LEABHARLANN CHOLÁISTE NA TRÍONÓIDE, BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH | TRINITY COLLEGE LIBRARY DUBLIN
Ollscoil Átha Cliath | The University of Dublin

Terms and Conditions of Use of Digitised Theses from Trinity College Library Dublin

Copyright statement

All material supplied by Trinity College Library is protected by copyright (under the Copyright and Related Rights Act, 2000 as amended) and other relevant Intellectual Property Rights. By accessing and using a Digitised Thesis from Trinity College Library you acknowledge that all Intellectual Property Rights in any Works supplied are the sole and exclusive property of the copyright and/or other IPR holder. Specific copyright holders may not be explicitly identified. Use of materials from other sources within a thesis should not be construed as a claim over them.

A non-exclusive, non-transferable licence is hereby granted to those using or reproducing, in whole or in part, the material for valid purposes, providing the copyright owners are acknowledged using the normal conventions. Where specific permission to use material is required, this is identified and such permission must be sought from the copyright holder or agency cited.

Liability statement

By using a Digitised Thesis, I accept that Trinity College Dublin bears no legal responsibility for the accuracy, legality or comprehensiveness of materials contained within the thesis, and that Trinity College Dublin accepts no liability for indirect, consequential, or incidental, damages or losses arising from use of the thesis for whatever reason. Information located in a thesis may be subject to specific use constraints, details of which may not be explicitly described. It is the responsibility of potential and actual users to be aware of such constraints and to abide by them. By making use of material from a digitised thesis, you accept these copyright and disclaimer provisions. Where it is brought to the attention of Trinity College Library that there may be a breach of copyright or other restraint, it is the policy to withdraw or take down access to a thesis while the issue is being resolved.

Access Agreement

By using a Digitised Thesis from Trinity College Library you are bound by the following Terms & Conditions. Please read them carefully.

I have read and I understand the following statement: All material supplied via a Digitised Thesis from Trinity College Library is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, and duplication or sale of all or part of any of a thesis is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for your research use or for educational purposes in electronic or print form providing the copyright owners are acknowledged using the normal conventions. You must obtain permission for any other use. Electronic or print copies may not be offered, whether for sale or otherwise to anyone. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

NEIGHBOURHOOD REGENERATION IN THE NEOLIBERAL ERA: DUBLIN AND PARIS, A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

KATIA ATTUYER

Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Ph.D.

Department of Geography
Trinity College Dublin
Dublin 2
Ireland

2010

TRINITY COLLEGE
10 APR 2012
LIBRARY DUBLIN
9378

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at this or any other university. Except where otherwise acknowledged, it is entirely my own work. The library may lend or copy the thesis upon request, subject to normal conditions of acknowledgement.



Katia Attuyer
October 2010

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is the culmination of academic work involving brainstorming, interviews, reading, research and discussion. Its completion was made possible by many people who supported me during its creation, without whom it would not have been possible to complete this thesis. I would like to take this opportunity to thank everybody who helped in the realisation of this project.

Primarily, I wish to thank Dr. Andrew Maclaran, who has been my supervisor since the beginning of this project. I was extraordinarily fortunate in having his supervision and intellectual guidance for this thesis. This project benefited tremendously from him contributing valuable ideas and discussions. His knowledge about urban policies has been invaluable to this thesis. He provided me with many valuable suggestions, which helped improving this thesis. His constant encouragement during the course of this work was very appreciated. I could never have embarked, or traveled this path without his support.

I also offer a great deal of thanks to Josephine Henry, Community Technical Aid. I would like to thank her for facilitating my first meetings with the community of the north west inner-city and enhancing my comprehension of planning matters in Dublin.

During my time at Trinity College, I learned a great deal from all of the people I had the privileged to associate and work with especially Paula Brudell. I would like to thank her for her friendly comments and stimulating conversations.

I would like to acknowledge all the participants who gave so generously their time for interviews and research, both in Dublin and Paris. Furthermore, a great debt of gratitude is owed to the Association Salle Saint Bruno especially Catherine Hardouin for opening the research centre out of hours so many times, facilitating access to information in the short time I had in Paris, I would like to thank Yann Musiak for giving access to library resources and tracking down research material on my behalf in the Bibliothéque Administrative de Paris. Their kind support has been of great value in this study.

I would like to thank my mother and grandparents for their support and love; this thesis is dedicated to them. I also wish to thank Pauline Callandreau for providing friendship, accommodation, and encouragement. I am very grateful to my housemates Gar Barr, Marta Zapotoczna and Lola for their patience and understanding.

One of the most important persons who has been with me in every moment of my PhD is Ollie Sweetman. I would like to thank him for the many sacrifices he has made. His love and persistent confidence made this thesis a little easier to produce.

SUMMARY

This thesis is centrally concerned with changes in state policies. The research aims to trace the evolution of urban regeneration policies in two different geographical contexts, paying attention to both temporal and geographical variations in governmental approaches to regeneration. The study aims to review the manner in which the growing intensification of the neoliberal agenda has differently affected the process of urban regeneration in Paris and Dublin. The aim is to account for variations in the global neoliberal project. This research seeks to make a contribution to the development of urban studies by offering empirical evidence of path-dependency in the evolution of regeneration policies. The study also strives to identify how different socio-political ideological contexts have shaped the ability of indigenous communities to change the outcomes of regeneration. The overall objective is to discuss how powerful socially disadvantaged communities are in influencing the processes of regeneration. The research reviews the manner in which community input has been achieved through involvement in formal structures and through informal mechanisms such as community protest.

This thesis drew on two strands of the literature, namely neoliberal governance and participatory governance. The literature on urban neoliberal governance examines the recent shift by states to adopt a more market-led approach to urban development. The literature draws the attention to the importance of local histories and contingencies in shaping the outcomes of neoliberal reforms. Some theorists also highlight the need to conceptualise neoliberalism as a dynamic process rather than an end-state. This thesis drew upon the conceptual frameworks of 'actually existing neoliberalism' and 'neoliberalisation'. Another strand of the literature examines the emergence of new opportunities for disadvantaged community to participate in the policy-making process. While a part of the literature focuses on discussing new tools for public participation and best practices in community participation, critical theorists invite researchers to question the assumptions behind the positive rhetoric surrounding participation and collaboration. They point to the contradiction between policy-makers offering new avenues for citizens to have a say in policies and subordinating community interests to private sector requirements to a greater degree than previously. A main question in the literature concerns the extent to which non-market and community-based solutions can develop in a global context of expanding neoliberalism.

The empirical research employed a comparative methodology, drew on a wide range of secondary and primary information sources and adopted a case study approach in order to examine how government initiatives have attempted to address the issues of deprived neighbourhoods and to explore the community experience of engaging with the state. The case studies focused on two separate neighbourhoods, one in Paris and one in Dublin, allowing an in-depth examination of the process of policy-making and policy implementation over time. Among the methods employed were interviewing, policy documents reviewing and archival research.

In Ireland, market-led urban regeneration programmes of the mid-1980s and early 1990s were criticised for their lack of social concern and local input, creating a democratic deficit in legitimacy. Integration of citizens and their organizations in the process is claimed to address the exclusionary and undemocratic character of past policies. New approaches introduced in the mid-1990s emphasise collaboration across different

stakeholders through partnership structures, social gain occurring through the participation of representatives of the socially excluded and grassroots involvement in priority setting guaranteeing a revision of the property-led revitalisation agenda. On their introduction under the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme, Integrated Area Plans (IAPs) were presented by the Irish Government as 'a radical departure' from previous schemes which had been about property upgrading only. Working in partnership with the community was expected to enable policy-makers to better address local needs. The Irish case study examines the experience of one inner-city community which participated in the implementation of an IAP by engaging with the local authority and ultimately resolved to oppose local government initiatives. Inner-city working-class communities viewed local government actions as serving a pro-development agenda. A consultative and integrated approach was promoted during the drafting of the plan. However, there was a strong reliance on private-sector investment to deliver regeneration. The programme was set in a broader national system, which increasingly relies on private-sector actors to deliver physical development and to provide social goods such as social housing and public amenities. Overall, the accomplishment of community objectives has been undermined by giving precedence to wider objectives which prioritise the benefits of redevelopment for the city as a whole over those of the local community needs. Since 1998, the urban regeneration agenda has remained dominated by the imperatives of the market. This property-led approach to regeneration did trigger opposition at local level. However, the local community ability to resist entrepreneurial polices has remained limited, with gains lying essentially at the margins.

In France, at the central government level, the emergence of a discourse promoting a property-led approach to urban regeneration is relatively recent. Since the start of the new millennium, a new discourse emphasising the physical aspect of regeneration and stressing the need to attract private investment and private households in deprived areas has developed at national level. This change in orientation is a response to the perceived failure of past national urban-renewal policies in neighbourhoods covered by the *politique de la ville* programme. Although the Borloo law and the *rénovation urbaine* policy might attest to a greater diffusion of neoliberal ideas in regeneration policy at national level than in the past two decades, these changes should not be over-emphasised. Social objectives have not disappeared and their implementation is not left to private actors. Indeed, the creation of the ACSé in 2006 contradicted the announced end of the contractual approach and the suppression of *credit spéciaux* for the social regeneration of run-down areas.

The local state engaged in less market-driven ways in the Parisian case than in the Dublin case. A project including a number of indigenous concerns managed to survive despite the development opportunities of the site and despite the pressures from a new group of gentrifiers promoting the provision of privately owned properties and the development of private businesses instead of social housing and social services provision. This may be case specific or due to the Parisian municipality political orientation and its own financial capability. Yet, it is also to be related to the fact that public funds for regeneration projects are accessible through central government. Therefore, local government was not as dependent on private funds as in Dublin. Moreover, the neoliberal discourse and ideology have not infiltrated French national social and economic policies to the same extent than in Ireland, affecting local perceptions of what is possible. Financial constraints and ideological factors explained the prevalence of market-driven objectives in the Irish case despite the existence of formal structures for participation.

DECLARATION ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii

SUMMARY iv

LIST OF FIGURES ix

LIST OF TABLES x

LIST OF PLATES xi

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER TWO: NEOLIBERALISM, THE URBAN CONDITION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 7

2.1. From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism: Ideology, Public Policies and State Form 7

2.2. Neoliberalism at the Urban Scale 15

2. 3. Community Participation: Theory, Practice and Neoliberal Agenda 26

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND INFORMATION SOURCES 45

3.1. Research Aims 45

3.2. Methodological Approach 46

3.3. Sources and Data Collection 53

3.3.1. Sources and Data Collection in Ireland 54

3.3.2. Sources and Data Collection in France 66

CHAPTER FOUR: THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRISH URBAN RENEWAL POLICIES 81

4.1. Urban Policies 1963-1985: Setting the Scene 81

4.2. Urban Renewal Legislation, Phase 1: Designated Areas and Purpose Agencies 84

4.3. The Impacts of Ten Years of Property-led Regeneration 90

4.4. Urban Renewal Legislation, Phase 2: Introducing Community Participation and Social Objectives 96

CHAPTER FIVE: IRISH CASE STUDY, REGENERATING THE HARP/MARKETS AREA 105

5.1. The HARP Area: Geographical and Social Context 105

5.2. The HARP Framework Plan: 'Major Initiative' and Steering Group 108

5.3. From "Major Initiative Steering Group" to "IAP Monitoring Committee": who gets to participate? 112

5.4. The Monitoring Committee Role and Remit 126

5.4.1. Defining Participation: Moving Backwards 126

5.4.2. Lack of Strategic Action 130

5.5. West side of Smithfield: evidence of the lack of planning remit for the IAP Monitoring Committee 132

5.5.1. Initial Conflict 132

5.5.2. Appeal to An Bord Plenála: Using the Planning System 137

5.6. Community Gain Task Group: another rubber-stamping committee? 144

5.6.1. Where is the money? The fund as a forgotten matter 144

5.6.2. Who decides what is 'community gain', how it is administered and by whom? 148

5.6.3. A unilaterally-agreed new process: the 2006 guidelines 151

5.7 Markets Area Draft Framework Plan 156

5.7.1. A Land-use Plan 157

5.7.2. How to Use a Public Site: Civic Plaza Levering
Private Development Versus multi-purpose Community Centre 159

5.7.3. Role of Private Consultants 163

5.8 HARP Area ten years after 171

CHAPTER SIX: THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH URBAN RENEWAL POLICIES 175

6.1 The French Planning System: Setting the Scene 175

6.2. The Emergence of a National Urban Regeneration Policy: '*Rénovation Urbaine*' laws in the 1960s 177

6.3. A Shift From *Rénovation* to *Réhabilitation* in the Late 1970s 181

6.4. The *Politique de la Ville* Policy, an Integrated Policy for Declining Neighbourhoods: Its Origin and Development under the Mitterrand Presidencies 184

6.5. The *Pacte de Relance pour la Ville*: A Short-lived Interruption to the Logic of the *Politique de la Ville* 188

6.6. 1997: The Return of the Left in Power and the 1999 Re-launch of the CDV Programme 190

6.7. The Borloo Law: The End of the *Politique de la Ville*? 192

CHAPTER SEVEN: FRENCH CASE STUDY, REGENERATING THE GOUTTE D'OR/CHÂTEAU ROUGE AREA 197

7.1. The Regeneration Plan for the Southern District 200

7.1.1. Local context 200

7.1.2. The Municipal Project 202

7.1.3. Divergence of Opinions Regarding the *Politique de la Ville* Programme 207

7.1.4. Community Protest against the *Ville de Paris* Regeneration Project 209

7.1.5. Gains Obtained Through the *Enquête Publique* 219

7.1.6. The Development of a 'Critical Partnership' 221

7.2. Regeneration Plans for the Northern district 228

7.2.1. 1995-2001: Left-wing *arrondissement* against Right-wing *Ville de Paris* 228

7.2.2. The emergence of a New Local Actor:
'*Droit au Calme*' / '*Collectif d'Habitants Goutte d'Or Château Rouge*' 232

7.2.3. Victory for the Left in the Municipal Elections of 2001 and 2008 238

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL AND NATIONAL CONTEXTS IN URBAN REGENERATION 257

8.1. The Importance of Historical, Political and Cultural context 257

8.1.1. France 257

8.1.2. Ireland 266
8.1.3. Comparative Elements: Summary 273
8.2. The role of Local Elected Representatives 274
8.2.1. France 274
8.2.2. Ireland 281
8.2.3. Comparative Elements: Summary 285
8.3. The Role of Private Actors: France and Ireland 286
CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 291
APPENDIX A 297
BIBLIOGRAPHY 303

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Destructive and creative moments of neoliberal urbanisation 21

Figure 2.2: French student poster 30

Figure 2.3: Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation 31

Figure 2.4: Davidson's Wheel of Participation 33

Figure 3.1: *Grand Projet de Renouvellement Urbain,* 11 districts 48

Figure 3.2: Urban Renewal Areas in Paris, 2003 49

Figure 3.3: Location of the HARP area 52

Figure 3.4: HARP Area and Markets Area 52

Figure 4.1: Designated Areas in Dublin 87

Figure 4.2: Designated Areas in Ireland 88

Figure 5.1: Map of the HARP area 105

Figure 5.2: Site 4 of the HARP IAP 133

Figure 5.3: HARP IAP, achievements to date 171

Figure 7.1 Location of the Goutte d'Or administrative area 198

Figure 7.2 *Politique de la Ville* perimeter 199

Figure 7.3: Petition 212

Figure 7.4: Poster concerning a local demonstration 215

Figure 7.5: Social housing units delivered as part of the Goutte d'Or and Château Rouge regeneration 226

Figure 7.6: Social composition of Paris and Goutte d'Or in 1982 and 1999 227

Figure 7.7: Paris social composition in 1982 232

Figure 7.8: Paris social composition in 1999 233

Figure 7.9: Median selling price of apartments located in Paris, Goutte d'Or Administrative area and the 18th arrondissement 1990-2008 233

Figure 7.10: Action Plan for Château Rouge, 2005 242

Figure 7.11: Annual production of social housing in Paris, 1998-2008 244

Figure 7.12: Relocation of displaced households due to the regeneration of Château Rouge, 2007 254

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Sources consulted to trace the evolution of national regeneration policies in Ireland 54

Table 3.2: Documents consulted in order to review local governmental efforts to regenerate the HARP Area 57

Table 3.3: Documents investigated in order to review local governmental efforts to regenerate the Markets Area 60

Table 3.4: Information Sources from DICP, MACRO CDP, MARDAG, NWICN 61

Table 3.5: List of documents reviewed from the case files 29N.121294 & 29N.121296 held by An Bord Pleanála 63

Table 3.6: List of interviewees for the Irish case-study 65

Table 3.7: National sources tracing the evolution of regeneration policies in France 67

Table 3.8: Documents consulted in order to review local government efforts to regenerate the Goutte d'Or area 69

Table 3.9: Documents consulted reviewing local government efforts to regenerate the Château Rouge area 73

Table 3.10: Documents provided by local groups 74

Table 3.11: List of interviewees for the French case-study 78

Table 4.1: Location and size of Designated Areas, 1986 86

Table 4.2: Criteria for selection and prioritisation of areas for IAPs 101

Table 5.1: Indicators of deprivation in the HARP area and Dublin Co. Borough in 1991 106

Table 5.2: Socio-economic objectives for the HARP area 108

LIST OF PLATES

Plate 5.1: Site 4 of the HARP IAP before redevelopment 133

Plate 5.2: Demonstration concerning Smithfield redevelopment 136

Plate 5.3: Kids before cars 169

Plate 6.1: Place d'Italie, Paris 179

Plate 7.1: Dereliction in the Château Rouge area 202

Plate 7.2: Musulman believers praying in the street 240

Plate 7.3. Information panels in Château Rouge 251-252

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The past thirty years have been characterised by an increasing incursion of market logic into more and varied domains of society. The percolation of neoliberal ideology into the political, economical and social spheres can be observed in various geographical contexts and at different spatial scales. Neoliberal ideologies assert that the 'free' market is the optimal mechanism to allocate resources and call for the dismantling of collectivist institutions and practices (Harvey, 2005). For the past few decades, neoliberalism has meant the dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state, the privatisation of public assets and services, a greater faith in the market's ability to solve all society's ills, cut in social entitlements and rise in user fees. Neoliberalism has been promoted by international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and individual nation states such as the USA, who have presented trade and markets liberalisation as leading to greater competitiveness. The economic crisis of the 1970s created favourable conditions for the advancement of the neoliberal model over the following decades (Peck, 2004). Neoliberal ideology gained in popularity in political circles during the early 1980s, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. The rise to hegemony of neoliberalism during the 1970s and 1980s occurred primarily in the UK and the USA. However, in the 1990s, a range of other states subscribed to the neoliberal project. Although only a limited number of states have adopted an explicit program of neoliberal restructuring like the British and American governments of the 1980s, Thatcherism and Regeanism have had a significant influence on subsequent restructurings at international, national and local levels (Brenner et al, 2005).

Such reforms in policy must be conceptualised within the international paradigm shift in political and economic thought from market to government failure (Peck and Tickell, 2007). The ascendancy of neoliberalism did not naturally occur from the 1970s economic crisis. Rather, neoliberal restructuring is a socially-constructed phenomenon. As Leitner et al have pointed:

> "It [neoliberalism's "market order"] did not emerge spontaneously from innate human desires to truck, barter and exchange; nor was it generated as an inevitable by-product of the regulatory needs of financialized capitalism." (Leitner et al, 2007: 314).

The rise of neoliberalism to hegemony may appear paradoxical as, in 1970s, the failure of reformist policies led a number of social scientists to provide a radical critique of capitalist society. Yet, these criticisms were superseded by a hegemonic discourse that placed the responsibility for the social and economic crises onto the government rather than on the

market (Peck and Tickell, 2007). The state has been encouraged to facilitate rather than regulate the market (Smith, 2002).

In the urban realm, neoliberalism has meant that local governments increasingly pursue pro-development strategies, adopting entrepreneurial strategies such as place promotion, relaxation of planning regulations and fiscal incentives (Harvey, 1989). At the urban level, neoliberalism has also meant a growing reliance on private consultants and non-elected bodies to define problems and prescribe solutions. Attracting private investment has become the main priority for city governments in an era of increasing competition among cities, across and within national boundaries. Urban planning policies are assigned the role of enabling the physical transformation of the city in order to attract wealthy residents and investors. On the other hand, a new discourse promoting participation in order to change the relationship between the state and its citizens has emerged. However, academic writings question whether consultation can be more than tokenistic in an era dominated by the influence of neoliberalism. A common question relates to the ability of disadvantaged groups to resist pro-market policies.

During the 2000s, neoliberalism has become a key concept within the social sciences. For instance, the international literature on the urbanisation of neoliberalism provides a rich conceptual framework through which contemporary urban processes can be understood. Nonetheless, several authors have identified gaps in the literature that need to be addressed. Scholars such as Peck (2001, 2004) and Larner (2003) have called for more empirical research to be undertaken in order to comprehend the spatialities and temporalities of contemporary neoliberalisation processes. In fact, several academics have claimed that neoliberal restructurings are likely to differ across policies and places. There is a general agreement that state reforms in a world increasingly dominated by different strands of neoliberal ideas and practices will not necessarily converge towards a unique model. It is expected that differences will exist because neoliberal policy reforms do not unfold over blank canvasses; local, regional and national contexts have inherited of specific characteristics due to past political struggles and past institutional settings. It is argued that ideas and practices of the past will bear consequences on present-day reforms. For instance, Brenner and Theodore (2002, see also Brenner et al, 2005) have coined the term 'actually existing neoliberalism' to emphasise that reforms are path-dependent. Similarly, Leitner et al have claimed that:

> "Neoliberalisms were all conceived and birthed in rather different contexts; neoliberalization was unevenly developed from the start. It follows that ***some degree of***

> ***context-specificity is essential*** to the understanding of neoliberalism." (Leitner et al, 2007: 314, emphasis added).

Yet, despite calls for recording geographical variations in policy changes and state restructuring, especially concerning variations in urban reforms, few such empirical accounts are found in the literature. This research concentrates on filling this empirical gap. This research seeks to make a contribution to the development of urban studies by offering empirical evidence of path-dependency in the evolution of regeneration policies. By employing a cross-cultural study and by examining temporal changes, this thesis attempts to elicit key differences in the processes surrounding the evolution of urban regeneration which have arisen from the varying operations, intensity and impacts of actually-existing neoliberalism. This is accomplished by drawing upon two specific international case studies; the Goutte d'Or/Château rouge area in Paris and the Historic Area Rejuvenation Project (HARP) area in Dublin. The research examines changes in French and Irish national policy frameworks for urban regeneration. It directs particular attention to the manner in which regeneration policy is implemented at the local scale and how such policies have evolved under the increasing influence of neoliberal agendas. One research objective is to review the manner in which government initiatives have attempted to address the issues of neighbourhoods encountering both dereliction and deprivation. Another objective is to explore and record the local community experience of trying to influence urban change in the area together with views regarding the regeneration process and the process of engaging with the local state. The research analyses the impacts of regeneration and queries the extent to which the policies under study have addressed the needs of local disadvantaged communities.

This thesis is organised in nine chapters. Chapter Two and chapter Three provide the theoretical and methodological context for the research. Drawing on debates within the social sciences, Chapter Two discusses a series of questions in relation to public policy. The first part provides an overview of the international literature which has focused on the changing role of the state over the last three decades. It points to the growing influence of neoliberal ideology in a variety of economic and social policies across different geographical contexts. The literature highlights clear changes in the political ideology of local and central governments, which under the influence of neoliberalism tend to discard their social obligations and actively promote pro-market policies. The literature draws the attention to the importance of local histories and contingencies in shaping the outcomes of

neoliberal reforms. According to the context, the dismantlement of Keynesian measures will be more or less rapid, more or less complete, more or less contested and so will the imposition of new measures permitting the extension and maintenance of the neoliberal project. Chapter Two also examines the literature on community participation. The idea of community participation has universally positive connotations and participation is now widely accepted as an essential feature of governance and policy formation. The examination of academic writings seeks to reveal the multiple meanings of participation and some of the paradoxes of participation.

Chapter Three details how the research was conducted. It focuses on the methodological choices that were involved in the research process. It explains the benefits of a comparative methodology, the choice of case studies and the use of policy documents reviews and interviews as research techniques. It provides a detailed description of information obtained from a wide range of sources.

Chapter Four provides an overview of urban renewal policies in Ireland. It mainly examines the Irish context after 1986. It reviews key legislation set in the 1980s leading to the development of a property-led approach to redevelopment. It notes that a study published in 1996 concluded that the tax-led approach had succeeded in stimulating private investment and in renewing physically the inner-city areas of Irish cities and towns by addressing dereliction and dilapidation. However, it identified a number of deficiencies, the lack of benefit arising to the local population being listed as the main weakness of a policy based on tax incentives. As a consequence, the new urban renewal policy put into place in the late 1990s explicitly sought to develop a more inclusive approach to urban regeneration policy and to ensure local regeneration initiatives would produce inclusive social outcomes.

Chapter Five examines the extent to which, in practice, the new policy arena managed to be inclusive of interests representing socially-deprived groups and analyses the extent to which their needs have been addressed by the new scheme. A case study is used in order to assess the extent to which communities were facilitated in having their needs addressed under this new situation. Utilising the semi-structured interviews with community representatives, the chapter describes and analyses the main issues for community groups regarding the regeneration process in the HARP area.

Chapter Six reviews the emergence and development of French urban-renewal policies. It reviews key legislation and the main principles guiding regeneration policy. It discusses how the nature of the instruments and measures promoted respectively under

left-wing and the right-wing government have differed. It shows that the Right has operated a slow shift towards a market-led policy and has recently re-introduced an approach that gives precedence to physical actions. It argues that the new tools introduced in 2003 represent a considerable departure from past public-led approaches but warns against concluding that these represent a U-turn in policy or a strict convergence with Anglo-Saxon types of property-led regeneration.

Chapter Seven explores in greater depth the characteristics of French urban regeneration policy and the nature of recent policy changes through a longitudinal case study. This chapter endeavours to examine how local and national forces have shaped the regeneration process in the Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge area. It traces how government initiatives have addressed the issue of neighbourhood decline over the last 25 years. Using community documents and interviews with key actors, the chapter provides an analysis of local conflicts in relation to the regeneration process.

Chapter Eight provides a comparative analysis. It presents a discussion of the two national experiences of regeneration based on the empirical findings. The chapter shows that Ireland and France have experienced varying degrees of neoliberal reform which has an impact on how neighbourhood regeneration is carried out, confirming the importance of local context. Chapter Nine, the concluding chapter synthesises some of the major findings of the thesis.

CHAPTER TWO: NEOLIBERALISM, THE URBAN CONDITION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

2.1. From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism: Ideology, Public Policies and State Form

The last three decades have been marked by significant transformations in the functioning of capitalism both in countries of the global North and South, leading to the rise of neoliberalism as a dominant state project. The previous configuration of capitalism is known as the 'Keynesian compromise' (Duménil and Lévy, 2005: 9). Keynesian theories, which promote a strong and openly interventionist national state, came to prominence in the 1930s, regarded as a possible response to the Great Depression (Harvey, 2005). They gained legitimacy amongst policy-makers after the American New Deal proved successful in restoring growth and, after the Second World War, many policy-makers relied onto such theories in the hope of keeping business cycles and recessions under control (Hackworth, 2007). The institutions and policies established under the post-war Keynesian consensus remained untouched in most advanced industrial nations until the election of M. Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1979 in the UK and R. Reagan as President in 1980 in the US. The Keynesian consensus took different forms, from *dirigiste* and Christian-democratic states in Europe and to a more liberal form in the US (Tickell and Peck, 2003). Nevertheless, within these various 'national Keynesianisms' there was a common recognition that the state needed to intervene in and even, in some cases, to replace market processes in order to maintain low unemployment levels as well as economic growth and to develop different welfare systems (including health care, retirement and education) for the well-being of its citizens (Harvey, 2005).

Regulatory and redistributory interventions were justified on a number of grounds (Hackworth, 2007). First, Keynesian theorists argued that markets were unable to regulate themselves and needed government intervention to sustain them. In this view, one of the state's tasks was to maintain effective demand. This was accomplished by providing some forms of income redistribution, which increased purchasing power and enabled governments to support mass-consumption. Government expenditures were regarded as having a multiplier effect and creating a final economic value superior to the initial expenditure (Hackworth, 2007: 7). Hackworth (2007: 8) identified four additional justifications for intervention given by Keynesian economists. They related to perceived market failures. They included for instance the tendency for firms to merge and for monopolies to emerge in a non-regulated environment. Monopoly, it was argued, would

lead to higher prices being charged for commodities, contradictory to citizen's interests and justifying state regulation. A second reason related to the fact that certain goods such as national defence or road networks are consumed collectively, rendering the setting of individual price difficult. A third justification was the market's failure to integrate the cost of 'externalities' in their price. Hackworth (2007: 8) gave the example of pollution as a cost not factored in by most industrial firms, often being borne by the state or its citizens, rendering state taxation and regulation an acceptable practice. Lastly, the tendency for markets not to cater for the needs of the poorest or to provide them with goods and services of a socially-acceptable quality served as a powerful justification for state intervention in domains such as heath care and housing. This was not considered as a failure of the market by Keynesian economists, but a general support for egalitarianism during the Keynesian period led to the general acceptance of government involvement in such arenas on moral grounds (Hackworth, 2007). States actively intervened in a diversity of domains from industrial and labour-market concerns to planning policies and the extension of the welfare safety net. This particular mode of regulation complemented a particular accumulation regime known as Fordism, that rested on the organisation of social relations of production at a national level, characterized by mass production of goods and mass consumption (Tickell and Peck, 2003). Arrangements centred on national mass production and consumption combined with a Keynesian national welfare state succeeded in bringing high levels of economic growth in the advanced capitalist countries in the 1950s and 1960s, while levels of living and wages increased for a significant portion of society. In fact, the post-war Keynesian compromise has been interpreted as a 'class compromise' between capital and labour, which led to labour gaining a larger share of the wealth created and improvement in conditions of life in almost all countries, while the economic power of the wealthiest was restrained to a certain extent (Harvey, 2005). Inequalities remained but working-class power had slightly increased.

Yet, as any other state-capital arrangement, the Keynesian-Fordist model contained inherent contradictions, which led to a crisis in the accumulation strategy. During the early to late 1960s and early 1970s, this system began to break down as it proved incapable of sustaining capital accumulation (Harvey, 2005). A number of economic crises occurred both at national and international levels. Western economies experienced a slowdown in economic growth, rising inflation and growing unemployment, notably due to growing competition from Newly Industrialising Economies, the oil crisis of 1973, new transport, communication, and information technologies and the internationalisation of capital flows.

Decreases in economic growth, declines in tax revenues and the spiralling costs of welfare commitments led to question the validity of the Keynesian compromise (Tickell and Peck, 2003). Faced with declining accumulation rates and the perceived failure of the Keynesian mode of regulation, governments across the advanced capitalist world searched for new policies and regulatory strategies to ensure the continuation of capital accumulation.

In reaction to the Keynesian consensus of the post-war years, neoliberal ideology spread and ushered in an era which praised the virtues of the free market and the withdrawal of the state from the management of the economy. The economic crisis of the 1970s created favourable conditions for the advancement of the neoliberal model over the following decades (Peck, 2004). This neoliberal model is characterised by the deregulation of the economy, trade liberalisation, the dismantlement of welfare programmes, the privatisation of public services and industries, tax cuts and the predominance of the financial sector. Proponents of neoliberalism consider the market to be the most efficient and just way of allocating resources in all realms of life and regard state intervention as a major constraint impeding the efficient operation of markets. Neoliberal doctrines are characterised by a strong antipathy towards any form of Keynesianism, socialism or social democracy. Neoliberal ideologues believe in the beneficial effects of competition, individual liberty and private enterprise. Neoliberal ideology gained in popularity in political circles during the early 1980s, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. In fact, although the intellectual roots of neoliberal thought can be traced back to the post-war writings of the Austrian political philosopher Friedrich von Hayek, who established the Mont Pélerin Society in 1947, and Milton Friedman, a member of that society. The influence of this intellectual movement, commited to general concepts of personal freedom, free-market principles of neo-classical economics and strongly opposed to state interventionism, remained marginal within the academic arena and the public policy field until the global recession of the 1970s (Harvey, 2005; Tickell and Peck, 2003). Despite their lack of influence during the 30 years of Fordism, a number of pro-market intellectuals existed and formed what Tickell and Peck (2003: 170) called 'a loose network of proto-neoliberals'. Through institutions such as the Mont Pélerin Society and the University of Chicago, these 'proto-neoliberals' laid the basis for constructing a new ideological project centred on the hypothetical benefits of the state as a facilitator rather than a regulator of the market.

In response to the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, neoliberal arguments grew more convincing, gaining strong support from wealthy individuals and businesses opposed to state intervention and regulation of mixed economy and winning over key influential bodies and political leaders. In this respect, the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the USA one year later represented decisive moments in the rise to hegemony of neoliberalism. With these governments, neoliberalism moved from the status of intellectual project to state strategy. Both the Reagan and Thatcher governments focused on curtailing the power of labour unions to establish a new industrial relations agenda, restrictions in public and social spending, privatisation and the reduction of regulations viewed as presenting barriers to the 'free' working of the market (see Harvey, 2005; Tickell and Peck, 2003). Neoliberal politicians and their administration began to develop a new range of governmental practices such as privatisation and the term 'neoliberalism' came to describe not only an ideology promoting the extension of market rules in all realms of life but also a set of policies informed by this philosophy (Peck and Tickell, 2007).

The rise to hegemony of neoliberalism during the 1970s and 1980s occurred primarily in UK and the USA. However, in the 1990s, a range of other states subscribed to the neoliberal project. Although only a limited number of states have adopted an explicit program of neoliberal restructuring like the British and American governments of the 1980s, Thatcherism and Regeanism have had a significant influence on subsequent restructurings at international, national and local levels (Brenner et al, 2005). Such policy reforms must be conceptualised within the international paradigm shift in political and economic thought from market to government failure (Peck and Tickell, 2007). Influential supranational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the OECD have played a significant role in diffusing and imposing such policies.

The OECD, the IMF and the World Bank have contributed to the spread of neoliberal policies. They have been international disseminators of neoliberal ideas such as public management reform ideas. The pronouncements of these three organisations have tremendous legitimacy and their publications are touchstones for government officials. Publications such as the OECD's annual reports *Going for growth* have been diffusing the idea that national governments need to support the creation of competitive labour markets, engage the private sector extensively in the financing and delivering of services and commit to open their good and capital markets. Privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation and competition have been essential elements of the strategies promoted by the OECD, the

IMF and the World Bank since the mid-1970s. For instance, in 1977, the OECD produced a key report entitled "*Towards full employment and price stability*", which aimed to identify solutions to the economic problems of the 1960s and early 1970s. The report primarily disputed the soundness of demand-side Keynesian economic policies associated with high levels of public expenditure. The authors claimed that

> "Many of the problems encountered in recent years with regard to both growth and inflation can be traced back to the rapid rise in public expenditure." (OECD, 1977: 167-168).

They linked society's problems to the development of a welfare state and encouraged curtailing public expenditure by introducing a user-pay system:

> "The efficiency of the programme could be improved by resorting somewhat more to user charges...it would help establish more clearly the connection between the demand for particular public services and the price the community is prepared to pay for them. "." (OECD, 1977: 213).

The report also prescribed the removal of rigidities and the introduction of greater flexibility within the labour market.

Similar themes and solutions are found in the publications of the World Bank. The *World Development Reports* published yearly since 1978 set out the World Bank's priorities for action. Industrial and developing countries have been enticed to open their economies to international trade and investment, improve the climate for business and intervene less or differently. For instance, the Word Development Report for 1997, *The State in a Changing World*, was devoted to define what role the state should play. The report aimed to improve efficiency by bringing government to work closely along business lines. An effective state was defined primarily as one that develops public rules and public institutions which "allow markets to flourish" (World Bank, 1997:1). Similarly, the 2002 World Development Report, *Building Institutions for Markets*, focused on building new institutions to support markets with the aim of promoting growth and reducing poverty. In this document the World Bank supported the idea that competition would foster better institutions and provided a definition of good governance that reflected its neoliberal stance:

> "Good governance includes the creation, protection, and enforcement of property rights, without which the scope for markets transactions is limited. It includes the provision of a regulatory regime that works with the market to promote competition" (World Bank, 2002: 99).

The 1993 Report, *Investing in Health*, and the 1994 report, *Infrastructure for Development*, claimed that markets and private spending could meet most needs for infrastructure and social services. These international institutions have facilitated

discussions between a wide range of actors including officials, professionals and politicians; these networks have acted as conduits for policy change.

Additionally, the perceived lack of viable alternatives to the neoliberal project, the depoliticisation of reforms and references to the supposed ineluctability of economic process such as globalisation contributed to the rise of neoliberalism (Brenner et al, 2005). There are significant discrepancies between the theoretical benefits of 'liberating' market forces and the actual effects of neoliberal strategies. There is growing evidence that the predicted results of the utopian neoliberal theory, of a rising economic tide that would lift all boats, were not realised. On the contrary, authors such as Harvey (2005) contend that neoliberalism has acted essentially as a vehicle for the restoration of capitalist class power at the expense of the working classes throughout the world leading to increase in social and spatial inequalities[1].

Yet, paradoxically, during the last three decades, neoliberal state policies have increasingly been presented as "common sense" (Peck and Tickell, 2002). The widespread adoption of neoliberal ideas and policies has led Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999, quoted in Sites, 2007) to describe neoliberalism as the new "planetary vulgate". Its influence has reached a growing number of policy fields. Its logic has infiltrated various economic and social policies. Indeed, Brown (2003, quoted in Dikeç, 2006) highlights how deeply neoliberal ideas and practices have permeated daily life and maintains:

> "Neo-liberalism is not simply a set of economic policies; it is not only about facilitating free trade, maximising corporate profits, and challenging welfarism. Rather, neo-liberalism [...] reaches from the soul of the citizen-subject to education policies to practices of empire. Neo-liberal rationality, while foregrounding the market, is not only or primarily focused on the economy; rather it involves extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action." (Brown, 2003: 7, quoted in Dikeç, 2006).

The rise to hegemony of neoliberalism is marked by the diffusion of neoliberalism to a variety of policy domains and geographical scales from the subnational to the international levels. It has reached an ever-growing number of national contexts. As McGregor (2007) argues, a significant development in the neoliberal project consists of the contemporary, even if belated, progression of neoliberal ideas in countries like France and Germany. The diffusion of neoliberal ideas and practices in new national settings may result in policy reforms sharing greater commonalities. Yet, the literature warns against the danger of

---

[1] Neoliberalism heralded a long decline in US salaries and wages (see Harvey, 2005; Duménil and Lévy, 2005). The US Federal Minimum Wage fell from being equivalent to the poverty line in 1980 to being 70 percent of it by 1990. Income of Chief Executive Officers in USA compared to median income of workers rose from 30:1 in 1970 to 500:1 in 2000. In Ireland, there was a massive transfer of income, wealth and power away from working people (see Allen, 2009).

reproducing a hegemonic story and of overemphasising the similarities in central- or local-state restructuring and policy reforms. For instance, Larner (2003) argues that researchers should pay greater attention to the contingency of neoliberalism; otherwise, there is a risk of seeing similarities where there is none. She contends:

> "It [neoliberalism] arrives in different places in different ways, articulates with other political projects, takes multiple material forms, and can give rise to unexpected outcomes." (Larner, 2003: 511).

Similarly, Peck (2004, see also Peck and Tickell, 2002) emphasises the hybrid nature of neoliberalism and claims:

> "While the neoliberal discourses and strategies that are mobilized in these different settings share certain family resemblances, local institutional context clearly and (*really*) matters in the style, substance, origins and outcomes of reformist politics. In this sense, there are no 'pure' or paradigmatic neoliberal transitions, but a series of institutionally mediated and geopolitically specific neoliberal hybrids." (Peck, 2004: 395, italics in original).

In the literature, it is claimed that state reforms in a world increasingly dominated by different strands of neoliberal ideas and practices will not necessarily converge towards a unique model. It is expected that differences will exist because neoliberal policy reforms do not unfold over blank canvasses; local, regional and national contexts have inherited specific characteristics due to past political struggles and past institutional settings. It is argued that ideas and practices of the past will bear consequences on present-day reforms. For instance, Brenner and Theodore (2002, see also Brenner et al, 2005) have coined the term 'actually existing neoliberalism' to emphasise that reforms are path-dependent and that even in UK and the USA, neoliberalism is never implemented in a 'pure' form. This concept was intended to highlight the need to examine how neoliberalism is introduced, resisted and renegotiated in particular contexts and how pre-existing institutional configurations and socio-political compromises have impacted on the nature of reforms. Yet, despite calls for recording geographical variations in policy changes and state restructuring, especially concerning variations in urban reforms, few such empirical accounts are found in the literature, leading Peck to conclude that:

> "It is no longer really enough to say that neoliberal states are 'differently interventionist' and that the ascendant processes of institutional change are qualitatively rather than quantitatively distinctive; there is a growing need to add *content* to these assertions, to track actual patterns and practices of neoliberal restructuring, and to make meaningful part-whole connections between localized and institutionally specific instances of reform and the wider discourses and ideologies of neoliberalism." (Peck, 2004: 396, italics in original).

Brenner and Theodore (2002) also used the concept of 'actually existing neoliberalism' to highlight the need to examine how theoretical, idealised representation of

neoliberalism diverge with its actual manifestations and outcomes, for instance highlighting its effects on access to goods such as housing. Notably, while a part of the literature argues that contemporary development has resulted in a retreat or 'hollowing out' of the state, a number of authors (see Peck, 2001, 2004, Brenner et al, 2005) have maintained that governments have reorganised rather than retreated. Brenner and Theodore (2002: 5) argue that although neoliberal ideology criticises state intervention, actual neoliberal policies and practices involve "coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to impose market rule upon all aspects of social life". While governments may have withdrawn from certain activities, they may be more actively present in other domains. Therefore, it is important to pay attention to whether governments use their powers and funds differently from in the past and consider whether they concentrate on providing social housing and health care or building prisons. Peck (2001) outlined how governments increasingly deal with the problem of poverty or social polarisation through coercive measures, such as the policing of public space and supporting capital's needs to a higher degree, organising competition, rather than attempting to avoid the worst effects of capitalism and encourage social integration through welfare-state policies which they had during the Keynesian era.

Another useful concept in the literature is the notion of 'roll-back' and 'roll-out' neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002), which highlights that the implementation of the neoliberal project is a dynamic process and that neoliberalism does not exist as a neat and fixed collection of policies. The authors have suggested the deployment of neoliberal strategies consists of two interrelated phases or processes; a 'destructive' process consisting of the dismantlement and delegitimisation of redistributive, welfariste policies and of the institutions that sustained them during the Keynesian era and a 'creative' process characterised by the settings of new rules and state forms. 'Roll-out neoliberalism' refers to "the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations" (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 37). These new regulations vary from new trade laws internationally to new punitive laws that aim to criminalise and control poor and marginalised social groups. Again, according to the context, the dismantlement of Keynesian measures will be more or less rapid, more or less complete, more or less contested and so will the imposition of new measures permitting the extension and maintenance of the neoliberal project (Brenner et al, 2005) Brenner et al (2005) argue that the neoliberal project is constantly evolving and that the term of neoliberalisation should be used to highlight the dynamic aspect of the process.

2.2. Neoliberalism at the Urban Scale

The process of neoliberal restructuring is a multi-scalar phenomenon, with process of 'creative destruction' reaching through all geographical scales (Peck et al, 2009). Nonetheless, according to Brenner and Theodore (2002, 2005), cities represent a geographical scale of particular interest for the observation and examination of processes of neoliberal restructuring, which are believed to have particular strength at the urban scale. Moreover, cities are seen as key to the neoliberalisation process. Contemporary urban transformations are claimed to be both the expression of and help to constitute the neoliberal project. Cities are both the receptor and instigator of neoliberal reforms. According to Brenner and Theodore:

> "Cities are not merely localized arenas in which broader or national projects of neoliberal restructuring unfold...Cities have become increasingly central to the reproduction, mutation, and continual reconstitution of neoliberalism itself during the last two decades...Indeed, it might be argued that a marked urbanisation of neoliberalism has been occurring during this period...Cities have become the incubators for many of the major political and ideological strategies through which the dominance of neo-liberalism is being maintained." (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 375-376).

In other words, cities can be spaces in which neoliberalised national programmes end up being implemented and reworked, or places where neoliberal programmes first appear or places that serve as models for other cities, as neoliberal solutions are subsequently copied and adapted elsewhere.

Brenner et al (2005) identify three main reasons why cities have become crucial arenas for the development of neoliberal experiments and practices. First, cities in the advanced industrial capitalist countries have faced deindustrialisation and changes in the global economy . Greater instability in economic conditions and greater uncertainty in cities' ability to retain and sustain capital investment within their boundaries have led cities to divert their efforts towards short-term solutions such as place promotion and competition to attract jobs and private investment (see also Peck and Tickell, 1994). Secondly, reduction in national public spending on housing, local services and facilities such as social services, crèches or sport grounds resulted in cities' facing great difficulties to find finances for services and goods they used to manage (Brenner et al, 2005). Therefore, intervention in such areas is increasingly either abandoned or contracted out to the private sector. For instance, urban municipalities may contract out the drawing up and the implementation of neighbourhood regeneration plans to private firms or privatise the

provision of municipal water services. This raises issues in terms of access and social justice, since their delivery will be submitted to the profitability requirement of the private sector. Thirdly, market rules are increasingly naturalised in the local arena as new ways of working are promoted through national programmes reforming the public sector around newly accepted values of 'customer satisfaction' and 'economic efficiency' and entrepreneurialism (Brenner et al, 2005). Private-sector principles are increasingly imported into the public domain. Fiscal austerity can be either imposed by central government cut in budgets or self-inflicted as costs of running local welfare services are increasingly depicted as a burden impeding local growth rather than as a duty of the local state. Local energy and funds thus becomes redirected towards different areas and social groups.

In fact, much of the literature focusing on changes in urban policies since the 1970s has contended that local governments have increasingly adopted business-like approaches to urban governance instead of more traditional managerial forms. This move has been conceptualised by Harvey (1989) as a shift towards 'urban entrepreneurialism'. He claimed that the emergence of the entrepreneurial city and new urban policies has involved local governments shifting away from their traditional preoccupations with welfare services provision and wealth redistribution, while being more concerned with stimulating economic growth and recasting their position in the emerging global economy (Harvey, 1989). Inter-urban competition and the attraction of companies and social groups with high levels of economic power became a central goal of urban policies, the integration of private interests in policy-making arenas becoming more openly promoted. The shift to entrepreneurial modes of urban governance has been accompanied by the setting of new structures of governance such as public-private partnerships, whereby the decision-making process is no longer centred on and controlled by locally-elected bodies (Swyngedouw et al, 2002). New non-elected institutions and agencies tend to play a greater role or even supersede local authorities as managers of urban policies, raising issues of accountability (Swyngedouw et al, 2002). Thus, the need to facilitate the logic of private-sector actors becomes increasingly emphasised within these new policy networks.

Increased perceived or actual competition between cities and the rise of neoliberal thinking generates a global economic and political environment in which cities are strongly encouraged to improve their competitive advantages. Local authorities are expected to adopt a pro-active approach to identify market opportunities for the benefit of private investors (Swyngedouw et al, 2002). In their search to enhance their competitiveness and

generate growth, urban governments seek to change their image and offer infrastructures such as business parks, science and technology parks, conference centres or waterfront regeneration and services likely to attract private investment. In theory, local governments are encouraged to offer and develop original solutions to attract private investment. This led some authors to claim that in the new context local authorities have potentially greater autonomy to develop their own economic and urban policies than under the Keynesian era when it is argued local government actions were constrained by top-down bureaucratic procedures. Some authors (see Healey, 1995) argued that such changes could represent new opportunities to enhance local democracy.

In contrast, critical geographers have insightfully argued that, in practice, the range of solutions offered is relatively limited and that urban governments increasingly attempt to provide a 'good business climate' (Harvey, 1989; Peck and Tickell, 1994) by redeveloping old industrial neighbourhoods into office districts. In a climate marked by fiscal constraints, cities attempt to generate a steady flow of property and business taxes, by relaxing planning regulations or offering appealing tax regimes. Similarly, more recently, under the influence of Florida's (2004) writings, local authorities are pushed to provide facilities and regeneration plans susceptible to appeal to the 'creative class', resulting in plans which emphasise the desires and practices of the middle-class and élites rather than working-class needs. Attracting creative residents and creative industries becomes the new focal point for urban policies (see Peck, 2005, for a critique). Consequently, in the last three decades, urban regeneration policies have become a central element of such new urban policies as local authorities endeavour to modify their city image by changing the built environment and engage in such modifications as a support for city-marketing campaigns and local boosterist strategies (Hall and Hubbard, 1996, 1998). Governmental interventions in the built environment are also increasingly intended to facilitate speculative redevelopment as a way of attracting corporate investment and new residents (Brenner et al, 2005). Yet, there is a risk of entrepreneurial programmes being repeated and copied in different places, rendering any competitive advantage ephemeral (Harvey, 1989). In fact, Peck (2005) contends that cities that adopt an entrepreneurial agenda have constantly to find new ways to lure capital in, varying from property-led to culturally-led and creatively-led regeneration plans. For instance, the promotion of flagship events (e.g. Olympic games or cultural festivals) and projects has been used as major tools for the realisation of entrepreneurial or neoliberal agendas. Central and local governments have played a greater role in the initiation and financing of large-scale urban projects,

notably by assembling land, developing more flexible planning regimes and priming large areas for profitable redevelopment. For example, Swyngedouw et al (2002) have shown through their study of thirteen European large-scale urban redevelopment projects that such projects have become central to the development of urban neoliberal policies and to the retreat of more redistribution-driven approaches to planning and regeneration. Based on their case-studies, they argued that the state is differently rather than less interventionist in urban redevelopment projects. In contrast to the Keynesian-Fordist version of planning which consisted of the regulation of property speculation and the public acquisition of land to mass-produce social housing and provide collective infrastructures, neoliberal redevelopment policies increasingly consists of public subsidies for private speculative property activities (Swyngedouw et al, 2002; Weber, 2002).

The existence of geographical variations in urban restructuring projects according to local political, economic and cultural circumstances is accepted in the literature. Nonetheless, Harvey (1989: 10) has convincingly argued that the logic of inter-urban competition could have strong disciplinary effects and could lead to cities adopting in series redevelopment strategies that are more in line with the logic of capital accumulation than during the Keynesian period. Harvey (1989) questioned the ability of individual cities, even the most progressive, to escape this neoliberal agenda without prior changes in global conditions, and the ability of socially-innovative projects to survive in an increasingly neoliberalised world. Harvey claimed:

> "It is by no means clear that even the most progressive urban government can resist [social polarisation] when embedded in the logic of capitalist spatial development in which competition seems to operate not as a beneficial hidden hand, but as an external coercive law forcing the lowest common denominator of social responsibility and welfare provision within a competitively organised urban system." (Harvey, 1989: 12).

Similarly, more recently, Peck and Tickell (2002) have argued that as a growing number of cities turn towards entrepreneurialism, the likelihood for non-neoliberal projects to emerge is reduced. By adopting such approaches, cities are believed to reinforce the extra-local forces that render them vulnerable and which led them to adopt entrepreneurial strategies in the first place. They become "accomplices in their own subordination" (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 46). According to Peck and Tickell:

> "Because signature cultural events, prestige corporate investments, public resources, and good jobs are in such short supply, cities (perhaps the most visibly denuded victims of roll-back neoliberalism) are induced to jump on the bandwagon of urban entrepreneurialism, which they do with varying degrees of enthusiasm and effectiveness." (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 46).

This argument seems to gain strength as contemporary empirical research provides numerous examples of cities which have reluctantly or enthusiastically converted to entrepreneurial planning or regeneration strategies in the USA or the UK, such as Manchester (Quilley, 1999, 2000; Ward, 2003) or Glasgow (Boyle and Hughes, 1994; Boyle et al, 2008) in the heartlands of neoliberal urban policies, or in secondary locations such as Dublin (McGuirk and MacLaran, 2001) or Toronto (Keil, 2002). Nonetheless, authors such as Savitch and Kantor (2002) have argued that researchers may find more optimistic accounts in localities, which are less dependent on private actors and their profitability criteria thanks to national public transfers to achieve their planning and regeneration goals.

An important aspect of the neoliberal city which was identified early on by Harvey (1989) has been the adoption of entrepreneurial policies by cities. However, as the neoliberal project is consolidated at the urban scale, neoliberal policies tend to mutate, to be resisted and to adapt. New 'flanking mechanisms' (Brenner et al, 2005) are added to manage the contradictions of neoliberalism. The literature stresses that the neoliberal project is constantly evolving. Applying the notions of 'roll-back' and 'roll-out' neoliberalism to the local scale, Brenner et al (2005) have provided a schematic periodisation of the manifestations of neoliberalism at the local scale. They have furnished a useful list of how 'destructive' and 'creative' moments of neoliberalism can manifest themselves in the urban arena (see Figure 2.1). For instance, the 'roll-out' phase is associated with the rise of punitive policies towards the urban poor to replace the anti-poverty and redistributive programmes of the post-war era, which have been dismantled to varying degrees during the 'roll-back' phase (see Figure 2.1).

In fact, in order to attract highly mobile capital and wealthy populations, cities have increasingly marketed themselves as successful in regenerating themselves. To promote their cities, many local governments have become involved in image-enhancement strategies, concealing some aspects of local life, notably the existence of growing social divisions and inequalities. More recently, it has been argued that in addition to local governments paying less attention to the needs of their most vulnerable inhabitants and silencing negative aspects of entrepreneurial policies, city governments have increasingly sought to hide marginalised populations by resorting to punitive strategies. Smith (1996) coined the term 'revanchist city' to capture such trends. According to Smith (1996), such policies are fuelled by revengeful discourses which blame the failure of past welfare

policies on the marginalised people they were supposed to assist. Smith used the term originally to make sense of development in New York City under the Giuliani administration (1993 to 2002). During his two terms as Mayor of New York City, a particularly repressive attitude was developed towards groups such as homeless people, panhandlers, unemployed people, graffiti artists, prostitutes, drug

Mechanisms of neoliberal localization	Moment of 'destruction'	Moment of 'creation'
Recalibration of Intergovernmental relations	▪ Dismantling of earlier systems of central government support for municipal activities	▪ Devolution of new tasks, burdens and responsibilities to municipalities ▪ Creation of new incentive structures to reward local entrepreneurialism and to catalyze 'endogeneous growth'
Retrenchment of public finance	▪ Imposition of fiscal austerity measures upon municipal governments	▪ Creation of new revenue collection districts and increased reliance on local revenues, user fees, and other instruments of private finance
Restructuring the welfare state	▪ Local relays of national welfare service provision are retrenched; assault on managerial-welfarist local state apparatuses	▪ Expansion of community-based sectors and private approaches to social service provision ▪ Imposition of mandatory work requirements on welfare recipients; new (local) forms of workfare experimentation
Reconfiguring the institutional infrastructure of the local state	▪ Dismantling of bureaucratized, hierarchical forms of local public administration ▪ Assault on traditional relays of local democratic accountability	▪ 'Rolling forward' of new networked forms of local governance based upon public-private partnerships, 'quangos' and the 'new public management' ▪ Incorporation of elite business interests in local policy and development
Privatization of the local public sector and collective infrastructures	▪ Elimination of public monopolies for the provision of standardized municipal services (utilities, sanitation, mass transit, etc.)	▪ Privatization and competitive contracting of municipal services ▪ Creation of new markets and interurban networks for service delivery and infrastructure maintenance
Restructuring urban housing markets	▪ Razing public housing and other forms of low-rent accommodation ▪ Elimination of rent controls and project-based construction subsidies	▪ Creation of new opportunities for speculative investment in central-city real estate markets ▪ Transitional and 'emergency' provision for the homeless ▪ Introduction of market rents and tenant-based vouchers in low-rent niches of urban housing markets
Reworking labor market regulation	▪ Dismantling of traditional, publicly funded education, skills training and apprenticeship programs for youth, displaced workers and the unemployed	▪ Creation of a new regulatory environment in which temporary staffing agencies, unregulated 'labor corners' and other forms of contingent work can proliferate ▪ Implementation of work-readiness programs aimed at the conscription of workers into low-wage jobs ▪ Expansion of informal economies
Restructuring strategies of territorial development	▪ Dismantling of autocentric national models of capitalist growth ▪ Destruction of traditional compensatory regional policies ▪ Increasing exposure of local and regional economies to global competitive forces ▪ Fragmentation of national space-economies into discrete urban and regional industrial systems	▪ Creation of free trade zones, enterprise zones and other 'deregulated' spaces within major urban regions ▪ Creation of new development areas, technopoles and other 'new industrial spaces' at subnational scales ▪ Mobilization of new 'glocal' strategies intended to rechannel economic capacities and infrastructure investments into 'globally connected' local/regional agglomerations
Transformations of the built environment and urban form	▪ Elimination and/or intensified surveillence of urban public spaces ▪ Destruction of traditional working class neighborhoods in order to make way for speculative redevelopment ▪ Retreat from community-oriented planning initiatives	▪ Creation of new privatized spaces of elite/corporate consumption ▪ Construction of large-scale mega-projects intended to attract corporate investment and reconfigure local land-use patterns ▪ Creation of gated communities, urban enclaves and other 'purified' spaces of social reproduction ▪ 'Rolling forward' of the gentrification frontier and the intensification of sociospatial polarization ▪ Adoption of the principle of 'highest and best use' as the basis for major land use planning decisions
Inter-local policy transfer	▪ Erosion of contextually sensitive approaches to local policymaking ▪ Marginalization of 'home-grown' solutions to localized market failures and governance failures	▪ The diffusion of generic, prototypical approaches to 'modernizing' reform among policymakers in search of 'quick fixes' for local social problems (e.g., welfare-to-work programs, place-marketing strategies, zero-tolerance crime policies, etc.) ▪ Imposition of decontextualized 'best practice' models derived from other institutional contexts upon local policy environments
Reregulation of urban civil society	▪ Destruction of the 'liberal city' in which all inhabitants are entitled to basic civil liberties, social services and political rights	▪ Mobilization of zero-tolerance crime policies and 'broken windows' policing ▪ Introduction of new discriminatory forms of surveillance and social control ▪ Introduction of new policies to combat social 'exclusion' by reinserting individuals into the labor market
Re-representing the city	▪ Performative discourses of urban disorder, 'dangerous classes' and economic decline	▪ 'Entrepreneurial' discourses and representations focused on urban revitalization, reinvestment and rejuvenation

Figure 2.1: Destructive and creative moments of neoliberal urbanisation (Source: Brenner et al, 2005)

dealers and squatters. This was exemplified by the development of well-publicised 'zero tolerance' policies. Laws against begging and sleeping in public spaces such as parks and sidewalks were used to adjust city spaces to the taste and interests of the middle and upper classes. Yet, according to Smith (1996), such practices have spread outside of New York and of the USA with the rise of neoliberal agendas. As local governments compete more intensely to attract wealthy investors, residents and tourists, they tend to display greater desire to control those individuals and groups deemed 'undesirable' or detrimental for the attraction of wealthy tourists, gentrifiers and private capital. Recognising the importance of local contexts, some researchers have attempted to examine to the degree to which the concept of the 'revanchist city' can be applied to European cities such as Glasgow (MacLeod, 2002) or Rotterdam (Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2005). They have found that elements of 'revanchism' have infiltrated urban policies but that there were major differences to the trends observed in New York by Smith.

Brenner et al (2005) also noted that, with the consolidation of the neoliberal project through time, local governments are increasingly adopting gentrification as a deliberate urban development strategy leading to a new geography of gentrification and increased socio-spatial polarisation (see Figure 2.1). The authors have built on Smith's argument. According to Smith (2002), the neoliberalisation of urban policies has resulted in gentrification evolving from a sporadic to a large-scale phenomenon in cities across the world. As neoliberalism becomes naturalised at the national and local scales, governments increasingly intend to remedy the problems of disadvantaged inner-city and suburban neighbourhoods through promoting an influx of middle/upper-class residents and activities into deprived areas and by facilitating the development of an appropriate residential and commercial building stock for this purpose (Smith, 2002). For Smith, during the second wave of gentrification, that is during the 'roll-back' period of the neoliberalisation process, local and central governments played a facilitative role in the redevelopment of inner-city locales and in their gentrification, notably by relaxing planning controls and assembling land for the benefit of the private sector. An example of such process is the redevelopment of the London Docklands under the Thatcher government of the 1980s. Yet, the progression of gentrification was mainly due to corporate investment in disinvested neighbourhoods, such as Soho in New York, that were seen as safe places for investment because of the presence of proto-gentrifiers, mostly artists with limited economic resources who helped to change middle-classes and upper-classes perceptions of such areas. During

that period, the gentrification process was contained to some extent due to the state's remaining commitment to certain aspects of Keynesianism which limited the removal of social-housing from central areas, and to the existence of significant anti-gentrification movements (Smith, 2002).

However, a new phase of gentrification, starting in the mid-1990s, is claimed to have emerged as central and local governments became more actively and more overtly involved in encouraging and orchestrating gentrification in association with the consolidation and spreading of the neoliberal project to an increasing number of countries (Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Smith, 2002). According to Hackworth and Smith (2001), the relationship between government policies and gentrification has been reinforced due to three factors. First, prolonged reductions in the availability of national public funds to implement local regeneration plans have put pressure on local governments to use gentrification as an alternative sources of tax revenue. Secondly, the profitable opportunities present in relatively easily gentrifiable districts (i.e. close to the city business district and with an absence of public housing) had already been largely exploited by the private sector during the 1980s. Private developers are less likely to invest in remaining locations, for instance areas further away from the centre or sites with public housing, which are seen as economically risky without state backing. Thirdly, as neoliberal ideas become hegemonic, a reduction in social-housing provision and even the destruction of social housing units which created obstacles to gentrification on potentially valuable sites became more widely accepted. New programmes such as HOPE VI in the USA, which allowed the demolition of social units without requiring one-to-one replacement, have replaced previous programmes which aimed to retain housing for poor households in the inner city (Hackworth and Smith, 2001).

The relationship between public policy and gentrification is not wholly novel (Smith, 2002; Lees and Ley, 2008). During the earlier wave of gentrification in the 1960s and 1970s, a number of public policies aided gentrification. For instance, post-war slum clearance programmes set up in many countries in the 1950s and 1960s led to the dismantling and displacement of a number of inner-city communities. Yet, during that period, local and central governments were still committed to the development of social-housing units for poor people, including within central districts. The influx of middle-class residents to working-class districts was generally an unforeseen effect of public policy rather than its having been promoted as a solution to the problem of inner-city

communities. The level of state involvement in the process and the scale of the process have dramatically altered:

> "Whereas state-sponsored post-war urban renewal in western cities helped to encourage scattered private-market gentrification, that gentrification and the intensified privatization of inner-city land and housing markets since the 1980s has, in turn, provided the platform on which large-scale multifaceted urban regeneration plans, far outstripping 1960s urban renewal, are established. The current language of urban regeneration, particularly in Europe, is not one-dimensional, but it bespeaks, among other things, a generalization of gentrification in the urban landscape." (Smith, 2002: 438-439).

> "Whereas the key actors in Glass's story were assumed to be middle- and upper-middle-class immigrants to a neighbourhood, the agents of urban regeneration thirty-five years later are governmental, corporate, or corporate-governmental partnerships. A seemingly serendipitous, unplanned process that popped up in the post-war housing market is now, at one extreme, ambitiously and scrupulously planned." (Smith, 2002: 439).

The literature focusing on the relation between public policies and gentrification is sparse. Yet, a few accounts in the USA (Hackworth, 2007), the UK (Lees, 2008) and Ireland (Kelly and MacLaran, 2004; Kelly, 2008) have confirmed that a new form of state-led gentrification has emerged. These authors have shown how under the guise of 'social mixing' or 'urban renaissance', local and central governments have promoted the gentrification of inner-city locales. Kelly (2008) has shown that the state has played a crucial role in the recent gentrification of inner Dublin. In contrast to other cities, Dublin showed little evidence of any significant gentrification prior to 1990 but, from the mid-1990s, the process of gentrification intensified and became more widespread (Kelly and MacLaran, 2004; Kelly, 2008). In a first phase, the introduction by central government of tax-incentives for property-based renewal facilitated gentrification in Dublin. After an initial phase of entrepreneurialism, during which time the local authority was largely marginalised in policy formulation by central government, the local authority has modified its mode of operation and a new phase of entrepreneurialism has emerged (see McGuirk and MacLaran, 2001). Deepening commitment to an entrepreneurial ethos in the local authority has meant that the local state has been particularly active in selling the city for capital over the past 15 years (Kelly, 2008). Kelly identified key policies relating to the provision of housing affected by a deepened entrepreneurialism. She highlights how, under the guise of encouraging 'social mixing', the local authority has withdrawn from providing new social-housing units in a number of inner-city locales in which it is deemed that there is a sufficient percentage of publicly owned accommodations. She notes that the availability of housing for low-income groups in the central area of Dublin has declined due to the sale of sites previously earmarked for social accommodation and due to the opening up of new neighbourhoods, mainly comprised of social units to private capital.

She demonstrates that the reliance on tax-incentivised residential and commercial redevelopment has resulted in significant price increases in the private sector. These processes have resulted in a severe housing crisis and the displacement of low-income groups from the inner city. Inner-city locales traditionally used for working-class activities and residence have therefore been re-colonised for middle-class consumption (Kelly and MacLaran, 2004; Kelly, 2008). These evolutions have been attributed to a rise of a neoliberal agenda in the city and to a growing authoritarianism in local government, despite a seemingly opening up of formal avenues for participation in the policy-making process (Kelly, 2008; MacLaran, Clayton and Brudell, 2007). The phenomenon of 'gentrification' studied by Kelly differs from the process observed by Glass (1964) in London, as a high proportion of units are newly-built rather than comprising old units upgraded by individuals owners. Yet, one common trait is the class transformation of the areas concerned justifying the use of the term gentrification (see also Slater et al, 2004 for a debate on the definition of gentrification).

Efforts to examine the role of public policies in the recent gentrification of Dublin have not been matched by similar attempts in Paris, nor indeed in France more generally, with the notable exception of Rousseau's (2008) research. Rousseau (2008) illustrated how local government in Roubaix has recently attempted to address physical and economic decline by devising a culturally-led regeneration strategy aiming to attract middle-class residents and business activities.

However, a few studies in the late 1960s and early 1970s did point to the detrimental effects of post-war renewal policies in Paris on low-income groups (Coing, 1966; Groupe de Sociologie Urbaine de Nanterre, 1970). They demonstrated that public policies which intended to improve housing conditions in districts with a high presence of low-income populations actually resulted in their displacement either to suburban social-housing complexes or to other deprived neighbourhoods of central Paris. More recently, Lidgi's (2001) examination of planning policies in the 20th *arrondissement* of Paris during the 1980s and 1990s revealed that under the Chirac and Tiberi mandates, such policies were geared towards the interests of higher-income groups and resulted in strong protest from organised groups such as the *Bellevilleuse*. In contrast, most contemporary French studies of gentrification are concerned with the experience of gentrifiers moving into working-class districts. For instance, Mandel (2005) interviewed gentrifying households regarding their motivations in settling in the Château Rouge area of Paris, while Clerval (2008) examined the practices of gentrifiers living in the 10th and 11th *arrondissement* and

concluded that they do not interact with low-income households. Bidou-Zachariasen and Poltorak (2008) observed similar trends in another sub-area (Sainte-Marthe) of the 10th *arrondissement*. They distinguished two sub-groups of gentrifiers possessing different cultural and economic resources. This appears to impact on their level of involvement in the neighbourhood. Thus, overall, there remains a dearth of research on the process of gentrification in France[2]. Nonetheless, it is generally claimed that gentrification in French cities in recent decades is mainly the result of 'spontaneous' rather than orchestrated processes and the relationship between gentrification and public policies is rarely investigated (see Authier and Bidou-Zachariasen, 2008). Yet, Clerval (2007) rightfully wonders what actual impacts the arrival of middle- and upper-class populations have had on local policies, given the such groups readily admit to lobbying local politicians in order to affect change in their neighbourhoods according to their own preferences and interests.

Thus, the literature points to the existence of geographical variations in neoliberal regeneration policies but also stresses the constant evolution of the neoliberal project. Therefore, temporal variations are also to be expected.

2. 3. Community Participation: Theory, Practice and Neoliberal Agenda

Community participation has become a major consideration in the discourse of policy-makers from local through to international levels. Change towards new modes of governance has often been stimulated by international and European discourses and policy (see e.g. UN-HABITAT, 2003) and justified by the perceived weakness of traditional methods of decision making associated with representative democracy, which have been described as opaque and compartmentalised. These critiques have led to requests for the opening of policy networks to new actors through participation and inter-sectoral coordination. The dominant rhetoric is usually optimistic, stressing that more participation is necessarily better. Although the imperative for participation and community involvement has increased, critical engagement with the notion and the purpose of participation has perhaps been lacking. Instead, within both the policy-making and the academic arenas, attention has been focused on developing better tools and mechanisms for participation (see Sarkissian, 2004; Unesco, 2000). As Burton (2003) stressed in his

[2] Most of French research on gentrification is incorporated in a single book published in 2003 and a special issue of the journal *Espaces et Sociétés*, published in 2008.

review of the recent literature on public involvement in neighbourhood regeneration, there is, with a few exceptions, wide support for greater community participation. Therefore, the literature on the topic tends to focus on practical obstacles to participation rather than on the intrinsic value of the principle and its actual impacts on the decision-making process or on social inequalities generally (Burton, 2003). In other words, participation has largely been endorsed as improving the decision-making process. Consequently, the establishment of participatory structures is perceived as a new tool necessary to deliver 'good' governance. Yet, Swyngedouw (2005) invites us to question the assumptions behind the positive rhetoric about new governance structures:

> "In a context of perceived or real 'state failure' on the one hand and attempts to produce systems of 'good' governance on the other, institutional ensembles of governance based on such horizontally networked tripartite composition are viewed as empowering, democracy enhancing and more effective forms of governing compared with the sclerotic, hierarchical and bureaucratic state forms that conducted the art of governing during much of the 20th century. While these innovation figures of governance often offer the promise of greater democracy and grassroots empowerment, they also exhibit a series of contradictory tendencies." (Swyngedouw, 2005: 1992).

First, many contemporary optimistic conceptual accounts of new forms of citizen participation and partnerships fail to acknowledge the power differentials between differential stakeholders and there is an unspoken assumption that differences are merely superficial and not sufficiently profound to prevent consensus from emerging (Cochrane, 2003). Such conceptual accounts often fail to acknowledge their own ideological basis and rest on the unstated belief of the possibility for a pluralist model of democracy to emerge.

MacLaran and McGuirk (2003) have provided a useful summary of the main characteristics of pluralism. Pluralist theorists claim that power is spread among many different groups within society that compete with one another to control public policy, with no particular group dominating the policy-making process. Instead, it is argued that while some groups dominate in some political arenas, other groups and interests tend to dominate other governmental decisions. In essence, the pluralist conception of the policy-making process contends that the state (elected and executives political officials) acts as a 'broker' and a neutral arbiter between competing and conflicting interests groups in order to serve the 'public interest' and is able to ensure that none of the group dominate the agenda-setting and decision-making process (MacLaran and McGuirk, 2003). In this perspective, citizens are perceived to have relatively equal resources, ability to organise and equal access to decision-makers.

For instance, in a representative democracy model, it is assumed that all citizens have a voice in government through the election of representatives who serve as intermediaries between themselves and the government. Elected representatives are in turn supposed to convey the interests and desires of their electorate and the government to be responsive to the wishes of the people. Yet, representation is not always equally accessible for all people in a nation. Cultural norms and social power structures have often constrained the participation of certain groups such as women, ethnic minorities and lower-income groups. Moreover, when voters cast their vote, their choice of candidate is not necessarily motivated by their adhesion to his/her ideas, but may rather reflect their condemnation of the other candidates' views. Pluralists are in favour of a system which offers competing interest groups different points of access to government officials to present their arguments (Janda et al, 2008). They support decentralised structures of government and a system in which power is divided amongst a large number of institutions. The setting of forums and participatory structures where different groups can voice their opinions is generally viewed as a means of improving access to government and the decision-making process. It is assumed that bureaucrats will be equally responsive to these different claims and will be able to accommodate them by providing solutions that are mutually beneficial to all, insisting on the possibility that conflicting interests can be reconciled within the current model of social and economic organisation (MacLaran and McGuirk, 2003). Therefore, a pluralist analysis would regard current policies which promote participation and partnerships as opportunities to redress the balance between different interest groups and would be optimistic regarding the impact of such structures (Taylor, 2000).

This set of propositions has been criticised for being over-optimistic about the actual distribution of power in society and the functioning of governments. Pluralist fail to recognise the existence of fundamental differences in resources between different classes, interest groups and communities, which greatly affect their ability to mobilise and access necessary knowledge and influential decision-makers. Therefore, without prior redistribution of social power, political pluralism may indeed result in the unequal treatment of demands emerging from groups with diverging interests or limit debate and concessions to occur on small issues, allowing the status quo to remain at other levels (MacLaran and McGuirk, 2003). In planning policies, such interpretations have contributed to the promotion of planners and policy administrators as being objective and unbiased experts and of planning as an inclusive activity (MacLaran and McGuirk, 2003). Such apolitical approaches have been criticised for obscuring rather than enhancing the debate

on urban democracy, partnerships and participation in the past and there is a risk of repeating the same mistakes in contemporary debates (Harding, 1996).

In fact, community participation is not a totally novel policy tool. Community involvement in urban policy and planning policy was promoted in the 1960s and rediscovered in the 1990s (Taylor, 2000), although it has been reframed in a language of 'partnership' between different 'stakeholders' and of the local state as an 'enabler'. In countries such as the UK, this rediscovery and the participatory turn in planning in the 1990s has given a new legitimacy to planners and local governments who had been marginalised by the policies of the political Right during the 1980s (Hague and Jenkins, 2005). In fact, after gaining support in the 1960s and 1970s, the issue of community involvement had been displaced by discourses focusing on market solutions to the problem of urban decay in the 1980s. Yet, even when supported by policy makers' discourse, the ability of local communities to affect local decisions had been questioned during the late 1960s. It is useful here to re-examine the seminal work of Arnstein (1969).

An early contribution to the debate on public participation in planning was provided by Arnstein's work on urban programmes in the USA in the 1960s and her famous 'ladder of citizen participation' (Arnstein, 1969). She challenged the idea that planning is an apolitical activity and that planners act in practice as neutral arbiters. She criticised embellished rhetorical accounts depicting participation as simply a means for the 'have-nots' to have their interests and needs taken into account by decision-makers. Instead, she highlighted that participation is a political activity suffused with tensions. She used the reproduction of a French poster to remind her readers that people other than the participants may profit from their participation (Figure 2.2).

She stressed the existence of significant inequalities in the resources which could be commanded by disadvantaged community groups and those of other more powerful groups including public institutions. Therefore, she analysed citizen involvement in decision making from the point of view of the redistribution of power. The ladder depicted participation as a power struggle between citizens attempting to gain control and powerful institutions such as planning authorities limiting their ascent to the 'top' and constraining, whether deliberately or not, their ability to claim such power. Recognising that society is riven with economic, social and political divisions, she argued that citizen participation should be a process by which power is redistributed, enabling those 'have-not' citizens traditionally excluded from political and economic processes to be included in the future and share in the wealth of the affluent. She claimed that genuine participation would entail

a redistribution of power and that any other form of participation would be "an empty and frustrating process for the powerless", which would nonetheless allow "the power holders to claim that all sides were considered, but [would] make it possible for only some of those sides to benefit" (Arnstein, 1969: 216). Therefore, she sought to devise a typology of participation, which would distinguish processes that involved some redistribution of power and influence on the outcomes of the programmes from practices likely to maintain the status quo.

She proposed a ladder metaphor for citizen engagement in decision-making and differentiated eight different levels of participation, each rung of the ladder representing a different level of devolution of power to citizens (see Figure 2.3).



Figure 2.2: French student poster. In English, "I participate, you participate, he participates, we participate, you *participate...they profit.*"
(Source: Arnstein, 1969)

These ranged from manipulation, at the bottom rung, where participation is used as a public-relations exercise, to citizen control, at the top, covering situations in which citizens have control over the plan. In fact, the eight rungs were each divided into three sub-categories. At the lowest level, Arnstein identified two forms of 'non-participation', which were respectively termed 'manipulation' and 'therapy'. According to Arnstein, some local governments had set up participatory structures, which aimed at enticing citizens to accept a pre-defined plan rather than allowing a redistribution of power to occur. The next three rungs were defined as three forms of participation that amounted to 'tokenism', preserving the uneven distribution of power. They included 'informing', a one-way communication

mechanism from officials to citizens; 'consultation', which provided opportunities for the voices of citizens to be heard but no guarantee that their views would be taken into account; and 'placation', which entailed offering a seat for a handful of citizens on the board of public agencies but ensured that powerholders retained the right to decide.

	Degrees of Citizen Power	
8	Citizen control	Participants and residents are able to control a program or an institution, govern policy managerial aspects, and negotiate the conditions under which "outsiders" can make changes
7	Delegated power	Negotiations occur between citizens and public officials that give citizens the power to make decisions and maintain control over plans and programs
6	Partnership	Power is redistributed through negotiation between citizens and power holders and they agree to share planning and decision making responsibilities
	Degrees of Tokenism	
5	Placation	Occurs when ground rules allow the have-nots to advise, but the power holders still have the decision-making power, truly appeasing citizens depends on the quality of technical support they have in expressing their priorities and the extent to which the community has been organised to argue for those priorities
4	Consultation	Involves inviting citizens' opinions (often through surveys, meetings, etc.); power holders gain evidence that they have gone through the necessary steps for involving "those people"
3	Informing	Involves advising citizens of their rights,responsibility and opinions; often involves one-way communication(from officials to citizens) with no means for citizens to express their opinions and no power for negotiation
	Non-Participation	
2	Cynical consultation / Therapy	Power holders involve citizens in extensive activity, but the focus is on curing them of their "pathology" instead of changing the social structure that create their "pathologies"
1	Civic hype / Manipulation	Citizens are arranged on advisory committees or boards merely to "educate" them or to get their support; participation becomes distorted into the power holders' public relations instrument

Figure 2.3: Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation
(Source: Redmond 2003: 53 after Arnstein, 1969)

Further up the ladder were three rungs, which offered some form of power over the decision-making process. These included 'partnership', which allowed a certain degree of negotiation and bargaining to occur; followed by 'delegated power', covering programmes for which citizens gained a dominant position in the decision-making process through negotiation with public officials; and the highest rung, 'citizen control', where sufficient resources and power were devolved to allow citizens to control a plan. Arnstein contended that most of the participation mechanisms she studied belonged to the categories at the

bottom of the ladder and she stressed that often when power was shared between the statutory and the community sector, power had been gained by the citizens rather than given away by the powerholders. This statement highlighted the importance for citizens to control the rules of engagement including through contestation rather than simply by engaging in processes predefined by external actors.

