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Defend-Protect-Support:

The Evolution of the Irish Military 1956-1978

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Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

July 2014

Supervisor: Professor Eunan O'Halpin

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Signed 

Name Niamh Campbell

Summary

This thesis is a study of the evolution of Irish Defence Forces from the period 1956 until 1978. The Coxian approach was used to provide a conceptual framework. Coxian historicism questions how the prevailing system developed by revealing the historical structures characteristic of particular eras. It is grounded in both critical theory and historicism, and acknowledges the importance of structures and institutions while placing heavy emphasis on empirical analysis.

The modern Defence Forces can be considered as a highly regarded organisation. This has been achieved despite years of underfunding, a paucity of policy, and strict bureaucratic control. This thesis will advance that the period 1956 to 1978 had a significant influence on the evolution of the Defence Forces. The seminal events and dominant factors that existed during the period under review, namely civil-military relations, the advent of United Nations Peacekeeping missions and a revived aid to the civil power role due to the Northern crisis greatly influenced this change.

Irish civil-military relations throughout the twentieth century were defined by strict civil control. Financial control was a key element in this process. The years prior to the period under review were examined and a clear pattern of behaviour emerged that shaped the civil- military relationship thereafter. This relationship was also observed in the study of reports affecting the Defence Forces in the twentieth century, namely the Devlin and Gleeson Reports, along with the Defence Review Board Reports. It is evident that after independence, defence was rarely a priority of the Government, reflected in the lack of

defence policy and decreased spending on the defence budget. The catalysts for challenging this ambivalence were the new roles that emerged for the Defence Forces in the period under review.

The first of these new roles was brought about by the advent of the Defence Forces involvement in United Nations armed peacekeeping missions. UN missions in the Congo (ONUC), Cyprus (UNFICYP), and the Sinai (UNEF) were examined through the four stages of a mission. While the Defence Forces were lacking in experience and ill-equipped for this new role, it was instrumental in the evolution of the organisation. It exposed inherent weaknesses in the Defence Forces, particularly in regard to training, clothing and equipment, all of which had to be addressed. Both the United Nations Archive in New York and the Unit Histories from the Military Archives in Dublin were of benefit to research in this area. One of the major elements in influencing culture however was the 'Siege at Jadotville'. Commandant (Comdt.) Patrick Quinlan changed the paradigm that was then considered a dominant norm. While not immediately respected in military circles, the concept of force protection, so evident in Jadotville, is now a major tenet in the ethos of the Defence Forces. These missions were studied from an operational perspective using comparative analysis of Unit Histories from the Military Archives and UN archival material.

The Northern crisis in 1969 once again exposed inherent weaknesses in the defence organisation. The initial response of the deployment of the Army to the Border was considered a debacle. It is evident that there was a lack of both intelligence on the ground and long-term planning with regard to Northern Ireland. While elements of the

Defence Forces had greatly improved due to overseas service, the revised role of aid to the civil power within the State stimulated change for the force as a whole.

Following independence, the Defence Forces changed their culture from that of a guerrilla force to that of a conventional army. This thesis will argue that in the period under review the culture changed again from a pure conventional force to that of a constabulary force. This appellation should not be confused with that of policing; rather it refers to one that is in constant use and not held in reserve for times of war.

Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the guidance and support of my supervisor Professor Eunan O'Halpin. His generosity with time and advice, combined with his sense of humour, has made the experience of research a most enjoyable and rewarding one.

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For permitting me access to the diaries of Captain Robert Eagar, I wish to extend my warmest thanks to the extended Eagar family, especially to the late Paula Furnari.

To my colleagues in Joseph, both past and present, whose support, understanding and friendship have made time spent on "the mat" both manageable and enjoyable.

To my own council of war, thank you for keeping life far from monotonous.

I would like to thank my mother Claire and sister Orla for their encouragement and support. I would especially like to thank my father Colm for his thoughts, opinions and critique.

To Paul, your support and patience has seen me through the more difficult times throughout the course of this research. For that, and so much more, I thank you.

It gives me great pleasure to dedicate this thesis to my great-grandfather, my grandfathers and my father, all members of the Irish Defence Forces.

Niamh Campbell

Trinity College Dublin

July 2014

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

2 I/C	Second in Command
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
ARP	Air Raid Precautions
ATCP	Aid to the Civil Power
BN	Battalion
Brig. Gen.	Brigadier General
CAB	Cabinet Office
Capt.	Captain
Comdt.	Commandant
Col.	Colonel
Coy	Company
DF	Department of Finance
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DO	Dominions Office
DT	Department of the Taoiseach
EEC	European Economic Community
EOKA	National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters
EU	European Union
FCÁ	Fórsa Cosanta Áitiúil
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FO	Foreign Office
G2	Army Intelligence (1920s-1950s)
GHQ	General Headquarters
IRA	Irish Republican Army

IRBATT	Irish Battalion
IRCON	Irish Contingent
Lieut.	Lieutenant
LO	Liaison Officer
LOP	Lookout Post
Lt. Col.	Lieutenant Colonel
Lt. Gen.	Lieutenant General
MA	Military Archives, Dublin
Maj. Gen.	Major General
NAI	National Archives of Ireland
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO	Non Commissioned Officer
NICRA	Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
ONUC	Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (United Nations Operation in the Congo)
OP	Observation Post
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAC	Public Accounts Committee
PDF	Permanent Defence Forces
PDFORRA	Permanent Defence Forces Other Ranks Representative Association
PRO	Public Record Office, London
PRONI	Public Record Office, Northern Ireland
RACO	Representative Association of Commissioned Officers
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
RTÉ	Raidió Teilifís Éireann

T.D.	Teachta Dála
UCDA	University College Dublin Archives
UN	United Nations
UNA	United Nations Archives, New York
UNBISnet	United Nations Bibliographic Information System
UNEF I	United Nations Emergency Force I
UNEF II	United Nations Emergency Force II
UNFICYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMO	United Nations Military Observers
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
USNA	United States National Archive

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Chapter 1

Introduction

On July 7 2009 the Secretary- General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon remarked in a speech in Dublin Castle

> Ireland is famous throughout the world for its contributions to United Nations peacekeeping. Every day for more than half a century, an Irish soldier has been walking point for peace under the United Nations blue flag. Today, nearly 500 Irish men and women are stationed in the Middle East and across Africa in support of United Nations-mandated missions. Your contingent in Lebanon was justifiably renowned for its contribution to stability in that country.[1]

It is difficult to place the content of this statement in the context of the post-Emergency Defence Forces. By 1952 the Defence Forces was described as 'really little more than a framework on which the reserves and the F.C.Á. could form into fighting formations for war ... The Army at present would be quite incapable of fighting anything but guerrilla warfare, and could not defend Southern Ireland against any organised attack'.[2] The contrast between the two statements is stark and can be considered as evidential to the evolution of the Defence Forces over the past fifty years. The pace that this evolutionary process has taken is remarkable taking into consideration that Ireland still continues its policy of neutrality and

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[1] Secretary-General, in Address on United Nations Peacekeeping, Hails Participation of Ireland, from Afghanistan, to Chad, to Kosovo; available from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sgsm12357.doc.htm; last accessed 08/08/13.

[2] Michael Kennedy & Victor Laing (Eds), *The Irish Defence Forces 1940-1949: The Chief of Staff's Reports* (Dublin, 2011), pp l-li.

spending on defence remains low.[3] How then did the Defence Forces evolve under the circumstances in which it was placed and what were the major factors in that evolution?

Military change has been examined and analysed as a form of revolution. Significant debate has surrounded both Michael Roberts's concept of the Military Revolution and, more recently, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). It is not within the scope of this thesis to repeat this debate here, however a brief introduction of both will provided.[4] At its most simplistic, the core of Roberts's Military Revolution was tactics, strategy, army size, and overall impact.[5] As Geoffrey Parker remarked

> Roberts deployed his daunting knowledge of early modern European history (in many languages) to select four critical changes in the art of war in the century following 1560. He reviewed in turn the "revolution in tactics" (the replacement of the lance and pike with firepower), the growth in army size, and the adoption of more ambitious and complex strategies, ascribing most of these transformations to the military innovations wrought by Maurice and William Louis of Nassau in the Dutch Republic in the 1590s, and by Gustavus Adolophus of Sweden a generation later. He then examined the impact of the new scale warfare upon Europe's political and social development.[6]

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[3] The World Bank places Ireland's military expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at 0.6% which is well below the average of the European Union at 1.7%.

[4] For further reading on the Military Revolution please see Clifford J Rogers (Ed), *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Transformations of Early Modern Europe* (Oxford, 1995). This includes Michael Roberts original article *The Military Revolution, 1560- 1660*. See also McGregor Know & Williamson Murray (Eds), *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050* (Cambridge, 2001) and Colin S. Gray, *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History* (London 2002).

[5] Geoffrey Parker, 'The "Military Revolution", 1560-1660 – A myth?' in *The Journal of Modern History*, xlviii, no.2 (June 1976), p.197.

[6] Geoffrey Parker, 'The "Military Revolution", 1995-2005: From Belfast to Barcelona and the Hague' in *The Journal of Military History*, lxix, no.1 (January 2005), pp 205-206.

The most commonly held definition of the RMA is that of Andrew Marshall of the Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon.[7] Marshall states that RMA is 'a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organisational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations'.[8] While both these definitions provide only a very brief introduction to the significant research on both approaches, the major distinction between the two is that while RMAs are 'chosen happenings, pursued purposefully by states to produce new ways of destroying their opponents', Military Revolutions 'brought systemic changes in politics and society. They were uncontrollable, unpredictable, and unforeseeable. And their impact continues'.[9] Both of these concepts, for the most part, place a heavy emphasis on the changing character of war as a result of new military technology and tactics. However, when examining the Irish context, neither of these approaches appears compelling

John Lynn took a divergent approach than to those of the Military Revolution and the Revolution in Military Affairs. Lynn argues that

> First and most important, institutional characteristics – recruitment, social composition, motivation, command, administration – take precedence over technology and tactics, because for the broader questions of history, institutional development is simply more important than technical innovation. When methods of

---

[7] Andrew Marshall, described as the "American godfather" of RMA by Colin S. Gray, was appointed the Director of the Office of Net Assessment by Richard Nixon in 1973 and has been reappointed by every President of the United States since. Colin S. Gray, *Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty of Context* (February 2006), p.5; available from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB640.pdf; last accessed 20/08/12.

[8] Sean M. Maloney & Scot Robertson, 'The Revolution in Military Affairs: Possible Implications for Canada' in *International Journal*, liv, No. 2 (Summer 1999), p.445.

[9] Gray, *Revolutionary Change in Warfare*, p.5.

> combat are examined here, it is not so much for their own sake as for their influence on military institutions. Second, change in army style is presented as an evolutionary process marked by transitions that include both survivals from the past and seeds of the future.[10]

Lynn describes his work on army evolution as not 'simply one more appeal to incorporate social history into the study of war but a hypothesis that provides a picture of what military history looks like when institutional criteria are given primary emphasis. As such this work does not dally about the margins, but goes to the heart of the subject with a new agenda'.[11]

Jeremy Black argued that

> Much of the scholarly work on military history has adopted an explanatory model of change that centres on the impact of new military technology... The principal alternative approach to military history that is currently fashionable focuses on the so-called "new military history". The emphasis here is on social contexts, especially the position, experience, and relationships of the rank and file.[12]

However Black believed that the new military history, while useful, was less helpful from the perspective of providing a long-term explanatory model of military change. He considered another approach, that of military organisation. He believed that the term military organisation should be understood in two ways. The first should consider the organisation of the military including their units and command structures. The second should consider

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[10] John A. Lynn, '*The Evolution of Army Style, 800-2000*' in The International History Review, xviii, no.3 (August 1996), p.507.
[11] Lynn, *Evolution of Army Style*, p.535.
[12] Jeremy Black, 'Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective' in *The Journal of Military History*, lxii, no.4 (Oct 1998), p.871.

organisation as an aspect of, and intersection and interaction with, wider social patterns and practices.[13]

Black examined a number of aspects that could lead to a change in the military organisation such as the origins of the modern military organisation, political systems, greater independence on the part of the ordinary soldiers, morale, willingness to accept combatant losses, the standard of the officer class, including Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs), the continuum between the specialisation of military service and mass participation, and the effect of alliance membership.[14]

Both raise some interesting questions. Why should the focus be placed on technology as an instrument for military change? This was certainly not a decisive factor in the change in the Irish Defence Forces. Therefore one has to examine other elements that contribute to military change. Lynn focused on the institutional characteristics and the belief that changes in army style were evolutionary. Black refers to morale, the effect of alliance membership, the standard of the officer class and the professionalisation of the military. Black's thesis of the examination of the organisation to explain military change is relevant when examining change in a military that is not continuously in the sphere of wartime operations.

Informed by the above, this thesis will concentrate on seminal historical events that have shaped the modern Defence Forces that emerged from the post-Emergency stagnation, caused by poor conditions and lack of equipment. These seminal events include: the evolving civil-military relationship, a challenge in all democracies but of particular relevance in nascent states; the advent of international peacekeeping under the auspices of the

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[13] Ibid.
[14] Black, *Military Organisations and Change,* pp 872- 890.

United Nations that gave the Defence Forces a role overseas; and aid to the civil power operations that provided a meaningful operational role at home. Each of these had a profound effect on the Defence Forces and greatly influenced the development of the organisation in place today. It is for this reason that this particular period was chosen and a brief introduction and explanation of each will be provided here.

Civil-Military Relations

All democracies require the careful management of civil-military relations. The civil side provides the military with the checks and balances required in order to support and sustain a democracy. Theorist Samuel Huntington commented that the professionalism that is now characteristic of the modern officer has resulted in unique challenges in civil-military relations.[15] Civil-military relations are rooted in and reproduced through social practice. It follows that military culture and civil-military relations have a symbiotic relationship. It has been argued that the Government's treatment of the Army post-Civil War was intriguing when the Army and its members secured independence for the State and were victorious in the Civil War. One could reasonably have expected respect and deference for the Army to be felt throughout the State.[16] However, this was not the case and the consequence of the Government's actions during this period, including the demobilisation of a considerable amount of personnel, led to the Mutiny in 1924. As the Irish Defence Forces Handbook comments 'its importance is not in what actually happened but that when it was resolved the supremacy of civilian authority was finally established over the military for the first time

[15] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (London, 1985), p.10.
[16] Theo Farrell, '"The Model Army": Military Imitation and the Enfeeblement of the Army in Post – Revolutionary Ireland, 1922 -42' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, VIII (1997), p.112.

since 1913'.[17] This, tied in with the passing of the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924, left the Army with little autonomy.

But who exactly is the "civil" in civil-military relations? The military is easy to define. In Ireland the Defence Forces are divided up into two parts; the Permanent Defence Force (PDF) and the Reserve Defence Force (RDF). The PDF is then further divided into three services; the Army, the Air Corps and the Naval Service. The military are also visually distinguishable through uniforms. They are bound and subject to a code of conduct that is unique to their organisation, though in a democracy this is usually reflective of the society in which the military operates. The civil side is not as easy to define. It is not a monolith. For the purpose of this thesis the "civil" in civil-military relations represents civil servants of many departments, most notably the Department of Defence and the Department of Finance. The "civil" is also represented through members of parliament, both in Government and in Opposition.

Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen.) Peadar MacMahon served as Chief of Staff from 1924, after the Mutiny, until 1927 when he was appointed Secretary of the Department of Defence. He stayed in this position until March 1958. MacMahon therefore had a profound influence on the defence organisation, both civil and military, and greatly shaped the civil-military relationship. It is therefore necessary to examine the MacMahon era from the foundation of the state until the period under review in order to gain an understanding of the complexities of this relationship.

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[17] 'Our Origin and Development' in *The Irish Defence Forces Handbook* (1987), p.91 (Military Archives Dublin hereafter MA). This will be discussed in further detail in the chapter A Complex Relationship: Civil Military Relations in Ireland.

Civil control of the military comes in many forms but one of the methods most commonly used in a democracy is through the budgetary process. Finance has an overwhelming influence on how professional military organisations are run in obvious areas such as strength, equipment, installations, etc. The extent of the financial control of the Defence Forces will be examined and its inevitable influence of civil-military relations. A theoretical framework will initially be provided to understand the complexities of such a relationship. The examination of the early period is necessarily detailed in order to analyse the military in a newly democratic state.

The analysis of civil-military relations will seek to establish the position of the Defence Forces within the milieu of Irish society. It will also consider developments in military education as they have a direct relationship with the professional ethos of the organisation.

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

The impact of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations on the evolution of the Defence Forces is considerable. The entry of Ireland into the United Nations organisation was a pivotal moment both for the status of the country in the international community and for the Defence Forces, as it fundamentally altered the nature of its role. UN peacekeeping operations were not originally envisaged in the Charter and are often considered the "brain-child" of Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary General of the UN. Peacekeeping operations had a marked influence on the evolution in the Defence Forces. Irish involvement in UN Peacekeeping Operations from 1958 until 1978 will be examined from a micro- military perspective, using example incidents that happened during these operations and the "lessons learnt" from each, in order to enhance our understanding of the root causes of the change that was happening in the Defence Forces.

In the twenty first century, the Defence Forces participates in missions with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the UN. At the time that research for this thesis commenced, the Defence Forces had recently withdrawn from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in Lebanon, were commanding the EU mission in Chad (EUFOR), were commanding a pivotal sector of the NATO mission in Kosovo (KFOR), and were playing a major role in the Nordic Battle Group (NBG 2008). This was occurring simultaneously, a feat that much larger forces would consider difficult to undertake. This thesis will provide the historical backdrop that promoted the necessary shift in the organisation to enable this to occur. While it does not claim to alter the historiography surrounding Irish involvement in peacekeeping, it provides additional insight from a number of perspectives including UN archival material, and increases the understanding of the significant impact of peacekeeping on the evolution of the Defence Forces.

Aid to the Civil Power in Response to the Crisis in Northern Ireland

The outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland in 1969 provided the Defence Forces with a revised role with regard to internal security, including frontier or border security. It also was the catalyst for the withdrawal of Irish contingents from peacekeeping missions. Overseas operations were successful in having influenced change in certain aspects of the defence organisation but not all. The catalyst for the organisation as a whole to change was the aid to the civil power role during the Northern Crisis. Overseas units were prepared every six months and the resources of the Defence Forces, the Army in particular, were devoted to the training and preparation of this element of the organisation. The advent of the much increased aid to the civil power role meant that the entire organisation had to be put in a

state of readiness. This involved a new approach and conventional training, albeit a necessary foundation, was not sufficient on its own. Soldiers were now on operations on a twenty four hour basis, not the norm for a peacetime Army. The very distinction between peace and war, which was previously fudged by the term Emergency, was again challenged. Morris Janowitz used the term "constabulary" to describe military forces that are 'continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture'.[18] This term was very apt for the Defence Forces that emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s and became a "dominant norm". In 1968 John Jackson argued 'the small army of the Irish Republic demonstrates very clearly the development of the constabulary concept'.[19] It is argued here that the Defence Forces could not have been fully established as a constabulary force until the advent of the aid to the civil power role throughout the Northern crisis. Aid to the civil power challenged the very understanding of the use of military force and the effect of its adoption as a routine role of the organisation will be examined.

Having identified the three themes; it is now necessary to discuss the methodology employed to analyse them.

Methodology

The methodology used in this thesis intends to aid the examination of the central research question, that is, how did the Defence Forces evolve from the post-Emergency stagnation to the organisation it is today? As stated previously, the period under review was chosen due

[18] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York, 1971), p.418.
[19] John Jackson, 'The Irish Army and the Development of the Constabulary Concept' in Jacques Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays* (The Hague, 1968), p.109.

to a belief that events that occurred throughout this era contributed significantly to the evolution of the Defence Forces. It was necessary to have 1978 as an endpoint due to the National Archives Act commonly known as the "Thirty Year Rule". While some later source materials, such as the Gleeson Report 1990, were available, the author believed that there would not be enough significant material available to adequately research United Nations operations or the crisis in the North after 1978.

By nature historical studies often rely heavily on the excavation and critical analysis of primary source material. Once the major themes had been identified, through preliminary secondary material research, archival research began. As the thesis is formatted thematically, it is considered necessary to describe the research design and use of sources for each chapter individually. The first theme researched was civil-military relations. A brief introduction to theory, examining the work of major contributors, was considered necessary in order ascertain what areas were worthy of discussion. The author decided to keep the theoretical introduction brief, to serve as an overview of debate rather than an in-depth analysis and critique surrounding the various theoretical arguments, the scope of which would not be of relevance to this thesis. From the examination of the literature surrounding civil-military relations, specific areas of research were established in which to study the civil-military relationship in the Irish context.

The author considered it pertinent that the period under review should not be examined in isolation. Therefore it was decided to provide analysis of the historical experience to illustrate how the relationship developed to the period under review to examine the military in a nascent democratic state. One of the key areas of examination was to investigate how the civil side began to exert control over the military. Both Eunan O'Halpin and Theo Farrell

have pointed to the use of financial control.[20] Transparency and accountability are considered to be essential factors in achieving good governance in a democratic state. Therefore the author considered sources that would illuminate this further. The reports of the Committee of Public Accounts were crucial in this regard as they provided a clear representation of the working relationship throughout the earlier years of the State through the examination of the auditing process. These were considered alongside Dáil Éireann debates on Defence in an effort to provide further evidence of public statements made by the civil side with regard to the Defence Forces. While analysis of the Emergency, with regard to its success or failure as a military operation, was not within the scope of this thesis, the Chief of Staff reports throughout the period provided contemporaneous accounts of how the Defence Forces were affected by the civil-military relationship. This was considered alongside the wealth of scholarly literature available.

Through both research into theory and secondary material, key research areas emerged. Two official publications, The Public Services Organisation Review Group 1969 (Devlin Report) and Report on the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence Forces 1990 (Gleeson Report), provided confirmation of the dysfunctional civil-military relations and the legacy of this. From analysis of these, the Defence Forces archives were then mined. The author considered that the analysis should focus on the evolution of the Defence Forces through the prism of their own experience. This was considered because research pointed to the 1960s as being a period of self reflection and assessment within the Defence Forces as witnessed through the Defence Review Board Report 1965 and Defence

[20] Please see Eunan O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its Enemies since 1922* (Oxford, 2000) and Theo Farrell, ' 'The Model Army': Military Imitation and the Enfeeblement of the Army in Post-Revolutionary Ireland, 1922-42' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, viii (1997).

Policy Memorandum 1967. By examining it through the archives of the Defence Forces, there would be a greater contribution to knowledge rather than repeating previous arguments. The Military Archives provided evidence of not only the civil-military relationship as a whole but also with regard to factors affecting civil control over the military such as education and the ceremonial role. These were used in conjunction with Oireachtas debates, official publications and secondary literature to provide context.

The second theme was participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations. The effects of membership are considerable in terms of foreign policy but also concerning the role of the Defence Forces. The three missions that the Irish Defence Forces participated in the period under review were to be examined, but what was the appropriate method and what was to be learned from such examination? The purpose of analysing the missions individually was to ascertain what if any were the differences with regard to the experiences from one mission to another. The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines 2008 suggest that missions are planned in four stages and therefore the author believed that the clearest method in attempting to decipher changes in missions was to use this template. These stages were pre-deployment, deployment, execution and withdrawal.[21] Acquiring relevant primary source material was then considered. If the primary purpose of this study is to chart the evolution of the Defence Forces through their own experience then once more the Defence Forces military archive was to be targeted.

[21] 'Deployment and Start-up of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines 2008; available from http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eNg.pdf; last accessed 20/09/13.

The Unit Histories offer contemporaneous accounts of missions and eye witness accounts from those serving in the missions. The Unit Histories present some challenges with regard to how accurately events were recorded and for whom they were recorded for.

Alistair Thomson remarked that life stories, which include diaries, letters, memoirs and oral histories, 'offer rich and beguiling historical evidence, which historians have perceived and used in very different ways. At one extreme personal testimony is criticised as a flawed and unreliable source because of bias, self- justification or forgetfulness'. With regard to military history, Thomson refers to historian Richard Holmes remarking that 'if you look at what veterans were writing just ten years after the end of the war, it's quite different from what they were writing at the time'.[22] However Thomson asserts that at the other extreme 'enthusiasts and popular historians respond that personal narratives illuminate the lived experience and meanings of historical events...'. To provide contrast to Holmes' argument, Thomson quotes Samuel Hynes as saying 'if we would understand what it is like, and how it feels we must... seek the reality in the personal witness of the men who were there'.[23] Samuel Hynes is a solid example of the potential usefulness of "life stories". Hynes' *The Soldier's Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War* describes the modern wars as told by the men who participated in such wars. Hynes used journals, memoirs, and letters of men who fought in wars, specifically looking at both World Wars and the Vietnam War. As reviewer Robert Wohl remarked

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[22] Alistair Thomson, 'Life Stories and Historical Analysis' in Simon Gunn & Lucy Faire (Eds), *Research Methods for History* (Edinburgh 2012), p.101. For further analysis on the use of witness testimony by Richard Holmes please see *The Guardian*, 10 Nov 2007 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2007/nov/10/featuresreviews.guardianreview5).

[23] Ibid. Please see Samuel Hynes, *The Soldiers' Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War* (London, 1998).

> Histories give us the big picture of war: they tell us why wars began and why they were won and lost. War memoirs are not concerned with the "why" of war but with the details of one individual's experience. They are true to that experience but not trustworthy as history.
>
> If these testimonies are not historically truthful, what do we learn from them and why do we read them? One answer, of course, would be that, though appalled by war, we are also—like the authors of these works—nostalgic for "its old excitements". Hynes believes that our interest in war memoirs goes beyond this. The stories soldiers tell are an antidote to the myths of war we carry in our heads: they tell us what men do in war and what war does to men, the internal changes it brings about in the individuals who do the fighting...[24]

While Wohl, like many historians, questions the validity of the approach, that is relying solely on testimony on those who served and wrote both during the time of service and after, he does not dismiss it in its entirety seeing some value in the testimonies. Hynes remarks that 'we must believe that human beings can learn from the testimonials of others (or what are libraries for?). Because wars exist in history, personal narratives of war must add to our historical knowledge'.[25]

While Hynes' argument is somewhat convincing, the importance of source criticism and contextualisation must come under consideration. Thomson discussed the two extremes and there must be the possibility of being able to straddle the two schools of thought. The

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[24] Robert Wohl, 'Review: Samuel Hynes, The Soldiers' Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War' in *The Journal of Modern History*, lxxi, no.1 (March, 1999), p.171.
[25] Hynes, *The Soldiers' Tale,* p.285.

Unit Histories were to provide a contemporaneous account of the mission written by those who served. It is traditionally written at the conclusion of the Unit's time with the mission, typically using the Unit Logs that were completed daily. One could argue that the Unit Histories would look favourably on the Unit writing them, recording the history they wanted recorded, omitting information which would cast them in an unfavourable light, rather than an accurate depiction. However, one must consider the potential value in a source such as Unit Histories. They provide the account that the Unit placed on record in line with their experience. To refer back to Wohl 'they are true to that experience'. With regard to the examination of the evolution of the Defence Forces, one that in part was built on the experience of participation in United Nations missions, these histories can provide insight into this evolution. However, the author did not dismiss the issues raised above regarding bias etc; and therefore it was necessary to provide context through the use of United Nations archival material alongside memoirs, diaries and other secondary source material.

The bulk of the United Nations archival material regarding the Irish contingents concentrated on the Congo. This was due in large part to the difficulty in excavating relevant material in the archive in New York. The author recognises the potential wealth of information this archive holds and considers this to be worthy of further study. However the deficiency in United Nations material was somewhat diminished by the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet). The UNBISnet is an online catalogue of UN documents and publications held by the UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library and the Library of the UN Office at Geneva. The coverage of UNBISnet is from 1979 onward, however, older documents are being added to the catalogue on a regular basis. These included reports and collections of letters with regard to both the missions in Cyprus and the Sinai.

Memoirs and diaries included Indar Jit Rikhye, military advisor to UN Secretary-Generals Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant, Michael Harbottle, Francis Henn and the diaries of Captain Robert Eagar, an intelligence officer from the Emergency until the early 1960s. The Eagar diaries, in private hands, provided insight into the sentiment and reaction of the Defence Forces in Ireland with regard to the Niemba ambush.

The third and final theme researched was the impact of the Northern crisis on the Defence Forces. Analysis of the Northern crisis generally falls into various themes. However the role of the Defence Forces is generally never considered a major one, the exception being the role of one of its members in the Arms Crisis of 1970. While some source material remains unavailable or in a redacted form due to its sensitive nature, there is a wealth of material available on the Defence Forces during this period in the Military Archives. The first task after the initial research was how to divide this material and select sub-areas to be further researched. As the analysis of the Northern crisis is so vast, the objective for this chapter was to remain entirely focused on the thesis question – how did the Defence Forces evolve from the post-Emergency stagnation to the organisation it is today? It was through this prism that the Northern crisis was examined. Historical background was considered necessary not only to give context to the conflict itself, but also to provide insight on the historical cooperation between the British and Irish Defence Forces during the Second World War. From there the next logical step was to discuss the political and military reactions to the outbreak of violence in August 1969. The analysis of the political reaction to the outbreak of violence is brief and its purpose is to provide context for the discussion of the military reaction. It is also in part due to the large wealth of secondary literature available. Sources used to describe the political reaction included the T.K. Whitaker papers,

as Whitaker was acting as policy advisor to Taoiseach Jack Lynch on matters concerning Northern Ireland, speeches made throughout this period both in Ireland and in Stormont, Cabinet memoranda, various political memoirs, and secondary literature.

The source material for analysis of the military response came primarily from the Military Archives. These included Situation Reports, Interim Reports of the Planning Board on Northern Ireland Operations and Plans and Operations Files. These documents provided evidence of both Defence Forces capability and planning during this period. However the author considered that they must be examined with the previous decade of experience in overseas missions in mind. The author also considered it necessary that in light of the examination of the military response, an analysis of how the Defence Forces perceived itself in 1969 would be required. This again relied heavily on material from the Military Archives, some examples being the *Working Paper on Defence Policy 1970, Memorandum to the Government 1970 and Military Responses to Memorandum to the Government*.

Other issues that emerged with regard to the Defence Forces and the Northern crisis included the impact of aid to the civil power, the issue of refugees, the relationship with the British Armed Forces and the Arms Trial. The source material for the above was varied. In addition to Military Archives, the Garret FitzGerald papers provided the political aspect with regard to aid to the civil power operations, alongside other political memoirs. The examination of the relationship between the British and Irish Defence Forces included correspondence between the British Ambassador in Dublin to both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. A wealth of both scholarly and popular analysis exists with regard to the Arms Trial. However, the author considered it a necessary addendum to any discussion of the Defence Forces during the

Northern Crisis. This material was used in conjunction with Captain Kelly's own memoirs, Military Archive material and the Committee of Public Accounts Final Report – Northern Ireland Relief Expenditure 1972.

The methodology described above reflects that of an historical study. All source material was considered with regard to its usefulness and was critically examined. A wide range was researched. However, as discussed previously, the primary focus of this thesis is to examine the evolution through the organisations experience. Secondary material was used to provide further insight and context. It is now necessary to discuss the conceptual approach in which this evidence will be analysed.

Conceptual Framework

This section will set out the conceptual framework in which this thesis is grounded. The necessity of such a framework is advanced as it has been argued that historians have a tendency to place a heavy focus on narrative rather than on an analytical approach. This debate can be traced to the early twentieth century. R.F. Hoxie argued in 1906 that historical narrative 'masquerading as historical method, has become a fad'.[26] He considered the phrase 'the present can be understood with reference to the past' and argued that if this were indeed true, it would have marked a significant scientific advance in the study of history. He believed this was not the case and, as remarked previously, that there was still huge emphasis on the use of narrative.[27] His objection to the use of narrative derives from his assertion that

[26] R.F. Hoxie, 'Historical Method vs. Historical Narrative' in *Journal of Political Economy,* xiv, no.9 (Nov 1906), p.568.
[27] Ibid.

> The main trouble with those who indulge in historical narrative is that they seem to think that academic reconstruction of the past can contribute to the ends of the practical interest of the present. In this they are for the most part mistaken. From the standpoint of the practical interest involved the academic reconstruction is a hopeless tangle of relevancy and irrelevancy, altogether without definite teaching.[28]

This debate has continued throughout the twentieth century. Simon Gunn and Lucy Faire remarked that 'research methods have all but disappeared as a component of historiography and a subject of debate among historians'.[29] Gunn and Faire enlist the work of Richard Biernacki, Paula Fass and Peter Mandler respectively to illustrate criticism of the lack of attention to methodology.[30] They concluded by remarking that 'we should bother with methodology... because it is intimately linked to epistemology, the grounds of knowledge. If historical research and historiography have no specialised, effective claim to knowledge, then it is unclear on what basis "history" can claim to be a discipline at all'.[31]

While the above statement may be considered provocative, the necessity for a clear methodology, founded in a conceptual framework, for historical writing is worthy of discussion. Why should history be exempt from the rigours of theoretical methodology?

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[28] Hoxie, *Historical Method vs. Historical Narrative*, p.572.

[29] Simon Gunn & Lucy Faire, 'Introduction: Why Bother with Method?' in Simon Gunn & Lucy Faire (Eds), *Research Methods for History* (Edinburgh 2012), p.1.

[30] Gunn & Faire remark that Biernacki 'argued that the cultural turn created an over-dependence on linguistic models of culture based on semiotics or sign systems; instead, research should be organised around the comparative analysis of cultural practices and how they can be seen to work...'. Paula Fass was quoted as arguing that the recent lack of methodology in current historical writing results in 'inquiries that are literally all over the place... [and] a profusion of styles and methods that seem to obey no rules but the unique bypaths of the individual historian's mind'. Mandler 'argued that an increasing theoretical sophistication in new forms of historical writing has obscured a lack of methodological precision'. Ibid, p.2. See also Richard Biernacki, 'Method and Metaphor after the New Cultural History' in Victoria E. Bonnell & Lynn Hunt (Eds), *After the Cultural Turn* (Berkeley, 1999), pp 62-92, Paula Fass, 'Cultural History/Social History: some reflections on a continuing dialogue', in *Journal of Social History*, xxxvii, no. 1 (Fall, 2003), p.41 and Peter Mandler, 'The Problem with Cultural History', in *Social and Cultural History*, i, no.1 (2004), p.116.

[31] Gunn & Faire, 'Why Bother?' in Gunn & Faire (Eds) *Research Methods*, pp 4-5.

However some difficulty can occur when attempting to select a conceptual approach. Often one approach may not fit into the selected area of research, particularly when there are a number of sub elements that occur over a period of time. By contrast, combining approaches can lead to a somewhat incoherent framework thus diluting the rigours of the process.

This thesis argues that there was a considerable evolution of the Irish Defence Forces from 1956 to 1978. In order to examine how this evolution occurred, it was crucial to analyse how the structures in the organisation changed over a period of time. Therefore it was necessary to adopt a conceptual approach that concentrated on structure. Approaches such as constructivism and historical institutionalism were considered. However, Coxian historicism was considered to be the most appropriate choice. A brief outline of Cox's method will be provided now.

Coxian Historicism

Coxian historicism is very comprehensive and far less limiting than others. It is necessary therefore to provide a brief outline of the approach.[32] Cox remarked that 'theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose'.[33] Timothy Sinclair remarked that Robert Cox's 'unique method for understanding the structures of world order has not been matched elsewhere in the emerging critical tradition for its flexibility and adaptability to research problems'.[34] He commented that 'Cox's work reflects a willingness to sample from discordant intellectual traditions to create a method. For example, he sees no contradiction in using the Weberian

[32] This approach was first read by the author in Andy Mullan's, 'The British Left's "Great Debate" on Europe: The Political Economy of the British Left and European Integration, 1945-2004' (PhD Thesis, University of Bradford), p.38.
[33] Robert W. Cox, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge, 1996), p.87.
[34] Timothy J. Sinclair, 'Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order' in Robert W. Cox, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge, 1996), p.8.

notion of the elite and the Marxist idea of class in the same analysis, based on the specification of an elite as the political and moral leadership of a class'.[35]

Cox has argued that there are two broad purposes for theory; problem-solving and critical theory. The first, problem- solving theory, considers that 'it takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as a given framework'. The aim of problem-solving is to make these relationships and institutions work easily by attending to the problems that may obstruct them.[36] The second, critical theory, questions how the prevailing structural system developed. Critical theory

> unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing... the critical approach leads toward the construction of a larger picture of the whole of which the initially contemplated part is just one component, and seeks to understand the processes of change in which both parts and whole are involved.[37]

The Coxian explanation of critical theory is applicable to the answering of the central research question posed here, which is how did the Irish Defence Forces evolve from a stagnant post-Emergency force to the organisation it is today?

Coxian Historicism proposes to 'reveal the historical structures characteristic of particular eras within which such regularities prevail' as theories which put forward 'general valid laws

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[35] Sinclair, 'Beyond International Relations Theory' in Cox, *Approaches*, p.9.
[36] Cox, *Approaches*, p.88.
[37] Ibid, p.89.

or human regularities are not sustainable, except where the temporal boundaries of these laws are acknowledged'.[38] Cox's method of historical structures

> is one of representing what can be called limited totalities. The historical structure does not represent the whole world but rather a particular sphere of human activity in its historically located totality. The *ceteris paribus* problem, which falsifies problem-solving theory by leading to an assumption of total stasis, is avoided by juxtaposing and connecting historical structures in related spheres of action.[39]

Cox identifies three categories of forces that interact in a structure; material capabilities, ideas, and institutions. Material capabilities refer to technological and organisational capabilities. Ideas, he postulates, are broadly of two kinds. One kind is made up of inter-subjective meanings, which are 'those shared notions of the nature of social relations which tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behaviour'.[40] The second 'kind' of ideas are the collective images of social order that are held by different groups of people which may be opposed to one another. This 'clash of rival collective images provides evidence of the potential for alternative paths of development and raises questions as to the possible material and institutional basis for the emergence of an alternative structure'.[41] Institutions provide a means to stabilise and perpetuate a particular order. Cox remarks that

> Institutions reflect the power relations prevailing at their point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations. Eventually, institutions take on their own life; they can become a battleground of

[38] Sinclair, 'Beyond International Relations Theory' in Cox, *Approaches*, pp 7-8.
[39] Cox, *Approaches*, p.100.
[40] Cox, *Approaches*, p.98.
[41] Cox, *Approaches*, p.99.

> opposing tendencies, or rival institutions may reflect different tendencies. Institutions are particular amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn influence the development of ideas and material capabilities.[42]

However Cox noted that these factors should be considered a 'heuristic device', in that historical structures are 'contrast models; like ideals they provide, in a logically coherent form, a simplified representation of a complex reality and an expression of tendencies, limited in their applicability in time and space, rather than fully realised developments'.[43] Cox applies the method of historical structures to three levels; social forces, forms of state and world orders. He remarked that

> considered separately, social forces, forms of state, and world orders can be represented in a preliminary approximation as particular configurations of material capabilities, ideas and institutions. Considered in relation to each other, and thus moving toward a fuller representation of historical process, each will be seen as containing, as well as bearing the impact of the others.[44]

The central research question posed in this thesis is how the Defence Forces was able to evolve in the way that it did during the period under review. It is considered here that the Coxian historicism provides the best framework in which to examine this. It is a highly flexible and integrated approach. Its foundation in critical theory, that of questioning how the prevailing system developed, is directly related to the central research question. Historical analysis is therefore required and themes and events must be selected as being

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[42] Cox, *Approaches*, p.99.
[43] Cox, *Approaches*, p.100.
[44] Cox, *Approaches*, p.101.

major contributors to the development of the prevailing system. The central research question can be examined through Cox's three forces that interact in a structure: material capabilities, ideas, and institutions and then placed in the context of the three levels; social forces, forms of state and world orders. Civil-military relations can be considered under both the material capabilities and institutional framework. It will facilitate the thesis in addressing not only the crucial issue of power and control but also defence policy, or lack thereof. Again both institutions and material capabilities can be considered in the context of United Nations membership and the advent of peacekeeping. The outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland can be examined through the prism of all three forces. Cox's method is grounded in empirical research and with a heavy focus on the historical perspective. While Cox is primarily considered an international relations scholar, his method can be seen as interdisciplinary and a useful approach for historical research. By being grounded in both critical theory and historicism and acknowledging the importance of structures with its analysis based in material capabilities, ideas, and institutions, the Coxian approach provides a coherent conceptual framework for this thesis. However a caveat should made here that this is theory-testing rather than building. As this is a thesis based on historical research, the evidence must take precedence rather than be an exact fit.

Summary

Using the methodology outlined above, and based on the extensive research undertaken for this study these three factors continuously emerged and therefore became the dominant themes. A literature review will be carried out first to examine current trends in this area and discover gaps in current knowledge. The seminal themes will then be discussed in further detail in the following chapters. Civil-military relations will be addressed first as its

roots are found in the foundation of the State and also influence all other activities. The period under discussion coincides with the first Irish participation in a United Nations mission and the influence of peacekeeping operations will be addressed next. The Defence Forces were participating in its second armed peacekeeping mission when the crisis in Northern Ireland erupted. Its impact on the Defence Forces will be discussed in chapter four.

While this is an examination of the evolutionary change of the Defence Forces, it is of necessity Army centric and focuses on the experience of the officer class. The Army was at the forefront throughout the 1960s and 1970s in the defence organisation and dominated the issues under discussion. This is not to dismiss what amounts to a revolution in Irish naval affairs as a consequence of European Economic Community (EEC) membership after 1973, when the role and capacity of the naval service was transformed. Nor does it dismiss the evolution of the Air Corps or Irish innovation in weaponry and armoured vehicles. However, the focus of this examination of the military will remain, primarily, on the Army and the officer class. This thesis should be considered a contribution to the ongoing examination of the Irish military rather than a definitive text.

Evolution of the Irish Defence Forces: A Literature Review

This literature review aims to place this thesis of the evolution of the Defence Forces within the framework of other authors in this field. While the focus of research undertaken for this thesis is historical in nature, other scholarly work in this area comes from varying disciplinary backgrounds including historians, international relations scholars, sociologists, and former Defence Forces personnel. The current trends in this area primarily focus on analysing the development from a guerrilla force to that of a conventional army immediately post-independence. However, some of the gaps in the existing literature include little analysis of the evolution of the post-Emergency Defence Forces as a whole rather than examination of the individual elements. In addition to doing so in the literature review, this author will also reference these and other scholars at appropriate junctures throughout this thesis.

Theo Farrell, Professor of War Studies at King's College London, introduces the post-revolutionary Irish Army as "feeble" both politically, due to the low level of government support, and strategically, as they sought to defend the State in a manner that even its own planners disagreed with.[45] Farrell remarked that 'critics might also point out that the Irish Army was under-resourced because the state could barely afford it. There is some truth in this. The massive expansion of the Army during the Civil War (1921-2) placed a huge burden on public finances. Yet cuts in Army expenditure, falling from £11 million in 1924 to just over £1 million in 1932 were excessive'.[46] Farrell argued that in order to understand how the enfeeblement occurred, two propositions must be advanced. The first is that political and

[45] Theo Farrell, ' "The Model Army": Military Imitation and the Enfeeblement of the Army in Post Revolutionary Ireland, 1922-42' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, viii (1997), p.111.
[46] Farrell, *The Model Army*, p.112.

strategic enfeeblement was the 'unintentional product of choices made by the Army leadership'. These choices, he believed, stemmed from an inability of the leadership to stand up for themselves more effectively to the unreasonable demands made by civilian policymakers. The second proposition 'is that this self-defeating behaviour was caused by the organisational culture of the Irish Army, which led it to imitate the British Army. In copying the British, the Irish Army developed an inappropriate military structure and strategy, and placed itself at the mercy of civilian policymakers'.[47]

Farrell linked the fate of the Army with both the rise of the Department of Finance and the military Mutiny in 1924. The former began with the passing of the Ministers and Secretaries Act 'which institutionalised the procedure whereby all public expenditure required prior approval from the Department of Finance'.[48] After the military Mutiny in March 1924, which will be discussed in more depth in chapter three, the Army council was forced to resign resulting in a significant loss of leadership. Another result of the Mutiny was the establishment of new procedures giving the civil servants in the Department of Defence control over all Army policy.[49] Farrell summarised

> Thus, by 1924, civilian control of the military had been firmly established by weakening the position of the military officers in favour of civilian officials in the Department of Defence, by getting rid of the existing Army leadership in the wake of the mutiny crisis, and by strengthening the Department of Finance's control over Army finances. There was little the Army could do; nor could Army leaders block legislation before the Dáil that was going to dilute their power. However they could

[47] Ibid.
[48] Farrell, *The Model Army*, p.114.
[49] Farrell, *The Model Army*, p.115.

> have stood up for themselves by refusing to resign when ordered to by the Executive Council. This, in turn, would have enabled the Army to have been more vigorous in defending its own power within the Department of Defence.[50]

Farrell argued that the reason why the Army chose to act in the way it did was due in large part to the desire to become a professional army. He remarked that 'in creating a professional army, army leaders looked to foreign armies for ideas... By imitating others, particularly the British, Irish Army leaders formed beliefs about how they should organise themselves and fight. These beliefs became embedded in the organisation in its formative years, thereby forming the culture of the organisation'.[51] Farrell qualifies this by referring to a General Staff memo on the development of the Defence Forces which stated that while other armies had their traditions 'we have not the advantage of experience and even yet are only in the process of building up our traditions'. Farrell remarked that 'experience in the IRA and Ireland's guerrilla warfare tradition were considered practically useless' as they had never served in a regular army.[52]

Eunan O'Halpin discussed the establishment of the Army in his chapter 'The army in independent Ireland' in *A Military History of Ireland.* He remarked

> the history and fate of the army in independent Ireland present a number of apparent paradoxes. How is it that a state which won independence by force of arms, whose constitution still lays claim to the six counties of Northern Ireland, whose politics have been suffused with a concern for the symbols of sovereignty and

[50] Farrell, *The Model Army*, p.116.
[51] Farrell, *The Model Army*, p.125.
[52] Farrell, *The Model Army*, p.126.

> whose defence policy is centred on the principle of military neutrality, has consistently maintained only an emaciated and grievously underequipped defence establishment.[53]

He posits that the reasons for the Irish Army remaining as such range from the violent circumstances of the army's creation, the strength of the democratic system, Ireland's defence relationship with the United Kingdom, and 'more prosaic factors such as finance'.[54]

Eunan O'Halpin's *Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its Enemies since 1922* is a significant study regarding the changing nature of defence of the State and its security apparatuses. Fundamentally it differs from Theo Farrell's work as O'Halpin places his discussion of the Defence Forces in a historical narrative rather than in an attempt to theory build or test. O'Halpin remarks that Ireland's 'history of unbroken democracy, and the dearth of external enemies, sets Ireland apart from other European States which emerged after the First World War. It is all the more striking given the unresolved question of partition'.[55] O'Halpin rejects Farrell's claim that Army leaders could have refused to resign. He posits that this would have been implausible in the circumstances of 1924. O'Halpin remarks that when Chief of Staff Sean MacMahon asked the Government for the grounds for demanding his dismissal, 'he was peremptorily dismissed'. He comments that when Cosgrave expressed concern that he had not been consulted about the decision to demand the resignations, Kevin O'Higgins, whom O'Halpin refers to as the high priest of civil supremacy, replied that it was such an urgent matter that there was no time for

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[53] Eunan O'Halpin, 'The army to the independent Ireland' in Thomas Bartlett & Keith Jeffery (Eds) *A Military History of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1996), p.407.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Eunan O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its Enemies Since 1922* (Oxford, 2000), p.350.

consultation.[56] By accepting this 'arbitrary and patently unjust treatment' the officers who resigned vindicated the principle of civilian control of the military.[57] O'Halpin concurs however with Farrell's assertion regarding military professionalism. He remarks that to aid the restoration of order the Army were used as a 'surrogate police force' after the Civil War. O'Halpin suggests that this was contradictory to the wishes of Minister for Defence Richard Mulcahy whose professed aim was to turn the 'army into a compact, apolitical, and highly trained defence force, one "that would be absolutely responsible to even a de Valera Government"'.[58]

Farrell advances his argument regarding the evolution from guerrilla to conventional warfare in *'Transnational Norms and Military Development'*. Farrell's core argument considers that

> the Irish Army acted according to dominant norms- i.e intersubjective beliefs about identity and behaviour – encoded in organisational culture at the time of its birth... I draw on sociology's new institutionalism which argues that many forms of social organisation and state activity are shaped by transnational norms that define professional identity, standards, and conduct... My account of Irish Military development concentrates on two such transnational norms of military professionalism – norms of conventional warfare and norms of civilian supremacy.[59]

Farrell debated the constructivist versus cultural approaches. He concurred with Jeffery Legro that there was a need for 'synthetic cross-level ideational models to show how

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[56] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.51.
[57] Ibid.
[58] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.41.
[59] Theo Farrell, 'Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army' in *European Journal of International Relations*, vii, no.1 (2001), p.64.

systemic and unit-level norms interact to shape military behaviour'.[60] Farrell posited that the purpose of this article was to close the constructivist – culturalist gap by offering such a model.[61] Farrell proposed to achieve this by embarking on a study of how transnational norms of military professionalism are embedded in the cultures of specific organisations, in this case the Irish Army. The focus is on the empowerment of transnational norms in new national and organisational contexts, as he termed it, norm transplantation.

Farrell centres his argument on the transnational norms of military professionalism. He considers military professionalism as 'the core beliefs that underlie transnational military practice about the fundamental possibilities of professional organisation and action' and divides these core beliefs into norms of conventional warfare and norms of civilian supremacy.[62] So how did these transnational norms of military professionalism appear in post-Independence Ireland? Farrell posits that 'the Irish Civil War provided the necessary external shock for radical norm transplantation to take place'.[63] Farrell concluded that 'radical norm transplantation took place in post-revolutionary Ireland because external shock, personal change and effective entrepreneurship operated in synergy to effect rapid and profound cultural change in the Irish Army'.[64]

In *World Culture and Military Power* Farrell examined 'two key processes whereby states generate military power: military organisation and the conduct of military operations and... shows how these processes are profoundly shaped by world culture'.[65] Farrell once more dismisses rationalist approaches in favour of a constructivist approach with an emphasis on

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[60] Farrell, *Transnational Norms*, p.65.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Farrell, *Transnational Norms*, p.73.
[63] Farrell, *Transnational Norms*, p.89.
[64] Farrell, *Transnational Norms*, p.91.
[65] Theo Farrell, '*World Culture and Military Power*' in Security Studies, xiv, no.3 (July – September 2005), p.449.

the impact of norms. Farrell remarks that 'the conceptualisation of these norms presented in this article draws on a particular constructivist approach, called sociological institutionalism, which examines how norms evolve within transnational organisational fields, are diffused through transnational professional networks and take worldwide effect'.[66] To explore the casual impact of world culture on military organisation and operations Farrell used two case studies. The norms of humanitarian law were examined through NATO air operations in the Kosovo War and, more relevant here, the norms of conventional warfare were examined through the Irish military organisation in the early twentieth century. In each case study Farrell asserts that they confound neorealism.[67] Farrell sought to 'move beyond competitive theory testing, to incorporate insights from neorealism and pluralism into a more sophisticated constructivist theory of the generation of military power'.[68] Farrell advances cultural adaptation theory which develops

> a "three-step" account of how world culture shapes the generation of military power, one that combines insights from neorealism, pluralism, and sociological institutionalism: world culture provides the social structure of military activity, international anarchy provides material incentives for strategic activity within this social structure, and bureaucratic and alliance politics provide processes whereby social structure and strategic action are reconciled.[69]

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[66] Farrell, *World Culture*, pp 449-50.
[67] Farrell, *World Culture*, p.450.
[68] Farrell, *World Culture*, p.451
[69] Farrell, *World Culture*, p.452.

Farrell's cultural adaptation theory expects that in light of increasing level of threat there will be some norm modification. However this will occur within the norm parameters. As Farrell remarks

> Legitimacy remains the primary motive. In practising norms, actors affirm and reproduce their identities and worldviews... Rising threats- be they military or political in nature- may challenge these norms, especially for rational norm followers, and especially if the practices prescribed by the norms in question do not provide an effective response to the rising threat. In such cases, we can expect actors to modify their military practices in response to the rising threat, but to do so in ways that avoid norm violation... if the norms are well established, actors will bolster them, whereas poorly established norms are more likely to be stretched.[70]

The case study relevant to the Irish context is that of the norm of conventional warfare. As to the definition of the norm of conventional warfare, Farrell remarks that 'norms of conventional warfare prescribe military organisations that are standing, standardised, technologically structured, and state based. In addition to these core norms are subsidiary norms regarding the precise make-up of conventional militaries: for example, the tri-service structure, the basic unit of organisation, functional specialisation, and the fashionable military technologies of the day'.[71]

Farrell remarks that Ireland 'provides an instructive example of norm-driven military organisation by a small state'.[72] He reiterates his previous argument surrounding the

[70] Farrell, *World Culture*, p.461.
[71] Farrell, *World Culture*, p.462.
[72] Farrell, *World Culture*, p.466.

nascent years of the Army and its attachment to the British model of military organisation in preference of a possibly more successful guerrilla warfare model. Farrell posits that neorealism cannot explain Ireland's force posture in the lead up to the Second World War. He also dismisses bureaucratic politics, as while 'a large conventional force promised to increase army resources and autonomy... Irish Army leaders had no reason to believe that they would get the troops, tanks, and planes they desired. This should have been obvious against a backdrop of more than a decade of defence cuts... In short, the Army was never going to get the funds it needed for a fully equipped conventional force structure'.[73]

Farrell argues that 'sociological institutionalism explains that which rationalism cannot. Norms of conventional warfare were deeply entrenched in army culture, as shown by the Army's hopelessly ambitious modernisation program'. Farrell continued that the urgency of the civil war had led to the emulation of the British Army which provided the primary mechanism through which professional norms were encoded into the culture of the Irish Army. These were reinforced through the training of Irish officers in both American and British military training academies in the late 1920s.[74] Farrell asserts that 'norm stretching was not really in the cards given how well established were the norms of conventional warfare'. Therefore additional resources were used to bolster norm conformity in the Irish Army.[75] This arose from the belief of an increasing threat from the United Kingdom at the beginning of the Second World War. Taoiseach Eamon De Valera's intervention insured that the Army received a far more substantial defence budget.[76] Farrell provided the rationale

[73] Farrell, *World Culture*, p.469.
[74] Farrell, *World Culture*, p.470.
[75] Farrell, *World Culture*, pp 472-3.
[76] Farrell, *World Culture*, p.472.

behind using guerrilla warfare. However it was the norm of conventional warfare that prevented this from happening.[77]

Farrell concluded that the 'norms of conventional warfare are central to the professional identity of militaries worldwide and are promoted through profession-based literature and education'.[78] He remarked that it was this norm that prevented the Irish Army from reorganising its conventional approach to that of guerrilla warfare, despite there being compelling strategic reasons for doing so.[79] Farrell asserts that this case study demonstrates 'the explanatory value of cultural adaptation theory' and remarks that 'in the Irish case, the growing threat from the United Kingdom triggered intervention by the Irish Prime Minister in a long-standing bureaucratic war between the Army and Finance Department officials. This resulted in a massive increase in Army resources, albeit to support a conventional force posture and thereby bolster norm conformity'.[80] However Farrell issues a caution with regard to policy implications remarking that one must be careful in generalising about the impact of world culture on military behaviour.[81] He believed that they were case-specific and depended on the degree of norm bolstering versus norm stretching by actors. His final conclusion remarked that 'further study of cases across space and time is necessary in order to get a clearer picture of the conditions and extent of strategic action in the shadow of world culture'.[82]

Eunan O'Halpin has also examined the prelude to the Emergency period. As the international situation continued to escalate the Army requested a budget increase.

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[77] Farrell, *World Culture*, p.473.
[78] Farrell, *World Culture*, p.485.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Farrell, *World Culture*, p.486.
[81] Farrell, *World Culture*, p.487.
[82] Farrell, *World Culture*, p.488.

However, as O'Halpin remarks, 'between 1937 and 1940 the Department of Finance fought vigorously, if not consistently, against increased spending on the army, either for equipping existing units or for creating new ones... Finance's arguments veered from insouciance to fatalism'.[83] He remarked that War of Independence pensions placed a heavy burden on defence spending, especially after 1934 when the anti-Treaty forces were entitled to it. He considers that 'while provided under a separate vote, this spending probably increased the determination of the Department of Finance to hold down defence costs'.[84]

Farrell also defends his argument regarding Ireland's conventional force posture in the lead up to the Emergency in *Professionalization and Suicidal Defence Planning by the Irish Army*. He states that Irish War plans during the Second World War revealed 'a military organisation preparing to commit suicide'.[85] Farrell remarks that in 'this case, the Army leadership acted according to their beliefs of how a professional army should organise itself and behave. Irish Army leaders formed beliefs about military professionalism by imitating the British Army, and this led them to believe that guerrilla warfare was not the business of professional armies'.[86] In this article Farrell examines the 1934 War Plan and analyses its credibility in comparison with the 1940 General Defence Plan 2 (GDP 2).[87] The 1934 plan concentrated on a British invasion which 'painted a pretty grim picture. The plan recognised that the Army lacked the resources to develop a force structure capable of repelling an invading British

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[83] O'Halpin, 'army in independent Ireland' in Bartlett & Jeffery (Eds*) A Military History of Ireland*, pp 416-7.
[84] O'Halpin, 'army in independent Ireland' in Bartlett & Jeffery (Eds*) A Military History of Ireland*, p.416.
[85] Theo Farrell, 'Professionalization and Suicidal Defence Planning by the Irish Army, 1921-1941' in *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, xxi, no.3 (September 1998), p.67.
[86] Ibid.
[87] The 1934 War Plan was drawn up by Irish Military Intelligence also known as G2. The first General Defence Plan (GDP 1) was designed to suppress an IRA uprising and prevent German invasion. GDP 2 focussed on a British invasion due to actions undertaken by the British War Cabinet.

force through sustained conventional operations'.[88] The plan estimated that Britain could immediately put 71,000 troops against an estimated Irish force of 25,000 – 36,000. The plan remarked that 'British units would all be highly trained, completely armed and equipped, and properly organised. The bulk of our troops would be half-trained, badly armed, and imperfectly organised'.[89] Intelligence officers noted that 'the bulk of our present Army officers, and many of our public men, have practical experience of [guerrilla warfare]. Hence there is a constant feeling that having fought the British on this basis before, with a certain measure of success, that it forms the obvious basis upon which we should fight them again'.[90]

Farrell commented that the 1934 plan was an inventive combination of organised resistance and guerrilla campaign. However it 'was quite at odds with the prevailing view within the Army General Staff'.[91] GDP 2, designed a mere six years later, was designed to meet the British invasion of the entire country under a conventional force posture.[92] This was considered by Farrell to be quite at odds with the 1934 plan 'which strongly warned of the risks of deploying along static lines'. While he concedes that this may have been due to a differing objective he remarks that 'it is difficult not to conclude that the 1934 plan offered a far better defence for Ireland during the early war years than GDP 2'.[93] Farrell states that the Army's choice of conventional force structure and strategy was 'truly puzzling' in strategic terms and suggests plausible explanations for this behaviour such as other military

[88] Farrell, *Professionalization and Suicidal Defence Planning*, pp 68-9.
[89] Farrell, *Professionalization and Suicidal Defence Planning*, p.69.
[90] Farrell, *Professionalization and Suicidal Defence Planning*, p.69.
[91] Farrell, *Professionalization and Suicidal Defence Planning*, pp 70-1.
[92] Farrell, *Professionalization and Suicidal Defence Planning*, p.73.
[93] Farrell, *Professionalization and Suicidal Defence Planning*, p.74.

threats to the State such as an IRA uprising, civilian intervention and organisational self-interest.

However Farrell dismissed these explanations in favour of his core thesis, which is the norm of military professionalism. Farrell reiterated much of his argument from his article *The Model Army*. He remarked that this argument was 'confirmed by the syllabus of the Irish Command and Staff Course in the mid- 1930s, which allocated only three hours to guerrilla warfare from a total of 361 hours training; in contrast eighteen hours was spent on chemical warfare'.[94] Farrell concluded that if the 1934 plan had been followed that the Army would have developed an 'unusually organised force capable of conducting both mobile conventional and guerrilla operations simultaneously. Such a force would have presented a formidable deterrent to British invasion. Unfortunately, it was inconceivable given the Irish Army's culture'.[95]

However, Farrell's thesis of the Irish Defence Forces choosing the norms of conventional warfare and military professionalism over the more strategically sound tradition of guerrilla warfare in defence planning in the led up to the Emergency do not take into consideration the outcome of the Civil War. O'Halpin remarks that 'it is important to stress that in broad terms the army swiftly achieved its primary military goal: within two months of the outbreak of fighting, serious republican resistance was limited to parts of the south and south-west, and the republican military effort had declined into a series of uncoordinated guerrilla actions'.[96] While considering that 'the kindest thing that could be said for the government's military performance was that it was less bad than the opposition's the nascent Army did

[94] Farrell, *Professionalization and Suicidal Defence Planning*, pp 78-80.
[95] Farrell, *Professionalization and Suicidal Defence Planning*, p.82.
[96] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.17

defeat the anti-treaty forces as a conventional force.[97] Therefore, having successfully defeated a guerrilla force with conventional force posture, it would be nonsensical to adapt such an approach in pre-Emergency defence planning.

Significant attention is given to the pre- and inter-Second World War period in Eunan O'Halpin's *Defending Ireland*. He remarks that

> in April 1923 the government was utterly dependent on the military; by 1932 the army was cowed, emaciated, and resigned to further decline. This transformation in military fortunes was wrought by a government which, in common with most of its successors, steadfastly refused either to articulate or to make a provision for a coherent national defence policy.[98]

O'Halpin describes the mobilisation fiasco in 1939 and the subsequent, somewhat successful, reorganisation in the early years of the Emergency, despite the lack of weapons and equipment necessary to provide a robust defence of the State. However, he also gives considerable thought to the security dilemma's facing the State since 1945. It is this period that will be discussed here as it is most relevant to the research question.

O'Halpin observed that in the post-Emergency period the Army advanced proposals 'for a properly equipped and trained standing army which would act as a kernel for much larger first- and second-line reserves who could be called for full-time service as conditions dictated'.[99] What made this different from previous proposals was what he termed 'the authority and vigour' in which they were advanced by Chief of Staff Lt. General Dan

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[97] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.25.
[98] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.82.
[99] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.258.

McKenna. This was considered to be a consequence of the experience of unpreparedness by the Defence Forces in the lead up to the war.[100] O'Halpin asserts that the Government did not agree with McKenna and remarks 'it was as though neither the Emergency nor the Second World War had happened...'.[101]

O'Halpin also discussed the implications of the consideration of NATO membership on the civil-military relationship. He remarks 'the choice which the army was trying to get the government to make was... a rational one between two kinds of military credibility, that which came from being a member of a powerful alliance, and that which depended on independent national defensive strength as a meaningful deterrent against aggression'. However it is evident that no Irish government had any intention of building an army capable of such.[102] In reality, O'Halpin posits that 'the post-war years... saw a wholesale reversion to defence policy and practice as seen since 1925... In external defence, the defence forces' role would continue to be largely symbolic, at most sacrificial lambs should the state be attacked'.[103] He also asserts that the post-war era saw a resurgence of the supremacy of the Department of Defence. He comments 'as the defence forces shrank, so the paper and procedures needed to administer them expanded as Defence reasserted its administrative supremacy over the warriors'.[104] Other subjects that were discussed in his analysis of the initial post-war period included a brief examination of UN operations, intelligence cooperation, Irish communist activity, refugees and immigration, Anglo-Irish relations, and Republican subversion.

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[100] Ibid.
[101] Ibid.
[102] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.262.
[103] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.263.
[104] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.265.

