English Civil War', in *I.H.S.*, x, no. 37 (Mar. 1956), pp. 28-9.

[9]Zagorin, *Court and Country*, p. 290; Pearl, *London*, p. 143; Rushworth, iii (1), 480-1; *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, pp. 238-9, 244.

[10]D'Ewes (C), p. 396, note 1; *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, pp. 247-8. The arrangement was more than fortuitous, or a cover for domestic plans. The concern of the 'radicals' would be apparent in the investment of their resources for the subjugation of the rising, while a more general civic concern hinged on the future of Londonderry.

specified list of arms and ammunition for the second instalment of the expeditionary force, and for other, smaller, forces in Ireland.[11]

The soldiers mustered at English ports under phase one of the expedition were gradually sent across as funds were made available.[12] But with impressment not conceded officers would have to be appointed to the planned new forces before recruitment could proceed. In a situation of increasing anxieties over the control of military power, the identity of such commanders could not but cause concern. In the House and at the Irish committee the claims of individuals for appointments had been pushed, with a certain amount of tension between veteran English soldiers and displaced Irish gentlemen.[13] But in the aftermath of the attempted arrest of the Five Members the focus was more on exclusion than inclusion. Particular exceptions were made as early as Jan. 10, and by the time the full list of Leicester's nominees was called for on Jan. 26 it had been resolved that none of the officers outside Parliament on Jan. 4 would be accepted 'except they confess or reveal some designs', nor would those 'listed at Whitehall, Hampton Court, Kingston, or Windsor'.[14]

If providing an English army was fraught with difficulty, what of the Scots? The Lords had long stood out against the Scots' terms on the grounds, reasonable enough to them, that an adequate English military presence should precede, or at least accompany, the allies. As it was put on Jan. 3, their commissioners were to 'bring them [the Scots] to such low terms and Conditions as they think fit for this House to grant'.[15] Scottish proposals had progressed in two stages. Agreement on the narrower, logistical arrangements for a 10 000 - strong army having been obtained in Dec., the Scottish commissioners submitted a wider set of proposals for the conditions under which the army would operate.[16] Even the Commons had shown reluctance at some points, as in the handing over of Derry as one of the garrison towns, over the extent of the powers of the Lord Lieutenant (to summon them from Ulster), and over

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[11]See appendix 1(iii) for details about munitions.

[12]These were the Lord Lieutenant's regiment and the cavalry regiment under his son, Lord Lisle, both bound for Dublin (*P. J., i,* 22, 38, 99-100, 144; *Commons' jn., ii,* 369-70, 386) and the regiment destined for Munster under Vavasour, now 1 000 strong (*Commons' jn.*, ii, 390). For the impact of the first contingent in Dublin, see *P. J., i,* 135-6, 139-40; *Ormonde MSS,* New Series, ii, 62-4. See appendix 1 (i) for details of recruitment generally.

[13]For later examples of nominations, see *Commons' jn., ii,* 415, 424; *P. J., i,* 302-3, 336-7, 340. Leicester may have been more accommodating to the 'English of Ireland', *Egmont MSS*, i, 164-5; (though see Carte MS 2, ff. 140-1). In 1641 the Irish committee had insisted that all nominations go to Leicester, e.g. D'Ewes (C), pp. 107, 132, 333, 370, 372.

[14]*Commons' jn.*, ii, 397-8;*P. J., i,* 23, 31, 45, 181-3, 184. One (unnamed) lieutenant who so informed the House was 'specially recommended'.

[15]*Lords' jn., iv,* 502.

[16]Broadly, they were concerned with the handing over of garrison towns (article 1); the supply of munitions, provisions (2) and horses (3); authority over the local population (4); ability to act as an independent army in their own 'Circle' (5); terms for pay (6); a share in plantations (7). *Lords' jn., iv,* 491-2.

the issue of 'plantations'.[17] The peers were liable to be even more concerned at the prospect of a Scottish army acting free of English control (as mediated through the Irish government) and at the prospects of a future strengthening of the Scottish presence in Ireland.[18] The original terms were re-submitted to the upper House in Jan., but they had made little progress by Jan. 24.[19] Likewise in terms of naval activity, the level of concern at possible foreign aid for the Irish insurgents[20] had not been matched by any response by the royal authorities. Their downplaying of the threat[21] meant not only consideration of a naval impressment bill but the inauguration of negotiations with merchants for a sea guard.[22]

By Monday, January 24 such a catalogue of failures and delays had built up enough pressure as to force a breakthrough in the next few days. A barrage of Irish correspondence had lately seen a committee appointed to seek a further city loan of £100 000.[23] An interim plan was hatched to break the impasse over Scottish involvement, allowing 2 500 soldiers to go at once with money and provisions provided and possession of Carrickfergus granted. When the Houses re-assembled on Jan. 24 Clotworthy took the proposal to the Lords, who gave it their approval.[24] In the Commons more news from Ireland (buttressed with reports from Chester) caused the House to demand further investigations, along with a renewed call for the granting of a 'standing commission' for all needed military intervention, to be held by the lord lieutenant, and for instructions to be drawn 'for a Commission, for the more speedy Putting in Execution all matters concerning the Affairs of *Ireland*'.[25] If further incentive for action on Ireland were needed it was available from some of the county petitions then arriving at Westminster. Pym carried four to the Lords on Jan. 25, all referring to Ireland, but with pride of place going to the petition accompanying the City's refusal of the requested loan, on grounds not only financial, but relating to inadequate responses over Ireland and continuing dangers in England.[26]

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[17]They were willing to allow to the Scottish general the right to make conditions for surrenders 'as shall be most expedient for the Service, but not to grant any Toleration for the Popish Religion'.

[18]See the comments of the Venetian ambassador, *Cal. S. P. Venice, 1640-1642*, pp. 267, 273, 285.

[19]The Commons decisions were reported on Jan. 15, but no response is recorded, *Lords' jn., iv,* 515, 516, 517. See also Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters,* pp. 56-8.

[20]*Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, pp. 236-7, 240, 245.

[21]As seen in royal orders on Jan. 9 (*Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, p. 251). See *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, pp. 252, 255, 267 for communications doubting the existence of Continental aid for Ireland, or hinting at alternative uses for the ships so assigned.

[22]*Commons' jn.*, ii, 257, 378;*P. J., i,* 63, 68, 74.

[23]*P. J., i,* 135-7.

[24]*Lords' jn., iv,* 530, 532, 534; *Commons' jn., ii,* 392, 393, 401-2; *P. J., i,* 147.

[25]*Lords' jn., iv,* 529; *Commons' jn., ii,* 392; *P. J., i,* 144, 148-9, 151-2, 155, 156-7. Thomas Tomkins had responded to the news from Chester with calls for the dismissal of Leicester, but this did not catch for the moment.

[26]Rushworth, iii (1), 504-7; *Lords' jn., iv,* 537-40; *P. J., i,* 160-2, 168-9; Clarendon, *Rebellion*, i, 538-9. Fletcher, *Outbreak*, chapter 6 provides a detailed discussion of the petitions of early 1642, showing a concern for Ireland compounded of anxiety over the papist threat (pp. 200-4), as well as concern for the relief of Irish Protestants (pp. 210-1). Generally both the diagnosis of the perceived

It was a precise analysis of the position held by a majority in the Commons. The primary obstacles to intervention in Ireland were presented as stalling over impressment and the issue of commissions for officers (thus hindering the raising of volunteer companies) and over the Scottish army. Genuine obstacles to the raising of funds were noted, which alone could have accounted for delays to date; the concentration was on the hindrances to the next stage of operations.[27] Pym accompanied the delivery of the petitions with a speech of 'unusual vehemence, ...particularly widely reported and praised' and even included in the *Lords' Journals*.[28] In it he presented with clarity the dimensions, if not the internal workings, of the crisis of which events in Ireland were an integral part, bringing the listener back to the prefatory diagnosis of evil counsel as the universal disease. This was further than the City petition had openly gone, and it seems possible that even yet MPs were being carried along with the analyses of grounds for failure, without necessarily assenting to assertions about the secret cause.[29] Yet the infiltration of the unreliable would join the perceived problems of practical deficiencies and the denial of funding to produce two logistical breakthroughs, and two institutional innovations which would transform parliamentarian intervention in Ireland.

The most immediate concern was the need to advance the military expedition to Ireland. While logistical efforts continued to make incremental progress,[30] a more significant enhancement, potentially at least, came with the re-awakening of the impressment bill in the Lords on Jan. 27, leading to its being ready by Feb. 7.[31] In a situation where military issues had become pre-eminent, and where the quest for security had prompted the measures which lay at the heart of the future Militia Ordinance,[32] it also became imperative to assess carefully the officers named for commands in the army designed for Ireland. Detailed schedules of officers had been approved by early Feb., but not before extensive excisions had been made, and the

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dangers (pp. 200-7) and the prescriptions for the resolution of the English crisis (penal laws, defensive measures and church reform, pp. 210-22) fitted the stance of Pym and his allies in Parliament.

[27]Financial clauses covered the weight of earlier loans (§1) and failure to repay (§2); the existence of bad debts, including Irish ones (§4) and the decay of trade (§12). As well as lamenting the inadequate response over Ireland (§3, 5-7), with special reference to Londonderry, they rehearsed ill consequences of the English breakdown (§11) specifically the not disarming of Catholics (§8), the misuse of the fleet (§9) and the gathering of troops at Covent garden (§10).

[28]Rushworth, iii (1), 503-4, 508-11; *Lords' jn., iv,* 540-3; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 243; Russell, *British Monarchies*, pp. 468-9.

[29]Cf. the comments of John Morrill in *The nature of the English revolution* (London, 1993), p. 267 on the propensity of 'backbenchers' to be influenced by such presentations.

[30]Leicester had correctly claimed that many of the specific complaints over the equipping, pay and transportation of the remaining units at Chester were being dealt with even as the complaints reached Westminster, *Commons' jn., ii,* 391; *P. J., i,* 146, 154.

[31]*Lords' jn., iv,* 502, 547, 567, 570-1; *Commons' jn., ii,* 419, 420; *P. J., i,* 219-20, 293, 303, 311, 315, 320-2.

[32]Fletcher, *Outbreak,* p. 244; Russell, *British monarchies*, pp. 464-5 (so also the 19 propositions, Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 262-3).

choice of senior officers remained problematic.[33] Interest even extended to the existing Irish army with a vote that all officers be cashiered who did not take the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance.[34] The King, having had his choice of English commanders over-ruled, was receiving word from Ormond (Feb. 8), commander-in-chief in Ireland in Leicester's absence, of the inclinations of prominent officers in the army at Dublin, and recommending assurances to them of royal favour.[35]

Alongside the securing of the military expedition, the second breakthrough in these weeks was the building of a support structure for the army outside of Parliament, based on the Scots and the City of London.[36] The other side of the coin from the negative petition of Jan. 24-25 was a growing utilisation of the resources of the 'new men' in City politics whose position over Ireland had been made clear from the moment of their 'coup' at the start of the month. Once again Sir John Clotworthy was at the centre of negotiations. When proposing the supply of foodstuffs for the Scots at Carrickfergus as part of the interim plan, he went on to suggest consultations with merchants for the wider supply of victuals, in particular an ordinance to secure re-payment for goods delivered to Ireland.[37] The next day he was able to report an appropriate ordinance to repay, from the City chamber, the value of victuals certified as delivered at secure ports, duly passed by Jan. 27;[38] by Feb. 7 it was agreed that all shipments of provisions to Ireland could be sent free of customs charges.[39] Likewise Stapleton was ready (Jan. 25) to report the offers of merchant ships to guard the coasts of England and Ireland - five vessels were offered and accepted by the Lord Admiral, because royal ships would not be ready in time. In fact at least two of the King's ships allotted for the guard of the Irish coast had been re-assigned to escort the Queen to France.[40]

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[33]No fewer than 31 exceptions were made from one list, while 3 of the 7 colonels recommended to Leicester by the King were considered 'altogether unfit' on the basis of their actions on Jan. 4. *Commons' jn., ii,* 398-9, 407, 411; *P. J., i,* 192-3, 199, 201, 208, 210, 240, 243-5, 248, 260-1, 262.

[34]Though an exception was made for Clanricard, Clotworthy specifically secured the expulsion of Sir John Netterville and Sir George Hamilton, the former to be replaced by Lord Folliott. *Commons' jn., ii,* 415; *P. J., i,* 282-3, 285, 288; Carte MS 2, f. 498. Attempts to remove Sir George Wentworth on account of his brother, the late Earl of Strafford, failed. *P. J., i,* 430; *Cal. S. P. Clarendon*, i, 223.

[35]*Cal. S. P. Clarendon,* i, 223. Control of the Irish forces was especially important if the King had already begun to think of going to Ireland, Russell, *British monarchies*, p. 458, and see below chapter 3.

[36]Cf. Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 260-1.

[37]*Commons' jn., ii,* 391-2; *P. J., i,* 147.

[38]*Lords' jn., iv,* 546; *Commons' jn., ii,* 395; *P. J., i,* 163, 165, 169, 194, 219.

[39]*Commons' jn., ii,* 405, 412, 418; *P. J., i,* 233, 270-1, 276, 301, 305.

[40]*Lords' jn., iv,* 508, 511, 513, 535, 561; *Commons' jn., ii,* 393, 399, 401, 408, 410; *P. J., i,* 161, 167-8, 172, 173, 188, 192, 194-5, 200-1, 211; *Cal. S. P dom., 1641-3.*, pp. 283-4, 285-6. The plan was connected to wider scares of foreign intervention, presented in the Commons by William Pennoyer and Maurice Thompson, as well as the allegations in the City petition about misuse of the royal fleet. The shipowners fit Brenner's depiction of 'colonial-interloping merchants', and their five vessels were later re-used in the sea adventure fleet (K. R. Andrews, *Ships, money and politics. Seafaring and naval enterprise in the reign of Charles I* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 197). For a suggestion of self-interest in the

Parliament was developing an increasing dependence upon mercantile interests, particularly in London, to fulfil their plans regarding Ireland. It was less a dependent relationship than a committing of important tasks by a body entrusted with the welfare of England - taken to include the securing of Ireland - to those both capable of fulfilling it and trusted not to divert resources to other, perhaps sinister, ends.[41] A similar view could be held with regard to the Scots. Full negotiations had been re-started by the acceptance of the provisional plan but seemed no nearer resolution. It was a blunder by the King which altered things, his refusal to allow inclusion of the delivery of Carrickfergus as part of the interim plan. The royal decision was a failure to compromise at a moment when the seemingly interminable negotiations looked like bearing fruit at last. Significantly it was the peers at this point (Jan. 27), albeit 'after a long Debate' who appointed 17 of their number to investigate the issue, including the King's advisers, who were voted to be 'Enemies to the King, and both Kingdoms'. It was for the Commons to assent and add 35 MPs.[42] In this situation the King relented, that very day pleading his wish not to hinder the relief of Ireland. Even then the committee remained in being, with its powers extended '... to take into Consideration the Quiet and Safety of the kingdom'. Its report also finally came through on Feb. 15, on evil counsel.[43]

The incident is an important one. It signalled clearly that the upper house, which had for so long mustered a majority suspicious of Scottish involvement in Ireland, was now in the hands of the interventionists.[44] The news from Charles which generated the peers response on Jan. 27 may have eased the reopening of the impressment debate that same day after a break of over three weeks. It was a particularly unfortunate decision by the King, who had proved amenable to Scottish demands.[45] Among the statements indicative of a mood of optimism generated by the decisions to proceed on the Scots and impressment[46], there appears one from the King's secretary. Sir Edward Nicholas, apparently glad at the departure of both English

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offer of ships for state employment, see Fox to Pennington, Feb. 3, in *Cal. S. P dom., 1641-3.*, p. 274.

[41]Likewise later clothing contracts seem to have been allocated to City militants, particularly the partnership of Richard Turner sr., Richard Turner jr, Tempest Milner & Maurice Gethin. For their contracts, see P.R.O. S.P. 28 / 139 / 12; for their political activities, Brenner, *Merchants and revolution*, pp. 398, 426, 455, 480, 482, 511, 529.

[42]*Lords' jn., iv*, 544, 545, 547; *Commons' jn., ii*, 399, 400.

[43]*Lords' jn., iv*, 547-8; Commons' *jn.*, ii, 401-2, 433.

[44]For the struggle for control of the upper House, see Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 242-3, 420-2; Russell, *British monarchies*, pp. 467-8, 470, 471. With a parliamentarian majority not yet assured, perhaps frustration at the continued delays swung a few extra peers to the interventionist side (there was no division).

[45]Perhaps he was influenced by recent Scottish hints that he listen to Parliament, Russell, *British monarchies*, pp. 451-2. Certainly by Feb. he was urging the Scots to send their forces to Ireland, Perceval-Maxwell, *Irish rebellion*, p. 264.

[46]*Cal. S.P. Venice 1640-1642*, p. 285; Edward Reed to Sir John Coke, Feb. 17, H.M.C. *Cowper MSS*, ii, 306; Dobbins to Sir Philip Perceval, Feb. 15, Egmont *MSS*, i, 164.

and Scottish forces, and rejoicing that the end of the insurrection would set the King free, presumably from his English Parliament.[47] For this, surely even a Scottish army in Ireland could be swallowed.

For Parliament, the problem, of course, was maintaining momentum. The flurry of activity in late January had followed a relatively barren few weeks. The Scottish agreement, which would continue to be thrashed out, did not come cheap. The Scottish authorities had taken care to have their requirements of money and supplies carefully laid down and signed for. It meant new burdens on the overstretched resources of Parliament (e.g. the Scots were given no less than £30 000 from the Merchant Adventurers' loan of Feb. 1642, from a total of £50 000). Moreover vigilance would have to be exercised if an adequate settlement in Ireland was to be the outcome of the war there. The worries of the emergent parliamentarians on this score would combine with the need for a more stable system in the third major breakthrough of late January, the Commission for Irish Affairs.

Taking its rise in the votes of Jan. 24, instructions for commissioners 'concerning the means to manage the war and to establish peace and true religion in that kingdom' [Ireland] were reported by Pym on Feb. 3 and by Feb. 7 the lower House had agreed the instructions and the a list of nominations by the Irish committee. The next day the matter reached the Lords, when Leicester reported it as the opinion of the Irish Committee that business could better be conducted by a lesser number of commissioners, holding power under the Great Seal.[48] A certain confusion over numbers continued, and the peers ignored the actual instructions until March 8, though they made headway relatively quickly thereafter. Royal approval was forthcoming by April 2.[49] It is hard to avoid the conclusion that historians have overlooked the 1642 Commission. That it is not included in discussions of the 'executive' organs of the wartime Long Parliament is of course valid if the context is one of English constitutional evolution.[50] But in fact the Commission was both a direct response to a whole series of problems clearly identified in the course of events since November 1641, and, in its practices if not in its scope, a precursor of such bodies as the Committee of Safety.[51]

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[47]*Cal. S. P dom., 1641-3*, pp. 276, 288.

[48]*Lords' jn., iv*, 569; *Commons' jn., ii*, 414, 417-8; *P. J., ii*, 266, 268-9, 27, 291, 300-1. The only amendment made in the Commons had been the addition of a clause to overrule 'unlawful fees' in the army. It is also worth mentioning that Moore reported the Commission on its first reading as based on 'an ancient commission'.

[49]It was agreed to have 7 Lords and 14 commoners, with a quorum of 11, at least 3 of them peers. All were to have been members of the Irish committee, and Leicester was to act as 'an Assistant' while still in England. *Lords' jn., iv*, 614, 632, 643-5, 647-8, 659; *Commons' jn., ii*, 428, 453, 456, 477, 481, 492, 508; *P. J., 1*, 345, 350, 363, 365, 370-1, ii, 48, 71.

[50]See especially Wallace Notestein 'The Establishment of the Committee of Both Kingdoms', *A.H.R.* xvii (1911-2), and Lotte Glow, 'The Committee of Safety', *E.H.R.* lxxx (1965).

[51]Though comparatively short lived CIA, as will be shown, had a more solid administrative structure and a more detailed remit, and showed more effective responses to its assignments, than the 'precursors'

A number of strands of thought came together in the formation of CIA.[52] It has been suggested that a kind of threefold regression took place in the junto's usurpation of executive action in Ireland, from the allocation of kingly functions to Parliament, then to the reliable elements within Parliament, finally to internal and external select bodies. CIA straddles all three stages. The royal letter of Oct. 30 had been used to justify Parliament's intrusion into the Irish war, despite its limited and ambiguous tone. In the Commission[53] Charles merely assented to Parliament's role as that of 'advice' whether in the prior nomination of the Commissioners, or in such future instructions as CIA should receive from him (C). Later they are instructed to pursue such directions as they should receive 'From us by the counsel and consent of our high court of parliament' (11). But this was in all probability an asset. Charles did not in the event intervene in the workings of CIA save when appealed to, but had explicitly given the Houses a place between himself and the new body. From the outset Parliament had sought his imprimatur under the Great Seal in taking logistical steps themselves over Ireland.[54] It will be seen that when this was no longer available it was found difficult to hold together even the depleted House of Lords of the late spring of 1642. In the meantime what the King had apparently agreed to was a situation not very far at all from that hoped for in the disputed instructions of early November that, at least with regard to Ireland, the King '... will be graciously pleased to employ such counsellors and ministers as shall be approved by his Parliament,...that so his people may with courage and confidence undergo the hazard of this war, and,...restore to his Majesty and this kingdom that honour, peace, safety, and prosperity which they have enjoyed in former times'.[55]

As for the form of the new body, its defining nature was its compactness. Unlike the Irish committee named on 2 Nov., 1641, with 12 peers and 56 commoners, CIA was intended from the first as a small body,[56] a parallel with the way in which the Committee of Safety replaced the earlier and much larger Committees for Defence.[57] While CIA was by no means independent of Parliament (though its reports to the Lords were very rare) it seems to have been less dependent than its predecessor for approval of each step taken; its powers were, after all, set down in advance, rather than accumulated by a series of referrals from the Houses. In a sense, therefore, it answered

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cited by Notestein, 'Committee of Both Kingdoms', pp 47-8 or Glow, 'Committee of Safety', pp. 290-1

[52]This will henceforth be used to indicate 'Commission[ers] of Irish Affairs' as in *P. J., ii.*

[53]The Commission and Instructions will be found in *Lords' jn., iv,* 643-4; *Commons' jn., ii,* 418; *P. J., ii,* 403-6. For convenience all references in the text will merely cite the Commission as '(C)' and the Articles of the Instructions by number (1-11).

[54]See e.g. *Lords' jn., iv,* 424-5; *Commons' jn., ii,* 304-05; cf. Russell *British Monarchies,* p. 416.

[55]Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, pp. 200-1.

[56]*Lords' jn., iv,* 569. All discussion of numbers varied from 12 to 21 only.

[57]Glow, 'Committee of Safety', pp. 290-1

Northumberland's complaint in November, that in Parliament 'the slowness of the motions of that great body will beget inconveniences'.[58] By March 1642 the Lords had come to be dominated by figures such as Northumberland, Manchester, Holland, Pembroke and Salisbury whose allegiance, it has been argued 'does not seem to have been to anything resembling Parliamentary sovereignty, but to a sort a aristocratic conciliarism which would enable the peers and the great officers to continue the government in the King's name unless or until he came to his senses'.[59] This is a notion not unlike that which produced CIA. In a sense closer to committees of the Privy Council than those of Parliament, CIA had from the outset of its activities fixed times (thrice weekly) and place (Star Chamber) of meeting and, significantly, paid employees including auditor and secretary, the latter to keep 'a book of entries and a book of orders'.[60] In institutional terms, then, CIA answered general problems for Parliamentarians in providing a prototype executive in legally impeccable form, linked to both King and Parliament, dominated by aristocratic grandees and their allies. The coincidence in date with the Militia Ordinance and the 19 Propositions is hardly coincidental.[61]

As to the functions for which CIA was created in 1642, the most obvious was that which consumed most interest in Ireland over the year as a whole, the recruiting and equipping of the military. In view of all the delays and defects of the previous months, it is not surprising that the commissioners were explicitly granted authority to ensure full recruitment and reinforcement of the forces voted (4), to provide them with foodstuffs and clothes (5), weapons and equipment (6) and shipping, as well as to set out a sea guard (7), and over expenditure on pay for the forces and other costs resulting from their ascribed duties (3). In sum what was at stake was the culmination of repeated attempts to obtain a structure for military supply free from the convolutions inherent in conditions of disputed authority. In particular the powers are clearly similar to the repeated calls for a 'general warrant' or 'warrant dormant', as on January 24 for troops and their equipment, which Gawdy termed a 'standing commission'.[62] And again parallels with the future Committee of Safety are apparent,[63] though this latter brings out the point that while a unified, directive authority had been set up it was one

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[58]*Cal S.P. dom., 1641-3*, p.165

[59]Russell, *British Monarchies*, p. 472. For attitudes among the proto-parliamentarian peers see Russell, *British monarchies*, pp. 471-4 (including a continuing commitment to legalism); Morrill, *English revolution*, pp. 11-13, 300-2 (which concentrates on the 19 propositions and the militia ordinance); more generally, J. S. A. Adamson, 'The baronial context of the English civil war', in *R. Hist. Soc. Trans.*, xl, (1990).

[60]*P. J., ii*, 139, 407-8

[61]For the Jan. origin of the 19 propositions, see Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 262-3; cf. Morrill, *English revolution*, pp. 59-60 for the constitutional hesitancy of the spring programme as unapproved by the King, unlike CIA.

[62]*Commons' jn.*, ii, 391; *P. J., i*, 156.

[63]Glow, 'Committee of Safety', pp. 292-5 describes the role of the Committee of Safety in the payment of the armies and in the procurement and distribution of war supplies.

operating on explicitly exclusive principles. The ideal of the 'popular party' to free the direction of the war from evil counsel was in effect to exclude the participation of the King himself. What had not been conceded, however, was the power to commission fresh troops.

Powers were granted which gave to CIA an incipient 'British' function, if within limits. Towards the Scots, it held responsibility for ensuring the observation of all articles and agreements made, and advisory powers over the best use to be made of the ally's army (8). Advisory duties were also granted vis-a-vis the Lord Lieutenant, Lords Justices and 'other governors and commanders' as to 'what you conceive to be needful for the prosecution of the war' (9). To an extent its relations with Leicester, while he remained in England, were problematical. Obviously communication was easy with his attendance, but relative powers were not fully worked out. By early May, at least, the Commissioners had assumed directive power over the Lord Lieutenant's issuing of funds, while he could at least pressure them as on the delivery of arms.[64] Since CIA was to 'so order and provide that you be duly informed' of the condition of Ireland and the progress of the armies (10) they resolved to inform all those 'to whom any of his majesty's provinces, towns, castles, and forts in Ireland were committed' to address their despatches to them.[65] Perhaps as a result of this, the Irish Privy Council had, by June 7, begun direct correspondence which not only included the usual pleas for aid but added that if this was forthcoming they would need 'present and particular direction for the prosecution of the war and the execution of His Majesty's justice upon these unnatural and unthankful rebels'.[66] For the moment CIA did not resolve the ambiguous dealings of the emergent English parliamentary executive and the established Irish executive, a subject under discussion from 1641.[67] At the least, the King had consented to the insertion of an English authority, tied to Parliament, into the affairs of the other two Kingdoms.

Finally, there is the matter of the terms of the first article, which deserves quotation in full :-

> You shall in the first place be careful to inform and advise us how the true reformed Protestant religion may best be maintained, practised, and professed in that kingdom, idolatry, ignorance, and superstition diminished and suppressed, and to perform and execute

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[64] *P. J., ii*, 430, 431, 429, 420-1

[65] *P. J., ii*, 421-2. Again cf. the intelligence gathering function of the Committee of Safety, Glow, 'Committee of Safety', pp. 291-2. CIA would take an active role in strategy formulation by the autumn, see below.

[66] *Ormonde MSS* New Series, ii, 128-141, especially pp. 130-1.

[67] A certain confusion also colours the discussions over the responsibility of the Scottish commander to account to present or future Irish governing authorities, e.g. *Lords' jn., iv*, 568; Commons' *jn.*, ii, 416, 419. For recent tensions between the two Parliaments, see Perceval-Maxwell, *Irish rebellion*, pp. 164-5, 173 (which argues that the issue did *not* dominate concerns in the Irish Parliament in early 1641); Russell, *British monarchies*, pp. 379, 384-5, 391-2.

> all things requisite for the effecting thereof according to the laws and statutes of that kingdom with such gentleness and moderation that all our loving subjects who have been seduced and misguided may discern our princely care not only to protect their persons and estates according to the rules of justice and the laws of that kingdom but likewise to provide for their souls and consciences to be instructed in the ways of salvation.

This could be seen as no more then the conventional inclusion of matters religious at the head of declarations and manifestos. But from the first the commission was envisaged as containing power 'to consider of the matters of religion in Ireland' as well as to provide a focus for military planning.[68] Though it spoke of 'gentleness and moderation' the article was clear that what was aimed at was execution of the penal legislation towards the suppression of 'idolatry, ignorance and superstition'. As such it is in line with the attempts to put into operation the laws against the Catholics of England[69] and with plans for expansion of Irish legislation to bring it into line with the more stringent English laws against Catholicism. While the motivating force of religion of the parliamentarians of 1642 has been recognised, it is perhaps worth bearing in mind that there was a distinction between the aims of purging false religion, and renovating the true church, even if they overlapped in their professors. The role of religious aggression in the rising, and the idea that lax enforcement of the penal laws had enabled insurrection was voiced in official correspondence from Ireland, though entangled with other causes.[70] In both countries it created division, predicating the closing off of options based on an accommodation with Catholicism. But it was a broad enough creed to win a response from Protestants in England and Ireland who could not be described as 'puritans.'[71]

If CIA was an attempt to solve to the satisfaction of Pym and his supporters some of the long standing problems of effective intervention, the 'Adventure' was geared to the same end. Primarily of course it was a fund raising venture, and as such had the closest of links to the denial of the £100 000 loan. From Nov. 1641 Parliament had depended entirely on borrowed money to pay its military costs.[72] Yet as D'Ewes

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[68]*P. J., i*, 274. Again it was a decision with wider connotations, given the repeated suggestions in Parliament of the introduction of 'commissioners' either at central or local level, to oversee changes in the English church. Russell, *British monarchies*, pp. 185, 193-4; Anthony Fletcher, 'Concern for renewal in the root and branch debates of 1641', in *Studies in church history*, xiv (1977), pp. 279-86.

[69]See e.g. Nineteen Propositions no. 6 and perhaps no. 9. *P. J., ii*, 494-7; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 247.

[70]Early correspondence from the Lords Justices is littered with such claims. So e.g. in their letter of Nov. 27 to Leicester they claim that it is their opponents and not they who 'make it a war of religion' -*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, pp. 29-30. The same attitude was delivered in an Dec. 8 speech in the Commons by Rudyerd - Rushworth, iii (1), 456. Perceval-Maxwell, *Irish rebellion*, pp. 14, 249, 259-60 presents Catholic clergy as providing 'ideological' motivation during the rising.

[71]See below, chapter 4 for the continuing force of anti-popery in Parliament and for Parson's disclaimer of the label 'puritan'. For the pre-eminent strain in Irish Protestantism of the need to combat Catholicism see e.g. the discussion of Archbishop Ussher in Hugh Trevor-Roper, *Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans. Seventeenth-century essays* (London, 1987), chapter 3, and above, pp. 2-4.

[72]See appendix 1 for a discussion of funding Nov. 1641 - Aug. 1642.

declared on Dec. 17, the unfolding of events had meant that while first thoughts were of 'sending over some 5000 men and that a few months would have ended the warre; now wee are to maintaine an armie of above twentie thousand men, and it is like to be of long continuance'.[73] The preliminary petition which mooted the adventure scheme, as read by Holles on Feb. 11, concentrates on the military response. Rather than a general loan secured on land what they offered was that they 'tender at their own charges considerable forces to be added to the new forces'.[74] It was not envisaged that the provision of arms be other than from the 'state stores', but the propositions did seek to lay claim to the powers of impressment and requested the right to appoint officers.[75] Thus the complaints of the City petition are clearly being addressed. After all the situation was still one in which impressment had only been squeezed through on Feb. 8 (and not yet assented to by the King) and royal orders to raise the projected 6000 men had stalled, not least through disagreements over officers.

While there remains no list of the original sponsors, they have been regarded as outside the City establishment[76] and with a core of 'colonial-interloping' merchants.[77] Certainly a variant of the scheme, the additional or sea adventure, was dominated by such figures.[78] This suggests a continuity with earlier 'privatised war' proposals focusing on a West India Company, which had shown similar thinking in the advocacy of private finance and control of operations, and with the growth of plantations and of trade as aims.[79] Proposed in the 1620s, such notions had undergone a revival of interest in 1637 and 1641.[80] Joint-stock war was, effectively and perhaps appropriately, the English form of the private war well known in the Europe of the Thirty Years' War[81] but adapted to the needs of a country whose wars, even when as nearby as in Ireland, would demand a not inconsiderable naval dimension. For the moment it levered into prominence individuals without whose acumen and ability to extend credit the Irish war, staggering in any case, might have collapsed.

But a more domestic background may be traced, hinting at a more disparate set of original sponsors. In Dec. and Jan. traders to Ireland had sponsored two petitions to Parliament which had shown an established economic interest lying behind demands

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[73]D'Ewes (C), p.307

[74]*Commons' jn., ii,* 425, 435-6; *P. J., i,* 349-50, 353, 354, 369-71.

[75]MacCormack, 'Irish Adventurers', p. 37.

[76]Pearl, *London*, pp. 207-8.

[77]Brenner, *Merchants and revolution*, pp. 401-3.

[78]Brenner, *Merchants and revolution*, pp. 403-10.

[79]J. C. Appleby, 'An Association for the West Indies? English plans for a West India Company, 1621-1629', in *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, xv (1987), especially pp. 219-27; Andrews, *Ships, money and politics*, pp. 6-7; Brenner, *Merchants and revolution*, pp. 247-69.

[80]Brenner, *Merchants and revolution*, pp. 301, 351; Russell, *British monarchies,* pp. 408, 476.

[81]M. S. Anderson has used the phrase 'Age of the Entrepreneur' in discussing European military developments of the years 1618-60 - see Anderson, *War and society in Europe of the Old Regime 1618-1789* (London, 1988), pp. 33-76.

for an active policy in Ireland.[82] There was also, of course, the Irish precedent of the Londonderry plantation[83], a case where a reluctant City was persuaded to sink substantial funds into civic creation in a context of corporate land grants resulting from a cycle of 'rebellion' and confiscation. Though the city had lost their estates in Ulster by 1641-2 they had not forgotten them.[84]

The bill for the adventure moved relatively quickly through the Houses, given the technicalities of the question, and the prompted inclusion of Scottish and Dutch subscriptions. Its details will not be discussed here, save to note that as approved on March 19. it permitted the raising of £1m and assigned 2.5m acres as collateral.[85] A supplementary Act extended the time frame for subscriptions[86], while by early April, the Commons had intruded themselves into the process by the appointment of a permanent committee, including all MP-adventurers, to dispose of adventure stock, though the adventurers themselves could elect their own representatives to attend the parliamentary body.[87]

In terms of the Feb. propositions, detailed discussion at the Irish committee leaves unclear the balance of influence in the detailed financial terms as between the merchant sponsors and such MPs as Earle and Clotworthy.[88] Reports of the meeting of the old Irish committee's sub-committee on the Adventure proposals shows the focus of interest on securing a royal rent from the lands (the proposal to double Crown

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[82]*H. M. C. rep. 4,* p.109; *Lords' jn., iv,* 488; Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution.*, pp. 367, 369, 374 for the Dec. petition ('the petition's signers were overwhelmingly domestic traders');*Commons' jn., ii,* 393; *P. J., i,* 159, 166 for the Jan. petition. For the view that merchants with money tied up in Ireland were behind the adventure, see Dobbins to Perceval, Feb. 15, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 164. Nor were the four original nominees for treasurers 'colonial-interloping' merchants' or (save John Towse) radicals; they were however quickly replaced and two (Bateman and Garrett) do not appear among the subscribers, *Commons' jn., ii,* 3463, 465; *P. J., i,* 490, 495; Pearl, *London,* pp. 66, 92 & note 107, 248 (Bateman), 149-50, 299 (Garrett), 325 (Towse), 266 (Halsteed); Brenner, *Merchants and revolution*, pp. 78, 81, 82, 90, 101, 376 (Bateman), 371, 430-1, 447, 520 (Towse), 81 (Halsteed), 420.

[83]Another precedent were the 'Royal Contract' estates, given in lieu of royal debts in the 1620s. The story was by no means a happy one, but in the context of the 1640s the example of a fixed landed base to prevent perpetual regress on loans may well have suggested itself to some in London. Robert Ashton, *The City and the Court, 1603-1643* (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 160-1, 180; Pearl, *London*, pp. 81-2, 98, 333n6. It is to be remembered that the estates in question were for repayment of individual creditors.

[84]Indeed it seems that £10 000 from the City Companies £100 000 loan for Ireland was invested in the 'Adventure' in the summer of 1642, drawing land in counties Meath and Westmeath. *Cal. S. P. Ire., Adv.*, pp. 309, 344, 348.

[85]*Lords' jn., iv,* 593-5, 607-8, 613-4, 615, 632, 642, 643, 658; *Commons' jn., ii,* 435-6, 437, 439-40, 450, 456, 461, 463, 465, 467, 470; *P. J., i,* 404, 415, 448, 465, 471, 476, 478, 484-5, 486, 490, 515; *ii,* 22, 24, 30, 45, 62.

[86]*Lords' jn., iv,* 662, 675, 679-80, 682, 685, 687, 702; *Commons' jn., ii,* 491, 493, 95, 498, 500, 504-5; *P. J., ii,* 75, 90, 96-7, 102, 104, 108. The subsequent explanatory Act, promoted by Pury, allowed for corporate subscription, was passed by the Houses on 15 April, and received the assent on 22 April. *Lords' jn., iv,* 687, 702, 716, 719, 721; *v,* 9-10; *Commons' jn., ii,* 506-7, 514, 521, 526; *P. J., ii,* 114, 135, 151, 156, 168-9, 203, 206.

[87]*Commons' jn., ii,* 506, 511; *P. J., ii,* 112 & note 11. On 28 April the London committee was given power to procure supplies, *P. J., ii,* 238.

[88]*P. J., i,* 395.

rents, whether from the new lands or all royal lands in Ireland, however, failed),[89] while optimism was expressed about permanent financial gain, not only through rising rents but also increases in customs and decreases in military costs.[90] In his speech to the Lords Whitelocke pointed out how the propositions could assuage English discontent at the large sums otherwise necessarily raised through taxation; in the longer term he emphasised how the lands to be allotted to the adventurers would not only profit them but also add £30 000 to £40 000 in reserved rents to the royal revenue in Ireland 'which never yielded much, and altogether would scarce defray the charge of that Crown.'[91] Thus confiscation could not only feed the hopes of Thomas Edmundes that 'then land will surely be cheap in Ireland' and open 'to settle to posterity' by efforts 'to extirpe and extinguish the papist'[92] but also the view of Henry Kinge that rent on the newly distributed land 'will make his Maty [sic] a greater revenue than any before him ever had'.[93]

Since the 1620s one of the principal political aims of John Pym and his allies had been to establish royal financial solvency. This meant the putting in place on an adequate 'permanent' revenue, and it had not escaped the attention of prominent parliamentarians at this time that this could include a more thorough exploitation of royal landed estates, perhaps even by an Act of Resumption.[94] Wentworth, who has been bracketed with Pym as 'the two leading natural administrators in the Commons' in the 1620s, saw his role in Ireland as one of financial reconstruction, using both customs revenue and plantation based rented income.[95] In the 'private advertisement' sent by some members of the Irish council on Nov. 26 they had noted the advantage of active reconquest 'in raising a greater and far more considerable revenue here to the Crown than formerly, from the estates of those who were actors in the present general mischiefs'.[96] Whatever personal advantage may have been scented by confiscation,

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[89]*P. J., i*, p.387; cf. p. 369f for discussion of doubling.

[90]*P. J., i*, p.370. What was envisaged was a 'plantation militia' on the newly planted lands, similar to that previously contained in the terms of the Ulster Plantation.

[91]*Speech of Bulstrode Whitelocke*, 17 Feb., T.T. E200 (30). Whitelocke again referred to increased customs revenue as an additional benefit. Interestingly his description of 1641 plans to increase Irish revenue was 'upon examination, to be very small, and all that was advanced, came by unworthy Monopolies; and to private hands'. It is also worth noting that Whitelocke, not usually portrayed as a religious zealot was reported as having said that '[T]he question is not now, Whether English or Irish shall govern; but whether the Protestant, or the Popish Religion shall be established, and which of them shall be ruined'. [pp 4, 6-7].

[92]*Egmont MSS*, i, 163. To Perceval, Feb. 8.

[93]*Tanner letters*, p. 140. To Martyn Calthorpe, Feb. 17.

[94]See e.g. Conrad Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics 1621-1629* (Oxford, 1979), pp. 282-4; cf. J. N. Ball, 'Sir John Eliot and Parliament, 1624-1629' in Kevin Sharpe (ed.), *Faction and Parliament. Essays on Early Stuart History* , (reprint, London, 1985), p. 180 for Eliot. For the hopes of Pym and Bedford to utilise church lands and increased customs revenue in 1641, see Russell, *British monarchies*, pp. 254, 256-7.

[95]Russell, *Parliaments*, p. 385; cf. Hugh Kearney, *Strafford in Ireland 1633-41. A Study in Absolutism*, (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1989) pp. 81-3, 85, 169-70.

[96]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 22-3, 26-7.

appeal was also made to a strain in English parliamentary thought which saw 'the ease of his Majesty's subjects of England'[97] generally to lie in a secure royal revenue with fewer calls on 'extraordinary' taxation[98]. Moreover, since Strafford's fall, this same grouping had been persistent in their support of plans for plantations in Ireland as a means to secure future revenue to the Crown.[99]

Irish plantation had of course been concerned with more than the generating of royal revenue. Those members of the Irish executive who advocated its retention and extension in the months before the outbreak of the rising coupled promises of financial gain with Jacobean notions of the promotion of 'civility', the rule of law, English security and general prosperity.[100] The final draft propositions of the adventure contained a clause

> That, for the Erecting of Manors, Settling of Wastes and Commons, Maintaining of Ministers, Creating of Corporations, and Regulating of the several Plantations, One or more Commissions be hereafter granted by Authority of Parliament.[101]

It was a sentiment which could tap a broader philosophy of improvement not unrepresented among the English parliamentary classes, and resonant with plantation-like aims.[102] Urgency had been injected into the long-standing project in Ireland by announcements from Dublin of not only murder and spoliation but also of how the insurgents 'defaced the chargeable buildings and profitable improvements of the English to their uttermost power' in Ulster, and 'are so barbarous as they are no less delighted in the demolishing and defacing the buildings and improvements of the English than in imbruing their hands in their blood' (Wicklow).[103] From the beginning of the century, Irish 'barbarism' had been largely associated with the rule of the native

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[97]A phrase from the preamble to the 'Adventure' Act made much of by Bottigheimer to point up 'reluctance to tax England in order to repress Ireland' (*English Money*, p. 41). Parliaments were often reluctant to tax England at all.

[98]The Grand Remonstrance petition after all had put the call for non-alienation of confiscated land in Ireland forward 'that out of them the Crown may be better supported' prior to 'some satisfaction made to your subjects of this kingdom' (Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*. p. 205). The two are complementary and not unlike protests on the disposal of royal resources in England.

[99]Perceval-Maxwell, *Irish rebellion*, pp. 157-9. For a statement of the condition of Irish revenue in June 1641, see Russell, *British monarchies*, p. 391 (cf. the views of Radcliffe of the losses involved by an abandonment of land-title revenue, p. 388).

[100]Perceval-Maxwell, *Irish rebellion*, pp. 157-9; Russell, *British monarchies*, p. 390. Robert Dunlop was prepared to comment on Parsons that 'at least it may be said for him that in his case private interest was balanced by a sincere belief on the plantation system as a means to establish the interest in Ireland on a firm and endurable basis', *D. N. B.*, xv, 419.

[101]*Commons' jn., ii*, 435.

[102]For general notions of 'improvement' see e.g. Buchanan Sharp, 'Rural discontents and the English Revolution' in R. C. Richardson (ed.), *Town and Countryside in the English Revolution* (Manchester, 1992), pp. 263-5; H. R. Trevor-Roper, *Religion, the Reformation and Social Change* (London, 1967), chapter 5.

[103]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 8 (5 Nov.), 20 (22 Nov.). Cf. Dec 14. - malice towards the English extends 'even to the beasts of their fields and improvements of their lands, for they destroy all the cattle of English breed, and declare openly that their reason is because they are English, ...and they destroy all improvements made by the English and lay waste their habitations'. (p.38).

nobility, unfettered by the constraints of English law. Thus the breaking of their power promised security, civility and prosperity.[104] Events in 1641 had to be thought of as 'another kind of rebellion', not only in its religious motivation but also in the way in which 'the meaner sort of people of the natives rise up unanimously' and without noble leadership. If this demonstrated incorrigibility, it was added to a demonstration that all the progress made under James I towards the attainment of the public goods of English political discourse - peace, Protestantism, economic improvement, security from foreign foes, even social stability - threatened to be vitiated in Ireland.[105]

The other side of the coin, from this perspective, was that prospects were equally sweeping. Success offered Charles the 'glory of that great work of a full settlement and reformation of that kingdom.'[106] In a manner akin to that in which, for some English MPs, the generally accepted need to suppress the Laudian church had led to the more partisan intention of replacing it with a more perfect reformed church[107], so the general ambition of suppressing rebellion in Ireland had prompted in some the hope of a more completely reformed kingdom in its wake. This, of course, precluded concessions to the insurgents. Nor could a complete wiping clear of the past meet the need to recompense 'faithful subjects' who had been the victims of the loss or destruction of goods. One of the Council letters which suggests an inner 'party' (Dec. 14) announced the defection of the Pale and the resultant opportunities. Enclosed was a draft proclamation calling for an immediate laying down of arms, but not promising that this would bring full pardon.[108] The reasoning was that the cycle of rebellion could not be broken if leniency was shown. But the need for reparation was also mentioned, a trend which would soon lead to more explicit calls for restitution from confiscated rebel property on the basis of investigations authorised into the losses claimed by injured parties.[109]

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[104]Such ideas were utilised by Sir John Davies in the aftermath of the Elizabethan wars, and lived on into the Cromwellian settlement. For Parsons' attachment to the notion of overcoming the native (and old English) nobility see *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1625-32*, pp. 57 (12 Dec., 1625), 141-2 (14 Jan., 1626), (and for the ending of any noble exceptions to the work of the Court of wards, pp. 77-8, 100, 255, 259-60, 440-1).

[105]For examples, see *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 7-8, 15, 20-1, 34, 43.

[106]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 96-7.

[107]Morrill, *English revolution*, pp. 58, 70-2.

[108]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 42-5.

[109]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 63, 66, 67. The Irish council was deeply concerned at the opinion of 'some...that England never did conquer this kingdom fully, but only had it upon submission from the natives, and so this horrid conspiracy and commotion is not to be adjudged a rebellion'. And this in turn is a reflection of their worries that without some such legally incontrovertible basis the proposed confiscations would somehow be overruled. In letters first to Leicester and then to both the King and the English Parliament direct the Council had set out the difficulties in proceeding to confiscation either by Common Law or through the Irish Parliament, *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 88-91, 96-7,103-4, 105. They were thus obliged to rely on the legal maxim of automatic forfeiture to the King in the case of rebellion, since this constituted treason, a concept convenient for Irish Protestants in the future in avoiding the implications of the adventure legislation. (For the identification of rebellion and treason, see Richard Bolton, *A Iustice of Peace for Ireland* (Dublin, 1638),i, 266).

The institutional innovations of the adventure and CIA were more than attempts to remedy structural defects, though between them they did contribute much to the logistical potential of the English war effort in Ireland.[110] More than that they expressed a vision and a programme for a future where Pym and his allies would have triumphed in England. CIA was more a prototype for English governance (including, perhaps, of Ireland) while the adventure was the ground for a co-operation with Parsons and his associates in Ireland. As in the years ahead, bonds between Irish Protestants and the English Parliament were not based primarily on the constitutional claims of the latter, in England or Ireland, indeed sometimes the former had difficulty in negotiating these. Rather, it came to be that 'parliamentarians' held on to those matters of primary interest to Irish Protestants - the defence of religion; future reform of, and security in Ireland; recompense for Protestant sufferings and losses, and punishment of miscreants. Indeed so central to the evolving parliamentarian position were such notions that they were applied to the English case also. For the moment, an axis had been created around a common 'policy' towards Ireland, one which combined military intervention and a preclusion of compromise. Despite the efforts of Irish Protestants, it would draw most of them eventually to Parliament.

What, then, of the role of 'religion' in the creation of such a parliamentarian Irish policy? Recent discussions of the parliamentarian cause have not only put religious concerns at their heart but have recognised the complexity of 'religious' motivations.[111] In so far as the months from Jan. 1642 saw an increasing reliance by parliament on external support from London and Edinburgh, the role of religion as a bond of unity can be clearly discerned.[112] But in terms of Ireland, perhaps a few comments on 'religious' motivation are necessary. The religious impulse of parliamentarians can perhaps be seen to operate at three levels, with decreasing degrees

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[110]For the contribution of adventure funds see chapter 3, and appendix 1. The persistent efforts of CIA in organising the war effort may be seen from its minute book, N.L.I. MS 14 305, partially printed in *P. J., ii.*.

[111]Religious concerns are central to the treatment of events in 1640-2 in Fletcher, *Outbreak*; Russell, *British monarchies*; Morrill, *English revolution* (e.g. pp. 54-5 for the 'complex' nature of religious grievances).

[112]For the religious radicalism of many of those who would come to the fore in adventurer activities, see, Keith Lindley, 'Irish adventurers and godly militants', in *I.H.S.* xxix (1994), pp. 1-12.. The Scottish alliance has long been recognised as forged in religious terms; for statements by the Scots of a religious motivation (the threat from Catholicism), and for their willingness to drop demands for greater power in Ulster, see Perceval-Maxwell, *Irish rebellion*, pp. 265, 268.

of support - combating the dangers of popery[113]; combating the dangers of tyranny[114]; further reform of the Protestant church. The last of these has held pride of place in the division of the English into armed camps, but the other two both survived as integral parts of the parliamentarian 'ideology'.[115] In Ireland, the reality of the first threat had always been regarded as that much greater, the impulse to move beyond so much the less.[116] In early 1642 evidence from the English provinces suggests that in so far as a war of religion was feared, it was a conventional one between Protestant and Catholic[117] but this was much closer to the reality on the ground in Ireland. There were, then, religious resonances between the stance of English parliamentarians and Irish Protestants, so long as the urge to associate of 'religion' with 'reform' is not too readily admitted. As for the insight that religion provided the dynamism to counter the hesitancies of English constitutionalism this too would have its impact on Parliament's intervention in Ireland, as demonstrated in the summer of 1642.

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[113]Morrill, *English revolution*, pp. 61-4 for a convenient statement of the vision inspired by the 'popish' threat.

[114]Morrill, *English revolution*, pp. 54-5, 65, 296-9 for the combined notions of royal 'abdication' and prelatical tyranny.

[115]See chapter 4 for the continuing role of anti-popery as a prime ingredient in the self-perception of parliamentarians in 1643.

[116]This is not to say that there are no examples of 'reformist' Irish Protestants, of whom Clotworthy is the most prominent. Where they can be detected, or suspected (as with the Cootes) their propensity to lean to Parliament was greater (as seen in Ulster, where some had petitioned against episcopacy in 1641). But the 'coiled spring' seems to have been less wound in Ireland, and perhaps even 'tyranny' had been deflected into the campaign against Strafford (which had spilled over to include Bishop Bramhall). (Of course the Scottish presence in Ulster meant that religious developments there must proceed somewhat out of line with the other provinces.)

[117]Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 223.

Chapter 3
The Militia Question
Feb. to August 1642.

The 'militia' controversy in England may be regarded as the immediate cause, or 'occasion'[1], of the outbreak of the war in England, and as largely caused by the need to provide an army for service in Ireland. But neither the stages in the debate nor its relationship to Ireland are always clear. Three issues, of increasing importance for the emergence of war, were the right to impress Englishmen (specifically for service overseas), the control of the county trained bands (primarily for local defence) and the power to raise troops in England (for 'active' service, beyond their home base). All were related to the rebellion in Ireland, the second indirectly as a response to fears of the spread of the turmoil. Already in Dec. the first two stages of the dispute had been linked as proposals for a militia bill were introduced, perhaps as a pressure to gain impressment, more certainly because greater impetus was given to the need for national defence by the Irish threat.[2] Earlier discussion of a militia[3] bill, in the summer of 1641, had been by the listing of county commissions for a limited time; the new proposals were more drastic.[4] In the 'weeks of crisis' in late Jan. - early Feb. these, essentially 1620s,[5] issues came to the fore. By Jan. 18 the basis for the later Militia Ordinance had been laid, and with the capture of the upper House by the oppositionists over the next two weeks the peers' agreement on both impressment and the disposition

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[1]Morrill so describes the Militia ordinance and the 19 propositions, *English revolution*, p. 60; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, especially chapters 11-12 shows the 'untidy' outbreak of war in England with local struggles for control of military resources.

[2]Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 207, 214-7.

[3]The term 'militia' is somewhat confusing, too readily being made synonymous for 'trained bands'. Here the latter will generally be referred to as such, with 'militia' allowed a broader sense akin to 'military', though it must be remembered that 'militia' bills were primarily concerned with the county trained bands.

[4]Gardiner, *Eng.*, x, 95-6, 99, 101-2 argued the case for the militia bills as a means of pressuring the Lords on impressment in a manner akin to the use of Root and Branch to press for Bishops' Exclusion. He is followed by Lois G. Schwoerer, '"The Fittest Subject for a King's Quarrel"; an essay in the militia controversy', in *Jn. Brit. Studies*, xi, (1971), pp. 52-4. For further discussion of the July and Dec. 1641 bills, see Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 66-7, 165; Russell, *British Monarchies*, p. 435; Clarendon, *Rebellion*, i, 365-6, 442-7. Perhaps a closer analogy lies in the options of trial or attainder as means to be rid of Strafford, (strengthened by Haselrig's role in introducing the bill for attainder and the Dec. 7 bill) in other words that a common goal was being sought by more or less direct (and uncompromising) means.

[5]See S. J. Stearns, 'Conscription and English society in the 1620', in *Jn. Brit. Studies*, xi (1972).

of the trained bands was obtained.[6] When the Militia Ordinance came out in early March it was very clearly an intellectual product of the events from Nov. 1641, adducing the rising, the attempted arrests and the fears of invasion for its promulgation.[7] But, to be an adequate defensive measure, it also had to meet sufficient legalistic criteria to pass as supportive of the existing 'constitution' which it did in two ways, by returning to the method of listing of county lieutenants, and by resorting to the form of an ordinance.[8]

By April the focus of attention was beginning to shift to the efforts, by King and Parliament, to raise active military force, at least ostensibly for service in Ireland. Yet all three stages in the 'militia' dispute were linked, from Feb. to April, and in ways which would influence the parliamentarian - dominated position on Ireland, even then under construction. The inter-relations of Irish and 'militia' policy occur in three areas - in the definition of the 'emergency' under which Parliament claimed to operate; in the tension between the dynamic and legalistic sides of its case, leading to the defection of support to the King; in a tension between statutory and institutional concessions made by Charles and his turning instead to reliance on a dangerous combination of prerogative and 'British' support.[9]

In his 'soothing message' of Feb. 7, the King offered to appoint nominees to the county trained bands, provided he did so by his own authority and with an agreed time limit.[10] In other words he had failed to concede the principle that his authority was in any way limited on this front. This was what was then breached by the Impressment Act (assented to on Feb. 14), which in practice posed no threat to Charles's control while ceding statutory limitations on prerogative.[11] It had been a concession which could be presented as a trade-off for a halt on proceedings on the county forces, though this did not occur.[12] Yet the King's conciliation drive does not appear to have ended.[13] By the time he made his next statement on matters military, on

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[6]Schwoerer, '"The Fittest Subject...";an essay', p. 56; Perez Zagorin, *The Court and the Country*, pp. 299-300; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 244-5. For the Lords see especially Russell, *British Monarchies*, pp. 468, 470-1, 472 & n.83

[7]For the inclusion of the combination of threats, from the Irish rebellion to the Jan. 4 attempt, and invasion in both the Jan. 31 draft and the final version of the Ordinance see Commons' *jn., ii,* 406; *P. J., i,* 551; Gardiner, *Constitutional documents,* pp. 245-7.

[8]Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 245-6.

[9]Further, while the Impressment Act was to operate through JPs, the King's orders for raising volunteers for Ireland continued to rely on the county Lords Lieutenant (*Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47,* p. 356.), making their nomination of direct relevance for the Irish war.

[10]Russell, *British Monarchies*, p. 475; Rushworth, iii (1), 519; Clarendon, *Rebellion*, i, 557.

[11]See Russell, *British Monarchies*, pp. 434-5 on the 'constitutional principle' behind the Impressment Act.

[12]B. H. G. Wormald, *Clarendon. Politics, history and religion 1640-1660* (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 59-61 gives Clarendon's account and suggests modifications from his retrospective perspective for the notion of a trade-off via Culpepper.

[13]For opinions on Charles's conciliatory phase, or readiness or war when feasible, see Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 229-32, 236; Russell, *British Monarchies,* pp. 454, 457, 495. Probably it was more than a 'tactic' unless than term be used to imply retreat on lesser matters, albeit under pressure for

Feb. 28., he had succumbed to the extension of the impressment arrangement to the county forces - in offering to proceed by statute; in the placing of power in the King in the first instance (and then in the nominees); in the inclusion of a time limit.[14] The difficulty for those still at Westminster was not in the terms but in the concern for defence from the King himself.[15] What was more, indications were coming through of the King's propensity to grant with one hand and withdraw with the other. The day after the issue of the message on the militia he issued an order for Leicester to raise 6 000 volunteers for Ireland, thus by-passing the conceded impressment.[16]

His verbal response of March 8 that he would not concede the militia showed Charles as no longer conciliatory, while the command to the public to resist the execution of the militia ordinance was a blatant rejection of the legalistic assumptions of Parliament about the value of ordinances. It was liable to prod them to defensive responses as on all occasions when they believed their rights and privileges were concerned.[17] Meanwhile the King was maintaining an 'acceptable' line on Ireland, of a kind needed to retain English support.[18] His Feb. 14 missive had first mooted the possibility he might 'venture his own Royal Person in that War, if His Parliament shall think it convenient', as well as promising to 'leave nothing undone for their Relief, which shall fall within His possible Power'. It was a promise which would be drawn on to collect his assent to the adventure proposals.[19] Then on March 8, 15 & 18 he professed to lament slow proceedings over Ireland and projected his own co-operativeness.[20] Indeed little progress had been made recently. March was the low point of parliamentary finance regarding Ireland and though officers had now been accepted for the regiments of the 'second phase' they were put on half-pay and no moves were made to initiate recruitment. It took the freeing of the adventure funds to

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'moderate' supporters, to retain control of more important ones. The concessions could later be subverted.

[14]Rushworth, iii (1), 521-3; Clarendon, *Rebellion*, i, 577-9. Cf. Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, pp. 242-5.

[15]For support in both Houses for a defensive measure and acceptance of the legal status of an Ordinance, though less useful than statute, see Fletcher, Outbreak, p. 245; Russell, *British Monarchies*, p. 472 and 'The Scottish party in English Parliaments 1640-2', in *Historical Research*, lxvi, no. 159 (Feb. 1993), p. 43 for Whitelocke. Note that on Feb. 7 Pierrepoint, for the Militia Committee, accepted a time limit to 1644, *P. J., i*, 305.

[16]*Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 356.

[17]Clarendon, *Rebellion*, i, 189-90; Rushworth, iii (1), 531-2; Gardiner, *Eng.*, x, 172; Russell, *British Monarchies*, pp. 479-82

[18]This can be seen as having begun with the agreement to a proclamation condemning the rebellion in early Jan. and as only explicitly faltering in early 1643.

[19]*Lords' jn., iv*, 580-1; *Commons' jn., ii*, 430; Rushworth, iii (1), 553-4; Russell, *British Monarchies*, p. 475. For the response in the Commons, pressing ahead on English defence, see *P. J., i*, 374, 376-8.

[20]Clarendon, *Rebellion*, i, 589-90, 591-2, ii, 2-3, 5-6; Rushworth, iii (1), 531-2, 533-4, 535-8; Gardiner, *Eng.*, x, 172.

produce the needed thaw in operations, under the guise of a loan for the general service in Ireland.[21]

This was in early April, and it was now that the strands came together in Charles's April 8 message. His offer to go to Ireland promised the fulfilment of parliamentary goals, the suppression of the insurgency, the denial of toleration, the securing of the adventurers. In addition, he proposed to raise 2 200 soldiers to accompany him, with arms from the Hull magazine, and to leave the militia secured by bill in his absence and the country under commissioners, though with the continuation of Parliament.[22] The message arrived on April 11, as the Commons busied itself with the intricacies of Irish logistics.[23] In terms of English developments, it was a strategically sound decision for the King to link the county bands and the raising of soldiers. Pym's response to the latter, on April 14-15, was belligerent, reflecting the fear that the King would be able to escape the restrictions placed upon him. The declaration argued against the royal journey, but also protested that troops raised in the manner prescribed would have to be suppressed and commissioners appointed in the manner proposed would be resisted. More 'moderate' MPs noted that efforts were made to drive the declaration through wholesale even though some strands were perceived 'very strange and high'.[24]

The need for Pym to secure a condemnation of the raising of forces distinct from consideration of the county forces was necessary in the light of opinion in Parliament. This can be seen in the response to the King's militia bill on April 19-20 with the Commons giving almost unanimous approval, including that of strong supporters of the recent Ordinance.[25] It was eagerly grasped at, perhaps the last moment when the still limited, second stage of the militia dispute was regarded as soluble. That the King then rejected the Bill (April 28) demonstrates how, for him, it was not detachable from broader considerations. With the rejection of his proposal to travel to Ireland *and* his being spurned at Hull, effectively ending the possibility of his being able to arm a force independent of the county trained bands, his temporary concession was no longer appealing.[26] But the incident shows the potential of a legal

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[21]See appendix 1(iii) for details. The contribution thus made was generally recognised. See, for example, John Berners' (April 11) statement that 'the reason no more of our forces are gone over was want of money, which now the subscribers have somewhat subscribed', *Tanner letters*, p. 147.

[22]Clarendon, *Rebellion*, ii, 33-4; Rushworth, iii (1), 560 -560a; *Lords' jn., iv,* 709-10.

[23]*Commons' jn., ii,* 521-3; *P. J., ii,* 151-4.

[24]*P. J., ii,* 169-70, 171, 172, 177-8; *Lords' jn., iv,* 719-20, 721, 722; Bulstrode Whitelocke, *Memorials of English affairs* (4 vols., Oxford, 1853), i, 167; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 231-2; Russell, *British monarchies*, pp. 488-9 where Russell points to Pym's 'considerably more extreme' draft version, and mentions that it envisaged parliamentary choice of 'guardians' in the King's absence.

[25]Of the amendments, the time limit merely brought it into line with the Feb. offer.

[26]Zagorin, *Court and Country*, pp 316-7; Schwoerer, '"The Fittest Subject..."; an essay', p.62; Gardiner, *Eng.*, x, 186, 191; Whitelocke, *Memorials*, i, 171-2; *Lords' jn., v,* 10; *Commons' jn., ii,* 537; *P. J., ii,* 191-2, 193. The rejection of the bill (April 28) came after the spurning of the proposed Irish journey and the first repulse of the King at Hull (April 23). Given Charles's recent 'not for an

solution across the board on 'militia' issues in terms of the impressment formulation, a reconciliation of emergency and legalistic assumptions.

But did Charles really intend to go to Ireland? Clarendon's retrospective account probably blurs the reality of Charles's wider plans in the spring of 1642. While Clarendon and his circle can be linked in principle to the kind of offers being made on the militia, or even over 'policy' in Ireland, other arrangements there could only have excluded them.[27] Since Feb. the King had given indications of his options of using his other kingdoms to break the impasse in England. Apparently he was sufficiently satisfied with his Oct. 1641 arrangements in Scotland to look there for support by Feb. 1642. Whether or not he hoped that personal intervention could do like wonders in Ireland or not, he was clearly regarded as heading towards Scotland in March - April. His hopes were not entirely unrealistic, for if appeals by letter failed to win active support for him, they closed off sustenance for his English foes, for the moment.[28] With Ireland, rumours and hints of travel appear around the same time.[29] More openly apparent are the directions for the departure of Lord Lieutenant Leicester, still in the King's trust.[30] Leicester's final refusal, on March 26, pleading lack of resources, comes very close in time to the King's proposal.[31] This was made less than a week after Charles gave his approval to the Commission appointing CIA (April 2). In Parliament's response they urged Charles to allow the new commissioners to act. Again taking away even as he gave, the King seemed poised to subvert the very institution he had created.

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hour' attitude, it seems inconceivable that he would grant pertinent concessions over domestic force unless he intended to retain alternative military power and / leave the country for a period of time.

[27]Wormald, *Clarendon*, p. 103 constructs the incident as 'a blending of policies sponsored by Hyde and the Queen', the former urging a message showing 'solicitude for Ireland' and compromise on the militia, the latter the need 'to secure arms and a seaport'. Wormald seems to accept that the Bill could have succeeded had it been part of a consistent policy, *Clarendon*, pp. 104-7. This in turn would explain the retrospective self-justifications of Clarendon, claiming the Irish plan was a decision 'very suddenly taken, and communicated to very few, without consideration of the objections that would naturally arise against it' but aimed only to pressure the Houses into 'a better temper and sobriety'. This smacks of disappointment at the exclusion by Charles, in making this plan, of Clarendon's otherwise influential circle. That he later claimed that the expedition could have 'speedily.....reduced Ireland' is perhaps a cover for immediate disappointment. In turn, Clarendon's presentation may have dulled future consideration of the significance of the proposal. See Clarendon, *Rebellion*, ii, 41-2; H. M. C. *Montagu MSS*, p. 150 (William Montagu to Lord Montagu, April 21) for a report of Culpepper's role in the attempt to win the King to compromise on the trained bands.

[28]Russell, *British monarchies*, pp. 490-4.

[29]Sir John Coke, jr. to Sir John Coke, sr., Feb. 24, H. M. C. *Cowper MSS*, ii, p. 308 suggested a journey to Scotland, shortly after the first hints that the King might travel to Ireland.

[30]Charles's letter of Feb. 1 to the Dublin government suggested that Leicester's arrival was imminent, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 356.

[31]Leicester protested at a lack of instructions and of military provisions, and that the failure to pay his arrears as ambassador to France meant he could not support himself as Lord Lieutenant. *Lords' jn., iv*, 679; *Commons' jn., ii*, 503-4; *P. J., ii*, 104, 107-8; H.M.C. *Buccleuch MSS*, i, 295. See Russell, *Causes*, pp 164-6 for examples of unpaid royal debts, including that to Leicester, and its possible adverse effects on the King's cause. In his reply to parliament's message on the journey to Ireland (April 25) the King again protested at Leicester's failure to travel to Ireland, Clarendon, *Rebellion*, ii, 38-9.

What he would do in Ireland is also unstated, obviously enough. Whatever his avowals, the logical assumption would be some sort of collusion with the Catholic forces, as indeed the Queen appeared to assume.[32] That Charles himself believed in his ability to reconcile the most diverse of groupings in loyalty to his person is testified by his future career, most apparently his persistent belief that he could use both Scottish covenanters and Irish Catholics for his service. What is certain is that in the spring of 1642 the Earl of Antrim was operating in Ulster, attempting to win both the Scottish forces and their local allies to the King, apparently with royal approval. If his efforts, begun in April, met with little success they are indicative of a potential course of action for the King, involving parleys with Sir Phelim O'Neill even while speaking against the insurgents' conduct, and relieving the besieged Protestant town of Coleraine.[33] The possibility of a royal journey to Ireland remained alive even in May[34] and with it the option of a settlement there in which the King could reconcile, to his own satisfaction, the various promises he had made to date.[35] His attitude from the first had been not unlike that in 1640 when he hoped that Parliament would supply the resources he needed for his fight with the Scots without interfering.[36] So in 1641-2 he wished that they would sustain armies he would raise and leave to him to suppress, pardon or tolerate.[37]

It was not that raising the stakes over military issues was confined to the King alone. The April 15 vote that any who advised the King's raising of 'forces for Ireland, or otherwise, ... is an enemy to the state' accompanied the delivery of a CIA request that they be permitted to raise no less than 10 000 fresh troops for Ireland.[38] This power had been clearly omitted from the original instructions, and it was now requested so as to allow the issuing of commissions to officers who would then raise

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[32]*Letters of Queen Henrietta Maria*, ed. M. A. E. Green (London, 1857), p.66 (May 5). (Cf. the comments of John Dillingham cited in Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 265 on the range of unpalatable options which speculation attributed to the King's announcement of his journey).

[33]Jane H. Ohlmeyer, *Civil war and restoration in the three Stuart kingdoms. The career of Randal Macdonnell, Marquis of Antrim, 1609-1683* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 111-2. For Antrim's relief efforts at Coleraine, see T. H. Mullin, *Coleraine in by-gone centuries* (Belfast, 1976), pp. 87-8.

[34]*Letters of Queen Henrietta Maria*, (ed. Green), pp. 66, 68 for references in letters of May 5 & 11; a letter form Lord Conway (May 19) suggesting the King would come to Dublin, read in the Commons on June 4, B. L., Harl. MS 163, f. 147b. Rumours of the King's coming to Ireland were also reported circulating among the Ulster insurgents in May (Raymond Gillespie, 'Destabilising Ulster', p. 114).

[35]The Venetian ambassador (May 2) reported that the King would sail from Carlisle, making a landing in Scots held Ulster most likely, but the ambassador wisely refused to speculate about Charles's motives, *Cal. S.P. Venice 1642-1643*, p. 46.

[36]Russell, *British monarchies*, pp. 155-6.

[37]There was the possibility that the King's arrival would mobilise 'neutralist' sentiment to active participation against the insurgents, Nicholas to Ormond, April 13, Carte MS 3, f. 64. Charles's squaring of the circle of his promises could, speculatively, have followed the hints in Antrim's programme in accepting the status of the insurgents as rebels but then issuing (selective) pardons. This was not unlike the royal-Ormond efforts of the later 1640s, while an ambiguous response on the practice of Catholicism would meet the promise not to grant toleration, while not upping the level of persecution (again as later).

[38]*Lords' jn., iv*, 720; MacCormack, 'Irish Adventurers', pp. 34-6; *P. J., ii*, 170.

and transport men to a maximum number of 10 000.[39] It was a proposal connected not only with the need for reinforcements, but possibly also with the adventure. Both MP-adventurers and (some) ordinary subscribers had shown their anxiety over the King's proposed journey.[40] They had also shown restiveness over the 'lending' of their money to the general war effort[41], but the adventurer-MPs were approached on April 18 to sponsor 5 210 troops for despatch to Munster,[42] in an approximation to the original intention of a relatively 'private' army. The move coincided in time with the delivery of propositions for an 'additional' or 'sea adventure' restricted to the coasts of Ireland[43] and the two measures proceeded in tandem through the Houses to a successful completion by the end of the month.[44]

The sticking point remained the authority to raise troops, both within and beyond the adventure schemes. It was complicated by being sought at this time for the second half of April was proving the same kind of turning point as the end of Jan. had been. The beginnings of the 'pamphlet war' over the militia has been dated to April 22, though the flood gates of publication only opened following the King's refusal of the Militia Bill on April 28, coinciding with the 'second round' of the official paper war where 'the parties were openly appealing to the country for support.'[45] The effort made by Parliament to throw the blame for the failure of the Militia Bill onto the King

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[39]*P. J., ii,* 412, 419-20. As proposed this would add to the April 4 commission a clause allowing for either volunteers or pressed men 'to reinforce our army there, as well for supply of such as shall either die or depart from the same, as for the strengthening of those parts of the kingdom which are not yet so well provided for as is requisite'.

[40]MacCormack suggests that MP adventurers may have hesitated to pay in their own instalments with the royal message. After the vote against it 'a large number of payments were made on the 16th and in the days following', MacCormack, 'Irish Adventurers', p. 35, note 94. MacCormack's appendix records 4 MPs making payments on April 16 and a further 17 between April 17 & 20. The position of the Adventurers was clarified on April 15 when Hasilrig presented a petition 'from the subscribers or adventurers' which claimed the ' divers' had retreated on hearing the King's plans. The unidentified petitioners 'humbly desired both houses to be earnest suitors to his majesty to alter that resolution and to speedily return to his parliament', *P. J., ii,* 178-9. On April 19 Crew brought a report that the treasurer, Aldermen Andrews, had actually heard of a Commons vote ' that if the king's intended journey did hold for Ireland, they who had subscribed should not pay in their money' - an investigation was called for, *P. J., ii,* 185.

[41]*Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 367, 368; *Commons' jn., ii,* 520, 529, 531. They cut the requested loan of £10 000 to £6 000.

[42]*Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 361. The vote to activate the adventure provision for raising troops had been taken on March 31, *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 365; *Commons' jn., ii,* 506.

[43]Walter Long delivered the first proposals (for 6 ships and 500 men) on April 16; the Commons approved though the Lords referred the matter to a committee, *Lords' jn., v,* 5, 6; *Commons' jn.*, ii, 531, 533; *P. J., ii,* 182, 187.

[44]*Lords' jn., v,* 12, 15-16, 21, 26, 29, 33-4; *Commons' jn., ii,* 536, 548, 549, 550; *P. J., ii,* 198-9, 213, 227, 239-40, 244, 246, 251, 252, 253. The commission for CIA to raise 10 000 soldiers was taken to the Lords on April 25 along with a message to hasten the Sea Adventure. The Commons had allowed that the warrant for troops was permitted by the Impressment Act, a view the Lords accepted permitting CIA to apply to the King for authorisation to empower JPs to impress the men.

[45]Lois G. Schwoerer, *No Standing Armies! the antiarmy ideology in seventeenth-century England* (Baltimore, Md., 1974), p. 41, with a discussion of the pamphlets on pp. 41-50. Charles's reaction this first broad sheet shows its significance - *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, pp. 308-10. See Russell, *British Monarchies,* pp. 504-5 for the 'second round' of official productions.

can be seen as an attempt to retain some of those committed to 'constitutional' reforms, albeit in tandem with 'popish plot' assumptions.[46] The tension between the legal and the dynamic dimensions of the national emergency were becoming apparent.

Early May saw continued application to both the main and the 'additional' Adventure proposals, with votes passed to allow the procurement of equipment and the nomination of officers.[47] Then on May 18 the King's message from York was read denying the commission to raise 10 000 fresh soldiers and instead despatching to Leicester a warrant for the raising of 4 000 volunteers. The Lord Lieutenant informed CIA that he had not sought any such authorisation while Pym was named to report to a lower House stirred by further word from Ireland the continued need for 10 000 troops.[48] As a committee was named to prepare an order for raising men the more militant of MPs were bringing in Adventure claims leading to two ordinances for the raising of men by them.[49] Cromwell added a call for a further committee to draw up a declaration 'to show the several delays had proceeded from his majesty of late in hindrance of supplies for Ireland', especially the late warrants.[50]

In the Lords the arguments used show the continuing need of legal foundations for their actions. Two questions were involved, the power given by the Impressment statute for the raising of troops in general, and any power granted in the 'adventure Acts' for the raising of volunteers. No indication is given that the Commons chose to respond to the former query, and even on the latter the arguments were merely implicit.[51] They proved acceptable; but when Leicester informed the peers that same day (May 28) of a royal offer to amend the warrant for 4 000 additional soldiers the

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[46]Wormald, *Clarendon*, pp. 106-7, 110, 112-3 provides such a reading of May - June 1642, tracing such aims through declarations issued by Parliament.

[47]*Lords' jn., v,* 49; *Commons' jn., ii,* 553, 559, 561; *P. J., ii,* 279, 284; *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47,* p. 361. On May 6 the Commons voted that the 6 ships be allowed to sail at once. The commission authorising the sea adventure completed its circuit on May 11, *Lords' jn., v,* 54, 56-7; *Commons' jn., ii,* 554, 562-3, 567; *P. J., ii,* 286, 305, 306.

[48]Charles cited earlier rejections of his offers to raise men (Dec. & April) and wanted new levies in the accustomed manner; his authorisation relied on volunteers (not pressed men as sought) through the county Lords Lieutenant. *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, pp. 319-20; *Lords' jn., v,* 73; *Commons' jn., ii,* 580, 582; *P. J., ii,* 351, 456. By now the 10 000 were apparently regarded as distinct from the main adventure force; Pym described them as 5 500 'for the City' (Dublin), 1 000 'for the sea' and 3 500 as recruits. See *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 187 for reference to the plan to reinforce Dublin. Charles's timing had been as unfortunate as always, for the Commons were in receipt of fresh news from Ireland, always a prompter for the more 'forward', *Lords' jn., v,* 6-7;*P. J., ii,* 322, 325, 327, 328; *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 121-5. Perhaps the Monmouth petition referring to Ireland was also received at this time, H. M. C. *Portland MSS*, i, 39.

[49]*Lords' jn., v,* 82; *Commons' jn., ii,* 583; *P. J., ii,* 362. D'Ewes reports the adventure motions as supported in this instance by Lisle and Marten.

[50]Cromwell had gone to the Lords on May 26 to urge haste on troops for the sea adventure, and moved for his declaration next day.

[51]The Lords asked for reasons for the claim of power to raise men under the Impressment Act, apparently without response; at the conference on the Adventure legislation Reynolds and Lisle both insisted that only volunteers were being considered, and Wilde argued for an implicit power following of necessity from the stated right to send over troops - they must be raised first; the Lords duly added the word 'volunteers' to the order. *Lords' jn., v,* 88-9, 91; *P. J., ii,* 383. See also note 45 above.

upper House accepted the opportunity to get around the obstacles for the general recruitment and added a request for a further warrant for 6 000 more troops.[52] Little over a week before the Houses voted their propositions to raise soldiers in England[53], the military needs of Ireland were still considered bound by statutory limitations and the possibility of co-operation with the King jumped at. Yet the decision on the adventure Act effectively lodged in Parliament as ample powers over military intervention in Ireland as could prove necessary.[54]

Even so it was too cautious an approach for the proponents of the sea adventure. By the time an ordinance for the implementation of the plan was discussed in the Lords[55] (June 4) it had emerged that the King had received a copy in the form of a commission and had refused it. The exact details are not easy to unravel, but the outcome was the winning of the Lords to the ordinance to set the sea adventure in motion.[56] Thereby they authorised the raising of troops *not* directly validated by statute. Pressure for the London committee over the main adventure won assent from the peers to the raising of specified troops on July 5.[57] By now, of course, the Houses were perched on the edge of a decision to raise 10 000 volunteers for their own service, and the Commons effectively captured by the future 'war party'.[58] The new army, like the adventurer force, was dependent as much on City militancy as parliamentary

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[52]*Lords' jn., v,* 88, 89.

[53]Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 336.

[54]The argument was that the Act for the 'speedy and effectual Reducing' of Ireland covered the use of money for the said reduction via the sending and supply of armed forces, until *Parliament* declared that Ireland was duly reduced; since such work could not be done until such forces were raised, those to be sent could be raised by Parliament by virtue of the Act. *Lords' jn., v,* 91.

[55]The decision taken in the upper House on May 28 had not directly encompassed the order for sea adventure troops since, as Cromwell explained on May 30, this sought an 'additional' 1000 soldiers under named officers (headed by Lord Brooke) over and above those agreed under the original act. *Lords' jn., v,* 92. This reinforces the impression of the sea adventure as a venture of a ginger group beyond the main body of subscribers (Brenner, *Merchants and revolution*, pp. 403-9).

[56]The order to raise 1 000 volunteers under Lord Brooke appears to have been assented to on May 31, *Lords' jn., v,* 94, 95; *P. J., ii,* 394. The issue then shifted to on ordinance to allow the flotilla to sail and act in Ireland, apparently in the same form as the commission intended for royal approval, *Lords' jn., v,* 102, 103, 105, 108, 113, 114, 115; B. L. Harl. MS 163, ff. 148a-b, 151a. Notification of royal disapproval was received on June 16 and, with Commons pressure again, the Lords now agreed. The lower house had at one point voted to despatch the ships save for one pinnace which could follow after with the Commission / ordinance. *Lords' jn., v,* 140, 142, 143, 144-5; B. L. Harl. MS 163, f. 183b; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum,* i, 9-12.

[57]That is, the ordinance now translated the general vote of May 28 into specified approval of the proposals of the adventurers, including their slate of officers, and the numbers for the expedition. Long had reported the officers' names on May 28, and the adventurer committee also seems to have stoked the pressure on Parliament at his time, *Lords' jn., v,* 92; *P. J., ii,* 384; *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, p. 361. Further pressure was brought to bear from the City adventurers on the MP-adventurers (*Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, p. 362); both Houses agreed to Lord Wharton as Colonel-General on June 21. With the approval of the ordinance, Wharton was appealed to for warrants to summon volunteers, while money for them was authorised on July 8. *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, pp. 362, 368, 369; *Lords' jn., v,* 153, 157, 177, 182, 193; *Commons' jn., ii,* 631, 642, 653, 656. The City adventurers had hoped that their officers would assemble, on Tuesday, June 21 at 9 a.m. for a sermon by Stephen Marshall, a sufficient indication of the sentiments of the committee.

[58]Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 340-1.

authorisation.[59] But the adventurer process had pushed both Houses to take powers over the levying of offensive forces on a merely implicit statutory power, then without even this.

If anything, then, escalation of military claims was greater when applied to Ireland than England, though developments in England followed close behind. A few points about the two processes are worth adding. One was that the parliamentary case was still based on an unstable compound of legalistic responses to national emergency and 'fears and jealousies' of religious extraction appealing beyond the letter of the law, as is widely acknowledged.[60] When it came to military issues, it made for easier acceptance of arguments over domestic, county forces than over the raising of armies. Once this question arose it precipitated out of the parliamentary alliance 'moderate' peers who had supported or at least not condemned the Militia Ordinance.[61] Even the raising of armies for Ireland was hard to accept without statute, and potential agreement with the King was still sought. Secondly, however, the growing strength of those not willing to tarry was becoming apparent.[62] The Adventure's supporters wanted action and were genuine about the need for activity on Ireland - the Sea Adventure ships were mandated to sail at once for the Irish coast. Parliament's Irish policy, suspended between 'national' and 'religious' imperatives was being captured by those who regarded events there as part of an apocalyptic programme.

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[59]Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 338-9; cf pp. 337-8 on the consequence of the June efforts under the propositions, largely diverted into the defence of participating counties.

[60]Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp 334, 339; J. W. Allen, *English Political Thought 1603-1644* (London, 1938 reprint, London, 1967), p. 395.

[61]Russell, *British Monarchies*, pp. 511-2; Sir Charles Harding Firth, *The House of Lords in the Civil War* (London, 1910), p.114. Examples are Spencer, Littleton, Bankes and Pagett. All these men had been recommended under the Militia Ordinance, and Spencer had served on the 28 January committee. As Clarendon noted, Parliament had until then succeeded in persuading those 'without reducing of whom they would have made a very sorry progress in mischieve, that all would be well' and the King 'yield to what they desired', *Rebellion,* ii, 69-70. Pagett, who could accept defensive authority under the Militia Ordinance and even act to intercept royal arms, was clear that he could not acquiesce in the raising of armed force against the King (see his letter to Parliament of June 17 in *Clarendon S. P.*, ii, 144). For continued 'legalism' even into July, despite 'war party' dominance, see Russell, *British Monarchies*, pp. 513-7, and, for the examples of Selden and Whitelocke, insisting on the need for statutory authorisation of all military power, and believing that Parliament's actions were the 'lesser of two legal evils', Richard Tuck, ' "The Ancient Law of Freedom": John Selden and the civil war' in John Morrill (ed.), *Reactions to the English civil war, 1642-1649*, (London, 1982), pp. 152-3. Clarendon described the pacificatory influence of the defectors once they had gone to York, now seeking to prevent the King's resort to arms, *Rebellion*, ii, 181-6.

[62]It is worth noting how pressure to implement the adventure was already associated with the future radicals Cromwell, Long and Lisle - Reynolds is hard to place but was hardly a moderate. Such men were also more open to those 'religious' fears described by Morrill (*English Revolution*, chs. 3, 4) than the 'good lords' many of whom had a distinctly secular outlook, see e.g. Russell, *British Monarchies*, p. 473, perhaps making them more prone to put the cause above its legal underpinning. Cromwell's interest in Ireland in 1642 has been little noticed by his biographers, but see *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell* ed. W. C. Abbott (4 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1937-47), i, 172-3, 180, 186; MacCormack, 'Irish Adventurers', p.37, note 103. For Cromwell's general political position in 1640-2 see J. S. A. Adamson, 'Oliver Cromwell and the Long Parliament' in John Morrill (ed.), *Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution* (London, 1990), pp. 50-55; cf. pp. 76-81 for the later Cromwell disillusioned with Parliament.

The role of London, as mentioned, was vital. Though the long-debated bill to raise £400 000 received the royal assent, it was already mortgaged away to old debts.[63] Instead it was the adventure which had breathed fiscal life into plans for Ireland. But with the emergence of their independent initiative the adventurers' established reluctance to cede control of their fund even to Parliament increased the need for alternative funding.[64] The call for a loan of £100 000 by the Companies of the City of London succeeded in early June, allowing over £60 000 to be gathered by the end of July.[65] Shortly after the Companies denied a similar loan for the war preparations in England, suggesting either reluctance or over-commitment.[66] Either way, this money was not diverted to English uses but duly spent.[67] It was badly needed, the more so as Parliament had, by July 21, taken to itself the pay of all Protestant forces operating in Ireland, whether the 'old' army or forces raised in 1641-2 under authority of the Dublin government or the King.[68]

It was part of a greater involvement in the war effort in Ireland, as opposed to just providing a logistical structure in England. CIA had been permitted some directive powers over the war in Ireland by virtue of their Commission.[69] In the spring and early summer of 1642 the focus of the war in Ireland had shifted and this was recognised. The threat to Dublin was reduced in the aftermath of the engagement at Kilrush (April 15) while in Ulster, despite poor, often desperate conditions, the Scottish and local forces had cleared much of the province of active opposition.[70] Instead the focus was shifting further south and west and, as the Dublin authorities

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[63]See John Venn's financial report of May 6, *Commons' jn., ii,* 557, 558; *P. J., ii,* 273, 279, 284. Also Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 343.

[64]See appendix 1 for the role of the adventure loans.

[65]*Commons' jn., ii,* 570, 595, 601, 605-6, 612, 645, 700; *P. J., ii,* 312-3, 392, 396, 400; Pearl, *London,* pp. 208-9; William Montagu to Lord Montagu, 2-4 June, H. M. C. *Buccleuch MSS*, i, 303-4. Harper, 'Public Borrowing', p. 66 shows that £91 770 was collected by Dec. 1642, two-thirds of it between June 14 and July 2. See M. A. E. Green (ed.), *Calendar of the proceedings of the Committee for the Advance of Money 1642-1656* (3 vols., London, 1888), i, 114-16 for efforts to Jan. 1643 to obtain the last £7 600. Charles's letter to the City authorities on June 14, while opposing recent attempts to raise money on the 'propositions' prudently allowed exceptions to be made of loans for Ireland or to repay the Scots, *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, p. 339.

[66]Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 343.

[67]Appendix 1 below.

[68]This occurred in two phases, in April for forces outside Ulster and in June - July for the considerable number of forces there, *P. J., ii,* 186-7, 189, 415-6; *Commons' jn., ii,* 662-3; *Anal. Hib.*, iv, 6-8. The principle was acceptable, but worries were expressed at engagements that could not later be met, BL Harl. MS 163, ff. 160a, 207b. For the process, in response to petitions sent, see *Commons' jn., ii,* 622, 631, 632, 646, 650, 662-3, 664, 683, 697; *Lords' jn., v,* 227, 228; N.L.I. MS 14 305, for June 9, 22 & 27. Sir William Hamilton's men were added in Sept., *Anal. Hib.*, iv, pp. 2-3.

[69]*P. J., ii,* 403-06.

[70]See Clotworthy to Pym, June 28 / 30 cited by D'Ewes (BL Harl. MS 163, f. 280a) and Gawdy (BL Add. MS. 14 828, f. 165b). Gardiner, *Great civil war*, i, 114; Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 17-19, 23-5; Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters*, pp. 103-25, 127-8. By May 16 Tichborne (at) was hoping that the Scottish army under Monro would be re-deployed beyond Ulster where rebel strength was greater, Tichborne to Ormond, Carte MS 3, f. 176.

mentioned on June 7, towards the idea of 'an offensive war'.[71] Of the former, CIA had been concerned, since April, to launch a plan for the relief of key coastal sites, especially Galway, Limerick and Kinsale.[72] The Sea Adventure and the main Munster Adventure army were designed to the same ends. But a consideration of two of these towns indicates the complexities resulting from direct intervention in the conduct of the war, in political and strategic terms.

Galway, by June 23, presented a case where the possibility of neutrality based on toleration had been implemented by local grandee, Clanricard.[73] The Lords Justices were cautious enough not to condemn his action, while noting that they would not have taken such a course, and would prefer its dissolution.[74] The Parliament rose to the challenge and condemned the articles on the basis of the Adventure Act, voting to move the King to revoke the protection of the City and to call on the Lords Justices to summon it to surrender 'absolutely' to the King's mercy.[75] The Dublin authorities had added to their call for advice on offensive war a request for direction on the 'execution of his majesty's justice upon these unnatural and unthankful rebels...'. Likewise they reported their expulsions of Catholic clergy from Dublin and wondered whether they should consider the preparation of bills 'for confirming here all laws in force in England against Jesuits, priests, friars etc., as also against Papists'. For the moment they had forborne to expel all Catholic inhabitants, though if King or commissioners 'shall adjudge it fit to be now done, we shall readily do it'. One at least of the commissioners was more than ready; Oliver Cromwell had it agreed that CIA should consider the issue of the estimated 10 000 Catholics in Dublin, whose presence was deemed such as demanded the deployment there of a garrison of equal size.[76]

If Galway provoked questions of 'policy', the situation at Limerick raised questions of strategy. By June 25 the Commons were discussing a letter from Inchiquin, acting Lord President in Munster, about the collapse of plans for the relief of the castle there (with effects on the internal political divide among Munster Protestants) and its imminent capture.[77] In fact the castle had fallen four days before the letter was

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[71]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 130.

[72]*P. J., ii,* 186, 409-10, 411-2, 412-3, 416, 418, 423, 426, 427-8; James Hogan (ed.), *Letters and Papers relating to the Irish rebellion, 1642-6* (Dublin, 1936), pp 26-7, 38.

[73]Clanricard seems to have aimed for a general cessation, in relation to hopes for the King's arrival; see his letters to Ormond, May 19 & 28, Carte MS 3, ff. 194, 208.

[74]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 148-151; BL Harl. MS 163, f. 207b; BL Add. MS 14 828, f. 143a.

[75]BL Harl. MS 163, ff. 214b, 224b, 235a; BL Add. MS 14 828, ff. 144a, 146a; *Commons' jn., ii,* 643; *Lords' jn., v,* 164, 166, 167.

[76]BL Add MS 163, f. 231b; *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 138-40.

[77]BL Add MS 163, f. 231b; Hogan, *Letters and papers*, pp. 42-3. K. S. Bottigheimer, 'The English interest in southern Ireland, 1641-1650', (Ph.D thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1965), pp. 60-4 discusses the way the failure of the Boyle interest to support the drive on Limerick had become a bone of contention between them and the late Lord President, St. Leger, and his son-in-law and deputy, Inchiquin.

read. The adventure forces had been designed for the province but by mid-July an alternative approach was under consideration, namely the despatch of 10 000 soldiers from Ulster and Leinster to Munster, especially to save Limerick; the Lords stalled on the plan.[78] The original army intended for Ireland, 10 000 strong, had by now all landed, and clearly greater expectations had been raised than had been fulfilled.[79]

Yet the role of more 'radical' MPs - Cromwell, Mildmay, Strode and especially Reynolds - lends some suspicion to the motivation behind the attempts to utilise more efficiently forces in Ireland.[80] By July 25 rumours were circulating of the re-deployment in England of the adventurer regiments.[81] Five days later came the raid on the adventure funds for the support of the English army. D'Ewes alleged that it was perpetrated at a packed, and 'thin' meeting of the adventurer committee, a view given some grounds by later spokesmen for the MP-adventurers, such as the Goodwyn brothers.[82] It was the kind of action which handed huge propaganda advantage to the King, who could ask 'whether they who divert the Men and Money collected for the Relief of distressed *Ireland*, to raise forces against their Prince ...do not joyn with the Popish and Jesuitical Faction in the bloody Massacre of many thousand Protestants in that miserable Kingdom?'.[83] Its effectiveness was somewhat countered when the royalist Earl of Northampton seized supplies destined for armies in Ireland. Valued at £600 they were hardly a major loss in themselves but could be realistically presented as sufficiently threatening to close down the main supply routes from London to Chester, and later Bristol.[84]

The diversion strategy continued to be raised in the Commons, coupled with criticisms of the supposed ineptness of the command in Ireland, and calls for the disarming or expulsion of Catholics from Protestant zones, principally Dublin, to free soldiers for service elsewhere.[85] It was up to the Irish Council to deliver a dose of

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[78]BL Add MS 163, ff. 273b, 274a; *Lords' jn., v,* 214, 218, 226-7; *Commons' jn., ii,* 675, 677; N.L.I. MS 14 305, for July 11. It was later supplemented by the proposal that the first of the adventurer regiments, under Lord Kerry, go to the aid of the Earl of Thomond in the vicinity of Limerick, BL Harl. MS 163, f. 280a, 280b; BL Add. MS 14 827, f. 165b; *Lords' jn., v,* 226, 228; *Commons' jn., ii,* 682. It was also planned to send a 1000-strong regiment from Dublin by sea to aid the southern outpost at Duncannon. BL Add MS 163, f. 284b, 288b; *Lords' jn., v,* 230; *Commons' jn., ii,* 683, 684, 685.

[79]See appendix 1(i) for the army sent.

[80]See e.g. *Writings and speeches of Cromwell* ed. Abbott, i, 186.

[81]*Cal. S.P. Venice, 1642-3*, p. 107. For a later example of reluctance to serve Parliament and of offer of service with the King by William St. Leger, son of the late Lord President, see *Cal. S.P. Clarendon*, i, 234. For his later service, see P. R. Newman, *Royalist officers in England and Wales, 1642-1660* (London, 1981), p. 324.

[82]Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 343-4; BL Harl. MS 163, ff. 295b, 312b, 417b; Harl. MS 164, f. 262a. The Committee of Safety also drew upon the clothes obtained by the adventurers to supply Essex's army, *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, pp. 366, 274.

[83]The statement was elaborated in a fuller message on Aug. 13, Rushworth, iii (1), 767, 775. For the response among moderates, see the reaction of D'Ewes, BL Harl. MS 163, f. 295b; Harl. MS 164, f. 262a.

[84]BL Harl. MS 163, f. 300a; *Commons' jn., ii,* 736.

[85]*Lords' jn., v,* 294, 321-2; N.L.I. MS 14 305, for Aug. 16 & 23.

realism. Parliament had been discussing paper armies, for only half of those listed in Leinster were effective for service, and the abject failure to supply ammunition rendered offensive action impossible.[86] Even more worrying was the prospect that an inadequate naval response would cut Ireland off from English relief.[87] The events of the summer of 1642 showed what the absence of adequate naval action could allow to happen, with the delivery of munitions and officers from Europe and the development of a privateering fleet at Wexford.[88] Here the King should take some of the blame, authorising the withdrawal of the last royal ships in late June[89]. The best that Parliament could, or would, do was to advance the privatisation of naval war, relying on the Jan. scheme for the hire of merchant vessels, many of them having served briefly in the sea adventure fleet.[90]

This reliance on these same figures, from a 'colonial-interloping' and religiously radical background was shifting the balance of the parliamentarian response to the Irish war.[91] If supplies sent to Ireland were mediocre, especially in terms of munitions, that they went at all was becoming due to these same men. The Ordnance

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[86]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 191-5. Cf. Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters*, pp. 128-30 for the Scots' reluctance to leave Ulster. Kerry's regiment was diverted to co. Cork, though Duncannon was relieved, from England. A last flicker of the schemes appears in Long's proposal (Sept.. 5) to send Conway's 1000 men by sea from Ulster to Munster, *Lords' jn., v*, 298-9, 329, 336, 338, 346-7; *Commons' jn., ii*, 729, 736, 742, 758.

[87]See e.g. Lords Justices to CIA, Sept. 23, in Hogan, *Letters and papers*, pp. 140-1 for fears and a proposed naval plan.

[88]See Jane H. Ohlmeyer, '"The Dunkirk of Ireland": Wexford privateers during the 1640s" in *Journal of the Wexford Historical Society*, xii (1988-9).

[89]J. R. Powell & E. K. Timings (eds.), *Documents relating to the civil war, 1642-1648* (Navy Record Society, vol. cv, 1963), p. 12. Later orders (Aug. 18) were for the ships to report to the Queen in Holland, but they appear to have gone to Newcastle, although upon arrival the plan was revived of sending them on to Holland, Powell & Timings, *Documents*, pp. 35, 44. One newsletter for Sept. alleged that the two captains were responsible for intercepting supplies bound for the Irish Protestants on the seas en route to Newcastle, 'as Pirats rob upon the seas', *Perfect Diurnall*, 5 - 12 Sept., E 239 (17), p. 1. The two ships were intercepted and captured at Newcastle, Powell & Timings, *Documents*, p. 44; *Lords' jn., v*, 297, 299, 335, 336; the King's action in withdrawing the ships was condemned in a vote on Sept. 5, *Lords' jn., v*, 339. For the struggle for the navy, see Andrews, *Ships, money and politics*, pp. 184-7.

[90]For the sea adventure, see Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 36-42; R. P. Stearns, *The Strenuous Puritan: Hugh Peter, 1598-1660* (Urbana, Ill., 1954), pp. 188-97; Bottigheimer, 'English Interest', pp. 69-72. Pamphlet accounts by the commander, Lord Forbes or the chaplain, Hugh Peter, include *Good Newes from Ireland* (T.T. E109 (4)), *A True Copie of Two Letters brought by Mr. Peters* (T.T. E121 (44)), Hugh Peter, *A True Relation of the passages of God's Providence in Ireland* (T.T. E242 (15)). Whatever about its direct military or political consequences, the expedition caused a withdrawal of cover from other areas of the Irish coast. By Oct. the same vessels were re-employed as a naval guard, payable from adventure funds, while a further ordinance allowed for the issue of privateering certificates, *Lords' jn., v*, 377, 407, 408, 409-10, 413; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 33-6. BL Add. MS 4 782, ff. 12a,, 12b shows the 10 ships to have been those employed in the Sea Adventure. For a general account of naval operations, see M. L. Baumber, 'The navy and the civil war in Ireland, 1641-1643', in *Mariner's Mirror*, lvii (1971).

[91]Brenner, *Merchants and revolution*, p. 403; cf. pp. 403-9. For the involvement of the sea adventurers, and many of the committee-men of the main adventure in radical religious reform and /or iconoclasm, see Lindley, 'Irish adventurers', pp. 4-10. Andrews, *Ships, money and politics*, ch. 8, especially pp. 191-4, 194-5, 197-8 sets the Sea Adventure in the broader context of mercantile naval involvement, past and present.

Office had proven a satisfactory supplier of arms to all of the 10 000 troops of the first and second phases of the expeditions, while the adventurers procured their own stock of arms. But by June the Office was not only receiving directions from the King which turned its already somewhat obstructive legalism into outright disobedience to Parliament, it was also almost bare of resources. The focus on the magazine at Hull, central plank in the escalation of English dispute, was pertinent to its holding the last remaining major stocks of munitions, especially ammunition and artillery. While the stand-off over its control occurred, Parliament and CIA turned to merchant suppliers for ammunition for the relief of the coastal sites recognised in April. Thereafter reliance on such individuals as William Pennoyer became almost absolute, paralleled in the way in which a few big suppliers or 'syndicates' were dominating the provision of food and clothing under the 'certificate' system which alone was still operating, a dominance based on their ability to sustain delayed payment and to provide shipping with adequate defensive capability to venture Irish waters unguarded.[92]

Contradictory impulses had been generated by the active intervention of parliamentarians, including the more 'radical', in matters Irish. On the one hand they subscribed to a 'forward' policy which brooked no delays based on scruples of appealing to the King, which operated in conjunction with elements in London, and which offered no compromise in Ireland. On the other there was the element of unreality about their view of the military potential of the Protestant cause, and even a propensity to attribute failures more to roguery than to the magnitude of logistical obstacles. As will be seen, both sides of the case would persist in the years ahead in an uneasy logic.

The injection of a 'religious' dynamic is part of the process of breakdown over Irish policy which began in England almost as soon as the institutional structure to implement the 1641 programme was set up, and which spilled over into the build-up to conflict in England. The response of the English Parliament to events in Ireland contributed to the outbreak of war there not only at the practical level of an unremitting concentration on the question of military control, but at an 'ideological' level of shaping the respective positions of King and Parliament for the ensuing years. From the start events in Ireland had been interpreted as a threat to the security of the nation, meaning that Parliament must respond but that all aspects of 'defence' were up for review. It

[92]See appendix 1, section (iii) for a discussion of these matters.

was not, however, until the focus settled on active armies that opposing views became irreconcilable, the hope of a settlement on the county forces persisting until April. The needs of Ireland did not allow such matters to be settled separately from the matter of active interventionist armies and so served to push the 'militia' question through three stages - impressment, trained bands and field armies. Charles chose to make the latter central and here, as on matters Irish, persisted in retaining a concept of personal (or prerogative) right even as he made institutional and statutory concessions to the parliamentarian vision.

As for the 'ideological' aspect, parliament had, since Nov. 1641, allowed a religious dimension as part of a broader 'national' interpretation of events in Ireland (a position appealing also to Irish Protestants). There was no imperative need to untangle the two unless the suggestion that religious dynamic was sufficient to break the limits imposed by legal conservatism be applied to Irish policy.[93] But this appears to have happened and the consequences of separating the strands may be seen in two incidents. One concerns the Irish Parliament, feared by its English 'sister' in late 1641 but, as transformed by the final expulsion (22 June, 1642) of any remaining Catholic MPs, now supported to the extent of asking the King to ensure that Leicester, when in Ireland, could maintain it in existence. He should specifically be allowed to assent to Bills already voted, approved under the English Great Seal and returned to Dublin. There was little doubt about what such bills would concern themselves with for the suggestion for the application of English penal legislation to Ireland had already been made. From a dangerous obstacle to the future of Ireland, the Dublin parliament had moved to become a potential ally in an anti-popish crusade.[94]

The potency for parliamentarian self-understanding after 1642 of the need to defend England against papists and their allies will become apparent. Irish considerations were absorbed as a part of what the English war was about and remained undisputed throughout the decade.[95] But if bringing forward religious considerations meant the interference of Parliament, or CIA, in the affairs of Ireland it also hinted at alliance with not only City radicals but the Scots. This was to over-ride 'national' with 'religious' considerations.[96] The tension thereby generated may be

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[93]Morrill provides the clearest presentation of a disjunction between the hesitancies of action based on legal-constitutional views and actions, and the dynamism of those with a 'religious' basis. See *English revolution*, pp. 40, 47, 59, 66, 305. This fits well with Irish policy, so long as 'religion' is taken here in the primary sense of shoring up the defences of Protestantism against attack from without rather then 'rebuilding the Temple' within (for the relevance of both, e.g. *English revolution*, p. 14, 64-5).

[94]B. L. Harl. MS 163, ff. 278b (July 19), 290b (July 23); *Lords' jn., v*, 234-5.

[95]Morrill, *English revolution*, pp. 35-7 suggests the relevance of the term 'England's wars of religion' for the three-kingdom context of the 1640s.

[96]The relevance of religion to both these alignments has been stated above. See Morrill, *English revolution*, pp. 105, 107, 114 for a defence of the notion that the Scottish crisis was fundamentally religious, and led to blame being laid at the doors of English prelates; Russell, *British monarchies*, pp. 519-24 for the emergence of religious bonds between parliamentarians and covenanters in the summer of 1642, despite the presumed limited appeal to many of the peers.

demonstrated in the actions of Leicester himself. A stickler for legal propriety he had hesitated over acting to raise troops until he had royal as well as parliamentary validation. Yet he had proved 'reliable' in his support of Scottish intervention, in his concern for a 'general warrant' or for CIA, and in his disclosure of the details of the Dillon mission. In 1642 Charles seemed to trust him enough to urge him to Ireland, and only after his protests are there hints at dismissal.[97] Yet throughout May and June he went beyond even the conservative upper House in standing out against actions without legal warrant, sometimes as a lone voice.[98] In June- July he remained sufficiently trusted at Westminster to have his reasons for delay accepted, and money voted him for his own expenses and to pay the army in Ireland.[99] Then on the verge of departing for Ireland, he headed to York for the King's approval.

If an extreme case, Leicester how obstacles presented to a commitment to the need to act in Ireland on grounds of 'national' security, yet in accord with correct methods, necessarily involving the King. Those who came over to the royal camp in 1642 brought a commitment to law, and indeed an English 'nationalism' opposed to Scottish or Irish considerations, both of which would sit uneasily at times with the King. Yet even if Parliament was leaning to the 'religious' agenda, this did not mean that an attachment to legal propriety, or even to co-operation with the King, was dead.

Among Irish Protestant the desire for co-operation in England was especially acute. Like many Englishmen, however, the choice between the disputing sides there was forced upon them, beginning in Dublin, the centre of power.[100] Unlike their English fellow-subjects, though, Irish Protestants were not, for the most part, engaged in a war with those for them they still felt strong bonds of unity. Too many elements - religious, cultural, 'national' - as well as recent bitternesses served to separate them for those with whom their real bond was as fellow-subjects. With the exception of the Ormondists, who could see the possibility of constructing a union on this very base[101], increasing numbers of Irish Protestants would regard the King as either their defender or the pawn of their foes, and then concluded that he was more probably the latter. When that happened they began to turn to the novel aspirant for the role of their protector, the Parliament of England, but it would be a choice more complex, and more painful, than one of mere opportunism.

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[97]H.M.C. *Buccleuch MSS*, i, 298 (April 14).

[98]See e.g. *Lords' jn., v*, 95, 143 for objections to the sea adventure orders. He also objected to votes to raise English armies.

[99]*Lords' jn., v*,, 123, 127-8, 129-30, 143; H.M.C. *Buccleuch MSS*, i, 305.

[100]See below chapter 4; for the pressures on Englishmen see e.g. Morrill, *English revolution,* p. 188; cf. Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 400-1 for the balance between activism and commitment.

[101]Yet the commitment of the Protestant Ormondists to a polity with 'room for Catholics' (Russell, *British monarchies*, p. 531) was limited - Ireland was to remain a Protestant Kingdom even if there was not the imperative to remove Catholicism 'root and branch'.

Chapter 4.
From civil war to cessation, September 1642 - August 1643.

From September 1642 there could be no question but that the war in England was foremost among the issues considered by those Members of Parliament still assembling at Westminster. But if some MPs went beyond pragmatic relegation of Irish needs to blatant, indeed principled, indifference, the period after the outbreak of English hostilities shows more clearly than before the emergence of an active Irish lobby within the English Parliament comprising both Irish-based and 'Adventurer' MPs. Their efforts were directed along two fronts. In the first place they would have to struggle constantly in an effort to secure adequate money, munitions and provisions not only to enable those English forces sent to Ireland in 1641-2 to continue the fight against the Irish Catholics, but also to sustain their Scottish and Irish allies (or dependants). Closer to home it was also clear that some means would have to be found to repay those City suppliers whose advances were vital if anything was to be obtained for Ireland, but to whom indebtedness was getting out of hand. All of this meant a hard struggle to win a share of limited resources also needed elsewhere. Parliament's wheels ground slowly when it cause to generating additional resources, especially via taxation, for Ireland as for England.

If victory was to be won in Ireland it required not only effective military success there but political will - there must be no 'sell-out' either through any dealings the King might undertake with Catholic Irish interests, or by a drift from the hard-line position held by the Dublin authorities. Efforts were made to hold steady the Irish government, but attempts to co-operate with Oxford were precarious. threatened not only by the rise of militant parliamentarian sentiment, but also clear signals that the King would not follow a line on Ireland acceptable at Westminster but would act to regain direct control of his government and army there. A change of mood is apparent by the early summer. An upsurge in propaganda by June 1643 reflected an increasingly strident awareness of Parliament's need to act, if necessary alone, to secure its Protestant vision. 'Official' anti-popery (as opposed to popular scares) perhaps only now reached its peak, as parliament leaned more heavily on its real friends - in London and, increasingly, in

Scotland- and correlatively grew more willing to cut off less reliable allies, particularly in Ireland.

For Irish Protestants the shock and immediate reverses of 1641 had given way to a relatively successful military response based on local resources as well as substantial English and Scottish armies. Not enough had been accomplished, however, to leave the way clear for either a strategy based on rapid suppression of the insurgents, nor to sustain a long haul of a war. Political decisions had tended towards the former option, however, so that the downturn in English support, combined with the overhaul and revitalisation of the Catholic Irish left Protestant strategy adrift. The primacy of logistical limitations in determining their political as much as their strategic options thus began to take effect. As much as anything it would determine the levels of support for the alternatives put forward by an increasingly divided Irish Council, one under pressure by both of the armed camps in England. Their reluctance to declare an allegiance in these terms saw such labels foisted on to them in accordance with their preferred policy for Ireland, a neat reversal of the way in which the English war was increasingly being described in terms originally applied to Ireland.

The executive position of the Houses with regard to Ireland had been considerably altered by the establishment of CIA, but the role adopted in the summer of 1642 was not followed through. For the most part the minutiae of Irish business in the years 1642-6 was overseen by a succession of select committees with limited executive functions, liable to competition from other bodies over their remit as each succeeding emergency spawned further deliberative bodies. CIA had been given defined powers and a membership of political 'heavyweights',[1] but this strength was also its weakness

[1]Even in June - July 1642, Northumberland, Mandeville and Pym are listed as present at all 14 recorded meetings, Evelyn at 13, Earle at 12, N.L.I. MS 14 308. (Reynolds and Cromwell are also recorded on 12 occasions each.)

for the importance of these 20 men made them liable to be called upon for other duties.[2] By August an attempt had been made to circumvent the restrictions on the size of the CIA quorum by allowing the body to meet as a 'committee', 'in regard the Commissioners cannot meet, by reason that divers of them are out of town, in the Service of the Parliament', but this soon proved inadequate.[3]

An alternative body was already in existence, the adventurer committees of MPs and London representatives.[4] Pressure from them over the failure of CIA to meet was countered by the opinion of the House that CIA's legal status under the great Seal could not be overruled. It led to a hybrid body of all CIA members, all MP-adventurers and other named MPs, to meet when the commissioners could not.[5] In fact the 'committee for Adventurers' quickly stabilised as the 'committee for the affairs of Ireland' with regular meetings recorded, several times weekly, from Oct. 4.[6] Accompanied by a new 11 - strong 'London committee' (Sept. 23) it concerned itself mainly, for the next six months, with the supervision of arrangements for the supply of Ireland.[7] Attendances are only recorded form Feb. 1643 from when they show that, though a considerable number of MPs turned up for at least one meeting, regular attenders were few. The core group for Feb. - Sept. 1643 embraced the chairman, John Goodwyn (63 attendances out of 66), two 'commissioners' recently returned from Dublin, Robert Reynolds (24) and Robert Goodwyn (26), the three Irish MPs Clotworthy (37), Arthur Jones (31) and William Jephson (18), all of whom were only episodically in London, and three adventurer-MPs, Sir Robert Parkhurst (33), Sir William Allanson (24) and Lord Wenman (23).[8] No one else managed even as many as 15 appearances, and the

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[2]Thus 6 of the 7 CIA peers were members of the Committee of Safety, and Pym, Holles, Marten, Vane and Evelyn were also regular attenders there. See Glow, 'Committee of Safety', p. 313. Meyrick (like Essex) had military duties, Reynolds soon left for Ireland, and Cromwell for East Anglia.

[3]*Commons' jn., ii*, 723, 726; Lords' *jn., v*, 303. This allowed only 4 commoners and two Lords to act, at least in an advisory capacity, but only three further meetings are recorded on Aug. 23 (6 & 4 present), Sept. 16 (6 & 2) and Oct. 12 (4 & 2); previous meetings had been well above the higher original quorum figure. N.L.I. MS 14 308.

[4]*Commons' jn., ii,* , 500, 511, 728, 742 for the formation of the committee and its activities in August.

[5]B.L. Harl. MS 163, ff. 312b, 313a; *Commons' jn., ii*, 750. The Sept. 3 proposal had been made by Robert Goodwyn.

[6]The minutes of this committee survive as B.L. Add. MS 4 782. On Oct. 19 they were granted the right to receive copies of all orders and resolutions taken concerning Ireland (*Commons' jn.*, ii, 815). These survive in N.L.I. MS 14 308 and Bodl. Rawl. MS A110; the latter has been printed in *Anal. Hib.*, iv (1932). The Lords failed to respond to the establishment of the new body, and its efforts to obtain direction of the Irish war were overlooked by the Commons, *Commons' jn., ii,* 808, 810, 812; *Lords' jn., v*, 400; B.L. Add. MS 4 782, f. 10a.

[7]*Commons' jn., ii,* 780 for the London committee. The joint committees' work embraced only a few supply initiatives (see appendix 3 for details) and was mostly the supervision of existing plans for supply through certified deliveries, and the allowing of customs-free shipments to Ireland (*Commons' jn., ii,* 815, 884), while form Jan. 1643 the committee oversaw the collection and distribution of the 'New Loan and Contribution'.

[8]B.L. Add MS 4 782. In so far as future political alignments are relevant, Parkhurst, and even more Wenman, have been placed on the 'peace party' wing, and R. Goodwin, and even more Allanson, in the

small numbers attending had been accepted as early as Oct. 28 when only 4 members, joining with the London committee, were deemed adequate to conduct business.[9]

In effect an 'Irish lobby' was forming, signalling the shift of Irish affairs from the centre of attention as war broke out over England, but in effect putting the country on a par with the English regions as a competitor for centrally disbursed resources. Yet of course Ireland was not an English region, not least in constitutional terms. The superseding of CIA by a body at once lodged within the English Parliament's institutional framework, and with an outlier in the city of London, was a limited, but not unimportant, shift in the relationship between Westminster and Dublin. Intrusion into the executive functions of the Irish government would become more apparent with a further initiative from the adventurer-MPs, the Aug. 29 proposal to send to Ireland 4 persons 'to be of the Council of War, and in Commission with them that are of that Council.'[10] Probably linked from the start to the failure of Leicester to move to Ireland[11] the proposition was very much military in orientation; two of the four should remain at Dublin 'for Intelligence' while the others accompanied the army in the field. It reflected a concern about the conduct of the war that they were intended to ensure 'that the War be not protracted, but every thing managed for the best Advantage of this State, and the Lessening of the Charge as much as may be...', a concern also registered in the suggestion that the Commons discuss 'the nomination of a Captain General of all the Forces in *Ireland* '.[12]

The relative roles of the commissioners and of Leicester suggest different priorities between the two Houses. Early Sept. saw the lower House nominate commissioners and assign a pay schedule and instructions.[13] Even the idea of a Captain-general was opened up for discussion, with Leslie mooted as a possible option.[14] The Lords, however, having voted satisfaction with Leicester's conduct, delayed passing the instructions and felt they needed to be clarified to square them with

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'Independent' party. Reynolds seems a clear man of the centre. See David Underdown, *Pride's purge. Politics in the puritan revolution* (Oxford, 1971), Appendix.

[9]*Commons' jn., ii,* 826.

[10]*Commons' jn., ii,* 742. Again the proposal was presented by Robert Goodwyn.

[11]A particularly strident vote on Aug. 15/16 gave him little over a week to be at Chester, 'And if he shall fail herein, that then both Houses may consider of chusing another'. *Commons' jn.*, ii, 721, 722. On Aug. 24 they received a letter from Leicester of his 'not being yet dispatched, by reason of his Majesty's commands', *Commons' jn., ii,* 734.

[12]*Commons' jn., ii,* 742.

[13]The nominees were Robert Reynolds and Sir Henry Mildmay, Robert Goodwyn later being substituted for the latter. The London adventurers had the option of adding two further members 'to be assistant to these Committees', *Commons' jn., ii,* 760; B.L. Harl. MS 163, f. 325b. Their duties were gradually being expanded to include the need to 'see the laws put in Execucon against the Papists' as well as to handle 'the settling of ther [the adventurers'] affaires ther', *Commons' jn., ii,* 756, 760, 763; B.L. Harl. MS 163, ff. 354a, 361b, 383b.

[14]*Commons' jn.*, ii, 765; *Perfect Diurnall,* Sept. 12-19, E 240(5), p. 6 - the matter was referred for 'further consideration'. By early Sept. rumours were circulating that the King had refused to agree to Leicester's commission, but the captain-general issue was repeatedly postponed, *Commons' jn, ii,* 755, 757, 765. The *Perfect Diurnall* for Sept. 5-12, E 239(17), p.3

the honour of Leicester's position 'because the Ordering of the War belongs to the Lord Lieutenant...'.[15] When Leicester returned to London it was 'peace lords' like Northumberland and Holland who took him up,[16] even while opinion in the Commons varied from Marten's hostility to a purely pragmatic form of support from Pym and St. John. The lower House stalled on the Lord Lieutenant's request to vote, and pay, for his departure. Instead the commissioners were expedited.[17]

The intention behind their mission is seen clearly in the Instructions delivered to them.[18] They were, in the first place, to advise themselves of all things concerning the state of the war and vote on all debates on its conduct.[19] To the end that the war be conducted more effectively and efficiently a range of powers was allocated to them. They were to combat promotion by 'indirect Means' and ensure officers were 'well-affected' (article 2) as well as to report such civil officials as merited commendation (art. 9). To prevent the drain on resources the Irish poor were to be discouraged from leaving for England and relief was to be administered in Ireland (art. 10). Most notable, however, was art. 8. the improving of revenue and the reduction of costs, 'by Way of Adventure, or otherwise'. Then there was a second stage to the instructions, a systematic programme of anti-Catholic measures. All garrisons an the army were to be cleared of Catholics (art. 3); steps should be taken against all (in practice, likely to be Catholics) who claimed neutrality (art. 4); all penal legislation should be enforced (art. 5) and the conviction of 'rebels' should be pressed (art. 6) - an essential prerequisite to land confiscation. Both levels would be taken seriously by the commissioners and

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[15]*Lords' jn.*, v, 353,357, 358-9, 360.

[16]These two, with Newnham, had drawn up the order on Leicester and the commissioners. The former two had acted to counter slander against Leicester back in May (*Lords' jn., v,* 95). Northumberland was Leicester's relative and long-time ally and it was Leicester's letters to him which the upper House used to justify the Lieutenant. Holland seconded Leicester at Conference with the 'sense' of the House in seeking money, *Lords' jn., v*, 370, 371, 373. The letter (*Lords' jn., v*, 358-9) was printed - *A Letter from the Lord of Lecester*, E 118(48) - and appears in R. W. Blencowe (ed.), *Sydney papers* (London, 1825), pp. 363-8.

[17]Leicester made a good impression on the newsletter writers, see *Perfect Diurnall*, E 240 (10), and Coules's *Perfect Diurnall*, E 240 (14), p. 8 though the latter claimed that the Commons' failure to make a decision was due to a petition pending from the London adventurers which was less than generous to Leicester. Marten's charges ranged from delaying commissions, merchants (possibly the sea adventure) and the Scots to failures over the English Militia Ordinance. The others defended him on the grounds of the delays contingent on any alternative, e.g. (St. John) if they moved to impeach him. Pym even defended his inaction over the Kent militia on the basis that he would otherwise lose 'his place', *Commons' jn., ii,* 781; *Walter Yonge's diary of proceedings in the House of Commons 1642-1645* ed. Christopher Thompson, i, 18 Sept. 1642 - 7 March, 1643 (Wivenhoe, 1986), pp. 16-17.

[18]*Lords' jn., v,* 364-5.

[19]The newsletters present the gathering of intelligence as a central goal. Knowledge of 'the certaine truth of the condition' of Ireland was needed in an atmosphere of heightened rumour, including the Spanish role in the country, to which was added worries about some of the members of the Dublin administration - they should discover 'through whose default it was they have lain about Dublin all this summer, and done no service' and who was 'not hearty' to the cause. *Special Passages*, Sept. 13-20, E 118(10), p.42; *A Continuation*, Sept. 29- Oct. 1, E 240(17), p.3. The author of the *Perfect Diurnall*, Sept. 19-26, E 240 (13) saw the committee as needed specifically to try the truth of O'Neill's commission, then under discussion.

initiatives launched in the Dublin Parliament.[20] The kind of suspicions of Dublin which generated such a strategy, and the placing of 'popery' at its heart, is clearly seen in an 'abstract' of a letter sent from Dublin (dated Sept. 1) which Reynolds delivered in the Commons on Sept. 26[21] and echoed in the newsletters. There was criticism of the conduct of the war[22] and suggestions of unreliability or treachery at the highest levels[23] even while Leslie was lauded as successful in Ulster. Other claims included the ill-effects of the large Catholic population in Dublin[24] and Royalist undermining of the war effort, including by the withdrawal of officers to England.[25]

Even so royal approval was sought for the commissioners' departure, now accompanied by a 'declaration' or 'Letter of Credence' proclaiming that, as holding the 'Credence, Power, and Esteem, of a Committee sent over thither by the Advice and Authority of ... Parliament' all Irish officials, the Lord Lieutenant among them, should give 'their best furtherance and Assistance' to the commissioners' execution of their instructions.[26] Leicester was less successful with the Commons refusing to resolve on his departure without viewing the instructions he had received from the King.[27] He eventually consented but, though the instructions were placed in Pym's hands, a whole week then elapsed during which the commissioners were sent off, without the King's

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[20]Reynolds and Goodwin to Lenthall, 13 Dec. 1642, in Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 168-70; *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 119-120. Acts to 'abolish Popery, and to attaint the Rebels' had already been raised, unsuccessfully, in the Irish parliament in August 1642, *Lords' jn. Ire., i*, 181, 182-3.

[21]B.L. Harl. 163, f. 383b; *Yonge's diary*, ed. Thompson, p. 18.

[22]The 'forces in [and] about that cittie had trifled away ther time this summer' and the present plan, to fortify Dublin at the citizens' expense, 'would be ther undoing'. Cf. *Special Passages*, Sept. 13-20, E 118(18), p. 45; Sept. 20-27, E 119(2), p. 51 for claims that little had been done. *A Continuation*, Sept. 21-24, E 240(9), claimed that Ormond, with 8 000 troops, 'stirs not but suffers the rebels to come even to the walls of *Dublin*, pillaging and spoyling without any resistance'.