Arnstein admitted that her typology had certain limitations, pointing out, for instance, that the 'ladder of citizen participation' is based on a separation of society into two groups, the powerless and the powerholders while, in practice, neither group is homogeneous and disadvantaged communities can comprise divergent views and interests. Secondly, she recognised that her typology did not account for other potential constraints preventing genuine participation, including factors such a lack of knowledge, time or organisational capacity of the participants and resistance to change of professional practices and cultures among the planners. Thirdly, the use of a limited number of rungs was acknowledged as representing a simplification of reality and she stated that, in practice, more nuances would exist.

Yet, the strength of Arnstein's analysis rests in its ability to highlight the existence of differential power relations affecting the process. This classification can be very useful in identifying and warning against the most manipulative forms of the process. The typology strongly warns potential participants that participation can encompass a wide variety of process, not all being liberating and empowering and warns against the dangers of uncritically accepting offers of participation without appropriate clarification of what is on offer. Since then, other authors have offered different versions and nuances of the original ladder (see for instance Pretty, 1995, quoted in Jones, 2003: 590) better to reflect their case-studies or their areas of enquiry (health services, environment management, etc.) in the spirit of Arnstein, by focusing on different levels of power and emphasising the outcomes of participation. Yet, more recently, the image of a ladder has been supplemented by the metaphor of the 'wheel of participation' (see Davidson, 1998). The authors of this alternative metaphor were local municipal practitioners from Glasgow who criticised the hierarchical nature of the ladder for implying that higher rungs should be the ultimate aim of all participation exercises. They used the image of the wheel to convey the idea that different types of engagement are legitimate for different contexts and circumstances (Davidson, 1998). Their emphasis was on identifying and reviewing a wide range of methods and tools that can be used to inform (e.g. press releases and exhibitions), consult (e.g. surveys and focus groups), participate (e.g. citizens' juries and planning for

real) or empower (e.g. delegation to tenants' organisations) stakeholders, since in their views "expectations from participation have not materialised due to the use of inappropriate techniques and unclear objectives" (Davidson, 1998).



Figure 2.4: Davidson's Wheel of Participation
(Source: Davidson, 1998)

Although this approach may be useful to develop guidelines and 'best practice' models for local authorities and planners, such analysis diverts attention from broader issues concerning the distribution of power in society and its impact on participatory exercises. It regards participation as a goal in itself, providing the 'correct' procedure to enable people to have an input or negotiate within existing programmes rather than a means to overcome social inequalities and transform communities. It is an approach in which the aims and limits of participation and power are established by the managerial system itself. It diverts attention from the goals and outcomes to the tools of policy and therefore debates on the

appropriateness of the policy-making process risk increasingly to focus on the methods used rather than on whose class interests are served.

This change in emphasis is, in part, due to calls in academic and governmental debates to move towards favouring strategies that seek to solve issues of exclusion by promoting the recognition of difference and diversity. It had become 'best practice' to find means actively to engage a multiplicity of interest groups in the policy-making process and especially to give recognition to minority groups such as the disabled or minority ethnic groups. In this respect, the work of post-structuralist theorists has contributed to displace issues of redistribution and, to some extent, replace them by issues of recognition (Perrons and Skyers, 2003). Post-structuralists condemn analyses that focus on class oppression as the primary source of exploitation in society because, in their views, such approaches tends to neglect other forms of domination based on grounds other than class, such as gender, ethnicity or sexuality (see MacLaran and M^{c}Guirk, 2003). They contest the Marxist perspective and do not see power inequalities stemming necessarily from economic inequalities. For them, a 'fairer' society may be achieved not through redistribution but by recognition of diverse values and cultures. Therefore, policy-makers and planners are invited to celebrate diversity and devise plans that can accommodate a diversity of ways of living. Yet, this celebration of diversity is not without shortcomings. First, such discourse could easily be employed to recast an 'unequal' society into a 'diverse' society (MacLaran and M^{c}Guirk, 2003). By highlighting the fragmentation of society, it may lead to the multiplication to social movements defending particular cultural lifestyle but render the emergence of a unified movement based on more universal struggles difficult (Miller, 2007). Moreover, such approaches focus on identifying differences rather than on the processes that led people to "be located in specific racialized, sexual and social spaces" and, therefore, instead of challenging the wider structures sustaining the injustices, the solutions are centred on changing individual behaviours or including non-dominant groups in policy-making arenas (Perrons and Skyers, 2003: 268). Yet, it is questionable whether recognition alone can remedy exclusion or is only one aspect of the solution. As Perrons and Skyers (2003) stressed:

> "An inclusive society would certainly require all contribute to decision-making, but unless these decisions concern resource use and involve redistribution they are likely to be limited in effect, that is inclusion involves recognition and redistribution." (Perrons and Skyers, 2003: 267).

Lastly, post-structuralist approaches adhere to a reformist vision of the state; they are based on a strong faith in the capacity of the state to transform social relations. Without

denying that the state can implement some reforms, from a Marxian perspective such reforms are ultimately constrained by the overarching imperative to maintain conditions conducive to capital accumulation. A Marxian perspective has the advantage to question the extent to which local or individual reforms such as socially innovative bottom-up initiatives can prosper and, by themselves, lead to broader societal transformations in the absence of prior changes in the current model of economic and social organisation at national and supranational levels or without more sweeping shifts in macro-regulation.

Perrons and Skyers (2003) have substantiated this claim by examining the effectiveness of giving recognition to traditionally excluded groups by including them in the policy-making process. They used a regeneration programme in the London Borough of Hackney as a case study and concluded that access to material resources remained central to people living in deprived areas and that unless the included voices are given some control over the distribution of resources, inequalities will be reduced only marginally. People included in the local arenas of policy development could not affect processes such as the functioning of property and labour markets whose origin lay beyond the local area. Consequently, although participation had been positive for a few tenant representatives who had gained inter-personal skills, knowledge and a sense of having some influence on their surrounding, this had not led to radical change. Nonetheless, they recognised that local participation may have positive impacts if it leads to political awareness and to the mobilisation on broader issues.

Other contradictions challenge the idea that new forms of governance favouring policy making through the interaction of a wide range of actors through horizontal and networked relations may increase democracy and citizens' empowerment.

New ways of governing are seen as superseding hierarchical and top-down forms of rule setting. Yet, some serious issues, which question the democratic quality of the new settings, can be identified (Swyngedouw, 2005). First, in the traditional system of governance, some elected body was, at least in theory, accountable to the public and could be sanctioned or rewarded for its decisions through the election process. However, the new structures are not necessarily led by elected members, leaving the whole question of accountability wide open (Elander, 2002). The absence of strict procedures and rules while potentially allowing the adaptation of policy to local needs can, in practice, result in the rules guiding the institutions to become very opaque and subject to constant change and may also result in tyrannical decisions (Swyngedouw, 2005). Similarly, Jones (2003) demonstrated that community representatives are often brought into arrangements created

by powerful local authorities; the working of the new institutions and the participants' role in them, even if not explicitly exposed, is often controlled by the public sector rather than defined and agreed freely by the citizens. The absence of clear procedures and rules can also render challenging decisions difficult. Secondly, there are significant issues in terms of who is entitled to participate. Although the new structures aim to be inclusive by integrating multiple stakeholders, they often remain dominated by local political and economic élites (Jouve, 2007; Swyngedouw, 2005). In fact, business actors tend to benefit from current restructuring as they gain greater direct access to the political sphere than in the past. Although economic actors have in the past benefited from privileged access to decision-makers, notably through behind-the-scenes discussions, the promotion of new forms of governance involving the state, the private sector and civil society legitimise private business involvement in policy; such involvement becomes a stated objective of policy and is naturalised as positive for all (Jouve, 2007). Another issue concerns the difficulty in ascertaining whether civil society representatives are effectively representing their 'community' and it can be difficult to identify how they get mandates from and feed back into their community base. In fact, Jones (2003) identified community representatives who, once in situation of power, fail to act on behalf of the interests they are deemed to serve. Taylor (2000) also noticed that some groups tend to be alienated from the process; established and well-known groups tended to dominate in a number of participatory structures. Moreover, despite a discourse encouraging capacity building, constraints such as time and resources are still not sufficiently recognised. Swyngedouw (2005) further noted that the attribution of representative status is a highly political process and that closer attention should be given to the possibility for both the state and powerful groups to manipulate such representation.

McCulloch (2004) examined how the local community was represented in a governmental regeneration programme, which required strong engagement with local communities in the definition of the redevelopment plan in order to ensure local support for the programme and its adequacy to disadvantaged people's needs. The programme studied was a British initiative named 'New Deal for Communities' set up by the New Labour central government in 1998, the author using the city of Newcastle upon Tyne as a case-study. McCulloch (2004) illustrated how conflicts over the question of legitimate representation emerged between representatives from the 'community' and professionals from different public agencies. A first bid to the government was rejected because there was insufficient evidence of participation from the local community. Consequently, a

partnership structure was set up, including local people volunteering to be community representatives, local councillors and representatives of public agencies, such as the health service or the police. The community representatives held a majority of seats on the partnership, giving them potentially a high level of control over the plan. Yet, in practice, their input into the plan was limited. The first draft of the plan was devised by private consultants, which collected local ideas through meetings with the local population and wrote the draft with the support of paid community-regeneration workers from the main public agencies. Once the bid was won, focus groups were set up in order to define and identify special projects that would receive funds in order to reach the plan's objectives. Although the selected projects needed further approval from the partnership and were subjected to community scrutiny through this structure, the latter were not involved in the initial choice. This was a crucial stage of the decision-making process, in which community representation was mainly accepted in the form of paid community-development workers hired by the public institutions. Therefore, professional middle-class officers from the partner agencies, rather than people from the neighbourhood itself, selected the projects that reached the board for approval. The true locus of power resided in the focus groups, which led the process. The professional community workers perceived themselves as representing and having a grassroots-based agenda. However, these claims were challenged by the unpaid community representatives living in the area. In their views, the paid development workers acted as gatekeepers, preventing alternative projects from being considered. They had concerns regarding the nature of the projects which were selected as they felt that they would benefit the outside professional workers and their attached institutions rather than the local community. Consequently, the approval process and the release of funds were slow; many abstained from voting, while others left. Local unpaid representatives did not constitute a unified group and had difficulty organising themselves around common interests. Their sole commonality was their negative view of community workers. They failed to organise a resistance movement and lacked resources to produce an alternative plan. The fear of losing the public subsidies led ultimately to the approval of a number of projects by the partnership, thanks to the abstention of local representatives rather than through their support. Yet, for the outside evaluators, the community had been represented.

McCulloch (2004) questioned the legitimacy of this representation. He highlighted that middle-class well-educated professionals living outside the area and owning their homes were speaking on behalf of other groups not because local people had entrusted

them to do so but because powerful institutions considered them as legitimate actors. They gained such legitimacy because of their training and their ability to speak the language of policy makers. Therefore, the author concluded that it was debatable whether the project could be defined as community-led and argued the process was still a top-down way of governing. His findings converge with those of Taylor (2007), supporting the idea that existing power holders define the 'rules of the game' and that only a few privileged persons are able to gain access. In her study of community participation in neighbourhood renewal, Taylor (2007) noted that in a significant number of cases, the power holders constructed the 'community' as people with similar characteristics to themselves. Moreover, communities are not homogeneous; not all people in a locality have inclusive attitudes towards issues like race, gender or age. Those who become recognised as representatives may have a limited and exclusive agenda; a few residents may hijack the participation process, resulting in tyrannical decisions (Robinson et al, 2005).

Taylor (2007) also noted that representatives with ties in the community risked becoming 'professionalised' as their role demanded the assimilation of new skills and knowledge, with the possibility of their being co-opted as they tended to internalise the values of their new peers in the process and became detached from their constituency. In fact, some of the literature expresses concern that, by becoming involved, community activists may become incorporated, obtaining little for their community but losing their ability to contest decisions (Cochrane, 2003). Taylor (2007) found that some community participants who depended on partners for funding, even indirectly, tended to avoid taking on an advocacy role or criticising public institutions actions through fear of affecting funding decisions. However, despite finding some evidence of incorporation in some renewal schemes, Taylor (2007) argued against embracing a pessimistic and simple model of incorporation. She stressed that while there were community groups incorporating new cultures and taking on extra work with little benefits, there were a few examples of communities, which managed to manipulate prevailing discourses to their advantage and were able to gain more.

McCulloch (2004) raised further concern about the broader impacts which professional community workers could have on national debates on social exclusion. He noted that a number of professional community workers, notably in the Community Development Projects (CDPs), financed by the Home Office and engaged in similar area-based initiatives promoting community involvement in the late 1960s and early 1970s ended up doubting and criticising openly the capacity of area-based interventions to address

structural inequalities. Their reports, such as 'Gilding the ghetto' argued that such schemes brought only cosmetic solutions to deprivation and that the roots of local problems were capitalism and the capitalist state itself; they also contested the idea that social exclusion had its roots in local people's incapacity to engage adequately in the labour market. McCulloch (2004) stressed that contemporary community workers have not produced similar radical criticism of state action. According to McCulloch (2004), this absence of critique is due to weaker ties between community workers and social science researchers compared to the late 1960s and early 1970s, as well as to a generally lower degree of support for social democracy in contemporary British society. In the UK, this may reflect a greater acceptance of governmental discourses, which suggest that people in disadvantaged areas bear some responsibility for their own situation and that solutions therefore reside in individuals becoming active citizens by improving their performance and, with the assistance of the state, adapting to the requirements of the market (McCulloch, 2004). Responsibility for social exclusion is thereby transferred onto civil society. Such reorientation can be traced to the ascendancy of neoliberal policies centred on deregulation, competition and individual achievement. Its development, since the 1980s, has been facilitated by state agencies' promotion of market values and by the ability of the latter to get a significant part of civil society to accept or conform to the market 'rules of the game'. Neoliberal values have infiltrated economic as well as social policies in the UK and the USA while factors such as the circulation of ideas through international experts and the high mobility of private capital have led to the adoption of similar pro-market policies in other national settings (Harvey, 2005).

Herein lies a major contradiction in the new urban policies debate; there is a tension between the stated objectives of increasing democracy and citizens' participation, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the rise of a neoliberal ethos promoting privatisation and marketisation in local and central government policies. Paradoxically, while there are increasing opportunities for citizens to have a voice in public decisions and increasing expectations for local governments to collaborate with community interests through new structures to devise emancipatory solutions to social problems, there is a high risk that such entities may be under strong pressure to conform to market-based solutions. In turn, such pressures affect the extent to which community activists can influence the nature of local projects such as local regeneration plans. In a context of creeping neoliberalism embracing economic efficiency and profitability, the question of how far alternative non-market based and socially innovative solutions can develop either through protest or partnership remains

an open and controversial issue. Thus, in a context where public policies are subjugated to the interests of capital in greater degrees and more overtly than previously, it is unclear whether participation from disadvantaged groups can be more than tokenistic.

Peck (2001) argues that the transfer of greater responsibility to the local state has not been accompanied by an equivalent transfer of power and that the setting of collaborative revitalisation initiatives forms part of a program of state restructuring along neoliberal lines. Such critics contend that community organisation accepting offers of collaboration in an global context of neoliberalism may see their actions and efforts serve the state's priorities rather than their community's interests. This may occur either thanks to the co-opting of local activists who distance themselves from their community-based agendas or, if consensus cannot be reached, through the authoritarian imposition of market discipline by the state. Similarly, Swyngedouw (2005) argued that new structures of governance are autocratic rather than democratic modes of governing, which exclude groups supporting alternatives such as socio-democratic or anti-privatisation strategies or circumvent their influence by diffusing dissent. Thus, while neoliberal discourses highlight freedom and choice, in practice, the range of public policy deemed worthy of consideration is reducing (Peck, 2001). Drudy and Punch (2005) highlighted such contradictions in relation to Dublin,

> "Indeed, it could be argued that the state is now acting as a broker for capital in this process, while co-opting dissent and assuaging working-class combativity by diverting it into the safe channels of participatory and consultative structures. Once "on the inside" of such consultative committees or boards, it is likely that many tenants and community representatives will feel less able to speak critically about any of the policies and projects, however uneasy or alarmed they might be. Moreover, these consultation processes are not as a rule subject to much external scrutiny, nor do they greatly influence the outcome beyond a few marginal concessions (for example, the appropriateness or otherwise of a PPP demolition and redevelopment is never up for negotiation)." (Drudy and Punch, 2005: 178).

There are only a few studies examining how the autocratic logic of neoliberal central-state policies may collide with the promotion of local innovation. However, some researchers in the UK have stressed that New Labour policy discourse encouraging 'bottom-up' solutions and community participation in urban regeneration is at odds with actions in other arenas (see Foley and Martin, 2000; Cochrane, 2003). For instance, according to Foley and Martin (2000) calls for flexibility and adaptation to local needs under the 'New Deal for Communities' regeneration scheme may be superseded by demands to achieve other centrally-defined criteria. In fact, in parallel, the authors rightly questioned how flexibility can be achieved as a new British programme, 'Best Value',

attempts to reinforce an auditing culture with strict criteria to meet centrally-defined targets and requirements to produce quick and measurable outcomes. Civil servants may have to choose between respecting performance indicators and community demands; if career advancement depends on the former, they may ignore local demands contradicting central government support of neoliberal approaches.

Empirical studies examining tensions between the pursuit of community-based urban regeneration on one hand and the increased legitimacy of neoliberalism as a guiding principle of public policy on the other hand are rare. Elwood (2002) provided the most optimist account. She aimed to examine precisely how much autonomy community organisations possessed under an increasingly neoliberal form of urban governance and to what extent they can challenge neoliberal regeneration initiatives. She examined the impact of community involvement in the regeneration of various disadvantaged neighbourhoods in the city of Minneapolis and challenged the idea that the state has managed to get community groups to accept the superiority of market solutions and co-opt them. She argued that a neoliberal approach to neighbourhood renewal promoting physical improvement and homeownership did not reach the local level uncontested. Interestingly, she showed that a few alternative visions emerged from community groups, which integrated in their regeneration plan measures to support the development of affordable housing or plans to support renters. While it is important to highlight that the acceptance of neoliberal ideology is not as widespread as one may believe, Elwood's (2002) conclusions may be over-optimistic about the actual influence of community groups. Although her research informs us of the possibility for community groups to have alternative, less market-driven visions integrated into local plans and local policies, it says little about the ability of such groups to have such visions implemented. In fact, the author based her research on a review of the content of agreed local plans rather than on the nature of implemented plans, because the state failed to monitor rigorously the implementation process or keep records of the measures actually implemented. Yet, clearly, the integration of inclusive objectives is not sufficient to guarantee their implementation.

Other authors are more pessimistic regarding the democratic qualities of new governance structures. For instance, Davies' research (2007) examined partnership arrangements bringing together private sector, state and community interests to develop local projects addressing social exclusion issues in Hull and Dundee. He observed that the protagonists had very different interpretations of what empowerment meant, which could not be reconciled through debate as each party lacked a basic understanding of way the

other party was thinking. Consensus about the course of action to be adopted could not be reached as there was disagreement about the very meaning and purpose of empowerment. Conflict was not resolved through debate, as idealised by communicative theorists but, instead, resulted in the powerful actors imposing their views on subordinate groups. When conflict did occur, centrally-defined objectives failed to be implemented, local public managers were able to dismantle existing structures for participation and replace them with new arrangements, in which community activists were peripheral insiders, sitting at the table but unable to influence central issues. For the public managers, partnership was about better coordination and use of public funds. For the community activist, it meant having a voice, experimenting and accessing funding for innovative projects. Davies (2007) concluded that participation structures failed to bring about more democratic decisions, as they were set within a broader framework of general support for neoliberal principles at central level, which required that government decisions conform to the rationale of economic efficiency and profitability. Despite the appearances, the path of action was pre-determined rather than defined locally. Participation was one of the indicators used by central government to evaluate local government performance but, ultimately, public managers felt that ignoring local voices was justified as acting otherwise would have led local government to fare badly in other more important areas, such as value for money.

González and Vigar's (2008) account also warns against being over-optimistic about the possibility of bottom-up, grassroots-based actions to change to 'rules of the game', that is to transform authoritarian state institutions and get counter-hegemonic projects to develop. They examined how community activists mobilised to prevent the gentrification of an inner-city site and the implementation of a property-led type of regeneration in Newcastle, England. They showed that in spite of the existence of favourable conditions, including well-resourced and well-organised community interests as well allies in the public authority who supported community-based regeneration, the community activists had only limited success in shaping the redevelopment outcomes. A pervasive discourse of neoliberalism, the lack of financial independence of the local state and a high level of central government control on local policies meant that a truly alternative model of redevelopment was not implemented. Community activists managed to stop some of the larger high-density development schemes that only provided accommodation for the well-off. Yet, they failed to get the local authority to design a scheme that truly reflected their views of redevelopment; this would have included considerably more housing for the disadvantaged and greater preservation of the built and

natural environment (González and Vigar, 2008). The authors concluded that such failure could in part be attributed to the state's greater reliance on private capital to achieve its goals in recent decades but also to the inability of the local activists to link with other groups fighting the imposition of market logic in other neighbourhoods. The authors' sentiment is that, paradoxically, governmental call for greater citizen participation and social inclusion is counter-balanced by the extension of market principles to all aspects of economic and social life. In these conditions, according to González and Vigar's (2008), resistance against hegemonic capitalist practices is not entirely futile but the space for alternative ideas to develop and succeed is very limited. However, the authors rightly argued that there might be space for alternative and less market-driven projects in other national contexts, where the pervasion of neo-liberal ideas is less pronounced than in the UK. Up to date, cities located in either the UK or the USA have been the main focus of studies examining how and to what extent neoliberal priorities have been advanced, negotiated or challenged at the neighbourhood level through neighbourhood-based regeneration programmes. This may be explained by the fact that these countries represent the 'heartland' of neoliberalism. Similar projects developed later in other contexts; they arrived in different places through several different channels and encountered different levels of resistance, as they displaced existing institutions and practices, resulting in a hybridisation of the neoliberal project.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND INFORMATION SOURCES

This chapter outlines the aims of the research and describes the methodological approaches adopted to achieve these aims, presenting the sources and procedures used to collect data.

3.1. Research Aims

This research is concerned with the physical and social aspects of regeneration of inner-city disadvantaged neighbourhoods. It focuses on the regeneration of mixed-tenure neighbourhoods rather than on social-housing neighbourhoods. The research aims to trace the evolution of urban-regeneration policies in two different geographical contexts, paying attention to both temporal and geographical variations in governmental approach to regeneration. In Chapter 2, it was noted that the literature raised concerns regarding the implications for disadvantaged communities of the rise to hegemony of neoliberalism, notably in terms of their ability to have their voices heard, to resist the neoliberalisation of urban policies and have alternative views implemented. Nevertheless, the literature also drew attention to the hybrid nature of neoliberalism and stressed that public policies in a world increasingly dominated by different strands of neoliberal ideas and practices will not converge on a unique path, noting the importance of path-dependency and local contingency in the "rolling back" of Keynesian strategies and the "rolling out" of neoliberal policies and practices. Yet, there are few empirical accounts of variations in urban reforms. This research concentrates on filling this empirical gap.

The current research aims to identify how differences in socio-cultural and political contexts have impacted on urban regeneration policies. The thesis also strives to identify how different socio-political ideological contexts have shaped the ability of indigeneous communities to change the outcomes of regeneration. The study aims to explore differences from one socio-political context to another and investigate how political ideas and societal values shape regeneration policies. This is accomplished by drawing upon two case studies internationally; one in Paris and one in Dublin. The research examines changes in French and Irish national policy frameworks for urban regeneration. Secondly, it directs particular attention to the manner in which regeneration policy is implemented at the local scale and how such policies have evolved under the increasing influence of neoliberal agendas. It investigates local-governmental initiatives to address the issues of deprived neighbourhoods, keeping in mind central-government constraints, reviewing how

local governments engage with local communities in the design and implementation of such initiatives and the nature of the impacts of such programmes.

In summary, the research strategy comprises cross-cultural and temporal perspectives in an attempt to elicit key differences in the processes surrounding the evolution of urban regeneration which have arisen from the varying operations, intensity and impacts of actually-existing neoliberalism.

3.2. Methodological Approach

The study adopted a comparative methodology. Comparative work is valuable as it can provide a deeper understanding of a single issue than would be obtained through a single study. By confronting different ways of tackling a similar problem, the merits and limitations of different approaches are more easily identifiable. They can challenge taken-for-granted ways of thinking about particular problems and their solutions. One motivation for comparative studies can therefore be to learn from other countries' experience in order to develop 'better' policies. At another level, comparative studies can elucidate why governments follow certain courses of action and why certain policy instruments rather than others are engaged. By giving attention to cultural and ideological differences, they can contribute to understanding how similar constraints present at the global level unfold differently at local levels. However, for methodological and practical reasons, comparative studies are not easy to conduct. One obvious challenge is the language barrier, which explains why comparative studies are often set within the English-speaking world (USA and UK for instance). This limits the amount of knowledge that can be gained on different ways of conducting the policy-making process.

This research compares urban regeneration policy in two different socio-cultural systems characterised by marked political systems at national and local levels. It explores national policy and legislation, examining policy-making and implementation at the scale of two neighbourhoods, one in each capital city. The selected neighbourhoods, namely the Goutte d'Or /Château Rouge area in Paris and the Historic Area Rejuvenation Project (HARP) area in Dublin, presented similar characteristics and issues. They comprise inner-city areas with a concentration of physical and social problems and had been targeted by local government to implement national programmes of regeneration. While possessing key similarities, French and Irish society present important and interesting differences with regard to public policies and their outcomes. France has a legacy of a strong interventionist welfare state, while Ireland has a more conservative approach to the role of the state and

might more appropriately be described as a 'minimal welfare state'. While both states have experienced a growing influence of neoliberalism in public policy, key differences remain in the two societies with regard to the degree of acceptance of neoliberal ideas and practices and the level to which the neoliberal agenda in public policy has been contested. These factors represent key justifications for employing a comparative strategy involving France and Ireland.

Selection of case-study areas

An important stage of the research involved selecting areas suitable for investigating the manner in which local governments, under the growing influence of neoliberal agendas, have addressed the issues of deprived neighbourhoods in the contemporary era. This involved identifying areas facing similar problems in the capital city of both countries which had been targeted for public intervention after 1980 and over a sufficient period in order also to compare temporal variations in approaches. A first step involved identifying and gathering information on the districts located with central Paris and Dublin currently undergoing redevelopment or having recently been redeveloped.

In Paris, documents from the *Ville de Paris* and the *Atelier Parisien d'Urbanisme* indicated that the major areas being currently targeted by public policies were located on the periphery of the central city. In fact, in 2002, the local authority launched a major programme of renewal called *Grand Projet de Renouvellement Urbain* covering 11 neighbourhoods (Figure 3.1) aimed at redeveloping districts on the outskirts of Paris city characterised by an overrepresentation of unemployed and low-income people. These areas mainly comprised large brownfield sites and high-rise social housing complexes built in the 1960s possessing many similarities to suburban social-housing neighbourhoods built in the post-war era. These were being redeveloped in collaboration with suburban local governments and under a national programme of urban renewal (*politique de la ville*). However, they have little equivalent in Dublin, except for the Ballymun area.

Moreover, the objective of the study was to focus on policies for inner-city mixed neighbourhoods. Therefore, the *Grand Projet de Renouvellement Urbain* districts were deemed unsuitable for this research project. Information on more central districts being targeted under national and local policies for regeneration was therefore sought. A number of neighbourhoods facing both physical and social issues were identified. They were the Porte Saint-Denis/Porte Saint Martin area, the Belleville/Fontaine au Roi area and the Goutte d'Or area (see Figure 3.2).

The Porte Saint-Denis/ Porte Saint Martin area received little public attention in the 1980s and 1990s. It had been identified as in need of regeneration by the local authority at the start of the millennium. Central government designated the area as a priority zone (*politique de la ville* and ZUS districts). In 2001, the district became part of the Housing Improvement Programme (*Opérations programmées d'amélioration de l'habitat,* OPAH), which involves a joint contract between a local authority, the National Home Improvement Agency (ANAH) and the state to enable repairs to be coordinated and undertaken through public subsidies clusters of private-housing units over three to five years. This programme was mainly managed by the ANAH, rather than by the local authority, only a few isolated buildings were targeted for a short period and there was no overall plan for the area. This area therefore presented limited interest for studying the dynamics of local regeneration policy over time.



Figure 3.1: *Grand Projet de Renouvellement Urbain*, 11 districts
(Source: Ville de Paris, 2002)



Figure 3.2: Urban Renewal Areas in Paris, 2003
(Source: APUR, 2003)

The Belleville sub-area of the Belleville/Fontaine au Roi area was targeted for redevelopment in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A plan was produced by the *Ville de Paris* in 1989 and the area was later integrated into the national *politique de la ville* programme. Regeneration took place in the locality throughout the 1990s. Although the area has been identified as needing further intervention and remains defined as a priority zone by central government (politique de la vile and ZUS district), no regeneration plan has been submitted to the new national agency, the ANRU, which has managed the current national urban renewal programme initiated in 2003. Funds have mainly been sought to set up local social programmes in the Fontaine au Roi sub-area, while a few housing blocks throughout the 20th *arrondissement* have been integrated in a Housing Improvement Programme managed by the ANAH.

The Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge area was of greater interest for the research. Part of the Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge area (referred to only as Goutte d'Or in Figure 3.2[3]) was targeted for redevelopment in the 1980s, while the drafting of a new plan for the second part of the area was initiated in the mid-1990s. A first draft was created in 2001 and an amended version was submitted to the ANRU in 2004. The first plan was designed between 1983 and 1985, implemented throughout the 1990s and completed by 2004, while the implementation of the second plan is still ongoing. Therefore, the Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge area had characteristics of particular interest for this research. It was a district where local and central government action could be investigated over a significant period, thereby imparting a valuable temporal perspective.

In Paris, it was particularly important to select an area targeted recently for renewal since neoliberal practices have been slower to make their way into French society. Focusing only on a regeneration project initiated in the 1980s, even if it were implemented over a long period, would have probably failed to identify recent changes in approach due to the increasing penetration of neoliberal practices in France after 2002[4] and thereby run the risk of overemphasising any differences between Ireland and France. Such considerations justified adopting Château Rouge as a suitable case study for the research.

Similarly, in Dublin, data was sought on districts recently targeted for redevelopment. The city has undergone considerable redevelopment over the last two decades. A first model of redevelopment set up in 1986 involved designating inner-city areas for tax-based incentives to developers, investors and homeowners. It was accompanied by the creation of a special purpose agency to regenerate the docklands area, the local authority having been largely by-passed in the definition and implementation of such schemes. A second approach introduced in the early 1990s resulted in the re-creation

---

[3] The name Goutte d'Or has been given to different districts of Paris. The 71st administrative district of Paris is called Goutte d'Or. The southern part of the 71st administrative targeted by the *politique de la ville* programme is also named Goutte d'Or. Yet, locally, Goutte d'Or refers to a smaller area, limited to the southern part of *politique de la ville* area, whereas the northern part of *politique de la ville* area is referred to as Château Rouge. In this thesis, except if otherwise stated, the term Goutte d'Or will be used to refer to the southern part of *politique de la ville* area and the term Château Rouge will be used to refer to the northern part of *politique de la ville* area.

[4] In fact, right-wing parties gained greater influence after 2002 as they gained greater control of state institutions with no *cohabitation* occurring after 2002. *cohabitation* refers to a situation where a state president governs together with a prime minister and a parliamentary majority of the opposite political party.

of the Temple Bar area as a cultural-tourism district. While local government's elected and appointed officials had greater input into this scheme, the local authority was not the main actor in this project. These schemes greatly contributed to changing the physical and social fabric of Dublin and also to the spread of new and more entrepreneurial-planning practices in the city. A third approach emerged in the mid-late 1990s with the development of the Integrated Area Plan (IAP) model. While being a national scheme established under the Urban Renewal Act of 1998, IAPs were prepared for target areas by local authorities who were then given responsibility for implementing the approved plans. As this research was concerned with local-government efforts to regenerate deprived neighbourhoods, this rendered the investigation of renewal processes under such schemes highly relevant. Moreover, the conception and implementation of IAPs were intended to include consultation with local community groups. Studying regeneration processes in an IAP area afforded an opportunity to examine local government initiatives in a neoliberal era and the community experience of engaging with the local state.

National government criteria stated that areas selected for an IAP were to be areas which experienced high levels of social disadvantage and physical decay. Following the 1998 Urban Renewal Act, Dublin City Council (DCC) prepared IAPs for six areas, five of which were in the inner city. These comprised O'Connell Street, the North East Inner City, the Liberties/Coombe, Kilmainham/Inchicore, and the Historic Area Rejuvenation Project (HARP) together with the suburban district of Ballymun. Ballymun was excluded from election because of its suburban location. The North East Inner City, Liberties/Coombe, Kilmainham/Inchicore and HARP areas all possessed value for the research.

Although not originally an IAP, the HARP (Figure 3.3) became designated as such under the Urban Renewal Act, 1998. A plan for the HARP area emerged in 1995 under the 'Major Initiative' and became a model for the subsequent definition of IAPs. Because of this early start, community interaction with local government could be examined over a significantly longer period here than elsewhere. Additionally, more recently, only two of these areas, namely the HARP and the Liberties/Coombe areas, have been targeted by DCC to be part of a new phase of the city redevelopment, framework plans being developed in the Markets area of the HARP district (Figure 3.4) and in the Digital Hub area of the Liberties/Coombe district. Thus, while HARP and the Liberties/Coombe IAPs were both deemed suitable for investigating the temporal changes in approach to regeneration and community involvement, the HARP area potentially held significant advantages.



Location of the HARP area

Figure 3.3: Location of the HARP area
(Source: after DICP)



Markets area
HARP area
DED area

Figure 3.4: HARP Area and Markets Area
(Source: after DCC)

Other considerations

The research adopts a qualitative approach. Investigations into regeneration policy can be supported by the use of quantitative methods, including measuring changes in socio-economic status or in the number of sites redeveloped. However, quantitative studies alone are insufficient to grasp the complex reality of regeneration policies. Qualitative methods can provide further understanding of how socially-disadvantaged communities experience regeneration policies by exploring how they regard such policies. Finally, the research uses a case-study approach. A common critique of case-study-based research concerns the validity of generalisations deriving from them. It is accepted that the phenomena under observation may indeed be particular to their locality and may not be representative of other neighbourhood regeneration efforts. Yet, the purpose of the research was to explore in depth the process of regeneration within particular contexts in order to obtain a deep understanding the complexity of the public-policy process and of communities' participatory engagements with that process.

3.3. Sources and Data Collection

The methodology employed for this research involved using a diverse range of sources and techniques to ensure in-depth examination. These include both secondary and primary information sources including the review of policy documents and relevant literature, and archival research, informal interviewing, in-depth interviewing and field observation.

Obviously, the channels used to obtain these sources varied according to the countries and their specificities. For instance, there was no equivalent in Ireland to the French *Bibliothèque Administrative de la Ville de Paris*, a municipal library dedicated to Parisian administrative issues, or to the *Association Salle Saint Bruno*, a community organisation running, amongst other services, a resource centre gathering municipal and community records pertaining to all aspects of life in the case-study area (Goutte d'Or and Château Rouge). These institutions allowed free and unrestricted access to a large collection of published and unpublished records from the Parisian administrative services and the elected council of Paris, such as Council meeting transcripts and internal memoranda. In order to gain access to comparable data in Dublin, the researcher had to

submit a written request and pay a fee to the local authority under the *Freedom of Information* Act, 1997 and *Freedom of Information (Amendment) Act*, 2003.

A first imperative was to identify the broad cultural, institutional and political context within which urban policies are established in both countries, initial information being gathered on how the issue of neighbourhood regeneration has been addressed over recent decades, the aim being to identify temporal changes in approaches and discourses at national level. Information was particularly sought on the goals, instruments and actors of regeneration policies. Attention was paid to changes in legislation and in the financing process as well as to the respective role of local and central governments in designing and implementing regeneration policies. Information was gathered on the formal structures and guidelines set by national government in order to incorporate the views of the local population in policy design.

This first stage involved a literature and a document study, which related to the post-war period but especially focused on policy changes since the 1980s. The literature review aimed at identifying sources dealing with regeneration policy and legislation, the role of private actors, that of the public sector role and of community input. The documentary study comprised a review of published and unpublished documents including legislation, policy statements, government reports and debates.

3.3.1. Sources and Data Collection in Ireland

Documents from Central Government, Ireland

Legislation
Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1963
Planning and Development Act, 2000
Urban Renewal Act, 1986
Finance Act, 1986
Temple Bar Area Renewal and Development Act, 1991
Urban Renewal Act, 1998
Government Policy: Published governmental reports and circulars
Study on the Urban Renewal Schemes, Report for the Department of the Environment, KPMG, 1996
Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development, 1994-1999
1998 Urban Renewal Scheme, Guidelines, 14th April 1997
1999 Urban Renewal Scheme, Monitoring Guidelines, April 1999
Circular UR 3/99, 1999 Urban Renewal Scheme, 23rd April 1999
Circular UR 3/02, Monitoring Arrangements for the 1999 Urban Renewal Scheme, 26th March 2002
Review of Area-Based Tax Incentive Renewal Schemes, Report for the Department of Finance,

Goodbody Economic Consultants in association with Mazars and HKR, 2005
Indecon Review of Property-based Tax Incentive Schemes, Report for the Department of Finance, Indecon, 2005.
Unpublished Documents
Announcement of the New Urban Renewal Designations and Speech by Mr. Robert Molloy, T.D., Minister for Housing and Urban Renewal, 17th February 1999

Table 3.1: Sources consulted to trace the evolution of national regeneration policies in Ireland

The documents reviewed for the purpose of ascertaining the characteristics and temporal evolution of national policy and legislation on the regeneration of deprived and derelict neighbourhoods are listed in Table 3.1. The review targeted measures and policies for mixed-tenure neighbourhoods and did not review in depth those measures solely concerned with the regeneration of social-housing estates.

Documents from Local Government, Ireland

One research objective was to review the manner in which government initiatives have attempted to address the issues of neighbourhoods encountering both dereliction and deprivation. As noted earlier, this was to be achieved through the examination of national policies followed by empirical research adopting a case-study approach. This provided an opportunity to investigate in detail how local governments have responded to the need for regeneration in specific neighbourhoods by investigating how national legislation and policy, together with local community demands, have framed local policy responses. Additionally, the research aimed to chart the avenues and structures available for community participation in urban regeneration policy. It was one main objective to explore and record the local community experience of trying to influence urban change in the area together with views regarding the regeneration process and the process of engaging with the local state. The research reviewed the impacts of regeneration and queried the extent to which the policies under study actually addressed the needs of local disadvantaged communities.

Three plans were examined for the research in Dublin. These related to the same geographical area, that is the HARP area, which is located in the north-west inner city area of Dublin, stretching from O'Connell Street to the National Museum at the Collins Barracks (Figure 2.4). These included;

- The HARP Framework Plan, 1996
- The HARP Integrated Area Plan, Taxes Incentives Sites, 1998

- The Markets Area (Draft) Framework Plan, 2002 and 2006

These facilitated a review of the dynamics of regeneration in the local area from 1995, when the area was selected for targeted intervention, to the current date. The case-study mainly focused on the actions conceived and implemented under the HARP Integrated Area Plan. This programme ran from 1999 to 2008; analysis of the design, implementation and outcomes of the process was undertaken. In contrast, the study of the regeneration process in the Markets area, a sub-area of the HARP area, was mainly concerned with the design phase of the project as its full implementation is not yet complete.

In order to examine how local government has tackled physical and social regeneration issues over time in a particular district and examine the extent to which neighbourhood regeneration efforts have been shaped by neoliberal thinking and practices, a wide range of published and unpublished municipal records were reviewed. Published documents reviewed in relation to the regeneration of the HARP area included the *HARP Framework Plan* (1996), *HARP Integrated Area Plan, Taxes Incentives Sites* (1998). The latter provided invaluable information on the approach adopted by the local authority to regenerate the HARP area. They provided information on the stated objectives of the regeneration initiative, the nature and range of issues covered by the programmes and the actors involved in discussions leading to the plan. Review of the plans also provided some information on the channels provided for the community to convey its needs during the drafting of the plan and on the role envisaged for the community during its implementation. It allowed examination to be made of the mechanisms initially devised to ensure the implementation of the stated aims.

Published documents reviewed also included the annual reports relating to the implementation of HARP Integrated Area Plan. Through these reports, data was collected on the characteristics of the development projects granted permission on the Tax Designated Sites, the activity status of each development and progress on the achievement of economic and social benefits proposed for the area. They included data on social projects and community facilities provided in the area. Although these reports helped in assessing the outcomes of the projects, they failed to provide either adequate depth or range of information for the research objectives. For instance, data found in the annual reports available in the public domain did not permit a detailed instigation of the funds received and spent for community gain. Similarly, they did not provide a detailed record of

the role played by the Monitoring Committee in the regeneration process or of the community experience of the process.

Therefore, additional data was sought under the *Freedom of Information* Act, 1997 and *Freedom of Information (Amendment) Act*, 2003. These Acts oblige government departments, local authorities and a range of other statutory agencies to publish information on their activities. They also establish a legal right for each person to access records held by public bodies and government departments.

Documents Available in the Public Domain
HARP Framework Plan, 1996
HARP Integrated Area Plan, Taxes Incentives Sites, 1998
HARP Integrated Area Plan, Annual Report, 1999-2000
HARP Integrated Area Plan, Annual Report, 2000-2001
HARP Integrated Area Plan, Annual Report, 2002-2003
HARP Integrated Area Plan, Annual Report, 2003-2004
HARP Integrated Area Plan, Annual Report, 2004-2005
Integrated Area Plans, Community Gain Grants, Information Leaflet, June 2006
Internal Documents Obtained as part of Freedom of Information Act Request
Report on the Implementation of the HARP Major Initiatives, 1995-1999
Submission from Dublin Inner City Partnership, 1999 re: Report on the Implementation of the HARP Major Initiatives, 1995-1999
An Taisce's Abbendum to the Report on the Implementation of the HARP Major Initiatives, 1995-1999
Submission from Noel Coogan, North West Inner City Network, 2000 re: Report on the Implementation of the HARP Major Initiatives, 1995-1999
Letter from Tony Gregory, T.D and chairperson of the HARP Steering Committee to Robert Molloy, T.D, Minister for Housing and Urban Renewal
Letter from Robert Molloy, T.D, Minister for Housing and Urban Renewal to Tony Gregory, T.D and chairperson of the HARP Steering Committee, 29th September 1999
Minutes of HARP Steering Committee Meetings, 1996 to 1999
Minutes of HARP Monitoring Committee Meetings, 2000 to 2008
Community Gain Application Process
HARP Integrated Plan, Community Gain- Minor Grants, Report to Central Area Committee, December 2006
HARP Community Gain Funding, Withdrawal of Grants, 29th June 2007
HARP Community Gain Funding, 19th September 2007
HARP Community Gain Funding, 7th December 2007
HARP Community Gain Funding, 11th February 2008
HARP Community Gain Funding, 5th March 2008
Provision of Social and Affordable Housing, Smithfield West Side, June 2006
City Council Social Housing Projects, Report to the HARP (IAP), 10th March 2006
Letter from HARP Project Manager to the Planning and Development Department, 25th January 2006
Presentation from Paul Kearns, planning official to the HARP Monitoring Committee, 2007
Review of the HARP IAP, 2007
HARP Integrated Area Plan, Final Report, 2008

Table 3.2: Documents consulted in order to review local governmental efforts to regenerate the HARP Area

However, some material is exempted from disclosure including information of a personal, commercial or confidential nature. Moreover, charges may be applied for the time spent retrieving and photocopying the records. Abortive attempts had been made to obtain these records informally. This, combined with initial difficulties and delays in accessing published documents, led the researcher to make Freedom of Information Act requests, despite their cost. The request was granted and the researcher was permitted to consult the paper files held by the local authority and to identify records of interest, which were subsequently reviewed and copied. Access was denied to none of the records. This source provided information on the nature of projects funded under the community gain clause, imparting insight into the community outcomes of the scheme.

Minutes of the Steering and Monitoring committees were also accessed via this source. Although the minutes did not include a full transcript of the discussion, they provided information on the nature of the issues debated and allowed identification of some of the issues raised by the community. The range of community information was limited, generally not being recorded in most reports. However, the Final Report included the community's views elicited from a focus group. Internal memoranda and reports also facilitated understanding of the policy process. The local authority sources used in relation to the HARP area are listed in Table 3.2.

The Markets area is located in the HARP area and was targeted for regeneration under the *HARP Framework Plan* and the *HARP Integrated Area Plan*, although the Commercial Regeneration Unit in the Planning and Economic Development Department of Dublin City Council was later given the task to regenerate this area. Studying this renewal project provided an example of more recent efforts from the local authority to upgrade the area, thereby allowing temporal changes in the policy process to be examined. Moreover, parts of the land in the Markets area was in public ownership, providing an interesting contrast to the HARP project, which focused on private sites.

In order to review how the local authority addressed the needs for regeneration in the Markets Area a number of sources were consulted. Information was gathered on the objectives of the regeneration project, the actors consulted during the design of the scheme, the channels offered to the local community to input into the plan and have its needs addressed. Information was also gathered on the local authority's responses to community demands and attempts to influence the nature of the regeneration process. Information was

sought on interactions between local community groups (correspondence, informal and formal meetings, debates mediated by outside consultants) and the local authority and their outcomes. Published documents consisted of

- Markets Area Draft Framework Plan, 2002
- Markets Area Framework Plan, 2006

These documents provided information on the aims of the regeneration process, details of expected changes in land-use, some background information on the area, together with data on revisions made to the plan. However, they did not contain information on the nature of comments and submissions made to the local authority by community groups, individuals or businesses or of its treatment of such submissions. No details were provided of meetings as part of the consultation process. However, during meetings and interviews with community groups, the researcher was furnished with additional documents, the community groups having kept many of the unpublished documents either provided by the local authority or submitted by themselves to the local authority. These included a copy of the submission made to DCC by MACRO CDP in relation to the plan, which conveyed information on the community's needs together with their own vision for the proposed regeneration plan. An assessment of third-party submissions to the local authority prepared by a consultant on behalf of Dublin City Council provided insight into the handling of community views.

These documents were very useful, yet lacking key data. Therefore, a request for further information was made under the *Freedom of Information* Act, 1997 and *Freedom of Information (Amendment) Act*, 2003. Information was gathered on internal meetings of DCC, public and informal meetings with community representatives, correspondence, reports commissioned as part of the plan making and memoranda. Although the researcher was not invited to consult the files directly, reading of some community documents and contact with a community planner helped to define the request precisely. Moreover, discussions with the officer in charge of the request brought additional knowledge on the records held by the local authority. Records obtained were either created by the local authority or received by it. They provided information on the plan-making process, such as the people involved, the issues which were debated and responses to local concerns. Key documents included details of senior officials' meetings, assessment of community submissions and requests by senior officials (e.g. Planning Department report on Third Part Submissions) and letters and presentations received from community groups regarding

the regeneration process and the plan. Table 3.3 shows a list of documents provided by the local authority and reviewed for this research.

Documents Available in the Public Domain
Markets Area Draft Framework Plan, 2002
Markets Area Framework Plan, 2006
Internal Documents Obtained as part of Freedom of Information Act Request
Markets, Brief for Consultants, 5th March 2001
Markets Area Urban Framework Plan, Working Group Meeting Minutes, 24th May 2001
Internal Memo, Re: Markets Framework Plan, 5th February 2002
Markets Area Urban Framework Plan, Working Group Meeting Minutes, 1st March 2002
Letter of MACRO on behalf of MARDAG to HARP Project Manager, re: creation of MARDAG, 13th March 2002
Invitation to local meeting from MACRO, re: Markets Redevelopment
Letter from HARP Project Manager to MACRO, 21st November 2002
Letter from MARDAG/MACRO to Deputy City Manager, 25th November 2002
Letter from MACRO CDP to HARP Project Manager, enclosed responses of MARDAG (Community Market's Plan, Briefing Document) and Residents of Block A & B St Michan's House Greek Street to the Markets Area Draft Framework Plan, 14th February 2003
Powerpoint Presentation from MARDAG to the Area Committee, 10th June 2003
Letter and Invitation to Public Meeting from MARDAG to Senior Executive Officer, Commercial Regeneration unit, 18th September 2003
Assessment of Third Party Submissions to Dublin City Council Prepared on Behalf of Dublin City Council by RPSMcHugh, October 2003
Response from MARDAG to the Assessment from RPSMcHugh, no date
Planning Department Report on Third Party Submissions to Dublin City Council, no date
Letter from City Engineer to Lord Mayor of Dublin, 28th October 2003
Letter from Deputy Planning Officer to MARDAG, 27th November 2003
Notes of Meeting held in MACRO Building, re: Third Party Submissions on Framework Plan, 11th February 2004
Notes of Meeting held in MACRO Building, re: Recreational and Leisure Facility Provision in Markets Area, 21st April 2004
Motion from Tony Gregory T.D re: Markets Leisure Facility, 18th May 2004
Markets Area Recreation and Leisure Needs Assessment, Prepared for Dublin City Council by ILAM, 2004
Meeting between MARDAG and Project Team, Minutes, 9th March 2005
Meeting between MARDAG and Project Team, 19th April 2005
Letter from Executive Manager, Commercial Regeneration Unit, to MARDAG, 20th April 2005
Letter from Senior Executive Architect, Commercial Regeneration Unit, to MARDAG, 15th August 2005
Letter from Executive Manager, Commercial Regeneration Unit, to the Central Area Committee, Revisions of the Markets Area Framework Plan, 14th March 2006

Table 3.3: Documents investigated in order to review local governmental efforts to regenerate the Markets Area

Documents from Community Groups: DICP, MACRO CDP, MARDAG, NWICAN

A dense network of community and voluntary groups exist in Dublin's north-west inner-city. The major groups were identified and contacted to obtain background information on the area, such as community issues in relation to the area, community

proposals in relation to regeneration and statistics concerning the area. Two local community plans presented some information in that regard. These were the *North West Inner City Community Project*, prepared on behalf of the Dublin Inner City Partnership (DICP) and the *North West Inner City Area Action Plan, 1999-2004* produced by the North West Inner City Area Network (NWICAN, also known as NWICN). NWICN is a network of over 60 community and voluntary groups in the north west inner city which seeks to ensure that the community has an active say in how the area is developed. NWICN campaigns and lobbies in relation particularly to social exclusion issues. The DICP is an independent local-development company which aims to work against socio-economic disadvantage in inner Dublin and promotes the participation of residents in the regeneration of their locality. The DICP has provided support to community groups in the HARP and Markets area.

Documents from NWICN and DICP
NWICN Community Gain Meeting and NWICN Draft Community Gain Framework, 2nd September 2002
NWICN, Questions for the Community Gain Sub-committee of HARP from the Community, 26th November 2003
Letter from HARP Project Manager to Noeleen Jennings, Re: Questions from the Community-HARP IAP Community Gain, 3rd March 2004
Letter from Danny Pender & Noeleen Jennings, Community Representatives, HARP IAP & NWICN, to Cllr Tom Dtafford & to HARP Project Manager, re: HARP Community Gain, 4th February 2005
Letter from Danny Pender & Noeleen Jennings, Community Representatives, HARP IAP & NWICN, to HARP Project Manager, re: HARP Community Gain, 3rd June 2005
Letter from HARP Project Manager to Danny Pender & Noeleen Jennings, Community Representatives, HARP IAP & NWICN, re: HARP Community Gain, 16th August 2005
Minutes of HARP Pre-meeting, 29th August 2005
Letter from Executive Manager, Dublin City Council to David Connoly, DICP, re: Draft Community Gain Application Process Document, 16th February 2006
Letter from Michael McCarthy, NWICN to Cllr Burke, HARP Monitoring Committee, October 2006
Assistant City Manager Report to the Chairperson and Members of the Central Area Committee on Community Gain Implementation Procedures for Integrated Area Plans, no date
Documents from MACRO CDP and MARDAG
MARDAG meeting minutes, 8th August 2002
Petition from Residents of Block A & B St Michan's House Greek Street to Dublin City Manager, 23rd May 2005
Press Release, Re: Protest March in Support of Leisure and Sports Facilities in the Market's Area, no date
Letter to Celine Graham, MACRO CDP from Martin Kavanagh, Executive Manager, Re: Markets Area Framework Plan, 23rd May 2005
MACRO CDP, Outline Progress Report, March 2006
MACRO CDP, Market's Area Update, June 2006

Table 3.4: Information Sources from DICP, MACRO CDP, MARDAG, NWICN

Two other major community organisations in the area were contacted. One was the Markets Area Community Resource Organisation (MACRO), a non-profit organisation and Community Development Project (CDP) operating mainly in the Markets area but also in the HARP area more generally, whose goal is the identification of local needs and building a community response. MACRO CDP was established in 1995 and later supported the development other community groups, such the Market's Area Residents Development Action Group (MARDAG), of nine residents' and voluntary groups. MACRO CDP also facilitated the actions of community representatives involved in the Monitoring Committee of the HARP Integrated Area Plan. All these organisations have considerable experience of engaging with the local authority regarding regeneration issues. Yet, due to lack of time and staff, they have not been in a position to produce documents or reports providing a detailed account of the community experience of such engagement. Nonetheless, they were able to provide access to a number of letters and minutes of meetings that contained useful information on their concerns and aspirations, together with data on how they reacted to changes in the area resulting from the implementation of local-authority plans. These documents are listed in Table 3.4[5].

Documents from An Bord Pleanála

An Bord Pleanála is an independent administrative tribunal that decides on appeals against planning decisions made by local authorities in Ireland. This is an alternative channel for voicing local communities concerns and opposition to a development if the submission of observations to the local planning department fails. Proposals to redevelop one of the major sites (Site 4, West Side of Smithfield) targeted for regeneration under the HARP Framework Plan, 1996 and qualifying for tax-relief under the HARP IAP, were granted planning permission by the local authority. Given the importance of the site in terms of its size and its perceived contribution to the overall regeneration of the area and considering the extent of contestation generated after permission was granted for development, it was deemed useful to review the appeal process for this site. Data was collected on the nature of the concerns expressed by the local community in relation to the site regeneration during the appeal process. This involved reviewing letters and oral presentations from local activists and councillors to An Bord Pleanála (see Table 3.5).

[5] Documents obtained twice, both under the Freedom of Information requests and through the community groups are only listed once.

Information provided by the local authority in support of its decision was also reviewed. Finally, the outcomes of the appeal were reviewed through consultation of the decisions listed in the Board order. All the documents consulted are listed in Table 3.5. Under provisions in the *Planning and Development Act 2000*, any person may inspect files relating to appeals decided by the Board. Files can be inspected for at least five years after the case is determined. The community and local-authority experience of the appeals system and their views on the opportunities offered by the planning tribunal to influence regeneration and planning policies were further investigated through personal interviews. These interviews formed part of a broader strategy that consisted in generating data that was not otherwise available.

Written Documents
Board Direction Order, 30th April 2001
Inspector's Report
Letter from James Kelly and Patricia Wafter to An Bord Pleanála, 16th September 2000
Letter from MACRO to An Bord Pleanála, 16th September 2000
Letter from Noeleen Jennings, Member of the HARP Monitoring Committee, to An Bord Pleanála, 9th October 2000
Letter from Michael and Moira Heery to An Bord Pleanála, 13th September 2000
Letter from Cllrs. Tony Gregory, Christy Burke, Brendan Carr and Chris Giblin to An Bord Pleanála, 11th October 2000
Letter from Senator Joe Costello to An Bord Pleanála, 10th October 2000
Letter from P.F.A McDonnell, Dublin Planning Officer to An Bord Pleanála, 4th October 2000
1st Party Response to 3rd Party Appeals, 18th October 2000
Press Release by MACRO, Re: High-Rise Development in Smithfield, 26th January 2001
Speech by the Elected Representatives of North West Inner City in Relation to the Proposed Developments at the West Side of Smithfield, 31st January 2001
Speech by Noeleen Jennings, Local Resident and Community Representative on the HARP Monitoring Committee, to An Bord Pleanála, 30th January 2001
Speech by Terry Crosbie, Local Resident and Member of MACRO, to An Bord Pleanála, 30th January 2001
Speech by Carmel Keogh, Local Resident and Member of MACRO, to An Bord Pleanála, 30th January 2001
Speech by Michael Smith, Chairman of An Taisce and Community Representative on the HARP Monitoring Committee, to An Bord Pleanála, 30th January 2001
Audio-tapes
Recording of the Oral Hearing, 30th / 31st January and 1st February 2001
Photographs and Photomontage
Photographs and photomontage submitted by Fusano Ltd. And Kulling Properties

Table 3.5: List of documents reviewed from the case files 29N.121294 & 29N.121296 held by An Bord Pleanála

Newspapers

National and local newspaper such as the Irish Times and Irish Independent provided additional information on the actions of different actors involved in the regeneration of the area.

Interviews

Orientation meetings with a community planner from Community Technical Aid, a voluntary organisation facilitating technical support to inner-city communities. The planner has been actively involved in inner-city community activities and has provided assistance to community groups and residents from disadvantaged areas attempting to convey their views to the local authority. Under the direction of the community planner and an inner-city community activist, two field excursions of area were undertaken which familiarised the researcher with the case-study area. The community planner also provided assistance in organising meetings and interviews with community activists and community regeneration workers who had knowledge of and had been involved in the regeneration process (see Table 3.6). While such support facilitated access to neighbourhood experts and neighbourhood residents, accessing some groups remained difficult. For instance, a meeting with a group of several residents from St. Michan's social housing complex who had been involved in lobbying for their community's interests to be included in the *Markets Framework Plan*, was cancelled four times. Finally, a single interview with a representative of the group was obtained. An in-depth interview with the community planner was also later conducted by the researcher to investigate personal views regarding the participation process and the regeneration process in the area.

Key individuals were identified for interview in order to ascertain the views of the community concerning changes in the area resulting from the implementation of the *HARP Integrated Area Plan*, their perspectives on the project to regenerate the Markets area and their views on community input in the regeneration process more generally. During the interviews, information was also gathered on the actions taken by different groups to influence the regeneration agenda as well as their perception of the value of such actions. The interviews, which each lasted up to three hours, were designed in a semi-structured fashion, allowing for specific questions to be asked while permitting flexibility for informants to develop themes which they deemed important. The interviews provided invaluable information not recorded elsewhere about the community's experience of the regeneration process. Their length reflected informants' experience of participating in both

the HARP and the Markets area regeneration process. Most spoke about both programmes in the same interview, while a second interview was arranged in a limited number of cases. Community representatives included both elected representatives and member of local groups. Additionally, two residents who joined and supported community groups during the appeal to An Bord Pleanála agreed to contribute to the research.

In addition to interviews with community representatives and elected representatives, the views of a number of senior council officials were sought. The attitude of officials in relation to the process of plan-making and plan implementation provided additional insight, but the primary focus was on the community experience of the regeneration process and its perception of the appropriateness of the measures taken in relation to community needs[6].

Position	*Organisation and/or Committee membership*
Former Local Councillor	Steering Committee, HARP & Monitoring Committee, HARP IAP
Local Councillor	Monitoring Committee, HARP IAP
Local Councillor	Monitoring Committee, HARP IAP
Community Representative	HARP Area Residents, Steering Committee, HARP & Monitoring Committee, HARP IAP
Community Representative	NWICAN, MARDAG & Monitoring Committee, HARP IAP
Community Representative	MACRO & Monitoring Committee, HARP IAP
Community Representative	DICP, MARDAG & Steering Committee, HARP
Conservation Activist & Local Resident	Steering Committee, HARP & Monitoring Committee, HARP IAP
Community Regeneration Worker	MACRO Community Development Project & MARDAG
Community Regeneration Worker	MACRO Community Development Project & MARDAG
Community Representative	NWICAN & MARDAG
Community Representative	St Michan's Residents Group & MARDAG
Community Representative	Beresford Street Residents Group & MARDAG
Local Resident	Affiliated to MACRO CDP
Local Resident	Affiliated to MACRO CDP
Community Planner	Community Technical Aid
Senior Official	Project Manager, HARP IAP, Dublin City Council
Official	HARP IAP, Dublin City Council
Senior Official	Executive Manager, Commercial Regeneration Unit, Dublin City Council
Senior Official	Senior Executive officer, Commercial Regeneration Unit, Dublin City Council
Former Senior Official	Former Chief Planning Officer, HARP

Table 3.6: List of interviewees for the Irish Case-Study

Interviews with officials tended to be short, their commonly being restricted to 30 minutes due to participants' time constraints. Nonetheless, in most cases, this was sufficient to

[6] The research aim was not to ascertain the veracity of the claims made but to permit community perspectives to be recorded.

cover major issues. In only one case was a second interview sought. In total, 21 individuals were interviewed during 25 meetings (see Table 3.6). All interviews were recorded and subsequently fully transcribed.

After transcribing all interviews, the researcher familiarised herself with the data by listening to the tapes several times and by reading and re-reading individual transcripts. General impressions gained though in-depth engagement with the interview material were recorded in a separate notepad. The next stage of the data analysis consisted in reading through each transcript, underlining each relevant fragment of information and creating labels or codes for them. The later helped organising the data into categories and identifying recurring themes or issues in the data. Rather than using preconceived categories, the researcher chose to let the codes emerge from the data. The list of categories evolved as the analysis progressed. Sub-categories were created to more accurately differentiate the data. Some categories were given new names, while new categories were added in order to have all relevant phrases coded. Subsequently, using the cut and paste function in Word MS the data was rearranged. All data pertaining to a particular theme was assembled in an individual Word document. This step allowed identifying and capturing similarities and differences in people's responses for each issue.

3.3.2. Sources and Data Collection in France

In France, comparable information to that collected in Dublin was amassed in order to examine how government initiatives have attempted to solve the issue of neighbourhood decline over recent decades and to investigate the community experience of regeneration. The process of data collection for the French study involved reviewing government reports, interviewing key informants and examining local regeneration plans and community reports.

Documents from Central Government, France

In order to identify temporal changes in approaches and discourses at national level, information was sought on the goals, instruments and actors involved in regeneration policies. The examination of the French literature involved scrutinising sources dealing with regeneration policy and legislation, the role of private actors, that of the public sector and of community input. It comprised a review of published and unpublished documents including legislation, policy statements, government reports and debates. The documents reviewed for the purpose of ascertaining the characteristics and temporal evolution of

national policy and legislation on the regeneration of deprived neighbourhoods are listed in Table 3.7.

Legislation
Décret n° 58-1464 relatif aux Zones à Urbaniser par Priorité [ZUP] & Décret n° 58-1465 relatif à la rénovation urbaine, 31st December 1958
Loi d'Orientation Foncière, 1967
Loi n°82-213 relative aux droits et libertés des communes, des départments et des régions, (loi Defferre), 1982
Loi n° 83-8 relative à la répartition de compétences entre les communes, les départements, les régions et l'Etat, 7th January 1983
Loi n° 83-663 relative à la répartition de compétences entre les communes, les départements, les régions et l'Etat, 22nd July 1983
Loi n° 91-662, Loi d'Orientation pour la Ville, [loi LOV], 1991
Loi n°96-987 relative à la mise en oeuvre du Pacte de Relance pour la Ville, [loi PRV], 14th November 1996
Loi n° 2000-1208 relative à la Solidarité et au Renouvellement Urbains, [loi SRU], 12th December 2000
Convention portant sur l'intervention du 1 % logement en faveur du renouvellement urbain, 11th October 2001
Loi n° 2003-710 d'orientation et de programmation pour la ville et la rénovation urbaine, [loi Borloo], 1st August 2003
Convention relative à l'intervention du 1% Logement dans la politique de rénovation urbaine, 10th September 2003
Décret n° 2004-123 relatif à l'ANRU, 9th February 2004
Convention 2003-2008 Etat- Caisse des dépôts et consignations: Politique de la ville et rénovation urbaine, May 2004
Convention entre l'Etat, l'Agence nationale pour la rénovation urbaine et l'Union d'économie sociale du logement conclue en application de la convention du 10 septembre 2003, 27th October 2004
Loi n° 2005-52 de programmation pour la cohésion sociale, 18th January 2005
Loi n° 2006-872 portant engagement national pour le logement, 13th July 2006
Government Policy: Published governmental reports
Rapport sur l'amélioration de l'habitat ancien, Simon NORA & Bertrand EVENO, 1975
Ensemble, refaire la ville, rapport au Premier ministre du Président de la Commission nationale pour le développement social des quartiers, Hubert DUBEDOUT, 1983
Demain la ville, rapport présenté à Martine Aubry, ministre de l'Emploi et de la Solidarité, Jean-Pierre SUEUR, 1998
Renouvellement urbain et contrat de ville, Rapport Cavallier, 1999
Rapport de la Cour des comptes sur la politique de la ville, 2002
Renouvellement urbain, l'urbanisme au service du social, Délégation interministérielle à la ville (DIV), 2002
Rapport sur la participation des habitants dans les opérations de renouvellement urbain, Zaïr KEDADOUCHE, 2003
Programme national de rénovation urbaine. Bilan d'étape. Comité d'évaluation et de suivi de l'Agence nationale pour la rénovation urbaine (CES ANRU), 2006
De nouvelles perspectives pour la rénovation urbaine. Rapport d'évaluation 2006. Comité d'évaluation et de suivi de l'Agence nationale pour la rénovation urbaine (CES ANRU), 2007
Rapport d'activité 2008 de l'Agence nationale pour la rénovation urbaine (ANRU), 2009
Unpublished Documents
Question écrite n°09756: Relance du dispositif des zones franches, Ministère délégué à la ville et à la rénovation urbaine, RAMONET Marcelle, 2002

Table 3.7: National sources tracing the evolution of regeneration policies in France

Documents from Local Government, France

The Parisian case study allowed investigation in detail into how local government has responded to the needs for regeneration in a specific neighbourhoods by examining how national legislation and policy, together with local demands, have framed local policy responses over the last three decades. Additionally, one research objective was to study community views regarding the regeneration process and the process of engaging with the local state. Another research aim was to consider the extent to which the initiatives under study actually addressed the needs of local disadvantaged communities.

Two renewal projects were scrutinised for the research in Paris. These related to the same geographical area, that is the Goutte d'Or/ Château Rouge area covered by the *politique de la ville* programme (see Figure 2.4). The first project, involving the Goutte d'Or sub-area, was initiated in 1983 and was completed by 2004. The Château Rouge sub-area was not considered for active intervention prior to the mid-1990s. It was eventually initiated in 2001 and its implementation still continues. These two phases facilitated a review of the dynamics of regeneration in the local area from 1983, when the area was selected for intervention, until 2009.

Examination of how local government has tackled social and physical regeneration issues over time, involved reviewing a wide range of published and unpublished municipal records. These included transcripts of Council meetings (*débats*, see Table 3.8) when the renewal project for Goutte d'Or area was presented and debated, together with documents (*exposé des motifs or projets de délibération*, see Table 3.8) presenting aims and rationale of the project to the Parisian Council prior to its members voting on different aspects of the project. These documents provided information on the nature of the actions voted on by the Parisian Council in order to regenerate the area and allowed divergences of opinions between political parties regarding the regeneration programme to be investigated. They provided data on the stated objectives of the regeneration initiative, the regeneration procedures which local government chose amongst those provided for by national legislation and policy and they also furnished data about the evolution of the project. Relevant minutes and transcripts were accessed through the *Bibliothèque Administrative de la Ville de Paris*.

Published documents
Projet de déliberation, exposé des motifs, mise en oeuvre d'une restructuration concernant la partie sud du quartier de la Goutte d'Or, 10th January 1983
Bulletin Municipal Officiel de la Ville de Paris, débats du Conseil de Paris, séance du 17 Janvier 1983, 10th March 1983
Projet de déliberation, exposé des motifs, rénovation-réhabilitation du secteur de la Goutte d'Or à Paris 18ème, 19th September 1983
Bulletin Municipal Officiel de la Ville de Paris, débats du Conseil de Paris, séance du 19 Septembre 1983, 22nd October 1983
Bulletin Municipal Officiel de la Ville de Paris, débats du Conseil de Paris, séance du 26 Mars 1984, 28th April 1984
Bulletin Municipal Officiel de la Ville de Paris, débats du Conseil de Paris, séance du 28 Janvier 1985, 16th March 1985
Unpublished documents given from Mairie de Paris to Association Salle Saint Bruno re: Goutte d'Or regeneration
Compte-rendu de la réunion tenue par M. Jolain (Directeur de la Construction et du Logement, Ville de Paris) sur le quartier de la "Goutte d'Or", 4th June 1982
Note à Monsieur Cabana, Secrétaire Général de la Ville de Paris, par M. Jolain (Directeur de la Construction et du Logement), no date
Note de Présentation de l'opération Goutte d'Or, Direction de la Construction et du Logement, Ville de Paris, 13th june 1983
Letter from Jacques Chirac to Roger Quillot, 22nd August 1983
Note de reflexion sur l'opération Goutte d'Or, Cabit Golder, 15th September 1983
Note pour Alain Juppé, Direction de la Construction et du Logement, 21st September 1983
Opération de restauration du quartier de la Goutte d'Or, relevé de décisions, 14th November 1983
Note à l'attention de Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, Eligilibité de l'opération Goutte d'Or à la procédure de la Commission Pesce (anciennement Commission Dubedout), Réunion avec M. Figeait, Secrétaire Général de la Commission, 20th December 1983
Opération de restructuration-rénovation du quartier Goutte d'Or, Compte-rendu de réunion entre la DCL (Ville de Paris) et OPHLM, 23rd December 1983
Note, Thurnauer, La Goutte d'Or, Première approche, 10th February 1984
Association Paris Goutte d'Or, Entretien avec Michel Neyreneuf, note, 26th March 1984
Opération Goutte d'Or, audit social et communication, document de travail, Golder, 29th March 1984
Goutte d'Or réunion, questions à évoquer, Renée Dubec, 20 May 1984
Conférence de presse, 3rd July 1984
Letter from Lucien Vochel, préfet to Jacques Chirac, Maire de Paris, 4th July 1984
Note à Alain Juppé, Adjoint au Maire, Enquête d'utilité publique du secteur Goutte d'Or, 19th July 1984
Quartier de la Goutte d'Or, 10 ans de rénovation, Mairie de Paris, 1994
Commission Locale du DSQ Goutte d'Or, comptes-rendus de réunions, 1984 to 1995
Goutte d'Or rénovation, rapport OPAC, état d'avancement au 11 Mars 1999, 1999

Table 3.8: Documents consulted in order to review local government efforts to regenerate the Goutte d'Or area

Additional information was gathered through consulting unpublished municipal records relating to the Goutte d'Or regeneration project. These included minutes of meetings between Council officials and local councillors, internal reports and internal memoranda prepared during the drafting of the scheme. These documents imparted a greater understanding of the policy process and conveyed increased insight into

councillors' and officials' perceptions of the local area. They also provided additional information on the aims that they hoped to achieve. Their attitudes towards community efforts to intervene in the plan-making process were also partially recorded in these documents. These records had been given by a local councillor to the local community resource centre, the *Association Salle Saint Bruno*, and access to the archives of the *Association Salle Saint Bruno*'s facilitated the scrutiny of such records. The archives also provided access to municipal records relating to the implementation of the scheme and included accounts of the community facilities built under the scheme. The local-authority sources used in relation to the Goutte d'Or project are listed in Table 3.8. Although these documents were very useful, they did not provide a detailed account of the community experience of the regeneration process nor did they provide adequate data on the community's attempts to affect changes in the area.

In the 1980s, the *Ville de Paris* considered the Château Rouge area to be ripe for intervention. However, the municipality ultimately decided that Goutte d'Or was in greater need of regeneration at the time and postponed intervening in the northern part until the late 1990s. Meetings with local groups were held from 1994 in order to define a regeneration programme for the area and a first project was initiated in 1998, but the regeneration process remained slow until 2001, when the Château Rouge project was redefined. Studying this renewal project provided an example of more recent efforts from the local authority to upgrade the neighbourhood, thereby allowing temporal changes in the policy process to be examined.

In order to review how the local authority addressed the needs for regeneration in the Château Rouge area a number of sources were consulted. Reviewing minutes from the Council meetings provided information on the nature of the actions voted by the Parisian Council in order to regenerate the area and allowed divergences of opinions to be investigated between political parties regarding the mechanisms to be used. Given that the decision-making process rested with the elected representatives rather than with the council officials, this was a source of invaluable information. For instance, it provided information on the extent to which the municipality used its right to compulsorily purchase land in the regeneration area. The minutes of the Parisian Council meetings after 1995 are available on the local-authority website and can be searched according to key words; this facilitated the review.

Additionally, a review of the different versions of the plan submitted to the national agency, the Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine (ANRU), in order to access national funds provided information on the objectives of the regeneration project, the nature of the actions planned and the type of developments envisaged. Through consultation of the final plan approved by the ANRU, information was gathered on the agreements made to finance its implementation, the anticipated costs and the funds made available by national, regional and local government. Information was provided on the type of redevelopment projects whose final costs would be covered by the ANRU. It also furnished information on the actions financed solely by local government under the regeneration project in order to respond to local needs yet which lay outside the remit of the ANRU. Most of the plans and documents submitted to the ANRU were obtained through the local authority.

However, these documents contained little information on the draft plan (*document de travail*) for the area, initiated prior to the creation of the ANRU which had been written by a local councillor in 2001 but had not been presented to the Council for approval. Several internal documents produced by the municipality had been lodged with the *Association Salle Saint Bruno* (Table 3.9) and yielded information on the initial aims of the project, on the perceived needs of the area, on internal meetings of different departments of the local authority and on the discussions which helped shape the final plan. Access to these archives also provided information on the type of studies commissioned by the local authority in designing the plan. One of the documents (*Plan d'action "Goutte d'Or-Château Rouge", situation au 13 Mai 2002*) was particularly helpful in identifying local measures implemented independently prior to seeking national financial subvention.

Moreover, the documents and plans submitted to the ANRU contained no information on the nature of community input sought, the oral or written comments made to the local authority by local groups and individual residents, nor the actions taken in reaction to local pressures and proposals. Data was sought on the consultation process. However, the formal structures available to residents and local groups to participate in the design of the project were very limited; the process consisted mainly of providing information during public meetings or in local newsletters. Aspects of the regeneration project were presented during public neighbourhood meetings (*Conseils de quartier*). Since 2002, by law, these meetings must be set up in every city with a population of 80,000 or more inhabitants, their role being purely consultative. They represent an

opportunity for the elected representatives to present their actions and projects for particular neighbourhoods and to enter debate with the local population concerning the degree to which they meet their needs. During these *Conseils de quartier*, the councillors can make presentations and seek feedback from the public on any aspect of local life. The Parisian Council has divided the city of Paris in 121 neighbourhoods and *Conseils de quartier* meetings covering a wide range of subjects have been scheduled more or less frequently for each. The district Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge is one of the neighbourhoods covered by *Conseils de quartier* meetings. Minutes of the *Conseils de quartier* meetings for the Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge area provided information on the neighbourhood, the type of information made available to the local population, the type of input sought by the municipality, the nature of the actions envisaged or taken by the municipality with regard to the local area. The minutes also allowed identification of local concerns and conflicting opinions regarding the regeneration process, notably concerning the issues of social housing, social mixing and commercial activity in the area. This source also helped the identification of individuals and key groups attempting to influence the policy-making process by participating in public meetings.

Published documents produced by the local authority and its semi-public agency, the SEMAVIP included newsletters (*Lettre d'information*) concerning the regeneration project. The newsletters yielded information on the characteristics of the development projects granted permission on the sites acquired by the local authority as part of the regeneration project, the activity status of most sites and progress made on upgrading public spaces. They included data on certain social projects and community facilities provided in the area as well as on commercial projects supported by the municipality. Although these newsletters helped in assessing the outcomes of the project to date, they failed to provide sufficiently detailed information for the research objectives, notably any assessment of how the objectives set under the original plan were met. Therefore, additional data was sought on the nature of the projects implemented. Unpublished reports from the Parisian administration supplied supplementary data on the type and number of housing units built, the type of commercial activity supported and the type of social projects set up or supported through the provision of subsidised premises. Access to these reports was obtained through the archives of the *Association Salle Saint Bruno*, which stores a number of municipal records relating to the Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge district.

The local authority sources used in relation to the Château Rouge project are listed in Table 3.9.

Published documents
Conseil du 18e arrondissement, délibération, 11th October 1993
Extrait du registre des délibérations, délibération du Conseil de Paris, séance du 8 décembre 1997, 24th December 1997
Bulletin Municipal Officiel de la Ville de Paris [online], débats du Conseil de Paris, 23rd and 24th October 2000, [last accessed 25th November 2008]
Communiqué secteur Château Rouge, 5th March 2003
Extrait du registre des délibérations, délibération du Conseil de Paris, séance du 8th April 2002, 17th April 2002
Relevé de conclusions du Conseil de quartier Goutte d'Or- Château Rouge, 20th November 2002
Compte-rendu de la réunion de concertation, 23rd April 2003
Compte-rendu du Conseil de quartier Goutte d'Or- Château Rouge, 9th December 2003
Compte-rendu du Conseil de quartier Goutte d'Or- Château Rouge, 3rd May 2004
Dossier de demande de financement à l'Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine, Secteur en ZUS La Goutte d'Or, Paris 18ème arrondissement, Mairie de Paris, December 2004
Compte-rendu du Conseil de quartier Goutte d'Or- Château Rouge, 11th May 2005
Lettre d'information Château Rouge, Mairie de Paris & SEMAVIP, February 2005
Lettre d'information Château Rouge, Mairie de Paris & SEMAVIP, June 2005
Lettre d'information Goutte d'Or Château Rouge, Mairie de Paris & SEMAVIP, October 2005
Dossier de demande de financement à l'Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine, Secteur en ZUS La Goutte d'Or, Paris 18ème arrondissement, actualisation et compléments, November 2005
Projet de convention ANRU secteur ZUS Goutte d'Or, mise à jour, 13th November 2006
Compte-rendu du Conseil de quartier Goutte d'Or- Château Rouge, 23rd November 2006
Convention ANRU secteur ZUS Goutte d'Or, modifications, 20th February 2007
Projet de déliberation, exposé des motifs, Convention financière ANRU, ZUS Goutte d'Or, Paris 18ème arrondissement, April 2007
La lettre d'information Château Rouge ZUS Goutte d'Or, Mairie de Paris & SEMAVIP, May 2009
Unpublished documents given from Mairie de Paris to Association Salle Saint Bruno re: Château Rouge regeneration
Quartier Château Rouge, Les réunions publiques de concertation sur les projets de la ville, 1994-6
Dossier d'enquête préalable à la Déclaration d'Utilité Publique, May 1998
Projet de note à l'attention du Maire de Paris, le secteur Château Rouge, 2nd May 2001
Plan d'urgence "Château Rouge", document de travail, Neyreneuf, 19th September 2001
Réaction au document Plan d'urgence "Château Rouge" de Michel Neyreneuf, par J.P Salviani, chef de projet politique de la ville, 28th September 2001
Plan d'action "Goutte d'Or- Château Rouge", situation au 13 Mai 2002, Mairie du 18ème, 13th May 2002
Commerces du quartier de Château Rouge, Mairie de Paris & Partenaires Développpement, November 2003
Synthèse du tableau de suivi du Plan d'action "Goutte d'Or- Château Rouge" et du tableau de suivi des actions politique de la ville, commission locale de concertation, 7th April 2004
Synthèse du programme d'aménagement du secteur Château Rouge, comité technique, 26th October 2004
Secteur d'aménagement Château Rouge, programmes d'aménagement des pieds d'immeubles, bilan & fiche développement économique, 18th June 2008
Plan de relogement ANRU Goutte d'Or, point d'avancement et perspectives, Délégation à la Politique de la Ville et à l'Insertion, 19th June 2008

Table 3.9: Documents consulted reviewing local government efforts to regenerate the Château Rouge area

Documents from Community Groups

Municipal records contained little information on the nature of the comments made to the local authority by local groups, individuals and businesses, or on their experience of the regeneration process. However, the *Association Salle Saint Bruno* has archived many of the unpublished documents submitted by local groups in relation to the Goutte d'Or regeneration project. These provided invaluable information on the actions taken by local groups to have their concerns heard and on the nature of the main issues raised by the local population. Many of these documents were created by *Paris Goutte d'Or*, a residents' association. They included copies of letters and petitions submitted to the local authority in relation to the plan, which conveyed useful information on their concerns and aspirations. These documents are listed in Table 3.10.

