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Discourses about '*foreigners*' in contemporary Austria

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
to the Department of Sociology,
University of Dublin (Trinity College)

March 2005

Petra Irene Aigner

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

Petra I. Aigner

March 2005

Summary

A number of events, such as the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the opening up of Eastern Europe, the Yugoslavian crisis in the 1990s and the Austrian membership of the European Union since 1995 have contributed to an increase in the numbers of immigrants entering Austria. These events have led to an upsurge in debates about immigration and immigrants in contemporary Austria at national macro as well as regional microstructures of society, including the political elites as well as the regional actors of the everyday. Differing discourses range from exclusionary expressions and the rejection of foreigners, to welcoming articulations such as the appreciation of cultural diversity. Specifically, the diverse Austrian political players, namely the contemporary governmental alliance parties, 'Österreichische Volkspartei' (ÖVP - People's Party) and 'Freiheitliche Partei Österreich' (FPÖ - Freedom Party) and as well the opposition parties, namely 'Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich' (SPÖ - Social Democratic Party) and the Green Party, portray predominantly dissimilar, but also corresponding opinions about immigration and immigration policies. In this respect, depending on the political party, their political orientational tradition and the party's contemporary position in parliament, a pro immigration approach is partly supported by the perception of foreigners as useful tools within the labour market, as well as by multiculturalist and welcoming articulations about immigration and foreigners. Correspondingly, exclusionary anti immigration approaches range from immigration being an economic and cultural threat to Austrian society to putting a stop on immigration and rejecting migrants. On the basis of each party having differing political approaches towards immigration, their exercised type of leadership can be identified. In this respect, from a theoretical point of view, Max Weber's three pure types of legitimate domination - the legal-rational, the traditional and the charismatic type - arguably appear to occur, either in their pure form or in mixed forms. Thus, actors of the unofficial everyday sphere might on the one hand partly reduplicate opinions portrayed at the national macro levels of society or on the contrary, might partly form their independent perceptions about immigration depending on their socio demographic background. Subsequently, on a theoretical basis the identified types of leadership type and domination might be either legitimated by the actors of the everyday or, if dependent on other socio demographic factors other than political support, be partially or not at all legitimated.

However, it appears that the types of political domination in contemporary Austria might largely be legitimated by the regional actors of the everyday owing to two specific Austrian features firstly, the '*Proporzsystem*' and secondly the concept of '*Lagermentality*'. The first describes the proportional placement of party political actors into segments and subunits of the Austrian society, proportionally divided by each party's election success. The latter expresses the traditional political orientational support of specific subunits of society for particular political parties. These two features are interdependent.

Based on the above, the thesis aims firstly to identify the discourses portrayed by the four main Austrian political players in relation to migration. Secondly it investigates the discourses exhibited by the regional everyday actors in Upper Austria, specifically analysing the role of the socio demographic background characteristics of the respective supporters in their choice of discourses. An explicit focus will be the analysis of the opinions of the regional respondents divided by their political support. Subsequently, the correspondence or dissimilarities between the discourses demonstrated by the political elites and the participants of the case study will be investigated. In this respect, the project will theoretically situate, apply and develop, as well as practically test and analyse Max Weber's theories of domination and legitimacy. Based on those theoretical arguments, a fourth ideal typical domination and legitimacy type was developed and introduced. The Weberian leadership types will be specifically applied to the Austrian political parties. Consequently, on the basis of the discourses exhibited, to what extent everyday actors might or might not legitimate possible forms of domination and leadership will be discussed. The field research consisted of qualitative research. First, the qualitative analysis of political manifestos and parliamentary debates in order to identify the discourses about migrants demonstrated in the political sphere. Second, a case study consisting of 37 qualitative semi structured interviews was conducted to investigate the articulations of the regional everyday actors. The interviewees were divided by their socio demographic background, including age, gender, class (socio-economic background), rural/urban background, educational background and by their political support. A supplementary quantitative analysis of the material was carried out. The field research was carried out in Upper Austria between September 2001 and May 2002.

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my Mom.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: An Introduction
Contemporary Austria and the public and private debates about immigration 1

Chapter 2: Austrian political players and Max Weber
1. Immigration to Austria - a brief introduction 16
2. 'Lagermentality' and 'Proporzsystem' 22
3. Dependencies of political elites and the everyday- a general background 27
4. Max Weber 32
5. A fourth ideal-typical leadership type- utopia and dystopia 41
6. Austrian political parties and different types of domination 52
6.1 Social Democratic Party- SPÖ 56
6.2 Political orientation of the SPÖ and Austro-Marxism 58
6.3 The People's Party (ÖVP) 64
6.4 Political orientation of the ÖVP 66
6.5 The Freedom Party (FPÖ) 68
6.6 Political orientation of the FPÖ 70
6.7 The Green Party 71
7.0 Summary 73

Chapter 3: Methodology
1. Introduction 75
2 Applied research methods and the formation of codes 77
3 The coding process and appendices 78
4 The national political discourses - the macro sphere data 82
4. 1 Specific coding characteristics regarding the parliamentary debates and political manifestos.. 83
5 The unofficial everyday discourses - the micro sphere 86
5.1 Semi structured qualitative interviews 86
5.2 Sampling method 87
5.3 The role of the researcher 90
5.4 Conducting the interviews - the reliability and validity of the data 91
5.5 Analysis of the data and specific characteristics of the coding process for the interview data 93
5.6 Presentation of codes 94
5.7 The socio demographic background of the interviewees 97

Chapter 4: An investigation of the discourses expressed by political elites about '*Ausländer*' in Austria
1. Introduction 101
2. The discourses of the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) 103
2.1 General 103
2.2 Thematic group 'definitions and associations' 103
2.3 Thematic group 'immigration, labour market, welfare system' 104
2.4 Thematic group 'culture' 107
2.5 Thematic group 'integration' 108
2.6 Thematic group 'religion' 110
2.7 Thematic group 'identity' 111
2.8 Contradictory elements 112
2.9 Summary 112
2.10 Continuity and change 112

3.0 The discourses of the People's Party (ÖVP) 113
3.1 General 113
3.2 Thematic group 'definitions and associations' 114
3.3 Thematic group 'immigration, labour market, welfare/social system' 114
3.4 Thematic group 'culture' 116
3.5 Thematic group 'integration' 117
3.6 Thematic group 'religion' 119
3.7 Thematic group 'identity' 120
3.8 Summary 120
3.9 Continuity and change 121
4.0 The discourses of the Freedom Party (FPÖ) 121
4.1 General 121
4.2 Thematic group 'definitions and associations' 121
4.3 Thematic group 'immigration, labour market, welfare system' 121
4.4 Thematic group 'culture' 124
4.5 Thematic group 'religion' 125
4.6 Thematic group 'integration' 126
4.7 Thematic group 'identity' 127
4.8 Summary 127
4.9 Continuity and change 127
5.0 The discourses of the Green Party 128
5.1 General 128
5.2 Thematic group 'definitions and associations' 128
5.3 Thematic group 'immigration, labour market, welfare system' 128
5.4 Thematic group 'culture' 129
5.5 Thematic group 'integration' 130
5.6 Thematic group 'religion' 130
5.7 Thematic group 'identity' 131
5.8 Continuity and change 131
6. Summary of all parties and their leadership types 131
7. Comparison of features of leadership types 132
8. Situating overlapping discourses- the left-right spectrum 136
9. Summary 145
10. Additional analysis of an excerpt from a parliamentary debate 146
11. Recommendations and future research 148

Chapter 5: Case study of regional everyday discourses in contemporary Upper Austria
1. Introduction 151
2. Usage of codes categorised by political support groups 152
3. Usage of codes categorised by gender 153
4. Usage of codes categorised by age 153
5. Usage of codes categorised by rural/urban background 155
6. Usage of codes categorised by professional background 156
7. Usage of codes categorised by educational background 158
8. Thematic groups and usage of codes 160
8.1 Thematic group 'immigration, labour market and welfare system 161
8.1.1 A codes in this thematic group 162
8.1.2 B codes in this thematic group 164
8.1.3 C codes in this thematic group 166
8.2 Thematic group 'culture and integration' 168
8.2.1 A codes in this thematic group 169
8.2.2 B codes in this thematic group 170
8.2.3 C codes in this thematic group 171
8.3 Thematic group 'religion' 173
8.3.1 A codes in this thematic group 173
8.3.2 B codes in this thematic group 174
8.3.3 C codes in this thematic group 174
8.4 Thematic group 'identity' 174
8.4.1 A codes in this thematic group 175
8.4.2 B codes in this thematic group 175
8.4.3 C codes in this thematic group 175
8.5 Thematic group 'definitions and associations' 175

8.6 Thematic group 'personal experiences' 177
9 Summary 177

Chapter 6: A comparative analysis between the regional everyday and the political elite discourses
1. Introduction 180
2. The Spö regional support group 181
2.1 Thematic group 'immigration, labour market and welfare system' 181
2.1.1 Immigration 181
2.1.2 Labour market 183
2.1.3 Welfare system 184
2.1.4 'Rights-based' approach 186
2.2 Thematic group 'culture ' 187
2.3 Thematic group 'integration' 188
2.4 Thematic group 'religion' 190
2.5 Thematic group 'identity' 192
2.6 Thematic group 'associations and definitions' 193
2.7 Summary 194
2.8 In depth interview analysis 196
3.0 The ÖVP regional support group 197
3.1 Thematic group 'immigration, labour market and welfare system' 197
3.1.1 Immigration 198
3.1.2 Labour market 199
3.1.3 Welfare system 200
3.1.4 'Help' approach 201
3.2 Thematic group 'culture ' 201
3.3 Thematic group 'integration' 202
3.4 Thematic group 'religion' 205
3.5 Thematic group 'identity' 206
3.6 Thematic group 'associations and definitions' 208
3.7 Personal experiences 208
3.8 Summary 208
3.9 In depth interview analysis 209
4.0 The FPÖ regional support group 211
4.1 Thematic group 'immigration, labour market and welfare system' 211
4.1.1 Immigration 211
4.1.2 Labour market 213
4.1.3 Welfare system 214
4.2 Thematic group 'culture ' 215
4.3 Thematic group 'integration' 216
4.4 Thematic group 'religion' 219
4.5 Thematic group 'identity' 219
4.6 Thematic group 'associations and definitions' 221
4.7 Personal experiences 221
4.8 Summary 222
4.9 In depth interview analysis 222
5.0 The Green party regional support group 224
5.1 Thematic group 'immigration, labour market and welfare system' 224
5.1.1 Immigration 224
5.1.2 Labour market 225
5.2 Thematic group 'culture ' 225
5.3 Thematic group 'integration' 225
5.4 Thematic group 'religion' 226
5.5 Thematic group 'identity' 226
5.6 Personal experiences 226
5.7 Summary 226
5.8 In depth interview analysis 226
6.0 Comparative analysis of the legitimation of leadership types 228
7.0 Model of legitimation 229
8.0 Conclusion 231

