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A Relevance Theoretic analysis of contrast connectives in Spanish: *pero* and *aunque*

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SUMMARY

This thesis presents a pragmatic analysis of a number of contrast connectives in Spanish, in particular *pero* 'but' and *aunque* 'although'. The study follows the theoretical framework of Relevance Theory (RT). The ideas put forward in this analysis build on previous RT analyses of the English counterparts, *but* and *although.* We provide an account of the function of these connectives based on the notions of the procedural meaning and inferentiality (Blakemore 1987, 1993, 2000, 2002, Iten 1998; 2000(a), 2005 and Hall 2003, 2004, 2005). However, we develop this account further by providing a different analysis of how *pero* and *aunque* contribute to the process of utterance comprehension.

From a RT point of view, our analysis follows the main tenets on which the theory is based. Our analysis of the connectives *pero* and *aunque* builds on the RT position that there is great reliance on the process of inferencing in deriving the meaning explicitly communicated. We propose a procedural meaning for these connectives based on the idea of contrast with alternatives. This analysis favours a view of their effects as arising from the explicit rather than the implicit side of what is communicated. In particular, these connectives are analysed as constraints on the derivation of propositional attitudes and illocutionary forces, which in this theory are described as higher level explicatures. This analysis of *pero* and *aunque,* as contributing to the explicit side of communication, contrasts with previous RT studies of their English counterparts *but* and *aunque*, in which these latter have been described as constraints on the derivation of the implicit content

Our thesis also raises some internal issues that need to be addressed in this theory. First, it casts some doubt on the relevance of differentiating between how to access explicatures (including higher level explicatures) and implicatures. Secondly, it points to the different levels of explicitness of the higher level explicatures. Finally, this study suggests the need to account for the combinations of different types of higher level explicatures, which has been raised here when analysing examples of *pero* introducing constructions of different modality.

As this is the first extensive Relevance Theoretic analysis of *pero* and *aunque* it is directly relevant to developments within RT. In addition, this analysis extends the boundaries of what has been done on these connectives in the Hispanic tradition. This study develops a new analytical framework which elaborates and extends advances made in previous grammatical and pragmatic studies of these connectives. Regarding the function of *aunque,* our unitary analysis can account for all the different divisions provided by theorists in both the Hispanic and the English tradition. Furthermore, our analysis proposes a cognitive explanation for the traditional division between the adversative and the concessive uses of *aunque.*

An important feature of the present study is the use of authentic data which has not previously been analysed. We use a mixture of oral and written samples of authentic language. On the oral side, we use extracts from naturally occurring conversations as well as examples from Spanish oral corpora accessible on the web (oral corpus of the Universidad Autónoma and CREA). On the other hand, we present excerpts of written language, the main source of this type of language being the national newspaper *El País,* in editions from 2002 to 2007. There are also examples from two novels and naturally occurring examples from emails. This mixture of data sources presents a representative sample of the uses of these connectives. Furthermore, our use of authentic examples helps counter the criticism that Relevance Theory relies too heavily on the use of invented data.

In the English and the Hispanic traditions, there have been many attempts to describe the meaning of contrast associated with structures containing connectives such as *pero* and *aunque*. However, no one has yet attempted to account for this notion in cognitive terms in the manner in which this is attempted here. It is true that there have been some RT attempts to account for the description of the meaning of *but* in terms of contrast. However, that alternative was rejected as a result of a wrong interpretation of the notion of contrast. Our analysis, on the contrary, provides a precise explanation, from a cognitive perspective, of the meaning of contrast encoded in these connectives. We argue that the notion of

contrast constitutes the central meaning of these connectives and constrains the derivation of the propositional attitude of utterances in which they are inserted.

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A mis padres

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Introduction 1

PART I
Chapter 2. Literature on adversatives 11

2.1. Introduction 11
2.2. Three traditions of *but* 12
2.3. Uses of *but* 18
2.3.1. Following Lakoff's model 18
2.3.2. Unitary accounts of *but*: denial or cancellation 24
2.3.3. Unitary accounts of *but*: contrast 27
2.3.3.1. Pragmatic accounts of contrast 27
2.3.3.2. *But* as a marker of a coherence relation of contrast 30
2.4. Summary of adversatives in general 35
2.5. Adversatives in the Hispanic literature 36
2.6. Traditional grammatical approaches to adversatives 37
2.6.1. Definitions of the adversative relation 37
2.6.2. Types of adversatives 40
2.6.2.1. Restrictive (non-exclusive) and exclusive adversatives .. 40
2.6.3. Emphatic *pero* 45
2.6.4. Syntactic description of adversatives: subordination, coordination, interordination 46
2.6.4.1. Adversatives as coordinated structures 46
2.6.4.2. Adversatives: coordination or subordination? 49
2.6.4.3. Adversatives as examples of interordination 50
2.7. Pragmatic approaches to adversativity 52
2.7.1. Argumentation Theory analysis of adversativity 52
2.7.1.1. Types of adversatives in the Argumentation Theory tradition 53
2.7.1.2. Analyses of the connective *pero* in the AT tradition 55
2.7.2. Conversation analyses of *pero* 63
2.7.3. Syntactic description of adversatives in the pragmatic tradition. 70
2.8. Presupposition and expectation 71
2.9. Summary of adversatives in Spanish 75
2.10. Conclusion 77

Chapter 3. Literature on concessives 79

3.1. Concessives: introduction 79
3.2. Studies on concession 80
3.3. Concessive structures with *although* 81
3.3.1. The meaning of concessive structures with *although* 81
3.3.2. Distinctive features of concessive structures with *although* 82

3.3.2.1. Concessive constructions and subordinated causal constructions..... 83
3.3.2.2. Concessives and adversatives (*although* and *but*)..... 86
3.4. Different types of *although*-concession..... 97
3.4.1. Two types of *although* examples: König (1985, 1988), Grote et al. (1997) and Sidiropoulou (1992)..... 97
3.4.2. Three types of *although* examples: Sweetser (1990)..... 99
3.5. Summary of studies on concession..... 100
3.6. Concessives in Spanish..... 102
3.6.1. What adversatives and concessives have in common and how they are different..... 102
3.6.1.1. Differences in the role of the conjuncts..... 104
3.6.1.2. Differences in the nature of the presuppositional feature of concessive examples..... 106
3.6.1.3. *Aunque* and *pero*: the hearer's and speaker's perspective..... 107
3.6.1.4. Adversatives as inverse structures of concessives..... 109
3.6.1.5. An Argumentation Theory analysis: two types of concession?..... 110
3.7. Different types of *aunque*..... 112
3.7.1. Two uses of *aunque*: adversative and concessive *aunque*..... 112
3.7.1.1. Characteristics of the adversative *aunque*..... 114
3.7.1.2. Differences between adversative *aunque* and adversative *pero*..... 115
3.7.2. Only one type of *aunque*..... 117
3.7.3. Modality and content *aunque*..... 123
3.7.4. Logic of event or logic of argumentation concessives..... 125
3.7.5. Four types of concessives..... 126
3.8. Summary of concession in Spanish..... 127
3.9. Conclusion..... 129

PART II
Chapter 4. Relevance Theory: theoretical framework..... 131

4.1. Relevance Theory: Grice's followers..... 131
4.2. The process of utterance interpretation: optimal relevance..... 134
4.3. The process of utterance interpretation: the context..... 136
4.4. Process of utterance interpretation: explicit and implicit content..... 138
4.4.1. Explicatures..... 139
4.4.2. Higher-Level Explicatures: Attitudes and Speech Acts..... 141
4.4.3. Implicatures..... 145
4.4.5. Implicated premises and implicated conclusions..... 147
4.4.6. Strong and weak implicatures..... 148
4.4.7. Mutual adjustment..... 148
4.5. Conceptual and procedural meaning..... 149
4.6. Metarepresentation in relevance..... 151
4.6.1. Propositional attitudes..... 154
4.6.1.1. Conceptual expressions contributing to the propositional attitude..... 156
4.6.1.2. Procedural expressions contributing to the propositional

attitude..... 160
4.7. Introduction to Relevance Theory accounts of *but*..... 162
4.8. Discourse connectives in RT..... 162
4.9. Blakemore's Relevance Theory analysis of *but*..... 164
4.9.1. Introduction..... 164
4.9.2. Denial and contrast uses..... 165
4.9.3. Correction use..... 167
4.9.4. Objection uses..... 169
4.9.5. Blakemore's examples: in search of the denied assumption..... 170
4.10. Does *but* encode *and* and something else?..... 172
4.10.1. Blakemore's proposal..... 172
4.10.2. Rouchota's proposal..... 175
4.10.3. Contribution to the truth conditions..... 178
4.10.4. Blakemore & Carston's analysis of the semantic/pragmatic differences between *and* and *but*..... 180
4.10.5. Conclusion of the *and/but* issue..... 181
4.11. Higashimori's unitary analysis of further uses of *but*..... 182
4.12. RT alternative account of *but*..... 185
4.12.1. Cognitive statues of the denied assumptions: accessible vs. manifest..... 185
4.12.2. Function of *but*: suspension vs. denial..... 188
4.13. Criticism of the RT alternative accounts of *but*..... 195
4.13.1. The role of premises..... 197
4.14. Conclusion..... 198

Chapter 5. Our RT proposal for 'alternatives' account of *pero* 201

5.1. Introduction..... 201
5.2. Earlier accounts of *but* in contrast terms..... 203
5.2.1. RT attempts to give a contrast account of *but*..... 204
5.3. An RT contrast analysis of *pero*..... 206
5.4. Denying assumptions, suspending inferences or evoking alternatives. 209
5.5. Accessibility of the alternative assumptions..... 210
5.6. Explicit or implicit aspects of communication..... 212
5.7. Our RT proposal for 'alternatives' account of *pero* 218
5.7.1. Contrast with expectations..... 222
5.7.1.1. Exceptional..... 226
5.7.1.2. Surprise..... 228
5.7.1.3. Indignation or anger..... 230
5.7.2. Compensatory..... 232
5.7.3. Hay más (*there is more*)..... 234
5.7.4. Contrast..... 236
5.7.5. Politeness or epistemic commitment..... 242
5.7.6. Restriction..... 245
5.7.7. Emphasis..... 248
5.7.7.1. Emphatic exclamation..... 249
5.7.7.2. Emphatic imperative..... 252
5.7.7.3. Introducing a question..... 253
5.7.7.4. Emphatic repetition..... 260

5.7.8. Justification 262
5.7.9. Clarification 267
5.7.10. Lo más importante (*the most important*) 269
5.7.11. Affective stance 272
5.7.12. Topic change 276
5.7.13. Coordinated examples of *pero* 279
5.7.14. Pero si 280
5.8. Controversial examples for a denial or suspension account 285
5.9. Correction sino 291
5.10. Conclusion 295

Chapter 6. *Pero* and *focus* 300

6.1. Introduction 300
6.2. Rooth's theory of focus 300
6.3. Two contrast accounts of focus sensitive *but*: Umbach and Sæbø 302
6.3.1. How does their machinery work in both accounts? 303
6.3.2. Examples with contrastive topics 304
6.3.3. Examples with focus in the rheme 306
6.3.4. Examples of double contrast 307
6.3.5. How to account for non-simple contrast examples 309
6.3.5.1. Sæbø's accommodation examples 309
6.3.5.2. Umbach's accommodation examples 311
6.3.6. Conclusion of the contrast-focus analyses of *but* 312
6.4. *Pero* combined with focalising particles 315
6.4.1. Introduction 315
6.4.2. Non-scalar additive particles 315
6.4.2.1. A Relevance Theoretic account of additive particles 315
6.4.2.2. An analysis of *but* with additive particles 318
6.4.2.3. Non-scalar additive particles in Spanish 320
6.4.3. Exclusive particle: *only* 327
6.4.3.1. Scalar and non-scalar uses of *only* 328
6.4.3.2. How many uses of *only*? 331
6.4.3.3. *But* and *only* 332
6.4.4. *Sólo* 'only' in the Hispanic tradition 333
6.4.4.1. Examples of *pero sólo* 334
6.4.5. The scalar additive focalising particle: *even* 336
6.4.5.1. Classification of studies on *even* 337
6.4.5.2. Relevance Theory accounts of *even* 340
6.4.6. Scalar additive particles in Spanish: *incluso* 'even', *hasta* 'even' 342
6.4.6.1. Examples of *pero* with *incluso* 'even' 344
6.4.6.2. Examples of *pero* with *hasta* 'even' 347
6.4.6.3. Examples of *pero* with *ni siquiera* 'not even' 348
6.5. Conclusion 349

Chapter 7. An alternative relevance theoretic account of *aunque* 351

7.1. Introduction 351

7.2. Iten's RT account of *although*..... 352
7.3. Underlying logical form and syntactic description..... 354
7.4. Iten's RT account of *although*..... 355
7.5. Accounting for different uses of *although*..... 356
7.6. Iten's classification of the two types of *although*: direct and indirect *although*..... 358
7.7. The order of the clauses: Q *although* P/ P *although* Q..... 364
7.8. Iten's RT analysis of *but* and *although*..... 365
7.9. An RT analysis of *aunque*: a contrast of relations..... 366
7.10. The role of contrast in *pero* and *aunque*..... 371
7.11. An illustration of our RT account of *aunque*..... 372
7.12. Types of *aunque* clauses in Spanish..... 376
7.12.1. Differences between *pero* and adversative *aunque*..... 379
7.12.2. Correlation between adversative *aunque* and other uses of *although*..... 381
7.13. Unexplained implausible examples of *although*..... 384
7.14. Conclusion..... 386

Chapter 8. Conclusion..... 389

Bibliography..... 402

Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1. Overview

This thesis presents a pragmatic analysis of a number of contrast connectives in Spanish, principally *pero* 'but' and *aunque* 'although'. The theoretical approach used is Relevance Theory (RT) (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995). This is an inferential cognitive theory developed from the ideas put forward by Paul Grice (1957, 1969, 1975, and 1989). These types of connectives have been discussed in RT, most notably by Blakemore (1987, 2002). Using authentic data, we will argue for a distinctive analysis of *pero* and its semantically related connective *aunque*. We will propose a procedural meaning for these connectives based on the idea of contrast with alternatives — an analysis which favours a view of their effects as arising from the explicit rather than the implicit side of what is communicated.

The main innovative contributions of this thesis are as follows; first, it is the first analysis of *pero* and *aunque* from a Relevance Theoretic perspective. In the literature it has been common to account for this type of connective in terms of contrast, no one has yet attempted to account for this notion in cognitive terms in a manner in which this is attempted here. Previous accounts of these connectives limited their analysis to a general description of contrast and opposition without any further elaboration. Our analysis will attempt to overcome this weakness by presenting a more precise explanation of the 'contrast' meaning encoded in these connectives. This is done by proposing a notion of contrast between explicit representations and alternatives. In this thesis, we put forward an account of contrast with alternatives, which resembles the underlying idea proposed by Rooth (1985, 1992). There is some parallel with Rooth's alternative semantics focus in which focus devices are set to trigger contextually dependent alternatives. However, our aims are different in that we focus on the effect that evoking alternatives has on how to entertain the explicit representation these connectives introduce. Furthermore, we maintain that the derivation of the alternatives will be guided by the principle of relevance, i.e. the hearer will stop when expectations of relevance are satisfied.

Secondly, in the Hispanic literature, most works in the pragmatic tradition had followed Argumentation Theory in focusing exclusively on the meaning of these particles in terms of argumentational strength. Our study will develop a different analytical framework that will shed new light on the contribution of these connectives to the process of utterance understanding. The pragmatic effect derived from this contrast with alternatives will be accounted for in terms of propositional attitude. Among the advantages of this proposal, we can point out that we are able to account for a wider range of uses than any of the previous accounts of these connectives.

Thirdly, this study uses authentic data, not previously analysed, which has been extracted from various sources (emails, conversations, corpora, newspapers, books) and thereby manages to present a representative sample of the uses of this connective (*pero).*

Fourthly, RT has been pushing pragmatic principles deeper into what has been traditionally considered semantically coded meaning. This has been done by means of the notion of explicatures, which are explicit content derived by pragmatic processes, similar to those by which implicatures are derived (see Wilson and Sperber 2000, Carston 2002, Wilson 2004). So this thesis contributes to this process, by proposing constraints on the derivation of what are known as higher level explicatures. Analysing these procedural units, which have traditionally been accounted for as contributing to the derivation of implicatures, as constraints for the derivation of the higher-level explicatures of utterances, provides a better understanding of this level of content and suggests that further research along this line is required.

Finally, another significant contribution of our account of contrast with alternatives is that it implies a simplification of the theory. Our account of *pero* and *aunque* can dispense with the notions of manifestness, accessibility and inferential suspension, which have been put forward by some relevance theorists

to account for these connectives (Blakemore 1987, 1989[1], 1992, 2000, 2002 Iten 2000(a), 2000(b), 2005 and Hall 2003, 2004, 2007). These notions are proved to be unnecessary since they are replaced with the notion of alternatives, which are representations constructed online and constrained by the Principle of Relevance.

1.2. Data sources

One weakness of Relevance Theory has been the reliance on data invented by the analyst. One of the aims of this study was to use naturally occurring data to overcome this weakness. In the type of pragmatics in which we are involved, it is common practice to use extended stretches of discourse in natural context. This immediately raises issues about data collection. For example, traditional data elicitation with native speakers testing for grammatical and ungrammatical sentences does not provide adequate types of data.

We have sought to use both samples of oral and written language. To do this we have used extracts from naturally occurring conversation recorded by the writer and examples from different corpora. On the one hand, we have used the oral corpus of Spanish collected by the UAM (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) accessible on the web at http://www.lllf.uam.es/corpus/corpus_oral.html. This corpus contains oral texts, recorded with audio tapes, with over 1.1 million words. The corpus was collected between 1991 and 1992. This task was carried out by the research group directed by Professor Francisco Marcos Marín in the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM). The corpus is divided in textual types, including the following subjects: administrative, scientific, conversation, educative, humanistic, instructions, legal, political and journalistic.

On the other hand, we have used a large amount of examples from the CREA (Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual), corpus created by the RAE (Real Academia Española) and accessible on the web at http://www.rae.es. The CREA corpus contains not only oral but also written data extracted from many sources and various forms of Spanish. This corpus is a collection of texts from different origins, which contains over 200 million words. It is composed of a wide range of written and oral texts, produced in all Spanish-speaking countries from 1975 to the present. Written texts (90%) come from books and newspapers and they cover

[1] As we will see in this chapter the main divergence from her unitary account was in her work in 1989. All the other works seem to follow the same line of analysis with some redefinitions on the status of the assumptions that are contradicted and eliminated.

more than a hundred different subjects. The spoken language (10%) is represented by transcriptions of voiced documents, from both the radio and television. Our study uses examples of both oral and written language from different subjects but it is limited to examples from Spain. When we use examples from this corpus precise reference will be cited in each case.

On the other hand, we will also present excerpts of written language, the main source of this type of language being the national newspaper *El País,* in editions from 2002 to 2007. We purchased the CD of *El País* and the rest of the examples have been retrieved from the archives that are accessible from www.elpais.com. Furthermore, we will also present examples from two novels, *La Lluvia amarilla*, by Julio Llamazares and *Travesuras de la niña mala*, by Mario Vargas Llosa are also used. Finally, the data includes naturally occurring examples taken from emails sent to the writer.

The aim in employing all of these data sources is to provide naturally occurring data to support our arguments. We would like to emphasize we are not attempting to provide any corpus based generalization about the use of these linguistic expressions, such as for instance the relative frequency of these particles.

We are aware of issues that arise about the use of this type of data, in particular, about the non-occurrence of ungrammatical or unacceptable examples. The unavailability of ungrammatical examples does exclude some type of argumentation based on this. However, in our view the great advantages of using real data as opposed to RT invented examples outweigh this possible disadvantage.

To summarize, although exploring corpus-based generalizations would be an interesting line of enquiry we are not attempting to do this in this work.

1.3. Structure of the thesis

This thesis is structured in two parts: the first part presents a review of the literature on adversatives and concessives as discussed in both the English and Spanish language traditions. The second part introduces the theoretical framework of Relevance Theory and explains how these types of connectives have been analysed in this theory. It then presents our own extensive analysis of the Spanish connective *pero.* Given the nature of the contrast analysis of *pero* (which is linked to the function of focalisers) the next chapter seeks to establish how exactly it differs from other focus devices. It also outlines two analyses that have accounted for *but* and its German counterpart *aber* as focus markers. Then, we move on to consider how this connective behaves when combined with other focalising particles like *sólo* 'only' or *incluso/hasta* 'even', and additive focus markers such as *también* and *además* 'too, also, moreover'. The aim of this analysis is to see if sharing the focalising meaning can result in a combined meaning or if, on the contrary, each preserves its own meaning when combined in context. To finish, we examine how the semantically related connective *although* has been defined in RT before presenting our alternative analysis for the Spanish *although*, which is based on the same idea of contrast proposed for *pero*. The discussion also reviews previous analyses of this connective to assess whether the classifications suggested in the literature could be justified in attempting to develop a unitary cognitive account of *aunque*. The structure of each of these chapters in next outlined in more detail.

Chapter 2 outlines the three main traditions (Anglo-American, German and French) through which the connective *but* was analyzed in the 1970s. These three have in fact been highly influential for subsequent work in this topic. The first mentioned tradition began with the work by R. Lakoff (1971), who argued in favor of two types of reading of the connective *but,* namely, semantic opposition and denial of expectations. This chapter shows how this article became the main point of reference for most subsequent research on this connective. In the literature on *but* there are also some linguists who have opted for a more unitary

account of this connective based on the notion of cancellation (Dascal and Katriel 1977 and Bell 1998) or on the notion of contrast (Grice 1975, Rieber 1997, Bach 1999, Winter and Rimon 1994, Halliday and Hasan 1977, Schiffrin 1987, Mann and Thompson 1988, Fraser 1998, 2002 and Salkie and Oates 1999).

The second section of chapter 2 reviews the grammatical and the pragmatic approaches to research on adversativity and considers the significant differences in the way this type of relation has been analysed by these two approaches. The grammatical approach focuses mainly on a description of the adversative relation and on the classification of its uses; it also deals with the syntactic nature of adversative examples. The pragmatic tradition, on the other hand, has been highly influenced by the model of Argumentation Theory, which has added a discourse dimension to the study of the connective *pero* (Fuentes 1997, 1998(a), 1998(b), 2000) as well as the conversational perspective (Moya 1996, Briz 1993(a), 1993(b), 1995, 1997, 1998, Porroche 2002, Gaudino-Falleger 2002). AT accounts for adversative constructions as having an interactive effect typically associated with the idea of argumentation. In addition, in the pragmatic analyses, there is also some concern with the syntactic nature of these structures. Most theorists agree that the notion of interordination, which was first put forward in the grammatical tradition, is the most adequate description for the adversative constructions. The chapter finishes with some reference to the notions of 'presupposition' and 'denial of expectation' that seem to be central to most accounts of adversativity.

Chapter 3 starts with the English tradition, focusing on those studies of the inferential processes that underlie concessive examples with connectives such as *although* and *but.* We next review the presuppositional meaning of concessive structures of *although* and move on to examine the defining features that make concessive structures different from other structures such as causals or adversatives. We then review the ways in which different theorists have accounted for the relation between adversative and concessive examples by considering what discourse connectives are used to mark these relations. We review analyses that follow the Argumentation Theory framework (König 1985, 1988 and Winter and Rimon 1994) as well as those following Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) (Grote et al. 1997 and Salkie and Oates 1999). The review of all these works, which

contrast the function of the connectives *although* and *but,* is that all agree that these two connectives may share the accessibility to some kind of implied conditional assumption of the type *'If p then not q'*, which is accounted for in different terms. We also review those concessive contexts in which the connectives *but* and *although* seem to be interchangeable and how different theorists account for the differences. Finally, we outline some classifications of the uses of *although* based on the type of underlying inference (internal/external, adversative/concessive, SIC/SAC, epistemic/speech act/ content).

This chapter then moves to review how the relation of concession has been defined in the Hispanic grammatical tradition, drawing the distinction between adversatives and concessives. The two connectives associated with these relations are *pero* as the 'adversative coordinator' and *aunque* as the 'concessive subordinator'; both share the factual character of the clauses they link as well as their contrast meaning of denial of expectations. We then look at the different ways in which theorists have accounted for the differences between these two semantically related connectives *pero* and *aunque*. In general, many agree that both *pero* and *although* can mark concession, understood in terms of denial of expectation; however, there are differences in how they define what makes these connectives distinctive from each other. We then review the different types of the connective *aunque,* starting with the controversial discussion on the division between concessive and adversative uses of *aunque.* We discuss the arguments put forward by those who have disagreed with this distinction (Martínez Álvarez 1992, Trujillo 1990 and Serrano 1990). Finally, consideration is given to further divisions of *aunque* put forward by other theorists based on differences in the nature of the underlying relation (Kovacci 1974, Ferrari 1991, Lázaro Mora 1982, Crevels 1998).

The second part of the thesis starts with chapter 4, which discusses the theoretical framework that will be the basis for the cognitive-pragmatic analysis of the Spanish connective *pero* and *aunque*, Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995). There are two main reasons for selecting this theory: first, the pragmatic studies of connectives in the Hispanic tradition have been almost exclusively carried out following the Argumentational Theory proposed by Ducrot and Anscombre (1977). The cognitive-pragmatic approach to connectives proposed by Relevance Theory

can then shed new light on how this connective affects the comprehension process. Secondly, as we hope this study will show, the analysis of these Spanish connectives could be a reference for RT accounts of similar connectives in other languages, such as *but* and *although* in English. Our study seeks to provide a better insight into what is actually encoded in the connective in the belief that its contribution to the whole process of utterance understanding will enhance our understanding of how we communicate.

This study then moves on to summarize how the English connective *but* has been analysed by those followers of this theoretical framework. We start with the first account provided by Diane Blakemore (1987), which was seen as innovative in its time, due to the introduction of the notion of procedural meaning. Indeed, it served as the main point of reference for all the subsequent work on this connective. In chapter 4, we also present the controversial issue that *but* 'encodes *and* plus something else'; the way in which different relevance theorists have dealt with the possibility that *but* may have a conjunctive meaning is examined here. Blakemore and Carston's (2005) pragmatic analysis of *and* and *but* is also reviewed, considering how these two connectives differ in the instructions encoded in their meaning.

Most analyses of *but* agree with Blakemore's original idea of denial of a manifest assumption. Higashimori, for instance, adopts Blakemore's proposal to account for a large number of uses. Other relevance theorists, who have followed Blakemore's analysis, have put forward some modifications, either in relation to the nature of the cognitive status of the assumptions being denied (Iten 2000(a)) or in relation to the actual instruction encoded by *but* (Hall 2003, 2004, 2007). All these modifications from Blakemore's original account seem to cast some doubt on whether or not her proposal was on the right track. Finally, the chapter also outlines the differences among some relevance theorists in relation to the role played by the premises that are accessed in the examples with *but.*

Chapter 5 presents an account of the Spanish connective *pero* as a procedural unit, as suggested for *but* in RT, but with a description of its meaning in terms of contrast rather than denial. This chapter starts with a brief examination of the

differences between previous contrast analyses of *but,* including the RT attempts, and our proposal, which conceives *pero* as a marker of contrast with alternatives. We suggest that the contrast meaning encoded by *pero* constrains the derivation of the higher level explicatures of the utterances it introduces, thereby opening a new path for the analysis of this type of connective in RT. In addition, it deals with the controversial issue of the cognitive status of the accessible assumptions.

The main aim of chapter 5 is to present the first extensive RT account of the connective *pero* which relies on the collection of authentic data — we hope by the use of the authentic data to avoid the perceived over-reliance on invented examples in the RT literature. We argue that the presence of *pero* invites the addressee to access contextually inferred and contrasting alternatives to the proposition expressed, which constrain the derivation of the speaker's propositional attitude or illocutionary force[2]. We propose a classification of a large number of uses that can be accounted for in terms of differences in the propositional attitude. So far, it had been argued that the speaker could make her propositional attitude explicit by means of sentential adverbials such as *unfortunately* or *sadly* (see Ifantidou 1993, 1994, 2001); here, we argue that the speaker can also make explicit her attitude by other means that require more inferencing involved. This approach fits perfectly in a framework which claims that the derivation of the explicit content not only involves decoding, but also includes a great deal of inferencing both for the basic explicatures as well as the higher level explicatures. We would then conclude that this view opens a new way of analyzing the connective *pero*, in a manner which no longer restricts its contribution to the implicit part of communication. Moreover, we also provide an analysis for the correction *sino*, which has proved to be so controversial in previous analyses.

To begin, chapter 6 notes that although our proposal for the procedural meaning of *pero* resembles the underlying function of contrastive focus, there is a significant difference between simple contrastive focus and the instruction encoded by the connective *pero* 'but'. We then review two works done in the

[2] In this study, we will refer to speaker as 'she' and hearer as 'he'.

German tradition that link the English *but* and the German *aber* to the function of focus in order to prove that despite sharing the idea of evoking alternatives, there is a significant difference between their accounts and ours. This comparison of both types of analysis shows the difficulties of providing formal mechanism to access the assumptions and the need to incorporate the pragmatic element. This is exactly what our analysis does. We also deal briefly with an issue that could arise from a proposal that links the function of *pero* to that of a focaliser, namely, how *pero* combines with other focalising particles such as scalar markers like *sólo* 'only' or *incluso* 'even' and *hasta* 'even' and additive focus marker such as *también* and *además* 'too, also, moreover'.

The final chapter 7 starts by critically evaluating the RT account of *although* provided by Iten (1998, 2000(a) 2000(b), 2005). We look at the description of the encoded meaning of this connective and critically discuss the relationship between her proposed division into direct and indirect examples of *although* and other divisions reviewed in previous chapters. Then we put forward a RT analysis of the Spanish connective *aunque*, which shares some basic contrastive meaning with *pero* but differs in regards to the nature of the assumptions that are contrasted. This analysis gives a better account of the function of this connective than the one proposed by Iten for the English *although*. Finally, this chapter looks at the division in the Hispanic tradition between adversative and concessive uses of *aunque* and outlines the difference between these two uses in information structure terms. We also discuss the correspondence between this division and other classifications found in both the Hispanic and English traditions, to see whether these differences are relevant when providing a unitary procedural analysis of this connective. The chapter will finish with two controversial examples and will explain how the present account could provide a better explanation of the implausibility of adding the connective *although* in those examples.

PART I

Chapter 2
Literature on adversatives

2.1. Introduction

The tradition of studies of discourse markers has been very fruitful in the last few decades. There have been many works that have referred to a group of contrast or contrastive discourse markers and described them as units that signal contrast (see Quirk et al 1985, Schiffrin 1987, Mann and Thompson 1988, Winter and Rimon 1994, Fraser 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002(a), 2002(b), Salkie and Oates 1999 among others). However, there has never been much precision when accounting for the concept of 'contrast' itself (see criticism in Fraser and Malamud-Makowski 1996, Bell 1998, Fraser 2002). Within this group of contrast we find a large number of examples such as: *on the other hand, on the contrary, but, however, although, yet* and *still,* among others. However, in this study we will restrict our analysis to two of them: *but* and *although.*

These two connectives, *but* and *although*, have been traditionally defined as 'prototypical adversative' and 'concessive' markers respectively. However, in the literature there have been different views on how to define 'adversative' and 'concessive' relations and some theorists have argued that both *but* and *although* can be used to mark these two relations (see König 1985, Sidiropoulou 1992, Winter and Rimon 1994, Grote et al 1997, among others).

In the first part of the chapter, we will concentrate on presenting the different analyses that have been put forward for the English connective *but,* which can be described as the prototypical example of contrast and adversativity. This review will focus mainly on the work carried out in the English tradition with some references to the analysis of corresponding connectives in other languages.

In the second part of the chapter we will review the studies on adversatives in Spanish, which can be divided into those works that have followed a grammatical

morphosyntactic approach and more recent pragmatic and conversational analyses. We will discuss the main differences between these two traditions.

2.2. Three traditions of *but*

In the early 1970s *but* became the focus of scholarly attention in three different traditions (Foolen 1991: 82), Anglo-American, German and French. The first, the Anglo-American tradition, begins with Robin Lakoff's classic paper (Lakoff 1971). Lakoff distinguishes two types of *but:* 'the semantic opposition *but'* use, which draws attention to a difference between the information in two sentences, as in:

(1) John is tall *but* Bill is short.

The 'denial of expectation *but*', on the other hand, allows counter cases or exceptions to contextual assumptions, as illustrated in the example (2) below:

(2) John is a Republican *but* he is honest.

We may take as a background assumption or belief to this utterance to be (3):

(3) Republicans are dishonest.

This would license the rule of inference (*modus ponens*) in (4):

(4) If John is a Republican then John is dishonest.

In this view the use of *but* in (2) above allows the sentence in (5) below to avoid being a logical anomaly while allowing the general belief in (3) to be maintained.

(5) John is a Republican *and* John is honest.

In a sense *but* here marks an exception to a belief that does not necessarily invalidate the belief. In these examples (of denial of expectation), Lakoff argues that the presuppositions that are accessed do not have to be derived necessarily from knowledge of the world, but can also be derived from prior discourse. She

expects the hearer to calculate the presupposition and to be able to calculate the denial.

Lakoff (1971) draws a distinction between symmetric uses of *and* in which the two clauses are reversible with no significant change of meaning as in:

(6) Fords can go fast, *and* Oldsmobiles are safe. (Lakoff 1971: 135)

and asymmetric uses as in example (7) below, which involves a presupposition (Harry has a Ford) and the notion of causation:

(7) Fords can go fast, *and* Harry just got a ticket for speeding.

She then suggests that the distinction drawn between symmetric and asymmetric uses of *and* could be paralleled to the symmetric and asymmetric uses of *but,* which corresponds to the denial of expectation and semantic opposition uses respectively (Lakoff 1971: 135). In the symmetric use of *but,* the order of the clauses can be switched without changing the interpretation:

(8) a. John is short *but* Bill is tall.
b. Bill is tall *but* John is short.

On the other hand, in the asymmetric uses, switching clauses leads to the dubious (9b):

(9) a. John is a Republican *but* honest.
b. John is honest *but* a Republican.

Therefore, the reversibility is considered as the defining feature of the semantic opposition examples together with the implausibility of substituting the conjunction *but* by *although,* which is the defining characteristic of the denial of expectation use.

The author also acknowledges that there are examples that would not fit into this neat division of these two uses of *but.* For instance, she admits the oddity of examples such as the following:

(10) Bill murdered Alice, *but* he wasn't caught. (Lakoff 1971: 136)

She argues that it is clearly not an example of semantic opposition, because of the lack of reversibility. However, it is not a typical causal-related denial of expectation either, because, despite its asymmetry, being caught is what is actually expected when someone commits a murder. She, then, opts for accounting for this use as an example of semantic opposition and explains the asymmetry as a result of the temporal priority. She also claims that in this example *but* is used instead of *and* if the speaker's emotions are aroused. However, it is unfortunate that she does not elaborate any further on this idea.

Another problematic example was the following one:

(11) John wanted to be a doctor, *but* he failed chemistry.

Lakoff is discouraged from including example (11) within the denial of expectation use because it cannot be replaced by *although*. She then concludes that it is a special type of semantic opposition, but with ellipsis.

In the second tradition, German, there are influential studies such as Pusch (1975), Lang (1977) and Abraham (1977). Their main contribution consists of identifying a third use of *but* to be added to the two uses identified by Lakoff. The authors observed that the English connector *but* translates into two German lexical items: *aber* and *sondern*, the former corresponding to the denial of expectation use, as in:

(12) a. John ist Republikaner, *aber* er ist ehrlich.

b. *John is a Republican* ***but*** *he is rich.*

and the latter being used in correction examples, where it links two utterances, the second correcting something stated in the first:

(13) a. Das ist nicht meine Schwester, *sondern* meine Mutter.

b. *That isn't my sister,* ***but*** *my mother.*

This use of correction *but* in English has the following features: syntactically, the first utterance will always have an explicit negation (Lang 1977: 296 fn 33)[1]; semantically, it does not have a restrictive character, as it happens in the other uses of *but* (which translate as *aber*). Instead, it conveys some meaning of correction or substitution.

Abraham (1977) studies three related languages, English, Dutch and German, and notes that the corrective use of the conjunction was only lexicalised in German. He also proposes that the twofold distinction proposed by Lakoff should not be seen as a clear-cut distinction but as a gradual one. In fact, he claims that he can find meaningful readings for examples that Lakoff would describe as unacceptable, such as:

(14) John is rich *but* poor. (Lakoff 1971: 134)

Not only does he find it acceptable, but he also claims that this type of example proves that conjunctions are world-changing conjunctions.

Abraham (1977: 112) also mentions a third translation of *but* into a different conjunction in German: *dafür,* which is a paratactic conjunction with no direct lexical equivalent in many languages. The following example illustrates this use:

(15) Meine Schewester ist intelligent, mein Bruder *dafür* hat wunderbar lange Haare.

My sister is intelligent, ***in compensation*** *my brother has wonderful long hair.*

He admits that wherever the compensatory *dafür* holds in its normal reading its interpretation overlaps with that of *aber* 'but':

(16) Sie ist klein, *aber* wohl proportioniert.

She is small ***but*** *well shaped.*

[1] In the examples of *sonder* there has to be an "explicit negation" in the antecedent with either the particle *nicht (not*) or the indefinite pronoun /adjective *kein (no*), which is to be decomposed into *nichtein (not +one)*. It cannot be used with the negation lexicalized.

The fact that the connective *but* translates as three different lexical items in German (*aber, sonder, dafür*) is used as an argument to claim that there is not one lexical item with three different senses but three distinct, homonymous lexical items in English[2].

The third tradition, French, has its origin in the classic paper by Anscombre and Ducrot (1977). They developed the pragmatic theory called Argumentation Theory, in which connectives are seen as argumentative instructions that impose restrictions on the utterances they link. They noted that the two uses of the French connector *mais* were not lexically marked. They named the correction use $mais_{SN}$, after the equivalents in German *sonder* and Spanish *sino.* On the other hand, the denial of expectation use, which corresponds to the German *aber* and Spanish *pero* was labelled as $mais_{PA.}$

They claimed that *mais* was ambiguous and that there were distributional properties that distinguished these two uses. For instance, the conditions for the correction use of *mais* in examples of 'P $mais_{SN}$ Q' as in (17) were the following:

(17) X: Je te promets d'essayer
Y: Je ne te demande pas d'essayer , $mais_{SN}$ de reússir. (A & D 1977: 27)

X: *I promise to try*
Y: *I am not asking you to try,* ***but (mais$_{SN}$)*** *to succeed.*

Correction ($mais_{SN}$)

a. *P* has the form of *not P*'

b. *P mais Q* has to be uttered by the same enunciator.

c. The speaker presents *Q* as the justification to reject *P*'

d. Not only *Q* has to refute *P*' but it has to do it in a direct manner. *Q* and *P*' have to characterise the same kind of fact (in ways which the speaker deems incompatible with each other). [3] *Q* has to be capable of replacing *P*' (1977: 24-25).

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[2] See Iten (2000(a): 135) for criticism.
[3] Iten (2000(a): 136-7) argues that this definition is not accurate, since there are examples of metalinguistic negation with incompatibility of representations rather than facts.

They also mention (1977: 26-27) that the negation in *P* must have what they call a 'polemic' character in its strict sense, which means that it can be used to object to a preceding or to a potential utterance[4].

On the other hand, to explain the 'denial of expectation' use of *mais* in examples of 'P $mais_{PA}$ Q' like (18) the following conditions were identified:

(18) Il est intelligent, $mais_{PA}$ il ne traveille pas. (A&D 1977: 28)

He's intelligent but ***(mais$_{PA}$)*** *he does not work.*

Denial of expectation ($mais_{PA}$)

a. *P* is an argument for $\neg R$.

b. *Q* is an argument for *R*.

c. *Q* is a stronger argument for *R* than *P* is for $\neg R$. (1977: 28)

Some of the main claims in relation to this second use of $mais_{PA}$ were the following[5]:

a) q is always the strongest argument (not r is always favoured).
b) by saying p *mais* q the speaker always expresses some form of acceptance of p.
c) p *but* q construction always aims at annulling a particular conclusion r.

Each of these three traditions (English, German and French) marks the start of the investigation of the contrast connectives in the three languages and they have been very influential in successive works.

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[4] In contrast to this, Dascal and Katriel (1977:161) claim that there are examples of polemic negation that would not be analysed as correction. For instance (B')below:

A: I think we should ask John for some information on the economical situation. He is an economist.

B: He is not an economist, but a businessman.

B': He is not an economist, but he is a businessman.

[5] Snoeck (1995) argues against the following claims: that q is always the weightest argument and that the construction as a whole may be seen as a defence of not r; that saying p *but* q the speaker always expresses some form of acceptance of p; and finally that the p *but* q construction always aims at annulling a particular conclusion r.

2.3. Uses of *but*

2.3.1. Following Lakoff's model

As mentioned above, Lakoff herself noticed that her account would find it difficult to account for some of the uses of *but* and she leaves open the option of taking her research a step further in light of new examples. In fact, this task has been carried out by many authors, who have started their analysis with Lakoff's work as their main point of reference. Sweetser (1990), for instance, favours Lakoff's division between denial of expectation and opposition uses of *but*, corresponding to the asymmetric and symmetric distinction respectively (1990: 105). She then incorporates it to her own classification of how the conjunction *but* could be pragmatically enriched[6]. Her basic claim is that *but* presents a clash between two conjuncts, since it goes against our expectations to have them side by side. She then maintains that the clash can only occur in two domains: the epistemic and the conversational level[7]. An example of clash at the epistemic level would be the following:

(19) John keeps six boxes of pancake mix on hand, *but* he never eats pancakes (Sweetser 1990: 100).

In this example, the *but* conjunct clashes with an apparently necessary conclusion, but it can also clash with other apparent premises as in the following example:

(20) A: Do you know if Mary will be in by nine this evening?
B: Well, she's nearly always in by then, *but* (I know) she has a lot of work to do at the library, so I am not sure. (Sweetser 1990: 100)

In the examples in which *but* functions at the conversational level, it makes a clash of speech acts as in:

(21) Look up that phone number- *but* don't bother if it will take you more than a few minutes. (Sweetser 1990:101)

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[6]As will be shown later, for other conjunctions such as *although* or *because*, Sweetser adopts a three rather than a two way classification: content, epistemic and speech acts (Sweetser 1990: 111).

[7] She rejects the possibility of the 'content *but*' because she claims that if two states coexist in the real world they cannot be said to clash in this real world. Instead, she argues that the clash takes place at the level of the speaker's beliefs about the likelihood of their coexistence (Sweetser 1990: 104).

In this example, the clash takes place between the speech act of command of the first and the denial of the second.

As mentioned above, Sweetser also states that the examples of epistemic and speech act *but* could be either asymmetric or symmetric, corresponding to Lakoff's division of denial of expectation and opposition uses respectively (1990: 105). For instance, in the epistemic domain, the asymmetric use will present coequal premises (contrasting propositions):

(22) John is rich *but* dumb. (Sweetser 1990: 105)[8]

In the symmetric use, the train of reasoning leads from the first clause:

(23) John is rich *but* Bill is poor. (Sweetser 1990: 105)

In the speech-act domain, the difference between the symmetric and asymmetric use is that the former presents contrasting or conflicting co-equal speech acts, which are independent of each other as in:

(24) King Tsin has great mu shu pork, *but* China First has excellent dim sum. (Sweetser 1990: 105)

The asymmetric use, on the other hand, involves cases where the second clause follows from the first or depends on the first clause and therefore the order of the conjuncts could not be changed (1990: 110):

(25) I love you *but* please take those wet boots off the carpet!

As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4, following the Relevance Theory framework, Blakemore (1989) and Rouchota (1990) also favour Lakoff's distinction between the two types of *but*:

[8] As will be shown later, this is an example taken from Lakoff (1971:134), who pointed out that it could have either a denial of expectation or a semantic opposition reading; Sweetser seems to have taken the latter.

> "the denial of expectations interpretation results form the use of *but* as a constraint on the relevance of the proposition it introduces-that is, as a discourse connective, the contrastive interpretation results form its use as a constraint on the relevance of the conjunction of the two propositions it connects" (Blakemore 1989:17) (my emphasis).

However, as will emerge in our discussion later, Blakemore subsequently changes her mind (Blakemore 2000, 2002) and returns to her original account (Blakemore 1987) favouring a unitary account of *but* as a marker of denial.

Next, we would like to draw attention to Lakoff's analysis of the example below:

(26) John is rich *but* dumb.

Lakoff argues that (26) could have both a semantic opposition and a denial of expectation reading. The latter would happen in a context in which "one had for whatever reason acquired the notion that rich people were usually smart" (Lakoff 1971: 134). On the other hand, the semantic opposition reading was explained by accessing the following assumption "being rich is a good thing, but being dumb is a bad thing (so it might not be such a good idea to marry him)" (Lakoff 1971: 134). In fact, what can be read from Lakoff's analysis of this example is that her division between the semantic opposition examples and denial of expectation is unnecessary, since both uses seem to share the same underlying idea[9]. As will be shown below, in the literature some theorists have adopted Lakoff's division but have also included examples such as (26) in a different group (concession, contradicting evaluation or indirect denial of expectation).

Writing on the Dutch connective *maar* 'but', Overstegeen (1997), for instance, follows the division presented by Lakoff, semantic opposition and denial of expectation, but adds a third group called 'concession'. His definition of the semantic of opposition relation is as follows:

> "A relation between two conjuncts each having different subjects, to which properties are attributed that are mutually exclusive in the given context. Or there

[9] Iten (2000(a): 131) also points out that the explanation given by Lakoff to account for this example of semantic opposition is actually a clear explanation of denial of expectation.

may be just one entity to which different properties are ascribed, either at different times or places or in different possible worlds" (Oversteegen 1997:61).

He illustrates this use with the following example:

(27) On Monday Mat plays volley-ball *but* on Thursday he plays hockey.

On the other hand, the denial of expectation use is divided into denial of expectation and concession as illustrated in the examples below:

(28) Greta Garbo was considered to be the standard of beauty (p) *but* she never married (q).[10] (1997:61) (denial of expectation)

(29) The hotel is expensive *but* it is comfortable. (1997: 62)[11] (concession)

In fact, in the literature on *but* there are other examples in which this distinction between denial of expectation and concession has been adopted (Spooren 1989, Rudolph 1996, Lagerwerf 1998). Some theorists have opted to refer to it as examples of direct or indirect denial of expectation (see Abraham 1977, Foolen 1991, Blakemore 1987, 2000, 2002, Iten 2000(a) and Hall 2004).

It is also noteworthy that Lakoff's model has been the reference for work carried out on connectives in other languages such as Russian and Bulgarian. In relation to the former, Malchukov (2004) has presented a three-use classification of the Russian *no* 'but'. It is interesting that Lakoff's semantic opposition use seems to be represented with a different conjunction (contrastive *a*[12]) (see also Lang 1984: 72). He then distinguishes three uses of the *no* conjunction, one of them corresponding to Lakoff's denial of expectation (2004: 180):

-Denial of expectation

(30) Vanja prostudilsja, *no* poshel v shkolu.

Vanja caught a cold, ***but*** *went to school.*

[10] Greta Garbo werd als de maatstaf loor schoonheid gezein (p) maar ze is nooit getrouwd (q).
[11] Het hotel is duur maar het is comfortable.
[12] It was pointed to me by one student (personal communication) that the same thing happens in Polish. However, to my knowledge there is no work done in this area.

-Contradicting evaluation

(31) Kostjium krasivy, *no* dorogoj.

The suit is beautiful, ***but*** *expensive.*

-Restrictive

(32) On pobezhal, *no* upal.

He started to run ***but*** *fell.*

The first two examples (denial of expectation and contradicting evaluation) seem to correspond to what Overstegeen called denial of expectation and concession and other theorists' division between direct and indirect denial respectively. In the third group, called 'restrictive', *but* seems to introduce a different continuation from what could be expected. However, it is not clear how this use differs from the example of denial of expectations.

In the Bulgarian tradition, Fielder (2004) also seems to base her analysis on Lakoff's two conjunctive uses, also adding a third attitudinal discourse use, which was pointed out by some authors earlier (see for instance Schiffrin 1987, Fraser 1996, 2002, Bell 1998, Rouchota 1990, Iten 2000(a)). Fielder refers to the two readings of the Bulgarian conjunction *ama* 'but' traditionally identified in the study of adversative constructions. First, the so-called *strong contrast-delimitation* (*protivopostavitelno-ogranicitelno*, 1983: 299), where S2 delimits or even contradicts S1. Interestingly, she argues that this use of *ama* can be analyzed as a truth-conditional semantic use since S2 negates or contradicts S1, as illustrated below:

(33) O-xo! Da go vodja na banja! Men pocnaxa malko da me zimat djavolite, **ama** se sdâržax i ne samo ce se sdâržax, ami[13] me i dosmeša.

[13] Note that *ami* is a different kind of 'but'. Here it combines with *i* 'and, even' forming a kind of compound conjunction of a comparative nature that occurs in the larger construction *ne samo ce ... ami i* 'not only... but even'. Fielder 2005 discusses the difference between *ama* and *ami* as signaling negative versus positive face.

So that's it! The gentleman wants to be taken to the baths! I felt like telling him to go to hell, ***ama*** *I restrained myself, not only did I restrain myself, but was even a bit amused.*

The second reading of *ama* was labelled *the adversative-explanatory* use (*protivopostavitelno-izjasnitelno*, 1983: 299), where S2 elaborates on S1, as in the following example:

(34) Ostavi se! Vidiš li tozi pojas? – i Baj Ganjo si povdiga si širokata žiletka, – vsičkite muskali šte gi natâpca vâtre. Istina, težicko malko, **ama** sigur.

Forget it! Do you see this sash? — And Baj Ganjo raised his vest. — I'll stuff all the phials in here. True, it's a little heavy, ***ama*** *it's safe.*

The difference between these two uses of *ama* is that in the first type, there is contradiction with the proposition S1, whereas in the latter, it is with the assumption raised by virtue of asserting S1, i.e. an implied proposition that is contradicted. Therefore, one can conclude that there seems to be some resemblance between Fielder's and Lakoff's division.

To sum up, it appears that Lakoff's work has played an important role in the studies on this type of connective. Sweetser (1990), for instance, has adopted the symmetric and asymmetric distinction and has adapted it to her own division of epistemic and speech act examples. Rouchota's and Blakemore's division between contrast and denial of expectation seems to correspond very closely to Lakoff's semantic opposition and denial of expectation uses.

Furthermore, some theorists have presented an additional use, as part of the denial of expectation group, which corresponds to one of the interpretations of Lakoff's analysis of her example of semantic of opposition (26). Fielder (2004), for instance, distinguishes between strong contrast delimitation and adversatory explanatory uses, which correspond to Lakoff's semantic opposition and denial of expectations groups respectively, including in the latter examples such as (26). Overstgeen (1997) agrees with the semantic opposition and denial of expectation division but makes a further distinction to account for examples such as (26),

which he calls 'concession' examples. This subdivision of the denial of expectation into two groups seems to also correspond to Malchukov's (2004) division between denial of expectation and contradicting evaluation. In addition, Malchukov identifies a third use of the Russian *no* 'but'called restrictive and claims that the semantic opposition is accounted for with a different connective.

Among the main contributions of these analyses that are influenced by Lakoff's account, one could point out the need to account for examples like (26) as belonging to a different group. Furthermore, it is raised the possibility of using a connective different from *but* to mark the relation of the semantic opposition use, in contexts in which there is an explicit contrast between the content of the two propositions linked.

2.3.2. Unitary accounts of *but*: denial or cancellation

As noted above, it is not always easy to maintain Lakoff's account of two distinctive uses of *but*. In fact, in the literature there are some theorists who have instead opted for a unitary account in terms of denial or cancellation. Foolen (1991), for instance, claims that the contrastive use of *but* can be reduced to the denial of expectation type[14]. To support this claim, he argues that if the conjunction *and* can also be used to contrast two states of affairs, it is an indication that *but* is reserved for those cases in which there is an additional "denial of expectation, which leads, in the pragmatic level, to a strengthening of the contrastive comparison" (Foolen, 1991: 90)[15]. He supports his argument with the following examples:

(35) A: John and Peter don't live in the same place, do they?
B: No, John lives in Amsterdam and/(??but) Peter lives in Rotterdam.

[14] As will be shown in the thesis, the rejection of Lakoff's division in favour of a unitary account will also be followed by relevance theorists such as the Blakemore (1987, 2002), Iten (2000(a), 2005). See also the studies discussed earlier (Abraham 1979 and Lang 1984).
[15] In his account he also refers to the corrective and exceptive use of *but*; this latter use has also been mentioned in later accounts (Winter & Rimon (1994) and Fraser (2002(b)).

(36) A: John and Peter both live in Amsterdam, don't they?
B: No, Jóhn (indeed) lives in Amsterdam but/(??and) Peter lives in Rotterdam.

(37) A: Where do John and Peter live?
B: Well, John lives in Amsterdam and/but Peter lives in Rotterdam. (Foolen 1991: 85)

In the first example only *and* is acceptable because it does not go against the expectations. In the second example, on the other hand, only *but* is acceptable, since there is a clear context of expectation to which the *but* utterance seems to go against. Finally, in the last example, he argues that since there is no clear indication of any expectation being present in the context, both examples could be possible, being then determined by the context.

Departing from Lakoff's division and supporting a unitary account, there are two other significant works: Dascal and Katriel (1977) and Bell (1998). They differ from Foolen (1991) in that they both reject the idea of denial of expectation in favour of the notion of cancellation. Dascal and Katriel (1977) focus on the Hebrew connectives *aval* and *ela*[16], which corresponds to the English connector *but*. They propose an 'onion model' which analyzes utterance meaning as:

> "having several 'layers', ranging from the more to the less explicit, from an inner 'core' of content to contextually conveyed implicatures *via* layers and sublayers such as presuppositions, modality, felicity conditions and illocutionary force" (Dascal & Katriel 1977: 153).

In this model the function of these connectives is accounted for in terms of cancellation of some of the layers of the previous utterance:

> "The point of using an 'aval' or 'ela' utterance is to mark explicitly some particular separation between a pair of layers (or sublayers), or a contrast within a given layer. Such sentences foremostly indicate a refusal to accept all the layers of meaning of an utterance *en bloc*" (Dascal & Katriel 1977: 153).

Therefore, what distinguishes these two connectives is the type of layers they cancel. For instance, in P *aval* Q, P indicates acceptance of one layer and Q

[16] *Ela* corresponds to the German *sonder* and the Spanish *sino*.

indicates the rejection of another. For instance in (38) B accepts the propositional content of A's utterance, but not its illocutionary force:

(38) A: Shut the door.
B: O.K. *but* (*aval*) don't give me orders.

In the following example, on the other hand, the *but* 'aval' clause indicates the cancellation of the conversational implicature created by P (in this case it is cancelled by the assertion of Q):

(39) A: What do you think of John?
B: I like his wife a lot, *but* I guess I like him, too (*aval).*

In the examples with *ela,* the element that is cancelled belongs to the same layer and it is actually replaced with another of the same order. An example of *ela* would be the following:

(40) A: The Pope, who is the only leader of the Christians, is elected by the cardinals.
B: He's not the only leader *but (ela)* one of the most important.

A decade later, Bell (1998) also adopts the idea of cancellation to account for the contrastive group of markers following his core-periphery approach (Bell 1998: 50) [17]. In this model, he describes *and* as an example of peripheral 'contrastive' and *but* as a good representative of core 'contrastive'. Like Dascal and Katriel, Bell argues that *but,* which is the nucleus of this contrastive group, should not be accounted for in terms of contrast or denial of expectations. Instead, it should be analysed as a marker of cancellation (Bell 1998: 524). He proposes a relation of cancellation that takes place between two utterances, P and Q, whenever an aspect of information derived from P is cancelled in Q. By 'aspect of information' he means the following:

> "any piece of information which is derivable, though not necessarily derived, by the hearer from the prior discourse context either globally or locally with respect to any feature of the act of communication such as propositional content, illocutionary force, perlocutionary effects in terms of face, politeness,

[17] Other examples in this group of contrastives would be for instance *in contrast, on the other hand, however, though, nevertheless, yet, still.*

> mood, etc., and conversational conventions such as turn-taking and topic change[18]" (Bell 1998: 527).

It then seems that the main departure from Dascal and Katriel's account relates to the scope of the information that is cancelled by the *but* utterance, since he disagrees with the claim that the cancellation refers to some layer of the immediately prior or local discourse segment.

This analysis seems to be very close the Relevance Theoretic analysis of *but* proposed by Blakemore's (1987) account. As will be discussed later, the main difference lies on the fact that Blakemore supports an analysis based on denial rather than cancellation. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Bell adopts the notion of context as proposed by Wilson in Relevance Theory:

> "assumptions may be drawn from the preceding text or from observation of the speaker and what is going on in the immediate environment, but they also may be drawn from cultural or scientific knowledge, common-sense assumption and more generally any item of shared or idiosyncratic information that the hearer has access to at the moment" (Wilson 1994: 41).

However, Bell rejects the term 'assumption' because according to him it implies that the interlocutors know, assume and believe it. Instead, he prefers the notion of 'information', which can be continually updated as the discourse proceeds. In fact, he views cancellation as playing a very important role in the negotiation of shared understanding.

2.3.3. Unitary accounts of *but*: contrast

2.3.3.1. Pragmatic accounts of contrast

In this section, we will present some accounts that have used a unitary view of *but* in terms of contrast. Paul Grice (e.g. 1975) who is first to favour an analysis of the connective *but* using the notion of contrast. Following the Modified Occam's Razor[19], he argues that all the uses of *but* can be reduced to contrast and that more specific interpretations are to be explained pragmatically. According to his theory

[18] See Higashimori (1992(a), 1992(b)) for a similar analysis using denial rather than cancellation.
[19] The Modified Occam's Razor states that senses shouldn't be multiplied beyond necessity (Grice 1975).

there are ground-floor statements, which carry the truth conditional content of an utterance and higher-order speech acts[20], which allow comments on these statements. The function of *but* then consists of indicating the performance of a higher-order speech act that contrasts two ground-floor speech acts. This notion of contrast is defined as an example of conventional implicature[21], as illustrated below:

(41) It is midnight but the pubs are closed. (Grice 1975/89: 37)

In this example what is conventionally implicated is the contrast between A (*it is midnight*) and B (*the pubs are closed*). Therefore, Grice argues that the speaker is communicating A, B and the fact that there is a contrast between A and B (non-central higher-order speech acts).

Rieber (1997) presents a unitary contrast analysis of *but,* which follows the underlying idea proposed by Grice. He claims that *but* contributes to the content of the utterance and explains the notion of conventional implicatures in terms of *tacit performatives.* His proposal is that discourse connectives suggest or imply what they do by means of performatives (Rieber 1997: 52). His selected performative verb is '*suggest*'[22]so, for instance, in:

(42) Shaq is huge *but* he is agile.

He maintains that what is being communicated is as follows:

(43) Shaq is huge and (*I suggest that this contrasts*) he is agile.

In this example the conjoined proposition in the parenthesis is the tacit performative, which does not contribute to the truth conditionality of the whole utterance. In this case the performative of suggesting contrast is at level of the utterance but it could also be at the level of implications of the utterances.

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[20] Higher order speech acts are not central, i.e. they are parasitic on the performance of central speech acts such as saying, asking and telling (Grice 1989: 122).
[21] This contrastive meaning of *but* fulfils the characteristics of conventional implicatures because it is detachable and it is not indicated in truth-functionally equivalent ways of stating the same thing.
[22] 'suggesting' is understood as "tentatively putting forward a proposition" (Rieber 1997: 54).

Bach (1999) also agrees with the notion of basic contrast and with the idea that *but* encodes conceptual information, which must be pragmatically enriched before the hearer can identify the intended relation. Bach's analysis differs significantly from previous contrast accounts of *but,* since he states that the meaning of contrast encoded by *but* contributes to the level of what is said[23]. He argues that this claim can be tested applying the Indirect Quotation Test (IQ test):

> "An element of a sentence contributes to what is said in an utterance of that sentence if and only if there can be an accurate and complete indirect quotation of the utterance (in the same language) which includes that element, or a corresponding element, in the ' that' – clause that specifies what is said" (Bach 1999: 338).

To support his proposal, Bach reacts against what was considered as a common sense assumption that every indicative sentence expresses exactly one proposition (abbreviated to OSOP). He asserts that with sentences containing devices such as *but* there is no such a thing as *the* proposition expressed—in these cases what is said comprises more than one proposition. Therefore, *but* can easily be explained as being responsible for just one of the propositions that are part of what is said, which may not be in the foreground.

He describes *but* as an example of a preservative operator because it yields a new proposition preserving the original proposition. It is also a binary operator that picks up the first of its operands from prior discourse or context, what property or relation it ascribes to its operand(s), and how the precise character of this property or relation is determined by context. As an operator, *but* combines with the rest of the sentence to yield a proposition which, although it is not part of the truth conditional content of the utterance, is something which has truth conditions. Bach then claims that:

> "the proposition then while truth conditional is secondary to the main point of the utterance. Indeed contrary to the common assumption of one sentence, one proposition, such utterances express more than one proposition" (Bach 1999: 328).

[23] Bach takes 'what is said' as the logical form plus reference of any pure indexicals (Bach 1999: 339; 2001: 22). (See Hall 2004, 2007 for criticism)

He then replaces Grice's idea of conventional implicature with a frame in which an utterance can express multiple propositions. Bach writes:

> "In some cases, the propositions that are alleged to be conventional implicatures are actually aspects of what is said" (Bach 1999: 320).

A significant difference of his account in relation to previous accounts of *but* is that in his account there is no need for an extra proposition because *but* is analyzed as an operator. Therefore, in utterances containing *but,* the hearer recovers a proposition with something like contrast as a constituent.

Unfortunately, none of these authors seem to be very explicit when accounting for the actual notion of contrast that seems to be encoded by *but.* One can then say that the difference can be established mainly in terms of the level of the utterance to which *but* seems to contribute. Grice (1968), for instance, seem to account for the function of *but* as contributing to the implicit part either as a conventional implicature or as a presupposition, respectively. On the other hand, Rieber (1997) follows Grice's analysis very closely but rather than using the notion of implicature he opts for 'tacit performatives', which seem to combine the idea of speech act and implicitness[24]. Finally, Bach (1999) agrees with the conceptual notion of contrast encoded by *but* and insists that the contribution is at the explicit level of what is said.

2.3.3.2. *But* as a marker of a coherence relation of contrast

Halliday and Hasan (1976) discuss how some conjunctive elements contribute to the cohesiveness of discourse. In particular, the conjunction *but* is described as marking the relation of adversativity, which can be accounted for as "contrary to expectations" (1976: 250). At first sight, it looks as if this relation could correspond to one of the two uses of *but* pointed out by Lakoff (1971), which could be linked to the analysis that was favoured by some of authors mentioned above (Dascal and Katriel 1977, Foolen 1991, Blakemore 1987, 2002, Bell 1998). However, this does not seem to be the case since Halliday and Hasan divide the

[24] See Blakemore (2002) for criticism on this combination of tacitness and speech act.

adversatives into three different categories: adversative proper, contrastive ('set against') and correction. The adversative proper can be linked to Lakoff's denial of expectation and the contrastive use is very similar to Lakoff's semantic opposition use, as illustrated below:

(44) He is not exactly good looking but he's got brains (H & H 1976: 252).

(45) He is rich but he is dumb (Lakoff 1971: 134).

What makes their analysis different from the others is that they focus on the effect that this type of conjunctive elements have at different planes of discourse: internal or external[25]. By external, they refer to those examples in which the relations are established between facts in the external world, as in the example below:

(46) All this time, Tweedledee was trying his best to fold up the umbrella, with himself in it.... *But* he couldn't quite succeed, and it ended in his rolling over, bundled up in the umbrella, with only his head out (H& H 1976: 250).

On the other hand, the internal relations also refer to the same notion of contrary to expectation, but unlike the external examples "the source of the expectation is to be found not in what the presupposed sentence is about but in the current speaker-hearer configuration" (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 252-3). The following example illustrates the internal type:

(47) You might catch a bat, and that's very like a mouse, you know. *But* do cats eat bats, I wonder? (1976: 253).

This idea of different planes will be later taken up by some coherence theorists. Schiffrin (1987)[26], for instance, describes *but* as an indicator that displays or makes explicit implicit relations between successive discourse segments, which are understood as cognitively real entities. Schiffrin claims that *but* has a core

[25] This distinction of planes could be linked to Sweetser's classification between content and epistemic on the one hand and speech act levels on the other.

[26] Schiffrin's account of contrastive meaning referring to different levels can be traced back to the distinction proposed by Halliday and Hassan's between internal and external levels (see Bell 1998 and Grote et al. 1997, who comment on this idea).

meaning of contrast and its pragmatic effect is that of "marking an upcoming unit as a contrast with a prior unit" (1987: 177). This contrast effect can sometimes be easily identified in the semantic component of the propositions, but others will be derived from the cultural knowledge of the participants or expectations of each other's conduct, i.e. they can be proposition knowledge or context based. She identifies different planes to which this contrast may affect: referential, functional and interactional knowledge and expectations[27].

In fact, there are many examples in which *but* may simultaneously mark different functions such as referential contrast, functional contrast and contrastive actions. For instance, in the example (48) *but* marks referential contrast initiated in A, but also reclaims the floor and her right to make the point:

(48) A: Yes, her father was Italian, she was raised –
B: *but* she was raised by the Jewish grandmother, and sent to a Jew- eh to a Catholic school.

In the next example *but* marks both a referential and functional contrast:

(49) (Sally has asked Zelda if she is interested in sports)
Zelda: a.Ump um. I am not interested in it.
b. My family is
c. JoAnn is
d. She knows more than the boys do.
e. *But* not me.

The referential contrast being Zelda versus her family and the functional contrast between what was requested and what was not requested.

Schiffrin also notes that "*but* as a marker of speaker return can gain an additional expressive function as a point-making device, which indicates the speaker's orientation, commitment, or intensity to a particular assertion" (1987: 173). She

[27] Redeker (1991) presents a very similar analysis of *but*, with differences in the description of the planes; Schiffrin's Action Structure is divided into Ideational Structure and Rhetorical Structure and Schiffrin's Exchange Structure is Redeker's Sequential Structure. She then argues that there is no need to consider Information Structure and Participation Structure independent from the other three.

admits that in the cases in which *but* has this function of stating one's point it may take priority over other interactional goals.

In a different tradition to the Gricean one and more closely related to the taxonomic and coherence analysis of Schiffrin, we find Fraser's (1998) analysis of *but.* He claims that *but* encodes procedural meaning that can be explained in terms of contrast. Fraser claims that *but* has a core meaning which signals simple contrast, nothing more, being the pragmatic interpretation derived from the specifics of S1 and S2 (Fraser 1998, 2002(b)). Like any discourse marker, *but* is separate from the propositional content of the sentence and its function is to signal the relationship of contrast between U1 and U2. He is not concerned with different planes of discourse, as Schiffrin or Redeker. Instead, he concentrates on classifying the different uses of *but* specifying the part of the U1 message, with which the direct U2 message is contrasted; the contrast could then be with the explicit content or an inference. If the latter, it could then contrast with a contextual inference, a perlocutionary effect, a defining characteristic, a presupposition, a felicity condition or a topic. He concludes that the effects that this discourse marker may have are incompatible states of the world, rejection or denial or reorientation.

The role of discourse connectives as indicators of coherence relations has also been studied by Mann and Thompson (1988) within the theoretical framework of Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST). They claim that the recognition of a hierarchically organised discourse and the relations established within it is more important for the analysis of coherence than other lexical cues. Their analysis of the function of *but* is to display or make explicit a relation of contrast between successive discourse segments units. This relation of contrast has the status of a cognitively real entity and it is defined as follows:

> "The relation is multi-nuclear. The situations presented in these two nuclei are (a) comprehended as the same in many respects (b) comprehended as differing in a few respects and c) compared with respect to one or more of these differences" (Mann and Thompson 1988: 75).

Thus this type of relation would only be able to account for those examples of direct contrast, which presents two utterances with the same status, like in the example below:

(50) She fried the onions, *but* she steamed the cabbage (taken from Fraser (1988: 313-4))

Interestingly, as Salkie and Oates (1999) point out there are some examples of *although* which are 'direct equivalence' of *but* examples, which mark general contrast:

(51) She fried the onions, *although* she steamed the cabbage (taken from Fraser (1988: 313-4))

The difference lies in the status of the utterances linked[28]. The first example with *but* is a typical example of a multinuclear relation (MN), with both utterances having the same status. On the other hand, the second example with *although* is a case of nucleus satellite relation (NS). However, apart from the difference in the status of the clauses linked, there is no further explanation about whether there is any other aspect that differentiates these two examples.

Salkie and Oates (1999) also add a third use for *but* known as contrast (NS), which expresses a contrast between two entities or predications that have different status as in:

(52) (See Indiana Jones!) Sure it's an adventure, *but* it is also a lesson in cinematography....(Adam 1990: 192)

In this example there is a contrast between both propositions linked by *but* and they argue that there is a greater emphasis being placed in the second proposition. However, it is not clearly specified why would this greater emphasis only happens in examples such as (52) and not in the others.

[28] On the other hand, as will be shown in chapter 3, both *but*, as well as *although,* can be used in examples with a different type of relation called 'concession', which are characterised by having two utterances with a different status (Mann and Thompson 1988: 15).

2.4. Summary of adversatives in general

So far this chapter has presented the three main traditions of analysis of *but* that started in the 1970s and discussed their influence on subsequent works. The first tradition began with the work by Lakoff (1971), who argued in favour of two types of readings of the connective *but:* semantic opposition and denial of expectations. We showed that this article became the main point of reference for most of the later research on this topic. Some authors have agreed with her proposed division and have incorporated the main ideas into their own framework, for example, Sweetser (1990). In fact, a closer analysis of what Lakoff's described as an example of semantic opposition casts some doubts about the sustainability of her division. Different authors have referred to this use, and they have presented an analysis that incorporates a third use to Lakoff's two uses division (Overstegeen 1997 (Dutch), Malchukov 2004 (Russian), Fielder 2004 (Bulgarian)). Furthermore, Malchukov (2004) points towards the possibility of using a different connective from Russian *no* 'but' to account for what Lakoff had described as semantic opposition.

We also reviewed other proposals that opted for a more unitary account of this connective. Foolen (1991), for instance, argued that when the two uses distinguished by Lakoff are analyzed in context it becomes clear that they could all be explained in terms of denial of expectation. Following the same idea of a unitary model, Dascal and Katriel (1977) and Bell (1998) put forward an account of all the examples of *but* in terms of cancellation. The former presents an 'onion model' in which utterances are conceived as having different layers, where some of these layer will be cancelled by the *but* utterance; the latter follows the same idea of cancellation but extends the notion to cover the cancellation of any feature of the act of communication which is not necessarily derived by the hearer from the immediately prior or local discourse segment.

On the other hand, this study examined those theorists who put forward a unitary analysis of *but* based on the notion of contrast. For instance, Grice (1975), Rieber (1997), Bach (1999) describe some notion of contrast encoded in *but* in terms of conventional implicature, presuppositional failure, tacit parentheticals and some

kind of operator, respectively. We discuss the differences among all these accounts of *but.* There are also theorists (Halliday and Hasan (1977), Schiffrin (1987), Mann and Thompson (1988), Fraser (1998, 2002) and Salkie and Oates (1999)) who present a unitary analysis of contrast *but* from a coherence-based perspective. All these works have in common that they analyse the function of *but* in terms of its contribution to the discourse level of coherence. Some of them have identified different levels of discourse to which *but* may be refer, while others have focused on the different types of relation *but*, which are described based on the status of the utterances linked.

Thus far this chapter reviewed the different analyses of the generic contrast marker *but* in English, with some references to other languages. Now, we will proceed to review the Hispanic literature on adversatives and more particularly on the connectives *pero* and *sino*

2.5. Adversatives in the Hispanic literature

Studies on adversatives in Spanish can be divided into two main groups. On the one hand, the grammatical morphosyntactic tradition has shown a particular interest in the syntactic nature of constructions with adversative connectives and in the morphological status of the elements linked. In this tradition different authors have analysed adversatives from a semantic-logical point of view, relying on classical notions such as opposition and semantic incompatibility. The most representative works in this tradition are Bello (1847), DRAE[29] (1973), Gili Gaya (1972), Rodríguez Sousa (1979), Rivarola (1976, 1980), Vera Lujan (1981), Martínez Álvarez (1983), Hernández (1984), Acín (1993).

On the other hand, the pragmatic and conversational approaches have shown a special interest in how the implicit information modifies the explicit information and their analysis also goes beyond the level of the sentence (i.e. texts, dialogues). The pragmatic studies have focused on the argumentative nature of the constructions, the notion of information hierarchy, the type of implicit information

[29] DRAE (Diccionario de la Real Academia Española)

that the adversative connectives generate and the role of the connectives at the level of textual coherence[30]. It is clear the influence of Argumentation Theory (AT) in the analysis of adversatives, as can be seen in Cuenca (1991)[31], Portolés (1995) and Fuentes (1997, 1998(a), 1998(b), 2000). In the pragmatic tradition, there are also analyses of *pero* from a conversational point of view, which focus on the function of the adversative *pero* not only as part of the intervention of the same speaker but also as a reaction to what the other speaker has said (Moya 1996, Porroche 2002, Briz 1993(a), 1993(b), 1995, 1997 and Gaudino-Falleger 2002).

2.6. Traditional grammatical approaches to adversatives

2.6.1. Definitions of the adversative relation

The grammatical tradition starts with A. Bello (1981 (1847)), who defines *pero* as an adversative and corrective conjunction that introduces the second clause and denotes opposition ('contrariedad') between the preceding and the following proposition. Most definitions of adversatives in the grammatical tradition share, on the one hand, the concept of opposition ('contraposición') and on the other, the presence of a 'positive' and a 'negative' member. The relation of opposition can be established between the two members that are linked, regardless of whether or not the elements are themselves opposites[32]. Gili Gaya (1964), for instance, defines adversative coordinates as examples of:

> "contraposition between two sentences... where the opposition is marked by an adverb of negation, or a negative adjective or pronoun" [33](Gili Gaya 1964: 281).

[30] See Danjou-Flaux, N.1996: 'Adversativité et cohesion du discourse'.*Modèles Linguistiques*, 95-114. In the Hispanic tradition one may note some classifications based on textual functions in the following works (Mederos 1988, C. Fuentes 1987, Casado Velarde 1993).

[31] Her works focuses on the connectives in Catalán rather than Spanish.

[32] Acín argues that this is the reason why this opposition is defined as a discourse rather than a language relation (Acín, 1993: 22).

[33] "contraposición entre dos oraciones... donde la oposición suele manifestarse por la presencia de algún adverbio de negación, o de algún adjetivo o pronombre negativo" (Gili Gaya 1964: 281).

In the DRAE (1973) [34]adversatives are:

> "coordinated sentences where there is a positive and a negative sentence, and there is an opposition of two judgements of contrary logical quality" [35] (DRAE 1973: 510).

On the other hand, the presence of a positive and negative member has not always been accounted as a necessary requirement:

> "Two elements of contrary content can be coordinated in a semantic relation of adversativity, with one of the members being negative and the other one positive (although it is not a compulsory condition)".[36] (Hernández Alonso, 1984: 224).

Regarding the role of the connectives in marking the relation of adversativity, some authors argue that they play a very important part in marking the semantic relation of opposition between the two members. Martínez Álvarez (1983), for instance, describes connectives as the driving force in this semantic process:

> "In the adversative connexion, two sentences are linked with a connector that not only unifies in the utterance the content of both but also opposes them explicitly (regardless of whether or not the substances are opposed by themselves)" [37] (Martínez Álvarez 1983: 336).

Acín (1993) also highlights the need for a specific type of conjunction to define the relation of adversativity:

> "A relation of coordination between two elements linked by a specific conjunction. They have to be opposite" [38] (Acín 1993: 17).

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[34] In the French tradition Marouzeau (1933), Dubois (1973) and Mounin (1974) also account for adversative adverbs as markers of opposition.

[35] "oraciones coordinadas donde hay una contraposición entre una frase afirmativa y una negativa, donde se oponen dos juicios de cualidad lógica contraria" (DRAE 1973: 510).

[36] "dos elementos de contenido contrario pueden coordinarse con una relación semántica adversativa, en la que uno de los miembros coordinados suele ser negativo y el otro positivo, sin que sea esta una condición indispensable" (Hernández Alonso, 1984: 224).

[37] "en la conexión adversativa, se enlazan dos oraciones mediante un conector que no sólo unifica en el enunciado el contenido de ambos sino que además los contrapone explícitamente (con independencia de que sus sustancias puedan de por sí estar opuestas)" (Martínez Álvarez 1983: 336)

[38] "una relación coordinativa entre dos elementos unidos por una conjunción específica y que se entienden como contrapuestos" (Acín 1993:17).

She argues that the presence of *pero* in the adversative examples plays a vital role both in contexts where the opposition could have already existed between the members as well as in those in which it is necessary for the contraposition interpretation to take place (Acín 1993: 215).

Alarcos (1994), on the other hand, argues that the opposition in adversative constructions is marked by specific conjunctions such as *pero*. However, he also claims that this content of opposition can exist without the need for any conjunction[39]. In effect, he suggests that the presence of the adversative conjunction is not a necessary condition for an adversative example:

> "adversative sentences with conjunctions such as *pero, mas,* where two sentences are opposed explicitly because the content of the two sentences can be by itself opposite without having to indicate it with an adversative connective"[40] (Alarcos 1994: 321).

In general terms, a weakness of these studies is the lack of explicitness when defining the idea of opposition or antiorientation between the members in an adversative example. The only explanation provided is that adversatives are examples of contrast in which the relation of opposition between both components is marked either by a negation or by the semantic properties of the members. In fact, the notion of opposition is sometimes accounted for as an indication of an objection or contradiction:

> "adversativity is the relation that exists between two terms that are opposed, i.e. when A behaves either as a problem- objection- for B or as total contradiction, in these cases we can say there is an example of adversativity" [41] (Rodríguez Sousa 1979: 236).

On the other hand, it has also been of notorious influence the traditional view of denial of expectations, which explains the opposition in adversatives as "M2 is

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[39] This idea was also discussed in Schiffrin's (1987) work on discourse markers when she questions whether the connectives create the relation or just mark it.

[40] "grupos oracionales adversativos con conjunciones como pero, mas, donde dos oraciones se contraponen explícitamente porque el contenido de las dos oraciones puede ser por si mismos opuesto sin necesidad de indicarlo con un conector adversativo" (Alarcos 1994: 321).

[41] "aquella relación existente entre dos términos cualesquiera siempre y cuando estos vayan contrapuestos. En otras palabras, cuando un termino A aparezca, bien como el inconveniente- la objeción- de otro término B, o bien en total contradicción con este, podremos decir que estamos en presencia de una relación de adversatividad" (Rodríguez Sousa 1979: 236)

contrary to M_1, or to an implication of M_1, or that M_2 would not be expected in connection with M_1 or an implication of it" (Dik, 1968: 287).

In this tradition from the semantic point of view, the opposition in adversatives can be marked either as negation, semantic opposition, restriction, or denial of expectation. Despite the differences in the definitions, all the accounts agree that the contrast is always established between the two conjuncts linked by the connective (A and B). On the other hand, it is worth noting that most works in this grammatical tradition have focused on the syntactic analysis of these constructions, which relate either sentences or inferior units. A large majority agree that adversatives operate at the level of coordination. However, as will be shown later, there have been some objections to this claim, with some theorists opting for a description of adversatives as examples of subordination or interordination.

2.6.2. Types of adversatives

2.6.2.1. Restrictive (non-exclusive) and exclusive adversatives

Most theorists in the grammatical tradition agree that coordinated adversatives can be divided into restrictive and exclusive examples:

> "Adversatives are those coordinated sentences with their meanings opposed partially or totally (restrictive or corrective (the first type) versus exclusive (the second type))"[42] (Lázaro Carreter 1971: 34).

Restrictive adversatives are signalled by the connective *pero* and exclusive adversatives[43] by *sino*[44]. Both connectives are linked to the idea of 'contraposition' but only the former connects two 'compatible elements', with the second element restricting the meaning of the first one, as illustrated below:

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[42] "adversativas son aquellas oraciones coordinadas cuyos significados se oponen parcial o totalmente
(coordinación 'restrictiva' o 'correctiva' la primera vs. 'exclusiva' la segunda)"(Lazaro Carreter 1971:
34).

[43] In relation to this division it is interesting to point out that Hernández Alonso (1984: 224) argues that the exclusive can also be expressed with *pero* (A *pero* no B) or even with *y* (A *y* no B).

[44] This distinction is not lexically marked in languages such as French or English.

(53) Juan es inteligente *pero* engreído.

Juan is intelligent ***but*** *arrogant.* (Echaide 1974-5: 7)

In the exclusive examples, on the other hand, *sino* connects 'incompatible elements' and there is a relation of total opposition between two members, one stated and one denied, as shown below:

(54) Juan no es inteligente *sino* engreído.

Juan is not intelligent ***but*** *arrogant.* (Echaide 1974-5: 7)

Some authors[45], such as Alcina and Blecua (1982), have referred to this division as exclusive and non-exclusive adversatives structures[46]. Here, we will elaborate on how these two types have been analysed and classified in this grammatical tradition.

Exclusive examples with *sino (que)*

The exclusive opposition is normally marked by *sino*, which can link words and phrases but not utterances or paragraphs. This connective is always used in contexts where the first member of the coordination is a negation[47], as illustrated below:

(55) No es tonto *sino* vago. (Acín 1993:37)

He is not silly ***but*** *lazy.*

[45] M. J. Cuenca (1991), C. Fuentes (1998(a)), in the Argumentation theory tradition, also favour this division.

[46] In fact, the actual distinction between the two main groups of adversatives is reminiscent of the work presented by Melander (1916) between the coordinated adversatives that are "modifiant" or "excluant" (French tradition). In the former "L'idée énoncée dans la proposition coordonnée exprime une modification, une correction ou une restriction de l'idée énoncée dans la proposition précédente, "Il est riche, mais (il est) généreux", in the latter "L'idée énoncée dans la proposition coordonnée exprime une exclusion ou une suppression de l'idée déjà énoncée qui est toujours negative" (Melander 1916: 1).

[47] Koenig & Benndorf 's (1998: 379) when analyzing this correction conjunct in German agrees that it should not be described on its own but as a construction *no ... sino* (German *nicht ... sondern*).

In fact, it has been argued by authors such as Acín (1993: 37) that exclusive relations can also be marked with *pero* in contexts where there is no negation in the first conjunct, as illustrated with Echaide's (1975: 10) example:

(56) Tiene hambre *pero* no sed.

He is hungry ***but*** *not thirsty.*

It is also important to note that if the elements linked are verbal phrases then it becomes *sino que*, as illustrated below:

(57) No ha vendido el coche *sino que* lo ha alquilado. (Seco 1989: 146)

He has not sold ***but*** *rented the car.*

The negation in the preceding clause is a compulsory feature of the exclusive examples with *sino,* with the exception of those cases in which it is inserted in a question (Kovacci 1986)[48], as in the example below:

(58) ¿Qué podria ser *sino* cantante?

What could he be ***but*** *a singer?*

It is also noted that apart from the correction reading, *sino* can also have a corrective or exceptive reading (DRAE 1973), also called restrictive by authors such as Gili Gaya[49]. If *sino* has this exceptive value, it can be substituted by *salvo* 'apart from' or *excepto* 'except', as shown below:

(59) No habla nadie *sino* Maria (referring to a member and not the whole sentence)
No habla nadie *excepto* Maria.