Petition to the Parisian Council
Poster "non à la destruction"
Leaflet "Goutte d'Or, quartier mort"
Procès-verbal d'enquête publique
Letter to Jacques Chirac, Comité de Défense du Logement Goutte d'Or, 14th November 1983
Letter to Alain Juppé, Démolition ou réhabilitation? Nos positions, Paris Goutte d'Or, 4th March 1984
Letter to M. le Président de la Commission d'enquête de la rénovation de la Goutte d'Or, Mouvement contre le racisme, 25th June 1984
Letter to Commission chargée de l'Enquête Publique, Rabreau, Culot, Panerai, Lemoine, Loyer, 26th June 1984
Letter to Commission chargée de l'Enquête Publique, Associations Paris Goutte d'Or, Vivre à la Goutte d'Or (APFS-CGL), 27th June 1984
Rapport des Associations Paris Goutte d'Or, Vivre à la Goutte d'Or (APFS-CGL) à la Commission d'enquête, Rénovation-Réhabilitation de la Goutte d'Or, 4th July 1984
Letter to Jacques Chirac, Appel des Cent, 5th July 1984
Paris Goutte d'Or, Rénovation-Réhabilitation de la Goutte d'Or, remarques et propositions, 14th March 1985
Remarques de l'association Paris Goutte d'Or, Aménagement du secteur "Château Rouge", Enquête Publique, 1998
Projet pour Château Rouge, Association Droit Au Calme, 2000
que fait vraiment coordination toxicomanies 18 dans les quartiers du 18ème ? Collectif d'habitants Goutte d'or Château Rouge, 2006
Community newspapers
Paris Goutte d'Or, community newspaper number 1, June 1984 to number 51, June 2001 & Paris Goutte d'Or newsletter, April 2005
Le 18e du Mois
Community reports
Le tableau de bord de la vie sociale à la Goutte d'Or, Association Salle Saint Bruno, 2005
La vie de quartier à la Goutte d'Or, perceptions et representations des habitants, Associations Salle Saint Bruno & Coordination Toxicomanie, 2006
Découvrir ou Redécouvrir le quartier de la Goutte d'Or, document de synthèse, Association Salle Saint Bruno 2008

Table 3.10: Documents provided by local groups

Paris Goutte d'Or (PGO) was created by local residents in order to voice local concerns regarding the municipal plan and remained the main community group active in the area during the design and implementation of the scheme. *PGO* organised the mobilisation of the local population and gained the support of national voluntary groups. Furthermore, *PGO* recorded its experience of the regeneration and consultation process by publishing a quarterly newspaper dedicated to local issues and community concerns regarding the regeneration of the areas. This community newspaper contained information on meetings and correspondence with the municipality, views on actions and proposals from the *Ville de Paris* and views on the changes in the area brought by the regeneration process. All issues of the newspaper were reviewed, imparting considerable insight into the community's perceptions of the appropriateness of the measures taken in relation to the community's needs. Original documents furnished by *PGO* also provided data on its vision for the regeneration of the Château Rouge area. Yet, *PGO* activities have been limited since 2001, when its President resigned following election as a local councillor.

A new generation of local activists emerged in the last decade, promoting different visions for the redevelopment of the Château Rouge area from the original project of *Paris Goutte d'Or* and affiliated voluntary groups. The newcomers have attempted to influence public policy and have reacted to changes resulting from the implementation of the Château Rouge renewal plan. They have created two local groups, namely *Droit Au Calme* and *Collectif d'habitants Goutte d'or Château Rouge*. These have produced a limited number of documents, which detailed their positions towards the municipality's actions and its proposals in the early stage of the process. As information concerning their most recent experience of engaging with the local government had not been recorded, this was sought through direct interviews.

Finally, a limited number of reports published by the *Association Salle Saint Bruno* were used to assess the outcomes of the regeneration process to date and to gain additional information on the different groups living in the area and their respective aspirations. These reports are listed in Table 3.10.

Other sources

- *APUR*

The *Atelier Parisien d'Urbanisme* (APUR), a planning agency for Paris, was created in July 1967 by the Paris City Council. It is charged with documenting urban trends, participating in the definition of planning and development policies and preparing projects for Paris. To fulfil these missions, the APUR monitors changes in Paris, especially demographic, economic, social and real estate data on the French capital. Maps and statistics relating Paris and the 71st administrative district of Paris were retrieved from different documents produced by the APUR.

- *Chambre des Notaires de Paris*

The *Chambre des Notaires de Paris* is the professional body for notaries in Paris. This organisation keeps data on property prices in Paris. Certain information from this database was provided for the purpose of this research, helping to trace the evolution of property prices in Paris generally, the 18th arrondissement and the 71st administrative district.

- *Paris Habitat, OPH (formerly OPAC)*

The OPH, the main provider of social housing in Paris, collects data on the occupiers of public-housing complexes. Triennial surveys of its tenants are conducted. Results for the 2003 and 2006 surveys for the Goutte d'Or *politique de la ville* district provided data on the social characteristics of the population living in social housing.

- *Institut national de l'audiovisuel*

The Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge area has attracted significant media attention over the years. Through the *Institut national de l'audiovisuel* archives, a three-hour radio show consisting of an audio documentary and a debate on the regeneration of the Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge area between a local councillor, community services providers and *Droit Au Calme* was accessed. The programme was recorded in 2002, providing insight into the positions of different local groups and individuals regarding the appropriateness of the measures defined by the municipality.

- *Newspapers*

National and local newspaper such as *Le Monde*, *Libération*, *Marianne* and *Le Parisien* provided additional information on the actions of different actors involved in the regeneration of the area.

Interviews

Although there was a considerable range of secondary sources providing invaluable information about the community's experience of the regeneration process during the first phase of the area redevelopment in the southern part of the district, key data was lacking concerning the second phase of the area's redevelopment. Interviews were conducted to acquire further information necessary to achieve the research aims.

Residents groups and community-service providers acting on behalf of low-income groups were contacted. Key individuals were identified in order to ascertain the views of these organisations concerning changes in the area resulting from both regeneration projects, together with their perceptions of the appropriateness of the measures taken over the years in relation to the needs of low-income groups.

A second type of local group was identified; these represented middle-class interests and have mobilised more recently in order to influence local policy and the nature of the second regeneration project. Although this research had been mainly concerned with disadvantaged groups' experience of the regeneration process, interviews were also sought with the second type of local group in order to gain greater insight into the many forces which have shaped regeneration policy in the area. The new groups of gentrifiers have been very active in lobbying local government, potentially involving significant ramifications for how the needs of socially disadvantaged groups are addressed. Information was sought on the channels which these new groups have employed in order to have their aspirations addressed, their experience of the consultation and regeneration processes and their attitudes towards other local groups.

Two interviews were also carried out with a local councillor currently in charge of planning and housing issues, providing greater insight into how the municipality attempt to responds to local needs and pressures. In addition to interviews with local groups and a councillor, the views of a number of senior council officials were sought. The interviews with the officials were instructive in that they allowed greater understanding of the constraints and influence surrounding the policy process. In total 14 individuals were interviewed during 16 meetings (see Table 3.11). All interviews were fully recorded and transcribed. Finally, the researcher was invited to two informal group meetings organised by the *Collectif d'habitants Goutte d'or Château Rouge*, informal interviewing took place during these meetings.

Position	*Organisation and/or Committee membership*
Local Councillor & Former Community Representative	Mairie du 18e arrondissement & Former President of Paris Goutte d'Or
Community Representative	Paris Goutte d'Or & Accueil Goutte d'Or (President)
Community Representative	Association Salle Saint Bruno (Director) & coordination inter-associative du quartier de la Goutte d'Or
Community worker	Association Coordination Toxicomanie
Community Representative	Association des commerçants et riverains du quartier de Château Rouge
Local Activist	Collectif d'habitants Goutte d'or Château Rouge & Conseil de quartier, collège habitants
Local Activist	Collectif d'habitants Goutte d'or Château Rouge, formerly affiliated to Droit Au Calme
Local Activist	Collectif d'habitants Goutte d'or Château Rouge
Senior official / Project Manager	Secrétariat Général, Mairie de Paris
Senior official (*Chef de projets urbains*)	Direction de l'Urbanisme, Mairie de Paris
Policy officer (regeneration)	Délégation à la Politique de la Ville et à l'Insertion, Equipe de Développement Local Goutte d'Or, Mairie de Paris
Policy officer (housing)	Délégation à la Politique de la Ville et à l'Insertion, Equipe de Développement Local Goutte d'Or, Mairie de Paris
Policy officer (employment)	Délégation à la Politique de la Ville et à l'Insertion, Equipe de Développement Local Goutte d'Or, Mairie de Paris
Project Manager (*Responsable d'opérations*)	SEMAVIP

Table 3.11: List of interviewees for the French case-study

After transcribing all interviews, the researcher familiarised herself with the data by listening to the tapes several times and by reading and re-reading individual transcripts. General impressions gained though in-depth engagement with the interview material were recorded in a separate notepad. The next stage of the data analysis consisted in reading through each transcript, underlining each relevant fragment of information and creating labels or codes for them. The later helped organising the data into categories and identifying recurring themes or issues in the data. Rather than using preconceived categories, the researcher chose to let the codes emerge from the data. The list of categories evolved as the analysis progressed. Sub-categories were created to more accurately differentiate the data. Some categories were given new names, while new categories were added in order to have all relevant phrases coded. Subsequently, using the cut and paste function in Word MS the data was rearranged. All data pertaining to a

particular theme was assembled in an individual Word document. This step allowed identifying and capturing similarities and differences in people's responses for each issue.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRISH URBAN RENEWAL POLICIES

This chapter provides an overview of urban renewal policies in Ireland. It mainly examines the period after 1986, during which a national framework for urban regeneration effectively emerged and developed, with the Irish government targeting blighted areas for renewal. Area-based property-led initiatives became the main focus of urban policy. Prior to 1986, planning legislation and housing policy guided the development of urban areas. Urbanisation occurred relatively late compared to other countries. Ireland remained a predominantly rural society until the 1960s, when a change in economic policy was introduced. Ireland moved away from protectionism and the economy was opened to foreign capital in order to generate growth in industrial employment. Industrialisation and rapid urbanisation ensued. Irish planning laws were deemed inadequate to cope with this new era. Advice was sought from the World Bank and the United Nations in order to develop a modern planning system that could provide optimum management of the physical changes that were to accompany the modernisation of the Irish economy and society (Bartley and Waddington, 2001). New planning legislation was introduced in 1963, which rendered it obligatory for all local authorities to produce a development plan for their area, which would be revisable every five years. The use of development plans and development controls were intended to anticipate and prevent undesirable changes. Although local authorities received legal powers under the new legislation to develop land, they remained mainly regulatory bodies because they lacked financial resources to operate in a pro-active manner (MacLaran, 1993). During this initial era, stretching from 1963 to 1985, urban development was guided by a planning system administrated locally rather than by an explicit national urban policy. In the case of Dublin, the suburbanisation of activities and people was encouraged, to the detriment of the inner city. This earlier period will be examined only very briefly; the aim is to highlight some key elements that will contribute to a better understanding of policies set up in the 1980s and the 1990s.

4.1. Urban Policies 1963-1985: Setting the Scene

The modern Irish planning system was introduced in October 1964, when the Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1963, came into effect. The Act required each local authority to devise a development plan for its area within three years; it was envisaged that such plans would be reviewed every five years, but in practice the process

generally took far longer (MacLaran, 1993). The Act granted powers to the local authorities to assemble and develop land, which could have been used to ensure the renewal of obsolete areas. Section 77 of the Act allowed them to acquire land for development and to develop it by themselves or with the help of others, giving them the possibility to play quite an active role in land development. However, these powers were little used, as the financial resources required to undertake such tasks were never transferred to them; therefore, local authorities essentially took on the role of controlling the development of land through land-use zoning and development control (MacLaran, 1993). Because of the scarcity of funds available to urban planners, their ability to shape the urban environment was highly constrained and highly dependent on private actors' activities or on the actions of other departments (e.g. the housing department) within the local authority, which themselves were restricted in their role due to central control. As pointed out by MacLaran (1993), this is especially problematic during slump periods when few planning applications are forthcoming. With limited public funds, only those aspects of a development plan which are compatible with market logic tend to be implemented. The planners' role therefore tends to be limited to avoid the worst effects of uncontrolled development.

The legislation provided two channels for citizens' views to be inserted in the decision-making process. The public can become involved during the elaboration of the development plan. The local authority must consult the public and publish its intention to elaborate or review a plan. The public can make observations and submissions at the initial stage, when the local authority announces the upcoming review, at the stage of the publication of the draft plan, or when the amended plan is presented. Any submission received within the permitted timeframe must be given consideration before the plan is adopted. The power of adopting the plan rests with the elected members who, like the public, can make comments on the plan and may require changes to be made. The plan is an important document, since it presents the local authority's policies for land-use and development control. When exercising development control, the city planners must consider the provisions of the plan. The public can also intervene, once permission has been granted. Irish citizens possess the right to appeal a local authority decision to grant permission for development. Any person who has made an observation or submission in relation to a planning application has the right to appeal a planning decision to An Bord Pleanála, an independent appeals Board. However, although mechanisms to include public

views in urban planning exist, private actors are the dominant influence on the planning system and in practice public participation is limited (see McGuirk, 1995).

Influences on urban-planning policies derive from different sources, including private developers and political pressures, but also from abroad, through the importation of policy models or through having recourse to foreign experts when devising policies. For instance, in the mid 1960s, international experts were commissioned by the Irish government to assist the local authorities in their new task of preparing a development plan for their areas. International planning consultants produced an advisory plan for the Dublin region and also for the Limerick-Shannon region, while a separate plan for the remaining seven regions, known as the Buchanan Report, was prepared (Bartley and Waddington, 2001). The Buchanan Report recommended the promotion of industrialisation and population in a limited number of growth centres to avoid the over-development of the capital city, as had happened in the UK. The recommendations of the Buchanan Report were not adopted, meaning that the coordination of individual plans through regional planning remained weak, while Dublin underwent a period of major growth (Bartley and Waddington, 2001).

Its development pattern was strongly influenced by the settlement strategy commissioned by the government for the Dublin Region by the U.K. consultant Myles Wright (see Bartley and Waddington, 2001; MacLaran, 1993). Importing the idea of new towns from Britain, he suggested that population growth and industrial expansion should be mainly accommodated in new towns to be located to the west of the city. The strategy did not recommend increasing the residential potential of the city itself, which later exacerbated the decline of the central city. Myles Wright's proposals, published in 1967, were incorporated in an altered form in the development plans of Dublin City and Dublin County over the next two decades. The plans facilitated the suburbanisation both of industrial activity and residential development to the detriment of the central area. Three new towns were built: Tallaght, Clondalkin and Blanchardstown. However, unlike the British model, Dublin's new towns did not develop as autonomous entities. In Dublin, the new-towns policy was to be implemented as cheaply as possible for the public purse; therefore, they were deprived of much of the public funding for social facilities (MacLaran, 1993). With the exception of social housing and some infrastructural development, there was a heavy reliance on the private sector to develop most aspects of the new towns. They developed as low-rise and low-density housing estates, lacking

essential matching commercial and social facilities. The local authorities had difficulties in redressing this situation as they lacked the necessary funds. They also lacked the power to coordinate growth at the regional level. The decentralisation of activity and population continued as a "default urban policy" (Bartley and Waddington, 2001: 12) until the mid 1980s, the resulting decline of the inner city being blamed on the local government's perceived inability to guide the development of the modern city. As a consequence, the central government introduced renewal polices for Dublin and other major cities in the mid 1980s which, to a large extent, bypassed the local authorities.

4.2. Urban Renewal Legislation, Phase 1: Designated Areas and Purpose Agencies

Global economic restructuring and global recession in the 1970s had a strong impact on the Irish economy and its cities. There was an unprecedented rise in unemployment due to two global recessions after the oil crises and, following Ireland's entry into the EU, an increased inability of Irish labour-intensive manufacturing firms to compete with manufactured imports, leading to many closures. The effects of economic restructuring were particularly evident in inner urban areas. A common pattern of inner-city decline appeared in cities such as Dublin (see MacLaran, 1993) and Cork (see O'Callaghan and Linehan, 2007), which was exacerbated by past urban policies of decentralisation. For instance, between 1971 and 1981, inner Dublin witnessed a 27 percent decline in population, while the number of manufacturing employees fell by 55 percent (MacLaran, 1993: 210). By the early 1980s, the older parts of the city were marked by high levels of dereliction and growing problems of depopulation, unemployment and social issues such as drug abuse. In 1985, there were 65 hectares of derelict land and vacant buildings adjacent to the 'hard core' of Dublin's central business area (see MacLaran, 1993) The severity of the problems constituted the impetus for government intervention.

The Urban Development Areas Bill in 1982 was the first national attempt at initiate inner-city revitalisation. The Bill concerned primarily Dublin and envisaged the establishment of two special commissions. One would oversee the redevelopment of land located north of the Custom House Quay, while the other one would oversee renewal in Dublin's south inner city. Using the concept of the Urban Development Corporation employed in the London Docklands as a model, these commissions were to receive substantial powers (Moore, 1999). Any development carried out directly by the commissions or approved by them would be exempted from the need for planning permission from the local authority. However, the Bill was not enacted due to a change in

government. Nevertheless, concerns regarding the decline of inner-city areas increased during the mid 1980s. For instance, the Easter Regional Development Organisation plan published in 1985 which created significant controversy and an animated public debate. It proposed a new plan for the Dublin region, in which the prevailing pattern of decentralisation would continue rather than any attempt being made to counter these trends. This, it was observed, would have led to the emergence of a hollow 'doughnut city' (Bartley and Waddington, 2001). Moreover, despite some attention[7] to the problems of Dublin's inner city, local government had failed to reverse economic decline and physical dereliction (MacLaran, 1993). Consequently, in 1986, central government introduced its first major piece of regeneration policy in the form of the Urban Renewal Act.

The core objectives of the Urban Renewal Act were two-fold. First, one aim was to promote urban redevelopment by stimulating private investment in areas that, in the absence of public-sector intervention, were likely to remain undeveloped. A second goal was to boost the construction industry which, as a result of simultaneous slumps in industrial, office and residential development, was characterise by an unemployment rate of over 45 percent. The Act was aimed mainly at encouraging property-led regeneration through the provision of generous tax incentives available to the private sector for new developments and for the refurbishment of old buildings. The emphasis was placed on the physical element of regeneration. A broader approach including social aims, such as job creation and public investment, was rejected because of the poor state of public finances at the time (Williams, 2006). In contrast to past planning legislation, which focused on controlling urban development, the new policy encouraged a pro-development attitude and a move towards more entrepreneurial modes of governance (McGuirk and MacLaran, 2001).

The Urban Renewal Act (1986) empowered the Minister for the Environment to designate priority zones for renewal. However, local authorities were largely bypassed during the process of delimitating such Designated Areas (McGuirk and MacLaran, 2001). The initial legislation applied to Dublin and the four other major Irish cities (Cork, Limerick, Galway and Waterford). A majority of Designated Areas were found in Dublin (see Table 4.1), which is unsurprising given the constant importance of Dublin in the Irish urban system and economy. In fact, 25 percent of the Irish population live in Dublin, compared to only 4.5 percent in Cork, the second-largest Irish city. A total of five areas

[7] The development by the IDA of small factory units in each of the quadrants of the inner city and the scheme by the Inner-City task Force to subsidise employers for engaging persons taken off the Live Register (see MacLaran, 1993: 215)

were initially established in Dublin, four of which were located in the inner city. One was a Greenfield site in Tallaght which received 'redevelopment' status incentives in order to encourage the development of a new shopping centre.

City	Designated Area	Acres
Dublin	Gardiner Street	91
	Quays	68
	Henrietta Street	2.5
	Custom House Docks	81.
Cork	South Parish/ Shandon	27
	Blackpool	18
Limerick	John's Gate	39
Galway	Merchants Road	14
Waterford	Meaghers Quay/Lady Lane	14

Table 4.1: Location and size of Designated Areas, 1986 (Source: KPMG, 1996)

These inner-city areas included the disused Custom House Docks, large parts of the quays, a large area in the north of the city around Gardiner Street and the small, architecturally important, area of Henrietta Street (see Figure 4.1). In 1988 and in 1990, the scheme was extended to include additional new areas of Dublin's inner city and additional provincial towns (see Figure 4.2). Tax incentives available in these Designated Areas were originally set by the Finance Act, 1986. The advantages offered were varied. They aimed to encourage the construction of new buildings and to attract new occupiers in commercial and residential developments (see MacLaran, 1993; Williams and MacLaran, 1996). They included benefits such as reductions in commercial rates for ten years and reductions in income tax for owner-occupiers. Overall, these incentives were mainly for people who had access to substantial capital, such as investors, developers and high earners. In order to hasten development, the fiscal incentives were initially to be made available for only a short period of time (KPMG et al, 1996). However, time extensions were later granted, accompanying the geographical extensions mentioned previously.

The Urban Renewal Act, 1986, also revived the idea originally presented in 1982 of setting up a special-purpose agency invested with special regeneration powers by creating the Custom House Docks Development Authority (CHDDA). This independent development agency was given the task of securing the regeneration of the derelict Custom House Docks area. Under the Act, the CHDDA received powers to acquire, hold and manage land in the area. One function of the CHDDA was to prepare a development plan

for the area. Once approved by the Minister, this document served as a framework for private actors who wanted to submit development proposals concerning the area.



Figure 4.1: Designated Areas in Dublin (Source: Williams and MacLaran, 1996)

In order to speed up renewal, planning powers were transferred to the CHDDA. All developments consistent with the planning scheme elaborated and therefore approved by the CHDDA were exempted from seeking planning permission from the local authority. The role of the local authority was marginal in the renewal project, since the legislation simply required that the CHDDA consult the local authority and consider its City Development Plan. The area also benefited from appealing tax breaks. The redevelopment project was boosted by the decision in 1987 to create an International Financial Services Centre in the area, providing additional advantages in the form of a reduced corporation tax of 10 per cent for those companies that specialised in internationally traded services. Redevelopment in the docklands area under the auspice of the CHDDA and its pro-development ethos was influential in setting the stage for subsequent models of regeneration (see MacLaran, 1993; M^{c}Guirk and MacLaran, 2001).

DESIGNATED AREAS



Figure 4.2: Designated Areas in Ireland (Source: KPMG, 1996)

In the early 1990s, legislation was enacted to promote the regeneration of Temple Bar, an area of the city with a unique mix of cultural, retail and food activities, a long-term project to turn the district into a central bus station was abandoned, probably as much due to budgetary constraints as to pressures from conservationists (MacLaran, 1993). The

government aimed at preserving the character of the area by creating a cultural and tourist district. In 1991, the area also received the status of priority area for renewal under the 1986 Urban Renewal Act, and the 1991 Finance Act defined the package of incentives available.

The main difference with other Designated Areas was that the incentives were more favourably orientated towards refurbishment rather than new construction. Another difference was that there was a greater control over the availability of tax relief, being restricted to certain types of uses including residential, cultural and tourism. Large offices were not permitted. Temple Bar Renewal Ltd. was charged with assessing the merits of developments seeking tax reliefs, thereby controlling the allocation of tax incentives. While this was successful in encouraging certain types of function, the weakness was that any approved use could still be developed without limitation (KPMG et al, 1996). However, the elaboration of a framework plan for the area also meant that development occurred in a less ad-hoc fashion than in most other Designated Areas (KPMG et al, 1996).

In addition, the special-purpose agency, Temple Bar Properties, was established to act as a property company for the area, acquiring at pre-incentive prices the existing holdings of sites then in public ownership and operating as an active developer in the area (see MacLaran , 1993). However unlike the CHDDA, Temple Bar Properties did not become the planning authority for the area, the agency and private developers needed to apply to Dublin Corporation for planning permission in the traditional way. Thus, in contrast to the previous schemes, the local authority was reintegrated in the regeneration process, although in a marginal position rather than as a leader of the programme (Stafford and Payne, 2004). Another difference was that not all the development was tax-driven; some funds came from the EU and the exchequer. Overall, this model of regeneration has been depicted as superior to the CHDDA and Designated Areas models (see KPMG et al, 1996; Bartley and Waddington, 2001).

Soon after the termination of the first urban-renewal scheme, which was initiated in 1986 and expanded between 1988 and 1991, the government decided to introduce a new scheme called "New Life for Your Town" in 1994. The scheme commenced in August 1994 and concerned 35 urban centres. Originally, the scheme was intended to run for a three-year period, but it was extended in the 1997 Finance Act and in the 1998 Finance Act. Finally, the programme ended on the 30th of April 1999. Despite some adjustments, the thrust of the programme remained the same as the previous programme. One of the

changes introduced by the new scheme was the emphasis on refurbishment and residential developments by devising particularly attractive tax incentives for the refurbishment of buildings for residential purposes (Department of Finance, 1999). The aim was to bring people and activity back to the city and to reverse the trend towards suburbanisation (DoE, 1994). Incentives were available for residential, commercial and industrial uses and, to a lesser extent, for office development where an office development was to receive tax relief only where this was "ancillary to other commercial development" (DoE, 1994: 4). There were two other new elements in the scheme. One aimed at promoting the refurbishment of vacant upper storeys in existing shops and business premises for residential purposes. Therefore, through the 'living over the business' sub-programme, allowances were made available in certain streets designated by the Minister of the Environment. The second innovation was the introduction of Enterprise Areas, the concept being imported from the UK (Moore, 1999). Six Enterprise Areas were designated. They were established in the major urban centres of Dublin, Cork and Galway. Within their boundaries, allowances were only available for a certain type of industrial development. However, the type of qualifying enterprises evolved with time and came to include office activity (Moore, 1999). In this second scheme, the role of the local authority was also minimal. The central government controlled the decision-making process by defining the scheme content and the priority areas. There was a clear division of tasks, as highlighted in official documents presenting the scheme:

> "The urban renewal scheme is a joint venture between the State, which provides the financial incentives, the local authorities who promote the scheme, and the private sector which makes the necessary investment and carries out the work." (DoE, 1994: 1).

As the later quotation emphasised, the 1994 scheme remained a property-led regeneration policy relying on private actors.

4.3. The Impacts of Ten Years of Property-led Regeneration

In 1996, the DoELG commissioned from a consortium headed by KPMG Management Consulting a major review of the impact and effectiveness of the Urban Renewal Schemes nationally. Moreover, a number of academic studies carried out in the mid 1990s documented the impacts of such schemes in Dublin (see Bartley and Treadwell Shine, 2003; MacLaran, 1993, 1996, 1999; MacLaran and Murphy, 1997; Prunty, 1995; Williams and MacLaran, 1996). The urban renewal schemes were deemed successful in bringing back activity and residents to central cities, contributing to a change in the image

of the inner city, from one of dereliction to one of a desirable place in which to live, work and do business. However, while the physical benefits of the schemes were undeniable, the studies criticised this type of property-led approach to regeneration for its lack of social concern and lack of local input, creating a deficit in democratic legitimacy. The benefits of the commercial and residential developments failed to trickle down to the local indigenous population.

Over the ten-year period in which the Schemes were in operation, the number of Designated Areas increased from nine, located in five major cities in 1986, to over 100, located in 35 urban centres in 1996 (KPMG et al, 1996). Considerable investment in office development had occurred under the Urban Renewal Schemes, frequently in areas that had not been traditional areas for office development. The incentives contributed to the creation of new business districts in the Irish towns and cities. Between 1986 and 1995, over IR£1.7 billion of private-sector investment was generated under the schemes nationally, 32 per cent of which was invested in office development (KPMG et al, 1996: ii). Dublin and especially the CHDDA accounted for the vast majority of this office investment (75 percent), followed by Limerick and Galway cities (KPMG et al, 1996: 52). This can be explained by the intensity of office development in these Designated Areas during the first few years of the schemes in Dublin. The introduction of the tax incentives coincided with rising demand in office space due to economic growth; therefore, developers responded quickly to the availability of financial advantages in these areas (MacLaran, 1994). Between 1986 and 1992, 70 per cent of space developed in the Designated Areas of Dublin consisted of office development (Williams and MacLaran, 1996). However, much of the development was speculative. Therefore, the amount of office space constructed soon surpassed the requirements for such space. Consequently, by the end of 1991, 45 percent of the newly completed space lay vacant and the focus of development activity switched to the residential sector in these areas (MacLaran, 1996).

Intervention from the government encouraged that shift, since, in 1991, Section 23/27 tax reliefs, which had been generally available to investors who rented out their residences, became applicable only within the Designated Areas, instead of nationwide. This resulted in a surge in the provision of residential space in the centre of Irish urban centres, in locations which had long been neglected by private investors. Between 1986 and 1995, there were about 7,600 new residential units constructed in the Designated Areas of the five major cities, a majority of which were built in Dublin (5,300 units), accommodating a new population of about 17,500 people (KPMG et al, 1996). In Dublin,

the schemes sold well, in part because central city living became attractive in the 1990s to an increasing number of young adults who wished to leave their parental home early and could afford to do so because of an expanding jobs market (MacLaran, 1999).

Studies examining these residential schemes noted several issues. First, in many of the designated areas, the preferred option for the developer was to demolish and rebuild rather than to refurbish residential properties and for this reason the Living over the Business scheme had little success (KPMG et al, 1996). This has obvious consequences in terms of conservation. Secondly, the quality of the developments was poor, with a prevalence of small units characterised by an intensive use of kitchenettes and small bathrooms, and a lack of external space available for the use of the residents (KPMG et al, 1996; MacLaran 1996). Thirdly, there were concerns regarding the sustainability of these developments, because of the transient nature of the people living in the new complexes (MacLaran, 1996) and their reluctance to get involved in local organisations as well as their lack of interaction with local residents. The socio-economic characteristics of the population residing in the new complexes tended to vary greatly from those of the local residents.

The Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Trinity College Dublin, carried out two surveys of new residential complexes located in Dublin inner city in 1993 and 1995. The results of these surveys showed that among the new residents there was a low representation of unemployed people, retired people and children. Residents were predominantly young professionals at an early stage of their career, with 94 per cent of the respondents being under 45 years old (MacLaran, 1996). The social status of the respondents tended to be high, sharply differentiating them from the indigenous population of the inner city. Their educational attainment was high, with over three-quarters of the residents holding a degree or professional qualification and most of them working in either a professional, managerial or clerical position (MacLaran, 1996).

Many of the new residential schemes were built in the vicinity of areas of high social deprivation, characterised by gated developments with high levels of security and surveillance, creating tensions between the 'new' and the 'old' communities and acting as an impediment to the integration of the two groups. Increased social segregation and concomitant resentment was highly visible in the Dublin Docklands, where the new developments were referred to as "yuppies enclaves" (Moore, 1999) and the old dock wall which had encircled the former Custom House Docks, already several metres high, was surmounted by a 5-metre fence to complete the segregation of the two communities. It was

dubbed 'The Berlin Wall' by the local population (Bartley and Treadwell Shine, 2003). The redevelopment of the CHDA resulted in the juxtaposition of one of the state's most deprived social housing estates with one of the most high-priced pieces of real estate (MacLaran, 1993).

This trend towards the gentrification of traditional inner-city working-class neighbourhoods raises broader questions concerning the relevance of tax-led renewal policies in solving the social issues of disadvantaged inner-city communities. In the U.K., several studies have documented that the benefits of property-based renewal policies failed to trickle down to disadvantaged groups (see for instance Turok, 1992). In Ireland, as early as 1993, MacLaran stressed that governmental urban renewal policies relying on tax incentives to the private sector were unlikely to bring solutions to the problems of the local communities, even though they had some advantages for the government, such as their highly visible effects on the landscape and their relative low cost in the short term in comparison to grants or direct public-sector involvement. The research commissioned by the government gave weight to this concern. The consultants found that few additional jobs were 'created' in the Designated Areas, as businesses relocated in order to take advantages of the tax incentives available in these districts. Thus, they concluded that the Urban Renewal Schemes had had an impact on the location rather than on the level of employment nationally. This leads one to question whether the use of such an instrument is justified, given that the cost to the Exchequer of the tax breaks granted between 1986 and 1996 have been estimated at IR£367m to IR£461m. This question is most salient since the foregone tax could have been used to finance training courses or other social services needed by the inner-city communities. Bringing employment opportunities within a reasonable geographical distance of the communities most affected by a high level of unemployment did not mean that those jobs would become accessible to them. Indeed, the consultants found no evidence that the local community had benefited from employment opportunities arising from investment under the Urban Renewal Scheme (KPMG et al, 1996). This finding was valid for long-term employment positions such as jobs in the banking sector, for which the local population lacked appropriate skills, and for shorter-term jobs in construction; even manual jobs tended to be filled by outside contractors and workforces. A few programmes were developed by local community groups to encourage links between employers and job seekers and had positive effects, but more mechanisms were needed to make sure local people could benefit from investment in their areas. Overall, the tax-led approach was found to be inadequate in addressing the needs of

socially deprived inner-city communities. The consultants recommended using alternative mechanisms to achieve social goals. They concluded that:

> "Since 1986, some urban communities in or adjacent to designated areas have experienced long-term unemployment, escalating rates of crime and drug abuse and the alienation of young people in spite of the level of private sector investment attracted to the area due to the tax incentives. It is recognised that one must look beyond the tax-based Urban Renewal Schemes for the roots of these problems and for their solutions." (KPMG et al, 1996: 116).

Overall, the indigenous population of the inner city lacked the necessary capital to take advantage of the fiscal benefits offered by the Urban Renewal Schemes. Unsurprisingly, the consultants' research found that the benefits accrued mainly to the relatively well off, such as property developers, investors or people living in the new residences (KPMG et al, 1996).

Property-led regeneration policies in Ireland not only failed to address the needs of disadvantaged urban communities but, perhaps more worryingly, may have exacerbated their difficulties. Several studies have highlighted that in Dublin and in other major cities, as the fiscal advantages resulted in serious increases in land values and housing costs, it was increasingly difficult for the local population and their relatives to remain in the area and for community organisations to find affordable space to carry out their social activities (KPMG et al, 1996; MacLaran, 1999; Bartley and Treadwell Shine, 2003). In Dublin, this was exacerbated by the contraction in social housing provision. Public-sector housing complexes can slow down gentrification and help the indigenous population to maintain themselves in the area going through restructuring. In Dublin, many of the sites that had been earmarked for social housing were sold, as funding from the national government was not being provided for their development and central government pressurised local authorities to dispose of their existing stock of sites to facilitate the private-sector-led process of redevelopment (McGuirk and MacLaran, 2001).

In Dublin, one impact of the Urban Renewal Schemes was that the local authority increasingly adopted a pro-development attitude and has taken the role of selling the city as a good place for property investment. As illustrated by McGuirk and MacLaran (2001), centrally-driven schemes transformed Dublin's inner-city appearance by sparking a property boom and have generated a change in the mode of operation of the Dublin municipality. This shift towards a more entrepreneurial mode of governance was initiated by central-government actions (McGuirk, 2000). Paradoxically, Dublin Corporation (the local authority for the Dublin area) had little role in the transformation of the social and physical fabric of the area for which it had responsibility. The 1986 urban renewal schemes

had resulted in a marginalisation of Dublin Corporation in policy development and a further centralisation of power at the national level. The Designated Areas were originally delimited without the consultation of the city Planning Department, while the CHDDA became the planning authority for the docklands, having expropriated planning powers from Dublin Corporation. The negative perception of planning activity from the central government and, more widely from, private developers resulted in the sidelining of the local authority. Planners were seen as entrenched in bureaucratic modes of working; therefore, the municipality planning department was not seen as able to adopt the entrepreneurial style of practice which property-led regeneration demanded (McGuirk, 2000).

This tendency to give a peripheral role to the local authority in the regeneration of the inner city, especially in the redevelopment of the Dublin docklands, led to a 'fight back' attitude at management level, which had the determination to prove that the local authority could be as efficient as a special-purpose agency (Bartley and Treadwell Shine, 2003; McGuirk and MacLaran, 2001). Dublin Corporation moved away from its traditional role of regulating and controlling physical development and increasingly redefined its task as being to facilitate property development (McGuirk and MacLaran, 2001). McGuirk (2000) argued that the Dublin municipality, in the process of redefining itself as an entrepreneurial entity, inserted new actors in the development process. She illustrated how the latter came to dominate the networks of urban policy making while others, namely the city planners, became marginalised within their own organisation.

Pressures from the central government and developers on Dublin Corporation to take a more entrepreneurial stance resulted in the local authority setting up an Inner City Development Team (ICDT) within the Development Department, a section of the municipality that operates separately from the Planning Department and that is in charge of managing municipal land (McGuirk, 2000). McGuirk's research showed that the primary concern of the ICDT was to provide a point of contact within Dublin Corporation for developers interested in presenting projects for inner-city sites, while offering its support to such projects by adopting a collaborative and facilitative approach to private-sector development. The team acted as a catalyst for urban renewal by releasing land that was owned by Dublin Corporation to private developers and by marketing the Designated Areas as profitable places for property development (McGuirk, 2000). The interviews carried out by McGuirk showed that the team was purposely recruited to adopt a new way of working; one member explained: "We have tried to put a stamp on the way we deal with

development—a way that is different to the bureaucratic way" (ICDT member quoted in McGuirk, 2000: 664). The pro-development mode of operation of the team clashed with the traditional values of the local-authority planners, some of whom had difficulty in coming to terms with this approach as they felt that development needed to be regulated more strongly. According to McGuirk (2000), tensions developed between the Development Department and Planning Department approaches, resulting in the marginalisation of the city planners from urban renewal policy networks. Those who remained involved adopted a more flexible approach to planning rules and were those who responded favourably to the new pro-development ethos that emanated from the city management quarter (McGuirk and MacLaran, 2001). For McGuirk (2000), the exclusion of city planners from the renewal process combined with the emphasis of centrally defined urban renewal schemes on physical regeneration seriously restrained the possibility for social objectives to be given attention during the earlier schemes.

The inability of the early schemes to deliver social outcomes has also been linked to the exclusion of community interests from the urban renewal policy networks (see KPMG et al, 1996). For instance, Moore (1999) stressed that in the original plan for the Dublin docklands area drafted in 1987, the special-purpose agency had stated its intention to provide channels for the local community to influence the nature of development; however, a consultative structure was not set up before 1995. Moreover, this structure, called the community liaison committee, did not permit effective community input. In most other areas, with the exception of Temple Bar, development was proceeding in an ad-hoc manner, and no overall plan was devised to guide the renewal process; this was an additional impediment to the consideration of social issues (KPMG et al, 1996). The main route that the local community had to influence development was by submitting observations in relation to individual planning permissions.

4.4. Urban Renewal Legislation, Phase 2: Introducing Community Participation and Social Objectives

As seen above, by the mid 1990s, both academic research and commercial research commissioned by the Department of the Environment had illustrated the shortcomings of property-based renewal policies in Ireland. The consultants provided an in-depth analysis of the Urban Renewal Schemes, covering a wide range of issues, from tax estimates of foregone to the social impacts of the schemes. The KPMG study published in 1996 concluded that the tax-led approach had succeeded in stimulating private investment and in renewing physically the inner-city areas of Irish cities and towns by addressing dereliction

and dilapidation. However, it identified a number of deficiencies, the lack of benefit arising to the local population being listed as the main weakness of a policy based on tax incentives. The consultants stated:

> "While it was not an expressed objective, the incentives, nevertheless, clearly failed to address the issue of the social exclusion of the indigenous communities in inner-city areas, particularly in Dublin." (KPMG et al, 1996: 118).

Another key issue was the piecemeal approach to regeneration, which consisted of letting redevelopment of individual sites occur in an ad-hoc manner rather than developing a planning framework in order to obtain an integrated development of individual sites or projects.

The consultants recommended that in the future urban renewal policy should not rely on tax incentives alone. They also called for the adoption of a more focused approach in awarding designated status to areas seeking such status. The aim was to target specific sites as catalysts rather than make tax incentives available throughout a whole district. It was felt that designation should emerge from the preparation of a Strategic Area Plan – that is, a strategic vision for the area expressed in a plan. The consultants hoped that, as a result, tax incentives would stop being applied in an *ad-hoc* manner and, instead, would be part of a coherent regeneration plan. Ultimately, the objective was to move away from a narrow conception of urban renewal that emphasises physical issues in order to recognise and address the variety of problems that declining areas were facing. They promoted the adoption of an integrated and holistic approach to regeneration, giving equal importance to physical and social issues. Their definition of urban renewal clearly stated the importance which they attributed to the adoption of a multi-faceted approach:

> "Urban renewal must address the physical, economic, social and environmental regeneration and rejuvenation of urban areas having regard to the local situation, the overall situation and any individual conditions" (KPMG et al, 1996: 135).

They envisaged that Strategic Area Plans would form part of the city or county Development Plans, which each local authority was obliged to elaborate under Irish law. Development Plans were deemed insufficient by themselves, as they did not provide detailed redevelopment strategies and were too broad in their scope. They recommended that each plan would provide a significant level of detail, analyse the difficulties which the area was facing, followed by a presentation of the objectives of the local regeneration scheme and how such objectives would be attained.

The consultants wished to see the integrated strategic approach adopted broadly in Ireland outside the policy domain of urban renewal. Their vision conceived planning as a

social activity as much as a physical activity. Their recommendations also stated that the local authorities should be the entities in charge of the elaboration of Strategic Area Plans because of their knowledge of local structures and local needs. Yet, the consultants stressed that the plan should be defined in co-operation with the local community. The participation and consultation of those potentially affected by the regeneration process and those involved in community development initiatives were presented as paramount to ensure that any plan would be relevant to the needs of socially-disadvantaged groups. Community interests were also to be involved during the implementation phase. Overall, they emphasised the need for initiatives such as training and education programmes to form part of the plan. Lastly, they noted that a combination of grants and tax-based subventions might be needed, since even with tax incentives some projects would not be developed.

Following the publication in 1996 of the consultants' research, the Department of the Environment and Local Government (DoELG) published guidelines in 1997 for a new urban renewal scheme[8]. It seemed that the government had accepted criticisms and recommendations from the consultants. Based on the report's recommendations, the government underlined the importance of introducing new principles in urban renewal policy:

> "Based on [their] recommendations, the new urban renewal scheme will, in a number of important respects, be different from its predecessors. In general, the scheme will feature a much more focused approach, targeting the remaining areas of need. It will also be a much more integrated scheme. While physical renewal will, of course, continue to be a central objective, it won't be the only one. The Government's National Anti-Poverty Strategy requires that future policy on urban renewal must take full account of the social needs in and effects on areas targeted for regeneration." (DoELG, 1997: 1).

The new policy called for a move away from relying solely on designation to solve the issues of declining areas and, as recommended by the consultants, the new central tool for regeneration was to be a Strategic Area Plan, renamed an Integrated Area Plan (IAP). Local authorities that wanted to apply for tax incentives were now only authorised to do so for sub-parts or individual sites within an area for which they had prepared an IAP. The allocation of tax incentives only to areas covered by an IAP was a result of the recommendation to avoid designation in an ad-hoc manner. Designation was to emerge

[8] This scheme, originally known as the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme, has been renamed and referred to as the 1999 Urban Renewal Scheme.

from a strategic vision for the area expressed in an IAP. The new policy described an IAP in the following terms:

> "An IAP in the context of the 1998 urban renewal scheme is intended to address the physical, economic, social/employment and environmental regeneration of a declining urban area." (DoELG, 1997: 7).

> "It should create an holistic vision for the future of the area, balancing physical (including residential) development, economic and community development, conservation, and environmental and amenity improvements." (DoELG, 1997: 11).

It was envisaged that the time necessary to reach all the objectives of an IAP would vary, some goals being more difficult than others to implement, but an appropriate timescale was deemed not to exceed five to seven years. The guidelines stated that the incentives would be available for a limited time and that complementary measures, such as grants and the provision of community facilities, should be considered in order to ensure that all the objectives of an IAP would be met in time. Evidently, the needs of lower-income groups seemed to be receiving much greater attention than under the 1986 or 1994 schemes. For instance, the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme's guidelines stated that the focus should not only be on the provision of private residential units. Local authorities were asked to "seek to maximise opportunities for new social housing on infill sites" (DoELG, 1997: 15). The stated objective was to ensure that no less than 15 per cent of the new bed-spaces located in an IAP would be social housing units.

The IAP policy aimed to differ from past approaches to urban regeneration in terms of the issues which it addressed and the people whom it involved. In response to the consultants' critique regarding the inadequacy of the consultation process under the two previous Urban Renewal Schemes, the new guidelines put a major emphasis on the need to consult and involve all relevant stakeholders, including the local community, from the definition stage through to the implementation of the regeneration scheme. The process was expected "to bring together a wide range of 'actors' involved in implementing or affected by the IAP, in meaningful partnerships" (DoELG, 1997: 11). A full sub-section of the guidelines (Section 7.0 'Consultation, participation and partnerships') was devoted to the integration of local knowledge and local needs within the plan, through collaboration with local groups at the stage of plan-making. The DoELG even provided a model to follow by suggesting that inspiration should be taken from the consultation process that had taken place

during the elaboration of the Historic Area Rejuvenation Project (HARP) Framework Plan[9]. The involvement of local interests was clearly expected to continue after the definition of the plan's objectives and after the elaboration of strategies to reach these aims. The guidelines requested a range of stakeholders to be involved in the implementation of an IAP. Although there was room for adaptation, the suggestion was to establish "a wide, cross-sectoral steering group, including representatives from local commercial, community and conservation/environment groups, which would have an active and continuing role throughout the period of the plan" (DoELG, 1997: 24). However, as will be seen in the next chapter, Monitoring Committees were set up instead of Steering Groups, leaving the local authority itself to lead the implementation of the scheme rather than becoming a truly collaborative approach in which the community sector was an equal partner.

Unlike previous schemes, local authorities had a significant role to play in the definition process. They were the entities identifying and choosing the sites for designation and were given the responsibility of elaborating the framework for regeneration (the IAP). Yet, central government retained control over the regeneration schemes by providing clear criteria for the selection of areas that should become IAPs (see Table 4.2) and by setting out in detail what issues the IAPS should cover. Ultimately, local authorities had to forward their applications to the DoELG to receive IAP status. The DoELG was also the final decision maker with regard to tax designation. The fact that designation was now to concern a limited number of IAPS and that areas would therefore be competing against one another to gain such status may have constituted for some localities a motivation to adopt in their application the integrated approach which the DoELG recommended. This may well have reflected a will to increase their chances of selection rather than a commitment to such principles. One issue is that there was no statutory requirement on the local authority to deliver the rest of the plan, once the individual sites in IAP had been approved for tax designation. A monitoring system was indeed put into place but, as will be seen, it failed to ensure that an integrated approach was adopted.

In its task of selecting applications that met governmental guidelines, the DoELG was helped by an Expert Advisory Panel. This was a new feature in comparison to the previous schemes. The composition of this panel reflected the commitment the government had made to give greater attention to the needs of disadvantaged people. In fact, people involved in working with or for disadvantaged groups sat on the panel. These included a

[9] This will be examined in the following chapter, together with the rationale underlying why the HARP Framework Plan was to be presented as a useful model.

representative from FAS, the national unemployment agency, and a representative from Combat Poverty Agency, a body advising the government on poverty policies.

On the 17th of February 1999, the Minister for Housing and Urban Renewal, Robert Molloy T.D., announced that five cities and 38 towns would be included in the new scheme. In total, seventy-eight applications had been received, but only 49 were approved. The tax reliefs became operational from the 1st of March 1999 for residential schemes and from the 1st of July 1999 for commercial and industrial developments. They were to continue until the 31st of December 2002, but the deadline for qualification was later extended to the 31st of December 2004. A second extension (*Circular UR 1/06*) was granted in a restricted number of cases until the 31st of July 2008. At the announcement of the successful applications, the Minister (DoELG, 1999) praised the new policy as "a radical departure from previous schemes". A similar language describing IAPs, which emphasised innovation, inclusion and participation, was found in the municipality of Dublin. A senior planner, Dick Gleeson, explained that:

> "The IAP approach to urban planning represents a major departure from the long-established approach of the City Development Plan."
> "The IAP incorporates a more holistic planning philosophy, with the social and economic agenda balancing the more traditional emphasis on environmental aspects"
> "Emphasising consultation, the IAP can respond with focused strategies to address local issues on the ground" (Gleeson, 1999: 52).

- Priority will be given to areas in cities and the larger towns with strong urban characteristics where the greatest concentrations of physical decay and social/economic disadvantage tend to occur
- The IAP area must contain sites or key developments with the potential to benefit from designation incentives
- Priority will be given to physically run-down areas which also experience high levels of social disadvantage, especially in inner-city areas
- Opportunity for achieving synergy with other area-based plans should be maximised
- In defining the boundaries of an IAP area, the focus should be on building on an existing sense of coherence

Table 4.2: Criteria for selection and prioritisation of areas for IAPs (Source: after DoELG, 1997)

In Dublin, six districts were approved as IAPs under the 1999 Urban Renewal Scheme, five of which were in the inner city. In Dublin, the local authority adopted an innovative approach. In order to avail of the incentives, each development had to contribute some element of 'community gain' to the IAP (Hughes, 2000). Originally, in

1999, Dublin Corporation defined four types of contribution that could be accepted as 'community gain' (Hughes, 2000). In the residential sector, the 'community gain' requirement could be fulfilled by allocating a part of the development to social or affordable housing. Alternatively, a financial contribution towards community facilities was deemed acceptable. Another way to qualify for tax incentives was to provide amenities directly, such as youth-club facilities, training workshops or resources centres. Finally, if the development created permanent employment opportunities, it would be viewed as a gain. The Dublin Docklands area was not included in the new IAP scheme. Instead, a new special-purpose agency, the Dublin Docklands Development Authority (DDDA), succeeded the CHDDA in 1997. However, the DDDA had a much wider remit. Geographically, its remit embraced some 520 hectares and the new master plan also incorporated ambitious social goals, with participatory structures being established to facilitate local consultation (Drudy, 1999). The new plan was guided by similar principles to the IAPs. The local authority was not longer sidelined by the DDDA.

In summary, the new urban renewal policy put into place in the late 1990s explicitly sought to develop a more inclusive approach to urban regeneration policy and to ensure local regeneration initiatives would produce inclusive social outcomes. The shift in policy was welcomed. Bartley and Treadwell Shine (1999) argued that they were potentially a good tool since they were more community centred than the renewal schemes which had preceded them. They believed that, if successfully implemented, they could represent a hybrid of American urban entrepreneurialism and the European social model. Indeed, such convergence may well have been possible, as suggested by the 1996 consultants' report, had the use of tax incentives been complemented by public grants towards social projects. However, it also required ideological support from within the local authorities for such an integrated approach. In the case of Dublin, McGuirk and MacLaran (2001) warned that although the IAPs might present an opportunity for local-authority planners to reinsert themselves in regeneration policy networks and to use their new position to implement the social dimension of the plans, the increasing pro-development approach adopted at management level could preclude their reaching such objectives. Moreover, they insisted that one should be careful not to assume that an inclusive approach to policy making would necessarily result in socially-inclusive outcomes.

Similarly, Bartley and Treadwell Shine (2003) called for a close monitoring of participative structures in order to ensure they did not result in more subtle forms of

exclusion. The main concern was that entrepreneurial practices that usually led to social polarisation were still promoted, both locally and nationally, the question being how such contradictory trends could cohabitate in practice.

The following chapter will examine the extent to which, in practice, the new policy arena managed to be inclusive of interests representing socially-deprived groups and will analyse the extent to which their needs have been addressed by the new scheme. A case study is used in order to assess the extent to which communities were facilitated in having their needs addressed under this new situation. While it is recognised that the findings of an in-depth case study cannot permit wide generalisations to be made, it nevertheless provides a detailed understanding of the actual workings of urban regeneration policy. It also tempers official rhetoric which presented the new scheme as a major departure from previous renewal initiatives. Moreover, the research complements recent research which has reviewed the impacts of neoliberal and urban entrepreneurial agendas on working-class communities in Dublin (see Kelly, 2008; MacLaran et al, 2007), while the comparison with a French case study imparts a trans-national perspective on how disadvantaged groups are able to have their needs addressed in a context which has been less receptive to pro-market policies.

CHAPTER FIVE: IRISH CASE STUDY, REGENERATING THE HARP/MARKETS AREA

5.1. The HARP Area: Geographical and Social Context

The area covered by the Historic Area Rejuvenation Project (HARP) Framework Plan and the Integrated Area Plan (IAP) lies within the north-west quadrant of Dublin's Inner City. It is an extensive area stretching over 1.5km from O'Connell Street on its eastern side to the National Museum at Collins Barracks on the western border. It is delimited to the south by the river Liffey and by the former Richmond Hospital to the north (Figure 5.1). It covers a total of 109 hectares and its population was estimated at approximately 7,000 in 1996 (Dublin Corporation, 1996). The area possesses a rich historical and architectural heritage including institutional buildings such as Collins Barracks, designed by Thomas Burgh, James Gandon's Four Courts building and the Incorporated Law Society's offices located in the former Blue Coat School on Blackhall Place, designed by Sir Thomas Ivory.



Figure 5.1: Map of the HARP area (Source: Dublin City Council)

Henrietta street, which dates from the 1720s, was Luke Gardiner's first venture in estate development and is architecturally one of the most important streets in the city, including

buildings designed by William Lovett Pearce, and is enclosed at its western extent by the Law Society's King's Inns building, designed by James Gandon and Henry Baker.

The area has a long history that extends beyond 800 years. The area encountered considerable growth during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and became a prosperous and affluent area. However, decline ensued for various reasons in the nineteenth century. Notably, following the death of the Earl of Mountjoy, a descendant of Luke Gardiner I, the Gardiner estate, which comprised a swathe of prestigious and substantial residential properties in the north inner city stretching from Henrietta street to Mountjoy square and Summerhill, was subdivided and sold to a plethora of landlords. Many of those substantial buildings which had housed wealthy families during the eighteenth century were, in the following century, subdivided into single-room dwellings to accommodate the poor. Thus, the arrival of substantial numbers of rural migrants to the locality put pressures on the existing housing stock and led to a rapid decline in the area's prestige and to the quality of the built environment.

Despite this decline, the area retained important assets during the early twentieth century. For instance, significant employment opportunities existed in relation to market activities and industrial functions such as glass making and coach building (Rourke and Kenny, 1999: 9). However, outward migration of the population, particularly to suburban social-housing schemes, and the decline of traditional industries from the 1970s meant that the area experienced high level of socio-economic deprivation and physical decay throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The loss of major employers such as the Jameson distillery and the cattle market had dramatic impact on the socio-economic and physical fabric of the area.

The 1991 Census of Population revealed a severe decline in the population of the HARP area between 1986 and 1991, when only 3,438 people lived in the district, representing a 22.7 percent drop from the 1986 figure (Dublin Corporation, 1996). Table 5.1 shows that the HARP area was characterised by high levels of social disadvantage in 1991, with indicators such as the unemployment rate and percentage of early school leavers being significantly above the norm for Dublin.

INDICATORS	HARP AREA	DUBLIN CO. BOROUGH
Unemployment	22%	12%
Ceased education under 16 years	47%	29%
Lone parent units as % of all family units	29%	21%

Table 5.1: Indicators of deprivation in the HARP area and Dublin Co. Borough in 1991 (Source, Dublin Corporation, 1996)

Moreover, decline in economic activity and the relocation of a substantial part of the area's population to the suburbs brought consequences for the physical fabric of the area. A study carried out in January 1996 demonstrated that the environmental quality of the HARP area was poor (Dublin Corporation, 1996). It showed that the problem was more acute in the western part of the study area, with a large number of derelict sites and dilapidated buildings around Smithfield.

In the early 1990s, the local authority recognised the need for intervention in the north-west inner city and designated the core of the area as the Smithfield Rejuvenation Area in the 1991 City Development Plan (Dublin Corporation[10], 1998). The first regeneration plan for the whole HARP area was submitted to the Department of Environment and Local Government (DoELG) in 1993 for consideration under the EU LIFE programme, but the submission was unsuccessful. In this initial proposal, the objective of urban renewal was mainly defined in terms of physical redevelopment, while benefits to the local population were conceived as trickling down from investment in new residential and commercial schemes (Russell, 2002: 204). A second plan for the rejuvenation of the northwest inner city was submitted in 1994 to the DoELG for consideration under the Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development (OPLURD). The aim of that EU programme had been to:

> "Bring about social and economic development at local level, to involve and enable local communities to be involved in that development in a formal way, and to achieve physical improvements to the environment." (Government of Ireland, 1995: 11).

It promoted an integrated approach to urban revitalisation and local development and promoted the active engagement of local communities in such endeavour; they were to be "prime movers in the planning and execution of the development initiatives" (Government of Ireland, 1995:37). In 1995, Dublin Corporation was advised that the HARP area had been selected as one of the five Irish flagship projects in the inner city of major cities funded under the EU OPLURD, and subsequently known as the five 'Major Initiatives'. Under this scheme, a budget of IR£5 million was provided by the EU and was to be complemented by the same level of funding from Dublin Corporation to finance key projects in the HARP area. However, to secure the funding, an "action plan" for the area had to be devised (Russell, 2002: 208). This plan was developed by Dublin Corporation and adopted as the HARP Framework Plan in August 1996.

---

[10] Since 1 January 2002, the name Dublin City Council applies both to the assembly and to the whole system of Dublin government but it was formerly called Dublin Corporation

5.2.The HARP Framework Plan: 'Major Initiative' and Steering Group

The HARP plan had two original elements. It provided a departure from previous area-based approaches to renewal such as the Temple Bar and Custom House Docks schemes, since it offered both a broader consultative process and possessed broader objectives (Russell, 2002). The HARP plan provided not only a framework for the physical renewal of the area but also stressed the importance of addressing socio-economic issues. There was a strong commitment to the adoption of an integrated approach, the plan stating that:

> "Urban renewal can no longer be treated as a stand alone land use project synonymous with physical infrastructure provision only. Issues to be addressed include employment, local housing (social and private), environment, education, leisure and tourism, transport (public, private- car, cycle, pedestrian), and equity, i.e. connecting opportunities to the needs of the disadvantaged or marginalised groups in terms of access to jobs and services." (Dublin Corporation, 1996:18).

Alongside an analysis of issues such as land use and urban design, the plan examined the nature of socio-economic issues in the area. Moreover, it defined a clear set of socio-economic objectives (Table 5.2) and offered a set of three strategies to achieve these aims. They included a strategy for community empowerment, which praised the benefits of community participation in urban regeneration, a strategy for employment and education offering an area-based approach to social issues such as unemployment, and a strategy for economic promotion with a strong focus on the food industry. In other words, an approach based on community-development principles was proposed and the plan adopted a discourse supportive of 'participation', 'partnership' and 'empowerment'.

- To empower local communities by acknowledging and supporting the enabling mechanisms, including education, which will sustain community development.
- To assist community and voluntary groups in the provision and management of facilities and infrastructure.
- To foster and facilitate the development of appropriate organisations and the establishment of partnerships to bring about change.
- To reinforce the existing economic base and to encourage long-term economic growth by improving the quality of life in the HARP area.
- To improve access to existing jobs through support for education and training.
- To provide new workshops in the HARP area

Table 5.2: Socio-economic objectives for the HARP area (Source: Dublin Corporation, 1996)

The second special element of the HARP plan was to be its inclusiveness during the drafting of the plan. Instead of seeking comments on an already-drafted plan, Dublin Corporation initiated an extensive process of consultation with community groups, national statutory bodies and business representatives, providing them with the opportunity to share their own knowledge of the area and participate in the identification of local needs before the plan was drawn up. A complete chapter within the plan was dedicated to the process of community consultation, in which it was explained that consultation with local interests, which was a requirement of the OPLURD, had provided valuable knowledge and greatly helped in the identification of local needs. The criticism of local community groups that previous renewal projects in the city had been "based on property development rather than a fuller realisation of social and economic potential"(Dublin Corporation, 1996: 14) seemed to be accepted and the request to broaden the goals of regeneration policy was acknowledged by the inclusion of a socio-economic strategy. The consultation process was said to be ongoing and the need to consult local interests further in the future was stressed, to allow the needs of the local population to be addressed.

In fact, the role envisaged for community groups surpassed involvement in the identification of local needs and extended to their participation in the definition of strategies to respond to these needs and to their taking part in the implementation of these schemes (Dublin Corporation, 1996: 18). Moreover, the local authority was to facilitate this involvement, as stressed in the following statement:

> "The local authority must encourage and develop a capacity for community development leading to involvement and participation – striving towards a fully integrated urban renewal process." (Dublin Corporation, 1996: 18).

Russell (2002) showed that the consultation process during the elaboration of the plan was genuinely inclusive and that this was due in part to the influence of EU thinking regarding the plan. She also attributed the exceptional level of consultation to the openness of the planners involved in drawing up the plan to community issues and community development together with a genuine willingness to integrate outsiders' ideas. This view was also expressed by respondents interviewed during the current research:

> "The city planner was excellent because he was in favour of community approaches." (I-03)
>
> "The planner worked alongside me; two of us worked together on developing the cultural plan for the HARP plan. Can you imagine? That's never happened before; they'd always been handed down." (I-06)

However, the level of collaboration during the implementation of the plan under EU funding was to be less satisfactory. The plan made clear recommendations regarding the structures to be established in order to ensure the implementation of the plan. The plan stated that two structures would be established, a multi-sectoral Steering Group[11] and an Implementation Group comprising local authority officials. The impetus for the establishment of a Steering Group emanated from the EU, as stated in the HARP Plan:

> "In accordance with the Guidelines from the Department of the Environment in relation to the Urban and Village Renewal Sub-Programme of the Operational Programme for Local, Urban and Rural Development [OPLURD], the Corporation proposes to establish a Steering Group to oversee implementation of the Plan and advise the Corporation's Implementation Group, who will be responsible for Implementation of the Plan." (Dublin Corporation, 1996: 89).

The composition of the Steering Group was also a reflection of OPLURD requirements. However, in the absence of precise requirements in the OPLURD concerning the role of the Steering Group, the local authority itself defined the terms of reference for the group (Russell, 2002: 262). The group was relatively free to set up its own functioning rules but its main duties were defined as follow in the HARP Framework Plan:

"

- The Steering Group will provide an ongoing evaluation of the implementation of the plan, with particular reference to its effects on the physical, social and economic development of the HARP area;
- The Group shall advise on possible linkages with other Operational Programmes and linkages with the private sector with a view to sourcing and encouraging private sector investment in the area
- The Steering Group shall ensure the conformity of the proposed actions and measures taken by the Implementation Group with the aims of the Framework Plan." (Dublin Corporation, 1996: 89).

Moreover, it was stated that the Implementation Team would be obliged to report to the Steering Group and should take into consideration its views and opinions. However, once the Group was established, conflict emerged over the interpretation of the actual role its members were to play. They were informed that their duty was only to oversee the spending of EU funds. As well documented by Russell (2002), the divergence between the role outlined in the plan and the responsibilities which the Steering Group was granted in practice led its members strongly to contest the Council vision and argue for greater input in the plan. The importance of this dispute was also raised by some interviewees. For example, one member of the committee explained that:

---

[11] also referred to as Steering Committeee

> "They wouldn't have had a committee at all, except that the European Union insisted on it because there were structural funds being dispersed in the early stages. It was European thinking that said that they should have a committee to steer the expenditure of that money. There was always a bit of a fudge at the beginning whether it was steering the expenditure of that money or whether it was steering the development generally. I think that the Corporation had their eyes very firmly on the idea that it was only steering the particular funding that was coming from Europe." (I-05)

In a paper presented after the dismantling of the Steering Group, one activist stressed that this had been the most disappointing aspect of the way in which the structure had worked. Concerning the implementation phase, he argued that:

> "Considering the restrictions and frustrations experienced, I consider that the Steering Group proved effective in delivering their objectives. The most unsatisfactory element of the functioning of the steering committee was the difficulty of ensuring that it would concentrate on the wider issue of the implementation of the whole plan and the intensive physical development of the area rather than the spending of the allocated funds." (Connolly, DICP submission to the HARP Monitoring Group, 2000).

Despite these limitations, the involvement of community representatives in the Steering Group for the HARP area did bring a number of positive results, outlined by Russell (2002) in her study of community involvement in Dublin, Cork and Limerick 'Major Initiatives'. She showed that in the HARP area, although the Steering Group was set up as one of the funding requirements of the EU OPLURD, it achieved more than budget enlargement for the project. She maintained that because of the strength and political astuteness of many members of the Steering Group, measures were taken to ensure that fulfilment of the socio-economic objectives of the HARP plan would remain a priority. The influence of the group on the direction taken by Dublin corporation resulted in the construction of a community centre and the setting up of an Employment and Enterprise sub-committee, which was seen as a very positive development. One committee member in the submission of the Steering Committee, stated that:

> "The setting up of the Employment & Enterprise sub committee has been a very positive development, (proposed by the community reps) as it has been successful in bringing together agencies and individuals to seriously address the problems of unemployment and lack of skills in the community." (Coogan, NWICN submission to the HARP Monitoring Group, 2000)

Similarly, Connolly (Connolly, DICP submission to the HARP Committee, 2000), a member of the Steering Group and head of a community development agency, felt that it was due to this sub-committee that the 'employment and education' strategy, one of the three strategies targeting socio-economic issues, had been successful. In contrast, he argued that Dublin Corporation had failed to fully implement the 'community empowerment strategy'.

At the end of the 'Major Initiative', the full implementation of the plan had not been achieved. However, Dublin Corporation stated its commitment to seeing the HARP Framework Plan carried out, and applied for IAP status "to secure the plan's strategies and objectives relating to the physical and socio-economic rejuvenation of the area" (Dublin Corporation, 1998:1). Moreover, the HARP plan and its guiding principles had, at this stage, been depicted as a model to be mainstreamed by external consultants evaluating Irish urban renewal projects (see KPMG, 1996) and by the DoELG (1997). Therefore, there was hope that the shortcomings encountered during the implementation of the HARP 'Major Initiative' could be addressed during the HARP IAP.

5.3. From "Major Initiative Steering Group" to "IAP Monitoring Committee": who gets to participate?

The HARP "Major Initiative" was presented as a successful operation both by external consultants in 1996 (see KPMG, 1996) and by the DoELG, which suggested adopting many of the programme's principles in its new 1999 Urban Renewal Schemes. For instance, when formulating an Integrated Area Plan for submission to the Government, local authorities were encouraged to follow the model of community consultation adopted in HARP. The guidelines for the 1999 Urban Renewal Scheme[12] were published in 1997 and included a copy of chapter three of the HARP Framework Plan, which had introduced part of the community consultation process instigated as part of the HARP "Major Initiative" under EU guidance.

The originality of the HARP approach rested on the involvement of community interests in the initial phase of the plan-drawing process, which consisted of the identification of local needs. This contrasts with previous approaches to plan-making, whereby local authorities or special agencies commonly sought public input in the form of written comments on an already-drafted plan. Therefore, in the HARP Draft Framework Plan and the HARP Framework Plan, rather than being defined by the local authority alone, local needs were identified locally by community groups. Chapter three of the plan presented issues that local organisations and residents groups wanted to see addressed by the plan. These appeared under seven headings, which covered both physical issues, such as conservation, and socio-economic questions, such as access to employment and education. At a later stage, in chapter six, the plan also described a set of strategies to

[12] Referred to at the time as "1998 Urban Renewal Scheme".

respond to these needs. It appeared from the interviews conducted for this research that the community was also involved in devising solutions to the identified problems.

In the document "1998 Urban Renewal Scheme Guidelines", the DoELG clearly indicated a willingness to integrate this novel approach into mainstream policy. This policy document stated:

> "Wide, cross-sectoral consultation and involvement should form an essential element in IAP preparation. The need for such consultation will first arise at the initial data-gathering stage, when the needs, strengths and weaknesses of the area are being analysed. The second opportunity will arise when key issues have been identified, and draft strategies are being formulated." (DoELG, 1997: 17)

Moreover, the guidelines envisaged that the community would play a role during the implementation phase of the plans. Indeed, the IAP process was described as comprising eight key moments, one of which was "Implementing the strategy in consultation with representative groups" (DoELG, 1997: 5). Similarly, under the criteria to use to select IAPs, the government stressed "the need to ensure widespread and effective consultation in preparing and implementing the IAP" (DoELG, 1997: 8).

However, the nature of that role was described only in vague terms. The DoELG (1997: 19) justified taking a non-prescriptive approach in order to take into account the possible need to adapt the structures to special local circumstances. Even though the guidelines allowed for flexibility, the government made indirect reference to the HARP structures recommending the establishment of a steering group and a project management team, mirroring the arrangements in HARP, during the implementation of the "Major Initiative" program. Overall, the scheme portrayed the HARP arrangements as a model to follow and upon which to build. Although the precise tasks of this steering group were not detailed, it was stated that this "wide, cross-sectoral steering group [...] would have an active and ongoing role throughout the period of the plan" (DoELG, 1997: 19). The use of partnership arrangements involving organisations outside of local government was suggested to carry out specific projects as part of the plan. Despite using vague terms, the text alluded to a significant role for the community during the implementation phase.

However, a few months after the announcement that 49 of the 78 applications submitted to the government had been granted IAP status, the DoELG issued a new circular relating to the scheme's monitoring. This subsequent issue of guidelines for monitoring the scheme emphasised the role of the community in the implementation process more specifically as that of monitoring progress. Mention of the Steering Group had disappeared and had been replaced by a request to establish a Monitoring Committee. While implementation and monitoring were listed as two separate tasks in the IAP in the

original document, with the community intervention mainly set to occur in the first one, the second guidelines referred to the community's role in contributing to the Monitoring Committee. The composition of this committee and the tasks it was to accomplish were more tightly defined than for the Steering Group which had been envisaged in the previous guidelines. Nonetheless, the Monitoring Committee was still encouraged to take on a "pro-active role throughout the period of the IAP" (DoELG, 1999: 2), suggesting that despite the addition of more prescriptive guidelines, flexibility would still apply to suit individual cases.

Despite this discourse of flexibility, the rules of engagement were in practice firmly controlled by the state. The attempt by community groups in the area to challenge this restrictive conception of the role and to promote a role which would build on the existing strengths of the Steering Group by providing for higher community representation on the Monitoring Committee was unsuccessful. The officials' conception of participation prevailed in practice. The original HARP Framework Plan was presented as a model to follow for subsequent regeneration plans. Dublin Corporation Council submitted the 1996 HARP Framework Plan and a document presenting the proposed tax-incentive sites to DoELG to be approved as an IAP under the 1999 Urban Renewal Scheme. Accreditation was received in March 1999 as "it was believed that the adoption of the Plan as an IAP would help secure its strategies" (Dublin City Council, 2002). In April 1999, new national guidelines regarding the monitoring of the implementation of the IAP were published, which were presented at the July meeting of the HARP Steering Group (Steering Committee Minutes, 1999). The project manager announced that a Monitoring Committee would be constituted, which implied the dismantling of the Steering Group.

This announcement created concern among the members of the Steering Group. It was the first time that any termination of the structure had been mentioned. Indeed, in its application for designation as an IAP under the 1999 Urban Renewal Scheme, the local authority had depicted the existence of the Steering Group in positive terms, claiming that:

> "Under the direction of the Steering Committee and the Project Team, there has been a broadening out of the objectives for the HARP Plan to secure a more balanced approach to the Plan's implementation. This has resulted in a greater emphasis being placed on social an economic projects and initiatives aimed at community development, educational and training programmes and job placement and creation." (Dublin Corporation, 1998: 5).

Moreover, local authorities submitting IAPs had been required to outline the strategy and the structures they woud pursue to ensure successful implementation of the plan. In the case of the HARP IAP, under the heading 'implementation' the local authority (1998) made reference to both the Steering group and the Project Team, suggesting at that time

that the intention was to retain the group. The Project Team was also to "facilitate the consultation process" and to "develop and encourage a partnership approach" (Dublin Corporation, 1998: 5) during the implementation phase. This all suggested more than a simple monitoring role for the community. The language used in the application echoed the contemporary national government discourse on urban regeneration principles. This mirroring of language may have contributed to the approval of the scheme.

Therefore, it is questionable whether the deployment of such a discourse really reflected an acceptance of such principles or merely an indication of the need to employ a 'community-centred' rhetoric to gain approval. The community's conclusion on this issue is quite pessimistic. The community expressed concern about the way the Steering Group had been working and about the role it had been given. For instance, one activist stated that:

> "Over time, that became quite tense and became quite argumentative because there was a continuous attempt, as we saw it, to water down or dilute the effects of the committee. They try to see us as purely advisory and decisions being made separately but we were quite assertive in our role over the couple of years." (I-01)

However, there was a general feeling that through the adoption of confrontational tactics, the community sector had progressively moved the role of the Steering Group closer to their initial vision of its role, with a greater influence on decisions. Therefore, its dismantling was regarded as a reluctance of the local authority to accept such working practices:

> "MACRO[13] for a short while was on the Steering Committee, until they changed the rules and some were pulled off it. We think that was done deliberately because the cosy cartel had been upset. The original Steering Committee, was what it says it was. It was a steering committee, steering the development and the regen [regeneration] in the area. And actually we had a say, an influence on what happened. We were able to increase that influence while working with the local councillors and working with local politicians and the local community groups. So it was that, we made it more effective, that it wasn't just them rolling stuff through the HARP Committee. We were able to question them, pull them back and all that. When they changed it then from the Steering Committee to a Monitoring Committee, as the name implies, it became just a monitoring role." (I-02)

There was a general and strong agreement amongst the interviewees that the shift occurred because there was a desire amongst the senior officials to take control back, as observed in the following :

> "As the Steering Committee became more powerful, there was the beginning of a kind of a break, where it was ...well we'll have to manage this...go back in management mode,

[13] the Markets Area Community Resource Organisation (MACRO), a non-profit organisation and Community Development Project (CDP) operating mainly in the Markets area but also in the HARP area more generally, whose goal is the identification of local needs and building a community response.

particularly with the most senior officials. At the other levels, between the community and the day to day officials if you call them that, they were quite happy to work together. And they worked quite well, especially the employment officer. A lot of the people who went in initially volunteered, so they were quiet community friendly, they wanted to engage. When the committee became too powerful, people were changed around." (I-03)

The same activist added that the switch was a means of eliminating dissenting voices:

"They just announced it. They removed some of the more problematic people from it like David Connoly [DICP] and switched other people on it." (I-03)

Similarly, one community representative explained:

"It was 'we are terminating it but we are now putting in place a Monitoring Committee'. It was cut down in size and that is when there was no seat on it for the DICP[14] and other organisations, it was really cut down. I think maybe it was an opportunity to make it more manageable from certain perspectives if you know what I mean. You could get rid of the loudest voices." (I-04)

Another person who sat on both committees succinctly summarised the situation as follow:

"It started off with a Steering Committee, and then a Monitoring Committee. I think this reflects the city council desire to downgrade its power." (I-05)

Another stressed that:

"The Steering Group was dismantled and was replaced by a monitoring group, which took away a lot of its power. Yeah, because it became just a rubber-stamping exercise." (I-06)

Concerns and confusion emerged. On the one hand, HARP was deemed successful. For instance, at a meeting of the HARP in March 1998 regarding new tax incentives, the Steering Group was informed that "the H.A.R.P plan was used as a model/prototype for integrated area plans nationally" (Steering Committee Minutes, March 1998). On the other hand, actions were taken that undermined the realisation of one of the main objective of the original plan, which was community empowerment, raising questions about how committed governments actors actually were to applying novel approaches. This contradiction was highlighted by a community activist:

"HARP was recognized as a very effective model. That's why we felt it was very ironic and contradictory that since it was considered to be so effective and a model that they wouldn't then retain the structures that it had developed.
At the time, there was not great justification for that, because we could argue that it was a continuation of something we ran quite successfully. But as far as I am concerned it was an attempt to get rid of a sort of authority that it had won for itself, start with a new group of people." (I-01)

[14] The DICP is an independent local-development company which aims to work against socio-economic disadvantage in inner Dublin and promotes the participation of residents in the regeneration of their locality.