Chapter 7: Conclusion 234

Bibliography 246

Appendices:
Appendix 1 - The Spö Party codes 257
Appendix 2 - The ÖVP Party codes 259
Appendix 3 - The FPÖ Party codes 261
Appendix 4 - The Green Party codes 263
Appendix 5 - Overall codes 265
Appendix 6 - Codes by socio-demographic background 266
Appendix 7 - Codes Spö. Övp and FPÖ by political support group 269
Appendix 8 - Green party support group codes 272
Appendix 9 - Mapping of discourse codes 275
Appendix 10 - Translation of interview with SPÖ supporter 278
Appendix 11 - Translation of interview with ÖVP supporter 280
Appendix 12 - Translation of interview with FPÖ supporter 283
Appendix 13 - Translation of interview with Green Party supporter 285
Appendix 14 - Translation of parliamentary debate 289

List of graphs

Chapter 2

1.1 Numbers of immigrants between 1981 and 2001 according to their country of origin 18
1.2 Numbers of Austrians defined by citizenship versus those migrants without Austrian citizens 19
1.3 Naturalisation figures by province 20
1.4 Interdependence between the three pure types of leadership –utopia and dystopia 49
1.5 Leadership types, their legitimation and their possible form of appearance 51

Chapter 4

4.1 Usage of codes demonstrating the left to right continuum spectrum 102
4.2 Usage of A, B and C codes allocated to the political parties 102
4.3 The comparative usage of leadership type features 133
4.4 Usage of concepts of leadership type features comparative between political parties 134
4.5 Usage of codes visualizing the left to right party spectrum 137
4.6 Usage of codes divided by political parties 137

Chapter 5

5.1 Usage of codes categorised by political support 152
5.2 Usage of codes categorised by gender 153
5.3 Usage of codes categorised by age 154
5.4 Usage of codes categorised by rural/urban background 155
5.5 Usage of codes categorized by professional background 156
5.6 Usage of codes categorised by educational background 159
5.7 Thematic group immigration- usage of codes categorised by political support 161
5.8 Thematic group culture and integration categorised by poltical support 168
5.9 Thematic group identity categorised by political support 175

Chapter 6

6.1 Usage of codes allocated to the political parties support group 180
6.2 Thematic group immigration- Spö support group 182
6.3 Thematic group labour market 184
6.4 Thematic group religion 191
6.5 Thematic group labour market 199
6.6 Thematic group integration 203
6.7 Thematic group religion 205
6.8 Thematic group identity 207
6.9 Thematic group immigration 217
6.10 Thematic group identity 220
6.11 Model of the legitimation of political parties by everyday actors 230

Chapter One: An Introduction

Contemporary Austria and the public and private debates about immigration

> The long-term effects of immigration on society emerge in the fourth stage of the migratory process: permanent settlement. Outcomes can be very different, depending on the actions of the state and population of the receiving society. At one extreme, openness to settlement, granting of citizenship and gradual acceptance of cultural diversity may allow the formation of ethnic communities, which are seen as part of a multicultural society. At the other extreme, denial of the reality of settlement, refusal of citizenship and rights to settlers, and rejection of cultural diversity may lead to the formation of ethnic minorities, whose presence is widely regarded as undesirable and divisive. (Castles and Miller, 1998, p. 29)

Immigration resulting in permanent settlement has had its impacts and implications on Austrian society. In fact, Austria's long-standing history of immigration has been the cause of multiple discussions and debates in different social spheres throughout the recent decades. In short, Austria's immigration history can be divided into three major episodes. Firstly, the Habsburg Empire, which ended in 1918, left its imprint on contemporary Austrian society. During the multiethnic Empire historic ties to Eastern Europe were established. The collapse of the Empire, and the reforming of the First Austrian Republic, led to the existence of Slovenian, Hungarian and Croatian minorities on the southern borders of contemporary Austria. Strictly speaking, however, immigration as well as transit migration from Eastern Europe occurred during the establishment and existence of the Iron Curtain. For example, after the Hungarian uprising in 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968 and the Polish Solidarnosz beginning in 1981, refugees fled the former Communist regimes following these events to seek refuge in Austria (Wischenbart, 1994). Secondly, in the 1960s and 1970s, the 'guest-worker' system influenced immigration flows into Austria. Traditionally, 'guest-workers' were of Yugoslav origin (Wischenbart, 1994), however many 'guest-workers' were of Italian origin, as well as more recently of Turkish origin. Despite being expected to return to their countries of origin, 'guest-workers' regularly continued to stay in Austria, which, in turn, led to family reunification programmes. Those programmes continue to benefit significant numbers of immigrants. Thirdly, events such as the fall of the Iron Curtain and the Yugoslavian crisis of the 1990s contributed to further immigration to Austria. For example, in 1981, 303,684 foreigners[1] lived in Austria. By 1988, the figure had risen to 344,020 (ÖFM, 2003). However, in 1998, within a decade after the fall of the Iron Curtain and following the Yugoslavian

[1] In this paragraph foreigners and immigration numbers are referred to in respect of individuals having their residency in Austria without Austrian citizenship

crisis, this figure had roughly doubled rising to 737,277 (ibid.), which constitutes roughly 12% of the Austrian population. Predominantly, these recent events as well as the rising numbers of immigrants have reintroduced debates about immigration and immigrants in contemporary Austria at national macro, as well as regional micro structures of society, including the state, the government, as well as the everyday. For example, in 1990 in a nationwide opinion poll by Fessel GfK (Plasser et al, 2000, p. 158), it was revealed that the 'foreigner issue' became exceptionally important within the everyday sphere, possibly as a result of forthcoming elections as well as higher migration influx.

At this point, prior to introducing the topic of this thesis any further, it has to be explained how specific terminology regarding minorities has been used and defined throughout the work. Firstly, it has to be noted that theoretical debates in the field often imply controversial definitions of concepts of ethnicity, and race as well as ethnic minorities. Theorists in the field who define the different concepts in a variety of ways include Eriksen, Rex, Barker, Barth, Hall, Banton, Miles and others. Particularly, the concepts of 'race' and the usage of this terminology, as well as the concept of ethnicity, ethnic minority and ethnic group have given rise to theoretical debates amongst academics and have led to confusion between concepts of ethnic minorities and racial minorities. However, this thesis is neither debating nor theorising about the diverse concepts of ethnicity, ethnic groups, ethnic identity, 'race', racial minority or ethnic minorities. For the purpose of this research it is solely significant to define how the concept has been used by, as well as expressed by, political and everyday actors in their respective discourses. In this respect, the distinctions and definitions of foreigners, migrants, minority members, ethnic minorities as well as concepts of ethnicity and 'race' used in this thesis are the expressions commonly used by the political elites as well as the respondents of the case study. In fact, even the definitions of who is an Austrian and who is not, or what is being Austrian and what is not, have been passively defined by the talk and the commonly used terminology of the political elites and interviewees, not by the author or the author's choice of a theoretical definition. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the way the concept of minority group members, or 'non Austrians' used by the political players and the interviewees is best described by a definition Collins (1995) gives regarding ethnic groups. The definition of 'ethnic group' by Collins (1995, p. 205) reads: 'Ethnic group is a group of people sharing an identity which arises from a collective sense of a distinctive history. Ethnic groups possess their own cultural customs, norms, beliefs, and traditions. There is usually a common language and boundary maintenance observed between members and non

members'. In this respect, it is further significant to indicate that in common terminological use by the political players and interviewees, ethnic minorities sometimes included Hungarian, Slovenian and Slovak minority groups in Austria; Roma and Sinti were also sometimes included in this group. Furthermore long-standing minorities such as religious minorities, e.g. the Jewish community, were occasionally included. However, generally new migrant groups consisting of 'guest-workers', refugees and asylum seekers, transit-migrants, and seasonal workers, were most often referred to as 'foreigners' ('*Ausländer*') by the political speakers and the interviewees. Furthermore, in some cases, the political players and interviewees appeared not to draw many distinctions between the above listed migrant groups. In fact, they seemed to use an 'all inclusive approach', defining any form of migrant or minority group member, or any individual exhibiting any form of cultural, linguistic, national or physical difference to Austrians as a 'foreigner' in their discourses. Subsequently, for the purposes of this thesis and for theoretically defining how the Austrian political elites and case study respondents understand 'the other', Hall's (Hall in Hesse, 2000) definition of ethnic minorities is, in addition to Collins's definition, applicable. It is that the term 'ethnic minorities' includes ethnic, racial and national minority groups who exhibit cultural, national and/or physical differences from those of Austrians. It nevertheless appeared that the talk about 'foreigners' was most often related to groups, such as guest-workers or eastern European migrants, rather than traditional minority groups such as the Roma, Sinti or the Jewish community. It also appeared that distinctions between legal and illegal migrants, or migrants with or without work permits were often not made, even though one group of people as well as a political party defined citizenship as an important in/out group marker. It was questionable how the interviewees and political elites defined 'being an Austrian' and not 'being an Austrian' . This doubt was also taken into consideration in the research methodology and data analysis. Additionally, some distinction in the usage of definitions about migrants by the respondents could be looked at more closely in the Chapter Four to Six. For the purpose of this thesis the terminology 'foreigner' and 'migrant' will be used based on the usage of these concepts by the political elites and case study respondents.

After consideration of the definitions and usage of concepts of the 'other' in this thesis, the social institutions and spheres concerned with ethnicity have to be highlighted. Fenton (1999) argues that within a social system, different layers of society have to be considered. In this respect, he indicates that ethnicity can occur in macro, meso and micro formations of society, hence social spheres, such as that of the state, the media and the everyday. It

could then be suggested that on the one hand ethnicity occurs in those social settings, however, additionally emerging ethnic minority groups and foreigners often become the objects and subjects of those social spheres. Subsequently, minority groups can become objects of political players who exercise influence on policy-making concerning immigration and integration procedures. This study will concentrate on the perspectives of the majority, such as the political elites and their debates, and not the minority members. Hence the minority members became objects of the study, rather than subjects.