[23]The Governor of Dublin, Charles Lord Lambert, 'was soe Irishified as hee cared not much for ther safetie'; there was a 'popish' paymaster and 'recusants are admitted to the councell table'; though £20 000 had recently arrived the soldiers lacked money and clothes and so Parliament should send a committee to oversee the distribution of its funds. *Perfect Diurnall*, Sept. 26 - Oct. 3 , E 240 (19), p. 2 claimed that money sent 'hath not bin well managed for the relife of the Protestants', the paymaster 'being notoriously suspected to be a Papist'.

[24]*England's Memorable Accidents*, Sept. 19-26. E 240(12),p. 21 reported that even with Dublin fortified the presence of 'thrice as many malevolent Papists' as Protestants could presage massacre of the latter. Back on Aug. 24 the Commons voted 'That Order be given immediately for Disarming the Papists in *Dublyn*, and thereabouts' and that 'principal Papists' be 'secured'. The Lords Justices were to be reproved for failure to ensure disarming earlier, *Commons' jn., ii*, 735.

[25]See e.g. *Perfect Relation*, Sept. 19-26 E 240 (15) which reported a 'great number' of Irish around the King and alleged the failure to send Leicester was due to 'Irish Rebels and Papists at Court hindering him' (p. 2). For officers withdrawn see e.g. *Special Passages*, Sept. 20-27, E 118 (45), pp. 49-50 which cites examples.

[26]*Lords' jn., v*, 376-7, 385, 388; *Commons' jn., ii*, 782, 787, 793; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 32-3. Capt. William Tucker was accepted as the sole nominee of the Londoners on Sept. 26 (*Commons' jn., ii*, 782). For his family and trade background, see Brenner, *Merchants and revolution*, pp. 118-20, 184, 186, 188, 189, 190, 195 and for his religious position, pp. 414, 449.

[27]*Commons' jn., ii*, 795, 797; *Yonge's Diary*, ed. Thompson, pp. 38, 41-2; B.L. Harl. MS 163, f. 418b. The declaration coincided in date with rumours that Falkland had been sent to Ireland to call the army to England, but the Irish committee apparently suggested Leicester as a counter to Falkland, *Perfect Diurnall*, Sept. 26 - Oct. 3. E 240(19), p. 2; *A Continuation*, Sept. 29 - Oct. 1, E 240(17), p. 3.

approval, but with £20 000.[28] Only then was Leicester considered, his instructions copied but not read in the House. He avowed his departure on the basis of the Commons' vote even though they had failed to provide him with money.[29]

The incident is significant for the motivation behind the commissioners and for the ambiguity over Leicester. Permanently incised was the policy of vigorous war and of no compromise with Catholicism that held sway with those most concerned with Ireland. This was not to be deviated from in coming years. Also established as permanent features were the concern at perceived ineptness (or worse) in the handling of the war in Ireland, and concern over the control of the substantial (English) military resources present across the Irish sea.[30] As for Leicester, attitudes in the Commons varied from hostility to marginalisation; starved of funds and bound by active commissioners, he was treated as little threat and possibly a quiescent ally. He held residual importance in his being a hinge around which King and Parliament might still co-ordinate policy in regard to Ireland, if in neither case placing full confidence in the Lieutenant, a possibility which fits with the continuing support given him by the 'peace lords'. A vestige of the 'legal-national' position on Ireland, now going down before a 'reformist-religious' dynamic, support for Leicester perhaps also displays the germ of future disputes over preferences for a conventional and aristocratic Lord Lieutenant or for more humble committeemen nonetheless claiming the 'best Assistance' even of that exalted figure by the authority of the Parliament of England.[31]

The present commissioners, Reynolds and Goodwyn, had been fortified just before departure by the Commons' reception of the optimistic prognostications of the commander of the sea adventure, Lord Forbes, as voiced by Hugh Peter. He declared his belief that '5 or 6000 men will take Limerick and Galloway [Galway] and ende the warre before xmas'. This sanguine assessment, and the highlighting of the region in question - 'the strength of the rebellion lies here, and ther would be no difficultie in subduing the rest' - kept alive the summer's scheme for the recapture of Limerick, Reynolds and Goodwin pressing the strategy on the more hard-headed Dublin executive during their stint in Ireland.[32] At Galway direct confrontation occurred between the full-force methods of Forbes and of the commander of the local fortress,

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[28]*Commons' jn.*, *ii*, 798, 802, 803; *Lords' jn.*, *v*, 389, 393, 394, 396-7; *Yonge's Diary* ed. Thompson, p. 52; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, ff. 1a-b; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 65; *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 119-120.

[29]*Commons' jn.*, *ii*, 811, 812, 823, 835; *Lords' jn.*, *v*, 396-7, 432, 433; *Yonge's Diary* ed. Thompson, pp. 59, 84; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 6b.

[30]Leicester's quarrel with Ormond over the summer of 1642 concerning the right to appoint to military posts had culminated in the granting of a royal commission to Ormond in Sept. assuring his military command even in the event of Leicester's arrival, Carte, *Ormonde*, ii, 287-97, 347-9.

[31]There is thus a continuity in the attitude of the 'secular' parliamentarian peers, especially Northumberland, throughout the 1640s, from 'pacific' to 'independent' tendencies. See also chapter 10 below.

[32]*Yonge's Diary* ed. Thompson, p. 25; *A True Copie of Two Letters brought by Mr. Peters* E 121(44).

Capt. Anthony Willoughby, and the cautious approach of the Lord President of Connacht, Roger Jones, Viscount Ranelagh. They displayed complete mutual incomprehension over the prospects of military success. Ranelagh, like Clanricard, saw Forbes's schemes as fantastical; Forbes complained to Parliament of Ranelagh's pusillanimity, pleading shortages of money, ammunition and provisions.[33] It was the sharp end of a lack of understanding transferable to the broader relations of Parliament and Irish Protestants, the former still innocent of the limitations of military success.

Yet, in view of Forbes's somewhat unsavoury reputation as a ruthless bigot,[34] it is worth noting that he did not castigate the Lord President on principled grounds that pardons, negotiations, and truces were inherently wrong. (Ranelagh was to arrange a 3 month truce for Athlone in Oct. 1642.[35]) His letter to Parliament indeed attacked the Catholic clergy, both for persuading the Irish that they had royal approval for their actions, and for pretending the Parliament made no distinctions and offered no hopes of pardon, leading them to prefer death to capture. His twofold solution, however, was for agreement between King and Parliament in England which 'would quickeley take of the masque' and cause the 'greater part' to desert, while a 'discreete liberty given to Gouvernours of Counties, and Provinces, to pardon some speciall Persons, and Corporations upon honourable termes, wold untye their bond'. His action at Galway, opposing Clanricard's terms, was because they were dishonourable and served to strengthen the rebels.[36]

Both of Forbes's proposals were liable to appeal to Irish Protestants particularly, as will be seen, the former. When it came to 'honourable' terms for submission, this clearly did not encompass any toleration of Catholicism. Moreover, as Forbes's stint in Munster had shown, it made no room for 'neutralist' sentiment.[37] Lord Inchiquin, deputy to the late Lord President, Sir William St. Leger, and acting commander in the province, had complained of self-interested motives behind the sea adventure expedition, and of how they 'offered violence to some of the popish gentrie who weere assistant before against the Rebels & weere since driven into open rebellion themselves'.[38] St. Leger could hardly have been accused of operating any other than a rigorous policy in the south, though he recognised the dependence of the government

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[33]Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 40; *A True Copie of Two Letters...*, E121(44) contains Forbes's recital of Ranelagh's complains (Sept. 27 letter) and his proposals, if given 5 000-6 000 men (Sept. 28 letter).
[34]C. V. Wedgwood, *The King's War, 1641-1647* (reprint, London, 1983), p. 111 calls him 'an angry Calvinist ...convinced that the Irish were less than human, the settlers incompetent or treacherous'.
[35]Bagwell. *Stuarts*, ii, 9-10.
[36]*A True Copie of Two Letters...* E 121(44), pp. 5-6.
[37]Clanricard was, of course, the most prominent 'neutralist' as well as half-brother of the Earl of Essex. As late as May 1643 he was able to win exceptional treatment from Parliament, being secured exemption from sequestration measures, though a Catholic, *Lords' jn., vi,* 51, 53.
[38]B.L. Harl. MS 163, f. 393b.

upon some level of support by 'natives'.[39] This was most likely continued by his successor (and son-in-law) but a pragmatic response, based on military necessity, to equally pragmatic neutrals, could seem less necessary from a distance, and more prone to misconstruction when undertaken by an 'Irishman'.[40]

News reaching London from Munster in Sept. 1642 was redolent with victories, often 'miraculous'.[41] It prompted the Commons to grant directly a relatively robust supply of clothing and food[42], and to take care of the naval protection of the southern coast.[43] But the Commons decision to have Inchiquin promoted to St. Leger's place was blocked by the upper House who declared that 'being an *Irishman* born, and many of his kindred out in Rebellion, it might be prejudiciall to make him Provost'. Apparently it did not stand in the way of his assuming military command, nor of his having his own regiment voted him.[44] Already certain allegations of dereliction of duty were in circulation against Inchiquin, presaging more serious accusations to follow[45], but perhaps these were more liable to sway the more extreme elements of the Commons that peers who had stood by Leicester and Clanricard. Speculatively, it might be suggested that opposition to Inchiquin had more to do with the fact the some of the Lords wanted the top post for someone else.

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[39]For St. Leger's attitudes to 'natives', the 'Romishly affected', martial law and the absence of suitable terms for a ceasefire, see his letters to Ormond 1641-2, Carte MSS 2, ff. 57 (Nov. 16), 145-6 (Dec. 2), 184 (Dec. 19); 3, ff. 77-9 (April 20); Perceval - Maxwell, *Irish rebellion*, pp. 246, 257.

[40]See the comments of 'Mab. Bruce' of Castlelyons, to Sir R. Verney, Dec. 26 (*H.M.C. rep. 7*, app. i, p. 443b) that the new President and General (Inchiquin) 'hath so many of his friends in rebellion, and so many of his friends and kindred which he gives protection and are protected by him, that they outdoe all us poor people; if you give not a remove to him, I fear you and us will have cause to repent of it...', 'they ['the worst'] are protected by the President within a mile of our castle'.

[41]See Reynolds's announcement of Dungarvan's capture of Ardmore castle (Sept. 13) and Sir William Ogle's news of the 'wonderful victorie' at Liscarrol on Sept. 3 (reported Sept. 29), *Commons' jn., ii*, 763, 787; *Lords' jn., v*, 376, 377; *Yonge's Diary* ed. Thompson, p. 25; B.L. Harl. MS 163, ff. 361b, 392b, 393b, 394b. For an account of Liscarrol see Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 22-3. Contemporary pamphlets concerning victories in Munster, especially Liscarrol, include *Severall Passages of the late proceedings in Ireland* E 117 (17), which claimed that full victory was possible with 6 000-8 000 infantry and 1 000-1 500 cavalry in health and good order; *A most exact relation of a victory...* E 119 (22), pp. 3-7, from Tristram Whitcombe; *Good newes from Ireland* E 121 (8), from Governor William Brocket of Kinsale; *Digitus Dei; or, a miraculous victory* E 121 (15), from Richard Gethings who indicated that 'all the Neutrals' in the region had awaited the outcome of the battle; *A true relation of God's Providence in Munster* E 122 (4).

[42]See appendix 3 for details.

[43]A particular problem was the emergence of Wexford as a privateer haven. Despite fresh plans for a winter guard, the main emphasis of the naval response by Westminster was the commissioning of the 10 ships which had served as the sea adventure flotilla as an additional sea guard, payable from adventure funds, and an ordinance to authorise Parliament - sponsored privateers, licensed by the Navy Commissioners. See *Commons' jn., ii*, 749, 779, 784 for the emergence of proposals. For the navy's winter guard see *Commons' jn, ii*, 784, 789; Powell & Timings (ed.), *Documents*, pp. 42-3; for the deployment of the adventure ships, *Commons' jn, ii*, 790, 795-6, 797, 812, 913-4, 815; Powell & Timings (ed.), *Documents*, p. 43; B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 12a-b; for the privateers, *Commons' jn, ii*, 787, 801; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 33-6.

[44]*Commons' jn., ii*, 787; *Lords' jn., v*, 376, 377; *Yonge's Diary* ed. Thompson, p. 25. Reynolds had supported the move to appoint Inchiquin with reports that the King's choice was Lord Grandison, 'who was thought to be one of the Kings evill Counsellors'.

[45]Inchiquin to CIA, Oct. 28, in Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 160-1; Bottigheimer, 'English interest', pp. 80-4.

Certainly lobbying for the Lord Presidency by the Boyle interest would be a feature of the end of 1642 and early 1643.[46] The politics of the Munster Protestants has been presented in terms of the rival interests of the Boyle family, headed by the Earl of Cork, and of St. Leger - Inchiquin.[47] Their spheres of interest had emerged in the early *ad hoc* response to the Rising, later validated by Dublin, and the Boyles resented any downgrading of, or interference in, their centre of influence at Youghal.[48] Instead they were concerned to harbour their resources for the defence of their zone, a course of action which involved the exportation of 1500-3000 cattle to western England, approved by the compliant co-commissioner in civil affairs, and Cork's son-in-law, David, first Earl of Barrymore.[49] Dublin had briefly yoked Barrymore and Inchiquin as St. Leger's successors in matters civil, but the former had died on Sept. 29. In the event Inchiquin received Parliament's grant of military power as extending to the full range of presidential powers.[50] The south and west of Ireland demonstrate that, if

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[46]Charles Smith claimed that Dungarvan and Broghill came to England in early 1643 'to solicit for the presidency of Munster' (Charles Smith, *Antient and present state of the county and city of Cork* (Dublin, 1750), ii, 84 & note 51). He gives no explicit warrant for this position and none has been found. But the case for such a mission, begun in Nov. 1642 on behalf of Dungarvan, is strong. Cork's letters to his eldest son, found in B.L. Eg. MS 80, show a constant concern for Dungarvan's 'great busines' (f. 39a) which Cork is chary of committing to paper. Certainly it involved 'that advancment which I advised you in' (f. 16a, Feb. 24) which, if not gained, would produce 'such affronts as your spiritt will not digest' (f. 39a, April 4). What these were is clear as early as 21 Nov. 1642. Inchiquin had denied supplies to Dungarvan's troop and ordered them to his base at Cork city, 'whereby you may make a Judgement what to expect, except you prevent it... ' (ff. 14a-b). The 'friends' that Dungarvan should greet on Cork's behalf are always peers - Warwick, Holland, Newburgh (f. 14b, Nov. 21). Is it even possible that Cork was advancing the Boyle candidacy among such even before Dungarvan's arrival in London? For Cork's earlier attempts to cultivate contacts among the English peerage, see P. S. J. Little, 'Family and faction: the Irish nobility and the English court, 1632-1642', (M. Litt. thesis, University of Dublin, 1992), especially chapter 5, 'Cork and the English court, 1636-42', pp. 183-218 (pp. 212, 214-5 on Cork's limited links with Warwick in 1641-2; p. 218 on the greater prestige accorded his heir, Dungarvan, than to Cork himself).

[47]Bottigheimer, 'English Interest', pp. 80-4; see also J. A. Murphy, 'The politics of the Munster Protestants, 1641-1649', in *Cork. Hist. Soc. Jn.,* lxxvi (1971), pp. 9-10, 12.

[48]Bottigheimer, 'English Interest', pp. 84-7. Inchiquin to Cork, 26 Dec. 1642 (B.L. Eg. MS 80, ff. 40a-b) explicitly states that further supply to Youghal would starve other garrisons. From April 1642 the Dublin authorities had allowed Cork almost an autonomous hegemony in south Munster, superintending indictments for counties Cork and Waterford (f. 29a, April 28) against the Lord President's role elsewhere (cf. ff. 20a-21a, and the receipt by Cork of commissions of the peace for issue in the two counties, ff. 13a-b, Sept. 16). In Aug. Inchiquin had attempted to recruit for Cork city in the Boyle centres of Bandon and Youghal, which Bottigheimer regards as attempts to extend his forces and draw power into his hands, pp. 72-4. For further problems in Dec., see pp. 88-9.

[49]See Bottigheimer, 'English Interest' pp. 80-4 for the conflict, and Dublin's failed compromise of ordering salt beef to be imported for cattle exported. Perhaps Bottigheimer fails in sympathy for the Boyles. Like Inchiquin they recognised the vulnerability of cattle to raids by the Irish, though Inchiquin's response was to take all cattle into the army's hands. Cork lamented the loss of income from markets and rents, but this was not just inappropriate greed. Cork was maintaining, as he had for a year past, large numbers of forces for whom Dublin could do no more than ask Parliament to list for pay (B.L. Eg. MS 80, ff. 13a-b, Sept. 16). Money from the exports was needed to sustain the war effort in Cork's territory; even the quest for the Presidency may be seen as motivated by a need to guard local resources. For Inchiquin's complaints on the exports, see Inchiquin to CIA, Oct. 28, in Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 159-160.

[50]Civil power was designed for a commission, Inchiquin - Lenthall, Nov. 11, Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, p.163; Bottigheimer, 'English Interest', pp. 66-9, 80-7. The Dublin decision, in July 1642, on the two successors to St. Leger had been accompanied by an assurance to Cork that he would have been

provincial disputes concern matters of strategy and a contest for regional dominance more than 'policy' this does not make them any less virulent[51], as well as raising the problem of neutrality. A long strain of Irish Protestant / English parliamentarian thinking hovered between an acceptance of pardons and a willingness to concede them, and a reluctance to do so on acceptable grounds in terms of religion and landholding.[52] The regions also suggest, finally, that the problems of a local commander may have been less with personal rivals than with the hardships undergone by his troops.

It is impossible to overestimate the importance of logistical conditions in determining military outcomes in the Irish wars of the 1640s, and consequently the making of political decisions.[53] Inchiquin claimed to be down to 1 000 effectives by Oct. 1642, the arrival of Kerry's 2 000 fresh soldiers being no help since they were unarmed and 'add to our misery and accelerate our ruine in the more speedy consuming of our victuall'. This was down to bread and cheese which 'canot yield a sick man broth, nor cann he that is well continue so if he sells his dinner to mend his shoes for the next march.' Dependence on 'shipp provisions' had left the army reduced to one months stores.[54] Conditions elsewhere were equally bleak, for example at Derry[55] and Duncannon.[56] As the Irish government recognised, shortages of ammunition and money were particularly worrying, the former threatening the scale of operations,[57] the latter prompting mutiny.[58]

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appointed, but for his indisposition and his being needed at Youghal (B.L. Eg. MS 809, ff. 261-271, July 13). Barrymore (c.1605-1642) had married Cork's daughter, Catherine, in 1621. His death was due to wounds sustained at Liscarrol and he was buried 'in the Boyle vault at Youghal' (*Complete Peerage*, i, 443). Cork's concern for his grandson, the 12 year old second earl, is seen in efforts to secure for him the military commands held by his father (B.L. Eg. MS 80).

[51]Bottigheimer hints at a continuity between St. Leger's willingness to accommodate a 'mixed' society in 1630s Munster as against Cork's demand for a 'pure' one, and a 1640s division where Inchiquin took up a less doctrinaire position than the complete conquest of the province pressed by the Boyles, but while there were degrees of rigor, neither St. Leger nor Inchiquin showed themselves averse to extreme measures, and perhaps the clash was as much over strategy and regional power than 'ideology', Bottigheimer, 'English interest', pp. 9-11, 64-5.

[52]As early as 27 April, 1642, Conway, at Belfast, pointed out to CIA his preference for the granting of powers to pardon to all regional commanders-in-chief, but expected this to be earned by service, both by those 'of quality' and the 'meaner' sort, though without any pardon for those possessed of property who wished to treat, Carte MS 3, f. 102. Coote would later seek to include the former category of person, while in April 1642 Jephson proposed that parliament permit the pardoning of the 'meaner sort' (B. L. Add. MS 4 782, f. 145b).

[53]For recent assessments of the military dimensions of the 1640s wars in Ireland, see Scott Wheeler, 'Four armies in Ireland', and Rolf Loeber & Geoffrey Parker, 'The Military revolution in seventeenth-century Ireland', both in Ohlmeyer, *Ireland 1641-1660.*

[54]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 184-5; Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 124-5, 156-8; *Commons' jn., ii*, 787. Kerry's men, a foretaste of the adventurer army had been intended for north Munster, all but lost following the capture of Limerick castle. See the Earl of Thomond's letter to CIA, Aug. 3, in Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 117-9.

[55]Vaughan *et al* to CIA, Sept. 3, in Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 119-121.

[56]Lord Esmond to the Lord Lieutenant, Sept. 29, Oct. 10, in Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 146-8, 153-4.

[57]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 186-7 (Sept. 1), 195 (Sept. 13), 197-9 (Sept. 23), 207 (Sept. 29). The Dublin government stated that only 100 barrels of powder and 6.5 ton of match had been delivered. The shortages were forcing them to a 'defensive war' and could lead to the evacuation of garrisons across

The shortfall in supplies, particularly from the autumn of 1642, is one of three shortcomings advanced for generally negative judgements of the Protestant war effort[59] the others, geographic disunity (inducing a, literally, provincial outlook)[60], and leadership weaknesses, being shared by their opponents.[61] The very nature of the war in Ireland caused outright military success to be even more elusive than in contemporary England. Though there was regionalism, the spread and scale of Protestant operations tends to be under-estimated. The picture is less one of a series of territorial blocs as of a combination of zones of concentrated activity and more or less prominent 'free-standing' garrisons (e.g. at Galway, Athlone or Duncannon). Both had emerged from the conditions of late 1641, the latter as strongpoints still secured, a function not only of military planning but often a successful result of the plantation schemes. The latter were areas where refugee concentration had allowed for recruitment of forces often incorporated into the 'national' army. By the autumn of 1642, moreover, only one such zone, that of south Munster, had become physically cut off (by land) by a combination of terrain and of Catholic power concentrated along a Wexford/Waterford - Kilkenny - Limerick axis, perhaps the heartland of confederate strength. The Dublin /north Leinster zone could be linked to east Ulster via the garrisons at Drogheda, Dundalk and Newry. While east and west Ulster remain separate zones by virtue of different political balances, alternative military commands and, often, strategic objectives, it is clear that almost all of Ulster was, for the moment, clear ground for Protestants.[62] And besides, whatever the military situation, the power of Dublin at a political level, for good or ill, was felt throughout Protestant Ireland.

Leinster (pp. 191-3, 197-9). Unsuccessful efforts had been made to obtain ammunition by purchase in the Netherlands (pp. 190-1) or by loan from Carrickfergus (p. 208). For a list of munitions and equipment certified as needed on Sept. 20, see Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 133-4.

[58]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 187-8, 199.

[59]J. Lowe, 'Some aspects of the wars in Ireland', *Irish Sword*, iv (1959-60), 84-5. Carte, *Ormonde*, ii, 323-9 discussed the shortages. He believed that the observer of Parliament's actions 'will scarce bring himself to think that the parliament were in any haste to suppress a rebellion which they found so necessary and serviceable for their purposes' (p.329).

[60]Lowe, 'Aspects of the wars', pp. 86-7 for the confederates; Hugh Hazlett, 'A history of the military forces operating in Ireland, 1641-9' (PhD thesis, 2 vols., Queen's University, Belfast, 1938), ii, 446-52. His account of the Leinster war to 1643 (ii, 422-8) points to the need to secure the Dublin - Ulster axis through garrisons, and the spread of operations from Dublin, both effectively accomplished. Both Carte and Bagwell order their military account on provincial lines.

[61]Hazlett, 'History of the military forces', ii, 446-52 points particularly to the problems caused by Leicester's absence and the lack of an overall, undisputed civil and military command, but it is not clear what difference Leicester himself would have made.

[62]Despite the government's caution in March 1642 by the late summer the actions of Ormond and Monro had secured the coast from Dublin to Carrickfergus, and east Ulster forces had linked up with those controlling the west of the province. If the Scots remained rigid on not operating beyond Ulster (*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 235-6) the Ulster 'British' were more flexible, when not hampered by supplies and acted in co-operation with Moore's forces based on Dundalk. The forces of west Ulster were likewise disposed to operate in Connacht in the years ahead. 'Regionalism' seems more a product of poor communications and co-ordination and especially of long-distance commissariat than of provincial priorities. Again Munster, cut off and threatened is perhaps an exception.

As late as the end of 1642 government forces could undertake lengthy operations; maintain forces scattered throughout much of Leinster;[63] sustain vigorous activities as far from Dublin as Co. Roscommon.[64] But perhaps the tide had turned by the late summer of 1642 not only due to greater Catholic (now confederate) strength,[65] but also to the failure to produce a major investment in the war from England. Lack of munitions was an obvious and inexcusable problem, the earliest to appear, and one not unconnected with the general failure of England to produce armament in 1642.[66] But lack of manpower, as has been recognised, meant limitations on the extent of territory which could be safely controlled.[67] Perhaps to excess this had been the Lords Justices' plea even in March 1642.[68] Such a 'field army' as Dublin possessed, while too small (and too ill-equipped) to take and hold key, especially urban, positions was yet massively too large for impoverished Dublin to support. Lack of provisions did make a difference in limiting campaigns undertaken to pillaging and foraging. Long distance marches, like sieges, required supplies beyond the resources of an administration not subsidised to the hilt by London.[69]

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[63]In Dec. 1642 Col. George Monck had defeated the Catholic General for Leinster, Thomas Preston, at Timahoe - Castlehaven recorded that this 'made us pretty quiet till the spring following'. Castlehaven, cited in Bagwell, *Stuarts*,, ii, 29. See also E 84(25), *A letter from a gentleman from Dublin, wherein is declared a famous victory by Col. Munckes.* Expeditions in the Jan. - Feb. 1643 showed a respectable sphere of operations form the capital, as far as Maynooth (freshly garrisoned), Kildare and Arklow, the latter with gains in sheep and cattle lifted - for reports see E 89(31), *The newest intelligence from the army in Ireland,* letter 2, pp. 5-6 & letter 1, p. 2; E 91 (18), *Special newes from Ireland*, p. 2; the 'Journal' of Capt. William Tucker, in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 181. The Carlow garrison was reported as harrying the suburbs of Kilkenny, the Catholic 'capital', Tucker, 'Journal', in Gilbert, *Ir. confed*, ii, 199. Yet the aims of such expeditions had more to do with sustenance and morale than strategic gain.

[64]See the 'relation' by colonel Michael Earnley, one of the officers sent from England in 1642, in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, 11, 134-7. For the situation at Athlone, see Carte, *Ormonde*, ii, 397-90; *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 233-5, 242, 243-4.

[65]O'Neill's impact on the Ulster forces is well known, though it took time to put into effect. Lowe, 'Aspects of the wars', pp. 86-7 who singles out Preston's command of the Leinster army as worth adding to general problems like a lack of unified command in explaining the confederates' lack of success, though in fact he operated successfully in the winter of 1642-3 mopping up the garrisons in King's county, Carte, *Ormonde,* ii, 384-6; Tucker, 'Journal', in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 188 on the fall of Birr (Jan. 28) - 'If we doe not goe out to them, its very likely he will take all our garrisons'. Perhaps there has been a tendency to concentrate too much on the strengths or weaknesses of generals as compared to the constrictions which bound them all.

[66]For the situation in Jan. - Feb. 1643 see *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 234 (Feb. 20) for the loss even of the Nov. 1642 supply; 226-8 (Jan. 20) on shortages being to blame for the failure to take Wexford or Kilkenny and on Dutch schemes.

[67]Lowe 'Aspects of the wars', p. 84 suggests that all Protestant armies lacked the manpower to consolidate gains from victories in the field.

[68]For the Lords Justices' instructions, see Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 296, 298-9, 306-7. They were of course anxious also to limit the extent to which Ormond was able to hand out pardons to Pale defectors - the two concerns are not unrelated.

[69]Lords Justices to the Speaker, Feb. 25, *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 240 - if forces stay in Dublin 'they must unavoidably perish' unless food were sent from England. But 'We find also that if we send part of them abroad to get victuals by the sword, in which case they must march in a considerable strength, we are not assured that there is competent provisions to be had abroad to enable so many men to live'; nor munitions or money for that matter.

At Westminster there may have been sympathies for remarks like Marten's that England's safety outweighed Ireland's, but structural failings went beyond any principled opposition.[70] As well as the depletion of resources by the massive July 1642 'loan',[71] the new Irish committee was burdened by a plethora of inherited debts,[72], leaving minimal resources for fresh supplies.[73] With the traditional overland supply lines cut reliance was placed on direct supply by sea. The certificate system, however, depended upon assurance of re-payment and rumours were rife by Dec. 1642 of failure to do this.[74] Certainly the amount of goods reaching Dublin by this means were pitiably small[75], while 'official' supply was not planned.[76] The MP-adventurers were not blind to the financial shortages at the heart of their difficulties, nor were they slow to lay the blame on Parliament.[77] Yet Parliament had not as yet grasped the nettle of coercive taxation even for England, its financial machinery only a product of the months from Feb. 1643 on.[78] Even then the parliamentary armies remained

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[70]It is not clear how far Marten expressed a principled opposition to the support of the Irish war, though this is quite likely, but it seems probable that most of his hearers accepted his lead on the pragmatic basis of greater dangers nearer home. For debates on supply for Ireland, see *Commons' jn., ii*, 829, 844, 880, 883, 892; B.L. Harl. MS 163, ff. 244a, 245b, 246a. There was an extension of the committee's power to issue certificates in Jan., 1643, B.L. Add MS 4 782, ff. 54a-b. For examples of applicants, ff. 62a, 65a, 136a-b.

[71]When they managed to pull together their accounts in Jan. 1643, the committee estimated that £216 127-5-5 had been received by the adventure treasurers to the end of July 1642, of which £142 781-2-7 had been spent on Ireland, and all of the balance of £73 346-2-10 issued to the Committee of Safety. B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 64a-b.

[72]In Oct. 1642 they were made responsible for £8 090-5 owed for victuals, and for £14 141-8-4 promised in pay to the Ulster forces, and transformed into a supply of clothing, B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 5a-b; *Lords' jn., v*, 389; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 370. Only £1 000 of the debt for victuals had been cleared even in Feb. 1643, while the clothing debt was added to money owed to Turner and partners for earlier supplies to give a total of £42 051-18-8, only £2000 of which had been cleared by Feb. See *Anal. Hib.*, iv, 89-91 (for a summary of debts), 35-6, 39, 45-6, 48 (for other smaller debts for clothing); P.R.O. S.P. 28/139/12 for a statement of the Turner debt to early 1645.

[73]The committee planned to keep aside £5 000 to meet immediate needs, most of which was allocated to cover smaller certified deliveries of goods to Ireland, *Anal. Hib.*, iv, 20; B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 17a-b.

[74]Commissary Perceval to Lenthall, Dec. 12, Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 166-8.

[75]The commissioners did bring money (from the June loan - see appendix 2) and ammunition, but by early Nov. commissary Perceval was worried about food shortages, having stocks for 8 weeks, not 8 months as hoped, *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 219-20; Perceval to Frost, Nov. 5/8, Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 161-3. Nine certificates accepted for payment between Nov. 1642 and March 1643 for deliveries to Dublin, total only £2 170-10-2 in value, mostly in grain and herrings (the latter arranged by Perceval himself), and only two larger shipments can be added to these, one of them (for £1 800) by the major supplier Michael Casteel.

[76]Perceval to Lenthall, Dec. 12, Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 166-8. Frost was in London by late Oct., B.L. Add MS 4 782, f. 17a. The danger of food shortages extended to discontent among the common soldiers who were 'paid in victuall' and to the ships which were provisioned at Dublin. Copies of Perceval's letters were requested by the committee on Dec. 3, B.L. Add MS 4 782, f. 43b.

[77]But attempts in late 1642 to secure repayment of the adventure 'loan', as for example from part of the recent City 'loan', went nowhere. Instead they prompted denials of the extent of the adventure 'loan' claimed at £100 000 but accepted by Lenthall as £40 000. See *Commons' jn., ii*, 751, 795; B.L. Harl. MS 163, ff. 312b, 417b.

[78]The House did make reference to the use of a proposed assessment for the 'Supply of the great Occasions of *England* and *Ireland*', (*Commons' jn., ii*, 860, Nov. 23). For the general development of English revenue matters see Gardiner, *Great civil war*, i, 64-5, 72, 96-7; J. H. Hexter, *The reign of*

slumped in a condition of disease, hunger and general ill-usage only exceeded by the soldiers serving in Ireland; in regard to either country the 'low and sordid problem of military supply and finance did not fascinate the average Parliament man'.[79] But at least England did not experience systematic destruction as a matter of military policy; nor did the warring sides there face the depths of distrust prevalent in Ireland.[80] It was not feasible to conduct a war in terms of well-stocked field armies moving over Ireland suppressing the rebels by defeat and destruction, nor by means of the alternative of maintaining an extensive presence through garrisons fed by the arable produce of the locality.[81] The only available alternatives over much of Ireland were cattle raiding, the devising of some form of 'protection' for Catholic farmers despite orders,[82] or the much condemned use of custodiums, that is, temporarily requisitioned land of 'rebels' pending permanent re-allocation.[83] It was not as if the war by starvation was officially abandoned; what continued to be fought was a war of attrition on a grand scale aiming, quite coldly, at victory and all the good things that would bring by substantial elimination of population, hopefully before one's own military and civilian forces disappeared.[84]

King Pym (Cambridge, MA., 1941), pp. 17-18, and pp. 16-27 for a discussion of financial legislation to the summer of 1643.

[79]Hexter, *Reign of King Pym*,, pp. 108-9.

[80]To the losses felt by Protestants from the outset of the rising were added the intimidation by excesses employed by the government and its agents and an officially promulgated policy of negligible contact with the 'rebels'. See e.g. the Council's order of 28 May, 1642 'to the severall Gouvernors not to hould any manner of correspondence, treaty, or intelligence with any Irish Papists, residing neere their garisons. etc.', in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 45-6. Cf. Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 418-9 for the kinds of bonds uniting English society even in 1642, but not present in Ireland, at least after the rising.

[81]For comments on garrisoning strategy, see Loeber & Parker, 'Military revolution', pp. 81-3.

[82]Tucker, 'Journal', in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 109 (Feb. 1) states that the Council voted that, given that 'lands lay waste about the garrisons, to tollerate by proclamation such kernes as had not shed any blood to plow the lands with corne, and they should only pay one-fourth parte of the cropp, for the use of the King'. On Feb. 5 he records that a proclamation was discussed, but deferred (p. 193). In July, Ormond was urging upon the Council 'That some settled course be taken for setting forwards of fishing, plowing and gardening near every main garrison, which I have oft propounded', which presumably required some reliance on local labour, *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, i, 63.

[83]Carte, *Ormonde*, ii, 422-6 condemns custodiums as promoting private ends over the public service. His attack relies on two citations from Tucker's 'Journal' (Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 187, 192). The former states that the failure to use the army in the summer of 1642 'was because so many custodiums weare mantayned per the soldiers, for privat profitt, as they coulde not be drawne off for the State service'. This would reinforce the failure (Jan. 1643) to send horse to relieve Naas, which was not 'granted by the State, saying the troopes weare imployd upon the chiefe commanders' custodiums and could not be drawne off'. The second, dated Feb. 4 , is the claim that corn from the custodiums was to be rated at 20s a barrel, not 10s, to cause more corn to be brought in. Such evidence certainly does not discount the motive force of private profit. As Sir John Temple regularly lamented, such senior persons as himself had such grants as their only source of income, being unable either to draw salaries or income from estates. But this does not deny the potential for production inherent in the grants, and the hint is there that the soldiery themselves valued them. Certainly at Naas they lamented the failure to adequately till the available custodiums (*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, i, 60-1). (See also the role of custodiums in the garrison at Dundalk, Lord Moore to Ormond, Nov. 7, Carte MS 4, f. 19). Moreover, the potential for patronage was certainly not overlooked by the King, as will be seen.

[84]Privy Council on Feb. 20 (*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 234) - 'our want of corn being so much the more, in regard that we, in confidence to be supplied forth of England plentifully with corn, have caused great destruction to be made of corn, and certainly there is nothing that may conduce their [the

Part of the commissioners' remit had been to introduce efficiency into the war effort. By Dec. reports from Dublin stressed the plight of all classes and the inability of the city to support the army[85] - in the depths of winter it was marched out explicitly to keep the disaffected busy and in the hope of garnering additional resources and harbouring those in Dublin; gains were duly limited but at least the government's opponents were denied peaceable possession of such areas.[86] The commissioners seem to have been behind the proclamation for mustering of troops under oath to prevent fraudulent returns,[87] and added the promotion of an Irish 'adventure' as a means of assuring officers of future remuneration of their arrears.[88]

Very quickly, however, they ran into obstacles. By Dec. 19 army officers had produced a petition to set before the Irish Council, the effective beginning of army petitioning in the wars of the 1640s.[89] The petition was precipitated by the return to Dublin of major Henry Warren,[90] a professional soldier of long standing[91] who had been sent by the officers in the late autumn to put their case to King and Parliament. Whether his efforts to secure aid were genuine or not, he was soon acting as a courier between the King and Ormond[92] and delivering a report on the London situation which, whether accurate or not,[93] seriously damaged the credibility of the commissioners in Dublin and of the Houses.[94] The petition addressed purely 'military'

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rebels'] destruction than the burning of all corn, if we may be so supplied from thence as we ourselves may not be also destroyed thereby.'

[85]*Exceeding certain and true newes...*, E 84(26). Dated 2 Jan., 1643 this was published as a letter from '*J. Skout*', 'a Marchant in *Dublin*, ... a *Dutch-man*'.

[86]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, ii, 225-6, 230-1. Tucker commented on the Maynooth expedition (Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 193) that the confederate besiegers fled at night, leaving 'four or five Rebells slayne and as many English : ther was no service done at all, but only expectation and the gayne of one ass'. Grenville's victory at Rathconnell, on the way back from Athlone, was thus greeted as a triumph and given miraculous credentials by Tucker, in 'Journal', in Gilbert, *Ir. confed*, ii, 194-5. See E 91 (15), *Joyfull and happy news from Ireland*, and E 91 (18), *Speciall newes from Ireland* for accounts of the battle and *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 235, 239 for rewards to Grenville. The culmination of such schemes came with the offer by Lisle and Monck to take 2 000 troops into the 'Rebells Countrey' and survive on the growing corn, Tucker, 'Journal', in Gilbert, *Ir. confed*, ii, 179-80; E 89 (31), *The newest intelligence from the army in Ireland*, letter 1, p. 3; E 91 (18), *Speciall newes from Ireland* pp. 5-6.

[87]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 372; Reynolds and Goodwyn to Lenthall, Dec. 13, in Hogan, (ed.), *Letters and papers*, p. 169.

[88]Carte, *Ormonde*, ii, 392-3; Reynolds and Goodwyn to Lenthall, Dec. 13, in Hogan, (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 168-70. They claimed to have won the Lords Justices, Ormond, privy councillors and army officers to subscription of arrears with the aim of reducing present costs and of engaging officers in the war. They aimed to produce subscription books for the other three provinces.

[89]The first 'army plot' could be considered an attempt to fuse military hardship to political aims, see Russell, *British monarchies*, pp. 291-4.

[90]The Remonstrance opens 'findeing no releefe from England, uppon the returne of major Warren', Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 395-7; cf. ii, 393.

[91]Newman, *Royalist officers*, p. 398.

[92]Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 1. Charles to Ormond, Jan. 12 refers to 'serjant majore Warrens message' previously sent to Ormond.

[93]Tucker believed that Warren 'brought noe answer at all, but framed one, as he pleased, from some particular persons', ('Journal', in Gilbert, *Ir. confed*, ii) and this seems likely to be correct.

[94]*Commons' jn., ii*, 984. The message brought by Warren was that a 'principal person' on the Irish committee had said that if £500 would save Ireland, they would not spent so much. See below,

grievances, mainly with regard to pay - the general lack of it, its corrupt dispensation and the challenge to their integrity made by the oath-bound musters. Also raised were demands for the right to martial law only among the army; for the securing of arrears and the right to have these paid in money and not in subscriptions, 'which they conceive to bee a hard condition for them to venter their lives on'; and the consideration 'whether they doe not deserve the rewards in land without other price, as well as in former rebellions in this kingdome others have done.'[95]

The Council seems to have concocted a relatively satisfactory reply to the petition, though their anxiety can be seen in the order that all citizens deliver in half their plate to pay the army.[96] Meanwhile Ormond, who had acted as conduit for the petition, had despatched a copy to Oxford and won words of concern from the King.[97] Perhaps this gave rise to a second petition, launched in Jan., and with support form the major outlying garrisons, as Drogheda and Dundalk[98], seeking to petition the King directly since Parliament had failed the officers.[99] In particular their grievance seems to have extended to the manner in which the adventure subscriptions had been collected. As early as Dec. 12, when Sir Thomas Wharton and Sir Robert King came forward to adventure their pay, the two MP commissioners had disagreed in their response.[100] Reynolds was much more enthusiastic, but in effect he seems to have merely pledged his word that adventured arrears would be secure.[101] The commissioners had intended from the outset to put an adventure bill through the Irish parliament but their efforts stalled and the officers refused to put their money down without a surer foundation.[102] Within the Irish Council division emerged over the sending of an army petitioner to the King, with Ormond winning the despatch of Major Michael Woodhouse against the wishes of the Lords Justices and the English commissioners.[103]

Political divisions in Dublin were beginning to take on the colours of English differences as Parliament, then the King, angled for support but fragmentation would only occur when English influence became entangled with deep-seated and opposing

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[95]Carte, *Ormonde*, ii, 395; v, 395-7. For a discussion of martial law, see Tucker, 'Journal', in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 178.

[96]Only a derisory sum of £1 200 was collected. To place this in context see Raymond Gillespie, 'The Irish economy at war, 1641-1652', in Ohlmeyer (ed.), *Ireland, 1641-1660*, pp. 167, 169.

[97]Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 399-400, 381-2.

[98]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 225.

[99]Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 398-9. The second petition accepts that the petitioners are 'fully satisfy'd in all points' by the Council's answer but must appeal to the King since that are 'likely to perish'.

[100]'Mr. Goodwin was much displeased..., but Mr. Reynolds stood in justification of the act, and would not alter it, at which Mr. Goodwin was much discontented', Tucker, 'Journal', in Gilbert, *Ir. confed., ii*, 176.

[101]Tucker condemned Reynolds's decision on Jan. 3 'to give it under his own hand what the Parliament should performe' on the subscriptions without the privity of the other commissioners. He adds the officers' complaint 'that the Parliament should deal fayrely with them, because theire was yet noe Act of Parliament to confirme theire subscriptions'. Tucker, 'Journal', in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 185.

[102]Tucker, 'Journal', in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 185.

[103]Tucker, 'Journal', in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 187-9; Carte, *Ormonde*, ii, 400-2.

policies for Ireland. Outside the capital it seems certain that most Irish Protestants still placed their hopes in the restoration of relations between the King and his English Parliament. Among those despatched to London in the hope of obtaining supplies for their province had been three senior Ulster figures, colonels Sir James Montgomery, Arthur Hill and Audley Mervyn and, from Munster, Sir Hardress Waller[104]. The Ulstermen did win a vote of money, later modified to clothing and available by Nov.[105]; Waller's efforts for the moment appear only to have resulted in another extension of the certificate system.[106] Meanwhile all four won permission from the Committee of Safety to petition Charles 'so to reflect upon the bleeding condition of that perishing kingdom, that timely relief might be afforded'. Charles's reply, in a letter written by Falkland, is an interesting combination of propaganda and of a pacific, 'constitutional' royalism, such as would win favour in Ireland. There was an acceptance that Charles had 'recommended their [Irish Protestants'] condition to both his Houses of Parliament' at the outbreak of the rising. He could thus side-step responsibility, (as he had with the Dublin army) proclaiming his own past efforts, and seek specific requests before offering assistance. But he could also insist that he had made 'the miserable present condition and certain future loss of Ireland to be one of the principal motives most earnestly to desire that the present distractions of this kingdom [England] might be composed'.[107]

The response of the colonels was to bring the matter before Parliament along with their 'Conceptions'. These were, firstly, the overriding need for an English accommodation if Ireland was to be delivered. Only second came the need for immediate war supplies. Lastly, failing this also, they hoped Parliament would 'allow them a favourable Construction' if they were forced to accept harsh terms from their enemies.[108] Their intervention did strike a certain chord. The following day (Dec. 10) the Commons allowed Goodwin to deliver his long-delayed report, but as dealing only with debts it was a wholly inadequate response to Irish needs, while the surrounding debate focused on suspected financial improprieties and witnessed some incredulous demands made on Goodwyn to 'give an account how things came to such & such prices'.[109] Overall, however, the 'resultats' of the four officers 'were not relished by

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[104]For reports from Munster, see *Anal. Hib.*, iv, 19-20; B.L. Harl. MS 164, 111a-b; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 11a; *Commons' jn.*, ii, 859, 860.

[105]*Anal. Hib.*, iv, 10, 11, 4-6; *Lords' jn.*, *v*, 347, 388-9, 391; *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 370; B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 5b-6a, 14a-17a, 34b, 35a, 28a; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1641-3*, p. 433. See also appendix 3 for details.

[106]This assured blanket repayment for all goods delivered to Munster from west of England ports, *Anal. Hib.*, iv, 20, 23-4; *Commons' jn., ii*, 873, 880; *Lords' jn.*, *v*, 482; B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 27b-28a. Munster had been voted a supply in Sept., confirmed in Nov. - see appendix 3.

[107]*Lords' jn.*, *v*, 483-3; Clarendon, *Rebellion*, ii, 491-2.

[108]*Lords' jn.*, *v*, 483-5.

[109]B.L. Harl. MS 164, f. 246a. The Nov. 23 reading of reports from the Dublin commissioners had pointed to suspected corruption, and now added news that even in Ulster the situation was far from rosy, B.L. Harl. MS 164, ff. 111a-b; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, ff. 11a-b; *Commons' jn., ii*, 860.

ye ho[use]' as leaning towards 'an accommodacon yt might be pr[e]judiciall to ye Privil[age] of Parliam[en]t, Religion & Lib[re]ties of ye Sub[jec]t...'. Parliament had already shown itself uncompromising in its attitude towards peace in Ireland, whatever about the challenge reality made to their imaginings.

Perhaps an inkling that Charles might have an alternative plan prompted a greater willingness to assist Leicester, now making his final bid to reach Dublin.[110] In the event he was recalled by the King and recognised that Chester was as far as he would get. The Lords wanted Parliament to urge the King to send Leicester or at least record any objections he might have, and failing that to 'dispatch such a Personage thither as both Houses may confide in', or they must declare they would 'no more manage the Affaires of *Ireland*'. The Commons failed to respond.[111] As a symbol of possible co-operation over Ireland, Leicester was being ditched by both sides.[112] While Westminster could still be swayed by a strong current of opinion in favour of English peace at almost any price there were counter-currents tugging against settlement, including a petitioning campaign in London to step up the war effort. The named sponsors, Sir David Watkins and Richard Shute, were central figures in London Adventurer activity, the latter a Commissioner for the Sea Adventure, the former the 'chairman' of the City Adventure committee. More pertinently, while most attention on this and later petitions from this constituency has been focused on its political - constitutional implications (especially in early 1643[113]) the practical demands put forward are not to be neglected. They eschewed accommodation save on 'honourable and safe conditions'; demanded active implementation of measures to repay City contributors from papists' and malignants' estates; urged immediate battle by the Earl of Essex with supplementary troops. All were clearly analogous to proposals made for Ireland in late 1642.[114]

What was developing was a growing tendency to a 'one war' sentiment, whether fuelled by millenarian expectations or not, which not only made compromise in

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[110]B.L. Harl. MS 164, f. 263a; *Commons' jn.*, *ii*, 892, 895, 897; B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 50b, 52a; *Lords' jn.*, *v*, 499, 502. Opposition had come from Rigby and, indirectly, from Marten, though whether over dislike of spending on Ireland or a lingering distrust of Leicester is unclear.

[111]*Commons' jn.*, *ii*, 900, 902, 905. The wording of this vote differs from the in *Lords' jn.* which ends 'else they shall not be able to save that Kingdom'; in *Commons' jn.* is unclear whether King or Parliament should 'declare' Parliament free of the obligation. B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 71b; *Lords' jn.*, *v*, 512, 513, 516, 517, 518. Yonge says of Dec. 29 that 'it is conceaved' that Digby would be sent to Ireland as Lord Deputy to bring the 'Irishe army' to England, *Yonge's Diary*, ed. Thompson, pp. 212-3.

[112]For a picture of Leicester as a potential mediator in an Irish context, in 1641, see Perceval-Maxwell, *Irish rebellion*, pp. 176-8.

[113]In Dec. 'they refused to specify their political principles and long-term goals' (Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, p. 442) made clear in Feb. - March 1643.

[114]*The True and Original Copy of the First Petition which was delivered by Sir David Watkins...* , E 130 (26) discussed by Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, pp. 438-442 and by Pearl, *London*, pp. 253-4. For the development of 'radicalism' in 1642-3 see David Wootton, 'From rebellion to revolution: the crisis of the winter 1642/3 and the origins of civil war radicalism', in *E. H. R.* cv, (1990), pp. 654-669, including his argument that the ideas in question arose in response to moves to compromise.

England undesirable, but helped ensure that the commitment to victory in Ireland remained at the centre of the self-definition of the parliamentary cause.[115] Such 'one war' sentiments could not but colour London - Edinburgh links. While the nomination (Nov. 18) of John Pickering to lay Parliament's case before the Scottish Council[116] focused Parliament's fleeting attention on the Scottish forces in Ulster they located that army in a context of a war raised 'by the Practice of the Papists... for the Destruction of Religion in both the Kingdoms of *England* and *Ireland*...'.[117] 'Anti-popery' remained central to the religious dynamic of Parliament and to its three-kingdom perspective.

The Scottish army in Ulster had contributed to a securing of all of Ulster north of a Newry - Ballyshannon line with the signal exception of Charlemont, albeit having created substantial devastation within the province, and a 'prolonged strategic deadlock' wherein they failed to break out of Ulster.[118] Meanwhile their stay has long been regarded as having profound religious consequences for the province in the establishment and protection of a Presbyterian system, extending beyond the area where the army quartered.[119] They were building on a religious peculiarity going back through the 1641 anti-episcopacy petitions to the activities of dissident Scottish clergy in the 1620s-30s, culminating in the 'Sixemilewater Revival' from 1625 and the subsequent 'Antrim meeting'.[120] The residue was unique in Irish terms. In July 1642 the Scottish General Assembly received a 'Humble Petition', 'subscribed by fourteene

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[115]For early indications, see P. Christianson, 'From expectation to militance: Reformers and Babylon in the first two years of the Long Parliament in *J. E. H.*, xxiv (1973), pp. 236-40. See also the reported comments of Stephen Jerome, installed in a Dublin lectureship in Nov. 1642, Carte MS 4, ff. 37, 40, 44, 52, 54, 56, 58, 59, 62, 64. (For Jerome, see Alan Ford, 'The Church of Ireland, 1558-1634: a puritan church?', in Alan Ford, James Maguire & Kenneth Milne (eds.), *As by law established. The Church of Ireland since the reformation* (Dublin, 1995), p. 61.

[116]*Lords' jn., v*, 451, 469. See David Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution, 1637-44. The Triumph of the Covenanters* (Newton Abbot, 1973), pp. 255-6 for approaches to the Scots in Nov. - Dec. 1642.

[117]The plan was to divert £20 000 which should have been repaid to the Merchant Adventurers. The Scottish Council had sent two papers, one on their army in Ireland, the other on £40 000 of Brotherly Assistance still owed. See *Commons' jn., ii,* 897, 905, 906; *Lords' jn., v*, 524 for the message; B.L. Harl. MS 164, ff. 273b-274a for the ensuing debate which saw the 'radical' MPs Bond and Rigby propose a scheme whereby an invading Scottish army could support themselves from confiscation of delinquent property in the north of England.

[118]Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters*, pp. 127, 128, 130. As Stevenson points out, this permitted a confederate build-up outside the province. For devastation, Patrick Adair, *A true narrative of the rise and progress of the Presbyterian church in Ireland*, ed. W. D. Killen, (Belfast, 1866), pp. 89-90 and, for O'Neill's opinion, Brendan Jennings (ed.), *Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders, 1582-1700* (Dublin, 1964), pp. 507-9. T. Dalyell to - , Feb. 1643, in *H.M.C. rep. 10* app. 1, pp. 78-9 records 'Thair is laitle sum prouision of meil cum in , so that the General Major intens shorlay to the fieldis, ... boit be all apirins, ve are not able to staye aboue eight dayeis, in regaird ve vaint horses for carieng our provision'.

[119]Adair, *True narrative*, p. 90; E. M. Furgol, 'The military and ministers as agents of presbyterian imperialism in England and Ireland, 1640-1648', in John Dwyer, Roger A. Mason & Alexander Murdoch (eds.), *New perspectives on the politics and culture of early modern Scotland*(Edinburgh, 1982), pp. 103-110.

[120]For the events of the 1620s-30s see Marilyn J. Westerkamp, *The triumph of the laity. Scots-Irish piety and the Great Awakening 1625-1760* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 23-42; W. D. Baillie, *The Six Mile Water revival of 1625* (Newcastle, 1976). For the anti-episcopal petitions, Perceval-Maxwell, *Irish rebellion*, pp. 113-5.

score and seven persons' headed by Viscount Ards and Clotworthy. Its appeal for clergy, especially for the return of those fled from Ulster, pointed to the action of the 'prelates' as stamping out the peaceful and fruitful ministry briefly established; the war was not blamed, but seen as an opportunity, while the urgency of the situation could allow it to act as precedent for the future.[121]

This overt anti-episcopal stance and openness to reform was apparent in Dec. 1642 - Jan. 1643 in a publication of three letters concerning Sir William Stewart, colonel of one of the regiments in north-west Ulster.[122] The letters were addressed to Stewart's London solicitor, Anthony Pont, and extolled his military successes while promoting a case for the sending of supplies to Stewart. Thomas Marshall, one of the regimental officers, claimed the victories were envied by the 'Papisticall and Prelaticall faction, because he is one that abhorreth all corrupt courses in mattres of Gods worship and who (I hope) if God spare his dayes will prove an active Instrumant for furthering the worke of Reformation in that land'.[123] Another correspondent, John Lockhart, hoped that Pont might '(if it be possible) purchase a *mandamus* for your Collonell and Sir *Robert Stewart*, to put away the servicebook men... as very great hinderers of our Scots that are well affected either to resyde there or to resort thither.'[124]

Stewart had been the Lords Justices' nominee in Sept. 1642 for overall command in Derry city and in counties Londonderry, Donegal and Tyrone, but strenuous opposition from Sir Robert Stewart meant that command remained in

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[121]E 239 (11) *A view of the present condition of the three Kingdomes* contains both the petition (pp. 18-20) and the Aug. 6 response (pp. 21-2). The Assembly's response, on Aug. 6, hardly matched the plea. It permitted six ministers to serve in Ulster, two at a time for four-month periods, though it added that they held the power to enact ordinations. Baillie's account of the debate shows ministers, including himself, attempting to get out of the unpleasant duty of going to Ireland, *The letters and journals of Robert Baillie* ed. David Laing (3 vols., Edinburgh, 1841), ii, 48. (See also pp. 61-2 for his efforts to escape again in Nov.). Note Baillie's comment that 'it was the Assemblies care to beware lest all the men who went over to that land should be in danger, in the first settling of that Church, to favour any differences from our Church.'

[122]There were five infantry regiments in west Ulster, most with a cavalry troops attached. Those under Sir William Stewart, Sir Robert Stewart and Audley Mervyn (successor to Sir Ralph Gore) were based in Donegal - Tyrone - Londonderry, while Derry city also sustained a number of foot companies later commissioned as the city regiment under the Mayor, Robert Thornton. Sir William Cole commanded the fifth regiment based on Enniskillen. Other, smaller, formations also existed, particularly in the south-west Ulster / north Connacht area.

[123]He particularly criticised Parliament's assistance to Bishop Leslie of Raphoe, who had undertaken his own defence of the episcopal palace , but who was an old antagonist of Stewart. For this and Stewart's uncertain religious loyalties, see M. Perceval-Maxwell, 'Strafford, the Ulster-Scots and the covenanters', in *I. H. S.*, xviii (1973), pp. 545-6.

[124]*Speciall good news from Ireland ...of a victory... by Sir William Stewart*, E 86(21). The third letter, from William Stewart, son of Sir William, also reported the victories (Glasgow, Dec. 16) and asked about the clothes shipment expected by his father. The news of successes in west Ulster at this time also appears in *The last intelligence from Ireland* E 120(23); Sir William's exploits are celebrated in editions of the *Perfect Diurnall* for Jan. 23-30, magnifying enemy losses (1 000 killed, or 4 000 defeated) and minimising casualties (none, or 5 killed) and all 'notwithstanding the Protestants want of money and other ayd', E 245(25), E 245(26).

commission.[125] The resolution is significant for Sir Robert would emerge as a 'King's man' and the north-west generally would emerge as a crux of intra-Protestant tensions, on religious, political and national lines.[126] Certainly not all Ulster Protestants shared religious commitments of the kind that would, in England, make for supporters of Parliament but there was a bed-rock of reformist religious sentiment not apparent elsewhere. It would effect both the external alliances and internal divisions of the northern province.

One individual certainly committed to all stages of 'godly' reformation (doctrine, form and structure) in all three Kingdoms was Sir John Clotworthy. In 1640-1 he had liased with the Scottish Covenanters from a base in England[127], and his interest in the northern Kingdom had not diminished in 1643. John Pickering kept him informed of the developments there, where the call to battle to 'rescue the King out of captivitie' was part of a campaign which focused not only on 'unity of Religione' and uniformity of church government, but 'putting downe the masse in England'.[128] Clotworthy himself passed through Scotland on his way to London, arriving there on Jan. 30 to report that 'hee heard the Scots vehemently affirme, that if the King would not upon their first motion grant them a Parliament, their next motion should be with an Army into *England*.'[129] From Ulster he had sent word of a 'confession' made by the Earl of Antrim the previous spring, that Charles had offered him 'a commissione to become Generall of the Cathiolique army of Ulster' and it seems unlikely that he had not touted such news in Scotland also.[130] If it was too cold to produce much response there, or if the processes of Scottish politics were not ready to react, the doings of Antrim would produce a storm within a few months. For the moment, Clotworthy

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[125]Carte MSS 4, f. 11; 5, f. 62.

[126]The struggle for the governorship of the strategically vital city of Derry opened in Feb., 1643 with the death of the long-standing governor, Sir John Vaughan, with Sir Robert Stewart emerging as the King's candidate, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 379.

[127]Peter Donald, *An uncounselled King. Charles I and the Scottish troubles, 1637-1641* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 191-6. Donald suggests that Clotworthy's 'religious sympathies were central to the feeling of common ground with the Scots' (p. 195).

[128]'[T]he Earle of Newcastles decalratione was produced and confuted in every pulpit' and Alexander Henderson's petition, commissioned by the General Assembly, went forward. H.M.C. *Hamilton MSS, Supp.*, p. 67. In his letter to Pym (Jan. 9) Pickering makes much of this declaration and its specifically religious demands. He draws attention to the claim 'that the endeavour of the papists is to bring all in the condition Irland is in', H.M.C. *Hamilton MSS, Supp.*, p. 66. P. R. Newman, 'Catholic Royalists of northern England, 1642-1645', in *Northern History*, xv (1979), p. 95 accepts a basis in fact for claims of parliamentarian propagandists for considerable Catholic support for Newcastle.

[129]*Certain Informations*, no. 3, Jan. 30 - Feb. 6, E 88(17), p.18. This is unsupported evidence for the journey since Pickering's letter only shows Clotworthy in Scotland earlier than his Jan. 18 letter, but is by no means improbable. The Jan. 30 speech concerned the need to aid Ireland. The newsletter recorded Clotworthy's journey south to Capt. Hotham 'disguised and disfigured'. As such the captain was unable to recognise him until Clotworthy disclosed his identity in private and was 'with many embracings, and much joy received and welcomed by the Captain'. If in little else, it seems Sir John shared with the Earl of Antrim a reputation as a veritable master of disguise.

[130]To Mandeville, 'Murton', Pym and Hampden, Jan. 18 (Antrim town), H.M.C. *Hamilton MSS supplement*, pp. 68-9.

joined a mass of Irish agents and petitioners assembling in Westminster.[131] He was one of five men specifically asked by the Irish Council in Jan. 1643 to press for the provision of supplies[132], beyond which there were any number of more or less hopeful supplicants, mostly army officers or clergymen.[133]

All their efforts would be needed for the assessment of the situation regarding finance and supplies delivered to the Commons on Jan. 3 was unremittingly bleak.[134] Suggestions had already been made to introduce variations on the adventure, and though they would bear fruit, their time was not yet. Instead, the response to what was, in effect, an ultimatum from Munster (read in the Commons on Friday, Jan. 27) was to give an opening to an ordinance, drafted by John Goodwyn for the Irish committee, which offered a revival and extension of the 'Loan and Contribution' scheme. The bill passed both Houses within two days. Unlike the original contribution, aimed at displaced Protestants, this was directed at the armies in Ireland; in scope it extended to the United Provinces, as well as England and Wales, and to the proffering not just of money but of 'any Victual, Arms, Ammunition, Goods, Wares, or Commodities fit and necessary'. Repayment (for which no time-limit was set) could be in money or Irish land, at adventurer rates. Implementation of the measure was rapid and the first payments were being made from it by mid-Feb., predictably to repay debts.[135] It was progress, and was accompanied by continuing efforts to despatch goods assembled for Ulster[136] and Munster.[137]

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[131]Likewise of the 'Irish lobby' within Parliament, Dungarvan had reached England in Nov., (*Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, p. 408), Viscount Conway was expected back in mid-Feb. (Sir John Coke to Sir John Coke, 13 Feb. 1643, H.M.C. *Cowper MSS*, ii, 330-1), while both Jephson and Jones had become regular attenders at the Irish committee by April (B.L. Add. MS 4 782).

[132]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 230-1. The others were Conway, Sir Robert King, Nicholas Loftus and Arthur Hill. The Council had sent an official agent, Richard Fitzgerald, to London as far back as 1641.

[133]Almost all regiments or important garrisons were officially represented in addition to the numbers who were soliciting support for themselves, their families and friends, with decreasing chances of success. Among the more prominent agents (in addition to those mentioned already) were Ranelagh and Arthur Jones, who received goods for Athlone; John Bunbury, agent for Duncannon; lieut. - col. Saunderson of Sir Robert Stewart's regiment and the clerics James Thrale (representing Claneboy), Humphrey Galbreth (the two Stewarts) and Robert Barkley, Dean of Clogher (Sir William Cole). By 27 May, 1643 the Irish committee insisted that officers in London should elect one agent to represent each province in the distribution of provisions, an attempt to curb the proliferation of representatives (B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 190a-b).

[134]B.L. Add MS 4 782, ff. 62a-b; *Commons' jn., ii*, 912, 914 (Jan. 3-4) for reading of reports and attempts to clear debts in the Commons. The report showed the scale of the 1642 'loan' and of outlays for Ireland, B.L. Add MS 4 782, ff. 64a-b, while urgent requests from Ireland were received.

[135]*Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 70-3; *Lords' jn., v*, 580-1; E 88(4). For the Jan. debates and actions on supplies see B.L. Add MS 4 782, ff. 69b, 70a; B.L. Harl. MS 164, ff. 281a, 282b, 283a, 283b, 284a; *Lords' jn., v*, 578; *Yonge's diary*, ed. Thompson, pp. 272-3.

[136]Especially the Scottish army, *Yonge's diary*, ed. Thompson, pp. 272-3; *Commons' jn., ii*, 945, 949.

[137]*Commons' jn., ii*, 961; B.L. Add. MS 4 762, ff. 83a-b, 84a-b; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 96-7. For news from Munster, in which province the newsletters showed particular interest, see Inchiquin to Lenthall, Jan. 12, Jan. 13 in Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 172-3, 173-4; Commons' *jn., ii*, 945; B.L. Harl. MS 164, f. 283a; B.L. Add. MS 31116, f .23a. *Speciall Passages* throughout Jan. and

Apart from Marten's overt statements opposing any concern for Ireland[138] it is unclear whether the Commons' vote against the revival of the Lords' earlier motion that Charles either send Leicester to Ireland or appoint a suitable replacement had more to do with Ireland or with overtures to the King.[139] Whatever the intention the vote augured ill for co-operation with the King over Ireland, and this at a time when the peace talks known as the 'Treaty of Oxford' were about to begin. It was the culmination of the efforts of the Westminster 'peace party' and, though the propositions advanced did not explicitly deal with Ireland, as in later negotiations, Parliament's hard line remained present by implication.[140] Their proposed Act of Oblivion excluded not only all offences committed in relation to the Irish rebellion, but all counsel or encouragement offered, a sufficiently wide definition to satisfy not only intransigents in Ireland but 'one war' proponents in England. Furthermore discussion had ranged over the extent of anti-Catholic legislation to be promised by the King; that increased stringency should be included was not in doubt.[141] Simultaneously approval had been given to the suggestion of the commissioners in Dublin for expulsion of Catholics from the Irish capital.[142] As one newsletter summed it up, the talks were designed to ensure a people 'enjoying our Religion without innovation, and our Liberties without violation; the Papists extirpated his Majesties Dominions, *Ireland* subdued and planted with honest English Protestants...' (Feb. 11)[143]

Clotworthy's actions in Feb. 1643 combine support for the peace talks with extreme anti-Catholic actions.[144] There is no incompatibility here, merely a reflection of his particular priorities, but the month of Feb. showed how hard it would be to reconcile them. By Feb. 14 word had reached the Commons of a commission issued by the King (Jan. 10) for Ormond and others to treat with the confederate Catholics.[145]

Feb. printed a series of letters reportedly from Kinsale - see nos. 22/E 84(36) (Jan. 3-11), 25/E 86 (39) (Jan. 24-31), 27 / E 89(17) (Feb. 7-14).

[138]Parliament should not 'take any further care of Ireland but declare to the world that during these troubles at home wee cann doe nothing to releive that kingdome', B.L. Harl. MS 164, f. 284a.

[139]Marten would have the twofold motion 'whollie rejected' while others favoured it but the final vote which against the peers' proposal, gives ambiguous signals in failing to differentiate the two options presented, and little can be concluded from it. Thus while *Commons' jn., ii*, 946-7 has Clotworthy and Waller as defeated tellers in support of the Lords' motion, and Armine and Vane as their opponents, D'Ewes (B.L. Harl. MS 164, f. 284a) reverses the latter of each pair, and neither combination seems more obvious. A 'war party' man could conceivably oppose the motion on the same grounds as Marten, or because he did not want to appeal to Charles, or support it as advocating a replacement of Leicester.

[140]Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, pp. 262-7 prints the parliamentary proposals.

[141]*Lords jn., v*, 577; *Commons' jn., ii*, 917; *Perfect Diurnall*, Jan. 2-9. E 244 (44); Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, pp. 264, 266 (articles v, xiii).

[142]Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 168-70; *Commons' jn., ii*, 914. In fact the proclamation of April 1 issued by the Dublin government suggests economic as much as political motivation in so far as it covers the expulsion of both Catholic and Protestant arrivals to the city, the latter to go to England, Carte MS 5, f. 37.

[143]*Special Passages* no. 27 (Feb. 7-14), E 89 (17), p.225.

[144]J. H. Hexter, *the reign of King Pym*, (), pp. 36-8.

[145]*Commons' jn., ii*, 965; B.L. Harl. MS 164, ff. 296b-7a; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 25b.

The reaction shows again the continuing force of anti-popery,[146] as in Goodwyn's sarcastic response was that the King 'intends to make peace with his best subiects first'.[147] Even the most short-sighted of MPs could not cut Ireland loose if it left that island open to a royal-Catholic alignment with implications for the future of England. The committee that emerged from that day's debate gave 12 of the most prominent MPs a remit to prepare a Declaration on the subject and to 'think of some letter of Encouragement to the Justices and Committees at *Dublyn*'. The battle for the control of the Irish government was out in the open. Parliament was in effect 'encouraging' them to open defiance of the royal will.[148]

Over the next week two proposals emerged for additional funding for Ireland and the Commons agreed to a full debate on matters Irish set for Feb. 28. But both the request for a £200 000 loan from the United Provinces, sponsored by 'the Lords, Knights, Gentlemen and other Protestants, late Inhabitants in the Kingdom of *Ireland*' [149] and the long-standing adventure demand for compulsory delivery of unpaid adventure subscriptions were sought in the form of Acts.[150] That is, the King's approval would be needed. When the debate came round on Feb. 28, though, the centre-piece proved to be fresh news from the commissioners in Dublin, detailing their expulsion from meetings of the Irish Council, on receipt of orders from Oxford.

While acknowledging the potency of anti-Parliament rumours their slant was broadly to play up Protestant successes and attribute discouragement to the receipt of the commission for negotiations.[151] Threat was thus laced with hope. Reynolds and Robert Goodwin claimed that 'the labour is on both sides the Sea, to make the Rebels appear strong and considerable, and to put difficulties and impediments upon our Military proceedings, the better to bring on a most horrid pernitious peace...' whereas in fact the confederates 'will ere long (if you do not exceedingly abandon this service) disband, starve, and cut-throats among themselves'. Clotworthy followed this despatch with a letter from his 'brother' John Chichester, lately released from 'imprisonment' in beleaguered Athlone. His letter had a bleaker tone asking for help

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[146]Hexter, *King Pym*, pp. 20-1(though cf. 29, 161-2).

[147]*Yonge's diary*, ed. Thompson, p. 311.

[148]*Commons' jn., ii*, 965; D'Ewes, ff. 296b-297a. The committee consisted of Pym, Glyn, Holles, Vane, Prideaux, Rous, Clotworthy, Marten, Goodwin, Wentworth, Barrington and St. John. Wilde and Hill were added the next day.

[149]Clotworthy presented the petition for this with assurances that he knew of 'diuerse of the dutche marchants whoe will contribute that waye'. *Yonge's diary*, ed. Thompson, p. 319; B.L. Harl. MS 164, f. 307a; *Commons' jn., ii*, 970, 981.

[150]A committee combining legal and 'Irish' figures was set up to question whether the original legislation left scope for compulsion, *Commons' jn., ii*, 973.

[151]B. L. Harl. MS 164, f. 309b; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, ff. 28b-29a; *Yonge's diary*, ed. Thompson, pp. 335-6; *Commons' jn., ii*, 984; *The true state and condition of the Kingdom of Ireland*, E 246 (31). The rumour was that spread by Warren - the words in question are not unlike the kind of things Marten at least was wont to say. The principal recent good was the victory at Rathconnell, discussion of which covers the bulk of the printed letter.

'That we may not dye in a ditch, and starve, which is the condition threatening us all'. But his worries were compounded by the fact that what was being squandered through inadequate support was 'a probable way of reducing these mis-creants for ever'.[152] The 'Irish lobby' were generating a 'one last heave' momentum combing prospects of outright ruin or of imminent, and total, victory in Ireland. For the moment they at least managed to win yet another committee to consider what course 'may be most necessary and requisite for the speedy Supply and the Safety of the Kingdom of *Ireland* '.[153] Tension persisted between a yawning distrust of the King and the need to bind him to financial measures.

The commissioners' return to England was effected soon after and they quickly entered into the shaping of Irish policy at Westminster.[154] Their time in Dublin had been characterised by the intrusion of English political priorities as well as the rise of the army officers as petitioners. Ormond expressed concern that the efforts of the commissioners to woo the out-garrisons was their attempt to construct an anti-treaty power within the armed forces.[155] Richard Bellings's account adds further to the idea of a conflict for the army's allegiance. He claims that the support given by the Lords Justices and the commissioners to Lord Lisle's command of an expedition to Ross / Wexford by Feb. 1643 was not only so that victory would cast doubt on the advantage of proceeding with negotiations with the confederates, but that Lisle would receive the honour of the enterprise and 'soe winn upon the souldier enriched by the spoyles of the country under his command, as to affect him beyond the Marquis of Ormonde'.[156] This would certainly make sense of the withdrawal of support for the expedition by Reynolds and Goodwyn once Ormond made it clear he would command, an action suggesting a better reason than mere pique.[157] Nor is it impossible that Ormond's own motives were at least in part to keep the army with him through success in the field, as

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[152]*The true state and condition of the Kingdom of Ireland*, E 246 (31). Cf. Yonge's comment (source unclear) on the debates that day - 'It is thought that yf wee had but 3 or 4000 men nowe in Irelande p[ro]vided with victuells wee might runn over all Irelande for the enemy is almost starved for wante of victuell... so that yf wee could furnishe our men with victuells and supply them from porte to porte wee might doe much with gods blessing that waye'. It reads like a recipe for success from Elizabeth's wars, or indeed one written by the Lords Justices. *Yonge's diary*, ed. Thompson, p. 338.

[153] Lenthall apparently brought a motion that a committee should 'drawe upp some heads to represent this to his Ma[jes]tie as a part of the treatie'. B. L. Harl. MS 164, f. 309b; *Commons' jn., ii*, 984. The new committee comprised Clotworthy, St. John, Vane [sr ?], Gerrard, Armine, Pym and Parkhurst. Prideaux, Cage and Browne were added on March 7, Reynolds and Robert Goodwyn on March 11 (*Commons' jn., ii*, 992, 999).

[154]*A Continuation* no. 35 (March 2-9), E 92 (20) reported their return in letters from Plymouth. Both men were officially added to the new Irish committee on March 11. Both were to be among the most regular attenders at the older, adventurer, committee from March on. *Commons' jn., ii,* 999; B.L. Add. MS 4 782.

[155]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, Carte claims they also attempted to stir up the population to protest against any treaty, Carte, *Ormonde*, ii, 402.

[156]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 123-4. He adds that this was so the army could be persuaded to intervene on the side of Parliament against the King, which is unlikely, at least in the short term.

[157]Carte, *Ormonde*, ii 426-7.

well as increasing his bargaining power with those whom he was commanded to treat with, but whom he clearly regarded as rebels, even if with some cause. Bellings adds a convincing portrait of Ormond setting himself forth as patron of, and one among, the army commanders, the defender of their interests with the government, not as Privy Councillor but as Lieutenant - General.[158]

Ormond's opponents were disposed to attribute to him the killing off of the 'Irish adventure' plan. Robert Goodwyn, less than eager at the outset, claimed that subscriptions were obtained to the value of £35 000 and the expressions of dislike from the King sunk the scheme, but a later tract contended that it had been Ormond who had procured Charles's disavowal.[159] Certainly there seems to be no doubt that Ormond was working for the expulsion of the commissioners, duly affected by mid-Feb.[160] Their supporters on the Council, however, ensured that they departed with a letter of commendation and escorted by one of only two pinnaces available to the Dublin government.[161] The King's letters to Ormond had shown that, whatever the limitations placed on a negotiation with Irish rebels, 'no peace can be drawn out of the Articles propounded' by the English rebels. He was candid about the impossibility of his sending supplies to Ireland but insisted that Ormond overcome Protestant support for the Lords Justices refusal to implement the commission for negotiation.[162] This division of opinion over whether or not to accept peace short of total victory was the primary one within the Irish executive. During the commissioners' stint in Dublin, they had already aligned themselves with the uncompromising element, but a firm commitment to Parliament had not been returned.[163]

The outcome of the spring campaign into the south-east would be vital, politically even more than strategically. Ormond certainly worked hard to ensure success, neglecting the negotiations now beginning in order to win a better position by

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[158]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 125-7.

[159]B.L. Harl. MS 164, f. 329a for Goodwyn's claims, made to D'Ewes; the MS of *Ormond's Curtain Drawne*, B.L. Add. MS 4 819, ff. 320a-b claims that Ormond gained the King's disavowal through the agency of captain Yarner; certainly Yarner was at Oxford in late Jan. with correspondence from Ormond, Carte MS 4, ff. 342, 347.

[160]*The true state and condition of the Kingdom of Ireland*, E 246 (31), the letter of Feb. 15, sets out the committee's account of their expulsion.

[161]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 236 (Feb. 21). Not all of the 8 signatories (Parsons, Borlace, Sir Adam Loftus, Sir Gerard Lowther, Temple, Sir Thomas Rotherham, Sir Francis Willoughby and Sir Robert Meredith) appear as later 'parliamentarians', but only Willoughby seems to have been much involved in the early treaty negotiations. Notable in their absence are 5 other councillors, whose signatures appear on another letter dated Feb. 21 (*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 236), Ormond, Brabazon, Lambert, Ware and Wentworth.

[162]For orders for the expulsion, and arrest, of the commissioners see Charles's letters to the Lords Justices, Feb. 3, Carte MS 4, f. 349; to the Lords Justices and Ormond, March 1, Carte MS 4, ff. 432. 435.

[163]Conflict had spilled over into relatively minor matters, such as the activities of the minister sponsored by the committee, Stephen Jerome, or the disciplining of the Bishop of Meath for failure to contribute to the call for plate.

battle, as he was to do in the autumn.[164] With him out of Dublin, the opponents of the treaty made their last bid for the King's attention, the very day before the scheduled meeting at Trim. Their March 16 letter is a key statement of the developing 'massacre' legend, advancing the subsequently much-cited figure of 154 000 slain from Oct. 1641 to March 1642, as culled from the testimony of Rev. Robert Maxwell. As Carte recognised, the strategy adopted was the eliding of the Old Irish of Ulster with the Old English Catholics of the Pale. All could therefore be condemned for barbarism, for settled hatred of the English and of Protestantism, and for explicit rejection and usurpation of the King's rights and authority. The authors' vision was quite openly that of a final and complete solution to the problem of Ireland. Peace was to be wished for, but 'the settlement of it in this kingdom will be of a different consideration from the rest', for 'if peace should now be granted them before the sword or famine should have so abated them in numbers as that in reasonable time English Colonies might overlap them, ... the English do plainly foresee it can never be safe for to cohabit with them, secure for England to enjoy them, or likely that themselves ... can ever digest into a people good to themselves, or profitable to their king or country'.[165]

It was their last real chance, and it failed. Though Ormond declared himself happy neither with the terms submitted on March 17, nor with the Lords Justices' opposition to the treaty,[166] his return premised an alteration in the balance of forces. Pamphlets celebratory of his victory at Ross honoured the general, who showed 'both his valour and his inveterate hatred against his kinsmen and Countrymen for their Rebellion' but did not attempt to disguise two facts. One was the poor condition of the troops whose return to Dublin was a disaster both for them and the populace.[167] The other was that 'much more might be done, if wee had but more men to make good the places that would be gotten in, which now we cannot doe for feare of weakning our Army'.[168] The military option had failed, with no decisive outcome to the march to the

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[164]Carte MS 4. For examples, see Ormond's efforts to co-ordinate with Esmond, and to obtain naval assistance for the operation, Carte MS 4, ff. 438, 439, 463, 467, 469, 471.

[165]The authors protested that they did not wish 'the utter extirpation of the nation (which is far from our thoughts, though some to render us the more odious report so of us)' but their admitted desires were surely enough to draw down odium from their foes. *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 244-53; cf. Carte, *Ormonde*, ii, 444-7 for his opinion on the attempt to identify Old English and Old Irish. The signatories were quite open in their condemnation of the former; for example, attributing the early threat as not only from 'the barbarous rebels of Ulster but also by the degenerate, ungrateful Lords and gentry of the Pale' (p. 246) or by pointing how the 'old English' towns and corporations 'run with the country' as in former insurrections (p. 250).

[166]Carte MS 5, f. 17 for Ormond's draft comments.

[167]*A full and true relation of the late victory*, E 96(6), letters from Robert Cole, who claimed to have served on the expedition. He described the foot soldiers as without bread for 5 days, the cavalry as having 'got somewhat abroad riding hard or it', and Dublin as empty of food. In his earlier letter, *The true coppies of two letters*, E 94(20), Cole reports how the belief at one point that the army was to turn back to Dublin was greeted by the troops, loath to 'so soone part with their plenty to eate shotten herrings without bread, and cold water instead of hot water' back in the city.

[168]*Truth from Ireland*, E 99(12), a letter from 'G.T.' dated March 27. Cf. Cole's opinion, *The true coppies of two letters*, E 94(20) when setting out that Wexford and then Waterford and Ross were

south-east. The Lords Justices and their allies were quite clear that they now had more to fear from their own army than any external enemy,[169] though they could have taken little comfort from the confederate documents of March 17 which openly named those they considered liable for the troubles of Ireland.[170] On its return the army had submitted another statement of grievances, this time to the Irish House of Lords.[171] So wary had the Lords Justices now become that they prorogued the session to Nov. rather than have such a course take effect.[172]

But closer to home even than this, members of the Council itself had broken with the Justices' control. Eight of its members signed a letter to the King on April 1 such as the Justices would not have approved, pointing out the misery of the army and population in direct terms, awaiting the King's opinion on what they should do. The signatories would be at the heart of the cessation plans.[173] The response from Oxford moved along three tracks. Already the dismissal of Parsons from the Lord Justiceship (dated March 31) had been decided at Oxford; then there was a new commission, dated April 23, for the negotiation of a one-year cessation; finally, there was a public letter on April 29. Charles encouraged the army 'to make such a shift yet for a while for subsistence as possibly you shall be able to effect with your united forces and counsel' until he could give succour. He blamed parliament to whom he had 'commended the care of the country..., the only means of reducing the rebels to obedience'.[174] As in the past and the future, Charles was at his most successful when at his most impotent. Parliament could be blamed for all the harm done his faithful soldiery, whose welfare was always in his mind. Meanwhile he was winning the official government of Ireland over to his side.

Some of them at least were aware that his motives were far from detached from the current of war in England.[175] Charles's stance as upholder of the army in Ireland was being chipped away concurrently by his dispensations to prominent individuals. A

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objectives, but of little use even if taken, 'if we have not a supply of man out of *England*, ... as to come over to Garrison, and hold those places', p. 1 (March 15).

[169]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 269-70 (April 22). On April 4 they recorded the receipt that day of a new paper from the officers 'in such a style and threatens so much danger' as that without money it would be 'impossible to contain them from breaking out into mutiny' (p.265).

[170]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 226-42. Parsons came in for most condemnation, but Sir Adam Loftus, Clotworthy and Arthur Hill are also named, as is the late Sir Charles Coote. The accusations against these men could be expanded to cover others supporting a 'vigorous' war effort and 'final plantation' settlement.

[171]Carte, *Ormonde*, ii, 452-3 for the text; Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 439 gives the April 22 petition to the King following the petition to the Irish Lords.

[172]Carte, *Ormonde*, ii, 454-7; see v, 440-1 for Bolton's letter to Nicholas, April 22, on the incident.

[173]Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 432-4 (April 1); Carte MS 5, f. 18. The signatories are Bolton, Ormond, Brabazon, Bishop Martin of Meath, Lambert, Willoughby, Ware and Wentworth.

[174]*Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 381.

[175]Charles had written again to Ormond (March 23) privately that he must conclude a cessation so as to bring his army over or service in England, Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 5. For formal issues of commissions, see Carte MS 5, ff. 147, 151.

succession of officers were diverted to commands in his English armies[176], probably not unwillingly while, despite the recent condemnation of custodiums by the army petitions, the King remained lavish in his grants to officials in Dublin.[177] The split in opinion in Dublin was concerned with the conduct of the war in, and post-war settlement of, Ireland, but it was precipitated by the intrusion of English divisions. Here the King, operating through Ormond (and the army) has a more prominent part even than the parliamentary commissioners. It seems his attitude was awkwardly even-handed in regard to 'rebels' in England and Ireland. In both instances the King had strict limits beyond which he would not make concessions, but in both he was ready to operate by a pre-negotiation cessation of conflict. When the English talks broke down irreparably, the go-ahead to press those in Ireland was given. Yet such was the centrality of the Irish war to Parliament that any conception of themselves on a par with the barbarous Irish insurgents was anathema. Simultaneity and equality of treatment could not possibly succeed in England, and in Ireland was liable to alienate increasing numbers of Irish Protestants.

Yet if these were to be drawn over to an alternative alignment, Westminster needed to outbid the King with the necessary support for war in Ireland. The spring of 1643 did see the despatch of goods under 'official' supply initiatives underpinned by the 'Loan and Contribution', with a regional framework for collection and valuation established[178], and arrears from earlier Irish funds allocated to the Goodwyn committee's efforts to sustain the war effort.[179] The surrender of Galway fort (June 20) came just as a shipment of supplies had finally been commissioned to sail, and they were diverted to the ill-used outpost at Duncannon.[180] Deliveries were made to east and west Ulster, the former becoming even more dominated by the activities of John Davies as supplier, while local officers resident in London made their own arrangements for the sending of anything from munitions to Audley Mervyn's

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[176]Officers include Woodhouse (Carte MS 4, ff. 384, 549), Captains Edward Molesworth and Edward Boughton (Carte MS 4, ff. 460, 553). Cf. Newman, *Royalist Officers*, pp. 44, 421 for future service.

[177]*Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 377, 385, 378, 380, 381, 383, 379, 383. It seems probable that Charles was following his usual course of attempting to buy loyalty through reward - among the recipients were Baron of the Exchequer William Hilton; Sir Maurice Eustace; Sir Francis Butler who was to present the attack on Parsons in March 1643; Sir Patrick Wemyss and Sir Robert Hannay who both acted as conduits for Oxford to Dublin at this time (though they failed to hold to Ormond and the King). Offices were also awarded, as the Governorship of Meath to Sir Henry Tichborne (with pay and custodiums) and Major General to Sir Francis Willoughby.

[178]B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 110b, 112a-b, 118a-b, 120a-123b, 128a, 129b.

[179]For moves to secure control of all arrears, see B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 102b-103a, 105a-b, 138a-b, 162b, 165b; B.L. Harl. MS 164, f. 317b; *Commons' jn., ii*, 994, 996. Collectors named by the May 10 ordinance for assessment arrears were to collect arrears of the contribution also. A second ordinance on May 17 clarified procedures associating collections with the machinery of the £400 000 ordinance. *Lords' jn., vi*, 40-1, 49, 50-1; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 158-60. *Commons' jn., ii*, 996 (March 9) envisages the arrears being used to clear debts.

[180]See appendix 3 for details. Benjamin Goodwyn had been central to the effort to supply Galway.

Madeira.[181] Munster was moving to the forefront of attention and managed to have two major consignments sent, also now obtaining a dominant supplier in the person of adventurer William Pennoyer.[182]

Even Dublin obtained its first organised shipment of goods since Nov. 1642 with the main agency being that of the third Goodwyn brother, Benjamin.[183] In each instance the dominance of a large-scale contractor was emerging, the latter two as implicit representatives of the London adventurer interest.[184] Larger shipments meant greater delays than private, certified, endeavours (most took at least three months from authorisation at committee level to the sailing of the provisions ship[185]) but the scale of the contracts meant that repayment could be delayed. It was an unavoidable situation. John Goodwyn squeezed 17 orders for repayment through the Commons on March 22, leaving them to straggle through the upper House for the best part of the next month, but it was effectively the end of the system crushed by non-payment of sums owed, and the resort of the Irish authorities to outright confiscation of cargoes.[186]

The debate of Feb. 28 had seen a new Irish committee, chaired by Vane[187], set up to provide remedies for the present crisis. It decided to enquire the cost of sending victuals to sustain all Irish forces for 6 weeks and obtained estimates (from Goodwyn's committee) of £28 000 - £30 000. But the attitudes of the two bodies rapidly diverged. The adventurer committee hoped to get the money from specified English assessments as a repayment of part of their July 1642 'loan'.[188] Vane, however, was not disposed to let such details get in his way. Having delivered a particularly excruciating letter from the Dublin authorities on their final and 'inevitable Ruin', he delivered the reply which his committee had drafted, confidently assuring Dublin 'that wee had provided 6

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[181]See appendix 3 for details of the main shipments. The activities of the Ulster officers (especially Clotworthy) in 1643 became to object of the accounts' committee's scrutiny in 16 - see P.R.O. S.P. 28/ 253B.

[182]See appendix 3 for details.

[183]See appendix 3 for details. Commissary Perceval later recounted that the value of four shipments received in May (1) and July (3) came to a mere £2 300 in total value, Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 11-2.

[184]Pennoyer had been perhaps the single largest contractor in 1642, most of his concern going to the south and west of Ireland. In 1642-3 he was assigned custody and valuation of goods intended for Ireland, while the *Edmund and John* which went to Munster was described as his ship (B. L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 46a-b, 130a-b, 182b, 266b-267a). In 1643 he was also involved in smaller supplies (including ammunition) for west Ulster (B. L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 66b-67b, 87b, 116b-117a). One of the most prominent of the 'new' merchants, he was also a Levant Company trader, and was to re-emerge as a significant Irish supplier in the later 1640s. Goodwin joined the London committee in Feb. 1643, and was later described as 'assistant' to the MPs' committee; he dominated the Galway and Dublin shipments, and acted as agent for Loan and Contribution collections, (B. L. Add. MS 4 782, e.g. ff. 45a, 81b, 160b-161b, 169a-170b, 177b-178a 181a-b, 184a-b, 235a, 239b). For an unfavourable assessment of his activities (by William Dobbins, 1645), see P.R.O. S.P. 28/253B, pp. 55-6.

[185]B. L. Add. MS 4 782. See also appendix 3.

[186]B.L. Harl MS 164, ff. 317b, 339a; *Lords' jn.*, *v*, 680, 690-1, 692, 694, 695-6, 697, 698-9; *Anal. Hib.*, iv, 59-67; B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 178b-179b.

[187]It is not clear if this was the elder or younger Vane, but the possibility that it was the former emerges from the speech made by him on April 17, though this need not be related to membership of an Irish committee.

[188]B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 98b-99a, 118a.

weekes provisions to be sent away to severall parts of Ireland' and adding a recommendation that, in the short term, trade be used to generate supplies by the encouragement of the resort of merchants to Dublin.[189] The duplication of Irish committees was not a happy decision. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the new, Star Chamber based committee, apparently chaired by the elder Vane, had little patience with the methodical efforts and book-balancing mentality of the older (adventurer) committee under Goodwin which met in the Exchequer Chamber.

Both were willing to co-operate on the bill to recoup unpaid adventure subscriptions.[190] It had been claimed that £40 000 could be secured thereby, but the introduction of the principle of compulsion had produced considerable legal wrangles, even though the pill was considerably sweetened when the draft Bill was seen to provide for restored rights to land upon payment which, as D'Ewes put it, 'gave many of us content'.[191] A sub-committee of Goodwyn's committee, headed by John Maynard, negotiated the legal minefield to the extent that the Commons approved their bill on April 13.[192] In the meantime pressure was again being exerted by the refugee (or émigré) community in London, a petition presented on March 21 (by 'divers *English* Gentlemen, Inhabitants of *Ireland* ') leading to a revival of the notion of a 'national adventure' by the Kingdom of England to the tune of £200 000.[193] What must be borne in mind is the English context of these deliberations, in two regards. Firstly, the barriers to compulsive taxation in England were only now being breached. Essex's army relied on voluntary financial support every bit as much as armies in Ireland relied on the offerings made in the 'Loan and Contribution' scheme.[194] Secondly, the English situation showed that condemnation of armies and their commanders, and the promotion of grandiose and unrealistic schemes were more likely than not to be the prerogative of the more militant of MPs.[195] This has a bearing on the activities of Vane's Irish committee. By April 17 their investigation of Irish finances led them to conclude that £500 000 or more had been expended to date and they were empowered to investigate further. But when the Speaker then made delivery of

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[189]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 6; B.L. Add. MS 4 782, f. 118a; B.L. Harl. MS 164, f. 332b. The letter from Dublin is found in *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 239-241.

[190]In the debate on March 17, Vane reported that his committee 'conceive no Way to be more proper for the raising of these Monies', that is, the £30 000 for 6 weeks supply, than the dispatch of the repayment bill. It duly secured a second reading. *Commons' jn., iii*, 6.

[191]*Commons' jn., ii*, 984; B.L. Harl. MS 164, ff. 309b-310a; *Yonge's diary*, ed. Thompson, pp. 337-8.

[192]*Commons' jn., ii*, 988; *iii*, 6, 14, 27, 36, 43; B.L. Harl. MS 164, ff. 311a-b, 332b, 350a, 366a; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, ff. 29b, 39b; *Yonge's diary*, ed. Thompson, pp. 341-3.

[193]*Commons' jn., iii*, 10-11 mentions the request as the raising of money 'by way of Subsidy' but the subsequent debate as on a 'national' adventure.

[194]Hexter, *Reign of King Pym*, pp. 15, 21; Brenner, *Merchants and revolution*, pp. 427, 430-1.

[195]See for example the planned 'general rising' scheme which ended in ignominy, Hexter, *Reign of King Pym*, pp. 122-3, 126-7; Pearl, *London*, pp. 267-73; Lotte Glow, 'Pym and Parliament: the methods of moderation', in *Jn. Mod. Hist.*, xxxvi (1964), pp. 377-81.

lamentations from the Dublin government, and John Goodwyn responded with an attempt to press the bill for £200 000, Vane sr reacted by 'reproveing' Goodwyn and expending his ire to encompass the Irish authorities. Their letter and Remonstrance he took 'to bee a meere threatening of us'.[196]

On May 4, the Irish executive's reply (April 22) to the Vane committee's optimistic letter of March 17 was read in the House. The response was a dash of reality. Whatever about the situation in peacetime, since the rising the 'rebels' had possessed themselves not only of 'all the money, plate, household stuff, corn, cattle and all the wealth of the country' through robbery but 'at the same time became (and still continue) masters of all the native commodities in the country' which they traded for continental aid. All that the 'good subjects' had left was an inconsiderable amount of hides taken from captured cattle. The authorities admitted to having themselves plundered Dublin's merchants and retailers. Their needs were so great that any merchant who thought to bring goods to Dublin for Irish products faced a government 'constrained...either to force those provisions from those that shall bring them, or from those to whom they shall sell them, and from both without any payment of money for them.' To this they added that their own army had now become as great a danger as the enemy, openly mutinous and riotous through want.[197] It was an accurate assessment of the condition of things, not only in the capital but, for example in Munster also, where Inchiquin's efforts to exploit trade proved equally nugatory[198], and he was forced to rely on the minimal material rewards produced (along with political odium) by arrangements with local occupiers of agricultural land.[199]

At Westminster the missive from Dublin was greeted with the petulant response that complaints were always forthcoming but never any acknowledgement of the extent of Parliament's efforts since the outbreak of the rising, and order was given for a listing of provision made.[200] Yet perhaps it is too much to assume thereby any strong feeling that Ireland was too much trouble and would be better left alone till England's worries

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[196]*Commons' jn., iii*, 47; B.L. Harl. 164, ff. 370a-b; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 44a.

[197]*Commons' jn., iii*, 70; *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 266-80. For examples of just such confiscation, see *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 272.

[198]See Smith, *Hist. Cork*, ii, 82 for discussion of seizures of tobacco in the port towns in Nov. 1642 and of all cattle in Feb. 1643. Inchiquin confiscated £600 worth of herrings and appealed to Parliament to compensate the owner and in May tried to procure money from the export of confiscated hides. Parliament, however, ordered any money raised to be paid in compensation and not go to the war effort (*Commons' jn., iii*, 92, 101; B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 165a, 172a, 197b-198b). Thus when the Houses did concern themselves with mercantile losses, it was as too late a stage to encourage trade, but served to weaken the resolve of the Irish military - Perceval makes mention of the adverse effect on morale of the incident, Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 6.

[199]In March 1642(?3) Inchiquin issued a warrant to the governor of Kinsale to collect revenue due the King from property now forfeited by the rising, showing a willingness to exploit the potential of confiscation ('MSS of the Old Corporation of Kinsale' in *Anal. Hib.*, xv (1944), p. 208). More usual, perhaps, are the kind of arrangements permitted on Perceval's property allowing 'protection' to occupiers in sowing, in return for one sheaf in four at the harvest (*Egmont MSS*, i, 185-6, 187).

[200]*Commons' jn., iii*, 70; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 48a.

were sorted out. Instead, as mentioned, a better parallel to the outbursts of the (far from radical) elder Vane might be the incredulous and angry attitudes of the 'war party' to Lord General Essex. There is the failure to believe that the efforts made by the Houses could not have gleaned more success than had appeared[201]; the reluctance to address the significant details of army logistics[202]; the willingness to support impractical ventures for rapid victory; all mirror opinion about the Irish war.[203] A change in the tempo of things has been perceived from April 1643 with an upswing in the criticism of the parliamentary commander, but also with a general drift within the Commons towards a 'war policy' with the palpable failure of the Oxford treaty.[204] Paradoxically perhaps, it thus allowed for co-operation between the militants and the more hard-headed proponents of practical assistance within an increasingly vehement propaganda portrayal of the war. As always, there is relevance here for consideration of Ireland.

The much delayed bill for adventure payments emerges as something of a last fling in the otherwise moribund effort to co-ordinate royal and parliamentarian energies in Ireland. It made its circuit to Oxford, carried there by three serving officers in Ireland, William Jephson, Sir Robert King and Col Arthur Hill. Charles's reply, as written by Falkland on May 5, was read in the Lords on May 8. It rejected the bill, principally arguing the diversion of the (supposed) £100 000 'loan' of 1642 and alleging uncertainty whether the new collections would not be so used. Similarly the powers of the treasurers Warner, Towse and Andrews was attacked, of whose 'Integrity and Affection [he was]... in no degree satisfied.' Doubts were also raised about the interpretation of the original Act, and the possibility of Parliament's version being prejudicial to the interests of creditors and purchasers of land. The message ended pointedly by noting that Ireland could best be served by the outbreak of peace in England. Clotworthy reported the letter to the Commons.[205] In response the Commons acceded to the Goodwyn committee's requests on arrears collection[206] and made the committee responsible for the drafting of a reply.[207]

Any pacific hopes raised by the tone of the royal messages[208] were dashed by the circumstances in which the responding declaration would be discussed. Allegations were being aired that Royalist atrocities in Bucks. were the work of 'Irish Wallons &

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[201]Hexter, *Reign of King Pym*, pp. 108, 111-2.
[202]Hexter, *Reign of King Pym*, pp. 108-9.
[203]See above, note 195.
[204]Hexter, *Reign of King Pym*, pp. 111-2, 119.
[205]B.L. Harl. MS 164, ff. 384b-385a; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 145b; *Commons' jn., iii*, 75. The text appears at *Lords' jn., vi*, 36-7.
[206]*Commons' jn., iii*, 86, 89; B.L. Add MS 4 782, ff. 162b, 163a; *Lords' jn., vi*, 40-1, 49, 50-1; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 158-60.
[207]B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 166b.
[208]*Cal. S. P. Venice 1642-3*, p. 274; *A Continuation*, no, 44, May 6 -11, E 101 (17); *Mercurius Aulicus*, no. 19, E 103 (10), p. 248.

Pap[ist]s' all alike seeking the extirpation of Protestantism when Jephson drew attention to what he had observed at Oxford. There, he claimed, great store was set by the Lords Taaffe and Dillon, men who he claimed to know as having been in correspondence with the Munster confederate leader, Lord Muskerry, assuring the latter of covert royal approval of his actions. The Commons claimed that they saw 'the same Spirit here'. Stapleton is reported to have 'seconded' Jephson, 'shewing that we have fostered the Papists too long, letting them have a quiet being amongst us, while they by all meanes labour our ruine...' According to the *Perfect Diurnall* the resulting resolution was that 'these Papists here are acted by the same counsell and principles as they in Ireland, and seeing they in generall have been such promoters of the warr against the Parliament, and many actuall agents in it...' action must be taken. All counties should rise up at the coming of the Earl of Essex to oppose the establishment of popery in England and Ireland. More specifically, all Papists under arms, or found to have aided the enemies of Parliament with arms or money were to be proceeded against as traitors.[209] Papists, *en masse*, were deemed to be Englishmen worthy of being treated as Irish. It was but a prelude to the specific condemnation within a few days of the most notable Catholic in England, the Queen herself.[210] To render secure the 'popish plot' interpretation a second declaration on matters Irish was to be drawn up. That for which a committee of 13 were named on May 18 was specifically geared towards proving 'That the Rebellion in *Ireland*, and this in *England*, spring from one Head; and are managed with concurrent Counsels to one End; for the utter Overthrow and Extirpation of the Protestant Religion'.[211]

Such a spurt of declaration-making would carry over into June, and even July. The first, on the adventure bill, was delivered by Clotworthy on May 25, though it took a close vote to get it read.[212] Its basic thrust was to 'vindicate the Howse' particularly over Irish expenditure, and a schedule was attached asserting the facts of the matter as

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[209]B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 51a; Commons' *jn.*, *iii*, 91; *Lords' jn.*, *vi*, 52, 53; *Perfect Diurnall*, no. 49, May 15-22, E 249(8).

[210]*Mercurius Aulicus* no. 21, E 105(12), pp. 271-2, reporting of May 22, suggests that Essex, Manchester and Saye refused to accept anxieties in the Lords that the votes encompass the Queen, but such was the bias of 'these righteous Judges' that they did exempt Essex's half-brother Clanricard from sequestration - it was better to be a 'friend of some potent member' than the Queen of England. Her impeachment followed within the week.

[211]*Commons' jn.*, *iii*, 91. The 13 included Jephson, Clotworthy and Reynolds, but the matter was referred particularly to John Glyn and Francis Rous. More directly, a 6-men committee headed by Jephson was allotted the task of collecting such informations as they deemed relevant to such a consideration of the Rising (*Commons' jn.*, *iii*, 92).

[212]The document appears to have reached the Commons on May 22 as presented by Goodwin, when the House voted against sending any answer to the King. The committee was, however, instructed to re-draft the document to be a declaration to the kingdom, *Commons' jn.*, *iii*, 96. The division on May 25 saw Sir Guy Palmes and Francis Rous win 30 votes in favour of a reading to 24 gathered by Sir Henry Anderson and Sir Peter Wentworth, *Commons' jn.*, *iii*, 102.

regards funding.[213] There was a debate and a division about the preamble, with the more 'radical' MPs opposing the address being made to the King, even though the tenor was far from pacificatory, stating that Parliament was not disposed to dispute with the monarch any legislation it presented to him, being understood to be 'always... for Your Majesty's Honour, and the Weal of all Your Kingdoms'. The document should not be construed, therefore as any attempt to answer scruples raised, only as a clearing of what was charged against the Houses. The established 'Irish' interest had held firm on the matter, Robert Goodwyn and Reynolds pressing the declaration on the grounds that the diversion of money was an old charge laid against the Houses that 'had brought a scandall upon the Parliament in forraigne parts long before' this new bill.[214]

By May 29 yet another committee was launched to investigate the present and future situation of the armies in Ireland, this time in conjunction with a full assembly of adventurers in London, fixed for June 2.[215] Before a report of the proceedings could be made to the Commons, the temperature there was raised (June 4/5) by the reading of intercepted letters. Leicester, still Lieutenant in name, confided in his daughter that the King had prohibited his travelling to Ireland because 'his Ma[jes]ty entended to agree with the Rebells of Ireland that hee might trust them and that hee had told his Ma[jes]ty plainely that they would cheate him of his Kingdome...'. Reynolds then added three letters written by Sir William Parsons to various persons in England, including himself, as well as correspondence from (anonymous) contacts made when in Ireland. D'Ewes reported that the news 'made my heart and I believe the hearts of many more to ake'. Parsons's message was of his expulsion from the Lord Justiceship, though his language was hardly designed for parliamentary ears[216]; Reynolds's correspondent condemned the replacement, Sir Henry Tichborne and added that 'the whole frame of the government was now likely to bee altered there and that his Ma[jes]ty spedily

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[213]It suggested that, instead of siphoning off £100 000, (really £73 346) from Irish funds, parliament had overspend on Ireland to the tune of £279 207 - 19 - 3, of which £123 382-14-9 had been spent since the July 1642 'loan'.

[214]*Commons' jn., iii,* 102-3; B.L. Harl. MS 164, ff. 392b, 393a; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 53a. The Lords read the answer on June 5 and referred it to a committee of 6. By June 14 Jephson was pressing them for agreement as well as advancing the new 'Declaration toughing *Ireland* ', but the document never appears to have emerged from the upper House. *Lords' jn., vi*, 81, 95 (the six were mostly 'peace' lords, Northumberland, Salisbury, Holland, Bedford, Conway and Howard). Parliamentarian newsletters make much of the incident, throwing out figures like £500 000 for parliamentary expenditure on Ireland, and praising the merchants who had foregone £20 000 or £30 000 worth of goods, *Perfect Diurnall*, no. 49, May 8-15, E 149(5) and *Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer*, no. 18, May 2-9, E 101(4), p. 143. The first issue of *Mercurius Civicus*, for May 4-11, E 101(15) is particularly emphatic on the need to reactivate interest in Ireland, reminding readers 'that the very Heathen Romans, when Italy was over-run with a powerfull invading Army, and *Hannibal* marched even to the gates of Rome, even then they sent supplies into Sicilie'.

[215]This was to follow a meeting of all MP adventurers at the same location on June 1, *Commons' jn., iii,* 109, 110; E 104(23), [untitled circular summoning adventurers to a meeting at Grocers' Hall].

[216]He asked Ranelagh to intercede with Falkland for his restoration, seeing he was 'no Roundhead after ye New Appellacon, nor no Puritan after ye old'.

intended to receive the Rebells there into his favour'. Parsons, 'an enemy to the Rebells and a favourer to the Parliament of England' (the two terms were thus conjoined by a supporter, not a critic) was even to be charged with treason, including for allowing Reynolds and Goodwyn to leave Dublin unharmed.[217] Other news included word of ongoing negotiations between the King's agents and Kilkenny, and the suggestion that, however bad the condition of the Protestant forces, that of the rebels was worse.

A spurt to Irish business was rendered possible, fuelled by the adventurers' meetings at Grocers' Hall. The bill to raise £200 000 for Ireland was accepted as an ordinance on June 9 with a fresh declaration.[218] Progress was made on the harnessing of Dutch benevolence towards Ireland[219] and, on June 19, a new strategy was unveiled. All power over new initiatives was to be vested in the May 29 committee along with the newly elected London adventurer committee, though both the old parliamentary and London committees would have power to join with the new.[220] They would preside over four measures, two financial, two in the structures of power. The adventure would receive new life in two pieces of legislation, one allowing for 'doubling' in the value of land to be allotted on adventures previously made on payment of an additional quarter payment, and of such a rating for completely new adventures. The other was the proposal to raise a wholly new adventure, to be financed by the confiscation of urban property, specifically the towns of Waterford, Limerick, Galway and Wexford. Both these measures would be brought in the form of ordinances as soon as possible but with the provision that Acts of Parliament to confirm them be passed in both England and Ireland. In addition parliament promised to send to Ireland a Commander in Chief 'such as the Kingdom will have good Cause to confide in' and a committee (of one MP and one adventurer) to each province for the keeping of intelligence. It was the largest initiative undertaken since the outbreak of English war, and passed the Lords on June 23, being, significantly, then sent on to the London authorities.[221]

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[217]Meanwhile papist numbers in Dublin were said to be growing to the detriment of food supplies which were low in any case. B.L. Harl. MS 164, ff. 395a-b, 396a; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 55a; *Commons' jn., iii*, 115. The Commons took the opportunity to set in motion the trials of Irish prisoners held in London at this juncture, referring the matter to Reynolds and Robert Goodwyn. For newspaper reportage, see *Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer*, no. 22, May 30 -June 6 E 105(8) & E 105(9) and *Special Passages*, no. 43, May 30 - June 6 E 105(10). It is possible that the anonymous information from Dublin was being sent by Temple; certainly he was accused of communication with Reynolds and Goodwin in the impeachment charges.

[218]B.L. Harl. MS 165, ff. 98b, 108a; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 56a; *Commons' jn., iii*, 121; *Lords' jn., vi*, 95-6, 97, 98-9; *A Declaration of Parliament concerning the miserable condition of Ireland* ... E 55(1) and an expended version, E 55(20), *A Declaration .... whereunto are added the propositions made by the committees...*

[219]*Commons' jn., iii*, 122.

[220]*Commons' jn., iii*, 136

[221]*Commons' jn., iii*, 135-6; *Lords' jn., vi*, 104, 105.

The potential was there for a revamping of the war effort if loans could be arranged on the basis of the ordinances proposed, while the alterations in the Irish government made by the King could be counter-acted in a much more stringent control by Parliament. Altogether they appear as part of what is almost an overhaul of the parliamentarian cause at this time; the fall-out from the collapse of negotiations,[222] was a condition of fresh rigor compounded by the revelations of plots[223] and news of real or potential defections from the cause.[224] Late May and early June witnesses a transformation fitting to addressing the problems of a long fight, only resolvable in military terms. The impeachment of Henrietta Maria is striking as particularly noteworthy, for it bears no obvious relation to prospective military gain, and even less to any potential accommodation with her husband. It stands as part of an evolving self-definition which makes the whole gamut of anti-Catholic statements and actions of a piece. The 'fears and jealousies' of 1643 were as real as those of 1641-2[225], contained as potent an Irish dimension as the association of the King and his 'best subjects' at Kilkenny was revealed, and working to as prominent an end, the Parliament-Covenanter alliance solemnised in the Solemn League and Covenant.

The parliamentary committee despatched to Scotland in May 1643 was, overtly, a response to the problem of supporting the Scottish army in Ulster.[226] More pertinent was the role of the most pernicious of plots, the 'Antrim plot' which, if primarily focused on Ireland, included an alleged threat to Scotland on a scale far beyond Antrim's personal designs.[227] Its impact on Scottish opinion will not be discussed

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[222]The attempt to formulate new peace proposals in August was seen as a last chance to define Parliament's cause in a limited manner, as their lapse after the Scots alliance, and the despondency of their supporters shows, Gardiner, *Great civil war*, i, 183-4, 184-8; J. T. Cliffe, *Puritans in conflict. The puritan gentry during and after the civil wars* (London, 1988), pp. 74-6; Patricia Crawford, *Denzil Holles, 1598-1680. A study of his political career* (London, 1979), pp. 97-8.

[223]Most notably in 'Waller's plot'. Whatever about the real intentions behind the episode it is hard to resist seeing its impact as decisive in creating distrust and strengthening the more militant parliamentarians. As Wormald puts it (*Clarendon*, p.132) it was 'the application of the *coup de grace* to the peace party'; Charles had 'rounded off a course of policy the effect of which was to seal off at each end two apparently irreconcilable blocs, and had brought about within each of them the submergence of non-violent parliamentarism', albeit only temporarily. Significantly the news of the fall of Lord Justice parsons and of the King's use of Lord Taaffe as envoy was broken only five days after that of the plot (June 5) and immediately before the acceptance of the Vow and Covenant and the Assembly ordinance (Gardiner, *Great civil war*, i, 146-9).

[224]Of the 44 MPs who defected throughout the war, from 20 to 32 switched to Charles in May-June 1643 (Ashton, *English civil war*, pp 188-9), including, most spectacularly, the Hothams (Gardiner, *Great civil war*, i, 159-161). J. T. Cliffe believes that, nationally, 'very few' puritan gentry defected 'though a considerable number were suspected of royalist leanings at one time or another' - he instances the furore over the abortive March 1643 Devon - Cornwall cessation (which did see James Chudleigh move to a prominent royalist command) among other examples - Cliffe, *Puritans in conflict*, pp. 776-9.

[225]And as liable to exaggeration, as in the claims of the Rev. Mr. Dodd, late of Cavan and Oxford, that 4 000 Irish rebels had joined the King at Oxford, claims D'Ewes found 'farre stretched beyond all possibility of truth', B.L. Harl. MS 164, f. 233a.

[226]*Commons' jn., iii*, 93, 96, 113, 132, 133, 134, 135, 141, 148; *Lords' jn., vi*, 59-60, 79.

[227]Ohlmeyer, *Civil war and restoration*, pp. 117-24.

here,[228] but the receipt of reports in Parliament, under the imprimatur of the Scottish Council (June 27) edged the English Parliament a step closer to full-scale negotiation in the face of a common threat.[229] More information on Antrim's machinations on July 6 doubtless glided the process still further. Generously, and expediently, Parliament this time left the determination of Antrim's fate to the Council of War of Monro's army.[230]

The intellectual context, as throughout these years, was one of the papist threat to uproot Protestantism throughout the King's realms, spearheaded from Ireland. On July 4 the latest, and fullest, declaration on Ireland was brought forward requiring half an hour to read.[231] In its final form it passed the Commons on July 14, guided throughout by Robert Reynolds; as printed it ran to 63 pages, 23 of them text and 40 of supporting documentation and as a work of propaganda it was a notable achievement. The declaration managed to incorporate a wide range of testimonies given to the committee set up to compile it. Even the voluble John Dodd was there, suitably edited no doubt, to prove the presence of named Irish 'rebels' at Oxford. The declaration set a figure on Protestant deaths in Ireland, confirming the 154000 figure to be much echoed in the years ahead. (This it attributed to another convenient clerical witness, Robert Maxwell).[232] The document made a great stir among the newsletter writers.[233] It drew together the evil plans to subvert Protestant Ireland from the beginning of Charles's reign, through the activities of the parliamentary commissioners in Dublin (given a worthy defence) to the Antrim revelations. It was a signal that parliamentarian self-definition remained firmly locked into anti-popery. More than that it very neatly made that popish threat one to all of Charles's kingdoms, and one countenanced by those closest to the King, and ended with the unavoidable conclusion 'That no earthly power is likely in humane reason to withstand this damnable Plot, but the power of the Parliament of *England*'.

Newsletters and pamphlets reporting Ireland recorded with great consistency three themes. Wants were great, indeed dire; victories were vouchsafed to the faithful Protestants and British and prospects were good against a starving enemy; any attempt at treating with the 'rebels' was a betrayal of religion and nation and the doom of both

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[228]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, i, 175, 177-8; Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, pp. 270, 273-4; Lawrence Kaplan, 'Steps to war: the Scots and Parliament, 1642-1643', in *J. Brit. St.*, ix (1970), pp. 57-8 for the 'Antrim plot' and its impact.

[229]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 146. A copy of the Scottish declaration and votes is found as E 56(9) *A Declaration of His Majesties Privie-Councell in Scotland ...*; cf. *Reg. privy council Scot., 1638-43*, pp. 442-4.

[230]*Commons' jn., iii*, 157-8. H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 120-3 for Monro's examinations, made known to Parliament.

[231]B.L. Harl. MS 165, ff. 115b, 126b; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, ff. 61b, 63a; *Commons' jn., iii*, 154, 164, 165, 166.

[232]E 61(23) *A Declaration of the Commons, concerning the rebellion in Ireland....*

[233]See e.g. *Perfect Diurnall*, no. 2, July 3 - 10, E 249(24); *Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer*, no. 24, July 4 - 11, E 59(22); *Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer*, no. 26, July 11-18 E 61(1).

kingdoms. The appeal to the country for action and assistance was covered from all angles.[234] In Parliament Clotworthy and Jephson piloted through the ordinances for doubling, for the new urban adventure and for the Dutch contribution.[235]

But their initiative had come too late if it hoped to persuade Dublin that the advantages of continuing the war were greater than those conferred by a cessation of hostilities. Despite denials, a change in the 'frame of government' had occurred and the whole orientation of the new executive was running counter to that of its predecessor. On May 3, two days after the reading of Charles's commission for a cessation, eight senior figures signed a 'Consultation' to work for the same - Ormond, Lord Chancellor Bolton, Sir Francis Willoughby, Sir Thomas Lucas, Sir James Ware, Sir George Wentworth, Justice Donnellan and Sir Maurice Eustace.[236] It was not as if they, particularly Ormond, had any notion of capitulation. Ormond's activities throughout June and July suggest a willingness to continue the war if that were feasible, and to win the best possible terms if that were not.[237] But three considerations separated them from men like Parsons or Temple. For Ormond and his like, pardon and negotiation were not wrong in themselves, only in their circumstances; Ormond, for example, persistently pressed the case for a hearing for Catholic gentry detained in Dublin for their surrender to him.[238] More immediately important, they saw cessation as, for the moment, as the most realistic military option, but were opposed in this their own grounds. Finally, Ormond at least was well aware that Charles wanted a cessation to take his army over to the English war.

Ormond was persistent in his demand that the confederates add to their terms the support of his forces.[239] With even the excise, proclaimed in Dublin on 24 June as a last expedient, failing to bring in the needed money, his concern was reasonable enough.[240] Perhaps the totally inadequate logistics for the campaign he attempted to launch in June - July persuaded him that war was no longer possible.[241] Certainly news from Munster could not but nudge the process forward. Compelled to disperse

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[234]See e.g. *Perfect diurnall*, no. 2, July 3- 10, E 249(24), pp. 11, 14; *Perfect diurnall*, no. 6, July 31- Aug. 7, E 249(34), pp. 45-6; *Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, no. 22, May 30 - June 6, E 205 (8), pp. 169-70; *Speciall passages*, no. 44, June 6-13, E 105 (32), pp. 360-1

[235]*Commons' jn., iii*, 160, 178, 183; B.L. Harl. MS 165, f. 122a; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 61b; *Lords' jn., vi*, 129, 131, 147, 148, 151, 158; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 192-7, 220-1.

[236]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 268.

[237]See his reports to the government in Dublin, June 24 & 25, Carte MS 5, ff. 569, 581.

[238]Not that this meant that he was particularly soft on those he considered 'rebels'. In the Irish Lords he rejected supplications from those charged with treason (*Lords' jn. Ire.*, i, 191; he had earlier shown a more generous attitude, i, 184-5). Though he forwarded a petition from prisoners to Parliament, and affirmed the truth of their claims, he added little advocacy and reminded the reader of the impossibility of reading the heart, even when outward actions were clear, Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 424-5, 426.

[239]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 284-5, 287, 306.

[240]See E 62(10) *Irelands Excise* for a copy of the proclamation.

[241]Carte MS 6. See e.g. Lambert to Ormond, July 16, Carte MS 6, f. 78. On June 22 Ormond had stated before the Irish Council that of £10 000 in cash and supplies could be had within two weeks, he would break off negotiations and move against Wexford. It was not forthcoming, Carte MS 5, f. 535.

his men north, west into Kerry, and east into Waterford, in the hope of winning needed resources, Inchiquin had witnessed the last of these parties under Vavasour defeated at Fermoy on June 4, 'the first victory of the Irish in the field since the beginning of the war'.[242] Inchiquin swung in behind the idea of a cessation, whether regional or national as vital to survival in the southern province.[243]

Ormond's putting on the record his willingness to continue fighting if that were possible has been seen as his way of securing himself for negotiating.[244] No doubt that is correct. But it seems clear that fighting and negotiation were conceived of as alternative routes to the objective of securing the year's harvest, as recognised as Algernon Sidney.[245] It was not as if the argument for the cessation in terms of military necessity was unchallenged. Temple expressed shock that the officers should so readily support a ceasefire, and attributed it to a belief that the Irish would contribute to their upkeep, a notion he considered ludicrous.[246] Parsons reminded Ormond that however ill Parliament had served Ireland, they would give nothing after a cessation and, more pertinently, that survival by pillage would no longer be acceptable.[247] As anti-cessation arguments in both Ireland and England would continue to point out, the only option to the unreliable Parliament was an enemy not likely to be more forthcoming, especially given his own needs. While Parsons had his own reasons to oppose negotiation anyway, June saw Sir Philip Perceval, later a signatory, and later still a defender of the cessation on grounds of necessity only, in a sceptical frame of mind about the benefits to the army.[248]

In the end, of course, the deal went ahead. Charles lodged the blame with Parliament[249] though Ormond had to remind him that the whole plan was almost up with the news of the Antrim scare.[250] A majority on the Irish Council, and almost certainly Lord Justice Tichbourne, held on to the military option till well into the late summer, with the prospects of securing the harvest declining.[251] Ormond's final terms

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[242]Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 47-8; Bottigheimer, 'English Interest', pp. 94-5.
[243]Bottigheimer, 'English Interest', pp. 95-9.
[244]*Tanner letters*, pp. 161-2; J. C. Beckett, *The Cavalier Duke. A life of James Butler, !st Duke of Ormond*, (Belfast, 1990), pp. 29-30.
[245]Sidney to the Countess of Leicester, June 18 in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, xlix - 'it hath bin long foresene that they which could be masters of this hervest would starve theire enimyes'.
[246]Temple to Dr. Thomas Temple, June 16 in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, xlvii - 'But 'tis admirable to see howe many of our comanders are swayed ... to applaud the intended Cessation; which I cannot find any reason they have to approve of, but onely their hopes of payment from the Rebells, ...which they despaire of elsewhere.' Even in good faith he saw it as impossible that Ireland, which peaceful and prosperous could not sustain 2 000 troops could now, wasted, support 10 000. In any event he thought the cessation 'is onely thereby to gaine tyme to gather in their harvest, and make benefitt of their herring fisheries..., whereby to furnish themselves with munition' and renew the war.
[247]Parsons to Ormond, June 22, Carte MS 5, f. 541.
[248]Perceval to Sir Robert King, June 17, Carte MS 5, ff. 478-9.
[249]Charles to Ormond, July 2, in Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 455-6.
[250]Ormond to Charles, July 11, in Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 456-8.
[251]See, for example, the Lords Justices letter to Ormond, Aug. 31, on the exigencies of the military situation, Carte MS 6, ff. 294-5.

went no further than the bare halt to the war, and the winning of a contribution.[252] News from the provinces indicated that only thus could military reverses be halted. Consistently, through June - August, Irish Protestants in London had sought to persuade him of the imminence of parliamentary aid.[253] Latterly they had taken to making it clear that this could only be assured if negotiations halted.[254] Monro, from Ulster, appears to have made it his condition for assistance also, that all treating be broken off.[255] But the summer of 1643 was a crisis time at Westminster, the 'darkest hours' of defeat and internal discord.[256] Progress over the proposed measures for Ireland was minimal, and rumblings presaged the future turmoil between the multiplicity of bodies overseeing policy, and particularly finance.[257] Only in August was there a return to the a more vigorous approach, with relief ships despatched and progress on the assessment ordinance.[258]

The final rounds of the cessation negotiations took place in an atmosphere which made clear that to military necessity must be added the dictates of English political allegiance. In Aug. four leading anti-cessationists, Parsons, Temple, Sir Adam Loftus and Sir Robert Meredith were ordered arrested. The charges lodged against them explicitly condemned them for supporting the English Parliament against the King, and seeking to promote such a stance among the army.[259] Soon Ormond would introduce an oath to bind the forces to the King's cause.[260] In Parliament, reports from Ireland were interpreted to show the dangers of a ceasefire with the rebels, and how the demise of Protestantism in Ireland and the flight of the Protestant population was the unavoidable outcome.[261]

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[252]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, ii, 365-76. D. F. Cregan considers the omission of any clauses on the Irish grievances and suggests '[t]his in a sense was a triumph for Ormond', 'The confederation of Kilkenny: its organisation, personnel and history', (Ph. D thesis, N.U.I., 1947) p. 139. Beckett, *Cavalier Duke*, p. 31 goes further - '[t]o have secured a truce on these terms, without having made any concession in return, was a very considerable achievement'. Its weaknesses would become apparent in time.

[253]See Ranelagh's letters Carte MS 5, ff. 425 (June 13), 492 (June 20), 611 (June 27).

[254]Clotworthy to Ormond, July 25, Carte MS 6, f. 116; Sir Thomas Wharton to Ormond, Aug. 29, Carte MS 6, f. 281.

[255]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 307-8.