The same respondent felt that the need to take back power had been motivated by a desire to prevent such a redistribution of power occurring in other parts of the city:

> "But, the basic point, as far as I am concerned, is that they dissolved the HARP committee through getting rid of the chair, who was Tony Gregory, myself, Michael Smith although he came back under An Taisce and others. They got them out of the way before the new IAPs were set up. Personally, I had done my time on it and I was glad to go off it. But it was definitely an attempt to stop that sort of strength from continuing on and then influencing the other IAPs." (I-01)

Another respondent noted that the dismantling of the Steering Group coincided with the community's proposing initiatives that were contradictory to the objectives of the local authority. As noted by McGuirk and MacLaran (2001), Dublin Corporation in the late 1990s increasingly adopted an entrepreneurial mode of governance, becoming highly supportive of developer-led regeneration and regarding their role as facilitating private development. In contrast, community activists and some local councillors were trying to promote a vision of the local state as a regulator of private enterprise for the public good. One local councillor recalled to which extent disagreement on that issue occurred:

> "They didn't want to interfere in any way with the continued development, and development, and development. Development was at the centre of everything, whereas we would have felt that it had to be controlled development. It had to be regulated development, and we would have put the community first, but they never even thought of that and never wanted any of that. So, we lost out and we had meeting after meeting after meeting as well as public meetings with local communities and, really, it was going nowhere." (I-07)

When the IAP was introduced in the HARP area, it meant that a certain number of sites could benefit from tax-incentives. Some of the activists on the Steering Group contested the logic behind the introduction of such tax breaks and whether they actually provided benefits for the local community:

> "The fundamental question we keep asking is why was the City Council bending over backwards to facilitate developers with tax-incentives and not putting demands on them, you know in terms of community gains and other things; when in fact they were benefiting hugely by coming in to an area designated like that. So that was our ideological argument. The answer from the Council at the time was 'well they wouldn't come in if we didn't give them all these incentives, in the inner-city, because it's derelict land .
> I never accepted that. The reason developers come into the inner-city is because it's hugely valuable land, highly profitable, huge returns on it. And if the City Council was operating in the interest of the citizens, they should have been much more demanding of the developers not facilitate them as much as they were." (I-01)

Therefore, community activists put forward alternative ways of thinking about how private development could support community needs:

> "We looked at different ways of trying to develop, get resources in the area, develop if you like more control over developers in the area. That was resisted. But that was pursued. We

> tried to use tax-incentives in a way that benefited... to get community gain out of it. It was initiated by the partnership [DICP] first as an idea because we found it elsewhere." (I-01)

According to minutes of the Steering Group meetings (1998), the Steering Group introduced the idea of a levy for the benefit of the community as part of the tax-incentive package, when they were invited to a presentation of the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme. Such an approach was not part of national policy at the time. Indeed, the members were informed that there was:

> "No provision [...] in the Department of the Environment's circular for the provision of a levy and that the financial package basically repeated the range of incentives that operated in the previous scheme." (Minutes of Steering Group, 1998).

However, the local authority agreed to make a submission to central government regarding the introduction of such 'Community Gain' and it was agreed that the final decision would rest with central government. In fact, the issue was presented to the Expert Advisory Panel (Minutes of Steering Group, 12 June 1998) as part of Dublin Corporation's submission. The levy was sold by the officials "as a way of delivering the social aspects of the plan" and they envisaged that the levy "[could] be recouped by the developer as part of the project costs by way of capital allowances" (Minutes of Meeting with the Expert Advisory Panel). The Panel agreed to support the approach. The insistence in national policy that new schemes provide a 'radical departure' from approaches adopted in previous urban renewal schemes militated in favour of the acceptance of the levy. Although the integration of their proposal in local government policy was a victory welcomed by community, the application of the concept was strictly controlled by Dublin Corporation officials during the implementation phase as they controlled negotiations with the developers, the interpretation of how community gain should be enforced and the definition of what should constitute community gain. These circumstances led to concerns among some of the original activists who believed that the local authority had a very narrow interpretation of the levy and felt that control over the scheme had been taken away from local representatives (see below).

Significantly, the idea of a levy originated within the Steering Group from members who were not invited onto the subsequent Monitoring Committee, thereby rendering the implementation of such a commitment difficult to follow for its initiators. It also appears from this research that there existed for a significant time a general lack of awareness of the existence of such a commitment among certain community members and groups. Although originally the Steering Group imagined it would manage the scheme, in

practice, a few years after the IAP started a sub-committee of the Monitoring Committee was set up to oversee the spending of the fund.

Some activists explained the cessation of the Steering Group as an attempt to restrain the application of such levies despite their inclusion in policy statements and to diminish the community power on this issue. For example, one member stated:

> "Once we started speaking about community trust, the City Manager then accelerated the demolition of the Steering Group. Once the Steering Group failed, that was it; it was all over for the community...
> He [the City Manager] regarded community as a bit of nuisance and a bit of an impediment to the development. We were beginning to gain lots of ground ... [...] When he did the sums, it didn't look good for him, that's why the Steering Group was scrapped." (I-06)

In summary, there was a general feeling that the Steering Group that had begun to be effective at challenging the local-authority approach to private development and at questioning its way of working was restrained through the setting up of the Monitoring Committee, which had a more limited membership and remit. Great disappointment about the change was expressed both by interviewees that were removed and by those who were invited back. For one member, a certain dynamic was lost because the remit of the committee was more tightly controlled and people felt disengaged:

> "The remit of the committee was reduced when it became an IAP Committee, but I think there may be other reasons why it reduced. People were maybe getting jaded because they felt they had been disenfranchised. I think there was a general loss of energy in the committee."(I-05)

All participants saw the move as proof that local and central government were not supportive of such structures, that it had developed in exceptional circumstances, but now public sector actors had taken back control from the community sector.

It also seems that although there was disappointment and some resistance to the move, the full consequences of the change were perhaps not fully appreciated by all community groups at the time but became apparent to them later. This allowed any hidden agenda to remain largely unchallenged. One community worker stressed the difficulty for community groups with limited resources and with many tasks to accomplish to understand the scope of programmes they did not design and the impact of decisions made by others on their behalf:

> "`It was initially a Steering Committee and then it became a Monitoring Committee. I remember not paying much attention to it at the time but thinking about it, thinking back on it, a Monitoring Committee has very little actual control, whereas a Steering Committee directs it. So I think, probably, if we had been more aware of what IAPs were about, we would have paid more attention... But, I think, for CDPs [Community Development Programme] and residents, the IAP is one thing and there are twenty other things happening, so it's difficult to keep track of all." (I-08)

The project team manager presented the national guidelines for the constitution of the Monitoring Committee at the Steering Group meeting in July 1999. The members expressed their desire to see the Steering Group continue its work and to see the role and responsibilities of the Monitoring Committee transferred to them as an additional task. However, the only action taken at the time to prevent the Steering Committee from being disbanded consisted of sending a letter to the Minister of State, Bobby Doyle, who had responsibility for the IAP scheme. Tony Gregory (Letter dated 16th august 1999), a local politician and TD, recommended on behalf of the Steering that the "composition of the Monitoring Committee should be set aside for the HARP area"; he required the continuation of the Steering Committee on the grounds that it had "served a useful function in ensuring a balanced approach is adopted in the implementation of the HARP Framework Plan", which had been approved as an IAP.

The reply from the Minister of Housing and Urban Renewal contained little substantive justification for not granting such a request. It merely explained that "it would not be possible" (Letter 29th September 1999) since the group was established in relation to a different scheme, which was to expire in 1999. It thus failed to recognise the continuity between the HARP "Major Initiative" and the HARP IAP. The letter from the Minister of Housing and Urban Renewal defined the role of the community in vague terms. The Minister (stated that when he established the guidelines, he was "anxious that the Committees would [...] reflect the local authority's lead role in implementing the IAPs" (Letter dated 29th September 1999) , stressing that he did not envisage the local community and the local authority would equally share responsibility in the implementation of the scheme. However, the committee was also to reflect the "open, transparent and consultative nature of the IAP approach" (Letter dated 29th September 1999). However, the term "consultative" was not defined, leaving its interpretation open to interpretation.

Similarly, at the last meeting of the Steering Group (Minutes, 10th December 1999), in response to community concerns about the "loss of expertise" HARP would suffer due to the dissolution of the group and the suggestion that the group be kept as "a consultative group to advise the Monitoring Committee", the project manager merely stated that in the new scheme "there would be consultative groups". However, their role or nature was not detailed, leaving unclear whether or not the members of the old Steering Group would in any way be reintegrated in the process through different structures. It is unclear whether such vagueness had been purposely maintained but, in any case, it functioned to downgrade the issue to a mere technical and practical question of change due

to the expiry of one scheme and the commencement of another programme, thereby effectively terminating the debate, at least for a while. Both the Minister and Dublin Corporation officials appear to have adopted a discourse that avoided politicising the issue, although in effect dismantling the Steering Group transpired to be of crucial importance. It is an issue, which should have deserved more deliberation. However, it was presented as a *fait accompli,* as recalled by the community representatives:

> "At the time there was not great justification for that. We were writing to the Department saying this is not right, you have lots of experience here.But the department took a stand on it, that's it, they were getting rid of it and they did." (I-01)

> "They just changed it, said same committee, different name, smaller number, more manageable." (I-04)

Moreover, it is interesting to note that the Minister promoted leadership for the local authority in the implementation of the scheme, devolving power to the local level in urban regeneration policies. However, in practice, central government could still control to some great degree the nature of the scheme, since the city manager is appointed centrally rather than elected or appointed locally, and holds considerable power regarding urban regeneration and planning. This situation was described as "undemocratic" (I-06) by one community activist as, in practice, local politicians had very little input and influence in defining the composition and the remit of the committees. This relates to one of the shortcoming of Irish local democracy, in which elected representatives have a very limited range of powers in comparison to their European counterparts.

Another important point to note is that people that were not invited back onto the new committee belonged to organisations whose main role and purpose is advocacy and capacity-building in favour of disadvantaged communities, such as the MACRO CDP and the local partnership (DICP). In other words, they were mainly paid community-development workers. Although in the literature there has been warning about relying on professionals to represent the community as they can act as gatekeepers and put forward issues that are not always of direct relevance to the community (McCulloch, 2004), in this case, the professionals were working alongside the voluntary community representatives by providing essential support, such as training and knowledge, which had not been provided by the statutory agencies. This was noted by one of the representative from the Steering Group:

> "There was never any assistance. The only assistance I ever got was through the community development organisations, the DICP and all of that. Other than that, I don't think that I would have stayed there, I couldn't have. Because, for the first couple of weeks, I didn't open my mouth. When I say the first couple of weeks, it could have been a

> year and it was going over my head. It was only, as I said, the community development organisations that actually gave me any and tried to make sure that I was OK. At the time, I was the resident association, I was coming back to them, but it didn't mean that much to them either. And the language, as I said was a huge barrier. And then, other times [...] when people came in and gave presentations, all the things about the design and bla bla bla, that language too!"(I-04)

From the interviews carried out for this research, there was no evidence of the community representatives wanting to see community development agencies removed from the process nor any evidence of their being seen as non-representative. Indeed, community representatives used professional community development workers in the area later to strengthen their input in the IAP programme. A community representative referred to the importance of this help:

> "When I go to a meeting to HARP, I always go to a pre-meeting with the network coordinator, and [he] brought up the question show us the terms of reference for HARP. We said what is that? what does that mean? We didn't have a clue, [he] explained what terms of reference were, [he] educated us. You should have this; after three years they should have done this and that, you should be asking this question. It was pure ignorance on our part." (I-09)

In the HARP IAP, who could participate was controlled and defined by government actors rather than by citizens. The decision regarding who was to participate was, in part, constrained by the existence of guidelines published by the DoELG (1999) which, for example, recommended having a maximum of nine members with three community group representatives. In contrast, five community representatives sat on the HARP Steering Group, with additional community members being included in relation to some meetings. However, central government did not provide guidelines on how to choose those three representatives. For example, it did not specify whether such community groups should be area-based groups or groups representing particular people such as the young, the elderly and so on. The guidelines did not stress that the local authority alone should to make the decision. While, in practice, the interpretation of who was to be included remained with the local-authority, it did not present a clear explanation of its choice. This may explain why in the review of the HARP commissioned by the local authority, people expressed "concern [...] about how people came to be on the committee and that the criteria [...] were not transparent" (HARP Final Report, 2008: 12). One local councillor's statement gives a sense of how constrained the choices were:

> "There was a number of community representatives on HARP, but that could have been strengthened because we had a good input from the community. We were restricted by numbers and I think maybe if we had fought that, we would have got more. For example, I would like to see a senior citizen representatives on the HARP."(I-11)

The participant also showed concern about the lack of transparency regarding the criteria used to retain the community representatives on the committee or to replace them when one steps down:

> "I would question now really the structure that kept me there, without having to go for re-election, so who was I representing." (I-04)

The vagueness of the criteria meant that it was difficult for the community representatives to challenge the local authority, even if they felt that the contribution of the local community was undermined. One of the community seats on the Monitoring Committee was left empty for over two years, since the member left the organisation it represented and therefore stopped attending. MACRO was required to provide a resignation letter from the person but had difficulty in so doing. The local authority remained strict on the necessity of such a letter despite the absence of any such provision in the legislation. This left the other community-sector representatives having to challenged the use of such criteria, established unilaterally by the local authority. This experience reinforced the feeling that the community sector was not welcomed there, especially if they had divergent views. One activist recalled that:

> "Once [X] left we had difficulties replacing her. I don't think they wanted us there. The other community representatives would have to fight to ensure that MACRO had a place and then they gave it to someone else who agreed with them." (I-08)

The situation outline above reveals that when participants are controlled and defined by government actors rather than by citizens, there is a danger that legitimate actors become defined as people who are acceptable to, with similar backgrounds to and way of seeing as those in power. There is also a danger that governments invite into the participative process those non-organised groups less able to challenge government thinking, an issue which has been highlighted in the work of Taylor and Warburton (2003, quoted in Taylor, 2007).

In the case of the HARP IAP, the people who were not invited back on the new committee were those who had the greatest ability at the time, thanks to their personal and professional experience, to present alternative solutions and ways of thinking to those promoted by the local authority. The danger when removing such actors is to limit the debates to non-strategic issues and leave participants to deal with minor issues, as will be shown in the following section about the remit of the Monitoring Committee. This is worsened when time constraints apply, as community representatives do not have sufficient time to come up with their own vision of regeneration or when participants feel the environment is not supportive of critical questioning. The danger is then to have a

structure where what is deemed possible and reasonable within the framework of the programme is tightly defined by government actors, as has been the case in the HARP IAP, while others alternatives are silenced, despite the inclusion of community actors in the process. It appears from this research that actors already holding power can diminish the community contribution by questioning the legitimacy of the representatives. Dissenting voices may become ignored as they are depicted as unreasonable, self-interested or excluding of others. They are thus not accorded legitimacy and are by-passed. For instance, one of the project managers justified ceasing engagement with some of representatives:

> "The structures in place are biased against the new population. That voice was silenced but that voice was valid. There was an imbalance in the representation[...]. What we always found was that if you were liaising with the established bodies responsible for representing the community and you had a project, you couldn't rely on them to reflect the views of the community. You had to go directly to the community affected by a project. It surprised me, that' s why I am so critical towards the role of these people who were paid to represent the community, they didn't do their jobs."(I-10)

The interviewee later elaborated on how these community structures were not representative as they excluded the newer population

> "I think, in many cases the structures that were in place there to support the existing community were never extended out to the new community, and there was always two communities there – the established and the new. And the agencies that were responsible and charged with the responsibility of community development didn't see that it was their responsibility to integrate both communities, which I also felt was a serious defect in, you know, how the community representation was structured in the area. I don't think they viewed the new population as being a potential resource that would be beneficial to the overall area. They call them blow-ins or they tend to call them gentry, but they never tried to engage really with them. While I was involved with the HARP community, we were struggling out to try and see if we could in some way get representation around the table from that new community."(I-10).

Government actors framed the 'rules of the game' regarding the IAP Committee membership, they also kept control of what the role of these members was, as will be seen in the following section. They effectively put into place a form of participation that was more manageable than what was experienced during the 'Major Initiative' but less useful to the community. Paradoxically, government presented the IAPs as a rupture with urban-renewal policies that preceded them. It was hoped that IAPs would be more integrated and more community-centred than previous schemes and that they would build on the approach pioneered in the HARP 'Major Initiative'. Therefore, IAPs were described as having "moved to the opposite end of the spectrum from the first urban regeneration model, as represented by the independently managed CHDDA" (Bartley and Treadwell Shine, 1999:

21). Bartley and Treadwell Shine (1999) suggested that with the introduction of the IAPs, Ireland adopted an "'adaptive entrepreneurial' approach" (ibid: 21) to avoid the excesses of the American entrepreneurial model and its "negative knock-on effects for local communities" (ibid: 23), through the influence of the European social model. They saw them as a potential hybrid mode of governance. However, they did express doubt on the true inclusive nature of the scheme.

In practice, mainstreaming the innovative approach promoted in the HARP Framework Plan has resulted, in the case of the HARP IAP, in taking back control rather than a real partnership. Community activists that took part in the schemes described the shift as a step backwards in terms of community power, even though they had viewed the Steering Committee as imperfect. The IAP was also seen as a retrograde step, since it focused on the development of tax-incentive sites rather than following a more integrated approach as professed in the HARP Framework Plan. The physical element of the plan was implemented while the resolution of socio-economic issues became conceived of in terms of narrow "trickle-down effects". Locally, the programme's failure to address social issues and benefits to the local disadvantaged community was attributed to the lack of power given to community representatives (elected councillors and community-sector activists) and reliance on the private sector to address social goals, since no extra special funds except 'the community gain' were made available by local or central governments under the IAP to address social issues. One elected representative explained how he saw these issues preventing the HARP IAP from succeeding:

> "The weakness was that the IAP itself, its members had very limited powers and that the essential powers rested with the planning department and because there wasn't a budget going with the IAP, it meant that the entire project was dependent on developers, private developers, and their wants rather than the needs of the community in the area. So, it defeated, to a large degree, the purpose of the IAP in the first place. The structure was good, but the powers were poor." (I-07)

The next two sections will examine these two issues in greater detail. While section 5.4 will examine what remit the Monitoring Committee was given, section 5.5 will more specifically study issues around the application of the Community Gain levy. It was shown above that the membership of the IAP Monitoring Committee was controlled by the public-sector actors. The following section demonstrates that city officials also tightly determined the role of its members.

5.4. The Monitoring Committee Role and Remit

5.4.1. Defining Participation: Moving Backwards

The introduction of the new urban-renewal scheme was presented as an opportunity to remedy the shortcomings of previous programmes and to be more inclusive. When announcing the successful applicants, the Minister for Housing and Urban Renewal introduced the IAP initiative as "a radical departure from previous schemes" (Molloy Speech, 1999). The government clearly indicated its determination to implement the lessons learned through the review of previous approaches to renewal and acknowledged the previous lack of focus on socio-economic issues:

> "On the social side, indigenous residents and those in adjoining areas found it difficult to reap the benefits in terms of employment and other opportunities. A new, more structured approach was called for and the framework devised for future schemes was based on the recommendations of the KPMG Report." (Molloy Speech, 1999).

The KPMG Report promoted the adoption of an integrated approach, going beyond the resolution of physical issues and based on the following definition of urban renewal:

> "Urban renewal must address the physical, economic, social and environmental regeneration and rejuvenation of urban areas having regard to the local situation, the overall situation and any individual conditions." (KPMG et al., 1996: xii)

It advocated the benefits of community consultation and participation in the formulation of regeneration plans and encouraged central government to require that local authorities provide details of how the plan's objectives would be implemented. Lastly, the implementation process was to be cross-sectoral. Its recommendation were given legal status through the publishing of the '1998 Urban Renewal Scheme: Guidelines' (DoELG, 1997). In these guidelines, the consultative and innovative approach taken in the production of the 1996 HARP Framework plan was presented as a worthwhile prototype, with the continuing and active involvement of the community being promoted during the implementation phase.

At local level, Dublin Corporation claimed that each of the five IAPS would provide a holistic approach to regeneration (Gleeson, 1999). The HARP plan was praised as covering "all the elements required for inclusion in an integrated area plan" (Dublin Corporation, 1998: 1). The consultation process carried out during the preparation of the plan and the influence of the Steering Group during the 'Major Initiative' "in broadening out the objectives for the HARP Plan" were also acclaimed (Dublin Corporation, 1998: 5). Dublin Corporation adopted a discourse supportive of consultation and partnership and

stated that its role during the implementation process included to "facilitate the consultation process", as well as to "develop and encourage a partnership approach" (Dublin Corporation, 1998: 5). The description of the Steering Group in positive terms suggested that it would be continued should the IAP status be granted. However, as seen before, the committee was dismantled and replaced by a group which had a far more limited representation of community interests. This was interpreted by the community as an attempt by the local authority to reclaim control and as a step backwards. People interviewed were quite sceptical about the degree of sincerity of Dublin Corporation's commitment to participation, regarding the establishment of the Monitoring Committee being motivated merely by the need to comply with the legislation and an attempt to appear to engage in consulting:

> "I think it was part of the legislation, I think they had to, or I don't think they would have done it." (I-08)

> "When they're not forced to have a committee, to have community involvement, they won't systematically provide for it. They won't renew it for the Markets, even though it's a big development with a big impact on the community, once the IAP is exhausted. So that's a definitive indication that they won't do it unless they're required to." (I-05)

> "What they put in place is the IAPs that make it look like the community has a say. You have to put structures in place but we have no say in this area."(I-02)

Indeed, conflict soon emerged about the remit of the new Monitoring Committee. During the IAP application process, in addition to the use of partnership vocabulary, Dublin Corporation described the role of Steering Group as having "to monitor the implementation of the plan's policies and objectives" but also said it would have to "ensure that there is a balanced approach between social, economic and physical development" (Dublin Corporation, 1998:4). Moreover, the 1996 HARP Framework Plan, which was adopted as an IAP, promoted community empowerment and envisaged that the community could raise new issues later, the aim being "to ensure a development process of the HARP area which fully accords with the needs of the citizens in the area" (Dublin Corporation, 1996: 16). However, once the Monitoring Committee was set up, its members were advised that their role was only to monitor development on the tax-designated sites, even though it had been envisaged that the role of the group could broaden later to include the whole area (Monitoring Committee Minutes, 13th December 1999). This conception of the role of the community was much more circumscribed than initially announced. It created disbelief and confusion regarding the actual purpose of the committee. This situation led the community to request the provision of clearly agreed terms of references

and to challenge the local authority's interpretation of their role. However, despite repeated demands, Dublin Corporation failed to provide and agree on clear terms of reference, which one interviewee regretted strongly since it rendered the whole process obscure:

> "I would have liked the all structure to be different. I would have liked it to be a more open and transparent process. I would have liked to see the game plan to be clear, that everybody knew who was there, what they were there for, an agreed terms of reference. The rules of the game changed so many time that nobody knew why it was set up in the first place. No clear terms of reference for the group." (I-04)

This appears to have been a recurrent concern until the end:

> "There was a meeting on the remit of the committee, but that should have happened 12 years ago, and the decisions of that meeting haven't been finalized and I doubt...It looks like they won't be finalized before the committee is disbanded." (I-05)

The only terms of references provided were the national guidelines on Monitoring Committees. These were vague, supposedly to allow adaptation to local circumstances, and they were not defined with any input from community interests themselves. From the interviews, it appears that there was an obvious lack of clarity about the remit of the Monitoring Committee from a community perspective. In contrast, Dublin Corporation interpretation's of the responsibility of the community was strictly that of monitoring the tax-designation process and the Project Manager expressed frustration concerning the community's attempts to challenge this assigned role:

> "They felt, in some cases, that they should be the decision-making body. They weren't the decision making body. It was never envisaged that they would be the decision-making body. They were a monitoring body. They were primarily to oversee and monitor the key objectives of the IAP, which was the development of the key designated sites. For the most part, they weren't terribly interested in that...The Monitoring Committee members themselves always felt that they should have a more decision-making role, and I think an awful lot of time and energy was wasted in kind of discussing that and arguing over that point rather than getting on with what their actual job was. And I think also they didn't really kind of have an interest in, say, the physical development other than say wanting to, you know, you might say, curtail them." (I-10)

This conflict reflected underlying differing conceptions of participation and the narrower role which the local authority accorded the term in practice:

> "The community thought that they would participate in the consultation, that parts of their suggestions would be taken on board, but the Council saw it as information giving". (I-03)

> "Dublin City Council[15]'s interpretation of consultation was telling us something – not asking you what you thought. They would tell you something and say 'now we've consulted with you'. Our interpretation was to be sat down and told from the start what will happen and to agree to it". (I-02)

[15] Dublin City Council and the Council refer to Dublin Corporation, the administrative structure.

The imposition of Dublin Corporation's interpretation meant that the Monitoring Committee was not seen as a structure holding any power. Many participants spoke at length of the lack of control that the community had regarding the decisions affecting the area, despite their inclusion on the Monitoring Committee:

> "The problem lies in the power structures and the fact that the Monitoring Committee just rubber-stamps the decisions made by the Implementation Committee. That Committee is only made of Dublin City officials, architects, planners and traffic manager." (I-06)

> "If they wanted to do something, they did it, even if the community and the rest of the Committee didn't want them to do it. They were always able to pass it." (I-05)

> "At HARP, there wasn't really power at all there; it was just an exercise. The decisions, a lot of the important ones, they were made outside HARP. I think we controlled very little. The control was with other players. And I think that between the developers and the Council[1], they were the main players. Personally, I think the powers are with the statutory agencies not with the community . Although they have community reps, it was rubber-stamping as opposed to decision making." (I-04)

The difficulty for the community in getting its voice heard was also related to the limited influence they felt they could have on the formulation of local policy through their local councillors:

> "We are constantly in contact with the councillors but we find it's a waste of time, to be honest, because of the amount of control that the planners and the engineers have. It's absolutely unbelievable. They have been running HARP for the last 10 years." (I-06)

This situation again highlights the weakness of local democracy in Ireland, as explained by one of the councillor who sat on the Monitoring Committee:

> "We need more power, the local government needs more power. There's no doubt about it. Maybe the directly-elected Lord Mayor will be the beginning of that. Whereas here at least in the Dáil, the civil servants work according to our policies and according to our direction. In Dublin City Council, the Manager and his services control the agenda for the councillors, and the councillor work...rather than the other way around. So, we really have a long way to go to improve local democracy and we are a long way from providing the tools and resources for local democracy to operate adequately." (I-07)

In conclusion, the shift from the Steering Group to the Monitoring Committee represented a considerable retrograde step. Rather than presenting an opportunity to build on the lessons learned and to improve the consultative process initiated under the 'Major Initiative', the introduction of the IAP was generally regarded as having been associated with a diminution of community power:

> "But certainly the Steering Committee seemed to have a bit more input." (I-05)

> "The HARP for us, I put a question actually, was it going to be a People's Manifesto or a meal ticket for developers; it could have gone either way. At the beginning if we had kept control of it, I think we could have achieved an awful lot, you know. Once the Steering Committee was gone, that was it really, it was over." (I-06)

This had an impact on the content of the plan as alluded to by the above respondent.

5.4.2. Lack of Strategic Action

While most interviewees thought that the councillors had generally been supportive of the community when they had been asked to relay their requests. Some expressed regret that the discussions during the meetings of the Monitoring Committee were more focused on small issues rather than concentrating on devising a vision for the area. Some felt that it was a missed opportunity for the councillors to take a leadership role in policy making. Instead, small and practical issues were often brought up. There is a danger for consultative structures to be diverted from their initial purpose and become a talking-shop where issues were dealt with which had usually been addressed elsewhere. Some participants felt it diverted community attention and helped the city officials to progress the implementation of their vision for the area, as stressed by one community representative:

> "Most of the discussions were Dublin City Council raising micro issues and the elected representatives championing these issues and, of course, the officials were delighted with that because it meant that they could go ahead with the real important things, pushing through a vision of the area which was economically driven and not have much of the meetings taken up with that."
>
> "The elected representatives were very parochial and didn't have a vision."(I-05)

The nature of the talks reflected the lack of real power of the committee on the development of the area. Their role mainly was confined to monitoring the tax-incentives sites. The IAP programme itself became focused on the development of derelict sites rather than with the broader framework. The absence of any proper public budget beyond tax incentives for the implementation of IAP also meant that the implementation of the plan depended primarily on private actors' actions. Therefore, the nature of the project was set within limits set by the profitability criteria of private-sector development. The central role of the developers and the implication for the nature of the plan was stressed by many persons:

> "The essential powers rested with the planning department and because there wasn't a budget going with the IAP, it meant that the entire project was dependent on developers, private developers, and their wants rather than the needs of the community in the area." (I-07)
>
> "What we were sold in HARP is nothing. What transpired is nothing compared to the original plan. It bears very little resemblance because what happened was that it became developer-led; so the developers dictated the pace." (I-06)

> "The regen [regeneration] is mainly about profit. Development in this area is development-led.[...].The community picks up the scraps." (I-02)

> "One thing I have learned from it, which is quite complex and takes time to realize is that the Council can draw a plan up, as they did for HARP - very progressive; they use modules as they call them. They have very good ideas on planning, set them out. But developers don't have to work to that agenda. The developers can set their own agenda." (I-01)

In fact, the HARP IAP was centred mainly on physical development and mainly on the private sites, rather than on the physical improvement of public amenities and flats complexes. For example, a Councillor explained that the St. Michan's complex was not upgraded as originally envisaged in the IAP plan:

> "I mean, we still have St. Michan's exactly the same as it was before, whereas that was promised to be a major new rejuvenation scheme. So, development always came first. Private development always came first, and social development always came a poor second." (I-07)

The focus on the physical element meant that, once again, social and economic benefits were conceived as comprising narrowly-defined trickle-down effects and were sourced by the imposition of community levies, as will be seen later. This concentration on the physical element of regeneration was a major disappointment for the community:

> "What happened is the IAP got caught in the planning... and the holistic thing went, so I think that was detrimental in that sense." (I-08)

> "In a sense we've had a very substantial amount of residential development, but we have very little community development." (I-07)

Moreover, despite having to monitor the tax-incentive sites, the Monitoring Committee was not given a formal role in planning issues. The committee tried to challenge this interpretation of its role and to obtain a greater input in planning. In the first IAP Annual Report (1999-2000: 11), Joe Costello, a local councillor and TD, stated that the main area of concern was the lack of integration between the Monitoring Committee and the Planning Department. During this research, another councillor stressed the absence of any power the Committee had in physical development:

> "Even though the tax incentives were there to provide for community gain and there was to be an integrated approach, and we had the Monitoring Committee, in reality what happened is that planning applications went through the normal planning process and the HARP had no role in determining planning applications. And, very often, because we met quite infrequently, planning applications would have gone through in the Planning Department and the 5 weeks observation period was up by the time that we would even be aware of an application. I tried to do something when I went on the HARP. At one stage, I asked if we could be notified of all planning applications that came in. But I was basically told that that was outside our remit and that we did not have a planning remit." (I-12)

5.5. West side of Smithfield: evidence of the lack of planning remit for the IAP Monitoring Committee

5.5.1. Initial Conflict

The absence of any real devolution of decision-making power to the Monitoring Committee in the realm of physical planning was demonstrated when the City Manager granted two planning permissions for a site located on the west side of the Smithfield square, which many Committee members regarded as being in contradiction with the principles of the HARP plan. Despite the fact that the Monitoring Committee did not have any statutory remit in planning, the elaboration of a progressive plan in collaboration with community groups and the promotion of principles such as consultation meant that the community had presumed that some of their views would be reflected in planning decisions. Failure to register any such impact with respect to major decisions regarding the development of the Smithfield cell was greeted with disbelief and created considerable frustration:

> "It became quite frustrating because decisions that we might make were not or did not seem to be seriously taken on board by the planners." (I-07)

> "Next you see the application, permission granted, that must have been in the pipeline at that stage, so how much trust could you have in the system? You were trying to work alongside and with, in an organisation, and yet outside this arena they would be working against what we, the community, would see as against the wishes and the good of the general community." (I-04)

This situation left many members feeling that the structures of the IAP failed to change the approach to physical regeneration:

> "Decisions were made for development in the same narrow manner as though the IAP didn't exist." (I-07)

Dublin Corporation gave support for the controversial development on the western side of Smithfield Square (Site 4 in the HARP IAP) on the 17th of August 2000, less than a year after the abolition of the Steering Group, an action which had already caused doubts about the local authority's true commitment to the embracing of community-development principles.

Figure 5.2: Site 4 of the HARP IAP (Source: Dublin Corporation)

Plate 5.1: Site 4 of the HARP IAP before redevelopment (Source: An Bord Plenála)

The proposed development lay within a roughly rectangular site, bounded to the east by Smithfield Square, to the west by Queen Street, to the North by North King Street and to the south by Haymarket (see Figure 5.2). For many years, most of the site had been occupied by Duffy's scrapyard and Linder's motor garage. When the developers submitted

their application, the Smithfield fruit and vegetable market building remained on the site and was still open for trading, a residential home for ex-servicemen also occupied part of the site. However, most of the site had been cleared of buildings (Plate 5.1). The development was divided into two distinct parts. A northern part corresponded to the scheme proposed by Kulling Properties Ltd., while the larger southern part related to the submission made by Fusano Properties Ltd. The two schemes were seen as complementary. Permission was first sought in August 1999 by Fusano Properties for a IR£100M (¤127M) scheme (McDonald, Irish Times, 4th of August1999). The combined schemes covered a site area of 16,791 sq.m., while an overall plot ratio of 4.5:1 was envisaged[16]. It was proposed to build a new Curved Street linking Smithfield Square to Queen Street along the boundary of the two sites. The combined proposals were for a mixed-use development incorporating a Children's Museum, a theatre, retail units, offices, a restaurant/micro brewery, a car-park, a leisure centre and almost 500 residential units. The proposed development ranged in height from 5 to 9 storeys in addition to a 23-storey apartment tower. The latter represented the most controversial part of the scheme. Each floor was to accommodate just one apartment, each comprising 130 square metres (1,400 square feet) with the upper-floors enjoying a 360° view of the city (McDonald, Irish Times, 4th of August1999).

Planning permission was granted on 17th August 2000, a year after the initial submission. Communication between the developers and the planning department occurred during that period, as reflected in the submission of additional information to the planning department such as an Environmental Impact Statement in February 2000. The existence of such communication was also stressed during the Oral Hearing. The review of the audio-cassettes from the hearing reveals that the planning officer in charge of the case met the developers some four or five times, but had no meetings with any of those who had submitted objections to the scheme prior to his making his decision (An Bord Plenála, Audiotapes, 2001). Moreover, pre-planning discussions had taken place between the property developers and the local authority for almost a year prior to the submission of the proposal (Fagan, Irish Times, 23rd of August 2000). In fact, conversations with land owners and promoters regarding the site are likely to have occurred from late 1997 or early 1998. Dublin Corporation initiated Compulsory Purchase Order (C.P.O.) proceedings on the whole site on the 10th December 1997 (Dublin City Council, Personal Communication, 10th September 2009). A design brief was prepared as part of this procedure by the Economic

[16] All figures in relation to the proposed schemes were extracted from the Inspector's Report

Development Unit (Dublin City Council, Personal Communication, 10th September 2009). According to these documents, the purpose of the C.P.O. was to facilitate the redevelopment of the west side of Smithfield by helping in land assembling matters, while the design brief was drawn "in the interests of freeing the property for development at the earliest date" (Carey, quoted in Irish Independent, 12th of February 1998). In other words, it was to make the site free for redevelopment by private developers in the interest of urban regeneration. In the development brief, the planners gave an indication of the type of development they would favour, but also called for suggestions from interested parties and noted the possibility of extending the scope of the brief, showing flexibility. References were made to the HARP Framework Plan and to the necessity to have a Flagship Project. Indeed, the value of this redevelopment was stressed in the HARP Framework Plan, the west side of Smithfield being described as "a key site in the regeneration of Smithfield" and the establishment of a development brief was noted as forthcoming (Dublin Corporation, 1996: 80).

It is important to note that local residents and groups were not invited to contribute to this brief, depriving them of any influence through that channel, while developers could engage in pre-planning discussions. This highlights imbalances in access to planners and planning decisions. In fact, prior to the granting of planning permission for the west side of Smithfield, communication with local residents and groups amounted to the reception of submissions in relation to the developers' proposals, as they were entitled by planning law, and a single presentation at the HARP IAP meeting in July 2000, one month before giving planning permission. The presentation to the Monitoring Committee was requested by the local councillors when they became aware of the scheme at a meeting of the Central Area Committee in June 2000, more than two years after the design of the brief and almost a year after Fusano Properties' first planning application. This took the form of a slide show presentation by the planning officer. At the meeting of the Monitoring Committee in July 2000, both local councillors and the community representatives expressed concerns about the scheme, in terms of its height, density and lack of provision for social housing (Meeting Minutes, July 2000). The councillors therefore required that the decision be postponed. The City Manager nonetheless gave planning permission to the scheme in August, when the local councillors were on holiday, subject to 30 conditions. This generated considerable consternation over the ease with which the wishes of the elected and community representatives could be overruled by officials in Dublin Corporation. For

the community, this event was proof that there was a democratic deficit with regard to decision-making in planning:

> "Everybody was just gob-smacked that this could happen. We weren't aware of that stage. We would have known the laws and the by-laws of DCC [Dublin Corporation]. That was the first time we found out that it was possible for the City Manager, in the absence of the councillors, to vote something through, and we found that amazing. We hadn't known this before. We hadn't been aware of that. And that was the beginning of a very sharp learning curve. Well, everybody, the CDPs and the local tenant's associations, we all have to put our heads together and start learning very, very quickly. And we thought it was a very undemocratic thing to do." (I-02)

> "I just kind of wonder, should the City Manager have them powers. The whole thing started by the City Manager taking decisions into his own hands, using the power that was there, that he did have the right to use. But unfortunately, as far as I am concerned, he used it inappropriately." (I-04)

The City Manager's decision was felt to be in such contradiction to the views of the local community that a strong opposition movement emerged. Local residents with the support of MACRO organised a demonstration in front of the council building (Plates 5.2), while T. Gregory and J. Costello, two local politicians, pushed forward the following emergency motion in the names of Ald. T. Gregory and Cllrs. J. Costello, C. Burke, N. Kehoe, C. Giblin, B. Carr and R. Brady:

> "We, the undersigned Councillors condemn the high handed behaviour of the City Manager in granting planning permission to the recent major planning application for Smithfield without considering the serious concerns expressed by the local community and the local Councillors at the Central Area Committee on the HARP Monitoring Committee and in failing to await the outcome of the Urban Height and Density Study which is due to report shortly." (Council Meeting Minutes, 4th September2000)

Plate 5.2: Demonstration concerning Smithfield redevelopment (Source: MACRO)

However, it was felt that stronger legal action was necessary. Indeed, when the community failed to influence the decision-making process through the consultative structures which the local authority had established, they used an alternative avenue available to them under Irish planning law, the right to lodge a third-party appeal to An Bord Plenála.

5.5.2. Appeal to An Bord Plenála [17] :Using the Planning System

There were five third-party appellants to the scheme and three persons submitted observations. They included submissions from local groups such as MACRO and NWICN, individual members of the Monitoring Committee, An Taisce and the elected representatives. Submissions were also received from non-organised parties, including a submission from a local architect. Local groups benefited from the input and support of these local experts and accessed resources through networking. They also obtained the assistance of a community planner through Community Technical Aid (CTA), which had been set up in 1995 by the DICP to respond to local communities' technical needs. They

[17] This section is written based on the inspector's report and on individual documents available in the Oral Hearing file for the case Pl.29N.121296, available through the public access department of An Bord Plenála.

accessed this help through their own networks and own funds since previous demands made by members of the Steering Group to have funds made available to access planning assistance had not been granted. Despite the availability of CTA support, the objection process presented major challenges in terms of skills for local groups, as explained by two participants:

> "It was very educational. As I said earlier, we had no clue... we didn't even understand the language they were speaking at the time when it came to development and building, and some of us were ahead of the others on the building terms, but not the architectural or the city planner terms."(I-02)

> "It was completely alien, without the [CTA community planner] the community would have been lost, the language of planning you know, the all process, [CTA] explained it simply."(I-04)

There were also major differences in terms of resources available to the appellants and the developers. For instance, when it came to the Oral Hearing at Bord Plenála:

> "They [the developers] had solicitors, medical people, head of safety, architectural planning, barristers, all types of professionals. They'd come in every morning and then come and set up all their equipments and we'd go and sit on the other side of the room. And we would have an Irish Times and pass that around." (I-02)

> "Some of us had to get up and speak on behalf of the community, I hate public speaking. I was terrified, to get up in a room full of people, and then the intimidation aspect of it, which was you know... we were going in with pieces of paper and they were coming in with trolley loads and the suits, oh you know." (I-04)

The grounds of the appeal were diverse. The main issues identified related to the perceived lack of consultation, excessive height and bulk of the development, insufficient provision of social and affordable housing units and lack of guarantees that the cultural elements of the plan would be delivered. The appellants also objected on the grounds that the plan contravened the guidelines of the 1999 Development Plan and the site brief presented in the HARP IAP. For instance, the site was identified as Site 4 for tax-designation purposes in the HARP IAP and it was proposed that the development would consist of buildings with 4 to 5 storeys and could incorporate one tower of 7 to 8 storeys, which was significantly lower than the approved 23-storey apartment tower.

The lack of consultation and the resulting lack of consideration of community issues were identified by different appellants as problematic. For instance, in one letter to An Bord Plenála, dated 13th of September 2000, Mr. and Mrs. Heery stated that "As there was no meaningful consultation with residents whatsoever, the various elements of the community, our interests and concerns have neither been identified or considered in this planning decision". Similarly, one of the community representatives sitting on the HARP

Monitoring Committee spoke at length about the consultation process attached to HARP and the inadequacy of the process surrounding these planning submissions during the Oral Hearing. She explained that an innovative and consultative approach to plan-making was adopted but that during the implementation process, the local authority failed to include the community. She stated that:

> "Firstly, I will go back to the consultation on the framework for HARP. This was the first time that the local community had been consulted about the future of their area, and we were happy with the process and the resulting framework plan[...]. The Framework Plan laid down excellent principles to follow, and the setting up of the steering committee, made up of all interests created hope for the area" (HARP Community Representative, Speech to An Bord Plenála, 2001)

She later added that:

> "MACRO does not agree with the applicant's statement that consultation was achieved through HARP. One short meeting took place in June 2000 to show and explain a model of the two developments. Further information was requested but was never received." (HARP Community Representative, Speech to An Bord Plenála, 2001)

For the appellants, the most striking consequence of this lack of consultation was a complete misinterpretation by the developers of the community facilities available in the North West Inner city. While the community estimated the need for community facilities to be considerable, the developers believed there to be an under-utilisation of existing facilities.

The issue of consultation was noted in the Inspector's report. However, this issue was generally deemed to lie outside the remit of the Board. Many community members also worried that the cultural facilities such as the Children's Museum had been included in order to secure planning permission but would not be financially viable and would therefore subsequently be replaced by commercial premises by applying for a change of use from cultural to commercial functions, a practice which the community had witnessed previously of the east side of the square.

The appellants, especially MACRO and the community representatives from the HARP Committee, also worried about the low quantity of social housing to be provided. A total of 12 units out of 82 apartments in the Kulling scheme were reserved for affordable owner-occupied housing but no social housing for renting was to be included. For the Fusano scheme, the local authority had included as a condition that the social housing element be increased to 42 units but included within that number were the units for ex-soldiers which already existed on site but which were to be destroyed and rebuilt. Thus, few additional new units would be provided. Moreover, these units represented only 11.5 percent of the total units, a significantly lower figure than the 15 percent recommended in

the IAP document and well below the indicative figure of 20 percent which had been introduced in the Planning Act of 2000. Indeed, there were fears in the community that even these units might not be delivered. While the Inspector from An Bord Plenála had recommended that the provision of social housing units be made a condition for planning permission, the Board did not accept this condition.

The excessive plot ratio, the lack of social housing units and community facilities were all seen as to be motivated by the search of profit and there was a strong conviction that, by approving the scheme, Dublin Corporation had strongly sided with private developer interests rather than acted for the common good. One interviewee remembered how s/he interpreted the decision as having been very biased:

> "I really felt 'what's going on here?' It's collusion between the councillors and the developers. And I really thought the timing and everything ...I was disappointed. You know, the City Manager is there to act on behalf of the public, not any one sector. And to do the like of that, you know, it's just to have no consideration." (I-04)

Similarly, one appellant stressed in a letter to An Bord Plenála that the role of the public sector was not to facilitate private-sector profit making:

> "As justification for such excessive development, the developers will argue that site purchase costs make the proposed scale of development a 'regrettable' necessity. We would contend that it is not the role of Dublin Corporation to underwrite the profitability of development in respect of development sites where the developer has paid too high a price to enable him to profitably develop within recognized development parameters (such as for example the IAP for these two sites indicated as site number 4 in Dublin Corporation IAP of 1998/1999)." (Kelly, letter to An Bord Plenála, 16th September 2000:3)

Another interviewee also saw the local authority as overtly supporting private interests:

> "The developers and the Corporation are together and your only hope is An Bord Plenála. They push it as far as they can to get every inch of value, they squeeze everything." (I-13)

The issue of a favourable decision for the developers despite their failure to respect the official guidelines was also generally attributed to ideological orientations in government policies and the support of a pro-development approach both amongst politicians at central level and senior officials in the local authority. This was explained by a local councillor:

> "The decision was made on that, not by us but by others. It was left to us individually to object to it, you know, to object, to turn in an application. The Manager was in favour of it, the Planning Department was in favour of it, and it was reduced. There was a hearing about it, but that was it. It got the approval of the City Manager probably on the basis that it finished the square. It completed the square and it was a massive development. At the time, there was great belief that everything to do with development was good. The bigger, the better." (I-07)

Likewise, in relation to the difficulty of having community benefits enforced, he also stated that:

> "I think that, you know, it was 'development good', go ahead and plough ahead with development. This was great. It was creating jobs. It was building up the city. It was eliminating dereliction. And that was the view all round... I think the government of the day too was a very pro development government. I think that the planning authorities, they bought into that. That was full steam ahead. 'Go ahead, get on with it. Never mind all of these characters that are suggesting that we have to, you know, look at other areas. Just plough ahead'. That seemed to be the nature of the Planning Department at the time. The Manager and the Assistant Manager in charge of planning, they were very much in favour of development." (I-07)

The existence of financial constraints for local government and especially weak financial independence from central government was also mentioned by activists as a factor preventing the consultative process from being carried out meaningfully and from producing visible results for the community. One respondent said:

> "It's important to understand that at development department level and at city manager level the primary desire has been to increase the rates base. DCC [Dublin Corporation] is financially in dire straits; they are in quite big trouble. Their funding is now almost entirely Department of the Environment based for all their special projects, they are not able to fund their special projects out of their own incomes. They have a number of sources of income. Their main one used to be road tax. They have also a significant source of income from rates, which are charges upon public services made upon business premises. And the result of that, and to increase their rates base and to increase their income, they have been granting larger, larger and larger and in many cases less desirable commercial permissions. The other thing, of course is that for large commercial developments including speculative developments there are significant levies attached. So at management level the only interest is in increasing the financial revenue, which accrues to the city council as a result of development, there is no interest whatsoever in consultation or planning." (I-14)

In other words, other discourses about the need to manage resources efficiently and the necessity to support private development for the 'greater good' of the city came into conflict with the discourses of addressing the needs of those who benefited the least from the economic boom and from property development. Their inability to influence the nature of development within their locality through the structures put in place by Dublin Corporation had eventually obliged them to rely on the right of any ordinary citizen to appeal planning decisions to an independent board, dependent upon the help of local experts who might provide them with sufficient skills to assist in the appeals process.

However, the remit of the independent board is limited to physical planning issues and does not cover social issues. The main victory gained through the appeal process was the omission of the 23-storey tower and of a 'glass-ship' building. Certain buildings were also reduced in height. Nonetheless, gains in terms of the scheme's density and height had, subsequently, additional effects for the community. In fact, a bargaining process took place later between community groups and the developers, outside of Dublin Corporation:

> "The other thing that did came out of it was that the developer on the west side of the square, when they made their subsequent planning application after initial problems, they approached the local community very openly and they said look we don't really need to have these problems and is there something, are they things we can agree upon and things we can agree to disagree upon. So, for example, subsequent to that, we agreed as a group certain aspects of that development. We agreed to disagree on certain other ones. In other words, we said 'ok, we will object and we will appeal this but not this'. And then the developers themselves came back with mitigation basically, directly dealing with the local community. Where they would say 'ok there are maybe local community projects that need funds, maybe there are local community facilities that need to be funded, we can accommodate some of that'. A bargaining process went one, and it was quite an effective one." (I-14)

According to the residents, a series of discussions with the developer gave them better information about the planning application and allowed them to discuss them directly. This was a generally preferred solution:

> "At least we knew what was coming but the other way a lot of this stuff just jumps on top of you and then there's trouble" (I-09)

It also resulted in direct negotiation of community gain for the site between the community groups and the developer, a fund being set up and managed by MACRO and the developer. Some social and affordable dwelling units were also delivered, in contrast to the situation on other sites The developer also benefited because when he reapplied for a smaller tower (12 storeys), no objection was lodged.

This planning incident, combined with subsequent events, resulted in the community's overall appraisal that it was easier to have an influence through the national planning system structure and especially through An Bord Planála or through direct discussion with the developers than through the local consultative structures which had been put in place by the local authority. In fact, many interviewees identified the national appeal system as the only source of influence for communities in planning issues within the HARP area:

> "In the HARP IAP, I can't think of any structures that I would consider people could participate in. I actually think the biggest influence in terms of Smithfield, it was not DCC structures at all, it was the planning system that was useful and the right they had under that, I think, gave them leverage that they wouldn't have had otherwise. The planning system allowed an 'in' into influencing but I don't think the IAP did." (I-08)

> "They talked about consulting us but the decisions are made before the consultation. Consultation comes after, after things are settled.They just ignore you, really. They say it's not true, but that's my view. It's my view about everything that has to do with development. We did have some input when I came to the Hearing with An Bord Plenála." (I-13)

Moreover, subsequent discussions with the developers were the result of the failure to engage adequately through the established structures. Although some activists and

community workers had found the process "easier" and "more straightforward" with developers than with the city officials, it should be remembered that the delivery of any gain made through such negotiations remained conditional upon the overall profitability of the scheme, limiting the actual scope of the potential gains, and that the community do not wish to see these replace the state provision of social facilities.

Overall, the appeal did provide some positive tangible outcomes, such as the reduction in the height and bulk of the development. It also resulted in a local increase in skills in the whole planning arena and the development of a network which could be put to use in other conflicts, such as the opposition to the Markets Area Framework Plan, as will be seen later. It also developed indirectly the capacity which people had to speak for their neighbourhood. Furthermore, it led to the identification of a need for training locally and to the subsequent running by voluntary groups of a planning course organised with the assistance of Community Technical Aid. This meant that individuals and groups have subsequently possessed a greater level of understanding of the planning system and a far greater degree of confidence in participating. For some, it has also allowed them to build contacts with people willing to provide resources on a voluntary basis

> "In some way it was a very successful community-building exercise. Many of us involved in that are still involved in various community organizations and activities. We would regularly monitor the development of the area. ...Certainly there was a feeling among the local community that there were resources available to them to deal with development issues. On a simple level, it was a case of networking."(I-14)

> "It was always presumed that the community would just roll in behind the city council. They would assume that you didn't know anything about planning. But we had expert advice from [...] an urban planner. A qualified urban planner who had obtained advice from other quarters as well, so we were always well briefed. I mean, ,we ran education courses in the area on planning. So we have brought people up to a level."(I-02)

The conflict that emerged regarding the planning application for the west side of Smithfield illustrates the serious limitations of the formal participation process. Despite a discourse which overtly favoured community involvement in plan-making and the adoption of a community-centred approach to regeneration, when those representing and working for the community voiced their disapproval of the private-sector proposals for regeneration of one of the key sites within the HARP IAP, their views entirely failed to register with the local authority. Other objectives were prioritised, such as the necessity to ensure that tax-designated sites would be redeveloped within a certain time frame, and came into conflict with the broader aim of integrated development. One of the constraints to the implementation of the original plan was the pro-development ethos adopted within Dublin Corporation under the guidance of the City Manager. This reinforced central-

government pressure, brought to bear through policies which promoted reliance on the private sector to achieve the production of social goods, such as social housing and community facilities. Moreover, the adoption of business methods such as an audit culture, led the emphasis of regeneration to move towards the measurable aspects of regeneration such as the number of sites developed. The pressure linked to the achievement of such quantifiable goals can be detected in the following quotation from one of the project managers, adding to tensions due to different conceptions of the role of the Committee and the ideological differences between officials and the community about the benefit of private-sector development:

> "We were monitored at HARP in relation to our annual reports, to ensure that those key objectives were being met, because the Department would ask of us why weren't these sites developed? And you'll see that the role of the Monitoring Committee was to kind of identify blockages and constraints in development. But, for the most part, they wouldn't have provided any real assistance to those kind of issues, ... because they felt they were in some way kind of adversely impacting on the community rather than seeing it as a benefit to the community." (I-10)

There was a general feeling that the community and the Monitoring Committee had not been given powers to affect the decisions regarding the physical elements of the plan during its implementation, leading them to use the planning system to bring about some marginal influence on the nature of development, making some gains on densities and height, within the constraints of the legal system available to them. Similarly, their influence on social issues during the implementation phase was severely limited. First, once established, the Monitoring Committe was mainly given the task of overseeing the tax-certification process and to oversee the spending of the community-gain funds. Secondly, the community's own vision of the community fund's purpose clashed with that of the local-authority. Therefore, as will be seen, the establishment and operation of a task group to deal with 'community gain' became another arena where the community sector found the participation process frustrating and disappointing.

5.6. Community Gain Task Group: Another Rubber-stamping Committee?

5.6.1.Where is the Money? The Fund as a Forgotten Matter

The notion of 'community gain' was introduced during the application process for IAP status for the HARP Framework Plan. Dublin Corporation (1998) produced a document summarising the 1996 HARP Framework Plan and presenting additional information, mainly comprising an outline of the sites that Dublin Corporation had selected

to benefit from tax incentives. The application of tax-incentives to these sites was justified by the potential socio-economic benefits which could be brought to the area and was seen as helping to achieve the broad objectives of the plan, notably through the generation of 'community gain'. The benefits of designation were presented in the following terms:

> "It is considered that the adoption of the HARP Plan as an integrated area plan under the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme, and in particular through the designation process would provide the necessary catalyst required for private investment to impact positively on the local indigenous resident population. It would also complement the programme of physical regeneration undertaken as part of the HARP Framework Plan.
> Therefore, it is proposed that 'designation' would play two essential but complementary roles in the physical, social and economic rejuvenation of the HARP area through (a) the generation of a new use culture and (b) 'community gain'- the creation of employment and housing opportunities and the provision of community facilities." (Dublin Corporation, 1998: 8-9)

The availability of tax incentives was presented as being strictly dependent on the provision of such 'community gain', which would take the form of a financial contribution or the provision of community facilities or opportunities, or both (Dublin Corporation, 1998: 10). Several examples of conceivable 'community gain' were listed and included 'local training/ employment initiative', 'community facilities', 'social and affordable housing'. It added that if financial contributions were sought, the funds should be directed towards 'community facilities' and that the projects chosen should "have a significant impact on the socio-economic rejuvenation of the HARP area" (ibid: 10). An indication of the amount sought was provided and it was set at up to 15 percent of the site value. The necessity for such a financial contribution was reiterated regarding a number of the individual sites, a total of 14 out of 26 sites having such a condition attached. In the case of most of the other sites, benefits were also referred to but in the form of the conservation of historic buildings, job creation and provision of enterprise units.

Despite the stated importance of community gain to the achievement of the objectives of the plan and to guarantee the adoption of an integrated approach, it appears that initially little debate concerning the collection and distribution of this fund occurred between the local authority and the community. It appears from the interviews undertaken for this research that there was little awareness among community groups and activists of the actual existence of such 'community gain' levies and of their purpose, initially at least. The community activists who had negotiated the inclusion of the community levy sat on the Steering Group. However, they not included in the new Monitoring Committee. This rendered the following-up process difficult. Interviewees expressed concern and frustration regarding the level of information provided to the community on this issue throughout the

process. One community worker explained that in order to receive information they repeatedly had to bring forward the question of the community funds and make the local authority accountable for it:

> "The IAP, it was a new thing, we were doing the basic stuff, then we realised that there's huge stuff going on, we needed to get involved. So we tried, but ....Over 10 years...it has taken for the community to be able to find out where the community gain money is and what it is for. I remember reading the plan; there's 15 percent and we would all say but where is it? And I know that people were bringing it up at HARP but it's taken us this long, with the result that only now they are beginning to give the money out...
> So it's taken us a while to ask the right questions and it's taken us a while to get any answer and I don't think it's necessarily because people are hiding information but the city council.., they are not used to being accountable to anybody else. They are used to being accountable to their manager and that was it. So, it has taken us a while to track it down . The community fund is there, at least it's visible now. " (I-08)

In fact, according to the annual reports published in relation to HARP, the issue of community gain was not tackled before the year 2002-2003 when, for the first time, a community gain task group was set up by Dublin City Council (DCC[18]) as a sub-committee of the Monitoring Committee. This provided an opportunity for the community representatives, with the support of local community groups, to put questions forward and obtain greater information. For example, a list of seven questions regarding 'community gain' was prepared and passed on through the community representative to the HARP Project Team Manager and the Community Gain sub-committee in November 2003. The list included precise and practical questions including:

> "How much money or other Gains have been negotiated to date and could we have them Separated out?
>
> Breakdown year by year of Community Gain Levies on each tax Designated Site.
>
> Where are the Community Gain Levies at present or where have they been spent to date?" (NWICN, questions to the HARP, 2003).

In this document, the community also expressed the desire to receive a response within fourteen days. However, the Assistant Area Manager did not reply until over three months later, in a letter dated 3rd of March 2004, which gave a response to each of the eight questions. It was stated that DCC had negotiated 'community gain' in relation to seven tax-designated sites that amounted to ¤2,109,142 plus two walkways, of which only ¤912,136 and one walkway had been received at the time.

---

[18] Dublin Corporation changed name and became Dublin City Council (DCC) Dublin Corporation referedto the city government and its administrative organisation in Dublin between 1661 and 1 January 2002. It is now known as Dublin City Council.

It is important to note that neither the community representatives nor other community interests were consulted or involved in the negotiations relating to the monetary or other nature of this 'community gain'. Moreover, it is unclear what percentage of the site value was in fact provided as a contribution to the fund, although an initial figure of up to 15 percent had been stated in the plan. Obtaining such numerical data in relation to the funds appears to have remained a difficulty for the community even after this initial response. In fact, it appears that the above questions emerged regularly during the course of the HARP IAP, causing frustration and a perception that the collection of such funds was not always a priority of the DCC, as explained by one community development worker:

> "We've asked...but we still find it difficult, and it has been difficult all around what is the total community gain in the area? What will it be at the end of the development? They would give you figures; is that the total up to now? Is that the money to be collected? They are the things you can't get, they are foggy on those things. They are all kind of vague. I don't think they knew themselves. It was a new thing. I think they just wanted to get on with the building, and they didn't take this community gain stuff as seriously as they should have. They didn't prioritise it. They just saw it as an extra income for the Council and when we started asking question, they were kind of annoyed as well." (I-02)

This situation meant that the community representatives have felt that they had to pursue these issues and chase the information continuously. For example, in 2005, the community representatives sent another letter, in which very similar questions were again asked, including the amount of fund levied and the breakdown of the grants approved (Letter from Pender and Jennings, 2005). It highlights the fact that the community had concerns regarding lack of transparency surrounding the amount of revenue actually yielded and to be yielded in the future through the 'Community Gain' levy. However, through frequent raising of questions and the slow release of information, broader questions and concerns emerged and were brought up. Indeed, the community expressed dissatisfaction about the decision-making process concerning the community gain structures put in place to administer the fund. They questioned the validity of the definition of community gain put forward by the local authority and its vision of who should decide on such a definition.

5.6.2.Who Decides What is 'Community Gain', How it is Administered and by Whom?

The North West Inner City Network (NWICN)[19] stressed as early as 2002 that, in order to participate meaningfully in the IAP process, the community should not only receive clear information on the fund but should also be given a clear mandate in relation to its administration. It stated that:

> "Beyond establishing a fundamental transparency about the amount of finance raised, the Community also wishes to be centrally involved in the administration of all finances generated through the imposition of the 'Community Gain' levy." (NWICN, Working Document, 2002: 3).

The organisation, which nominates one of the community representatives on the Monitoring Committee, justified the need to have 'community control' of the fund in order to ensure that community assets were secured (ibid: 4). They also clearly stated their desire see the system for the administration of the fund determined in consultation with the community representatives and the organisation that mandated them. They envisaged that they would receive a declaration from DCC detailing how they proposed to administer the fund, that the community's proposals would be sought and considered and that "proper consultation" (ibid: 2) would take place. NWICN proposed that community Foundations and Community Trusts be considered as models to follow in the H.A.R.P. (ibid: 4). In other words, they wanted terms of reference to be agreed in relation to the administration of the fund. However, in practice, the rules lacked visibility for the community and were controlled by DCC. This created difficulties for the community representatives both in terms of the general IAP process and in terms of the community gain:

> "How can you monitor, the rules change according to whichever project manager is there at the time. The rules of the game changed so many time that nobody knew why it was set up in the first place. No clear terms of reference for the group. I mean that was very, very clear when they started distributing the community gain, because they didn't have any terms of reference for distribution." (I-04)

In the absence of agreed terms of reference, DCC's understanding of 'Community Gain' and of the role of the community representatives in its administration initially prevailed. The procedure was described as inconsequential by one of the representative:

> "The way it started off was [that] we were given a sheet of paper and what it had on it was such a thing, such an amount; such a thing, such an amount; such a thing, such an amount. It was a list. We were supposed to just tick the box. These were all DCC projects." (I-04)

---

[19] NWICN is an independent member- based forum of Community and Voluntary Groups in the North West Inner City of Dublin and seeks to ensure that the community has an active say in how their community is developed

The area of most concern to the community representatives and the community at large was the lack of input they had been accorded in selecting the projects that could be financed under the 'Community Gain'. There was also concern about signing off approval for the projects since they significantly differed from what the community would have seen as qualifying as 'Community Gain'. This motivated the community representatives to question the DCC officials' interpretation of 'Community Gain':

> "There was a sheet of paper, put in front of us, and it was basically four or six, whatever, projects, and they were all Council, and part of it you see that road...the roadway, they never finished it off, that was the Roads Department there was ¤20,000, and I questioned it. I said why? That's the Roads Department budget. That shouldn't come out of the community gain; and I was made to feel that I was depriving my neighbours of having their road finished! It was just tick boxes and it was all DCC. So, we reported that to the organisations, to the network [NWICN]."(I-04)

There were contrasting common-sense readings of the purpose of the fund, as explained by one community activist:

> "But community gain was to us, again, there was a matter of interpretation. There was money that was to be spent on the infrastructure... community infrastructure to us that was health and safety, leisure and recreation, educational, that sort. DCC seemed to think it could be spent on lampposts and pavements and roadways. We said no, that the budgets already existed for those within the ordinary budget, in the council and that any money made to the levies should be used to better the lives of the people living in that area...When we asked what was community infrastructure in their view, they said 'well, pavements, lamp posts, roads'. We said we didn't see that as community infrastructures. We would see crèches, a youth hall, educational and recreational facilities... that debate went on for a while... They were putting in lighting, pathways they were taking that from the community gain budget. There was already a roads budget. It should be aimed at inclusion" (I-02)

Another person stressed how DCC's interpretation of the fund was limited to the financing of ordinary rather than community projects and was not differentiated from other sources of exchequer money:

> "My feeling is that this was not seen as community gain money. It was seen as another pot of funding for the Council to be able to spend"(I-04)

When the community came to realise that they had not contributed to either the formulation of a definition for 'Community Gain' nor to the definition of the role and mandate of the community representatives on the 'Community Gain Task Group', they challenged the decision-making process itself by putting in writing the following questions:

> "What are the terms of reference and who decided on them?
> Who decided the make-up of the group?"

And,

Where are the guidelines on where this money can be spent?" (Letter from NWICN, 2003: 1).

The responses highlighted the fact that little debate and reflection had surrounded these important questions. In a letter dated 3rd of March 2004, G. Perry, the Project Team Manager, explained that there were "no terms of reference" and "no guidelines" in existence and that the establishment of an IAP Task Group on Community Gain was recommended by a report approved by the Central Area Committee at a meeting on 13th March 2001. This report was written with input only from the IAP Project Managers and there is no evidence in the report of any consultation having taken place. It recommended that the Task Group's purpose would be 'to consider suitable projects for funding' (DCC, Report on Community Gains Implementation Procedures, 2001) and it advised that the membership of the group should comprise:

- The IAP Project Manager and IAP chairperson
- One IAP Community Representative, a second IAP Community Representative or an IAP Trades Representative and one IAP Business Representatives
- One Enterprise and Employment officer and one Area Committee Officer (from DCC)

It is unclear from the report what the role each member of the group task was to be. Moreover, there was no indication of the amount of the 'community gain' to be sought. The figure of 15 percent of the site value quoted in the HARP IAP document (Dublin Corporation, 1998) was not repeated. In contrast, the report insisted that the fact that the tax incentives given under the IAP were not as advantageous as those sought initially and that were available under the previous Urban Renewal Schemes. This argument was also forwarded by one of the DCC officials, who insisted that the Community Gain levy had been a new additional requirement for the developer, suggesting that it may have been seen in DCC quarters as an obstacle to development:

> "...I think [it] dampened down the attractiveness of the sites, because the package of tax incentives was considerably less than the package of incentives that were available prior to this. I suppose if I was to say in a nutshell what was the downside, it went like this: whereas before, the tax incentives were there to incentivise development and they worked, this time around we had no incentives and yet there was no requirement on the part of the developer in the earlier scheme to effectively address the issues of, say, social and economic renewal. It was purely physical renewal. This time around, we had a reduced package of incentives, but the asking on the part of, say, us who were given the, or certifying the tax incentives was to provide for social and economic community-gain objectives when the package was low. So developers turned around to us and said there's

no incentive here because there's no benefit in that you're not offering a full package and you're asking for more." (I-10)

This may explain why its collection was not always prioritised. As stated in a recent report, there was a widespread feeling amongst city officials that their application would deter developers (Goodbody Economic Consultants, 2005). While the highest figure for the Community Gain fund was listed as having occurred in the HARP IAP, it nevertheless still represented only 1 per cent of the total Scheme expenditure (Goodbody Economic Consultants, 2005). This raises questions about the efficiency of mechanisms that rely on private-sector actors to deliver social goods. Overall, the community sector felt that the interests of the developers were accorded priority. Moreover, as seen above, when collected, the use of the levy money was strongly contested by the community sector as not being community-centred. The decision-making process on how to disperse the fund was tightly controlled by officials in DCC rather than by citizens or local councillors. As a result of contestation around the administration of the fund, an official procedure was devised and put into place by DCC, but that occurred only in 2006, seven years after the beginning of the scheme and, as will be shown in next section, the new process was characterised by minimal input from community interests. There therefore emerged a strong argument in the community sector for the need to discuss such matters at an early stage and for the community representatives to be provided with sufficient time, resources and recognition to ensure that benefits to the community actually emerge during the implementation of the plan:

"The criteria for community gain, should have been decided in the initial stage, at the very beginning. What is community gain? What does it mean to you? What does it mean to me? Who can apply for this? All of this should have been precise. It should be decided with a local input at the very beginning. I think the training is the first thing that should have taken place. Then when people have the training they can sit down and negotiate, including the community gain." (I-02)

5.6.3. A Unilaterally-agreed New Process: The 2006 Guidelines

In June 2006, DCC published an information leaflet about Community Gain Grants for the five IAPs. It provided estimates of the funding to be received between 2006 and 2008, a definition of who was eligible to receive such funding, examples of eligible

facilities and services, and details of how and by whom the applications would be assessed (DCC, Information Leaflet, 2006). It was the first time that such a detailed information pack containing official application forms was provided to the public, making the procedure more transparent and representing a step forward from the approach adopted previously, as stated by a councillor who sat on the Community Gain Task group:

> "I was there when the guidelines were drawn up, and we had the meeting with the new guidelines. People had to do applications, and they had to do it by a certain date. Before that, it was quite unclear what the actual terms were; it was a bit *ad hoc*." (I-12)

However, although the rules were now enunciated clearly, they still reflected strongly DCC's initial conception of the use of the fund, which is unsurprising since the rules were drafted by city officials. The local authority responded to the community desire to see terms of reference and guidelines drawn up but did not co-write them with the community nor involve community interests in the drafting of such rules, other than by asking for comments on an already-drafted guide. Therefore, despite the fact that some consideration was given to the issues raised by the community representatives, they were left with a sense of a missed opportunity:

> "When it came to doing up the terms of reference for the community gain, there wasn't a community person sitting at the table, so ok we had to pass it but...This was done for the five IAPs, but there was no community rep [representative] involved in drawing up the procedure. Why were we left out of that? We should have been involved in drawing up the procedures for drawing up that fund. Why was the community left out of that? It was a huge mistake that we made, or I made, as a community rep [representative]. I should really have pushed that, to make sure that the community was involved at that stage of drawing up the guidelines. I was still learning. It was still a learning curve for me. When certain things come up that you haven't dealt with before, it's hard to know what questions you should be asking, how you should be asking them and all of that." (I-04)

As explained in the above quotation, the community attributed its lack of lobbying for such participation to their lack of understanding of the importance of being involved at that stage. The drafting of the Community Gain Funding Guidelines on the basis of outside assumptions took the ownership and power of definition away from local communities at a critical stage. This highlights the need for the community to be engaged at every stage of the process, notably in the design of the project and its guiding rules. Until community groups are given power over the construction of the 'rules of the game', they miss an essential aspect of control. Moreover, it shows again the need for access to resources, such as opportunities for discussion with external advisers, to be offered to community representative so that alternative conceptions of their role in the project's implementation and other solutions than those proposed by the government sector can emerge. Most importantly, such views need then to be given recognition through implementation.

When designing the guidelines for the distribution of community gain grants, the local authority defined two categories of grant, namely 'Major Grants' and 'Minor Grants'. Statutory bodies, such as DCC, were granted the right to apply for funding under the 'Major Grants' category despite the community's expressed reluctance to see DCC projects being financed though IAP Community Gain Funding. Community and voluntary organisation could apply to both funds. However, in the case of the Major Grants, which covered projects valued at over ¤50,000, a maximum of 80 percent of the project cost or 50 percent of the staff costs could be covered, clearly creating significant difficulties for organisations which are short of cash, as outlined by one of the applicants:

> "We applied for a community bus. We were told we would get 80 percent and we would have to bring the other 20. But we haven't got the other 20. We could try to get it, we would have to go into debt to get it, we would get a loan from the bank, but that's the way they work" (I-02)

Moreover, such applications were assessed first by a member of staff of DCC within the IAP area. Secondly, it was examined by a panel expert composed of different experts as required but that included an Assistant City Manager and a Senior Financial Manager. The panel made decisions on the applications, including those submitted by DCC, and then forward them for review to the Monitoring Committee, leaving little room for input from the community sector in the overall process.

The main area of influence for the community sector related to the administration of the 'Minor Grants', which were aimed especially at community development projects. The applications were to be submitted directly to the Monitoring Committee for decision. There was a strong feeling that such grants would not have been available to the community had the community representatives and their mandating organisations, with the help of the councillors, not repeatedly challenged the public-sector vision of community gain funding. Therefore, there was a feeling that at least some gain had been obtained on that issue to the benefit of the community:

> "I do think that as a community rep [representative], that we've opened the community gain a bit to the community. I don't think that originally that was ever intended, you know. It was people making decisions for us. DCC would decide how that community gain would benefit the community, as opposed to the community deciding how that community gain would benefit them." (I-04)

However, it should be noted that there were also constraints attached to the distribution of 'Minor Grants', which further limited the role of the Community Gain Task Group in the overall process. For example, DCC imposed a rule that "No IAP would distribute more than ¤250,000 of such funding" (Information Leaflet, 2006: 7). For the

HARP IAP, this figure represented only 10.4 percent of the expected funding for the period 2006-2008. A total of 49 minor-grant applications were received in relation to HARP and the total applied for amounted to ¤405,177 (DCC, Memorandum, 2006). Four applications were deemed ineligible. The HARP Monitoring Committee distributed funds to 45 organisations, totalling ¤248,835 just short of the ¤250,000 limit set by DCC. In the case of the HARP IAP, an additional amount of ¤150,000 was allocated for a second round of Minor Grants (DCC, letter dated 11th February 2008), bringing the overall fund for Minor Grants to a total of ¤400,000. However, some voluntary and community organisation also benefited from the 'Major Grants'. In 2009, a total of ¤5,441,419 had been collected, 69.2 percent of which was allocated to DCC projects (see Appendix A). These included a budget of ¤1,699, 525 for the Roads Department, a fund of ¤690,000 for the Parks Department, and a payment of ¤500,000 for upgrading the Smithfield Civic Space. The remainder of the money granted to DCC was spent on a range of projects including the provision of Heritage signs (¤100,000), an exhibition on conservation (¤9,160) and the refurbishment of enterprise units for community use (¤770,000), only the latter of which was of much importance to the community (Appendix A).

The significant level of funding allocated to DCC was defended by one local councillor as a consequence of the financial constraints facing local authorities and their consequent search for alternative funding:

> "There's no money, local authorities are quite starved of finances; local authority don't have any powers to raise money themselves, [..]. In some cases you have rates, but it's a complicated system. We don't have local taxation, DCC has a limited budget, so if you wanted to do something special within that for a particular area then DCC says you either do it from the community gain funds or you wait ten years for it to happen, and these are the calls that we as councillors have to make, because when each year we pass the estimates, we are aware that we have very little money" (I-12)

The respondent also alluded to the impact of business interests lobbying to be recognised as legitimate recipients of the fund, raising questions about how 'community' should appropriately be defined:

> "There was often a conflict between the community representatives and DCC, and sometimes DCC and the business representatives of HARP. Because there was one development done on Mary street, DCC were saying they didn't have the funds to do the road, you know, that it would actually bring up the whole community, and Capel street and the rest, it will lift the whole area, if they did this, but the normal road. They said they didn't have the money out of the budget, yet businesses were looking for it, people were saying the community gain is not for businesses, we have so many projects that could do with that. There was always conflict." (I-12)

The redefinition of the rules in 2006 and the opening up of the Community Gain Fund to community and voluntary groups was regarded as an important gain by the

community activists and the local councillors interviewed. In fact, it was seen as the only area where the community had succeeded in having a say through the Monitoring Committee. One councillor, when asked if she thought anything different had been accomplished due to the existence of the Monitoring Committee, replied:

> "The community gain aspect. I think all the community gain would have gone to DCC... would have gone in the general kind of parks budget or whatever, we wouldn't have seen the benefit for the community." (I-12)

and when asked to identify what power the Monitoring Committee had, responded that:

> "The main area of power was the disbursement of the community funding - that was an important job." (I-12)

Similarly, an activist identified it as the main area of influence:

> "When they changed it then from the Steering Committee to a Monitoring Committee, as the name implies, it became just a monitoring role. Well, it still had a very important role around community gain." (I-02)

Nonetheless, concern remained about the whole process since it was felt that its shortcomings had not been overcome, resulting in an overall negative evaluation of the system which had been put in place. One interviewee concluded that:

> "It was very badly handled. It was controlled by the City Council although we had stakeholder representatives on it. It was still very much controlled by the city council." (I-06)

Lastly, through discussions with the different activists, it appeared that there was some regret that so much energy and focus had to be directed towards the discussion of the handling of the fund and questions emerged about how this issue might have forced the community to retrench into a money-chasing role rather than addressing broader issues. One committee member argued that

> "I think they should have been pushing for more social housing and more facilities to be provided, rather than be content to be getting maybe point two of a percent of the cost of development by way of community fund."(I-05)

Moreover, the community activists expressed the view that community gain should have occurred from the implementation of the overall plan rather than just through the community gain funds. They also felt that the social and community aspects had not been adequately addressed overall and should have been dealt with as a priority rather than concentrating on the development of private sites. Looking back on the HARP IAP experience, one activist stated:

> "What we negotiated was put to the back. The private was done first. We didn't get what we were promised . We achieved small community gain that helped small groups but we didn't achieved the bigger stuff." (I-15)

When asked what he would have done differently, his response was:

> "The first thing is that I would have made sure the community stuff was built first, then the community gain would have been there forever" (I-15)

This is a strategy that community activists attempted to adopt in the case of the Markets Area Framework Plan, as will be seen in the next section. It presents the strategies and tactics used outside the formal structures of the HARP IAP during the definition of the Plan. The community, then armed with greater experience of participation and a greater understanding of planning issues, were able to present their own vision for the redevelopment of the plan.

5.7 Markets Area Draft Framework Plan

The HARP Framework Plan was originally designed in 1996 for an area comprising the north-west quadrant of Dublin's inner city. It is an extensive area stretching from O'Connell Street to Collins Barracks covering a total of 109 hectares. One of the strategies identified in the plan was the creation of four local cells within the HARP area. This was to facilitate the delivery of "tailor-made policies and strategies in response to the problems and opportunity existing at the local scale" (Dublin Corporation, 1996: 65). Each cell was centred on a landmark building or space. These cells were the Retail Cell, focused on Henry street, the Smithfield Cell, centred on Smithfield square and its bordering sites, the Markets Cell, which concentrated on the buildings which comprised the fruit and vegetable market and the fish market and, lastly, the Collins Barracks Cell. The plan envisaged that a Local Area Plan (LAP) would be devised for each cell, which would bring to life the principles promoted in the overall Framework document (Dublin Corporation, 1996: 2).

Thus, they were to be written in consultation with local groups and interests. Indeed, "the development of a culture of ongoing communication, consultation and partnership with the local communities and organisations" (Dublin Corporation, 1996: 65) comprised one of the ten stated approaches of the plan. Within the Markets Cell, projects included the creation of incubator units for new enterprises on the disused Daisy Market site and the upgrading of the Fish Market building to reach EU hygiene standards. Subsequently, the HARP Framework Plan was submitted and adopted as an IAP, since it met all the criteria required thereunder (Dublin City Council, 2002). The Fish Market and adjoining lands were again identified as key sites for regeneration and included in the sites that could

benefit from tax incentives. The proposal included the development of space for both enterprise and cultural usage. Food-processing activities were favoured and the development of cultural facilities were also included to alleviate the shortage of such space in the area included for community art groups. Overall, the creation of jobs in labour-intensive sectors were presented as the rationale for the project.

5.7.1. A Land-use Plan

A Local Area Plan (LAP) did not emerge for the Markets area. Nonetheless, DCC produced a Draft Framework Plan for the area in 2002.The Commercial Regeneration Unit of DCC was put in charge of the project. An Urban Design and Use Framework Study consultation was launched for the Markets area in November 2000. As part of the process, DCC issued a Brief for Consultants in March 2001 (DCC, Brief for Consultants, 2001). Significantly, no community interests were invited to participate in the writing of this brief. This is important since the brief was later used to decide on the validity of the submissions made in relation to the Draft Framework Plan, as part of the consultation process. The brief suggested that the most appropriate use for the fruit and vegetable markets building was to create a vibrant retail food market. Restaurants, cafés and stalls for high-quality market produce were listed as possible developments. Therefore, it advocated a move away from the wholesale functions of the Markets area. Furthermore, the consultants were encouraged to develop a new vision for the Markets area that would not only be based on the redevelopment of buildings which were in public ownership but would also be supported through the upgrading of surrounding private sites, which included numerous warehouses. A team of professionals from Barcelona, Dublin and London was selected in April 2001 to develop a plan based on this brief.