Nobody speaks ***but*** *Mary.*
Nobody speaks ***except*** *Mary.*

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[48] Moya (1996) refers to these examples and explains that the fact that the use of a question implies '*no afirmar' (not making a statement)*, therefore it is a special type of negation.

[49] There has been some confusion with the labels given to both the adversatives with *pero* and *sino*. For instance, Gili Gaya 1964 uses the "restrictive" to describe both types; Lázaro Carreter (1971: 34) describes *pero* as restrictive and corrective, while others use corrective exclusively for '*sino'* examples.

In this exceptive use *sino* can change position in relation to the two components it links, as shown below:

(60) Nadie *sino* tú creerá esto: nadie creerá esto *sino* tú.

*Nobody **but** you will believe this; nobody will believe this **but** you.*

Restrictive or non exclusive examples with *pero*

We will now review some classifications of the restrictive or non-exclusive examples of *pero.* Authors like Rivarola (1976, 1980) and Vera Luján (1981)[50] divide the restrictive (non exclusive) *pero* into two types: adversative (non presuppositional) and concessive (presuppositional). This division is based on Lakoff's (1971) distinction between a non-presuppositional (symmetrical) and a presuppositional (asymmetrical) use of *but*[51].

Rivarola (1976, 1980), for instance, argues that the adversative *pero* only indicates a conjunctive opposition or an exclusion, as in:

(61) Erasmo es inteligente *pero* Evaristo es tonto. (1976: 7)

*Erasmo is intelligent **but** Evaristo is stupid.*

The presuppositional concessive *pero*, on the other hand, does not present an opposition between the two coordinated members. Instead, it points towards an implicative relation that is presupposed between one of the conjuncts and the negation of the other (Rivarola 1976: 4):

(62) Erasmo esta enfermo *pero* sale.

*Erasmo is sick **but** he goes out.*

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[50] Acín (1993) also follows Lakoff's distinction between the two types of *pero* (presupposition and non presuppositional) like Rivarola and Lujan, but does not use the term concessive for the former; Ferrari (1991) also claims that there is a restrictive symmetric adversative use, which allows for the permutation of the conjuncts without a change in the meaning.

[51] Kovacci (1972: 21) also agrees with this symmetrical and asymmetrical dichotomy. However, she admits that in the symmetrical examples the second constituent has more communicative dynamism, which causes the order reversal to lose some meaning.

(63) Cuando Erasmo está enfermo, Erasmo no sale: F1→ ~F2 (1976: 7)

When Erasmo is sick, Erasmo does not go out.

Similarly, Agustin Vera Luján (1981) favours two different uses of *pero* as adversative or concessive, which are illustrated by the following examples[52]:

(64) Juan es listo *pero* Antonio es tonto. (1981: 187)

Juan is clever ***but*** *Antonio is stupid.*

(65) Le han maltratado *pero* no les odia. (1981:189)

He has been maltreated/bullied ***but*** *he does not hate them.*

As in the English tradition[53], this distinction between the two types of presuppositional and non presuppositional *pero* has been rejected by those who favour a unitary presuppositional account of this connective and claim that any change in the order of its members involves a change in the interpretation of the structure (see for instance Rivas 1989).

Other authors have, instead, opted for a further classification of the different uses of the examples with *pero.* Alcina and Blecua (1982), for instance, provide a taxonomic classification of the uses of *pero* (inverse adversative, modifier, contrast, restrictive and intensifier), which are placed in a continuum (Alcina and Blecua, 1982: 1175-6). The examples of *pero* under the label of 'inverse adversative' seem to resemble very closely Rivarola's and Vera Lujan's concessive use. There have been other classifications of the non-restrictive connective *pero*, similar to the one presented by Alcina and Blecua. Hernández Alonso (1984: 225), for instance, identifies the following values: restrictive, specifying, contrast, additive.

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[52]Agustin Vera Luján then distinguishes three types of syntactic structures: subordinated concessive (*aunque*), coordinated concessive (*pero*) and coordinated adversative *(pero*), and only the first two have a presuppositional character. The main difference between his account and Rivarola's is that the latter also favours an adversative use of *aunque.*

[53] As we saw in the chapter on *but* in the English tradition, this analysis of a non presuppositonal use of thie connective has been criticized as being an artefact of the use of the decontextualised examples (see Abraham 1979, Blakemore 1987, Foolen 1991, Bell 1998)

Acín (1993: 24) also distinguishes the examples of *pero* that conjoin units inferior to the sentences from those that conjoin sentences. She then considers whether the contraposition is implicit or explicit. If explicit, the conjuncts can be given either different values (positive and negative) or not. If they are not, the further division will establish whether there is the same or a different subject as well as the differences in gradation. Most interestingly, she completes her classification with some conjoint examples of *pero*, where the notion of adversativity seems to fade away, gaining different meanings such as restriction, inverse restriction, rectification, justification, explanation and amplification (Acín 1993: 196-203).

2.6.3. Emphatic *pero*

In the grammatical tradition of studies on adversatives, most works make some reference to the so-called emphatic use of *pero,* which is a reaction to an extralinguistic situation, as illustrated in the following example:

(66) *!Pero* siéntate mujer, siéntate! (Beinhauer, 1958: 126)

***But** sit down woman, sit down!*

Gili Gaya (1972: 282) comments on this use of *pero* at the beginning of a clause as a marker of the speaker's surprise, impatience, anger or disagreement in relation to what was expressed by the interlocutor.

Another type of example of emphatic *pero* is the one that links repeated items, as in the following example:

(67) Es bueno *pero* bueno.

*It is good **but** good.*

In this example the adversativity happens in terms of gradation, similar to what happens with *no sólo...sino también* 'not only... but also', with an effect of intensification (Echaide 1974-5).

Other works such as M. Seco (1967), DRAE (1973), Hernández Alonso (1984), Moliner (1984) or Vigara (1992) also refer to the existence of an 'emphatic use of *pero'*, all agreeing that it gives relevance to what comes next. However, there is no agreement on whether or not it retains its adversative character in these contexts. Acín (1993-4), for instance, argues that in this emphatic use, *pero* loses its coordinated character to mark emphasis. However, it retains the value of an opposition particle, as it opposes the element it introduces with either its opposite or a neutral one (see example (67)). Alternatively, it may simply foresee a possible objection or express surprise that implies antiorientation to what is normally expected (see (66)). Furthermore, Acín also points out that in these examples the conjunction can be eliminated without changing the structure. Finally, Acín (1993: 165) argues that in emphatic examples such as (68), where *pero* links two sentences with different modality, the adversative relation is not clear and seems to be replaced with a function of intensifying what follows:

(68) Ojalá no la hubiera querido tanto. *Pero* ¡ a ti no te engañaré!

I wish I had not loved her so much. ***But*** *I won't lie to you*!

2.6.4. Syntactic description of adversatives: subordination, coordination, interordination

2.6.4.1. Adversatives as coordinated structures

As mentioned earlier, the syntactic aspect of adversative constructions has been one of the main concerns of most works in this tradition. Many theorists have opted to ascribe adversatives to the group of coordinated sentences, which can be defined as:

> "constructions consisting of two or more members which are equivalent as to grammatical function, and bound together at the same level of structural hierarchy by means of linking device" (Dik 1968: 25).

Followers of this view can be found in general works such as The Academia (1931, 1973), Gili Gaya (1972), R. Seco (1954), M. Seco (1972), Marcos Marín (1974), Alonso and Henríquez Ureña (1977), C. Hernández (1984), Hadlich, R.L

(1971), Alarcos; E. (1994), in more specific works on coordination (Antoine (1959), Dik (1968), Lang (1990), among others) and finally in those works that deal exclusively with the relation of adversativity (Bobes 1973, Echaide 1974, Barrenechea 1974, Rivarola 1976, 1982, Báez y Moreno 1977, Martínez Álvarez 1983).

One of the main arguments to support the claim that adversatives belong to the syntactic category of coordination has been their resemblance with other coordinates such as copulatives[54]:

> "the adversative coordination is indeed the same as a copulative: there are elements linked by a coordinator, which assumes other implied ones, and the resulting unit is equivalent to each of the coordinated elements, that is, it is an independent or endocentric construction (in Hockett's sense)" [55] (Bobes 1973: 265).

However, there are also a number of features that make adversatives distinctive from other coordinated structures. First, adversatives are examples of binary and non- recursive[56]coordinated utterances, since the non-iterative connective cannot connect more than two members situated at the same level of analysis [57]. Secondly, there are also restrictions in relation to the categories of the members that can be linked with the adversative nexus *pero*; in constructions with *pero*, there must be a common reference in the elements linked, which, consequently, excludes the category of nouns[58] and verbs from the list (Flamenco 1999: 3857). Thirdly, there is also a strong link between the members conjoined; this implies that they cannot be analysed independently and that the order cannot be changed

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[54] Hernández (1997: 167) points out that adversatives resemble both copulatives and disjunctives.

[55] La coordinación adversativa es efectivamente igual a la copulativa: hay elementos unidos por un coordinador, que suponen otros sobreentendidos, y la unidad resultante es equivalente a cada uno de los elementos coordinados, es decir, es independiente o construcción endocéntrica (en el sentido de Hockett)" (Bobes 1973: 265).

[56] Dik accounts for this idea when he claims that adversatives differ from other examples of coordination in that they lack the feature of 'infinite expansibility (1968: 26), i.e. they can only link two elements (binary coordinators)'(Dik, 1968: 49).

[57] There are two types of coordinated structures: recursive and non-recursive. The former would include those structures where there is no limit regarding the number of elements to relate. e.g. copulatives and disjunctives. On the other hand the latter includes those cases in which only two elements can enter the relation e.g. adversatives. In fact sometimes the term 'adversative' has been avoided in favour of this terminology of non-recursive coordination.

[58] However, Echaide points out (1974-5:10) an exceptional context that contradicts this rule: its variant *pero no,* when the first element is positive and *pero sí,* when it is negative.

(1) Compra peras *pero* no tomates.
He eats pears *but* he does not eat tomatoes.

without implying a change of structure (asymmetric constructions). Fourthly, from the semantic point of view, an adversative example does not admit partial references, and it can omit the first element due to its character of confronting negative and positive elements (Bobes 1973). Finally, it is also pointed out that when there is opposition at the semantic level, the difference between adversatives and copulative coordination is that in the former more subjectivity is communicated[59].

Franchini (1986) puts forward a test to assess whether the sentences with *pero* and *sino* should be described as coordinated structures. He claims that those examples that do not admit the structure illustrated below are examples of coordination.

a) M1 and x M2
b) M1 x M2 and x M3

In this test, *and* stands for the neutral coordinator and x is the nexus (*pero* or *sino* in adversatives examples) (Franchini 1986: 196).

If this test is applied to examples with *pero,* they results in implausible examples, as illustrated below:

(69) *Llueve *y pero* saldré.

It is raining ***and but*** *I am going out.*

(70) *No llueve *y sino que* hace sol.

It is not raining ***and but*** *it is sunny.*

(71) *Llueve pero saldré *y pero* no me importa.

It is raining but I am going out ***and but*** *I don't mind.*

[59] Regarding the issue of subjectivity, he claims that in the adversative examples, together with the syntactic semantic opposition, there is also an opposition of the value judgement, which is different for each of the members (Bobes 1973: 274-276).

He then concludes that not passing this test is a good indicator to claim that they are examples of coordination.

2.6.4.2. Adversatives: coordination or subordination?

A defining feature of coordinate structures is that from the syntactic point of view there is a relation of 'non-dependance':

> "coordinated sentences are sentences joined by a number of grammatical links and that maintain among themselves relations of equality and of non syntactic dependence" [60] (Rodríguez Sousa 1979: 237).

This is the main characteristic that separates adversatives from subordinated constructions. However, its implicative nature draws them closer and it is presented as the main objection against the inclusion of adversatives as examples of coordination. Moreover, the fact that diachronically the adversative nexus has functioned as a subordinated nexus of causal type has also been another argument put forward by those wanting to describe adversatives as examples of subordination (Ros 1976, López García 1983).

A.M. Echaide (1974-5) attempts to explain whether adversatives can be described as examples of coordination or subordination; her test is based on functional position of the elements (the alteration of the order):

> Coordination – M1cM2 ->M2cM1.
> Subordination- M1sM2 ->sM2M1. (Echaide, 1974-5: 6) [61]

Echaide claims that, on the one hand, the coordinated structure is valid for adversative cases since their contribution remains the same and they are grammatically correct; however, she acknowledges that the alteration involves some change of meaning:

(72) Es inteligente *pero* engreido.

He is intelligent ***but*** *arrogant.*

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[60] "las oraciones coordinadas son oraciones unidas por una serie de enlaces gramaticales y que mantienen entre si una relación de igualdad, de no dependencia sintáctica".

[61] This is valid for all cases of coordination except for those in which there was a chronological order or an omitted member of the coordination.

(73) Es engreido *pero* inteligente.

*He is arrogant **but** intelligent.* (Echaide 1974-5: 7)

On the other hand, she notes that adversatives share the binary feature with subordinated structures, which leads her to suggest that:

> "Adversativity is on the borderline between on the one hand the copulative and the disjunctive and on the other the subordination"[62] (1974-5: 7).

She concludes that despite the slight semantic change when altering the order of the clauses, the position of the propositions is a stronger argument to support an analysis of adversatives as examples of coordinated paratactic structure (Echaide 1974-5: 8).

2.6.4.3. Adversatives as examples of interordination

García Berrio notes that adversative examples were in the limit between coordination and subordination (i.e. between exocentrism and endocentrism)[63] (García Berrio 1970: 221). He admits that adversatives share with copulatives the function of simple addition, but with the distinctive feature that it is impossible to separate the second clause, due to its endocentric character. On the other hand, this endocentric character is reinforced by the fact that it is easily commuted by concessives, which are clear examples of subordination (1970: 221-2). He then concludes that:

> "The adversative expression is closer to the mechanics of the endocentric construction, exclusive of the hypotaxis, than to the paratactic exocentrism" [64] (1970: 19).

He not only distinguishes between coordination, a relation with independent elements with their own focal point (polycentrism), and subordination, which

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[62] "la adversación se encuentra a caballo entre la copulación y la disyunción por una parte y la subordinación por otro".

[63] Gili Gaya (1972) also tried to overcome the rigid distinction between coordination and subordination by claiming that it was not an opposition division but a gradation one.

[64] "la expresión adversativa está más próxima a la mecánica de la construcción endocéntrica, privativa de la hipotaxis, que al exocentrismo paratáctico".

obeys a process of integration with a common focal point for the whole construction (monocentrism). He also establishes a further subdivision of the latter into *subordinación-determinación* 'determination-subordination' and *subordinación-interdependencia* 'interdepending-subordination', including the adversatives in the latter.

Following García Berrio, Rojo (1978) goes a step further by separating adversatives from both coordination and subordination, and defining them as examples of interdependence or interordination (within the group of bipolars). The main characteristic of this type of construction is that none of these members can be independent, since each member depends on the other to construct the superior constituent. Rojo (1978) summarises this view as follows:

> 'The adversative sentences are formed by two clauses (each of which can also be complex) which express facts that are contrasted in the speaker's mind. The relation between the two clauses is not of coordination but of interordination, since they are constant, with two elements that determine each other mutually. Like concessives, consecutives, conditionals, in adversatives there are no more than two element at the higher level... that is, they present all the characteristics of a bipolar structure"[65] (Rojo, 1978: 111).

In the grammatical tradition, Rodríguez-Sousa (1979), Blesa (1984), Hernández Paricio (1992) are among those who have followed the trend of describing adversatives as examples of interordination. Rodríguez Sousa (1979), for instance, explains that in the adversatives there is a primary element, which states something (thesis) and a secondary element, which modifies the primary one by means of contrast (antithesis)[66]. This implies restrictions on mobility since the order is syntactically relevant. He also explains that this relation of interordination not only affects the traditional restrictive examples but also the exclusive examples, which present a relation of incompatibility.

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[65] "Las oraciones adversativas están formadas por dos claúsulas (cada una de las cuales puede ser a su vez compleja) que expresan hechos que se contraponen en la mente del hablante. La relación existente entre esas dos claúsulas no es de coordinación sino de interordinación, puesto que se trata de dos constantes, de dos elementos que se exigen mutuamente. Al igual que en las concesivas, las consecutivas, las condicionales, en las adversativas no hay más que dos elementos al nivel mas alto... Es decir presentan todos los rasgos característicos de las oraciones bipolares" (Rojo, 1978: 111).

[66] Rojo y Jiménez (1989) claim that adversatives are examples of bipolar structures, which have a thesis and an antithesis the same way that the consecutives have the antecedent and the consequent (see also Hernández (1997)).

2.7. Pragmatic approaches to adversativity

Having discussed how adversatives have been defined semantically and syntactically in the grammatical tradition, we proceed to survey how this topic has been dealt with in the pragmatic/conversational tradition.

2.7.1. Argumentation Theory analysis of adversativity

The most influential theory in this tradition is Argumentation Theory by Anscombre and Ducrot (1977), which studies adversative constructions as having an interactive effect typically associated with the idea of argumentation (see section 1.2.). In fact, adversativity is no longer considered a relation of opposition (or contraposition), but an 'argumentative mechanism', i.e. elements that argue in a contrary sense are linked to derive a conclusion. In this approach, the opposition may be between the inferences derived from the linked elements, which are based on some knowledge shared by a community known as 'topos':

> "A topos constitutes a bimember structure of our mental context thanks to which the presence of an antecedent favours the continuation of the discourse with a determined consequent" [67] (Portolés 1995: 242).

The speaker then uses connectives such as *pero* to indicate her intention of making the 'hearer' derive a conclusion, based on different topoi and the context (Fuentes 1998(a): 11).

Unlike the grammatical accounts, the antiorientation signalled by adversative connectives is not based on the semantic content of the elements but on the context and the communicative intention of the speaker. The defining feature of adversative constructions is that the second element of the construction is stronger argumentatively and therefore it determines the orientation of the whole utterance (see for instance Fuentes 1998(a)). It is argued that even in examples in which there seems to be simple contraposition, it is the second element that is

[67] Un topos constituye un esquema bimembre de nuestro contexto mental gracias al cual la aparicion de un antecedente favorece la prosecucion del discurso con un consecuente determinado (Portolés 1995: 242). See also "topoi is knowledge shared by the community" (Portolés, 1998: 74).

informatively and argumentatively stronger, and therefore determines the orientation of the whole utterance.

Therefore, the instructions encoded by the connective are the following: interpret the first member of the argument in favour of a conclusion *r* and the second in favour of the contrary conclusion —*r* and give more argumentative force to the second, so that the argumentative value of the total will be —*r*. All of this is done taking into account that conclusions are always determined contextually. For instance, the sentence:

(74) Pedro es alto *pero* Juan es bajo. (Fuentes 1998(a): 13)

Pedro is tall ***but*** *Juan is short.*

may occur in a context in which the utterance *Pedro es alto* 'Pedro is tall' could lead to the conclusion that *this couple has tall children.* However, with the utterance *Juan es bajo* 'Juan is short', the inference derived goes in the opposite direction, i.e. *this couple does not have tall children.* And it is the second element that is stronger argumentatively.

What is new about the Argumentation Theory analysis of these constructions is, on the one hand, the claim that connectives have the specific function of donating an argumentative orientation that determines the way utterances are to be interpreted. On the other hand, adversative constructions are studied not only as playing a role at the sentence level, but also in the construction of the text, i.e. they are discourse elements which are necessary for the textual construction and the pragmatic action of the adversative nexus in the communicative interaction (Cuenca 1991, Portolés 1995, Hernández 1997, Fuentes 1998(a), 1998(b) [68], 2000, Briz 1993(a), 1993(b), 1995, 1997, 1998, Porroche 2002).

2.7.1.1. Types of adversatives in the Argumentation Theory tradition

[68] In her earlier work (Fuentes 1987), she followed a textual coherence approach and it was only be in later years that she adopted the pragmatic framework of Argumentation Theory.

As described above, Anscombre and Ducrot (1977), like those theorists in the grammatical tradition, identify two types of adversatives. In AT the two types of adversatives are described as fulfilling two different discourse functions. Restrictive adversatives are used as a mechanism of the argumentative operation. Exclusive adversatives, on the other hand, are used as a mechanism of corrective reformulation. As noted before, in Spanish, unlike French or English, there are two different lexical units, *pero* and *sino,* to mark these two types of adversativity.

In this theory, it is argued that in the refutative examples with p *sino q* the second member, q , refutes the truth value of a virtual affirmation p'. It was actually the first time that the nature of the negation or the value of the total exclusion was examined. It was explained as 'polemic' negation, which indicates the opposition of the speaker to an assertion p' exterior to the discourse. This assertion p' could have been made explicit or just deduced from the context. In all the examples with *sino,* then, there is 'polyphony': i.e. there are different voices in the discourse (Ducrot 1984) and the speaker only takes responsibility for the second segment, since the first one is attributed to someone else.

However, the negation in the first utterance is not the exclusive feature for a correction reading. As illustrated below, it is the nature of the negation (descriptive versus polemic) that distinguishes the two readings:

(75) No es catedrático de Lingüística *pero* es profesor. (descriptive)

He is not a professor of Linguistics ***but*** *he is a lecturer.*

(76) No es catedrático de Lingüística *sino* profesor.(polemic)

He is not a professor of Linguistics ***but*** *a lecturer.*

It is only in the examples of descriptive negation (75) that the speaker takes responsibility for the negation. Moreover, *pero* diffes from *sino* in that the former can only connect sentences and not inferior units, except for the linking of attributions, which connection is followed by the affirmative adverb *sí* to support the polarized opposition, as illustrated in:

(77) No es guapa *pero* sí inteligente.

She is not pretty ***but*** *she is intelligent.*

In the Argumentation Theory framework, *sino* is a correction or refutation marker, which can either correct something or call attention to a segment. However, sometimes it can instead be used to indicate a change in argumentation, because by denying something and asserting something else, the argumentative direction of 'what is said' changes. Therefore, it is common to both *pero* and *sino* that the second segment determines the argumentative orientation and is more relevant in terms of information strength.

2.7.1.2. Analyses of the connective *pero* in the AT tradition

In the Argumentation Theory tradition *pero* has always been accounted for as an indicator of an argumentative antiorientation, which signals that the second element leads to a conclusion that is contrary to the one implied by the first element. This conclusion can be in the *topoi* (causal implication shared by the members of a community) or it can just be created or suggested by the speaker. In fact, it has been pointed out that it can even be an antiorientation in the subjective attitude (see Fuentes 2000: 337). Here, we will review the two most influential analyses of this connective that have followed this approach: Portolés (1995) and Fuentes (1997, 1998(a), 1998(b), 2000).

Portolés (1995)

Portolés (1995) presents an AT analysis of some counter-argumentative connectors *pero* 'but', *sin embargo* 'however' and *no obstante* 'nevertheless'. Like all the argumentational theorists, he claims that *pero* indicates that the element it introduces eliminates some of the possible inferences that could have been derived from the preceding element and that it is the second element that marks the argumentative orientation in the development of the discourse. He also points out that *pero* can have a 'direct' or an 'indirect' use, which distinguishes it

from other counterargumentative connectors such as *sin embargo* 'however' and *no obstante* 'nevertheless', since these can only have a direct use[69].

In its direct use *pero* introduces an utterance that is contrary to what could be expected to be derived from the antecedent, as shown below:

(78) Ana es inteligente *pero* ha suspendido el examen.
I
Ha aprobado el examen.

Ana is intelligent ***but*** *she has failed the exam.*
I
She has passed the exam

On the other hand, in the indirect use of *pero,* the contrary conclusion is not expressed explicitly in the second utterance but has to be inferred from the first utterance, as illustrated below:

(79) Alicia es inteligente *pero* tiene mala memoria.
I I
Aprobará el examen No aprobará el examen

Alicia is intelligent ***but*** *she has bad memory*
I *I*
She will pass the exam *She won't pass the exam.*

The conclusions derived from the two utterances linked by *pero* are opposite, and it is the second conclusion that is stronger in relevance. Moreover, in this use, it is not possible to combine *pero* with other counter-argumentative connectors such as *sin embargo* 'however' or *no obstante* 'nevertheless'.

This indirect *pero* can be classified into three groups: the first one consists of those examples in which there are different *topoi* as in:

(80) María es inteligente *pero* tiene mala memoria. (Portolés 1995: 247)

Maria is intelligent ***but*** *she has bad memory.*

[69] In fact, direct *pero* can be replaced by and combine with the other counter-argumentative connectors such as *aún así, sin embargo, no obstante* 'even so, however, nevertheless'.

(a) Ser inteligente ------->aprobar el examen
To be intelligent----------> to pass the exam
(b) Tener mala memoria------->-suspender el examen
To have bad memory ----------->-to fail the exam.

the second group includes those examples with the same *topoi,* which can be either anti-orientated or co-orientated. The following is an example of anti-orientated *topoi:*

(81) Come legumbres *pero* pocas (Portolés 1995: 248)

She eats beans ***but*** few.

(a) Comer legumbres---------->-engordar
to eat beans---------->to put on weight
(b)Pero pocas-------- ------>no engordar
But few----------> not to put on weight

In this example the first member is insufficient to derive the desired conclusion. On the other hand, in the examples of co-oriented coordinated members, the information in both members is oriented towards the same conclusion, and it indicates that the conclusion would be valid only if both conditions (A and B) are fulfilled, as illustrated in the following example:

(82) Para aprobar hace falta ser inteligente *pero* sobre todo saberse el temario (Portolés 1995: 248)

To pass the exam you need to be intelligent ***but*** *specially to study the syllabus.*

(a) Ser inteligente (A)------>aprobar
To be intelligent --------> to pass the exam
(b) Saberse el temario (B)--> aprobar
To know the syllabus------> to pass the exam

In the group of co-oriented member he also includes examples such as the following:

(83) Ha metido la pata, *pero* bien.

He put his foot in it, ***but*** *really.* (ibid 249)

arguing that the member introduced by *pero* is necessary to draw the appropriate inferences. In some cases it may be a repetition of the previous member, and the function will be the same as the example below:

(84) tonta....*pero* tonta

*silly....**but** silly*

He also refers to the uses of emphatic *pero,* which have no explicit antecedent and cannot be substituted by *sin embargo* 'however' or *no obstante* 'nevertheless'. He refers to those uses at the beginning of dialogues as in:

(85) *Pero* !qué gordo!

But , how fat!

and also to those examples where the opposition relates to a behaviour or activity that has no linguistic realization, for instance:

(86) *Pero,* !por qué te asustas!

***But,** why are you scared!*

The example of (85) is explained as an argumentation against an assumption about the weight of someone that goes beyond reality. However, he does not appear to give any further explanations for the other examples and it is not totally clear how they fit into the AT model.

Fuentes (1997, 1998(a), 1998(b), 2000)

Also following the Argumentation Theory framework Fuentes (1997, 1998(a), 1998(b), 2000) presents one of the most extensive accounts of *pero*, based on Anscombre and Ducrot (1980). She argues that in 'p *pero* q', no conclusion can be derived from *p* or *q* individually, since it is the context and the use of *pero* that give value to the arguments from which the conclusions are derived. The antiorientation of the elements linked can be based on opposition ('contrariedad') or simply on a different gradation in the same argumentative scale. For instance, the following example of restriction leads to the opposite conclusion:

(87) Llueve mucho (A), *pero* poco tiempo (B).

It rains a lot ***but*** *for a short while.*

A leads to the conclusion that *hay peligro* 'it is dangerous' whereas B implies the contrary conclusion *no hay peligro* 'it is not dangerous'.

A. Discourse uses of *pero*

An important contribution of C. Fuentes (1998(a), 1998(b), 2000) is that she not only analyses examples of *pero* that link sentence units (words, phrases, adjectives) or sentences but also describes *pero* as a connective at the level of discourse. She explains that, due to its main function of giving salience to the second element, *pero* has acquired other discourse uses, which involve loss of some specific content (Fuentes 1998(a): 35). The function of *pero* at the macro-structural level includes connecting utterances in conversation, linking paragraphs and marking change of topic in discourse. In all these uses, *pero* still retains its function of marking the fact that the second segment expresses what is most important informatively and argumentatively. Therefore merits closer consideration Fuentes' analysis of the macro-structural uses of *pero* (1998(b): 125 ff.).

Turns in conversation

Pero can also be used in turns in conversations without necessarily having to establish a contraposition with what has been said before. First, it may be just an *objection*, which means that rather than presenting a contrary position, it simply introduces a different sense. e. g. *Sí, pero*...'yes, but...':

(88) A: Eso queda por ahí lejos, ¿no?
B: Pues, fijate.
A: ¡Ah!, pues entonces, mira, una excusa para no pisarla.
B: *Pero* es más grande. (Fuentes 1998(b): 126)

A: *That is far away, isn't it?*
B: Well, look at this.

A: Ah!, well then, look, a excuse not to stand on it.
B: ***But*** *it is bigger.*

Secondly, it may introduce an uncompleted turn, which happens in those cases when the speaker has been interrupted and does not go back to objection she had in mind:

(89) . E: Y ¿tú que crees?
I: *Pero.....*
E: .....que tú le has influido en algún sitio a ella? (Fuentes 1998(b): 127)

E:*And, what do you think?*
I: ***But*****.....**
E: ...that you have had an influence in her in any way?

Thirdly, there are also examples of pure objection, of contrary position or contrary reaction to what the other speaker is saying:

(90) E: Ven con nosotros
I: *Pero* no hemos comido (Fuentes 1998(b): 127)

E: Come with us
I: ***But*** *we have not eaten*

This objection can also go with a modal structure:

(91) Ven con nosotros
a. *Pero,* ¿tú estás loco?
b. *(Pero) si* no tengo ganas[70](Fuentes 1998(b): 127)

Come with us.
a. ***But****, are you mad?*
b. ***(But)*** *if I don't feel like it.*

[70] This example has been explained by C. Fuentes as an elision of the main clause in a conditional sentence. Almela (1985) and Montolío (1990) also explains this adversative use of *pero* as a correction of the previous intervention. As shown in the example, when it precedes an interrogative structure it cannot be introduced by *si*. In many cases, the conjunction *si* could substitute for the adversative connector *pero*, which becomes redundant. These types of examples can invalidate the content of an element or affect the modality of the utterance. See chapter (5) for further discussion on this topic.

All the examples in this group of 'turns in conversation' share two features: on the one hand, they have some primary connective value to link with previous information and on the other, they indicate a stance contrary to what was previously said (counter-argumentative value).

Finally, Fuentes also notes at those conversational examples in which there is a change in the line of argumentation (topic) in favour of something that is more important for the speaker. She argues that there is no opposition, rather there is an information hierarchy as well as emphasis.

(92) A: ¿Cómo te ha ido el colegio?
B: Bien, el maestro es muy guay. Hemos hecho....
A: ¿*Pero* Ángela está contigo? (Fuentes 1998(b): 130)

A: How was your day at school?
B: Good, the teacher was very cool. We have done....
A: ***But****, is Ángela with you?*

Connecting paragraphs

Fuentes (1998(b), 2000) indicates that *pero* may also relate paragraphs, indicating a change of argumentation, which is not necessarily opposite. In these cases, *pero* also retains its function of introducing the most significant information for the speaker. She distinguishes the following types of *pero* connecting paragraphs: firstly, the counter-argumentative *pero* that exposes an objection or an opposed argument as in the following example:

(93) the Royal Academy of Ancient Music, bajo la dirección de Christopher Hogwood a las 20.30 horas, en el Palacio de la Música. Glorieta de América, s/n. A Coruña.
Pero no creas que va a ser tan fácil. Ese mismo día, la Fundación Barrié de la Maza acoge en sus instalaciones a Mark Lubotsky y Brenno Ambrosini. (Fuentes 1998(b): 128)

The Royal Academy of Ancient Music, with Christopher Hogwood as conductor at 20:30, in the Palacio de la Música. Glorieta de América , s/n A Coruña.
But *do not think that it is going to be easy. This same day the Foundation Barrié de la Maza welcomes Mark Lubotsky y Brenno Ambrosini in its facilities.*

Secondly, *pero* may mark a change (*giro)* in argumentation, marking one element as informatively privileged in relation to the previous element. It can do this by introducing a change of topic like *pero antes...* 'but before...', by cancelling a likely expectation that the hearer could have *no crea que aquí acaba ..aún hay más* 'don't think that this is all, there is more to come'. Alternatively, it may just indicate that the opposition is argumentative or informative (hierarchical) as in *pero también, pero además* 'but also, but as well', or of a scalar type as in *pero lo peor es* ...'but the worst is...', *pero incluso* 'but even', where *pero* does not oppose something negative to something positive but something of a higher degree in the scale (Fuentes 2000: 336).

In the examples of connecting paragraphs it seems that the counter-argumentative value of *pero* has been weakened and it just functions as a connective, giving relevance to the information that follows. Interestingly, this author argues that there is certain subjectivity involved in these constructions, as the speaker appears as the omnipresent enunciator, who uses *pero* to organize and orientate the discourse (Fuentes 2000: 337). The speaker takes responsibility for what follows *pero*, which contrasts with what was first asserted by the other and accepted by the speaker (see 'polyphony' in Ducrot, 1986).

B. Emphatic use of *pero*

Fuentes argues that the traditional 'emphatic *pero*' is a good example to confirm the thesis that *pero* is a marker of information hierarchy. Fuentes (1998(b)) claims that when *pero* precedes an utterance with a marked modality (interrogative, imperative, exclamative), it signals emphasis and modal attitude, which can be described as impatience, strangeness, happiness, as shown below:

(94) *¡Pero* come! (Fuentes 1998(b): 135)

***But** eat!*

(95) *Pero* ¿quién te lo ha dicho? ((Fuentes 2000: 335)

***But** who has told you that?*

(96) ¡*Pero* tengo Reyes! (Fuentes 1998(b): 135)

***But** The Three Wise Men left something for me!*

In these cases there is no linguistic connection with a previous utterance. Instead, the connection is established with the extralinguistic situation (connexion with reality, and opposition to what is expected). It can also connect with something expressed before or some aspect of the situation. However, the lack of explanation as to how this function of *pero* relates to its main function as marker of argumentative strength is also unfortunate.

Summing up, Fuentes' main contribution has been to present some uses of *pero* beyond its use as a coordinated conjunction (either adversative or concessive) at the sentence level. She studies *pero* as a macro-structural connector, which connects paragraphs as well as interventions in conversation. In these discourse uses, the contraposition is weakened but it retains the function of signalling that the information that follows has the greatest relevance from an argumentative point of view. For instance, it can mark a change of topic to the most relevant information or it can add information that is more important and not expected. Finally, she also discusses its emphatic use, which does not link linguistic elements, claiming that the contraposition is explained in terms of gradation and linked to modal attitudes, but she gives no further explanation. Her conclusion after analysing a large variety of uses of *pero* is that a unitary account of *pero* cannot be explained in terms of opposition[71]. Instead, she argues that it has to be accounted for as a mechanism of information structure, which signals connexion and indicates how the argumentation is oriented, introducing the most important information *("paso a lo más importante")* (Fuentes 1998(b): 143).

[71] Unless the opposition is understood in terms of argumentative relevance.

2.7.2. Conversation analyses of *pero*

J. A. Moya (1996)

In the pragmatic tradition there are also some analyses of *pero* that have focused on its use at the conversational level[72]. J.A. Moya (1996), for instance, reacts against Argumentation Theory analyses claiming that not all the linguistic exchanges can always be explained in an argumentative or refutative sense. Instead, he proposes an analysis of *pero* from a syntactic-pragmatic perspective, which takes into consideration not only the utterance point of view, i.e. the speaker's perspective (message production), but also the hearer's perspective (interpretative point of view)[73]. From the speaker or genetic perspective, in an example of M1 *pero* M2, the speaker uses *pero* when there is some problem with the truth of one of the inferences derivable from M1 and gets out to cancel it. On the other hand, from the interpretive perspective, the hearer interprets that there is an implicature derivable from M1 that would enter into contradiction with M2, and therefore has to reject it. In fact, he also states that the implicatures in the adversative constructions are from the hearer's point of view, which contrast with concessive examples that present implicatures from the speaker's point of view.

J. A. Moya, like AT theorists, also rejects the division between presuppositional and non presuppositional uses of *pero*[74], arguing for a unitary account of indirect adversative examples. His analysis takes syntax, pragmatics and information structure into account as the main parameters to explain these constructions. In relation to the information structure he maintains that all the examples of M1 *pero* M2 are examples of focalization, where the information in M2 must by definition be necessary for the correct interpretation of M1 and be new, because otherwise, the hearer would not have inferred the false implicature from M1. In fact, it is the implicature what distinguishes *pero* from *sino,* since the cancellation in the latter

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[72] There are also a number of examples that applied the ideas of the grammatical tradition to the oral texts, not only point out uses such as the emphatic but also the combination of *pero* with other markers such as *pero bueno (but well).* Solano (1990, 1991) Spanish in Costa Rica, Rojas Nieto (1970) in Mexico, Vidal (1980-1981) in Chile and Narbona (1989) in Andalucia.

[73] See also Rudolph (1988)

[74] See also Rivas (1989) and Lanero Rodríguez (1992) for the rejection of a non-presuppositional use of *pero.*

does not involve any implicature but just the explicit content of the previous utterance (Moya 1996: 126).

Antonio Briz (1993(a), 1993(b), 1995, 1997, 1998)

The focus of study of Briz's work is also colloquial conversation[75], which is described as following a number of rules that make it a coherent unit. Intonation and pragmatic connectives are described as important contributions to conversational coherence[76], both internally (within one intervention) as well as between different interventions by the same or by different speaker. He acknowledges that conversation can be analysed from different points of view, but his main concern is with its argumentative aspects (Briz 1998: 114). He distinguishes between two types of pragmatic connectives: those that are predominantly argumentative and those that are predominantly metadiscursive (Briz 1998: 199, 1997: 14). *Pero* is described as an argumentative connector, which indicates that the argument is antioriented and linked to the function of opposition (1997: 18).

He also distinguishes between two uses of *pero* as a monologal[77] (within an intervention) and dialogal (exchange) connective. In the former, *pero* introduces an antioriented argument, which is stronger than the preceding one (p→r; q→not-r; p *pero* q→not-r;). In the dialogic use the function of *pero* is to mark a reactive illocutionary act, signalling disagreement, contrast or doubt.

An illustration of the monologal use in (B2) and the dialogic use in (A2) is presented below:

(97) A1: ¿Y allí ya no vas? ¿a Escultor Ortelis?
B1: a Escultor Ortelis no/ Santa Sofía/ cuando me llaman

[75] It is worth noting that Briz and the group Val.Es.Co created their own corpus for their study based on colloquial conversation.

[76] Similar to relevance theorists, he argues that cohesion is not the objective of argumentative connectors but rather a consequence (Briz 1997: 36).

[77] He explains that an argumentative relation is always a communicative relation, since even if it is a monologal intervention there is an attempt to orientate and negotiate an agreement with the interlocutors.

A2: *¿pero* no ibas a dar de comer a los niños allí?
C: ¿al comedor?
B2: fui el año pasado/*pero* este año como ya empezaron a llamarme de Santa Sofía y he hecho dos sustituciones (...) (Briz 1998: 183)

A1: Don't you go there? ¿to Escultor Ortelis?
B1: to Escultor Ortelis, no/ Santa Sofia/ when they call me
A2: ***but*** *don't you go to feed the kids?*
C: to the dinning hall?
B2: I went last year/ ***but*** *this year since they started calling me from Santa Sofia and I have been doing some hours (...)*

In (B2) *pero* links two arguments that have an opposite concessive relation while in (A2) it replies marking disagreement to the previous intervention, therefore it is not marking an opposition between utterances but between utterance acts ('actos enunciativos').

In some contexts, this dialogic use may be a simple mark of expansion or transition of a speech situation, as illustrated below:

(98) *Pero* es que la cosa fue de la siguiente manera / compraron el viernes los números los tiraron a la mesa del despacho y el lunes cuando fueron se encontraron con que les había salido el gordo y el cuponazo. (1997: 21)

But *the thing is that it happened this way/ on Friday they bought the tickets they threw them on the office desk and on Monday when they went there they found out that they had won the jackpot.*

Finally, he also argues that from the conversational point of view, this antioriented character that characterizes *pero* hinders the closure of the conversation.

Margarita Porroche (2002)

Margarita Porroche (2002) also focuses exclusively on the conversational uses of *pero* as a reaction against previous studies of *pero*, which have been more interested in the syntactic features than the pragmatic values. As with Moya and Briz, her AT analysis of conversational *pero* includes examples from the same speaker or reaction to the other speaker's intervention, but she focuses on the latter. The speaker may, for instance, use *pero* to continue what the other speaker

was saying, with an objection that could have been done by the other speaker himself (2002: 10). In fact, as shown below, such examples are normally followed by the 'agreement' of the speaker that is interrupted:

(99) A: Yo no digo que sea mal chico.
B: *Pero* tú prefieres que no trabaje contigo.
A. Exactamente.

A: *I am not saying he is a bad boy.*
B: ***But*** *you prefer if he does not work with you.*
A: Exactly.

As discussed above, Briz describes *pero* as an example of a predominantly. argumentative connector. This use of the term 'predominantly' seems to suggest that there could be some metardiscursive uses. In his work, however, we could not find them. Porroche, on the other hand, points out metadiscursive uses of *pero*[78] introducing a question. These may either allow the other speaker to clarify an aspect of his intervention or to go back to a topic that had been brought up before but was then dropped. In fact, these examples are explained as if the speaker was reacting against the inference derived from observing the maxim of conversation of clarity.

(100) *Pero* ¿Cuál sería tu decisión?
But, what would your decision be?

Like Fuentes (1998(b)), Porroche also refers to uses of *pero* within the intervention of one same speaker, where there is a positive or negative reply without reservations, followed by an argument that contradicts an inference. She adds that these examples may sometimes be described as metadiscursive[79], since *pero* introduces a change in the conversation, or tries either to get the conversational turn (101) or to go back to a previously proposed topic (102):

[78] She also calls them internal uses, which must follows from Halliday and Hasan's division between external and internal relations.
[79] See also Cepeda and M.T. Poblete (1996).

(101) A: La Universidad no habla de dinero.
B: *No, pero* yo no hablo de dinero, hablo de la calidad humana del profesorado.

A: *The University does not talk about money.*
B: No, ***but*** *I do not talk about money, I talk about the humane quality of the teachers.*

(102) A:El ayuntamiento no tiene dinero.
B: De acuerdo, *pero* podrían hacerse muchas cosas.
A: Sí, *pero* sin dinero....

A: *The city council has no money.*
B: Yes, ***but*** *many things could be done.*
A: Yes, ***but*** *without money....*

In relation to the emphatic use of *pero,* she also refers to those uses of *pero* that introduce elements that are of an inferior rank to the sentence (subject, complement, ...) as in :

(103) Lloro *pero* de rabia. (Rojas 1982: 235)
I cry ***but*** *out of anger.*

The function of *pero* in its emphatic uses is to stop any type of inference that could come to the hearer's mind when hearing what precedes *pero.*[80]

Porroche concludes that both, the 'conversational' *pero* and the standard *pero,* share the rejection of an inference from A by the assertion in B. The only difference is that the conversational *pero* has greater freedom in the 'conversational game'[81]. The function of *pero* is to react to what comes first. However, it does not always presuppose relations of the semantic content, but it can also have metadiscursive or internal uses in which the relation is based on the functions of the utterance in the discourse, namely, conversational maxims, turn-takings and even a reaction to an extralinguistic situation.

[80] See Hall (2004, 2007) in the RT tradition for a similar account.
[81] For the similarity between the function of *pero* in both monologal and dialogal examples see also Portolés (1995) and Schwenter (2001).

Livia Gaudino-Fallegger (2002)

Livia Gaudino-Fallegger's (2002) analysis of *pero* using oral corpora rejects the view that there are two variants of *pero* (coordinated conjunction and extrasentential discourse connective) since this would imply ignoring the fact that the sentence is part of a superior unit (discourse) in which the same procedures operate[82]. She therefore claims that there is only one *pero,* which indicates the type of existing semantic relation between the entity it introduces and the preceding entity. She also claims that:

> "From the semantic point of view, the internal *conexo* of the connector has a dimension which is at least propositional"[83] (Ferrari 1995: 189).

She then asserts that it is the dimension of the *conexo* (the entity introduced by the connector) that distinguishes *pero* from other connectors such as *porque* 'because'. She argues that *pero* affects the whole sentence, which consists of both '*contenido puesto*' (explicitly given) and '*contenido presupuesto*' (also linguistic as it is in the syntactic structure but placed in the communicative background); The '*contenido puesto*' consists of both the propositional content (of truthconditional nature) and the positional content; the latter involves the propositional attitude and the so-called Satzmodus[84], which relates to the illocutionary acts and the propositional attitude. Therefore, *pero* has an effect on a sentence (or *asunto*), i.e. Satzmodus (Act (p)). This then explains why *pero* carries some restrictions in terms of its distribution within the sentence, since its semantic effect can only be achieved in the linearity of the discourse. Therefore the semantics of *pero* is known as an iconic-procedural device:

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[82] See also Garrido (1997: 142)

[83] "Los conectores son formas cuyo valor consiste en indicar el tipo de relación semántica vigente entre su conexo y la entidad antecedente. Desde el punto de vista semantico, el conexo interno de un conector tiene dimensión al menos proposicional. El antecedente tiene que ser proporcionado o proporcionable linguisticamente" (Ferrari 1995: 189 translated by Livia Gaudino-Fallegger 2002).

[84] She opts for the German term Satzmodus and its characteristics are that it is of no-lexical nature, it is realised with the combined action of different linguistic levels (syntactic, morphological and intonation) and it can be open or closed)).

> "Pero is an iconic-procedural connector of presuppositional nature whose action consists of suspending one (or more than one) assumption that is in correlation to previous parts of the discourse" [85] (Gaudino-Falleger 2002: 10).

As will be seen later there are different ways of accounting for these two types of connectors but it is interesting that this author mentions the idea of the 'propositional attitude' as part of the scope of the conexo of *pero,* since it proves the independence of the two utterances that are linked. This idea can be linked with the controversial topic of whether examples with *pero* are examples of coordination or subordination and how independent the clauses linked by the connector are. This will be discussed in the following section. Finally, it is also interesting to note that defining the function in terms of suspension resembles very closely the Relevance Theory analysis put forward by Hall in recent years (Hall 2003, 2004, 2007).

2.7.3. Syntactic description of adversatives in the pragmatic tradition

The idea of interordination favoured by Rojo (1978), Rodríguez Sousa (1979) and Jiménez Juliá (1984) is also adopted in both the argumentation tradition and in conversational analyses. Moya (1996), for instance, explains that what distinguishes a coordinated from an interordinated construction is that the former simply marks the relation that exists between the members that are connected. An interordinated construction, on the other hand, has the extra function of indicating the value that is assigned to each member of the relation, so that it can be appropriately interpreted, i.e. each member acquires a specific value based on its position in relation to the nexus (1996: 39).

Adversatives are examples of interordinated clauses because the two members are intimately related without being functionally dependent on each other. From the pragmatic-textual point of view, they form one only predication, propositional content of which contributes to the global discourse. The position of the members

[85] "pero es un conector iconico procedural de naturaleza presuposicional cuya acción consiste en suspender una (o mas de una) suposición que está en correlación con partes anteriores del discurso"

does not depend on the nexus but on whether or not they contribute with new information (*rheme* versus *theme*). It is in fact the structure of information that determines the rule of syntactic construction, i.e. the order is always <M1 pero M2>. The examples with *pero* are examples of focalization in which the information introduced by the connector (M2) has to be both necessary and new. It has to be necessary to allow for the correct interpretation of M1, by contributing some implicature that will be denied. It has to be new because otherwise the hearer would not have inferred the false implicature from M1.

In the AT tradition, M. J. Cuenca (1991) and Briz (1995, 1997) also claim that adversatives are examples of interordination, defined as binary, asymmetric, and interdependent in terms of polarity. Fuentes (1998(a), 1998(b)), however, argues that in examples with *pero* there is a relation of interordination but only at the semantic level. She argues that interordination in adversative examples derives from the opposition between two groups or two members. In concessive examples, on the other hand, it derives from the relation of determination between the two elements that are linked, which in effect present an inoperative causal relation. However, from the syntactic point of view, she supports the view that examples with *pero* (either adversative or concessive) are always examples of coordination (Fuentes, 1998(a): 22). She emphasises that *pero*[86] can link elements at all levels (words, phrases, sentences, utterances, paragraphs) and it is always placed between the two (i.e. it is not a 'translative', which excludes it from being defined as a subordinating connector). In fact, a change in the order of the segments it links would result in a difference in the informative order with the second gaining greater emphasis.

2.8. Presupposition and expectation

As discussed earlier, Lakoff (1971) was the first to point out the presuppositional character of the examples with *but*, in particular for those examples she described

[86] As will be seen in next chapter, Fuentes argues that adversatives (two opposite facts leading to two opposite conclusions) can be expressed with either *pero* or *aunque,* the same way that concessives (violation of a causal relation) can. The difference being that the concessive examples with *pero* are coordinated and the concessive examples with a*unque* are subordinated (Fuentes 1998(a): 22.-26).

as denial of expectations. Lakoff defined presuppositions as "deductions that the hearer extracts from his/her own experience, knowledge of the world or what has been said previously[87]" (1970: 147ff.). In her account, then, presuppositions establish an expectation in *P,* (if *P* then not *Q*), which is then denied. In the Hispanic tradition many linguists have also adopted the term 'presupposition' to define the implicit information of adversatives and concessives (Rivarola 1976, Vera Luján 1982, Lázaro Mora 1982, Rivas 1989).

In the grammatical tradition, Rivarola's (1976) analysis of *pero* describes the presuppositional (concessive) use as follows:

> "the concessive sentence establishes a conjunctive relation between two clauses that is contrary to an implicative presupposed relation between one of the sentences and the negation of the other one"[88] (1976: 4).

This proposal resembles Lakoff's analysis in that the presupposed implication has an 'expected' or 'normal' character, as shown below:

> "a concessive utterance expresses a case in which there is an expectation that is not accomplished and it can then be defined as 'a denial of an expectation'"[89](1976: 6).

In fact, Rivarola (1980: 865-6) insists that the nature of the presupposition in concessive examples is not an implicative logical relation but an expectation. He argues that in a sentence such as the following:

(104) Erasmo es esmirriado *pero* es un buen levantador de pesas.

Erasmo is skinny ***but*** *he is a good weightlifter.*

the speaker is asserting that:

(105) Erasmo es esmirriado ^ es un buen levantador de pesas.

Erasmo is skinny ^ *he is a good weightlifter.*

---

[87] According to Lakoff, the more idiosyncratic the presupposition, the less acceptable it would be to the hearer .

[88] "la oración concesiva establece una relación conjuntiva entre dos frases que es contraria a una relación implicativa presupuesta entre una de ellas y la negación de la otra" (Rivarola 1976: 4)

[89] "un enunciado concesivo expresa un caso en que una expectativa no se cumple y puede ser definido como 'contrario a una expectativa''(1976: 6)

what is denied is the implicative relation expressed in:

(106) X es esmirriado →x no es buen levantador de pesas

However, he claims that the implication (106) could not be the presupposition of the example (104) because the negation of these two sentences would be the actual implicative relation and for *p* to be a presupposition of *q,* it has to be the case that it would also be the presupposition of ~p. Therefore, he concludes that the presupposition that contrast with concessive sentences would then have to be an expectation such as:

(107) Exp X es esmirriado → x no es buen levantador de pesas.

Exp. X is skinny → x is not a good weightlifter

In the pragmatic tradition, J. A. Moya (1996) argues against the term 'presupposition' that has been used when explaining the meaning of *pero*. He then examines the nature of the implicit information conveyed in adversative constructions, looking at the four possible optional concepts that had been put forward in previous analyses: presupposition, implication, inference, implicature. He rejects the first two because they are logical deductions, which depend on the propositional content of the utterances and normally cannot be cancellable (Moya 1996: 64). On the other hand, inferences, as deductive processes which do not depend on the propositional content but the context, are accepted as suitable candidates to explain what takes place in adversative constructions.

(108) El secretario es muy alto. (*The secretary is very tall)*

Possible inference: Juega al baloncesto (*He plays basketball)*

(109) El secretario es muy alto *pero* no juega al baloncesto. (*The secretary is very tall* ***but*** *he does not play basketball)*

He concludes that the best alternative to account for the implicit information generated by adversative constructions[90]are the particularized conversational implicatures[91], which are cancellable, non-detachable, non conventional, non logical deduction, indeterminate and which depend on the context:

(110) Mi hijo está enfermo. (*My son is ill)*

Possible particularised implicatures:

Quiere ir al doctor. (*He wants to go to the doctor*).
Come menos que antes. (*He eats less than before).*

(111) Mi hijo está enfermo pero no quiere ir al doctor. (*My son is ill* ***but*** *he does not want to go to the doctor*).

(112) Mi hijo está enfermo pero no come menos que antes. (*My son is ill* ***but*** *he does not eat less than before*).

As noted above, Grice analysed the implicit meaning conveyed in these constructions with *but* in terms of conventional implicatures, explained as a higher-order speech act: 'there is a contrast between *a* and *b*'. Moya rejects the idea of conventional in favour of particularized implicatures, because of its reliance on the specifics of the context[92]. Moya then replaces the idea of some speech act of contrast for the derivation of implicatures that are rejected. As we will see later, Moya's view is in fact closer to Relevance Theory's proposals of the meaning of *but* in terms of denial of implications that are manifest (derived or derivable) in the context.

In relation to this issue, he also explains that while the notion of presupposition is a logical or linguistic concept, expectations are "the attitude that the individual adopts from a given assumption" (Moya 1996: 72). He complains that using this term has been detrimental for the analysis of this kind of structure since this view

[90] He also extends this to the concessive examples.
[91] Grice's implicatures are conventional or conversational; the latter can be generalized or particularised.
[92] Lavacchi and Nicolas Martinez, 1994: 269 had also agreed with this claim that the derivation of these implicatures is not just based on the conventional meaning of the propositions.

takes away the value of the role of the context[93], which is crucial in these constructions. He gives the following examples to illustrate his point (1996: 73):

(113) He ido a los grandes almacenes, *pero* no he comprado nada.

I have gone to the department stores, ***but*** *I have not bought anything.*

(114) He ido a los grandes almacenes, *pero* no he visto a Pedro.

I have gone to the department stores, ***but*** *I have not seen Pedro.*

The first one is a clear example of what can be considered as denial of expectation (it is expected that if you go to a department store, you buy something) but it is not that clear that we can account for the second example in the same terms.

It can then be concluded that there is a clear influence of Lakoff's analysis in these studies. In the grammatical tradition, Rivarola (1976) adopts both the notion of the underlying presupposition as well as the idea of the expectations. On the other hand, in the pragmatic tradition, Moya (1996) studies the nature of this presupposition and rejects the view that what is presupposed is an expectation. Instead, he favours that the hearer has access to conversational implicatures that will then be denied. This explanation can then account for the determination of the context.

2.9. Summary of adversatives in Spanish

This last section has described how adversatives have been studied in the Hispanic literature, identifying both a grammatical and a pragmatic tradition. The former relies on the semantic relations of opposition and contrariness and is more concerned with establishing typologies of examples and debating on the syntactic structure of these sentences (Bello (1847), DRAE (1973), Gili Gaya (1972),

[93] Context here refers to the extensive notion of context proposed in RT, which includes any set of assumptions that are used in the interpretation of an utterance. This includes not only the assumptions previously expressed but also the perceptual information or any general knowledge shared or not by the participants.

Rodríguez Sousa (1979), Rivarola (1976, 1980), Vera Lujan (1981), J. Martínez Álvarez (1983), Hernández (1984), Acín (1993)).

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On the other hand, the pragmatic tradition has been highly influenced by the model of Argumentation Theory, where the main focus is on analysing adversative connectives as markers of the argumentative meaning of the structure. Important sources of this approach include Cuenca (1991), Portolés (1995), Fuentes (1997, 1998(a), 1998(b)), Briz (1993(a), 1993(b), 1995, 1997, 1998, Porroche (2002)[94]. It is also in this tradition that theorist start analysing the function of *pero* at the conversational and discourse level. There is a number of works that deal with the function of *pero* both as part of the speaker's intervention and as a reaction to what the other speaker has said before (Briz 1993(a), 1993(b), 1995, 1997, 1998, Moya 1996, Porroche 2002, Livia Gaudino-Fallegger 2002). Moya (1996) views the function of *pero* as an indicator of a rejection of a previous implicature, and explains how the syntagmatic structure of examples with *pero* has to accommodate the structure of information. Briz (1993(a), 1993(b), 1995, 1997, 1998), following AT, describes the dialogic uses of *pero* as a mark of a reactive illocutionary act, which could signal disagreement, contrast or doubt. Porroche (2002) adds the metadiscursive use of the connective, which relates to pragmatic notions such as the topic or the conversational maxims. Finally, Livia Gaudino-Fallegger (2002) accounts for the function of *pero* in terms of 'suspension' and her analysis centers on how the scope of connectives such as *pero* differs significantly from other connectives such as *porque.*

The syntactic nature of adversatives has been at the heart of most works in both traditions. In the grammatical tradition, the debate was originally centred on whether adversatives could be considered as examples of coordination or subordination. However, a new syntactic category, 'interordination', is put forward as the most suitable concept to explain the specific syntactic characteristics of adversatives (independent but interrelated utterances) (Rojo 1978, Jiménez Juliá 1984 and Rodríguez Sousa 1979). This notion of interordination was then also adopted as the most popular among the pragmatic

[94] Also Schwenter (1996 (a), 2001), which will be discussed later in the thesis.

studies (Briz (1993(a), 1993(b), 1995, 1997, 1998, Moya 1996, Porroche 2002 and Gaudino-Falleger 2002). In this tradition, Fuentes (1998(a): 19) differs from most theorists, arguing that the notion of interordination can only be applied at the semantic level. Fuentes then maintains that at the syntactic level, adversatives with *pero* are still examples of coordination due to its grammatical features of non translative nexus .

Finally, there are some references to the notion of 'presupposition' and 'denial of expectation', which some theorists borrowed from Lakoff. Rivarola (1976) argues that the implication has to be described in terms of expectation in order to be compatible with the definition of presupposition. Moya (1996), on the other hand, rejects both the notion of presupposition and of expectations and claims that the examples of *pero* could be better accounted in terms of particularised implicatures. In fact, we consider this to be crucial aspect, which has been at the centre of debate for decades and still no agreement has been reached about the actual inferences that take place and their cognitive status. We will therefore go back to this point when presenting our account of the function of *pero* in chapter 5.

2.10. Conclusion

This chapter began by discussing the three main traditions (Anglo-american, German and French) that in the 1970s analysed the connective *but* and we discussed their influence on subsequent work in this topic. The chapter showed how Lakoff's (1971) proposal for the two types of readings of the connective *but,* semantic opposition and denial of expectations, became the main point of reference for most of the subsequent research on this connective. We also discussed how some linguists have opted for a more unitary account of this connective based on the notion of cancellation (Dascal and Katriel 1977 and Bell 1998) or the notion of contrast (Grice 1975, Rieber 1997, Bach 1999, Halliday and Hasan 1977, Schiffrin 1987, Mann and Thompson 1988, Fraser 1998, 2002 and Salkie and Oates 1999).

The second part of the chapter reviewed the grammatical and pragmatic analyses of adversativity in the Hispanic literature. We discussed the significant differences in the way this type of relation has been analysed in both traditions. The former focuses mainly on describing the meaning and the syntactic features of adversative examples and providing different classifications. On the other hand, the pragmatic tradition, which has been highly influenced by the Argumentation Theory; adds to the study of the connective *pero* both the discourse and the conversational dimension (Fuentes (1997, 1998(a), 1998(b), 2000, Moya 1996, Briz (1993(a), 1993(b), 1995, 1997, 1998, Porroches 2002, Gaudino-Falleger 2002). We also reviewed the analysis of adversative examples from the syntactic point of view. The chapter finished with some reference to the actual notion of 'presupposition' and 'denial of expectation' that seem to have been discussed in most accounts on adversativity.

Chapter 3
Literature on concessives

3.1. Concessives: introduction

The previous chapter reviewed some significant studies of adversative markers like English *but* and some counterparts in other languages. The present chapter focuses mainly on the notion of concession. It starts with its prototypical connective *although* as studied in the English tradition (Sidiropoulou, M. 1992, Winter and Rimon 1994, Sweetser 1990, E., McClure and E. Geva 1983) as well as in some crosslinguistic analyses (König, 1985, 1988, Grote et al., 1997, Salkie and Oates 1999). Next we present an analysis of how concessive structures differ from other subordinated structures such as causal constructions. We then discuss the relationship between adversatives and concessives, which have been traditionally studied in parallel because of their semantic similarity. Even though it is a widely-held view that *although* is linked to concession and *but* to contrast or adversativity, many works have argued that both *but* and *although* can be markers of adversativity (or contrast) and concession (for instance, König 1985, Grote et al. 1997, Salkie and Oates 1999). An important shortcoming of the studies on this topic is their lack of unambiguous terminology in respect of concession, adversativity or contrast. This chapter attempts to identify the way different works have linked these relations to the connectives *but* and *although.*

The second part of this chapter will review the most representative works on concession and concessive markers in the Hispanic tradition. We will consider similarities and differences between adversatives and concessives, and the connectives *pero* and *aunque* that have been linked to them. Then we will discuss the different types of the connective *aunque,* starting with the division between a concessive and an adversative use of *aunque.* We will see that this division, which was first presented by Bello (1847), has not been accepted by all linguists (see for example, Martínez Álvarez 1992, Trujillo 1990 and Serrano 1990). Finally, further divisions of *aunque* will be reviewed (Kovacci 1974, Ferrari 1991, Lázaro

Mora 1982, Crevels 1998). Some links will be identified between these division and those proposed in the English tradition.

3.2. Studies on concession

The notion of concession has been studied by many theorists from different points of view. For instance, some works have studied concession as a type of coherence relation (Longacre 1983, Mann and Thompson 1988, Thompson 1987, Salkie and Oates 1999, Grote et al. 1997, among others). The notion of concession is sometimes incorporated into their own model of conversation moves (see Couper-Khulen and Thompson 2000, D. Barth 2000) and have considered how speakers 'concede' the interlocutor's point of view differently from the writers[1]. Finally, some other scholars have studied concessives as a type of clause combination, looking at the relation between the clauses linked and the connectives used to mark this relation. For instance, Halliday (1985) analyses concessives as a subtype of conditionals, Di Meola (1998) defines concessivity as hidden causality, König (1985, 1988, 2000) studies relations between concessive structures and conditionals or causals.

The main aim of this thesis is to shed light on the function of connectives such as *although* and *but* from a cognitive and interpretative point of view. Therefore, the first part of the chapter is restricted to a survey of how different accounts have explained the inferential processes that underlie examples with *although* and *but.* My analysis first reviews how different researchers have accounted for the similarities and differences between *although* examples on the one hand and casual subordinated constructions on the other. Then, we focus on how theorists have linked the connectives *but* and *although* to relations of adversativity and concession in different ways. To finish, we discuss the different classifications provided by various authors regarding the uses of the prototypical concessive connective *although.*

[1] E. McClure and E. Geva (1983) carried out a study with children. They also pointed out that elements such as *although* or *but* are more necessary in written than oral discourse since the former lacks context and paralinguistic features that can help to establish these relations.

3.3. Concessive structures with *although*

3.3.1. The meaning of concessive structures with *although*

The relation of concession has been traditionally linked to connectives like English *although*. In Frege's quotation one can already see an attempt to explain the meaning encoded in this type of conjunction:

> "Subsidiary clauses beginning with *although* also express complete thoughts. This conjunction actually has no sense and does not have the sense of the clause but only illuminates it in peculiar fashion" Frege *On Sense and Reference* (1892: 73-4) (my emphasis).

Many theorists have tried to determine what lies behind the idea of 'illuminating in a peculiar fashion'. In the literature, there is a general consensus that the meaning encoded in a concessive connective like *although* cannot be accounted for in terms of truth conditions. Winter and Rimon (1994), for instance, claim that both sentences below have the same truth conditions but not the same acceptability:

(1) I love Venice and I would like to be there again.

(2) ?*Although* I love Venice, I would like to be there again. (Winter & Rimon 1994: 367)

The implausibility of the latter can only be explained in terms of the underlying presuppositional meaning. The question that arises, then, is how to account for this presuppositional meaning. König (1985, 1988) and Winter and Rimon (1994), for instance, have claimed that there has to be some incompatibility between the two propositions linked by *although,* when accessing the default implication:

If p', then normally not q'

Therefore, the oddity of the example (2) is due to the difficulty of accessing any implication of the type that would lead to some incompatibility.

It is then argued that the assumption underlying all examples of '*q although p*', '*although p, q*'[2] is that "the speaker asserts both propositions (*p*, *q*) and directs the hearer towards the background assumption that the eventualities *p'* and *q'*, which *p* and *q* describe an instance of, do not normally go together" (König, 1988: 147). Then, in the following example:

(3) *Although* it is raining, I am going out.

the speaker asserts *p* (*it is raining*) and *q* (*I am going out*) and leads the hearer to access the non-logical implication that '*If it is raining, people do not normally go out*'.

Most theorists, irrespective of the theoretical framework[3], agree that there are two main features that characterise concessive structures. First, there is the presuppositional character, which is explained in terms of failure of expectations, i.e. the concessive conjuncts signal the unexpected, surprising nature of what is being said in view of what has been said before. Secondly, the examples with *although* are also characterised by the factual character of the two components that are linked by the conjunction.

3.3.2. Distinctive features of concessive structures with *although*

There are two main issues that have been reviewed by those studying concessive structures, which will be discussed in this section. First, it has been considered the relation between concessive structures with *although* and other types of structures, such as causal subordinated constructions. Secondly, it has been common to study concessives and adversatives together, since they both share some characteristics as subtypes of contrast structures. Some scholars have endeavoured to delimit the

[2] Winter & Rimon (1994) only presents examples with the *although* clause in the first position, i.e. *although* p, q.

[3] König (1985,1988) follows the AT model, Sidiropoulou (1992) bases her analysis in the framework of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), Winter and Simon (1994) work with the formal model of Veltman Data Logic (as well as the influence of AT), Grote et al. (1997) uses the RST framework as a reference and finally Iten (1998, 2000, 2005) adopts RT for her analysis of *although*.

boundaries between different types of contrast relations, identifying which connectives are associated with them.

3.3.2.1. Concessive constructions and subordinated causal constructions

Concessive structures share with most subordinates the link between propositions and their factual character[4], since both entail their component clauses (König 1988). However, it is the nature of the link that distinguishes concessives from other subordinate constructions. For instance, in examples of causal constructions, the adverbial clause contributes to the creation of the causal relation, which is part of the truth conditions of the construction. In a causal constructions such as (4), one can see that the following conditional (5) is entailed:

(4) I did not go out *because* it was raining.

(5) If it had not been raining, I would have gone out. (König 1988: 146)

In concessive constructions, on the contrary, the connection between the two propositions linked seems to be implicit. In concessive examples, the implication is described as a presupposition of a general incompatibility between the two propositions in question (see König 1985, Sidiropoulou 1992). Therefore, in the example below:

(6) *Although* Paul is an atheist, he goes to mass every Sunday.

the link between the two clauses is due to the presupposition (or conventional implication) of incompatibility, which in the example above would be interpreted as:

(7) If one is an atheist, one normally does not go to mass on Sundays.

[4] From a semantic point of view conditionals are different from concessives in that they do not entail either of the propositions linked (König 1985: 3)

The link between these two constructions is pointed out by König (1989), who claims that concessives with *although* are dual of causal relations. The relation of duality holds between two propositions if there is equivalence in terms of truth conditions between one positive proposition and the external negation of its internal negation. Therefore, claiming that '*because P, Q'* and '*although P, Q'* are duals of each other corresponds to saying that:

(8) *Although p, q* should be equivalent to ¬ ((*because p*)¬ *q*) (and the reverse)

This idea can be illustrated with the following examples:

(9) The road is not getting wet *although* it is raining

(10) It is not the case that the road is getting wet *because* it is raining.

In both examples the hearer accesses a non-logical implication of the type '*if p then q*' as illustrated below.

Because P, Q

P & *Q* (entailment)
if *P*, normally *Q* (presupposition)

Although P, not-Q

P & *not-Q* (entailment)
if *P*, normally *Q* (presupposition) König (1989: 196)

However, there are a number of arguments against this proposal. First, as Iten (2000(b)) points out, if we have an external descriptive negation (*it is not the case*) the scope will be different in both examples and consequently the truth conditions will be different too, as illustrated below:

(11) *Not (although P, not-Q) equivalent to P because Q*

(12) It is not the case that *although* it was raining, Peter didn't get wet.

(13) *Because* it was raining, Peter got wet.

Secondly, in concessive examples the relation can be established between implicatures of the propositions which are linked; this is something which does not happen in the causal examples:

(14) *Although* we did not lose, we did not win either.

(15) ?It is not the case that we won, because we did not lose

Finally, and in my view most importantly, there is a difference in the truth conditionality of the examples with *although* and *because.* On the one hand, the truth conditions in an example such as '*although p, q*' corresponds to the truth of both *p* and *q*; on the other hand, in the examples of *p because q*, the truth of *p and q* is not sufficient to account for the truth conditions of the whole utterance[5].

Concessives also differ from causal constructions[6] in that both conjuncts can have different mood or illocutionary forces, as illustrated below (see König 1988 and Winter and Rimon 1994): [7]

(16) *Although* I wont be able to stay for very long, I promise to come (Winter and Rimon 1994: 372).

The fact that concessive examples can combine clauses with different moods, which is in fact typical of coordinated structures, explains the resistance to being within the scope of an operator such as *only, also, too,* or *even*[8]. The reason is that concessive connectives do not take a maximal scope, as it is illustrated in the following examples with the different connectives (not (q *because* p) vs. not –q, *although* p).

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[5] As Iten (2000(a), 2005) points out this leads to crucial cognitive differences, such as, for instance, whether the meaning of the connective contributes to the explicit or implicit level of content.

[6] Conditional and temporal structures follow the same pattern as the causals.

[7] Despite acknowledging that there are examples with different speech acts, in their analysis they only present examples in the indicative mood.

[8] When *even* is combined with *though* it is described as part of the concessive connective (see Konig,1985).

(17) This house is no less comfortable *because* it dispenses with air conditioning.

(18) This house is no less comfortable, *although* it dispenses with air conditioning. (König 1988: 149)

In fact, the difference between these two structures is also marked prosodically, since the first utterance is read as one tone group with one nuclear accent whereas the second example has two focal accents and therefore two-tone groups (König and Siemund 2000: 344).

To sum up, despite the clear link between the concessive examples with *although* and the notion of causality, it is clear that these structures cannot be accounted for as causal examples. Among the main differences it is pointed out that in the concessive examples *although* makes a contribution at the implicit level which cannot be described in truth conditional terms.

3.3.2.2. Concessives and adversatives (*although* and *but)*

In the tradition of studies on concession, some authors have agreed that both *although* and *but* can mark similar relations. This section reviews how different authors have accounted for the differences and similarities between these two semantically-related connectives.

A. Analyses from the Argumentation Theory perspective

König (1985, 1988), following the Argumentation Theory model, explains the difference between adversatives and concessives as follows:

> "Adversative relations can be defined as relations between propositions that support contradictory conclusions with the main point of the speaker expressed by the second proposition. Concessive relations, by contrast, are based on conditional, frequently causal, relations between events. What is asserted in a concessive does not normally go together". (König 1985: 6)

He notes that the two relations share the idea that there is "something that is suspended" (König 1985: 6). In the latter, the applicability of the conditional relation (if *P* then not *Q*) to a current situation is suspended whereas in the former,

it is the conclusion that could be drawn from *p* that is suspended. The representation of these two relations is as follows:

-Adversatives:

Typical form: p *but* q

(non logical implication): p→r, q →not r, q carries more weight.

-Concessives:

Typical form: *although* P, Q

(non-logical implication): Normally (if P, then not-Q)

König claims that each relation is associated with a prototypical connective. However, it is possible to find both *although* and *but* with either a concessive or an adversative reading. For instance, an example of concessive *but* would be the following:

(19) He had no money, *but* he went into an expensive restaurant[9].

The non logical-implication here is *Normally (if one has no money, one does not eat in an expensive restaurant)*. An adversative reading of *although*[10], on the other hand, can be seen in the following examples:

(20) *Although* we did not lose, we did not win either.

(21) We did not lose, *but* we did not win either (König 1985: 7).

It is, however, unfortunate that König does not elaborate on how these examples are to be worked out by the reader. Based on his description of adversatives presented above, one could presume that it could be that from P (*we did not lose*) the speaker may derive some conclusion, such as for instance (*we are happy*) and

[9] This is an adaptation of König's example: "not having any money, he nevertheless went into this expensive restaurant" (König 1988: 50).

[10] König (1985) also points out the fact that none of the other concessive connectives (*even though, despite, in spite of*) could be used with an adversative reading: '*?Even though/in spite of* the fact that he knows his job, he has blue eyes'.

then from Q (*we did not win either*); the conclusion derived may be its contrary (*we are not happy*), which carries more weight.

Also following the theoretical framework of Argumentation Theory, Winter and Rimon (1994) offered an analysis of connectives of contrast, including *but* and *although*. They claim that all sentences with contrast connectives presuppose the following general condition:

> C: *p* implies *not (r)* and *q* implies *r* (Winter & Rimon 1994: 170).

Winter and Rimon do not adopt König's distinction between adversative and concessive examples. Instead, they distinguish between two types of contrast markers: restricted (*yet, nevertheless, although, (even) though)* and non restricted *(but)*[11]. They argue that restricted connectives such as *although* could only be used in the context in which r=q. This explains why *but* could not be replaced by *although* in examples such as the following[12]:

(22) We were hungry *but* the restaurants were closed

(23) ?The restaurants were closed *although* we were hungry (Winter & Rimon 1994: 370)

Unlike König, Winter & Rimon argue that the criterion for classification of the two types of contrast connectives is not based on the nature of the underlying inference but on the directness or indirectness of the contrastive clause (*q*).

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[11] On the one hand, in relation to the order of the propositions, restrictive examples with *yet, nevertheless* share with the examples of the non-restrictive the construction is "*p conjunction q*". On the other hand, in examples with *although, (even) though* the construction is "*q conjunction p*" (Winter and Rimon 1994: 375).

[12] Iten (2000(a)) argues that the reason why Winter and Rimon do not accept the use of *although* for indirect examples is that they work only with the structure *p although q*, which is the least favoured for this type of examples.

B. Analyses from a Rhetoric Structure Theory perspective

Following the Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) some theorists have described the concession relation, which is a subtype of contrast relations (Nuclear-Satellite (NS)), as follows:

> Constraints on Nucleus (N): Writer (W) has positive regard for the situation presented in N.
> Constraints on Satellite: W is not claiming that the situation presented in S does not hold.
> W acknowledges a potential or apparent incompatibility between the situation presented in N and S. W regards the situations presented in N and S as compatible. Recognizing the compatibility between the situations presented in N and S increases reader's positive regard for the situation presented in N (Mann and Thompson 1988: 15).

Grote et al. (1997), for instance, claim that one of the main defining features of a concessive relation is the fact that it requires a specific connective such as *although* to mark the relation. The following is a clear example of this relation:

(24) *Although* Charley is quite tall, Karen is short.

They also admit that the concessive relation can be marked not only by the prototypical connective *although* (or *(even) though)* but also by *but,* provided the context gives necessary information for the concessive reading, as in:

(25) (Charley and Karen are twins) Charley is quite tall, *but* Karen is short. (Grote et al. 1997: 91)

In effect, they claim that what distinguishes the relation of contrast from concession is the fact that it is only in the examples of the former that the relation may be inferred from propositional meaning alone, without any specific linguistic marker, as in the example below:

(26) Charley is tall. Karen is short. (Grote et al. 1997: 91)

Grote et al. state that the two main defining characteristics of concessives are: the 'unexpectedness' feature and the difference in the status of the proposition that the connective introduces (Nucleus Satellite (NS)). The connective *although,* as a subordinator, gives less prominence to the conceded element, irrespective of the order of the clauses[13]. In fact, they argue that this feature distinguishes *although* from the prototypical contrastive markers like *but, on the other hand,* which give the same status to the two elements (Multinuclear (MN)), with only the linear order of the elements determining which proposition is more important (see also Spooren 1989).

They argue that this difference in the status of the proposition is thus able to explain the oddness of examples such as (28) below, since it would be wrong to place the minor act between the cause and the consequence:

(27) He failed the exam, *but* he is smart. Let's hire him.

(28) ?He failed the exam, *although* he is smart. Let's hire him. (Grote et al. 1997: 92).

However, it is also unfortunate that there is no reference to the fact that in this particular example the intonation and the syntactic structure may lead to a different reading of the *although* clause, which would make the example perfectly acceptable in this context.

They also argue that their proposal is able to explain why Anscombre and Ducrot's example of concession with *but* cannot always be replaced with the concessive *although*[14], as illustrated in (29B') below:

(29) A: We need an economist. Shall we ask John?
B: John is not an economist, *but* he knows a lot about economy.
B': *Although* John is not an economist, he knows a lot about economy.

[13] Grote et al. (1997) note that this idea that the proposition introduced by *although* is the minor act had been previously pointed out by Elhadad and Mckeown (1990).
[14] This change of connectives involves a change in the order of the propositions, to maintain the same argumentative orientation,

They explain the oddity of the example with *although* by arguing that there is a change in the prominence of the propositions, which change may go against the original function of *but* as simply marking the contrast between two facts. Therefore, the reason why the replacement is not adequate in this context is that "the whole utterance may be leading more towards the contrast relation than to concession" (Grote et al. 1997: 92)[15].

It is worth noting their attempt to explain why these two examples with *but* and *although,* despite both being examples of concession (denial of expectation), are not interchangeable in this particular context. They explain that the implausibility of (29B') is due to the fact that in the example with *although* the 'contrast' status of *but* is missing. In fact, what is interesting about these examples is that it raises the question of whether the substitutability of these two connectives (*but* and *although*) in examples of concession (or denial of expectation), with the corresponding change of order, can be adequate in all contexts. This relevant question does not seem to be answered by those who claim that both connectives can fulfil the same function (König 1985 and Winter and Rimon 1994). In fact, looking at the example above (29), it seems clear that the oddity of (B') as an answer to the question in (A) should prompt some reflection about the meaning encoded in this connective and consequently about its plausibility in different contexts. We will go back to this example when presenting our account of this connective in chapter 7.

Following the same theoretical framework of RST, Salkie and Oates (1999) agree that the examples of *although* and *but* are examples of contrast. They claim that there are examples of *although* corresponding to examples with *but* with 'reversed order', as illustrated below:

(30) The road was rugged, *but* still we seemed to fly over it with a feverish haste.

(31) *Although* the road was rugged, still we seemed to fly over it with a feverish haste. (Salkie and Oates 1999: 41)

[15] In fact, we will go back to this example in chapter 7 to provide a different explanation for the oddness of *although* in this type of context.

In both examples, an expectation arises from the first proposition, which is denied in the second, i.e. they are both examples of the nuclear-satellite relation of concession.

They also point out that if this relation of concession affects two implied facts, it can only be marked by the connective *but*[16], as shown in the following example:

(32) His name is Siegfried, *but* he wears a beret.
He is called Siegfred→ He is German
He wears a beret→ He is French (he is not German)

It appears to us that this could also explain why in the example (29) above, only the example with *but* could be used, however, Salkie and Oates do not make this point.

As described in chapter 2, *although* can also be used in examples of contrast that are 'direct equivalence' of *but* examples:

(33) She fried the onions, *but* she steamed the cabbage.

(34) She fried the onions, *although* she steamed the cabbage. (taken from Fraser 1988: 313-4)

However, there is a difference in the status of the utterances that are linked here. For (34) is a case of nucleus satellite relation (NS) while (33) is an example a multinuclear relation. It is unfortunate, again, that there is no further explanation on whether or not there is any underlying difference between these two examples.

The picture proposed, then, is as follows: on the one hand, there are two types of contrast relations which can be marked by *although*—contrast or concession—both being examples of NS relations. On the other hand, *but,* apart from its

[16] This example would be explained as an adversative example in König's account and shares Winter and Rimon's (1994) claims that only examples with *but* can be examples of non restricted contrast.

prototypical use as a marker of general contrast[17], can also be used to mark concession (NS) as in (30) (direct concession) and (32) (implied concession). Therefore, *but* as in contrast (NS) cases and *but* concession (NS) cases differ in that the latter expresses a contrast between a fact and an expectation while the former expresses a simple contrast between two propositions.

There is a remarkable lack of explanation of the fact that both *but* and *although* can be interchangeable in examples of contrast and concession, with the corresponding change of propositions in the latter. Like many theorists before, there is no mention of any constraint in the type of context in which this substitution would be plausible. This may be due to the fact that most of the examples they present are isolated examples taken out of context; this makes it more difficult to judge the adequacy of the replacement. For instance, if we take the following Salkie and Oates' examples:

(35) I agreed to follow his advice, *but* I did so with some misgivings.

(36) *Although* I agreed to follow his advice, I did so with some misgivings.

and contextualise them by introducing a question such as:

(37) What did you do after all?

It is clear that the answer (35) would be plausible. The example (36), on the contrary, could not be a direct reply to this question (or perhaps to any question). Unfortunately, the reason why this substitutability is not always possible has not been adequately addressed. As will be argued later, the explanation may be found in the differences underlying the inferential processes underlying the constructions with *but* and *although.*

[17] As described in chapter 2, *but* can be a marker of general contrast in examples of multinuclear relations or in a nuclear-satellite.

The examples of 'direct equivalence'

Regarding the examples of direct equivalence, where the connectives *but* and *although* can replace each other without changing the order of the propositions, it is interesting to see that neither Salkie and Oates (1999) nor Grote et al. (1994) are able to give a convincing explanation of what makes this use of *although* distinctive from other uses of either *although* or *but*. Salkie and Oates (1999) claim that in examples like (38) and (39) below the functions of *although* and *but* are the same, i.e. they mark general contrast, with the only difference lying on the status of the propositions contrasted;

(38) She fried the onions, *but* she steamed the cabbage.

(39) She fried the onions, *although* she steamed the cabbage. (taken from Fraser 1988: 313-4)

Grote et al. (1994), on the other, also present an example of *although*, which is a direct equivalence of the *but* example in (41) below. They explain the oddness of *although* in this context by claiming that since the *although* clause is a minor act, it should not be placed before the consequence.

(40) He failed the exam, *but* he is smart. Let's hire him

(41) ?He failed the exam, *although* he is smart. Let's hire him (Grote et al. 1997: 92)

We agree with them about the oddness of (41). However, it is also true that this example without the continuation *Let's hire him* could easily be accounted for as plausible. Unfortunately, they do not seem to give an explanation of how it would then be possible to account for the difference between these two examples with *but* and *although*.

Furthemore it is interesting that, following the same theoretical framework, this use of *although* is described differently. Salkie and Oates describe (39) as an example of contrast *although,* Grote et al., on the other hand, describe (41) as an example of concession. At first sight, they may seem like two different uses of

although. However, the fact that the two connectives *(but-although)* are interchangeable without reversing the order of the propositions is a good argument in favour of treating them as examples of the same use.

One would then expect that any adequate analysis of the meaning of *although* should explain how examples of *although* that replace *but* without reversing the order of the clauses differ from both other uses of *although* and *but*. It is unfortunate that so far these accounts have only been able to account for differences based on an evaluation of the status of the propositions. As will be discussed later, this use of *although* could correspond the adversative *aunque* 'although' described in the Hispanic tradition, which is, indeed, different from the concessive use of both *aunque* 'although' and *pero* 'but'.