[256]Hexter, *Reign of King Pym*, pp. 117-32

[257]Clotworthy and Jephson opposed Robert Goodwyn over the record of the treasurers for Irish funds, but the Goodwyn committee continued to complain over the handling of revenue, B.L. Harl. MS 165, f. 152a; B.L. Add. MS 4 782, ff. 243a-b, 246b, 248b. By Sept. all powers, including over accounts, was transferred to the large committee set up on July 14, but it was a papering over cracks. The bill to raise £200 000 did make progress in Aug. - Sept., see appendix 2. *Commons' jn., iii*, 209, 213, 218-9; B.L. Add MS 4 782, ff. 246b, 247a-b, 248a-b; B.L. Harl. MS 165, ff. 158a, 184b; B.L. Add. MS 31.116, f. 74b.

[258]Carte MS 6, ff. 213, 281.

[259]Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 519-20. Other charges were thrown in, including the financial irregularity which was to become grist to the mill of such charges in the years ahead, even if Loftus merited suspicion more than most.

[260]Rushworth, iii (2), 950 (Oct. 13).

[261]*Commons' jn., iii*, 213; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 72a. The letter announcing the arrests (read Aug. 21) is probably that found in H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 125-6. The Commons voted that yet another committee should find out whose fault the sad state of affairs was.

A year after the outbreak of the war in England, Parliament had not forgotten Ireland. But the effects of domestic conflict were felt in three ways. Firstly, the logistical difficulties of 1641-2 were greatly exacerbated by the need to sustain a war closer to home; only from the spring of 1643 could the beginnings of an effective English financial structure be seen, and its extension to Ireland was delayed even longer. In turn this made the struggle for scarce resources more acute, and a smaller Irish 'lobby' emerged to fight its corner at Westminster. At least this signified that the war in Ireland was still regarded as part of the struggle going on in England. Indeed by the summer of 1643 the explanatory role of the Irish conflict had taken on a new lease of life as part of 'one war' thinking. A renewed militancy further extended the third development, the collapse of efforts at a co-operation on Ireland between King and Parliament on the lines of a 'national' war. Charles had clawed back enough ground to distinguish his own position on Ireland, even if he still kept Parliament in the picture as a scapegoat.

In Ireland the same consequences of the English struggle worked themselves out in different ways. The hope of a reconciliation between King and Parliament in England was fervently held among Protestants in Ireland. But here politics were even more determined by the structural basis of war. The nature of the war being fought in Ireland, not only strategically but 'ideologically' as a war of attrition, was not sustainable in the circumstances of 1643. But nor was there a politically feasible alternative. The cessation, like the rise of the first of the army petitioning campaigns of the 1640s, was determined more by provisioning than policy. But subsequent interpretation of the ceasefire gave an opening for the corrosive power of competing English 'ideologies'. The dabbling of King and Parliament had not led to the formation of Irish branches of the English camps, but it had tugged at two corners of the Protestant self- perception. There was the idea of loyalty to their monarch, against all rebels, which could see the restoration of the monarch in England as a first stage to his regaining of his Irish Kingdom. But there was also the prospect that Ireland not be returned to its 1620s-30s condition, but be transformed to a more secure, 'settled' and Protestant future. This appeal to the colonial mission was one which could bind figures with as differing views on parliaments or puritans as Parsons and Reynolds. It was an Irish basis that the capture of Irish Protestants for Irish party allegiance would be built.

Chapter 5.
Ulster, the Scots and the Adventurers, Sept. 1643 - June 1644.

From the start the Covenant and the cessation proved interlocked, emblematic of an increased inter-action between events in the three kingdoms.[1] In early Sept. the discussion of the Covenant at Westminster had seen Clotworthy successfully move the inclusion of Ireland in the clauses on the reformation of religion. But the debates surrounding the incident make a point relevant to the consideration of Ireland in the next year, for the motion was opposed both by those who wished to have nothing to do with it and by those whose concern for the Scots was such that they did not want to proceed without their approval.[2] Ireland could be squeezed out of consideration by greater pressures, and could be talked down by pro- or anti-Scots. Hesitancy over Ireland was not a 'party' prerogative, but Irish policy did see alternative responses in 1643-4, and primarily in consequence of the Scottish involvement.[3]

The English commissioners who had been negotiating in Edinburgh had not been averse to the idea of withdrawing the Scottish army in Ulster for service in England, though the Committee of Estates was more open to having the army stay, if the English would meet their financial obligations.[4] But when papers from Edinburgh,

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[1]Scotland's willingness to sign was reportedly increased by threats from Ireland. See Edward J. Cowan, 'The Solemn League and Covenant', in Roger A. Mason (ed.), *Scotland and England 1286 - 1815* (Edinburgh, 1987), p. 192. Cowan places considerable weight on Argyll's role in the Covenant negotiations, and it was he who was particularly concerned with the Irish threat.

[2]B. L. Harl. MS 165, ff. 163b-164a; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 224, 230.

[3]It has often been asserted that support for the Irish war was a characteristic of the 'peace party' in 1643-5, but even if the broader term 'Essex's party', taken to include Clotworthy and Reynolds, is substituted seems to be inadequate. The 'war party' man, Sir Henry Vane jr, was enthusiastic in his efforts on behalf of the Scots in Ireland, at a time when they appeared the only 'reliable' force. Concern for Ireland shows the usual 'regional' emphasis, albeit in a different form, and there seems little evidence of 'political' differences over Ireland beyond the Scottish question. For the extent of regional determinants on policy at Westminster from late 1643 see Lotte Glow, 'Pym and Parliament: the methods of moderation', in *Jn. Mod. Hist*, xxxvi (1964), pp. 386-9.

[4]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 144-5. The English were, of course, not offering enough money either for withdrawal or to support the army in Ireland. A reading of the proceedings of the convention perhaps hints that withdrawal was being toyed with (given suitable recompense) only as a material necessity and not preferred. Certainly they showed a solicitude for the Scottish population of Ulster as well as concern at the threat from Ireland, both good reasons to keep the army in Ireland. *Acts parl. Scot.*, vi, 8-9, 12, 15-17, 17-18, 48-50.

concerning the Ulster army, were discussed in the Commons on Sept. 16 the result was a series of votes promising support, as well as three others denouncing the suspected cessation and promising a declaration on the subject.[5] This came through on Sept. 29, alongside a letter to the Dublin authorities, the sponsors including Clotworthy, Robert Goodwin and Hatcher, one of the returned commissioners to Scotland.[6]

The letter to the Lord Justices took its stance squarely on what was increasingly being advanced as a 'constitutional' argument. The Dublin government 'misunderstand the power that is in the Houses of Parliament, both by the Act of Parliament and by his Majesty's commission under the greate seale of England and instruccions to divers members of both Houses', that is, by the 'Adventure' legislation and the establishment of CIA. The argument from necessity was not good enough. Dublin's failure to seek 'advice or counsell' but only look for supply was 'no more but to make the Houses of Parliament the commissaries of victuall, armes and ammunicion and treasurers for money, but not to participate in your counsell of warre and peace'. They instanced the failure to correspond since June 10; the long background of negotiation since the issue of the first royal commission; the expulsion of their commissioners. Less compelling was their attempt to assert that supply had in fact been sent, and that other provinces had withstood the need to treat though 'in no lesse wants than those at Dublin'. Instead the 'true causes of it were the wicked practices of those that have cast this kingdome into such combustions ', the papists, who having 'given us an unparalleled example of their cruelty in time of peace, so now they have of their craft and subtility in time of warre'.[7]

Of course the die was not yet cast, the 'Trojan horse' not yet admitted. Thus the 20 reasons which were enclosed, which cover the whole compass of arguments against such a course of action, combining pragmatic assertions that Protestant military potential would be squandered with 'ideological' arguments about the triumph of popery and the fading of opportunities to make recompense (to Protestant victims as well as English adventurers) or exact restitution. The concession that if the Irish government could find better reasons than had been advanced so far they should send to Parliament for their approval was immediately countered by confident assertions that surely Dublin would reject the cessation deal, and take up Parliament's offer of 'such a weekly contribucion' as would sustain their forces.[8] The Declaration itself was largely an echo of this letter, with the claim that it was the (deliberate) spreading of rumours of

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[5]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 244, 248; *Anal. Hib.*, iv, 87.

[6]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 258, 259. For reports of discussions in Scotland on supplies, B. L. Harl. MS 165, ff. 177b-178a, 184b.

[7]*Anal. Hib.*, iv, 82-4. The reasons are an interesting amalgam of fact and fiction, with valid logistical reasons blending with overoptimistic assessments, and a curious assessment of the enemy as considerably cleverer and more energetic than Parliament's friends, even if this doubled as untrustworthiness and the force of malice.

[8]*Anal. Hib.*, iv, 84-7.

cessation which had hindered supply, not that shortages had caused the ceasefire.[9] Inchiquin received a special plea to counter the end of hostilities, though the efforts of Reynolds to provide a bait in the grant of full command in Munster still did not bear fruit.[10]

When confirmation of the cessation came through in Oct., with the delivery of the articles, the response was the same clear hostility. But significance can be attached to two aspects of the reaction. One was the insistence that the action in Ireland had contributed to the 'toleration of the Popish religion', even if indirectly in so far as the current position of Catholicism could not be altered in the next year.[11] The other was the immediate decision that the Scottish commissioners be consulted. More than that, the Commons voted that 'Order may be taken the Covenant may be taken by all the Officers, Soldiers, and Protestants of their Nation in *Ireland* : As likewise, this House will take care, that the *English* Protestants, Commanders, and Officers in *Ireland*, shall take the Covenant also'.[12] Effectively the Commons had delivered to the Scottish government and army power over the Scottish population of Ireland. The Convention of Estates had closed its deliberations on Aug. 26 with a letter to the officers of the Scottish army in Ulster, assuring them of its concern, a concern which extended to 'other good cuntrey men and christianes in these parties' a phrase appropriate for the local Scots populace. They continued by asking 'Whither or not the rest of the Scottis and Inglisch in Wlster wilbe content to concurre and joyne with them and yow in this Covenant'.[13] Now it seems the Parliament of England itself had decided that they would, and divided and assigned the task on national lines.

The Scottish government had proved the conduit through which news of the cessation had first reached London. They continued to receive, consider and pass on news from their commander in Ireland, a process which would focus the attention of the Parliament on Ulster from October on. Of course the Scottish Council was concerned about the willingness of the English to provide for Monro's men, now 18 months behind in their pay. But their concern was more than this ongoing grievance, for the news that the commanders of local forces in Ulster appeared willing to become incorporated in the cessation raised general questions about the continued stay of the Scottish army.[14] The same thought had occurred to the English commissioners in

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[9]*Lords' jn.*, vi, 238-40; *A declaration of Parliament shewing the present design...* E 69(16).
[10]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 227; *Lords' jn.*, vi, 203-4. The Navy committee was instructed to provide a guard for shipping in which Jephson would bring 'his Goods, Provisions for the Supply of the Province of *Munster* '. For this supply, see appendix 3. Wharton was apparently referring to it as awaiting convoy on Aug. 29, Carte MS 6, 281.
[11]The news was accompanied with other suggestions of fresh Catholic activity, allowing an interpretation that 'Popery is designed to be set up in *England* and *Ireland*', B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 84a; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 282; *Lords' jn.*, vi, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265.
[12]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 277.
[13]*Acts parl. Scot.*, vi, 49.
[14]B. L. Add. MS 31 116, ff. 85a, 86b.

Edinburgh. Vane, despatched back to London, reported that the cessation had largely drawn Scotland to the Covenant.[15] The implication that it would be folly to fail to provide for their Irish army was reflected in the Commons' vote that the new Scottish committee should take a course to provide for the needs of both Scottish armies, that in Ireland and that designed for England.[16]

Two ordinances were rushed through, tying support of the armies to income from sequestrations, mediated through loans raised in London.[17] In effect it tied the Scottish army's pay to the property of the enemies of Parliament. It seems not too far-fetched to parallel this with the way in which the Irish war was to be funded from the outset by the Adventure. The sequestration of property was not of course confiscation, but this too had already been mooted. Confiscating the land of Englishmen was more politically controversial than that of the Irish, and would anyway run into difficult legislative problems, as even the Irish plan, founded on statute, had done. But the parallel is there. The Treasurers named in these ordinances, Michael Herring and Richard Waring were both of them prominent London Adventurers. And, since London was effectively funding the Scots, it seemed quite reasonable that the decision be taken that the City nominate a committee to reside with the Scottish army in England, as the adventurers had been, and would again be, asked to send representatives to the forces they were helping to support in Ireland.[18]

Clearly the momentum of the Scottish alliance was carrying over into a determination of the Irish situation. But the element of 'squeeze' continued to trouble those most committed to the war effort and reappeared in the attempt to pass an ordinance to finally repay the clothing contractors now owed huge sums of money. Sponsored by Reynolds, it aimed to provide repayment through 'concealed' estates of 'malignants'. D'Ewes claimed that the proposed power to seek out 'money plate iewells or other goods' and to 'breake the Walls dores or houses where such goods were and the same to sieze' was opposed on the one hand by 'honest moderate men'

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[15]*Lords' jn,., vi*, 274-5; *Perfect Diurnal*, no. 15, Oct. 23-30, E 252 (4), p. 113. The problem was that, even if the English commissioners agreed that Monro's army stay in Ireland, they did not have the wherewithal to negotiate a satisfactory arrangement to support the army, *Lords' jn., vi,* 275-6; H. M. C. *Portland MSS*, i, 136-7.

[16]*Commons' jn., iii,* 289, 290; *Lords' jn., vi*, 277. The whole process of Scottish negotiations has been fully described in Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 143-8. It is worth pointing out that the terms submitted by the army in Ireland remained consistent, despite their internal divisions. In none of their official statements did they express a desire to withdraw more than a part of their army and in each statement issued in 1643 they were to demand £60 000, or four months' arrears of pay (approximately the same) at once, *and* a guarantee of full repayment either in land or money. (The decision to accept at least part of what was owed in land of course made retaining some foothold in Ireland imperative.) It was the English who moved most, even if they eventually compromised the amount of money they promised.

[17]*Acts & ordinances, interregnum,* , 311-5, 322-7.

[18]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 279 (Oct. 17). The full committee would be two Londoners (apparently to be named by the Common Council), two peers and four of the House of Commons. One of these latter was none other than Robert Goodwin, veteran of the first such mission in Dublin.

like himself and Maynard 'as being against the law and liberty of the subiect, and no mans money plate or iewells could bee safe if such a violent course were given way unto' and on the other by the radicals who sought to direct all income from sequestrations to the Scots.[19]

Preferential treatment of the Scots had implications for Parliament's dealings with local Protestant forces in Ireland. When Clotworthy delivered the considered opinions of the committee set up on receipt of the cessation articles, their standard condemnation of the arrangement was accompanied by two other votes. One committed Parliament to the decision that 'the warr be vigorously prosecuted, notwithstanding this cessacion', with the promise of 'a setled course for the maintenance' of those armies which continued the war and, with full victory, that everyone 'according to his condition and meritt shalbe plentifully rewarded in land'. The other stated that, while those who accepted the cessation would be outside Parliament's care, those 'whose eyes shalbe opened upon the discovery of the treachery and ruine attending this cessacion' and who returned to full allegiance would be entitled to full rewards.[20] Both seemed designed to keep Irish Protestants on course.

The votes were successfully transmitted to the Lords on Oct. 31. Alongside them were a fresh set of instructions to the English commissioners in Scotland. The 7th instruction included the assurance that Monro's army was among those which Parliament had undertaken to support in Ireland. The other relevant orders fleshed out this commitment. Specifically, £60 000 and 10 000 suits of clothes were promised with the possibility of treating on arrears 'it being impossible at present to pay them in moneys'. Full accounts were authorised to be drawn up. Generally, the commissioners could meet their 'Brethren' notably to consider 'the fittest and best ways and means for the ordering of the Scottish *and other Brittish* forces in Ireland at the easiest expense and charge to both kingdoms, in such manner as may best prosecute that war, and the ends expressed in that Covenant'; by joint advice they were 'authorised to settle upon some course with our Brethren of Scotland, by the joint advice of the committees of both kingdoms to manage that war' and to inform Parliament 'what you shall do herein'. Parliament was not just committing itself to carry on the war in Ireland. Having spent the last two years squeezing the governing

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[19]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 272, 289; *Lords' jn.*, vi, 261, 272; B.L. Harl. MS 165, f.193b. D'Ewes reports attempts to at least curtail the powers given e.g. to London and to daylight hours, with the need for accompaniment by a constable and for inventoried and official detention of all goods seized. The incident is a good indicator of the conflicting views over the role of confiscation among parliamentarians.

[20]*Anal. Hib.*, iv, 91-2; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 294, 295; *Lords' jn.*, vi, 298; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f.88a; B.L. Harl. MS 165, f.199a. In practical terms, the Commons called a meeting of the Irish committee for the next morning 'concerning a present Provision for the Army in *Ireland*'. Clotworthy was to notify the Londoners' committee to attend also.

institutions of the 'kingdom of Ireland' out of the control of the war, they were now opening up control to the governing regime in Scotland.[21]

For the moment though they were still committed to the support of the local forces in Ireland. Goodwin's committee was ordered to bring in an ordinance for a three month tax for the support of the British forces in Ireland, being equivalent to a quarter of the amounts listed in the ordinance for the English war effort.[22] A letter was agreed to be sent to the Ulster forces which, it was hoped, would oppose Ormond's truce. The terms of repudiation were those now familiar,[23] and the inclusion of the observation that Parliament was the body 'to whome the ordering of that warre is solely committed' also normative. Promises of supply mentioned the ordinance for an assessment in England as well as the immediate sending of victual. But to all this was added the news that the messenger, Owen O'Connolly, would deliver to them the Solemn League and Covenant 'the only expedient which will aboundantly satisfy both Houses' being their taking of it alongside Monro's men. Notable also was the call to 'improue all advantages against the enemy in the way of conduct wherein you are, untill the Houses shall send some person of eminency and ability unto you with full instructions in this weighty and important matter'. The letter was to 'be read to the souldiers under your comaund the first and fittest opportunity'.[24] Parliament was simultaneously introducing the single most divisive issue into Ulster Protestant politics in these years, perhaps attempting to appeal to the soldiery over the heads of their officers, ultimately a very successful strategy, and leaving more open the question of the directing of the war in Ulster than some interests would have done or would be possible within but a few weeks. In both these regards the document looks very like the work of Sir John Clotworthy, though there is a lack of evidence of just where the letter originated.

If there were as yet but the faint hints that Parliament was sheltering concerns, for the Scots and for Irish Protestant forces, which might not be entirely compatible, it had become clear by the end of October that their focus was almost solely on Ulster. Yet Dublin had not shown itself quite so ready to burn its bridges to Parliament. Even within the Irish Privy Council, the question of military necessity prevailed over any expression of the need to aid the King in his struggles in England. In letters to secretary Nicholas shortly before (Sept. 9) and after the cessation (Sept. 19) they urged the necessity of a supply of munitions, for 'we be not too believing in the undertaking of an enemy whose wounds of distrust given us are not yet healed, but rather ... that the enemy through our want may not be emboldened to a breach, but that by His

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[21]*Tanner letters*, pp 163-4; *Lords' jn.*, vi, 287, 288-9, 290.
[22]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 298; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f.88b.
[23]Though note the description of the task of the forces as being 'the ridding of it [Ulster] of those wretches who were a burdan to the earth', and of the pro-cessationists as 'shamefully apostasised'.
[24]*Anal. Hib.*, iv, 92-4; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 298; *Lords' jn.*, vi, 292-3.

majesty's power and greatness they may be so awed as not to dare to attempt a breach'.[25] The attitude of mistrust was one echoed in Parliament's own productions. But Dublin's argument was that, if they could not afford to trust the 'rebels', nor could they afford to rely on London. On Oct. 28 the Council took the trouble to address a massive statement of their position as a rebuttal of Parliament's accusations.[26] They rehearsed the contents of all their letters to Parliament since the departure of Reynolds and Goodwin in Jan. 1643. Here were all the pleas for supplies, especially ammunition; the fears of army discontent and mutiny; the reflections on the unrealistic nature of Parliament's proposals. The list of supplies actually sent shows the meagreness of the response. Yet it was the line of argument least liable to offend the scruples of Parliament, and with it went an attempt to address the question of Parliament's right to concern itself in the Irish war which scrupulously avoided any overt rejection of Parliament's claims.[27] The missive was received at Westminster on Nov. 10 and no direct response was made to its arguments.[28] But the validity of the conclusions was hardly the less real for that;[29] military necessity was the one argument that could win a sufficient number of Irish Protestants to make the cessation acceptable.

The King's intention, however, went well beyond this. Charles envisaged three stages of demilitarisation in Ireland - first a cessation; then the withdrawal of the English forces to serve his cause in England; finally a treaty with the Confederates sufficient to convert them into military allies.[30] The first troops sent from Ireland were

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[25]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 309-10, 311-3. See also Ormond's letter to Nicholas, Sept. 28, which recognises the cessation only as a respite, and urges that infantry must be kept up, though he recognises the need to reduce the army, *Clarendon S. P.*, ii, 155-6.

[26]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 320-32.

[27]They claimed to have always accepted Parliament's holding a power 'to advise and direct the managing of the war' as also the authority of the CIA, even asking the latter's directions, but only to receive few, and unrealistic, proposals. The commission to treat did not hinder the war effort but was only to hear the requests of the rebels, concerning whom the King expressed 'his extreme detestation of the odious rebellion which the recusants of Ireland have without any ground or colour raised against him'. They had no plan to divest Reynolds and Goodwin of the power granted by Parliament, had only acted on royal orders, and pressed Parliament's own instructions as not giving power to act as part of the Council. Finally, there was no 'alteration of Government', only an exchange of one of the governors, as at all times past had been done.

[28]*Lords' jn.*, vi, 300, 301; B.L. Harl. MS 165, ff 206a, 226b. The Commons consigned the letter to the 'perusal' of Robert Reynolds, and on Nov. 18 appears to have ordered him to give an account to the House on the matter. There is no evidence of his having done so, *Commons' jn.*, iii, 307, 315. Instead Parliament needed to show that no dividend had been gained for the cessation. See, for example, *A true and exact relation of the condition of Ireland since the cessation...* E 76 (4), published by Parliament in late Nov., which relates the hardships of the Dublin population after the cessation.

[29]See the 'Vindication' produced by Perceval in 1646 where the Dublin commissary provides detailed evidence of money and supplies to argue that 'nothing but want and necessity ... and the exceeding great discontents of the army ... did or could compel his consent to the cessation...'. The bulk of the 'Vindication' is printed in Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 6-22 (iii, 6 quoted); see also *Egmont MSS*, i, 270-7.

[30]Charles's letter to the Lord justices and Ormond of Sept. 7 envisaged the evacuation of the army, but also the need to retain garrisons, Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 465-7. By Nov. 10 Digby was able to tell Ormond of the King's agreement to Taaffe's proposal to raise 2 000 troops from among the Irish, Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 503-5. Ormond had of course been aware of the aim of withdrawing troops for months, while the King made it clear, in a letter of July 2, that he intended to allow 'rebel'

landing in England by early November. The beginnings of a treaty could be seen in the despatch of both confederate and government representatives to lay their case before the King. Of course any permanent arrangement would have to have the approval of the Irish parliament, and the Lords Justices were worried over the validity of the present parliament since the change of administration.[31] Authorisation for its continuance was received with only one day to spare, but it was not clear how this, by now solidly Protestant, body would react to plans for an Irish settlement.[32]

Indeed disillusion, even with the cessation, had set in very quickly. In Ulster, Monro had set his face against the possibility of a ceasefire even before it had been completed.[33] O'Neill reported his violations of the arrangement after the articles had been sent him, 'like a madd bull in furye'.[34] In the event he retreated from his assault on Charlemont and appealed to Scotland, though not actively opposing the truce. But given the uncertainty about whether the Scots would remain in Ireland, the response of the local commanders could be more significant. Colonel Arthur Chichester unreservedly accepted the cessation, agreeing to abide by its terms in cases of dispute. But these were many and complicated, and not wholly free from violence. Both sides were eager to maximise resources, for at no point does there appear to have been any intention to reduce troop numbers by any of the armies in Ulster. As Chichester told his delegates to the meeting with the Irish forces, the Ulster Protestant army 'doe clayme all Ulster for their quarters (Charlemont and such other holds ... only excepted)' , a concession in itself since these were 'straitly besieged' at the date of the signing. Nothing should therefore be done which would prejudice this greater claim, for which delegates had been sent to Dublin. At the talks on alleged violations by either side, Chichester's officers were to 'see if by this clamper you can absolutely exclude them out of Ulster, which they justly deserve'.[35]

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commissioners to come over to lay their terms before him, with 'ministers' sent by the Irish government to give advice, Carte MS 6, f. 12.

[31]Privy Council to Nicholas, Sept. 28, *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 313-4, 314-5. The 11 suggested by Dublin were Archbishop Ussher, Ranelagh, Kerry, Inchiquin, Lambert, Lowther, Sir William Stewart, Ryves, Tempest, Sambach and Charles Coote. As they indicated, no less then 6 were in England already. By Nov. 12 they learned that Charles wished to call over Kerry (actually in England), Lowther, Stewart, Justice Donnellan and Clerk to the Council, Sir Paul Davies. Protests at the necessity of the latter remaining in Dublin appear to have won out, and Perceval was actually sent, *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 334-5, 337.

[32]The relevant commissions were accompanied with an order that Parliament meet for one day only, though the Council informed Digby that the Commons at least sought 'that they might continue a few days unprorogued, to the end that they might apply themselves to some business concerning the affairs of the kingdom', *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 335. Charles's letter to Ormond of Nov. 19 instructed him to further prorogue Parliament, at its Dec. 18 meeting, to Feb. 18, Carte MSS, 7, f. 639. Charles had earlier planned to dissolve and replace the Parliament (July 2, Carte MS 6, f. 12), but Ormond had argued in favour of continuation (Sept. 28, *Clarendon S. P.*, ii, 155-6).

[33]Monro to Lords Justices, Sept. 9, Carte MS 6, ff. 442-3. He also alleged that news of a cessation hampered his military plans.

[34]O'Neill to Ormond, Sept. 27, in Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-52*, i, 50-1.

[35]Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-52, ii*, 554, 554-5, 555-6, 556-7, 557-9. Disputes included each charging the other with intruding on their quarters to take up crops. O'Neill specifically disputed the

A correspondent of Conway's (writing Oct. 2) pointed out that the land in dispute between Chichester and O'Neill had seen harvesting going on for the last seven weeks, Chichester's and Conway's own regiments stocking a magazine at Portadown with provisions to last three months. Not surprisingly the cessation is 'very unpleasing in these parts'. The Scots had retreated from Charlemont, and he believed the cessation might lead them to depart, leaving only garrisons behind. Overall, he hinted that the cessation was unrealistic for Ulster, and liable to lead to a worse situation than before.[36] If the Scots were to leave, it could only expose further the local forces. They were as aware as any of the need to remain strong during the truce, but when senior figures of Scottish origin (the Montgomerys and the Stewarts) reacted to the truce by calling on the Dublin authorities for 'some present supplies and subsistence for them and their regiments and troops, and in what manner they shall be disposed of during the cessation' the answer, that they could do no more than recommend the petitioners to the care of the King, was hardly the response required.[37]

These men had come to Dublin, and there participated in a petition, signed by 'divers other persons of quality of his Majesty's Protestant subjects here' which they delivered to the Council, to be forwarded to the King.[38] The petition premised itself on a standard Protestant account of 1641 - from prosperity and civility, especially due to the Protestant population, through a totally unexpected uprising to the threat of general extirpation and the usurpation of royal power. What this was designed to support was a request that four 'agents', Capt. MacWilliam Ridgeway, Sir Francis Hamilton, Capt. Michael Jones and Fenton Parsons, or others, who could 'manifest the truth hereof' be admitted to the royal presence. The terms of their requests could hardly be repudiated by the King. What they claimed to seek was that 'the Protestant religion may be restored throughout the whole kingdom to its lustre, that the losses of your Protestant subjects may be repaired in such manner and measure as your Majesty in your princely wisdom shall think fit, and this your kingdom may be so settled, as that your said Protestant subjects may hereafter live therein under the happy government of your Majesty ... with comfort and security'. The petition had a formidable list of signatories. To the three peers who headed the list, Kildare, Montgomery of Ards, and Blayney, were added Sir James Montgomery, Sir Charles Coote, Sir Robert Stewart,

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Protestant practice (apparently used by the Catholic side in Munster) of leaving men in open fields to claim territory, 'which truely was as much as to leave one man upon euery hill in Ulster, and make it a possession', clearly the intention. Chichester even allowed his delegates to Dublin to press Ormond for restitution 'or that we may have liberty to fetch preyes from them, if we can'. See also Jerrold I. Casway, *Owen Roe O'Neill and the struggle for Catholic Ireland* (Philadelphia, 1984), pp. 93-6.

[36]*Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 386-7.

[37]Council to King, Oct. 14, in *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 317-8. It is to be remembered that the cessation document made no terms for Ulster, thus the fervour of the debates on implementation.

[38]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 316-7, 319. Two documents were involved, the first apparently requesting permission to deliver the latter.

Sir Arthur Loftus, Francis Willoughby, Robert Sterling, George Monck, Henry Jones, William Parsons.[39]

The petitioners appear to have gone on to request further signatures.[40] What had emerged was not an anti-cessation movement, but it was a campaign to safeguard interests in any possible peace settlement. It was not as if the Dublin government were liable to throw away too many concessions anyway. But the petitioning campaign indicates that a strong and influential body of opinion, extending to senior military figures (made still more powerful by the removal of the 'English' army from Dublin) were not willing to settle for less than they could have won by victory in the war against the confederates.

Those of the signatories who returned to their commands in Ulster in Nov. would have to face up to two developments there. One was the growing possibility that the Scottish army would remain in the province, with fresh supplies, as an anti-cessationist force.[41] The other was a growing popular pressure to re-open the war. On Nov. 8, the two Stewarts joined another 16 signatories headed by Mayor Thornton of Derry in a letter to the Lord Chancellor and government of Scotland. The letter is an indication that Dublin had not provided the securities needed for the present condition in north-west Ulster. This is a crucial document. It goes beyond the long-term worries of the Dublin document, and openly shows a pro-war sentiment. Ulster after all had seen relative success in 1643. The petitioners now made it clear that if their suit was successful, they would 'want neither affection nor zeal to the prosecution of these rebels, so long as there runneth a drop of warm blood in our veins'. What they needed was the immediate supply of ammunition and victual, and pressure on Parliament to supply more. They also required that Monro's army remain in Ireland.[42]

Dublin soon received the assurances of Sir James Montgomery, concerning the Stewarts, that 'their ends are good and that he cannot misdoubt of their affection and fidelity to His Majesty'. Responding to seditious stirrings in their absence, 'to gain

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[39]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 341-3, 343-4.

[40]Sir Samuel Luke (who claimed to base his account on a 'George Hamilton' arrived from Dublin) claimed that they 'afixt 2 coppies of their peticion upon 2 emminent places in Dublin, wishing all others to subscribe their names and ioyne with them', a claim with some grounds given their going from the Council to gain more signatures. *Journal of Sir Samuel Luke*, ed. I. G. Philip, vol. iii, 1 November 1643 - 29 March 1644 (Oxford, 1953), pp. 212-3.

[41]As early as Oct. 27 Sir James Montgomery reported to Ormond that it was uncertain if the Scots would go, and that supplies for them had been announced; if they stayed they may regard pro-cessationists as enemies, Carte MS 7, ff. 262-3. By Nov. 4 Chichester was able to report deliberate efforts to slow the withdrawal from Ireland (Carte MS 7, f. 373). Ormond was aware that Monro was opposing the departure of his army, and confided a suspicion that, once his opposition to the cessation was open, Monro may even move on Dublin, (Ormond to Archbishop of York, Nov. 10 & 11), Carte MS 7, ff. 403, 414. For division within the Scottish army, see Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 138-9, 145.

[42]Carte MS 7, f. 383; H.M.C *Portland MSS*, i, 148-150. This letter was read in Parliament before the big debates on the Scots in Dec. Even before that it may have influenced the Scottish government in pressing England to continue their army in Ireland and pursue the war.

time and to stop the current, and the better to divide them' the Stewarts 'thought fit to seem to comply with the multitude, and to concur in a letter, and having qualified it all they could, did sign it with the others'.[43] Montgomery further claimed to have blocked another letter intended for the English Commons.[44] But however much a brake was being applied, what was unmistakable was that pressure was building in Ulster to resume the war. The arrival of the Covenant had not been necessary to mobilise popular opinion in Ulster, for the initiative had been taken to petition for it.[45] The response in Dublin was to build on the comparatively reliable officer corps. Sir John Clotworthy's regiment was already labouring under the disadvantage of the absence of all officers above the rank of captain, but Ormond's efforts to nominate a major was interpreted by the effective commander, Sir John's brother, James, not only as an insult to existing officers but as part of an attempt 'for the breaking of your regiment'.[46] Certainly Ormond would respond to later pleas to grant the power to purge Ulster regiments of politically unreliable officers.[47]

In a sense, this was but a reflection of the King's grander policy of re-modelling civil and military authority in Ireland. The King's letter to the Lord Justices to deliver the sword of state to Ormond as the new Lord Lieutenant was dated Nov. 18, though it was not to take effect in fact until Jan.[48] Partly it was a matter of rewards and assurances of support; individuals closely associated with the cessation or the sending over of the army received property allocations, some, like that to Sir Thomas Lucas, going so far as to be a full grant of lands formerly held in custodium - confiscation and

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[43]Lords Justices and Council to Nicholas, Dec. 19, *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 339-340; Montgomery to Ormond, Carte MS 8, ff. 249-50. Mervyn condemned the letter (Mervyn to Ormond, Feb. 21), Carte MS 9, 217-8.

[44]Montgomery to Ormond, Carte MS 8, ff. 249-50. He did, however, send his own letter to Chancellor Loudoun (Carte MS 8, f. 247), which proclaims his loyalty to the King, yet adds that he could see no better way of serving the King than against the Irish rebels. It was this attitude which was to lose Charles the support of Irish Protestants.

[45]Robert Thornton to Ormond, Dec. 28, Carte MS 8, ff. 231-2. The Stewarts were reporting their own problems with a local 'band' to join Monro against all cessations, while the Covenant was expected, having reached east Ulster by Dec. 6; Matthew reported (Dec. 7) the arrival in Belfast of O'Connolly, Parliament's agent for the Covenant, with news of promised supplies, Carte MS 8, ff. 32, 55. As early as Nov. 19 he mentioned that the new Scots believed many of the locals would join them in the Covenant, hopes Matthew felt likely to be justified, given that most of the soldiers even under English colonels were Scottish, Carte MS 7, f. 527.

[46]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, i, 67-70. For a recommendation of James Clotworthy, with reservations, see Audley Mervyn to Ormond, Dec. 28, Carte MS 7, f. 625. By April 1644, Ormond's nominee, Burleigh, had been trying to influence the regiment against the Covenant, Carte MS 10, f. 366.

[47]Sir Robert Stewart sought from Ormond on Dec. 10 (Carte MS 8, ff. 80-1) the power to replace those of his officers who allied with the Scottish army; authority to purge officers was granted to the Stewarts by Ormond on Jan. 5, along with promises of supplies and hopes that their loyalty would soon be clearly shown (Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 2-4). For earlier alterations among officers see Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 27-9; for the plan to use the present Irish Parliament (in 1644) to 'sever the fit and reasonable from the unfit and unreasonable parts', Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 107.

[48]The same day order was issued granting bail to the four displaced members of the Council, but they were forbidden to leave Ireland, and charges were to be drawn up by Sir Maurice Eustace. *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp 387, 388. The eventual charges are printed in Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 518-20.

redistribution by fiat.[49] Other grants built up a structure of military governorships, of counties and towns, which not only had their pay-outs but promised a nation-wide military authority in the hands of those considered reliable.[50]

The question was whether changes in the elite could stem the flow of popular pressure, principally in Ulster, from whence the news, in Dec., was of the arrival of the Solemn League and Covenant, and its recommendation to the local forces, and populace. The Council despatched a letter to the Colonels (Dec. 14) forbidding the swearing of the Covenant in the army, and the Lords Justices buttressed it with a Proclamation issued four days later.[51] This would be a genuine commitment to the opposite cause from that which Dublin now openly espoused by sending aid to Charles's English armies. Even if the affirmation was made that the province's officers opposed the Covenant, the very terms of their repudiation could hardly be welcome. Robert Thornton, Mayor of Derry, writing to Ormond on Dec. 28 pointed out that subscription of the Covenant would be against his conscience, something he could not say of a breach of the cessation.[52] Other Ulster officers stressed the need for local unity, even a disregard of English divisions.[53] The months ahead would suggest that the commitment of the Ulster colonels to any truce was limited and the prospect of renewing the war quite appealing. Nor could Dublin be complacent with the prospect that the fidelity that they remained assured the Ulster commanders held in their hearts could be buried beneath the belligerent sentiments of their own soldiers and neighbours.

There were a number of stages whereby discontent with the plans formulated at Oxford, and promoted from Dublin, would transform into opposition. The most basic was dissatisfaction at how the Sept. cessation arrangement was being worked, or not worked. Unlike Ulster, where the prospects of regional victory had seemed good in 1643, Munster's condition had been poor. Inchiquin took a vigorous part in the despatch of troops thence to England, though he soon found his resources so straitened as to make even this difficult.[54] But before long the province witnessed the sapping

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[49]*Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 388. Land grants were also made to Colonel Robert Byron and captain Thomas Armstrong.

[50]Examples could include the new Viscount Moore succeeding his father not only to a regiment and troop but to the governorship of Dundalk, of co. Louth and Slane barony (co. Meath), or the award to Chichester of command of Belfast and of Inishowen, and £1 000 from customs revenue, Carte MS 7, f. 311.

[51]Carte MS 8, ff. 114, 134. Sir Robert Stewart had sought an order form the Council against the cessation (Stewart to Ormond), Dec. 10, Carte MS 8, ff. 80-1.

[52]Thornton to Ormond, Dec. 28, Carte MS 8, ff. 231-2.

[53]Rawdon to Eustace, Dec. 18, stated that he had no doubt local officers would reject the cessation, but believed most wanted to continue the war without regard to English divisions, Carte MS 8, f. 145. The need for a united response prompted the meeting planned for Jan. 1.

[54]See Inchiquin's letters to Ormond, Carte MS 7, f. 91 (Oct. 10); Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 498-500 (Oct. 29); Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 522-3 (Nov. 23); Carte MS 8, f. 139 (Dec. 18). The cessation in Munster has been regarded as received as 'a temporary and local military expedient' (Murphy, 'Munster Protestants', p. 9). This seems an accurate assessment, though Inchiquin's own motives are hard to

effects of the interminable disputes dependent upon the attempted implementation of the accord. Thomas Reymond, had no doubt, by Dec. 7, that '[o]ur condition is far worse than in the time of open hostility' for the wheels of negotiated redress ground very slowly, and their outcome was slight advantage, compared to the possibilities of armed restitution.[55] Disputes largely focused on claims mounted to the possession of territory from which to draw sustenance, but covert shifts of allegiance were alleged also to have occurred. All in all, Thomas Bettesworth, one of the commissioners to settle disputes, could put it forward as 'a received opinion' that 'the cessation will be sooner ended than the controversies that arise from it'.[56]

Land fell in value[57], and depopulation hung as a threat - Sir Philip Perceval was prepared to cut his losses to some extent, accepting the presence of those he considered in violation of the articles if they would 'pay us sheaf and grazing, that there may be something to subsist upon'.[58] His correspondence with Bettesworth shows an under-current still flowing. The latter informed him of the whereabouts of the 'examinations' taken about the 'enquiry of losses', one of the branches of the 'Depositions', noting that 'they are kept safe'. Perceval's reply ended 'Pray send me notes of the murders about Cashell and Goolan Bridge'.[59] Whatever for the present, the idea of a future reckoning appears to have remained.[60] It was the kind of sentiment liable to lead to a second stage of disaffection, where both present and future security could appear to be better served by a resumption of war, particularly if the fears of a sell-out through treaty negotiations, latent in the October petition, were allowed to grow. The final stage, the fixing of renewed war in Ireland to adherence to Parliament had not occurred anywhere

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discern. He certainly exported troops with diligence, and as late as Feb., 1644 was disappointed that he could not have crossed over to a command in England, Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 35. (For his efforts to extend recruitment for the King to ex-confederate troops, see Carte MS 8, ff. 316-7.)

[55]*Egmont MSS*, i, 195.

[56]Bettesworth to Perceval, Oct. 28, *Egmont MSS*, i, 190-1. Bettesworth was writing after the first meeting of the Protestant and Confederate commissioners at Mallow. He said that 30, not 3 commissioners, were needed to address the issues raised and the meeting, which lasted three days, was spent 'merely in clamper, without anything done to the purpose'.

[57]Bettesworth to Perceval, Oct. 28, *Egmont MSS*, i, 192.

[58]Perceval to Bettesworth, Nov. 17, *Egmont MSS*, i, 194-5. Writing to Sall, Nov. 13 (*Egmont MSS*, i, 192-4) Perceval stated 'I am so far from seeking to have them [the lands in question] depopulated, or the tenants undone. I confess I am not able to tenant them, and that I would be well-pleased the new possessors continue, so as they pay me sheaf and grazing, acknowledge their entry to be contrary to the articles, and restore what sheaf or goods I should have had if they had dealt fairly with me'.

[59]Bettesworth to Perceval, Oct. 28, *Egmont MSS*, i, 190-1; Perceval to Bettesworth, Nov. 17, *Egmont MSS*, i, 194-5.

[60]It is hardly coincidental that Sir William Stewart made his 'Deposition' of losses to Jones and Pigott on 12 Oct., 1643 not only listing massive losses, but helpfully listing the 'rebel' leaders, Gilbert, *Contemp. hist. 1641-52*, i, 552-3. Likewise it appears that Henry Jones and his associates among those commissioned to take depositions chose Nov., 1643 as the moment to issue a second remonstrance summarising statement made, presumably to make plain the malice of the rebels, even in time of cessation. See Aidan Clarke, 'The 1641 depositions', in Peter Fox (ed.), *Treasures of the Library : Trinity College Dublin* (Dublin, 1986), p. 120; for a discussion of the resulting document, Clarke, '1641 Rebellion and anti-popery', pp. 151-7.

by the end of 1643. Parliament was promoting such an alignment in Ulster, through the medium of the Covenant. But even there it was the end of a process, one as much conditioned by the instincts of the elite as by the covenanting sympathies of the 'giddy' masses.[61]

At Westminster, the main impact of events in Ireland was felt in the increasing numbers of troops landing to join Charles's English armies.[62] Whether or not they were perceived as English Protestants or Irish papists, as the propaganda quickly alleged[63], they made a significant impact on the English war, particularly in the north-west, where the small army constructed around the Irish veterans undertook a not unworthy campaign.[64] There was even the possibility that they be combated through a 'meer adventure'.[65] But while Parliament also acted against those it considered complicit in the cessation[66], it continued to entertain hopes that Ulster might continue the war.[67] On Nov. 27 it was resolved to send £4 000 to anti-cessationist forces in the province, while plans were still afoot for an Irish assessment bill.[68]

Yet by Dec. it had become clear that the Scots were set to dominate the agenda. On Dec. 12 a batch of papers from Edinburgh were read. Included was a copy of the message sent from Derry to Scotland, but it was overshadowed by the report of the

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[61]The term is Sir Robert Stewart's, still downplaying support for the Covenant in his letter to Ormond of Dec. 21, Carte MS 8, f. 179.

[62]The ordinance of Sept. 8 against the landing of troops from Ireland was not only concerned abut the native Irish but about the effect of the return of the 'English -Irish army', *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 283-4.

[63]Brereton combined propaganda about the landing of papist rebels with attempts to woo Earnley and his men, see John Lowe, 'The Campaign of the Irish Royalist Army in Cheshire, November 1643 - January 1644', *Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire*, cxi (1960), pp 55-6. See also *An addition to the relation of some passages about the English - Irish army* ... E 32(13) which reports attempts to win over the 'English-Irish' by appealing to the memory of gallant Harcourt. *Mercurius Britannicus*, (no. 11, Nov. 2-9,) claimed to see a plot in the use of Protestants from Ireland first akin to the manner in which the King delayed the employment of Catholics in England - *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, P. 566.

[64]Ronald Hutton, *The Royalist war effort 1642 - 1646* (London, 1982), pp. 124, 127; Lowe, 'Irish Royalist Army', pp. 56-74 for the north-west. For forces landed in the south of England, see M. D. G. Wanklyn, 'Royalist strategy in the south of England 1642-1644' in *Southern history*, iii (1984), pp. 69, 70; Hutton, *Royalist war effort*, pp. 116, 138.

[65]B.L. Harl. MS 165, ff. 246a-248b.

[66]Ormond had already been condemned, now Inchiquin too was voted to be worthy of treason charges for sending over his army. Within a few days Clanricard had lost his exemption from sequestration; Dungarvan, now the second Earl of Cork, was expelled the House and also to be sequestered. But those deemed guilty of acquiescence in the truce included many officers well known at Westminster. Now these - Montgomery, Hill, Waller, Mervyn - were not to receive any money previously allocated to them. *Commons' jn.*, iii, 307, 312 (Nov. 10, 15). Sir Thomas Lucas was ordered sequestered as a signatory of the cessation on Nov. 30, *Commons' jn.*, iii, 324.

[67]In fact the London adventurers appear to have written to the Ulster commanders as early as Sept. 19, even seeking to win them to the Covenant, Carte MS 6, f. 539. The Speakers' letter, approved on Nov. 1, was only directed to the north, Carte MS 7, f. 360 (dated Nov. 4).

[68]*Commons' jn., iii*, 321-2.

arrangements made between the English commissioners in Scotland and their Scottish counterparts in response to the latest demands from Monro's army. Most of the proposals concerned supply. Accounts were to be drawn up (article 1); £10000, 10000 suits of clothes and 10000 bolls of meal were to be sent over at once (2) with £50000 more by Feb. 1, though this could be to Carrickfergus or Leith (3); munitions were to be provided (6) and if money was not forthcoming, the army was to be shipped to England (5). The crucial 4th article, however, stated 'That the chief commander of the Scots Army in Ireland shall also command the rest of the British forces there'.[69]

The controversial question of a supreme command only became definitive in November. The Scottish Convention had raised the matter in July, before the arrival of Parliament's delegates, but had not made the matter non-negotiable.[70] The probability was that at this time it was an effort to secure greater co-ordination and overrule in the disputes known to exist in Ulster. The army's November paper did no more than respond to the query from the Convention as to their approval. That the officers specifically mentioned a *resident* commander may be noted, in the context of earlier complaints about absentee officers, of whom the General, Leven, was but one.[71] The definitive decision, on Nov. 28, was thus after it had become clear that the nominal commander in Ireland, Ormond, had gone to the side of peace, precipitating a crisis in command for all belligerent forces, and after local Ulster commanders showed a short-term acceptance of the truce. In any event the papers were despatched to the 'Committee for the *Scotts* Affairs that sits at *Goldsmiths' Hall*; and to the Committee for *Irish* Adventurers of this House, and of London.' All were to meet on Thursday, Dec. 14 'to consider what Possibility there is of performing the Propositions propounded in that Dispatch' and to report to the Commons.[72]

The choice of committees was crucial to the reception the articles would receive, for if the request for Scottish command in Ulster became definitive at this point, it had already been noised, at Westminster and beyond.[73] Much of the evidence for discussion of the issue, and others, comes from a document drawn up in criticism of Clotworthy, possibly a memorandum from, or to, the Scottish commissioners in London, perhaps for despatch to Edinburgh.[74] This claimed that the Grocers' hall

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[69]*Commons' jn., ii*, 335, 337, 338-9; *Tanner letters*, p. 165. For the Nov. terms from the army in Ulster, P.R.O.N.I. MS T.525/4 [Transcript of N.L.S. Wodrow MSS Fol. lxv, no.84].

[70]The Convention's position of July 17 made the appointment of the Scottish general as commander of Ulster forces 'NOT of the particulars which are demanded as necessarie' *Acts parl. Scot.*, vi, 17. The new vote was not specifically limited to Ulster.

[71]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp 143-4, 145, 148; P.R.O.N.I. MS T.525/4 for the Nov. terms.

[72]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 335, 337, 338-9.

[73]As early as Nov. 10 Digby was able to inform Ormond of the dispute over whether Monro or Lisle should have the command. Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 503-5.

[74]The document is unsigned and undated. A transcript may be found at PR.O.N.I. T.525/5. A date in early 1644 seems likely since Clotworthy is still seen as a foe of the Scots, but reference is made to his activities with the new adventure committee in Jan., so it cannot be earlier than this. Almost certainly the document was designed for transmission to Scotland, or at least to Scotsmen, since it

committee (London adventurers) had petitioned for Leslie or his deputy to be 'Captaine gen[e]rall of Ireland to oppose the Cessation'; a circumstance which had led Clotworthy to obstruct the reading of the petition in the Commons.[75] Certainly the London committee had delivered a petition and propositions to the Commons on October 23, by which time they already felt hard done by[76], but though referred to two committees neither petition nor propositions surfaced again.[77] Instead Clotworthy was charged with taking advocacy of Lisle so far as to have engaged him in dealings with Leicester, now at Oxford.[78] There is no proof of the claim, though his opponents were apt to suggest some correspondence between Clotworthy and the court.[79] But the accusation is not unbelievable, if regarded as an attempt to win a commander not likely to offend the loyal sensibilities of Ulster's Protestant commanders. If the long-drawn effort to keep Ireland a non-partisan issue in English politics was dead (despite the hopes of Irish Protestants), Leicester still represented legitimate authority in an inescapable manner. Ormond was not appointed by the King as Lord Lieutenant until Nov. 18, and the formal ratification did not take place until the following Jan., due to delays in transmission[80], leaving Leicester an absentee Lieutenant.[81]

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mentions that Clotworthy's hostility to the Scottish army while he was in Ulster was 'well knowne to them in Scotland already'. A most likely moment for it would be soon after the arrival of the Scottish commissioners in London in Feb. See the discussion in M. Perceval-Maxwell, 'Ireland and Scotland 1638 to 1648,' in John Morrill (ed.), *The Scottish National Covenant in its British context, 1638-1651* (Edinburgh, 1990), pp. 202-3.

[75]P.R.O.N.I. MS T.525/5, article 6.

[76]In his Oct. 23 letter to parliamentary clerk John Rushworth, the committee's chairman, Sir Daniel Watkins complained that the propositions had not been read and asked Rushworth to bring them to the Speaker's attention that morning, H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 143. The *Perfect Diurnal* no.15, for Oct. 23-30, E 252(4) merely reported 'a Petition, with some Articles annexed', the former 'setting forth the ill consequence of the said Cessation ..., and how contrary and prejudiciall the same is to the former Acts of Parliament for the reducing of the said Irish rebellion, to which His Majestie also gave his assent' (p.114). It is possible that Watkins's letter post-dates the reading of Oct. 23 since this seems to have concerned the petition and not the propositions.

[77]*Commons' jn., iii,* 286. It was referred to both Goodwyn's committee and a fresh committee of 12. A later reference to a committee 'for the consideration of the Government of the Army in *Ulster*', otherwise not known, may refer to this body, *Commons' jn., iii*, 305.

[78]P.R.O.N.I. MS T.525/5, article 19.

[79]Valerie Pearl, 'Oliver St. John and the "Middle Group" in the Long Parliament August 1643 - May 1644' , in *E. H. R.*, lxxxi (1966) , pp. 512-3 mentions Earle challenging Clotworthy over the Brooke plot (see below) and adds that 'some weeks before' an intercepted letter from Oxford had implicated Sir John.

[80]*Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 387. Ormond was sworn in on 21 Jan., 1644, Beckett, *Cavalier Duke,* p. 31.

[81]Carte argues that Leicester was reluctant to cede his role even in late 1643, Carte, *Ormonde,* iii, 49-50. Further circumstantial evidence for these contacts lies in the allegation that Clotworthy was also dealing with Leicester over the appointment of his 'brother' Colonel John Chichester, as Governor of Derry. Here the charges are detailed and the case strong. Chichester was supported by the Committee for Irish Affairs in the late summer, and had been at Oxford. He even won Ormond's approval for the Derry post. The importance of this command would be re-emphasised when Chichester failed to take it up, being accidentally drowned *en route* to the city in early 1644. The civic authorities wanted no imported military governor to contest their powers, and opposition to a Scotsman was even wider, extending to the King. The final choice, Audley Mervyn, though acceptable to the city government, first failed Ormond by taking the Covenant, then tried to double-cross the covenanters.

In any case the London committee got its opportunity at the meeting scheduled between it and the committee for Scottish affairs, and duly submitted a paper.[82] Their document was primarily a defence of the proposal for a joint command in Ulster, though none of the reasons adduced actually show why this commander should be Scottish rather than local, unless this was seen as the only basis on which the Scots would stay in Ireland, which the committee ardently sought. Certainly their arguments were against any idea that the war should not be continued by the two forces, and to this end they pledged their support. They pressed for the planned 'national' adventure, both for its own end and as an encouragement, and backed compulsory payment of monies offered. The comparative failure of doubling was largely laid at the door of the failure to name an acceptable commander in chief. Of new proposals, they offered the idea that merchants with debts in Ireland be allowed land for these, on payment of half again, and that the 'poor Protestants' of Ireland also be recompensed (after the adventurers and in return for double the crown rent) as a means to draw them to the anti-cessationist ranks. The proposals were of a kind later agreed by Clotworthy's alternative adventurer committee; it was not over such that disputes would arise. Otherwise the meeting gave its assent to the terms worked out in Edinburgh in late Nov., with Vane reporting proceedings to the Commons on Dec. 22. and assuring them of the adventurers' assistance in bringing them to fruition.[83]

The one matter which roused debate, and a 'very vehement & earnest' one, was the core question of a Scottish commander-in-chief for all British forces. Those in favour he lists as Vane, St. John and Mildmay, with opposition from Clotworthy, Reynolds and John Goodwin, preferring 'some English Nobleman'. Clotworthy in particular stressed the adverse effect of a Scottish appointment upon 'neare upon 12000 English' in Ulster who would leave rather than so serve. D'Ewes himself spoke for the Scots, but missed the point in talking about standing on 'Puntilioes & matters of honour'. He went on to add that the letter of the Treaty would have put the Scots under none other than Ormond as commander, that the chief command could always be altered, and ended with the sentiment that 'for mine owne part, I should much rather wish that the Scots would wholly conquer Ireland and possess it, then that those bloody popish Rebells there should prevaile to destroy both them and us'. No doubt all this was quite acceptable to many of the 'moderate' MPs, but it was easy for D'Ewes to

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[82]*Tanner letters*, pp. 169-71.

[83]H. M. C. *Portland MSS*, i, 164; *Commons' jn., iii*, 349-50. What seems to have been intended was that the adventurers advance the money, the first £10 000 if assurance was given of the assessment ordinance, the rest if their proposals were agreed to, and with the passing of the ordinance assigning £70 000 to the Goldsmiths' Hall (Scottish committee) treasurers (i.e. from sequestration funds). The Commons referred the whole matter back to Goldsmiths' hall, but the episode underlines the close relationships between the bodies to fund the Scottish and Irish war efforts, so much so that a confusion of committees can regularly occur. Overlap between the two London committees seems extensive, and confusion is caused by the fact that London's Scottish committee appears to have been based at Turner's hall, from where the London adventurers would soon be issuing orders also.

wish Ireland to the Scots while he enjoyed his ease in a peaceful English future - not so perhaps for those with more material concerns in the other island.[84] In the event, the relatively small number of MPs present saw fit to value the new Scottish alliance over any possible setbacks in Ireland, and 57 followed Vane and St. John in the vote for one commander in chief, to the 25 with Clotworthy and Reynolds.[85] Scottish interests were more important than the planters', even Clotworthy's attempt to ensure 'that some course may be taken for the payment of the English army in Ulster' going nowhere.[86]

This attempt to uphold Irish Protestant interests, even to the extent of challenging Scottish ones, is the key to why Clotworthy was regarded by the Scots as one of their key opponents in 1643-4. This is not to say that there were not wider considerations. As regards 'party' politics, and bearing in mind both that these were more a matter of small 'juntoes' not large blocs, there does appear to have been a greater polarisation following the entry of the Scots into the war, including a re-drawing of Essex's 'party', between August 1643 and Feb. 1644.[87] Clotworthy can be identified as part of this grouping, and with this identification goes an increased emphasis on what had already emerged as his twin aims, the promotion of settlement, but strictness as to the religious terms that could be accepted. If this makes him appear an obvious ally of the Scots, part of the reason for a delay in recognising a coincidence of ambitions was in the different strategies adopted by the Scots, and by Essex's supporters at this time.[88] But Clotworthy's record of co-operation with Covenanter Scotland would suggest a need to find reasons for the vehemence of the (temporary) rift between him and them in 1643-4 which go beyond the Scots having been cosseted by those (like Vane) with a different view on English settlement from Sir John, and the answer would appear to lie in the situation in Ulster. If the Scots regarded the appointment of one of their countrymen as essential to the security of their army in Ireland, Clotworthy's concern for the Ulster 'British' could lead him to argue that 'it

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[84]B.L. Harl. MS 165, ff. 252 a-b.

[85]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 350.

[86]B.L. Harl. MS 165, ff. 252 a-b.

[87]The clearest statements on internal politics in 1643-4 appear to be those found in M. P. Mahony, 'The Presbyterian Party in the Long Parliament, 2 July 1644 - 3 June 1647', D.Phil thesis, Oxford, 1973. See pp. 11, 30-1 for comments on the limited nature of 'party'; pp. 5-7, 31-3 for the formation of Essex's party. Pearl, 'Oliver St. John', points to the polarisation (p. 494) while not denying the complexity of politics (pp. 492, 495); the emphasis on the fact that it was *not* religious opinions (in the classical sense) which divided 'radicals' from moderates (pp. 490-2) remains normative after 1643-4 when religion would act as a counter-current, much as regionalism would do in 1643-4.

[88]Kaplan and Mahony both confirm that Clotworthy was to the fore in the effort in March to win the 'uncommitted' to an English cessation, and in 'working constructively for peace'. See Lawrence Kaplan, *Politics and religion during the English revolution. The Scots and the Long Parliament 1643-1645* (New York, 1976), p.43; Mahony, 'Presbyterian Party', p. 98. While Holles and his supporters were ready to see an English cessation, and the return of the King to London, the Scots pinned their hopes on the sending of propositions, which the more pacific of the English MPs did not come round to until Nov. 1644, Mahony, 'Presbyterian Party', pp. 81-4, 135-7.

would bringe all the busines into confusion if an english man did not comand these apart by themselfes'.[89]

The months of Jan. - March 1644 would see the first real divisions within the parliamentarian camp over Ireland, not over whether or not to fight the war there, but over the respective roles of the Scots and of the Irish Protestants. Such disputes contributed to a breach in co-operation between those, MPs and adventurers, most eager to press the Irish war, even as developments beyond Westminster gave greater assurance of the willingness of both Scots and Ulster Protestants to resume the conflict in Ireland, the latter even on Parliament's terms. It was Clotworthy and his associates who made the running in January. Two days after the crucial debate on Dec. 28, the Commons voted that MP adventurers should meet 'the Body of Adventurers in *London*' on Jan. 4 'and take into their serious Consideration, by what Ways and Means the *British* Army in *Ulster*, opposing the Cessation, may be maintained and encouraged to proceed in Prosecution of that War of *Ireland* '. All London clergy were to read the order for the gathering of the City's adventurers.[90] The victory lay not just in the return of the local Ulster forces to the agenda. Clotworthy's opponents would allege that, having failed to win committees to his position against the Scottish command, he had striven to have discussion removed from the pro-Scottish London committee and Goldsmiths' hall committee, and remitted to a 'convention' of adventurers.[91]

The outcome of the specially convened Jan. 4 meeting was to put the case of the Ulster 'British' back on the agenda. The meeting resolved that 'all the Brittish forces in Ulster, or elsewhere in Ireland, ...opposing the Cessation, and that shall take the Nationall Covenant, when it shalbe tendered them, shalbe provided for with the same proporcons of money, victuall, and clothes, as shalbe provided for the Scottish Army there'. This translated itself into a vote in favour of a 6 month weekly assessment for the Ulster forces, as well as specific votes of supplies akin to those ordered for Monro's army. Moreover, to accompany any supplies sent should be persons 'nominated by the body of Adventurers, and approved of by the houses' to ensure all

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[89]P.R.O.N.I. MS T.525/5, article 10. He was challenged about his use of the term 'English' to describe 12 000 local forces, upon which he reverted to the term 'British' claiming a common anti-Scottish sentiment among Ulster English and 'old' Scots

[90]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 353; E 79(28) [untitled circular] for the order delivered to London clergy.

[91]He was supposed to have decided this after the first joint meeting of the London (Grocers' hall) and Goldsmiths' hall (Scottish affairs) committee showed that there he would be over-ruled. P.R.O.N.I. MS T.525/5, articles 6 (obstructing the adventurer petition); 11 (seeking to win committees against the vote); 15 (ensuring the transfer of business); 21 (obstructing Goldsmiths' hall and the London committee). Clotworthy was alleged to have taken his campaign beyond even these circles. He was put forward as having agitated before and after the votes of Scots' convention and Commons, insinuating privately to MPs and adventurers the need for an English commander, naming Lisle (9); to have carried Lisle's case to the adventurers at the 'Royall Chandge' (13) and to have worked 'to have destroyed' some (one?) on the London committee in favour of a Scottish general by 'fowle information' given out , though no proof was ever made (7). This looks like a reflection of Clotworthy's clashes with Watkins (see below). In some of these charges Reynolds is alleged to have co-operated with Clotworthy.

provisions were suitably distributed, as well as to perform other tasks assigned by Parliament. It was hardly a resolution without precedent, but the potential at least was for a watching brief on a Scottish commander in Ulster.[92]

A further meeting the following day resulted in much more ambitious, if ultimately abortive, plans. The attendance record reveals a number of City adventurers, and records that 'divers others' were present, but of MPs only the 'Irish' stalwarts Clotworthy, Reynolds and John Goodwin. What was agreed, however, was not only the parliamentary vote to fuse the Commons' and the City's adventurer committees but to allow the Londoners to add such as they thought fit. Plans were made for weekly assemblies, both in the Exchequer Chamber, and at Grocers' Hall, home of the two older committees respectively.[93] No less than 11 propositions were then assented to on the matter of the welfare of Ulster. What they amounted to was the immediate implementation of the adventurer arrangements in the nine counties of Ulster, and in adjoining county Louth. Commissions under the Great Seal of *England* were to be issued, both of Oyer and Terminer, (to open the felony and treason proceedings needed to begin confiscation), and of Survey of the extent of forfeited land. While most of the remainder (propositions 5 - 9) related to the way in which the envisaged plantations should be organised[94], some were of wider importance. Contrary to reports later to be spread, the demand of the Scottish army for the allocation of land was not ignored.[95] Forfeited land in counties Cavan and Louth was to be allocated to 'patentees in trust' named by the Scottish commissioners 'appointed for the ioynt mannaging of the Warre in Ireland' to be disposed of for the army's arrears. Admittedly these were the counties least under the control of the Scots, the one in O'Neill's hands, the other garrisoned by Ormond's army. Land in the other counties was to go to adventurers who advanced a quarter proportion of adventurers formerly paid, or made new contributions in excess of £200.[96] In other words, the repeated attempts to squeeze more from the adventurer legislation was now to have the attraction of an immediate reward.

Two other resolutions rounded off the scheme. The promise was made that both the English and the Irish Parliaments would pass legislation to confirm the holdings, if desired. Also, the idea of sending delegates to Ulster was expanded. Such

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[92]B.L. Add. MS 4 771, ff. 4a-b.

[93]B.L. Add. MS 4 771, f. 5a.

[94]Thus the power to export, custom free, livestock or goods for the 'stocking and improving of the said allotted lands' (no. 5, a concern of the original legislation); the power to erect manor courts for the larger grantees (no. 6); authority to establish churches and clergy, forts and magazines (no. 7); commissions to be issued for sheriffs and other officials (no. 8); the right of adventurers to draw into 'associations' with adjacent grants (no. 9).

[95]P.R.O.N.I. MS T.525/5, article 15 says the meeting passed votes from Clotworthy's party which 'tend meerely to put a difference betweene the Scotts and the English, and to plant the forfaited part of Ulster by this Rebellion onlely with the English Adventurers, and that at p[r]esent, excluding the Scottish nation there out allto gither'.

[96]Those who had doubled on the July 14 ordinance were to be included, but only to the extent of receiving one proportion now, the other at the end of the war.

'persons of great trust and integrity' would not only oversee the process described, but undertake whatever else was needed 'for the good of the service in generall, and most advantageous for the said Adventurers in particular'.[97] Continuation of the larger meetings was envisaged - the next to be on Jan. 9.[98] All in all the resolutions have an air of continuity with the 1641-2 arrangements for direct adventurer activity, and the perception of the Scots as auxiliaries. The Ulster British were taken on board, though there was no attempt to curb the demand for their participation in the Covenant, which Clotworthy had campaigned for earlier. Perhaps there is also a hint of the reason why the adventurers would split over such proposals. Immediate implementation was promised, but the reward of land in Ulster was possibly not the most appealing. Later initiatives concentrated on the appropriation of urban property in coastal sites in southern and western Ireland. Speculatively, this could be seen as much more attractive to the kind of colonial merchants prominent at many levels of adventurer activity; conversely, land in Ulster, in proximity to the London-owned territory at Londonderry may have had greater appeal to the domestic traders who later flocked to Clotworthy's Presbyterian standard.[99]

In any event, neither the adventurers nor Parliament responded wholeheartedly to the initiative. A petition drawn up from the 'convention' meetings was, eventually, delivered to the Commons, but was apparently unread.[100] Arrangements were made to continue the new joint-committee (of MP-adventurers and a revamped London committee)[101], and their actions ran contrary to the efforts of the earlier London body.

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[97]B.L. Add. MS 4 771, ff. 5b-7b.

[98]It is notable that the minutes of the Jan. 5 meeting record the absence of 'divers' of the London adventurers' committee. All were to be 'personally desired' to attend on Jan. 9.

[99]It must be stressed that this is a speculative assessment. What is clear is that Clotworthy's scheme was not supported by the existing London committee, who later prompted the urban adventure. (The first adventure based on urban property had been included in the Doubling Ordinance of July 1643 and covered southern and western towns under confederate control. By 1645 the option of adventuring on the property of the Munster ports, whence Inchiquin had evicted the Catholic population, was promoted by Grocers' Hall). Brenner's assessment of the 'colonial-interloping' merchants shows their role on the London committee, and their later support for the non-Presbyterian faction in London, which has been associated with smaller-scale, domestic traders, *Merchants and revolution*, pp. 402, 459, 487-91 (the Presbyterian leadership of 1645-7 contained a 'far smaller proportion of overseas traders than had previous City ruling groups' and a higher proportion of domestic traders, p. 489). See Thomas M. Truxes, *Irish-American trade 1660-1783* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 14-17 for the manner in which the Munster ports, as well as Galway, had begun their rise as centres for transatlantic provisioning by the mid-17th century; pp. 21-2 for the rise of tobacco imports into Ireland from the 1660s, particularly through the ports of the south and west. Thus such towns would have an obvious appeal, even in the 1640s, to merchants trading to the Americas in terms of both export and import.

[100]Delivery was to be made by 17 citizens and as many of the Lords and Gentlemen of Ireland as may have notice'. B.L. Add MS 4 771, ff. 9a-b; B.L. Harl MS 165, f. 279b; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 368, 370, 372; *Perfect Diurnall*, no.25, Jan. 8 - 15, E252(16).

[101]B.L. Add MS 4 771, ff 9a-b; B.L. Harl MS 165, f.279b; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 368, 370, 372. The Jan. 5 meeting had voted for the various arrangements for the operation of the committee, that is, times and places, the roles of a clerk, the need for an order book, and that all orders be signed by at least 8 MPs (B.L. Add. MS 4 771, f.5a). This last was the most problematic, for after Feb. finding even 8 MPs was unusual. The only regular attenders were the established trio, Clotworthy, Reynolds and John Goodwin.

Thus control of the Dutch contribution was sought by the new body, implying a re-direction of the supplies, and thus undermining the Dec. 28 arrangement whereby offerings from the Netherlands would be used to meet the promises to Monro's army.[102] Moreover the new committee gave to Clotworthy, and three adventurer associates, an auditing function over all previous adventurer accounts, having earlier refused to appoint the existing treasurers to a position within the newly proposed scheme.[103] Given the future controversies over Irish accounting the measure looks like a bid for partisan direction of the Irish war.[104]

Both armies in Ulster needed to be both coaxed and pressured of they were to fulfil the combative ambitions of their respective sponsors. The Scots had formed themselves into the kind of armed petitioners whose resolutions were as determinative of political developments in Ireland as those of any civil institution.[105] By Jan. 11 the Scottish convention of estates gave them permission to depart Ireland by Feb. 2 if the promises made them were not met, though opinion in both the army, and the Scottish government, was divided over the option of withdrawal.[106] Ulster's senior officers had held their conference at Belfast to consider the Covenant. They resolved that the league was as yet only proposed, not pressed; given this, and the widespread support for it, not least among private soldiers, it would cause greater 'distraction' to proclaim the Covenant, as instructed, than to let it go ahead. They thus suggested a respite of the order.[107] Ormond's information suggested that the colonels' desire to resume the war extended to a willingness to receive supply from Parliament, though privately they sought neither the Covenant nor any new commander-in-chief.[108]

Instead Feb. saw a slowing down of activity for Ireland. The new committee accepted that progress had been made on the assessment, so that contracts on its credit could be advanced. Otherwise it busied itself with the standard minutiae of Irish affairs, repayment of debts, collection of arrears and so on. Efforts to resuscitate the

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[102]Having first insisted on their taking control of the scheme (from agents named by the Londoners), the new committee directed instructions to Monro that the incoming shipment, on the *Golden Morning Star*, should be distributed to 'poore distressed protestants', *not* soldiers, Scottish or local. (The Royalists had already made propaganda play with this, but the resolution does not seem to have taken effect). Moreover, future collections should not be expended on supplies but transmitted in cash so that purchases could be made, at cheaper rates, in Britain. The man behind such good value purchases was none other than the rising commissary, John Davies. (See also appendix 3). B.L. Add. MS 4 771, ff. 4b, 7b-8a, 16a - 17a, 22b - 23a.

[103]B.L. Add. MS 4 771, ff. 8a, 8b - 9a, 10a - b.

[104]For the emergence of the first ordinance for a general accounts committee, with powers also over Irish spending, see B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 105a (Jan. 1).

[105]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 122-3 for the officers' bond of 1642; pp. 143-55 for meetings of officers and the despatch of agents, 1643-4.

[106]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 151-3.

[107]British officers to Lords Justices and Ormond, Jan. 16, Carte MS 8, f. 510. The thought that the departing Scots might draw with them numbers of their own troops was a concern for the colonels, who issued an order to prohibit departure of their men, Jan. 11, apparently to limited effect, *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, i, 71; Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, p. 151.

[108]See Lt.-Col. Matthew (Chichester's regiment) to Ormond, Jan. 13, Carte MS 8, f. 480.

early Jan. proposals appear to have generated no response.[109] The Commons did (Feb. 20) call on Clotworthy, Reynolds and Jephson to 'make a full Representation of the Whole State of that Kingdom, unto this House, with their Opinions thereupon', but, as will be seen, this did come before the Commons until April.[110] Clotworthy's reputation had been battered, not only by covert charges of peculation[111] or of keeping too close contacts with Oxford,[112] but also in being openly implicated in the web of plots entangling parliament in early 1643. While his hands were hardly clean as regards links to the 'enemy' the charges have the ring of a conspiracy from within to defame him, or worse.[113] In late Jan. the Commons permitted joint meetings of Grocers' hall and Goldsmiths' hall committees, to consider the Ulster British;[114] further matters were likewise referred to the Irish and Scottish committees meeting together.[115]

The Scottish agenda came more to the fore. On Feb. 3, with the arrival of the Scottish commissioners imminent, St. John delivered to the Lords an ordinance for the imposition of the Covenant in the three Kingdoms. Ireland, however, appears only in the preamble, on the desirability of tripartite unity; no mechanism for enforcement there is contained in the body of the legislation.[116] Much of the month in Parliament was taken up with debates over the formation of the first Committee of both Kingdoms. With regard to Ireland, ¶ 4 granted power 'to advise, consult, order, and direct, concerning the carrying on and managing of the War for the best Advantage of the Three Kingdoms, and the keeping of a good Intelligence between the Three Kingdoms,

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[109]B. L. Add. MS 4 771, including ff. 17b - 18b for the committee's assessment (Feb. 6) of its progress to date. For a statement on the scale of the debt on the Turner account which, despite new votes, was running at almost £40 000 in March 1645, see P. R. O. S.P. 28/139/12.

[110]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 404.

[111]P.R.O.N.I. MS T.525/5, articles 4, 16, 20. It was but the beginning of a series of such charges levied at Clotworthy which have marred his historical reputation.

[112]P.R.O.N.I. MS T.525/5. This included not only the Leicester issue, but also the claim that Clotworthy was maintaining contact with his relative Arthur Jones, now second Viscount Ranelagh, at Court. Again this was to hang over Sir John's head for years to come.

[113]For the interlocking plots, see Kaplan, *Politics and religion*, pp 15-17; Gardiner, *Great civil war*, i, 264-75. For accusations against Clotworthy, which implied his dealings with some of the original 1641 plotters, see *Commons' jn., iii*, 364, 366; B. L. Harl. MS 165, f. 271a; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, ff. 106a, 107a; B. M. Gardiner (ed.), 'A Secret Negotiation...', in *Camden Miscellany*, viii (1883), pp. xi (on Watkins), 11 (on the plotters), 13-17 (on Clotworthy).

[114]*Commons' jn., iii*, 381. The designations given committees confuse which is intended, but it remains clear that Irish affairs were being returned to the supervision of the Scottish committee (Goldsmiths' hall) and probably of their allies.

[115]For example, the testimony of colonel Lawrence Crawford, ex-Dublin army, and later of the eastern Association. He had left Dublin, with his officers, refusing to take Ormond's army oath to fight for the King. *Commons' jn.*, iii, 386, 387; *Perfect Diurnall*, no.28, Jan. 29 - Feb. 5, E252(19), p.224. Crawford was given permission to publish his vindication, which he did - L. Crawford, *Irelands Ingratitude*, E33(28).

[116]Meanwhile Clotworthy reported a proposal for a committee to meet the Scottish representatives, which suggests that his differences with them were not complete, and perhaps widened by his rivals over Irish policy. *Lords' jn.*, vi, 407, 408, 411-2; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 376-8.

their Forces, Committees, and Counsels'.[117] With the implication that only one 'War' was being fought, the potential for the Committee's involvement in its Irish dimension is clear.[118] When it occurred, it was primarily in terms of the Scottish army. With some of its regiments abandoning Ireland for their homeland, the Scottish Council and Committee of Estates resolved, on Feb. 20, to reverse an earlier decision and command the remainder of the army to stay in Ireland.[119]

Even so, this was only a temporary extension, until the end of March, dependent on the despatch of the support promised in Nov. 1643. Vane's reports to the Commons showed that the committee for Scottish affairs had been working to supply clothing and foodstuffs.[120] But the real fillip to the Scottish requests came with the onset of Committee of Both Kingdoms' activities.[121] Having mulled over the Nov. arrangements, C.B.K. had Vane report them to the Commons on March 5-7.[122] Both Houses now gave their support to virtually all the logistical queries and confirmed that the Scottish commander should also command 'the rest of the *Brittish* forces in *Ireland*', 'by joint advice, with the Committees of both Kingdoms'. Perhaps as a corollary of the new command, the Commons did vote that 'as long as the *British* Regiments in Ulster shall remain in the Service of the King and Parliament, that the Two Houses of Parliament do give Satisfaction to them ,for their Maintenance'. To C.B.K. was referred the article concerning the recall of the Scots in case of non-payment. More importantly, on March 9 they were assigned responsibility for setting out 'the Manner of tendering and taking the National League and Covenant in the Kingdom of *Ireland*'.[123] It had taken five months to secure the terms for the maintenance of the Scottish presence in Ireland.

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[117]Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, pp. 271-3.

[118]It is not evident that Clotworthy supported the ordinance - his delivery of the Feb. 3 vote referred to a larger, temporary committee (cf. Kaplan, *Politics and religion*, p. 22 & note 68). Robert Reynolds appears as a principled opponent, on the grounds of the weakening of the power of Parliament itself, and of the preponderance of military and civil officers. B.L. Add. MS 31 116, ff. 113a-b; cf. B.L. Harl. MS 166, f. 7a. His opposition to the dominance of officials comes out again when the Self Denying Ordinance was before the Commons, he having a prominent drafting role - Kaplan, *Politics and religion*, pp. 86-7.

[119]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 154-5.

[120]B.L. Harl. MS 166, f.18a (Feb. 26). The committee's records suggests that initial funding for the provision of food and clothing for Monro's army came through loans raised in Scotland by the English commissioners in Edinburgh. But they also suggest that a contract was awarded to London merchants for the supply of clothing worth £4 000 on the basis of a loan raised (in England) in December, *Cal. C. C.*, i, 3, 779.

[121]Hereafter abbreviated as 'C.B.K.'

[122]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 418; B.L. Harl. MS 166, ff. 25b, 28a; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, ff. 121b, 122a; *Lords' jn.*, vi, 455, 456.

[123]*Lords' jn.*, vi, 458, 464; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 418; *Tanner letters*, pp. 172-3. The Dec. votes had related only to the Commons. At that time they had assented to the 1st, 2nd, and 4th articles, i.e. that accounts be drawn; for £10 000, food and clothes at once; for the Scottish command. These three articles were now passed by the Lords also. In addition both Houses agreed to articles 6 and 7, on the sending of arms for the army, and on the support of local anti-cessation forces. Both agreed to support the answer originally delivered by their commissioners to the demand for £50 000 more by Feb., (article 3) and to refer to C.B.K the promise to withdraw the army if this was not paid (article 5).

Not that Parliament could be complacent. On March 19 the Commons heard from the Scots officers in Ireland, unaware of the recent votes, that they had received nothing, not even orders to stay or leave, and would leave if not soon provided for, along with '40 000 Brittish families'.[124] C.B.K sent off a flurry of letters, to the army, to Edinburgh, to the Scottish commissioners with their English army, all full of assurances.[125] Vane was to approach the Accounts committee to secure the 'accounts for the sequestrations, and for the bringing in of the money for the Scotts' army in Ireland'.[126] Proposals from Grocers' Hall led the C.B.K to set up a sub-committee for Ireland - it consisted of the Scottish commissioners, plus Northumberland Vane jr, St. John and Wallop.[127] The role of the Scottish commissioners, prodded from Edinburgh by Loudoun,[128] should not be under-estimated. By March 26 the sub-committee had readied its proposals, principally on the means to obtain the long-promised £60 000, still tied to sequestrations, and also for an ordinance to ensure payment of adventure subscriptions. In the longer term, an ordinance was planned to raise £4000 per month *each* for the Scottish and British forces, and the appointment of C.B.K nominees to oversee the distribution of Dutch aid among all those in arms in Ulster. The commitment to a Scottish command now was seen to mean that Leven, the named commander-in-chief, appoint a resident commander, while C.B.K name a committee to reside with the armies.[129]

In London, there were still fears, in April, of further landings from Ireland, now attached to Catholic forces.[130] Ormond's stream of troops had run dry, partly because of a revamped parliamentary navy.[131] The landings had also advanced the application of revenue from delinquents' property, in so far as regional ordinances were

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[124]B.L. Harl MS 166, f.35b; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 431.

[125]*Cal. S.P. dom., 1644*, pp. 48, 49-50, 72.

[126]*Cal. S.P. dom., 1644*, pp. 72-3.

[127] On March 21 Vane [sr ?] and Stapleton were added, *Cal. S.P. dom., 1644*, pp. 61-2, 64.

[128]See Loudoun's letter to Wariston, one of the commissioners, to press the case for the Scottish armies, March 14 in *H. M. C. rep. 6*, p. 8. Loudoun perhaps showed a greater interest in the army in Ireland than others in Edinburgh, as seen in correspondence with London and Ulster, urging the army to stay and fight, and the English to pay up. Cf. Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 152, 154.

[129]*Cal. S.P. dom., 1644*, pp. 79-80. The timing of money sent was to be £30 000 to Carrickfergus by April 30, the rest by June 30. The Scots only agreed to send the terms to Edinburgh, before their assent could be taken. The ordinance for compulsory adventure payments was to replace the bill rejected by the King; another ordinance was sought to allow credit in the next instalment of the £200 000 promised from sequestrations for *both* Scottish armies. Again the intimate relationship between sequestrations for the Scots and the adventure is apparent.

[130]On April 4, John Moore wrote to the C.B.K. of the probability that 6 000 Irish 'rebels' were ready to cross to the north-west of England, *H. M. C. rep. 10.* app. 4, p. 72. Other reports of imminent invasion may be found in *Perfect Diurnall*, no. 36, April 1 - 8, E252(27), p. 247 and no. 39, April 22 - 29, E252(30), p. 307.

[131]The one failure was the guarding of the west of Scotland, despite promises, allowing the landing of Macdonnell's men. By May, Warwick had accomplished a close investment of Dublin. M. L. Baumber, 'The navy and the civil war in Ireland, 1643-1646', in *Mariner's Mirror*, lxxv (1989), pp. 256-7, 258, 259-6-, 260-1. See also J. R. Powell, *The navy in the English civil war* (London, 1962), pp. 54-5, 58-61, 71-2, especially for the blocking of the southern, Munster - Bristol axis for landings.

passed to mobilise resources to counter the 'Irish' threat.[132] Clotworthy had wanted to counter the possibility of Irish invasion at source. Parliament should 'uphold & encourage' Protestant forces in Ulster and stand by them in a refusal to obey Ormond's commands; Stapleton followed the motion with one for the impeachment of Ormond for high treason.[133] The possibility of a swing in the loyalties of the northern province was growing, but with it increasing evidence of division. Ormond's correspondents, most of them of English extraction, cast doubt on the attitudes of the 'ancient' Scottish population. Chichester reported the efforts of the inhabitants of Co. Down to persuade Monro's army to stay; Matthews that only the three 'English' regiments could be trusted. Certainly there was concern that troops from the English regiments would not be enough to hold the garrisons vacated by the Scots, while Mervin's letters belie his claim that he did 'not love' national distinctions.[134] All seemed to fear being over stretched on supplies, which could only be much worse if the local population did leave in any numbers. Mervin, Sir James Montgomery and Sir Robert Stewart all asked to be allowed to replace the Scots when they withdrew from Coleraine, seeking the governorship and quarters for their forces.[135]

By March 1 Robert Stewart was telling the Lord Lieutenant that some among the local officers were in a 'band' to break the cessation in the hope that this would stay the Scottish army.[136] Five days later, the commanders at large told Ormond that their plans were 'frustrate' by the failure of the Scots to depart.[137] Ormond's tentative efforts to withdraw forces from Ulster to serve Charles in England had to be abandoned; in the circumstances, even the allocation of an Ulster port for the

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[132]*Lords' jn.*, vi, 424-5; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 378-81 (north Wales), 409-13 (Cheshire).
[133]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 400; B.L. Harl. MS 166, f. 13a. The final, successful, vote was that Ormond 'be forthwith accused of High Treason, for levying War against the King and Parliament, and adhering to the Rebels of *Ireland*'. The vote that his orders not be obeyed was also acceptable. But the Commons preferred strengthening English forces to Clotworthy's plans, reading an ordinance for forces in Shropshire and naming a new committee to combat Irish invaders in Cheshire, Lancashire, Staffordshire and Shropshire. The *Perfect Diurnall*, no. 30, E 252(21) reports the news of Ormond's efforts to procure a proclamation against the Covenant preceded the vote to condemn him as 'Traitor against all the three Kingdoms'. The communication to forces in Ireland was not only to disregard his orders 'but to endeavour to bring him to a just and legall triall upon the treasons and other criminous misdemeanours alleaged against him' (pp. 237-8). There is a good case to be made for seeing the proposed impeachment as a counter to the unresolved charges against the four arrested ex-Councillors in Dublin, in the mind of Parliament at this time. Crawford had argued the danger to them , *Commons' jn.*, iii, 387.
[134]Arthur Chichester to Ormond, Feb. 16, Carte MS 9, f. 207; John Chichester to Ormond, Feb. 16, Carte MS 9, f. 205; Matthews to Ormond, Feb. 28, Carte MS 9, ff. 361-2; Mervyn to Ormond, Feb. 17, Carte MS 9, ff. 217-8; Mervyn to Ormond, Feb. 21, Carte MS 9, f. 269. Mervyn's letters are largely couched in English - Scottish terms, vaunting his own regiment against those of the Stewarts. His criticism of the correspondence with the Scottish Chancellor was of a piece with his pique that inhabitants of Ireland should have to respond to opinion in Scotland.
[135]Mervyn to Ormond, Feb. 21, Carte MS 9, f. 269; Montgomery to Ormond, Feb. 22, Carte MS 9, ff. 287-90; Stewart to Ormond, Feb. 22, Carte MS 9, f. 291.
[136]Stewart to Ormond, March 1, Carte MS 9, f. 391.
[137]British officers to Ormond, March 6, Carte MS 9, f. 461. See below, note 148.

embarkation of Antrim's force for Scotland would be risking too much.[138] Sir Frederick Hamilton had been employed from the Scottish government with the order to stay Monro's forces.[139] It seems certain he was involved in other negotiations. Loudoun had responded to the letter from Derry, whatever the circumstances of its writing, promising aid and assistance from Scotland. Perhaps to avoid all taint of association with 'rebels' it was to him and his associates that some among the 'British' authorities addressed their March 26 letter openly repudiating the cessation.[140]

The move into the parliamentarian camp had not been without a struggle.[141] If the continued presence of the Scottish army and the arrival of Dutch supplies, a foretaste of future provisioning, persuaded the local commanders to resume the quarrel[142], the Covenant remained a major stumbling block. Clotworthy's efforts at Parliament had been geared to making the re-entry in to the war of the northern province as painless as possible, but his campaign for an acceptable commander (as well as adequate resources) had missed the political mark, an unavoidable situation for one so committed to the coventanting principle. In Ulster pressure for the Covenant had been from the bottom up, in social terms, but while this fits with the idea that the Covenant was received as a defensive bond, plugging Ulster into a broader, primarily Scottish, military energy[143] the force of a religious groundswell should not be ignored.[144]

If the elite would hold out for some time to come, it was not that 'ideological' considerations had not reached the members of the proprietorial - military nexus dominant in Ulster.[145] By Feb. they had announced to Ormond that they found it acceptable to receive provisions from Parliament, claiming that any perceived weakness on their part would give room to the confederate delegates, planned to go to the King,

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[138]Ormond to Digby, March 13, Carte MS 9, f. 511.

[139]Thornton to Ormond, March 14, Carte MS 9, ff. 530-1.

[140]Loudoun to the officers and officials in and around Derry (2 letters), Feb. 27, Carte MSS 9, f. 348, 10, f. 271; British officers to Loudoun, March 26, Carte MS 10, f. 269.

[141]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 160-3; Perceval - Maxwell 'Ireland and Scotland', pp. 204-5.

[142]British officers to Ormond, April 7, Carte MS 10, f. 153, April 14, Carte MS 10, f. 207.

[143]Perceval-Maxwell, 'Ireland and Scotland', pp. 204-6; D. Miller, *Queen's Rebels: Ulster loyalism in historical perspective*, (Dublin, 1978), pp. 14-16.

[144]In Derry at least, Mayor Thornton was reporting a fusion of religious and national tension by Oct., 1643 (Thornton to Ormond, Oct. 17, in Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-53*, i, 792). Cf. the account of the spread of the Covenant in Ulster in Adair, *True narrative* ed. Killen, pp. 102-118.

[145]R. Gillespie, 'An army sent from God: Scots at war in Ireland, 1642-9', in Norman Macdougall (ed.), *Scotland and war AD.. 29 - 1918*, (Edinburgh, 1991), pp 123-4 gives one of the reasons for antagonism between settlers and the 'New Scots' the threat to the power base of the former, which included military commands. These as presented as conferring social as well as military standing, their loss tokening a reduction in landlord status. Indeed, throughout most of Ireland the control of military force among Protestants remained very much a prerogative of the established social elite, 'professional' soldiers being confined to imported armies or, to a lesser extent, the remnants of the 'old' army stationed in and around Dublin.

to impose their conditions on him.[146] This concern, going back to the Oct., 1643 Dublin petition, had not died. At the one day session of the Irish Parliament on Nov. 13, the Commons had busied themselves with a Remonstrance to be delivered to the King by agents, but the prorogation shut down the initiative.[147] It re-surfaced with the meeting of the Houses the following Feb. 17, with the Commons giving approval to what appears to be the Oct. petition, nominating agents to attend the King, and constructing an elaborate structure to provide funding for their mission.[148] The direct implication was that Protestant Ireland stood firmly behind a policy which refused to make any concessions, lest this permit a repetition of the events of 1641; but the votes also show the continuity of some sort of 'national' structure for Protestant Ireland, a reminder that not all politics were regional politics.[149]

Certainly there was a general frustration at the implementation of the cessation arrangements, felt most keenly further from Dublin. Since the previous autumn, Clanricard had feared that quartering arrangements in Connacht would prompt local Protestant forces to repudiate the ceasefire, and (by Dec.) possibly co-ordinate war efforts with the Scottish army.[150] In the south Inchiquin had declaimed that the cessation would be the ruin of the Protestants. As Sir Hardress Waller wrote to Bettesworth 'Surely Mr. Donno O'Callaghan doth but exercise his wit and play the merry devil with us touching our quarters, which he may very well do, having all in his own hands.' Bettesworth, as one of the commissioners under the cessation, continued to recorded failed meetings and the overload of disputed business throughout the spring. Defection could not but cause animosity, the narrowness of quarters frustration bordering on the impossible.[151] Bettesworth and Perceval retained an interest in the

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[146]British officers to Ormond, Feb. 5, Carte MS 9, f. 104; Arthur Hill to Ormond, Feb. 15, Carte MS 9, ff. 199-200. See also British officers to Ormond, March 6, Carte MS 9, f. 461. They told Ormond they had resolved to appeal to Parliament since supply was essential to keeping their army together, which in turn was necessary to keep the population in Ulster. Scottish plans frustrated their plans which assumed that the King could be done no better service than retaining the Scottish army and re-supplying themselves. Hill at least claimed that detaining the Scots would help the King in England.

[147]*Commons' jn. Ire.*, i, 314. It is possible that Ormond and the Lords Justices were willing to use the Lords to speed the prorogation despite the Commons' debates, *Lords' jn. Ire.*, i, 198-9.

[148]*Commons' jn. Ire.*, i, 317. The lower House had acknowledged the King's Nov. 6 response to the petition. It appears that it was the same document which they wished to uphold; there is no indication in the *Journals* of a new text.

[149]*Commons' jn. Ire.*, i, 317. The collection of a subsidy for the agents was organised on a provincial basis, but presumably with the belief that it could function beyond Leinster.

[150]Clanricard to Ormond, Oct. 3, Dec. 3, in Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 473-4, 532-4. For Carte's own comments on the Roscommon anti-cessationists, see Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 68-9. The province was far from being a secure confederate region, and anti-cessation activities by the Cootes and Ormesbys seem to have preceded moves from Ulster. By March the Supreme Council insisted that they must act to suppress the 'ill-affected' in the province, though they would not move against Protestant garrisons without notifying Ormond - Archbishop of Cashel, etc. to Ormond, March 26, Carte MS 10, f. 24.

[151]For example, while his side alleged that the 'protection' clause was 'general' encompassing all who had 'adhered to us most part of these wars, and revolted lately' his opposite numbers demanded written proof of each 'protected' person and, thereby, estate. Barry to Reymond, Feb. 24, *Egmont MSS*, i,

provincial depositions, apparently transmitted to Oxford, and a reminder not only of material losses but of 'many notable murders'.[152] When Inchiquin travelled to Court in Feb., in pursuit of the Lord Presidency[153] (and to counter allegations apparently spread against him), his forces were down to 510 infantry at Cork, 120 at Bandon, 120 at Kinsale, 270 at Youghal and a total of 200 cavalry. By April there were further disbandments, Waller (accused by the confederates of parliamentarian sympathies) was despatched to Oxford to seek aid, and Inchiquin faced wrangles with the civic authorities for resources to support his men. Soon he would be prepared to countenance rumours of disaffection in Cork city. But disaffection of a different kind worried Ormond - he feared Inchiquin's departure to Oxford would mean the loss of Munster not to the confederates, but to parliament.[154] Certainly Waller, 'military governor' during Inchiquin's absence, informed Bettesworth (Feb. 12) that he desired to know how Inchiquin 'proceeds in England, upon notice whereof "I shall know what sail to bear" '.[155] Waller had persisted in pressing Ormond to provide for the Munster forces, whether through Kilkenny or otherwise,[156] but clearly the exigencies of the situation were re-directing sights even in Munster.

Parliament thus had some grounds to hope that Protestant Ireland would join its projected tripartite alliance. But the stages between disillusion and realignment were not to be rushed. The effects of a sanguine interpretation can be seen in a report delivered to the Commons by Reynolds on April 1, the outcome of an order given back in Feb. to prepare findings on the state of Ireland.[157] To such conventional matters as

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208; Waller to Bettesworth, Feb. 12, *Egmont MSS*, i, 199; Reymond to Perceval, Feb. 12, *Egmont MSS*, i, 199-200; Bettesworth to Perceval, Feb. 24, *Egmont MSS*, i, 201-3.

[152]Bettesworth to Perceval, Feb. 24, *Egmont MSS*, i, 201-3; Bettesworth to Perceval, March 24, *Egmont MSS*, i, 209-10. For the Munster depositions, see Clarke, '1641 depositions', pp. 114-6.

[153]Given the exigencies of his situation, and the failure to gain support from the confederates, it may be that Inchiquin sought the title as much to bolster his position with them (cf. later efforts at compromise Presidents in Connacht - chapter 7 below) as for personal ambition. Thus, for example, he consistently sought pressure from the King or Ormond to force (the virtually non-aligned) Limerick city to supply his forces (Inchiquin to Ormond, Dec. 18, Carte MS 8, f. 139). In the circumstances, the Lord Presidency may have seemed like a useful means to such ends.

[154]Bottigheimer, 'English interest in southern Ireland', pp. 114-126.

[155]*Egmont MSS*, i, 199.

[156] Waller to Ormond, Feb. 6, Feb. 9; Ormond to Waller (undated), Carte MS 9, ff.125, 163, 568. Waller was concerned about the reliability of the Munster towns and was uneasy about a situation where food supplies demanded upon purchases in the Irish quarters, which could be closed off if the enemy pleased.

[157]The body to whom the motion was referred is unclear. In any event, the Feb. 20 order did include the Clotworthy - Reynolds committee, but probably not only it. The MPs took it upon themselves to call a meeting of all London adventurers on the basis of the Feb. 20 vote, to what end is not certain. By March they were complaining that planned joint sessions of the Goldsmiths' and Exchequer based committees had failed to materialise due to the non-appearance of the London committee - B.L. Add. MS 4 771, ff. 28b - 29a, 35b. The identity of the 'Irish gentlemen' co-opted to the plan is not known, but one individual present was 'Major Coote' presumably Chidley Coote, whose pamphlet was published in London in March, but possibly his elder brother, Charles, B.L. Add. MS 4 771, f. 27b. London publishers sponsored a small stream of anti-cessation works, some by figures recently come from Ireland. See Richard Harrison, *Irelands Misery*, T.T. E30 (12); Lawrence Crawford, *Irelands*

the condemnation of the cessation and warnings of the possibility of large scale invasion, they produced a strategy based on maximising the potential of the Protestant forces in Ireland. Ulster was to be the driving force, but Protestants in Connacht though few in number, were seen as holding important strongholds and ready to rise 'as one man' to join the relieving army from the north. More Leinster Protestants had moved to Dublin after their losses, but were seen as having taken heart, petitioning against the 'rebels'. If stocked with food and munitions the city could receive yet more of the Leinster forces, and hold out in turn until the army approached, presumably having circled half of Ireland. To support such grandiose designs the ordinance for weekly assessment for Ireland was upheld.[158] The scheme was not without its element of fantasy, but was at least a possible alternative to concentrating all resources on the Scots in the hope of their triumph. Whitacre recorded Reynolds as naming towns held by either army, and claiming that Ulster had 10 000 infantry and 1100 cavalry, locally recruited, whereas 2 000 Scots had already left, and more would follow if not supplied. He did not have a clear run, though, for Vane was meanwhile giving his report as from the Scottish commissioners.[159]

Neither, said D'Ewes, was 'perfected today', and the next day's discussion featured an appearance by Rev. Mr. Traile, long since sent to report from Ulster. He was positive - both British and Scots showed 'their good Affections to the Parliament of *England*; and their Inclination to take the solemn League and Covenant; and their Disaffection and utter Dislike of the Cessation; and of any Peace that shall ensue thereupon'. This last phrase is suggestive, for if Traile was at all accurate he was representing the sentiment recognised in the Oxford negotiations as relating to the 'Protestant' agents, that no peace settlement at all would please them save total victory.[160] It was, however, the Scots who would win most from the April debates. Their commissioners drew up their own document, dated April 3, promising continued involvement in the Irish war despite sufferings 'unparalleled in any story and not to be undergone by any others'. They pressed the 'joint committees' (C.B.K.) findings on support of the armies, and urged speedy news to the army and to Edinburgh.[161] Along

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Ingratitude, T.T. E33(28); Chidley Coote, (younger son of the late Sir Charles) *Irelands Lamentation for the late Destructive Cessation, or, a Trap to catch Protestants'*, T.T. E35(4).

[158]B.L. Add. MS 4 771, ff. 27b - 28a.

[159]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 443; B.L. Harl MS 166, f. 42a; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 128b. As recorded for April 2, Vane seems to have read Loudoun's letter on the departure of three regiments from Ireland, and of the difficulties of keeping the rest of the army there.

[160]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 444; B.L. Harl MS 166, f. 42b; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 129a.

[161]*Tanner letters*, pp. 173-4. The document cited both Traile and Loudoun. It claimed that nothing had been sent from England for 22 months, and demanded an answer on the 5th 'Result', that is, withdrawal if payment was not made.

with papers on their other army, in England, they seem to have reached the Lords first, with Saye reading their findings on April 4.[162]

It was, after all, honeymoon days for the future 'Independents' and the Scots, and the batch of Irish orders agreed on April 8-11, though including a promise to pay both Scots and Ulster British, was a ratification of the C.B.K. sub-committee's proposals.[163] Clotworthy protested at the decision to supply both the 'new Scots' and the Ulster forces with £4000 each per month, on the grounds that the latter's larger numbers deserved more money.[164] The C.B.K moved to action on the sequestrations, accepting that these were the most viable means of paying for the Scottish alliance. Acknowledgement was made, as sought by the Scots, that £30000 of sequestration money had gone to other ends than the repayment of Scottish debt since the May 1643 order to this end.[165] A new sub-committee of Wharton, Gerard, Vane, St. John and the Scots was set up on April 17 to supervise the use of sequestration and other funds to repay the Scots, and the Treasurers were again told that no other use was to be made of the money, this time till £60000 was diverted.[166] By May 25 the Lords had approved a letter to Edinburgh assuring the ratification of all treaties, including that on Ireland, and promising that arrangements for the April 11 orders were underway. Indeed, by June 1, order had been given for Captains Kerse and Willoughby to set sail for Leith with the first £30000 from the sequestrations.[167]

Competing policies were more a matter of priorities than of open hostilities to either of the armies in Ulster. It could be argued that the struggle was an attempt to remove obstacles in the way of bringing the 'British' over wholeheartedly to

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[162]*Lords' jn.*, vi, 499-500. Wharton presented another such paper from the Scots to the peers on April 8, asking that the response should be made in time for the re-assembly of the Convention, due on April 11 - *Lords' jn.*, vi, 505.

[163]The final vote was of seven resolutions, *Lords' jn.*, vi, 512. Three concerned the back pay of the 'New Scots' - there was to be a speedy collection of £60 000 for them from sequestrations; a new ordinance was to pass to guarantee the next third of the £200 000 promised for the Scottish war effort in general; on the vexed question of timing, it was agreed that £30 000 reach Carrickfergus by May 15, the same again by June 30. The old Bill for compulsory payment of adventure subscriptions was to be an ordinance, and a 'settled course' was agreed to be introduced to supply the £4 000/month to each army. Again, the principle of Scottish command was accepted, and a resident commander called for, to be assisted by commissioners from both Kingdoms. While the Lords took the measures at one go, the Commons had passed them piecemeal. The ordinance for the next payment to cover England was commissioned as early as April 4 (to St. John), that on the adventure being again Maynard's task. While the Scottish measures were determined on April 8, the command and the £8 000/month were raised on April 10.. Even then the Scots had preferential treatment, for any sum owed above the £4 000 was to be guaranteed on the public faith, and the possibility of augmentation included. Moreover, Scottish participation in every aspect of the scheme was guaranteed, with joint treasurers for every fund, even the Dutch aid. *Commons' jn.*, iii, 448, 452, 456.

[164]B.L. Add. MS 31116, f. 131a. What Clotworthy is reported to have said is that he 'would have more sent to ye Brittish, bec[ause] they are more in number, & all in Extreme want, lest they should otherwise grow into discontent, if they had not ye like p[ro]portion yt ye Scottish Regim[en]ts had', and managed a long debate before defeat.

[165]*Cal. S.P. dom., 1644*, pp. 109, 113, 119.

[166]*Cal. S.P. dom., 1644*, pp. 123-4, 133.

[167]*Lords' jn.*, vi, 568-9; *Cal. S.P. dom., 1644*, pp. 189, 197.

Parliament's side, as against a greater trust in, and reliance on, Scottish than Irish allies. A certain amount of broader partisan animosity was probably mixed in, though.[168] Animosity spilled over into jurisdictional conflict between the Irish committees, as the C.B.K insisted on using the Grocers' Hall committee of City Adventurers as its executive. For the citizens of the adventurer committee, support of the Scots was broader than the war in Ireland - many of them were now financially involved with two Scottish armies through the sequestrations measures. It was the London committee who were to certify any stocks of equipment for Ireland still detained in England and to examine any persons in possession of the same. They were given the right to regain all such and have it sent over, and to keep contact with the collectors in the Netherlands, whose activities were now to be directed by the C.B.K via the citizens.[169]

Dutch relief was to be a major contribution to the war effort, despite the earlier vote to confine it to refugees, and the continued play royalist propaganda would make of the diversion.[170] But the 'committee war' was to have deeper consequences, for it would rumble on in the years ahead, poisoning relationships between those at the cutting edge of support for the Irish war effort. Thus, for example, C.B.K. backed up the old London committee, now meeting at Turners' hall, in a dispute with the new 'joint'-adventurer committee over the disposal of remaining goods held for Ireland.[171] Some sort of compromise was reached and, so far as they can be identified, the goods in question were of relatively little value. But the element of rivalry was setting fair to becoming a permanent sore, a product of distrust, and generating further resentments, all to the hindrance of the logistical support for the Irish war.[172] Moreover, to some extent, an issue of principle does perhaps intrude. For invariably the items discussed were designed originally for local forces in Ireland, and the aim of the London committee (and thus C.B.K.) seems to have been rather to use them to fulfil promises of further arms for the Scots' army.[173] Again, priorities in the Irish war were at stake.

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[168] Not for nothing does the 'alternative' C.B.K mentioned by D'Ewes in early May consist of 'Mr Hollis Sr John Clatworthy Mr Robert Reinolds & others'. B.L. Harl. MS 166, f. 58b.

[169] *Cal. S.P. dom., 1644*, pp 115, 123-4, 129-30.

[170] *Lords' jn.*, vi, 592,597, 598-9; *Cal. S.P. dom., 1644*, p. 256; B.L. Harl. MS 166, f. 100b. The parliamentary letter to Strickland was to have been produced by Clotworthy, *Commons' jn.*, iii, 512. See also appendix 3 for the Dutch contribution.

[171] For the orders issued by the different bodies, see *Cal. S.P. dom., 1644*, pp. 169-170, 181, 210, 227, 229, 256 (C.B.K); *Cal. S.P. dom., Addenda, 1625-49*, pp. 659-60, 661 (Turners' hall); B.L. Add. MS 4 771, ff. 43b - 44a, 45a-b, 46a, 49a ('new' adventurers committee, Exchequer).

[172] C.B.K. did not deliver to Clotworthy those arms he claimed as his own but, having brought the matter to the Commons, remitted them to the custody of Maurice Thompson and William Pennoyer, *Cal. S.P. dom., 1644*, pp. 256, 346; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 564.

[173] Later testimony by the agents Francis Smith and William Jennings is that they were employed by the Turners' hall committee to supply the Scottish army in the 'north' (Ireland or England ?). P.R.O. S.P. 28/253B, pp 91, 125-6.

A firm commitment to parliament had yet to be made by the Irish Protestant leadership. In a slightly longer session of the Dublin Parliament in April, a consideration of the Covenant prompted a letter from the Speakers commending the Lords Justices' Dec. proclamation against it.[174] During the interim until the next session (May 6) the Houses agreed that the bishops, judges and lawyer-MPs meet to formulate a fuller rebuttal.[175] The letters sent to Ulster provoked an open rejection from Monro, who denounced the ineffective cessation.[176] Sir James Montgomery and Viscount Ards reported the impossibility of proclaiming the Covenant, popular within and without the forces (the former even hinted at presbytery action to silence clerical opponents). Both men sought to go to England.[177] Chichester, Blayney and Hill (April 25) reported that they had read the proclamation, despite opposition - in the aftermath they also considered 'shifting for our selves' the wisest option. Together with Monro's command, Chichester reported on April 29, the Covenant would be the ruin of the 'loyal' subjects.[178]

West Ulster showed a similar pattern. Robert Stewart blamed Frederick Hamilton for winning over the Derry populace to the Scots, Parliament and the Covenant, but promised to oppose him from nearby Culmore fort (April 17).[179] By now Ormond had acted to replace the late compromise candidate for the city's governor, John Chichester, naming Mervin. Though the civic authorities had waged a campaign to have only civilian control, Thornton now accepted that the 'sedition' associated with the Covenant demanded a military figure. Mervin assumed that want had drawn support to the Covenant, but like Thornton he recognised a level of agitation among the relatively well off. Despite efforts to portray the conflict as an Anglo-Scottish one, it was to two Derry Aldermen., Lawson and Osborne that the Scottish clergy coming with the Covenant looked for assistance. Mervyn sought to have the men cashiered; argument was opened with the Scottish clergy, interestingly that the Covenant would break Protestant unity. But to no avail. In fact the argument could be used against Mervin that he must make the by now almost universal subscription or himself break the united front.[180]

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[174]*Commons' jn. Ire.*, i, 324, 325, 326; *Lords' jn. Ire.*, i, 206. The letter, and proclamation, were duly printed on the Houses' initiative, *A declaration of the Lords and gentry of Leinster and Munster...* E 4 (22), pp. [3] - [6].

[175]*Commons' jn. Ire.*, i, 328, 329; *Lords' jn. Ire.*, i, 207, 208, 210. The proposal began with Bolton's mention of work he had began to counter the Covenant.

[176]Monro to Ormond, April 22, Carte MS 10, f. 331.

[177]Sir James Montgomery to Ormond, April 23, Carte MS 10, f. 350; Sir James and Viscount Montgomery to Ormond, April 23, Carte MS 10, f. 355.

[178]Carte MS 10, ff. 391, 395-6, 472-3.

[179]Stewart to Ormond, April 17, Carte MS 10, f. 261.

[180]Ormond to the Derry authorities, April 17, Carte MS 10, f. 265; Mervyn to Ormond, April 22, Carte MS 10, f. 336; Thornton to Ormond, April 22, Carte MS 10, f. 338; Scots ministers to Lawson and Osborne, April 25, Carte MS 10, f. 361; Thornton to Ormond, April 25, Carte MS 10, f. 401; Mervyn to Ormond, April 25, Carte MS 10, ff. 409-11; Sir Robert Stewart to the Scottish clergy,

Ulster's elite was resisting the popular - religious pressure for an alignment with Parliament. But their weak spot was their own stance on the future of Ireland. In April to July 1644 Oxford perhaps displaced London as the focus of English activity in determining the fate of the other island, as conflicting claims about the condition and future settlement of Ireland were advanced.[181] Concerning the Oxford negotiations, Clarendon is for once a good guide in matters Irish, for he was one of the team appointed to vet the various proposals. His summation of the King's aims is that through the cessation he hoped 'to have made a good peace there, and to have had the power of that united kingdom to have assisted in suppressing the rebellion in this'.[182] There can be little dispute on the accuracy of this, though perhaps when he came to the point Charles always preferred the assistance to the unity and peace of Ireland.

Clarendon himself implied that the Catholics were at least willing to consider amending their claims, more than the other two sets of delegates. The 'official' advisers from the Dublin council would do no more than shift somewhat on future reparation from the insurgents. Otherwise they were adamant

> that there could be no other security for the Protestants in that kingdom but by leaving the Irish without any capacity or ability to trouble them, for their perfidiousness was such that they could not be trusted; and therefore they must either be put into such a condition by being totally disarmed that they should not be able to do any mischieve, or that all the Protestants must leave the kingdom to the entire possession of the Irish; and whether that would be for his majesty's service and security they must refer to his own wisdom.[183]

What was more, he saw the unofficial Protestant delegates as even more unremitting. They sought nothing less than the renewal of the war. Admitting that they could not sustain the same alone, and forced to recognise that the King was unlikely to sustain them in his present condition, 'They answered, that they hoped he would make a peace with the Parliament, and would then be able to send over such assistance to Ireland as would quickly settle that kingdom'.[184] It is at this point that the opinion of one segment of Protestant Ireland could be read as from the mouth of the 'Presbyterian' MPs of 1644-7. Frustration with the situation in Ireland had brought them as far as the

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April 26, Carte MS 10, f. 407; Mervyn to Ormond, April 26, Carte MS 10, ff. 411-2. Mervyn was the last of the west Ulster colonels to avow the Covenant (in his own manner) and Adair describes the scene where 'the soldiers who had taken it before cried out - "Welcome, welcome, Colonel!" ", Adair, *True narrative*, ed. Killen, p. 116.

[181]The terms presented by the Catholic and Protestant agents respectively may be found in Edmund Curtis & R. B. McDowell (eds.), *Irish historical documents 1172-1922* (London, 1943), pp. 152-6, 156-8.

[182]Clarendon, *Rebellion*, iii, 445.

[183]Clarendon, *Rebellion*, iii, 447-8.

[184]Clarendon, *Rebellion*, iii, 448. Writing to Ormond, both Digby (May 6) and Radcliffe (May 16) criticised the Protestant agents as refusing to negotiate and aiming to exclude any negotiated settlement, Carte MS 10, ff. 532-3, 651. Clanricard (to Ormond, May 29) believed their terms amounted to the same as the Parliament's declarations and the Covenant, a policy of extirpation, Carte MS 11, f. 62.

middle ground of English politics. It would take only a nudge of disapproval at Oxford to push them over to the 'moderate' wing of the Parliament. Charles was of course hemmed in. Quite aware of the odium heaped on his cause in England even by the cessation he was not likely to make any show of failing to safeguard the Protestant interest.[185] Indeed, not only were the delegates a thorn in his side, but timing had again let him down. While unhelpfully obscure in its doings, there is little doubt that the continued existence of the Oxford 'Parliament' was an open nuisance to the conduct of Irish negotiations. Frustrated, Charles handed all over to Ormond, to make the best he could of the situation.

But the delegates did not all return home happy, or even content. By June 1, Captain William Parsons, nephew of the former Lord Justice and one of the 'Protestant' delegates, appeared before the Commons at Westminster. He voiced the complaints of the delegation at their treatment. Having had enough trouble getting out of Ireland, they found the Catholic delegation had left with their answer, before they could have a response to their terms. Worse, their rivals had, during their stay, had 'frequent accesse & dayly discourse w[i]th ye K[ing] in his Garden, when the Protestant Agent stood aloof, & had no Countenance nor Respect at all'; they had not even received a proper answer to their proposals 'but were discountenanced with the Title of Unreasonable, and the Propositions of Madmen'.[186]

The Commons generously offered a sequestered house, and even to furnish it, for the agents' use whilst in London. Key 'Irish' figures Reynolds, Lord Lisle, Clotworthy and Jephson were to take Parsons's information of the happenings at Oxford. The rest of the delegates were referred to the 4 MPs on June 10 (as well as appearing before C.B.K) and they were to produce a declaration.[187] Agostini scorned the outcome. Parsons 'found open ears and ready disposition. They appointed commissioners for him, but their pockets will be closed by their powerlessness, and he will take away nothing but declarations and words, and in the mean time the army promised by that kingdom to his Majesty is making ready'.[188] But not only was he wrong on the latter point, he had mistaken the political significance of the arrival of the agents. Militarily, parliament would engage in a new logistical offensive, if never of adequate dimensions. More important were the inroads they were making into Irish

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[185]Clarendon, *Rebellion*, iii, 448-9.

[186]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 513-4; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 141b; B.L. Harl. MS 16, f. 68a. The *Perfect Diurnall*, no. 44, May 27 - June 3, E252(38) reported that the agent had 'been taken by some of our Scouts', though this need not imply forcible capture. The exact status of the two Protestant delegations remains unclear, in particular the extent to which the 'unofficial' appointees were representative of the Irish Parliament. Certainly it continued throughout 1644 to work for the collection of the funds promised the 'agents', *Commons' jn., Ire.*, i, 315, 317, 319, 329, 330, 331, 333, 335.

[187]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 514, 520, 525-6.

[188]Agostini's report, June 17,*Cal. S.P. Venice, 1643-1647*, p.108.

Protestant opinion. Just over a month later, on July 13, C.B.K was ordered to examine two other figures from Ireland who had arrived at Westminster - Sir William Stewart and Sir Philip Perceval were two of those sent to Oxford 'as Commissioners from the State in *Ireland*'.[189]

The Oxford negotiations were the beginning of a process which would topple all of Protestant Ireland into Parliament's lap. For the moment the aftermath, in May-June 1644, was of the Protestant interest riven as never before. The Ulster officers planned another summit in Belfast in early May, to respond definitively to the cessation. Ormond instructed Matthews from Newry to get to Belfast and secure it; if he found them well-affected, money would be sent.[190] In fact the meeting was interrupted by Monro's capture of the town. While Dublin condemned the action, and Moore and Matthews prepared to prevent the like at Dundalk and Newry, the bulk of the officers moved very quickly to negotiate with Monro and, on May 17, to issue a declaration on the lawfulness of the war.[191] In the west too the Covenant won completely - Conyngham, commanding William Stewart's regiment in his absence, succumbed, as did Mervin. The latter was portrayed as only accepting to keep his regiment for the King, but he gave Ormond an elaborate justification, going beyond military necessity, and foreseeing a role for the Irish Parliament in its terms.[192]

Stevenson does not think Monro's ambition extended beyond control of Ulster, and this he had largely accomplished.[193] He was even willing to assure the British officers that they would be supplied, but that the Covenant would not be enforced. The fact that O'Neill supplied Protestant Newry and Lisburn against him though within the cessation arrangements, would hardly win support in Ulster to the Ormondist position. But Matthews was soon reporting the eviction of English clergy who would not take the Covenant. In late June he was plotting action against the Scots, and it is hardly surprising that he feared attack at Newry with Monro's march south.[194] Chichester

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[189]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 560. Perceval wrote to Ormond from Oxford (May 23) implying the relative exclusion of the 'official' delegates, consulted at the outset when they adopted a cautious negotiating position, but not given any later chance to respond to the Catholic agents. His overall tone is one of exclusion and disillusion, particularly with the English councillors, who had remitted the negotiations to Dublin, where it would be more dangerous to work out a settlement, Carte MS, 10, f. 747. By contrast, Radcliffe told the Marquis (June 11) that Perceval's fellow delegates, Stewart and Lowther, had 'played ye fooles notably', being too opposed to the Catholic terms, and too afraid of offending Parliament; Perceval could have passed for a 'Roundhead'. Carte MS 11, f. 172.

[190]Ormond to Matthews, May 2, Carte MS 10, f. 502; so to Chichester, May 2, Carte MS 10, f. 509.

[191]Moore to Ormond, May 18, Carte MS 10, f. 688; Matthews to Ormond, May 19, Carte MS 11, f. 54. The declaration that 'this warr against the Irish Rebells is a most iust warr' and one in which they would join, as enabled by supplies, was produced by the officers of the three 'English' regiments (Chichester's, Conway's and Hill's) upon which any Ormondist hopes of resistance to the covenant had been based.

[192]Ormond to Conyngham, May 8, Carte MS 10, f. 561; Mervyn to Ormond, May 24, Carte MS 10, f. 789; R. Stewart to Ormond, May 26, Carte MS 11, f. 3.

[193]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, p. 163.

[194]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, i, 76-8.

was at Dublin trying to win support for his regiment, but O'Neill was the only feasible source of aid, and though he professed himself willing, he urged 'the confusion our Creaghts are in, by the approaching of the Scots'. The best he could suggest was joint importation from the Isle of Man. But as he told Matthews on July 26, when at Armagh, 'I ...do make no question but the report of our advancing so near unto you was welcome and gladsome news to you'. His *entente* with the Ormondists was looking more like an alliance.[195] Given the opinions long expressed by the Ulster officers about the virtue of the war against him, his approach could not but win most them more to the parliamentarian side.

Parliament, at last, was prepared to be generous. If the Scottish commissioners continued to agitate for their supplies, after the issue of a receipt on July 16 for the first £30000 of arrears more attention was given to their allies in Ulster.[196] The response centred on a letter dated June 7 and issued by several east Ulster officers - Montgomery, Theophilus Jones, Blayney among others. They added to this delegates - Sir William Cole of Enniskillen, Colonel Arthur Hill, Major Keith and Captain Tweedy 'taking there to their Assistance Colonel *Clotworthy*'. The picture of their past opinions was one attuned to parliamentarian ears. While portraying the ill effects of lack of resources, only broken by the Dutch aid, they claimed that as far back as Traile's mission in Nov. they were ready to continue the war, but were restrained only by their fear of the Scots' departure. The reassurance that they would stay, combined with the supplies had made then resolved to fight again, but their delegates requests were vital, for army discontent was threatening disbandment.[197]

C.B.K. looked over the propositions of the officers but waived responsibility, though reminding Parliament that it had already 'passed some votes concerning the Managing of the War there, which are transferred to the Kingdom of *Scotland*'; they now sought 'that nothing may be done that may interfere with those Votes'.[198] The Commons indeed took these considerations on board. On July 29 it appears to have been Vane sr who brought forth the requests for £90 000 worth of provisions lest 'those forces would be disbanded, & ye Plantacon there wholly deserted'.[199] 28 MPs

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[195]*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, i, 78-9.

[196]H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 179-180. The July 4 paper from the commissioners nonetheless praised 'the constant endeavours' of the Goldsmiths' hall committee.

[197]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 560; *Lords' jn.*, vi, 621, 622-3. *Perfect Occurrences*, no. 29, July 5- 12, E252(53) trumpeted the prospects of the 'gallant army of 20000' - 'Ulster is cleer from the Rebels for the present. and that the English and Scots are Masters of the field there, and stay for nothing but supplies to fit them, which being come are resolved to advance and follow the Rebels'.

[198]*Cal. S.P. dom., 1644*, pp 350, 372, 375. This C.B.K. waiver of responsibility and insistence on the established authority was stated in the Commons on July 29, *Commons' jn.*, iii, 574.

[199]B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f.152a. *Commons' jn.*, iii, 574 records the presentation as coming from the Ulster British agents, but Whitacre mentions Vane delivering Scottish propositions for the British regiments - perhaps no more than a confusion. Vane jr, on July 27, had continued his advocacy of the Scots, this time pressing the support of their army in England through the sale of delinquent estates. The close association of the estates issue with Ireland may be seen also in the attempt in May to

were named as a committee, plus all MP adventurers, to 'consider of the Propositions this day presented to the House, from the distressed *Brittish* Regiments in *Ulster*; and to bring them as low as possibly they can; and present their Opinions to the House. And this Committee is further to take notice of the Votes formerly passed in this House, concerning the carrying on of the War, that nothing may interfere with those Votes: And are to consider what Commanders and Officers are fit to be removed; and of Raising of Monies for carrying on the War; and of lessening the Charge'.[200] At last the forces of Ulster had won enough trust in Parliament to have their condition fully assessed. But it could not but be said to be a somewhat grudging response, envisaging cost cutting, insisting on the recent changes in authority, even hinting at a purge of officers. And it had not been forthcoming until not only had the Covenant won almost total support among the armed forces, but the British had suffered a major display of Monro's power in his seizure of Belfast, their leading stronghold in east Ulster. The Ulster British would be supported under Scottish patronage. The practical outcome would not be fruitless, but even here the timing was poor. For within a week, news of the defection of Munster would open up- a second front in Ireland to support, and one with no unfortunate complications involving the Scots.

Discussing Inchiquin's 'defection', Murphy does not attribute it to personal disappointment over the presidency, nor to any ideological 'espousal of the tenets of parliamentarianism on the part of the Munster Protestants generally'. Rather it was the principle that 'the Irish are the King's worst enemies, any Royalist pact with them is unacceptable to the Munster Protestants, King and Parliament must come to terms to prosecute the war against the Irish, meanwhile the Munster army must avail of parliamentary help to defeat the King's enemies'.[201] In this form it reads like a hibernicised form of the parliamentary claim to fight for the King against his true foes, papists, evil counsellors and all, even if this meant using arms against those with royal commission. Bottigheimer follows the same argument. Inchiquin had not betrayed the King, 'only the policy of Irish appeasement'. His plans were nothing if not wide-ranging. To Paulet and his brother he suggested the return of troops from the west of England, to have their arrears and a share in the adventure repayment. To Jephson he offered up his command; but he hoped to co-operate with the Scots, and to the C.B.K he suggested that the adherence of the Lord Lieutenant was not impossible.[202]

In much of this he was far too sanguine. His defection has been seen in practice to move through three stages - from the July letters to figures in England, to the

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borrow money from the Merchant Strangers for the relief of Gloucester 'and to check the incursions of the Irish rebels', repayable from the excise and from sequestrations in Glous. and Wales - B.L. Harl. MS 166, ff. 100b-101b.

[200]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 574.

[201]Murphy, 'Munster Protestants', p. 10.

[202]Bottigheimer, 'English interest in southern Ireland', pp. 129-135; *Cal. S.P. dom., 1644*. p. 357.

expulsions from the Munster towns at the end of the month, to the 'enticement' of parliamentary ships and the taking of the Covenant in August.[203] Behind the open declarations, there was some layer of secret negotiation. Inchiquin denied long plotting, but then he would have been expected to. C.B.K on July 15 were discussing reports sent by the Lord General on his western campaign 'with the Irish letters and papers enclosed'.[204] Two individuals seem to have had a not wholly innocent role. Waller, by July 29, was at Bristol, as an agent for the province to the King, and as such he wrote to Ormond - it is not clear if more was involved. By contrast, that consistent go-between Sir Thomas Wharton was openly writing to the Lieutenant from Cork (July 18, 19) advising him not to join the 'rebels' against the Irish Protestants, but woo the King to an accommodation with the Parliament against the Irish foe. He was now on his way to Parliament to this end.[205]

The collapse of the cessation in three out of four Irish provinces shows it up as a political disaster as regards Irish Protestants. As armies mouldered away, there remained no guarantee that their worst fears would not again be realised (either by war or negotiated defeat). Perhaps this is where popular pro-war sentiment takes its rise. Certainly it seemed that renewed fighting offered better prospects of survival, in the short as well as the longer term. For the King also the cessation had been a halting place, but not necessarily on the path further struggle, and the emergence of peace talks with the confederates only resulted on alienation among Irish Protestants. That was not to say that they would necessarily end up with Parliament. Among the elite the dominant attitude could be said to be a temporary pragmatism, accepting the cessation and tentatively following the King's line, but reluctant to make concessions to their foes. Flanking them were the Ormondists of the future, not perhaps yet distinct but more attuned to Charles's wishes in so far as this meant treating others as well the confederates as rebels; and the rump of a 'conquest party' whose insistence on Irish victory override considerations of wider alignments.