To return to the point being made earlier, indicating that the 'foreigner' issue had gained significance in public and private debates in the 1990s, it could be argued that at the political level, discourses about immigration differ depending on different political party factions. In order to investigate those party specific discourses further, Austrian political parties have to be introduced briefly. The political party system and factions in contemporary Austria consist of a number of parties. However only four are represented in parliament and shape contemporary political discourses. These are the Social Democrats (SPÖ), the Christian Democrats or 'People's Party' (ÖVP), the 'Freedom Party' (FPÖ) and the Green Party (GRÜNE)[2]. With the exception of the Green Party, these politically most influential parties were founded during the Habsburg Empire, though at that time named differently. In 1888/89 Victor Adler founded the SDAP (Social Democratic Worker's Party), the predecessor of the SPÖ (Ucakar, 1997). The socialist 'Lager' ('camp') changed its name from SDAP to SPÖ (Socialist Party) after the Second World War and again in 1991 to SPÖ (Social Democratic Party). The SPÖ traditionally facilitated a socialist political orientation of the Austro Marxist school of thought, representing the 'working class' (Ucakar, 1997), the blue-collar workers and the urban population (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000). The ÖVP was founded during the Habsburg Empire as the former Christian Social Party, being historically interlinked with Catholicism and thus interested in promoting close linkage between church and state (Müller, 1997), as well as traditionally emphasising humanistic values and, more recently, its economic competence. The ÖVP traditionally represents rural populations, farmers, hence agriculture, civil servants, tradespeople, officials and employees (Müller, 1997). The FPÖ, the former German-nationalist third camp, was re-established as VdU ('Verband der Unabhängigen') after the Second World War and became the FPÖ in 1955 (Luther, 1997). The FPÖ traditionally followed a pan-German nationalist political orientation, representing the petty

[2] These four parties are most influential both regionally as well as nationally. Other existing, but non-influential parties, will be explained in more detail in the following chapters.

bourgeoisie, urban population, men, Protestants (Luther, 1997), and protest voters with a certain tendency to an authoritarian way of thinking (Simon, 1954 in Luther, 1997). The contemporary Green Party, by contrast, is the product of the unification of two Green Parties, namely the VGÖ founded in 1982 and the ALÖ established in 1983 (Dachs, 1997). This unification of Green parties took place in 1986 (ibid.).

During the Second Austrian Republic, for the most part the ÖVP and the SPÖ dominated politics. However, in 1999, this situation was overturned, signifying a turning point in Austrian politics. In the election in 1999, the FPÖ scored 26.91% (BMI, 2003) of the votes and the ÖVP 26.91% resulting in the formation of a governmental alliance between ÖVP and FPÖ. The SPÖ and the Green Party achieved 33.15% and 7.4% respectively of the votes and represent the opposition. In the following election, in November 2002, the SPÖ scored 36.51% and Green Party 9.4% or roughly the same amount of votes as in 1999, while a change could be observed in voting patterns within the ÖVP and the FPÖ. The ÖVP reached 42.3%, gaining approximately 17% and the FPÖ lost support, achieving 15% fewer votes, resulting in 10.01%. (BMI, 2003). Nevertheless, the FPÖ-ÖVP coalition government was re-established, and continues in government to the present.

Depending on the differing political party factions, their political orientational agendas and their position within parliament, as introduced above, the political discourses are expressed in a wide variety of ways. For example, foreigners are either welcomed, and cultural diversity is perceived as a benefit or on the contrary, assimilationist perspectives or the rejection of migrants is demonstrated by the different political parties. Further arguments range from anti immigration policy-making to the suggestion that foreigners as tools for the labour market are necessary. Despite a complex and often contradictory set of discourses implied by each of the Austrian political parties, nevertheless it appears that the SPÖ indicates overall positive expressions about migrants, the ÖVP contradictory discourses of welcoming some migrants whilst rejecting others, the FPÖ rejecting foreigners and the Green Party welcoming diversity. Generally, all parties cover the thematic topics of the labour market, the culture and identity of minority vs. majority, integrationist concepts as well as the welfare and social system in the articulations about migrants and immigration.

On the other hand, actors of the unofficial everyday sphere might, in theory, partly reiterate opinions expressed at the national macro levels of society or, conversely, might partly form

independent perceptions about immigration depending on their socio demographic background. The views of native Austrians indicated in an opinion poll that 46% believed that foreigners were taking jobs away from the indigenous population (Irregular Migration, 1998). For instance, in an opinion poll in 1996, 56% Austrians shared the view that foreigners were responsible for an increase in criminality and abuse of the social security system. Four out of ten respondents agreed that the number of foreigners in Austria was a threat to Austrian identity and way of life. (Irregular Migration, 1998). In 1995 an opinion poll was carried out which showed that 24% of Austrians (36% FPÖ sympathisers) would prefer not to have a Jewish neighbour. Seventeen per-cent of Austrians (28% of FPÖ sympathisers) believed that Jews 'have too much influence in our country'. When asked about neighbours they would not like, 42% of those questioned (60% of FPÖ sympathisers) rejected gypsies, 39% (56% of FPÖ sympathisers) Turks, and 31% (43% of FPÖ sympathisers) Croats. (Bailer-Galanda & Neugebauer, 1996, p.21). Additionally, Plasser and Ulram (2002, p.157) argue that in the 1990s 8 out of 10 Austrians were of the opinion that foreigners do jobs which Austrians do not do any longer, and 6 out of 10 respondents argued that foreigners were necessary for the Austrian economy. However, simultaneously, in 1991 a minority of 36% of respondents appreciated the cultural diversity of the migrants as a contribution to Austrian life and everyday living. Thirty-eight per-cent of Austrians perceived immigration to be beneficial only in that it was a securing of the pension system as foreigners have more children. Further it is argued by Plasser and Ulram that six out of ten respondents indicated that foreigners increased crime levels in Austria, and 50% perceived that Austrian employees would be endangered and threatened by foreign competition in the labour market. Seventy five per-cent of respondents indicated that there was too much immigration and too many foreigners in Austria. By 2001 opinions had not changed to a large extent, though change was evident in that fewer respondents feared the increase of a criminality level (48%) and perceived a threat for the Austrian labour force (48%). Fifty-nine per-cent of respondents still perceived that too many foreigners were living in Austria. Fifty per-cent of respondents indicated that foreigners were a cultural and social benefit, while 60% favoured the need for a decrease in immigration. (Plasser & Ulram, 2002, p.157). Insecurity had grown and immigrants were accused not only of taking jobs away from the natives, but also of benefiting from the Austrian welfare state (Zweimueller & Winter-Ebmer, 1996). This argument served as an important accusation in the 1990s. The above results of opinion polls indicate changes over the decades but also a large anti-migrant 'feeling' amongst

native Austrians. However, the opinion polls revealed neither socio demographic background, nor political party allegiance for respondents.

Following from views expressed by native Austrians in opinion polls, questions arise, as to the identity and background of the individuals who express such positive or negative arguments in regard to 'foreigners'. And further, who are the elites or everyday actors having either liberal or conservative opinions and on what factors might these choices of opinions and discourses depend? From a theoretical perspective, it is debatable on which basis pro- or anti-immigration opinions are formed. In terms of political elites, is it the political party's orientation, their position within parliament or could the choice of arguments depend on the current most fashionable propaganda to impress the voting population? On the other hand, within the regional sphere is there a possibility that the socio demographic background of individuals determines differing articulations or can a connection between political expressions and the people's opinions be identified? More specifically, do factors such as age, gender, class, the rural/urban divide or the educational background of individuals determine differing articulations? Or after all is there a possibility that a connection between a specific political party's expressions and its supporting everyday actors' expressions exists?

In order to answer the above questions a particular research design was developed. The focus was put on the analysis of the political elite discourses divided by political party background. With regard to the everyday regional sphere, a case study was designed with a sample of 37 respondents. The analysis of their discourses considered factors such as their age, gender, rural/urban background, political support, class or educational background. However, the ultimate focus of the study was the comparative analysis of political elite discourses and everyday discourses by local actors divided by their political support. In this respect the aim was to compare political and everyday discourses aiming to identify similarities and differences of discourses as well as possible dependencies between the two spheres. Nevertheless, as a by-product of the analysis the possible determination of discourses within the regional actors being dependent on their socio demographic background was considered.

In terms of socio demographic background factors of the interviewees a variety of outcomes and results from this study was expected. For example, within the group of respondents the age factor might have had an impact on the formulation of opinions. In this

respect, in the older group of respondents, the possibility existed that exclusionary discourses about migrants would predominate. On the other hand, young respondents might have been more liberal in their discourses, arguing for multiculturalism and indicating pro immigration expressions. Such an outcome could be related to the likelihood that older Austrians (for example age group 65+) might still be influenced by their upbringing in an authoritarian regime which used biological racism in its propaganda. By contrast, younger age groups (particularly those younger than 35) possibly grew up with the teaching of anti-nazism in school and experienced becoming part of a United Europe; additionally modern means of mass communication such as the internet might have served as a liberating determining factor. Similar expectations could be identified in regard to education, professional income or gender background of the everyday actors. To provide another example, it could be suggested that the perception of foreigners is highly gender dependent; the theoretical possibility exists that women are more Islamophobic than men and in consequence argue for a higher assimilation of Islamic migrants. Such an outcome could be expected since western women might perceive traditional Islam as a suppressing force for women.

Regarding the connection between macro and micro discourses, it appears that the opinions expressed by political elites or everyday actors demonstrate recurring arguments in both spheres ranging from extreme liberal and welcoming opinions to rejection and perceptions of threats and problems. Hence, theoretically, the possibility of a political dependence in the choice of discourses could exist within the regional micro structures of society. In other words, a political or mutual influence in the choice of discourses by everyday actors could be possible. In this respect, Max Weber argues that political parties operate not only on a state level, but also on a social level. He identifies that different types of domination and leadership types exist, which in turn have to be legitimated by the everyday actors.

In general, it could then be suggested that the political domination could largely depend on the social-political system of a specific society. In closed, inflexible stagnating systems a higher loyalty of everyday actors towards the political parties could be expected, and in turn a stronger influence of the political parties on the everyday actors. In the specific case of Austria, due to features of the Austrian political-social system such as the 'Proporzsystem' or the 'Lagermentality', the likelihood of this as well as the applicability of Weber's theories of domination and legitimacy is strong. In practice, the Austrian 'Proporzsystem' used to determine and influence subsystems and units of public and

private life by placing political actors within those subunits depending on the most recent election results (Pelinka & Rosenberger 2000). Whereas in the past this influence was very strong, it has been in decline in recent years (ibid.). Wandruszka (in Morrow 2000, p. 35), established the 'Lagertheorie' ('Lagertheory'), which explains relations between Austrian political parties and regional subunits in contrast to Anglo-Saxon parties. He argues that 'parties in Austria became competing and self-perpetuating '*Lager*' (camps), whole self-sufficient groups, rather than more restricted parties in the Anglo-Saxon sense, and that the social functions of parties fostered a top-down dependence culture, incorporating 'guided movements', rather than wide and participative democratic pluralism'. Thus, in regard to the actors of the everyday, political loyalty ('Lagermentality') towards the camps ('*Lager*') became a matter of personal identity (ibid.; Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000). In this respect it could be understood that the political '*Lager*' or party was interconnected with the regional everyday supporters who were traditionally loyal to their political '*Lager*'. It can hence be argued that Austrian 'Proporzsystem' and 'Lagermentality' strengthen the theoretical anticipation of a dependence and cohesion between political elites and everyday actors in general; and in particular of dependences and correspondence of the formulation of discourses about migrants. These features further enhance the possible applicability of Weberian theories of domination and legitimacy[3].