C. McClure and E. Geva (1983)

The difference in the status of propositions linked by these connectives was also previously mentioned in other works. For instance, E. McClure and E. Geva (1983) analysed the conjunctions *but* and *although* from the standpoint of the development of cohesion in discourse. They argued that both *but* and *although* were examples of *adversative* conjunctions which indicated that, contrary to the expectations created by the assertion of one proposition, the second proposition was also true. They argued that the only difference between these two conjunctions was that *but* was a coordinator whereas *although* was a subordinator (1983: 412). This can, in fact, be linked to the distinction of introducing the nucleus and satellite presented above. They attempted to prove the hypothesis that the difference between these two conjunctions could be explained in terms of focus. They claimed that *but* was used to introduce foreground information and *although* background information. Therefore, the selection of one or the other conjunction was determined by the proposition focused on in the context.

Their analysis presents different combinations of propositions with the conjunctions *but* and *although* in which the continuation is based on the focus of the previous sentence, as illustrated below:

(42) The box was large, *but* it was light. So it was easy to lift.
(43) The box was light, *but* it was large .So it could hold a lot.
(44) The box was large, *although* it was light. So it could hold a lot.
(45) The box was light, *although* it was large. So it was easy to lift.
(46) *Although* the box was large, it was light. So it was easy to lift.
(47) *Although* the box was light, it was large. So it could hold a lot.

We would like to point to the fact that in this account the order of the *although* clause does not seem to alter the focus of the utterance. Unfortunately, as in the other analyses reviewed above, it fails to account for different possible readings of *although*. There are, for instance, some uses of *although* in the second position that would make some of the examples implausible (see for instance (45)). However, there is no elaboration of this fact, since their unitary claim is that *although* never introduces foreground information.

D. Conclusion of concessives and adversatives

All these works which contrast the function of the connectives *although* and *but* agree that both *but* and *although* may share the accessibility to some kind of implied conditional assumption of the type *'If p then not q'*, which is accounted for in terms of one of the following: presuppositional failure (Winter and Rimon, 1994), something suspended (König, 1985, 1988), failed expectation (Grote et al., 1997), incompatibility (Salkie and Oates, 1999) and denial of expectations (E. McClure and E. Geva, 1983). They all agree with the description of *although* as the prototypical connective of concession. However, they also claim that *but* can sometimes be used to mark the same type of relation (König, 1985, 1988, Grote et al., 1997, Salkie and Oates, 1998).

In those concessive contexts in which the connectives *but* and *although* seem to be interchangeable (with the corresponding change of clause order) there are, however, some theorists who have pointed out certain differences in terms of the status of the clauses (Grote et al. 1997 (minor and main acts) Salkie and Oates 1999 (satellite nucleus vs. multinuclear relations) and E. McClure and E. Geva 1983(coordinated (focus) vs. subordinated (background)). However, in these examples there is no further elaboration regarding the relevance of the differences

in status or focus of the clauses, or on the different type of inferences they signal. On the other hand, there is lack of explanation as to the difference between examples of direct equivalence between *but* and *although,* and cases that require the reversibility of the propositions.

Finally, it has also been argued that *but* and *although* can be used to mark general contrast — two utterances that differ in some respect (Grote et al. 1997, Salkie and Oates 1999) — or adversativity — two utterances from which the conclusions derived would differ in some respect (König 1985). However, it is unfortunate that this equivalence of the function of these connectives in the same type of context is not elaborated any further.

3.4. Different types of *although*-concession[18]

There is in the literature on concession different classifications of the concessive marker *although* and the different functions of concessive relations. On the one hand, there are some works that have favoured a classification of the concessive connective *although* based on the different types of inferences involved (König 1985, 1988, Grote et al. 1997, Sweetser 1990, Sidiropoulou 1992). On the other hand, König (1988) and Grote et al. (1997) have identified different functions of concessions, which cut across the previously mentioned division based on the type of underlying inferential processes.

3.4.1. Two types of *although* examples: König (1985, 1988), Grote et al. (1997) and Sidiropoulou (1992)

As noted above, König (1985, 1988) proposes a division between concessive and adversative *although* examples, as follows:

(48) *Although* it is raining, I am going out.

(Non-logical) implication: Normally (if P then not-Q).

[18] In some examples it will be *even though.*

(49) *Although* we did not lose, we did not win either.

(Non logical implication): $p \rightarrow r$, $q \rightarrow$not r, q carries more weight.

König links this division of the two readings of *although* to Halliday and Hassan's (1976: 250ff) distinction between internal and external concessives (or adversatives) and Borkin's (1980, 50ff) distinction of 'dissonance of an empirical nature' and 'dissonance of a rhetorical nature', which was illustrated with the following examples:

(50) *Even though* he had not eaten for days, he looked strong and healthy.
(51) *Even though* this solution would be harmful to our enemies, the damage done to us would be even greater. (König 1988: 148)

The second example presents a conflict between the conclusions derived from the two propositions whereas the first example encodes propositions that would not normally go together.

It is also possible to identify some link between this division and Grote et al.'s analysis of external and internal *although* examples, which is based on Mann and Thompson's (1988) division of 'external' or 'subject manner' and 'internal' relations. The former refers to a general expectation of cause-effect in the world, and the latter indicates an increase in the hearer's positive regard or the prevention of a false implicature (Grote et al. 1997: 94).

M. Sidiropoulou (1992) also presents a parallel analysis of two types of *concession* marked by *although*: Shared Implicature Concession (SIC) and Speaker's Attitude Concession (SAC). These two uses seem to resemble König's adversative and concessive examples respectively. However, Sidiropoulou introduces the idea of the 'attitude' as a defining feature of the SAC examples. This use of *although* relates to the speaker's implicit (positive or negative) attitude to the propositions that are linked, as illustrated below:

(52) *Although* she ordered him (= which might be considered rude), she was entitled to do so (= so she should not be blamed for being rude)
P (negative) Q (positive)

(53) *Although* she ordered him (=which was good, as it was necessary), she was entitled to do so (=so giving the order wasn't much of an achievement)
P (positive) Q (negative)

This use contrasts with the SIC examples of *although*, which present a violation of an underlying assumption shared by the interlocutors (Sidiropoulou 1992: 204). In the SIC examples, there is no signalling of a change in the speaker's attitude but a violation of a modus ponens as illustrated below:

(54) *Although* she ordered him, she was not entitled to do so

(55) *Although* she was not entitled to order him, she did

Assumptions (p): she ordered him → she was entitled to do so

or

(q): she was entitled to order him→ she did

Sidiropoulou claims that both examples give access to the shared assumption of *one orders people, if one is entitled to do so* and she argues that from this contrast established between the explicit content and the underlying assumptions the speaker could derive conversational implicature such as *one who orders people, but is not entitled to do so, is rude* (Sidiropoulou 1992: 204).

3.4.2. Three types of *although* examples: Sweetser (1990)

Sweetser (1990) makes a similar, but three-way, classification between content, epistemic and speech act examples with *although*. The first one could possibly be linked to the external examples in other traditions while the other two could be a subdivision of the internal examples.

For Sweetser (1990), content examples present a real world (non) causal relation connecting the two clauses, as illustrated below:

(56) *Although* he could hardly walk, he came and saved my life.

The epistemic reading presents a relation between the utterances in terms of conclusions the speaker may draw from them. In examples of this type the relation is at the level of premises and conclusion, as shown below:

> *(57) Although* he came and saved me, he had not heard me calling for help
>
> (*The fact that he did not hear me is true in spite of the fact that he came, which might reasonably have led me to conclude that he had heard)*

Finally, in the third type, called speech act *reading*, the relationship is established between the speech acts. The *although* sentence indicates the unusualness of the combination of the two speech acts, as in the following example:

> (58) *Although* I sympathize with your problems, get the paper in tomorrow! (I command you in spite of my sympathy).

As will be discussed in chapter 7, in the Hispanic tradition there have been some divisions that resemble those discussed above. We go back to them when presenting our own account of *aunque*, addressing the issue of whether or not these differences are necessary when attempting to provide a cognitive account of this connective.

3.5. Summary of studies on concession

The main aim of this first section was to present different analyses of the functions of the connective *although* which has been traditionally linked to the relations of contrast and concession. It began with a definition of the meaning encoded in the prototypical concessive connective *although*. Then we moved on to compare *although* constructions with other subordinated constructions such as causals. This analysis concluded that what makes *although* constructions distinctive from causals was the lack of contribution of *although* to the truth conditionality of the utterance, of the two tonal unit that underlies all the examples with *although* and of the implicit nature of link between propositions.

We, then, surveyed how different theorists have linked both connectives *although* and *but* to relations of contrast, adversativity and concession. Many theorists account for the notion of concession in terms of denial of expectation. They agree that both *although* and *but* could signal this relation, with the corresponding change of the propositions linked. Furthermore, some of the theorists mentioned that *although* could replace *but* without reversing the propositions. However, there is no much explanation as to how this use differs, if at all, from the other uses of *although.*

On the other hand, it was noted that the notion of general contrast (or adversativity) could also be marked by both *but* and *although.* König, for instance, does not account for any difference between the adversative examples with *although* or *but.* On the other hand, Salkie and Oates explain the difference between the examples of contrast with *although* and *but* in terms of the status of the propositions linked, without any further elaboration.

Finally, we commented on some classifications of the uses of *although* based on the type of inferences underlying the constructions (internal/external, adversative/concessive, SAC/SIC, epistemic or speech act/content). A consideration of all these divisions raises a question as to whether or not these distinctions are relevant when accounting for a cognitive analysis of these connectives (as well as for the real function of using this type of connective), an issue which will be addressed later in chapter 7.

In the next section we will review the studies of concession that have been presented in the Hispanic literature.

3.6. Concessives in Spanish

Studies of concession have been less numerous than those on adversatives and most of them have run parallel to the work on adversatives given its resemblance in meaning. In the Hispanic tradition, concession has been described, on the one hand, as a relationship that exists when there is an obstacle that is not strong enough to stop the main clause from happening:

> "Subordinated concessives express an objection or difficulty for the realization of what is said in the main clause; but this obstacle does not prevent it from happening". (Gili Gaya, 1961: 322)[19]

On the other hand, some authors have claimed that what characterises concessive constructions is their presuppositional character, which consists of an 'unexpressed assumption' that corresponds to a generally accepted condition such as '*if A, then normally B*' (Algeo (1969, 1973), which is contradicted.

> 'The concessive sentence establishes a conjunctive relation between two clauses which is contrary to an implicative relation that is presupposed between one of them and the negation of the other'. (Rivarola 1976: 4)[20]

3.6.1. What adversatives and concessives have in common and how they are different

In the grammatical tradition the distinction between adversative and concessive examples is based on their syntactic characteristics, the former being associated with coordination and the latter with subordination[21]. The connective *pero* is described as the prototypical 'adversative coordinator' and *aunque* as the

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[19] "Las oraciones subordinadas concesivas expresan una objeción o dificultad para el cumplimiento de lo que se dice en la oración principal; *pero* ese obstáculo no impide su realización"

[20] " la oración concesiva establece una relación conjuntiva entre dos frases que es contraria a una relación implicativa presupuesta entre una de ellas y la negación de la otra"

[21] As seen in the previous chapter not all authors have agreed with the association between adversatives and coordination. Some have described adversatives as subordinated structures (Ros 1976-77, López-García 1983) and others as interordinated structures (Rojo1978, Rodríguez Sousa 1979, Jiménez 1984, Cuenca 1988, Rivas 1989, Moya 1996 , Catalina Fuentes 1998). On the other

'concessive subordinator'. Concessives and adversatives share the fact that they refer to real situations, i.e. have a factual character, and the fact that there is some implicit information that contradicts the propositional content expressed in each of the members. In both structures then there is an element of 'contrast', which consists of "breaking with the expectation that emerges from the implicative link that underlies the two sentences"[22] (Flamenco, 1999: 3812). The linguistic and extralinguistic context seems to play an important role in the process of understanding these structures, since the relations are not always logical relations. Here, we outline the way in which different theorists have explained the distinction between these two relations and the connectives associated with them[23].

Bello (1847: 1221-6, 1257-63) has been quoted as the first writer to point out the semantic closeness between *aunque* and *pero*, since both indicate 'contrariedad' (opposition). In fact, he asserts that sentences with these two connectives could have identical meaning, as illustrated in the examples below:

(59) *Aunque* era puro y bien intencionado su celo, en vez de corregir irritaba.

***Although** his zeal was pure and well intentioned, it has to be confessed that it irritated instead correcting.*

(60) Era puro y bien intencionado su celo, *pero*, en vez de corregir, irritaba.
(Bello 1847: 1259)

*His zeal was pure and well intentioned, **but,** it has to be confessed that it irritated instead correcting.*

---

hand, there are examples of concessive with *pero* that have been linked with coordination (Rivarola 1976, Vera Luján 1982, Catalina Fuentes 1998)

[22] "La ruptura de una expectativa surgida del vinculo implicativo que de un modo subyacente se establece entre las dos situaciones denotadas"

[23] However, in this comparison between *pero* and *aunque*, we leave aside the uses of opposition *pero* since it is not even agreed by all theorists whether they should be distinct from denial of expectation use.

He also acknowledges that each of them belongs to different syntactic categories—*pero* links two independent propositions while *aunque* links a main clause and a subordinated.

Similarly in Gili Gaya (1961) and Esbozo (RAE) (1973) both concessives and adversatives are described as opposing two contrary judgements, as illustrated below:

(61) Me ha ofendido profundamente *pero* sabré perdonarle.

He has ofended me deeply, ***but*** *I'll forgive him.*

(62) *Aunque* me ha ofendido profundamente, sabré perdonarle.

Though *he has offended me deeply, I'll forgive him.*

Moliner (1966) refers to *pero* and *aunque* as conjuncts share the same idea but with some differences in the focus:

> "in fact, the concessive conjunctions express the same idea as adversatives; but adversatives are applied to the action that has taken place rather than to the circumstance action to which they are opposed".[24] (my emphasis)

In fact, this explanation can be linked to Bello's (1847) earlier suggestion that *pero* introduces the main idea and those with *aunque* the accessory idea[25].

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3.6.1.1. Differences in the role of the conjuncts

Lázaro Mora (1982: 128) argues that both *'p pero q'*, and *'aunque q, p'* convey the idea of objecting to the realization of something. However, there are some differences in the role played by the conjuncts and the way the presupposition is contested. On the one hand, in *'p pero q'* the conclusion derivable from *p* is going to be contradicted by *q*. In *'p aunque q'*, on the other hand, the obstacle presented by *q* is not sufficiently strong to stop the realization of *p*. Therefore, while *aunque*

[24] "En realidad las conjunciones concesivas expresan la misma idea que las adversativas; *pero* éstas se aplican a la acción realizada en vez de a la acción circunstancia que se opone a ella"(voz concesiva).

only indicates an obstacle that goes against a presupposition (r), *pero* negates the presupposition (no r). In both cases, everything is planned by the speaker beforehand, i.e. it comes from the speaker's state of mind.

Lázaro Mora then explains that the difference between concessive *aunque* and adversative *pero* can be accounted for by the "property of quiasmatic symmetry" as illustrated below:

(63) Me gusta el café, *pero* no lo tomo (no me lo traigas)

I like coffee, ***but*** *I don't drink it (do not bring it to me)*

(64) *Aunque* me gusta el café, no lo tomo (no me lo traigas)

Although *I like coffee, I do not take it (do not bring it to me)*

(65) No tomo café, *pero* me gusta (puedes traerme)

I don't drink coffee, ***but*** *I like it (you can bring some)*

(66) *Aunque* no lo tomo, me gusta el café (puedes traerme)

Although *I don't take it, I like coffee (you can bring some)* (Lázaro Mora 1982: 130)

This same idea is expressed by Lavachi and Nicolas (1994) who, following Grice's theory of implicatures, claim that while *aunque* introduces an implicature that is false, *pero* introduces a true implicature:

> *Pero*: "what follows (or one of its implicatures, true ones) is contrary to one of the implicatures, false one, of what I have just said" (Lavachi &Nicolas 1994: 270). *Aunque:* "what I say in the main clause (or one of its implicatures (true ones) is contrary to one of the implicatures, false one, of what follows *'aunque'*" (Lavachi &Nicolas, 1994: 272)[26].

[25] Similarly López García (1983) argues that while concessives stress the topic, adversatives stress the comment and Hernández Paricio (1997) claims that concessive stress the antithesis and adversatives the thesis.

[26] Pero: "lo que a continuación digo (o una de sus implicatures, verdaderas) es contrario a una de las implicatures, falsa, de lo que acabo de decirte" (Lavachi &Nicolas 1994: 270). Aunque:. "lo que digo en la principal (o una de sus implicaturas, verdadera) es contrario a una de las implicaturas, falsa, de lo que digo a continuación" (Lavachi &Nicolas, 1994: 272).

3.6.1.2. Differences in the nature of the presuppositional feature of concessive examples

Some theorists have attempted to explain the differences between adversatives and concessives defining the nature of the presuppositional feature that characterizes these constructions. Rivas (1989), for instance, agrees with the denotative presuppositional character as the common feature for both adversatives and concessives[27]. However, she claims that adversatives with *pero* show a relation of 'non-compatibility' while concessives with *aunque* present a relation of 'non implication and non-compatibility', since the former also involves the latter. This implies that the relation in examples of 'p *pero* q' is less strong than in the examples of '*aunque* p, q'. Like Lazaro, she argues that the speaker plans all this beforehand, so that the hearer can interpret the relation accordingly[28].

In Rivas' analysis, all the examples of adversatives share the same representation (Rivas 1989: 249):

p<--/---> ¯q (adversative relation)

Exp (p<-----> ¯q) (presupposition)

There are examples of total (in)compatibility (67) or of partial (in)compatibility (68)[29], as illustrated below:

(67) Erasmus es listo *pero* Evaristo es tonto.

Erasmus is clever ***but*** *Evaristo is stupid.*

(68) Juan juega con fuego *pero* no se quema.

Juan plays with fire ***but*** *he does not get burnt.*

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[27] Rivas claims that a sentence that does not have these conjunctions is not adversative or concessive (for instance an example with "and"). Moreover she maintains that the use of the conjunction *pero* or *aunque* would automatically imply that it refers to a presuppositional content even if normally the content of the utterance does not relate to it (Rivas 1989: 246).

[28] Moya (1996:91) points out as one of the weaknesses in Rivas' account that she claims that it is only the value assigned by the speaker that decides the adversative or concessive value of the construction.

[29] She claims that it corresponds with the traditional distinction between exclusive and restrictive adversatives.

In both cases non-compatibility or non-equivalence is established between the first member and the negation of the second one, in contraposition to an expectation of compatibility as in (67') and (68'):

(67') Eramus es listo-Evaristo es listo.

Erasmus is clever-Evaristo is clever.

(68') Juega con fuego- se quema.

He plays with fire- he burns himself

On the other hand, in the examples of concessives there is a relation of non-implication, which is described as follows:

P--/---> no q (Rivas 1990: 240)

Therefore, in an example like the following:

(69) *Aunque* Erasmus es inteligente, Evaristo es tonto.

***Although** Erasmus is intelligent, Evaristo is stupid.*

She claims that there are no expectations of the type (*Erasmus es inteligente - Evaristo es inteligente*) as in the adversative examples above. Instead, it relates to a different type of expectation, implied by the use of *aunque,* which in this context would be *'if it is claimed that Erasmus is intelligent, it is also claimed that Evaristo is intelligent'.*

3.6.1.3. *Aunque* and *pero*: the hearer's and speaker's perspective

Moya Corral's (1996) syntactic-pragmatic[30] analysis of *pero* and *aunque* analyses the function of these conjunctions from both a genetic perspective (speaker's

[30] Moya claims that the syntactic-pragmatic approach is superior to the argumentative approach because not all the linguistic exchanges can be analysed as having an argumentative or refutative meaning (Moya 1996: 49)

point of view) and an interpretative perspective (hearer's point of view)[31]. From the genetic perspective, in both adversatives (M1 *pero* M2) and concessives (*aunque* M2, M1, M1 *aunque* M2), the speaker wants to say M1. However, he knows that it is inadequate for the particular context, due to some implicit information that determines its truth. The speaker then adds some extra information introduced by the connective, which indicates how to interpret M1 so that the difficulty can be overcome (Moya 1996: 98).

From the interpretative perspective, in both types of structures, M1 *pero* M2 and *aunque* M2, M1 or M1 *aunque* M2, the hearer interprets that there will be an inference that would be in contradiction with the propositional content of the other proposition. Rejecting the inference then solves this. The difference is that in the examples with *pero* the inference is deduced from M1 and in the examples with *aunque* it is deduced from M2 (Moya 1996: 107-114). Therefore, as in previous accounts[32], what is common to both constructions is the cancellation of implicatures[33]. He adds, however, that in the adversative examples the implicatures act on the hearer (hearer's implicatures) and in the concessive examples they act on the speaker (speaker's implicatures). This implies that in the former both hearer and speaker are involved in the process of cancellation of the implicatures. In the latter, on the other hand, the whole mental process takes place on the speaker's ground.

Moya (1996) explains that there is some difference in the information structure of the sentences with *pero* and *aunque.* He argues that the examples with *pero* (M1 *pero* M2) are examples of focalization, where the information in M2 must be by definition both necessary and new (see chapter 2). This implies that the

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[31] This links with Rudolph's (1988) idea that the speaker uses *pero* and *aunque* to express the speaker's opinion and point of view; *pero* introduces an unexpected surprising element (the speaker expects the hearer be surprised as he was himself), while in the examples with *aunque* the speaker is not surprised about the information but expects the hearer to be surprised. This idea of the speaker expresses her opinion and judgements by using these constructions is also shared by (Ferrari, 1991: 137).

[32] Cfr. Lázaro Mora (1982) or Lavachi and Nicolas (1994).

[33] He defines adversativity as "un proceso encaminado a cancelar un contenido falso vinculado con el miembro no conjuntivo" ("a process directed to cancel the false content linked with the non-conjunctive member") and concessivity as "un proceso encaminado a cancelar un contenido implícito vinculado con el miembro conjuntivo, pero que afecta a la veracidad del no conjuntivo"

syntagmatic structure has to accommodate the information structure. The examples with *aunque,* on the other hand, allow more flexibility in the position of the members: first, the inferential processes are deducted by the speaker without taking the hearer into account; second, none of the members linked compulsorily contributes with new information. It is then the speaker's task to assign *theme* or *rheme* depending on her interpretation of the communicative situation. Therefore, in these examples, the focalization is free and the structure of information does not determine any rule of syntactic construction.

3.6.1.4. Adversatives as inverse structures of concessives

Hernández Paricio (1997) presents a syntactic analysis of concessives and adversatives. He argues that adversatives are inverse structures of concessives, similar to what happens between examples of cause and consequence. He illustrates this parallel with the following examples:

(70) No iré *porque* no quiero.

I won't go ***because*** *I do not want to.*

(71) No quiero ir *con que / así* que no iré.

I don't want to go ***therefore/so*** *I won't go.*

(72) Iré *aunque* no quiero.

I will go ***although*** *I don't want to.*

(73) No quiero ir, *pero* iré.

I don't want to go ***but*** *I will go.*

He argues that the choice of an adversative or concessive structure depends on whether the speaker wants to stress the 'thesis' or the 'antithesis'[34]when expressing the relation of restrictive opposition. He argues that this is similar to

("a process directed to cancel the implicit content linked to the conjunctive member, but that affects the truth conditions of the non conjunctive").

[34] Hernández's use of thesis and antithesis is related to the information structure: thesis is the information that prevails and antithesis is the weak argument; therefore it is different from

what happens in causal examples in which the speaker may want to emphasise either the 'consequence' or the 'cause'. Therefore, the same way that the marked structure is the consecutive one in the causal examples, the adversative structure is the marked one in examples of restriction. Inverse structures present an inversion of the logic-semantic relation while the connectives (e.g. *por lo que* 'for what', *por lo cual* 'for which',[35] *pero* 'but' [36]) are complementizers and have an anaphoric nature. This explains why the utterances they introduce cannot change positions.

3.6.1.5. An Argumentation Theory analysis: two types of concession?

As noted earlier, AT has been the most influential theoretical framework in the conversational-argumentative tradition. Cortés, M. H. (1993), for instance, follows Moeschler and Spengler's (1981, 1982, 1983) distinction between two types of concessives[37](argumentative concession and logic concession)[38]. The argumentative concession seems to correspond to the typical AT analysis of adversatives, which has *pero* as the prototypical connector. These examples of argumentative concession follow the 'argumentative square'[39], which is illustrated below:

(74) Es inteligente *pero* es desordenado.
He is intelligent ***but*** *messy.*

the speaker states the truth of *p* (*Es inteligente)*
the speaker then states *pero q (es desordenado)*
From *p* you can conclude *(r)* (hay que contratarlo= he has to be hired)
That conclusion would be invalidated by the opposite conclusion derived from *q*

Rodriguez Sousa's (1979) and Rojo's (1978) use of these terms. These authors claim that *pero* introduces the antithesis (the contradictory element) and *aunque* the thesis.

[35] This contrasts with other connectives that are used in non-inverse structures: *por lo tanto, en consecuencia, ...no obstante, sin embargo...*

[36] There has been some debate on whether the characteristics of the *pero* constructions are typical of its coordinating structure or alternatively of its inverse character.

[37] See criticism Hernández (1997), Rivas (1989: 247-8).

[38] In fact, Moeschler and Spengler conclude that concession can be described as *a continuum* between these two types of logic and argumentative concession.

[39] However, it could also have the triangular structure, in which case it would be an example of direct contradiction.

Logic concession, on the other hand, is linked to the standard concession, which is generically linked to the connective *aunque*[40]. Examples of logic concession have the structure '*p aunque q*' or '*aunque q, p*', with two relations involved (implication and contradiction). The following example illustrates this type of relation:

(75) *Aunque* el río se ha desbordado, el puente no se ha hundido[41].

***Although** the river has overflowed, the bridged has not collapsed.*

It presupposes the existence of a causal relation between the two contents *(p* (*el río se ha desbordado*) implies *no q* (*el puente se ha hundido*)). However, it makes clear that this relation does not take place; there is a *q* (el *puente no se ha hundido*), which is in contradiction with *no q* (implied by *p*).

The main difference between these two types of structures is that in the argumentative concession there is a conflict between two different conclusions — one positive and one negative — (r and not r). Furthermore, there is some hierarchy of the arguments, as it is the second conjunct that plays a central role in determining the conclusion r. The examples of logical concession, on the other hand, lack any argumentative hierarchy and the only existent causal relation is between *p* and *not-q* [42](i.e. *p* normally causes *not-q*). This is an implicative presupposition that exists "objectively in the extralinguistic world", which contrasts with the argumentative type, which has a "particular value"[43] (Cortés, M.H. 1993: 222).

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[40] (i) le concession argumentative est associée a un type de discours que se donne comme argumentative (fondé par l'argument);
(ii) la concession logique est associée a un type de discours qui se donne comme démonstratif (fondé par la preuve) (Moeschler and Spengler, 1982:12, 14, 17)

[41] Bien que la rivière fût en crue, le pont ne s'est pas effondré.

[42] Moya (1996: 86) criticises the fact that this causal relation cannot account of all the concessive examples with *aunque*. In this regard he cites examples such as "Laura es muy mala por las mañanas *aunque* yo no la oigo" ('Laura is very bold in the mornings, *although* I don't hear her') and "*Aunque* no te lo creas, Indurain ha vuelto a ganar el tour" ('even though you may not believe it, Indurain has won the tour again').

[43] This distinction seems to correspond to the external and internal division.

3.7. Different types of *aunque*

As shown earlier there is not always a neat connection between adversativity and *pero* on the one hand and concession and *aunque* on the other. It was mentioned earlier how some theorists have identified a concessive use of *pero* (Rivarola 1976, Vera Luján 1982, Fuentes 1998, among others). On the other hand, some authors have agreed with the two readings of *aunque*: concessive (adverbial) and adversative (conjunctive). In fact Bello (1847) was the first to note that apart from the concessive *aunque,* there was another use of *aunque* that was very close to *pero*. However, this distinction has not been agreed by all theorists. Some authors have argued that the closeness in meaning of the two uses of *aunque* makes it very difficult to draw a clear division.

3.7.1. Two uses of *aunque*: adversative and concessive *aunque*

Andres Bello postulates an adversative use of *aunque*[44] that could be considered as synonymous with *pero*. It links not only sentences but also "all different analogous elements denoting a kind of opposition between them"[45] (Bello 1860: 750). An example of this adversative *aunque* is the following:

> (76) Era puro y bien intencionado su celo, *aunque* es preciso confesar que en vez de corregir irritaba.
>
> *His zeal was pure and well intentioned,* ***although*** *it has to be confessed that it irritated instead of correcting.*

There is also a reference in Cuervo's (1953) dictionary to the two uses of *aunque;* the entry for the concessive or adverbial *aunque* says that:

> "it introduces an objection, real or possible to the thought expressed in the main clause,

[44] See Lázaro 1982 for an explanation of the adversative value of *aunque.*
[45] Enlaza oraciones y "toda especie de elementos análogos denotando cierta oposición entre ellos" (1860: 750).

> denoting at the same time that this objection is admitted but does not destroy or invalidate it"[46]. Cuervo (1953, cf. Dicc. s.v. *aunque*)

while the conjunction *aunque*:

> "belongs to the adversatives in that it links similar elements denoting some opposition between them"[47]. Cuervo (1953, cf. Dicc. s.v. *aunque*)

Numerous works in the grammatical tradition have supported this idea that *aunque* could gain an adversative value given its similarity with the prototypical adversative examples with *pero* (RAE (1931: 308), Gili Gaya (1961: 283), Cuervo (1953), Echaide (1975), Rodríguez Sousa (1979), Lázaro Mora (1982), Lopez Garcia (1983), among others).

Alcina and Blecua (1975: 1000) are also among those supporting the semantic distinction between concessive *aunque*, which presents a relation of cause-effect, as illustrated below:

(77) *Aunque* llueva, iré.

***Though** it rains, I will go.*

and adversative *aunque*, which instead of presenting a logical relation, just specifies and qualifies what has been said in the main clause:

(78) Vive en Madrid, *aunque* no estoy seguro.

*He lives in Madrid, **although** I am not sure.*

However, what distinguishes their account from other supporters of this division is that Alcina and Blecua maintain that syntactically both uses are examples of subordination.

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[46] "Se introduce una objeción, real o posible, al pensamiento expresado en la proposición principal, denotando al mismo tiempo que tal objeción aun admitida, no lo destruye o invalida"

[47] "pertenece a la clase de las adversatives, en cuanto enlaza elementos semejantes denotando cierta oposición entre ellos".

3.7.1.1. Characteristics of the adversative *aunque.*

There is a number of phonosyntactic features that distinguish the adversative from the concessive use of *aunque*. First, adversative *aunque* can link not only propositions, but also words or phrases, which do not show a relation of dependence[48]. Secondly, adversative uses of *aunque* do not admit alternation between the indicative and subjunctive mood, as concessive uses do[49]. Thirdly, adversative *aunque* always introduces the second conjunct and there is a pause between the two conjuncts, sometimes marked with a full stop (Bello 1853: 249). In fact, as Lázaro Mora (1982) illustrates with the following examples, if the proposition introduced by the adversative *aunque* is moved forward, it then gains a concessive reading:

(79) Cogimos fresas; *aunque* estaban verdes. (adversative)

We collected strawberries; ***although*** *they were green.*

(80) *Aunque* estaban verdes, cogimos fresas (concessive) (Lázaro Mora 1982: 126)

Although *they were green, we collected strawberries*

Marcos Marín (1974) argues that another good indicator to determine whether or not there is an adversative relationship is the replacement of *aunque* with *pero*[50], as shown below:

(81) Son muy ricos, *aunque (a pesar de que)* no lo parecen.

They are very rich; ***although (despite the fact that)*** *they don't look it.*

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[48] There are some exceptions to this rule in examples of the concessive use of *aunque* introducing phrases:

(1) *Aunque* cansado, fui a la fiesta.
Although *tired, I went to the party.*

[49] In fact, the only cases in which the adversative *aunque* may introduce subjunctive is when it is a variant of the imperative as in

"Dice que está casado; *pero (aunque)* no lo creas". (Lázaro Mora, 1982: 124)

[50] See also Cascón (1985: 53).

(82) Son muy ricos, *aunque (pero)* no lo parecen. (Francisco Marcos Marín 1974: 417)

They are very rich, although ***(but)*** *they don't look it.*

3.7.1.2. Differences between adversative *aunque* and adversative *pero*

The main question that arises is whether *aunque* can always substitute *pero* in those adversative contexts or if, on the contrary, there is any difference between them that prevents them from being interchangeable without resulting in a change of meaning.

For instance, Bello (1981) claims that despite their similarity, there is a subtle semantic difference between *pero* and the conjunctive, i.e. adversative, *aunque*:

> *"Aunque (although),* as a conjunction, is a synonym of *pero (but),* but not entirely, as there are cases in which the choice of one or the other depends on the specific relations. *Aunque* introduces an accessory concept; *pero* the main idea"[51]. (1981: 719 in Moya 1996: 17)

In the grammatical tradition, Lázaro Mora (1982: 125) and López García (1994:166 & 183) also argue against the neutralization of *pero* and restrictive *aunque*. They suggest that there is a gradual opposition in which *pero* marks the contents it introduces with more force than *aunque* does[52]. Flamenco (1999: 3820) illustrates the difference with the following examples:

(83) María vive muy lejos, *pero* hay un autobús.

Mary lives very far away, but there is a bus.

(84) María vive muy lejos, *aunque* hay un autobús.

Mary lives very far away, although there is a bus.

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[51] *Aunque*, como conjunción, en este oficio se hace un sinónimo de *pero*, mas no enteramente, pues hay casos en que la elección del uno o del otro depende de relaciones delicadas. *Aunque* anuncia un concepto accesorio; *pero* la idea principal". This idea is very much linked to the information structure distinction between rheme and theme established by Firbas.

[52] See also Fernández Ramírez (1951: 359).

In this example with *pero* the difficulty (*the fact that the house is very far away*) is not as extreme as it seems to be in the example with *aunque*. Unfortunately, there is not much elaboration on how they account for this difference in the strength of the utterances. This is a topic that is addressed later (see chapter 7 (7.12.1))

Moya (1996: 136) also rejects the neutralization of both *pero* and *aunque* in adversative contexts. He claims that in all such contexts the speaker's choice of each connective is linked to whether she perceives the relation as involving an implicature of the hearer (*pero*) or of the speaker (*aunque*). Similarly, Serrano (1990: 766-7) supports the view that both *pero* and the adversative *aunque* share the common feature of opposition (*contraposición*)[53]. However, the adversative *aunque* has an extra meaning of 'non limited extension', which impedes the neutralization of these two connectives:

(85) Es tonto, *pero* aplicado.

He is stupid, ***but*** *hard-working.*

(86) Es tonto, *aunque* aplicado.

He is stupid, ***although*** *hard-working.*

The first example can be paraphrased as *es tonto, y por el contrario aplicado* 'He is stupid, and on the contrary, he is hard-working', which contrasts with the second example, whose meaning is explained as *es tonto y más allá de eso, venciendo eso, a pesar de eso, aplicado* 'he is stupid and beyond that/ despite that/overcoming that hard-working'.

Finally, Rivas (1989) admits that adversatives with *pero* and concessives with *aunque* constitute a neutralizable opposition because of the "undeniable fact that *aunque* can be used in the same position as *pero*" (1989: 253). The fact that the relation of non-implication also covers the relation of non-compatibility allows for the possibility of neutralizing the opposition with *aunque*. She presents the

[53] Serrano (1990: 767) rejects the corrective feature as the distinctive feature of adversatives, since this function is also found in concessive constructions.

following example of adversative *aunque*, which implies non-compatibility instead of non-implication:

(87) Estos quedaron vivos de los azotes, *aunque* contra todas las fuerzas naturales.

They survived the lashes, ***although*** *this was against all the odds.*

She argues that 'p *pero* q' is the marked structure and 'p *aunque* q' is the neutral one. It seems that if the neutralization[54] of the relation takes place, there is no linguistic way of determining whether it is adversative or concessive.

3.7.2. Only one type of *aunque*

As mentioned earlier, not all the authors have agreed with the distinction between concessive and adversative types of *aunque* [55]. Martínez Álvarez (1992), for instance, argues against the two types of *aunque* claiming that *aunque* functions in all its uses as a 'transpositor'[56], which means that it "transposes the sentence it introduces to the role of accessory adjacent"(1992: 170)[57]. She claims that the pause, the position of the propositions and the restriction of mood are not valid arguments to account for a distinctive conjunctive use of *aunque*. In relation to the mood, she maintains that the use of subjunctive does not depend on the connective but on what the speaker wants to communicate. Similarly, Trujillo (1990) insists that the only reason why concessives can be in the subjunctive is not due to their syntax but to the 'non-closed perspective' meaning of *aunque,* which makes it compatible with this mood. However, this explanation does not address the reason why it is only the concessive *although*, and not the so-called adversative examples, that can go with the subjunctive mood.

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[54] This neutralization would be defined as neither adversative nor concessive.

[55] To the authors presented here we can add Acin (1993), who also favours only one possible use of *aunque* as concessive. This claim is supported by the fact that the conjuncts cannot be reversed.

[56] Which is composed of the adverb *aún (still)* plus the relative *que (that)* and has an incidental adverbial function of sentence modifier.

[57] "La función de transpositor consiste en transponer la oración a que precede al papel de adyacente de aditamento".

Trujillo also objects to the idea that the conjunctive use of *aunque* can only go in the second position. In fact, he refers to Bello's adversative example to argue that it would admit a change of position without changing its meaning:

(88) Escribe bien, *aunque* despacio.

He writes well, ***although*** *slow.*

(89) *Aunque* despacio, escribe bien.

Although *slow, he writes well.*

He then suggests that the only reason why the *aunque* clause cannot be moved forward in some examples is because the 'logical'[58] subordination would hinder the process of interpretation:

(90) Era puro y bien intencionado su celo, *aunque* es preciso confesar que en vez de corregir irritaba.

His zeal was pure and well intentioned, ***although*** *it has to be confessed that it irritated instead correcting.*

(91) *?aunque* es preciso confesar que en vez de corregir irritaba, era puro y bien intencionado su celo[59].

Although *it has to be confessed that it irritated instead correcting, his zeal was pure and well intentioned.*

He also argues that, if you take one example of concessive *aunque* (92) and one of the so-called adversative *aunque* (93), it is clear that the independence of the propositions linked and the relation between them is the same in both examples:

(92) *Aunque* estaba lloviendo a cantaros, insistieron en ir al baile. (Gramática Bello 1847: 1221) (concessive)

Although *it was pouring rain, they insisted on going to the dance.*

(93) Era puro y bien intencionado su celo, *aunque* es preciso confesar que en vez de corregir irritaba. (Gramática Bello 1847: 1225) (adversative)

His zeal was pure and well intentioned, ***although*** *it has to be confessed that it irritated instead correcting.*

[58] He insists that it is a logical and not a syntactic subordination.
[59] Interestingly, this example is accepted as plausible in Martínez Álvarez's (1992) analysis.

Furthermore, he claims that both examples could be equally substituted by *pero* and he argues that if there is any difference in meaning it would be the same kind of difference in both examples:

(94) Insistieron en ir al baile, *pero* estaba lloviendo a cantaros.

They insisted on going to the dance, ***but*** *it was pouring rain.*

(95) Era puro y bien intencionado su celo, *pero* es preciso confesar que en vez de corregir irritaba.

his zeal was pure and well intentioned, ***but*** *it has to be confessed that it irritated instead correcting*

It is, however, unfortunate, that he does not elaborate any further on the exact correspondence between these examples, leaving it to the reader to find out by himself.

He then concludes that there are not two different types of syntax for *aunque.* In fact, he even claims that both *aunque* and *pero* examples have the same syntactic structure[60]. The difference is only semantic and explained as different 'senses' that can be lined up in a continuum, with the concession and adversativity at both ends of the spectrum (see Hernández Paricio 1997: 211). For instance, in the examples:

(96) Llegarán *aunque* se lo impiden.

They will arrive ***even if*** *they try to stop them.*


(97) Llegarán *pero* se lo impiden.

They will arrive ***but*** *they prevent it.*

From a syntactic perspective, in the example with *aunque* the main clause (*llegar* 'to arrive') goes beyond the idea of the *aunque* clause (*impeder* 'to prevent it')

[60] This contrasts with Martínez Álvarez's account of *aunque* and *pero,* which indicates that each belongs to two different syntactic categories (Hernández, 1997: 211).

while in the examples with *pero* the meaning of the first clause is not prolonged but interrupted.



Therefore, *aunque* has a unitary semantic meaning, which consists of introducing a content "superposed to another more relevant content which goes beyond its reach" (Trujillo 1990: 87). This meaning then contrasts with the function of *pero,* which consists of 'focalising' the segment it introduces in opposition to another content[61].

It then seems unlikely that this unitary account would be able to explain the underlying differences between examples such as the following, which are extracted from his own paper:

(98) Insistieron en ir al baile *aunque* estaba lloviendo a cantaros.

They insisted in going to the dance ***although*** *it was pouring rain.*

(99) Me dice que lo tutee, *aunque* no me atrevo.

He asks me to address him informally, ***although*** *I don't feel at ease doing this.*

We would agree that in the first example the main clause goes beyond the idea expressed in the *aunque* clause. However, it is not that clear that the second example could be explained in the same terms. It is unfortunate that Trujillo does not elaborate the ways in which how his proposal applies to this type of example.

[61] As observed by Hernández (1997:210) this distinction between the two functions of 'focalisation' and 'superposition' could be linked to the notion of *pero* introducing the 'main idea' and *aunque* the 'accessory' (Bello 1847) as well as his 'thesis' vs. 'antithesis' proposal.

Similarly, Serrano, M. J. (1990) claims that Bello's attempt to distinguish between the relative adverb *aunque* and the correlative conjunction is just "an attempt at separating two variants of the same value"[62] (1990: 767). She argues that from the contraposition value of *aun* 'yet/still', the compound *aunque* can be a subordinating relative adverb, if the 'non limited' meaning dominates. Alternatively, it could also be a coordinating conjunction if there is an added sense of 'opposition'. However, both have in common the semantic value of its component *'aún'* 'yet/still' (non limited extension), which allows for mood variation.

The examples with *pero* and *aunque* share the idea of opposition but there is a difference as illustrated below:

(100) Me callo *pero* lo sé. (perspectiva limitada)

I won't say it ***but*** *I know it (limited perspective)*

(101) Me callo, *aunque* lo sé. (perspectiva abierta)

I won't say it, ***although*** *I know it (open perspective)*

In the first example *lo sé* 'I know it' is opposed to *me callo* 'I don't say anything'. In the second example, the *although* clause is considered the opposed extension of *me callo*, i.e. *me callo aún en este caso* 'I don't say anything even in this case', which allows for the use of the subjunctive[63]. Therefore, in this example the adversative *aunque* does not present an obstacle between the counter-cause and the effect as in the subordinated cases. It simply points to the existence of contrary circumstances, preserving the idea of non limited extension.

Finally, Flamenco (1999) also disagrees with the semantic distinction between two types of *aunque.* He, however, admits that there is an adversative use of *aunque,* which goes in the second position after a pause and introduces a proposition in the indicative mood. He explains that this use, which is marked

[62] "una distinción de Bello entre un *aunque* adverbio relativo y otro conjunción correlativa no es mas que una intento de separar dos variantes de un mismo signo". (1990:767)

[63] Her explanation and the option of accepting the subjunctive may suggest that she is interpreting a concessive rather than an adversative reading of this example.

with heavy stress, indicates a 'sense' of restrictivity[64]. This is simply the result of the relevance the speaker wants to give to that clause. His point is that what has been traditionally called adversative *aunque* is not a different semantic type. It is just a restrictive reading, which specifies and restricts the preceding utterance (regardless of the notional content of the actual *aunque* clause). He illustrates the two readings with the following examples:

(102) Acabaré de explicar este tema *aunque* ya sea tarde. (concessive)

I will finish explaining this matter ***even if*** *it is already late.*

(103) Acabaré de explicar este tema, *aunque* ya (¿?sea/es) tarde. (adversative)

I will finish explaining this matter, ***although*** *it is already late.*

Furthermore, he also agrees with Martínez Álvarez (1992) and Trujillo (1990), that there are examples of *aunque* with restrictive character that can be in the subjunctive mood (Flamenco, 1999: 3819)[65]. However, he claims that these would be interpreted as imperatives rather than as examples of hypothetical subjunctive (1999: 3820):

(104) Dice que Pedro se ha casado; *aunque/pero* no te lo creas.

He says that Peter has got married; ***although/but*** *do not believe it.*

(105) Dice que Pedro se ha casado *aunque/pero** no te lo creas.

He says that Peter has got married ***even if/but**** *do not believe it.*

Summing up, all these authors identify some differences in the uses of *aunque*. However, they do not think that they are so strong as to account for them as different semantic types. Trujillo (1990), for instance, denies any syntactic difference and claims that semantically there are different uses that can be placed in a continuum. Serrano (1990), on the other hand, argues that despite the

[64] This position indicates that it has more force from the informative point of view.

[65] Cuervo (1953) had registered an example of coordinated '*aunque*' with subjunctive, which seems to have some reminiscence of the adverbial use : "Dificultosa cosa es que el que vive sin

differences, the common feature of non-limited perspective is a stronger argument to favor the unitary account. Finally, Flamenco (1999) claims that there are syntactic differences between the concessive and adversative readings and that the latter is linked to the function of restriction. However, this difference can only be explained in terms of 'senses' and not as a difference at the semantic level.

3.7.3. Modality and content *aunque*

Having reviewed the division between concessive and adversative uses of *aunque,* we will move to present a different division of the uses of *aunque.* Kovacci (1974) distinguishes two different types of concessive relations, based on Bally's (1944) division between *dictum* and *modus*[66]. The first type of *aunque* modifies the sentence nucleus as illustrated below:

(106) *Aunque* trabaja mucho, el dinero no le alcanza.

***Although** he works a lot, he can't get by on his salary.*

In the second type, on the other hand, *aunque* modifies the modality of the sentence:

(107) *Aunque* no lo creas, me voy de vacaciones.

***Even if** you don't believe it, I am going on holidays.*

This division seems to closely correspond to Ferrari's (1991) classification of the two types of concessives: the first type linked to the "*estructura patente de las oraciones*" (visible or surface structure of the sentences) and the other one linked to the "*estructura profunda de las oraciones*" (deep structure of the sentences). The former group can be analysed as 'concessive modifier +sentence nucleus' as in the following example:

(108) *Aunque* se apresure, llegará tarde.

***Even if** he hurries up, he will be late.*

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sujeción alcance luego en los principios verdaderos humildad, aunque a Dios ninguna cosa haya dificultosa" (Gran, Esc. Esp. 26, 2 (R. 11.354, 2). (In Serrano, 1990:763)

[66] See Garrido (2004: 43) for further information.

The latter group can be described as 'concessive modifier + sentence modality:

(109) *Aunque* su padre lo ignore, Pedro es un farsante.

***Even if** his father ignores it, Peter is a fraud.* (Ferrari 1991: 120)

From the semantic point of view, in the first type, the expectation created in the clause introduced by *aunque* is in contradiction with the main clause and there is a relation between two facts. In the second type, on the other hand, the proposition manifests an objection that is irrelevant for the speaker. Furthermore, there is a relation between the *aunque* clause and the attitude of the speaker. The concessive proposition functioning as a modifier of the assertive modality of the sentence.

Flamenco (1999) also refers to this distinction calling them "concesivas de enunciado" (utterance concessive) and "concesivas of enunciación"(the act of uttering concessive):

(110) Te estuve esperando más de dos horas *aunque* hacia un frío terrible.

*I was waiting for you for over two hours **although** it was freezing cold.*

(111) Te estuve esperando más de dos horas *aunque* pienses lo contrario. (Flamenco 1999: 3825)

*I was waiting for you for over two hours **although** you may not believe it.*

It seems clear that this use of *aunque* can be described as affecting a higher level of interpretation, i.e. what has been traditionally known as speech act type. Therefore, a link can be established between this use and Sweetser's cases of speech act uses discussed earlier.

3.7.4. Logic of event or logic of argumentation concessives

Lázaro Mora (1982), based on Moeschler and Spengler's (1981, 1982, 1983) distinction between argumentative concession and logic concession described earlier, comments on two different uses of the *although* constructions based on whether the obstacle or contraposition obeys the logic of events or the logic of argumentation[67]. In fact, this may be linked to the division between internal and external examples in the English tradition. He illustrates the difference between the two types of *although* constructions with the following examples:

(112) *Aunque* no ha trabajado en su vida, tiene mucho dinero.

***Although** he has never worked in his life, he has lots of money.*

(113) *Aunque* tiene mucho dinero no ha trabajado en la vida.

***Although** he has lots of money, he has never worked in his life.*

In the first example, we can apply the logic of events, understanding that *not having worked* is a natural obstacle for *having lots of money.* The obstacle that is not efficient is introduced by *aunque.* On the other hand, the second example is of the logic of argumentation type, and her *having much money* is not an obstacle to *not having worked in her life.* The only thing that can be said about this example is that *having much money* could give access to certain inferences (*having worked*) that cannot be accepted.

[67] Despite the close resemblance between Lázaro's 'logica de acontecimientos' y 'logica argumentativa' and Moeschler and Spengler's logic and argumentative concession, they are, however, different realities or notions in that the former distinction is not a distinction between different types of concession but different perspectives of expressing opposition.

3.7.5. Four types of concessives

Finally, reference must be made to Crevels' (1998) classification of concessive constructions at four different semantic layers — predicational, propositional, illocutionary and textual. They all show distinctive formal aspects, as illustrated below.

In predicational concessives, the relation is established at the level of the state of affairs:

(114) Saldremos *aunque* llueva.

We will go out ***even if*** *it rains.*

In propositional concessives, there is a combination of a premise and a conflicting conclusion:

(115) Aunque no compartimos la ideología del PSOE, preferimos que estén ellos a que haya un gobierno de derechas.

Although *we don't share the PSOE's ideas, we prefer them to a right-wing party.*

In illocutionary concessives, there is an obstacle to the speech act of the main clause:

(116) María, la carta se encuentra en el salón- *aunque* estoy convencida de que ya lo sabes.

María, the letter is in the living room- ***although*** *I am sure you already know that.*

Finally, textual concessives do not modifiy the main clause of a concessive construction, but rather generally a whole preceding text unit, thereby signalling an unexpected turn.

(117) A: ¿Prefiere la mujer delgada y huesuda a la mujer con curvas y redondeces?
B: Yo me quedo con Modigliani. Soy de los antiguos. *Aunque* también me gusta la Venus de Milo.

A: Do you prefer a thin and bony woman to a curvy and rounded one?
B: I prefer Modigliani. I am a traditionalist. ***Although*** *I also like Venus of Milo.*

As acknowledged by Crevels, this analysis is an attempt to apply Sweetser's (1990) analysis to the Spanish language and it is argued that there is a correspondence between the first three types and Sweetser's content, epistemic and speech act examples respectively. Crevels then adds the textual level[68] to her analysis. It is then a different classification from those presented above. This classification crosscuts the adversative and concessive division. For instance, in the propositional group there are typical concessive examples such as (116) above or adversative examples[69] such as the following:

(118) Es el Sadam Hussein del fútbol español, *aunque* tiene razón en algunas cosas.

He is the Sadam Hussein in the Spanish soccer, ***although*** *he is right in some of the things (he does)*

In summary, it appears that there are some links between the classifications presented in the Hispanic and English traditions. We return to these classifications later when presenting our account of the Spanish *aunque* in chapter 7. At that stage I will consider whether w these divisions are relevant to the cognitive analysis of this connective.

3.8. Summary of concession in Spanish

The second part of this chapter reviews the most representative works on concession and concessive markers in the Hispanic tradition. On the one hand, it considers how grammatical approaches have explained the similarities and differences between adversatives and concessives, which traditionally have been linked to the connectives *pero* and *aunque* respectively. Despite similarities in

[68] See also Lang (2000) for a fourth discourse level.
[69] It is notable that Crevels specifies that adversative uses of *aunque* will be excluded from her study (Crevels 1998: 131). However, she illustrates her classification with some uses that could easily be described as examples of adversative *aunque* (see examples (116), (118)).

terms of opposition or denial of expectation, different theorists have accounted for the differences between *pero* and *aunque* in terms of action vs. circumstances (Moliner 1966), main idea vs. accessory (Bello 1847), negation of presupposition vs. obstacle (Lázaro Mora 1982), true implicature vs. false implicature (Lavachi and Nicolas 1994), non-compatibility vs. non-implication (Rivas 1990), thesis vs. antithesis (Hernandez Paricio 1997), focalisation vs. no focalisation (Moya, 1996), more vs. less argumentative force (Fuentes 1998(a), 1998(b))[70].

This study also dealt with the different types of the connective *aunque,* starting with the controversial discussion on the distinction between a concessive and an adversative use of *aunque.* This distinction was first put forward by Bello (1847) and then followed by many theorists such as the RAE (1931: 308), Gili Gaya (1961: 283), Cuervo (1953), Echaide (1975), Rodríguez Sousa (1979), Lázaro Mora (1982), Lopez Garcia (1983), Alcina y Blecua (1975) [71]. Once this distinction had been accepted, the issue of exchangeability between the adversative *aunque* and the adversative *pero* arose. This review therefore discussed how different theorists accounted for this distinction. Finally, this review explained why authors such as Martínez Álvarez (1992), Trujillo (1990) and Serrano (1990) disagreed with this distinction. They argue that the non-limited meaning of *aunque* is the unitary feature for all of its uses and that the division into two different types is unnecessary.

Finally, we considered further divisions of *aunque* put forward by Kovacci (1974) and Ferrari (1991) on the one hand and Lázaro Mora (1982) on the other. The first two distinguished between modality and content *aunque.* This modality use could be linked to the speech act uses identified by Sweetser (1990) in the English tradition. Lázaro Mora (1982), following the general ideas proposed by Moeschler and Spengler, identifies two types of examples with *aunque* based on the nature of the contradiction, i.e. whether it responds to the logic of events or to the logic of argumentation. In fact, it seems that this division can in fact be linked to the distinction in the English tradition between external and internal examples of

[70] See also Crevels' (1998) division between expressing the head concept vs. expressing secondary concepts.
[71] Only semantic but not syntactic.

concession. To finish, we reviewed Crevels (1998) who appears to adopt Sweetser's model to the Spanish concessives but adds a fourth semantic layer described as textual.

3.9. Conclusion

This chapter started by discussing with those accounts that have studied the inferential processes that underlie concessive examples with connectives such as *although* and *but.* We reviewed the presuppositional meaning of concessive structures of *although* and examined the defining features that make concessive structures different from other structures such as causals or adversatives. On the other hand, we considered how different theorists have accounted for the relation between adversative and concessive examples: looking at what discourse connectives are used to mark these relations (König 1985, 1988 and Winter and Rimon 1994 in AT and Grote et al. 1997 and Salkie and Oates 1999 in RTS). The upshot of all the reviewed works is that they all agree that *although* and *but* may share the accessibility to some kind of implied conditional assumption of the type *'If p then not q',* which is accounted for in different terms. We also discussed those concessive contexts in which the connectives *but* and *although* seem to be interchangeable and how different theorists account for this. Finally, we reviewed those classifications of the uses of *although* based on the type of the underlying inferences (internal/external, adversative/concessive, SIC/SAC and epistemic/speech act /content).

The second part of this chapter described how the relation of concession has been defined in the Hispanic grammatical tradition, drawing the distinction between adversatives and concessives. The two connectives associated with these relations are *pero* as the 'adversative coordinator' and *aunque* as the 'concessive subordinator', both sharing the factual character of the clauses they link and contrast meaning of denial of expectations. We then discussed how the differences between these two semantically related connectives, *pero* and *aunque,* have been accounted for. We then moved to review the classifications of the connective *aunque,* starting with the controversial discussion on the distinction between

concessive and adversative uses of *aunque*. We examined the differences between these two types and the arguments put forward by those who have disagreed with this distinction (Martínez Álvarez 1992, Trujillo 1990 and Serrano 1990). Finally, we discussed further divisions of *aunque* based on differences in the nature of the underlying relation and established some links between these divisions and those proposed in the literature on concession described earlier in the chapter.

PART II

Chapter 4
Relevance Theory: theoretical framework

4.1. Relevance Theory: Grice's followers

Relevance Theory (RT) developed from the ideas put forward by Grice (1957, 1969, 1975 and 1989) in relation to utterance interpretation. Grice's main contribution was his articulated rejection of the view of communication as a process of mere encoding and decoding. Grice attempted to establish the basis for an inferential model of communication as an alternative to the traditional code model. Grice's argument is that "much more is communicated than what is actually said" (Levinson, 1983: 101) and he drew a distinction between the idea of 'what was said' and 'what was implied'. He introduced the term implicature (conventional or conversational) to refer to the intended implications of an utterance that are not discovered by linguistic decoding alone.

One of Grice's central claims was that utterances automatically create expectations, which guide the hearer towards the speaker's intended meaning. He claimed that:

> "[S] meant something by x' is roughly equivalent to saying [S] intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of recognition of this intention" (Grice, 1957: 58).

This recognition of the intention of the speaker raises in the hearer expectations that are then described in terms of a Cooperative Principle*: 'Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged'* and its maxims (Quantity, Quality, Manner and Relevance), which speakers are expected to observe (Grice 1961, 1989: 368-72) [1].

[1]There have been many followers of Grice's ideas, who have adopted his basic reasoning with however significant differences of interpretation. For instance, some neo-Griceans such as Horn (1996) have substituted the four maxims for principles that govern the inferential processes (Q and R principles, Levinson (2000), on the other hand, has used the maxims to derive his three

Relevance Theory can be said to have been consolidated as a theory with Sperber and Wilson's publication of *Relevance Theory: Communication and Cognition* in 1986. Sperber and Wilson developed Grice's intuition that utterances raise expectations of relevance, but depart from Grice's proposal in significant ways. Firstly, RT claims that the principles governing the inferential communication cannot be traced back to social norms of communication but to human cognition. Sperber and Wilson object to the existence of maxims that have to be obeyed by the speaker when producing an utterance; instead, they explain the whole process of utterance understanding as being ruled by one general principle known as ' the general principle of relevance', which can be divided into two further principles: on the one hand, the "Cognitive Principle of Relevance", which says that:

> "Human cognition is geared towards the maximization of relevance".(Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 260)

The idea behind this principle is that any act of processing information is generally aimed at bringing about the greatest improvement to their overall representation of the world for the least processing effort. In Sperber and Wilson's words:

> "....the human cognitive system has developed in such a way that our perceptual mechanism tends automatically to pick out potentially relevant stimuli, our memory retrieval mechanism tends automatically to achieve potentially relevant assumptions, and out inferential mechanisms tend spontaneously to process them in the most productive way" (Wilson and Sperber 2004).

On the other hand, the second principle, called the "Communicative Principle of Relevance", derives from the former and focuses on the examples of communicative ostensive stimuli:

> "Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance" (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 158).

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heuristics (Q, M and I) that explain the derivation of generalised conversational implicatures, which are based on default knowledge.

This principle then applies to any example of ostensive- inferential communication, i.e. any examples in which there is an intention to inform the audience of something (informative intention) and also an intention to inform the audience of one's informative intention (communicative intention). In fact, these two intentions, despite the fact that they normally go together, are independent and there may be examples in which there is communicative intention but not informative intention.

Sperber and Wilson distinguish two ways of conveying information[2]:

> "one would be providing direct evidence for the information that wants to be conveyed and the other way would be providing direct evidence of one's intention to convey it" (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 23).

They acknowledge that the first type should not be considered as a form of communication and therefore they only focus on the analysis of the second type, which is known as '(ostensive) inferential communication', where "the audience infers the communicator's intention from evidence provided for this precise purpose" (ibid). This theory then excludes from their analysis those examples of accidental information transmission or covert information transmission. Furthermore, they specify that the object of analysis is not only restricted to verbal communication but will also include ostensive examples of non-verbal communication.

A significant point in common with Grice's model is that human intentional communication goes beyond the processes of coding and decoding; however, Sperber and Wilson assign a role to pragmatics that has a lot more extensive reach than Grice could have foreseen:

> "Linguistically encoded semantic representations are abstract model structures which must be inferentially enriched before they can be taken to represent anything of interest" (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 174).

[2]This division can be linked to Grice's natural meaning (meaning n) and non natural meaning (meaning nn)

Sperber, for instance, modifies Grice's claim that not everything that is communicated is encoded, with another claim saying that "nothing that is communicated is wholly encoded" (1994: 3).

RT relies a great deal on different pragmatic (inferential) processes to access the mental representations that have been intended by a speaker who produces an utterance. The pragmatic processes used to derive both the explicit and the implicit content are guided by the same pragmatic principle. We can then conclude that RT differs from Grice's model because, on the one hand, the reliance on pragmatics is not only for the derivation of the implicit but also the explicit content and on the other, the derivation of implicatures are not calculated based on the compliance with some maxims but as a consequence of a general pragmatic principle of relevance, which equally guides the derivation of the explicit content.

4.2. The process of utterance interpretation: optimal relevance

As mentioned earlier, one of the main foci of this theory is the analysis of the interpretation of utterances, which are clear examples of ostensive stimulus. Any utterance raises in the audience an expectation of its own optimal relevance, on the assumption that:

> "it is relevant enough to be worth the audience's processing effort; and it is the most relevant one compatible with communicator's abilities and preferences" (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 270, see also Wilson and Sperber 2004).

In this theory, relevance is defined as "a property of an input[3] to cognitive processes" (2002(b): 44) and if the input is an utterance it will be relevant to an individual whenever:

> "it connects with background information he has available to yield conclusions that matter to him; say, by answering a question he has in mind, improving his

[3] By input they include things such as a sight, a sound, a memory, a conclusion or an utterance (Wilson and Sperber 2004).

> knowledge on a certain topic, settling a doubt, confirming suspicions, or correcting a mistaken impression" (Wilson and Sperber 2004).

Thus they posit that the propositional content expressed by an utterance is meant to interact with a set of propositions in the hearer's cognitive environment producing any of the following positive cognitive effects[4]: the derivation of new assumptions through the interaction of the new information with existing assumptions, the strengthening of an existing assumption or the contradiction and elimination of an existing assumption (Blakemore 1992: 135)[5]. However, the relevance of an input cannot be calculated based solely on the cognitive effects that it yields. It also has to balance the effort invested in deriving these effects. The processing effort will depend mainly on two factors: firstly, the linguistic and logical complexity of the utterance and secondly, the size and the accessibility of the context itself (Sperber & Wilson 1986/95: 130)[6].

Relevance to an individual, then, is assessed taking into account both factors, the cognitive effects and the processing effort:

> "Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at a time. Other things being equal, the smaller the processing effort expended, the greater the relevance of an input to the individual at that time" (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 609).

Moreover, one does not have the same expectations of relevance in all different contexts. Expectations of relevance will depend on the communicative circumstances and it can be that the same utterance in two different contexts may have different degrees of relevance based on the expectations brought to the

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[4] By positive cognitive effect Sperber and Wilson mean that 'it is an effect that contributes positively to the fulfilment of cognitive functions or goals' (1995: 265); this definition is set in contrast with 'cognitive effect', which is a contextual effect occurring in a cognitive system (an individual)

[5] In fact, Sperber and Wilson, also admit that the notion of positive cognitive effects could also refer to instances of reorganisation of existing knowledge or elaboration of rational desires (1995: 266). Sperber and Wilson (1990) also mention cases in which new information could "increase in saliency or in plausibility, of a whole range of assumptions yielding what will subjectively experienced as an impression"

[6] It has been admitted that one of the main difficulties found in the relevance theoretic framework is in fact the measurement of the factors that are involved in assessing the effort (Gutt, 1991: 30).

situation by the hearer; This links with the idea that relevance is not understood as a quantitative but as a comparative relation (see Wilson and Sperber 2000(a))[7].

On the other hand, to assess the optimal relevance of an utterance one also has to take into account the fact that together with the characteristic of the balance between effects and effort invested, the production of the utterance may be constrained by "the speaker's abilities and preferences" (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 270). Despite the speaker's interest in communicating the most optimal utterance to yield the maximum number of effects without any unnecessary processing effort, she[8] cannot always control external factors that may intervene in the communication process.

In this framework, the principle of relevance is not something that may or may not be obeyed but it is always observed in any example of ostensive communication. The hearer should understand the intended interpretation that will lead to an optimally relevant representation of the utterance. We can then conclude that the search for the optimal relevance implies that the hearer will not stop processing once he finds any information worth processing but will try to maximise the information without using any unjustified processing effort.

4.3. The process of utterance interpretation: the context

The principle of relevance rules the whole process of utterance interpretation and then the hearer identifies the intended interpretation of the utterance guided by the presumption of its own optimal relevance. This process consists of deriving the propositional content that is explicitly and implicitly communicated, which combines with the assumptions in the hearer's cognitive environment resulting in enough effects to make the processing of the utterance worth the effort. The

[7] Wilson and Sperber 2004 claim that it is a more plausible view that individuals use more basic intuitive methods rather than numerical quantitative methods in assessing relevance. In fact, they remark that some aspects that take place in the interpretation process such as the strength of the assumption or the level of attention cannot be quantified in numerical terms; therefore, as they had already claimed in S&W 1995: 124-32) it is preferable to treat effort and effect as *non-representational* dimensions of mental processes.

[8] I will refer to the speaker as 'she' and the hearer as 'he'.

speaker's cognitive environment is here defined as the set of facts that are manifest to her, i.e. that can be perceived or inferred:

> "A fact is manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true" (Sperber & Wilson 1986/95: 39).

In RT the cognitive environment takes into account external factors such as information perceived in the physical environment and also includes information retrieved from memory but places the emphasis on the mental ability to process all the information inferred from these two sources (see Gutt 1991: 25).

The context thus is "a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer's assumptions about the world" (Sperber and Wilson 1997: 145). It is selected in each communicative situation in order to maximize the relevance of the utterance being processed, and it plays a decisive role in this process:

> " ...people hope that the assumption being processed is relevant (or else they would not bother to process it at all), and they try to select a context which will justify that hope: a context which will maximize relevance. In verbal comprehension in particular, it is relevance which is treated as given and context which is treated as variable" (Sperber &Wilson 1995: 142).

In this framework, the actual notion of relevance itself is conceived as being context dependent (Sperber & Wilson 1986/95: 125). This context is not limited to the contextual environment or the preceding linguistic context. Instead, it covers:

> "a set of mentally represented assumptions, some of which are representations of immediately perceptible environmental features, but most of which are either retrieved from memory or constructed on the basis of stored assumption schemas" (Carston 2000: 21) (see also Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995(chapter 3), Blass 1990(b)).

On the other hand, the context is not uniquely determined and fixed before the actual process of interpreting the utterance. Instead it seems to be a dynamic mechanism, which is chosen as part of the interpretation process that maximises the relevance of the utterance being processed (Sperber and Wilson 1982: 76). The context is selected as the process of understanding the utterances develops

rather than in advance. Then, following the actual principle of relevance it is obvious that the speaker will first draw from the most accessible context, either from the preceding text or from what can be observed in the immediate environment (Blakemore 1992: 126) and only if it does not yield adequate effects, the speaker may draw from "cultural or scientific knowledge, common-sense assumptions, and more generally any item of shared or idiosyncratic information that the hearer has access to at the time" (Wilson 1994: 42, Sperber and Wilson 1995: 147, Sperber and Wilson 1997: 145).

In RT the relationship between the new proposition and the context can be viewed from two different perspectives: in terms of the way the context is affected, or in terms of the role played by the contextual assumptions[9] in assessing the relevance of the utterance. In this framework, when accounting for the inferential abilities involved in the assessment of context modification the emphasis lies in the hearer's assumptions, the hearer's context, and the effect of the communication on the hearer's context as shown below:

> "In every case the method of processing is the same. The hearer supplies specific contextual assumptions and derives specific contextual implications. What varies is not the specificity of the assumptions and conclusions derived, or the formality of the reasoning processes involved, but simply the amount of foreknowledge the speaker must be assumed to have had of the way the utterance would be processed and with it the degree of responsibility he must take for the particular conclusions derived" (Wilson and Sperber, 1986: 252).

4.4. Process of utterance interpretation: explicit and implicit content

The process of comprehension consists of the derivation of the propositional content that is conveyed by the utterance as intended by the speaker. This process involves the derivation by means of hypothesis formation and confirmation[10] of

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[9] In relation to the different assumptions that are accessed and modified in the process of utterance understanding it is important to point out the fact that not all of them have the same strength and that the differences are not accounted for in numerical but in comparative terms.

[10] Sperber and Wilson adopt Fodor's (1983) view of the mind as a variety of specialised systems *input systems* and *central systems* each with its own method of *representation* and *computation*. The former process information perceived and the latter combine information, derived from the various input systems and from memory and perform *inferential tasks* (Blakemore, 1987: 56). The pragmatic interpretation is a function of the so-called "central system of thought", which involves

both the explicit content (explicatures) and implicit content (implicatures), which are then confirmed in an online process of mutual adjustment. The hearer then is expected to go through some non demonstrative[11] inferential process to obtain some significant cognitive effects always guided by the factor of least effort, and stopping when the expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned) (see Carston 2002(b): 380, Sperber and Wilson 2002: 259).

4.4.1. Explicatures

The process of utterance understanding is significantly different from that proposed by Grice and other neo-Griceans and post-Griceans (Grice 1969, 1975, Levinson 1983, 1988,2000, Recanati 1987, 1989, Bach 1994, Horn 1996, 2003). In RT the pragmatic machinery used in the inferential processes not only works for the derivation of implicatures but also (and to a great extent) for the derivation of the 'explicatures', i.e. those assumptions communicated by the utterance that are inferential developments of its logical form.

In RT the function of decoding leads the hearer to access the semantic logical structure, which is known as the semantics of the utterance[12]. Then the speaker relies on the context (accessible contextual assumptions) to enrich this logical form (abstract structure) into what is known as the explicature:

> "an explicature is an ostensively communicated assumption which is inferentially developed from one of the incomplete conceptual representations (logical forms) encoded by the utterance" (2002(b): 377).[13]

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forming a hypothesis on the basis of the input delivered from the various perceptual systems and grammar and confirming it in the light of background assumptions stored in memory.

[11]Carston defines non demonstrative inference as "an inference to the best explanation, which is not strictly valid (as opposed to a deductive inference which is valid)"(Carston 2002(b): 378). For criticism see Levinson (2000).

[12] Following Fodor (1983), RT claims that grammar characterises the code aspect of language. It is a module which pairs a representation of the acoustic signal with an incomplete logical form, a mental representation which is then enriched in various ways and interpreted in the central system which is guided by the criterion of consistency with the Principle of Relevance.

[13] Carston (2002) when dealing with examples of coordination she extends her definition of explicature and it then reads as follows: "a proposition communicated by an utterance is an explicature of the utterance if and only if it is a development of either a linguistically encoded logical form of the utterance or of a sentential subpart of that logical form. (my emphasis)

This development involves a large number of inferential processes, which are totally context dependent. Among the tasks involved we can point out disambiguation, reference resolution and other pragmatic enrichment processes of propositional completion and propositional strengthening.

Grice viewed the explicit, i.e. 'what is said', as the result of decoding and some contextual processes of disambiguation and reference assignment. In RT, on the other hand, the task of decoding only leads to the derivation of a linguistic abstract structure (template), which is not something that is actually represented by the hearer. It is only the development of this logical structure into propositional content that is represented by the hearer as being communicated (see Carston 2000, 2002(b)). This development then involves a few more pragmatic processes aside from the two mentioned by Grice, all guided by the same communicative principle of relevance.

Among the inferential processes involved in the derivation of explicatures, apart from the traditional process of disambiguation[14] there are also examples of saturation. These include not only indexical elements such as pronouns or demonstratives, but also slots that have to be filled by grammatical constraints as well as linguistically 'unmandated (free) enrichment', which in RT is described as a development of the logical form (for further reference on this topic see Sperber and Wilson 1995, 2000, Blakemore 1992, Carston 2000, 2002(b), Maruenda 2003-4, Wilson 2004). Finally, there are also adjustment processes of narrowing or broadening the encoded concept[15](See 2002(b): 197-205, Wilson and Sperber 2000: 238).

To sum up, it is then clear that the development of the logical form to derive to propositional content that is communicated (explicature) involves a lot more than just decoding, disambiguation and reference assignment. There are other inferential processes such as enrichment of hidden constituents and different types of

[14] (see Carston 2002(b): 185-186)

[15] This type of study that accounts for the relation between the concepts that are encoded and the concepts that are actually communicated is known as lexical pragmatics and has been one of the main foci of research in Relevance theory in the last years (see for instance Wilson 2004).

adjustment of the concepts[16], which are always guided by the same principle of relevance. It can then be concluded that in RT the explicatures are considered to have different degrees of explicitness[17].

> "an explicature is an amalgam of the encoded and the pragmatically inferred, so that explicitness is a matter of degree and explicatures are more or less explicit" (Carston, 2002: 171).

4.4.2. Higher-Level Explicatures: Attitudes and Speech Acts

As mentioned earlier, explicatures are defined as a development of the logical form. Sperber and Wilson argue that 'this development' includes not only the inferential processes that lead to the truth conditional propositional content intended by the speaker but also the conceptual representations of the speech acts and propositional attitude descriptions in which the proposition is embedded. These representations are called higher level explicatures and are recovered by a combination of decoding and inferencing (Sperber and Wilson 2002(b): 119, see also Wilson and Sperber 1993: 5-6, Blakemore 1992 Wilson and Sperber 1990: 102, Wilson and Sperber 1993: 11). Let's illustrate this with an example:

(1) Someone who is usually indecisive about whether or not it is a good idea to break up with her boyfriend:

Sue: So what are you going to do?
Ann: (with conviction and a happy face) I am going to break up with him[18].

The speaker is communicating the following explicatures given below:

a. Ann is going to break up with her boyfriend.
b. Ann says that she is going to break up with her boyfriend.

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[16] This interest in the analysis of the concept encoded and communicated is an example of the shift in the locus of the crucial relationship: from one that holds between proposition expressed and thoughts communicated to one that holds between encoded linguistic meaning and proposition expressed (= thought communicated) and from a global relation between whole propositional forms to a local relation between constituent concepts (Carston 2002b: 339).

[17] As will be discussed later the different degrees of explicitness also affect the derivation of what is known as higher level explicatures.

[18] The speaker could have selected instead some sentential adverbs such as 'happily' or 'positively' to mark her propositional attitude to the utterance. (For sentential adverbials see Fantidou 1993(a), 1993(b))

c. Ann believes that she is going to break up with her boyfriend.
d. Ann is happy that is going to break up with her boyfriend.
e. Ann is convinced that she is going to break up with her boyfriend.
f. Ann promises that she is going to break up with her boyfriend.

However, it is the context that will determine which of them will have more relevance. In fact, it is not always the case that all the explicatures that the speaker has made manifest are actually represented by the hearer. Instead, it may be the case that the hearer only represents a subset of these. For instance, Sue may want to know whether or not they are staying together since she tries to decide whether or not to invite them both to her own wedding; in that case, she may just represent the based level explicature (a) and the higher level explicature (e). These two representations have been explicitly communicated and are likely to be relevant by giving rise to contextual effects such as, the derivation of the following implications: '*Sue has to change the invitation she has written for them, she has to phone the restaurant to cancel one menu, she has to phone him to apologise for not inviting him to the wedding, ...*'. In other cases, if the speaker (Sue) has the opinion of her friend (Ann) that she is always very indecisive and she is never happy with her own decisions, then the representation of the propositional attitude encoded in the higher level explicatures (d) and (e) may be of most relevance as they may contradict the hearer's existing assumption of the speaker's behaviour.

What is distinctive of the higher level explicatures (b-e) in relation to the basic explicature (a) is that the former do not contribute to the truth conditionality of the proposition, although they have their own truth conditions. As mentioned earlier, for Sperber and Wilson explicitness is a matter of degree, therefore, the greater the degree of decoding the more explicit the communication. For instance, in this example the speaker could have made her propositional attitude more explicit by choosing adverbials such as '*happily*' or *'positively'* or she could have made the illocutionary force more explicit by saying: *I promise that I am going to break up with him*.

As Carston points out, the significance of the higher level explicature (in which the proposition is embedded) can be clearly observed especially in two contexts: in cases of non-literalness and of non-declarative utterances (2002(b): 119).

Among the cases of non-literalness, there are, for instance, examples of irony or reported speech, which are accounted for in terms of the communicated higher level explicatures rather than the communicated basic explicatures. They are examples of representation by resemblance, or interpretive use, which amounts to saying that the speaker presents an utterance as an interpretation of someone else's thought (See Wilson and Sperber 1988). In the examples of irony as in the one below:

(2) (A student, who lives normally on a very small budget, has just bought a second hand suit and shows it to her housemate)

The housemate: that looks really elegant
The student: It was really dear. I paid all of €2!

It is a description of a state of affairs, since the speaker does not really communicate '*It was really dear. I paid all of €2*'. Instead, the speaker is only expressing her dissociation towards the assumption expressed in that proposition. It is an example of interpretive relation between the speaker's thought and this attributed utterance or thought (see Sperber and Wilson 1995: 224). The speaker (the student) is clearly dissociating from the opinion that is expressed (see Sperber and Wilson 1981, 1986/95).

On the other hand, in relation to the examples of non-declarative cases, Relevance Theory rejects the proposal presented by speech act theorists (see Austin 1962, Searle 1979), which links sentence types structures with speech acts. They argue that this correlation would imply that many examples would have to be excluded as insincere or defective (see Blakemore 1992, Sperber &Wilson 1995, Carston 2002(b)). For instance, imperative examples were traditionally matched to the speech act of 'the speaker attempting to get the hearer to do something'. However, there are many examples that do not fit in with this description. As Blakemore (1992) points out, there are cases of audienceless example '*Please don't rain*' or examples in which the hearer is not in the possession of performing the action '*get well soon*' (Blakemore 1992: 111-2).

In RT then imperative examples are described as communicating an explicature that is a description of states of affairs both achievable (or potential) and desirable (to some degree) to the speaker or the hearer or, perhaps, a salient third person (Carston 2002(b): 120). This general and abstract schema has to then be narrowed down depending on the context together with the pragmatic determination of the indeterminacies discussed above of disambiguation, reference assignment, propositional completion and propositional strengthening. Therefore, there is again a great reliance on the pragmatic side to arrive at the intended interpretation. What is distinctive of these examples is that there is no commitment to the basic explicature but only to the higher level explicatures. We will illustrate this with an example:

(3) (*A mum talking to her 4 year old son who is struggling to finish his supper)*
Finish it.

Here the speaker (the mum) communicates the higher level explicatures *it is desirable for her that her son finishes the dinner that is on his plate.* Then the propositional form of the imperative utterance (*the son finishes the dinner that is on his plate*) is not communicated but as a potential and desirable proposition, i.e. it is only the higher-level explicature (a) that is being explicitly communicated. In this particular context one would have to consider the following contextual assumptions: the hearer (the son) can bring about the potential situation described (finishing the dinner), the speaker (the mother) is in a position of authority relative to the hearer (the son) and the situation is going to be desirable for the speaker (the mother).

In RT grammatical forms of declarative, imperative and interrogative sentences are linked to very general and non-specific acts of communication[19]. The view proposed is that there is a list of linguistic devices, "indicative, imperative, or

[19] Carston likes to call the higher level descriptions in which the proposition is embedded '(weak) speech act' "to distinguish them from the commitment involved in the traditional speech acts such as assertion, or request. The idea is that propositional forms (enriched logical forms) may be integrated into assumption schemas such as "X says that P" (or X tell H that P) and X tell Y to P, where these are merely speech act reflections of different ways in which a representation can be entertained by someone (as a description of an actual state of affairs or of a potential and desirable state of affairs)" (Carston 2002(b): 209)

subjunctive mood, rising or falling intonation, inverted or uninverted word order, the presence or absence of a *wh*-words or of markers such as let's or please" (Sperber &Wilson 1995: 247) that guide the hearer in the interpretation of the utterance in many different ways. In this theory, any illocutionary force indicator such as declarative or imperative mood or interrogative word order merely has to make manifest a rather abstract property of the speaker's informative intention: the direction in which relevance is to be sought (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 254).

In this framework, then, what really counts are the linguistic clues that guide the hearer in the process of interpretation and tell him whether the utterance has to be embedded into a higher level explicature of description or of interpretation. For instance, declarative sentences are linked with *saying that*, imperative sentences with *telling to*, and interrogative sentences with *asking whether:*

> "*Saying that* is analysed in terms of the communication of a thought which is entertained as a description of an actual state of affairs; *telling to* is analysed in terms of the communication of a thought which is entertained as a description of a state of affairs that is potential and desirable; and *asking whether* is analysed in terms of the communication of a proposition which is entertained as an interpretation of a desirable thought" (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 246, Blakemore, 1992: 117 see also Wilson 1991).

Imperatives and interrogatives then share the feature of communicating the higher level explicature rather that the basic explicature of the proposition. However, they differ in that the former is a description of a desirable state whereas the latter is an interpretation of a desirable representation (Wilson and Sperber 1986/95: 231). We will go back to this when analysing examples of *pero* introducing imperatives and interrogatives in chapter 5.

4.4.3. Implicatures

Grice (1969, 1975) introduced the notion of implicature to refer to the propositional content that was intended by the speaker and that was not the result of decoding explicit information. He divided the implicatures into two types: conventional and conversational implicatures. The former, which are triggered by connectives such as *but* or *therefore,* are linguistically decoded and linked to a set

of non basic, non central speech acts that relate to basic central speech acts of asserting, telling or asking (see Rouchota 1998(a) and Carston 2002(b): 160). On the other hand, conversational implicatures are derived by inferencing guided by the speaker's observation of the conversational maxims[20]. The derivation of implicatures as implicated premises and conclusion can be illustrated with the following example:

(4) A: Smith does not seem to have a girlfriend these days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.
[B implicates that Smith has, or maybe has, a girlfriend in New York]. (Grice 1975: 32)

In Relevance theory, there is no place for the conventional implicatures as described by Grice in terms of (conceptual) higher order speech acts. If we were to take this description and incorporate it in the RT model, it would fall into the category of higher level explicatures. Instead, Relevance theorists have accounted for Grice's prototypical examples of conventional implicatures (e.g. *but*, *therefore, moreover*) as constraints on the inferential process that take part at the implicit level.

As regards conversational implicatures, they play a very central part in the process of utterance understanding. In this framework, the derivation of implicatures will not be the result of observing the conversational principle and its maxims. Instead, as happens with the derivation of explicatures, it is just part of the propositional content that the speaker intends to communicate implicitly, guided by the communicative principle of relevance. Implicatures are not derived like explicatures, as inferential developments of the logical form. Instead they are derived exclusively by inferencing[21]. As regard conversational implicatures,

[20] Grice distinguishes two different varieties: generalised conversational implicatures (GCIs) and particularised conversational implicatures (PCIs) (Grice 1989:37). The former can be seen in examples with for instance a quantifier such as 'some' , which implies that the stronger scalar term does not hold (not all). On the other hand, the PCIs are intimately bound up with a specific context of the utterance. In contrast, some authors such as Bach (2005) or Relevance theorist such as Carston (2002(b)) have accounted for the GCI as impliciture or explicatures respectively.

[21] Carston (2002: 189) proposed the Functional Independence Principle, which claims that to both the proposition expressed (the explicature) and the implicatures should play independent roles in the mental life of the hearer: "If an alleged implicatures was such that its role in subsequent inferences such as the derivation of contextual effects subsumed the role of the alleged position expressed, then the alleged implicatures was most likely really a pragmatic aspect of the

Relevance Theory, unlike Grice, elaborates on how the derivation of these assumptions involves a number of deductive processes, which are part of a bigger process of non demonstrative inferential processes that are carried out for the derivation of what is communicated by the speaker (see Carston 2002(b): 137).