Outside Dublin, there was the instance of a genuinely popular war sentiment, in Ulster, but one as liable to prompt disunity, on ethnic and religious grounds, as to rejuvenate the Protestant war effort as a whole. Most of the provincial elite clung to hopes of English settlement, but if this made them ideological companions of Hyde as

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[203]Bottigheimer, 'English interest in southern Ireland', pp. 135-41.
[204]*Cal. S.P. dom., 1644*, p. 362.
[205]*Clarendon S.P.*, ii, 169-70.

well as Holles, it was the old 'fears and jealousies' about the King's intentions that prodded them towards a stance akin to 'peace party' or 'Presbyterian' parliamentarians.

Not that politics at Westminster had fallen into any neat 'party' framework. The struggle for resources furthered the decline into 'regional' competition cutting across other political differences. These were present, and largely as a result of the Scottish alliance. In relation to Ireland this meant not one, but two 'regional' lobbies, one promoting the Scots, the other the planters, in a small war in the committee rooms. Even so the broader matter of the absorption of the Scots into the parliamentary cause had been accomplished. The very fact that their pay was rooted in the penalisation of delinquents, on the Irish model put them into the picture in a 'one war' setting. In turn the Scots were willing to adapt the parliamentarian vision as it pertained to Ireland, but not without their own alterations. In so far as a 'Covenanter Britain' was in process of intellectual formation, it made the choices of those Irish Protestant leaning to Parliament that bit more complicated.

Chapter 6.
Peace negotiations, Dublin and Uxbridge, July 1644 - February 1645.

In the politics of the three Kingdoms the months from July 1644 to February 1645 saw two principal sets of negotiations take place aimed at resolving the various interrelated conflicts. The first, held in Dublin from Sept. 1644, was a continuation of the ill-fated Oxford negotiations of the previous spring and aimed at an accommodation between Charles and the confederate Catholics of Ireland. Then, from Nov. 1644, overtures began which would lead to a 'treaty' on the English war - the debates of royalists, parliamentarians and Scots at Uxbridge, 29 Jan. - 22 Feb., 1645. Within this framework three sets of developments affected the relationships between Parliament and the Protestants of Ireland. First was a greater commitment to the war effort, on both sides, but with it the hampering effect of delays at Westminster. Even so, by mid-1645 conflict had re-awakened in all the Irish provinces, and with greater co-ordination than before, as Parliament worked out the implications of its re-evaluation during the winter months of 1644-5.

Parliament's activation of its claims to a greater say in Ireland culminated in the Scots-driven Uxbridge propositions, which more clearly than before set out the agreed Parliament-Scots position on the neighbouring island and elaborated the details of an Irish future very different from the one predicated on a negotiated settlement between the King and the confederates. The proposals set forward at the two sets of talks precipitated the third development under consideration, a polarisation in Protestant attitudes in Ireland. If the 1643 cessation saw Protestant Ireland drift into three camps - a large 'pragmatist' acceptance of the ceasefire being flanked by pro-negotiation 'Ormondists' and by hardline 'anti-cessationists' - the process of negotiation was accompanied by a crumbling of the middle ground. The only doubt was whether the 'alternative Ireland' propounded by the Covenanter allies at Uxbridge would be any more appealing than Charles's vision for his three kingdoms, on display closer to home.

Stevenson has presented Monro's situation in early 1644 as 'bleak', with the departure of part of his army to Scotland; with the cessation causing a breach with Ormond and tensions with local Protestants; with the impending threat of an assault on Ulster directed from Kilkenny.[1] But by the early summer the situation was looking better for him. Dutch aid was perceived by royalists as persuading the Ulster forces to renew the war; certainly it gave the wherewithal to begin action.[2] If Monro's 1644 campaign into Leinster had few permanent effects it was his 'largest, ... longest, ... and... most successful...' operation. Moreover, in fending off the O'Neill - Castlehaven assault of July - Sept., 'the honours of the 1644 campaign in Ulster undoubtedly went to Monro'.[3] Monro had failed to gain control of the Ormondist holds of Dundalk and Newry, but if tensions persisted with local forces in Ulster, the latter were clearly in favour of continuing hostilities.[4] Sentiment among the Ulster officers remained in favour of a combination of English peace and Irish war. By August Rawdon had confided in Matthew his hopes of an English settlement, while claiming that all officers, given reports of renewed fighting in Munster and Connacht, hoped Ormond would resist pressure for a peace settlement, or even for another cessation.[5] Sir Robert Stewart had heard that the Scots might broker a settlement in England, while Mervyn, still claiming to serve Ormond under cover of the Covenant, reported that no form of cessation could please Ulster, and the only acceptable peace was one based on Catholic surrender.[6]

As in Ulster, so in Munster the declarations of July 17 - 18, defending the decision to engage in hostilities, combined the aims of a peaceful settlement in England with a refusal to make peace in Ireland; appealing to London for support in the Irish war did 'not involve a formal declaration for the parliament or an acceptance of its religious and political tenets'.[7] This is not to suppose that Inchiquin leapt blindly into the arms of Parliament. M. L. Baumber has assembled enough circumstantial evidence to provide Warwick with a key role in the defection. Having a marriage alliance with the Boyles, the Earl had been in touch with the first Earl of Cork since the outbreak of

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[1]Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters*, pp. 191-2.
[2]see appendix 3.
[3]Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters*, pp. 194-5, 200.
[4]Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters*, pp. 195-7.
[5]Rawdon to Matthew, Aug. 23, Aug. 27, Carte MS 12, ff. 173, 204. Rawdon was major in Conway's regiment in Co. Down, while the Ormondist Matthew was in active command at Newry.
[6]Stewart to Sir Patrick Wemyss, Aug. 31, Carte MS 12, f. 229 ; Mervyn to Ormond, Sept. 6, Carte MS 12, f. 305.
[7]J. A. Murphy, 'The expulsion of the Irish from Cork in 1644', *Cork Hist. Soc. Jn.*, lxix (1964), 124-5. Cf. Bottigheimer, 'English interest', pp. 129-35.

the rising. The probability that Broghill sponsored Warwick's meetings with Lt. Phaire and Sir Thomas Wharton is a substantial one, and beyond doubt is the role Warwick played in diverting immediate assistance to the southern province through his control of the fleet.[8] Indeed, Baumber would have it that the south-western campaign associated with Essex, Warwick and Robartes contributed, perhaps deliberately, to Inchiquin's belief in massive parliamentary intervention, including claims for an army of 10 000.[9]

In terms of Irish influences, the announcement had been preceded not only by the cessation related problems of violations and encroachments, and by worrying loss of military power, but by an unusually high degree of tension, with claims and counter-claims of plots and planned resumptions of arms. Nor should Inchiquin's statements in vindication of his actions be overlooked, pointing to alienation at Oxford due to the position of Catholic delegates there. From the spring the confederate delegation had been casting doubts on the loyalties of Inchiquin's forces,[10] and by July 6, in their proclamation for a general rising, had warned about possible parliamentary landings on the south coast.[11] Inchiquin alleged 'a plot laid to take these garrisons, under pretence of a suspicion they had of my intention to bring in the parliament shipping and forces'. He of course urged such a plot as the grounds of his expulsions of Catholic civilians from Cork, while Broghill put forward the raising of new forces, purportedly to counter the Covenanter threat, as provocative.[12]

As with Ulster, it was still hoped in Munster that Ormond would join in the plan of English peace and Irish war. Both Inchiquin and Sir Thomas Wharton wrote to the Lord Lieutenant seeking his association with their measures, the latter proclaiming that his task in England would be to promote the reconciliation of King and Parliament.[13] As late as Sept. 14 Inchiquin was offering Ormond the command of his forces, though by now he was obliged to attempt to explain away the Covenant. Like Mervyn in Derry, he tried to present it as not anti-monarchical.[14] Thus recent, outright supporters of the King's war in England had been bounced into an alignment with his enemies primarily through of 'fears and jealousies' relating to their Irish Catholic foes. This did

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[8]Baumber, 'The navy and the civil war in Ireland, 1643-1646', pp. 262-3.
[9]Baumber, 'The navy and the civil war in Ireland, 1643-1646', pp. 263-4.
[10]A memo presented to Charles at Oxford went so far as to list dubious commanders and garrisons, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 162-5.
[11]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 205-8.
[12]Inchiquin to Clanricard, July 26 in *Letter-book*, p. 102; Broghill to Clonmel corporation, July 26 in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 216-7. Murphy, 'Expulsion of the Irish', p. 126, accepts the reality of a plot to seize Cork.
[13]Inchiquin to Ormond (no date) in *Clarendon S. P.*, ii, 168-9; same to same, July 23, in *Clarendon S. P.*, ii, 170-1; Wharton to Ormond, July 19, in *Clarendon S. P.*, ii, 169-70. Inchiquin argued with Esmond (Aug. 30) that any English peace would be a prelude to fighting in Ireland, Carte MS 12, f. 215.
[14]Inchiquin to Ormond, Sept. 19, in *Clarendon S. P.*, ii, 173-5. Cf. Bottigheimer, 'English interest', pp. 142-4.

not make them so very different from 'moderate' English parliamentarians[15], and this coincidence of view comes through in the shared hesitancy about the Covenant; in a suspicion of the Scots;[16] in hopes of accommodation in England. Indeed the hint of this last may have prompted a resumed Irish war.[17]

In the meantime Ormond was saddled with the task of making the King's peace in Ireland. On July 26 he learned that Charles was 'transferinge to you the treatye, and the power to conclude a peace with the Irish', on the explicit grounds that 'if I [Charles] should doe that heere, which perhaps may be necessarye there, ... it might, thorough indispositions heere, be of dangerous consequence to the maine of my affaires'.[18] Ormond responded by seeking copies of earlier documents, and expressing his pessimism, on July 30.[19] Daniel O'Neill lamented the 'cautious counsellors' round the king, who failed to provide the instructions Ormond repeatedly sought, leaving all to his discretion.[20] As before it seems that, from the Oxford perspective, the resumption of the Irish treaty was related to the failure of accommodation overtures in England.[21] Digby's letters to Ormond confirm that much had been expected from such contacts; their fruitlessness made even the 'extremest remedies' necessary.[22] It was something of a portent that this included the idea of military co-operation with the confederates, a

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[15]'Moderate' has been preferred to 'Presbyterian' on the grounds that leading members of both post-1645 'parties' were inclined to (alternative) accommodations with the King, while even in 1643-4 hesitancy about the Scots or the Covenant were shared by individuals who would later be 'Presbyterians' and 'Independents'. The argument here is simply that parliamentarianism contained strands of thought and opinion akin to those of many Irish Protestants. (See also Pearl, 'Oliver St. John'. pp. 495-8 for the breadth of suspicion of the Covenant in Parliament in late 1643 'from all parts of the house' (p. 496).)

[16]Pearl, 'Oliver St. John', pp. 495-9, especially the reminder of the 'deep political, economic and nationalistic rivalries between the two peoples' (p. 498). If Essex's group' had coalesced in late 1643 (Mahony, 'Presbyterian party', pp. 39-40) around those who shared the earl's desire for an 'honourable peace' and were worried about the Scots alliance as likely to escalate the war (Mahony, 'Presbyterian party', pp. 47, 51-2) then their coalition with the Scots in late 1644 could only come about on the basis of a shared desire for an accommodation (Mahony, 'Presbyterian party', pp. 110-2). (See also Hughes, *Warwickshire*, p. 225 for the doubts about the Covenant, later overcome, of the 'moderate' (but later pro-army) earl of Denbigh.)

[17]Baumber, 'The navy and the civil war in Ireland, 1643-1646', pp. 262-4. See Smith, *Constitutional royalism*, pp. 119-120 for the hesitancy of Essex to Royalist approaches in the summer of 1644, but, though from June Essex had concentrated on his military freedom, his supporters had earlier acted to win a peace settlement unobstructed by Scottish demands (Mahony, 'Presbyterian party', pp. 100-3.).

[18]Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 7. Cf. Digby to Ormond, July 22, Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 173.

[19]Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 184-5; Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 162.

[20]Digby to Ormond, Aug. 13, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 192-5. Arthur Trevor was more cynical about the failure to send Ormond instructions, which Digby claimed was impossible since conditions were 'soe variable'. He warned Ormond that he was wary of his good fortune when 'the earl of Bristoll, lord Digby, lord Cottington, and the councell will putt the stocke into your hand, and stand themselves behind the hangings. I presume the marquess of Ormonde will thinke it proportionable to reason, that they goe their shares, if they expect a profitt in the returne'. Trevor to Ormond, Aug. 20 in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 197-8.

[21]Gilbert, *Contemp. hist. 1641-52*, i, 594-8. O'Neill continued to promote Ormond's interest at court, particularly his freedom of manoeuvre and freedom from interference - see Gilbert, *Contemp. hist. 1641-52*, i (2) , 598-9; cf. Donal F. Cregan, 'Daniel O'Neill, a royalist agent in Ireland, 1644-1650', in *I. H. S.*, ii (1940-1), p. 402; Cregan, "An Irish cavalier: Daniel O'Neill in the civil wars 1642-51', in *Studia Hib.*, iii, (1965), pp. 117-8.

[22]Digby to Ormond, Aug. 13, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 192-5.

position dependent on the construction of a 'settl'd peace' in Ireland. It was to this end that talks, delayed over procedure, began in Dublin on Sept. 5.

Already, as far back as July 1, the confederate Supreme Council had written to him presenting the King's approved plan as co-operation against the Covenanters.[23] The move had support from other quarters. Clanricard and other Connacht grandees - Ranelagh, Dillon and Taaffe among them - concocted a letter which presented the loyalists of Ireland as trapped between 'two powerful armies' of confederates and Covenanters, with a negotiated peace necessary. In the short term the Scots should be publicly declared the King's enemies, for 'to subsist in this divided condition, without joining or receiving help from one party or other, we conceive utterly impossible'.[24] Clanricard secured Thomond's signature, but not that of Inchiquin, who, not surprisingly, replied that the Irish were a greater danger than the Scots.[25] As in England in 1641, so in Ireland in 1644 the question of loyalties was largely of who one feared most, the Irish or the Scots, and Ormond was walking a tightrope. If, a year earlier, Ormond could have hoped to keep almost all Irish Protestants in a more or less committed loyalty to their King the situation now was one where they could not but choose between two alternative sets of possible 'rebels'. The marquis was in no doubt which was less unpalatable. His own officers he ordered to try to protect pro-cessation Catholics from the Scots,[26] but he firmly rejected the idea of taking arms against them - 'I doe not think ten protestants would follow mee, but rather rise like one man against mee, and adheare to the Scotts'.[27] If he was to follow the King's instructions and negotiate a settlement with the confederates which would remove from them the stigma of having been declared rebels, he could not in the meantime risk attaching that label to the covenanters.[28]

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[23]Carte MS 11, f. 328.

[24]*Letter-book*, pp. 93-5. The letter was finally despatched to Ormond on Aug. 18 by Clanricard, Dillon and Taaffe with a covering letter which stated that they feared that Inchiquin had indeed gone over to Parliament, but that they saw no need to alter their stance - *Letter-book*, pp. 103-4; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 196-7.

[25]The majority, he claimed, were inveterate, and Kilkenny was not serious about peace. *Letter-book*, pp. 96-7, 98-9, 101-2.

[26]Ormond to Tichborne and Moore, July 12, Carte MS 11, f. 435.

[27] The latter he saw as liable to continue the war whether he made a settlement or not, and presented as grasping at control of the whole island. Irish Protestants, having lost their subsistence in the rising were a prey to the war-mongers, fearing no restitution from a peace. Ormond to Digby, July 9, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 152-9; July 17, Carte MS 11, ff. 484-6. Interestingly, Ormond accepts the fact that this course of action was 'incited by the clergie with the same wants and despaire...'.

[28]The persistence with which Ormond and others wished to have the Leinster Protestants described as the King's 'loyal subjects' shows the residue of the 1641-3 conception, throughout Ireland, of the Protestants as 'loyalists' in the 'royalist' sense. The notion of 'loyalty' was now open to two counts of ambiguity, consorting with Irish or Scottish 'rebels'.

In London peace proposals hinged on the Scots-inspired propositions then completing their rounds of ratification, proposals not without their echo in parliamentary decisions on Ireland in late 1644.[29] On all questions relating to Ireland the running was being made by C.B.K, with a fair amount of input from Irish petitioners, adventurers and the Scottish commissioners. The Commons showed themselves content to pass business over to the executive, voting it power over the carrying on of the War in *Ireland* ' on Aug. 27.[30] Among the powers given C.B.K. was that of naming sub-committees for Ireland and on Sept. 28 they named Wharton, Gerard, Pierrepoint, Crew and Wallop to act with any two of the Scots 'to receive information concerning the business of Ireland, and to consider thereof'.[31] But the Lords had specifically authorised them to name sub-committees of adventurers.[32] A continued role for the adventurers meant some summons of large assemblies over major issues, like the news from Munster or the assessment, but the power of the London committee continued,[33] and with it the ongoing feud with Clotworthy and Reynolds, accusations and counter-accusations being thrown across the floor of the Commons.[34] C.B.K., meanwhile, seems to have continued its alliance with the London committee, acknowledging Grocers' Hall's role as a sub-committee, and successfully nominating as treasurers for the assessment the four men - Kendrick, Foot, Bunce and Avery - who had long controlled Irish funds, despite attacks on them by the Clotworthy group.[35]

C.B.K.'s range of interests extended to all parts of Ireland. They had moved quickly on Munster, passing preliminary votes on Aug. 10, only a week after the

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[29]On Aug. 19, 1644, the Commons had read the long-prepared proposals, now back from Scotland 'with some few Verbal Alterations', agreed them, and sent them to the Lords. Rushworth, iii (2), 779.

[30]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 609.

[31]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644*, p. 538. Any 9 could act as a quorum (*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 3). Additions to the sub-committee included Warwick, St. John and Stapleton on Oct. 19, and Vane Sr.. and Glyn on Nov. 18, (and Browne on Nov. 19) though these latter may only have been with regard to Derry. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 55, 123, 134.

[32]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 612.

[33]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644*, p. 415; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 587, 609.

[34]By Aug. 20 it was known that a 'Remonstrance' had been delivered to C.B.K. wherein 'some Imputation was cast upon Sr Jo: Clatworthy + Mr Reynolds', at which they were 'much offended'. Though a large committee named to examine the circumstances seems not to have reported, the document was later referred to as 'presented in the Name of the Committee of Adventurers in *London*, for Lands in *Ireland* '. Characteristically, Clotworthy and Reynolds were not slow to counter-attack two of the committee's members, Watkins and Alexander. The latter, on a Commons vote, was suspended from his post as an adventurer treasurer, but Watkins's friends rallied to him, even winning a vote of the House's thanks, if not an apology from Sir John. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644*, p. 433; *Cal. S. P. dom., Addenda 1625-49*, p. 666; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 599, 601, 609, 640-1, 643, 646; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 155b; B. L. Harl. MS 166, ff. 108b, 125b. The division over Alexander's suspension saw Haselrig and Bainton tell 44 votes for him, to Stapleton and Dacres's 49 against. Strode defended Watkins on each occasion and, with Ashe, was sent with the House's assurances of favour. Denis Bond had moved that Clotworthy apologise.

[35]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644*, pp. 454, 535-6, 544; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 640, 644.

arrival of formal word from the province.[36] For once the Commons felt moved to add its approval (though not without regionalist opposition) and indeed the House showed more concern for the southern province than for Ulster, despite C.B.K.'s attempts to interest them in its affairs.[37] But practical assistance was slow[38]; in Dec. C.B.K. was still struggling to obtain £1 000 as an interim advance to Munster.[39] At least it was agreed that the province's ports should be open to freelance trade,[40] and Dutch aid was reported by Oct. 29, a support represented as vital to survival.[41] Inchiquin's pragmatic acceptance of continued cessation for the southern province reflected his dampened hopes as the winter approached.[42] The word from Cork on Dec. 30 was that they were 'at a very low ebb..., having only beans and rye bread left, and those will only last three weeks.'[43] No wonder that the province sent over petitions and agents; by Dec. 2 their intermediary, Jephson, had been joined by no less than Broghill, presenting propositions to C.B.K.[44]

There was at least the prospect for a securer basis for support of the Irish war. The long-awaited assessment ordinance for Ireland was finally passed on Oct. 18[45]; possibly this was once again pressed for by Clotworthy's old committee;[46] what is not in doubt is his personal involvement with the ordinance at every stage from the preliminary meeting with the adventurers to press the measure until he delivered the

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[36]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644*, p. 415; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 577; B. L. Harl. MS 166, f. 104b. C.B.K. included consideration of the 'Governor' of the province.

[37]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 577, 582, 589, 592; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 155a; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644*, pp. 477, 452 for Ulster. In the debate on Aug. 12 the 'Westerne men' opposed the sending of arms to Munster, preferring to supply the south-west of England, but without success, *Commons' jn.*, iii, 587; B. L. Harl. MS 166, f. 106a.

[38]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644*, pp. 476, 484, 493.

[39]Grocers' Hall were made responsible for the immediate relief of Munster, see e.g. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 105-6. They were to find the £1 000, allocated eventually from the City's share of the assessment, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 166, 176, 202.

[40]Likewise Parliament agreed to assume costs of foodstuffs sent to the province and to write off some of Inchiquin's debts for supplies. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 44, 48, 55, 220-1; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 668, 671, 673.

[41]Brockett to Ormond, *Cal. S.P. Clarendon*, i, 252; *Egmont MSS*, i, 241. See also appendix 3.

[42]Inchiquin negotiated various interim cessations with Muskerry, but remained confident that Kilkenny would not overrule them. That of Dec. 20 extended the ceasefire to Feb. 1. Inchiquin to Reymond, Dec. 10, 13, 20, 24 in *Egmont MSS*, i, 242-3.

[43]Hodder to Perceval, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 243.

[44]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 180, 183.

[45]*Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 531-3. The ordinance is in conventional form, most of its length being the setting of county rates and county committees. As with previous Irish measures, provision was made for payment of half of the assessments in kind, 'viz. Good sound Wheat, Rye, Barley, Pease, and Oatmeal, ... fit to be transported into Ireland' or sold for its value in inland counties. As usual, provision was also made to raise credit at 8%.

[46]On Aug. 12 the MP - adventurers' committee was ordered to investigate 'Ways and Means' to supply Munster, *Commons' jn.*, iii, 588. On Aug. 16 the Irish committee was to consider the 'best and readiest Means for the preservation of those Provinces, [Ulster and Munster] and for Providing of Monies for the Purpose', *Commons' jn.*, iii, 593. Presumably these orders relate to the main committee on Ireland of 1642-4.

final version to the Lords on Oct. 10.[47] On Oct. 21 C.B.K. resolved on a division of the £80 000 expected from the assessment - £20 000 was to be held in reserve, £42 000 was for spending on Ulster, £10 000 on Munster, £5 500 on Connacht and £2 500 on Duncannon.[48] The actual outlays were to be undertaken only after widespread consultation, not only with the London adventurers, but with representatives from each province in Ireland.[49] Grocers' Hall and the 'gentlemen of Ireland' were engaged in lengthy debate, Oct. 31 - Nov. 8, a process which apparently resulted in the acceptance of proposals from John Davies for the supply of Ulster and Munster.[50] Only Duncannon was left as a duty of the adventurers, only to see Davies awarded a warrant for the fort on Nov. 27.[51] The decision was even taken, on Nov. 21, to allow the shipping of food, clothes and fuel to Dublin on the basis that Protestant citizens may perish while Catholics received aid from the countryside.[52] In this case the matter was scuppered from the other end, as Ormond refused Swanley's offer to let supplies pass to the Irish capital, even in time of cessation (so long as Ormond did not 'countenance' rebels), Ormond denying he had any need of such assistance.[53]

The arrival of Davies on the scene at this point signals a first reversal for the London adventurers. Over the next three years he would not only come to dominate Irish provisioning, but would do so on the basis of contracts outside the circle associated with the London committee. When the Londoners charged him with malpractice and corruption they would associate him with Clotworthy.[54] Certainly Davies's rise suggests something of a supplanting of the adventurers by Protestant emigres from Ireland, until the two combined energies in 1647. Widespread consultation took place again in mid- November, leading to the formulation of C.B.K. plans on Nov. 27 - 29. Davies's goods were to be inspected and a system of new magazines was to be established to serve all the Irish provinces (save Leinster). That

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[47]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 609, 615, 616, 620-1, 623, 627, 631, 634, 635, 640, 659, 666, 667; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, ff. 158a, 162b; B. L. Harl. MS 166, ff. 112a, 149b.

[48]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 61-2. The decision involved consulting propositions delivered by the 'Irish gentlemen' on the disposal of the money.

[49]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 48.

[50]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 85-6, 104-6; *Cal. S. P. dom., Addenda 1625-49*, p. 669.

[51]A series of votes on the reinforcement of Duncannon, with Sir Arthur Loftus as governor, was approved in the House on Oct. 25. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 68, 164; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 676. Loftus's propositions were heard by C.B.K. on Oct. 16, and may have initiated interest in Duncannon, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 48.

[52]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 62, 106; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 701.

[53]Carte MS 12, ff. 508, 510, 513.

[54]P.R.O. S.P. 28 / 253B, part ii 'Depositions in connection of an examination of abuses in the Accounts of Sr John Clotworthy and Mr. Davies' contains the collections made by the Committee of Accounts which, though covering other Irish accounts also, concentrate on the two men. (An abstract, dated 1650, is also present in P.R.O. S.P. 28 / 253B.) Most of the charges relate to very minor allegations, though Davies is charged with over-pricing and the delivery of inadequate goods in his 1644-5 shipments. For a list of Davies's London associates, a distinct group from the other suppliers, see P.R.O. S.P. 28 / 139 / 8; for Davies's activities see also appendix 3.

'fit persons' should be named to oversee distribution was indicative of closer control.[55] On into Dec. the grand scheme took shape, with the issue of supply warrants, and the authorisation of Loftus's recruitment for Duncannon.[56] Broghill was to be consulted over Munster, and the Ulster gentlemen to provide a computation on the division of the £42 000 assigned their province.[57]

Nor were the Scots marginalised. In late Oct. C.B.K. had sponsored a paper on their Irish grievances which at least saw the Commons call to account those it deemed responsible.[58] Whatever about emerging tensions between the Scots and some parliamentarians, in late 1644 Scottish influence, including over Ireland, was all but at its peak. In wide-ranging discussions over the appointment of a governor for Derry city the Scots, as well as the city of London, sought to have their interest considered.[59] More significantly, a discussion was scheduled on one aspect of the April 11 Anglo-Scottish arrangements, namely of a resident committee of both kingdoms for the Irish war.[60] By the end of Dec. pressure, through C.B.K., had seen the Commons approve measures for the Scots, including the despatch of the £10 000 (sent by Dec. 31), action on the naval guard and on promised arms supplies, and a resolution to frame an ordinance to remove 'obstructions' in the sequestration process.[61] The way in which C.B.K. thinking was moving is revealed in the report of their sub-committee on Dec. 27.[62] It envisaged the extension of the war effort, by drawing on the resources in Ulster. Though the Scottish commissioners vetoed a plan to transfer 2500 Scots to Connacht, it was agreed to deploy, and pay, 1500 of the 'British' there, while another 2000 should be sent into Munster. Connacht's return to the war was signalled by the decision to seek a copy of the commission given to the province's Lord President.[63] (Indeed, the Commons had voted as far back as Oct. 1 to nominate Sir Charles Coote to

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[55]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 135, 137, 164, 166.

[56]Loftus was authorised to recruit 300 men on Dec. 14, while the sub-committee considered his commission and money for raising troops, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 183, 190, 193.

[57]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 171, 172, 174, 176, 183-4, 190, 195.

[58]The Navy committee and Goldsmiths' hall were called upon over failures in the sea guard and in the delivery of £30 000 due respectively. The Scots were also concerned about the promised £4 000 per month and arms supplies - these went to a liaison committee. *Commons' jn.*, iii, 668, 681; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 161; *Tanner letters*, p. 177.

[59]C.B.K. had already considered the views of Grocers' hall and of a number of Irish figures, including Sir Frederick Hamilton. The problem, following the death of the compromise candidate John Chichester, was over the appointment of Audley Mervyn by Ormond. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 123; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 697-8; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, ff. 174a-b.

[60]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 166.

[61]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. C.B.K. had been pressing the case of the wants of the 'New Scots' from the beginning of December, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 175; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 715. Loudoun had written to Glyn (Dec. 24) asking for an answer on the Scottish armies before the return of some of the commissioners to Edinburgh, H.M.C *Portland MSS*, i, 198. (It was Glyn's report which had seen the vote to send £10 000 to Carrickfergus). For orders to send the £10 000 from Goldsmiths' Hall, see *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 201, 202.

[62]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 200.

[63]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 201.

that post[64]). Closer control on the ground meant the recommendation to the Commons that the English side of a resident C.B.K. should be appointed, to join the Scots already named.[65]

What these months showed then, was a willingness to grasp at a strategic plan for the war in Ireland, a willingness more apparent at the C.B.K. than on the floor of the Houses. Moreover, all such plans remained bipartisan, despite the growth in tensions between some parliamentarians and the Scots in general. However C.B.K. be considered in 'party' terms it is apparent that concern for the Irish war was not confined to the 'peace' party or Essex's friends.[66] Beyond Parliament the adventurers were kept on board, but a greater initiative was probably now in the hands of spokesmen, nominated or self-appointed, from the Protestants of Ireland. So many voices were there to speak for Ulster that on Dec. 11 they were told to choose a smaller number from among them to deal with C.B.K. They were, however, voted expenses money, as were the Protestant 'agents' previously at Oxford.[67] The established 'Irish' lobbyists Clotworthy and Reynolds were assigned the task of furthering the tortuous trial proceedings of Lord Maguire.[68] Why the prosecution was then in motion, and indeed why the notorious 'No Quarter' ordinance of Oct., 1644 was rushed through in one day, is unclear.[69] Landings in England had ceased[70] and both the ordinance and the trial look like warning shots at a time when Ormond's negotiations in Dublin suggested the possibility of invasion by genuine 'rebels'.

The comprehensiveness of the ordinance denying quarter, by race (all 'native' Irish), and religion (all Catholics born in Ireland), contrasts with the treatment of the soldiers sent over in 1643-4 a large number of whom were almost certainly Irish Protestants. Jephson, on service in the south of England, had acted as intermediary in the surrender of Wareham and the recruitment of its ex-Munster garrison, then serving the King under Inchiquin's brother, Henry O'Brien, for a return to the province.[71] Some attempt to recruit prisoners was also made in the Gloucester area,[72] but with more success in the north-west of England. Brereton's letters on the fall of Liverpool

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[64]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 647. At that time Reynolds and John Lisle were named to draw up an ordinance. Coote's own propositions for action in Connacht had been incorporated into the report of the Ulster representatives back in August.

[65]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 201.

[66]Pearl, 'Oliver St. John', pp. 511-2 argues that C.B.K. was not staffed by anti-Essex figures.

[67]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 732; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 201. Efforts continued in the plan to gain Sir John Temple's liberty through exchange, and like moves were initiated for Parsons, Loftus and Meredith, *Commons' jn.*, iii, 666.

[68]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 673, 674.

[69]*Commons' jn.*, iii, 673, 675, 676, 691, 703; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 554-5.

[70]Though the ordinance specifies landings in Great Britain, a significant distinction, since Macdonnell's Irish force had only landed in Scotland in the summer of 1644, and may have been reinforced later, Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 172-3.

[71]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644*, pp. 425, 427, 433; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 589, 619

[72]Massey to C.B.K., Sept. 1, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 466.

to Sir John Meldrum show how the latter responded to rumours of disaffection among the 'Irish' there by appealing to Lt. - Col. Chidley Coote. As a result 'diverse of the old soldiers from Ireland who knew him came over the works to him' and to Lt. - Col. Michael Jones, 'under whom they formerly served in Ireland'. It was alleged that the mutiny of more such had caused the surrender, where prisoners numbered 120 officers and 700 men, to 400 who had switched sides. Of course, the disaffection, for some at least, may only have been fear at the consequences of surrender in the light of the No Quarter decision. In this case it was waived, as the surrender had preceded notification of the order.[73]

Whatever about those Irish forces transferred in 1643-4, those left in Ireland showed little taste for the policies pursued at Dublin from September on. A belligerent petition from Ulster to the Lord Lieutenant set out to rebut any idea of a peace necessitated by Protestant weakness. If the King were deceived into such a settlement it could only mean 'quarter graunted us, and iron chaines of slavery, and Antichristian bondage'. Instead Ormond should follow the example of the Munster forces who 'find it high tyme rather to study unity among our selves then peace with them'; 'theise inhumaine natives are incapable of any mercy or pardon, but such as shall gratiouslie flowe from his Majesty and his greate Counsell, without capitulacion'.[74] There was no arguing with this kind of attitude, and Ormond was not unaware of its prevalence - if even those in England who wished well to the King

> haue such a reluctancy to a peace with the Irish,... how can it be possible that the English heere, who for the most part haue felt those iniuryes and affronts, which the other soe much pitty and recent, will be induced to aquiessye to a settlement not held fitt to be avowed on that side....[75]

The debates themselves centred on the 17 propositions submitted by the confederate delegates on Sept. 5, duplicates of the revised articles they had brought forward at Oxford.[76] Reports of the debates between the confederate delegates and a legal-minded committee of the Irish Council[77] cover four days of discussion.[78]

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[73]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644*, p. 544; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 50, 67, 92, 95, 129, 168; *Commons' jn.*, iii, 691.

[74]Gilbert, *Contemp. hist. 1641-52*, i, 602-5.

[75]Ormond to Digby, July 9 in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 153-4.

[76]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 128-33, 277. Schematically, they may be considered as centred on two questions - the removal of religious and civil disabilities, both past (articles 1, 7-8) and future (4-5, 16-17) and the reform of government, whether Parliament (2-5, 10-11) or executive (6, 9, 12-15). The latter focused especially on the vexed question of land (6, 9, 12) and the categories above of course overlap - thus the question of disabilities includes issues like the Trained bands (15) or an Act of Limitations (6).

[77]The committee included Lord Chancellor Bolton, Chief Justice Sir George Shurley, Justices Thomas Dongan and Sir William Ryves, and Sir Maurice Eustace, Speaker and Sergeant - at - law, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 278 & n.1.

[78]The first (Sept. 6) covered parliamentary matters - the calling of a 'free Parliament', the role of Poynings's' Law, the abrogation of Irish parliamentary proceedings since 1641 (Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 278-82). The crucial religious matters of article 1 were deferred, by Ormond, until the final day, Sept.

Thereafter, Ormond delivered three sets of propositions, on behalf of the King, and of the Protestant Church and 'party'[79]; the confederates added 14 'Additional Propositions' on Sept. 19.[80] Detailed discussion cannot be given here[81], but some of the concerns of these negotiations have a wider bearing. In particular it seems clear that, aside from the raising of concerns which harked back to the 1620s Graces,[82] debate closely paralleled the kinds of issues to be discussed five months later at Uxbridge - religion; the militia; the constitutional control of Ireland; control of the executive; oblivion, restitution and punishment; the rule of law.[83]

Debate on article 1, on religious matters, was postponed until last.[84] The outcome of the discussions was to do no more, in the end, than clarify the legal situation in Ireland. At Oxford, Charles had claimed that the penal laws 'had never been executed with any rigor or severitye' in Ireland and the same would be true again. Ormond now offered the same, adding that the King 'for divers waighty consideracions will further advise before he consent to the repeale of any of the Acts intended...'.[85] Charles introduced the military question in his first two demands, for restitution of all

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17 (Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 289-92); in the interim, the negotiations on Sept. 14 and Sept. 16 were more heterogeneous, the former day mainly dealing with rights to land and to office, especially religious and national disabilities (Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 282-6), the latter with an Act of Oblivion, with limits on the Irish executive and with the independence of the Irish Parliament (Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 286-9).

[79]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 319-20, 321, 312-3.

[80]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 324-7.

[81]They are best followed in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, which prints all the relevant documents. In addition to those mentioned above, there are the 'Reasons' given by the Catholic commissioners for their propositions (Sept. 28, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 298-305) and why they considered Ormond's response unsatisfactory (Sept. 28, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 305-11); their response to the various proposals given by Ormond (Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 321-3, 323-4); Ormond's 'Answer' to the original propositions (Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 293-7) and 'Explanation' of his answer (Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 313-9) and his response to the new articles (Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 327-9). See also T. L. Coonan, *The Irish Catholic confederacy and the puritan revolution* (Dublin, 1954), pp 180-6 for a discussion of the main issues.

[82]At Oxford Charles had agreed, yet again, to the implementation of those of the Graces promised in 1641. Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*,, iii, 176, 283-4, 295. Article 9 of the additional propositions specifically sought the granting of all Graces promised since the 1620s and not otherwise discussed. In the Dublin discussions, no new concessions were wrung on matters such as post - 1634 plantations, on the prohibition of 'natives' from land purchases in planted areas, or on named appointments to office of Catholics, but on most of these issues no outright rejection had been given. For a list of the 'Graces' see Aidan Clarke, *The Old English in Ireland, 1625-42*, (London, 1966), pp. 238-54.

[83]Of course, this schema is for comparison only; it is not intended to suggest any conscious copying of demands made in either country (nor the relevance to the Irish articles of the 'Graces' demands of the 1620s or 1641). In his analysis of 'issues and sticking-points' in the various English negotiations of the 1640s, David L. Smith has identified 7 areas in a list similar to the one compiled above, - religion; the militia; parliament; the law; 'council and counsel'; 'the fate of "delinquents" '; the King's "honour and conscience" '. Smith, *Constitutional royalism and the search for settlement, c. 1640-1649* , (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 142-218

[84]The article read as follows :- 'That all Acts made against the professors of the Roman Catholique fayth, whereby any restraint, mulct, or incapacity may be layd upon any Roman Catholique within the kingdome of Ireland may be repealed, and the said Catholiques to be allowed the freedom of the Roman Catholique religion', Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 128.

[85]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 175, 293-4, 289-93, 305-6. See Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, pp. 180-1 for the legislation considered.

cities, town, counties, and all castles, forts, and munitions taken and held by the confederates (as well as the end of their jurisdiction) and the placing of all armies and military strength under the Lieutenant's control. A precisely similar demand opened his English negotiations, and the response in either case was likewise similar, as well as predictable - all such were held 'for his Majesties use and service, and the safetie of the kingdom, and his Majesties interest therein,...' against his true enemies.[86]

'Constitutional' issues focused on the Irish parliament. What was sought by the confederates was the calling of a new, 'free', parliament; the suspension of Poynings's law during its meeting; the overturning of votes in the Irish Parliament since 7 Aug. 1641[87], and of all 'indictments, attainders, outlawries in the King's bench, or elsewhere' due to the Rising. Without this last (seen as action by King or Irish House of Lords to remove records *en masse*) too many peers, MPs and freeholders would be disabled from sitting or voting in a new Parliament. Ormond could only repeat that neither parliamentary nor judicial decisions, if legal[88], could be declared void, but offered pardon through a final Act of Oblivion.[89]

The new parliament was aimed at ratification of an agreed settlement, but this meant some prior decision on the authority both of Poynings's Act and of the claims of the English Parliament over Ireland. No agreement was reached on either, with neither the King nor Ormond making concessions on the former issue;[90] on the second question that King had only offered to refer the matter to the two Parliaments, 'when it shall please God that they may freely and safely sitt, ...hee will take care to the utmost

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[86]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 319, 321-3; Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, p. 286. On the trained bands (article 15) the Council had replied that the question was not 'seasonable' for the King to grant. Charles and Ormond were more lenient, offering to give a response when further explanation was given of means for the security of Protestants under such an arrangement, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 178, 288, 297, 304, 311, 318.

[87]Debate did not arise on this clause, the confederates admitting that it had been 'qualified' by 'good ordinances' such as the denunciation of the Covenant. The 'pretended Parliament' was alleged to have lost most of the 'estated and right members' before such measures were passed, (thus tying this demand to that for the exclusion of non-residents in a 'free' parliament). Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 282, 294, 300-1, 308.

[88]This, however, provided a significant loophole, for Ormond claimed that this 'legal' clause excluded the parliamentary vote to expel Catholics, since such required an Act to impose the Oath of Supremacy, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 315-6. A royal direction to Ormond to have the parliamentary order vacated as illegal (i.e. an encroachment on royal authority since without a statutory basis) was issued the following Jan. 22, Carte MS 13, f. 503.

[89]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 279-80, 280-1, 294-5. (The councillors added the suggestion that a bill to overturn legal rulings could be passed in the present Parliament. Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 279-81.) It was urged that pardon, even in parliament, 'restores neither blood nor estates 'but that to void all grants depending on attainder, a clause was needed to condemn the indictments. Ormond replied that full restoration was implied, but that the King must approve the actions of courts and ministers till the case be otherwise proved, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 308-9, 316.

[90]The King had in fact insisted that the proposed new parliament restrict itself to treaty matters, a fact which could be seen as rendering it other than 'free'. In the end, the confederates accepted that the suspension should only cover matters in the treaty, but insisted on some suspension whereby 'the peoples' judgement will be much quieted'. Likewise Ormond let slip that he would create suspicion among Protestants in England and Ireland 'if that hee should admitt such innovation att this tyme, there being noe necessity thereof'. Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 280-1, 294, 300, 307, 314-5

of his power that they shall both contayne themselves within their proper limitts, his majestye being the head and equally interested in the rights of both Parliaments'. No one would be liable to doubt Charles's intentions to keep his parliaments within limits. But Ormond's statement that the King 'may not foreclose the Houses of Parliament from making any declaration agreeable to the lawes of the land' was backing a strand within Irish Protestant thinking which was attached to the autonomy of the Irish Parliament.[91]

Other proposals here aimed at the control of the Irish executive, both by curbing of powers, and by changes in personnel. Thus there were proposals to abolish the Court of Wards and other 'feudal' powers; to restrict the chief governor to a 3-year term, and remove his right to purchase land; to restrict the Council board to 'matters of state'. The additional proposals sought to limit or abolish Castle Chamber, and to press further the demand for the employment of Catholics by having the King choose some of the nobility for personal attendance.[92] All these are standard demands against the Caroline regime, albeit with the distinctly Irish emphases on the protection of land, and on the removal of religious disabilities.[93]

If the confederates' proposals thus put them in many ways in line with the demands of all reformist movements of the 1640s, the fact that some Irish Protestants had retained control of the official organs of Irish government allowed Charles, through them, to employ the language of the 'rule of law' as effectively as he was doing in England. It is remarkable how many of the responses from Oxford or from Ormond lay stress upon the need to uphold statute and the courts of law. This was argued not just in obvious matters like the refusal to void decisions, as requested in articles 3 - 4, but on matters like the Wicklow plantation, where Irish statute was alleged as the block, as it was in the case of the attempt to over throw decisions on land taken in the first instance by the Council.[94] Charles wanted the end of the confederation and a return to

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[91]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 177, 286-7, 296, 303, 310-1, 318. The issue cannot be discussed in detail here, save to mention that the April 1644 session of the Irish parliament had been discussing a draft of *A declaration how, and by what means, the laws and statutes of England...came to be of force in Ireland* in Walter Harris (ed.), *Hibernica* (Dublin, 1747-50), ii, 1-21. See *Commons' jn. Ire.*, i, 326, 328; *Lords' jn. Ire.*, i, 203, 207, 208. The probability is that the author was the Lord Chancellor, Sir Richard Bolton, and certainly nothing advanced by him and the other councillors at the negotiations contradicted the argument of the final version. The 'Ormondists' would make the Irish parliament a central plank in their programme but this does not mean that all other Irish Protestants were willing to see the Irish parliament overwhelmed by Westminster. See also Aidan Clarke, 'Colonial constitutional attitudes in Ireland, 1640-60' in *R. I. A. Proc.*, xc (1990), pp. 357-61.

[92]For Wards and homage, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 177, 285, 296, 310, 317-8; for the Council, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 177, 297-8, 296, 304, 311, 318; for the Chief Governor, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 178, 288, 296-7, 304, 311, 318. For the additional propositions, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 324-7.

[93]Thus, for example, the contemporary propositions from Parliament sought to confirm the abolition of Wards and homage in England, Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, p .277. In Ireland, as the confederates protested, the Court of Wards was even less justifiable, lacking statutory basis as in England, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 302-3, 310.

[94]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 176, 316-7 for the plantations; Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 177, 296, 318 on the Council.

the laws in force in Ireland and the courts of justice. He refused to countenance the possibility that trials in these (as of those excepted from Oblivion) could be other than indifferent. Like the Parliamentarians in England, the confederates were reduced to arguing that conventional methods could not be followed when some at the core of government in the past were involved in a 'plott', 'a design to extirpate a nation'.[95]

Finally, this emphasis on future restoration and corresponding punishment is a feature of all attempts at settlement in the troubles of Charles's kingdoms. Most of the confederate demands were of course to secure their own future from the 1641-2 measures. Where they disagreed with the royal offer of a statute of Oblivion drawn up by the Council was principally in their desire to extend it to goods seized, and to try those excluded in Parliament, not in unreliable courts.[96] Moreover, the new propositions aimed at excluding those who refused the cessation or took the Covenant - they should be 'proclaimed Traitors and prosecuted accordingly'; counties and corporations which rejected the cessation should be barred from electing to Parliament; those who assisted the King's enemies in England, or others unnamed, should be subject to impeachment and attainder, with forfeiture to the King, while those of 'our partie' with estates held by the Scots or Parliamentarians should 'be recompensed out of the estates of those malignants in this kingdom'.[97] It was not unlike a mirror image, if in slightly less lurid tint, of the future those enemies saw for the confederates themselves.

The negotiations demonstrate the similarity of demands between the confederates and the English parliamentarians, which raises the question of whether the King's response was likewise parallel. As will be seen there is reason to believe that Charles pursued comparable goals in both kingdoms. In turn this had the effect of committing Ormond and other Irish Protestants to policies not dissimilar to those of the English 'constitutional royalists'. For the moment, though, Ormond recognised that, having consulted a 'Special Committee' of the Irish Council the responses they gave to the confederates 'after much debate, weare agreed to be in substance the same with those received at Oxford'.[98] For some of those close to the middle ground of Irish

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[95]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 319, 311, 318. The case for a plot is in the responses on article 3, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 301, 308-9. The Confederates pressed for a royal declaration of dislike at proceedings and order to investigate the plot, so that Parliament could void the decisions. Ormond's reply included that the case must be proved *before* the king issue any proclamation or directions, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 316.

[96]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 176, 289, 297, 304-5, 311, 318. Everyone was equally concerned to get back what they claimed as theirs (though the King would waive some of what was due him) but the confederates responded to the Protestants' demands for restitution, which they accepted should be reciprocal, by trying to draw the line at the settlement, and not allow future law suits. Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 312-3, 323-4. Most of the royal and clerical demands also concerned restitution of property or rights, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 319-20, 321.

[97]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iii, 324-7.

[98]He identified as 'the mayne matters likely to be insisted uppon [as] the repeale of the Penall Lawes in force in this kingdome against recusants, what persons or crimes should be excepted out of the Act for

politics, like Clanricard and Taaffe, the prospect of a breakdown in negotiations was disastrous.[99] Clanricard may well have had a hand in an early attempt to break the deadlock.[100] An undated paper from the confederate commissioners appeared, dealing mainly with issues such as lands, though conceding that the trial of those outside oblivion need not be in Parliament but by 'indifferent commissioners'. Crucially, on religion, they accepted that the King 'cannot, without scandall and apparent loss of his partie, grant that which they may well hope and beleeve will fal of it self, and heerafter be admitted vnto them'. If satisfied on other matters, they would let things rest here.[101]

Ormond despatched Sir Henry Tichborne and Sir James Ware to Oxford with details of the negotiations and the controverted matters.[102] In the aftermath of the treaty stalemate there was a danger of slippage in both directions from a nascent 'royalist' centre committed to a settlement. Ormond was concerned at the shrinkage of the Irish council; not merely at a numerical shortfall, but at disaffection among the remnant.[103] Certainly the negotiations had witnessed outbursts which showed the depths of animosity still present as a result of the events of 1641-2.[104] Throughout Protestant quarters the consequences were grave. By mid-October the Covenant had been taken at Duncannon[105], spreading to the Munster ports.[106] Likewise in Connacht, explicit

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the General Pardon, the suspending if Poynings's Act, and the triall of offenders in their new Parliament' - to three of which he had given a negative response, the fourth, the exceptions, not having as yet been much debated. Ormond to Digby in Gilbert, *Ir. confed..*, iii, 329-33. Ormond gave a similar list in a letter to Thomond of Dec. 5, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 88-9.

[99]Clanricard to Ormond, Sept. 29 in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 200-1; *Letter-book*, pp. 108-9, 111-4, 114-7.

[100][William Usher to Perceval], Oct. 4 in *Egmont MSS*, i, 239.

[101]Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 11-12.

[102]It was reported that Taaffe and Barry, also gone for Oxford, were to attend the King with the others about the treaty, 'these being appointed to appear, some for the Councii, the other for the Irish...', [William Usher to Perceval], Oct. 8 in *Egmont MSS*, i, 240.

[103]With Ware and Tichborne gone, 'the king's busynesse will haue great want of them, there remaining now but very few [councillors], and of them some that have of late discovered very ill affections'. Ormond to Digby, Oct. 19, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 207-8. Ormond requested permission to add Chichester to the Council; on Oct. 8 he had written to Donnellan and Lowther, councillors still not returned from the spring delegation to Oxford, assuring them of provision for their return to Dublin. Digby's letter of Dec. 16 allowed Chichester's appointment, and Ormond's freedom 'to suspend from the councell board, which you will make such use of as in your wisdome you shall thinke fitt'. Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 210, 220-1; Carte MS 12, f. 440.

[104]Ormond was not specific about who he considered disaffected, and there may be no relation to stringent remarks at the talks. But the statement by chief justice Shirley that he was remiss in not prosecuting those he still considered rebels, a term which included his opposite numbers at the talks, was hardly helpful to the negotiations (William Usher to Perceval, Oct. 4 in *Egmont MSS*, i, 239). Lambert, who protested that, in always following the King's instructions, he had become hated by Catholics and Roundheads alike, claimed that the Irish would always deceive, and sought to have the events of 1641 excluded from any general pardon, Lambert to Webb, secretary to Richmond, Nov. 2, Carte MS 12, ff. 545-7. Lambert put Sir George Wentworth and Bishop Martin of Meath in the same category of being hated by both extremes. Perhaps Lambert's wavering is reflected in Digby's Dec. 16 instruction that Ormond could name Sir Faithful Fortescue as Governor of Dublin if he saw fit to replace Lambert, Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 221.

[105]H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 188.

[106]Bottigheimer, 'English interest', pp. 145-6.

opposition had emerged in October, despite the potential in the west, then and later, for a cross-religious, 'loyalist', 'centre party'. The fragmentation of control in the province gave the Roscommon anti-cessationists scope for action, and they made clear their opposition to the alignment of Ormond, Dillon (the Lord President) and Clanricard - an alignment cemented by commitment to the King's party in England, and thence to an Irish treaty.[107]

Inchiquin's position bears close resemblance to that of Mervyn in Derry.[108] While protesting to Ormond that the Covenant posed no rebellious danger, he nonetheless tried to formulate his own alternative oath. This he sent to Duncannon, where Esmond acknowledged that Inchiquin appeared interested only in engaging in the 'Irish cause'.[109] In Connacht too an oath was devised, pledging the subscribers to take commands from, and hold posts for, the King and Parliament of England.[110] More directly serious was the turn of events at Drogheda, Ormond's most significant garrison after Dublin. Apparently running from October through to the following January, the 'plot' to remove the town from Ormond's orbit appears to have gone through three stages.[111] The first envisaged direct negotiations with the English Parliament and defection to Inchiquin; the second, co-operation with Monro's forces, through joint operations in Co. Louth; finally, the surprisal of Drogheda by the garrison (including the plunder and expulsion of the 'papists') followed by Scottish assistance until relieved by Parliament.[112] Delays and betrayals foiled the enterprise, with arrests on Jan. 5, though even then the possibility of a similar action at Dundalk was not yet dead.[113]

The incident drives home two points about Protestant Ireland at this juncture. The first is how fear of a treaty with the confederates was paramount among the motives to break with Ormond, and thence the King.[114] One plotter, the dowager Lady

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[107]*Egmont MSS*, i, 239; Clanricard to Sir Lucas Dillon and Hubert Burke, Nov. 23 in *Letter-book*, p. 119.

[108]Mervyn took the Covenant, but in his own manner apparently, swearing to the 'title' and not the contents of the oath, and declaring the religion, the 'honour ad happiness' of the King and the 'peace and safety' of the three kingdoms at one with commitments made under the Oath of Supremacy. Mervyn to Ormond, 4 Feb. 1645, in *Ormonde MSS*, i, 91; cf. Adair's account (*True narrative*, ed. Killen, pp. 107, 113, 116) of Mervyn's progression from opposition to acceptance.

[109]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 49. The oath meant no acceptance of any peace not warranted by King and Parliament. It included reference to the King's placing the prosecution of the war in Parliament (by Act) but no reflections on the war in England and only a general religious commitment to extirpate popery and schism.

[110]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 31.

[111]The fullest account is in Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 147-53; cf. Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters*, pp. 215-6. Carte's lists of officers and civilians involved is given at pp. 147, 148; another list appears in T. M[aule] to Perceval, Jan. 30, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 245.

[112]Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 147-9.

[113]Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 149-51, 151-3.

[114]Writing to Digby (Feb. 4), Ormond confessed 'I haue long feared our wants, ioyned to the generall aversion the English heere haue to a peace with the Irish, and the large promises that are made from London, would at length produce some such designe...'. Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 243.

Moore recounted the informations of various Catholic politicians - Antrim as having alleged that 'one condicion of the peace was that their party was to have one church and ours another, and that this tolleracion was to be assented unto by our Councell as well as by theirs'. Alderman Nugent of Drogheda was said to have reported a peace concluded, allowing assenting Protestants to repossess their losses but with any opponents 'proclaimed traitors and rebells with the Lord of Inchiquin and the Scotts...'.[115] But if Ormond was unsure how to respond to the plot, feeling unable to follow his instinct towards rigor,[116] he could perhaps have taken comfort in that the plotters showed only somewhat less distrust of the Scots than of the Irish. The preference throughout was for co-operation with the English Parliament (a delegate was specifically sent to communicate with Clotworthy at Westminster), and the earlier plans for a co-ordinated taking of the city foundered on the fear that the Scots might appropriate too much of the booty. Likewise the final plan, admitting the Scots after taking control, still led to concern that the latter would break the arrangement and take control, so Monro was asked, late in the deal, to scale down the forces he would be sending.[117]

Clearly there was little sign that Protestant Ireland (at least outside Ulster) had become a third party to the 'Covenanter coalition'. Tensions between the 'English' of Ireland and the Scots was still a variable in the political calculations of 1644 but for the moment it was just about outweighed by the general Protestant opposition to a peace on the kind of terms offered at Dublin. While Ormond marked time on negotiations, those Protestant forces outside Ulster now looking to Westminster became as aware as their northern brethren that Parliament was more prodigal of words than deeds. Good intentions and grand schemes did not fill empty bellies. Inchiquin finally got his commission to the Presidency in January, but he got little else. Worries grew that the cessation could not go on being renewed indefinitely[118], especially after Preston moved against Duncannon on Jan. 20. The officers of Youghal, headed by Broghill,

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[115]It is notable that such a fact could be put forward to justify opposition to a treaty - other reports offered less generous treatment to any Protestants. Thus Sir Nicholas White allegedly told Lady Moore that her late husband's actions meant that no reparation could be expected by any of his kin. Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 131-3.

[116]Though he wished to make an example of those involved but he tellingly conceded 'the number of the ill affected, the distance wee are yett at with the Irish, and the weakness and wants of such as stand right...'. Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 243.

[117]Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 150. Carte made much of the fear that a treaty would mean failure to pay military arrears in explaining the reasons for the defection (Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 153-4). While he consistently played up material considerations, they must not be overlooked in any consideration of the actions of the military forces in Ireland in the 1640s, any more than in England. Ormond was of course well aware that his officers had mostly lost out in the seizures of 1641-2 and would oppose any arrangement which failed to make financial or other restitution or at least guarantee future sustenance. For an attempt by him to utilise the argument that shortage of money led to disaffection see his letter to Limerick city, Jan. 30 in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 136-7.

[118]It was, however, extended piecemeal, to Feb. 1, Feb. 15, Feb. 28, March 3 and (on March 1) April 10. *Egmont MSS*, i, 243-4, 245, 247.

petitioned Inchiquin to go personally to London to obtain relief.[119] In Ulster local civilian suffering produced a petition to Scotland (Jan. 10) on food shortages, as well as another attempt by the Scottish army to press their case, in Edinburgh and London, this time through Colonel George Monro.[120]

Yet as the Westminster machinery creaked forward the fulfilment of the 1644 plans would mean most for Ulster. With the Davies contracts agreed (Jan. 9) , C.B.K. swiftly followed up with the issuing of warrants for delivery of supplies to the province.[121] Connacht was in effect included within the Ulster deliveries, and 1 500 Ulster troops were specified for service there. Coote's presidency was presented to a tardy Commons (Feb. 8).[122] Duncannon also figured much in the deliberations, with the putting together of Loftus's relief expedition, troops and supplies being gathered[123] but Munster was somewhat marginalised.[124] Some moves were made to answer the petition of the officers for pay, but the Commons tacked on to the Commission to Inchiquin a suggestion that they adventure their arrears, and present pay.[125] Munster's military success was held to be in the hands of the proposed reinforcement of 2 000 from Ulster, the despatch of which was left in the hands of Monro and the Ulster Council of War.[126] Probably the continuing influence of the Scots at C.B.K. effected the primacy of the north, though the role of the Ulster agents should be mentioned.[127] On the whole, Parliament, and especially C.B.K., continued to display a concern for Ireland. Their plans, if somewhat unrealistic, were at least definite, and the plan to send nominees to accompany supplies presaged tighter control.[128] The focus on Ulster showed no sign of the Scottish / 'British' differences of 1643-4. But Westminster was building impatience in Ireland by its inability to provide for mundane needs.

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[119]Bottigheimer, 'English interest', pp. 152-5.

[120]Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters*, pp. 203-5. The Earl of Crawford-Lindsay provided Monro with a recommendatory letter to C.B.K. on Feb. 7; all letters concerning the new Scots were ordered read on Feb. 24, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 292, 320.

[121]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 231; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 14, 15; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 185b for Jan. 9. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 244-5, 254, 259, 276-7, 291.

[122]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 272, 285, 294; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 44.

[123]Loftus's commission was approved at C.B.K. on Jan. 10 and money voted on Jan. 13 and Jan. 23, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 242, 249, 272. Feb. saw the voting of warrants for troops and supplies to Loftus and his subordinates, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 291, 294-5, 309, 320, 327.

[124]The longer standing Ulster representatives were to discuss Broghill's propositions. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 270.

[125]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 234, 237; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 19, 20, 21, 27 for the commission and instructions; for moves on pay, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 258-9, 264, 270, 327; *Cal. S. P. dom., Addenda 1625-49*, p. 674.

[126]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 271-2, 291, 294.

[127]Certainly personal presence was an asset - Broghill won a nomination as General of the Horse for Munster, and all officers present seem to have got some share in the handouts of parts of their pay. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 251.

[128]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 244. In this case, the initiative seems to have come from the Commons. On Jan. 6 they ordered C.B.K. to 'consider of fit persons to be sent as Commissioners into *Ireland*, to take the Muster of the Armies there', *Commons' jn.*, iv, 11.

Where Parliament itself took cognisance of Ireland was in the development of the plan submitted to the King in Nov. and discussed in Jan. - Feb., which must be recognised as a plan for all of Charles's kingdoms.[129] The papers exchanged during the Uxbridge negotiations[130] elucidate the 'Covenanter' vision for the future of a reformed Britain, including Ireland.[131] From the King's side they show the consistency with which he pursued the same objectives, separately and distinctly, in England and Ireland. Ormond's agents to Court were delayed in their departure by parliamentary shipping[132], and by the time they presented to Charles the state of affairs in Ireland, the King had probably already listened to the Scottish - parliamentarian terms, read to him on Nov. 24.[133] From here on the interplay between the sets of negotiations is unavoidable, and timing was to be vital.

On Dec. 15 both the King and Digby wrote to the Lieutenant, hopeful with regard to an Irish settlement on the basis of the paper submitted by Muskerry and Browne (and probably inspired by Clanricard), and offering repeal of the statutes on worship, if not on jurisdiction.[134] This was only two days before Charles's envoys reached Westminster offering the appointment of commissioners by both sides in England to negotiate a peace.[135] But any attempt by the King to play his fortunes in the three kingdoms as one game was hampered by the growing irritant of parliamentary control of the seas. For the returning counsellors, Tichborne and Ware, were taken at sea by Swanley and sent to London, their papers captured or disposed of.[136] While Ormond repeatedly put off negotiations in Dublin, and the cessation was temporarily renewed, no word from Oxford arrived.[137]

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[129]By Nov. 20 the two Houses and the Scots had sent representatives to the King and Charles's response, probably encouraged by the Holles - Whitelocke intervention, was to seek to treat through commissioners appointed by each side. Parliament's Jan. 18 response set out the terms for the preliminary negotiations for 20 days; as accepted, they began on Jan. 31 at Uxbridge. Rushworth, iii (2), 798, 855, 856-7; *Parliamentary or constitutional history of England* (24 vols., London, 1751-62) xiii, 337-41 for events at Oxford.

[130]Smith, *Constitutional royalism*, pp. 120-4 provides a recent discussion of the Uxbridge treaty.

[131]The term 'Covenanter' (or more usually 'Covenanter coalition') will be used in relation to the agreed programme put forward by the English parliamentarians and their Scottish allies in 1644-6 (particularly as it affected Ireland), and the alliance which grew to include substantial numbers of Protestants in Ireland in the furtherance of these ends. While it began to languish from 1646, the legacy of this Anglo-Scottish league persisted in many of the positions with regard to Ireland set out at Uxbridge. It is noticeable that, within Ireland, the Scots were seen as the prime component within the 'Covenanter coalition'.

[132]Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 311 for delays. The departure seems to have been on Nov. 4 - see Ormond to Fennell, Nov. 7 in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 214.

[133]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 85; Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, pp. 275-86.

[134]Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 9-10; vi, 219; Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 104-5, 116. The arrangement offered was not to execute the penal laws if peace was made, and kept, in Ireland, and 'to the repeale of them by a law' (excluding appeals and praemunire) in the future in return for Irish assistance in quelling the English rebellion.

[135]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 99.

[136]Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 75-6.

[137]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 117, 130.

Before the English treaty opened, Charles wrote again on Jan. 9.[138] This crucial letter showed where he then stood. That the Parliament would press him to continue the Irish war being inevitable, Ormond should use that to push the confederates into a peace. Charles could then avoid Parliament's demands. On the other hand, Ormond must tell the Irish that if they could not make a deal in time, Charles must accede in England and so lose them the favours he was ready to bestow in Ireland. As a back-up, he not only continued to urge the case for Irish military intervention in England (and Scotland[139]) but to offer, in extremity, Ormond's co-operation against Inchiquin and the Scots. One step further he was prepared to go - on Jan. 22 he permitted the suspension of Poynings's Act rather than a relapse into the war.[140] But Charles's efforts to impel each set of negotiations by means of the other could not work. Ormond only received the Dec. and (probably) Jan. letters, at the hands of Jack Barry, on March 6, long after the conclusion of the Uxbridge treaty.[141] Through the winter months Ormond was forced to mark time, appeasing neither Protestant nor Catholic opinion, and giving the king's opponents in England apparently free rein to fix an alternative future for Ireland with his Majesty. In fact, doing nothing was probably his best course, letting other people make mistakes for him.[142]

The House of Commons had decided (Jan. 6) that Ireland should be made one of the priorities of the English treaty, alongside religion and the militia.[143] It was clear that Parliament and the Scots had produced a full alternative policy on the third kingdom covering all six areas identified in discussing the Dublin negotiations; despite this, on the first day of discussions on Ireland (Feb. 7), the Parliamentarians and Scots made it clear that they wished debate to focus on article 13 - to nullify the cessation and vest the Irish war in Parliament[144] - which must be settled before opening up any other

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[138]Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 8-9; Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 118-9. In the meantime he had written his letter recommending Glamorgan on Dec. 27, and issued Glamorgan's instructions on Jan. 2, Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 164, 166. Gardiner's assertion that Glamorgan was only mandated to give assurances on the non-implementation of the penal statutes, and that his wider powers related to the raising of international Catholic aid is doubtless correct, Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 166-8.

[139]Cf. Charles to Ormond, Jan. 4 in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 225-6.

[140]Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 223-4.

[141]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 118.

[142]Peace negotiations had a habit of exacerbating not easing political tension. If the gap exposed in the Dublin talks looked wide, even between the more accommodating in both camps, it looked much narrower in comparison to the chasm between both and the 'Covenanter' position at Uxbridge. The Dublin talks looked set to further undermine the middle ground in Ireland; after Uxbridge the reconstruction of a 'centre party' could begin.

[143]The Lords had proposed the other two issues, and they, and the Scots, agreed to include Ireland. *Commons' jn.*, iv, 11, 18, 31; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 184b. (The general lack of concern for Ireland in the upper House seems apparent from lack of recorded initiatives in the *Lords' journal*, but it is not clear why this is so.)

[144]The text of the article reads as follows:- 'That an Act of parliament be passed to make void the cessation of Ireland, and all treaties with the rebels without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, and to settle the prosecution of the war in Ireland in both Houses of Parliament, to be managed by the joint advice of both kingdoms, and the King to assist and to do no act to discountenance or molest them therein'. Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, p. 278.

resolutions on Ireland.[145] The result was that the first session of three days on Ireland degenerated to old wrangles about the legality and, particularly, the necessity, of the cessation. Even though further matters emerged in the second round of talks, they ran in tandem with rehashed accusation and counter-accusation going right back to the Rising itself.[146]

The Royalists more effectively counter-attacked with queries on the other articles on the control of Ireland, the effect of which was to exploit the muddled chain of command to allege that the King's authority was 'wholly taken away, and in truth, that whole kingdom be thereby delivered into the Hands of His Majestie's Subjects of *Scotland*, which we conceive is neither just, prudent, or honourable to be done'.[147] Exploiting divergent wordings in different parliamentary votes, they alleged that Leven was given full command of the military in Ireland if C.B.K. were to disagree, dislodging both the English Parliament and the Lord Lieutenant.[148] Parliament's counter was simply to deny any confusion in the structure of King - Parliament - Commissioners - Lieutenant - Leven, and to retort that there was no harm in Leven's being Scottish, nor was any part of Ireland delivered to the Scots 'who do only join with their Councels and Forces, for carrying on the War, and reducing that Kingdom to His Majesties Obedience'.[149] But it is worth remarking on the fact that the Scots were fixed on as the source of English division over Ireland. The king personally, and royalists generally, seemed almost eager to cast all blame for failure of the talks on the

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[145]Rushworth, iii (2), 897-8. The full official text of the Uxbridge debates may be found in Rushworth, iii (2) - the papers relating to Ireland at pp. 897-918, 932-41. Parliament admitted that articles relevant to Ireland included nos. 12 (the confirmation of Anglo-Scottish treaties, including that on Ireland), 14, ii - iii (exclusion from pardon of Irish rebels), 17, iv (powers of a C.B.K. including in Ireland), 20 (nomination of officials including the Lord Lieutenant and other senior figures in Ireland) - Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, pp. 278, 279, 282-3, 283-4. These covered questions of the militia; of the 'constitutional' position of Ireland; of the control of the Irish executive; of future oblivion or punishment.

[146]Rushworth, iii (2), 898-900, 900-2, 906-8, 908-9, 910-3, 915-6, 932-6. Parliament apparently based their claim for illegality on the adventure legislation and the common law claim that the '*private Interest of the Subscribers for Money was concerned in it*' which the Royalists did not try to deny in law, only defuse in practice, Rushworth, iii (2), 898-900, 900. The only novelties were the Royalists' query about the idea of the King 'to assist', explained as consenting to financial legislation, and the parliamentary query about present treating with the Irish, to which they were informed that Ormond's powers were not known, Rushworth, iii (2), 898, 902-5. The format agreed for the Uxbridge talks was to spend three days on religion, followed by three on the militia, and three on Ireland, repeating this sequence twice more, with a final few days to sum up.

[147]Rushworth, iii (2), 902-5, 907-8. Some of the queries were resolved - that Leven was under the control of the militia commissioners of article 17, and that the English commissioners alone, in the absence of parliament, had the nomination of he Lord Lieutenant.

[148]Rushworth, iii (2), 906-8, 936-7. Their claim was that of a clash between the 1642 Treaty, placing power over the war in Parliament, and the 11 April, 1644 agreed orders which placed command in Leven, under C.B.K. and did not mention Parliament. This would give Leven sole command in case of C.B.K disagreement, since referral to Parliament in such a situation was not provided for. There was no role for the Lord Lieutenant, even if inserted above Leven, for the latter had *all* forces allocated him, and was anyway subordinated to C.B.K. not Parliament, leaving the problem of disputes still open.

[149]Rushworth, iii (2), 909-10.

Scots.[150] Chancellor Loudoun lamented that '"That which was chiefly intended by those who did treat for the King was to make objections and cast in question to divide the two Kingdoms."'[151] The propaganda potential of the Scottish role in Ireland was also exploited to the full - Radcliffe told Ormond that they had 'swallowed Ireland in their hopes', Daniel O'Neill adding that Ormond's own estate was marked out for delivery to the Scottish Chancellor.[152]

To reinforce their claims the Parliamentary and Scottish negotiators had appended a harangue on the need for war against 'these execrable antichristian rebels, who have made a covenant with Hell, to destroy the Gospel of Christ, and have taken up arms to destroy the Protestant Religion, and set up Popery, to rend away one of His majesties Kingdoms and deliver it up into the hands of strangers...'.[153] It was left to the Royalists to urge that while justice must be done upon those who have broken 'the Laws of God and Man, their Faith, their Allegiance, the Bonds of Charity, Rules of Humanity, and Humane Society' it might perhaps be worth considering '...whether it would not be more agreeable to our Christian profession, to endeavour the binding up of those Wounds, which interests, passions, and animosity have made.'[154] Clearly the perceptions on Ireland entertained by the Uxbridge negotiators were completely incompatible. But beyond the insistence on the full, unreserved and immediate advance of the war in the neighbouring island the 'Covenanter coalition' envisaged permanent upheaval in the ecclesiastical and civil control of Ireland, a drastic response to the seriousness of the religious and political threat alleged against the confederates.[155]

Even as the treaty continued, the Commons on Feb. 6 were reading the Bill to abolish the episcopal hierarchy mentioned in the third proposition , and resolved, 'That the Hierarchy in *Ireland* shall be inserted in this Bill; to be taken away and abolished by this Bill'. A further bill was to be drawn up for the disposal of episcopal and capitular lands in Ireland.[156] The only religious clauses at Uxbridge which had mentioned Ireland had been that on the abolition, and the one on the subscription of the Covenant

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[150]Thus favouritism in the supply of Scottish forces in Ireland was alleged, as well as the delivery of control there to them, Rushworth iii (2), 934. Charles told the Queen (March 5) that Parliament had 'transmitted the Command of *Ireland* from the Crown of *England* to the *Scots*, which... will clearly shew, that reformation of the Church is not the Chief, much less the only end of the *Scottish* Rebellion.' Rushworth iii (2), 947. For Scottish anxiety to cut a deal with the King see Kaplan, *Politics and religion*, pp. 97, 103; Stevenson, *Revolution and counter-revolution*, p. 14; Stevenson, 'The early covenanters and the federal union of Britain', in Mason (ed.), *Scotland and England*, p. 172.

[151]Kaplan, *Politics and religion*, p. 108.

[152]Radcliffe to Ormond, Feb. 24, Carte MS 14, f. 131; O'Neill to Ormond, Feb. 22 in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 249. See also Digby to Ormond, Feb. 23 in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 250-2.

[153]Rushworth, iii (2), 910.

[154]Rushworth, iii (2), 914.

[155]See above, chapter 2, for how some, in England and Ireland, had responded to the rising from the outset by advocating a more thorough 'reform' of Ireland for the future.

[156]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 43.

in the three Kingdoms.[157] But it was clear the terms of that document were to be fulfilled and, given the similarity of wording of its § 2 with the proposition (5) on the reformation of religion, it seems reasonable to assume that these measures (on worship and church government) could be envisaged as extending to Ireland also.[158]

Nor was there any difficulty, save the King's consent, in applying any such legislation to Ireland. With the exception of the clause on the appointment of Irish officials, left in the hands of Parliament or its commissioners, the only direct reference to civil power in Ireland in the long term was to vest its militia (including, as was recognised, a standing army) in the joint militia commissioners. Given that the basis of almost all propositions was the duplication of English and Scottish government in the absence of joint control, it seems as if the key development was not the claim of the English Parliament to legislative and regulatory functions in Ireland, nor even the acceptance of that claim by the Scottish Covenanters, but the latter's insertion of its own executive into the framework of control, removing the need to have an Irish Parliament act as security.[159] 'The intransigence displayed by the Scots at Uxbridge pertaining to Ireland and the militia reveals how secular issues concerned them almost as much as the religious one'.[160] If the demand for both a presbyterian church and a joint military command in England reflected Scottish needs for security at home[161], surely the danger to the Covenanter regime from Ireland merited similar institutions there. If, further, they were expressive of a 'federal' idea then Ireland was to be included, and not as a third party, but as a dependency of England.[162]

The King's plans had worked on the basis of keeping separate negotiations in the separate kingdoms. But this is not to say that he did not operate on a similar set of conditions in each case. At the heart of all negotiations, and of Charles's personal dilemma, was the matter of religion and on this he held to three concerns as a common religious policy in 1644 conditions. First was the defence of the Church, in Charles's mind indistinguishable from defence of bishops and ecclesiastical lands, to both of which the king felt bound by his coronation oath.[163] If this meant clear denial of the

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[157]As far back as Oct. 21 C.B.K. voted that all officers employed in the Irish service should take the Covenant; on Jan. 8 all Irish officers then in London were ordered to subscribe to it, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 62, 237.

[158]Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, pp. 268, 275-6. At Uxbridge the Directory of Worship and the propositions on (presbyterian) church government already agreed by Parliament were taken to encompass the terms of proposition 5, Rushworth, iii (2), 897-8.

[159]Russell, *Causes*, pp. 126-7; Perceval-Maxwell, 'Ulster 1641 in the context of political developments in the three kingdoms', in Mac Cuarta (ed.), *Ulster 1641*, pp. 101-2. The Royalists, it should be noted, refused to consider a joint Anglo-Scottish arrangement on the militia, let alone adding Ireland. Rushworth, iii (2), 881-3; Kaplan, *Politics and religion*, pp. 105-6.

[160]Kaplan, *Politics and religion*, p. 106.

[161]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 122; Kaplan, *Politics and religion*, p. 103.

[162]Kaplan, *Politics and religion*, pp. 97-107; Stevenson, 'Early Covenanters and the federal union', pp. 167, 170-3, 177-8.

[163]So he told his commissioners before the treaty opened, that, 'as for the Churches Patrimony, I cannot suffer any diminution or alienation of it, it being without peradventure, Sacriledge, and likewise

central demands at Uxbridge, it had little effect in Ireland as yet, but would soon open up as the confederate refusal to surrender church property now held by Catholic clergy became one of the breaking points of 1645 negotiations. With this went an insistence on the need 'to keep the dependency of the Clergy intirely upon the Crowne, without which it will scarcely sit fast upon the Kings Head...'.[164] Thus the commissioners argued that by Parliament's bill 'His majesties ancient and undoubted Power of the *Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction* is wholly taken away'.[165] Likewise in Ireland, there is no reason to doubt Gardiner's opinion that Charles, even at the furthest point of concession, never intended the repeal of such legislation as the Acts of Appeals and Praemunire.[166]

There was a third, more positive strand to Charles's thought, a willingness to allow measures 'for the ease of tender Consciences (so that it endamage not the Foundation)'. This lies behind what Gardiner called 'the one object of interest in the whole dreary futility' of the Uxbridge negotiations, the offer from the Oxford clergy of a measure of toleration.[167] The problem was that, when his enemies interpreted Charles's concession as a boon to Catholics they were correct.[168] In the extension of a 'toleration' the King was lumping Catholic recusants and Protestants dissidents together - he would offer not to penalise either for their conscience, but would 'establish' neither.[169] Otherwise the royal(ist) position was a consistently

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contrary to my Coronation-Oath'. Rushworth iii (2), 945. The Royal commissioners offered £100 000, to be raised from church lands by statute, but without alienation. Interestingly, they later (Feb. 22) complained that, of church lands confiscated, only some of the revenue, and none of the control, was given the King, whereas the lands '(if those Corporations must be dissolved) do undoubtedly belong to His Majesty in his own right'. Rushworth iii (2), 872-3, 924.

[164]Rushworth iii (2), 945.

[165]Rushworth iii (2), 872. Instead they recognised that the propositions included that 'the Authority and Jurisdiction of the several Assemblies shall be settled by Parliament', and did 'not offer to constitute the least dependence of the Clergy upon His Majesty...'. Rushworth iii (2), 869, 924. Even before the 1640s, Charles held a 'dynamic conception of his supremacy, as the fount and interpreter of ecclesiastical law. In Charles's view, the supreme governor in consultation with his clergy had effected the Reformation and could legally initiate further change. Parliament, he believed, had merely ratified the breach with Rome', K. Fincham & P. Lake, 'The ecclesiastical policies of James I and Charles I' in Kenneth Fincham (ed.), *The early Stuart church 1603 - 1642* (London, 1993), pp. 43-4.

[166]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 163, 173-4. With the English negotiations broken down, he gave Ormond permission (Feb. 27) to allow 'the present taking away of the penall laws against the papists by a law' but there is no reason to believe that Charles understood these to encompass legislative pillars of his ecclesiastical supremacy, any more than when, on March 5, he wrote to the Queen allowing the offer of a like repeal of recusancy laws in England. Charles to Ormond, Feb. 27 in Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 13; vi, 257-8; Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 153-4. Charles to the Queen, March 5, in Rushworth iii (2), 947.

[167]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 125, 130. This was not overthrown in Charles's later offer of a Synod, for this had originally been seen as encompassing such in its remit, Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, p. 287.

[168]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 127.

[169]James I had pursued the policy of trying to win the middle ground from both 'moderate' Catholics and puritans. The emphasis on the distinction between 'papists' and 'Jesuited Papists' (i.e. between those seen as loyal and those seen as tyrannicides and anti-monarchists) 'was so frequently repeated that among some strongly Anglican apologists for the King's cause it may almost be described as an orthodoxy'. Charles had been seen as not acting on the basis that the catholic and puritan threats were equivalent. If he now offered some toleration for the quietists in either camp, the process of greater

'conservative' one. On the militia, the government of Ireland and the control of the executive the King merely asked for trust and offered generosity.[170] In either Kingdom, he would not surrender his immediate control, however much he might allow a share of delegated authority. In making this stand for the return of power to 'their Ancient Channels' Charles utilised the 'constitutional royalist' language of the 'rule of law'.[171] No less than three of the six propositions submitted by his side on Jan. 21 echoed this theme.[172]

The King's representatives alone did not submit detailed terms of pardon or of punishment. His English and Scottish opponents had 57 named individuals excepted, along with huge categories both for exclusion from office and from mercy. Even more than the confederates, they based their, and the nation's, material recompense on the backs of those deemed culpable.[173] Royal(ist) strategy was not only to appear conservative, but also inclusive with a common 'policy' of seeking to detach the more pliable members of the opposition, usually on a personal basis.[174] In both England and Ireland the months since Nov. 1644 had shown the extent to which 'moderates' were prepared to rally to the King once he displayed his own moderation.[175] Unfortunately he just wouldn't go far enough in return. Instead he seems to have set

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clerical acceptance of the Roman church in the 1630s (by cooling the debate on doctrine and concentrating on matters of jurisdiction) had fuelled the fears of those who saw no such distinctions among Catholics and who believed, like Ussher, that 'idolatry could not be tolerated by any godly prince, even if those who practised it were in other matters quiet and loyal...'. G. E. Aylmer, 'Collective mentalities in mid-seventeenth century England: II Royalist attitudes' in *R. Hist. Soc. Trans.*, xxxvii (1987) p. 12; Fincham & Lake, 'The ecclesiastical policies of James I and Charles I', pp. 25-30, 48-9; Anthony Milton, 'The Church of England, Rome, and the True Church...' in Fincham (ed.), *The early Stuart church*, pp. 208-10; Ford, *The Protestant Reformation*, pp. 255, 268.

[170]The defence of his crown Charles 'interpreted as a refusal to agree to terms which might be regarded as inconsistent with royal dignity and majesty, into which category parliamentary control of the militia and the renunciation of past royal actions and policies might be deemed to fall', Ashton, *English civil war*, p. 234. Thus to repudiate the cessation would make 'ourselves incapable of being trusted at any time after, and odious abroad...', Rushworth iii (2), 933.

[171]The Royalists' final paper (Rushworth iii (2), 922-5) is filled with this language - reform of religion must be 'regularly and calmly made' through the meeting of King, Parliament and Synod; the failure to discuss law, liberty and property and privilege of Parliament is lamented.

[172]All things 'contrary to the known laws of the land, or contrary to His Majesty's legal and known power and rights' was to be recalled; illegal powers over persons or property assumed by Parliament and its agents were to be disclaimed; all persons agreed to be excluded from pardon were to be tried by the usual course of justice. Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, pp. 286-7.

[173]Robert Ashton, *The English civil war. Conservatism and revolution 1603-1649* (London, 1978), p. 234; Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, pp. 278-81.

[174]The King's final paper on Ireland made much of the Parliament's 'exasperation' of the Irish rebellion, by making it both a religious and a national quarrel. As in all cases, Charles's interpretation was of a rebellion, a form of insurgency more amenable to resolution on a personal basis. He defended the cessation as 'it being more acceptable to God and Man to preserve a few good men from destruction, then to destroy a multitude, though in the way of Justice, and perhaps a Cessation may bring some of those Rebels to reflect uppon their offences, and to return to their Duty, all are not in the same degree of Guilt,...', Rushworth iii (2), 938-9, 940.

[175]Events in England showed there was 'at least partial revival of that consensus between members of the peace party at Westminster and royalist moderates at Oxford'; 'the king had more sympathizers in the parliamentary ranks than he realized.' (Ashton, *English civil war*, p. 234; Kaplan, *Politics and religion*, p. 78.) Likewise in Ireland, individuals like Muskerry, Browne and Plunket showed how far they were prepared to go in order to meet the King.

his hopes on the most selfish instincts of his opponents. His English commissioners were allowed to offer not only security to defecting individuals, but 'places' too, 'so they be not of great Trust'.[176] As part of the response to Ormond's requests for instructions and powers at the end of 1644 he was given authority to grant personal pardons, and an effectively free hand in the bestowal of offices, including military.[177]

By late Feb. Charles professed despair at an English settlement - 'their aime is a total subuersion of religion and regall power, and ... nothing less will content them or purchas peece heere...' - and so threw himself back on Ireland.[178] When Ormond received Charles's instructions for a treaty on March 6,[179] his overall strategy was much as it had been when he opened negotiations. His priority was to retain residual Protestant loyalty to the King, even it this meant temporary loss of practical control in parts of Ireland. Towards the confederates, he still toyed with the idea of pardons and promotions, as he had in 1641-2, against Clanricard's insistence on the need for, and justice of, a settlement.[180] Ormond was presiding, somewhat uneasily, over one ideological coalescence summoning the allegiance of Protestant Ireland in 1644-5. 'Constitutional Royalism', as it emanated from Oxford, offered security for all in a renewed submission to the King, *and* to the laws of the land. And in being as narrowly English as it was[181], it left room, in a Dublin incarnation, for an additional commitment to the laws and institutions (including especially the Parliament) of Ireland. This was a vision of a return to an idealised Ireland of the 1620s -30s, a settled, 'Humane Society' with its rules and its order. It was not without its attraction, and its epitome is in the arguments of the Protestant lawyers on the 1644 debates.

The real danger was that Ormond, and through him the King, would continue to lose the 'esteem and trust' of Protestant Ireland. Letters from Ulster show how far

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[176]Rushworth, iii (2),946.

[177]King to Ormond, Jan. 22, Carte MS 13, ff. 495, 505, 521. The King's faith in the value of grants of office can be surmised from his making Muskerry Lord President of Munster (Feb. 9), while urging Ormond to woo Inchiquin back to his side, Bottigheimer, 'English interest', pp. 152-5.

[178]Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 13. Given that the Scottish Covenanters were identified as the real enemy, the emphasis in Jan. on enrolling Irish aid against them, in Scotland or in Ulster, came back to the forefront.

[179]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 118.

[180]Clanricard (Jan. 10) believed a general proclamation of pardon would not split the confederates, but unite them; Ormond replied that he would need to see the contents of such a pardon before he could conjecture the response, but believed some would be thereby more satisfied than through the uncertainties of war, *Letter-book*, p. 132; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 232-3.

[181]The Royalists concluded that 'whatever is now, or hereafter be thought necessary to be done [on the militia], we desire may be so settled, that this Kingdom may depend uppon itself, and not be subjected to the Laws or advice of *Scotland*, as we think fit that *Scotland* should not receive rules or advice from this...', Rushworth iii (2), 924.

hopes had been invested in the English negotiations.[182] What remained to be seen was who would be blamed for their collapse. For the moment Ormond continued to contend with suspicion generated by the Irish negotiations. Ormond was reminded by the parliamentary admiral, Swanley, that he had authority to treat with him towards 'an honourable complyance with your best freinds, the Parliament...'.[183] To this end, Ormond was sent copies of the correspondence of the confederate agent in France, O'Hartegan, attacking a settlement. They were laughed off in Dublin and Oxford - Ormond told Clanricard the letters were 'worth your observation, and the most of it may provoke your mirth', and Digby responded that he 'shall need say noe more then of a madman's whose calumnyes cannot wound'.[184] Yet wound they had. The letters were commended to Ormond by his captured councillors, Tichborne and Ware, at least the former of whom seems to have reconsidered his loyalties in the aftermath.[185]

Ormond was aided by Parliament's failure to match its war rhetoric with practical assistance, or even control, but this was a diminishing asset. In the north-west Mervyn described an air of weariness that the 'large promises which the Covenant assured them into a belief of performance are failed...'.[186] But other information suggested the continued need for caution. Mervyn had dug in at Derry, assigning royal rental income to pay the troops and confident of enough local support to fend off challenges to his governorship. Yet the Ormondist triumvirate of Mervyn, Sir Robert Stewart and Mayor Thornton faced internal opposition. Local protests emerged with Thornton's moves against the Scottish Covenanter clergymen, and Mervyn's rejection of 'a petition signed by the Covenanters... concerning the ecclesiastical discipline'. As a result, petitions were despatched to Parliament and the Scottish Assembly.[187] Rather than try to drive the wedge deeper at a national level, Ormond aimed to woo all the 'antient inhabitants of Vlster' and ultimately Monro's army.[188]

What he had to become engaged in was a battle for the soul of Protestant Ireland. What Mervyn and his allies faced was a local commitment to the 'Covenanter coalition'. The winter of 1644-5 had not only seen the reassessment of a Parliamentary

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[182]Rawdon to Matthews, Jan. 5, Carte MS 13, f. 265; Sir James Montgomery to W. Usher & S. Mayart, Carte MS 13, f. 287.

[183]Swanley to Ormond, Jan. 12 in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 122. In late January it was reported that Swanley had been planning to 'surprise Dublin' with inside help. Nicholas to Ormond, Jan. 26 in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 236.

[184]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 61-2, 63-6, 86-8 for some of the letters. Ormond to Clanricard, Feb. 3, Digby to Ormond, Feb. 23, both in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 241, 251.

[185]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 116; Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 75-6.

[186]He believed that the 'Northerne army is so equally poised, that if but one regiment should start it would much weaken the whole'. Mervyn to Ormond in *Ormonde MSS*, i, 90-95; Galbraith to Ormond, Jan. 29, Carte MS 13, f. 568.

[187]Mervyn to Ormond, Feb. 1, Feb. 3, Carte MS 14, ff. 38, 61-2; Thornton to Ormond, Feb. 3, Carte MS 14, ff. 40-1; Mervyn to Ormond in *Ormonde MSS*, i, 90-95.

[188]His letter to Galbraith (Feb. 25) was designed to counter rumours that the Drogheda plot had cast suspicion on all Scots - only some were guilty, and the nation had not lost his esteem and trust. Ormond to Galbraith, Feb. 25, to Digby, Feb. 27 in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 254-5, 258.

- Scottish position on Ireland, one which offered not a return to a 'golden' Ireland but the path to a renewed, and Reformed, Britain of which Ireland would be a part, if a subordinate one. Here security was offered implicitly through the oversight of reliable English, and Scottish, institutions and individuals; explicitly, through the disposal of the Catholic threat, root and branch. A black - and - white creed which placed Justice before Mercy, where punishment and restitution were indispensable, and where settled laws may not always be applicable to the greater good was apt also to chime to many indigenous echoes.[189] The idea that there could not be '*any agreement of Peace, and respite from Hostility with such Creatures, as are not fit to live no more than with Wolves or Tygers, or ravenous Beasts, destroyers of Mankind*'[190] fitted well with an established 'tradition of settler commentary', a 'local and secular demonology which construed the rebellion as an atavistic rejection of everything the colony stood for, and subsumed the rooting out of protestantism in the eradication of civility.'[191]

Audley Mervyn wrote to Ormond that

> A peace with the Irish is generally a harshe sound to every eare, and the reason of this is diverse. Som in conscience hold no toleration of their religion; som judge the bloud of their frinds yet unrevenged; somme their personal losses not to be repaired; others that it is beyond the reach of state to provide for our securitie for the future, and not a few because the cuntry is pleasant, and held too good for them.

Given this strength of opinion, his advice was that 'if theer be a necessitie to transact such a matter', Ormond should turn to the Irish Parliament as a 'buckler' for himself and the King.[192] The question was whether, even with the Irish parliament onside, Protestants could feel sufficiently secure to subscribe to 'Ormondist' ambitions with the necessary consequence of some deal with some of the confederates, or whether the trauma of 1641 could only be adequately overcome by dependence on the promises inherent in the Covenanter vision, even if that involved swallowing a downgrading of the institutions of Ireland, and a greater openness to the Scots than the 'English' of Ireland had traditionally shown.

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[189]There were of course any number of ways in which Irish Protestant opinion could influence that of Parliament, from MPs like Clotworthy, to the numerous 'agents' in London from the forces in Ireland, the various 'agents' in Oxford earlier in 1644, and continuing networks of contact - Perceval's Dublin agent offered to send news through Edmund Borlase (presumably the future historian) who could be contacted through Reynolds, *Egmont MSS*, i, 237-40.

[190]Rushworth iii (2), 917. This was from the final paper delivered by this side to the Uxbridge discussions on Ireland. They wanted no peace '*till Justice have been fully executed upon the Actors of that accursed Rebellion....We desire War there, as much as we do Peace here.*' Rushworth iii (2), 917-8. The Royalists had spoken about violating the rules of 'Humane society' and Charles's final paper brought into play the suffering of innocents in wartime against the idea that 'all' were 'ravenous beasts', Rushworth iii (2), 941.

[191]Clarke, '1641 and anti-popery, p. 157.

[192]Mervyn to Ormond in Ormonde *MSS*, i, 93-4. Mervyn held a loyalty to that institution which guided his politics after 1660 as much as before 1641. J. P. Prendergast, 'Some account of Sir Audley Mervyn...', *R. Hist. Soc. Trans.*, 1st ser., iv (1874), 421-54.

Chapter 7
Renewing the war,
March to October 1645.

After the failed negotiations of the winter of 1644-5, the spring brought an upsurge in conflict in both Ireland and England. As the process of reform and reorganisation, principally through the Committee of Both Kingdoms, took effect in the emergence of the New Model Army in England, so the plans for a rejuvenation of the Irish war were put into effect. With new supplies sent them, the forces of Ulster not only reopened their campaign in the north, but extended their operations south-west into Connacht. Moreover, in both provinces Parliament successfully asserted greater control on the ground. The month of May not only saw an acceptance by the Ulster forces of the authority of commissioners appointed from Westminster, but also the passing of a commission for a new Lord President of Connacht, Sir Charles Coote.

Renewed warfare in the north and west was to persist, and grow in success in coming years. But otherwise the months March- October, 1645 exhibit events which appear transitional or tangential in terms of the main trends in Parliament and among Irish Protestants. Westminster generally saw an upsurge in 'party' or 'factional' in-fighting, but while Irish policy also saw opposing interests clash, their disputes cannot be neatly fitted into any of the recent interpretations of the political alignments of these months.[1] That would not occur until later. From Dublin, Ormond pursued his directions to seek the goal of a settlement by negotiation with the confederates. The Lord Lieutenant continued to combine this with his search for cracks within the facade

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[1]The three interpretations considered in this and later chapters are Kishlansky's 'emergence of adversary politics' only really apparent in 1646; Mahony's rise of the 'Presbyterian Alliance' in the winter of 1644-5 as 'central to an assessment not only of 1645 but of the whole decade'; and Adamson's 'palace coup' of 1644-5 to topple a vice-regal, military - based Essex with an oligarchy running a 'complex patronage machine'. Elements from all three are relevant to parliamentary policy on Ireland (as will be seen), and no attempt will be made here to assess the interpretations as a whole. Mark. A Kishlansky, *The rise of the New Model Army*, (Cambridge, 1979); 'The emergence of adversary politics in the Long Parliament' in *Jn. Mod. Hist.*, xlix (1977). Michael Mahony, 'The Presbyterian party in the Long Parliament, 2 July 1644 - 3 June 1647', (D. Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 1973); 'The Savile affair' in *Parliamentary History*, viii (1988) (cited, p.214). J. S. A. Adamson, 'The peerage in politics, 1645-9', (Ph. D thesis, University of Cambridge, 1986); 'The baronial context of the English civil war',*R. Hist. Soc. Trans.*, xl, 1990 (cited, pp. 115, 119).

of unity of both confederate and 'Covenanter' unions; his efforts in this direction informed even his (indirect) foray into a fighting war, in Connacht. But while Ormond concentrated most of his energy in winning over Catholic loyalists to the King's service, he also presided over a process, paralleled in England, whereby ever more dangerous solutions would be offered to bridge the chasm between Charles and his dissatisfied subjects, using ever more tenuous constructs. In the end this only demonstrated the size of the gap created by religious differences. Along with a hardening of resolve at Kilkenny, it would throw Ormond back on an increasing, though never total, need to identify 'loyal subjects' with Protestants.[2]

In March 1645 the Committee of Both kingdoms retained the primary role in directing Parliament's affairs in, and concerning, Ireland. It was to them that the delegates of the Scottish army in Ulster, Colonel George Monro and Major William Borthwick, reported on March 3. The committee was amenable to their requests as, on the basis of its report, was the Commons. Goldsmiths' Hall and Grocers' Hall were to be consulted as to means to find present and permanent revenue for the army, as well as meet its considerable arrears.[3] With C.B.K. continuing to press the Scottish case[4], the Commons debated the matter on March 19. D'Ewes recorded the sentiment that the Scots must be pressed to advance, having 'done little all this while in Ireland' even if in the end this was waived 'because it was unseasonable to presse them to advance against the enemy till they weere provided of monie & cloaths...'.[5] Criticism of the Scottish army in Ireland paralleled that of their army in England. The Scottish army was not marginalised but strategically tied into the plans for the spring campaign, but this meant their advance south in return for promises of supply.[6] If like demands were laid on both Scottish armies, they suffered from like difficulties - most obviously, that funding

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[2]The identification was never total, for even in terms of the quarters assigned by the cessation it was recognised that those allocated the Protestants encompassed also those (Catholics)who adhered to them (voluntarily or not). Nor did Ormond fail to make another bid at a 'middle party' in 1646-7, building largely on hopes of the Pale gentry.

[3]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 77, 78; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 334, 336; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 198b; *Cal. C. C.*, i, 18. What was sought was payment of the promised £4 000 per month, including arrears for its non-payment to date, totalling £44 000; £16 000 as the remainder of the lump sum of £60 000 negotiated in 1644; smaller demands for arms, and the support of cavalry troops recruited by the Scots in Ireland. Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 204-5; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 813; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 333.

[4]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 353, 357; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 215.

[5]All that could be offered was £6 000 now and renewed promises of £4 000 / month. Further consultation was to be had with Goldsmiths' Hall and Grocers' Hall, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 84, 86; *Cal. C. C.*, i, 19; B.L. Harl. MS 166, f.193a; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 199b.

[6]Kaplan, *Politics and religion*, pp. 117-9. C.B.K. initiatives to provide money for the Scots in England in Dec. were 'an essential element in the overall military picture', as a means to sustain a 'stable force' while the main English armies were reorganised. Kishlansky, *Rise of the new model army*, pp. 31, 35-6.

armies through money raised on land was becoming less feasible. Goldsmiths' Hall had aimed to support both armies on the basis of sequestration revenue, but this had amounted to only £70 000 in its first two years (1644-6), including £17 640 in Sept. - Dec. 1644, and only £10 600 in all of 1645,[7] a fraction of the cost of even the English army.[8]

In terms of Monro's Irish army the committee claimed to have sent £80 395 - 10 - 7 in money and goods[9]; certainly they despatched £40 000 in specie and appear to have underwritten food contracts in Scotland.[10] The individuals involved were also prominent in the Irish adventure. The Goldsmiths' treasurers, Michael Herring and Richard Waring, were active adventurers; the Goldsmiths' committee records show the active role of Sir David Watkins, Jerome Alexander, Samuel Moyer, Richard Shute and William Thompson.[11] Yet with land-based funding falling short these men would have to look to alternatives. Back in Feb. a temporary assessment had been passed to allow Goldsmiths' Hall to support the Scots in England[12]; a month later it was suggested that excess income from the assessment for Ireland be used as a stop-gap for the Scots there.[13] Assessments were no panacea; even if collection grew more reliable in 1645[14], the pattern set by the assessment for the English forces was one where ready money came from loans advanced on the credit of the ordinances.[15]

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[7]Kishlansky, *Rise of the new model army*, p. 313 & note 17.

[8]Up to April of 1645, the Goldsmiths' Hall committee was trying to raise £40 000 for Leven's and Callander's armies in England, eventually securing the last £10 000 on their own personal credit. *Cal. C. C.*, i, 17 (Feb. 27, 28), 18 (March 11, 17), 19 (March 20, April 4, 9).

[9]H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 216.

[10]Thus £30 000 was sent in the summer of 1644, and £10 000 in December (perhaps another £4 000 was sent at some point since the new Scots agreed that only £16 000 was now owing of £60 000 voted). In August 1644 they began to make payments for the 10000 bolls of meal which the Estates had voted for in July; by Oct. 1645 their records suggest either that they were still paying this contract, or had likewise shouldered a new Scottish contract (of Feb. 1645). *Cal. C. C.*, i, 781, 25. Cf. Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 201-4.

[11]What is more, the latter group seem to be identical with the sub-committee mentioned as sitting at Turners' Hall which co-ordinated supplies, continuing to send support to the Scottish army in England to Dec. 1645 but, as an order of 7 Feb. 1645 clearly shows, aiming to supply the Scots' forces in both England and Ireland. *Cal. C. C.*, i, 16, 30. The list of adventurers committeemen in Feb. 1643 (B. L. Add. MS 4771, f.3) includes Watkins, Alexander, Moyer and Herring; the other three were all commissioners for the sea adventure, *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 11. For the treasurers, see *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 802-3; for the others, *Cal. C. C.*, i, 8, 30 (*Cal. C. C.*, i, 23-4 for Watkins specifically).

[12]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 313-4; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 630 - 46; Kaplan, *Politics and religion*, pp. 74, 119. As alternatives to sequestration, the committee proposed both composition and the sale of the lands of the incorrigible (March 3). *Cal. C. C.*, i, 17 (Feb.; March 3).

[13]This came from the Commons' committee set up after the March 19 debate; in the short term all they could suggest was to seek £6 000 through the sale of Buckingham's paintings. *Commons' jn.*, iv, 94; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 217. For the future of the paintings scheme, eventually run aground on puritan scrupulosity (and the aspirations of the earl of Northumberland), see *Commons' jn.*, iv, 121; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 206b; Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 197-8.

[14]James Scott Wheeler, 'English army finance and logistics 1642-1660', (Ph. D thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1980), p. 86.

[15]Wheeler, 'English army finance', pp. 86ff mentions that £146.000 in loans was raised on the main English assessment in 1645 for Fairfax's army. Kishlansky, *Rise of the new model army*, pp. 37, 67

This could only be stretched so far and meant long-term income was mortgaged away for short-term gains. For the moment, in any case, there was little more to be squeezed from the first assessment for Ireland. The bulk of the expenditure had gone on the contracts negotiated between C.B.K. and John Davies for the supply of food and, more particularly, clothing to the Ulster British.[16] The last of Davies's convoys set sail on April 14,[17] a long-delayed material incentive to the forces in Ulster (and Connacht) to re-start the war in earnest. The decision to supervise the war on the ground was also coming to fruition. By April 7 three commissioners - Sir Arthur Annesley, Sir Robert King and the City representative, Colonel William Beale - had been named to go to Ulster. The ordinance carried through the Commons on April 12 placed them under the authority of Parliament and the C.B.K. for a period of 8 months, in co-operation with their Scottish counterparts.[18] It was taken to the upper House by Clotworthy alongside a commission for Sir Charles Coote as Lord President of Connacht.[19]

The commissioners, it was hoped, would encourage the army to advance at once 'in order to be ready by harvest time to make provisions for planting winter garrisons...'.[20] A C.B.K. letter was framed to urge military action in both provinces in response to the supplies and the imminent departure of the commissioners, while Coote added another letter, to both Monro and the British, to permit the despatch of a 1500 strong expedition into Connacht.[21] But these were dated May 10 & 13 for the commissioners (and Coote) were held up by the fact that they would have no money to bring with them as even a token of pay for the troops; the 'surplussage' of the

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criticises the assessment as inadequate for earlier English armies, and as having 'collapsed' by the autumn of 1645.

[16]Later investigations by the Committee of Accounts show that, on the basis of C.B.K. warrants issued from Dec. 1644 to March 1645, he loaded and despatched vessels to Duncannon and Cork (Jan. 1 / 11), to Strangford and Belfast (Feb. 28 / March 1), to Ballyshannon and Derry (March 14 / April 4). P.R.O. S.P. 17/H/10, ff. 170-180; *Cal. S. P. dom., Addenda, 1625-49*, p. 692 (Feb. 1646). If the shipment delivered to the 'Laggan' forces is taken as typical, then the bulk of the £9 619-17-5 1/2 specified as spent went on clothing, regarded as one month's pay (£6 630-2-0 1/4). £2 186-13-5 1/4 was allocated to wheat and cheese, the rest for ammunition (£511-12), weapons (£133-10), saddles (£63) and surgeons' chests (£95). Davies claimed to have shipped goods to a total value of £43 572 -17-3 3/4, all but £7 884-18-8 being spent on Ulster. P.R.O. S.P. 17/H/10, ff. 178b, 180a.

[17]Depositions of Peter Wappell and Symond Tranckmor, P.R.O. S.P. 28 / 253B, pp. 100-1.

[18]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 391. On March 19 C.B.K. had written to Grocers' Hall, asking them to submit the names of 4 or 5 'persons of the City' fit to be added to 'persons of quality' appointed by C.B.K. to join the Scottish commissioners in Ulster in managing the war. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 357-8. The appointment of the Ulster commissioners was a direct result of the Uxbridge proposals (many of which were in process of enactment), in that they were authorised agents of C.B.K. powers under proposition 17, IV, iv; in addition they had power to dispose of church lands, as intended under the Uxbridge terms, Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, p. 283; Rushworth, iii (2), 872.

[19]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 109, 127. The Ulster ordinance was passed on May 3, Coote's commission sent for the Great Seal on May 6/7, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 133, 134.

[20]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 383-4. They had power over the distribution of resources, and of the allocation of forces, to make reports and recommendations to C.B.K. and had powers to treat, or bribe, to obtain persons or places of importance.

[21]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 475-6, 487.

assessment was found to amount to only £1 800 so far.[22] Instead the C.B.K. letter was limited to echoing a Commons vote of April 12 that 'the Engagements, Loans, and Arrears of the *Irish* Officers shall be satisfied out of the Rebels' lands, after the Adventurers and former Engagements upon those Lands shall be discharged'.[23]

Communications from the Ulster British command in March had shown that their concern went beyond immediate relief to assurances of 'a constant way laid down for our future maintenance during the warre, and securitie given for our arreares as others have...', even the promise of a 'reward for our service'.[24] The Scots, of course could, and did, protest that the local forces had been the beneficiaries of an estimated £80 000 from the assessment.[25] The search for a means to satisfy their requests encountered John Davies, who now offered to provide food and clothing worth £24 750 for the Scots in return for small advances and repayment, and of his previous debts, from the assessment surplus.[26] In so doing he threatened the interlocking adventurer-Goldsmiths' hall interest. First, he had re-entered the provisioning business for the Scots, since 1643 in their hands; secondly, he had staked his credit not on further land confiscation, but on the assessment mode of finance which they had been angling for. Already, on April 16, C.B.K. had told the Grocers' Hall treasurers that, rather than having money in outlying areas sent up to London, it be paid direct to those assigned by Davies and his partners, Thomas Rodberd and John Chesten, to recoup their outlays on the 1644-5 supplies to the British forces.[27] They had managed to infiltrate the very structures of the financial machine hitherto the preserve of so closed a circle.[28]

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[22]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 384, 391. C.B.K. had written to the local authorities of London and the area for the remainder of their assessment on March 20, the Commons backing the call of April 5, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 360, 385; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 101. A warrant for officers' pay, from the assessment, seems to have borne no fruit, and Grocers' Hall were ordered (April 19) to meet the shortfall. *Cal. S. P. dom., Addenda, 1625-49*, pp. 677, 678. The warrants sent to Grocers' Hall were for £7 379-13 for Ulster and £666-13-4 for Connacht.

[23]Reynolds was named to bring in an ordinance to this effect. *Commons' jn.*, iv, 109; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 475-6. The Ulster agents were now to be got back to their commands, a ship and victuals being provided - though they were not to go without subscribing the Covenant. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 414, 425, 450, 451.

[24]Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-53*, i, 650-1; Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 160-1 (March 10).

[25]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 412, 414; *Tanner letters*, pp. 187-8.

[26]He wanted £3 000 up front, and £3 750 in one month; the other £18 000, plus old debts of £12 195 could come from the assessment (he was delegated the rights to collect - see below, note). Further, he offered to supply goods worth £40 - 50 000 in the autumn on the strength of the next assessment. The Commons ordered Vane, St. John and Crew to obtain the £3 000 advance from the excise. *Commons' jn.*, iv, 120-1, 145; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 206b.

[27]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 413.

[28]The treasurers of the 1644 assessment were the same four men (Foot, Kendrick, Avery and Bunce) as had been named treasurers for the adventure acts. *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 531, 546; B.L. Add. MS 4 771, f. 3b.

That circle had made its final bid for the assessment surplus, in the guise of the Grocers' Hall committee, in a letter of April 10.[29] The context was the quest for the relatively paltry sum of £4 000 needed as immediate aid for Munster[30] and the committee took the opportunity of discussions with William Jephson, representing the province, to push its case for a permanent support of the expanding Irish war sector. Almost certainly what they had in mind was that combination of retroactive 'doubling', compulsory adventure and disposal of urban property in Munster, aspects of which were being promoted since 1643, and which took on programmatic status in 1644.[31] The document, of which nothing was to come for the moment, shows the explicit linkage between the provisioning and financing of the various non - English armies; the attempt by this group to keep active control of all Irish finances, including the assessment surplus; and their plans for expansion of funding by extension of land-based credit. As such they were set on a collision course with Davies and his backers, to become apparent by the next winter, by which time it would have taken on explicit 'political' colouring. Renewing the war had opened up an internal conflict founded on army provisioning, and brought to light the manner in which confiscated land remained the foundation of any long-term war finance.

Ulster was regarded as the driving force of the new offensive sought at Westminster. There the balance of power had shifted in favour of the local forces as more and more of Monro's army was withdrawn to Scotland to counter Montrose's campaigns.[32] With the commissioners held up in London through the want of a small sum to take over as pay for the soldiers,[33] Ormond made attempts to woo, first the Ulster British, then Monro's Scottish army, through the agency of Archdeacon Humphrey Galbraith. Unable to offer material assistance, the tack was to play down the obstacle of having taken the Covenant, try to explain away the cessation and throw the blame for the collapse at Uxbridge unto Parliament.[34] For the moment his efforts

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[29]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 412; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 219-20. They also bid, once again for the York House paintings. As mentioned, the scheme was shot down in the Commons on April 23, and Davies triumphed instead.

[30]The quest for money for Munster was taken in response to letters from the province setting out its desperate condition. See *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 339-40, 361, 362-3, 395. Warrants issued on April 23 insisted that the treasurers pay over the money, allowing them to borrow the sum on the credit of the assessment, but orders to pay up were still being issued on May 31, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 370, 371, 380, 381-2, 427, 547. It is worth noting that C.B.K. informed Grocers' Hall that the first supplies of the winter 1644-5 went to Munster a region of vital importance in the trade of England.

[31]*The state of the Irish affaires...* (London, 1645) E 314 (7), pp. 10-12; cf. Bottigheimer, *English money*, pp. 90, 93-4.

[32]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 204-5; David Stevenson, *Revolution and counter-revolution in Scotland 1644-1651* (London, 1977), pp. 27, 31, 33, 44. Cf. Loudoun's fears (to Armine, March 6) of how the British were 'daily importuned to receive officers and Orders' from Ormond, expressed in the context of his desire to keep the Scottish army in Ulster, *Tanner letters*, p. 181.

[33]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 489, 505, 547.

[34]Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 161-4.

bore little fruit.[35] The senior British officers, meeting at Antrim on May 17, formulated a 'joynt and unanimous Declaration' in advance of the arrival of the commissioners. Repeating their discontent at inconsistent supply, they claimed that they sought to establish 'a firme union and order amongst our selves' by a 'generall court of warre' to respond to the commissioners 'and for the better order, administration of justice, good government, and subsistence of the army, and for no other cause'. Lest any seek to traduce them, they insisted that they intended nothing 'destructive or preiudiciall' to the Covenant; nor would they cease to prosecute the war 'untill ane safe peace shall be concluded in this kingdome by the consent of the King and Parliament of England, into whose hands the management of this warre was dissolved'. They even pledged co-operation with Monro to the extent of obedience to his orders, when in joint operations in the field.[36]

The document does not imply that the army was bridling at parliamentary control - clearly the threat of a peace with the Irish was still the greatest worry for them. But it is indicative of the cohesion of the political and military leadership of the province, a consideration linked to the proprietary nature of much of the Ulster army.[37] This comes across when taken in conjunction with another letter drafted at the meeting, in response to Westminster dabbling with the regiment formerly commanded by Lord Conway.[38] He having been displaced back in Dec. 1644, on the basis of his defection from Parliament in England and in March, 1645, Lord Blayney, long importunate for a command in Ulster, was given the regiment by C.B.K (Conway's son, Edward, being given his father's horse troop).[39] The acting commander, Theophilus Jones, informed Ormond of regimental hostility to the displacement of the Conways, claiming that the regiment would go over to the Lord Lieutenant if he named Edward Conway as Colonel. The Ulster petition of May 19 supported the regimental preference for Conway and suggested that without his assistance the regiment could not survive in its wasted quarters.[40] This, too, is a useful reminder of the nature of war in Ireland

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[35]Carte aims to clear Ormond of the charge of not proclaiming the Scots and their allies as open enemies both on the grounds of the latent danger, and because of the possibility of winning them over (Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 158-9, 165). Ormond's strategy certainly moved in this direction, but Carte's failure to provide a chronology elides Ormond's spring initiatives into the more fruitful negotiations of the autumn.

[36]Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-53*, i, 653; Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 165-6. Notable also is the vision of final triumph as 'the establishment of ... true worshipp in its lustre, his Majesties iust authoritie in its vigour, and the remnent of his Majesties good Protestant subjects in securitie under the protection of his Majesties lawes and government in this desolat land...'.

[37]Gillespie, 'An army sent from God', pp. 123-4.

[38]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 402. The letter was signed by 5 colonels, 5 lieutenant colonels and 4 majors. For Carte's comments of the role of disputes over commands, see Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 164-5.

[39]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 200, 361, 375, 386.

[40]Jones to Ormond, April 18, Carte MS 14, f.408; Jones to Ormond, May 1, Carte MS 14, ff. 474-7; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 402. In his second letter to Ormond, Jones had sought the lieutenant - colonel's position for himself; Blayney was to offer this to Jones in a letter dated May 20, Carte MS 14, ff. 555-6.

throughout the 1640s. Reliance on fixed and adequate quarters, whether of a landlord-commander,[41] based on a garrison town, or confiscated, could not only curb long-range strategic designs,[42] it could also lead to open clashes between supposed allies.[43]

Ormond was informed that Parliament, by June 1645, was demanding a Connacht campaign in return for supplies, the beginning of the central role, political and military, played by the west in the summer of 1645.[44] But the spring had seen most of the real fighting confined to Munster. From April to June, following Preston's capture of Duncannon, Castlehaven had enjoyed almost uninterrupted success in the south, ending by laying siege to Youghal.[45] His aims were less to defeat Inchiquin in the field than to ensure the dwindling of the latter's quarters by the autumn.[46] As news from the province filtered through to Westminster, it caused something of a flurry with fresh summonses of all adventurers, and re-submission of the Grocers' Hall plan. In the end little was achieved beyond a decision to send prisoners to reinforce the province, funded by voluntary collections.[47] Broghill was again sent off to England to plead the south's case[48], but though Inchiquin had re-entered the fighting war by necessity and not choice, he showed no inclination to stray from the course he had adopted. He showed no response to the blandishments offered by Oxford,[49] his

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[41]Probably the bulk of Conway's officers and men were recruited from among his own tenants - certainly Jones was able to claim that much of the regiment had only held to Parliament in an effort to save Conway's estates from sequestration - a situation which would endanger their own position. Jones to Ormond, April 18, Carte MS 14, f. 408.

[42]Hughes, *Warwickshire*, pp. 186-7, 191-2, 198-9, 213-4 for discussion of the dominance of garrisoning for county forces in Warwickshire, their support through 'assignation' of revenue and sequestration income, and the limitations imposed through lack of resources and the need to defend the locality. (Cf. the comments of the Ulster officers in 1647, pleading inability to advance south and aid Ormond because their large quarters needed guarding, and they did not have the resources to sustain their forces in a lengthy absence on campaign, Carte MS 21, ff. 143, 180.)

[43]There were not only renewed disputes between Monro's men and Ormond's north Leinster garrisons (Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, p. 216), but also a damper placed on Jones's offer when his men clashed with some of Gibson's garrison at Dundalk over supplies (Jones to Ormond, Gibson to Ormond, both June 28, Carte MS 14, ff. 436, 437). These episodes are a reminder that there is a danger in excessive regionalisation; the boundary between south-east Ulster and north Leinster was a fluid one, reflected as much in 'political' contacts as in the combined military operations of 1647.

[44]Jones to Ormond, June 10, Carte MS 15, f. 55.

[45]Carte *Ormonde*, iii, 155-6; Bellings in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 8-16; Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 90-4; Bottigheimer, 'English interest', pp. 155-9. At some point, however, Inchiquin enjoyed more success than was sometimes seen in retrospect - thus his orders to Reymond of May 12 express optimism about the war, though other Munster Protestants were more pessimistic, *Egmont MSS*, i, 253-4; cf. Hodder to Perceval, May 14 & June 7, *Egmont MSS*, i, 254-5, 256-7.

[46]Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 93.

[47]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 165, 169, 181, 187; B.L. Harl. MS 166, f. 220b; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 227; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 563, 590. As for the long - awaited £4 000 for the province, C.B.K. voted on June 21, that it report that Davies would be able to supply the same. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 604. C.B.K. had by now approved the payment of his second instalment on the Scottish contract, of £3 750.

[48]Smith to Perceval, June 8, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 257. Smith lamented that the 2 000 soldiers supposed to be diverted from Ulster had failed to materialise.

[49]Bottigheimer suggests that Digby's letter, that Inchiquin 'shall not want any invitation, encouragement and reward that a person of reason and honour can aspire to' was perhaps deliberately allowed to be intercepted, and read in Parliament, to promote distrust of him. But though Oxford had named Muskerry as a rival Lord President on Feb. 9, Digby repeated his offer in a letter to Ormond on

correspondence with a series of clerics focused on the necessity of continuing the war in Ireland[50], and hinted that he could act as an intermediary if Ormond wanted to make his peace with Westminster.[51]

Efforts to co-opt defectors were characteristic of the early part of 1645. In England and Ireland, and between the two, ties of kin and friendship were being tugged to dislodge the powerful and defuse the danger by removing component parts of the enemy. In London, C.B.K. had long since authorised Sir Robert King to enter into correspondence with Ormond. In Feb. he sent extracts of letter from O'Hartegan and Sir Brian O'Neill;[52] King claimed to fear that 'misinformation' might cause Ormond to join 'rebels and papists against the British protestants', 'a coorse would absolutly vndoe you, and the contrary coorse ... is the only visible means to preserue you...' - he was even willing to travel to Ormond in his efforts to deflect him.[53] The captured Irish councillors, Tichborne and Ware, were visited in London not only by C.B.K. but by such Irish figures as Cole, Stewart, Sir Frances Hamilton and Sir Charles Coote.[54] Tichborne at least may have been tempted away.[55]

Ormond, of course, had been trying to play this game longer than almost anyone. 1645 saw him try to get around the long-drawn out process of negotiation by two means, subversion of enemy unity or cutting corners to divert attention away from the obstacles to peace, and towards a means to support the King. Both show how 'Ormondist' thinking had become tied to 'Royalist' opinion at Court, an identification which could broaden the appeal of 'loyalty' beyond Protestant Ireland, while keeping narrow the policy options available to Ormond. It is towards these considerations that such episodes as the 'Glamorgan mission' or Ormond's western campaign need to assessed.

In early March Lord Taaffe was despatched from Oxford with the latest royal instructions for Ormond - these he delivered on April 5. These allowed repeal of the penal laws and suspension of Poynings's Act, but added that these enlarged powers were not to be revealed until needed. Accompanying the instructions was a royal

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May 13 - 'it weare a happy service if any alluremants could regaine him, and if the presidentship of Munster will doe it, and your excellance think fitt., you may assure him of it'. Bottigheimer, 'English interest', pp. 152-5; *Egmont MSS*, i, 248; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 286.

[50]Inchiquin to the Bishop of Cloyne, Carte MS 15, f. 547. Inchiquin claimed that thus resisting the Irish he was doing the best service to the King; he played down open commitment to the Scottish - parliamentarian cause in so far as indicating he could live with their anti-episcopacy, though not an advocate, in light of the greater good.

[51]Ambiguously, he was reported to have said that 'hee doubts not but hee hath friends in England that haue so much power with the parliament as shall effect any thinge that his lordship shall thinke reasonable to propound'. Dean Boyle to the Bishop of Cloyne, Aug. 30, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 317-8.

[52]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 321, 333.

[53]King to Ormond, March 3, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 259-60.

[54]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 337, 340.

[55]Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 75-6.

warrant for Ormond to make promotions within the peerage[56]; an order for the admission of Justice Donnellan to the Privy Council[57]; and Digby's recommendation that Clanricard be admitted, if possible.[58] It was all very much of a piece with Ormond's own thinking. On March 28, before the receipt of these letters, he sought an earldom for Lambert, 'strangely altered, and soe vseful at counsell', adding 'there are many considerable persons of the Irish that, I conceiue, might be gained with addition, others with new creations, of honour...'.[59] He also made mention of the two important draft bills, which he was to send on April 22. News reaching Ormond suggested that many in Kilkenny had no intention of reaching terms, but were preparing for war.[60] Thus the first of the draft bills, an 'Act for avoiding of all doubts concerning the validity of the late cessation' was to provide the imprimatur of the Irish Parliament for that measure, and indemnify royal servants. The second, 'Act declaring his Majesties Grace and Goodness...' granted concessions - remissions of rent and conversion of tenure in Ulster (for both planters and natives) from *in capite* to socage. These were to be extended to those obedient since 21 October, 1641, or subsequently received into grace and favour. Ormond was to be allowed to receive individuals or corporations into this condition, giving assurances of possessions as of 20 October, 1641. It was a two-sided defence, applicable to confederate or covenanter, but with particular suitability for the latter.[61] The whole package was in one sense an alternative to reaching a deal with the confederates; in another it was the providing of a 'buckler' in the case of a future backlash.

Ormond's intention to operate using the incorporation of Catholic grandees was a perceptive one, for the confederate commissioners now indicated that they set posts for Catholics above the suspension of Poynings's Act.[62] But the signals from Oxford were inconsistent; something of a moratorium on grants of honour had been imposed by May 13,[63] though Clanricard's joining the Irish Council was agreed to.[64] On May 22 Charles permitted Clanricard and Thomond to each raise a regiment of foot and a troop of horse, to be part of the regular army;[65] further royal letters expressed gratitude

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[56]Charles to Ormond, March 4, Carte MS 14, f. 212.
[57]This was first ordered in Dec. 1644, *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 396.
[58]Digby to Ormond, March 4, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 263. Digby was less keen on the admission of Taaffe - he professed himself unconvinced by Taaffe's argument that while Clanricard may be more acceptable to Protestant opinion, this would count for less than Taaffe' popularity with the (Catholic) Irish.
[59]Ormond to Digby, March 28, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 274.
[60]Captain Burowes to Ormond, April 7, Carte MS 14, f. 349.
[61]Ormond to the King, April 22, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 401; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 220-1.
[62]Ormond to the King, May 8, in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 252.
[63]This even extended to Lambert. Digby to Ormond, May 13, Carte MS 14, ff. 524-5.
[64]Significantly, this was to be upon taking the oath set out in article 15 of the Graces, avoiding the Oath of Supremacy. Charles to Ormond, May 13, *Letter - book*, p. 161.
[65]Charles to Ormond, May 22, Carte MS 14, ff. 562, 579.

to the existing Council, but also spoke of further posts for Catholics.[66] Instead the King seemed committed to the idea that Ormond could hatch a peace settlement on the basis of the instructions he had sent in February.[67] Well into June Charles and Digby remained sanguine on the prospects of Ormond's negotiations.[68] From Kilkenny, where the confederate assembly began its session on May 29, Clanricard suggested that concessions on penal legislation would secure a peace, and even remained hopeful of settling the newly raised issue of the disposal of church buildings.[69] For Ormond, however, there were two problems which would dog all attempts at royalist - confederate co-operation, the need for assurances of military support for the King;[70] and the complexity of the legislative question of penal laws.[71]

Towards the latter it is clear that Ormond was willing to make a 'bold adventure' in collaboration with Clanricard. Its terms remain unclear but involved a private undertaking to qualify the laws against Catholicism.[72] Clanricard, viewing Kilkenny as many royalists did Westminster, hoped that the offer would allow 'many' to 'be freed from the obedience, or rather thraldom of the confederate government here.'[73] In the event, the assembly was won to a clerical statement dropping the churches question, but with the opposite intention of thereby ceding nothing. As the official negotiations re-opened it was clear that the confederate delegates were to be

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[66]Charles to Ormond, May 22 in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 287-8. Digby, writing to Nicholas (May 25) was claiming that the peace would be concluded by the month's end. He was referring Ormond's bills over for the 'King's learned counsel's opinions', but also for them to receive the great Seal.