Investigating Weber further, he theorises that leadership and domination can occur in three ideal typical forms, that of the legal-rational leadership, that of the traditional and that of the charismatic. However, he emphasises that in reality, the ideal types in terms of leadership do not exist in their pure form, but rather show features of mixed leaderships. For example, it could be suggested that the SPÖ, based on its agendas and political discourses, follows a predominantly legal-rational leadership type; the ÖVP pursues a traditional type of leadership and the FPÖ a charismatic leadership type, while the Green Party follows a charismatic-utopian form. The concept of utopian and dystopian leadership type or domination should be understood as a newly identified form of domination and will be critically discussed in more depth in Chapter Two. However, it could further be argued that all the above leadership types appear in combination or mixed leadership form in the Austrian political parties, and this will be critically investigated in Chapter Two.

[3] While it will not be possible to identify direction and flow of influence on discourses, it could still be hypothesised that a correspondence or similarity between the political and the everyday discourses exists, which will allow for a testing and application of Weber's theories of legitimate domination.

Following Weber further, it could be suggested that the 'governed' follow commands of one type of leadership; they are even in some form dominated by one type of leadership type. Correspondingly, this political form of domination can only be sustained if actors of the everyday also legitimate it, in that sense continue to follow it, believe in it and obey it. If Austrian political players each exhibit one or more types of leadership types or form of domination then those correspondingly must be legitimated by the everyday regional actors. For example, the legal-rational leadership type hypothesised within the SPÖ must be legitimated as such by the 'governed', the support group. Consequently, it will be investigated on the bases of discourses about migration and migrants, whether and what leadership types can be identified within Austrian political parties and whether those leaderships are legitimated by the regional actors.

Given the above theoretical insights, this thesis is concerned with the following aims and objectives. Firstly, Max Weber's theories of domination and legitimacy will be investigated in the contemporary Austrian political climate. Such investigation includes the tracing of his types of domination and leadership within the structures and agendas of the four main Austrian political players on a theoretical basis. In continuation the discourses portrayed by each respective party about migrants and migration will be revealed and critically analysed serving as a basis for testing the theoretically established leadership types. Secondly, the articulations demonstrated by regional everyday actors will be analysed. In this respect, respondents will be categorised by their socio demographic background to identify possible dependencies for choices of discourses by factors such as gender, age, rural/urban background, their professional (class) background, educational or political support background. The interviewees' responses will be analysed considering each of the respective backgrounds. Once both spheres the political and the regional have been investigated separately and independently, an in-depth comparative study of political and everyday discourses will be undertaken to analyse the correspondence or dissimilarities as well as the interrelationship of the arguments used by the political elites and the regional respondents divided by their political support only. Based on the occurring similarities or differences Weber's concept of legitimacy will be tested. The aims and objectives of the thesis were based on qualitative and quantitative analyses of political manifestos and parliamentary debates as well as on a case study with 37 respondents from Upper Austria.

Chapter Two

Chapter Two concerns and introduces Austrian immigration history, focusing on the different immigration waves of recent decades. Further, the chapter introduces the theoretical relationship between the Austrian population and the political parties emphasising the role of the Austrian 'Proporzsystem' and 'Lagermentality', which can be understood as an important feature of Austrian society. This will lead to a discussion of the theories of the possible interrelationships between public and private spheres, the state and the everyday. The specific focus of the chapter attempts to explain and develop Max Weber's theories of legitimate domination. The theoretical interpretation and application of Weber is an attempt to situate and apply his original theories in a contemporary political climate. Specifically different leadership types will be traced within the Austrian political players (SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ and Green Party) based on the explanation of their history and agendas as well as their political orientations. Furthermore, in addition to Weber's three ideal types of domination and legitimacy existing, a fourth type of domination and legitimacy will be theoretically developed, identified and also applied to the Austrian political system.

Chapter Three

Chapter Three explains and justifies the methodology and research methods used for the collection of the data and subsequent analysis. The chapter explains that the field research consisted of mainly qualitative research in two different areas using two main methodological research tools. First, qualitative analysis of political manifestos and parliamentary debates to investigate discourses about migrants portrayed by political elites. Secondly, a case study was conducted with 37 respondents who were divided by their socio demographic background (age, gender, class, rural/urban background, educational background, professional/class background and political support). As a supplementary method, some of the material was quantitatively analysed. Qualitative semi structured interviews were carried out, which were specifically designed to compare discourses occurring at the national political level with discourses occurring at the regional everyday level of society, focusing on the interrelationships between political and everyday individual discourses. A comparative analysis of this kind has not yet been undertaken within Austria, so far as the author is aware. The methods chapter further details the sampling methods, the data material, the way in which qualitative methods were applied and carried out, the advantages and disadvantages of this particular approach, as well as the

role of the researcher. A specific focus was given to the data analysis methods and the coding of the material. A complex coding system was developed (Appendices 1-9). In order to facilitate a comparative analysis, the data were subdivided into thematic groups including 'definitions and associations'; 'immigration'; 'labour market'; 'welfare system'; 'culture'; 'integration[4]'; 'religion and identity'; as well as 'personal experiences'.

Chapter Four

In Chapter Four the findings of the political discourses about the immigration of foreigners is explored. The chapter investigates the discourses portrayed within the four main political parties, the SPÖ, the ÖVP, the FPÖ and the Green Party. While the SPÖ discourses predominantly indicate pro foreign and immigration opinions, as well as perceiving migrants to be of benefit to Austrian culture, the Christian Democrats (ÖVP) indicate opposing opinions, identifying certain labour migration as necessary but understanding migrants to be a threat. The Freedom Party (FPÖ) generally exhibits anti immigration discourses and insists on the assimilation model as the right mode of integration. The data is analysed and the political parties portrayed by their discourse but are also analysed in terms of their theoretically identified leadership types. Hence, the theoretically developed Weberian types of leadership are tested on the basis of the data results and applied to the data findings. Further, the continuity and change in discourses depending on the parliamentary/governmental position of the parties (in government or opposition) is critically investigated. The discourses of the political parties are situated and located in a discourse 'left right' continuum spectrum[5]. Recommendations for future follow- up studies and for additional comparative investigations are given.

Chapter Five

Chapter Five investigates expressions of everyday people towards migrants. Factors such as age, gender, professional/class background, educational and rural/urban as well as political support background of the respondents are specifically considered. Thematic groups of discourses are analysed, divided and categorised by the choice of codes according to the interviewees' socio demographic background. This chapter serves as a

[4] Similar to the previously mentioned way of defining concepts of the 'other' and the usage of the definition of 'foreigner' for the purpose of this thesis, concepts of integration also will be defined passively by way of the data material rather than by the author's choice of a theoretical definition, despite a multitude of theoretical discussion within the field. Further explanations can be followed up in Chapter Five.

[5] 'Left' and 'right' as a form of terminology have to be understood as defined not by specialist literature but by the everyday usage of this concept.

basis for the following chapter, by quantitatively establishing discursive tendencies of the regional actors towards migrants categorised by their socio demographic background.

Chapter Six

Chapter Six consists of a non-representative case study with 37 (36+1) regional Upper Austrian respondents divided by their political support. Eleven respondents for each party, the SPÖ, ÖVP and FPÖ as well as 3 supporters of the Green Party were interviewed. One interview was invalid. The investigation firstly facilitates the qualitative analysis of the discourses of regional actors, and secondly the direct comparison of correspondence and similarity occurring between the political sphere opinions and those expressed by the respondents. The Weberian concept of the legitimacy or legitimation of political domination will be tested.

When I started to engage in the formulation of ideas for this thesis and the compilation of a research question and specific topic, I was influenced in many different ways, both intellectually and academically, as well as by my personal background.

Having originated in the field of ethnic and racial studies and having successfully participated in the MPhil in Ethnic and Racial Studies at Trinity College Dublin between October 1998 and November 1999, I was then inspired by the previously conducted master's thesis 'Racism in Austria - continuities and changes'. The research conducted for this MPhil. thesis compared old racism of biological superiority predominant during the Nazi era with the new cultural racism prevalent in the 1990s. Following this research, my interest in the far right movements across Europe and in political forms of racist discourses was fuelled. As a result of attending classical sociology courses, I then discovered Max Weber and his account of domination and legitimacy. In consequence Weber assumed central importance. In light of theories of political domination, I became interested in the question as to how discourses and perceptions about foreigners are formed, and particularly, whether they are formed independently by social actors of the everyday, according to their socio economic background, or whether theories suggesting that political domination is reflected in the formation and determination of discourses about foreigners. Only while gathering data during the field research did I regenerate theories and reinterpret

my findings in a grounded theory approach. These influences resulted in the combination of classical sociological theory, political sociology and the area of ethnic and racial studies. However, it is significant to mention that this thesis was written externally to an Austrian university, and also written for an international audience.

Additionally, a significant issue to mention is that originally I was also going to include the media in my study, but later realised that the inclusion of another area of research would have exceeded the limitations of a PhD thesis. In this respect I would like to mention that the media is often theoretically referred to as a mediator between the macro and micro sphere of society, and can be regarded as a part of the social meso structures. The media of course could be considered influential and important in respect of portraying diverse opinions about the foreigners and migration topics. In fact I had already conducted research on the representation of migrants by the print media, considering three different daily newspapers, each of which was associated with, or unofficially close to one of the three most influential Austrian political parties. Such associations were reflected in the sponsorship of each specific newspaper by the state, but also by one of the political parties. The aim of an analysis of the media was to compare the representations of foreigners exhibited in a meso social sphere, an intermediate tool of disseminating opinions, with the discourses of the political elites and the regional everyday actors. On a theoretical basis, several possibilities for the role of the media then evolved. The media could either have been a mediator and embedded within the two spheres as a disseminator of the political opinions, partly as funded by the parties; Or, it could have been seen to represent common public opinions by achieving higher sales numbers. Future research on this specific topic would be most desirable.

Apart from these intellectual influences, I have always been interested in migration and integration, and have been influenced by being Austrian myself and also by having lived in different European Union societies. For example I lived in Birmingham for three years (from 1995-1998) and graduated with my primary degree from the University of Birmingham in 1998. Birmingham's multiethnic community (at that time not academically perceived), led to an interest in ethnic minority groups, colonialism and integration procedures. Being a foreigner in England myself and having initially faced mild cultural and obvious linguistic differences, I observed the host population's perception and treatment of me, while also noting my own experiences of being part of a foreign minority. On my regular visits to Austria, my country of origin, I was then fascinated by my

resumption of the role of a majority member, and became all the more interested in the experiences of, and discourses about, minorities in Austria. In total I have lived in the following European Union member states, including my home country, Austria, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany.