The HARP Framework Plan recommended drawing up plans for the different cells in consultation with local groups. An innovative approach to consultation had been adopted during the formulation of the HARP Framework Plan, with groups being invited to identify problems to be addressed and to contribute to the design of solutions. This had then been promoted nationally thanks to the publication of guidelines for the preparation of IAPs. However, DCC and the commissioned private consultants reverted to a more traditional conception of consultation and looked instead for community contributions in the form of comments on an already drafted plan, which went on public display for one month from November to December 2002. This form of consultation was deemed

insufficient to be meaningful by the community activists interviewed. For example, one person stated:

> "The city council just want you to write a little note on a piece of paper and put it into a box. That was the height of their consultation. [...] on the community-development perspective, I think that their consultation, I would not classify that as consultation at all. And it was basically information, and that was it. And the residents actually said that to the person that showed the plan [...]. They basically said, listen 'we just see that as an information exercise, we don't accept that this is consultation'. So that is where I suppose the CDP and CTA sort of try to work with the residents to make sure they have ... first of all, have advice and second of all have the opportunity to have meaningful input into it but the Dublin city council did not have that. Their methods would not be what, I would see as community development or proper participation." (I-08)

One of the main issues raised concerned access to independent advice and the difficulty in terms of cost of accessing such advice:

> "They put that model on public display in Macro Community Resource Centre. They did not put anything in place for... people to be able to be advised on it, you know in terms of the model, I could look at a model, you could look at a model and it made no sense to me. They did say the planners would ..., but I supposed people felt that the planners were Dublin City Council planners and so were not independent." (I-08)

> "There is always the problem of funding to engage independent advisors. The council has offered their architects, their planners but we are saying they're not ours, they are your planners, we want independent...and we want to look at things from the community point of view not the Council point of view." (I-02)

The timing for consultation was also seen as problematic, since it did not include the initial phase

> "Individuals within DCC have come up with this, and they commission someone to draw this framework plan, in this case it is a Spanish architect. A lot of money has been spent on this without one question being asked to the community. So when that is presented to us and we see it, straight away the first question I ask is 'who drew up this?' Who did they consult with?' and all of a sudden it shows up that there was no consultation with the community. I have constantly said to DCC, and in fairness to them they are starting to listen, why are you only doing in-house documents. You must, once you come up with a good idea, or think it is a good idea, you must invite in the community activist to take that document a bit further." (I-09)

The consultation process through the Monitoring Committee of the HARP IAP was also described in negative terms, the community input through this structure being described as 'minimal' and 'not satisfactory'. According to the Minutes, some information regarding the project to change the fish market use was provided in 2001 and a trader was invited to present his vision of the site in that year, with a presentation of the draft document being made in July 2002. The initial consultation both within the HARP structures and outside was therefore seen as disappointing, one member of the Monitoring Committee commenting:

> "There was a draft plan presented ... No support, no technical support, the language, and to be honest we weren't the only ones, the community sector weren't the only ones sitting around that table that didn't have a clue about what they were talking about. The jargon they were using, and it's always presented in a glossy way, in a very positive way, and they take maybe your silence, your ignorance for consent. I know there was a lot of to-ing and fro-ing. The community did object, they strongly objected, at the HARP as to how it was being done, that it should be more input from the local community."(I-04)

There was a feeling amongst the interviewees that people on the Committee had no more influence than had those people outside this structure. In fact, it emerged from a review of DCC internal documents that a working group was set up by DCC to discuss the plan with the private consultants. However, only members of the HARP IAP Project Team (i.e. city officials) sat on it and no member of the Monitoring Committee was present. In contrast, the working group did consult with local private interests.

Moreover, while the HARP model was presented as pioneering because it aimed at addressing socio-economical concerns in the area in tandem with physical issues, in contrast, the plan for the Markets Cell was primarily a land-use plan. The Markets Area Draft Plan published in 2002, was a short document which consisted of three parts. A two-page introduction presented the HARP area and the Markets area; it was followed by a five-page presentation of the proposed plan, while a third section consisted of plans and drawings. Perhaps surprisingly, in view of the stated concern of the model, no section was devoted to socio-economic issues. For DCC, the physical and commercial nature of the plan justified a consultation process centred wholly on business interests. Indeed, in a letter to the Lord Mayor dated 28th of October 2003, the Commercial Regeneration Unit explained that:

> "The Framework Plan is essentially a land-use and urban design plan for the commercial core of the markets. The main objective of the plan is to rejuvenate and reinvigorate the markets and to create an amenity space between Smithfield and O'Connell street. As such, the working group for the plan consulted with the landowners, business and traders in the area. When the draft plan was completed this was put out to broader consultation through its display to the HARP monitoring committee and elected members on the area committee. Additionally it was put on display for one month in the MACRO Community Resource. All comments and submissions received are being considered" (Letter from the Commercial Regeneration Unit, 2003)

5.7.2. How to Use a Public Site: Civic Plaza Levering Private Development Versus Multi-purpose Community Centre

The proposal was for a new mixed-use development centred on an upgraded and reorganised Fruit and Vegetable Market building, which would accommodate a reduced wholesale market activity on only about 20 percent of its area. On the southern edge of the

building, the addition of a small new Fish Hall was proposed to compensate for the demolition of the Fish Market building, whose cast-iron structure only was to remain. A new public space was to be developed opposite the Fruit and Vegetable Market building, on its western side, on the cleared Fish Market site. Additional public space was envisaged on the eastern side. The redeveloped markets building and new pubic space were to constitute a new Market Square. The Market Square was to be surrounded by new six-storey buildings containing commercial activities at the lower levels, office activities on the middle floors and apartments on the upper levels. One of these new blocks was to be built on the Fish Market site, while the others were mainly on private sites. Finally, an underground public car park was included.

When the Markets Area Draft Plan was released in 2002, community activists and residents expressed great concern over the lack of attention given to social problems in the area and the absence of any reference to the needs of social-housing tenants living on the adjacent site, in St. Michan's complex on Greek Street:

> "There wasn't any social needs addressed in the Market's plan, it was simply, it looked to me like... it was a physical plan, it was about building... it was about getting people into the area and into apartments, [...]. So it was about regenerating the area physically, but it did not take into account the existing social issues, or any social issues that might come with the new tenants."(I-08)

> "People of Greek street, in that block they just ignored them completely, they were just putting a block in front of them, they were putting an underground car park, when they should have been sports grounds for schools, they gave it no thought. It's like we don't exist. It s all about the profit, it's profit driven." (I-04)

> "The main concern, based on our dealings with local residents, has been that the Market plan wouldn't be done to suit the local community and not the local needs, but it would be done to suit the needs of developers."(I-02)

> "They [DCC] would see it as a tourist attraction. So the residents [of St Michan's] will gain nothing. They will only gain more traffic, more people." (I-16)

Not only were there concerns that the plan was geared more towards addressing the needs of private developers but there were also fears that the plan could have negative impacts on the local community in terms of job displacement caused directly and indirectly by the closure of the wholesale markets and the surrounding warehouses. The fate of those street market traders who bought their merchandise in the wholesale markets was also evoked. Moreover, the validity of DCC's argument that jobs would be created in retailing was questioned by one respondent:

> "I would question their background research in particular around retail and employment issues. I really do not think that they have expertise and retail knowledge to make some of the presumption they seem to be making. For example, they would say 'well we will move

> the wholesale market out and it will create lots of new employment' on the base that 'oh well it's not creating very much employment the markets, now, is it ?'. If you look at Grangegorman report on employment, it shows that the top 50 employers in the Dublin 7 area, Fyffe's is in the top five, I think it's the top private [...]. Ok, Fyffe's, will move out to somewhere else and they'll take the jobs with them, sell the land, these jobs may not be lost but they will be lost to the inner-city, that is the point. So, I would really question the background research." (I-03)

In other words, the community questioned whose interests the implementation of the Markets Area Draft Plan would primarily serve.

DCC regarded the sites as under-utilised and perceived their current uses negatively, notably because of the circulation of trucks. Therefore, they looked for a use that would be in their eyes more desirable; the interests served were broadly defined as those of the 'city'. For example, when asked what social objectives the plan would fulfil, one official explained:

"The contention was that the market buildings were parochial, they were only for the people of the area. That is strategic for the city, when we go in there it must be something that is accessible socially and economically available and accessible to all the city to enjoy, a market building like Covent Garden. At the moment what is there is like that it shuts at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the environment is hostile, because there are trucks. Its actual benefit to the city and people in the area is quite minimal, it's not a big employer anymore, it's mainly warehousing. By regenerating it, the social benefits would be for the city say, providing social outlets as much as an economic outlet, that's how we do it. Ok?" (I-10)

Another official described the benefits in the following terms:

> "One, you were kind of using better a key space in the city centre area, and the benefits of that, you know, you were bringing back people in the city centre area, you would have people living there, socialising there, you would have a whole relived area. The adds-on then would be, say, the connection to Smithfield and the connection to Heuston quarter." (I-17)

In fact, one of the main benefits expected by DCC from the redevelopment of the publicly-owned Markets sites was that it would act as a catalyst for further redevelopment, it was to be used as leverage for private development. One respondent stated that:

> "Due to the markets area being a key city centre location, the redevelopment of the Council-owned site would be seen to naturally encourage and facilitate the redevelopment of adjacent lands. The fact that such a key site is in our ownership is of major benefit. It means as in this case that the Council can lead and kick start the regeneration process. " (I-17).

Similarly, during one of the meetings of the Working Group on the 24th of May 2001, one of the private consultants for the Markets area plan opined that "the large-scale public investment represented by the square together with the new LUAS system would have a 'domino effect' of stimulating private development in the area." (Working Group Meeting Minutes, 2001). Overall, in the discussions, the good of the city was closely associated with facilitating land development and creating a new quarter accommodating a new population. The new civic square was to be a 'stepping stone' between O'Connell Street and Smithfield and have a possible knock-on effect on retail activity in Smithfield. With the proximity of the Four Courts, the redevelopment was also to respond to the office needs of the legal sector (Dublin City Council, 2002:4).

When awareness emerged that a draft plan was being prepared, local interest groups came together and established an Action Group comprising representatives of local residents groups, local community development organisations such as NWIC(A)N and MACRO CDP, the local school and members of the Markets' and Stoneybatter Community Forum. The group received advice from CTA and a local architect who had provided support to the community during their previous opposition to the development on the West Side of Smithfield. It was chaired by the DICP and facilitated by MACRO CDP. The group, called Markets Area Residents Development Action Group (MARDAG), was set up initially because the community had concerns about the consultation process and wanted to engage with DCC. It first met in May 2002. In August 2002, the HARP Project Manager agreed to meet the group and to provide a presentation of the Markets Area Draft Plan, which was then put on public display in November 2002. DCC received nine written submissions, two of which were from MARDAG and one from residents from St. Michan's House, who were also part of MARDAG.

MARDAG (Briefing Document, 2003) expressed dissatisfaction with the consultation process, which was described as both 'inadequate' and 'lacking transparency', and also with the content of the plan itself. The group developed its own vision of the regeneration process and submitted an alternative plan to respond to local community needs. The community's plan recommended that the improvement of local-authority flats complexes located in the vicinity of the Markets buildings should be added as an objective of DCC's draft plan (MARDAG, Briefing Document, 2003). This concerned notably St. Michan's House, for which roof, playground, créche and precinct improvements were sought, the complex having previously been identified as in need of regeneration by Dublin Corporation (1998) as part of the IAP process. Secondly, MARDAG promoted an

alternative vision for the Fish Market site. The Civic Plaza was replaced by a community facility that would address local recreational and leisure needs, examples of proposed community centres including a swimming pool, a gymnasium and a multi-purpose space. Local groups had previously identified the need for such leisure facilities during the elaboration of the HARP Framework Plan in 1996 and on their potential positive impact on anti-social behaviour. This difference of vision for the Fish Market site between DCC and community groups highlighted significant ideological differences regarding the use of publicly-owned land. While DCC intended to use it to leverage private developments, local interests wished to see the land used directly for the provision of social goods. The community also expressed concern regarding the social composition of new residential blocks which would be developed on neighbouring private sites. Because alterations to Part V of the Planning Act 2000 had been made in 2002, they feared that future developments would not necessarily incorporate any social and affordable housing units on site. This was of major concern to local residents since they considered that many local people and their children were already experiencing increasing difficulty remaining in the area due to the escalating price of accommodation. Additionally, they required clarification about the legal status of the plan and the role of the councillors in its adoption. The community vision was submitted to DCC and was also presented to the Area Committee in order to lobby local councillors for support.

5.7.3. Role of Private Consultants

DCC commissioned a private consultancy to assess the third-party submissions they received relating to the 2002 Markets Area Draft Framework Plan. The consultants provided a response to the points raised by MARDAG and by St. Michan's House residents in their three submissions. However, rather than actually assessing the desirability of the community's proposals, the consultants mainly confined themselves to observing whether or not the community's suggestions could be reconciled with existing policy documents, as set out in the Brief for Consultants (DCC, Brief for Consultants , 2001), and with DCC's stated aims for the Markets. For instance, the desire of the community to see the improvement of social-housing complexes integrated in the plan and to bring together the commercial and the housing sections of DCC to work together, was rejected on the basis that:

> "The project Brief for the Markets Area does not extend to address the issue of improving existing Local Authority housing in the area. Rather, these are issues that should more reasonably be taken up with the Housing Section of Dublin City Council. The issue of

> Social and Affordable Housing will be addressed through the planning application process, in accordance with the provisions of Part V of the planning and Development Act 2000, and the Dublin City Housing Strategy." (Assessment of Third Party Submissions to Dublin City Council Prepared on Behalf of Dublin City Council by RPSMcHugh, 2003:3).

Similarly, comments on the need to upgrade play and crèche facilities were also discarded since:

> "It was not within the Brief of the Draft Framework Plan to include measures in respect of the quality of existing play and crèche facilities in the area, and in particular, within the St. Michan's House complex." (Assessment of Third Party Submissions to Dublin City Council Prepared on Behalf of Dublin City Council by RPSMcHugh 2003:6).

It is important to reiterate that, given the importance of this document in the decision-making process, the community had been accorded no input in the design of the brief and had therefore been denied any means of influencing the final plan. It also underlined the importance of involving local activists at an early stage if meaningful input were to be obtained.

Moreover, the response to the community's concerns raised questions about the appropriateness of hiring private consultants to consider local groups' contributions since they did not necessarily possess in-depth knowledge of local issues, expertise in, or understanding of social and community-development issues. For example, the planning firm stated:

> "It is unclear upon what criteria the Action Group has determined that a swimming pool, gymnasium multi-purpose space, social and affordable housing, and childcare facility requires to be provided upon the site of the existing fish markets building. It is considered more appropriate to provide a public civic plaza on the site of the fish market, thereby ensuring the creation of a central node of public cultural and amenity use within the Market Area, and serving both the existing, and planned new communities in the area." (Assessment of Third Party Submissions to Dublin City Council Prepared on Behalf of Dublin City Council by RPSMcHugh, 2003:3).

No reference to local studies calling for such facilities was made in the assessment and awareness of the existence of such documents did not seem to exist. For example, the Area Action Plan 1999-2004, produced by NWICAN (Rourke and Kenny, 1999: 45) for the north west inner city, stressed the acute shortage of community facilities and their benefits for early school leavers, drug users and so on. It is therefore open to question how a fully-informed and unbiased assessment could have been reached, since the advice produced was mainly based on the review of statutory bodies' documentation alone. Moreover, it is unclear what criteria the consultants used to decide that "it is unreasonable to conclude that the Draft Framework Plan is 'fatally flawed' from a community perspective" (Assessment of Third Party Submissions to Dublin City Council Prepared on Behalf of Dublin City Council by RPSMcHugh, 2003: 3). One of the interviewed councillors openly challenged

the ability of the private consultants to take on board the community's statement of needs in the absence of having consulted with them:

> "The example given at the time was that the majorettes had nowhere to practice and again they needed a hall where they can throw their batons high up in the air. They needed somewhere decent where they could practice. There were no places for kids to play football; there was no winter football pitch. There was a major lack of resources. And at one stage, once the consultants' report came back and said the Phoenix park was only two miles away, which was completely insensitive to the community, there was absolute war when that report came out." (I-12)

Another councillor stressed that commercial pressures meant that local community groups had difficulty in finding space for community purposes and regarded this as a failure of the HARP IAP. In fact, although the differences in the plan could be linked to the lack of understanding of community needs and differences in conception of what the 'good of the city' comprises, the lack of support for the provision of community leisure facilities can be linked to fundamental concern with their costs. The promotion at national level, despite the contemporary economic boom, of Public-Private Partnerships in delivering social goods on the basis that they would reduce exchequer costs, did not provide a favourable context for the acceptance of this project at local level. In fact, during the presentation of the draft plan to the HARP Monitoring Committee, one of the community representatives raised the issue of the lack of leisure facilities in the area. DCC then raised the issue of the cost and, according to the minutes of the 8th of July meeting, stated that

> "The new square is a public space and will provide passive recreational facilities such as fairs and market events. The issue relating to active recreation was more difficult due to the problem of cost." (Monitoring Committee Meeting Minutes, 8th of July 2002)

The choice of relying on private developers to complete the plan was motivated by financial reasons and by the perceived superiority amongst senior officials of the private sector in delivering regeneration. For example, one official declared:

> "What we found is like that, we work with the private sector to obtain the best, because the private sector they take the risk, they know how to do it better, and it's cheaper by far, that's why we involve the private sector. When you look at the markets plan, you look at what we are getting out of it. We are going to get public car parking. We are going to get a new municipal market building that is going to be available to the city for a range of services and retail, a new public square area. All this coming out of it. Ok, the only thing we put into it is land, we don't put the money." (I-10)

The choice not to acquire the private land that was concerned by the plan was also justified at the Monitoring Committee by the fact that "management believed that the resources are not available to pursue this approach and would prefer to see a Public Private Partnership approach adopted" (Monitoring Committee Meeting Minutes, 8th of July 2002). This meant that DCC had to rely on private-sector interests to achieve their goals both on

the public and private land. The choice of a PPP rather than directly undertaking the redevelopment of public land financed by public funds also meant that the nature of the project was automatically constrained by the requirement of profitability for the private-sector partner.

Thus, financial viability rather than social needs was a strong guiding principle in the production of a second report commissioned by DCC in relation to the Markets Area Draft Plan. Indeed, following on the release of the assessment of third-party submission by RPS McHugh, MARDAG, armed with a strong vision for the area thanks to the production of their own plan, further lobbied their local councillors and DCC so that their views would be taken into account. One community worker felt that although the consultation process was unsatisfactory, the production of the Community Briefing document had allowed some negotiation to take place.

The dissatisfaction of the community with the response given to their submission was voiced through the HARP Monitoring Committee and through direct complaints to local councillors who, in turn, made representation to the officials. Moreover, MARDAG forced DCC to engage further by producing a response to the assessment of Third Party Submissions to Dublin City Council by RPS McHugh, a strategy that was described as 'delaying tactics' by one of the activists, in order to be heard (I-04). MARDAG and local politicians called for a meeting to discuss the RPS McHugh report (Response from MARDAG to the Assessment from RPSMcHugh, no date) and its acceptance by DCC, which had only added that an EIS for the car park would be carried out, that the distance between the new residential blocks and St. Michan's House would be increased and that the private developer would only be required to provide affordable housing under Part V of the Planning Act, 2000, since large parts of the markets area was situated in DEDs which already had in excess of 50 percent of it dwelling stock in the social-housing sector (Planning Department Report on Third Party Submissions to Dublin City Council, no date).

The meeting took place on the 11th of February 2004. Community representatives supported by local politicians stressed that the fish market was the last site in public ownership in the area and that some of it should be reserved for community uses (Meeting Minutes, 11th of February 2004). They re-stated their concerns about the lack of facilities in the area, especially for new families moving in the area and for young people, to counter anti-social behaviour. They also noted and that two plazas, including one in Smithfield, were already in existence. In response, DCC officials at the meeting offered to carry out an

assessment of the recreational and leisure needs of the population, ILAM Ireland Services Ltd subsequently being hired by DCC to carry out the research.

The local community was invited to contribute to the study by providing information but the design of the study, the analysis and interpretation of the information remained in the hands of the consultants. Community groups were not considered to comprise valid analytical agents and they were not involved in the definition of the terms of reference to which the consultants had to work. Moreover, there were concerns regarding the motivation behind the conduct of this additional consultative exercise:

> "It was done on the back foot, it was done to be seen to be doing participation."
> "The general response was 'oh well we'll give you something', but I wouldn't call the engagement wholehearted - you know, fully engaged, or an equal partnership. It was almost like a tool for showing the city councillors 'oh well we are doing something'." (I-03)

Financial viability rather than the identification of social needs remained at the centre of the consultants' research. Their consultation methods and their dealing with the community created frustration. One councillor described the process in the following terms:

> "They asked ILAM to do it. They held a couple of meetings and it was absolutely awful. It was a disaster of a public meeting. The people who were running it, I don't know if they had done a public consultation before, if they had experienced before, they were really quite appalling. So they kind of said: 'What do you want? Are you really not being unrealistic with such high expectations? How are you going to manage a swimming pool? How are you doing to make sure that it is filled?' And the community was saying: 'we thought that the idea was that you were coming here to ask us what we wanted not how we were going to manage it. We don't see that we would be managing it. We would see Dublin City council managing it'. And then she got quite condescending." (I-12)

All interviewees from the community voiced strong disapproval of the consultants' approach and challenged both their findings and their independence. The lack of involvement of community activists in the design of the questionnaires was also a source of concern. Participants spoke at length about the shortcomings of this research:

> "That meeting, there was a flipchart, and the group that had done the research, invited members of the audience...they had it done as a time-frame, a leisure facility opened from 10 am to 10 pm, 'come up here, fill that up for us'. People were disgusted. Time and effort by community groups and individuals, went in, senior citizens... and it's all what they could come up with, 'fill that in for us'. It was just beside the business area of the city, Mary Street and the legal centre. If community needs couldn't fill that, there wouldn't be any problem getting workers in the area, people who didn't live in the area, to use the facilities on their lunch hours or after work in the evening or before, come on!
> The councillors, [...] because he was a school teacher, he would know a lot about the recreational use down in Sean Mc Dermot Street and all of that, he said 'they can't get space down there, what are you talking about, it would be packed, you can't get an hour for kids'. Tony Gregory absolutely slaughtered them. They weren't independent consultants on that night, it was very clear on that night, that they were there, um, he who pays the piper,

names the tune, that was very clear. They were literally treating the community as complete idiots. People were really angry on that night." (I-04)

"We and the councillors proved that it wasn't worthwhile, it was a waste of money. It could have been a good report, had it been a joint report between DCC and ourselves. Then we could have put the right questions in ... DCC wanted to make it look like they consulted with a lot of the community, like the schools. But if you go to schools and say we are going to give you 500 quid, that would be great. But if you go to the school and say would you like 500 or a thousand, you are giving them a choice straight away. A lot of these questions that were put to these people - they were not choices. Why didn't they ask questions like -if you had a multi purpose hall, would the school access it, how many times a week would they access it?- We all knew the schools would probably be in there ten times a week. They didn't ask this kind of question." (I-09)

"I think in terms of consultation, my experience of paid consultation is that whoever pays the consultant and gives terms of reference has an influence on the outcome of the competition, and I think, that's what happened in here. They were told not what to find out, but were told how to do it." (I-08)

Local politicians also contested the objectivity of the study. For example, one councillor said:

"We identified the community needs, but it was almost as though the officials have written that, you know, that certain things couldn't be done. This couldn't be done, that couldn't be done... So we weren't happy with that, and that was an unsuccessful part of it."

"I think until that time that the local authority had been so much involved against us rather than with us. And then, I felt that if this is what comes out of the so-called independent survey that's funded by the local authority, in fact you can see the finger marks on them, then it was looking very bad." (I-07)

There were further concerns about the level of emphasis on financial issues and on how social needs could be addressed within such constraints. A community representative observed:

"I know things have to be financially viable but there's more to a community than money. And there's more to it, the health, the well-being of that community and if you leave that out, you are leaving out a huge, huge part of the community. It's not about developers, because developers come in and go out, investors come in and go out. It's about long-term community and trying to make it an attractive place, when people do come in for the short term that they would like to stay there. But unfortunately, the time we are living in, people don't matter as much as profit. .We have no proper leisure facilities. There's that research being done for the GDA, mentioned two gyms and two swimming pools. Now, how many people have a thousand pounds to join that one in Smithfield, please! Where is the other gym, I don't know, and the other swimming pool, if you are speaking about the one on Navan road, it's a private one. There's only a certain number of public hours. [...] People would really benefit from affordable leisure facilities." (I-04)

The report from ILAM (Markets Area Recreation and Leisure Needs Assessment, Prepared for Dublin City Council by ILAM, 2004) recognised that there was a need for the provision of recreational and leisure facilities in the area but their favoured solution was a

wellness/ Spa-style development and they proposed to solve the question of affordability by the development of a leisure card for eligible individuals to benefit from reduced rates.

Following the publication of the report, local councillors and activists decided to accept that the provision of a swimming pool was too costly to be approved and concentrate instead on obtaining a community centre and the upgrading of social housing. Finally, talks were initiated to improve St. Michan's House. Continuous pressure through the councillors and community activists, including a demonstration (Plate 5.3), resulted in DCC offering to integrate a community centre, not on the Fish Market site but on an adjacent smaller site known as the Daisy Markets. Thus, the Markets Area Draft Plan was altered in 2006 to include the community centre (DCC, 2006). However, the plan remained a Framework Plan, which has no statutory basis.

Plate 5.3: Kids before Cars (Source: MACRO)

Agreement on the content of the plan allowed DCC to start the tendering process in 2006. DCC annouced a preferred bidder to implement the plan in January 2008 (Mulligan, Irish Independent, 30th January 2008), even though there was still uncertainty regarding how the centre would be built and financed. A consortium comprising Blackrock

International Land (the property arm of Fyffes), together with Joe Linders and Paddy Kelly (two developers involved in the west side of Smithfield project) won the bid. Their proposal included the construction of a leisure centre as a community gain. While the community welcomed the provision of such a facility, they had concern with the proposed height of the residential buildings but were worried that any objection to the scheme might result in the loss of this facility; there was a strong feeling that DCC should have provided such a centre directly to avoid such a dilemma.

Lastly, it is important to note that no progress since the choice of a preferred bidder has been made and no work has commenced. The plan is currently 'on hold', and its implementation has been compromised by the change in the economic and property-development climate, which raises questions about the likely construction of the community centre in the near future. While the DCC officials interviewed expressed disappointment regarding the non-accomplishment of the plan, they attributed this to the length of the consultation process. While some accepted these delays as the 'price of democracy', other respondents expressed considerable frustration with the consultation process and labelled some of the demands as unrealistic. One considered that, to a certain extent, they were dealing with 'wants rather than needs' (I-18) and felt that 'a window of opportunity' had been missed. Another official defined realistic demands and an appropriate time-frame for consultation in terms of those which would meet the requirements of the private sector and reproached the community for its lack of understanding of the operational requirements of the private sector:

> "I think sometimes that, I think people are not realistic in relation, just understanding, I think the significance of that land-use economics [...] Often we dismiss, you know, the land-use economics and concentrate on, say, the social economic. But until you have, say, the actual physical renewal, until that actually stacks up and makes sense, you won't derive from it the social and economic benefits, because one begets the other. One pays for the other... And I think the community groups have to take responsibility for spending too much time maybe asking and not really coming to a decision. I think decisions have to be crystallized. I think we have to kind of give ourselves like a finite time to make those decisions. The Markets Plan went on for far too long...There was a lot of opposition to it and I think people thought, like, that this was a license to print money and ask for kind of extravagant social objectives out of it that could never be actually substantiated, whether it's a swimming pool or whatever the case may be. And they wouldn't listen to realism. I think the opportunity was lost. I think in a lot of our housing projects too, I think there was an unreasonableness [...] they thought it was always going to be under the table, the offer. But the offer wasn't because once the economy collapsed, once the financials didn't make sense, that's it. It's gone!" (I-10)

Thus, the failure of the project was attributed more to the length of consultation than to public-sector reliance on private-sector actors for its achievement and its inability

to deliver the project once the economic situation changed. There therefore still remained a wholehearted belief amongst officials in the benefits and advantages of private development, untinged by the collapse of public-private partnership arrangements.

5.8 HARP Area ten years after

The last meeting of the HARP Monitoring Committee took place in October 2008. A DCC official made a presentation in relation to the achievements of the HARP IAP. He noted that 16 out of the 26 tax-designated sites had been successfully developed. A total of 855 planning applications were received during the lifetime of the HARP IAP, 506 of which were granted (DCC, HARP IAP Final Report, 2008: 5). The intensity of new development in the HARP area resulted in a massive increase in local population. Between 1996 and 2006, the population of the area increased by 67 percent, compared to an increase of 5 percent for Dublin City as a whole (DCC, Presentation from Paul Kearns, planning official to the HARP Monitoring Committee, 2007). The improvement to the built environment has been identified as a major accomplishment of the IAP by DCC (DCC, HARP IAP Final Report, 2008). Figure 5.3 presents a list of some of these achievements.

Achievements to Date

* A boardwalk has been built over the River Liffey (the Millennium Walkway)
* Henry street has been completely repaved with new granite stones.
* Two new bridges have been built over the River Liffey at Ormond Quay and Blackhall Place.
* New apartments and retail units have been built on the site of a former car park in Smithfield.
* A new playground has been installed at Kevin Barry House.
* New civic spaces have been created in Smithfield and Wolfe Tone Park.
* A New Community Centre has been built for the Markets Area Community Resource Organisation (MACRO).
* Marmion Court has been refurbished.

Figure 5.3: HARP IAP, achievements to date (Source: Dublin City Council)

In terms of social inclusion, DCC identified the creation of mixed-income communities as a benefit of the HARP IAP. In fact, one of the officials interviewed also stressed that the increase in private housing was to be welcomed:

> "The level of, say, public housing would have been maybe around 30 percent and then the balance was in private accommodation. Just figures like that. I know that was the kind of profile for the city centre after all the redevelopment. The proportionality has improved, like, you know, insofar as like, it went from something like 35 percent down to about 20 percent. That's not to say that there was less public housing, it just means like that the mix

> of public and private housing was increased and enhanced. So if you're talking then about, say, social objectives, the fact that these areas were heretofore, say, predominantly public housing areas where you might, for argument's sakes, say thus one of the things was the absence ofother forms of housing. The incentives brought in private housing." (I-10)

While the development of a more socially mixed population was depicted as a positive result because of the current faith in the benefits of social mixing, this has to be qualified as it tends to obscure other developments detrimental to the local disadvantaged population. `for example, the lack of provision of new social-housing units by the local authority and the low provision under Part V means that, in Inns Quay C, one of the DEDs included within the HARP area, there has been a contraction of the housing stock of 7 percent (DICP and Haase, 2008), rendering it difficult for low income groups to maintain themselves in this area. In the interviews, a number of people complained about the difficulties for local people and their descendants to afford accommodation in the area. Moreover, while there have been new private developments accommodating new more affluent households, the quality of life in many of the social-housing complexes has not improved. St Michan's House complex, despite its poor overall condition, has still not been upgraded. Although through the protest around the Markets Area Framework Plan, it was finally envisaged that the complex would be regenerated, the project is currently on hold. A consultation processed has been initiated and feasibility studies have been carried out but work has not been completed. This is also true for other public housing complexes within or contiguous to the area, such as Chancery House and O'Devaney, which were to be refurbished as part of the HARP IAP in order "to ensure a direct improvement to the homes and environs of many of the area's most deprived residents, and allowing them to benefit directly from the realisation of the HARP Plan" (Dublin Corporation, 1998: 7). Moreover, while indicators of deprivation such as the unemployment rate and education attainment at the ED level tend to indicate that poverty is now less of an issue in the inner-city, such data hide new socio-spatial inequalities at the micro level whereby there exists a new "patchwork of highly disadvantaged and highly affluent neighbourhoods at the micro level and in close proximity" (DICP and Haase, 2008: 31). In Inns Quay C, there has been a considerable reduction in male unemployment from 38.8 percent in 1991 to 19.4 percent in 2006. However, this can in part be attributed to the influx of higher-skilled professionals (DICP and Haase, 2008: 20). During the same time period, there was an immense increase from 3.5 percent to 30.7 percent of the population of the ED with higher educational qualifications.

In its final HARP IAP report, DCC (HARP IAP Final Report, 2008) identified a number of accomplishments under the heading "Social and Community Benefits". However, two of them, namely the refurbishment of Marmion Court Housing complex and the construction of the Macro Community Resource Centre, were in fact initiated and financed under the HARP 'Major Initiative'. The other benefits listed included physical projects such as the refurbishment of Ormonde Square and Wolfe Tone Park. Other benefits were mainly seen as arising from the community gain fund or by the creation of employment opportunities such as construction jobs due to the large scale of development in the area. However, as was noted above, only a limited percentage of the community gain fund was spent on projects such as training for the unemployed or services for the lone parents. As highlighted by one of the community workers interviewed, the funding for such projects occurred mainly outside of the IAP. Moreover, although the benefits of the 'Community Gain' fund raised through the application tax-incentives should not be ignored, it is difficult to assess with precision the usefulness of the tax incentives since there is no indication of how much tax-payer money was lost in the HARP area[20].

The introduction of the IAP programme was presented as an opportunity to depart from past approaches to urban renewal and put into place more inclusive forms of urban renewal. The HARP 'Major Initiative', which is the prototype for the IAP, and the HARP IAP programme created spaces for community interests to insert their knowledge, needs and strategies into urban regeneration policy. In that sense, the HARP Framework Plan, which was later adopted as an IAP, represented an innovative plan-making process. A more consultative and integrated approach was indeed adopted. However, there was still a strong reliance on private-sector investment to deliver regeneration. The programme was set in a broader system, which relies on private-sector actors to deliver physical development and increasingly to provide social goods such as social housing and public amenities. Overall, the accomplishment of community objectives has been undermined by giving precedence to wider objectives which prioritise the benefits of development for the city as a whole over those of the local community. Since 1998, the urban regeneration agenda has remained dominated by the imperatives of the market. Therefore, the IAP programme represents a continuation rather than a departure from past entrepreneurial

[20] At national level, it has been estimated that the area-based tax incentive schemes have cost the Exchequer ¤1,933m in tax foregone (Indecon, 2006:ii).

urban policies. There is no evidence that a hybrid mode of governance, between American entrepreneurialism and a European social model, has emerged as it was hoped by Bartley and Treadwell Shine (1999). The development of structures to elaborate and implement the plan that included community interests did not result in inclusive outcomes. This property-led approach to regeneration did trigger opposition at local level. The establishment of participative structures did not result in the co-option of dissenting voices and community pacification. On the contrary, as has been seen in the case of the Markets Plan, a number of community activists are more informed on the technical aspect of planning, on the city policies and procedures and are better able to challenge the Council's position directly. However, their ability to resist entrepreneurial polices have remained limited, with gains lying essentially at the margins.

CHAPTER SIX: THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH URBAN RENEWAL POLICIES

This chapter reviews the emergence and development of French urban-renewal policies. The origin of a national programme of urban regeneration can be traced back to the late 1950s. Conceived of only in physical terms, elaborated centrally and implemented in a top-down fashion, this first programme was prematurely abandoned due to strong public opposition. Protest movements resulted in the reorientation of national policies in the late 1970s and to the development of a wider range of planning tools to address urban decline. Protecting the architectural character of run-down areas and limiting population displacement became a greater concern of urban regeneration policy. In the 1980s, policy-makers emphasised the need to consider social as well as physical issues, which resulted in the setting up of the *politique de la ville* policy under the initiative of the socialist French President, Mitterrand. The *politique de la ville* policy made additional funds and tools available for the most deprived areas. This policy promoted the adoption of an integrated approach by defining a broad strategic project for the area in collaboration with various actors and combining a variety of instruments and sub-programmes available both locally and nationally to regenerate disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Initiated by the Left due to the worsening of socio-spatial segregation following the global economic crisis of the 1970s, successive governments have extended the *politique de la ville* policy. However, the nature of the instruments and measures promoted respectively under the Left and the Right have notably differed. The Right has operated a slow shift towards a market-led policy and has recently re-introduced an approach that gives precedence to physical actions.

6.1. The French Planning System: Setting the Scene

The French planning system belongs to the Napoleonic family (Newman and Thornley, 1996). The importance of codified law is a main characteristic of countries that are included in this family. Over two centuries the French government has endeavoured to develop a comprehensive set of rules that central and local administration have to obey when dealing with French citizens. These rules are intended to guarantee identical treatment of the population across administrative and political units. Administrative decisions that do not follow such rules are illegal and can be challenged in a court of law. Uniformity of treatment has been the main rule and local discretion has not been a strong

principle of local government action (Green and Booth, 1996). The *Code de l'Urbanisme et de l'Habitat* is a reflection of such tradition. Regulations for the development of land are specified in the *Code de l'Urbanisme et de l'Habitat,* a national document which dates from the 1950s but is frequently revised. National regulations in the code are expressed in local zoning plans. Local plans and national regulations define clearly and strictly the respective rights and obligations of citizens, developers and government. Permission can only be granted if all rules have been complied with. Although third-parties are not given the right to intervene in the initial decision-making process, planning decisions can be challenged once taken.

Until the 1980s, the French system was highly centralised but since the Decentralisation Acts (effective as of 1982) planning powers have been shared between local and central government. The management of land has increasingly become the responsibility of the local councillors and the mayors' powers have increased. Mayors can now grant planning permission, set up redevelopment projects, make use of pre-emption rights. There are four levels of government —state, region, *département* and commune — all of which have an interest in planning. However, the main players are the state and the communes. The state can intervene in local affairs through national rules and regulations. Moreover, the Ministry for planning has local offices in most large towns and will exert influence over local issues through the government's *préfets* who represent the state services (Newman and Thornley, 1996).

A comprehensive planning system emerged in the post-war era in France. The *Loi d'Orientation Fonçière* in 1967 introduced two levels of plan. The *schémas directeurs*[21] are strategic plans. They are not obligatory and not legally binding on landowners and developers. Such plans are usually prepared by a group of communes, present objectives for the edification of major infrastructures, which must be consistent with the objectives and plans of other bodies such the state and the region. The *Plan d'Occupation des Sols* (POS[22]) is a lower level of plan and it is a strict zoning plan. Communes are not obliged to produce a plan (Newman and Thornley, 1996). POS but it is not necessarily drawn by local government; state services can be asked to devise a POS. Yet, the drawing of a POS bring important powers to local government including the right to grant or refuse planning permission and the right to buy land for development. Communes with a POS can exert a 'pre-emption right' on all developed land within their boundaries. Vendors can be required

[21] Replaced by SCOTs in 2000

[22] Replaced by PLU in 2000.

to notify the commune of any intention to sell lad and required to sale such land to the commune. A commune can also acquire land by issuing a compulsory purchase order for public purposes if the project has been given 'public interest' status by a *préfet*. These tools are used to reduce land speculation and build land banks. In the absence of a POS, the state makes all planning decisions based on national regulations (Newman and Thornley, 1996).

6.2.The Emergence of a National Urban Regeneration Policy: '*Rénovation Urbaine*' laws in the 1960s

The notion of urban regeneration was first introduced in the French legislation of 1958, even though public intervention relating to the existing urban fabric had occurred well before the proclamation of these laws. For instance, during the nineteenth century, the Hausmannization of Paris led to many parts of the city being razed to make way for new boulevards and new infrastructures. A national policy to redevelop central cities was developed at a time of significant economic and urban growth in France after World War II, known as the "*Trente Glorieuses*". It complemented a policy of urban expansion at the cities' periphery.

After World War II, France had faced a severe shortage of housing units in urban centres due to massive destruction during the war and strong rural to urban migration. New measures were put into place to tackle strong urban growth. In 1953, a law empowering public bodies to expropriate land for housing development was passed. This expropriation right was consolidated by the decrees of the 31st of December 1958, which created the *Zones à Urbaniser en Priorité* (ZUP) and the *zones de rénovation urbaine*. They were areas delimited by the Minister of Construction. The purpose of the ZUPs was to create *ex-nihilo* new neighbourhoods at the periphery of existing urban centres. The aim was to control land speculation at the periphery by creating areas within which the government could acquire land by using its right of expropriation and its *droit de préemption* (right to buy any property coming on the market within the ZUP), thereby ensuring the control of urban growth (Merlin and Choay, 2005). In practice, although the ZUPs contributed to curbing the housing crisis, these areas suffered from an under-provision of basic services and infrastructure. Moreover, they have never became the mixed neighbourhoods which the government had envisaged, but often resulted in social segregation due to the spatial concentration of high-rise social housing estates (Merlin and Choay, 2005).

The decrees of the 31st December 1958 also defined the procedures surrounding the *rénovation urbaine* (urban regeneration) policy. The objectives of the *rénovation urbaine* policy were two-fold. First, it aimed to restructure the central areas of the French cities by modernising them and adapting them to the needs of modern urban life characterised by an increasing use of automobiles and by the development of tertiary activities. Secondly, it aspired to improve the housing conditions of low-income groups. Indeed, according to the Department for Construction:

> "The *rénovation urbaine* policy aim[ed] to rehouse in sound and healthy buildings families that [we]re physically and morally decaying by living in slum conditions. It also aspir[ed] to ensure the centre of the cities would regain a structure and an architecture worthy of its time, when it had been damaged due to a lack of maintenance or because of poor construction." (Circular 59-54, 1959, quoted in Coudroy de Lille, 2006, 30).

The *rénovation urbaine* policy of the 1960s affected not only insalubrious accommodation but also land devoted to industrial and warehousing uses, which were deemed to be better suited to a suburban location (Saillard, 1964). The demolition of obsolete properties and the restructuring of the street layout were at the core of the *rénovation urbaine* policy. There was little emphasis on the refurbishment of run-down areas, except in the case of exceptionally remarkable buildings or areas which, after 1962, benefited from a national effort of restoration and conservation through the creation of *secteurs sauvegardés* (protected areas) allowing historical areas such as the Marais in Paris to be preserved. The initial objectives of the *rénovation urbaine* policy were very ambitious since the programme planned the demolition of 500,000 housing units covering an area of 5,000 ha. nationwide, of which 1500 hectares were located in Paris (Loinger, 1981). Between 1960 and 1965, it was envisaged that 50,000 accommodation units would be demolished annually and that thereafter the number of annual demolitions would be even higher (Piron, 2002). Like development in the ZUPs, the process of demolition-reconstruction in the *zones de rénovation urbaine* was implemented under strong control from the central government, which was in charge of initiating and financing the urban regeneration initiative. Once the boundaries of the areas concerned by the *rénovation urbaine* policy were delimited, the local authorities implemented the projects under strong guidance from state services. With the help of central public funds, land was acquired through right of expropriation and obsolete buildings were demolished; some of the land was redeveloped publicly while some was sold to private developers.

Plate 6.1: Place d'Italie, Paris
Source: Mairie de Paris

The government never achieved its initial objectives in terms of demolitions. The cost of the scheme became unmanageable and its financing became increasingly complex (Piron, 2002). Originally perceived as bringing improved comfort and modernity, this policy rapidly became the target of heightened criticism, which resulted in a significant reduction in the launch of similar initiatives after 1968. The *rénovation urbaine* policy was criticised for a number of reasons. Critics asserted that public aid was serving private profits, notably in the case of developers intervening towards the end of the schemes (Merlin and Choay, 2005). Its impact on the historical urban fabric of many city centres was another source of criticism (see Plate 6.1). Yet, the most controversial aspect of the scheme was its negative effects on disadvantaged groups.

While little research actually examined how regeneration initiatives carried out under the 1958 decrees had affected the indigenous population living in the renovated neighbourhoods, these had a lasting impact on publicising the negative social outcomes of such renewal projects. The work of Coing (1966) and the study carried out by the Groupe de Sociologie Urbaine de Nanterre (1970) under the direction of Manuel Castells were extensively quoted and their results were widely disseminated. The latter undertook an analysis of 23 renewal operations between 1955 and 1970 in Paris. They argued that, under the guise of modernising run-down areas, the government's underlying real intention had been to change the social structure of the areas undergoing regeneration. Their claim stemmed from a statistical analysis of the social and physical characteristics of the areas before their regeneration. Based on statistical analysis, the Groupe de Sociologie Urbaine de Nanterre (1970) established that the most significant factors determining whether or not

an area would be identified as a targeted for regeneration were its social characteristics, such as a high proportion of Algerians, of unskilled and semi-skilled workers or a high representation of communist voters, rather than its degree of physical decay. They also revealed that the regeneration of both the "îlot 13" and the "Flandre-Tanger" neighbourhood had led to significant changes in their social composition with a marked increase in the proportion of professionals and a decrease in the percentage of unskilled and semi-skilled workers (Groupe de Sociologie Urbaine de Nanterre, 1970). Similarly, Coing (1966) produced a unique in-depth analysis of the regeneration of a working-class area know as "îlot 4" in the 13th *arrondissement* of Paris. He documented the impacts of the regeneration process and showed how some of the population was displaced and how the process broke their social networks (see Coing, 1966). Later, a study of the Parisian renewal schemes by Loinger (1981) provided further evidence of the social transformation of the areas targeted by the *rénovation urbaine* policy. He showed that districts that had an under-representation of senior executives and an over-representation of manual workers saw their characteristic profiles brought into equilibrium with the Parisian average (Loinger, 1981).

In Paris, the *rénovation urbaine* policy led to a displacement of the indigenous population, which was unable to remain in the regenerated areas because of rent increases. The cost of the regeneration programme tended to favour high-quality accommodation over social housing (Coudroy de Lille, 2006). The most vulnerable population moved to other districts of Paris or to the suburbs, notably in the ZUPs where social-housing complexes were built for this purpose. Overall, and despite a lack of data, it has been estimated that less than 20 per cent of the indigenous population was rehoused in the renovated area (LeGarrec, 2006). Loinger and Lallemand (1978) obtained a similar figure for two schemes undertaken in the 14th *arrondissement* of Paris.

This significant displacement of disadvantaged populations generated criticism from academics and resulted in protest movements by the local population. The Groupe de Sociologie Urbaine de Nanterre (1970) used the politically charged term of "deportation" to emphasise the state-enforced displacement of certain populations from the city centres to the suburbs. By the mid 1960s, the unpopularity of the *rénovation urbaine* policy was acknowledged . In 1964, Saillard, a senior civil servant, admitted that:

> "It [the *rénovation urbaine* policy] concerns a population loaded with memories and prejudices, worried about its future and suspicious of public institutions. The necessity of the *rénovation urbaine* policy is not yet understood by the public." (Saillard, 1964, 17).

Protests against this policy grew during the late 1960s and early 1970s, notably after May 1968. This resulted in the devising of new policies in the late 1970s for existing neighbourhoods. The objectives of the *rénovation urbaine* policy in terms of demolitions were significantly reduced after 1968 and the policy was definitively abandoned in 1978. Meanwhile, the housing policy initiated after World War II, which relied on the construction of large-scale high-rise social-housing complexes (*grands ensembles*) at the cities' periphery, came under strong criticism in the 1970s. Therefore, in the late 1970s, the government developed a whole range of new tools to redevelop run-down areas

6.3. A Shift From *Rénovation* to *Réhabilitation* in the Late 1970s

The government commissioned a report listing suggestions to improve the existing housing stock (*réhabilitation*) instead of razing run-down areas (*rénovation*) (Nora-Eveno, 1976). Simultaneously, a second report (Barre, 1976) was commissioned on the financing of French housing policy. Two new policy instruments emerged from these reports' analyses, namely the *Opération Programmée d'Amélioration de l'Habitat* (OPAH) and the *Aide Personnalisée au Logement* (APL). Based on the recommendations of the Nora-Eveno report (1976), the government designed new policy tools to encourage both the transformation of run-down buildings into accommodation fit for habitation and the retention of the existing population in the area.

The OPAH procedure formed part of this new strategy. An OPAH is a legal instrument created in 1977, based on the conclusions of Nora-Eveno report (1976), which recommended having recourse to incentive measures instead of coercive tools, such as expropriation, and to define a strategic project rather than relying on ad-hoc initiatives in order to control the social and urbanistic impacts of regeneration programmes (Fribourg, 1989). The consultants recommended direct state aids for the poorest in order to compensate for eventual rent increases; they considered the use of tax incentives as inadequate since it favoured the wealthy (Alain, 1989). An OPAH is a strategic action involving the state, a local authority and a public agency, the *Agence Nationale pour l'Amélioration de l'Habitat* (ANAH). Each of the three partners commits to providing financial contributions to improve a small area, usually covering a few hundreds accommodation units, for a three-year period. The ANAH offers subsidies to the owners of old or run-down accommodations to improve quality standards, while the local authority, with the help of the state, finances the development of some missing local infrastructures and services. An OPAH aims to "protect and improve properties while ensuring that the

current occupants remain on site and enjoy better living conditions" (circular of the 1st of June 1977, quoted in LeGarrec, 2006: 43). The amount of subsidy from the ANAH depends on the level of an owners' income if the accommodation is owner-occupied and, if the accommodation is rented, the subsidy varies according to the rent charged after improvement. Owners who commit to rent control for nine years receive the highest subsidy. The registration of the upgraded property also allows the tenant to receive the APL, a new financial help set up in 1977 for low-income groups facing housing difficulties.

With the introduction of the OPAH policy, greater attention was paid to the social impacts of regeneration. However, there is no obligation for rent control to continue after nine years, which raises questions on the longer-term impacts of this policy. It marked a will to see the old housing stock playing a greater part in the provision of social-housing units through rent support or public acquisition. The decree of the 2nd of March 1973 that authorised voluntary and state agencies building HLM–a type of social housing–to acquire and upgrade old housing blocks in need of refurbishment. Until 1976, this procedure of acquisition and upgrading was used only marginally, but it later became a common activity leading to the production of an average of 6,000 to 7,000 social housing units per year during the 1980s (Dunoyer de Segonzac, 1989).

Demolition is still practised. Central government introduced two planning tools to replace the procedure of *rénovation urbaine*, namely the *Résorption de l'Habitat Insalubre* (RHI) and the *Zone d'Aménagement Concerté* (ZAC) aimed at restructuring considerably existing run-downs areas. The RHI procedure was set up by the *loi Vivien* of the 10th July 1970. The first stage of a RHI procedure involves identifying unsanitary (*insalubre*) blocks or isolated buildings using a list of criteria defined in 1970, which were never amended and today appear rather subjective and inadequate (Merlin and Choay, 2005). Expropriation pronounced under the *loi Vivien* allows the state to acquire the plot at a rate of compensation based only on the value of the unbuilt land minus the cost of the demolition of the insalubrious building. This reduces the cost of urban renewal compared to the *rénovation urbaine* procedure. If the property is rented, a financial contribution can be required to rehouse the tenants. Unlike the *rénovation urbaine*, expropriation and demolition can only be allowed for the construction of social housing or collective infrastructures useful for the neighbourhood or to create a project of public utility such as the development of a land bank. For the local authority, a RHI has the advantage of attracting major state subsidies since the state finances between 70 and 80 per cent of the

operational deficit. Nowadays, the RHI is increasingly seen as a tool for a few isolated buildings and as an adjunct or complement to other interventions (Merlin and Choay, 2005: 472). A feature of the RHI is that the procedure has remained strongly controlled by the central government through the role of the *préfet*, even after the decentralisation laws of the early 1980s.

The ZAC is the second planning tools aimed at major restructuring of existing urban areas, including the demolishing run-down buildings and modification of the street layout. The ZAC procedure was introduced by the *Loi d'Orientation Fonçière* in 1967, which made it obligatory for every local authority to have a development plan (*Plan d'Occupation des Sols* - POS). Initially, the POS was devised by the local state services, the *Direction Départementale de L'Équipement* (DDE) and approved by the *préfet*, but after the decentralisation laws, this role was transferred to the local authority. Within the perimeter of a ZAC, development rights can be more advantageous than initially envisaged in the POS, for example by allowing higher densities. In exchange for this advantageous regime, the local authority negotiates the financing or delivery of public facilities and social housing with the developer (Loinger, 1981). The project is strictly controlled by the public authority, even if it later delegates the role of developer to a semi-private company. The financial risks are assumed by the local authority which, since the decentralisation laws, has assumed control over the redevelopment of the ZAC. To implement the ZAC plan, a local authority can exercise its right of expropriation *(droit de pré-emption)* allowing a commune to buy any property coming onto the market. Within the framework of the decentralisation laws, local authorities with a POS also received the right to define areas outside the ZACs, where they can use their *droit de préemption* (Morand-Deviller, 1996).

The development of the OPAH, the RHI and the ZAC combined with the expansion of the *droit de préemption* have given to public authorities a wider range of planning tools to regenerate existing old areas than was available in the 1960s when a single instrument, the *zones de rénovation urbaine*, existed. These new instruments have remained in use until today. In the 1970s, another policy innovation involve initiating a specific policy of *réhabilitation urbaine* to upgrade the newer stock of social housing built in the suburban ZUPs.

In March 1977, the state launched *Habitat et Vie Sociale* (HVS) programme, which aimed to improve living conditions in the *grands ensembles* (Anderson and Vieillard-Baron, 2003). Despite an initial attempt to address both physical and social issues, the programme

mainly focused on physical solutions such as the painting of housing blocks and the construction of sports grounds. The scheme had little impact and was criticised for being highly centralised and for relying on cosmetic solutions (Jaillet, 2000). However, its originality resided in its attempt to promote a broad strategic and interdepartmental approach, leading many commentators to describe the HVS as the ancestor of the *politique de la ville* policy, which has supported the development of an integrated approach to urban regeneration since the 1980s. In other words, the development of new policy tools in the 1970s led to more significant changes in urban regeneration policy in the 1980s. From the OPAH to the HVS, greater concern appeared for social issues accompanying the physical regeneration of disadvantaged areas in the 1970s. Greater attention was paid to the issue of displacement and to the provision of social facilities. In the following decades, the social question became a central preoccupation for central government while new challenges appeared with the 1980s decentralisation laws opening the urban regeneration policy making process to a multiplicity of actors (Badariotti, 2006).

6.4. The *Politique de la Ville* Policy, an Integrated Policy for Declining Neighbourhoods: Its Origin and Development under the Mitterrand Presidencies

There is no official definition of the term *politique de la ville* or simple description able to encompass all the aspects of this policy, since successive governments have set up numerous programmes in its name since the early 1980s. Sections three to six intend to present its guiding principles and its evolution under left-wing and right-wing government. The term *politique de la ville* refers to a variety of state actions and measures aiming to reverse the decline of the most disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods and to address the social exclusion of their residents (Cour des Comptes, 2002:1). These actions were originally grouped under the *développement social des quartiers* (DSQ) programme. The *politique de la ville* policy emerged in 1981 with the establishment of the *Commission Nationale pour le Développement Social des Quartiers* (CNDSQ), shortly after the riots that took place in the Lyon suburbs during the summer of 1981. The decree n°86-183 stated that this committee's role was to:

> "Examine and suggest to the government actions of all kind likely to prevent the physical and social decline of neighbourhoods in difficulty. In that capacity, it [the CNDSQ] monitors changes in the social situation of these neighbourhoods. It helps to raise public awareness on these issues. It carries out necessary research and studies." (Decree n°86-183, quoted in DIV, 2004).

Dubedout, the socialist mayor of Grenoble, famous for his positions in favour of local development and participative democracy, originally chaired the CNDSQ. The committee

consisted of a variety of actors including elected representatives, civil servants, community workers and community activists and aimed to work synergistically to address issues that each of them had failed to solve individually (Merlin and Choay, 2005). In addition to its advisory role, the CNDSQ participated in the policy-making process. The CNDSQ's first task was to launch a pilot scheme in 23 neighbourhoods. In these areas, the development of innovative programmes and new modes of operation was encouraged (Anderson and Vieillard-Baron, 2003). Secondly, the group was invited to reflect on a decentralised policy striving to offer an integrated and diversified approach to the problem of disadvantaged areas (*quartiers sensibles*). This resulted in the production of a key report, *"Ensemble, refaire la ville" (Remaking the city together),* which became a reference guide for the development of the *politique de la ville* policy and led to the setting up of the *développement social des quartiers* (DSQ) programme. The report stressed that even though the riots had highlighted the concentration of physical and social problems in some suburban neighbourhoods, similar issues manifested themselves in central districts. The report argued:

> "Apparently, they [old central neighbourhoods] are not marked by the same level of neighbourhood violence as suburban districts. Yet, the social issues encountered in these areas are equally serious [...]. The negative traits of ghetto areas can be attributed to the Goutte d'Or neighbourhood in Paris and the St. Michel area of Bordeaux as well as to the Minguettes estate in Vénissieux [...]. Responses to this situation have only been partial and sectoral. They do not take into account the neighbourhood social dynamics, except when there exist a particular effort from the municipality or an active struggle from the inhabitants, as in Roubaix." (Dubedout, 1983, 11).

DSQ programme targeted a limited number of neighbourhoods regarded as priority zones (the *ciblage* or targeting principle). The mayor, in collaboration with the préfet, delineated their boundaries based on local knowledge and he was given responsibility for the implementation of the project (Jaillet, 2000). The DSQ programme emphasised the need to adopt an integrated approach by requiring that the schemes would address physical issues such as improvement in the urban landscape and housing but also wider issues such as education, training, employment, and the prevention of juvenile delinquency (*globalité* principle) (Dubedout, 1983, 14). It also encouraged adapting national norms and rules to suit the local situation (Merlin and Choay, 2005). For instance, public-service providers were allowed to adapt their method of delivery to serve the particular needs of the population of disadvantaged areas (*innovation* principle). Another aspect of the DSQ procedure was the stated need to involve a wide range of public actors from different government departments in the definition and implementation of the project (*transversalité* and *partenariat* principles), while also involving the voluntary sector by financing their

actions in distressed areas (*coopération* principle). Finally, the local population was encouraged to participate in the definition of the project, although no special structures were put into place to this effect (*participation des habitants* principle).

In 1984, the DSQ programme moved from its status of a pilot project and was integrated in national policy. In total, 148 priority neighbourhoods were integrated in this programme for a five-year period, of which about 30 were centrally located districts (DIV, 2004). National and regional government committed to contribute equally to this policy. Special credits were made available within each government department and within the budget of the region to complement credits available under common law (*crédits de droit commun*), notably for housing programmes. An agreement signed between the state and individual regions and valid for five years stipulated the nature of these credits.

The *politique de la ville* policy introduced the concept of positive discrimination in French policy and in the allocation of public resources. This represented a significant departure from the principle of equality of treatment between individuals and territories on which the French Republican ideal is grounded. For instance, the Department of Education created the *Zones d'Éducation Prioritaire* (ZEP), a programme which channels additional resources to schools in disadvantaged areas has encouraged the development of new teaching projects since 1982. Similarly, the *Fonds Social Urbain* was set up in 1984 to finance additional projects to improve the built environment of distressed areas.

In order to support and encourage an intergovernmental approach, a new structure the *Comité Interministériel des Villes* (CIV) chaired by the Minister for Urban Planning and Housing was created. Its role was to coordinate the actions of different Departments in order to achieve three complimentary goals, comprising the eradicating of insalubrious accommodation, innovating in the domain of urban planning and increasing solidarity and balance within cities by creating assistance programmes at the inter-urban level (Anderson and Vieillard-Baron, 2003, 40). Addressing socio-spatial differences in the name of solidarity has remained a strong goal of French urban policy (Chaline, 2008). Throughout the last decades, central government has increasingly justified its direct intervention in disadvantaged run-down neighbourhoods under its duty to guarantee national solidarity, even though the decentralisation laws of 1982-3 conveyed upon local governments the responsibility and right to devise policies for their local area independently. As the right of local governments to administer themselves freely can challenge the citizens' right to equal treatment, the state re-established its competence of policy intervention in order to compensate for the excesses brought by decentralisation. Because of the French imperative

of solidarity, special public credits were thus made available to finance urban regeneration in disadvantaged areas. In contrast to other countries, such as the UK, the reliance on private investment remains very limited (Chaline, 2008).The

In 1988, it was generally recognised that this new approach to the issue of disadvantaged neighbourhoods had beneficial effects, even though it had not reversed the process of neighbourhood decline but merely slowed it down (Merlin and Choay, 2005). The first assessment of the *politique de la ville* policy noted that it had helped to make public policies more responsive to the needs of distressed areas by distinguishing itself from the majority of sectoral policies which apply the same national norms to all territories (Epstein, 2000). Mitterrand made this policy a national priority when he was re-elected in 1988. His second term as French President was characterised by a prolongation and an expansion of the *politique de la ville* policy. The number of districts covered by a DSQ contract tripled for the period 1988-1993 (Epstein, 2000). New structures, namely the *Conseil National des Villes* (CNV) and *the Délégation Interministérielle à la ville* (DIV), replaced the CNDSQ, while a Minister specially devoted to this policy was nominated for the first time in 1990. The principles of *globalité*, *transversalité, partenariat* and *coopération* were confirmed as comprising its guiding principles (see Jaillet, 2003). At national level, all public bodies were required to give attention and offer broad solutions to the issue of territorial solidarity (Epstein, 2000). The main objective remained that of regenerating run-down areas by implementing a mix of initiatives aimed at improving their physical aspect and increasing the inclusion of their residents into French society. The principles remained largely unchanged; however, new instruments were developed.

In the late 1980s, a contractual approach was adopted in response mainly to the new challenges brought by decentralisation. The decentralisation laws by ascribing different policies to different levels of government rendered the adoption of an integrated approach to the problems of declining districts more complex. For instance, the *commune* became responsible for policy concerning the physical development of the area comprised within its boundaries, while the *department* obtained responsibility for social policy, but overlaps occurred. Actions relating to declining areas had to be coordinated across governmental departments (horizontally) and across levels of government (vertically). A new tool called *contrat de ville* (CDV) intended to overcome this fragmentation. Local actors defined the content of the CDV under the supervision of the mayor and in collaboration with the *préfet*, who represents the state locally. The CDV presented a strategy for the declining areas of a *commune* or of a group of *communes*. The different

partners gathered within the framework of the CDV could negotiate a strategy adapted to the uniqueness of each area by assembling in diverse forms the procedures, instruments and credits made available by various actors in the name of the *politique de la ville* policy (Epstein, 2000). In the context of the reinforcement of local powers, national guidelines focused more on determining broad principles rather than on defining the specific substance of the contract. Therefore, local action could consist of the combination of national widely available tools such as the OPAH or the ZAC to regenerate physically a declining area, with specific tools such as the ZEP being used to address educational issues in this area.

The CDV was used to commit different actors to act in favour of distressed areas, but its introduction also reflected the desire to broaden the scale of intervention from the neighbourhood to the urban region (Jaillet, 2000). During Mitterrand's second term of office, there was a stated desire to act on the problems of poor neighbourhoods as well as on the causes of socio-spatial inequalities. Two laws were voted to this effect in 1991 (Jaillet, 2000). One created the *Dotation de solidarité urbaine* that transferred funds from richer to poorer municipalities. The second, the *Loi d'Orientation sur la Ville* (LOV) attempted to share better the cost of caring for poor households between *communes* of a same city region by encouraging a better distribution of social-housing units between them. Under the Socialist government, the number of areas covered expanded greatly from 23 neighbourhoods in 1982 to about 1300 neighbourhoods for the 1994-1998 period, resulting in a dilution of funds (Jaillet, 2000).

6.5. The *Pacte de Relance pour la Ville*: A Short-lived Interruption to the Logic of the *Politique de la Ville*

In the mid 1990s, concern grew regarding what was perceived to be a deterioration in the social situation of disadvantaged neighbourhoods due to the resurgence of violent incidents. In 1995, Chirac based the electoral campaign on the theme of 'social fracturing' and promised he would give a new impetus to the *politique de la ville* policy (Jaillet, 2003). His election and the return to power of the Right resulted in the conception of the *Pacte de Relance pour la Ville* (PRV) under the political supervision of Gaudin, the Minister for Territorial Planning, City and Integration. The PRV, enacted in 1996, introduced a change in the direction of urban policy. As observed by Dikeç (2007a: 285), the PRV gave a neoliberal orientation to French urban policy. This programme moved away from a redistributive approach; it shifted attention away from fostering solidarity and

collaboration between *communes* and, instead, to increasing the economic competitiveness of particular districts. The main tenet of the programme was to foster economic activity within priority neighbourhoods by offering tax concessions to local businesses. This economic approach, based on increasing the attractiveness of an area for business contrasted, with the social approach adopted by the Left, which had attempted to improve the employability of the inhabitants of disadvantaged neighbourhoods by setting up measures such as training schemes.

The scheme's content and extent were defined centrally rather than negotiated locally through a contract (Jaillet, 2003). The range of the tools available was limited. Mainly, the PRV adapted the nature of the tax concessions according to the area's level of deprivation. According to this perspective, the neighbourhood contained both the problem and the solution, so long as they could attract businesses (Dikeç, 2007b). This represented a departure from previous attempts to establish links between the problems of the neighbourhood and the mechanisms at play at the larger scale of the urban region. While under the DSQ and CDV programmes, local actors relied on local knowledge and chose freely the indicators they deemed suitable to delimit disadvantaged areas, with the PRV designation relied on centrally-determined criteria. The new legislation defined a new geography of priority neighbourhoods and created specific zones, the *Zones Urbaines Sensibles* (ZUS), the *Zones de Redynamisation Urbaine* (ZRU) and the *Zones Franches Urbaines* (ZFU). In order to gain the status of ZFU, the area needed to meet criteria such as exhibiting an unemployment rate at least 25 percent higher than the national average (see Green et al, 2001). Importing a UK principle, designation relied on a bidding process for the first time (Jaillet, 2003). A hierarchy of deprived spaces was created. The ZUS were officially defined as areas "characterised by the presence of *grands ensembles* or areas of degraded housing and a significant imbalance between housing and employment" (INSEE, 2007, 3) and they comprised the ZRU and ZFU. The latter were declared as the most deprived areas using a 'synthetic index of exclusion' and, therefore, received the most advantageous tax breaks, including exemption from business rates (*taxe professionnelle*), company tax (*impôt sur les bénéfices*), land tax (*taxe fonçière*) and employer tax contributions (*charges sociales patronales*). The programme was mainly conceived in economic terms and aimed to revive economic activity in the *quartiers en difficulté* (distressed areas). With the setting up of the ZUS, the number of priority sites was reduced to 751, including 372 ZRUs and 44 ZFUs.

A second important axis of the PRV concerned security. The main change involved putting the emphasis on improving the judicial system in the *quartiers en difficulté*, rather than on preventive policies, the focus of past policies (Dikeç, 2007b). The third axis concerned the improvement of housing and urban landscape, its main emphasis being the encouragement of greater social mixing (*mixité sociale*) by allowing the *préfet* to make the social-housing stock of the ZUS available to people with earnings above to the normal qualifying limit.

Overall, the scheme represented a shift away from the approach adopted in the 1980s and early 1990s. Béhar (1997), a specialist of French urban policies, described the changes as representing a retreat of the state in favour of the market and an ideological turn. The Right denied that the changes were motivated by ideology and instead depicted the PRV as serving the Republican Pact and its core value, equality. In addressing the Senate, Raoult, Deputy-Minister for the City, argued that:

> "The priority given to economic activity in the Pacte [PRV] was not introduced by ideology; it was not a question of being all liberal or all social. We tried to mix Cardo[23] and Madelin[24] approaches [...]. Highlighting security and economic activity is not al all "reactionary", often it corresponds to the Republican ideas of liberty-equality-fraternity." (Sénat, 1996)

6.6. 1997: The Return of the Left in Power and the 1999 Re-launch of the CDV Programme

The interruption of the *politique de la ville* logic was short-lived. Following the lack of popularity of the Prime Minister, Juppé, and widespread strikes in response to his attempt to restructure the French welfare state, Chirac dissolved the National Assembly in 1997. One year after the introduction of the PRV, the Left was back in power for a five-year period of *cohabitation*, with the socialist, Jospin, as Prime Minister. Paradoxically, the Jospin government appeared initially reluctant to invest significant effort in a policy created by the Left and supported by many actors. The government merely focused on the issues of urban danger and crime, often associated with the *quartiers en difficulté* (Jaillet, 2003). In October 1997, the Jospin government recognised French citizens' 'right to security' and set up two new instruments for districts with an above-average incidence of delinquency, namely the *Contrat Local de Sécurité* (CLS), a new contractual procedure, together with a community police force (*police de proximité*).

---

[23] French Right-wing politician known to support a number of social programmes for disadvantaged areas

[24] French Right-wing politician and strong supporter of *laissez-faire* economics

Nonetheless, Sueur, the socialist mayor of Orléans, was commissioned to write a report on the future of the *politique de la ville*. The Sueur report (1998) criticised the allocation of generous tax concessions in the ZFU for failing to create a significant number of new jobs and, instead, leading to the relocation of companies and their employees to ZFUs to avail of tax incentives. The government therefore decided against continuing the PRV programme. The PRV was not abruptly interrupted, but it was envisaged that its measures would be slowly phased out and terminate in 2002 (Dikeç, 2007b). This led to the coexistence for a few years of two schemes, each with its own measures and particular geography of priority neighbourhoods.

The Sueur Report stated that intervention should not be limited to the neighbourhood but conceived at the level of the urban agglomeration. The government acknowledged this recommendation and announced the reintroduction of the CDV programme. Jospin, in a circular in 1998, outlined the objectives of the new generation of CDV and new specific programmes followed. The programme was ambitious, even though it consisted mainly of reconfiguring measures dating from the late 1980s and early 1990s (Dikeç, 2007a: 285). National recommendations emphasised the need for broadly-based and integrated approaches, justifying the reintroduction of a contractual approach (Jaillet, 2003). Another recommendation was to increase the resident participation, but no structures were set up to this effect. Intercommunal collaboration in policy making was encouraged and two laws were passed to support this approach (*loi Voynet*, *loi Chevènement*). A third law (*Loi de Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbain*, SRU) aimed at a better geographical distribution of social housing by requiring that each *commune* of a large agglomeration provide at least 20% social housing. The SRU law expanded on the LOV, enacted in 1991 by introducing stricter rules. These new measures were all characterised by their emphasis on solidarity and redistribution and aimed to increase social and territorial cohesion (Dikeç, 2007b). The emphasis was on reducing rather than eliminating social inequalities and, according to Dikeç (2007b: 114), reflected the Left's "tacit acceptance of lasting inequalities" in contrast to its more radical approach in the early 1980s.

In physical terms, although the accent was still on *réhabilitation*, a few sites were deemed to be in need of greater redevelopment. Therefore, a sub-programme of large-scale physical regeneration was established by Bartolone[25], including programmes of demolition and reconstruction accompanying social interventions as part of strategic projects at 50

[25] Bartolone was Minister for the City from 1998 to 2002

sites. The reintroduction of the CDV led to the reopening of negotiation between the local authorities and the state to define the content and geography of urban policy, leading to 247 CDVs covering wide-ranging measures, 70% of which were each signed by a group of *communes*.

6.7. The Borloo Law: The End of the *Politique de la Ville*?

Momentarily disqualified, the *politique de la ville* was reinitiated by the Jospin government and a new set of contracts (CDV) was launched to support the social and physical development of deprived areas. However, the sub-programme, developed by Bartolone giving greater emphasis to physical actions in a limited number of sites, was hardly implemented because of a lack of funds. Nevertheless, by accentuating physical issues, it paved the way towards a radical change in policy direction introduced by the Right in 2003.

In the years following the re-introduction of the CDV, the impacts of the *politique de la ville* were highly debated. In a report published in 2002, the *Cour des comptes* (National Audit Office) criticised this policy for being complex and inefficient. The *Cour des comptes* (2002) argued that the policy was indecipherable for many elected or voluntary actors on the ground due to the existence of numerous sources of funding split across different levels of government and across various Departments. This situation was worsened by a multiplication of the number of programmes and procedures that arose under the policy over the years, as each department invented its own measures. The report noted that coordination efforts were insufficient and that regeneration plans merely consisted of a superposition of urban and social actions in a same area. The report criticised the vagueness of the objectives of urban policy, which had rendered evaluation almost impossible and quasi-nonexistent. The report attributed this vagueness to the constant broadening of the issues that the policy sought to address, ranging from physical planning to the prevention of delinquency, combined with the constant increase in the number of 'priority' neighbourhoods. The impacts of this policy on social exclusion were described as limited, based on the analysis of quantitative indicators such as unemployment rates showing above average values for priority neighbourhoods. However, the report failed to account for those people who had benefited from the policy but had moved out of the area (Jaillet, 2003). Another widespread criticism at the time concerned the insufficiency of the funds allocated to the policy, estimated at ¤5.7 billion in 2003 (Jaillet, 2003). These criticisms were emphasised by scholars like Donzelot (2000) who

argued that French policies had limited impact in comparison to US policies and recommended the importation of measures such as community empowerment.

Within this general context, the Right regained power in 2002 following the re-election of Chirac and its victory in the parliament election. The question of security had been a dominant issue during the electoral campaign, with disadvantaged neighbourhoods being increasingly depicted as outlaw or 'no-go' areas (*zones de non-droit*). Sarkozy, the new Minister of the Interior, replaced preventive actions in priority neighbourhoods with repressive measures (Dikeç, 2007b). Borloo's success in restoring the attractiveness of the city of Valenciennes during his mayoral term led to his nomination as Minister for the City and Urban Regeneration. Borloo's nomination signalled the "death of *the politique de la ville*" (Jaillet, 2003, 15) and its replacement by a policy of *rénovation urbaine*. Based on the *Cour des comptes* report, he estimated that *the politique de la ville* had failed and dramatized the situation of the priority neighbourhoods (Epstein, 2005a). He depicted them as "ghettos" that urban policy needed "to break" (*Le Monde*, 19 June 2003). He had two additional priorities for urban policy, namely creating jobs and simplifying procedures. These three priorities were at the centre of the *Loi d'orientation et de programmation pour la ville et la rénovation urbaine*, known as the 'Borloo law', passed in August 2003.

The law was conceived along three axes and radicalised measures introduced under the PRV programme. First, it established a demolition programme (*Programme national de rénovation urbaine*, PNRU) for the ZUS areas, aiming to build socially-mixed neighbourhoods in the place of "ghettos". The objective was to demolish 200,000 degraded housing units and refurbish another 200,000 units. The law envisaged that all units of accommodation demolished would be rebuilt but not wholly within the ZUS limits. Some households would be relocated outside the ZUS resulting from the construction of 200,000 new units of social housing. The *Fonçière Logement* would build housing to let or buy at market price on some of the land freed up in order to attract a new population and entice private developers to reinvest in the ZUS. Secondly, more areas with tax concessions were defined to increase economic activity in the ZUS. The creation of 41 new ZFUs was planned under the Borloo law and the 44 ZFUs created in 1996 were re-activated until 2008. Thirdly, a public agency, the *Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine* (ANRU) was created to manage the regeneration programme (PNRU). The ANRU would centralise and distribute subventions, providing a single stop (*guichet unique*) for the financing of the PNRU, replacing the previous need for multiple financial agreements. For the period 2004-2008, the ANRU was to manage a budget of ¤30 billion, comprising funds

from the state complemented by funds from the Union d'Économie Sociale pour le Logement (UESL), collector of the "1% logement", a tax on private companies to provide funding towards financing French housing policy. This contribution increased the funds available but was negotiated in exchange for the transfer of land to the *Fonçière Logement.* This arrangement was to simplify the procedures.

However, the creation of the ANRU meant more than a simplification of financing. Together with the Borloo law, it represented a recentralisation of urban policy and a change in its content (Dikeç, 2007a). For instance, parts of the funds of the ANRU which had previously been controlled at local level in the name of *politique de la ville* were now allocated automatically to housing or planning programmes (Epstein, 2004). The geography of priority neighbourhoods was defined centrally rather than based on local knowledge. The new urban policy targeted solely the 751 ZUSs, immediately depriving over half the neighbourhoods previously identified as priority areas of any access to national special funds. Moreover, only about 100 of the 751 were to be selected by the ANRU to receive its subventions based on its own assessment of local projects rather than upon local needs, introducing competition as a new guiding principle for the allocation of national resources. The shift from the *politique de la ville* policy to the *rénovation urbaine* policy modified and narrowed the objectives of public policy: the former having focused on improving living conditions and social inclusion through a variety of programmes, the latter pursuing a programme of physical and economic redevelopment based on tax concessions and demolition in order to reduce differences in territorial development. ZUS were to become similar to other areas. For example, the Borloo law aimed to reduce by a third the number of unemployed people living in the ZUS and set up a monitoring programme to measure whether or not the ZUS characteristics converged towards national averages. Previous policy (DSQ and CDV programmes) had been flexible in terms of the objectives and the implementation of operations. In contrast, within the new programme, the objectives and actions were defined by national law rather than negotiated locally (Epstein, 2004) thereby increasing central control on the content of local schemes. Even though local authorities could amend them, they were strongly encouraged to adopt national criteria.

In summary, The Borloo law brought major changes in terms both of the nature of urban policies and the role ascribed to central and local government in their definition (Jaillet 2003, Epstein 2004). Regarding the former, it emphasised physical intervention whereas the *politique de la ville* policy had favoured an integrated approach. Under the

new configuration, physical and social issues were addressed and financed through two separate channels, which prioritised physical actions. Actions on the built environment were financed by special state subventions (*crédits d'exception*) made available for the ZUS areas through a central programme administrated by the ANRU, whereas social actions were left to the initiative of local government and initially to its financial capabilities (Jaillet, 2003). Special state subventions in this domain were to disappear[26], but some of them were reinstalled in 2006 following the creation of a national agency (*Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances*, ACSé), as a result of the 2005 urban riots. The ACSé financed social programmes in distressed areas. Regarding central-local relations, the Borloo law, like the PRV programme, did not renew the contractual approach and strengthened the power of the central state (Epstein, 2005b). The state opened a bidding process, inviting local actors to submit local projects to the ANRU.

By forcing local authorities to compete for funds, the state limited the relative autonomy that local authorities had enjoyed when devising their projects. Although local authorities enjoy relatively strong financial autonomy from the state, access to national funds often remains a major issue for the implementation of local regeneration projects. Therefore, competition can have strong disciplining effects on local authorities wishing to regenerate disadvantaged areas (Epstein, 2005a). Local authorities not selected by the ANRU, ran the risk of seeing their projects postponed for a number of years. The Borloo law defined the state's orientation during the period 2004-2008, and a change in power leading to any revival of the *politique de la ville's* original principles, as in 1997, was unlikely. Therefore, local elected representatives were under considerable pressure to adopt the approach which the ANRU promoted, namely modifying significantly the physical aspects and image of the area by demolishing a large numbers of social or degraded private housing units, improving public facilities such as parks, and reducing the spatial concentration of poor households through the development of accommodation for wealthier people.