[67]On May 13 he told the Council that the Jan. 22 restriction on the penal laws was to be waived; Ormond was told to follow the Feb. 27 instructions even in the absence of Council approbation, Charles to Ormond, May 13, in *Cal. S.P.Clarendon*, i, 262, 265. The previous day, Charles had written to the Queen that Ormond was ' "somewhat fearful to take that burden upon him without the Council there; but I have cleared that doubt likewise to him that nothing but his disobedience - which I cannot expect - can hinder speedily the peace of Ireland. " ' Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 260 & n. 4, citing *Letters of Henrietta Maria*, p. 303.

[68]Charles to Ormond, June 18, in Carte, *Ormonde*, v, 14; Digby to Ormond, June 19, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 301.

[69]Clanricard to Ormond, May 26, in *Letter - book,* pp. 155-7; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 291-3. Clanricard professed himself unable to understand how the King's party in England in Ireland could oppose immediate repeal. Clanricard assumed that if the return of the churches was not explicitly demanded, the return of peace would see them handed over on accordance with the laws of the land, circumventing the question of conscience.

[70]Ormond to Clanricard, May 29, in *Letter - book,* pp. 157-9; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 293-5.

[71]In his recent negotiations, 'though Ormond had asserted that the King demanded no more than a theoretical acknowledgement of his jurisdiction, he was reminded that the Protestant clergy put forward a practical claim to the power of the keys, carrying with it the right of excommunication and absolution, a right the exercise of which was followed by civil consequences'. Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 31.

[72]Clanricard to Ormond, June 4 & Ormond to Clanricard, June 9, in *Letter-book*, pp. 163-5, 165-6. Ormond insisted that some sort of answer be made on the churches, though he hoped it could be satisfactory to the King and 'also avoid the pressure said to be imposed thereby upon their consciences' - he recommended following the agreed statement on the future of the confederate civil jurisdiction.

[73]Clanricard to Ormond, June 11, in *Letter-book*, pp. 167-8. Clanricard hoped that 'fit' commissioners would be chosen and granted full powers. He had held off on Ormond's paper until he had seen how things were going at Kilkenny.

closely bound by the more stringent assembly in all matters of religion.[74] If Ormond's attempt to avoid this 'rock' had failed, his efforts to recruit Catholic forces for the King's service in England were to be assisted by two agents despatched from France and Oxford. Both Oliver Fitzwilliam[75] and Daniel O'Neill were sent to make recruitment their priority.[76] In this they prefigure Glamorgan's mission as much as Ormond's 'adventure' had done.

Consideration of Glamorgan's time in Ireland clarifies three points about Charles's, and Ormond's, position. Firstly, there is no reason to doubt that Charles's position was anything other than what he laid it out to be in his letter to Ormond of July 29 (received on Aug. 14, three days after Ormond recommended Glamorgan to Muskerry) that he should not have 'permission for you to grant onto the Irish ... any thing more in matters of religion than I have allowed you already' save the establishment of chapels in some Catholic parishes.[77] Charles ordered Digby to write to the Irish commissioners - his letter expressed angry disappointment that the terms once offered at Oxford had not been adhered to, and claimed that rational men could not expect the King, in the light of both his conscience and present position, to allow retention of churches.[78] The King paralleled his case in Ireland and in England in his 'resolve ... never to yeald up this Church to the governement of Papists, Presbiterians, or Independants'.[79] Jermyn recognised that the remission of the Irish treaty to Paris might make no difference since the King may insist on the same basis as at present;[80] Digby that Charles would not only not make concessions to the Scots on church government, but that he would not even offer the necessary deceptive hopes without

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[74]Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, pp. 190-2. But note that Ormond had obtained a judicial opinion that the hearing and saying of Mass was not liable to penalties under the Act of Supremacy.
[75]The document submitted by Fitzwilliam to the Queen, and by her sent on to Charles, is found in *Lord Digby's cabinet* (London, 1645) E 319 (15), p. 56; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 81-2. It is almost entirely concerned with the terms under which forces could be levied for English service and is vague in the extreme on politics. Fitzwilliam was recommended primarily on the basis of his military experience, for example of recruiting Irish troops for overseas service (see Jermyn to Digby, May 18 in *Lord Digby's cabinet*, pp. 44-6; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, p. 465). In other words, his main qualification, like Glamorgan's, was not political adroitness, but logistical ability in raising troops.
[76]Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-53*, i, 655, 656-7 for O'Neill's instructions, strikingly similar to Glamorgan's, including in the subordination to Ormond. O'Neill, it was hoped, could secure some military assistance from the 'old Irish'. Cregan, ('An Irish Cavalier', pp. 120-1) points out that O'Neill spent the next several years mainly in negotiations for troops; by Oct. 1645 he was claiming to have won all, or most of Owen Roe O'Neill's army to serve under Ormond.
[77]*Letter - book*, pp. 179-180; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 305-6.
[78]*Letter - book*, pp. 181-2; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 309-10. Digby clearly felt that the Feb. terms, plus the concession on chapels, were 'the very utmost concession that can possibly be yielded unto, without causing a revolt, not only of all [the King's] party here, but also such a one of his Army and all his Protestant subjects...' in Ireland as would deliver the island to the Irish, Digby to Jermyn, Aug. 27, in *Lord Digby's cabinet*, p. 52; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 86-7.
[79]Charles to Nicholas, Aug. 25, in *Evelyn's diary*, iv, 170 cited in Smith, *Constitutional Royalism*, p. 148.
[80]Jermyn to Digby, Aug. 5, in *Lord Digby's Cabinet*, p. 43; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 32. Cf his comments on Fitzwilliams's mission, Jermyn to Digby, May 18, in *Lord Digby's Cabinet*, pp. 44-6; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 465.

which the Scots could not be won.[81] Charles's commitment to his vision of the church was absolute and, hinged as it was on notions of royal supremacy, could not countenance concessions to alternative spiritual authority, whether Pope or presbytery, even in limited ways.[82] The surrender of church buildings was the surrender of absolute ecclesiastical jurisdiction.[83]

In this situation, it seems that Ormond read Charles correctly on the limit of concession. But perhaps too much has been made of his attempt to use the power of concealment given him, and not enough of the legal complexity of the issue of 'penal' legislation.[84] The secrecy issue is sometimes alleged on the basis of Fitwilliams's letter (July 16) to Digby, where he claimed to have been told by Ormond that the latter 'never had order from the king to grant the Irish either the penal lawes to be taken off, or that they should keep any of the churches now in their possession.' Perhaps Ormond was less than forthcoming, but Fizwilliams's terms were extremely vague ('free use of Religion a free Parliament, and the penall Lawes to be taken off') and missed wholly the fundamental question of whether penalising laws extended only to the Elizabethan Acts, or the medieval legislation against papal jurisdiction.[85] Thus Ormond's repeated appeals to legal and ecclesiastical opinion to try to find a compromise.[86] Thus also his 'bold adventure', perhaps not so very bold by others standards, but unusual for him in trying to pre-empt precise royal instructions.[87]

Finally, there is a clear trend by late 1645 of those who considered themselves the King's friends of trying to save him from himself.[88] This went beyond Glamorgan himself[89] to a knot of Catholic Ormondists working to avoid the 'rock' of religion in a bid to militarily shore up Charles's cause.[90] Here the crucial document is the

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[81]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 286, citing Bankes MSS. Cf. Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, p. 204; Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 284-6; Stevenson, *Revolution and counter-revolution*, pp. 56-7.

[82]Smith, *Constitutional Royalism*, pp. 143-56 provides a discussion of Charles's views of religion throughout the negotiations of 1642 - 8. Moreover, by the summer of 1645 his whole attitude was anti - concessions in any area - 'he had already embrace the role of martyr.' Smith, *Constitutional Royalism*, p. 125.

[83]Cf. Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 35.

[84]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 33-4 recognises the intricacies and obscurities even in the final Glamorgan agreement, but (pp 31-2) still follows Fitzwilliam of the centrality of the secrecy issue.

[85]Fitzwilliam to Digby, July 16, in *Lord Digby's cabinet*, pp. 49-51; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 20-1. Fitzwilliam clearly believed in the three articles as the key to unlocking negotiations, asking that Ormond be given these powers, to use if all else failed.

[86]Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, pp. 192-3.

[87]In the days immediately preceding the signing of the Glamorgan articles, Clanricard urged Ormond to 'lay aside all doubts and scruples' over the repeal of religious legislation. But Ormond, having received the letters from Charles and Digby on Aug. 16, sent these down to Kilkenny as validation of his position. His letter shows both his annoyance at what he saw as the fluidity of the confederate demands (due to 'their waywardness and stupidity') and his continued grappling with the intricacies of the legislative position. Clanricard to Ormond, Aug. 23, Ormond to Clanricard, Aug. 25, in *Letter - book*, pp. 173-6, 177-9.

[88]Cf. Smith, *Constitutional Royalism*, pp. 125-7.

[89]S. R. Gardiner, 'Charles I and the earl of Glamorgan', in *E.H.R.*, ii (1887), p. 705.

[90]Clanricard, Glamorgan, Barry and O'Neill had suppressed the Digby letter sent to the Irish commissioners because of their confidence of a settlement (*Letter - book*, p. 181). By Sept. 4,

'defeasence' known only to Glamorgan and the commissioners.[91] Clanricard's correspondence shows that, firstly, the commissioners were enthusiastic to gain a settlement - Glamorgan agreed to negotiate *only* with them, and they were aware of the 'defeasence'; secondly, that Glamorgan and Clanricard, with Barry and possibly O'Neill worked as a team at Kilkenny with the commissioners.[92] The most likely solution to the conundrum of what happened there is that all concocted a scheme *seeming* (as in Glamorgan's oath) to safeguard the army until the assembly's demands were met, while actually offering an opt out once the army was in England.[93] This is not, of course, to doubt that they hoped that Charles would grant the requests; Clanricard, and probably Glamorgan, were far from unsympathetic.[94] But the priority was the army.[95] There is no need to assume that Ormond knew the details of the plan, any more than to assume a covert scheme formulated by the King. Ormond would not have disputed the method, of referring contested matters to the King[96], though he had a shrewder perception of what the King's conscience would permit him to concede.[97]

The episode, on a par with many initiatives in England to get around Charles's stickly conscience and give him new military or political support was, like all the others, doomed to ultimate defeat.[98] In the event, it collapsed through a series of

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Clanricard was expressing delight that Glamorgan had brought the treaty to 'such a happy and secure condition' by winning clerical support for the raising of troops. Retiring to Portumna for the hunting, he clearly foresaw few problems with remaining negotiations. Clanricard to Sir George Hamilton, in *Letter - book*, pp. 185-6. Cf. Muskerry's comment to Clanricard (Aug. 31), *Letter - book*, p. 184.

[91]Conveniently printed in John Lowe, 'The Glamorgan mission to Ireland, 1645-6' in *Studia. Hib.*, iv, (1964), p. 170.

[92]Clanricard to Ormond, Aug. 23, Ormond to Clanricard, Aug. 25, in *Letter - book*, pp. 173-6, 177-9. Cf. Lowe, 'Glamorgan mission', pp. 164, 167; Cregan, 'An Irish Cavalier', p. 121.

[93]The oath taken by Glamorgan, of which a wider confederate audience were aware, appeared to put him in a position almost to force the King's acceptance, at least under penalty of losing his Irish army; the 'defeasence' was known only to the commissioners and completely undermined the aspect of compulsion - while the commissioners may have wanted Charles pressed, they allowed a way out - Lowe, 'Glamorgan mission', pp. 169-170; cf. Gardiner, 'Charles and Glamorgan', p. 704; Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, pp. 195-6. The assembly had declared itself bound by its oath (Aug. 28) until the peace, presumably including Glamorgan's articles, was ratified by Parliament.

[94]Lowe, 'Glamorgan mission', pp. 168-9.

[95]As Glamorgan's future actions demonstrate, Lowe, 'Glamorgan mission', pp. 163, 173-4, 188-9.

[96]The assembly voted to 'refer to his Majesty's pleasure such things about Religion as Ormond either had not power or inclination to grant', Lowe 'Glamorgan mission', pp 170-1. Lowe, 'Glamorgan mission', p. 163 notes that Ormond may have sent Glamorgan to 'facilitate the sort of settlement that was practicable but also to secure men and materials. The correspondence between Glamorgan and Ormond certainly show that he was occupied with these two tasks whatever else he was doing'. This seems a correct interpretation of Ormond's position - there seems no need to add another level of 'covert' negotiations.

[97]Ormond felt sure that the King would need a firmer commitment to the return of churches than Clanricard's hopes from leaving the issue unspoken. In 1647 when faced with the army's *Heads of the Proposals* 'Charles retorted that "though there was nothing done against the Church-government established, there was nothing done to assert it " ', implicitly rejecting Sir John Berkeley's 'argument that " the law was security enough for the Church " '. Smith, *Constitutional Royalism*, p. 152, citing Ashburnham, *Narrative*, ii, cli - clii. For one as consistent in his principles as Charles, the need for written guarantees was likely to be as true in 1645 as two years later.

[98]For the efforts of the Queen , Digby, Montreuil, Holland among others, see Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 285-6, 339-41, 343; iii, 1-3; Stevenson, *Revolution and counter-revolution*, pp. 56-7, 57-9.

contingent circumstances. The supposedly easier 'civil' treaty in fact dragged on for months, to general disillusionment; the process of raising an army proved as logistically defeating as the worst of previous efforts; Rinuccini managed to strengthen the already present, and very reasonable, doubts among the more religiously committed that Glamorgan could get what he offered; and, crucially, the capture of a copy of the document meant that repudiation had to come sooner rather than later. In the end, Ormond would return to the strategy which he (and possibly also Charles) had favoured all along - not formal treating for a settlement, but the detachment of as many as possible, first of Irish Protestants (particularly, in late 1645, in Ulster and Connacht) and then of 'Ormondist' confederates (in early 1646).[99] But what was demonstrated was the central dilemma of the 'Ormondist' position, the difficulty of creating a cross-religious 'loyalist' union while the commitment to Ireland as a Protestant Kingdom was retained. That was a commitment shared by King, Lieutenant and the most accommodating of Irish Protestants. As with efforts to forge new alignments elsewhere, it was easier to do when principles, and formal treaties, were ignored, and bonds of mutual interest created on the ground. In 1645 the most appropriate scene for such efforts was the province of Connacht.

The statement that the 'confederates never established total control over the north-west' could be applied to Connacht as a whole, as can the remark that the cessation led to 'a chaotic and, according to Clanricard, an almost anarchic situation in Sligo and in north Connacht in general'.[100] Though Clanricard presented the continuing disorder emanating from the garrison at Castle Coote as the work of 'pillagers' of mixed race and, apparently, religion[101] there was evidence of pro-Parliament sentiment both here and among Sir Frederick Hamilton's forces in Leitrim. The 'King's party' were confined to Athlone and Clanricard's three baronies in Co. Galway.[102] Open war was begun by Sir Charles Coote; with approximately 4 500 men gathered in Co. Tyrone (June 17), he advanced from the north-west, taking Sligo on July 8.[103]

Both the Ormondist Lord President, Dillon, and Clanricard professed themselves unable to offer resistance, and Ormond issued a commission on June 24 to

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[99]It is vital to note, all the same, that the 'Ormond peace' of 1646 returned to the principle of referring religious matters to the king, obviously with Ormond's approval, see Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 112.
[100]Mary O'Dowd, *Power, politics and land: early modern Sligo 1568-1688* (Belfast, 1991), pp 130, 127.
[101]Clanricard to Ormond, Feb. 27, March 10, in *Letter - book*, pp. 146, 149-50.
[102]Clanricard to Ormond, Jan. 29, in *Letter - book*, p. 138; Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 169. Athlone, the base of the late Lord President, Ranelagh sr., had been delivered to his (royalist) successor, Viscount Dillon, on Ranelagh's departure to England in 1643, Liam Cox, 'Athlone in the civil war 1641-1652' in *Ir. sword*, x (1971), p. 48.
[103]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, p. 222; Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 95; Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers*, p. 189.

Viscount Taaffe.[104] He was empowered to raise forces to oppose those who 'presume in hostile manner to enter into any of the quarters allotted in Conaght to such as are obedient to his Majestie's governments now established there and their adherents, or who shall attempt, commit, or doe any hostile act or acts in the said province to the prejudice of his Majestie's said subjects in their persons or estates...'. Though this could cover both the troublesome Roscommon garrisons who had spurned Dillon's authority and violated Clanricard's quarters, and could be stretched to Coote's forces, it was essentially a defensive remit, and Ormond clearly intended it to be so. As for Taaffe's further powers, these included the right to command 'all such forces who shall joyne with you' in the task and the receiving into mercy and pardon of 'such of the said persons who shall come to you and give obedience unto his Majesties authority'.[105] Like the granting of martial law and the power to commission officers these were not uncommon adjuncts of military power, but developments suggest that Ormond wished all these powers to be actively employed to extend royal control.

Both Clanricard and Dillon had earlier condemned confederate failure to suppress anti-cessationists in Connacht, though they were unwilling to co-operate to this end.[106] As an alternative, Clanricard now ordered all forces under his authority to serve under Taaffe[107]; Dillon recommended, successfully, the adhesion of Sir James Dillon to the new forces[108]; Ormond also agreed to the offer by the Earl of Westmeath to raise a regiment and a cavalry troop for the King, probably as part of the same initiative.[109] By Aug. 3, Taaffe claimed to have 2 500 infantry and 400 cavalry.[110] At this very time, Ormond was refusing Muskerry's continued requests for offensive co-operation against the Ulster Protestant forces in the absence of a peace, though not declining the 'loyall offer' of assistance.[111] Yet, without any concessions to, or recognition of, the confederation, he was building a force based on families (Dillon, Taaffe, Nugent) from a background very like his own - Old English, sometimes

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[104]Clanricard commented that the commission was issued because neither he nor Dillon had adequate resources, 'and not willing to join with or receive the assistance of the confederates until they were united with us under the king's government', *Letter - book*, p. 169. Cf. Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 169-72.
[105]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 306-8; *Letter - book*, pp. 168-70.
[106]Clanricard to Dominic Burke, July 11, in *Letter - book*, pp. 170-1; Dillon to Ormond, July 5, Carte MS 15, ff. 209-10.
[107]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 307-8; *Letter - book*, p. 170.
[108]Carte MS 15, ff. 240, 244.
[109]Carte MS 15, ff. 285, 291.
[110]Taaffe to Ormond, Carte MS 15, f. 339. Bellings describes his army as Taaffe's own 'English volunteers, Sir James Dillon's regiment of one thousand foot, and two troops of horse commanded by Major Finglas and Captain Barnewall of the Leinster list...', plus Clanricard's men, 'and some auxiliaries from the confederates...'. Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 16-17.
[111]Muskerry to Ormond, Aug. 18, Carte MS 15, f. 455; Ormond to Muskerry, Aug. 19, Carte MS 15, ff. 467-8.

religiously divided, liable to straddle the line between loyalist and 'rebel' or curb the activities of the latter.[112]

With this force, Taaffe made significant gains in August[113] - Tulske[114], Elphin, Castle Coote and Jamestown[115] were taken by force or submitted to Taaffe's army, Carrigdrumrusk, Boyle[116] and Roscommon, though untouched, now professed obedience to the King's government and the cessation. But there were considerable problems. That Taaffe's army quickly ran into serious logistical problems was only standard for armies in 1640s Ireland.[117] As a small force anyway, any fall in numbers (even through garrisoning) could be serious, while opinion in Dublin, which Clanricard came to share, was that military co-ordination with the confederate armies was only justifiable, if at all, in case of imminent danger. With Coote's failure to obtain an adequate relief force in the late summer - autumn[118], this was clearly not the case. By the time of O'Queely's assault on Sligo in Oct., using the remnants of Taaffe's forces, the military advantage in Connacht had probably been lost.[119] By then, moreover, the political basis of the campaign had collapsed.

It was not just suspicion that the confederate armies and administration would usurp the work done by the 'Ormondists'[120]; Taaffe himself had an unfortunate habit of stirring up trouble. As early as Aug. 7 Ormond was worried that confederate dabbling might foment a breach between Taaffe and Ranelagh, which he laboured to

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[112]Both Westmeath and Sir James Dillon had opposed the MacGeoghegans' rising in Co. Westmeath in 1641, while Taaffe and Dillon hovered between Ireland and the King in 1641-2 in efforts to patch a settlement. Dillon, like Ormond, had been admitted a Privy Councillor having professed Protestantism, though he was to be reconciled to Rome in 1646. By that time Taaffe had taken up a command under confederate authority, and Westmeath's regiment, like Sir James Dillon's was part of their Leinster army. Clarke, *Old English*, pp. 119, 188; O'Dowd, *Power, politics and land*, p. 124; *Complete Peerage*, iii, 28; iv, 358; Nicholas Perry, 'The infantry of the confederate Leinster army, 1642-1647', in *Ir. sword*, xv (1982-3), pp. 234, 236.

[113]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, iv, 16-18.

[114]Taaffe to Ormond, Aug. 14, Carte MS 15, ff. 414-5.

[115]Dillon seems to have engineered Jamestown's capture through Sir Lucas Dillon, Sir James Dillon and 200 soldiers being admitted as a new garrison, though the old one was not evicted, Carte MS 15, ff. 663, 673, 712-3.

[116]Articles of submission, Aug. 25, Carte MS 15, f. 502.

[117]For Clanricard's efforts, see *Letter - book*, pp. 182-3, 183-4, 185-6.

[118]Hogan, (ed.), *Letters and papers*, pp. 189-90 gives Coote's account (dated 4 June, 1646) of the 1645 campaign. He claimed that the bulk of his relief force was called back due to news reaching Monro from Scotland. The victory over O'Queely was won by the forces he had left in Connacht, and he brought a reinforcement in the autumn.

[119]Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 96; Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, p. 199; Cox, 'Athlone in the civil wars', p. 49 for Sir James Dillon's participation.

[120]While Clanricard told Taaffe on Aug. 31 that he would 'labour' at Dublin to have the confederate Leinster army sent to Connacht and O'Neill's army used to create a diversion in the north, his letter (from Dublin) of Sept. 8 hoped to divert away the confederate forces 'there being no need of them, who will be as destructive as the enemy' - *Letter - book*, pp. 182-3, 187. Dillon, who on Aug. 30 warned Ormond that they could not meet the northern forces threatening them in the field, reported on Sept. 1 that the retreat of the Ulster army had avoided Preston's advance on Connacht - Carte MS 15, ff. 551, 560.

overcome.[121] Much more serious was Taaffe's displacement of the Protestant Bishop of Elphin from the castle he had held since the outbreak of the rising. Before the campaign started, Ormond had issued instructions that special regard was to be had for Bishop Tilson.[122] By Aug. 14, however, the bishop was complaining at the eviction of his garrison in favour of a Catholic one; though then agreeing to surrender the castle, he professed himself worried at the safety of his men.[123] Dillon attempted to mediate, and Ormond insisted on restoration, citing the terms of Taaffe's commission on submissions.[124] But the bishop claimed he could not return while Taaffe held command, and wrote to ecclesiastics in Dublin (Sept. 17) of a Catholic religious takeover after his departure from Elphin.[125] Clanricard, like Ormond, was worried lest Taaffe's improvidence 'in a matter of so small concernment not only shake and endanger the good success of that province' but disturb more important proceedings by 'fomenting jealousies and misapprehensions'.[126] For other Protestant garrisons were petitioning Ormond and Dillon on the basis of their displacement from control after submission.[127] Taaffe was suspected of inclining more to the confederates than his commission warranted, to the prejudice of the government in Dublin; on Sept. 23 Clanricard ordered his own forces to leave Taaffe and announced that the commission had been withdrawn, largely because of the Bishop of Elphin incident.[128]

Ormond's western strategy aimed, militarily, merely at the defence of 'loyal' Connacht. Politically, it aimed at the expansion of that constituency, but in two directions. Catholic grandees, and their supporters, were to be incorporated, not through institutional amalgamation but service under royal authority. After all, as late as Aug. 9 (about the time of the opening of the campaign), Clanricard, at Kilkenny, wrote to ask Ormond if the latest concessions could be offered to 'well disposed' individuals on the same basis as 'to all in general', a plan apparently acceded to by Ormond.[129] Yet the submission, and incorporation, of Protestant garrisons was also clearly aimed at. A temporary pay-off was made in that Coote's relief force was

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[121]Carte MS 15, f. 373. Certainly Taaffe had complained (Aug. 3) that Ranelagh had not been forward with his assistance. Ranelagh seems indeed to have pursued his usual political shiftiness - in July he had been in close touch with the staunch Robert Ormesby, and even the accommodating Dillon thought that Ranelagh had left Athlone on news of the Ulster advance so as to be 'safe' with all parties. Even so, Ormond continued to keep lines open to him, intervening on Ranelagh's behalf (in Sept.) in disputes over the possession of ordnance. Carte MS 15, ff. 166, 339, 424, 569.
[122]Carte MS 15, f. 373.
[123]Carte MS 15, ff. 420, 430.
[124]Carte MS 15, ff. 439, 458, 462, 474, 524-5, 545-6, 552.
[125]Carte MS 15, ff. 578, 652.
[126]Clanricard to Capt. Richard Burke, Sept. 21, in *Letter - book*, p. 189.
[127]Jamestown garrison to Ormond, Carte MS 16, f. 61.
[128]Clanricard to Taaffe, Sept. 8, to Capt. Richard Burke, Sept. 21, in *Letter - book*, pp. 186-7, 188-90.
[129]*Letter - book*, p. 173.

discouraged to find these garrisons held against them[130] but local hostilities (and perhaps Taaffe's ineptitude) were obviously too great for this to work. The future loyalty of neither the Protestant garrisons nor the Catholic forces was guaranteed. Clanricard's comment acts as an epitaph of failure - 'I shall hold to my former maxim that until we all serve and obey one master, neither myself nor any under my care shall by my consent undertake any great employments, though they may carry with them a seeming show both of honour and profit, which cannot be permanent in the midst of so many distractions in the government'.[131]

It all augured badly for Ormond's renewed attempts to win support in Protestant Ulster.[132] There the main military activity of the summer had been Coote's expedition; Monro's 'rather half-hearted attempt' to besiege Charlemont, and a plundering expedition into Co. Monaghan completed the picture.[133] Monro was relatively secure in Ulster. On the whole his position was very like that of his nominal commander, Leven, in England. In the absence of sustained external support, both were forced to commit too great a share of their resources to obtaining sustenance for their men. Both were undermined as the success of Montrose in Scotland meant more of their soldiers were siphoned off back home.[134]

In London, C.B.K. continued to keep an eye on Ulster, approving Davies's contract to supply the Scottish army there (Aug. 8).[135] Early August saw them mull over final instructions for the Ulster commissioners, approved by Aug. 12.[136] But by now they seemed to be inclined to extricate themselves from Irish affairs. Instead a new committee would rise to prominence as the needs of another province came to hold priority at Westminster. The terms of reference of the committee set up on July 1 'to receive, prepare and consider of Propositions for the speedy relief of that Kingdom, and particularly for the Province of Munster, and to prepare them in such order for the two Houses of Parliament, as may most facilitate the affairs of that distressed

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[130]See e.g. Clanricard to Sir George Hamilton, Sept. 4, in *Letter - book*, pp. 185-6.
[131]Clanricard to Capt. Richard Burke, Sept. 21, in *Letter - book*, p. 189.
[132]The bills which he had sent to England to buttress such efforts were intercepted on their way back. See Digby to Ormond, Sept. 26, in *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 162.
[133]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 221-2. Stevenson sees 1645 as 'an interlude' between confederate efforts to 'break the deadlock' in Ulster. But he does note that 'the balance of power in 1645 seemed to continue to move in favour of the Scots. Monro was able to march through the province at will, with only Charlemont held against him, and Coote's successes in Connaught distracted Irish attention from him.'
[134]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 203, 205-7, 221 for Ireland; for Leven, see Gardiner, *Great civil war*, ii, 230-1, 256, 262-3, 308-10, 339; Stevenson, *Revolution and counter-revolution*, pp. 18-19.
[135]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 53.
[136]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 43, 45, 55, 60. C.B.K. were aware of the Ulster 'declaration and bond of union' by July 23, and voted to keep it secret. It was later referred to a sub-committee of Crew, Browne and Glyn, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 26, 55.

Kingdom' - were little better than advisory.[137] But their remit to concentrate on the south of Ireland was justified by the precarious position of the Protestant forces there in the midst of the summer's fighting.

Broghill was present at the committee's first session (July 4) and its early recommendations set the parameters for parliamentary action into the autumn. Immediate reinforcement was recognised at vital, so £10 000 of excise money should be used to arm, cloth and transport 1 600 men to the province. In the long term, the committee deliberated over a battery of proposals, many of them old adventurer demands like compulsion of past subscribers; sale of Munster urban property; a forced 'adventure' by English towns; a monthly tax of the value of one meal. Additional options included a 'new society of well-affected persons' to raise and maintain troops and the continuation of the assessment .[138] The Commons agreed to the sending of soldiers upping the numbers to 2 500 at a cost of £20 000, and to the continuation of the assessment for 6 months. The committee was to work out the details, but was awarded the right to itself send over these soldiers.[139] The rising profile of Munster, and with it of the July committee, was not so much a function of a shift in 'political' or even strategic preference as a response to the declining position of Inchiquin and his forces. As so often it seems as if the House was moved most by the news relayed to it; letters from Inchiquin were read on July 23 and July 28, reiterating the danger to Youghal and the problems of mutiny and desertion. The House urged on the committee new legislation for martial law, and for the continuation of the assessment, but only awarded £5 000 from the excise.[140]

Meanwhile John Davies's rise continued unabated. With the provision of money for the Ulster commissioners still impossible, C.B.K. had agreed to their suggestion to send cloth instead, naturally supplied by Davies.[141] Whilst the new Irish committee continued to consult the Grocers' Hall committee they voted (July 26) that the most expedient way of relieving Munster was to accede to Davies's offer of £10 000 worth of goods within 10 days, an offer apparently given the green light.[142] By late August the funds designed from the new assessment, in so far as they concerned

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[137]They were to meet thrice weekly in the old Committee of Safety chamber with, yet again, William Hawkins acting as secretary, *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 722-3; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 195; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 405.

[138]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 405-6.

[139]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 203; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 219b; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 407. Despite the desertion of earlier ex-prisoners, the Commons decided that this was the means to be used in the new reinforcement, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 10, 218, 219.

[140]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 216, 222; *Tanner letters*, pp. 190-3.

[141]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 26, 45; *Cal. S. P. dom., Addenda, 1625-49*, p. 682.

[142]The Commons heard the propositions on July 28 though no overt response is given; but by July 30 C.B.K. had issued a warrant for Davies to send 1 200 quarters of wheat to Munster, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 407; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 222; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 36-7; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 235.

Ulster and Connacht, were to be utilised by Davies; the new committee had also given him a contract to send meal to the north of Ireland.[143] The Commons had agreed to the C.B.K. arrangement for Davies to send cloth to the north of Ireland forces, and given a reading to an ordinance (Aug. 23) to repay his debts.[144] As agreed by both Houses on Sept. 27, it aimed to settle his April offer to supply the Scottish army, and to repay accumulated debts of £12 195. To this end, all surplus of the first assessment was in his hands, and he could nominate agents locally to collect.[145] Even the £5 000 which the excise was to supply for Munster had been advanced as a loan by three of Davies's business associates, Bard, Parker and Brown.[146]

This money was intended to fund the cavalry to go to the province, which William Jephson, MP had been nominated by the new Irish committee to command. They also intended him to be part of a committee to be send to Munster alongside William Ashurst MP and two London representatives, lieutenant colonel Francis Rowe and major John Booker, nominees not of the adventurer committee but of the Common Council.[147] The Irish committee approved both the assessment ordinance and the adventure proposals (Aug. 2) but only the former passed the Houses (Aug. 15).[148] Basically, it extended the operation of the former ordinance over the months Nov. 1645 to April 1646, with the addition of two new treasurers, Aldermen Thomas Andrews and William Berkeley (with William Hawkins as 'cheque'). But it also allowed for major expansion of the powers of the Irish committee. In the first instance, they were given disposal of the money accumulated by the ordinance (with the right to raise loans thereon up to £30 000), though not of the arrears of the old assessment, unless a surplus was reached. Broadly, they could now meet daily 'to advise and direct the managing of the war in Ireland, and all things thereunto belonging, in such manner as shall be most for the advantages of the affaires both of England and Ireland'.[149]

By August the levying of troops had moved beyond prisoners, and now took in two regiments, one of cavalry under Jephson, one of infantry under Scottish colonel Robert Sterling.[150] The committee moved into executive action in mid-August, its

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[143]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 410, 411, 412.

[144]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 251, 255; B.L. Harl. MS 166, f. 258b. For continued delays over the contracts, see *Commons' jn.*, iv, 261, 264, 265, 270. See also appendix 3.

[145]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 270, 276, 285, 291-2; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 776-83.

[146]The provision was contained within the assessment ordinance, *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 746-9.

[147]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 408; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 233-4, 245; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, ff. 2b, 4a. This is not an indication of politics - Rowe was the brother of the prominent City 'independent' Stephen Rowe, and himself a long-standing city activist, as well as prominent adventurer (and committee man), but suggests the further marginalisation of Grocers' Hall.

[148]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 409; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 236, 242.

[149]*Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 746-9.

[150]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 410, 413-4; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 251-2; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 4b. The reinforcements were to swear an oath not to accept any peace but one approved by Parliament. One last effort on prisoners may have been the Aug. 12 order to allow Fairfax to recruit in the west of

control of the new assessment giving it directive powers. Money was assigned to Davies for Ulster and Connacht, for the Munster committee and for raising troops.[151] By Sept. 11 C.B.K. acceded to their request to hand over an analysis of how they had spent the first assessment;[152] when the Ulster commission finally passed it placed directive power over them not only in Parliament and C.B.K. but also in the Irish committee;[153] C.B.K. informed those in command in Ireland of the authority of the new committee, while devolving petitions and cases from Ulster to the commissioners to deal with on the spot.[154]

By the time they arrived in Ulster, Ormond's diplomatic offensive was under way. Based on the 1642 Anglo-Scottish treaty, it appeared to offer something for everyone, but not material assistance. Perhaps 'Galbraith's mission came too late to have any chance of success' with the commissioners coming too close at his heels.[155] But the appeal of Ormond's rather stringent terms was not probably not very great.[156] Certainly they left no scope for those, and there were some, who saw the reform of religion as an ideological imperative. Moreover, that Ormond was moving in this direction was already an admission of defeat. For there is no hint that Protestant opinion was not still after a combination of rigorous war in Ireland and an agreed peace in England. Such sentiments appear among Ormond's own supporters. Thus William Cadogan, commander at Trim for most of the 1640s, hoped indeed that Galbraith would heal the 'slight breach' with the Ulster Protestants, but so as to enable joint action against the Irish who 'have played the poltrons with a good King, that I believe hath suffered too much for their sake'.[157] Perhaps there was not all that much reason to hope for such a settlement at this time, but in London it was obviously seen as no bad thing to let it be believed that there was. The official letter which accompanied the commissioners to Ulster in Oct. 1645 set out that there was 'good ground to hope ' that the King would now abandon wicked counsels for his 'most faithfull Counsell', Parliament.[158]

England for Munster, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 409. For details of the 1645-7 expeditions see appendix 4.

[151]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 413-4. See also appendix 2.

[152]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 410; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 131.

[153]All provincial presidents were likewise to report to them, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 270, 276; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 14b; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 414.

[154]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 183, 184-5, 188, 200, 205, 212. This particularly involved the convoluted events in Derry - see also *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 60, 67. For the Irish committee's letter to Ulster setting out their own, and the commissioners', authority, see B.L. Add. MS 4 769A, f. 3a.

[155]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 217-8. Cf. Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 161-5.

[156]Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-53*, i, 670-1 for Ormond's undated memo.

[157]Cadogan to -, Sept. 9, in *Ormonde MSS*, i, 24-5. Richard Perkins, newly appointed to command at Newry, got in touch with Sir Thomas Wharton (Oct. 25) and seems concerned about the implications of news of an English treaty, Carte MS 16, f. 63.

[158]B. L. Add. MSS 4 769A, f. 3a.

The parallel empowering of the committee for Munster had made no real progress since the end of August.[159] Perhaps like the Ulster commissioners they were held up by the failure to obtain the relatively small sums to accompany them. By Sept. 23 the Irish committee noted a shortfall of £12 850 for immediate needs, mostly for Munster. They decided to turn again to the adventurers, offering repayment to the committee and treasurers at Grocer's Hall, and meanwhile asking the Lord Mayor to call a full meeting of all adventurers. As part of the looking back to land-based revenue, they also proposed the bringing in of an ordinance to impose sequestration in Ireland.[160] By now everything was poised to blow up in their faces. Authorising the committee to issue commissions to raise men for Ireland,[161] the Commons despatched Lisle, Thomson and Venn to the London municipal authorities to ask if they could give an advance on the Irish assessment to raise soldiers for Munster and send the provincial committee off with some cash.[162] They took their time to respond, but the auguries were not good.[163]

In political terms, the situation in October 1645 suggests three conclusions. Firstly, and perhaps obviously, even in 1645 not everything Parliament did need be interpreted in terms of 'party' or faction. The new Irish committee more obviously reflects the 'proclivity for layering new mechanisms upon old, of superseding rather then eliminating unsatisfactory administrative devices'[164] than any political agenda. Until the autumn it embraced MPs of very diverse political opinion, but predominantly those of the undifferentiated middle - Jephson, Ashurst,[165] Knightly, Reynolds. The adventurers were shortly to inject real division into the debate over Ireland, but it is perhaps too simplistic, though appealing, to see the build-up of tension in 1645 as between 'Presbyterian' preference for Ulster and for funding by assessment, and 'Independent' favour of Munster and land confiscation.[166] Rather, Munster was on

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[159]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 411; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 257.
[160]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 415-6.
[161]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 298 (Oct. 4).
[162]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 309 (Oct. 11). There are no records of the Irish committee for the early part of October.
[163]See Perceval to Jephson, Oct. 23, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 262-3, including his urging Jephson back to London in the hope that Davies might advance the money for Jephson's cavalry, Clotworthy and Arthur Hill having persuaded him to that end.
[164]Kishlansky, *Rise of the new model army*, p. 23. Thus the older (adventurer) Irish committee (established Jan. 1644) was still meeting intermittently, with residual duties of disposal of petty sums of money, B.L. Add. MS 4 771, ff. 62-5.
[165]It should be remembered how many different knots and bonds among parliamentarians could come into play. In one context Ashurst, prominent in the early days of the Irish committee, was a 'middle' grouper, as so many others thereon. In another, he was in effect a dependent of Sir William Brereton, not only personally active on the committee, but a close contact of Sir Robert King, and a man with several New English officers under him, notably Chidley Coote and Michael Jones.
[166]But see Bottigheimer, 'English interest', pp. 171-5.

everyone's mind throughout 1645; a genuine choice between the two would not occur until 1646.

Thus though there were greater political antagonisms, and growing chasms between pro- and anti-Scots, and between religious groups, these had not yet muddied the waters of Irish policy. It is not as if these divisions would not have their effect later, as would the rise of the powerful aristocratic faction described by Adamson.[167] But the waters would remain muddied by too many currents. Thus of the various identified members of the London adventurer committee(s) almost all fit the 'radical' description politically - promoters of the war effort, of the 1642-3 petitioning campaigns, even of the 1647-9 'revolution'. But this does not prevent a clutch of them from being religious Presbyterians, even to the extent of petitioning Parliament in 1645-7.[168] Nor did it mean they were uninterested in the Scots - as the Turners' Hall committee they worked to support the Scots in England throughout 1645, and, when Grocers' Hall petitioned Parliament in Dec. 1645, it did not seek to displace Leven from his nominal Ulster command or substitute a Lord Lieutenant for the provincial presidents and committees.[169] That both these latter would be 'Presbyterian' policies in 1646-7 shows the fluidity still of extraneous policies, as on Ireland, between 'parties'.

Instead what wracked the Irish lobbies were much more mundane questions. Like colonising companies before them, the adventurers had consoled themselves over the delay in their projects by the profits to be made from provisioning services.[170] By 1645 this was being wrested away from them by John Davies and his 'cheesemonger' associates. The episode is a reminder of the way in which financial questions undoubtedly played a significant role in determining political alignment in the 1640s. Davies had managed to begin to effectively 'privatise' assessment collection, denuding the adventurer group of an alternative to the waning revenue from land. Efforts to resuscitate landed alternatives were ongoing; in Oct. the ordinance to repay Irish supplies by Pennoyer and Hill out of sequestered property was finally passed, appropriately enough transferring the property allocated to that owned by Glamorgan and his family.[171] Throughout it had very much been the labour of Robert Reynolds to

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[167]See note 1 above for works dealing with changes in 'party' politics.

[168]Of the adventurers who negotiated with the Irish committee in July 1645, Kendrick, Avery and Herring qualify as religious Presbyterians, and probably Watkins also (only Avery in political terms). See *The state of the Irish affairs*, pp. 9-10; Brenner, *Merchants and revolution*, pp. 491-3.

[169]*The state of the Irish affairs*, pp. 21-2.

[170]For the manner in which the 'Magazine' of the old Virginia Company had allowed mercantile profits to be made from provisioning while the colonial tasks for which the Company existed stagnated, see E. S. Morgan, *American slavery, American freedom. The ordeal of colonial Virginia* (New York, 1975), pp. 97, 113.

[171]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 316; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, ff. 19b, 20a.

get the bill accepted. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that he would spent the same months wrangling for the broader principle of a bill to confiscate delinquent lands.[172]

But again no 'party' line-ups are obvious. As will be seen, plenty of religious Presbyterians must have been eager to pursue confiscatory schemes to recoup revenue. Nor had Davies any 'party' backing in England. But the adventurers recognised that he combined support from other London traders with the backing of the 'Irish' in London. There was not only his intimate relationship with Clotworthy, but he was recommended by Hill and by the Ulster commissioners, the New English Annesley and King. Indeed, 1644-5 had seen the first wave of (usually Ulster) New English take the lead as the main external lobby for matters Irish. Their fight with the adventurers was primarily a matter of money, not policy. As displaced persons, it would do them no harm to receive paid commissionerships, nor, as in the case of the deputy Irish treasurer, Nicholas Loftus, to have their old job resuscitated, with corresponding wages.[173] The potential power of Irish Protestants at Westminster could act as a counter to any renewed efforts Ormond might make to win the community as a whole; their presence was symbolic of an actual alliance between Parliament and Protestant Ireland which was still a tender plant. Yet as Parliament finally directed its attention to a sustained Irish war, and as more Protestants there allowed war fever to bind them to Westminster, incipient schisms within parliamentary ranks would become realised by the injection of wider political disputes.

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[172]Kishlansky, *Rise of the new model army*, p. 111.

[173]For orders by the committee that all Irish funds pass through Loftus's hands, see *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 413-4, 417.

Chapter 8
The Government of Ireland, Nov. 1645 - June 1646.

By the closing months of 1645 the war in England was clearly being wound down. If parliamentarians were as committed to the ending of the Irish war (by conquest) as they had always claimed, then their opportunities for doing so were clearly increasing. At one level, they did indeed respond, and the diversion of resources seen in previous months was stepped up even further. But if the old hope of a bi-partisan approach to Ireland, as between King and Parliament, had faded, it was also becoming less clear if a consensus was available even among Parliamentarians. Of course, the logistical work of the Irish committee could be undertaken by MPs of varying political colours, and the emerging revelations of royal dealing in Ireland made a willingness to effectively exclude Charles from a future role fairly universal. Yet the months under review here saw fissures begin to appear over Irish policy, not so much in response to the situation there, as to changes in circumstances in England. A growing financial crisis, a 'political transformation' hinged on changing relationships with the Scots, and decisive twists in the religious question, were all to spread their malign effect into consideration of plans for Ireland. Co-operation on practicalities could only partially hide the breakdown of consensus on both ends and means.

If the outlines of a parliamentarian settlement were becoming blurred there was, temporarily, the possibility of an alternative, royalist, 'solution'. But from the start the Ormond Peace of March 1646 was a structure whose foundations were being undermined from several directions - in so far as they had been constructed at all. While discontent within confederate ranks has been recognised, Charles himself was an unsteady support. If the terms were within his general parameters of acceptability he could not but waver given his simultaneous negotiations with the enemies of his Irish friends. Ormond, like his master, was never so single-minded as to ignore the alternatives to the deal he had cut. And perhaps worst of all, it was never apparent that the Peace commanded the support of any broad Protestant constituency. Like their English co-religionists, the arrangements could only ever be at best a distasteful necessity, but for too many the taste was becoming too nauseating to be endured.

Though the July 1645 Irish committee had been primarily designed to aid Munster, the condition of that province was such as to prompt grave concern at the end of the year. 'Little of substance was accomplished by the committee'; more was gained by the diversion of supplies from the New Model Army in the west of England, and particularly by the efforts of the parliamentary sea captains.[1] Sir Hardress Waller reported of the Army generals that 'beyond their power they extended themselves for our instant relief' with cash and victuals.[2] The same could hardly be said of Westminster, though by late Nov. a convoy had been ordered to take relief to the province, particularly with Youghal under siege.[3]

The difficulties were symptomatic of a crisis in parliamentarian finance, extending beyond Irish needs. Whatever the success of the assessment used to support the New Model, it is clear that by Nov. 1645 it was unable to provide sole support for the forces it was designed to supply. Recourse was had to large-scale borrowing, and other revenues were drawn on to provide credit. The Irish assessment likewise suffered from problems both of insufficiency and slowness; loans and credit had been used to support the Irish war from 1641, but collateral was diminished and tarnished. Yet access to other sources, like excise and sequestrations, was now being blocked as Parliament, whether from political bias or not, starved its other children to feed its ravenous new military offspring.[4]

Parliament's problems lay in finding willing creditors, and in providing a satisfactory means to repay them. Income from the first Irish assessment, estimated at £80 000, and in the hands of C.B.K., was all assigned by the summer of 1645, the bulk for the Ulster front.[5] Considerable assignments had been made on the basis of the

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[1]Bottigheimer, *English money*, pp. 91-2. P.R.O. S. P. Ire. 63, 261/9, p. 96 provides a list of supplies sent to Munster from Aug. 1644 to Jan. 1646, totalling in value over £70 000. Apart from £37 240 allocated from the first two assessments (and £2 000 from the excise), the rest (about half) came from private relief efforts, the largest being the Dutch collections, the naval officers and the parliamentary armies. See also *Tanner letters*, p. 197; *Egmont MSS*, i, 264.

[2]Waller to Perceval, Dec. 4, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 264-5.

[3]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 233.

[4]Kishlansky argues that payments to supplement the assessment in Sept. - Nov. 1645 'effectively terminated the New Model Army's financial self-reliance'. Though Gentles is relatively complimentary about the financial provision made for the New Model at this time, he does admit that, in its first fifteen months, the army had to raise 25% of its revenue from loans secured on the excise and compositions. In fact, all five major loans can be dated Sept. 1645 - March 1646. Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, p. 67; cf. pp. 112-3 for failure even to meet anticipated revenue, let alone its diversion. Ian Gentles, *The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645-1653* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 29-31.

[5]P.R.O., S. P. Ire. 63, 261/9, pp. 64-5 sets out the £79 515 accounted for, of which Ulster received £48 767-12 (61%), Connacht £9 728-6-8 (12%), Munster £19 390 (24%), with costs 'at home' £2 629-1-4 (3%).

second assessment[6], but if action was to precede the slow process of collection, then some more ready source was needed. This is what lay behind the committee's approach to the Grocers' Hall treasurers and adventurers (Oct. 23) seeking an advance of around £15 000.[7] Grocers' Hall had its own agenda, which it had been pressing since July. They wanted to allow new subscriptions on the 1643 adventure ordinance; compulsion of defaulting subscribers; confiscation of Munster urban property; a 'monthly meal' tax; compulsory adventures by previous non-investors. In return they had offered £20 000 and future supply.[8] To the request for £15 000 they returned a comprehensive negative response, castigating the conduct of the war in Ireland and going on to the offensive against assessment as a valid or worthwhile means of producing revenue.[9]

The 'Remonstrance' had been delivered through the Common Council, who agreed to 'mediate' with Parliament;[10] but the outcome, in Nov., was an almost total sidelining of the adventurers' plans, by both Irish committee and Commons, with the alternative of a new assessment being brought forward instead.[11] At this point there is no clear indication of a 'political' dimension to the financial disputes, though this was always liable to colour opinion. In a sense there was always a tension between the use of 'national' taxation and the advocacy of means of making those deemed responsible for the troubles of the times pay (literally) for their sins. But for the moment, with Parliament edging towards a reassessment of all financial arrangements, and a clogging up of all streams of income, the choice of assessment over adventure was probably pragmatic. It was not the end of land-based propositions. At the Irish committee on Nov. 11, a William Hawkins, 'merchant of London', offered six propositions.[12] As well as a revivified 'Doubling' ordinance (as in July, 1643) he proposed attaching the pay of the new forces for Ireland to further confiscated Irish land. For the moment the committee did not bite. What Hawkins's standing was is not clear, and it is unlikely he

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[6]The second assessment had been passed in August, but was only to take effect in Nov. 1645. From August on the Irish committee allocated the first £20 000 due (of an estimated minimum of £40 000) granting £7 850 for Munster. P.R.O., S. P. Ire. 63, 261/9, pp. 66-7.

[7]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 415. P.R.O., S. P. Ire. 63, 261/9, p. 66 shows that the first £20 000 (including £5 000 allocated direct by the Commons) was to be used for recruitment of 2 000 infantry and 500 cavalry for Munster, with the provision of some foodstuffs.

[8]*The state of the Irish affaires...* E 314 (7), pp. 9-14; cf. Bottigheimer, *English money*, pp. 93-4.

[9]*The state of the Irish affaires...* E 314 (7), pp. 1-8; cf. Bottigheimer, *English money*, pp. 92-3, 95.

[10]They did so by forwarding the adventurer documents to both Houses, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 337, 341; *Lords' jn.*, vii, 698, 695; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 242a; *H.M.C. rep. 6*, p. 84.

[11]The Irish committee did support the proposal for a 'monthly meal' tax in the Commons on Nov. 17, unsuccessfully; news from Munster did prompt the Commons to request a full report on Irish finance which estimated army costs at £33 863 - 10 - 8 per month, and was coupled with Irish committee calls for a fresh assessment at double the previous rate. *Commons' jn.*, iv, 345, 351, 353, 365; *Lords' jn.*, viii, 7, 10; Cal. *S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 419, 420-1; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, ff. 243 a-b.

[12]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 418; cf. Bottigheimer, *English money*, pp. 95-6.

was there as a representative of the Adventurers' committee.[13] The defeat of their counter-propositions was the beginning of their eclipse.

Soon Grocers' Hall would be shown to have backed another losing cause in the Scottish command in Ulster. In terms of Westminster's relations with the Scots in 1645, 'the pivot on which the political transformation [in Parliament]... turned',[14] an Irish 'issue' had existed since May 1644 when Monro had seized Belfast. The Irish committee were concerned, as early as Oct. 30, that the town be delivered to the 'English army' as a magazine and place of retreat, being held in violation of the 1642 treaty. The committee reported to both Houses, and they in turn approved a letter (Nov. 27) to go to the Scottish Parliament demanding the surrender of the town by Jan. 11.[15] By now the issue had broadened sufficiently for the committee to begin searching out all relevant votes and treaties relating to the Scottish position in Ireland (Nov. 25).[16] But before leaping ahead to seeing a rooted opposition to a Scottish role in the conquest of Ireland, the immediate circumstances of Anglo-Scottish relations in the autumn of 1645 need to be considered. In the first place, disputes were largely of a material nature; the Commons' critical votes of Oct. 13 were related to charges of Scottish exaction in Yorkshire, and were countered, then as later, with Scottish accusations of inadequate supply. More pertinent to the Belfast case was the ongoing argument of Scottish garrisoning of towns and castles in the north of England, even after their field army had departed the region.[17]

Indeed, too much can be made of rooted opposition to the Scots, in England or Ireland.[18] The correspondence of such figures as the younger Vane and the earl of

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[13]Two men of that name appear to have been prominent in Irish affairs. The man who acted in various secretarial capacities from 1642 is probably an employee of Leicester's in the 1630s; as 'William Hawkins of Iver', Bucks. he sat on the 1648 Irish committee (Leicester's agent had been associated with Iver since at least 1637). H.M.C. *De L'Isle MSS*, vi, 113, 117; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 1150-1. William Hawkins the adventurer is probably a Londoner who sat on numerous assessment committees for Middlesex and Westminster from 1645; as 'citizen and merchant-tailor' he put up £1 250 for the original adventure, and £312-10 in 1643, as well as buying up a huge range of other investments, mostly from Exeter, and gaining land grants in Co. Down, even if he was to settle in Co. Cork. The London Hawkins is probably also the prominent religious Independent of that name. *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 623, 970, 1087; *Cal. S. P. Ire., Adventurers 1642-59*, pp. 23, 81, 148, 171, 185, 194, 202, 214, 236, 240, 322, 342, 343, 355, 385; T. C. Barnard, 'Planters and policies in Cromwellian Ireland', in *Past & present*, 61 (1973), p. 42; Murray Tolmie, *Triumph of the saints. The separate churches of London, 1616-1649* (Cambridge, 1977), p. 140.

[14]Ashton, *English civil war*, p. 246.

[15]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 417; *Lords' jn.*, vii, 698; *Lords' jn.*, viii, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 340-1, 353, 357; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 315; Add. MS 4 769A, ff. 4 a-b.

[16]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 422. The committee wrote to the Ulster commissioners, who had also raised the issue, enclosing the vote of Nov. 13 and a copy of the letter of Nov. 27. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 422; Add. MS 4 769A, f. 4b.

[17]The issue emerged in papers sent to Edinburgh on Sept. 5; the Scots promised to render the garrisons at the war's end, the English wanted them delivered by 1 March, 1646. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 114-5, 194-5, 198, 226-7; Stevenson, *Revolution and counter-revolution*, pp. 18, 55-6.

[18]Far too much can be made of supposed rejoicing over Montrose's victory, Cal. *S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. xviii. The letter from Captain William Vaine to Sir Henry Vane, senior, is not from a prominent Parliamentarian, and is in any case ambiguous, seeing Montrose's victory as 'sad news', only likely to 'not prove too disastrous' since it moves the scene of the war, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 130. Cf.

Northumberland, not known for their pro-Scottishness later, shows a number of considerations also relevant for Ireland. Firstly, at least part of their concern was with the threat to real property in the north of England and, less self-interestedly, the possible alienation of the area as a result[19]. The parallel with the concerns of North of Ireland landowners, Clotworthy and his local allies, is obvious, as is the worry about loyalty to Parliament in the area[20]. Secondly, though disillusionment with the military failure of the Scots forces is real[21], this does not mean that they were, as yet, written off, nor that the aim of sending money was not genuine, even if not the priority of a financially stretched administration.[22] Again, the Ulster army was not ignored, even if down-graded; the adventurers were critical of it yet still willing to maintain Leven's nominal command.[23] Finally, where genuine political problems had emerged there was yet a willingness to seek a solution.[24] It was only over the next six months that open

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Northumberland's comment (Sept. 22) that the recent Covenanter victory 'will be for the present the best security to the north of England; indeed that victory came very seasonably...', *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 150. It also seems too Machiavellian to see opposition to the withdrawal of the Scottish army from Ulster to Scotland as dangerous in crushing Montrose too soon (cf. Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, p. 208).

[19]Northumberland (Sept. 2) lamented the Scottish decision to garrison his castle of Cockermouth and mentioned a conversation with Lord Grey in which he congratulated the latter for 'the good condition I understood his estate to be in' only to be told that the information predated the passing of Leslie's army which 'swept all away'. He worried that the failure to discriminate friend from foe in their depredations meant the Scots were alienating potential supporters in northern England. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 105, 149-50; cf. pp. 124, 155-6, 159, 166, 191 for local worries.

[20]As early as Oct. 30 the Irish committee had written to the Ulster commissioners to investigate the complaint of Lady O'Neill about Scottish exactions; this was extended in their detailed instructions of March 31. B. L. Add. MS 4 769A, ff. 3b, 6b-8a.

[21]Sir Robert Honeywood (Sept. 9) spoke of how Scottish withdrawals had meant 'all their actions, both at home and here, have fallen under a general suspicion, not only amongst the common sort, but people of the best quality'; Northumberland (Oct. 7) said the Commons 'spoke very plain language of that army the other day, an truly I find everybody, even their best friends, so unsatisfied with their giving us no manner of assistance'. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 127, 179; cf. pp. 125, 149-50, 183.

[22]The younger Vane seems (Sept. 15) to have gone along with the conditional votes of money and arms; he hoped (Oct. 8) his father would urge the Scots to Newark 'and then all will settle again, and we may jointly make use of our good success to the speedy settling of the distractions of the kingdom...'. Northumberland (Oct. 7) thought if the Scots had gone to Newark it would have been 'very useful to us and advantageous to them'. Honeywood (Oct. 7) reported Vane's response to Scottish demands as having 'showed great judgement an discretion in turning all into a fair way' including by the vote of £30 000 and munitions. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 138, 179-80, 183.

[23]*The state of the Irish affaires...* E 314 (7), pp. 1-3, 21-2.

[24]Expressions of amity are present in almost all the letters mentioned above. For example, Northumberland (Sept. 22) followed complaints about garrisons and the failures of Leven's army with the comment that 'I heartily pray that a good understanding may continue between the two nations, for otherwise I am certain they are both likely to suffer'. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 150; cf. pp. 179, 215 for his worries. Honeywood (Sept. 9) followed his report of the loss of popular support for the Scots with the point that, if their army proved more useful and their counsels more united to the English, 'they may gain the hearts of the people again, which are not lost, but are in a suspense'. His praise (Oct. 7) for Vane's 'discretion' over supplies extended to Vane's willingness to accede to the Scottish demand to set up a Presbyterian system though not with the 'latitude of power' the Assembly (and Scots) demanded, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 127-8, 179-80. Possibly the decision to consider peace terms twice weekly was also a concession to Scottish pressure, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 191-2. Even Baillie, whose worries were growing throughout Oct. that some parliamentarians were 'seeking a quarrell', admitted on Nov. 25 that the 'desyres of those who seemed to be seeking a breach with us, is for the time either broken or laid aside'. *Letters of Baillie* ed. Laing, ii, 322, 326. The

hostility would emerge, as the increasingly stringent language of Baillie's letters attests.[25] Even then, it was a temporary combination of frustrated backbenchers annoyed at Scottish monetary demands and military failure, with political opponents concerned with peace terms and religious settlement.

Still, there would be little inclination to make a priority of the lacklustre Scottish army in Ulster, as there had been in some quarters in 1643-4. Moreover, one thing which clearly did rankle was the suggestion of covert Scottish negotiations with the King. Yet it was not only the Scots who were to blame on this score. Among the terms supposedly offered to Charles by the 'Independents' in Nov., 1645, was that one of the conditions for their support was the provision of some sort of religious haven in Ireland.[26] Reports of the offer are lacking in detail, and it seems soon to have faded, but this does not necessarily imply that it was not seriously advanced. One thing which seems clear is that, as at so many crucial moments in the 1640s, religion must be taken seriously. This is not to say that all 'party' alignments were based on a central doctrinal division, but it is certain that religious disputes were a reality, a genuine cause for political strife in their own terms. For one thing, the previous six months had seen a considerable rise in religious tension. If the definitive split within the Westminster assembly of divines had occurred as far back as Feb. 1645, there had been serious efforts to reach accommodation in March - May. But by October the Independent divines had refused to present their alternative 'platform' to the dominant Presbyterian one, and signalled their shift from comprehension within an agreed settlement, to toleration outside, for themselves and the sects. A final bid by 'independent' politicians to patch up differences was undertaken in Nov., but proved doomed from the outset.[27]

If this breakdown would increase the appeal of an overseas refuge[28] there was also by now at least a likelihood that elements within the Army would respond to the

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most obvious example of an attempt, by both sides, to patch up their differences was the revival of the accommodation committee for religion.

[25]In late January, Baillie reported a deterioration of relations as occurring at the beginning of December, but it is only in the spring that a fears a war, and that his castigation of his Independent (as opposed to sectarian or episcopalian) opponents reaches vehement levels, *Letters of Baillie* ed. Laing, ii, 343, 363-4, 368-9.

[26]What Montreuil reported was based, he said, on Holland's disclosures to him, that 'the Independents were eagerly treating with the king and promising him all the places, and all the forces in their hands, provided he, after having made use of them, would give them Ireland, as a retreat, where they could live in peace, without constraint, and practice their religion, or in other words, that he would establish Independency'. Montreuil to Mazarin, Nov. 13/23, in *Montereul correspondence*, i, 59. Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 12, 16; J. R. MacCormack, *Revolutionary politics in the Long Parliament* (Cambridge, MA., 1973), pp. 104-5.

[27]Robert S. Paul, *The Assembly of the Lord. Politics and Religion in the Westminster Assembly and the 'Grand Debate'*, (Edinburgh, 1985), pp 434-6, 445-9, 449-53, 482-9. Baillie's letters for Nov. - Dec. show this Scottish concern for comprehension (as Paul shows throughout) and scandal at the Independents' 'desyres for tolleration, not only to themselves, but to other Sects. The Parliament has no great inclination to satisfie either'. The Scots would even allow the Independents alone their (limited) toleration, but certainly not the others - *Letters of Baillie* ed. Laing, ii, 326, 341.

[28]The cooling off of such plans may also be related to the revival of the Accommodation committee, which lingered in until the following January, with the Independents proving least willing to budge.

notion. Whatever about the religious composition of the New Model at its outset, by the autumn of 1645 the fact was that 'friendly newsbook editors were openly describing the New Model as "the Independent army".'[29] An anonymous pamphlet, dated to Dec., 1644, had even then argued plausibly for the deployment of religious Independents in the conquest and settlement of Ireland.[30] A year later circumstances were more fitting. Waller's letters show interest in the army in an Irish expedition, particularly on the part of Cromwell, 'whose spirit leads much that way, and especially for the support of Munster..'.[31] The reason may have been far removed from religious toleration, but it is worth bearing in mind that some adventurers had specific designs on the province. In his submission to the Irish committee, William Hawkins had argued the usual case for Munster urban confiscation, but added that the re-granted towns should have 'as ample civil and martial immunities as the City of London, and ecclesiastical immunities similar to those in the New England patent'.

Too much must not be built on possible linkages, but there would appear to be a religious strain running through the plans advanced over the next 2 years. For the moment, another of Hawkins's proposals gained more attention, the call for a 'Commander-in-chief' with 'very full civil and military powers', 'able, honest, and popular'. The matter was hard to avoid, given that Parliament were going over their peace terms at this time. By Dec. 1 the Commons had not only approved articles placing in their hands the military of Ireland, and the control of the war, but also their future nomination of the Lord Lieutenant and of provincial presidents.[32] It took a series of debates over the next two months before a Lord Lieutenant was actually nominated. Along the way the Commons moved by a series of resolutions and divisions the import of which is not always clear. But the element of disagreement was clear from the time of the first major debate, on Dec. 8. The only vote passed was 'That the Government of *Ireland* shall not be continued in any Person or Persons, longer than One whole Year'.[33] The implication was that agreement had not been reached, and that all sides wanted to guard against a major defeat.

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[29]Gentles, *New Model Army*, p. 140. Gentles has recently challenged the idea of the New Model officer-list as a compromise, arguing it was a victory for the anti -Essex (proto - Independent) grouping - see Gentles, 'Choosing the officers of the New Model', in *Hist. Research*, lxvii (1994), pp. 264-85. Though Kishlansky had argued for a continuing Presbyterian presence and co-operation among religious factions in the army, he accepts that 'as the New Model's successes mounted and the dispute over church government intensified criticism of the army increased, reaching its height in the winter of 1645-6 with the publication of *Gangreana*'. Kishlansky, 'The Case of the Army Truly Stated: the creation of the New Model Army', in *Past & Present*, lxxxi, (1978), p. 54.

[30]E 1190 (4). The tract, as found in the Thomason collection, is anonymous and lacking a title page. Thomason's date is 12 Dec., 1644. The author clearly felt that distance was more likely to breed amity among the different types of reformist Protestants - he also envisaged conversion of the Irish, who 'are reasonable Creatures' with rudimentary Christian beliefs (p.9).

[31]Waller to Perceval, Dec. 4, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 265.

[32]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 359, 362; Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, pp. 293-6, 304 for the final draft.

[33]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 368-9; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 247a.

In effect there were two distinct issues to be resolved . One was the relevance of the 1644 agreement on a Scottish command in Ireland, the other the matter of whether a 'single person' be named to head the Irish government at this time. With the House in grand committee again on Dec. 15 the opportunity was taken to clear the ground for future decisions. Though 'papers' were delivered, and nominations made,[34] 'a Long debate' merely decided that the government 'be Co[mmi]tted to One or more According as it should be Ordered by Parliam[en]t'. The Scottish command was not repealed but notice was served that it would continue during Parliament's pleasure.[35] Five days later the House did vote to repeal the 1643-4 votes, both those giving Leven supreme command, and those vesting the war in Ireland in a C.B.K.[36] Scottish protests were brushed aside, but the trend appeared to be towards government by committees rather than a new chief governor.[37]

The case against a new Lieutenant was argued from Grocers' Hall, in the culminating pages of a pamphlet issued by them setting out their positions over the last several months.[38] They opted for the maintenance of provincial control, including support for Leven in the Ulster command despite earlier criticism of the war effort in that province.[39] Perhaps their publication influenced the House in its renewed discussion of the Scottish case on Jan. 5, but to no avail. More than that, the division which took place was on the motion whether the government 'shall be committed to more persons than one' and was defeated 61:50. Whitelocke's summary of parliament's position at that juncture was that Ireland be governed 'by a single person to be nominated by both houses, for a year & that all Treatyes with the Rebells shall be nullyfyed, & the war to be managed by both Houses of Parlem[en]t'.[40] The continuing

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[34]Perceval seems to have had this day in mind when he told Waller (Dec. 22) that about 'ten days ago, the Lord Lisle was named publicly in the House (by Sir John Evelyn) as a fit person for that place, (contrary to the expectation of those who set that business first on foot, aiming at another, and conceiving the north the fittest place to begin the work),...'. *Egmont MSS*, i, 268.

[35]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 376; B.L. Add. MS 31 116. f. 248a; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 326.

[36]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 381; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 31a; B.L. Add. MS 31 116. f. 249a; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 326.

[37]Perceval reported of the Dec. 20 debate that 'it is resolved for the present (as I am informed by some of the house), that the affairs there shall be managed by committees for this season..' *Egmont MSS*, i, 268. On Dec. 24 the Commons refused to read a letter from the Scottish commissioners which, as heard in the Lords, protested at violation of the 1644 arrangements; but the motion by Temple that a governor be appointed reportedly did not even find a seconder. *Commons' jn.*, iv, 384-5; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 31a; B.L. Add. MS 31 116. f. 250a; *Lords' jn.*, viii, 61, 64-5; Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, p. 210; Perceval to Waller, Dec. 24, *Egmont MSS*, i, 268.

[38]*The state of the Irish affaires...* E 314 (7). The pamphlet came out around Jan. 3, and thus appears to have been intended to influence discussion on the Lieutenancy as well as to vindicate the committee over revenue matters.

[39]*The state of the Irish affaires...* E 314 (7), pp. 21-2. They argued against a new Lieutenant on the basis that Dublin was not yet in Parliament's hands, and so he lacked a suitable residence, but also preferred provincial government and recommended both Inchiquin and Leven.

[40]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 396-7; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 33b; B.L. Add. MS 31 116. f. 252a; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 326-7. The successful tellers were Evelyn and Strickland, defeating Clotworthy and Holles.

focus on treaties with the Irish is not accidental. As well as being a long-standing element in parliamentarian policy, it took on new relevance as information concerning the Glamorgan negotiation leaked through (Jan. 16). Contemporaries suggested that great damage had been done to the King's reputation;[41] certainly the repudiation of all treaties with the Irish was included as one of the core demands of Parliament in response to Charles's latest overtures to them,[42] while progress was continued on legislation to outlaw Catholicism in Ireland.[43]

A new Lieutenant could perhaps be regarded as a political guarantor as well as a military conqueror. In any event, Parliament topped its command structure on Jan. 21 with a vote that Philip, Viscount Lisle be 'Governor' of Ireland for the period of one year.[44] Inchiquin, soon to be his bitter opponent, for now requested that the 'one man' named to govern Ireland begin in Munster 'the first province in the kingdom'. His report was included in one the Irish committee drew up on Jan. 27.[45] They had kept consideration of the material basis of the Irish war before a House preoccupied with the question of governance. By December it had been established that assessment would be the way to go forward in terms of finance, and a new ordinance was under discussion. The request had been made that the Irish committee bring in a full computation of the costs of the Irish war, as part of a general attempt to overhaul financial arrangements, to simplify procedures and ease the tax-payer.[46] Their estimate of total costs for present and projected forces in Ireland was about £48 961 / month; the suggested reinforcement was 500 cavalry and 3 500 infantry for Munster, 1 340 cavalry and 3 000 infantry for Ulster. But they had incurred no further expenditure since their Nov. report.[47] Having assigned the assessment funds at that time, they were still waiting for collections to be completed, advances not having been made. The reading of the report secured only promises, and certainly no offers of interim or

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[41]For comments on the impact of the revelations, see *Montereul correspondence*, i, 117, 124; Baillie to Ramsay, Jan. 20 in *Letters of Baillie* ed. Laing, ii, 338. Of course Charles moved quickly to repudiate the terms, but the odium over Ireland, which had preceded the new revelations, was bound to stick.

[42]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 403-4, 408-9, 418, 419; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 35b, 37a-b; B.L. Add. MS 31 116. f. 254a-b; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 304, 306.

[43]The grand committee of Jan. 3 resolved that any new governor obey parliament's instructions; it also charged Reynolds to bring in a bill to outlaw Catholicism, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 394-5; B.L. Add. MS 31 116. f. 252a. Jan. 20 saw the reading of a bill to outlaw Catholicism in Ireland, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 411; cf. Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, p. 292 for provisions against Catholicism in the Newcastle propositions, though Ireland is not specified.

[44]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 413; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 36a. However, the Ulster commissioners were also voted to remain in place, acting without the necessary conjunction with their Scottish counterparts, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 408; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 429.

[45]P.R.O. S.P. Ire. 63, 261 / 9, pp. 90-9; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 432-6.

[46]B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 34b. The assessment ordinance for Ireland was progressing through its stages, and the committee was pressing ahead with the reinforcements for Munster, delayed by the failure to obtain a loan for their costs. *Commons' jn.*, iv, 404, 405; B.L. Add. MS 31 116. f. 254a for the assessment. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 427-8, 431; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 35a for reinforcements, and efforts to obtain money.

[47]P.R.O. S.P. Ire. 63, 261 / 9, pp. 90-9; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 432-6.

additional finance.[48] Instead the commitment to existing means was reaffirmed, with measures to tighten assessment collection and its further devolution to John Davies and partners.[49]

The adventurers' committee had been defeated on two fronts, in their financial plans[50] and political recommendations.[51] While tension with the Scots had seen some of their allies of 1643-4 melt away,[52] any realignment with Holles and his supporters could hardly extend to Ireland in so far as Clotworthy had long campaigned for an overall command in Ulster more amenable to planter interests. But if this combination could overthrow the 1644 command structure, it could not produce an agreed alternative. The idea, then floated, of placing Cromwell in command in Ireland could not but wrench apart opinion in Parliament.[53] Why Clotworthy and Holles voted against one-man rule in Ireland is not so clear, but future events could suggest three possible reasons. Lisle himself was clearly an 'Independent' candidate[54], though this may not as yet have been too obvious a stumbling block.[55] More generally, there appears good grounds to suspect that 'Presbyterians'[56] in Parliament lent towards

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[48]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 432-4, 443-4; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 38b; B.L. Add. MS 31 116. f. 255b.

[49]C.B.K. ordered that the collection of the assessment in Somerset, Dorset, Gloucester and Bristol was to be put into his hands. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 334, 359-61. The adventurer organisation had been effectively shut down. The Commons' committee to liase with the adventurers had ordered the surrender of all their records on Dec. 11 - the response was to plead the authority of the Accounts committee and counter with charges against Davies. See *The state of the Irish affaires...* E 314 (7), pp. 14-16; cf. Bottigheimer, *English money*, p. 96; MacCormack, *Revolutionary politics*, p. 99. Instead a full statement of Davies's accounts was delivered by the Accounts committee on Feb. 27. (Even so, the Commons, approving the new assessment on Feb. 16 sought to obtain credit at Grocers' Hall, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 443-4.) For the Davies accounts, see *Cal. S. P. dom., Addenda, 1625-49*, p. 692; P.R.O. S. P. 17 / H/ 10.

[50]Their long-standing attempt to impugn Davies had come before the Commons on Dec. 8, with Pierrepoint attempting a repudiation of behalf of Davies's sponsor, C.B.K. All was referred to a committee of 39, but did not re-emerge. *Commons' jn.*, iv, 368; *The state of the Irish affaires...* E 314 (7), pp. 1-8, 10-12, 12-14; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 247a. Evidence about Irish provisioning had been taken by the Accounts Committee since Sept., 1644, much of it concerning Davies. His opponents would still be harping on old allegations as late as 1650. See P.R.O. S.P. 28 / 253B.

[51]Continued support for the Scottish command may reflect the fact that Grocers' Hall was financially enmeshed with the Scottish armies, as well as a dose of religious Presbyterianism. This of course does not mean that the adventurers were not divided on these matters, as Hawkins's submission shows, only that Grocers' Hall had gone this way.

[52]Though see the qualifications made above on the level of dissension. Vane, for example, even after Cromwell's 'conquest' of Scotland did not want the Scots reduced to the level of a 'conquered' people (Jonathan Scott, *Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677* (Cambridge, 1988), p. 100).

[53]Waller suggested (Dec. 4) that Cromwell's enthusiasm made it 'a matter very serious whether we should not all petition to have him as our Deputy..'. *Egmont MSS*, i, 265. After the Dec. 20 debate Perceval believed Waller's intended petition for Cromwell had been inaugurated, but 'stayed by them for some reasons'. *Egmont MSS*, i, 268. By Jan. 31 Nicholas reported to Ormond that Cromwell had turned down the command ' resolving first to see the Independents settled in their hoped for gouernment in England...'. Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 351-2. Thus the likelihood that Lisle was an '*ersatz* Cromwell' is strong, Bottigheimer, *English money*, p. 104.

[54]See below, chapters 9-10; for the moment it should be noted that Evelyn was the first person noted as nominating Lisle, on Dec. 15 (*Egmont MSS*, i, 268).

[55]Clotworthy was supposed to have had campaigned for him in the past, and could co-operate with him in 1646; real divisions seem to have been delayed.

[56]It cannot be too often repeated that religious labels are both essential and confusing. The reality of religious disputes in 1645-6 is inescapable, but this means neither the establishment of permanent

conciliar (and institutional) rule, in state as well as church, usually under the permanent supervision of the Houses; the aristocratic 'Independents', at least, show a propensity to vest more trust in the appointment of reliable individuals to key positions of power. In Irish terms the 'Presbyterians' appear consistent in preferring a combination of strong regional government (Lords President and provincial commissioners) plus the more temporary central office of Lords Justices. Finally, there is just the possibility of concern that the nomination of a new Lieutenant would close the door finally on Ormond's defection, or at least erect an unnecessary obstacle to the reconciliation of Irish Protestants (or even the King) long accustomed to accord legitimacy to the Marquis's actions.[57]

Parliament's naval commanders had continued to woo Ormond in late 1645;[58] more successfully, their blockade further hindered communication between Dublin and the King. But despite pessimism among the royal entourages about an Irish peace[59] Ormond worked away at negotiations[60] somewhat more inclined to believe the confederates had accepted that their cause was bound to fall with the King's.[61] If he was operating blind of the royal will, he proved again an accurate interpreter of Charles's intentions, and the centrality of the issues of religion and of the sending of military aid to England. The terms delivered by the confederates in Nov. worried Ormond in so far as they did nothing to prevent Catholic use of ex-Protestant church buildings.[62] Instead he delivered what he deemed his final offer,[63] adding that if the

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'parties' nor that all other issues saw similar alignments. As will be argued here, it seems better to regard the two 'juntoes' as having genuinely integrated policies but not always being able to bring with them all those who agreed on religion; also that there was an irreducible core remaining of the original 'Cause', defection from which could arouse the ire of the House.

[57]Nicholas was aware of this, as he told Ormond, Feb. 18 (Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 354). There remain many uncertainties. Nicholas was certain that Inchiquin had been a contender in the Jan. debates (Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 351-2, 354) but it is hard to see who his supporters were, (unless Clotworthy and Holles fell back on him after the choice had been made for a new Lieutenant, or a regional sentiment was co-ordinated, perhaps by Jephson); nor can this square with Perceval's belief that the proponents of a new Lieutenant wanted him to take action in Ulster.

[58]See e.g. Captain Moulton to Ormond, Nov. 2, Carte MS 16, ff. 157-8.

[59]Charles had (Nov. 7) forbidden Prince Charles to make a retreat to Ireland, *Cal. S. P. Clarendon*, i, 286; news reaching parliament from Paris (Nov. 22 & Nov. 29) was that the treaty was, at first, presumed to have collapsed; later, that the Irish was unwilling to accept any terms, *Tanner letters*, pp. 197-9. By Dec. 13 Ashburnham professed a hope that a peace was not concluded, 'being now fully aware of the base intentions of the Irish', *Cal. S. P. Clarendon*, i, 290.

[60]As far as he was concerned, with Glamorgan giving assistance, Lowe, 'Glamorgan mission', pp. 172-4.

[61]Ormond to Dillon, Nov. 4, Carte MS 16, f. 168.

[62]Ormond referred the latest confederate statement of terms to the Lord Chancellor and 10 legal officers on Nov. 6 with the query whether they precluded legal punishment under the Elizabethan laws for the saying of Mass or other Catholic services in Protestant churches; they affirmed there would be no legal basis for penal action, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 169-70. Ormond made this the explicit basis of his rejection of those terms on Nov. 10, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 176-80.

[63]Ormond to Muskerry, Nov. 21 / 22, *Letter-book*, pp. 190-1, 191-4. To Glamorgan (Nov. 22) Ormond sent the papers, and professed 'I have stretched my authority to the uttermost that, either with safety to the Treaty or myself, it will endure...', Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 199.

confederates were not agreeable to the safeguards he had tried to stitch into the religious articles, he was happy to have all referred to the King directly, unprejudiced by previous concessions by either side.[64]

From all that is known of Charles's religious opinions, there is no doubt that Ormond was right that the King would go no further, even if this left justifiable fears at Kilkenny that referral of the religious articles would mean their abandonment.[65] The 'Ormondist' stance was that further concessions would have to be earned by military service to the King.[66] And, indeed, in Charles's letters of Dec. 1-2 he was adamant that without 10 000 troops a treaty would be useless, and it would be better to proceed by cessation.[67] Opinion in Dublin was uncertain about the outcome of the talks with the confederates,[68] and all the while Ormond kept channels open to the Protestants of Ulster.

Ormond's terms were not unlike those for the Catholics - the primary move must be the submission to royal authority as mediated by the Lieutenant; with this a toleration of aberrant religious practices could be granted.[69] It was hardly generous, but the attraction was there of re-entering the established political order, which the prominent among the Ulster Protestants had never repudiated. More than that, there was the conferring of the approval of that authority on their primary end - war to victory against the Irish Catholics. Thus Ormond's agent, Galbraith, reported the commanders in east Ulster in 'an earnest desire that this warr weare carryed on with your all allowance and concurrence' and 'overjoyed' at such a prospect. Even Sir Robert King, who Galbraith found 'bent wholy to make a party heere for the parliament', was 'very desirous to enterteyne the motion, and see what can be further effected'. The problem, of course, was that only Parliament could supply the resources needed to continue the war.[70] This, and the assurance that it would not sell out their interests, was what had brought Ulster to terms with Parliament in the first place. Old-fashioned legitimisation was better, but the war came first.

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[64]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 184-94 provides Ormond's summary of the state of negotiations by Nov. 21, including the offer to refer religion to the King's 'determination' (p. 190).

[65]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 40.

[66]Ormond to Muskerry, Dec. 15, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 330-1. See also Clanricard's letters to Glamorgan (Nov. 24), Leyburn (Dec. 7) and Muskerry (Dec. 7) in *Letter-book*, pp. 194-5, 197-8, 198-9.

[67]The two letters to Ormond are found at *Cal. S. P. Clarendon*, i, 289 and Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 328-9. As Ormond was to point out the terms were contradictory, for while the first demanded aid by April, the second insisted on an army of 10 000 by March 1. In neither case must a peace be made without 'assurance' of military assistance.

[68]N. Loftus to Perceval, Dec. 8, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 265. Cf. Sir William Usher to Perceval, Dec. 17, who professed himself 'not so wise to be able to tell you what will be the issue of the treaty', *Egmont MSS*, i, 266.

[69]Gilbert, *Contemp. hist 1641-53*, i, 649-50.

[70]Galbraith to Ormond, Nov. 14, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 327-8.

War was also top priority with the King. Only on Jan. 13 did Ormond receive the Dec. 1-2 letters urging military assistance. It is at least possible that the emphasis therein contributed somewhat to Ormond's lenient treatment of Glamorgan. He had been arrested in Dublin on Dec. 26, to the delight of Protestant opinion, and the bolstering of Ormond's standing.[71] His actions (in the covert negotiations) were characterised by the Irish Council as scandalous to the King and a 'detriment to him ... in point of regall powre, royall authoritie, revenue, interest dependence, jurisdiction, and governement; and that in soe highe a degree, as to import no lesse than an abslout giving vpp of the king's ecclesiasticall supremacy within this kingdome, and in lieve of it, introducing the fullnes of papall powre, of vast prejudice to all the protestant clergie...'.[72] This is significant since it strikes at the residue of beliefs which could unite all Protestants, including Ormond and the King in defence of a Protestant Kingdom of Ireland.[73]

There is thus no need to doubt the sincerity of Charles's disavowals of Glamorgan, or even his calls for his prosecution.[74] More surprising was Ormond's release and re-employment of the earl. But, as before, Glamorgan's value was in his supposed logistical aptitudes.[75] He hesitated to commit himself to fresh propositions, and when he did (Feb. 16) was not relapsing,[76] but pursuing the same logic as Clanricard, happy if some genuine concessions to Catholicism could be won, but aware that all depended in getting real aid to Charles.[77] In a combination of garnering

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[71]Nicholas Loftus was full of praise for the action of Ormond and the Council in arresting Glamorgan, - they 'carry all things for the preservation of the Protestants with much wisdom and care'. The arrest, he believed, would stymie Glamorgan's 'peace' and with it the Irish expedition to England. Loftus to Perceval, Dec. 22, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 267.

[72]Council to Charles, Jan. 5, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 333-8.

[73]As a reminder of what the church meant in Charles's eyes it is worth noting that in his negotiations with the Scots through Montreuil, Charles seems to have tried to buy them off by offering Irish land as collateral for their arrears, in order to save episcopal property. *Charles I in 1646: Letters of King Charles I to Queen Henrietta Maria* ed. J. Bruce (Camden Society 1st series lxiii, 1856), pp. 4-5; Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 23.

[74]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 326; Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 252-4; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 347-9, 349-50. Baillie (to Dickson, Jan. 31) responded to Charles's letter repudiating Glamorgan hopefully, seeing in it the handing over of the war to Parliament, to be combined with their efforts in sending forces, to reduce the possibility of further Irish invasions of 'this isle', *Letters of Baillie* ed. Laing, ii, 347. Montreuil was aware that not all in Parliament were as satisfied with the royal explanations as regards Glamorgan, *Montereul correspondence*, i, 130.

[75]Ormond relied on Glamorgan to move forward efforts to obtain 3 000 soldiers and £3 000, though in this last he failed badly. That Glamorgan should do so by negotiating with those (including Rinuccini) Ormond could not approach was the rationale for all such go-betweens. Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 255-6, 260-1 and *Letter-book*, pp. 201-2 for Glamorgan to Ormond; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 352-3 for Ormond's reply.

[76]The original terms were very like Ormond's own - to refer decisions on religion to the King, having already brought him an army. He merely lacked the Lieutenant's discretion in making offers, or rigidity in hazarding an army for the greater good of the Protestant monarchy. See Lowe, 'Glamorgan mission', pp. 180-5.

[77]Clearly he hoped that (what he considered) the Queen's articles left his own redundant - failing them, he committed himself to very little, only the best deal he could wring from Charles. He told Ormond (Feb. 8) that he did not want to meddle further with concessions, and that the Queen's treaty overruled his 'clandestine efforts', Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 260-1. He repeated these words to Clanricard (Feb. 9)

resources and treating for a settlement Ormond was pursuing the course undertaken by the King with regard to Parliament.[78] Both men were aware of the need for speedy conclusions, if for different reasons. For the King the rejection, in England, of his call for a personal treaty, meant that Irish settlement came to the fore[79], but, in his personal casuistry, he believed that his latest offer to the houses committed him to take Parliament's advice on Ireland *after* the arrival at an English peace and *after* he had been made aware of his engagements in Ireland. His reasoning was that by that time the Irish peace would be made or broken definitively.[80] Again Ormond was urged ahead, and the Lieutenant's estimate of perhaps 6000 soldiers ready by April 1, with more to follow, accepted as a basis for negotiation.[81] Ormond, on the other hand, believed the options to a treaty had almost vanished. Continued cessations would be disastrous for the Protestant community, and he wanted advice about how to respond to possible overtures from Parliament[82], liable to become ever more appealing to that community.[83]

Ormond's dabbling in Ulster politics had worked little effect. Over the winter of 1645-6 the commissioners had effected a parliamentary hegemony over the Protestants of the province. Their reports in Jan. informed of successes in Connacht,

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adding that he did not want 'the inconvenience of demanding anything, when I come into England, from the king but his commands to fight for him, and not any conditions by his majesty's granting which, he may esteem, he has bought my coming at a very dear rate'. Clanricard counselled the avoidance of new entanglements, but seems to have seen Glamorgan's offers as 'preparations for accomplishment of her majesty's royal designs and gracious favours'. Most important was to trust to the public commitment that the Dublin government would obey the King's ruling and purpose his 'free consent' by submission to his government and military aid. *Letter-book*, pp. 205-6, 206-8. Cf. pp. 210-2, 212 for other examples of Clanricard's faith in the binding of the Lieutenant and Council to the royal wishes.

[78]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 16-19. His call for Irish aid in his letters of Dec. 1 & 2 fit with this attempt to garner all available assistance.

[79]Charles wrote to Ormond to 'expressly comand you to conclude a peace, soe that it be according to those instructions wee haue already giuen you', even without the level of assistance earlier demanded. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 306; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 341. A letter in *Cal. S. P. Clarendon*, i, 299 (Jan. 18) suggests that this meant holding the line on Poynings's law and on the Acts of Appeal and Praemunire - that is, the king's policy was unchanged from December.

[80]Charles to the Queen, Feb. 8, in *Charles I* ed. Bruce, pp. 17-18. He adds his opinion of the Irish as ungrateful and of the Muskerry religious terms as the furthest concession he will make. To Parliament (Jan. 15), he said he would 'endeavour to give them satisfaction' over Ireland, only to tell the Queen (Jan. 18) that by these very words 'it may be I give them leave to hope for more than I intended..'. He had made this offer in his Dec. 26 letter. The second letter was read on the same day (Jan. 16) as the Commons received the Glamorgan revelations. *Lords' jn.*, vi, 72; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 278-80, 311; *Charles I* ed. Bruce, p. 11; Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 21-9.

[81]Charles to Ormond, Feb. 17, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 353.

[82]Ormond to Charles and to Nicholas, Jan. 19, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 342-4, 344-7. He also returned to the bill he had sent over, though it is not clear if this was the measure for the future security of the Protestant Ormondists, of for making arrangements to receive others into pardon. Nicholas later referred to the 'bill of graces' which was not being returned due to fear of interception. Ormond to Nicholas, Jan. 19., Carte MS 16, f. 432; Nicholas to Ormond, Feb. 18 in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 354.

[83]See the comments of Nicholas Loftus (to Perceval, Jan. 14) concerning an incident of murder and cessation violation in Wicklow, that if 'we had a peace, no wise man would take any benefit by it, and if he did, he would hazard his life.... Our condition here is full of uncertainty and hazard, and our only hope is in a union of the King and Parliament'. *Egmont MSS*, i, 278. For other references to this incident, see Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 241-3, 248-50.

with the significant detail that these were likely to be made permanent by the cultivation of the area by the invading force and the drawing in of the local population by the issue of protections. They claimed that their having the Glamorgan documents 'dispersed into several hands at Dublin, the people were so enraged to see religion betrayed' that Ormond had to arrest the offender.[84] Whether, as Galbraith believed in December, the attachment of local Protestants to Parliament was more material than spiritual, the cement remained the commitment to a war policy. He had to admit that the local commanders had wanted to submit Ormond's propositions to the commissioners.[85] In any case, the meeting of all commanders which he expected seems to have committed them to a forward war policy, aiming at the prevention of cultivation in the northern midlands area for the forthcoming year.[86] If elements of Conway's dissolving regiment gravitated to Ormondist garrisons[87], the drift was more the other way. Sir Robert King was the Lothario of the parliamentarian cause, politically speaking. Despatched first to Derry (for the general meeting of early Jan.) he moved on into Connacht.[88] At Boyle (Jan. 31) he wrote to tempt local officers into a surprisal at Athlone. Some fell for his blandishments, others were incorruptible, and Dillon squashed the plot.[89] But worse was to follow, for though Ormond had recently congratulated Ranelagh on his fidelity, the viscount delivered Roscommon to a garrison of Coote's men by Mar. 4.[90]

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[84]*Tanner letters*, pp. 201-2. Bellings told Ormond (Feb. 26) that 'There are divers Irish gentlemen in Connaght, and elsewhere, reddy to be at their side, whose names he knowes not yet', Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 262. By Jan. 12 their analysis was not that the military stand-off was due to troop shortages, but inadequate support of the armies there. Moreover, such assistance should be accompanied by a 'deputy', their own powers being limited, and running out. *Tanner letters*, pp. 203-6.

[85]Galbraith to Ormond, Dec. 21, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 331-3. Perhaps Wemyss was the 'malitious instrument', lately come from Dublin, whom he identified as stirring up suspicions that Ormond was prejudicially anti-Scottish, to the detriment of an accommodation. Thus Ormond's later adamance that Wemyss take no part in his negotiations with the commissioners, e.g. Carte MS 16, f. 573 (though of course Wemyss had already alienated Ormond by being implicated in the Drogheda plot).

[86]Bellings to Ormond, Feb. 26, in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 261-3.

[87]Ormond to Gibson, Jan. 26, Carte MS 16 f. 460.

[88]*Tanner letters*, p. 206. Galbraith had thought such a meeting in the offing on Dec. 22; in his Feb. letter, Bellings records the decision taken there for co-ordinated campaigns in the spring. Bellings to Ormond, Feb. 26, in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 261-3

[89]Carte MS 16, ff. 469, 495, 500, 510, 535, 533-4, 552. King, of course, had old associations in the area. Ormond, notably, countermanded Dillon's order for the execution of Richard St. George for his treachery (so as to use him in an exchange), Carte MSS 16, ff. 667, 677; 17, f. 46.

[90]Ormond to Ranelagh, Jan. 5 & 23, Carte MS 17, ff. 498, 457. Ranelagh to Ormond, Feb. 25, said he had been unjustly regarded as implicated in the late plot, but was now joining 'the English of this country', Carte MS 16, f. 557. Taaffe to Ormond, March 4, announces the new garrison, Carte MS 16, f. 579. As usual, Ranelagh did not neglect his personal interests. The word from London was that 'he gave up his castle upon good terms. As far as I can Hear, what rents he received there is to be applied to the army, and he is by contract to receive the value here for his subsistence'. Perceval to Broghill, April 7, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 286. But though the Ulster commissioners repaid the cash he had lent Coote, and his sequestration seems to have been removed in England, Parliament did not meet its obligations. By 1650 his wife was complaining that despite the arrangement the only money ever paid was a small allowance to herself and their children granted in Feb. 1647 - *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 521, 522, 531; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 465; *Cal. C. C.*, iii, 1659.

Whether the battle for the soul of Protestant Ireland was regarded from London as potentially encompassing the conversion of Ormond, in Ulster the commissioners went so far to suggest that they could now cut a deal without the Scottish commissioners, and wanted to make a treaty, assuming none with the Irish.[91] This was in Feb., but Ormond stuck to his, and the King's, then preference for formal arrangements with the confederates, sending the most non-committal of responses.[92] But, as indicated, there were limits to the extent to which he would go with Kilkenny, especially on religion and military assistance.[93] The terms set out in Nov. had largely been stuck to, and the months leading up to the open accord of March 28 had being taken up largely with internal confederate debates over provisions for religion and, latterly, practical military problems.[94] The confederates had wanted to delay publication in the hope of continental aid, and in the hope of royal ratification of religious concessions.[95] But Ormond was aware of sentiments within Protestant Ireland. Refusing the delay in publication, he told Glamorgan of the consequences of further cessation renewals - 'inevitable ruine ... upon all his Majestie's true servants heere, through want, and the consequences of muteny, disorder, and treachery that will certainly accompany it, and are alredy, upon the noyse of a barren Peace, beginning to appeare'. If the northern armies moved against Dublin it was in expectation of finding 'more frends than enemyes'.[96]

Richard Bellings had been aware of such dangers since he reported to Ormond of Ulster plans for spring campaigns. Expeditions were expected both into Connacht and through the midlands of counties Monaghan, Cavan, Westmeath and Longford. Moreover, 'Dundalke, the Newry, Drogheda, and the rest of the English garrisons in

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[91]Annesley and Beale to Ormond, Feb. 16, Carte MS 16, f. 525.

[92]Ormond to Annesley and Beale, March 2, Carte MS 16, f. 573.

[93]The clearest statement of his position is in an undated memorandum, apparently only for his own use, and written, it seems, before the signature of the Peace. It deserves quotation in full. 'I conceive to make the offer now will plainly discover whether they intend to make Peace upon any conditions lesse than those given by my Lord of Glamorgan. If noe lesse will serve, then is his Majestie noe longer kept in hope of the advantages he hath hitherto promised himself by a Peace here, and soe he will be at liberty to propose to himselfe and prosecute such other ways of preserveing himself as perhaps are not consisten with the Irish Peace. And if what shall now be offered come so far short of satisfieing that it will not soe much as divide the Irish, I conceive if he give them up a sacrifice to his own safty, the sin of their extirpation will be equally shared betweext the Parliament, that covet their land and thirst for their blood, and themselves, that will accept of noe conditions but such as for noe earthly considerations his Majestie can graunt, nor any honest Protestant Minister of his can be an instrument to convay unto them, whilst his Majestie, thus prest on the one hand and his offers on the other not only rejected but raising continual prejudices upon him, shall be cleere to God and the world'. Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 285-6.

[94]The confederates, of course, were counting on further concessions on the basis of Glamorgan's latest deal. the final terms are set out in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*,, v, 286-308. The military terms were the despatch of 6 000 men by April 1, and another 4 000 by May 1.

[95]Glamorgan to Ormond, March 11 & March 18, in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 270, 281 sought delay on the basis of European aid; the Supreme Council's letter to Muskerry (March 18) adds that the Glamorgan terms could be taken to the King, and insists on the proclamation to call all to join the treaty side or be deemed rebels, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 282-3.

[96]Ormond to Glamorgan, March 14, in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 272-3.

those partes will martch out with them, notwithstandinge of any Peace, if it be concluded.'[97] All this made it vital that Ormond concede a military alliance with the confederates. Even O'Neill gave assurances that Ormond 'shall comaund those under my comaund as soone as any army in Ireland' against 'the Kinges enemies'.[98] They could hardly have hoped for much from Ormond's actual military resources. If, however, he went ahead with a proclamation of all those outside the treaty, perhaps enough of those in arms could be won to reduce the fighting to the irreconcilable parliamentary faction.[99] Though non-committal at first, Ormond agreed, on March 30, that he would join the confederates if the latter were attacked, and, as far as possible, prosecute those who would not submit to the peace.[100] Charles was still unwilling 'that the peace of Ireland should be sacrificed to please the Scots..'.[101] He admitted (March 26) that the landing of unsupported infantry would only mean their ruin, and should be stopped, but then reversed the instruction in the space of one letter. The Irish peace must go ahead so as to be in place before any terms were made with Parliament.[102] As usual, though, such orders took time to arrive. But he appears to have envisaged a co-operative reduction of Ireland to 'perfect obedience' very like that sought by the confederates.

Ormond was being backed into a corner. What he had sought all along was a settlement which could bring all 'loyal' Ireland back under its Protestant monarchy. Instead he was being forced to choose between absorption in to 'rebel' military camps. Within days of the signing of the peace, it had been made clear that his aim of militarily assisting the King had vanished.[103] Thus the authentication of loyalty had not been made. Towards the regaining of Ireland for Charles, Ormond was still willing to promise the 'reduction' of the parliamentarians, but he clearly understood this in his own terms, excluding an offensive military arrangement.[104] He was worried about

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[97]Bellings to Ormond, Feb. 26, in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 261-3.

[98]O'Neill to Daniel O'Neill, March 21, in Gilbert, *Contemp. hist, 1641-53*, i, 666; Casway, *Owen Roe O'Neill*, p. 125.

[99]Supreme Council to Muskerry, March 18, in Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 282-3.

[100]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*,, v, 266, 312-3. Ormond left the terms of such action to his own judgement.

[101]Charles to Henrietta Maria, March 22, in *Charles I* ed. Bruce, p. 28.

[102]Charles to Ormond, & to Digby, March 26, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 356-7, 357-8. Charles posited Ireland as either a royal retreat or a base for future gains in England and Scotland. He was still aiming at victory by division in England.

[103]By the beginning of the month the Supreme Council were aware of the fall of the last of Charles's ports in England, and Ormond was informed of the inability to send aid. A letter of April 11 mentioned the diversion of 3 000 of the men for English service against the Parliamentary forces at Bunratty. Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 324-5; Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 56-7.

[104]Ormond held to this even after the failure of the April 1 deadline, in his reply to the confederate overtures in mid- April. But he still only offered to think about a declaration to work division among the confederates enemies, and pointed out that if the Irish published the Glamorgan terms, he would be forced to repudiate them, as already rejected by the King. Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 330-2, 332-3.

even keeping what support he had among Protestants.[105] As an evidence of danger he reported, on March 24, a 'desperate plot' in Dublin.[106] The day that the articles were signed a corporal, 'being frantic' and 17 men tried to seize the castle itself. If 'no man of quality was found to have a hand in it' great suspicion was generated.[107] He may be doing the King's will, but Ormond was skirting a chasm of Protestant disapproval.[108]

The fears of the confederates were largely the result of the obvious stepping up of parliamentary involvement in Ireland. The process continued at Westminster through the spring. On March 2 both Houses agreed an ordinance extending the powers of the Ulster commissioners for another six months.[109] A week later the renewal of the Irish assessment was likewise accomplished.[110] Yet, as Perceval was to comment on March 30, 'Want of money is the chiefest stay', there being 'not yet any thorough course taken for the speedy raising of money designed for the Lord Lisle's despatch'.[111] Clearly Lisle was perceived as a fighting Lieutenant. That the focus of the war should still be Munster was no more than a reflection of the failure to make much progress since the resolutions of the previous autumn.[112] At least the renewal of the assessment meant that the Committee had more money to use as credit .[113]

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[105]Thus, for example, his insistence on the payment of the £3 000 agreed, to quell discontent in Dublin. By mid-April the confederates were willing to offer other limited material concessions to the same end. Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, v, 327-8, 328-30, 330, 331-2.

[106]Ormond to Glamorgan, March 24, Carte MS 16, f. 694. On Feb. 9, the parliamentary naval captain, Robert Clarke, reported approaches from within Dublin by a Major Edward Aston, offering to withdraw men for service in Munster, if a peace with the Irish were signed by Ormond, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 437-8.

[107]V. Savage to Perceval, April 2, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 284-5. John Borlace jr., the regimental commander of the men involved, seems to have fallen into odium, as his repeated letters seeking intercession with Ormond attest, Carte MS 17, ff. 68, 231.

[108]Loftus may not be an accurate witness (though their is reason to think he represented a considerable constituency in Dublin in his opinions) but he reported on March 18 that 'we all, the protestants here, have great hopes that the peace of England will suddenly be concluded.... If God send an agreement between the King and his people there, the war here will suddenly be at an end.' Again, the preference was for an English, over an Irish, settlement. The aversion to a treaty is seen in the coincidence in date with the statements drawn up by ex-cessationists in London, Perceval and Inchiquin, asserting that they had accepted the ceasefire unaware 'of any intention that his Majesty had to make the Cessation an introduction to a peace...'. *Egmont MSS*, i, 283, 274-5; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 434-5.

[109]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 458, 459; *Lords' jn.*, vii, 192-3. This only extended their military powers; the Irish committee said that the new commission granting civil authority had been delayed since the Great Seal was 'under a vacancy', B. L. Add. MS 4769A, f. 6a.

[110]Apparently it passed the Commons on March 6 - B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 258a; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 42b; *Lords' jn.*, viii, 205.

[111]Perceval to Waller, March 30, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 284.

[112]See appendices 2-4 for details. Inchiquin, for example, still had not received the interim £6 000 voted him as an emergency measure. The focus on Munster in late 1645 had been partly a response to its dire condition, partly a reflection of the fact that Ulster had been favoured previously. For efforts over money and troops in March, 1646 see *Commons' jn.*, iv, 465; *Tanner letters*, p. 215; *Egmont MSS*, i, 283; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 443. 444 (commissions for Jephson's and Sterling's officers, March 28 & 31).

[113]See appendix 2 for details. For money and supplies see also *Commons' jn.*, iv, 493, 495, 496; *Lords' jn.*, viii, 243.

On March 16 the vote was formally taken that Lisle be made Lord Lieutenant, with power to act as commander-in-chief and to execute the laws, under the direction of Parliament. The Solicitor general was to draw up his commission, and the *English* members of C.B.K. to prepare his instructions and consider a Council for him.[114] It had followed the reading (March 11) of more captured correspondence, speaking of the conclusion of a peace in Ireland, with the sending over of 10 000 Irish soldiers in return for 'a Tolleracon of theire Religion there'. The order was given to print the 'Earl of Glamorgan's Negotiations', and they appeared on March 17.[115] The propaganda war, too, was entering a new phase.

If Lisle's commission appears to be related to negotiations in Ireland, it was also relevant to plans for discussions in England. Perceval identified the one obstacle to the completion of Lisle's commission as the Scots, who '(upon occasion of the propositions now to be sent to the King) do much insist upon the command in chief; but 'tis thought that that will be no hindrance'.[116] He was right. The Commons' vote on Lisle followed a vote to omit the 1643-4 arrangements in forthcoming propositions.[117] The Scottish commissioners recognised that most of the amendments from Uxbridge were towards cutting back the ties between the two countries, including in their control of Ireland.[118] It was not that all these changes were permanent but, on the evidence of Baillie's letters, April was the low point in the relations between the allies.[119] The Irish Committee were not above participation in the dispute. On March 7 they had written to the Ulster commissioners on the basis of votes against the newly raised Scottish cavalry in the province, a Scottish practice also condemned in England.[120] A full letter was despatched to the commissioners on March 31.[121] The main gist was to prevent the exactions of the military ('some' of the British and 'most' of the Scottish officers were blamed) and replace it with equitable quartering for all, and

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[114]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 475; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 260a.

[115]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 472; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 259a; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, ff. 43a-b; Shiela Lambert, *Printing for Parliament 1641-1700* (List and Index Society, special series, no. 20, London, 1984), p. 114. *The Lord George Digby's Cabinet and Dr. Goff's negotiations*, E 329 (15) appeared on March 26, Lambert, *Printing for Parliament*, p. 115.

[116]Perceval to Waller, March 30, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 284.

[117]The Lords gave their approval on April 9, and the commission was sent for the Great Seal, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 488, 504.

[118]Stevenson, 'Early Covenanters and the federal union', pp. 173-5. It is worth adding that among the recommendations of the Scottish government, in the absence of agreement on the Uxbridge terms, was that 1/3 of places on the Scottish Council be given to Englishmen, in return for 1/3 of Scots on both the English *and Irish* Councils. Scotland remained unwilling to face an autonomous and threatening Irish government.

[119]While on March 6, he felt that 'except some evill spirit interpose, there is some appearence of peace shortly'; by March 17, he was much less hopeful, and by April 24 was fearing a new war. *Letters of Baillie* ed. Laing, ii, 357, 361, 368-9. April also saw the condemnation by Parliament of the Scottish publication of their disputes over the propositions, Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 100-1.

[120]B. L. Add. MS 4769A, f. 6a.

[121]B. L. Add. MS 4769A, ff. 6b - 8a.

restitution where appropriate to the civilian population. By April 9 the Committee voted to complain to the Commons on the continued occupancy of Belfast and the Scottish practice of withdrawing veterans and replacing them with raw recruits.[122]

If Perceval was clearly worried at the extent of 'jealousies between the Scotch and others' he also recorded of the Lisle initiative that Davies and partners were 'in hand wholly to furnish him (the citizens and adventurers being backward)..', with all aiming to be ready by midsummer.[123] Though there had been long delays, and particularly over finance, Parliament was, by early April, looking for 'one way' of receipt and payment of all revenue for England and Ireland, an important prerequisite for financial success, and including an estimate of the costs of all forces.[124] Lisle issued commissions to raise the regiments long promised for Munster, and further supplies were organised[125], but Ulster too was promised assistance.[126] By April 24 a minor breakthrough occurred when money from 'central' reserve funds was voted for Ireland.[127]

As yet the destination of any expedition Lisle might lead had not been openly declared.[128] But at least there was a range of successes to prompt speculation. Reports continued to arrive of successes in the north-west, but most resounding was the news of the intervention at Bunratty, near Limerick. The plan had originated in Dec. with Broghill, who delivered 700 men to a parliamentary convoy which first assaulted Dingle. By March 10, they had reached the Shannon and made approaches to the Protestant, but neutral, Earl of Thomond. Though wary of the consequences for his people if later deserted by Parliament, and cautious in the absence of obvious authorisation, he proved compliant. Moulton, in command of the ships, was buoyant about the prospects in the region after the admission of the garrison - with 1 500

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[122]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 444.

[123]Perceval to Broghill, April 7, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 285-6, 288. Cf. Bottigheimer, *English money*, p. 97.

[124]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 499, 507-8. A new assessment ordinance was under discussion by April 24, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 520-1.

[125]See appendices 3 & 4 for details. Four fresh regiments (one of them cavalry) were intended, though money was still only available for the two commissioned in 1645, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 444; Perceval to Hodder, April 9, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 287. For supplies see *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 444-5, 445-6, 456, 456-7; *Cal. S.P. dom., Addenda, 1625-49*, p. 695.

[126]The Irish committee had written to the Commissioners on April 7 promising 'further meanes ... shortly ...for full relief', B. L. Add. MS 4769A, f. 8b. Their commission was renewed by April 24, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 521, 522.

[127]See appendix 2. This involved £10 000 from the excise, £10 000 from Goldsmiths' Hall, and £5 000 from Haberdashers' Hall. (There was also talk of another 'Spanish money' scheme.) On such bases the Committee could take action without waiting for the slow arrival of assessment funds. *Commons' jn.*, iv, 520-1, 524; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 266a; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 48a. The tellers in favour of money for Ireland were Knightley, Temple, Clotworthy and Evelyn. Probably this money was intended as an advance only, but the point remains that substantial sums were diverted, even if temporarily.

[128]Perceval thought a 'small force' sufficient for Dublin. Perceval to Jephson, April 13, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 287.

troops, and a reinforced Inchiquin to act in diversion, 'as much good might be done here as in Munster..', though delay would endanger the locals.[129]

Was Thomond forced into his new alignment? Certainly Glamorgan thought him 'a traytor to your king and country'.[130] His response came suspiciously near to the like reaction from Ranelagh, and to the signing of the accord by Ormond, for it to look like coincidence that parliamentary forces landed on his doorstep. The consequences for the royalist - confederate cause were grim.[131] As Clanricard recognised, with renewed aggression from Ulster, and the prospect of a revitalised army under Inchiquin, the cause in the west was in genuine peril.[132] He had been offered the joint command in the province in the aftermath of the settlement, which he remained reluctant to undertake in the ambiguous situation of non-publication.[133] Ormond offered the right to 'lead and make use of any forces you can get' in advance of formal powers to repel 'those that adhere to the parliament'.[134] But this was merely to repeat the unsuccessful formula of the 1645 Connacht campaign.

The Lieutenant, with the Peace not proclaimed, and its literal terms now broken by the failure of the expedition to England, was still not going to make an open break with the Protestants of the north.[135] On April 9, he wrote to the commissioners, repeating his terms of a month earlier, that they should send him propositions, though in the meantime lending countenance to an attempt to capture them.[136] By the middle of April, the Earl of Argyll had landed in Ulster, along with fellow Scottish commissioners, to make a brief effort at an Ulster C.B.K. even as Westminster was voting down the system. Argyll's political abilities are perhaps not fully appreciated.[137] Just as in July he would work wonders for the Scottish position at Westminster, so now he managed to win this last moment of Covenanter co-operation

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[129]Moulton to Lenthall, March 17, in *Tanner letters*, pp. 215-6. Note that he requested 'power to pardon persons, necessary for the state's service'.

[130]Hogan, *Letters and papers*, p. 189.

[131]Localism was particularly endemic in the west anyway, and the general feeling was that neither the Clare gentry nor the city of Limerick would do much to oppose the incursion. Crosby to Ormond, April 24, Carte MS 17, f. 225. Even Digby was able to sympathise with the confederate desire to divert thence 3 000 of the men they had promised for English service. Digby to Ormond, April 3, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 363-5.

[132]Clanricard to Leyburn, April 12, in *Letter-book*, p. 220.

[133]But he was clear on the need to oppose 'the Scots and the arms of the malignant garrisons...'. The enemy, he reported 'receives the contribution of three whole baronies' in Co. Mayo, a sign that they had gone beyond the earlier raiding. Clanricard to Ormond, March 29, to Darcy, April , *Letter-book*, pp. 215-7, 222-4.

[134]Ormond to Clanricard, April 22, in *Letter-book*, pp. 226-7.

[135]Ormond told Muskerry, April 6, that military intervention on behalf of the King was a 'necessary adiunt to the peace' and in the best interests of the Irish. Part of the reason, as his letter to Digby a day earlier would suggest, was that the inclusion of the conditional military clause was vital in winning the Council's support for the Peace - in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 366-8, 365-6.

[136]Carte MS 17, f. 104. The plan to capture them centred on Major Galbraith, brother of Humphrey; a counter-plan existed to capture the latter, Carte MS 17, ff. 38, 40, 143.

[137]For an argument for the central role of Argyll in Anglo-Scottish relations in 1641-3 see Cowan, 'Solemn League and Covenant', pp. 183-9.

in Ireland. Together the English and Scottish commissioners appraised Ormond of what they wanted - nothing less than the discounting of a treaty with the Irish, the admission of their troops to Dublin, and Ormond's submission to 'King and Parliament'.[138] Though the Lieutenant did not throw out their surrender terms, but asked for a meeting of delegates,[139] his letter to Digby rings true in its assertion that he was only playing for time - safeguarding his quarters against attack, and 'to satisfie some wavering mindes, and in full assurance to make aduantage of it; their insolence is such vpon their late successe.'[140]

Parliamentary successes could only be furthered by developments at Westminster that spring. On May 2 the Commons voted that their Lieutenant, Lord Lisle, should be empowered to raise troops. The vote had originated in the Lords (April 28) in a report from C.B.K. by Lisle's uncle, the Earl of Northumberland.[141] In specific terms, the resulting ordinance matched the recommendations of the Irish committee back in February.[142] The most obvious reason for delays was the lack of ready cash to get forces levied; but perhaps some thought should also be taken of the recruiting drive for the New Model from Jan. 1646, now drawing in the south-western counties, where Sterling had been ordered to recruit.[143] In financial terms, a complex and shaky structure had been erected to get the funds called for in the Feb. report. If the April 24 resolutions had offered temporary access to diverse funds, there was a more stable revenue on offer from an extension of the assessment.[144] To get around

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[138]In return promises were made that Ormond would have personal security to a degree unparalleled in the late wars - Annesley saw this as opening 'a faire way for the flourishing estate of the protestants in this kingdome'. Carte MS 17, ff. 146, 157, 159; Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 211-2, 219. Rawdon told Eustace, April 14, that Argyll promised £80 000, regular revenue, 5 - 6 infantry regiments and 1 500 cavalry, Carte MS 17, f. 137. Given that Stevenson shows Argyll as coming to *withdraw* Scottish soldiers, it seems any truth behind the report would suggest his recounting of English assistance. That Argyll would thus implicitly countenance Parliament's increasing, and the Scots' decreasing, power in Ulster, might suggest parallel reasons to why he was popular at Westminster.

[139]Carte MS 17, ff. 206, 214.

[140]Ormond to Digby, April 26, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 372.

[141]*Lords' jn.*, viii, 288; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 530. He was to be given power to raise such forces as were already authorised by votes of Parliament and to commission officers. When, however, the lower House passed an ordinance specifying Lisle' powers in this regard, over the projected 7 840 new soldiers the Lords stalled their response until mid-June - when passed by them the Commons failed to respond, probably because the votes had been overtaken by troop increases. *Commons' jn.*, iv, 555, 570, 577, 580, 582; *Lords' jn.*, viii, 321-2, 325, 341, 342, 358, 367, 377. Whether the Lords were displeased at restrictions being placed on Lisle, or over the size of the forces is unclear.

[142]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 544. See appendix 4 for elucidation of troops numbers. The 6 000 infantry and 1 840 cavalry reflect the numbers then sought for Munster (2 000 and 500) and Ulster (3 000 and 1 840) plus Sterling's regiment, as yet unformed (cf. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 455). Though Inchiquin had envisaged the new recruits as bolstering his depleted regiments, the Commons voted on March 6 that they be made up into regiments under Lisle's authority, *Commons' jn.* iv, 465.

[143]Gentles, *New Model Army*, pp. 33, 38. He shows that a total of 17 000 foot was reached by April, higher than the original strength. Cf. Baillie's worries at this time of the general build-up of parliamentary forces in England, *Letters of Baillie* ed. Laing, ii, 364-5.

[144]See appendix 2 for all details. The assessment was now to run from 1 May - 31 October, 1646. See *Commons' jn.*, iv, 544-5, 546; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 51a; *Lords' jn.*, viii, 317; *Cal. S. P. dom., Addenda, 1625-49*, p. 695; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 448-9.

the delays contingent upon collection, a further ordinance (May 23) shored up the credit worthiness of the tax by stabilising the machinery for collection of arrears, and added guarantees for repayment of an advance of £40 000 by the treasurers of present income. As for further access to excise funds, that had been swallowed up in the ongoing struggle to recoup John Davies's advances.[145]

Thus May - June saw the Committee hard at work on the logistics of the future Irish expedition. As in 1641-2, troops were being rounded up, often in batches of company size, officers were commissioned[146], and the demand for yet more ready money remained at the heart of the daily struggle. Other issues fell somewhat in the shade. Belfast was debated in the Commons on May 13, and at the Irish Committee on May 16, alongside the questions of Scottish recruitment in Ulster and the exchange of experienced troops.[147] On June 6 notice was received, via Sir Robert King, of Ormond's sending to Monro the King's letter to him of April 3, announcing his intention of joining the Scottish army, in an attempt to win Monro over to Ormond's side.[148] The matter was debated in the House on June 8 - 9, with a plea from the Scottish commissioners to give no credit to a fabricated document. The result was a vote that Charles had intended to divide and set at arms the Parliament and the Scots.[149] Two days later it was resolved that the offending letter be sent to a range of range of persons and bodies from the King to the Scottish Parliament, along with a letter setting out Parliament's comments. It was not the severe breach that could have occurred - the chief blame was laid on the King, not the Scots. And that day their armies in England and Ireland were voted funds.[150]

Though it was not yet known in London, there was not much of an army in Ireland to receive funding. On June 5, Monro went down to a serious defeat at Benburb, at the hands of Owen Roe O'Neill.[151] Ironically, just as Parliament started to get to grips with the Irish war effort, its adherents began a dangerous losing streak.[152] The 1646 campaigns show the confederates deliberately co-ordinating their armies to make significant gains and stalemate the war again. The prospects for Ormond of

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[145]See appendix 2 for details. A vote to repay Davies was squeezed through the House on May 13 by only 25 : 21 (*Commons' jn.*, iv, 545), but his continued co-operation was clearly essential even if it meant a huge diversion of present funding to pay for past supplies. See also *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 848-52; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 533; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 450-1.

[146]The Irish committee adopted two strategies for recruitment - luring ex-soldiers into service at the point of disbandment, and allowing officers to approach the committee with offers of men. For examples of the former see *Commons' jn.*, iv, 537; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 448, 449 (Massey's brigade),449, 450. For the latter, e.g. Cal. *S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 448, 449.

[147]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 544-5; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 448-9.

[148]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 567, 568; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 273a; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 54a.

[149]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 570; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 273a; Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 113-4.

[150]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 570.

[151]Casway, *Owen Roe O'Neill*, pp. 127-36; Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 227, 230-2.

[152]Roscommon was retaken by Preston, threatening the Protestant gains in Connacht, while the beleaguered garrison at Bunratty surrendered on July 14. Bagwell, *Ireland*, ii, 115-22.

control of the island if he threw in his lot with the confederates were becoming real; and, as he well knew, the prospects of looming parliamentary conquest were also almost palpable. But Ormond's problems included the worries of the good royal servant that his own instincts might not be in accordance with the royal will. The blending of factions under the royal banner had been Ormond's guiding star, in the intervals when the light of the royal Sun was not to be seen.[153] In the 1646 campaign, as in previous years, Connacht was the cockpit. There is no doubting Ormond's desire to keep it out of the hands of the parliament party to the extent of combining efforts to persuade O'Neill to intervene with attempts to dissuade Coote from attacking royalist quarters.[154] Clanricard was himself wary of accepting formal command over confederate forces in the absence of the proclamation of the Peace, but he had none about the need to declare against Coote and his followers, and rejected the proffered casuistry that since Coote's men acted as rebels they could be treated as such with formal declaration.[155]

Yet Ormond, albeit he was hampered by his own council, was adamant about keeping his bridges unburnt. His disappointment with the confederates was genuine, and his knowledge of the royal mind fragmentary. On June 11 he wrote to the King in response to the April 3 letter, promising to send an explanation why there was no peace settlement. With Charles gone to the Scots, all was in uncertainty and instructions were urgently needed to prevent the 'dissolution of your governement heere'.[156] In his diplomatic manoeuvres subsequent to his arrival among the Scots, Charles did not advert much to Ireland, though Montreuil's report of May 28 is an interesting parallel to the Ormond formula in the King's satisfying the Scots on civil matters and postponing religion for a final, Parliament -ratified settlement.[157] When he wrote to Ormond on June 11 telling him 'to proceede noe further in treaty with the rebels, nor to engage vs uppon any conditions with them after sight thereof'[158] he thought he had conveyed his intention that Ormond was 'only to stop treating there, after the receipt of it, but

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[153]Charles's latest letter had caused complete confusion for Ormond, though he reckoned it best to persist with trying to send military aid (Ormond to Digby, April 26, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 372).
[154]Ormond to Clanricard, May 9, in *Letter-book*, pp. 239-40; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 373-4. Ormond doubted Kilkenny's plan to operate in Connacht (excluding O'Neill) - cf. Muskerry to Ormond, May 6, Carte MS 17, ff. 298-9. On O'Neill see Gilbert, *Contemp. hist. 1641-53*, i, 672, 673; cf. Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, p. 222.
[155]Clanricard to Ormond, May 3, Carte MS 17, f. 273; to Council, May 10 & to Ormond, May 11 in *Letter-book*, pp. 233-5, 235-9; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 374-6, 376-9; Clanricard to Ormond, June 3, in *Letter-book*, pp. 255-7; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 388-92.
[156]Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 392-3.
[157]The Scots refused, insisting on the priority of the religious settlement. In fact the King's offers proved acceptable on both the militia and Ireland, though not on religion. Clearly the Scots had less interest in Ireland than their opponents alleged - as seen in their latter acceding to the Newcastle Propositions. *Montereul correspondence*, i, 207, 212.
[158]Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 392.

meddles nothing with what was done before.'[159] The message was hardly clear to that end.

It had been what Ormond had been doing, rejecting all confederate approaches on the basis of awaiting royal orders.[160] If he showed little more than delaying tactics in his contacts with the Ulster commissioners, this was perhaps also a sign of his uncertainty, while the aim of keeping calm Protestant opinion in Ormondist territory was perhaps not unsuccessful.[161] When in fact the royal letter of June 11 arrived (on June 26), its effect was a (temporary) halt by the Council of all proceedings relating to the treaty with the confederates. In a series of letters to the King the Council attempted to reorient itself to the prospect of a Protestant war. Having earlier (June 22) offered the King their opinion that a war in conjunction with the Ulster forces would be ruinous, yet undertaken if ordered[162] they repeated the opinion of the dangers of conflict in the absence of assistance, and defended the application of pragmatic cessations.[163] But in their plea for the persons, estates and consciences of themselves and the other loyalists in Dublin, they thought fit to include a vindication that they had acted as they thought best, and their language is that of commitment to Anglo-Scottish union, the flourishing of Protestantism and the conversion and suppression of its opponents.[164]

The Dublin government was let off the hook of a new war with Digby's arrival and persuasion that Charles did indeed want a peace with the Irish Catholics.[165] But the episode points up the dilemma of Protestant loyalism. The language of the June 29 letters was not feigned.[166] It was merely that such talk was usually hidden by pledges of obedience to the King. There should have been no incompatibility, for such men, between the royal honour and safety and the upholding of the (Jacobean) Protestant settlement in Ireland. That there was an incompatibility had made the reconciling of conscientious conflicts such a problem in the treaty negotiations 1643-6. As has been pointed out concerning English 'Constitutional Royalism' all the ideological commitments of such figures were so interwoven that their disentangling was seen as

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[159]Charles to the Queen, in *Charles I* ed. Bruce, pp. 47-8.

[160]Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, pp. 220-2.

[161]Carte MS 17, ff. 271, 321, 385, 399; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 364; Rushworth, iv (1), 272. V. Savage told Perceval (May 25) that 'About a week since there was a great rumour of commissioners to go hence to treat with the Scotch commissioners, but since that report is grown very calm', *Egmont MSS*, i, 292.