Additionally, I was inspired by my upbringing. During my school years and as a result of my grandmother telling stories about her resistance to Nazism, I developed a long-term interest in Nazism, Austria's role in the Third Reich, mass manipulation, propaganda and the determination of public opinion by diverse means of those in power. This interest was further rekindled by frequent questioning about my Austrian identity and the common association of Austria with Hitler, which led to critical introspection about Austrian identity and society. The interest in political domination and determination as well as the existence of the 'Proporz system' convinced me that politics and political parties seemed to matter more in Austria than in other societies. I decided to investigate these personal experiences I had, further paying particular attention to customs which define schools, banks or other Austrian institutions as being dominated by a political colouring, and are therefore seen as Socialist, Christian Democrat or Freedom Party influenced. These experiences I had had ultimately returned to the recurrent question as to whether in Austria, political authorities and elites have more influence with the general public than in other societies, and which I was able to investigate during the course of the past few years while conducting research for this thesis.

Chapter Two

Austrian political players and Max Weber

This chapter focuses on Austrian immigration history which has led to the recent upsurge in discussion and debate about immigrants and immigration both within the political sphere as well as within the everyday sector of Austrian society. Furthermore, the chapter will provide an introduction to Austrian political parties and their party specific principles, agendas and organisational structure from a theoretical point of view. Then, the theoretical relationship between the Austrian population, the regional everyday and the political elites will be provided. The Austrian 'Lagermentality' and 'Proporzsystem' and the dynamics of the Austrian political system will be explained and critically situated within the framework of Max Weber's theories. His theories of domination and leadership type will be explained, interpreted, analysed, developed and applied to Austrian political parties on the basis of each party having a different historic development, different organisational structure and political orientational principles. In addition to the existing three Weberian ideal types, the legal- rational, the traditional and the charismatic, a further type of domination, 'utopian' and its counterpart 'dystopian' leadership was identified, theoretically developed and discussed. The process of 'legitimating' or not legitimating types of domination was critically investigated and questioned on a theoretical basis.

1.0 Immigration to Austria – a brief introduction

The source of the recent upsurge in discussion both within the political as well as within the everyday sphere has to be explained. Throughout the recent decades, Austria's long-standing history of immigration has been the cause of multiple discussion and debate. Austria's immigration history can be divided into three major episodes. Many push-and-pull factors, amongst them economic, political, and social, as well as geographical influences have contributed to population movements, transit migration and immigration flows to Austria. Firstly, the Habsburg Empire left its imprints on contemporary Austrian society. During the multiethnic Empire, historic ties to Eastern Europe[6] were established.

[6] In terms of definitions it needs to be highlighted that the terminology Eastern, Central and Western Europe can be defined in a number of ways. Kuerti (1997) argues that Central Europe now has to be seen under different aspects. The author (ibid.) consequently argues that Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia now distance themselves from their communist past and identify themselves as Central or East Central European, whereas they view other states such as Slovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia, Ukraine and Russia as truly Eastern European, as a result of their past including a higher degree of Communism (ibid.). Hence, definitions of Eastern Europe have changed over the decades, however, for the purpose of this thesis Eastern European countries are referred to as countries dominated by Communism up to 1989.

As already indicated in Chapter One, the collapse of the Empire, and the formation of the First Austrian Republic led to Slovenian, Hungarian and Croatian minorities being established on the southern borders of contemporary Austria. For example Wischenbart (1994) argues that as a result of the Habsburg expansion, Austria's people are the product of different waves of mass migrations and that 'Austria's identity is traditionally based on concepts such as forming a bridge between the west and the east, being a product of an old and multifaceted fusion of central European cultures and generating unity out of diversity' (Wischenbart, 1994, p.78). Transit migration from Eastern Europe occurred following the establishment of the Iron Curtain. For example, after the Hungarian uprising in 1956, 180,000 Hungarian refugees entered Austria. Most were resettled in other western countries, while about 20,000 were granted asylum in Austria and stayed on (Jandl & Kraler, 2003, p. 2). Secondly, the 'guestworker' system influenced immigration flows into Austria. Castles and Miller (1998, p. 71) explain that: 'migrant workers were conceived as temporary labour units, and could be recruited, utilised and sent back again.' The 'guestworkers' traditionally were of Yugoslav origin, however also of Spanish or Italian origin, as well as more recently of Turkish origin (Castles & Miller, 1998). For instance, in 1973, a total number of 226,801 'guest-workers' was recorded (Wischenbart, 1994, p. 75). Despite being expected to return to their countries of origin 'guest-workers' regularly continued to stay in Austria, which in turn led to family reunification programmes. These programmes continue to benefit significant numbers of immigrants. Kupiszewski (1996) argues that in addition to the labour migration and family reunification programmes, seasonal worker migration for the hotel and catering industry, as well as day-to-day cross boundary commuting also contributes significantly to immigration waves. Thirdly, and most recently, events such as the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the opening up of Eastern Europe, the Yugoslavian crisis in the 1990s and Austrian membership of the European Union since 1995 have contributed to an increase in the numbers of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers entering Austria. In 1981, 303,684 foreigners lived in Austria, in 1988, the figure had risen to 344,020 (ÖFM 2003). However, in 1998, within a decade after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the Yugoslavian crisis, the figure had roughly doubled, rising to 737,277. By 2001, the numbers had reached 764,314 immigrants without Austrian citizenship living in Austria, which indicates approximately 9.3% of the Austrian population. Graph 1.1 shows the numbers of immigrants between 1981 and 2001 according to their country of origin. (ÖFM, 2003).

1.1.: In- und Ausländische Wohnbevölkerung in Österreich 1981-2001 nach Herkunftskategorien (Jahresdurchschnitt)

Jahr	Bevölkerung Gesamt	davon				
		Inländer	Ausländer	davon ehem. Jugoslawien	Türkei	sonstige
1981	7.568.710	7.265.026	303.684	126.601	60.277	116.806
1982	7.575.717	7.267.301	308.416	124.612	32.367	121.437
1983	7.567.016	7.270.364	296.652	121.523	62.247	112.882
1984	7.570.529	7.272.741	297.788	120.961	62.617	114.210
1985	7.578.261	7.273.879	304.382	122.977	64.837	116.568
1986	7.587.989	7.273.106	314.883	125.913	69.233	119.737
1987	7.598.154	7.271.907	326.247	128.952	74.081	123.214
1988	7.675.279	7.271.259	344.020	133.836	79.951	130.233
1989	7.658.801	7.271.618	387.183	146.203	91.733	149.247
1990	7.729.236	7.273.175	456.061	172.631	106.766	176.664
1991	7.812.971	7.280.225	532.746	207.693	120.493	204.560
1992	7.913.812	7.290.780	623.072	258.831	132.826	231.375
1993	7.991.485	7.301.881	689.603	305.452	139.781	244.370
1994	8.029.717	7.316.214	713.503	322.819	141.667	249.017
1995	8.046.535	7.323.052	723.483	329.541	142.766	251.176
1996	8.059.385	7.331.195	728.190	333.591	140.841	253.758
1997	8.072.182	7.339.511	732.671	335.800	138.505	258.366
1998	8.078.449	7.341.172	737.277	336.423	138.821	262.033
1999	8.092.254	7.344.082	748.172	340.862	136.334	270.976
2000	8.110.244	7.352.367	757.877	341.634	134.547	281.696
2001	8.131.953	7.367.639	764.314	341.730	133.435	289.149

www.oefm.at (25.09.2004); [Bevölkerung Gesamt = total population], Inländer = Austrians by citizenship, Ausländer = individuals living in Austria without Austrian citizenship, Yugoslavien = former Yugoslavia, Türkei = Turkey, Sonstige = Others, Davon = of which

Comparative factors for the region of Upper Austria are shown below.

1.1. In- und Ausländische Wohnbevölkerung 1981-2001 nach Herkunftskategorien, Oberösterreich (Jahresdurchschnitt)

Jahr	Bevölkerung Gesamt	davon				
		Inländer	Ausländer	davon ehem. Jugoslawien	Türkei	sonstige
1981	1.271.856	1.236.243	35.613	13.501	5.723	16.389
1982	1.276.917	1.239.869	37.048	13.525	5.864	17.659
1983	1.278.731	1.243.210	35.521	13.035	5.660	16.826
1984	1.281.426	1.246.086	35.340	12.422	5.359	17.559
1985	1.284.295	1.248.784	35.511	12.164	5.546	17.801
1986	1.287.692	1.250.769	36.923	12.460	6.061	18.402
1987	1.290.554	1.252.564	37.990	12.796	6.579	18.615
1988	1.294.116	1.254.962	39.154	13.003	7.292	18.859
1989	1.302.361	1.257.545	44.816	14.014	8.553	22.249
1990	1.317.313	1.259.778	57.535	20.450	10.790	26.295
1991	1.336.559	1.262.971	73.588	28.372	13.696	31.520
1992	1.357.300	1.267.228	90.072	37.923	16.358	35.791
1993	1.373.317	1.271.020	102.297	48.691	17.576	36.030
1994	1.383.620	1.275.453	108.167	53.122	17.909	37.136
1995	1.385.769	1.278.998	106.771	53.104	17.607	36.060
1996	1.380.703	1.279.455	101.248	51.431	17.120	32.697
1997	1.377.902	1.279.094	98.808	50.599	17.022	31.187
1998	1.375.436	1.279.418	96.018	50.017	16.871	29.130
1999	1.377.054	1.279.871	97.183	51.562	17.025	28.596
2000	1.379.524	1.282.053	97.471	51.882	17.145	28.444
2001	1.383.951	1.285.609	98.342	52.352	17.259	28.731

wwww.oefm.org (25.09.2004)

Numbers of Austrians defined by citizenship versus those migrants without Austrian citizenship are illustrated in Graph 1.2 below.

1.2 Ausländische Wohnbevölkerung, 1961 bis 2001



www.oefm.org (25.09.2004) Green Colour= Austrians; Orange = Foreigners in Austria without the EU-14; White = EU-14

The figures shown in the graph must be viewed in light of Austrian naturalisation policies. Jandl & Kraler (2003, p. 3) state that a new naturalisation act was passed in 1998. In this act, the concept of *ius sanguinis*[7] was still included, while the ability of the migrants to integrate sufficiently is significant to the naturalisation process. A waiting period of approximately 10 years before naturalisation could be effected was also to be expected. (Jandl & Kraler, 2003). However, the naturalisation numbers since 1998 have risen. In 1988 7,315 immigrants were naturalised, whereas in 2001, 31,731 were naturalised (ÖMF, 2003). Martinello (1995, p. 12) gives the following statistics about naturalisation of aliens per 100,000 in the years 1990, 1985-89, 1980-84, 1975-79. According to his study in Austria between 1985 and 1989 2,531 naturalisations were accepted, and in 1990, there were 1,861. (Martinello, 1995). In Graph 1.3 below naturalisation figures by province can be viewed in chronological order.[Einbürgerungen=naturalisations, summe= sum of all naturalisations, Ausland= other countries, in Österreich= in Austria]

[7] Ius sanguinis is defined by Castles and Miller (1998, p. 238) as the right to citizenship by descent from a national of the country concerned.