Attracting a new population was assumed to have positive effects and was justified in the name of social mixing. Increasing social mix has always been a recommendation within French policy, though never a prescription as in the Borloo law. While ensuring social mix at the scale of the neighbourhood has been depicted by French policy makers as an ideal since the creation of the ZUPs in the 1950s, under the new programme, social mixing became the main objective and replaced goals such as social development. In

[26] Therefore, social actions in disadvantaged areas were momentarily financed only through national sectoral policy (*politiques et crédits de droit commun*)

policy documents, social mixing has been strongly associated with guaranteeing equality, a fundamental precept of the French Republic (Lelevrier, 2004). Developing a socially-mixed area was expected to diminish the stigmatisation of run-down areas and their inhabitants and, in turn, provide equal access for all to public services, social and cultural facilities as well as to employment. Yet, despite its positive connotation, the concept of social mixing has been increasingly used abroad in regeneration policy as a smoke-screen for neoliberal policies promoting gentrification (Slater, 2006; Kelly and MacLaran, 2004). This is a real concern for areas where land redevelopment could be highly profitable, as in the central area of Paris. Reintegrating the area into the active property market, attracting a new population, acting in partnership with private actors, creating tax breaks, represent a radical departure from past public-led approaches. It suggests a degree of convergence with 'Anglo-Saxon' urban regeneration policies which, since the 1980s, have focused on property-led regeneration and private-sector actions.

The next chapter explores in greater depth the characteristics of French urban regeneration policy and the nature of recent policy changes through a longitudinal case-study. It is argued that, although the Borloo law and the *rénovation urbaine* policy might attest to a greater diffusion of neoliberal ideas in regeneration policy at national level than in the past two decades, these changes should not be over-emphasised. Social objectives have not disappeared and their implementation is not left to private actors. Indeed, the creation of the ACSé in 2006 contradicted the announced end of the contractual approach and the suppression of *credit spéciaux* for the social regeneration of run-down areas. The ACSé made available ¤400 million through the signature of new contracts, the *contrats urbains de cohésion sociale*, replacing the CDV for the period 2007-2009. Thus regeneration policy remains dominated by a predominance of public actors and funds both in its physical and social aspects. For instance, the partnership with the *Fonçiére Logement* is a public-private partnership *á la française*. In France, the private partner, a housing association, has characteristics which are far closer to those of a public body than to private-sector developers, which act as the counterpart in Irish policy. This 'moderate' neoliberalisation of French policy cannot be assimilated to a convergence towards a similar path as Irish policy. The French case study also allows us to contrast the consequences for local residents of public-led regeneration policy with those of private-led regeneration exemplified by the Irish case.

CHAPTER SEVEN: FRENCH CASE STUDY, REGENERATING THE GOUTTE D'OR/CHÂTEAU ROUGE AREA

The Goutte d'Or administrative district[27] is located in the 18th *arrondissement* of Paris (Figure 7.1). Boulevard Barbès constitutes its western limit and separates the area from the Montmartre district. The elevated metro line to the south constitutes a symbolic frontier between the Goutte d'Or area and the other neighbourhoods. The area is delimited by the ringroad to the north. However, the northern part of the district is hardly inhabited because a high percentage of the land is dedicated to railway activities. In fact, over 50 percent of the area comprises of railways and buildings used by the French national railway company SNCF (Toubon and Messamah, 1990). Therefore, the district is well separated from neighbouring areas, but its inhabitants also benefit from considerable accessibility to the public transport network of Paris, having two metro lines and two regional and national train stations nearby. Its accessibility makes the area a desirable location to live. Yet, the area suffers from physical dilapidation and social problems. After years of neglect, the area has been the object of several regeneration initiatives for the last 30 years.

Different planning tools such as the *Résorption de l 'Habitat Insalubre* (RHI) and *Opération Programmée d'Amélioration de l'Habitat* (OPAH) procedures have been used in the area. Moreover, the residential zone (Figure 7.2) has been targeted for exceptional action under the *politique de la ville* programme over the last 30 years. Since the selection of the area as a priority zone by the *Commission National pour le Développement Social des Quartiers* (CNDSQ) in 1982, the district has always been part of the *politique de la ville* programme, from the *Développement Social des Quartiers* (DSQ) programme to the *Contrat de Ville* (CDV) programme. It was designated as a Zone Urbaine Sensible (ZUS) in 1996 and is one of the only areas of Paris qualifying as such nowadays (Figure 3.2). The municipality has recently competed for funds under the new programme of *rénovation urbaine* run by the *Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine* (ANRU) to regenerate the northern part of the area known as Château Rouge, despite its disapproval of the policy. It represents a particularly interesting area in which to conduct a longitudinal and explorative study of the evolution of urban regeneration policies. This chapter endeavours to examine how local and national forces have shaped the regeneration process in this area.

[27] Also know as *quartier administratif 71*

Figure 7.1: Location of the Goutte d'Or administrative area (Source: APUR, 2005a)



Figure 7.2: *Politique de la Ville* perimeter (Source: Association Salle Saint-Bruno, 2006)

7.1. The Regeneration Plan for the Southern District

7.1.1. Local context

The neighbourhood owes most of its present features to its quick and relatively anarchical development between the 1830s and the end of the 19th century associated with the development of the national railway system in the north of Paris. The Goutte d'Or area soon developed a role of host to migrant working-class populations from French rural regions and from abroad with a significant number of hostels (*hôtels meublés*) offering cheap accommodation opening in the area. The over-representation of people living in hostels remained a characteristic of the area until its recent regeneration in the late 1980s to early 1990s. The area was spared the destructive redevelopment under Haussmann and under the vast programme of *rénovation urbaine* (urban renewal) carried out in Paris in the 1960s and 1970s by the central government under the 1958 national laws. The latter resulted in the displacement of a significant number of low-income households to suburban housing estates. Despite the fact that it suffered from significant dilapidation as the buildings were poorly maintained, there was little public policy intervention in the area until the 1980s.

The neighbourhood of Goutte d'Or was earmarked for renewal under the master plan for Paris of 1977, which was drawn up under the influence of Jacques Chirac, the first elected mayor of Paris[28]. Nonetheless, the Council of Paris did not vote for any urban intervention for this area before January 1983. The re-election of Chirac as mayor of Paris in 1983 marked the start of an active period in terms of urban projects, particularly in the eastern part of Paris. The authority and the power of Chirac were reinforced following the municipal elections of 1983, as his party lists won a majority of votes in every *arrondissement* and the 1982-1983 decentralisation laws further increased local-government powers. Shortly after his election, Chirac presented a major planning document, the *Plan-Programme de l'Est de Paris* (PPEP) to the Parisian Council. Commissioned by the Mayor, this document translated in technical terms his political objectives for the eastern part of Paris and his own vision for the future of Paris. The core aim of PPEP was the upgrading of the eastern half of Paris. The PPEP noted deficiencies in housing standards and public facilities and a lack of service-sector activities in the east. It attributed the low presence of highly-ranked services to the poor image of the east. It was argued that the situation and image of the East had similarities with those of the

[28] Paris had a special status until 1977 and was under the direct tutelage of the *préfet* until 1977. In contrast with other cities, Paris had no elected mayor until 1977.

banlieue [29] (APUR, 1987). The PPEP aimed to remedy the situation by implementing of a number of priority interventions. They included the creation of new neighbourhoods, with the ambition to building 20,000 new dwellings in new mixed-tenure housing developments to "avoid the concentration of too much subsidised accommodation of the same type in a same district" (APUR, 1987:20), the improvement of housing conditions by the rehabilitation of the old housing stock and the strengthening of tertiary activities through the construction of 300,000 sq.m. of office space. The renewal of the Goutte d'Or O administrative area formed part of this PPEP.

Both the southern (Goutte d'Or) and northern part (Château Rouge) of the district (Figure 7.2) were described as a "quasi-ghetto" in the PPEP (APUR, 1987:12) because of the state of dilapidation of the housing stock and because of the concentration of social problems in these neighbourhoods (Plate 7.1). The upgrading of the eastern half was presented as being needed to compensate for years of neglect which the eastern part had endured. Yet, it was unclear whose interests the upgrading would serve (Lidgi, 2001). Lidgi (2001) reviewed the planning policies pursued in the 20th *arrondissement* during the 1980s and the 1990s, when the Right controlled the Parisian Council and argued that the right-wing policies of the 1980s aimed to alter the sociological composition of the east side for electoral motives, amongst others:

> "Urban planning policies of the 1980s [were] geared towards rich and middle-class groups" (Lidgi, 2001:64).

> "In the eastern *arrondissements*, the urban doctrine aim[ed] to transform the social fabric, to make Paris and its eastern districts a city of the middle classes, one of the objectives amongst others, being to strengthen the power of the RPR party, by consolidating and developing its electorate base" (Lidgi, 2001: 68).

She showed that a movement of opposition to such policies emerged in the 20th *arrondissement* and resulted in the Right loosing the local elections in 1995 in the area. It will be shown in the following sections that similar concerns emerged in relation to the Goutte d'Or operation.

[29] *Banlieue*, the term refers to the poor suburbs of French cities.

Plate 7.1: Dereliction in the Château Rouge Area (Source: Author, 2006)

7.1.2. The Municipal Project

This section shows the objectives which the municipality sought to achieve with the renewal project for Goutte d'Or, presenting the objectives as they appear in internal and official documents. In 1982, the Mayor required the municipal services to conduct surveys in the area in order to devise a regeneration project and nominated Juppé, the second deputy-mayor, as supervisor of the operation in 1983. These studies were limited only to the investigation of the quality of the buildings. Observations such as the state of the roof and the level of natural lighting were collected for each building over 15 hectares in order to establish the insalubrious character of the district. The result of these surveys was presented to the Parisian Council in January 1983. In the working document (*Exposé des Motifs*[30]) presented to the Parisian Council in January 1983, the municipality classified the buildings into four categories:

- insalubrious buildings for which restoration was ruled out.

[30] The *Exposé des Motifs* is the part of a Bill or an Act in which the author of the Bill presents factual and legal reasons that justify its adoption.

- insalubrious buildings for which the costs of repairs and of bringing them up to acceptable standard were prohibitive given their intrisic value.
- buildings that were lacking amenities, but which could be brought up to acceptable standard within acceptable cost and technical conditions.
- buildings that did not require any intervention. (*Exposé des Motifs*, 1983).

During the Council meeting, the speaker for the majority (*rapporteur*) concluded that the sub-area of 6 hectares located in the southern part of the Goutte d'Or administrative district, was "the most dilapidated, the one most lacking amenities and posing the most severe social problems" (Council Minutes, January 1983). He therefore asked the council to approve the need for public intervention in the southern part of Goutte d'Or (hereafter Goutte d'Or) and the initiation of the RHI procedure, which would allow the *Ville de Paris* to acquire under compulsory arrangements any buildings which the *préfet* had confirmed as insalubrious. The *Ville de Paris* aimed to demolish certain dilapidated buildings, rehabilitate a limited number of them and construct some public facilities, a crèche and a school being listed at the time. The Council voted unanimously in favour of initiating the RHI procedure and redeveloping the area. No social analysis of the area was carried out at that time. During the second presentation of the project to regenerate the area to the Council, the councillors were provided with no further details of the social aspect of the plan. The Council, dominated by the Right following the re-election of Chirac in March 1983, was asked to approve the initiation of a *Déclaration d'Utilité Publique* (DUP) procedure for Goutte d'Or, which would allow the *Ville de Paris* to use expropriation orders for both salubrious and insalubrious buildings in the area in order to establish a larger-scale urban intervention deemed to serve the public good, as housing conditions would be improved. Lastly, the Council was required to approve the Mayor's choice of the OPAC[31] as the public agency in charge of coordinating the regeneration process. In January and September 1983, despite a limited understanding of the social character of Goutte d'Or, the Council approved initiatives that could allow expropriation and demolition to take place once the *préfet*'s officers had completed a second survey and once the project had been presented for comment to the public.

A sociological study of the area was only commissioned in December 1983, after the main lines of the plan had already been drafted. Thus, understanding of the social reality of Goutte d'Or was based on perceptions of the area rather than on scientific facts. A generally derogatory view of the Goutte d'Or infused the documents of the municipality. Rocher, councillor from the majority party, noted the Goutte d'Or's "overall mediocrity"

[31] OPAC is a public agency constructing social housing but also carrying other land development projects.

(Council Minutes, January 1983). The municipality attributed the deterioration of the district in part to the arrival of migrant workers, stating that "this movement of population combined with the anarchic development of private properties, has triggered an accelerated process of deterioration." (*Exposé des Motifs*, 1983). The municipal documents emphasised the high level of illegal and criminal activities in Goutte d'Or

> "A part of the population lives in hiding, has neither residency permit nor work permit and refuses to regularise its situation, living without respecting any regulation and thus avoiding national and local taxation." (*Exposé des Motifs*, 1983).

> "The development of delinquency, the growing dangerousness of the neighbourhood led to the decaying of the neighbourhood's social situation, as upright citizens are being chased away by misfits. We must urgently halt this process of [social] decay." (*Exposé des Motifs*, 1983).

While actions on the built environment involving expropriation, demolition and rehabilitation dominated the description in the political and administrative documents, the municipality, nonetheless, had broader ambitions than just improving the physical aspect of the area. Yet, it appears that social benefits were conceived of as deriving from physical upgrading. No social plan was prepared for the area. Adopting a discourse that was promoted nationally and encouraged the adoption of an integrated approach, the municipality claimed that the plan should "not restrict itself simply to treating the physical aspects, but take into account the social, human and cultural elements of the neighbourhood" (*Exposé des Motifs*, 1983). With the exception of the construction of a police station, no programme of social projects or public and community facilities was added to the draft plan. In fact, it is doubtful whether the plan was designed to benefit the indigenous population at all. On the contrary, the municipality aspired to change the social composition of the area. Without specifying the exact nature of the changes envisaged, the working document presented to the Council in January 1983 announced:

> "The will to improve the quality of life and the social environment has the objective of revalorising the southern part of Goutte d'Or so as to obtain its **physical and especially its sociological transformation**, so that this deprived area regains its fundamental function as a place for culture, work, exchange and conviviality." (*Exposé des Motifs*, 1983, emphasis added).

Other internal documents reveal the Ville de Paris's willingness to change the social and ethnic composition of the area:

> "It would be pointless to spend a lot of money to modernise the built environment if we do not change the sociological composition of the population, meaning a decrease in the proportion of immigrants, which is excessive, and the return of a national population. On the other hand, we must ensure that delinquents and eccentrics are incapable of causing harm." (Memorandum from the Secrétariat-Général to the Direction de la Construction et du Logement, *1983*).

"The retained objectives are those normally associated with regeneration projects:
- the improvement of buildings
  - rehabilitation
  - specified new construction
- gentrification (*reconquête sociale*)." (Internal Memorandum, *Ville de Paris*, 1983).

In the light of these comments, it is questionable whether from the outset the renewal of Goutte d'Or was designed to benefit its indigenous population, whose future was unclear. In this regard, the absence of a detailed rehousing plan is indicative of the minuscule concern the city had for the local population. The working document acknowledged that the regeneration operation would result in the displacement of a part of the population but no attempt was made to quantify with any degree of accuracy the number of persons concerned or to clarify where the displaced population would be relocated. The sites for relocation were evoked in vague terms:

> "The possibilities for nearby relocation, in the 18th *arrondissement* are limited. There is the disused land owned by the S.N.C.F, the *Gare de l'Evangile* site. In any case, the construction of new flats there will probably not suffice. We shall have recourse to new developments in the north-east of Paris; we shall not rule out the possibility of rehousing people in the suburbs which, whether we like it or not, might be unavoidable for some families." (*Exposé des Motifs*, 1983).

The lack of attention to establishing a detailed rehousing plan can be attributed to the negative vision of the area which the councillors and the administration possessed. The public authority saw it as a sanctuary for squatters and illegal migrants, which led them to believe that the rehousing question would resolve itself:

> "It is not excluded that the rehousing problem will reveal itself to be less arduous than anticipated. In fact, a part of the population lives in hiding. It is evident that this atypical population will itself attempt to find new accommodation in order to retain its anonymity." (*Exposé des Motifs*, 1983).

The lack of clarity in relation to the social consequences the project was to have on the local population provoked a few interventions from the opposition parties during the council sessions. Although the municipality had provided a clear list of the buildings it wished to demolish and rehabilitate, it remained vague on the nature of the buildings that it planned to construct. While the municipality required the council to approve a public-housing agency as implementer of the plan, it remained unclear whether or not this body would build only social-housing units, since the plan referred to the need to coordinate the efforts of different constructors, which could have been either public or private developers. The opposition expressed concerns both about the type of new buildings to be developed in

the neighbourhood, questioning whether or not they would be suitable for low-income groups, and about the relocation plan, as they attempted to clarify whether displaced households would, as far as possible, be relocated on-site or predominantly outside the area. The constant vagueness of the municipality's responses on that subject led the Socialist Party and the Communist Party to abstain from voting in favour of the draft plan in March 1984. They argued that the social impact of the plan had not been adequately addressed. The speaker for the Communist Party asserted:

> "The social content is essential. We will not tolerate the regeneration and rehabilitation of the Goutte d'Or area leading, once again, to the eviction of low-income people from the capital, to build and regenerate other than in the interest of this population. In conclusion, we believe that the agreement does not give us sufficient guarantees regarding rehousing" (Council Minutes, March 1984).

However, the abstention of these two political groups did not prevent the approval of the draft plan and the initiation of the DUP and RHI procedures, as the R.P.R and U.D.F. possessed an overwhelming majority.

Another reason for abstention was the poor level of information provided to the local population and its involvement in the drafting of the plan. The speaker for the majority defended a traditional vision of participation, which consisted of seeking input after drawing up a plan:

> "Believe it or not, M. Jospin, whatever the nature of the problem we have to treat, be it local or national, we have a totally different approach As a general rule, we prefer to think before acting. Therefore, we start thinking, we put procedures into place and we get surveys done. Then, naturally, we will be able to choose, with the administration and the councillors, the type of development plan we wish for Goutte d'Or. From that time on, of course, M. Jospin, and you know it, I told you many times, an information centre will be opened; it will be possible to present the plan to the public scrutiny." (Council Minutes, March 1984).

This dispute over the provision of information and the method of consultation, informs us about the municipality's conception of appropriate participation. Its actions were very limited and not only signalled its unwillingness to involve the population in the decision-making process but also its desire for social control. At that stage, only the nomination of a councillor to liaise with the population had taken place. Although the city was planning to open an information centre, its establishment was linked to the desire to control the information given to the population and to ensure that such communication was favourable to the plan; it was a marketing and social-control exercise rather than serious consultation. The municipality hired a private public-relations agency to devise a plan for public communication. A memo written by the agency after meeting the municipality, which

aimed to "formalise a certain number of objectives wanted by the municipality" (Memorandum of meeting, Cabinet Golder, 15/09/83), reveals the municipality's conception of communication, notably in terms of the management of public opinion:

> "The issue of communication towards the public will be, without doubt, responsible for a large part of the global image of the operation and of the local authority that has clearly decided the programme. It would therefore be a matter of:
> Explaining in order to reassure, motivate and cool the situation (*take the heat off*)
> Regularly taking the full measure of what is said and felt in the sector
> Controlling what is said and, if needed, written about the operation."
> (Memorandum of meeting, Cabinet Golder, 15/09/83).

The municipality's desire to control the communication and information processes can be ascribed to fears regarding possible political repercussions of poorly managed communication:

> "The essential objective, beyond the eradication of insalubrious buildings, is to avoid leaving oneself open to regarding the setting aside or deliberate eviction of immigrants, or a sociological shift seen as too pronounced 'upwards', or lastly following demonstrations of evident frustrations from displaced inhabitants. Criticisms that could have a strong political impact." (Memorandum of meeting, Cabinet Golder, 15/09/83).

Thus, the information deficit can be explained as resulting from the fear of a negative reaction from the population. Yet, this lack of information would actually become the source of the contestation movement that surfaced in 1983 and intensified during 1984.

7.1.3. Divergence of Opinions Regarding the *Politique de la Ville* Programme

Left-wing councillors attempted to influence the nature of the regeneration project by opposing certain elements of the plan during the Council debates but failed to obtain any changes in terms of either rehousing rights or the provision of information to the local population. They also campaigned to integrate the regeneration of Goutte d'Or into the national programme, known as the *îlot sensible* programme, which had been initiated in 1982 by the Socialist government. The *îlot sensible* programme was conceived as a pilot project, which aimed to find innovative ways to address neighbourhoods with a concentration of social problems. The emphasis was put on the need to coordinate social and physical actions, departing from past renewal programmes, which had focused mainly on the physical elements. It viewed central decisions as incapable of solving the problems of disadvantaged neighbourhoods and therefore promoted the definition of plans at local level by local councillors, who were encouraged to involve the inhabitants in the definition of appropriate actions. The *îlot sensible* programme was the precursor of the *politique de la*

ville programme, an area-based policy aiming at solving both urban and social issues in an integrated manner. The policy originally developed by the Left was ultimately pursued by successive governments in diverse forms. Yet, in the 1980s, strong tensions existed between the Left and the Right, as they struggled for power. The Left had won the presidential election in 1981, and then the legislative elections. However, the local elections of 1983 were a victory for the Right, especially in comparison to the 1977 municipal elections, which had seen many localities elected left-wing mayors. The Right planned to regain control at national level by differentiating itself from the Left at local level. As a result, a few mayors, including Chirac, experimented with neoliberal practices, such as the privatisation of local services and the involvement of private interests in the renewal of deprived areas, driven more by a desire to distinguish themselves from the programmes of socialist municipalities than out of any wholehearted embracing of neoliberal ideology (Lorrain, 1991). Their ability to experiment especially with physical planning issues had increased with the 1982-1983 decentralisation laws, which had reinforced the powers of the mayor and local government. Integration in the *îlot sensible* programme depended on approval at both central and local levels.

In 1982, Jospin, socialist councillor and deputy, asked central government to include Goutte d'Or on the list of areas that could participate in the programme. However, the municipality initially judged it unnecessary to participate in the initiative, the majority announcing its refusal during the original presentation of the draft demolition plan at the Council meeting of January 1983. Jospin attempted unsuccessfully to sell the practical and financial advantages of the programme, arguing that the neighbourhood would receive priority funds for social actions. Yet the implementation of the physical regeneration plan was dependant of the government's cooperation, since the costs of eradicating insalubrious dwellings accommodations would be covered up to 80 percent by the state[32]. During the Council debates, Jospin hinted at the possibility that the government had to exploit this bargaining power:

> "I cannot imagine, Mister Mayor, that you would launch such an operation if you were not certain of this [financial] assistance [...]. In these conditions, I believe it would be reasonable that the City gives, finally, a positive response to the proposal made by the Dubedout Commission, now Commission Rodolphe Pesce in charge of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, to classify the sector Goutte d'Or in the category *îlot sensible*." (Council Minutes, September 1983).

Chirac revealed his awareness of this bargaining power in writing to the Minister for Urban Planning and Housing:

---

[32] The normal figure was 70% and 80% for area with a high proportion of migrants

> "Given the importance of the operation, would you please confirm that you agree, in principle, to State participation, which would mean financing 80 percent of the RHI deficit in conformity with the rules that usually apply to such action, and financing a specific plan for rehousing the population. I add that it seems to me desirable that, in the event that the operation would take place under these conditions, it would be selected as *îlot sensible* in the name of the 1984 programme." (Letter from Chirac to the Minister for Urban Planning and Housing, dated 22/08/1983).

The Mayor also requested the administration to meet the CNDSQ to assess further the benefits of the programme. Civil servants presented its financial advantages, proving that the funding issue had potentially a strong role in changing the municipality's attitude:

> "The CNDSQ, while not having its own budget, benefits from the right to access certain governmental budget lines, notably from the Department of Housing (RHI, for example). The CNDSQ prioritises a global approach in the treatment of the problems encountered in each operation by allowing a spatial concentration of budgets from different ministerial origins." (Memorandum from the *Direction pour la Constuction et le Logement*, 20/12/1983).

Reassurance was also given regarding the risks of interference from the State. In the same memorandum, the administration announced that local government would keep "total political responsibility for the operation" and that therefore:

> "*A priori*, the will shown by the municipality to reduce the ghetto character of Goutte d'Or, to put a stop to squatting and to obtain a sociological diversification should not be contested by the CNDSQ, despite its obvious concern to relocate as far as possible immigrants on site." (Memorandum from the *Direction pour la Constuction et le Logement*, 20/12/1983).

In May 1984, Juppé confirmed to the State that the municipality would adhere to the programme, while the first *îlot sensible* meeting which included community groups took place in November 1984.

In conclusion, the signing up of Goutte d'Or to the *îlot sensible* programme was a point of contention which was resolved, as the municipality finally recognised its financial benefits and came to the conclusion that the government would not be in a position to dictate particular solutions to them. The acceptance can also be linked to the desire not to upset the main finance provider for the project.

7.1.4. Community Protest against the *Ville de Paris* Regeneration Project

In the preceding sections, it was seen that the regeneration of Goutte d'Or formed part of a larger regeneration project for the eastern part of Paris, which the municipality considered to be in need of upgrading. The redevelopment project for the Goutte d'Or district was presented to the Council during the last session prior to the 1983 local elections. With his large success during these elections, Chirac consolidated his authority

on the Parisian council and declared the regeneration of the east side, including Goutte d'Or, to be a priority for his second mandate. The opposition criticised the *Ville de Paris* for failing to consider the potential impacts of the draft plan on the local population. Yet, this critique had limited consequences, since Chirac had a large majority in the Council. While the Left had obtained the integration of Goutte d'Or in the *îlot sensible* programme, the municipality remained free to decide what actions to implement as part of its regeneration plan, as the *îlot sensible* programme was a pilot project and not legally binding. The *Ville de Paris* did not appear to adhere to its main guiding principle. Although the *îlot sensible* policy[33] promoted an integrated approach to regeneration, the majority voted in favour of a draft project focusing overwhelmingly on the physical regeneration of the neighbourhood. The socialist central government had limited powers to amend the project's thrust, since its *îlot sensible* policy also promoted the definition of regeneration projects by local rather than central government, based on the principle of local self-government. This principle also guided the decentralisation laws passed by the socialist government in 1982-1983, which significantly increased local-government powers in physical planning. These new laws further restricted the central government's ability to influence the nature of the project.

At best, the *préfet* could encourage the municipality to avail of the national special funds to support the setting up of social programmes and services by public and community actors in districts targeted by the *îlot sensible* policy. Additionally, by integrating the pilot scheme, the municipality was expected to find innovative ways of involving the local population in the plan-making process. Yet, no structure was put into place to inform or consult the inhabitants prior to the plan being drawn up, which would have given them the opportunity to present their needs. The consultative process was conceived only in terms of the submissions of comments on an already-drafted plan. This lack of consultation became a major source of criticism among resident groups, such as Paris Goutte d'Or, which became a major opponent to the plan.

Initial actions of protest and their failure[34]

A group of local activists created a residents association called "Paris Goutte d'Or" (PGO) in August 1983. Its two main leaders were Neyreneuf, a high-school teacher and

---

[33] The *îlot sensible* policy was the precursor to the *politique de la ville* programme

[34] This section was written based of documents available through the *Association Salle Saint Bruno archives,* which hold all PGO archives and some of the municipal archives relating to the regeneration plan.

Masséra, a factory worker and had about 60 members at its inception. PGO was created a few months after the first vote of the Council on the regeneration plan, which initiated a procedure of *Résorption de l'Habitat Insabubre* (RHI) aiming at eliminating housing declared insalubrious by the *Ville de Paris* services. However, the establishment of PGO preceded the vote of a *Déclaration d'Utilité Publique* (DUP) procedure by the Council in September 1983 which authorised the *Ville de Paris* to acquire compulsorily all the buildings concerned by the RHI procedure and certain other dilapidated buildings in order to redevelop the neighbourhood. Before the expropriation process and area redevelopment could begin, national legislation required the Council vote to be followed by consultation in the form of an *enquête publique* (public inquiry), consisting of a presentation of the municipal project to the public and the collection of their comments. When PGO became aware of the project to regenerate the area, it decided to mobilise the local population to define the nature of the project in collaboration with the municipality, prior to its public display.

PGO expressed concern about the plan's social consequences and, to a lesser extent, raised concerns about its impacts on its architectural characteristics. PGO feared that the extensive demolitions that were planned would lead to the social transformation of the area's population. PGO feared the repetition of an approach which had been applied in Paris during the 1960s and 1970s which had led to the displacement of poor households to suburban social housing, as explained by one of its members:

> "We felt that the *Ville de Paris* wanted to carry out a bulldozer-type of renewal, to evict the residents and build something else. We had the example of what had just happened behind the Montparnasse train station. There, they had demolished and rebuilt the neighbourhood. We did not want that. I think that we gained a lot of support locally on that issue, we managed to mobilise people by saying 'we want to retain a working-class and multi-cultural neighbourhood'." (I-A)

Their apprehension stemmed from the absence of a precise rehousing plan and was aggravated by the eviction, in early 1984, of the 60 residents of an insalubrious building that the municipality had bought. The public authorities provided no help to the evicted whom they considered as squatters, despite the fact they were still paying rent to an unscrupulous landlord. Consequently, most of them temporally camped in the local church. PGO interpreted this incident as a sign that the municipality had little will to take into account the human and social dimensions of the physical regeneration of Goutte d'Or. The group condemned the handling of the eviction by publishing a press release, which stated that:

"The manner in which this operation is being handled is scandalous. If the public authorities act in this way, what will happen during the rehabilitation/destruction of the neighbourhood." (Press Release dated 8/02/1984).

PGO initially publicised its opposition to the regeneration plan by way of leaflets and posters, warning against the negative impacts of the plan and calling for the population to mobilise in order to obtain the drawing up of a new plan in consultation with the local residents to ensure that it better met its needs. The group also circulated a petition (Figure 7.3) that reiterated its main demands, which were:

- "To block the current decision-making process
- To give precise information to all inhabitants.
- To set up consultation structures prior to decisions being taken in order to alter the demolition programme.
- To schedule a clear and precise rehousing plan for all current inhabitants, including those living in hostels."

A M. LE PREFET DE PARIS

A M. LE DEPUTE DE LA CHAPELLE-GOUTTE D'OR

Les habitants soussignés , habitants du secteur de la Goutte d'Or - Sud , considérant que les projets actuels de destruction du quartier ont été élaborés sans concertation et que leur réalisation changera entièrement le caractère du secteur , demandent :

* que le processus enclanché soit bloqué en l'état
* qu'une information précise et globale soit donnée à tous les habitants du secteur sur les projets actuellement mis au point
* que des structures de concertation soient mises en place avant que les décisions soient prises afin que soit revu le programme des destructions , le classement des immeubles ainsi que les dispositions concernant les équipements publics
* qu'un plan clair , précis et programmé de relogement de tous les habitants actuels du secteur (même de ceux qui habitent dans des hôtels meublés) soit programmé .

Ils disent ainsi OUI à la REHABILITATION ,

mais NON à la DESTRUCTION du quartier !

NOM	Adresse	Signature
Rekkad	28 Rue de la Goutte d'or	
FOFANA	28 Rue de la Goutte d'or 75018 Paris	
ZEBBARI	28 Rue de la Goutte d'or 75018 Paris	
M. LE	28 Rue de la Goutte d'or	
R FOFANA	28 Rue de la Goutte d'or	
Z: SAMOURA	28 Rue de la Goutte d'or	
[illegible]	28 Rue de la Goutte d'or	
[illegible]	28 Rue de la Goutte d'or PARIS 75018	
[illegible]	28 Rue de la Goutte d'or 18e	
[illegible]	28 Rue de la goutte d'or	
[illegible]	28 Rue de la goutte d'or	
[illegible]	28 rue de la goutte d'or 75018	
ABRAND	28 rue de la goutte d'or	MAK
MAARAF	28 Rue de la goutte d'or	
Kaita	28 Rue de la goutte d'or 75018	

(Pétition à faire circuler et à déposer signée dans la boite aux lettres de l'Association "PARIS-GOUTTE D'OR" - 27 rue de Chartres - PARIS 18) .

Figure 7.3: Petition (Source: Association Salle Saint Bruno)

The group created a citizens' movement against the municipal project using intensive leafleting, posters and a petition to present its arguments. Yet, it also attempted to engage in a dialogue with the local councillors with the hope of altering the consultation process and the plan. In a letter dated 4/03/1984, PGO requested a meeting with Juppé, the elected representative responsible for the regeneration plan, in order to discuss its concerns. A copy of the petition was attached to the seven-page letter that detailed PGO's main objections to the municipal demolition plan. It argued that the planned operation failed to address the needs of the local population and that it would only result in displacing the problems. PGO attributed the inadequacy of the plan to the lack of understanding that the councillors and the administration had of the neighbourhood and its population and stressed that:

> "You need to know what type of changes the inhabitants desire in order to improve the quality of life in Goutte d'Or. So far, no decision-making body has deemed to ask them." (Letter from PGO to Juppé, underline in original, 4/03/84:3).

It criticised the administration for applying criteria usually used for slum clearance "mechanically and heavily" in order to declare the area insalubrious while ignoring more "qualitative elements" such as the need to "retain a working-class neighbourhood" (Letter from PGO to Juppé, 4/03/84:4). The lack of transparency and information provision was also a major criticism, reflecting a belief that the municipality was misleading and providing biased information:

> "During two years, in silence, the city had their investigating officers undertaking work. No one informed us seriously, honestly, before, during or today. We are promised a few public facilities but they are careful not to tell us that one hundred buildings are going to be demolished. Business owners are wondering: will they be maintained, compensated? Families are worrying. If our dwellings are demolished, where will we be rehoused?" (Letter from PGO to Juppé, 4/03/84:5).

The municipality did not grant the request of PGO either to modify the plan or to alter the consultation process. According to the municipal records, a meeting did occur in response to its letter. However, it would appear that it was held more in order to control and counter what was said on the project than to collaborate in defining a new project. The municipal Memorandum summarising the meeting reveals that the municipality doubted the seriousness of the group and its true motives, appearing to believe that its members acted more out of political conviction than out of concern for the common good, regarding them more as political agitators. In the Memorandum, it was stated that:

> "A priori, given the form of thinking in terms of urban planning, its obedience to or sympathy for communism seems likely [...]. Based on the principle that, at present, this association can prove itself to be effectively dangerous, we did not questioned the quality

of its intentions [...], but stressed that it is dangerous to play on the population fears." (Memorandum of meeting with PGO, *Ville de Paris*, 1984).

Indeed, according to a member of PGO, the first contact with the municipality was confrontational

"At first, Juppé saw us as political opponents who wanted to mess up everything" (I-B).

In the Memorandum, the soundness and seriousness of PGO arguments were systematically challenged. The municipality discarded the PGO's observations concerning consultation. As in the Council debates, its defence of existing procedure testified to the municipality's narrow, traditional conception of consultation. In the Memorandum, participation was described as exemplary in terms of information and consultation, since a public enquiry and the opening of an information centre during this enquiry were planned. Yet, this exercise only aimed at collecting observations on an already-defined project. The use of the Golder consultancy was presented as guaranteeing the exemplarity of the operation. Yet, this private consultancy firm specialised in communication rather than consultation. Another Memorandum revealed the municipality desire to better master its communication strategy in order to neutralise the resident group;

"[PGO] is consolidating its presence on the ground. A quaterly bulletin is going to be published. It is certain that the Golder agency needs to develop several responses on the issue of relocation." (Memorandum of meeting, *Ville de Paris*, 20/05/1984).

While still apprehensive of its impact, the municipality gave little consideration to PGO's demands as it saw its leaders as political opponents and considered them as not legitimate representatives of the population, given the victory of the Right at the local elections.

Intensification of mobilisation during the public inquiry

The municipality was applying the minimum legal requirement in terms of consultation of the population living in a neighbourhood targeted for regeneration through RHI and DUP procedures. The Council voted for the initiation of these procedures respectively in January September 1983. The RHI meant that the municipal administration could compulsory acquire insalubrious buildings after the *préfet* had carried out a survey of the concerned buildings to confirm their insalubrious nature. The DUP allowed the city to integrate a larger number of buildings in the redevelopment plan. Certain buildings, which were not substandard, could also be included on the list for expropriation and demolition if it were deemed for the public good *(utilité publique)*. Since the decentralisation laws, local government has control over a DUP procedure. While the DUP process involved a vote of the local council, in order to be legal, it also required a public inquiry (*enquête publique*) to

take place. Originally, public inquiries involved only property owners but, in 1983, the law Bouchardeau enlarged the notion of 'public' to all persons concerned by the redevelopment project. These are mandatory for a large number of projects ranging from neighbourhood regeneration to motorways building programmes. An individual (*Commissaire-Enquêteur*) or a team (*Commission d'Enquête*), chosen by the *préfet* from a list of citizens recognised as able to evaluate the public utility of a development project, carry out the inquiry. After inspecting the local-authority project and receiving comments from the public in writing or orally, these external evaluators pronounce themselves either in favour or against the projects involving a DUP. Yet, their role is mainly advisory. PGO attempted to convince the *Ville de Paris* not to restrict the consultation to the minimal legal requirement of the public inquiry. They feared that conducting the consultation process within this framework would not guarantee the integration of the population's voice in the regeneration project.

The public inquiry process is not merely advisory but, in addition, the *Commissaire-Enquêteur* and the *Commission d'Enquête* rarely deliver an unfavourable judgement (Blatrix, 1999). According to Blatrix (1999) the opponents are often regarded as a minority group by the *Commission d'Eenquête*, which tends therefore to speak against them on the ground that the majority who approve of the project tends to remain silent and not participate. Similarly, the councillors tend to see the public enquiry as "a platform for the opposition" (Blatrix, 1999: 165) and rarely see it as legitimate vehicle for public expression which, for most of them, should occur at election time. Yet, after failing to convince the *Ville de Paris* to modify their regeneration plan, PGO used the public inquiry to its advantage.



Figure 7.4: Poster concerning a local demonstration (Source: *Asssociation Salle Saint Bruno*)

PGO augmented its visibility during the running of the inquiry. It intensified its presence on the ground, mobilised and encouraged the local population to voice its opposition to the project and mobilised experts to speak in its favour. PGO became a key actor in the neighbourhood.

In order for its comments not to be discarded, it was important for PGO to demonstrate its representiveness to the *Commission d'Enquête* and to the councillors. It attempted to generate a critical mass of submissions to the *Commission d'Enquête*. It organised a demonstration involving the local population and shopkeepers, who closed their premises on a Saturday to protest against the running of the consultation process during the summer holidays and during the Ramadan, despite the high proportion of North-African residents in the area. The publication of the first issue of its newsletter also coincided with the start of public inquiry. Sold locally and distributed to the media and the councillors, the newspaper was a means of presenting its arguments, to inform people of the regeneration process and convince them to participate in the consultation process. In order to avoid a low turn-out during the inquiry, PGO helped to decipher and simplify the consultation process for the inhabitants. PGO obtained the support of two voluntary organisations, namely APFS and CGL [35]. The local population was advised to create 'block associations' in each building and was invited to avail, at no cost, of the technical and legal help offered by these two organisations to formulate their contributions. PGO also rendered the process of participating easier by publishing in its newsletter information that, taken together, represented a type of instruction manual. In its first issue, an article explained what a public inquiry was, where to find the inquiry register and when to access it. Moreover, the dissemination of PGO aguments against the plan through the publication of a newsletter and flyers led other actors to join the protest. For instance, ASTI, a non-governmental group representing migrant workers, took up many of the points raised by PGO and wrote to the *Commission d'Enquête* to support PGO's fight against possible changes in the area's social composition. PGO legitimacy as a voice of the local population was increased by the production of a booklet in which PGO gathered statements from 100 residents describing their attachment to the area and expressing their will to remain in the neighbourhood. In contrast to the image promoted by the councillors and the administration, the interviewed residents presented Goutte d'Or as a socially and ethnically

[35] The *Association Populaire Familiale Syndicale* (APFS) and the *Confédération Général du Logement* (CGL) are national voluntary groups dealing with housing issues.

mixed area. Their testimony emphasised the lack of understanding which the plan-makers had of the area:

> "A ghetto, our district? No, it is a sort of village. Goutte d'Or is a mix of cultures. Between neighbours we have rubbed shoulders for year. It is those who never come here who imagine that it is a ghetto." (L'Appel des Cent booklet, quoted in PGO newspaper 1, 1984:1).

Providing facts to invalidate the diagnosis of the municipality allowed them to question the appropriatness of the solutions prescribed by the *Ville de Paris*.

Besides proving its representativeness, another obstacle for PGO was to prevent its comments from being dismissed on the grounds that they related to the private sphere rather than public interests. The notion of *utilité publique* being subjective and vague, its definition is often a source of discord between different social groups during a public inquiry (Blatrix, 1999). In Goutte d'Or, the municipality's argument that it served the public good by improving housing and living conditions in the area was dismissed on the grounds that there was no evidence that this improvement would benefit current residents. The absence of a relocation plan made the evaluation of the plan's social impacts difficult and therefore any claim that the regeneration project was carried out in the public interest. It was an essential document missing in the file submitted to the public and the *Commission d'Enquête*. This omission was particularly problematic because of the lack of clarity regarding the rights of tenants living in hostels or those without any lease or bills in their name. For instance, the *Ville de Paris* was able to acquire an occupied hostel as an 'empty' premises, leaving the owner in charge to evict its lodgers. The destruction of nine hostels was planned. These structures were a form of *defacto* social housing for migrant workers. Local and national groups such as PGO and ASTI strongly condemned the lack of consideration given to the fate of these residents. ASTI refered to the specificity of the population at length in its submission to the *Commission d'Enquête*. Referring to "people in hostels (*hôtels meublés*)", "people who pay their rent in cash to (real or fraudulent) owners", "people who ceased paying rents because the accommodation was not maintained", "people who share accommodation because of the housing crisis", it asked:

> "What solution does the current project offer to these people??? By failing to mention them, we can assume they [the plan-makers] are not taking them into consideration, except hoping, as said by M. Chirac during the 17th of January 1983 Council session that they 'will vanish'.
> NO PUBLIC AUTHORITY CAN IGNORE THE FACT THAT THROWING THEM INTO THE STREETS WOULD RECREATE AND AGGRAVATE THOSE PROBLEMS ...
> ...EVEN IF THAT HAPPENS IN OTHER NEIGHBOURHOODS...
> ...PROBABLY IN SUBURBANS DISTRICTS" (Letter from ASTI to the *Commission d'Enquête*, 1984: 5).

Local groups strongly challenged what they saw as a distortion by the municipality of what the public interest should entail:

> "The most affected – as usual – will be the most disadvantaged: French and immigrants. We cannot accept that the area be drained out of its residents under the pretext of regeneration. Is it not rather a project that might lead to speculation and deportation of most deprived families? We would like to receive written guarantees and commitments concerning the questions we are asking." (Letter from ASTI to the *Commission d'Enquête*, 1984: 1-2).

> "This project is a political operation at the expense of the public interest. The Mayor of Paris, J. Chirac, intends fix the problem of migrants once for all (poor French people are also included among them) to strenghten his authority, by playing on the current racist tendency of some of his voters." (PGO Newspaper 1, 1984: 1).

> "When they promised that they will take care of us in the neighbourhood, they meant...that Mr. Chirac should be allowed to throw us out of our neighbourhood and destroy our homes with the help of the State (which finances up to 80% of the cost)...
> **We will not leave the neighbourhood!"**
> **"We want to keep our homes and repair them with the help of State money, which is also our money!**" (PGO, Newspaper 1, 1984: 2).

The municipality's espousal of a traditional demolition-redevelopment approach was challenged on social and heritage grounds. To respond to the critique regarding the lack of respect for the area's heritage, the *Ville de Paris* had insisted that the choice between conservation and demolition was not motivated by political motives, but based on strictly scientific measures. Therefore, PGO sollicited the assistance of experts during the public inquiry. PGO cast doubts on the validity of the municipal diagnosis by encouraging the *Commission d'Enquête* to take into account broader criteria than rebuilding costs and the national definition of insalubrious premises. PGO emphasised the negative social costs of demolition, while the experts highlighted the costs in terms of loss of heritage. Culot, an architect and member of the National Commission for Historical Buildings, argued:

> "Without questioning in any way the work and the technical abilities of the inspectors who took part in the selection of apartment buildings destined to be demolished, a visit to the place demonstrates that the questionnaires used to determine the degree of salubriousness of the buildings did not integrate all the parameters inherent in this area. I must admit that, leaving aside the social issues, which are not my area of expertise, the architectural qualities of the edifices, those of public spaces and courtyards, are far from being taken adequately into account in the surveys....It appears to me that the work completed under the sanitary aspect should be amended today on the basis of a more detailed heritage study."(Letter from Culot to PGO, submitted to the *Commission d'Enquête*, 1984).

A technical report written by four professors supporting PGO's stance was also submitted to the *Commission d'Enquête*. By having recourse to well-respected experts, PGO highlighted that the municipal diagnosis was actually far more subjective than the municipality wanted to admit.

7.1.5. Gains Obtained Through the *Enquête Publique*

Community groups considered the length of the inquiry and the information provided by the municipality insufficient to assess the interest of the project for the public good. The *Ville de Paris* had refused to interrupt the decision-making process or postpone the inquiry. The public inquiry was originally scheduled to last four weeks, as required by national law. Consequently, the *Commission d'Enquête* came under pressure to use its right to request a two-week extension from the *préfet*. The *préfet*, who is accountable to central government, granted this demand and prolonged the inquiry until the 21st September 1984, taking into account the summer holiday months. He justified his decision on the grounds that the *Commission d'Enquête* received insufficient information "to validly appreciate, within the initial timeframe allocated, the public interest of the different aspects of the project" (Letter from the Préfet to the Mayor of Paris, 4/07/1984). For the first time, the demands presented by the community groups were being taken on board. Yet, local councillors were still reluctant to accept them. Juppé had still a negative vision of community input. In a press conference held on the 3rd July 1984, he referred to local groups against the projects as "political agitators trying to stop any initiative". His request to grant more time to the *Commission d'Enquête* to write its report instead of prolonging the time for the public to submit comments was refused by the *préfet* (Letter from the préfet to the Mayor of Paris, 4/07/1984). The *Commission d'Enquête* also used its power to request the *Ville de Paris* to provide additional information and to set up public meetings, leading to one information meeting in September which was open to a limited number of local groups including PGO and ASTI. It represented a turning point in the regeneration project. The municipality provided its first estimate of the number of people who would be displaced by the demolition plan and identified social-housing complexes under construction in Paris that could be used for rehousing. For the first time, the municipality also committed itself to providing support to people that did not qualify for rehousing under national laws and to build 'very social' housing units on-site to preserve the social composition of the area. Yet, no written or statutory guarantees were given, preventing groups such as ASTI to take a position in favour of the plan (Letter from ASTI to the *Commission d'Enquête*, 09/1984).

The level of participation to the public inquiry was high; 328 individual or collective observations appeared on the inquiry register, while the *Commission d'Enquête* received 91 letters and petitions (*Procès-verbal d'enquête publique, 1984*). In total, almost

900 people expressed their opinions, only about 40 of whom were in broad approval of the plan (*Procès-verbal d'enquête publique, 1984*). In its report, the *Commission d'Enquête* provided an appraisal of "the rightfulness and scope of the diverse observations with regard to the public utility of the operation" (*Procès-verbal d'enquête publique, 1984*: 18). It dismissed the criticisms regarding the lack of information and consultation as "having little ground" (*Procès-verbal d'enquête publique, 1984*: 20). According to the *Commission d'Enquête*, the municipality had surpassed the minimal requirements by announcing its intention to regenerate the area in several newspapers, opening an information centre in the neighbourhood and it had provided additional information during the extension of the inquiry. Therefore, its decision was based on a relatively traditional vision of participation; one based on the mere provision of information. Diverging from the residents groups, they did not acknowledge the need for a co-definition of the plan between the *Ville de Paris* and the residents, even though they regretted

> "The services that conceived the regeneration project did not make more direct and frequent contacts with the inhabitants and the local associations, whose knowledge of the area and studies of the sector could have complemented and updated the basic data that were available."(*Procès-verbal d'enquête publique,* 1984: 21).

In contrast, the absence of a relocation plan was deemed to be a valid criticism. The *Commission d'Enquête* argued that the nature of measures put into place to rehouse the local population represented a key element to consider when assessing whether or not the plan could be declared as serving the public good. It agreed with the local groups about the necessity of obtaining a written commitment and used its legal entitlement to require additional information to obtain a written confirmation of the reassurances the municipality had verbally given to local groups during the September meeting. The *Commission d'Enquête* also attached the rehousing plan submitted by the Ville de Paris in October to its final report, thereby making it a public document. Moreover, it concluded that the acceptance of the public utility of the project should de subject to the municipality's integrating this rehousing plan in the municipal decree legalising the DUP procedure. The obtaining of rehousing rights was a major achievement for community groups. In its second newspaper, PGO proclained these advances as "important progress" and welcomed the fact that the population had now a written document, which could be used as a reference (PGO Newspaper 2, 1984: 4). Finally, although the commission's position fell short of local demands in terms of conservation, the *Commission d'Enquête* did recommend that 13 buildings earmarked for demolition be refurbished, since they were not in a sufficient state of dereliction to justify demolition.

7.1.6. The Development of a 'Critical Partnership'

After reviewing the report from the *Commission d'Enquête*, the municipality voted on the DUP procedure in January 1985. Although the *Commission d'Enquête* had only an advisory role, its conclusions could have been used by the *Tribunal Administratif*[36], if the municipal decision to regenerate the area were challenged in court. The *Ville de Paris* decided to integrate the *Commission d'Enquête*'s recommendations "in order to not slow the regeneration operation" (Minutes of Council Meeting, 1985). It confirmed its commitment to implementing a progressive rehousing plan, which departed from its original plan and reflected the growing influence of PGO on the regeneration process. Written engagements were presented as part of the final plan and the DUP procedure was approved unanimously (Minutes of Council Meeting, 1985). The municipality granted PGO's request to create a new status called '*occupants de bonne foi*' (good-faith residents) entitling people without proper lease to be rehoused. In fact, the working document submitted to the Council for approval stated that:

> "The rehousing offers will concern not only people in a regular situation regarding their occupation conditions, that is those who will be able to produce a lease, but also those who will be considered as *occupants de bonne foi*, that is those who can justify of a verbal lease or any justification proving their occupancy." (*Exposé des Motifs*, 28/01/1985).

The only restriction applying was that the occupiers were to be legally resident in France. The *Ville de Paris* also committed itself to "endeavour" finding new accommodation for the long-term residents of hostels (*hôtels meublés*) (*Exposé des Motifs*, 28/01/1985). Although the phrase signified only a weak commitment to address their needs, it nonetheless provided some recognition of the need to put some provision in place for this population, as demanded by PGO. The approved plan comprised exceptional measures concerning the type of people to be rehoused, as well as special rules that departed from national guidelines in order to prioritise the allocation of new social housing units built in the locality to those affected by the regeneration project, even if they had not hitherto been on the municipal housing list. All units built in Goutte d'Or were to be reserved for the local population and those who had resided longest in the area were to be the first to be allocated an apartment in the area. In addition, a quarter of the social units becoming

[36] The *Tribunal Administratif* is the court, which deals with internal French civil service matters.

available (new or vacant) in the neighbouring 17th, 18th and 19th *arrondissements* were to be reserved for rehousing the local population.

Yet, the existence of a written document presenting the rehousing commitments proved essential. In fact, the legal situation of *occupants de bonne foi* soon raised difficulties for the plan's implementers, threatening their rehousing rights. The difficulty stemmed from the fact the concept of *occupants de bonne foi* had no legal basis and to the fact that the owners of expropriated building were entitled to greater compensation if they had no tenants. Therefore, some of the owners who had abandoned their properties did not recognise the occupants as *occupants de bonne foi*, considering them rather as squatters to claim full compensation. In this situation, the plan's implementer, the OPAC tended originally to they let the *Tribunal Administratif* decide on the issue, but the latter, for which the status of *occupants de bonne foi* did not exist, ruled against recognising them as renters and ordered the OPAC to pay the full compensation. In this situation, the OPAC initially tended to refuse to bear the cost of rehousing the tenants. The residents' group therefore had to remain vigilant to ensure that the municipality kept its promises and, when the situation occurred in 1986, PGO again used its newsletter to raise awareness. It used the publication of an article entitled "Rehousing: is the city reversing its commitments?" (PGO Newspaper 9, 1986: 1) and of the rehousing plan submitted to the *Commission d'Enquête* as a pressurising tactic. In fact, PGO remained highly mobilised during the implementation of the plan and used the publication as a vehicle for mobilisation and pressure. According to a member of PGO, the publication of the newsletter gave them credibility:

> "We published a newspaper in order first to talk about the neighbourhood and show that it wasn't a plague-stricken area and, secondly, we used it as a tool for debate. We were publishing the *Ville de Paris* proposals and our counterproposals. It was the only tool like that in Paris. There was their project and ours. We were trying to be impartial, not to distort their thinking and express clearly what we wanted. It gave us credibility." (I-A)

It is questionable whether or not their demands would have been fully taken into account if the residents' association had been present only during the definition of the plan and had stopped applying pressure during its implementation. Analysis of the different issues of the newsletter show that a number of disagreements persisted after the plan was passed. Yet, the relationship between the *Ville de Paris* and the residents' group improved significantly through the years. The households, which were not originally recognised as *occupants de bonne foi,* were rehoused and no further incidents relating to that issue were reported in the newsletter. Despite some struggles, the members of PGO provided through

the years a positive evaluation of the regeneration of Goutte d'Or and of its mobilisation. They noted their satisfaction regarding demands over the relocation of the residents. Already in 1987, statements from the president of PGO showed improvement in their relationship with the municipality and the resolution of that conflict. In an article he co-authored, he affirmed that:

> "First of all, we must recognise that, in general, the City's commitments (rehousing in Paris city all *occupants de bonne foi* who have legal residency in France) have been respected. For that matter, to this day, there are almost 250 families relocated in either old or new social housing units of the 18th and 19th arrondissement. Of course, for a few families, this relocation was only possible thanks to the vigilance and the pressure from the local groups, but what is important is that it took place." (Bogazzi and Neyreneuf, 1987 : 118).

In 1999, in issue 45 of the newspaper, the residents again expressed their satisfaction and concluded:

> "Rehousing process for the southern part of Goutte d'Or, mission accomplished. The last residents evicted because of the regeneration of the area have been rehoused in February. They used to live in an hostel [*hôtel meublé*]. It is evaluation time ; a total of 1,200 relocations took place since 1984. Let's say it, finally, it ran relatively smoothly. There have been a few hitches, but the stubborness of the residents' groups and the willingness of the councillors to respect their promises did pay off." (PGO newsletter 45, 1999 :8).

Similarly, more recently, one activist stated

> "It took a while, but the municipality took on board fully and recognised the category *occupants de bonne foi*." (I-A)

Secondly, community activists obtained some gains in terms of public and social facilities. The provision of such facilities had been lacking in the original plans. For instance, during the initial council debates, the opposition had requested the provision of a space for community groups, but the idea had been dismissed. In 1985, a coalition of 11 community groups led by PGO submitted the same request. Their demand was eventually granted in 1989, when a local chapel was acquired by the municipality in order to provide a facility hosting community activities. Its refurbishment became an additional objective of the regeneration plan. The activities developed within this facility have subsequently evolved but they have included activities supporting mainly unemployed and migrant people. Other gains have included the construction of a public library, a public medical centre and a sports ground.

These gains are attributed in part to the changes in attitude and to the setting aside of political differences between the community leaders and the key councillor in charge of the regeneration plan, as explained by the two main leaders of PGO :

" We always refused to align ourselves with any political party. Yet, we never refused to speak with the municipality because it was Right-wing. I think that Juppé understood that, he has permitted quite a few advances. " (I-A)

"At the start, Juppé conducted the operation. Broadly speaking, he saw us as protesters who wanted to mess up things. Progressively, he realised that working with us was in his interest and that it was more efficient. On the other hand, after being really confrontional, we became very pragmatic and Juppé understood that we were not ultra-leftist [*des ultra-gauchistes*] people trying to raise hell. Thus, bit by bit, we became real partners. Like that, we managed to introduce a lot of things. We gained the objective that people living in *hôtels meublés* would be rehoused. We obtained the creation of a post office, a convenience store, and so on, which were not planned originally. We obtained quite a lot of changes. " (I-B)

Some gains are also to be attributed to the integration of the Goutte d'Or neighbourhood in the *politique de la Ville* programme. This permitted access special funds, notably at national level, to implement some of the community programmes. For instance, the community centre funded a number of its projects through this programmes. The importance of this source of funding was recognised in the interviews, one community activists explaining that :

"We had not only to come up with ideas but also to find the funds. So, at that time, we had the *ilôts sensibles* programme, it helped. " (I-A)

The elected representative in charge of the *politique de la Ville* programme in Goutte d'Or was also Juppé, who took the responsibility for the regeneration plan and was the elected representative in charge of municipal finances. This role and its close relationship with the Mayor facilitated the release of funds for the social and physical regeneration of the area. As will be seen later, his departure led to the questionning of the design and implementation of the second phase of the plan concerning the northern side of the neighbourhood. The latter was suffering from dereliction but its regeneration was not regarded as being so urgent as that of the southern end and was postponed until the early 1990s, when Juppé intitiated a series of meetings with the same local groups to define a regeneration plan in consultation with the local community. The introduction of the *politique de la ville* programme helped to finance social facilities and services but it also contributed to the setting up of a few consultation meetings. Although at national level participation of the local population was a broadly-promoted principle, no formal structures were defined centrally. In order to define the measures to be funded and the sources of funding, a few regular meetings were set up locally. Local activists estimated that these meetings had a beneficial effect and provided the local community with spaces for dialogue with decision makers and public-service providers

> "The *polititique de la ville* programme, well, it gave us a serie of meetings we wouldn't have had otherwise. It gave us space for dialogue and interjection. " (I-A)

> "To place that [the social regeneration] in the framework of the *ilôts sensibles* programme pushed the need to organise meetings. Like that, networks got created and things slowly improved. At the end, we had a real consultation process. As long as Juppé was part of the municipality, it worked." (I-B)

The community activists generally expressed their satisfaction regarding the integration of their requests, with the exception of their requirements in terms of the preservation of local architecture. Their main overall goal had been that all people likely to be displaced by the regeneration process would be rehoused by the municipality within Paris and that those wishing to return to the area would be entitled to come back. Their fight for rehousing rights reflected a desire to see the social aspects of regeneration being taken into account and a desire to prevent a dramatic change in the social composition of the area, thereby retaining its working-class character. By the end of 2003, 1395 households had been rehoused as part as the implementation of the Goutte d'Or regeneration plan, 68 percent of whom were rehoused in the 18th *arrondissement* and 35 percent remaining on site (Association Salle Saint-Bruno, 2005). An additional 24 percent were allocated a dwelling in the neighbouring arrondissements (10th, 17th and 19th) and 8 percent were rehoused in other parts of Paris or outside Paris. In total, by 2005, 112 buildings had been demolished, representing 1600 flats and 500 rooms, and 850 social housing had been built, half of which had four or more rooms[37] (Mairie de Paris, 2005). The construction of large dwellings corresponded to a request from community groups, which wanted to cater for the significant presence of large families in the area, especially amongst migrants. The construction of large apartments in the south part of the area, where regeneration took place, contributed to an increase in the representation of apartments with '4 or more rooms' in the administrative district from 8.9 percent to 13.7 percent of the local stock between 1982 and 1999 (APUR, 2005a, 2005b). Most of the social-housing units had been built by 1998 (Figure 7.5). The living conditions in the administrative district area have improved after the regeneration of the southern part. While 54 percent of dwellings had been lacking at least one basic amenity (toilet or shower) in 1982, this figure had decreased to 20 percent by 1999 (APUR, 2005a, 2005b). Yet, this was still twice the Parisian average. This can be explained by the level of dereliction of the northern end of the area, which was not covered by the original plan.

[37] In addition to the bathroom and kitchen.



Figure 7.5 : Social housing units delivered as part of the Goutte d'Or and Château Rouge regeneration (Source : Association Saint-Bruno, 2005)

Lastly, Bacqué (2006) has shown that there is little evidence, in the southern part of Goutte d'Or, of the process of replacement of working-class and foreign migrants which commonly accompanies the renewal of disadvantaged areas. This has been accomplished by the construction of a significant number of social-housing units. With the renewal programme, which concerned the southern area, the percentage of social housing in the total housing stock of the *politique de la ville* perimeter increased from 1 percent in 1982 to 13 percent in 1999 (Association Salle Saint-Bruno, 2005). Figure 7.6 shows that, in the administrative district of Goutte d'Or, the proportion of maual workers had declined between 1982 and 1999. Yet, manual workers were still almost 2.5 times the proportion in Paris generally. On the other hand, the group 'higher professionals and managers' remained highly under-represented, even though their presence in the neighbourhood had increased. Data from the APUR (2005a, 2005b) also show that there was a decline in the foreign population but that it was still over-represented. In 1982, foreign residents comprised 34.2 percent of the population of Goutte d'Or administrative are, compared to 16.6 percent for Paris. By 1999, these respective figures were 28.6 percent and 14.5 percent In the Goutte d'Or area as defined by *the politique de la ville*, the unemployed were also over-represented in 1999, representing 23.1 percent of the economically active population, compared to an unemployment rate for Paris of 12 percent (Association Salle Saint Bruno, 2005 : 51). The population living in the social housing owned by the OPAC in 2003 in *the politique de la ville* area was particularly disadvantaged.

In 2003, the average monthly household income of people living in the OPAC dwellings located in the Goutte d'Or area[38] was ¤451, compare to ¤977 on average for households living in the Parisian OPAC (OPAC, personal communication, January 2009). Recently, there has been a slight change in the population, but the changes mainly concern the northern part of the district. During the last property boom (after 1998), the affordability of the private properties for sale in the area attracted a new upper-middle class population into Château Rouge, the northern end of the district, while low-income groups have managed to maintain themselves in the social housing stock of southern end (Bacqué, 2006; Mandel, 2005). The former group tends to buy and upgrade flats in Château Rouge, having great expectations regarding the regeneration of the area, which was announced as early as 1993. However, that regeneration process was stalled by the departure of Juppé in 1995 and was not again prioritised until 2001 upon the election of a new Mayor.



Figure 7.6: Social composition of Paris and Goutte d'Or in 1982 and 1999 (Source: APUR, 2005 a, 2005b)

[38] *Politique de la ville* perimeter

7.2. Regeneration Plans for the Northern district

7.2.1. 1995-2001: Left-wing *arrondissement* against Right-wing *Ville de Paris*

In the 1995 local elections, the Left gained control of 5 out of 20 Parisian *arrondissements*, located in the north-eastern working-class part of Paris which had been targeted for regeneration programmes under the Chirac mayorship. Protest movements from the local population, which regarded the upgrading projects undertaken by the Right from 1983 to 1995 as having been detrimental to their interests, resulted in the election of the Left in these five districts in 1995 (Lidgi, 2001). A group of socialist politicians, headed by Vaillant, obtained a majority of votes in the 18th *arrondissement*. Yet, an *arrondissement* mayor and its council have mainly a consultative role and lack access to public funds. All decisions, financial or otherwise, are taken at central level, by the Parisian council, which remained controlled by the Right between 1995 and 2001 with Tibéri as Mayor. Therefore, Vaillant and left-wing councillors were limited in their ability to initiate action and could act mainly as local government lobbyists in favour of local groups.

The defeat of the Right in the 18th arrondissement was accompanied by the departure of Juppé from the Parisian council following his nomination as Prime Minister by Chirac. As Parisian councillor in charge of local finances and influential collaborator of Chirac, Juppé had played an essential catalyst role in the drafting/design of the Goutte d'Or regeneration plan and, ultimately, his support had been crucial in the implementation of community goals. Juppé was replaced in his role of manager of local affairs by Bloch, elected to the Parisian council in the 18th *arrondissement* and nominated as deputy-councillor in charge of commerce. Two other right-wing councillors, Couderc and Lambert, assisted Bloch in dealing with local issues. Their arrival resulted in the collapse of the close partnership which had temporarily emerged, putting aside political differences between local groups and the Right, represented by Juppé. As explained by one high-profile community leader:

> "We were pragmatic and we had in front of us a smart man. At the beginning, he [Juppé] perceived us as political enemies, but then he realised that it was not about that. The proof is that when he left, after 1995, nothing further happened. Between 1995 and 2001, it was a disaster [...]. They didn't give a damn. The influential man in the 18th [*arrondissement*] for the Right was Bloch. His thinking was that the regeneration of Goutte d'Or had been highly costly and that, on top of that, local people voted badly since the Left had just won. So, at that time, he [Bloch] cancelled the Fleury project and the expropriation process was stopped." [I-B]

The reassignment of responsibilities previously held by Juppé to different party members affected the project for the northern end of the district, known as Château Rouge, rather than the project for the southern part, which had been completely drawn up and had, in large part been implemented by 1995. Almost half of the social housing units planned had been built by 1995. Although their construction was not fully completed prior to 2004, a large number of units continued to be produced under Tibéri between 1995 and 2001 (Figure 7.5). This might be due partly to construction delays and to the fact that those projects which had commenced under Juppé could not be easily interrupted. The main impact was on the completion of a planned social facility which was not under construction in 1995. Negotiations including local groups concerning the *politique de la ville* programme had led to the inclusion of a Music Centre in the CDV for the period from 1995 to 1999. The contract signed in 1995 envisaged that the facility's costs would be borne by the region, the state and the *Ville de Paris*. The region committed to set aside ¤9 million for this project. However, this particular contract and the associated commitment was due to expire in 1999, when any unused funds would be re-allocated to other projects. The *Ville de Paris* announced on several occasions the postponement of its own financial allocation. In 1999, Bloch revealed during a public council meeting the cancellation of the project on cost grounds. Similarly, in a letter written to PGO in 1999, Lambert stated:

> "On the question of the Fleury Music Center, my position is simple, I have never been in favour of this project, which is costly and does not appear to me to be a priority for the neighbourhood, think about the tax-payers' money." (Reproduced in PGO newspaper 42, 1999: 5).

The local groups had required the building of this amenity in order to counter anti-social behaviour and provide recreational space for local disadvantaged youths. The plot of land reserved for the centre had been acquired but remained derelict until a new shift in political power occurred with the election of Delanoë. Bloch also questioned the development of a community restaurant aimed to assist with the re-integration of ex-prisoners. The restaurant was to occupy the ground floor of one of the new social-housing blocks built as part of the Goutte d'Or regeneration plan and this project had been designed by the *Ville de Paris* in collaboration with the *préfet* and community groups as part of the CDV signed in 1995. The creation of the social enterprise was, however, retained after its proposed abandonment created controversy in the local media (*Le 18e du Mois*, 2000). However, under the influence of Bloch, all the other commercial premises delivered and managed by

the OPAC[39] on the same street *(rue des Gardes)*, were allocated to fashion designers. Bloch decided to transform the *rue des Gardes* into a 'fashion street' and convinced the OPAC, which had difficulties in leasing its new premises in Goutte d'Or[40] to lower the rental price for young creators. The Parisian councillor in charge of commerce, negotiated financial assistance from the regional government and obtained the support of the French Fashion Federation for his project. A dozen workshops-boutiques subsequently opened, the local population and local community groups criticising this initiatives for being inappropriate for the neighbourhood, despite the existence of a local African tailors community and for threatening its working-class feature. One community worker argued:

> "In Paris, certain populations are pulled away to create socially mixed areas. The typical example is *rue des Gardes*; it is not suited to the neighbourhood. There were articles in Elle magazine, targeting women of a certain social class; it was aimed at the *bourgoisie*." [I-C]

During this period, PGO regained its oppositional role and used its newspaper to protest against the actions of the *Ville de Paris*, especially against the failure to respect the terms of projects to which the previous right-wing municipality had committed itself. For Goutte d'Or, it affected mainly the completion of the Fleury Centre, but for Château Rouge, it meant that the regeneration project was significantly postponed and its nature considerably altered.

Originally, the northern end of the district was considered less derelict than Goutte d'Or, which explains why the regeneration project initially focused on the southern part. However, in 1993, the Council of Paris voted in favour of creating a regeneration plan for the Château Rouge area, which had continued to decline. The council debates stressed that the plan should aim to improve living conditions in the district. The council required the plan to be drawn up in consultation with the partners involved in the *politique de la ville* programme (DSQ contract), including community groups. The SEMAVIP, a semi-public agency controlled by the *Ville de Paris* was hired to conduct surveys on both physical and social issues in the neighbourhood and assist with the consultation process. Prior to the departure of Juppé, four public meetings were organised between 1993 and 1995, in addition to meetings reserved for community groups, The review of the PGO newspaper at the time indicates that local groups were highly satisfied with the consultation process, the proposals and the level of information received. However, the plan was not finalised prior to the arrival of the new municipal team. In 1996, the *Ville de Paris* organised a new public

[39] the largest public housing agency in France
[40] all located on the ground floor of new occupied social housing blocks

meeting during which local right-wing councillors presented their regeneration plan. The latter dealt only with the upgrading of the housing stock and its objectives were narrowly restricted compared to those defined during the consultation process. For instance, only 40 apartment blocks were targeted for public action, although the SEMAVIP had identified that 84 of them needed to be acquired publicly and demolished.

Despite local protests demanding the integration in the expropriation procedure of the other 44 blocks, the *Ville de Paris* decided to encourage the private sector to renew them by offering public subsidies to their owners by launching two OPAHs. One covered the period 1995 to 1997 and the second one, which offered larger subsidies, ran from 1998 to 2002. The procedure of compulsory acquisition was limited to 39 buildings and initiated in February 1998. However, until 2001, the production of social housing units remained slow. As exemplified by Figure 7.5, only 36 units had been delivered by 2001. Community groups, such as PGO, reproached the right-wing municipality for relying on incentives rather than coercive measures that would have allowed the construction of permanent social-housing units, and also drew attention to the absence of social facilities in the plan and the lack of an integrated approach. Moreover, they considered that the new municipality failed to sustain what they perceived to be a successful partnership across political groups under Juppé. Speaking of the regeneration plan for Château Rouge, PGO wrote:

> "It is to the legacy of Alain Juppé, to the partnership constructed during long years in Goutte d'Or, to the intelligent consensus sought with the opposition that they want to put an end." (PGO newspaper 42, 1999: 4).

The group considered that neither protest nor partnership could succeed with the municipality and believed its only hope rested with the election of a new city government. It concluded that:

> "The current context does not allow us to hope for a change in attitude. So, let's resign ourselves to our faith and wait for 2001 to return to this question with the new municipal team." (PGO newspaper 42, 1999: 4).

In 2001, the main community leader presented himself as a candidate for the local elections and was elected as part of a list incorporating socialist, communist and green activists. However, his vision for the area was challenged by a new generation of local activists comprising of recent gentrifiers.

7.2.2. The emergence of a New Local Actor: *'Droit au Calme' / 'Collectif d'Habitants Goutte d'Or Château Rouge'*

The two OPAHs launched in Château Rouge after 1995 had very limited impact on the neighbourhood. Many of the insalubrious blocks underwent no improvement work. The *Pacte de Paris*[41] (2002) showed that the second OPAH which commenced in 1998 had facilitated the limited upgrading work in only 13 out of 28 blocks by 2002. The area continued to decline physically and the provision of incentives to private actors was insufficient to reverse the situation of the most dilapidated buildings, despite the start of a property boom in Paris in 1998. These blocks either became derelict or remained occupied by very low-income groups who lived in overcrowding conditions, typical of the densely-occupied working-class residential districts of north-eastern Paris. However, the most recent property boom created strong pressure on this stock.



Figure 7.7: Paris social composition in 1982 (Source: Clerval, 2007)

[41] The Pacte de Paris is a voluntary housing organisation



Figure 7.8: Paris social composition in 1999 (Source: Clerval, 2007)



Figure 7.9: Median selling price of apartments located in Paris, Goutte d'Or Administrative area and the 18th arrondissement, 1990-2008 (Source: Chambre des Notaires, 2008)

The Parisian property boom that lasted from 1980 to 1991 generated significant gentrification in some working class districts (Clerval, 2007). As shown by Figures 7.7 and 7.8, in 1982, there was strong social contrast between the eastern working area part of Paris and the western bourgeois element; however, in 1999, the east-west divide was less marked due to the arrival of higher-income groups. Only a few dominantly working-class areas remained in the north-eastern part of the capital city. However, after 1998, overall market conditions exerted upward pressure on housing price in the north-eastern districts. Property prices in the administrative district 71- covering Goutte d'Or and Château Rouge (Figure 7.2) - have considerably risen in recent years, following the general Parisian trend (Figure 7.9). According to Barthélémy et al (2004), who compared the administrative district 71 with the neighbouring La Chapelle district, which had not undergone regeneration, the increase in property prices in district 71 could not be attributed to public regeneration policies conducted since the 1980s. Clerval (2007) also argued that the first phase of gentrification of Paris was mainly to be attributed to the actions of middle-class households spontaneously upgrading working-class housing during the 1980s boom.

The most recent Parisian property boom created pressure on the remaining working-class areas. In Château Rouge, this boom led to the arrival of a new population of middle- and higher- classes in the private residential stock (Mandel, 2005). Mandel (2005), who carried out a study of owner occupiers who had recently settled in Château Rouge, found that their principal reason for buying a property in this area was that they were unable to afford a property anywhere else in *intra muros* Paris. In fact, although the prices have risen in this district, they have remained lower than the Parisian median price (Figure 7.9). The price increase also started later in the administrative district 71 than in the rest of Paris, with a tremendous rise in real estate prices occurring after 2002. Indeed, in 2003, the administrative district 71 recorded the second highest annual increase in property prices at 22.5 percent (Mandel, 2005). Nonetheless, in 2005, the median price remained at ¤3,039 per sq.m in the area, compared to ¤4,750 per sq.m for Paris as a whole and ¤8,223 per sq.m for the Notre-Dame area (Mandel, 2005). Among those new gentrifying households attracted by the affordability of Château Rouge, Mandel (2005) found that some were also attracted by the working-class character of the area but many had moved hesitantly because of the poor image of the area but hoped for a change. Mandel's study and the study from *Coordination Toxicomanie*[42] (2006) highlighted that the new residents, mostly

[42] *Coordination Toxicomanie* is a community group offering a range of services for drug users.

arriving after 1999, conduct most of their activities outside the neighbourhood, working, shopping and socialising in better-off districts. Most of them who have children enrol them either in private schools or in public schools in other parts of the city because the educational level of the local public schools is regarded as inadequate. They rarely get involved in local events, such as the annual fair, and are generally not involved in community groups or in local politics.

Amongst the new incoming residents, a small group of activists has emerged, which has been highly active in trying to influence the nature of the regeneration policies for Château Rouge since 1999. Originally, they were gathered in a residents' association created in 1999, named *'Droit au Calme'. Droit au Calme*, which was very active at its origin, was dismantled after a few years when its president moved away but reappeared in the form of informal action group called *'Collectif d'Habitants Goutte d'Or Château Rouge'*. In 2006, *Coordination Toxicomanie*'s study estimated the *Collectif d'Habitants Goutte dOor Château Rouge* group's membership to number about 40 persons. These activists meet informally every week in a local bar and differ from other gentrifiers as a significant part of their social life is spent in the area. Opened with funds borrowed from other activists, one activist runs a tailor's shop and tea room in the area, which also acts as a meeting place. Many group members own a property in the area. The group includes an ex-social worker, a journalist, an architect and a lecturer and claims to have around 100 members. They tend to have a higher social status to the community activists who were mobilised during the regeneration of the south end of Goutte d'Or and are highly critical of the latter's actions. They use national rather than local media in order to voice their concerns, especially during periods of local elections. According to some journalists, this forms part of a strategy of lobbying the media and politicians in order to denounce what the residents' association argues is an abandonment of the district by the state, which contributed to the development of a *zone de non-droit* (outlaw area) (*Le Monde*, 2/10/00). Prior to the 2001 elections, they published lengthy articles in Le Monde (2/10/00), Libération (13/01/01) and Marianne (20/11/00), in which the residents' association accused public policies of leading to the 'ghettoisation' of the area. They use of the media to depict a very negative picture of the area. For instance, the author was invited to two of the group informal meetings in 2008, to which M6 (national TV channel) and RTL (national radio station) also were present. They offer journalist crews access to their properties to film drug dealing, prostitution and illegal trafficking activities. They have also organised

against drug-dealing activities in their blocks by invading the space used by drug dealers, such as stairways and the courtyards; their forcing a drug user to move out being presented as a success story for their methods compared to what is described as the inaction of the state. The group also uses the internet to voice its criticisms through the creation of different blogs and to put particular pressure on the candidates to the local elections in 2001. While community groups such as PGO also addressed and questioned local candidates on their plan for the regeneration of Château Rouge, the actions and criticism of *Droit au Calme* and *Collectif d'Habitants Goutte d'Or Château Rouge* were typically more virulent.

On its blog, now closed, *Droit au Calme* published a document named '*Projet pour Château Rouge*' presenting its vision for the regeneration of the district's northern section. Its plan comprised three components, namely housing, trade and drug issues. In terms of housing, it reprimanded the *Ville de Paris* for having let the northern area declined physically and mobilised against the potential replication in the northern section of the Goutte d'Or regeneration plan, which they deemed to have been a failure. The activists claimed:

> "Priority was given to the southern Goutte d'Or, according to a catastrophic, ghetto-creating policy of 'total social housing'. The local schools are now paying the price of this monstrous mistake." (*Projet pour Château Rouge*).

Droit au Calme demanded the creation of a new action plan for Château Rouge immediately after the elections that would focus on creating a socially-mixed neighbourhood and on upgrading the area's image to create a new cultural and tourist quarter in the vicinity of the *Gare du Nord* train station connected to London and Brussels. Concerning commercial activity, the main issue listed was the existence of nuisances due to the concentration in the area of stores selling 'exotic' products. In fact, the neighbourhood is famous for attracting visitors from throughout the Ile-de-France, seeking to buy African products, mainly food but also cosmetics. This 'exotic market' is considered as a source of nuisance because of the traffic and noise generated. The disturbances linked to the market were one issue already mentioned during the original debate on Château Rouge regeneration between 1993 and 1995; it is the only question on which 'old' and 'new' activists are in partial agreement. They consider that there is a need to diversify commercial activity. Yet, the 'new' activists are in favour of a radical change, while the 'old' prefer finding a balance. In its project for Château Rouge, *Droit au Calme* required that a new facility be found to host sellers of 'exotic' products. The relocation and regulation of this activity was called for and justified by the wholesale nature of the market

and the failure to adhere to food-hygiene legislation. The development of an illegal street market where stolen or counterfeit goods are sold was also taken as an example of the abdication of the state in Château Rouge in favour of illegal traffickers. In fact, in 2000, *Le Monde* (2/10/00) reported that *Droit au Calme* filed a complaint against the *préfet* for failing of the state services in the area. Thirdly, regarding drug issues, the group attributed the over-representation of drug users in the area to the setting up of structures for drug users, such as needle exchange facilities, by the public authorities under the framework of the Goutte d'Or regeneration plan and the *politique de la ville* programme. The community and voluntary structures benefiting from public support have been the target of harsh criticism because their approach rested on treating drug users, rather than the local population, as victims. *Droit Au Calme* called for an assessment of the local structures and an allocation of funds based on the results. *Droit Au Calme* have promoted an approach based on its conception of community services as a provider of solutions to reduce the number of drug users. This contrasts with the policy of risk reduction for drug users promoted by local service providers. The structures such as *Coordination Toxicomanie* and *Espoir Goutte D'Or*[43] aim to reduce the social exclusion of drug users by providing food, shelter and medical support. These structures were set up under the influence of the indigenous resident activists from the southern part of Goutte d'Or. For instance, people who militated in PGO helped to set up and find public funding for *Espoir Goutte d'Or* . However, militants from *Droit au Calme* and from *Collectif d'Habitants Goutte d'Or Château Rouge* estimate that these structures provide inadequate solutions.