O'Halpin begins his analysis of the Northern crisis in 1969 remarking that neither the Government nor the political system was prepared. He remarks that the 'government's political response to the unfolding events in Northern Ireland was confused'.[105] While he gives consideration to the Arms crisis, there is considerable analysis given to the evolution of Republican subversion since 1969 and their links with foreign groups.[106] O'Halpin also considers the complexities of interstate security cooperation remarking that despite the Arms Crisis, G2 (military intelligence) retained good links with British security agencies.[107] He remarks that 'exchanges of intelligence and joint assessments of terrorist capabilities and intentions appear to have become that stock-in-trade of cross-border cooperation, together with the provision of cover from the Irish side for British security forces investigating incidents near the border'.[108]

In regard to the development of the Defence Forces, O'Halpin argues that 'since the late 1980s there has been a sustained effort to reappraise the purpose, structure, and operations of the defence forces'.[109] These were seen largely in the shadow of the Northern crisis with an increased role due to aid to the civil power operations.[110] The Army's involvement in UN missions brought significant change in the early 1990s. The UN training school was established in the Military College, legislation was passed that allowed the Army to participate in peace enforcement missions and a military advisor was appointed to the

[105] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.304.
[106] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.311.
[107] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.329.
[108] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.332.
[109] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.340.
[110] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.339.

Irish mission in UN headquarters.[111] O'Halpin also discussed the implications of European Union membership on defence policy.[112]

O'Halpin concluded that 'the state's apprehension about the role of the military has had unhappy consequences for the defence forces. These have been denied a clear long-term role beyond the vaguest and most implausible of injunctions to secure the independent defence of the national territory'.[113]

O'Halpin also considered the post-Emergency period in his chapter 'The army in independent Ireland'. He remarked that 'from a military perspective, the lessons of the 1939-45 period were clear. Defence was a long- term business not one to be dealt with through a series of hasty and inadequate improvisations'.[114] However O'Halpin considers that the Government did not share the military's conclusions and 'all the old pre-war problems of numbers, equipment, policy and purpose re-emerged in the post-war era'.[115] This chapter also examined the new roles the Irish army were given in this period – United Nations peacekeeping missions and aid to the civil power operations because of the Northern crisis. He concludes that 'the army today finds itself in a familiar plight. Defence policy continues to consist mainly in maintaining the form, not the substance, of an army organised to defend the State unaided from external aggression'.[116]

John Jackson, a British sociologist was also concerned with the post-Emergency era in *The Irish Army and the Development of the Constabulary Concept* and argued that the Irish Army

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[111] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.340.
[112] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, pp 344-47.
[113] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.351.
[114] O'Halpin, 'army in independent Ireland' in Bartlett & Jeffery (Eds*) A Military History of Ireland*, p.421.
[115] O'Halpin, 'army in independent Ireland' in Bartlett & Jeffery (Eds*) A Military History of Ireland*, p.422.
[116] O'Halpin, 'army in independent Ireland' in Bartlett & Jeffery (Eds*) A Military History of Ireland*, p.427.

very clearly demonstrated the development of the constabulary concept which, Morris Janowitz argued, is increasing the characteristic posture of the armies of smaller nations in Western Europe.[117] Jackson posits that Irish civil-military relations closely resemble 'the ideal formulation of the democratic model' where the Irish military see themselves subject to unwavering civil control.[118] Jackson considers the Irish Army as a prototype of certain aspects of the constabulary role. He sought to analyse the specific pattern of civil-military relations that developed, the institutional characteristics of the Army in its internal and external relations and attempted to assess what indigenous professional elements characterise the Army's institutional identity as opposed to traditional and situational factors which have led to the acceptance of the constabulary role.[119]

Like Farrell and O'Halpin, Jackson considered that the Irish Army in its present form must always be considered in the context of the War of Independence and the establishment of the State as there was uncertainty about the function and purpose of the Army during this period. He remarked that in the nascent years of the Army 'there appeared to be a general reluctance on the part of the political leaders of the country to commit themselves beyond recognition that the army existed as a mark of sovereignty in the State'.[120] O'Halpin also questioned the necessity for an army in the newly independent state. He, like Jackson, considered that the Army was a symbol of 'virile independence' and sovereignty. He remarked that the Army was needed to lay claim to the Irish Volunteers, lest the Republicans take it as their own and to provide a defence to Republican subversion. He

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[117] John Jackson, 'The Irish Army and the Development of the Constabulary Concept' in Jacques Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces and Society* (The Hague, 1968) p.109.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Jackson, 'Development of Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces*, p.111.
[120] Jackson, 'Development of Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces*, pp 112-3.

concluded that the Army was also required for the purposes of external defence.[121] Jackson posited that the State's policy of neutrality throughout the Second World War was the State's way of asserting its independence status and also emphasised the defensive and internal role of the Army.[122]

Jackson stated that after the end of the Second World War 'Ireland's interests were developed in association with international activities particularly after her admission to the United Nations in 1956. This international involvement has since become highly significant as Irish foreign policy has been increasingly indentified with United Nations affairs'.[123]

He considers that the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) established the precedence for the external application of the constabulary concept and symbolised a new role for both the Army and the State as an "effective neutral".[124] Other activities such as the Cadets forming part of the Guard of Honour at President Kennedy's funeral also signified a new, more international role, for the Army.[125]

Jackson also queried the relationship between Ireland and Britain and the impact this had on the competition between nationalist values and professional military codes. He points to the continued dominion status and the British-occupied Treaty Ports until 1938 as ties that bound Britain and Ireland. The consequence of this was that 'the ideological features of national policy have never entirely permitted the growth of a totally negative image of the British as a means to assert their own institutions'.[126] O'Halpin considers the issue of the

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[121] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, pp 82-3.
[122] Jackson, 'Development of Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces*, p.114.
[123] Jackson, 'Development of Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces*, p.114.
[124] Jackson, 'Development of Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces*, p.115-6.
[125] Jackson, 'Development of Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces*, p.117.
[126] Jackson, 'Development of Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces*, p.118.

Treaty Ports further when remarking that 'for Ireland, the impact was more profound, because it meant that the government could postpone indefinitely further consideration of problems of external defence'.[127]

With regard to civil-military relations, Jackson remarks that a 'structural problem may arise from the degree to which the Irish Army would appear to be "domesticated"'. He posits that this relates not only to civil control of the military but also to the structure of the military organisation. He illustrates this with an example regarding recruitment which took place within the three areas of command. He remarks that there was little interchange of personnel between the three areas. Another consequence of this is that recruitment then generally tends to mainly attract people from garrison towns, therefore not fully representative of the State.[128]

Jackson concluded that he did not consider the five major hypotheses that Morris Janowitz used to examine the modern American military profession as being appropriate in the Irish context. Janowitz's hypotheses were; modification takes place in the basis of authority and discipline toward a more 'managerial' concept involving persuasion and group consensus, a narrowing of skill differential between military and civilian elites due to changes in technology, a widening in the base of officer recruitment, the career structure is modified to make access to elite positions dependent on competent performance, and the military has developed a more explicit political ethos.[129] Jackson suggests that there are features of the Irish situation which are clearly deviant from the pattern suggested by the armies of older

[127] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.95.
[128] Jackson, 'Development of Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces*, p.119.
[129] Jackson, 'Development of Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces*, pp 123-25.

Western states.[130] Such features include describing the Irish Army as having a more 'conscious' discipline rather than 'blind' which may have grown out of a cultural tradition in which the obligations of soldiers were clearly defined. There were also no real differences in social origins between officers and men and this meant that discipline was viewed as a military tool rather than one used to consolidate class distinctions.[131] He remarked that technological advancement did not have a significant impact on the advancement of the Army. With regard to widening the base of officer recruitment, the Cadet School's educational requirement of having a Leaving Certificate qualification limited entry.[132] Jackson described the promotion system of the Army as depending on the results of examinations as a basis for entry to staff courses and the Command and Staff School. The military has no explicit political ethos. However, in the external sphere, Jackson remarks that 'there is a sense in which the Army has acted in an innovating capacity in seeking wide experience with discussion and interchange with other armies. This has no doubt contributed toward the development of new definitions of the military posture and adaptation of professional training'.[133] Jackson concludes that he does not believe that the constabulary concept is adequate to describe the participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions. He uses the term Fire Brigade concept, a term coined by Gen. MacEoin, which would have the ability to 'act speedily, anywhere, at the minimum notice and in a neutral capacity'.[134]

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[130] Jackson, 'Development of Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces*, p.122.
[131] Jackson, 'Development of Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces*, pp 123-24.
[132] Jackson, 'Development of Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces*, p.124.
[133] Jackson, 'Development of Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces*, p.125.
[134] Jackson, 'Development of Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces*, p.126.

Trevor C. Salmon's *The Changing Nature of Irish Defence Policy* remarks that 'in the post-1945 period there has been little genuine debate on issues relating to Irish defence policy. Only problems associated with Northern Ireland, such as the non-use of force and possible overflow of violence into the Republic, can be said to have been discussed seriously'.[135] He believed that this was due to a lack of research on defence at the time his article was published in 1979 and that research that had been carried out was too backward thinking in nature, focussing on the origins of neutrality and its impact on the Emergency period. He remarked that 'the emphasis on Northern Ireland and neutrality has precluded discussion and analysis of other critical issues in Irish defence policy'.[136]

Salmon points to the little attention paid to the role of the Permanent Defence Force (PDF), the relationship between the role or roles of the PDF and its structure, and the level and type of capabilities required to fulfil those roles. He remarks that 'although these topics have occasionally been discussed in the Irish Dáil, there has been no concerted examination of them and once they have gone out of fashion they may be forgotten again'.[137]

Salmon posits that another area which is deficient in analysis was UN peacekeeping and when considering the roles of the PDF remarked

> has enough account been taken of the UN peacekeeping role? It is strange, particularly given the relative continuity of such service – since 1960 in respect of peacekeeping and in 1958 in respect of observing some 17,000 soldiers have been

[135] Trevor C. Salmon, 'The Changing Nature of Irish Defence Policy' in *World Today*, xxxv, no.11 (November 1979), p.462.
[136] Salmon, *Changing Nature of Irish Defence Policy*, p.463.
[137] Ibid.

> supplied- that no separate unit of the PDF has been established for such purposes or trained for the special, and abnormal, requirements of the peacekeeping role.[138]

He also believed that the arguments against alliances with Britain and NATO were outdated remarking that

> the first question to ask is whether Ireland is capable of effectively defending itself. All the European "neutrals" – Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland –seem to make a bigger defence effort than Ireland, a tendancy which is especially pronounced given their lack of an "internal security" problem. The figures for defence spending suggest that Ireland is implicitly relying on Britain and NATO.[139]

After an analysis of the implications of a possible EU defence policy he remarked that there was a need for a thorough re-examination of the roles and structures of the PDF which have continually been reiterated rather than examined.[140] He considered that the 'structure and equipment of an army ought presumably to be related to the nature of the actual threats it faces'.[141] However he points to the political consensus that the Army was incapable of meeting the internal security needs of the State. He concluded that

> recent developments put the onus on them [Irish policymakers] to develop a new orientation in order to meet the changed nature of the problems. Ireland is already cooperating with its neighbours and will be cooperating increasingly, albeit in a non-

[138] Salmon, *Changing Nature of Irish Defence Policy*, p.468.
[139] Salmon, *Changing Nature of Irish Defence Policy*, p.467.
[140] Salmon, *Changing Nature of Irish Defence Policy*, p.468.
[141] Salmon, *Changing Nature of Irish Defence Policy*, p.469.

> legalistic and non-formalistic manner, in areas of security and in ways which 30 years ago would have been impossible to contemplate.[142]

Other notable works on the Defence Forces include JP Duggan's *A History of the Irish Army*.[143] Duggan has provided a comprehensive history of the Irish Army from the founding of the Volunteers until the 1990s. A considerable amount of text deals with the period from the War of Independence until the end of the Emergency. Regarding the period of this thesis, Duggan provides an account of the dismantling of the Emergency forces and the organisational issues that arose because of this. Duggan also tackles the beginning of UN operations and briefly discussed border operations in the North. While this book is the first of its kind, it is descriptive and uncritical rather than analytical in nature.[144]

It is evident from the above discussion that Theo Farrell has made a significant contribution to the understanding of the evolution of the Defence Forces, specifically looking at the transformation from a guerrilla force to a conventional force posture. He examined the decision to adopt a British military model post-independence, the importance of being considered a professional army and its impact on the dominant norm of conventional warfare. Farrell focused his analysis from the post- independence period until the Second World War. Therefore a study concentrating on the evolution of the Defence Forces from the post-Emergency period onwards can be considered worthy as considerable growth and change has occurred throughout this period. The intention here is not to further theory test

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[142] Salmon, *Changing Nature of Irish Defence Policy*, p.470.
[143] John P. Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army* (Dublin, 1991).
[144] The author concurs with the review of Donal O'Carroll. Please see Donal O'Carroll, 'Oglaigh na hEireann. Review: A History of the Irish Army' in *Fortnight*, no.296 (June 1991), p.25.

or build on the approaches outlined by Farrell; rather, it seeks to provide an historical narrative with a theoretical and conceptual framework appropriate for this study.

Eunan O'Halpin provides an extensive chronological account of both defence and security issues affecting the State. O'Halpin's work is not primarily concentrated on the history and changing nature of the Defence Forces, although they play a significant role in his research. This thesis attempts to build on the knowledge he provided on the Defence Forces. It is evident from the analysis of *Defending Ireland* that the approach and central research question of this thesis differs to O'Halpin's work although each of the themes identified by the author is addressed. This thesis will expand on each theme by using different source materials and will provide a more specific thematic analysis of events referred to in *Defending Ireland* by primarily examining them through a military lens.

John Jackson provides another framework on which this thesis was based. This thesis will argue that Janowitz's constabulary concept could not be considered to be fully developed until the ongoing aid to the civil power operations as a result of the Northern crisis. Without this enduring role, the Defence Forces could not be properly regarded as a constabulary force.

It is evident that Trevor C. Salmon's article *The Changing Nature of Irish Defence Policy* is outdated considering the wealth of analysis provided by scholars in this literature review. However, while this thesis is not primarily concerned with policy, what it hopes to achieve is to consider Salmon's argument regarding new developments for the Irish Defence Forces and their implications for the organisation.

This thesis will add to the work undertaken by John P. Duggan in *A History of the Irish Army* by providing an analytical account of the history of the Defence Forces, elaborating, expanding and shedding further light with additional source material to what has already been discussed here. Duggan provides a framework from which to base further research.

This literature review has sought to do is examine scholarly work on the history and evolution of the Defence Forces and from this consider what gaps exist and what this thesis will contribute to the knowledge. From this, it is evident that there is a lack of significant work on the evolution of the post-Emergency Defence Forces and the objective of this thesis is to fill this gap.

Chapter 2

A Complex Relationship: Civil-Military Relations in Ireland

"Nations which develop a properly balanced pattern of civil – military relations have a great advantage in the search for security. They increase their likelihood of reaching right answers to the operating issues of military policy. Nations which fail to develop a balanced pattern of civil-military relations squander their resources and run uncalculated risks"

- *Samuel Huntington (1957)*[145]

Introduction

Civil-military relations have been described as 'subjects of research during times of peace'.[146] Periods of war offer their own considerations and challenges with regard to civil-military relations but the Irish Defence organisation, because of the State's policy of military neutrality since the Second World War, has yet to face these wartime challenges. Notwithstanding this, civil-military relations have had a remarkable influence on the evolution of the Defence Forces. This is not a uniquely Irish phenomenon. The relationship between the civil and the military elements of a state's apparatus has long been of interest to historians, political scientists and sociologists. Civil-military relations have become a multi-disciplinary research theme due to its ever changing and evolving nature. As Peter Feaver remarked 'The civil-military problematique is so vexing because it involves balancing two vital and potentially conflicting societal desiderata. On the one hand, the military must

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[145] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil – Military Relations* (London, 1957), p.2.

[146] Jacques Van Doorn, 'Continuity and Discontinuity in Civil-Military Relations' in Michel Louis Martin and Ellen Stern McCrate (eds), *The Military, Militarism and the Polity: Essays in Honor of Morris Janowitz* (London,1984), p.35.

be strong enough to prevail in war... On the other, the military must conduct its own affairs so as not to destroy or prey upon the society it is intended to protect'.[147] Feaver has attempted to demonstrate the precarious nature of civil- military relations and the unique balancing act required to achieve a harmonious co-existence. Major theoretical debates in civil-military relations include institutional theory, convergence theory, agency theory, concordance theory, and institutional/occupational theory. The scholarly work of the major theorists associated with the above will be briefly discussed.[148] Examination of their core arguments is necessary as it will provide a theoretical foundation in which the Irish context can be examined.

Theoretical Debates

Samuel Huntington's primary objective in *The Soldier and the State* was to develop 'a way of looking at and thinking about civil-military relations, in short, a theoretical framework' because of his belief that the study of civil-military relations had suffered from too little theorising.[149] Huntington posited institutional theory.

He believed that the development of the officer corps into a professional body, (that is professionalism in the form of a vocation to service as a career officer with expertise, responsibility and corporateness), distinguished the modern military officer from that of warriors of previous eras and gave a 'unique cast to the modern problem of civil-military relations'.[150] Huntington believed that in order to preserve liberal democracy, objective

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[147] Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-military Relations* (London, 2003), p.4.
[148] This is not to dismiss the work of other theorists in this field such as James Burk, Eliot Cohen, Sam C. Sarkesian and David Segal. The civil-military relations debate is vast and it is not within the scope of this thesis to provide an in-depth examination. What is presented here is a brief discussion of the theoretical debates in order to provide a framework for the evidence to be placed.
[149] Huntington, *Soldier and State*, p.vii.
[150] Huntington, *Soldier and State*, p.7.

civilian control was required rather than subjective. Objective civilian control was defined as the maximising of military professionalism and directly opposed to subjective civilian control. He observed that 'subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them a tool of the state'.[151] He remarked that by professionalising the military, it renders them politically sterile and neutral.[152] Huntington defined two levels and five patterns of civil-military relations. The two levels were identified as the "power level" and the "ideological level". On the power level, Huntington believed that the key issue was the power of the officer corps in relation to civilian groups within society. On the ideological level, the key issue was the compatibility of the professional military ethic with the political ideologies prevailing in society.[153] Of the five patterns of civil-military relations identified by Huntington, the third may be applied to the Irish context: anti- military ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism. A society which suffers few threats to its security is likely to have this type of civil-military relations. This is challenging for a military force because the existence of an inherent anti-military ideology leads to an isolated existence from general society.[154] While Huntington created a workable civil-military theoretical framework that was applicable to most military forces, his thesis was not to go unchallenged.

Morris Janowitz's opening statement in *The Professional Soldier* succinctly addresses civilian attitude to the military:

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[151] Huntington, *Soldier and State*, pp 83-4.
[152] Ibid.
[153] Huntington, *Soldier and State*, pp 85-6.
[154] Huntington, *Soldier and State*, pp 96-7.

> The civilian image of the professional soldier remains firmly rooted in the past. His style of life, his day to day tasks, and his aspirations change as the technology of war is transformed. Yet, outdated and obscure conceptions of the military persist because civilian society, including the alert political public, prefer to remain uninformed. Military officers, especially those who occupy posts at the highest echelons, are only dimly perceived as persons, decision-makers, and political creatures.[155]

Janowitz's theory analysed the evolution of the military profession between the two World Wars commenting that it was based on existing trends in invention, organisation and firepower. The outcome of this was a merger of the military and the civilian departments. As the resources of the state were increasingly required by the military, 'it became appropriate to speak of the "civilianization" of the military profession and of the parallel extension of military forms into civilian social structure'.[156] However, Janowitz posited that the

> self conceptions and professional ideology of the military officer have served as a powerful counterforce to civilianisation. The activities subsumed under the term military – the management of the instrument of violence – are immense and, in fact, they are mainly logistical and administrative. Nevertheless, the notion of combat – preparation for battle and actual battle- has remained a central military value.[157]

Janowitz's solution of protecting the liberal democracy differed from Huntington's "objective control" in that Janowitz believed that the military would benefit from outside

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[155] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (London, 1960), p.3.
[156] Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, pp viii-ix.
[157] Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, p.xi.

civilian intervention. He introduced a theory of convergence, arguing that the military, despite the extremely slow pace of change, was in fact changing even without external pressure.[158] Convergence theory postulated either a civilianisation of the military or a militarization of society. However, despite this convergence, Janowitz insisted that the military world would retain certain essential differences from the civilian and that it would remain recognisably military in nature.[159] Janowitz agreed with Huntington that because of the fundamental differences between the civilian and military worlds, clashes would develop which would diminish the goal of civilian control of the military. His answer was to ensure that convergence occurred, thus guaranteeing that the military world would be permeated with the norms and expectations of the society that created it. Janowitz encouraged the use of conscription, which would bring a wide variety of individuals into the military. He also encouraged more use of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) to ensure that military academies did not have a monopoly on the type of officer in the military services.[160] He specifically encouraged the development of ROTC programs in the more elite universities so that the broader influences of society would be represented by the officer corps. The more societal influences present within the military culture, the smaller the attitudinal differences between the two elements and the greater chance of civilians maintaining control over the military.[161]

Samuel Finer's seminal work *The Man on Horseback* has been described as representing

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[158] Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, p.viii.
[159] Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, p.xv.
[160] ROTC is a scheme in the US where potential officers are recruited in universities. Their fees are paid in exchange for a service commitment. ROTC is regarded as a counterbalance to the influence of the West Point Military Academy. Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, p.xxix.
[161] Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, pp xiv – li.

> a pioneering effort to comprehensively look at the global phenomenon of intervention efforts by armed forces into civil affairs. This provides a different perspective and it is an examination of the subject not undertaken by others. Finer reviews motives, causes, methods, consequences, and other factors that may stimulate or preclude such intervention.[162]

Finer disregarded the historically accepted theory, what he described as 'an unreflecting belief', that it was natural for the military to obey the civil authority. He questions that 'instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise'.[163] Finer identified three political advantages over civilian organisations; a marked superiority in organisation, a highly emotionalised symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms. [164] Finer challenged Huntington's core thesis regarding the necessity of professionalising the military in order to preserve democracy. He pointed to the German and Japanese, which he described as "notorious" examples of the highly professional officer corps intervening in politics.[165] He asserted that it was of no use to retort that in such cases these armies cannot be described as "fully" professional. He believed that this reveals the weakness in Huntington's thesis stating that 'all is made to hang upon a very special definition of professionalism, and by pure deduction from this, of a so-called "military-mind". The argument then becomes "essentialist". If soldiers are observed to act in ways inconsistent with these concepts of "professionalism" and the "military mind", so much worse for the soldiers; they are not completely "professional", not purely "military"'.[166] Jay

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[162] Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New Jersey, 2006), p.xiv.
[163] Finer, *Man on Horseback*, p.5.
[164] Finer, *Man on Horseback*, pp 5-6.
[165] Finer, *Man on Horseback*, p.25.
[166] Ibid.

Stanley remarked that 'Finer has developed a theoretical paradigmatic design that can be interpreted as the core of his thesis. Recognising that societies are not static, the model results in the formation of continua for the development of the two dimensions of military intervention and political culture, with each reflecting four levels'.[167] These four levels are minimal, low, developed and mature political cultures. Intersecting the levels of political cultural development is a continuum of four levels of military intervention; constitutional, increased pressure, displacement and supplantment.[168]

Peter Feaver believed that the question of civil- military relations had become increasingly important in a post- 9/11 era 'simultaneously raising the stakes and underscoring the importance of civilian control to the day-to-day workings of the government'.[169] Feaver believed that the theoretical literature had not progressed much since Samuel Huntington published *The Soldier and the State*. He commented that Morris Janowitz provided an essential counterargument to Huntington but considered that on the key question of how civil institutions control military institutions daily, Janowitz's model did not represent a 'significant alternative'.[170] Feaver believed that Huntington's theory survived the test of time due to his theory being grounded in a 'deductive logic derived from democratic theory while his critics have not'.[171] Feaver's attempt to alter the paradigm is to put forward agency theory. He posits

> agency theory shares an institutional point of departure with Huntington, exploring how civilian and military actors relate on political decision in a democracy. Agency

[167] Finer, *Man on Horseback*, p.xvi.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, p.2.
[170] Ibid.
[171] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, p.9.

> theory uses the tools of the rationalist method, and is able to subsume Huntington's best empirical insights without being dependent on the rest of the Huntington model, which is not supported by the empirical record.[172]

He believed that agency theory, while Huntingtonian in nature, offers the possibility of linking Huntington's institutional analysis to some of Janowitz's sociological approach. He commented that agency theory was broad enough to address a range of civil-military issues and that it was 'specific enough to be useful in illuminating the political give and take involved in any single one. It has, in short, at least the necessary ambition if not the necessary prominence to be considered a rival paradigm of civil-military relations'.[173] His agency theory predicted that the result of a regime of intrusive monitoring by the civilian leadership, combined with shirking on the part of the military, would result in the highest levels of civil-military conflict.

Rebecca L. Schiff posited the theory of concordance in her article *Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance*. Schiff remarked that the central questions in this study were 'why will a military intervene in its own nation's system of government?' and 'what conditions promote or inhibit domestic military intervention?'.[174] She remarked

> a major conclusion of current civil-military theory is that militaries should remain physically and ideologically separated from political institutions. By contrast, the alternative theory proposed in this article argues that three partners- the military, the political elites, and the citizenry – should aim for a cooperative relationship that

[172] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, pp 9-10.
[173] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, p.10.
[174] Rebecca L. Schiff, 'Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance' in *Armed Forces and Society*, xxii, no.1 (Fall 1995), p.7.

> may or may not involve separation but does not require it. This concordance theory sees a high level of integration between the military and other parts of society as one of several types of military relationship.[175]

Schiff comments that the type of civil-military relationship is less important than the ability of the partners to agree on four indicators. These indicators are the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style.[176] Schiff believes that concordance theory achieves two goals- 'first it explains the institutional and cultural conditions that affect relations among the military, the political elites, and society; second it predicts that if the three partners agree on the four indicators, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur'.[177]

Schiff indentified two problems with current theory on civil-military relations that concordance theory resolves. Firstly, current theory is derived largely from the American experience. To combat this concordance theory 'considers the unique historical and cultural experiences of nations and the various other possibilities for civil-military relations'.[178] Secondly, current theory calls for the separation of civil and military institutions. Concordance theory resolves this as it

> moves beyond institutional analysis by addressing issues relevant to a nation's culture. Current international events demonstrate that ethnic orientations and issues of multicultural diversity are in fact causes of the domestic unrest now found throughout the world. Concordance theory operationalizes the specific institutional

[175] Schiff, *Theory of Concordance*, p.7.
[176] Schiff, *Theory of Concordance*, pp 7-8.
[177] Ibid.
[178] Schiff, *Theory of Concordance*, p.8.

and cultural indicators mentioned above and explains the empirical conditions under which the military, the government, and the society may agree on separate, integrated or other forms of civil-military relations in order to prevent domestic intervention.[179]

Schiff provided two case studies to illustrate the usefulness of concordance theory, Israel and India.[180] She concluded that 'policymakers should consider the indigenous conditions and complexities of nations before assuming that a particular civil-military scenario prevents domestic military intervention in all cases'.[181]

Charles C Moskos posited two models – Institution versus Occupation - to describe alternative concepts of military social organisation. His hypothesis is 'that the American military is moving from an institutional format to one more and more resembling an occupation'.[182]

Moskos defined an institution in terms of values and norms, 'a purpose transcending individual self interest in favour of a presumed higher good'.[183] Military service can be considered to have many institutional features such as extended periods abroad and being subject to military discipline. Moskos comments that 'the military variant of professionalism historically has been consistent with the institutional model'.[184] Moskos considers that an occupation 'is legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e., prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies'. He remarks the military has typically avoided the organisational

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[179] Ibid.
[180] Schiff, *Theory of Concordance*, p.9.
[181] Schiff, *Theory of Concordance*, p.22.
[182] Charles C Moskos, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organisation' in *Armed Forces and Society*, iv, no.1 (November 1977), p.42.
[183] Ibid.
[184] Moskos, *Institution to Occupation*, p.43.

outcomes of this model despite 'repeated recommendations of governmental commissions that the armed services adopt a salary system which would incorporate all basic pay, allowances, and tax benefits into one cash payment'.[185]

He considers that the cessation of conscription and the rise in military pay are two of the most visible changes in the modern military system. However he points to other indicators that could result in a more occupational model; proposals to reduce or eliminate some military benefits; the increasing class and racial unrepresentativeness of the grand combat arm; the separation of work and residence locales; the resistance of military wives to attend customary social functions; the high level of attrition and desertion post-Vietnam; and the increasing tendency of active duty personnel to bring grievances into litigation.[186]

A shift to an occupational model is not without organisational consequences and Moskos points to two certain outcomes of this shift, trade unionism and the increasing reliance on contract civilians to perform military tasks.[187] He concludes 'to describe observable trends in military organisation is not to mean they are inevitable. But developmental analysis reveals the impetus and probable outcomes of present trends in the emergent military'.[188]

The above examination of civil- military relations provides a theoretical insight to the Irish experience. Huntington promoted objective rather than subjective control; Janowitz encouraged convergence where military forces would be imbued by the norms of civil society; Finer debated whether it was natural for the military to be subject to civilian direction; Feaver endorsed agency theory and that intrusive monitoring, coupled with

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[185] Moskos, *Institution to Occupation*, p.43.
[186] Moskos, *Institution to Occupation*, p.45.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Moskos, *Institution to Occupation*, p.49.

shirking, resulted in the highest levels of conflict; Schiff advanced concordance theory which posits that the type of civil-military relationship was not important as long as the three partners agreed to the four indicators; and Moskos examined the institutional/occupational model and its consequences. These theoretical debates provide a foundation from which the civil-military relationship will be examined.

However, while these debates provide a foundation, the underlying conceptual framework remains Coxian historicism. Cox's method is highly flexible and integrated and much of the work of these theorists can be viewed through Cox's prism. For example, many of these of theorists have a strong institutional focus, examining the 'opposing tendencies' of rival institutions, the civil side and the military. All seek to examine the prevailing system and do not take social power relations for granted.

It is necessary to examine this relationship in the period predating that which is under review, the historical experience, in order to fully comprehend both its intricacies and the legacy for later years. The examples which follow are illustrative of each decade and will provide a unique insight into the complexity of civil- military relations in the twentieth century, especially that of a nascent democratic state. The Government had the task of the reorganisation of the post-Civil War Army and its role in the State. Kurt Lang remarked that 'coercive intervention by the military in politics of nations only just freed from colonial domination had been commonplace, with the low level of political culture characteristic of

many new nations being regarded as conducive to such intervention'.[189] Referring to the Irish experience Maryann Valiulis remarked

> in a country just emerging from a struggle for independence and a devastating civil war, the army was one of the most vital and central institutions; and the relationship between the military and the elected civilian government was crucial. In fact, at the end of the civil war, a strong possibility existed that, unless the government acted quickly to establish its control, the army could remain the dominant force in Irish politics for years to come.[190]

Historical Experience: 1920s – 1950s

Anthony Giddens posited that a question all democracies must address is how they intend to control violence.[191] Laura Cleary and Teri McConville remarked that 'there is a growing recognition that democracy will falter unless the principles of good governance are applied equally and impartially across all sectors of government, including, and especially, the defence and security services'.[192] They continued that 'for many new democracies, whether they are transitioning away from communist, authoritarian or military regime, the armed forces will have been a critical support to the regime. The challenge, therefore, is to develop a new, more balanced relationship between the civil society and the military'.[193] This can be considered in the Irish context, with the Army playing a critical role in securing

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[189] Kurt Lang, 'The Military Putsch in a Developed Political Culture' in Jacques Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays* (The Hague, 1968), p.202.
[190] Maryann Valiulis, 'The "Army Mutiny" of 1924 and the Assertion of Civilian Authority in Independent Ireland' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxiii, no.92 (Nov 1983), p.354.
[191] As quoted in Laura R. Cleary & Teri McConville, 'Commonalities and Constraints in Defence Governance and Management' in Laura R. Cleary & Teri McConville (Eds), *Managing Defence in a Democracy* (Oxon, 2006), p.4.
[192] Cleary & McConville, 'Commonalities and Constraints' in Cleary and McConville (Eds), *Managing Defence*, p.3.
[193] Cleary & McConville, 'Commonalities and Constraints' in Cleary and McConville (Eds), *Managing Defence*, p.5.

independence and winning the Civil War. However, the Government then had the responsibility of good governance of a democratic state and had to apply civil control of the military. As Valiulis remarked, 'the department of defence began early in 1923 the process of demobilisation and attempted to restructure the army. It planned to transform the nature of the military from a politically- involved and independent guerrilla force into a highly professional and disciplined army subject to unquestioning civil control'.[194]

The demobilisation of thousands of soldiers and the reorganisation of the Army resulted in the Mutiny in 1924. The mutineers 'were a group of officers who had fought in the Anglo-Irish war and who believed they were not being treated in a manner commensurate with the sacrifices they had made for the independence movement'.[195] The Mutiny began on 6 March 1924, after unsuccessful meetings between the mutineers and members of Government, when an ultimatum was delivered to the Government demanding 'the removal of the army council and the suspension of demobilization and reorganization' among other things.[196] President Cosgrave 'characterised the Mutiny as a "challenge to the democratic foundations of the state, to the very basis of parliamentary representation and of responsible government"'.[197] On 18 March there was a raid of a mutineers' meeting in Devlin's public house on Parnell Street and eleven officers were arrested. This led the cabinet to demand the resignation of the Army Council.[198] Valiulis commented that 'by peacefully resigning, the Army Council affirmed its belief in the liberal democratic ideals of

[194] Valiulis, *Army Mutiny*, p.358.
[195] Valiulis, *Army Mutiny*, p.358.
[196] Eunan O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its Enemies Since 1922* (Dublin, 1999), p.48.
[197] Valiulis, *Army Mutiny*, p.360.
[198] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, pp 50-53 and Valiulis, *Army Mutiny*, p.362.

the State'.[199] As JP Duggan concluded, 'the quashing of the mutiny in 1924 set the seal on the transition from a revolutionary military organisation which had successfully conducted a guerrilla campaign and survived a bitter Civil War, to a disciplined Regular National Army, subject to constitutional rule and subordinate to the government'.[200] The outcome of the Mutiny cemented the nascent State's attachment to democratic ideals. The next step would be how to apply enduring civil governance.

One of the most influential ways of securing civilian control is the "power of the purse". As Cleary remarked, 'through control of the budget and oversight of policy formulation and implementation, they seek to prevent the abuse of the military as an institutions and as individuals, and to ensure that the military is in service to the people, not a ruling faction'.[201] This was certainly the strategy of successive Irish governments. The passing of the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924, gave the Department of Finance 'the supervision and control of all purchases made for or on behalf of, and all supplies of commodities and goods held by, any Department of State and the disposal thereof'.[202] As Eunan O'Halpin remarked, 'civilian hegemony was attained primarily through financial controls'.[203]

The majority of the analysis of the historical experience will be examined through the use of the Committee of Public Accounts' reports. The structure and function of the Committee of Public Accounts dates back to the reforms initiated by the British Chancellor of the

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[199] Valiulis, *Army Mutiny*, p.364.
[200] John P Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army* (Dublin, 1991), p.138.
[201] Laura R. Cleary, 'Transparency and Accountability' in Laura R. Cleary & Teri McConville (Eds) *Managing Defence in a Democracy (*Oxon,2006), p.60.
[202] *Report of the Public Services Organisation Review Group* (hereafter Devlin Report) (Dublin, 1969), p.211
[203] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.88.

Exchequer, William Gladstone, on public expenditure.[204] The Irish Free State began to conduct Committee of Public Accounts meetings in 1922. The work of the Committee of Public Accounts is based on the annual report of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Appropriation Accounts. The work of the Comptroller and Auditor General provides independent assurance that public expenditure is properly administered.[205] The use of these reports for analysis of the burgeoning civil-military relationship is related to the assertion that both transparency and accountability are 'focal points in the promotion of good governance and security sector reform'.[206] Cleary remarked

> One of the principal means of ensuring accountability, and one of the least appreciated, is by audit. There is a tendency to view auditors with suspicion and hostility, and those subject to audit believe the auditors are only there to find fault. If, however, the purpose of accountability is to develop more efficient and effective organisations, then an audit, depending on how it is conducted, can make a significant contribution to that end.[207]

This thesis will examine the historical experience of the civil-military relationship by examining the auditing process as a method of civil governance of the military in a nascent democratic state. It will of necessity be quite detailed as this is crucial in demonstrating a clear pattern of behaviour. It should be also noted that the military were not unique in this process as all government departments are subject to similar procedures. From the research

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[204] History of the National Audit Office; available from http://www.nao.org.uk/about-us/role-2/what-we-do/history-of-the-nao/; last accessed 10/10/13.
[205] Role of the Public Accounts Committee; available from http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/agenda/committees_list/public-accounts/role/; last accessed 10/10/13.
[206] Cleary, 'Transparency and Accountability' in Cleary & McConville (Eds) *Managing Defence*, p.59.
[207] Cleary, 'Transparency and Accountability' in Cleary & McConville (Eds) *Managing Defence*, p.65.

undertaken, civil-military relations were not shaped by a single event; rather it was the application of consistent and recurring financial controls that fashioned the relationship.

1927-1929

By the end of the 1920s it became evident from the discussions recorded in the 1929 Committee of Public Accounts' report, that procedural changes were being put in place to exercise civil governance. Examples of this were apparent from the beginning of a meeting which took place in June 1929. The first issue that was addressed regarded pay upon resignation. Mr. J Maher, who represented the Exchequer and Audit Department, brought forward an incident where an officer

> whose resignation was accepted as from 22 May 1923 received pay up to the 17 September 1923. The acceptance of his resignation was communicated to his commanding office, but it would appear that on relinquishing duty at his station he went to another station, and payment was made on a ruling that there was no evidence that the acceptance of his resignation has been notified to him before September 1923.[208]

In 1923 pay and allowances were made by an officer of the Quartermaster Generals Branch. By 1929 however, officers were paid directly by cheque from the Army Finance Department. Procedural changes such as this can be regarded as progress in a fledgling democracy and can be considered as evidence of the emerging civil governance over the military.

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[208] *Report of the Committee of Public Accounts – together with the proceedings of the Committee, minutes of evidence and Appendices Appropriation Accounts 1927 -1928* (hereafter PAC 1929) 5 June 1929, p.106 (Official Publications, Trinity College Dublin).

The second issue that was discussed at the June 1929 meeting concerned flying pay, i.e. pay awarded to members of the Air Corps as a retention bonus and danger money, and its correlation to insurance. Officers were not insured by the State but at their own expense. Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen.) Peadar MacMahon gave evidence at this meeting. He had been appointed Chief of Staff in March 1924 following the 1924 Mutiny and served in that capacity until 31 March 1927 when he was appointed Secretary of the Department of Defence. He served in that capacity until 30 March 1958. In his thirty one years as Secretary of the Department of Defence, he served with eight Chiefs of Staff.[209] Eunan O'Halpin decribed MacMahon as an 'extreme example of a poacher turned gamekeeper. As secretary he was the main conduit of advice to the various ministers whom he served, and as an ex-chief of staff he could second-guess the army even on purely military matters'.[210] In his evidence, Lt. Gen. McMahon stated that the extra pay was regarded partly as technical pay and partly as risk pay as the cost of the insurance premium for Air Corps officers are much higher than that of infantry or artillery officers.[211] In response to a question as to 'when fixing the flying pay the question of the insurance policy was taken into account?' MacMahon stated 'No. If Army officers were going to do that it would be better for the Army to pay the insurance and as you know the State, except in a few cases, does not insure'.[212]

The question of insurance, present in the early days of the organisation, is an important issue within any military force as they are employed in a high risk profession. With regard to this particular case, W. Doolin, representing the Department of Finance, stated that

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[209] Author's private collection.
[210] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.88.
[211] *PAC 1929,* 5 June 1929, p.108.
[212] *PAC 1929,* 5 June 1929, p.108.

> two things were taken into consideration, one was skill, and the other was risk. The question of insurance did not enter into it at that stage. That was a private matter between the officer and his family. Obviously the premium would be higher in the case of men engaged in dangerous occupations, but the matter is entirely a personal arrangement. It is a skilled occupation and the broad basis upon which flying pay was fixed was (1) risk and (2) skill.[213]

It should be noted that there was significant interest from infantry officers in becoming pilots in the 1920s due to the attractive pay conditions. Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col) Michael O'Malley remarked that 'the flying pay of a pupil pilot represented a 50 per cent increase in pay, while a successful pupil would be rewarded a pay increase of almost 90 per cent'.[214] The query regarding risk pay suggests that even in the early years of the state there was a desire for transparency in public spending.

The above examples are taken from the Committee of Public Accounts reports. Debates in Dáil Eireann were also concerned with Army expenditure. In 1929 the Minister of Defence Desmond FitzGerald remarked 'this is the first year we got the cost of the Army down to what has been estimated as the normal cost; that is to say, the whole cost of the Army this year is met out of revenue and nothing is treated as exceptional expenditure'.[215] Not all members agreed with the Minister. Frank Kerlin, a Fianna Fáil politican, countered

> If this Estimate is referred back for reconsideration, and if the Minister for Defence gets down to serious work on it, with his colleague the Minister for Finance, I am

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[213] *PAC 1929,* 5 June 1929, p.109.
[214] Michael O'Malley, *Military Aviation in Ireland 1921-45* (Dublin, 2010), pp 113-114.
[215] Dáil Debates, 29 (1157) 01 May 1929; available from http://debates.oireachtas.ie/Dáil/1929/05/01/00026.asp; last accessed 01/07/12.

> sure the difficulty of obtaining at least the £100,000 required for that purpose would be not insurmountable. If the Minister for Finance arms himself with the economy axe, and if the Minister for Defence uses the pruning knife, I am sure that between the two they will be able to clip the wings of the Army Estimate a little more closely.[216]

Kerlin also alluded to previous debates in which the 'utter uselessness of the present type of Army organisation' was discussed. He believed that the Government was only toying with the question of national defence and that there was too much emphasis placed on following the British Army model despite the differences in financial resources.[217]

The Irish Military Mission to the United States of America was also under discussion at this time. The Mission, consisting of six officers, was sent to the United States in 1926 to study organisation and training methods, on courses of instruction with the United States Army. On its return in 1927, a Temporary Plans Division was set up to formulate military theory and policy for the Defence Forces. The Division made a detailed study of defence requirements and submitted its report in five extensive memoranda in June 1928.[218] The choice of America as the location for the mission was interesting. Eunan O'Halpin quotes a memo in 1925 by the executive council, remarking that

> the Army must be an independent national force capable of assuming responsibility for the defence of territory of Saorstát Éireann against invasion, or internal disruptive agencies; but it must also be organised, trained and equipped as to render

[216] Dáil Debates, 29 (1161) 01 May 1929; available from http://debates.oireachtas.ie/Dáil/1929/05/01/00026.asp; last accessed 01/07/12.
[217] Dáil Debates, 29 (1163-1164) 01 May 1929; available from http://debates.oireachtas.ie/Dáil/1929/05/01/00026.asp; last accessed 01/07/12.
[218] *The Irish Defence Forces Handbook*, p.92 (MA).

> it capable of full and complete coordination with the forces of the British Government in the defence of Ireland.[219]

Despite this statement of policy, no evidence was found of steps taken to develop links with the British forces although there were incidental contacts regarding specialist training and related matters.

The Committee of Public Accounts discussed the cost of the Mission and not only encompassed the question of travelling expenses but also brought under question the cost of a journey to Canada taken by the officers which was not included in the original sanction.[220] The report continued that the officers were abroad for seventeen months and were obliged to go on leave when their school was on leave, as there was no other option available to them. Because of this they also would have been entitled to a leave voucher. It also came to light that a wife of one of the officers went to the United States. Maher did not think it was 'customary in the public service to pay expenses to the relative of an officer going for a short time on transfer from one place to another. That is to say, where it is not on permanent transfer...Then there is a second point that during the residence of the wife in America this officer was paid subsistence allowance at a special rate'.[221] Deputy Thomas O'Higgins, a Cumman na nGaedheal politician, countered that

> The question of the transfer, 14 to 17 months, could not be regarded as a short transfer in the Army. It would be about the maximum length that any officer would be left in any particular position. The officer is just transferred and there is nothing

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[219] Eunan O' Halpin, "The army in Independent Ireland" in Thomas Bartlett & Keith Jeffery (Eds) A *Military History of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1996), p.413.
[220] *PAC 1929*, 5 June 1929, p.112.
[221] *PAC 1929*, 5 June 1929, p.113.

said about the transfer being temporary or permanent. Then there are regulations which entitled the family to have their travelling expenses paid by the Army Finance Department. With regard to the subsistence allowance, it cannot be mixed with the ordinary subsistence allowance under ordinary regulations, which allow subsistence allowance at the usual rate.[222]

Deputy Robert Briscoe, a Jewish Fianna Fáil politician, concluded

> When this matter was under review last year, I was questioning in my own mind the advisability of this expenditure in comparison with the amount of value the State would receive in exchange. In view of certain reorganisation that is going on in the Army at the present time, arising out of the experience gained by these officers in America, are we to take it that this reorganisation is the result of the experience gained in America?.

MacMahon countered 'Yes'.[223] By the normal standards of Dáil scrutiny of military affairs, this was an unusually purposeful exchange.

The merits of the Military Mission were also discussed in the Dáil. Kerlin remarked that he approved of sending officers on international courses, with the preference of America over Great Britain. However he felt that the cost of the mission was excessive, remarking ' I suppose I may be pardoned for voicing the suspicion that the entire amount of £34 per week per officer was not spent on the acquisition of military knowledge. I am sure that a fair proportion of it was spent on social extravagances and on hitting the high spots, I suppose,

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[222] *PAC 1929*, 5 June 1929, p.113. It should be noted here that Deputy O'Higgins would become a founder of the Blueshirts in 1932.
[223] *PAC 1929*, 5 June 1929, p.113.

in West Point, or whatever other academy the officers attended'.[224] Thomas Derrig, a Fianna Fáil politician, sought to examine the Appropriation Accounts in the same sitting of the Dáil. He remarked, with regard to the Military Mission, 'I do not know if we got value for the money in that case or not'.[225] He asked that if the Minister was going to seek further capital for educational courses, 'he ought to tell us whether the effect of the education that has already been given is to place the Army on an American basis or whether, as I understand, it is now the position that it is lapsing back again to the old foundation of working upon British regulations'.[226]

These were very insightful from Fianna Fáil politicians of this era. Eunan O'Halpin remarked

> If the minutes of its meetings are any guide, the main preoccupation of the Fianna Fáil parliamentary party between October 1927 and December 1931 was discipline. This term embraced not only the basic criterion of always voting as instructed, but a host of related matters such as policy making, speaking in debates, attending meetings, and paying subscriptions when due.[227]

Fianna Fáil's Thomas Derrig, Frank Kerlin and Robert Briscoe all had recent military experience both during the War of Independence and the Civil war. It is suggested that because of this, they could contribute in such a manner to the debate. Laura Cleary posits that one of the barriers to accountability is lack of professionalism. By this she is not

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[224] Dáil Debates, 29 (1169) 01 May 1929; available from http://debates.oireachtas.ie/Dáil/1929/05/01/00026.asp; last accessed 01/07/12.
[225] Dáil Debates, 29 (1221) 01 May 1929; available from http://debates.oireachtas.ie/Dáil/1929/05/01/00026.asp; last accessed 01/07/12.
[226] Dáil Debates, 29 (1221) 01 May 1929; available from http://debates.oireachtas.ie/Dáil/1929/05/01/00026.asp; last accessed 01/07/12.
[227] Eunan O' Halpin, 'Parliamentary Party Discipline and Tactics: The Fianna Fáil Archives 1926-32' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxx, no.120 (November 1997), pp 586-587.

referring to military professionalism. Rather it refers to 'military officers in developing democracies complaining about the quality of the political leaderships' knowledge of defence and security issues'.[228] It is evident from above that those who were knowledgeable in defence matters were able to contribute constructively to the debate.

The Military Mission provided an opportunity for change within the organisation through professional military education. The Mission was the catalyst in establishing the Irish Military College. If the Irish State were to follow Huntington's theory and keep the Defence Forces politically neutral, then they would have encouraged such a mission to increase the professionalism of the force. It is clear that while some members of the Dáil understood the usefulness of such a mission, others questioned the expenditure and its value for money.

Another concern at the conclusion of the first eight years of the organisation was the acquisition of equipment and uniforms, a necessity for the nascent organisation. An example of how problematic this could become is evident in the period between 1927 and 1928. During this period, twenty four leather flying coats were purchased at a cost of £218. 12s. A similar number were purchased in 1925, some of which were still in store. The discussion began by asking why these were issued to officers of the Air Corps not engaged on flying duties. Maher remarked that

> During the financial year, the issue of flying coats was not an issue of personal equipment under the regulations. Subsequently, regulations were framed making the issue of flying coats to officers of the Air Corps personal equipment. That order did not come out until the month of February, 1928, which is towards the close of

[228] Cleary, 'Transparency and Accountability' in Cleary & McConville (Eds) *Managing Defence*, p.69.

> the financial year. The view of the Comptroller and Auditor General was that as these coats are rather expensive they should not be personal equipment, but should either be attached to the machines or else used only for actual flying. That would mean a considerable economy in the use of the coats, whereas when they are used as personal equipment, there is a good deal of extra wear and tear.[229]

The discussion with regard to equipment continued to the purchase of rifle barrels, authorised by the Department of Finance in 1926. The number authorised was 3,000. The number ordered was 10,000. Lt. Gen. MacMahon could not initially provide a reason for the discrepancy.[230] The following day, MacMahon provided further information regarding the Department of Finance sanction for the purchase. He stated that it was informal but considered urgent. He remarked

> we had a number of rifles that were defective. They could be made serviceable by substituting new barrels for the old barrels. We thought we could get the barrels at that particular time. As a matter of fact, it was only when an officer was over in London in connection with the matter that we found we could not get delivery as early as we anticipated. It was when the officer was about to go to London that the Accounting Officer saw a representative of the Department of Finance and got verbal sanction.[231]

The Chairman required justification from the Department of Finance regarding the further sanction. Doolin commented that

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[229] *PAC 1929*, 6 June 1929, p.124.
[230] *PAC 1929,* 12 June 1929, p.125.
[231] *PAC 1929,* 12 June 1929, p.134.

Early in February, 1926, a statement of the quantities of ammunition and rifles required was submitted to us. The statement setting out the requirements was formally submitted to us and formally approved. It contained an item for 3,000 rifle barrels. All this was proceeding side by side with the settlement of the details of the coming general Army estimate. February is the time of year when the Department of Finance is pressing to get definite and final figures from all Departments. At this particular stage we had arrived at final figures for the coming estimate. About the 6 February, 1926, after the sanction for the 3,000 barrels had been given and long after the final figures for the Army Estimate, including the sub-head that deals with supplies of ammunition and rifles and other things of that sort, had been arranged, Mr. Gorman appeared in the Department of Finance with a notification from the Quartermaster – General setting out that it was urgently necessary to increase the supply of new rifle barrels required for the purpose of reconditioning the existing stock of defective Army rifles. He asked for the authority to increase the 3,000, already formally agreed to, to 10,000; that meant an increase of 7,000 rifle barrels. The officer in my Department dealing with the matter gave him a written unofficial sanction. He wrote across the document which Mr. O' Gorman showed to him, indicating that there could be no alteration in the Estimate (which had just been fixed and the particulars of which had gone to the people who were making arrangements for the printing of the Estimates,) but that if deliveries could be effected within a very short period – the space of two months – the Army authorities might go ahead and purchase the 10,000 rifle barrels.[232]

[232] *PAC 1929*, 12 June 1929, pp 134-5.

The debate continued at length and what may be deduced is that that the debate was solely centred on rifle barrels; rather it was about civil governance of the military. It is evidence of the Committee of Public Accounts attempting to place some order on a seemingly chaotic government spending process.

Further into the proceedings, Army expenditure on equipment was brought up once more, in this case the purchase of 500 draught lamps (oil lamps) which had not been used. The Report of the Comptroller stated 'I have asked for explanation of the purchase of a number of other articles which would appear to be in excess of normal requirements'.[233] The Chairman believed it to be a clerical error made by the Army. However, he commented that 'how can a mistake of this kind arise as regards numbers? ... If it was another item than draught lamps, it might be a very serious matter from the point of view of finance. If this mistake were (sic) made, for instance, in ordering horses or motor cars, and you ordered 500 instead of 50, it would be very serious?'. Lt. Gen. MacMahon answered that 'Since that time the whole question of purchase has been taken over by the civil department. I can tell you a mistake like that cannot occur under the present system'.[234] As mentioned previously, the auditing process was put in place to develop a more efficient organisation and to safeguard public funds. By allowing Lt. Gen. MacMahon to clarify the position, it allowed procedural changes to be put in place to ensure errors like this would not happen again.

The amount of articles that the Army held in store was also considered to be fairly large, due in large part to the demobilisation of a substantial amount of Army personnel in the early 1920s. MacMahon stated that the amounts were 'based on the number of posts we

[233] *PAC 1929*, 12 June 1929, p.126.
[234] *PAC 1929*, 12 June 1929, p.126.

held in 1926. The posts since, as a result of the policy of Government, have been considerably reduced. As a result of that some of these things were not required immediately, and they have to be held in store'.[235] Some of the purchased articles that were under discussion ranged from meat dishes, bought with consideration of the yet to be formed Reserve, to 100 easels. The chairman concluded that

> The only comment I wish to make on this is, that previous Committees appear to have it brought to their notice that the Army seem to have had a habit of anticipating regulations and of certain things being put into effect by ordering materials to be used. I think it would be well if this Committee could be assured that in future, if at all possible, and in normal circumstances, the Army would only embark on the purchase of articles when requisitions have been sanctioned by the Department of Finance?[236]

Members of the Dáil suggested that the purchasing of equipment had more sinister undertones. Séan Lemass remarked in 1929 that 'I see by the Estimates that we are going to spend £25,300 more on warlike stores this year than last year. I do not know if the Executive Council have inside information that the Army is likely to be engaged in war this year. It is true that the Minister for Justice, through his Department, is doing his best to provoke a war'. Lemass also commented that the Army's Estimate allowed for twice the quantity of ammunition to be expended from the previous year. [237] Despite the Government's policy of demobilisation and reorganisation, Army expenditure had not changed in tandem.

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[235] *PAC 1929*,12 June 1929, p.128.
[236] *PAC 1929*,12 June 1929, p.128.
[237] Dáil Debates, 29 (1187) 01 May 1929; available from http://debates.oireachtas.ie/Dáil/1929/05/01/00026.asp; last accessed 01/07/12.

The Chairman also raised an interesting point during a discussion regarding the improper upkeep of the petrol, oil and transport accounts. He stated

> I think this is a rather important matter. The Committee went into the matter fully last year and we were assured then that a system of log books had been established. It transpired last year in a number of cases that the log books had not been properly kept and the Committee was assured that the procedure would be tightened up. It would appear that the tightening up has not taken place. We have still cases where log books have not been kept and where orders have not been completed. Generally it appears there is a disposition on the part of some officers in the Army, not to comply exactly with the requirements of the regulations which are now in force.[238]

What may be taken from this Committee of Public Accounts' Report is that the Army was still an embryonic organisation. There is clear evidence of administrative mistakes and poor procedures. The spending process was disorganised and there appeared to be little structure in place to support the new organisation.

The role of MacMahon is also noteworthy. JP Duggan's *A History of the Irish Army* comments on Lt. Gen. MacMahon's feelings on the Department of Finance in 1926 when he was Chief of Staff - 'The Chief demanded an explanation. The figures given were correct, he said, but apart from that he protested against the system which permitted any civil servant to criticise or veto the professional work of any of his officers. He wanted action which would definitely preclude any such interference in matters of military policy in future'.[239] This was the same MacMahon who in 1929 as Secretary of the Department of Defence

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[238] *PAC 1929*, 12 June 1929, p.143.
[239] Duggan, *History of the Irish Army,* p.151.

stated that 'since that time the whole question of purchase has been taken over by the civil department. I can tell you a mistake like that cannot occur under the present system'.[240] The convergence theory of Janowitz would have been truly tested in this case.

The consequences of the above were considered in the Dáil by Deputy Thomas O'Higgins, when he stated that

> the House should hear a little bit more as to what the Army has done, and a little bit less of the annual attacks launched upon the Army, in the efforts to reduce the Army a little here and a little there. That kind of thing will never bring about any mental stability in the Army, and without mental stability people cannot settle down to do their job with thoroughness and efficiency.[241]

The above examination of the civil-military relationship during the first years of independence raises some interesting points. Notwithstanding the close proximity to the War of Independence and maybe because of the close proximity of the Civil War, an anti-militaristic ideology appeared to be emerging. The political power of the military was diminished in the aftermath of the Mutiny in 1924. This reflects Huntington's third pattern of civil-military relations. His theories on objective versus subjective civilian control are also relevant and it is clear that the latter is emerging. The Government had only begun the process of 'militarising the military' by providing them with warlike stores and sending them on demanding educational courses. However this appeared to be the result of a disorderly spending process rather than a real investment in defence. What is evident from the

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[240] *PAC 1929*, 12 June 1929, p.126.
[241] Dáil Debates, 29 (1202) 01 May 1929; available from http://debates.oireachtas.ie/Dáil/1929/05/01/00026.asp; last accessed 01/07/12.

examination of the auditing process in the first years of the State is that administrative structures were needed, especially in terms of expenditure.

1930-1939

The 1930s was a decade of upheaval for the international community. The Wall Street crash in 1929 and the subsequent political fallout culminated in the Second World War. The Irish Free State was not able to isolate itself from these events and the challenges they brought about. The early 1930s witnessed a debate on the need for an army at all. The following exchange in 1930 between William Davin of the Labour Party and Frank Aiken of Fianna Fáil is evidence of this:

> Mr. Davin: What do you want an Army for at all?
>
> Mr. Aiken: I do not know what the present Government wants an Army for.
>
> Mr. Davin: What would you want an Army for?
>
> Mr. Aiken: To protect the rights of the people.
>
> Mr. Davin: To protect them against the peace-makers outside?
>
> Mr. Aiken: The peace-makers are going to be the greatest troublemakers so far as I can see.[242]

This erudite debate occurred in the Dáil and set the tone for other events. An Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTÉ - the Irish national broadcaster) documentary claimed that Aiken's appointment as Minister for Defence when Fianna Fáil took power in 1932 was an attempt

[242] Dáil Debates, 33 (651) 20 February 1930; available from http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie/D/0033/D.0033.193002200021.html; last accessed 01/07/12.

by Eamon de Valera to reconcile the Free State Army with the party. Frank Aiken, the former Chief of Staff of the IRA during the Civil War, was instrumental in the adoption of de Valera's political position of the abandonment of militarism and the taking up of the constitutional path. However militarism was not completely discarded by the new Government and Seán MacEntee claimed that once Aiken was in office, he handed out revolvers to each member of the party in the Dáil.[243]

What is remarkable about the change in Government in 1932 was not what happened with regard to the Army but what didn't. The aims of the party, set out by Fianna Fáil in 1926, would suggest that there was still a deep connection with the republican movement. De Valera remarked that the name Fianna Fáil was chosen 'to symbolise a banding together of the people for national service, with a standard of personal honour for all who join, as high as that characterised the ancient Fianna Éireann, and a spirit of devotion equal to that of the Irish Volunteers from 1913 to 1921'.[244] However when de Valera came to power he did not tamper with the Army, its functions or its personnel, and it remained intact. This may be regarded as highly remarkable for a party which had lost the Civil War only a mere decade prior to coming into power.

The Eucharistic Congress was held in Dublin in June 1932. Despite the large role that the Defence Forces played throughout the Congress, which was considered the leading international Catholic event, inefficiencies in administration remained constant. This can be observed in a discussion regarding the dress of An Marc Shluaigh. An Marc Shluaigh, also

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[243] Hidden History Founding Fathers: Frank Aiken Gunman and Statesman, first broadcast on RTÉ One on 12 December 2006.

[244] Interview with Eamon de Valera given in part to the Representative of the United Press, April 17 1926, Eamon de Valera Papers P150/2011 (University College Dublin Archives hereafter UCDA). Also available from Diarmaid Ferriter, *Judging Dev: A Reassessment of the Life and Legacy of Eamon de Valera* (Dublin, 2007), p.113.

known as the Blue Hussars, was formed in 1932 as a Ceremonial Mounted Escort. It was for use on ceremonial occasions, particularly in connection with the Eucharistic Congress. It consisted of four officers, four Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and fifty three men. It was disbanded in 1949 and was replaced by a motor cycle escort.[245] The pressure of hosting an event as large as this meant that all elements had to be examined. One of the elements that demonstrated civil governance over military procurement was the dress of the Blue Hussars. The straps for the spurs made in the Post Office factory were too small for the members of the Ceremonial Mounted unit who wore larger size boots. The solution to this problem was that 'these items are required for transmission to Post Office stores so that samples can be made in black leather for approval, for the Mounted Unit referred to above'. Once approved, 'this in turn had to be sent back to the contracts officer'. [246] This is clear evidence of inefficient and time-consuming procedures; an inefficient system that both the civil and military sides allowed to continue.

The Defence Forces Handbook remarks that during the 1930s the Army was run down. It comments that 'the five Battalions, known collectively as the Regiment of Rifles, were short of men and equipment. Even allowing for the economic situation at the time, only 5% of the annual Defence Budget was allocated to the purchase of warlike stores i.e. weapons, ammunition etc. and even then, bureaucratic delays meant that even less was actually expended on such stores'.[247]

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[245] Badges and Emblems Request by Hugh Gaffney for Information re Military instignia, "The Blue Hussars" etc IE/MA/ASE (MA).
[246] Harness and Saddlery: Equipment of Ceremonial Mounted Unit IE/MA/ASE (MA).
[247] *The Irish Defence Forces Handbook*, p.94 (MA).

1937 was defined in Europe by the Spanish Civil War, trouble with the Monarchy in Great Britain due to the Wallis Simpson affair, and Adolf Hitler's now infamous Hossbach Memorandum. Civil-military relations in Ireland did not reflect this turbulent climate. With the downturn of the world economy in the 1930s, the issue of pay was at the forefront. It is apparent from the question posed in Public Accounts proceedings in 1937 that frugality was being promoted within the Defence Forces. The report stated that it had become 'practice to permit members of the Forces to draw only a part of their pay and to allow the balance to accumulate in their accounts. These credit balances have shown a tendency to increase as reflected in the amount of the undischarged liability in respect of pay at the end of each financial year'.[248] The Chairman continued, drawing attention to the 'various infringements of the regulations governing the issue of pay and allowances. It appeared to me that a more effective departmental audit of the pay accounts would help to ensure a stricter observance of the regulations on the part of pay officers and I am informed that better arrangements have now been made to attain this object'.[249] The following exchange between the Chairman, Deputy Daniel McMenamin of Fine Gael and Lt. Gen. MacMahon, in his capacity of Secretary of the Department of Defence, provides an insight into the practice of retaining a portion of pay which began fourteen years prior and the attitudes towards it:

> Chairman: Do you not think it was a rather obtruse [sic] way of doing things?
>
> MacMahon: Well it has certain advantages attached to it from the soldier's point of view. I admit that it might give rise to irregularities.

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[248] *Report of the Committee of Public Accounts- together with the proceedings of the Committee, minutes of evidence and Appendices Appropriation Accounts 1935-1936* (hereafter *PAC 1937*) 9 June 1937, p.118 (Official Publications, Trinity College Dublin).
[249] *PAC 1937,* 9 June 1937, p.118.

Chairman: Was not the machinery wrong and weak?

MacMahon: At that particular time there was no other method by which the soldier could be encouraged to save his money. The soldiers saved considerable sums as a result of that arrangement and they had considerable sums to credit when they left the Army.

Chairman: Could you not have induced them to open Post Office Savings Bank accounts or to take Savings Certificates?

MacMahon: There were no Savings Certificates at that time.

Chairman: But you had the Post Office Savings Bank?

MacMahon: You could not bring a soldier to the post office – he would probably spend the money on the way to the post office. [250]

This scheme may have been considered from the military side as an attempt to help soldiers save. However, it is also further illustrative of the civil governance that existed throughout this period. In this case, a departmental audit would have ensured that no fraud would take place.