[162]Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 400-4.

[163]Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 405-11.

[164]Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 412-4.

[165]Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, pp. 224-6.

[166]Beckett, *Cavalier Duke*, pp. 36-7 suggests that Ormond was able to assume that the king's latest letter was not his real wishes and that the June 29 letters were designed to 'put pressure on the king to sanction further negotiations with the confederates ...and to provide in advance justification of his own conduct if he should, by a renewal of hostilities, be obliged to abandon Dublin.' The latter point seems very likely, but it is not certain if he favoured more negotiations over a continued cessation, or was unwilling to countenance reversals of policy dependent on the King's new circumstances.

the loss of the whole.[167] The block signatures of the Council correspondence disguises any internal disagreements about when one thread was about to be removed from the twine. But Ormond's own letters show he had to struggle to win approval for his actions. Back in April he told Digby that only the promises of military aid to Charles and his economical showing of royal instructions to make signing the treaty a direct order had got it through the Council.[168] For Clanricard in June, the failure to condemn the forces under Coote was related to opposition within the Council, which he wanted Ormond to work with him to break.[169] Ormond did not rise to the offer - if he could not carry his own Council, his influence in Protestant Ireland was bound to become negligible. As it was he was dangerously replicating the position of the King himself, his support diminishing, and his symbolic role as legitimating authority remaining his best card.

If the King felt trapped, like the Protestants of Ireland, between Irish and Scots, the relationships between all three kingdoms were shaken by the battle of Benburb, already alluded to. Its main effects were three. Firstly, it broke the back of Scottish power in Ireland, if not of Scottish influence.[170] Second, it presaged an upheaval in the internal politics of the confederacy comparable to the disintegration of the English parliamentary cause in 1647-9. Finally, it gave the spur to efforts in London to hasten an end to the Irish war. The news of the 'great defeat' was heard on June 15 and 'ye whole Afternoone of this day was spent in Considering how reliefe might be sent to ye Protestants there, of men Munye, Armes, & amunition...'.[171] The committee duly set to work and the process of contracting for regiments for Ireland effectively begins from this point. Their plan for financial support included the assignment of £50 000 from the customs, but more controversially, the proceeds of the sale of £20 000 worth of delinquents' lands.[172] Of the broad political issues outlined as the beginning of this chapter, the financial crisis had become completely entangled with the reconquest of Ireland. Together with obligations in the summer to pay off the Scottish army in

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[167]Smith, *Constitutional royalism*, p. 318.
[168]Ormond to Digby, April 26, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 372.
[169]Clanricard to Ormond, June 3, in *Letter-book*, pp. 255-7; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 388-92.
[170]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 236-7.
[171]Clotworthy's report from the Irish committee secured a vote in favour of the raising of 5 000 infantry and 1 500 cavalry for Ulster and the Committee was given the task of obtaining supplies and of submitting estimates. The Ulster Commission was renewed, though without the Scots, and an immediate £10 000 allocated from compositions at Goldsmiths' Hall. As with recruitment to date the Irish Committee was enabled to draw on regional forces and Lisle to issue commissions. Even the Lords now assented to the ordinance for Lisle to raise troops, though scarcely relevant in the light of increases now voted. *Commons' jn.*, iv, 576-8; B.L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 274a; B.L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 54b; *Lords' jn.*, viii, 377. See also appendix 4.
[172]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 463-4; *Tanner letters*, pp. 225-6. See also appendix 2.

England, the costs of the Irish war helped carry over the financial burden of the war years even in the months when the financial fate of the New Model was in doubt.[173] By contracting a reliance on the sale of property the Irish Committee was opening a new hornets' nest, letting loose a brood of personal and political interests to harass and hinder the reconquest process.

The Scottish question was more ambiguous. For all the rumours of wars a settlement was possible, though tension would be ongoing. Baillie (June 26) considered the upswing in Scottish fortunes as consequent upon their defeat in Ireland, their 'severe carriage towards the King', Argyll's recent appearance at Westminster and, particularly, the Scottish government's positive response, after all the disputes, to the latest (Newcastle) propositions.[174] Their stock would rise more with their departure from England, suggesting that the view of the English that amity was best served by mutual distancing was correct, on their part at least.[175] In terms of Ireland, the Scots had effectively surrendered their safeguarded role by agreeing the new propositions; perhaps as something of a reward the Commons voted, on June 22, that the propositions regarding Ireland should not infringe engagements made to the Scots.[176] If the Irish committee was still worried over Belfast this, and like issues, were not the stuff of future war.[177]

Greater trouble was stored up in religious differences. On June 20 the Commons voted that Ireland be encompassed in the articles on religion then being agreed.[178] While abolishing the episcopal system, this left the full power of settlement in the hands of Parliament.[179] If it removed the future of the church from the hands of the clericalist Presbyterians in Assembly and City[180] (and the Commons) it left the common outcome for the two kingdoms uncertain. In Irish terms, though, two implications were obvious. One was the confirmation that no-one there was left any

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[173]See Kishlansky, *Rise of the new Model Army*, pp. 110-2. The New Model's assessment was not renewed from August, 1646, though arrears collection apparently continued to provide some funding for them. See Robert Ashton, *Counter-revolution. The second civil war and its origins, 1646-8* (London, 1994), ch. 2 for the discontent caused by the continuance of wartime taxation, including the Irish assessment.

[174]*Letters of Baillie* ed. Laing, ii, 376.

[175]For this attitude, see Stevenson, 'Early Covenanters and the federal union', pp. 173-4.

[176]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 584.

[177]The Irish Committee produced another paper on Belfast on June 17, again demanding surrender, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 460. As will be more fully discussed below, 'military' issues could be potent sources of disagreement without needing to shield 'political' differences. The Irish committee's disputes with Monro's forces look back to Clotworthy and the Ulster British arguing for a fair deal, and sideways to the protests of English communities at the alleged depredations of the Scottish armies.

[178]*Commons' jn.*, iv 582, 583.

[179]Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, pp. 291-2.

[180]Cf. Baillie's comment on March 17 that 'The Pope and the King were never more earnest for the headship of the Church than the pluralitie of this Parliament', *Letters of Baillie* ed. Laing, ii, 360. Baillie was well aware that clericalist Presbyterianism was opposed not by religious Independents alone, of whom there were too few in Parliament, but also by those he called the 'lawyers' or 'Erastians'.

prescibed say in the future religious establishment, which could not but differ greatly from that existing in 1641. In turn this closing of the door to an Irish alternative to the English arrangement barred any lingering hopes of a 'haven' across the Irish Sea.

This is not so say that 'Independents' would lose interest in Ireland. Lisle might not stand out as a zealot for any particular religious cause, but his political contacts were such as would be least likely to rejoice in a strict Presbyterian settlement. As with his brother, Algernon, Lisle's closest contacts were with the 'Royal Independents' or the Saye - Northumberland group, likely to blend a mild episcopacy with a genuine belief in the religious supremacy of the civil power and an inclination to a mild toleration.[181] Religious disputes were an imported commodity in the debate over Irish policy in 1646-7, and it is never clear how far they caused differences, or were a mere cloak for less principled opposition. But insofar as religion was a glue to bind grandee groups to broader parliamentary (and external) constituencies[182] it was also a solvent of parliamentarian consensus on Ireland. For the moment all those at Irish Committee were working together in the common cause. The sub-committee of June 18 on finance included Clotworthy, Sir William Waller, Temple, Norton and Goodwyn, a pretty broad sweep of opinions.[183] But the balance was altering. Members added to the Irish committee in April - May included Lisle himself and his family friend and ally, Sir John Temple, plus Sir Gregory Norton and Thomas Challoner. From here on the four were highly consistent in their attendance and, in the divisions of 1647, invariably operating together. This did not necessarily denote a clash of opinion if external issues could be kept out of the agreed agenda of re-conquest. But in the event they could not.

Mention of Temple raises one last point. By April of 1646 his *Irish rebellion* had reached the London presses with contemporary impact as well as being a legacy to

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[181]J. Scott, *Algernon Sidney*, pp. 88-9. J. S. A. Adamson has adduced Saye's position to be in favour of independency as closest to the apostolic model, but also seeing limited toleration as less of a danger than repression, and worrying over the clerical usurpation of the magistrates' role. For him, Presbyterianism was the 'principal threat to traditional patterns of obedience and social hierarchy', 'The *Vindiciae Veritatis* and the political creed of Viscount Saye and Sele', in *Hist. Research*, lx (1987), pp. 58-60. Indeed, it is arguable that the equation of Presbyterianism and moderation, and of Independency and radicalism is fundamentally misplaced, even at the political level. Baillie's closest contacts on religious matters - Tate, Rous, etc. - were 'radical' on most matters, and indeed 'Presbyterian' terms generally were more stringent in their overhaul of the church, but also in the punishment of enemies, and perhaps even the future role of Parliament. Many of the adventurers, too, show a blend of radicalism and religious Presbyterianism.

[182]Again it must be pointed out that religion, whilst a real cause of division, did *not* determine parliamentary line-ups on all issues. But while the 'juntoes' could have uneasy relationships with the mass of MPs there was a sense in which they hitched themselves to external religious and political pressure groups, as the City and the Army intruded themselves in Parliament's decision-making. (See below, and for a discussion of these external forces, see Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, especially chapters 4 (on the City and the Scots) and 7 (the Army)).

[183]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 461.

posterity.[184] If a long-time associate of the Sidney family, he was also one of the 1643 Dublin anti-cessationists.[185] By June 12, the Irish Committee was considering a petition seeking arrears from the former Lord Justice, Sir John Borlace, who it set to work on his old profession, examining the ordnance.[186] Soon they had a petition from Arthur Shirley on behalf of his father, Sir George, still signing letters as a member of the Irish Council.[187] By June 18 they had moved on to Sir William Parsons himself.[188] The New English were breaking for Parliament. Parsons and Loftus, prisoners since 1644, had refused to put themselves up for exchange, apparently preferring to remain in Dublin.[189] Whether their change of opinion was a result of the imminence of the Ormond Peace or not can only be guessed at. But it is possible. By the summer of 1646, Nicholas Loftus had resumed the handling of the Irish revenue at Westminster.

The influx of New English only imported their own dissensions.[190] Throughout the rest of 1646 and much of 1647 three processes would run simultaneously, an increased English input (political as well as logistical) into the war in Ireland; the first rumblings of an avalanche tumbling Protestant Ireland to Parliament, whether set off by the soundings of parliamentary concern or of royal concession; and the importation of matters of dispute, personal as well as principled, and by Irish Protestants as much as English parliamentarians, into what appeared to be a fusion of the causes they espoused.

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[184]By May, Perceval was in receipt of a letter from John Watson asking his advice on Watson's publishing on the rising, in the light of Temple's work. *Egmont MSS*, i, 292. Watson had been one of the clergymen assigned to collect depositions in 1641 - Clarke, '1641 rebellion and anti-popery', p. 216 & note 40.

[185]It is hard not to see Temple as standing somewhat apart from his associates of 1643. Whatever about his background in Ireland he had been a newcomer to office in 1641 and was outside of the family ties which bound the Parsons - Loftus connection. His future was one permanently attached to the Sidney interest, while the other ex-councillors showed greater flexibility and a greater commitment to 'New English' unity (perhaps here Meredith is another exception - see below, chapter 10, especially note 278). If these observations are correct, it is a little ironic that later generations should regard Temple as spokesman for Protestant Ireland.

[186]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 458.

[187]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 459, 463.

[188]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 461.

[189]Temple and Meredith had been exchanged. Ormond to Nicholas, Jan. 19 said of the other two that 'hetherto they haue still waued' the option of exchange, Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 343.

[190]A straw in the wind was Temple's rapid launch into an assault on Perceval on the basis of the latter's involvement in the cessation, though Perceval had no doubt that old, personal grievances were at the root of the attacks. Of the 'anti-cessationists' Parsons and Loftus proved the more forgiving.

Chapter 9.
Alternative alliances,
July 1646 - January 1647.

In logistical terms, perhaps nothing is so striking about the 1646-7 expedition as the manner in which it was a re-run of that of 1641-2. With the failure to detach a sizeable contingent of the New Model in July, recruitment was effectively by means of contracts with individual colonels or even captains, though of course now they could draw upon veteran forces from the English war.[1] In terms of commissariat, continuity extends even to personnel, the two senior figures, William Dobbins and Sir John Veele, holding like positions in 1641-2, though the role of a third figure with Irish interests, John Davies, had increased enormously.[2] The greatest changes had occurred in the field of finance, where the whole panoply of 1640s innovations were deployed, though deeper probing shows that earlier patterns of credit and under-funding remained dominant.[3] Most of all, as in 1641-2 the gap between orders given and their implementation is a crucial dimension. In neither period were the executive committees particularly incapable or negligent - the Houses' requirement were usually attained in this regard - but delays, often unavoidably, meant many orders were overtaken by other developments, or that new orders were piled upon earlier ones making workloads confused as well as burdensome.

Votes taken in Feb. and June 1646 had committed the Houses to a total of 10 000 fresh infantry for Ireland. By the end of July contracts had been approved for 6 regiments (of 1 000 each) and, with the defeat of the July 31 motion to send 4 New Model regiments to Ireland, another 4 contracts were signed in August - October.[4] But two qualifications need to be added to a relatively successful operation. Firstly, the Irish committee's methods altered recruitment from the reinforcement of existing units in Ulster and Munster to the creation of new regiments under officers who had fought

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[1]See appendix 4 for discussion of the stages of recruitment, and the identity of the officers concerned.
[2]Veele was the agent of the Irish committee at Bristol. His counterpart at Chester, Charles Whalley, had also been active in 1641-2. Two men who had themselves taken the burden of supplying clothing for solders in Dublin in 1641-2, Tobias Norris and Sir William Anderson, won employment in Ulster, the former as commissary, the latter as one of the commissioners for the province.
[3]See appendix 2 for a discussion of funding in 1646-7.
[4]See appendix 4 for details.

in England. The reasoning probably related to this being a more successful means of assembling troops, but by the autumn of 1646 it had taken on 'political' overtones in the eyes of commanders in Ireland.[5] Secondly, there was no such success in recruiting the cavalry, which fell far short of target numbers.[6] In light of the role of the horse regiments in the New Model[7] it is worth bearing in mind that organised opposition to recruitment for Ireland in 1646 came from only two quarters - in the attempt to draw upon Massey's disbanded western brigade,[8] and from Algernon's Sidney's proposed regiment composed of Eastern Association cavalry troops.[9] As with the New Model, the recruiters had made the mistake of allowing large bodies of soldiers to be addressed - success came rather where, for example, only two infantry regiments remained in either Lincolnshire or Norfolk, so that the equivalent of one was disbanded and one sent to Ireland.[10]

In May of 1647 the *Moderate Intelligencer*, often so confident of a speedy end to the wars in Ireland, commented, 'But Ireland's war, that possible might have been ended this summer, in the apprehension of many wise, is like to hold for ought that is perceived, longer then will well with exhausted England's purse'.[11] It was a justifiable apprehension. Of all the tensions and strains which beset the English body politic as it passed through a period of intense disorder to outright civil war in 1647-8 none was perhaps as all-encompassing as the financial crisis which would precipitate excise riots,

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[5]See appendix 4 for details of recruitment. See below, pp. for disputes. The change of focus also involved a re-direction of the new armies to Munster, once it became clear that Lisle intended a separate expedition with a distinct army.

[6]See appendix 4 for details of recruitment.

[7]Austin Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen: the General Council of the army and its debates, 1647-1648*, (Oxford, 1987), p. 43 suggests a greater restiveness and self-organisation among the New Model cavalry than the infantry, a distinction which made recruiting for Ireland easier among the latter. The case seems general.

[8]Massey's brigade has been shown to have been almost exclusively comprised of horse - it was not seen as the main recruiting ground for the Irish expedition, though it was expected to contribute heavily to the cavalry. Unusually, however, there seems to have been no attempt to recruit the brigade as a unit - Westminster despatched money along with orders for disbandment and re-recruitment by Irish nominees, Sir William Fenton and Major Thomas Meredith. The result was a disaster - there is little indication of any real response, and the provision that the money for those who agreed to go for Ireland could be diverted if not needed was taken up (Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, p. 115). Massey's men were being asked for a response not unlike that of the New Model in early 1647, and they were likewise unimpressed. See Gentles, *New Model Army*, pp. 143-4 for political background; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 473, 488, 491, 512, 516, 520 for instructions to Meredith and Fenton, which show the scale of response sought by Parliament. For Massey's force as cavalry see R.K.G. Temple, 'The Massey Brigade in the West', *Somerset and Dorset Notes and Queries* xxxi (1985), pp. and cf. Thomas May, *A Breviary of the History of Parliament* in *Select tracts relating to the civil wars in England* ed. F. Maseres (2 vols., London, 1815) i, 70; *Moderate Intelligence* no. 74 (30 July - 6 August), E 349 (14), p. 576.

[9]Colonel Michael Jones's attempt to assemble Sidney's troops at St. Albans on July 10 saw disorder and mutiny, and there is no evidence that the soldiers in question ever served in Ireland. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 471, 472, 475, 476.

[10]These formed the basis of Grey's and Loftus's regiments respectively (see appendix 6). There do not appear to be examples of organised infantry opposition to Irish service, though there is plenty of mentions of plunder and of desertion due to delays after enlistment.

[11]*Moderate Intelligencer*, no. 112 (29 April-6 May), E. 386 (7), p. 1056.

mutinies, large-scale sales of royalist and ecclesiastical property and the perpetuation of well-hated money-gathering committees, local and national.[12] In general, it could be argued that the whole political history of the parliamentary cause in the 1640s-50s could, and maybe should, be written around the issue of finance.[13] This will not be attempted, but what is clear is that the various advances were to be tied to the outright confiscation and sale of the land of those deemed 'malignant', and not in this instance in Ireland, but in England. It would seem incorrect to tie such a 'radical' policy to the 'Independent' faction. As the Newcastle propositions show, the majority voting in the Houses was as inclined to be hardline on this issue as it was on that of Presbytery.[14]

Ireland had long been funded by a confiscation-based scheme, the adventure,[15] though now there were moves to tie Ireland's war firmly to the disposal of English delinquent property.[16] But 1646-7 showed other continuities with the first expedition in 1641-2. As was the case then, there could be no action without credit which had now evolved into a three- or four-tiered system built on the assessment for Ireland. Even then, almost all the money raised would have to go on the task of assembling forces for Ireland, leaving them unpaid and unsupplied once they had crossed the channel.[17] The large sums needed for Ireland would add to the tension building up at Westminster, especially given the simultaneous debates over the amounts to be voted to the departing Scottish forces from England, challengers for the use of delinquents' lands as collateral. And, looming in the background, the main body of English forces, the New Model, whose assessment was not to be renewed in October 1646, and who

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[12]Ashton, *Counter - Revolution.*, chapters 2-3 discusses popular responses to taxation and committees.

[13]Ashton, for example, follows the established line that the 'Presbyterian' leadership sought to pursue a policy based on tax reduction and disbandment, both likely to win popular approval, (though Kishlansky is inclined to attribute such aims to the 'conservative' peers) *Counter - Revolution*, p. 55. Yet the 'Presbyterians' could approve large sums for both the Scots and Ireland. In the April 1646 divisions proponents of money for Ireland include obvious figures like Clotworthy and Temple, but also Evelyn; opposition tellers include Haselrig and Marten, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 521. The question of priorities *within* 'parties' as well as between them almost certainly comes out through the direction of finance. For attempts to look at the institutional basis between the political use of finance see., e.g. Adamson, 'Peerage in politics', chapter 1; D. H. Pennington, 'The Accounts of the Kingdom 1642-9' in F. J. Fisher (ed.), *Essays in the economic and social history of Tudor and Stuart England*, (Cambridge, 1961).

[14]See the detailed propositions on confiscation in article 16, in Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, pp. 298-304; cf. the leniency of the *Heads of the Proposals*, article xv, in *Constitutional documents*, pp. 322-3.

[15]It had almost certainly been as much a necessary financial expedient as a politically motivated confiscation scheme, but had in any case run its course long since. Thus Bottigheimer fails to find any significant role for the Adventurers in 1646-7, either financially or politically; see *English money*, especially pp. 92-6.

[16]On July 8, the Commons resolved that the excise money would be repaid out of the sale of the estates of named English delinquents; Clotworthy was not only ordered to bring in an ordinance to that end, but also headed the list of 5 MPs named at the same time to bring in a general ordinance for the sale of delinquent property. *Commons' jn.*, iv, 608, 620, 622-3, 641; *Lords' jn.*, viii, 440-1.

[17]See e.g. P. R. O., S.P.Ire., 63 / 262 / 9, pp. 114-8 for a Sept. 1646 report (the summary in *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 518-9 is inadequate). This diversion of funds was despite the explicit intention of the assessment ordinances to provide for the armies *in* Ireland.

would receive no excise funds after November.[18] It is no wonder that Parliament maintained, intermittently, its elusive search for a single all-encompassing revenue system, or even, in late 1647, 'of some certain Foundation for a certain Way of Subsistence for those Forces that are already in *Ireland,* under the Command of the Parliament' and for such an Army as, 'will be necessary to be formed for vigorous Carrying on of an Offensive War in *Ireland* .'[19] It was only in the changed circumstances of March, 1647, that the first steps towards a unified revenue base were taken.

Within this context of military and financial difficulties a space must be created for the narrower 'political' debates at Westminster. The years 1646-7 saw the growth of two determinants of Parliament's policy towards Ireland, an increasing hold on decision-making by a growing number of New English (or 'Old Protestant') *émigrés*, and increasing factional strife among the English MPs themselves. It was not as if this latter had not long dogged the parliamentary cause[20], but it intruded forcefully on Ireland only with the end of the war in England.[21] Even here, however, it remains to be seen how far English divisions resulted in overall differences of 'policy' over Ireland. Actual conflict, while highly significant, seems to lie in certain areas somewhat tangential to the basic aim of reasserting English control of Ireland by force. In effect, these issues are threefold - the role of the New Model, in Ireland as in England; the control of military and political office in Ireland; the overflow effect of rivalries within the Irish Protestant communities, attaching themselves, for the moment, to English groups. Where these issues were not to the fore, broad consensus continued, as in the late summer and autumn of 1646.

The groupings to which the Irish Protestants attached themselves went by religious labels. Parsons wrote that 'The 2 visible parties spoken of to support the divisions are the presbytery and the independency, and under theis denominacions yt is thought do all other lesser divisions and partialities ranke themselves, as occasion serves'.[22] It was a characteristically perceptive analysis, for in neither case can it be

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[18]Gentles, *New Model Army*, p. 30.

[19]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 499, 507-8, 524 for efforts in April, 1646; *Commons' jn.*, v, 25-6, 68, 77, 107, 112 for later reports.

[20]On the whole there seems little reason to doubt Kishlansky's claims for an upsurge in 'adversary politics' after the fighting ceased in England, even if some of his applications to Ireland are less certain. Nonetheless, he seems correct in maintaining that over the broad policies of Scottish withdrawal and Irish war there was a parliamentary consensus, if division over means (see, e.g. Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 139-40).

[21]The research for this chapter had been completed, and it largely written, before the publication of John Adamson, 'Strafford's ghost: the British context of Viscount Lisle's lieutenancy of Ireland', in Ohlmeyer (ed.), *Ireland 1641-1660*. While it will be seen that this work generally supports Adamson's findings, some criticisms will be advanced of details of his work.

[22]Carte MS 19, f. 402; Adamson, 'Strafford's ghost', p. 135. Parsons, as will be seen, followed the logic of his analysis, and hitched his 'partiality' to the Independents.

argued that the grandees led a committed mass party on a range of issues.[23] From a religious stand-point, however, there is considerable overlap with the three issues mentioned above.[24] A stance on the New Model could not be unrelated to perceptions of it as a force for religious toleration[25]; 'Independent' grandees, in particular, were regarded as aiming at a hegemony of influential office,[26] while, less definitely, it would seem the 'Presbyterian' leadership pandered to a parliamentary oligarchy in both church and state.[27]

But as Gardiner recognised, the credit of either 'junto' rose or fell as the mass of MPs gravitated to the more stringent leadership on basically consensus issues like the departure of the Scots or the maintenance of religious uniformity.[28] Right through to the summer of 1647 there was little dent in the adherence of parliament to the Newcastle terms which the army (and the Northumberland - Saye peers) would later reject - rather a process whereby they were being legislated for by ordinance prevailed.[29] Whoever held the upper hand in the Houses, the probability of a settled England, effectively ignoring the King and working as the Covenanter administration in Scotland, seemed likely to come to pass until the build up of financial and military tensions burst out in the spring of 1647.[30] So on Ireland, though there were signs of

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[23]Religious division could be as much a matter of toleration or uniformity as presbytery or independency. What is not apparent is that religion based line-ups followed 'radical' - 'moderate' lines, rather that both religious camps were internally divided.

[24]The association of New English faction and parliamentary 'party' was *not* one founded on agreed religious ideas, with a few exceptions. As Parsons indicated, the former could shield beneath grandee protection on a pragmatic basis as a, detachable, component. Thus religion acted as an agent for polarisation even, to a limited degree, over Ireland, but not as a directly disputed matter save, just possibly, in emerging perceptions of the nature of the war in Ireland which, like so much else saw the light of day in Munster in 1647 - see also chapter 10.

[25]For the association of divisions over the Army with religious differences, see Gentles, *New Model Army*, pp. 140-3, 145-7.

[26]MacCormack, *Revolutionary politics*, pp. 141, 144-5 mentions suspicions of the 'Independent' grasp on commands and offices and the implications for peace proposals; it is not irrelevant that Clotworthy's Oct. 10 motion for the introduction of a ballot box into the Commons was for voting 'when Any question should be out for giveing of Mony or offices', B. L. Add. MS 31116, f. 285b. See also *Montereul correspondence*, i, 330-1. For comments on the 'aristocratic' nature of the Independent grandees, and especially of Northumberland, see Scott, *Algernon Sidney*, pp. 44, 45-7, 81, 88-9 (though perhaps these figures can only be described as a 'middle group' in the different circumstances from 1647 on).

[27]Paul, *Assembly of the Lord*, p. 57 & note 12, usefully points out the compatibility of Presbyterianism and parliamentary rule, though in the loosest sense of 'Presbyterian' (and most popular with MPs) with emphasis on a national, and representative Church (a 'lame, Erastian presbytery'?) rather than a clerical and locally ordered one. Adamson portrays Saye as regarding Presbyterian government as the 'principal threat to traditional patterns of obedience and social hierarchy' as well as believing Independency closer to the Scriptural pattern and avoiding the danger of unnecessary compulsion in matters of faith - Adamson, '*Vindiciae veritatis*', pp. 58-9.

[28]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 185-6.

[29]The Lords agreed to those on the Scottish treaty and the Irish cessation on Dec. 14, *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 910.

[30]Stevenson, *Revolution and counter-revolution*, pp. 73-81; *Montereul correspondence*, i, 321-4, 335-7, 378-80, 412. See Edward J. Cowan, 'The political ideas of a covenanting leader: Archibald Campbell, marquis of Argyll, 1607-1661' in Roger A. Mason (ed.) *Scots and Britons. Scottish political thought and the union of 1603* (Cambridge, 1994), for a discussion of Argyll's opinions at an earlier stage which shows his commitment to the responsibility of the nobility in government even

an Independent hegemony at the Irish Committee from July to October, Clotworthy is something of a fly in the ointment.[31] His presence, even on most of the executive sub-committees, is indicative of an outweighing of the need to relieve Ireland over any 'party' considerations he may have had.[32]

In July the recent concern for Ulster, post-Benburb, remained a priority.[33] Otherwise, on July 3, the Commons nominated Lisle and Holles to draft a letter to the King urging him to order Ormond to deliver Dublin and his other garrisons to the Parliament. His response, received on July 15, was that he must await the peace propositions from Parliament - and there the matter rested.[34] Instead a letter from Nicholas Loftus, dated July 17, shows that a major expedition to Munster under Lisle himself had clearly been decided on by then.[35] With news from Ireland unpromising, the Irish committee's determined assault on the Commons' indifference led to financial and military concessions (July 30-31) which would keep them busy,[36] though also a close vote before the demand for forces was swung away from the New Model.[37]

Lisle's position was as yet secure,[38] but the concentration on Munster would lead to the importation of that province's factional rivalries. Given that the axis of internal dispute is often seen as one of Inchiquin versus Broghill, it is perhaps worth

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without, or against, the King - a context for his apparent willingness to abandon Charles in 1646 (or even for his ability to deal with the Independents?) and one drawing on a combination of Gaelic and Calvinist ideals (p. 259).

[31]See *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 466-532. Of 47 attendance lists, Lisle and Temple are recorded on 44 occasions; Sir Gregory Norton on 36; Thomas Chaloner on 28. Clotworthy had 41 recorded attendances.

[32]For example, he and Temple were nominated to press for funds on July 14, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 475; on Aug. 1 he was named as one of 5 MPs on a sub-committee to ascertain which forces should be sent to Ireland, one of the other members being Cromwell, even though the two men opposed each other in the Commons over the sum of money to be paid to the Scots, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 485; *The diary of John Harrington MP* ed. M. Stieg (Somerset record society vol. lxiv, 1977), p. 32.

[33]The Irish committee obeyed its resolution to be 'diligent' in pressing for aid as they pursued the Commons, ultimately successfully, on the need to use delinquents' estates and the excise to support the war. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 469-70; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 613, 617, 620, 622-3; B. L. Add. MS 31116, f. 277a; *Tanner letters*, p. 225.

[34]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 599, 603, 618; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 417-8.

[35]Carte MS 18, f. 58. He also believed that the terms settled between Parliament and the Scots would mean a 'happy peace' in Britain and a 'lively war' in Ireland, the old Irish Protestant panacea.

[36]See appendices 2 & 4 for details. The reports from the Irish committee on forces suitable for service in Ireland had a legislative impact throughout August in ordinances permitting disbandment and re-recruitment, e.g. *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 862-3; *Lords' jn.*, viii, 464.

[37]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 631-2; B. L. Add. MS 31116, ff. 279a-b; *Harrington* ed. Stieg, p. 30. The motion was defeated by only one vote; as the diarists show, the threat of a continued Scottish presence was urged against the split of the Army. The decision to cannibalise Massey's brigade for Ireland had already been taken, on July 23. Together they had clear implications for the political balance in England, but towards Ireland probably only logistical effects, though it should be noted that the offer by Massey's brigade to go *en masse* was rejected (by the Independents?) in like manner to the rejection, later, of the like offer of the New Model (by the Presbyterians). Perhaps either option would have given greater internal unity and power to the forces in Ireland. Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 112, 114-5; Gentles, *New Model Army*, pp. 142-4; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 630. The July petition from the officers of the brigade, asking that 'we may continue our companyes and Comanders' whether in Ireland or elsewhere, is printed in Temple, 'Massey brigade', pp. 437-8.

[38]Harrington, when speaking of Lisle, has a suspicion of 'his person disliked of some', though he does not elaborate. *Harrington* ed. Stieg, p. 30.

noting that the trouble seems to have begun elsewhere. Early July saw first William Jephson, Inchiquin's faithful ally, then the Lord President himself complain about the slanders laid on the latter by Sir Arthur Loftus.[39] He showed no worry about Broghill, then in Munster. Indeed, speaking of the defence of Inchiquin emanating from his province, Perceval's informant Pigott spoke of the arrival (Aug. 14) of a 'noble personage' then at Bristol, who undertook to vindicate Inchiquin in London.[40] This was Broghill, and he may even have carried the 'attestation' of the Munster forces in favour of their commander - certainly he put his name to it.[41]

Only in his letter of Sept. 16 does Inchiquin seem to detect 'pretences' behind Broghill's claims to friendship, and he links them to his gaining recruits for his regiment at the expense of the President's, and to the selection of officers receiving payments from Parliament.[42] These were the kinds of issues that exploded during Lisle's stay in Munster. Whatever Broghill's attitude on leaving Ireland he very quickly joined the bid for resources of Loftus, his brother-in-law. In August Loftus obtained command of one of the new regiments designed for Ireland, despite his poor record;[43] another associate in 1647, Sir Hardress Waller, submitted a scheme to raise no less than 4 regiments and won the rank of Major - general for himself; Broghill not only received resources to stabilise his old cavalry regiment but was awarded command of a brigade of 4 new infantry regiments to serve under Lisle.[44] By contrast, the Irish committee had ruled that supplies then being sent to Munster were not to be issued but held in reserve for the coming over of Lisle.[45] On Sept. 5, Lisle wrote to the Lord President, in effect prohibiting any re-modelling of the Munster forces in advance of his arrival.[46]

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[39]Jephson to Perceval, July 4 in *Egmont MSS*, i, 297; Inchiquin to Perceval, July 9, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 298-9. Inchiquin's worries were about claims of collusion with the enemy and financial misconduct. By Aug. 28, he told Perceval of his worries over attacks on his sending men to aid Charles in 1643-4 as well as close inquiry into his finances, *Egmont MSS*, i, 306-9.

[40]*Egmont MSS*, i, 304.

[41]*A letter from a person of quality residing in Kinsale..*, 15 Sept., 1646, E 354 (6), p.8. Broghill heads the list. But see Murphy, 'Munster Protestants', pp. 9, 12; Bottigheimer, 'English interest', pp. 197-8.

[42]*Egmont MSS*, i, 316.

[43]See appendix 4 for details.

[44]See appendix 4. For Waller's and Broghill's commands see *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 470, 501, 509 (Waller, including for his old regiment, formerly St. Leger's), 500, 501, 506 (Broghill). That Broghill agitated for both old and new regiments is no contradiction for, like Waller and Loftus, he had an old command (H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 390-1 - there *may* be criticism of Inchiquin in this report, but it remains guarded). Broghill was ultimately given command of all new forces sent into the province until the arrival of Parliament's Lord Lieutenant. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 506, 510, 520, 524; *Egmont MSS*, i, 342.

[45]*Egmont MSS*, i, 309; *Perfect Occurrences*, no. 40, (Aug. 26 - Sept. 2) , E 513 (13) - Clotworthy signed this order alongside Denbigh, Temple, Norton and Challoner, perhaps as a result of the ruling that all committee-men present must sign orders. Likewise, the £30 000 in Spanish currency to be advanced by the assessment treasurers was held over for the Lieutenant's departure.

[46]*Egmont MSS*, i, 312. This is certainly implied in Inchiquin's response. He seems to have wanted to amalgamate undersized companies, which may have caused discontent. A similar reorganisation was

All along the commanders in Munster had been seeking recruits - it was always London which changed these into newly commissioned regiments. Descriptions of the existing armies in Ireland regularly show hugely disproportionate numbers of officers and men.[47] The latter were prone to desertion as well as casualty; the former, as pre-rising landowners, depended on their commands as a last peg of support in Ireland. To commission and recruit new regiments might help otherwise redundant parliamentarians, but it would disgruntle the indigenous Protestant elite. Only a few were able to secure favouritism at Westminster as part of the attempt to give Lisle an appropriate and independent military command. Regardless of 'ideology', the auguries were not good for harmony in Munster.

That politics in wartime should be largely determined by military needs and demands is quite logical, but perhaps the New Model has won too much of the limelight in the historiography of the 1640s. Contemporaries were well aware of the disorders and nuisance of other forces in England, prompting demands to get them to Ireland. Even more out of flavour were the Scottish forces in the north of the country.[48] While it would be too much to doubt the distaste of the 'Independents' for the continued Scottish impact on English decision-making in late 1646, it seems probable that much of the English pressure to get rid of the army of their brethren was of the same type which vented itself on all costly, idle, disruptive (and even violent) bodies of soldiery. The negotiations to pay off the Scots dominated the autumn of 1646 for MPs. But it would be too cynical to see all the expressions, on both sides, of the desirability, and achievement, of unity and amity as hypocritical. As it became clear that Charles was not going to concede the Newcastle terms there are clear indications that opinion in Edinburgh was in favour of withdrawal, the main obstacle being the one openly advanced, the need to secure arrears of pay.[49]

The key figure in all this was Argyll. He smoothed Parliament's feathers in June - July, and is portrayed throughout the next several months as the proponent of withdrawing the troops and keeping favour with the English.[50] This is not irrelevant to

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undertaken in 1647 by Michael Jones when he gained control of Ormond's forces after the surrender of Dublin.

[47]See e.g. Holles's report in Jan. 1646 of 3 698 infantry with 615 officers and 848 cavalry with 120 officers, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 432; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 432. The same is true of Ulster also.

[48]Disorders among troops outside the New Model peaked in the months May to Sept., 1646 - J. S. Morrill, 'Mutiny and discontent in English provincial armies, 1645-1647', in *Past & present*, lxi (1972), p. 53. *Mercurius Civicus* was moved to offer the conclusion that 'it were not a amisse if the tumultuous soldiery in this Kingdom were removed into Ireland, and that those who are better disposed, and more fast to the Parliament should stay at home in their place, they will finde in Ireland spirits as contentious and unruly as their own, let them buckle with them', E 346 (6) - no. 165 for 23-30 July, p. 2329. Ashton, *Counter-Revolution*, pp. 304-9 discusses discontent at the Scottish army.

[49]Stevenson, *Revolution and counter-revolution*, pp. 73-5.

[50]See his speech of June 25, placing unity above Scottish preferences, printed alongside the letter from Charles to Ormond forbidding further treaty with the Irish, *The Lord Marques of Argyle's speech...*, E 341 (25). For his attitude in the autumn, see e.g. *Montereul correspondence*, i, 283-4.

the other Scottish army, that in Ulster. Their position was very much akin to that of their fellow-countrymen. It seems quite reasonable to suppose that the complaints from Ulster over quartering and provocative behaviour are indeed the product of clashes over scarce resources. Reports on Ireland emphasise the desolate nature of Ulster by this stage - if Leven's army was at odds with that of Poyntz in less devastated areas of England then how much more is it plausible in the north of Ireland. Clotworthy's acquiescence in challenging Monro's forces may be seen as a kind of constituency work, albeit not that for which he was elected.[51] Argyll and Lauderdale submitted the claims of the two forces together on July 11. The propensity of the Scots to treat their English garrisons as holding 'cautionary towns' parallels their proprietary attitude to Belfast. Moving ahead to the end of 1646, it can be seen that the Scottish officers were not unwilling to bargain for a final settlement, allowing them to leave with their money.[52] As for Argyll, he was not without his own motives. Never loath to withdraw troops for Ireland if needed at home, he was still enduring the activities of the remnants of Antrim's brigade in his territories in the Isles.[53]

Overall, though, the impression of the late summer is of relative Anglo-Scottish harmony, if not an abatement of suspicion.[54] So long as the agreed Newcastle propositions were being advanced by both sides even the King saw little chance of a split between the two nations.[55] French diplomatic efforts, at the heart of the drive for a settlement in the three kingdoms, presupposed religious concessions by Charles at least in the short term, to Presbyterianism in Britain (to at least buy off the Scots[56]) and to Catholicism in Ireland.[57] In neither case could they find a willing concessionary in

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[51]For actions taken by the Irish committee from the time of its formation in 1645 about quartering disputes in Ulster, see above, chapters 7-8; for control of Belfast as an aspect of this issue, see below. Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 237-8; Ashton, *Counter-revolution*, pp. 304-6, 309 for disputes over quarters in England.

[52]H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 386; *The Lord Marques of Argyle's speech... And a letter from General Major Monro...* E 341 (25), pp. 10-12; Ashton, *Counter-Revolution*, p. 315; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 567-8.

[53]Antrim's official surrender in Oct. 1646 did not extend to the feud with Argyll and only in May 1647 were the last of MacColla's men chased from Argyll's lands. Ohlmeyer, *Civil war and restoration*, pp. 177-9, 186-8. Hamilton, by contrast, seems to have stood by a forward policy in England and Ireland (cf. Adamson, 'Strafford's ghost, pp. 148-9).

[54]Most of the evidence of disputes mentioned by Ashton precede June 1646. Thereafter the temperature rose and fell, generally quelled by the news of the army's departure and the perception that the Scots were sticking to the agreed terms. The flare up in Sept. - Oct. which sparked Baillie's fears can be said to have really started with the speech by Thomas Challoner on the sole right of the English Parliament. It may be speculated that Challoner belonged among those MPs who least liked the Newcastle terms, though anti-Scottish polemic could win a wide audience (also the dispute arose again when the King's failure to accept terms opened the possibility of alternative settlements). Again, it was one of the Campbell brothers, Loudoun, who was sent to douse the flames. See Ashton, *Counter-Revolution*, pp. 8, 12, 311-3.

[55]*Charles I* ed. Bruce, pp. 53-4.

[56]The French believed that Charles's refusal either to give a consent to the propositions or to establish Presbyterianism in the interim till full arrangements were made, was losing him the support of Parliament and the Scots respectively. *Montereul correspondence*, i, 218, 228-30.

[57]See for example, Montreuil's letter of July 16 / 26 for his opinions on the means for the King to gain support in all of his kingdoms, *Montereul correspondence*, i, 228-30.

the King,[58] but he was at least wiser than those around him in so far as he saw an Irish accommodation as in itself blocking settlement with the English and Scots.[59] His Aug. 1 response to the Newcastle terms had been vague and non-committal; it was read in the Lords on Aug. 12 in conjunction with Scottish offers to withdraw their troops and to consult on the 'disposal' of the King.[60] With the allies remaining firm, Charles had long recognised that he would have to be able to present a *fait accompli* in terms of an Irish treaty,[61] but by August even this looked like no escape from the Anglo-Scottish demands.

The 'Ormond Peace', duly proclaimed on July 30[62] was, of course, not bound to last. That its collapse followed so swiftly thereafter should not overshadow the genuine hopes entertained in some quarters. Richard Bellings professed to hope that the basis had been laid for an Ireland which would not undergo 'revolutions' every 40 years, as hitherto; Ormond himself professed the hope, to Hyde, of a 'foundation for a happy settlement in his majesties other kingdomes'.[63] As in the preceding negotiations, the key issues were religion and military power. Bellings and Ormond were concerned about the collapse of the financial underpinnings of the treaty, but the Lieutenant was also concerned about the ill-effects of the spoliation of Leinster by O'Neill's forces which had remained south after Benburb.[64] The complaints of local (Catholic?) landowners about the Ulstermen, made to Ormondist garrisons[65], and the petitions of the latter themselves to Ormond about intrusions on quarters, plunder and even hostilities,[66] are but another indication of the depth of anger and frustration caused by military and material causes, in turn fuelling ethnic (or religious) animosities,

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[58]See Charles's letters to the Queen and the royalist exiles in Paris for his violent opposition especially to Presbyterianism (printed or calendered in *Charles I* ed. Bruce, *Cal. S.P. Clarendon*, i) as discussed in Smith, *Constitutional royalism*, pp. 128-32, 149-50.

[59]Charles to Henrietta Maria, Aug. 19 & Aug. 31, in *Charles I* ed. Bruce, pp. 60-1, 62. Though he reassured the Queen's court in Paris that he would stick by an Irish accommodation, he was under no illusion but that such would 'infallibly hinder all accommodations here'. (This was after Parliament had read his Aug. 1 letter.)

[60]Parliament passed an ordinance against libellers of their brethren and began the financial talks which would settle a sum of £400 000 of arrears by the month's end. Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 133-4, 137-8; Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, pp. 306-8.

[61]His letter to Parliament of July 6 was presaged on the rumours of an Irish peace; thereafter he appears to have tried to send word for Ormond to press on with a treaty under the aegis of the Queen and Prince. *Charles I* ed. Bruce, pp. 51-2, 54-6; *Montereul correspondence*, i, 226-7; *Cal. S. P. Clarendon*, i, 328. Digby spread the word in Ireland, e.g. Digby to Clanricard, July 7, in *Letter-book*, p. 270.

[62]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 57-60; the copy of the articles authenticated by the Irish committee in London was issued on Aug. 24, *XXIX Articles of Peace concluded by the Marquesse of Ormond ... and Viscount Mountgarret...*, E 351 (6).

[63]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 62-3; Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 421-2.

[64]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 62-3, 65-7.

[65]See -- to Cadogan, July 15; Ormond to Trafford, July 16; James Moore to Cadogan, July (?), in *Ormonde MSS*, ii, 44-5.

[66]Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-52*, i, 689, 690-1, 695-6, 805.

whether of Scots and English or of Palesmen and Ulster Irish.[67] Ormond, however, like O'Neill himself, acted to maintain the valuable Ulster army in Leinster so long as it remained within the peace.[68] Its military potential, for example in Connacht, outweighed the complaints.[69]

For Ormondists the Peace could signify the coming in of the confederates as loyal subjects. Ormond had won from the Protestant clergy in Dublin a remonstrance in favour of the peace, the 'only meanes to continue these blessings of religion and loyaltye among vs, and to be the only hopefull way to reduce this kingdome wholly to his majesty's obedience'.[70] But the Catholic synod that met at Waterford in early August was not so accommodating. Whatever Rinnuccini's ultimate aims, the statements issued concentrated, quite reasonably, on the lack of guarantees contained in the articles - especially in the general context of past Caroline offers of religious concessions to Catholicism.[71] Though the synod ordered the interdiction of towns where the peace was proclaimed, complete breakdown can not be said to have occurred until September. Until then, and even afterwards, the Ormondist counter-strategy was twofold. One the one hand, to concoct a means of guarantee sophisticated enough to bridge the gap between the level of assurance needed by Catholic Ireland and the realities, both personal and circumstantial, of what the King could offer.[72] On the other, to construct a solid enough bank of support, Protestant and Catholic, to forestall or crush opposition to the Peace.[73] If anything, the second course would appear to

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[67]Ormond to Bellings, Aug. 10, suggests that O'Neill's men were not intent on a 'conquest' but plundered through 'want of meanes' - Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 65-7. For tensions relating to the presence of the Ulster army in Leinster, where it took ups control of key garrisons and quartered itself (thus denying resources to the Leinster army) see Casway, *Owen Roe O'Neill*, pp. 146, 156, 165-6, 168, 174.

[68]O'Neill to Ormond, July 25, Ormond to O' Neill, Aug. 3, in Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-52*, i, 690, 692. Owen Roe sent a complete list of his forces to Daniel O'Neill, Aug. 7, seeking inclusion in a 'settlement of meanes', Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-52*, i, 693-4. Casway, *Owen Roe O'Neill* argues throughout of the priority for O'Neill of the need to keep his army together, even if this meant avoiding battle or trespassing into Leinster for quarters (see e.g. Casway, *Owen Roe O'Neill* , p.170).

[69]For efforts to deploy both Preston's and O'Neill's armies in Connacht see Ormond to O' Neill, Aug. 3, in Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-52*, i, 692; Ormond to Preston, Aug. 3, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 61.

[70]Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 423-5.

[71]Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, p. 230; Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 97-102; but cf. Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 246-7, 254-6.

[72]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 158-9 show the first stage of the plan for 'private' assurances, lying with the old Supreme Council, a plan later adopted by Clanricard and Digby. For the Council's offers see Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 132-4; and for continued mediation by Luke Dillon and Dr. Fennell, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 136-9.

[73]Ormond had maintained a tenuous correspondence with the Protestant leaders in Ulster in July (Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 418-9). With the Peace proclaimed, letters from the Privy Council were despatched north (Aug. 19) commanding obedience, but by Aug. 22 Ormond's own letters to the Ulster officers enclosed the clerical documents in an effort to argue that no Protestant (nor many Catholics) could side with those in thrall to the Pope, Spain and the guilty Old Irish, and urging union against the same, Carte MS 18, ff. 303, 318, 325. There is less evidence of overtures to Inchiquin, though it appears that Ormond's herald intended to go to his garrisons to proclaim the Peace, Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 114, 119. Of course Ormond was still trying to woo O'Neill in late August, offering custody of captured lands in Ulster and a military command, Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-52*, i, 700.

have been that favoured by Ormond personally. But until his discomfiture at Kilkenny, neither seemed impossible.

In Britain, negotiations still presupposed the existence of the Irish Peace. Clearly the articles on Ireland remained high on the list of priorities of Charles's opponents there. Sir Robert Moray reported the King trying to have the Irish settlement presented as 'usefull to all', protecting the Scots and other British in Ireland.[74] But despite suspicions in some quarters (in Aug. - Sept.) that the Scots might make terms with the King similar to those of the Irish,[75] Charles repeated (Sept. 7) that the Scots still stood by the Covenant, 'besides, I find the Irish peace angers them much'.[76] The French believed that none of the parliamentary - Covenanter groupings would stand by the King,[77] and of the issues around which they hoped to construct a settlement Grignon identified the real sticking points as religion and Ireland - those 'best disposed' to the King at Westminster were 'obstinate' on winning Ireland from the King, while he could not see how Charles could abandon the Irish without the danger of their casting off all loyalty to him.[78] There was just a hint that Charles might throw over the French initiative for Independent terms softer on religion, on 'delinquents' and to 'waue Ireland till the King and Parliament be agreed...'.[79] It looked like a return to the tentative 1645 offers, but squares ill with the support of both grandees and army for the ongoing war there, and particularly the build-up to Lisle's expedition.[80]

But all such offers remained premised on the existence of the 'Ormond Peace'. Ormond himself professed to believe that his commission to make a treaty had been ended with the proclamation of the peace. As a result, any arrangement which could be

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[74]*The Hamilton papers* ed. S. R. Gardiner (London, Camden Society, 2nd series, vol. xxvii, 1880), pp. 109-10.

[75]Moray to Hamilton, Aug. 29, in *Hamilton papers* ed. Gardiner, p. 113; Jermyn & Culpepper to Charles, Sept. 18 / 28, in *Cal. S. P. Clarendon*, i, 333.

[76]*Charles I* ed. Bruce, pp. 63-4. Already Bellievre seems to have recognised that the only realistic hope of Scottish - Irish royalist co-operation was an overtly Gaelic one based on a retreat by the King to the highlands, thence to draw also on Irish troops, following the Peace. (His letters in late Aug. can, however, bear the interpretation of an ex-Covenanter alliance with confederate troops, though he would later go for the other option, *Montereul correspondence*, i, 248.)

[77]*Montereul correspondence*, i, 283-4, 276-7.

[78]*Montereul correspondence*, i, 266-7 (though cf. Bellievre's views, *Montereul correspondence*, i, 276-7). The other core issues were the militia (i.e. the three Uxbridge items), the disposal of 'places' and the fate of ex-Royalists, *Montereul correspondence*, i, 266-7, 276-7, 283-4; *Hamilton papers* ed. Gardiner, pp. 113-4.

[79]*Hamilton papers* ed. Gardiner, p. 115. Cf. Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 165-6; MacCormack, *Revolutionary politics*, pp. 138-41.

[80]Certainly the suggestion does not fit with any concept of the Independents' commitment to a more rigorous 'conquest' policy in Ireland than any attempted previously (Adamson 'Strafford's ghost', pp. 138-42 and Bottigheimer, *English money*, pp. 101, 104-5 suggest this type of 'ideological' dimension to Lisle's expedition). The report may be inaccurate (the 1647 *Heads of the Proposals* were gentler on religion and delinquents, but echoed Newcastle on Ireland, if not on pardon - Gardiner (ed.), *Constitutional documents*, pp. 316-26); it may indicate splits within the 'Independent' camp (cf. Marten's views); it may hint at Army plans to hold off on Ireland in the same manner as their supporters' refusal to send regiments across. Perhaps most likely it was, if made, an attempt to get Charles off the hook of Ireland while Lisle's armies acted to deliver another *fait accompli*, a conquered Ireland.

made would have to formally concede submission to its authority. His bid was made, symbolically, through a personal journey to Kilkenny.[81] The consequences of his discomfiture there were profound, turning him from the idea of a formal deal with a recognised Catholic body. That negotiations continued was largely on the initiative of Digby and Clanricard. As with the Ormondists on the Supreme Council, the centre of the continuing talks was the offer to obtain 'firm and authentick assurance', albeit privately, on the religious articles.[82] Where the confederates went further was that such assurances would concede the Glamorgan terms as opposed to repeal. Neither was acceptable to the clericalists.[83]

Ormond was also already backing away. The effect of the attempt to surprise him and his troops at Kilkenny, and the treachery which he saw in the breach of the treaty appear to have struck at the heart of all his political and personal presuppositions. His anger and disgust at unfaithfulness permeate his letters and declarations thereafter.[84] By the time he returned to Dublin, his inclination to appeal to Parliament was apparently formed. His Sept. 23 letters to Digby and Clanricard show that he was not only opposed to any concession of the Glamorgan terms, but believed 'there is noe dealing with this people but by force.' Yet the appeal to Parliament was grounded upon 'the law of nature and selfe preseruation' and the promise to have 'don nor declared noething that may cause despair in any that shall resolutly indeavour the peace of the kingdome' was genuine.[85] In a sense Ormond had retreated to an 'Old English' political position. His appeal to Protestants in and beyond Ireland was on the basis of an endeavour to throw off the allegiance of Ireland to the Crown of England and transfer it to the Pope or Spain. The opposing of such a position was one in which 'loyal' Catholics must be admitted to join.[86] That Ormond should call upon both the Scots and the Parliamentarians within Ireland was no more than a reflection of his hope

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[81]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 159; Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 257-8, 261; vi, 92-3, 94, 94.

[82]Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, pp. 230-2; Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 264-5. Ormond's formal position (Sept. 10) was that the quarrel was between the confederate commissioners and the clergy with Digby acting to compose their differences, Ormond himself merely seeking submission to the King, Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-52*, i, 704.

[83]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 132-4. By the end of Sept. Oliver Fitzwilliam tried to persuade Ormond to win Preston by granting the Glamorgan terms, but Ormond insisted that the terms 'are things I have nothing to doe with, nor will have'. Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 142-3, 143, 147-8. In Nov., the rejection of the Clanricard propositions centred on the lack of guarantees, *Letter-book*, p. 312; Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 156, 158-62.

[84]Thus he told Charles that the 'treachery of the preuayling party amongst the Irish' had forced him to approach parliament, hoping the terms he offered both preserved Protestant lives yet did not tarnish his duty of allegiance. To Jermyn he professed 'shame that soe little faith is found in a place where I haue soe much interest of blood and alyance, and ... greefe that the perfidy heere should force mee to councells contrary to my former way of serveing his majestie and my own inclination' - Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 435-6, 436-7. See also Lane's letter to Thomas Nugent (Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 433-4).

[85]Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 264, 268-71; vi, 432, 433; *Letter-book*, pp. 287-8.

[86]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 161; cf. Daniel O'Neill's remark to Roscommon, Sept. 1, of the opponents of the peace that 'ther quarrell iss to all peaceable men', Protestant and Catholic, his claims that the Pale was pro-peace and his advocacy of negotiations with Catholic representatives, Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-52*, i, 701-2; also, i, 703.

that either, or both, were nearing a settlement with the King in Great Britain - indeed that his efforts might contribute to the same.[87] He had swung decisively towards a 'loyalist coalition', largely through personal animus to 'treachery'. On Sept. 29 agents were despatched to the English Parliament, authorised by Lieutenant and Council. But though the offer was made that no peace or cessation could take place without the approval of Parliament, Ormond wanted to guarantee the rights of all Protestants 'and others' who had supported him. Even ex - 'rebels' must be encompassed if now loyal. Attempts were made to distinguish between categories of 'rebels' setting limits to land confiscation, and the late Peace was defended.[88] Ormond was in effect arguing the same case he had put against the Lords Justices of 1641-3.

On the basis of 'loyalty', Ormond could appeal to Parliament and the Scots in the hope that they would be prepared to offer military support rather than allow the victory of forces opposed to the English connection; the same assumption would characterise his dealings with elements of the disintegrating confederacy.[89] His offer was conveyed to Parliament by Oct. 12 where it was referred to the English members of C.B.K., reinforced by Lisle, Holles, Clotworthy and Temple.[90] With further additions a few days later, they would establish themselves as the Derby House Committee for Irish Affairs (hereafter D.H.C.I.), for the moment charged with the arrangements for taking over Dublin.[91] The opportunity caused a diversion of forces

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[87]Ormond to Sir James Montgomery, Sept. 18, announced his intention of moving Parliament and the British and Scots in Ulster to oppose a 'second rebellion' aimed at detaching Ireland from the Crown of England - all like-minded men should oppose 'soe pernicious a plott...However, thorough the distemper of the tyme, wee may have differed in our wayes, I hope this adress will waken the people of the other two kingdomes, and be a meanes to procure a happy reconcilement of all differances...', Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 431.

[88]Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 269-71. But when he sought legal opinion on how to preserve gentlemen worried about joining 'us' because formerly outlawed for treason his legal advisers were unable to find a means whereby they might legally be put in a state of 'preservation', Carte MS 19, f. 146.

[89]Thus the terms sent to Parliament requested troops and supplies, though Parliament would only consider surrender terms; likewise he notified George Monro that he wanted Scottish soldiers to balance Parliament. His hope of the Leinster army was that they would join the fight under the command of Clanricard.

[90]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 684, 690; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 284b; *Harrington* ed. Stieg, pp. 41, 43; B. L. Add. MS 37 344, ff. 66b-67a; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 525. The newsletters followed the *Kingdoms' Weekly Intelligencer*, no. 168 (Sept. 29 - Oct. 6), E 356 (4), p. 264, in reporting the good news unreservedly, 'such indeede as we cannot wish for better'. Cf. *Moderate Intelligencer*, no. 83 (Oct. 1 - 8), E 356 (8), p. 678; *Perfect Diurnal*, no. 167 (Oct. 5 - 12), E 513 (17), p. 1341. It was left to the *Scottish Dove*, no. 154 (Sept. 30 - Oct. 8) E 356 (10), p. 44 to note that 'what security is in a revolting enemy I yet know not, but hope all is reall; but if hee doe deliver *Dublin* into the Parliaments hands, it will be good security...'.

[91]As well as the four added on Oct. 12, the Commons voted Fiennes, Lewis and Goodwin onto the Committee. Both *Commons' jn.*, iv, 693 and the newsletters recognise that secrecy was paramount, *Mercurius Civicus* even referring to the 'Committee of secrecie' - no. 176, (Oct. 8 - 15), E 357 (12), pp. 2417-8. *Perfect Occurences* no. 42 (Oct. 16), E 513 (18) notes that 'it is not thought fit (as yet) to divulge the particulars of the Treaty' though he was hopeful.

assembling in England while further funds were voted,[92] overturning a defeat for the financing of the Irish war obtained as recently as Sept. 25.[93]

On that occasion, with news of 'distractions now among our enimies in Ireland..' Sir John Temple advanced the proposition that the Irish Committee have power for three months to offer conditions for the surrender of forts and towns - 'to grant any terms to any upon service don for us'.[94] If this signalled a comparatively generous approach to former foes, it did not imply that Parliament's generosity extended to blanket support for Ormond and his government. The Commons voted (Oct. 14) that Ormond should retire from the Lieutenancy,[95] and acted on the assumption that Protestants under Ormond's jurisdiction could be treated akin to English Royalists - they were assured their persons and estates, but on submission to Parliament and with the need to compound for any English property.[96] It was not only that Ormond had already been replaced in Parliament's eyes by the appointment of Lisle to the Lieutenancy. The whole basis both of an autonomous Irish regime, and of an internal Irish settlement constructed from the remaining shards of the Ormond Peace, was being legislated away with the enactment of ordinances confirming many of the main elements of the Newcastle terms in the absence of royal approval,[97] among them the voidance of the cessation and all treaties not approved by Parliament (Oct. 13), and the militia ordinance placing forces in Ireland in Parliament's keeping (Oct. 15).[98]

Ormond and his remnant must not stand in the way of the long-standing vision of Ireland's future held by the Houses, but perhaps other, less lofty, considerations affected his treatment. Thomason gives the date of Oct. 5[99] for publication of the tract

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[92]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 697-8, 702, 710; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 288a; *Harrington* ed. Stieg, pp. 44-5; B. L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 67b; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 529-30. Lisle secured re-direction to Dublin by D.H.C.I. in Nov., *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 726. D.H.C.I. approved of Algernon Sidney as the Governor of Dublin, with George Monck as deputy. As regards the other provinces, it was intended that they act to cause diversions to ensure the successful take-over of Dublin, Bottigheimer, *English money*, p. 100.

[93]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 676-7; B. L. Add. MS 31116, f. 284a; *Harrington* ed. Stieg, p. 39; *Perfect Diurnal*, no. 165 (Sept. 21 - 28), E 513 (12), p. 1325; *Perfect Occurences*, no. 40 (to Oct. 2), E 513 (13).

[94]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 676; *Harrington* ed. Stieg, p. 39; *Moderate Intelligencer*, no. 82 (Sept. 24 - Oct. 1), E 355 (23), p. 665 described the call for 'a Plenipotent for our Commissioners, there to take to mercy such as will come over from the Rebels and their party...'. Harrington bears witness to the lack of limitations by noting that he wanted to restrict the giving of terms to exclude 'murderers' of those who had acted 'against religion' but didn't, *Harrington* ed. Stieg, p. 39.

[95]This followed a report from the new committee, Commons' *jn.*, iv, 693; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 285b; *Harrington* ed. Stieg, p. 44; B. L. Add. MS 37 344, ff. 67b.

[96]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 479-80.

[97]The process was particularly associated with St. John and probably secured 'cross-party' approval, MacCormack, *Revolutionary politics*, p. 145; *Montereul correspondence*, i, 303-4.

[98]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 691, 695; B. L. Add. MS 31116, f. 286a; *Harrington* ed. Stieg, pp. 43-4; B. L. Add. MS 37344, f. 67a.

[99]*Ormond's Curtain drawn: in a short discourse concerning Ireland,* E 513 (14). The published version, which breaks off in mid-sentence, is only the first half of the MSS found at B.L. Add. MS 4 763, ff. 4-5 & B.L. Add. MS 4819, ff. 333-44 (as printed); B.L. Add. MS 4819, ff. 320-332 (unprinted

Ormond's curtain drawn, seen as a propaganda piece advanced by the circle around Lisle.[100] Its main object of vilification is Ormond himself and a possible reason for its publication is as a counter-blast to any sense of generosity - talks with Ormond must result in his replacement not employment under Parliament. But given its New English authorship it stands as something of a curiosity, for most of Ormond's Dublin rivals proved short on vindictiveness. When the Ormond terms were first delivered to Parliament in October they were accompanied by letters from two of the anti-cessationist former Councillors, Sir William Parsons and Sir Adam Loftus.[101] Landing in England in Nov., they kept up their good reports of the Marquis - both men 'speak very honourably of him and that he is resolved to see the worst of danger in the city rather than put himself into the Castle and leave his fellow sufferers without it'.[102] It was curious praise from men whom Ormond had imprisoned for the last number of years, albeit at least latterly not with great discomfort.[103] But it strengthens the likelihood that the pamphlet drew much of its venom from personal grudges, though hardly less influential for that.

Whatever the attitude of Lisle and his backers to the pamphlet, his assumption of the Lieutenancy fits in 'Independent' strategy in Oct. - Nov. 1646. The news reaching Charles of Ormond's dealings with Parliament made him give way a little to Will Murray's persuasions on Ireland even if, as he informed the Queen, he was still trying to be slippery and keep his options open on Ireland through a play on words.[104] If no grouping could be satisfied with what he offered[105] there was a possible meeting of minds with the 'Independents' along the lines predicted by Moray (Nov. 14) that those 'most zealous ... in State matters in London' would not put religion first, and 'no Englishman will euer in his heart' hold it necessary that an English peace require Scottish approval; the 'Independents' could join the King because not 'wedded unchangeably' to forms of religion, and because their leaders would turn to him if

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portion, probably in Annesley's hand). This ends with the names of the censors who approved the tract (including Thomas Temple) and the date 'Sept. 1 1646'.

[100]Adamson, 'Strafford's ghost', pp. 140-2 provides a full discussion of the pamphlet. Though apparently written by Adam Meredith, alterations were made by Temple. Meredith's authorship makes sense of the detailed discussion of the treatment given his father, Sir Robert Meredith (ff. 323b, 327b) which might suggest a personal animus against Ormond. Certainly Sir Robert later showed himself less forgiving than other commissioners, in Dublin in 1647.

[101]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 684; *Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer*, no. 168 (Sept. 29 - Oct. 6) E 356 (4), p. 264 confirms that this was to assure Parliament of the validity of the offer of treating. Perceval's reaction (Oct. 8) had been that perhaps 'all's but a plot of Orm[ond], *Egmont MSS*, i, 324.

[102]*Egmont MSS*, i, 330, 331.

[103]Colum Kenny, *King's Inns and the Kingdom of Ireland. The Irish 'Inn of Court' 1541-1800* (Dublin, 1992), p. 122 on the house arrest of Parsons and his associates. That Parsons continued to write to him from England suggests his willingness to fulfil what he considered his obligations to the Lieutenant. Carte MS 19 ff. 217, 402-3.

[104]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 166, 168, 174, 178-9; *Hamilton papers* ed. Gardiner, p. 118; *Charles I* ed. Bruce, p. 76.

[105]*Montereul correspondence*, i, 299-300, 303-4, 306-7.

'inuested with the whole power of the State and King's persone by offices and changes...'.[106] If all this smacks of the usual charges of partisan quest for power it does chime with the role of Councils and office-holders in all terms of settlement associated with the aristocratic Independents in particular.[107] In terms of Ireland the necessity of keeping Ormond out, and putting their man (Lisle) in, was essential to a wider programme for the future government of England and Ireland.

There had been more to appeal to the King in the Ormond Peace, in civil terms.[108] Thus rumours circulated that the Scots in Ireland would be brought in under its aegis.[109] Ormond certainly hoped for 'a breach betweext (at least) the best party of the Scots and the parliament; and both will bid faire for vs'.[110] But it was no more likely than Parliament's acceptance, at least while Argyll held sway.[111] Charles himself wrote to the Queen that he had 'been excessively (indeed unmannerly) pressed by the marq[ues]s of Argyle to persuade Ormond to submit to the parliament, which I have absolutely refused..'.[112] There were not only political reasons for the failure of the Scots to come to Ormond's rescue. Given their recent setbacks there seems no reason to doubt the truth of the Scottish claims that they were militarily unable to aid Ormond as far south as Dublin.[113] But no more than Parliament would they offer no - strings - attached aid or submit to an Ormondist alignment within the 1646 framework.

The problem of resources also affected the disparate Catholic armies now moving closer to hostility with each other.[114] Ormond's tolerance had receded as a

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[106]*Hamilton papers* ed. Gardiner, pp. 123-6.

[107]The full propositions drawn up for Uxbridge are usually regarded as of 'war party' provenance and they place great emphasis on the powers of a re-vamped C.B.K. Changes in the 1646 terms can be regarded as symptomatic of their break with the Scots; this is doubtless true, but it perhaps also is notable that the direct authority of Parliament is less trammelled. Moving forward again, the *Heads of the Proposals*, if indeed associated with the 'Independent' peers, show a willingness to downgrade the present Parliament. See Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, for all relevant propositions, e.g. articles on the militia (pp. 282-3, 293-7, 319-20), reduction of powers given to the Conservator of the Peace to 1641 levels (pp. 282-3, 297-8). Cf. MacCormack, *Revolutionary politics*, pp.104-6, 140-1, 144-5.

[108]The Irish settlement was more than an attempt at reconciliation between King and confederates. Apart from the crucial matter of religion, the terms had proved not unacceptable from a 'royalist' point of view, in the limited institutional trammels placed on the King. Thus Ormond's hopes of it as a model (or 'foundation', Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 421-2) probably extended beyond its status as a return to allegiance.

[109]Inchiquin had reported news spread by Digby's messenger in Sept. that the Scots in Ireland were joining the Ormond Peace, as their fellow-countrymen in England joined the King against Parliament. He himself refused to accept this on the grounds that the King was not openly authorising the Irish settlement though in Scottish hands. Inchiquin to (Warwick ?), Sept. 10, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 312-4.

[110]Ormond to Digby, Oct. 22, in Carte, *Ormonde*, vi ,446-7. On Oct. 12 he had said he believed that he was 'persuaded their [the Scots'] affections to the king are better then is beleeved', Carte, *Ormonde*, vi ,440-1.

[111]Despite Hamilton's later success in the Scottish Parliament, he continued to be over-ruled throughout Dec. - Jan., Stevenson, *Revolution and counter-revolution*, pp. 77-9.

[112]*Charles I* ed. Bruce, p. 70.

[113]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, p. 242.

[114]Casway repeatedly points to this commander's overriding concern with the survival of his army - in 1646 this meant control of the Leinster garrisons (e.g., Casway, *Owen Roe O'Neill*, p. 168). Preston's actions from July, 1646 on seem largely determined by the same worry about the loss of resources needed to keep his army together, e.g. Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 52-3, 86, 102, 132; *Letter-book*, pp.

result of his experiences in August - September. While Clanricard, in early Nov., still seems to have worked towards an arrangement with the confederates as a body (and thus necessarily with the Nuncio) Digby's move to detach Preston and use him against the clericalists and the Ulster 'Old Irish' seems to be the furthest Ormond would go.[115] Even so his letters throughout October show an unwillingness to trust Preston and a refusal to delay military measures for the security of Dublin even if this risked building up opposition.[116] By the middle of November Clanricard had coaxed a submission out of Preston, and had been careful to implicate Ormond as little as possible.[117] That the arrangement collapsed was not only due to the internal weakness of Preston's position within his army, and his failure to persuade the broader confederate movement to respond, but also his logistical weakness which demanded clear support from either Council or Lieutenant if his army was to survive.[118] The proposal that Catholic forces be admitted to Ormondist garrisons was absolutely non-negotiable, perhaps for reasons of sustenance, as well as evidence of security. Only with such concrete grounds of assurance and a military alliance against O'Neill could the Leinster confederates be won.[119]

Ormond refused. Not only did was his distrust of Preston personally to be justified in the event, but it was obviously asking too much of his primary constituency, the Protestants of Dublin and Leinster, to admit to their remaining holds

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277-8. It is all too easy to over-estimate the logistical resources available to the confederate generals, making their lack of military success look more reprehensible.

[115]Casway, *Owen Roe O'Neill*, pp. 157-8. For Clanricard's propositions of Nov. 16, to the nuncio, see *Letter-book*, pp. 313-4; in October he seemed to regard his task as 'to reduce all matters to a certainty', removing the 'plausible generalities' of the clerical party - see *Letter-book*, pp. 288-9, 294-5, 295-7, 300. Ormond's root assumptions come out in his letter to Preston of Oct. 27 which blasts confederate disloyalty and asserts that the terms accepted by the commissioners should 'have been inviolably stuck to' in honour 'whether advantageous or prejudicial to those that trusted them', *Letter-book*, pp. 305-6.

[116]See the correspondence between Ormond and Digby in October, where the latter warned the Lieutenant against any destruction of corn in the Pale which would turn otherwise friendly locals into supporters of O'Neill, Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 441-6.

[117]Clanricard's terms of Nov. 14 offered little that was new, either in propositions or guarantees, *Letter-book*, pp. 309-11. For his obtaining an 'engagement' see Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 276-8; *Letter-book*, pp. 316-7, 317-9, 321-2. As he pointed out at the end of Nov., all that was required of Ormond was an assurance to follow instruction from the Queen and Prince, and disregard orders from a captive King which would harm Irish Catholics - Ormond was willing to give such pledges, the problem being the need for military co-ordination, *Letter-book*, pp. 334, 335. The 'Clanricard concessions' were a more successful re-run of the Glamorgan style of negotiation.

[118]For the efforts of Preston and his supporters to persuade Rinuccini, see *Letter-book*, pp. 315-6 - again rejection centred on the alleged lack of security for the offers made, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 546-7; Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, , vi, 158-62. Clanricard noted that delays saw the plan collapse through the impossibility of Preston's resisting the pressures of lack of supplies - *Letter-book*, p. 337; cf. p. 335.

[119]See Theobald Butler's letter to Ormond lamenting the failure to admit a garrison, since without this Preston's officers could not otherwise justify the acceptance of the peace 'without the consent of the councell or kingdome'. Admission would be the effective guarantee of the terms offered, otherwise the army would risk being 'dispersed amongst ill affected seducers', Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 164-5. Clanricard noted (Nov. 29) that it was unreasonable both to insist on admission to garrisons until submission to Ormondist authority was made concrete and hostilities began, but also to expect the Leinstermen to move against former allies till guarantees i.e. admission. He sought a way around by a series of gestures (*Letter-book*, pp. 336-7).

of those who had threatened them militarily for the last several years. In Dublin the option of closing with Parliament was considerably more appealing, as Ormond recognised,[120] and liable even to swing the Dublin Parliament.[121] Not that this made the Nov. negotiations with the parliamentary commissioners easy, or in the end successful.

One of the objections lodged by Ormond as nullifying the negotiations was the refusal of the commissioners to guarantee the continuance in office of the civil and military office-holders then appointed. He believed that the security of loyal Catholics had not been taken into account; that his need of royal approval was not optional and should have been clear; he was worried over the extent of the ordinances to which Dublin was called to submit, especially those concerning religion. The commissioners for their part were not wholly unconciliatory, though they insisted on the discussion of their instructions, not the terms originally submitted by Ormond. Most notable, perhaps, is their admission that 'We know of know Ordinance of Parliament, that requires the Covenant to be taken in the Kingdome of Ireland', nor indeed of any orders to suppress the Prayer Book there. On loyal Catholics, they were of opinion that 'If any such be, it's probable the number is not considerable' and special provision was not necessary. Even on the employment of army officers, 'we have power by our Instructions, and doe intend accordingly to imploy such of them as shall be found fit for the service.'[122]

Both sides were operating on an 'Old Protestant' agenda, which was hardly surprising given that at least four of the five parliamentary commissioners had primarily Irish interests.[123] Dublin had been the bastion of Protestant 'Royalism' (loyal to Church as well as King) but even if Ormond's stance on these issues was more rigid than that of the population at large, he had come forward as the champion of the interests of the 'loyal' constituency, a role he had always believed in, but one now dominant for him. The talks over, three of the commissioners continued north to Ulster where they had been given responsibilities. Orders were sent out to divert supplies to Ulster and troops either to Belfast or to Munster.[124] Inchiquin had remained dubious about the prospects of a satisfactory arrangement at Dublin. The President and his supporters were gloomy. Bad weather and the lack of a constant supply hampered action, the only effective task being the attempt to recoup uncollected

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[120]Ormond to Digby, Nov. 23 contrasted the offers of security, supply and war against the Irish given by Parliament, to submission to shortages and the possibility of bad faith as no incentive to the loyal population of Dublin, Carte, *Ormonde*, vi, 468-9.
[121]Savage to Perceval, *Egmont MSS*, i, 334-5.
[122]The texts of the papers exchanged were printed (in Dublin and, later London) as *Severall Papers*, E378 (4) from where the citations are taken; Carte, *Ormonde*, iii, 279-82 for summary.
[123]Clotworthy, Meredith, King and Sir Thomas Wharton (the first three also being named Ulster commissioners); the fifth man was Richard Salway.
[124]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 547-9.

'contributions'.[125] As yet there were still hints and hopes that a reconciliation between Inchiquin and Broghill was possible. Significantly, Inchiquin's expressed concern, to Lisle, was rather that his alterations in the officer corps would be urged against him by those close to Sir Arthur Loftus.[126]

The collapse of the Dublin negotiations had seen D.H.C.I. formally vote (Dec. 10) that Lisle go to Munster, and that speedily.[127] The old Irish committee (set up in July 1645) continued to operate, retaining authority over the Irish assessment, while D.H.C.I. functioned quite naturally as an extension of the old C.B.K., setting policy dimensions but not looking too closely into logistics.[128] Its activities in Dec. - Jan. show it to be dominated by 'Independents', indeed by future supporters of Lisle.[129] But they had taken care to bring on board New English figures like Parsons and Adam Loftus.[130] The report made by D.H.C.I. to the Commons on Dec. 23 shows the influence of the 'paper' dated Dec. 10 and signed by Annesley, Sir Adam Loftus, Parsons, Temple and Waller. After a general survey of the state of Ireland, they recommended that the Lieutenant be sent first to Munster with seven regiments; that though he must bring over the £30 000 assigned to him and the excise money voted for Ireland, these were inadequate given the small area held in the south of Ireland, and so a 'monthly provision' should be voted for the forces there. Ulster and Connacht required money and supplies and towards the former a 'fit course be forthwith taken that they may be reduced into one command subject to the Lord Lieutenant' to avoid the present situation, 'distracted under different commands'. Generally, additional forces should be raised for all three provinces, and the means taken to conduct a unified strategy, geared to 'destroy' the 'subsistence' of the Irish.[131]

The Commons proved eager to applaud the sentiments expressed, including the continuance of the war throughout Ireland.[132] By Jan. 4 the lower House had approved the Lieutenant's instructions, and the order that he have a sword of office.[133] The lacuna in the Dublin negotiations was repaired by an article in the Instructions that

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[125]*Egmont MSS*, i, 332-3.
[126]*Egmont MSS*, i, 328, 332-3.
[127]*Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 727.
[128]Since the records of the (1645) Irish committee do not survive for these months it is not certain where the boundaries of the two committees' responsibilities meet. The Dublin negotiations were firmly in the hands of the newer body, and once those collapsed it was from here that the 'policy' documents were presented to the Commons, and where the parameters of Lisle's activities in Ireland were set. D.H.C.I. had to refer to the older body, however, on any disbursal of funds. The assignment of quarters in England to troops drawn for Ireland also remained with the Irish committee.
[129]Of 11 attendance lists from Nov. 17 on, only five members are recorded on more than half the occasions - one peer, Northumberland (6) and six Commoners, Lisle (8), Pierrepoint, Temple (both 9) and Armine (8).
[130]*Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 726.
[131]*Commons' jn.*, v, 12, 22; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 399-401; Bottigheimer, *English money*, pp. 100-1; Adamson, 'Strafford's ghost', pp. 129-30.
[132]D.H.C.I. was to prepare further reports, but the despatch of Lisle to Munster was approved.
[133]This had been agreed at D.H.C.I. on Dec. 10, *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 727.

Ireland have the same church government as that of England; likewise most of the taxation was to persist. Steps were authorised towards the application of delinquents' fines to Irish causes.[134] One further vote passed shows the continuing rise of the Irish Protestants. On Jan. 1 D.H.C.I. moved to the nomination of Irish Councillors, to provide an entourage for Lisle so as to make him a Lieutenant in fact as well as title.[135] The list changes somewhat in the record of Commons' approval - those approved on Jan. 4 are given as Sir Adam Loftus, Temple, Parsons, Borlace, Valencia, Meredith, Shirley, Inchiquin and Sir Charles Coote. Only the latter two, Parliament's Presidents in Munster and Connacht, are new members, the other seven being voted bonuses if they would return to Ireland.[136] It was a moment of triumph for the opposition within the old Council, and for the New English generally, but was less certainly a 'party' manoeuvre.[137]

Late December has been seen as the beginning of a 'Presbyterian' counter-bid in Parliament, succeeding on religious questions and as tensions defused between the British allies.[138] There had been a certain falling out earlier in the month, not helped by news of 'correspondency' between Ormond and the Scots in Ulster,[139] but it was smoothed over. All sides in Westminster were keen to see the Scottish forces leave England and 'amicable conference' had been held on the means to pay them.[140] Nor were the Scots unwilling to go, and the resolutions of the Scottish Parliament on Dec. 16 / 17 committed them to the Newcastle terms or, in effect, a kingless settlement.[141] Charles's continued efforts to adapt the Will Murray proposals fell on stony ground among the Scots, and could appeal little to any in England.[142] As drafted by Dec. 5, they contained the King's equivocation on Ireland, a fair bid to balance the advice from Paris with reality.[143] In the event, he turned instead to rehash his August call for the

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[134]*Commons' jn.*, v, 25-7, 40, 41, 42; B. L. Add. MS 37 344, f. 73b; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 294b; *Cal. C. C.*, i, 53.

[135]*Cal S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 727-8.

[136]*Commons' jn.*, v, 40-1; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 296a. For funds voted to them, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 729; warrants, *Cal. C. C.*, i, 800 also include £2 000 each of the arrears of Hardress Waller and Algernon Sidney.

[137]The delivery of the D.H.C.I. report on the Council had been made by Sir William Lewis. Whether or not he omitted some of those voted at the Committee on Jan. 1, those dropped included the 'Independent' MPs, Norton and Salway, as well as Annesley and King.

[138]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 183-5.

[139]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 734; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 291a. The main question at issue was the old problem of the 'disposal' of the King's person.

[140]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 179-82; Ashton, *Counter Revolution*, pp. 312-3.

[141]Stevenson, *Revolution and counter-revolution*, pp. 77-9.

[142]Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 182-3. One of the few positive responses to the first Murray propositions was that of Perceval, *Egmont MSS*, i, 324.

[143]The word from Paris was for both a Scottish and an Irish settlement, which the King recognised as incompatible. What he hoped to accomplish in his latest message to Parliament was to 'say that I will give full satisfaction as to the managing of the war [in Ireland], so that if I find reason to make peace, there my engagement ends', Charles to the Queen, Dec. 5, in *Charles I* ed. Bruce, p. 84. Cf. Jermyn & Culpepper to Charles, Dec.11, in *Cal. S. P. Clarendon*, i, 346; Queen to Charles, Dec. 11, Dec. 14 in *Cal. S. P. Clarendon*, i, 346, 348 & in *Charles I* ed. Bruce, pp. 97-9.

right to come to London for treaty.[144] Presbyterian ascendancy did not imply a softer deal for the King for they were insistent on holding the King to the core issues, of which control of Ireland was one.[145] For the moment, the French reckoned their game was up. They saw Charles as becoming even more unrelenting on the religious question, with the Scottish parties now closing ranks against him, as the English were doing.[146]

The King's instructions to Ormond were approving his Lieutenant's conduct of the simultaneous treaties, and urged a renewal of the approach to the confederate remnants, 'yet without ruining conscience'.[147] If he had gained little from his contacts with the Scots in Ulster he was still assumed to have considerable influence 'upon the most and best' in the northern province.[148] It was a situation which the new Ulster commissioners would have to counter. But they did so more with the carrot than the stick. Arriving in Ulster on Nov. 30, they had written to Coote and Monro about the disposition of their forces, specifically notifying the latter that they had orders to occupy Belfast, but would not trespass on his quarters.[149] The exchanges over Belfast were no more successful in dislodging the Scots than at any stage in 1645-6, but they now had both a new imperative and a new apologetic thrust. The former was the actual presence of numbers of fresh English troops who required quarters in a province generally recognised as in a poor condition.[150] Already by Dec. 9 Wemyss described the situation as lamentable, with losses through shipwreck, no means of sustenance for the troops and the beginnings of mutiny.[151] The commissioners themselves reported to Lisle that Monro had offered Lecale as desperately needed quarters. Though the Scottish general described the area as the 'marrybone' of the North, the commissioners

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[144]Gardiner, *Constitutional documents*, pp. 308-9; Gardiner, *Great civil war*, iii, 184-6.

[145]*Montereul correspondence*, i, 378-80.

[146]Bellievre commented that the King was now lamenting the abolition of the Scottish bishops, though the French believed that only a grant of Presbyterianism, even without the Covenant, could save him. Among the slim hopes remaining was the Highland - Irish option; but Grignon heard that his counterpart in Ireland, Dumoulin, had departed, swept away by the rising wave of 'Spanish' support in Catholic ranks. *Montereul correspondence*, i, 363-7, 374-6, 357-8.

[147]Ormond could act on the directions of Queen and Prince, and openly acknowledge his obedience to trustworthy messengers, and 'not stick at anything for want of legal power from the King'. Carte, *Ormonde, v*, 18; *Cal. S. P. Clarendon*, i, 358-9.

[148]Wemyss to Perceval, Dec. 9, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 341.

[149]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 551-2.

[150]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 552, 553, 554-5. Annesley, one of the former Ulster commissioners, had helped to draft the Dec. summary which concluded that most of the province was under Parliament's control 'but of no benefit or advantage to them except the residence and some poor relief for their forces there, and the bare habitation of the few British mentioned...', H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 399. This was in line with earlier insistence by the commissioners that the province could support no more troops though such were needed for victory. For the situation reported in late 1646, see *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 565-6

[151]Wemyss to Perceval, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 341.

were adamant that no more troops be sent over to Ulster in the absence of supplies, though they had earlier ordered those assembled to come over.[152]

The pressure on quarters was a genuine military problem. Even to get Lecale, the commissioners had to arrange the removal of resident Scottish troops and the re-allocation of existing local forces with claims on the area.[153] When, on Dec. 15, the commissioners decided to send Owen O'Connolly to the Scottish parliament to urge their case on Belfast, their plea for urgency lest their men perish, and the offer of money to Scottish troops evacuating the town need not be seen as rhetorical ploys.[154] Meanwhile the commissioners' direct statements to Edinburgh built up an alternative argument, based on the defence of the Ulster Protestants, principally Chichester. Though they 'may have made mistakes' these were not sufficient to justify the expulsions and the charges of treason. The fullest defence of Chichester and his officers pointed out that the Scottish army had likewise hesitated about whether the cessation had authority over them; that the British had acted afterwards in destruction of corn; that it was 'reprehensible' but not rebellious for them to go to Dublin for consultations. Charges that Chichester was bribed to accept the cessation, or that he issued the proclamation against the Covenant were refuted - any blame was attached to his conveniently deceased lieutenant - colonel, Matthews. In conclusion they suggested that even in 1645 the Scots had not really acted as if Chichester was in rebellion, and defended actions undertaken under Ormond's authority while the latter was at war.[155]

The general tenor of Scottish responses was not such as to suggest they wished to counter the commissioners with any expansion of Scottish power, or even necessarily permanent retention of what they had. A meeting with a delegation from the army showed them concerned, in the short term, with the delineation of quarters and pay equal to that obtained by their forces in Ulster; but they also pressed for a 'final settlement' which would allow them to depart, delivering up the towns in their hands. Likewise, the reply signed by Crawford - Lindsay on behalf of the Scottish Parliament (Dec. 31) denied Belfast, but offered a resolution based on the departure of the army with the payment of arrears. The sense that the Scots had decided to repeat their strategy in England of holding on to local towns as guarantees of fair treatment (as well as sustenance) is hinted at in the offer that Monro's soldiers would be quartered 'closely' within the town, leaving 'convenient' room for the English.[156]

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[152]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 565-6, 583, 585.
[153]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 568, 571, 581, 583, 588.
[154]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 561-2. It is worth noting that O'Connolly was directed specifically to Argyll and Wariston, though whether through the hope that they would prove generous or merely as a recognition of their power is unclear.
[155]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 558-60, 560-1.
[156]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 567-8, 571.

As for the planter population, they were presented as '...rich in nothing here but of factions and divisions, which increases daily', leading some to seek 'some man of quality to command them'.[157] On Jan. 2 the commissioners issued a series of letters to at least four of the local colonels. It sought to counter rumours 'that the servitors of this country might be wrought out of their employments, and their service of the State thus made fruitless for them'. The thrust of the letter was merely an update of the usual promises of regular supply.[158] But as well as jam tomorrow on the promise of Parliament, the commissioners proved willing to act on their own account within the limits of their powers. With Davies delivering some of the goods for which he had contracted, allotment among the local forces was recorded on Jan. 15.[159] The right to set out the limits of quarters was used in favour of some of those set back by the recent arrivals (Sir James Montgomery, James Clotworthy, Lord Folliott, Viscount Claneboy).[160] Most notably, the granting of custodiums was liberally used in favour of a significant number of planter figures - Thornton, Beresford, Hewetson, Ormesby, Francis King. If mostly drawn from the property of Catholics, now 'rebels', at least one grant was from episcopal property, albeit that of the 'excepted' Bishop of Derry.[161]

In marked contrast with Munster in 1647 the new expedition to Ulster sought to overcome logistical difficulties without challenging the local power of elites. Not all of those with whom they worked were necessarily in favour at Westminster. Robert Thornton, the perennial Mayor of Londonderry, was appealed to in order to arrest the newly arrived commander, Wetton, apparently for moral misdemeanours. Thornton was granted temporary power over Wetton's troops, and their money; Coote, temporarily governor of Derry, could use martial law against any threats to the Mayor.[162] And this at the same time as the Accounts committee at Westminster was securing orders for Thornton to be arrested and sent back to London, having earlier absconded to Ireland when faced with charges of fraud and peculation.[163]

Meanwhile, the leaky south Ulster frontier between troops nominally under Parliament, and those with allegiance to Ormond, which had earlier seen the seepage of

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[157]Wemyss to Perceval, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 341. As an example of local division see Sir William Stewart to Perceval, Dec. 9, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 341-2. The question of military command in Ulster is an uncertain one - already in Jan. 1646 the commissioners were worried about the failure to renew their military powers; but the motion for a new Commander - in - chief for the province had been overruled (on grounds of cost) on Sept. 25 and remained dormant despite renewed recommendations in the Dec. 10 report, H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 400; *Tanner letters*, pp. 205-6; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 677. (Harrington suggests that the commander envisaged in Sept. was Sir William Waller, *Harrington* ed. Stieg, p. 39.)

[158]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 580.

[159]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 579, 580, 587.

[160]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 581, 583, 586, 587, 588, 589, 595.

[161]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 579, 582, 585, 595-6, 597-8.

[162]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 557, 562, 569, 599.

[163]*Commons' jn.*, v, 62 (Jan. 25); P. R. O., S.P. 28 / 253B.

news and supporters south, was yielding a few gains to the commissioners. As early as mid-Dec. Tichborne was trying to make contact with King, offering co-operation in the event of military activity.[164] For the moment the commissioners had to admit themselves incapable of any such, beyond plundering expeditions.[165] By the middle of January they were ready to leave; '...having nothing to give the soldiers they would but be derided by them that wish them ill, and scorned and abused by them they should depend on to be aiding and obedient unto them'.[166] They left with the newly arrived officers, and no doubt soldiery, protesting about their want of means, despite efforts to garner local resources. But they had guaranteed quarters, and the institutional powers of Councils of War, for both old 'British' and new, English regiments.[167]

Materially and politically, it was a far cry from Munster. As Broghill prepared to return to Munster he made no secret of the authority he now held independent of the President.[168] Inchiquin's partisans could only express their hope that 'integrity and honesty will protect him', though the return of William Jephson to England could do no harm.[169] Inchiquin himself suspected that Broghill had tried 'to make the new colonels of his faction', but without success; the future would prove him correct and already he had won an earnest of approval in the testimony given of him by lieutenant-colonel John Booker.[170] Broghill had cause to be sanguine.[171] While soldiers in Ulster waited for the shoes and stockings promised them, the new Irish Privy Council showed much more success in obtaining their pensions.[172] Broghill himself had been entrusted with £6 000 for Munster, Sir Arthur Loftus now won a grant of £5 000, much less clearly recorded as other than personal.[173] Lisle himself, of course, was the designated recipient of the £30 000 advanced by the assessment treasurers - on Jan. 14 it was

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[164]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 558.

[165]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 563, 581, 584.

[166]Davies to Perceval, Jan. 13, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 352-3.

[167]For complaints by senior officers of the new units, see *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 588-9; for efforts to prevent the export of food to Scotland, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 587-8, 600; for the establishment of (autonomous ?) Councils of War, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 600, 601. Davies was also keen to promote greater food production, Davies to Perceval, Jan. 13, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 352-3.

[168]Pigott to Perceval, Dec. 11, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 342.

[169]Pigott to Perceval, Dec. 11, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 342; Pigott to Perceval, Jan. 1, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 349-50; Alexander Pigott to Perceval, Jan. 29, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 355.

[170]Inchiquin to Perceval, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 355-6; Pigott to Perceval, Nov. 10, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 328-9.

[171]See the tone of his letter to Perceval, Dec. 1, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 340-1, but compare the experiences of Perceval's brother-in-law as a collector of the Irish assessment, Fitzgerald to Perceval, Dec. 12 & Jan. 11, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 342-4, 350-2.

[172]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 586, 595; *Cal. C. C.*, i, 800.

[173]*Cal. C. C.*, i, 52. For action to get in the needed money see also, *Calender of the proceedings of the Committee for the Advance of Money 1642-1656* ed. M. A. E. Green (3 vols., London, 1888) i, 58, 60; *Cal. C. C.*, i, 52, 53. There is thus the suspicion that the control of the financial committees by the Peers who are regarded as supporters of Lisle won money when he himself and his associates were directly concerned. See Adamson, 'Strafford's ghost', pp. 136; Adamson, 'Peerage in politics', chapter 1. Perceval also recorded that Lord Wharton had managed to win some of the funds needed for the Dublin mission, albeit too late - this may be part of the same pattern or a reflection that Wharton's' brother, Sir Thomas, was one of the commissioners, *Egmont MSS*, i, 340.

ordered packed into chests to accompany the Lieutenant on his journey to Ireland.[174] In the short term Ulster only won small sums - £1 400 for the 'British', £1 600 for the Scots - derisory in comparison with Lisle's money chests.[175]

Lisle and his associates were riding high, though John Davies, whose business acumen had echoes in political perceptiveness, foresaw a heavy fall if they ventured to Munster.[176] Grignon mentioned that opinion expected the subjugation of Ireland within six months, England and Scotland 'being united'.[177] Plans to reinforce the Scottish army in Ulster might have proved a greater threat to unity,[178] but the redeployment failed to happen, fizzling out in a mutiny in Peebles in Feb. Such an outcome was not entirely unwelcome either to the parts of the army already in Ulster, or to Argyll who had wanted to stall the reinforcement.[179] The Earl of Antrim had taken the opportunity of the latest confederate assembly to moot plans for a fresh assault on the northern kingdom. He also showed little inclination to accept any reworked Ormond Peace which the Assembly had set itself to discuss.[180] Referral to that body was the salve for Preston's conscience in the aftermath of his latest repudiations of the Clanricard - brokered arrangements.[181] But the statement sent to Kilkenny by Ormond made no concessions - it was a litany of indictments against treachery and betrayal since August 1646, failing even to suggest means of overcoming the damage done.[182]

The Lieutenant's actions in Dec. already showed him less concerned with a solemn negotiation than with the hard military facts of control in the crucial provincial centres in Leinster.[183] If Ormond set out from Dublin on the assumption that Preston would join him to secure Leinster from the Ulster army, that general's failure did not sent Ormond scurrying back to Dublin. Instead he moved back into the Pale and then headed for Westmeath.[184] With force and persuasion he seems to have designed a

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[174]*Cal. S. P. dom., Addenda 1625-49*, p. 705. In Parliament the assessment was renewed at the end of January, as Lisle took formal leave of the Commons. See also appendix 2.

[175]. But at least Parliament was still committed to a forward policy in Ireland - a full report from D.H.C.I. was expected as soon as possible *Commons' jn.*, v, 67-8; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 299b. There was also a vote that all serving officers hasten back to Ireland - their absence had generated a certain degree of hostility, at least in Ulster, *Egmont MSS*, i, 352-3.

[176]Davies to Perceval, Jan. 13, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 352-3.

[177]*Montereul correspondence*, i, 412, 415-6, 423-6. Though D.H.C.I. were to draft a further letter to Edinburgh on the Belfast question, relations continued in non-confrontational mode. *Commons' jn.*, v, 67; *Montereul correspondence*, i, 390-1.

[178]*Montereul correspondence*, i, 405-6.

[179]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 245-6.

[180]Ohlmeyer, *Civil war and restoration*, pp. 183-5.

[181]*Letter-book*, pp. 340-1, 344-5; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 552-3, 555-6. Cf. Clanricard's angry response, *Letter-book*, pp. 341-2.

[182]*Letter-book*, pp. 348-53.

[183]The actions of Preston and O'Neill as well as Ormond show this determination to gain the upper hand in the province as a prerequisite of political clout. Casway, *Owen Roe O'Neill*, p. 168 for O'Neill; Preston's response was largely conditioned by the pressure exerted on the loyalty of his army to him in the circumstances of lack of quarters, *Letter-book*, pp. 339, 340-1, 344-5; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 552-3, 555-6.

[184]Casway, *Owen Roe O'Neill*, pp. 166-8; Savage to Perceval, Dec. 19, *Egmont MSS*, i, 348-9.

poaching of Preston's constituency, conciliatory Leinster gentry hostile to the 'Ultaghs'. Luke Fitzgerald, one of the signatories of the 'Clanricard Peace' might refuse to yield his post of the artillery in his care, but the Leinster regiments of Sir James Dillon and the Earl of Westmeath were reported to have joined Ormond by the end of Dec. as he moved towards Athlone.[185]

Davies feared Ormond's actions showed him up as 'a very knave', only acting against O'Neill in the hope of winning better terms with Parliament in the long run. Meanwhile, however, 'All the old English are inclinable to adhere unto him and cometh in to him daily'.[186] More positively, Richard Osborne rejoiced in the Irish divisions. With support already from the Butlers and Bourkes, Ormond, 'if not diverted by some conceived neglect of the Parliament of England or seduced by some reginal letters, will be able with some helps and supplies from England to give a period to these base wars, or more properly rebellion...' since Leinster and Munster were now swinging against the Ulster Irish who plundered them as they had formerly 'our nation', and condemned them as the first fomenters of rebellion.[187] The attitudes he expressed may fairly be assumed to be close to Ormond's own. Whether King or Parliament, or indeed prospective Irish allies, played the roles assigned them in the scenario was another matter.

As Parliament's Lord Lieutenant set off for Ireland, it was his royalist counterpart who remained the key player in Irish Protestant politics, the one around whom greater and lesser allegiances continued to eddy. He had made one last throw for that cross-religious (and even cross-national) coalition based on loyalty to the Crown and the English connection, which could not be made to work save under the very different conditions prevailing after 1648. It did not mean he had permanently alienated Protestant Ireland.[188] If a build-up of Irish Protestants had crystallised around the core group backing Lisle as their best hope in Ireland, this did not mean that they would not dissolve away as the political temperature rose. When it came to the mark in 1647, he found few New English would stand by a policy which seemed to

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[185]Savage to Perceval, Dec. 19, *Egmont MSS*, i, 348-9. The correspondence with Fitzgerald is found at *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 563, 564, 565-6, 566 - note that the Nuncio and his supporters urged Ormond's renewed hostilities (cattle-lifting) as proof he was no longer concerned with the treaty but was out to 'extirpate' the nation - the idea of a truce until the assembly was thus ended on Ormond's doing. The meeting with Ormond to which Clanricard urged Fitzgerald was part of a wider design, the details of which appear in Carte MS 19, e.g. Ormond's report of submissions in ex-Catholic quarters in Co. Meath, in return for 'protection' (Carte MS 19, f. 639); circular letter of Dec. 23 for a meeting of the gentry of Co. Westmeath to win supply for Ormond's army by consent (Carte MS 19, ff. 676, 681); John Nugent to Sir James Dillon, Dec. 29, announcing that the county had appointed delegates to meet with Ormond (Carte MS 19, f. 780).

[186]*Egmont MSS*, i, 352-3.

[187]Osborne to Perceval, Jan. 10, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 350.

[188]As well as the examples cited, see remarks by Broghill in favour of Ormond (Pigott to Perceval, Dec. 11, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 342). Perceval was more suspicious (*Egmont MSS*, i, 354), suggesting again that opinion on Ormond was less determined by 'policy' on Ireland than by personal elements.

quash their control of things on the ground - in this at least the Straffordian parallel was all too clear.[189] In the meantime, all parties to the Irish war had to make their political choices while in thrall to military potentialities. An economically devastated country continually hampered the prospects of decisive martial actions, while prompting the officer corps of the various armies (from the Scots in Ulster, to Preston's and O'Neill's armies, and the Munster Protestants) to act as autonomous economic and political interest groups. When England experienced the full force of such developments in 1647, the impact was great enough to almost knock off course the political and military breakthrough in Ireland Parliament had been building up to for years.

[189]Adamson, 'Strafford's ghost', pp. 137-8, 157-9 draws parallels which he admits 'may not be pressed too far' between the plans for extension of English domination in the 1630s and 1646-7. The idea is relevant in so far as it points to a downgrading of the Old Protestants and the exclusion of a Scottish role in Ireland. It is perhaps less clear that the course of events for the next several years was set in the spring of 1647 by the new 'policy' - it may be more accurate to see all such as merely provisional until the autumn since it was the swinging of the New Model to a position away from the Newcastle terms which was used in both Scotland and Protestant Ireland to win support for the King, whatever latent sympathy may have been in existence already.

Chapter 10.
The alliance of Parliament and Protestants, February - August 1647.

By the beginning of Feb. 1647. Ormond's decision to opt for a deal with Parliament. even on surrender terms, appears to have been taken. In Nov. 1646 he had disliked the terms offered and accepted the lure of the Clanricard - Preston negotiations. But by Jan. 14 his letter to Bagenal claimed that he had never opposed Clanricard's efforts but rather promised to effect them, but would never admit a further treaty - and Bagenal could tell Ormond's friends as much.[1] The statement he despatched to the Assembly at Kilkenny (Jan. 25) was little more than a denunciation of confederate perfidy from the time of the proclamation of the peace. The concession that Taaffe and Barry visit the city in response to an invitation for talks was hardly of great significance at the tail end of such a message.[2] Ormond's hard line thus pre-dated the Assembly's formal rejection of the 1646 Peace - all he empowered Taaffe and Barry to obtain was a one - month cessation of hostilities in return for £1 000, Ormond withdrawing from confederate quarters - extension for another month would cost another £1 000.[3] Ormond's actions suggest that his priority was the preservation of his forces and of the 'loyal' population.[4] Peregrinations with his army saw efforts to win contributions from local populations. Despite limited successes in Westmeath and Longford, where Ormond hoped to win contribution from the assembled gentry[5], he managed to fix

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[1]Carte MS 20, f. 135. Bagenal had told Ormond that the clergy had claimed the marquis had not been sincere towards the Clanricard talks, but Ormond asserted his readiness to have complied with what was required of him under the terms.

[2]*Letter - book*, pp. 348-53.

[3]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 172-3. An Ormondist revival has been detected at the assembly, but they seem to have shown as little inclination for a treaty as the Lieutenant. Casway, *Owen Roe O'Neill,* pp. 173, 174-5; Coonan, *Irish catholic confederacy*, pp. 246-8 argue for Ormondist gains on the basis of amendments to the new Oath and the 'conciliatory' tone of the rejection of the Peace. Still, Ormond's emissaries were not admitted until the Peace had been voted down. Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 138-9 leans to a confederate lead in the rejection of new talks.

[4]On Jan. 10 he had gone so far as the reject Clanricard's offer of going to Kilkenny to win a cessation during deliberations 'as not material to us whether it be assented to or not, but I am confident the faction disaffected to peace would make worse use of such a motion proceeding from any held moderate than of all the strength they can make'. *Letter-book*, pp. 346-7.

[5]Ormond to Westmeath, Jan. 1, Carte MS 20, f. 10; Roscommon to Ormond, Jan. 2, Carte MS 20, f. 18; Clanricard to Ormond, Jan. 9, Carte MS 20, f. 95; *Letter - book*, pp. 346-7.

quarters in the Pale counties for specified units, supported by local payments.[6] This despite reports that the formerly flourishing area faced depopulation and an additional levy imposed by the confederates.[7]

On Jan. 28 Ormond wrote to the commissioners in Ulster for safe-conducts on a matter of importance; a week later he and the Council passed a formal statement to apply to Parliament and for him to quit the government.[8] Why had he come to this point now ? Given his efforts to survive on his own resources for as long as possible, the news of an open and united confederate opposition could push Ormond to Parliament. The news from Kilkenny, sent by Taaffe and Barry, was not hopeful; Antrim and his supporters were in the ascendant there. But this was on Jan. 30.[9] The earlier overture may have had something to do with a clash at Kells where some of the soldiers from O'Neill's army attacked some of Ormond's.[10] Probably this was before Jan. 21, when Ormond wrote to Philip O'Reilly seeking prisoner exchanges. O'Reilly defended the attack as a response to a plundering expedition undertaken by Tichborne. It was not so much the seizures that were at issue as Tichborne's co-operation with the 'Scoich' and the threat to civilians.[11] Perhaps the incident helped Ormond along his path[12]; certainly it showed how far in advance of him some of his subordinates were. Tichborne (at Drogheda) had made contact with the Ulster commissioners through Ward (at Dundalk) and Burgh (at Lisnegarvy)[13] and had notified the Marquis that he intended to take part in a strike into Cavan and Monaghan; he was not over-ruled.[14] Pressure must have been building up from too many sources; the 'Old English' counties of Leinster had not rallied sufficiently and even in Dublin there was rumbling discontent at costs.[15]

For whatever reason, Ormond's Feb. 6 letter to Wharton and Salwey claimed that he was now satisfied with surrender on the terms offered in Nov. 1646, and

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[6]Ormond to Sir William Hull, etc., Jan. 26, Carte MS 20, f. 196; Ormond to Barnewall, Jan. 30, Carte MS 20, f. 220; Ormond to Armstrong, Jan. 30, Carte MS 20, f. 222.

[7]Cadogan to Ormond, Jan. 29, Carte MS 20, f. 214. Ormond admitted that his troops may have taken supplies but promised restitution and urged full payment. But to Tichborne he suggested that some regions would not pay up until they had known more suffering, Ormond to Sir Thomas Nugent, Jan. 6, Carte MS 20, f. 75; Ormond to Tichborne, Jan. 7, Carte MS 20, f. 68.

[8]Ormond to Meredith. etc., Jan. 28, Carte MS 20, f. 205; Council Act, Feb. 5, Carte MS 20, ff. 247-9.

[9]Carte MS 20, f. 223.

[10]Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 137; Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-53*, i, 138.

[11]Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-53*, i, 717, 718-9.

[12]*Egmont MSS*, i, 360 on the 'sad disaster' at Kells.

[13]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 558, 563; Ward to Tichborne, Jan. 4, Carte MS 20, ff. 7.

[14]Tichborne to Ormond, Jan. 5 & Ormond to Tichborne, Jan. 7, Carte MS 20, ff. 44, 68. This is not to say that Tichborne did not harbour a fair amount of distrust for the northern parliamentarians.

[15]On Jan. 16 the Council reported to Ormond that Dublin was protesting at the weight of assessments and the lack of trade, Lambert blaming both Papists and Roundheads. Carte MS 20, ff. 149, 146-7. For the pressing crisis of resources affecting the confederates as well as Dublin in 1647 see Gillespie, 'Irish economy at war', pp. 176-7 (pp. 161-2 for the relative prosperity of Co. Meath and its locale throughout most of the 1640s).

sought to yield his command as soon as possible, in the meantime holding his possessions for the English Crown and Nation.[16] He contacted all other relevant figures[17], including, interestingly, Parsons, saying he sought to retire and asking him to help smooth the way for Ormond to recruit a force for the service of France.[18] There is no cause to doubt the reality of Ormond's commitment. Though Barry was empowered (Feb. 8) to contract for a cessation for 21 days, including an extension of the English quarters[19], this did not mean he was to invite peace propositions from Kilkenny.[20] The Feb. 17 arrangement was a simple truce, based on that of 1643[21]; the same was what was sought from Ormond's contacts with O'Neill.[22] It was the confederates who now sought to open substantive talks through Fennell and Barron.[23] Instead the Council made contact with Inchiquin (Feb. 8), recounting their actions and asking for a loan of ammunition.[24] In Dublin the remnant of the Irish Parliament swung behind the approach to Westminster with a declaration and the appointment of agents, a move which some saw as meaning 'no submission made by the rebels will hinder the receiving of such forces as shall be sent over..'.[25]

Parliament did not delay in making its response. After hearing Ormond's papers read on Feb. 20 the Commons ordered the Derby House committee to assemble so as to report back that same morning. 13 turned up at Derby House, not the usual 5 to 8, to draft a letter to Ormond, and others to the various regional commanders (Lisle, Inchiquin, Coote, the Ulster British, even Monro, through the Scottish commissioners) to undertake diversionary attacks; to produce instructions for the commissioners and votes of £3 000 to Ormond (with £10 877 - 14 - 9 to follow) and £12 000 to send forces.[26] Monday saw the Commons act as promised[27]; Clotworthy got the letter to

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[16]A second letter, concerning his personal financial settlement, urged a hand-over by March 10, through fear of holding out longer. Carte MS 20, ff. 260, 258-9.

[17]The other commissioners, now in Ulster, and his own former agents to London (Lowther, Willoughby and Davies among them), Carte MS 20, ff. 256, 252.

[18]Carte MS 20, f. 254. All these letters are dated Feb. 6.

[19]Ormond to Barry, Feb. 8, with the 'Instrument' empowering him to conclude a cessation, Carte MS 20, ff. 270, 272.

[20]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 182-3.

[21]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 183-4.

[22]Casway, *Owen Roe O'Neill*, p. 175 recognises that Ormond sought a truce for his own safety while negotiating with Parliament and sees this as indicative of Ormond's untrustworthiness. Ormond had asked if O'Neill would be a part of the three week cessation; he agreed but issued a warning over the previous activity of Ormond's troops in south Ulster, Gilbert, *Contemp. hist., 1641-53*, i, 719, 720-1.

[23]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 185; Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, p. 248.

[24]Carte MS 20, f. 268.

[25]Carte MSS 20, f. 307; Sir William Usher to Perceval, Feb. 16, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 361.

[26]Salwey was voted on to the body and the Lords urged to send their members; the Admiralty committee was ordered to get ships over to Dublin at once, and have others ready to take troops across. *Commons' jn.*, v, 91; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 729-30.

[27]On Saturday, the House had time only to approve the instructions, but D.H.C.I. ordered the letters to be sent anyway lest the delay over the weekend be too much; Ormond was told of the diversions and that a resolution would be hastened. *Commons' jn.*, v, 92; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 730; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 523-4; D.H.C.I. to Ormond, Feb. 20, Carte MS 20, f. 336. Thus the two copies

Ormond passed and the Nov. negotiations were reviewed and approved as a basis for the new arrangement. The money votes were seen through and D.H.C.I. given charge of the operation.[28]

D.H.C.I. had been looking into the whole question of the army thought necessary in Ireland, while the older (Star Chamber) Irish committee negotiated for specific troops.[29] Four of the regiments contracted for in 1646, all but one intended for Lisle's Munster expedition, were still in England[30], and it was resolved (Feb. 26) to draw upon these for rapid re-deployment to Dublin, while the forces sent in Nov. 1646, now stationed in the Lecale, would advance south[31] A detailed financial schedule kept just within the £12 000 allocated.[32] In Feb. 1647 the element of urgency was determinative if the expedition was to succeed. D.H.C.I. wrote to Ormond again on Feb. 23 confirming acceptance of the treaty. The first stage of the take-over was launched with Lt.-col. Huetson and Major Astley sent to Dublin, activating *en route* the troops in Lancashire and Lecale.[33] They were authorised to ensure Parliament's forces were admitted to the garrisons outside Dublin (Drogheda, Dundalk, Newry, Carlingford and Greencastle) or, if Ormond agreed to give hostages, to have the regiments from Lecale and Castle's men put under Ormond's command until further

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of each of the letters, the first mentioning acceptance of Ormond's offer, the latter merely diversion, but with copies of Ormond's offer.

[28]*Commons' jn.*, v, 93-5. Reynolds was now added to D.H.C.I. There all lines were followed up - Goldsmiths' Hall was pressed for its money; ammunition was gotten from the Tower and the navy; the Irish committee were asked to remit £6 000 worth of foodstuffs to the city and orders to the navy confirmed - guard of the coast and readiness to take over 6 000 infantry and 400 cavalry. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 730-1.

[29]The emergence of new forces for Ireland at this stage is unclear, given the absence of records from the older Irish committee after October 1646. Almost certainly the Star Chamber committee had continued to use its authority to negotiate for troops for Ireland among those forces being disbanded. See e.g. the Aug. 1646 ordinance for Shropshire disbandment (*Lords' jn.*, , viii, 464), akin to that for the Eastern Association which furnished soldiers for Loftus's new regiment (the Lynn companies are specifically named), *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 862-3.

[30]And causing tensions with local communities, see e.g. *Commons' jn.*, v, 67, 70, 95.

[31]*Commons' jn.*, v, 91; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 732, 731; *Tanner letters*, pp. 232-2. For details see appendix 4. Of the units to be drawn on (Castle's, Long's, Hungerford's and Birch's) the first (Castle's) arrived in Dublin on March 6. (Birch's regiment did not cross over and was replaced by Kynaston's Welsh regiment). The regiments from Ulster were Moore's, Fenwick's and Coote's cavalry; as earlier, it proved hard to assemble fresh cavalry troops in 1647.

[32]It allowed one month's pay to, and transport of, the primary expedition (3 000 foot and 300 horse), plus a bonus of £530 to the Lecale forces and an allocation of £4 000 for supplies, mostly munitions. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 732; *Tanner letters*, pp. 232-4. By the beginning of March the Houses, having heard the representation from their opposite numbers in Dublin, voted an extra £10 000 for Ireland, as well as any ammunition the Army committee could spare. *Commons' jn.*, v, 100, 101, 102.

[33]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 732-3, 733-4. The Ulster based soldiers were to have money sent from the stock at Chester; agents were to be sent to the others to prepare shipping and food. Both men held commands in the regiments in Ulster, in Fenwick's and Coote's respectively. Astley seems to have been among the Salop cavalry in 1645. *Letter Books of Brereton* ed. Dore, ii, 185 & note 2 suggests that, like others listed, he did not come of local gentry. He may have had previous connections in Ireland

forces could arrive.[34] The follow-up would be handled by the previous commissioners plus Annesley, though only he, Meredith and King would go in the first instance.[35]

By March 18 it would seem an efficient response had been set in motion with final orders to despatch ammunition and supplies[36], money voted to the commissioners (though not their final instructions) and Castle ordered to sail at once, if all failed landing in Ulster.[37] But two votes taken that day were intimations of the collapse of a unified push by Parliament. The decision to place Michael Jones[38] as deputy Governor of Dublin was the first step in unravelling the hegemony of command vested in Lisle and his associates, while the nomination of a sub-committee (Wharton, Waller, Clotworthy and Salwey) to consult with Fairfax over forces for Ireland presaged the onset of the Army's conflict with Parliament itself.[39] It was not really feasible to recruit, supply and transport forces with the speed deemed necessary, and the response was not unworthy. But while some units in process of formation could be used, the urgency of the task had prompted a letter from C.B.K. to Fairfax on Feb. 26 stating that two further regiments would be needed.[40] Fairfax's March 4 reply seems to have been acceptable and he was told of parliament's approval and urged to ready the 2 000 men, under Colonel Robert Hammond, for Chester.[41] The whole question of the main Army's future was being prised open by the Dublin question.

Parliament had shown neither delay nor division in its response to Ormond. As well as the D.H.C.I. letters he was on receipt of one from the former commissioners urging 'open dealing' while Wharton gave the assurances Ormond had requested about the future for his family; Clotworthy claimed that the public would not suffer and yet Ormond would get his money, characteristically adding that he hoped the confederate miscreants would suffer for their treachery.[42] While Ormond appealed to Munster (successfully) and Ulster (not so) for munitions[43], he agreed to a safe-conduct for

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[34]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 525-6.

[35]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 734. Clotworthy's omission is unlikely to have been caused by concerns about his political reliability since he was assigned to vet correspondence going to Ormond, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 733.

[36]Goldsmiths' Hall, on March 6, followed up the three sums voted with its own orders, adding demands that those who fines were to go to pay for Ireland pay up or forfeit composition rights. At least some of the money must have been in Loftus's hands by March 13 when the Lord General was asked to provide an escort to guard funds to Chester. *Cal. C.C.*, i, 59; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 529, 536. For details of finance, see appendix 2.

[37]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 737; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 533-4.

[38]For the moment he was at Chester, ready to receive any hostages who might be delivered, and had offered to produce a contingent of cavalry for Dublin, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 734, 735; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 529.

[39]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 737.

[40]His opinion was to be deferred to as to which regiments, if any, he could supply and for how long, but Major George Rawdon was sent to press their case. *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 525.

[41]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 531, 534.

[42]Carte MS 20, ff. 367, 347, 343. Fenwick (Feb. 12) said the Lecale troops would be ready to march against the common foe whenever Parliament gave the word, Carte MS 20, f. 303.

[43]Monro to Ormond, March 5, Carte MS 20, f. 394.

Huetson and Astley on March 9.[44] Already he had told Digby that he must go through with the arrangement despite a recent Catholic bid - dismissing their terms as unreasonable he indicated no more than an intention to keep them talking.[45]

The terms advanced were in one sense minimalist, not even attempting a 'settlement', in another strong on securities binding Ormond to the confederates. Independent governments and quarters were to be maintained, though with co-operation in war, peace or truce, and Ormond was offered personal and party funding. But he was to receive confederate troops into his garrisons or cede them temporarily, and any Catholics living in his quarters must be free of Protestant jurisdiction and have church buildings and livings where in a majority.[46] Though he discussed the details, it seems clear that all the Lieutenant wanted was a further cessation - the present one was holding, if not with a moratorium on pillage[47]. It is inconceivable that at this stage Ormond would grant concession which it seems certain he (like the King) would regard as irrevocably undermining the Protestant foundations of the Kingdom of Ireland. In the meantime he won his cessation extension, from March 13 to April 10.[48] He was still in a tight corner. On March 16 he wrote to Clotworthy asking that Parliament take possession of his garrisons as he was endangered by rebel despair and the unreliability of 'others'. To the commanders in Ulster, who had explained their diversion order, he commented that he could not join them in hostilities pledged as he was to the present cessation.[49] Already the first deadline suggested by him to Parliament had been passed.

Three actions showed his irrevocable commitment to surrender. On March 15 he issued warrants to quarter the Lecale forces of Fenwick (at Trim), Moore (at Dundalk) and Coote.[50] The following day he wrote to vouch for his hostages - Chichester, Roscommon and Ware; if three of his closest associates were not enough, by March 17 he had to add his second son, Richard.[51] Finally, on March 17, he wrote to the King. It was a letter denouncing Irish perfidy; though Charles had allowed him to act on the Clanricard - Preston terms, he portrayed these now as but an underhand means to capture Dublin. Surrender to parliament was best for Religion, the Crown

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[44]Carte MS 20, ff. 410, 412. By March 3 his former agents had written to tell him of the plan to receive hostages and that the first forces sent would be under his command; colonel Castle and his troops were off the Irish coast and seeking directions to land. Carte MSS f. 20, 388; 22, f. 35.
[45]Carte MS 20, f. 409.
[46]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi. 185-7; Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, p. 248 on the Assembly's debates on the terms.
[47]Tichborne to Ormond, March 3, Carte MS 22, f. 22.
[48]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 189-90, 190-1.
[49]Carte MS 20, ff. 449, 457.
[50]Carte MS 20, ff. 441, 443, 447. Castle was called upon to garrison Dublin, Carte MS 20, f. 451.
[51]Ormond to D.H.C.I., March 16, Carte MS 20, f. 453; to the commissioners & to D.H.C.I., March 17, Carte MS 20, ff. 487, 491.

and the King's faithful servants.[52] On March 22 he formally broke off negotiations with Kilkenny.[53] The latter part of the month presents a picture of the Marquis trying to settle things before what he doubtless felt to be an imminent departure, and of a scrabbling on all sides for the allegiance of any individuals of doubtful loyalties as the Irish war entered its starkest form since 1643. Ormond made allocations and arrangements for garrisons and quarters, extending to Lecale, demanding that the new forces refrain from plunder[54], and urged Roscommon and Dudley Loftus to promote his design of taking the nucleus of an army into French service[55]. In particular his efforts for 'loyal' Catholics did not falter. Roscommon was also called upon to press their case in London, even of those who had held commerce with rebels[56]; plunder of contributing residents near Navan was still a matter to be investigated[57] and garrisons were ordered to preserve the property of resident Catholics.[58] That the Supreme Council circulated uncommitted Catholics with warnings of dire plans laid by the Parliament to whom Ormond was surrendering or allying himself shows that they were well aware of the imminence of a war void of the confusing category of 'Royalists'.[59]

Ormond's contacts with the east Ulster forces may have dulled any plans they might have had for diversionary assaults. But in the north-west Coote showed his usual vigour, plundering as far as Tirawley from his base at Sligo. At Westminster the value of his command over the Laggan forces as well as his own small Connacht brigade was recognised, if not yet formalised, though his requests were more tangible, for men as well as supplies. To Perceval he asked that the Committee, especially Clotworthy, might act in his favour against 'that torrent that carrieth all to Munster...'.[60] For John Davies, briefly gone to Ulster, criticisms of Lisle for

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[52]Carte MS 20, ff. 478-9. It is not clear if he was aware of Rawdon's March 5 letter to Eustace, which suggested the likelihood of a settlement in England, including that the King would agree to prosecute the Irish war, Carte MS 20, f. 396.

[53]Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 192.

[54]Ormond to Lecale officers, March 24, Carte MS 20, f. 534.; Ormond to Gibson, March 26, Carte MS 20, f. 547; Ormond to Coote's regiment, March 29, Carte MS 20, f. 572.

[55]Ormond to Roscommon, March 16, Carte MS 20, f. 463; Ormond to Loftus, March 26, Carte MS 21, f. 150.

[56]Ormond to Roscommon, March 18, Carte MS 20, f. 469. As well as those Catholics 'constant' to the Protestant party, and covered by the treaty, he urged consideration of two groups - those who may have entertained the rebels but had since come in and contributed to the army's upkeep and those in rebel quarters, of known good affection, who may desire to be received into mercy.

[57]Cadogan to Ormond, March 18, Carte MS 20, f 499.

[58]Carte MS 20, ff. 580-1. This circular, to Ormond's established garrison commanders, notes that Catholics feared the new soldiers arriving from England, and they should take special care to ensure none of these men harmed person or property so that tillage could go forward.

[59]Letters (March 28) to Sir Nicholas White, Sir Henry Talbott, Sir Andrew Aylmer, Carte MSS 20, ff. 556, 558, 560; Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vi, 192-3; *Letter - book*, p. 382.

[60]*Egmont MSS*, i, 379-80; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 609; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 728. Perceval himself had been recruited to act as an 'agent' for Ulster, though his personal 'interests' lay elsewhere. It was not as if the north did not have a substantial quota of delegates in London, Sir William Stewart naming Sir Robert Hannay, Lieut. - col. Owen O'Connolly, Captains Shaw, Beresford, John Stewart (son of Sir William), major George Rawdon, Lt. McGill and Robert Ormesby (*Egmont MSS*, i, 359). Davies reckoned that each regiment 'on this side of the country' would be

favouritism already peep out. His own task he took to be the reconciliation of tensions in the region and he urged Perceval to cultivate a broad span of individuals in London. The general political drift is not entirely clear - Davies's main concern seems to have been the safety of the northern region, rather than (as yet) a quest for factional gain. One thing was clear, though. The new soldiery Davies did not like, and his criticisms were to be echoed by many other old hands of the Irish wars in all parts of the country. Davies 'would rather ... have to do with ten thousand of the old men than with five hundred of these new ones, who will have beef, butter, cheese, pease, and wheaten bread - things difficult to manage anywhere, and especially here..'.[61]

The situation in Ulster was not only militarily bleak. Politically, two matters shadowed the scene, the repositioning of the Protestant elite round Parliament and the situation of the other army in Ulster, the Scots. The Belfast issue had knocked around for a long time, but the Ulster commissioners stint in the winter of 1646-7 had raised the issue's significance. It also witnessed what appears to have been a willingness by the Scots to negotiate their departure, coinciding with their fellows in England. In London the spotlight remained on Belfast, as the letter of Feb. 4 to the Scottish Parliament showed, pointing to the need for the provisions generated by the town being used for the new forces.[62] Through Stevenson's account may be seen the continuation of the plea for an arranged withdrawal, perhaps in the army's plea (mid - Feb.) for arrears, more certainly in the dealings of the English commissioners in Edinburgh.[63] That the situation was partly fuelled by English dislike of having the army there is not to be doubted,[64] but the issue must be contextualised in the broad pattern of 1646-7 in Scotland as well as England, which was to reduce military commitments to the minimum necessary for security.[65] Thus the vote to remit consideration of the Scottish army to D.H.C.I. on Feb. 22 not only followed closely on the heels of the withdrawal from England but also coincided with the first votes on the reordering of the main armies in England.[66] The Committee, on Feb. 23/25, does not appear to have acted in a spirit different to the commissioners in Edinburgh; the former meeting called for accounts to be drawn up at Edinburgh, the latter voted to have Captain Drummond's

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represented and his letters show he considered it impossible to lobby enough given the inadequacy of the supplies sent to the northern provinces (*Egmont MSS*, i, 356, 361-2).