1.3 Einbürgerungen 1946-2001 nach Wohnbundesland des/der Eingebürgerten

Jahr	Summe der Einbürgerungen	davon im Ausland	in Österreich	davon Bgld.	Kär.	NÖ	OÖ	Sbg.	Stmk.	Tirol	Vbg.	Wien
1946	82.161		82.161	2.538	2.518	19.969	7.682	2.371	12.411	1.402	4.861	28.409
1947	59.818		59.818	1.113	4.531	11.074	7.217	2.753	10.419	1.022	1.609	20.080
1948	45.578		45.578	661	3.784	9.710	5.121	1.509	7.452	2.420	897	14.024
1949	40.249		40.249	711	3.142	9.958	4.343	2.060	5.874	2.435	499	11.227
1950	39.824		39.824	704	3.896	6.354	7.122	2.619	5.380	1.676	790	11.283
1951	38.973		38.973	588	3.967	2.906	7.721	2.280	5.228	3.278	881	12.124
1952	29.185		29.185	732	1.684	2.428	5.124	1.817	4.333	3.885	642	8.540
1953	20.460		20.460	457	1.203	2.065	3.916	1.189	3.225	2.754	418	5.233
1954	22.646		22.646	1.317	969	1.636	3.167	720	4.324	2.977	960	6.576
1955	40.523		40.523	907	1.895	4.250	9.914	2.032	9.836	2.466	2.489	6.734
1956	35.431		35.431	520	2.041	3.095	13.200	3.166	6.018	2.198	1.336	3.857
1957	20.318		20.318	181	611	1.582	11.007	719	1.880	1.450	848	2.040
1958	8.712		8.712	90	397	844	2.143	511	1.300	905	708	1.814
1959	7.688		7.688	169	464	720	1.672	358	1.186	829	444	1.846
1960	6.322		6.322	184	412	669	926	242	1.244	569	368	1.708
1961	6.083		6.083	236	423	572	923	192	1.032	492	350	1.863
1962	5.153		5.153	116	364	684	760	236	754	440	307	1.492
1963	4.640		4.640	147	418	531	687	232	769	365	349	1.142
1964	4.371		4.371	206	364	656	721	254	409	398	323	1.040
1965	3.999		3.999	170	356	546	625	207	402	442	324	927
1966	4.062	137	3.925	115	401	433	552	223	501	385	270	1.045
1967	5.409	577	4.832	120	360	578	861	350	410	483	485	1.185
1968	5.485	629	4.856	124	448	537	768	367	606	463	314	1.229
1969	5.460	720	4.740	125	354	527	553	416	703	443	355	1.264
1970	5.565	725	4.840	58	339	610	580	391	680	479	371	1.332
1971	5.521	776	4.745	102	214	496	500	400	677	397	334	1.625
1972	6.017	792	5.225	101	327	590	679	485	558	501	438	1.546
1973	6.183	825	5.358	110	364	510	558	440	583	526	266	2.001
1974	6.648	891	5.757	78	394	605	706	472	589	708	289	1.916
1975	7.139	644	6.495	100	355	843	713	556	771	736	341	2.080
1976	7.545	548	6.997	101	474	837	936	495	875	846	410	2.023
1977	7.405	424	6.981	95	369	885	898	500	935	741	377	2.181
1978	6.942	380	6.562	128	360	809	802	496	775	700	315	2.177
1979	7.754	421	7.333	107	333	732	762	467	791	664	382	3.095
1980	8.602	426	8.176	127	325	833	761	463	619	623	429	3.996
1981	7.980	548	7.432	78	298	752	819	398	600	573	335	3.579
1982	7.752	593	7.159	88	257	781	738	427	682	597	350	3.239
1983	10.904	1.004	9.900	108	491	766	874	646	842	783	547	4.843
1984	8.876	1.084	7.792	62	362	575	906	581	603	660	510	3.533
1985	8.491	1.180	7.311	83	362	515	804	539	491	563	408	3.546
1986	10.015	1.955	8.060	94	293	698	835	495	481	556	430	4.178
1987	8.114	1.496	6.618	89	224	556	784	357	366	326	270	3.646
1988	8.233	918	7.315	98	244	593	931	363	379	303	293	4.111
1989	8.470	1.165	7.305	80	225	485	758	345	311	246	275	4.580
1990	9.199	218	8.981	47	164	612	683	309	330	272	252	6.312
1991	11.394	257	11.137	69	163	676	853	361	333	369	266	8.047
1992	11.920	264	11.656	78	224	775	1.186	307	316	413	459	7.898
1993	14.402	271	14.131	108	319	1.291	1.428	355	585	566	808	8.671
1994	16.270	995	15.275	198	239	1.541	1.681	451	651	666	587	9.261
1995	15.309	943	14.366	183	250	2.073	2.028	657	559	1.005	770	6.841
1996	16.243	616	15.627	155	233	1.809	1.191	590	662	1.154	789	9.044
1997	16.274	482	15.792	183	219	2.791	981	509	842	981	658	8.628
1998	18.321	535	17.786	214	248	2.881	1.452	598	1.098	978	967	9.350
1999	25.032	354	24.678	382	239	4.358	3.396	804	1.372	1.421	1.699	11.007
2000	24.645	325	24.320	481	263	2.831	5.264	949	2.209	1.204	1.650	9.469
2001	32.080	349	31.731	851	438	3137	5.449	1.661	2.410	1.793	2.598	13394
Σ	**907.795**	**24.467**	**883.328**	**17.067**	**44.611**	**120.570**	**137.661**	**43.690**	**109.671**	**56.527**	**39.700**	**313.831**

Quelle: Statistik Austria, Eigene Berechnungen

Illegal migrants, a hotly debated topic within the contemporary European Union, also form part of the large immigration group. Until 2004, Austria formed one of the EU outer borders and was asked to tighten border controls (Irregular Migration, 1998). In fact, 38,550 illegal immigrants were arrested between 1990 and 1996 on the border between Austria and Hungary (13,689 from Rumania, 3,693 from the former Yugoslavia, 766

Bulgarians, and 402 Hungarians) (Irregular Immigration, 1998). However, these numbers are now obsolete since these Eastern European states have joined the European Union and Austria is no longer an outer border country and many of those former illegal immigrants are no longer illegal. Debates concerning asylum-seekers and refugees situated in Austria continue. For example, asylum-seeker applications have increased by 18.09% from 5,920 in 1995 to 6,991 in 1996 (Irregular Immigration, 1998). However, only 8.18% (716) of those were recognised, which indicates a fall in numbers from the previous year, when 13% were recognised (ibid.).

The most common arguments and themes in regard to immigration and migrants are the labour market and welfare system, and cultural and integrationist aspects. As partly described in Chapter One, commonly discussed viewpoints are that foreigners a threat to the labour market, depriving Austrians of jobs, or lowering the wages; or alternatively, that they contribute to the labour market in various ways as 'guestworker' migration is needed. However, from an economic perspective, Zweimueller & Winter-Ebmer (1996) argue that foreign labour includes lower wages and immigrants hold jobs which natives would not accept. Consequently substitution of foreigners for natives does not and would not take place, but rather would introduce new opportunities for native workers. Furthermore immigrants would only replace the 'guestworker' generation. The authors argue that only a small increase in unemployment amongst low income workers could be expected, and most changes caused would be by illegal immigrants. Another frequently used topic is that of the welfare system regarding migrants. These discussions range from the welcoming of migrants as additional taxpayers to debates about migrants as a burden and drain on the labour market. For example, Plasser & Ulram (2002, p. 157) argue that in the 1990s 80% of Austrians were of the opinion that foreigners did jobs that Austrians did not do any more, and 60% of respondents argued that foreigners were necessary for the Austrian economy. Thirty-Eight per cent of Austrians perceived immigration as beneficial only in that it was a securing of the pension system as foreigners have more children. Fifty per cent perceived that Austrian employees would be endangered and threatened by foreign competition on the labour market. (Plasser & Ulram, 2002).

2.0 'Lagermentality' and 'Proporzsystem' - defining characteristics of the Austrian political system

A brief introduction of Austrian political parties and contemporary governmental alliances has been given in Chapter One. The following sections will develop the understanding of the Austrian political system including the 'Proporzsystem' and 'Lagermentality' further.

The Austrian political system can briefly be described in the following way. Müller (1997) argues that around 400 parties exist in Austria; however in reality, the majority of these are not influential. In fact today's major influential parties have been described previously and are the SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ and Green Party. It is necessary to mention that two further parties gained political influence in the past, namely the KPÖ (Communist Party of Austria) which was a relic of the Russian forces occupying Austria after 1945, and which has since lessened in importance, in fact is not part of parliament any more. Furthermore the Liberal Forum founded in the late 1980s gained some oppositional influence in the 1990s but was abolished in 1995 (Liegl, 1997). Both have to be mentioned as, at different points in time, they gained parliamentary seats, and had some, but not much, influence on the Austrian political system.

The concepts 'Proporzsystem', 'Lagermentality' and political 'Lagers' characterise the relationship between the political parties or the political system and the subunits of society. The Austrian 'Proporzsystem' can be compared to the Dutch pillar system (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000). Both the Dutch and the Austrian systems are rare and exhibit common characteristics (Daalder, 1987). Specifically, these consist of the extension of the political power of macro structure political elites to subunits and subsystems of society. In the Netherlands the social subunits are called 'pillars'. In Austria the political parties are defined as 'Lagers' (camps) and the loyalty towards the Lagers by regional actors within subunits is referred to as ''Lagermentality''. (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000). It could be added that under the concept of Lager, the political party but also its influenced social subunits belong to. Hence a supportive layer of society in the micro sphere could also be defined as a Lager, in that case a supportive Lager.

More specifically, firstly, the 'Proporzsystem' means that influences of the political parties depending on their parliamentary strength, are proportionally disseminated and divided between meso and micro subunits of society. The parties place representatives in a

proportionally divided way in the microstructures of society. Pelinka & Rosenberger (2000) argue that the traditional bipolar SPÖ and ÖVP dominated Proporzsystem, exceeded its influence on all social and economic levels and in continuation, exercised proportionally divided power. Specifically, the parties placed their representatives often party members or supporters proportionally within the bureaucratic system, such as employees of large institutions, the school system, educational institution, banks, courts, industry. In practice this is frequently reflected in the membership of parties ('parteibuch-wirtschaft'), as such membership facilitated better career and employment opportunities. It could for example be argued that the VÖEST ALPINE (steel industry) was seen by the public as a 'red' (social democratic) institution in which party members stood a better chance of employment than non party members. Political parties even became the owners of meso institutions, such as companies, and depending on the outcome of the elections, ownership rights were proportionally divided. (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000, p. 146).