There was some discussion between Deputy Crowley, a Fianna Fáil politician, and the Chairman regarding the suitability of the Post Office, in that there had been reports of falsifying accounts there too. However the chairman noted that there were regular audits within the Post Office, unlike the Army. Mr Maher, who represented the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor- General, raised an interesting point when stating that 'the funds

[250] *PAC 1937*, 9 June 1937, p.118.

deposited in the Post Office are sent daily to the Head Office, whereas in these cases the officer would have anything from £200 to £300 on hands'.[251] At the end of this exchange Lt. Gen. MacMahon stated that this arrangement was finished. The Chairman concluded 'I think it was very proper to do so. It is very hard to save people from themselves. It was a very dangerous thing to allow so much money to lie in the hands of a pay officer'.[252] The discussion surrounding pay raises many interesting points. Cleary describes accountability as 'not simply about uncovering wrong doing, it is about improving the individual and collective behaviour and the process of government'.[253] However, there is a tendency to view auditors with suspicion and hostility. While the evidence points to the Committee of Public Accounts attempting to prevent potential fraudulent activity, the military may have considered this exchange to reflect on their trustworthiness and professionalism. Exchanges such as these contributed to a challenging civil-military relationship.

The last issue to be considered in 1937 was the payment of the Reserve Defence Forces. The Chairman began reading the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General

> The Regulations pertaining to the issue of pay to members of the Reserve provide that pay shall be paid to a reservist only in respect of the days of his actual attendance when mobilised or undergoing additional voluntary training. This provision does not appear to have been strictly adhered to, as pay has been issued in excess of the amount to which reservists were entitled for the period from the recorded hour at which they reported to their unit headquarters to the recorded hour at which they left on termination of training. Also, reservists when being

[251] *PAC 1937*, 9 June 1937, p.119.
[252] *PAC 1937*, 9 June 1937, p.119.
[253] Cleary, 'Transparency and Accountability' in Cleary & McConville (Eds) *Managing Defence*, p.75.

> conveyed to and from their homes by military transport for training in weekend camps or for annual training are regarded as military personnel on duty. As the views expressed by the Department of Defence in reply to my inquiries on those matters do not appear to me to be consistent with the existing Regulations, I think it desirable, for the purpose of pay and allowances, that the position should be clarified as regards the place and point of time at which mobilisation and demobilisation are actually effected.[254]

Maher adds to this by stating that if a reservist reports to their unit just before midnight they would be paid for that day. Maher believes the Auditor needs a clarification of what a "day" actually is. Lt. Gen. MacMahon responded to Maher by stating that

> I think that anyone with experience of mobilising and demobilising a battalion would understand the difficulties. The first day is taken up in getting the man's hair cut, in getting him bathed, and in issuing him with his uniform, bedding, and his knife, plate, mug, fork, etc. If you put yourself in the position of a battalion commander who has 400 or 500 men to equip on the first day, you will see the difficulty. He arranges that the local men arrive in the morning and he will probably have them equipped by lunch time. The men who have to come a distance come in the afternoon and are equipped in the afternoon. The reference to men coming in before mid-night is not quite fair. They all have to come in time for equipment, and the first day is devoted to equipping them. If we insisted on all the men reporting at 10 o' clock on the first day, half of them would be kicking their heels around the barracks until mid-day and, in addition, we would probably have to pay the men who came a considerable

[254] *PAC 1937*, 9 June 1937, p.122.

> distance a subsistence allowance because they would probably have to travel on the previous day, so that the State loses nothing by this arrangement.[255]

Lt. Gen. MacMahon's response is an indication of how disparate some elements of the civil service and the military were. He had been Secretary of the Department for some ten years following his tenure as Chief of Staff and yet intimated that civilians could not possibly be aware of the complexity in mobilising a battalion. The Committee is there to examine the expenditure accounts and are not required to have in-depth military knowledge. However, military systems were being used as a barrier to transparency.

The Chairman confirmed with MacMahon that this method of mobilisation had proven to be more efficient for the Army. However, Maher, while in many ways agreeing with MacMahon, still continued his argument about needing clarification about what a "day" is. It was his belief that the regulations should be more clearly defined. The Army, as evidenced here, didn't operate in the strict administrative and cost saving manner that the Department of Finance so desperately wanted. Lt. Gen. MacMahon's response to Maher's request for a definition of a day is a testament to this:

> I am afraid it is impossible. If you define a day, you will have to say that the local men shall come in at 10 am and the men from a distance shall come in the afternoon. You really cannot define a day. If you do, it means that you pay a subsistence allowance to a considerable number of men in the unit. They can do no work while they are

[255] *PAC 1937*, 9 June 1937, p.122.

there because they can do nothing until they are equipped and the first day is taken up with that.[256]

Deputy Smith interrupted with an interesting comment, which ended the conversation, stating that 'any day he comes in to satisfy the authorities that he is ready for the following day can safely be regarded as a day of actual attendance'.[257] This is an example of the dynamic of the civil-military relationship at this time. One can refer to Rebecca Schiff's theory of concordance. All partners do not agree on the four indicators, most specifically that of the political decision making process, and therefore the relationship is not harmonious.

It is evident in the 1930s that the application of civil governance of the military was causing tension. The 1937 Public Accounts Reports are perhaps reflective of Janowitz's theory of the civilian attitude to the military in that they 'are only dimly perceived as persons, decision-makers and political creatures'.[258]

The examples analysed above are evidence of the growing belief that the military would benefit from greater civilian intervention. However, the debates in the Dáil also suggested that the Army was being used as a political pawn. In 1935 Dr. Thomas O' Higgins commented that while Fine Gael had no objection to either Army payments or costs, they did object to how the Army had been used in the twelve months prior. He remarked that 'the Army of Ireland is the plaything of no politician... All too frequently of late we have had, at great cost to the taxpayers, and merely for the political effect in the Party sense, the

[256] *PAC 1937*, 9 June 1937, p.123.
[257] *PAC 1937*, 9 June 1937, p.123.
[258] Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, p.3.

Army and the unfortunate personnel of the Army hurled from point to point merely to salute the political chiefs of a political Party'.[259] O'Higgins believed that the Army must be above and outside of politics.[260] This argument by O'Higgins was to be expected from one of the founding members of the Blueshirts. Fianna Fáil had begun to use military tribunals to try Blueshirt cases under article 2A of the constitution, which allowed military courts to be used to try political offenses. This had previously been used to try members of the IRA.[261] However, such ceremonial displays had their usefulness, especially when one considers the possible threat of republicanism. Barry Buzan commented 'without a widespread and quite deeply-rooted idea of the state among the population, the state institutions by themselves would have great difficulty functioning and surviving'.[262] These ceremonial displays suggest to the public that the Army was loyal to the Government and the threat of republicanism would not change this.

However, this period should also be informed of the views of Dan Bryan, who would become head of G2 (military intelligence) in the Defence Forces. His paper, Fundamental factors affecting Saorstát Defence Problems, 'analysed the various options available to the

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[259] Dáil Debates, 55 (1799) 03 April 1935; available from http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie/plweb-cgi/fastweb?state_id=1341834310&view=oho-view&docrank=8&numhitsfound=10&query_rule=%28%28$query1%29%3C%3DDATE%3C%3D%28$query2%29%29%20AND%20%28%28$query4%29%29%3ASPEAKER%20AND%20%28%28$query5%29%29%3Aheading%20AND%20%28%28$query6%29%29%3ACATEGORY%20AND%20%28%28$query3%29%29%3Ahouse%20AND%20%28%28$query7%29%29%3Avolume%20AND%20%28%28$query8%29%29%3Acolnumber%20AND%20%28%28$query%29%29&query1=19350101&query2=19361231&query5=ARMY&docid=49164&docdb=Debates&dbname=Debates&sorting=none&operator=and&TemplateName=predoc.tmpl&setCookie=1; last accessed 06/07/12.

[260] Ibid (1801).

[261] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.117.

[262] Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Sussex, 1983), p.39.

Irish government, and strongly recommended neutrality in the foreseen conflict'.[263] Eunan O'Halpin remarked that Bryan's analysis

> stressed Irish military weakness, the strategic significance to Britain of Ireland's position in the Atlantic, the fact of the British military presence in Northern Ireland and in the treaty ports, and the likelihood that foreign powers would attempt to use Ireland as a base from which to mount intelligence and other operations inimical to British interests, most likely in conjunction with the republican movement.

O'Halpin considered that Bryan's paper 'became the basis of a memorandum circulated to ministers in 1936, the only considered analysis of Irish defence policy and capabilities to reach the cabinet for many years'.[264]

The Emergency

The focus of this thesis is not to analyse the actions and reactions of the Defence Forces during the Second World War/Emergency period.[265] However, it greatly impacted upon the period under review and will be examined from that perspective. The Defence Forces was expanded and large scale recruitment took place while the Government's policy of neutrality was being implemented. However, as Eunan O'Halpin remarked, 'if foreign policy was crystal clear in 1939, defence policy was not. The State was extraordinarily ill-prepared to defend itself. The army had just six thousand ill-equipped and poorly trained regular

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[263] Maurice Walsh, *G2 In Defence Of Ireland: Irish Military Intelligence 1918-45* (Dublin, 2010), p.9.

[264] Eunan O'Halpin, ' "A Greek Authoritarian Phase"? The Irish Army and the Irish Crisis, 1969-1970' in *Irish Political Studies*, xxiii, no.4 (December 2008) pp 478-479. O'Halpin quote's JP Duggan's *Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich* in *Defending Ireland* stating that Bryan initially wrote 'Fundamental Factors' as a paper for a command and staff course at the military college, p.136.

[265] For analysis on the Emergency see Brian Girvan, *The Emergency: Neutral Ireland 1939-45* (Dublin, 2006) and Clair Wills, *That Neutral Island: A Cultural History of Ireland During the Second World* (Dublin, 2007) along with other works referenced here.

soldiers scattered throughout the country, together with a ragbag reserve of uneven quality'.[266] He continued that 'the Irish government ignored external defence problems until the late 1930s, when they were given no option otherwise. This had very serious consequences for the army as they were left pathetically short of equipment, weapons and men. This meant that its only obvious role for the previous decade had been an internal security one'.[267] Lt. Gen. William Callaghan described his experience:

> The Emergency period for us was the war period of other armies. We saw and were part of the organisation, mobilisation and development of the biggest army the state has ever raised. All the reserve elements were called up and put on a war footing and in addition to a general mobilisation units were strengthened, new units organised and the field organisation of the army was put into effect with Battalions, Brigades and Divisions in operation. Units were deployed to their operational areas and basic field training continued at pace together with leader training at all levels. The operational duties of the army were defined and allotted to the different formations. It was a great opportunity to be undergoing "on the job" training.[268]

Not all would agree with Lt. Gen. Callaghan's assessment of the Emergency era Defence Forces. O'Halpin's assessment of the mobilisation period is telling. He observed that due to the mobilisation "fiasco", the Army's energies were not put into intensive training; rather they were wasted with the absorption and then discharging of the reserves that were initially called up.[269] The fiasco refers to the reduction between November 1939 and May

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[266] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p. 153.
[267] O'Halpin, 'army in Independent Ireland' in Bartlett & Jeffery (eds.) A *Military History of Ireland,* p.413.
[268] Lt Gen W Callaghan, 'Cadet to UNIFIL Force Commander' in *The Irish Defence Forces Handbook* (1987), p.62 (MA).
[269] O' Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.161.

1940 'for financial reasons, in the number of all ranks on permanent service in the Defence Forces'. By May 1940, strength only stood at 13,335'.[270] The opposition in Government also expressed concerns regarding the mobilisation. Professor John O'Sullivan queried in the Dáil exactly what the Government expected to gain in the calling up of extra people. He remarked 'How did they prove, or show – or attempt to show – an increase in the personnel of the Army put this country in a better state of defence?... Is a mere increase in numbers of that kind a guarantee or a proof that we are in a better state of defence...'.[271]

Prof. O'Sullivan was correct in raising his concerns regarding the mobilisation. From 1 May to 30 September 1940 the strength of the Army rose from 13,346 to 37,310. During this period the Army reported that 'generally speaking, the recruits presenting themselves for enlistment are of an excellent type... The high standard of intelligence and soldierly enthusiasm greatly simplifies the task of training'.[272] By the end of March 1941 the strength was up to 40,607. By this time, however, training throughout the organisation was considered 'uneven'.[273] This was believed to be due to an insufficient number of officers and NCOs due to the rapid expansion. Morale, 'the most vital element in our ability to defend the State', was also said to have declined. The Annual report from 1940-1941 commented

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[270] General Report on the Army for the period 31st March 1940 to 1st April 1941 (MA). Reports in this series will be referred hereafter as Annual Report followed by the appropriate year. These reports are also available from Michael Kennedy & Victor Laing (Eds), *The Irish Defence Forces 1940-1949: The Chief of Staff's Reports* (Dublin, 2011).

[271] Dáil Debates, 79 (50) 05 March 1940; available from http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie/plweb-cgi/fastweb?state_id=1342011310&view=oho-view&docrank=131&numhitsfound=141&query_rule=%28%28$query1%29%3C%3DDATE%3C%3D%28$query2%29%29%20AND%20%28%28$query4%29%29%3ASPEAKER%20AND%20%28%28$query5%29%29%3Aheading%20AND%20%28%28$query6%29%29%3ACATEGORY%20AND%20%28%28$query3%29%29%3Ahouse%20AND%20%28%28$query7%29%29%3Avolume%20AND%20%28%28$query8%29%29%3Acolnumber%20AND%20%28%28$query%29%29&query1=19390701&query2=19451231&query5=Army&docid=56776&docdb=Debates&dbname=Debates&starthit=125&sorting=none&operator=and&TemplateName=predoc.tmpl&setCookie=1; last accessed 7/7/12.

[272] Annual Report May 1940-September 1940 (MA).

[273] Annual Report 1940-1941 (MA).

that the 'morale of the Defence Forces and morale of the civil population are complementary. One had a powerful influence on the other. Consequently, it is essential that each be constantly stimulated by every means possible'.[274] It was believed that the country's morale showed a marked decline during this period and 'consideration should be given to the possibility of having it refreshed by periodical statements by National Leaders'.[275]

There appeared to be little dialogue or consultation between the military and civil sides at this time. As O'Halpin remarks 'there is no evidence that the Government or the Department of External Affairs ever looked to the military for advice on any aspect of international affairs, despite Irish membership of and enthusiasm for the League of Nations, despite the defence implications of the 1921 treaty, and despite the militarisation of international relations in the 1930s'.[276] O'Halpin continued his analysis stating that in 1936 'the director of intelligence observed that his appraisal of developments in Europe was hampered by the fact that he never received any political information or analysis at all from External Affairs'. He believed that the army's greatest difficulty up to 1936, linked to the lack of interest of successive governments in practical defence issues, was with money.[277] By 1940, as Theo Farrell commented, 'Irish military planners could see that they were in serious trouble. One planner acknowledged, "In the nature of things unless the enemy blunders badly or we happen to be extremely lucky, the odds are against us"'.[278]

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[274] Ibid.
[275] Ibid.
[276] O'Halpin, 'army in Independent Ireland' in Bartlett & Jeffery (Eds) A *Military History of Ireland,* pp 413-4.
[277] Ibid.
[278] Theo Farrell, 'World Culture and Military Power' in *Security Studies*, xiv, no.3 (2005), p.468.

While the focus of this thesis is not the Air Corps, the investigation conducted into their effectiveness, organisation, equipment, training and administration in 1941 cannot go unmentioned. The investigation was established in January 1941 Lt. Col. O'Malley remarked

> the terms of reference, the evidence of witnesses and the report and findings of the Committee do not indicate, however, the exact circumstances that led to the investigation. It would appear that the condition of the Air Corps during what [P.A] Mulcahy [Director of Military Aviation] called the "invasion nervous" months of the summer of 1940 and the manner in which Mulcahy exercised his command, and his functions as DMA [Director of Military Aviation], were central factors.[279]

O'Malley posited further that 'the general belief, handed down by successive generations of flying officers, is that the matter of Mulcahy being in receipt of flying pay and wearing pilot's wings, was the main cause of the unrest that resulted in the investigation'. As previously discussed "flying pay" resulted in a significant pay increase. However O'Malley considered that the complaints made by two junior officers against Mulcahy's technical and professional competence were the major factors behind the enquiry.[280] The Committee in charge of the investigation considered that the aircrafts procured would have been unsuitable for combat and that the aircrafts would have been unable to offer air support to ground forces.[281] However, the terms of reference was at the discretion of the General Headquarters (GHQ), the result of which 'presupposed that Mulcahy had little responsibility'.[282] Despite Mulcahy's considerable failings, especially in terms of

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[279] O'Malley, *Military Aviation*, p.243.
[280] O'Malley, *Military Aviation*, p.268.
[281] O'Malley, *Military Aviation*, pp 248-9.
[282] O'Malley, *Military Aviation*, p.245.

procurement of suitable aircraft and equipment and not being a fully qualified pilot, the majority of the Committee voted to keep the status quo.[283] Only the Chairman, Maj. Gen. O'Neill sought to remove Mulcahy. The result of the enquiry not only exposed the weaknesses of the Corps but also proved detrimental to morale. It 'would do little to restore a Corp's aviation culture that had been stagnating for too long'.[284] This report is representative of the inherent weaknesses of the organisation and the manner in which they were addressed.

The nature of the threat will naturally have an impact on civil-military relations. Gone was the small professional army that had been in development since the Civil War and in its place emerged a force up to War Establishment strength. The Emergency had paradoxically proven both the worth and the inefficiencies of the defence organisation. As O'Halpin writes, 'in the event, the war passed Ireland by. The army did not have to fight anyone. As an embodiment of the national resolve to remain neutral, and as an effective and disciplined instrument of government, it had nevertheless proved both its symbolic and its practical worth. It received scant reward once peace came'.[285] Soon after the Emergency was declared over, it became apparent that no serious attempt to review the country's military position was to be undertaken despite the difficulties faced during the early stages of the Second World War. Defence was considered an expensive business by the Government in comparison to the size of the State and 'furthermore the Army had done an excellent job improvising defence and security arrangements from 1939 on; doubtless it

[283] O'Malley, *Military Aviation*, p.267.
[284] O'Malley, *Military Aviation*, p.270.
[285] O'Halpin, 'army in Independent Ireland' in Bartlett & Jeffery (Eds) *A Military History of Ireland,* pp 421-422.

could do so again if the situation demanded it'.[286] Whatever its shortcomings and despite the many deficiencies the organisation faced, specifically in weapons and equipment, they attempted to create a viable force that would be able to defend the state. This was supported by the civil side and provides evidence of how the Defence Forces could be mobilised during periods of real threat. Further evidence of this concept will be provided in the 1970s.

1945-1949

The post war period saw a transformation in the international system with the emergence of two ideologically hostile superpowers, a wave of decolonisation and consequently one of democratisation, and the creation of the United Nations. Ireland was not exempt from post war renewal. It had the arduous task of dismantling the Emergency Army and of putting a workable peace- time alternative in its place. Downsizing any military force has intrinsic difficulties, as had been clearly illustrated by the Mutiny in 1924. While history did not replicate itself on this occasion, many difficulties emerged. One was linked to the disbandment of the Construction Corps. This had been created 'for young unemployed unmarried men to undertake certain public works'.[287] Not long after the Emergency, the Chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts began the proceedings by reading the Report of the Comptroller:

> The sanction of the Department of Finance was obtained in January, 1945, for expenditure of £4,300 on the purchase of materials for works which are being carried out at a military aerodrome. Expenditure on civilian labour was also incurred in connection with the project and I am informed that owing to a misunderstanding

[286] Ibid.
[287] Duggan, *History of the Irish Army*, p.185.

sanction was not obtained for this expenditure, which had amounted to £3, 720 5s 7d, but that covering authority has now been sought.

The sanction accorded in 1945 also covered the provision of plant and equipment, including a sum of £2,200 for the purchase of one mile of light railway track with bogies and locomotive. It appears that the locomotive was not put into service and that the use of the bogies, which had been hand-operated for a short period, was discontinued. I was informed that the equipment could not be operated owing to lack of sufficient labour, and that the question of the use to which it will be put in future is under consideration.

The conversation continued between the Chairman and the Secretary of the Department of Defence, Lt. Gen. MacMahon:

Have you anything further to add? – Yes, when we undertook this particular job we had a construction corps and it was our intention to have the work carried out by members of that corps. Recruiting for the corps dropped off and men became time – expired and left, and, eventually, we found ourselves with a very small number. In fact, the numbers in this corps became so small that we had to disband this corps. As a consequence we then had to employ civilian labour to do the work.[288]

During the Committee of Public Accounts discussions, William E. Wann remarked that 'when the machinery was purchased it was anticipated that large working parties of construction corps personnel would be available to provide work for the plant. The strength of the

[288] *Report of the Committee of Public Accounts – together with the proceedings of the Committee, minutes of evidence and Appendices Appropriation Accounts 1948 -1949)* (hereafter *PAC 1951*) 15 February 1951, pp 81-82 (Official Publications, Trinity College Dublin).

construction corps fell off very considerably, as the Accounting Officer states, and as a result the equipment proved unsuitable for the purposes for which it was acquired'. Lt. Gen. MacMahon countered that 'it is used at the Curragh at the moment bringing supplies to the ranges. The equipment is very useful to the Army. It can be used in connection with repairs at the artillery range at the Glen of Imaal and at the rifle range at Kilpedder'. He continued by stating that the locomotive was not used as a driver was not available and that the use of hand operated bogies was discontinued when construction corps labour was no longer available, as it was more economical to use the civilian labour attending on the excavator and dumper.[289] The use of civilian labour rather than military personnel was illustrative of a move back towards a small professional Army. Though a number of proposals were put forward to make the Construction Corps more relevant in the late 1940s, these were never progressed. The Government provided reassurance that there was no change in its general policy on the Army. In 1948 the Minister for Defence remarked that the only change in policy was the abandonment of recruiting for the Construction Corps, stating that it was not fulfilling a defence purpose; rather he believed it could be 'described as a social service'.[290] This has wider implications. As Charles Moskos remarked

> Apparently, in certain roles requiring high levels of technical sophistication, civilians are simply more cost effective than military personnel. Nevertheless, if task efficiency is the issue, a more nagging implication is that military personnel cannot or will not perform long-term arduous duty with the efficacy of contract civilians. If this

[289] *PAC 1951*, 15 February 1951, p.82.
[290] Dáil Debates, 110 (714) 14 April 1948; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0110/D.0110.194804140076.html; last accessed 07/07/12.

were to become the norm, beliefs conducive to organisational integrity and societal respect- the whole notion of military legitimacy – become untenable.[291]

It is also evident that structures were still not in place for an efficient procurement system. The differing perspectives in civil-military relations at this time can be found in the examination of records in relation to an item of clothing – the Army Greatcoat. When discussed at the Committee of Public Accounts, the Chairman began by stating that

> A contract for the supply of 24,000 yards of serge lining at 5s. 4d. per yard was placed in September, 1947, in connection with the provision of greatcoats. The adoption of a new pattern greatcoat was under consideration at the time and as the new specification provided for a lining of cotton Italian cloth efforts were made to cancel the contract for the serge. These efforts were unsuccessful as the serge was in process of production but the contract was short – closed on delivery of 16,703 yards and it was decided to use the serge as lining for the new pattern coats instead of the lighter material specified. As the price of the latter was approximately one half that of the serge, I inquired regarding the purchase of materials whilst the questions of specification remained undecided and was informed that it was not known, when the demand was issued, whether the new pattern greatcoat would be approved and that in fact approval was not given until December, 1947.[292]

When asked what the additional cost would be, Lt. Gen. MacMahon answered that

> It would be very difficult to answer that question. We set aside sufficient of the serge for blouses and trousers for the F.C.A. for a period of three years. The balance was of

[291] Moskos, *Institution to Occupation*, p.48.
[292] *PAC 1951*, 15 February 1951, pp 82- 83.

no use for any other purpose except for lining the greatcoats, and, on the advice of the Controller of Stores in Post Office, we continued to use it for that purpose. At that particular time there was no doubt that the cotton was much cheaper. It was 2/3 a yard for a width of 28 inches whereas the serge was 5/4 a yard for the same width. The cotton has not been available for a considerable time and we would not have been able to get it for some of the recently made coats. It would have been very difficult - if not impossible – to estimate what the additional cost might have been.[293]

The Chief of Staff Annual Reports 1948-1949 also considered the issue of the greatcoats but looked at it from a very different perspective. A new design of greatcoat had been approved for NCOs of the Permanent Defence Force but production had yet to start as old pattern stocks would have to be cleared before the new pattern could be issued. The greatcoat issue also affected the FCÁ as there were serious shortages. The report remarked 'it was hoped to have purchased 11,000 during the 1948/49 year but the necessary sanction was not forthcoming. The £50,000 provided in the in the 1949/50 Vote for FCÁ clothing (including boots) will not meet requirements this year. The amount provided will not be sufficient to meet purchases of boots, greatcoats and groundsheet'.[294] Attempts were being made, indeed supported by the Secretary of the Department, to enhance uniforms. The Defence Forces were in a period of transition but believed that 'the position generally in

[293] *PAC 1951,* 15 February 1951, p.83.
[294] Annual Reports 1948 – 1949 (MA).

regard to Dress can hardly be described as satisfactory'. They wanted to move 'towards a return to more uniform standards and to a greater regularity in types of uniform'.[295]

The issue of warlike stores was another post-Emergency concern. However as O'Halpin remarks

> It was predictable that, with the great crisis of 1939-45 successfully overcome, Defence should revert to its leisurely pre-war purchasing habits. Despite all the problems encountered in attempting to secure adequate and timely military supplies during the Emergency, for over a decade afterwards no serious efforts were made to improve the army's supply position with a view to strengthening the country's hand in future international crises, either by purchasing suitable modern weapons and equipment or by lessening reliance for supplies on Britain.[296]

The questioning in the Committee of Public Accounts discussed large quantities of ammunition, purchased in 1940, which were found to be defective and were returned to the suppliers. Replacement ammunition was received. It was stated that whilst the ammunition returned as defective had been packed in chargers and bandoliers, the replacements were not packed in this way when they were returned. The British War Office forwarded replacement ammunition in January 1948, and the defective ammunition was returned in September 1948. When asked why it took so long to discover it was defective, Lt. Gen. MacMahon explained that this was American ammunition and was not subject to the same tests that the British applied. The Americans supplied it to the British and the British, in turn, gave the Irish Army their requirements. There were no guarantees given by the British with

[295] Annual Reports 1948 – 1949 (MA).
[296] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.265.

regard to the ammunition. It was common to have defective rounds, but seemingly uncommon to have the rounds replaced. As MacMahon commented

> If they had wished to do so, they could have told us: 'You have so many defective rounds. We may have ten or 20 times that number and we cannot do anything about it.' Instead of doing that, they replaced 4,000,500 rounds free of charge. We took up the question of the bandoliers with them and they explained that the ammunition and bandoliers we returned were sent to a dump where they lay in all sorts of weather. As a result the bandoliers were valueless and would not be worth trying to rescue. I think it would be unfair to press the matter so far as they are concerned. They acted in a very decent way so far as were [sic] concerned.[297]

This exchange not only gives an insight into the purchasing of ammunition during the Second World War, especially on an international level, but also provides an insight into the relationship between the British and the Irish during the war. 'Acting in a very decent way' is telling about Lt. Gen. MacMahon's opinion of the British. As a former Chief of Staff of the Army and the then Secretary of the Department of Defence, he could be regarded as a reasonable barometer of Defence culture at this time.

The Government also discussed the issue of warlike stores. The Minister for Defence, Dr. Tom O'Higgins, explained the process of obtaining warlike stores:

> Each year we have had a figure for war stores. It is easy enough to put down a figure in the Book of Estimates, ask the Dáil to approve of it, and then tax the people for its equivalent in money. That is only the first step. The next step is to get the supplies.

[297] *PAC 1951*, 15 February 1951, p.84. Bandoliers are cotton cases which ammunition is put in for easy transport.

> To-day supplies are as difficult to get as they ever were in the past. The War Office at the present moment will take our order. Perhaps in 12 months' time they will notify us to turn that order into a firm order and they will then supply. We will always get a free supply of obsolete armaments- that is, armaments which become obsolete because of military development and day to day experiment.[298]

This discussion of warlike stores suggested the difficulties that the post-Emergency Army faced. Most of the armaments already held by the Army were obsolete. They appeared reliant on the British War Office for further supplies and these, albeit free, were also obsolete. In these circumstances, it is difficult to posit how much progress could have been made. While the Committee of Public Accounts may have focused on seemingly banal items, the exchanges provide insight into the rather complex procurement system at this time.

A discussion on air-raid precaution (ARP) stores illustrates the differing post war priorities. The Emergency had naturally seen the acquisition of ARP stores. Paragraph 75 of the previous Public Account Committee report stated that proposals for the adjustment of discrepancies in the accounts of air-raid precautions stores had been submitted to the Department of Finance, and the Chairman asked for further information regarding the discrepancies disclosed. Lt. Gen. MacMahon stated that that their records so far as ARP stores were concerned, were destroyed in a fire at St. Anne's, Clontarf. The Army had to reconstruct their records and 'naturally they could not be expected to be perfect. So far as these discrepancies are concerned, we are rectifying them and have reached agreement with the Department of Finance as to how we will furnish the details to that Department.

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[298] Dáil Debates, 110 (720-721) 14 April 1948; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0110/D.0110.194804140076.html; last accessed 07/07/12.

We hope to submit them soon for authority to write off'.[299] The arrangements were made for the disposal by local authorities of ARP stores, the cost of which had been met from State grants which had been paid, and accounting for the amounts realised. Large quantities of these stores remained unsold. Lt. Gen. MacMahon commented that 'We propose to retain these. They will be very useful, and, in view of the international situation, it would be madness to dispose of them now'.[300] The priority for the Department of Finance appeared to be the disposal by sale of war stores to pay back the State grants which had been given during the war time period. The military priority, reflected by the Secretary of the Department of Defence MacMahon, was to retain essential emergency stores as they believed that the international climate was not yet stable enough. This provides an indication of how the military assessed the post-war international system and how civil governance continued to be exercised.

The disposal of equipment in the post war era was not confined to Army stores and the concerns that were brought forward to the Committee of Public Accounts were varied. One such example concerns the selling of four navel torpedo boats for £1,000. When asked why the price was so low, as they had been purchased for £40,000 ten years prior, Lt. Gen MacMahon stated that 'not if you knew the vessels. Even a motor car depreciates very rapidly over that period and this type of boat was not made to last. Its life is very short. The hull is made of wood and the engines are very high – powered. The hull does not last long. In this case dry rot set in after some years and the engines reach a stage when it is uneconomic to recondition them'.[301] The policy for purchasing vessels had changed since

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[299] *PAC 1951*, 15 February 1951, p.85.
[300] *PAC 1951*, 15 February 1951, p.85.
[301] *PAC 1951*, 15 February 1951, p.85.

the Appropriation Accounts were complied and corvettes were purchased instead. Their purchase was due in large part to the fact that they were the only ones they could obtain at the time.[302] These torpedo boats had proved most unsuitable for Irish waters. This again provides evidence of the challenges faced in re-equipping the Defence Forces in the post-war era.

The supply of transport was also a post-Emergency consideration. The Chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts stated that 'the purchases of a number of vehicles were not proceeded with; partly offset by increased expenditure on maintenance of vehicles'.[303] When asked about the purchasing policy, Lt. Gen. MacMahon stated 'we purchase usually to replace vehicles no longer worth keeping. When they become uneconomic to keep, we dispose of them and we provide for money to purchase vehicles to replace them'. The Chairman then commented that 'the Army may not ever be as effective as we would wish, but is it not very ineffective if its transport is not first class and arranged so that, in an emergency when transport is not obtainable from outside, you will have adequate supplies'. Lt. Gen. MacMahon answered that 'as far as ordinary transport vehicles are concerned, we purchase only sufficient to cope with our everyday needs. If an emergency occurred we would commandeer transport; the consumption of petrol would be restricted and we would either purchase or acquire in some other way vehicles normally used for civilian purposes'.[304] These sentiments would be echoed in August 1969.

Discussion then focussed on military education, specifically courses of education abroad which were availed of to a greater extent than visualised. It was stated that this was

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[302] *PAC 1951*, 15 February 1951, pp 85-86.
[303] *PAC 1951*, 15 February 1951, p.88.
[304] *PAC 1951*, 15 February 1951, p.88.

because of the desire for the latest military knowledge.[305] This commenced in 1926 with the Military Mission to the United States and these courses greatly influenced the professionalisation of the Defence Forces. Notwithstanding Samuel Huntington's theory of some years later that professionalism strengthened civil control over the military, reasonable expenditure on these courses continued to be examined. Examples of some of courses undertaken during this time are Long Gunnery Course, Survey Officers Course, Briefing and Intelligence Course, Driving and Maintenance of Churchill Tanks Course and Staff Courses.[306]

It is clear that the post-Emergency economic situation naturally influenced attitudes towards defence. Control of capital, as Cleary termed 'the power of the purse', and its impact on the organisation has been a recurring element of the civil-military relationship that existed since the foundation of the State. However, what has been demonstrated through this period is the increasing emphasis that was put on re-equipping the organisation, together with a satisfactory standard of dress and military education. This professionalisation was forward in its thinking but needed adequate resourcing.

Another issue arising from the post-Emergency era was that aside from Northern Ireland and neutrality, critical issues in Irish defence policy were mostly precluded from serious discussion. As discussed previously in the literature review, Trevor Salmon remarked that little attention was paid to the role of the Permanent Defence Force, the relationship between the role of the permanent force and its structure, the level and type of capabilities required to fulfil those roles and the possibility of there being an incompatibility in these

[305] *PAC 1951*, 15 February 1951, p.88.
[306] Annual Report 1948-1949 (MA).

roles with respects to; internal security and the requirements of external security, the relationship between defence and deterrence and the nature of the threat. He remarked that

> Although these topics have occasionally been discussed in the Irish Dáil, there has been no concerted examination of them and once they have gone out of fashion they have been forgotten again. A typical example is the suggestion made in 1948 and again in 1952, that the army should adopt guerrilla tactics rather than rely upon heavy equipment and a continental type of structure. Such ideas appear to have been dismissed rather than analysed, partly because they were seen as defeatist, i.e. acknowledging that occupation was likely in a conflict, but also because of the view expressed in 1952 by Oscar Traynor, Minister of Defence, that "so long as the situation in the North is as it is, any military staff worth its salt in this country will have to rely on the orthodox method, although they may later have to resort to other methods".[307]

1950-1956

The years immediately preceding the period under review naturally shaped the Defence Forces of that time. The 1950s was a decade of change for the Irish Defence Forces. Ireland's entry into the United Nations transformed the nature of the Defence Forces dramatically over the coming decades and can be remarked as having considerable influence on the evolution of the organisation. Defence Forces planning also took on a new role with the completion of an Air Defence Plan and procurement planning for suitable

[307] Trevor Salmon, 'The Changing Nature of Irish Defence Policy' in *The World Today*, xxxv, no.11 (November 1979), p.463.

equipment and warlike stores. In the international arena the Council of Defence met to discuss the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war, while domestically the re-emergence of IRA activity along the borders saw the Army involved in Aid to the Civil Power Operations (ATCP), including responsibility for the internment camps introduced by the Fianna Fáil Government.

Reequipping the Air Corps was a challenging task. However, the Government's commitment to developing a significant air capability is open to question. The Committee of Public Accounts noted that 'a contract placed for the supply of three Mk. 55 Vampire Trainer aircraft, equipment and manuals, at the cost of £146, 828, provided for an advance payment of 25 per cent, for delivery of the aircraft within six months from the date the advance was made, and for the payment of the balance on acceptance of the aircraft'. The aircraft were delivered in July, 1956.[308] This appears to be indicative of a move towards the purchasing of suitable equipment for the Air Corps. These planes were to be used primarily for operational fighter and training purposes.[309] The Minister for Defence Oscar Traynor remarked that 'according to the newspapers some training planes have recently been purchased. That is a step forward. That is something that I am personally very glad to see being provided for the air force. We all know that the equipment available to the air force is not of a type that would be of any use in any circumstances which would be likely to bring them into conflict with enemy forces'.[310] Purchasing equipment for a military force that would not 'be of any use in any circumstances' is hardly indicative of a cogent defence policy and may be likened

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[308] *Report of the Committee of Public Accounts – together with the proceedings of the Committee, minutes of evidence and Appendices Appropriation Accounts 1955 -1956* (hereafter *PAC 1958*) 11 July 1957, p.21 (Official Publications, Trinity College Dublin).

[309] Dáil Debates, 154 (33) 08 February 1956; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0154/D.0154.195602080043.html; last accessed 07/07/12.

[310] Dáil Debates, 156 (277) 11 April 1956; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0156/D.0156.195604110024.html; last accessed 07/07/12.

to giving a sop to Cerberus. The purchase of that Vampire Jets could be viewed as a prestige purchase rather than one borne out of military need. There was no indication at the time of consideration of the acquisition of helicopters, which would have had far greater practical military benefits. This necessary purchase was delayed to 1963 and coincided with Kennedy's visit.

In regard to other equipment, Oscar Traynor remarked that the Government was so anxious to have the Army properly equipped to carry out their duty to the State that a special team of ordnance experts was sent around Europe to conduct research in the various munitions and arms factories to see what equipment was available and then to make the selection on the basis of the defensive equipment that would best suit the State's needs. The sum involved was said to be £2,000,000. Unlike the aircraft, this appears to be a genuine effort to modernise the Army.[311]

The maintenance of barracks and new works was also discussed at the Committee of Public Accounts. Between 1953 and 1954 a scheme was set up for the erection of eighty eight houses for married soldiers on a site owned by the Department adjacent to a military barracks in Dublin. The houses were built by labour supervised by the Corps of Engineers. The query regarding this came from the Chairman who enquired 'have you any idea General, of the relative cost of erecting these houses as compared with the average cost incurred by the local authorities to erect similar houses?'. When Lt. Gen. MacMahon, still in his role of Secretary of the Department of Defence, answered that the question never arose, Deputy Charles Haughey, who was a long serving member of the FCÁ, stated that the Corporation erected their houses at a cost of £1,100 per house, in comparison with the cost

[311] Ibid.

of £1,500 per house built by the Defence Forces.[312] While the houses cost more that those constructed by the Corporation, it is probable that using the Corps of Engineers was the only way that the project would have been completed. This was supported by others in Dáil Éireann. Deputy Sean Collins remarked in discussions on the Defence Vote that he had been an advocate for the use of the Corps of Engineers in attempting to solve the Army housing issue. He continued: 'I felt it was rather extraordinary that we should have a highly skilled corps of engineers, with everyone from architects and engineers down to various skilled tradesmen doing everything but building houses for the Army'.[313]

Discussions in these meetings were not limited to the examination of Defence Forces expenditure. An example of this revolved around £8 being paid to a contractor in respect of a clerical error made when tendering. When Deputy Booth raised the question about whose clerical error it was, the chairman bluntly commented 'may I direct the Deputy's attention to the fact that there is Finance Sanction (S.9/13/39) for that'. Booth then exclaimed 'does that mean the almighty...' and was promptly cut off by the chairman who stated 'it means that it has probably been pretty closely investigated'. Deputies Haughey and Booth then both made remarks regarding the legitimacy of this.[314] The "almighty" may have referred to the infamous T.K. Whitaker, Secretary to the Department of Finance. The Chairman tried to pacify both by stating

> I directed the Deputy's attention to the fact that there is Finance sanction in order to reassure the deputy that the Department of Finance is unlikely to lean in favour of a

[312] PAC 1958, 11 July 1957, p.22.
[313] Dáil Debates, 156 (285) 11 April 1956; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0156/D.0156.195604110024.html; last accessed 07/07/12.
[314] *PAC 1958*, 11 July 1957, pp 22-3.

> contractor. All of us are human and if there was clerical error and the Department of Finance, after investigation, certifies it is a clerical error and not a material alteration, it is usually pretty good evidence that is purely a slip.[315]

Booth remained unconvinced so the Chairman continued 'I do not want Deputies for a moment to imagine that my occupation involves any suggestion that they are not free to pursue any inquiry here as far as they can do so. That is why General MacMahon has come here'. The Chairman was James Dillon, Fine Gael T.D. and a barrister, farmer and merchant.[316] While Lt. Gen. MacMahon claimed that it was an inadvertent error in the typing of the contract rather than a material alteration, Haughey ended the discussion ominously stating 'Whatever that may mean'.[317] This exchange had the undertones of both Booth and, ironically, Haughey intimating that there was some level of impropriety in the Department of Finance.

The Medical Corps was also on the agenda of the Committee of Public Accounts. Deputy Sheldon noted that there had been increased expenditure for the services of civilian medical practitioners and that there was a slight increase in the strength of the Medical Corps. MacMahon answered that it was 'due to very difficult operations where our Medical Director is satisfied that an outside specialist is required. That occurs sometimes very rarely and sometimes very frequently'. MacMahon also stated that the reason for a slight increase

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[315] *PAC 1958*, 11 July 1957, pp 22-3.
[316] Members Database 1919 -2005; available from http://oireachtas.ie/members-hist/default.asp?housetype=0&HouseNum=18&PartyId=9; last accessed 13/04/09.
[317] *PAC 1958*, 11 July 1957, pp 22-3.

in strength was due to the position that medical officers were below strength the previous year and were merely being brought up to strength.[318]

Clothing and equipment were also discussed. The note related to a substantial reduction in the availability of uniforms when compared to what was provided for in the Estimate. MacMahon stated that 'I should like to explain that the Post Office purchase our uniforms and uniform cloth and the makers of the cloth were not able to deliver it in time. It was something outside our control'. When asked what action was taken against the contractor, MacMahon remarked 'that happens quite frequently. We are not in touch with the makers at all. As I have explained, that is the function of the Post Office'.[319] He continued 'if the Post Office are too rigid with these people, they will pay for it. They will increase their tenders if there is not a little bit of give and take. That is the explanation the Post Office gives when we ask could they not take any action against them'. Many would echo Haughey's thoughts when he commented 'it seems extraordinary' and Sheldon's remark 'a nice comment on our industrial programme'.[320] This is further evidence of the lack of progress made to rectify the structures in place to organise military procurement.

This Public Accounts Committee Report ends with the Chairman asking

> General MacMahon one question that really applies to the Army. I had a case recently in which a fellow wanted to join the Army but had not the money to pay his fare and he was told that if he would pay his fare it would be refunded to him if he was accepted?' 'That is correct'. 'But there is no means of getting him a warrant'?

[318] *PAC 1958*, 11 July 1957, p.23.
[319] *PAC 1958*, 11 July 1957, pp 23-4.
[320] *PAC 1958*, 11 July 1957, pp 23-4.

'No. You can see the difficulty, Mr. Chairman, that would be involved there. A man might like to get a trip to Dublin and might be completely ineligible and if he got a warrant and came to Dublin we might hear no more about it. Therefore, we have to arrange for repayment of his expenses when he is accepted.[321]

This concludes the historical analysis of fundamental elements of the civil-military relationship that existed in Ireland from the establishment of the State until the period under review. It was undertaken to provide a foundation to explore this relationship further. The majority of the above analysis was done through the financial prism by examining the auditing process of the nascent Defence Forces. The level of scrutiny undertaken here was necessary to demonstrate how the process operated and the outcomes of such a process. It is evident from the above that the procurement procedure structures were not satisfactory. Auditing did not build a more effective organisation, one of its intentions as well as acting as a public watchdog; rather procurement was a recurring bureaucratic challenge. It appears that neither civil nor military management had the ability to organise this. This intensive auditing process may have had other consequences. Many of the procedural changes mentioned here took responsibility away from the military and gave it to the civil side. Exchanges witnessed in the Committee of Public Accounts' reports also impacted significantly on the civil-military relationship, as much of it focused on perceived "wrong-doing" on the part of the military. Huntington believed that civilian control over the military was often identified with democratic government.[322] It has been posited here that governance of the military required this auditing process in order to preserve this democracy. It should be considered that the Irish Government followed this model and in its

[321] *PAC 1958*, 11 July 1957, pp 25 -27.
[322] Huntington, *Soldier and State*, p.82.

headlong rush for democracy, it sought to control the organisation that helped found the State.

1956- 1978

The period under review was defined by numerous events. As outlined in the introduction, two that are considered to have had significant impact on the evolution of the Defence Forces are United Nations membership and the Northern Ireland crisis. Both of these will be examined thoroughly in the subsequent chapters. This chapter seeks only to focus on their affect on the civil-military relationship; however other aspects will also be discussed.

United Nations Membership

The influence of Ireland's membership of the United Nations, both for the Defence Forces and for the State, cannot be underestimated. Conor Cruise O'Brien remarked 'Ireland, partly as a result of her neutrality during the Second World War and partly for other reasons, had been isolated from the world for too long and the mental atmosphere in our country had become uncomfortably musty and close'.[323] With regard to this, John Jackson quotes an Irish Times article remarking that the Irish soldier was 'kept in readiness for a battle he will never fight. Practising himself in the use of weapons he will never use'.[324] However, securing membership was not without its difficulties. The initial push to join the United Nations in 1946 was met with an ambiguous response from the Government. Joseph Morrison Skelly points to a preparatory note in which Eamon de Valera was advised that 'there is much in the

[323] Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History* (New York, 1966), p.14.
[324] John Jackson, 'The Irish Army and the Development of the Constabulary Concept' in Jacques Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays* (The Hague, 1968), pp 114-115.

Charter to raise doubts in our minds'.[325] Specifically, legal advisor Dr. Michael Rynne asked de Valera to consider Article 43 which he suggested seemed 'to indicate that membership of the United Nations would result at least in the concession of naval and air bases on Irish territory for use in another great power war'.[326]

De Valera repeated these concerns remarking

> My own view is that the present organization does not appear as satisfactory from the point of view of the small nations as the old League of Nations was. However, we have not had the settling of that. Inasmuch as it is the large Powers which will have, in the main, to supply the force which is necessary to support the rule of law, it is not unnatural that the large nations should claim considerable power in what they regard as certain vital matters, but I think that could be secured by an arrangement somewhat better than the present one. However, I do not think there will be anything gained by my discussing changes and improvements in the existing organization. I think I have made it clear that our general desire would be to form part of a security organization and that the very serious question of whether we should or should not apply will come up

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[325] Joseph Morrison Skelly, 'Ireland, the Department of External Affairs, and the United Nations, 1946-55: A New Look' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vii (1996), p. 65.

[326] Skelly, *A New Look*, p.65. Article 43 of the United Nations Charter reads:
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes; available from http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml; last accessed 10/10/12.

> for consideration probably when the peace treaties have been signed and a peace situation has been reached.[327]

However Skelly claims that behind 'his mask of public indifference' de Valera supported UN membership and the platform it would provide for the State. Deirdre McMahon concurs remarking 'it is worth recalling that de Valera had been equally despondent about the League in the 1930s yet played a prominent role in its proceedings'.[328] Skelly believed he was simply biding his time waiting for assurances from the United Kingdom and the United States that they would back Irish entry.[329] Noel Dorr remarked 'clearly it was only once he had satisfied himself that any residual hostility by Britain and the US based on Irish neutrality during the years of war had abated that de Valera arranged the Dáil debate of July 1946 and, then, with the approval of the Dáil, submitted Ireland's application for UN membership'.[330] Both Skelly's and Dorr's assumption is plausible as de Valera had been a keen proponent of the failed League of Nations, and collective security, therefore making it unlikely that he would not attempt to secure membership, if only to gain a platform to discuss partition. He intimated this position during a motion on UN membership in the Dáil. He remarked

> Is our joining an organisation of this sort going to improve the prospects of bringing about the unity of our nation so that our State, at any rate, would be a

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[327] As quoted in Till Geiger, 'A Belated Discovery of Internationalism? Ireland, the United Nations and Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-60' in Michael Kennedy & Deirdre McMahon (eds) *Obligations and Responsibilities: Ireland and the United Nations, 1955-2005* (Dublin, 2005), p.27.

[328] Deirdre McMahon, ' "Our Mendicant Vigil is Over." Ireland and the United Nations, 1945-55' in Michael Kennedy & Deirdre McMahon (eds) *Obligations and Responsibilities: Ireland and the United Nations, 1955-2005* (Dublin, 2005), p.8.

[329] Skelly, *A New Look*, pp 64-65.

[330] Noel Dorr, *Ireland at the United Nations: Memories of the Early Years* (Dublin, 2010), p.34.

> nation State, or will it do the reverse? I do not think myself, looking through the charter, that one could reasonably hope that through the organisation itself we would be able to bring about the unity of our nation. But circumstances might develop in the future which would lead in that direction. Nobody could say—and I think it would be very foolish to think —that there is any system provided under this charter by which we could bring about our own unity. On the other hand I do not agree with those who think that entry into this organisation would do harm or would postpone the day of the unification of our own country.[331]

This opinion was echoed by William Cosgrave who commented

> I should like for a moment to dwell on the fact that so far as this country is concerned the one major political problem is Partition. What the future of Partition may be in our acceptance of membership of the United Nations I cannot attempt to forecast; but I think that it should never be absent from the minds or from the consideration of the representatives of this country, either in the United Nations or elsewhere, that so long as Partition continues harmonious, cordial and friendly relations between this country and Great Britain can never be established on the basis on which they might rest if Partition ceased to exist. So far as our contribution to world affairs is concerned, our effective voice, our strength, our force, and our unity in

[331] Dáil Debates, 102 (1323-24) 24 July 1946; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0102/D.0102.194607240014.html; last accessed 05/04/12.

contributing to these matters would be all the greater if the problem of Partition were solved.[332]

However, despite protests regarding partition, it clear from meetings in the UN that de Valera secured assurances from both the United Kingdom and the United States. In the report of the admissions Committee, the UK remarked that they were convinced that Ireland was a peace-loving state and were satisfied that they would be able and willing to carry out their obligations in the Charter. The Soviet Union blocked Irish membership as they declared they had no diplomatic relations with the State.[333] Cold War politics influenced the membership admission process as well as dominating other aspects of the security architecture.

When Ireland joined the UN in late 1955 this did not immediately lead to Defence Forces' participation in UN operations. Peacekeeping operations were still in their infancy but it soon became apparent that a change in legislation would be required before the Defence Forces could participate. Richard Heaslip commented that just when Ireland became a member of the UN, the concept of armed peacekeeping began to emerge.[334] While Defence Forces participation in peacekeeping missions will be discussed in depth in the following chapter, the initial reaction of the Government is worthy of discussion here. The Defence Act 1954 restricted military activity to internal protection of the State from external hostility.[335] In order to be constitutionally able to participate in missions the Act would have

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[332] Dáil Debates, 102 (1463) 25 July 1946; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0102/D.0102.194607250004.html; last accessed 05/04/12.

[333] Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members, 21 August 1946; available from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/DER/NL4/608/68/PDF/NL460868.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 05/04/12.

[334] Richard Heaslip, 'Ireland's First Engagement in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Assessment' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, xvii (2006), p.32.

[335] Defence Act 1954; available from http://acts2.oireachtas.ie/zza18y1954.1.html; last accessed 04/03/12.

to be altered. The issue of participation first arose when the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) was created. UNEF I was established because the 1949 Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel collapsed due to Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal. In October 1956 Israeli forces launched an attack on Egypt and occupied the Sinai and the Gaza Strip. As France and the United Kingdom then became involved in the conflict, it was referred to the General Assembly in order to seek a resolution. UNEF I, which was to be the first UN armed peacekeeping mission, was then established. The combination of a lightly armed UN force along with observers became what could be considered the 'blueprint for the UN's approach to containing other potentially destabilising conflicts'.[336] In November 1956 John Costello, then Taoiseach, discussed UNEF I in the Seanad stating that

> I think it would be necessary to amend the Defence Forces Acts before we send any troops. If there was a very large volume of public opinion desiring that we should make this gesture in the interests of international peace and as a small nation very vitally interested in the maintenance and preservation of peace, and also being vitally interested in economic security, it would be easy enough to secure an amendment of the Defence Forces Acts. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, as a new member, and it not having been suggested to us that we ought to contribute something, and in the very unprecedented circumstances in which this force was evolved, I think it is better for us, as a small nation, and a new member of the United Nations, at least to await developments.[337]

[336] Heaslip, *First Engagement*, p.32.
[337] Seanad Eireann, 46 (1156) 21 November 1956; available from http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie/S/0046/S.0046.195611210011.html; last accessed 12/05/09.

While the Government supported the idea of providing a contingent in the future, the Department of Defence were less positive. Kevin Boland, then Minister for Defence, believed that the strength of Defence Forces in the late 1950s prevented any provision of a contingent to UNEF.[338] The State was never formally asked to contribute to UNEF I but the existence of such a mission meant that the concept of participation was open for debate and preparations were made to amend the Defence Act in 1957. However this was shelved in early 1958 when the decision was made to wait until an actual invitation to participate was presented.[339]

When the possibility providing contingents for the mission in the Congo arose, de Valera believed they should contribute a contingent as 'it is a weakness in world organisations that their members often tend to be more conscious of the advantages these organisations seem to afford them than of the obligations which membership of them implies'.[340] This led to the passing of the Defence (Amendment) Act 1960 which was described as

> an Act to authorise the despatch of contingents of the Permanent Defence Force for service outside the State with international forces established by the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations for the performance of duties of a police character, to extend the area of service of certain members of the Permanent Defence Force, and for those purposes to amend the Defence Act, 1954, in certain respects and to provide for other related matters.[341]

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[338] Ireland's Financial Contribution to UNEF (National Archives of Ireland DFA 305/173/1, hereafter NAI).
[339] Department of the Taoiseach, 20 March 1958 (NAI S16137).
[340] Dáil Eireann, 183 (1878) 20 July 1960; available from http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie/D/0183/D.0183.196007200038.html; last accessed 01/07/12.
[341] Defence (Amendment) Act 1960; available from http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1960/en/act/pub/0022/print.html; last accessed 01/07/12.

Membership of the United Nations introduced another facet into the civil-military relationship. The Defence Forces were provided with a new role, a highly militarised one, something that by definition could have been at odds with the wishes of the civil side. The concept of neutrality had been deeply embedded into both the public and political consciousness. While participation in peacekeeping missions did not necessarily deflect from this position, it did provide the Defence Forces with a new role. The Defence organisation had little power over the decision to participate in missions. This is clear from the continued Governmental interest in amending the Defence Act even though the Defence organisation itself believed that they were at too low a strength to consider any participation in missions. Richard Betts theorised that during the early stages of the Cold War, American military professionals rarely dominated decision making regarding the use of force. However their influence was at its peak when they argued against the use of force.[342] There are many parallels to this in the case of the early decision making on Irish participation in missions. However, participation in missions would serve both the civil and military sides. The military was provided with a new role that would revitalise the organisation and the civil side was handed an excellent instrument with which to conduct foreign policy.

The Defence Review Board Report 1965, the origins of which will be discussed presently, commented that

> Any assessment of the advantages gained by Ireland's peace-keeping operations under the United Nations' flag must include a consideration of the nation's prestige created abroad and at home. In the Congo operations alone, the armed forces of

[342] Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises 2nd Edition* (New York, 1991), p.5.

> some twenty seven nations were at one time or another not only operating with our Defence Forces but, for the first time for many, coming to know that a country called Ireland not only existed but maintained its own armed forces pledged to support world peace.[343]

Irish politicians now had an international platform, addressing meetings of the Security Council and General Assembly, much of which was the direct result of Defence Forces participation in such missions.

An Era of Defence Forces' Self-Reflection

In 1944 a memorandum was presented to the Government by the Defence Forces stating that if Ireland was to remain neutral in future wars, it must be organised and equipped to defend itself. This memorandum laid out plans that sought to ensure that the Defence Forces would be sufficiently strong. In 1958 the General Staff submitted yet another memorandum to Government on the reorganisation of the Defence Forces. This was due in large part to their inability to implement the 1944 proposals.[344] The 1958 reorganisation 'was in essence a plan to make full use of all the arms and equipment then available to the Defence Forces' and to create 'the maximum field forces which it is realistic to expect could be mobilised at the commencement of an emergency'.[345] It was prepared on the presumption of a policy of neutrality. The underlying concept was that if there was a threat to the neutrality of the State soon after the outbreak of war, there would be no time to procure weapons and equipment. The 1958 memorandum did not assess any current threat

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[343] *Report of the Defence Review Board 1964-1965*, p.62 (MA).
[344] *Defence Review Board,* pp 18-19 (MA).
[345] *Defence Review Board,* p.72 (MA).

to the State nor did it evaluate the capabilities of the force proposed.[346] The new element in this attempt at reorganisation was the integration of the FCÁ or Reserve Defence Force with the Permanent Defence Force and First Line Reserve (retired Permanent Defence Force personnel) in order to make up the units and formations outlined in the memorandum. This attempt at reorganisation was also considered inadequate and by 1965 it was believed that even if full manpower was available, it would still fall short of what was required to militarily support a policy of neutrality.[347] The Defence Forces believed that the '1958 scheme was in essence an improvisation forced on the planners of the time by the failure to implement its 1944 predecessor... It accepted all the shortcomings of the time and restricted future development'.[348] It was considered that 'the lack of such a progressive policy largely gave rise to the situation wherein the 1958 organisation was, -and still is-, based on a variety of equipments procured during World War II. This equipment factor, -and not an assessment of defence tasks-, in fact determined the type of organisation now in being'.[349] What is most telling regarding both the 1944 and 1958 memorandums, both of which were considered insufficient by the authors of the Defence Review Board Report, is that the Government approved both despite neither providing a realistic reorganisation scheme that would ensure the defence of the State. It is perhaps indicative of the post-Emergency period that there was little attention, or indeed finance, paid to the matter of defence. The Report remarked

> Ireland spends a smaller percentage of its gross national product and of its national income on defence than any Country listed. It is significant that defence spending as

[346] *Defence Review Board,* p.72 (MA).
[347] *Defence Review Board,* p.73 (MA).
[348] *Defence Review Board,* p.81 (MA).
[349] *Defence Review Board,* p.77 (MA).

> a percentage of gross national product has dropped by over 26% from 1.37% in 1960 to 1.01% in 1964. Similarly the defence spending as a percentage of national income has dropped by 10.5% from 1.40% in 1960 to 1.25% in 1964.[350]

The Report also commented that only four per cent of the total defence vote was spent on warlike stores.[351] That plans were approved for the reorganisation of the Army without assessing the threats to the State is evidence of the priority given to defence by the civil authority. It also suggests that defence planning was not properly considered by the military side.

Throughout the 1960s it became apparent that the Defence Forces was going through a period of self – reflection. The Defence Policy Memorandum 1967 remarked that three military studies had been carried out in the previous five years on the national defence problem, namely *Ireland in a Major War 1962, Memorandum on Defence Policy 1963 and Report of the Defence Review Board 1966.* The latter was established by Lt. Gen. Sean McKeown in December 1964 'for the purpose of making a study of defence requirements to meet a possible future World War'. The Board consisted of six members of the Defence Forces ranging from Colonel (Col.) to Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Elements outside of the Defence Forces were not to be consulted. The Report does not indicate that any initiating directive was handed down from the Minister for Defence or his department.[352] The Defence Policy Memorandum of 1967 was also established by the Chief of Staff. Both of these reports are military centric and their distribution lists indicate that they were never

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[350] *Defence Review Board,* p.151 (MA).
[351] Ibid.
[352] *Defence Review Board*, Annex "O" (MA).

submitted to the Department of Defence.[353] As one of the most detailed studies on Irish defence this should not have been the case.

A feature of the above reports is the necessity to identify a clear purpose and a defined role for the Defence Forces in the State. It was remarked that allotting clear cut and reasonably attainable missions was of fundamental importance when deciding on the structure, training, and equipping of the organisation. A draft statement of purpose was submitted in the 1967 Memorandum as there was widespread spread belief that a definitive role was an essential component for morale. [354]

The Defence Forces believed that the framing of defence policy and the provision of the means to put that policy into effect was the duty of the Government. The 1967 Memorandum stated that 'in many cases while military recommendations were accepted in principle by the Government, the means to give them effect were not subsequently provided and without those means, the policy adopted was incapable of implementation'.[355]

The Report suggested that it was evident that successive Governments had been more concerned with the economic, social and cultural development of the State than with the issues relating to defence policy. With the Government focus primarily on the above issues, and with the "means" inherently tied with this focus, the Defence Forces believed that it was 'retarding development in other important directions'. It further believed that the reason for the lack of investment on defence was linked to the 'success of international diplomacy to date in finding temporary solutions to critical international situations and the

[353] Copies of Ireland in a Major War 1962 and the Memorandum on Defence Policy 1963 are available from the Military Archives. However the Defence Review Board incorporates military thinking as expressed in both documents.
[354] *Defence Policy Memorandum 1967*, p.4 (MA).
[355] *Defence Policy Memorandum*, p.1 (MA).

apparent absence of an immediate threat to our national security are factors which resulted in lessening the urgency of defence preparations since the end of the Second World War'.[356] However the Defence Forces believed that the anxiety expressed by the Secretary General of the United Nations, surrounding the increasingly hostile situations in both Vietnam and the Middle East, should lead to a continuous study of the defence related issues.

The military recommendation was that a National Council of Defence should be established ideally consisting of the Taoiseach, Ministers for External Affairs, Defence, Finance, Industry and Commerce, and Labour. It was stressed that the Council should meet regularly not only to advise the Government on the direction that defence policy should take and how to source the means to achieve it, but also to study the significance of new trends in international relations and changes in defensive alignments. The Council would advise on alterations to basic planning assumptions and recommend any adjustments to defence policy that may be necessary in the light of these developments.[357] The Council of Defence had already been established by the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924 and was to meet every six months. The Defence Act 1954 also provided for the establishment of a Council of Defence which would meet as and when the Minister required and the composition of the Council changed, with the Minister no longer being considered a member.[358] Eunan O'Halpin remarked that this change in regulations resulted in the Council of Defence ceasing to play a meaningful role and that between 1958 to 1991 the Council is said to have met just seven times.[359] The Defence Forces believed that regular meetings of the Council were essential to study developments and trends, to advise on military defence policy, on

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[356] *Defence Policy Memorandum*, pp 1-2 (MA).
[357] *Defence Policy Memorandum*, pp 1-2 (MA).
[358] *Defence Policy Memorandum*, p.3 (MA).
[359] O' Halpin, *Defending Ireland,* p.265.

requirements and priorities, and to review outstanding problems and the progress of military defensive preparations.[360]

The Defence Review Board in 1965 examined the conditions imposed by the civil side in relation to manpower and equipment. The Report referred to a memorandum of a conference on emergency planning which took place in the Taoiseach's room on 29 June 1962. The memorandum stated that 'An Taoiseach referred to the limitations imposed by man-power and adverted to the strengths provided for in the integration proposals approved by the Government. He stressed the point that provision should NOT be made for the purchase of equipment in excess of that required for the manpower available under existing conditions of service'.[361] This was a significant direct intervention from Seán Lemass. The capabilities of the Defence Forces were greatly reduced by the large proportion of obsolete weapons, equipment and vessels in service and the lack of modern replacements.[362]

One of the more interesting aspects of this Report is that a comparative analysis was made between the Swedish and Irish Governments' demands on their armed forces. The Swedish government stated that

> The Armed Forces shall work to the end that our peace and freedom shall be preserved. The Forces shall, therefore, have such strength, organisation and preparedness that attack on Sweden would demand such large resources and take so long a time that the advantages to be gained by the attack could not reasonably

[360] *Defence Policy Memorandum*, p.3 (MA).
[361] *Defence Review Board*, p viii (MA).
[362] *Defence Policy Memorandum*, p.12 (MA).

be estimated as being worth the stake invested. Defence against invasion shall be the Armed Forces' primary mission. The Forces shall have the utmost capability to prevent an aggressor from gaining a firm foothold on Swedish soil and from exploiting our country for his own purposes. In every part of the country, there shall be the capability of offering tough resistance, even if necessary in the form of free war. The Forces shall be capable of warding off a full-scale invasion, by sea or across land frontiers and an airborne effort in conjunction therewith, while at the same time maintaining a tough defence against a secondary invasion attempt. Security against secondary operations shall be capable of being organised within the country in its entirety. Every Swede capable of bearing arms, who is not confined by other essential employment in the overall defence effort of the nation ought to be capable of military participation in the struggle for the country's independence.[363]

The Irish Defence Forces, by contrast, stated that the organisation was in a worse state of combat-readiness than at any time since they were formed, which was in direct contrast to what they felt was an emphasis by the Government on progressive planning in all sectors of the national life.[364]

This low level of combat readiness had not changed by 1967. This was attributed to the low strength of the Permanent Defence Forces (PDF) that resulted in a high incidence of duties for personnel which in turn adversely affected recruiting and the retention of personnel that were in service. Also mentioned was the inherent organisational weakness that resulted from low strength and led to the PDF being heavily reliant on the FCÁ to make up for

[363] *Defence Review Board,* pp 1-2 (MA).
[364] *Defence Review Board,* p.3 (MA).

deficiencies in units. Once more the lack of a mission statement was referred to. The underlying belief was that a cogent, unambiguous mission statement would provide a sense of purpose to those serving and would highlight the importance of the organisation to those who did not.[365]

However, the most significant financial implication of the recommendations of the reports was the increase in strength of the Permanent Defence Force. This would have resulted in an increase of £3,500,000 annually to maintain the force. The summary of requirements of capital items for all three services was £26,092,250.[366]

The Defence Review Board Report divided the contribution of the Defence Forces to the nation into two categories; the moral contribution and the material contribution. The moral contribution focused on the Defence Forces as the physical embodiment of national identity. The material contribution focused on the development of the character and physique of personnel. However, the Report also noted that there had been a tendency by the Government to give the Defence Forces tasks that would deflect it from 'the true role of the military, which in peace time is the preparation for war'.[367]

The idea of a 'contribution to the State' led to an examination in this report concerning the civil opinion of the Defence Forces and the effect this in turn had on morale. The Report states that the morale of the organisation is reflected in its status in the country. This is measured in terms of its appeal as a profession, the prestige accorded to its members, and

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[365] *Defence Policy Memorandum*, p.12 (MA).
[366] *Defence Policy Memorandum*, pp 21-22 (MA).
[367] *Defence Review Board,* p.3 (MA).

their social standing in the community. The Report commented that the Army could not be said to be held in high regard. The blame for this was placed on

> The almost total lack of interest in defence amongst the public at large, their representatives, and those who mould and influence public opinion... It is true to say that a widely-held opinion is that the Army is a faintly absurd, out of date but expensive appendage; of some use for ceremonial but otherwise mainly engaged in pointless drilling on barrack squares. Its influence on income tax is more discussed than its influence on invasion.[368]

Once more Government policy is mentioned as a possible catalyst for change, in that the Defence Forces required a clear mission statement and that the public needed to be educated on the need for such a mission.[369] These statements are reflected in Dáil Debates throughout this period where the Defence Vote received little to no attention.