4.4.5. Implicated premises and implicated conclusions

There is a basic division between implicated premises and implicated conclusions. The hearer is expected to be able to access implicated premises to combine with the actual proposition to derive implicated conclusions that are part of the propositional content intended by the speaker (see also Blakemore, 1987: 69). Therefore, the implicated conclusions are meant to be inferred from explicit content plus contextual assumptions and always guided by the expectation of getting enough contextual effects for no unjustified processing effort. We will illustrate this with an example from S&W (1995: 194ff):

(5) a) Peter: Would you drive a Mercedes?
b) Mary: I would not drive ANY expensive car.

Utterance (5b) processed in a context containing (6a) will yield the contextual implication (6b):

(6) a) A Mercedes is an expensive car
b) Mary would not drive a Mercedes.

In S&W terms, (6a) is an implicated premise, and (6b) is an implicated conclusion. The speaker could have instead chosen a more direct answer saving the hearer the effort of accessing the implicated premise and then the implicated conclusion. However, this is justified in this theory since this extra effort is paid off by the extra effects obtained such as for instance the derivation of implications such as that '*the hearer should not buy her an expensive car for her birthday, ...*'

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proposition expressed (Carston 2002(b): 189)". (See also The Availability Principle Recanati 1989: 310; Recanati 1993:248).

4.4.6. Strong and weak implicatures.

In this model then a proposition may be more or less strongly implicated. It is strongly implicated if its recovery is essential in order to arrive at an interpretation that satisfies the hearer's expectation of relevance. For instance,

(7) Ann: Should we phone Mary to go out tonight?
Mary: I want to stay at home.

Implicated premise: If she wants to stay at home, she does not want to phone someone to go out.
Implicated conclusion: She is not going to phone Mary to go out tonight.

It is weakly implicated if its content is also intended by the speaker but not in a clear and precise manner. In fact, what leads to an assumption being defined as weak is that the speaker needn't have had a particular implicature in mind for the hearer to derive. Instead, there is a range of implicature that could be derived from which the speaker could select one or more. For instance in the following example:

(8) A: What are you going to do this evening?
B: I have a headache.

There is a large range of implications that can be derived such as that '*she is going to spend the day in bed watching television, she is going to go to bed early, she is not going to be going to the gym, she is going to cancel a dinner engagement ...*'. Weak implicatures thus are just *contextual implications* that are intended in some way (all implicatures are intended) and are what the speaker wants the hearer to derive.

4.4.7. Mutual adjustment

A very important contribution of this theory is that implicatures are not derived after the explicatures. Instead, they are both derived in a process of mutual adjustment (Sperber and Wilson 1998: 194, Carston 2000: 10). In fact, the process of comprehension is described as an online process carried out over time and it may be the case that the pragmatic enrichment of the explicature is subsequent to

the derivation of the implicated conclusion. At the same time the derivation of the final implicature will be derived from the actual enriched explicatures.

> "The process is one of parallel adjustment: expectations of relevance warrant the derivation of specific implicatures, for which the explicit content must be adequately enriched" (Wilson 1998: 194).

Therefore, explicatures and implicatures are two different types of intended communicated assumptions, which are accessed by different procedures but in an online process of mutual adjustment. In fact, what is very important in the process of interpreting the utterance is not so much whether the content has been communicated implicitly or explicitly. Instead, what really matters is the strength of each of the communicated assumptions[22] and how they contribute to the derivation of cognitive effects (Carston 2002(b): 366).

4.5. Conceptual and procedural meaning

Blakemore (1987) argued that not all linguistic items contribute to the process of utterance understanding in the same way. On the one hand, there are words such as common nouns, verbs, or adverbs that encode concepts and need to be inferentially enriched in the context. These words were to contribute to the development of the encoded schema into some specific content, which will be truth conditional. On the other hand, words such as discourse connectives: *but, so*, and *after all* do not contribute to the truth conditionality by encoding a concept. Instead, they encode procedures about the context in which the utterance has to be processed. They guide the hearer in the manipulation of the conceptual representation so that the intended contextual effects were derived, reducing the overall effort required[23] (see also Rouchota 1998(a): 98, Ifantidou-Trouki 1993(a): 84, 1993(b): 201, Blakemore 1996: 333). She illustrates this idea with the following examples (Blakemore 1987: 106-8, 2002: 78-9):

(9) John can open Bill's safe. He knows the combination.

(10) John can open Bill's safe. *After all,* he knows the combination.

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[22] See Carston (2002: 380) for definition of strong vs. weak communication.
[23] This conceptual and procedural distinction follows from Fodor's view of mind according to which the cognitive processes are computations over representations.

(11) John can open Bill's safe. *So,* he knows the combination.

The function of these expressions is to guide the hearer on how to interpret the utterance they introduce. Unlike conceptual expressions, their contribution cannot be accounted for in terms of truth conditionality. Instead, they are used to make communication more efficient by saving the hearer's effort when arriving at the intended interpretation.

Wilson and Sperber (1993) explain the difference between the conceptual and procedural encoding, claiming that it corresponds to "information about the representation to be manipulated, and information about how to manipulate it" respectively (Wilson & Sperber 1993: 2). They then suggest at least two ways of recognizing these two types of information:

> (a) Conceptual meaning is available to consciousness[24], whereas procedurally encoded information is not (1993: 16).
> (b) Conceptual meaning is compositional, whereas procedurally encoded information is not (1993: 18).[25]

The lack of contribution of connectives to the truth conditional content of the utterances in which they are inserted led some theorists to think that there was a correspondence between items encoding conceptual and procedural meaning and having truth conditional and non truth conditional meaning respectively[26]. However, further studies on different types of procedural meaning have proved this relation to be unsustainable. For instance, there are examples of procedural information, for instance, pronouns that contribute to the truth conditionality (Nicolle 1995, Bezuidenhout, A. 1997) as well as examples of conceptual

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[24] Bezuidenhout (2004) claims that this should not be considered as a distinctive feature since the way conceptual meaning is envisaged in this theory is as an skeletal logical form which does not seem to be available to conciousness.

[25] Bezuidenhout disagrees with the idea that this feature is exclusive of conceptual meaning since there are lexical items that are treated in RT as encoding procedural information that can also occur as a part of semantically complex phrases as illustrated in the following examples:

(1) Photoshop allows us to digitally manipulate photographic images. So, although perhaps not obviously so, photography has become more like painting. Bezuidenhout (2004: 107).

[26] See Carston (2002(b): 164) for discussion on this idea.

decoding that do not contribute to the truth conditionality of the utterance, as is the case with sentence adverbials, which will be analysed below[27] .

On the other hand, the fact that discourse connectives contribute to the derivation of the implicit content raises expectations of a possible link between the conceptual meaning contributing to the explicit content and the procedural to the implicit. However, it is only the former that can be maintained, since there are examples of procedural meaning that contribute to the explicit, such as intonation (Escandell Vidal 1998(b)), particles such as *eh* (Ramírez 2003), the subjunctive (Ahern 2001, 2004) or pronouns (Nicolle, 1995, Bezuidenhout, A. 1997). The first three contribute to the higher level explicatures whereas the last one contributes to the basic explicatures. Furthermore, it has also been suggested that the same linguistic particle could encode both the procedural and the conceptual meaning (see Takeuchi, M. 1997, 1998) or pronouns such as 'he' (Bexuidenhout 2004)[28]. We will refer back to this division when presenting my alternative account of connectives *pero* 'but' and *aunque* 'although', which departs from the traditional view that these procedural units constrain the implicit content.

4.6. Metarepresentation in relevance

In Relevance theory the feature of the intentionality of the speaker plays an essential part in the whole process of communication and explains the different levels of inferentiality involved. Grice comments on this idea when dealing with the derivation of conversational implicatures, as described below:

> "He has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the CP; he could not be doing this unless he thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required; he has done nothing to stop me from thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q" (Grice 1975: 50).

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[27] Sentential adverbials such as 'fortunately', 'frankly' do not contribute to the truth conditionality of the utterance in which they are embedded but their contribution may have truth conditions of their own.

[28] See also Recanati (1993), Bach (2001).

It seems that according to this model there were too many metarepresentations[29] involved that have to be clearly represented by the hearer in order for the speaker to convey its intended meaning. His model required the identification of the speaker's intention and any assumption needed for its identification had to be *mutually known*[30] (see Recanati 1987, Schiffer 1972, Searle 1969, Smith 1982, Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995 and Sperber & Wilson 2000 for discussion). On the other hand, according to Grice this 'working out schema' is only suitable for the derivation of implicatures, which take as the departure point the explicit content, i.e. 'what is said'. Relevance theorists, on the contrary, view metarepresentations as a natural part of the interpretation process, which happen quite intuitively. There are, in fact, many different orders in these representations that play a role not only in deriving implicatures but also in what is actually being intended by the speaker at both the explicit and the implicit level.

In Relevance Theory it is agreed that both hearer and speaker are able to go beyond the coding and encoding processes. The hearer is able to work out what is the intended meaning conveyed by the speaker, taking as reference only the schematic logical structure that results from the decoding process. This will then be enriched at the explicit and the implicit level to gain sufficient effects to make the processing worth the effort and stopping once this aim has been achieved.

The presumption of optimal relevance that comes with any instance of ostensive communication may sound a bit too idealistic and may wrongly point towards an ideal context of communication. Some people may object to this idea arguing that there are examples in which people consciously lie or try to deceive the hearer, which may enter in contradiction with RT's principle of relevance. However, RT

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[29] It is in fact this ability to metarepresent that distinguishes human beings from other animals and it can therefore be seen as an evolutionary characteristic (Sperber 1994).

[30] RT framework disregards Gricean ideas that there has to be a conscious effort to obey some social norms and access to all the assumptions that could be common knowledge of both speaker and hearer. RT rejects the idea that mutual knowledge is not only shared by the speaker and hearer, but known to be shared and known to be known to be shared (Sperber and Wilson (1982a: 65)[30]. In RT they posit that single principle which simultaneously determines context, content and intended inferences, with no appeal to mutual knowledge. The fact that some knowledge is considered mutual is generally result of comprehension rather than a precondition for it, i.e. it is constructed in the process of utterance comprehension based on the notion of the Principle of Relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1982a: 62).

is perfectly capable of accounting for these cases, claiming that even in cases of intentional deceit, the presumption of optimal relevance is still preserved. To understand this, one has to accept the ability of the communicators to metarepresent different levels of intentionality. Sperber (1994) explains that there are different strategies for interpreting utterances going from a naïve stage to a much more sophisticated stage, the latter involving a higher number of metarepresentations but always guided by the same expectation of optimal relevance (see Sperber 1994, Sperber and Wilson 2000).

This capacity of metarepresentation helps to explain what is known in RT as interpretive uses of language,[31] which includes examples of echoic utterances, free indirect speech, ironic utterances, parodies, interrogatives (see Pons Borderia 2004: 68). Sperber and Wilson (1986/95: 224-243) support a distinction between interpretations and descriptions, which fits naturally in their relevance-based analysis of ostensive inferential communication. They argue that any propositional form can be accounted for as either a representation of a state of affairs (descriptive use) or as a representation of a representation (interpretive use) (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 229).

The interpretive use of a proposition can then be explained in terms of resemblance with other propositions that it represents, sharing with it some type of logical or contextual implications. In fact, this interpretive use is not only applied to propositions but also to any non-verbal representation that stands as an interpretation of something else. For instance, Sperber and Wilson illustrate this concept referring to the representation of a dog by means of a drawing, or posture, or imitation of a bark; if these are examples of ostensive behaviour we can easily see how they could be interpreted as representation of something they resemble in some respect.

As mentioned earlier, very clear instances of this use can be the examples of irony (see example (2) above). More examples of interpretive use can be found in interrogative examples, where the speaker is not communicating the explicature of

[31] Escandell Vidal, V. 2000, Sperber and Wilson 1995: 4.7, 1988, Blass 1990, Papafragou 2000.

the utterance but she is instead indicating that the interrogative is an "interpretation of answers that the speaker would regard as relevant if true" (Ibid, 252) (see Escandell Vidal 2000, Sperber and Wilson 1988). For instance, in an example of interrogative such as the following:

(12) What time is the film starting?

We can say that the speaker is communicating that there is a development of the logical propositional form encoded in the utterance, such as for instance *'the film is starting at x time'*, which will be relevant if true.

Therefore, what unifies all these examples of interpretive use is that the hearer, guided by the principle of relevance, will identify what types of features are shared between the utterance that he is interpreting and the original thought that the speaker is trying to communicate.

Some works have also turned to the interpretive use to explain linguistic phenomena such as the subjunctive mood (see Rouchota 1994, Papafragou 2000, Ahern 2001, 2004) or figurative uses (metaphorical use) (see Carston 1997, 2002 (Chapter 5); Sperber & Wilson 1998; Wilson & Sperber 2004; Wilson 2004, Vicente 1995). The interpretive -descriptive distinction together with the notion of higher level explicature has actually made the RT framework able to account for phenomena that was not easily accounted for in previous accounts.

4.6.1. Propositional attitudes

In the philosophical and linguistic literature, works on propositional attitude have focused on the notion of reporting someone's belief (attitude reports) and in particular on the status of the 'that clause' used in this type of report sentences[32] (see Jaszcolt (ed), 2000(a)). Among the main concerns in the philosophical tradition one can point out the debate about how sentences are held to be

[32] In some studies they also include those examples in which the report clause has the first person as the referent : *'I believe that, I want that, I doubt that...'*(see Jaszcolt 1999)

ambiguous between a *de re* (transparent) and a (*de dicto*) reading (see Jaszcolt 1999 and forthcoming).

(13) Max believes that the king of France is bald (Jaszcolt 2000(b): 2).

In the (*de re)* interpretation the reporter ascribes to Max a belief about a particular, known individual. On the other hand, in the (*de dicto*) reading she states that Max believes in the existence of such an individual.

In relation to these examples of attitude reports, Bezuidenhout (2000) proposes a RT analysis of the 'that clause' as encoding procedural meaning that specifies that this clause is an example of interpretive meaning. The procedure that is encoded by any attitude description of the form 'S *ϕ's* that p' uttered in a context C is as follows:

> "Assign a content to S's attitude *ϕ* that resembles in contextually appropriate ways the content that would be expressed by the speaker if were she to sincerely utter the sentence *p*" (Bezuidenhout 2000: 139).

In RT, however, the notion of propositional attitude covers a wider range of phenomena. As mentioned above, Wilson and Sperber (1990, 1993) claim that the hearer has to make inferences to get to the proposition conveyed and additional inferences to recover the higher level explicatures, i.e. the speaker's attitude to the proposition and the type of speech act that she is intending to perform. The representation of the propositional attitude consists of a subject, who expresses the propositional attitude, a specific verb that encode a specific attitude or range of attitudes, and the clause to which the attitude applies. Among the range of linguistic phenomena that seem to contribute to the communication of these propositional attitude we can distinguish between those that encode conceptual meaning and those that encode procedural meaning.

4.6.1.1. Conceptual expressions contributing to the propositional attitude

Regarding conceptual expressions, one could, for instance, mention sentential adverbs (Ifantidou-Trouki 1993(a), Ifantidou-Trouki 2001, 2005, Wilson 1991), parentheticals (Ifantidou-Trouki 1993(b), 1998(a)) and reformulation markers (Blakemore 1993). In RT, most of the research on these conceptual particles has been as a reaction to those studies in the Speech Act tradition[33] that failed to make distinctions between their different defining features. In the Speech Act tradition they were described as non truth conditional elements, which served the function of indicators that were semantically external to the sentence (Ifantidou-Trouki 1993(a): 69, Ifantidou-Trouki 2001, 2005). RT analyses seem to be a step further by classifying the nature of these particles and clarifying the level of interpretation to which their meaning contributes.

Sentential adverbials have been classified into four groups: illocutionary, attitudinal, evidential and hearsay adverbials, as illustrated below.

> a. Frankly, I'm bored.
> b. Sadly, Paul's car was stolen.
> c. Evidently, Bill has cheated in the exams.
> d. Allegedly, the cook has poisoned the soup. (Ifantidou-Trouki 1993(a): 66-67)

In Relevance Theory all these sentential adverbs share the feature of encoding conceptual information (see Ifantidou-Trouki 1993(a)[34], Wilson 1991). However, they do not contribute to the process of utterance understanding in the same way (see Ifantidou-Trouki 1993(a), 1993(b), Wilson 1988). The test of truth conditionality, which consists of embedding the examples into the logical operator '*if...then*', proves that the information encoded in the adverbial contributes to the truth conditions of the utterance only in the last two examples. Evidential

[33] See Bach and Harnish 1979, Austin 1946, Austin 1962, Urmson 1963, Strawson 1971, Palmer 1986, Chafe 1986.

[34] Among the arguments to test the conceptual nature of these adverbials they posit: the option of being true or false in their own right, the existence of synonymous manner adverbials and the feature of compositionality (see Ifantidou 1993(a): 85-86).

adverbials, on the one hand, have an effect on the degree of commitment to the claim (Ifantidou-Trouki 2001: 147), and hearsay adverbials, on the other, indicate that the basic proposition is not a reflection of the speaker but of someone else's view, i.e. the speaker does not commit to its truth (ibid 148).

Therefore, despite sharing the feature of encoding conceptual information, these adverbials differ in their contribution to the truth conditionality of the utterance. As regards their overall contribution to relevance it seems that the first two examples can be described as examples that communicate two separate utterances[35], each with its own truth conditions (one of which may be much more important or relevant than the other). The separation of the utterance into two propositions is supported by the fact that sentential adverbials, as well as parentheticals, have the comma intonation and the free position in the sentence, which suggests that these constructions are independent of their host clause[36]. On the other hand, in the last two examples, there is just one proposition, and in the case of the hearsay adverbs it is an examples of interpretive use.

In fact, this classification of the two types of sentence adverbials, can be linked to the distinction between main clause parentheticals (14) and true parentheticals [37](15), (16), as illustrated below:

(14) *I wonder* whether he is coming

(15) He is coming, *I wonder*

(16) He is, *I wonder,* coming

In the Speech Act Theory, as happens with the sentence adverbials, parentheticals were all accounted for as indicating rather than describing some speech act, which

[35] This option then is similar to the one proposed by Speech Act theorists (see Recanati 1987: 36-40).

[36] Interestingly, Bach (1999) also favours an analysis of utterances with *but* as encoding more than one proposition, however when he deals with utterance modifiers such as some discourse uses of *but*, or *nevertheless* he does not allow this option. (See criticism in Blakemore 2002).

[37] Rouchota 's (1998©) work on parentheticals is interesting because she adds to this group discourse connectives such as *nevertheless, moreover*, which share defining features of comma or intonation. Her proposal then implies a change in the view of parenthetical as exclusively encoding conceptual information and contributing to the explicit side of communication. Instead, there are also examples of parentheticals that encode procedural meaning and contribute to the implicit side.

did not contribute to the truth conditionality (see Urmson 1963, Strawson 1971). The difference between the two types was accounted for in terms of stylistic differences and its function was described as weakening the assertion (see Urmson 1963: 224-225). Parentheticals[38] were conceived as signals to help the reader to assess and understand what was said. They were not part of what was said and they were considered to be separate speech acts (or utterances)[39](Urmson 1963: 239).

Relevance theorists (Ifantidou-Trouki 1993(b), Rouchota 1998(a), Blakemore 1996) disagree with this view and argue that first of all, given the conceptual nature of these constructions[40], their function could not be equated to that of procedural expressions that also contribute to the explicit content, such as mood, punctuation, intonation or manner of expressions (see Austin 1946: 103). They argue that in the first example (main clause parenthetical), the parenthetical contributes to the basic explicature (i.e. to the truth conditions of the utterance). In the last two examples, on the other hand, true parentheticals contribute to the higher level explicatures (i.e. they do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance, but they may be true or false in their own right)[41].

Therefore, these true parentheticals, like the attitudinal or illocutionary adverbials, are treated as separate units[42], which do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance, but have their own truth conditions. Their function is to comment on the relevance of the host utterance. As Blakemore (1996) says, adopting Hand's (1993) terminology, the parentheticals *'fine tune'* the explicature so that the speaker communicates her degree of commitment (1996: 336). Therefore, the main contribution will be the one of the host utterance:

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[38] For an account of parentheticals as conventional implicatures see Jayez, J. & C. Rossari, 2004.

[39] This contrast with real performatives such as 'I bet .. or I guarantee', which are analysed as examples of doing (rather than orientating) and are analysed as single speech acts (see Ifantidou 1993(b)(196).

[40] The arguments put forth for a conceptual account of these expressions were: the possibility of charge or untruthfulness in their use, and the compositionality (Ifantidou 1993(b): 202). The same applies for apposition markers (see Blakemore 1996: 333-334).

[41] To assess whether they contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance they use different tests, such as for instance the embedding in logical connectives such as *although* and *because*, which indicate that only the first example *'I wonder'* falls within their scope (see Ifantidou 1993(b): 199-200).

[42] This idea has been supported by other works (see for instance Fabb 1990, Espinal 1991)

> "intuitions about the truth conditions of the utterance as a whole will be intuitions about the subpart of it which makes the major contribution to relevance" (Ifantidou 1993(a): 89)

Therefore, both illocutionary and attitudinal adverbs and true parentheticals share not only the conceptual nature but also their contribution to the higher level explicatures. They do not contribute to the truth conditionality of the utterance and their analysis has to be taken as encoding two different propositions that have different strength of relevance. On the other hand, evidential and hearsay adverbs share with main clause parentheticals the conceptual meaning and their contribution to the truth conditionality of the utterance.

Similar to the analysis of both sentential adverbials and parentheticals, Blakemore (1996) presents her account of reformulation markers (*in other words, that is, that is to say, in short*), which also encode conceptual meaning[43]. They contribute to the explicit level of representation but not to the truth conditionality of the utterance. She rejects the view that these markers are guides for the identification of coherence relations (Knott and Dale 1994, Sanders et al. 1993, Hobbs 1979). Instead, she claims that they guide towards the most optimally relevant representation of the utterance, by means of encoding concepts that once developed contribute to the higher level explicatures communicated by the utterance. For instance, reformulation markers such as *in other words*, *in short* in discourse uses signal that what follows is relevant as an interpretation of a thought, with which it shares logical and contextual implications (Blakemore 1996: 338). Therefore, these markers indicate that a proposition stands as a representation of another utterance. This creates in the hearer expectations of faithfulness to this other representation, since the speaker is not committed to the truth of its propositional form. For instance, in the example below:

(17) A: We will have to let her go
B: *In other words/in short*, she's fired. (Blakemore 1996: 338)

The speaker, rather than communicating her belief that she is fired, is only expressing her belief that this is how the previous utterance can be interpreted

[43] See also Fraser 1990

(ibid. 340). Blakemore then explains that in this type of examples then the higher level explicature would read as:

a) The speaker believes that P is a faithful representation of a thought Q

rather than.

b) The speaker believes that P (where P is the propositional form of the utterance) (ibid 340).

Andersen and Fretheim (2000) also point out that together with the traditional parenthetical expressions, there are also final position particles such as *maybe* or *then* that encode a weak degree of commitment to the proposition expressed, as illustrated below:

(18) Paul is tired, maybe?

(19) Paul is tired, then

These examples are also clear cases of interpretive use, since they do not describe Paul's psychological state but represent the speaker's interpretation of a thought she attributes to her interlocutor[44].

4.6.1.2. Procedural expressions contributing to the propositional attitude

To derive the propositional attitudesintended by the speaker the hearer does not have to rely only on conceptual expressions. There are also procedural units such as for instance syntactic marking by means of sentence type (declarative, interrogative, imperative, exclamative), intonation (see Escandell-Vidal, 1998 2000, 2001, Hidalgo Navarro 2000), morphological marking of mood in verbs (indicative, subjunctive), (see Rouchota 1994, Papafragou 2000, Ahern 2001, 2004), different types of particles such as *eh* or *huh?* (see Ifantidou-Trouki 1993(a), 1993(b), Ramírez Gelbes 2003, Andersen and Fretheim (eds.) 2000).

[44] These examples support RT view that not all declarative sentences can be accounted for in terms of assertions.

Andersen, G. & T. Fretheim, 2000 (eds.) presents collection of articles that discuss how some pragmatic markers contribute to different types of propositional attitude such as surprise, animosity, newsworthiness, affective stance, epistemic commitment, lexical commitment, guarantee of relevance, mutual manifestness and general consensual truth. Gisle Andersen (2000), for instance, accounts for the pragmatic marker *like* as a signal for the hearer that a less than literal interpretation of the utterance is the most relevant one. This account seems to formulate the function of *like* in terms of expression of attitude, which resembles Stubbs' (1986) claim that *like* indicates reduced 'lexical commitment' towards the linguistic material that falls in its scope (interpretive resemblance). Regina Blass (2000) analyses *after all* in different languages (English, German and an Afro-Asiatic language) claiming that it is a secondary constraint in the interpretational procedure that indicates mutual manifestness[45]. This departs from Blakemore's previous analysis of *after all* as a constraint on the implicit level. She argues that *after all* is linked to the speaker's wish to strengthen or weaken preceding propositions or held assumptions. This means that *after all* encodes a procedure for constructing an explicature on a higher level. Finally, in the Hispanic tradition, Ramírez Gelbes (2003) presents an analysis of the particle *eh* as an example of procedural content that constrains higher level explicatures. She explains that the instruction encoded by this particle can be explained as "take this utterance as an utterance where the speaker says what she says seriously" (Ramírez Gelbes 2003: 157).

As discussed here, the communication of the propositional attitude can be done by means of conceptual or procedural content. RT provides a good framework to reflect the fact that in interactive discourse one not only expresses propositions, but also different attitudes. However, further research is required to fully understand how this is actually communicated. This thesis aims to contribute to this research by adding some connectives to the list of units that contribute to make mutually manifest some propositional attitude.

[45] In RT they opt for mutual manifestness instead of mutual knowledge because they don't rely on what is actually known by the participants but those assumptions that can be perceived as true by both of them in a particular context.

4.7. Introduction to Relevance Theory accounts of *but*

This section will review some attempts within the theoretical framework of Relevance Theory (RT) to explain the role of the connective *but* in the process of utterance comprehension. Blakemore (1987, 1989, 2000, 2002) has been the most influential work in this tradition, being the reference for all subsequent work carried out in this framework. As will be discussed below, different authors have modified Blakemore's account of *but* either by adding some uses that had not been previously discussed (V. Rouchota 1990, I. Higashimori 1992(a), 1992(b), 1995 and C. Iten 2000(a)) or by presenting a different definition of the function of *but* in the process of utterance understanding (C. Iten 2000(a), 2005, A. Hall 2004, 2007). In the next section, we briefly sketch out the RT approach to discourse connectives in general before moving on to discuss the account of *but*.

4.8. Discourse connectives in RT

Blakemore (1987) presents an analysis of discourse connectives that differs significantly from other contemporary accounts in the coherence tradition. There is a large number of contemporary works that have analysed discourse connectives[46] as linking devices and markers of coherence relations (Schiffrin 1987, Fraser 1990, Redeker 1991, Mann and Thompson 1988). Blakemore, however, studies discourse connectives such as *after all, but, so* from a cognitive point of view. She concludes that the function of these items should not be described in conceptual terms, as was the norm in coherence based analyses. She instead suggests an account for these connectives as procedural expressions[47] that encode instructions to guide the hearer towards an optimally relevant interpretation of the representation they introduce (see also Wilson and Sperber 1993, Unger 1996). She explains that the principle of relevance that rules

[46] Different authors have called the same units with different names; for instance Schiffrin, (1987) calls them 'discourse markers', Fraser (1996) 'pragmatic markers', Abraham (1991) 'discourse particles', Ducrot et al. (1980) 'mots du discours', Redeker (1991) 'discourse operators', Knott, (1994) 'cue phrases'(see Jucker 1998:1)

[47] See also Sperber and Wilson (1986/95); Wilson and Sperber (1993); and Rouchota (1996) for a selection of further references on procedural analyses of discourse connectives. Furthermore, in RT this idea of procedural meaning has been used to account for many different linguistic items that constrain not the effects but the derivation of both propositions at the explicit as well as the implicit level.

communication justifies having a mechanism that the speaker uses to save the hearer's effort in recognising the intended effect:

> "Their sole function is to guide the interpretation process by specifying certain propositions of context and contextual effects. In a relevance-based framework, where the aim is to minimise processing costs, the use of such expressions is to be expected" (Blakemore 1987: 77).

Blakemore claims that connectives such as *therefore, thus* and *so* contribute to the effect of deriving a contextual implication, that *after all*[48] is linked to the effect of strengthening an implication and that *but, however* and *nevertheless*[49] constrain the derivation of the effect of contradicting and eliminating an assumption (Blakemore 1992: 137-142). This initial proposal fails to account for the differences among the connectives within each group, which in fact was also a weakness of many coherence-based analyses[50]. Blakemore (2000) overcomes this shortcoming by expanding her description of discourse connectives not only as instructions towards a particular cognitive effect but also as constraints on context selection[51](see Blakemore (2000, 2002) for an analysis of the differences between related connectives such as *but, nevertheless* and *however*).

Henceforth, RT analyses discourse connectives from a cognitive point of view[52], focusing on the type of semantic meaning encoded and the way they contribute to the processes of utterance interpretation. It is argued that if these expressions contribute to the connectivity of discourse, "it is connectivity which derives from the way the use of these expressions achieve relevance" (Blakemore 1996: 346). Coherence relations are simply seen as a by-product of the interpretative process guided by the principle of relevance (see Blakemore 1987, 1988, 2002, Blass 1990, 1993, Unger 1996, Rouchota 1998(c)).

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[48] Later in the thesis we will see a more recent account of this connective given by Blass (2000).
[49] See also Blakemore 2000, 2002.
[50] See Blakemore 2002 for criticism on other accounts of *but.*
[51] In Blakemore (2002), for instance, she also adds to her account of connectives the analysis of the particle *well,* claiming that rather than being linked to any particular cognitive effect, its function was to guide the hearer towards the presumption of relevance (Blakemore 2002: 128-148).
[52] It contrasts with other coherence accounts whose purpose is the study of the marking of coherence relations (Mann and Thompson 1988, Sanders et al.. 1992, 1993) or coherence planes (Schiffrin 1987, Redeker 1991).

Finally, it is also important to point out that in RT two types of connectives have been identified; on the one hand, some connectives such as *because* encode conceptual meaning and contribute to the explicit part of communication (see Blakemore 1987, Rouchota 1998(d)); on the other hand, there are also procedural connectives such as *but, so, after all*[53], which instruct the hearer on how to manipulate a representation in order to arrive at the intended interpretation (see Blakemore 1987, Rouchota 1998(c)).

Taking a broader view of discourse connectives, one could include in this group conceptual units such as sentential adverbials. As described above, they contribute to the higher level explicatures. Furthermore, it is important to note that not all procedural connectives constrain the implicit import. Procedural expressions such as the particle *eh* in Spanish constrain the derivation of the higher level explicatures. In this thesis, however, we will limit our analysis to a restricted group of procedural connectives, whose function has been traditionally described as constraining the implicit import of the utterances.

4.9. Blakemore's Relevance Theory analysis of *but*

4.9.1. Introduction

After this very brief review on how discourse connectives have been studied and classified based on their cognitive characteristics, we now turn to review the analyses of the procedural discourse connective *but*[54]. Blakemore (1987) presents the first RT account of *but*, not as a marker of coherence relations but as a constraint on the derivation of implicit content. She argues that analysing *but* as encoding procedural rather than conceptual meaning provides a good explanation for its lack of contribution to the truth conditionality of the utterance. She explains that the procedural meaning encoded by *but* saves the hearer processing effort by constraining the inferential computations that establish the relevance of the

[53] There have been claims that some connectives may encode both procedural and conceptual information (Takeuchi, M. 1997, 1998).

[54] Wilson and Sperber (1993) provided three tests to distinguish procedural from conceptual meaning: firstly, it cannot easily be brought to consciousness; secondly, it is not truth evaluable; thirdly, the test of compositionality: *but* cannot combine with anything else to form a compound unit. See also Iten (2000(a): 157) and Hall (2007) for a defence of the non-conceptual meaning of this connective.

utterance it introduces. The speaker uses *but* to indicate that the utterance it introduces has the cognitive effect of contradiction and elimination of an existing assumption. Moreover, *but* also constrains the interpretation of the preceding clause from which the hearer may derive the proposition that is logically inconsistent with the *but* utterance[55]. As will be shown below, this idea of linking the function of one connective to the indication of a particular cognitive effect, although appealing at first, seems inadequate when analysing some of the uses of this connective (see Hall (2003, 2004) for criticism).

4.9.2. Denial and contrast uses

Blakemore (1987, 1989[56], 1992, 2000, 2002) presents an analysis of *but* as a single constraint on relevance. In her initial accounts (Blakemore 1987, 1989), she focuses on Lakoff's (1971) distinction between the denial of expectation and the semantic opposition uses (or contrast use[57], as she calls it). She argues that the role of *but* in the examples of denial of expectation is to encourage the hearer to process the utterance introduced by *but* in a context that allows the derivation of a proposition logically inconsistent with one derived from the preceding utterance (Blakemore 1987: 130, 1989: 25).

> "In a situation in which a hearer has an immediate access to an assumption P any utterance U which conveys not-P will be taken as evidence of the speaker's belief that the evidence for not-P is stronger than that which the hearer has for P and hence that P should be abandoned. In such a situation we shall say that the proposition expressed by U is relevant as a denial" (Blakemore 1989: 25).

This first group is then divided into direct and indirect denial of expectations, both sharing the function of denying a proposition, which is not part of the propositional content of the sentence just uttered, but of its interpretation (1987: 129). The difference between these two types is that in the direct type the *but*-

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[55] She also allows for the possibility of contradicting and eliminating an assumption made by another speaker.

[56] As we will see in this chapter the main divergence from her unitary account was in her work in 1989. All the other works seem to follow the same line of analysis with some redefinitions on the status of the assumptions that are contradicted and eliminated.

[57] This change in the nomenclature is due to the fact that not all the examples that belong to this group can be claimed to be opposite from the semantic point of view.

utterance is relevant as a denial (i.e. contradicts and eliminates an assumption) in virtue of its explicit propositional content. For instance, in the example below:

(20) It is raining *but* I am going out.

but indicates that the explicit content of the utterance it precedes contradicts and eliminates the assumption *I am not going out,* which would be derived from *it is raining* (premise) combined with the assumption *'If it is raining, people do not go out'*. In the indirect type, on the other hand, the *but* utterance is a denial in virtue of its implicit content, as illustrated in the following example taken from Dascal and Katriel (1977):

(21) (A and B are discussing the economic situation and decide that they should consult an specialist in economics)
A: John is an economist.
B: He is not an economist *but* he is a businessman (Blakemore 1987: 129).

Blakemore claims that in these examples the implicature derived from the *but* utterance *John should be consulted* contradicts and eliminates the conclusion that could have been derived from the first utterance *John should not be consulted.* In the example (21) the second clause contradicts and eliminates the implications of the first in an indirect way.

In these examples of denial, the speaker uses *but* not only to indicate how the proposition it introduces is relevant. It also marks a connection between the pragmatic interpretation of the proposition it precedes and that of the previous clause, from which the denied proposition may be derived. There is, therefore, a relation between two propositions and each of the propositions is relevant in its own right. Blakemore (1989) argues that this is the feature that distinguishes the denial uses from the contrast uses, the latter being illustrated below:

(22) Susan is tall *but* Mary is short (1989: 28)

Blakemore (1989) explains that in contrast uses *but* functions as a conjunction and rather than leading the hearer to abandon an existing assumption, it indicates that

there is '*a property*' derived from the first conjunct that is to be denied by the utterance introduced by *but*. In (22) *but* simply draws to the difference in height between Susan and Mary. In this type of examples the two conjuncts are not relevant in their own right but as part of a conjoined structure.

However, this distinction is not evident in her later works (Blakemore 2000, 2002), where she seems to return to her initial proposal (Blakemore 1987) that accounts for the so-called contrast use in terms of denial of assumptions. Blakemore (2002), for instance, explains the function of *but* in (22) above as indicating the denial of the assumption that there is no contrast between the heights of the two subjects (Blakemore 2002: 101-2). We will elaborate further on this use later in this thesis; in the meantime, we simply note that there has been a significant change in her analysis.

Of the two generic uses of *but* pointed out by Lakoff (1971), it seems that only the denial use fits well in Blakemore's account. On the other hand, the contrast use has been more controversial not only for the inconsistency in relation to its conjunctive status but also for the uneasiness in accessing the assumption that is denied. As will be seen, other RT analyses (Iten 2000(a), 2005, Hall 2004, 2007) have also acknowledged this difficulty and have attempted to provide alternative explanations to include this use in their unitary accounts.

4.9.3. Correction use

To the two traditional uses of denial and contrast, Blakemore (2002) also adds the correction use of *but*[58]. This use was first studied in the RT tradition by Rouchota (1990), who notes that in Greek (as in other languages such as Spanish or German) it translates into a different connective. Iten (2000) also refers to it and, as will be discussed later, uses it as an argument to counter the view that the

[58] As pointed out by Iten (2000(a)), Blakemore (1989) mistakes the assumption that two different lexical items for the English *but* in languages such as German, Spanish and Hebrew corresponded to the distinction between the contrast and denial of expectation.

eliminated assumption is a manifest one. The formal features[59] of this use are the following:

Firstly, there is an explicit, unincorporated negation in the first proposition:

(23) It is not ambiguous *but* vague (correction)

(24) It is unambiguous *but* vague (denial) (Blakemore 2002: 108)

Secondly, there is omission in the second clause of the material that is shared with the first clause:

(25) He is not my grandson, *but* my nephew (correction).

(26) He is not my grandson, *but* he is my nephew (denial) (Blakemore 2002: 108).

Her account of this correction use of *but* says that both segments involved in these constructions achieve relevance by contradicting and eliminating the very same assumption. In an example such as (27) below, the assumption that is denied by both clauses is that *he is clever.*

(27) He is not clever *but* hardworking. (Blakemore 2002: 110)

Blakemore's explanation that the function of *but* in this case is to instruct the hearer to deny an assumption previously denied by the first proposition seems problematic. Other relevance theorists have acknowledged the difficulty of accounting for this use following a unitary analysis, which does not describe *but* as an ambiguous connective[60] (see Iten 2000(a), 2005, Hall 2003, 2004, 2007). In our analysis of the Spanish data, we will also account for the Spanish counterpart corrective connective *sino*. We will then discuss how its function differs from the one proposed for *pero* 'but'.

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[59] This description was first by Iten (2000(a)) based on the analysis given by Anscombre and Ducrot (1977: 33)

[60] See Iten 2000(a) for long discussion on this topic. Hall (2004, 2007) does not attempt to give an explanation but points out that its syntactic characteristics as conjoint structure seem to be compatible with the idea that there is a common effect of denial of the same assumption.

4.9.4. Objection uses

Blakemore (2002) also accounts for examples of *but* with no preceding utterance, which had been previously pointed out by other relevance theorists (see Higashimori 1992(a)[61], Rouchota 1998(c) Iten 2000(a)). Blakemore explains examples such as (28) claiming that *but* denies an assumption which is not derived from the previous utterance but provided by a state of affairs that is manifest to both speaker and hearer.

(28) (A gives B, who has just received a shock, a glass of wine)
But I don't drink. (Blakemore 2002: 109)[62]

As Iten (2000(a))[63] points out, Blakemore is able to account for these uses because, unlike many other theorists, she does not rely on the existence of some previous utterance or act of communication (R. Lakoff's 1971, Quirk 1972[64], Anscombre & Ducrot's 1977, D & K's 1977, Bell 1998). However, we would suggest that the use of the connective in these examples of objection should go beyond the indication of denial. In effect, as will be shown later, the fact that in Spanish the objection *but* translates as two connectives — one adversative and one conditional — may shed some light on how to provide a better description for the function of *but* in this context (see Almela 1985, Montolío 1990, Schwenter 1996(a), 1996(b), 2001, and Fuentes 1998(b))

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[61] As we will see later Higashimori refers to a wide range of uses of *but* that had not been studied by Blakemore; Unfortunately, in later accounts Blakemore does not seem to acknowledge Higashimori's work, although she refers to some of the uses after they had been identified by Iten (2000(a)).

[62] Interestingly, Bach (1999) distinguishes between the use of *but* that contributes to the truth condition and is a sentence modifier from those uses of *but*, such as these discourse initial or objection uses presented here, that are described as utterance modifiers "used to introduce a reason or evidence against something previously asserted" (1999: 358).

[63] Iten (2000(a)) refers to both discourse uses such as (28) above as well as other initial discourse uses that that were accounted by Bell (1998) as cancelling "the topic domain". She then claims that they could all be successfully dealt with the unitary denial account proposed by Blakemore (Iten 2000(a): 130)

[64] These examples are also an obstacle against Quirk's definition of *but* as an example of concessivity: 'concessive conjuncts signal the unexpected, surprising nature of what is being said in view of what was said before that' (Quirk, 1972: 674)

The view that prevails in Blakemore's works[65] is that all the uses of *but,* identified by her and other relevance theorists, are linked to the cognitive effect of contradicting and eliminating an assumption that has to be manifest to the hearer (not necessarily as an implication from what has been said before), as described below:

> "If the use of *but* is linked to the cognitive effect of contradiction and elimination then it will be acceptable only in those contexts in which the interpretation of the utterance prefaced by but includes an assumption which is contradictory to an assumption that is presumed to be manifest to the hearer" (Blakemore 2002: 109) (my emphasis).

As seen earlier, in RT a 'manifest' assumption is:

> "A fact that is manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at the time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true" (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 39).

However, even within RT, this account of *but* has not been universally accepted. In fact, different authors in this tradition have cast doubt on both the cognitive status of the eliminated assumption and the actual cognitive effect linked to it. We will discuss this later (see 4.12), but first, we will look at another controversial issue that has also been the focus of attention of most works in this field.

4.9.5. Blakemore's examples: in search of the denied assumption

If an utterance has the cognitive effect of contradiction and elimination, one would expect the assumption being denied to be clear and salient. However, if we look at some of Blakemore's examples, this does not always seem to be the case. In fact, it appears that in order to account for all the examples in terms of denial, she sometimes resorts to explanations that go against our intuition. For instance, in the next example:

(29) A: What was the weather like this winter?
B: Well, it was wet at the beginning *but* it went really dry after Christmas. (Blakemore 2002: 101)

[65] With the exception of her 1989 account.

Blakemore claims that the manifest assumption that is to be denied is that *'the weather was supposed to be uniform'*, which derives from the actual question itself. It seems difficult, especially for inhabitants of Britain or Ireland, to see why the hearer has to access the assumption that *'the weather was supposed to be uniform'* and take its denial as the relevance of the *but* utterance. Looking at this explanation, it seems that the hearer has to represent an (probably mistakenly attributed) assumption in order to eliminate it subsequently, which is clearly at odds with the way we naturally process this utterance.

It is also interesting to note that Blakemore (2002) draws attention to the possibility of examples where the denied assumption is not derived as an implication from the first segment but instead is presumed to be part of the hearer's encyclopaedic knowledge, as in the following example:

(30) New York was the windiest city in the USA *but* Chicago had light winds.
(Encyclopaedic knowledge, Chicago is the windiest city in the USA).

We assume that Blakemore is seeking to demonstrate with this type of example that the speaker may directly access the assumption that is denied, without having to rely on premises that combine with the content of the first utterance. However, it seems that if what is being denied in this example is that *Chicago is the windiest city in the USA*[66], this is not done by the *but* clause but by the preceding clause. Stating that *New York was the windiest city* implies that *Chicago was not the windiest city*, since it is impossible that two cities are simultaneously the windiest cities in the same country. On the other hand, there seems to be a way to account for this example following their traditional approach: the implication denied derives from the combination of both the first proposition and the general assumption that *Chicago is the windiest city in the USA.* That is if NY was the windiest city, then Chicago, which is known as the windiest city in the USA, would be expected to be very windy as well, which is obviously denied by the *but* clause.

[66] I presume that denied assumption should be that (*at that particular time*) *Chicago is the windiest city.*

This point raises the issue of how relevant the nature of the assumption that leads to the denied assumption is. If the relevance lies on the denial of an assumption, it is not clear why it should matter whether the premises used in the derivation of the conclusions are part of the encyclopaedic knowledge or of a more contextual type. Interestingly, as presented in earlier chapters, discussion on the nature of the premise involved in the inferential processes has arisen in both the English and the Hispanic tradition of analysis of *although* and *aunque*. We will return to this point to see how relevant it may be for a cognitive account like the one proposed in this thesis.

4.10. Does *but* encode *and* and something else?

4.10.1. Blakemore's proposal

The view that *but* could have *and* as part of its meaning has been a recurrent topic in the literature of *but* in general and RT in particular. As will be discussed here, there has been a good deal of confusion regarding this topic, due to the lack of differentiation between the syntactic and semantic features of these two conjuncts.

Blakemore (1989) argues that there are two types of *but* — contrast and denial — and only the former use works as a conjunction, i.e. *but* encodes *'and* plus something else' (1989: 24). She puts forward the following argument to support the view that the contrast use of *but* is an example of conjoined structure. Firstly, contrast *but* can also be conveyed by juxtaposed sentences and by the *and* conjunction:

(31) Susan is tall *but* Mary is short.
Susan is tall *and* Mary is short.
Susan is tall. Mary is short.

Secondly, P *but* Q in contrast cases can be embedded in the scope of a logical operator such as *'if...then* ', with the idea of contrast not being part of the truth conditions of the utterances. This seems to be an indication that the antecedent must simply be a conjoined proposition:

(32) *If* Susan is coming *but* Jane is not, *then* I shall cancel the lecture.

She then seems to assume that if *but* functions as a conjunction, it must also share some of the semantic features of *and*. She claims that the function of this contrast use of *but* is to guide the hearer to derive parallel sets of contrasting implications and each conjunct is to be relevant only by being part of a conjunction, i.e. the conjoined proposition has relevance over and above the relevance of its conjuncts taken individually (Blakemore 1989: 24). She argues that contrast *but* will then be different from the denial uses because the speaker does not derive P from the first clause, only to abandon it. Instead, the first clause provides the hearer with property (F) (i.e. tallness) that is to be negated by the second clause. In a contrast example such as (33), what *but* indicates then is that the hearer should derive a proposition of the form *not* (F(Bill)).

(33) John is tall *but* Bill is short.

To sum up, Blakemore (1989) presents the contrast *but* utterances as resembling *and* utterances, both syntactically and semantically.

On the other hand, in Blakemore (1987) and her post-1989 works, she argues against the distinction between the contrast and the denial *but,* favouring a unitary account of *but* in terms of denial. She interprets the so-called contrast uses as involving something more than drawing the contrast between two facts. For instance, in (34) below, there is an assumption derived from the previous utterance, which would be *mine also vote Labour*:

(34) A: My parents vote Labour
B.1: Mine vote Tory
B.2: *But* mine vote Tory (Blakemore, 1987: 134).

The fact that *but* cannot be replaced with *and* is used as an argument to reject the view that this *but* utterance is a conjoined utterance. Another argument is that while *and* can conjoin any number of propositions, *but* can only draw attention to

a binary opposition[67]. She argues that this restriction in the number of elements to be contrasted by *but* is as a good indicator that the function of *but* should go beyond the idea of simply drawing attention to a contrast. Finally, the fact that the order of the propositions cannot be exchanged without modification in the interpretation is further proof that there is more than contrast involved in the *but* examples. For instance in the example below:

(35) Mary voted Labour, Susan SDP, Anne Tory, *but* Jane did not bother.

It appears that *but* is not simply used to indicate that there is a contrast between Jane on the one hand, and Mary, Susan and Anne on the other. If that was true, the order could be exchanged with no modification in the interpretation, which is not the case (Blakemore, 1987: 136). She then argues that in this example the hearer has access to a conditional proposition, with its consequent being denied by the proposition introduced by *but.*

(36) *If* Jane is like Mary, Susan and Ann, she would have voted for some political party.

Since she seems to understand the contrast use as being linked to the conjunctive nature of the connective, her rejection of this use leads her to reject the conjunctive feature of *but*. She then solves this problem by claiming that *but,* in all its uses, functions purely as a discourse connective. She concludes that her analysis of *but* suggests that there is "a discrepancy between syntactic representation and propositional form" (1987: 139). She explains that a sentence may be syntactically coordinate without pragmatically representing it as a conjoined proposition.

Her unitary description of *but* as a discourse connective suggests that the truth conditions of any example of *P but Q* fall out from the truth conditions of the

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[67] Higashimori (1992(a): 338) claims that there are examples of contrast and denial in which *but* can be used more than once. For instance:

(1) The first time John took the exam he failed, *but* the second time he succeeded. *But* that's not surprising.

(2) John is tall *but* his sister is short. *But* that's not surprising.

He then argues that *but* can be used as a denial of expectation (1) or contrast (2) sense twice at different levels of computation (i.e. (P but Q) but R). (See also criticism in Iten 2000(a): 157).

conjuncts, in the same way that they do in *P.Q*. It seems that Blakemore opts for differentiating *and* from *but* by depriving *but* of its own syntactic characteristic as a conjunct. As will be argued in this chapter, this is the result of failing to distinguish between the semantic and syntactic functions of these units.

As shown earlier, according to Blakemore (1987), *but* does not behave as a conjunction, i.e. as *and,* and therefore it cannot be described as a contrast marker. Instead it would be analysed as a discourse connective. Its function will then be accounted for as a single constraint on the relevance of the proposition it introduces, which is in fact dependent on the interpretation of the other (dependence relevance).

> "The notion of dependent relevance is a particular kind of coherence, namely the coherence achieved when information provided by one discourse segment is used in establishing the contextual effects of the next" (Blakemore 1987: 112).

Her proposal then is that *but* functions in all its contexts as a discourse connective. This makes it distinctive from *and*, which always behaves as a conjunction. However, this distinction fails to account for the fact that both *and* and *but* may share syntactic features in some contexts. Both can be discourse connectives or conjunctions, with each of them encoding a meaning that makes them distinctive from each other. We will now look at how other relevance theorists have accounted for this issue.

4.10.2. Rouchota's proposal

Rouchota (1990) agrees with Blakemore (1987, 1989) that *but* encodes one semantic constraint on the interpretation of utterances. However, she argues that *but* always has *and* as part of its meaning, which means that it always makes some contribution to the truth conditional content. In fact, she proposes a stronger view than that of Blakemore (1989), claiming that this applies not only to the contrast but also to the denial of expectation use. To support her claim, she uses the test of embedding the utterance in the scope of logical operators that Blakemore had used for her contrast examples:

(37) *If* John is a Republican *but* he is honest, *then* I will change my mind about the Republicans. (Rouchota 1990: 71)

She explains that, like the contrast examples, in the denial ones, the consequent will be true not if there is a denial implied but if the antecedent is a conjoined proposition.

A second argument in favour of the view that *but* is not a purely non-truth functional constraint on relevance is that unlike other discourse connectives, *but* can be in the *that clause* of reported speech.

(38) Mary said that Peter loves her *but* she does not love him. (Rouchota 1990: 72)

Finally, her third argument is that *but* cannot co-occur with *and,* as illustrated below:

(39) * Peter is not married *and but* he is always in the company of beautiful women. (Rouchota 1990: 73)

It seems clear that Rouchota manages to identify what is common for *and* and *but* examples at the syntactic level. Both are examples of conjoined structure and, therefore, their truth conditions will depend on the truth of each of the conjoints that they link. On the other hand, she also accounts for the differences between them in terms of the two types of coherence relations that they indicate. In the *and* examples, the coherence is established at the propositional level whereas, in the *but* examples, it affects the contextual effects (either the negation of a property (contrast) or the negation of a proposition (denial)). This suggests that *but* always shares the function of generating a relation of dependent relevance between the propositions it connects, as explained by Blakemore:

> "The coherence that arises when the information made available by the interpretation of one discourse segment is used in establishing the contextual effects of the next. This second type gives rise to the relation of dependent relevance" (Blakemore, 1987: 112).

The main difference between Rouchota's and Blakemore's account is that the latter rejects the view that *but* could indicate a relation of dependent relevance and also be part of a conjoined proposition, as expressed below:

> "The use of *and* gives the hearer an explicit indication that it is the relevance of a conjoined proposition that is being guaranteed. This means that we would not expect a speaker conforming to the Principle of Relevance to convey a relation of dependent relevance in a conjoined utterance" (Blakemore 1985: 9).

This rejection results from Blakemore's unfounded idea that sharing the syntactic feature of conjoined utterance with *and* involves adopting its semantic features as well. Rouchota's analysis, on the other hand, has no problem accounting for both the unitary account of *but* in terms of dependence relevance as well as its contribution to the truth conditions of the utterance. Rouchota maintains that the contribution to the truth conditionality of both *and* and *but* is that the utterances P *and* Q and P *but* Q are true if both P and Q together are true.

Rouchota claims that *but* and *although* are not purely non truth functional units. This feature distinguishes them from other connectives such as *therefore* and *after all,* which also generate a relationship of dependence. It seems, then, that this feature of contribution to the truth conditionality is her way of establishing the distinction between conjunctions and discourse connectives. However, this distinction fails to capture the fact that *but* may function not only as a conjunction, but also as a discourse connective.

Interestingly, Iten (2005) also seems to argue against this possibility when she states that:

> "It is hard to see how one and the same lexical item could function both as conjunction and as discourse connective" (2005: 155).

However, in the literature on connectives (see for instance Schoroup 1999, Schiffrin 1987, Fraser 1990,1993,1996, Bell 1998, Pons Bordería 1998, Fuentes 1987, 1998(a), 1998(b)); there has been general consensus that *but* and *pero* can function as both conjunctions and discourse markers (or extra sentential links). It seems that what makes Iten reject this dual use of *but* as discourse connective or

conjunction is her belief that this distinction corresponds to Blakemore's distinction between contrast and denial uses of *but*. This is, however, a false assumption, since it is possible to find discourse and conjunctive uses in the so-called denial uses.

4.10.3. Contribution to the truth conditions

Rouchota (1990) may be correct when she claims that the contribution to the truth conditionality of both *and* and *but* is that the utterances P *and* Q and P *but* Q are true if both P and Q together are true. We agree with her that it is a distinctive feature of the propositions containing conjuncts such as *and* or *but*. However, it is also possible for *but* to function as a discourse connective and then to have the structure P.Q. In this case the truth conditions would not result from the truth of P and Q individually. This, however, goes against Blakemore's (1987) and Iten's (2005) view, explained in the extract below:

> "Any utterance of *P but Q* is true just in case *P* is true and *Q* is true. In other words, truth-conditionally, *P but Q* clearly is equivalent to *P and Q*. However, if a speaker utters *P. Q*, then, surely, the full content of what she uttered will be true just in case *P* is true and *Q* is true. In other words, truth-conditionally the juxtaposition of *P* and *Q* seems to be equivalent to *P and Q*, too" (Iten 2005: 155).

It is unfortunate that Iten does not give any argument to support her view that the truth conditions of juxtaposed examples can be derived in the same way as individual sentences.

On the other hand, regarding the issue of truth conditionality, Blakemore and Carston (2005) point out that there is a significant difference in the way the semantics of *and* contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance in which it is inserted. This links with Rouchota's claim that *and* contribute to coherence at the propositional level. Blakemore and Carston (2005) state that in the *and* examples the presence of the conjunction affects the truth conditionality of the utterance, going beyond the truth of each of the conjuncts taken individually. For instance, in the following example:

(40) She jumped on the horse and rode into the sunset (Blakemore & Carston 2005)[68].

the truth conditionality does not depend on P and Q being true as independent units but it should also cover the enrichment of the semantic logical form into a representation like the following:

(41) She$_i$ jumped on the horse$_j$ at t_n & she$_i$ rode the horse$_j$ into the sunset at t_{n+1}. (Blakemore & Carston 2005)

As their account of the pragmatics of the *and*-utterances[69] says:

> "On this relevance-based account, every utterance in which two sentences are coordinated with *and* communicates three explicatures, one of which is conjunctive, the other two of which are the propositions expressed by the individual conjuncts" (Blakemore & Carston 2005: 589).

This contribution of *and* to the propositional (truth conditional) content does not happen in the examples with *but* since they argue that its meaning only affects the derivation of the implicit content. It is then clear that there is a significant difference in relation to the semantics and the truth conditional contribution of *and* and *but*.

We would like to finish this section, agreeing with Iten's (2005) claim that *but's* syntactic behaviour as conjunct or discourse connective should be taken as "semantically uninteresting as both would be encoding the same constraint" (Iten 2005: 155). We think it is clear that whatever meaning *but* encodes should be independent of (as well as compatible with) its syntactic features. As noted above, this discussion on the syntactic and semantic features of this connective has also been popular among those works in the Hispanic tradition. We will thus return to this idea when presenting our alternative account of the connective *pero*.

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[68] See also Carston 2000, 2002(b)for more discussion on the pragmatics of *and*.

[69] In fact, the fact that the pragmatics of the sentential *and* can be said to explicitly communicate not only the conjoined proposition (P & Q) but also the proposition expressed by the individual conjuncts (P), (Q) led Carston (2002) to re-define the notion of explicature as "a proposition communicated by an utterance is an explicature of the utterance if and only if it is a development of either a linguistically encoded logical form of the utterance or of a sentential subpart of that logical form".

4.10.4. Blakemore & Carston's analysis of the semantic/pragmatic differences between *and* and *but.*

We will now discuss how Blakemore and Carston (2005)[70] have described the difference between the meaning encoded in both *and* and *but,* using the following examples:

(42) Her husband is in hospital *and* she is seeing other men.

(43) Her husband is in hospital *but* she is seeing other men. [71]

On the one hand, in the example with *and* the speaker relies on the hearer's ability to see the contrast between what is communicated and the manifest assumption about what is expected of wives in those circumstances. This contrast leads to the derivation of some *emotional attitude,*[72] which is the result of the hearer's acceptance of the truth of this assumption[73]. On the other hand, in the example with *but* there are both the recognition of the contradiction between the stated and the assumption and an extra element of elimination. In the example with *but* the two segments seem to play a different role. The first conjunct is an input to the inferential process, which makes manifest an assumption (e.g. *she is having a bad time*). The second one is an input to the inferential process which results in a contradictory assumption (e.g. *she is having fun*), eliminating the assumption made manifest by the first segment.

The crucial difference, thus, between *and* and *but* is that in the first example the two segments play parallel roles in the inferential processes leading to a particular cognitive effect. In the *but* examples, on the other hand, the two segments play different inferential roles. In the examples with *but* the relevance is not derived from seeing both conjuncts forming part of an explicature. Instead, each conjunct

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[70] See also Blakemore (2002:105-108).

[71] This example was given by Kitis (1995, 2000) and she argues that the example with *and* indicates an attitude of surprise or outrage at the fact that the two conjuncts are true together.

[72] Carston (p.c.) suggested that this emotional attitude could probably be accounted in terms of higher level explicatures.

[73] This 'emotional attitude' conveyed in examples with *and* is not actually being encoded by *'and'*, the same way that in the examples of causal and it is not a meaning that is encoded but derived pragmatically from the context together with the constraints imposed by the conjunction.

is relevant in its own right and the inferential processes that take place in each conjunct are in conflict with one another.

From this discussion it has been made clear that there is a significant difference between the semantic-pragmatic meaning of *but* and *and*. In my opinion, this semantic-pragmatic distinction should be maintained and conceived as clearly distinctive from the fact that each of these connectives can behave as both conjunctions and discourse connectives.

4.10.5. Conclusion of the *and/but* issue

As we have seen from the above discussion of this issue, there is a degree of confusion resulting from failing to distinguish between the syntactic characteristics of *and* and *but* as conjunctions, on the one hand, and their semantic features on the other. There are some conjunctive examples of *but* where the truth of the conjunctive structure is true if both members linked are true. However, this does not imply that *but* encodes *and*, as seems to have been misinterpreted. It simply means that this is what follows from its status as a conjunction.

Based on the mistaken assumption that *but* has *and* as part of its meaning, there have been attempts to see if they both share the same pragmatic processes. This, however, has proved not to be the case. It is, in fact, this failure to differentiate between the syntactic characteristics and the semantic and pragmatic function of these units that led Blakemore to claim that "there is a discrepancy between the syntactic characteristics and the pragmatic ones" (Blakemore 1987: 139). However, it seems that rather than a discrepancy between these two characteristics, it would be more appropriate to say that *but* has its own syntactic and semantic characteristics and that it shares with *and* only the syntactic ones.

On the other hand, it is important to clarify that there are also discourse uses of both *but* and *and* that do not fit into the category of conjunctions (i.e. units that conjoin two elements that have the same syntactic status). In these uses, however, each of them will still preserve their encoded meaning, which is independent of

their syntactic status. Therefore, there is no need to claim that *but* only functions as a discourse connective as an argument to distinguish its semantics from the semantics of the *and* conjunction. Instead, we would argue that *but*, like *and*, can have both a conjunctive and a discourse connective use and that in both uses, they will keep their unitary semantic constraint in relevance.

As explained in chapter 2, discussion of the syntactic features has also been at the centre of debate in the Hispanic tradition. Not all authors agree with the view that examples with *pero* are examples of coordination. Some have opted for including these examples in a new syntactic relation known as 'interordination', which covers the idea of interdependence that distinguishes the examples with *pero* from other standard examples of coordination (see Rojo 1978, Rodríguez-Sousa 1979, Blesa 1984, Montolío 1990, Hernández Paricio 1992, Catalina Fuentes 1998, Cuenca 1991, Moya 1996). However, we believe that again this need to propose a different syntactic category simply results from the failure to distinguish between the syntactic and the semantic functions of these particles. We would, instead, agree with Fuentes' (1998) claim that the notion of interordination should be applied to the semantic rather than the syntactic level. We would then conclude that, regardless of whether it is agreed that *but* or *pero* have *and* as part of its meaning, i.e. are conjunction at the syntactic level, their semantics should be defined as independent from this syntactic feature and it should remain the same in all of its uses.

4.11. Higashimori's unitary analysis of further uses of *but*.

We summarised above Blakemore's unitary analysis for different uses of *but* (Blakemore 1987, 2000, 2002). Higashimori (1992(a)) attempts to apply Blakemore's (1987) unitary account of single constraint (denial of expectations) to some uses of *but*, discussed in the literature (Van Dijk 1979, Lauerbach 1979 and Spooren 1989)[74]. He identifies differences in the uses of *but* based on the

[74] However, he distinguishes between contrast and denial uses as having different characteristics; in the contrast use of *but* the contrastive parts bear contrastive stress, the order of the conjuncts can be freely exchanged and it can be paraphrased with *while* in the denial of expectation use, on the other hand, the contrary properties affect the whole proposition, the two conjuncts are irreversible

nature of the assumptions that are denied. It is unfortunate, however, that he does not explain how these differences are relevant in the process of interpretation and what exactly the hearer represents in each case. For instance, he explains the example below as a case of denied 'presupposition':

(44) A. Dan stopped beating his wife
B. *But* he has never beaten her.

He also presents examples such as the following where there is clash with Gricean maxims:

(45) This is just a minor point, *but*.....(quantity and relation).

(46) I am probably wrong, *but*.....(quality and relation).

(47) I am sorry to be vague, *but* .....(manner and relation).

He describes this use as "'discourse expectation denial', i.e. given that I have said this, you will expect to infer that, but you shouldn't" (Higashimori 1992(a): 342).

He also comments on those examples that show a relationship between *but* and politeness principles. For instance:

(48) I do not want to interrupt your thoughts, *but* do you think we might do a little talking? (Don't impose & *but*)[75]

(49) I do not want to prejudice your decision *but* ...(give options *but* ...)

(50) Now, I am sorry to be rude *but* I have some things in my mind (Be friendly *but*).

In these examples the denied assumption is some socially conventionalised knowledge that is derived from the first conjunct and that may be manifest to both speaker and hearer (1992(a): 343).

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and it can be paraphrased by *although*. As we discussed earlier this distinction is no longer accepted by Blakemore (1987, 2000, 2002).

[75] The first assumption in the first example of 'I should not say anything so not to interrupt your thoughts' is socially conventionalised knowledge (see Carston 1990).

Similar examples are extracted from Lauerbach's (1989) work, which includes examples such as (51), where there is a violation of a "Face Threateaning Act", preceded by a negative attitude of apologising:

(51) I'm sorry *but* you do not know the facts.

He also includes examples of the use of *but* and the illocutionary conditions, which he argues can also be accounted in terms of denial of expectations:

(52) A: Let's go (implies I am ready to go)
B: *but* I am not ready yet (Higashimori 1992(a): 341).

It is unfortunate that Higashimori claims to adopt a RT perspective but does not elaborate on what is different in all these examples from a cognitive point of view. He simply agrees that all the examples are easily accounted in terms of denial of expectations without any further explanation. In fact, he introduces in his analysis different pragmatic notions (presupposition, illocutionary conditions, face threatening act, maxims) taken from different theoretical frameworks without contextualising them within the framework of RT. It is not clear what assumption is that is denied in each example and how (or whether) the hearer represents it.

However, this work is of interest for our analysis because it presents a wider range of uses of *but.* Of particular interest is example (53), which has not really been discussed in the English tradition. It is one clear example where the effect of denial seems to fall on the speaker's rather than on the hearer's side:

(53) *But*, you had your hair cut! (Higashimori 1992(a): 340)

Higashimori, however, does not seem to have any problem applying Blakemore's analysis to this type of example, which views the function *but* as follows:

> "The speaker only continues with the *but* clause because she has grounds for thinking that the presentation of the first proposition has yielded a contextual implication that she wishes to deny" (Blakemore 1989: 27).

It is not clear that Blakemore's analysis could easily account for examples such as (53), where there is no implication that the speaker wants the hearer to deny. In

this example, on the contrary, the speaker seems to be communicating an attitude of surprise in relation to what she is seeing (which, in many cases, could actually be something that the hearer may have expected himself).

4.12. RT alternative account of *but*

4.12.1. Cognitive status of the denied assumptions: accessible vs. manifest

Iten (2000(a)) presents an RT analysis of *but* which provides minor modifications to Blakemore's proposal. She agrees with Blakemore that *but* encodes procedural meaning that guides the hearer towards the denial of an assumption. However, there is some disagreement regarding the cognitive status of the assumption that the hearer is instructed to abandon. In Blakemore's work, the contradicted and eliminated assumption is described as "an assumption held by the hearer" (1987: 128), "an assumption that is expected to be derived" (1989: 26), "a proposition understood as being part of its interpretation" (1987: 129), which in fact amounts to saying that the denied assumption must be manifest to the hearer. Iten (2000(a)) expresses the inadequacy of the status of 'manifestness' of the denied assumption to account for certain uses of this connective. For instance, in the examples of correction *but*, she observes that the assumption that is contradicted has already been denied in the previous utterance. In (54) for instance:

(54) She is not my mother *but* my sister.

The negative sentence *she is not my mother* makes accessible the positive sentence *she is my mother,* which is then contradicted and eliminated both by the utterance preceding and by that following *but*. This assumption, which has already been denied by the first clause, cannot be described as manifest, i.e. accepted as true or probably true, either to the speaker or the hearer.

Iten also feels the need to revise the status of the denied assumption, when attempting to explain the so-called counterfactual uses of *but,* illustrated in (55) below.

(55) Tom was meant to be here *but* his car broke down.

In this example the denied assumption, *Tom is here*, has clearly been made accessible by the first utterance but it cannot be said to be manifest, since it is in contradiction with a conversational implicature derivable from the first utterance.

Her solution to this inconsistency with Blakemore's account is to suggest that the status of the denied assumption should not be described as 'manifest' but merely 'accessible' in the context:

> "*but* indicates that the clause it introduces is to be processed as a denial, i.e. as an assumption that, either directly or indirectly, contradicts and eliminates an assumption accessible in the context" (Iten, 2000: 152)(my emphasis).

Iten explains that accessible assumptions are those assumptions that are merely 'entertainable' and don't necessarily have to be accepted as true or probably true. In fact, sometimes, they are more likely to be represented as false or probably false (Iten 2000(a): 160).

However, Iten (2005) herself, following criticisms from Hall (2004), withdraws her own claim that what is denied can be just an assumption that is accessible in the context, claiming that:

> "it is not clear what the hearer would gain from being informed that a certain accessible assumption, quite possible one he was never even going to consider should be eliminated. Indeed it is hard to see how something that was never represented as true or probably true could be contradicted and eliminated" (Iten 2005: 146).

Iten (2005) then goes back to support Blakemore's analysis of *but* as a procedure that instructs the hearer to deny a manifest assumption as the most suitable way to account for all its uses:

> "What follows Q contradicts and eliminates an assumption that is manifest in the context" (Iten 2005: 147).

With regard correction examples, she argues that the *but* clause contradicts and eliminates the assumption the first clause has not quite succeeded in eliminating, which in the example above (54) would be that *she is my mother*. She then explains that the use of *but* in this context is justified because the speaker thinks there is a possibility that an undesirable assumption could still be manifest to the hearer. On the other hand, she explains counterfactual examples like (55) following Hall's (2003) proposal that an implication from the *but* clause denies an assumption that could have been made manifest, e.g. *that Tom is at fault for not turning up*. However, it feels like her attempt to fit this type of example in the denial model proposed by Blakemore results in explanations that contradict our intuition about what is actually happening in these examples. In fact, if one takes a modified version of the counterfactual example like (56) below, one will probably find it difficult to account for it in similar terms:

(56) Tom was meant to be here *but* as usual he found himself a good excuse.

In her latest work, Iten (2005) clarifies that the cognitive status of the denied assumption is something stronger than just 'accessible' but weaker than 'intended to be manifest'. She explains that Blakemore's description of the denied assumption as being 'derived' from the first clause or the context (Blakemore 2000: 479) does not imply that the assumption is actually communicated, i.e. intended to be made manifest or more manifest by the speaker. Instead, it simply means that it has to be manifest in the context (2005: 144).

She also argues that accounting for the status of the assumption as being 'manifest' rather than 'expected' or 'represented' by the hearer provides a better tool to account for the controversial so-called contrast examples in terms of denial. For instance, she explains Lakoff's example, repeated below, saying that the denied assumption of *Bill being tall* is made "very weakly manifest" (2005: 149) by the description of John in the preceding utterance:

(57) John is tall *but* Bill is short.

Indeed, one can say that this redefinition of the cognitive status seems to be a step further (but still not convincing) in the attempt to maintain a unitary account of all the uses of *but* in terms of denial. The first solution was to downgrade the status of the assumption to being 'accessible'. Once this option is rejected, due to the inconsistency of linking the cognitive effect of contradiction and elimination with an assumption that may not be represented as true, she opts for a relaxation in the actual notion of 'manifestness'. However, it seems unclear how the relevance of the *but* utterance in a contrast example such as (57) can lie in the contradiction and elimination of a 'weakly manifest' assumption.

In fact, this same point was made by Hall (2004: 222), who claims that the only justified way of accounting for an utterance as having the effect of contradicting and eliminating an assumption is if the denied assumption is "strongly manifest – i.e. it does have to be mentally represented"[76] (2004: 222). Hall (2003, 2004, 2007), instead, postulates a modification of the actual function of the connective that is not linked to any particular cognitive effect. However, as will be shown below, Hall's analysis encounters similar difficulties to Blakemore's when accounting for certain uses of this connective.

4.12.2. Function of *but*: suspension vs. denial

Hall (2003, 2004, 2007) presents an alternative RT unitary account of *but* that attempts to compensate for some of the difficulties that have arisen from previous analyses. She supports Blakemore's conclusion that there are no pure contrast uses. However, she contends that the denial of expectation analysis, if defined as contradiction and elimination of a manifest assumption (or even the milder version of an accessible assumption) is too strong to account for all the uses of this connective.

[76]She refers to Blakemore's claim that "for an utterance to achieve relevance as a contradiction, it must communicate an assumption which is contradictory to an assumption which the hearer believes to be true" (2002: 111) [Hall's emphasis] (Hall 2004: 222).

For instance, she claims that if the analysis of denial of expectations were valid, the following example (58) would sound marked, as the proposition *so I don't know'* follows a supposedly eliminated assumption that *he can be relied on*[77]*:*

(58) A: Do you think we can rely on him?
B: Well, he's honest, but he's a Republican, so I don't know (Hall 2004: 221)

However, she argues that there is no sign of markedness in this type of example. This is because the *but*-clause does not eliminate the assumption that *he can be relied on.* Instead, it simply introduces an argument that points in a different direction. Her proposal for the function of *but* therefore is the following:

> "My suggestion for the constraint encoded by *but* is, then: suspend an inference that would result in a contradiction with what follows" (Hall 2004: 228).

The link between the connective and the effect of contradiction and elimination of an assumption is then replaced by an indication that what follows has to undermine a conclusion that the hearer may have drawn. The function of *but* is to instruct the hearer that:

> "The context provides some evidence compatible with a certain inference; an aspect of the interpretation of the *but*-segment contradicts the result of this inference, had it gone through, so *but* signals that the speaker doesn't want the hearer to draw some potential conclusion" (Hall 2004: 228).

Hall, therefore, agrees with Blakemore's original idea that *but* encodes procedural meaning[78], but accounted for in terms of a constraint to *cut off* or *suspend* a possible inference. She also shares the view that this connective is a mechanism to save the hearer's effort in reaching the intended interpretation. However, it is not very clearly explained how the suspension of a possible inference is to save the hearer's effort, especially, in the so-called contrast uses, where she claims that the assumption that is suspended may remain unrepresented by the hearer.

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[77] Iten (2005: 153) argues back claiming that if her account was right it should accept examples such as: "*Well, he is honest, but he's a Republican, so it could go either way*", which seems to be problematic.

[78] See Hall (2007) for long discussion in favour of an analysis of *but* in procedural terms.

Hall holds that her analysis of *but* in terms of cutting off a line of inference has an advantage over Blakemore's account because it does not restrict the status of the suspended assumptions within the boundaries of manifestness:

> "it allows for the conclusion being easily accessible but doesn't rely on it having been expected, or having been recovered, on the basis of the first clause and context alone, since the inference doesn't need to have gone through" (Hall 2007: 170).

Once she disregards the account of the connective *but* in terms of the cognitive effect of elimination of an assumption, there is no need to define the status of the targeted assumption as manifest. Instead, her analysis explains that there are different degrees of manifestness of the suspended assumptions, ranging from very strongly manifest to not even being represented by the hearer[79]:

> "The varying status of the conclusion(s) that the speaker wants to cut off with the but-clause–from actual expectations of the hearer, through to potential conclusions that, in the contrast-type cases, are not necessarily ever represented by him–can be accounted for in terms of their degrees of manifestness" (Hall 2004: 228).

At one of the extremes of this continuum she places the examples of the so-called contrast uses:

> (59) A: Do John and Bill live in the same town?
> B: No, John lives in Amsterdam *but* Bill lives in Rotterdam (From Foolen 1991) [80].

In examples such as (59) *but* does not indicate the suspension of one particular assumption. Instead, it indicates that what is undercut is a range of possible inferences that are not expected to be accessed or represented by the hearer.

> "this captures our intuitions about what happens in the contrast use, where *but* can look like it's being used just to draw attention to the fact that two things are different, without any concern for what the hearer might otherwise have concluded. It's difficult to identify where the potential contradiction might lie,

[79] Interestingly, Iten also mentions that the assumptions that are to be contradicted did not need to be represented by the hearer before the processing of the *but* utterance; however, unlike Hall's account, the representation is compulsory when the contradiction and elimination of the assumption takes place.

[80] Foolen uses this example to compare it with its equivalent with the conjunction *and.*

and *but* can be perfectly acceptable without the hearer needing to recognize what particular conclusions he is being diverted from" (Hall 2007: 231).

She explains that this underdeterminacy in the suspended inferences could be justified by our metarepresentation ability to manipulate different representation without being fully aware of its complexity.

At the other extreme, there are cases of clear denial of expectation, where the undermined conclusion is clearly represented by the hearer. For instance, in the following example:

(60) Anne is rich *but* unhappy.

The suspended assumption that is being cut off, *Ann is happy,* is derived from a combination of the first clause and background information. She claims that this assumption is "therefore represented and entertained by the hearer as false" (2007: 170). It is not clear then how this representation of a false assumption differs, if at all, from the traditional denial view.

With regard to the objection examples, she argues that there is also a line of inference being cut off. She explains that in examples such as (61) below, the speaker's use of *but* is an indicator that the previous statement uttered by the hearer is false and it is then this status of falsity that counts as a good reason to reject the inferences that could be derived from it:

(61) A: John is a Republican.
B: But he's honest!

It then seems that in both the denial (60) and the objection (61) examples, there is an identified assumption that is indicated as false. Due to the status of falsity of the assumption, the hearer is encouraged to suspend any inference that could be drawn from it. It seems then that Hall's account is very similar to Blakemore's analysis in terms of denial. However, Hall insists that the main difference is that the relevance of *but* does not lie in the contradiction and elimination of an existing manifest assumption as an end in itself, but instead:

> "the main relevance, even in denial uses, lies not in the contradiction and elimination of this assumption, but in getting the hearer to entertain the implicated premise and the fact that the state of affairs introduced by the but-clause is an exception – from which the cognitive effects of the utterance follows" (2004: 226).

Hall's explanation of the different interpretations of *but* is therefore based on the salience of the undermined conclusion and the relationship between the two conjuncts. However, as discussed earlier, there are very important differences in the salience of the conclusions, which make her account of the function of *but* as a unitary constraint on relevance difficult to sustain. Here we will look at the two extremes of the continuum described above. On the one hand, there are examples like the contrast ones, where the use of *but* is justified by the indication that there would be inferences (that the hearer may not be aware of and does not need to represent) that are being cut off. In this case, the idea of saving effort is justified because the hearer saves himself from deriving the inferences which would then result in a contradiction with the *but* utterance.

On the other hand, there are many other cases in which the inferences seem to be derived, and in these cases the hearer identifies the premise that leads to the conclusion that contradicts the *but* clause. Therefore, in these examples, the hearer represents the premises involved in the derivation of the conclusions that are represented as false. Hall also explains that in some of these examples the speaker then entertains the *but* clause as an exception. In the denial examples, therefore, it is not that obvious how the speaker is meant to save the hearer's effort by doing this. In fact, even if this were the case, it seems to be of a very different nature from the contrast examples. It appears that in the contrast examples, the cutting off takes place at the level of the inferences themselves and in the denial examples the cutting off seems to take place at the level of the actual conclusion.

In conclusion, in relation to the controversial examples of contrast, Hall can give a more plausible account than Blakemore's denial account. Hall does not rely on the identification of a specific assumption that is targeted and eliminated. Instead, she argues that *but* instructs the hearer to cut off an unspecified line of inference without even having to represent it. On the other hand, in the denial examples, it

seems that the process is very similar to Blakemore's, only that rather than indicating the effect as an end in itself, the instruction to suspend a possible inferential route (and conclusion) guides the hearer towards different cognitive effects:

> "The point of *but* is to contradict an assumption as a means to deriving further cognitive effects, which may be of any of the three kinds (strengthening, in the case of correction but on Blakemore's 2002 analysis)" (Hall 2004: 226).

Indeed, if the function of *but* is to "contradict an assumption" then it is important to know what its cognitive status is. If this assumption is strongly manifest then it is difficult to see how the relevance can lie only in indicating the contradiction but not the elimination of the conclusion. As Iten (2005) points out:

> "if there is an inference to be cut off, then there is also likely to be an assumption (conclusion) that is (or would be) the result of that inference. Since the but clause only occurs after the assumption that might have triggered an inappropriate inference, it is likely that the inference will have yielded an undesirable conclusion, which will have to be eliminated if the inference is cut off" (Iten 2005: 155).

It appears that the general idea of indicating contradiction rather than the actual effect of contradiction and elimination is essentially right. However, it does not seem clear how this helps to derive further cognitive effects. On the one hand, Hall favours an explanation of identifying an assumption as false from which no more inferences should be derived, which resembles very closely Blakemore's account. On the other hand, Hall also refers to the fact that the relevance lies in the identification of the premise and the status of exceptionality of the *but* clause. However, if the relevance lies in the identification of a contradicted assumption then the contrast examples require an alternative explanation, since there is no identified contradicted assumption. Therefore, it seems that this account lacks further clarification of what the unitary function of *but* is in all of its uses.

It is worth noting how Hall convincingly argues against the function of the connective as a constraint on a particular cognitive effect. Furthermore, it is also interesting that her analysis allows for the contradicted assumptions to be represented as being false (rather than denied) and that there is scope for the

accountability of the notion of exceptionality of the *but* utterance. This change seems to be, essentially, on the right direction. However, it is not always clear how all these ideas are linked to the encoded meaning of this connective in terms of suspending or cutting off inferences (or assumptions).

It is also very interesting that Hall points at the possibility of interpreting the *but* utterance as an exception, which derives from the constraints imposed by *but.* She explains this idea of exceptionality as part of the communicated implicit content of this type of utterance. In Lakoff's well-known example:

(62) John is a Republican *but* he is honest.

She claims that the constraint is at the level of implicatures and that the hearer should recover the implicated premise *most Republicans aren't honest* and thus the implicated conclusions *John is unusual for a Republican.* However, we will provide a different way of account for this unusualness as affecting the explicit level of content.

To finish with Hall's account, we would like to note that another significant drawback of her proposal is that her unitary account of suspension of possible inferences is unable to explain correction examples such as:

(63) She's not my sister *but* my mother.

She acknowledges this inadequacy, but attempts to map the line of research that an account of this use should follow:

> "A full account of correction but, then, is likely to involve the interaction of the conjunction reduction which encourages the correction reading, plus metalinguistic negation, and contextual factors which determine whether the correction or denial reading is preferred" (Hall 2007: 173).

4.13. Criticism of the RT alternative accounts of *but*

Hall's (2004, 2007) analysis can thus be described as the last in the attempts to weaken the cognitive status of those assumptions that are 'contradicted and eliminated' or 'suspended'. As outlined above, Blakemore supports the stronger version, since she claims that the assumption that is eliminated and contradicted must be manifest. Iten (2000(a)) attempts to redefine this position, claiming that the assumption does not necessarily have to be manifest but in some contexts (such as correction *but* and counterfactual *but*) could be just accessible. Even in her latest account (Iten 2005), in which she describes the cognitive status of the denied assumption as manifest, she allows for the possibility of denying assumptions that are not expected or represented by the hearer but can be accessed as true or probably true. Finally, Hall states that the different types of assumptions suspended by the *but* utterance may have different degrees of manifestness allowing for cases in which the suspended assumption may not even be represented by the hearer (as in the so-called contrast uses). Therefore, one can say that in Blakemore's account, the assumptions seem to be held in mind and believed to be true; in Iten's (2000(a)) they have to be held in mind but not necessarily believed to be true and, then, in later accounts (Iten 2005), she allows for non-expected or represented manifest assumption. Finally, in Hall's (2003, 2004, 2007) the assumptions are not necessarily held in mind but they are potentially derivable.

We would suggest that this need to weaken the assumptions from strongly manifest, to weakly manifest or even to not representing them at all raises the question of whether these accounts are on the right track in accounting for the function of this connective in terms of denial or suspension. On the one hand, in the denial examples, it does not make sense to speak of denial effects unless the assumption is manifest. On the other hand, in the suspension effect, it is not necessary for the assumption to be manifest, since it may not be represented at all; however, in this context it is difficult to see the relevance of suspending something that is not represented; and if it is represented, it is difficult to see how

Hall's account is different from Blakemore's account of elimination. My account will address this question and will give an alternative proposal that solves the problems arising from these works.