Secondly, the concepts of 'Lager' and 'Lagermentality' have to be defined. As described in Chapter One, Wandruszka (1954 in Morrow, 2000, p. 35) argues that 'parties in Austria became competing and self-perpetuating Lager (camps), whole self-sufficient groups, rather than more restricted parties in the Anglo-Saxon sense, and that the social functions of parties fostered a top-down dependence culture, incorporating 'guided movements', rather than wide and participative democratic pluralism'. Political loyalty towards the camps (political Lagers) 'Lagermentality' developed more than loyalty to the state political system. Towards the end of the Habsburg Empire, this Lager loyalty and patriotism was the result of the many different nationalities of the monarchy, which inhibited the population from developing an attachment to the nation (Morrow, 2000; Gerlich, 1987). These layers (Lagers) had a two fold influence firstly by political parties gaining influence, and secondly, by gaining stature within the subsystems of society, on an institutional as well as on a regional basis. One without the other would not be sustainable. Both in the First and Second Austrian Republic those Lagers and the corresponding 'Lagermentality' continued to exist. Regional individuals felt traditionally loyal and supportive, usually for one of the big camps (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000). This is well expressed by 'they did not only vote for this party, the party was also a home for them' (ibid.). This could be interpreted as a stagnating support for the parties, but also demonstrates a certain 'top-down' power relationship. Particularly since for the regional people the party meant 'being looked after for their lives', in terms of access to housing and employment. In that sense the power held by the parties was influential and also appears not to have left individuals

with much opportunity for changing their minds. Pelinka & Rosenberger (2000) further argue that in terms of a political orientational tradition, the political orientations were determining the political socialisation of several generations. These were born into a Lager (traditional family support was transmitted), and then felt a bond, a strong loyalty, to the Lager and to the party (ibid.). This could particularly apply to the support and belief in the orientations of the specific supported party, which then in turn would be reflected in the regional individual's voting behaviour for that party.

However, the above described concepts ('Proporzsystem' and 'Lagermentality') were particularly applicable in former decades, most strongly during the period of the First Austrian Republic, with lessening impact during the Second Austrian Republic. This can partly be understood as a result of Austria's being a First Republic 'conflict culture democracy' (*'Konfliktkulturdemokratie'*) and post-Second Republic 'concordance democracy' *('Konkordanzdemokratie')* (Plasser & Ulram 2000, 2002, Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000). The 'Proporzsystem' and 'Lagermentality' were more easily facilitated by the First Republic 'conflict culture democracy' than by the Second Republic 'concordance democracy'. The existence of the 'Lagers' (political camps) in the First Austrian Republic in the conflict culture resulted in hostility and conflict between the 'Lagers'. These conflicts strengthened the unity of the Lagers (political camps) and their support Lagers internally in their cohesion and externally in their demarcation from other 'Lagers'. In the Second Republic the 'Lagers' obtained consent and compromises, despite still at first being strictly separated from each other by social cleavages. However, the concordance democracy of the Second Austrian Republic led over several decades to a partial disintegration and collapse of the previously very strictly demarcated political Lagers. Because of strong political stabilisation and stagnation, the Lagers had become self-destructive. In fact it is commonly argued today that the strength and cohesion of 'Lagermentality' and 'Proporzsystem' is slowly decreasing. (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000; Plasser & Ulram, 2000, 2002, Plasser, Ulram & Grausgruber, 1992).

It could also be suggested that the loss of power and domination as a result of the dismantling of the 'Proporzsystem' as well as the disappearance of specific party traditional camps is reflected in the political parties in the following way: firstly, a diminishing influence can be identified in that SPÖ and ÖVP have lost 350,000 members since the 1980s (Plasser & Ulram, 2000, p. 23). Secondly, Müller (1995) and Hartman (1996) argue that the sub organisations of the political parties are also in decline. Thirdly,

communication with the outside world has lessened, in that the party-owned newspapers have been taken off the market. Due to the abolition of party newspapers and magazines (only a few have remained such as the SPÖ 'Aktuell'), the political discourses and orientations are not transmitted as effectively as they once were (ibid.). In that respect, Müller (2000) in Plasser *et al.* (2002) argues that since the 1980s party newspapers have almost completely vanished.

Further the breaking down of the 'Lagermentality' is reflected in the regional sphere, where traditional support for the political parties of the subunits of the differing cleavages is decreasing (Plasser & Ulram, 2000). Political scientist literature further strengthens this argument. Until the 1970s, Austria could be described as a country with the least fluctuation in voting patterns according to the Pedersen Index (Müller, 1997) when compared with other countries, while today greater fluctuation can be observed. This, in turn, indicates a breaking down of the 'Lagermentality'. In the past, while low voting fluctuation occurred, the overall party system and the relationship between the parties could be described as stagnating. It is further indicated that such stagnation was also related to cleavages. For example, traditionally the political Lagers both in the macro and the micro sphere were divided by cleavages of class (farmers, employees, workers and entrepreneurs), religion (Catholic or anti-clerical), or region (city, country, centre or periphery). (Müller, 1997). Such cleavages were determinants for the foundation and development of Austrian political parties (Müller, 1997), and can be observed in the micro structures of society, specifically in the support groups. These cleavages then are interconnected with the entire system of Lager, Lager support and regional groups and camps.

More specifically by international comparison in the 1970s and '80s Austria was the subject of the least voting volatility possible, according to the Pedersen Index, yet recent calculations revealed that Austria is no longer part of an ultra-stable political system[10]. Further, it is argue that in 1986 the Pedersen Index was 9.9 in Austria, reached 10.0 in 1990, and increased in 1994 to 15.3. (Müller, 1997). This indicates strongly increasing voting fluctuations. Expressed in percentages of floating voters, the increase ranged from 7% in 1979 to 16% in 1986, to 22% 1995 of floating voters. (Plasser et al, 2002, pp 49-93). Again, this serves as an indication of a breaking down in 'Lagermentality'.

[10] Compared with Anglo Saxon parties, Austria showed strong stagnation in the 1970s

Müller (1997, p. 30) suggests that new topics and issues debated, such as the 'theme of foreigners' and then included in the (election) propaganda and discourses of the specific parties have split and divided the support group Lagers (layers). Amongst other factors, new issues of political debate have been influential, the breaking down of traditional Lagers and in turn also the Proporzsystem. Also, political parties could also not any longer rely on the loyalty of their traditional support groups, such as the rural population for the ÖVP, or the urban working class for the SPÖ. The rural population now also votes for other parties, unlike its traditional Lager loyalty to the ÖVP. Additionally, the working class, traditionally supporting the SPÖ, is no longer a strong support group for the Social Democrats. For example Haider and his charismatic slogans, and the issue of 'foreigners' have changed support behaviour during the 1990s. While, the SPÖ and ÖVP still have support and gain votes for classical and traditional reasons, their popularity is possibly diminishing. The Green Party has gained support and is chosen as a result of its involvement in environmental issues, and the FPÖ has increased its popularity mainly due to Haider's charisma and the discussion of foreigners and immigrants as objects for scapegoating. (Plasser & Ulram, 2000).

Plasser & Ulram (2000) describe the erosion of party loyalties, with weakening support for the Lagers, indicating that only a certain percentage of supporters have remained loyal to their traditionally supported parties. They argue also that the behaviour of supporters has changed from traditional to more active initiative supporters. Austria is in a transformation stage from being a passivity submissive support culture to that of an active participation culture. (Plasser & Ulram, 2000). This argument can be directly related to the 'Lagermentality' and 'Proporzsystem', as in the former 'Proporzsystem' the political parties had extending influence and power in the subsystems and units of society. This, in turn, created submissive as well as passive 'Lagermentality' behaviour amongst regional actors. They could be described as drifting along within their own cleavages following the support of a certain party as their parents and family had always done. This passive and submissive support for political parties will also become relevant again in the section applying Max Weber's theory of domination and legitimacy. The erosion of the passive voting and Lager system becomes obvious in the following figures (Plasser & Ulram, 2000). In 1960, 75% of the Austrian population identified traditionally with certain parties. By 1990 only 50% of the Austrian population identified traditionally with a particular political party, feeling loyal towards it. (Plasser & Ulram, 2000). It should be noted however that voting behaviour is distinct from the feature of traditional support (and

'Lagermentality') for a specific party in terms of its political orientation. This study does not focus on, and has not investigated, changing voting behaviour, but is mainly concerned with different regional Lagers, traditional support the legitimation for the content of discourses, and the political orientation expressed by a specific political party.

It is further significant to point out that the political awareness of everyday actors and their knowledge of politics has increased to 36% of Austrians being moderately interested and 32% now strongly interested in political issues. Within the social groups of employees, urban population, academics and self-employed, awareness and political knowledge of current issues and the political system has grown. On the other hand, within the social groups of workers, farmers, and the rural population, interest and awareness has stagnated or even declined. It could further be argued that within the social groups of rural farmers, entrepreneurs and older generations, as a result of the determination of the traditional 'Lager' cultures, the traditional 'Lagermentality' has greater prominence than within the younger age group. (Plasser & Ulram, 2002). The above findings indicate that for the older Austrian voters more submissiveness and traditional support for specific parties can be seen. It could even be argued that discourses portrayed within the macro sphere could be replicated amongst the older age group, rural farmers and entrepreneurs.

3.0 Dependencies of political elites and the everyday- a general background

Considering the above demonstration of the traditional dynamics of the Austrian political parties within their own system as well as in relation to the subsystems of society, the following power dynamics between the political elites and the everyday set in sociological theory can be identified. For the purpose of this study, these theoretical insights will focus on Max Weber's theories as these appear most applicable, particularly due to the above outlined characteristics of the Austrian political system and its dynamics. It would be fruitless to explain numerous theories, however a few other sociological concepts will be mentioned below, prior to the in-depth discussion about Max Weber's theories.

It should firstly be noted that the theorising of the relationship between politics and the base dates back to the ancient Greek philosophers, specifically Plato and Aristotle. Philosophies about the state and its existence as well as about the legitimacy of any state or state system have already been debated in ancient Greek times. The source of all political philosophy, and maybe even political sociology and political science can be traced back to the writings of Plato (428 B.C.) and Aristotle.