The Defence Forces believed that public awareness would have been increased by a positive public relations campaign. The Report stated that 'by far the greatest requirement for the Defence Forces is positive publicity. By constantly taking the initiative an overwhelming proportion of good publicity must be maintained over bad publicity'.[370] It was believed that a public relations staff could

> do much within the Defence Forces to obviate uninformed comment and leakages of wrong or wrongly slanted information. The requirement here is to keep all ranks of the army, through commanding officers, informed of impending events or matters

[368] *Defence Review Board,* p.84 (MA).
[369] Ibid.
[370] *Defence Review Board*, p.127 (MA).

> which are likely to effect (sic) them or their families. It is only by the ready provision of such information that uncertainty can be obviated.[371]

The example of poor public relations during the Congo mission was used to explain a drop in recruits coming into the organisation. The Report stated that

> An example of the army's loss through lack of public relations staff is the fact that army recruiting figures dropped from 1686 the year before the Congo operation commented to 1040 the year after. It should have increased. For this operation the army gained wide publicity, a great deal of sympathy and prestige but unfortunately few recruits. All the stories of loneliness, weariness and boredom in the heat of the Congo jungle were in sad contrast to the stories of excitement and adventure arising out of the overseas commitments of the British army in similar or sometimes less attractive locations.[372]

What is evident from the analysis of the above is that senior officers placed the responsibility of the running of the organisation firmly in the hands of the Government. However, there appears to be no evidence of Army management pushing these recommendations to Government despite both Reports portray a less than flattering view of the reorganisation attempts in 1944 and 1958. The 1965 and 1967 Reports provide a far more detailed examination of the Irish defence organisation. However, the cost of reorganisation was also considerable and this was a significant barrier to have recommendations implemented, especially when considering that defence spending was on a downward trend.

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[371] Ibid.
[372] *Defence Review Board*, p.128 (MA).

The Public Services Organisation Review Group 1969

The analysis of the Defence Forces continued into 1969.The Public Services Organisation Review Group 1969, commonly known as the Devlin Report, was convened by the Minister for Finance in 1966 with the following mandate 'having regard to the growing responsibilities of the Government, to examine and report on the organisation of the Department of State at the higher levels, including the appropriate distribution of functions as between both Departments themselves and Departments and other bodies'.[373] The report on the Department of Defence states that

> Section 17 of the Defence Act 1954 provides that: under the direction of the President, and subject to the provisions of this Act, the military command of, and all executive and administrative powers in relation to, the Defence Forces, including the power to delegate command and authority, shall be exercisable by the Government and, subject as such exceptions and limitations as the Government may from time to time determine, through and by the Minister.[374]

This placed the Defence Forces under the jurisdiction of the President, the Government and the Minister for Defence. It also commented that the Department of Defence differed from other departments as the Secretary to the Department is not the only direct advisor to the Minister. The Minister is also supported by advice from the three military officers who are members of the Department.[375]

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[373] *Devlin Report*, p.3.
[374] *Devlin Report*, p.245.
[375] *Devlin Report*, p.245.

The Devlin Report summarised the functions of the Department of Defence as the 'raising, training, organising, equipping, maintaining and controlling, according to law, the Military Defence Forces of Ireland'. Further functions included carrying out other duties as the Government may direct which are compatible with the capabilities (organisation, manpower, discipline and equipment) of the Defence Forces. Examples include rendering aid in natural disasters, sea fishery protection, UN peacekeeping duties, air/sea rescue and helicopter service.[376]

O'Halpin commented that the

> Defence organisation also suffered acutely from a chronic weakness which handicapped the effectiveness of many elements of central government in independent Ireland, the so called "dual structure" under which all actions or decisions recommended by technical or professional experts were subject to further detailed scrutiny and review by the mainstream civil service.[377]

The Devlin Report was instrumental in highlighting this.

In its findings regarding the Department of Defence, a chart was provided illustrating how the responsibilities of the military and civil branches operate in relation to one another on matters in which they are both involved.[378] It appears from this chart that there was a strict system of review by the civil branch of all work carried out by the military branch. For example with regard to retirement on medical grounds, the military branch furnishes the relevant data and the civil branch processes it. In relation to the letting of lands, the military

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[376] Ibid.
[377] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland,* p.265.
[378] *Devlin Report*, p.246.

branch furnishes recommendations as to the military position and the civil branch process and arranges lettings. Devlin stated that the supply procedure was the most important instance of combined administrative work by civil and military personnel. The procedure comprises two main sequences, estimation and procurement. The estimation sequence is telling of the inefficiency of the dual structure. When annual estimates were being complied for the following financial year, supply proposals were submitted by the Quartermaster-General. The sequence was as follows:

1. The military directors of the Specialist Corps prepare requirement lists for weapons, ammunition and equipment for their corps.

2. Proposals are submitted in quantity and value to the Quartermaster-General.

3. The proposals, when processed, are submitted to the civil side where a complete appraisal of them is undertaken in detail (starting at a junior level) and further supporting documentation and explanations are called for from the military side, where necessary.

4. The proposals are altered as may be necessary by the civil side after consultation with the Quartermaster- General.

5. The proposals, amended as may be, are submitted in the form of draft estimates for the Minister's approval.

6. The draft estimates are then submitted to the Department of Finance.

7. The draft estimates are finalised by discussion and correspondence between the Department of Finance and the civil side of the Department of Defence.

8. When the Department's Estimates have been approved by the Dáil, purchase proposals are processed by the Department. This involves the submission of a detailed case by the military where only outline proposals had been submitted when the Estimates were being prepared. The proposals may be approved Departmentally in accordance with authority delegated by the Department of Finance. Otherwise the specific sanction of the Department must be obtained.[379]

It would appear that the procedures required the movement of proposals backwards and forwards between the military and civil branch, each doing effectively the same task. Devlin's remarks regarding this practice are telling. The Report states that 'the administrative procedures of the Department of Defence are based on a rigorous interpretation of the requirements of civil control, and of financial supervision by the civil side of the Department... Efficiency would be enhanced if this dual structure were eliminated, while adequate provisions were made to provide for supervision of financial estimates and expenditures'.[380]

The Devlin Report highlighted that the Department of Defence's administration efforts were time consuming and inefficient. Devlin recommended that the Council of Defence should meet regularly and should be used as an arena by both sides to advise the Minister. Further recommendations included that the Secretary to the Department

> should have the normal finance, planning, organisation and personnel units, and, in line, he should have two Assistant Secretaries, one for Supply, Accommodation and Lands and one for Civil Defence. The Organisation Unit should be the Secretary's link

[379] *Devlin Report*, pp 246-247.
[380] *Devlin Report*, p.247.

> with the Adjutant General on Defence Forces regulations and records, and with the Chief of Staff on Defence Forces organisation. The Personnel Unit should be the Secretary's link with these two officers on Defence Forces conditions of service and welfare. The civilian side of the existing Administration function- inspections, regulations, inquiries, and surveys- should also move to the Organisation Unit.[381]

The Report concluded that 'the civilian side of the Department under the Secretary should be responsible for general administration and budgeting co-ordination; the military side for military execution; and the Defence Services Agency for all procurement activities. All should operate under the Council of Defence and the Minister'.[382]

These recommendations were not followed as evidenced in 1970 when the Tánaiste was asked by Barry Desmond of the Labour Party whether any directives had been made in accordance with Devlin's recommendations; the answer, simply, was 'no'.[383] It would appear from this that the civil side, both legislature and executive, were happy to maintain the status quo. Joseph Lee provides an interesting analysis regarding the implementation of Devlin:

> it was not entirely a matter for surprise that observers, not excluding politicians themselves, should detect a certain lack of political will in the implementation of Devlin... There could be no more compelling evidence of the need for Devlin than the reaction to Devlin. The most ingenious, and disingenuous, excuse advanced for resistance was that the civil service was too busy to implement it. This reinforced the

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[381] *Devlin Report*, p.248.
[382] Ibid.
[383] Dáil Debates, 249 (1321) 12 November 1970; available from http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie/D/0249/D.0249.197011120007.html; last accessed 21/03/12.

Devlin perception that alternative structures were urgently required to give the harassed officials a chance to reflect on what they were doing.[384]

Dr. Garret FitzGerald posited that the reason that the Government failed to implement Devlin's recommendations, and why there was a high level of civilian control over the military, lay in 'our own history'. He remarked 'I may well be told by the Minister that this originated at the time when my father was Minister of Defence and when he had the task of bringing the Army fully under control so that, when the time came for a democratic change of government, the people whom we had defeated a few years earlier would not attempt to intervene in this democratic process'.[385] When there are systemic problems, failure to act will always be exposed at a later date. The unwillingness on the part of the Government and the Civil Service to follow any of Devlin's recommendations resulted in the festering of discontent in the defence system. These were exposed again, remarkably in the Report of the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence Forces in 1990 which will be discussed later.

The Northern Crisis

The Northern crisis in 1969 provided a new role for the Army, especially with regard to border control and aid to the civil power. However the civil-military relationship remained constant despite the Defence Forces' new role. In February 1970, during the first Vote on Defence in the Dáil since the outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland, the then Minister for Defence Jim Gibbons remarked that the Defence Forces 'responded magnificently to the demands made on it during this very difficult period'. However Deputy Mark Clinton of Fine

[384] Joseph Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society* (Cambridge, 1989), p.549.
[385] Dáil Debates, 245 (877) 19 March 1970; available from http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie/D/0245/D.0245.197003190076.html; last accessed 21/03/12.

Gael remarked that 'it is fair to say that one finds a fairly widespread attitude – and something should be done about this – that money spent on defence is money down the drain. A good deal needs to be done to dispel this attitude and one of the things that is essential is that the Army should be more closely integrated in the whole fabric of our society'.[386] He continued by commenting that the general public would need to see a "return on investment", remarking that the Army would need to assist more in the social and economic development of the country during peace time.[387] The nature of how the Defence Forces was to assist in the social and economic development of the country wasn't specified by Clinton. It certainly represented forward thinking. The Defence Forces had embarked on armed peacekeeping missions overseas earlier in the decade and was now to have a real security role in the state. The role definition, discussed earlier, that the Defence Forces had sought was about to be realised.

As the Defence Forces became more relevant, public opinion also began to change. Deputy Augustine "Gus" Healy remarked that he would like to place on record his appreciation for the change in outlook with regard to the Army and that 'it is not so many years since people outside and inside this house were inclined to think the only purpose the Army had was as a kind of refuge for ne'er-do-wells who could not make an honest living or could not be trusted to make an honest living in ordinary civilian life'. He believed that this image of the Army had completely changed. However, he also stated that the Army was 'not the greatest career a young man could choose'.[388] It is evident from these comments that while the Army's actions after the initial outbreak of violence, particularly the setting up and running

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[386] Dáil Debates, 244 (1685) 25 February 1970; available from http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie/D/0244/D.0244.197002250047.html; last accessed 23/03/12

[387] Ibid.

[388] Dáil Debates, 244 (1698) 25 February 1970; available from http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie/D/0244/D.0244.197002250047.html; last accessed 23/03/12.

of refugee camps, were met with appreciation; many of the other advances made throughout the organisation in the previous decade went unnoticed. If "all politics are local", then the same can be said about the activities of the Defence Forces. In an era where the State was trying to make its mark on the international community, the role of the Army as ambassadors for the State was almost ignored. While the Defence Forces were providing a unique service to the State, they were, to quote Janowitz once more, 'only dimly perceived as persons, decision-makers, and political creatures'.[389]

The Ceremonial Role: The Funeral of President John FitzGerald Kennedy

The impact of the civil opinion of the Defence Forces on morale has been discussed earlier in this chapter. It was remarked that the public often viewed the Army as an expensive appendage but of some use in a ceremonial role. The Defence Review Board Report acknowledged the importance of this role, specifically regarding Army Bands. It remarked that the 'Bands are a most important requirement in an Army both from the point of view of development of the martial pride of the soldier and of the appeal of the army to the public... The Irish public is very anxious that at International Sporting Functions, in particular, our Bands turn out in a manner which the nation can be proud'.[390] It is evident from this that the Bands were viewed as an important service element of the organisation, directly linking them with the public.

The ceremonial role was perhaps most visible during the 1960s with both the visit and funeral of President Kennedy and the fiftieth anniversary of the 1916 Easter Rising. Two Kennedy aides, David Powers and Kenneth O' Donnell remarked

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[389] Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, p.3.
[390] *Defence Review Board*, p.148 (MA).

> Later when we were discussing the various memories of our trip to Ireland, the Kennedy sisters... agreed that the President's stirring speech to the Irish parliament later that Friday afternoon was the outstanding highlight of the visit. The President shook his head. "For me, the highlight was the ceremony at Arbour Hill," he said. "Those cadets were terrific. I wish we had a film of that drill so that we could do something like it at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier"'.[391]

Following Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, the 37th Cadet class were asked, at the request of Jacqueline Kennedy, to perform the Queen Anne's drill at the gravesite at Arlington Cemetery. This request was passed through the US State Department to the then United States Ambassador to Ireland, Malcolm McCloskey, who conveyed it to the Taoiseach, Seán Lemass on Saturday 23 November. The Taoiseach gave his immediate assent, and arrangements were made to have members of the 37th Cadet class flown to Washington the following day on the plane with President de Valera. A list of the Cadets travelling, giving their names, ranks and serial numbers were furnished to the US Embassy by the Department of External Affairs, and the necessity for passports was dispensed with by mutual agreement.[392] In a recent documentary aired on TG4, Kennedy's Cadets, the most common remark from both American soldiers and those present in Arlington on the cadet's performance was not only the solemnity they brought to the occasion but the sharpness of their dress but also their drill. It was considered very impressive, especially as the Cadets were so young.[393]

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[391] Ryan Tubridy, *JFK in Ireland: Four Days that Changed a President* (London, 2010), p.183.
[392] Letter from Secretary of Department of Defence to Benis M. Frank, 16 May 1965 (MA).
[393] Kennedy's Cadets first aired on TG4 on November 19 2008.

The funeral garnered much interest in the Irish Army. Members of the American public were moved enough to write about 'the magnificence of the drill which was very impressive'.[394] Numerous requests were made to the Defence Forces regarding the use of the drill. Keith Bryan, a Veteran's Service Officer in Columbus Nebraska wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Defence stating

> millions of Americans were favourably impressed, I am sure, as I was, with the excellent performance of the Irish Guard unit that took part in the funeral services for our late President, John F. Kennedy. If the drill performed by the unit on this occasion is described in a printed manual, I am extremely desirous of obtaining a copy of the manual for the use of our local American Legion drill team.[395]

Major RJ O' Leary of the US Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps Unit of Miami University Oxford Ohio wrote

> The Miami University Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps has, among its extra-curricular activities, a drill team. After a number of years of moderate success it is currently reorganising and rewriting its presentation. In our search for new material, the memory of the Irish Military Unit performing its drill at the graveside of President Kennedy came to our minds.[396]

Each enquiry was answered with permission to use the drill and a brief history of its use in the State: 'the funeral drill executed by the Cadet Guard at President Kennedy's funeral is

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[394]Letter from Laurence Burns to Commander Irish Guards Funeral Drill Team, 29 November 1963 (MA).
[395]Letter from Keith Bryan to Secretary of Department of Defence, 10 December 1963 (MA).
[396] Letter from Major RJ O' Leary to Secretary of Department of Defence, 22 June 1965 (MA).

the normal Irish military funeral drill. This drill is executed at all military funerals and at all funerals where a military contingent is present'.[397]

The Cadets performance at President Kennedy's funeral placed Ireland and the Defence Forces on an international stage and the State received praise and recognition for the performance of the Cadets in Arlington. Kennedy's funeral is a representative example of the Defence Forces ceremonial role and how it was displayed to the general public. Events such as the Niemba Funerals, 1966 commemorations and state funerals were the only visible activities the Defence Forces undertook in full view of the public before taking up the aid to the civil power role. It should be remembered that President Kennedy's funeral occurred two years before the Report of the Defence Review Board in which public opinion was discussed. The Defence Forces were again being used as an instrument of foreign policy and while they were lauded abroad, for the most part, the organisation perceived itself to be largely ignored at home.

Military Education

Education is a critical component of managing and adapting to change in any organisation. Education provides new ways of thinking and is essential in the development of leadership. American scholar Steven Kenney remarked

> in the military, arguably, the importance of education to equip us for revolutionary change is greater than it is in any other arena. As the world proceeds rapidly into a future of great uncertainty, the ability of our officers and enlisted personnel to think

[397] Ceremonial Funeral of President Kennedy Enquiries re: Drill Carried out by Cadets (MA).

> innovatively and strategically, to apply finally honed critical faculties and knowledge bases in any situation, "on the fly", could be our single greatest force multiplier. [398]

While the subject of discussion was the American military, this statement has equal relevance in an Irish context despite obvious differences in their size and role.

The Irish Military Mission to the United States of America 1926-1927, having examined the US military system and their methods of education, recommended in their report that

> The education our officers require is manifestly that which will enable them to deal with the problems which are peculiarly ours, as well as the military problems which are common to our and other armies. They must get that tactical training which suits the type of combat they are likely to find themselves in, they must be trained to use the military machine which our policy and our resources permits us to have, and they must be trained to face all these problems in the light of the characteristics of our people and our State.[399]

The Military Mission report also recommended that the formulation of a doctrine of war and the procurement and training of a faculty to conduct the teaching of this doctrine were primary objectives. The recommendations of the Mission placed emphasis on systems and methodologies appropriate for the Irish Defence Forces. The Mission led to the foundation of the Military College in the Curragh, the enduring bedrock of military education.

The military training and education system was the subject of further study during the period under review. The Review Board Report observed that the lack of trained and high

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[398] Steven H Kenney, 'Professional Military Education and the Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs' in *Air and Space Power Journal* (January 1996), p.52.

[399] The General Report of the Irish Military Mission to the United States of America 1926-1927, p.115 (MA).

quality NCOs was one of the most serious defects in the Army during this period. The recommendation was that all NCOs should have to qualify on a series of comprehensive courses to enable them to be prepared for each successive rank.[400] When discussing Officers, it was remarked that

> the requirements of the modern military officer dictate that he be a man of general knowledge and education with a clear and developed mind capable of grappling with the complex problems of defence, the training to deal with administrative problems arising therefrom and the ability to cope with the rapid advances of technology at all levels of the military sphere.[401]

A cadet entered the Military College with a Leaving Certificate standard of education and while this was considered to be a reasonable foundation, it was 'not a sufficiently high standard for the officer of today – much less for the future'. It was noted that most foreign military academies would educate their officers to a university standard as a training requirement.[402]

In a farsighted move, the military proposal to educate officers to university standard was supported by the Department of Defence and approved by the Commission on Higher Education. In the 1969-1970 report of the Committee of Public Accounts, the Chairman stated

> Following the consideration of a recommendation by the Commission on Higher Education that the training of military cadets should be associated with university

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[400] *Defence Review Board,* p.112 (MA).
[401] Ibid.
[402] *Defence Review Board,* p.112 (MA).

> studies it was decided that suitably qualified members of the cadet class appointed in 1968 should be given the opportunity of pursuing studies at University College, Galway. A total of fourteen cadets commenced courses in Arts, Commerce, Science and Engineering in October 1969. The charge to this subhead includes expenditure amounting to £1,028 on college, registration and examination fees and text books.[403]

The choice of University College Galway may have had much to do with its linkage to the Irish language and the Permanent Defence Forces has its only Irish speaking unit in that City. In 1973 Jim Gibbons, then in opposition, remarked in regard to changes in the Irish language requirement for cadetships whether this meant "that the Irish Army are now abandoning their traditional position as being one of the primary nurseries which we have had since the foundation of the State for the Irish language?'.[404] The choice of Galway would suggest that it was not abandoning this position.

The Accounting Officer stated that

> the major development there has been the sending of cadets to UCG. At the present time there are 90 cadets attending Galway University and it will be a standard feature in the coming years. On entry, cadets are required to have matriculation so that they can go on to university. We have not been able to recruit the full number with matriculation and last year we had to hold a special examination based on the leaving certificate in order to supplement the earlier intake. Possibly this practice will have to be repeated.

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[403] *Report of the Committee of Public Accounts – together with the proceedings of the Committee, minutes and evidence and Appendices Appropriation Accounts 1969-1970* (hereafter *PAC 1971)*, 26 October 1972, p.115 (Official Publications, Trinity College Dublin).

[404] Dáil Debates, 267 (1210) 18 July 1973; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0267/D.0267.197307180080.html; last accessed 25/08/12.

The difficulty in recruiting sufficient candidates of university standard probably reflected the general standard of education at that time. The terms and conditions of service were also changed for cadets. The Secretary of the Department of Defence, Stiofán O'Cearnaigh, stated that it is now 'ten years in the case of those with degrees in arts, economics or science. In the case of an engineer it is twelve years. That means they must remain in the Permanent Defence Forces for that length of time from the date of graduation plus an additional ten years on the Reserve Defence Force'.[405] He also stated that each year there were a number of vacancies that are reserved for serving personnel with the educational qualifications. The Minister for Defence, Jim Gibbons, commented on the programme remarking

> a significant step was taken during the year regarding the training of cadets. Following consideration of the recommendation of the Commission on Higher Education that the training of military cadets should be associated with university studies, I decided in August last that appropriately qualified members of the cadet class appointed in 1968 should be given the opportunity of pursuing university studies at University College, Galway.[406]

The developments in education were central to the further professionalisation of the Defence Forces and cadets were not the only ones to be afforded additional opportunities. A scheme was introduced in 1969 which gave enlisted personnel the opportunity to partake in a one year course in a vocational school to receive the day group certificate. In September of that year, one hundred and fifty two men commenced courses in eight schools, ninety

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[405] *PAC 1971*, 26 October 1972, pp 116-117.
[406] Dáil Debates, 245 (713) 19 March 1970; available from http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie/D/0245/D.0245.197003190008.html; last accessed 23/03/12.

seven taking the full daytime course and fifty five taking a shorter night course.[407] The emphasis on education was placed on the organisation as whole rather than concentrating on the officer class. It not only served to improve the organisation but also to make a career in the Army more attractive in an attempt to make recruitment drives more successful. This enlightened handling of the educational issue clearly demonstrated how the civil-military relationship should have been conducted.

The new and revised roles that were given to the Defences Forces in the 1960s were discussed in 1992 in the Report of the Board on the Review of Cadet and Officer Training in the Permanent Defence Forces. It stated that

> Successful peacekeeping including military observation duties, requires officers with good military skills. In addition there is also a requirement for linguistic competence, the social skills necessary to work in an international organisation, and an understanding of political, sociological and anthropological factors. There is some similarity in UN peacekeeping operations and operations in atcp [aid to the civil power] in that both are based on the principle of minimum force. Equally however both are based on a thorough understanding of the fundamentals of conventional operations.[408]

The Report reveals that despite the role changes for the Defence Forces, there was little change in education, particularly in the Command and Staff Course. This course is the principal one for senior officers and therefore its construct is emblematic of the priorities of

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[407] *PAC 1971*, 26 October 1972, p.117.
[408] Report of the Board on the Review of Cadet and Officer Training in the Permanent Defence Forces, p.12 (MA).

the organisation. A breakdown of the course content revealed that forty six per cent of the instructional time was based on defence of the state against external aggression while only nine per cent was devoted to aid to the civil power operations and three per cent to UN missions. The Report remarked that 'many officers indicated a perception that too much time was devoted to the conventional operations aspects of the course. This arises mainly from the fact that there is an immediate and direct "transfer of learning" following the course in regard to operations in atcp and in support of the UN'.[409] While it was acknowledged that conventional operations were still 'the bedrock of the course' it was believed that time spent on peacekeeping and aid to the civil power was too little.[410] The dominant norm of territorial defence was still to the fore in education despite that the Defence Forces were involved in armed peacekeeping operations for some thirty two years and aid to the civil power for twenty four years at the time of the Report. It appears that while the new roles were central in the evolution of the organisational culture, the education system had remained rooted to the past.

The education system remained largely unchanged in this respect until the early part of this century. The curriculum review of the Cadet School in 2006 is illustrative of the new approach. The review remarked that

> Successfully meeting the needs of a changing military environment will require The Cadet School to provide teaching and learning programmes to the highest international standards in order to produce graduates who can resonate with rapid changes in all facets of living and who are capable of facing the lifelong challenges of

[409] *Report on the Review of Cadet and Officer Training,* p.62 (MA).
[410] *Report on the Review of Cadet and Officer Training,* pp 62-63 (MA).

> working in creative, innovative and unpredictable environments... The cadet graduate must not only have specialist knowledge in the military field but must also have a range of generic competencies (academic, managerial and critical) which are required to participate in an environment which is subject to constant change, the skills to continue learning throughout a professional lifetime, sufficient breadth of knowledge and understanding to react to entirely new challenges and be capable of placing the work of the military leader within a broader social and cultural context.[411]

Education and training in the Defence Forces falls largely within the military domain and there is no evidence of civil interference in the process. However by concentrating the educational effort on a type of warfare that they were unlikely to participate in, the Defence Forces were not preparing their future leaders for their new roles. There is also no evidence of any education in civil-military relations, despite this being an area of considerable importance since the foundation of the State.

The form of civil control of the military in the early years of the State set the tone for the relationship throughout the late 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Despite new and ambitious roles for the Defence Forces and notwithstanding its small size, it was tightly controlled by the civil side. This control was exercised through the most powerful medium of all, resources and finance. There was little real discussion on defence policy despite the increasing risk of internal threat and a wider role in the international arena through the medium of the United Nations. The Defence Forces were discontented with the functioning and structures of the organisation, and recommended alternatives. However senior officers failed to bring

[411] The Cadet School Curriculum Review 2006. Author's collection.

these alternatives to fruition; perhaps because the recommendations, while considered necessary, were ambitious and costly. While new roles emerged, greater exposure through events such as Kennedy's funeral and greater educational opportunities, the civil-military relationship remained strained. As stated earlier, the legacy of this period was exposed, remarkably in the Report of the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence Forces in 1990.

The Civil-Military Legacy: The Gleeson Report

The Devlin Report highlighted that the Department of Defence's administration efforts were time consuming and inefficient. The failure to act on its recommendations exacerbated the problems, ones that were to arise again in public in the Gleeson Report. The Report of the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence Forces, hereafter called the Gleeson Report, was established in 1989 with the following terms of reference: 'To carry out a major review of the remuneration and conditions of service of the Defence Forces having regard to their separate and distinct role and organisation and to make recommendations'.[412]

The Report was ordered by Government following a period of deep frustration and disillusionment in the Defence Forces, much of which stemmed from the period under review. The general conclusions in this Report are therefore considered important to this study. Gleeson reported that

> from a national perspective, the Defence Forces have traditionally enjoyed high esteem and trust but their internal affairs have tended to attract a relatively low

[412] *The Report of the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence* Forces (hereafter Gleeson Report) (Dublin, 1990), p.xiii.

> level of public and political interest. It has been observed before that armies in democracies tend, by turn, to be ignored or, at best, taken for granted and then trustingly looked to on the occasion of a variety of civil or military emergencies. The Defence Forces in this country are no exception.[413]

The Report remarks that this was the first examination of this kind in the history of the state and that unsurprisingly, long lists of grievances were present. It was the opinion of the Commission that they were presented with an agenda of issues which had been accumulated over sixty years. The Report tackles the issue of the 'dual structure' in chapter one. This states:

> Before dealing with these issues the Commission feels it necessary to comment on the performance, as it perceives it, of both the civil and military management of the Defence Forces. The Commission is not seeking to attribute blame for the present difficulties to the persons who currently hold senior management positions on the civil and military sides. It accepts that the problems which have developed over a period of time can be ascribed to a combination of factors including the organisational arrangements and financial constraints under which senior management have had to operate, the problems created by the lack of a precise definition of the role of the Defence Forces and the absence of clarity in defence policy.
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> While giving due recognition to these constraints, it appears to the Commission that many of the problems which have arisen are attributable to deficiencies of military

[413] *Gleeson Report*, p.13.

> and civil management. There appears to be clear evidence at times of quite unnecessarily bureaucratic working arrangements between the civil and military authorities, on the one hand, and within the military chain of command on the other. There seems to have been a failure to effect timely changes such as would improve the general working environment within the Defence Forces. Given the developments in the public service generally in recent years in relation to systems of promotion, the failure to bring about necessary changes in the promotion system for officers cannot escape criticism. The main reason the Commission makes these observations is to draw attention to the need for a particular emphasis on management reform, at all levels on both the civil and military sides, if the problems confronting the Defence Forces are to be effectively tackled.[414]

In its discussion of the integration of civil–military structures, the report noted that a certain suspicion and lack of trust between military and civil managements was reflected in a number of submissions and in discussions which the Commission held. The Officers Team's submission stated, for example, that the 'duality of the present system results in a "them and us" situation down to the lowest working levels. It is inefficient in terms of the use of resources and in delivery of the service it is supposed to provide'.[415] It went further reporting that

> The centralised bureaucracy and the slow processing of decisions through extended chains of command, create a sense of powerlessness and disillusion among military personnel, resulting in lower morale and widespread feelings of frustration.

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[414] *Gleeson Report*, p.16.
[415] *Gleeson Report*, p.20.

> Discontent and frustration in the face of what is perceived as an insurmountable bureaucracy were frequently cited as causes of complaints by both officers and enlisted personnel. Relatively minor expenditure proposals which have been approved by the military management are subject to further close scrutiny by the Department of Defence. By way of example only, the Commission found that quite straightforward applications for the authorisation of medical procedures had to be processed through a lengthy chain of command through the Director of the Army Medical Corps to the Department of Defence and back down the chain again. Other examples of what seemed to be unnecessarily bureaucratic procedures, with little real decision making permitted at local level even in minor matters, ranged from procurement procedures in relation to aircraft parts to the purchase of rations locally for barracks in rural areas.[416]

The above grievances were attributed to the centralised bureaucracy, evidence of which was examined earlier in the Committee of Public Accounts Reports. The Gleeson Report articulated how the 'dual structure' affected the Defence Forces and provided further insight into the nature of the civil-military relationship. The "enfeeblement" of the military not only wasted administrative time and man power but also caused deep – rooted resentment.

One of the recommendations to come from this Report was that

> a review should be undertaken by professional management consultants of the management structures within the Defence Forces, the relationship between

[416] *Gleeson Report*, p.21.

> military and civil management, the geographical deployment of the Defence Forces, physical asset management and the systems of procurement, financial management and information management which should operate in the Defence Forces and the Department of Defence.[417]

This took place in the 1990s and led to the first Government White Paper on Defence in February 2000. Representative bodies such as Permanent Defence Forces Other Ranks Representative Association (PDFORRA) and the Representative Association of Commissioned Officers (RACO) also emerged from the process, unions in all but name.

It is clear that the civil-military relationship has been fraught and indicative of how Coxian historicism describes institutions and how they can become a battleground of opposing tendencies. The foregoing examples serve to illustrate the nature of the relationship between the military, the layers of civil service, and the Government. It is evident that the dual structure caused difficulty, inefficiency, and resentment. It had an overwhelming influence on how the organisation was managed. The blame for the lack of effective management can be placed on both sides of the relationship. The effects of a brutal civil war and the subsequent Mutiny resulted in an anti-militaristic ideology, not only from the politicians but also from the general public. The period under review also witnessed a broadening of roles for the Defence Forces as they forged a new identity out of the post-Emergency stagnation. The Defence Forces spent a considerable part of the 1960s examining their own organisation, noting deficiencies and criticising the lack of military thought and planning in previous reorganisations. As Cox remarked 'the clash of rival collective images provides evidence of the potential for alternative paths of development

[417] *Gleeson Report*, p.190.

and raises questions as to the possible material and institutional basis for the emergence of an alternative structure'.[418] However, there was little evidence of implementation of these recommendations. The grievances outlined in the Gleeson Report suggest that the bureaucratic controls also led to deep resentment. All of the above had a profound influence on the evolution of the organisation. A key challenge emanating from these conclusions is to examine how an organisation that were perceived as "enfeebled" at home, could earn such a high reputation overseas.

[418] Cox, *Approaches*, p.99.

Chapter 3

The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in the Evolution of the Irish Defence Forces

Introduction

The entry of Ireland into the United Nations organisation (UN) on 14 December 1955 was a critical moment both for the status of the country in the international community and for the future role of the Defence Forces. It gave the State a platform to contribute to and influence international policy that it may never have achieved without membership. There was also an inextricable link between the values of the emerging Irish state and the United Nations. Bunreacht Na hÉireann, the Irish Constitution, states in Article 29 that 'Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality'.[419] The UN was founded on a similar rationale to that of the League of Nations, which had significant Irish political involvement, in that the organisation's primary objective was to endeavour to maintain international peace and security. Membership would also impact the role of Defence Forces through peacekeeping.

In its own review of peacekeeping, the United Nations remarked that the evolution of international relations after the Second World War, including the process of decolonisation and the emerging and differing ideologies among the member nations about the use of United Nations machinery, quickly affected the functioning of the organisation founded in 1945. It became apparent that since all international disputes could not be expected to be

[419] Bunreacht Na hÉireann; available from http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/Pdf%20files/Constitution%20of%20Ireland.pdf; last accessed 20/08/09.

resolved by peaceful means alone, a process had to be found to stop or contain those which escalated into armed conflict. It was determined that out of that need, United Nations peace-keeping operations

> evolved as, essentially, a holding action. They did not to replace the means of voluntary settlement of disputes which are set out in Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, nor the enforcement action envisaged in Chapter VII, but rather sought to supplement the purposes and intent of those two Chapters. As Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld put it, they could take the place of a new Chapter of the Charter – to be numbered "Six and a Half".[420]

UN peace-keeping operations

> Were not originally envisaged in the Charter as among the measures to preserve world peace; they are a purely empirical creation born of necessity. The term "peace-keeping operation" gained currency in the 1960s, not only well after the Charter was drawn up but also, in effect, after the pragmatic use of this novel concept had already been established within the strict limits set out by the essentially voluntary nature of dispute resolution, the burden of resolution resting with the parties themselves.[421]

Membership of an international organisation such as the United Nations represented a further evolution of the role of Ireland among the nations of the world but there were initial

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[420] The Blue Helmets: A Review Of United Nations Peace-keeping (New York, 1985), p.3 (Military Archives Dublin hereafter MA).
[421] Ibid.

concerns with regard to its impact on the policy of neutrality. The political debates regarding the ramifications of membership have been discussed in the previous chapter. However Ireland was not alone in this regard as Sweden had a similar experience. It became a member state in 1946 and since then

> Active membership of world organisations developed into one of the cornerstones of [Swedish] foreign and security policy. Nevertheless, the UN membership was initially viewed with a certain amount of caution due to the failure of the previous collective security system under the League of Nations and, above all, to the possible implications for Sweden's non – aligned policy... it was, however, felt that UN membership was compatible with a policy of neutrality.[422]

Irish neutrality, after domestic political deliberations, was also believed to be compatible with the UN.

Stephen Hill and Shahin Malik outline what they believe to be the three distinct periods of peacekeeping: the birth of UN peacekeeping, 1947-1956; the assertive period, 1956 – 1974; and the quiescent period, 1974-1987. They describe the assertive period as one where the UN took steps to promote and foster peacekeeping by establishing nine new missions which were 'both ambitious and diverse in nature'. It was also during this period that the principles of peacekeeping, for example the respect for the sovereignty of the state, were established.[423] It was during this "assertive period" that the Irish Defence Forces had its first missions.

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[422] Tor Sellstrom, 'Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa' in *Nordiska Afrikainstitutet* (Uppsala, 1999), p.50.
[423] Stephen M. Hill & Shahin P. Malik, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations* (Hants, 1996), pp 31-33.

United Nations Operation in the Congo

This chapter will begin by analysing Ireland's first venture into an armed unit mission, the United Nations Operation in the Congo, in the four stages of a mission; pre-deployment, deployment, execution and withdrawal. These mission stages are largely based on those set out by the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines 2008. This states that 'although the trajectory of each United Nations peacekeeping operation evolves differently, for planning purposes the lifecycle of a United Nations peacekeeping operation can be divided into the following broad phases – rapid deployment, mission start-up, mission implementation and transition (hand-over, withdrawal and liquidation).[424] The pre-deployment stage will examine the situation in the Congo and the Irish political and military reaction regarding the request for a contingent. The deployment stage will analyse elements of the initial operation largely surrounding the activities of the advance party. The execution stage will focus on operational methods, drawing on those that have influenced the evolution of the Defence Forces. This will include one of the seminal events in the Army's history, the siege at Jadotville. The final stage, withdrawal, will be briefly discussed followed by "lessons learnt".

Pre-deployment

The genesis of the Irish peacekeeping tradition lies with the provision of a contingent to the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). While officers of the Defence Forces participated as unarmed observers in the UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) and the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in 1958, ONUC would be their first armed troop

[424] 'Deployment and Start-up of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines 2008; available from http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eNg.pdf; last accessed 20/09/13.

mission with the UN. Prior to this, there was a debate within the Government as to whether it would be realistic to contribute to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in 1956. As discussed previously, Taoiseach John A. Costello was dubious about providing a contingent remarking 'there is, in fact, no obligation on any member to contribute to this police force... The situation is new. We were not asked or requested to contribute, nor was it suggested we should. In these circumstances, I think it would be better for us to wait and see how matters develop'.[425] However as the mission developed with contingent nations being withdrawn and replaced, Frank Aiken, who became Minister for External Affairs in March 1957 when Fianna Fáil regained power, became increasingly concerned that Ireland would be approached and if they failed to provide a contingent it 'would be inconsistent with the position which Ireland had always taken up, in relation to the preservation of peace by international collective action'.[426] While never providing a contingent to UNEF I, the debate surrounding possible involvement provided impetus for participation in future missions. This would be crucial in the lead up to the decision regarding ONUC.

While acknowledging the opinion of then Taoiseach Seán Lemass that 'the situation in the Congo is one of extreme complexity', for the scope of this thesis it is only necessary to have a basic understanding.[427] The Congo became independent from Belgium on 30 June 1960. Immediately after decolonisation, significant problems became apparent for the nascent state. The political and military situation in the Congo was changing rapidly. There was a

[425] Seanad Debates 46 (1154-1155), 21 November 1956; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/S/0046/S.0046.195611210011.html; last accessed 09/05/12.
[426] Katsumi Ishizuka, *Ireland and International Peacekeeping Operations 1960-2000: A Study of Irish Motivation* (London, 2004), p.21.
[427] Dáil Debates 183 (1880) 20 July 1960; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0183/D.0183.196007200038.html; last accessed 09/05/12.

mass exodus of Belgian nationals, to such a degree that the State was left without trained leadership. As David Gibbs remarked

> The new country had serious regional and ethnic divisions (with some 200 separate language groups), and the resulting sense of national identity was significantly weaker than in other African countries that were reaching independence at approximately the same time. In addition, there were very few Congolese who had had any meaningful political experience prior to independence and, indeed there were no more than thirty Congolese with university degrees.[428]

This was echoed by Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal, Hammarskjöld's special representative in the Congo. He remarked that there was an 'almost complete lack of trained civil servants, executives and professional people of Congolese origin in virtually all walks of life, and the striking absence of administrative and political experience would inevitably have created a serious situation for the Government of the young Republic'.[429]

As with many African states, the Congo had a complex tribal structure and the possibility of the State fracturing along these lines was ever present. Tribal warfare, especially in the province of Kasai, began to take a large toll of human life and to produce a drifting population of many thousands of refugees.[430] General elections took place prior to independence. Patrice Lumumba of the Mouvement Nationale Congolese (MNC), a former

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[428] David N. Gibbs, 'The United Nations, International Peacekeeping and the Question of 'Impartially': Revisiting the Congo Operation of 1960' in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, xxxviii (September, 2000), p. 362.

[429] First Progress Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo, 21 September 1960, p.3; available from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (hereafter UNBISnet) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N60/228/94/PDF/N6022894.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 12/05/12.

[430] Ibid, p.4

postmaster, became Prime Minister and Joseph Kasavubu of the Alliance des Bas- Kongo (ABAKO) became President. A military mutiny ensued and this was due in large part to tensions between the Congolese non commissioned officers and privates of the Force Publique and the white Belgian officers. Indar Rikhye, the military advisor to the Secretary-General wrote

> On 5 July, General Emile Janssens, commander of the Force Publique, addressed the Congolese non-commissioned officers of the Leopoldville garrison following the first acts of indiscipline the previous afternoon. He wrote on the blackboard: 'After Independence = Before Independence', and announced: 'The Force Publique continues as before.' These words had a cataclysmic effect on his listeners, and the word soon went around that independence had brought little change to the army.[431]

The Congolese then mutinied and began to attack white officers, which led to Belgian intervention. The situation deteriorated rapidly after Moise Tshombe, the leader of the Confederation des Association Tribales du Katanga, declared his wish for Katanga to secede from the Congo. Katanga had vast mineral wealth and would have been crucial in building the Congolese economy. Dr. Noel Browne, a left-leaning deputy who joined five political parties throughout his career, told the Dáil that

> At that time Mr. Tshombe insisted that he wanted to secede from the Congo, to establish a partitioned State, to divide the Congo as our own country was divided 40 years ago, and to take away this industrial potential from the whole of the Congo. To any of us who have even longrange contact with this problem of Partition in our own

[431] Indar Jit Rikhye, *Military Adviser to the Secretary General: UN Peacekeeping and the Congo Crisis* (London, 1993), p.1.

> country, the partitioning of any country is equally repugnant. We felt that it would be a disastrous thing for the Congo were Mr. Tshombe to proceed with his suggestion for the partitioning of the Congo.[432]

The issue of partition would arise in both the Congo and Cyprus and the Irish Government would, as expected, align themselves with the anti-partition side. Browne's statements echoed the international feeling on the Katanga secession. As the situation deteriorated a request was made for UN assistance by Lumumba and Kasavubu. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 143 which authorised the Secretary–General, Dag Hammarskjöld, to provide the Congolese Government with military assistance.[433] Hammarskjöld commented that the mission was in place

> to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance, as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks.

However Hammarskjöld was quick to point out that in order to assist the Congolese Government in re-establishing its administration 'specifically in the field of security, certain decisions had already been taken by me in response to a general appeal from the Government... Thus, the Force introduced is to be regarded as a temporary security force, present in the Republic of the Congo with the consent of the Government for the time and

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[432] Dáil Debates 185 (165) 23 November 1960 ; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0185/D.0185.196011230056.html; last accessed 09/05/12.
[433] United Nations Security Council Resolution 143, 14 July 1960; available from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/157/32/IMG/NR015732.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 01/09/12.

purpose indicated'. [434] Four African states, Tunisia, Morocco, Ghana and Ethiopia, immediately contributed contingents. The Government of Ghana was particularly enthusiastic about providing a contingent and also contributed a detachment of police, highly qualified technicians and a medical team.[435] However Hammarskjöld believed in having an ethnically and geographically diverse force.[436] He remarked

> While the United Nations must reserve for itself the authority to decide on the composition of such military elements, it is obvious that the host country, in giving its consent, cannot be indifferent to the composition of those elements... In order to limit the scope of possible differences of opinion, the United Nations in recent operations has followed two principles: not to include units from any of the permanent members of the Security Council; and not to include units from any country which, because of its geographical position or for other reasons, might be considered as possibly having a special interest in the situation which as call for the operation.[437]

Under those principles, obtaining an Irish contingent would be laudable. The Irish Army were a western force who had no past colonial ties with the African continent and who could readily sympathise with the problems of the newly independent state. Importantly it

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[434] First Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Security Council Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960, 18 July 1960; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9891635.7755661.html ; last accessed 23/03/12.

[435] Catherine Hoskyns, *'The Congo since Independence: January 1960 – December 1961'* (London, 1965), p.132.

[436] Nina Heathcote, 'Ireland and the United Nations Operation in the Congo' in *International Relations*, iii (1971), p. 883. Also of note in this article is the reference to Hammarskjöld commenting that 'while the Force... should be built around a hard core of military units from African States, it should also, to the extent which might be found practical, include units from other areas, which meet the general conditions for the composition of a United Nations Force'.

[437] First Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Security Council Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960, 18 July 1960, p.4; available UNBISnet http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9891635.7755661.html ; last accessed 23/03/12.

also set a precedent that while the UN would take into consideration the host Governments wishes with regard to contingent composition, it would not be the deciding factor.

Retired Irish Army Colonel (Col.) Terence O'Neill's observations on the composition are significant. He states that

> At a time when "Pan – Africanism" was in vogue and a "brotherly" attitude might have been expected, significant differences between various African states were apparent. The Ethiopians, who boasted of their ancient heritage, had contempt for the Nigerians and the Ghanaians. The Nigerians despised the Ghanaians and all despised the Congolese, who were seen as having "let the side down".[438]

Hammarskjöld sought to capitalise on this concept of Pan –Africanism remarking that African nations should be the first to offer assistance 'as an act of African solidarity' and sought to build the Force around a hard core of military units from African states. It was hoped that this approach would strengthen not only African relations but also strengthen their ties with the international community. However this solidarity was not to take away from the 'element of universality, natural -and indeed essential- to any United Nations operation'.[439]

While Taoiseach Seán Lemass maintained that Irish troops were sought because of Ireland's "special position" in relation to world affairs, it may also be posited that the State's

[438] Terence O'Neill, 'UN Peacekeeping: Expectations and Reality' in *International Affairs*, xiii, (2002), pp 209-10.
[439] First Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Security Council Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960, 18 July 1960, p.6; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9891635.7755661.html ; last accessed 23/03/12.

neutrality was also a factor.[440] Sweden and Yugoslavia, as European states, were also requested to participate. Reminiscent of UNEF I, questions arose with regard to both the mandate of the mission but more importantly the capability of the Army. Noel Browne argued that the soldiers had a lack of operational experience observing that

> these soldiers are going into an extremely difficult situation and I do not think it quite fair to allow them to do so with their limited military knowledge – of an extremely high level, no doubt and they are extremely competent, no doubt; but they are in no way equipped or educated to deal with the likely situation that could arise...should a civil war develop over the question of the right of Katanga to secede.[441]

In 1958 Capt. Patrick Giles, a retired officer and a member of Fine Gael, stated in the Dáil with regard to the Army that 'there are too many idle men. We realise that our Army of 10,000 men is an insurance against danger, but they are idle men and they are not contributing very much to the national economy. There are too many idle men both in the Army and outside it'.[442] Notwithstanding the accusation of being 'idle', there was considerable interest in overseas service in the army. This was to be expected as it was a relief from menial barrack work and provided an opportunity for travel that otherwise would have been unavailable. Lt. Gen. Seán McKeown, the Force Commander of ONUC from January 1961 to March 1962, regarding the response from members of the Defence Forces, remarked 'it was fantastic, and we said to hell with whether they were prepared or not, it

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[440] Dáil Debates 183 (1878) 20 July 1960; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0183/D.0183.196007200038.html; last accessed 09/05/12.
[441] Dáil Debates 183 (1897) 20 July 1960; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0183/D.0183.196007200038.html; last accessed 09/05/12.
[442] Dáil Debates 166 (1163-4) 27 March 1958; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0166/D.0166.195803270026.html; last accessed 09/05/12.

was worth it to give 700 men an opportunity of this experience'.[443] However he also remarked that the Army had not 'given any serious thought to participation in a United Nations operation with troops, apart from a short study that was done by our plans and operations people in GHQ, which reckoned at the end of some brief deliberations that in our situation at the time the most we could afford was a reinforced company; at the very best 250-300 soldiers all ranks'.[444]

While considerable matters were left in a rather ambiguous and unclear manner, members of both the Dáil and the Seanad approved the decision to provide a contingent and the Defence Amendment Bill was passed. This allowed the Defence Forces to participate in an armed mission overseas. Noel Dorr, a former head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and one-time ambassador to the United Nations, described the Government's decision as being 'novel, and indeed wholly unprecedented'.[445] It also set in motion what has become a mainstay of Irish military life.

Once the political deliberations were concluded, preparations for the military operation began. The first unit to be sent overseas was the 32nd Irish Infantry Battalion which broadly consisted of a Battalion Headquarters, a Headquarters Company and three Rifle Company Groups. This totalled in strength to forty five Officers (including two Chaplains) and 640 Enlisted Personnel, a total of 685 in all. The Battalion was activated on 22 July 1960, the date on which all ranks reported to the Curragh Training Camp.[446] Lt. Gen. McKeown recalls that the manner in which troops were requested was 'all urgently, urgently, urgently; this

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[443] Sean McKeown, 'The Congo (ONUC): The Military Perspective' in 'The Development of UN Peacekeeping Concepts Over the Past Fifty Years: An Irish Perspective' in *The Irish Sword*, xx, no. 79 (1996), p. 44.
[444] McKeown, 'The Congo' in *The Irish Sword*, p.43.
[445] Noel Dorr, 'The Development of UN Peacekeeping Concepts Over the Past Fifty Years: An Irish Perspective' in *The Irish Sword*, xx, no. 79 (1996), p.19.
[446] Unit History 32nd Battalion in the Congo, p.4 (MA).

was the keynote'. He also remarked on the lack of briefing given to those who were departing.[447] The speed at which the battalion was formed meant that there was little time for any training to be provided for the soldiers before they left. This would have been beneficial as Irish soldiers were not used to operating as a battalion and the force was composed of disparate units which had never trained or operated together. For a military unit this is a considerable concern. The only evidence of briefing and training was the Battalion Officers meeting with the President and the Taoiseach in Áras an Uachtaráin the day prior to departure and the parade past the GPO on the day of departure. There was a "preparatory period" of six days which included the preparation of weapons, vehicles and foodstuffs. However, even this task was not completed by those that were going to the Congo. The 32nd Battalion's Unit History states that

> Throughout the whole period of Congo Service there was ample proof of how well the Battalion was organised and equipped; of how well this equipment had been packed and recorded, and in general, of the far sightedness of those who organised the work as well as of the thoroughness with which the work was done. Whilst the personnel of the Battalion were basking in the full glare of 'glamorous' publicity, the work outlined above was being done quietly at all hours – day and night – by personnel of the various Corps and Services.[448]

While the assertion regarding the standard of organisation and equipment can be refuted, this would suggest that there was little involvement from the Battalion in the preparatory period.

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[447] McKeown, *The Congo*, p. 43.
[448] *32nd Bn in Congo*, p.5 (MA).

There is little evidence to suggest that there was any awareness of those going overseas of the tasks that lay ahead. Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Mortimer Buckley, the first Irish commander in ONUC, remarked 'it was a very big responsibility but we didn't even know where the Congo was'.[449] Lt. Gen. McKeown's first reaction, when asked by Fredrick Boland, Irish ambassador at the Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, to create a battalion to be sent to the Congo, was to wonder 'where the hell the Congo was for a start'.[450] Col. Terence O'Neill recalls a conversation between himself and a Corporal as they prepared to set off. He asked the Corporal why he wanted to go to what was then known, as the Belgian Congo. He replied 'that he was not really sure but he expected that it would be a bit of a break from his normal routine. Moreover, if it proved boring, he would, he hoped, be able "to slip across the border into Belgium for the odd weekend"'.[451] While this evidence is anecdotal in nature it implies that the knowledge of the situation in the Congo was limited.

Deployment

Upon arriving in the Congo the following message was circulated to all soldiers:

Welcome to the United Nations Force in the Congo

> You serve as members of an international force. It is a peace force not a fighting force. The United Nations has asked you to come here in response to an appeal from the Government of the Republic of the Congo. Your task is to help in restoring order and calm to this country which has been so troubled recently. You are to be friendly to all the people of the country. Protection against acts of violence is to be given to

[449] Lt. Colonel Mortimer Buckley, 'To the Congo on a Wing and a Prayer' in David O'Donoghue (Ed), *The Irish Army in the Congo 1960 – 1964: The Far Battalions* (Dublin, 2006), p.15.
[450] McKeown, *The Congo*, p.43.
[451] O'Neill, *Expectations and Reality*, p.202.

> all the people white or black. You carry arms but they are to be used only in self defence. You are in the Congo to help everyone, to harm no one. Your conduct should always be such as to do credit to your country and to the United Nations. You are serving the United Nations here. Your orders on the move will come through your officers only from United Nations. You have a great opportunity now to help the Congo and its people. In doing that you will also help Africa. We have confidence that you will do your very best here.[452]

The notes taken by the officer commanding the Advance Party, Commandant (Comdt.) Joseph Adams, give a stark picture of the conditions in which the Irish soldiers had to operate. They point to an absence of intelligence, inadequate supplies and a lack of communications equipment, the foundations on which military operations are built. The initial proposal was that the Irish battalion would be sent to the area of Coquilhatville, with the mission of restoring order in the Equateur Province. However the

> Briefing on the situation in the proposed area of deployment was non-existent because the staff had no information on the area. The staff was unaware of the United Nations (NEW YORK) undertaking to provide tropical clothing and there were no stocks available. There was no mosquito netting nor could [the] United Nations

[452] UN Press Release Co/15, 19 July 1960 as quoted in Catherine Hoskyns, '*The Congo since Independence: January 1960 – December 1961*' (London, 1965), p.134.

> provide any long range wireless equipment for communications between the Battalion and United Nations Leopoldville.[453]

This was also referenced in a United Nations progress report which remarked that contingents 'had to be air-lifted into unknown situations in distant places without, in many cases, any communications other than through liaison officers with Force Headquarters in Leoplodville. Time allowed very little briefing on the United Nations mission, and the lack of information permitted even less instruction on the situation in a given area'.[454] The Chief Medical Officer of the UN influenced a change of mind on this decision when he stated that they should not send white troops into this area for medical reasons; being that it was low and swampy and full of hook worms and mosquitoes. General Von Horn subsequently changed the area of operation to the province of Kivu. However

> The change in operational area, while to the medical benefit of the Unit, created a number of other problems. The greater distance involved (East Kivu was over 1000 miles from Leopoldville) created an urgent requirement for high powered radio for communications. The only practical means of quick deployment, reinforcement and resupply would be by air. It was important that the Unit should be based on a good air – head.[455]

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[453] *32nd Bn in Congo,* p.7 (MA). Leopoldville was where the headquarters of the mission was based. Col. Justin McCarthy was based there as part of Major General Von Horn's staff.

[454] First Progress Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo, 21 September 1960, p.13; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N60/228/94/PDF/N6022894.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 12/05/12.

[455] First Progress Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo, 21 September 1960, p.13; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N60/228/94/PDF/N6022894.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 12/05/12.

It is evident that the UN had little intelligence about the prevailing political and military climate. Adams remarked that the UN staff had no information regarding the situation in Kivu and that, as he was commander of the advance party, he believed that it was his responsibility to acquire it. This was not disputed by the UN. Ambassador Dayal commented with regard to intelligence and communication that 'an immense responsibility devolved upon local commanders and their men, and it is the best evidence of their devotion, discipline and judgement that no serious situations arose in any of the varied and delicate situations in which they found themselves at such short notice'.[456] The advance party spoke with planters, missionaries, truck drivers, Sabena pilots and officials, and the representatives of commercial firms such as Fridam and Sedec. Telephone calls were also made to Bukavu, Goma and Kindu and additional information was acquired from a power plant superintendent and from other civilian sources in these towns. By these means the advance party was able to build a very concise picture of the Force Publique (later National Congolese Army) and the Belgian Forces in the Kivu province, down as far as platoon level.[457]

Subsequent operations by 32nd Infantry Battalion in Kivu proved the accuracy of the intelligence picture.[458] The lack of a complete intelligence picture is reflective of the UN organisation and its limitations at this time and serves as evidence of the problems that arose in the early years of operations. However, this provided the Irish advance party with active experience in this field, something which had been largely out of practice in a practical manner since the Emergency. The lack of tropical equipment available to the

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[456] Ibid.
[457] *32nd Bn in Congo,* p.8 (MA).
[458] Ibid.

battalion would also hinder future Irish contingents. Adams also noted other errors which he attributed to the United Nations such as the population of Kivu had not been prepared for the arrival of white United Nations troops, the airfield in Goma, where the battalion was to fly into, had not been secured, and accommodation in Goma had not been reconnoitred and earmarked.

Vehicles for the battalion's use had also not been procured. Adams believed that even if the ten Land Rovers consigned from Ireland came in an early lift, they would have been completely inadequate. He also commented that the possible reaction of the Congolese National Army (ANC) and the local population was not known.[459] The lack of adequate intelligence sharing and equipment proved detrimental to the Irish throughout their time in the Congo. These were challenges that had to be overcome by soldiers with little experience in the field and as evidenced above had no knowledge of the area, its people and its history. Deployments, by their nature, can be described as muddled and confused. The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines 2008 remarks that the deployment stage 'can be a fast-paced and seemingly chaotic experience' and that 'effective leadership and strong managerial skills are a premium during start-up'.[460] This would suggest that the experience of the 32nd Battalion was not altogether that extraordinary. However it was managed by the effective leadership of Comdt. Adams.

[459] *32rd Bn in the Congo*, p.10 (MA).

[460] 'Deployment and Start-up of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines 2008; available from http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eNg.pdf; last accessed 20/09/13.

Execution

The main tasks that the Irish troops carried out included control of local airports; patrols to make contact with the national army and police to encourage them to return to work and surrender their arms; and rescuing missionaries and Belgian nationals.[461] These operations were hindered considerably by out of date equipment, poor communications and bad staff work at the Force Headquarters. Lt. Gen. McKeown commented that

> We were dependant on receiving pretty accurate information in Leopoldville, being so far from Dr. Cruise O' Brien in Elisabethville and our people in Albertville and Stanleyville in the north. Accurate communications over that vast area were quite difficult, even apart from language difficulties. I would go so far as to say that communications at times were deplorable and frequently inaccurate, largely because of the language problem, technical problems and general bad staff work. A great many people filling staff appointments had no staff training and hadn't the faintest idea of how to compile simple reports on simple happenings, and of making two and two up to four. This was one of the very great headaches we suffered from, and in fact the only way of finding out exactly what was going on in a particular area was to go there and find out for oneself.[462]

Lack of communication between contingents and the headquarters left them isolated and lacking the command and control necessary for operations. Mission integration in

[461] Sgt. David Nagle, '1958 to 1968' in *An Cosantóir* (June 2008), p.21.
[462] McKeown, *The Congo*, p.46.

peacekeeping operations remains both a challenge and a priority to the UN.[463] The structures were not in place to support integration. It therefore placed considerable responsibility on Irish commanders who had no experience in this type of operation.

The equipment that the Defence Forces possessed was obsolete and unsuitable and as McKeown commented 'a bit of a public relations disaster'.[464] Noel Dorr remarked

> Their equipment was, I think, outdated; the ranking system was kept low so that a captain in the Irish army might well be the real equivalent of a lieutenant colonel or at least a major in other contingents; and above all, the uniforms, which I think were categorised unflatteringly as "bull's wool", were more suited to the rigours of the Irish winter than to the heat of an equatorial climate.[465]

The bull's wool may have been a "public – relations disaster" but clothing stores stocked no other alternative. The 32nd Battalion's Unit History comments:

> The lack of a National tropical uniform was a factor which became apparent to all ranks very early in their overseas service. In high summer in Tripoli our troops created quite a spectacle. The heavy woollen uniform was impossible to wear in that blistering heat. When the tunic was removed the even less sightly "grey back" and braces were exposed to the gaze of astonished American servicemen. Only those

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[463] 'Managing United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines 2008; available from http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eNg.pdf; last accessed 20/09/13.
[464] McKeown, *The Congo*, p.44.
[465] Dorr, *Development of UN Peacekeeping*, p.20.

who were quite insensitive failed to have their morale badly jolted by this experience.[466]

The situation regarding weapons and ammunition supplied to the soldiers mirrored that of the uniforms but had more serious consequences. In a memorandum by the Minister for External Affairs Frank Aiken comparing the combat efficiency of the Irish, the Congolese and the Katangese forces in 1961, the Irish were stated to have grenades, Bren machine guns, No. 4 Lee Enfield rifles, Gustaf sub machine guns, medium mortars, light mortars, Energa launchers and armoured cars mounted with machine guns. The memo stated that the

> Irish forces have sufficient for 14 days' continuous fighting by World War 2 standards and for a much longer period for guerrilla type operations... Except for Energa launchers, which are only effective at very close range by something in the nature of a suicide squad, we have no defence against armoured cars, while our armoured cars can be stopped quite easily by their 75mm Guns.[467]

While the Aiken memo stated that Irish contingent would have enough ammunition for 14 days, Terence O'Neill commented that the Irish 'had only World War Two bolt action rifles and light mortars, the ammunition for which was obsolescent and unreliable'.[468] The effectiveness of the armoured cars provided was also questioned. O'Neill commented that 'these vehicles were penetrable by high velocity bullets and were subsequently found to be death traps'.[469] Cathal O'Shannon, a reporter for the *Irish Times*, lamented that 'by and large this was a frighteningly lightly armed force'. He commented that the Katangese, supplied by

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[466] *32nd Bn in the Congo*, p.115 (MA). The Battalion landed in Tripoli before making the journey into the Congo.
[467] *"Comparison of Combat Efficiency of Irish Forces now serving in the Congo with Congolese or Kantangese Forces"*, Frank Aiken Papers P 104/6301 (University College Dublin Archives hereafter UCDA).
[468] O'Neill, *Expectations and Reality*, p.207.
[469] Ibid.