A weakness of all these RT accounts is that it is difficult to see how an expression can be accounted for as a mechanism to deny or cut off something that is not there but seems to be triggered by its presence. We believe that in both denial and suspension accounts, there should be answers to the following questions: Is the denied or suspended assumption previously represented by the hearer? and, if so, how?. In the case of the elimination, they seem to emphasise the idea that it has to be represented as manifest when processing the *but* utterance. On the other hand, in the suspension analysis, there is no need for this, and they allow for the extreme case where there is no representation of any suspended assumption. Instead, what is suspended is merely the inferential process that could lead to the assumptions itself. The problem is that there are many other cases in which the suspended assumption is actually identified and, therefore, it would have to be explained whether the connective plays a role in its derivation of these suspended assumptions or if the function of the connective is only restricted to mark the suspension effect. This is in fact one of the main disadvantages of these accounts, i.e. there is little said about how and why the actual assumptions are derived.

My alternative RT account of the connective *pero*, like Hall's (2003, 2004, 2007), rejects Blakemore's (1987, 1989, 1992, 2000, 2002) claim that the connective *but* is a non-truth conditional constraint on relevance, which directs the hearer toward a specific type of cognitive effect: contradiction and elimination of an assumption. On the other hand, we agree with the procedural non-truth conditional constraint to maximise relevance "by making their intention about the implicit content of their utterance manifest" (Blakemore, 1987: 127, 2000: 477). However, we will give a more convincing account of what implicit content is communicated, going a step further by specifying how this information can have some effects on the higher level explicatures of the *pero*-clause.

4.13.1. The role of premises

As discussed above, it is agreed that for an assumption to be denied by the *but* clause, it must be part of the speaker's cognitive environment. As noted by Rieber (1997), however, the denied assumption cannot be one that has been communicated by the speaker herself, because it is counterintuitive to think that a speaker would intentionally communicate a proposition that she does not want the hearer to derive. Blakemore (2000: 474) reacts to this criticism explaining that what is really happening in examples with *but,* such as that (64) below, for instance, is that the hearer recognizes that he is not only expected to abandon the conclusion, (66) but also to recognize that the inference from (65a) to (66) is illegitimate, and hence to abandon the contextual premises needed for its derivation (67).

(64) Her husband is in hospital *but* she is seeing other men.

(65) (a) Her husband is in hospital
(b) She is seeing other men

(66) She is not seeing other men

(67) If someone's husband is in hospital, then she will not be seeing other men

She then goes on to claim that:

> "indeed it is possible that the speaker's intention in producing the utterance in (67) was to get the hearer to abandon this assumption or to communicate that this assumption, which might be regarded as a particular instance of a social or cultural generalization is in fact false" (Blakemore 2000: 474).

However, we would agree with Hall (2003) that in these contexts the assumption that is accessed (the premise) to derive the assumption that is denied by the *but* utterance (conclusion) is strengthened rather than eliminated. Indeed, we believe that if the intention of the speaker were to deny the general assumption expressed in (67), it would have been done by using a conjunctive *and*, since expressing two facts happening together in a conjoined structure is a good argument against the claim that these two facts do not normally go together.

As we can see from the following example, the function of denying a general assumption would be better achieved using the conjunction *and* [81] rather than *but*.

(68) A: Every time it rains the flowers die.
B1: Last week it rained and the flowers looked beautiful.
B2: ?Last week it rained but the flowers looked beautiful.

On the other hand, it is interesting that Iten (2005) seems to interpret Blakemore's explanation differently. She argues that in an example such as:

(69) It was raining *but* Peter went out.

the speaker would be contradicting and eliminating not only the conclusion that *Peter did not go out* but also the assumption that *Peter does not go out in the rain* (2005: 152). Iten then agrees with Hall that the general assumption *People do not normally go out in the rain* is not denied but confirmed. However, even if this explanation seems somewhat more plausible than Blakemore's, we wonder how this would be compatible with an example such as the following:

(70) It was raining *but* Peter went out. He has never done it before.

It appears that this is a plausible example; however, if we were to take Iten's analysis it would not be acceptable since what is denied by the *but* clause is then contradicted by what follows. Therefore, we would conclude that in the examples with *but* it is very likely that the hearer will access some contextual assumptions, i.e. premises, which will be part of what is communicated; however, we would argue that the function of *but* is clearly not to invalidate these assumptions.

4.14. Conclusion

This chapter began by discussing some of the aspects of RT most relevant to our thesis, without attempting to give a full exposition of the theory. It then proceeded

[81] As we saw before, the function of *and* was based on the acceptance of the general assumption. I think, however, that the use of an *and* construction would fit a context in which one's intention is to deny a general assumption.

to review how the function of the English connective *but* has been explained in RT. Blakemore (1987, 1989, 1992, 2000, 2002) stands out as the most influential analysis, which has been the point of reference for other works such as Rouchota (1990), Higashimori (1992(a), 1992(b), 1995), Iten (2000(a), 2005) and Hall (2003, 2004, 2007). All of these have followed Blakemore's account of *but* as a single constraint in the inferential process, albeit with some modifications. Iten (2000(a)), for instance, argues that the assumption that is contradicted and then denied cannot be described as being 'manifest', but simply 'accessible' in the context. Hall (2004, 2007) rejects the link between the connective *but* and the cognitive effect of contradiction and elimination, opting for an analysis in terms of suspension of lines of inferences. Iten (2005) returns to the original idea of denying a manifest assumption, which does not necessarily have to be expected or represented. Iten (2005) also criticises Hall's alternative proposal, claiming that suspending an inference that would derive in a conclusion implies the denial of that same conclusion.

To sum up, there has been much debate on the idea of the cognitive status of the assumptions; on the one hand, Blakemore and Iten have tried to find the appropriate type of cognitive status of the assumptions so that their account of denial can be maintained. On the other, Hall opts for providing a different procedure, which does not involve so many constraints on the cognitive status of the assumptions involved. Finally, in relation to the number of uses of *but*, we have also discussed how some authors have extended the list while remaining faithful to the unitary account given by Blakemore (1987) (Higashimori 1992(a), Rouchota 1990 and Iten, 2000(a)). It is, however, interesting that Higashimori points to a discourse use of *but* that has been largely ignored and that does not seem to be easily explained by Blakemore's analysis.

This chapter has extensively discussed the issue of whether *but* in some (or all) of its uses may have *and* as part of its meaning. Blakemore (1989), for instance, seems to change her position in different accounts. In 1989, she suggests that *but* has *and* as part of its meaning in the contrast uses and therefore it behaves as a conjoined utterance, which in RT terms means that the relevance of the structure lies in the whole conjoined utterance and not in each of its conjuncts individually.

In 2002, she returns to what she had claimed in her original account (Blakemore 1987) and argues that all uses of *but* are examples of denial, which cannot be analysed as examples of conjoined utterances. This new position was then corroborated in a recent article that presents an extended view of the pragmatics of *and* (Blakemore & Carston 2005). In 1990, Rouchota adopts a more extreme stance and claims that, in fact, *but* has *and* in all of its uses (contrast, denial and correction). She claims that *but* always contributes to the truth conditions of the utterance while indicating a relation of 'dependent relevance', which means that each of the propositions is consistent with the principle of relevance individually. Finally, Iten (2000(a)) concludes that there is no reason to believe that the contrast and denial uses of *but* are simply two different uses of the one and same lexical item, which may or may not have *and* as part of its meaning. What really matters in this approach is that *but* encodes a single constraint on the interpretation of its host clause, which involves contradiction and elimination of an assumption *accessible* in the context. As we have attempted to prove, such confusion is the result of a failure to differentiate the syntactic from the semantic features of these conjuncts. In effect, this is similar to what happens in the Hispanic tradition, where the notion of interordination is adopted as the syntactic description of examples with *pero* when, in fact, it is simply a defining semantic feature.

Chapter 5
Our RT proposal for 'alternatives' account of *pero*

5.1. Introduction

As discussed in our review of the literature on *but* and *pero* (chapter 2), some authors have accounted for the function of this type of connective in terms of contrast. In fact, Blakemore's (1987) procedural account of *but* was partly a reaction to some coherence-based and pragmatic analyses that viewed this connective as a marker of contrast in conceptual terms. She instead opted for an alternative procedural analysis of *but* as a marker of denial of some manifest assumption. Regarding this notion of contrast, it is interesting to recall that in 1989 Blakemore attempted an account that incorporated the notion of contrast to explain some of the uses of *but.* However, this idea was subsequently rejected in favour of the unitary denial account and various arguments were put forward against the contrast analysis. In this chapter, we will suggest that the rejection of an analysis of contrast by some previous RT analyses is due to a misconception about the actual nature of the contrast encoded by this connective.

This chapter aims to present an account of the Spanish connective *pero* as a procedural unit, as suggested in RT, but with a description of its meaning in terms of contrast rather than denial. We start by showing how our account is substantially different from any of the previous accounts that explain contrast as a relationship between the utterance preceding and following the connective. Furthermore, we demonstrate how our proposal differs from other RT attempts to account for *but* in contrast terms.

We argue that the contrast encoded by *pero* consists of an instruction to the hearer to contrast the representation that *pero* introduces with some alternatives, which are accessible in the context; this will always be guided by the communicative principle of relevance. This analysis differs from previous RT accounts of denial and suspension. We argue that the effect of contrast encoded by *pero* constrains the derivation of the higher level explicatures of the utterances. This description

moves away from all previous RT analyses of *but* that accounted for it as a constraint on the implicit content. Moreover, we will describe how our analysis can provide a practical response for the long debate on the cognitive status of the assumptions that were previously described as denied or suspended.

The last and largest section of this chapter will present the data that supports our proposal. We will put forward what we believe to be the first extensive RT analysis of the connective *pero*[1], which considers the different types of propositional attitude it may convey. Furthermore, we will discuss the examples of the corrective *sino,* considering how its function differs from the one proposed for *pero*.

This analysis will differ significantly from previous RT accounts of its English counterpart *but*, not only for the type of procedure that we propose, but also for the methodology used to support our analysis. We have worked with an extensive collection of authentic data, extracted from different sources such as electronic corpora, newspapers, conversations and emails. This is a means of overcoming one of the main weaknesses of previous RT analyses, namely, the extensive reliance on invented examples (see Sperber and Wilson, 1997: 146). Unfortunately, even with the considerable advantage of authentic data, some aspects of the context will still be lacking, namely, those that can only be accessible *in situ* (see RT's notion of context: Wilson 1994: 42, Sperber and Wilson 1995: 147, Sperber and Wilson 1997: 145). However, we would argue that this is the most faithful representation of authentic language with which researchers can work. Finally, we would suggest that the analysis we offer for the Spanish connective *pero* could probably be extended to the English counterpart *but* (despite some differences in its uses), but this will not be the focus of our research.

[1]The very few references to a RT analyses of *pero*: Montolío 1997, 1998, Castaño 1994 and Garrido 2004 have followed Blakemore's analysis of denial of assumptions.

5.2. Earlier accounts of *but* in contrast terms

As reviewed in previous chapters, some coherence-based and pragmatic accounts have analysed the function of *but* in terms of contrast. In the coherence tradition, the notion of contrast encoded by *but* is conceived as a conceptual relation. In Rhetorical Structure Theory, for instance, Mann and Thompson (1988) or Salkie and Oates (1999) account for the function of *but* as marking a contrast relation between two nuclei, which are comprehended as being the same in many respects, differing in a few respects and compared with respect to one or more of these differences[2]. Fraser (1999), on the other hand, puts forward an analysis of the function of *but* in procedural terms as a pointer towards a relation of contrast. However, this study simply explains that *but* marks the most general type of contrast (between S1 and S2) without any specificity on the nature of this contrast.

On the other hand, in the pragmatic tradition Grice (1989), Rieber (1997), Bach (1999) have accounted for this connective in conceptual terms, with differences regarding the level of contribution (propositional and truth conditional content (Bach 1999) vs. higher level description (Grice 1989, Rieber 1997)). Finally, Winter & Rimon (1994) also describe *but* as a contrast connective and explain its function in terms of inferences following the AT framework.

One of the disadvantages of all these contrast accounts is that, rather than providing a clear description of the notion of contrast encoded by *but*, their description is in very vague terms so that it can account for all of the different uses of *but* (see criticism in Iten 2000(a): 146). Our analysis, on the contrary, elaborates further the precise nature of the relation of contrast that is encoded by the Spanish connective *pero.* In doing so, we work with the semantic notion of contrastive alternatives and our approach takes a line which echoes the general idea underpinning the work presented in Rooth (1985, 1992). But before doing so,

[2] For coherence-based analyses see Schiffrin 1987, Sanders, Spooren and Noordman 1992, Knott and Dale 1994.

we recall how some relevance theorists have approached the possibility of analysing the connective *but* as a marker of contrast.

5.2.1. RT attempts to give a contrast account of *but*

Blakemore's (1987) procedural analysis of *but* in terms of denial was a reaction to previous conceptual analyses of *but* that explained its meaning in terms of contrast. She convincingly argues that the definition of the function of *but* should be accounted for in procedural terms and preserve its non-truth conditional feature. In fact, accounting for *but* as a procedure explains why it cannot be said to be true or false, since inferences cannot be falsified. The only thing that could be said is whether or not the inferences go through; this seems to fit perfectly with the function of *but*.

Regarding the notion of contrast, there have been some attempts to apply a procedural analysis of *but* in contrast terms. However, this idea has been rejected for the following reasons: first, it has been argued that if *but* were a marker of contrast it should be able to contrast more than two things and move the order of the propositions without modification in the interpretation (Blakemore (1987: 134-7). Secondly, it has been argued that the fact that there are contrast examples with *and* (see (1) below) that cannot be replaced by *but* counts as another argument against the analysis of *but* as a marker of contrast.

(1) A: What's the capital of Germany now–Bonn or Berlin?
B: It's BERLIN, and not Bonn.
B': ? It's BERLIN, *but* not Bonn (Hall 2004: 219).

Hall (2004) suggests that redundancy might have been used as an argument to explain the implausibility of this example. However, she rejects this argument on the grounds that *but* can readily co-occur with contrast expressions like *in contrast, or contrary to what you would think,* as illustrated in the example below:

(2) John is tall *but, in contrast*, Bill is short (Hall 2004: 219).

Hall (2007) also presents the following example to argue against a contrast analysis of *but:*

(3) Context: The (infallible) weather forecast has predicted that tomorrow will be cold. The speaker doesn't care if it's cold or not.
(a) I hope it will be sunny and cold.
(b) ?? I hope it will be sunny but cold. (Hall 2007: 166)

Hall argues that if the speaker were simply marking the contrast between sunny and cold there should be no reason for (3b) to be unacceptable. Therefore, she rejects an analysis of *but* as a marker of explicit contrast between A and B, i.e. the two explicit elements it links.

Another argument against the analysis of *but* as a marker of contrast is that examples of contrast with conceptual connectives such as, *in contrast, on the other hand* cannot be replaced with the connective *but*, as shown in B" below:

(4) B': Because he's half price; the other guy, *in contrast/on the other hand,* charges more to work on a weekend.

(5) B": ?Because he's half price, *but* the other guy charges more to work on a weekend (Hall 2004: 219).

Because of these arguments, the analysis of *but* as a marker of contrast has been rejected in RT in favour of a procedural analysis, which describes *but* as an indicator of the cognitive effect of denial (Blakemore 1987, 1992, 2000, 2002), as shown below:

> "In using an expression which activates the cognitive effect of contradiction and elimination, the speaker is signalling that he presumes the hearer to have derived an assumption from the first segment, which is in fact false". (Blakemore 2002: 108)

We, however, argue that relevance theorists' rejection of an analysis of *but* as a marker of contrast is the result of a wrong interpretation of the kind of contrast encoded by this connective. It is unfortunate that they attempt an analysis of *but* as an explicit marker which establishes a contrast between the first and the second proposition. Blakemore (1987, 1989) and Hall (2004, 2007) consider the possibility of accounting for *but* as the procedural counterpart of conceptual

markers such as *in contrast* and *on the other hand.* They conclude that this substitution is not possible because *but,* unlike such conceptual markers, encodes a procedure that instructs the hearer towards the effect of denial or suspension of inferences.

Rejecting an analysis of *but* in terms of contrast can be seen as a result of following an inappropriate line of argumentation. We agree with them that *but* should not be analysed as the procedural version of contrast conceptual markers. However, this does not seem to be a valid reason to discard a contrast analysis of *but.* As will be shown in this chapter, there are other ways of accounting for this type of connective in terms of contrast which can give a precise account of the instruction encoded in its meaning.

5.3. An RT contrast analysis of *pero*

Here we want to put forward a RT analysis of *pero* as a marker of contrast which will be able to account for the whole range of its uses. To do so, we work with a notion of contrast that does not involve explicit contrast between the propositions linked, but rather between the representation introduced by the connective and the evoked alternatives. A concise description of the interpretation process induced by *pero* would be that it indicates that the utterance it introduces contrasts with alternative propositions that could have replaced it. This constrains the way the speaker entertains this representation. This interpretation of contrast explains why the connective *pero* cannot be substituted for any other type of marker that may indicate contrast between the explicit content of the propositions it links.

In the following example, taken from an article by the writer Almudena Grandes:

(6) Cuando volvió del instituto, a media tarde, no logró verla. Había tantos trastos nuevos sobre los antiguos, que apenas se distinguía ninguno. *Pero* lo que si vio Júnior fue la silueta de su madre husmeando. (*El País 19-02-2006, pg. 100*).

When he came back from college, in the midafternoon, he couldn't see it. There was so much new junk on top of the old junk that made

everything indistinguishable. ***But*** *what Junior saw was his mum's silhouette sniffing around.*

the speaker uses *pero* to mark the way she entertains the representation *pero* introduces. In this example, the speaker is pointing towards the alternative that the representation introduced by *pero* has not taken place. Then by directing the hearer towards this contrast, the speaker instructs him to embed the utterance into some kind of propositional attitude which could be described in terms of surprise or unexpectedness. In this example, it is unlikely that the speaker would want the hearer to deny an assumption that could have been derived from the previous utterance or want the hearer to suspend any inferential process. Instead, it appears that the speaker is introducing some information and indirectly communicating the way she entertains this representation, what in itself will be relevant in this context.

Similarly in the following example, the speaker indicates that the representation introduced by *pero* contrasts with its opposite alternative. The speaker points towards this contrast to make explicit her attitude of indignation or disappointment towards the representation pero introduces, what may yield a number of implications.

(7) Se discute mucho acerca de las causas del recrudecimiento de la tensión migratoria en las fronteras de Ceuta y Melilla, pero se habla poco de las características de una migración en la que los pobres de solemnidad se desplazan a pie y ahorran lo que pueden para tener un teléfono móvil. (*El País Semanal 23-09-05, pg. 60*).

There is a lot of discussion about the reasons for the increasing migratory restrictions on the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, ***but*** *there is very little said about the type of migration in which the poorest ones travel on foot and save what they can in order to have a mobile phone.*

It would be very difficult to account for the function of *pero* as a simple marker of explicit contrast between propositions. The speaker seems to be communicating some extra meaning by using *pero* in this context. She is explicitly marking the way she entertains this representation, and this becomes relevant in this context. By the same token, it defies analysis in terms of denial or suspension, since it is

difficult to see what assumption is intended to be denied or what inference could be suspended.

A further advantage of analysing the function of *pero* as evoking the existence of alternative assumptions is that it provides a better solution for the long debate in RT on the cognitive status of the denied or suspended assumption. Analysing these assumptions as 'alternatives' allows greater flexibility in relation to their cognitive status: they may vary in their degree of specificity and the extent to which they are manifest. The alternatives are being constructed 'online' subject to the principle of relevance, i.e. they do not have to be known or expressly formulated prior to exchange. In some cases the alternative propositions may be clearly specified, as in the example above, while in others it may be simply more vaguely specified. However, what is common to all these examples is the fact that the speaker is pointing towards the relevance of the contrast itself and implications will be derived from it.

In the following example, for instance, the alternative may not be represented by the speaker or hearer as a specific proposition but instead, it may be perceived as a group of possible alternatives that have something in common at the propositional level.

(8) Puedo decir muchas cosas de Ariadna y todas son buenas. *Pero* su arma más poderosa es la sonrisa. (*El País Semanal, 18-9-05, pg. 53).*

I could say many things about Ariadna and they are all good. ***But*** *her most powerful weapon is her smile.*

The speaker is contrasting the quality focalised in the *pero* utterance against any other quality that could have been selected instead. The speaker is making explicit her commitment towards the exceptionality of this particular attribute, which will be relevant in this context. In fact, this type of example would pose problems for those defending an account of *pero* either in terms of contrast between the utterances linked, or in terms of denial or suspension of assumptions. If attempting a denial account, one would have to argue that the speaker thinks that the hearer could have inferred that *all her attributes are the same quality* or *that*

the best quality is not her smile. This, however, goes against our intuition about the function of *pero* in this context.

5.4. Denying assumptions, suspending inferences or evoking alternatives

We now elaborate on the relevance of bringing something with the status of alternativeness to the context. We discuss how this differs from previous RT accounts which rely on the idea of suspension or denial. It seems that both the denial and the suspension approach place too much weight on how the speaker thinks an utterance is going to have an effect on the hearer's cognitive environment. As reviewed earlier, Blakemore (1987, 1989, 2000, 2002), Iten (2000, 2005) and Hall (2004, 2005) focus on the idea of facilitating the hearer by constraining his search space to minimise the effort he has to make and to help him to avoid misunderstanding. According to Blakemore, the function of the connective *but* is to deny an assumption that the previous proposition may have made manifest:

> "the speaker only continues with the but clause because she has grounds for thinking that the presentation of the first proposition has yielded a contextual implication that she wishes to deny". (Blakemore 1989: 27) (my emphasis)

Blakemore also says that the speaker "presumes the hearer to have made an inference which is illegitimate" (Blakemore 2002: 108) (my emphasis). However, there are not real grounds for this 'presumption' that the hearer may have derived an implication that needs to be denied. Therefore, it is not clear that the mission of the speaker should be to eliminate possible implications that the hearer could have derived. This mission is even less clear in the so-called contrast examples. In these examples Blakemore admits that the assumption to be denied is the fact that there is no contrast, but she does not explain why the hearer could have derived this assumption in the first place. In Hall's (2003, 2004, 2007) account, there is the same type of problem, since she claims that in such contrast examples the suspended inference may not even be represented.

Previous RT analyses of *but* rely too much on a model of communication in which the speaker has the ability to foresee what the hearer is going to derive and her mission consists of stopping him from deriving some possible inferences. This type of analysis gives the hearer a very passive role in the process of utterance understanding. In contrast, our proposal does not conceive the function of the connective *pero* as eliminating or suspending assumptions. Instead, *pero* is used to direct the hearer towards the derivation of implications based on the meaning of the contrast it encodes. In our analysis, the speaker uses *pero* to make explicit her intention of making manifest her attitude towards the representation *pero* introduces. She does this without having to rely on her ability to foresee which specific effect the utterance may have on the hearer. This shift of the onus from the hearer to the speaker has the advantage of solving the problem raised by previous analyses that allowed for the suspension of propositions that had never been represented.

Thus the function of *pero* is to direct the hearer towards a contrast between the representation of the *pero* utterance and possible alternatives. The explicitness of this relation of contrast guides the hearer towards certain conclusions regarding the speaker's propositional attitude, i.e. how the speaker entertains that assumption. As discussed earlier, in RT, the propositional attitude is accounted for as part of the higher level explicatures. Therefore, our analysis of *pero* is conceived as a constraint on the explicit side of communication. As we will illustrate with an extensive collection of examples from authentic data, this contrast can result in many different interpretations in terms of the propositional attitude or illocutionary force of the utterance which *pero* introduces.

5.5. Accessibility of the alternative assumptions

Our account focuses on the effect that the connective *pero* may have when evoking alternative assumptions that are guided by the communicative principle of relevance. The derivation of these alternatives will depend on the context and will always be determined by the search for optimal relevance. In fact, Relevance Theory offers the ideal framework to explain the accessibility of the alternatives

evoked by *pero* without having to rely on any formal mechanism[3]. According to the RT model, processing any ostensive stimulus is generally aimed at bringing about the greatest possible improvement to the hearer's overall representation of the world for the least processing effort. As noted earlier, the principle of relevance is always observed by those involved in exchanges of overt communication, which says that:

> "Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance". (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 158)

The function of the speaker then is to provide the hearer with the tools he needs to arrive at the optimal interpretation of the utterance, i.e. an interpretation that will bring sufficient effects without any unnecessary processing effort. Taking all these ideas into account, the presence of a connective like *pero* instructs the hearer to evoke alternatives which contrast with the representation *pero* introduces. The expectation of optimal relevance would guide the hearer access to the alternative assumptions, making the processing of the utterance relevant enough to justify the processing effort invested.

As will be shown later in this chapter, the accessibility of alternatives can sometimes be guided by grammatical constructions such as negation or by some information that has been explicitly communicated in the particular context. In any case, what is constant is that the derivation of the alternatives will always be guided by the communicative principle of relevance. For instance, in an example like (9) it is easy to see that the alternative is the opposite of the utterance introduced by *pero*, i.e. *no estoy enamorado* 'I am not in love':

(9) R: soy orgulloso, vanidoso, pero sin pasarse.
P: ¿Es romántico?
R: en el sentido de la tradición romántica literaria, nada. En el sentido amoroso considero absurdo el amor, *pero* estoy enamorado. (*El País 25-09- 2005, backpage* (an interview with Enrique Vila-Matas)).

R: I am proud, vain, but without going overboard
P: Are you a romantic?

[3] In the next chapter we will critically review the analyses provided by Umbach (2001, 2004, 2005) and Sæbo (2003), which attempted to provide a formal mechanism for assessment of the accessibility of alternatives.

R: In the sense of the literary romantic tradition, not at all. In the love sense I consider love to be absurd, ***but*** *I am in love.*

On the other hand, in examples such as (10) below it is not that easy to point to the specified accessible alternatives that are evoked by the connective:

(10) Le han dejado quedarse dos meses más para respetar el fin del curso, pero ahora su madre se tendrá que conformar con verlo una hora cada semana o cuatro juntas al mes. (El País Semanal, 16-07-06, pg. 38 ff).

He has been allowed to stay two extra months so as to observe the end of the academic year ***but*** *his mum will have to make do with seeing him an hour a week or four successive hours per month.*

In this example the utterance that *pero* introduces contrasts with a different context for the mother in which she could be able to see her son more frequently. This alternative is not a clearly specific assumption; rather it could be any of a range of assumptions with a better context for the mum than the one explicitly communicated. Despite the lack of specificity, the hearer has to be able to realise that some alternatives are evoked, which latter will constrain the derivation of the propositional attitude in which the *pero* utterance may be embedded, such as for instance '*it is unfortunate that, it is unfair, it is regrettable...*'.

5.6. Explicit or implicit aspects of communication

Previous RT analyses argue that *but* does not contribute to the proposition expressed by the utterance that contains it. This connective is described as a purely non-truth conditional device that the speaker uses to maximise the relevance of the utterance by making her intention about its implicit content manifest (Blakemore 1987: 127). As discussed in chapter 4, the process of utterance comprehension involves the derivation by means of hypothesis formation and confirmation of both the explicit content (explicatures) and implicit content (implicatures), in an online process of mutual adjustment. The derivation of the implicit content consists, on the one hand, of the construction of appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions (implicated premises) and

on the other the construction of appropriate hypotheses about the intended contextual implications (implicated conclusions) (see Wilson and Sperber 2004).

RT accounts of *but* (Blakemore 1987, 2002, Iten 2000(a), Hall 2003, 2004, 2007) agree that its use constrains the derivation of the implicit content. However, it is not clearly specified why the effect of this connective has to be restricted to the derivation of implicit content. In both denial and suspension analyses, it is argued that the hearer accesses contextual assumptions (premises) that lead to the derivation of those conclusions that are to be denied or suspended. Hall (2003, 2004, 2007), for instance, emphasises the important role of the implicated premises in some (but not all)[4] uses of *but*. She argues that the role of *but* consists of cutting off potential implications derivable from the *'false assumption'* that may result from the combination of a premise with the explicit propositional representation. However, there is no explanation on whether the denied or suspended assumption is also considered as a type of implicature.

In Blakemore's account, the denied assumption is an end in itself; on the other hand, in Hall's account the suspended assumption is not an end in itself but part of a process of saving effort triggered by the presence of the connective. It seems that in neither account there is enough specification about what is really conveyed at the implicit level or how exactly the function of *but* can be described in terms of implicatures.

In our account, on the other hand, we propose that the speaker uses *pero* to invite the addressee to access contextually inferred alternatives that contrast with the proposition expressed, constraining the interpretation of the speaker's propositional attitude towards this representation. The accessibility of these contrastive assumptions will be constrained by the content of the *pero* utterance and the search for relevance. In some cases, like (11) below, the alternatives are

[4] In the contrast examples, she does not identify any particular assumption that is suspended. Instead she argues that the relevance of using *but* in those examples lies in its role of cutting off some possible inferential process. Therefore, in these examples it is more difficult to identify what is then communicated at the implicit level since not even the implicated premise seems to be accessed.

derived from the combination of some contextual assumption (implicated premise) with some propositional representation preceding the *pero* utterance:

> (11) Yo soy como esas visitas pesadas que se pasan una hora despidiéndose y se te quedan en la puerta con el abrigo puesto sacando temas absurdos ...los anfitriones empujando suavemente para que te vayas porque están fundamentalmente hasta las narices de la visita y una vez que consiguen, sin perder la sonrisa, que la visita esté al otro lado de la puerta, dicen adiós y cierran bruscamente. *Pero* yo soy de las que vuelven a llamar al timbre para decir, por favor, despedidme de vuestro niño que es sencillamente encantador. (*El País 31-08-2002, pg. 44*).
>
> *I am like one of those tedious guests that spend an hour saying goodbye and linger in the doorstep with their coat on talking about silly things ...the hosts pushing the door softly to make you leave because they are bored of you, and once they manage to have you on the other side of the door, they say bye and, still smiling, close the door sharply.* ***But*** *I am the one who rings the bell again to beg them to please give my regards to their son, who is simply adorable.*

In this type of example, the hearer may access an implicated premise such as *if someone is pushing you to leave their house, you should not try to get back.* This premise then combined with the utterance preceding the *pero* utterance will easily lead to the derivation of the alternative that contrasts with the *pero* utterance. This explicit marking that the representation that describes the speaker's behaviour contrasts with the expected behaviour in that context (the alternative) will guide the hearer towards the way the speaker herself entertains this representation. In this particular case, we would claim that the explicit marking of acknowledgement of exceptionality and markedness of the speaker's behaviour is relevant in itself, leading the hearer to the derivation of implications.

In other cases, the alternative could simply be the opposite of the representation of the *pero* utterance, as in the next two examples:

> *(12)* Otra vez ha repetido experiencia acompañada de su marido, Ernesto de Hannover, y de Andrea, Carlota y Alexandra, hijos comunes de la pareja y de sus anteriores enlaces. Cazar por aquí es una gozada, así que Carolina y Ernesto abatieron cientos de perdices, circunstancia nada rara cuando se llevan bateadores, ojeadores y secretarios, porque esto es un paraíso cinegético. *Pero* todos fueron felices. Caminaron, hablaron, dispararon y comieron torta del Casar,

jamón ibérico, lentejas y huesos de santo. (*El País 31-10-2002, pg. 42).*

She has repeated once again the experience together with her husband, Ernesto de Hannover, and Andrea, Carlota and Alexandra, their children of their own and children from previous marriages. Hunting around here is a real pleasure, so much that Carolina and Ernesto knocked down hundreds of partridges, which was not unusual considering they had batters, beaters and secretaries, as this is a hunting paradise. ***But*** *they were all happy. They went for a walk, they had a chat, they were shooting and tasted 'torta of Casar', Iberian ham, lentils and 'Saint's bones'.*

In this first example the alternative of the *pero* utterance would be its positive counterpart *no son felices* 'they were not happy'. Marking this contrast with a contrastive alternative has the effect of constraining the derivation of the speaker's propositional attitude towards this representation. One possible interpretation of this example could be that the accessible alternative derives from a well-known general assumption that the family is not normally happy in this type of contexts. If the speaker opts for marking this contrast is to make explicit that this utterance is entertained as describing a remarkable fact. On the other hand, the speaker could be making explicit her attitude of surprise or indignation towards this representation, in a context where the speaker is pointing towards the fact that practising a sport that kills animals did not have any negative effect on then. In either interpretation, the speaker is making explicit how she entertains this representation, which will lead the hearer to infer some implications.

The second example is the following:

(13) A: He dicho: «Hay un árbol en el jardín».
B: Lo he oído. Parece algo normal, ¿no?
A: Hay un árbol en el jardín, *pero* ayer no estaba.
B: ¿Y qué? ¿Acaso pretendes que me preocupe? (*El País (Babelia) 03-01-2007, pg. 12).*

A: I said «There is a tree in the garden»
B: I heard that. It seems quite normal, doesn't it?
A: There is a tree in the garden, ***but*** *it was not there yesterday.*
B: So what? Are you suggesting that I should be worried about it?

In this example the most accessible alternative seems to be its positive counterpart *ayer estaba el árbol* 'the tree was there yesterday'. By marking this contrast with

pero the speaker is making explicit how she entertains this representation, which could be described as surprise or worry. Moreover, it is worth noting that in the line following the *pero* utterance, the hearer makes some reference to this attitudinal information conveyed by *pero*, when he asks her if she expects him to get worried about it.

To finish this introduction to our proposed analysis of *pero* as a constraint on the derivation of the speaker's propositional attitude, we will comment on two further examples. The first excerpt presents a piece of news about the break-up of a very popular couple.

> (14) Allí estaba el periódico Bild am Sonntag para comunicárselo inmediatamente a los fans del rey de la raqueta: "Se acaba la más bonita historia de amor de este año". *Pero* el problema de entendimiento entre la pareja se centra, más bien, en asuntos de descendencia, dice el tabloide alemán. Ella quiere hijos. Él no. Ella quiere casarse. (*El País 16-07-02, pg. 43)*
>
> *The newspaper Bild am Sontag was right there to immediately communicate it to the fans of the king of tennis: "the most beautiful love story has come to an end". **But** the couple's misunderstanding is mainly based on issues of descendants, the German tabloid says. She wants to have kids. He doesn't. She wants to get married.*

The speaker precedes the explanation with *pero* to clearly make explicit the way this representation is entertained. The hearer is instructed to contrast this proposition with an alternative, which could easily be a well-known general expectation such as, for instance, *that he was seeing other women*. On the other hand, the alternative could be a wide range of unspecified options, including more expected or stronger arguments. In either case, it seems clear that the speaker is making explicit her attitude of surprise or disappointment towards this particular explanation. Therefore, by using *pero*, the speaker seems to make explicit a lot more than a simple explanation of what caused the end of the relationship.

Finally, in the next example *pero* precedes a representation that describes the price of a piece of art.

(15) De hecho, se dice que la obra de arte más cara es una fotografía, la famosa Moonrise over Hernandez, New México (1941), de Ansel Adams. Hace 10 años valía 1.000 dólares, *pero* ahora cuesta entre 30.000 y 40.000, y se calcula que hay unas 2.000 copias, de las que cada año salen varias a subasta ... (*El País 02-01-2007, pg. 24).*

In fact, it is said that the most expensive piece of art is a photograph, the famous Moonrise over Hernandez, New México (1941), by Ansel Adams. it was worth 1.000 dollars 10 years ago, ***but*** *now it is worth between 30.000 and 40.000, and it is estimated that there could be 2000 copies, several of which are auctioned every year...*

Here *pero* seems to guide the hearer towards the accessibility of other figures, which in this context may be those well below the expressed figure. Introducing this representation with *pero* is then a way of explicitly marking the writer's attitude towards this representation, probably as an indication of surprise. This marking will then be relevant in the context.

My proposal then goes a step further by claiming that the derivation of contrastive assumptions is not an end in itself. This invitation to derive contrastive alternatives is a way to constrain how the speaker entertains the actual *pero* utterance. Our claim is that using *pero* to explicitly mark a contrast with alternatives will constrain the derivation of the speaker's propositional attitude. This analysis then suggests that *pero* has an effect on the explicit level of content.

It is clear that *pero* does not encode a concept and does not contribute to the derivation of basic explicatures. Instead, its explicit pointing towards the existence of contrastive alternatives is a way of constraining the derivation of the higher level explicatures, i.e. the propositional attitude or illocutionary force, in which the *pero* utterance may be embedded. So far, it had been argued that the speaker could make her propositional attitude explicit by means of sentential adverbials such as *unfortunately*, or *sadly* (see Ifantidou 1993, 1994, 2001) as well as some particles such as *eh?* (Ramírez, S. 2003). Here, we are arguing that the speaker can also make her attitude explicit by other means that require a greater degree of inferencing.

As explained in chapter 4, in RT, the illocutionary force and the propositional attitude of the speaker is described as part of what is explicitly communicated as higher-level explicatures[6]. Wilson and Sperber (2002: 274) state that higher-level explicatures "like all explicatures, are recovered by a mixture of decoding and inference based on a variety of linguistic and non-linguistic cues" such as prosody, mood indicators, word order, tone of voice and facial expression. Our analysis of *pero* defined in terms of contrast with alternatives is then clearly another means of constraining the derivation of this level of content.

This view of *pero* as contributing to the explicit level fits perfectly in this framework, since it is agreed that the derivation of the explicit content does not involve only decoding but also a great deal of inferencing, both for what is known as the basic explicatures as well as the higher level explicatures. Furthermore, it can be claimed that this view opens a new way of analysing this connective in this framework, no longer restricting its contribution to the implicit part of communication.

5.7. Our RT proposal for 'alternatives' account of *pero*

As noted earlier this study is the first RT analysis for the Spanish connective *pero*. To date, there has been no attempt to do so in the literature, and those who have made some reference to an RT analysis of *pero* have mainly agreed with Blakemore's unitary proposal of denial (Montolio 1997, 1998, Castaño 1994, Garrido 2004). As mentioned earlier, one of the main advantages of our analysis is that it is based on authentic data extracted from both oral and written sources including newspapers, corpora, emails and conversations. This is a significant departure from previous RT works on the English connective *but*, since these analyses were mainly based on invented examples[7]. Working with a large amount of data has the advantage of offering a more faithful and extensive view of the

[6] See for instance Blakemore (1991); Wilson & Sperber (1993); Ifantidou (2001) regarding the notion of higher-level explicatures.

[7] As mentioned in the previous chapter Higashimori 1992 presents a more extensive list of examples, some of them extracted from corpus but he does not really elaborate on them.

uses of this connective. Moreover, our analysis will also discuss whether or not there is a common meaning between *pero* and the corrective marker *sino,* which could explain why they convert into a single connective in languages such as English or French.

As reviewed in chapter 2, there is an emphatic use of *pero* that has been studied by different theorists in the Hispanic literature on adversatives. This emphatic use, which has no correspondence in English, has been partly the trigger for the proposal presented here. We will recall this use with an example:

(16) ¡*Pero* qué grande estás!

But *you have grown so much*!

This use has not been reported in the English tradition, with the exception of Higashimori's (1992(a)) example:

(17) *But*, you had your hair cut! (Higashimori 1992(a): 340).

However, he does not analyse this use differently from any of the other uses. He accounts for the function of *but* in this example as a denial of an assumption manifest to the hearer. He does not seem to note that the denial is actually on the speaker's side.

We would argue that it is precisely this idea of going against the speaker's (not the hearer's) own expectations that is made explicit with the use *but.* We claim that in this type of example, it is clear that the connective does not mark denial of an assumption manifest to the hearer or suspension of a possible inferential process. Our account based on alternatives is suitable to explain the function of *but* in this type of example as an instruction to contrast the *but* clause and an alternative (possibly, but not necessarily, an expected one) accessible in the context. It is then from this contrast that the hearer can derive the type of attitudinal information in which the *but* clause may be embedded. The speaker of the example (16), for instance, seems to make explicit her surprise over the size of the person to whom the comment is being addressed. This is derived from the

contrast between her statement and an alternative expectation, which would probably be that the addressee were a smaller size.

This type of examples have triggered the line of analysis of the connective *pero* that we are presenting in this thesis, which differs considerably from previous relevance theoretic analyses of its English counterpart *but.* As explained above, in this tradition most of the concern has been with the way the speaker could save the hearer's effort by guiding him to eliminate or cut off unwanted assumptions. As we will illustrate with some data, our account of the function of *pero* focuses instead on its contribution to make her attitude towards what is expressed explicit.

This section attempts to prove that viewing *pero* as an indicator of contrast with alternatives can account for a wide range of authentic uses. As mentioned earlier, we follow a theoretical framework that favours a view of communication where the speaker aims at maximising the relevance of the utterance she produces, i.e. the hearer may get the maximum number of effects for the minimum effort invested. For this purpose the speaker may use some procedural expressions that guide the search for relevance in the process of utterance interpretation by constraining the choice of contextual information and the cognitive effects that can be obtained. The question we shall address then is how exactly *pero* contributes to the relevance of the proposition it introduces. We will do so by looking at examples of authentic data.

It is also important to note that *pero* is only one of the many ways of communicating the speaker's propositional attitude. For instance, in oral communication the speaker may also make use of other channels such as gestures, or tone of voice, which will also contribute to the derivation of the intended propositional attitude. However, due to the nature of our research, we will not consider these extra factors; however, it is important to keep in mind that they may also play an essential role in determining the intended propositional attitude. Furthermore, we would like to clarify that the use of sentential adverbials to describe the contribution of *pero* at the level of propositional attitudes does not imply a direct correspondence between the meaning indicated by *pero* and these conceptual markers. This is simply one way of carrying out the notoriously difficult

task of capturing the exact meaning conveyed by *pero* at the level of propositional attitudes. It is, in fact, worth noting that it is the speaker's decision to use a procedural unit rather than a conceptual marker to make explicit the propositional attitude. This implies that there will be a greater degree of lack of specificity, which will, in fact, be relevant in itself.

Most of the analyses of *pero* in the grammatical tradition relied on invented examples. Fortunately, this practice changed with the pragmatic tradition, which started working with larger pieces of discourse as well as examples of authentic conversation. As mentioned earlier, for our cognitive analysis of *pero*, we will work with a wider variety of authentic data. Our analysis will not be restricted to either the spoken or written mode, which clearly contrasts with previous RT analyses of this type of connective. We aim to give a precise description of the meaning of the Spanish *pero,* which will hopefully also be applicable to its English counterpart *but,* and similar connectives in other languages.

Furthermore, as will be discussed at the end of this chapter, this cognitive analysis of *pero* should be able to explain some of the issues that have already been raised in the Hispanic tradition, such as the nature of the presuppositional content triggered by the use of this connective (Rivarola 1979, Moya 1996), the relevance of the syntactic nature of these constructions and the accountability of the intuition that *pero* conveys some subjectivity (Bobes 1973, Fuentes 2000). Finally, it will also provide an alternative definition of the function of *pero*, not based on the notion of argumentative strength, as proposed by those AT writers (Portolés 1985, Fuentes 1998(a), 1998(b), 2000).

In the next section, then, we will present a description of different types of attitude that can be explicitly marked by the use of *pero*, by looking at examples from authentic data.

5.7.1. Contrast with expectations

As shown in previous chapters, the analysis of the connective *but* in terms of denial of expectations has been very popular since Lakoff's paper in 1971. A good example of this influence is the work by Blakemore (1987) as well as her RT followers (Rouchota 1990, Higashimori 1992(a), 1992(b), Iten 2000, 2005). In our analysis, the expectations also play a role in some of its uses. However, rather than conceiving them as something to be denied, expectations are understood as alternatives that contrast with the utterance introduced by *pero*, constrained by expectations of relevance. This contrast with alternatives will constrain the derivation of the speaker's propositional attitude towards the representation introduced by *pero*.

We will illustrate this with some examples where the alternative evoked by *pero* can be described as an expectation. The first example is extracted from an interview to a film director, who talks about the Spanish actress Ariadna Gil with whom he is working at that moment:

> (18) Es muy entregada y, a la vez nada pesada. Se lo curra mucho en su casa, *pero* cuando luego viene al rodaje no está dando la torrija con mil preguntas. (*El País Semanal, 18-09-2005, pg. 56).*
>
> *She is very dedicated to her work while not being annoying at all. She works really hard at home,* ***but*** *when she comes to the set, she does not bother you with millions of questions.*

In this example, the speaker (the director) uses *pero* to mark the contrast between the representation it introduces and a highly accessible assumption, which in this case could be its positive counterpart. The speaker is marking the exceptionality of one of the features of this actress' behaviour, by pointing towards the alternative of what the speaker is used to finding in those circumstances. The speaker is then suggesting that it is a common trait for those actresses who work really hard to be always bothering with millions of questions. The explicit marking of how the speaker entertains this representation as exceptional could lead to the derivation of different implications, i.e. the hearer will derive

implication not only from what the actress does but also from the fact that what she does is perceived by the speaker as being exceptional.

It is important to note that in this context, it is very likely that the hearer may not know this characteristic of hard-working actresses and only learns about it as a result of the contrast encoded by *pero*. In fact, whether or not it is something that is common knowledge or simply a perception of one particular individual (in this case, the director), by using *pero* the speaker will succeed in communicating this extra information.

Similarly, the following example can also be accounted for as a contrast between the representation of what happened and an alternative expectation:

> (19) Hace unos años, después de un almuerzo entre universitarios, Marisa Paredes nos habló espontáneamente de los primeros años de su vida; era un relato lleno de vigor, hermoso y salvaje, vital. Pero cuando terminó de contar los prolegómenos de su adolescencia, la actriz, que además ha sido desde hace algunos años diva indiscutible del cine español, guardó un silencio encerrado del que no logramos sacarla hasta hace tres semanas, exactamente el 13 de noviembre de 2004, a las once de la mañana, en sus casas de la madurez, en el centro de Madrid. (El País Semanal 28-11-2004, pg. 16).
>
> *Years ago, after lunch among university students, Marisa Paredes told us spontaneously about the early days of her life; it was a story full of vital, beautiful and wild energy.* ***But*** *when she finished telling us about her early teenage years, the actress, who has been the undisputed diva of the Spanish cinema for years, remained in silence, which was only broken three weeks ago, on the 13th of November 2004 to be precise, at 11 in the morning, in her house of maturity, in the centre of Madrid.*

The writer starts describing how Marisa Paredes enthusiastically told some university students about the early days of her life. She then introduces with *pero* a description of how the actress went silent after finishing the introduction on her early teenage years. This representation clearly contrasts with an alternative expectation, which could be a continuation in the same line of strength and vitality as the earlier part. In this example, then, the speaker uses *pero* to point towards this contrast, making explicit her propositional attitude, which could be described as *'surprisingly, unexpectedly, disappointingly ...'*.

In the next example the journalist again uses *pero* to indicate the contrast between what is said and what the speaker would have expected to find in those circumstances:

(20) Está afónica de tanto hablar en tantos sitios a favor de esa ópera prima; *pero* ahí está, con una fortaleza formidable, enfundada en su bata, con el aire de fragilidad que la ha hecho parecer una dama vienesa que parece que ha de romperse con el aire que rompe las vajillas sublimes. (*El País Semanal 28-11-2004, pg. 17).*

She is hoarse from talking too much and in so many places about her first work; ***but*** *there she is, incredibly strong, wrapped up in a dressing gown, with that air of fragility that has made her look like a Viennese lady who seems that would break with the air that breaks only the finest dinner service.*

The nature of the alternatives will be constrained by the context of the previous information. In this example, there is first a description of how the actress has lost her voice by promoting her work in numerous places. Then, *pero* introduces a representation of the description of the actress that clearly contrasts with an accessible alternative of an exhaustive looking actress, which could be expected in that context. It is interesting to note that the first utterance describes the actress as an exceptional character, who has gone to the extreme of losing her own voice for the sake of promoting her own film. This is then followed by a further description of the actress, which is presented as remarkable and exceptional. Using *pero* to make explicit the speaker's propositional attitude of surprise and perception of the exceptionality could then strengthen the assumption derived from the previous utterance. Therefore, it seems that in this example it would be difficult to describe *pero* as a marker of denial. Instead, it would be better accounted for as a constraint on the speaker's propositional attitude, which may strengthen a previously communicated assumption.

The following example is taken from a context where it is being discussed what is going to happen with the land of someone who has just died:

(21) simultáneo> ya falleció. Entonces, ahora.....eh..... reclamándolas, una tía de... de nosotros, por parte de mi marido, claro, *pero* que ya se ha muerto el marido de esta señora, y no tiene hijos. (*UAM Oral Jurídico*[8]).

Already died. Then now,...eh... claiming for them, an aunt of ours, on my husband's side , of course, ***but*** *whose husband has already died and she has no children.*

Here *pero* is making explicit the contrast between the proposition introduced by *pero*, which is partly elliptical *reclama las tierras y ya se ha muerto el marido de esta señora, y no tiene hijos* 'She claims for the land and her husband has already died and she has no children' and points towards what the speaker may conceive as a more expected alternative, which could be described as *reclama las tierras y tiene alguna familia con quien repartirla* 'She claims for the land and she has some members of her family to share it with'. In this example, making explicit the contrast will guide the hearer towards a number of implications about the way the speaker entertains this representation. The description of the intended propositional attitude could be along the lines of surprise, frustration, anger, or lack of understanding. Again, as it is an example of oral communication, there will be other channels such as the tone of voice or the facial gestures that will also contribute to the determination of the exact nature of this propositional attitude. This explicit marking of the speaker's propositional attitude will clearly lead the hearer to derive further implications or strengthen assumptions that he could have had.

Finally, in the last example from this group, the proposition introduced by *pero* contrasts with an expected positive counterpart alternative *sé por qué* 'I know why':

(22) Nos llevamos fatal *pero* no sé por qué (*conversation).*[9]

We get on really badly ***but*** *I don't know why.*

[8] Legal Oral. UAM.

[9] It is interesting to compare this example with the inverse example "no sé por qué ***pero*** nos llevamos fatal". In this example *pero* could point towards a contrast with the alternative in which the speaker could be unsure about the representation 'nos llevamos fatal'. It seems that the contrast would be at a different level, i.e. it is about the different degrees of credibility of the *pero* utterance.

This contrast may constrain the speaker's propositional attitude, which could be described in terms of unexpectedness such as '*I am surprised that, it is strange that* ...' or some other type of affective stance such as '*it is unfortunate that, it is regrettable that...*'. As mentioned earlier, to determine the exact description of this higher level explicature the hearer may use other types of ostensive communication such as gestures, tone of voice or other contextual clues.

The idea underlying all these examples is that the speaker uses the connective *pero* to mark explicitly her intention to contrast the content of the representation it introduces with alternative assumptions. In these examples the propositional attitude derived from this contrast could be described in terms of unexpectedness or surprise. The notion of expectations has been traditionally linked to this type of connective as part of what the speaker wants the hearer to deny. In our account, on the other, the speaker uses *pero* to explicitly point towards a contrast with alternatives, which constrains the derivation of the speaker's propositional attitude towards the representations introduced by *pero.*

5.7.1.1. Exceptional

The speaker may sometimes use the connective *pero* to mark the relevance of the exceptionality of what she is saying. This is also included in the same group of 'contrast with expectations', however, there is an interesting feature of the examples of this group that makes them somewhat distinctive from the others. In these examples the speaker is marking some information as exceptional in itself rather than expressing that it goes against the speaker's expectations. The speaker uses *pero* to mark that the information it introduces contrasts with accessible alternatives of more ordinary standards.

The following example presents a description of a theatre play:

(23) El trabajo de búsqueda de equivalencias en la pantalla de los giros de la escena de Marivaux desencadena un gracioso, elegante y refinado ejercicio, lleno de buen gusto, de teatralidad cinematográfica, que la directora y guionista inglesa Clare Peploe desarrolla en los preciosos

decorados naturales donde filmó con seda y sutileza *El triunfo del amor. Pero* es un juego que sin duda está irradiado -y esto se percibe en la seguridad de trazo de la secuencia y en el sólido empaste entre palabras, gestos y actos- por un guión primoroso, meticulosamente elaborado, del que son autores, además de la directora, Bernardo Bertolucci y Marilyn Golddin. *(El País 4-1-2002, pg. 38).*

The effort of searching for equivalences in the screen of the Marivaux's scene's turns triggers a cute, elegant and refined exercise, full of good taste and cinematographic drama, which the English director and screenwriter Clare Peploe develops in the precious natural sets where she shot with silk and subtlety El triunfo del amor. ***But*** *it is a game that with no doubt is illuminated- and that can be perceived in the steady outline of the sequence and in the solid harmony between words, gestures and acts-by a exquisite, meticulously elaborated script, written by authors such as Bernardo Bertolucci and Marilyn Golddin apart from he director.*

The speaker uses *pero* to introduce a proposition that describes some features of this play. Using *pero* in this context then confers the actual information a character of exceptionality, which contrasts with some description of a more standard type.

The following example is an extract from an interview with Minister of Culture Carmen Calvo:

(24) A: ¿Qué ha visto Zapatero[10] en usted?
R: Yo creo que veterana-ocho años de gestión en Andalucía-*pero* con las ideas muy en la actualidad. Quizá esa mezcla de lo nuevo y lo experto. *(El País. 16–09-2005, backpage).*

A: What has Zapatero seen in you?
R: I think that my experience of running Andalucía for 8 years ***but*** *with ideas that are very much up to date. Maybe this mixture of originality and expertise.*

In this case the propositional attitude of exceptionality is derived from the contrast between the *pero* utterance and a highly accessible alternative, which could be the contrary of what she says. In fact, this notion of exceptionality of the representation plays a very important role since it seems that among the reasons for the president to appoint her, there is not only the two features described but

[10] Zapatero is the current president of Spain.

also the fact that they are conceived as having some exceptional character. Therefore, this explicit marking of the propositional attitude is clearly relevant to the hearer and implications can easily be derived from its explicitness.

Similarly, in the following excerpt using *pero* is also a means of marking the relevance of making explicit the speaker's attitude towards the exceptional character of the information introduced by the connective:

(25) Muñoz es un artista que no hace obras o, más bien, que no da importancia a la obra hecha, sino al proceso de hacerla, y de recordarla, *pero*, al contrario que el arte conceptual tradicional, el suyo es un trabajo escasamente intelectualizado que busca a un público no especializado que puede participar en su trabajo sin plantearse siquiera si esto que está viendo o haciendo es realmente arte.(*El País 06-01-2002, pg. 30)*

Muñoz is an artist who does not do works or, rather, who does not value the final work, but the process of doing it, and of remembering it, ***but*** *contrary to the traditional conceptual art, his is a work that is hardly intellectualized, which searches for a non specialized public that can participate without even questioning themselves whether what they are doing is really art.*

In this case the attitudinal meaning is the result of the contrast between the content of the *pero* utterance and some evoked alternatives, which can be the opposite of what is expressed in the *pero* utterance. As in previous examples, it is evident that the speaker is communicating a lot more that a mere description of this artist's work; the speaker is explicitly drawing attention towards the fact that these characteristics are regarded as exceptional, which is made explicit by the connective *pero*.

5.7.1.2. Surprise

The examples of this group share the feature that the contrast encoded in *pero* constrains the speaker's propositional attitude of surprise. We will start with some examples of this group:

(26) Me incorporé en la cama y miré a mi alrededor. Sabina seguía ahí, al lado de la puerta sin dejar de mirarme un solo instante. *Pero* la perra ya no estaba. En su lugar, un niño monstruosos, con la cabeza deformada y una crin de caballo recorriéndole la espalda sostenía entre las suyas el bulto dolorido y tumefacto de mi mano. *(Llamazares, J. 1990: La lluvia amarilla. pg. 68).*

I sat up in the bed and looked around. Sabina was still there, next to the door staring at me incessantly. ***But*** *the dog wasn't there anymore. In its place, a monstrous kid, with a deformed head and a horse's mane down its back was holding between his the painful and swollen lump of my hand.*

In (26) *pero* introduces a propositional representation: *la perra ya no estaba* 'the dog was not there' and directs the hearer towards an alternative, which could be that *la perra estaba (allí)* 'the dog was there'. As happens in previous examples, the speaker makes explicit this contrast in order to mark the relevance not only of the explicit content of the utterance but also her attitude towards this information. In this example, the hearer, guided by the principle of relevance, will develop the logical form into a complete propositional representation (explicature), going through different processes such as reference assignment of the article *(la)*, time reference assignment of the adverb *(ya)* and of the location (hidden constituent). The connective *pero*, on the other hand, will contribute to the development of the explicit content, not of the basic explicatures but of the higher level explicatures, which is constrained by its meaning of contrast. The context will guide the hearer in determining the intended attitudinal representation, always taking as a reference that it aims at deriving an optimally relevant representation. In this case, it could be described as either surprise or some other type of emotional stance. This representation of the speaker's attitude towards this representation may then lead the hearer to derive further implications.

The following example presents a case of fake results published by a Norwegian doctor in several specialised journals.

(27) Un médico noruego lleva años publicando datos absurdos en revistas especializadas. Sudbo, según se supo ayer, llevaba cinco años inventándose unos resultados sobre el cáncer de boca que publicó en tres revistas médicas. *Pero* algunos de sus montajes son

tan chapuceros que podrían haber sido detectados por un profano. *(El País 24-01-2006, pg. 31).*

A Norwegian doctor has been publishing absurd facts in specialised journals for years. Sudbo, as known yesterday, had been five years inventing the results about the mouth cancer which were published in three medical journals. ***But*** *some of the cons are so shoddy that could have been detected by a layman.*

The information that is introduced by *pero* is marked to contrast with an accessible alternative, which could be, for instance, that the doctor had supported his false claim with a better worked-out plan. It is from the accessibility to this alternative and its contrast with the actual *pero* utterance that the hearer can derive the speaker's intended propositional attitude towards this type of information. In this case, one could interpret the propositional attitude marked by *pero* in terms of surprise or incredulity, which is presumed to be optimally relevant for the hearer.

5.7.1.3. Indignation or anger

This section presents examples where *pero* directs the hearer towards a contrast between the utterance it introduces and an alternative derived as an implication from the previous information. The propositional attitude that derives from the contrast encoded in *pero* may be described as indignation or anger. We will start with an example from a well-known journalist (Javier Marías), who writes about the situation in Spain regarding the smoking ban:

(28) Con esto tenemos un país demente en el que se prohíbe fumar, *pero* no meter cuatro tiros, en los espacios públicos. *(El País Semanal 19-02-2006, pg. 102).*

This has resulted in a demented country, which bans smoking, ***but*** *doesn't ban shooting in public places.*

The speaker (Javier Marías) uses the connective *pero* to direct the hearer towards an alternative that could have replaced the *pero* utterance. In this case, the hearer would access the assumption that smoking is less dangerous for a society than shooting. Therefore, if the former is banned, the latter should be (at least) equally

banned. However, this does not seem to be the case, as the speaker explicitly marks it by introducing the utterance with the connective *pero*. Using *pero* in this context, then, is a means of constraining the writer's attitude towards the proposition *meter cuatro tiros no está prohibido* 'shooting in public places isn't banned', which could be described as 'indignation' or 'anger'. This representation then contrasts with what would have been expected and acceptable in such a context, which is that *meter cuatro tiros está totalmente prohibido* 'shooting in public places is firmly banned'. In this example then the contrast that the connective indicates may lead to the embedding of the utterance into some higher level explicature of the following type *'disgracefully, shamefully, shockingly, outrageously...'*. To sum up, it seems that the speaker guides the hearer to access the following assumptions: what is happening, what would have been expected and the relevance of this contrast, which includes how the speaker entertains this representation. All these assumptions will then lead the hearer to derive a number of implications in the context.

The following examples can be analysed along the same lines:

(29) Eso se ha reformado levemente, y ahora sí es posible expulsar, *pero* el profesor debe salir de la clase con el expulsado, dirigirse a la Jefatura de Estudios, abrir allí un expediente y no sé cuántos trámites más. (*El País Semanal 16-10-2005, pg. 126).*

This has been slightly reformed, and it is now possible to expel the students, ***but*** *the teacher must leave the class, go to the Head of Studies' office, and open a disciplinary action and many other countless procedures.*

Using *pero* in this example guides the hearer towards a contrast between the representation it introduces, which describes the steps the teacher has to follow when expelling a student, and a highly accessible assumption, which would include a scenario with less hassle for the teachers, since the previous information presents the expel of students as a positive measure for a smooth running of the school. In this example the propositional attitude in which the utterance may be embedded could be something like: '*it is a shame that, it is disgraceful that, it is sad that, it is excessive that, it is unacceptable that, etc...*':

Here below there is another example that deals with the topic of the smoking ban:

(30) Seremos bar de fumadores para no perder clientes. Alfonso es fumador hace 20 años, pero se corta de cara al público: "no podemos estar con el cigarro despachando una de croquetas, pero buscas el momento y te escapas al servicio a echarte uno de vez en cuando. La ley antitabaco le parece "bien, en el fondo", pero se rebela porque "el Estado prohíbe, *pero* sigue recaudando impuestos por el tabaco". (*El País 31-12-05, pg. 56).*

We will be a smokers' bar so that we do not lose clients. Alfonso has been a smoker for 20 years, but he is shy when he is facing the public: "we cannot be with the cigarette serving a portion of croquettes, but you wait for the moment and run to the toilet to have a fag from time to time. The smoking ban seems to him like a "good idea deep down", but he does not approve of the fact that the State bans it ***but*** *continues to collect taxes from tobacco".*

The speaker uses *pero* to make explicit her attitude towards the representation that it introduces, i.e. *El Estado sigue recaudando impuestos por el tabaco* 'The State continues to collect taxes from tobacco', which contrasts with an alternative accessible assumption such as *the State does not make any profit from this industry*, which in fact would be expected in a context where the State bans its use. In this example, then, the intended propositional attitude made explicit by *pero* could also be described as '*it is a shame that, it is disgraceful that, it is unacceptable that…*'

5.7.2. Compensatory

The compensatory use of *pero* corresponds to some examples which have been described in the RT tradition as examples of indirect denial of expectations, such as the one presented below:

(31) (They are looking for someone who could give some financial advice)
A: John is an economist.
B: He is not an economist *but* he is a businessman. (Blakemore 1987: 129)

Blakemore claims that an implicature of the *but* utterance (*he may be of some help)* would deny an implication of the preceding utterance (*he may not be of any help*). Our proposed analysis, on the other hand, is that *pero* instructs the hearer towards a contrast between the selected assumption it introduces, *he is a businessman,* and an indefinite number of alternative assumptions such as any other profession unrelated to economics. In fact, in this example the denial takes place in the first utterance, since it explicitly denies what the other speaker has just said. The utterance introduced by *pero,* on the other hand, communicates how the speaker entertains the representation, as a result of the contrast it indicates.

Now, we will elaborate on this idea discussing some authentic examples, like the one below:

(32) (*Hablando para quedar*) yo mañana curro hasta las 24: 30, *pero* luego estoy de mañana hasta el lunes, y libro martes, miércoles y jueves de la siguiente... sé que mis horarios son un coñazo,... *(email)*

(discussing arrangements to meet) I am working tomorrow till 24.30, ***but*** *then I am only working in the mornings until Monday, and I am off on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday the following week.... I know that my timetable is a pain...*

In this example, for instance, the speaker is explicitly marking her attitude towards the content of the proposition introduced by *pero*, which can be described as a 'positive stance of compensation'. This is derived from the contrast with a highly accessible alternative, which could be a busier timetable for the week with no free time (as seems to be the case of the day after). In this example, the alternative does not have to be clearly specified or represented in detail by the hearer, but it is clear that it plays an important role in determining how the speaker entertains the representation. Therefore, the speaker's attitude towards this representation will contribute to the relevance of the proposition, guiding the hearer in the derivation of further implications.

The next example presents the same idea of contrast between the *pero* utterance and an accessible alternative, which does not have to be necessarily specified:

(33) Partiendo de los tres euros (500 pesetas), el precio de entrada a los conciertos varía según el artista, *pero* por las tardes la entrada es libre. (*El país 4-1-2005, pg. 7)*

Starting from three euro (500 pesetas), the cost of the concerts varies depending on the artist, ***but*** *the evening concerts are free.*

In this case the alternative could be a scenario where there was no concession for the evenings. The speaker uses *pero* to make explicit her attitude about the way this representation is entertained, which could be accounted for as some 'positive compensatory' attitudinal meaning.

5.7.3. Hay más[11] (*there is more*)

It is common to use *pero* to introduce an utterance that adds information of the same type as the one presented in the previous utterance(s)[12]. Using *pero* in this context also has the effect of adding extra information about the way the speaker entertains the proposition. As discussed here, our account of *pero* explains its procedural semantics as a constraint on the derivation of some alternative assumptions that contrast with the information introduced by the connective. In examples such as the ones below, the speaker adds similar information to the one presented in the previous proposition and *pero* instructs the hearer to contrast the utterance it introduces with the alternative that there was no more information of the same type. In fact, this group could be included in the 'contrast with expectations' examples, only that it is not the actual content of the proposition that contrasts with some more expected information. Instead, the contrast is established between the fact that there is extra information on the same topic and the alternative that no more information of that type was provided. This suggests that the fact of having this extra information on the same topic is entertained by the speaker as exceptional or noteworthy.

[11] See in chapter (6) my account of *pero además*.
[12] Cfr. Portolés' (1995) examples of cooriented *topoi.*

We will illustrate this idea with the following examples:

(34) (El Gran Hermano / Tele5) A diferencia de la primera edición, los concursantes podían calcular el efecto que producían sus excesos. *Pero* esta no ha sido la única novedad. El cambio de Mercedes Milá por Pepe Navarro ha introducido una agresividad que ha coincidido con las tensiones internas auspiciadas por un casting que mezcló gasolina con mecheros. *(El País 15-07-02, pg. 71).*

(Big brother / Tele5) Unlike in the first series, the contestants could assess the effect caused by their extravagances. ***But*** *this has not been the only innovation. The substitution of Mercedes Milá for Pepe Navarro has introduced some aggressiveness that concurs with the internal tension provoked by a casting where oil was mixed fire.*

In this example there is first some information about some new features in the TV programme of Big Brother. The speaker then introduces with *pero* the representation that there are more innovations to be added to this second part of the programme. The function of *pero* is to evoke an alternative, which could be the lack of any innovation. Marking this contrast, the speaker is making explicit how she perceives this extra information to be exceptional, which will have some cognitive effects on the hearer.

We will now move to another example, which has a special feature that provides further support for our proposal:

(35) *Y seguimos con desgracias*, porque Rosa, la famosa Rosa de España, sigue sin recuperar la voz y todos sus amigos y compañeros la animan desde Lecturas y Semana. De todas maneras la ganadora de OT ha comprado un chalé de 1.000 metros cuadrados a sus padres, que han dejado su pueblo de toda la vida por una urbanización chic en Granada. *Pero continuamos con los malos rollos* porque Isabel Pantoja y su cuñada Teresa Rivera (hermana de Paquirri) todavía andan a la gresca 18 años después de la muerte del torero. *(El País 04-10-02, pg. 57).*

And we continue with misfortunes*, because Rosa, the famous Rosa de España, remains unable to use her voice and all her friends and mates are comforting her from Lecturas and Semana...* ***But we continue with bad news*** *because Isabel Pantoja and her*

sister in law T.R. (Paquirri's sister) are still fighting 18 years after the death of bullfighter...

In this example there are two markers that indicate that there is more of the same type of information to follow: *seguimos con desgracias* 'we continue with misfortunes' and *continuamos con los malos rollos* 'we continue with bad news', each one preceded by a different connective: *y* 'and' and *pero* 'but' respectively. In the utterance introduced by *pero,* the speaker points towards a contrast with an alternative, which in this case could be a different type of continuation that did not involve bad news. From the contrast made explicit by *pero*, the hearer may then derive the speaker's attitude towards this selected information, which could be read as '*it is surprising, it is exceptional, it is unusual...*'. This explicitness of the propositional attitude is missing in the example introduced by the conjunction *y* 'and'.

If one were to follow Blakemore's analysis of denial to account for these examples, one would have to agree that the speaker expects the hearer to have derived the assumption that there would not be any more information of the same type. Then, the use of *pero* would be justified as a denial of this assumption. Similarly, following her analysis of suspension, Hall would claim that the hearer is instructed to suspend a possible inference that could be derived from the previous information, which could be a continuation of the same topic. It seems that neither of these explanations sounds like a plausible explanation of the relevance of using *pero* in this type of examples. It is not justified why the hearer should have derived the assumption that needs to be denied or suspended.

5.7.4. Contrast

Most relevance theorists working on *but* have described the contrast use as one of the most controversial. Once the idea of analysing this connective in terms of contrast was discarded (see Blakemore 1987, 2002, Hall 2003, 2004, 2007), there have been several attempts to explain the so-called contrast uses as examples of denial or suspension. This, however, has encountered some difficulties. As discussed earlier, Blakemore (2002), for instance, argued that in the contrast use,

the assumption that is denied is that there is actually no contrast between the propositions; Hall (2004, 2007), on the other hand, accounts for this use claiming that it suspends inferences that are not necessarily represented by the hearer. We would argue that our account of contrast of alternatives, on the other hand, can readily accommodate these examples without having to present them as special cases.

First of all, it is important to recall that *pero* is not simply pointing towards a contrast between the content explicitly expressed in the two utterances linked by the connective. To achieve that effect, the speaker would use connectives such as *en cambio* 'whereas', *en contraste* 'in contrast', etc. The function of the connective *pero,* on the other hand, consists of explicitly marking the speaker's intention to contrast the content of her assertion with alternative assumptions, constraining the derivation of the higher-level explicatures in which the utterance is embedded. In the example below, for instance,

(36) Y es que el metro cuadrado en Parla está entre los más baratos de Madrid a 1.322 euros, según la consultora Tasamadrid. Las inmobiliarias de la zona ofrecen pisos de 80 metros cuadrados por unos 108.000 euros. *Pero* en el centro de la ciudad, al lado de la estación de Renfe, una promotora ofrece pisos de 70 metros cuadrados por más de 180.000. (*El País 08-07-02, pg. 24).*

The square metre in Parla is one of the cheapest in Madrid, it costs 1,322 euros, according to the consultancy Tasamadrid. The state agents of the area are offering 80 square metres apartments for around 108,000 euros. ***But*** *in the city centre, near Renfe station, a property developer offers 70 square meters apartments for more than 180,000.*

The speaker uses *pero* to instruct the hearer to contrast the representation it introduces with an alternative in which prices in the city centre could have been similar to those in Parla. It is unlikely that in this example the speaker intends to deny an assumption that is manifest to the reader, since it seems to be a manifest assumption that prices of houses tend to be more expensive in the city centre. Instead, the speaker points towards this contrast to make explicit her propositional attitude towards this representation, i.e. it constrains the higher level explicatures of the utterance in the line of *'it is disappointing that, it is frustrating that...*'. On

the other hand, there could be a context in which the alternative could be an even dearer price. In this case the propositional attitude resulting from the contrast could be described as *'it is surprisingly positive that, it is encouraging that ...'*. The exact nature of this description will be determined by the expectation of relevance and the communicative principle of relevance.

In the following example, extracted from an interview to the songwriter Joaquin Sabina, the speaker also indicates with *pero* a contrast between the *pero* utterance and an alternative, which could easily be its opposite counterpart. By marking this contrast, the speaker is also pointing towards a propositional attitude of strong commitment towards the proposition as well as some emotional attitude, which could be interpreted as *'it is frustrating, it is worrying, it is strange that ...*'

(37) Un neurólogo me dijo que esto era normal, *pero* yo no encuentro normal estar dos años en un agujero negro. *(El País Semanal 18-09 2005, pg. 19).*

A neurologist told me that it was normal, ***but*** *I don't think it is normal to spend two years in a black hole.*

In this example, the function of *pero* becomes clearer if we replace it with the conjunction *y* 'and'. In the example with *y* the speaker seems to be quite objective while presenting the information. In the same example with *pero,* on the other hand, the singer makes explicit her propositional attitude towards the representation it introduces (e.g. *disappointingly, unfortunately, worryingly, annoyingly, strangely*).

The following extract is also taken from the same interview to this singer:

(38) Me pillas en un día bueno. Hace año y medio (cuando la entrevista anterior), estaba en medio de una depresión. *Pero* hace cuatro meses me levanté una mañana y me apetecía salir a tomar una pizza, me apetecía escribir una canción, visitar a los amigos... (El País Semanal 18-09-2005. Pg. 20).

You get me on a good day. A year and a half ago (the time of the last interview), I was in the middle of a depression. ***But*** *one day four months ago I woke up and I felt like having a pizza, I felt like writing a song, like visiting some friends.*

In this example, *pero* directs the hearer towards an alternative assumption, which could be that the singer could have been as depressed as he was in previous months. This could not be a manifest assumption that needs to be denied, since he mentioned in the preceding utterance that the depression belonged to the past, by using a past tense (*estaba* 'I was'). Marking this proposition with *pero* is instead a way for the speaker to make explicit his attitude (in this case, probably of positive affective stance and maybe a marker of exceptionality) towards the representation it introduces, which is marked as relevant in the context.

Another example belonging to this group is the following:

(39) B: ¿Pedro, eres feliz conmigo?
A: A veces sí *y* a veces no.
B: A veces sí *pero* a veces no. *(conversation)*

B: Pedro, are you happy with me?
A: Sometimes I am ***and*** *sometimes I am not.*
B: Sometimes I am ***but*** *sometimes I am not.*

Here an accessible alternative could be that *siempre estoy feliz* 'I am always happy', which is the opposite of what is stated. Interestingly, the first utterance has already denied this fact, because when someone says that *a veces soy feliz* 'sometimes I am happy', it is implied that he is not always happy (see Grice's maxim of quantity and principle of relevance). Therefore, to account for the use of *pero* in this type of example, one will plainly need to go beyond any idea of suspension or denial. If there is any denial at all, it would be in the first rather than in the *pero* utterance. In this example, using *pero* marks the contrast between the representation *sometimes* and an accessible alternative like *never*. This contrast, then, constrains the interpretation of some propositional attitude of affective stance such as '*unfortunately*, *worryingly, sadly, regretfully* or *disappointingly'*.

Another similar example would be the one below:

(40) De tanto en tanto, como lo haría una recién casada llena de atenciones por su marido, se venía a colgar de mis hombros y a darme un beso por la espalda, en el cuello o la oreja. *Pero* cuando llegaba Yilal se olvidaba por completo de mí y se dedicaba a jugar

con el niño como si fueran de la misma edad. (*Vargas Llosa, 2006: Travesuras de la niña mala, pg. 262).*

From time to time, as a newlywed wife would do devoting herself to her husband, she used to put her arm around my shoulders and kiss me from the back, in the neck or the ear. ***But*** *as soon as Yilal arrived, she would forget about me and she used to play with the kid as if they were the same age.*

In this extract, the speaker describes the change that takes place in his wife's behaviour when Yilal arrives. Opting for *pero* is once more a mechanism available for the speaker to make explicit his attitudinal stance. In this example, the speaker guides the hearer towards an accessible alternative in which her behaviour could have remained the same as it was before the arrival of Yilal. The attitude that can be read from this contrast could, for instance, be described as '*interestingly, disappointingly, gladly, sadly, wrongly…*'. The hearer will have access to other accessible contextual assumptions that will determine which one is the most relevant in this particular case, always guided by the communicative principle of relevance.

In the next example John Lennon's wife tells us about what her husband used to say at night:

(41) (Sobre John Lennon). En mitad de la noche me solía decir: "Siempre hacen versiones de los temas de Paul, *pero* nunca interpretan los míos". (*El País 12-10-2005, pg. 45).*

(About John Lennon). In the middle of the night he used to say: "they always do versions of Paul's songs, ***but*** *they never interpret mine"*

She is drawing the addressee's attention towards the contrast between the representation that *nunca interpretan mis temas* 'they never interpret my versions' and the highly accessible alternative *siempre//algunas veces interpretan mis temas* 'they always/sometimes interpret my versions'. This contrast may constrain the speaker's propositional attitude in which to embed the proposition, which can be described along the lines of '*it is frustrating, it is unfair, it is wrong, it is disappointing, it is suspicious, it is strange, etc…*'.

If one were to follow Blakemore's denial account, the use of *pero* would be justified as an instruction to deny some implication that could derive from the first proposition. In this case, it could be argued that from the proposition *siempre interpretan los temas de Paul* 'they always do versions of Paul's songs' the hearer could derive that the same should happen with his. It seems very unlikely that in this context this would be an implication that needs to be denied. In fact, in this case the hearer is his wife, therefore it is very unlikely that this assumption could be manifest to her and needed to be denied. Instead, a more plausible explanation could be that the speaker wants to evoke the alternative of what he would have wanted to happen. By doing this, the speaker makes explicit how he entertains this representation.

To finish this section, we will comment on the following example:

(42) Los niños admiran casi sólo a los mayores; los viejos, casi sólo a los niños. *Pero* los adultos admiramos por igual a los viejos y a los niños.

Children admire almost only old people; old people, almost only children. ***But*** *we adults admire both old people and children equally. (El País 25-09-2005, pg. 8).*

Using *pero* in this example evokes the existence of an alternative assumption (*adults could admire just one particular group (adults or children) instead of admiring both groups equally)*, which contrasts with the *pero* utterance. It is then from this contrast that the hearer could derive a number of implications, such as the idea that adults admiring both the elderly and children makes them special in some way. In this analysis, then, these implications derived from the contrast affect how the hearer identifies the speaker's attitude towards what *pero* introduces. The use of *pero* constrains the recovery of the higher level explicatures in which the utterance should be embedded, i.e. how the speaker entertains the *pero* proposition. Therefore, the hearer could derive different implications not only from the utterance introduced by *pero* but also from the alternatives that are evoked by *pero* and the actual fact that the speaker is pointing towards this contrast.

5.7.5. Politeness or epistemic commitment

In the RT tradition, Higashimori (1992(a): 342) notes that there are some examples where what is denied is socially conventionalised knowledge derived from the first conjunct, which could be manifest to both speaker and hearer (1992(a): 343). Similarly, Bell (1998) argues that *but* can cancel different types of acts of communication including the "perlocutionary effects in terms of face, politeness, mood, ..." (1998: 527). Our account, on the other hand, does not rely on the notion of denial or cancellation. Instead, it will rely on the notion of contrast with alternatives to account for this type of examples. If one looks at the following excerpt, for instance:

(43) No quiero ser pedante, *pero* es mejor ser honrados, orgullosos, fuertes. (*El País 22-06-2002, pg. 12).*

I don't want to be pompous, ***but*** *it is better to be honest, proud, strong.*

One finds that politeness conventions are actually met by the utterance preceding *pero: no quiero ser pedante* 'I don't want to be pompous'. The speaker is explicit about her detachment from being pedantic. Therefore, we do not agree with the view that the use of this connective is to mark that the speaker is not observing some social conventions. Instead, we would argue that with the first utterance the speaker is actually making explicit that she is following these conventions.

Following the hypothesis put forward in this thesis, the speaker may use *pero* in this context to indicate her commitment towards the utterance it introduces against an alternative. Making explicit this commitment is of special interest in this example, since in the previous utterance the speaker is expressing her intention not to be pedantic. The speaker is then pointing towards the alternative that taking those circumstances the speaker could have opted for, i.e. not saying what he is about to say, which contrasts with the fact that he is actually saying it. The contrast, then, seems to take place at a higher level, i.e. between *'saying it'* and *'not saying it'*. This constrains the speaker's attitude, which could be interpreted as being apologetic for having to express something that is presented as inappropriate, but at the same time necessary. It is then relevant that the speaker

makes explicit the way she entertains what she is saying and implications will follow from this.

Similarly, in this group there are also those examples of the speaker expressing lack of understanding about some event, with an utterance like the following: *yo no sé cómo* 'I don't know how', preceding the *pero* utterance:

(44) Y no sé como, *pero* de repente el "rubio" me empezó a besar, el otro también... y de *(email)*

And I don't know how, ***but*** *suddenly the blond one started to kiss me and the other one as well*

In this example the speaker marks with *pero* her commitment towards the information it introduces. This is highly relevant in this context, since the reliability of the representation it introduces could be questioned due to the uncertainty marked by the preceding information. It can then be argued that in this example the contrast does not take place at the level of the basic propositional content (explicatures) but at the level of higher level explicatures. In this case, the higher level explicatures that are contrasting may be *estoy segura de que* 'I am sure that' and *no estoy muy segura de que* 'I am not very sure that ...'. The speaker uses *pero* in this example to make relevant her commitment towards what she is asserting, conferring it some type of unexpected character that justifies this marking of explicit commitment.

Below, there are further examples of this group of epistemic commitment, where the *pero* utterance is preceded by *'it may be a hallucination'* or *'it is curious'*. These utterances may lead the hearer to a context of lack of credibility in relation to what follows. The speaker, however, introduces with *pero* the following proposition, to mark her commitment towards the truth of this representation. This explicit marking of commitment is then relevant in itself and will also have different implications in the context.

(45) Quizá se trata de una alucinación, *pero* vi que Bouteflika llevaba unas veces la cuchara a su propia boca, y otras, a la de la cabeza de repuesto.

It may be a hallucination, ***but*** *I saw Bouteflika taking the spoon to his own mouth at times, and other times, to the spare head.*

(46) (El entrevistado habla de cómo su familia le había hecho una fiesta sorpresa para su 90 cumpleaños reuniendo a antiguos compañeros).
R: Es curioso, *pero* varias personas me habían dicho que había sido sacerdote.
E: No, No

(The interviewee talks about the surprise 90th birthday party organised by his family who brought his old colleagues together).
R: It is funny ***but*** *several people told me that you had been a priest.*
E: No, no....

Interestingly, if the connective *pero* is replaced with *que* 'that' in the examples above, there is a clear difference in the propositional attitude of the speaker towards the representation introduced by *pero*. It seems that the speaker uses *pero* to contrast the truth of the representation with the alternative that this representation was not true, which is made accessible from the preceding utterance, i.e. *Quizá se trata de una alucinación* 'it may be a hallucination', *Es curioso* 'it is funny'. The propositional attitude that results from this contrast can then be defined as an explicit strengthening of the speaker commitment towards the truth of this representation.

To finish with this group, we would like to discuss two similar examples where the order of the clauses has been inverted:

(47) No mires *pero* tienes a Juan detrás de tí. *(conversation)*

Don't look ***but*** *Juan is right behind you.*

(48) Tienes a Juan detrás de ti *pero* no mires. (*conversation*)

Juan is right behind you ***but*** *don't look.*

In the first of the two examples the speaker seems to strengthen her commitment towards the *pero* utterance. In this case, this explicit marking of commitment to the truth of the proposition is highly relevant because the hearer has to take the speaker's word as the only proof of what she is saying. We cannot see how a denial or a suspension account could explain this type of example.

In the second example, on the other hand, the imperative *no mires* 'don't look' contrasts with an accessible alternative, which could easily be its opposite, *mira* 'look'. The speaker is then marking with *pero* her commitment towards one interpretation while contrasting it with an alternative that is highly accessible in the context. The function of *pero* in this context could be to make explicit to the hearer that the speaker is entertaining the two alternatives and marking her explicit commitment towards the explicit one. This could be described as illocutionary force of warning.

5.7.6. Restriction[13]

In the examples of this group, *pero* introduces representations that can be described as restrictions on the preceding utterance. The function of *pero* in this context is to mark a contrast between this selected restriction and alternative options of a different nature, constraining the speaker's propositional attitude towards this restriction. For instance, in the example below:

(49) Pues sólo dan la opción de que yo siga *pero* como autónoma. (*email*)

Well, there is only the option that I continue ***but*** *as self employed.*

the speaker is marking a contrast between the representation of being self-employed and other accessible alternatives, which in this context could include better work conditions. Marking this contrast may be a way of constraining the derivation of some propositional attitude of disappointment or frustration towards the selected representation. In this type of examples, it is worth noting that not making explicit the propositional attitude towards that restriction would result in very different implications.

[13] This use has also been described as emphatic use of *pero* (see for instance Acín 1993, 1993-4, Portolés 1985: 249).