[61]*Egmont MSS*, i, 365-6, 366, 369-70. He also characterised them as unruly and disobedient. Those named by Davies for Perceval to cultivate included Valentia and his son, Annesley, King, Montgomery, Lowther and (Sir Paul) Davies.

[62]*Tanner letters*, pp. 231-2; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 728, 729.

[63]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, p. 247.

[64]Montreuil felt they feared having to rely on the Scots assistance in Ireland. *Montereul correspondence*, i, 444-5.

[65]*Montereul correspondence*, ii, 12-13.

[66]*Commons' jn.*, v, 95; Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen.*, p. 28. Woolrych states that the Commons voted against the New Model in advance of the provincial forces, but these were going down piecemeal and an ordinance on disbandment and re-allocation to Ireland was read on March 1, *Commons' jn.*, v, 101.

long delayed paper read in the Commons.[67] When they took their decision on March 12 -13 to recommend that they could no longer pay the Scots and would carry on the war by their own army not only did they vote to adhere to the terms of the 1642 treaty (one month's notice and two weeks pay on discharge) but promised the soldiers would be paid up to date.[68]

Of course, the suspicion would have been strong that once dismissed arrears were foregone.[69] But Parliament had honoured its promise to find money for the army lately in England - the key was whether the Houses could be persuaded to give security for Monro's forces also.[70] In Edinburgh, Montreuil believed the Scots would deliver all in Ireland rather than break with Parliament (March 2 / 12) and that the Scottish parliament would cede their holds provided they were paid before departure (March 16 / 26).[71] All told a gap remains over intentions in London. A desire to see the Scots gone cannot be dismissed but this does not show a lack of concern for Ireland, for the Scots had hardly proved themselves there, while pressure from Irish Protestants was for them to have all available supplies themselves. The terms offered to the Scottish army were hardly worse than those given many English regional forces, or indeed those offered to the New Model. It was the Scottish army formerly in England which had been the exception. A final resolution for Monro's soldiers would be deferred by the gathering storm in England, which showed that grand schemes for financial and military reorganisation and retrenchment had to take more account of the men with swords in their hands.

As Scottish stocks fell, that of the 'New English' rose. From early 1647 almost all of the earlier elite can be seen re-aligned with Parliament, most of them carefully avoiding future 'party' entanglements. It was not just a convenience, for in some sense it was the natural home of Irish Protestants. Their own Parliament had recently shown that it placed much of the blame for past sufferings on the failure to enforce the recusancy laws and urged that this be a non-negotiable requirement laid on future governors.[72] It was the kind of request that was meat to the English Parliament's view of the Irish situation. But as the Protestant community re-grouped much of their concern was to ensure that any erring brethren could be re-encompassed. Lowther and

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[67]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 731; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 412.
[68]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 736, 737.
[69]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, p. 248.
[70]The *Moderate Intelligencer* seems to have felt a need to explain the decision on Ireland 'that this may not seem to any strange' reminding readers of the original agreement to return on a month's notice; *Perfect Occurences* felt that the army 'will be content to be dismist, if they may receive satisfaction of by-gones, as *Monro* intimated very lately in a letter to *Argile*.' *Moderate Intelligencer* no. 105 (March 11-18), E 381 (3*), p. 971; *Perfect Occurences* no. 11 (March 12), E 381 (7), p. 86.
[71]*Montereul correspondence*, ii, 41, 64. By April 6 / 16 his opinion was that hostility in Scotland to the votes was due to the failure to give detailed assurances of payment - his opinion of the Scots was now so low as to imagine them ceding Edinburgh if asked. *Montereul correspondence*, ii, 93.
[72]*A remonstrance from the Parliament at Dublin*...E 382 (3).

Sir Paul Davies, seeking relief, secured certificates from Parsons despite having been members of the Irish Council which had jailed him. D.H.C.I. expressed 'confidence in their loyalty to the English nation and the Protestant religion'.[73]

Not all Irish Protestants were so popular. Hostility to Ormond remained strong in early 1647, apparently of a kind akin to the 'man of blood' picture of Charles I as one whose deeds demanded punishment for the sake of justice.[74] But this should not be seen as a 'party' response.[75] The earl of Leicester's claims that Ormond delayed surrender of Dublin until after his sons had lost their Irish commands smacks more of family pride than politics[76], for once Ormond took the plunge he gives every appearance of an eagerness to be gone from Dublin. His timing was a response to Irish events and his inclination to place little weight upon factions among parliamentarians.[77] Where the role of factions comes out it is in three matters - the struggle for positions of power and its accompaniments, alignments with Protestant factions and disputes over the New Model Army. Otherwise the picture of politics at Westminster, when it comes to Ireland, still most obviously fits a pattern of 'two juntoes' with MPs generally subscribing to a policy of re-conquest.[78] Where all this clearly comes into its own is in

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[73]H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 407, 413; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 734.

[74]Edmund Smyth went so far as to claim that the hostility of 'some' had grown so great that they have said it were better all those innocent people should perish rather than he should escape unpunished, grounded, as I conceive, upon that text that evil is not to be done that good may come thereof'. The sentiment has connotations not only of the 'man of blood' charges later thrown at the king, but also savour of the pursuit of Perceval and others implicated in the cessation. But two points should be made. Firstly, Smyth himself, though seeing any abandonment of talks as inexcusable if it caused further Irish Protestant suffering, had little time for Ormond who 'hath not deserved any favour himself, who hath so far hazarded God's cause, the safety of the poor Protestants there and his own preservation and interest upon nice punctilios...'. It was probably an opinion held widely, as by Perceval. Smyth to Perceval, Feb. 25, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 363-4. (Perceval. a 'moderate' showed less affection for Ormond than many associated with a drastic policy and 'Independent' allies, like Parsons and Broghill, yet not a pursuit of vengeance. Personal matters possibly account for both dimensions, for though Perceval was described as a 'friend' of Ormond, this was in terms of securing Ormond's money from Parliament, in which Perceval had a stake as one of Ormond's creditors. His letters to the Marquis show little sign of personal friendliness, *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, i.)

[75]Or at least not one with 'ideological' considerations. If Clotworthy (or even Holles) remained more open to Ormond's defection than 'Independent' MPs, even Lisle claimed to have resisted the demand for Ormond to be made an 'excepted' person, while his aristocratic supporters were open to the rehabilitation of English Royalists. The resistance to Ormond was a fusion between those who saw him as an obstacle to their control of England (and Ireland) through office, and those inspired by proto-regicidal need to bring 'men of blood' to justice. The more lenient approach was that of most (but not all) Irish Protestants, and just possibly of those 'Presbyterian' grandees (not rank - and - file) who possibly sought in Ormond one last bridge between Parliament and King over Ireland.

[76]*De L'Isle MSS*, iv, 564.

[77]When, in July, Clanricard and Daniel O'Neill tried to build hopes on English political reversals, Ormond could only see 'that all this stir in England is for the putting down of one rebellious faction for the setting up of another, without hope of advantage for the King or his party...'. *Letter - book*, pp. 458-9, 461-2, 462-3.

[78]Indeed it may be suggested that 'radical' opinion lay with the undifferentiated bulk of MPs, as distinct form the 'Royal Presbyterians' as much as the 'Royal Independents' on matters like the future of delinquents or even the religious settlement. Since voting patterns cannot be analysed there is no need to assume broader 'parties' only greater organisation among the 'juntoes' to explain divisions, in the Commons at least. It appears that all the grandees were faction leaders eager to agree with Charles and somewhat in advance of their followers. Such plans as, for example, a counter-coup relying on

regard to Munster. The Inchiquin - Lisle clash in March - April 1647 is too well-known to require detailed recounting. For such a short engagement it had lasting consequences in running battles at Westminster for another year until Inchiquin's 'defection' appeared to prove his critics right. But perhaps two issues of contextualisation can assist in understanding the episode, (even if these must be added to an increasing number of interpretations[79]) - the parallel with English provincial disturbances, and the army revolts of 1647.

When Lisle left for Ireland at the end of February with his military and political staff, the likelihood of a clash with Inchiquin was already set.[80] Richard Fitzgerald, still collecting assessments in Wales gave his opinion that 'it was decreed from the beginning none allied or born there [Munster] shall have command unless a time-server, a back-biter, a flatterer and worse or a relative to such'.[81] Already by March 13 the situation was so severe that both groups had sent off representatives to put their case in London.[82] But the charges and counter-charges presented are almost mirror images - the Lisle group's accusation that Inchiquin was too lenient to the Irish as an ethnic group makes a nice counter to his claim that they saw no great harm in an 'honest Papist'.[83] Otherwise each charged the other with, broadly, five main failures - financial mismanagement[84]; military shortcomings[85]; ill-use of custodiums and 'protections'[86]; factionalism; leniency to malignants.

Scottish and City support at most tinge only a clique as the Army claimed. The major issue of the recruitment of external support was largely religious. If the broad mass of MPs, as of Assembly divines, were undifferentiated puritans, they still had to jump one way or another once the bishops went down. Despite all qualifications, City statements in 1646-7 do ring out with anti-sectarianism, those of the army with calls for toleration. As Underdown has shown of events in 1648-9, decisions had to be made from moment to moment, rather than on the basis on pre-existing groups, and that religion was not too close a predication. So in 1646-7 it would seem that either 'coalition' had but a semi-permanent relationship with its leaders, and a strong religious core - yet one not pertinent to every voting issue.

[79]Both Adamson ('Strafford's ghost', pp. 138-42, 145-6, 150-4) and Bottigheimer (*English money*, pp) use the idea of a new rigor in parliamentary policy associated with Lisle (though this need pose no necessary danger to Irish Protestants). Additionally, Bottigheimer usefully sketches in the New English context, both generally as an 'exiles return' and narrowly in the Inchiquin - Broghill disputes. All this is useful but ignores a genuine 'Independent' dimension to the expedition. This is provided by Adamson (though the implications drawn on policy change, to embrace Scotland, and to presume a direct line form Inchiquin's anger in 1647 to his 'defection' a year later seem less certain).

[80]*Egmont MSS*, i, 362.

[81]*Egmont MSS*, i, 360.

[82]*Egmont MSS*, i, 370.

[83]*Egmont MSS*, i, 377, 380.

[84]Inchiquin charged Lisle with retrenching the pay of existing officers, even while bringing over an inflated staff establishment, and of favouritism in regimental pay; he in turn of having 'profits converted to private uses' apparently including the misuse of provisions. *Egmont MSS*, i, 373-4, 375, 377.

[85]The new men complained of abuses in musters, where 1/3 to 1/2 of those listed were missing, while Inchiquin (not without cause) blasted strategic ineptness, a case he would vindicate in the months ahead. *Egmont MSS*, i, 366, 375, 380.

[86]Henry Whaley pointed out that Inchiquin's custodiums had been granted wholesale to the detriment of the populace (the new Lieutenant setting up a committee to regulate them); apparently Inchiquin was also supposed to go easy on protections. He claimed the gains made hereby - not only material, but

Factionalism was a charge Inchiquin used most; perhaps it stung deepest. He and his associates (especially Jephson) were seen as excluded from counsel[87], while officers were put out of their commands if they showed 'either a dependency on or an affection to either of us'.[88] Where broader issues came in was that Inchiquin elaborated this to mean exclusion for 'not adhering to the Independent party' (March 5) growing to the accusation that 'the doctrine here preached by the Lord Lieutenant's chaplains is strong and direct Independency, and the government prescribed and pursued by the Parliament both inveighed against and decried publicly in the pulpit'.[89] The counter used by his enemies was 'disaffection' not only in generosity to the 'rebel' but to the 'malignant' - Inchiquin was forced to deny allowing the profits of their estates to royalists in England but was forced to admit that he could not answer for 'all my then actions [at the time of the cessation] as consonant to the pleasure of the parliament, my sending men to England then and other actions declaring me then to be for the King's service...'.[90]

These last two points are the heart of the matter. Provincial disputes throughout an England now under Parliament's sway are, predominantly, accusations of employing malignants or countenancing sectarians.[91] Too close a 'party' alignment should not be pressed - Col. King in Lincolnshire hammered both on the basis of the Covenant.[92] Of the other charges it must be said the pecuniary faults and self-interest were used as a tarnish for all internal enemies one wanted to lay low; in an Irish Protestant context so also was generosity to Papists or Irish. If Lisle's supporters threatened a Committee for Accounts, the Lord President's counter - call for commissioners was not mere expediency.[93] He had long petitioned for such a body (to regulate money matters and rebel land and property), almost winning a commission in 1645. He continued to press for a new one, clearly envisaging something akin to the Ulster commissioners, who so neatly handled awkward issues of resources.[94] He wanted them to take away the sticky matter of 'protections'[95] which was clearly advanced to damage him on racial grounds. They were a necessity in Irish conditions, as so stony an officer as Coote recognised, as did the Dublin commissioners[96] and,

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division among the enemy, while as early as March 5 he was countering with the favour the 'Independent party' were extending 'even to the very rebels, to whose persons and estates (submitting to their power) they resolve to give protection'. *Egmont MSS*, i, 366-7, 377, 368.

[87]*Egmont MSS*, i, 368, 373-4, 380.

[88]*Egmont MSS*, i, 373.

[89]*Egmont MSS*, i, 368, 374, 380.

[90]*Egmont MSS*, i, 377.

[91]See e.g. Ashton, *Counter-revolution*, pp. 96, 163-4, 241-5 (sects), 216-22 (ex-Royalists).

[92]Ashton, *Counter-revolution*, pp. 92-3, 221.

[93]*Egmont MSS*, i, 367, 371.

[94]*Egmont MSS*, i, 399.

[95]*Egmont MSS*, i, 419-20.

[96]*Egmont MSS*, i, 413, 434-5.

probably Lisle's own council. More mileage could be got out of raking out a Royalist past, particularly one of military support.

As for the religious charges, Inchiquin himself admitted that he was hardly the sort of man to attract odium for the strength of his devotion to any religion.[97] His appeal to the Presbyterians Holles and Stapleton was on the basis of *religious* order. If the 'Independents' he feared were men like Broghill's and Lisle's patron Northumberland[98], or even someone like Pierrrepoint, he was beating too loudly the drum of religious anarchy. In fact what arrived in Munster was an army whose Lieutenant - General was Algernon Sidney, its Major - General Sir Hardress Waller and the Commissary - General, Thomas Harrison. A group where Sidney is the most 'moderate' augurs ill from an Inchiquin, though when Sidney reached his conviction of opposition to any religious compulsion is not certain.[99] Waller, however, had probably already adopted as chaplain Thomas Larkham (or Larkin), a man for whom the religious order in New England had proved to strict.[100] Perhaps Waller was moving towards his position (of 1648) of doubt about the magistrates power in matters of faith.[101] Harrison had less need of a chaplain, as already established as a 'preaching major'.[102]

If then, Inchiquin was frustrated at the usurpation of his authority by outsiders, the terms of the dispute quickly escalated through general accusations to the conventional hostilities prevalent in *English* regions. The intermediate charges seem unresolvable, though it is hard to see how Inchiquin could have siphoned off much from the miserable stocks sent him, as opposed to the relative abundance of Lisle's provisioning, or to ignore the successes of his forces once he had regained command. That the new officers ultimately stood by him also testifies to his credit. In the terms of 1646-7 power politics, the resources of 'central' power were ones most appropriate to maintaining the hold of those associated with the Independent leadership (and in turn of

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[97]*Egmont MSS*, i, 452.

[98]*Egmont MSS*, i, 453. Though Adamson has shown that Saye feared Presbyterianism as a social threat - can he have been alone ? Inchiquin's claims had validity in so far as the religious Independents had moved away from an alternative national settlement to a call for toleration outside the national church which could threaten religious order and could be opposed by both clericalist and 'Erastian' Presbyterians. (Adamson, *'Vindiciae Veritatis'*, pp. 58-9; see also Adamson, 'Peerage in politics', chapter 2 'The government of the Church' on opinion in the upper House.)

[99]Scott is able only to demonstrate Sidney's political co-operation with the 'Royal Independents' and activity under Northumberland's aegis. But he asserts that the tenor of Sidney's later political thinking and acting was both premised in religious terms, and that at the centre of these was a hostility to all imposed religious uniformity. (Moreover, he traces these ideas to Sidney's formative family and educational influences.) Scott, *Algernon Sidney* , pp. 4,17, 23, 27, 29, 80-2, 88-9.

[100]Anne Lawrence, *Parliamentary army chaplains, 1642-51* (London, 1990), pp. 145-6; *D.N.B.*, xi, 592-4. Intriguingly, the *D.N.B.* entry cites Larkham's MS diary (which Lawrence believes lost) to the effect that Larkham claimed to have been ' "chaplain to one of greatest honour in the nation, next unto a king" ' - could he have been Lisle's chaplain ?

[101]A. S. P. Woodhouse, *Puritanism and liberty* (London, 1938), pp. 136-7.

[102]C. H. Firth, *Cromwell's Army*, (London, 1902), p. 318.

bringing those involved in the army or the county committees into an alliance with them). But many parliamentarians had supported centralisation not on the basis of 'ideology' but as a pragmatic means to win the war, and could swing away if threatened by rumours of upheaval in the social (or religious) order in the counties. In Munster terms Lisle was the face of central government and of 'radicalism' outside of the accepted social order. Certainly it would seem that the plan to send Lisle had won much wider support that he would garner in 1647. Perhaps if there was a 'Presbyterian' policy behind the fights over positions, it was based on 'a return to normalcy' as in the English regions. Yet the examples of English politics which look like suitable parallels for Inchiquin's situation also all show the powerful distorting effects from any general pattern of specific local conditions - this would obviously be very much greater when not a different region, but a different country, is in question.[103] But in terms of broader 'Irish policy' the incident shows up little difference in thinking, save just a hint that the Presbyterian - Inchiquin terms of reference were more 'religious', the Independent - Lisle perception of the war more 'national' or 'ethnic'.[104]

The second context, that of army revolt, will be considered later. For the moment it was that other army revolt, that of the New Model, which was the motor which drove English political development from March to August 1647. As looming antagonisms relating to the army fused with differences emerging from Lisle's foray into Munster in late March - early April 1647, a genuine 'party' breakdown occurred in Parliament's dealings with Ireland. Yet even now it was qualified by three considerations - that 'party' strife was more a matter of power struggle than policy issue, save tangentially; that disagreements over Ireland were as much imported into politics at Westminster by the play of external interests as generated by internal

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[103]Clive Holmes, 'Colonel King and Lincolnshire politics, 1642-1646', in *Hist. Jn.*, xvi (1973), pp. 483-4 provides a valuable account of the transformations in 'party' alignments and the interaction of local and national politics. King had been supported by the 'war party' in 1644 in promoting effective centralisation (the Eastern Association) against traditional county leaders either inept or leaning to peace. But by 1646-7 moderates in Parliament were defending his attacks on the 'increasingly alien' agencies of central power, not responsive to local needs, and of lower social standing, as well as tainted with sectarianism. This looks like Inchiquin's situation, yet Holmes also shows that King was opposed in 1646-7 by Lincolnshire 'moderates' who could not fault King on grounds of 'ideology' but still sore at his ousting of them in 1643-4. Again, many of Inchiquin's opponents had grievances of no direct relevance to the 'party' strife of these years. See also Ann Hughes, *Politics, society and civil war in Warwickshire, 1640-1660* (Cambridge, 1987), chapter 6 for the 'subtle interrelationship' between local and national considerations in another county, and the importance of resources disputes for 'political' controversy.

[104]This is only suggested in so far as Lisle concentrated on charging Inchiquin with leniency to the Irish, while Inchiquin harped on Lisle's favouritism to Catholics. The two had, however, been intertwined since 1641 and it was dangerous for all concerned to unravel the threads too much. Moreover, if true, it hardly puts the 'Presbyterians' in a more 'moderate' position, merely one which shows up their commitment to religious reformation and unity between the Kingdoms. For Inchiquin personally, as for other Protestants of Irish background, the need to make religion a bond of unity capable of overriding difference in nationality is apparent. The letters of Richard Fitzgerald are crucial to a consideration of this theme, e.g. *Egmont MSS*, i, 411.

dynamics; that, as with all war politics, material considerations lay at the heart of debate.

That is not to say that tensions were newly generated. Of the situation prior to March 1647 it is perhaps worth bearing in mind the kind of attacks levelled at Fairfax's forces. Whether true or not, accusations of sectarian excess were levelled at the New Model from 1646.[105] The fullest recent account of army politics in 1647 returns to the idea of a political re-modelling of the New Model.[106] But as with the Lisle episode this was the partisan outcome of what began as a consensus policy (or at least acquiescence) and continued for most of its course with the support of the broad mass of undifferentiated parliamentarians. By Feb. - March 1647 a major effort was under way to reorganise the military - financial complex for England and Ireland. Regarding Ireland, the Commons had been pressing D.H.C.I. for a statement on the proposed size and support of forces in Ireland from Dec. 23, though it was only delivered by Armine on March 6.[107] Given the role attributed to D.H.C.I. in Holles's 'Presbyterian' plans[108] it is worth noting that this was not yet a 'Presbyterian' body.[109] The report merely suggested numbers - 3 000 cavalry, 8 400 infantry, 1 200 dragoons; it was the House which voted to draw on the existing army. D.H.C.I. was to determine a single 'establishment' to pay all forces and to select the cavalry.[110] By the time this second report was delivered on March 15 it was read by Holles.[111]

For ordinary MPs, the broad strokes of the plan were probably satisfactory. As well as reducing the size of the military in England (Feb. 19) and granting a large force for Ireland (March 6) the votes of March 8 (limiting senior officers, excluding MPs

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[105]Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, pp. 21-3 for a balanced look at Edward's charges. Cf. the pamphlets cited by Ashton (*Counter - Revolution*, pp. 163-5) which show the charges of religious anarchy pre-date the equation with social upheaval; both apply to the Army. The idea of the 'Presbyterians' as the primary party of social and political order generally seems somewhat shaky (as compared to the leadership at least of the opposing faction) but seems valid in so far as they saw a danger in the Army in social and especially religious terms. See the useful comments of Ashton, *Counter -revolution*, pp. 269-71 on the issue (though he accepts the general premise of 'Presbyterians' ' partisan support of order).

[106]Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, pp. 27-33. Cf. Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 151-2, 154-8.

[107]*Commons' jn.*, v, 26, 68, 107.

[108]Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 164-5.

[109]Recent attendance had seen Northumberland, Manchester, Saye and Wharton as the only peers, while of MPs, Pierrepoint, Vane (which one?), Armine, Fiennes and Wallop balance Holles, Stapleton, Clotworthy, Lewis and Waller. Probably Salwey belongs in the former camp, and possibly Reynolds. Temple wrote to congratulate Reynolds on his appointment to D.H.C.I., suggesting that he was hopeful of his continued support of Lisle. Holles was later to consider Reynolds a defector from his camp, even on matters Irish he opposed Clotworthy and Glyn on the wording of a letter seeking to extricate the King from association with the 'rebellion', *Egmont MSS*, i, 375; 'Memorials of Denzil Lord Holles' in *Select tracts* ed. Maseres, i, 308; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 603.

[110]*Commons' jn.*, v, 107.

[111]*Commons' jn.*, v, 112. He and Clotworthy were to be regular, almost sole, reporters thereafter. Even so, any hegemony at Derby House does not appear until April. This would suggest both that control of the Commons preceded any winning of the 'executive' committee, and that 'Independent' withdrawal from Derby House only followed the first phase of the Army Revolt (that leading up to the March 30 'Declaration of Dislike').

from commands and enforcing present church government) could appeal not only to hardened Holles supporters but also to those anxious to save money, to uphold the principle of self-denial, and to support the religious settlement. The Commons passed their ordinance for control of (peace - time) forces and rapidly saw through a £60 000 assessment for both countries.[112] By the time of the March 29 vote to disband all infantry save those assigned to garrisons or to Ireland[113], many of the former had been abolished.

Much later the agitators would claim they opposed neither disbandment nor Irish service in principle, but needed their grievances met.[114] These began with material demands and questions of command, and spread to self-vindication[115], a progression later seen in Munster. But even before the politicos took to dabbling in questions of command, the financial problems underlying reorganisation had become apparent. The query by the New Model officers of how they would be paid and supplied in Ireland reflected, whether consciously or not, failure to provide for troops once they had crossed the Irish Sea.[116] The general financial report had been made on March 15. Summaries suggest a total annual charge, including artillery, of £1 203 645 - 2 - 4 for 41 regiments and three companies of infantry, 13 regiments and 18 troops of cavalry and 2 regiments of dragoons. The committee for the sale of delinquents' estates was ordered to meet.[117] The debate was resumed next day, firstly with the vote to discharge the Scots - in the light of financial reports the fact that the Commons 'voted that the Kingdome shall be eased thereof' seems plausible.[118] Second, consultation was to be had with the Irish officers in London on the size of forces and the use to make of them, and with Fairfax on his troops[119]. Finally the vote was taken for an

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[112]Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, pp. 30-2; *Commons' jn.*, v, 86, 114, 119. Garrisons were being dismantled already and the troops used for Irish service, *Commons' jn.*, v, 101, 104.

[113]*Commons' jn.*, v, 124.

[114]Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, p. 204; cf. Gentles, *New Model Army*, p. 158.

[115]Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 198-200.

[116]Of over £35 000 voted for the Dublin expedition, over £13 000 was due to be paid for Ormond personally and £10 000 cash sent to Dublin; most of the rest being eaten up in small charges, the largest £2 200 to Jones for his cavalry. With the £5 498 they could give one month's pay to, victual and transport, the regiments under Castle, Long and Hungerford. But this left a remainder of only £320 and they had neither the wherewithal to provide the 6d daily owed to men delayed at the coast nor to send the regiments of Birch and Kinaston. *Commons' jn.*, v, 68, 94-5, 96, 100, 101, 107;*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 742.

[117]*Commons' jn.*, v, 112; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 414. Holles's report also made mention of the demanding terms submitted by colonel Hammond for a reinforcement from the New Model for Dublin, and Drummond's report from the new Scots. *Perfect Occurences* mentions 'The whole charge of the warres will be about 1 400 000*l per Annum*, if effectual' and the recommendation to squeeze more money from Royalists. The *Moderate Intelligencer* hints that the debate would have moved on to consider Fairfax's army but for rumours of a petition. *Perfect Occurences*, no. 11 (March 12), p. 84, E 381 (7); *Moderate Intelligencer*, no. 105 (March 11 - 18), p. 970, E 381 (3*).

[118]*Commons' jn.*, v, 113-4; *Perfect Occurences*, no. 11 (March 12), p. 85, E 381 (7).

[119]*Commons' jn.*, v, 114; *Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer*, no. 201 (March 16 - 23), p. 463, E 381 (9); *Moderate Intelligencer*, no. 105 (March 11 - 18), p. 971, E 381 (3*).

ordinance for £60 000 a month for one year from March 1, to be prepared by Scawen and Reynolds.[120] Brought in on March 20 it was passed on April 7.[121]

Even without the peers delaying the ordinance until June 23, and the fact that its collection in the country ultimately failed utterly[122], there were clearly grounds for serious concern over pay.[123] The gaps were exposed in the quest for a London loan of £200 000 in April , clearly aimed at supplementing the assessment with immediate funds for disbandment and Ireland. The fall-out was an inter-House conflict over collateral, particularly a clash over composition or delinquent sales.[124] For the purpose of this chapter the basic issue is clear - adequate money to set things afoot for Ireland was not to hand, let alone financial security. Over at Derby House discussion on April 9 suggests that they felt that pay in either country should be the same; in both a similar proportion of (officers' ?) pay should be respited, in England on the public faith, in Ireland on rebel lands (after the adventurers were settled).[125] The heavy Presbyterian majority at D.H.C.I. by now shows both that they were equal in their treatment of the soldiers in either planned army, and that it was with them that the proposals for wholesale payment of the army through confiscation was formalised first.[126]

Thus under-funded, the Commons voted a mere 6 weeks back pay to soldiers not going for Ireland, those who had volunteered obtaining 8 weeks worth plus the usual month's advance pay.[127] By the end of April army discontent had nearly bubbled over - to the officers' *Vindication* (April 27) would soon be added the first agitator documents. The whole crisis has been fully discussed and the point made how few and insubstantial were the units recruited for Irish service.[128] In terms of grievances drawn from the proposed Irish future, the two key items were the

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[120]*Commons' jn.*, v, 114; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 304b.

[121]*Commons' jn.*, v, 119, 130, 134; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 305b, 307a.

[122]Gentles, *New Model Army*, p. 30.

[123]The ordinance at best could meet but half of Irish costs alone, let alone the standing forces of both countries. The Commons knew that the excise was grossly overloaded and Goldsmiths' Hall had been stretched. Since January there had been advocates of using delinquents' property for military costs, but this had still come to nought. Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 152-3 for a summary of the situation.

[124]Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 168-73; *Harrington* ed. Stieg, pp. 47, 48.

[125]*Commons' jn.*, v, 138, 140; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 740, 741; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 307b. It was the Commons, apparently, who had earlier voted that rates for Ireland should be higher. D.H.C.I. lists were presented on April 13, winning approval for parallel pay.

[126]Whatever terms were voted, the prospects for Irish service remained as unappealing as ever. Those in Ireland still depended on expedients, including new contracts with a now reluctant Davies (*Commons' jn.*, v, 136-7; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 609-10, 611, 625; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 307a). Grocers' Hall was approached to see if they had any money left (their £4 000 was ordered to Veel at Bristol to send off Townsend, Blount, Cecill, Scott and the artillery, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 744, 747). Goldsmiths' Hall was squeezed again, the Commons voting £12 000 (April 16) then £20 000 (April 20). On the credit of this, D.H.C.I. ordered £5 000 to buy victuals for Dublin, £4 000 to send away troops, and other sums. By May 11 the £4 000 for troops was still being begged (*Commons' jn.*, v, 144, 146; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 744, 745, 746, 747).

[127]*Commons' jn.*, v, 155; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 308a.

[128]Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, pp. 52-4, 56. See also appendix 4.

uncertainty of supply and the dispute over command. This last had been the main area of 'party' conflict as it pertained to Ireland. Now divided opinions over the New Model came into play as causative force.[129]

Back on March 6 it had been agreed that the government of Ireland should be re-opened as a matter for discussion.[130] It was nearly a month before the debate took place.[131] The one relevant, 'political' vote, that of Michael Jones to command in Dublin, had emanated from D.H.C.I. on March 18, and still envisaged him as a deputy to Algernon Sidney.[132] It was only on March 27, the day when Clotworthy reported the first mission to the Army where the officers had queried pay and command, that the House voted 55 : 42 to debate the government of Ireland and the command of the forces there. In two divisions Hesilrig and Morley went down to Stapleton and Waller and Stapleton and Lewis.[133] In the debate on April 1, the basis for change was made the Dec. 1645 vote to limit any government chosen to a period of one year, meaning that Lisle's term of office would end on April 15. The progression was through four votes - to separate military and civil power; to entrust the former to Lords Justices; to name commanders to existing and new forces under the control of parliamentary commissioners; that the military commanders be Waller and Massey. Only the last two led to divisions, the first succeeding 64 : 56, but the named officers being voted down 99 : 76. Notably the command was limited to three provinces, leaving Inchiquin secure

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[129]More broadly, two things should be remembered. First the spring had not seen a rift open up as regard the King. Parliament still stood by the Newcastle terms, even in April; the Scots were quiescent; Army contacts with Charles have been discountenanced; French envoys feared a settlement without him. Secondly, where conflict did occur was over the church, then under intensive discussion. Both matters are relevant for Irish politics.

[130]*Commons' jn.*, v, 107.

[131]In the interim the decision to end the career of the Scottish army was taken, Holles and Clotworthy both participating (*Commons' jn.*, v, 112, 113-4, 115); financial measures included the assessment and further moves on delinquents' money (*Commons' jn.*, v, 112, 114, 117, 119; both Northumberland and Holles had campaigned for the City loan); the first recruiting mission to the Army was begun (*Commons' jn.*, v, 114, 126, 127; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 737, 738). Private arrangements continued, notably with colonel John Birch (*Commons' jn.*, v, 126, 128; *Weekly Account*, no. 13 (March 24 - 30), E382 (1); *Moderate Intelligencer*, no. 107 (March 25 - April 1), p. 986 E 382 (8)).

[132]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 737; *Commons' jn.*, v, 121, 124; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 610. At the D.H.C.I. meeting to nominate him the attendance was Wharton, Armine, Vane jr., Salwey, Wallop, Waller and Clotworthy.

[133]*Commons' jn.*, v, 127. See Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, pp. 32-3; Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 187-8 for the mission to the Army. It is well worth noting that the terms offered by Colonel Robert Hammond for service in Ireland (H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 414) are a miniature of the later concerns of the Army at large. He only offered his regiments for 2 - 3 months, and demanded a full account of (adequate) provisions in Dublin as well as to hold the governorship of Dublin i.e. army unity, supply, command. See *Moderate Intelligencer*, no. 105, (March 11-18), p. 970, E 381 (3*); *Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer*, no. 101, (March 16 - 23), p. 266, E 381 (9); *Weekly Account*, no. 12, (March 17 - 24), E 381 (12). Hammond was from the first involved on the officers' committees which responded to queries akin to those he had put forward - Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, pp. 32, 37, 42.

in Munster.[134] The following day Skippon was successfully voted Field Marshal with Massey as Lieutenant - general, though Waller failed even as Major - general.[135]

This was the nub of the 'Presbyterian' counter-offensive, a drive to combine military reorganisation in both kingdoms (broadly accepted as necessary) with a reversal in the allocation of political and civil office as a means both to a diffusion of power and to the exclusion of perceived supporters of toleration and the sects.[136] The first two weeks of April saw political juggling as the future commands of military forces were voted and service in England or in Ireland or disbandment was apportioned.[137] D.H.C.I. was now moving into its role as Holles's political dynamo, with additional members and powers to transport and disband forces and (April 9) commission officers as approved by the House.[138] On April 8, the day decisions were made on the futures of individual regiments, it was successfully moved the Michael Jones be made full Governor of Dublin, replacing Sidney.[139] With whatever high hopes D.H.C.I. commissioners may have begun plans for disbandment before the Saffron Walden meeting of April 15 their politicisation of the issue, if recent, was genuine. At some point the differences over entrusting Ireland to Lisle had fused with Inchiquin's struggle for Munster.[140]

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[134]*Commons' jn.*, v, 131; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 306b; *Harrington* ed. Stieg, pp. 46-7.

[135]*Commons' jn.*, v, 133; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 307a. *Harrington* ed. Stieg, p. 47 states that a vote against putting the question of giving Waller the command led to Waller himself suggesting Skippon.

[136]The appeal of the programme to the Westminster constituency at large is apparent, particularly in the successful vote to appoint commissioners alongside regional commanders, a long-standing practice in England. The alternative to the concentration of military and political power in an 'Independent'-sponsored figure like Lisle is obvious. It strengthens the likelihood that while 'war party' commoners might act in coalition with the Saye - Northumberland peers, whose drive for power through (aristocratic) office has been argued by Adamson ('Baronial context', pp. 118-9; see Adamson, 'The English nobility and the projected settlement of 1647', in *Hist. Jn.*, xxx (1987) especially pp. 579-84 for the later success of Saye and his associates in dominating the Lords where, Adamson, argues, their programme secured more ready approval from 1647), the 'Presbyterians' were predominantly a Commons-based body active of the rights of the institution of Parliament, in loose alliance with what Kishlansky dubbed the 'conservative peers'. In terms of opposition to an independent executive, one could argue a continuity from 'peace party' opposition to the setting up of the C.B.K., through the removal of the strong C.B.K. of the Uxbridge terms by the time of the Newcastle propositions, to the 1646-7 claims for Parliament against dissolution. Or even beyond to the Rump career of, e.g. Robert Reynolds.

[137]Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, pp. 40-3. He considers that 'political considerations strongly affected the choice of regiments for retention or disbandment is beyond reasonable doubt' (pp. 42-3).

[138]*Commons' jn.*, v, 134, 138; Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 166-7. It was in April that the departure of the 'Independents' from attendance at Derby House is apparent, quite probably in response to the restiveness of the Army, with which they had entered into alliance perhaps even in 1645, but their support for whom was as much causative of future developments as determined by them.

[139]*Commons' jn.*, v, 136; *De L'Isle MSS*, vi, 565-6. Leicester, as ever aware of slights upon his sons, blamed Glyn and the elder Vane for a surprise vote. Algernon's only available defender he named to be Sir William Armine.

[140]Perhaps it was Lisle's increasingly 'Independent' identification in 1646; perhaps, as Adamson, suggests, worry over the control of the large force planned to be stationed in Ireland; perhaps the tenor of Inchiquin's letters helped spark greater concern over commands in Ireland. Adamson, 'Strafford's ghost', pp. 136-7.

Though news had filtered through from the province for some time, the return to England of both Sir Arthur Loftus and William Jephson brought the Munster fight home to MPs.[141] Generally, charges levelled throughout April were no more than a re-hash of those relayed in March.[142] All sides sought to entangle their foes in a web of improprieties.[143] To Lenthall, Inchiquin intimated that he had only £6 400 in money and £1 900 in provisions at Lisle's departure, which could barely stretch to 5 weeks pay, especially if more forces arrived.[144] The issue of leniency and the counter-charge of overriding regional priorities and individuals remained at the heart of the matter. Inchiquin' s April 4 letter linked the two in the exclusion, from himself down, of those whose deeds were 'committed not only long before my Lord Lieutenant [Lisle] was elected over this kingdom, but before I had any commission or authority sent me from the Parliament to constitute those laws by which they now condemn me...', actions taken 'somewhat unjustifiably (as to the precise rule of the law) merely for our own preservation, for that in case we had prosecuted with fire and sword, and proceeded so rigorously as they now condemn us to death for not doing, we had utterly perished'.[145] Other local opinion supported him. Munster regiments were displaced to out garrisons at Mallow, Tallow and Lismore[146]; Smyth was displaced at Youghal, probably for Needham[147]; Brockett lost Cork and his regiment (to Monck) and received a death sentence, commuted to banishment within 16 days.[148]

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[141]*Egmont MSS*, i, 376. Leicester's account of his son's return records Sir Arthur Loftus's return to London on Sunday, April 25 (he had been *en route* back to Munster when he met the others returning) with a letter from his father and Temple to the Speaker. The rest of the party struggled to London on May 1. The letter survives, though no debate is recorded before May 7. It records the final act of the drama, an armed confrontation over Lisle's plans to leave military power, after his departure, in the hands of a commission - Inchiquin, Broghill, Sidney, Waller - and Inchiquin' s refusal. The authors claimed that, as councillors, they acted as mediators, disarming the conflict and eventually leaving all in the President's hands. H.M.C. *De L'Isle MSS*, iv, 566; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 419-0.

[142]Lisle had apparently reorganised income from land so as to give more of the profit to the 'English' of Munster, in return for a fixed charge to the army, thus cutting down of custodiums, but Inchiquin alleged to no great financial effect. *Egmont MSS*, i, 381-2, 395; *Perfect Occurences*, no. 14 (April 2 - 9), pp. 109-10, E 383 (25).

[143]As well as general waste of resources, Inchiquin claimed certain knowledge of Sir Arthur Loftus's misuse of funds in recruiting no less than three regiments. *Egmont MSS*, i, 381-2, 382, 384-5. He suggests that Perceval contact Fenton Parsons, a member of the Committee of Accounts, to look into the matter.

[144]H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 418-9; *Egmont MSS*, i, 392. In fact when pre-engaged money and existing bills were considered only £5 400 was available, which could only be stretched by the current practice of only paying officers for 3 days per week. At that, the cost was still £2 200 weekly. Thus Lisle had spent his £25 000 in one month - for of the remaining funds at his departure, £1 600 had been generated locally by the customs and the excise. In his statement to D.H.C.I. he countered Temple's claim of 'the great abuse of converting public profits here to private uses', adding 'I will make it appear that we had done more before their coming to improve the revenue than they did, and that work I am now making a further progress in than I believe they would have done'. *Egmont MSS*, i, 395.

[145]*Egmont MSS*, i, 385.

[146]*Egmont MSS*, i, 391, 390.

[147]*Egmont MSS*, i, 390.

[148]*Egmont MSS*, i, 389-90.

If there was a hostility to leniency by Inchiquin which was more than a ploy to overthrow him , then it looks very like the policies advocated by the Lords Justices in 1641-3, actions in which Lisle was a leading actor as were the ex-councillors. It was, then, stringent but unrealistic. Inchiquin defended his alternatives solely on grounds of expediency, and there seems little reason to doubt him in view of his own willingness to use 'fire and sword' when it suited him. For now he merely asked that he might be given 'such instructions as goes to other parts of the kingdom for taking of people under contribution and giving protections'.[149] This harks back to Inchiquin's original requests in 1646, now re-applied for by Jephson as remedies in the current crisis - for a committee to go to Munster with powers of audit and over supplies; recruitment of existing units and a fixed establishment, plus constant supply and security for debts.[150] At D.H.C.I. opinion had swung in his favour and on April 20 an old order of Nov., 1646 was ordered put into effect, giving £900 to the President to recruit his cavalry. It was signed by Suffolk, Willoughby, Holles, Stapleton, Clotworthy and Jephson.[151]

Clearly Inchiquin had been incorporated in to the Presbyterian system of 'reliable' officers, but not without opposition. Debate in the Commons commenced on May 7, with both Lisle and Temple giving reports. They were thanked, along with Sidney and Harrison and a further debate set for May 13, with D.H.C.I. to bring information.[152] Perceval's letter of May 4 suggests unhappiness at the breach , 'tis sad news for us that had our expectation fixed upon a vigorous prosecution of the enemy unanimously' and he was surely not alone in this. But in his next letter he made the point that Pierrepoint, once a supporter of Lisle, had given the opinion that Inchiquin must now prove himself in the field of be thought 'but a temporiser'. The opinion was widespread, the more cynical 'apt to insinuate that there hath been no such intent [of diversion] but, as the contributions may be got, to let them of those parts alone, and so to render our friends in all parts subject to ruin'. As for 'the committee' they pointed to the size of Inchiquin's force, which surely must act, but also 'they cannot find means nor maintain such a force to maintain those places or get contribution towards their

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[149]*Egmont MSS*, i, 395. He did, however, sign articles with 'the gentlemen, freeholders, and inhabitants of ...Barrymore' for protection until 1 May, 1648 'with provisoes for payment of contribution...'. *Egmont MSS*, i, 396. Smyth's letter of April 30 shows how inept commissariat work led to the loss of supply obtained hitherto through markets, *Egmont MSS*, i, 397.

[150]*Egmont MSS*, i, 387-8. See also Inchiquin's letter of April 22, where he proposed a reorganisation of forces (perhaps as planned in summer 1646), i.e. to recruit or reduce regiments; no redeployment to Dublin; full power to commission officers so long as he held command; commissioners 'as went along with Sir Thos. Fairfax' and a Chief Justice, *Egmont MSS*, i, 407.

[151]*Egmont MSS*, i, 391.

[152]*Commons' jn.*, v, 166; *Perfect Occurences*, no. 19 (May 7), p. 146, E 387 (5); *Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer*, no. 208 (May 4 - 11), p. 522, E 386 (13); *Moderate Intelligencer*, no. 113 (May 6 - 13), p. 1067, E 386 (20). Harrington reports Temple's 'charg my Lord Insequin for disservice to the state and desire he might be called to answer it. Colonel Jepson desire the matter to be fully examined but ingage upon his life the Lord Insequin would approve himself faithful to the Parliament.' *Harrington* ed. Stieg, p. 51.

maintenance, which I thought good to signify unto you, as a matter of the greatest consequence to be laid hold on'[153].

Fortuitously or not, the Commons delayed their investigation. Then, on May 19, they heard Inchiquin's latest reports of the capture of Cappoquin and of Dungarvan.[154] He was to have a letter of thanks, and D.H.C.I. was to consider his propositions.[155] It was as useful a turn of events as Inchiquin could hope for, though it promised nothing in terms of supplies, or even his long-sought commissioners. He was in the clear, if not vindicated or unopposed.[156] But the balance was swinging towards him. On May 18 Perceval reported that Valentia, Captains Parsons and Meredith, and Colonel Gray all stood by the Lord President[157]. Indeed Parsons sr. and Annesley jr. could probably be relied on also[158]. Sir Robert King 'did not like the recalling of my Lord Lisle, and I like as little the accusing of my Lord of Inchiquin, to whom I wish the same measure you do, and indeed he will deceive me much if he do not vigorously prosecute the war this summer'[159]. As always, a closing of the ranks behind those most likely to win the war was the Irish Protestant response. Undercurrents of old jealousies, and new bitternesses, had not died but were not yet too openly discerned.

The consensus that had backed Lisle as the best chance for success in Ireland crumbled as a result of both his ineptness and his perceived partisanship. Inchiquin had come to be aligned with the 'Presbyterians' - by April 22 he had taken to addressing Holles, Stapleton, Clotworthy and Davies as a bloc.[160] But his principal considerations remained those relating to success in Munster,[161] and if he could deliver here he could possibly retain the confidence of the bulk of MPs as well as prominent Irish Protestants. He had antagonised a prominent segment of the 'Independent' coalition, but almost imperceptibly he had also called down upon himself the odium of the New Model Army.

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[153]*Egmont MSS*, i, 399, 400-1. In a situation where English support for the war would be inadequate the question of subsistence upon Irish resources was largely a choice between the rich, but temporary, opportunities of plunder (with the consequent damage to the enemy's resources) or the less productive, but more lasting, effort to draw on local produce by compulsory payment (with the accusation of collaboration).

[154]*Commons' jn.*, v, 175; *Tanner letters*, pp. 240-2.

[155]*Commons' jn.*,. v, 176; *Harrington* ed. Stieg, p. 52.

[156]King in Lincolnshire was also saved from condemnation rather than actually winning a case in 1647. Holmes, 'Colonel King', pp. 480-1.

[157]*Egmont MSS*, i, 406. The mentioning of Jephson's wanting the charges against Inchiquin read suggests that he hoped for a speedy resolution in the Lord President's favour.

[158]*Egmont MSS*, i, 401, 404.

[159]*Egmont MSS*, i, 404.

[160]*Egmont MSS*, i, 392. By April 6 Perceval had commended Holles, Jephson and Clotworthy to Inchiquin, though he added his hopes that Inchiquin would be able to get rid of Lisle with due civility, *Egmont MSS*, i, 387-8.

[161]*Tanner letters*, pp. 242-3; *Egmont MSS*, i, 408-9 (with its apparent wish for resignation in favour of Jephson).

It is said of Fairfax, in May 1647, that 'it was intolerable for him that the parliamentary commissioners dealt with his officers as they pleased without involving him.... He had a right to expect that Parliament's orders, or those of its commissioners should be mandated through him as commander - in - chief, so that his authority was preserved intact...'.[162] The same words could be used of Inchiquin. Of his foes he had clearly made one, perhaps for the first time, of Sir Hardress Waller. Obviously Waller had decided his return to Ireland was to be a lasting one, since he had stayed on after Lisle had gone and pleaded for a reduced role in the Munster army. But for Inchiquin he had stood on his seniority too long, and was dismissed the service. Returning to England, his voice joined the chorus[163]. But he was a more dangerous foe, for he retained not only a New Model regiment, but the confidence of that army, including its agitators. By early May nine officer- and 14 soldier-agitators wrote to Fairfax concerning the units drawn off for Ireland. It asked him to order them into companies and regiments, remove 'unfaithful' officers and add trustworthy ones with overall command over them, and other forces for Ireland still in England being given to Sir Hardress Waller.[164]

By mid - May, D.H.C.I. had drawn its Irish contingent of the New Model away from the rest of the Army.[165] None of the regiments came up to full strength[166]. Instead by the month's end they were losing recruits back to the New Model. It in turn had united, emitting the pro-Ireland officers and faced Parliament as a body.[167] The political confrontation had begun. Only in May did broader questions begin to intrude into the Parliament - Army stand-off, with Charles's futile new propositions adding to Army fears of 'Presbyterian' conspiracy.[168] It was truly unfortunate timing, for Holles and his associates were indeed succeeding on external fronts, Scotland and Ireland. The lack of a Scottish invasion in 1647 is the dog that did not bark; the reality of the kind of plot feared by the Army diminishes greatly in the light of the studied failure of Edinburgh to 'engage'. Right through the summer it seems the insistence on the need for a 'covenanted King' was too strong to break the uneasy bond with England. Even the seizure of Charles in June, while causing protests, could be damped down by

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[162]Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, pp. 51-2.

[163]*Egmont MSS*, i, 392, 393-4, 395, 405-6.

[164]Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, pp. 67-8. Woolrych does not believe Waller had returned to his regiment by mid - May, but his arrival must have come soon after, certainly he had been in London before May 18. Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, p. 81; Gentles, *New Model Army*, p. 157; *Egmont MSS*, i, 400, 405-6.

[165]Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, p. 93.

[166]Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, pp. 48-52. They had ordered the infantry into four new regiments, under colonels Gray, Kempson, Herbert and O'Connolly. At 1 200 men apiece, the total was for short of the anticipated 8 400.

[167]Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, pp. 104-5.

[168]For Bellievre's views about the likelihood of a 'Presbyterian' dominated settlement throughout April, but his concerns following the King's propositions, see *Montereul correspondence*, ii, 86-8, 109, 129-30,144-5, 147.

Argyll if the King refused concessions on religion.[169] In turn this reinforces the idea that the removal of their army from Ireland was acceptable to the Scots, if they could ensure recompense as with their army in England.[170] The context is the ongoing debates to squeeze collateral even for the City loan of £200 000; the only obvious alternative to the ones requested by London, land in Ireland, could hardly be appealed to now if the object was to remove the Scots from Ireland. The arrival of George Monro in the Scottish capital as agent appears as directed towards an agreed departure if adequately compensated.[171] The vote to dismiss that army was re-opened on May 13, but the Commons representatives to a conference to put the case for the army's end - Clotworthy, Pierrepoint, Tate, Armine, Reynolds - seems indicative of cross - party assent.[172]

Perhaps the imminent departure had caused a re-assessment of policy concerning Ulster.[173] Reports from the north and the west told their usual gloomy tale, but they were accurate in reminding London that resources sent there in the last year had been unusually slim.[174] Coote's worries (April 6) are more interesting - the possibility that his officers would be replaced or units dissolved would not be borne; his ties to those in question were too close. He remarked that 'If I have exceeded my commission let me suffer; if I have advanced the service, I hope those who have engaged with me and myself shall not receive so great a mark of the Parliament's disfavour as this would be'.[175] His reasoning is so close to Inchiquin's as to raise the

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[169]Ashton, *Counter - Revolution*, pp. 316-20.

[170]Montreuil mentions the failure to provide adequate security. *Montereul correspondence*, ii, 93. The possibility of recruiting from the Ulster army for overseas service was clearly entertained, *Montereul correspondence*, ii, 104.

[171]*Montereul correspondence*, ii. 120-1. Montreuil admitted the pipe-dream quality of an Irish Catholic - new Scots alignment.

[172]*Commons' jn.*, v, 172; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 309b; *Harrington* ed. Stieg, p. 52. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 745 shows that D.H.C.I., on May 8, read the letter submitted by Monro's army to the Ulster commissioners in Feb. See also the interesting letter from 'Mosse' to William Rowe (at Chester - received April 20), *Ormonde MSS*, ii, 59-60. The former is not known, but the letter suggests that he was bringing papers from the commissioners in Edinburgh to London. Rowe, later to be an agent to Edinburgh himself, was now secretary to the Dublin commissioners, and had responsibilities over the troops at Chester (*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 733, 736, 737, 742, 6, 10, 770, 764). Mosse commented that 'The Scots will not surrender Belfast whilst their army is in that kingdom. Pay them their arrears and they will quit that and the kingdom, not otherwise'. Generally, Mosse was moving towards a disapproval of Parliament, largely for its treatment of the New Model, an army of 'honest men' who, unlike earlier armies, had been more willing to fight than treat. He also felt that the Houses slowness showed them 'an unfit company to manage affairs; expedition and secrecy are never amongst them. A Parliament is a good phisick, but ill diet'. His sentiments are akin to those of many in the army. Meanwhile, traces of a final Scottish attempt to manoeuvre into a stronger bargaining position may be behind General Robert Monro's requests to Ormond (March 13) that he be allowed to garrison Dundalk and Newry, now that Parliament had allowed him to correspond with the Marquis. Ormond (March 16) insisted the Parliament would have to assent, Carte MS 20, 439, 459.

[173]Perceval reported (May 18) a meeting of the agents where he urged the nomination of Monck as Major-General for the province, a suggestion that was favoured but 'it was forborne to be ventured on lest it should not pass, in regard he had once served the King'. *Egmont MSS*, i, 405.

[174]Davies lamented the paucity of provisions and prevalence of local divisions. *Egmont MSS*, i, 383.

[175]*Egmont MSS*, i, 386-7.

question whether Lisle would not have stirred as much trouble in Connacht. After all the western men had hardly a clean record as regards co-operation with Ormond, and Coote had made his own use of contribution.[176] The regime at Westminster was not unreasonable. D.H.C.I. heard the agents of the two provinces in mid - April[177]; Star Chamber granted 20 days' pay, and commissions to recruit cavalry.[178] By May 13 named regiments had also been awarded the 20 day's wages, by the Lord Mayor, apparently part of the £200 000 loan.[179]

Ulster forces had a military capacity not only in the west, but in the east of Ireland. On April 7 Tichborne sought to pressure Ormond into allowing an advance into enemy quarters arguing from the heavy concentration of troops in the limited Protestant zone of supply, and pointing to possible reinforcements from Ulster.[180] If Ormond had any doubts on the basis of his late cessation, they were dispelled by Preston's move against Carlow on April 18, just after it ended. He now appealed to Monro, Lisle and D.H.C.I. urging diversions and supplies, and claiming his own men were tied to their garrisons by shortages.[181] Delays in the handing over of his garrisons lay with London, not with Ormond.[182] His willingness to leave seems clear - on April 9 he formally authorised Dudley Loftus to negotiate his departure with troops for France.[183] His obstacle was the need to preserve 'loyal' subjects while Parliament delayed. They had of course been sending troops, and allowing Ormond to command them,[184] but this only exacerbated problems, in two ways. The ability to supply a

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[176]T. C. Barnard, 'The Protestant Interest, 1640 - 1660' in Ohlmeyer (ed.), *Ireland 1641-1660*, p. 231 points to the 'affinity' which the Cootes built up, mainly in the west of Ireland, and 'thanks to prowess of the battlefield' of the Sir Charles Cootes, father and son. It is worth noting how the 1659 purges which lost Coote the hold he had on the military through posts held by family and connections 'impelled Coote to act' in an attempt at reconciliation with Charles II. Such store on military control would seem true of the 1640s also.

[177]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 740.

[178]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 616, 682.

[179]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 625-6. A batch of export licences for Ulster was approved, as well as direct votes of supplies.

[180]Carte MS 20, f. 590.

[181]Council to Monro, & to Lisle, Carte MS 20, ff. 632, 635. Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 141 dates the attack to April 10.

[182]The commissioners' instructions appear to have been ready only by April 7, progress on Ormond's finances coming next day, with Commons' approval following soon after. It then took from April 15 - 21 to secure the commissioners' powers over funds for Dublin; apparently they were to have the £13 000 remaining, at Chester, of the original £25 877-14-9. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 734, 737, 738, 739; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 607; *Commons' jn.*, v, 136, 137, 139. For supplies sent, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 738; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 611.

[183]*Commons' jn.*, v, 143, 144, 146, 148, 149. The sum would appear to be the £10 000 voted for use in Dublin, and the first, cash, instalment of Ormond's pay-off, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 743.

[184]D.H.C.I. to Hungerford, April 7, Carte MS 20, f. 593.

larger army was minimal,[185] while their arrival could be seen as a provocation.[186] While he still had control, Ormond acted in favour of loyal Palesmen, though at least part of the reason must be his increasingly desperate search for support for the remnants of his army. A Proclamation of April 3 assured all Catholics within Protestant quarters that, despite the arrival of forces from England and the north, protection was to be maintained, and pillage punishable by death, until June 10. If it was not to be extended thereafter they would have notice and the right to depart with their goods.[187] Yet reports reaching London stated that 'most of the Irish that was worth anything has left this place [Dublin] and gone to Kilkenny or to the Irish quarter, themselves and goods'.[188] The prospect of an uncomplicated national - religious war never seemed more likely.[189]

Of course not all the consequences of such a simplification were agreed. Gifford (April 15) from London, suggested different views concerning Ormond. Some blamed him for Protestant blood due to his sending troops to Charles in 1643; others, and here he mentioned Holles and Stapleton, were more favourable. He even cited the nomination of Lords Justices to replace Lisle, rather than a Lord Lieutenant, as calculated to please Ormond.[190] This may fit into Presbyterian - Independent divisions, but not certainly. For the moment, all remained in the hands of the commissioners.[191] Hopes of political advantage do not seem relevant from Ormond's side. Informing Clanricard (May 1) of the arrival of commissioners with full powers at Chester, and aware of parliamentary divisions, he added that 'Men have long fed themselves with hope of advantage to his majesty out of those differences. I for my

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[185]The word from Dublin was not only the lack of supplies accompanying the new troops but also their less then impressive appearance, compared to their foes - *Egmont MSS*, i, 386, 388. Castle's man had a bad reputation in north-west England, no doubt the product of a long-delayed, under-funded expedition - cf. Castle's complaints about the locals, *Tanner letters*, pp. 236-7.

[186]Certainly Captain Wood told Lenthall (April 24) that the landings had sparked the Irish attack on Carlow. Carte MS 20, f. 646. He urged the sending of a 'godly' martial man to assist Ormond, most of the depleted Council being bishops.

[187]*Ormonde MSS*, ii, 56-7. All were signed by Ormond, Bolton, Bishop of Cloyne, Lambert and Forth. By April 7 the order was extended to any beyond the quarters who would make an agreement to pay contribution. Both proclamations were circulated and ordered set up in public places (*Ormonde MSS*, ii, 57).

[188]Wemyss to Perceval, May 12, in *Egmont MSS*, i, 402. Indeed much of Ormond's correspondence in May - June is concerned with an attempt to exchange Protestants wishing to leave Athlone for Catholics ready to leave Dublin, Carte MSS 20 - 21.

[189]*Letter - book*, pp. 399, 419-21.

[190]Carte MS 20, f. 613. As well as the sending of troops to England in 1643, the other matter held against Ormond was said to be his participation in what was seen as Dillon and Taaffe's dispossession of Protestant for rebels - Ormond's predictions about the fall-out of the Elphin incident had proved all too true.

[191]At Chester in late April, they had apparently been delayed from crossing by adverse winds, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 746; *Egmont MSS*, i, 403, 404.

part think their animosities but such a trick as the Dutchman who cheats all the world by bargaining when he is drunk'.[192]

Wemyss (May 12) supposed that Ormond would take the field, if not still dogged by supply problems.[193] He did manage to stir Tichborne and Armstrong into a foray as far as Carrickmacross, despite shortage of rations.[194] But this time efforts to co-ordinate an attack with the east Ulster forces was vetoed by the pusillanimity of the regional commanders, despite the efforts of go-betweens like Conway, Trevor and Tichborne.[195] Whatever their material shortcomings, the commissioners did despatch a significant letter on May 17. Calling on Ormond to secure his quarters and prevent oppression, they promised Parliament's protection to all, 'without distinction of Religion'.[196] Meanwhile one final, curious re-run of overtures from the various Catholic factions to Ormond had time to be played. With intercepted letters showing the arrival of Parliamentary troops, Kilkenny made a final bid via Grant, but to no avail.[197] Ormond still refused a treaty, though willing to consider a truce for his own ends. To Digby, on May 13, he repeated his belief that no good was emanating from Kilkenny, only a response to Inchiquin's military successes.[198] Indeed financial and military weakness continued to prompt the Supreme Council,[199] while O'Neill also appears to have offered a renewable truce as an alternative to Parliament.[200]

Whatever about O'Neill, the Supreme Council (counter-) offered another truce in June[201] - Grant believed that this might have succeeded if offered earlier. His terms

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[192]*Letter - book*, p. 424. His face was set against any treaty with Kilkenny, their failure to extend a cessation by mediation of the Queen's agent Winter Grant (Leyburn) a sign that 'their aim has been to destroy me if they could; if not, to force me out of the kingdom and all other good subjects with me if they might deal with their matches'.

[193]*Egmont MSS*, i, 402.

[194]Carte MS 21, ff. 17, 36, 79-80.

[195]Carte MS 21, ff. 11, 18-19, 21, 59, 61, 66, 87, 113-4, 117, 143, 180.

[196]Carte MS 21, f. 109. This was a firmer foundation than any waiting for changes in England, as advocated by Ormond's messenger, Lt. Leigh. He argued that links between the King and the Army would lead to liberty of conscience even for the Irish, though with the loss of part of their estates, but seems to have rested his hopes for Ormond on the friendship of Holles and his associates, Carte MS 21, f. 119 (May 18). But it should not be dismissed as completely devoid of foundation. As for 'Independent' friendliness to Ormond, there is a hint in Stephen Smith's letter of June 6 which praises Sir Thomas Wharton and Salwey as especially helpful to Ormond, albeit in personal matters, Carte MS 21, f. 302.

[197]Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, p. 250; *Letter - book*, pp. 423-4, 425-6, 436-7, 440-1.

[198]Carte MS 21, f. 81. Ormond told Grant, May 15, that confederate treachery had led directly to his appeal to Parliament, Carte MS 21, f. 93.

[199]Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, p. 253.

[200]This has been presented as the Ulster general's offer of a two - month, renewable, truce to which Ormond responded by agreeing not to negotiate with Parliament; and that O'Neill's effort to bring the Supreme Council aboard through his nephew, Daniel, was frustrated by their imprisonment of the envoy. Speculatively, it may reflect on O'Neill's current situation, particularly his need to hold on to key Leinster garrisons, despite being ordered to Connacht. As a military arrangement it thus bears comparison with the 1649 truces with Coote and Monck. Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, pp. 253-4; Casway, *Owen Roe O'Neill*, p. 182; Cregan, 'Daniel O'Neill', p. 125.

[201]Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, p. 253. Thus the imprisonment could have been the ground for a counter-offer, both for factional gain, though this is not certain.

show little advance on 1646 or even 1645 - a basis in the 'Ormond Peace' with the 'Clanricard concessions' to be sought from France, and a renewable cessation for 6 months.[202] It is less certain Ormond would, even could, have agreed. By June 7 the commissioners were in Dublin Bay with 2 000 soldiers, and more on the way.[203] Even Digby, and that point, thought surrender inevitable, like Ormond showing more concern over future destinations.[204] The articles were sent to the Lieutenant on June 15 and rapidly concluded, allowing him residence in Dublin Castle until July 28.[205] Colonel John Barry (June 16) resolved to abandon Ireland as 'equally averse to the Covenant as to the oath of association at Kilkenny', yet lamented that 'if I carry myself never so loyal to the King or so affectionate to the English interest, I must not hope to enjoy a foot of it, being a Papist, until the charge of the war and the undertakers be first satisfied...'.[206]

Ormond accepted the Nov. terms with only three quibbles. The first, on the handing over of artillery and stores he himself 'waived', while the third concerned security for his own money. But the second was of significance. It was Ormond who tightened the wording of the clause on protections (it was approved) adding to the statement that those who paid contribution would be protected 'and will continue payment of contribution', while cutting the words 'or will come under contribution' lest it allow 'the most bloody rebels' to avail of protection. To the latter the commissioners protested that Parliament had made them 'dispensers of mercy to all indifferently' but they would concur so as to remove any advantage to those 'we never intended to admit ... to protection whose horrid murders and outrages rendered them as well incapable as unworthy thereof...'.[207]

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[202]*Letter - book*, pp. 423-5. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 674, 675-6 for letters from the Supreme Council to the Leinster committee that Ulster (O'Neill) forces were not needed to repel the Parliament's new soldiers, if the Leinster army were combined with Ormond's men. This suggests not only their desire to exclude O'Neill, but hints at Ormond's having sought to include the Ulster Catholic forces.

[203]Commissioners to Ormond, Carte MS 21, f. 188.

[204]Digby to Ormond, June 9 & 11, Carte MS 21, ff. 198-9, 206-7; Ormond to Digby, June 11, Carte MS 21, f. 204.

[205]Commissioners to Ormond, June 15, Carte MS 21, f. 216. Grant thought the commissioners 'have accorded with all my Lord of Ormond's conditions even beyond his expectation', though Daniel O'Neill added that the articles had 'no provision made for any Catholic's fortunes' which 'would make the quarrel of the Irish much juster'. He claimed the commissioners' sense of urgency had grown due to events in England and (on Taaffe's word) that Ormond held the Castle for 6 weeks, resolving to break off if war resumed in England 'or the Irish offer reasonable things or he relieved'. Yet he adds the unlikelihood of the time-frame, or that the Council would offer 'what my lord lieutenant had rather run all extremes then yield to', *Letter - book*, pp. 453, 456.

[206]*Egmont MSS*, i, 417.

[207]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 677-8, 678-80. There is a hint that Ormond was involved in an underhand negotiation with the commissioners. On June 1 he wrote to Sir Robert King claiming to have hoped by now to have offered a proposal to settle the present disturbances. Because of delays he was now sending this via one Slingsby and if King approved, he should send it on - Carte MS 21, ff. 173-4. An undated paper exists presented by Slingsby to D.H.C.I. though the Committee's records only mention him in connection with Ormond's hopes to carry a contingent to France. Its terms are somewhat unclear but hinged on a proposal to receive Prince Charles in Dublin as a means to a general

All was far from resolved as the hand-over of Dublin began. But the initiative had succeeded in placing the capital, and soon all vestiges of Irish government there, in the Parliament's hands. The general view of a straight fight between English (and Irish) Protestants and Irish Catholics, as sought by Parliament, is clear. But the first steps in the process which would delay that conflict to 1649-50 were being taken, and in England. From June to August 1647 the prospects of a large-scale military confrontation ebbed and flowed until the Army wave swept over Westminster. Yet the remnants of a 'parliamentary' cause remained arching over all the factions - even in mid - June Bellievre's greatest fear remained Presbyterian - Independent reunion at the expense of the King.[208] There were limits to how far outsiders could exploit English parliamentarian, as much as Irish confederate disunion. In some senses the eviction of the Presbyterian grandees, like Rinuccini's 1646 coup, was highly significant for the internal balance of directive power (and even rigor) but still held most supporters on board a still existing, albeit more rickety, general cause.

All the same, by June 14 the Army had issued its *Declaration* with a recognisable political agenda with a purge, a limit to the duration of Parliament and a reform of representation among its items.[209] Though it had promised, a few days earlier, to accept disbandment or Irish service once its demands were met, the army's advance had led to counter-measures in London.[210] Trust had obviously vanished entirely. There is no doubt that Army suspicions of wicked intentions among their foes had reached the forefront in their self - justifications.[211] These charges, if true, depended upon utilising the soldiers designed for Ireland. D.H.C.I. was indeed supplying money for these soldiers;[212] but it is less certain how far the Irish forces were intended as a counter - force. Most suspicion must attach to the order to gather the regiments at Reading 'for conveniency of paying them', issued on June 6.[213] The

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settlement; neither the commissioners, nor Northumberland, whom Slingsby approached in London, offered any encouragement for him to pursue the initiative. (Carte MS 21, f. 365).

[208]*Montereul correspondence*, ii, 160-1, 165, 170, 171. His despatches uses the term 'Presbyterian' both on the sense of Holles's clique and of a broader sentiment (e.g. *Montereul correspondence*, ii, 196, 198).

[209]Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, p. 126.

[210]Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, p. 125; Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, p. 242. Only at the beginning of the month, prospects had looked much brighter - perhaps 'Presbyterian' disunion had seen the Commons give way on many demands (Gentles, *New Model Army*, pp. 172-3 makes much of 'basic disunity' and 'lack of confidence displayed by the constituent members of the Presbyterian coalition') - on finance, indemnity and the rescinding of the Declaration of March 30. Perhaps the succeeding two weeks had seen the effect of alternative external pressures, with the intervention of reformadoes and Londoners tilting the balance by June 8 (Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 232-4, 237; Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, pp. 122-3).

[211]Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 238-40 accepts Army fears of the Scots and the City, but also supposes that most London preparations were defensive (p. 380 & note 80).

[212]*Commons' jn.*, v, 146, 175,190, 195, 197, 203, 206-7, 208, 209, 214; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 750, 753, 754, 755; Cal. *S. P. dom., addenda, 1625-49*, pp. 709-10.

[213]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 754; cf. *Commons' jn.*, v, 203 for a vote of June 8, apparently to send the regiments to Worcester.

danger, however, lifted quickly - by June 16 O'Connolly (who had not been ordered to Reading) was, along with Birch, directed to embarkation zones.[214] All the regiments were so ordered on June 20.[215] Nor had the non -New Model regiments still in England been issued with countermanding orders to delay embarkation.[216]

By July 1, D.H.C.I. had overhauled arrangements so as to get the regiments off to Ireland, along with miscellaneous units still to go there.[217] The hold of the Presbyterian grandees had slackened, if not altogether slipped. Yet, aside of course from their attempt to utilise the New Model for Ireland, the months June - August witness relative continuity over the span of Irish plans. Ormond's money was to be paid;[218] withdrawal of the Scots was confirmed in Sept.;[219] the Weavers' Hall money was ordered over to Ireland in August;[220] there was even a re-opened negotiation about sending the New Model to Ireland.[221] This is not to claim that August 1647 is not a break in the history of the Long Parliament, merely that, in general outlines, the Irish strategy was retained. Limited, but nonetheless genuine, logistical support was provided, reorganisation of regional forces continued and no attempt was made to revive the Lieutenancy. In this sense the only loss was the unified military - financial strategy which would have offered more resources to the Irish war with the disposal of the New Model Army.[222] But the moment of triumph in winning Protestant Ireland coincided with a tilt in the balance of power at Westminster with, at first, tangential effects on Ireland but ones which threw the war effort off balance within six months.

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[214]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 755. This was the day the charges against the 11 MPs were discussed in the Commons.

[215]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 756.

[216]By now charges against 11 'Presbyterian' MPs had been sent in by the Army, including explicit charges of misusing recruits for Ireland (Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 243-4.). If true, it was a short - lived aberration.

[217]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 757-8; *Commons' jn.*, v, 227, 280.

[218]*Commons' jn.*, v, 229, 281, 291; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 759, 765.

[219]*Commons' jn.*, v, 236, 285, 292, 294, 296-7; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 764, 767.

[220]*Commons' jn.*, v, 219, 224, 235, 246, 250, 270. Of the fresh £40 000 for Ireland charged on Weavers' Hall (June 22), £10 000 had been allocated to Munster by June 26; the D.H.C.I. report on the remainder, on July 3, divided it among the other regions of Ireland. *Commons' jn.*, v, 219, 224; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 758, 760.

[221]*Commons' jn.*, v, 254, 268, 281, 287, 298. At a micro - level, while hostility to the 1647 'deserters' for Ireland saw them voted (twice) to be disbanded by the Army's supporters (*Commons' jn.*, v, 248-9, 263; Gentles, *New Model Army*, p. 231), an exception was made for the soldiers under Colonel John Ponsonby. As former Northern Association cavalry, they seem not to have attracted such odium, and a continuity in official orders extends from the offer of their Irish - based colonel on June 15 to the regiment's arrival in Ireland in October. *Commons' jn.*, v, 211, 229, 243-4, 277; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 756, 761, 773; C. H. Firth & G. Davies, *The regimental history, of Cromwell's army* (2 vols., Oxford, 1940), ii, 604. Ponsonby had previously served in Drogheda. Remnants of Kempson's and perhaps O'Connolly's regiments also straggled to Ireland - both commanders had previous service there.

[222]An alternative re-ordering of resources did take place in late 1647 - early 1648 but, as well as delays, promised less to Ireland, and was overtaken by the renewed conflict in England. Gentles, *New Model Army*, pp. 227-8 for the financial overhaul in Nov. - Dec., 1647, pp. 231-4 for the army reorganisation in Jan. - Feb. 1648 disbandment, relying on the 'ruthless' collection of assessment arrears.

Political difficulties first appeared in the minor, but symptomatic, case of Sir Philip Perceval. Newly elected for Newport in Cornwall, the attack upon him in the Commons should be placed in the context of attacks on other 'unreliable' MPs.[223] It seems clear that the prime mover, Temple, exploited the atmosphere of distrust, probably for his own private vendetta.[224] Perceval's own account states that Temple prompted Hoyle to lay the charge, though the latter admitted not even knowing Perceval's full name. Lisle and Sidney joined in the attack, though Perceval records the former as milder, in seeking a full examination.[225] The core of the case was his assent to the cessation[226], Sidney alleging Perceval had sent certificates to Oxford to obtain the same, and that he advised the ending of soldiers to England; Lisle that he was a 'special confidante' of Ormond. Harrington mentions a counter - accusation, by Clotworthy, of Temple's 'applying himself to the King' which went nowhere. Debate, however, ran for three hours, though he was not suspended but referred to an investigative committee.[227]

There seems little doubt the Perceval had been caught in the general purge by the army and its friends which extended beyond the 11 Members to perhaps 30 other MPs on the basis of past dabbling with the King's party.[228] The detailed accusations against the Eleven appeared on July 9.[229] Of the articles, three (aside from the misuse of New Model recruits) related to Ireland - no. 12 was a re-hash of peculation charges against Clotworthy, now with John Davies tagged on; no. 13, interestingly claimed that Clotworthy, alone of the 1646 Dublin commissioners to Dublin, had 'held secret intelligence' with Ormond and Digby, well after the negotiation expired; no. 14 was a re-telling of the Lisle expedition alleging that Broghill and Loftus had come to impeach

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[223]B. L. Add. MS 31116, f. 311a; *Harrington* ed. Stieg, p. 51. Perceval had been admitted to the Commons on May 25, *Egmont MSS*, i, 430.

[224]Perceval's speech to the Commons on July 14 was used to tackle Temple over rusty accusations of bread for the army in Ireland (1642) rather than to raise the question of the cessation. *Egmont MSS*, i, 426-7.

[225]But he adds that Lisle had ignored the witnesses Perceval had brought forward 'last year' seeking an investigation, and Lisle's admission of Temple's animosity to Perceval - Sir Philip himself mentioned both in his speech, *Egmont MSS*, i, 431.

[226]On June 14 he wrote to Sir Hardress Waller against 'malicious persons' who would poison Waller against Perceval on the basis of the cessation, which he claimed to have quickly turned to oppose. *Egmont MSS*, i, 417.

[227]*Egmont MSS*, i, 430-1; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 311a; *Harrington* ed. Stieg, p. 54; *Commons' jn.*, v, 195, 203, 210. For the further development of the case, see *Egmont MSS*, i, 416, 423, 425, 426-7. 431, 431-2; *Commons' jn.*, v, 233, 238, 245.

[228]Underdown, *Pride's Purge*, pp. 81-2.

[229]*A particular charge of impeachment in the name of Sir Thomas Fairfax and the army under his command,* E 397 (17). The first, non-specific statement was delivered to parliamentary commissioners on June 14; as *A charge delivered in the name of Sir Thomas Fairfax and his army...* E 393 (5), pp. 3-5 shows, the charges were (1) to invade and overthrow the rights and liberties of subjects; (2) from March 1647, to create jealousies between Parliament and Army; (3) rejection of the Army for Irish service, instead an attempt to break the Army, costing England to raise a new Army for Ireland; (4) a new war through forces raised in England or diverted from Ireland; (5) encouraging Reformadoes to act against Parliament. See also Gentles, *New Model Army*, pp. 176-7.

Inchiquin 'for betraying the Parliaments Army to the enemy (as formerly he had done)' which caused the recall of Lisle and the commitment of the forces to Inchiquin. Much is made of Inchiquin's claim that orders from London meant that 'no man that favoured the Independents ... should have any trust or warrant therein' and of the expulsion of Sir Hardress Waller. Waller thus becomes the likely link - man in the harnessing of Irish charges to the attack. Earlier articles show how Clotworthy would have been included anyway in the basis of his performance as a commissioner to the Army in the spring of 1647. The accusation of fraud looks like the smear uniformly administered to one's foes, failing to add any large wrong -doing to the small, uncertain, cases used in 1643-4. The real interest lies in the Davies's addition as an enemy, for he had been commissary to Lisle in 1646-7. What would appear to have happened was that factional disputes with Inchiquin (especially by Waller) had been tacked on to the purge campaign. The charge of dealings with Ormond, whatever its basis,[230] falls in with the broad attack on Holles's associates as soft on malignants, an attack which would encompass Glyn and Lewis in Wales[231] or, outside of the Eleven, Perceval's Oxford contacts.

Perceval,[232] like Inchiquin and Davies, had been caught between two converging scissor - blades of animosity - the Army's desire to purge its foes, and in the process its willingness to tarnish them with all possible evidence of malignancy, particularly correspondence with Royalists; and the importation of Irish Protestant factionalism, a by-product of the wholesale movement of that body into Parliament's camp. Waller, for example, stood astride both. Both strategies were designed to exclude enemies from positions of control,[233] one of the easiest ways to do so being to appeal to the more unremitting side of the parliamentarian sensibility, that which wished

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[230]Clotworthy had made contact with Ormond, but the surviving letter shows no covert purpose. Davies had made contact with Eustace (as did Clotworthy) but professed himself dissatisfied (*Egmont MSS*, i, 336). Perceval's letter to Lady Ormond recommended not only Clotworthy, but also Wharton and King (*Egmont MSS*, i, 325). It is not impossible that Clotworthy made contact privately - the intermediary named is 'one *Slingsby*', the name of the agent Ormond sent to Sir Robert King in June 1647 - but that he was in contact with Digby is less plausible, and the letters between the two men fail to mention Clotworthy. Nor is it easy to think what alternative offer he would, or could, have made to Ormond at this juncture. He was formally cleared by the Commons in 1648.

[231]David Underdown, 'Party management in the recruiter elections, 1645-48' in *E. H. R.* , lxxxiii (1968), pp. 258-64 discusses election procedures by some of the Eleven for seats in Wales (including Annesley's) and Cornwall (including Perceval's) but finds it likely that many of the seats were won by normal patronage methods. Collusion with local ex-Royalists was a necessity in areas where there were few alternatives.

[232]By July 23 Perceval was claiming that, if excluded, he did not much mind 'for I am sure I have lost no reputation by it ...'. *Egmont MSS*, i, 435.

[233]The army's 'primary object was to get the most dangerous men out of parliament and to cripple the Presbyterian leadership, rather than to engage in an act of exemplary justice for its own sake'. Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 252-4 focuses on three aspects of the 'plot' - recruitment of counter - forces, directly and indirectly; communion with delinquents; 'party' organisation. The second, he notes, was based on such scanty material as a re-hash of the Savile charges.

to punish the guilty, even the guilty by association.[234] This was hardly an exclusively 'Independent' stance[235] for there were tensions over punishment at almost every level of English, and Irish, politics from at least 1645. June to October 1647 saw a comprehensive campaign for the exclusion of ex-Royalists from Parliament, the franchise and local office.[236] This strain in Parliament which could be appealed to in the cause of purging the guilty[237] could lead to hostility to Ormond, or indeed Inchiquin. As for Irish factionalism, Perceval saw Temple's animosity as the root of the problem for him, sprouted by his closeness to Inchiquin and Jephson. Other cases abound. The Boyles, Loftuses and Parsonses were long-standing associates, and even kin;[238] their toppling after Sir Arthur Loftus in countering Inchiquin in 1646 is no surprise. But when Lisle's heralded conquest turned into a squabble, it was just as easy to read the detachment of the Annesleys. Valentia was known to be favourable to Inchiquin in Feb. even though he accompanied the expedition; by May he had become the President's defender.[239] John Davies was also revealed by Feb., and he openly recommended thenceforth Valentia and his son, Sir Arthur Annesley, as well as Sir Robert King.[240] Davies had also cultivated Lowther and Sir Paul Davies as early as Nov. 1646.[241] Sent by Ormond as his delegates to Parliament, both rapidly made their peace.

The most obvious sign of 'New English' acceptability was the rumoured re-appointment of Sir William Parsons as Lord Justice, in April - May. Already, Parsons can be seen detaching himself from opposition to Inchiquin.[242] Inchiquin had not

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[234]Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, p. 139. He suggests that 11 was too small to change the balance in the Commons, too large to make Charles stick (pp. 137-8) but the first objection is removed by an attack on up to 30 more on other grounds - it was an attempted purge by non-coercive means.

[235]Adamson, 'English nobility and the projected settlement', p. 54 points to the mitigation both of the numbers of the 'excluded' and the scale of fines in the Northumberland - Saye proposals, adding 'notorious' mitigation efforts by Northumberland and Howard at committee. (Can there be any similarity with the attitude of e.g. John Weaver ? *Egmont MSS*, i, 423, 431)

[236]Ashton, *Counter - Revolution*, pp. 216-7.

[237]Cf. agitator opinion (July) about the use of force to clear away obstacles in Parliament, especially Captain Clarke's opinion that it was not so much changes in the laws which were needed as 'good and wholesome executors of them', Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, pp. 156-8. The same principle could be applied to the failure of the war in Ireland.

[238]F. E. Ball, *A history of the county Dublin* (6 vols., reprint, Dublin, 1995), ii, 120-8.

[239]*Egmont MSS*, i, 358, 362, 398, 406. Valentia had his own grievances - his August 4 letter denouncing Temple, and Inchiquin's other foes, in referring to the 'very same instruments that did co-operate with the Earl of Strafford and were promoted by him for bribery are still specially trusted and employed' may show a grievance still rankling with Sir Adam Loftus, who displaced Valentia (then Lord Mountnorris) from his post as Vice - Treasurer. *Egmont MSS*, i, 441; Kearney, *Strafford*, pp. 71-2. Charges of co-operating with Strafford were a scatter -gun form of using malignancy smears; apart from Valentia almost all ex-officials could be tainted, politically as diverse as Bolton, Lowther and Parsons.

[240]*Egmont MSS*, i, 365, 366, 371.

[241]*Egmont MSS*, i, 328, 337, 339, 379.

[242]*Egmont MSS*, i, 384, 402; 382, 401, 406.

escaped further sniping, even from Munster,[243] but his letters to London urged reinforcements and supplies to enable him to step up his campaign.[244] As usual, Parliament favoured a winner and June - July saw him make material gains, and even win the appointment of his long - sought commission.[245] Even when the commissioners proved unwilling to go, the alternative was to vest control of the funds back with the President and Council, though this could be a double-edged sword.[246] Perhaps the continued success of the Presbyterians allowed Inchiquin to survive the accusations now delivered by the Army, but a role should probably also be assigned to an appeal by his officers in early July.[247]

Their *Remonstrance*, drawn up at a Council of War on June 23, set out their position since the departure of Lisle.[248] While avoiding any condemnatory language, it backed the assessment previously made by Inchiquin of the depletion of resources, despite the sizeable sum brought over by the expedition. With only £4 732-8-5 and another £5 000 since sent them, desertions had reduced their 10 606 soldiers to 9 000 'sick, and whole'. Lacking resources for a major engagement, the troops were stationed on the outer edge of the area under their control. They asked that 'some person, or persons of quality and trust' could be sent to audit all local accounts ('profits, rents, customes, contribution, and Excise') as proof that resources sent and those collected locally were inadequate, and to give a 'certainty' to an unsettled revenue. The neutral tone was only breached in that the audit was hoped to show 'that those that faithfully desire, and second their desires with endeavours, may not suffer in their reputation under the severe censure of being carelesse in their actions for the

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[243]Colonel Roe's criticisms were viewed even by those he sought as allies, as due to personal pique; having earlier opposed Lisle he had little chance of building support for his calls for reform, *Egmont MSS*, i, 403, 405, 427.

[244]He argued that Irish divisions would allow him to take any city in the region, but that he had neither adequate supplies 'to subsist before it' nor enough troops to spare for garrisons. If able to make such gains this would reduce costs to England by allowing 'great plenty of corne and all provisions in all our quarters' (H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 424-5).

[245]Davies was organising some supplies for him (*Egmont MSS*, i, 416 - cf. p. 421), and on June 26 the Commons earmarked £10 000 for recruits, provisions and money for the province (*Commons" jn.*, v, 224; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 736). The decision to send commissioners to supervise the last two of these and to ensure a vigorous war was taken up by D.H.C.I., the nominees of July 9 being Ashurst, Jephson and Swinfen (*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 756, 758, 761). By now it had been decided that no less than £8 000 should go direct to Munster, £1 000 of it being issuable on Inchiquin's own warrant for 'first necessities'. There was, then a continued trust in Inchiquin.

[246]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 760; *Commons' jn.*, v, 247, 255, 256, 260; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 703, 705; *Cal. S. P. dom., addenda, 1625-49*, p. 710. At the end of July Perceval stated that the commission had collapsed because, with Jephson absent, the others were reluctant to go to Ireland. All was therefore devolved back on Inchiquin, unless Jephson returned quickly to get things over-ruled, *Egmont MSS*, i, 436. With the collapse of the new commission referral to the Presidential Council would give room to members which included Broghill, Loftus and another relative, Sir William Fenton. *Egmont MSS*, i, 435, 442.

[247]On June 25 Inchiquin had lamented the unruly behaviour of the new troops - he was so weary of his task he wanted out, *Egmont MSS*, i, 419-20. Townsend's regiment arrived in the first week of July, *Egmont MSS*, i, 422.

[248]E 399 (33), *A Copy of a Remonstrance setting forth The sad condition of the Army under...INCHEQUINE...*, pp. 1-5.

publique, or cold in their performances'. Of 33 signatures, 7 were by colonels, 9 by lieutenant - colonels, 17 by majors.

The agents had departed by the beginning of July and all three were 'new' officers, Lieutenant - colonel Peter Stubber, Major John Choppyne and Major Christopher Elsyng, though perhaps as few as 6 or 7 other signatories were.[249] As such, the impression of unity behind Inchiquin could be created, especially given that the publication of the *Remonstrance* (July 24) was done by the agents to counter a malicious letter published under the name of Lieutenant - colonel Knight, with 'materiall objections' against Inchiquin which were 'false, injurious and unworthy credit'.[250] This document, consisting of two letters (June 22 / July 4) builds its case on Inchiquin's military mishandling and his waste of resources, losing the opportunities of the men, money and supplies left by Lisle. As troops starved, Inchiquin was able to 'play at bowls on the Fast day, to sit up whole nights a Feasting, with Dancing and Fidling'. More was at issue than incompetence, as the author's frequent attacks on command by 'the natural *Irish*' show. But the basis of the case remained the 'materiall objections' against which the bulk of the army presented a united front.[251]

The incident shows up the fact that events in Munster were, among other things, a variety of provincial army revolt. By Aug. 25 the Munster officers had produced another 'Humble Remonstrance'.[252] In his letters to Fairfax and Lenthall, on Aug. 25, Inchiquin claimed that it was sparked by the London tumults, which had prompted the demand that they not submit to any not clearly authorised by Parliament, resolving to stand for 'the State's interest' until Parliament's pleasure was clearly known. Fears of alterations in the Munster army also made the officers, some of whom had already experienced 'hard measure' , demand their arrears before changes were made. Claiming to be aware that his enemies would exploit his support of the petition, 'that so I might stand upon my own terms and capitulate for my conditions of security', he offered to throw himself on the justice of Parliament and Army. He had countenanced the remonstrance only to avoid disorder, though he accepted the validity of their claim for arrears. The loss of their commands would have meant 'the double disadvantage of dishonour and of not providing for their future subsistence by the

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[249]*Egmont MSS*, i, 422 for the delegates. Other 'new' officers included Needham, Roe, Sterling, Crispe, Marshall, Pinchon and probably Patterson; possibly Knight, Ryves or Daniel.
[250]E 399 (33), *A Copy of a Remonstrance ...*, p. 6.
[251]E 399 (23), *A Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Knight...* Knight was hardly disinterested. Perceval was unsure whether he had written to Loftus, but it seems likely that this was who was intended to use the information. Certainly Knight offered his (unnamed) colonel a relation of events if he wanted the same, apparently as a peace-offering and to secure Knight's place as lieutenant - colonel. That the colonel's 'Recruit is Disbanded' recently (p. 14) would seem to point to Sir Arthur Loftus, whose new regiment was presently disintegrating in England, *Egmont MSS*, i, 401.
[252]*Egmont MSS*, i, 456.

settlement of any course for the payment of their arrears...'. Neatly, he concluded with a welcome for the 'happy and clear composure of all differences' in England, which had made him stay the document, since he hoped that the Parliament would extend their care for the arrears of Fairfax's army to their fellow instruments of Providence in Munster.[253]

The whole performance was a highly skilled, if disingenuous attempt to extricate his army, reminiscent of Inchiquin's tortuous defence of the Covenant in 1644. It was left unclear exactly which 'tumults' the Munster army were condemning, though other commentators were less guarded. What is significant is the progression of grievances. Arrears was a grievance common to all armies, and a desire to avoid being re-modelled quite natural for serving officers. These alone could ignite disturbances elsewhere, even on an organised scale, as in Wales in 1648.[254] But a second level had been reached as the vindication of their integrity depended on not being unfairly dismissed. This looks like the development noted regarding the New Model, where the quest for self - justification rapidly took shape, both in calling for public disavowal by Parliament of its attacks on them, and the insistence on indemnity arrangements.[255] The third stage, 'politicisation', was for now abortive, unlike in England, where it not only extended to attacks on the Army's enemies, but support for an alternative programme, religious and constitutional, for the Kingdom.[256] But perhaps any attempt at a Presbyterian counter - revolt in southern Ireland was too much the child of Major - General Sterling and (his ?) Lieutenant - Colonel, Thomas Marshall. Not only did they circulate the Remonstrance to Scots and Scots - Irish throughout the two kingdoms, but they accompanied it with letters overtly condemning Fairfax's army and calling for a defence of Presbyterianism.[257] The idea was not

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[253]*Egmont MSS*, i, 456-8, 458-60. For an earlier (Aug. 17) disclaimer that he would use allies 'that would stand with me upon terms till we made conditions to have arrears and such things...', see *Egmont MSS*, i, 452. At this time Inchiquin, already concerned at the Army's adoption of censures on his conduct (*Egmont MSS*, i, 447-8), purported to believe his days in command numbered, but not to mind this if only he could resign with suitable support thereafter for himself and family. Indeed he appears to have wanted Perceval and Jephson to devise suitable resignation terms. *Egmont MSS*, i, 452, 454-5. The former letter also contains Inchiquin's religious disavowals, denying 'being religious'; yet the sentiments are those of a convinced Erastian - 'I wished for a public form of [church] government, which I always thought the Parliament competent judges to establish or alter as they see convenient'. This not only chimed with many English 'Presbyterians' but was the kind of opinion soon to be as disliked by elements in the army (e.g. Waller) as conventional Presbyterianism.

[254]Ashton, *Counter - Revolution*, pp. 347-8, 416-22. The same progression, from concern with arrears to 'honour' is found among Laugharne's men.

[255]Kishlansky, *Rise of the New Model Army*, pp. 198-200; Morrill, *English revolution*, pp. 310-17.

[256]In Munster, Alexander Pigott (August 28) stated that the officers, bar 4 or 5, made a remonstrance 'which is most in substance with that of Massey's and Poyntz's'. *Egmont MSS*, i, 461. It should not be forgotten that the English Reformadoes also had a political case to make. See Woolrych, *Soldiers and statesmen*, pp. 33-4 for the reformadoes; Ashton, *Counter-revolution*, pp. 390-6 for Poyntz and Massey.

[257]H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 433-5; *Tanner letters*, pp. 259-65. In all 13 letters were sent, but probably very few arrived, for they were intercepted by Michael Jones at Dublin, probably with the assistance of Wemyss, one of those addressed.

totally mistaken, for the force of popular Presbyterianism was to be harnessed in Ulster in 1648-9, but it is more than a little likely that Sterling overshot his mark in 1647 in claiming that the Munster officers 'will never be subservient to them [the Independents], but will withdraw hence on the best terms they may and spend their lives and what is dearest to them in defending the Covenant'. More significant is his admission that 'they waive the inserting of any particular expressions against that faction, until they are assured what course will be taken for their future support or the satisfaction of their desires specified in the Remonstrance'.[258]

Inchiquin's friends in London suggested two courses of action- arrest Sterling and Marshall and win favour by military success.[259] The prescription was followed, Perceval's specific advice to show ruthlessness in destruction[260] followed through in Inchiquin's sack of Cashel.[261] Perhaps Inchiquin was honest in disclaiming an originating role for the remonstrance and in stating that the officers willingly let it drop in view of the changes at Westminster, though it would not be beyond belief that he might even have encouraged Sterling to sound out his countrymen.[262] Still the probability is that Sterling was the prime mover in this dimension of the campaign. By Nov. 30 a draft amnesty had appeared for all involved in the Remonstrance, now it was withdrawn and obedience rendered, though not for Sterling or those 'who have acted beyond the said general Engagement'.[263]

Inchiquin was eager to keep his army onside with Parliament, whether dominated now by Farifax's army or not. His future course was as much shaped by events in Ireland as by developments in England of which Irish Protestants would not approve. For months he had seen potential success in Munster through the encouragement of confederate defections, but recognised that he would not be trusted to pursue the necessary negotiations, a task he hoped to see parliamentary commissioners

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[258]*Tanner letters*, p. 260 (Sterling to Leven).

[259]*Egmont MSS*, i, 462, 466; Jephson and Perceval, Sept. 23, said that the disowning of the remonstrance had succeeded until the arrival of the Sterling letters, which were looked upon as a declaration of war by the Munster army; if action was not taken, the region would be deserted by Parliament, to the ruin of the Munster Protestants, *Egmont MSS*, i, 467-8.

[260]*Egmont MSS*, i, 462, 466 - 'burn and waste the enemies countries, and so disable them, which is the surest way to gain your honour and to satisfy the Parliament of your clear intentions'; 'do all they can with fire and sword, and leave off this way of capitulating. The only best way to end the war, and to get them well accepted here, as I conceive, is to proceed vigorously against the rebels'.

[261]*Egmont MSS*, i, 468, 472; *Tanner letters*, pp. 265-7.

[262]*Egmont MSS*, i, 463-4. Pigott (Sept. 25) said that 'the instrument ... was only promoted by Sterling', *Egmont MSS*, i, 469. The officers wrote to Perceval in Oct. to act for them, still threatened over the remonstrance. Inchiquin said that all they wanted was to be assured they were not odious to the Parliament and Army, but would obey while employed and, if outed, seek only their arrears, *Egmont MSS*, i, 470-1, 475. By Oct. 29 Hodder could report that Sterling and Marshall had been put aboard parliamentary shipping for England, *Egmont MSS*, i, 480, 481.

[263]*Tanner letters*, pp. 278-9; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 765. The accused claimed that all their letters were despatched due to the Council of War's authorising that to Leven, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 769.

perform.[264] By July his optimism of an organised defection had slipped, though he hoped for much from commissioners' dealings with individuals.[265] Thereafter he let the matter lie, following warlike advice and smashing his opponents at Knockanuss in November. But the seeds of an alternative alignment, taken up in 1648, had been sown. They had to be watered by both Protestant and Catholic showers.

Also an augury for the future had been Sterling's failed bid to re-assert the Covenant among the Scots in Ireland. Parliament's perspective on Monro's army was that their days in Ireland were numbered,[266] though this had long been planned. At least they were receiving more favour back in a Scotland which was, only possibly, witnessing a countdown to the Engagement from September.[267] But a coalition of all the Scots in Ulster would have to wait longer than that arrangement, and be on the basis of a different cause.[268] Instead Clotworthy's old design of an 'English' commander in the north was fulfilled, though in two persons not one, with Monck named as regional commander in east Ulster, Coote in the west.[269] The establishment had gone ahead of four regional armies in Ireland under commanders of Parliament's choice and, with the exception of Inchiquin, Fairfax - like in their freedom from 'party' involvement.[270]

In time religious (and national) tensions would drive a wedge through Ulster adherence to Parliament. But for the moment Coote, for one, was more concerned with Inchiquin's opposite worry, relations with 'reliable' Catholics. In his June missive he added a request that he be allowed to formally employ the Costello brothers, Thomas

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[264]*Egmont MSS*, i, 406, 413-4, 419. Inchiquin had hinted, in May, at a means to seek favour in London by offering Dungarvan town to the City to settle, though aware that Parliament might take ill a direct overture to London, by-passing them. Any economic regeneration would of course also work for Inchiquin's gain, *Egmont MSS*, i, 407. Coonan, *Irish Catholic confederacy*, pp. 254-5 describes the conflict within the Munster army over command by Glamorgan, Muskerry or Taaffe, with the officers taking sides.

[265]*Egmont MSS*, i, 422.

[266]For the orders issued by (an 'Independent') D.H.C.I., *Commons' jn.*, v, 285, 292, 294, 296-7; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 764.

[267]The Scottish army had by now enough home support to be voted money in the interim while pressure was applied for their arrears, Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, p. 252. See Ashton, *Counter-revolution*, pp. 323-6 for the Engagement, which he is inclined to see taking rise from November.

[268]The Ulster realignment was very clearly along the lines of practice in Edinburgh where both wings of the Covenanter movement could unite against the regicide. It thus demonstrates the penetration of religious aspiration among the Scots of Ulster, a fact which, as seen above, made them lean most eagerly to Parliament from 1643, but now openly oppose it, but not on Ormondist cross-religious lines. Clearly the Presbytery, for example, regarded themselves and their supporters as the true holders of the Protestant cause, untainted by the associations with O'Neill undertaken by Coote and Monck. (See Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 268-74 for the uneasy relationship between royalist and presbyterian in Ulster in 1649.)

[269]They were voted £7 000 and £8 000 respectively. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 758-9, 762; *Cal. S. P. dom., addenda, 1625-49*, p. 711. Leinster was to have £9 850. Both northern commanders were to have personal pay, and Monck to receive his own command, plus control of Newry and Carlingford.

[270]This was therefore more a 'Presbyterian' triumph than anything else, or at least a victory for non-partisan parliamentarianism. Again it must be emphasised that the drift in Ulster towards Covenanter opposition to Parliament in 1649, whilst its origins may be traced to the autumn of 1647, was by no means inevitable by then, but was a product of the tensions surrounding the 'Second Civil War' and subsequent 'Independent Revolution'.

and Dudley, who though 'of an old English extraction' had served in his campaigns - 'It is true they are Papists which is all can be said to their prejudice'. Other officers backed his request.[271] No decision seems to have been taken at Derby House, and Perceval's response was that 'I do not think the time fit for doing much, but I observe the Commissioners at Dublin and the President of Munster protect and defend such men...'.[272]

It was hardly a hopeful model, but it did make a point concerning Dublin. By June 9 some of the new troops had been reported 'plundering the mass-houses and divers Papists houses, and under colour of them many a Protestant did suffer the loss of all he had'.[273] The commissioners' instructions contained more formal repressive measures. They were to purge the army and garrisons of Papists; to proceed against non-contributing 'neutrals' as rebels' to execute laws against 'rebel Papists' and convict rebels by law, *if possible* ; to prepare laws for the good of the 'Protestant cause', the King and Kingdom.[274] But Jones's instructions of Sept. 3, sent to Trim, allowed for the retention of protection to those 'formerly ... of the Irish party' who seek it, in return for a composition and weekly payments, even those who had abandoned a former protection being allowed to be re-admitted, albeit with payment of arrears. All farmers and labourers were to be protected, so as to encourage agriculture.[275] As well as the continued economic needs of the garrison, the scale of the commissioners' problems with their own forces is striking. On July 6 the commissioners reported a serious mutiny in Dublin, mostly among Kinaston's men ('accustomed to like practizes in North Wales') which led to several deaths. They could hardly avoid further such with less than £30 000 for pay - they were voted £10 000. Otherwise they reported their reorganisation of the existing army, reducing 11 old regiments to 7, and holding musters.[276]

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[271]H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 426-7, 427. He continued to barrage Westminster with reports of his successes in Connacht, as far south as Co. Mayo, H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 422-4, 427; *Egmont MSS*, i, 413.

[272]*Egmont MSS*, i, 435.

[273]*Egmont MSS*, i, 413.

[274]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 762. The only other instructions were to order the war by land and sea, and to ensure military officers held rank not for money, but from merit and as well-affected to religion and the cause.

[275]*Ormonde MSS*, i, 63-4. The new government, in their proclamation of June 23, spoke of a situation of exactions by the soldiers and apprehension by the populace, including 'protected' persons. They condemned unauthorised free quarter or sale of goods by the troops, and promised protection for one year 'without any distinction of offence or religion' and to bring in any from beyond English quarters who would offer to pay contribution within the next 28 days. This was 'to take away all apprehension from the people of this kingdom, that the Parliament (as hath been insinuated by desperate persons) intend the extirpation of the Irish nation.' It was also to encourage husbandry and tillage. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 688-9. Perceval, commenting on this proclamation, says it is a wonder any who wish well to the cause should not think it a fit way to proceed until 'this' kingdom be in a better posture to support the war, *Egmont MSS*, i, 437-8.

[276]H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 429-30; *Egmont MSS*, i, 425. *Ormonde MSS*, ii, 61-2 for the musters. They planned to cut the cavalry from 20 troops to 11 or 12, and insisted that they must have artillery if they were to do more than 'waste the enemye's corne'.

No wonder Annesley and King reacted badly to the news that they were expected to stay on until Sept. 1, though their original task had been accomplished by July 28, following Ormond's delivery of the sword of state, and departure from Dublin. They went so far as to advise the sending of a deputy commander to assist Jones rather than replacement 'commissioners, a name odious to the soldiers'.[277] The commission had its internal problems, Meredith acting at odds with the others[278] to add to the problems of unruly troops.[279] Nor were they particularly popular with local Protestants. Those, like Sir John Gifford, who lost their command through the re-modelling, could protest both the loss of 'the bread his sword (the only estate now left him) might purchase him' (or at least his arrears) and the disgrace his being cashiered would bring when 'neither his faith, honesty, or courage have suffered blemish'. Though the commissioners protested only the necessity of reductions, and the fact that the articles had not promised security of command, and though they offered command of a cavalry troop as compensation Gifford was convinced that 'the malice of some false friend' (he thought Meredith) had put him out.[280]

That the reconciliation of Irish Protestants and English Parliament, whilst in some senses natural, contained more tensions than regional frustration may be seen in the discontent generated by the June 24 proclamation forbidding the use of the Book of Common Prayer and substituting the Directory.[281] It appears that earlier negotiation had seen them urge a minimalist form of worship - prayer, psalms, Scripture, preaching (June 19) but this was countered with a defence of liturgy by resident clergy, which was in large part a defence thereof against 'popery'.[282] The proclamation followed and was met with a full response issued on July 9, pointing out that the order had 'debarred' the signatories from their churches.[283] By July 21 Savage commented that the commissioners 'have discontented the clergy, and the best officers ... they cashiered, which makes them jealous of their own shadows, inasmuch that I think all

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[277]*Tanner letters*, pp. 255, 255-6.

[278]*Egmont MSS*, i, 432-3, 433. They added that Meredith had retreated from his accusations that the others had been willing to act under Ormond's commission. Annesley hints that Meredith may have been co-operating with Temple, whom Annesley otherwise opposed. Here is a possible link back to the *Ormond's curtain drawn* pamphlet, which suggests co-operation between Temple and Meredith's son in an unremitting assault upon Ormond which the other 1643 anti-cessationists do not seem to have shared.

[279]*Egmont MSS*, i, 433, 438. Annesley comments on 'few here fighting for the cause, so when money fails, all will move very slowly'.

[280]*Egmont MSS*, i, 424, 425.

[281]*Tanner letters*, p. 245.

[282]*Tanner letters*, pp. 245-6, 246-7.

[283]Only briefly alluding to the intrinsic merits of the Prayer Book, the document built its case on legal grounds, from Royal Supremacy, through the legislative safeguards of 11 Eliz., to the role of ecclesiastical and civil authorities in ecclesiastical causes and the status of the Church of Ireland as 'a free national Church independent of Convocation of any other', *Tanner letters*, pp. 247-50. Savage (July 7) commented that the clergy had indeed been silenced by the order and were ready to depart the city - 'Those that were never esteemed for any parts they had are preferred. This the Protestants here do much take to heart', *Egmont MSS*, i, 425.

our harvest will be spoiled, and then we shall want both horse and man's meat this winter, if we live so long'.[284]

But Jones's skill as a governor soon seems to have taken effect. His military decisiveness came into play at once and was celebrated in his triumph at Dungan's Hill on August 8. The same Savage was, by October, hoping for the governor's long stay at the helm.[285] Despite regional and religious tensions he and the other provincial commanders had managed to put on course an alliance of at least the English Protestants of Ireland and the Parliament of England which would hold through the remainder of the war years.[286] Ormond's former army had come over with only some grudging, and the Lieutenant himself, having busied himself only over his money and his (failed) attempt to take French service, denied any last - minute hopes based on reversals in England or, on Digby's urging, among the confederates, and stepped aboard Wood's vessel on July 28, as promised.[287]

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[284]*Egmont MSS*, i, 434.
[285]*Egmont MSS*, i, 479.
[286]The obvious exceptions are the Munster 'revolt' of 1648 and the Covenanter realignment in Ulster. But neither constituted a complete break with the broader parliamentary cause; the Munster 'defection' was re-adjusted on the same basis as the reversal in 1644, in response to moves for a treaty with the confederate remnant; in Ulster, Coote had managed to hold Derry and with it the residue of 'English' Ulster - the war of the Scots in the north was more a second front in Anglo-Scottish tension than in any sense a triumph of Ormondist attitudes, despite the efforts of figures like Viscount Montgomery.
[287]Cf. *Letter-book*, p. 470.

Conclusion.

On August 15, Owen Roe O'Neill wrote to the marquis of Clanricard, asking him to join the confederate cause militarily, for 'your own great experience and wisdom will tell you, that there are left in Ireland but two parties, the one the malignant party of the parliament that would destroy your religion, king, and nation, and the other your own countrymen, kindred, alliance and dependants that fight for all three.'[1] For the moment of which he spoke he was, in essence, correct (if not as regard aims). For the first time since 1643 Irish Protestants had, almost entirely, banded together in their war with Catholic Ireland. If the near future would make the latter look as if they were already tottering on the brink of disintegration, for the moment all confederates were united on the need for unity, if nothing else. Perhaps they looked no worse than had Parliament in the winter of 1644-5, for example, though unlike Westminster they did not pull up from the brink. Irish Protestants would also, in large numbers, soon wrench free from their bond with Parliament. But after all the shifts of 1648-51 they did settle with Cromwell, and more rapidly then the most discreet of outright Royalists might have done. Ormond and Inchiquin personally battled on long after their followers had deserted bringing crucial, perhaps decisive, military assistance to Cromwell.[2]

At the end of 1647, D.H.C.I. sent out summonses to a whole gamut of senior Irish *émigrés* to meet them, as well as bringing the adventurers back on board, after a long period at sea. By Jan. 1648 an ordinance to raise £50 000 from delinquents' property in England for the use of Ireland was finally passed, an earnest of commitment to put Ireland first. The commissioners to execute the measure were drawn from the

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[1]*Letter - book*, p. 470.

[2]Gentles, *New Model Army*, pp. 358, 365, 368-71, 375. Ormond had, for example, managed to get only 1 087 infantry and 604 cavalry from Protestant Ulster in 1649 (*Ormonde MSS*, i, 205-6), much smaller than local Covenanter forces. Inchiquin had brought much more of his army over in 1648, but their defection from him was rapid once an actual treaty (as opposed to truce) was in place with the confederate remnant. In the circumstances of 1649-50 distrust was too strong among both Catholic and Protestant 'Royalists' to make any effective co-operation possible, and the anti-Cromwellian 'coalition' was never more than a paper union.

'New English' and the City adventurers.[3] It was, on the surface, the hopes of 1641-2 fulfilled, a genuine war effort to win back Ireland in co-operation with the settler elite.

Why, then, did Ireland have to await the changed circumstances of 1649 ? Two sets of reasons must be adduced. First, the high demands, for priority in military - fiscal terms, set by Cromwell were not met in 1648. Of course, renewed war in England was the obvious reason, but perhaps the lurking danger from another, radical, angle, should not be overlooked. In late July, after the first showdown between Army and the Houses had been won by Fairfax's men, but on the eve of the London counter - *coup*, fresh, and sympathetic, commissioners from Parliament had quizzed the Army officers about 'what horse and foot may be spared for Ireland, after securing the safety of England'. When the news from London prematurely ended the discussions, the officers had given sympathetic ear to proposals delivered by Temple and Hardress Waller, supplementing the non- New Model forces of Ponsonby and Birch (including with artillery) and adding 2 000 infantry for Dublin, 'under good commanders'.[4] Then, in Sept., with parliament suitably cowed, it seems the Army grandees again looked at Ireland. The Commons voted a new 'establishment' for the two Kingdoms for a total of £100 000 per month. Fairfax was to settle garrisons, allocate forces, nominate officers.[5] But if 'political' obstacles to an expedition had gone, not so the material grievances of the rank and file. The October *Case of the Army* again protested against an Irish campaign before the soldiers' grievances were addressed.[6] Perhaps Burford as well as Colchester or Preston was a necessary prerequisite of the renewed Irish war.[7]

Secondly, however, there were political shifts. If July 1647 simplified Irish politics with Ormond's departure, it coincidentally complicated England's, with London and the Army intervening with Parliament. The next six months saw four crucial processes in the three kingdoms, even if Westminster policy on Ireland remained constant. There was a shift in the Westminster balance even if neither blunt nor permanent.[8] The increasingly hostile attitudes to the King, particularly the Vote of No Addresses, sent out worrying signals and helped to shift perceptions.[9] In Ireland the confederacy's wayward course plummeted but, with Ormond gone, the anti-nuncio party had to appeal to other Protestant interests, notably the already wavering

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[3]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 767, 768, 771; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 1147-66. It may be speculated that the measure was made possible by the changes in the formerly obstructive Lords, and perhaps by the fiscal reorientation which seemed to secure the New Model by other means.
[4]*Tanner letters*, pp. 257-8.
[5]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 599-600.
[6]Gentles, *New Model Army*, p. 200.
[7]Gentles, *New Model Army*, pp. 330-1.
[8]Ashton, *Counter-revolution*, pp. 289-90, 291-7, 297-9 for a partial rehabilitation of the 'Presbyterians' in 1648 and discussion of late 1648 which shows that division even then was not 'Presbyterian' versus 'Independent'.
[9]Ashton, *Counter-revolution*, pp. 39-41, 212-5.

Inchiquin, who perhaps had less to offer them.[10] In Scotland the Engagement was but the symbol of a move in the political balance, perhaps as late as Nov. 1647. With Scottish politics an uneasy see-saw between a 'moderate' nobility and a Kirk party (not unlike Catholic Ireland), the fact that the army in Ulster joined the former was probably out of necessity. It was another year, and another cause, before Ulster - Scots would swing against Parliament, in sympathy with *both* wings of Edinburgh opinion.[11] This suggests a fourth, regional, element to the political balancing act. Not all of Protestant Ulster went into either Covenanter camp - Coote could still muster support in the north-west. Jones held on to Dublin even after the regicide. Munster is the exception in 1648 and *that* was the major product of Lisle's Irish campaign. All Irish - based armies were under-funded and over-looked, but Inchiquin's seems to have suffered a greater shaking even than Ormond's did after Jones took charge. Of the four regional armies of 1647, only it advanced its grievances to a second level, demanding vindication as a body (like Monro's officers), or even to a third. Only it broke out in revolt in 1648 in a manner akin to the discountenanced forces in south Wales, or indeed elements of Parliament's fleet.[12]

The course of events, in England and Ireland, in 1647-51, serve to drive home three points applicable to the whole course of Parliament - Irish Protestant relations in the 1640s. The first was that, whatever its internal divisions over power, strategy or even (religious) principle, there was an irreducible core for the parliamentary cause which included victory in the war of Ireland. It was essential to Parliament's self-perception as guardian of the national interest that the Irish threat be quashed, and to its reform ambitions that religion and civility be promoted in Ireland. The Irish paradigm was one used to interpret the actions of Parliament's foes in England and its tortuous negotiations with Charles included an insistence that he take up his rightful role as protector of England's sister kingdom.

That the Protestants of Ireland would move to Parliament was a function of this common cause. From Ormond to Coote the perception of danger was the same - the usurpation of Catholicism in a Protestant Kingdom, the wrenching of Ireland from the Crown of England, the destruction (if not extirpation) of the English of Ireland. Irish Protestants, for all their factionalism, showed a strong propensity to draw in erring

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[10]Ohlmeyer, *Civil war and restoration*, p. 199, regards the months between Dungan's Hill (Aug.) and Knocknanuss (Nov.) as marking the end of a phase for the confederates, one which they had struggled to prevent the 'the English parliament, their implacable enemy, from becoming so powerful that it could invade and destroy them', though, as she sees it, failing to decide between incompatible and contradictory strategies of all-out Royalism in return for limited concessions from the King, or full repudiation of the Stuarts and the attempt to sustain a Catholic Ireland with continental help.

[11]Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 267-8.

[12]For these two revolts see Ashton, *Counter-revolution*, pp. 413-5, 418-20. Laugharne present a strong likeness to Inchiquin, in accusations of his favouring delinquents, in 'radical' officers being sent into his army, in 'central' interference in his command and his defence of his army's conditions and reputation (pp. 418, 420).

brethren in a common bond for security. The overwhelming impact of 1641 could not be assuaged, but the alternatives for the future were not agreed. Ormond's stance, somewhat Old English, was to reconcile on a basis of 'loyalty' those Catholics who could function in a Protestant Kingdom with those Protestants who recognised that support for their King was a non-negotiable dimension of their political selves. Outside (mainly Scottish) Ulster the positive religious reform dimension of the parliamentary cause may have won over few Protestants, but most never had to face the choice pressed upon their co-religionists in England. They were more pushed to Parliament by the apparent failure of the King to guard his own, and their interests. Treaty, on the basis taken up at Oxford in 1644, was seen as hanging Damocles's sword above them in perpetuity. Only in victory was safety. For long years to come, survivors of the 1640s would maintain their true service of the King, even when he failed to perceive his own best interests[13]; it seems unreasonable to deny them the right to have acted thus in the heat of the fight itself.[14]

But, finally, must come a reminder that politics in wartime must of necessity be largely the politics of war. Armchair strategists at Westminster (and in Dublin) could wax fierce about vigorous war, but Ireland's was a messy war of ceasefire, plunder and siege more than sweeping campaigns and battlefield triumphs. It was a war for resources before it could be a war for victory. And along the way it placed power in the hands of the men with swords. Unlike in England, they might not make a revolution but they could defend their bailiwick, spatial and social. If the 1640s left Protestant England watchful of their Kings' concerns in Ireland, it re-schooled Protestant Ireland in its old ambitions and insecurities, and ensured that it would remain determined to hang on to its own guns.[15]

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[13]Thomas Morrice, *A collection of the state letters of Roger Boyle, first earl of Orrery* (2 vols., Dublin, 1743), ii, 398-9 The Papists were 'seemingly good subjects, but to become more dangerous rebels. But the protestants of Ireland, if seemingly rebels, were such, but to become more useful subjects'.

[14]See e.g. Sir James Montgomery to Chancellor Loudoun (Dec., 1643, Carte MS 8, f. 247), where he proclaims his loyalty to the King, yet adds that he could see no better way of serving the King than against the Irish rebels; Inchiquin to the Bishop of Cloyne, (30 July, 1645, Carte MS 15, f. 547) where he claimed that in resisting the Irish he was doing the best service to the King.

[15]For future militaristic sentiments among Irish Protestants see T.C.Barnard, 'Conclusion. Settling and unsettling Ireland: the Cromwellian and Williamite revolutions', in Ohlmeyer (ed.), *Ireland, From independence to occupation*, pp. 278-81.

Appendix 1
Finance and logistics 1641-2.

This appendix will present data on the supply of troops, money, munitions and provisions for the war in Ireland in 1641-2 as a means to an assessment of the relative logistical success of Parliament, and as a basis for the discussions (in chapters 1-3) of the political implications of logistical issues. It must be noted that figures cited must not be pressed too closely. While surviving documentation for 1641-2 appears to be fuller then for later in the decade, complete accounts are not available, while the usual problems of the duplication of orders and the multiplication of relevant authorities makes for uncertainly about the continuity of given votes. Especially in terms of finance, therefore, all totals given (except where indicated) have had to be constructed from disparate records, mostly warrants for payment, and should be taken as general estimates only, not exact sums.

(i) Troops.

The size of the army proposed to be raised for Ireland obviously determined the scale of logistical requirements. Once the decision was taken on Nov. 11 to send 10 000 infantry from England this notional figure was held on to in estimates for food,[1] munitions[2] and pay,[3] though implementation of votes to effect the levy of such a number was delayed. Given the completion of the disbandment of the English army used in the second Bishops' War, there was no organised force to draw from, so recruitment had to be begun anew.[4] The raising of troops, though normally directed through the Privy Council rather than Parliament, proceeded through commissions issued to colonels (responsible for a regiment) and captains (for a company) who filled

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[1]*Commons' jn., ii,* 357; D'Ewes (C), p. 348.
[2]*Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3,* p. 187.
[3]Schedules and musters, P.R.O., S.P. 17 /H /7, p.5. Though undated these seem to date to Jan. - April 1642. The estimates of unit costs on pp 2-4 are as those presented by Pym on 17 Nov. 1641, *Commons' jn., ii,* 318-9; D'Ewes (C), pp 159-60
[4]The lengthy process of disbanding the English army from the Bishops' Wars had ended by Sept 18. and even the related garrisons had been dispersed by October, Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 54. Part of the Scottish army of 1640-1 was still in arms, allowing for a preliminary force to be sent to Ireland ahead of English troops - see Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, pp. 65-9.

up their quota of volunteers or pressed men. The same process was used in 1641; in the King's absence Parliament approved commissions for 1 000-strong regiments issued by the Lord Lieutenant, Leicester.[5] The plans for the army went through two phases, with an unsuccessful third phase being attempted in the spring of 1642.

Phase 1. On Nov. 5 it was agreed that 3 500 infantry and 600 cavalry were to be raised immediately.[6] The first recruits, under officers named by Leicester and approved by Parliament, were ordered assembled under Sir Simon Harcourt on Nov. 12; by Dec. 30 an 1 100- strong regiment, with 300 supernumeraries were reported landed in Dublin.[7] This indicates success, despite lack of impressment legislation. With or without it, money was essential, both levy-money for the soldiers' costs and the month's advance pay normally allowed to officers[8].

Of the remainder of the first batch of soldiers[9], recruitment awaited the issue of commissions to officers and payment of funds. For example, Captain Molesworth, of Leicester's regiment (which had been voted such money on Dec. 16 - 17[10]) was able to write on Dec. 16 that their commissions were dated from Saturday (Dec. 11), and that they expected orders to go by the following day.[11] But the City Chamber, holding the only available cash, failed to pay the needed £10 000 over to the Treasurer until Dec. 20, meaning it was only issued on Dec. 21 - 24.[12] The assembly of the men thereafter was comparatively rapid - preliminary musters by company were held at Chester from Jan. 8 - 26 (firelocks Jan. 27 and Feb. 18) though most units required at least a further week to be brought to full strength.[13] The first cavalry troops were mustered in full by Jan. 3.[14] It was not enough to assemble men at Chester, though, but nor could they be sent off without more money to pay transportation costs, as the records of the Chester authorities show.[15] Letters from Dublin suggest the Leicester's 1 500 men had landed

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[5]*Lords' jn., iv,* 424-5.
[6]*Commons' jn.,* ii, 306; *Lords' jn., iv,* 424-5.
[7]*Commons' jn., ii,* 351-2, 361-2; D'Ewes (C), pp 220, 276-7, 328; *Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 56-7; schedules and musters, P.R.O., S.P. 17 /H /7, pp. 5, 11.
[8]Hazlett, 'Military forces', i, 412-4.
[9]This consisted of a regiment of 1 500 men under Leicester himself, a contingent of 400 firelocks, a regiment under Vavasour for service in Munster expanded from 500 to 1 000 strong (*Commons' jn.*, ii, 390) and 300 cavalry. (Thus a total of 4 000 infantry is reached since Harcourt's regiment was accepted as 1 100 strong.)
[10]*Commons' jn., ii,* 346, 347.
[11]Molesworth to Sir John Pennington, *Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3,* p. 203
[12]D'Ewes (C), p. 254 & n.13, citing Guildhall, Repertories, 55, f.351a; Leicester's warrants, 1641-2, P.R.O., S.P. 28 /1B, Part II, pp. 424, 432.
[13]Schedules and musters, P.R.O., S.P. 17 /H /7, p.19.
[14]Schedules and musters, P.R.O., S.P. 17 /H /7, p.23. All 600 cavalry (in 9 troops) eventually sent over as a regiment under Lord Lisle had mustered at Chester by March 2, the first 300 all being recorded on Jan. 3. The three dragoon companies were not mustered until March 7 - 14. The second batch of cavalry failed to materialise.
[15]*H.M.C. rep.5, app.*, pp 350-2, (Cholmondeley MSS), the records of the Chester municipal authorities, provides details on transport costs. The Mayor and Aldermen received £5 000 in two

by Feb. 27 and the firelocks by March 7; 300 of the cavalry had landed by Feb. 20 - 21.[16] Vavasour's Munster regiment had partly gone by Feb. 25, but notification that all had landed only appears on March 23.[17]

Phase 2. On Dec. 28 Parliament voted to raise five infantry regiments (5 000) men, 300 more cavalry and additional forces in Ireland.[18] As subsequently expanded, these eventually comprised the following :-

Infantry (England): Ogle's regiment (for Munster);
Paulet's regiment (for Munster);
Cromwell's regiment (for Dublin);
Huncks's regiment (for Dublin);
Earnley's regiment (for Connacht, via Dublin);
Ranelagh's regiment (for Connacht, via Dublin; originally 500-strong and to be raised in Connacht; then transferred to English recruitment on Jan. 25, and upped to 1 000 on Feb. 1[19]).

Infantry (Ireland):[20] Conway's regiment (Ulster);
Clotworthy's regiment (Ulster)[21];
St. Leger's regiment (Munster)[22].

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instalments in Jan.-Feb.. The cavalry present were owed £1 406-0-8 for one month's pay and the infantry, if the rate of £132-6 for '100 men besides officers' is usual, perhaps £2 500. The remaining money had to cover food for horse and man for an estimated four days in transit, plus the hire of shipping - examples of the rates charged suggest that at least £240 would be needed to cover the 392 or so horses and accompanying cavalry, and at least £200 for the infantry - both were shipped in small detachments.

[16]Hazlett, 'Military forces', i, 186-8; *P.J., ii*, 2, 12-13, 34-5.

[17]*P.J., i*, 464, 467; *P.J., ii*, 175.

[18]*Commons' jn.*, ii, 359-60, 361, 365; *Lords' jn.*, iv, 495-6, 500.