Belgium, had modern FN rifles, heavy machine guns, artillery and air power as well as defined bases.[470] Irish transport was also inadequate for mobile operations. The vehicles available, which were in poor condition, included Irish owned jeeps and land rovers and UN jeeps which were ex-Belgian vehicles.[471] This was considered an enduring problem in the Congo as outlined in the comments of the Commanding Officer of the 36th Battalion in 1962, Lt. Col. Hogan, who stated that:

> It would appear that in this matter of transport we, as a contingent, do NOT get what we should because we make do with what we have in any location. To quote an instance of what other contingents felt about transport and the lack of it, the following is an example. The Tunisian Battalion transferred to Elisabethville early this year found themselves, like us, with inadequate transport. They went through the normal channels when applying for vehicles but got nowhere. Eventually the Battalion Commander got in touch with his Government, who notified UN HQ in New York that they would withdraw the Battalion from the Congo unless they were supplemented. Whereas I am quoting hearsay with regard to that story, my own experience would lend credence to the incident. I feel I should repeat that men's lives could have been lost due to the lack, and the unroadworthy condition of the transport available to us.[472]

The Katangese, by contrast, had modern armoured personnel carriers. As evidence above, those in command of the Irish contingent viewed themselves as a poorly equipped, barely

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[470] Cathal O'Shannon, 'A Journalist's Tale' in David O'Donoghue (Ed), *The Irish Army in the Congo 1960 – 1964: The Far Battalions* (Dublin, 2006), p.3.
[471] *Combat Efficiency* (UCDA).
[472] Unit History 36th Battalion in the Congo, p. 95 (MA).

mobile force. Communications between battalions and headquarters were largely non-existent. The lack of contemporary equipment would be a factor in the major incidents that occurred during the mission – the Niemba ambush and the siege at Jadotville, both of which will be discussed later. The lack of contemporary equipment and clothing can be linked to low spending on the Defence budget in Ireland. From 1960 to 1964 it rose by .01% of Gross National Product (GNP), rising from 1.03% in 1960 to 1.04% in 1964.[473] There was no meaningful increase despite the Army being continually involved in overseas operations over the span of four years. While the State faced no real internal or external threat, there was no real investment made into modernising the force.

This was the first time that the Irish Defence Forces had to work with foreign armies to form a cohesive force. While the potential pitfalls in attempting to gather nationalities were discussed earlier, the Unit Histories illustrate their working relationships, which were largely positive. The Indians were described as having excellent 'planning, coolness and toughness in action'. They were also complimented for their 'drills, speed and accuracy'. The Ethiopians were said to be 'quiet and reserved and appeared to be competent in the use of their equipment which was mostly US supplied'. They were also described as being 'very generous with presents of cigarettes and bottles of scarce and very acceptable refreshments'. The Norwegians and Danes were thought of as very helpful and 'very good friends'. The Canadians were regarded as 'a most efficient and cheerful lot and seemed to take all snags in their stride'. The Italians were perhaps given the highest praise; 'They were efficient, kind, considerate and very human people from the excellent Capt. Cipolot (Medical

[473] Memorandum for the Government – Military Comments, April 1970 (MA).

O/C) to the lowest male nurses... it will be most difficult to forget the Italians of the Red Cross Hospital Elisabethville'.[474]

A relationship with the British was also formed. Edward Burke remarked that British intelligence in Uganda, which was still a colonial territory, was monitoring the Irish presence in the Congo. This intelligence was received through the Special Branch of the Ugandan Police who had contact with an Irish intelligence officer in the Congo, Comdt. Fleming. However Burke remarked that Anglo-Irish intelligence was a symbiotic relationship. It was considered that 'cooperation between the British authorities in Uganda and Comdt. Fleming appears to have occurred intermittently during the Irish presence on the Ugandan border. Comdt. Fleming also seems to have agreed to warn the British of any possible escalation in Kivu that might affect Uganda'.[475]

The appointment of Lt. Gen. Seán McKeown as Supreme Commander of ONUC, replacing the Swede General Carl Von Horn, was considered a great tribute 'to Ireland and the capabilities of the Irish Army Officer'. The fifty year old General was originally from Dundalk and had previously been the Battalion Commander in Limerick. Contemporaneous reports suggest that McKeown was highly regarded as the *Irish Independent* journalist Raymond Smith described his homecoming in Dublin:

> It revealed to me his homely spirit. One might have been forgiven for regarding him as a rather phlegmatic character, considering that he had gone to Camberly Staff

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[474] *35th Bn in the Congo*, p.26 (MA).

[475] Special Branch Report and Intelligence Summaries on the Congo and Ruanda- Urundi: Report on Irish Troops, 30 October 1960, FO 371/146651 (The National Archives: Public Records Office, London. Hereafter TNA: PRO) as quoted in Edward Burke, 'Ireland's Contribution to the United Nations Mission in the Congo (ONUC): Keeping the Peace in Katanga' in Michael Kennedy & Deirdre McMahon (eds), *Obligations and Responsibilities: Ireland and the United Nations, 1955-2005* (Dublin, 2005), p.135.

> College in 1947 to undergo his Command and Staff Training with the British Army. But he never lost his distinctive Irish warmth or personality – "he never forgot he was Irish" was the tribute I heard one officer pay him... He made it a point also, when he toured the different outposts where UN troops were stationed to talk to men in their billets and canteens, thus winning their deep respect and undoubted loyalty.[476]

While McKeown's ability to be force commander of a multinational UN operation could be called into question, especially in light of the future events that would occur in August 1969, the position gave McKeown a unique responsibility, one that much could be taken from. It also opened the window of opportunity that enabled Irish officers to acquire senior posts in future missions.

Discipline is a fundamental element in the execution of any military operation. This has evolved because soldiers are entrusted with lethal force and because they must work together to form cohesive units. Without discipline, military operations would be rendered anarchic. The requirement for discipline naturally exists in war but has equal if not greater relevance in peacekeeping. The differences between peacekeeping and war and the effect that it would have on discipline was also discussed by the United Nations. The Special Representative of the Secretary General in the Congo remarked that

> The fact that the United Nations is a peace force provides another problem unfamiliar to the highly trained soldier. He is allowed the right to use force only in the last resort of legitimate self defence. The troops are also compelled by the

[476] Smith, *Fighting Irish*, p.113.

> demands of non-intervention not to resort to military initiative in situations which would normally call for a strong reaction from courageous and responsible troops. This imposes on them a heavy strain, and only high morale, discipline and a belief in their mission have made it possible for contingents to meet this challenge with honour, and without the use of force.[477]

Discipline is developed in training and routine duties for use on operations and is not something that can simply be practiced from time to time. The early years of overseas operations challenged the Defence Forces in that regard. The Unit History from the 32nd Battalion commented that

> For the past fifteen years or so there has been an easing – off of disciplinary standards at home. Offences which at one time met with very severe punishments (i.e. insubordination and disobedience) have for some time back been treated more lightly. Absence has become a very common offence and excuses for it have been accepted which at one time would not have been. NCOs have progressively lost the authority and power over men which they once indisputably wielded. What has caused all this is beyond the scope of this paper but the fact that is has occurred must be recognised if a study of the Battalion's disciplinary record in the Congo is to be of any value.[478]

The report continued that the discipline required for active service in the Congo had of necessity to be far stricter than the discipline which the average post-Emergency soldier had

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[477] First Progress Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo, 21 September 1960, p.14; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N60/228/94/PDF/N6022894.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 12/05/12.
[478] *32nd Bn in the Congo*, p.108 (MA).

become accustomed to at home. The need to impose comparatively heavy punishments for what the soldier regarded as comparatively trivial offences became very apparent. Because of the disciplinary background referred to, the average post-Emergency NCO or Private displayed a lack of awareness and understanding of the absolute necessity for strict discipline and instant obedience.[479] The social origins of both officers and enlisted personnel were not too dissimilar. John Jackson remarked that 'neither an aristocracy nor an industrial proletariat have contributed to the modern Irish Army. This would suggest that discipline has been interpreted as a military tool rather than a means to emphasise and consolidate social distinctions between officers and men'.[480] The legacy of the stagnation of the post-Emergency period is evident here. The report of the 32nd Infantry Battalion concluded that home discipline should be tightened so that the transition to overseas service would be a smooth one.[481] This was a significant recommendation, reflecting clear dissatisfaction with what they regarded as the lax disciplinary culture which had developed in Ireland over the previous decade.

The grounds for the repatriation of men during their service in ONUC serve to demonstrate behaviour which required discipline. The examples illustrated here have been taken from all units during the span of the operation. These also provide an insight into how some soldiers reacted to being abroad on operations for the first time. For example a Gunner was repatriated to Ireland after being disciplined for loading his weapon in 'an irresponsible way... thus seriously endangering the lives of his comrades'. He was also considered 'not only NOT suitable for U.N. Service but his presence here is a constant danger to this unit and

[479] *32nd Bn in the Congo*, p.108 (MA).
[480] John Jackson, 'The Irish Army and the Development of the Constabulary Concept' in Jacques Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays* (The Hague, 1968), pp 123-124.
[481] *32nd Bn in the Congo*, p.110 (MA).

to the mission it is required to accomplish'.[482] There were also cases of men being repatriated due to admitting to being under-age for serving in the Defence Forces.[483]

There were also incidents of excessive use of alcohol. In one such incident, a soldier's commanding officer wrote that 'he has become a bad example to the NCO's and men of the Unit and his continued presence here would adversely effect (sic) discipline'.[484] Another told of a corporal who not only was constantly inebriated but also had a "nixer" on the side selling liquor to the local Congolese in Leopoldville. It is interesting to note that it was believed that the explanation for his behaviour lay with the fact that his duties as a cable distributor left him with too much time on his hands.[485] There were a number of more serious offences. A trooper was repatriated because he entered a Congolese home and demanded the woman of the house with a bayonet. Another case referred to three Irish soldiers initially disciplined for going absent without leave. However what they did during this time also came to light. The offences committed included assaulting African civilians, sexual assault of an African woman, 'improperly taking away a civilian vehicle' and stealing an unspecified amount of money.[486] Offences such as these lead to civil unrest and feelings of unease and hate towards the soldiers in the community in which a battalion would operate. These men put the lives of their comrades in danger as there was fear of retribution from the locals. Ray Murphy argues further that 'the reality of prostitution and sexual exploitation in this context is all the more disturbing as UN peacekeepers are supposed to facilitate a return to normality in a war-torn society and not to breach the trust

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[482] Letter from Lt. Colonel R. O Sullivan to Contingent Commander ONUC HQ, 4 December 1963 (United Nations Archives, New York hereafter UNA).
[483] Letter from Irish Contingent Commander to ONUC Force Commander, 22 November 1963 (UNA).
[484] Letter from Comdt. Foley to Chief of Military Personnel, 25 February 1963 (UNA).
[485] Letter from BQ – Camp N'Galiema to Irish Liaison Officer Leopoldville, 21 May 1962 (UNA).
[486] Letter from Officer Commanding 37 Irish Battalion to ONUC HQ, 30 July 1962 (UNA).

placed in it by the local population'.[487] While one could argue that prostitution existed in the Congo before the Irish battalions arrived, engaging in such activities is considered a breach of trust as it is directly in opposition of their mission objective.

The aforementioned incidents involved a minority of soldiers from the units involved but served to illustrate the consequences of a lax disciplinary culture. Senior officers quickly learnt that not every soldier is fit for overseas service and that a more structured selection process was required. It also served as a lesson that absolute discipline and zero tolerance for insubordination was necessary in order for missions to operate effectively. Restrictions had to be put in place on the establishments that soldiers could frequent and on the time they were allowed to spend away from their base. The 32nd Battalion discipline report stated that service in a tropical country, absence from home, little relaxation, lack of privacy, heavy duties, absence of mail, etc, contributed to the occasional feelings of annoyance and bouts of exasperation, depression and frustration 'which the soldier might not experience at home' found their expression in insubordination and disobedience. This was considered as being at the root of the disciplinary problems for the Army overseas.[488]

Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) Patrick Diarmuid Hogan, who had served in the Congo, offered a different perspective and remarked

> our disciplinary record out there was marginal, almost nothing. We had a few fellows who perhaps were not suited to go out at all – suddenly the heat and loneliness of being away from their natural habitat, friends and family got them down. One fellow

[487] Ray Murphy, 'An Assessment of UN Efforts to Address Sexual Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel' in *International Peacekeeping*, xiii, no 4 (2006), p. 531.
[488] *32nd Bn in the Congo*, p.108 (MA).

> wanted to express himself one night looking out through a window, so he ran up and down the billet and put his fist through all the windows. In that way he felt better. I don't know why, but there you are. He didn't injure himself doing that, at all.[489]

There are also indications that this may not have been an uniquely Irish phenomenon and initiatives such as leave centres would play a key role in minimising some disciplinary issues. Lt. Gen. Kebbede Guebre, an Ethiopian Officer who succeeded Lt. Gen. McKeown as Force Commander in April 1962, commented that

> Rest/ leave centres established for ONUC military personnel would provide a welcome relief in the tedium of their daily routine and boost morale. Most of our military personnel are away from their respective home countries for the first time and are not accustomed to travelling on their own. The financial implications in the case of individual leave travel plus inexperience and language difficulties make it almost impossible for the individual soldier to avail himself of leave in order to travel on his own. Nevertheless, specialists in psychiatry have stressed the need for change of environment in the case of ONUC military personnel serving in the Congo for any period exceeding four months.[490]

It was also believed that the slow development of the postal service was considered yet another hardship, however it was believed that the 'excellent spirit' of the Force had remained 'unimpaired' by these shortcomings.[491] As remarked previously, the speed at

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[489] Brig. General Patrick Diarmuid Hogan, 'The Scars of Niemba' in David O'Donoghue (Ed), *The Irish Army in the Congo 1960 – 1964: The Far Battalions* (Dublin, 2006), p.57.
[490] Letter From Lt. Gen Kebbede Guebre to Dr. Ralph Bunche, September 1962 (UNA).
[491] First Progress Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo, 21 September 1960, p.14; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N60/228/94/PDF/N6022894.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 12/05/12.

which the 32nd Infantry Battalion departed for service in the Congo resulted in little time available for the preparation and training of the soldiers involved. This is particularly relevant when their lack of experience is taken into account. This is not just the experience of individual soldiers but the experience of the Defence Forces as a whole. The transition from an ill-equipped peacetime army into an operational one could not happen instantly and disciplinary problems were a consequence of this. As the first contingent in the Congo, 32nd Battalion's own analysis of the disciplinary problems should have served as warning for future contingents. It is evident that the systems that were sufficient for life in a barracks in Ireland did not prepare them for operations in the middle of Africa.

The Niemba Ambush

On 8 November 1960 an eleven man Irish patrol was ambushed by Baluba tribesmen in Niemba which resulted in nine casualties. The ambush has had considerable impact on the history of Irish peacekeeping. The focus here will not be another narrative of the ambush itself; rather it will focus on the aftermath. The contemporaneous entries in the personal diary of Capt. Robert George Eagar, an intelligence officer, recall that period:

> 8 November 1960: Stayed up late to listen to accounts of the US General Election
>
> 9 November 1960: Kennedy victorious. Over to the office. News of the Congo ambush and 11 casualties.
>
> 10 November 1960: was not in the office until 11 oc. Terrific fuss over the ambush in the Congo and Col. B [arry Director of Intelligence] was on the warpath. Stayed clean and did a few jobs.

> 11 November 1960: Back to office and spent the morning drafting the "very special" Kenny letter. Nothing strange inside.[492]
>
> 14 November 1960: Very busy all morning – the atmosphere in the office not so good.
>
> 15 November 1960: Had to go to the Castle on two jobs ... Not in until after 11oc. A mortuary atmosphere still inside.
>
> 16 November 1960: All Army dances out on account of Congo
>
> 22 November 1960: On to the office – Col. B at Mass for Congo victims. Left early and brought the 3 small ones to see the funeral. Lack of reverence and too many non- Army people marching. [493]

These sentiments with regard to the funerals were not shared by the media and they reported that the mood of the country was reflected in the large numbers that turned out to line the streets of Dublin as the funeral cortege made its way to Glasnevin Cemetery. Raymond Smith remarked that

> Now there were no cheers, only the plaintive music of the Dead March filling the air, catching up the emotion of the silent thousands and intensifying that deep emotion and that still silence as each coffin passed by. No sound from the crowd, only the beat of the muffled drums, the tolling of the Church bells and all who stood there that day felt somehow as if these bells were tolling for their nearest and dearest.

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[492] The Kenny letter is believed to regard Private Kenny who survived the ambush.
[493] Private Diaries of Captain Eagar held by the author. Col. B refers to Col. Brendan Barry Director of Intelligence.

People knelt and prayed and many wept silently and no one could forget the dignity and solemnity of the occasion.[494]

Notwithstanding the public outpouring of grief, there were no calls to bring the troops home and no such action by Government. Edward Burke remarked that while critical questions about Irish casualties were avoided, there was a 'grave disquiet among the public that a body of men alleged to have the latest firearms could have been overwhelmed by a primitive body of any number with bows and arrows'.[495] This can be contrasted with the actions of other nations whose contingents had suffered similarly. The murder and dismemberment of an Italian air crew in Kindu in November 1961 provides an example. The Italians flew into Kindu to bring two armoured cars to the Malayan contingent. After their arrival, they were surrounded by the Congolese National Army (ANC). The Italians were accused of being Katangan spies and were shot, dismembered and the pieces of their bodies thrown to the locals. Thirteen were killed and while the Italian Government did not make any public announcements, they withdrew their air contingent from ONUC and expressed the view privately that the UN had failed to provide security.[496] The Malayans also withdrew from Katanga following an attack from the Baluba tribe. Their Commanding Officer remarked that the United Nations was regarded by the local population as an accomplice of popular persecution and were treated as an enemy force.[497] The Irish Government did not react in this manner. Noel Dorr remarked that 'Ireland was sobered by the tragedy: this was no longer a great adventure, these deaths were real. But if the innocent idealism of the

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[494] Smith, *Fighting Irish*, p.71.
[495] Burke, 'Ireland's Contribution to ONUC' in Kennedy & McMahon (Eds), *Obligations and Responsibilities*, p.147.
[496] Rikhye, T*he Congo Crisis*, pp 290-1.
[497] Burke, 'Ireland's Contribution to ONUC' in Kennedy & McMahon (Eds), *Obligations and Responsibilities*, p.153.

initial decision to join the UN was tempered by the stark reality of Niemba, it was not diminished'.[498] While grief because of the soldiers' deaths was expressed publicly, the obligation to the UN and its tenets of international peace and security held firm.

The Siege at Jadotville

The siege at Jadotville was one of the most controversial incidents throughout the years of participation in peacekeeping missions. The narrative here reflects the witness testimony and memories of those who were present. Therefore this does not attempt to become the definitive account; rather it reflects the account that was put forth for military record.

The UN believed that civil war was inevitable due to Katangan secession and authorised the use of force. Terence O' Neill points to three developments which caused Katangan – ONUC relations to decline: 'First, O' Brien arrived in Elisabethville in March, convinced that his task was to end Katanga's secession. Second, the Indian brigade arrived in April, even less well equipped than the Irish, also dedicated to crushing Katanga. Third, talks between the Congolese government and the Katanga authorities broke down in May'.[499]

The precursor to the siege at Jadotville was Operation Morthor, Hindu for "smash", which began in Katanga on 13 September 1961. The objective of this operation was to finish the rounding up of mercenaries which began in Operation Rumpunch.[500] The 35th Infantry Battalion Unit History states that these operations 'cost the Battalion a total of three killed and fifteen wounded, and are of historic significance as the first occasion on which Irish

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[498] Noel Dorr, *Ireland at the United Nations: Memories of the Early Years* (Dublin, 2010), p.75.
[499] J.T. O'Neill, 'Eyewitness – The Irish Company at Jadotville, Congo, 1961: Soldiers or Symbols?' in *International Peacekeeping, ix*, no.4 (Winter 2002), p.130.
[500] Operation Rumpunch was a plan by UN Secretary General's Representative to the Congo, Dr. Cruise O' Brien, and his staff to offset the mercenaries that were Katangan military leaders. It began on 28 August 1961 and consisted of Irish, Swedish and Indian personnel.

troops engaged in active combat with an organised enemy since the inception of the Army'.[501] It was hoped that Operation Morthor would be the catalyst for an end to the Katangan secession. However, what it led to was Katangan attacks on the UN posts, which included the Irish at Jadotville. The siege at Jadotville and the consequences of the ensuing ceasefire provoked mixed reactions in the Defence Forces for many years. However it provides an instructive example of how an army unit coped in a combat situation, which would have been the first for most of A Company 35th Battalion.

The Irish company arrived in Jadotville, a mining town, on 3 September 1961. They were ostensibly there as a response to a request from Paul Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium, who was concerned that there could be anti-European riots and wanted protection for the white population.[502] However Terence O'Neill states that no such concerns were held by either Conor Cruise O'Brien or group *Mide*, the initial deployment to Jadotville, that there would be an outbreak of rioting. General Indar Jit Rikhye, military advisor to the Secretary General, remarked that 'the invitation was obviously a ruse to entrap UN troops'.[503] Comdt. Patrick Quinlan, Commanding Officer of the Company, may have felt some threat to the Company as soon as they arrived in Jadotville as he ordered trenches to be prepared immediately. O'Neill remarked that Quinlan had reached out to both the Burgomaster, also referred to as the Burgomeister, and the President of Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) and found them both to be quite hostile. The UMHK was a Belgian mining company operating in Katanga that supported both the secession and Tshombe. Officers also noted a marked feeling of hostility throughout the population of the town and

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[501] *35th Bn in the Congo*, p.6 (MA).
[502] O'Neill, *Soldiers or Symbols*, p.132.
[503] Ibid.

on 5 September the Company was surrounded by gendarmes who erected roadblocks in key strategic positions around the camp. Quinlan again set the task of digging trenches and the Company withdrew to an inner ring of defence.[504] They were unable to get fresh rations from the local traders as the town was blockaded.[505] The Company was not informed in advance of the United Nations strike on Elisabethville on 13 September 1961. However, the Katangese may have been aware of the forthcoming operation as the Company were surrounded by the Gendarmerie on 11 September. Col. Quinn, Deputy Chief of Staff at ONUC HQ, remarked:

> The fact of the surrounding of the Irish Company on 11 September was not taken here as positive indication of serious trouble but was considered at that stage to be just another typical Congolese incident especially when on 12 September a medical officer with medicine and other supplies was allowed into the company area through the surrounding gendarmerie. On commencement of operations on 13 September morning the position of this company became serious.[506]

The incident regarding the medical officer was not regarded as "typical" by those involved. Lieut. Lars Froberg, a Swedish Army interpreter, was going to Jadotville accompanying Capt. Liam Donnelly, the medical officer and two trucks of Irish soldiers, who were to act as escorts.[507] Donnelly had been sent by Comdt. Quinlan to Elisabethville to relay the news of

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[504] O'Neill, *Soldiers or Symbols*, p.133.
[505] *35th Bn in the Congo*, p.15 (MA).
[506] Letter from Fredrick Boland to Secretary of External Affairs Con Cremin, 19 September 1961,Frank Aiken Papers P 104/6410 (UCDA).
[507] Froberg commented that the two trucks of soldiers were a "reinforced platoon" and were destined for Jadotville. Terence O'Neill disagreed stating that they were only to act as an escort to the bridge. For the purpose of this thesis O'Neill's version of events will be used.

the deteriorating situation to the Battalion Commander and to ask for assistance. Froberg recalls the approach of the convoy to Lufira Bridge, the location of the roadblock:

> After a couple of hours on the road – as I realize now, in retrospect – the first warning came. I saw something moving right in front of us, so I shouted "Stop!" "What's the matter?" asked Captain Donnelly. "Have a look yourself," I said and pointed. What we could see ahead was Lufira Bridge. On and around it were swarms of black soldiers – gendarmes. All our vehicles had now stopped. On our side of the bridge there were trucks parked in zigzag fashion and in front of them oil drums, filled with gravel and stones, had been placed as a barrier.[508]

After a tense conversation with one of the gendarmes, Froberg, together with Donnelly and the medical officer with supplies were allowed to pass the bridge. He described the exchange as a 'thrilling moment'.[509]

On the morning of 13 September 1961, whilst the company celebrated mass with their company chaplain Father Fagan, the Katangese forces attacked with both mortar and machine guns. The Irish ran to their trenches to take their positions and began to fire back. The Gendarmes were surprised to find Irish troops concealed in the trenches. During an initial lull in the fighting, Quinlan ordered that 'any vessel that could contain water' was to be filled as, although it was hoped that the attack that morning was the 'action of some hot heads', the large forces of Gendarmes moving into position suggested otherwise.[510] Two and a half hours after the initial attack, the Unit History reports that the Gendarmerie began

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[508] Lieutenant Froberg, 'Remembering Jadotville' in David O'Donoghue (Ed), *The Irish Army in the Congo 1960 – 1964: The Far Battalions* (Dublin, 2006), pp 113-14.
[509] Froberg, 'Remembering Jadotville' in O'Donoghue (Ed), *Army in the Congo*, p.115.
[510] *35th Bn in the Congo*, un-numbered (MA).

another attack with very heavy mortar and small arms fire. The attack was considered to be one of the heaviest launched by the Katangese during the war. In conjunction with mortar and machine gun fire, there was also constant bombing and strafing runs by a sole Fouga jet which was supporting the Katangese.[511] Raymond Smith, a journalist reporting on ONUC, remarked

> Now the Irish troops had to contend with psychological warfare of a most vicious type... A man purporting to belong to the Red Cross would ring up at night to warn them that the native population of Jadotville could not be held back any longer and that wild tribesmen were coming in to eat them. But Commandant Quinlan replied firmly that if they were attacked by these alleged mobs, his men would be ordered to mow them down mercilessly.[512]

The reported standards displayed by the Irish soldiers in combat during the siege were deemed commendable as most had never been in a prior combat situation. It was reported that the Company inflicted major casualties on the Katangese, destroyed mortars and, used an improvised anti-aircraft weapon to damage the jet whilst surrounded and outnumbered. Their No. 31 wireless sets had been rendered useless on the first day of the attack and they had to pass fire orders and corrections from trench to trench. Quinlan remarked that 'the co-operation between the men in trenches in forward positions and our mortar crews was of a very high standard'.[513] The capture of two mercenaries who stumbled unsuspectingly

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[511] Letter from Fredrick Boland (Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations) to Con Cremin (Secretary of the Department of External Affairs) 21 September 1961 Frank Aiken Papers P 104/6410 (UCDA).
[512] Smith, *Fighting Irish*, p.77.
[513] *35th Bn in the Congo*, unnumbered (MA).

into the Irish position was also described.[514] The living conditions throughout the siege were declining. The Company reported that they were unable to prepare meals during daylight as their cooks were in the trenches and only received an evening meal at around eight or nine o' clock. Water was also an issue and 'thirst became our greatest enemy'.[515] Quinlan also noted that there was a grave danger of disease due to burst sewers from bombing and shelling. There was a 'vile' smell and flies were swarming around the trenches.[516]

Comdt. Quinlan attempted to negotiate a cease fire on Saturday 16. However the terms of this cease fire, such as the water being turned back on, were not honoured by the Katangese. Quinlan, accompanied by Fr. Fagan, Capt. Donnelly and the interpreter Froberg, met with Mr. Munongo, from UMHK, who demanded the Irish surrender. It is in Quinlan's decision to surrender that the controversy lies. It is important to place it in context, in light of the evidence that the Company presented above in their Unit History. Throughout the siege the Company had five men wounded but no fatalities. Based on the level of fire they were under, the low level of fatalities could be considered a testament to the entrenching and other defensive precautions that Quinlan had ordered on arrival. Quinlan stated that 'we decided at this stage that the only road open to us was to accept this surrender as further action would have resulted in the complete annihilation of our men'.[517]

The sentiment reflected in the Unit History points to the belief that they fought for as long as they could, in very harsh conditions, for a position in a country that held no real

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[514] Ibid. Quinlan remarks that two white mercenaries by the names of Pierre Van Der Wegen and Michael Paucheun were captured on Thursday 14 September. They had been with President Tshombe that morning who had told them that an Irish Company had been taken hostage at Jadotville and when they came on to Lufira Bridge they were told the same story by the Gendarme there.
[515] *35th Bn in the Congo*, unnumbered (MA).
[516] *35th Bn in the Congo*, unnumbered (MA).
[517] *35th Bn in the Congo*, unnumbered (MA).

significance for them, and for an international organisation rather than their own nation. Quinlan's surrender came, as evidenced from his statement above, from a desire to save his men from continued suffering rather than any other motivation. Smith, in reference to Quinlan, outlined 'how he felt at the moment he signed the surrender he said: I would never like to feel the same way again. It was the first time, perhaps, that an Irish officer was faced with such a responsibility and such a decision but under the circumstances it was the only one to take'.[518] After the surrender, the members of A Company were taken as prisoners of war. They were released on 25 October 1961. Froberg, the interpreter, recalled the final exchange:

> I found Quinlan together with President Tshombe and their attendants, both black and white, and, of course, members of the press. I first turned to Quinlan and asked, "What do you want me to say to the President?". "Whatever you like Larry," Quinlan answered. So I turned to the President and asked him in French "Do you have any questions, Mr. President?". Tshombe grinned derisively and asked why there were so many UN prisoners and so few Katangese prisoners. Then I asked him: "Do you really want to know?" "Yes", he said, still grinning. "Well," I said, "Go to Jadotville and dig in the ground. There you will certainly find your brave soldiers."[519]

The siege at Jadotville, as recorded by A Company, presents an account witnessed by them and, to refer back to Robert Wohl, is true to that experience. This was the history the Company sought to put on record for their colleagues to examine. It paints a pragmatic picture of Quinlan, a man who was admired by the Company he commanded. The Unit

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[518] Smith, *Fighting Irish*, p.79.
[519] Froberg, Remembering Jadotville' in O'Donoghue (Ed), *Army in the Congo*, pp 125-6.

History suggests that the Company supported Quinlan's decision of surrender, a decision that was not popular within the rank and file in Ireland.

The siege at Jadotville is also illustrative of the problems that emerged regarding information and intelligence sharing throughout the UN bureaucracy.

Both the Irish Government and the Permanent Mission in New York received little information regarding the siege at Jadotville. This dearth of information provides an insight into the complex UN/ home government dynamic and this particular incident also demonstrates significant intelligence failings on the part of the UN. For example the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the UN was not even aware of Operation Morthor and Irish participation in that operation, despite meeting the Secretary General two days prior to its commencement. The Irish were not unique in this regard. Fredrick Boland met with the ambassadors from the Netherlands, Canada and Norway, all troop contributing nations, all of whom had recently met with the Secretary General in days prior to the operation, and none of whom had any hint of the operation. A letter from the Irish Permanent Mission to the UN to the Department of External Affairs commented

> During the weekend 9th – 11th September, we began to feel that the Operations Room in the UN building was not giving us a completely frank picture of the situation in Katanga. They kept discounting and pooh-poohing what they described as the mischievous and propagandist reports carried by the news agencies and the British Press. The only information they had to dispense themselves was exiguous and

> evasive. Our later inquiries regarding the reported encirclement of Irish troops at Jadotville illustrated how inadequate the UN's intelligence arrangements were.[520]

The Irish media had reported on Monday 11 September 1961 that the Irish Company in Jadotville had been surrounded by 500 Katangese. When Brendan Nolan, a member of the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the UN, received a cable the next day from External Affairs seeking information regarding these reports he contacted General Rikhye, from the Indian Army, who was appointed military advisor to the Secretary General. Nolan waited all day, repeatedly contacting Rikhye's office, with no success. Rikhye finally established contact the following morning to state that he had received a complete report of the military situation in the Congo and that there was no mention of trouble in Jadotville even though the press agency reports continued to indicate that there was heavy fighting and casualties. He elucidated that only incidents of great military importance were usually reported.[521] On 15 September 1961 the Permanent Mission received a copy of the report by Lt. Gen. McKeown, which covered the period between the 9 and 15 September, on the exchanges between himself and the Brigade Commander at Elisabethville about the situation at Jadotville. Boland commented that

> While it is not for us perhaps to act as judges, it appears to us that Elisabethville may have failed to grasp the significance of the Katangese troop movements at Jadotville and that there was a certain lack of energy and promptitude in investigating them and in keeping General McKeown posted about the situation. It is also clear, I think, that at the time when we started inquiring about the Jadotville position, that the UN

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[520] Letter from Fredrick Boland to Con Cremin, 18 September 1961 Frank Aiken Papers P 104/6410 (UCDA).
[521] Letter from Permanent Mission of Ireland to the UN to Secretary of External Affairs, 19 September 1961,Frank Aiken Papers P104/6410 (UCDA).

had available, probably here but certainly at Leopoldville, information which they failed to pass on to us.[522]

It was officially reported on 14 September 1961 to the Permanent Mission that the Irish Company was surrounded in Jadotville. They contacted the UN Secretariat throughout the day and received press reports indicating that there were fifty seven Irish casualties. Throughout that evening the press reports were consistently unpromising regarding the Irish position. However any effort to make contact with the Secretariat military staff failed. At 9 P.M. Nolan spoke with the Chief of the UN Security Guards and asked him to send a man to the Secretariat to see if anyone was on duty to alert them to the Irish attempt to make contact. After waiting forty five minutes, it was reported that no one was on duty. The Swedish Permanent Representative had similar problems. While Rikhye insisted that a duty officer had been present, it would appear unlikely given the experience of both Nolan and the Swedes. Boland's "British colleague" stressed that the lack of intelligence that surrounded the whole ONUC mission was what would ultimately make it fail:

> He says that Mr. Hammarskjöld managed to keep everyone in the dark about his intentions except the Katangese. In his view, the weakness of ONUC from the start has been its lack of proper military intelligence. He had pointed that out frequently to the Secretary General, but nothing had been done about it. In the present instance, it was only too clear not only that the Katangese knew in advance what was intended but that they had decided to resist the operation by force. The surrounding of the Irish troops at Jadotville on the 9th September was indicative in this connection. It should have served as a danger- signal to the UN command. But it

[522] Letter from Boland to Cremin, 18 September 1961, Frank Aiken Papers P104/6410 (UCDA).

didn't. Owing to its lack of proper intelligence, the UN had embarked, without knowing it, on an operation certain to be resisted by force.[523]

From the evidence above it can be concluded that the UN headquarters in both Elisabethville and New York were largely responsible for the flawed intelligence picture throughout the siege at Jadotville. The reaction from the opposition in the Dáil regarding the lack of information is telling. Brendan Corish, elected Labour Party leader the previous year, remarked in November 1961 that:

> What we are concerned about are the events in the first weeks of September, why there was such a trickle of information at that period and why it was necessary for the Minister to travel 6,000 or 7,000 miles to find out what was happening, especially in view of the fact that it was suggested from these Benches on one occasion to the Minister that there should be a liaison officer between the troops in the Congo and the Government to keep them abreast of the information available. We did not seem to have that.[524]

The structures were not in place for an efficient and effective intelligence system. Noel Dorr remarked that 'communication systems at the time were not good'. When he received a request from the Irish contingent to ship armoured cars to the Congo 'the message had been sent by a very indirect route – from the Congo, through UN headquarters in New York, then to the Irish Mission to the UN and so on to External Affairs in Dublin for transmission to the Department of Defence'.[525] In addition to the difficulties with intelligence, Boland

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[523] Letter from Boland to Cremin, 18 September 1961, Frank Aiken Papers P104/6410 (UCDA).
[524] Dáil Debates 192 (169), 15 November 1961; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0192/D.0192.196111150013.html; last accessed 09/05/12.
[525] Dorr, *Ireland at the United Nations*, p.62.

considered that the 'UN Operations Room and Information Services proved entirely unequal to the task of countering these alarmist and (as later events proved) largely erroneous reports, owing to the extreme paucity of the information reaching them from the Congo'. This he considered to be 'an inexcusable failure on the part of the UN'.[526]

The experience in peacekeeping operations in the Congo provided an instructive environment for the Defence Forces and in turn had a lasting impact on the evolution of the organisation. Despite the lack of briefing, training and adequate equipment it was considered that they performed their duties to a high standard. A legacy of this period, though not readily attributed to Pat Quinlan, was the concept of force protection in Defence Forces planning. He was perhaps the first Irish proponent of this approach. He remarked 'I was not prepared to let my brave men die for nothing. We have no doubts and don't think I regret my decision. I have all my men alive and that is the greatest victory I could ever hope for'.[527] The Defence Forces were not immediately receptive to this change, at much personal cost to Quinlan.

Withdrawal

The end of the Katangese secession, and ONUC, began with Operation Grand Slam. The operation was carried out in two phases. The first involved the eradication of road blocks in Elisabethville, the removal of gendarme positions that were being used in combat against the UN, to enlarge UN control and to gain greater freedom of movement. The second phase was to advance to Kipushi and Jadotville if the political and military opinion considered it

[526] Letter from Boland to Cremin, 18 September 1961 Frank Aiken Papers P 104/6410 (UCDA).
[527] Doyle, *Heroes of Jadotville*, p.147.

necessary.[528] The operation was a success and pushed Tshombe into negotiations. On 14 January 1963 the Belgian Government announced to UN Secretary General, U Thant, that Tshombe would allow the UN to have full movement in Katanga. Once assured of his own personal protection, Tshombe signed an agreement ordering his troops not to resist when surrendering their arms to the UN. [529] In February 1963, due to the reintegration of Katanga into the Congo, a phasing out of the UN force was begun, aimed at its termination by the end of that year. At the request of the Congolese Government, the General Assembly authorised the retention of a reduced number of troops for a further six months. The 1963 level of troops, 19,800 men, was reduced to 5,470 by 1964, of which 355 were Irish. The Force was completely withdrawn by 30 June 1964.[530] This included the final Irish unit, the 2nd Infantry Group, who returned to Ireland that month.

Col. Ned Doyle commented in 2004 that

> It is forty-five years since our first troops went overseas to serve the United Nations and the cause of peace: things bigger than themselves and their own country. We had a very different Army in a very different world. The aim was to save lives rather than destroy them. Small countries like ours depend for survival on a peaceful world, where international treaties are respected and the rule of law is maintained. So, in a vital way, supporting the UN is a national interest.[531]

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[528] Rikhye, *The Congo Crisis*, p.304.
[529],Rikhye, *The Congo Crisis* p.311.
[530] ONUC Background; available from http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucB.htm#Operations; last accessed 19/09/09. See Rikhye, *The Congo Crisis*, p.314 for statistics.
[531] Colonel Ned Doyle, 'Preface' in David O'Donoghue (Ed), *The Irish Army in the Congo 1960 – 1964: The Far Battalions* (Dublin, 2006), p.xv.

The Irish Defence Forces now have a tradition of involvement in UN and UN authorised missions. Though Irish officers were deployed with UNOGIL in Lebanon in 1958, the Congo represented the first time Ireland deployed armed soldiers in units overseas. This would be a major catalyst for the evolution of the organisation.

In the introduction to this thesis, Jeremy Black's scholarly work on military change was examined. Black focussed on political systems, greater independence on the part of the ordinary soldier, morale, willingness to accept combatant losses, the standard of the officer class, including NCOs, professionalisation of the military, and the effect of alliance membership. Taking the Irish experience in ONUC in isolation, it can be considered that this period had several evolutionary aspects.

The provision of contingents to ONUC had an undoubted affect on morale. It provided respite from menial barrack work and gave both enlisted personnel and officers the opportunity to travel while gaining valuable operational experience that would have been unavailable at home. Operational experience also improved the standard of officers, the most visible example seen in the reported actions of Quinlan throughout the siege at Jadotville. The Niemba ambush had considerable impact with regard to the willingness to accept combatant losses. While there was a public outpouring of grief, there was no request from the Government to the UN to repatriate the contingent due to the fatalities. However, A Company 35th Battalion's Unit History points to the unwillingness to accept the loss of life of soldiers and the personal letters and diaries of Pat Quinlan confirms this.

The Unit Histories provide a written testimony of the experience of ONUC as members of the contingent wanted it recorded. However there was an unwillingness throughout the

Unit Histories to analyse and take action on both performance and inadequacies. There were no appraisals of the standard of the contingent and their equipment. This is a considerable shortfall as analysis and appraisals of this nature would have aided future contingents deploying in this area of operations. This can be viewed as evidence of the somewhat insular nature of military life. However this was considered in a separate report and will be discussed presently.

The importance of the Congo experience was described by Conor Cruise O'Brien when he considered

> There was, as the world knows, tragedy but there was also, among that heterogenous collection of human beings who made up the UN effort in Katanga, almost everything else: contrasts in exotism, comradeship and suspicions, luxury sometimes and occasionally squalor, heroism and prudence, great talents and impenetrable blankness, hours of gaiety and of horror, inexplicable arrivals and unforeseen departures, the kindnesses, bafflements, sacrifices and laughter of Swedes, Indians, Irishmen, Canadians, Englishmen, Ethiopians, Frenchmen, Tunisians, Danes, Malayans (almost everyone except Belgians and Russians), all partly fused, under their blue caps, into something new- "Onusians".[532]

Military education and training were discussed earlier in chapter two. Such education and training is naturally based on theory. However as the distinguished military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz remarked, 'so in the practical arts the leaves and flowers of theory must be

[532] Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History* (New York, 1966), pp 10-11.

pruned and the plant kept close to its proper soil – experience'.[533] The Army had their initial experience of armed operations in the Congo.

Lessons Learned from ONUC: A Defence Forces' Reflection

As stated previously, the 1960s was a period of self reflection and analysis for the Defence Forces. This extended towards the peacekeeping role, one to which they were committed. By 1965 Ireland had already participated in ONUC and had begun to contribute contingents to UNFICYP. The Defence Review Board Report 1965 provided a thorough analysis of overseas missions, raised relevant questions, and clearly identified the lessons learned.[534] The withdrawal from ONUC did not equate to a cessation, or disinterest, on the part of the Defence Forces of military assistance to the United Nations. There was an understanding by both the authors and contributors to the report of the prevailing international climate. The Report remarked that

> the evolution and development of emerging nations, the necessity for maintaining or readjusting national boundaries and other allied problems will, in the future, create situations compelling the United Nations to take the adequate steps for the maintenance of peace and security. Measures taken with this aim in view must of necessity entail a United Nations effort involving surveillance by observers or the deployment of a military force.[535]

The Report remarked that the State's neutrality and its record in the Congo would result in continued requests for contingents. It stated that the Government had set a precedent by

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[533] Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, 1976), p.61.

[534] The Defence Review Board Report was commissioned on 10 December 1964 with the purpose of examining and reporting on the organisation and its combat efficiency in order to assess its capability to carry out its roles. This was ordered by the Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Seán McKeown.

[535] *Defence Review Board Report 1965*, p.62 (MA).

supplying contingents for four years in the Congo and by then providing one for Cyprus, and therefore it would feel an obligation to the UN. The Defence Forces recognised the importance of peacekeeping missions to the organisation remarking that 'the fact that the Irish nation could of its own free will and in modern times contribute significantly to the maintenance of world peace, must be considered a major step in our evolution'.[536]

The components of requests from the UN were analysed. They fell under three broad headings; officer observers, organised units, and Commander and Staff officers.

In the case of officer observers, the normal career structure had fitted relatively well for the posts and tasks that were assigned to them overseas. The main weakness under consideration with officer observers was the lack of a continental language, particularly French. However the Army felt that as Irish officers had a 'very good command of the English language', that it would increase their value to missions as English was then and remains one of the primary operational languages in the UN.[537] It was clear that their experience to date left the organisation with a clear vision of the qualities an officer observer should have. The Report remarked that the

> basic military requirements are physical fitness, good motor transport driving ability, practice in accurate reporting in writing or over a radio net. In addition it is essential that the officer has the character and personality which enables him to work in harmony in small teams with officers or other nationalities, and with the officials and inhabitants of the countries concerned.[538]

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[536] *Defence Review Board Report 1965*, p.62 (MA).
[537] *Defence Review Board,* p.63 (MA).
[538] Ibid.

In the case of organised units, the infantry battalions that they formed and deployed were the type of unit needed to meet the United Nations requirement for troops in the peace keeping role. The tasks were considered to be of the aid to the civil power type, with little to no combat against organised military resistance.[539] However, with the experience in Niemba and Jadotville fresh in recent memory, the Army believed that the arms and equipment carried by Irish troops should be at least equal to local armed belligerents. The infantry weapons, classified as small arms in the report, they had during this period were deemed adequate for the missions being undertaken.[540] In the case of non-infantry weapons the 120mm Mortar, which is an artillery weapon, was deemed to be invaluable due to its range and weight. The main deficiencies in arms and equipment identified from the conflict in ONUC related to armoured cars, armoured personnel carriers, light anti-aircraft weapons, communications equipment, and sub-base locations.[541]

Although the armoured cars available were considered to have done 'Trojan work', the armour, armament and method of propulsion of these vehicles were inferior to the vehicles and weapons available to the opposition which the army felt 'put our men at a great disadvantage'.[542] Such was the disadvantage, that they did not suffer more casualties was considered very fortunate. The provision of Panhard Armoured Cars improved the situation.[543] However as only eight were provided, when twelve was considered the minimum essential, this too was deemed inadequate.[544]

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[539] Ibid.
[540] Small arms were described as pistols, British made FN rifles, Bren light machine guns, Vickers machine gun, 84mm Anti-Tank Gun and mortars (60 mm and 81mm) in *Defence Review Board,* p.63 (MA).
[541] *Defence Review Board*, pp 64-5 (MA).
[542] *Defence Review Board*, p.63 (MA).
[543] Panhards are classified in the Report as small light armoured cars.
[544] *Defence Review Board*, p.63 (MA).

Another issue raised was armoured personnel carriers that were required to support the armoured cars. The Report remarked

> The main supporting element required for the Panhard is a dismountable number of troops which can move in relatively close proximity to the armoured car and can provide the manpower which the armoured car lacks, particularly for such tasks as house clearing and overcoming road blocks. Such troops to be of value must be carried in wheeled armoured personnel carriers.[545]

Throughout their time in ONUC, this deficiency was ameliorated by being issued Swedish or American vehicles of this type. In UNFICYP contingents were issued with British vehicles.[546] However the Army believed that they could not continue to rely on outside assistance if they were to continue to supply contingents to future missions.

In the case of the light anti-aircraft weapons, the experience of ONUC was once more considered. The Report stated that

> our units in Katanga were subjected to attack from the air without any effective method of hitting back. The simplest type of aircraft could be used even to throw down explosives on our troops with impunity. Nor in the case of more sophisticated aircraft have we any weapon with our units abroad which could act as a worthwhile deterrent to low-level attack. It is essential that units are not allowed out naked to this degree.[547]

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[545] *Defence Review Board,* p.63 (MA).
[546] Ibid.
[547] *Defence Review Board,* p.64 (MA).

The Army recommended the procurement of twin-mounted 20mm calibre anti-aircraft machine guns for future missions.[548]

Communications equipment, or the lack thereof, was considered one of the major failures in the siege at Jadotville. This equipment was considered vital on a United Nations mission where 'fast and accurate reporting is required and where the reporting of some isolated incident may have worldwide implications'.[549]

The Report commented that

> Where more than one unit is sent abroad to the same theatre of operations a small sub-base may be required to hold or pool stores not immediately required or stores necessary as reserves by the units. This enables units to move locations with the minimum of impediments and reduce losses. It also helps greatly when units are rotating by reducing the amount of stores involved.[550]

There was a partially established sub-base in Kamina during ONUC but in UNFICYP the need for a sub-base did not arise to the same extent due to the availability of British bases. However when a change of location took place, such a sub-base had to be established at Nicosia.[551]

What is evident from the above analysis is that the Irish Army believed that they were ill-equipped for their inaugural mission overseas, citing that they were fortunate there were not more casualties. The Report remarked that the

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[548] Ibid.
[549] *Defence Review Board*, p.64 (MA).
[550] *Defence Review Board,* p.65 (MA).
[551] Ibid.

> situation has developed because, since the emergency period, sufficient financial provision has not been made to provide the Defence Forces with major modern equipments or to replace the heavier obsolete weapons and specialised vehicles. Our deficiencies in this respect have accumulated over the past decades and will continue to do so if adequate financial provision is not made to procure the weapons, vehicles, wireless sets and other equipments which are essential.[552]

However there is no evidence that any of the above findings were presented to the Department of Defence in any meaningful manner.

At the time of the Defence Review Report in 1965, the Irish Army had already supplied one Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Seán McKeown in ONUC, and it was believed that further requests would come. In order to fulfil these requests, and to ensure the right candidate was chosen for the position, the Army remarked that 'it is essential that the Officer selected should have experience of commanding at least a battalion or brigade and have served as a staff officer in the rank of Lt. Col. or Col. Having undergone a course or courses in a foreign army would also be a help but not essential'.[553] The above criteria could be mistaken for a Curriculum Vitae of Lt. Gen. Seán McKeown.

With regard to staff officers, it was believed that 'experience and results have proved that our staff officers compared very favourably with their counterparts from other armies and in the main showed greater versatility in staff duties'.[554] However it was believed that it should be a requirement that staff officers who were to be posted to the headquarters of a

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[552] *Defence Review Board,* p.100 (MA).
[553] *Defence Review Board,* p.65 (MA).
[554] Ibid.

mission should be a graduate of the Command and Staff School. The question of language was also raised again. The official language at the Force Headquarters both in ONUC and the UNFICYP was English. The Report remarked that as Ireland was 'one of the few English speaking non-committed nations it is almost certain that requests for staff officers will be made for any future United Nations peace keeping mission'.[555]

The system of raising units was also discussed in the Report. It was remarked that 'the present system of providing units for United Nations duty is largely the same as that crash-system by which the first unit was provided'.[556] The system of raising units meant that no unit could be activated until a request for troops was received and approved. Volunteers were requested throughout the Permanent Defence Force and the personnel were selected from this volunteer list. The unit was organised on an ad hoc basis and this in turn had an adverse affect on unit cohesion. Medical processing and the provision of clothing and special equipment was delayed until the formal request for troops had been received from the UN and agreed to by Government. This resulted in the unit only really forming a few days before its departure.[557]

The reasons for this system were also set out. When the United Nations first asked for a contingent

> no unit organised for this purpose existed, nor indeed was there any liability on the part of members of the defence forces to serve overseas. Furthermore no unit of the permanent force was sufficiently strong to be used as a framework on which to

[555] *Defence Review Board*, p.65 (MA).
[556] Ibid.
[557] Ibid.

> organise a United Nations unit. The only possible way to meet this sudden commitment was to organise an ad hoc unit on a voluntary basis.[558]

The Report further remarked that

> an ad hoc unit hastily thrown together from all Corps and staffs of the PDF and sent overseas before it has time to be properly trained and integrated is scarcely the best type of unit to despatch to one if the trouble spots of the world. Even given well-trained individual officers and men it takes several months for a newly formed battalion to work up as a team to the state of operational efficiency which is essential for a peace keeping role. The unavoidable growing pains of such a process should be endured at home. This process shows up such defects as maladjustments of personalities, weaknesses of personnel or equipment, lack of uniformity in reactions and the many other minor shortcomings which must be adjusted and tested as the bedding in period proceeds.[559]

It also stated that 'because of the low strength of units at home it has not been possible to provide the amount of individual and team training required nor has it been possible to provide practical leadership training for officers and NCOs. Many young officers and NCOs command platoons or sections for the first time'.[560] The thrust of the argument pointed in one direction and that lay with the perceived requirement to have up to strength units at home. The strength of the Army, discussed previously, was considerably lower than the establishment – the notional figure it was meant to have. While it was evident that the

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[558] *Defence Review Board*, p.66 (MA).
[559] *Defence Review Board*, p.66 (MA).
[560] Ibid.

strength was below the establishment figure, the assertion that it could only be solved by recruitment is questionable. It is true the Defence Forces were not organised for expeditionary operations at this time but they could have, as a minimum, made proposals to change the organisation at home so that it could better enable them to deploy units overseas. They could have made proposals to reorganise at home within the available strength rather than having hollow, under strength units. There is a scarcity of evidence of such thinking at that time. It is noteworthy that this argument was still being used some twenty five years later and was addressed in the Gleeson Report referred to earlier in chapter two. Gleeson stated that

> The discrepancy between the strength and the establishment figures was a recurrent theme in submissions made to the Commission. Defence Forces personnel attach considerable importance to the prescribed establishment figures, though this concept is no longer seen as particularly significant in other areas of the public service. Indeed the Commission noted that, in a reply to a Dáil question on 8 May 1990, the Tánaiste and Minister for Defence said "the establishment figure is to a large extent a notional concept and is not directly related to present day requirements".[561]

The impact of the escalation of violence on soldiers was also discussed. It was believed that if a mission was to escalate to a minor war, the Defence Forces would not be sufficiently trained to 'give the kind of performance which the country would rightly expect of them'.[562] Once more it was considered fortunate that the missions had been mainly of a policing

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[561] *The Report of the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence* Forces (hereafter Gleeson Report) (Dublin, 1990), p.33.
[562] *Defence Review Board*, p.66 (MA).

nature. They believed that this could be remedied by building the strength of the Army, meaning that training could be undertaken.[563] This was deemed essential as it was remarked that 'the troops we send overseas are representatives of the nation in an area on which the attention of the world is focused it is imperative that they should be the best who can be procured. The problem of supplying suitable men for overseas units has in recent times become more critical'.[564]

The delay in the procurement of essential items was also a factor in the weakness of the prevailing system. By way of example, vaccinations for essential inoculations were not purchased until the despatch of troops had been sanctioned. This resulted in further inefficiencies for units during the very short periods that they had available for training.[565] Similarly, overseas uniforms were not held in stock and only purchased when required. Despatching contingents to the United Nations was then considered to be a continuing role of the Army and therefore it was recommended that a limited amount of stock of essential supplies and equipment would be necessary so that contingents would be able to deploy to the area in conflict with the least delay.[566] The lack of sufficient technicians also had an impact on the operational capability of the units. The Board remarked that 'only the willingness of specialist personnel to extend their overseas service has made it possible for a unit to become operational. This is most unsatisfactory and could have serious adverse effects on the operation of the unit'.[567]

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[563] Ibid.
[564] *Defence Review Board*, pp 66-7 (MA).
[565] *Defence Review Board*, p.67 (MA).
[566] Ibid.
[567] Ibid.

More prophetically the preoccupation of the Army with overseas missions to the detriment of home-based units was also under discussion. The Report remarked that 'these commitments have been met at the expense of the home based units in men, arms, equipment, training and increased incidence of duties. Should the army be required to take on another secondary role at home (such as aid to the civil power) it would find itself in a most difficult position'.[568] While this issue would come more into focus in the 1970s, it must be remembered that the very purpose of an army is to conduct operations and the condition of home based units should not be considered a secondary matter.

The Defence Review Board Report made many recommendations to improve peacekeeping missions. It remarked that 'it is essential that any unit which is sent overseas should be well trained, well integrated and have had a reasonable testing period at home to eliminate weaknesses'.[569] Many factors would be required to produce such units. It was suggested that the standing arrangements should

> include that the personnel who are going to form the next unit must be, at all times, provisionally nominated. The personnel provisionally nominated for overseas service must be medically and administratively processed without waiting until a request for United Nations assistance is received and authorised. Sub-units and units designated for United Nations service must be brought together for training for the maximum amount of time consistent with the exigencies of the service. At all times sufficient stocks must exist of all weather clothing, tentage, and the many special items of equipment and supply which are necessary for a battalion. Last minute procurement

[568] *Defence Review Board*, p.67 (MA).
[569] Ibid.

> of these items with its attendant uncertainties and frustrations must be obviated. Proper liaison must exist at all times with United Nations Headquarters in New York. It is essential that an Irish Army Officer be included in the permanent delegation to United Nations or alternately the Embassy staff in Washington, as a military liaison officer. No civilian without military experience at a high level, is competent to act satisfactorily in this capacity. Other participating countries have found such a liaison officer necessary.[570]

The strength and quality of the Army was to be built up as quickly as possible. Arms and equipment were not just to be adequate for the task envisaged but also for the units' security. The Report noted that 'any tendency to underarm or equip the unit because of the nature of the task envisaged, thereby lessening a unit's ability to defend itself, should a situation worsen must be at all times critically assessed'.[571] The unit should at all times be capable of splitting into smaller components without resulting in the shortage of essential items. The Report concluded with an issue that was highlighted during ONUC. It concluded that 'the impression created by units abroad is of great national significance. Dress is a very important factor. National prestige and indeed the morale of the individual suffers seriously if dress and national regimental markings are in any way inferior to those of other participating nationalities. A high standard of dress is therefore essential'.[572] This conclusion was associated with the "bulls-wool" uniform and its effect on morale. In a similar manner to the strength issue, the matter of overseas uniforms was not adequately corrected and was again the subject of comment in the Gleeson Report some twenty five years later. At

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[570] *Defence Review Board*, p.68 (MA).
[571] Ibid.
[572] *Defence Review Board*, p.69 (MA).

the time of the Gleeson Report, soldiers being deployed to Lebanon were buying elements of the uniform themselves. Gleeson stated that 'the Commission can see no reason why members of UNIFIL should bear the cost of essential clothing and equipment and recommends that the cost of additional items of clothing or equipment that are deemed necessary should be met by the Department of Defence' [573]

While many of the issues raised in this Report were to remain uncorrected for many years, it still represented a clear effort on the part of the Defence Forces to identify the lessons learnt and to recommend how various factors, most importantly equipment and training, could improve the operational efficiency of units. However the failure of this remains that little of its recommendations were implemented and it appears to have been an academic exercise. The bigger question arising from this report is to examine whether any of the changes were implemented throughout the latter years of UNFICYP and in UNEF II. Both will be discussed now.

[573] *Gleeson Report*, p.168.

United Nations Force in Cyprus

The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is one of the longest running peacekeeping missions in the history of the UN. The Republic of Cyprus became an independent state on 16 August 1960. The background to the Cyprus conflict is complex and its origins lie with the hostility between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Clement Dodd remarked that 'it is sometimes urged that history is best forgotten so that we are free to address the problems of the present with fresh minds. Unfortunately this is very difficult to do in Cyprus. On both sides there is still a lively sense that history has deprived them of their natural dues. So to understand the problem its origins in recent history cannot be ignored'.[574] Cyprus came under British rule in 1878 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The island's geo-strategic position meant that the island had been ruled by numerous dominant regional powers. Norrie MacQueen commented that 'Cyprus has been subject to changing foreign rule throughout history. Its geographical position made it a major strategic prize when the Mediterranean lay at the centre of the western economic and political world'.[575]

Britain had little strategic interest in Cyprus until the outbreak of the First World War. Turkey was on the side of the Central Powers, and Britain assumed complete title of the island, something that was ultimately recognised by both the Greek and the Turkish communities in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 after which Cyprus became a Crown Colony. As the 40th Battalion unit history commented 'so now the old Imperial intransigence was backed up by the cry of "vital interests"'.[576] While originally of little strategic importance to the British, Cyprus became of value due to its proximity to the Middle East and British

[574] Clement Dodd, *Disaccord on Cyprus: The UN Plan and After* (Cambridge, 2004), p.1.
[575] Norrie MacQueen, *Peacekeeping and the International System* (Oxon, 2006), p.92.
[576] Unit History 40th Battalion in Cyprus, p.4 (MA).

defence interests there. It was because it was considered "a vital strategic area" that the British Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Henry Hopkinson, declared in response to questions about granting Cyprus Dominion status that

> Whether in due course this would lead to self government – I think he called it Dominion status – and the right, I take it, to opt out of the Commonwealth. Certainly this is a first step on the road to self-government and it depends on how the new scheme is operated by the parties in Cyprus as to how fast we can go along on that road. At the same time, my statement has made it quite clear that there can be no question of any change of the sovereignty of Cyprus.[577]

However the wave of decolonisation that followed the Second World War raised the question of independence.

In 1954 the demand for *Enosis*, the desire for the Greek Cypriot's union with Greece, was brought to the UN by the Greek Government. However *Enosis* was to be put in abeyance on the 17 December 1954 at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly where it was decided that it would be inappropriate to consider adopting a resolution at that time.[578] The right to self determination for the Greek Cypriots was enhanced by Col. George Grivas, best known by the nom de guerre *Dighenis,* who was a fabled hero of Greece. He arrived in his native Cyprus on 10 November 1954 and set up a guerrilla force called EOKA after the Greek initials of the *National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters* or *Ethniki Organosis Kyrion Agoniston*. On

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[577] UK Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol.531 (Session 1953-53), 507, 28 July 1954. Also quoted in Alan James, *Keeping the Peace in the Cyprus Crisis of 1963-64* (Hampshire, 2002), p.5.

[578] Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in case of the population of the Island of Cyprus, 514th plenary meeting, 17 December 1954; available from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20814%20(IX).pdf; last accessed 12/09/12.

the night of 31 March 1955 explosions all over Cyprus heralded the beginning of the EOKA campaign which was to continue until 9 March 1959. The British position was extremely vulnerable as all the public services, including the police were infiltrated with EOKA members or sympathisers. In order to quash disloyalty, the British hired Turkish Cypriots as Auxiliary Police. It also ensured that the Turkish minority would not be swept up in the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement and begin to make demands of their own.[579] Brigadier Francis Henn, a former Chief of Staff of UNFICYP from 1972-1974, commented that

> initially EOKA's campaign was directed against the British Administration, but it soon took an intercommunal turn. Turkish Cypriots, perceiving that their interest lay in supporting the colonial power, readily cooperated with the British, and violent incidents between Greeks and Turks multiplied as the former realized the extent to which the latter were an obstacle to *enosis*.[580]

Although not directly involved with EOKA's campaign, Archbishop Makarios emerged as the leader of the Greek Cypriot community even though exiled by the British from the island during the 1950s. While *Enosis* was being espoused by the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriot community were advocating *Taksim*, a form of partition, for the island. In an effort to resolve the conflict, representatives from Britain, Greece and Turkey met in Switzerland in 1959 leading to the London and Zurich Agreements signed in February 1959. The 40th Battalion quote Anthony Eden's memoir when examining which group had the greatest claim to the island: 'in geographical and tactical considerations the Turks have the strongest claims in Cyprus, in race and in language the Greeks, in strategy the British, so long as their

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[579] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.4 (MA).
[580] Brigadier Francis Henn, *A Business of Some Heat: The United Nations Force in Cyprus Before and During 1974 Turkish Invasion* (South Yorkshire, 2004), p.8.

industrial life depends on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf'.[581] Throughout the negotiations the British continued to demand partition, a factor which was to cause the Irish Government much concern when asked to contribute a contingent to UNFICYP. This will be discussed in greater detail presently. The British were also allowed to keep their main military bases on the island, thus securing their geo-strategic interests. The agreement, known as the Treaty of Guarantee, can be summed up thus

> The settlement proposal involved an agreement that Cyprus would not seek unification with either Greece or Turkey. Nor would it be partitioned. There would be a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice president, both of whom would have a veto over decisions affecting security and foreign affairs.[582]

After independence was achieved, the Government of Cyprus applied for membership of the United Nations. This application was supported by Harold Beeley, deputy head of the British Mission to the UN.[583] However UN membership and independence did not mean that all issues were resolved. As Terence O'Neill and Nicholas Rees remarked 'independence for the Greek Cypriots was a sorry compromise in the road to enosis: for the Turkish Cypriots it was a Greek plot with enosis as the objective'.[584] The Unit History commented

> The excitable temperament of the Cypriot people, inflamed by its press and radio, helped to keep the two communities apart and in deep distrust of each other. It was virtually impossible to speak for a few minutes with a Cypriot without being pressed

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[581] *Unit History 40th Bn*, p.1 (MA).
[582] Macqueen, *Peacekeeping*, p.94.
[583] Letter to the President of the Security Council from the Acting Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, 19 August 1960 ; available from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N60/199/48/PDF/N6019948.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 23/03/12.
[584] O'Neill & Rees, *Peacekeeping in a Post-Cold War Era*, p.79.