For many of the militants in *Droit au Calme* and *Collectif d'Habitants Goutte d'Or Château Rouge*, the drugs issue provided the initial reason for their mobilisation and subsequent involvement in local politics, following what they describe as a disappointing encounter with local structures and community workers. One activist who bought a flat in Château Rouge in 1999 recalled her experience in these terms:

> "When I moved in here, there were junkies living everywhere in the building. I had to step over the bodies of spaced-out people to get home. I told myself that I could not live like that. So, I talked to the police, which said that there were community organisations that I should contact for help. That's why I got into contact with *Coordination Toxicomanie* and the other one, *EGO* [*Espoir Goutte d'Or*]. *Coordination Toxicomanie* just explained to me that there are junkies in society and that we have to live with them. It is one of these useless mediation service. So, I blew a fuse." [I-D]

[43] *Coordination Toxicomanie* and *Espoir Goutte D'Or* promote a therapeutic community approach for drug abuse.

These activists hold profoundly negative views of the different community service providers engaged in the area under public funding provided primarily through the *politique de la ville* programme, regarding them as partly responsible for the ghettoisation of the Goutte d'Or/ Château Rouge area. Many criticised them for being part of the poverty industry, arguing that it is against their self-interest to eliminate poverty. For instance, one stated:

> "Here, in the neighbourhood, community workers live on the misery of others. When you see the amount of money that is given by the municipality to community groups, it's frightening." [I-E]

Another activist explained:

> "First of all, there are too many community and voluntary groups in the area and way too many of them are financed by the state or by the *Ville de Paris*. There is a dense network of community-based organisation in the 18th arrondissement because there are heavily funded. Inevitably, these people do not want to lose their monthly payments but it doesn't necessarily mean that they are efficient. When I am told that an organisation that employs 20 people managed to get just 6 people off drugs, I am thinking that it's costing a lot for a very poor result. Anyway, the question should be asked differently. Are drug addicts offenders or sick people? If they are offenders, the police should intervene; if they are sick, they should be in hospital. A community organisation cannot help. In the whole area, you have only one or two capable persons in these community organisations; all the other ones are incompetent. In my opinion, they are rubbish." [I-F]

At best, some activists regarded their presence as contributing to minimisation of violent incidents and rioting and recognised that the area had been largely spared during the 2005 riots. However, they considered that this had been at an unacceptable cost and by accepting behaviour which was at odds with their conception of French society. One person argued:

> "There are a number of organisations that cater for very disadvantaged people such as ex-prisoners, drug addicts, single mothers and so on. Personally, I am willing to admit that thanks to them we don't have a situation as violent as in the 19th [*arrondissement*] or like in the suburbs. Paradoxically, they managed to do that by creating a counter-society and a way of life, which stands in contradiction with the ideal of social cohesion (*le vivre ensemble*)." [I-G]

> "The *Ville de Paris* relies on these community groups. They are paid with public money. They reduce the risks of social explosion but it is a problem that the municipality supports them, because these people they are not going to criticise the councillors. They might denounce capitalist societies, often they are people on the extreme left, but they won't oppose the municipality's plans." [I-G]

7.2.3. Victory for the Left in the Municipal Elections of 2001 and 2008

In 2001, the Right presented two lists of candidates to the local elections; one headed by the outgoing mayor Tibéri and one headed by Séguin, while the Left (socialist

and communist party) was united behind the candidature of Delanoë, the opposition leader since 1993. The Greens, led by Contassot, also stood for election with a separate list. In the first round of local elections, by adding the two right-wing candidates' scores, the Right had obtained a majority of votes and was, in theory, in a favourable situation again to win the municipal elections. However, the two leaders could not reconcile their differences and both stood for election in the second round. In contrast, the Left and the Greens decided to form a coalition and stood together on a unified list. The second round resulted in victory for this left-wing coalition in 12 out of the 20 *arrondissements*, which allowed its candidates to control a majority of seats in the Parisian council. Delanoë was elected mayor and succeeded to Tibéri (mayor from 1995 to 2001) and Chirac (mayor from 1977 to 1995). Delanoë was originally a local representative from the 18th *arrondissement*, which was one of the *arrondissements* won by the left-wing coalition. Vaillant, who was re-elected as mayor of the 18th *arrondissement*, led the coalition list in this district. The main leader of PGO ran for election as a non-party candidate of this coalition and obtained a seat in the *arrondissement* council but not in the Parisian Council. He resigned from the presidency of PGO, which has since been less active in local politics[44], as its other members were mainly involved in service-providing organisations and the production of their newspaper ceased after 2003. The election of Delanoë was followed by the re-commencement of a number of regeneration projects in the 18th *arrondissement*, which had been idle between 1995 and 2001. They included the redevelopment of two brown-field sites in the La Chapelle administrative area and regeneration of the Château Rouge sub-area in the Goutte d'Or administrative district. The definition and execution of these regeneration plans accelerated when the Parisian and *arrondissement* councils stood on the same political side[45].

Plan d'Urgence

In May 2001, the mayor of Paris organised a meeting with the local councillors of the 18th *arrondissement* and civil servants of the *Ville de Paris* in order to discuss possible responses to the main issues encountered in Château Rouge. According to the minutes of

[44] PGO is more or less inactive since its President was elected local councillor. Only one member remains active in local politics. Yet, many are involved in community structures such as *Espoir Goutte d'Or* or *Coordination Toxicomanie*.

[45] After 2001.

the meeting[46], there was a perceived urgent need to physically regenerate the area through public rather than private action and to reduce the nuisances and conflicts linked to the commercial activity in the neighbourhood. They also acknowledged the need to re-launch several abandoned projects, such as the construction of the Fleury Centre for music for the young and the construction of a mosque to resolve conflicts between different populations caused by the use of public space for prayer (Plate 7.2). The drawing up of an action plan, often referred to as the emergency plan, was decided. The councillors of the 18th *arrondissement,* including Neyreneuf, ex-leader of PGO, were commissioned to design the plan. A first draft was written in September 2001. The existence and content of this draft was presented to the public by way of the local media, namely by *Le 18e du Mois*, in January 2002 and by elected representatives themselves at a public meeting in May 2002.

Plate 7.2: Musulman believers praying in the street (Source: Author)

The draft plan identified six key themes, namely physical planning, commercial and economic activity, road and green space issues, public and social activities, safety measures and mosques. One objective was to purchase and redevelop substandard dwellings and derelict buildings in order to construct social housing. However, it was envisaged that in contrast to the previous plan for the south of Goutte d'Or, the focus would not only be on constructing 'very-social' housing units (PLAI) and transitional housing (*logement d'insertion*). Some 'upper-social' housing (PLS) units would be built on a limited number of plots in order to try to introduce social mix. On the other hand, all residents including those with sub-leases and long-term hostel dwellers obtained the right

to be re-housed by the municipality as long as they were legally in France. This surpassed the requirements of national legislation and represented an extension of the conditions obtained by community activists for the southern district. In terms of economic activity, the main aim was to purchase premises and use the ground floor of the social-housing blocks to boost economic activity. A secondary aim was to reduce conflicts arising from the concentration of 'exotic' shops by increasing health and safety controls and favouring the accommodation of artisans and community groups rather than 'exotic' shops in the new municipal buildings. A study examining the possibility of relocating wholesale activities was also envisaged. Other aims included the provision of community space, street improvement to reduce traffic issues, and enhancing the visibility of community police. The content of the plan remained largely unchanged subsequently, even though the details of the draft plan were not finalised before 2005, the date at which the *Ville de Paris* submitted its final regeneration plan to the ANRU in order to obtain state funds. Nevertheless, the plan's implementation commenced as early as 2002, initially using funds from the municipality. Another public meeting presented the draft plan in April 2003, while subsequently its components were discussed primarily in public meetings, known as *Conseils de Quartier*, which were conducted three or four times a year.

In parallel, the development of social measures such as training schemes and after-school support groups were pursued within the framework of the *politique de la ville* programme. The Parisian Council has increased substantially the funds available for community projects run as part of this programme after 2001, amounting to ¤610,000 in 2002 and ¤607,000 in 2003, compared to ¤277,000 in 2001 (Mairie de Paris, 2005). The district covering both Goutte d'Or south and Château Rouge has been targeted for exceptional treatment as part of the *politique de la ville* programme since 1982. It was integrated in the DSQ programme, the CDV programme, the ZEP programme and the *politique de la ville* perimeter has been classified as a ZUS area since 1996. This district has nonetheless remained one of the most disadvantaged areas of Paris. For instance, in 1999, the unemployment rate was 23 percent compared to 12 percent for Paris and, in 2002, 65 percent of pupils entering secondary school had repeated a year (Mairie de Paris, 2005).

The draft plan recommended that the different departments of the *Ville de Paris* focus prioritise their attention and funds towards the neighbourhood. Consequently, a person was hired to coordinate and speed up the interventions from various departments in

2002. A new procedure of property acquisition was initiated in 2002, covering buildings that had, against community wishes, been ignored by the 1998 procedure. Figure 7.10 shows that the action plan relied mainly on direct public intervention. Only a few sites were selected to receive incentives to encourage regeneration by private actors. This clearly bears witness to the influence of the 'old' community activist from Goutte d'Or who favoured a strong public actor to allow for the permanent retention of social housing and public amanities. The Parisian council voted two additional expropriation procedures in 2006, bringing the number of targeted sites to almost 60.

In order to speed up the acquisition of buildings and their redevelopment, the *Ville de Paris* delegated its power of expropriation and pre-emption to a semi-private company (a *société d'économie mixte*) called SEMAVIP. The Parisian council assigned the responsibility to implement the action plan to the SEMAVIP in 2002.

Figure 7.10: Action Plan for Château Rouge, 2005 (Source, SEMAVIP newsletter, 2005)

The SEMAVIP was charged with three tasks, namely redeveloping derelict and insalubrious buildings, upgrading public space and revitalising the area's economy. The OPAC, a public housing agency which was in charge of the southern-end regeneration, remained highly involved in the redevelopment of the northern end. While SEMAVIP had technical skills in land development and planning, OPAC is mainly a developer/builder. The *Ville de Paris* owns 77.5 percent of the SEMAVIP capital and the *Caisse des Dépots et des Consignations*, a public bank, owns 20 percent. The nomination of the SEMAVIP as plan implementer did not diminish the control which the public sector has over the regeneration process. The SEMAVIP has no decision-making powers; its action remains

closely controlled by local councillors who are present in different technical working groups, such as the rehousing commission, as explained by the SEMAVIP project manager:

> "There is always an elected representative. We facilitate these technical meetings; we make suggestions to the councillors, but they are the ones giving the green light and they are the ones coordinating the public meetings" [I-H]

Its role is strictly defined by the *Ville de Paris*. A contract was signed stressing that the SEMAVIP would need prior approval from the Parisian Council before acquiring any additional property not covered by the expropriation procedure but needed for the area's regeneration. The *Ville de Paris* provides the SEMAVIP with all the funds necessary to carry out the plan, by contributing resources from its local budget, by sourcing external funds from the ANRU and the regional government and by contracting mortgages to the *Caisse des Dépots et des Consignations*. The SEMAVIP remains a predominantly public-sector actor and the project remains a public endeavour. According to the SEMAVIP project manager:

> "It is not an operation a private developer could have carried out; it wouldn't have worked financially, you need a public-sector actor to bear the costs." [I-H]

The Parisian Council controls the release of funds, while the *Arrondissement* Council controls the definition and the implementation of the plan; all appearing to work in symphony. The costs must cover the compulsory-purchase procedure but also the purchase of properties acquired on a voluntary basis or by pre-emption. Indeed the *Ville de Paris* has engaged in an ambitious policy of property acquisition.

A local action plan as part as a broader Parisian policy in favour of social housing

This local strategy of property acquisition using the city's right of expropriation and pre-emption to effect the eradication of insalubrious housing and derelict sites in Château Rouge is part of a broader municipal policy aimed at developing the Parisian social housing stock. In fact, shortly after its election in 2001, the new Parisian local government announced its desire to differentiate itself from the previous right-wing municipality by increasing the production of social housing within the *Ville de Paris* boundaries. Delanoë set an annual target of 3,500 new social housing units for his first term of office. Re-elected in 2008, the mayor announced a new annual target of 6,000 units in order to ensure that 20 percent of the Parisian housing stock comprises social housing by 2014. His policy is based on the SRU law, passed by the French Socialist Government in

2000, which makes it compulsory for cities of more than 50,000 people to have rent controls in at least 20 percent of their housing stock by 2020. Moreover, the municipality wants to ensure a better distribution of the social-housing stock across the city and to even out the city east-west divide, by increasing the number of social housing units in upmarket districts.

These objectives may appear overly ambitious due to the cost and shortage of land in the French capital and to the fact that local government is still dependent on central-government funds to carry out its housing policy. French housing policies remain highly controlled by the central government which, in 1982-1983, refused to decentralise this policy in conformity with the principle of equal access of all citizens to public goods and services, including social housing. However, without minimizing the importance of these constraints, Pollard (2005) showed that since 2001 the *Ville de Paris* has developed a few innovative solutions. First, the *Ville de Paris* has required private developers to incorporate 25 percent of social housing within all new development projects. Secondly, it has asked one of its agencies to identify the owners of vacant accommodation and encourage them to rent to either students or disadvantaged households.



Figure 7.11: Annual production of social housing in Paris, 1998-2008 (Source: www.paris.fr)

Thirdly, the municipality has expanded its social-housing stock by purchasing existing private accommodation which do not require upgrading. Between 2001 and 2005, 39 percent of new social-housing units were produced in this manner (Clerval, 2007). Lastly, the *Ville de Paris* has relied on its right to expropriate buildings deemed irremediably

insalubrious in order to build social-housing units and public facilities. The Parisian Council delegated this power to another semi-private agency it controls, the SIEMP.

The SIEMP intervenes across the whole city. In Château Rouge, the SIEMP works in collaboration with the SEMAVIP. These properties often represent a *de facto* social-housing stock, where very disadvantaged people live in over-crowded conditions. It is important to note that applying social-housing standards leads to a reduction in the number of flats available and tenants housed. Moreover, reductions in funds at national level are affecting the municipality (Clerval, 2007). The central government privileges the construction of 'upper-social' housing (PLS) over 'standard' (PLUS) and 'very-social' housing (PLAI). Rents for 'very social' housing are well below average. In Paris, in 2005, rents were ¤5.14 per sq.m./ month for PLAI housing and ¤8.65 per sq.m./ month for PLS housing (Whitehead and Scanlon, 2007). In 2008, only 22 percent of the new social housing units financed in Paris were PLAI housing (Mairie de Paris, 2008). Figure 7.11 shows that the production of social-housing units increased during the Delanoë mayorship, but the percentage of social housing units increased only by 2 percent between 2001 and 2007, rising from 13.5 percent to 15.6 percent (Mairie de Paris, 2008). Although the actions of the municipality are not negligible, it is unsure that Delanoë will reach his 20 percent target by 2014. This policy of stimulus to social-housing development is limited by national government constraints, but also because of the opposition from part of the local population in areas such as Château Rouge to the construction of social housing, in the name of social mixing.

'Social mix', a controversial concept

One element of the new population living in Château Rouge is opposed to the construction of social housing in the area which, in their perspective, contributes to the decline and ghettoisation of the district. They argue for a mixed neighbourhood. Their discourse is in accord with the principles of the national policy of 'breaking the ghettos' by introducing middle classes into poor areas, promoted by the right-wing government since 2003 and its main agency the ANRU.

The *Ville de Paris* has in part adopted a discourse supporting social mix. Indeed, in response to local criticism, local councillors have promoted the introduction of social mix into their draft plan. The 'social mix' discourse was also mobilised in order to attract funds from the ANRU. However, it must be conceded that 'social mix' is a vague term. People

tend to have different representation of what 'social mix' signifies and what a working-class neighbourhood comprises. For instance, it is apparent that the municipality and ANRU have different conceptions when they refer to social mix. The *Ville de Paris* has stated its will to maintain the working-class character of the area and is using the construction of social-housing units as a tool to this effect, while the ANRU promotes the destruction of social housing and the construction of private housing for the middle classes. Civil servants from the *Ville de Paris* clearly identified this divergence. For instance, one explained

> " Promoting social mix - it is a political choice. It so happens that it coincides with ANRU's discourse. Now, it is clear that when ANRU and the municipality speak of mix, they are not talking of the same thing. When the local councillors speak of social mix, it is because they want to improve the quality of life in the neighbourhood; this includes improving the image of the area, making sure people visit the area, ensuring the area is more open and so on. The objective is to ensure the area and its inhabitants are less stigmatised by an image of deprivation, while ensuring that low-income groups can still live here. It is an objective which is difficult to attain because increasing the attractiveness of an area often chases away low-income groups; we have to work with that. So, it is not the same thing than when ANRU speaks of social mix. The discourse of ANRU is not the same as that of the Parisian Council." [I-I]

The discourse of the municipality tends to be ambiguous. The objective of the *Ville de Paris* is to maintain the working-class character of the area. Yet, the recurrent use of the term 'social mix' creates specific expectations from the existing population of gentrifiers who interpret the councillors' declarations according to their own conceptions of a socially-mixed area, which tends to exclude the presence of social housing. Therefore, the new incoming resident activists tend to be very critical of the municipal regeneration plan and actions. Their assessment is that the municipality has failed so far to introduce social mixing into the area. Different activists interviewed in December 2008 stressed their disappointment on that issue,

> "I am very angry. I knew it, but it has just been confirmed to me in front of 100 people at the *Conseil de Quartier* [public meeting]...that is, they are rehousing poor people in the same area, there's no social mix." [I-D]

> "We were expecting the creation of a social and ethnic mix from the regeneration process. It's not at all what they are doing; it's disgusting." [I-E]

> "What is urgently needed in the area is to bring the bourgeois classes in *en masse* or, if this expression is shocking, say help the middle classes to settle in." [I-G]

In other words, these residents promote the construction of accommodation for rent at market price and a new form of affordable housing for owners occupiers (*accession sociale á la propriété*). This desire could have been addressed through the transfer of sites to the *Fonciére Logement,* required as part of the acceptance of funds from the ANRU.

Yet, the municipality has determined that only accommodation in which rent control applies would be built on the sites transferred, even though in line with their objective of social mix, 'upper-social' housing will be built (Mairie de Paris, 2006). On the remaining sites, standard social housing will be built predominantly and 'very-social' housing will be mainly constructed outside the perimeter of Château Rouge but in Paris city.

This disappointment of incomers also concerned the nature of the activities in the publicly-owned commercial premises. Their disappointment was worsened by the existence of ambiguous discourses from the local councillors, reflecting divergences of opinions on this issue within the Left majority itself. For instance, the idea of implementing creative activities such as graphic design companies was evoked at some stage but lacked support from all councillors and was badly received by part of the population which feared a gentrification of the area. This resulted in the withdrawal of the project. The final plan presented to the ANRU did not integrate this option and instead envisaged a few convenience stores in addition to providing space for community and social-service providers. This choice was roundly condemned by many newly-arrived residents, for example:

> "The municipality said they would set up a creator district, but in all the buildings they have bought, they are putting in community groups, even though 98percent of people have had enough of the community groups" [I-E]

> "Except for four or five shops, overall, the commercial premises, they are occupied by municipal or para-municipal activities. It's a failure. There's no political will to change. You know, there are place like in *Sarcelles* where they create a ZFU area and use tax-incentives to attract new activities." [I-G]

The municipality has chosen to control the nature of the activities by publicly owning a number of premises rather than by creating a ZFU area entitling local businesses to avail of tax breaks, an option favoured by the local opposition and the 'new' activists. However, the creation of a ZFU in Paris is seen as a 'foolish' idea [I-B] by members of the Left majority as owning the premises allows them to negotiate some social gains in exchange for below-market rents. For instance, one of the premises was rented to a convenience store but the council required that two positions be filled by unemployed people, while others are occupied by companies employing people training to get back to work (*enterprise d'insertion*) or by social services providers which have difficulties in paying market rents.

The municipality has granted a number of concessions to the newcomers. In order to reduce the conflicts linked to noise, traffic and hygiene issues due to the massive sale of 'exotic' products in local stores and in the local street market, the right for local shops to

have a stall on the pavement has been abolished in numerous instances. The repairing of the local streets has been used as an opportunity to regulate better the use of public space. A number of premises are also being allocated to more traditional activities in an attempt slightly to diversify the local economic activity. The allocation of the first premises to be completed has involved an organisation providing free legal advice for disadvantaged people faced with issues of immigration, housing or domestic violence, a community group offering subsidised computer courses, and a community project providing space for young people. After allocation commercial premises mainly to public or community sector activity, a number of premises have been offered to private enterprises including an alteration/tea room shop, a newsagency and a mini-mart. As yet, not all the premises have been developed and, although new development will include a community centre, it is also envisaged that a few convenience stores such as a bakery or a florist shop will also be developed. As promised, they have undertaken surveys to consider the feasibility of moving the 'exotic market' outside Paris on a more accessible site. However, they found that shop owners had a limited interest in moving and faced difficulties in finding a site, because of resistance from other municipalities to develop such a market in their locality. Therefore, the project has been suspended. Moreover, the *Ville de Paris* has offered to reconsider the location of a facility for drug users. People affiliated to *Droit au Calme* and the *Collectif d'Habitants Goutte d'Or Château Rouge* have, through petitions, demonstrations and public meetings opposed the expansion of Espoir Goutte d'Or. Yet, the local councillors have refused to abandon the project and have obtained funds from the ANRU to build bigger premises. Nonetheless, they have offered to take into account safety issues by locating the new structure in a different street, on the edge of the district rather than at its heart. These municipal actions have occurred in part in response to the demands of highly-visible politically-active interests groups representing the middle/upper classes who employ national media and local public meetings to voice their views. Nevertheless, these municipal responses are aimed at pacifying the relations between different social and ethnic groups living in the area rather than attracting a new middle-class population into the area.

Therefore, local activists remain highly critical of the municipality's regeneration programme and its objective of maintaining the area as a working-class district, which they regard as preserving a ghetto. One of the activists from *Collectif d'Habitants Goutte d'Or Château Rouge* argued:

> "I have the feeling that they [the local councillors from the majority] consider that the 18th *arrondissement* is a working-class area and that it should remain as it is. They ease their

> social conscience by claiming that they are in charge of maintaining the working-class character of the area and arguing that there is a risk of gentrification; but there is absolutely no risk of gentrification in Château Rouge. They say 'yes, there is. It can happen quickly'. Well, tell me where?" [I-G]

These activists have extensively voiced their concerns through the *Conseils de Quartiers* consultation bodies. Since 2002, their setting up has been compulsory for cities larger than 80,000 residents. They help to inform residents concerning the decisions of the municipal council regarding projects which directly concern the district. The strategy of the new residents is to attend these public meetings in large numbers and often to distribute petitions and pamphlets to those attending. Although they have no decision-making powers, these structures constitute a space for debate and to gauge residents' opinions. The role of decision maker is strongly associated with the elected representatives and the local councillors and local-authority officers do not regard the new activists as representative of the local electorate, leading most actors to question strongly the usefulness of this type of consultation exercise. One municipal officer stated:

> "What use is it to repeat exactly the same thing for the nth time? They express themselves, but they already have done that many times. The councillors are here and listen to them but, honestly, the elected representatives already know them. So, I don't think that they benefit from this participation." [I-I]

Another officer explained:

> "For me, public consultation, it is nonsense [*c'est du flan*]; the population that comes to these meetings is not representative of the area; the problem is that it's mainly the middle classes that attend. There are things on which I refuse to negotiate; they are the social housing units, the community centre and so on. We can discuss things like the location of the facility for the drug users, but at some stage we have to say 'stop'; otherwise, who screams the loudest wins. The elected representatives decide; it is their role. They are answerable to the electorate. Us, the administration, we provide them with information, analyses and data but at the end, the politicians decide, otherwise Mister X is going to ask for flowerpots in front of his house. It is public money, we are spending, so the public interest must guide the project." [I-J]

Local activists from *Collectif d'Habitants Goutte d'Or Château Rouge* also criticised these meetings for serving merely to provide information:

> "The *Conseil de Quartier* is really something of a disappointment. Except for the community groups, which have time to waffle on, all the other people only attend to get information. People are aware that these structures are useless." [I-E]

Paradoxically, the new incoming resident activists defined themselves as Left-wing supporters, like the decider-makers themselves. Yet, they disagreed with their local actions and conclude that the solution to their problem rests in the domination of the council and emergence of new leaders in the party. One explained:

> "See, the area votes massively for the Left. So, we are not able to harm them politically. We can disturb them, ruin their meetings and attack them publicly but we are not able to beat them politically. They know it; the problem is internal." [I-G]

The new incomers criticise community programmes and services that have been set up by the municipality and the original indigenous resident activists who had opposed the original municipal plan for the southern part of Goutte d'Or and fought for the construction of social housing and community services. The indigenous resident activists see the arrival of these new groups in the northern part as negative and attribute their disagreement to class issues. They have concern regarding the disappearance of working-class activists. One member of PGO argued:

> "The militants that were mobilised during the regeneration of the southern area are not from Château Rouge. Thus, PGO is disappearing. I think that there is no working-class mobilisation in Château Rouge. Well, it exists but it is not as massive as in the south. Moreover, the economic situation has changed [...]. We see people from *Droit au Calme* or *Vivre à Château Rouge* organising, but when you look closely, these residents' associations have personal interests included economic interests. In contrast, PGO included hardly any property owners. It is entirely different"

> "They want to whiten the neighbourhood; they won't say it like that but...on the other side, it was not our objective. We didn't care whether they were white, black or Arabs. We wanted to retain the multicultural and working-class character of the area, they do not have the same aims at all."

> "*Droit au Calme* has a very negative position on everything; it goes well beyond planning and housing. When *Espoir Goutte d'Or* wanted to refurbish and extend their premises, they opposed them saying 'stop the junkies'. It is another conception of society. They protect property-owning interests." [I-A]

Similarly, the former President of PGO who was elected as *arrondissement* councillor in 2001 perceived the new incomers as having different class interests and claimed:

> "She [member of *Droit au Calme*] wrote some stuff on a blog, claiming that I am continuing to contribute to the ghettoisation of Château Rouge that had started under Juppé. She is a typical *bobo*[47] who has recently settled in the neighbourhood and now wants the area to change for her." [I-B]

In contrast, the new incomers contest this image of gentrifiers which the 'old' indigenous resident activists project onto them and, surprisingly, despite their strong resentment of the left-wing municipality of Paris and of the 18th *arrondissement*, they still define themselves as supporters of left-wing ideas. One militant explained:

> "You know, we are left-wing people fighting a left-wing municipality. At first, people tried to tell us that we were nasty speculators [...] or, worse, even fascists, but ...no."

---

[47] *bobo*, short for *bourgeois-bohème*. The term means bohemian bourgeois and refers to upper-middle class 'trendy' people who often belong to the new creative classes. It also refers to their life style, which is often described as contradictory with their displayed political views. For instance, it is used to describe people driving 4x4 vehicles while defending the environment.

> "When I first became a member, it had another name, *Droit au Calme*. First, I thought it might be a hiding place for fascists, but I was really happily surprised to see that all these people are left-wing, from social democrats to anti-globalisation activists." [I-G]

Significantly, although the new incomers complained about their influence on the decision-making process, they were generally satisfied with the level and quality of the information provided by the municipality. This might be due to the significant information campaign which the *Ville de Paris* had carried out relating to the Château Rouge regeneration plan, through the publication of newsletters and erecting information panels in the area (Plate 7.3). Interestingly, this situation contrasts sharply with the Irish findings.

Plate 7.3: Information panels in Château Rouge (Source: Author)

Plate 7.3: Information panels in Château Rouge (Source: Author)

Final Plan

The final regeneration plan was submitted in December 2004 to the ANRU and a few modifications were added in 2005 and 2006. The *Ville de Paris* presented its proposal to the ANRU on the 2nd of February 2006. The ANRU approved the project in July 2006 and offered a subsidy amounting to ¤55,688,831, including ¤37,915,264 to contribute to the financing of social-housing development. In total, 1,480 insalubrious and over-crowded private flats will be demolished, of which 1,212 were occupied. Therefore, 1,212 social-housing units were to be built to rehouse the affected tenants, but in order to comply with the ANRU law, not all of them will be built on site. In any case, the application of social-housing standards would have limited the ability to construct the same number of flats on the same area. In total, 787 units will be built in *Château Rouge*, only 84 of which will be 'very-social' housing units, 128 units will be constructed by the *Foncière Logement* as 'upper-social' housing, while the remainder will be standard social-housing units including 82 dwellings for students. On site, without ANRU financial support, an additional 13 dwellings will be built for severely handicapped people. The ANRU will also support the construction of 787 housing units outside the neighbourhood within Paris city, two thirds of these units being 'very-social' housing units and the remaining third comprising standard units. A working group comprising social workers, councillors and municipal officers is charged with finding appropriate housing for the evicted tenants and identifying source of rental and welfare support for them to which they are entitled. For instance, when moving from substandard to social housing, some may avail of the APL. Figure 7.12 shows that households have been relocated mainly in the north-east of Paris and, to a lesser extent, in up-market areas.

The *Ville de Paris* identifies annually social-housing projects to be financed by the ANRU. For instance, in 2006, 180 standard and 122 'very-social' units were selected. The final regeneration plan includes the creation of public and social facilities amounting to 5,600 sq.m., including a municipal crèche, the previously-abandoned municipal Musical Centre, a new community centre and the extension of two buildings for drug users. Most of these have been delivered to date or are near completion. These facilities are co-financed by the *Ville de Paris*, the regional government and the ANRU. The construction of a new public school is also planned without ANRU support. The plan's objective is also to deliver 3,500 sq.m. of subsidised commercial space, to be shared between public, para-

public and private activities. The ANRU and *the Ville de Paris* will contribute financially to the upgrading of 15 streets covering 22,000 sq.m. and 6,500 sq.m. of green space.



Figure 7.12: Relocation of displaced households due to the regeneration of Château Rouge, 2007. (Source: APUR, 2007)

Therefore, it appears that the municipality competed for ANRU funding but failed to adhere to the agency's principles and this, despite the adhesion of a part of the new population to the ANRU vision. In contrast to the Irish situation, the local-authority's aim was not to promote the gentrification of the area. Yet, there are limits to the local government's actions and policy; its has limited capacity to prevent the spontaneous gentrification of the area or to avoid the effects of local public improvements, such as the disappearance of derelict sites, on the private housing stock. These limitations are reluctantly and partially accepted by councillors and civil servants alike. One elected representative explained that:

> "The only way to fight the gentrification, or *boboisation*, of an area being regenerated is to build enough social housing; but if the rental and selling price of the neighbouring buildings goes up, then, what do you want me to do about it? I cannot do anything about that. What you need, then, is a law to bring all the land into municipal ownership, but that is not the job of a local councillor, that the job of central government." [I-B]

Similarly, a civil servant stated that:

> "The political will is to maintain a working-class area. We are not naïve, we know that the prices are increasing in the private-housing stock but the objective is to build social-housing units here so that the working-class can live here." [I-J]

Recently, one local councillor has recognised that the ANRU funding mechanisms have limited the municipal actions and argued that the social units built by the *Foncière Logement* are 'sham [*de pacotille*] social units' (Neyreneuf, quoted in Mairie de Paris, 2008). It appears that, at best, the *Ville de Paris* can only slow down the gentrification process. This is due to external factors such as property market characteristics and central government funding principles at the time, as well as to local factors, including local pressures from activists and contradictory views amongst the majority. A combination of factors have therefore led to lending greater significance to 'upper-social' housing in the regeneration of Château Rouge than been given to the Goutte d'Or regeneration, where the construction of 'very-social' housing was privileged. This is likely to lead to a pronounced change in the composition of the local population when the implementation of the plan ends, presumably in 2012. It also raise questions regarding the long-term impact of the regeneration and the fate of one part of the social-housing stock itself, since the *Foncière Logement* will be permitted to sell the social-housing units which it builds in Château Rouge after applying rent control for 20 years. Constraints due to national rules, although not always openly recognised by the interviewees, are nonetheless real.

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL AND NATIONAL CONTEXTS IN URBAN REGENERATION

8.1. The Importance of Historical, Political and Cultural context

8.1.1. France

Neoliberalism has become the dominant discourse and ideology in a large number of western nations and its logic has penetrated many policy domains including urban-renewal policies. However, the literature has pointed to the existence of geographical and temporal variations. Past studies have emphasised the importance of the historical context in formulating contemporary policies. Despite the existence of commonalities in state restructuring from one country to the other, policy reform will follow different paths because elements such as systems of belief and past institutional arrangement cannot be totally erased. Recently, Brenner and Theodore (2002) have developed the notion of 'actually existing neoliberalism' to stress the importance of path-dependency, embeddedness and contingency in neoliberal policies and practices. Policy reform will follow different paths because elements such as systems of belief and past institutional arrangement cannot be totally erased.

The role of context was found to be highly significant in the author's own research. It soon became apparent that neoliberal thinking had not permeated through national policies to the same extent in the French system as in Ireland. At local level, in the Irish case, the adoption of entrepreneurial urban policies was dictated by central government through the development and maintenance of tax incentives as a major tool for regeneration. Then, the implementation of such orientations was secured by the tight control and influence which the Department of of Environment and Local Government has on the city manager and by the creation of special-purpose agencies. The agencies were established not to avoid resistance from a local authority controlled by left-wing politicians unfavourable to such policies, as had occurred in the UK (see Béal and Rousseau, 2008) but, instead, to bypass authorities which were regarded in the 1980s as being bureaucratic and inefficient; the local authority mode of operation had to change. Central government imposed onto local government staff this shift by first by-passing them, which created a fight-back attitude, secondly, by recruiting a city manager supportive of entrepreneurial policies and, finally, by introducing business practices into the local authority through the ideas outlined in the Better Local Government policy, which was not only about improving local democracy but also about improving efficiency. There was no equivalent embracing

of market-led urban policies at the national level in France. Nonetheless, at local level, some French politicians saw decentralisation as an opportunity to experiment with neoliberal policies in the 1980s (Schmidt, 1990a), but adopted such policies more as a mean to distinguish themselves from the Socialist government than by ideological conversion (Lorrain, 1993a). Some of these mayors, such as Bousquet in Nîmes, consequently lost the support of their constituency because of the impact of policies such as the privatisation of local services. Similarly, the nature of urban regeneration projects promoted for the East of Paris after 1983 was one of the reasons why six *arrondissements* were lost to the Left in the 1995 Parisian municipal elections. Moreover, resistance to such practices had been more successful in the French case study even before the sanction of the electors, as was seen in Goutte d'Or.

The neoliberalisation of urban policies in France was not organised from the centre. There has been no strong political will at central level to organise intense competition between territories and national redistribution policies were maintained. Nonetheless, the diffusion of entrepreneurial models of governance has reached French Cities through other means. The decentralisation reform, as earlier mentioned, provided new opportunities for local politicians, especially in the domain of urban planning. As noted by Newman and Thornley (1996: 189) "urban entrepreneurialism was one of the significant trends in post-decentralisation France". The shift to entrepreneurialism can be linked to the perception by local actors and politicians of growing inter-urban competition in a more globalised and Europeanised world (see Le Galès, 1993). This led to the development of city-marketing policies, the construction of science parks and flagship urban development projects, together with the promotion of a favourable business climate. However, urban social policies in disadvantaged areas have not disappeared, thanks to the availability of funds through the *politique de la ville* Programme.

One of the main differences between the French and Irish contexts is the degree to which neoliberal ideology has made its way into national policies in general. As explained by Cole and Hanley (2006), politicians such as Alain Madelin, who supported explicit neoliberalism, have been quite rare in France and attract little electorate support. Right-wing parties have rarely adopted an explicitly neoliberal rhetoric, with the exception of the unsuccessful Chirac government from 1986 to 1988 (Schmidt, 1990a; 2002). Schmidt (2002) has shown that neoliberalism as a political ideology was adopted by the political Right only as a counter ideology after being defeated by the Left at national level in the 1980s. Lorrain (1993a) supported a similar argument earlier. He stressed that in France

there was not an equivalent intellectual debate similar to that which had taken place in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the UK and USA concerning the detrimental effects of state interventionism and which had led to the neoliberal turn of the Thatcher and Reagan governments. Nevertheless, the French Right did import some ideas and positions from the Anglo-Saxon Right in order to distinguish itself from the Socialist government that came into power in 1981. This was a political tactic to affirm their difference rather than a genuine conversion (Lorrain, 1993a). However, by the presidential election of 1986, the Right and Chirac had already moved away from the neoliberal theme (Schmidt, 1990a).

The importance and legacy of the French Republican tradition and the strong attachment of the French people to the Republican State can explain this limited explicit embracing of neoliberal ideas by politicians (Dikeç, 2006). The French Republican tradition emphasises the duty of the state in protecting its citizens and in guaranteeing national solidarity (Bloom, 2004). This conception emphasises the rights of French citizens, including their social rights and the duties of the State. The Republican tradition also emphasises the need to regulate markets (Bloom, 2004: 3). Moreover, this conception defines as one of the State's duties the imperative to "guarantee citizen's social justice through the provision not just of traditional social services but also public infrastructural services" (Schmidt, 2002 quoted in Dikeç, 2006: 65). As pointed out by Dikeç (2006), this conception of the state makes the redesigning of economic and social policies along neoliberal lines difficult to justify. Republican values cannot be easily married with market-orientated reforms.

This does not mean that economic liberalisation and privatisation have not occurred in France. However, Bloom (2004: 1) insists on the fact that "French liberalization is best understood as a pragmatic practice rather than an ideological conversion". Moreover, such reforms are mainly confined to economic policies and carry the mark of the French State (Dikeç, 2006). Indeed, the shift towards a moderate neoliberal political-economic programme was achieved under a Socialist government. F. Mitterrand was elected in 1981 on an ambitious programme. He promised to introduce new redistributive social measures, to nationalise some companies, and he envisaged relying on state interventionism and spending (*dirigisme*) to address the economic crisis. This resumption of Keynesian measures was presented in contrast to a first 'austerity' approach under Prime Minister R. Barre, with a decrease in the rate at which social spending rose (Smith, 2004: 93). The French Socialists promised no less than to "break with capitalism" (Smith, 2004: 94). In the first two years of his mandate, F. Mitterrand applied the programme for which he had

been elected. For example, the minimum wage and pensions were raised, while an extra 600,000 people entered the pubic sector as a result of the nationalisation programme (Smith, 2004; 98). However, the result was the creation of a deficit of unprecedented magnitude and double-digit inflation, which meant that France was running the risk of having to withdraw from the European Monetary System (Schmidt, 2002: 79), while still failing to improve its unemployment rate. Therefore, by 1983, the Socialists felt that they could not implement their programme and that they had no other choice but to take a U-turn in monetary, economic and finally labour policies. This shift was depicted as unwelcome but necessary because of external constraints (Schmidt, 2002; Bloom, 2004). Liberalisation of the economy has continued under different governments dominated by the Left and the Right and has been justified by globalisation and Europeanisation, rather than by adhesion to neoliberalism. According to Smith (2004), this explains the overall negative stance which the French possess towards globalisation. He criticizes French leaders for not taking a leadership role in implementing neoliberal reforms and for being too moderate in their reforms. In fact, reforms in the economic sphere reflects the French heritage of *dirigisme*; the state is still active even if its role has decreased (Schmidt, 2002).

Moreover, while some neoliberal reforms have been implemented in the economic sphere both by left-wing and right-wing government, reforms in social policies have not been possible to the same extent. One reason is the absence of a discourse that can reconcile such reforms with French Republican values or with the French concept of and attachment to the welfare state (Schmidt, 2002). In fact, it was not before 1993, with a right-wing government in power, that serious attempts to cut social spending and reform the social-security system were made (Schmidt, 2002). Moreover, in 1995, when the Juppé government attempted to introduce a partial marketisation of pensions, widespread strikes ensued, resulting in a modification of the reform and a return of the Left in power in 1997.

A further point worth noting is the fact that under left-wing governments, especially throughout the 1980s, social spending and programmes have tended to expand, especially targeting those most affected by neoliberal restructuring of the economy (Schmidt, 2002). Measures included a minimum-income programme for those not entitled to unemployment benefits (RMI), governmental-sponsored jobs for young people, and a universal medical insurance for those not covered by the national system (CMU). After 1983, there has been a change in attitude whereby the socialist ideal to eliminate inequalities has been replaced by an insistence on reducing such inequalities and fulfilling a duty of solidarity, which reflects a greater acceptance of capitalism and its inherent

inequalities (Jobert and Théret, 1994). Overall, in the social domain, there have been some reforms with mixed results but no dismantling of the welfare state (Schmidt, 2002; Dikeç, 2006). The importance of the republican tradition in preventing social reforms along strong neoliberal lines led Dikeç (2006: 66) correctly to note that the restructuring of the French state presents significant differences from the "US and UK-style neoliberalization". In summary, in France, there has been a convergence between the Left and the Right on the issue of economic management, while divergence and opposition are mainly expressed in the domain of social and employment policies, or on the subject of immigration and security (Cole and Hanley, 2006). This has had an enormous impact on the degree of neoliberalisation of such policies.

As shown in chapter 6, the *politique de la ville* programme comprises of physical and social policies which have been an area of contestation between right- and left-wing governments. While the former have attempted to some extent to introduce market logic in deprived neighbourhoods by trying to attract new businesses and introduce new populations, the latter have promoted social programmes to improve the quality of life and social cohesion in these areas by concentrating the operations and funds of different actors which are primarily public bodies. The approach of the Left has consisted of definition and negotiation at the local level of the geographical limits and the content of the scheme. Once agreement was reached, a contract linked the different actors committed to the project. The left-wing government of Mitterrand established the *politique de la ville* programme in order to introduce a social dimension to urban-regeneration schemes, especially in suburban districts. A programme of *Dévelopment Social des Quartiers* (DSQ) was created in 1981 and 15 pilot projects were initiated. Following pressures by the central government on the *Ville de Paris,* the mayor accepted the inclusion of Goutte d'Or in the DSQ programme. The DSQ policy was extended to 148 neighbourhoods in 1984 and encouraged local authorities to combine housing and environmental improvement with initiatives tackling issues such as exclusion, unemployment and education. As stressed by Green (1999: 378), the DSQ policy was essentially 'social in character'. The Socialists introduced a new tool called *Contrat de Ville* (CDV) in 1989, which replaced the DSQ in 1993. The fundamental principles of the *politique de la ville* were maintained. The main differences lay in the request to sign a formal contract and in the call not only for cooperation between different tiers of governments but also across tiers of governments. *Communes* were expected to collaborate to address the needs of districts requiring regeneration. Solidarity was a guiding principle of the CDV (Hall and Hickman, 2002).

Two laws were introduced at the time to complement the *politique de la ville* approach. One allowed national redistribution of funds from richer to poorer municipalities. The second sought to introduce a better distribution of social housing between municipalities, so that the costs and difficulties of catering for lower-income groups would be more equally shared between *communes*. The CDV programme was therefore a continuation of the DSQ.

The *politique de la ville* orientations and principles were challenged in 1996 with the setting up of the *Pacte de Relance pour la Ville* (PRV), which was to supersede the CDV. The change in direction was stimulated by the election of J. Chirac in 1995 and the appointment of A. Juppé as his prime minister, which meant that the balance of power had shifted in favour of the Right after a period of *cohabitation* (Green et al, 2001). The PRV moved away from the contractual approach favoured by the Left. The negotiations at local level, regarding the content of the scheme and the area it covered, were replaced by a more central definition of priority redevelopment zones and strategic objectives. For instance, only zones that met certain centrally-defined criteria could be integrated in the new *politique de la ville*. However, one of the main changes was that the PRV introduced competition between municipalities, importing a principle used in the UK, central government requiring them to bid to be in the scheme (Jaillet, 2003). The second change was the emphasis on economic development as a major objective of the regeneration plans. The PRV listed five objectives, and, while some elements of the schemes were recycled from past policies, the first objective of economic regeneration was new (Green, 1999). For the first time, the government made it a priority to attract new businesses and jobs and introduced fiscal deregulation to achieve this regeneration. Three different categories of priority redevelopment zones were defined, namely the ZUS, ZRU and ZFU. According to their level of deprivation, they benefited from different advantages. ZFU were tax-free zones for companies with fewer than 50 employees (see chapter 6). The PRV relied to a greater extent on market forces. The introduction of competition principles and tax-incentives explains why Hall and Hickman (2002: 693) described the PRV scheme as a "flirtation" with Anglo-Saxon-style regeneration. However, the PRV represented more of a brief departure than a rupture from the *politique de la ville* philosophy and cannot be equated to a neoliberal turn in national urban-regeneration policies. Indeed, one can speak only of a brief reorientation since, in 1997, the return of a socialist government under L. Jospin as Prime Minister, *cohabiting* with President J. Chirac, was accompanied by the reintroduction of the CDV scheme. However, the PRV could not immediately be abolished

and ran for five years in parallel with the renewed CDV programme, which failed to adopt any of the distinctive features of the PRV approach. Fiscal deregulation was not pursued by the Left.

Over the years, a few reports criticising the complexity of the *politique de la ville* and its lack of efficiency have emerged because of the continuous presence of high levels of deprivation in the districts targeted for intervention (Jaillet, 2003). It is within this context that a second and more serious attack on the *politique de la ville* occurred after the re-election of J. Chirac in 2002 and the arrival of a right-wing government that replaced Jospin's government. In 2003, the law known as "law Borloo" was enacted and initiated a major reorganisation of the *politique de la ville*. The definition of priority zones on centrally-defined quantitative criteria was reintroduced; the concept of ZUS, ZRU and ZFU was reactivated. The tax-free zones were reinstalled and the ZUS became the only area permitted to receive grants under the *politique de la ville* programme. By targeting only the ZUS, half of the neighbourhoods which had been identified by local actors during the negotiations of the CDV as in need of regeneration were omitted from the new scheme (Epstein, 2007). The *politique de la ville* was replaced by a *politique de rénovation urbaine* in 2003, which sought to attract new business and jobs by re-initiating and extending the tax-free zones but which also aims to attract a new population by producing a different mix of housing within regenerated areas. The aim of J.L. Borloo was to provide shock treatment to the most deprived areas by acting principally on the physical fabric of these districts. The "law Borloo" made provision for the demolition of 200,000 unfit dwellings, the refurbishment of 200,000 others and the production of 200,000 new units of social housing. The main principle was not to relocate all low-income households on site but to build social-housing units outside the regenerated district, some of the land used previously in the local area to accommodate low-income groups being transferred to the semi-private organisation, the *Fonçiére Logement*. A single agency ANRU was created in 2003 to provide funds for the physical regeneration of the ZUS. This approach contrasts sharply with the integrated approach of the *politique de la ville*. While a second separate agency was created in 2006 to finance some social initiatives within these districts, its existence is currently threatened. Moreover, as in the PRV, local authorities had to compete against one another to avail of the funds of the ANRU.

Because of the rupture with the guiding principles of the *politique de la ville*, some authors like Epstein (2004) questioned whether this signified the termination of the policy. In order to obtain funds, there exists a risk that people bidding locally for limited funds

might feel compelled to adopt the language and principles promoted by the agency. As local government may increasingly rely on the attraction of private businesses and new better-off households to regenerate their neighbourhoods and concentrate on the physical aspect of regeneration, this would represent a closer convergence with property-led regeneration and the Anglo-Saxon approach. Moreover, because of the centralisation of the decision-making process at the level of the ANRU rather than a negotiation at local level, dissident projects would be more likely not to gain funding.

The author's own research demonstrates that despite a call at the national level for instruments that would allow the attraction of private investment, new businesses and new residents, there is still space for contestation of national objectives at the local level. The district covered by the Goutte d'Or and Château Rouge areas belongs to the ZUS category and therefore qualifies to bid for funding under the "Borloo Law". In 2001, the Parisian Council and the 18th *arrondissement* council were won by a left-wing coalition. An activist who had been involved in the definition of the Goutte d'Or final scheme and had then lobbied for a similar project to be implemented in Château Rouge was elected. Shortly after his election, he wrote an emergency regeneration plan and a submission to the ANRU for funding was subsequently lodged and accepted. Even though the project for Château Rouge differs from the Goutte d'Or regeneration, since the objective is no longer to re-house everybody on site, there is still a strong will to maintain the social composition of the area and retain its original characteristics, an objective that clashes with the national objective of radical change. The local councillor has maintained the main characteristics of his plan despite national guidelines conflicting with his project and in spite of the pressures of a growing number of newly-arrived residents who had settled in the area because of the affordability of its private stock and want regeneration to bring more private services and more households in private-sector housing. They oppose the councillor's wish to develop social housing and social services in the area, but feel they have failed. However, Château Rouge is only one example of the new *politique de la ville* and the scheme was agreed upon at an early stage.

Epstein (2007) stressed that the ANRU showed flexibility during the approval of the initial projects, but then introduced stricter rules, further diminishing the possibility for diversity in approach. In his study examining three regeneration projects approved by the ANRU, Epstein (2007) found important variations in the application of principles promoted nationally. The city of Tours adopted a dissenting approach. While social mix was listed as an objective, the large-scale destruction of low-income dwellings and their

replacement by a different housing stock likely to impact greatly on the composition of the population was not envisaged. As in Château Rouge, the regeneration project in Tours was agreed upon at an early stage before the edification of more constraining rules.

Therefore, these two projects could have been designed at a key moment and the ensuing schemes might have adhered more closely to the aim of reducing the spatial concentration of disadvantaged households by building housing units for higher-income groups. However, since there is a dearth of studies on the subject, one cannot reach any clear conclusion on this point. It is interesting, nonetheless, to note that a report published in 2007 claimed that the initial political objective to demolish and considerably renew the housing stock of the ZUS districts will not be achieved (CES, 2007). The reduction of the initial objective was attributed to the difficulty of relocating displaced inhabitants during a time of housing crisis and to the attachment which people have to their home. The report estimates that 120,000 of the units originally scheduled for demolition would not take place . As a consequence, the study concluded that overall housing diversification will not be achieved (CES, 2007).

The results for Château Rouge cannot be generalised to other schemes. Yet, the study of Château Rouge shows that even when central government promoted the adoption of a market-led approach consisting of reinserting deprived neighbourhoods in the local property market, the Parisian local government was able to resist the implementation of such an approach. In France, central government does not appear to have forced local governments to adopt property-led regeneration plans to the extent that the Irish government was able through the tax-designated areas and the IAPs.

Although the concept of property-led regeneration is a relatively recent one at the national level and the use of market forces is mainly a feature of the 2003 scheme, this does not mean that attempts to regenerate areas by reinserting them in the local property market did not occurr before that time at the local level, independent of the central government. Bonneville (2005) showed two examples of such approaches in Lyon. The diffusion of entrepreneurial models of governance has reached French Cities by ways other than central control. Lorrain (1992) showed that some mayors used private agencies to design and deliver urban projects such as office parks in their cities, leading to a greater introduction of the entrepreneurial principal in the management of urban projects. Moreover, after the decentralisation laws of 1982, some conservative mayors experimented with neoliberal policies such as the privatisation of local services (Schmidt, 1990a) or the attraction of private investment to regenerate their cities through flagship projects, such as

Euralille. For some of these mayors, like Bousquet in Nîmes, the politics of privatisation were a means to oppose the socialist government, and the strategy was to reclaim control of central government by gaining votes at local level (Lorrain, 1993a). Chirac, used his new-found powers to privatise some municipal services such as street cleaning and water distribution (Schmidt, 1990a: 303). Some conservative mayors also used their planning powers to sustain entrepreneurial urban projects. Newman and Thornley (1996) give the example of Grenoble, where the land-use plan was modified to facilitate redevelopment. Chirac also used the planning system in the northern and eastern districts of Paris to promote the rehabilitation of working-class districts. Nonetheless, such projects faced local opposition and many of these projects became electoral issues. For instance, the privatisation of local services led to the defeat in the local election for the mayor of Nîmes (Kuhlmann and Fedele, *forthcoming*), while in Paris, in 1995, the RPR group lost six *arrondissements* in the north and east of the city, electoral defeat being strongly linked to opposition from local residents to regeneration projects. For example, Lidgi (2001) demonstrated that the local election of 1995 was used to contest and re-orient the regeneration project in the Belleville district. However, opposition has not always been successful. Newman and Thorney (1996) stressed that, in the case of the *Seine Rive Gauche* project, opposition had only limited impact. The project concerned large tracts of derelict land; brownfield sites were turned into office space, Chirac having mobilised a discourse about international competition and stressed the need to extend the commercial and office core of the city. In contrast, in small residential neighbourhoods such as Goutte d'Or and Belleville, the discourse of inter-urban competition could not be mobilised, which may have contributed to the greater success of the opposition movement, the success of the group PGO in stopping the regeneration being closely linked to the forging of a strong protest movement which could lobby local politicians and use the local political system to its advantage.

8.1.2. Ireland

In contrast to France, the neoliberal political agenda has gained considerable strength in Ireland. The influence of neoliberal ideas increased during the late 1980s and the 1990s, while neoliberal policies, including privatisation, were pursued more intensively after 1997 (O'Toole, 2003 quoted in Hearne, 2008). After three years of a "rainbow coalition" government led by Fine Gael, 1997 saw the return of Fianna Fáil in government, which formed a coalition government with the Progressive Democrats, a political party that

overtly supported neoliberal policies. As holders of the balance of power, the Progressive Democrats influenced policies to a degree which was disproportionate to their size.

The initial turn towards free-market policies occurred in the late 1980s, as a response to the severe economic crisis that affected Ireland. Indeed, with an unemployment rate of 10 percent in 1981 and 17 percent in 1987, the country was suffering one of the highest rates of unemployment in Europe (Allen, 2000). At this time, a strong consensus emerged amongst the political class regarding economic and fiscal policies appropriate for the recovery of the Irish economy. This resulted in a high degree of stability in economic policies characterised by a higher degree of responsiveness to global markets and the use of low business-tax rates to attract investment (Kirby, 2004). The turning point is usually agreed to be in 1987, when the Fianna Fáil government announced a programme of severe cuts in expenditure. This received the support of the main opposition party (Taylor, 2002). For Taylor (2002: 507), this led to a period of political void from which emerged a consensus on which policies should be implemented .

The ability to maintain a consensus around pro-business policies has been linked to the particularity of the Irish party system. Indeed, Kirby (2004: 208) viewed the non-ideological nature of the Irish party system as a significant contributor to the stability of macro-economic policies in recent decades. Unlike practically all other European party systems, the Irish party system exhibits no strong left-right division (Mair and Weeks, 2005). The two main parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, which were both founded as a result of differing stances regarding the Anglo-Irish Treaty, have not traditionally defined themselves in terms of left and right ideology. Mair and Weeks (2005) note that they span a wide range of ideological positions, moving often between centre-right and centre-left and adopting contradictory positions in function of the policy domain, which often makes the distinction between the two parties unclear. Moreover, the Labour party is weak in comparison to its French and European counterparts and has consistently been the third party in the system. The weakness of the left has remained a characteristic of Irish political life throughout the twentieth century. This is illustrated by the fact that "over the 17 elections from 1948 to 2002, the two largest parties [...] have won on average 75 percent of the first preference vote, compared to 11 percent for the Labour Party" (Coakley, 2005: 60), a matter of key significance as the political left is often associated with favouring social regeneration and the regulation of the property-market. In comparison, in France, the political Left was shown earlier to have played an important role in defining an integrated approach to regeneration and in emphasising its social

dimension. In Ireland, there is no evidence of an equivalent influence of the Left on national urban regeneration policies.

Irish political culture has probably constituted a more fertile ground than French political values for the acceptance of an ideology that promotes *laissez faire* principles. Another important element that has facilitated the restructuring of the Irish state along neoliberal lines is the integrationist concept of 'social partnership' (Allen, 2003; Taylor, 2005). The term social partnership refers to the national agreements on pay determination, industrial relations and general economic and social policies negotiated every three or four years between the government, employers and trade unions since 1987, the negotiations being political extended to include social organisations in 1997. These bargaining rounds resulted in the acceptance of limitations to increases in direct income, improvements in real incomes being augmented by income-tax reductions and social-welfare improvements. These arrangements and co-option of the trades-union movement into 'partnership' provided a quiescent labour force which broadly accepted the austerity measures. In parallel, a tax regime was adopted which was highly advantageous to high-earners and businesses developed, greatly increasing their earnings and profits. The policies covered by the agreements have expanded through the years and social partnership became a vehicle for the implementation of a wide range of neoliberal policies (Taylor, 2002). The virtual absence of political conflict around the state's restructuring has been attributed to a lack of critical reflections on social partnerships in Irish society, which includes union leaders but also the media and academia (Allen, 2003). Instead, there is a discourse that projects social partnership and its associated policies as different from Thatcherism and Reaganism in its ability to marry successfully neoliberal policies with the European social model, rendering criticism difficult (Taylor, 2002, 2005). Discourses situating the Irish model between Boston and Berlin or claiming that 'a rising tide lift all boats', contribute to a legitimation of the Irish model, although the validity of such claims can be seriously challenged (see Allen, 2003).

Critics did emerge, however, from a number of organisations involved in community development or in the provision of social services, catering for those most affected by neoliberal policies. The government's response was to invite representatives from these groups to participate in social partnership talks from 1997 onwards. However, the impact of integrating such groups has been quite modest in terms of policy modification (Meade, 2005) and also seem to have decreased over time (Larragy, 2006). The process of partnership gave few opportunities to the community sector to advance an

alternative mode of development. They were mainly limited to reacting to governmental actions rather than having any share in decision making. With the primary focus is on competitiveness, social goals became sidelined. Therefore, as Bartley and Borsheid (2003) concluded, "the national Partnerships have contributed to both economic growth and widening inequalities in the share of wealth". Similarly, Allen (2003) showed that despite a discourse of inclusion, social and wage inequalities increased considerably under social partnership. Yet, the forming of cross-sectoral partnerships has been promoted in different policy domains as a tool to avoid the shortcomings of pro-market policies, including those promoting regeneration.

With the launch of the IAP programme, the introduction of the community as a new partner was to allow the fulfilment of social objectives and should have resulted in a move away from a model of property-led regeneration. In practice, as at the national level, in the HARP IAP, the partnership model failed to provide the opportunity to community representatives to advance an alternative model of development. Any community aspiration which might involve the construction of an alternative to the US 'entrepreneurial-city' model through a serious commitment to integrating the community sector into the regeneration process was denied. They were not equal partners and did not share decision-making powers. Again, social objectives were sidelined and property development became the priority. This was linked to in the strong belief amongst senior officials in the benefits of growth and private development for 'the city', even in the face of the collapse of the Markets Area Framework Plan and despite the community's trenchant comments on the inadequacy of such regeneration for their needs. For both the redevelopment of the HARP area and that of the Markets district, it was noted earlier that officials conceived social and economic benefits to derive from the development of commercial and residential properties. Contestation of such a conception was met with resentment from senior officials; when consensus could not be reached, the views of the 'partners' were simply dismissed. Protest against the development of the west side of Smithfield was perceived as having no justification while, in the Markets district, senior officials viewed community demands as unrealistic and community action as leading to the missing of a "window of opportunity". Inclusive structures did not result in an inclusive outcome. A pro-growth attitude among management in DCC dominated and hindered the accomplishment of social goals in planning policies.

Another hindrance to the achievement of social objectives in the HARP IAP and in the Markets Area Framework Plan was the non-availability at local level of public funds

set aside to address these issues. This relates to the issue of the lack of financial independence at local level but it also poses broader questions about the embracing of pro-business policies at national level. A major impact of the tax-cutting neoliberal regime was that state spending fell far behind that of other EU states, with a drop from 20.2 per cent of GDP in 1993 to 14.1 per cent in 2000 for Ireland compared to a slight decline from 28.8 per cent to 27.3 per cent for the EU average (Kirby, 2004). As stressed by Allen (2003), this caused enormous difficulties for the poorer since they rely more heavily on public services. This issue was apparent in the Irish case study. Thus, in the Markets area, financial constraints meant that a public swimming pool could not be financed. Furthermore, while the consultants had shown that a range of privately-run facilities did exist in the area, it was evident from those interviewed in this research that residents on lower incomes would be unable to avail of them.

In contrast, in the French case, public funds were readily available. Although the cost of the project was considered high by the local councillor, which was an issue in itself, access to funds did not become a problem as the *Ville de Paris* had always granted his demands. Among the facilities financed solely by public funding were a sports grounds and a local library. It is important to note that the *Ville de Paris* has considerable financial autonomy, raising commercial and residential taxes and that the district could also rely on external funds from national and regional levels as it was priority zone for redevelopment. Indeed, the prevailing concept was that regeneration was a public-sector duty. In contrast, in the HARP IAP, private funds were to be levered to reach social goals. Moreover, in Ireland, this reliance on private forces to deliver social programmes or social infrastructure has not been limited to urban regeneration policies. The promotion of market values has spread to policy domain such as social housing (see Hearne, 2009) and education (see Lynch, 2006). The neoliberal turn has also affected areas such as welfare and social-benefit entitlements with a greater willingness to adopt punitive measures (see Taylor, 2005).

However, the introduction of the IAP programme was presented as an opportunity to depart from past approaches to urban renewal and move away from a strategy that relied solely on reinserting deprived neighbourhoods into the property market. The use of private actors to regenerate deprived areas preceded the IAP programme. As in the United Kingdom, from the 1980s onwards, neoliberalism has increasingly infused Irish urban policies at national level. As was seen in chapter 4, starting in 1986, the central government devised national schemes of fiscal incentives to allow property-led regeneration to occur in special areas of Ireland's major cities. Central government defined

the limits of the priority zones and the nature of the incentives. Centrally-controlled and quasi-private agencies such as the Custom House Docks Development Authority were also used to carry out property-led regeneration schemes. Overall, there was a certain marginalisation of the local authority services because of their perceived inadequacy to undertake the task (McGuirk and MacLaran, 2001). However, while central government ensured that a market-led approach to regeneration and planning policies was applied in the inner-city of Dublin using tools such as fiscal deregulation and the delegation of certain powers to quasi-private agencies, pressure was also applied to the local authority to participate in the active promotion of the inner-city as a good location for investment and property development (McGuirk and MacLaran, 2001). Centrally-controlled entrepreneurial initiatives not only transformed the physical and social fabric of the Dublin's inner city but prompted a change in the mode of operation of the local authority, which moved from playing a relatively passive and reactive role to development, to that of facilitator of the development process (McGuirk and MacLaran, 2001; Kelly and MacLaran, 2004). Central-government pressures pushed local authority planners to work more closely with developers to ensure their views were taken into account and that the plans made were compatible with a need for profitability (McGuirk, 1994). Central pressures also resulted in the establishment of a Inner City Development Team within Dublin Corporation, which comprised people with entrepreneurial flair, capable of moving from the traditional local-authority mode of operation, and who were charged with working with private-sector interests, releasing land in public ownership and selling the Designated Areas to promote development (McGuirk and MacLaran, 2001). Thus, a growing body of literature indicates that Dublin's attempt to become an 'entrepreneurial city' was largely imposed by under-funding from central government and by the strong influence which national government has had in local policies (McGuirk and MacLaran, 2001; Kelly and MacLaran, 2004; Punch et al, 2004).

However, as shown in chapter 4, after a decade of property-led regeneration policies, the government commissioned a review of these entrepreneurial strategies. While the consultants pointed to the success of the policies in improving the physical fabric of the city, they criticised the lack of social achievement and recommended adopting a holistic approach as embodied in the original HARP Framework Plan (see KPMG, 1996). Such recommendations seemed to be accepted by the central government, since they launched the IAP, which , promoted the adoption of an holistic approach in collaboration with the local community, balancing subsidies to property developers with potential gains for the

local community. At national level, the new schemes were described as seriously departing from past approaches. Therefore, it seems sensible to think that there would be some *rapprochement* with the approach adopted in other European countries, such as France, which had a longer tradition of promoting an integrated approach. In practice, however, the IAP programme in the HARP area represented a continuation of past entrepreneurial urban policies rather than a radical departure from them. There is no evidence that a hybrid mode of governance, between American entrepreneurialism and a European social model has emerged. Since 1998, the urban regeneration agenda has remained dominated by the imperatives of the market. Overall, the accomplishment of community objectives has been undermined by according precedence to wider objectives which prioritise the benefits of development for the city as a whole over those of the local community. In a manner similar to previous regeneration schemes of the 1980s and 1990s, the HARP redevelopment project resulted in large-scale property development and an influx of a new, better-off, population, in spite of the participative structures through which, it was claimed, community activists could influence the project. The failure of the IAP is not that surprising considering that the new programme comprised little more than the old policy instruments introduced in 1986, repackaged and presented in more inclusive terms. The main tool remained the enticement of property developers into deprived areas through tax incentives. No new staff or funds were made available to deliver the social programmes of individual IAP projects, nor did the IAP status offer priority of access to the funds of individual Ministries. The novelty was the rhetoric of 'social gain' which was to occur through regeneration. The sole new instrument in Dublin to achieve such a gain was 'the community gain' clause but it was dependent on private investors' actions and needed to embrace their requirement for profitability.

Overall, the scheme reflected a naïve faith in the ability of the market to deliver social outcomes. The local community felt that social goals were not achieved and evaluated the 'community gain' fund as having been of some assistance but as representing little compared to the benefits which the private sector received from tax incentives and the regeneration process. Moreover, there were issues concerning the management of the funds, some of which were used for tasks such as street lighting which the local authority would have normally carried out using its own funds, rather than for new social actions, in part because of central under-funding of the local authority.

8.1.3. Comparative Elements: Summary

The *politique de rénovation* represents a neoliberalisation of French national urban regeneration policies. Nonetheless, the latter still presents strong differences from Irish policies. At the national level, the overall reluctance of French society to embrace neoliberalism is still reflected in the type of instruments developed to regenerate disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Fiscal deregulation remains a peripheral tool in France while it still lies at the heart of Irish policies. Moreover, the research has shown greater divergence in neighbourhood regeneration to exist between the French and Irish case studies than might be expected from a simple review of the national schemes. The latter could have led one to believe in the gradual convergence along a similar path since, in theory, one was moving away from a strictly neoliberal path while the other was diverting slowly from its strong state-led approach. In practice, the HARP IAP represented more of a continuation of the past entrepreneurial approach than a departure, while the Château Rouge project adapted a new national policy to allow some prolongation of the Goutte d'Or regeneration project, based on strong public funding. The differences might be attributed to differences in the importance of neoliberalism as a guiding principle of policy in the two contexts but they may also be related to differences in administrative structures. In Ireland, the centralisation of policy-making has allowed a diffusion of neoliberal principles to the local level to a degree that would be unachievable in France. Despite a recent attempt to both re-centralise decision-making power through agencies such as the ANRU and forcing competition for funds between local projects to impose a move towards neoliberal forms of government (Epstein, 2005), the current research demonstrated that local government has retained an important role as a barrier to the diffusion of neoliberal urban redevelopment projects. In Ireland, neoliberal orientations in urban policies have been promoted at the central level. They diffused to the local level through the control which central government has on city managers and the influence which the later possess over urban planning and regeneration policies. Both central and local government have unreservedly embraced market-led policies. There is no equivalent to such a clear model of diffusion of policy orientations in France. In contrast, while such orientations have sometimes become evident at the local level and, more recently, at the national level, these were shown to have been moderated by other influences in the French case studies. This stresses the importance of the interaction of local and central governments in the production of urban regeneration policies in France.

8.2. The role of Local Elected Representatives.

8.2.1. France

The public perception of France has traditionally been as the most centralised western state and France is perceived as unique in this respect. This conception of the French state is based in its origin in the Napoleonic system of administration, which established that each *département* would be provided with a *préfet* to ensure local compliance with the central-state's authority (Booth, 1998). This system remained largely unchanged until the decentralisation laws of the 1980s and their significant impact on local policies and local political life. However, France's reputation as a highly centralised state is less and less deserved. Paradoxically, local regeneration policy in Paris was found to be less dependent on central government than it was in Dublin. This is attributable to the consequences of French local-government reform. While local regeneration policies in Paris were not as dependent on central government directives and national political orientations as in Dublin, they were not completely free from its influence; there was a co-dependence between local and central government to achieve regeneration. Entrepreneurial ideas in urban planning and urban regeneration were introduced locally in the *Plan-Programme de l'Est Parisien* by Chirac's municipality, but in the case of the regeneration of the Goutte d'Or district, such perspectives were reoriented both under pressure from the local population and from national and local politicians. In an opposite situation, right-wing national urban policies promoting strong intervention on the physical fabric of disadvantage neighbourhoods to radically change the social composition of such areas were adapted locally to serve different objectives by a socialist municipality who stated his intention to devise an urban policy "more ambitious in its social dimension" (Barbé, n.d.) than that of the Chirac's municipality. In the Parisian case, there was a high politicisation of local affairs, which was not found in Dublin, resulting from decentralisation reform which had made local government a legitimate space for political action (Schmidt, 1990b).

In order to understand the significance of this reform, it is necessary to review briefly how the system operated previously and what changes were introduced through the new legislation. All sub-national levels of government, from *département* to *commune,* had highly restricted autonomy and were subject to constant supervision by officers of the central government. The *préfet* possessed an *a priori* power of *tutelle* (tutelage) over *communes* and *departments*, meaning the *préfets* exercised oversight over local government. All local decisions had to be approved in advance by the *préfet*'s office. *Préfets* were national civil servants created by Napoleon and appointed by the Minister of

the Interior. These *préfets* were answerable to central government alone. Their role was to coordinate the implementation of national directive and policies in the locality. They were assisted in their task of carrying out national policy by technical field services of the central ministries decentralised to the departmental level (Booth, 1998). For example, the *Directions Départementales de l'Équipement* (DDE) was responsible for planning issues and infrastructures provisions in their localities and for advising the *préfet* on these issues. The mayor of the *commune*, even though elected locally, was regarded as an official of the state. For example, he delivered and refused planning permission but his decision was dependent on the opinion of the *préfet* and his services, whose views he was merely transmitting (Flockton, 1983). This organisation of local administration was dictated by a fundamental principle of the French Republic: equality of treatment (Booth, 1998). Administrative uniformity across the nation with local government controlled by civil servants was adopted to ensure citizens' rights. The social well-being of the French population was not to depend on local circumstances (Booth, 1998). The central state was traditionally seen as the guardian of the common good and its role was therefore regarded as making decisions in the national interest, standing over and surpassing the particular interests of localities or interest groups, the aim being to preserve the unity of the French state. In this configuration, local elected members are not expected to take on the task of policy making, but rather to be administrators.

Although France well-deserved its reputation as a highly-centralised state, the relation between the centre and the periphery was slightly more flexible than one would expect from the examination of the principles of the Napoleonic model and of the legal texts supporting centralisation (Cole, 2008). As demonstrated by Schmidt (1990b), who provided a widely-ranging literature review of the issue of decentralisation in France, a number of empirical studies showed that, in practice, prior to the decentralisation laws of the 1980s, *préfets* and field services of the different ministries had a certain amount of autonomy from Paris and were not entirely insensitive to local demands. Despite appearances, a certain level of complicity existed between them and some influential locally-elected representatives, the *notables*. This was a time when elected officials would present the merit of their views to senior national civil servants and lobby them to adapt their decisions to the specificity of the locality (Lorrain, 1993a). Therefore, locally-elected officials had a certain amount of power behind the scene and were to some degree accomplices with the *préfets* in certain decisions. This phenomenon has been referred to by scholars in France as 'cross-cutting regulation' (Schmidt, 1990b). Although limited in its

impact, such hidden influence did exist. However, it remained largely concealed from the public, as locally-elected officials used the rhetoric of centralisation to hide their complicity and responsibility for unpopular decisions. Thus, although the central government had a major input and enjoyed a great amount of control over local policies, there was some space for bargaining through informal contact at local level. To some extent, the local councillors helped to modify slightly the orientation of policies transmitted from Paris. However, at that time, a local councillor's main role was to be a problem solver (Lorrain, 1993b). Most local councillors were at the centre of large networks and used their numerous connections to solve individual issues of local citizens. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, there was a move away from this model, when a number of large cities controlled by the Socialists or the Communists became centres of opposition to governmental policy (Miller, 2006). During these decades, there commenced a move away from republican administration towards urban government (Lorrain, 1991). This move and its consequent politicisation of local affairs were accentuated by the decentralisation laws of 1982.

The original Napoleonic administrative system was highly centralised. Legislation in the nineteenth century enhanced the powers of local government by permitting the election of departmental and municipal councils by popular vote. However, only a century later, a substantive reform of local government was carried out. Decentralisation was one of the main achievements of the Socialist president, F. Mitterrand, during his first term of office. An initial framework law was voted into place in 1982 by a parliament dominated by the Socialist Party.

One of the main aims of that reform was to assert and ensure the right of democratically-elected councils at each level to administer themselves freely. The overall objective was to enhance local democracy by strengthening the ability of elected representatives to make policies they deemed important on behalf of their electorates (Cole, 2008). Consequently, the *préfet*'s *tutelle* over the mayor's decision was abolished and replaced by an *a posteriori* task to review the legality of decisions which had been made, or *contrôle de légalité* (Flocton, 1983). The *préfet* also ceased to be the chief executive of the departmental council, and these powers were transferred to an elected departmental president. For the first time, the region was recognised as another level of local government with democratically-elected councils (Booth, 1998).

These decentralisation laws resulted in a politisation of local affairs (Schmidt, 1990b; Mabileau, 1992 quoted in Green and Booth, 1996). The allocation of new powers

and responsibilities to locally-elected officials means they cannot attribute decisions to a distant centralised state, thereby forcing them to take responsibility for their actions (Schmidt, 1990b). As a consequence, the role of the mayor and municipal councillors has evolved greatly from that of administrators of public policies to that of initiators of policies for which they must take responsibility (Lorrain, 1993b). Moreover, the local politician's role has moved from being one of solving personal issues to being a strategist who is highly involved in fixing objectives and determining plans of action for his/her locality; thus politicians have to be more active.

Their new legitimacy has meant that they have taken numerous initiatives and mayors are now determined to carry out visible actions in the space of one term of office (Miller, 2006). This is especially true in the domain of urban policy, an area within which the mayor has become a privileged actor. Sometimes these actions are used to gain voters' support; flagship projects being used as a new strategy to make the mayor's actions visible and his policies known to his constituency (Chevalier, 1998). Local councillors are also expected to be active and clearly state their positions regarding policies affecting the locality for which they have responsibility. In fact, during the creation of the Goutte d'Or project, local groups appeal to local councillors from the opposition and forced them to state clearly their position on the municipal project. Since any inaction would have led them to be held equally responsible as their opponents for the controversial nature of the regeneration project, they were pushed to use their influence at national level to alter the project. Similarly, debates during recent municipal elections and at the *conseil d'arrondissement* in the 18th *arrondissement* have been characterised by conflict between right-wing and left-wing parties on the subject of the area's regeneration, the appropriateness of the tools used and the willingness of the local right-wing candidates to see tax-breaks applied and less social housing built. This debate paralleled discussions at the national level.

This politicisation of local affairs has meant that in Paris, in contrast to Dublin, municipal council meetings were essential places for debate concerning the case-study regeneration projects. Furthermore, this arena of public debate was more widely opened to the public in the Parisian case, since it is possible for any citizen to attend the council meeting without invitation and full transcripts of debates are freely available. In France, citizens were able to influence regeneration policy through lobbying their councillors and forcing them to adjust their decisions by using the threat of casting a potentially unfavourable vote if their needs were ignored. PGO was perceived as a potential political

enemy and this organisation was therefore listened to because of its political strength and its potential influence locally. In contrast, dissenting voices that disagreed with the socialist project in Château Rouge attributed their failure to be heard with their inability to beat the Socialist party in the locality, what they termed their "lack of political clout

The greater political and legal power of French elected municipal councillors compared to their Irish counterparts has meant that they have defined the general orientation of the regeneration projects, while the local civil servants have provided support to transcribe their political projects into technical terms. During the debates surrounding the regeneration project, citizens could lobby their politicians. Regeneration was clearly understood as being the responsibility of a mayor or an eminent local politician; those were Juppé and Chirac in the case of Goutte d'Or and, for the Château Rouge project, they were Delanoë and Neyreneuf.

This stands in considerable contrast with the situation in Dublin, where civil servants prepared and implemented regeneration projects which were not submitted to a vote of the elected council. Neither the HARP IAP nor the Markets Framework Plan was submitted to a vote of the council. They were the product of the Manager and senior staff who were not directly accountable to the public since they are nominated rather than elected to their positions. In Ireland, the ability of local citizens to drive local regeneration policy through their elected councillors was very limited in comparison to the French situation. However, this was not found to be related to the absence of responsiveness of public representatives to issues brought up by the local population, but was instead linked to the fact that Irish local councillors play a reduced role structurally in policy-formulation and decision-making than their French counterparts.

The ability of local councillors to have a strong impact on regeneration in France was obvious. Nonetheless, it did not mean that local policies were completely free from the influence of other levels of government or from national policies. This was linked to the fact that the second aim of 1980s decentralisation laws, which was to attribute particular responsibilities to different levels of sub-national authorities, was imperfectly achieved as well as its having conflicted with the first principle of free administration (Cole,2008). This is due to the difficulty in creating well-defined spheres of competence. In theory, responsibilities were transferred *en bloc* to different levels of local authorities and responsibility for particular policy was not supposed to be shared between different levels of local government. The *communes* were given the responsibility for physical planning, the *départemets* dealt with health and social services, while matters of economic

development became the preserve of the *regions* (Regourd, 2004). However, in practice, no policy, including urban regeneration, fits neatly into a single one of these *blocs*. Even the responsibility for the physical aspect of regeneration cannot be associated straightforwardly with a single level of government since the decentralisation of physical planning has actually been only imperfectly achieved (Jegouzo, 1993). *Communes* have essential powers to control the development of land and to direct the type of land-use within their perimeter. They have the right to initiate and approve their *plan d'occupation des sols*, a detailed zoning plan and essential tool for controlling development locally. Such responsibility previously rested with the *préfet* who relied on the technical help of the DDE. Communes that develop their own POS can afterwards deliver building permits, a task originally in the hands of the DDE. In fact, the local authority could continue to use the services of the DDE to help with plan preparation and development control or they could use another agency. They were also given the control of some tools to acquire land themselves such as *le droit de préemption*, which is the right of the mayor to purchase a property that comes on the market, pre-empting the intended buyer, in order to implement a regeneration project or to build social housing.