[19]*Commons' jn.*, ii, 394; *P.J., i*, 164, 244.

[20]The forces raised in Ireland fall into three broad categories - the 'old' army of pre-1640 units, mostly reinforced in 1641-2 (cf. *Lords' jn*, iv, 437, 555); new units formed from locals or refugees either 'unofficially' (and often disbanded, though some were taken into pay - see Parliament's intervention on behalf of new companies in Derry, *P.J., ii*, 429) or on the basis of commissions from the King or the Dublin government; other such units raised on the basis of commissions from Parliament, and for which it took responsibility from the outset. A few more units were planned, as for example for the earl of Thomond (*Lords' jn.*, v, 242, 243), or the intention to furnish cavalry troops to accompany the Scottish army in Ulster (Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters*, p. 316).

[21]The idea of raising soldiers in Ulster was mooted as early as Nov. 12-13 (*Commons' jn.*, ii, 313; *Lords' jn.*, iv, 437), but it was only on Dec. 16 (*Commons' jn.*, ii, 346, 347-8) that this resolved itself into the two regiments above, for which commissions were sought. A plan to raise 500 men to send to Carrickfergus failed to bear fruit, though if Moore is correct the men first raised for this were incorporated into the second Connacht regiment, now to be fully recruited in England, which was placed under Ranelagh (see above, note 19).

[22]St. Leger, Lord President of Munster, was touted as commander of one of the English-raised regiment to go to the province, but did not receive this command. The 1 000-strong regiment recorded for him in early 1642 was raised locally, but apparently following from earlier votes in Parliament to recruit in Munster. *Commons' jn.*, ii, 313, 361, 365; *Lords' jn.*, iv, 437.

Cavalry:[23] 3 Munster troops[24];
3 companies of dragoons.

Delays with the second contingent may have been largely financial. With the exception of the commanding officers, the officer lists for the new regiments were approved in the Houses by February 2.[25] No moves were made, however, to translate votes into action, and the officers were put on half- pay.[26] Only in early April was sufficient money made available for recruitment purposes, by loan from the Adventurers.[27] Whether impressment was used at this stage is again uncertain, but in the event action was fairly rapid. The first of the companies from the four (Dublin) regiments assigned to Chester mustered on April 26 and 29, while the remainder gathered between May 1 and June 12.[28] If anything the two regiments ordered to gather at Minehead (for Munster) assembled even more rapidly.[29] Money was assigned for pay and transport costs by Bill of Exchange on May 1 (£10 000 in all).[30] CIA's advice to send over individual companies on assembly seems to have been followed and the majority of soldiers were reported gone by May 24.[31]

Phase 3. A planned third phase failed to become operational, though with implications for finance and provisioning. The attempt to raise 10 000 more troops has been discussed in chapter 3, where the vital role of the adventure has been made clear.[32] The adventurers' own army was largely re-deployed for English service, though 2 000

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[23]Cavalry are harder to clarify than the infantry. The second batch of 300 (voted on Dec. 28 - *Commons' jn.*, ii, 360) were not raised if this is taken as distinct from the original 600, but it is possible that this had been cut down to 300, the other 300 being re-designated as dragoons. Certainly the April schedule aims at two sets of 300 cavalry plus 300 dragoons (P.R.O., S.P. 17 /H /7, p. 10). The 300 dragoons and a total of 600 horse were eventually sent, though shortages of money held many of the latter at Chester for a long stretch (see e.g. *P.J., ii*, 12-13, 188).

[24]The troops under Inchiquin and Jephson were apparently raised in England; they were certainly recruited with levy - money issued by Parliament. Courtney's troops was only to receive armament, a requirement of the other two troops also (*Commons' jn.*, ii, 361, 380; *Lords' jn.*, vi, 495-6; *P.J., i*, 45, 68; *P.J., ii*, 175). Earlier, Viscount Dungarvan had been authorised by Parliament to raise a troop in the province (*Commons' jn.*, ii, 347-8; *P.J., i*, 149).

[25]*P. J., ii*, 243-5.

[26]Leicester's warrants, March 1642, P.R.O., S.P. 28 /1B, Part I, pp. 406, 408, 410, 412, 414, 416. Half- pay was provided to cover Feb. 2 - March 14, and later extended to April 4.

[27]*Commons' jn., ii*, 515, 520, 524; *P. J., ii*, 138-9, 161. By April 12 Pym was able to report that since the officers had now received money they would be without excuse if recruitment did not follow and should be replaced. Money was indeed paid over that day, i.e. levy- money (£1 000 per regiment), the half- pay due the officers and a month's advance, and small sums to cover equipment. Leicester's warrants, April 1642, P.R.O., S.P. 28 /1B, Part II, pp. 444, 446, 448, 450.

[28]Schedules and musters, P.R.O., S.P. 17 /H /7, pp 20-22.

[29]The Commons were told on May 2 that 2 000 men were ready at Minehead, awaiting victuals and money for the voyage. *Commons' jn., ii*, 555; *P. J., ii*, 269-70.

[30]*P. J., ii*, 421; Leicester's warrants, April 1642, P.R.O., S.P. 28 /1B, Part II, p. 524.

[31]*Commons' jn., ii*, 584-5; *P. J., ii*, 364, 421, 438.

[32]Again, a distinction must be made between the 'official' reinforcement sought by CIA and Parliament, and dropped in light of the King's refusals, and the adventurer army, levied on the basis of the 1642 Act. See above, chapter 3.

men under Lord Kerry were despatched to Munster,[33] and a number of troops served under Lord Forbes in the 'Sea Adventure' which preyed on the southern and western coasts of Ireland in the summer of 1642.

Of the 13 000 or so troops[34] actually despatched, it can be seen that both the failure to issue commissions, and lack of ready money both hampered recruitment, which could be rapid when these were available. Of the two, money was the greater difficulty as the delay from Feb. to April demonstrates.

(ii) Finance.

Monetary problems lay at the heart of Stuart military ineffectiveness.[35] With a Parliament directly controlling the 1641-2 war effort the omens were not particularly good for a freer flow of cash on the Irish front.[36] It was not that all MPs were financially uninformed. By March at the latest they had been told that Elizabeth's Irish wars had cost £1 681 849.[37] The detailed cost schedule probably presented in April 1642 showed that forces then envisaged would probably require £1/2m p.a.[38] What has to be recognised is the fact that, even with the will to pay, the means for speedy payment were not there in 1641-2. Cromwell's 1649-50 campaign required an *already operational* land tax (i.e. one from which funds could be drawn at once) and large land sales.[39] Even though progress might be made in 1641-2 on a bill to raise £400 000 by

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[33]For Kerry's contingent, see *Lords' jn.*, v, 226, 228, 297, 346-7; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 32; H.M.C. *Portland MSS*, i, 65.

[34]This covers the 10 000 infantry, in 8 regiments (plus firelocks), Kerry's 2 000 men and about 900 cavalry and dragoons. The total is somewhat higher if two Munster cavalry troops are added (200) and Forbes's expedition included.

[35]In the 1620s and 1630s the wheels of the military machine tended to lock when adequate financial lubrication proved unobtainable. Richard W. Stewart, 'Arms and expeditions: the Ordnance Office and the assaults on Cadiz (1625) and the Isle of Rhe (1627)', in Fissel (ed.), *War and government*, p.122.

[36]For financial hesitancy in 1641 see Russell, *Causes*, p.164; Russell, *British Monarchies*, pp 235, 348-50, 357-60.

[37]*P. J., i*, 50. The fact that they decided to double the wages paid to officers in that war for the present campaign shows they could also see the effects of inflation.

[38]*Commons' jn.*, ii, 522-3; *P. J., ii*, 154. The undated cost schedule at P.R.O. S.P. 17 / H / 7, p.5 is almost certainly relevant here - it refers to the 6 regiments 'now to be raised'. The exact total given is £498 704-10-10 p.a., covering selected Irish-raised forces. Only half of this would be required to support the 10 000 English infantry with 1 000 horse, a fact recognised in the original adventure proposals in Feb., *P. J., ii*, 370.

[39]James Scott Wheeler, 'Logistics and supply in Cromwell's conquest of Ireland' in Mark Charles Fissel (ed.), *War and Government in Britain, 1598-1650* (Manchester, 1991), pp. 45-6. See also pp. 44-52 generally for the logistical successes of Cromwell's campaign. Compare Wheeler's account of Cromwell's Scottish campaign, in Wheeler, 'English army finance', chapter 8.

direct taxation, this was too slow a procedure to deal with immediate needs, and necessitated recourse to credit.[40]

Table 1:1 is extracted from a published statement of Parliament's finances issued in June 1642, and provides a broad outline of the flow of money from Nov. 1641 as it relates to the Irish war.[41] It demonstrates the extent to which Parliament was dependent on loans to pay for the war in Ireland in 1641-2. If chronological considerations are taken into account the reliance on credit is even greater. Until Feb. 1642, Parliament was entirely dependent on two loans of £50 000 each, one from the City, one from the Merchant Adventurers' Company. Expenditure in Nov. - Dec. is hard to assess without use of City records[42], but it seems that :-

£16 716 - 4 - 8 (at least) was spent on levy money and advance pay for the (relatively small) first contingents in England and Ireland;

£17 000 was sent to Dublin by Henley and Hawkeridge (which may have cost Parliament up to £20 000);

£5 000 was spent on the Navy;

£800 went on transport of arms by the Ordnance Office .

The fund used would appear to be that City loan, of which £44 977 was available by Dec. 21, of a total of £49 823 collected.[43]

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[40]The £11 000 which Parliament had 'inn cash' at the beginning of Nov. was not loose money. As collected from the subsidies, it was due to the Northern counties and had to be repaid to the Treasurers of the subsidy from the City loan. It is also worth noting that, unlike the situation during the Bishops' Wars, there does there appear to have been any attempt to place upon local communities the burden of the initial financial support of the new levies. All recruiting for Ireland was accompanied by the supply of money from central funds even though this necessitated delays, while food and clothing were also to be centrally directed through contracts made by specifically appointed staff. (The attempt to pay for supplies in Dec. 1641 from Cheshire / North Wales poll-money and subsidies is not an exception since this was merely a diversion of funds which would otherwise have been subsumed into 'national' taxation. *Commons' jn., ii,* 340; D'Ewes (C), p. 277 & note 10.)

[41]*A Declaration concerning the generall Accompts of the Kingdome ...* (1642), reprinted in *Somers' Tracts*, iv, 379-90.

[42]The City government retained control of the fund so that City records would need to be consulted for details; thereafter money was regularly disbursed through Nicholas Loftus, acting as deputy for his brother, Sir Adam Loftus. Coates used the City records in his edition of D'Ewes and the sums listed below may be referenced to the notes in D'Ewes (C), pp. 164, 183, 189, 210, 254. See also Heydon's accounts, P.R.O. S.P. 28 /139/15; Leicester's warrants, 1641-2, P.R.O., S.P. 28 /1B, Parts I.

[43]Probably at least some of the remaining money from the City loan went to cover other loans, from MPs and others, used to furnish funds sent to Ireland (see below, note). For the City loan see Harpur, 'Public borrowing', pp. 40-1.

TABLE 1:1 GENERAL STATEMENT OF IRISH ACCOUNTS 1641-2

INCOME	
Citizens of London	£ 49 823
Merchant Adventurers	£ 70 000
Loans from the 'adventure'	£ 31 000
Loans from MPs	£ 14 500
Mr. Henley's loan[44]	£ 5 000
Buckinghamshire loan	£ 6 000
Other loans to the Contribution account	£ 2 400
TOTAL OF LOANS	£ 178 723
Moneys received by the Contribution treasurers	£ 18 838- 13 - 4
TOTAL INCOME	£ 199 561 -13 - 4
OUTLAYS	
To Sir Adam & Nicholas Loftus	£ 149 368
To Sir John Smith, Scots commissioner for Ireland	£ 22 477- 03 - 4
To John Davies for supply of victuals to the Scots	£ 4 000
To the Navy Treasurer & Victualler for ships to Ireland	£ 5 000
To Sir Thomas Staples for Londonderry	£ 1 000
To Samuel Vassall, for freight of goods to Londonderry	£ 590
To Owen O'Connolly [reward]	£ 500
Paid out by the contribution Treasurers in England & Wales	£ 5 754
TOTAL OUTLAYS	£ 188 509 -03 - 4

From January on the way in which money was spent becomes clearer. Nicholas Loftus received £20 000 as his share of the Merchant Adventurer loan. His outlays in England in Jan. - Feb. total £19 661-0-2, again almost all to merely levy troops and provide minimal payment, and transport costs. This of course left precious

[44]Henley's loan was not strictly an additional income, since it was a deferred repayment of the final instalment of a total of £20 000 owed for money sent to Dublin; he allowed deferral of repayment, thus making extra credit of £5 000 available on the City loan, but at least £2 500 was repaid in April - see below, table 1: 6.

little for transmission to Ireland, despite repeated pleas from the authorities there.[45] Whatever the disadvantages of the scheme set up by Henley and Hawkeridge to transport money to Ireland in Spanish coin it was at least rapid, allowing delivery by Dec. 3. (The loss of money by Parliament had been recognised and accepted in advance.)

TABLE 1:2 EXPENDITURE, JAN. - FEB., 1642.[46]

Pay of troops already recruited (1 month)[47]	£ 7 827 - 12 - 8
Levy money / advance pay for new troops[48]	£ 8 186 - 4 - 8
Provisions	£ 1 921 - 8 - 0
Armament, including transport costs	£ 1 725 - 15 - 4
TOTAL OUTLAYS	£ 19 661 - 0 - 2

In addition, money was needed for despatch to Ireland, and to pay the Scottish allies of Parliament.[49] The £50 000 loan from the Merchant Adventurers was ordered split between Loftus and the commissioners for the Scots (Jan. 10), the latter receiving £30 000. In the June accounts (Table 1:1) this appears as the £22 477 -3 -4 1/2, which was used for paying the first of the soldiers, as well as for victuals and ammunition - apparently this being the £4 000 delivered to John Davies. The rest of the £30 000 appears to have been handed over, and was to be retained for payment of the Scots.[50]

Loftus's recorded outlays for March were small in scale, though he seems liable also for £2 000 'incident charges' payable to the Scots, and for unspecified costs, like the hire of shipping, which should be added to the sums listed below (Table 1: 3).

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[45]As in the 16th century war meant heavy subventions to the Irish Exchequer as well as expenditure in England - the Lords Justices from the outset explained that their greatest need was for money. *Ormonde MSS,* New Series, ii, 5, 9, 21, 30-1, 66-7, 71-2. Strictly speaking all expenditure was a kind of subvention since it was recorded as paid to Sir Adam Loftus, Irish Treasurer-at-Wars, in the person of his deputy, his brother Nicholas, even though the latter (based in London) spent most of the money in England. Money was issued on warrants signed by Leicester, and later CIA (P.R.O., S.P. 28 / 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D contain these warrants.).

[46]Leicester's warrants, 1641-2, P.R.O., S.P. 28 /1B, Part I may be used to construct totals of money spent.

[47]Regiments of the Lord Lieutenant, Clotworthy, Conway and Vavasour; the firelock companies; Baker's horse troop; Duncannon garrison.

[48]Additional men for Vavasour and Duncannon; 5 new horse troops; dragoon companies; Clotworthy's boat crew.

[49]By April 23 Dublin reported receipts of £20 000 in addition to the Henley delivery (*Ormonde MSS*, New Series, ii, 119). In so far as the sources can be traced, they appear as smaller loans, from MPs and from Henley himself (*Commons' jn., ii,* 408-9, 411, 414, 419, 425,462, 498, 500; *P. J., i,* 241-2, 284). Probably the City loan was used to bolster these.

[50] *Somers' Tracts*, iv, 379-90; *Commons' jn.*, ii, 442; *P.J., i,* 419. For Davies, see P.R.O. S.P. 28 /139/ 13, f. 148.

TABLE 1:3. EXPENDITURE, MARCH 1642.[51]

Pay and despatch of troops at Chester	£ 1 074 - 4 - 0
Pay, etc. sent to Duncannon (from Adventure)	£ 1 000 - 0 - 0
Pay for Clotworthy's regiment	£ 184 -18 - 8
1/2 pay for the officers of the '6 new regiments' to 14 March	£ 1 783 - 6 - 8
Purchase and transport of arms / clothes	£ 1 079 -19 - 0
TOTAL OUTLAYS	£ 5 102 - 8 - 4

The small outlays in March, and the need to rely on extensions of MPs' loans, reflects the low point of parliamentary finance in 1641-2. The next three months show a turning to the adventure, and to the 'contribution', neither fund intended for general Irish war costs. Tables 1:4 - 1:5 show possible distribution of money 'borrowed' from these two funds.

TABLE 1:4. SUGGESTED DISPOSAL OF £31 000 IN ADVENTURE LOANS

First loan, spent on the 6 new regiments, and smaller costs in England	£ 10 000
Second loan, spent on the 6 new regiments, and smaller costs in England	£ 4 000
Sent to Duncannon	£ 1 000
Sent to Youghal	£ 6 000
Sent to Dublin	£ 10 000

The advances made from the fund to the military expedition (in its second phase) effectively resuscitated it. Though Pym's motion of April 2 to borrow £10 000 was directed at paying troops in Dublin, as passed it gave Loftus the money 'for the service of Ireland' in general. Though a certain amount of controversy surrounded the spending of the money, Loftus's accounts for April - May show clearly that the bulk of

[51]Leicester's warrants, 1641-2, P.R.O., S.P. 28 /1B, Part I may be used to construct totals of money spent.

expenditure went on the new expedition.[52] The Adventure also provided funds badly needed in Ireland. In April both the £1 000 sought for Duncannon as far back as Jan. and £6 000 for Munster were sent via Loftus from the Adventurers' stock, the latter arriving by the end of May.[53] In May the earlier plan to send £10 000 from Adventure funds to Dublin also seems to have been accomplished[54] (See Table 1:4).

Even the 'Contribution' fund was being pressed into service. The fund was part of the same response to alleged massacre which produced the fasts and was explicitly aimed at relief. But it did not function as a self-regulating fund. As early as March 10 the Commons allowed the hard-pressed Loftus £2 000 from the fund for general Irish service.[55] Though most attempts to dip into the Contribution coffers were for relatively small sums for supplies[56] by April - May challenges were made which threatened to undermine its integrity more severely. From late April, local authorities petitioned for the right to disburse sums collected in their own areas, many such requests being granted.[57] When funds were not cut off at the source, the question of whether to spend the money on relief in England or in Ireland arose, and at least some money was sent across, to prevent the flight of the destitute to England.[58] Then on May 16 Sir John Evelyn of Surrey moved that the Contribution committee be suspended 'and that it might go to the wars, for they said that there [was] likely above 100, 000£ of it to come in'. Shortly after the committee in charge of the contribution was suspended, and though restored on June 1 at least £11 500 had been diverted in the meantime to help bear the costs of the war.[59] In all, orders of March - May had allocated no less than £13 500 from the Contribution to Nicholas Loftus for general purposes, plus £500 to buy shoes, £564 for clothing , and £3 000 to send to Frost at Chester. The claim that the Treasurers themselves disbursed £5 574 seems reasonable in the light of such losses. Thus a fund for 'relief' was early subverted to the consuming demand for military funding.

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[52]*Lords' jn., iv,* 695; *Commons' jn., ii*, 477, 512, 515; *P. J., ii*, 118, 123, 138.

[53]*Commons' jn., ii*, 386, 502, 505, 529, 531, 533; *P. J., ii*, 182, 414, 425; *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, p.361; P.R.O., S.P. 28 /1B, Part I, p.418. See St. Leger to CIA, May 30 for the arrival of the Munster money, but that it was worth less than one month's pay to the forces there. Cf. letter of March 23 showing no money had been sent until then, Hogan, *Letters and papers*, pp 15, 25, 28.

[54]*Commons' jn., ii*, 573.

[55]*Lords' jn., iv*, 642; *Commons' jn., ii*, 474, 476. At least half was spent on the troops at Chester, P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, part I, p.393.

[56]In April, for example, £500 was allotted to buy shoes and £564-13-4 for caps and stockings. A further £3 000 was sent in April to Frost fro the purchase of victuals, *Lords' jn., iv*, 717; *Commons' jn., ii*, 515, 521; *P. J., ii*, 138, 151; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1D, p.360.

[57]*Lords' jn., v*, 79; *Commons' jn., ii*, 541, 574; *P. J., ii*, 221. Sums were not only allowed to western areas like Bristol, Pembroke or Plymouth but across England from Shrewsbury and Bewdley to Cambridge and Northants., *Lords' jn., v*, 55, 61; *Commons' jn., ii*, 565, 615, 633, 640, 662, 683; *P. J., ii*, 297.

[58]*Lords' jn., v*, 77; *Commons' jn., ii*, 478, 564; *P. J., ii*, 36, 441; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.478.

[59]*Lords' jn., v*, 72-3, 77;*Commons' jn., ii*, 573, 574, 579, 580, 597; *P. J., ii*, 325-6, 334. Further assignments from the contribution to Loftus were later made £10 000 for the 'affairs of Ireland' in mid-July, *Lords' jn., v*, 218, 221; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1D, p.382 (July 15 & 20).

TABLE 1:5. SUGGESTED DIVISION OF CONTRIBUTION REVENUE.

INCOME[60]	
Received from collections	£ 18 838 - 13 - 4
Loans	£ 8 400
TOTAL ACCOUNTED INCOME	£ 27 238 - 13 - 4
OUTLAYS	
Relief in England and Wales[61]	£ 5 574
To Hull garrison (from Bucks. loan)[62]	£ 2 000
For officers' arrears, from the Bishops' Wars[63]	£ 1 000
To Loftus- in March (approx.)[64]	£ 2 000
-army shoes and clothes [65]	£ 1 064 - 13 - 4
-May 16 vote, pay to Ireland[66]	£ 1 500
-May 20 vote, paid June 7 & 21[67]	£ 10 000
- delivered to Frost[68]	£ 3 000
Sent direct - to Bandon[69]	£ 200
- to Derry (City collection)[70]	£ 1 000
TOTAL ESTIMATED OUTLAYS	£ 27 338 - 13 - 4

Loftus's outlays for raising and equipping the second phase of the planned expedition had been permitted by the adventure 'loan'; only at the end of April did he receive £20 000 from a second Merchant Adventurer Company loan (thus allowing further 'adventure' money to be sent to Ireland in May, rather than be spent on the new

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[60]*Somers' Tracts*, iv, 382-3.
[61]*Somers' Tracts*, iv, 384-6.
[62]*Commons' jn., ii*, 545; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1D, p.362 (April 28, May 4). But cf. another receipt of June 24 for £2 000 from the Contribution for Hotham, P.R.O., S.P. 28/1D, p.412.
[63]*Lords' jn., v*, 83; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1D, pp 409, 410 (May 24, 26).
[64]*Lords' jn., iv*, 642; *Commons' jn., ii*, 474, 476; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.393 (March 11/12).
[65]*Lords' jn., v*, 9; Commons' *jn., ii*, 521; *P. J., ii*, 151, 169; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1D, pp 352, 360 (April 14 & 22).
[66]*Commons' jn., ii*, 573; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1D, p.366 (May 16,June 1).
[67]*Commons' jn., ii*, 580; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1D, p.370 (May 20, June 7 & 21).
[68]*Commons' jn., ii*, 502, 515, 538; *P. J., ii*, 138; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.456 (April 25), S.P. 28/1D, p.358 (April 22 & 28).
[69]*Lords' jn., v*, 77; *Commons' jn., ii*, 564; *P. J., ii*, 441; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.478.
[70]*Commons' jn., ii*, 476; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1D, p.414 (June 8); *Somers' Tracts*, iv, 384.

troops). As Tables 1:6 - 1:7 show, the bulk of Loftus's expenditure in April - May was on setting forth these 6 000 troops.

TABLE 1:6 EXPENDITURE, APRIL 1642.[71]

Levy money and officers' pay for 5 new regiments (assuming a 6th at the same rate)	£ 8 419 - 16 - 8 (£10 103 - 16 - 0)
Small payments, e.g. the crew of the *Charles*, Kinsale	£ 212
Purchase of arms	£ 196
Purchase of shoes, transport of clothes, etc.	£ 1 146 - 13 - 4
Repayment to Henley	£ 2 500
TOTAL ESTIMATED OUTLAYS *(ADDING THE 6TH REGIMENT)*	£12 474 - 10 - 0 £14 158 - 9 - 4

TABLE 1:7 EXPENDITURE, MAY 1642.[72]

Pay and transport of the 6 regiments	£10 000
Other pay, especially artillery	£ 1 316 - 10
Munitions - for the 6 regiments	£ 1 143 - 6 - 8
- artillery	£ 1 078 - 1 - 8
Provisions - medicines / clothes sent	£ 325 - 8 - 8
- clothes purchased in Dublin	£ 1 400
- to Frost and Dobbins	£ 2 400
- to repay supplies in Ireland	£ 862 - 13 - 0
Repayment of loans raised in Ireland	£ 2 800
TOTAL OUTLAYS	£21 325 -10 - 10

Consideration of the figures above may give rise to three conclusions. First, as indicated, the appropriation of funds through credit was essential. The official financial report delivered to the Commons on May 6 indicated that the £400 000 then to be raised was entirely pledged for the repayment of earlier loans (£287 000) and as part of the Scottish Brotherly Assistance (£100 000), leaving other debts, including the latter £20

[71]Leicester's warrants, 1641-2, P.R.O., S.P. 28 /1B, Part II.
[72]Leicester's warrants, 1641-2, P.R.O., S.P. 28 /1B, Part II.

000 from the Merchant Adventurers unprovided for. It was agreed to press 'very earnestly' for another £150 000 as a loan from London.[73] The adventurers, after all, considered the £31 000 they had handed over to be a loan, and proved increasingly unwilling to cede control over the resources at their disposal, intended for their own expedition. In the event the City Companies agreed to lend £100 000 in early June.[74] By Dec. 1642, a total of £91 770 had been collected, two-thirds of it between June 14 and July 2.[75] The completion of recruitment of the original army meant that this was at last assigned for support of forces in Ireland, approximately as shown in Table 1:8.

TABLE 1:8. DISTRIBUTION OF £100 000 LOAN.[76]

Payable for the Scottish army in Ulster	£ 34 000
Paid for Parliament's two regiments in Ulster (Conway's & Clotworthy's)	£ 6 000
Sent to Dublin - Aug. 1642	£ 23 000
Sent to Dublin - Sept. 1642	£ 27 000
TOTAL	£ 90 000

The need to send money to Ireland had been increased by the decisions, in April and July, to take responsibility for the support of all the government forces in Ireland and not just those commissioned by Parliament.[77] Yet even if all of the £50 000 was delivered, along with the £37 500 sent up until April (and the £10 000 lent by the adventurers), it still fell far short of the £200 000 requested by the Irish government. This second fact, the failure of subvention, was to become even more apparent in the years ahead, as supplies of money dried up completely. Already it had meant a gap of several months when money was vitally needed in Ireland, and this despite the pleas from Dublin for cash, as more important than either troops or supplies.

Finally, even of the money spent on English forces, almost all was taken up with preliminary costs of recruitment (including advance pay), surplus equipment and transportation. Again, this is the onset of an established pattern (seen especially in 1646-7) where troops are assembled and despatched, but in effect ignored, as to pay and supplies, once in Ireland. This in turn prompts consideration of the supply network, both for munitions and provisions.

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[73]*Commons' jn., ii,* 557, 558; *P. J., ii,* 273, 279, 284.
[74]See above, chapter 3, for details.
[75]Harper, 'Public Borrowing', p. 66
[76]*Commons' jn.,* iv, 626, 640; P.R.O. S.P. 28 / 1B, pp. 559-60; P.R.O. S.P. 28 / 1D, pp. 372, 373, 386.
[77]*P.J., ii,* 187, 198, 415-6; *Commons' jn.*, ii, 662-3.

(iii) Munitions.

The supply of arms had long been the province of the Ordnance Office.[78] Its reputation for efficiency in the 1590s as well as the 1620s and 1630s has held up well in recent assessments.[79] Stewart's model for the Elizabethan Irish wars contrasts official control of arms supply with private provision of food and clothing to show relative speed and efficiency in the former and delays and deficiencies in the latter, not remedied in the 1620s.[80] In the Bishops' Wars, the Office had once again 'delivered the goods'. The main shortcomings have been identified as the slowness of delivery, and the related problem of delays in financial provision; though a longer war may have shown up the failure, from the late 1620s, to build up a stock of war materials, and the limitations of the domestic arms industry.[81] In 1641 Parliament looked quite naturally to the Office once again. The major shifts apparent in 1641-2, even from the practices adopted in the 1620s, were due directly and indirectly to the Bishops' Wars, in effect producing a centralisation in military logistics.[82] The mere fact that, with the disbanding of the English forces only a few months earlier, their weapons had been stockpiled in magazines, primarily that at Hull, but also in Carlisle and Berwick meant that any shortfall from the Tower stores could, indeed must, be made good from thence rather than by another trawl through the county magazines.[83] By Nov. 8, Parliament had provided the Master of the Ordnance, the Earl of Newport, with its warrant (subsequently reinforced with the King's order) to issue weapons in excess of those numbers of forces already voted to be raised, from stores in London (the Tower), Hull and Carlisle.[84]

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[78]The Armoury did continue to provide armour for cavalry in 1641-2, e.g. P.R.O. S.P. 28/ 1B, p.380. Cf. Richard W. Stewart, 'The "Irish road": military supply and arms for Elizabeth's army during the O'Neill rebellion in Ireland, 1598-1601' in Fissel (ed.), *War and Government*, pp. 21-3.

[79]Stewart, 'Irish road', pp 28-32; Stewart, 'Arms and expeditions', pp 118-9, 127-8; Andrew Thrush, 'The Ordnance Office and the navy, 1625-40' in *Mariner's Mirror*, lxxvii (1991), pp 339-354. But cf. the less favourable view of Ian Roy, 'Introduction', to Roy, (ed.), *The Royalist Ordnance Papers 1642-1646*, Part 1 (Oxford, 1964), pp 10-11.

[80]Stewart, 'Irish road', pp 17-19, 31-2; Stewart, 'Arms and expeditions', p.122.

[81]Mark Charles Fissel, *The Bishops' Wars : Charles I's campaigns against Scotland, 1638-40*, (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 106-10. Fissel suggests the demands of 1639-40 were not an 'adequate test' of the Ordnance Office as it then stood (p. 107). See, generally, pp. 90-110 on the Ordnance Office, especially pp. 100-3 on the shortcomings of a 'backward' arms industry; p. 106 on failure to develop a national armament.

[82]The same could be said of finances - see above, note 41.

[83]Cf. Stewart, 'Irish road' , pp 26-7 for the 1590s.

[84]*Lords' jn., iv,* 424-5; *Commons' jn., ii,* 305, 306; D'Ewes (C), pp 86, 90-1; *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp 344-5. The order allowed the issue of arms for 100 cavalry and 8 000 infantry; the latter could

Phase 1. It was, presumably, from the Tower that munitions were issued to the 3 500 infantry who constituted the first phase of the expeditionary force.[85] By early Dec. the 1590s' 'Irish Road' to Chester was operational and money for transportation of arms was being paid from the London loan to Newport and his deputy, Sir John Heydon.[86] Delays were more likely when it came to more specialised weapons - those for the companies of firelocks not being ready until April.[87]

Phase 2. Disputes between King and Parliament arose over the need to arm those forces Parliament had voted to raise in Ireland as well as the additional English troops decided on in Dec. 1642.[88] Explicit sanction for sufficient arms for the whole army of 10 000 infantry and 600 cavalry, and for locally raised troops, was blocked by the political breakdown, but Parliament appears to have maintained its ability to draw on the Tower arsenal when need arose.[89] The regiments in Ulster were to have the benefit of the relatively small magazine at Carlisle, eventually appropriated *in situ* by Clotworthy as he journeyed to Ulster in early 1642.[90] (It had been his insistence on the

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therefore cover not only the 6 000 men to be recruited in England, but the 2 000 soon to be ordered raised in Ulster as the regiments under Lord Conway and Sir John Clotworthy.

[85]*Cal. S.P. dom., 1641-3*, p.181. These were the regiments under Harcourt and Leicester, and probably the first 500 men assigned to Vavasour. Certainly the Dec. disputes did not extend to these forces.

[86]Stewart, 'The "Irish road" ', pp 23-5; Heydon's accounts (P.R.O., S.P. 28 / 139/ 15); Receipts to George Wood from carriers, 1641-2 (P.R.O., S.P. 28 /1B, Part II, 483-520, 650-671) for the transportation network re-activated in 1641. *Lords' jn., iv,* 461, 463; D'Ewes (C), p.189, note 9 for funds - the total cost was estimated at £469, and payment was made by City Chamberlain Bateman direct to Heydon (£200, 1 Dec.), Newport (£200, 1 Dec.; £40, 16 Dec.) or Errington (£29, 9 Feb.. P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.371). Carriers' bills and receipts at P.R.O., S.P. 28/1D, pp 455ff show the small scale of the operators e.g. £8-15 paid to Daniel Foster for the transit of 16 barrels of musket shot, 20 Jan. 1642, p.516. Compare the cost of £1889-12-5 for transportation of Irish Sea naval supplies.

[87] It was found necessary in January to provide £600 for the purchase of 400 firelock muskets for the two companies attached to Leicester's regiment; in March these were sent from London to Chester. Leicester's warrants, 1642, P.R.O., S.P. 28 /1A, p.315; 28 / 1B, p.388. There were also problems in supplying the dragoons, see Leicester's warrants, 1642, P.R.O., S.P. 28 / 1B, pp 367, 395, 458.

[88]*Commons' jn.*, ii, 389; *Lords'jn.*, iv, 527 for a list of those forces to be armed, which would have effectively covered all those listed in 'phase two' above, not already provided for. (Since there is no record of a royal warrant for these issues it appears that they were issued regardless from April on - though see note below. Certainly Hotham was empowered to issue Hull munitions, as of Feb. 21, on Leicester's warrant, though there is no record of this happening, *Lords' jn.*, iv, 600.) As seen in chapter one, the political difficulty lay in the King's insistence for limited requests for specified arms (and promises of re-supply) as against calls by some in Parliament for a 'warrant dormant' to allow ongoing issue of munitions for Ireland as fresh needs arose.

[89]Arms for Munster were handed over to Lord Inchiquin, *Egmont MSS*, i, 162. Though designated 'spare arms' it seems that at least half of this stock went to Vavasour's English soldiers, or so Inchiquin later claimed, Hogan, *Letters and papers*, p.124. (This would make sense in so far as arms for 2 000 were sought, but that Vavasour's regiment was expanded to 1 000 men.) Heydon appears to have overseen transportation, at a cost of £686-19, Heydon's accounts (April 1643) P.R.O., S.P. 28/139/15; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, pp 335, 352, 380, 402 for issues made; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1D for carriers' bills.

[90]Carlisle magazine was estimated as able to supply weapons for 1 300 infantry and one cavalry troop, and it allocation had been foreseen by Parliament as early as Nov., 1641. For the disposal of the munitions there, *Lords' jn., iv,* 440-1, 437; *Commons' jn., ii,* 313; D'Ewes (C), pp 99, 119, 122.

need to complete the armament of his own and Lord Conway's regiment, which had sparked the clash with the King over warrants.) There had been no apparent discrimination between the needs of English and Irish raised forces.

Charles had expressed concern about the re-stocking of royal stores, and on Feb. 1 the Lords ordered an examination of the question. An Ordnance Office report probably received by their Committee for the Defence of the Kingdom shows that a reasonably adequate number of muskets (8 016) were available for Ireland, though re-supply would take all of 6 months; other arms would require four months, but the real dangers were shortages of ammunition and artillery.[91] As troops began to be assembled the Ordnance Office again proved effective. By late April only 1 500 out of 6 000 soldiers lacked arms and though these were ordered to be sent over unarmed, the Office appears to have met its obligations through a number of small-scale orders for repair or purchase of weapons.[92] Meanwhile C.I.A. had been mandated to procure arms to replace those issued and looked into large-scale importation as well as small-scale domestic production.[93]

Phase 3; Ammunition and artillery. The Ordnance Office in Feb. 1642 lamented that they had had no deliveries 'these 13 months'. Since the deregulation of the gunpowder industry in the summer of 1641 there had been 'a difficult changeover period, in which there was little or no powder production'.[94] In the short term it was up to private

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Commons' jn., ii, 473; *P. J., i,* 17; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p. 329 for money (£160) given Clotworthy for his costs. The arms due him from the Tower were almost certainly taken over by his associate John Davies along with foodstuffs for which the latter had contracted. By Jan. 31 he is recorded as receiving recompense for his delays while awaiting delivery of munitions, P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.358. The smaller Berwick magazine was transported to London in Jan., 1642. Though it had raised trepidation among some about Charles's designs, it was mostly handed over to the owners of merchant shipping designed for the guard of the Irish coasts. The horse arms, for which they could have little use, went for Munster to the troops appointed to be raised by Inchiquin and Sir William Jephson, MP. *Lords' jn., iv,* 558; *Commons' jn., ii,* 360, 399, 408, 410, 424; *P. J., i,* 49, 90, 192, 195, 247, 339.

[91]*Lords' jn., iv,* 557, 585-6; Ordnance Office Memorial, Feb. 10, *Cal S.P. dom., 1641-3*, pp 280-1. Newport delivered an account book of the magazines to the Committee on Feb. 15, and this probably coincides with (or was at least based upon) the Ordnance Office 'Memorial' of Feb. 10 among the State Papers.

[92]*Commons' jn., ii,* 526, 553, 554; *P. J., ii,* 168, 416-7, 420-1, 428-9. For a list of (not quite serviceable) arms available in late April, see P.R.O., S.P. 28/1C, p.81 (undated list delivered to CIA by Heydon, Conningsly and Sherburne). Receipts and bills found at P.R.O., S.P. 28/1D, ii, iii show some large purchases e.g. of 860 swords from Benjamin Stone on 7 May (p.622) for £301 (note that no less than 1764 swords were required by the main army, *P. J., ii,* 433), or 334 long pikes and 666 musket rests at £108-9 from John Edwards and Robert Thacker (p.626). Most repair bills are of the order of the £5-2 to Walter Williamson for cleaning muskets, repairing breeches and adding new stocks (p.552). Repairs went on simultaneously for arms to be issued for the Sea Adventure.

[93]*P. J., ii,* 405, 414.

[94]Roy, 'Introduction', pp 10-11; Pennington, 'The making of the war', p.175; *Cal. S>P> dom., 1641-3*, p.280. By March 28 the Commons had appointed three MPs - Vassall, Spurstow and Rolle - to buy no less than 132 lasts of imported powder. *Commons' jn., ii,* 502. By May the Lords were behind the establishment of a committee to ensure adequate supplies of saltpetre, *Lords' jn., v,* 59, 76; *P. J., ii,* 306.

initiative to step in. After small shipments in March, the April plan for the supply of key coastal garrisons saw the ammunition component shifted from the Ordnance Office to two key London figures, William Pennoyer and Benjamin Goodwyn.[95] By then the 'third phase' of intervention required armament, in terms both of 'official' and adventurer troops, alongside the ongoing problems of ammunition and artillery supply.[96]

The adventurers had originally sought munitions from the royal stores, but by late April were given permission to purchase their own.[97] The increasingly tense political atmosphere, which blocked agreement on the raising of troops (as discussed in chapter 3) was relevant both to the matter of additional arms and of the particular problems of ammunition and artillery. For large scale supply the obvious source remained the magazine at Hull, reported to house not only weapons for 20 000 men, but also 120 field pieces and 7 000 barrels of gunpowder.[98] Plans for its despatch to Ireland had been available from Feb. at least, but by April the dispute between King and Parliament had conformed to that of Dec., 1641, namely between the demand for a 'warrant dormant' and the offer of specific issues as requested.[99] The entire arsenal was shipped to London in late May, but by now the political situation had deteriorated even further. The Lords, at least, hoped to persuade Charles to give his assent to issue artillery for Ireland from the supplies sent from Hull.[100] His response was that the Houses 'did write this to putt a scorn upon him, having alreadie taken them away by force'.[101]

By early May it had taken legal sleight of hand to overcome the legalistic objections of the Ordnance Office to the issue even of the remnants of the Tower arsenal.[102] Then towards the end of June the royal command, intercepted en route to Heydon, ordering him to send to York or Newcastle by sea 'inasmuch as it will not be

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[95]*Commons' jn., ii,* 534; *P. J., ii,* 409, 410, 411-3, 416, 423-4, 425-6, 427, 518; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, pp 605, 606. Transit of munitions to Chester and Minehead was also placed in Pennoyer's hands, taken from the Office, *P. J., ii,* 434; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, pp 480, 645; N.L.I. MS 14 035 (July 14).

[96]The projected artillery train for Ireland called forth more time and money than any other branch of the army yet, in the absence of other evidence, the bulk of it seems to have served only in the English war. Those who were to serve in Ireland, whether the Scots in Ulster, St. Leger in Munster, or Leicester himself, were convinced of the value of artillery to their respective campaigns *Lords' jn., v,* 129-130, 157, 159-60; *Commons' jn., ii,* 498, 570, 576-7; *P. J., ii,* 88, 438-9, 447; Hogan, *Letters and papers,* pp 27-8.

[97]*Commons' jn., ii,* 425, 559; *P. J., i,* 350; *P. J., ii,* 279.

[98]Fletcher, *Outbreak,* p.185.

[99]*Commons' jn.,* ii, 520, 532.

[100]*Lords' jn., v,* 157, 159-160; *Commons' jn., ii,* 637.

[101]D'Ewes, BL Harl. MS 163, f.259b; Gawdy, BL Add. MS 14 827, ff.152a, 153a; *Commons' jn., ii,* 656-7. Instead Marten secured the Commons' approval for the Committee of Defence to issue arms as they saw fit. CIA was given power to issue those on the disputed Irish artillery list, *Lords' jn., v,* 191.

[102]Reynolds argued that all arms sought from the Tower came under the terms of the Nov. 5 warrant for 8 000 infantry and 1 000 cavalry weapons, *Lords' jn., v,* 38; *Commons' jn., ii,* 552, 554. This would perhaps suggest that their scruples at obeying orders not from the King were only then aroused.

safe to do so by land, such cannon, arms, powder, shot, and munition as you can get out of or stores, ships, or otherwise, in such secret and close manner that the same may not be intercepted', took the bound from legalistic obstruction to treasonable conspiracy.[103] Parliament's counter-demands led to arrests among Ordnance Office staff and the impounding of supplies there and at the Armoury.[104]

In conclusion, it can be said that the Ordnance Office acted in 1641-2 very much as it had in 1638-40. If financial and industrial problems slowed its operations it proved adequate in the short term. After April 1642, however, a damper was applied by the unique elements of the 1641-2 situation, political breakdown and logistical developments (concentration of stores, shortages of ammunition). The importance of Hull was both quantitative (the last remaining large store of weapons) and qualitative (its ammunition and artillery[105]). Delays in tapping it meant that by the time the arsenal had been shipped to London, English tension was vying with Irish need. In the interim reliance had been placed on private contractors, pushed forward by the twin problems of shortages and disputed control.[106] Such men had the contacts abroad necessary to procure needed arms (e.g. by May 27 the Adventurers had bought 1 200 muskets in the Low Countries and sought permission to import them).[107] Yet by the late summer of 1642 they were falling far short of making the kind of provision that would be needed for the effective prosecution of the war in Ireland. While the large English and Scottish armies sent in 1642 had been quite successfully armed, the ongoing task of providing ammunition for them and their Irish-raised allies was not so readily met.[108] The Dublin authorities in particular stressed the problems continent on a lack of ammunition - this alone was enough to drive them to turn too a 'defensive war', especially given their enemies' ability to supply themselves fro the Continent. Although the parliamentary committee which arrived in late October brought a quantity of bullet, powder and match

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[103]Charles to Heydon, June 20, *Cal.S.P. dom., 1641-3*, p.343.
[104]Roy, 'Introduction', p.13.
[105]The concentration of artillery at Hull meant that the artillery train desired by Leicester was never despatched since by the time it could be assembled the looming English conflict took priority.
[106]In terms of Irish expeditions they, more then the 'amateurish' Ordnance Office appointees who replaced the Royalist defectors (Roy, 'Introduction', p.13), were the mainspring of supply.
[107]*P. J., ii*, 379. Likewise the total inability of Parliament to re-supply Scotland with arms equivalent to those they had sent with their army to Ulster meant the privatisation of this supply by Sept. 1642. It was transferred to the Scottish merchant in the Netherlands, Thomas Cunningham, an investor in the Sea Adventure (dominated by Pennoyer and his associates), *Commons' jn., ii*, 793, 806-7; Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters*, p.61.
[108]However, the 2 000 men sent with Lord Kerry in the autumn came to Ireland unarmed much to the disgust of Inchiquin. He found them 'rather a burden then an addicion of strength' and urged that, if not supplied, 'that they may be transmitted back', Hogan, *Letters and papers*, pp. 172-3.

(apparently that which has been shown to have been delivered by Pennoyer to Bristol[109]) it fell far short of their needs.[110]

(iv) Provisions.

Parliament reacted to a novel situation, where the dependence of any forces sent on relief from England would be greater than in the 1590s, and where a considerable refugee population also existed, with a two-track approach, 'official' and 'privatised' supply.

'Official' supply. The need to set up a 'Magazin of victualls' was recognised early on but it was late Dec. before a Commissary of Victuals was appointed, Gualter (or Walter) Frost, based at Chester. Frost was to have primary responsibility for supplying the full 10 000 strong English army.[111] Money was periodically made available to him and a second commissary, William Dobbins, was appointed in April with responsibility for Munster.[112] Frost's supplies were directed to the care of the Commissary General in Ireland, Sir Philip Perceval,[113] whose correspondence suggests the system was still operational in part as late as Nov. - Dec. 1642.[114] A third figure with similar responsibilities, but a greater part in Irish politics in the 1640s, was John Davies of Carrickfergus. His involvement, in sending victuals to his home town, coincides with the other relief measures of late Jan. 1642.[115] Carrickfergus was designated one of the garrison towns for the Scottish army, which was to receive both imported and local supplies,[116] a proportion of the victuals (and ammunition) to precede their landing.[117] The task fell to Davies's hands. By agreement with the

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[109]BL Add. MS 4782, ff. 22a, 22b, 23a (Nov. 2).

[110]*Ormonde MSS,* New Series, ii, 186-7, 191-3, 194-5, 197-9, 207, 210-1, 219-20. They urged their agent in London, Richard Fitzgerald, to be solicitous for ammunition, pp. 189, 212. Nor did the Scottish army in Ulster prove willing to share their stock of ammunition with Dublin, p. 208. For their (failed) attempts to import from the Low Countries, see *Ormonde MSS,* New Series, ii, 177-8, 190-1.

[111]At least at first, responsibility for provisioning the Irish Sea guard lay with the established naval victualler, John Crane, D'Ewes (C), pp 167-8, 169.

[112]For their appointments, see *Commons' jn., ii,* 357, 362; D'Ewes (C), p. 348 (Frost); *Lords' jn., v,* 9; *Commons' jn., ii,* 502, 515; *P. J., ii,* 138, 453 (Dobbins).

[113]H.M.C. *Egmont MSS.*, i, 175-6 for his Instructions from Leicester. Perceval may have suggested the appointment of a Commissary for Munster - Sir Percy Smyth to Perceval, March 29, H.M.C. *Egmont MSS*, i, 174.

[114]Hogan, *Letters and papers*, pp 161-3, 166-8. Frost remained involved in the task of provisioning Ireland 1642-3, as seen in the Adventurer records (BL Add. MS 4782), though now based at London.

[115]*Commons' jn., ii,* 403; *P. J., i,* 219. P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.358 (Jan. 31) for £1 000 delivered to Davies. Note that Clotworthy was already acting as security for Davies, P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.359 (March 8).

[116]*Lords' jn., iv,* 491-2, 517, 530; D'Ewes (C), p.371.

[117]*Lords' jn., iv,* 530; *Commons' jn., ii,* 401; *P. J., i,* 211.

English commissioners in Feb. a contract was sealed for his supply of £4 000 worth of victuals to 6 000 Scots for three months, to be delivered between then and July.[118]

'Privatised' food supply. While the Commissary system thus provided, in theory, an organised but regionally responsive means of feeding the armies, it could not hope to cope with the refugee problem also.[119] Though the Contribution was drawn on for this purpose the fund was too stretched to be of use. By the end of Jan., therefore, Clotworthy proposed a system of 'free enterprise' supply by merchants on credit - another example of his close association with mercantile interests in London at this time. As approved it offered repayment for delivery of food or clothing to a total ceiling of £25 000 at Dublin (£10 000), Carrickfergus (£15 000), Derry or Youghal (£5 000 each).[120] By early Feb. all such deliveries had been granted freedom from customs payments.[121] Processing of the resulting certification and the arduous task of securing repayment to the merchants involved consumed a disproportionate amount of time for all the Irish committees of the ensuing years.[122]

On the whole, the records of the goods carried under the ordinances show them to have fallen into two categories. The majority of certificates surviving, presented 1641-3, were for fairly small shipments (valued at <£100 or at most £200). Where the contractor can be identified they are often from small English (or Welsh or Scottish) towns[123] or, especially in Munster and at Derry, are local men.[124] But a few larger operators can be identified and they appear to form perhaps two coherent groups. William Pennoyer and Benjamin Whitcomb, already mentioned, added to their April

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[118]*Commons' jn., ii,* 453, 458; *P. J., i,* 459, 471; *Cal. S.P. dom., Addenda 1625-49,* pp 638, 644.

[119]See *Ormonde MSS,* New Series, ii, 40-1 (Dec. 14), 91-2 (March 4) for examples.

[120]*Lords' jn., iv,* 546; *Commons' jn., ii,* 391-2, 395; *P. J., i,* 147, 163, 165, 169-70, 194, 219. The Ordinance also prohibited any trade with those implicated in rebellion. The four ports named were those recommended by the Lords Justices for arms deliveries, *Ormonde MSS,* New Series, ii, 50-1. It should be noted that this scheme was not aimed exclusively at the civilian population, but overlapped with the provision of supplies to the army.

[121]*Commons' jn., ii,* 405, 412, 418; *P. J., i,* 233, 270-1, 276, 301, 305.

[122]The Ordinance required a certificate of delivery from the recipient in Ireland. Payment was due 30 days after this was received by officials in England.

[123]Examples: John Orrell, Tewkesbury, £28-1 corn, May (*P.J., ii,* 463; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.598); Thomas Barlow, Haverfordwest, £100 corn, May (*P.J., ii,* 465; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.550); Nicholas Phillips, Ipswich, £57-15, corn, August (*Lords' jn., v,* 497-8; *Anal. Hib.,* iv, 28); John Butler, Exeter, £24-11-6 butter, October (*Lords' jn., v,* 698; *Anal. Hib.,* iv, 58-9).

[124]For Munster, e.g. William Hodder of Kanturk (£122, £150), Margery Hassard of Youghal (£54-18-9), Nicholas Bagbier of Youghal (£132-16-6); of the larger local suppliers, both Tristram Whitcomb of Kinsale (£575-7-2) and Nicholas Nagle of Youghal (£1 163-14) merely supplied goods already held in Munster, though William Osborne of Youghal (£625-9) appears to have imported his goods - *Lords' jn., v,* 573, 599, 696, 699, 705; *Anal. Hib.,*iv, 24, 41, 56, 62-3, 69-70, 72, 79-80. Derry importers included City aldermen Henry Osborne, Henry Finch and Robert Lawson, *Lords jn., vi,* 156; *Anal. Hib., iv,* 72-3, 79-81.

arms supplies large quantities of foodstuffs for Limerick, Galway and Bandon.[125] The greatest of the 'new merchants', Maurice Thompson, negotiated a wheat contract for Ulster worth no less then £5 000 worth CIA in May 1642, notably deferring his repayment for 6 months.[126] Another group coalesced around Michael Casteel. Though the business relations between them is uncertain, it is clear that Casteel was the London recipient of money paid out on large shipments of corn by Raphael Hunt[127] or Abraham Rickeris,[128] or directly for himself.[129] By Jan. 1643 Casteel and Hunt were responsible for £1 800 beef delivered to Dublin.[130] Casteel also co-operated with John Davies in sending large stocks to Carrickfergus[131]. Already by Dec. 1642 over £5 000 was owed to Casteel alone.[132] Important networks were thus in process of construction from very early on.[133] By the end of 1642 neither the commissary nor the certificate systems were proving adequate. The former was starved of funds, its officials absorbed in to the general adventure-dominated supply network.[134] The latter dried up as repayment was delayed or collapsed altogether. But of the two methods the latter had the greater potential in a time of domestic instability, at least when geared to major contractors who could afford to supply on credit and accept deferred payment, with interest.[135]

Supply of clothing. With clothing the reliance on a handful of suppliers rapidly became the norm. Dublin hoped to expand the provision made to local troops by Sir William Anderson and Tobias Norris and, through the sending of cloth, to provide

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[125]*P. J., ii,* 425-7; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.477. It is worth noting that Pennoyer and Whitcomb wee unusual in that, in the 1630s, both had combined trade in the Levant Company with trade with the Americas. Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, pp 103, 379.

[126]*P. J., ii,* 465.

[127]£814-13 wheat and maslin, Dublin, May 1642. *P. J., ii,* 432, 439; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.481. Hunt also had £596 due for wheat paid over to John Hawkeridge, *P. J., ii,* 466; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.596.

[128]£2 346-14 corn, Dublin, June - July 1642. P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.599; N.L.I. MS 14305, 15 June.

[129]£919-13-9 wheat and £557-14 wheat, Dublin, Sept. 1642. *Anal. Hib.*, iv, 5.

[130]*Anal. Hib.*, iv, 67.

[131]E.g. £1 050 grain, June - July 1642(P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.603); £4 161-13-4 Sept. 1642 (*Anal. Hib.*, iv, 5); with Crane, Bard and Browne for £1 650 wheat, July 1642- these associates dealt on their own, Crane for £204 wheat, Sept. 1642, Bard or £1 500-8 wheat (*Anal. Hib.*, iv, 28, 29, 30; *Lords' jn., v*, 498, 501, 502).

[132]*Anal. Hib.*, iv, 19; BL Add. MS 4782, ff. 20a, 20b, 78a, 78b, 87b, 88a, 105b.

[133]Both the main text, and appendix 3 below, show the creation of alternative networks focusing on the adventurer committee (with Pennoyer probably the largest supplier) and on Davies.

[134]By Aug. 25 the interception by the royalist earl of Northampton of goods destined for Ireland (via Chester), worth a mere £560, signalled the end of the 'Irish Road' for the duration of the English conflict, since neither the north-western nor the south-western route could be used with any certainty (*Commons' jn.*, ii, 736, 744). Thus reliance on merchant shipping was necessary.

[135]See appendix 3. The larger dealers could also command shipping suitable for a passage to Ireland despite the hazards of privateers.

work for female refugees in making these into garments.[136] But real progress only began with the operations of CIA in April[137] and their method was one of large contracts with City drapers for regular supplies on deferred payments. Direction of clothing needs was effectively delegated to one men, George Wood.[138] He not only took receipt of huge quantities of items over the next two years but undertook for their transportation by carrier to Chester.[139] Dependence on London suppliers for clothing was fairly absolute. What it meant, in effect, was hugely increasing debt. Further contracts were made with the earlier suppliers[140] and especially with Richard Turner and partners. When the further supply of English raised troops and supply of the Ulster raised forces (all negotiated and supplies in 1642) are taken into account the latter had produced £16 854-3-4 worth of goods (almost all of it unpaid in Jan. 1643[141]) and by Nov. 1642, £44 051-18-9 worth.[142]

(v) Conclusion.

The situation in 1641-2 resembled that of the 1620s (or 1638-40) much more than that of the 1650s. The financial reorganisation, existing army and developed supply networks available to Cromwell were lacking. The information presented above suggests three conclusions.

Firstly, practical problems (especially money) probably outweighed 'political' ones in delaying the response to the Irish Rising, though disputes over officers' commissions and warrants for arms are exceptions, delays over the latter holding up despatch until English conflict appeared inevitable. Only after April 1642 could political disputes be said to outweigh logistical difficulties in preventing military intervention in Ireland.

Secondly, a decline in the ability of 'official' agencies and methods to sustain the war effort meant reliance on powerful individuals outside the system who could, and did, have their own political agenda for both Ireland and England. Thirdly, the

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[136]Norris did indeed secure £1 400 from CIA as suggested by the Lords Justices, *Commons' jn., ii,* 3; *P. J., ii,* 289, 445-6; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, p.466. CIA ordered Leicester to appoint a Commissary of Clothing at Dublin to oversee the making of shirts from cloth sent; this duty was added to the tasks of Ulster and Munster commissaries, *P. J., ii,* 454.

[137]Provision of clothing fell within their remit, *P. J., ii,* 405. However, they were to liase with the adventurer committee, empowered on April 11 to receive all propositions for such supply, *Commons' jn., ii,,* 521.

[138]*P. J., ii,* 462, 464. Compared to his contemporaries, Wood's accounts are scrupulous and remarkably full - P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, 672-673 are a copy of accounts delivered by Wood up to 22 April, 1644.

[139]Wood's receipts for carriers survive, P.R.O., S.P. 28/1B, 485-520, 651-671; P.R.O., S.P. 28/1C.

[140]*Anal. Hib., iv,* 36.

[141]*Anal. Hib., iv,* 39.

[142]P.R.O., S.P. 28/139/12, Accounts of Turner *et al* to 1644. Interest was also payable.

prospects for a prolonged Irish war were poor if the pattern of 1641-2 proved fixed, since it allowed little scope for sustaining armies sent to Ireland, the bulk of resources being consumed by the immediate tasks of recruiting, arming and transporting forces across the Irish Sea. All would bulk large in the logistical responses of Parliament to the Irish war in 1642-7.

Appendix 2.
Parliamentary finance, 1642-7.

This appendix, and the one following, will include information concerning the major financial and provisioning initiatives undertaken by Parliament for the Irish war, 1642-7. Two tables (2:1 and 3:1) will contain the listings of the more important outlays and supplies, with subsidiary tables containing information on more complex matters like the functioning of the certificate system, 1642-3 (3:2) or the division of funds from the assessments and other larger outlays in 1644-6 (2:2, 2:3, 2:4, 2:5).

It must be emphasised that, even more than in 1641-2, completely accurate figures cannot be given in an absence of adequate accounts. Lack of data, the huge delays between votes taken and the issue of money or goods, and the reliance on credit, sometimes in layers upon the assigned revenue, combine to render quantification extremely difficult. The aim of the following tables is therefore, merely to give a general impression of where money was being spent, and who was supplying goods to whom in the years in question.

The principal outlays and supplies have been placed in ten groupings, listed below. In the tables which follow the numeral 'I' - 'X' will indicate to which category any given outlay belongs. Abortive schemes have sometimes been included (and are italicised) to give a fuller picture of the plans entertained by Parliament.

Principal plans for finance and provisions, 1642-7.

(I). In June, 1642 funds were set apart for Leinster, but votes of money to Munster and Ulster (Sept., 1642) could not be met, so were replaced with clothing in lieu of pay. This was apparently delivered by the spring of 1643, under adventurer auspices.

(II). The system of supplying goods on private initiative continued into 1643 with Parliament agreeing to future payment on certificate of delivery. The scheme fisseled out, apparently because debts were not met.

(III). By Feb., 1643 a plan was agreed to send 6 weeks' supply of foodstuffs to all Irish provinces but no adequate funding was available; efforts continued into the

summer when rumours of cessation dampened efforts. Shipments to Dublin and Munster (and perhaps Ulster) seem to have drawn on goods received through the second 'Loan and Contribution' of Jan. 1643.

(IV). After the cessation, promises of supply to British forces again ran up against lack of money. The Scottish alliance ensured that Monro's army did receive funds (in 1644-5) from sequestrations, but it took the Dutch voluntary contribution to provide victuals for Ulster and Munster.

(V). The first Irish assessment (Oct. 1644) was almost all assigned to pay for large consignments of goods sent by John Davies to Ulster and Munster.

(VI). The second assessment, only half as large, was assigned in advance to pay for recruits to Munster, with smaller sums going there and to Ulster / Connacht for pay. Davies was allowed arrears of the former assessment for his debts and to supply the Scottish army, but there is no evidence of his providing for the latter, nor for further large contracts assigned him, though he played a role in **(VII)** and **(IX)** below.

(VII). By early 1646 the slow collection of the former assessment had delayed early recruitment, though by now Parliament was committed to a massive further reinforcement. £35 000 was ordered advanced from various funds to making levies possible, and appears to have been considered on the credit of the third (March 1646) assessment. A further instalment of £50 000 was needed for recruitment and was to be based on English land sales - it allowed for a loan to be raised in London. All £85 000 was preponderantly employed in recruitment. The assessment treasurers were to advance a further £30 000 which was to go to Ireland with Lisle, as occurred. Finally, efforts were made to set up magazines to supply forces in Ireland, again on the credit of land sales, but this was voted down.

(VIII). The possibility of Dublin's surrender in late 1646 called forth orders for £21 000 from Goldsmiths' Hall (compositions) though it is not clear of more than £5 000 was paid out - it found its way to Ulster.

(IX). The second Dublin negotiation again saw recourse to Goldsmiths' Hall in early 1647, this time for £35 000 (£13 000 for Ormond personally, though only £3 000 in cash, the rest for the expedition), which probably included **(VIII)** above.

(X). In 1647 £40 000 was negotiated from Weavers' Hall; it seems that £10 000 was made out to ex-New Model soldiers, the rest sent to Ireland as pay.

Sources: *Commons' jn.,* ii - v; *Lords' jn.,* iv - ix; *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47, 1647-60;*

Cal. S.P. dom., 1641, 1641-3, 1644, 1644-5, 1645-7; Cal. S.P. dom., Addenda 1625-49; Acts & ordinances, interregnum, i.

(I). N.L.I. MS 14 305; P.R.O. S.P. 28 / ID; B.L. Add. MS 4 782.

(II). B.L. Add. MS 4 782; *Anal. Hib.,* iv.

(III). B.L. Add. MS 4 782; Carte MSS 5-6.

(IV). *Cal. committee compounding,* i; B.L. Add. MS 4 771; Carte MSS 10, 12.

(V). P.R.O., S. P. Ire. 63 / 261 / 9.

(VI). P.R.O., S. P. Ire. 63 / 261 / 9.

(VII). *Cal. committee compounding,* i; P.R.O., S. P. Ire. 63 / 261 / 9; P.R.O., S. P. 28 / 302.

(VIII). *Cal. committee compounding,* i.

(IX). *Cal. committee compounding,* i; *Tanner letters.*

(X). P.R.O., S. P. 28 / 139 / 21.

TABLE 2:1 MAJOR OUTLAYS, 1642-7.

	Date	*Cost*	*Purpose*	*Revenue source*	*Outcome*
I	June 1642	£3 000; £5 000	Pay for Leicester; 'incident costs' for Leicester	Probably London loan; adventure	Apparently paid to Leicester; *unknown.*
I	June 1642	£50 000: £27 000; £23 000	Pay for the forces in Ireland	Loan by the London Companies	Delivered to Dublin: c.Aug. 1642; c. Oct. 1642
	July 1642	£73 346-2-10	'Loan' to the English war effort	Adventure	*Attempts to secure repayment fail*
I	Sept. 1642	£10 000; [£6 375]	Cash for Munster troops; clothing for same	Adventure; adventure stores (paid for already)	'Respited' (food sent instead; delivered Oct. 1642-March 1643
I	Sept. 1642 & Jan. 1643	£27 197 - 15 - 4 £1 000+ £2 380+ £2 076 +	Clothing for Ulster forces in lieu of pay; supplemented by victuals & munitions contracted for by Ulster officers; additional supply for north-west	Becomes debt to clothiers, still due 1645; from Loan and Contribution; payable from adventure on certificate basis from contribution funds, supplemented by adventure	Clothing sent between Nov. 1642 & spring 1643; *probably accompanied by other supplies;* mostly sent with main supply, though some diverted to English war effort

II Oct. 1642	£5 000	Contingencies, mostly to repay smaller supply debts or loans raised in Ireland	Adventure	Spent on smaller supplies
III *Feb. 1643*[1]	*£28 000 - £30 000*	*6 weeks supplies for all forces in Ireland*	*Aim to obtain by repayment of the adventure 'loan' (above) from English assessment*	*Loan not repaid; but some supplies sent using the 1643 'Loan and Contribution'*
IV Sept. 1643	£60 000;	Arrears of pay for Scottish army in Ulster; clothing for same;	*Suggestion that arrears and future pay to come from (English) sequestration and from extensions of adventure schemes;*	
Dec. 1643		victuals for same	*some reliance on Dutch contribution for foodstuffs.*	Duly delivered but more food ordered later
April 1644	*Confirm above*	*confirm above*	Money from sequestration funds;	Money sent in batches from June 1644, apparently all sent by 1645;
	(£13 000)	*onfirm above*	supplies apparently from Scotland, payable from sequestration funds	provisions paid for in instalments
IV July & Dec. 1643	-	Foodstuffs for 'distressed' Protestants	Contribution collected in the Netherlands (and spent there)	Provides shipments sent to Ulster and Munster but used for the local forces, not civilians

[1]By the summer of 1643 plans for extensive supply relied on the latest efforts to resusitate the adventure, along with some drawing uppon supplies taken in the second 'Loan and Contribution'.

IV *Nov. 1643*	*£4 000*	*Supplies for 'British' forces in Ulster*	*Planned assessment*	
Jan. 1644	*£10 000; cost of 5 000 suits;*	*As above*	*As above (also linked to adventure schemes)*	
July 1644	*£90 000*	*As above*		*Leads to 1644-5 (Davies) supplies - see below*
V Oct. 1644	£80 000	Supplies of clothing, food and other items to Ulster, Connacht, Munster & Duncannon; (small sums only sent in cash)	Oct. 1644 assessment;	Supplies sent Jan. - April 1645 (see also table 2:2);
VI July 1645	£10 000; later £20 000 (included in :-)	Recruit 1 600 for Munster -expanded to 2500	£5 000 advanced as loans made repayable on excise, but later attached to the assessment ordinance; rest sought as advance from Grocers' Hall but not forthcoming	Apparently advanced for Jephson's cavalry recruitment
Aug. 1645	£40 000	Supplies & reinforcements for Munster; lesser supply for Ulster & Connacht	August 1645 assessment - sums issued on the basis of loans permitted by the ordinance	(see also table 2:3)
VI *April 1645*	*£36 945 [£24 750 & [£12 195]*	*Supplies for Scottish army;*	*Surplus (i.e. over £80 000) of first assessment, or alternative;*	*No apparent effect*
		debts due to John Davies, for supplies to Scottish army & Ulster 'British' 1642		
Sept. 1645			*ordinance allows direct collection of assessment surplus*	*Davies makes collections, but no indication of fresh supplies*

VII Feb. 1646 April 1646	£35 000	Recruit 5 000 infantry & 1 840 cavalry for Ireland	£35 000 assigned - excise (£10 000); Goldsmiths' Hall (£10 000); advance by assessment treasurers (£10 000); Haberdashers' Hall (£5 000) (probably all to be repaid from the 1646 assessment)	New troops raised on the credit of this sum - at least £30 000 collected (by Sept. 1646 - that from Haberdashers' Hall possibly paid later)
VII June 1646	£50 000	Recruit 5 000 infantry & 1 500 cavalry for Ireland	Excise, repaid by sales; London loan substituted for excise	New troops raised on the credit of this sum as brought in by London loans; also some money sent to Ulster (£13 000) and Munster (£6 000)
VII May 1646	£30 000	To go with Lisle to Munster	Loan (in Spanish currency) from treasurers of the new assessment (£10 000 also assigned above)	Taken by Lisle in Jan. 1647
VII *July & Sept. 1646*[2]	*£40 000*	*Magazines to supply armies in Ireland*	*Sale of delinquent lands lent by excise (£25 000) & assessment (£15 000)*	*Advance voted down Sept. 1646*

[2]Plans were afoot for yet another massive supply by John Davies, to a value of £55 000 (Sept. 1646) but though the Irish committee approved, again nothing seems to have come of it (P.R.O. S.P. Ire. 63 / 262 / 9).

VIII Oct. 1646 Dec. 1646	£21 000 - £5 000 at once £21 000	To go with commissioners to Dublin Pay remainder of above sum, topped up with another £5 000 (this to Loftus)	Goldsmiths' Hall *As above*	Some spent, most carried on to Ulster *Since Dublin mission called off, appears likely that renewed calls for the payment of the remaining £16 000 become entangled with the renewed Dublin votes below (**IX**)*
IX Feb. 1647 March 1647	£3 000; £10 877 - 14 - 9; £12 000; £10 000	Ormond's arrears - in cash Ormond's arrears - in bills expedition to Dublin - costs of troops & supplies; supplement for Dublin expedition (apparently sent over in cash)	All from Goldsmiths' Hall	Apparently all sums paid up, though probably some in the guise of the 1646 votes (**VIII**) above - thus later refernces to a total debt of £31 000 (excluding Ormond's bills)
X *April 1647* June 1647	*£20 000;* £40 000	To Ireland as pay - apparently £8 -10 000 Munster; >£8 000 east Ulster; >£7 000 west Ulster & Connacht; £9 850 Leinster; perhaps £4 000 to ex-New Model troops in England[3]	*Goldsmiths' Hall* transferred to Weavers' Hall	All sums seem to have been delivered

[3]Payments made to these troops are unclear, especially since Weavers' Hall held other funds, but though an ordinance was passed to allow them £10 000 from Weavers' Hall, there are perhaps firmer grounds for counting the warrant to Loftus to pay over £4 000 to them; fragments of Loftus's accounts record the payment of money to the four regional commanders in Ireland of £8 000, £8 421, £7 300 & £8 350 respectively (P.R.O. S.P. 28 / 139 / 21).

TABLE 2:2

1644-5 ASSESSMENT

The accounts delivered by C. B. K. for the 1644 assessment have both a complete and a summary form. In both cases the total for all costs is given as £79 515, in *neither* case accurately - the detailed costs add up to £80 923, the summary costs to £80 515. The sums listed below are for those larger amounts which are most likely to have been assigned as described.

SOURCE : P. R. O., S. P. Ire. 63 / 261 / 9, pp. 64-5 (20 Nov. 1645).

Ulster: *(allocation for Davies's supplies)*	£ 42 000
Connacht: *(three separate allocations)*	£ 9 728 - 06 - 8
Munster: *(two separate allocations)*	£ 14 000
Munster: other small sums :	£ 1 950
Duncannon: *(two separate allocations)*	£ 3 340
Paid as costs, e.g. for Davies's collectors; fees to Dobbins, Sir Robert King, the treasurers, the Ulster commissioners :	£ 3 813
TOTAL	**£ 74 831-06-8**
'DISTRUBUCON' AS SET OUT IN C. B. K. RECORDS	
Ulster :	£ 46 350
Ulster commissioners and other officers to serve there :	£ 2 417 - 12 - 0
Connacht:	£ 9 728 - 06 - 8
Munster & Duncannon :	£ 19 390
'Necessary services' at 'home' :	£ 2 629 - 01 - 4
TOTAL	**£ 79 515 [£80 515]**

TABLE 2:3

1645-6 ASSESSMENT

SOURCE : P. R. O., S. P. Ire. 63 / 261 / 9, pp. 65-7 (20 Nov. 1645).

Munster:	to raise 2000 infantry	£ 6 000
	month's advance pay for 2000 infantry	£ 2 500
	to raise 500 cavalry	£ 7 500
	month's advance pay for 500 cavalry	£ 2 500
	foodstuffs for Munster forces (via Bettesworth)	£ 1 500
	pay for forces in Munster (via Munster commissioners)	£ 6 000
	Munster commissioners' allowance	£ 1 700
Ulster:	foodstuffs (via Davies)	£ 7 000
Connacht:	foodstuffs (via Davies)	£ 2 500
Miscellaneous, mostly pay or committee costs		£ 569 - 4 - 0
TOTAL		**£37 669-2- 8** **[£37 769-4-0]**

TABLE 2:4
EXPENDITURE FROM THE £85 000 ASSIGNED FOR RECRUITMENT, 1646.

SOURCE: P. R. O., S. P. Ire. 63 / 261 / 9, pp. 114-5 (23 Sept. 1646).

From £35 000 voted in Feb., *of which £30 000 has come in :-*	
Recruitment costs: Rees's [Roe's] 1 000 infantry:	£ 1 254 - 03 - 4
Needham's 1 000 infantry:	£ 1 752 - 04 - 8
Lord Lieutenant's 1 000 infantry:	£ 1 863 - 14 - 0
Grey's 1 000 infantry:	£ 1 627 - 04 - 8
Parsons's 100 firelocks:	£ 162 - 16 - 8
Lord Lieutenant's 500 cavalry:	£ 6 771 - 00 - 0
Sidney's 500 cavalry:	£ 5 447 - 09 - 4
Jones's 230 cavalry:	£ 2 782 - 18 - 0
Banastre's 70 cavalry:	£ 400 - 12 - 8
Jephson's dragoons:	£ 388 - 01 - 4
385 cavalry recruits for Ulster:	£ 3 465 - 00 - 0
Cavalry recruits for Broghill:	£ 900 - 00 - 0
Cost of quarters for troops delayed at Bristol:	£ 2 000 - 00 - 0
Pay for forces in Munster:	£ 6 000 - 00 - 0
Provisions supplied for the cavalry:	£ 350 - 00 - 0
Repayment of a loan made by Broghill:	£ 391 - 06 - 4
Mortars and grenades:	£ 347 - 17 - 4
TOTAL SO FAR:	*£35 904 - 08 - 4*
From the £50 000 voted in July 1646 *(of which £12 700 lent so far): -*	
Recruitment costs: Fenwick's 1 000 infantry:	£ 1 752 - 04 - 8
Moore's 1 000 infantry:	£ 1 752 - 04 - 8
Wetton's 300 infantry:	£ 588 - 05 - 0
Coote's 500 cavalry:	£ 588 - 05 - 0
Wemyss's 70 cavalry (Ulster) :	£ 827 - 12 - 8
Massey's cavalry :	£ 5 000 - 00 - 0
For quarters in England, sent to Chester :	£ 2 000 - 00 - 0

Sent to the armies already in Ulster & Connacht :	£13 000 - 00 - 0
Sent to Sir Charles Coote 'for his supply':	£ 500 - 00 - 0
Costs for transport of munitions overland :	£ 550 - 00 - 0
To John Davies for munitions & victuals supplied :	£ 5 000 - 00 - 0
For 'necessary charges' e.g. commissioners' pay :	£ 4 934 - 08 - 8
TOTAL	£76 789 - 01 - 4
Received to date of £85 000 expected :	£42 700 - 00 - 0
'There is more disposed then received' by:	£34 089 - 01 - 4
But less then the whole designed if £5 000 due from Haberdashers' Hall is received, by :	£ 8 210 - 18 - 8

TABLE 2:5. POSSIBLE DIVISION OF £80 000 DUE FROM 1646 ASSESSMENT, AS INTENDED BY THE IRISH COMMITTEE

Source: P.R.O., S. P. Ire. 63 / 261 / 9; *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 848-52.

£10 000	Advance by the assessment treasurers as part of £35 000 for the recruitment
£25 000	Eventual repayment of the remainder of the £35 000 as advanced by the excise, Goldsmiths' Hall and Haberdashers' Hall
£30 000	Further advance (in Spanish currency) by the assessment treasurers, to fund Lisle's expedition, and taken with him
£15 000	Intended to back the plan for magazines, which would receive permanent funding from sales of delinquent land, but the proposal voted down (probably to retain land revenue and the other £25 000 sought from excise as an advance)

Conclusion. The tables above suggest three possible conclusions about finance in the years 1642-7. Firstly, delays were considerable, perhaps most notably in the spending of a year considering an assessment for Ireland before the first one was passed in 1644. Only for small, immediately necessary funds like the £5 000 provided for Dublin in late 1646 could delays of less of only two months be expected. Secondly, there remained a long-standing failure to provide cash for Ireland. Linked to the delays was the need to operate on credit, often tying up revenue for a year or more ahead, but in turn making it easier to provide goods rather than money, but leaving the way open to contractors to profit from inadequate provisions or to cost Parliament more by buying in England rather than sending money to Ireland where food, for example, was reportedly cheaper. Finally, and most significantly, such funds as were available went mainly on recruiting troops rather then sustaining them once deployed. Again this duplicates the 1641-2 pattern, and it is only in later 1647 that money can be seen to be sent again to commanders in Ireland to support troops already stationed there. The inadequacy of the financial machine in earlier years, despite the best efforts of its operators, had clogged up the Irish war effort and made for a war of stalemates, desertion and short, ineffective plundering campaigns.

Appendix 3.
Parliamentary provisioning, 1642-7.

This appendix presents data on the supplies sent by Parliament to Ireland in 1642-7. The main table (3:1) groups the major issues into the same categories as were used in appendix 2, while table 3:2 covers the 'certificate system' of 1642-3. As with other appendices, the figures given cannot be pressed too far, given the lack of full accounts, nor is there even certainty that all supplies destined for Ireland were actually received there.

Sources: *Commons' jn.*, ii - v; *Lords' jn.*, iv - ix;
Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47, 1647-60;
Cal. S.P. dom., 1641, 1641-3, 1644, 1644-5, 1645-7;
Cal. S.P. dom., Addenda 1625-49; Acts & ordinances, interregnum, i.

(I). B.L. Add. MS 4 782; Hogan (ed.), *Letters and papers; Anal. Hib.*, iv;
P.R.O. S.P. 28 / 139 / 12; P.R.O. S.P. 28 / IC.

(II). B.L. Add. MS 4 782; *Anal. Hib.*, iv.

(III). B.L. Add. MS 4 782; *Anal. Hib.*, iv; Carte MSS 5-6; Carte, *Ormonde*, iii.

(IV). *Cal. committee compounding*, i; B.L. Add. MS 4 771; Carte MSS 10, 12;
Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters;* P.R.O., S. P. Ire. 63 / 261 / 9;
P.R.O. S.P. 28 / 253B.

(V). P.R.O. S.P. 28 / 139 / 27; P.R.O. S.P. 17 / H / 10;
P.R.O., S. P. Ire. 63 /261 / 9.

(VI). P.R.O., S. P. Ire. 63 / 261 / 9.

(VIII). P.R.O., S. P. Ire. 63 / 261 / 9.

(IX). *Cal. committee compounding*, i.

TABLE 3:1 SUPPLIES SENT TO IRELAND, 1642-7.

Date of vote	*Recipient region*	*Goods*	*Supplier (and payment)*	*Value*	*Date of delivery*
I Sept. 1642	Munster	3 000 suits of clothing	London adventure committee (from stores)	-	Oct. 1642 (some)
I Sept. / Nov. 1642	Munster;	Shirts for above suits & foodstuffs;	London adventure committee, especially Pennoyer & B. Goodwin. (Shirts & food from Adventure £5 000 - some paid - or on contracts;	£3 000 approx.	c. March 1643 (on the *Edmund and John*);
		(also ammunition and ship hire)	Pennoyer, with some re-payment from the 'Loan and Contribution';	£1 600 ship; £720 approx. for ammo.	
	Athlone;	miscellaneous especially clothes;	Athlone clothes from stores;		Feb. 1643 handed over to Ranelagh - not sent;
	Galway	miscellaneous - clothes, food, munitions, even fishing nets	London adventure committee, especially B. Goodwin; paid adventure £5 000 or 'old' contribution	>£600	c. July 1643 diverted to Duncannon

I Sept. 1642 &	Ulster	7 500 suits of clothing (4 000 to Belfast, 3 500 to Derry) in lieu of pay, for all Ulster forces; also cloth for cavalry and officers;	Richard Turner *et al* for the clothes (debt unpaid 1645);	£27 197-15-4;	*Various shipments until c. May 1643.*
Jan. 1643;		accompanying victuals and munitions;	John Davies for at least some food (from Loan and Contribution);	>£1 000	*Various shipments until c. May 1643.*
			other items by contracts with Ulster officers (payable on certificate, or funds to officers from adventure or 'Loan and Contribition');	>£2 380	
Dec. 1642 / Jan. 1643;		additional supply for Enniskillen forces (food & munitions)	London committee, especially Pennoyer (from adventure and 'old' contribution);	£1 825	c. March 1643
June 1643		500 more suits for Derry garrison	London committee, especially B. Goodwin (from Loan & Contribution)	£1 351 - 16 - 8	Some diverted to south-west England
III*Jan. & June 1643*	*All Irish provinces*	*Provisions divided among various Irish provinces according to area of collection in England*	*Loan and Contribution scheme*		*May have provided foodstuffs for next 2 shipments below as well as further Ulster deliveries by Davies*

III Feb. / April 1643	Munster	Remnants of clothes in adventurer stores & foodstuffs	London adventure committee, using stores, Loan & Contribution goods and some contracts (payable adventure)	(£5 000)[1]	c. June 1643
IIIMay 1643	Dublin	Foodstuffs (mainly grain)	London adventure committee, especially B. Goodwin (probably from Loan & Contribution)	£2 160 approx.	c. July 1643
III	All Irish provinces	Ammunition	London adventure committee, especially Pennoyer & W. Methwold (from 'Loan and Contribution')	£847 due Pennoyer (as above); >£724 due Methwold	*Accompanies I & III shipments to Derry, Belfast & Munster*
IVSept.1643	Ulster (Scottish army)	Clothing for 10 000; 10 000 bolls of meal	Appears to have been supplied by Scottish merchants, but payable from sequestration money	>£13 000[2]	April 1644 - some at least landed
IV Dec. 1643 - Jan. 1644	Ulster (east, including the Scots)	Foodstuffs	Dutch contribution	-	March - April & Sept. 1644
IV Dec. 1643 - Jan. 1644	Ulster (west)	Foodstuffs	Dutch contribution	>£5 000	c. July 1644 (2 shipments)
IV (July 1644 onwards)	Munster	Foodstuffs	Dutch contribution	£9 150	c. July - Oct. 1644 (4 shipments)

[1]Both Jerome Alexander (Aug. 15) and Sir Thomas Wharton (Aug. 29) claimed, in letters to Ormond, that provisions worth £5 000 were ready, the latter suggesting that they were designed for Munster; it is not clear of they were comprosed these goods only, or included the Sublin shipments, or indeed other shipments not listed here, Carte MS 6, ff. 213, 281.

[2]The cost of the supplies sent to the Scots is even more unclear then most since Goldsmiths' Hall (sequestrations) appears to have paid for supplies sent from Scotland; a warrant of 6 Feb., 1644 suggests that £13 000 was to be repaid for loans made in Scotland to buy provisions, but this may not be the total cost; the committee later claimed to have spent over £80 000 on the Ulster army, presumably including £60 000 sent in specie - they appear to have underwritten supplies sent to Monro's army by private individuals. (The committee also appears to have been responsible for a second quantity of foodstuffs sent in 1644-5.)

V Oct. 1644	Munster (including Ducannon)	Clothing (deducted from pay), food, ammunition & miscellaneous equipment;	John Davies & partners (from 1644 assessment)	£7 884-18-8	Jan. 1645 (2 ships)[3]
V Oct. 1644	Ulster (east)[4]	Clothing (deducted from pay), food, ammunition & miscellaneous equipment	John Davies & partners (from 1644 assessment)	£17 994-19-7	Feb. - March 1645 (2 ships)
V Oct. 1644	Ulster (west) & Connacht	Clothing (deducted from pay), food, ammunition & miscellaneous equipment	John Davies & partners (from 1644 assessment)	£17 692-19-03/4	March - April 1645 (4 ships)
VI Aug. - Sept. 1645	Munster		*(Perhaps goods shipped on the basis of the 1645 assessment)*		Money issued though no direct evidence of supplies
	Ulster & Connacht	Food and clothing	John Davies & partners (from 1645 assessment)	£7 000 & £2 500	Money issued though no direct evidence of supplies
VI *April 1645 (Sept. 1645)*	*Scottish army*	*Clothing & food*	*John Davies & partners (ordinance allows direct collection of assessment surplus)*	*£12 750; £12 000*	*No evidence of supplies sent*

[3]Other supplies were almost certainly sent since surviving accounts suggest that money assigned to Munster was used up (see table 2:2); Davies was later (July 1645) accepted as supplier of £10 000 worth of foodstuffs to Munster.

[4]Different totals for the Ulster shipment may be obtained from Frost's accounts (P.R.O. S.P. 28 / 139 / 27), which are probably an estimate in advence, and Davies's figures as audited by the Accounts committee (P.R.O. S.P. 17 / H / 10).

VI *April 1645 for Aug. - Sept. 1645* *Aug. - Sept. 1646*		*Provisions for forces in Ireland*	*John Davies & partners (from assessment arrears & surplus)* *John Davies & partners (excise)*	*£50 000 -£55 000* *£23 000*	*No evidence for measure taking effect* *No evidence for measure taking effect*
VII June 1646	Ulster & Connacht	'Defensive arms' and provisions	John Davies & partners (from 1646 assessment)	£5 000	*Money issued, and apparently supplied for new forces*
IX Feb. 1647	Dublin[5]	Miscellaneous provisions, including victuals for the three regiments being sent over to Dublin	To Goldsmiths' Hall treasurers; To commissioners for the army (probably for munitions ordered diverted)	£1 732 -4 - 8; £1 471 - 11 - 8	Money paid out, though goods acquired unclear; aim to furnish present expedition only, and probably achieved.

[5]Efforts were continued at least into April to provide provisions on a larger scale for Dublin, though it os not certain how successful these were.

TABLE 3:2

PAYMENTS MADE ON CERTIFICATE SYSTEM, 1642-3.

Date payment approved	*Dates of issue of certificates*	*Dublin*		*Munster*		*East Ulster (Carrickfer-gus)*		*West Ulster (Derry)*	
		No.	*Total value*	*No.*	*Total value*	*No.*	*Total value*	*No.*	*Total value*
Sept. - Oct. 1642	July - Sept. 1642	6	£2 916-18-9	2	£878-4	1	£4 161-13-4	1	£1 040
Dec. 1642	July -Nov.1642	2	£376-5	1	£548-10	3	£3 354-8	-	
Jan. 1643	July - Nov. 1642	3	£3 604-5-2	5	£1 582-14	-		-	
Feb. 1643	July 1642-Jan. 1643	2	£900-4	6	£1 566-18-2	-		-	
March -April 1643	Sept. 1642-Feb. 1643	7	£3 457-1-1	14	£877-15-3	1	£46-18	-	
April 1643	Dec. 1642-Jan. 1643	6	£834-8	-		1	£600	-	
July 1643	Nov. - Dec. 1642	2	£173-10	6	£973-4-6	-		1	£240-15-2
Sept. 1643	n / dates given	-		-		-		5	£2 238-6-1

SOURCES: *Lords' jn.*, v, vi; *Anal. Hib.*, iv; B.L. Add. MS 4 782.

The above table shows the payments authorised under the 'certificate system' of 1642-3. Except where indicated, payment was in all cases assigned to adventure funds, already heavily overstretched. The validation date was the date on which the certificates successfully passed the Houses and are no indication of forthcoming payment, which could be delayed for months thereafter - or even years in the cases of some of the larger creditors. The most obvious point to note the falling off in supplies sent by the summer of 1643, a result of the drying up of funds, as attested in reports from Ireland.

Otherwise, certain facts have been somewhat disguised by the uniform manner of the figures cited. One is the comparatively small scale of most of the consignments, which disappears because of a few very large outlays, of two types. The first was that of the handing over of supplies on the ground, the most notable being by Anderson and Norris in Dublin (which reduces the March total there by £3 336-1) and by Nicholas

Nagle of Youghal in Munster (whose goods worth £1 163-14 were accepted in Jan., leaving the other 4 certificates an average value of £350). The second type was the product of a handful of large suppliers, perhaps operating as a co-operative, centring on Michael Casteel whose deliveries contribute £1 477 - 7- 9 to Dublin in Oct. 1642 (2 shipments), £1 800 to the March total for Dublin, £4 161-13-4 for Carrickfergus in Sept. 1642 and £1 650 in Dec.

Of the other smaller shipments, dominance is held by individuals named as from the area in question, especially in Munster and at Derry, where five out of six consignments are handled by local three notables (aldermen). Overall, then , the system failed to attract the kind of English mercantile response it aimed for, at least on the basis of certificates received (though others would reach the Adventurers' committees later) but provided a safeguard for local importers as long as funds were available. Possibly also the increasing threat to sea routes to Ireland doomed such a project, requiring the use of larger, self-defending vessels or convoys.

Certificates for deliveries would continue to be issued beyond 1643, but are not recorded as being passed by Parliament; some, which recorded deliveries to the Scottish army, were considered by the Goldsmiths' Hall committee, others were submitted as part of provincial accounts, for example from Munster in 1646. Supplies picked up in London were also on occasion certified for future payment.

Conclusion. Parliament's provisioning efforts 1642-7 indicate in particular the rise of the contractor as the key to logistical success. Both the 'official' initiatives of 1641-2 and the reliance on small 'private' supply had proved inadequate by late 1642 and the alternative was 'official' co-operation (as auditors and administrators) with dominant groups of suppliers. These could rely on long-term credit for payment, but in the process alternative revenues would be attached to interested groupings. Until 1644 the London adventurers, and their associates at Turners' Hall (supplying the Scottish armies) dominated the field, William Pennoyer acting as the single most prominent figure. Thereafter John Davies, and an alternative set of City backers, came to control the field, and were still receiving countenance from committees for Ireland in 1647.

Only at the end of the period had it become possible to send even a fair proportion of what was owed in Ireland in money rather than as goods, though the winding down of the large scale contracts was more probably a consequence of the diversion of funds to recruitment. Only from 1648 on would new revenues be tapped, principally those deriving from land sales, to make possible, in time, the logistical successes of the Cromwellian expedition.

Appendix 4
Troops for Ireland, 1645-7.

This appendix aims to outline the stages by which an army was put together for despatch to Ireland in 1645-7, to list the regiments sent, and to comment briefly on the background of some of the officers, particularly those with previous experience in Ireland - few can be identified with certainty, and the likelihood of more individuals with a background in Ireland pre-1641 serving in these regiments is strong.

CHRONOLOGY OF VOTES FOR REINFORCEMENT.

July 1645: The new Irish committee resolved upon a limited reinforcement for Munster, eventually resolving itself into new regiments of infantry and cavalry under Colonels Robert Sterling and William Jephson respectively. Financial delays meant that little progress was made, and the regiments seem to have finally reached Ireland in July and August 1646. They were considered apart from the later units and had been funded from the second, 1645-6, assessment.

February 1646: The Irish committee won the backing of Parliament for the despatch of 5 000 infantry and 1 840 cavalry for all three provinces in which Parliament had forces. Specifically this was intended as 2 000 infantry and 500 cavalry 'recruits' for Munster; 3 000 infantry 'recruits', two cavalry regiments (i.e. 1 000 men) and 340 'recruits' for Ulster and Connacht combined. On March 6, C.B.K. procured a Commons' vote that the Munster forces be made into three regiments, to be commissioned by Lisle, while the May ordinance for Lisle's command empowered him to commission officers for 6 000 infantry (i.e. including Sterling's regiment) and 1 840 cavalry.[1] The Lords delayed Lisle's ordinance throughout May, despite Commons' pressure, perhaps a sign of their dislike at the loss of control over the military, and only consented on June 16.[2] Funding was seen as coming from advances of £35 000,

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[1]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 432, 443, 465, 544; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 427, 433, 455.
[2]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 530, 544, 555, 559-60, 570, 577, 580, 582; *Lords' jn.*, viii, 288, 321-2, 325, 341, 342, 358, 367, 377.

though some of the £50 000 later lent had to be drawn upon.[3] Delays, both in commissioning and funding, mean that the troops voted for in Feb. would only be recruited in the summer, alongside those agreed upon in June.

June 1646: In the aftermath of Benburb, Clotworthy delivered another Irish committee report (June 15) urging another 5 000 foot and 1 500 horse soldiers for the northern provinces. This time both Houses agreed within a matter of days.[4] In time the total of 10 000 infantry voted for in Feb. and June would be met, though the situation regarding the cavalry is less certain. The figure remained valid, though the counterflows of offers and failures to deliver which appear in the Committee records show little sense of pattern. By the end of July contracts for six regiments had been approved.[5] With the defeat of the vote on July 31 to send over four New Model regiments, another four contracts were signed in August - October.[6] Funding was to come from the £50 000 loan raised in the City.[7]

Aug. - Sept. 1646: The proposals submitted by Sir Hardress Waller to raise four infantry regiments in south-west England failed bear fruit beyond the recruitment of Townsend's regiment, but was indicative of the re-direction of energies towards a Munster campaign. If the first five infantry contracts split as three for Munster and two for Ulster as intended in Feb.[8], the direction by the autumn was clearly southern, once the likelihood that Lisle's expedition would be directed thence.[9] By September 1646 Inchiquin was ordered not to re-model the provincial army, while commissions were issued in England for commands in an organised expeditionary army.[10]

Sept. 1646 - Feb. 1647: The Irish committee's proposal in Sept. that 4 000 additional troops be despatched was agreed in principle, though funding was not provided.[11] With a gap in the records of the older Irish committee after October 1646 it

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[3]See appendix 2 for details.
[4]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 577, 582; *Lords' jn.*, viii, 380, 384.
[5]Those under Roe, Needham, Moore, Fenwick, Grey and Lisle himself.
[6]Those commanded by Townsend, Blount, Loftus and Castle.
[7]See appendix 2 for details.
[8]Roe (or Rowe), Needham and Grey for Munster, Moore and Fenwick for Ulster.
[9]Thus Lisle's own regiment would go there, as would those of Townsend (raised under Waller's aegis) and of Sir Arthur Loftus, clearly intending to return to Munster. Blount's regiment also ended up in the province, leaving only Castle's as aimed at a northern destination, as seen in its direction to Chester for boarding.
[10]Broghill was named to command a brigade of four regiments, Waller named as major-general. For Waller's and Broghill's commands see *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 470, 501, 509 (Waller, including for his old regiment, formerly St. Leger's), 500, 501, 506 (Broghill).
[11]*Commons' jn.*, iv, 676-7; B. L. Add. MS 31 116, f. 284a; *Harrington* ed. Stieg, p. 39; *Perfect Diurnal*, no. 165 (Sept. 21 - 28), E 513 (12), p. 1325; *Perfect Occurences*, no. 40 (to Oct. 2), E 513 (13). The *Moderate Intelligencer*, no. 82 (Sept. 24 - Oct. 1), E 355 (23) mentioned in connection with

is unclear when efforts to obtain these soldiers were undertaken.[12] Almost certainly the Star Chamber committee had continued to use its authority to negotiate for troops for Ireland among those forces being disbanded.[13] When D.H.C.I. voted on Feb. 26 to report the need to send 3 000 infantry and 500 cavalry to Dublin, it was able to name the units it proposed to draw on - those under Major Hungerford (from Shropshire), Col. Long, Col. Castle and the 'Herefordshire men', these latter being the 1 000 foot and 300 firelocks assigned to Col. Birch.[14] Only Castle's regiment had been contracted for pre-October 1646 and was sent to Dublin in early 1647 alongside the regiments of Long and Hungerford, plus a regiment from north Wales under Kynaston, first offered in October 1646.[15] Birch was delayed but his soldiers were still intended for Ireland in the summer of 1647. The quota of 4 000 had been recruited, if not despatched.

Thus targets were met for an estimated 14 000 infantry, if fully mustered, though, as will be seen, the cavalry fell below the number of units planned for, let alone short musters of recruited units.

INFANTRY REGIMENTS.

Robert Sterling. Sterling had been commissioned in Sept. 1645, and appears to have recruited in south-west England. As late as 28 July, 1646 the committee were instructing him to raise 1 000 men 'by beat of drum', and his departure was reported on Aug. 29, though some of his troops had already gone.[16] Sterling had almost certainly served in Ireland before the cessation under Colonel Lawrence Crawford, both men

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the resolutions on Sept. 25 a motion to send over part of the New Model, but that the House 'thought not fit to consider of it the time being late...', pp. 665-6.

[12]Four infantry regiments had still not crossed the Irish Sea in Feb. 1647 and were causing tensions with local communities in England (e.g. *Commons' jn.*, v, 67, 70, 95); all but one (Castle's) were earmarked for Lisle's Munster expedition, now under way.

[13]See e.g. the Aug. 1646 ordinance for Shropshire disbandment (*Lords' jn.*,, viii, 464), akin to that for the Eastern Association which furnished soldiers for Loftus's new regiment (the Lynn companies are specifically named), *Acts & ordinances, interregnum*, i, 862-3.

[14]*Commons' jn.*, v, 91; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 732, 731; *Tanner letters*, pp. 232-2 for the vote as for 3 000 infantry and 300 horse, perhaps more accurately. It was intended that the forces landed in Ulster in Dec. 1646 (now in Lecale) should also advance to Dublin, i.e. those under Moore, Fenwick and Coote.

[15]The regional commander, major-general Thomas Mytton had offered a regiment in October 1646, but it was only specified as Kynaston's in 1647. *Commons' jn.*, iv, 699; *Tanner letters*, p. 227; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 734, 739, 744, 746; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 611; Firth & Davies, *Regimental history*, ii, 649. Together with Long's, Hungerford's and Birch's, this would constitute the 4 000 troops sought in Sept. 1646.

[16]He sailed from Minehead for Youghal. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 413, 416, 482, 495; *Egmont MSS*, i, 310.

moving to the Eastern Association forces; Sterling would show himself a protagonist of Manchester's in the 1644 disputes.[17] Sterling's lieutenant-colonel appears to have been Norris Jephson, brother of the officer-MP, William Jephson, and like him leaving Ireland after the cessation for service in the south of England.[18]

Francis Rowe (Roe);

Simon Needham: The earlier foot regiments were piecemeal in their origins, apparently drawing on remnants of local and garrison forces, and not necessarily under local officers. The first two contracts, for the Munster regiments, were with Colonels Frances Rowe and Simon Needham. The latter's service dated back to Edgehill, thereafter being part of the Yorkshire forces under Fairfax.[19] Rowe (like his lieutenant-colonel, John Booker) had been in the London trained bands, at least since 1643, rising in rank in the wake of his brother, Owen Rowe.[20] In line with their destination, however, both were assigned recruiting zones in the south-west of England.[21] If Booker had reached Munster himself by early October, Needham seems to have been long in gathering his men. On Sept. 3 he had a shortfall of 600 (out of 1 000) and part of his regiment was still crossing over in Feb. 1647.[22] Many of the officers from both regiments are recorded as returning to Ireland in the wake of Inchiquin's 'defection' of 1648, and Needham died in command of a regiment in the second civil war.[23]

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[17]*Ormonde MSS*, i, 125 and *passim* to Jan. 1644; Temple, 'Original officer list', p. 76 (which appears to conflate Richard and Robert Sterling); Godfrey Davies, 'The Army of the Eastern Association', in *E. H. R.* xliv (1931), pp. 92, 95; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644-5*, pp. 325-6. Sterling applied for arrears for previous Irish service in May 1646, *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 438.

[18]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 486; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 626-7. G. N. Godwin, *The civil war in Hampshire* (reprint, Alresford, 1973) p. 61 mentions 'Morris Jephson' being made lieut. - col. to Norton at Portsmouth in July, 1645, though the index confuses Jephson with his brother, William.

[19]A Captain in Sir William Constable's regiment at Edgehill, he was its Lieutenant-Colonel by August 1643, serving at Marston Moor. On the regiment's disbandment in 1645, he held the same rank in another Yorkshire regiment that of John Bright. P. Young, *Edgehill, 1642* (Kineton, 1967), p. 256; P. Young *Marston Moor, 1644* (Kineton, 1970), pp. 69 & n.21,156.

[20]Francis Roe had been a Captain in the Blue Regiment in 1643, Owen the Major. By 1644, as Major, Francis was acting as London's Scout-master General, a post he also fulfilled for Cromwell in Ireland , dying at Youghal in 1649. Wilfrid Emberton, *Skippons Brave Boys* (Buckingham 1984) pp. 32,53; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1644*, pp. 84-5. (Abbott seems to conflate Francis and Will Rowe, thus leading to his denial of Cromwell's statement of (Francis) Rowe's 1649 death - *Writings and speeches of Cromwell* ed. Abbott, ii, 177.)

[21]The Rowe / Booker contract was dated May 25; like Needham, they were directed to Bristol on July 8, though by August 13 drawing criticism for delays. Their contract had been forwarded to the committees of Somerset and Gloucester, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 451, 459, 470, 491. Needham's contract dated to June 16, and he was involved in a plan to aid Bunratty. His delays being even greater, the Committee of the West was ordered to deploy the garrisons at Exeter and Bridgewater to make up his numbers - *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 459, 490, 504, 528. See also Hazlett, 'Military forces', pp. 372-4.

[22]Rowe was at Bristol *en route* by early December, *Egmont MSS*, i, 320, 342. For Needham, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 504; *Egmont MSS*, i, 357.

[23]Firth & Davies, *Regimental history*, ii, 577-81.

John Moore;

Roger Fenwick: On July 6, the committee sought commissions for three regiments, in each instance based on the local forces in which its commander had served.[24] Those of John Moore, MP, and Roger Fenwick, drawn from Liverpool and Shropshire respectively, were clearly designed for Ulster, being allowed to find quartering in Lancashire, and being directed to Liverpool for shipping.[25] Their regional base probably promoted their relative speed, since they were reported assembled at the coast be early October[26] - 1 400 appear to have sailed with the abortive Dublin expedition at that time, though both were heavily depleted by the time they were mustered in Ulster in March, 1647.[27] They were moved south to Ormond's garrisons at Dundalk and Trim in the spring of 1647. John Moore, MP for Liverpool, had seen military service in Lancashire, including a time as Governor of Liverpool. He would act as parliamentary commissioner in Ireland in 1647, would sign Charles death warrant in 1649, and died in Ireland in 1650. Fenwick had arrived in Salop in the summer of 1644 with the Earl of Denbigh, Commander-in-chief of the West Midlands Association, being given charge of the small garrison of Moreton Corbet. In October-December 1645 he held a major's rank under Chidley Coote.[28] Fenwick's lieutenant-colonel, John Huetson, though hard to trace through the 1640s, seems to have been a scion of a Co. Kildare family, while one of Moore's captains, Sir Walsingham Cooke, was a pre- 1641 landowner of Co. Wexford.[29]

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[24]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 469, 470, 471, 473, 479, 482, 513, 514, 530. Commissions from Lisle were approved by the two Houses, *Commons' jn.*, iv, 612; *Lords' jn.*, viii, 425.

[25]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 482, 490, 503; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 510 for a Sept. 11 order to proceed to Belfast.

[26] *Kingdom's Weekly Intelligence* no 169 (6-13 Oct). E 357 (15) p 267; Perfect Occurrences no. 42. E 513 (18). Both refer to Moore as having 800 men, despite substantial desertions.

[27]*Mercurius Civicus* no 178 (15-22 Oct) E 358 (13), p.2426. In Dec. 1646, Moore (after losses by shipwreck) had 448 men, Fenwick 664, though both recruited their regiments in 1648 - *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 565-6; *Ormonde MSS*, i, 198. Cf. Hazlett, 'Military forces', pp. 378-81, 433-4. Fenwick did not travel with the troops in the first instance, and seems to have kept some of their pay with him until he could be sure they would make it to Ireland, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 585.

[28]Firth & Davies, *Regimental history*, ii, 637-8, 650-2; *The Letter Books of Sir William Brereton* ed. R.N. Dore (2 vols., Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire cxxiii, cxxviii 1984 & 1990), i, 344 & n.4; ii, 123 & n.1, 185, 204, 222, 383.

[29]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 479; *Ormonde MSS*, i, 198. Both men appear on a 1649 list of 'delinquents' i.e. Parliamentarians, the former recorded as a Co. Kildare landowner, the latter for Co. Wexford, though both with Jones's forces in Dublin, *Ormonde MSS*, ii, 105, 107. For Cooke in Wexford pre-1641, see *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 131, 287, 339; Rolf Loeber & Magna Stouthamer-Loeber 'The lost architecture of the Wexford Plantation', in Kevin Whelan (ed.)*Wexford: History and society* (Dublin, 1987), pp. 176, 195-6; R.C.Simington (ed.) *The Civil Survey A.D. 1654-1656. Volume ix, County of Wexford* (Dublin, 1953), pp. 23, 24, 39, 40, 42. For Heutson in Kildare before and after 1641, R. C. Simington (ed.) *The Civil Survey A.D. 1654-1656. Volume viii, County of Kildare* (Dublin, 1952), pp. 188, 224, 226, 241; Robert Dunlop (ed.), *Ireland under the commonwealth* (2 vols., Manchester, 1913) i, 90; ii, 632-3; John Hewetson, 'Patrick Hewetson, M.D.', in *Kildare Arch. Soc. Jn.*, v (1906-8), pp. 47-8.

Henry Grey;

Lord Lisle: The third regiment of July 6, that of Col. Grey of Lincolnshire, causes more confusion. Though his commission was for a 1 000-strong regiment, he seems personally to have been under contract for only 500, other contracts going out to individual captains like Andrew Ruddock, Thomas Chandler and Samuel Playford.[30] The colonel in question is almost certainly Henry Grey, former governor of Leicester, and a colonel in the Lincs. militia from April 1645 to August 1646, and not to be confused with the New Model officer, James Grey, recruiting for Ireland in 1647.[31] Grey's commission was approved by the Houses on July 30 / August 4, by now accompanied by one for a regiment under Lisle's personal command.[32] Again, this was constituted from disparate elements, garrisons like Weymouth, Chichester and Henley, and companies contracted for with Captains, like Charles Gibbon or John Sydenham.[33] It is possible that its destination, like Grey's, was undecided at first.[34]

Richard Townsend: August saw the submission of an ambitious scheme by the former Munster officer and New Model colonel, Sir Hardress Waller, whereby he would raise a thousand- man regiment for himself 'by beat of drum' as well as recruiting three more regiments to 1 000-strength, with officers named by himself.[35] The context was that of the fall of Pendennis, the regiments assigned those of Robert Bennett, Thomas Ceely and Anthony Rowse, all of Cornish origin, and, like Waller, veterans of the 1645-6 campaign the West.[36] But although the Committee issued warrants to this effect on September 17, the only practical effect was the

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[30]Grey had only contracted for 500 men, and was ordered to raise the same 'by beat of drum'; by May, 1647, his contract was cancelled on the basis of his delivery of 429 soldiers to Munster, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 477, 490, 624. The three captains, though they returned to England in 1648, were to be involved in Ireland in the 1650s. Their contracts were for 100 men each, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 470, 474, 478, 481, 488, 501; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*I, pp. 12, 13. It is worth noting in passing that many of the officers expelled from Munster in 1648 may be found in the Cromwellian regiments returning to Ireland a year later, particularly in a few regiments, such as those of Cooke, Stubber and Phayre.

[31]Firth & Davies, *Regimental history*, ii, 418 conflate the two men. For Henry Grey's career, see Temple, 'Original officer list', p. 75 & note 207; Gentles, 'Choosing the officers', p. 271 & note 36.

[32]Clotworthy took the commissions to the Lords, but they required an ordinance confirming Lisle's commissions, which the lower House agreed, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 477-8; *Commons' jn.*, iv, 630, 633; *Lords' jn.*, viii, 447, 453.

[33]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 462, 463, 475, 478, 510, 513. Sydenham was brother of Colonel William Sydenham, MP, who stood surety for him; Chichester was governed by Lisle's brother, Algernon Sidney.

[34]Grey's regiment was included in the Munster brigade established in September and re-assigned to that province after the rush for Dublin in November, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 506, 549. There is no indication of Lisle's plans for his regiment before early 1647, by which time his southern destination had been confirmed.

[35] *Commons' jn.*, iv, 651-2; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 470, 501, 511, 514-5.

[36] Mary Coate , *Cornwall in the Great Civil War and Interregnum 1642-1660* (Oxford, 1933), passim.

commissioning of Townsend (Sept. 12) on Waller's nomination, with his Cork-born Lieutenant-Colonel, Robert Phaire.[37] Townsend appears to have taken over Ceely's regiment; his own service had been in the West, being a Lieutenant-Colonel at Pendennis.[38] Perhaps Waller's scheme fell through due to the extend of demands placed on the South-West for troops and finances, or an opposition within the Irish Affairs Committee. Disorder was notorious among the troops of the region anyway, including those Townsend attempted to carry to Ireland. [39] The regiment only reached Cork in July 1647, long after Lisle's departure - again its strength is uncertain. [40]

Sir Arthur Loftus: On Aug. 6, the Irish committee had approved Sir Miles Hobert's Norfolk regiment for Ireland, but by Aug. 25 had clearly placed the regiment under the command of another ex-Munster figure, Sir Arthur Loftus, who had already raised two regiments, the second of which had recently suffered at Bunratty. If any of his men straggled to Ireland it was as late as the early summer of 1647, though Loftus himself played a part in the Lisle expedition of the spring.[41]

James Castle;
Charles Blount: The final two infantry regiments were those of Blount of Gloucester and James Castle of Warwickshire. Again, though authorised in the autumn of 1646, neither reached Ireland until April - May 1647.[42] Blount, and his lieut.-col.., Peter Crispe had served as far back as Edgehill (as part of the abortive adventurer brigade) and then under Massey at Gloucester[43], (both settled in Ireland after 1649); Castle and his second - in - command, Henry Slade, had served under Brooke in the west Midlands before joining the Warwickshire county forces.[44]

Thomas Long;
Anthony Hungerford: Long's regiment was recruited in the Somerset area. Commissions are dated March 17, but despite repeated orders the regiment had still not gone over in late May, money as usual being the sticking point.[45] Of the officers, the

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[37] Phaire had served under Jephson in Munster, and had a future as a regicide, probable Quaker or Muggletonian, and leading Commonwealth figure in Co Cork. Firth & Davies, *Regimental history*, ii, 657; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 515; W. H. Welply, 'Colonel Robert Phaire, "Regicide" in *Cork Hist. Soc. Jn.* xxx (1925) pp. 20-4.

[38] Firth & Davies ii, 443; Coate, *Cornwall* p.519.

[39] See e.g. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47* , pp. 512, 526; *Cal. S. P.. Ire., 1647-1660* pp. 739-40, 747; *Egmont MSS*, i, 403, 407-8 - by now (May 1647) Clubmen disrupt Irish Service.

[40] *Egmont MSS*, i, 422; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p.515.

[41] *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 447, 488, 500, 504, 512, 524; *Egmont MSS*, i, 401.

[42] For contracts, see *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 516, 528, 530, 548.

[43] Young, *Edgehill*, p. 242.

[44] Hughes, *Warwickshire*, pp. 187, 194, 196.

[45] *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p.609; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 734, 735, 739, 743, 745, 747, 748. Long may have been a colonel in the Midlands by 1645 - Luke, *Letter - book*, pp. 574-5. Firth &

lieutenant - colonel, Primeiron Rochfort, was an Irish veteran, last recorded at Ballinakill. Though D.H.C.I. suggested his replacement, Long was allowed to use his judgement and Rochfort is found in a muster for May, 1648.[46] Hungerford had been much more rapid - his 912 men were mustered on May 6 in Dublin, apparently landing on April 20.[47] Brother to Sir Edward Hungerford MP, and half-brother to Anthony Hungerford, MP, he had reached Shropshire in Denbigh's army in 1644 (like Fenwick) and by Sept. 1646 had been seeking a permanent command in the county forces. Perhaps political pull won him an Irish command with the disbandment of the local forces.[48]

John Kynaston: As mentioned, this regiment grew from Mytton's 1646 offer and appears to have been detached as a body from the forces under his command. Since Kynaston was almost certainly not the parliamentarian of that name based at Plas Kynaston, Denbighshire, it is just possible he was related to the branch of the family which supplied an MP for Carrickfergus in 1634 (Edward) and a commissioner for Co. Down in 1627 (Francis).[49]

CAVALRY.

William Jephson: Jephson was advanced £5 000 to begin recruiting before the 1645-6 assessment funds could come on line, and seems to have got his regiment together in 1645. Diversions into English service meant that he was not given

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Davies, ii, 650 assume recruitment from Massey's army because of the region, but this is unlikely as it was a cavalry formation - unneeded county troops are a more likely basis.

[46]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 772, 774; *Ormonde MSS*, i, 123, 124, 128, 135, 140, 160; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 746; H. M. C. *report 8*, app. i, section iii, 592. Ballinakill fell in May, 1643 - Bagwell, *Stuarts*, ii, 34 making the date assigned in *Ormonde MSS* to his last appearance (early 1644) unlikely.

[47]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 611; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 735, 739; *Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 528-9; Firth & Davies, ii, 643.

[48]*Letter - books of Brereton* ed. Dore, ii, 123. Dore reckons Hungerford's lieut. - colonel, 'Foulks' or 'Foulke', formerly captain under him, 'does not seem to have been a Salop man'. Perhaps he was one of several of that name with Irish connections. *Letter - books of Brereton* ed. Dore, ii, 317-8.

[49]*Cal.. S. P. Ire., 1625-33*, pp. 64, 254. *Letter - books of Brereton* ed. Dore, ii, 279 suggests this identification. But if the commander in Dublin was dead by 1654 (Firth & Davies, *Regimental history*, ii, 649) the gentleman from Plas Kynaston continued active in north Wales politics in 1657 - A. H. Dodd, *Studies in Stuart Wales* (2nd edition, Cardiff, 1971) pp. 156, 163. Just possibly, Kynaston's 1647 major, John Farrer, was a former Dublin officer, though he is recorded there as late as Sept. 1646 - *Ormonde MSS*, i, 173, 180, 182, 184, 188, 190, 194. Another Captain Farrer was serving in north-west England in early 1646, *Letter - books of Brereton* ed. Dore, ii, 497.

permission to depart until Jan. 1646 and his letters show considerable delays thereafter, mostly financial before getting his men to Cork by July 19.[50]

Ulster recruits: Part of the problem in Ulster seems to have been shortage of actual horses more than of soldiers to ride them, as indicated in plans to use mounts no longer needed by the Eastern Association, having branded them for identification.[51] By the late summer of 1646, however, Irish committee records seem to indicate that men and horses were being recruited to the existing troops in Ulster - these had always stood outside a regimental system (though most of their commanders were also infantry colonels), the exception being Arthur Hill's regiment of five troops.[52] The fact that many of these men (Hill, Cole, Claneboy, Clotworthy) or their subordinate officers or agents (in particular Rawdon) were in London may have helped secure them recruits; certainly the contrast with Munster is stark - only Broghill appears to have won any reinforcement to his existing cavalry regiment, though there may have been assumptions early on that Massey's men could be used to supplement existing formation. When new units were authorised for Ulster they fell to established figures, notably Sir Patrick Wemyss, Audley Mervyn and Clotworthy.[53]

Michael Jones;
Chidley Coote;
Purbeck Temple: By the summer of 1646 it had been resolved to send no less than 6 cavalry regiments to Ireland, in addition to the Ulster recruits. The plans floundered completely[54], and the only successes are much smaller regiments or individual troops later attached to larger formations.[55] Temple's previous service was under Major-General Browne in the Berkshire/Buckinghamshire/Oxfordshire area, where he had

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[50]*Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 415, 431, 461, 463; *Cal. S.P. dom., 1645-7*, p. 61; H.M.C. *Egmont MSS*, i 279, 281, 283, 295-8, 299, 300, 305.
[51]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 454.
[52]See *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 464, 485, 490, 496, 500, 503-4, 511, 513 for orders for recruitment, pay, equipment and transportation.
[53]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 487, 491, 497, 744 (Wemyss); 531 (Clotworthy); 615 (Mervyn).
[54]Five contracts had been entered into by July, the three mentioned in text, that with Algernon Sidney (see below) and one with colonel Leonard Lydcott which appears to have borne no fruit at all. With May projections of 210 cavalry drawn off from Massey's brigade (as a first instalment, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 448, 454) and with 340 Ulster 'recruits', the shortfall of 2 800 was to be met with a proposal for a 700- strong regiment under Lisle (*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 457), regiments of 500 under Sidney, Coote and Lydcott, the 370 troopers offered by Temple and the 230 offered by Jones (*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 462, 464). For contracts, see *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 459-60, 517 (Temple), 470, 477-8 (Lidcott and Coote), 449, 465, 477-9, 482 (Jones). By Sept. almost all the totals had been altered - Lisle was listed as due for only 500 cavalry, as were Sidney, Coote, Lidcott and Jones, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 515.
[55]Contracts for individual troops of cavalry could produce praiseworthy bodies of soldiers, such as the 60 under Captain Thomas Hunt, later incorporated into Coote's regiment. See *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 516, 548, 569, 601; *Egmont MSS*, i, 337.

attained Colonel's rank and the Governorship of Henley by April 1646.[56] He would recruit more soldiers for Ireland in 1648. He is credited with 271 horsemen sent to Munster, while Jones and Coote seem to have brought over around 340 and 320 soldiers respectively, sometimes by incorporation of individually raised troops.[57] Jones and Chidley Coote had both forsaken military commands in Ireland in the wake of the cessation and the 1644 negotiations and taken service in the Cheshire area. Jones ended up as commander of the county cavalry and Governor of Chester, though not without clashes with the local parliamentary grandee, Sir William Brereton. His ability to raise a regiment in the area would seem clear, though his own forces by 1646 were in a mutinous state.[58] Coote acted as his subordinate, as at Rowton Moor in 1645, and had also left Ireland after publishing anti-cessationist material, obtaining command of the Salop horse (he sided with Brereton against Jones in October 1645).[59] He negotiated for 500 cavalry 2 July 1646 with Nicholas Loftus as surety, to be raised nearby in North Wales. Their regiments show both former local officers and some of obvious Irish background, like Viscount Baltinglass and Captain William Parsons.[60]

Algernon Sidney;

Lord Lisle: There is no proof that Lisle and his brother, Algernon Sidney, carried over 700 and 500 respectively.[61] After the collapse of Algernon's efforts to obtain 500 soldiers from the Eastern Association[62], his contract was scaled down to two troops,

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[56]*Cal. S. P. dom., 1645-7*, pp. 34-5, 371, 379, 421, 431-2.

[57]*Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, p. 742; *Egmont MSS*, i, 405, 406; *Two Letters sent from the Lord Inchiqueen...*, 18 May, 1647, E 389 (1), p.1.

[58] Archibald W. M. Kerr, *An Ironside of Ireland* (London, 1923) pp. 34-6, 52-4; R. N. Dore, *The Civil Wars in Cheshire* (Chester, 1966) pp. 47, 49, 52-4, 56; J. S. Morrill *Cheshire 1630-1660* (Oxford, 1974) pp. 81, 85, 158,194.

[59] Dore, *Civil Wars,* pp. 44, 47, 52; Morrill, *Cheshire,* p. 158, Firth & Davies, *Regimental history*, ii, 618.

[60]Parsons had turned to Parliament after the failure of the Protestant agency to the King in 1644; in 1646 he is found (with Baltinglass) recruiting among Massey's soldiers, and later for Captain Dudley Phillips's Ulster troop. Though he was reported as having been dislodged from his own troop by Lisle, he is later found taking a troop of horse to Ulster and is found in Jones's regiment by 1647 - *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 443, 448, 464, 490, 515; *Egmont MSS*, i, 464, 468; *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1647-60*, pp. 735, 746; *H. M. C. rep. 8* app. i, section iii, 595. Baltinglass's career is less clear between his service in Munster in 1641-2 and his commission in Coote's regiment - *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 448, 514; *Ormonde MSS*, i, 125, 135, 142. Parsons was nephew to Sir William Parsons; the Lord Justice's son, John, was given command of the firelocks to be sent to Ireland, Carte MS 19, ff. 402-3.

[61]Hazlett, 'Military forces', pp. 381-2 is most inaccurate on cavalry, assuming that the recording of the regiments of Lisle and Sidney meant a full quota arrived. On the other hand, he neglects to mention the Temple regiment and sheds no light on the first batch (210 cavalry) drawn for Massey's brigade. He also seems to miss Major Chopham's troop, which certainly served in Munster, and may have been incorporated into an old or new regiment, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 464, 485, 481; *Egmont MSS*, i, 422, 436, 449.

[62]Jones's attempt to assemble Sidney's troops at St. Albans on July 10 saw only disorder and mutiny, and there is no evidence that the soldiers in question ever served in Ireland. *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 471, 472, 475, 476.

and only four can be clearly identified as belonging to either of the two regiments, which would explain Inchiquin's decision in April to have them 'conjoined' under one command.[63]

Massey's brigade: It is possible that some soldiers were detached from the brigade (the figure of 210 is mentioned in May) but the plan to re-model the formation into fresh regiments for Irish service came to nought. In a mirror image of the New Model opposition, the soldiers objected to their re-formation as well as having material grievances. Recruitment was envisaged on a large scale and entrusted to Irish nominees, Sir William Fenton and Major Thomas Meredith.[64]

Cavalry numbers cannot readily be assessed, but perhaps two regiments (Jephson's, and Temple's 270), seven troops (possibly about 400) and some recruits were delivered to Munster, 300+ recruits to Ulster and two regiments (Jones's and Coote's, totalling about 600) to Leinster.

Conclusion. The basis from which the 1645-7 forces were raised were the county forces, the somewhat hidden soldiers of the English war. Attempts to draw on larger formations, the Western or Eastern Associations or the New Model, ran into trouble from the soldiery. The regimental commanders were experienced parliamentarians, but of no particular political hue - Moore was a regicide, Sterling and Grey supporters of Manchester - though a number of officers were members of parliamentary families (Hungerford, Needham, Fenwick) which might explain their successful contracts. Where the colonel might not have served in Ireland, there would seem to be at least four lieutenant-colonels who had (Rochfort, Jephson, Huetson, Phaire) and possibly numbers of lesser officers also.

As in 1641-2 recruitment was best accomplished by regimental (or troop) contract, though with two distinctions. Firstly, units existed already (though under threat of disbandment) which could be drawn upon, and those officers who worked from their own regional base appear to have assembled men most rapidly. Secondly, the choice to proceed by establishment of new formations ran counter to the preference of commanders in Ireland (and of common practice, as e.g. in the New Model) and

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[63]On 28 July, 1646, Algernon Sidney's new contract was for two cavalry troops, and he is credited with those of Doyley and Bridges which reached Munster in Feb. and April, 1647; a further contract for two troops, entered into on 30 July, 1646, was recorded fulfilled in June 1647, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, p. 484; *1647-60*, p. 18. Inchiquin's decision to amalgamate four troops into one regiment (23 April, 1647) pre-dated these last arrivals, *Egmont MSS*, i, 395.

[64]Their instructions showed that large numbers were expected is seen in the order to form the recruits into troops of 60, and these into regiments of 500, as also in the assignment of £5 000 to Veele for their pay, enough for at least 500, *Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47*, pp. 473, 488, 491, 512, 516, 520.

involved Parliament in the multiplication of officers (with resulting pay increases), probably a necessity to ensure speedier recruitment. Again as in 1641-2 delays were the result of failure to award commissions (especially in early 1646), though this was largely overcome by the powers of the Irish committee to enter into the contracts which preceded formal commissioning, and more especially of finance. The fact that adequate advances were not forthcoming kept the first (Sterling and Jephson) regiments waiting of the slow assessment collection to bring them up to strength. In 1646 large advances and loans were available for recruiting, but even here small shortfalls, like the lack of money to transport Castle's regiment, meant lengthy delays and higher costs in the end through quartering.

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