> to agree with the political sentiments of one side or the other, it was a very rare and a pleasant experience to meet a Cypriot who could speak of the problems with good sense and calm reason. A reasonable approach was regarded by a man's colleagues as a lack of fervour to the cause and "reasonable" people were inclined to find themselves under suspicion.[585]

The UN Secretary – General, U Thant, agreed with the Battalion's perception of the local press. He remarked that 'the irresponsible, inaccurate, highly emotional reporting of the local press has worked at cross purposes with any effort by the authorities to subdue violent reactions in civilian sectors over which they have uncertain control. On the contrary, the substance and the tone of their publications have served constantly to inflame public opinion'.[586] The Greek Cypriots sought to change the agreed Constitution stating that the agreements were 'not the goal, they are the present, not the future'.[587] The Turkish community immediately rejected this and widespread rioting broke out. Turkish Cypriots, as the minority, suffered most losses, so much so that Turkey then threatened military intervention.[588]

As tensions mounted, it quickly became apparent that intervention would be necessary. The governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, all co-signatories of the Treaty of Guarantee, made 'strenuous efforts to assist in resolving this critical and dangerous

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[585] *Unit History 40th Bn*, p.17 (MA).
[586] Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, for the Period 26 April to 8 June 1964, 15 June 1964; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N64/131/14/PDF/N6413114.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 23/03/12.
[587] *Unit History 40th Bn*, p.6 (MA).
[588] Ibid.

situation peacefully' and made attempts to 'avert bloodshed and to promote a solution'.[589] On 25 December 1963 the UK, Greece and Turkey offered the Government of Cyprus a joint peacekeeping force under British command, composed of British soldiers already stationed in Cyprus.[590] The cease fire was declared on 28 December after days of threats and kidnappings from both sides. This ceasefire could best be described as fragile. By 30 December, the Cypriot Government had already accused the Turks of flying military aircrafts over Nicosia thus breaking the terms of their agreement. This accusation was vehemently denied by the Turkish Government.[591] The permanent representative of Cyprus to the UN wrote to the President of the Security Council stating that since the ceasefire agreement, which was finalised on 2 January 1964 in London, steps had been taken by

> Turkey and by the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community designed to (1) threaten the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, (2) to create unilaterally conditions calculated to prejudice the outcomes of the Conference and (3) to wreck the very purpose for which the Conference is to be held, and to violate its spirit.[592]

The letter also stated that Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, then Vice President of Cyprus and a Turkish Cypriot, had

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[589] Letter from the Acting Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 9 January 1964; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N64/004/71/PDF/N6400471.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 23/03/12.

[590] Letter from the Acting Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 9 January 1964; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N64/004/71/PDF/N6400471.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 23/03/12.

[591] Letter from the representative of Turkey to the President of the Security Council, 30 December 1963 ; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL6/302/66/PDF/NL630266.pdf?OpenElement;last accessed 23/03/12.

[592] Letter from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 12 January 1964 ; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N64/006/86/PDF/N6400686.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 23/03/12.

> declared open rebellion against the Republic of Cyprus by unlawfully purporting to set up a bogus separate state within Nicosia and by terrorizing the moderate elements of the Turkish population through arbitrary arrests and threatened trials by Turkish underground organizations, in defiance of the established Constitution of the Republic, and in an attempt to destroy its unity and territorial integrity.[593]

Unlike the Belgians in the Congo four years previously, the British understood the importance of using an international peacekeeping force rather than taking unilateral action in a former colony.[594] Initially a NATO style force was suggested as a peace enforcement exercise. However there was an anti- American feeling within the Greek Cypriot community, who felt that the Americans would favour its ally Turkey. This anger was reflected with the explosion of two bombs outside the US Embassy in Nicosia on 4 February 1964.[595] By late February the situation had deteriorated further. On 24 February Rauf Denktas, the President of the Turkish Communal Chamber in Cyprus, wrote to the Security Council stating that 'Greek Cypriot insistence on recognition of the integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus by the Security Council is a trick for funding the untenable excuse to argue that the Treaty of Guarantee is non-effective with the intention of getting a free licence to continue the massacre of the Turks under the umbrella of the United Nations'.[596] He believed that Greek Cypriots were attempting to prove that the Treaty of Guarantee was no longer in effect

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[593] Letter from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 12 January 1964 ; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N64/006/86/PDF/N6400686.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 23/03/12.

[594] MacQueen, *Peacekeeping*, p.94.

[595] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.7 (MA).

[596] Letter from R.R Denktas to Carlos Alfredo Bernardes President of the Security Council, 24 February 1964 ; available from UNBISnet; http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/2941609.9190712.html; last accessed 23/03/12.

because the Treaty would prevent them from attacking Turkish constitutional rights 'by brute force and violence' and treating them as 'underdogs'.[597]

On 4 March 1964 a resolution was passed, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, allowing the creation of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), with the caveat that 'all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state'.[598]

With this UNFICYP was created. The next task was to build contingents from member states. The UN placed an oral request for a Canadian contingent on 4 March, to which they acquiesced. The advance party reached Cyprus on 12 March, the first contingent to arrive.[599] The military operation would comprise of contingents from Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Many of these countries were considered to be veterans in peacekeeping operations. Michael Harbottle, former Chief of Staff UNFICYP 1966-1968, remarked that 'although the British soldiers have much to offer and contribute to a UN peace-keeping operation in the way of military techniques and operational experience, they are novices compared with the Canadians, Irish, and Swedes in the arts of peace-keeping'.[600] As before, this thesis will discuss Irish involvement in UNFICYP within the structure of the four stages of the mission: pre-deployment, deployment, execution and withdrawal. This will include an analysis of the Irish Governments' apprehension to committing to UNFICYP, the training of soldiers prior to the mission, the

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[597] Letter from R.R Denktas to Carlos Alfredo Bernardes President of the Security Council, 24 February 1964 ; available from UNBISnet; http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/2941609.9190712.html; last accessed 23/03/12.
[598] Security Council Resolution 186, 04 March 1964; available from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/211/44/IMG/NR021144.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 09/03/10.
[599] Letter from the Permanent Representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary –General, 20 March 1964; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N64/065/54/PDF/N6406554.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 28/03/12.
[600] Michael Harbottle, *The Impartial Soldier* (London, 1970), p.46.

relationship between the Irish contingents and the local population, day to day life in Cyprus and the 'November Crisis' of 1967, and the deployment from UNFICYP to the Sinai.

Pre-deployment

The pre-deployment stage of the UNFICYP mission was defined by the apprehension of the Irish Government with regard to sending a contingent. The reasons for this apprehension were threefold; the issue of partition, the aftermath of the Congo, and the financial burden. The request for a contingent for UNFICYP reached the Irish Government in early March 1964 just as the Defence Forces were in the final stages of withdrawing from the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). One of the first issues considered was that of partition. Throughout the negotiations for the independence of Cyprus, both the British and the Turks supported some type of partition along ethnic lines. The history of partition on their own island left the Irish Government reluctant to participate in a mission that might result in its Defence Forces having to enforce similar conditions. Frank Aiken, then Minister for External Affairs, commented that 'in the complex situation obtaining in Cyprus and in view of the terms of the Security Council Resolution of 4th March, the Government had certain hesitations and required clarifications on a number of points before they could come to a decision on the request. In one regard they felt that an assurance was called for'.[601] Alan James remarked that

> from the start, Ireland's Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken, was reluctant to get involved. More than many of the Irish- which is saying a certain amount- Aiken was no friend of Britain... As his man in New York was instructed to say, "the Irish

[601] Dáil Debates 208 (1061-1061) 07 April 1964; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0208/D.0208.196404070056.html; last accessed 09/05/12.

> people are very sensitive about the question of partition", this being an allusion to Britain's division of Ireland prior to the Republic's independence, and Ireland's Constitutional claim to sovereignty over the whole island.[602]

The Government required assurances and further clarifications regarding the mission of UNFICYP. James Dillon, leader of the Fine Gael party, added 'we agree that a solution founded on the partition of Cyprus is a solution in which we wish to have no part and which would not, in my opinion, provide any solution for the existing problems that afflict that island'.[603] *The Irish Times* reported in March 1964 that

> As far as could be ascertained last night the members of the Government are still reluctant to embroil Ireland in the Cyprus problem, mainly because of the diverse and confused political aims of the parties most directly concerned. It is realised that war or military support "is politics by other means" and that absence of political clarity could mean utter chaos on the military side.[604]

The question of partition became such a concern that the Irish Government set out conditions under which they would send a contingent, one of which included the need for an assurance from the governments of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey that there would be no attempt to impose a settlement by force, especially one that would involve partition.[605] Politically this was one of the few, if not the only, missions that posed such an ethical consideration.

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[602] James, *Keeping the Peace*, p.105.
[603] Dáil Debates 208 (1066-1067) 07 April 1964; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0208/D.0208.196404070056.html; last accessed 09/05/12.
[604] *Irish Times*, 13 March 1964.
[605] *Irish Times*, 14 March 1964.

The repercussions of the Congo, principally the fatalities, resulted in members of Dáil Éireann considering whether they should acquiesce to the UN Secretary General's request. James Dillon remarked that

> It has been truly said we have every right to be proud of our Army and its performance in some extremely difficult assignments, which the Government has given them... I remember it being said in this House, after we had sent troops to the Congo to help in maintaining peace there, that had we foreseen the loss of life that would have been involved we might have taken a very different decision.[606]

Dillon also remarked on the lack of adequate equipment for the troops in the Congo and requested an assurance that not only would appropriate equipment be available but that the soldiers would have adequate time for training on how to use it.[607] However it is evident that members of the Defence Forces did not have the same hesitations. Gerald Bartley, then Minister for Defence and a member of Fianna Fáil, remarked that 'one cause of complaint is the fact that some members have had more than one trip abroad'.[608] While overseas service was voluntary for those who enlisted before ONUC there was never any reported shortage of volunteers.[609] This suggests that the Defence Forces embraced the new role of participation in international peacekeeping operations perhaps as an outlet to use their skills and to gain critical experience in the field. As remarked earlier it also provided respite

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[606] Dáil Debates 208 (1064-1065), 07 April 1964; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0208/D.0208.196404070056.html; last accessed 09/05/12.
[607] Dáil Debates 208 (1069 - 1071), 07 April 1964; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0208/D.0208.196404070056.html; last accessed 09/05/12.
[608] Dáil Debates 208 (1388-1390), 09 April 1964; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0208/D.0208.196404090008.html; last accessed 09/05/12.
[609] *Irish Times*, 14 March 1964.

from barracks work. Significantly, those who participated also received overseas allowances, which for a poorly paid army was a considerable matter.

The concern of how the mission was to be financed was also contentious. Norrie MacQueen remarked that 'the Congo force had caused a major split within the UN over the position of peacekeeping costs in relation to the overall budgetary disposition of the organisation'.[610] Security Council Resolution 186 stated that with regard to the creation of UNFICYP, 'all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for the purpose'.[611] The departure from collective financial responsibility of all UN members for the missions was met with great disproval by the Government. Frank Aiken remarked

> In regard to the financing of the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations has been stated so often both in this House and in the United Nations so as to render any detailed explanation unnecessary. All such expenses we believe should be the collective responsibility of all members and the non-observance of this principle can only result in a reduction of the effectiveness of the organisation. Accordingly, in my reply of 13th March to which I have already referred, I informed the Secretary-General that the Irish Government viewed with regret the decision to raise funds on a voluntary basis for the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus. They regarded it as a grave and unwise departure from the principle of collective

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[610] Norman MacQueen, 'Ireland and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus' in *Review of International Studies*, ix, no.2 (1983), p. 101.
[611] Security Council Resolution 186; available from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/211/44/IMG/NR021144.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 09/03/10.

> responsibility. Subject to Dáil approval, the Government will pay the usual United Nations overseas allowances to our troops and will accept no reimbursement from the United Nations unless it is levied on all members of the United Nations in the normal way.[612]

This proved to be financially impossible and it was agreed that the United Nations would be expected to pay for transportation to and from Cyprus, all expenses arising in Cyprus including rations and accommodation, all Irish equipment expended or lost as a result of service in Cyprus, and the capitalised value of any pension or allowance paid in respect of death or disability caused by service in Cyprus.[613] The Irish Government were not unique in raising concerns over the financing of the mission. The Canadian Government regarded 'arrangements for financing of the United Nations force as a departure from established practice and from what is desirable'. They would prefer that the responsibility should fall on the membership as a whole rather than the Canadians taking on the cost.[614] The Swedish Government, in a letter to the Secretary-General, wanted to 'recall that it has decided to make a voluntary contribution in the amount of $100,000. This decision has been taken without prejudice to my Government's stand on the principle of collective responsibility for the financing of the United Nations operations of this nature'.[615] The financial arrangement with regard to peacekeeping remains a contentious issue.[616]

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[612] Dáil Debates 208 (1062-1064) 07 April 1964; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0208/D.0208.196404070056.html; last accessed 09/05/12.
[613] MacQueen, *Ireland and the United Nations*, p.102.
[614] *Canadian Letter to Secretary General*, 20 March 1964 (UNBISnet).
[615] Letter from the Permanent Representative of Sweden addressed to the Secretary-General, 17 April 1964; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N64/085/08/PDF/N6408508.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 17/04/12.
[616] For more information on how peacekeeping missions are financed please see http://www.un.org/en/ga/fifth/pkofinancing.shtml.

On 24 March 1964 Army Headquarters announced that the 40th Battalion would be departing for Cyprus. Lt. Col. PP Barry was appointed commander. He remarked that 'a new mission for our Army was now born – peacekeeping in Western Asia between Moslems and Christians in the sunny Levant island of Cyprus'.[617] A reconnaissance mission began on the 28 March which included Lt. Col. Joseph Adams, Comdt J. Stewart, who was appointed 2nd in Command (2 I/C) of the 40th Battalion, and Mr. G Crean from the Department of Defence. Adams, whose previous experience included commanding the advance party to the Congo mission, briefed the General Staff and the officers in command of the Battalion on the situation in Cyprus upon his return, discussing the dispute between the two communities, the UN staff set up, the supply system envisaged, and the proposed installations for the Battalion.[618]

Unlike the previous mission in the Congo, the Unit History would suggest that there was a heavy focus on training prior to deployment. There was also a strict selection policy for personnel of the contingent as both the previous conduct record and individual training standards were thoroughly examined.[619] This policy could be attributed to the contributions made to the Defence Review Board Report which remarked on the need to recruit troops of a high standard.[620] Training included weapons training, guard duties, precautions against an ambush, immediate action drills and suppression of unlawful assembly.[621] Again, the increased emphasis placed on such training suggests that the experience in ONUC had an impact. The serious lack of training had left those who served in ONUC ill-prepared for

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[617] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.9 (MA).
[618] Ibid.
[619] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.10 (MA).
[620] *Defence Review Board Report 1965*, p.66 (MA).
[621] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.10 (MA).

operations of that nature. The result of this for future missions was that not only did the Defence Forces identify that intense pre-deployment training was a necessity but also pointed to the type of training that would be most beneficial to the contingent. Members of the contingent were also sent abroad to improve their skills. The armoured car group attended an intensive course in France on the Panhard armoured cars. The Battalion signals officer and two members of the signal corps completed a course in France on the Panhard wireless sets.[622]

The issue of modern equipment, raised by the Defence Review Board and also raised throughout the Unit Histories during the period of ONUC, was also addressed with the UN. The Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Seán McKeown, who served as Force Commander in ONUC, and the Quartermaster General Col. Curran visited the United Nations Headquarters in New York where, among other matters, they discussed the problem of equipment for a peace keeping force in Cyprus. While the military leadership was able to identify specific problems, e.g. the need for a tropical uniform, they were unable to resolve them.[623] On 1 April 1964, the 40th Battalion assembled at Plunkett Barracks in the Curragh for a briefing. The Unit History describes the address given by the Commanding Officer emphasising the absolute importance of the following factors in the mission they were about to undertake. His address highlighted the necessity for

- good conduct and sobriety as one of the main factors in successful peacekeeping as was high personal conduct standard by troops
- good bearing and dress both on and off duty

[622] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.10 (MA).
[623] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.11 (MA).

- keeping all ranks happy through good food and well organised recreation
- personal security and security of weapons
- impartiality, a sympathetic approach to the needs of parties in dispute
- sincerity, truthfulness and uprightness
- the importance of team work in that all ranks of Battalion should work as one team and that there should be proper merging of all personnel of all home commands into one unit.

While much of what was highlighted above resembles a utopian version of a unit mission, it is clear that the leadership were beginning to become aware of the qualities expected of both officers and enlisted personnel on overseas peacekeeping service. The discipline issues that arose throughout the mission in the Congo, whether formally reported or not, clearly had wider implications. The Chief of Staff alluded to this in his address to the Contingent on 7 April. He stated that he had confidence in the officers and men of the Battalion to give a good account of themselves in their respective roles. He also stressed the importance of good behaviour, good dress and security. He discussed the need for good military intelligence, remarking that the lesson should have been learnt in this matter from the Congo. He concluded that he was satisfied that Army HQ were capable of putting such good troops at the disposal of the United Nations for a peace keeping mission.[624] The pre-deployment stage of UNFICYP differed considerably from that of the first contingent going to the Congo. While some of it may have been emotive, there was a more evident focus on training and briefing.

[624] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.11 (MA).

Deployment

The advance party left for Cyprus on 9 April 1964. They were met by the British Major General (Maj. Gen) Mike Carver who served as the Deputy Force Commander. They were transported to ANZIO camp in the British Sovereign Base of Dhekelia in South East Cyprus.[625] The Officer Commanding, Lt. Col. Percy Blake from Galway, and the Inniskilling Fusiliers were to be their hosts during this period. The Inniskillings were an Irish unit, and approximately fifty per cent were from the Republic of Ireland. The notes from the advance party remark that

> This close association of the two units was an interesting one – in one of Maj. Gen. Carver's jocose moments he said that he was apprehensive lest a second "Green Line" be established in ANZIO. There was no need for worry – the units hit up a happy liaison which lasted during the full tour of Cyprus duty. The Inniskillings did everything possible for the 40th Bn during the early days in Cyprus, for which the 40th is most appreciative. Not alone that, but word of this happy merging must have quickly got to all the British installations in the base, as from the outset, the co-operation given by these installations and services to 40th Battalion were outstanding.[626]

The ability to establish bonds and effective working relationships with contingents of other nationalities, especially with the former coloniser, was considered to be an advantage for the Irish contingents. By way of example the British UNFICYP Chief of Staff Michael Harbottle remarked that

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[625] *Unit History 40th Bn*, p.14 (MA).
[626] Ibid.

> I found having the Irish in the Force a most refreshing experience. It may sound "oirish" to describe them as being eminently suitable as peace-keepers, but I believe that at least those I came to know so well will not mind my saying so. As born "rebels" (some might say that they are the origin of the species) they understand the rebel's mind, and can therefore with their gaelic logic and leprechaun charm talk anybody out of doing anything.[627]

The reported ability to be universally accepted would also be of benefit when keeping the warring sides apart. On the Greek Cypriot side the

> Authorities were glad to see Irish troops coming along. Our fight at home over the years against the British had not gone unknown to the Cypriots. Cypriots have had quite a lot of association with Irishmen in Britain and they felt that the Irish and themselves were on common anti- British ground. At this time, 40th Battalion sensed that anti-British feeling was as rife as anti-Turkish feeling on the part of the Greek Cypriots.

During the advance party's time in Cyprus the Greek Cypriot authorities organised a social gathering in "Gregoris Axfendiou" Camp south of Famagusta for the officers of the Battalion. This party, 'lavish in its food and perfumed ladies was really a brainwashing effort. The Battalion officers that day met some very hospitable and helpful Cypriots who afterwards were found to be head men in the district and tough and relentless negotiators'.[628]

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[627] Harbottle, *Impartial Soldier*, p.129.
[628] *Unit History 40th Bn*, p.19 (MA).

The Turkish Cypriot leaders, and its people, appeared to be more apprehensive of the Irish contingent. They had been very friendly with the British troops who patrolled the district before the arrival of the 40th Battalion. The Unit History remarked that

> Some not too well-wishers had given a bad picture of Irish troops to the Turkish leadership before the arrival of these troops on the island. The sincerity and excellent conduct of the Irish troops quickly exposed the malice of this misrepresentation and the impartiality of the unit in early incidents made it clear that the Battalion was going to be equally fair on both sides. The bulk of assistance given by the unit went to the Turk Cypriot population, simply because they were the people in need of help – and always with the acquiescence and good will, within reason, of the Greek Cypriot leadership. A good bond of friendship was built up between the Battalion officers and the leadership on both sides and, though, in the early days before the National Guard was brought under proper discipline, unit personnel had many a confrontation with the Government forces. Yet there was never a charge of partiality brought against the Battalion – it was accepted that the unit's efforts were always designed to prevent escalation and secure and maintain peace. [629]

It could be posited that the 'not too well-wishers' were the British despite the welcome from the Inniskilling Fusiliers. However as Brendan Corish remarked 'to the credit of the Irish nation, they were acceptable in the Congo; they were acceptable in Cyprus; and they would

[629] *Unit History 40th Bn*, p.19 (MA).

be acceptable in many other parts of the globe if unfortunately, there were further trouble'.[630]

Despite this, the relationship between the British and Irish was amiable and they were based adjacent to one another. Alan James remarked that

> contrary to some apprehension on both sides, no difficulties arose between them. An understanding was even reached that neither would "recognize" deserters from their army who now turned up serving in that of the other... Furthermore, the officers of the Irish Battalion showed no resentment at coming under the authority of Unficyp's British Deputy Commander.[631]

Additionally the Unit Histories do not report any hostilities with the British throughout UNFICYP. The 21st Infantry Group remarked that

> The usual cordial and helpful relations with other contingents prevailed although deployment decreed that we socialised with some contingents more than others. Special mention must be made, however, of our relations with the British Contingent. Prior to the two contingents arriving in Cyprus there was speculation on how 21 Infantry Group and 1st Battalion Royal Irish Rangers would get on together. Taking into consideration the fact that we were two professional units working together under the same HQ and also that both units were aware of possible friction

[630] Dáil Debates 208 (1077) 07 April 1964; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0208/D.0208.196404070056.html; last accessed 09/05/12.
[631] James, *Keeping the Peace*, p.118.

areas we feel that the good relations which existed with our "separated military brethren" were exceptional.[632]

The Battalion moved into "Wolfe Tone Camp" on 14 April 1964. Alan James remarked that it was believed that the Irish were engaging in 'a little light-hearted provocation' by naming the camp after the Irish nationalist.[633] However this appeared to have no lasting ramifications on the relationship between the two.

Execution

The Irish contingent was positioned in the Famagusta District. The area had one large town, Famagusta where the Greek Cypriots, who were the majority with a population of 25,000 out of 34,000 people, were separated from the others by huge walls. There were also a number of villages in the district with a total population of 91,370 Greek Cypriots, compared to 18,870 Turkish Cypriots. The district housed the main port, with the economy of the island depending to a large degree on its smooth running. This consideration weighed largely in the planning of the operations of the Battalion. There was added tension as the majority of the dock workers were Turks while the shipping administrators were primarily Greeks.[634]

The Battalion's main tasks during the early days of the mission included: extensive patrolling ensuring that all villages were visited twice weekly; escorting Turkish Cypriot workers; officials and invalids; and escorting Turkish Cypriot market convoys to Famagusta, Red Crescent supplies to Nicosia and food and equipment from Nicosia to Famagusta.[635] This

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[632] Unit History 21st Infantry Group in Cyprus, p.14 (MA).
[633] James, *Keeping the Peace,* p.122.
[634] *Unit History 40th Bn*, pp 15-17 (MA).
[635] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.24 (MA).

could have been the consequence of an incident in Famagusta on 11 May 1964 where two Greek Army officers and one Greek Cypriot policeman were killed. While the circumstances surrounding the incident remained ambiguous, the UN remarked that 'the true story has proved exceedingly difficult to establish, and indeed may never be known', it provoked a considerable response from the Greek Cypriot community.[636] The incident was followed by a 'wave of hostage-taking' resulting in thirty two Turkish Cypriots being abducted from Famagusta.[637] It was remarked that 'the overall effects of the Famagusta incident ... have been to raise the barriers of fear and suspicion between the two communities, to restrict even further the movement of the Turkish Cypriot community throughout the island, and to initiate a wave of bitter anti- Turkish Cypriot feeling among the Greek Cypriots'.[638] This increased tension and hostility added to the task of the Irish contingent.

Other roles included conducting searches for missing persons, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots, primarily people missing since the taking of hostages during Christmas 1963. Searches were also conducted for missing cars, lorries and farm stock. There were standing patrols to protect farm workers on their land; the areas of Tripimeni, predominately Greek, and Pergamos, which was a mixed village, were the most volatile places in this respect.[639] The role of patroling farms was of great importance. The United Nations believed that one of the major factors contributing to the 'calm since 2 May (1964) has been the mutual interest of both communities in gathering the harvest'.[640] Such emphasis was put on the

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[636] Report by the Secretary General to the Security Council on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus for the Period 26 April to 8 June 1964, 15 June 1964; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N64/131/14/PDF/N6413114.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 23/03/12, p.7.
[637] Ibid.
[638] Ibid.
[639] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.24 (MA).
[640] *Secretary General Report*, 15 June 1964, pp 15-16 (UNBISnet).

good relations between the two hostile sides during the harvest that the UN believed it showed that 'the will and ability to live and work together still exists'.[641] The Irish Battalion set about improving posts and outposts throughout the region and opened further outposts. The Unit History of the 40th Battalion reports frequent meetings with leaders of both communities.[642] It was also recorded that the Battalion were involved at a more fundamental level with both sides of the population. They attended band recitals, soccer matches and social functions hosted by both communities.[643] This represented an effort at both the micro and macro levels to immerse themselves in the local community, a significant force multiplier in a peacekeeping scenario. While many lessons learnt from ONUC focused on equipment and clothing, this key lesson of integrating with the local population could be achieved at little expense.

The 40th Battalion also had

> Daily dealings and the odd confrontation with the Cyprus Army, the National Guard. The National Guard was in its infancy; young, undisciplined men were delighted to have a gun in their hands, they were generally "cocky" and some of the more volatile elements in them considered UN presence a hindrance in their efforts to subdue the Turk Cypriot minority. There was constant negotiation with Cyprus police (city) and gendarmerie (country police) as they were then called – the police and the gendarmerie were well disciplined, courteous and always helpful, but, of course,

[641] Ibid.
[642] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.24 (MA).
[643] Ibid.

were not inclined to yield any pressure that would improve the lot of the Turk Cypriot population.[644]

The significance of both the Cyprus Armed Forces and the National Guard were also brought to the attention of the Secretary- General. The Cypriot regular police and the Gendarmerie had recently amalgamated to form one police force. It was remarked that while it was a police force and earmarked for such duties, it was armed and would be capable of military action. The National Guard's strength at the beginning of UNFICYP was around 15,000 strong. However 'some of its elements have been under very uncertain Government control. General Karayannis, a retired Lieutenant General in the Greek Army, has been appointed to command it in an effort to bring the force under stricter discipline'.[645] It was believed that this would 'result in the extremists on the Greek Cypriot side being brought under control'. The introduction of conscription also aimed to 'reduce and discipline the numbers of armed irregulars' in Cyprus.[646]

The objective of all the Irish contingents in Cyprus was to prevent the escalation of violence. This mission differed from that of the ONUC because in this instance they were not viewed as a belligerent by either of the local communities. Acquiring better equipment aided the pursuit of the objective significantly, and two Panhard armoured cars arrived in Cyprus during the early stages of the mission. Their arrival

was a great boost to Battalion morale – their presence gave to the Battalion a much needed mobile fire – power; they were a deterrent to would be gun users in both

[644] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.24 (MA).
[645] *Secretary General Report*, 15 June 1964, p.14 (UNBISnet).
[646] Ibid.

communities; they gave troops that confidence which might be lacking when soft skinned vehicles had to enter areas in which firing is taking place.[647]

The term "soft skinned vehicles" typically refers to a canvas backed vehicle in which troops were carried but which offered no protection. While suitable for peacetime training and administration, they were not considered appropriate for hostile situations. The arrival of the Panhard Armoured Cars meant that they would be able to patrol areas without fear of ambush.

The need for leisure time for soldiers serving abroad was highlighted throughout the mission in the Congo. The mandate for those contingents serving in UNFICYP was extended from the initial three to six months therefore resulting in a requirement for a break 'from the rigours of patrols, escorts, guards and other duties'.[648] The inaugural visit of 262 members of the 40th Battalion to Jordan and Lebanon was regarded as 'one of the major highlights and achievements of the Battalion's social and recreational activities whilst serving in the Middle East'. The itinerary selected was accepted as a result of an advance visit by two members of the Battalion, Comdt. T.V. Furlong, who had previously served in the Middle East, and Lieut. H O'Connor to Jordan and Beirut in July 1964. Six tours were organised, each taking about forty five personnel, and visited places such as the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Mount of Olives, the Via Delarosa, the Dome of the Rock, Bethlehem, Jericho, the Dead Sea, Umayad Palace, the Cedars of Lebanon and Baalbek. It was remarked that 'this trip will live forever in the memory of those members of the Battalion who were privileged to undertake it. The pilgrimage cum holiday was a welcome

[647] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.23 (MA).
[648] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.54 (MA).

break for the troops and was one of those episodes that makes an Irish soldier proud of his status'.[649] The itinerary above is reminiscent of a pilgrimage. It is resonant of the mid 1960s and the position of the Catholic Church in Ireland throughout that period.

The need for activities to keep soldiers occupied when not on duty was also highlighted. It was remarked that 'partly due to the stationing of Irish troops in a completely rural area devoid of normal recreational outlets of large towns, one of the greatest problems is boredom. One of the best means of combating this is with sporting activities'.[650] Sports included soccer, Gaelic football, hurling, basketball and volleyball. Unit Histories report that there were inter- company competitions organised which were keenly contested and promoted a unified company spirit within the contingents. Films were also shown regularly and concerts were organised.[651] The 3rd Infantry Group reported contributing to the historical wealth of Cyprus. A Company reported that

> one day in September A Coy started to hit the headlines not for peacekeeping or anything like that but for there (sic) great archaeological discoveries. While a grease trap was being dug an early Christian grave was uncovered fortunately there was nothing of value in it but nevertheless we had all sorts of knowledgeable boffins from Nicosia pottering around it for a day or so before it was closed up.[652]

Organising activities during the periods of calm between the two belligerents could be considered as a factor in the result of fewer disciplinary problems. Referring to the Unit Histories, the discipline of the Irish contingents improved significantly from ONUC. There

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[649] *Unit History 40th Bn,* pp 54 -55 (MA).
[650] Unit History 11th Infantry Group in Cyprus, no page numbers provided (MA).
[651] Ibid.
[652] Unit History 3rd Infantry Group in Cyprus, p.49 (MA).

were a small number of discipline problems reported and most were minor in nature. 40th Battalion believed that this record of good discipline 'can be attributed to a high standard of the soldiers selected for this unit and the high quality of leadership displayed by all NCOs of the Coy'.[653] This could be a result of the renewed emphasis on discipline during training before they departed to Cyprus. However much of the instances of Irish misconduct that occurred in ONUC were reported through UN memos rather than recorded through Unit Histories. Therefore the same may have occurred in Cyprus.

Morale was reported to have remained high throughout the Irish contingents' time in Cyprus. This was attributed to good weather, good recreational activities, and regular letters from home.[654] This was achieved despite the conditions that the Irish were subjected to in Cyprus, which were not always conducive to high morale. Lt. Col. Don O'Broin remarked in 1969 that

> The standard of living and storage accommodation provided does however call for adverse comment. The Irish unit is the only unit under canvas in the Island and considering the length of time we are in the area, this seems to me totally unnecessary. In the agreement for the UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus, the onus for providing suitable accommodation rests with the Government of Cyprus and while one can readily accept tentage as a temporary measure or in full active service conditions, the fact that Irish Units are now over five years in the same conditions does not help either morale or efficiency. More so indeed since many of the

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[653] *Unit History 40th Bn,* p.55 (MA). The author was unable to access UNFICYP files on discipline in the UN archives due to cataloguing issues.
[654] *11th Inf in Cyprus*, no page numbers listed (MA).

personnel are now on their second or third periods of service with UNFICYP. The locations of the camps do not enhance the position.[655]

It was believed that Ireland was treated by the UN as an unequal partner. When the question of accommodation arose in the Dáil in 1967, it was noted that there was evidence that the Irish contingent's standard of living was below that of other nations. The following exchange between the Minister for Defence Michael Hilliard of the Fianna Fáil party and Deputy Michael O'Leary of the Labour Party shows that those in power were aware of the standard of accommodation but refused to acknowledge it:

Hilliard: The accommodation allotted to the various contingents is dependent on the accommodation available in the particular sectors in which the contingents operate. The Irish contingent is accommodated under canvas as there is no suitable permanent accommodation available in the Lefka District. The United Nations authorities, however, have provided buildings of a semi-permanent nature in each Irish company location for messing, canteen and recreational purposes.

The object of my visit to Cyprus was to see the Irish contingent and I did not, therefore, inspect the accommodation of other contingents. I understand, however, that contingents in locations similar to the Irish are similarly accommodated.

O'Leary: I do not know if it is correct or not but my information is that Irish troops are mainly under canvas and that this is different treatment from the treatment given to other troops. I cannot understand how the Minister could go to Cyprus—I

[655] *11th Inf in Cyprus,* no page numbers listed (MA).

know that he had to talk with the Archbishop and with the Turkish minority—without inquiring about the different types of accommodation. Obviously we cannot appreciate what type of accommodation the Irish troops have if we do not know what type of accommodation the other troops have.[656]

The 21st Infantry group commented on the equipment, notably the kitchen equipment, supplied by the UN and British sources. They stated that

> Much of the equipment under these categories had become almost totally unserviceable due to age and full time operation under extreme conditions. Much of the cooking in use was totally unsuitable for military use. Replacements for unserviceable items involved time consuming protracted negotiations often proving fruitless and in many instances where items we replaced it was found that it was NOT much of an improvements on the article considered unserviceable. It was almost impossible to get new items ... NO matter how well substantiated a case was presented.[657]

There is clear evidence of a disparity between the accommodation and resources available to different contingents. The standard of accommodation of other contingent nations is beyond the scope of this thesis. However Unit Histories report a dissatisfaction of contingents in this regard which could have negatively impacted morale.

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[656] Dáil Debates 226 (1860-1861) 23 February 1967; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0226/D.0226.196702230028.html; last accessed 09/05/12.
[657] *21st Inf in Cyprus,* p.40 (MA).

The "November Crisis" in 1967, as it was known to the Irish contingent, was one the major incidents to occur during the period of Irish involvement in UNFICYP. The 9th Infantry Group refers to it as the term applied 'to the outbreak of fighting, which occurred in the Ayios Theodhoros/ Kophinou area of Larnaca District, between the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriots, and the subsequent involvement of Turkey, Greece, UN and the United States in the affair'.[658] It began in the early afternoon on 15 November 1967 when a Cyprus Police patrol and a platoon of National Guard infantry attempted to go through the mixed village of Ayios Theodhoros from the Greek Cypriot sector. Tension had reportedly risen sharply in this area in the weeks prior to this incident because of the Turkish opposition to the resumption of patrolling in this area. The incident escalated when the National Guard moved a road block during a patrol that was put in place by the Turkish Cypriot community. This patrol appeared to be much stronger than had previously been in the area and included an infantry platoon. The road block was said to be made up of a plough and a tractor. [659]

Almost instantaneously the Turkish Cypriots opened fire. The National Guard and the Cyprus police retaliated. 'During the next hour or so the firing became intense as the National Guard engaged the village with both artillery and mortars and launched a ground attack on it at approximately company strength'.[660] In an unrelated issue to this patrol, at roughly the same time, armoured cars and infantry moved in against Turkish Cypriot fighter positions covering Kophinou, a village two and a half miles away where tensions had been very high. That evening all Turkish Cypriot positions had been taken in Ayios Theodhoros

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[658] Unit History 9th Infantry Group in Cyprus, p.67 (MA).
[659] Special Report by the Secretary- General on Recent Developments in Cyprus, 16 November 1967, p.1; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N67/269/79/PDF/N6726979.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 25/04/12.
[660] *9th Inf in Cyprus,* p.67 (MA).

and the National Guard were virtually in control of the village. In Kophinou most positions had been taken, however the National Guard were not in control of the village.[661] From the beginning of the hostilities, UNFICYP made attempts to organise a ceasefire as the Force Commander was in constant contact with the Cypriot Government at all levels and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.[662] The November Crisis significantly set back the continuing progress to peace on the Island. The Turkish Charge d'Affaires stated that 'the attack launched against the Ayios Theodhoros area has introduced an element of complication such as has not been seen since 1964. Such action, while there was still a possibility of reaching a negotiated solution of the Ayios Theodhoros problem [patrolling by the Cyprus police] constitutes a flagrant provocation by the Cyprus Government'.[663] Later that night a cease fire was arranged between the Force Commander of UNFICYP and Mr. Kyprianou, the Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs. However negotiations were complicated by the desire of the National Guard to occupy UNFICYP positions. The evacuation of the injured was also a contentious issue. Permission was granted for UNFICYP to send in medical teams to give immediate aid to the villagers and assist in evacuation. However this effort was hampered by the fact that the National Guard clearance operations were continuing. The actions of UNFICYP during the November Crisis were criticised by the Greek Cypriots. General Georgios Grivas 'blamed UNFICYP for not having prevented what had happened'.[664] A National Guard senior staff member declared that the National Guard were not responsible for what happened and repeated General Grivas's claims that UNFICYP were responsible as they had not helped the Cyprus police to exercise their rights. The Force Commander rejected any

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[661] *9th Inf in Cyprus,* p.69 (MA).
[662] *Special Report*, 16 November 1967, p.5 (UNBISnet).
[663] *Special Report*, 16 November 1967, p.7 (UNBISnet).
[664] Ibid.

responsibility and insisted that UNFICYP positions should not be used by the National Guard. He also protested against the 'forcible and deliberate disarming of UNFICYP soldiers and disabling of UNFICYP radio equipment'.[665] When UNFICYP moved into the villages they found seventeen dead and seven wounded. The final death toll was twenty four, which included two Greek Cypriots. The Unit History describes the incident, echoing the UN report;

> [Aid was]Somewhat hampered by the fact that the National Guard clearance operations were continuing... In addition... much of the UNFICYP forces in the area was also under fire by the National Guard for most of the afternoon of the 15th November, and UNFICYP observation posts, buildings and tents were struck by bullets. In one case the cookhouse of a UNFICYP observation post was destroyed by mortar fire, and many mortar and artillery shells fell extremely close to the UNFICYP Headquarters in the Kophinou compound. Fortunately there were no UNFICYP casualties. In addition there were instances of deliberate damage by the National Guard to UNFICYP radio equipment so as to render it unserviceable, while at one UN post UNFICYP soldiers were forcibly disarmed by the National Guard. The magnitude of the Ayios Theodhoros operation and the speed with which it was carried out clearly indicate that the National Guard had planned in advance to carry out this operation in the event of any show of opposition by the Turkish Cypriots.[666]

The Irish involvement in the 'November Crisis' resulted in high motivation amongst the troops and 'excitement was at a high pitch as people realised that they were at the centre of

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[665] Ibid.

[666] *9th Inf in Cyprus,* p.69 (MA). Large portions of this Unit History relating to the November Crisis were a direct copy of the Special Report, 16 November 1967.

an international drama'.[667] Two nights after the initial outbreak of hostilities, fire was exchanged between the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriots in the Kokkina enclave area. There were no casualties but it was the 9th Infantry Group's 'first taste of inter-communal strife'.[668] On the 18 November fire was again exchanged, this time in the Limnitis enclave but quickly spread to other areas. No casualties were reported during this incident. Turkey put on a show of force with Turkish jets flying low across the island, military forces organising on the South coast of Turkey as well as a fleet of troop carrying ships.[669] The 9th Infantry Group dug out bunkers to ensure their safety if caught in the crossfire fire between the two belligerent sides. The Unit History remarks that 'the quality and design of dug-outs constructed by the troop in the November crisis raised many an eyebrow. The troop was ready for action during that tense period with firing mechanisms, dial sights, etc fixed and ready if required'.[670] The reactions of the Group were remarkably similar to that of Quinlan in Jadotville. Whether formally or informally, the siege of Jadotville had its impact.

At the beginning of December Rolz-Bennett, U Thant's Special Representative, and Cyrus Vance negotiated an agreement between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. As a result of these agreements normalisation measures were introduced in January 1968 and 'an air of calm prevailed once again'. The 9th Infantry Group concluded that

> Undoubtedly the "November Crisis" was the highlight of 9th Infantry Group's tour of duty with UNFICYP. When all else is forgotten the men of the 9th will remember the air of excitement that pervaded the atmosphere, the digging and sandbagging of

[667] *9th Inf in Cyprus,* p.71 (MA).
[668] Ibid.
[669] *9th Inf in Cyprus,* pp 70-71 (MA).
[670] *9th Inf in Cyprus,* p.54 (MA). The Troop refers to the Heavy Mortar Troop.

> bunkers, the pre-dawn rising and occupation of bunkers, the sight of the supersonic Turkish Air Force jets flashing by overhead and the bonds of fellowship engendered by men who calmly and resolutely prepare to face a common unknown danger.[671]

The 'November Crisis' was in many ways a catalyst for the stabilisation in Cyprus. Harbottle remarked that when he 'left in August of the same year, a wholly different atmosphere emerged- the military crises that had for so long been our daily business became a thing of the past...'[672] The Crisis again demonstrated to the Irish contingent the volatile nature of peacekeeping. While Cyprus may not have been the most demanding operation, the organisation continued to evolve in an operational setting. The relative calm continued to the 1970s.

Withdrawal

The ongoing situation in Northern Ireland challenged the ability to continue to provide contingents to UNFICYP. The first phase of withdrawal from the mission came when the 21st Infantry Group were asked to repatriate half their contingent. On 21 December 1971 the 21st Infantry Group received

> A letter from Ireland which gave us the first news of an impending move back to Ireland. It was dated 15 Dec 71 and informed OC 21 Infantry Group that a decision would be Infantry Group. The letter gave a rough outline of who would be returning and said that the repatriation was unlikely to be an emergency one as envisaged in 21 Infantry Group's OPERATION GARRYOWEN. A Telex confirming the Government's

[671] *9th Inf in Cyprus,* pp 72-73 (MA).
[672] Harbottle, *Impartial Soldier*, p.166.

decision on partial repatriation followed on 22 Dec 71, although by this time the decision had been announced both on BBC and Greek Radio News transmissions.[673]

However the decision of which contingent to repatriate was difficult:

> The major decisions here were straightforward enough but minor matters as to which individual specialists would be added to 'B' Coy from Group HQ and HQ Coy caused quite a lot of study, discussion and case-making. 21 Infantry Group's main problems here were to try to achieve balance between necessary operational personnel and important specialists while keeping with a "new group" strength ceiling of 129. Another problem was of course caused by the distance over which most correspondence, directives etc had to be transmitted. For instance it was quite hard for us to evaluate where the emphasis on "specialists" should be e.g. at home certainly if the move was an operational one but in Cyprus where they could assist the remaining Coy if the repatriation was a "numbers home" one. The early dispatch of an LO (Liaison Officer) from Ireland who could "give us a feel" of such intangible details would have been a help.[674]

The downsizing of the Irish contingent had natural implications for the deployment of the force. Brigadier Henn remarked

> following a reduction of 250 men in January 1972, Ireland's Contingent comprised its 22nd Infantry Group, which at a strength of 130 men represented no more than one company. Since this was insufficient to allow responsibility for a full District, the Irish

[673] *21st Inf in Cyprus,* p.9 (MA).
[674] *21st Inf in Cyprus,* p.10 (MA).

were allotted the eastern part of Larnaca District on the island's south coast; this was designated UNFICYP Larnaca Sector.[675]

The move by the Irish Government appears to have been grounded in *realpolitik*. The necessity to address the security situation in Ireland was finely balanced with a desire to remain relevant in the international arena. While the reaction of the Defence Forces to the Government direction is not clear, the repatriation attested to the necessity of the Defence Forces to the security of the State.

The decision to withdraw the complete contingent came not from the Northern Ireland crisis but from the crisis in the Middle East. In contrast to the relative calm of Cyprus, the Yom Kippur War broke out on 6 October 1973. The 25th Infantry Group had just arrived in Cyprus when the Government was asked by the UN to redeploy the group to the Sinai:

> Lt. Colonel Allen informed UNFICYP Chief of Staff at the conference that his unit would be ready to move from 1200 hours that day but that unless he received confirmation from Dublin that the government and Dáil approval had been given, it would not be possible for the movement of IRCON [Irish Contingent] to take place as was being planned. The move was then postponed until Tuesday 30 October when this approval was expected. This proved to be a blessing in disguise for although the troops were disappointed at not moving immediately, it did give the group an opportunity to prepare in greater detail for the move.[676]

The former Chief of Staff of UNFICYP provides insight into this episode when he states that 'urgency gave way to anticlimax when it was learnt that the Irish government required the

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[675] Henn, *Business of Some Heat*, p.54.
[676] Unit History 25th Infantry Group in Cyprus, p.3 (MA).

approval of the Dail (Irish Parliament), which was not due to meet until 30 October – a further 48 hours. So, with Phase 1 of the Operation completed early on 29 October, a pause in the activity at Akrotiri ensued'.[677] The 30 October 1973 was a Tuesday and unless the Dáil had convened in emergency session, this was probably the first occasion on which they could grant such approval. The Dáil approved the move on 30 October as expected. The last plane of the IRCON airlift left Cyprus at 1450 on 31 October. 127 personnel departed the Island while two NCOs and two privates remained in Cyprus. The short era of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) had begun.

Conclusion

While the purpose of this analysis is not to question whether the mission in Cyprus was successful, it was an issue that preoccupied some Irish contingents. The 3rd Infantry Group remarked that

> The inconsistency in the UN mission to bring about a return to "normal" is that the interpretation of "normal" by the two communities is irreconcilable. The Turk view is that UNFICYP should contribute to a return to normal conditions by reinstating the provisions of the 1960 Constitution which the Greeks regard as inoperative and superceded [sic]. Normality can only come about by a union of wills on the part of the two communities to lay down their arms and seek again to live in peace.[678]

This could be regarded as one of the reasons why the mission is still ongoing. It is evident that "lessons learnt" from ONUC were applied in UNFICYP. Harbottle remarked that 'the Irish have their memories of the Congo, where they lost a number of their soldiers killed,

[677] Henn, *Business of Some Heat*, p.151.
[678] *3rd Inf in Cyprus,* p.26 (MA).

and they dealt firmly and effectively with these capricious outbreaks'.[679] However problems still remained. The Defence Policy Memorandum 1967 pointed to three separate issues. The first was that units on UN missions are not as well trained and integrated 'as their tasks, security and national prestige demand'.[680] Due to low strength, personnel have had to be drawn from almost every unit in the Army and brought together for a short period before deployment. The limited time for integration and combined training was considered 'completely inadequate'.[681]

The second problem area related to the serious deficiencies in specialists and technicians. The working conditions were not considered attractive enough to keep them in service. This was considered particularly serious insofar 'as signal personnel are concerned, since signal communications are vital to this type of operation'.[682] The last issue concerned equipment. It was considered that deterioration in a UN operation from police type action to combat operations was a very distinct possibility. If this was to happen, armoured personnel carriers and light anti-aircraft weapons would be essential to protect the unit. The Defence Forces did not have adequate stocks of armoured personnel carriers and only a few obsolete anti-aircraft weapons.[683]

The lack of major incidents, such as the Niemba massacre and the siege at Jadotville, and the low rate of fatalities had consequences. It served as evidence to the Government that not all missions were as dangerous as the one previously undertaken in ONUC. If there had been the same amount of fatalities, there is no guarantee that additional resources would

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[679] Harbottle, *Impartial Soldier*, p.131. The outbreaks referred to violence Lefka District.
[680] Defence Policy Memorandum 1967, p.11 (MA).
[681] Ibid.
[682] Ibid.
[683] Defence Policy Memorandum 1967,p.11 (MA).

have been provided for the Defence Forces. Paradoxically, the lack of major incidents and casualties may have hindered the development of the Defence Forces as a peacekeeping force during this period. They were not constantly in combat situations, as they would be later on during their time in the Sinai and in Lebanon. That is not to say that nothing was gained throughout UNFICYP. Contingents gained valuable experience in core skills such as patrolling and negotiating. The importance of discipline was recognised and the reported infractions were mainly of a minor nature. Their continued contribution to UNFICYP until their redeployment to UNEF II enhanced the reputation of the Defence Forces and demonstrated the State's commitment to armed peacekeeping. The constant deployment of soldiers from a relatively small pool is a considerable undertaking and understandably impacted on their evolution.

United Nations Emergency Force II

The missions in the Congo and Cyprus set a precedent in the international community that conflicts could be, and perhaps should be settled by a regional or international intervention. However as Henry Wiseman remarked

> When the severity of such conflicts becomes so great as to defy resolution at that level, they are then thrust before the United Nations. The capacity of the organisation to maintain international peace and security is severely strained under these critical conditions. Yet it is precisely under these circumstances that the world press and public demand the greatest of accomplishments.[684]

The United Nations Emergency Force II, born out of the Yom Kippur War, is widely considered one of the most successful missions to date.[685]

The conflict began in the Middle East on 6 October 1973 when Egyptian forces in the Suez Canal and Syrian Forces in the Golan Heights attacked Israeli positions. This attack is directly linked to the perceived Arab humiliation after the 1967 Six Day War. The date of the attack is also significant as it occurred on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, which is considered the holiest day in the Jewish calendar. The United Nations Security Council met from 8 to 12 October to consider the conflict but due to the opposing positions of the Soviet Union and the United States no conclusion on how to resolve the conflict could be reached. Hostility continued and the situation became critical. By 22 October the Soviet Union and the United States had submitted a proposal which called for a ceasefire. This was confirmed

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[684] Henry Wiseman, 'United Nations and UNEF II: A Basis for a New Approach to Future Operations' in *International Journal*, xxxi, no. 1 (Winter 1975/1976), p.123.

[685] United Nations Emergency Force II will hereafter be known as UNEF II.

in Resolution 339 on 23 October and a request for an observer mission was made. However this did not cause the conflict to subside and at the request of Egypt, the Security Council met again on 24 October. As UN documents state

> the non aligned members of the Council, in close cooperation with the Secretary-General, worked out a resolution calling for an increase in UNTSO [United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation]Observers in the area and the establishment of a new United Nations peacekeeping force, which became the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II).[686]

After repeated violations of the ceasefire outlined in Resolutions 338 and 339, Resolution 340 sought to immediately set up a United Nations Emergency Force comprising of member states with the exception of those states in the Security Council.[687] In a Report of the Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution, it was considered that there were three essential conditions that must be met for the Force to be effective. Specifically that 'firstly it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation of the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit'.[688] Irish involvement was cut short due to internal security issues following the Dublin/Monaghan bombings. However brief, it would be the first contingent, rather than

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[686] Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) – Background. (www.un.org).
[687] Resolution 340 1973; available from (http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/288/67/IMG/NR028867.pdf?OpenElement); last accessed 09/05/12.
[688] Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), Secretary-General's personal files – UNEF II (United Nations Archive, New York hereafter UNA).

observer mission, to be sent to the Middle East.[689] The following section will discuss the short period of Irish participation in the mission.

Pre-deployment

On 28 October 1973 a progress report on UNEF II was submitted to the Security Council. The appointment of Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo, the then Chief of Staff of UNTSO, as the interim Commander of UNEF II was announced. The provisional headquarters was set up in Cairo, staffed by personnel then serving in UNTSO. The composition of the force was also analysed. The Secretary- General arranged for military personnel from the contingents of Austria, Finland and Sweden serving with UNFICYP to proceed immediately to Egypt to become the first element of UNEF II. The report remarked that the governments of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus were consulted and raised no objections, subject to the rapid replacement in Cyprus of the units transferred to UNEF II.[690] Waldheim, reflecting on past experience, suggested some guidelines for the Force. Interestingly he pushed for a wide geographic representation for the Force, adding however that they would have to be selected in consultation with the Security Council and the parties concerned. This meant that permanent members would still have considerable influence in deciding which member states would be allowed to supply contingents.

Another guideline mentioned was the use of force in self defence, an issue which was to haunt the UN in the latter part of the twentieth century. Waldheim remarked that 'the

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[689] Virginia Page Fortna describes observer missions as being 'typically small in size and involve unarmed monitors'. Traditional peacekeeping missions, which are discussed in chapters in this thesis, are described as 'somewhat larger and involve lightly armed military units (often in addition to observers)'. Virginia Page Fortna, 'Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War' in *International Studies Quarterly*, xlviii (2004) p.270.

[690] Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force, Secretary-General's personal files – UNEF II (UNA).

Force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character only. It shall not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council'.[691] The member states who offered contingents for UNEF II were measured on three key issues, whether they had diplomatic relations with parties, the nature of the offer, and the size of the offer. The differences that arose between member states, particularly on the issue of diplomatic relations, were significant. In Africa; Kenya, Ghana and Senegal offered contingents, the first of which had no diplomatic relations with Israel with the others about to break their ties. In Asia both India and Indonesia had no diplomatic relations with Israel while Nepal did. All Western European, Australian and Latin American potential contributions had diplomatic relations with both Egypt and Israel. In Eastern Europe, only Romania had diplomatic relations with Israel with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia abstaining from such relations.[692] The member states that would provide contingents during the period that the Irish contingents were serving included Austria, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, Senegal and Sweden.[693] Once more, Ireland's acceptability as an impartial UN member was recognised. This was attributable to its position of military neutrality, its lack of colonial baggage, and perversely the lightly armed nature of its Defence Forces.

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[691] Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), 26 October 1973; available from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N73/226/33/PDF/N7322633.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 12/04/12.

[692] Offers of Contingents for UNEF Summary 28 Oct. 1973, Secretary-General's personal files – UNEF II (UNA).

[693] Further Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force, 13 May 1974; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N74/121/78/PDF/N7412178.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 25/04/12.

On 30 October 1973 Dáil Eireann met to approve the dispatch of a contingent from the Defence Forces to UNEF II. In a statement UN Secretary General Waldheim commented 'I have approached the Irish Government and have enquired whether it would agree, as a temporary measure, to the transfer of the Irish Contingent in Cyprus to Egypt. The Irish Government has agreed in principle. Some practical arrangements have yet to be worked out'.[694] The Government motion approved an Irish contingent within the region of 240 all ranks, half of which were to be transferred from Cyprus. Garret FitzGerald, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, considered it

> flattering and a recognition of our impartiality and the independent and constructive attitude which has characterised our role in the various international organisations in which we participate, that we received this invitation... I have the fullest confidence that our officers and men will discharge their heavy responsibilities in a manner fully in keeping with the traditions of the Army and with the high standards of efficiency and dedication to duty which have always been displayed by our troops when they have been called upon in the past to assist the United Nations Organisation in its primary task of maintaining international peace and security.[695]

However the Government was aware that UNEF II would not be like UNFICYP. As the report of the Secretary General states 'the initial activities of the Force have of necessity taken place in areas of actual confrontation between the armed forces of the parties and have involved supervision of the cease-fire in cooperation with UNTSO observers, patrolling and

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[694] Secretary- General's Statement, Secretary-General's personal files – UNEF II (UNA).
[695] Dáil Debates 268 (800) 30 October 1973; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0268/D.0268.197310300038.html; last accessed 09/05/12 .

interposition where possible between forward elements on each side'.[696] In the Dáil, Fianna Fáil TD Michael O' Kennedy commented that 'the troops will be placing themselves between the combatants prior to the ceasefire within almost hundreds of yards of each other. This is very different from any position in which our troops would have found themselves either in the Congo or subsequently in Cyprus'. However Dr. Conor Cruise- O'Brien, a Minister in Government and a diplomatic veteran of ONUC, countered that

> there is no one, but no one, who can protect them. We should be clear about this. If there is anyone here who feels that this risk should be run, let him say so. Let no one come back afterwards in other circumstances and say that these men should not have been risked. I said this was not a no-risk operation but I do not want to suggest that these risks are excessive for the great purpose of maintaining the peace...

Others such as Neil Blaney, TD and formally of the Fianna Fáil party, commented that while participation may have a positive effect on Defence Forces morale, he could not

> but feel with many of those who know the situation in this country that it is rather queer that we seem to be able to help quite substantially despite our small size in settling the problems of other nations in any part of the globe and yet we seem unable to perform this service for ourselves nor do we seem to get much sympathy or thought from the other powers of the great United Nations who seem to be able to act if the situation is grave enough.[697]

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[696] Further progress report of the Secretary – General on the United Nations Emergency Force, Secretary-General's personal files – UNEF II (UNA).

[697] Dáil Debates 268 (812) 30 October 1973; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0268/D.0268.197310300038.html; last accessed 09/05/12.

This statement by a fervent nationalist alluded to the internal security issues Ireland was facing at the time and his comments can be viewed as evidence of his opinion on sending the Army into the North. Despite the debate, it would be in the State's best interest to agree to send a contingent in order to stay relevant in the international community as a small nation. It was doing this through the medium of the Defence Forces and the role of small armies in the new world order was continuing to emerge.

Deployment

Once the Government had approved the motion for a contingent to be sent to UNEF II, the Defence Forces began the process of deploying the 25 Infantry Group from Cyprus to the Sinai. During a party in Camp Inishfree, a message came from the Chief of Staff that 'consideration being given, subject to Government and Dáil approval, which is likely to be affirmative, for movement of unit to a new force in Egypt. Confirmation soonest but plan for it'.[698] The Irish contingent had to await Dáil approval and the transfer was postponed until 30 October. The Unit considered this a 'blessing in disguise for although the troops were disappointed at not moving immediately, it gave the group an opportunity to prepare in greater detail for the move'.[699] The last airlift from Larnaca to Cairo left on 31 October. The airlift was provided by the United Kingdom free of charge to the United Nations.[700] The reported speed at which this deployment was affected indicates that the previous staleness brought about by barrack routine was being replaced by an adaptive approach to operations.

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[698] Unit History 25th Infantry Group: Larnaca- Cairo- Sinai, p.2 (MA).
[699] *25th Inf Group*, p.3 (MA).
[700] Further Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force, 4 November 1973; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N73/240/72/PDF/N7324072.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 12/04/12.

The conditions in Cairo were unlike that of UNFICYP. Upon arrival it was reported that securing the stores and equipment was to be a priority. Guards were present upon their arrival and escorted them from the airport to the military academy. As the Unit History remarks, 'each truck load had an armed escort, the reason being that the other contingents who arrived earlier had "lost" some of their stores the trucks provided to carry stores for the Austrians and the Swedes having gone "astray" on the short journey from the airport to the academy'.[701] Once they arrived at the academy, it became apparent once more that they had left the luxuries of Cyprus behind. The accommodation was described as 'filthy billets, infested, and certainly not fit for habitation'.[702] The Irish contingent set up camp on a dusty square beside the other contingents who had also refused the offer of these permanent buildings. However past overseas experience ensured that the Irish contingent would not suffer due to this setback. It was remarked that 'at this stage the innate Irish facility for improvisation came to the fore – and a little "self help" was present too. Within a very short space of time "mog" tents and other essential items of equipment appeared as if by magic and few questions were asked as to how they were acquired'.[703] Paradoxically, the dearth of equipment in Ireland had prepared the Defence Forces to subsist with minimum support abroad.

The experiences of the short time spent in Cairo were varied for the contingent. Mealtimes took on an urban legend style status, with discussions of the "eleventh" plague, as the flies descended upon them.[704] Other experiences included

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[701] *25th Inf Group*, p.4 (MA).
[702] Ibid.
[703] Ibid.
[704] *25th Inf Group*, p.5 (MA).

> the souvenir swapping with other contingents, the incessant bugle calls over the public address system of the Academy, coupled with the high pitched incantation from the minarets, the magnificent swimming pool in the Academy which helped to keep us cool during the day, the constant roar of aircraft, both civilian and military, taking off and landing.[705]

The unease felt during the initial landing did not abate as the atmosphere was still tense in Cairo. It was believed that if war was to break out again, the Irish contingent would be in precarious position trapped in a military complex with a civilian airport on one side and a military airbase on the other.[706]

Communication with headquarters in Dublin was also an issue throughout their stay in Cairo. Telex was used but this was subject to unexpected delays.[707] As stated previously their stay in Cairo was temporary before entering the Sinai and, as with previous missions, an advance party was to arrive there first. The United Nations planned to deploy the Irish contingent along the forward defended localities in the area east of the Suez Canal and north of Ismailia.[708] However maps of this area were not made available to the advance party. The only information that was supplied to the party was that 'minefields were extensive and unmarked in many areas where fighting had taken place'.[709] The advance party passed Egyptian lines but the Israeli authorities would not allow them further into the Sinai despite the UN Security Council Resolution. An order was sent back to Cairo to stop the move of the harbour party. However once the advance party had returned to Cairo, Lt. Col.

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[705] *25th Inf Group*, p.6 (MA).
[706] *25th Inf Group*, p.6 (MA).
[707] Ibid.
[708] *Further Progress Report*, 4 November 1974 (UNA).
[709] *25th Inf Group*, p.7 (MA).

Allen learned that despite his orders to hold the harbour party there, UNEF headquarters insisted on the move of the harbour party to Ismailia, situated on the West Bank of the Suez Canal. This move was considered 'to have some awkward consequences'.[710] In a note from the UN Secretary- General to the governments of Egypt and Israel, the threat of renewed hostilities and the impact of these hostilities on international security were discussed. He wrote

> As Secretary- General I have a special responsibility for the advance elements of the United Nations Emergency Force which are now deployed on the battle lines. These troops ... have no stake in the present critical situation other than to make peace. Deployed with the maximum speed in the area of conflict, they have little except their own courage and dedication with which to defend themselves, should renewed fighting break out. I believe that all would agree that, by their conduct since their arrival in the area, they have given ample proof of their impartiality, their courage and their will to bring peace and conciliation.[711]

Arrangements were then made to deploy the contingent east of the Suez Canal to an area called Rabah.[712]

Execution

The 25th Infantry Group left for the Sinai on 9 November 1973. They described the journey

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[710] Ibid.

[711] Note to the Government of Egypt and Israel, Secretary- General's personal files – UNEF (UN Archives New York).

[712] Further Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force, 11 November 1973; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N73/250/52/PDF/N7325052.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 12/04/12.

> As far as the eye could see, on both sides of the road were artillery, self propelled guns, tanks, half tracks and dug in platoon and company positions. Missile bases and dummy bases were spread throughout the lines and at the first halt, those at the rear of the convoy witnessed the firing of some missiles at an Israeli air craft ... It was not long after the IRBATT crossed into Israeli occupied territory at what was later to become the world famous 101.[713]

The Group also noted the disparity in approach between the Egyptians and the Israelis, particularly in the deployment of their forces. The Egyptians concentrated on rigid defensive positions, with long lines of trenches which were heavily manned. The Israelis were completely mobile, with concentration of armour at strategic positions and very little infantry except for those mounted on APC and half tracks.[714] What is interesting about this analysis is that it is evidence of the Defence Forces' progression as a peacekeeping force throughout the 1960s.

There was the added complication of two UN missions running concurrently in the same area of operations i.e. UNEF II and UNTSO. This caused problems both on an administrative and operational level. The terms of reference of both UNEF II and UNTSO were not clearly defined in the initial stage, which meant that United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) continued to maintain positions and patrol in the Irish contingent's sector, thus duplicating their role. [715] Two observation posts were set up, OP Cork and OP Kerry.[716] OP Kerry was situated in quite a precarious position as there was a small Israeli position beside the OP

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[713] *25th Inf Group*, p.9 (MA). Please note that IRBATT is an acronym for Irish Battalion.
[714] Ibid.
[715] *25th Inf Group*, p.10 (MA).
[716] Observation Posts hereafter will be referred to as OPs.

while the Egyptians had manned positions to the north, south and west. It was commented that 'it was a good thing none of the troops suffered from claustrophobia'.[717]

The Unit History described the day to day running of the OP. It was very structured in nature with set meal times and a rigorous schedule of work to improve the OPs, dig trenches and construct shelters. It was remarked that 'on the OP itself one man was on observation duty all day with reliefs every two hours while at night time one NCO and one man remained on duty all night'.[718] There was an insistence on high standards of reporting from the beginning of the mission. This meant that the platoon commanders had a reliable system in operation and could be confident that reports coming from these OPs would be dependable.[719]

Accommodation was a concern for all contingents. The United Nations hoped that a method of solving the accommodation problem would be to set up the base camps in Egyptian Army camps. However it was noted that 'no adequate areas for camps have yet been made available, and such facilities would, in any case, require extensive financial commitments for renovation, reconstruction and housing'.[720] Obtaining rations and supplies and developing the base camp in Rabah was described as an 'arduous, if not dangerous' task. These tasks were challenging due to a shortage of transport. This was considered 'lamentable' and comments were made on 'how the transport section managed to keep these trucks on the

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[717] *25th Inf Group*, p.11 (MA).
[718] Ibid.
[719] Ibid.
[720] Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Emergency Force, 1 April 1974, p.9; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N74/079/77/PDF/N7407977.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 3/04/12.

road remains a mystery'.[721] This statement is resonant of the deployment to the Border in 1969 which is discussed in chapter four.