However, local authorities lack certain competences necessary for the implementation of land development and regeneration policy (Jegouzo, 1993). Some procedures, such as expropriation, depend in part on state approval. The responsibility for the financing of social housing and of the eradication of slum dwellings is also in the hands of the state. Lastly, national laws passed to guarantee social cohesion and social solidarity have an impact on the degree to which communes can in practice devise a land-use policy independently of the state. The laws LOV in 1991 and SRU in 2001 required that at least 20 percent of accommodation within *communes* of a certain size must be social housing for rent and now allow the *préfet* to intervene in case of non-compliance with the law and to acquire land for social housing instead of the mayor. Right-wing mayors have resisted the application of this law and complained that it contradicts their right to administer freely (Subra, 2006). The decentralisation of urban planning has been associated with decentralisation of all competences necessary for land development or physical regeneration of a neighbourhood. Moreover, this situation is made more complicated by the fact that national-urban renewal policy has moved from an emphasis on physical solutions during the 1960s to a stronger emphasis on issues such as education, unemployment and discrimination, especially through the *politique de la ville*, which encourages transversal approaches and make credits and support available for such

initiatives. But, as in the case of physical elements, the social and economical aspect of an urban renewal project may be the responsibility of different levels of government.

This dependence on other levels of government to implement regeneration policies explains why the French government has increasingly encouraged the use of contracts between different levels of government to commit different actors to a renewal project. It also explains why the initial project of the Chirac's municipality to implement a regeneration policy in favour of higher-income groups in the Goutte d'Or area was finally undermined not only through pressures citizens put on local politicians but also through pressures applied from central government, whose support was necessary since it controlled certain aspects of the project. These included the process of recognising the area as insalubrious, giving the legal right to expropriate certain properties and access to national funds to eliminate slum dwellings. After the decentralisation laws were enacted, central government could not impose its will on the Parisian municipality regarding regeneration policies, but managed to overcome the city's reluctance to participate in the *politique de la ville* programme which added a social dimension to the physical regeneration project in the Goutte d'Or area, by using its bargaining powers, both legal and financial. If it had refused, the municipality would have run the risk of seeing no project being achieved and of being seen by its electorate as inactive.

In summary, this research has shown that neighbourhood regeneration policy in France is the result of many influences and is shaped through the interaction of multiple actors. Contemporary regeneration policies are much more complex than they were in the 1960s, both in terms of the number and kind of actors involved in their definition and in terms of the different sources of finances. In fact, in the 1960s, following the framework law of the 7th August 1957 defining urban renewal as a national obligation, the state undertook a policy of extensive intervention in inner-city neighbourhoods that sought to upgrade their physical fabric (Piron, 2002). The DDE, with the *préfet,* initiated operations and delimited the areas concerned, while massive public funds from central government were used to finance such operations (Loinger, 1981). Such practices were increasingly criticised in the late 1970s. In the early 1980s, the Socialist government introduced the *politique de la ville* policy, seeking to promote an integrated approach to urban regeneration, both in mixed areas and in social-housing districts. However, it was not possible for this new policy be applied in a top-down manner since, at the same time, the government recognised the right of local authorities to administer themselves freely. Urban policy therefore became much more the outcome of negotiation between different levels of

government. Local mayors and councillors initiated the project and consequently sought political support and complementary funds at departmental, regional and national levels. Local elected representatives, as illustrated in the Parisian case-studies, became privileged actors, both in the initiation and definition of projects, their importance deriving from their new political and legal powers and to the fact that they had better access to local public funds. Localities received a transfer of finances for their new competences and could freely collect and determine property and business taxes. Overall, decentralisation has not been seen as a tool for reducing public intervention. Thus, as stressed by Pinson and Le Galés (2005: 12), it would be erroneous to associate decentralisation with a neoliberal agenda in the French context. Indeed, decentralisation has recently been criticised for contributing to an increase in public spending. When reviewing a report from the *Cour des Comptes* which found in 2009 that in 25 years of decentralisation, the spending of local authorities had increased five-fold and state spending has increased three-fold, Philippe Séguin, a French politician, regretted that " proximity is a call for spending" (Le Figaro, 29 Octobre 2009).

French local government plays a substantial role in policy making and decision making and can affect the well-being of its local population to a greater extent than Irish local government. It is therefore noteworthy that local public representatives and especially mayors are important figures in the public eye and voter turn-out at municipal elections has remained considerably high, reflecting perhaps the faith of French people in the ability of local government to make a difference (Morris, 1994; Lugan, 2001).

8.2.2. Ireland

In France, it was noted that decentralisation laws led to the attribution of 'general competence' to each level of government and to an increase in local democracy. This resulted in greater public input in neighbourhood regeneration policy. In Ireland, neither the concept of local democracy nor that of 'general competence' is so well developed and this has been reflected in the negligible role of publicly-elected representatives in either shaping the HARP IAP project or its outcomes. Compared to France, the Irish local government system is relatively weak, with a limited range of powers (see MacLaran 1993). Moreover, the absence of financial autonomy, with almost a high proportion of funding coming from central government, severely curtails its scope for independent action. Although the Irish government has committed itself to the introduction of some change, there is no equivalent to the decentralisation reform of the French Socialist government, referred to as the 'silent revolution' because of its far-reaching impact on

local democracy (Lorrain, 1993a). In fact, as stressed by Callannan (2003, 7), in Ireland, "the importance of local government as part of the nation's democratic system has often been overlooked". Thus, local authorities have more of a role in carrying out the decisions of central government than in devising local policies. Local authorities are seen more as service providers than as instruments of local democracy.

The distinctive feature of the Irish local government system is the operation of the managerial system, which was first introduced in Cork in 1929 and later implemented nationally following the County Management Law, 1940 (Sheeby, 2003). The powers which the system accords to the manager is a salient factor in comprehending the policy-making process. Under this system, the functions of the local authority are separated into reserved and executive functions. Reserved functions are the responsibility of the elected members and comprise matters such as adopting the budget, managing the development plan and by-laws, and nominating people on public bodies However, even these powers are limited. For example, in planning matters, the development plan is initially devised by officers of the planning department under the guidance of the manager. The elected representatives can make variations to the plan prior to its public display and ultimately have the responsibility of adopting the plan after the planners have amended it to reflect the public comments. Another set of reserved functions allows the elected members to direct the manager, within limits, as to how an executive function is to be exercised in any particular case (Sheehy, 2003). This is known as 'Section 4 procedure' and is exercised by resolution of the Council. Until the Section 4 procedure was amended in 1991 requiring that three-quarters of the Council vote in its favour to be enforced, it was used widely in planning matters, whereby managers were required to grant permission that would otherwise have been refused. The day-to-day decisions on individual planning applications remain an executive function and are therefore the responsibility of the manager, In contrast, in France this responsibility lies with the elected mayor. The manager exercises executive functions, that is, any function which is not a reserved function. The reserved functions are defined by law. This division of responsibility was originally introduced to bring efficiency and professionalism into the management of local affairs (Sheehy 2003). However, it has been rightly viewed by some as a negation of democracy, since many decisions are introduced and implemented by a non-elected manager (Democracy Commission, 2005). The manager, who is the chief executive officer for a local authority, is nominated under the recommendation of the Local Appointment Commission. The Commission is completely independent from the elected local council but comprises many

members from central government (McManus, 1993). Moreover, a manager cannot be dismissed by a city or county council alone. He/she can only be suspended by a 75 percent majority vote of the council, although the final decision to remove such a person from office lies with the minister. Managers are major actors through whom national policies are disseminated; they are the driving force behind local government.

Because of the management system and the tight control that central government can exercise on local government, the role which local councillors can play in policy making is very limited. However, a number of steps have been taken in the last fifteen years to enhance local democracy. For example, the Local Government Act, 1991, relaxed the *ultra vires* doctrine which prohibited local authorities from taking action not specifically defined by law. Local authorities now have some limited freedom regarding how to meet objectives and apply policies set nationally. Moreover, in 1996, a governmental policy document called *Better Local Government* was enacted. It contained four principles, one of which was to enhance local democracy. In order to strengthen local democracy, the report suggested a number of measures, including the recognition of local government in the Irish Constitution, developing the power and policy role of the councillor and facilitating the participation of local interest groups in local government. (Following the publication of *Better Local Government*, a referendum was held in 1999 to give constitutional recognition to local government; 77.8 per cent of voters cast a favourable vote (Callannan, 2003: 13). However, this new provision in the constitution mainly stipulates that elections have to be held every five years, while in the past local elections were often postponed by central government. Other changes promoted by the *Better Local Government* policy document have been given legal grounding through the Local Government Act, 2001, which consolidated the legislation on local government. For instance, this legislation required the creation and operation of strategic policy committees (SPC), which aim to reinforce the capacity of councillors to contribute to policy-making and policy reviewing (Boyle et al, 2003), while also providing an opportunity for civil society participation in local government. In fact, not less than a third of the members of each SPC are drawn from relevant sectoral interest groups. They must reflect the major functions of the local authority. However, SPC remains an advisory structure. Each SPC is chaired by a councillor who often reports to the main council by presenting policy positions (Boyle et al, 2003). Therefore, the councillors on a SPC can formulate policy proposals and evaluate policy but do not have decision-making powers. Through the setting of the SPCs, councillors are given the opportunity to spend more time reflecting on

strategic issues and local policies (Boyle et al, 2003). This is, in a sense, a departure from their traditional role, since McManus (1993) stressed that they have been left to deal with individual problems. However, no new powers have been given to councillors to implement policy. Neither has the division of responsibilities between reserved and executive functions been altered. This resistance to the delegation of powers to the elected council is also illustrated by the cancellation in 2003 of the provision for the introduction of a directly-elected chairperson of local city and county councils, which was made by the Government Act, 2001.

The author's own research found that there was a similar reluctance to give power to local elected public representatives over regeneration policy. In the HARP IAP, the elected councillors were given only an advisory role. The research also found that the limited powers of the elected representatives were judged to constitute a serious barrier to the implementation of regeneration policies aimed at meeting the social needs of lower-income groups. Elected representatives who were interviewed listed the imbalance of power between local councillors and managers as the main difficulty in resisting a pro-development, entrepreneurial regeneration in the HARP and Markets areas. Similarly, community activists felt that the manager and senior officials ran the council and that they could very rarely influence these decision makers through their public representatives. This can be attributed to the fact that the city manager is an appointee of central government and reflects national orientations, which were characterised by an increasingly fervent commitment to policies of neoliberalism and privatisation after 1997 (Hearne, 2009). Although there had been opposition to a pro-developer orientation at local level, as seen in the case of the implementation of HARP IAP and the elaboration of the Markets framework plan, local representatives' attempt to influence senior officials did not succeed in fundamentally re-orientating the regeneration project.

Moreover, in contrast to the Parisian case, there is no evidence that the council meetings became a platform for debate between councillors of different political persuasion on the potential orientations of regeneration policy in the inner-city. Consequently and in sharp contrast to the Parisian case, it is difficult to attribute to particular local politicians or particular local political parties the responsibility for the character of the regeneration project in the HARP area. The perceived inequalities resulting from the regeneration could only be blamed on either an unelected manager or a distant central state, limiting the possibility of expressing a clear sanction vote at local level or of using the threat of such action to influence the content of the project.

8.2.3. Comparative Elements: Summary

In France, the number of procedures and actors involved, nowadays, in the design of regeneration policies for a neighbourhood is complex. The notion of regeneration tends to lack legibility for French citizens because of the superposition of tools and instruments to achieve regeneration (Cour des Comptes, 2002). It is not surprising, therefore, that some authors have qualified the notion of urban regeneration as ambiguous (Bonneville, 2005) or described it as a 'holdall' concept (LeGarrec, 2006). However, what stands out clearly from the current research is the role of the local democratic institutions in the initiation and definition of regeneration policies, contrasting markedly with the Irish case. Even though the outcome of regeneration is the result of multiple interactions, including those between local and national politicians, the initial definition of the project is clearly under the control of a local councillor. In contrast, the input which councillor have in the Irish case takes place much later in the process. There was no deliberation in Council regarding the content of HARP IAP or an attempt by councillors to alter its content during the elaboration of the plan. Instead, they were mainly involved at the implementation stage through the Steering and Monitoring Committees.

Similarly, in the case of the Markets Area Framework Plan, the councillors were not the initiators of the regeneration programme, setting political orientations for civil servants to follow. They were lobbied by the local population not because of their role as decision-makers but because they could access and lobby senior officials who were responsible for the plan. Nonetheless, the latter remain mainly answerable to the manager. The main issue in Ireland is the power of a non-elected individual, the manager, in establishing regeneration programmes. The system is very centralised, which can cause difficulties in terms of its ability to respond to local needs and local debate. Although the exact content of an IAP project is drafted by local civil servants, the latter are more the members of a devolved service than of a decentralised body. The drafting of a regeneration project is strictly limited by national political orientations, by policies and instruments defined centrally. For example, in the HARP IAP, the main instrument available was the tax-incentive; local freedom consisted mainly in deciding which plots should benefit. The local authority lacked power and finance to define a project substantively different to that which was suggested by national directives. The lack of local funds and the lack of policy-making powers for the councillors meant that the content of the plan was primarily determined by central constraints.

8.3. The Role of Private Actors: France and Ireland

Unsurprisingly, the role of private actors and private finance was found to be significantly different in the two contexts. In the French context, private actors played a marginal role and there was a clear division of tasks between public- and private-sector actors. The latter were absent during the definition of the project. In a first phase, a local authority defined a project for the neighbourhood in need of regeneration, created a land bank and a strict redevelopment brief. Private actors, at best, participated in the project in a second phase by developing housing or commercial projects which had been strictly defined by local councillors and local-authority planners. Private actors were mobilised to implement pre-defined public choices. Thus, private actors were found to play only a peripheral role, despite a call at national level to involve the private sector to a greater extent in regeneration projects funded with public monies.

In the new urban regeneration national policy (*Programme National de Rénovation Urbaine*) launched in 2003, emphasis was placed on the need to develop a new division of tasks between the private and public sectors (Epstein, 2007). During the drafting of the new national scheme, it was argued that the complexity and length of the regeneration process could deter private actors from investing in such areas and participating in their renewal. Therefore, a single agency, the ANRU, was created in order to simplify the process of obtaining public funds for local projects but also to render the process more legible for outsider actors and accelerate the delivery of the project. According to Epstein (2007), the aim was to send a strong message to private investors, convincing them of a forthcoming change in the nature of the property market in these areas and enticing them to become new partners in the regeneration process. However, in practice, the departure was more discursive than actual. In the regeneration of the Château Rouge area, which was financed under the new *Programme National de Rénovation Urbaine,* new actors are visible. They are the *Fonçière Logement* and the SEMAVIP; both were absent from the previous project financed under the old *politique de la ville.* However, it is difficult to qualify them as being purely private actors or to equate them with the private developers encountered in the Irish case.

In official documents, the *Fonçière Logement* is presented as a new private partner nationally and is involved locally in the regeneration of Château Rouge. However, the *Fonçière Logement* is a housing association rather than a private developer. It has two missions; one is to build social-housing units in localities where social housing represents

less than 20 per cent of the housing stock and the other one is to promote social mixing by constructing 'affordable accommodation'[48] which is rented or sold at market price in neighbourhoods that display a high level of deprivation. The *Fonçière Logement* is a voluntary organisation funded by the *Union d'Économie Sociale pour le Logement* (UESL), a cooperative that collects a tax known as *1% logement* paid by all employers hiring ten or more employees. The UESL, which is controlled by unions and employers' representatives, negotiates regularly with central government about how to use the funds. In 2003, the UESL agreed to participate in the national regeneration programme by providing ¤6 billion to the ANRU, matching the amount the state was to allocate. In exchange for this contribution the *Fonçière Logement* receives between 15 and 35 percent of the land involved in each regeneration project financed by the ANRU. The *Fonçière Logement* receives a certain number of plots but is not involved in the design of the local regeneration project and does not have any bargaining powers at local level to influence the nature of the redevelopment. Once the land is transferred to the association, the *Fonçière Logement* acts in parallel, rather than in partnership, with the local authority. The exact proportion of land transferred is negotiated between the ANRU and the local authority; the *Fonçière Logement* has no say. In the case of Château Rouge, the agreed figure was 20 percent, but all accommodation built will be PLS social housing, that is a type of rented social housing for people whose earnings are above the income limit for traditional social housing but who are still selected by means testing. At national level, it is also interesting to note that the amount of land transferred has been below the original expectations, which means that the objective of social mix might not be achieved (CES, 2008).

Another partner in the regeneration of Château Rouge was the SEMAVIP, a *société d'économie mixte* (SEM). SEMs have been identified by other authors as important actors in the implementation of urban renewal projects in France (see Nelson, 2001; Verhage, 2005). The implementation of the redevelopment of Château Rouge was delegated to the SEMAVIP, which is a semi-private company specialising in land development. However, the involvement of this company did not reduce the amount of public-sector control on the project, nor did it introduce a business ethos. SEMs have been used for decades in France by local authorities to deliver public services or projects. In order to guarantee that they work of behalf of the public interest, a majority of their capital must be owned by public

[48] Logement social intermédiaire, a type of social housing open to people with a certain level of earnings

bodies and their chairman is a local politician. The SEMAVIP was chosen for its technical skills rather than for its business skills. The SEMAVIP is owned at 77.5 per cent by the *Ville de Paris*, the *Ville de Paris* transferring responsibility for the regeneration project to the SEMAVIP after the project was defined. Therefore, it has an implementation role; the SEMAVIP possessing no role in the definition of the plan. Moreover, decisions that were not finalised in the regeneration plan continue to be closely supervised by the local councillors. For instance, the SEM decided, in close discussion with local politicians and civil servants, what type of companies or community groups would be accommodated in the new space provided at ground-floor level of the residential blocks. The *Ville de Paris* delegated some important powers to the SEMAVIP such as its *droit de préemption* (priority right to buy a property coming onto the market) but the SEMAVIP can only use them within a framework tightly defined by the local authority.

Another important feature is the importance of the public funds mobilised in French regeneration projects, which contrasts greatly with the high reliance on private investment in the Irish situation. For instance, the financing of the redevelopment of the Château Rouge district will be ensured by the *Ville de Paris* and by a subvention from the ANRU, amounting to ¤55,688,831. In the French case, the sources of financing are identified at an early stage. The financing is envisaged in concert with the process of defining and obtaining political support for the project. Therefore, although all social infrastructures planned as part of the regeneration process are not yet built, the future financiers are clearly identifiable. For instance, a social centre and additional buildings for drugs users will be developed, the ANRU having set aside ¤1,489,865 for these two projects, with the remaining costs being covered by the *Ville de Paris*. In addition to the funds provided by the central and local government, local authorities can obtain funds in the form of loans from the *Caisse des Dépots et des Consignations* to implement their urban regeneration projects. This public bank finances, amongst other things, urban renewal operations and it has the advantage of offering loans with advantageous interest rates for building social housing and for redevelopment activities.

In contrast, private actors and private funding are key in Irish redevelopment projects. In the HARP project, a small amount of European funding was initially available, but it was modest and accessible only for a short period of time. Once the European funding stopped, the local authority for the national programme for urban regeneration was the IAP scheme. Dublin Corporation argued that to ensure the implementation of the

HARP project, its integration in the IAP scheme was necessary. In contrast to the French situation, the neighbourhood was not competing against other areas to obtain public funds or public loans but attempting to attract private investors by offering tax-breaks, with the social content of the plan relying on the private sector for its implementation. Thus, the local authority was dependent on market forces to achieve both physical and social outcomes. However, the ethos of profitability inherent within the private sector sits uncomfortably with the realisation of social goals and while the physical aspect of the plan was implemented, with a majority of sites targeted for redevelopment attracting interest from private developers, the social aspect of the plan failed to materialise. The community's own evaluation of the HARP IAP was that it had been a tool to facilitate property development and that it did not provide for a balanced approach between community and private needs. The community gain clause failed to produce the expected results. Senior officials saw it as a deterrent to development, since it rendered the tax incentives less attractive compared to those available under earlier schemes. To the community, development was prioritised over social gain and had been justified by officials adopting a rhetoric associating development with the good of the city.

Overall, the community activists felt that they lacked sufficient power over the definition and implementation of social gain. They had no say in the negotiations prior to the granting of planning permissions and, once the physical development had been delivered, the community had limited power to obtain the delivery of social facilities and services. The only times at which they were able to negotiate some social gain was when their actions could result in slowing down the development process. After the appeal concerning the development on the west side of Smithfield square, one developer re-discussed the content of the plan directly with the community. The community activists felt that a small gain relating to the physical aspect of the scheme through An Bord Pleanála improved their ability to bargain for some substantial community gain, since there was a recognition that their actions could affect the viability of the scheme. In the case of the Markets Area Framework plan, there was also a feeling that by engaging in delaying tactics, a small gain in the form of a commitment to deliver a community centre was obtained. Yet, its delivery is now very uncertain. In contrast, in the French case, there had been no instance of negotiating with private actors for community gain funds or facilities, all social objectives having been implemented by public-sector operations.

Another significant difference between the French and Irish approaches to regeneration is that the financing of the regeneration project is set out at an early stage and

forms part of the plan-making process in France. In contrast, neither the HARP Framework Plan nor the HARP IAP contained section dealing with finances. This is because there is such a high reliance in the Irish case upon private initiatives and finance. The plan-makers in Ireland prepare a vague briefing document and then let the private sector consider its attractiveness. If the private sector does not find it appealing, the project comes to a stop. This was illustrated in the case of the regeneration of the Markets district. A change in economic circumstances resulted in the project losing its attractiveness and being put on hold. Moreover, the private developers enjoy a high degree of latitude in their interpretation of the plan as the development brief for each site is not firmly decided as in the French case. Finally, the introduction of private-sector principles into Irish regeneration projects also occurs through the increasingly propensity to outsource tasks, such as plan making, to private companies. These consultancy firms are not elected and the public has little or no control over them. They are not animated by an ethos of enhancing 'the public good' but work according to private-sector principles. This was evident during the design of the plan for the Markets area. Private consultants were charged to assess the need to include a recreational centre in the plan and the consultants chose to assess the leisure-centre project on the basis of its financial viability, rather than on the social needs that it could fulfil.

CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION

In France, at the central government level, the emergence of a discourse promoting a property-led approach to urban regeneration is relatively recent. Since the start of the new millennium, a new discourse emphasising the physical aspect of regeneration and stressing the need to attract private investment and private households in deprived areas has developed at national level. This change in orientation is a response to the perceived failure of past national urban-renewal policies in neighbourhoods covered by the *politique de la ville* programme. This programme has increasingly come under criticism because of its inability to break the cycle of decline and to counter a trend towards the geographical concentration of poverty. Under the influence of J. L. Borloo, in 2003, the government proceeded to define new objectives for the *politique de la ville* programme and put into place new tools and actors to deliver the new urban policy, renamed *the politique de rénovation urbaine*. The latter promotes a property-led approach to urban regeneration in order to 'break urban ghettos' and produce measurable outcomes such as a decrease in local unemployment rates. Exceptional measures are justified by the need to reintegrate these areas into the fabric of the city, deviations from average characteristics being regarded as a danger to the principles of the French Republic and to the French Republic itself by threatening unity and uniformity. The goal is to encourage social mixing by action on the physical fabric of the area. The mixing of people from different social backgrounds at the neighbourhood level is assumed to have positive effects and to participate to the resolution of social and economic issues, despite the fact that policy-makers lack evidence of the beneficial effects of social mixing (Epstein, 2007). The government called for a radical change in approach involving private interests and argued that these areas required shock treatment.

The area examined within this research project went through two phases of redevelopment. The first phase took place under the 'old' *politique de la ville*, which was implemented under pressures of local activists opposed to a property-led approach promoted by Jacques Chirac. Sub-standard housing units have been in part replaced by social-housing units and new social services have been delivered but the area still suffers from a negative image because of a high concentration of disadvantaged households. Right-wing local politicians and newcomers to the area regard this first phase as a failure. Echoing a national discourse, they wanted to see the implementation of a more radical approach during the second phase of the plan. Yet, in the area examined by this research

project, the second regeneration scheme remained a publicly-dominated policy-making process with semi-private actors implementing a municipally-defined project; private interests were not actively involved. Social mix was adopted as a goal of the new plan, although the interpretation of the concept differed from the national vision. There was a strong will to maintain the working-class character of the district and opposition to any drastic change in neighbourhood characteristics. There were concerns about the capacity of the project to attain and maintain a balance between introducing greater diversity into the area in order to diminish the stigmatisation of the district, while ensuring that the introduction of some social mix - by constructing some accommodation for young workers or students - would not trigger greater change in the neighbourhood's composition. The policy-makers intend that the construction of social-housing units will prevent such a threat. Therefore, this case study does not support the existence of any U-turn in policy and does not suggest a convergence with Anglo-Saxon type of property-led regeneration, especially not with Irish urban renewal policies. Instead, environmental and physical actions are accompanied by a significant number of publicly-funded social measures, such as the provision of funds for local social initiatives and the provision of space for social activities.

The local state engaged in less market-driven ways in the Parisian case than in the Dublin case. A project including a number of indigenous concerns managed to survive despite the development opportunities of the site and despite the pressures from a new group of gentrifiers promoting the provision of privately owned properties and the development of private businesses instead of social housing and social services provision. This may be case specific or due to the Parisian municipality political orientation and its own financial capability. Yet, it is also to be related to the fact that public funds for regeneration projects are accessible through central government. Therefore, local government was not as dependent on private funds as in Dublin. Moreover, the neoliberal discourse and ideology have not infiltrated French national social and economic policies to the same extent than in Ireland, affecting local perceptions of what is possible. Financial constraints and ideological factors explained the prevalence of market-driven objectives in the Irish case despite the existence of formal structures for participation.

Secondly, the research raises broader questions regarding the actual benefits of social mixing. Although this had not constituted an original aim of the current research programme, it became obvious that because of the property-market dynamics in Paris, independently of national policies, the area had already become more mixed socially even

prior to the regeneration programme. Far from creating beneficial effects, the cohabitation of different social groups at the level of the neighbourhood had become a source of tension. The new incoming population mobilised against the setting up of further services for drug users and criticised the actions of the municipality which they regarded as contributing to the ghettoisation of the area. They strongly lobbied for actions such as the development of private accommodation for owner-occupiers which might lead to significant changes in the local population and have little relevance for the indigenous population. Thus, it is unclear whether reducing geographical distance between social groups can reduce social distance, a point which has been alluded to by previous research (see Chamboredon and Lemaire, 1970). More broadly, it questions the value of importing into France those features of policies which have failed elsewhere to address the issue of social exclusion, as seen in the Irish case study. State support for the construction of accommodation for better-off people can promote radical change in an area and local communities can fail to benefit even if involved in the definition of the process.

The social measures that characterised the original *politique de la ville* may have benefited some of their inhabitants who may have since moved out of the area. Without a study of the mobility of the households of a deprived area, it is not possible to conclude that all the deprived households are the same ones before and after the *politique de la ville* initiatives. They may simply have been replaced by others. However, they have failed to counter the concentration of deprived households, because they address the symptoms but not the causes of deprivation. It is important to remember that the causes of socio-spatial segregation lie outside the neighbourhood itself, being located in the characteristics of the capitalist system which creates inequalities and the housing market which allocates accommodation to different social groups. Areas of deprivation are the spatial manifestation of economic and social injustice. Therefore, if long-term solutions to poverty are sought, remedies that are more radical in terms of wealth redistribution will be necessary; they will include radically different national and global economic policies.

If area-based regeneration schemes such as the *politique de la ville* cannot eradicate poverty, leading to the perpetual concentration of funds on the same districts, property-based regeneration policies only impart an impression of a changing situation, as seen in Ireland. There is a risk that solutions imported uncritically from abroad lead to unexpected outcomes, creating new forms of exclusion. Studies by French academics, such as Donzelot (2006), promoting uncritically the importation of concepts such as empowerment or social mix from the US urban policy realm run the risk of misleading policy-makers by

overlooking a large body of work that has been highly critical of neoliberal urban policies, including collaborative ones.

In Ireland, the shortcomings of property-led regeneration were identified in the mid 1990s by both academic and government-sponsored research. Such policies focusing on regenerating distressed areas by relying on the private market rather than the state have led to new property development and a change in both land-use and social composition. Such policies have prompted news forms of neighbourhood change, which are initiated and driven to a great extent by the state rather than by private developers. These policies were successful in regenerating physically the disadvantaged neighbourhoods but failed to address the social needs of their working-class population and even exacerbated social polarisation, as seen previously. A shift in urban regeneration policy occurred in the late 1990s with the establishment of the IAP programme. In order to ensure social goals would be reached, the state promoted the development of a participatory urban-renewal policy centred on collaboration with communities. This trend towards the opening up to local community interests of partnership structures in charge of policy-making paralleled a similar trend at the time at national level. This was associated with the opening up of social-partnership to national representatives of the community sector in order to counter growing inequalities resulting from neoliberal economic policies. However, paradoxically, the Irish government simultaneously continued to support pro-market policies and reliance on the private sector to attain social goals. This was reflected in the sphere of urban policies by a pro-development attitude at national level. Tools such as tax incentives that facilitated property development remained at the heart of national urban policies.

At the scale of the Dublin municipality, a pro-growth attitude at management level permeated decisions relating to the restructuring of the urban fabric. There was a general faith and confidence in the market and private-sector development among senior officials. In this way, neoliberal discourse influenced key actors' perception of what constitues an appropriate regeneration policy. This positive attitude towards the market contributed to the local authority's failing to support an alternative model of development. Market pressures were given priority over communities' needs, contradicting local and central-state rhetorical emphasis on community engagement. In the HARP area, local activists managed to insert their views during the elaboration of the regeneration scheme. Collaboration between the community and the local authority during the definition of the scheme was seen as successful and the plan was truly original in its social goals. The Steering Group and the Monitoring Committee were formal structures set up to give some

continuation to this successful collaboration and as a means to ensure community participation in the implementation of the plan. This participation, however, was restricted by the market logic that the local and national governments supported at the time. The community representatives were not co-opted into the pro-development local agenda and they became critical of the way the plan was implemented. Their actions were seriously constrained by a lack of resources, a lack of control over planning decisions and a lack of influence over resource allocation. They felt that the impact of their participation in the process was limited. In their eyes, it had not led to a more inclusive regeneration policy.

This result concurs with research conducted in the UK which questions what power communities have in an increasingly neoliberal urban governance and highlights the contradiction between increased opportunities for community representatives to participate in policy and creeping neoliberalism subordinating social needs to market forces (see González and Vigar, 2008). Recent research has also stressed how community interests and social goals have been marginalised in urban regeneration partnerships in the UK, despite a call from New Labour for greater social inclusion (Davies, 2007; Perrons and Skyers, 2003). Furthermore, Davies (2007) questions whether, in a political environment more favourable to community needs, partnerships could lead to more equitable outcomes. Indeed, research carried out in times less supportive of liberal *laissez-faire* shows the limitations of participatory structures and how participation does not automatically result in a redistribution of power in favour of disadvantaged people (Arnstein, 1969). Communities often affect decisions at best on the periphery. Unless there is control over key decisions concerning the use and redistribution of resources, it is unlikely that participatory structures can challenge socio-economic inequalities.

Lastly, this research was mainly concerned with policy developments that took place before the global economic and financial crisis of 2007-8. During the period studied, the Irish government embraced a neoliberal agenda by promoting market solutions, minimising regulations, privatising public goods, promoting a *laissez-faire* attitude in planning matters, introducing tax-incentive schemes and allowing developers to disregards their obligations in terms of social housing provision. This crisis has been felt more strongly in Ireland than in many other developed countries because economic growth has been mainly driven by an over-stimulation of the property sector. The collapse of the Irish property and banking sectors can be in part linked to the global financial crisis but home policies are the main cause of the current crisis; the adoption of a neoliberal policies can explain the severity of the crisis (see Kitchin et al, 2010). Houses prices have depreciated

significantly, many housing estates and business parks lie unfinished or vacant, while the unemployment rate has risen from 4.4% in 2006 to 13.7% in 2010 (Kitchin et al, 2010; 7). It is questionable whether or not such crisis will lead to a reappraisal of the value of neoliberal policies, particularly in the context of urban planning policies. This is an area that would merit further research. Up to now, there is little evidence of change in policies. In the Irish case-study, officials still showed great support for private sector solutions despite the collapse of the market plan, while at national level there are very few critiques of the underlying neoliberal ideology that underpins the whole Irish economy. In France, the crisis has not been so pronounced. Yet, it would be of interest to inquire whether or not the French government learn from the failures of other countries and interrupt its recent conversion to pro-market solutions or continue on the same path.

Appendix A: Details of Community Gain Grants at 17/07/2009

Source: Dublin City Council Internal documents

Organisation	Amount	Category	Sub Category
Little Stars Crèche	6,000.00	Community	Childcare
Tiny Toes Creche	3,500.00	Community	Childcare
Muppet/ Rainbow Community Playgroup	3,000.00	Community	Childcare
Constitution Hill Community Crèche	8,000.00	Community	Childcare
St. Michans Community Crèche	9,000.00	Community	Childcare
Pitter Patter	8,000.00	Community	Childcare
Stanhope Street Playgroup	8,580.00	Community	Childcare
Step by Step	7,792.00	Community	Childcare
Dublin 7 Centre for Independent Living	2,000.00	Community	Community Development
Chrysalis Community Drug Project	5,000.00	Community	Community Development
Aosog	10,000.00	Community	Community Development
North West Inner City Training and Development Programme	10,000.00	Community	Community Development
North West Inner City Womens Network	5,000.00	Community	Community Development
Cairde	3,000.00	Community	Community Development
Carmichael Centre for Vol. Groups	10,000.00	Community	Community Development
NWIC community forum	10,000.00	Community	Community Development
Grangegorman Com. Forum	10,000.00	Community	Community Development
Grapevine Arts Centre t/a City Arts	200,000.00	Community	Community Development

The Markets Afterschool Activities Project	6,000.00	Community	Community Development
Bradog Regional Youth Services,	5,000.00	Community	Community Development
The Corner Ladies Club	7,900.00	Community	Community Development
Markets Group Summer Project	10,000.00	Community	Community Development
Smithfield Women's Group	2,500.00	Community	Community Development
Aosog	7,500.00	Community	Community Development
North West Inner City Network	1,750.00	Community	Community Support
North West Inner City Network	2,250.00	Community	Community Support
North West Inner City Network	6,000.00	Community	Community Support
Outhouse	4,000.00	Community	Community Support
Friends of the Elderly	2,000.00	Community	Community Support
Friends of the Elderly	6,000.00	Community	Community Support
An Siol	95,000.00	Community	Community Support
Outhouse Ltd	70,000.00	Community	Community Support
NWICN	44,000.00	Community	Community Support
DCC-Queen St units	370,000.00	Community	Community Support
MACRO CDP	4,000.00	Community	Community Support
Citizens Information Centre, MACRO	25,000.00	Community	Community Support
Macro Combined Res Assoc	5,953.44	Community	Community Support
MACRO CDP	59,818.00	Community	Community Support
MACRO CDP	30,000.00	Community	Community Support
An Siol CDP	5,000.00	Community	Community Support
An Siol CDP	5,000.00	Community	Community Support
Saint Paul's Community Centre Management Committee	10,000.00	Community	Community Support

Aontas Youth Arts Initiative	10,000.00	Community	Community Support
The Carmichael Centre	10,000.00	Community	Community Support
The Holiday Home Project	4,000.00	Community	Community Support
DCC - Queen St Units	400,000.00	Community	Community Support
Open Heart House	2,500.00	Community	Community Support
Chrysalis	9,458.00	Community	Community Support
Macro Building Management Ltd	5,000.00	Community	Community Support
Macro Building Management Ltd	5,000.00	Community	Community Support
Snug Counselling Service	1,895.00	Community	Community Support
Café Entrance Macro Bldg	19,934.23	Community	Community Support
Macro	7,150.00	Community	Community Support
Macro Sen Citz	10,000.00	Community	Community Support
Macro Bldg Mgmt.	10,000.00	Community	Community Support
DCC Heritage Signs	100,000.00	Community	Cultural
DCC (Henrietta St)	9,160.00	Community	Cultural
Opera Ireland	10,000.00	Community	Cultural
Dublin 7 School Completion Programme	9,360.00	Community	Education
Gateway Project	5,000.00	Community	Education
St. Pauls CBS	6,500.00	Community	Education
School Completion Prog	3,000.00	Community	Education
Gateway Project	33,363.50	Community	Education
Community ICT Project Ltd	383,760.00	Community	Education
Community ICT Project	10,000.00	Community	Education
Henrietta Adult and Com Education	5,800.00	Community	Education
Georges Hill Presentation Primary School, George's Hill.	2,000.00	Community	Education
Blackhall Afterschools Project,	10,000.00	Community	Education

The Joinery	10,000.00	Community	Education
Blackhall Afterschools project	4,500.00	Community	Education
DTE	5,000.00	Community	Events
Fingal Market Mgmt. Co.	9,800.00	Community	Events
Stoneybatter Senior Citz	7,100.00	Community	Events
Stoneybatter Senior Citizens Outreach Project	3,000.00	Community	Events
Halla Dubh	4,000.00	Community	Events
Macro Senior Citizens Service	5,000.00	Community	Historical project
Macro Senior Citizens	1,868.27	Community	Historical project
Greek St/Michans House	10,000.00	Community	Historical project
Threshold	7,000.00	Community	Housing
Sports against Racism Ireland (SARI)	30,000.00	Community	Intercultural
Capuchin Day Centre	10,000.00	Community	Miscellaneous
Arc Cancer Support	9,500.00	Community	Miscellaneous
Aughrim Street Scout Group	1,000.00	Community	Sports
Bradog United Football Club	4,000.00	Community	Sports
Atomic Dance & Drama	2,000.00	Community	Sports
Bendigo Football & Social Club	1,000.00	Community	Sports
Phibsboro Amateur Boxing Club	4,000.00	Community	Sports
Phibsboro Amateur Boxing club	10,000.00	Community	Sports
Oliver Plunketts/Eoghan Ruadh GAA club.	9,372.00	Community	Sports
Hercules Wrestling club	9,989.00	Community	Sports
Dublin Community Games	25,000.00	Community	Sports
Smithfield on Ice	21,600.00	Community	Sports

Georgettes Majorettes	9,500.00	Community	Sports
Markets Untd Football Club	7,740.00	Community	Sports
Dublin Christian Mission	10,000.00	Community	Sports
Georgettes Majoretts	5,000.00	Community	Sports
Karen Cronin - childrens trip to Los Angeles	2,000.00	Community	Sports
IntroArt	7,000.00	Community	Training
Smashing Times Theatre Co.	10,000.00	Community	Training
Smashing Times Theatre Co.	10,000.00	Community	Training
Stanhope St Gosel Choir	9,500.00	Community	Training
The Snug Counselling Service	10,000.00	Community	Training
Challenge Horizon	4,800.00	Community	Training
Bradog Regional Youth Services	5,200.00	Community	Training
Aontas youth Arts Initiative	10,000.00	Community	Training
Nigerian Association Ireland	4,000.00	Community	Intercultural
DCC Smithfield	500,000.00	Infrastructure	Miscellaneous
DCC Halston St park	250,000.00	Infrastructure	Parks
DCC Chancery St park	200,000.00	Infrastructure	Parks
DCC Parks - Linenhall st Park	100,000.00	Infrastructure	Parks
DCC Ormond Square Playground	80,000.00	Infrastructure	Parks
DCC Fr. Matthew Square (railed area)	60,000.00	Infrastructure	Parks
DCC -Roads Dept	80,000.00	Infrastructure	Roads
DCC Capel St Environmental works	500,000.00	Infrastructure	Roads
DCC -Roads Dept	1,100,000.00	Infrastructure	Roads
DCC Georges Lane	19,525.72	Infrastructure	Roads
Visual Arts Centre	56,000.00	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous
	5,441,419.16		

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alain, J. (1989). Une Politique en Marche. In: Duport, J.P. (ed.) *Réhabilitation de l'Habitat en France*. Economica, Paris.

Allen, K. (2000). *The Celtic Tiger: The Myth of Social Partnership*. Manchester University Press, Manchester.

Allen, K. (2003). Neither Boston nor Berlin: Class Polarisation and Neo-Liberalism in the Irish Republic. In: Coulter, C. and Coleman, S. (eds.) *The End of Irish History: Critical Reflections on the Celtic Tiger*. Manchester University Press, New York.

Allen, K. (2009). *Ireland's Economic Crash*. Liffey Press, Dublin.

Anderson, A. and Vieillard-Baron, H. (2003). *La Politique de la Ville - Histoire et Organisation*. Éditions ASH, Paris.

Arnstein, S. (1969). A Ladder of Citizen Participation. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 35 (4): 216-224.

Association Salle Saint-Bruno (2005). *Tableau de Bord de la Vie Sociale à la Goutte d'or*. Association Salle Saint-Bruno, Paris.

Association Salle Saint-Bruno (2006). *La Vie de Quartier à la Goutte d'or, Perceptions et Representations des Habitants*. Association Salle Saint-Bruno, Paris.

Association Salle Saint-Bruno (2007). *Découvrir or Redécouvrir le Quartier de la Goutte d'Or*. Association Salle Saint-Bruno, Paris.

Atelier Parisien d'Ubanisme [APUR] (1987). *L'Aménagement de L'Est de Paris. Le Plan Programme de l'Est de Paris*. APUR, Paris.

Atelier Parisien d'Ubanisme [APUR] (2005a). *Paris 1954-1999, 18eme Arrondissement, Données statistiques, Population, Logement, Emploi*. APUR, Paris.

Atelier Parisien d'Ubanisme [APUR] (2005b). *Paris 1954-1999, Données statistiques, Population, Logement, Emploi*. APUR, Paris.

Atelier Parisien d'Ubanisme [APUR] (2007). *Premier Bilan des Relogements dans le Cadre des Opérations de Renouvellement Urbain à Paris*. APUR, Paris.

Authier, J.Y. and Bidou-Zachariasen, C. (2008). La Question de la *Gentrification* Urbaine. *Espaces et Sociétés*, 132-133 (1-2): 13-22.

Bacqué, M.H. (2006). En Attendant la Gentrification: Discours et Politiques à la Goutte d'or. *Sociétés Contemporaines*, 63 (3): 63-83.

Badariotti D. (2006). Le Renouvellement Urbain en France : du Traitement Morphologique à l'Intervention Sociale, *Hal SHS*. Available from: <http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/12/18/21/PDF/Bada_HALSHS_RU_Praxis.v1.pdf> [Accessed 9/04/09].

Barre R. (1976). *Rapport de la Commission d'étude d'une réforme du financement du logement*, La Documentation Française, Paris.

Bartley, B. and Borscheid, M. (2003). Partnership funding in a period of new governance. In: Scott, C.M and Thurston, W.E. (eds.) *Collaboration in Context*. University of Calgary, Calgary.

Bartley, B. and Treadwell Shine, K. (1999). Promoting Economic and Social Gains: the Emergence of Dublin as an Adaptive "Entrepreneurial' City. *Insite*, Autumn/ Winter: 20-23.

Bartley, B. and Treadwell Shine, K. (2003). Competitive City: Governance and the Changing Dynamics of Urban Regeneration. In: Moulaert, F., Rodriguez, A. and Swyngedouw, E. (eds.) *The Globalized City: Economic Restructuring and Social Polarization in European Cities*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Bartley, B. , Treadwell, K. and Creamer, C. (1999). *The Dynamics of Urban Regeneration in Dublin*. URSPIC Project Report on the CHDDA. T.S.E.R EU Commission.

Bartley, B. and Waddington, S. (2001). The Emergence and Evolution of Urban Planning in Ireland. *Geographical Viewpoint*, 29: 7-14.

Béal, V. and Rousseau, M. (2008). Néolibéraliser la Ville Fordiste. Politiques Urbaines Post-keynésiennes et Re-développement économique au Royaume-Uni : une Approche comparée . *Métropoles*, 4: 160-202.

Béhar, D. (1997). Pacte de Relance de la Ville: L'Etat Français Organise son Retrait. *Alternatives Économiques*, 148: 34-35.

Bidou-Zachariasen, C. and Poltorak, J.F. (2008). Le «Travail» de *Gentrification*: Les Transformations Sociologiques d'un Quartier Parisien Populaire. *Espaces et Sociétés*, 132-133 (1-2): 107-124.

Blatrix, C. (1999). Le Maire, le Commissaire enquêteur et leur "Public". In : CURAPP/CRAPS (eds.) *La Démocratie Locale: Représentation, Participation et Espace Public*. CURAPP/CRAPS, Lille.

Bloom, S. (2004). *Republicanism and Privatization: French Economic Nationalism and the Global Marketplace*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17, 2004. Available from<: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73478_index.html.>

Bonneville, M. (2005). Les Ambiguïtés du Renouvellement Urbain en France: Effets d'Annonce, Continuité ou Rupture? *Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine*, 97: 7-16.

Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. (1999). On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason. *Theory, Culture and Society*, 16: 41-58.

Boyle, M. and Hughes, G. (1994). The Politics of Urban Entrepreneurialism in Glasgow. *Geoforum*, 25 (4): 453-470.

Boyle, M., McWilliams, C. and Rice, G. (2008). The Spatialities of Actually Existing Neoliberalism in Glasgow, 1977 to Present. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, 90 (4): 313-325.

Booth, P. (1998). Decentralisation and Land-Use Planning in France: a 15-year Review. *Policy & Politics*, 26 (1): 89-105.

Boyle, R., Humphreys, P.C., O'Donnell, O., O'Riordan, J. and Timonen, V. (2003). *Changing Local Government: A Review of the Local Government Modernisation Programme*. Institute of Public Administration, Dublin.

Brenner, N. and Theodore, N. (2002). Cities and the Geographies of 'Actually Existing Neoliberalism'. *Antipode,* 34 (3): 356-386.

Brenner, N. and Theodore, N. (2005). Neoliberalism and the Urban Condition. *City*, 9 (1): 101-107.

Brenner, N., Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2005). Neoliberal Urbanism: Cities and the Rule of Markets. *DEMOLOGOS working paper*. Newcastle, UK.

Brown, W. (2003). Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy. *Theory & Event,* 7 (1). Available from: <muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v007/7.1brown.html> [Accessed 9/04/10].

Burton, P. (2003). Community Involvement in Neighbourhood Regeneration: Stairway to Heaven or Road to Nowhere? *CNR Paper 13*, Centre for Neighbourhood Research, UK.

Callanan, M. (2003). The Role of Local Government. In: Callanan, M. and Keogan, J. F. (eds.) *Local Government in Ireland Inside Out*. Institute of Public Administration, Dublin.

Chaline, C. (2008). *Les Politiques de la Ville*. PUF, Collection: Que sais-je ?, Paris.

Chamboredon, J.-C., and Lemaire, M. (1970). Proximité Spatiale et Distance Sociale. *Revue française de sociologie*, vol. 11(1): 3-33.

Chevalier, D. (1998). La Politique Urbaine, Domaine Réservé du Maire. *Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine*, 80-81: 121-127.

CES (2007). *De Nouvelles Perspectives pour la Rénovation Urbaine: Rapport d'évaluation 2006*. La Documentation Française, Paris.

Clerval, A. (2007). Les Politiques Publiques face à la Gentrification. Le cas de Paris intra-muros. In: *Colloque international Pérennité urbaine ou la ville par-delà ses métamorphose*s, 15-16 mars 2007, Louest UMR 7145 / Mosaiques, Nanterre.

Clerval, A. (2008). Les Anciennes Cours Réhabilitées des Faubourgs: Une forme de *Gentrification* à Paris. *Espaces et Sociétés*, 132-133 (1-2): 91-106.

Coakley, J. (2005). Society and Political Culture. In: Coakley, J. and Gallagher, M. (eds). *Politics in the Republic of Ireland*. Fourth Edition, Routledge, London and New York.

Cochrane, A. (2003). The New Urban Policy: Towards Empowerment or Incorporation? The Practice of Urban Policy. In: Imrie, R. and Raco, M. (eds.) *Urban renaissance? New labour, Community and Urban Policy*, The Policy Press, Bristol.

Coing, H. (1966). *Rénovation Urbaine et Changement Social.* Les Éditions Ouvrières, Paris.

Cole, A. (2008). *Is France still Centralised? Perspectives on Decentralisation and Bounded Governance.* Paper presented at: the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28-31, 2008.

Cole, A. and Hanley, D. (2006). French Politics in the Twenty-First Century. In: Cole, A and Raymond, G. (eds.) *Redefining the French Republic.* Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York.

Community Development Project (1977). *Gilding the Ghetto: the state and the poverty experiments.* CDP Inter-Project Editorial Team, London.

Coudroy de Lille, L. (2006). Rénovation et Renouvellement Urbains, Évocation d'un Vieux Couple. *Urbanisme*, 346: 29-31.

Cour des Comptes (2002). *La Politique de la Ville : Rapport au Président de la République.* La documentation française, direction des journaux officiels, Paris. Available from: < http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/024000096/index.shtml> [Accessed 9/04/09].

Davidson, S. (1998). Spinning the Wheel of Empowerment. *Planning*, 1262: 14-15.

Davies, J. (2007). The Limits of Partnership: An Exit-Action Strategy for Local Democratic Inclusion. *Political Studies*, 55: 779-800.

Democracy Commission (2005). The Report of the Democracy Commission: Engaging Citizens. TASC, Dublin.

Dikeç, M. (2006). Two Decades of French Urban Policy: From Social Development of Neighbourhoods to the Republican Penal State. *Antipode*, 38 (1): 59-81.

Dikeç, M. (2007a). Space, Governmentality, and the Geographies of French Urban Policy. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 14(4): 277-289.

Dikeç, M. (2007b). *Badlands of the Republic: Space, Politics and Urban Policy.* Blackwell, London.

Department of the Environment [DoE] (1994). *New Life for Your Town.* Department of the Environment, Dublin.

Department of the Environment and Local Government [DoELG] (1997). *1998 Urban Renewal Scheme Guidelines.* Department of the Environment and Local Government, Dublin.

Department of the Environment and Local Government (1997). *1998 Urban renewal Scheme - Guidelines.* Department of the Environment and Local Government, Dublin, 24th November 1997.

Department of the Environment and Local Government (1999). *1999 Urban renewal Scheme –Monitoring Guidelines.* Department of the Environment and Local Government, Dublin, April 1999.

Department of Finance (1999). *Urban and Rural renewal Schemes Tax Incentives Schemes.* Tax Strategy Group Papers, TSG 99/32. Available from: <http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=1165> [Accessed 10/10/2009].

DICP and Haase,T. (2008). *The changing Face of Dublin's Inner City.* Study commissioned by the Dublin Inner City Partnership. Available from: < www.dicp.ie/pdfs/DICP_Divided%20City.pdf > [Accessed 9/10/09].

DIV (2004). *Historique de la Politique de la Ville (1977-2004).* Available from: < http://i.ville.gouv.fr/Data/Detdiv.php?id=134> [Accessed 9/04/09].

Donzelot, J. (2000). *La Politique de la Ville aux Etats-Unis et en France.* Seuil, Paris.

Drudy, P.J. (1999). Dublin Docklands: the Way Forward. In: Killen, J. and MacLaran, A. (eds.) *Dublin: Contemporary Trends and Issues for the Twenty-First Century.* The Geographical Society of Ireland in association with The Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Trinity College, Dublin.

Drudy, P.J. and MacLaran, A. (1994). *Dublin: Economic and Social trends, volume1.* The Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Trinity College, Dublin.

Drudy, P.J. and Punch, M. (2005). *Out of Reach: Inequalities in the Irish Housing System.* Tasc, Dublin.

Dubedout, H. (1983). *Ensemble: Refaire la Ville.* Rapport au Premier Ministre du Président de la Commission Nationale pour le Développement Social des Quartiers. La documentation française, collection des rapports officiels, Paris.

Dublin City Council (2002). *Markets Area Draft Framework Plan.* Prepared by MBM Architects, Donnelly Turpin Architects and AZ Urban Studio for Dublin City Council-Planning and Development, Dublin City Council, Dublin, November 2002.

Dublin City Council (2006). *Markets Area Framework Plan.* Prepared by MBM Architects, Donnelly Turpin Architects and AZ Urban Studio for Dublin City Council-Planning and Development, Dublin City Council, Dublin, January 2006.

Dublin Corporation (1996). *Historic Area Rejuvenation Project (HARP), Framework Plan.* Dublin Corporation, Dublin.

Dublin Corporation (1998). *H.A.R.P An Integrated Area Plan: Tax Incentive Sites.* Dublin Corporation, Dublin.

Duménil, G. and Lévy, D. (2005). The Neoliberal (Counter-)Revolution. In: Saad-Filho, A. and Johnston, D. (eds.) *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader*. Pluto Press, London.

Dunoyer de Segonzac, P (1989). La Contribution du Mouvement HLM. In: Duport, J.P. (ed.) *Réhabilitation de l'Habitat en France*. Economica, Paris.

Elander, I. (2002). Partnerships and Urban Governance. *International Social Science Journal*, 54 (172): 191-204.

Elwood, S. (2002). Neighborhood Revitalization through 'Collaboration': Assessing the Implications of Neoliberal Urban Policy at the Grassroots. *GeoJournal*, 58:121-130.

Epstein, R. (2000). Les Leçons Paradoxales de l'Évaluation de la Politique de la Ville, *Recherches et Prévisions*, 62: 33-41.

Epstein, R. (2004). La Loi Borloo : Renforcement ou Remplacement de la Politique de la Ville ?. *Revue de Droit Sanitaire et Social*, 3 (Juillet-Septembre): 714-731.

Epstein, R. (2005a). Les Politiques Territoriales Post-Contractuelles : le Cas de la Rénovation Urbaine. *Politiques et Management Public*, 23 (3): 127-144.

Epstein, R. (2005b). Gouverner à Distance: Quand l'Etat se Retire des Territoires. *Esprit*, novembre: 1-13.

Epstein, R. (2007). *Les Opérations de Rénovation Urbaine: Système d'Action et Logiques d'Acteurs*. PUCA, Paris.

Flockton, C. (1983). French Local Government Reform and Urban Planning. *Local Government Studies*, September/ October: 65-77.

Foley, P. and Martin, S. (2000). A New Deal for the Community? Public Participation in Regeneration and Local Service Delivery. *Policy & Politics*, 28 (4): 479-492.

Florida (2004). *The rise of the creative class: And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life*. Basic Books, New York.

Fribourg, A.M. (1989). Puis Vint l'Etat. In: Duport, J.P. (ed). *Réhabilitation de l'Habitat en France*. Economica, Paris.

Glass, R. (1964). Introduction to London: Aspects of Change. In: Glass, R. (ed.) *Clichés of Urban Doom*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Gleeson, D. (1999). Changing Approaches to Planning in Dublin's Inner City. In: Killen, J. and MacLaran, A. (eds.) *Dublin: Contemporary Trends and Issues for the Twenty-First Century*. The Geographical Society of Ireland in association with The Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Trinity College, Dublin.

González, S. and Vigar, G. (2008). Community Influence and the Contemporary Local State: Potentials and Contradictions in the Neo-liberal City. *City*, 12 (1): 64-78.

Government of Ireland (1995). *Operational Programme: Local Urban and Rural Development 1994-1999*. Stationery Office, Dublin.

Green, H. (1999). Le Pacte de Relance pour la Ville: plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose? (Recent Developments in French Urban Policy: A Question of More of the Same?). *Planning Practice & Research*, 14 (3): 377-384.

Green, H. and Booth, P. (1996). Urban Policy, Local Administration and Land Use Planning in Lille: Implementing the Contrat de Ville. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 3 (1): 19-31.

Green, H., Trache, H. and Blanchard, D. (2001). An Experiment in French Urban Policy: Evaluation and Reflection on the Implementation of the Zones Franches Urbaines. *Planning Practice & Research*, 2 (1): 53-66.

Groupe de Sociologie Urbaine de Nanterre (1970). Paris 1970 : Reconquête Urbaine et Rénovation-Déportation. *Sociologie du travail*, 4: 488-514.

Hackworth, J. (2007). *The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology and Development in American Urbanism*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.

Hackworth, J. and Smith, N. (2001). The Changing State of Gentrification. *Tijdschrift voor Economishe en Sociale Geografie*, 92: 464-477.

Hague, C. and Jenkins, P. (eds.) (2005). *Place Identity, Participation and Planning*. Routledge, Oxfordshire.

Hall, S. and Hickman, H. (2002). Neighbourhood Renewal and Urban Policy: A comparison of New Approaches in England and France. *Regional Studies*, 36 (6): 691-707.

Hall, T. and Hubbard, P. (1996). The Entrepreneurial City: New Urban Politics, New Urban Geographies? *Progress in Human Geography*, 20 (2): 153-174.

Hall, T. and Hubbard, P. (1998). *The Entrepreneurial City: Geographies of Politics, Regime and Representation*. Wiley, Chichester.

Harding, A. (1996). Is There a 'New Community Power' and Why Should We Need One? *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 20 (4): 637-655.

Harvey, D. (1989). From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: the Transformation in Urban Governance. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, 71 (1): 3-17.

Harvey, D. (2005). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Healey, P. (1995). Discourses of Integration: Making Frameworks for Democratic Urban Planning. In: Healey, P., Cameron, S., Davoudi, S. Stephen Graham, S. and Madani-Pour, A. (eds.) *Managing Cities: The New Urban Context*. Wiley, Chichester.

Hearne, R. (2009). *Neoliberalism and the Irish welfare state: public private partnerships in the delivery of schools and social-housing regeneration*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of Geography, Trinity College, Dublin.

Hughes, E. (2000). Integrated Area Plans build 'community'. *The Sunday Business Post Online*, 17 September. Available from: <http://archives.tcm.ie/businesspost/2000/09/17/story567671138.asp> [Accessed 10/10/2009].

INSEE (2007). Politique de la Ville et Observation Statistique. *INSEE, Actualités Magazine*, 45:1-3.

Jaillet, M.C. (2000). La Politique de la Ville, une Politique Incertaine. *Regard sur l'actualité*, mai 2000: 29-45.

Jaillet, M.C. (2003). La Politique de la Ville en France: Histoire et Bilan. *Regard sur l'actualité*, 296: 5-24.

Janda, K., Berry, J. and Goldman, J. (2008). *Challenge of Democracy: American Government in a Global World.* Houghton Mifflin Co, Boston .

Jegouzo, Y. (1993). La décentralisation de l'urbanisme. *L'Actualité Juridique-Droit Administratif*, May: 168-177.

Jobert, B. and Théret, B. (1994). France: La Consécration Républicaine du Néo-libéralisme. In: Jobert, B. (ed.) *Le Tournant Néo-libéral en Europe: Idées et Recettes dans les Pratiques Gouvernementales.* L'Harmattan, Paris.

Jones, P. (2003). Urban Regeneration's Poisoned Chalice: Is There an *Impasse* in (Community) Participation-based Policy? *Urban studies*, 40 (3): 581-601.

Jouve, B. (2007). La Gouvernance Urbaine: Nouvelle Catégorie d'Action des Politiques Urbaines. *Chaire Unesco Working Paper.* Available from: <http://chaire-unesco.entpe.fr/fichiers_PDF/publications/chaire%20gouvernance.pdf> [Accessed 27/03/2010].

Keil, R. (2002). "Common-Sense" Neoliberalism: Progressive Conservative Urbanism in Toronto, Canada. *Antipode,* 34 (3): 578-601.

Keiran , A. (2009). *Ireland's Economic Crash.* Liffey Press, Dublin.

Kelly, S. (2008). *Taking Liberties: Entrepreneurial Governance and Genytrification in Inner Dublin.* Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of Geography, Trinity College, Dublin.

Kelly, S. and MacLaran, A. (2004). The Residential Transformation of Inner Dublin. In: Drudy, P.J. and MacLaran, A. (eds.) *Dublin Economic and Social Trends*, Vol. 4. Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Trinity College Dublin.

Kirby, P. (2004). Globalization, the Celtic Tiger and social outcomes: Is Ireland a Model or Mirage? *Globalizations*, 1(2): 205-222.

Kitchin, R , Gleeson, J., Keavaney, K. and O'Callaghan, C. (2010). A Haunted Landscape: Housing and Ghost Estates in Post-Celtic Tiger Ireland. *NIRSA Working Paper 59.*

KPMG with Murray O'Laoire associates and Northern Ireland Economic Research Centre (1996). *Study on the Urban Renewal Schemes.* Department of the Environment, the Stationery Office, Dublin.

Kuhlmann, S. and Fedele, P. (*forthcoming*). New Public Management in Continental Europe: Local Government Modernization in Germany, France and Italy from a Comparative Perspective. In: Wollmann, H. and Marcou, G. (eds.) *Production and delivery of social and public services in cross-country comparison. Between government, governance, and market.* Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton

Larner, W. (2003). Neoliberalism? *Environment and Planning D*, 21: 509-512.

Larragy, J. (2006). Origins and Significance of the Community-Voluntary Pillar's Entry to Irish Social Partnership. *Economic and Social Review*, December 2006.

Lees, L. (2008). Gentrification and Social Mixing: Towards an Inclusive Urban Renaissance? *Urban Studies*, 45 (12): 2449-2470.

Lees, L. and Ley, D. (2008). Introduction to Special Issue on Gentrification and Public Policy. *Urban Studies*, 45 (12): 2379-2384.

LeGalès, P. (1993). Villes en Compétition? . In: Biarez, S. and Nevers, J.Y. (eds.) *Gouvernement Local et Politiques Urbaines.* Actes du colloque international, Grenoble, 2-3 février 1993. CERAT, Saint-Martin-d'Hères.

LeGarrec, S. (2006). *Le Renouvellement Urbain: la Genèse d'une Notion Fourre-tout.* PUCA, Paris.

Leitner, H. , Peck, J. and Sheppard, S. (eds.). *Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers.* The Guilford Press, New York.

Lelevrier, C. (2004). Que Reste-t-il du Projet Social de la Politique de la ville? *Esprit*, 303: 65-77.

Lidgi, S. (2001). *Paris – Gouvernance ou les Malices des Politiques Urbaines (J. Chirac / J. Tibéri).* L'Harmattan, Paris.

Loinger, G. (1981). Esquisse d'Analyse de l'Évolution de la Politique Urbaine en france depuis la Libération. *Espaces et Sociétés*, 36-37: 91-109.

Loinger, G. and Lallemand, M.A. (1978). Le Tournant de la Politique de Rénovation Urbaine à celle de Réhabilitation de l'Habitat. *Métropolis*, 4(33-34): 13-20.

Lorrain, D. (1991). De l'Administration Républicaine au Gouvernement Urbain. *Sociologie du Travail*, 4: 461-484.

Lorrain, D. (1992). Le modèle ensemblier en France. In: Campagnac, E. (ed.) *Les Grands Groupes de la Construction: de Nouveaux Acteurs Urbains?*. L'Harmattan, Paris, 71-82.

Lorrain, D. (1993a). La Décentralisation comme une Histoire en Train de se Faire. In: Biarez, S. and Nevers, J.Y. (eds.) *Gouvernement Local et Politiques Urbaines*. Actes du colloque international, Grenoble, 2-3 février 1993. CERAT, Saint-Martin-d'Hères.

Lorrain, D. (1993b). Après la Décentralisation, l'Action Publique Flexible. *Sociologie du Travail*, 3: 285-307.

Lugan, J.C. (2001). *The New Face of Local Government in France*. Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne.

Lynch, K. (2006). Neoliberalism in Education. In: Healy, S., Reynolds, B. and Collins, M. (eds.) *Social Policy in Ireland. Principles, Practice and Problems*. Oak Tree Press, Dublin.

Mabileau, A. (1992). La Décentralisation en Retard. *Cahiers Français*, 256; 66-72.

MacGregor, S. (2007). The Welfare State and Neoliberalism. In: Saad-Filho, A. and Johnston, D. (eds.) *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader*. Pluto Press, London.

MacLaran, A. (1993). *Dublin: The Shaping of a Capital*. Belhaven, London.

MacLaran, A. (1996). Office Development in Dublin and the Tax Incentives Areas. *Irish Geography*, 29(2): 49-54.

MacLaran, A. (1999). Inner Dublin: Change and Development. In: Killen, J. and MacLaran, A. (eds.) *Dublin: Contemporary Trends and Issues for the Twenty-First Century*. The Geographical Society of Ireland in association with The Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Trinity College, Dublin.

MacLaran, A. and M^{c}Guirk, P. (2003). Planning the City. In: MacLaran, A. (ed.) *Making space: Property Development and Urban Planning*. Arnold, London.

MacLaran, A. and Murphy, L. (1997). The problems of taxation-induced inner-city housing development – Dublin's recipe for success? *Irish Geography*, 30 (1): 31-36.
MacLaran, A., Clayton, V and Brudell, P. (2007). Empowering Communities in Disadvantaged Urban Areas: Towards Greater Community Participation in Irish Urban Planning? A Research Summary. *Journal of Irish Urban Studies*, 6: 73-88.

MacLeod, G. From Urban Entrepreneurialism to a "Revanchist City"? On the Spatial Injustices of Glasgow's Renaissance. *Antipode,* 34 (3): 602-624.

Mair, P. and Weeks, L. (2005). The Party System. In: Coakley, J. and Gallagher, M. (eds.) *Politics in the Republic of Ireland*. Fourth Edition, Routledge, London and New York.

Mairie de Paris (2005). *Secteur en ZUS, La Goutte d'Or: 18^{éme} Arrondissement. Dossier de Demande de Financement à l'Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine*. Mairie de Paris, Paris.

Mairie de Paris (2008). *Le Relogement dans les Quartiers Politique de la Ville à Paris-Rencontre du Jeudi 20 mars 2008*. Mairie de Paris, Paris.

Mandel, C. (2005). *Evolution du peuplement du parc privé et impact de l'opération de rénovation urbaine sur les stratégies résidentielles: enquête sur les nouveaux propriétaires de la Goutte d'Or*. Unpublished Rapport de Stage, Paris.

McCulloch, A. (2004). Localism and its Neoliberal Application: A Case Study of West Gate New Deal for Communities in Newcastle upon Tyne, UK. *Capital & Class*, 28 (2): 133-165.

McGuirk, P. (1994). Economic restructuring and the realignment of the urban planning system: the case of Dublin. *Urban Studies*, 31 (2): 287-308.

McGuirk, P. (1995). Power and Influence in Urban Planning: Community and Property Interests' Participation in Dublin's Planning System. *Irish Geography*, 28 (1): 64-75.

McGuirk, P. (2000). Power and Policy Networks in Urban Governance: Local Government and Property-led Regeneration in Dublin. *Urban Studies,* 37 (4); 651-672.

McGuirk, P. and MacLaran, A. (2001). Changing Approaches to Urban Planning in an 'Entrepreneurial City': The Case of Dublin. *European Planning Studies*, 9 (4): 437-457.

McManus, M. (1993). The Republic of Ireland. In: Chandler, J.A (ed), *Local government in liberal democracies: an introductory survey*. Routledge, London and New York.

Meade, R. (2005). We hate it here, please let us stay! Irish social partnership and the community/voluntary sector's conflicted experiences of recognition. *Critical Social Policy*, 25 (3): 349-373.

Merlin, F. and Choay, P. (2005). *Dictionnaire de l'Urbanisme et de l'Aménagement.* Nouvelle édition, mise à jour. PUF, Paris.

Miller, B. (2007). Modes of Governance, Modes of Resistance: Contesting Neoliberalism in Calgary. In Leitner, H. , Peck, J. and Sheppard, S. (eds.) *Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers*. The Guilford Press, New York.

Miller, S. (2006). Urban Governance and Local Democracy in France. In: Cole, A. and Raymond, G., *Redefining the French Republic*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York.

Moore, N. (1999). Rejuvenating Docklands: The Irish Context. *Irish Geography*, 32(2): 135-149.

Morand-Deviller, J. (1996). *Droit de l'Urbanisme*. ESTEM, Paris.

Morris, P. (1994). *French Politics Today*. Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York.

Nelson, S. (2001). The Nature of Partnership in Urban Renewal in Paris and London. European Planning Studies, 9 (4): 483-502.

Newman, P. and Thornley, A. (1996). *Urban Planning in Europe: International Competition, National Systems and Planning Projects*. Routledge, London and New York.

Nora, S. and Eveno, B. (1976). *Rapport sur l'Amélioration de l'Habitat Ancien.* La Documentation Française, Paris.

O'Broin, D. and Waters, E. (2007). *Governing Below the Centre: Local Governance in Ireland.* TASC, Dublin.

O'Callaghan, C. and Linehan, D. (2007). Identity, Politics and Conflict in Dockland Development in Cork, Ireland: European Capital of Culture 2005. *Cities*, 24 (4): 311-323

O'Toole, F. (2003). *After the Ball.* Tasc, Dublin.

Peck, J. (2001). Neoliberalizing States: Thin Policies/Hard Outcomes. *Progress in Human Geography*, 15 (3): 445-455.

Peck, J. (2004). Geography and Public Policy: Constructions of Neoliberalism. *Progress in Human Geography*, 28 (3): 392-405.

Peck, J. (2005). Struggling with the Creative Class. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 29 (4): 740-770.

Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (1994). Searching for a New Institutional Fix: the After-Fordist Crisis and the Global-Local Disorder. In: Amin, A. (ed.) *Post-Fordism: A Reader.* Blackwell, Oxford.

Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (2002). Neoliberalizing Space. *Antipode*, 34 (3): 380-403.

Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (2007). Conceptualising Neoliberalism, Thinking Thatcherism in Calgary. In: Leitner, H. , Peck, J. and Sheppard, S. (eds.) *Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers.* The Guilford Press, New York.

Peck, J., Theodore, N. and Brenner, N. (2009). Neoliberal Urbanism:Models, Moments, Mutations. *SAIS Review*, 29 (1): 50-65.
Available from: <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v029/29.1.peck.html#f3-text>

Perrons, D. and Skyers, S. (2003). Empowerment through Participation? Conceptual Explorations and a Case Study. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 27 (2): 265-285.

Pinson, G. and Le Galès, P. (2005). State Restructuring and Decentralisation Dynamics in France: Politics is the Driving Force. *Cahier Européen*, 7 (5).

Piron, O. (2002). De la Rénovation Urbaine au Renouvellement Urbain. In: Segaud, M., Brun, J and Driant, J.C. (eds). *Dictionnaire de l'Habitat et du Logement.* Armand Colin, Paris.

Pollard, J. (2005). Relancer la Production de Logements Sociaux à Paris ?. Conference Proceedings on "*le logement et l'habitat comme objets de recherche*". Journée d'étude Jeunes Chercheurs, 20 mai 2005. Université de Paris I, Paris.

Pretty, J. (1995). Participatory Learning for Sustainable Agriculture. *World Development*, 23 (8): 1247-1263.

Prunty. J. (1995). Residential Urban Renewal Schemes, Dublin 1986-1994. *Irish Geography*, 28 (2): 131-149.

Punch, M., Redmond. D. and Kelly, S. (2004). *Uneven development, city governance and urban change: Unpacking the global-local nexus in Dublin's inner-city.* Paper to City Futures: An International Conference on Globalism and Urban Change, Chicago, 8-10 July.

Quilley, S. (1999). Entrepreneurial Manchester: the Genesis of Elite Consensus. *Antipode*, 31 (2): 185-211.

Quilley, S. (2000). Manchester First: From Municipal Socialism to the Entrepreneurial City. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 24 (3): 601-615.

Redmond, D. (2003). *Tenant Participation and Estate Management: Empowering Tenants?* Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of Geography, Trinity College, Dublin.

Regourd, S. (2004). L'Organisation Territorial Issue de la Décentralisation de 1982: un Bilan Critique. *Cahiers Français*, 318: 3-7.

Robinson, F., Shaw, K. and Davidson, G. (2000). 'On the Side of the Angels': Community Involvement in the Governance of Neighbourhood Renewal. *Local Economy*, 20 (1): 13-26.

Rourke, S. and Kenny, B. (1999). *North West Inner City Area Action Plan 1999-2004.* North West Inner City Area Network, Dublin.

Rousseau, M. (2008). « *Bringing Politics back in*»: La *Gentrification* comme Politique de Développement Urbain? Autour des «Villes Perdantes». *Espaces et Sociétés*, 132-133 (1-2): 75-90.

Russell, P. (2002). *Communities & Institutions: Involving Communities in Urban Regeneration. Case studies of EU Co-Financed Urban Renewal in Dublin, Cork and Limerick 1995-1999.* Unpublished PhD. Department of Regional and Urban Planning, University College Dublin, Dublin.

Saillard, M. (1964). Rénovation et Restructuration des Villes. *Urbanisme*, 81: 7-23.

Sarkissian, W. (2004). What is Community Participation? In: Sarkissian, W. *New Directions.* Available from: <http://www.sarkissian.com.au/publications.htlm> [Accessed 27/03/2008].

Savitch, H. and Kantor, P. (2002). *Cities in the international marketplace: The Political Economy of Urban Development in North American and Western Europe.* Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Schmidt, V. (1990a). *Democratizing France: The Political and Administrative History of Decentralization.* Cambridge University Press, New York.

Schmidt, V. (1990b). Unblocking Society by Decree: The Impact of Governmental Decentralization in France. *Comparative Politics*, 22 (4): 459-481.

Schmidt, V. (2002). *The Future of European Capitalism*. Oxford University Press, New York.

Sheeby, E. (2003). City and County Management. In: Callanan, M. and Keogan, J. F. (eds.) *Local Government in Ireland Inside Out*. Institute of Public Administration, Dublin.

Sénat (1996). Bilan d'Application de la Loi d'Orientation pour l'Aménagement et le Développement du Territoire. La Politique de la Ville, intervention de M. Raoult. Available from: <http://www.senat.fr/rap/r95-475/r95-47512.html#toc10> [Accessed 9/04/09].

Sites, W. (2007). Contesting the Neoliberal City? Theories of Neoliberalism and Urban Strategies of Contention. In : Leitner, H. , Peck, J. and Sheppard, S. (eds.) *Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers*. The Guilford Press, New York.

Slater, T. (2006). The Eviction of Critical Perspectives from Gentrification Research. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 30(4): 737-757.

Slater, T., Curran, W. and Lees, L. (2004). Gentrification Research: New Directions and Critical Scholarship. *Environment and Planning A*, 36: 1141-1150.

Smith, N. (1996). *The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City*. Routledge, London.

Smith, N. (2002). New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrification as Global Urban Strategy. *Antipode*, 34 (3): 427-450.

Smith, T. (2004). *France in Crisis*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Stafford, P. and Payne, D. (2004). The Politics of Urban Regeneration in Dublin. Paper presented at *ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops 23: Governing the Metropolis*, Uppsala, Sweden, April 2004.

Subra, P. (2006). Heurs et Malheurs d'une Loi antiségrégration: les Enjeux Politiques de la Loi Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbain (SRU). *Hérodote*, 122:138-171.

Sueur, J.P. (1998). *Demain, laVille*. La Documentation Française, Paris.

Swyngedouw, E. (2005). Governance Innovation and the Citizen: The Janus Face of Governance-beyond-the-State. *Urban Studies*, 42 (11): 1991-2006.

Swyngedouw, E., Moulaert, F. and Rodriguez, A. (2002). Neoliberal Urbanization in Europe: Large-Scale Urban Development Projects and the New Urban Policy. *Antipode*, 34 (3): 547-582.

Taylor, M. (2000). Communities in the Lead: Power, Organisational Capacity and Social Capital. *Urban Studies*, 37 (5-6): 1019-1035.

Taylor, G. (2002). Hailing with an Invisible Hand: A 'cosy' Political Dispute amid the Rise of Neoliberal Politics in Modern Ireland. *Government and Opposition*, 37 (4): 301-323.

Taylor, G. (2005). *Negotiated governance and public policy in Ireland.* Manchester University Press, Manchester.

Taylor, M. (2007). Community Participation in the Real World: Opportunities and Pitfalls in New Governance Spaces. *Urban Studies*, 44 (2): 297-317.

Taylor, M. and Warburton, D. (2003). "Legitimacy and the role of UK third sector organisations in the democratic process". *Voluntas*, 14 (3): 321-338.

Tickell, A. and Peck, J. (2003). Making Global Rules: Globalization or Neoliberalization? In: Peck, J. and Yeung, H. (eds.) *Remaking the Global Economy*. Sage, London.

Timonen, V. (2003). *Restructuring the Welfare state: Globalisation and Social Policy Reform in Finland and Sweden*. Edwards Elgard Publishing Ltd, UK.

Toubon, J.C. and Messamah, K. (1990). *Centralité Immigrée : le Quartier de la Goutte d'Or : Dynamiques d'un Espace Pluri-ethnique : Succession, Compétition, Cohabitation.* L'Harmattan, Paris.

Turok, I. (1992). Property-led Urban Regeneration: Panacea or Placebo? *Environment and Planning A*, 24 (3): 361-379.

Uitermark, J. and Duyvendak, J. (2005). Civilising the City: Revanchist Urbanism in Rotterdam. *ASSR Working Paper*, 05/05.

UN-HABITAT (2003). *Tools to Support Transparency in Local Governance*. Presentation at the Workshop on Transparency and Accountability, 5th Global Forum on Re-inventing Government, November 2003. Available from: <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/MexicoWorkshop/UNHABITAT.ppt> [Accessed 27/03/2010].

UNESCO (2000). *The Global Campaign for Good Urban Governance*. Available from: < http://www.bestpractices.org/learning/urbangov.pdf> [Accessed 27/03/2010].

Verhage, R. (2005). Toward a Territorialized Approach to Urban Renewal: A Comparison of Policies in France and the Netherlands. International Planning Studies, 10 (2): 129-143.

Ward, K. (2003). Entrepreneurial Urbanism, State Restructuring and Civilizing 'New' East Manchester. *Area*, 35 (2): 116-127.

Weber, R. (2002). Extracting Value from the City: Neoliberalism and Urban Redevelopment. *Antipode*, 34 (3): 519-540.

Whitehead, C. and Scanlon, K. (2007). *Social Housing in Europe*. LSE London, London School of Economics and Political Science, London.

Williams, B. (2006). *Fiscal Incentives and Urban Regeneration in Dublin.* Planning and Environmental Policy Research Series, University College Dublin. Available from: <www.ucd.ie/gpep. > [Accessed 10/10/2009].

Williams, B. and MacLaran, A. (1996). Incentives Areas for Urban Renewal. In: Drury, P.J. and MacLaran, A. (eds.) *Dublin: Economic and Social trends, volume 2.* The Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Trinity College, Dublin.

World Bank (1997). *World Bank Report 1997: The State in a Changing World.* Oxford University Press, New York.

World Bank (2002). *World Bank Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets.* Oxford University Press, New York.