In the two examples below, the speaker uses *pero* to make explicit her intention of marking the exceptionality of what she presents, in a positive rather than in a negative tone:

(50) Yo querría daros mil ánimos a todas *pero* con un abrazo tierno y fuerte y una mirada de confianza (*email).*

I would want to give you all loads of encouragement ***but*** *with an affectionate strong hug and a reassuring look.*

(51) No hizo más que eso, sólo mirarla, *pero* con unos ojos tremendos, oscuros y densos. (*El País Semanal 28-11-2004, pg. 122).*

He did nothing more than that, only looking at her, ***but*** *with those huge dark and deep eyes,.*

.

The emphatic character is also the result of contrasting the restriction of what *pero* introduces with other alternative representations. In the example (50) it contrasts with a more standard way of 'encouraging' people in and in (51) with an ordinary way of 'looking at someone'.

The following example is an extract from an interview with the singer Norah Jones:

(52) Yo sólo quiero que se escuche mi música, *pero* por como suena, no por cómo soy. (*El País Semanal 07-03-2004, pg. 22*).

I only want my music to be heard, ***but*** *because of the way it sounds, not because of who I am.*

It is worth noting that she wants to make explicit her detachment from those singers whose success is not based on their music but on their personal lives. In fact, this example could easily dispense with *pero*. However, the speaker uses it to mark the relevance of making this detachment more explicit, i.e. she wants to draw attention to the hearer towards this contrast between what she really is and what she could have been had she followed the steps of some of her contemporary singers. This suggests that she entertains this representation as exceptional. The speaker is marking this as relevant and the hearer is expected to derive some implications from it. It is difficult to see how a denial or suspension account could

explain this type of example, since it is unlikely that from the first proposition the hearer could derive a manifest assumption that needs to be denied or an inference that could be suspended.

Next, we will discuss another example from this group, which is extracted from an account of a male singer about a time when he was suffering from depression and didn't want to socialise with his friends:

(53) Me invitaron tres o cuatro veces, y entonces llamó Simoneta y me dijo que si no iba me llamaría la Guardia Civil, y ante esos argumentos me rendí. *Pero* puse como condición que vinieran a mi casa, a este piso de Tirso de Molina. (*El País Semanal 18-10-2005, pg. 16).*

They invited me three or four times, and then Simoneta phoned and told me that if I did not leave she would phone the Guardia Civil, so I gave in. ***But*** *I said I would only do it on the condition that they came to my place, to this apartment in Tirso de Molina.*

In this example the speaker (the singer) explicitly marks how he entertains the proposition introduced by *pero*, which describes how he imposed on his friends the condition that they all had to come to his house. In this case, this representation contrasts with the alternative of him simply accepting his friends' invitation without any further imposition on them. Marking this contrast is a way of making explicit the fact that the speaker may perceive his own behaviour as exceptional or inappropriate, what in itself may guide the hearer towards the derivation of some implications about the speaker.

We will finish this section with the following example:

(54) Total, que este chico tenía otro amigo que era chino, americano, *pero* chino al fin y al cabo. (*email*)

So anyway, this guy had another friend who was Chinese, American ***but*** *Chinese after all.*

It appears that the speaker uses *pero* to make explicit her propositional attitude towards the representation it introduces, which presents information about the nationality of a guy the speaker has just met. This propositional attitude is derived

after contrasting the nationality presented and any other nationality that she could have expected in that context. Depending on the context, the hearer will be able to access different types of contextual assumptions to determine the intended attitudinal information. If it was manifest to the hearer that the speaker has always had a special attraction towards Chinese people, the propositional attitude would be totally different from the context in which it was manifest the speaker's lack of attraction towards this group.

5.7.7. Emphasis

As discussed in chapter 2 the emphatic use of *pero* has been the focus of study in the Hispanic tradition. Beinhauer (1958: 126) was the first to identify it and after him a long list of authors have included this use in their analysis of the conjunction *pero*[14]. Gili Gaya (1972: 282) pointed out that in these examples *pero* is a mechanism to mark surprise, disagreement, impatience or anger with what was expressed by the interlocutor. However, it is unfortunate that there has not been much elaboration on how to account for this attitudinal meaning. As noted earlier, Acín (1993) explains that the emphatic uses of *pero*:

(55) Ojalá no la hubiera querido tanto. *Pero* ¡a tí no te engañaré!'.

I wish I had not loved her so much. ***But*** *I will not lie to you!*

there is a different modality and a very strong pause and *pero* intensifies the sense of what follows (1993: 165). However, there is no further explanation on this notion of intensification.

My proposal agrees with Acín's view that using *pero* can result in some intensification or focalization of the information it introduces. However, our analysis goes a step further explaining that this is the result of the contrast it triggers. In the Hispanic tradition, the main debate in relation to the emphatic use of *pero* has revolved around the idea of whether or not this use should be considered as 'adversative', i.e. as a marker of contradiction and opposition. Our

[14] See DRAE (1962), M. Seco (1967), Gili Gaya (1972), Hernández Alonso (1984), Moliner (1984), Vigara (1992), E. Acín (1993-4), Portolés (1985), Fuentes (1997-8).

analysis of contrast with alternatives does not face this kind of problem since it is able to account for this emphatic use in the same terms as it does with all its other uses.

Here we will look at four different types of emphatic *pero*; the first three correspond to the use of *pero* introducing examples with different modality: exclamations, imperatives and interrogatives. These uses are of special interest for our study, since these types of structures are accounted for in terms of higher level explicatures. Therefore, adding *pero* will add an extra level that should be superposed to the already communicated higher level explicatures. Then, the fourth use will be the emphatic use of repetition, which does not share this feature of extra higher level as the others.

5.7.7.1. Emphatic exclamation

One of the most common emphatic uses of *pero* is the one introducing exclamations. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 253-4) argue that RT can provide a convincing account for exclamatives establishing some parallelism between them and interrogatives. The argument put forward by Sperber and Wilson is that both interrogatives and exclamatives are examples of interpretive rather than descriptive use (see distinction discussed in chapter 4). The guarantee of the relevance of these expressions lies in the "true completion of the incomplete thought of P" (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 252). They illustrate this idea with following example:

(56) Jane is so clever!

As happens with any instance of ostensive communication the most relevant interpretation will be one compatible with the principle of relevance, and in this particular example they argue that it could be that "the speaker is guaranteeing that Jane is cleverer than the hearer would otherwise have expected" (S&W 1995: 254)(my emphasis). However, it is not explained why the marking of the disagreement with expectations takes place on the hearer's rather than the speaker's side.

It is interesting that the connective *pero* can be added to this type of structures, which already have some marking of unexpectedness or surprise (see also in chapter 6 *pero incluso* 'but even'). The contribution of *pero* could be accounted for in terms of the relevance of explicitly marking the speaker's attitude. The hearer who processes an exclamation introduced by *pero* may derive implications not only from the unexpected information but also from this explicit marking of the speaker's attitude towards this information.

We will compare an example of an exclamation with the same example preceded by *pero*:

(57) ¡Jane es tan inteligente!

Jane is so clever!

(58) *¡Pero* qué inteligente es Jane!

***But** how clever Jane is!*

In the example (57) the speaker is simply expressing Jane's higher than expected degree of intelligence. In the second example, on the other hand, the speaker is making salient her attitude towards this phenomenon as also contributing to the relevance of the utterance and therefore it will be expected to derive implications from it.

Here we will comment on some more examples of exclamations introduced by *pero*:

(59) -¿Cómo recuerda usted la época de de Capuchino?
-Pues magníficamente bien, porque en realidad, yo lo he pensado eso muchas veces, era como aquello que uno aspira encontrar y que lo encuentra. Una especie de espíritu de familia, y le hablo de los tiempos, imagínese de los años cuarenta, cuarenta y siete, cuarenta y siete empecé como Capuchino, *pero* durante seis años en el seminario menor, ¡un espíritu de familia!, que complementaba a aquella que dejé. *(Conversación radiofónica*[15]*, Madrid 24/06/ 91 in CREA*).

[15] Radio conversation. Madrid.

-How do you remember those days as as a Capuchin?
-Well, amazingly well, because in fact, I have thought about that many times, it was like something one hopes to find and then finds it. A kind of a family spirit, and I am referring to those days, think of the 40s, forty seven, forty seven I started being aCapuchin, ***but*** *during six years in the lower seminar, a family spirit!, which complemented the one that I had left behind.*

In this example *pero* plays an important role in drawing attention to the speaker's attitude towards the situation expressed in the exclamation. In this context, the contrast between the description of the speaker's experience in the seminar and an alternative, which could be a less positive experience, constrains the attitudinal meaning of surprise and positive affective stance.

Below are two further examples of this group where the speaker introduces an exclamation with *pero* to make explicit her propositional attitude. As in previous examples of this group, the exclamation makes explicit the marking of surprise or unexpectedness on the part of the speaker, which in the first example can be described as echoic. Adding *pero* to the exclamation is a means of making explicit the speaker's commitment towards the propositional attitude of surprise or unexpectedness.

(60) Así que, con el pueblo tan bonito que tenemos. Porque es de lo más bonito de la sierra, pues es una lástima que la gente que venga aquí dice: *"¡pero* qué feo, qué sucio!"Y entonces yo creo que es una llamadita a la corporación, que va a entrar nueva para que den un toque a este pueblo (*Radio, Madrid, 24/06/91, in CREA*).

*So, with such a beautiful town. Because the mountains are really beautiful, it is a real pity to hear people who come here say: "****but****, how ugly, how dirty! And then I think that this is a call for the new council so that they change the town around.*

(61) Oiga, perdóneme, ¿usted no tiene una peluquería? Sí, señor. de mi alma, *pero* qué guapa eres Más guapa que la Sara, que mi señora, vamos. (*Que una Sara y punto, 23/09/90, TVE*[16] *2)*

Excuse me, don't you have a hairdresser's? Yes, indeed. My darling, ***but*** *how pretty you are!. Prettier than Sara, than my wife, I mean.*

[16] TVE (Televisión Española (Spanish National Television))

5.7.7.2. Emphatic imperative

As reviewed in chapter 4, in RT imperative examples communicate an explicature that is a description of states of affairs both achievable (or potential) and desirable (to some degree) to the speaker or the hearer or, perhaps, a salient third person (Carston 2002(b): 120). There are also examples of imperatives that can be preceded by *pero*, which indicate a contrast with alternatives, too. This contrast also constrains the derivation of the propositional attitude, which can be described in some contexts as upset or anger. We will illustrate this with an example:

(62) *¡Pero* ábrelo, que es muy divertido!

***But** open it, it is very funny*! (*UAM Oral Humanístico*[17])

In this example the speaker marks with *pero* a contrast between the fact that the speaker is describing a desirable state of affair (*that the hearer opens it*) and the context in which the speaker should not have had to express it (either because it has already been mentioned before or because it should be evident from the context). In this case, then, the contrast will not be established at the content level of the representation but at higher level instead. The higher level explicature constrained by this contrast may then be accounted for in terms of disappointment, anger or upset and it will embed another higher level representation. On the other hand, there could be another different interpretation for this same example. The speaker may have instead used *pero* to draw attention towards some contrast between the desirable representation of *opening it* and any other alternative representation that may be accessible in the context, such as for instance *playing with it, looking at it…*, which will lead to the derivation of a different type of propositional attitude.

[17] Humanistic Oral. UAM.

5.7.7.3. Introducing a question

In this modal emphatic category we can also include another use of *pero* that seems to be quite pervasive in conversation: the use of *pero* preceding a question. The examples with *pero* introducing a question are common in conversation but they can also be found in expository texts as well as in rhetorical uses. However, there is a restriction in the contexts in which *pero* could introduce a question. Unlike what happens with a question introduced with *and,* when the question is preceded by *pero,* there is some extra meaning conveyed, which restricts its context of use.

As described earlier, both interrogatives and exclamatives are accounted for in RT as examples of interpretive use. Interrogatives are described as having the feature of not communicating the explicature of the proposition but a higher level explicature as an interpretation of a desirable representation (Wilson and Sperber 1986/95: 231). Furthermore, there are two types of interrogatives: wh-questions and yes/no questions. We will consider both types, discussing the differences between them when preceded by *pero*. Generally, in wh- questions the contrast marked by *pero* is established at the level of formulating the question itself. On the other hand, in yes/no questions the contrast is marked between a possible true representations (answers) and its positive or negative alternative. We will here elaborate on this idea with some authentic examples.

In the wh-questions the speaker uses *pero* to point towards the fact that the question should not have been formulated. In these examples, thus, the contrast is established at the higher level *I am asking you this question* and the alternative like *I should not be asking you this question.* In these examples the propositional attitude of the speaker towards the actual fact of formulating the question can be described as surprise, disappointment or anger. We will illustrate this with examples from authentic data:

(63) O tal vez sea mejor decir un Quijote pasado por agua al tratar Terry Gilliam de hacer otra versión de las venturas y desventuras de aquel caballero de la triste figura -que fue como lo llamó su creador, Miguel de Cervantes-. *Pero,* ¿quién es, por favor, Terry Gilliam? Gilliam era el cartonista de Monty Python's Flying Circus, que no era un grupo de acróbatas del aire, sino un magazine de la televisión parcialmente animado que primero tuvo éxito en Inglaterra y luego dondequiera, incluyendo los Estados Unidos. (*El País 26-10-2002, pg. 13).*

Or maybe it is better to say a phoney Quijote when referring to Terry Gillian's attempt to do a version of the adventures and misadventures of the knight of the sad figure, as he was called by his creator, Miguel de Cervantes. ***But****, please, who is Terry Gillian? Gilliam was the cartoonist of Monty Python's Flying Circus, which was not a group of air acrobats, but a partially animated television programme, which was first successful in England and then elsewhere, including the United States.*

In this first example, the function of *pero* introducing a question can be interpreted as a way of expressing the speaker's attitude towards the fact that the speaker has to formulate the question on the identity of Terry Gillian. Introducing this question with *pero* points to a contrast with an alternative where there would be no need to formulate the question, because it would be known information. The attitude conveyed in this example may be interpreted in different (contextually relevant) ways such as, for instance, 'some attitude of annoyance or protest for having to request the clarification', 'some apologetic attitude for not knowing some information that is taken as known information' or 'some demeaning or condescending attitude for having to ask the question' taking the insignificance of Terry Gillian as opposed to Cervantes.

More examples of this type are presented below:

(64) A: Me llamo Enrique
B: *Pero* Enrique ¿qué más?

A: My name is Enrique
B: Enrique, ***but*** *what else? (conversation)*

(65) No? Eco es un momento tuyo, ahora tienes que subirte al escenario. ¿Luego puedo volver a verlos? ¿Cómo te encuentras? Oye, no, *pero* ¿qué ha pasado?, de verdad. A mí no me contéis. Nada, no ha pasado nada. Nada. Nada. (*Hola Raffaella, 28/01/93, TVE 1 in CREA*)

Eco is your moment, now you have to go on stage, can I then see them again later? How are you feeling? Listen, no, ***but*** *what's happened? Really?. I don't want to know anything. Nothing, nothing has happened.*

As in the imperative examples, where the speaker refers to a fact that something should have already taken place and it has not, in these examples the speaker also uses *pero* to point towards the context in which the answer to that question should have been given and the fact that it has not, making explicit the propositional attitude of impatience or annoyance.

Similarly, in the following example, the speaker introduces the question with *pero* to make explicit her attitude of disappointment towards what seems to be taken as a generally agreed concept, 'the young':

(66) "La juventud reclama espacios de ocio para emborracharse", dicen. ¿*Pero* qué es la juventud? La juventud es también ese muchacho. (*El País 22-03-2006, backpage*).

"*The young demand leisure space to get drunk", they say.* ***But*** *who are the young? This guy is also (the) young.*

The speaker introduces the question with *pero*, directing the hearer towards a contrast between the formulation of the question and its alternative, which may be that there was no need to pose the question. Doing so, the speaker may be expressing that asking this question may be perceived as exceptional in a context in which this definition may have wrongly been taken for granted as being generally agreed by everyone. The contrast marked by *pero* may also constrain the speaker's propositional attitude of regret towards the fact that this concept has not been properly defined.

Another example of this type is the following:

(67) Y el inmortal quiso reunirse con su hermano y no hacía más que darse golpes en la cabeza contra las paredes del palacio y no se moría. Claro, era inmortal, y como Zeus vio que iba a destruirle el palacio a golpes le dijo: "Oye, para". Y entonces, le dijo: "Bueno, *¿pero* qué te pasa?","Pues que yo quiero estar con mi hermano". *(Planetario, charla*[18]*, Madrid, 05/91 in CREA).*

And the immortal one wanted to join his brother and he kept banging his head against the walls of the palace and he could not die. Well, he was immortal and since Zeus realised that he was going to destroy the palace he said: "Listen, stop". And then he said "well, ***But*** *what is wrong with you?. "I just want to be with my brother".*

In this example the speaker (Zeus) uses *pero* to introduce the question that enquires about what is wrong with the addressee. It is not clear from this extract if the speaker had already asked the addressee that question before. If that was the case, it could be read as marking some propositional attitude of anger, which results from having to ask a question that should have been previously answered. On the other hand, the speaker could be presenting it as a rhetorical question, showing her attitude of discontent or anger towards the actual fact of asking the question, not because it has been asked before but because of the nature of it. If so, this use seems to be linked to some of the reading of the imperative examples described earlier.

Here below, we will present more examples where the speaker uses *pero* to make explicit that the speaker entertains the question it introduces as not having a plausible answer.

(68) Oye, Máximo, ¿no viene esta ¿Qué pasa? Noche la presidenta del club de fans de Brad Pitt? No, mira le hemos dicho que ya está bien de fans, que ya está bien de qué[...] Que queremos apuntarnos. [...] No, perdona, *pero* qué tiene, además, Brad Pitt que no tenga yo o que no tenga Es verdad.. *(Lo más plus, 11/12/96, Canal Plus*[19] *in CREA).*

Listen, Maximo, isn't the , what happens? President of the Brad Pitt's fan club coming tonight? No, look, I have told her that we had enough

[18] A conversation in the Planetarium. Madrid.
[19] TV Channel (Channel Plus)

of fans, [...] *We want to join.* [...] *No, sorry, really* ***but*** *what does Brad Pitt have that I don't. You are right.*

This example seems to be another case of rhetorical question, where the speaker is not really expressing the higher level explicature of a desirable representation. Instead, it works like an exclamation, where the speaker makes explicit her attitude towards the fact that he has to formulate a question. In fact, it is interesting that it is not marked with question marks, which may suggest that it is taken as an example of exclamation instead of interrogation.

Similarly, the following example can also be interpreted as an exclamation, where the speaker also introduces the question with *pero* to make explicit her attitude of surprise about the representation described in the utterance.

(69) Dónde vas con la sábana, José Luis. Deja la lámpara. *Pero* ¿qué haces en el armario? Se ha acabado la monotonía María. Baja del armario José Luis. (*Tariro, tariro, 13/12/88, TVE 1 in CREA)*

What are you doing with the sheet, José luis. Leave the lamp alone. ***But,*** *what are you doing in the wardrobe? The monotony is over Mary. Get off the wardrobe José Luis.*

The following example could be accounted in similar terms:

(70) Como ustedes son tan amigos y él te estima tanto, pensé, en fin, espero que no te importe. Pensé que podrías ayudarme.
Pero, ¿en qué forma te puedo ayudar?. Vargas Llosa, 2006: *Travesuras de la niña mala* (Ed. Alfaguara), pg. 183.

As you are such good friends and he cares so much about you, I thought, well, I hope you don't mind. I thought maybe you could help me.
But*, how can I help you?*

This is another example where the speaker also seems to make explicit her attitude of surprise towards the actual fact of having to formulate that question in this context.

It then seems that the function of the question seems to resemble the exclamations in some examples and the imperatives in others. This suggests that our account brings out the functional similarity between these types of structures.

As discussed in chapter 2, in the pragmatic tradition, Porroche (2002) accounts for this use of *pero* as a reaction on the speaker's side against the inference derived from the maxim of conversation of clarity.

(71) *Pero* ¿Cuál sería tu decisión?

But, what would your decision be?

Porroche's analysis seems to rely on some conceptualization of a maxim of clarity, to which the speaker seems to react. Fuentes 1998(b), on the other hand, presented similar examples claiming that there is no opposition, but rather information hierarchy as well as emphasis.

(72) A: ¿Cómo te ha ido el colegio?
B: Bien, el maestro es muy guay. Hemos hecho....
A: ¿*Pero* Ángela está contigo? (Fuentes 1998(b): 130).

A: How was your day at school?
B: Good, the teacher was very cool. We have done....
A: ***But****, is Ángela with you?*

My account, instead, would argue that Porroche's argument of 'lack of clarity' or Fuentes' 'information hierarchy and emphasis' could be accounted for as part of the speaker's propositional attitude, which could be described as surprise or disappointment. This results from the contrast between the actual formulation of the question introduced by *pero* and its accessible alternative, which could be that it should not have been formulated because this representation should have been provided to the hearer earlier in the discourse or because there is not a possible answer to it.

There are also examples of *pero* introducing yes/no questions. Here the function of *pero* consists of marking some contrast between the two possible (a positive or a negative) desirable representations. The speaker introduces the question with

pero to make explicit her propositional attitude towards one of the two possible answers, as will be illustrated with the following example:

(73) Ah! *¿pero* eso tiene tratamiento? . (*El País 31-12- 05, pg. 57).*

Ah! ***But*** does *it have a treatment?*

In this example *pero* explicitly marks the speaker's propositional attitude towards one of the possible interpretations. It seems clear that the speaker is not formulating the question in an objective manner. Instead, the speaker uses *pero* to make explicit that there is one desirable representation that he would entertain as exceptional or unexpected. In this case this representation could be that there is a treatment available. This is another example where the propositional attitude does not affect the description but an interpretation of a desirable representation.

Looking at the following example, the reader can see that the question loses its neutral or objective tone to gain some commitment towards one of the possible answers:

(74) *Pero* ¿en ningún momento se sintió presionada, intimidada? (*El País Semanal 16-10-2005, pg. 14).*

But*, didn't you at any moment feel under pressure, intimidated?*

In this case, the use of the connective shows how the hearer is expressing her attitude of surprise or disbelief towards the negative answer to the question, i.e. *that the hearer did not feel at any moment under pressure, intimidated.*

To finish, we will comment on one last example.

(75) H1> Ah, *¿pero* (8) y (9) quiere que lo abra?
¿Sí? Venga. (*UAM Oral Administrativo*[20]*)*

Ah, ***but*** *(8) and (9) do you want me to open it?*
Is that it? Come on.

[20] Administrative Oral. UAM.

The speaker is again marking her propositional attitude of surprise about the positive answer to the question introduced by *pero.* In this case, the propositional attitude is also reinforced by the exclamative particle *Ah.* In fact, being an oral example, there may be many other non-linguistic factors that may also contribute to this inferential process of determining the intended propositional attitude. Unfortunately, we do not have access to them; however, the use of *pero* is a good indication that the speaker wanted to make this propositional attitude explicit, whatever its precise description in the context.

5.7.7.4. Emphatic repetition

It is well known that the phenomenon of repetition has in itself some emphatic effect. In the examples in which the repetition is supplemented by the connective *pero,* there is some complementary information about the speaker's propositional attitude, which would not be accessed if the connective had not occurred.

In the example below it is interesting to see how the interviewer (P) wants to emphasise the fact that there is strong commitment towards the affirmation that the interviewee *does think*:

(76) Entrevista a Andrés Urrutia (presidente de la Real Academia de la lengua vasca)
R: Procuro pensar, y procuro pensar en varias. A veces no me sale. En algunos temas, en castellano y en otros, en Ezquerra. Sin desdeñar el inglés.
P: *Pero* pensar, piensa. (*El País 4-10-2005, backpage).*

Interview to Andrés Urrutia (president of the Royal Academy of the Basque Language)
R: *I try to think, and I try to think in several (languages). Sometimes it does not happen. In some topics, in Spanish and in others, in Basque. And I don't disregard English.*
P: ***But*** *regarding thinking, you do think.*

Using *pero* to mark strong commitment towards the representation it introduces is justified in a context where the interviewee has shown uncertainty about his ability to think in different languages. The interviewer then uses *pero* to point towards the contrast between this strong commitment and a highly accessible

alternative of more indecisive attitude. This propositional attitude of strong commitment could then be described, for instance, as '*undoubtedly, positively, categorically…*', which is marked as being relevant in the context.

The following example also belongs to this group called 'repetition *pero*':

(77) En cualquier caso, qué escasas me parecieron las muestras de repulsa. Tampoco encontré una sola declaración de auténtico desprecio hacia la banda terrorista, incluyendo no sólo sus actos, sino sus fines e ideas. Si fue por miedo (puede ser lógico), hubiera preferido leerlas sin ser adjudicadas a nombres propios, *pero* leerlas. (*El País 11-08-02, pg. 9).*

In any case, how scarce were the demonstrations of disapproval. Neither did I find a single declaration of genuine contempt for the terrorist group, including not only its actions, but also its goals and ideas. If it were because of fear (it may be logical), I would have preferred to read them without being assigned to factual names, ***but*** *(still) to read them.*

In this example *pero* introduces a repetition of what the speaker has previously explicitly expressed, regarding what she would have wanted to do with the letters, i.e. *leerlas* 'to read them'. Repeating this information and preceding it with *pero* could not aim at contradicting this assumption, since this is also expressed in the previous utterance. Instead, *pero* seems to instruct the hearer towards a contrast between the *pero* utterance and its alternative, which in this example seems to be what has actually happened, i.e. *no leerlas* 'not read them at all'. Therefore, the function of *pero* in this example is to make explicit her strong commitment towards this propositional content it introduces, which may lead the hearer to derive further implications.

Both of the examples described above seem to clearly resist an account in terms of contradiction and elimination of an assumption, since there is no 'manifest' assumption that needs to be denied. In the first example, the speaker could not have expected the hearer to derive the assumption that he *does not think* to then deny it. Similarly, in the second example, the speaker could not have instructed the hearer to deny the assumption that the speaker did not want to read them, since that would contradict the previous statement. It is therefore clear that in this

context the function of *pero* cannot easily fit into a denial or suspension account. This suggests that the speaker must use it with a different aim in mind.

We will finish this section with two further examples where the speaker uses *pero* to draw attention to the exceptional nature of the representation it introduces. The speaker wants to emphasise the way she entertains this representation as exceptional, by contrasting it with a simpler description, as expressed in the previous utterance.

(78) Fíjate que a los 90 años soy mucho más feliz que cuando era un adolescente. *Pero,* vamos, mucho más feliz.

Look, at the age of 90 I am much happier than when I was a teenager. ***But,*** *actually, much much happier.*

(79) Había días que te veías mas apurada, *pero* realmente te veías más apurada.

There were days that you were pressed for time ***but*** *you were really pressed for time.*

In the first example, the speaker uses *pero* to contrast the representation it introduces, *ser mucho más feliz* 'being much happier', with an alternative assumption, which could be a *more ordinary state of happiness.* The representation introduced by *pero* can then be embedded in some propositional attitude of emphasis towards what is entertained as exceptional by the speaker. Similarly, in the second example, the speaker uses *pero* to emphasise the way she perceives how busy those days are, contrasting the representation *realmente apurada* 'really pressed for time' with its milder alternative *apurada* 'pressed for time'.

5.7.8. Justification

In the following examples *pero* introduces a justification for the previous statement, which is presented as a representation difficult to be justified. In fact, the underlying logical form of the proposition *pero* introduces includes not only the justification but also the representation that needs to be justified, represented

elliptically by an omitted or empty pronoun. The speaker seems to use *pero* to make explicit how she entertains the fact that the representation has a justification, pointing towards an alternative that may include the lack of justification. As in previous examples, the instruction of contrast encoded by *pero* constrains the derivation of the speaker's propositional attitude. We will illustrate this justification use of *pero* with the following example:

(80) (alguien ha expresado su descontento con la idea de quedarse sola en casa)
Yo en tu caso me alegraría de estar casi sola en casa, *pero* es que yo soy una revenida y la gente me da cada día más pereza (la culpa la tiene el metro).(*email*)

(someone has expressed her unhappiness about being left home alone)
If I were you I would be happy to be at home on my own, ***but*** *(that) is because I am hard-boiled and I dislike people more and more each day (I would blame the underground)*

The speaker introduces with *pero* the representation that justifies what is expressed in the previous utterance. The development of the explicature that *pero* introduces would read as follows *pero yo me alegraría de estar casi sola en casa porque yo soy una revenida y la gente cada vez me da más pereza* 'but I would be happy to be at home on my own because I am hard-boiled and I dislike people more and more each day'. This representation seems to be entertained by the speaker as contrasting with an accessible alternative where this representation had no justification. This will then constrain the way the speaker entertains it as being exceptional. Making explicit with *pero* the speaker's commitment towards the exceptionality of this representation is relevant in the context, which suggests that implications may then be derived from it.

The following example can also be included in this group. However, instead of a null pronoun, there is the pronoun *eso*, which also needs to be developed inferentially, referring back to the previous proposition.

(81) las estrellas de la pantalla han desaparecido del firmamento del cine. ¿Qué estrellas? Bien, estoy pensando en actores como Cary Grant, James Stewart o John Wayne, o en estrellas como Ava

Gardner, Audrey Hepburn o Lana Turner. La verdad es que nadie les exigió ser grandes actores o actrices, aunque unos lo fueran de verdad y otros se limitaran a repetir su personaje. De hecho ha habido grandes actores (Charles Laughton, por ejemplo) que no alcanzaron la popularidad o el gancho de las estrellas, *pero eso* era sencillamente porque las estrellas eran otra categoría y lucían como tales por encima de cualquier otra consideración. *(El País 07-01-2002, pg. 30)*.

The stars of the big screen have disappeared from the cinema firmament. Which stars? Well, I am thinking of those actors like Cary Grant, James Stewart or John Wayne, or stars such as Ava Gardner, Audrey Hepburn or Lana Turner. The truth is that no one asked them to be great actors or actresses, although some of them were truly great and others just repeated their character time and time again. In fact there have been great actors (Charles Laughton, for instance) who never reached the popularity and the appeal of the stars, ***but that*** *was simply because the stars were in a different category and as stars they shone beyond any other consideration.*

In this example the speaker uses *pero* to make explicit her intention of drawing the contrast between the utterance introduced by *pero* (which again, consists of the previous statement that needs justification and the justification itself) and an alternative. The alternative in this example could be that there is no explanation for the fact that many actors have not reached the popularity and appeal of the stars. By making explicit this contrast, the speaker is making explicit how she entertains this representation. The intended propositional attitude can be described as acknowledging the exceptionality of finding a justification towards a representation that is presented as unjustifiable. Interestingly, the speaker could have simply used the causal marker *es que* 'is that' on its own or alternatively the generic causal marker *porque* 'because'. If the speaker decides to add *pero* is to convey this extra meaning, expecting it to have some extra effects on the hearer.

We will now comment on the following example, which is an extract from an interview with the famous Spanish actress Victoria Abril:

(82) (A journalist interviewing Victoria Abril)
J: En dos de sus tres películas españolas de este año le abandonan ¿Cómo la vida misma?
V: A mí la vida no me abandona**.** *Pero* es que yo le pongo mucho empeño. Yo abro mucho las orejas. (*El País Semanal 31-10-2004, pg. 29*).

J: You are abandoned In two out of the three Spanish films you have done this year. Does it resemble your own life?

V: Life does not abandon me. ***But*** *that's because I am very determined. I have my ears wide open.*

In this example the negative response to the interviewer's question is followed by a justification introduced by *pero*. In fact, the speaker could have simply followed her reply with an explanation introduced by the marker *porque* 'because' or simply *es que* 'is that'. However, the speaker adds *pero* to make explicit her propositional attitude towards the fact that there is an explanation to justify her previous answer. The speaker directs the hearer towards a contrast with an alternative where she could have identified herself with her own characters, in which case, there would be no justification for her reply. Marking this explicit contrast is a way for the speaker to constrain how she entertains the representation introduced by *pero* as exceptional, which will yield a number of implications in this context.

In the following example the mechanism that is activated by the use of the connective *pero* consists of drawing attention to the contrast between the representation of the preceding utterance with its justification and the contextually accessible alternative, which will have no justification for this representation:

(83) Mi marido ha tenido que renunciar a una beca posdoctoral española porque ésta no sólo no le daba derecho a acceder a una prestación por desempleo o jubilación, por ejemplo, sino que no se puede vivir con ella en el extranjero de ninguna manera dada su exigua cuantía económica. *Pero*, como dijo una feliz diputada del PP: "La labor de los becarios de investigación no puede considerarse un trabajo porque no es un trabajo". Menos mal que en ningún otro país civilizado piensan así sus políticos. (*El País 14-11-2002, pg. 13).*

My husband had to decline a Spanish postdoctoral scholarship because it meant not only that you were not entitled to any unemployment or retirement assistance, for instance, but also that it was impossible to live with it abroad due to its meagre salary. ***But****, as a delighted MP from the political party PP said: "the work of the research scholarship holders cannot be considered as a job because it is not a job". Thank God that there is no any other civilized country where their politicians think like that.*

In this case then the speaker uses *pero* to contrast the representation presented as an injustice in the previous utterance with its justification with the alternative, in which there would be no justification. The speaker marks this contrast to guide the hearer towards how she entertains the fact that there is a justification for what should be taken as an unjustifiable situation. In fact, the propositional attitude could be described as '*it is fair, it is normal, ...*'. However, this example requires an extra level of interpretation, since the speaker seems to be speaking with an ironic tone, which involves a detachment from the actual commitment towards the validity of this justification. This is, however, not part of the function encoded by *pero,* but the result of the ironic reading of the representation.

To finish this section, we would like to draw a link between these examples and what in the Hispanic tradition Rivarola (1980) has described as examples of modality *pero*, which is illustrated below:

(84) Erasmo es musculoso *pero* todos los levantadores de pesas lo son

Erasmo is muscular ***but (then)*** *all weightlifters are.*

Te digo que Erasmo es musculoso *pero en realidad no es necesario decirlo,* porque todos los levantadores de pesas son musculosos.

I tell you that Erasmo is muscular ***but in fact*** *it is not necessary to say it, because all weightlifters are.*

Rivarola argues that in this example there is a denial of a presupposition, which is the expectation that what is said is necessary[21](Exp. Decir F →es necesario decir F) (*Exp. To say F →it is necessary to say F*)[22]. Unfortunately, there is no elaboration on whether the denial takes place on the speaker's or the hearer's side.

In fact, Blakemore would probably adopt a similar analysis arguing that the manifest assumption that is denied is that what was said earlier was necessary. However, taking a RT perspective, it is difficult to justify fact that the speaker

[21] In fact, this idea could be linked to Grice's maxim of quantity.

[22] This is an adaptation of Lakoff's analysis of examples such as "George like Peking Duck, but all linguist are fond of Chinese food", which she paraphrase as "I say to you that George likes Peking Duck, but I really don't have to say this because all linguists are fond of Chinese food" (as an example of denial of expectation) (Lakoff 1971: 141-2)

communicates that what has been said before has no relevance. Instead, we would argue that it is more probable that the previous utterance is accepted as relevant in itself (and necessary indeed). Then, the speaker introduces with *pero* the proposition that justifies the previous fact, to direct the hearer towards the contrast between this fact being considered as unjustified and exceptional in itself and the fact that this representation is clearly justified by the explicit explanation. The speaker wants to make explicit to the hearer the way she entertains this fact, which in some contexts could be read as some display of modesty towards the lack of exceptionality of the fact that he is muscular or some attitude of resignation towards this representation.

5.7.9. Clarification

The speaker's use of *pero* in the examples in this section can be accounted for as an explicit emphatic commitment towards the information introduced by the connective and detachment from the alternatives that it makes accessible. We will start with the following example, which is extracted from an interview with an entrepreneur:

(85) No uso cremas. Bueno cuando tomo el sol en el barco. *Pero* me la da Nuria, porque dice que se me reseca la piel. (*El País 9-03 2003, backpage).*

I don't wear creams. Well, only when I sunbathe on the boat. ***But*** *Nuria rubs it in for me, as she says that my skin goes all dry.*

The speaker uses *pero* to indicate the contrast between the fact that it is his girlfriend who spreads the cream and a highly accessible alternative assumption, which could be that it is himself who spreads the cream. This explicit detachment from the alternative and the commitment (and emphasis) to the utterance introduced by *pero* would lead the hearer to derive a number of implications. For instance, the hearer may conclude that the speaker thinks that spreading cream is something typical of women and that men who do that could be considered as having some kind of feminine trait. The speaker has clearly made explicit the

relevance of this contrast, which justifies the extra implications the hearer may derive from it.

Similarly in the example below the speaker uses *pero* to make explicit his detachment from an alternative proposition, also highly accessible in the context:

(86) Desde que estalló la "intifada" y, en 1991, se cerró la frontera, se acabó el empleo. Ahora hace cinco años que comemos las raciones de comida que nos reparte semanalmente la UNRWA, la oficina de la ONU para los refugiados. Es poco y a veces las tripas de los niños gruñen de hambre**.** *Pero* ninguno de nosotros ha robado ni mendigado, ni lo hará jamás. *(El País 16-10-2005, pg. 4).*

Since the "intifada" broke out and, in 1991, the border was closed, the employment ceased. For five years we have been eating what we are weekly assigned by UNRWA, the UN office for refugees. It is not enough and sometimes the kids' tummies grumble from hunger. ***But*** *none of us has ever stolen or begged for, and never will.*

In this example the highly accessible assumption also seems to be the opposite of the utterance introduced by *pero*. The speaker uses *pero* to communicate his intended propositional attitude towards this representation, which contrasts with what the speaker conceives as expected in this context. Explicitly marking that she entertains this representation as exceptional (and maybe praiseworthy) may lead the hearer towards the derivation of different types of implications about these people, i.e. it is not only relevant that they didn't steal, or that they affirm that they will never do it but also the fact that this information is entertained by them as exceptional and that they feel the need to make explicit this clarification in this context.

The following excerpt presents a description of the exciting life of the biologist Anna Traveset:

(87) Recolectar excrementos de osos en Alaska, pelearse con alacranes y garrapatas o vigilar que las serpientes no se colaran en su cama han sido tareas implícitas en los trabajos de campo de la bióloga Anna Traveset. *Pero* en alguna ocasión la aventura pasó a mayores y temió por su vida. *(El País 28- 05- 2005, pg. 10).*

Collecting bears' excrement in Alaska, fighting against scorpions and ticks or watching that snakes don't get in your bed, have been implicit tasks in the fieldwork of the biologist Anna Traveset. ***But*** *at times the adventure went a bit further and she feared for her life.*

It seems clear that the speaker uses *pero* to draw the hearer's attention to her propositional attitude towards the *pero* proposition. The text preceding *pero* presents a picture of Anna's exciting life. The speaker then introduces with *pero* the proposition that explains that at times her exciting life put her own life at risk. The speaker uses *pero* in this context to highlight and clarify that the risk is also part of the biologist's life, which contrasts with the fact that she may simply have an (safe) exciting and brave life. The speaker then makes explicit her own propositional attitude towards this representation, which could be read as a warning for the addressee or simply a way of expressing how the speaker entertains it as remarkable. It is then clear that the speaker makes explicit her subjective attitude towards this representation, which would be left out if she had opted for the neutral *y* 'and' conjunction. Selecting *pero* in this context is then justified as the speaker's means to explicitly mark her attitude towards the representation it introduces, and therefore, it is presumed to have some effects on the hearer. In fact, a different reading could also be given to this example, if one understands that the speaker is being ironic about this woman's adventurous experiences, and then moves to a more serious tone with the utterance introduced by *pero.*

5.7.10. Lo más importante (*the most important)*

As reviewed in chapter 2, Fuentes' (1998) AT analysis of *pero* concludes that the only explanation for the function of *pero* that can account for all of its uses is that it introduces *'paso a lo más importante'* (introduces the most important information). On the surface, this kind of 'focalising' effect could be claimed to have some resemblance to our own proposal. It is unfortunate, however, that Fuentes does not explain in relation to what the information preceded by the connective is more important. In fact, there are some examples, like the ones below, where the information following *pero* explicitly communicates that the

information it introduces is the most important. This implies that adding the connective *pero* will then have to communicate some extra meaning.

My hypothesis is that the connective highlights that the information following the connective is the most important against any other information that could have been in its place, including what was mentioned in the preceding utterances. It may sound very similar to what Catalina proposes in her analysis, however, there is a significant difference. In our analysis, the relevance lies on the actual fact that the speaker is explicitly drawing attention towards the contrast between the selected information (which is explicitly described as the most important) and other alternatives. Marking this contrast will then constrain the derivation of higher level explicatures, i.e. the propositional attitude of the speaker in relation to the *pero* utterance. For instance, in the following example:

(88) (Hablando sobre la nueva plaza del barrio)Tiene un aire rompedor y ha cambiado el barrio, *pero* lo que la hace singular es que han sido los vecinos quienes la han diseñado. *(El País 9-10-2005, pg. 84).*

(Talking about the new square in the district). It has an impressive new look and it has changed the district, ***but*** *what makes it exceptional is that it was designed by the neighbours.*

The speaker starts with information about what makes this square singularly good. Then, *pero* highlights the selected most important feature, which contrasts with any of the previous features or any others that could have been selected instead. The speaker may use *pero* to indicate her own attitude of appreciation of this feature above the rest or alternatively, she may simply want to make explicit her own sense of exceptionality towards the fact that this is the most important information.

In this group we may also include those examples with the structure *muchas/os.... pero una/o...* 'many... but one of them', where the relevance of using *pero* consists of focalising *uno/a* 'one' over the *muchos/as* 'many' that function as alternatives. In fact, if *pero* is substituted by *y* 'and' in these examples, it clearly loses the feature of marked propositional attitude.

If we look at the next example:

(89) Cuando le sacas al Madrid del mullido confort del Bernabéu, ocurren partidos como éste de Santander, donde el Racing le pasó por encima con un gran fútbol y la actitud de los equipos que se toman en serio su trabajo. El Madrid, no. Perdió por muchas razones, *pero* una de ellas fue por su absentismo, por una desidia que no habla precisamente bien de un equipo que no gana fuera de Chamartín desde marzo. *(El País 20-10-02, pg. 50).*

... *When you take Real Madrid away from the comfort of the Bernabéu, matches such as this one in Santander occur, where Racing were far superior showing good quality football with an attitude typical of a team which takes their job seriously. Real Madrid lost because of many reasons,* ***but*** *one of them was absenteeism and laziness, which does not look good in a team that has not won outside their ground since March.*

Among the reasons why the football team (Real Madrid) has lost the match, the speaker highlights the one introduced by the connective *pero, i.e. por su absentismo* 'for their absenteeism'. The presence of the connective preceding this information seems to confer the representation some status of unexpectedness or newsworthiness, which is constrained by its contrast with an alternative reason that could have been selected instead.

In these examples *pero* introduces information that is co-oriented with the previous discourse and sometimes the idea of introducing the most important information is explicitly communicated with expressions such as *por encima de todo* 'above all', as in the following example:

(90) El partido apenas aportó lo ya sabido: que los suplentes del Barça están a años luz de los titulares y que Van Gaal apenas tiene banquillo. *Pero, por encima de todo,* quedó evidente que Riquelme tiene sitio en la libreta del holandés y que no pinta nada en el banquillo. *(El País 30-10-02, pg. 55).*

The match simply highlighted what was already known: that the Barça substitutes of are too far from the main players and that Van Gaal hardly has a bench. ***But above all****, it was evident is that Riquelme has a place in the notebook of the Dutch coach and that it makes no sense having him on the bench.*

The *pero* utterance introduces the example that is the highest in the scale of what has just been previously explicitly listed. It appears that *pero* guides the hearer to establish a contrast between what *pero* introduces as 'the most important' content and any other alternative that could have been in its place (in these examples the alternatives could be any of the representations that have been explicitly mentioned).

More examples of this type would be the following:

> (91) Los psicólogos creen que hay que apostar más por los mensajes positivos, por la exhibición de las ventajas a largo plazo, *pero sobre todo* por la enorme cantidad de ventajas que a corto plazo aporta el abandono del tabaco. *(El País Semanal 31-12 05, pg. 57).*
>
> *The psychologists believe that they should be going for positive messages that highlight the advantages in the long term,* ***but above all****, for the large number of advantages of giving up smoking in the short term.*

This example presents different pieces of advice given by psychologists for those attempting to give up smoking. The writer uses *pero* to select one that is highlighted above the rest. This piece of advice, which contrasts with any other piece of advice that could have been selected instead, is presented by the writer as being entertained as exceptional. The writer may use *pero* to communicate her surprise that the selected piece of advice is the most important, or it could be that the hearer is simply warning the hearer about the highlighting of this fact above the rest. In either interpretation, the reader may then easily derive implications from this explicit marking of the writer's propositional attitude, since it is marked as relevant in this context.

5.7.11. Affective stance

We shall start this section with an example from an interview to the Spanish actress Ariadna Gil:

(92) En cambio, algo bonito lo lees, te impresiona mucho y a tu familia le hace feliz (mas risas), *pero* inmediatamente lo olvidas. (*El País Semanal 18-09-05. pg. 56).*

On the other hand, when they write some positive comment you read it, it impresses you, and it makes your family very happy, ***but*** *you forget about it at once.*

The connective *pero* adds extra attitudinal information that derives from the contrast established between the *pero* utterance and a plausible (and possibly desirable) alternative which could be that *the positive comment stays in the actress' memory.* From this explicit contrast the actress is then explicitly marking how she entertains the proposition, which could be articulated as some display of modesty or detachment from public praise. From this explicit marking of the writer's propositional attitude the hearer can derive implications about how the actress chooses to portray herself.

In the following examples, the propositional attitude would be described as negative affective stance:

(93) Hasta hace unos minutos mis hijas y yo estábamos convencidos de que Dios no toleraría esta injusticia, que escucharía nuestra plegaria y comparecería en Gush Katia para impedirla. *Pero* no ha venido. (*El País Semanal 16 de octubre 2005, pg. 52).*

Up to a few minutes ago, my daughters and I were convinced that God would not tolerate this injustice, that he would listen to our prayers and would appear at Gush Katia to stop it. ***But*** *he has not come.*

The expression *hasta hace unos minutes* 'up to a few minutes ago' already suggests that things have been different than expected. The utterance introduced by *pero* expresses the expectation that they had *up to a few minutes ago.* It is unclear how *pero* could be denying the assumption *ha venido* 'he has come', since its denial is an implicature of the previous utterance. Instead, the speaker uses *pero* to make explicit how she entertains this representation, pointing towards a contrast between the representation of what actually happened and the alternative, which in this case is the desirable and expected one *that he had come.* The propositional attitude that the speaker makes explicit by the contrast encoded by *pero* could probably be described in terms of disappointment and disillusionment.

The following example has a special interest for a similar reason.

(94) unas semanas antes (de su muerte), The New York Times publicaba que las gestiones para la detención de Pol Pot estaban muy avanzadas, y que incluso se barajaba su extradición a Canadá. *Pero* la suerte había dispuesto las cosas de otra forma, y Pol Pot murió en su cama por causas naturales. (*El País Semanal 20-10-2005, pg. 123).*

A few weeks before (his death), the New York Times reported that the steps taken towards Pol Pot's arrest were very advanced, and that even the extradition to Canada was being considered. ***But*** *fate had planned things differently, and Pol Pot died of natural causes in his bed.*

It starts with the information of the death of the dictator Pol Pot. It then narrates how the events took place. It explains that there were steps being taken for his detention and that the dictator died before these steps could follow their due course of action. Using *pero* in this context clearly directs the hearer towards a contrast between what happened and what would have been expected if the arrest steps had been followed. It is interesting because it links with the traditional explanation in terms of denial of expectation. However, the speaker could not be instructing towards the denial of any manifest assumption, since Pot's death has already been mentioned earlier in the text. Instead, the writer seems to use *pero* to make explicit her attitude towards what happened, which contrasts with highly accessible assumptions of what could have happened. The propositional attitude that can be derived from this contrast could be described as negative emotional stance in the line of '*it is sad that ..., it is a pity that...,it is unfortunate that...,it is unfair that...*'. On the other hand, in a context in which it is accessible the assumption that the hearer had a great devotion for this dictator, the propositional attitude that could be read from this contrast would be one of positive emotional stance, such as '*fortunately, gracefully...*'

In fact, an AT analysis of this example would claim that the utterance preceding *pero* would lead the hearer to derive some conclusion that would be in contradiction with the information introduced by *pero*, being the latter stronger argumentatively. However, it is known from the beginning that the death had

taken place and this is then followed by all the steps that could have taken place if he had not died. It is not clear then what would be the conclusions derived from these propositions that could then be in contradiction with the conclusions of the *pero* utterance. It seems that our proposal offers a more plausible analysis, since it conceives the information preceding *pero* as relevant in itself. It actually leads to the derivation of further implications, which are not in contradiction with those derived from those of the *pero* clause. The extra meaning conveyed by *pero* is simply the explicit marking of the attitudinal meaning towards the representation it introduces, which is relevant in itself.

The last example from this group deals with the situation in Spain in relation to the terrorist group ETA:

> *(95)* La gran mayoría de los vascos son conscientes de que una decidida apuesta por la pacificación acabaría con el conflicto, como ha ocurrido con el IRA, *pero* en España tenemos que ETA es una fuente de votos a explotar de la que unos políticos se aprovechan y otros, por miedo, hacen que la situación se prolongue indefinidamente. (*El País Semanal 12-08-07, pg. 4).*
>
> *Most Basques are aware of the fact that a resolute bet for pacification would end the conflict, as happened with the IRA,* ***but*** *in Spain ETA is a source of votes which some politicians step on, while others, out of fear, let the situation remain the same indefinitely.*

The writer argues that most Basques believe that the end of the conflict would be possible, similar to what happened with the IRA in Ireland. She then introduces with *pero* what she perceives as the real reason why ETA will always be part of Spain. It is clear that the writer is marking his subjective negative affective stance towards what he describes as the reality in Spain, as he points towards a contrast with an alternative (more desirable) reality. In this example the writer's attitude that results from the contrast marked by *pero* could be accounted for as '*sadly, disgracefully, disappointingly, unfortunately...*'.

5.7.12. Topic change

In RT any instance of ostensive communication is guided by the principle of relevance. In this theory it is argued that there is no need for independent notions of discourse or topic coherence, since everything follows from the quest for relevance, i.e. they are understood as by-products of this search for relevance. Giora (1997), for instance, argues that Sperber & Wilson's notion of the principle of relevance is insufficient to account for text well-formedness (Giora 1997: 24). She claims that RT analyses should incorporate notions such as topic coherence, which is an essential principle governing human communication. Giora (1997) holds that a discourse may be optimally relevant to an individual, but nonetheless judged incoherent and the reverse, a discourse not optimally relevant to an individual may nonetheless be judged coherent (Giora 1997: 22, 24, 29-30). Wilson (1998(b)) reacts by stating that the unacceptability of such discourse pieces is best attributable to wasted processing effort, rather than to the unrelatedness of discourse segments.

Giora's account allows for a well-formed discourse to *deviate* from observing what she calls '*Relevance Requirement*', which says that all its propositions are conceived of as related to a discourse-topic proposition. However, this can only be done if it is *explicitly marked* with some connective such as *by the way*. Wilson then foresees some dangers on this possibility, since it may have to accept as plausible, examples that are clearly unacceptable.

> (96) Today is Tuesday. Incidentally, I can dance the tango. *By the way*, there are tadpoles in my village pond. *Anyway*, how many relevance theorists does it take to change a light-bulb? ... (Wilson 1998(b): 72)

In fact, in RT it is agreed that different markers may be used to indicate a change of context and this is accounted for as a means of saving the addressee's effort in arriving at the intended interpretation. However, the use of these markers is not motivated by a principle of coherence, as claimed by Giora, but instead follows

from the principle of relevance that guides every instance of ostensive communication.

In this section, we will present a number of examples of *pero* introducing an utterance that marks a topic change. Iten (2000(a): 130) had previously referred to this use of *pero* with examples of cancellation of topic domain presented by Bell (1998: 527). She maintains that this use has been overlooked by most theorists and that the RT's analysis of denial could easily account for it. To do so, what is to be denied should no longer be restricted to the propositional content, but include also assumptions accessible in the context.

In our account, the relevance of using *pero* in these examples is not accounted for in terms of the writer's commitment to a principle of topic coherence. Instead, it lies on making explicit the contrast between this new topic and some alternative, which could be the continuation of the same topic as the previous utterance. The writer points towards this contrast to make explicit the relevance of highlighting this change of topic, which may yield some implications in the context, as will be shown below.

In the following example the writer explicitly marks a switch from a controversial topic to another of a similar type, which is marked as relevant in itself:

(97) ¿De verdad ésos son síntomas de la ansiada renovación? Si todas las figuras consistentes del socialismo con trayectoria ejemplar y honradez probada, como Amador, a la que podrían seguir Carmen Alborch o José Antonio Griñán, se destinan al desguace porque la Ejecutiva de Ferraz rehúsa pasarles la ITV, convendría que fuéramos conociendo cuáles son las propuestas de incorporación del plan renove para evitar que llegue a cundir la sensación progresiva de deterioro. *Pero,* volvamos a la cuestión, la boda inminente dejará una factura colosal por la que nadie se ha interesado (*El País 03-09-02, pg.18).*

Are those real symptoms of the longed renovation? If all the important well-known names related to socialist ideals, with an exemplary career and proved honesty, like Amador, as well as Carmen Alborh or José Antonio Griñán, are ready for scrapping because the socialist executive refuses to pass the MOT, it would be convenient to start finding out which are the proposals for incorporation of the plan renove to stop the sensation of decline from taking over (...)... ***But***

going back to what really matters, the imminent wedding will leave behind a colossal bill that no one seems to have shown any interest on...

It starts describing with sarcasm what changes are taking place at the very heart of the political party (PSOE). It then decides to resume a topic that is described as the 'key' *(la cuestión)* piece of news: the wedding of the leader of the other political party (PP)'s daughter. The writer may use *pero* in this context to draw attention towards the alternative that it could have continued with the previous topic. It is unlikely that the writer could have wanted to deny the hearer's expectations that she would continue with the same topic. Instead, we would suggest that the writer wants to draw the reader's attention towards the change as being relevant in itself, not because the writer is obeying a principle of topic coherence but simply because this change is relevant for the hearer. This marking of the speaker's propositional attitude towards this change from a controversial topic to an even more controversial one will lead the hearer to derive of some further implications.

Another example in this group is the following:

(98) Si llego a saber conducir, por aquí voy a estar discutiendo si nos vamos o nos quedamos. Me monto en el Suzuki y adiós muy buenas. Y a los niños, que les den por saco también. Anda que es fácil sacar a estos niños de la piltra. *Pero* a lo que iba, qué extraña es la mente. Ustedes dirán que con semejante sueño me despertaría sudando, agitada. Para nada. (*Revista de verano. El País 08-08-2002, pg. 36*).

Had I been able to drive, I would not be here deciding whether to stay or leave. I would get on the Suzuki and would be off. And I don't give a damn about the kids either. It is ridiculously difficult to get these kids out of bed. ***But,*** *going back to what I was saying, how strange the mind is. You may well say that after that dream I should have woken up all sweaty and agitated. Not at all.*

In this example *pero* is also explicitly marking the speaker's propositional attitude towards the representation that involves resuming a previously mentioned topic. In this case, the speaker is drawing the hearer's attention towards the relevance of this change, which contrasts with the possible continuation of the 'diverted' topic. This change is not interpreted as an explicit marking of some maxim of topic

coherence. Instead, it is a way for the speaker to make explicit the relevance of this change, which guides the hearer to access contextual assumptions. In some contexts, this explicit marking of 'resuming the topic' could be read as being embedded in some kind of apologetic stance (for having been diverted for too long), which would lead the hearer to derive some implications.

5.7.13. Coordinated examples of *pero*

As discussed in previous chapters the coordinated nature of the examples with *pero* has been at the centre of debate in both the Hispanic and English tradition. As reviewed earlier, there seems to have been some confusion between the meaning of *y* 'and' and *pero* 'but' and their syntactic feature as coordinated conjunctions. We explained earlier, it should be stressed that, on the one hand, it is possible for both *y* 'and' and *pero* 'but' to function as either conjunctions or discourse markers. On the other hand, independently of their syntactic behaviour, each of these lexical items encodes a different meaning. In the case of *pero* 'but', it consists of instructing the hearer to establish a contrast between a proposition and alternatives, which then constrains the derivation of higher level explicatures.

In the following example, *pero* functions as a conjunction linking two adjectival phrases.

(99) Alguien con ese glamour de estrella que marca un estilo, pero siempre lista a disfrutar del chiste vulgar, ese que la hace una chica del grupo". Añade, "Chicote *pero* sofisticada ,con la manicura perfecta, *pero* traviesa" resume Mathew McConaughey tras rodar junto a ella *Failure to Launch*. (*El País Semanal 18-12-05, pg. 70).*

Someone with the glamour of a star who sets the style, but she is always ready to enjoy a vulgar joke, that which makes her part of the group". Adds, "tomboy ***but*** *sophisticated, with the perfect manicure,* ***but*** *naughty" says Matthew McConaughey after filming with her Failure to Launch.*

In this example, the actor Mathew McConaughey describes the actress with whom he is doing his last film. He makes explicit not only the pair of features conjoined with *pero*, but also that he entertains as exceptional the combination of the second

attribute with the former. The hearer then is expected to derive implications from both the characteristics described and also from the way the actor perceives this combination as exceptional, which is made explicit by the use of *pero*.

The reason why we have pointed at this clear conjunctive use of *pero* is to prove that its function is the same in the examples where it conjoins phrases as it is when it links propositions, or when it introduces an independent proposition after a pause. Therefore, as argued earlier, differences in the syntactic context do not result in semantic differences, since they are independent features.

5.7.14. *Pero* si

In the RT tradition there has been some reference to the so-called objection use of *but*. Rouchota was the first to refer to these examples where the speaker reacts to the non-linguistic context, as illustrated below:

(100) (Peter puts salmon on the table)
A: *But* I am allergic to fish. (Rouchota, 1998(c): 25)

Iten (2000(a)) also refers to the examples of *but* introducing an objection to a previous utterance, like in the examples below:

(101) A: John's in Paris at the moment.
B: *But* I've just seen him in Oxford Street.

(102) A: It's time for bed now.
B: *But* you said I could watch the end of Brookside.

According to Rouchota and Iten, there is nothing different or marked about these uses of *but*. They seem to fit perfectly into their account of denial. It is, however, unfortunate that it is not clearly described what assumption is actually being denied in this type of examples. It is however worth noting that Iten says that ideally an account of *but* "would explain how and why *but* can be used utterance- and discourse-initially" (Iten 2000(a): 130). As will be discussed below, in the Hispanic tradition some authors have attempted to do so.

This use translates into Spanish as a combination of two connectives *pero si* 'but if', where only the latter seems to be compulsory, i.e. *si* 'if'. *Si* can only be found in dialogic contexts and it is described as a mark of rectification of the previous intervention (R. Almela 1985, E. Montolío 1990). It is argued that *si* introduces a sequence that invalidates the implications of the previous utterance. It may invalidate the content of an element or the modality of the utterance (Fuentes 1998(b): 127).

Scott A. Schwenter (1998, 2001) presents a pragmatic analysis of this dialogic discourse connective *si* as a parallel of the (corrective) adversative sentence conjunction *sino*. He argues that these two connectives are in complementary distribution and both coincide in the type of implicatures to which they are sensitive. He attempts to corroborate Koenig and Benndorf's (1998: 384) observation that "lexical semantics can be sensitive to distinctions hitherto believed to only be relevant to the contextual interpretations of utterances". He takes a pragmatic perspective to explain the differences between *si/sino* and *pero* in terms of their sensitivity to different types of implicatures (Q- implicature and R implicatures (Horn 1996))[23], as illustrated below:

(103) L: Ana barrió el patio y limpió la cocina. (R implicates "in that order")
'Ana swept the patio and cleaned the kitchen.'

A: **Pero/#Si** limpió la cocina primero.
'But she cleaned the kitchen first'.'

(104) M: Creo que te han tintado **mal** el pelo.
'I think that you have dyed bad the hair'
' I think they dyed your hair poorly' (Q implicates "no worse than mal")

B: **Si /#Pero** me lo han tintado **fatal**!
'SI me it have dyed fatally'
'SI they dyed it horribly!'(Schwenter 2001: 63)

Following Argumentation Theory (Ducrot 1996), Schwenter (2001) explains that both *pero* and *si* constrain expressions of point of view in discourse. They both

[23] The Q principle: make your contribution sufficient: say as much as you can. The R principle: make your contribution necessary: say no more than you must.

introduce Q antiorientated to some other proposition P in the context, but they differ in how they orient speaker's point of view towards the previous utterance and/or its implicatures. In the case of *pero* it reflects a viewpoint that accepts an argumentative sequence P->R that precedes it (R being the implicit or explicit conclusion), while it introduces a stronger sequence antiorientated to the preceding one. On the other hand, *si* also introduces a 'stronger' antiorientated sequence, but cannot be used to accept the prior argumentative sequence P-> R in its totality:

(105) Juan es un genio (vamos a invitarlo).
(sí) *pero* es un idiota (al mismo tiempo)(no vamos a invitarlo).

Juan is a genius (Let's invite him).
***But** he is an idiot (at the same time) (let's not invite him).*

(106) Juan es un genio (vamos a invitarlo).
(*sí*) *si* es un idiota (*al mismo tiempo)(no vamos a invitarlo).

Juan is a genius (Let's invite him).
*(*yes)* ***but** he is an idiot (* at the same time)(let's not invite him).*

He argues that what is an important finding of his study is that it shows that refutation is not limited to propositions, but also to inferences from them, or to combinations of propositions and inferences used in an argumentative sequence. The pair *pero/si* in Spanish illustrates that the different types of refutation may be conventionally indicated by different forms, which depend on how they orient points of view to what precedes.

In the Hispanic tradition there are other linguists that have studied this use; Porroche (1998), for instance, explains the examples with *(pero) si* as *réplicas* 'rejoinders', similar to Moeschler's (1980: 67) analysis as an interactive function characterized by referring to the previous utterance (metacommunicative nature), marking the inappropriateness of the act it communicates. The sentence introduced by *si* or *pero si* indicates the lack of relevance of the previous utterance (the one uttered by the other speaker in dialogues, though it could also happen in some monologic contexts). In these structures there is some disagreement between the situation presented by the speaker A and the utterance of speaker B as well as some element of surprise.

From these analyses, we would agree with the function of *pero si* as marker of disagreement or 'inappropiateness' of the act of communication. Furthermore, our analysis will also be compatible with the idea that using this connective fulfils the function of orienting the speaker's points of view. Our proposed analysis for this type of examples is that the speaker uses *(pero) si* to indicate that the conditional clause it introduces—which has the *if clause* explicitly expressed and the main clause inferentially developed—contrasts with an alternative that would be accessible in the context. This idea can be illustrated with some examples:

(107) A: he batido el record de los cien metros lisos.
B: *pero* si ha corrido Lombao, que lo he visto yo.
A: pero los ha corrido para mí, que he puesto el dinero. *(El País 29-08-2004, pg. 42).*

A: *I have broken the 100 meter sprint record.*
B: ***but*** *Lombao was running, that I saw him.*
A: but he was running for me, since I have put the money.

The conditional clause *si ha corrido Lombao* 'if Lombao has run' with its elliptical main clause accessible from the previous utterance, *ha batido el record de los cien metros lisos* 'he (Lombao) has broken the 100 meter sprint record' contrasts with the alternative conditional that would be derived if the previous utterance is accepted *si ha corrido Lombao* 'if Lombao has run', *el otro hablante habrá ganado la carrera* 'the other speaker will have won the race'. It seems that the speaker wants the hearer to derive a contrast between conditional clauses, making explicit her strong commitment towards one of the conditional relation against the other.

This analysis is then very different from previous analyses of rejection of previous explicit or implicit information. Instead of claiming that the speaker is rejecting any information, we argue that the speaker is simply making explicit to the hearer her attitude of detachment and surprise towards the alternative conditional that is accessible in the context. Together with the detachment, one could also say that she expresses her attitude of surprise if this alternative conditional were to be accepted. In fact, our proposal seems to be compatible with what Schwenter has

identified as not total acceptance of the previous argumentative sequence or Moeschler's inappropriateness of the act it communicates. We emphasise the fact that the speaker is pointing towards a contrast between conditionals to express her point of view towards the previous representation.

Here below there are more examples of this type:

(108) A: La rosa que yo te he regalado se la regalas a Lola,
B: *pero si* ella tiene un montón de flores. (*Hola Raffaella, 05/08/92, TVE 1 in CREA)*

A: Give to Lola the rose I gave you.
B: ***but*** *she has lots of flowers.*

In this example, the speaker is pointing towards a contrast between the conditional representation towards which she will commit *si ella tiene un monton de rosas, no necesita las mias* 'if she has lots of flowers, she does not need mine' and the alternative *si ella tiene un monton de rosas, necesita las mias* 'if she has lots of flowers, she needs mine', which would be derived if she were to agree with what the other speaker has said. From this marking of contrast the speaker indicates her detachment towards the alternative representation, making explicit to the hearer her attitude of surprise and disappointment.

Similarly in the following example

(109) A: tengo una cinta!, , que estás tú de pequeña así.
¿Una cinta de pelo?
No, una cinta de vídeo.
¿Una cinta de vídeo?
Y estás tú, así.
.....
Pero di ¿cómo es posible?
Pues porque la tengo.
Sí, *pero si* a mí nunca me grabaron en vídeo[24]. (*Domicilio particular, conversación familiar*[25]*, Madrid, 30/12/91 in CREA).*

A: I have a tape, when you were a child
B: a hair band?
A: No, a video tape
B: and you are in it , like that

[24] Interestingly this contradict Schwenter (1996) claim that the examples with *pero si* cannot be preceded by the affirmative adverb sí (yes).
[25] Conversation between relatives at home.

....
A: but tell me, how is that possible?
B: well, I just have it.
A: ***Yes, but*** *I have never been recorded with a video camera.*

In this example the speaker is also drawing the hearer's attention towards the contrast between the conditional clause it introduces *si a mí nunca me grabaron en video, no puedo ser yo la de la cinta* 'If I have never been recorded with a video camera, it could not be me the one in that tape' and the accessible alternative *si a mí nunca me grabaron en video, puedo ser yo la de cinta* 'If I have never been recorded with a video camera, it could be me the one in that tape'. The speaker is indicating her propositional attitude of detachment towards this alternative, which is presented as unlikely.

It is important to highlight that in all these examples, the speaker does not seem to commit to the representation she introduces, since they are conditional structures. Instead, she makes explicit her propositional attitude towards what would be expected if the conditional were true.

5.8. Controversial examples for a denial or suspension account

Thus far we have argued for a unitary model of contrast of *pero*, which is able to explain the many different uses found in authentic data. We have also referred at different stages in our discussion to the difficulty of applying previous RT accounts that describe the function of this connective as a marker of denial or suspension. In this section we will refer to some examples that more clearly resist an analysis in that line.

The first example belongs to the group called '*pero lo más importante*':

(110) Entonces, la constitución española tiene algo muy importante; muchísimas cosas, *pero* hay un artículo, el artículo ve<(i)>nticuatro, concretamente, donde se habla de la tutela

efectiva de jueces y magistrados, y la presunción de inocencia mientras no se demuestre lo contrario. (*UAM Oral Jurídico*[26]).

Then the Spanish Constitution holds something very important; many many things, ***but*** *there is an article tw<en>tyfour, in particular, which deals with the effective guardianship of the judges and magistrates, and the presumption of innocence until proven otherwise.*

In this example, it seems difficult to explain the function of *pero* as a denial of a manifest assumption. To do so, one would have to agree that the only reason why the speaker continues with the *pero* clause is to deny an assumption that is derivable from what has been said before, which could be *that all the things in the Constitution have the same importance.* However, it is not easy to see how the relevance of using *pero* may lie in this. By the same token, it would also be difficult to apply an analysis in terms of cutting off or suspending possible inferences. We can only presume that it would be similar to the denial analysis, with the speaker instructing the hearer to suspend any inferential process that could be derivable from the previous utterance.

On the other hand, the proposal put forward in this thesis provides us with a more convincing explanation of the function of *pero* in this type of examples. We argue that the speaker uses *pero* to make explicit the way she entertains the representation it introduces. This is done by contrasting the utterance it introduces with some alternatives. In this example the alternative could be that the selected one could have been any other article in the Constitution. Using *pero* in this type of example constrains the derivation of the propositional attitude of explicit strong commitment to the noteworthiness of this focalised information, which the speaker presents as being relevant in itself.

Secondly, our alternatives account also seems to give a better account of why the so-called emphatic examples achieve the effect of emphasis that characterises them. As discussed earlier, there are different types of emphatic uses of *pero*. Here we will discuss one of the examples to see how our account can provide a better explanation of the function of *pero* in this type of context.

[26] Legal Oral. UAM.

(111) Es genial oírle decir eso a una persona a la que vas a entrevistar. Y casi me ha pasado dos veces este mes... ¡*Pero* es que usted, además, tiene 90 años!

It is great to hear someone you are going to interview say that. And it has happened to me twice this month. ***But*** *the thing is, you are 90 years old!*

Accounting for this example following Blakemore's analysis of denial would lead us to look for a manifest assumption that the speaker wants the hearer to deny. It is, however, not clear what assumption the speaker may want the hearer to deny. Instead, we would suggest that the speaker uses *pero* in this context to direct the hearer towards the way she entertains the representation introduced by *pero*, i.e. it constrains the propositional attitude of the representation it introduces. The presence of the connective guides the hearer towards the assumption that the speaker could have expected the hearer to have a different age. She then uses *pero* to make this propositional attitude manifest, which can be read as an explicit marking of some propositional attitude of surprise.

Similarly a denial or suspension account would fail to account for the function of *pero* in those examples where *pero* introduces a question. If we take the following example, for instance:

(112) Tú no te has enterado.
¿Que yo no me he enterado?
Tú qué te vas a enterar. Tú con el traje, con la gallina, con lo otro, con la pluma, con el ...pero ¿sabes lo que hemos tenido aquí para traer al primer invitado? Bueno, *Pero* ¿quién vas a presentar hoy?. *(¡Ay! Vida Mía, 01/04/92, TVE 1 in CREA)*

You have not found out.
That I haven't found out?
Of course you haven't. You with your suit, the hen, with the other thing, with the feather, with the..but do you know what we have gone through here today so that we could bring the first guest? Well, ***But*** *who are you presenting today?*

The speaker introduces with *pero* the question about the identity of the person she is going to interview that day. By marking this question with *pero* the speaker is directing the hearer to contrast the fact of formulating the question with the

alternative in which this question was not necessary because the speaker should have already been provided with this representation. Marking this contrast is again a mechanism to express the speaker's propositional attitude towards the representation.

The following example describes what topics were discussed in the *Basque Government Council:*

(113) "que ayer no se debatió en el Consejo de Gobierno vasco el tema del Perejil. Sí trató sobre cómo ayudar a las familias vascas, *pero* para nada del Perejil". (*El País 18-07-02, pg. 18).*

"that yesterday there was not debate on the Basque Government Council on the topic of Perejil. It focused on how to help out Basque families, ***but*** *there was nothing about Perejil".*

First it claims that the topic of the 'Perejil issue' was not discussed. Then it mentions that it was discussed how to help Basque families, followed by the proposition introduced with *pero* that repeats that there was nothing mentioned about the 'Perejil issue'. It is difficult to see how the speaker could have intended to deny the manifest assumption that the 'Perejil issue' was discussed, since that had already been denied in the previous utterance. Similarly, it would be difficult to see what inferential process could be suspended in this example. Instead, it seems more likely that the speaker uses *pero* to instruct the hearer towards a contrast between what would be expected in context (*that the 'Perejil issue' had been discussed)* and what actually happened, the opposite. This contrast then constrains the derivation of the speaker's propositional attitude towards the representation *pero* introduces, which could be described in terms of indignation or disappointment.

Similar difficulties are encountered when attempting a denial or suspension account for examples such as the following:

(114) Yo no sé quién será el asesor de imagen de nuestro presidente, *pero* la verdad es que le creo fracasado, al menos con él. (*El País 2002, in CREA).*

I don't know who could be our president's image advisor, ***but*** *the truth is that I think he is finished, at least with him.*

One would imagine that those supporting a denial account would claim that *pero* instructs the hearer to deny the assumption that the speaker would not say anything about the president's image advisor because she does not know who he is. However, it seems very unlikely that the relevance of the *pero* utterance could lie on this denial. It would also be difficult to account for this example in terms of suspension, since it is very difficult to see how the hearer could be instructed to stop deriving further implications from the previous utterance.

My proposal, instead, would be that the speaker wants to make explicit her 'assertiveness and certainty' towards the representation introduced by *pero.* The speaker starts admitting that she has no knowledge about the identity of the president's image advisor. She then introduces the following utterance with *pero* to make explicit her propositional attitude of certainty towards her opinion about the quality of this advisor's job. The speaker uses *pero* to mark the contrast between the higher level representation of the representation it introduces, which could be *I am positive/certain that...* and a highly accessible alternative, which could be *I don't know that....* Using *pero* in this example is well justified in processing terms, since the speaker needs to make explicit this strong commitment due to the nature of the preceding proposition.

The next example, which would belong to the group of justification *pero*, is another clear case that would resist a denial or a suspension account:

(115) Pues yo le puedo garantizar que lo... mi mujer no se encuentra en ningún momento discriminada, ella cumple su función y yo la mía. *Pero* lo que tiene que existir en la pareja siempre, y para todos los temas es el diálogo (*UAM Corpus debates*[27])

Well, I can tell you that my wife does not feel she is being discriminated against, she does her job and I do mine. ***But*** *what is needed in a couple at all times and for all purposes is dialogue.*

[27] Debates.UAM.

The speaker points towards a contrast between the proposition introduced by *pero* and an alternative representation. In this case, the alternative could be a different justification for the previous statement or the lack of justification. The speaker uses *pero* to mark her commitment towards the representation it introduces, which is presented as exceptional. From this contrast, the speaker is also communicating that the lack of dialogue is common to those couples with problems of discrimination. From this propositional attitude of the exceptionality of the representation that justifies his previous statement, the hearer could easily derive some implications about the way the speaker sees this topic. It is very unlikely that the function of *pero* in this context could be to guide the hearer towards the denial of an assumption or the suspension of an inference, since it is not clear what these could be.

Finally, we will refer to an example extracted from an article on Letizia Ortiz (the Prince of Asturias' fiancée at the time):

(116) Al principio de párrafo....(hablando de sus amigos) Ellos son los que le cuentan desde el último chiste sobre la pareja hasta si su falda blanca de vuelo, la que lució en la catedral de Palma, le sentaba bien o mal.

Pero por encima de todas estas consideraciones que recibe y pide, Letizia Ortiz confía en la opinión de Doña Sofía. (*El País Semanal 23-05-2004 pg. 82-96).*

Starting the paragraph...(talking about her friends) They are the ones who tell her everything, from the last joke about the couple to whether or not the skirt she was wearing in the cathedral of Palma suited her or not.

***But** above all these considerations that she receives and asks for, Letizia Ortiz trusts Doña Sofia's opinion.*

The speaker starts describing how important it is for Letizia what her friends tell her about the way she is perceived in her new role as the Prince of Asturias' fiancée. It then introduces with *pero* a new paragraph that explains that the Doña Sofía, the Queen, is the person of whom Letizia thinks most highly. It is also very difficult to see how the relevance of *pero* could be described in terms of denial of a manifest assumption.

It seems that an account of contrast with alternatives provides a more plausible explanation of the relevance of using *pero* in this example. The speaker is contrasting the representation it introduces with an alternative in which the most important comment for her could come from her inner circle of friends or family, making explicit the exceptionality of this information. This will then guide the hearer in the derivation of implications. On the other hand, the speaker could be making explicit her attitude of surprise over the fact that she could have such a close relation with the Queen. The speaker, however, is not directing the hearer to deny the alternative that she was not that close to the Queen. Instead, she presents it as being entertained as an alternative, which constrains the propositional attitude in which the proposition may be embedded. In this case the propositional attitude could in fact be described as '*surprisingly, unexpectedly,...*'.

In this section, we have discussed some examples that would more clearly resist an analysis of denial as proposed by Blakemore (1987, 2000, 2002) or suspension of inferences defended by Hall (2003, 2004, 2007). Many of these uses had not been identified in previous RT analyses of *but*. We hope to have succeeded proving that our account of contrast with alternatives can easily accommodate all of these uses. Working with authentic examples from a different language has brought to light a wider range of uses, highlighting the difficulties that previous RT analyses would encounter when trying to account for these examples with their definitions. As said earlier in the thesis, it is not our objective to make an analysis of the uses of *but*. However, we would suggest that the unitary account proposed for *pero* seems to be a good alternative to account for not only those uses identified in the RT literature but a wider range of uses that have not been yet identified.

5.9. Correction *sino*

To finish this chapter, we will comment on the function of the correction connective *sino*, which has been the focus of some controversy. Those relevance theorists that have accounted for the meaning of *but* seem to agree that the so-called correction use of *but* — which is the counterpart of the Spanish *sino* — has

proved to be notoriously difficult to account for in their unitary accounts. As discussed earlier, this use translates into a different lexical item in languages such as Hebrew, German, Finish and Spanish. In Spanish the correction use corresponds to the connective *sino* and we would suggest that both *pero* and *sino* share the basic meaning of contrast. However, there is also a difference between them, which lies in the explicitness of the alternatives that contrast with the utterance they introduce.

As explained in previous chapters, the main distinguishing feature of the constructions with *sino* is that the preceding utterance has to have an explicit negation. This feature is compulsory but not exclusive, since there are also examples with *pero* where the preceding utterance is a negation. We will discuss the difference between these two connectives in this context, but first we will analyse one example with *sino*:

(117) Imaginemos que ese joven necesita irse de casa de sus padres ya, no porque se encuentre mal en el nido, *sino* porque no quiere prolongar más este estado de transición. *(El País 22-03-2006, backpage).*

Let's imagine that that young man needs to leave his parents' house as soon as possible, not because he is not comfortable in the nest, ***but*** *because he does not want to extend this transition state any more.*

In this example the writer first negates one of the possible causes that may lead the young man to leave his parents' home. In fact, this first utterance denies what may be considered as a general belief in our society or at least an opinion that could be shared by many of its members. She, then, introduces the real reason why the young man wants to move, with an utterance that is introduced by *sino.* The connective *sino* focalises the information that states the real reason for the young man's decision and it does it by contrasting it with the alternative denied in the previous utterance.

The difference between *sino* and *pero* lies in the explicitness of the alternatives. When the speaker uses *pero* the hearer is directed towards the existence of some alternatives that contrast with the representation introduced by *pero*. In the

examples with *sino*, on the other hand, the alternative has already been explicitly communicated, which explains why its function differs significantly from the one marked by *pero.* In fact, the function of *sino* can be described as being parallel to some focalising particles, since its role does not consist of making explicit some meaning of propositional attitude but, instead, it fulfills the theoretical function of informing by reducing possibilities. This idea can be supported by the fact that in some examples with corrective *sino*, the connective can be replaced by a fullstop and some stress focalisation of the utterance.

It is important to note that the examples with *sino* do not always introduce full sentences. Sometimes they introduce a phrase like in the example below:

(118) Si los daños que causemos no superan los 300€.-, entonces no estaríamos cometiendo un delito *sino* una falta *(email)*

If the damage that we may cause does not exceed 300€-, then we would not be committing a crime ***but*** *an offence (email)*

We will analyse this example and look at the different interpretations it may have when *sino* is replaced with *pero*. First of all, to do the replacement we need to insert a complete sentence, since *pero* cannot introduce nominal phrases when following a negative proposition.

(119) Si los daños que causemos no superan los 300, 50 €.-, entonces no estaríamos cometiendo un delito *pero* estaríamos cometiendo una falta *(email)*

If the damage that we may cause does not exceed 300€-, then we would not be committing a crime ***but*** *we would be committing an offence (email)*

A common question that may arise in this context is how to account for the difference between the meanings of these two very similar sentences if both *sino* and *pero* are supposed to encode a similar type of instruction. As explained above, the answer is likely to be found in the accessibility of the assumptions that are evoked by the presence of these connectives and the effects in the interpretation of the utterance they introduce. On the one hand, in the example with *sino* the

speaker is simply marking the focalisation of this representation, which replaces the one denied in the previous utterance (which is normally accessible in the context) [28]. On the other hand, in the same example with *pero* the writer is explicitly marking her attitude towards the option introduced by the connective as contrasting with one of the alternatives made accessible by the presence of the previous utterance. In this example, the utterance introduced by *pero* — *estaríamos cometiendo una falta* — is meant to contrast with some alternatives, which in this case can be described as less negative alternatives, including the one of not having any bad implications at all. It seems that this contrast with the alternatives will lead the hearer to embed the *pero* utterance with some attitude of negative affective stance and possibly some illocutionary force of alerting.

To further illustrate our point, we have chosen an interesting case where the *sino* example is inserted in a *pero* utterance.

(120) Aznar se retrotrajo al periodo previo a la democracia en España, *pero* no lo limitó sólo a los 40 años de franquismo *sino* a todo un siglo. *(El País 18-03-2003, pg. 19).*

Aznar evoked the period previous to the democratic Spain, ***but*** *he did not just covered the 40 year of Franco's regime* ***but*** *the whole century.*

This combination, which could be an obstacle for any of the previous accounts, seems to fit easily in our proposed analysis. As discussed earlier, what makes the corrective use distinctive from other uses is the fact that the alternative that contrasts with the *sino* utterance happens to be communicated as the positive counterpart of the negative utterance preceding the *sino* utterance. For instance, if one analyses examples with *sino* described above, it is clear that the contrast is established between the *sino* utterance —*it was over a century* — and the expected assumption that the time covered will be restricted to 40 years, which is derivable from the previous utterance. The speaker may use *pero* to draw attention to a contrast between a representation and its alternative, which in this case happens to be explicitly expressed. *Pero*, however, maintains its function of

[28] This is described as polyphonic negation, which contrasts with those examples of descriptive negation in the examples with a negative utterance preceding *pero*.

explicitly marking some propositional attitude of surprise and unexpectedness towards the representation it introduces. The function of *sino,* on the other hand, is to focalise the representation it introduces against either the positive version of the polyphonic negation in the preceding utterance.

The following example resembles the examples that combine *pero* and *sino*, in that the alternative and the contrasted assertion are both explicitly communicated, however in this case there is no explicit corrective connective:

(121) Yo me enamoré de Pablo a los 16 y sigo así. Yo trabajaba de modelo y tenía el campo abierto. *Pero* en vez de tirarme al monte, me tiré al redil. (*El País 9-10-2005, pg. 53).*

I fell in love with Pablo when I was only 16 and I still feel the same way. I used to work as a model and I had an open field ahead. ***But*** *instead of taking to the hills, I went into the fold.*

The contrast is then established between *tirarme al redil* 'following the fold'. and its accessible alternative *tirarme al monte* 'taking to the hills'. Explicitly marking this contrast with *pero* suggests that the speaker wants to make explicit her propositional attitude. This could be interpreted in terms of exceptionality, as perceived by the speaker, which is relevant in itself and will trigger the derivation of implications.

5.10. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have presented a description of the connective *pero,* which shares with previous RT analyses of *but* its description in procedural terms. It was argued that the function of *pero* consists of constraining the inferential processes that will lead the hearer to the intended interpretation of the utterance (see Blakemore 1987; 1993; 2000; 2002, Iten 1998; 2000; 2005, Hall 2003; 2004; 2005). We have agreed that the procedural analysis is the most adequate description of the meaning of this type of connective. However, we have also highlighted that there were certain issues raised by previous RT analyses of *but* that motivate a different analysis.