The Unit History also described how the contingent celebrated Christmas. The Irish contingent spent December 1973 participating in a five-a-side soccer championship, with the final being played on Christmas Day. Forty tickets were made available for Midnight Mass in Bethlehem on Christmas Eve. However the reported demand for these tickets was so great that a raffle had to be organised to decide who should attend.[722] The experience was described that 'for a short while in the floodlit square they mingled with people from all over the world, buying souvenirs, listening to the various foreign choirs singing in the square and just meeting and greeting people who came up to speak to them. They were the only UN contingent represented there in any number'.[723] This aspect of the Defence Forces culture mirrored that of its national culture, a culture in which the Catholic Church had a very high standing at that time.

Rest and recreation was an issue that 'greatly concerned OC Group and his staff'.[724] The major issue was that the UN daily per diem did not change despite the relocation from Cyprus. This was considered unacceptable as there was a significant increase in the cost of living. Instead, 'we did make our own entertainments. The soccer league and volleyball championship were very popular, chess competitions, card drives and films got under way, talent competitions and of course – eyes down for bingo, with that all-star caller "The

[721] *25th Inf Group*, p.11 (MA).
[722] *25th Inf Group*, pp 12-13 (MA).
[723] Ibid
[724] *25th Inf Group*, pp.13-14 (MA).

Bleeder" in action'.[725] This is particularly reminiscent of the lessons taken from the Congo experience. These entertainments were organised to relieve potential boredom but also as a means of maintaining discipline. It is noted that they were all of a collective nature, rather than leaving individual soldiers to their own devices.

In the month of January 1974 there were renewed tensions between the Israelis and Egyptians. Both Irish positions came under fire several times. One incident was described 'as burst of fire through a tent' occupied by three Irish soldiers. The attack was reportedly close enough that one round went through a pillow that the Sergeant was sleeping on.[726] On 14 January three Sagger anti-tank missiles were fired at Israeli half tracks, which were located beside OP Cork. One of the missiles went directly over the OP. On 16 January 'the most serious incident to date occurred'.[727] Israeli positions in the vicinity of OP Kerry came under Egyptian mortar fire. However, OP Kerry reported that 'the shooting was none too accurate and a bomb landed only fifty yards from the platoon cookhouse'. Lt. Tom Creaton ordered the platoon to the bunkers and for the next three hours the attack continued with approximately fifteen rounds landing in the platoon area. The scene after was described as 'no one was injured, although all the tents on the OP were ripped by shrapnel and the Land Rover located on the OP was damaged'. This continued until 18 January when the Israeli and Egyptians Chiefs of Defence signed a ceasefire agreement.[728]

By February 1974 the role of the Irish battalion had changed. They had moved position and provided escorts for the body recovery teams who were searching the battle fields. This

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[725] Ibid.
[726] *25th Inf Group*, p.14 (MA).
[727] Ibid.
[728] Ibid.

operation which was known as OMEGA was later taken over by UNTSO. After the disengagement of both hostile sides had been completed, the Irish battalion 'controlled the main route between Jerusalem and Cairo and was given the additional task of supervising the exchange of prisoners of war, the handing over of bodies, and the passage from one side to the other of students or other civilians'. [729] The base camp was in the Rabah area where they manned a forward command post, a reserve position, and five outposts in the UNEF II zone in a sector from the Mediterranean Sea to the road leading from Kantara to Baluza.[730]

The 25th Infantry Group were in the Sinai until April 1974. One of the closing comments regarding their missions was that 'medically the Group had a fine record throughout the tour, proof positive of the excellent preventative medicine of the Medical officer and his staff. Sickness experienced during the tour could be divided into two main groups, injuries mainly from sports and gastro-intestinal'. It was believed that the Group had 'performed well in Cyprus, overcame many adversities in Cairo and carried out their mission in Sinai with distinction'.[731] There is no self-reflection or appraisals in this Unit History. However there is clear evidence that the change of operational area from Cyprus to the Sinai was a stark contrast.

The 26th Infantry Group replaced the 25th in April 1974, a deployment which was to last just six weeks. Because of their short period in service their Unit History was incorporated into that of the 25th Infantry Group. An interesting note in that History was that the Adjutant 'became something of an expert in finance having to deal with Cyprus Pounds, Sterling,

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[729] *25th Inf Group*, p.17 (MA).
[730] *Secretary General Report UNEF II*, 1 April 1974, p.7 (UNBISnet).
[731] *25th Inf Group*, pp 18-19 (MA).

Egyptian Pounds, Dollars and finally Israeli lire during the tour'.[732] Changes in location, poor accommodation and inadequate supply of stationary were used as reasons why the mission was not running smoothly. It was believed that Cyprus was a better run mission, having excellent logistical back-up while in UNEF II each battalion had to be self sufficient.[733] They remarked that 'at the start of the mission UNEF HQ was very much over-worked and the operational system was confused'. It was also reported that no information was available at UNEF HQ about the situation in the area the Group were based.[734] These feelings were echoed by Col. Terrence O'Neill and Nicholas Rees who stated that

> The Force Commander, General Ensio Siilasvuo of Finland... complained that not only had he no experience of international negotiations, but that no one could clearly define his task. There were serious deficiencies of staff at Force HQ and contingents also had to solve supply problems themselves largely through support from their home countries or through procurement in Egypt or Israel... The Irish Battalion was deployed on the Israeli 'side' and since Ireland had not established diplomatic relations with Israel, the Irish became 'hostages' in the hands of the Israelis.[735]

The Report of the Secretary- General on UNEF II also referred to restrictions on movement but from a different perspective. Waldheim remarked that

> one of the problems still outstanding relates to restrictions on the freedom of movement of personnel of certain contingents. I have consistently taken the position that UNEF must function as an "integrated and efficient military unit", that its

[732] *25th Inf Group*, p.24 (MA).
[733] *25th Inf Group,* p.26 (MA).
[734] *25th Inf Group,* p.42 (MA).
[735] John Terence O'Neill & Nicholas Rees, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post- Cold War Era* (London, 2005), p.27.

> contingents serve on an equal basis under the command of the Force Commander and that no differentiation can be made regarding the United Nations status of the various contingents. The matter is being pursued.[736]

In this case Waldheim was commenting upon the restrictions imposed by the governments of the contingents rather than those imposed by any of the warring factions. In peacekeeping, it is evident that a contingent can have many masters.

Withdrawal

The Dublin and Monaghan bombings ended the 26th Infantry Groups' mission in the Sinai. On 17 May 1974 at approximately 5:30 pm three bomb blasts went off in Dublin City centre almost simultaneously. A bomb blast occurred ninety minutes later in Monaghan Town. No warning was given to the Gardaí before the attack and the death toll reached thirty three. Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave, Fine Gael, stated that evening that 'what has happened today will help underline the criminal folly and utter futility of violent action as a means for furthering political ends'.[737] Leader of the Opposition Jack Lynch, Fianna Fáil, stated that

> every person and every organisation which played any part in the campaign of bombing and violence which killed and maimed people and destroyed property in Belfast, Derry or any other part of our country and indeed in Britain over the past five years, shares the guilt and the shame of the assassins who actually placed these bombs on the streets of Dublin and Monaghan last Friday.[738]

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[736] *Secretary General Report UNEF II*, 1 April 1974, p.5 (UNA).
[737] *Irish Times,* 18 May 1974.
[738] Dáil Debates 272 (1795) 21 May 1974; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0272/D.0272.197405210027.html; last accessed 09/05/12.

These attacks had wide implications for the country, not only in practical terms such as the banning of parking vehicles on O'Connell Street, but also had serious consequences for the evolution of the Defence Forces. It points to a central paradox of the Irish military. The Defence Forces were increasingly being defined in terms of competence in international operations rather than on preserving domestic security.

By 18 May the Government, after a second emergency Cabinet meeting, announced that they 'had decided to take specific measures to strengthen security and to increase the strength of the security forces. As part of this effort, the United Nations have been asked to release for service at home the Irish contingent now serving in the Middle East'.[739] The Minister For Defence Paddy Donegan, Fine Gael, however wished to reiterate that it was the desire of the Government that they would renew their relationship and begin to send contingents on missions again 'as soon as the unsavoury job that must be done at home is concluded'.[740] Donegan understood the impact of repatriating the troops back to Ireland with no assurance that they would be recommencing missions abroad. He appreciated that overseas missions were a cornerstone to recruitment at the time and also the role of the Defence Forces for Ireland in international relations. By elucidating that they would resume missions as soon as the Northern situation was under control, it helped ensure that there would not be a drop in strength levels at a time when the country's security was under threat. Interestingly, Donegan also commented that the nation should support the Defence Forces and asked 'the people to back them to the very hilt'.[741] A progress report of the

[739] *Irish Times,* 20 May 1974.
[740] Dáil Debates 273 (1716-1753) 27 June 1974; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0273/D.0273.197406270007.html; last accessed 09/05/12.
[741] Dáil Debates 273 (1716-1753) 27 June 1974; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0273/D.0273.197406270007.html; last accessed 09/05/12.

Secretary – General to the Security Council on 13 May 1974 remarked that Ireland's strength in the mission stood at 323 personnel, the lowest contribution to the 6,645 strength force.[742] On 18 May 1974 The Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN wrote to the Secretary -General Kurt Waldheim stating

> In confirmation of my telephone message earlier this morning, I have the honour to confirm that the Irish Government have decided, with great regret, to withdraw all officers and men of the Irish contingent now serving with the United Nations Emergency Force. After long and careful deliberation, following yesterday's bomb outrages in the State, the Government of Ireland feel that the exceptional strains at present imposed on the Irish security forces made this step necessary. I have been instructed to request you to arrange for the speedy implementation of the Government's request and it would also be appreciated if the Secretariat would be good enough to advise as soon as possible on the logistical requirements necessary for the transfer of the troops.[743]

The Government informed the Secretary General that they were prepared to send suitable air transport to the Rabah area to repatriate the main body of the contingent by 22 May. General Siilasvou, UNEF II Force Commander, reported to Waldheim that the Nepalese contingent would be replacing the Irish battalion, as they had been acting as a Force Reserve.[744] In a letter dated 20 May the Permanent Representative of Ireland thanked the

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[742] Further Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force, 13 May 1974; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N74/121/78/PDF/N7412178.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 02/05/12.
[743] Further Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force, 20 May 1974; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N74/127/92/PDF/N7412792.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 02/05/12.
[744] Ibid.

United Nations for its understanding with regard to the issue of repatriation. However what is noteworthy about this letter is the inclusion of the following; Ireland

> Can but hope that these circumstances will not be of long duration and that the need to retain the troops in Ireland will be temporary. They would be happy, when the present need has passed to send again an Irish contingent to the Middle East should the United Nations feel this desirable and, for their part, would wish to be regarding as continuing their commitment to the Emergency Force even if, for the present, it is not possible to supply troops.[745]

It is evident from this statement is that the Government did not want to lose its established place as a committed provider of peacekeeping contingents. Peacekeeping missions were not only considered essential for the morale of the Defence Forces but also in providing the Government with a platform in the international community.[746]

Conclusion

UNEF II had a considerable impact on the Defence Forces. The mission in itself was not daunting; the Defence Forces had an arguably steeper learning curve in both ONUC and UNFICYP. The impact lay with events that occurred at home. The bombings in Dublin and Monaghan shaped the direction that the Defence Forces would take throughout the 1970s and subsequent years. The repatriation of the contingent serving with the UN saw a paradigm shift from that of the previous decade where overseas missions were considered the primary role. These missions were the arena in which the Defence Forces could

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[745] Further Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force, 21 May 1974; available from UNBISnet http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N74/130/20/PDF/N7413020.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 05/05/12.
[746] Ibid.

demonstrate and enhance their skills in a practical rather than theoretical manner. Aid to the civil power, though important, provided a different platform. The opportunity to work with and learn from other armies allowed the organisation to develop, especially with regard to equipment. The Government, perhaps correctly, feared that without missions such as these the Defence Forces would retreat to the stagnation seen after 1945. While the role that the Defence Forces played during the crisis in the North was very important, their non-participation in missions from 1974 until the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978 was significant. Notwithstanding this, UNEF II was considered 'especially successful in pinning down the original ceasefire and in monitoring and managing the successive disagreements. However, its perceived success was due largely to the fact that it enjoyed particularly favourable conditions for a peacekeeping operation'.[747]

UN missions provided a new external role for the Defence Forces and had a significant impact on their evolution. The missions are indicative of how Coxian Historicism describes how organisational and material capabilities can change a structure. It is also suggestive of what Cox described as 'ideas'. Quinlan's paradigm of force protection was initially viewed as a 'clash of rival collective images' but became the basis for the emergence of an alternative structure.

John Jackson remarked that UN missions were the precedent that established the external application of the constabulary concept of limited military force.[748] While this may be true, it only affected the portion of the Defence Forces that served overseas. What cemented the

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[747] O'Neill & Rees, *Peacekeeping Post-Cold War Era*, p.27.

[748] Jackson, 'The Irish Army and the Development of the Constabulary Concept' in Van Doorn (Ed) *Armed Forces and Society*, p.115.

constabulary concept was the combination of UN service overseas and aid to the civil power at home. The latter will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Aid to the Civil Power: The Influence of the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland on the Defence Forces

Introduction

While many examinations of the Northern crisis have used military sources, the Defence Forces is naturally not always centre stage in this analysis and limited attention has been paid to it other than in regard to the Arm's Trial.[749] While the security forces of Northern Ireland are prominent in many studies, the Defence Forces were firmly engaged in aid to the civil power operations for the duration of the Northern crisis and beyond. This undoubtedly impacted on the evolving nature of the organisation.

The outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland in 1969 presented the Defence Forces with new challenges. One of the primary functions of the military force of any country is to contribute to the security of the state, in particular its territorial defence against armed aggression. This had become a multifaceted task in the latter part of the twenty-first century but was to become even more complex as the new threat facing the Defence Forces was internal. Colm Campbell and Ita Connolly commented that in relation to emergencies, including those involving subversive groups, 'the Army is significantly more problematic, since employment of the military to deal with civil disorder is not a seamless extension of its

[749]For example both Anthony Craig's, *Crisis of Confidence: Anglo – Irish Relations in the Early Troubles, 1966 - 1974* (Dublin, 2010) and Thomas Hennessy's, *Northern Ireland: The Origins of the Troubles* (Dublin, 2005) draw heavily on military documents in their analysis of the immediate outbreak of violence in 1969.

ordinary role, but a radical departure'.[750] It was certainly a radical departure for the Irish Defence Forces who had spent the previous decade evolving from a post-Emergency force, organised for static defence, into a professional peacekeeping force. It also raised the fundamental issue of the national aspiration, one deeply embedded in the national culture, for a "united" Ireland. The Defence Forces was not impervious to this belief as it originates from the Irish Volunteers, Óglaigh na hÉireann, a name which the Defence Forces adopted after independence.[751] While mindful of these origins, there was little evidence of cultural baggage in the decades that followed. A testament to this is the actions and reactions of the Defence Forces through the early years of the Northern crisis.

Aid to the civil power is now regarded as a routine core role for the Defence Forces. This level of familiarity did not exist in 1969 and in addition there was a widespread misapprehension that the Defence Forces might also play a direct part in the Northern crisis through physical intervention in border areas. The Irish Defence Forces define aid the civil power as 'in practice to assist, when requested, the Garda Síochána, who have primary responsibility for law and order, including the protection of the internal security of the State'.[752] The vast majority of the Garda Síochána were, and remain, unarmed. Since the foundation of the state there has been a clear policy of "taking the gun out of politics" and despite the outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland, there was no motivation to change that ethos in the prevailing political climate. The advent of aid to the civil power operations

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[750] Colm Campbell & Ita Connolly, ' "A Model for the "War against Terrorism"? Military Intervention in Northern Ireland and the 1970s Falls Curfew' in *Journal of Law and Society*, xxx, no.3 (September 2003), p346.
[751] Commandant Liam Campbell (Ed), 'A Pictorial History of Óglaigh na hÉireann, The Defence Forces of Ireland'; in private hands which the author has access to. This booklet was given to members of the Defence Forces in May 2006.
[752] The Role of the Defence Forces; available from http://www.military.ie/dfhq/overview/role/index.htm; last accessed 15/12/10.

allowed the Defence Forces to fill this void by providing armed assistance to the Gardaí. Notwithstanding this, their powers were limited and by way of example they did not have the power of arrest. Another challenge that presented itself in the aftermath of the events in Derry in August 1969 was the realisation that there were no occupied barracks or garrisons in close proximity to the border. After partition in 1921 there was a requirement to demilitarise the border area, due in large part to a desire to minimise any provocation. The closest military installations to the border area, that were fit for occupation, were Finner Camp in County Donegal and Gormanston Camp, south of Drogheda, about thirty miles from Dublin. This and many more aspects of the Defence Forces were about to change.

The effect of the Northern Ireland conflict on the Irish military will be examined through a short discussion on the historical context, the political and military responses during the outbreak of violence, an examination of the Defence organisation throughout this period, the issue of refugees, the role of aid to the civil power and its impact, the relationship between the Irish and British Armies, The Arms Crisis, and how Northern Ireland influenced the perception of the Defence Forces in Government.

Historical Context

T.K Whitaker, former Secretary of the Department of Finance, reminisced on the first visit to Stormont by the Taoiseach Seán Lemass in 1965 that: 'we started back on the road to Dublin with new hope in our hearts. We had no presentment of the tragic events of 1969 and the years since'.[753] The roots of the conflict in Northern Ireland are complex. For the purpose of

[753] The First Visit to Stormont, 14 Jan 1965 as recalled by Ken Whitaker, T.K. Whitaker Papers P175/1 (University College Dublin Archives hereafter UCDA).

this chapter a brief introduction to the conflict will be considered.[754] Tim Pat Coogan remarked 'the condition of affairs suggested by the term "the Irish Troubles" was already some three centuries old when Columbus discovered America'.[755] General feelings of disenfranchisement and a broad level of poverty throughout the 1960s , which had its origins in the passing of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922, resulted in the civil rights movement which was led in most parts by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA).[756] Laura Donohue commented that as the Act was levied 'almost exclusively on the minority population, the legislation, and regulations introduced under its auspices, it became a central grievance leading to the civil rights movement of the late 1960s'.[757] The Act was presented as a necessary constituent in re-establishing law and order after partition. It was perceived by Northern Nationalists as a discriminatory Act that favoured Unionists. This perception was amplified by what Diarmuid Ferriter referred to as the Ulster Unionist Party's "electoral hegemony" governing Northern Ireland from 1922 to 1978.[758]

The official NICRA objective was 'to assist in the maintenance of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, propaganda and assembly' and to 'advance measures for the recovery and enlargement of such liberties...' and it aimed to be non-party and non-denominational.[759] On a more fundamental level, NICRA sought to end the discrimination

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[754] Suggested reading on the history of Northern Ireland; Thomas Hennessy, *'A History of Northern Ireland 1920-1996* (Bastingstoke, 1997) provides an account of the twentieth century. Jonathan Bardon 'A History Of Ulster' (Belfast, 2005) provides a lengthy account of Ulster from prehistoric times to the present day. These texts are merely a small sample of the volume of material available on the topic.

[755] Tim Pat Coogan, *The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal 1966 -1995 and the Search for Peace* (London, 1995), p.1.

[756] The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association hereafter will be referred to as NICRA.

[757] Laura K. Donohue 'Regulating Northern Ireland: The Special Powers Acts, 1922-1972' in *The Historical Journal*, XLI, no.4 (Dec. 1998), p.1090.

[758] Diarmaid Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland 1900 -2000* (London, 2004), p.613.

[759] Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association: Constitution and Rules, HA/32/2/28 (Public Records Office Northern Ireland, Belfast. Hereafter referred to as PRONI).

for both gaining employment and council housing, to terminate the perceived electoral gerrymandering and the abolition of the "B" Specials, a part time auxiliary and exclusively Protestant police force. Commenting on gerrymandering, Aogán Mulcahy states that 'local government boundaries were manipulated to establish unionist control in areas where nationalists formed a majority of the population, and housing provision and public sector jobs were heavily skewed in favour of unionists.' He believed that the events that occurred in the late 1960s 'demonstrated the inherent instability of a state whose legitimacy had never fully been realised'.[760] The international influence on the civil rights protests should also be noted. 1968 was a year of international protest. In the United States there were anti-war protests occurring concurrently with the Civil Rights Movement, which allowed groups like the Black Panthers to come to prominence. West Germany was in the throes of the student movements and it was the year of the Prague Spring. Student protests dominated Parisian life and even Britain was not immune from the widespread revolt against the Vietnam War.

Violent clashes between civil rights marchers and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and in many cases Protestant militant groups, became increasingly frequent, most notably in Derry in October 1968 and Burntollet in 1969, culminating in the 'Battle of the Bogside' in August 1969. On 12 August 1969, 15,000 Apprentice Boys took part in the annual unionist parade in Derry. Rival factions of Catholic and Protestants began a violent confrontation which led to a clash between residents of the Bogside area of Derry and the RUC. *The Irish Times* described the scene: 'Earlier, up to 1,000 police and demonstrators fought a pitched battle with stones and firebombs in the Bogside. Armoured cars and Land Rovers led several

[760] Aogan Mulcahy, *Policing Northern Ireland* (Devon, 2006), p.5.

hundred police into the barricaded area and crowds of stone- throwing Protestants supported the RUC'.[761] The Derry Citizen's Defence Association coordinated a counter-attack by erecting barricades and organising street patrols resulting in the development of an area known as "Free Derry".[762] On the 13 August 1969 the Chairman of NICRA, Frank Gogarty, announced that 'We have just got a desperate appeal from inside the barricaded area of Derry. It said "this is the end, this is it"'.[763]

With regard to the reaction in the South, Tim Pat Coogan remarked that on the night and early morning of the 12/13 August Neil Blaney, Fianna Fáil Minister for Agriculture,

> Was a principal, possibly the principal, link between Dublin, London, Derry and Stormont. His private phone was almost continually in use, receiving reports of what was happening in all four centres and passing the news from one point to another. He was in touch in Dublin with the Minister for Defence, James Gibbons, who in turn was conferring with the army chief of staff and his senior officers, and with civil servants in the Departments of Foreign Affairs and of the Taoiseach.[764]

The outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland had a profound effect not only there but also had significant implications for both Britain and Ireland. It dominated the Irish political landscape for the next thirty years and helped shape many of the organs of the State such as the Defence Forces. It forced renewed cooperation between the three governments involved but against a background of sectarian violence, this was often strained.

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[761] *Irish Times*, 13 August 1969.
[762] Gordon Gillespie '1969: How the Crisis Unfolded' in *History Ireland*, XVII, no.4 (Jul-Aug 2009), p.18.
[763] *Irish Times*, 13 August 1969.
[764] Coogan, *The Troubles*, pp 98-99.

The relationship between the Irish Government and the governments of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland appeared to have improved by the 1960s. There were ebbs and flows in these relationships, many of them connected with the Second World War. The Emergency witnessed a period that could be defined as both cooperation and opposition. In 1939, the United Kingdom was Ireland's main military supplier but throughout the Emergency 'the procurement of arms for the Defence Forces depended greatly on the personal attitude towards Ireland of the British Prime Minister as well as on Britain's own military supply position'.[765] Under Neville Chamberlain some equipment was made available in an attempt to persuade the Irish to consider the British war effort more favourably. However this stance was revised when Winston Churchill came to power and supplies were not made readily available. While this was ostensibly due to the priority given to supporting and maintaining the British defensive effort, it was also 'due to Churchill's venom towards de Valera and Ireland for Dublin's refusal to join the war effort and allow the Royal Navy to use the Treaty Ports'.[766] After concluding that a German invasion of Ireland was becoming increasingly unlikely in 1942, the ban on supplying the Irish Defence Forces with equipment was relaxed. This resulted in the British Troops in Northern Ireland supplying the Irish with surplus stock which 'produced favourable results beyond reasonable expectation' and 'a definitely friendly attitude between the High Commands of Northern Ireland and Eire had been established'.[767]

However, many scholars have posited that the relationship went deeper than this and the aforementioned records may not fully account for the cooperation between the two

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[765] Michael Kennedy and Victor Laing (Eds), *The Irish Defence Forces 1940 – 1949: The Chief of Staff's Reports* (Dublin, 2011), p.xxxvi.
[766] Kennedy & Laing (Eds), *Chief of Staff's Reports*, p.xxxvi.
[767] Kennedy & Laing (Eds), *Chief of Staff's Reports*, p.xlii.

contiguous states. When discussing the possibility of an invasion of Ireland by the Germans in 1940, Robert Fisk remarked that it 'led not only to Britain's offer of Irish unity in return for Eire participation in the war but to the extremely secret military cooperation between the British and Irish armies to repel a German invasion of Eire'.[768] Fisk asserts that there were multiple secret meetings between the British and Irish in 1940, one in which the Irish Chief of Staff was present, to discuss the possibility of a joint defence effort in the case of an invasion of Ireland.[769] This would appear to be a marked difference to the public stance taken by both nations throughout the wartime/Emergency period. Britain publically refused to supply arms and equipment to the Defence Forces yet, secretly, was apparently planning to defend Ireland if an invasion occurred. It appeared that there was a mood of full disclosure as during one of these secret meetings a Lt. Col. Dudley Clarke of the British Army received full details of the Irish Defence organisation "without reservation" from the Irish and was prepared in return to share information on British strength in Northern Ireland. However, this cooperation did not exist without some degree of suspicion regarding Britain's interest in Ireland and Fisk noted that the 'invasion of Eire might come from Northern Ireland rather than from France'.[770]

Michael Kennedy's *Guarding Neutral Ireland* discusses the use of the coast watching service during the Emergency to stabilise relations with the British. He remarked that by using the Look Out Posts (LOP) reports 'rumours could be quickly verified or discounted by the correlation of information from neighbouring posts and, if need be, nerves calmed. These agitated nerves were often in London and not Dublin. Through G2, Coast Watching Service

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[768] Robert Fisk, *In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality 1939-45* (Dublin, 1983), p. 233.
[769] Fisk, *In Time of War*, p.233.
[770] Fisk, *In Time of War*, p.236.

operations linked into wartime British – Irish diplomatic and security relations'.[771] The passing of information 'received from LOPs did much to stabilize British-Irish relations in the early years of the War when the battle of the Atlantic was at its most severe and the likelihood of a British invasion of Ireland to secure naval facilities at its greatest'.[772] Eunan O'Halpin concurs with the analysis above remarking that 'from the outset the personal relations between the British and Irish Intelligence officers immediately concerned were extremely friendly and this mutual confidence was, it is believed, maintained and developed during the war'.[773] It was also commented that 'G2 proved highly efficient not only in placating the Allies but also in detecting and penetrating the covert intelligence and political activities of the Allies themselves in Ireland'.[774] What is evident from the above is that security relations were relatively strong throughout the war. The nature of the relationship between Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain was to define the post-war period. A relationship with a former ruling power was never going to be without distrust and misgivings and it was not until the 1960s that relations between the Irish and Northern Irish Governments would begin to thaw.

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[771] Michael Kennedy, *Guarding Neutral Ireland: The Coast Watching Service and Military Intelligence 1939-1935*, (Dublin, 2008), p.9. G2 is the staff designation for military intelligence.

[772] Kennedy, *Guarding Neutral Ireland*, p.10.

[773] Eunan O'Halpin (Ed), *MI5 and Ireland, 1937 -1945: The Official History* (Dublin, 2003), p.23. See Also Eunan O' Halpin, *Spying on Ireland: British Intelligence and Irish Neutrality During the Second World* War (Oxford, 2008), p.88. O'Halpin comments that British policy both framed and was framed by the work of the intelligence agencies, pursuing parallel rather than interconnected aims. Britain sought Irish cooperation in a range of security and counter-intelligence activities, however she also took steps to acquire intelligence covertly in and on Ireland.

[774] Eunan O'Halpin, "The Army in Independent Ireland" in Thomas Bartlett & Keith Jeffery (Eds) A *Military History of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1996), p.421.

Outbreak of Violence: Political and Military Responses

It is widely believed that the Irish Government was caught off guard in August 1969 despite the widespread civil rights marches and demonstrations of the previous year.[775] It is also apparent that the Government did not have any suspicion that the Northern Crisis would escalate to the extent that it did. Pádraig Faulkner, the then Minister for Education, remarked that in the June 1969 elections, Northern Ireland scarcely figured in debates. After the outbreak of violence in August 1969 he commented that 'we were soon facing a totally changed set of circumstances. At the time I felt that the Northern question would play some part in our lives but I never thought it would assume such extraordinary proportions in my party's future or in my own life'.[776]

In his controversial 'stand by' speech, Taoiseach Jack Lynch declared that many had been seriously injured and several of those did not want to be treated in hospitals in the North. Therefore he directed the Irish Army to establish field hospitals in Donegal adjacent to Derry and at other points along the border.[777] The mobilisation of members of the reserve was also authorised. The establishment of field hospitals and the calling-up of the reservists were perceived as a threat of invasion by some Unionist factions, notably by the Reverend Ian Paisley. He announced in Belfast in the days following the "Battle of the Bogside" that 'a friend of mine, who was across in Donegal, got back later and said he saw [Irish Army] troop encampments and said he had never seen the like of it'. Paisley declared that approximately

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[775] See Eunan O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland: The Irish State And Its Enemies Since 1922* (Dublin, 1999), p.304 & Michael Kennedy ' "This tragic and most intractable problem" : the Reaction of the Department of External Affairs to the Outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, xii (2001), p.87. Michael Kennedy comments that the Department of External Affairs had sent no officers across the border on fact- finding missions since the 1950s thus leading to a situation where the Department was completely out of touch with the situation on the ground.

[776] Pádraig Faulkner, *As I Saw It: Reviewing over 30 Years of Fianna Fail and Irish Politics* (Dublin, 2005), p.85.

[777] Statement by the Taoiseach, Mr. J Lynch Wednesday 13 August 1969, T.K. Whitaker Papers P175/1 (UCDA).

6,000 troops were at the border.[778] While this figure was a great exaggeration, the singular act of mobilising the Army caused unrest. Joseph Lee provides an interesting analysis, remarking that

> the actual practical measures announced by Lynch included the moving of Irish Army units to the border and the opening of field hospitals to deal with the refugees from the North. Lynch was signalling to the politically literate that he would do nothing. But the audience included the politically illiterate, Catholic and Protestant, who failed to decipher Lynchspeak.[779]

Pádraig Faulkner commented that 'there was concern about the state of the Irish Army, which was much below peacetime strength... The possibility of incursions into the North was raised but quickly dismissed. As far as I can remember the matter was raised in a rather haphazard way and was given little to no consideration'.[780] T.K. Whitaker, who had left the Department of Finance but who had remained as a policy advisor to Jack Lynch on matters concerning Northern Ireland while Governor General of the Central Bank of Ireland, wrote to Lynch on the 13 August 1969 and brought clarity to the Irish Government's position when stating

> Your recent call-up of first-line army reservists constitutes no threat to the authorities, or to any section of the people, in Northern Ireland. On the contrary, the men were assembled to be ready to serve if necessary, in a peacekeeping capacity in Northern Ireland, either under United Nations auspices or jointly with British

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[778] *Irish Times*, 13 August 1969.
[779] J.J. Lee, *Ireland 1912 -1985: Politics and Society* (Cambridge, 1990), p.429.
[780] Faulkner, *As I Saw It,* p.90.

> troops... The call up has established the highly satisfactory extent to which reservists are available and the speed and efficiency with which they can be brought back to service.[781]

This appears to be an attempt at revisionism and reflects the role and power of Whitaker, who was from Rostrevor in Co. Down, had within the State. In effect he was retrospectively giving Lynch the excuse he needed. Whitaker warned Lynch not to be critical of police attempts to restore law and order without overwhelming evidence of misbehaviour. He reminded Lynch 'there is a terrible temptation to be opportunist- to cash in on political emotionalism – at a time like this; but it should not be forgotten that a genuinely united Ireland must be based on a free union of those living in Ireland, on mutual tolerance, and on the belief that the ultimate Governmental authority will be equitable and unprejudiced'.[782] Anthony Craig comments that, as the Tralee speech in September 1969 was subject to redrafts by Lynch, with the deletion of the more conciliatory parts, it was tellingly one of the last speeches that Whitaker would write for Lynch on the subject on Northern Ireland.[783]

While Jack Lynch further clarified this matter in a later statement, by vehemently denying that the Irish Government had any intention of using force in the North, the burgeoning relationship between the states was badly damaged. This was particularly evidenced in their inability to come to agreement on the best course of action to take control over the developing crisis. Con Cremin, in a letter to the President of the UN Security Council, remarked that there appeared to be a loss of command by the RUC and that as the British

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[781] Letter from TK Whitaker to Jack Lynch 13 August 1969, T.K. Whitaker Papers P175/1 (UCDA).
[782] Notes Summarising Letter Sent to the Taoiseach 15 August 1969, T.K. Whitaker Papers P175/1 (UCDA).
[783] Anthony Craig, *Crisis of Confidence: Anglo – Irish Relations in the Early Troubles, 1966 -1974* (Dublin, 2010), p.62.

Army were not considered impartial 'the Irish Government requested the British Government to apply immediately to the United Nations for the urgent dispatch of a peace-keeping force to the six-Counties of Northern Ireland. The British Government rejected this request'.[784]

The British Government also rejected their request for a joint Irish-British Army peacekeeping force under any auspices.[785] While it would appear that the Irish Government was attempting to involve the United Nations in the Northern Crisis, O'Halpin remarked that the request to the UN was 'a predictably barren gesture'.[786] However this gesture, barren or otherwise, was to have consequences.

Major Chichester-Clark, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, responded to Lynch's actions by commenting that the 'behaviour of the Dublin Government has been deplorable, and tailor made to inflame opinion on both sides'. He alluded to the previous years by stating that 'all the Dublin government has done is convince us for all time that we must look elsewhere for our friends... They have behaved much like those hooligans who have used the present troubles as an excuse to burn their neighbours out'.[787] In a later speech he remarked that the call up of reservists had given rise to fears that the Republic might intervene in the North with military force and that 'the creation of good relations in this

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[784] Letter from the Permanent Representative of Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council, 17 August 1969; available from available from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N60/228/94/PDF/N6022894.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 12/05/12.

[785] Ibid.

[786] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.306.

[787] Speech by the Prime Minister, Major the RT. Hon. J.D. Chichester Clark, at a Press Conference in Stormont. 17 August 1969, CAB/9/B/312/1 (PRONI).

Island is hardly likely to be advanced either through stationing troops along our frontier or through the United Nations or through waging a propaganda war'.[788]

Anthony Craig believed that Lynch never had any intention of sending the Army over the Border. He asserted that

> the subtext of Lynch's speech was not that the Republic wished to invade Northern Ireland in defence of its minority, but that it wanted Britain, at least temporarily, to take responsibility. Lynch knew when he gave the 13 August address that the Irish Army – arguably outgunned even by the Ulster Special Constabulary (B Specials) – had no hope in the active defence of Northern Ireland's urban Catholic areas.[789]

Craig quotes a conversation between Lynch and journalist Desmond Fisher in which Lynch asked Fisher what he thought would happen if Lynch were to order the Army into the North. Fisher replied 'I said they would get about 20 miles into Down or Derry before they would be massacred... He smiled wanly at my answer and said he had come to the same conclusion himself'.[790]

Westminster shared Stormont's sentiments. James Callaghan described Lynch as not being easy to assess and remarked that although he had specifically renounced the use of force, he had sent troops to the border. Callaghan believed that he had also launched a 'world-wide propaganda campaign' against both the governments of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. [791] The deteriorating political situation meant that any military action would have to be considered very carefully. As Joseph Lee remarked 'both London and

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[788] Northern Ireland P.M.'s statement 23 September 1969, T.K. Whitaker Papers P175/1 (UCDA).
[789] Craig, *Crisis of Confidence*, p.50.
[790] Craig, *Crisis of Confidence*, p.50.
[791] Confidential Annex 11 September 1969, CAB/128/46 (Public Records Office, London. Hereafter PRO).

Dublin had played Pontius Pilate on the North for fifty years. They now had to find new instant roles'.[792]

The military response to the situation in Northern Ireland was somewhat confused and ambiguous. It is difficult to consider how it could have been any different as it was inextricably linked to the previously discussed political response. There was little military intelligence on Northern Ireland. O'Halpin commented that when confronted with the possibility of intervention in the crisis, the Army embarked on a series of military studies of Northern Ireland. This was something that had not been carried out since 1925. It was not an unfair assessment when he remarked that 'Northern Ireland in 1969 might as well have been North Korea'.[793] In a further evaluation, he remarked 'there is also a certain irony in the likelihood that Irish officers are better briefed on, say, the strength and activities of the opposing forces in Southern Lebanon than anyone in the Department of Defence is on submarine movements in Irish territorial waters'.[794] This assessment is evident in the Defence Review Board in 1965 where the internal subversive threat went almost unmentioned in the planning assumptions for threats against the state. It focused almost exclusively on threats from either the Western or Eastern Blocs. Annex "F", constituting one page of the one hundred and fifty page document, briefly discussed the strength of the IRA.[795]

On 14 August 1969, the Government directed that a military force be deployed in the eastern area of Donegal. The operation called for the establishment of the 14th Infantry

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[792] Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985*, p.430.
[793] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland,* pp 306- 307.
[794] O' Halpin, 'army in Independent Ireland' in Bartlett & Jeffery (Eds) *Military History of Ireland*, pp 424-425.
[795] Defence Review Board Report 1965 (Military Archives Dublin hereafter MA).

Group in the general area of Letterkenny and Ballybofey, the provision of medical treatment and evacuation services for the casualties and evacuees on the roads leading into Co. Donegal from Derry City, and the establishment of field hospitals in Rockhill and Dunree.[796]

The initial deployment of troops was regarded by many in the media as an embarrassment and just short of a debacle. Joseph MacAnthony, a journalist and a former Army cadet, remarked that 'troops in some areas were left for over a week without even a change of clothing. Others had to forage for their own food in the early hours of the move. Even public transport had to be commandeered'. He found it inconceivable that a national army that had been facing an increasing political problem on its doorstep would have to use CIE buses to transport its troops to the border. He referred specifically to an incident in Cork when a convoy from the 4th Infantry Battalion had bright red CIE buses that were interspersed among khaki coloured trucks 'of every vintage'.[797] MacAnthony also highlighted what he believed was the change in attitude of the Defence Forces to the Forsa Cosanta Áitúil (FCÁ) triggered by the Northern crisis. He remarked that 'suddenly, the FCÁ – the Cinderella of the Defence Forces – assumed an importance that it had not enjoyed since the Emergency. In August 1969 they were held in such contempt that the Plans and Operations Branch of GHQ did not consider it worthwhile to call up officers living near the border to supplement intelligence staffs'. The FCÁ's role expanded to being handed over responsibility for almost all defence installations at midnight on Friday night from the Permanent Defence Forces until Sunday night.[798] Many of those in the FCÁ during this period were under the age of

[796] Situation Report, 14 August 1969 (MA).
[797] Joseph MacAnthony, This Week undated, FCO/33/1616 (PRO).
[798] MacAnthony, *This Week* (PRO).

seventeen and entirely inexperienced for this type of operation.[799] Young officers were said to be shocked that 'the lack of contingency planning, and the poor leadership shown by the senior officers of the time could go unpunished'.[800] It is evident from this article, included in a British file on the role of the Defence Forces in the Republic of Ireland, that the Irish military response was not considered adequate for an organisation that had been participating in overseas missions for the previous decade. It was an opinion that had been shared with the former colonial power.

The Defence organisation's response to this crisis provides an interesting analysis of military thinking during this period. Minister for Defence Jim Gibbons issued a directive for a report on the possibility of Northern Ireland operations. The Chief of Staff, Sean McKeown, issued an interim report on the feasibility of the Defence Forces undertaking military combat or support operations in Northern Ireland in September 1969. Some conclusions drawn from this report were that the Defence Forces had no capability to embark on any kind of unilateral military operation, either conventional or unconventional, therefore making any operation in Northern Ireland militarily unsound. It was believed that if operations of any form were to be launched, the state would be exposed to the threat of retaliatory punitive military action by the United Kingdom.[801]

The Report stated that there was no clearly defined political objective, and in absence of such, four political situations were considered. The absence of a clearly defined political objective would always have ramifications for a military response. Without a direct indication from Lynch as to the State's response, military planning was based on

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[799] From a conversation with a former member of the FCÁ during this period August 2012.
[800] MacAnthony, *This Week* (PRO).
[801] Interim Report of the Planning Board on Northern Ireland Operations, 21 September 1969 (MA).

speculation. The first of the four situations - "Situation A" - considered attacks on the Catholic minority by Protestant extremists with which the Northern Ireland Security Forces could not cope. "Situation B" considered conflict between the Catholic minority and the Northern Ireland security forces on the civil rights issue. "Situation C" measured a conflict between Republican-Nationalist elements, possibly supported by illegal elements from South of the Border, and the Northern Ireland Security Forces. "Situation D" considered a conflict between Protestant extremists and Northern Ireland security forces not directly involving the minority.[802]

The Report remarked that 'all but one of the courses considered are offensive in nature. The degree of success of these courses would be limited by the psychological influence of the traditional concept of the Defence Forces as an organisation with a mission primarily concerned with the defence of the country.' To intervene in Northern Ireland would require a change in the deeply embedded ethos of the organisation. Training would have to be modified to offensive- oriented courses. In order for this to be successful, morale would have to be high. Reportedly it was not, due to a lack of combat experience, tactical training, and underdeveloped leadership skills amongst junior officers and NCOs.[803]

As discussed previously, many aspects of military change are derived from the organisation's historical experience and doctrinal preference. The Defence Forces historical experience, both at home and overseas, was reflected in its defensive doctrinal preference. It would have been difficult to orchestrate such a dramatic change in the organisation without popular support throughout. The Interim Report also provides an example of the

[802] *Interim Report,* September 1969 (MA).
[803] *Interim Report,* September 1969 (MA).

poor intelligence available to or collected by the Army at that time. This Report could not conclusively say which "Situation" was most likely. It did, however, outline what the Defence Forces was capable of in terms of operations in 1969. Interestingly, it suggested organising and conducting military training in the Republic for nationalists living in Northern Ireland, supplying arms, ammunition and equipment in accordance with availability to nationalist elements in Northern Ireland.[804] However, Anthony Craig suggests that this was not in fact a call to assist the IRA. He remarked that 'the truth is that neither the Military Planning Board's recommendations nor any reliable witness from the Cabinet suggests there was any decision to cooperate with the IRA. The planning board recommended that the army be brought fully up to strength first. And, while no one wanted a pogrom, none had yet occurred'.[805] O'Halpin commented that

> a handful of men from Derry were given weapons training at an army camp in Donegal. Whether or not these men were being trained purely to contribute to the protection of their areas in the event of further assaults on the scale already seen in Belfast, or whether the intention was to build up a nationalist fifth column to aid an Irish army incursion, remains uncertain. In any event, they were hastily sent away once the press got hold of the story.[806]

The Report remarked that the adoption of active intervention is Northern Ireland would demand an intensive intelligence effort oriented on the mission, both before and during operations. It continued

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[804] *Interim Report* September 1969 (MA).
[805] Craig, *Crisis of Confidence*, p.55.
[806] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.307.

> a number of the courses suggested, would involve support of and cooperation with various movements in Northern Ireland such as Civil Rights and Republican groups. This could also lead to cooperation with illegal groups in the Republic. These contacts would have serious implications on the national and international scene. They could pose serious problems in the aftermath, particularly where arms and equipment have been supplied.[807]

Thomas Hennessy stated that

> The Irish General Staff were warning against any Army intervention on military grounds. But the Defence Forces were also warning of the perils of invention on a political level. This is the significance of the directive. It and the plan put forward are extraordinary documents. At one level the advice of the General Staff on military grounds was ignored by politicians who were prepared to sacrifice the defence forces in the event of a 'Doomsday' situation: this was a one way mission. At another level the military warned of the potential hazards of entering a pact with a subversive organisation: the long term political aims of the Government and the IRA might be the same – the unification of Ireland- but only one wanted this done by peaceful means. [808]

It is evident that military planning at the time was cautious and was keen not to support any type of action over the other. It is unlikely, given the civil-military relationship that existed at that time, that any of the proposed actions that came from the military planning board were influenced by cabinet policy. As the Final Report commented, 'military action must be

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[807] *Interim Report,* September 1969 (MA).
[808] Thomas Hennessy, *Northern Ireland: The Origins of the Troubles* (Dublin, 2005), p.350.

geared to political decision'.[809] However, the overall recommendations of the planning board concentrated more on strengthening the Defence Forces with people, training and equipment.

One of the solutions that the Defence Forces proposed for tackling the deficiencies in training, though there is no documented evidence that it was actually brought to fruition, was a war game entitled "EX Armageddon".[810] Despite its doomsday moniker, the aim of EX Armageddon was to 'study, plan for and rehearse in detail the intervention of the Defence Forces in Northern Ireland in order to secure the safety of the minority population'.[811] Notwithstanding that EX Armageddon was a planning exercise and not an operation, it provided indicators of the military thought process at the time. In its concept, Armageddon was not a single exercise but 'a continuing war game which will be played over and over again in order to clarify problems and produce solutions to problems.'[812]

Armageddon was designed to assist in the creation of operational plans, to test those plans, to formulate further detail for plans, to exercise commanders and staff, and to analyse further requirements. Interestingly, it was to be two-sided, where selected officers of the Irish Defence Forces would play the role of "enemy commanders". 'In order to reduce the artificial nature of the "enemy" side it is essential to have "enemy" commanders complete with staffs who will actively oppose the intervention with the forces at their disposal'.[813] It appears that EX Armageddon was not simply designed to address the situation in 1969, but was also to be used on an ongoing basis to address future situations of this nature. It was

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[809] Recommendations of the Planning Board, 13 October 1969 (MA).
[810] EX is the international military abbreviation for Exercise.
[811] Plans and Operations File 1 Ex Armageddon, 1969 (MA).
[812] Ibid.
[813] *Ex Armageddon* 1969 (MA).

planned to be held at least four times each year. The exercise concept clearly states that 'EX Armageddon will be classified SECRET at all times'. It was not to be discussed by the participants outside of the locations in which it was being designed, i.e. Army Headquarters, and the location in which it was being conducted, i.e. the Military College. Clear instructions were provided on what to do with all documentation and maps. Communications were to be 'maintained by field telephone and by sealed hand delivered message. Radios will NOT be used'.[814]

It is evident from its detailed description that this was a serious attempt not only in planning but also in developing offensive training methods. It is also clear that the author(s) of the concept believed that it should be conducted with the utmost secrecy. Reasons for this could include possible political ramifications, both in Ireland and the United Kingdom, and a natural willingness not to let a possible belligerent side be on familiar terms with operational plans. Although never formally recognised or put into practice, EX Armageddon suggests that offensive military planning was in the early stages of development in the Defence Forces.

Anthony Craig claims that EX Armageddon took place in the Irish Military College in the Curragh and that 'the obviously sensitive papers it produced were later destroyed'.[815] However, he does not back up this assertion with any documentary evidence. The fact that EX Armageddon was written in pencil on the back of a Military College exam booklet would suggest that it was war gaming rather than a formal military plan. Craig also argues against Thomas Hennessy's assertion that exercises such as Armageddon, and the aforementioned

[814] Ibid.
[815] Craig, *Crisis of Confidence*, p.53.

Report of the Planning Board, were proof that 'the cabinet had embarked on a process in which Irish military forces might, in certain circumstances, intervene in Northern Ireland' and that Lynch was spearheading this.[816] Craig quotes people who were both in cabinet and close friends of Lynch, who deny he ever had any involvement in the importation of arms for the IRA, and asserts that the discord in cabinet was down to when "Armageddon" would arrive and of what its nature would be. It is this discord that drove cabinet members down two separate paths.[817]

Casting aside the argument of whether the Government had any intention of launching an offensive, this form of military planning, embryonic as it may be, was indicative of forward military thinking at the time especially considering that the Defence Forces had only been involved in overseas operations for a decade. The level of analysis and strategic thinking involved in both the recommendations and EX Armageddon itself is indicative of how much the organisation had evolved in the previous decade.

The Defence Organisation: 1969

The requirement to modernise the Defence Forces was long recognised within the organisation itself. As stated previously, between 1962 and 1967 four studies on national defence policy had been made; Ireland in a Major War (1962), Memorandum on Defence Policy (1963), Defence Review Board (1965) and Memorandum on Defence Policy (1967). A summary note on these studies stated that 'the Military views have been consistent. The basic recommendation was that Peace Establishment (1946) should be revised and filled to

[816] Hennessy, *Origins of the Troubles*, p.343.
[817] Craig, *Crisis of Confidence*, p.55.

full strength at approximately 14,000 all ranks'.[818] The strength of the Defence Forces at the end of December 1969 is outlined in the table below:

Permanent Defence Forces[819]	**Establishments**	**Actual Strength**
Army	12,442	7,383
Air Corps	860	498
Naval Service	673	371
Total	13,975	8,252

It is apparent from this table that there was a major variance between the actual strength and the establishment. It is a reasonable assumption that the establishment levels were based on an analysis of what might reasonably be required, whereas the actual strength was based on the budget available. The consistent military recommendation was to bring the actual strength up to the establishment levels. However as a Working Paper on Defence Policy revealed, 'no serious consideration was given to these recommendations presumably because the financial implications would not bear contemplation'.[820] In any military force a proportion thereof is used to carry out day to day activities such as garrison security, maintenance, and routine administration. The size of this element is reasonably constant

[818] Working Paper- Defence Policy (A Brief Summary) 1970 (MA).
[819] Memorandum for the Government – Military Comments, April 1970 (MA).
[820] *Working Paper* 1970 (MA).

whether the establishment is filled or not. Accordingly when the strength is below the establishment, it is the deployable element that suffers. Naturally this would be the element most relied upon during a crisis. From the outset of the outbreak of violence in the North, the Defence Forces were requested to carry out a number of duties that they had not previously undertaken. However, as the force was not up to establishment levels

> units have to be cannibalised so that the minimum of these duties can be reasonably well done. In addition, the FCÁ has had to be called upon to help out by performing duties which should rightly be done by PDF personnel. With current strengths any further commitment which might arise in the present disturbed climate could not be undertaken.[821]

The Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. O' Carroll, estimated on 30 September 1971 that of the 8,683 members of the Defence Forces in permanent service there would 'not be more than 2,500 line troops available for our commitments'.[822] This was a reflection of military capability at this time.

There was an acute awareness in the Defence Forces that strength had, at all times since the Emergency, been governed by financial restrictions. This has been discussed previously in this thesis when examining the civil-military relationship. However for the benefit of this analysis of the impact of the Northern Crisis on the Defence Forces, it is important to reiterate the military opinion of these restrictions, especially as the period was one which would require full strength. One method of control that received mention, when discussing the military views on the memorandum on defence policy, was that of a specification 'from

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[821] Military Views on Memorandum for the Government, September 1971 (MA).
[822] *Military Views on Memorandum* September 1971 (MA).

time to time of a "permitted figure" above which the Forces were not permitted to recruit'.[823] It continued by stating that 'in effect this means that even if all other conditions were favourable we were never permitted to reach the Peace Establishment figures'. It was generally believed throughout the organisation that the Defence Forces 'suffered over a long period from the lack of sustained interest on the part of politicians and Government, and from the accounting attitude and negative philosophy of civil servants dedicated to the curtailment of spending'. This lack of interest on the part of the both the Government and the civil side was cited as the one of the major reasons that long term planning was to remain impossible.[824]

This lack of long term planning not only affected the Defence Forces' ability operationally but also resulted in the organisation having what was termed 'an unhealthy age structure'.[825] This meant that while officers were being promoted to the rank of Colonel three years before retirement, there was still a deficiency of at least two hundred Lieutenants. The implication of this in relation to the Northern Crisis is that a Colonel at fifty seven was considered too old and generally unfit for operational duties. However the deficiency of Lieutenants, the leaders of the platoons, was a considerably more serious problem. It is the equivalent of an inverted pyramid structure. The inability to operate long term planning also resulted in the standard of barrack accommodation remaining poor and below par.[826] This reflected the curtailment of spending with defence expenditure steadily

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[823] *Military Views on Memorandum* September 1971 (MA).
[824] *Military Views on Memorandum* September 1971 (MA).
[825] *Working Paper* 1970 (MA).
[826] *Working Paper* 1970 (MA).

decreasing from the 1950s to 1969. It went from 1.18% of Gross National Product (GNP) in 1956 to 0.97% of GNP in 1969.[827] The table below illustrates this curtailment:

Year Ended March 31st	Net Gov Expenditure £ Million	Net Expenditure on Defence £ Million	% of Net Gov Expenditure on Defence	GNP at Current Market Price	Defence Expenditure as % of GNP
1956	106.138	6.535	6.2	550.7	1.18
1957	109.456	6.535	6.0	558.8	1.16
1958	111.437	6.023	5.4	580.8	1.03
1959	111.497	5.953	5.3	600.3	0.99
1960	117.770	6.611	5.6	635.9	1.03
1961	127.084	7.101	5.6	673.5	1.05
1962	142.023	7.527	5.3	723.1	1.04
1963	157.365	8.064	5.12	778.4	1.03
1964	171.796	8.684	5.1	830.0	1.04
1965	207.405	11.329	5.5	947.0	1.19
1966	229.024	11.665	5.1	1012.0	1.15
1967	246.821	10.367	4.2	1063	0.97
1968	279.426	11.279	4.02	1142.0	0.98
1969	323.029	12.240	3.8	1253.0	0.97

This decrease was occurring when the Defence Forces was developing and transforming its role as Ireland joined the United Nations and embarked on peacekeeping operations abroad. The cost of purchasing arms, ammunition and other military equipment was also increasing, making the cuts in defence expenditure more difficult to manage. These cuts were happening at a time when the organisation was engaged in operations abroad and when it was necessary to develop new capabilities due to the deteriorating security situation on the island of Ireland. This was to effect the organisation down to the lowest level.

[827] *Memorandum for the Government* April 1970 (MA).

Contemporaneous reports of the time, from 1969-70, refer to the morale of the Defence Forces and generally report that it was low: 'there is a tendency to pretend that morale is high and to think that it is an inexhaustible quality in the Defence Forces to which the Government and the public have an inalienable right; let there be no mistake, it is not high'.[828] Low morale was attributed to poor training, poor equipment and low pay. The low strength, the meagre defence budget and plummeting morale may represent the symptoms of an ailing defence organisation rather than the root cause of the difficulties. It is perceptible that there was a general feeling of frustration within the Defence Forces when the crisis in Northern Ireland occurred, something which was not resolved after the consequences of such frustration were made apparent.

The Defence Forces were not alone in seeking to study their defensive capabilities during the Northern Crisis. In a letter to the British Ministry of Defence, Brigadier MacMullen, the Military Attaché to the British Embassy, remarked that in regard to the Irish Governments defence priorities 'it is not easy to give an authoritative answer to this, with any great confidence, chiefly because we lack what one might normally take as the starting point for such an exercise, a statement of their Defence Policy'.[829] The letter continued that 'the Irish do not have an equivalent of our Annual Defence White Paper, and the estimates are published as a bare "shopping list" without any background explanation or justification which might give a clue to the existence of some Grand Design'.[830] MacMullen assessed that the Irish forces themselves had not considered a defence policy as they had no staff organisation apart from the day-to-day administration.

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[828] *Memorandum for the Government* April 1970 (MA).
[829] Letter from Brigadier (Retd) FG MacMullen to Lt. Colonel (Retd) AH Henderson, 6 January 1971, FCO 33/1616 (PRO).
[830] Ibid.

Irish Military reports were at odds with MacMullen's analysis. The 1970 report "Memorandum for the Government" clearly points to a requirement for a national defence policy, a mission for the Defence Forces and it roles to be clearly enunciated. Defence policy would normally emanate from national security policy and it is clear that this was not a priority for the State prior to the outbreak of violence in 1969.[831] It is understandable that in the absence of such policy it proved difficult for the Department of Defence to make a cogent argument with Government to secure the necessary funding for defence. Notwithstanding this, there appeared to have been no urgency on the Department's part to progress policy related issues. The Defence Forces would have to wait until February 2000 when the first defence policy was published in the form of the White Paper on Defence.

In terms of an aid to the civil power function, MacMullen commented that 'it is doubtful if they would be of much help in running the railways or power stations. I do not think they would ever be used to help the police in crowd control, except "in extremis". The use of the Army in this role would be taken by the IRA as an excuse to bring out their own arms'.[832] While it is evident from the foregoing comments that he did not necessarily hold the defence organisation in the highest regard, he believed that few senior officers, if any, felt any animosity towards the British. Many of these officers had been on military courses in Camberly (British Army Command and Staff Course) and others had a close working relationship through working together in the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).[833] This lack of enmity between the two forces is indicative of the changing nature of the Defence Forces during this period. This will be discussed presently in this chapter.

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[831] *Memorandum for the Government* April 1970 (MA).
[832] *Letter from Brigadier MacMullen to Lt. Colonel Henderson,* 6 January 1971 (PRO).
[833] Ibid.

Another concern for the organisation during this period was the considerable turnover in the position of Chief of Staff. In February 1971 Lt. Gen. Sean McKeown announced that he would be retiring. British records assert that it

> was not a great surprise; he has held the position for over ten years and, though it was thought he might stay until the retiring age for his rank, 63, which could have given him another two years, he has not been in very good health lately and the strain of the past year, including the Arms trial revelations from which he did not emerge too well, has taken its toll. There is no suggestion that he has been "sacked".[834]

He was succeeded by Patrick Delaney, which surprised both serving Irish Army personnel and their counterparts in the British Army. The British believed that while Delaney was well-liked and respected, he was one of the most junior officers in the running for the position. The British Embassy considered that the normal selection procedure for promotion in the Irish Army depended very much on seniority, and while this was considered frustrating for the ambitious, it was used as a safeguard against cronyism. This meant that Delaney's accession into power came as a surprise to many.[835] Further correspondence between the British Embassy and the British Ministry of Defence remarked that the decision to promote Delaney was considered to be a political one in order to have a "Fianna Fáil man" as a leader of the organisation. This so-called political appointment was to have no far reaching implications, in that Delaney was not appointed to lead the Army up to the North nor was he mandated to carry out modernisation and reform throughout the organisation. They

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[834] Letter from Brigadier (Retd.) FC MacMullen to Lt. Col (Retd.) AK Henderson, 26 February 1971, FCO 33/1616 (PRO).
[835] Ibid.

believed his appointment came from an 'instinctive fear' of 'he who is not on our side is against us' and that Fianna Fáil had never grown out of the old suspicions that the Army were 'Free Staters'.[836] While assuring the British Ministry of Defence that it would have no immediate change in relations with the Irish Army, MacMullen though that it would impact the morale of the organisation as it would lessen faith in the promotion structure.[837] However by the end of the summer of 1971, the position of Chief of Staff was again vacant after Delaney's sudden death from a heart attack. The British Embassy reported that 'though he did not appear outwardly to be a worrier, his colleagues tell me that his responsibilities were weighing very heavily upon him, poor man'.[838] Col. Thomas O'Carroll was promoted to Chief of Staff. The embassy considered that 'he is not quite such an "outsider" (used strictly in the betting sense) as was Delaney'.[839] However, O'Carroll had no operational experience on UN missions. It is striking that as late as 1971, some thirteen years after their first UN Mission, the key position of Chief of Staff would be assigned to someone without experience of international operations, which had become one of the two raisons d'être of the Defence Forces in the previous decade.

The Defence Forces and the issue of Refugees: 1969-1970.

It is important to analyse the reality of the role that the Defence Forces had throughout the early years of the Northern crisis, as opposed to hypothetical war games. On 14 August 1969 the Government directed that a military force be deployed in the eastern area of Donegal. The operation called for the establishment of the 14th Infantry Group in the general area of

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[836] Letter from Brigadier (Retd.) FC MacMullen to Lt. Col (Retd.) AK Henderson, 4 March 1971, FCO 33/1616 (PRO).
[837] *Letter from Brigadier MacMullen to Lt. Col Henderson, 4 March 1971* (PRO).
[838] Letter from Brigadier (Retd.) FC MacMullen to Lt. Col (Retd.) AK Henderson, 4 August 1971, FCO 33/1616 (PRO).
[839] *Letter from Brigadier MacMullen to Lt. Col Henderson, 4 August 1971* (PRO).

Letterkenny and Ballybofey, the provision of medical treatment and evacuation services for the casualties and evacuees on the roads leading into Co. Donegal from Derry City, and the establishment of field hospitals in Rockhill and Dunree.[840] The establishment of five field hospitals in a number of areas adjacent to and south of the Border and two refugee centres, in Finner Camp and Kildare, was part of the initial response after the outbreak of violence in 1969. Refugee camps welcomed anyone from Northern Ireland, irrespective of religious creed. Mark Clinton, a Fine Gael spokesman who would later become Minister for Agriculture, stated in the Defence Vote in February 1970 that

> in relation to the refugee camps, the right thing was done. We could not have done otherwise. They are Irish people; there was a great fear among these people and they fled from conditions that were impossible to endure. It was therefore only right that we should give them hospitality until conditions have stabilised.[841]

However, some believed that the facilities were not up to standard. James Tully of the Labour Party voiced his concerns

> I do not think Gormanston Camp was the ideal place to which refugees should have been brought. The Minister may say that it was not possible to find the ideal place and it was the best that could be found at the time but it is not a comfortable camp. As far as I know, most of it was built during the 1914-18 war. The huts are still there and many of us know that they were not very comfortable twenty or thirty years ago

[840] Situation Report, 14 August 1969 (MA).
[841] Dáil Debates 244(1688-89) 25 February 1970; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0244/D.0244.197002250047.html; last accessed 01/08/12.

and I am sure they have not become any more comfortable since despite the efforts of the Department to make them habitable for these families.[842]

The Defence Forces had different concerns with what they considered to be the "growing refugee problem". As of 1971, eight military camps were occupied; Kilworth, Coolmoney, Kildare, Kilkenny, Gormanston, Finner, Tralee and Waterford. The Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. O'Carroll, remarked that refugee camps were considered a 'drain on our manpower, barracks services and on space, NOT to mention the drain on time ... becoming a burden on the Regular Army. The task of looking after these refugees is incompatible with the task of preparing for an internal security situation'.[843] He believed that, given the current strength, the Army would find it 'increasingly difficult' to maintain the level of protection they were giving to vital installations across the country if they were to continue to hold responsibility to house and care for the northern refugees. He considered that if the mobilisation of a force to go across the border was to become a real possibility, the commitment to the housing of refugees would have to be handed over to other agencies.[844]

However, the Defence Forces received praise from the Government and the Opposition for their efforts in providing the refugee camps. Defence Minister Jim Gibbons remarked that the 'Army authorities have excelled themselves in the efforts they have made to make conditions in Gormanston as comfortable as possible for those who are still there'.[845] However positive the political feedback may have been, the refugee situation put a considerable strain on an already overstretched Defence Forces. One would also have to

[842] Dáil Debates 244(1691-1692) 25 February 1970; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0244/D.0244.197002250047.html; last accessed 01/08/12.
[843] Letter from T.L. O' Cearbhaill to the Minister for Defence, 13 August 1971 (MA).
[844] Ibid.
[845] Dáil Debates 243 (1946) 18 December 1969; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0243/D.0243.196912180078.html; last accessed 01/08/12.

question the validity of using a national army to manage a refugee situation. Paul J. Smith remarks that 'reliance on military force to deal with immigrants and refugees is not without controversy. For one, many traditional military leaders do not believe that this is a part of their duty'.[846] It appears from Smith's assertion that O'Carroll was not alone in his beliefs. Smith uses the later example of the 1994 Cuban and Haitian refugee crisis when American defence officials complained that critical military resources were being diverted to non military tasks such as managing the refugee situation.[847] The refugee problem provided yet another challenging role for the Defence Forces despite the fact that it may not have been what they desired. However, this humanitarian role fitted comfortably with the civil view of the Defence Forces and continued the guiding principles of de-militarisation that were put in place in the aftermath of the Mutiny in 1924.