On the one hand, the analysis we have proposed here, unlike previous RT analyses of *but,* does not see the procedure encoded in *pero* as consisting of an instruction to deny or warn the hearer to avoid implications derivable from another proposition. Instead, we view the function of *pero* as an indicator for the hearer to recognise the fact that there are possible alternative propositional representations that contrast with the representation introduced by *pero*. We have also explained how our proposal differs significantly from other previous contrast analyses of *but* found in the literature. We do not explain the function of *pero* as an explicit indicator of contrast between the propositions it links (Mann and Thompson 1988, Salkie and Oates 1999) or favour an analysis of contrast in conceptual terms either (see Grice 1989, Rieber 1997, Bach 1999). Instead, we account for *pero* as a marker of contrast with alternatives. The speaker is understood to contrast the content of her assertion with the alternatives that are activated through *pero,* resembling somewhat the way it is done by some focus-marking devices. The connective explicitly marks the speaker's intention to contrast the content of her assertion with alternative assumptions, which constrains the identification of the speaker's attitude towards the utterance.

Another contribution of our analysis is that it supports the view that the effects of this type of connective also pertain to the explicit side of what is communicated. In Relevance Theory, it is agreed that there are some pragmatic enrichment processes in which hearers continually access assumptions based on contextual and paralinguistic cues. These processes run simultaneous to the decoding of the linguistic expressions used and are involved in determining every level of meaning, from the proposition expressed (basic explicature) to the illocutionary force of the utterance and the speaker's propositional attitude (higher level explicature). Our analysis of *pero* in terms of contrast with alternatives presents another means of constraining the derivation of this level of content known as higher level explicatures, including both illocutionary force of the utterance and the speaker's propositional attitude.

In this respect, we hope it has been made clear that our analysis differs from previous relevance-theoretical proposals, which link this type of connective to the effect of contradicting and eliminating manifest assumptions (Blakemore 1987;

1993; 2000; 2002, Iten 2005),[29] or suspending possible inferences (Hall 2004; 2007). On the other hand, it also differs from previous accounts in relation to the level of content on which this type of connective seems to have an effect. In previous RT accounts the function of the English *but* was explained in terms of constraints in the inferential processes that take place at the implicit level. Our analysis, however, claims that the presence of the connective *pero* constrains the derivation of the higher level explicatures of the utterance it introduces. In fact, we propose that this is an indirect way of communicating the speaker's propositional attitude. However, it is important to note that *pero* is only one of the channels available for the speaker to make her propositional attitude manifest. In written and especially in oral communication there are many other channels such as the gestures, tone of voice or other contextual features that can be used for this purpose. Furthermore, we have also explained that due to the procedural nature of *pero* it is not easy to explain with conceptual terms the exact meaning derivable from the constraint of contrast it encodes. Here, we have attempted to account for it using sentential adverbials and other expressions; however. it is worth clarifying that there is not exact correspondence, since the meaning encoded by *pero* is more indirect than any of these conceptual expressions.

We would also like to point out that our analysis has shown that it can account not only for those uses that had been pointed out in previous RT analysis, but also for a wider variety of uses of *pero* found in the authentic data. Furthermore, it has shown the difficulties of trying to account for these further uses with the previously suggested analyses of denial or suspension. This may call for further revision of these proposals. We also explained that it was not our concern to present an extensive analysis of the different uses of *but.* However, we hope that this analysis may encourage this future work, to see if this proposal of contrast can also easily account for a wider range of uses of the English connective.

[29]Iten (1998) agrees with the idea of the contradiction and elimination of an assumption but prefers to use a notion of 'accessible assumptions' instead of 'manifest assumptions', so as to be able to account for counterfactual and correction examples. However, in her latest account (2005) she abandons this distinction, returning again to Blakemore's original proposal of manifest assumptions.

Finally, it seems that our analysis can also succeed in providing an answer for some of the controversial issues raised in the works on *pero* in the Hispanic tradition. Firstly, in relation to the presuppositional content triggered by the use of *pero*, it was discussed that authors such as Rivarola (1979) agreed with the idea of the denial of a presupposition, which was defined in terms of expectations. We argued in this chapter that the notion of expectation may play an important role in our account too. However, our analysis rejects the view that the speaker uses *pero* to deny expectations. Instead, expectations are conceived as alternatives brought to the context to contrast with the selected representation, constraining the speaker's propositional attitude towards it.

In the pragmatic tradition, for instance, Moya (1996) argued that the function of *pero* is to indicate that there is an implicature of the hearer that needs to be denied. This view is very similar to what Blakemore proposes in her relevance theoretic account. Therefore, the same objections that have been put forward against her analysis will apply to contest Moya's proposal. Furthermore, it is worth noting that our account allows for the possibility of the speaker making explicit her propositional attitude towards the representation it introduces. This will not be compatible with Moya's view of this connective as a marker of false implicature on the hearer's side.

In the pragmatic tradition, Livia Gaudino-Fallegger (2002) argued for the function of *pero* as a marker of suspension and Porroche (2002) argued that the function of *pero* in the emphatic uses was to stop any type of inference that could be derived. These two analyses resemble the account put forward by Hall (2003, 2004, 2007) in RT. In this chapter, we have also explained why a suspension account would not be able to explain some of the examples found in the data. Our analysis has shown that both the denial or suspension analysis cannot work as a cognitive explanation of the function of *pero,* since they are unable to explain some of the uses presented here. Instead, we have argued that the speaker uses *pero* to direct the hearer towards a contrast with alternatives, which constrains the derivation of propositional attitude in which the proposition may be embedded. The accessibility of alternative assumptions will always be determined by the relevant context and the search for optimal relevance.

Furthermore, we hope to have shown that the syntactic nature of the examples with *pero,* i.e. as a conjunction or a discourse marker, is not relevant to determine what is the actual meaning encoded by it. In either case, it will encode the same procedural information that guides the hearer towards some contrast with alternatives, constraining the hearer's view of how the speaker entertains the utterance (propositional attitude). Moreover, this function of *pero* as a constraint in the derivation of the propositional attitude can be traced back to what other authors have referred to as a marker of some type of subjectivity (Bobes 1973: 274-6, Briz 1998: 185, Fuentes 2000: 337, Moeschler 1982: 18-9).

Finally, our account not only detaches from the idea of contradiction or denial proposed in RT but also gives an alternative analysis to the one proposed by those following AT (see, for instance, Portolés 1985, Fuentes 1998(a), 1998(b), 2000). Our explanation based on the notion of contrast with alternatives is an alternative for what AT has described as stronger argumentative force. We have pointed out the difficulty of applying the AT analysis in some examples (see 5.7.11), as well as Fuentes' proposal of *pero* as a marker of 'paso a lo más importante' (introducing the most important information) (see 5.7.10).

Chapter 6

Pero and Focus

6.1. Introduction

Our proposal for the procedural meaning of *pero* can be seen as analogous to analyses of contrastive focus such as the one proposed by Rooth (1985, 1992). In this chapter, we will discuss the difference between simple contrastive focus and the focus marked by the connective *pero* 'but'. Secondly, we will discuss some works from the German tradition that link the English *but* and the German *aber* to the function of focus. There seems to be some similarity between their general claim that this connective is linked to the function of contrast focus and our proposal. However, we will show that there are substantial differences that make our present approach a more plausible one. Finally, we will briefly deal with one issue that could arise from a proposal that links the function of *pero* to that of a focaliser — how the meaning of *pero* combines with other focalising particles such as scalar markers like *sólo* 'only' or *incluso/hasta* 'even', and additive focus markers such as *también* and *además* 'too, also, moreover'.

6.2. Rooth's theory of focus

We will start with some basic notions of Rooth's (1985, 1992, 1996) minimal theory of focus interpretation. He explains the role of contrastive focus as evoking a set of alternative propositions. For instance, in the following example:

(1) (Three friends Mary, Louise and Ann sit for an exam and A asks Mary the following question)
A: How did the exam go?
Mary: Well, I (with focus) passed.

One can see how the emphatic stress in B's utterance suggests that A should derive the implicature that the other girls did not pass the exam. The focus-conditioned suggested inference has the logic of Gricean quantity (scalar) implicatures, i.e. they

are derived by comparing what has been said to logically stronger things that the speaker could have said (Rooth 1996: 271).

Other examples of focus are *related exhaustive list readings* such as in:

(2) John bought Mary a BOOK (and nothing else)

This example draws the hearer's attention towards other alternatives that could have been and his surprise that there was nothing more than a book. He also refers to examples with focus markers such as *only,* which may differ in the location of the focus.

(3) A: Mary only introduced [Bill]$_F$to Sue
B: Mary only introduced Bill to [Sue]$_F$

In this example the focalised element will contrast with other alternatives that could have happened but have not, since it is just the one selected by *only* that takes place.

Finally, there are some contrastive examples of focalisation with an effect of contradiction and elimination.

(4) A: I hope Susan liked the book John bought for her.
B: John bought MARY a book.

As can be seen from discussing this set of examples, there are different ways in which the focus can have an effect on the interpretation of an utterance. They all share the idea of evoking alternatives that are going to have some effect in the context.

Rooth's aim is to provide a formal semantic mechanism for this presuppositional model of contrastive focus. In this approach, every phrase $<\phi>$ has, in addition to its ordinary semantic value, $[[\phi]]^0$, a focus semantic value $[[\phi]]^f$. This focus semantic value is the set of all terms derived from $<\phi>$ by substituting objects of appropriate types for the focused constituents of $<\phi>$.

It is important to note that the set of alternatives to <ϕ> are held to be pragmatically available in the context of the utterance, i.e. it has to be salient in the context or accommodated.

In example (4), for instance, the focus has the function of contradicting and eliminating the alternative, which has just been mentioned in the previous utterance. It is, however, interesting to note that the adversative marker *but* cannot be added in an example like this. The reason being that, as extensively argued in our previous chapter, the function of *but* should not be described in terms of contradiction and elimination. Instead, as proposed here, *but* functions as an indicator of the propositional attitude of the utterance it introduces, by pointing towards a contrast with a set of alternatives. In example (4) above, making this attitude explicit would be clearly not relevant, which explains why the speaker would not use *but,* since that would result in causing the hearer to invest unnecessary processing effort for no positive reward.

In the other examples, the focalisation has its own purpose: implication that the others did not pass in (1), marking expectations of a better alternative present in (2) and exclusion of an extra person in (3). If one were to allow the addition of the connective *but* to these examples, the meaning conveyed by the connective should add something to the meaning of the focalised utterance itself, namely, that the speaker wants to make her attitude explicit and relevant to the fact that the focalised element happens instead of the alternatives.

6.3. Two contrast accounts of focus sensitive *but*: Umbach and Sæbø

In the tradition of studies of contrast markers we can note two scholars, Umbach (2001, 2004, 2005) and Sæbø (2003), who have provided an alternatives analysis of *but* as a focus-sensitive particle. They have explained the main function of *but* in terms of contrast with alternatives, conceding information structure a very important role. Sæbø claims that German *aber* 'but' interacts with the topic-focus structure of the sentence and carries presuppositions involving alternatives and

negation. Umbach, on the other hand, maintains that the use of *but* involves a denial with respect to a 'quaestio', which is a representation of the information structure of the conjoint structures. Both accounts, then, share the view that the connective *aber* 'but' is linked to the function of contrast with alternatives. The alternatives are derived from the information structure and one of the two alternatives contrasted is denied. They then attempt to formalise or systematize how exactly *aber* 'but' interacts with the information structure to establish the set of alternate propositions. As will be shown, both Sæbø's resort to the traditional notion of presupposition and Umbach's idea of 'quaestio' face constraints when accounting for some of the uses of this connective.

Both Umbach and Sæbø regard the central function of *but* or *aber* as encoding contrast[1] that interacts with the information structure. They agree that the function of *but* is defined as confirming a statement and denying a statement, which involves that one of the conjuncts has to be either explicitly or implicitly negated[2] (the denied statement is a presupposition or a expected alternative in Saebø's and Umbach's accounts respectively). They claim that access to the contrastive alternatives is based on the information structure of the conjuncts. However, they argue that some uses of the connective that have been identified in the literature[3] have to be accounted for in terms of accomodation.

6.3.1. How does their machinery work in both accounts?

These accounts also seem to draw on the ideas put forward by Rooth (1992, 1996) and Krifka (1993) [4]that focus always evokes alternatives that are constrained by the context. In Umbach and Sæbø's accounts of *but* and *aber* the information structure of the conjuncts plays a decisive role, since they rely on it to get access to the alternatives, one of which is denied. The contrasted alternatives require

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[1] Interestingly Sæbø claims that *but* encodes a 'conceptual meaning of contrast', however he does not elaborate on what exactly he means by 'conceptual'.

[2] Umbach argues that in some cases implicit negation can be detected by means of the quaestio of the utterance.

[3] Umbach ,for instance, includes the corrective but Sæbø does not.

[4] In fact, it is only Umbach who refers to this link between her account and Rooth's model. She contrasts her account to other syntactic accounts (Kiss 1998, Rochemont 1986, Steube 2001) that maintain the distinction between the two types of focus: ordinary/informational focus and contrastive/identificational focus). (see Umbach 2004)

similarity and dissimilarity and the distinctive feature of the contrast in adversatives is the additional requirement that when the alternatives are added to the common ground it results in a true proposition and in a false proposition (see Umbach), or as Sæbø says:

> "Contrast in the sense of adversativity consists in the rejection of the simultaneous validity of two alternatives (with respect to the background established in the first conjunct)". (Sæbø, 2003: 271)

6.3.2. Examples with contrastive topics

The following two examples illustrate two prototypical examples of the use of this connective with clearly identifiable contrastive topics:

(5) For **small companies** the harm is yet limited *but* for **intermediate size companies** it is becoming ruinous. (adaptation of Saebø's 2003: 262[5])

(6) The **small children** went to the zoo *but* the **big children** stayed at home. (Umbach 2005: 207)

With these two examples, we will illustrate the different ways in which these two accounts formalise the accessibility of the alternative assumptions that are denied.

Saebø, for instance, explains his theoretical interpretation of contrast in terms of presuppositions, based on the parallel he finds between the function of *aber* 'but' and previous presuppositional accounts of *auch* 'also'[6]. Both connectives share the feature of replacing the topic with an alternative, which in the case of *but* results in a negation. In the following example with *auch* 'also':

(7) Für grosse Betriebe nimmt der Schaden schon katastrophale Ausmasse an, und für mittlere wird er *auch* allmä hlich ruinös.

For large companies, the harm is getting disastrous proportions, for intermediate size companies, it is ***also*** *becoming ruinous.* (Saebø 2003: 263)

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[5] The original: Für kleine Betriebe hält sich der Schaden noch in Grenzen; für mittlere wird er aber allmählich ruinös. *For small companies, the harm is yet limited; for intermediate-size companies, however, it is becoming ruinous.'*

[6] Saebo says that "the meaning of *auch* 'also' consists in a presupposition – informally, the result of replacing the focus by an alternative- and on a dynamic notion of presupposition) (2003: 264)

There is a presupposition that results from replacing the topic *intermediate size companies* with the alternative *large size companies*, that is, */or large companies it is becoming ruinous.*

Similarly, in parallel examples such as (8) below, in which the adversative *aber* 'but' replaces the additive particle, there is a denied alternative that is also accessed by replacing topics.

(8) Für kleine Betriebe hält sich der Schaden noch in Grenzen; für mittlere wird er *aber* allmählich ruinös.

For small companies the harm is yet limited ***but*** */or intermediate size companies it is becoming ruinous. (adaptation of Saebø 2003: 262)*

In this case the alternative denied is accessed by substituting the topic[7] of the S2 *intermediate size companies* by the topic of the S1 *small size companies*, that is, */or small size companies it is becoming ruinous,* which results in a contradiction with the actual sentence. As he says:

> "the context entails the negation for the result of replacing the topic of the sentence by an alternative"(Saebø 2003: 263). [8]

On the other hand, Umbach, rather than using the notion of presupposition, opts for the notion of quaestio, which is a formalization in question form of the information structure of the conjoint structures. She defines it as "a mere diagnostic tool displaying the contextual conditions for the utterance to be felicitous" (Umbach 2005: 211). For instance in the example below:

(9) The **small children** went to the zoo but the **big children** stayed at home. (Umbach 2005: 207)[9]

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[7] There is no sistematicity in the way Sæbø uses the term 'topic'. He claims that what he calls topic has been known by other authors as 'focus'. His use of (contrastive) topic in Büring (1997) sense: it seems to be a theme focus. In many other cases, though, it seems to be (part of) the rheme focus.(p.c).

[8] Previous versions of this definition added that the alternative had to be in first sentence.

[9] She marks the contrastive topics with bold and the focus in the rheme with capital letters. However, in her work, like Saebø's, there is not always consistency in the marking, as sometimes she uses [ ]F to signal the focus of the rheme.

There are two contrastive topics (*small children* and *big children*) and the quaestio would ask about the two topics with a wh- question from the focus information. Therefore, the quaestio corresponding to the example above would be as follows:

> *Quaestio*: What did the small children do? And did the big children do the same? (Umbach 2004: 186)

If one compares both Umbach's and Sæbø's examples we can see that despite the resemblance, there is a significant difference. If one takes Umbach's example of the contrastive topics (6) and apply Sæbø's formula, the presupposition denied would be the result of substituting the topic in the second conjunct for the alternative in the first, *small children stayed at home*. This contrasts with Umbach's analysis, where the expected alternative that is denied seems to be *the big children went to the zoo*. In relation to this point, Sæbø (p.c.) states that both options amount to the same thing. However, it seems that the possibility of the existence of different alternatives makes manifest the need to incorporate the notion of the context into these models, which seems to have been left aside.

6.3.3. Examples with focus in the rheme

Umbach also refers to examples that do not have a contrastive topic but have a topic that functions as common ground for both propositions, as illustrated below.

> (10) John cleaned up the ROOM *but* he didn't wash the DISHES.
>
> *Quaestio* being: what about John? what did he do? And did he also wash the dishes?

This quaestio consists of the question about the topic and then the wh-question from the focus, with the answers resulting in a confirmed and a denied conjunct. However, this account is quite un-illuminating on what the scope of the focus is and how to account for it.

In example (10), there are two alternatives[10] *clean the room* and *wash the dishes* that are applied to an element in the common ground *John*. Thus one of these alternatives is confirmed while the other is denied[11]. If one compares this example with examples of coordination with *and,* they seem to share the idea of contrast established between mutual alternatives, which involves similarity and dissimilarity. However, it is the feature of the denial that makes them different from each other[12].

On the other hand, Sæbø also refers to examples in which the contrast is not established between contrastive topics but between contrastive rhemes[13]. Examples of this type would include, for instance, those in which the topic and the alternative are ordered along a scale such as:

(11) Many birds have returned, *but* not all.

In this example, Sæbø claims that the denied proposition would be *many birds have not returned* (Sæbø's p.c.). However, this interpretation seems to go against the intuitions that what is denied in this example is that *all birds have returned.* Again, there is an unfortunate lack of guidance about how to derive the alternatives, since we are not provided with a mechanism to know what exactly the topic or the focus is and what their scope in each individual example is.

6.3.4. Examples of double contrast

Umbach also makes a distinction between two types of contrast: simple and double contrast. In the example of simple contrast the foci could be in the predicates (12), individuals (13) or propositions (14):

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[10] The two alternatives are called sister alternative (SA) and expected alternative (EA).

[11] Umbach also establishes a link between the function of *but* and the function of the focalising particle *only.* In both cases there seems to be an exclusion of one of the alternatives that is attached to the common ground .The difference between them would be that the linguistic form *(but)* provides greater specification of the excluded alternative.

[12] Umbach insists on the idea that the denial function of *but* cannot be explained as if *but* contained a negation on its own ("nand"), instead, what *but* requires is that one of the conjuncts has to be explicitly or implicitly negated. (Umbach 2004: 168).

[13]He is not very consistent with his terminology and he also refers to these examples as examples of contrast between topics and alternatives.

(12) John cleaned up the ROOM, but he didn't wash the DISHES
Quaestio: What did John do?, and did he also wash the dishes?

(13) JOHN cleaned up the room, but BILL didn't.
Quaestio: Who cleaned up the room?, and did Bill do that too?

(14) [It is raining]$_F$ but [I am going out]$_F$
Quaestio: "Is it raining, and are we going to stay at home?

In the examples of double contrast, on the other hand, there has to be a focus in the theme part (contrastive topic) and also in the rheme part. This gets more complicated in examples in which the alternatives are not parallel. She points out different variants of double contrast, some are parallel, as in (15), and some are crossed examples, such as (16):

(15) John cleaned up the ROOM, but Bill did the DISHES. [14]
Quaestio: What did John do? And did Bill do the same or did he also do the dishes?

(16) John cleaned up the ROOM, but it was BILL who did the dishes.
Quaestio: What did John do? Did he also do the dishes?

Unfortunately, there is lack of explanation of how in examples (15) and (16), *John* and *dishes* and *room* and *Bill* respectively behave as contrastive topics. It is not clear if they have to be taken as common ground or if alternatively the common background has to be taken only from the first utterance. Again, it is difficult to see which are the alternatives in these examples.

These two types of contrast (simple and double) are supposed to be accounted for with same type of procedure, which reads as follows:

> "In the simple as well as the double contrast cases *but* is associated with a focus in the second conjunct which provides the Expected Alternative (EA). The Expected Alternative corresponds to the Sister Alternative (SA) in the first conjunct. EA plus SA constitute the alternatives under discussion referred to in the quaestio. The meaning of *but* consists in imposing *a denial condition*". (Umbach 2005: 218)

[14] Bold means theme focus and capital letters mean rheme focus.

In both types of contrast the alternatives EA and SA have to be of the same semantic type and the latter is determined after the EA is fixed. It seems that the model she proposes claims that there is only one type of information structure for each individual utterance, not properly allowing the context to play a role in its determination.

6.3.5. How to account for non-simple contrast examples

As illustrated above, in some cases the alternative simply corresponds to the positive counterpart of the negative assertion and in some other cases it is a simple mechanism of substituting foci or topics from the one in the previous utterance. However, even in the most simple examples, it is not clear how to account for the scope of the contrast (alternatives), since they do not provide us with any explanation as to how to determine the scope of the focus or topic. Their models seem to run into more difficulties when they depart from the very simple constructed parallel examples, where the alternatives are not explicitly given. They then resort to the phenomena of accommodation to be able to account for these cases, as will be shown below.

6.3.5.1. Sæbø's accommodation examples

Sæbø admits that in some traditional examples of denial of expectation and concession cases, the verification of the presuppositions is not always so straightforward. He then has to resort to the notion of conversational implicatures to accommodate for these types of examples. In instances such as the following, it is difficult to identify the topic and the alternatives because they are not supplied by the context.

(17) Die Waldwege sind steil, *aber* kurtz.

The forest paths are steep ***but*** *short.* (Sæbø 2003: 267)

He argues that *short* cannot be the topic[15] and *steep* the alternative, since the context would agree with the contrastive. Instead, he claims that the topic[16] could be the complement of *short*, as illustrated below:

(18) Die Waldwege sind steil *aber* kurz.

The forest paths are steep ***but*** *not long.*

He explains that this identification of the topic and the alternative (*long* and *steep* are alternatives) involves accommodation, which can be explained in terms of implicatures (concession or denial of expectations). In fact, he also refers to Lang's (1984) idea of the common integrator, which in this example would be explained as if *long* and *steep* both served as arguments for the same conclusion (*the path is strenuous).*

On the other hand, he also refers to those examples in which the *aber* sentence does not seem to contain a (contrastive) topic in any information structural sense of the term, but only a focus (or rheme). Sæbø claims that there may then be a reason to assume an implicit topic for the contrastive. In these cases, such an implicit topic will be the negation of the apparent focus, as illustrated below:

(19) Wasserskorpione sehen Landskorpionen ähnlich, sind *aber* ungifting.

Water scorpions resemble land scorpions, ***but*** *are not poisonous.*

He accounts for this example claiming that the topic (barely implicit) would be *are poisonous* and that the contextual alternative *resemble land scorpions*. He also adds that the obvious way to interpret this parallel is by assuming that land scorpions are poisonous. He then moves on to claim that the focus in the second utterance *poisonous* has to be replaced with *resemble land scorpions*, which results in *they do not resemble land scorpions*, which, he argues, is clearly denied in the context.

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[15] In personal communication, he explained this confusion about what is topic or focus saying that "On the one hand, he would like the information structure of "aber kurz" to be "as to length, they are negative", so that "aber" still associates with the `real´ theme focus, but on the other hand, "kurz" does appear to be the rheme"

[16] In fact, he also mentions another alternative solution: the complement of *steep* is the alternative, however he does not explain of what it consist.

It seems to me that there are different ways in which this example could have been accounted for in terms of alternatives. For instance, if we take the implicature *land scorpions are poisonous* and replace the topic *land scorpions* with the topic in the other explicit utterance *water scorpions,* one would have that *water scorpions are poisonous,* which would obviously lead to a contradiction with the actual context itself. Therefore, it seems that even following his own schema, it is possible to access to different alternatives and there is nothing that guides us in the selection of the correct one (if there is one). It then again makes manifest the need to incorporate into his model the role of the context as well as some pragmatic principles that could direct the hearer in the search of the alternatives.

6.3.5.2. Umbach's accommodation examples

Similarly, Umbach points out the difficulty of the applicability of her ideas to examples with no topic where the content of both conjuncts is regarded as rheme. An example of this would be the following:

(20) It is raining *but* I am going out.

In this example, since there is no overt negation in the S2, she proposes the proposition *not staying at home* from which we derive *staying at home* as an alternative that is being explicitly denied (EA). She claims that in this type of examples the theme is implicitly given by the reported event (Umbach 2005: 217).

She then also deals with those examples of *but* that have been accounted for in the literature in terms of denial of expectation or concession and accommodates them as part of her contrast analysis. For instance, she argues that what has been analysed as 'expectation' is no more than the result of the general implicature of negation and that rather than a regularity it is just a coincidence of facts (Umbach 2005: 222). She even admits that there are some examples in which the expectation, not belonging to the hearer's world knowledge, could be accounted for in terms of accommodation. The following example could be uttered in a

context in which the hearer does not know that loosestrifes are generally found in the month of July:

(21) It was July *but* we couldn't find any loosestrife.

However, she argues that there are many other examples in which accommodation would not be a plausible option as the expectation may be too *ad hoc* as to be accommodated as a general expectation. This account then undervalues the role of the expectation and outweighs the value of the quaestio, which refers to the question-under-discussion given by the previous context (Umbach 2005: 222).

Umbach also resorts to the notion of accommodation to extend her unitary contrast account to explain the examples of concession. She claims that there is no *'concessive but'* since the meaning of *but*, unlike other concessive markers, does not include incausality[17]. In fact, she states that considering *but* as concessive is due to overinterpretation. It is, however, perfectly compatible with a concessive reading the same way that *and* is compatible with a causal reading without implying that it is part of its semantics (2005: 224).

6.3.6. Conclusion of the contrast-focus analyses of *but*

Both Sæbø (2003) and Umbach (2001, 2004, 2005) argue that the function of *aber* and *but* is to indicate a contrast between alternatives, one of which is denied. Their account is a reaction to those accounts that favoured an analysis of *but* in terms of denial of expectations, concession or semantic opposition. They argue that those uses could be explained in their model by means of accommodation. In relation to the notion of denial of expectation, Umbach claims that everything is a result of the implicature derived of a negation rather than of default knowledge or general expectations.

The role played by the information structure of the conjuncts, which guides the hearer towards the contrasted alternatives, is an important feature of these two

[17] She uses the term 'incausality' to refer to the lack of realization of the causal relation (If X, then Y) that would be accessed in the context.

accounts. In the examples with contrastive topics the denied alternative is derived from replacing the topic in the second conjunct with the focus of the previous one (Umbach) or the focus of the second conjunct with the topic of the first one (Sæbø). On the other hand, in those examples that have a common background for the two propositions, alternatives have to be found in the focus of the rheme. In some cases, it is easily accessed, since there is an explicit negation. In other examples the denied alternative is accessed as a result of an implicature that could be derived from the two alternatives contrasted. In these cases, as Sæbø admits, the role of pragmatics is very important and in particular he has to resort to the so-called Gricean maxim of relevance (Sæbø 2003: 267). Indeed, these examples demonstrate the need to rely more on pragmatics in order to be able to account for the derivation of the alternatives in all and not only in some of the examples.

It seems that both accounts share the same view of contrast and information structure. They both attempt to provide a formal mechanism to access the contrastive alternatives, but the machinery they use to access to these alternatives is different. On the one hand, according to Sæbø, alternatives are accessed by reading off from the surface structure. His analysis then enters into difficulty where the examples are not very explicit or where the semantic or information structure is more complicated. For instance, there are cases in which the form in itself may be ambiguous (for example how different intonation may lead to different interpretations) or the semantic structure may be more complex, which makes the search for a more complex mechanism necessary.

On the other hand, Umbach goes a step further and tries to provide an interface, a language independent representation of information structure — the quaestio. The main drawback of Umbach's account is that it contains some imprecise machinery which is difficult to evaluate. In particular, she does not provide us with a precise mechanism for deriving quaestio in some utterances. Furthermore, the idea of the context does not seem to be adequately taken into account. As argued above, the derivation of the alternatives cannot be so mechanically derived. Instead, it is clear that there are different plausible options and it is unfortunate that this approach does not provide us with the tools to choose the intended one.

To conclude, these two accounts are of great interest because from our perspective, they are a step in the right direction in accounting for the use of *but*. On the one hand, they allow for the rejection of the notion of 'denial of expectation' or 'semantic opposition' as the basic function of this connective, in favour of an analysis based on contrast. On the other, they put forward the idea that its central role consists of evoking alternatives. However, their view of focus and alternatives places unnecessary stress on the information structure of the utterances and the relation between the two alternatives linked (one of which is denied), as if the coordination role of the connective played such a central role in the description of its meaning. In essence both accounts try to read off the alternatives from the utterance's form either directly in Sæbø's case or in Umbach's case indirectly via an information structure representation (quaestio), itself derived from the utterance form. In fact, this is an important disadvantage of this type of analysis, since they will not be able to easily account for the discourse uses of *but*.

We also would like to highlight that studying these analyses has shown that any account that only relies on the surface structure will fail as soon as it moves away from very simple examples, making evident the need to incorporate pragmatics into these models. It is, in fact, their reliance on the surface structure to automatically derive the alternatives that makes them significantly different from the RT analysis that we propose in this thesis. Our account, instead, relies on the important role played by the underdetermination of meaning and the notion of context as not being determined before hand.

To sum up, our account, like theirs, supports the idea that *but* shares with focalisers the function of evoking the existence of alternatives. However, our analysis differs from theirs in relation to the extent of resemblance between *but* and other focalisers. They support the view that the alternatives are derived from the information structure of the utterances. In fact, this is a significant weakness of their analysis since the need for some contextual support to access these alternatives is made evident. We, on the contrary, will claim that the alternatives cannot be mechanically derived, but guided by the expectations of relevance (see earlier discussion of the Communicative Principle of Relevance in chapter 4).

Furthermore, we take the analysis a step further to consider the relevance of accessing these alternatives. Indeed, this explains why the function of *but* differs significantly from that of other common focalisers.

6.4. *Pero* combined with focalising particles

6.4.1. Introduction

We have explained how the basis of our alternative account takes as reference the work on contrastive focus proposed by Rooth (1985, 1992, 1996). We have also explained briefly how our proposal of *pero* differs significantly from the focalising function of some of the focus particles (see section 6.2). Here, we will consider an issue that may arise from an analysis that views *pero* 'but' as sharing some features with focalising devices, namely, how this connective behaves when it combines with other typical focalisers such as *también* and *además* 'also, too, moreover', *sólo* 'only', *incluso* 'even', *hasta* 'even', *ni siquiera* ' not even'. We will start by reviewing the function of these focalisers and we will then move to discuss what happens when they combine with the connective *pero*.

6.4.2. Non-scalar additive particles

6.4.2.1. A Relevance Theoretic account of additive particles

The first RT account of additive particles is given by Blakemore (1987), who explains what Grice called conventional implicatures as "linguistically specified constraints in context" (1987: 76). Following the idea of optimalization of relevance presented in RT, additive particles are accounted for as devices that guide the hearer in the interpretation process by constraining his choice of context, i.e. they reduce the amount of processing cost by constraining the necessary assumptions to be accessed by the hearer.

Blakemore (1987: 97) claims that *also* does not contribute to the truth-conditional content but indicates a semantic constraint on relevance, which consists of making explicit a relation of addition. Any account of *also* should take into account

different aspects of the focal structure of the utterances in which it is included. Blakemore (1987, 1992) follows Wilson and Sperber's (1979) analysis of focus in terms of *'ordered entailments'*, which are obtained by substituting a logical variable for a syntactic constituent (see also Sperber and Wilson 1995: 203-215). For instance, in the example below we can derive the following grammatically specified entailments:

(22) Mary bought a house
  a. Mary bought something
  b. Mary did something with a house
  c. Someone bought a house

She claims that the speaker will commit herself to the truth of all of the entailments but will not expect all of them to play the same role in establishing the relevance of the utterance. In the utterance there are foreground and background entailments, which can be linguistically marked by devices such as heavy stress or clefting (Wilson and Sperber 1979). For instance, in the following example:

(23) Mary bought a HOUSE

The background entailment (what is taken for granted) will be that *Mary bought something*, which indicates that the point of the utterance lies in *what is it that Mary bought*. Then if we add *also* to this example:

(24) Mary also bought a HOUSE [18] (adapted from Blakemore 1987: 102).

It would be providing the following further information:

(25) Mary bought something else apart from buying a house

Also then guides the hearer to process the utterance in a context in which it is relevant to know what Mary bought and whatever was asserted to have been bought in the previous utterance. Therefore, both the focal structure as well as the

[18] Blakemore argues that the function of *also* in this example is the same as "moreover". "The parallelism in focus adds a more specific indication of the parallelism in the inferential processes involved" (Blakemore 1987: 104).

addition feature combine in the interpretation of the utterance. This means that utterances with *also* are meant to be processed in contexts in which it is relevant to know the value of the variable substituted for the focused constituent in addition to the value given to it in the preceding clause.

In this RT tradition, Blass (1990(b)) argues that the central feature of the use of *also* is to indicate a relation of parallelism (1990(b): 138). For instance:

(26) Klaus has five cars and also a yacht.

In this example, the second clause achieves relevance by *strengthening* or providing *additional evidence* for a contextual implication already derivable from the first clause. This idea of parallelism[19] implies that two utterances or assumptions are processed in the same or similar contexts, yielding the same or similar conclusions.

Blakemore (1987) also analyses the function of additive marker *moreover*[20]. She describes its function as an indicator that the propositions it relates are premises to the same conclusion. She argues that *moreover* can be used in two different contexts, which is then linked to two different contextual effects[21]. The first one corresponds to those cases in which P and Q are premises in different arguments, both of which have the same conclusion. *Moreover,* then, indicates that there is a conclusion which can be derived from P and which can also be derived from Q. An example of this type would be:

(27) Susan has bought a tracksuit. *Moreover,* she had a salad for lunch.
(Blakemore 1987: 92)

---

[19] Blass points out that the structure of parallelism can also be used in other context to mark *disconfirmation* but then *also* cannot be used in these cases.

[20] *Moreover*, unlike *also*, is not described as a focaliser. However, I incorporate it here as another example of additive particle. In the Hispanic tradition it may translate as *además* and as we will see, the study of *pero* combined with additive particles also includes it when accounting for the combination of *pero* with the focalising additive *también*.

[21] Recall that relevance can be achieved by three different types of contextual effects: contextual implication, confirmation and contradiction.

This first use of *moreover* introduces an extra premise for the same conclusion that could have been derived from the previous utterance *she is trying to lose weight*. This can be explained in RT as providing a better evidenced belief (Blakemore 1987: 93-4).

The second use of *moreover* is when Q leads the hearer to derive a contextual implication that could not have been derived from the previous information alone. An example of this second type would be:

(28) Tom is here. *Moreover*, he's brought his guitar. (Blakemore 1987: 95)

In this example, *moreover* indicates that the proposition it introduces has to combine with the previous proposition in order to derive a conclusion that could not have been derived otherwise. In this example, a possible conclusion that could be derived from both premises could be that *we can have some music*.

To sum up, in both uses, *moreover* constrains the hearer's choice of context so that the proposition in the first sentence is interpreted as evidence for a specific conclusion, either by strengthening it or by guiding him to its derivation[22].

6.4.2.2. An analysis of *but* with additive particles

Green (1968) presents an interesting study on the combination of particles such as *too* or *either* with the connective *but*. He argues that it is similar to the use of *and* in ordinary sentences with identical or non-identical elements in conjoined clauses. For instance:

(29) John is not a fink, *but/and* he is not a hero either.

(30) John is fairly bright, *but/and* he is pretty absent-minded too.

[22] Blakemore claims that the same can be applied to *furthermore* .

However, he points out that *but* cannot replace *and* without being ungrammatical in examples of emphatic coordination that require affective context, as illustrated below:

(31) You're a louse, *and/*but* I don't think that you love me either.

(32) Get out of here, *and/*but* don't push either.

He explains this ungrammaticality claiming that *but* can only be used when it is considered equivalent to '*and contrary to your expectations*'.

We would disagree with Green's claim in two respects: on the one hand, we would object to the claim that *and* and *but* can be interchangeable in those cases that indicate contrary to your expectations. For instance, if we take (30) above, it seems clear that when this example is contextualised, the interchangeability is no longer plausible. For instance, if we are thinking of hiring someone for a job that requires a fairly bright mind and also a very attentive personality then it is only the example with *but* that would be adequate.

Following our own account, this difference will be explained in terms of the extra attitudinal meaning conveyed by the connective *but.* This extra meaning will be conveyed as a result of the constraint imposed by the connective *but,* which instructs the hearer to derive some alternatives that contrast with the utterance it introduces. Because of this extra meaning, which goes along with some extra effort, it can be explained why it is not possible to use *but* in examples such as (31) and (32) above. It is clear that it is not relevant in these examples to make explicit the attitude towards one of the utterances as contrasting with alternatives. Instead, it simply presents the combination of the two things happening at the same time.

6.4.2.3. Non-scalar additive particles in Spanish

In the Hispanic tradition there are some pragmatic accounts on non-scalar additive particles that have followed the theoretical framework of Argumentation Theory. *Además* 'moreover' is described as a very common connector, which links two members of discourse with the same argumentative orientation (Fuentes 1987: 87-111, Eberenz 1994, Espinosa 1995, Portolés 1995). The second member guides towards certain inferences that would not be accessible with only the first member, as in the example below:

(33) Tienes que hacer una declaración escrita clara y rigurosa, contando toda la verdad y *además* debes hacerla pública cuanto antes. (*ABD, II-1996, 2)* (Portolés 1999: 4094)

You have to make a clear and rigorous written declaration, telling the whole truth and ***moreover*** *you have to make it public as soon as possible.*

On the other hand, there are also cases in which the second member that *además* introduces is just a complement that strengthens the argumentative value of the first member. For instance:

(34) Es una amiga y *además* es íntima. (Portolés 1999: 4094)

She is a friend and ***besides*** *she is very close /she is a friend* ***as well as*** *a very close one.*

It seems then that these two uses of *además* correspond to the two uses described by Blakemore for the function of *moreover.*

In general, the connective *además* has been studied together with the focalizing additive *también*, since both share the meaning of addition. What distinguishes them is that *también*, unlike *además*, needs to have something in common in both sequences. Indeed, *también* is a focaliser while *además* is an additive adverb. However, they both have been studied as behaving similarly when combining with *pero* (eg. Fuentes 1998(b)).

In the Hispanic tradition, Fuentes (1998(b): 126) argues that *pero* can combine with co-oriented elements such as *pero además*[23] 'but moreover', *pero también* 'but also' or *pero incluso* 'but even'[24]. She explains that *pero* indicates a change in the argumentation (*contraargumentación*), which does not stop the second member from being added to the first element. Both the value of *pero* and the value of the additive particle are maintained and the two elements that could be incompatible or antioriented happen at the same time. For instance:

(35) Come mucho *pero también* hace gimnasia. (Fuentes 1998a: 41)
She eats a lot ***but*** *she* ***also*** *does exercise.*

Fuentes also argues that in some contexts the opposition indicated by *pero* is not of content, but rather, it is argumentative or informative, i.e. hierarchical. In this combination it is common to see the function of *pero* adopting a change in the argumentation, leading to the most important information (Fuentes 1997-8: 146), as in the example below:

(36) Telefónica en su circular más parece una imposición en la que, faltaría más, se reserva el derecho del abonado a excluirse siempre y cuando realice el esfuerzo de negarse explícitamente.
Pero es que, *además,* como explica la propia agencia, la circular de Telefónica, dictada a regañadientes para cubrir un trámite molesto, no informa a los estafados de aspectos decisivos....(*El País 27-12-1997, pg. 10*) (Fuentes 1997/8: 149)

Telefónica in its circular seems to be presenting itself as an imposition where, of course, it reserves the right of the client to be excluded as long as they make the effort to refuse explicitly.
But, moreover, *as the agency itself explains, the Telefónica's circular, reluctantly dictated to cover-up an awkward procedure does not inform those that had been defrauded of crucial elements.*

Fuentes concludes that *pero* in examples of *pero también* and *pero además* is described as marking an argumentative opposition or change of argumentation. Therefore, the combination is possible, with both *pero* and the additive particles keeping their original meaning (Fuentes 1997/8: 149).

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[23] As we will see *pero además* may not always translate as 'but moreover' but as 'but on top of that, but what is more'...
[24] See also Portolés 1995

Our account will also support the view that the function of *pero* remains the same as in any other context, i.e. it makes explicit a contrast between a representation and inferentially accessed alternatives, constraining the derivation of some propositional attitude. Therefore, the combination of *pero* with *también* and *además* does not result in a compound meaning. Instead each of the linguistic units— *pero* and the additive particles — maintains its own meaning, i.e. *también* and *además* preserve their function of strengthening or marking parallel addition, as proposed by Blass and Blakemore for their English counterparts. Although this is compatible with the function of contrast encoded in *pero*, it is also independent of it.

Here we will discuss some authentic examples of *pero* preceding an utterance with *además* and *también* to see how to account for the differences between them. In examples where *pero* is followed by the particle *además* 'moreover' the alternative that is evoked by *pero* may be the assumption that there was no more propositions or representations of the same type, i.e. that the information that precedes *pero* could have exhausted all the information to be conveyed. Therefore, the speaker uses *pero* explicitly to mark her propositional attitude towards the phenomenon of adding an extra representation.

The example below presents the situation in Spain with the implementation of the new employment reform:

(37) Hace sólo dos meses que entró en vigor la reforma del sistema d protección al desempleo, lo que se conoce como el decretazo, y los funcionarios se enfrentan a la aplicación de todo un nuevo sistema. *Pero es que, además*, sus trabajadores están al mínimo. Pobre gestión de contratos. El INEM gestionó un 17,3% de los contratos que se firmaron en 2001. *(El País 14-07-02, pg. 47)*

It has only been two months since the reform of the unemployment protection system, which is known as "the decretazo" and the civil servants face the introduction of a whole new system. ***But, besides that****, it currently has the lowest number of workers ever. The management of contracts is poorly run. INEM handled a 17,3% of the contracts that were signed in 2001.*

The paragraph starts with the description of how this implementation involves civil servants having to face a completely new system. The proposition introduced by *pero* introduces an additional problem, which consists of shortage of staff to do the job. The function of *pero* in this context is to direct the hearer to contrast this information with an alternative, which could be the absence of any additional problem. This contrast may then constrain the propositional attitude, which could be described as *'it is a disgrace, it is unacceptable, it is wrong, it is regrettable...'*

Similarly in the following example:

> (38) La eficacia de los controles de precios propuestos por el Gobierno para vigilar la inflación es dudosa, *pero además* propiciará fácilmente nuevos privilegios y corruptelas. (*El País 06-01-02, pg. 12)*
>
> *The efficiency of the price controls proposed by the Government to keep an eye on inflation is questionable,* ***but what is more*** *it will favour new privileges and corruptions.*

The speaker is making explicit her attitude towards the added information introduced by *pero.* The text starts with the dubious efficiency of the new proposal of the Government and it then adds that this will bring new privileges and corruptions. The speaker adds to this negative effect by expressing explicitly her attitude, which could easily be one of indignation and disappointment. This is the result of marking a contrast with an alternative context, where there was no additional negative effect.

Alternatively, when *pero* combines with *también* 'as well, also, too' the speaker does more than draw attention towards the addition of the propositional representation, which contrasts with the lack of it. She, perhaps more importantly, highlights the inadequacy or unexpected nature of this extra information, which contrasts with an alternative of a different nature. The speaker then uses *pero* to mark this contrast, which directs the hearer towards a certain propositional attitude derivable from the presence of this addition. This can be illustrated with the following example:

> (39) El estudio *Homofobia en el sistema educativo* afirma que existe un "alto grado de desconocimiento" de la realidad de las lesbianas, gays,

transexuales, y bisexuales entre los alumnos, *pero también* entre los educadores. (*El País Semanal 27-07-06, pg. 23).*

The study 'Homophobia in the educational system' asserts that there is a "high degree of ignorance" about the reality of lesbians, gays, transsexuals, and bisexuals among the students, ***but also*** *among the educators.*

In this example *pero* introduces the representation that educators, like the students, are also part of the group that does not have much knowledge about the reality of lesbians, gays, transsexuals, and bisexuals. This representation contrasts with the alternative that the educators, unlike the students, could have a better knowledge on this topic. It is then by marking with *pero* the contrast between the fact that both students and educators share the same ideas on this issue and the alternative, which would exclude educators from sharing these ideas, that the speaker is making explicit some propositional attitude. This could probably be described in terms of surprise, disappointment or shame.

The following excerpt presents an example where the representation introduced by *pero* has already been explicitly mentioned in the previous utterance:

(40) La heterogeneidad puede implicar una tensión, también una riqueza, una complementariedad, *pero también* una tensión. (*Oral, conferencia en el instituto de la mujer, Madrid, 08/05/91. Párrafo 21 in CREA)*[25]

Heterogeneity can cause tension, as well as being enriching and complementing, ***but also*** *cause tension.*

The repetition of this content with the connective *pero* points the addressee towards a contrast between the presence of this negative information and an alternative with only positive alternatives, as in the preceding utterance. The speaker, then, is not simply adding some parallel information with the *pero* utterance. Instead, with *pero* the speaker is making explicit her attitude towards the fact that this added information exists, highlighting that not everything that is implied from this heterogeneity is positive. The explicit marking of the speaker's attitude towards this added information is not because of the addition itself but

[25] Oral, Conference in the Women's Institute, Madrid, 08/05/91. Paragraph 21.

because of the content of this addition, which contrasts with an alternative content. Henceforth, this explicit marking is relevant in itself, especially, because the information it introduces had already been mentioned *may imply some tension.* This suggests that introducing this repetition with *pero* will have some extra effects on the hearer. The propositional attitude in this example may be described as '*unfortunately, disappointingly'.*

In the following example:

(41) En general, sí . En , en general, sí. En [...] vamos indudablemente hay veces que nos faltan ciertos recursos *pero también* muchas veces depende de nuestra propia inexperiencia como [...] o mi propia inexperiencia como gestora o como ad [...] como admin. Administradora ¿no? *(Oral, radio Madrid, 01/03/91. Cadena COPE. España Debates in CREA)* [26]

In general, yes, in in general, yes. [...] Let's say undoubtedly there are some times that we are short some resources ***but*** *there are* ***also*** *many other times where it depends on our own inexperience as [...] , or my own inexperience as an agent or as an ad. [...].as an admin Administrator, doesn't it?*

Pero introduces the representation that this added factor of the person's own inexperience that contributes to the problem that is being discussed exists. The function of *pero* is to point towards the alternative in which there was only one cause of the problem, namely, the lack of resources, which was expressed in the previous utterance. The speaker is then explicitly marking that having this extra factor that contributes to the problem entertained as exceptional, which will also be relevant for the hearer.

In these examples, unlike the examples with *pero además*, it is not only the idea of the addition that is marked to contrast with an alternative. The contrast is also at the level of the content of the utterance. This type of contrast does again constrain the propositional attitude in which the *pero* utterance may be embedded, which can be described as commitment towards a representation that may be entertained as exceptional. In (41), the use of *pero* makes accessible the assumption that not considering this reason may be a widespread general opinion

[26] Oral Radio Madrid, 01/03/91. Radio Station (Cadena COPE). Spain Debates

or at least a highly accessible alternative. Marking her commitment to that representation, acknowledging its exceptionality, and her detachment to the alternative view is relevant in itself and some implications may be derived from this.

In the example below, the speaker wants to emphasise her commitment towards a two-way relation between the duty of the State regarding tax and the duty of the citizen:

> (42) Por otra parte, a mí me parece que en un país democrático el Estado tiene todo el derecho y toda la legitimidad moral de recaudar impuestos, *pero también* entonces el ciudadano tiene una legitimidad moral de pedirle a ese Estado que lo que tienen que hacer es explicar qué hace con esos impuestos, en qué lo gasta y de una manera eficiente. (*Oral Radiografía Madrid, 05/02/91.Rne, Radio 5 (entrevistas) in CREA*) [27]
>
> *On the other hand, I think that in a democratic country the State is perfectly within its rights and has full moral legitimacy to collect taxes,* ***but*** *then the citizen* ***also*** *has the moral legitimacy to ask them to explain what is done with the taxes, how they are spent and how efficiently.*

Again, the fact that the speaker introduces this representation with *pero* demands some form of additional processing effort, which will result in extra effects. In this particular case, *pero* introduces the representation that the citizen's moral legitimacy to ask the State to explain what is done with the taxes should happen in parallel with the State's rights to collect taxes. Adding *pero* in this example draws the hearer's attention towards the alternative — which in this case seems to be what actually happens — that the citizens do not have that legitimacy to ask the State what is done with the taxes. By marking this contrast with *pero* the speaker is then making explicit her attitude of commitment towards the lack of parallelism between the two facts, which is then presented as extraordinary and noteworthy.

The last example of this group considers the same type of additive marker, but in a negative context *tampoco* 'neither':

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[27] Oral Radio. Madrid, 05/02/91. Spanish State Radio Station, Radio 5 (interviews)

(43) Responsables de las cadenas públicas han lamentado más de una vez los bajos rendimientos, en términos de audiencia, de los telefilmes españoles. *Pero tampoco* las emisoras ayudan. *(El País 9-03-2003, pg. 59).*

Those responsible for the state channels have complained many times about the poor performance, in terms of audience, of the Spanish TV movies. ***But*** *the broadcasting companies do not help* ***either.***

The speaker uses *pero* to point towards a contrastive alternative, which could be that it is just the bad performance of Spanish films to blame for this undesirable situation. The speaker guides the hearer to contrast this alternative with the representation that another explanation for that situation exists. This makes explicit her attitude towards this representation, which could be described as insistence on a fact that is normally ignored.

6.4.3. Exclusive particle: *only*

There is an extensive collection of works on the exclusive particle *only*[28] and they all seem to agree that in a sentence such as the one below:

(44) Only [Peter] F passed the exam

The information conveyed is that:

a. Peter passed the exam
b. Nobody apart from Peter passed the exam

One of the controversial issues raised in these studies has been how to account for the relationship between (a) and the *only* utterance. For instance, Atlas (1993) claims that that there is a relation of entailment, Horn (1969), Rooth (1985) and Krifka (1993) claim that it is a presupposition, Mc Cawley (1993) analyzes it as a conversational implicature, Von Fintel (1994) claims that defining this relationship is not important and finally Geach (1962) claims that there is no relation.

[28] See Gast (2004: 5) for an extensive collection of works on *only*.

Unfortunately, we do not have space in the present discussion to deal with this issue of what is presupposed or implied in an utterance with *only* or if it is triggered by the connective or the focalising structure itself (see Horn 1969, 1996, Konig 1991, Taglicht 1984, Rooth 1985, Altmann 1976, Jacobs 1983, Beaver 2004, Beaver and Clark 2002). Here we will just comment on the notion of the scalar nature of this particle, which is relevant to our analysis.

6.4.3.1. Scalar and non-scalar uses of *only*

König's analysis of the evaluation of the scalar use

König (1991) is one of the defenders of the two uses of *only*: scalar and non-scalar. In both cases, he argues that the utterance with *only* presupposes the relevant sentence without the particle and entails that none of the alternatives under consideration satisfies the open sentence obtained by substituting a variable for the focus expression, as seen below:

(45) Only John came.
$\neg (\exists x) [x \neq \text{John}) \& \text{came} (x)]$

The example in (45) is a typical example of non-scalar use of *only* and it can be paraphrased as:

(46) Nobody *but* John came

In the scalar examples, on the other hand, *only* excludes values at one side of the scale and there is an evaluation associated with this scale. An example of a scalar use is the following:

(47) He is only a PLUMBER

An argument in favour of this distinction between a scalar and non-scalar use is that non-scalar *also* and scalar *even* may function as dual counterparts of *only* (König 1991: 100):

(48) He bought not *only* apples, but *also* pears.

(49) It is *only* a B grade required? No, you *even* need an A grade.

In the scalar example above (47) the focus value is characterised as low ranking, however there are examples that seem to express the exact opposite, the alternatives excluded by *only* seem to rank lower than the value given in the focus, as illustrated in the following example:

(50) Only a MIRACLE can save us (i.e. nothing short of a miracle)

However, not everyone has agreed with this distinction between scalar and non-scalar accounts. Some have argued in favour of a univocal use of *only* that is always associated with a scale and an evaluation (Foolen 1983, van der Auwera 1984, Jacobs 1983 and Löbner 1990). Others support a polysemous account that views *only* as having two lexical entries: a quantificational and a scalar one (Horn 1969, Altmann, 1976, Taglicht 1984). A different group favours a lexically non-scalar analysis of *only*, analysing it as being quantificational because it excludes all the members set of alternative values (Hole 2004)[29]. Here below, we will look at one example of a scalar unitary account of *only* presented by Gast (2004).

Gast's scalar unitary account of *only*

Gast (2004) opts for the scalar approach and claims that there is no need to distinguish between the two traditional uses of *only*. He argues that typical non-scalar uses such as:

(51) *Only* (John)$_F$ came to the party (non-scalar)

[29] Gast includes König (1991) as belonging to this group; however this does not match König own's classification.

can be included in the group of *'primary scalars'*, since it excludes those alternative propositions that are additive with regard to the proposition selected by *only*. Gast, like Rooth (1985, 1992, 1996), follows a proposition-based model to derive the alternatives but favours a function of *only* as a contra-additive focus particle. Rooth claims that in an example such as (51) above, none of the propositions of the following set are true except the first:

{ John came to the party, Bill came to the party, Jack came to the party}

On the other hand, Gast's contra-additive analysis claims that *only* excludes those alternatives that consist of the proposition selected by *only*, together with the other propositional alternatives. For instance, in the example above the alternatives excluded would be all but the first one, which is the weakest:

{John came to the party, John and Bill came to the party, John and Mary came to the party,....}

Gast explains this contra-additivity as a special case of informativeness[30] given that conjunctions always entail each of their conjuncts, then the propositions excluded by *only*-sentences always entail the relevant presuppositional host sentence.

Interestingly, Gast makes a distinction between different types of scalar examples and (47) above, repeated in (52) for convenience, is described as an example of what he calls 'the secondary scalar group'[31]:

(52) He is *only* a plumber

What distinguishes this example from the primary scalar group is that the *only* sentence should be analysed as an example of metonymy, where o*nly* interacts

[30] Cfr. Kay (1990)'s account of *even*.
[31] This corresponds to what Blass (1990(b)) has called "evaluative" use of *even*.

with contextual entailments[32]. He argues that from the focalised utterance there could be many entailments that could be derived, but the right one should be chosen contextually according to its relevance. In the example below:

(53) A: Are you going to buy a Mercedes. (Gast 2004: 18-20).

B: How could I? I am *only* a plumber

Gast argues that there is a list of possible entailments that could be derived with (c) standing as the most relevant entailment:

a. I can fix a tap
b. I don't wear uniform
c. I have the wages of a plumber

In this example then the alternatives derived would be the following:

(54) *I have the wages of a plumber, I have the wages of a plumber and I have the wages of an executive director.*

6.4.3.2. How many uses of *only*?

Having reviewed two different classifications of the uses of *only,* it can be concluded that it is clear that there is a distinction between different contexts in which *only* can be used. We would be inclined to agree with König's distinction between the scalar and non-scalar examples. We would argue that what he calls non-scalar examples can be described as referential examples, since one referential noun is selected from a group as shown in (51) above. On the other hand, in many other examples there is a clear scale and *only* seems to select one of the options in this scale, excluding all the others that are lower or higher in the scale.

[32] I would disagree with the use of 'entailment' to refer to what seems to be clear examples of implicatures. A good argument for this is that they are defeasible.

Unfortunately, Gast is not very clear when explaining the scale that is accessible in König's non-scalar examples (see 45). His contra-additive propositional analysis seems to fail to explain how the excluded alternatives can be described as being ordered in a scale. On the other hand, he demonstrates that there is a distinction between a primary and a secondary group, with the latter including examples with a clear evaluation based on a readily accessible scale. We would indeed agree with him that in examples of this secondary scalar group, as (53) above, there are a number of implicatures (rather than entailments, as he claims) accessible to the hearer, which would be derived from the position in the scale where the representation introduced by *only* is placed.

What is relevant for our analysis then is that in RT terms the description of *only* can be described as an exclusive marker, which excludes a number of alternatives by selecting the representation it introduces. The nature of what is going to be excluded will then be decided by the context and guided by the principle of relevance. In some cases, it would work as an exhaustive marker (in the referential cases), excluding all the other members of a set but the selected one. In others, it would just exclude those members higher or lower in the ranking of the scale with some examples in which the exclusion will have an effect on the implicatures. Henceforth, we agree with a unitary function of *only* of exclusion and then the different implication will be determined by the context and the expectations of relevance.

6.4.3.3. *But* and *only*

Umbach (2004: 170) has signalled a link between *only* and *but*. She argues that *but* is closely related to the adverb *only* in that *but* also excludes an alternative. She illustrates this idea with the following examples:

(55) a. John cleaned up the ROOM, *but* he didn't wash the DISHES.
b. John *only* cleaned up the ROOM (he did not also wash the dishes).

(56) a. John SLEPT *but* Bill DIDN'T.
b. *Only* JOHN slept (Bill did not also sleep).

In the (a)-versions, the alternatives presented in the *but*-conjuncts are excluded via negation (which is obligatory). In the corresponding (b)-versions the exclusion of alternatives is achieved by using *only*. The (a)-versions and the (b)-versions are nearly equivalent. However, they differ in two respects: first, in the examples with *only* there may be more than one excluded alternative, whereas in the case of *but* there is exactly one excluded alternative; second, in the case of *only* the alternatives under discussion need not be given explicitly, whereas in the case of *but* the alternative is necessarily presented in the second conjunct. Note that in the case of *only* as well as in the case of *but* the excluded alternative(s) could have been an addition to the focussed one.

As explained above, there is a significant difference between the function of a focaliser and the function of the connective *but.* Focalisers fulfil the function of focalising the information they introduce against a set of alternatives. In the case of *only* it actually introduces the only information that is valid, thereby excluding any other alternative that could have happened. In fact, in some examples there is some ranking involved and there is some attitudinal information depending on the relation between the focalised element and the alternatives[33]. This said, connectives such as *but* and *pero* have the function to make explicit the speaker's propositional attitude, which is constrained by the contrast between the representation they introduce and possible alternatives. It is for this clear reason that it is difficult to sustain Umbach's link between *but* and *only,* since that they both seem to fulfil different functions.

6.4.4. *Sólo* 'only' in the Hispanic tradition

The Spanish exclusive focalisers are '*solamente (sólo), únicamente, exclusivamente, puramente, meramente, simplemente, sencillamente*' (Bosque & Demonte, 1999: 773). They are described as negative quantifiers that convey some negative polarity and as exclusive quantifiers that contribute to an

[33] Some authors use the notion of a focalised item while others prefer the notion of focalised propositions.

'exhaustive listing', excluding the rest of the members of the semantic paradigm to which the focalised item belongs.

(57) *Sólo* Juan cree semejantes disparates.

***Only** John believes such nonsense.*

In the example above everyone but Juan is excluded from the list of members that believe in nonsense. *Sólo* can be easily replaced by a synonym *y nadie más, y nada más, y no otra cosa/nadie, excepto...*('and no one else, and nothing more, and nothing/no one else, except'...). It then seems that this description only covers the so-called referential exhaustive examples and leaves out the scalar examples.

In the next section, we will focus on the combination of *pero* with the exclusive focaliser *sólo*, to see how this combination is processed.

6.4.4.1. Examples of *pero sólo*

It is common to find *pero* introducing an utterance containing the focalising adverb *sólo*, as illustrated in the following example.

(58) Este nuevo producto que todavía no está puesto en el mercado, si lo tienen ya los Prycas, lo tienen los Alcampo, se están haciendo unas gestiones con Galerías Preciados y el Corte Inglés, lo tienen los Vips, *pero solamente* lo tienen esos, grandes superficies, hasta este momento. *(Oral: asesoramiento para un puesto de trabajo en una productora de video, Madrid 17-06-91, in CREA)*[34]

This new product that has not been launched in the market yet, it is already in the Prycas, the Alcampo, some deals have been done with Galerías Preciados and El Corte Inglés, it is already in the Vips, ***but only*** *in all these big stores for the moment.*

In this example *sólo* focalises the type of shops in which a particular product can be found, excluding any other shop from the list. It can be described as a clear example of referential exhaustivity. Adding *pero* to this example conveys some extra information, since it is a clear indicative of how the speaker is entertaining

[34] Oral: advice for a job in a video production company. Video. Madrid 17-06-91.

the representation itself. The speaker uses *pero* to indicate the contrast between the representation introduced by *sólo* and some alternative, which in this case could have been a larger number of shops. The propositional attitude that can be constrained by this contrast could be defined as (e.g. *it is a pity that …, it is regrettable that ....*) or an illocutionary force (*I am warning you that …*).

In the following example:

> (59) La terapia tras el infarto eleva la supervivencia un 25% *pero sólo* se hace en 12 centros públicos (*El País 19-03-02, pg. 29).*
>
> *Therapy subsequent to cardiac arrest raises the survival rate by 25% **but** this is **only** done in 12 public centres.*

The exclusive meaning of *sólo* is not only excluding all numbers higher than the selected number 12, but it is also pointing towards a scale. In this example, the speaker uses *pero* in order to make explicit her attitude towards this focalised information *sólo se hace en 12 centros públicos,* which contrasts with an alternative that could include any number that would be higher in the scale. The bigger the number in the scale the more positive implications it would have, which implies that the attitudinal meaning that could be read in this instance could be something like *'it is regrettable that..., it is a pity...,it is inadmissible…, it is unfair…'*.

The following is another example of *pero* combined with what is known as scalar uses of *sólo:*

> *(60)* El Depor no se movía. El partido demandaba el arte de Tristán. Apareció Tristán, *pero sólo* para ver de cerca cómo su compañero de delantera, Makaay, zanjaba la crisis, por llamarla de alguna manera (*El País 15-09-02, pg. 52)*
>
> *Depor was not going anywhere. The match was crying out for Tristán's art.Tristán appeared, **but only** to see close up how his fellow forward Makaay, was handling the crisis, for lack of a better term.*

In this case, the connective *sólo* excludes any type of performance that is higher in the rank than the one expressed by the utterance, which seems to be placed

relatively low on the scale. It is then the presence of *pero* that functions as an explicit marker of the speaker's attitude towards this phenomenon, which again can translate into different types of propositional attitude, such as for instance '*disappointingly, sadly, unfortunately, surprisingly...*'.

In the following example there are also numbers, which makes the accessibility of the scale easier to identify:

> (61) En los últimos diez años, Alonso ha concedido la libertad condicional por acceso al tercer grado a 62 presos de ETA. En 13 ocasiones su decisión fue recurrida, *pero sólo* en cuatro fue revocada. *(El País 25-10-02, pg. 17)*
>
> *In the last ten years, Alonso has given parole for access to the third stage to 62 prisoners of ETA. In 13 occasions his decision was appealed,* ***but only*** *in four was revoked.*

Sólo in this instance is then clearly excluding any number above 4 and below 13. It is, again, very significant that the speaker has made the choice to introduce this information with the connective *pero,* since it will lead the hearer to derive some implications from the explicitness of marking her attitude towards this situation. This attitudinal meaning may be described in terms of '*surprise*' or '*disappointment*' or any other that would be relevant in the context.

6.4.5. The scalar additive focalising particle: *even*

The additive focus particle *even* has been the focus of study of many scholars in the last few decades. What all the analyses seem to have in common is that this particle does not make any contribution to the truth conditions of a sentence and that its additive nature of the particle seems to overlap with additive particles such as *also, too*. In the analyses of *even* there is always some reference to its presuppositional character, which means that a sentence with *even* depends on some other sentence, expressed or implied (see Fillmore 1965, Horn 1969, Ducrot 1973, Fauconnier 1976, Anscombre and Ducrot 1983, Kay 1990, among others). What makes *even* different from all the other additive particles is that *even* clearly

indicates an order or scale induced in the interpretation of the utterance that contains it.

6.4.5.1. Classification of studies on *even*

There have been numerous accounts of *even* based on the nature of the meaning it encodes[35]. Some claim that *even* implicates the existence of a neighbour representation as part of its felicitous conditions. Bennett (1982: 405) claims that this assertion "has to be more surprising **than one** neighbour" while others such as Francescotti (1995: 167) argue that it "should be more surprising **than most**".

On the other hand, those who have analysed *even* as a marker of a pragmatic probability scale argue that *even* introduces the proposition that is at the **lowest point** (Fauconnier 1975, 1976). For instance, in an example such as:

(62) *Even* Alceste came to the party.

the propositional schema would be '*X came to the party*' and *even* indicates the existence of a pragmatic scale in which Alceste is at the lowest point (Fauconnier 1976: 31). Fauconnier (1976: 261-2) is also able to account for examples of scale of subjective conditional probability:

(63) George drank a little wine, a little brandy, a little rum, a little calvados, and even a little armagnac.[36]

In this example there is not a scale in which drinking a little armagnac is higher up in the scale than drinking a little wine. Instead, the function of the scalar particle is to "underline the increasing improbability of each proposition, given the presentation of the preceding one" (Fauconnier 1976: 262).

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[35] Iten (2000a) distinguishes three groups: firstly, the existential group which includes those who argue that the use of *even* requires no more than a neighbour proposition (Sj) (Fraser, 1969, Bennett, 1982 and Francescotti, 1995); secondly, the universal group, which places great importance on universal quantification (Lycan, 1991, 2001 and Barker 1991, 1994); finally, the scalar group, which assigns a vital role of the scales to explain the function of *even* (Fillmore, 1965, Horn, 1969, Fauconnier, 1975, Anscombre & Ducrot, 1983 and Kay, 1990).

[36] The original example given by Fauconnier is in French: "Georges a bu un peu de vin, un peu de cognac, un peu de rhum, un peu de calva et même un peu d'armagnac".

Kay (1990), for instance, disagrees with the idea of *even* as an end-of-scale marker[37] claiming that in examples as the one below *even* does not introduce a proposition that is at the end of a scale:

(64) Not only did Mary win her first round match, she *even* made it to the semi finals.

In fact, Kay not only disagrees with the end-of-scale feature but also with the idea that the scale in question is necessarily one of likelihood. Instead, Kay's scalar model is based on the Gricean notion of informativeness[38], which is explained as follows: "given a scalar model SM containing two distinct propositions p and q, p is more informative than q iff p entails q" (Kay 1990: 66) and the function of *even* is to "mark that the proposition expressed by the clause of fragment in which it occurs as more informative than some other contextual proposition" in the same scalar model (Kay 1990: 69).

Another important theme linked to this connective has been the violation of expectations[39]. Fillmore (1965), for instance, claims that (65) conveys the propositions (66) and (67):

(65) She even reads Sanskrit. (1965: 67f).

(66) She reads Sanskrit.

(67) One would expect that she does not read Sanskrit.

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[37] Despite Kay's rejection to link *even* invariably to "end-of –scale" propositions many of his followers had continued to insist on this view of "scalar end point" (Dancygier (1988: 161-2), "*even* introduces the highest point", Lee and Horn (1995: 15), "even is associated to the lowest point", Horn (1996) "..was the least likely member" (see Schwenter, Scott A. & S. Vasishth, 2000: 226)

[38] König (1991) has praised Kay's account because of the interaction between the notion of informativeness and the Gricean maxim of Quantity, which is actually reflected in lexical contrast in many languages. He also argues that the explanation of the ranking in terms of informativeness within a scalar model of unilateral entailment has been of great importance in the debate of the interface between pragmatics and semantics.

[39] Kay (1990) argues that the idea of 'expectation violation' is neither "a necessary nor a sufficient condition" (see Kay 1990: 83-4).

Karttunnen and Peters (1979: 12), on the other hand, argue that in an example such as (68) the speaker is entitled to infer (69) and (70):

(68) Even Bill likes Mary.

(69) Other people besides Bill like Mary.

(70) Of the people under consideration, Bill is the least likely to like Mary.

Kartunnen and Peters claim that (70) is then a conventional implicature of (68), which was then objected to by Kay, since he argues that it does not arise in all contexts (Kay 1990: 84).

Finally, in the framework of Argumentation Theory, Anscombre and Ducrot (1983)[40]also present a scalar and presuppositional analysis of *even*. They explain that the scales are related to the argumentative dimension of language. There is a link between what Kay referred to as 'informativeness or unilateral scalar entailment' and what is know in AT as 'argumentative strength'[41]. In an example such as:

(71) Pierre, and even Paul, came[42]

The sentence *Paul came* would count as a stronger argument for some conclusion and the scales would be determined according to the context.

As shown above, there have been different accounts of this scalar additive focaliser *even* with different views on the nature of its meaning. We would agree with the idea that it certainly evokes that the representation it introduces is lower

[40] The same as Fauconnier, Anscombre and Ducrot work on the French counterpart *meme.*

[41] Kay claims that "the function of *even* indicating stronger argument is explained by the interaction of the tp (textual proposition) and cp (contextual proposition) and the principle of Relevance (S&W 1986)" (Kay 1990: 92).

[42] The original example is in French: "Pierre et même Paul sont venus".

on the scale of likelihood. At the same time, it also implies that there are other representations that are communicated. In this case, what seems of interest for our analysis is that, unlike other focalisers, *even* does not exclude representations. Instead, it introduces some information that has a specific meaning of unlikelihood and is presented as the most informative (regardless of whether it is the most unlikely). Furthermore, when the speaker uses *even,* she also conveys the fact that there are other representations that also take place. These cannot be described as alternatives, since they could not replace the *even* proposition but co-exist with it.

6.4.5.2. Relevance Theory accounts of *even*

A number of theorists have presented an account of this focalising particle from a RT perspective. Blass (1990(b)), for instance, agrees with the parallelism between *even* and *also,* which had been pointed out by authors such as Karttunen and Peters (1979), Kempson (1975), Altmann (1976). She then adds that there are also uses of *even* that do not require this parallelism. For instance, in examples such as:

(72) Bill likes me a lot.

He *even* cleans my shoes. (Blass 1990(b): 157).

The hearer does not have to access the parallel assumption *Bill does something else apart from cleaning my shoes.* It is rather intended as a backwards confirmation. In this use of *even* it would simply indicate the degree to which Bill likes X.

Therefore, *even* in English can be used in both parallel use and backwards confirmation[43]. In the latter use *even* can have the same meaning as *after all, you see* as in:

(73) Bill likes me a lot.

You see, he cleans my shoes.

[43] The same thing seems to happen to the equivalent of *even* in Sissala.

(74) Bill likes me a lot.

After all, he cleans my shoes.

In all these examples the hearer has to have access to assumptions such as:

(75) If somebody cleans shoes for somebody else, then he must like this person very much.

Even then carries the additional implicature:

(76) Cleaning shoes is an unusual favour for another person.

Blass also claims that these two constraining functions, parallel interpretation and backwards confirmation, are combined with the fact that *even* always has a scalar implicature.

There are two other more recent accounts of the focus particle *even* from a RT perspective (Iten 2000(a), Delgado 2002). Both analyses agree with an analysis of the procedural meaning of *even* as not contributing to the truth conditional part of the utterance[44]. The function of *even* is then accounted for as a guide for the hearer in the process of optimalizing the relevance of the utterance it introduces. Iten claims that *even* constrains the context in which the utterance *even* introduces has to be processed:

> "Process S* in a context in which it is at the extreme end of a scale containing at least one assumption (i.e. fully propositional mental representation) different form S* in the element in the focus of even (Sj) such that the truth of S* makes manifest or more manifest all assumptions on the scale". (Iten 2002: 152)

Delgado (2002) claims that from an *even* utterance there are two different types of cognitive effects that are obtainable. On the one hand, the derivation of contextual implications that would be derived while processing the *even* utterance. For instance, in:

[44] From the classifications offered by them they seem to fit in the scalar view one.

(77) *Even* Max tried on the trousers

The hearer could derive the following contextual implications: *everyone tried on the trousers, the shopkeeper will be happy, etc....* On the other hand, the proposition expressed by the utterance contradicts and eliminates the manifest contextual assumption[45], which leads to a revision of the commonly, probably to their weakening. In the example above the assumption that would be contradicted and eliminated would be *Max did not try on the trousers* and this could lead to the revision of assumptions on which the manifest assumption was based, e. g. weakening (to the effect that *Max is less shy than you think*, or that *shy people are less predictable than you think,* for instance).

6.4.6. Scalar additive particles in Spanish: *incluso* 'even', *hasta* 'even'

In the Hispanic tradition the focalising additive connective *incluso* 'even', which is illustrated below, has been studied by a number of authors (Herrero 1987, Fuentes 1987, Garrido 1993, García Negroni 1995).

(78) Debemos llevar al niño al hospital. Tiene mucha fiebre e, *incluso,* ha comenzado a delirar.

We have to take the child to hospital. He has high temperature and, ***even,*** *has started to be delirious.* (Portolés 1999: 4097)

As it happens with most analyses of connectives and markers in the Hispanic tradition, Argumentation Theory has also been the most influential theoretical framework for the study of these units. The example with the scalar additive particle *incluso* illustrated in (78) is accounted for as presenting two arguments that would lead to the conclusion that the baby should be taken to hospital being the argument introduced by *incluso* the one that would be higher up in the argumentative scale. This description of *incluso* seems to resemble the one proposed for *pero*.

[45] I would suggest the same arguments I put forth against an analysis of *but* based in terms of contradiction and elimination of assumption can be applied to the meaning of *even*.

Portolés (1999: 4098)[46] refers to the autonomous use of *incluso* in examples such as:

(79) R: Hay que diferenciar. En un debate parlamentario vivo y tenso se pueden producir abucheos, pasa en todos los Parlamentos.
P: Hablamos de insultos.
R: *Incluso.* También ocurre en todos los Parlamentos [...] *(El País Domingo, 22- V-1994,16)*

R: We have to differentiate. In a intense and tense parliamentary debate there may be booing, it happens in all Parliaments.
P: We are talking about insults
R: ***Even.*** *It also occurs in all Parliaments.*

He also notes that there are cases in which the first member is not explicitly given, which reminds us to what Blass called 'backwards confirmation':

(80) Es un mentiroso. Dice, *incluso,* que yo soy el culpable.

He is a liar. He ***even*** *says that I am the guilty one.*

Regarding the controversial issue of the end-of-scale nature of *even,* Schwenter & Vasishth (2000) argue that there is a distinction between what the 'absolute' (endpoint-marking) and 'relative' (non-endpoint marking) uses, which in languages such as Spanish and Hindi is expressed with two different particles. In the case of Spanish there is a pair of scalar additive particles, *incluso* and *hasta*, that translate as *even.* Both particles are additive and scalar and differ in the relation of dependence on the information structure of the previous discourse context. *Incluso* "requires that the proposition they mark be more informative than another proposition on the same pragmatic scale, which is already accessible in the context (as does *even*)" (Schwenter, Scott A. & S. Vasishth 2000: 227). On the other hand, *hasta* does not have to fulfil this requirement as illustrated with the following naturally occurring examples:

(81) A: ¿Quién ha comido oreja de cerdo?
Who ate pig's ear?
B: Hasta/# incluso mi abuela la ha comida
Hasta *my grandma ate it*

[46] Portolés also refers to the connective *inclusive* which fulfils the same role as *incluso.*

In this example, *incluso* is infelicitous because there is not any other contextual proposition in the previous discourse. On the contrary, in the following example both *incluso* and *hasta* are allowed because the contextual proposition (X ate pig's ear) is accessible from the content of the yes/no answer:

(82) A: ¿Has comido oreja de cerdo?
Did you (sg.) eat pig's ear?
B: (Sí). Hasta/incluso mi abuela la ha comido
Yes. ***Hasta/incluso*** *my grandma ate it.*

He claims that the fact that *incluso* does not signal a fixed point (thus, not an endpoint) on a pragmatic scale, does not stop it from being compatible with both non-endpoint and endpoint interpretations. Schwenter & Vasishth (2000) illustrates this idea with the following example, where the particle *incluso* is used to climb the scale of unlikelihood.

(83) A: ¿vino a tu fiesta?
Did X come to our party?
B: No solo X, incluso vino Y e incluso Z
Not only X, INCLUSO Y came and INCLUSO Z came

6.4.6.1. Examples of *pero* with *incluso* 'even'

In the Hispanic tradition there has been some reference to the combination of *pero* with the scalar additive particle *incluso* as part of the general combination between *pero* and additive particles in general. As reviewed earlier, Fuentes (1997/8:145) argues that *pero* marks the change of argumentation, marking the most important information. This function is then compatible with the additive value of *incluso,* as illustrated below:

(84) Se calcula que Andalucía percibirá unos 40.000 millones de reparto. Por estas razones, el Ejecutivo cree que la Junta de Andalucía dará el voto afirmativo a estos aspectos del modelo de financiación sanitaria.

Pero el Gobierno confía *incluso* en que el aspecto más conflictivo de la negociación- la introducción de medicamentazo-

cuenta con el voto favorable de la Generalitat catalana. (*El País, 22-11-97, pg.16) (Fuentes 1997/8: 145).*

It is estimated that Andalucía will receive around 40.000 millions. For these reasons, the Executive believes that the Andalusian Government will give its positive vote to these aspects of the health financial model.

***But** the Government trust that **even** the most conflictive aspect of the negotiation-the introduction of the medicamentazo-counts with the favorable vote of the Catalan Generalitat.*

Unfortunately, Fuentes accounts for this type of example in the same way as she did with the combination of *pero* with non-scalar additives. She does not elaborate on whether or not there is any difference between them. It is just agreed that *pero*, on the one hand, and the scalar additives, on the other, combine preserving each its own meaning. It is, however, worth noting that in AT both *pero* and *incluso* are independently described as markers of the information with strongest argumentative strength. However, it is not clearly explained why both units with the same meaning are placed together.

Our view on the combination of *pero* with the additive scalar particles *incluso* and *hasta* is that *pero* makes explicit the relevance of marking the speaker's attitude towards the representation that contains the scalar particle. In these examples, the alternative pointed by *pero* would be that the representation introduced by *incluso* did not take place. It is interesting to see that if one were to follow Delgado's analysis of *even* as a marker of contradiction and elimination of an assumption and Blakemore's account of *but* as a marker of the same effect, it would be difficult to explain why the speaker could use both items to fulfil the same function. Our account does not face such a problem, since two different functions have been identified for each connective. We will illustrate this with an example:

(85) Los porcentajes de observancia de la huelga, como siempre, discutidos por los sindicatos y el departamento de Enseñanza de la Generalitat, *pero incluso* éste admite una incidencia muy elevada, sobre todo en cuanto al numero de huelguistas en la Enseñanza Pública. (*La Voz de Galicia,30/10/1991, in CREA)*[47]

[47] La Voz de Galicia (newspaper).

The percentages of support of the strike, are discussed, as usual, by the trade unions and the department of Education of the Generalitat, ***but even*** *the latter has admitted that the support was very high, especially in relation to the number of strikers in the State Schools.*

In this example, *incluso* introduces the representation that the Department of Education of the Generalitat, which is normally reluctant to admit a high incidence of support of the strike, has this time acknowledged this fact. This fact will clearly have implications in this context. Adding the connective *pero* to this already focalized structure has a strengthening effect, since it marks as relevant the explicitness of pointing towards the speaker's attitude of surprise or astonishment towards this representation. This marking of the propositional attitude is taken as being relevant in itself, and implication will then be derived from it.

The following example, which combines *pero* and *incluso,* presents a case of a child refusing to have a blood transfusion due to his religious beliefs:

(86) la Audiencia de Huesca sí apreció juicio suficiente en el niño para negarse a ser transfundido. Lo hizo de acuerdo con el Código Civil, *pero incluso* el Código Penal, en su artículo 181, acepta la idea de que un niño de 12 años tiene ese juicio de mayor de edad (como menor maduro), en este caso cuando puede consentir una relación sexual no sancionable. *(El País 20-97-02, pg. 27)*

The court of Huesca did see enough judgement in the child to deny having a blood transfusion. They followed the Civil Code, ***but even*** *the Penal Code, in its article 181, accepts the idea the a 12 year old child has the judgment of someone aged 18 or over (as an adult), in this case when he can consent to a non punishable sexual relationship.*

It starts explaining that the child's decision is backed up by the Civil Code. Then, *incluso* introduces a representation that says that this decision was also supported by a higher (and less expected) legal body, namely, the Penal Code. This proposition is preceded by *pero,* which makes explicit the speaker's attitude towards this fact. It points towards the (expected) alternative that this behaviour was not to be supported by the Penal Code (also indicated by the use of *incluso).* The nature of the speaker's attitudinal meaning marked by *pero* could easily be

described in terms of disappointment, astonishment, surprise, or a combination of some of these.

6.4.6.2. Examples of *pero* with *hasta* 'even'

As explained earlier, Schwenter & Vasishth (2000) claim that *hasta* can be described as an end point marker. This use is illustrated in the next example, which is a review of music event:

(87) Estuvo brillante en el que fue seguramente el Round Midnight más rápido de la historia, llevado a tempo de degüello como si él y sus compañeros quisieran condensarlo entero en ese minuto crucial. No pudo ser porque Coltrane y Perdomo dilataron sus solos sin mirar el reloj. Lo más afín a un segundero fue el walkin grave y firme de Drew Gress, *pero hasta* el serio contrabajista se dejó contagiar a menudo del sofoco colectivo. (*El País, 09-12-2003, pg. 55).*

Fantastic performance in what may be probable considered as the fastest Round Midnight in history, taken to a massacre tempo as if he and his colleagues wanted to condense it all in that crucial minute. It was not possible because Coltrane y Perdomo prolonged their solos without looking at the watch. The closest to a second hand was a serious and firm walkin by Drew Gress, ***but even*** *the serious double-bass player often succumbed to the collective feeling*

In this example *hasta* introduces the end point of a scale. On the other hand, *pero* makes explicit the way the speaker entertains this representation. It points to a contrast with the alternative, which could be the opposite of the end of the scale, i.e. *the serious double-bass player didn't succumbed to the collective feeling*. This contrast constrains the derivation of the speaker's propositional attitude, which could be described as '*amazingly, unexpectedly, surprisingly, …*'.