Aid to the Civil Power: Security Operations within the State.

Another role the Defence Forces acquired as a consequence of the outbreak of violence in the North was supporting the Gardaí and protecting vital installations as part of aid to the civil power. As previously defined, aid to the civil power is 'to assist, when requested, the Garda Síochána who have the primary responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of public peace and for internal security'.[848] However this definition caused outrage in military circles as it was believed that 'the qualification seems to imply a distrust of the Army and a fear that the Defence Forces might decide to aid the civil power without being requested'. The implication that the 'Garda Síochána have the primary responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of public peace and internal security' was considered to be 'so

[846] Paul J. Smith, 'The Military's Increasing Role in Immigration Enforcement' in *Immigration Review*, xxix (Summer 1997), pp12-13.
[847] Ibid.
[848] Comparison "Memo for Govt" (Ministers Office) and Mil Submissions on Def Policy, April 1970 (MA).

self evident that one would wonder why is it necessary to state it in a paper concerning Defence'.[849] It is evident that the military believed that the anti-militaristic government sentiment had gone too far and this definition cemented this belief, despite the fact that it had been nearly fifty years since the Mutiny.

After August 1969, the Defence Forces were deployed to protect key installations and to assist the Gardaí with patrol duties. This added additional pressure to an already overstretched force. By 1971 it was reported that the Defence Forces were providing troops to seven posts which had not been normally occupied prior to August 1969. This meant that by 1971, 610 personnel had to be drawn from already under strength units in their parent commands. Over 260 personnel were involved in patrol duties, mostly undertaken in conjunction with the Gardaí. The protection of vital installations involved another 330 personnel.[850] In 1971 the Garda strength was approximately 6,500 personnel, with 400 stationed in border areas.[851] In 1973 over 6,500 patrols took place, with approximately 16,500 Garda and Army road checkpoints. By 1974 the situation had escalated. The operational elements were stretched 'to the limit by these duties'. The report continued that 'about 1,700 are engaged on border security. Other security duties being undertaken include protecting installations of vital national importance, assisting at road blocks, protecting explosives used for industrial purposes, providing bomb disposal teams, as well as normal security duties at military posts including the protection of privately-owned arms

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[849] Ibid.
[850] Military Commitments and Requirements, 13 July 1971 (MA).
[851] Henry Patterson, 'The Border Security Problem and Anglo-Irish Relations 1970-1973' in *Contemporary British History,* xxvi, no.2 (2012), p.238.

and ammunition held in these posts'.[852] In 1974 the strength stood as follows: PDF 11,333 (5,500 operational), FCÁ 16,219 and the First Line Reserve 1000. The Interdepartmental Committee on Northern Ireland wanted to increase strength levels bringing the PDF up to 14,231 and the FCÁ to 22,646 at a cost of £6,000,000 for pay and a further £7,000,000 for equipment.[853] While never realised, it is indicative of the stress the aid of the civil power operations placed on the organisation.

Michael Mulqueen provides an analysis of the considerable inefficiencies in how the Defence Forces were allowed to operate in its aid to the civil power role. He remarked

> Successive governments, while content to have the Defence Forces operating as an armed police force in reserve, showed little interest in the detail of how they did it. For example, if the captain of a Naval Service ship suspected a vessel in his area of operations was smuggling arms or other illegal material he had to firstly await Garda permission to interdict. Lacking the power of arrest, he then had to sail his ship to shore to collect a garda, charge back out again, locate where the suspect craft had gone and, on finding it, launch a boarding party including the arresting garda who might have no experience of traversing Ireland's stormy waters in a small rigid inflatable boat.[854]

The violence in Northern Ireland had a profound effect on other operations that the Defence Forces were involved in during the early 1970s. As discussed in the previous chapter the catalyst for the withdrawal of an Irish contingent from a United Nations

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[852] Report of Inter-Departmental Committee on Implications of Substantially Increasing the Numbers in the Defence Forces, July 1973 (MA).
[853] Report of Inter-Departmental Committee on Implications of Substantially Increasing the Numbers in the Defence Forces, July 1973, Garret FitzGerald Papers P215/68 (UCDA).
[854] Michael Mulqueen, *Re-evaluating Irish National Security Policy* (Manchester, 2009), p.30.

peacekeeping mission was the Dublin – Monaghan bombings on 17 May 1974. This may have been a political rather than a practical act and the operational benefits to the Defence Forces of this withdrawal are not apparent. The decision resulted in the Defence Forces not participating in a major overseas operation until their deployment to Lebanon with UNIFIL in 1978. While this had an impact on morale, and meant the loss of operational experience derived from overseas service, involvement in the day to day security operations at home was of benefit to the organisation. The Army became very familiar with working among the civilian population, a skill that is considered indispensible in modern operations. It also gave them the opportunity to fill capability gaps that were exposed through their involvement in aid to the civil power operations. O'Halpin stated that 'the problems posed by indigenous and cross-border terrorism have also seen developments which tie in with rather than cut across the wider military interests of the Defence Forces: the Army handles bomb disposal work, for example, which is also important on some of its UN missions, and it has a special forces unit, which is frequently deployed on a range of security and protective duties'.[855]

However, the inherent challenges of aid to the civil power operations would naturally surface from time to time. The following incident, described in a Department of Foreign Affairs note of a conversation with a British official, is only one of many that illustrate such complications:

> On Saturday 15 December, a bomb exploded on Clady Bridge as it was being taken across. The bearer was instantly killed. There was considerable Gardaí and Irish Army activity following this incident. On Sunday 16 December at about 10:40 am quite an amount of shooting occurred. Some 40 shots were counted as coming from the

[855] O' Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.340.

> direction of the Republic and a number of rounds were fired back. An Irish Army patrol at the location, according to an Irish Independent report today, did not engage the gunmen. At this point I commented that a report on Saturday 8 December in the Independent, regarding blocking of Border roads, had proved to be inaccurate. Mr. Thom said that he realised that our Army was acting under restrictions since only the Gardaí were empowered to arrest the perpetrators.[856]

These challenges were exacerbated by an apparent lack of cooperation and sharing of information between the security forces on both sides of the border, as illustrated below:

> On 5 April 1974, at 1100 hours, an Army [British] on the East bank of the River Finn near Clady saw two gunmen armed with rifles across the river in the Republic. The Gardaí were informed through the RUC. At 1125 hours the gunmen opened fire at the Army patrol. Fire was returned until the Irish Army appeared and arrested the men. This was a successful outcome, but fortuitously. Had the security forces on both sides known of each other's movements beforehand, success would have been virtually guaranteed – and might have occurred sufficiently early to prevent the shooting.[857]

The challenges of communication between security forces during operations did not go unnoticed by the political side. In 1974 Merlyn Rees, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, wrote to Dr. Garret FitzGerald, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, requesting that there be monthly meetings between the two Chief Officers of Police and between the two Army

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[856] Mr. Thom was the Counsellor of the British Embassy. Confidential Note by C.V. Whelan, Garret FitzGerald papers P215/53 (UCDA).
[857] Confidential British Memo, April 1974, Garret FitzGerald Papers P 215/80 (UCDA).

Chiefs of Staff. He asked 'could we reach agreement that the police and the army on each side of the border should be authorised to make contact and operate with whichever force (police or army) was most readily available on the otherside wherever an incident occurred'.[858]

General Mike Jackson, a former adjutant in the Parachute Regiment, described the situation on the ground. He recalled:

> We had no formal contact with the Irish Army. If we were doing an operation right up against the border, a request would be put in for a Security Forces presence on the other side to deter IRA activity. This would always be done through the RUC, who would talk to the Garda, who in turn might call on the Irish Army for support. By and large the Irish Security Forces were cooperative at a local level. Officially they were not supposed to fraternize with us, but sometimes I might have a brief chat with an Irish Army officer at the border.[859]

The challenges of sharing information and intelligence were not confined to the inter-state domain and also surfaced between the Defence Forces and the Gardaí. This was to an extent a return to the situation in the late 1950s but both the internal and external threats were much greater. This was illustrated during the enquiry into the 1974 Dublin/Monaghan bombings. When the MacEntee Commission began their investigation, they acquired intelligence material concerning the bombings from the Defence Forces. The Final Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings remarked that

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[858] Letter from Merlyn Rees to Dr. Garrett FitzGerald, 20 March 1974, Garret FitzGerald Papers P 215/80 (UCDA).

[859] Mike Jackson, *Soldier: The Autobiography* (London, 2007), p.149.

> virtually all of the documents in this Army intelligence file are newspaper clippings. There are, however, four documents dating from 1974 which contain information obtained by Army Intelligence from confidential sources in relation to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. In two of these instances, Army Intelligence passed on the information to the Garda Síochána by letter. Copies of these letters are in the Army Intelligence file. In another instance, a handwritten note on the face of the document indicates that the Garda Síochána was informed, without specifying the means of communication.[860]

The fourth intelligence document contained information regarding a white van with an English registration, first seen parked outside the Department of Posts and Telegraphs in Portland Row and seen later at the B&I Ferry Port. This could naturally be regarded as a lead that the Gardaí should have followed. There was no evidence disclosed to the commission to show that these pieces of information were processed or checked as to the reliability of either the source or the content of the information by Army Intelligence. This meant that Army Intelligence either did not complete these actions, or that they did not record the results of action taken, or that the documentation was not filed properly. The Chief of Staff remarked

> While any action taken as a result of this report is not recorded, I am of the view that the most likely reason for this... is the failure to record the results. My reason for this conclusion is the practice, evident from other documentation in this and in other

[860] Final Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Dublin Monaghan bombings of 1974 (Hereafter MacEntee Report) (March 2007), p.211; available from http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Work_Of_The_Department/Northern_Ireland/Northern_Ireland_Publications/Dublin_and_Monaghan_bombings_of_1974_-_Final_Report_March_2007_.html; last accessed 18/07/12.

> files, of passing on without delay appropriate information in writing and orally to An Garda Síochána. Even allowing that Military Intelligence did not have any powers of investigation, corroboration of a search allegedly conducted by An Garda Síochána would have been a routine matter of desk-to-desk liaison.[861]

The Dublin / Monaghan bombing was the seminal event in the Republic during the Northern Crisis. It could reasonably be assumed therefore that intelligence sharing between the security forces of the State would be at their best in the aftermath of such an event and that some priority would be given to maintaining records to support the investigations that followed. This does not appear to be the case.

The aid to the civil power role meant that there would be a requirement for operational cooperation between the Defence Forces and the Gardaí. This ranged from the transport of terrorist suspects to and from jail, prison security such as in Portlaoise, and border security where Gardaí were routinely accompanied by military units. However despite this cooperation, it is clear from the MacEntee Report that the nature of intelligence sharing between the two was disjointed. Having a dual intelligence apparatus is not uncommon in western states and is used to provide "checks and balances". It also leads to competition, a situation that does not promote sharing or cooperation. The Gardaí were not the only organisation that the Defence Forces would be required to cooperate with. The crisis in the North signified a new era of relations between the Irish and British defence organisations, one marked by collaboration and difficulties.

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[861] *MacEntee Report*, pp 211- 212.

The Relationship between the Irish and British Armed Forces

The aforementioned incidents indicate the inherent difficulties of both aid to the civil power operations and border sharing with the security forces of another state during an internal crisis. Anthony Craig remarked that Anglo – Irish Security cooperation was the "missing dimension" of inter-governmental relations after 1969.[862] O'Halpin commented on the major factor, that of border security cooperation:

> the British... repeatedly sought direct army to army communications in those areas where the British army operates in tandem with or in lieu of the RUC, in order to facilitate the interception of terrorists crossing the border, but the government and its military advisors always refused to allow this. Army to army communications consequently are mediated through the respective police forces, an arrangement which undoubtedly lessens operational effectiveness.[863]

The British Military Attaché in Dublin did not feel that there was any enmity between the Irish and British forces during this period. This was reiterated by John Peck, then British Ambassador, who remarked that

> they in the Irish Army have a great admiration for the restraint shown by British troops in the North, notwithstanding the adverse propaganda which has been given such prominence in the press recently. They frankly admit to grave doubts that their own troops in similar circumstances, would have the training and discipline to put up with such provocation without running amok.[864]

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[862] As quoted in Patterson, *Border Security Problem*, p.231.
[863] O' Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.334.
[864] Memo sent to DCC from Sir John Peck, FCO 33/1616 (PRO).

The British embassy believed that it would have been highly unlikely that any senior officer in the Irish Defence Forces would be given an opportunity to speak about the cooperation with and admiration of the British Army.[865] The lack of hostility towards the historical foe could be attributable, at least in part, to participation with them in United Nations peacekeeping missions, most notably in Cyprus (UNFICYP). It was through these missions that cooperation with and understanding of other armies had been learned. The British appreciated the challenges involved and while they recognised that there was historical resentment against Britain, they also acknowledged that there were inextricable links between the two nations. They believed that 'the result is an extreme sensitivity towards HMG [Her Majesty's Government] and, above all towards the British Army, coupled with a friendly disposition towards British people as individuals'. [866]

It is evident from British files that cooperation between the Irish and the British was far greater than the general public knew. An example of this relates to the seizure of an arms shipment by the Irish Navy in March 1973 on the vessel Claudia off the coast of County Waterford. The British had requested that the arms seized should be handed over to them for examination. The Irish Minster for Defence Paddy Donegan remarked to Arthur Galsworthy, the newly appointed British Ambassador, that he had been instructed by Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave to provide them with the samples that they wanted. However 'he stressed that Mr. Cosgrave wanted this to be done very discreetly and on the basis that, if questioned, the Irish would deny that they had made them over to us'.[867] Arrangements were made for the Irish Army to bring the samples that were required from Cork to Dublin

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[865] Ibid.
[866] State of Security Assessment: Republic of Ireland, FCO 87/536 (PRO).
[867] Telegram sent to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from Arthur Galsworthy, 14 April 1973, FCO 87/247 (PRO).

and hand them over to the British there.[868] Although cooperation existed throughout the Northern crisis, Galsworthy noted the challenges of extending this to Border security. Galsworthy and Donegan met in the aftermath of the Claudia arms seizure in relation to increased cooperation along the border. Galsworthy wrote about Donegan's position commenting that he remarked

> The problem was the length of the Border and the nature of the terrain. The reason why the Irish troops kept one mile back was because of the risk of British and Irish units firing at each other (which... would delight the IRA). But Irish units listened to our Army radios and when there were signs of difficulty their orders were to move in. He would however welcome improved cooperation in the Border areas. The essential first step, as he saw it, was for an uninhibited exchange of intelligence about terrorist activities on the Border. [869]

It is evident throughout the early 1970s that the British were intent on getting increased Irish support on the Border issue. The British believed the Irish were not pulling their weight but that the change in the leadership of the Government in 1973 from Lynch to Cosgrave meant that Cosgrave would have to make up for Lynch's 'mistakes'.[870] Border security was a divisive issue as the two security forces were present under different mandates. The Irish Army was present in an aid to the civil power capacity whilst the British Army was present as part of a defensive operation. Garrett FitzGerald remarked that he had discussed the border issue with the new British government just before the collapse of the Sunningdale

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[868] Ibid.
[869] Telegram sent to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from Arthur Galsworthy, 14 April 1973, FCO 87/247 (PRO).
[870] Letter to Sir Crawford from WKK White, 23 March 1973, FCO 87/247 (PRO).

Agreements in April 1974. He stated that 'on the question of cross-border security measures I explained the difference between the role of the Irish army in giving support to the civil power, i.e. the Garda Síochána, and that of the British army, which had direct responsibility for security in border areas'.[871]

This was a difficult message for the British to understand. Merlyn Rees remarked that 'everybody seems to be living off us, with the Southern Government complaining about the British army but apparently not giving a thought to the deaths of British soldiers. Of course the army makes mistakes, but this all pervading carping is too much'.[872] On 18 September 1974 a meeting took place between Rees and Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald. Rees remarked that

> The day was spent discussing practical problems. There was of course no army representative there, which had the advantage of making Jamie [Flanagan, the Catholic Chief Constable of the RUC] the important man from our side and thus putting the police in the leading role on security. The meeting was a success and afterwards we were able to announce that we had reached substantial agreement on methods of improving cross-border security co-operation. We set up a number of standing committees on such matters as radio communication, which proved fruitful in the months and years ahead, and we agreed on the tightening of controls on explosives and detonators manufactured in the Republic... We got nowhere, however, on cross- border co-operation between the Irish and British armies. Paddy Cooney had been adamant beforehand that no progress could be made on this, so

[871] Garret FitzGerald, *All in a Life, An Autobiography* (London, 1991), p.232.
[872] Merlyn Rees, *Northern Ireland: A Personal Perspective* (London, 1985), p.125.

> we did not expect it. This did not, however, prevent counter-briefing yet again from Lisburn on 19 September, when it was announced that it was "hoped" the meeting in Dublin would establish a four-way (British army, Irish army, RUC and Garda) radio communications link for the co-ordination of security, particularly in border areas.[873]

A memo from the American Embassy in Dublin to the Secretary of State in Washington D.C. in September 1975 remarked that then Minister for Defence Paddy Donegan

> created a minor sensation by flatly stating in a radio interview that under no circumstances will the Irish Army intervene in Northern Ireland... In the same interview he ruled out any close cooperation between the Irish Army and the British Army in the Border areas, stating that in security matters the Irish Army can only act if called by the police, which is not the case in Northern Ireland.[874]

This situation continued and in 1976 there was still no direct link between the British and Irish armies. The British Secretary of State remarked that 'the difficulty faced by the Irish Government was that the Garda was an unarmed force which had evolved from the Civic Guard and any association with the British Army as such would not only be resented by the

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[873] Rees, *Northern Ireland*, p.126. While it apparent that the British Government wanted greater cooperation in securing the border areas, it is evident that they also were holding back intelligence. Garret FitzGerald remarked that while Merlyn Rees complained about explosives originating from the South ending up in the North, the British Government did not disclose British Army findings of explosives stored in Enfield, Co. Meath during 1973 and 1974. FitzGerald remarked 'it is hard to resist the conclusion that the British army had preferred to use these discoveries as a basis for a propaganda campaign against us rather than to give us information that could have helped us to stop the flow of explosives in 1973'. FitzGerald, *All in a Life*, p.257.

[874] Memo from American Embassy Dublin to Secretary of State Washington D.C., September 1975; available from United States National Archives (hereafter USNA) http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?dt=2476&rid=154440&dl=1345; last accessed 12/09/12.

Garda but would be counterproductive as far as a community in the South was concerned.'[875] O'Halpin observed that

> British criticism of the [Irish] Army's Border performance has usually been met with three related responses : first, the evidence is that the vast majority of Republican terrorist incidents in Northern Ireland were planned and carried out within the United Kingdom and did not involve any crossing of the border; secondly, the Army's duty along the border is not to ambush and destroy, but rather to deter and in support of the Garda, to secure the arrest of suspected terrorists; and thirdly, an argument which British officials naturally find particularly hard to take, that the border areas most notorious for terrorism were those places within Northern Ireland such as South Armagh where the RUC and the British Army themselves have been unable to patrol effectively.[876]

It is evident from the above that while there may have been no animosity between the Irish and British military forces, cooperation on border security was difficult to achieve. The ambiguous border demarcation lines meant that there was easy passage for both the IRA and the Northern Security Forces. The tension with the former ruling power over how best to secure the border and the uncompromising view that the Defence Forces should not be involved put pressure on an already strained political relationship. Rees concluded that while progress had been made, 'what was lacking was day-to-day co-operation, due to the

[875] Minutes of the Meeting between the Secretary of State and Mr. Cooney, 8 January 1976, FCO 87/537 (PRO).
[876] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.334.

traditional anti-British feeling which still existed widely in the South'.[877] However FitzGerald concluded *'plus les gouvernements britannique changaient, plus c'était la meme chose'*.[878]

The Arms Crisis and its Impact on the Defence Forces

The Arms crisis has been the subject of much analysis, debate and conspiracy theorising. O'Halpin remarked

> In May 1970 Sir Andrew Gilchrist, recently retired as British ambassador to Ireland, passed on a document to the head of the Foreign Office. It spoke of the possibility, following the momentous developments in Irish politics of May 1970 generally known as the "Arms Crisis", that Ireland might be facing a fate similar to that experienced in Greece since 1967; that is the replacement of civilian democratic government by the military.[879]

O'Halpin declared that Gilchrist's contention was way off the mark, 'as the Greek example showed, military coups require organisation, well placed individuals controlling key units and functions, disloyalty, means and above all a leader and senior conspirators; all of these were in very short supply in Ireland in 1970'.[880] Nevertheless, this is illustrative of the theories surrounding the legend of the Arms Crisis. However, the analysis here will concentrate mostly on its impact on the Defence Forces. This centres on the involvement of the military intelligence officer Captain (Capt.) James Kelly in the affair. Capt. Kelly was ostensibly "on leave" in Derry when violence broke out there in August 1969. The practice of intelligence officers taking leave in trouble spots is relatively common internationally.

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[877] Rees, *Northern Ireland*, p.320.
[878] FitzGerald, *All in a Life*, p.232.
[879] Eunan O'Halpin, ' "A Greek Authoritarian Phase"? The Irish Army and the Irish Crisis, 1969 -70' in *Irish Political Studies*, xxiii, No.4 (December 2008), p.475.
[880] O'Halpin, *Greek Authoritarian Phase*, p.476.

Once back in Dublin he reported to the Director of Intelligence, Col. Michael Hefferon who instructed Kelly to further develop the contacts he had established in both Belfast and Derry and 'to concentrate on Northern Ireland affairs for the foreseeable future. From then until my retirement from the army on May 1 of the following year, my duties were concerned solely with the situation in Northern Ireland'.[881]

Justin O'Brien relies heavily on military intelligence documents in his possession regarding Capt. Kelly's position on the North. He quotes Kelly reporting to Col. Hefferon on 23 August 1969 'at present, the government has the support of the people largely because of its stand as publicly announced. In itself it finds acceptance even in the most extreme republican circles to the extent that there is some indication that extreme republicanism is willing to co-operate in achieving the unity ideal'.[882] It would appear that Kelly was deeply aware of the ability of the Northern Crisis to spill over into the Republic, commenting

> It would seem to be now necessary to harness all opinion in the state in a concerted drive towards achieving the aim of unification. Unfortunately, this would mean accepting the possibility of armed action of some sort as the ultimate solution, but if civil war embracing this area, and civil war is not too strong a term, was to result because of unwillingness to accept that war is a continuation of politics by another means, it would be far the greater evil for the Irish nation.[883]

Kelly remarked that he had met with Catholics in Belfast who had stressed the urgent need for arms in the early stages of the crisis as they no longer trusted the Royal Ulster

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[881] James Kelly, *The Thimble Riggers: The Dublin Arms Trials of 1970* (Dublin, 1999), p.11.
[882] Justin O'Brien, *The Arms Trial* (Dublin, 2000), p.58.
[883] Ibid.

Constabulary (RUC). Thomas Hennessy remarked that 'Captain Kelly had been arguing for a time that Northerners should go down to Dublin and ask for the Irish Government's support and secure cooperation for the protection of Catholic areas... On his own admission, Kelly was offering advice rather than limiting his role to intelligence gathering, without any explicit authorisation from Dublin'.[884]

Kelly stated that he reported back to Col. Hefferon, the Director of Intelligence, and also to Neil Blaney T.D., the Minister for Agriculture and a member of the Northern Ireland sub-committee, on the various meetings that took place.[885] In addition Capt. Kelly asserted that the Minister of Defence, Jim Gibbons, had authorised Irish Army training in Donegal of men from Derry, under the guise of FCÁ membership, in order to prepare them for defence.[886] While this had been a suggestion put forward by the planning board in September 1969, 'they were hastily sent away once the press got hold of the story'.[887]

The Arms crisis has its genesis in the Bailieboro meeting on 4-5 October 1969. Kelly met with representatives of Defence Committees from various areas in Northern Ireland to discuss who would be responsible for the use and control of arms that might be issued by the Dublin Government.[888] This was to be funded partly from the Northern relief grant.[889] Kelly then set about the task of organising the importation of arms. Contacting an agent in Hamburg, with the assistance of the illustrious Albert Luykx, a Belgian business man who had escaped to Ireland after the Second World War, Kelly organised a shipment from Vienna

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[884] Hennessy, *Origins of the Troubles*, p.350.
[885] Kelly, *Thimble Riggers*, pp 12-13.
[886] Kelly, *Thimble Riggers*, p.15.
[887] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.307.
[888] Kelly, Thimble Riggers, p.18.
[889] The Northern relief fund was a Government fund of £100,000 to be used to aid the relief of the suffering in Northern Ireland. Charles Haughey was given control of this fund.

to Dublin. However, by late April 1970 the Garda Síochána Special Branch unit was tipped off about the importation and were going to seize it as soon as it landed in Dublin. Jack Lynch's knowledge of these events has been widely debated.[890] However, he could not ignore the opposition leader Liam Cosgrave when he brought this to Lynch on 5 May 1970. By this time Col. Hefferon had retired and Colonel Delaney was the new Director of Military Intelligence. Thomas Hennessy remarked

> As far as the new Director of Military Intelligence was concerned Kelly was a rogue officer (Whereas Kelly believed he was faithfully implementing Government policy). Delaney had little idea of what Kelly's activities had been in Northern Ireland, since he had not been briefed by his predecessor and was struggling to put the pieces together. As a picture emerged An tAire [The Minister] was briefed that Kelly had connected with Nationalist and Republican elements in Northern Ireland acting as a field liaison officer and as a 'link man' for these groups, and that he had reported directly to Colonel Hefferon with very little contact with the Security Sub-Section, from October 1969.[891]

This would be the catalyst that would see the dismissal of members of cabinet and the trial of an Army intelligence officer.

In the Dáil on 8 May 1970 Cosgrave remarked that 'this is not merely a serious question for the Fianna Fáil party. What is serious is that it reflects on the whole fabric and the whole

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[890] As noted previously Anthony Craig in *Crisis of Confidence* and Pádraig Faulkner in *As I Saw It* suggest that Lynch knew nothing of the plot to import arms. Thomas Hennessy in *The Origins of the Troubles* and Captain Kelly in *Thimble Riggers* suggest that the importation of arms came from the Cabinet.

[891] Verbal Briefing for An tAire, 22 April 1970 (NAI Military Intelligence File) as quoted in Hennessy, *Origins of the Troubles*, p.371. This document is available in the Military Archives Dublin and has been viewed by the author.

character of the nation. I want to assure those not merely in this part of the country but in the Six Counties of the north as well, that people need not be unduly concerned'.[892] By this time both Neil Blaney and Charles Haughey had been dismissed by Lynch after refusing to resign. Kevin Boland resigned in protest. Haughey, Blaney, Capt. Kelly, the Northern Republican John Kelly (no relation of Capt. Kelly) and Luykx were accused of conspiring to import arms. The Minister for Defence Jim Gibbons was the chief prosecution witness and believed that Blaney was in charge of running the operation. Gibbons had concerns in relation to Capt. Kelly but allowed him to continue in his position as an intelligence officer. In his evidence at the Arms trials he remarked that he believed the best way to remove Kelly from the situation was, with the assistance of Charles Haughey, to discreetly change his role to a smuggling prevention officer. It was suggested during the trial that because of this, Capt. Kelly may have believed that Gibbons was authorising his actions. In his evidence at the trial, Gibbons remarked

> No... I gave no such authorisation. My intention was that Captain Kelly would leave the army without the sense of being kicked out of the army or being got rid of after the service he had rendered in the North. Because of his particular position as an intelligence officer he had access to a great deal of confidential information, which, if he left the army with any sense of grievance, of being got rid of, I felt could be improperly used to the detriment of the state.[893]

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[892] Dáil Debates 246 (732-733) 8 May 1970; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0246/D.0246.197005080005.html; last accessed 01/08/12.
[893] O'Brien, *Arms Trial*, p.192.

All of the accused were cleared of the charges levelled against them. The final report of the Committee of Public Accounts, who met to inquire into the misappropriation of the relief fund, concluded that

> Captain Kelly was the only witness to admit any connection with the use of this money for the attempted purchase of arms or the financing of "The Voice of the North". He endeavoured to justify his actions in relation to this money, appearing to claim authority for them from his superiors viz., Colonel Hefferon and the then Minister for Defence, Deputy Gibbons. He also claimed to be acting as liaison officer with people in Northern Ireland to a Northern Ireland Committee of the Government or to the only two members of it whom he met, viz., the then Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries, Deputy Neil T. Blaney, and the then Minister for Finance, Deputy Charles J. Haughey. Because of his manner of giving evidence a disproportionate share of the Committee's time was absorbed in trying to establish the nature and possible justification of these claims. The making of these claims by Captain Kelly necessitated the calling of Colonel Hefferon and the three Deputies in question. Before considering in turn his relations with these people it must be made clear that none of them had, or claimed to have had, any authority to authorise withdrawals from Baggot Street, however much Captain Kelly may have imagined otherwise.[894]

Col. Hefferon was also discussed in the final report

[894]Committee of Public Accounts Final Report – Northern Ireland Relief Expenditure 1972; available from http://193.178.2.84/test/R/1972/REPORT_13071972_0.html; last accessed 01/08/12.

> Colonel Hefferon's evidence on his knowledge of this fund and of Captain Kelly's connection with it was unsatisfactory. But while Colonel Hefferon would appear from part of his evidence to have had knowledge of Captain Kelly's use of money from the fund to finance arms purchase, and while Captain Kelly stated in general terms that he was authorised by the Director of Intelligence in this matter, no evidence was presented to the Committee even by Captain Kelly himself, that this operation was initiated on Colonel Hefferon's authority or orders, nor, in the view of the Committee, did his detailed account of his communications with Colonel Hefferon justify his statement that he was authorised by Colonel Hefferon in this matter. Moreover, it may be noted that Colonel Hefferon in Court has said that Captain Kelly had told him that in "bringing in" arms he was acting with the knowledge and approval of two Government Ministers, the then Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries, Deputy Neil T. Blaney, and the then Minister for Finance, Deputy Charles J. Haughey, and that he (Colonel Hefferon) was not giving him any orders in relation to this course of conduct.[895]

O'Halpin concluded that the 'arms scheme was an indictment not only of the competence of its authors but of their political judgement. By the time that the scheme was hatched in October 1969, circumstances in Northern Ireland had changed dramatically'.[896] It was claimed in April 2001, as a result of an RTÉ Primetime investigation that the statement made at the trial by Col. Hefferon in relation to the Arms Crisis was altered, resulting in the

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[895] Committee of Public Accounts Final Report – Northern Ireland Relief Expenditure 1972; available from http://193.178.2.84/test/R/1972/REPORT_13071972_0.html; last accessed 01/08/12.
[896] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.309.

deletion of a large number of references made regarding Jim Gibbons.[897] Journalists went as far to say that in light of this new evidence

> Captain James Kelly was grievously wronged in the Arms Trial of October 1970. He was a servant of the State who acted in the interests of the States and under orders from his superior officer, Colonel Michael Hefferon, and his political boss, the Minister for Defence Jim Gibbons... And he [Kelly] deserves generous reparation. It should be given with a handsome apology, together with an admission of a quite extraordinary tampering of evidence.[898]

Until the time of his death, Capt. Kelly asserted that the Arms Trial was defined by collusion to cover up Government involvement in the procurement of arms.

Since the foundation of the State, successive governments had sought to "keep the gun out of politics". The Arms crisis succeeded in doing exactly the opposite and thrust the spotlight again on the perceived need to control the Defence Forces. There is no evidence of support in the Defence Forces for the actions of Capt. Kelly and it may well be that any support was confined to a very small minority. It also served to highlight the necessity for a clear and unambiguous chain of command in the military system and the dangers when any of the links in that chain are tampered with. Col. Hefferon stated that he did not authorise the actions of Capt. Kelly but he was the Director of Intelligence and should have been acutely aware of the actions of one of his subordinates. A captain is a junior officer in the Defence Forces and there are six more senior ranks than this with hundreds of officers in those

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[897] *Irish Independent,* 15 April 2001.
[898] *Irish Independent,* 14 April 2001.

ranks. At this remove, it is difficult understand the apparent freedom of action afforded to Capt. Kelly.

It is evident from the verbal briefing given to the Chief of Staff that senior officers did not approve of Capt. Kelly's actions:

> The purchase of arms in this fashion has grave implications for the military and State Security. Weapons should be purchased only for the forces of the State and NOT for illegal underground groups... The giving of arms to untrained people is a most serious matter. John Hume expressed the view that such action would be "suicide"... If illegal groups get arms in this fashion they are as likely to use them against our forces as they are against the British and so we are jeopardising our forces' safety... Kelly's own activities give cause for disquiet. He has been operating openly as a G 2 (Int) Officer and is well known on both sides of the border as such. He has made no apparent effort to conceal his identity. This is utterly irresponsible and must seriously compromise the activities of the Intelligence Section... His open consorting with illegal groups is also a serious Security matter, particularly as he is well informed on all activities and connections of the Intelligence Service here... It must be accepted that British Intelligence, now operating in a big way in Northern Ireland, will get on to it. They have their international links with European Security Agencies and CIA so the likelihood of this activity going undetected is small. As well as the

> Intelligence implication, there is the political reaction of the British Government to be considered...[899]

The corollary of keeping the "gun out of politics" is that politics must also be kept away from guns. This may well be the real legacy of this issue for the Defence Forces, in particular that its loyalties are to the State and the Constitution rather than to individuals or political parties. This was echoed by Patrick Cooney T.D. of Fine Gael in the Dáil in 1971 when he remarked that

> The Minister should have reassured us also that the intelligence corps of the Army was not going to be anybody's private army, that the members of the corps would be subject to the normal disciplines of an Army officer and that a very definite chain of command and procedure of reporting would be established in order to ensure that some of the things we know took place within that corps in the last year would never take place again. The consequences that could have arisen at the time these things were taking place are too terrible to contemplate. These checks and safeguards could be implemented without in any way diminishing the efficiency of that corps. Quite obviously liaison with other intelligence sources within the State will have to be looked into and improved.[900]

A salutary lesson for the Defence Forces on its place in the political order could be gained from the continuing level of interest in defence matters. Patrick Malone, a Fine Gael TD for Kildare, remarked on the debate in the Dáil on the Defence Estimates in 1971, i.e. the

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[899] Verbal Briefing for An Ceann Foirne, 23 April 1970 (NAI Military Intelligence File) as quoted in Hennessy, Origins of the Troubles, pp 371-372. This document is available in the Military Archives Dublin and has been viewed by the author.

[900] Dáil Debates, 251 (238-239) 28 January 1971; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0251/D.0251.197101280005.html; last accessed 01/08/12.

annual financial provision for defence, that 'I do not know whether this is something to be proud of, but I cannot imagine that at present in any State in Europe, if not in the world, a debate on such an important estimate as the Estimate for the Department of Defence would muster such a small attendance of Members'.[901] This debate was occurring at the height of the troubles in Northern Ireland and immediately following the Arms Crisis and there was still no evidence of the emergence of any increased interest in the Defence Forces. This was evident through the lack of a cogent defence policy despite the internal threat to the security of the State. This was also witnessed through the lack of increased expenditure on defence throughout this period. The United States Control and Disarmament Agency placed Irish defence spending at 1.35 per cent of GNP in 1965 and 1.36 per cent in 1974. While the latter may be considered an increase from 1.06 per cent in 1969, this increase is not significant when considering the extra personnel recruited. The Control and Disarmament Agency figures were an estimate and while they do not replicate exactly the figures furnished by the Irish Defence Forces they are representative of the trend.[902]

The Government's Attitude to the Defence Forces

The 1990 Report of the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence Forces, the Gleeson Report, commented that 'it has been observed before that armies in democracies tend, by turn, to be ignored or, at best, taken for granted and then trustingly looked to on the occasion of a variety of civil or military

[901] Dáil Debates, 251 (408) 02 February 1971; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0251/D.0251.197102020045.html; last accessed 01/08/12.
[902] United States Control and Disarmament Agency: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1965-1974, p.33 ; available from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185671.pdf; last accessed 13/10/13.

emergencies'. [903] This description succinctly captures the reaction to the Defence Forces in the immediate aftermath of the crisis in Northern Ireland. Not everyone agreed with this approach. In the debate on the Defence Vote in Dáil Éireann on 25 February 1970, Mark Clinton T.D. of Fine Gael argued for the necessity to change the approach to the Defence Forces by stating that 'it is also fair to say that one finds a fairly widespread attitude and something should be done about this – that money spent on defence is money down the drain'.[904] Clinton continued on 19 March 1970 by stating

> The impression one gets listening to the deputies speaking in the House is that there is nothing wrong and that the Army just sails along in the same old way as always. My honest view is that there is no policy on Defence in this country, that there is considerable political apathy on this question and that, outside the Army itself, there is very little thought or knowledge about it. That is all wrong. There should be considerable concern about the Army.[905]

At the earlier debate in February 1970, Liam Cosgrave, then leader of Fine Gael, commented that it would be likely that defence expenditure would have to increase. He continued that 'since the war we have acted on the illusory assumption that a peacetime defence force as laid down would be sufficient but in fact this has never

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[903] The Report of the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence Forces, the Gleeson Report (hereafter *Gleeson Report*) 31 July 1990, p.13.
[904] Dáil Debates, 244 (1685) 25 February 1970; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0244/D.0244.197002250047.html; last accessed 01/08/12.
[905] Dáil Debates, 245 (717) 19 March 1970; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0245/D.0245.197003190008.html; last accessed 01/08/12.

been reached... conditions have changed and the old time attitudes on Army personnel and pay are outmoded'.[906]

This type of discussion was unusual. The Army was never considered an essential component of the Irish state, other than for ceremonial and symbolic roles and as a bulwark against internal subversion. This was so in spite of leading politicians, such as Cosgrave and Haughey, having military experience. The low priority given to defence was reflected not only in the declining expenditure but the general lack of interest on the civil side. One of the more entertaining proposals of solving the "defence problem" came from Dr. Byrne of Fine Gael who considered that as the Army were sent out to complete civilian courses, some of the civilian administrators should be sent out on Army courses to foster 'greater cooperation and understanding'.[907] While humorous, it is evidence of an acute awareness of the civil/military issues in the defence organisation. The lack of a proper debate on defence at a time when there was a significant security threat to the state is remarkable at this remove. This left a lot of issues untended; the festering of which was revealed in the Gleeson Report. The Defence Forces significant contribution to the security of the State despite the lack of policy is all the more remarkable. This policy vacuum was to continue until February 2000 with the publication of the White Paper on Defence, some thirty years after the outbreak of the troubles in Northern Ireland and almost eighty years after independence.

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[906] Dáil Debates, 244 (1700) 25 February 1970; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0244/D.0244.197002250047.html; last accessed 01/08/12.
[907] Dáil Debates,245 (816) 19 March 1970; available from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0245/D.0245.197003190008.html; last accessed 01/08/12.

Conclusion

The outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland not only irreversibly changed the political landscape; it influenced the course which the Defence Forces would take throughout the 1970s. O'Halpin remarked that the development of the Defence Forces in the 1970s must be examined in the shadow of the Northern crisis.[908] While there is still debate whether the Government ever had any intention of sending the Army into Northern Ireland, the Defence Forces were, however informally, preparing plans for all eventualities.[909] The readiness of the organisation at that time, including strength levels and equipment, meant that conventional military operations were not possible. The Northern crisis provided the impetus for the internal examination of all aspects of the organisation and many deficiencies were highlighted. They concluded that that if there were ever to be capable of an incursion into the North, there was a necessity to change the very ethos of the organisation from defensive in nature to offensive. These are at the opposite ends of the military spectrum.

The organisation had long realised the need to modernise and the need to bring strength up to establishment levels, i.e. the levels that plans are based on. These levels were never reached, due in large part to the controls imposed by the civil side on strength levels and the associated budget provision in the Defence Estimates. The military campaign during this period included the management of refugee camps, border duties and, perhaps most importantly, the daily aid to the civil power operations in support of the Garda Síochána

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[908] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.339.

[909] Eunan O'Halpin remarks in "A Greek Authoritarian Phase?" that the outcome of the Arms trial 'rendered the analysis of events in Ireland in 1969-70, and what was and what was not Irish government policy on a highly charged and confusing period, particularly problematic for scholars' in O'Halpin, *Greek Authoritarian Phase?,* p.476.

throughout the country. Aid to the civil power overstretched the already pressurised Defence Forces and was not without its inherent complications, in particular the assumption of responsibility for non-military functions. Many of these, such as escorting cash in transit, together with vast overseas experience have helped to shape the modern Defence Forces. The crisis in Northern Ireland also had a profound influence on other operations involving the Defence Forces. In the immediate aftermath of the Dublin/Monaghan bombings, the Irish contingent deployed in the United Nations Emergency Force in the Sinai (UNEF II) was repatriated on the direction of the Irish Government. The absence of an Irish contingent in a UN mission from 1974 to 1978 served to further dilute the operational experience of the Defence Forces at that time and to confine that experience to security related operations within the state.

The crisis in Northern Ireland had an effect on the strength levels of the Defence Forces, which were substantially increased in the 1970s. However, it had only a minimal effect on the overall consideration of defence policy despite the change in the nature of the threat to the State. Notwithstanding this, the outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland had a profound impact on the evolution of the Defence Forces. It placed the military in an operational situation it was unused to and ill-equipped for, and propelled the organisation into transformation. It was a catalyst for change in their training methods and influenced all other operations. It helped to break down the "barrack wall" mentality and the Defence Forces were visible to the people of Ireland on a daily basis. The break in service with the UN stunted growth in that area but challenges in dealing with terrorism led to the development of other capabilities. It provided the impetus to become world experts in areas

such as bomb disposal, which was not only of benefit for operations in Ireland but would also have international relevance.

There was a marked shift in the organisation as a result of the Northern crisis. Through the use of Cox's method of critical theory to examine how the prevailing system developed it is evident that the seeds of this were sown by involvement in UN operations during the previous decade but were now significantly advanced. In this and earlier chapters, examples of the high proportion of the Defence Forces being utilised to simply keep the organisation going were provided. This was used as an excuse during the initial debate on UN deployment and during the outbreak of the Northern crisis. With daily operations, this attitude had to change. To refer to Cox's framework, the revived aid to the civil power role resulted not only a change in material capability, as there was a surge in recruitment, but also in terms of what he referred to as 'ideas'. National culture was shifting throughout this period. Prior to the Northern crisis many politicians, notably De Valera, campaigned for the romantic ideal of a 'United Ireland' and it was one of the cornerstones of the Fianna Fáil's agenda. Irish citizens were not impervious to this, nor were members of the Defence Forces. However, it became abundantly clear that the majority of people in the South would prefer the Northern crisis to stay up North and the idealistic notion of reunification soon came with a caveat – reunification but only by peaceful means. National culture had often attached great importance to the idea of a 'United Ireland', however, after a few heady days in August 1969 there was no great public desire to send the Irish Army over the border. On the contrary, as the violence increased in Northern Ireland from 1970 onwards and occasionally spilt over the border, there was overwhelming electoral and other evidence that the Irish public valued security far above territorial aggrandisement. The public reaction to the Arms

Trial was testament to this, notwithstanding later revelations in relation to the evidence given at the trial. The Defence Forces were reminded of the enduring necessity to keep the "gun out of politics" and to concentrate on their emerging roles. This included aid to the civil power, a role that has helped transform the organisation.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The origins of the Defence Forces lie with the foundation of the Irish Volunteers, Óglaigh na hÉireann, in the Rotunda Rink in Dublin in November 1913. The first forty years of its existence were marked by the achievement of independence, a divisive Civil War, a Mutiny, mobilisation during the Emergency, and demobilisation of the Forces in the post Emergency period. However, the period under review from 1956 to 1978 may well be regarded as having most influence on the Defence Forces that exists today. This is not because of its proximity to today from a time perspective; rather it is because of what transpired during that period. The previous chapters have examined the seminal events that occurred during the period under review and the influence of these on the evolution of the Defence Forces.

In the introduction, the concept of military change and evolutions were discussed. Both Michael Roberts' concept of the Military Revolution and the Revolution in Military Affairs were examined. However, it was considered that neither of these approaches was compelling in the Irish context. Criticisms of these approaches, placing emphasis on institutional characteristics and military organisation, were more convincing.

The cultural adaptation theory, as espoused by Theo Farrell, was examined in the literature review and was primarily focused on the choice of the post-Independence Army to convert to conventional warfare norms when the successful dominant norm at the time was guerrilla warfare. The use of conventional warfare norms was tested again in the lead up to the Second World War/ Emergency period. As Farrell remarked, strategically, the Irish

military leadership should have fallen back on their military heritage of guerrilla warfare rather than stick with the well entrenched norms of conventional warfare.[910] However, what became apparent during the Emergency period is that while the Defence Forces had ostensibly prepared for conventional war, they were neither prepared nor equipped to put that into practice. This thesis posits that in the post-Emergency period there was a further evolutionary shift from conventional warfare to a constabulary force.

A Coxian approach was used in this thesis in combination with a detailed narrative of the modern history of the Defence Forces. Cox's theory informed this thesis by being historically grounded in critical theory, using empirical sources to question how the prevailing system developed. With regard to the Defence Forces, applying critical theory involved examining how the prevailing system of the modern Defence Forces developed from the historically stagnated post-Emergency force. Coxian historicism enabled the central research question to be examined by identifying three, to use Cox's term, major parts – civil-military relations, UN membership and the revived aid to the civil power operations. Through the examination of these three major 'parts', analysing both their origins and how they changed throughout the specific era, a construction of a larger picture of the 'whole' emerged.

Cox advanced the argument that there are three categories of forces that interact in a structure; material capabilities, ideas and institutions. It is evident through the examination of material capabilities that significant changes were witnessed in the period under review, especially evidenced in UN missions overseas. However, these capabilities were not translated in an operational setting at home. It is also evident that there was a desire amongst middle ranking officers to examine and improve organisational capability as

[910] Theo Farrell, 'World Culture and Military Power' in *Security Studies*, xiv, vol. 3 (2005), p. 466.

opposed to the higher echelons in the organisation. Ideas, the second of Cox's 'forces', also influenced the evolution of the Defence Forces, especially in the realm of civil-military relations. The 'clash of collective images' is evidenced in both the Devlin and Glesson reports. Institutions, the final of Cox's forces, 'reflect the power relations prevailing at their point of origin'. This is evidenced in the history of the Defence Forces. The organisation reflected the power relations of the nascent state. However, as Cox remarked, institutions take on their own life. The Defence Forces was able to achieve this through outside forces, such as UN operations and the revived aid to the civil power role. The 'opposing tendencies' between the military and the civil side are well documented throughout this thesis.

The central research question posed in this thesis was to examine how the Defence Forces was able to evolve from the post-Emergency stagnated organisation to the one it is today. Coxian historicism is grounded in critical theory, which is directly related to the central research question, and provided a coherent framework for this thesis.

The defence organisation came into this period under the influence of the legacy of the Emergency. It is considered here that the Emergency exposed a lack of both defence planning and the ability to defend the State independently. The annual *General Report on the Defence Forces* provides a clear picture of the organisation throughout the Emergency period and its immediate aftermath. The references in relation to the standards and morale of serving personnel are indicative of the condition of the Army during that period. An example from the 1943-1944 report in relation to the falling standards of Non-Commissioned Officers is illustrative. The report remarks that

> The causes for this regrettable fact are not hard to find, and they present a problem for which there is no effective solution. All the factors which were responsible for the continually decreasing rate of recruiting, also react on serving troops. Public apathy, boredom, and the comparatively low rate of their remuneration are bound to affect soldiers with a sense that they are wasting their time in the Army.[911]

Morale was affected by many factors but most telling is that by 1944, without the realistic threat of war, it was difficult to continue to find effective stimuli to maintain the interest of the troops. It was also considered that

> Most of the troops have now been serving for four years which a long period of waiting when accompanied, as it has been, by all the discomforts of arduous training, the irksome share of unavoidable guard duties, cattle buying and turf cutting, together with the inevitable irritations caused by military discipline. If the troops could feel that their efforts were really appreciated by the country as a whole, it would greatly ease their problem... During most of the past year, however, the general atmosphere must have tended to make many of the troops feel that they were wasting their time, that there was no longer any real danger of invasion and their sacrifice was unnecessary and unappreciated by the people as a whole.[912]

By the end of the Emergency period the opinion of the military leadership was that there would continue to be a decline in recruitment levels and without some sort of compulsory military service 'there was no possible method by which this trend could be reversed or even checked'. It was considered that 'there appears to be little doubt that Army service is

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[911] General Report on the Defence Forces for the year 1 April 1943- 31 March 1944 (MA).
[912] *General Report 1943-1944*, p.58 (MA).

not favourably regarded by the present generation of young men and unless economic conditions alter very considerably in coming years so as to make an Army career relatively attractive compared with other types of employment, the country will be faced with a very serious position'. [913]

The Government did not share the concerns of the Defence Forces. As O'Halpin remarked that 'far from reviewing future defence policy in light of the state's uncomfortable experience during the Emergency, of wider strategic considerations such as Atlantic security which had proved so crucial, of the unexpected armed threat which the IRA had presented, and of the likely shape of the post-war world, they simply reached for the financial axe'.[914] This framed the organisation that existed at the beginning of the period under review in 1956. Three seminal issues had a profound influence on the evolution of the military in this period and conclusions from each of these areas will be drawn before discussing an overall conclusion for this period.

Civil-Military Relations

From the research undertaken, it is considered that civil control over the military in Ireland is primarily based on the medium of finance. It is evident that from the foundation of the State, the Government sought to subjugate the Defence Forces, devising structures to keep the nascent Army transparent and under civil control. Defence was never really considered a priority of the Government as evidenced by the steadily declining defence budget and the lack of a concise defence policy. This is apparent even when external or internal threats to the security of the state emerged.

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[913] General Report on the Defence Forces for the year 1 April 1944- 31 March 1945 (MA).
[914] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.258.

A palpable example of this was the lead up to the Second World War/Emergency period. It may have been reasonable in 1930 to discuss in the Dáil the necessity of having an army. However by 1939, when the threat of the outbreak of war was inevitable, defence policy was still as ambiguous as it would have been in peacetime. The Government only entertained the idea of external defence because they could no longer avoid it as the international climate had forced it upon them. Another example of the lack of priority of defence in Government was the Northern crisis in 1969. Again defence policy was confused and almost non-existent. There had been no serious military studies conducted on the situation in Northern Ireland since the 1920s and the deployment of troops to the border was considered an embarrassment and a failure.

One of the overriding impressions from the examination of the civil-military relationship is that it was based on restriction rather than enabling and there was no evidence of the promotion of innovation or transformation by the civil side. Because of this, it is surprising that in the 1960s the initiative existed to undertake four major studies by the Defence Forces. These reports suggest that this was a period of self-reflection for the organisation and it highlights that middle ranking Defence Forces personnel were able to critically assess the organisation as a whole and, from this, determine the best course of action to resolve any problematic elements. However, there is no evidence that these either went to Government or that senior Army management followed up on or sought to push these recommendations through. Instead, the issues raised would be a continued source of tension and remained in evidence to the time of the Gleeson Report in 1990. Rather than resolving issues, the priority appears to have been the retention of civil control of the military by the Departments of Finance and Defence. It is reasonable to conclude that the

reason the organisation continued to exist, despite the lack of meaningful investment in terms of policy guidance or finance, was because it was considered a necessary appendage to the nascent state as a mark of sovereignty and independence.

The civil-military relationship greatly influenced the evolution of the Defence Forces. The military was moulded into the organisation the civil side wished it to be. It is evident that neither the civil service nor the Government wanted to have an overly militaristic force. Generally, the Defence Forces were not used as an instrument of power and while there was some controversy regarding senior Army appointments in 1977 when the Coalition Government left office, this could hardly be viewed as an attempt by Cosgrave to usurp the power of the Army he was handing over to the next government. The people of Ireland also became comfortable with the compliant nature of the Army. They viewed it through its ceremonial role, witnessed through the many events that occurred in the 1960s, or its participation in UN missions. The latter did not generally impact on the general population with the noted exception of the Niemba massacre and the subsequent funerals. This attitude persisted even to the emerging Northern crisis in the late 1960s when there was a real threat to the security of the State. The influence of the civil-military relationship weighed heavily on the evolution of the organisation but new roles provided the impetus for the internal change that greatly challenged the status quo. In the course of research, it emerged that Lt. Gen. Peadar MacMahon a former Chief of Staff of the Army and Secretary General of the Department of Defence played a dominant role in civil-military relations up to the time of his retirement in 1958. His unique contribution is worthy of separate study.

Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions

Participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions had a major influence on the evolution of the Defence Forces. However, the decision to contribute the first contingent on armed peace support operations was subject to much debate. Prior to Irish involvement in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), the Defence Forces participated in both the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) and United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNSTO). The unarmed commissioned officers that were sent to observer missions, though pioneering in nature, could not have the impact that armed unit missions would have on the evolution of the Defence Forces. Notwithstanding this, the high performance of the Irish officers in these missions 'marked Ireland as being eminently suitable for the "peacekeeping club" of reliable, neutral and non-aligned nations'.[915]

Throughout the deployment stage of ONUC, both the Government and the Defence Forces demonstrated surprising ingenuity in the quick deployment to the Congo. However the price of this was a lack of preparedness. It is evident from the research that contingents were ill-trained, ill-equipped and ill-disciplined at times. It made the incidents in both Niemba and Jadotville almost inevitable, as the tools and skills to cope with this type of warfare were not in place. The UN archival material has been additionally insightful in this regard as it offered a contrasting source of information to that of the Defence Forces.

Comdt. Patrick Quinlan, the Officer Commanding in Jadotville, changed the paradigm of action in a hostile situation in terms of Irish peacekeeping and with the benefit of hindsight he may have greatly contributed to change in the Defence Forces. However, it took his

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[915] Richard Heaslip, 'Ireland's First Engagement in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Assessment' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, xvii (2006), p.41.

colleagues much longer to adapt to this changing paradigm. In the aftermath of the World Wars, heroism and valour had a direct relationship with sacrifice rather than force protection. John Keegan remarked that 'a nation that goes to war must expect deaths among the young men it sends and there was a willingness for sacrifice before and during the Somme that explains, in part at least, its horror'.[916] Those who died in the Niemba massacre were considered 'brave' soldiers and while this status is not questioned here, Quinlan recognised the importance of force protection in Jadotville and only surrendered when he realised that to continue fighting would result in the mass fatalities of his unit. Rose Doyle quotes Quinlan in September 1961: 'it is a pity that we, who never believed in the use of force, must suffer for the blunders of little dictators and stupid military leaders... We did not come here to shoot Africans, we came to help them... I was not prepared to let my brave men die for nothing'.[917] As the incident happened relatively early in the history of Irish peacekeeping, many of those who reacted so vehemently against Quinlan had never served overseas themselves and did not understand the complexities of leadership and decision making required in such missions. However, it should also be considered that the leadership skills required for these missions should already have been in place considering the emphasis on professionalization and officer education. Quinlan's paradigm of force protection has become a dominant norm. The White Paper on Defence 2000 paragraph 6.4.12 states that 'the safety of personnel is of paramount importance at all times'.[918] This is held as doctrine in the organisation today, however this came about at significant personal

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[916] John Keegan, *The First World War* (London, 1999), p.321.
[917] Rose Doyle, *Heroes of Jadotville: The Soldiers Story* (Dublin, 2006), p.vii.
[918] White Paper on Defence 2000; available from http://www.defence.ie/website.nsf/72804bb4760386f380256c610055a16b/93191a155924dad5802570c8005065d3/$FILE/whiteppr.pdf; last accessed 30/08/12.

cost to Quinlan. Quinlan never received recognition for the leadership he displayed and it was not until 2004 that a review of the Siege of Jadotville was ordered by the Government. Irish involvement in peacekeeping missions also exposed them to other national armies, many of whom were NATO standard. This allowed them to not only learn from those armies but to also see the deficiencies in their own organisation. The experience of cooperation with other organisations was greatly influential when the Defence Forces assumed the aid to the civil power role in the aftermath of the Northern crisis. The Defence Forces naturally improved as approximately one thousand soldiers were getting overseas operational experience each year. This was in complete contrast to the inactivity experienced in the post-Emergency era. Overseas missions also offered an operational experience without the inherent challenges of Irish civil-military relations. While Government still decided on participation and the level thereof in any particular mission, once the contingent was deployed control rested with the Defence Forces. Perversely, the challenging civil-military relationship at home may have provided Irish contingents with the skills to deal with the UN bureaucracy. The Irish Defence Forces were highly regarded as effective peacekeepers from the early days of its participation. This was confirmed when Lt. Gen. Sean McKeown was made Force Commander of ONUC from January 1961 until March 1962, when he then returned to Ireland to resume his position as Chief of Staff until March 1971. The research naturally found differences between missions, e.g. ONUC and the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), but it also demonstrated that lessons were being learnt. By the time the contingent was deployed to the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II), a solid base of training and experience had emerged. The paradox of this is that the performance of the organisation that McKeown led in 1969 in the aftermath of the outbreak of violence in the

North was considered embarrassing. However, it should be noted that in the absence of a defined mission statement from the Government or any form of real defence policy, tied in with the lack of finance given to the Defence Forces to equip themselves, it is difficult to envisage how they could have performed any differently. The key evolutionary influence of UN operations is clear: it gave the Defence Forces a new role and purpose and it also enabled it to grow as an organisation. However, this was not without consequences as evidenced in Niemba, Jadotville, and other areas of operation.

This research provides the basis for further study. The Defence Forces deployed with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) immediately after the period under review. This occurred some four years after the withdrawal from UNEF II. The impact of this withdrawal on the capability of the Defence Forces in the early years of the Lebanon experience is worthy of further research.

Aid to the Civil Power Operations

When the Northern crisis began, the Defence Forces had almost a decade of armed overseas operations completed. However, when they assumed aid to the civil power operations in 1969, most of the activities to be undertaken were not regarded as real military work and were perceived as a threat to their main role, that of preparing for war. The research reveals that this new role had a high impact on the evolution of the organisation. The initial deployment of the Army to the Border was considered an embarrassment. The actual strength of the organisation was well below establishment levels and the lack of any long term planning and associated resources meant that the Defence Forces ability to conduct operations was almost non-existent. The research revealed that despite the sharp increase in the threat to the security of the State, budgets

were still not increased adequately. Many aid to the civil power operations were conducted in view of the public and the people of Ireland witnessed the Defence Forces doing day to day tasks rather than in a ceremonial role or rotating overseas.

In many ways it can be argued that aid to the civil power operations complemented their experience with the UN as much for the same skill set was used. For example, doing a patrol that involves the protection of money in Dublin City requires many of the same skills as a patrol in Cyprus. This prepared the Defence Forces for what General Sir Rupert Smith termed 'war amongst the people'.[919] They worked with other agencies such as the Garda Síochána and the Prison Service, an essential capability overseas. The research revealed that overseas units developed an acute understanding of the political circumstances in which they operated; this was also necessary in the conduct of aid to the civil power operations at home. Aid to the civil power also meant that in addition to the thousand or so participating in overseas missions every year, until the repatriation of the unit in the Sinai after the Dublin-Monaghan bombings, a significant element of the Force were conducting operations on a daily basis.

While the expertise developed in aid to the civil power operations were not the norm for most military forces in 1969, the use of military skills in tandem with others are currently being championed by both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The latter's new strategic concept underlines that the lessons learnt from NATO operations

[919] General Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London, 2005), p16.

> show that effective crisis management calls for a comprehensive approach involving political, civilian and military instruments. Military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to Euro- Atlantic and international security... The effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires all actors to contribute in a concentrated effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles as well as their decision making autonomy.[920]

The Defence Forces have participated in a form of a 'Comprehensive Approach' for almost forty five years. While some of the aid to the civil power operations may have been initially taken on begrudgingly, they have increased the skills of the organisation in a host of areas, such as bomb disposal, and propelled further change.

In contrast to overseas operations, the Defence Forces suffered no fatalities in aid to the civil power operations in the period under review. While welcome, it is also remarkable and worthy of further study.

Final Conclusions

In a peacetime democracy the balance in the civil-military relationship will almost always be tipped in favour of the civil element. In wartime this balance shifts. The environment in which the Defence Forces operated in the period under review does not fall neatly within either peace- or wartime. Rather, the operations that the Defence Forces were involved in during this time ensured that the balance of power, while still strongly in favour of the civilians, began to shift towards the military. This was due in large part to the liberation

[920] A "Comprehensive Approach" to Crisis Management; available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm; last accessed 20/08/12.

achieved during overseas operations in which the civil side played no real operational part. The internal security threat also meant that the organisation had a renewed meaningful role at home in the security of the State. The White Paper on Defence, published in 2000, heralded further transformation of the Defence Forces. However, based on this research, the seeds for this transformation were sown in the period under review.

In the discussion of the literature, the work of Theo Farrell was examined and the shift from guerrilla to conventional warfare was examined. However, this thesis considers that the cultural shift did not end there. The advent of peacekeeping meant that the norm of preparing for pure conventional warfare, as espoused at the foundation of the State and continued during and after the Emergency, would no longer be sufficient. The rate of military change was accelerated by the requirement for continuous operations in aid to the civil power. In many ways, this can be equated to the constabulary concept espoused by Morris Janowitz. Janowitz asserted that

> The constabulary concept provides a continuity with past military experiences and traditions, but it also offers a basis for the radical adaptation of the profession. The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture. The constabulary outlook is grounded in, and extends, pragmatic doctrine.[921]

[921] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York, 1971), p.418.

This should not be confused with the views of Patrick Keatinge. When discussing the Irish Defence Forces in the 1980s, he asserted that aid to the civil power was their primary activity, with UN peacekeeping as a secondary, but no less important, role. He remarked that 'all this amounts to an army which is trained, equipped and deployed mainly in a policing role, just as the naval elements are engaged mainly in the policing of commercial fishing. In spite of the many changes in the Defence Forces during the past fifteen years, they remain what they were in the 1960s, a gendarmerie'.[922]

The term "constabulary" used by Janowitz, though confusing because of its association with policing, should not be equated to a gendarmerie. Ray Murphy believes that 'the term "constabulary" was probably an unfortunate choice of word as it conjures up an image of the unarmed British "bobby" keeping the peace along his beat'.[923] It refers to a force that has a defensive posture against external aggression but is continually prepared to act and is grounded in reality. John Jackson put forth the argument that the Defence Forces clearly demonstrated the development of the constabulary concept in 1967. This thesis argues that events after 1967 not only further cement this but are the real catalyst. Without the enduring aid to the civil power and overseas operations, the Defence Forces could not be properly regarded as a constabulary force.

The organisation evolved from one being concerned with purely defending the state from a conventional attack, to one concerned with active participation in operations both at home and overseas. The nature of operations continued to evolve during this period to the hybrid

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[922] Patrick Keatinge, *A Singular Stance: Irish Neutrality in the 1980s* (Dublin, 1984), p.69.
[923] Ray Murphy, 'Ireland, the United Nations and peacekeeping operations' in *International Peacekeeping*, v, no.1 (Spring 1998), p.44. Also quoted in Jean Callaghan & Mathias Schonborn (Eds) *Warriors in Peacekeeping: Points of tension in complex cultural encounters A comparative study based on experiences in Bosnia* (New Jersey, 2004), p.132.

form that is in place today, necessitating a comprehensive approach. The period under review heralded a profound change in the Defence Forces. In many ways it was born out of circumstances, overseas and aid to the civil power operations. Without these circumstances it is difficult to see how the organisation could have conceivably evolved in the manner in which it has.

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