This last example comments on how C. J. Cela presents the topic of love:

(88) (hablando de Camilo José Cela). Bien es verdad que su tratamiento del amor ha sido siempre demasiado—o no—materialista, pero al mismo tiempo constituye una reafirmación del misterioso poder de lo físico que en su propio cumplimiento niega a esa misma muerte. Eros y Tanatos, desde luego, *pero hasta* en sus constantes

provocaciones eróticas y sexuales Cela afirma la vida contra la muerte, cuyo triunfo sólo llega al final; (*ABC Cultural, 10/05/1996: La Muerte, El Sexo, La Palabra. in CREA)*[48]

It is true to say that his treatment of love has always been too-or non-materialistic, but at the same time it constitutes a reaffirmation of the mysterious power of the physique that in its own course denies the death itself. Eros and Tanatos, obviously, ***but even*** *in their constant erotic and sexual provocations, Cela asserts life against death, where triumph only comes at the end.*

In this example, the journalist refers to constant elements in Cela's work, namely, the two deities, Eros and Thanatos. She introduces with *hasta* one of the characteristic of Cela's work that is taken as the least expected (an end point). The speaker uses *pero* to make explicit her attitudinal meaning of admiration and wonder towards this originality that goes beyond the accepted norm. On the other hand, this contrast between the end point representation and its more ordinary alternative may constraint some propositional attitude of disapproval or disgust. In either case it is clear that using *pero* in this context is a means of marking a contrast that makes explicit some propositional attitude.

6.4.6.3. Examples of *pero* with *ni siquiera* 'not even'

As explained above, in Spanish *even* may translate like *incluso* or *hasta* in positive contexts. In negative polarity contexts, on the other hand, *not even* translates like *ni siquiera*. Here below, we will present some examples of negative polarity contexts to prove that the same that has been said about *pero incluso* and *pero hasta* can be applied to the examples of *pero ni siquiera*. The first example talks about the poet Carlos Bousoño:

(89) El poeta y académico Carlos Bousoño sabe que en la última edición del Premio Cervantes estuvo muy cerca de ganarlo, *pero ni siquiera* le produce tristeza el no haberlo conseguido porque, en su opinión, "lo importante para un escritor no es recibir un premio sino escribir lo mejor posible". (*El Diario Vasco, 23/01/2001 in CREA)*[49]

The poet and academic Carlos Bousoño knows that in the last edition of the Cervantes Prize he was very close to win it, ***but*** *not having got it*

[48] ABC (Newspaper) Cultural (section) 10/05/1996: Death, Sex and the Word.
[49] Diario Vasco (newspaper)

*does **not even** make him sad because, in his opinion, " what is most important for a writer is not being awarded with a prize but writing the best you can".*

It starts describing how this poet was very close to be offered the prestigious Cervantes award. It then introduces with *pero ni siquiera* the fact that this did not cause him any kind of sadness. Introducing this proposition with *ni siquiera* leads the hearer to entertain it as the most unlikely representation to be found in this context. Adding *pero* in this context has the function of marking more explicitly the relevance of pointing towards the propositional attitude in which this representation may be embedded. In this case, it could be described, similarly to previous examples, some explicit marking of astonishment or surprise, which will be relevant in itself.

6.5. Conclusion

In previous chapters, it was stated that there was some resemblance between the procedural meaning of *pero* and the underlying idea in the analysis of contrastive focus presented in Rooth (1985, 1992). This chapter started by clarifying the main differences between simple contrastive focus and the focus marked by the connective *pero* 'but'. Furthermore, we reviewed two works presented in the German tradition that also linked English *but* and German *aber* to the function of contrast focus. It showed that, despite the apparent similarity between their account and mine, there are substantial differences between them. Both Sæbø (2003) and Umbach (2001, 2004, 2005) attempt to provide a formal account of accessibility of contrastive alternatives, which clearly contrasts with our pragmatic account. From the analysis of their work, we identified the need to add a pragmatic model to support their formal mechanism. Our account, on the other hand, gives a greater prominence to the pragmatic level, rather than relying on any formal semantic model; we agree with the underlying idea of accessing alternatives, but we argue that these alternatives are accessed guided by the communicative principle of relevance. Furthermore, we also account for the relevance of drawing the attention towards this contrast with alternatives, which will translate in the explicitness of the speaker's propositional attitude.

Finally, we briefly dealt with one issue that could arise from a proposal that points at some resemblance between the function of *pero* and that of a focaliser. We considered how the meaning of *pero* combines with other focalising particles such as additive markers such as *también* and *además* 'too, also, moreover' and scalar markers like *sólo* 'only' or *incluso* 'even' and *hasta* 'even'. This analysis has shown that they can easily combine, but with each unit preserving its independent meaning. This attempt to clarify the distinction between *pero*, which share some features with focalisers, and genuine focalisers has proved to be a very good exercise to better understand the function of this connective. Furthermore, it seems to be highly relevant the fact that our proposal is able to give a distinctive function for connectives such as *pero* 'but' and *incluso* 'even'. This contrasts with some AT accounts that explained them as encoding the same type of meaning, namely, markers of argumentative strength (Fuentes 1997/8, Portolés 1999, Schwenter & Vasishth 2000). On the other hand, in RT Delgado (2002) also seems to account for e*ven* similarly to Blakemore's analysis of *but* as a marker of contradiction and elimination of assumptions. Our analysis, on the other hand, attempts to account for each of them as individually contributing to the relevance of the utterance in which they are inserted.

Chapter 7
An alternative relevance theoretic account of *aunque*

7.1. Introduction

In the RT tradition, the most important account of *although* has been the one provided by Iten (1998, 2000(a) 2000(b), 2005). As will be seen in this chapter, Iten starts her analysis of this connective by comparing it with its semantically related connective *but.* She explains that despite the similarities between them, there are clear differences both at the syntactic and semantic procedural level. This explains why they cannot be exchanged in all contexts. At the semantic level, she claims that both are procedural items that constrain the implicit part of communication. However *although*, unlike *but*, does not guide the hearer towards the elimination of assumptions.

We will also review Iten's double classification of direct and indirect examples of *although* and how it relates to some of the analyses reviewed in chapter 3. In particular, we will comment on how Iten's parallel of her own classification of *although* with König's (1985), Winter and Rimon's (1994) and Sidiropoulou's (1992) deserves further analysis, since some significant differences seem to have been overlooked.

Next, we will put forward an RT analysis of the Spanish connective *aunque*, which explains why the studies of *but/pero* and *although/aunque* in both the English and Hispanic tradition have always run parallel. We will argue that these connectives share an encoded procedure of contrast with alternatives, but differ in the nature of the assumptions that are contrasted. My main claim will be that *aunque* constrains the inferential processes by which an addressee represents information about the speaker's propositional attitude. This analysis of *aunque* will then be significantly different from Iten's proposal for *although.*

Finally, we will discuss how to account for the differences between the adversative and concessive uses of *aunque* identified in the Hispanic tradition. We will present an analysis based on the information structure of these two types of examples. We will also discuss the correspondence between this division and other classifications found in both the Hispanic and English tradition. We will conclude that none of these divisions provided in the literature needs to be accounted for in terms of differences in the procedure encoded by this connective. Instead, we will prove that RT provides the ideal framework to account for the different uses of this connective without multiplying its meaning.

7.2. Iten's RT account of *although*

As discussed earlier, in the framework of RT there has been a fruitful line of research on discourse connectives. In particular, the connective *but* has been the focus of study of many works (see Blakemore 1987, 1989, 1992, 2000, 2002, Rouchota 1990, Higashimori 1992(a), 1992(b), 1995, Iten 2000(a), 2005 and Hall 2003, 2004, 2007). However, there has not been much written on the concessive marker *although,* whose meaning has traditionally been linked to its semantically related connective *but*. In fact, it is in Iten's (1998, 2000(a), 2000(b), 2005) that we find the only extensive RT analysis of *although*, which has been revised and modified by the author herself[1].

Starting the analysis of the connective *although* by comparing it to *but* has been common practice in both the English and the Hispanic tradition. Iten argues that the structures with *although* and *but* can have the same concessive interpretation and the same truth conditional meaning, as illustrated below:

(1) Peter went out *although* it was raining.

(2) *Although* it was raining, Peter went out.

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[1] In Hall (2004) there is also some reference to the function of *although* due to the similarity in terms of function to the connective *but,* however she does not present an alternative account to Iten's.

(3) It was raining *but* Peter went out. (Iten 2000(a): 163)

However, she admits that despite the similarity in the type of meaning encoded by these two connectives, i.e. procedural meaning[2], there are also important semantic and syntactic differences that make *but* and *although* distinct from each other. For instance, an obvious difference is that they introduce different clauses (P *but* Q vs. *although* P, Q/ Q *although* P). Furthermore, syntactically, the examples with *although* are described as subordinating structures, while *but* constructions are examples of coordination.

Iten (2000(a), 2000(b), 2005) starts her analysis assessing in which of its uses *although* could replace the connective *but.* She concludes that this replacement is only plausible in the denial use (see (2), (3)) and in the so-called contrast use[3], which is illustrated below:

(4) John is tall *but* Bill is short.

(5) a. Bill is short *although* John is tall.
b. *Although* John is tall, Bill is short[4]. (Iten 2000(b): 5)

On the other hand, she highlights that *although* cannot be used in correction and discourse uses, as shown in the following examples:

(6) She isn't my sister *but* my mother.

(7) a. *She is my mother *although* not my sister.
b. *Although* not my sister, she is my mother. (Iten 2000(b): 5)

(8) Mary [catching Peter munching his way through a box of chocolates]:
*Although you're on a diet./?Although you're on a diet? (Iten 2000(b): 6)

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[2] *Although* has the features of procedural meaning: non truth conditionality, not conceptual awareness and non compositionality.
[3] It refers to what Lakoff called 'semantic opposition'.
[4] She argues that in this example the interpretation of 5(a) and 5 (b) could involve a direct denial and an indirect denial respectively.

Iten explains that the reason why *although* can replace *but* in some contexts but not in others is due to its own characteristics as a subordinating conjunction and differences in the procedural meaning encoded by these two connectives. This will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.

7.3. Underlying logical form and syntactic description

Regarding the syntactic description, Iten rejects the idea that the constructions with *although—although* P, Q and Q *although P*—could be analysed as having an underlying logical structure P & Q, as in the P *but* Q examples. Instead, she argues that the construction with *although* is an example of subordination (Iten 2005: 175). On the other hand, she also entertains the possibility that the examples of *although* P, Q and Q *although P* could encode two separate logical forms:

(a) P'
(b) Q'

A strong argument for this view is the fact that the two clauses could have different speech acts, as it was pointed out by Sweetser (1990) in her examples of speech act *although,* illustrated below:

(9) *Although* I sympathize with your problems, get the paper in tomorrow! (I command you in spite of my sympathy).

However, she argues against this view because it would imply that both propositions are totally unrelated. This could not be the case since it is possible to find *although* examples with first clause encoding indexicals that are bound by constituents of the second clause, as in the following example:

(10) *Although* he did not like it, Peter ate the spinach (Iten 2002(a): 177).

Iten resorts to Carston's extended definition of explicatures to explain why these constructions allow their clauses to have different speech acts:

> "An assumption (proposition) communicated by an utterance is an 'explicature' of the utterance if and only if it is a development of:
>
> a) a linguistically encoded logical form of the utterance or of
> b) a sentential subpart of a logical form (Carston 2002: 124)

The examples of *although* are example of subordinated constructions, in which the two elements linked can be independently pragmatically enriched.

In fact, it is this status as a subordinated structure that distinguishes the examples with *although* from the coordinated examples with *but.* This also explains the acceptability of (11) and the ungrammaticality of (12), since the coordinated structures cannot be preposed:

(11) *Although* it was raining, Peter went out.

(12) **But* Peter went out, it was raining.

To sum up, good arguments to support the view that *but* and *although* cannot be analysed as complete synonyms are their syntactic differences, the fact that they cannot be exchanged in all the contexts and that each connective introduces a different clause.

7.4. Iten's RT account of *although*

Iten (1998, 2000(a), 2000(b), 2005) convincingly argues in favour of an analysis of *although* in procedural terms. However, she changes her view on the actual description of the procedural meaning encoded by this connective. In 1998, she wrote that the procedure encoded by *although* in structures such as *although* P, Q and Q *although* P was the following:

> "What follows (i.e. P) contradicts, but does not eliminate, X. X is an aspect of the interpretation of Q". (Iten 1998: 100)

According to this description *although* shares with *but* the instruction of contradicting assumptions, but not of eliminating them. Iten also explains that in the *although* examples the aspect of the interpretation of Q that is contradicted but

not eliminated could be the proposition expressed, the higher-level explicatures or its implicatures.

In Iten (2000(b), 2005), she opts for an alternative explanation of the meaning of *although* in Q *although* P / *although* P, Q, which reads as follows:

> "Suspend an inference from what follows (i.e. P), which would result in an unresolvable contradiction". (Iten 2000(b): 26)

In this new definition the function of *although* is conceived "rather like a road sign warning of a *cul de sac*; i.e. it warns he hearer of a possible inferential dead end" (Iten 2005: 180). According to Iten, the use of this connective, which guides the hearer towards the suspension of an inference, can only be accounted in terms of the hearer's saving effort. The hearer is instructed not to infer a conclusion that would have to be rejected, since it would contradict a more manifest assumption (the explicature, the implicature or the higher level explicature of Q). Iten also argues that "a side effect" of the procedural meaning encoded by *although* is that it makes manifest, or more manifest, the contextual assumption that licenses the inference with the undesirable result (Ibid, 181). As will be discussed later, in our account this contextual assumption will also play a very important role. However, it will be significantly different from the one proposed by Iten.

7.5. Accounting for different uses of *although*

Iten argues that the procedure of suspending an inference can account for those examples like (13) below, which correspond to König's concessive examples and Sweetser's content or real world cases[5]:

(13) *Although* it is raining, I am going out.

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[5] This use could also be linked, on the one hand, to what Grote et al. (1998) has called external concession and on the other, to Lázaro Mora's examples of logic of events concession in the Hispanic tradition.

In this use of *although* there is access to a general expectation of cause-effect in the world of the type *if...then*, which in this case corresponds to:

(14) If it is raining, people do not go out.

Iten argues that the speaker will have to suspend the inference that would derive from combining the *although* clause, *it is raining,* with the assumption presented above (14), since it would enter in contradiction with what is expressed in the main clause.

Iten also claims that her suggested procedure for *although* is also able to account for what Sweetser calls epistemic examples[6], illustrated below:

(15) It was raining *although* Peter went out.

She explains that in this example, the accessible contextual assumption of the type *if then* can be described as being more idiosyncratic than the one described in the example above (13). In this example, the use of *although* is justified if the speaker feels that there is a danger of an inference that would result in a contradiction. The only difference between this type of examples and those like (13) above is that the contextual assumption licensing the suspending inference will be of a different nature. That is to say, in those cases where there is no cause-effect relation between the propositions linked, there should be another assumption accessible in the context to justify the use of the connective. For instance, in the example above, it would be that *Peter never goes out if it rains*. However, it is not clear if the instruction encoded by *although* is to stop the hearer from following the inferential route that would lead to an undesirable conclusion, since it seems that the hearer does go under this inferential route.

So far, we have shown how Iten's proposal accounts for examples where the nature of the assumption made accessible by *although* was either a general

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[6] This type of example can be related to what has been known as internal examples of concession or in the Hispanic tradition, to Lázaro Mora's examples of the logic of argumentation concession.

expectation or a more idiosyncratic type. Similarly, Iten is also able to account for those examples that affect the speech act domain, as in the following example:

(16) Is it raining, *although* I'll have to go out anyway.

In this example the accessible assumption will be that *if you have to go outside whatever the weather, there will be no point in questioning about what the weather is like*. However, it is again not really explained what is actually suspended in this example and how exactly the hearer is saving any effort by the instruction encoded by the connective *although*.

7.6. Iten's classification of the two types of *although:* direct and indirect *although*

Iten concludes that there are no differences in terms of the procedures encoded in the different uses of *although* described in the previous section. She, however, points out that the examples of *although* can be divided into two groups: direct and indirect uses, as illustrated below:

(17) *Although* it is raining, I am going out.

(18) *Although* it is raining, I need some fresh air.[7]

She claims that both examples can be accounted for with the same description of suspension of an inference that would result in a contradiction. The difference, however, is that in the former, the contradiction is with the explicit content and in the latter, with an implicature of the main clause.

In example (17) the content of the concessive clause refers to a state of affairs that would lead us to expect that the speaker would not be going out, that is, to expect something contradictory to the content of the main clause. In (18), on the other

[7] She explains that these examples of indirect concession favour the placement of the *although* clause in the second position, for reasons of easiness in the processing of information and saving effort expenditure.

hand, an additional step is taken in the inferential processes leading to the conclusions that can be drawn from the interpretation of the utterance as a whole. The implication is not simply that *if it is raining one does not need fresh air,* that is, the interpretation does not follow the same type of generalisation as in (17). Rather, the use of *although* in (18) is understood as suggesting that an implicature of the main clause, *I need some fresh air*, i.e. the implicature that the speaker intends to go out, would enter in contradiction with the same type of inference as in the direct example (17), i.e. *If it is raining, the speaker is not going out.*

Interestingly, Iten (2000(a), 2000(b), 2005) links her own distinction between direct and indirect uses to the two-fold classifications presented by König (1985), Winter and Rimon (1994) and Sidiropoulou (1992). We will explain, on the one hand, why this link needs further analysis and, on the other hand, why neither the previous divisions nor Iten's should be accounted for as being linked to differences in procedural terms.

We will start with the underlying difference between previous classifications and Iten's. For instance, König's (1985) distinction between a concessive and adversative type of *although* (repeated here) is based on differences in the nature of the suspended relation:

> "Adversative relations can be defined as relations between propositions that support contradictory conclusions with the main point of the speaker expressed by the second proposition. Concessive relations, by contrast, are based on conditional, frequently causal, relations between events. What is asserted in a concessive does not normally go together". (König 1985: 6)

In the concessive examples, thus, what is suspended is the applicability of certain norms concerning causal or conditional relations to a current situation. In the adversative examples, however, what is suspended is the argument from P to a conclusion the speaker does not want the hearer to draw.

Looking at König's explanation, it is easy to see the differences between his and Iten's division. It is true that there seems to be a correspondence between König's concessive example and Iten's direct example. However, it is not entirely clear a

close correspondence between König's adversative uses of *although* and Iten's indirect use of *although*, which are both illustrated below:

(19) *Although* we did not lose, we did not win either. (König)

(20) *Although* it is raining, I need some fresh air. (Iten)

The main difference between these two classifications is that Iten's indirect use of *although* seems to encode the same procedural meaning as in the direct cases, i.e. suspend an inference that would result in an unresolvable contradiction with a proposition that is implicitly (indirectly) expressed. König, on the contrary, accounts for the adversative uses of *although* as following a different mechanism than the concessives, namely, each utterance argues for a different conclusion, the second one having the strongest argumentative force. Therefore, there is a clear difference in the mechanism underlying the two analyses. In fact, it is likely that Iten could take König's adversative examples to fit her indirect reading, claiming that the hearer could access an assumption such as *if someone doesn't lose, he will be happy,* which will be indirectly contradicted by the implicature of the main clause[8]. However, this is very different from König's proposal for the function of *although* in these examples.

We would then conclude that there is no direct correspondence between Iten's direct and indirect use of *although* and König's concessive and adversative reading respectively. This claim is supported by the fact that König describes adversative *but* or adversative *although* as encoding the same mechanism. Iten, on the contrary, provides a distinctive type of procedural meaning for each of these two connectives. This implies that König conceives the clauses in the adversative examples with *although* as having a greater independence than Iten's examples of the indirect *although.*

Iten also links her direct and indirect readings of *although* to Sidiropoulou's (1992) two types of concessions: Shared Implicature Concession (SIC) and

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[8] Similarly, König's adversative example (19) could also have been analysed as a direct reading in Iten's terms; if we access the non logical implication that "if someone doesn't lose, then he wins";

Speaker's Attitude Concession (SAC), respectively. According to Sidiropoulou, as reviewed earlier, SIC refers to an underlying assumption that is shared by the interlocutors, and the SAC relates to the speaker's implicit (positive or negative) attitude to the propositions that are linked (Sidiropoulou 1992: 204). We will recall here some of her examples:

(21) *Although* she ordered him, she was not entitled to do so (SIC)

Assumptions (p): she ordered him → she was entitled to do so

(22) *Although* she ordered him (= which might be considered rude), she was entitled to do so (= so she should not be blamed for being rude)
P (negative) Q (positive) (SAC)

Iten (2000(b): 73) herself acknowledges that despite the resemblance between the indirect *although* and Sidiropoulou's SAC examples, her analysis could not incorporate the attitudinal component as a defining feature of the indirect use. However, there is, in fact, another more significant difference between these two analyses. Sidiropoulou maintains that the main distinguishing feature of SAC examples is the positive or negative evaluation of each of the propositions rather than the violation of a modus ponens or a modus tollens. This contrasts significantly with Iten's view of indirect uses of *although*, since she argues that in those uses there must also be a suspension of a non-logical implication accessible in the context.

In fact, it seems that Sidiropoulou's division of SIC and SAC is closer to König's categories of concessive and adversative examples, except that it adds the idea that the SAC has the extra meaning of indicating the attitude[9]; We can then conclude that what distinguishes Iten's division of direct and indirect examples of *although* from König' division between adversative and concessive *although* and Sidiropoulou's SAC and SIC is the fact that it is only in Iten's division that the underlying procedure remains the same for both uses. Furthermore, in König and Sidiropoulou's accounts the mechanism underlying the examples of adversative

[9] We will explain later that this idea of the attitudinal component is a crucial feature of our analysis, but we will account for it differently from Sidiropoulou's proposal.

although and SAC *although* are undistinguishable from the examples with *but.* For Iten, on the contrary, the procedure encoded by *although* is distinctively different from the one encoded by *but,* since only the latter involves elimination of an assumption.

Iten (2000(a), 2005) also comments on the correspondence between her direct and indirect division and Winter and Rimon's restricted and non-restricted division (1994). As reviewed earlier, Winter and Rimon claim that the general condition presupposed for examples with *although* is as follows:

> C: *p* implies *not (r)* and *q* implies *r.* (Winter & Rimon 1994: 170).

They argue that this presupposition is the same one underlying the examples with *but.* However, *although* has a further constraint since it can only be used in restricted context, i.e. in those cases in which r=q. Iten argues that the reason why Winter & Rimon do not accept the use of *although* in indirect/non-restricted contexts is not because they cannot be used in those contexts, but because they work with examples in which the *although* clause is in the second place, as illustrated below:

(23) We were hungry *but* the restaurants were closed.

(24) ?The restaurants were closed *although* we were hungry. (Winter & Rimon 1994: 370)

She then argues that if they were to account for examples with the *although* clause in the first position, their explanation of restricted and non-restricted uses of *although* would correspond to her own distinction between direct and indirect uses.

However, it is interesting to note that Winter and Rimon account for one exceptional case of *although* used in restricted context (see (25) below), which happens to be placed in the second position. This is a clear indicative that this use could not correspond to Iten's indirect use, since that is the least preferred position for indirect uses:

(25) (Uttered by the doctor who operated on the son to the father who is concerned that the operation wasn't successful.)

Your son walks *although* he walks slowly.

In such a case P (*your son walks slowly*) would imply not-R (*the operation wasn't a success*) and Q (*your son walks*) would imply R (*the operation was a success*). It appears that for Winter and Rimon there are no examples of non-restricted examples with *although*, with the exception of (25) above, which, in fact, would have to be accounted by Iten as an example of direct use. Therefore, it is not possible to establish a correspondence between Iten's indirect examples and Winter and Rimon's non-restricted case of *although*.

Finally, we will now consider the possibility of some correspondence between Iten's division of direct and indirect uses and the external and internal uses of *although*, which has not been discussed by Iten. As reviewed earlier, the external uses indicate a general expectation of cause-effect in the world. The internal uses, on the other hand, indicate the prevention of a false implicature (Grote et al., 1997: 94). It seems clear that there is not a clear correspondence between these two divisions. This can be confirmed by the fact that internal examples of *although* can have both a direct and indirect readings, as illustrated below:

(26) *Although* windows is cheap, I would not buy it. (internal)

(27) *Although* windows is cheap, I would look for other options. (internal)

The example (26), described by Grote et al. as internal, would be described by Iten as a direct example. On the other hand, the other internal example (27), a modified version of (26), would be described by Iten as an example of indirect concession.

7.7. The order of the clauses: Q *although* P/ P *although* Q.

Regarding the differences between Q *although* P / *although* P, Q, Iten claims that in the standard examples of concession the differences in the order of the clauses will be related to the prominence given by the speaker to the content expressed in each clause, with no difference in terms of the effect. However, it is not clear how her account could place so little importance to the order of the clauses. It seems to me that the examples with the *although* clause in the second position would require her suspension effect to work backwards. This would seem to contradict the idea of saving effort that she defends.

On the other hand, she claims that in the examples of indirect concession, the order of the clauses is more significant. She argues that there is some difference in terms of processing effort favouring *although* P, Q over Q *although* P. She asserts that following her definition of the connective *although,* the hearer is supposed to access two assumptions:

a) The assumption that would license the suspended inference.
b) The assumption that would force the elimination of the inferred conclusion (Iten 2000(b): 29).

The speaker will place first the clause that gives access to the first intended candidate assumption. Therefore, having a first clause giving rise to the wrong candidate will not be acceptable in processing effort terms. This explains why indirect examples normally have the first clause introduced by the connective *although*. This avoids making accessible a candidate eliminator assumption that is not intended by the speaker (2005: 185). This would, in fact, involve unnecessary processing effort on the part of the hearer, as in (28) below:

(28) ? I need some fresh air *although* it is raining?

(29) *Although* it is raining, I need fresh air.

However, it seems that the unacceptability of (28) should not be explained as a simple matter of unnecessary processing effort. My analysis, which is based on the notion of contrast, will provide us with a different explanation of why the interchangeability is not plausible in examples such as (28).

7.8. Iten's RT analysis of *but* and *although*

We will recapitulate Iten's view of the difference in the procedural meaning encoded by *but* (in P *but* Q) and *although* (in *although* P, Q, or Q *although* P):

> -*But* indicates that what follows (that is Q) denies a manifest assumption.
> -*Although* suspends an inference from what follows (that is P) to a conclusion that would have to be eliminated. (Adapted from Iten 2005: 186)

She then argues that these two defining meanings can explain why Lakoff's examples could be acceptable with *but* but not with *although:*

(30) John would be a doctor today, *but* he failed chemistry.

(31) ?*Although* John would be a doctor today, he failed chemistry.

(32) ?John failed chemistry *although* he would be a doctor today.

Iten explains that Lakoff could only manage to explain that this use of *but* is neither denial of expectation nor contrast without giving any further explanation of the non-acceptability of the *although* examples. Iten, instead, claims that her description of the two connectives can easily explain the inappropriateness of (31) and (32). First, she claims that in (31), the *but* clause indirectly denies that John is a doctor today (which is a weakly manifest assumption). Regarding the examples with *although,* on the other hand, she argues that they are not plausible because the suspended inference would have to go from *John would be a doctor today* to a

strongly manifest assumption *'John failed chemistry'*, which would only be possible by accepting the implausible inference:

(33) If X would be a doctor today, X did not fail chemistry.

At the end of the chapter we will return to this example to explain that there is an alternative way of accounting for the implausibility of using *although* in these examples.

7.9. An RT analysis of *aunque*: a contrast of relations

As explained above, Iten claims that *although* marks the suspension of a conclusion that would be derived from combining the clause introduced by the connective and an accessible assumption. She argues that *although* saves the hearer unnecessary processing effort preventing him from deriving what "would result in an unresolvable contradiction" (2000(b): 26). Thus, in an authentic example like (34) below:

(34) A hedge is ideal for ducks to nest in; *although* they usually build their nests on the ground, using leaves and grass, they like them to be well hidden. (*Owl light.* Hadwick, Jon. London: Kyle Cathie Ltd, 1991, pp. 13-146)

Iten's analysis would lead us to conclude that the assumption that is contradicted by the main clause — the one that is an implication of the *although* clause, which in this example might be something like *since they build them on the ground, ducks do not worry about hiding their nests* — is an implication that the hearer manages to avoid drawing, due to the indication marked by *although*. In fact, the only reason why the use of *although* would be justified is because there is the danger that the hearer could derive that implication that is not intended by the hearer. However, it seems to be very unlikely that the hearer would have access to that assumption and that the speaker felt the need to save him from going through this inferential path. This, then, casts some doubt on Iten's description of the procedure encoded by this connective.

We will propose an alternative analysis for the connective *aunque* 'although' as a guide for the hearer so as to recognise the fact that there are possible alternative propositional representations that contrast with what the speaker is actually affirming. The procedure encoded in *aunque* shares with *pero* the idea of contrast. However, *aunque* does not indicate a contrast between the proposition it introduces and an alternative. Instead, it guides the hearer towards a contrast between the relationship held by the two propositions that it connects and the assumption derived from applying a *modus ponens* type inferential operation (i.e. *if* P *then* Q; P, *therefore* Q) that would be inferred to hold. Furthermore, unlike the examples with *pero,* in the examples of *aunque,* the main clause does not have relevance in its own right. On the contrary, both clauses of the complex sentence – the subordinate concessive clause and the main clause – function as a unit that contrasts with the alternative, which also consists of a pair of clauses that express the 'expected' *if-then* relationship. We will illustrate this idea with the following example:

(35) Pensé en José María Cámara, que *aunque* es muy señorito es mi amigo *(El País Semanal 18-09-2005, p. 19).*

I thought of José María Cámara, who ***although*** *he is a posh young gentleman, is my friend.*

We consider that the function of *aunque* in the process of interpretation of (35) would consist of guiding the hearer to derive a non-logical implication such as (36):

(36) *If* [P] someone is a posh young gentleman, *then* [normally not-Q] he is not likely to be my friend.

This assumption would be accessed to contrast with the information that is actually communicated, i.e. that *José María Cámara is a very posh young gentleman and he is my friend.* Therefore, the speaker uses *aunque* to guide the hearer to establish this contrast, constraining the propositional attitude towards this relation between someone *being a posh young gentlemen* and *being her friend.* In this example, the propositional attitude could be described as something exceptional or unusual, which could lead the hearer to derive a number of

implications such as *there must be something special about J.M. Cámara for the speaker to make an exception with him*; or *the speaker may be changing her attitude towards these kind of people*; etc.

In other words, we disagree with the idea mentioned above that the speaker of an utterance containing a concessive expression attempts to 'save the hearer the effort' of drawing a conclusion that is contradictory to what is being asserted. Instead, we claim that drawing the hearer's attention towards a possible alternative conclusion derivable from the main clause content[10], is in fact an essential element of the interpretation of the concessive meaning. The two clauses of the concessive utterance in (35) are understood as a single statement, which contrasts with another possible alternative representation. This includes the two propositions in a relationship that is contrary to the one expressed in the utterance. The representation that is contrasted in such cases can be characterised in general as following the *if...then* schema, instantiating either causality, consequentiality or alternatives that often occur together. The two clauses of the concessive example seem to work as a unit that contrasts with another unit, specifically, that which has been inferred based on the content of main clause.

It is in this sense that this proposal provides further insight into the actual function of what Iten has called 'suspended inference'. Here, we, therefore, propose a description of the meaning of *aunque,* not as a device for saving the hearer effort by suspending an assumption. Instead, we describe it as a means for pointing to the hearer that there is a contrast between relations communicated and those that would be expected to hold based on the inferences derivable from the affirmation made in the main clause. From this contrast, the hearer can be expected to derive a number of implications. Hence, the explicit contrast, which will constrain the derivation of the speaker's propositional attitude towards the relation, can be described as the effects of this connective.

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[10] In this example from real life data (35) we can see that the concessive structure, which consists of two clauses, gets integrated into a more complex structure. It is then important to note that when we refer to the main clause we refer to the main clause of the concessive structure and not the main clause of the utterance in which this structure is embedded.

We will then go back to the example of *although* mentioned above (repeated here in (37)), to see if this alternative analysis could give a more plausible explanation of what instructions are encoded by this connective:

(37) A hedge is ideal for ducks to nest in; *although* they usually build their nests on the ground, using leaves and grass, they like them to be well hidden.

We would start by disagreeing with Iten's view that the speaker assumes that the hearer would be likely to infer that ducks do not like their nests to be well hidden (i.e., Q) based simply on the assertion of the fact that they build their nests on the ground (P) and therefore, she uses *although* as a means of preventing him from going through this inferential path. Instead, we argue that precisely by providing what might be considered background information, which supports an idea presented as somehow contradictory with what the speaker is affirming, the speaker is leading the addressee to identify a contrast between two types of related situations, one of which actually holds, despite being just the one that could be considered unexpected.

According to our analysis, the interpretation of concessive clauses also includes the representation of a possible relationship: that which could be formulated as '*If* P, *then* Q; P, *therefore* Q', and which the speaker is presenting as the 'normal' or 'expected' relationship between P and Q (whether or not this is actually so in an objective sense is another matter). We would then argue that the effect of contrast consists of the comparison between this relationship and the one that is actually asserted to exist by way of the utterance containing the concessive clause (P + not-Q). We will further illustrate this idea with more examples from authentic Spanish data later in the chapter.

Furthermore, we would like to highlight that our analysis is also able to account for the indirect uses of *although,* which was illustrated in (5) and repeated in (38) for convenience:

(38) *Although* it is raining, I need fresh air.

To explain this example, it first has to be recalled that in RT the proposition expressed is a development of a logical form encoded by the utterance. In this case, the syntactic structure of subordination plays a very important role in determining what is encoded. In the indirect cases the main clause of the construction, which is part of the underlying logical form, is elliptical and has to be developed, as illustrated below:

(39) *Although* it is raining, I am going out, I need fresh air.

Once the elliptical main clause has been identified as being part of the logical form of the concessive structure, the account for this example should not be different from the direct examples.

Let's illustrate this with an example of indirect *aunque:*

(40) Ahora Zenana sigue dando algunas clases de inglés, cuida a una pareja de ancianos y asiste a clases de catalán porque, dice, *aunque* volverá a Sarajevo, su vida estará ya siempre condicionada por este paisaje y por esta gente. (*La Vanguardia, 02-10-1995 in CREA).*

Now Zenana continues teaching English, looking after an old couple and attend Catalán lessons because, she says that, ***although*** *she will go back to Sarajevo, her life will always be conditioned by this scenery and these people.*

In this example, the relation between the *aunque* clause, *volverá a Sarajevo* 'she will go back to Sarajevo' and the elliptical main clause, which is part of the underlying logical form, *las cosas no serán como eran antes* 'things will not be the same as they were before she left' contrasts with an alternative *modus ponens*-type relationship between the *aunque* clause and the positive counterpart of the main clause (*si vuelve a Sarajevo, las cosas serán como eran antes* 'if she goes back to Sarajevo, things will be the same as they were before she left'). The speaker uses *aunque* to constrain her propositional attitude towards the lack of realization of this relation. This is, then, the same function as in the direct examples.

An important difference between this analysis and Iten's is that we disagree with her claim that what is described as the main clause is an implicature of main clause (Iten 2000(a): 183). Instead, we argue that it is part of the explicature of the subordinated construction, i.e. it is part of the development of its underlying logical form. In fact, this idea tallies with Iten's own claim that *although* constructions can be described as "a subordinating conjunction that makes available a slot in the logical form which is then pragmatically filled by a subordinating concept, which is determined by the context" (Iten 2005: 179).

In the indirect examples of *aunque* 'although', the main clause is elliptical. The explicit clause that accompanies the *although* clause is then a justification for the exceptionality of the relation expressed in the subordinated construction. This explains why the *although* clause has to be placed in the first position, since it could not have first with the justification of an unknown fact. Therefore, it is not just a matter of saving processing effort, as suggested by Iten, but there is a better explanation for the implausibility of the reverse order in this type of examples.

7.10. The role of contrast in *pero* and *aunque*

We would argue that both connectives, *pero* and *aunque,* have in common the notion of contrast as part of their procedural meaning. However, they differ in the following terms:

> ***Pero*** invites the addressee to access contextually inferred and contrasting alternatives to the proposition expressed, and this contrast constrains the derivation of the speaker's attitude.

> ***Aunque*** invites the addressee to access a *modus ponens* type relationship (i.e. *if ...then)* that would be inferred to hold, which contrasts with the relationship held by the two propositions that it connects, and this contrast constrains the speaker's propositional attitude.

Therefore, as previously explained, the contrast encoded in the meaning of *pero* constrains the derivation of the higher-level explicatures of the proposition introduced by *pero.* On the other hand, *aunque* constrains the derivation of the higher-level explicatures not only of one proposition but of the two propositions that are linked in a relation by *aunque.*

As reviewed in chapter 3, in the Spanish tradition the function of *aunque* was described as indicating an obstacle (Lázaro Mora 1982), a false implicature (Lavachi and Nicolas 1994), a relation of non-implication (Rivas 1990), a cancellation of the speaker's implicature (Moya, 1996) or as a marker of the argument with less argumentative force (C. Fuentes 1998(a), 1998(b))[11]. The cognitive analysis proposed here for *aunque* as directing towards a contrast of relations, which constrains the speaker's attitude, seems to be a significant step further. It explains to what extent using this type of connective contributes to the relevance of the construction in which it is inserted.

7.11. An illustration of our RT account of *aunque*

In this section, we will illustrate with authentic examples of *aunque* our alternative proposal. We will show how the procedure encoded by *aunque* instructs the hearer towards a contrast between relations, constraining the derivation of the higher-level explicatures of utterances it links. This description is valid for both, *aunque* P, Q and Q *aunque* P. We will start with an example of the former, illustrated in (41) below:

> (41) *Aunque* la ley penitenciaria de septiembre del setenta y nueve establece celdas individuales, cárceles con una capacidad máxima de trescientos cincuenta reclusos y un funcionario por cada diez presos, la realidad señala, por el contrario, el hacinamiento en las celdas, la superpoblación en las cárceles y una proporción entre funcionario y preso muy distinta. (*Vida y muerte en las cárceles, 05/02/87, TVE 1).*

[11] See also Crevels' (1998) division between expressing the head concept vs. expressing secondary concepts.

> ***Although*** *the penitentiary law of September seventy-nine establishes individuals cells, prisons with a maximum capacity of three hundred and fifty internees and one staff member for every prisoner, reality shows us, on the contrary, crowded cells, overpopulation of prisons and a substantially different proportion of staff members to prisoners.*

We would argue that *aunque* guides the hearer to identify a contrast between the relation between the content expressed in the main clause and the subordinate concessive, and an alternative representation of these propositions, with a different content in the main clause. In this example the *aunque*-clause introduces the conditions expected to be found in a prison, if they were abided by the law. This makes accessible an assumption such as:

> (41') If the law describes the conditions required in prisons, such conditions will exist in the prisons.

However, the utterance in (41) states that things are not the way this assumption leads us to expect. The speaker uses *aunque* to point towards a contrast between the way things should be (see 41'), and the way things are (*the law says something about the conditions in prisons* and *those conditions are not found in the actual prisons*). From this contrast marked by *aunque*, the hearer can access a certain range of possible higher-level explicatures — specifically, those expressing attitudinal information [12] — that the speaker explicitly communicates with the use of this connective. Thus, in this example, the speaker's attitude, in which the hearer embeds the relation expressed in the concessive sentence, could be something like *'it is wrong/regrettable the relation of P+Q'*, or *'it is unfair the relation of P+Q'*. From these assumptions about the speaker's attitude, the hearer could derive a number of implications, such as for instance that the speaker is skeptical about the political system, concerned about the lack of effectiveness of the laws, and so on.

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[12] Linking the function of this connective to the notion of propositional attiude can be traced back in the literature in examples such as Frege's (1982) "illuminates the propositions in peculiar fashion", Man and Thompson's (1988: 15) explanation of positive regard, Sidiropoulou's (1992) account of the SAC and also in the Hispanic tradition, Ferrari's (1991: 137) claim that the speaker expresses her opinion and judgements by using constructions with *aunque*.

Here below there is another example with the structure *aunque P, Q:*

(42) *Aunque* mi familia es lo más importante de mi vida, no creo que esté preparada para dejar de trabajar como actriz. La serie era difícil de compaginar, porque fueron semanas de 90 horas durante seis o siete años, pero ahora en el cine cuento con esa ventaja que pocas madres trabajadoras pueden disfrutar. *(El País Semanal, 18 12-2005, pg. 73.)*

***Although** my family is the most important thing in my life, I don't think that I am prepared to give up my job as an actress. It was difficult to combine the series with the family, since it meant 90 hour weeks over a period of 6 or 7 years, but the cinema has the advantage that is exclusive for very few mothers.*

In this example the speaker is directing the addressee towards a contrast between the relationship that *if your family is very important in your life, you will be willing to give up your professional life as an actress (for the sake of the family)* and the actual relationship between the two propositions it connects, which is the opposite. The speaker uses *although* in this context to constrain her propositional attitude towards this relation. In this case, its function could be described as an explicit marking of how she entertains this relation as exceptional and probably pointing towards some propositional attitude of regret or apology. Again, this explicit marking of the propositional attitude is the result of the encoded meaning of contrast between the relation of what is explicitly expressed and an alternative relation, which is marked as relevant in the context.

Another example with the *aunque* clause in the first proposition is illustrated below:

(43) *Aunque* llevásemos 30 años juntos, ante la ley sólo éramos compañeros de piso. *(El País 8-01- 2006, pg.26).*

***Although** we had been 30 years together, under the law we were only housemates.*

In this example, the propositional attitude that can be read from the contrast marked by the connective could be described in terms of indignation or anger. The speaker is drawing attention to the relation between being 30 years together, and

being considered only housemates and the most expected/fairer relation in which someone who has been for 30 years together should be considered as a partner in the eyes of the law. By drawing attention to this contrast, the speaker is then making explicit her attitude towards this situation, which can be described as a higher-level explicature of the type *'it is a shame/unfair/wrong...that...P+ Q'*.

There are also examples with the opposite order of the clauses, i.e. Q *aunque* P, as illustrated below:

(44) Uno de los vecinos solía acoger y ayudar al joven *aunque* nadie se lo había pedido. (*La Vanguardia, 02-09-1994).*

One of the neighbours used to take in and help the young man ***although****nobody had asked him to do so.*

In this example using *aunque* will lead the hearer to access an assumption such as the following:

(44') If someone takes someone in and helps him, he may have been asked to do so.

Here the speaker also conveys her attitude towards the relation established between the two facts linked by *aunque.* The hearer can then derive implications not only from the two propositions expressed, but also from the attitude of surprise, or of noteworthiness, towards the relation between the facts described, which the speaker makes explicit using *aunque.* Depending on the context, the hearer could derive implications such as, for instance, that the speaker thinks it is exceptional that someone could help a stranger for the sake of it, or that the speaker thinks that the young person mentioned was somehow undeserving of help, or lastly, that it is wrong that the neighbour interfered if he had not been asked to do so.

In different contexts, then, an utterance like (44) will achieve relevance in different ways. As explained before, in a framework like RT, the effects of processing an utterance consist of some sort of modification of the hearer's thoughts or beliefs, such as for instance, the cancellation of previous beliefs or the

recognition of new information, which may be added to his beliefs. For instance, (44) could lead to the contradiction and elimination of certain assumptions the hearer may have about the speaker's view on certain topics. For example, in the example above, the speaker could point to this contrast to make explicit her attitude that helping the young man in those circumstances was somehow inappropriate. This information could contradict the hearer's expectation on the speaker's attitude towards this type of situation. However, that would be the effect that the meaning encoded by *aunque*, i.e. the constraint in the propositional attitude, will have in this particular case. This does not imply that the meaning encoded by the connective *aunque* is linked to the effect of contradiction and elimination. My claim is that the meaning of *aunque* can result in different effects, which could also involve contradicting some assumptions that the hearer could hold. In other context, this same utterance may just reinforce some assumptions the hearer could already have, or create new implications. In sum, we wish to emphasise that this explicit marking of the contrast, which constrains the speaker's attitude towards the relation of the propositions linked by *aunque*, will be relevant by leading to some sort of modification of the hearer's thoughts or beliefs.

7.12. Types of *aunque* clauses in Spanish

We have shown earlier that our proposal is able to give a convincing explanation for the function of *aunque* in examples of *aunque P, Q*, or *Q aunque P*. In this section, we will go back to the controversial distinction between adversative and concessive uses of *aunque,* discussed in length in the Hispanic literature. We will address the issue of whether this distinction between the two uses of *aunque* should be accounted for in terms of differences in the way *aunque* may be processed.

As reviewed in chapter 3 the examples with the structure *Q aunque P* could be examples of either standard concessive *aunque* as in (44) above (*Uno de los vecinos solía acoger y ayudar al joven aunque nadie se lo había pedido* ' one of

the neighbours used to take in and help the young man even though no one had asked him to do so'), or instances of what is known in the Hispanic tradition as 'adversative *aunque*'. It was previously reviewed that this use, first presented by Bello (1847), has grammatical properties closely linked to the adversative connective *pero*, which distinguishes it from the concessive uses of *aunque* in the following ways:

(a) adversative *aunque* can link not only propositions, but also words or phrases that do not show a relation of dependence;
(b) adversative use of *aunque,* unlike concessive use, does not admit alternation between the indicative and subjunctive moods, as does concessive use;
(c) adversative *aunque* always introduces the second conjunct and there is a pause between the two conjuncts, which sometimes is marked with a full stop (Bello 1853: 249).

The first thing we would like to emphasise is that this distinction between the two types of *aunque* does not correspond to Iten's division between direct and indirect *although* or the adversative/concessive, presented by König[13]. We will discuss these differences between this division and other divisions found in the literature in section (7.12.2) of this chapter. In the meanwhile, we will discuss the differences between the examples of adversative and concessive *aunque,* which can be accounted for in terms of information structure. As will be shown, the examples with adversative *aunque* share some features with the examples with *pero*, while those instances of concessive *aunque* correspond to the traditional *aunque* described earlier.

As reviewed earlier, the adversative use of *aunque* has the following features that make it different from the standard uses of concessive *aunque*. Firstly, its identification requires a pause before the connective; this prosodic independence

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[13] In the German tradition, Günthner (2000) also identifies this use and describes it as a"restrictive example"

(1) She has done a lot for her, *although* she has reached his limits at times.

He claims that in these examples there is no presupposition *If then normally not* and that this use is characterised by the prosodic non-integration.

is a clear indication that the previous proposition is relevant in its own right. Secondly, unlike concessive uses, the content that adversative *aunque* introduces is presented as new information. On the other hand, this use shares with the standard concessive uses the fact that it also indicates that the content it introduces leads the hearer to identify a contrast between a *modus ponens*-type relationship (i.e. *if* P *then* Q; P *therefore* Q) that would be inferred to hold, and that which is expressed in the utterance (which can be represented as P + not Q (where Q is the *aunque* clause and P is the proposition that precedes it)).

The following example shows a clear adversative use of *aunque*:

(45) (In a conversation about the economic dependence of women who are victims of their male partners' violence)
Es que la dependencia económica de la mujer es precisamente el cerco tradicional dentro del cual hemos sido educadas, *aunque* tengo que aclararle que el maltrato no sólo se produce en los círculos más modestos de la sociedad. *(El País 16-10-2005, p. 16).*

The fact is that women's economical dependence is just the traditional boundary within which we have been educated, ***although*** *I do wish to make it clear that abuse does not only occur in the more modest social spheres.*

As occurs in the examples with *pero*, the utterance preceding the *aunque* clause is independent from the *aunque* clause in terms of relevance. This is actually marked with prosodic features. Moreover, the information introduced by the connective is new information. On the other hand, it seems clear that the speaker wants the hearer to identify the contrast between the two utterances that are linked by the connective (P + Q) and the combination that would be inferred after applying the inferential operation ('*if….then*'), which in this case would be a generalised belief such as *If women's economical dependence is just the traditional boundary within which we have been educated, abuse would only occur in the more modest social spheres.* The explicit marking of the speaker's detachment towards this type of generalised belief is in itself relevant, which will lead to a number of implications.

7.12.1. Differences between *pero* and adversative *aunque*

Comparing examples of adversative *aunque* and examples of *pero,* one can see that they both share the same meaning of contrast with alternatives and that none of them is used in subordinate or embedded propositions. Instead, they both require the contents of the preceding clause or utterance to be independent (and relevant in its own right). As discussed earlier, this similarity raised the question of whether *aunque* could be used to replace *pero* in all adversative contexts or if, on the contrary, the differences between them prevent them from being interchangeable without affecting the meaning of the sentence.

As reviewed in chapter 3, Bello (1847), who was the first person to introduce this use, answered this question claiming that despite their similarity, there is a semantic difference between *pero* and the conjunctive, i.e. adversative, *aunque*:

> "*Aunque* 'although', as a conjunction, is a synonym of *pero* 'but', but not entirely, as there are cases in which the choice of one or the other depends on the specific relations. *Aunque* introduces an accessory concept; *pero* the main idea".[14] (Bello 1981: 719 in Moya 1996: 17)

Flamenco (1999: 3820) also argues against the equivalence between the uses of *pero* and the restrictive *aunque*, which he illustrates with the following examples from Fernández Ramírez (1951: 359):

(46) Juan: ¿Vamos a ver a María mañana?
Are we going to see María tomorrow?
Ana: María vive muy lejos, *pero* hay un autobús
Ana: *Mary lives very far away,* ***but*** *there is* a bus (A contextualised version of an example from Fernández Ramírez (1951: 359)).

(47) Juan: ¿Vamos a ver a María mañana?
Are we going to see María tomorrow
Ana: María vive muy lejos, *aunque* hay un autobús.

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[14] "*Aunque*, como conjunción, en este oficio se hace un sinónimo de *pero*, mas no enteramente, pues hay casos en que la elección del uno o del otro depende de relaciones delicadas. *Aunque* anuncia un concepto accesorio; *pero* la idea principal"

Ana: *Mary lives very far away* ***although*** *there is a bus.*

He claims that the difference lies in the fact that with *pero* the difficulty suggested in Ana's response (*that the house is too far away*) is not as extreme as it seems to be in the example with *aunque*. However, it is unfortunate that there is no further elaboration on why this is so.

My proposal, on the other hand, is able to give a precise explanation for this difference, which has so far been described in vague terms. We argue that what distinguishes these two connectives is the procedure encoded by each of them. On the one hand, *pero* instructs the hearer to derive a contrast between the utterance it introduces and a range of alternative accessible assumptions. This basic meaning of contrast encoded by *pero* can be established in a wide variety of ways, as discussed in chapter 5. In the examples of adversative *aunque,* on the other hand, the contrast is established between a *modus ponens* type relationship (*if* P *then* Q; P, *therefore* Q) that would be inferred to hold and P + not Q (where Q is the *aunque* clause and P is the proposition that precedes it). Therefore, it seems that this should be able to give a better account of why there is a difference in strength, as will be further illustrated below.

Following this explanation, the difference between the two answers above would be explained as follows. On the one hand, in the example with *pero,* the connective focalises the information it introduces, i.e. *hay un autobus* 'there is a bus', and this leads to a contrast between this information and an accessible alternative *no hay un autobus* 'there is no bus'. By marking this contrast, the speaker is making explicit her attitude, which could be described in terms of positive emotional stance. Therefore, the positive commitment towards the representation it introduces against the alternatives evoked would be part of the higher-level explicatures of the utterance.

On the other hand, in the example with *aunque* there is a relation between both P *ella vive lejos* 'she lives far away' and Q *se puede llegar a su casa* 'it's possible to get to her house', which is, in fact, the elliptical main clause of the underlying subordination. This contrasts with the alternative relation of P, *ella vive lejos* 'she

lives far away' and therefore Q, *no se puede llegar a su casa* 'it's not possible to get to her house', which is accessible in the context. It is from this contrast that the hearer could derive assumptions such as, for instance, that the speaker is expressing her positive attitude towards the fact that visiting María may not be as awkward as it seems.

To conclude, we would like to highlight on the one hand, that there are some differences in the processing of adversative and concessive uses of *aunque* due to the independence of the first utterance, which has relevance in its own right. This idea agrees with those theorists who have favoured the division between the two uses of *aunque*, accounting for the differences in processing terms[15]. On the other hand, however, we argue that the underlying mechanism of contrasting relations is the same in both concessive and adversative examples of *aunque*. Therefore, we also agree with those who were reluctant to support this division, claiming that the *aunque* had a univocal meaning in all of its uses[16]. According to our account, this unitary meaning is accounted for in terms of contrast of relations and it will prevail in all of its uses, despite the differences in how to infer the members involved in this contrast.

7.12.2. Correlation between adversative *aunque* and other uses of *although*

It has been shown above that the distinction proposed in the Hispanic tradition between the adversative and concessive uses of *aunque* requires a different explanation in terms of processing instructions. As promised, we will now look at whether or not this distinction could correspond to those divisions of *although* proposed in the English literature. In the RT framework, for instance, Iten (1998, 2000(a), 2000(b), 2005) identifies two uses of *although*: direct and indirect, which differ on the level of explicitness of the information that is linked. The clearest indicative that proves the lack of correspondence between her division and the adversative/concessive uses of *aunque,* as described in the Hispanic tradition, is

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[15] RAE (1931: 308), Gili Gaya (1961: 283), Cuervo (1953), Echaide (1975), Rodríguez Sousa (1979), Lázaro Mora (1982), Lopez Garcia (1983).
[16] Martínez Álvarez (1992), Trujillo (1990), Serrano (1990), Flamenco (1999).

the order of the clauses. In the adversative examples the utterance introduced by *aunque* must be placed in the second position, which is the least favoured position for the indirect uses. Furthermore, Iten accounts for both direct and indirect uses in terms of suspension and constraint on the implicit content, which differs significantly from our account of contrast and constraint on the higher level explicatures.

At first sight, a direct correspondence between the adversative/concessive division proposed in the Hispanic literature and König's (1985) A.T. division between concessive and adversative uses of *although* could have been expected. In fact, the adversative examples of *aunque* share with König adversative examples of *although* that the clauses linked are argumentatively independent. However, the mechanism underlying the adversative *aunque* and König's adversative *although* is significantly different. If we look at König examples of adversatives illustrated below:

(48) (Non logical implication): p→r, q →not r, q carries more weight.

(49) *Although* we did not lose, we did not win either.[17]

One can see that König's adversative example of *although* does not correspond with the Spanish examples of adversative *aunque*. On the one hand, unlike König's analysis, we claim that the mechanism that underlies the examples of adversative *aunque* is the same one as in the examples of concessive *aunque*. The only difference is that the first clause has to be analysed as having relevance in its own right. On the other hand, we have emphasised that one of the defining characteristics of the adversative examples in Spanish is that the *aunque* clause has to be placed in the second position. This, however, does not seem to happen in König's example of adversative *although* (see (49) above). Furthermore, the adversative use of *although* has been argued to have the same underlying mechanism as the adversative *but* (see König 1985). My analysis, on the contrary,

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[17] König also points out the fact that none of the other concessive connectives (*even though, despite, in spite of*) could be used with an adversative reading:

?*Even though/in spite of* the fact that he knows his job, he has blue eyes.

will maintain that the function of the adversative *aunque* has to be described differently from the one encoded by *pero*.

As has been reviewed in this thesis, there have been other classifications of the connective *although*. For instance, those followers of Halliday and Hasan's distinction between external and internal relations identify two types of *although* based on whether it refers to a general expectation of cause-effect in the world or it indicates the prevention of a false implicature (Grote et al., 1997: 94). We will illustrate again an example of each type:

(50) *Although* it is raining, I am going out (external concession)

(51) *Although* you are correct that Windows is cheap, I nevertheless would not buy it, because it has many bugs (internal concession)

The criteria to explain whether it is an internal or external relation is based on the nature of the assumption accessed (the *if...then* inferential schema). In fact, this division seems to correspond to the division between examples of logic of event and logic of argumentation presented in Hispanic tradition by Lázaro Mora (1982), which is repeated here below:

(52) *Aunque* no ha trabajado en su vida, tiene mucho dinero.

***Although** he has not worked in his life, he has lots of money.*

(53) *Aunque* tiene mucho dinero no ha trabajado en la vida.

***Although** he has lots of money, he has never worked in his life.*

Neither of these divisions can be linked to the adversative/concessive classification proposed in the Hispanic literature. The lack of correspondence is also made clear just by looking at the order of the clauses. In the examples above, it is possible to have both types (internal and external or examples of logic of event and logic of argumentation) with the *although* clause in the first position, which would be unacceptable for an example of Spanish adversative *aunque*.

We have argued that the mechanism underlying both uses of *aunque* can be described with the same procedure, with the difference lying on the information structure of the propositions linked. It has also been proved that the adversative/concessive division proposed in the Hispanic tradition for *aunque* does not correspond to other divisions proposed in the literature. The question that arises is whether or not any of the other classifications proposed in the literature should be accounted for as encoding different procedures. My answer is that the unitary procedure of *aunque* put forward in this thesis, combined with the communicative principle of relevance, could account for the whole range of uses identified in the literature. Therefore, the different uses based on the directness or indirectness (Iten 2000(a), 2005), the nature of the underlying assumptions (internal/external division (Grote et al. 1997), logic of event and logic of argumentation (Lázaro Mora 1982)), or the level of content (Sweetser 1990, Crevels 1998, Kovacci 1974, Ferrari 1991) are not relevant to justify different procedures for this type of connective. Instead, there is just a unitary procedure for *aunque* as a marker of contrast with alternative relations, which constrains the derivation of the speaker attitude towards the propositions linked. Determining the level of explicitness, the nature of the relation or the level of content will be determined by the communicative principle of relevance, without having to account for them as differences in the encoded procedure.

7.13. Unexplained implausible examples of *although*

In this last section, we will try to provide a more sound explanation of why the following example, which has been quoted for a long time in the literature (Katriel and Dascal 1977, Bell 1998, Blakemore 2002, Iten 1998, 2005, Grote et al 1987, among others), is only acceptable with *but*:

(54) A: We need an economist. Shall we ask John?
B: John is not an economist, *but* he knows a lot about economy.
B': ?*Although* John is not an economist, he knows a lot about economy.

We saw that Grote et al. (1987) explain the oddity of B', claiming that the presence of *although* involves a change in the prominence of the propositions,

which may go against the original function of *but* as simply marking the contrast between two facts. They argue then that this may be due to the fact that "the whole utterance may be leading more towards the contrast relation than to concession" (Grote et al., 1997: 92).

On the account put forward here, however, the implausibility of the example with *although* can be explained by looking at the different types of 'contrast' encoded by each connective. On the one hand, in the example with *but,* both utterances are relevant in their own right. The first utterance denies what has just been said by the other speaker. The conjunct introduced by *but* contrasts with an alternative, which could be described as *he does not know much about economy*. This contrast may then constrain the derivation of higher-level explicature of this proposition, which could be described along the lines of '*luckily, fortunately,...* '. On the other hand, in the example with *although,* the whole construction would contrast with the expected relation *if someone is not an economist, he does not know much about economy*. The speaker would use *aunque* to make explicit her attitude towards the relation of the propositions it links, which could be described as '*it is exceptional, it is unusual...*'. Therefore, this type of structure could never be an answer to a 'yes or no question', since the main relevance of an *although* sentence is to communicate the speaker's attitude to the non-realisation of a relation between the content of the two propositions expressed.

Finally, we can also propose an alternative to Iten's explanation for the inadequacy of the examples presented below:

(55) John would be a doctor today, *but* he failed chemistry.

(56) ?*Although* John would be a doctor today, he failed chemistry.

(57) ?John failed chemistry *although* he would be a doctor today.

Recall that Iten argues that the examples with *although* are not plausible because it would suggest that there is a suspended inference going from *John would be a doctor today* to a strongly manifest assumption *John failed chemistry,* which would only be possible by accepting the implausible inference:

(58) If X would be a doctor today, X did not fail chemistry.

First of all, we would like to start by providing an alternative analysis of (55), which differs significantly from the one proposed by Iten. Iten (2005) argues that the *but* clause indirectly denies that *John is a doctor today* (which is a weakly manifest assumption). We, instead, would account for this as an example of the 'justification' group. According to our proposal, the speaker uses *pero* to draw attention to a contrast between the proposition (partly elliptical) *he is not a doctor because he failed chemistry* and the accessible alternative *he is a doctor today because he did not fail chemistry.* This contrast makes then explicit the propositional attitude, which could easily be described in terms of disappointment or negative emotional stance. It is then the nature of this relation that can explain the implausibility of the use of *although* in this type of example. It is not the intention of the speaker to draw the addressee's attention towards any unrealization of an '*if ...then*' relation that contrasts with the relation of what is being expressed. In fact, the nature of the structure (a statement followed by its justification) is not compatible with marking that type of relation.

7.14. Conclusion

This chapter reviewed how the connective *although* has been analysed within the framework of RT. Iten (1998, 2000(a), 2000(b), 2005) starts an analysis of *although* by comparing it with the semantically similar connective, *but*. We examined how Iten explains that both connectives can be described as effort-saving devices, which differ in the type of instruction encoded. She argues that the speaker uses *although* to lead the hearer to suspend assumptions but not to eliminate them as the connective *but* does. From the syntactic point of view, Iten notes that both connectives are part of two different types of structures. This, together with the differences in the procedure encoded, explains why the exchange of these two connectives is not plausible in all contexts. We also reviewed Iten's division of the direct and indirect uses of *although* and critically

discussed to what extent a correspondence could be established between this classification and those found in previous analyses of *although*.

After reviewing Iten's analysis of *although*, we moved to present a RT account of the Spanish corresponding connective, *aunque*, which differs significantly from Iten's proposal for *although*. We suggested that the function of *aunque* consists of leading the hearer to establish a contrast between what is expressed explicitly and possible alternatives. In particular, we claimed that *aunque* instructs the hearer to establish a complex contrast between an implicit reference to P + 'not-Q', and the content actually asserted, P+Q. Our main claim here is that *aunque*, like *pero*, restricts the inferential processes by which an addressee represents information about the speaker's propositional attitude, i.e. its effects pertain to the representation of higher-level explicatures.

We have also shown that this alternative analysis can account for examples of direct or indirect uses of *although.* We agree with Iten that a unitary analysis should be able to account for both uses. However, apart from the difference in the description of the function of this connective, there is another significant divergence in the description of the type of assumptions that are involved. Iten argues that in the indirect examples, the most likely candidate for the communicated assumption that is potentially contradicted is an implicature (Iten 2000(a): 183). In the analysis proposed here, on the other hand, that assumption is part of the development of the underlying logical form of the subordinated clause, i.e. part of its explicature.

Then, we discussed the two types of *aunque* discussed in the Hispanic tradition, adversative and concessive uses, and showed that an account of contrast could explain both uses. They share the function of marking a contrast between a possible state of affairs or situation that could be expected to exist and the one that is communicated. The difference between them is that the *'if'* clause of the *'If...then...'* inference schema that is accessed does not correspond to the *aunque* clause but to the previous utterance. Besides, this proposition is also independent in its own right. The main difference between these two types of examples of *aunque* has to then be explained in terms of their information structure. On the

one hand, *aunque* in adversative examples introduces new information whereas in its concessive use it introduces discourse-old information. On the other hand, it is only in adversative uses that the clause preceding the *aunque* utterance has relevance in its own right. In the concessive uses, the information expressed in the utterance is packaged as a unit.

Finally, after providing a unitary procedure of *aunque* for both its adversative and concessive uses, we referred back to previous classifications of the connective *although* to confirm if a parallel could be established between them, and concluding that the correspondence was not viable. We then moved to address the issue of whether these classifications of *although* proposed in literature could imply differences in the description of the procedure encoded. We concluded that there is no need to multiply its meaning and argued that the differences at the level of explicitness (Iten 2000(a), 2005), nature of the assumptions (Grote et al. 1997, Lázaro Mora 1982), or level of content (Sweetser 1990, Crevels 1998, Kovacci 1974, Ferrari 1991) will be determined by the communicative principle of relevance.

Chapter 8
Conclusion

In this chapter we will present the main findings of this thesis in a thematic framework.

8.1. Building up on previous RT analyses

This thesis presents a unitary analysis of *pero* 'but' and its semantically related *aunque* 'although', which employs the main Relevance Theory insights: procedural meaning and inferentiality. Our proposal builds on previous RT analyses of *but* and *although* (Blakemore 1987, 1993, 2000, 2002, Iten 1998; 2000(a), 2000(b), 2005, Hall 2003, 2004, 2005), which adopted a procedural description for these connectives. We support this approach as being the most effective for the accurate description of their role in the process of utterance interpretation. One of the most significant characteristics of our analysis is that we treat the Spanish connectives *pero* and *aunque* as markers of contrast with alternatives, which involves a constraint in the derivation of higher level explicatures. Our analysis also has the advantage of being based on a wide range of authentic data, which we hope will add to its descriptive value.

8.2. Reasons for selecting Relevance Theory

One of the main reasons for selecting RT as our theoretical framework is that most pragmatic studies of connectives in the Hispanic tradition have been carried out almost exclusively following the Argumentation Theory proposed by Ducrot and Anscombre (1977). Chapter 5 noted that it was problematic to account for some authentic examples following the AT account of contradiction and argumentative strength. We also highlighted the impreciseness of one of the most representative AT analyses of *pero* in this tradition, Catalina Fuentes (1997,

1998(a), 1998(b), 2000), which concluded that the unitary meaning of *pero* is to instruct the hearer that what follows '*is the most important thing*'.

Our RT cognitive-pragmatic approach, on the other hand, provides a more precise analysis of how exactly connectives such as *pero* and *aunque* affect the process of utterance comprehension. Our analysis is capable of accounting for all different uses of these connectives with (a) the unitary account of contrast with alternatives and (b) the communicative principle of relevance. Moreover, this study addresses the controversial issue of the notions of presuppositions and implicatures that have always been linked to these types of connectives. These are easily accommodated in our analysis as part of the proposed process of contrast with alternatives. They are described either as premises to access the alternatives or as alternatives themselves.

There is another reason for selecting this theoretical framework for our analysis. As noted in chapter 4, previous RT accounts of the English connective *but* and *although* raised some issues that required further analysis. Our aim has been to provide a better insight into what is actually encoded in these types of connectives and how their meaning has an effect in the process of utterance understanding. Therefore, our account of the Spanish *pero* and *aunque* differs significantly from previous RT analyses of *but* and *although.* Our thesis argues that *pero* and *aunque* have two main and parallel constraining functions: first, marking a contrast with alternatives, affecting either propositions (*pero*), or relations (*aunque*); second, such contrast constrains the derivation of higher-level explicatures in processes which lead to the identification of different propositional attitudes which are determined by the context. Our analysis, then, suggests that these connectives pertain to the explicit rather than the implicit side of what is communicated. This idea contrasts significantly with previous RT accounts of *but* and *although* (Blakemore 1987, 1993, 2000, 2002, Iten 1998; 2000(a), 2005, Hall 2003, 2004, 2005), which explained them as constraints on the inferential processes that take place at the implicit level.

In RT *but* and *although* were described as mechanisms to save the hearer's effort either by preventing the hearer from deriving certain implications or by guiding

him towards specific cognitive effects. *But* was linked to the contradiction and elimination of a manifest assumption (Blakemore 1987; 1993; 2000; 2002, Iten 2005), or the suspension of possible inferences (Hall 2004, 2007). *Although*, on the other hand, is described as an instruction for the hearer to suspend an inference that would lead to a contradiction (Iten 1998; 2000(a); 2005). We argued that this type of analysis gives the hearer a very passive role in the process of utterance understanding.

In contrast to the foregoing approach this thesis puts forward an analysis of these connectives as instructions for the hearer to aid him towards the derivation of implications based on the meaning of contrast they encode. We therefore argue that these connectives evoke the existence of alternatives that are to contrast with explicit representations, constraining the speaker's propositional attitude. Consequently, our analysis does not need to rely on the speaker foreseeing what specific effect the utterance they introduce will have on the hearer.

8.3. An account for the corrective connective

In addition, our analysis provides an answer to the problematic issue of the corrective marker *but*, which translates in Spanish as the correction *sino*. This correction use proved controversial for previous analyses of denial or suspension. However, we can readily account for this use in terms of contrast with alternatives. We argue that it is the explicit nature of the alternatives that makes the examples with *sino* distinctive from those with *pero*.

8.4. Providing an alternative analysis to account for the status of the cognitive assumptions

As discussed in chapter 4, previous RT accounts of *but* had to weaken the assumptions from strongly manifest to weakly manifest, or even go so far as to not represent them at all, in order to fit all the examples of their analyses. This need to weaken the cognitive status of the assumptions to fit their accounts raised the question of whether these accounts were on the right track when accounting

for the function of this connective in terms of denial or suspension. It seems contradictory to defend a denial account unless it is agreed that the assumption is strongly manifest. Similarly, for the suspension effect to be valid the suspended assumption has to be represented. On the other hand, if the suspended assumption is represented it is difficult to see how it could be different from an analysis of denial.

Our account then has attempted to give an answer to this controversial issue of the cognitive status of such accessible assumptions. Our analysis of contrast with alternatives helps to solve this problematic issue. Analysing these assumptions as 'alternatives' allows greater flexibility in relation to their cognitive status: they may vary in their degree of specificity and the extent to which they are manifest. These alternatives are being constructed 'online' subject to the principle of relevance,. Evoking these alternatives is not presented as an end in itself but as part of a constraint for the derivation of the speaker's propositional attitude.

8.5. The syntax and the semantics of *pero*

Furthermore, our analysis attempts to clarify the controversial issue of whether or not *but* could be described as encoding *and* and something else. Chapter 4 considered how this issue was discussed within RT. It was pointed out that there had been some confusion between the syntactic and the pragmatic features of constructions with *but*. We believe we have underscored the fact that these two aspects of the meaning of *but* are independent of each other. We also emphasized that the connective *but,* and its Spanish counterpart *pero,* could behave both as a conjunction and a discourse marker. This syntactic feature must be independent of the encoded meaning of this connective, which should remain the same in all contexts.

As discussed in chapter 4, this issue of *but* encoding *and* and something else links with the discussion in the Hispanic literature about the syntactic description of the *pero* examples. The solution adopted by many theorists was to describe structures which included *pero* as examples of interordination. However, this explanation

also seems to be the result of trying to include the meaning encoded by this connective in the syntax. Our approach would, instead, agree with Fuentes' (1998(a), 1998(b)) claim that the notion of interordination can only be used to describe the semantics of *pero.*

8.6. Contribution of connectives to the explicit content

Another important issue raised in this study is the relevance of differentiating between how to access explicatures (including higher level explicatures) and implicatures. In RT it is argued that both are accessed by similar processes of inferencing, they are not ordered and they influence the derivation of each other. Favouring an analysis of connectives such as *pero* and *aunque* as contributing to the derivation of the higher-level explicatures of utterances follows, in fact, the same line as some research carried out in RT in the last decade, which appears to place more emphasis on what is explicitly communicated (see Wilson and Sperber 2000, Carston 2002, Wilson 2004).

Our thesis suggests a move from an analysis of the meaning of *but* and *although* as contributing to the derivation of implicatures, to an account of *pero* and *aunque* as constraints on the derivation of higher-level explicatures. Therefore, our account raises the issue of whether or not it is relevant to have this clear-cut distinction between implicatures and explicatures. The content of both explicatures and implicatures is determined in a process of mutual adjustment and both can contribute equally to the process of reasoning, which is always guided by the notion of relevance.

8.7. Towards a better understanding of higher level explicatures

Furthermore our analysis of these connectives as constraints on the derivation of higher level explicatures provides additional insight into the communicative function of these types of explicatures; this is a topic that requires further research. On the other hand, our analysis poses the question of how to account for

different levels of explicitness or implicitness when communicating the information of propositional attitude. In this regard, we argued that different mechanisms used to communicate this type of information could be placed on a continuum of explicitness.

Among the RT analyses of different linguistic units that contribute to higher-level explicatures there are a number of studies of conceptual units such as true parentheticals (Ifantidou 1994), illocutionary and attitudinal sentential adverbials (Ifantidou 1994, Wilson 1998) and reformulation markers (Blakemore 1996), as well as procedural units such as intonation (Escandell 1998(b)), mood (Rouchota 1994, Papafragou 2000, Ahern 2001, 2004) and particles such as *¿eh?* in Spanish (Ramírez 2003). The connectives *pero* and *aunque* would be at the extreme of the procedural end, since they constrain the derivation of the higher level explicatures by contrasting the representations they introduce with alternatives that are mostly implicitly accessed. This makes it clear that there are different degrees of explicitness among higher level explicatures just as there are different degrees among basic explicatures (see Carston 2002(a)).

Furthermore, our study considers examples of *pero* which introduce examples with different modalities, such as interrogatives, imperatives and exclamatives. These structures are described in terms of higher level explicatures. Therefore our analysis of *pero* raises the issue of how to account for the combination of different levels of higher level explicatures.

8.8. The issues of the different values of *pero* and the loss of its specific meaning

It was noted in chapter 2 that certain authors describe some uses of *pero* as fading away from its adversative value to adopt other values such as restriction, inverse restriction, rectification, justification, explanation and amplification (Acín 1993: 196-203, Alcina and Blecua, 1982: 1175-6, Hernández Alonso 1984: 225). We believe our proposal can accommodate all these distinctions as parts of the constraint on the derivation of the propositional attitude. Our account does not

need to detract from the unitary meaning of contrast with alternatives to account for those uses.

Similarly, our analysis addresses the concern raised as to whether or not *pero* preserves its core adversative meaning in the emphatic uses. Our analysis has proved that *pero* preserves its unitary contrastive function in the emphatic uses, constraining the higher level explicatures that superpose onto other higher level explicatures of the propositions it introduces.

Finally, Fuentes (1998(a): 35) asserts that, as the main function of *pero* is to give salience to the second element, *pero* has acquired other discourse uses, involving some loss of specific content. Our study, in contrast with this, does not have to account for any loss of specific content, since the same meaning of contrast with alternatives explains the examples of *pero*, both at the sentence and at the discourse level.

8.9. *Pero* as a marker of subjectivity

As described in chapter 2, in the Hispanic tradition it has also been common to describe the use of *pero* as a marker of subjectivity (see Bobes 1973; 274-6, Fuentes 2000: 337, Briz 1997: 29). This idea can be traced back to Lakoff's (1971) claim that *but* is used instead of *and* if the speaker's emotions are aroused. Similarly, Moeschler and Spengler (1982; 18-19) argued that there are examples where it is difficult to decide whether to account for the reaction "but q" as an attack on the propositional content or as an expression of doubt, or surprise, which does not pose a threat to the standpoint which the protagonist is defending. Schiffrin (1987) also claims that the use of *but* is to indicate "the speaker's orientation, commitment, or intensity to a particular assertion" (1987: 173). Our proposed analysis of contrast of constrain in the higher level explicatures can accommodate all of these ideas (linked to the notion of subjectivity) as part of the propositional attitude constrained by *pero*.

8.10. Searching for a definition of contrast

Chapter 2 reviewed how R. Lakoff's (1971) classification of *but* into (a) denial of expectation and (b) semantic opposition uses of *but* influenced many later works in this field. This chapter showed that some authors agree with her division while others opted for a more unitary account of the function of this connective. Among the latter some adopted a unitary account in terms of contrast. However, they did not succeed in providing a very specific description of the nature of the contrast encoded in the examples with *but*. Our analysis, on the other hand, manages to give a further specification as to which type of contrast is encoded in structures containing *pero* and *aunque* by looking at the cognitive effects they have in the process of utterance understanding.

As outlined in chapter 4, there have also been some attempts in RT to account for the description of the meaning of *but* in terms of contrast. However, this idea was rejected as a result of a wrong interpretation of the notion of contrast. On their own admission, attempts to establish a correspondence between the meaning encoded by *but* and the function of other conceptual contrast markers failed. Our account, on the other hand, supports a different analysis of the notion of contrast encoded by *pero*. We argue that *pero* marks some contrast with alternatives that constrains the derivation of the higher level explicatures of the utterances it introduces.

Among the attempts to define the type of contrast encoded in examples with *but*, chapter 6 discusses the analyses of the German counterpart *aber* in terms of contrast with alternatives as provided by Sæbø (2003) and Umbach (2004, 2005). These analyses seem to be a step forward in the attempt to precisely define the type of contrast encoded by this connective. However, there is an unfortunate lack of the pragmatic element when accounting for the accessibility of alternatives evoked by this connective. This, in fact, is what we propose in this thesis. Our proposal asserts that the communicative principle of relevance will guide the process of accessing the alternatives evoked by these connectives. Furthermore,

we explain how accessing these alternatives will be relevant when processing the utterances introduced by this connective.

8.11. *Pero* as a marker of focus and its combination with other focalisers

Chapter 6 also discussed how *pero,* which is described as sharing some features with focalisers, would combine with other focalisers. This analysis not only clarified the meaning of these connectives as opposed to the meaning of focalisers but also provided different explanations for linguistic units that traditionally had been accounted for in very similar terms.

For instance, in the Hispanic tradition, Fuentes (1998(b)), following AT, describes the scalar focaliser *incluso* as a marker that introduces arguments that would be higher up in the argumentative scale. This description seems to closely resemble Fuentes' own description of the meaning of *pero* as a 'marker of the most important information' (Fuentes 1998(b): 143). This remarkable resemblance in the meaning of *pero* and *incluso* casts some doubts on the usefulness of combining them. Similarly, in the English tradition, Delgado (2002) accounts for one of the effects of *even* as contradicting and eliminating assumptions. This function corresponds to the description provided by Blakemore for the function of *but*. Therefore, the combination of these two markers in the same utterance is not justified in RT terms. Our analysis, on the other hand, provides a differentiated meaning for both as markers, which contribute differently in the process of utterance understanding.

8.12. Interchangeability of *pero* and *aunque*

As discussed in chapter 3, some studies pointed to the resemblance of meaning between *pero/but* and *aunque/although,* with most authors agreeing on the interchangeability of these connectives in some contexts (both in the Hispanic and in the English tradition). However, there was a lack of specificity about what contexts would allow this interchangeability without involving any change in their

interpretation. My account, on the other hand, provides an analysis of these two connectives as fulfilling two different (though related) functions. Our proposal is that these connectives have two main and parallel constraining functions: both share the idea of the contrast with alternatives; however, *pero* affects propositions while *aunque* affects relations. Encoding two mechanisms that contribute differently to the relevance of the utterance in which they are inserted suggests that interchangeability cannot be supported without giving rise to differences in processing terms.

Chapter 7 presents a RT account of *although* as a marker of suspension (Iten 1998, 2000(a), 2000(b), 2005). Considering some authentic examples we highlighted the fact that it is not obvious her claim that the speaker uses this connective to stop the hearer from reaching an unresolvable contradiction. Our analysis of *aunque*, on the other hand, describes its function as a marker of contrast of relationships. This contrast, which constrains the derivation of the speaker's propositional attitude, is, we argue, capable of accounting for all of its uses. Furthermore, this unitary analysis can be applied to both concessive and adversative uses of *aunque,* with the differences accounted for in terms of information structure; this was illustrated with some authentic examples.

As described in chapter 3, in the literature there have been different classifications of the uses of *aunque* and *although.* This could raise the question of whether or not these distinctions should be specified when attempting a unitary cognitive account of this type of connective. We conclude that a unitary account of the meaning encoded by this type of connective should be able to account for all its uses. In all different contexts, there is a contrast with alternative relations which constrain the derivation of higher level explicatures. In our proposal the different interpretations are decided by the context and are always guided by the communicative principle of relevance.

8.13. Further research

For future research we believe that our study could be developed further by examining the differences between *pero* and other similar connectives such as *sin embargo* and *no obstante* (see Blakemore 2000, 2002 for the English counterparts *however* and *nevertheless*). On the other hand, since our proposal is that these contrast connectives contribute to the derivation of higher level explicatures, it would be worth studying whether this could be applied to other types of connectives.

We also believe that our study may have some interesting implications in the field of Applied Linguistics. The study of connectives, due to their procedural nature, has proved to be among the most controversial topics when teaching languages. We suggest that our cognitive approach could shed new light on the teaching of these connectives. Such further study could start with a comparative analysis of how these connectives are used in different languages to identify the distinctive features of each language so as to devise some activities accordingly.

Among the limitations of this study we can point out that there are important factors that could contribute to the derivation of the propositional attitude, such as the tone of voice, facial expressions, intonation, that have not been taken into account here. It was not our aim to do this. However, it could be of interest to incorporate these additional cues in future analyses so as to have a better understanding of how propositional attitudes can be communicated in the fullest sense.

Finally, while it has not been the aim of this thesis to extend the analysis to other languages, we would nevertheless like to suggest that there is no reason why the account put forward for the Spanish connective *pero* could not be applied to other languages (e.g. to the English *but* or to the French *mais*). Similarly, it could be worth pursuing a study of the correspondence between *aunque* and the equivalents in English (*although, though, even though, even if*). Finally, a further related line

of enquiry would be to investigate the different uses of the indicative and the subjunctive moods with *aunque*.

8.14. Final remarks

To finish we would like to highlight what we consider to be the main contributions of this thesis at a more general level.

Firstly, from the point of view of the Hispanic literature we have succeeded in giving a precise account of the notion of contrast encoded by *pero* and *aunque*, which seemed to be lacking in the traditional grammatical accounts. Secondly, our pragmatic account of *pero* and *aunque* complements and improves previous pragmatic analyses, which relied exclusively on the argumentative role of these connectives. These previous studies proved to be insufficient to account for examples such as emphatic uses as well as some of other uses identified in this thesis. Our analysis of contrast with alternatives, on the contrary, is able to account for a wider range of uses. We have proved the advantage of an account of contrast with alternatives that does not rely on the notion of contradiction or elimination, which has proved to be significantly restrictive. Instead, our account is able to account for all the uses of these connectives in terms of constraint on the derivation of the propositional attitude.

From the point of view of the general literature, our view on the type of contrast encoded by *pero* overcomes the weaknesses of previous analyses of its counterparts in other languages. For instance, the connective *but* has been described in both conceptual and procedural terms as encoding some meaning of contrast; however, it was not clearly elaborated how exactly this contrast contributed to the interpretations of the utterances. Our proposal of contrast with alternatives differs notably from analyses that support a view of contrast as a conceptual representation that derives from the contrast between two elements explicitly described. This type of conceptual account proved to be restrictive and uneconomical. Our procedural analysis instead claims that the hearer is instructed to contrast the explicit representation with alternatives that are accessed online

and constrained by the principle of relevance. This view of contrast constrains how the hearer infers the way the speaker entertains the representation introduced by these connectives. This is an important improvement since this view of contrast with alternatives is able to account for a wider range of uses than could be accounted for by previous contrast accounts, such as for instance those examples in which there is no link between two explicit representations.

Finally from the Relevance Theory point of view there are two major contributions that derive from the work presented in this thesis. Firstly, our account follows the main tradition in RT of extending the phenomena that seem to contribute to the explicit content. We propose that connectives such as *pero* and *aunque* contribute to the derivation of explicit content, in particular, to what is known in RT as higher level explicatures. These explicatures are derived as a result of the contrast between the basic explicatures and the alternatives that are constructed online. This view differs significantly from previous analysis of the English counterparts *but* and *although*, which had been traditionally accounted for as contributing to the derivation of implicatures. Our account agrees that there is some implicit content that is accessed when processing utterances in which these connectives are inserted; however, the implicit content (the premises and alternatives) then constrains the derivation of the propositional attitude in which the explicit representation is embedded. Our analysis, therefore, opens an interesting line of research that could contribute to a better understanding of this level of content i.e. higher level explicatures.

Last but not least, the second main contribution of our analysis for RT is that our proposal provides us with a simplification of the theory that resolves the ongoing debate about the cognitive status of the assumptions that were to be denied or suspended. We argued that the alternatives that are instructed to be derived by the presence of connectives such as *pero* and *aunque* are constructed online and guided by the principle of relevance. Therefore, we solve the problem of defining whether these assumptions are (strongly or weakly) manifest, accessible or inferentially suspended. Finally, this simplification explains why our analysis is able to account for a wider range of uses than previous RT analyses of contradiction and suspension have been able to.

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