Plato designed the ideal typical version of the state in his work '*Politeia*' in which the state consists of three levels, philosophers as the rulers, watchers as the class of order, and farmers and manual workers as the productive group. This coincides with the Platonic interpretation of the soul, spirit and instincts. Plato argued that if the parts within the soul are in harmony with each other then the individual or the state will be just/fair. This ideal version of the state is also based on the notion of an individual only being able to do one thing perfectly and that such should be the life task and challenge for that person. Therefore Plato theorised strict division between different castes or classes. His ideal version is supposedly a system based on aristocracy. Ideally also the ruling class should consist of philosophers or leaders who philosophise, as only in philosophy can the idea of the 'good and pure' be seen. He further argued that the lowest level of the productive group should to live according to a form of communist principle. In that sense, he argued that no possession or ownerships would be allowed in this particular group, as in his opinion, no envy could then occur. Individuals must fulfil their duties in regard to the state. Justice is the most important principle and will lead to happiness. (Horneffer, 1973; Plato, 2004). In that respect it can be suggested that Plato had already identified the interdependence and interplay between political elites and the governed, though naturally in a very different system. However traces of the category of leaders and rulers as well as of the ruled, and the interconnection between those groupings can be found, particularly as Plato appeared to believe that a certain group of people would be better suited as the ruling elite (philosophical leaders), while a certain type of individual suits being governed and ruled.

In that sense he did not discuss the legitimation of the leader's domination but indicated that those ruled accepted being ruled. On the other hand, he attached the concept of philosophers or thinkers to the leaders, which could also be interpreted as relating to charisma, one of the ideal typical leadership concepts introduced by Weber and further explained later.

Aristotle, conversely argued that human beings were state-orientated beings who desired to live in a community. that state being a finished community. This natural living together in a community would enable the natural relationship between the ruler (governor) and the ruled (governed) to evolve. The state develops out of a natural being. For Aristotle the most important goal was state citizenship behaviour. In his ideal state, the law and rights

are defined by the state, and justice proclaims that everybody should obey the laws of the state. Aristotle further defines the state as a community of equals, not all of whom have equal rights. Full citizens would have full rights, while strangers would have no rights and no duties. Half citizens must work for the state and the community, and, foreigners would have no rights and no duties. (Horneffer, 1973; Aristotle, 2004).

It has been shown that Greek philosophers already described the interdependence and certain forms of rules between the state and society. It is interesting that Aristotle discusses the different laws and rules which individuals of different status groups must follow. Rights and duties are hence concepts which date back to that time and it will be shown later how much importance these concepts have assumed. It is also signifant to see that Aristotle already talked about the local, the citizen and the stranger who had no rights. Already distinctions between local and foreigner had been made, that is those groups within and outside the social and political system.

From a perspective of contemporary theories, it is significant to mention that diverse basic perspectives exist. A number of classical and contemporary sociologists focus on the relations between macro and micro spheres of society. For example Habermas, who will be discussed in more detail later, and his theory of the legitimation crisis of late capitalist states could have some relevance here. Derived from the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School, Habermas (1973) argues that the state apparatus and the administrative apparatus in a formal democracy are *de facto* independent of the masses. In more detail Habermas argues that in 'the legitimatory system in connection to the legitimation problems of late capitalism, that in late capitalism contrary to precapitalistic state foundations, when traditional loyalty towards the system (state) occurred, democratic procedures are almost manipulated so that the state apparatus and the administrative apparatus in a formal democracy are *de facto* independent of the masses' (Habermas, 1973, p.55). In that sense, he suggests that if participation of the masses is avoided, then the citizens of a state are bound to be passive citizens with little impact. In consequence, he argues that the scientification of the political process would lead to a crisis of legitimacy of the political process and the political systems in industrial societies (Habermas, 1973). This could also be understood as Habermas's indication of the domination of the masses. In regard to Weber's concept of legitimacy, Habermas's argument could be seen as expressing doubts in the concept of a legitimation of elites - due to economic changes taking place. In addition other factors of late capitalistic state changes contribute to the crisis of legitimacy.

In continuation of Habermas's arguments, which form part of the Frankfurt school being part of neo Marxist theories, Marxist theories in general are deterministic, arguing that the elites are in service of capitalist class interests to further the exploitation of the powerless classes. Classic Marxist positions theorised that the ruling material force(s) also established itself/themselves as the ruling intellectual force(s) (Ferguson, 1998). The 'base' was dominated by the 'superstructure' through political, legal, social and religious spheres (ibid.). According to McQuail (1994), besides the classic Marxist position, neo Marxist positions can be distinguished into the political-economic, the critical theory (Frankfurt school, especially Marcuse's one-dimensional society) and the hegemonic theory position (Gramsci, Althusser).

In the neo Marxist theories the economic aspects Marx traditionally focused upon became less important. While by some theorists the people are understood as dupes, others interpret the domination of the masses as action understood and tolerated by the masses. These arguments concentrate on the base and superstructure relations in which the base, the actors of the micro sphere, are considered dupes with little impact on the superstructure, which could be seen as equivalent to the state or political party structures. For example, Gramsci (1932/1975) proposes the theory of hegemony, defining it as cultural leadership exercised by the ruling elite. For Gramsci the concept of coercion is the exercise by legislative or executive powers (ibid.). Furthermore Gramsci understood the masses to be in need of help from social elites to be able to carry out a social revolution. In this respect it could be understood that Gramsci understood the masses to be passive and dominated by the ruling elites, not only economically but also culturally, nevertheless he followed the basic and traditional Marxist viewpoints in regard to the general theories of macro and micro sphere relations.

Structural functionalist views include Parsons's theoretical viewpoints. It is complicated and difficult to explain Parsons's theories in relation to the political system in short. However it could be argued that Parsons viewed the general structures and systems in relation to each other as well as the relationship of the actor with the social system. Parsons discussed the interrelationship of structures and systems and their interdependence. In regard to political structures and systems he argues that political power is a symbolic media of exchange and interchange since symbolic medium of interchange are able to be created and circulate in society, those in the political system are

able to create political power. (Alexander, 1983). Those in the political system can expend their political power and then achieve power over the social system. Further these 'mediators' fluctuate between the four action systems (cultural, behavioural, personality and social) and within the structures of each of these systems and hence create dynamics within relatively static systems. (Alexander, 1983). Such a theory does not reveal exactly to what extent Parsons includes concepts of domination. It could be argued that perhaps he understands the political level to be (a) dynamic, and (b) interdependent with other systems and subsystems hence, in simple words, he identifies a mutual dependence of political power and people. Further to mention is the core argument that the political system performs the function of goal achievement by partly mobilising actors (Parsons & Platt, 1973). Such a belief strongly reinforces the above interpretation of interdependence and mutual influence and dynamic between systems of society, such as politics and people. In fact, one is mutually dependent on the other. Further social order, socialisation and social control are concepts used by Parsons in his theories. Values and norms are internalised for life and determine the individual actor (Parsons, 1951). Again a mutual dependence can be understood between the diverse systems, whether macro or micro.

Considering the theories outlined above, Max Weber's theories appear to be the most applicable to the Austrian state system and its relations to the regional spheres, particularly as they appear to be most applicable to the characteristics of the Austrian political system due to the 'Proporzsystem' and 'Lagermentality'. Whilst Marxist or structural functionalist theories about macro and micro sphere relations give a broader viewpoint including other social sphere, Weber's theories are very specific. His theories of domination and legitimacy as well as the ideal types or mixed types of domination could be most applicable to the Austrian political parties, within which the concepts and types of domination appear to be traceable. In fact, based on theory as well as the practical settings of the Austrian political parties, a fourth leadership type will be developed and critically debated. The following paragraphs will explain as well as critically connect Weberian theories to the specific conditions and dynamics of the Austrian political system.

4.0 Max Weber

Weber (2001) suggests that in principle a relationship between the domination ('Herrschaft') and the 'governed' exists. However, other theorists also philosophised about the legitimacy of domination and the legitimation process, but Weber was the first to connect the state with its legitimacy and legitimate (Mommsen, 1989, pp 63-69). As previously discussed, it could be suggested that Plato already identified the interdependence and interplay of political elites and the governed. Traces of the interconnection between leaders and the ruled can be found. Plato believes that a certain group of people would suit to be the ruling elite in a better way (philosophical leaders) whilst a certain type of individual suits to be governed and ruled better. He does not discuss the legitimation of the leader's domination but however appears to indicate that those ruled accept being ruled. Regarding Aristotle's theories, obedience to the state and laws is indicated, another feature found in some form in Weber's legal rational type of domination, to be discussed later on. In regard to Aristotle, Mommsen (1974, p. 74) argues that 'the three pure types of legitimate domination' nonetheless bear the imprint of their intellectual origins, which may be traced back as far as Aristotle's theory of three forms of government circulating from monarchy, to oligarchy and democracy again to monarchy.

Following from this interactive relationship between the 'leaders' and the 'governed' the concept of domination and the legitimacy of dominations, as well as the process of legitimation or not legitimating the ruling elites has to be critically investigated. Weber defined domination ('Herrschaft') as 'the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons'[11] or 'domination as a sociological concept ...can only mean that there is a chance that the governed will submit to any command.'(Weber, 2001, WG, p.122; Mommsen, 1974, pp 84-85). Weber (2001, WG, p.122) appears to indicate that the cohesion of domination and the governed can be based on rational or material interests, but this cohesion then is instable. He further seems to indicate that in addition to the rational and material reasons for cohesion and dominations, the belief in legitimacy must be guaranteed. Weber expresses that 'legitimacy refers to the motivations which induce the subjects (or 'governed') to obey the commands given to them by the ruler, regardless of whether these commands are addressed to them personally or, as more often the case, are couched in the abstract language of regulations, laws or

[11] ‚Herrschaft soll heißen die Chance, für einen Befehl bestimmten Inhalts bei angebbaren Personen Gehorsam zu finden' (Weber, 2001, WG, p.122).

orders in council. The probability that any command will be obeyed by a given group of persons depends,..., largely on one thing, namely whether they believe in the legitimacy of the system or not.'

For example, Weber suggested that:

> 'the basis of every domination, of every obedience, is a belief: 'prestige' belief, in favour of the dominating person (force). This is seldomly unambiguous (explicit).'
>
> 'Grundlage jeder Herrschaft, also jeder Fügsamkeit, ist ein Glauben: »Prestige«-Glauben, zugunsten des oder der Herrschenden. Dieser ist selten ganz eindeutig.' | (Weber, 2001, WG, p.153)

Additionally, the above quote appears to indicate that the ruled must have a belief in the governors and that domination is not a one way concept of a ruling elite dominating the masses as argued by neo Marxist schools. Weber's 'view mainly appears to consist of how much consent to legitimacy is given by the ruled, that is in the empirically discernible willingness to subject themselves to a particular system of domination and to accept its norms as personally binding' (Mommsen, 1989, p. 21). Consequently, according to Weber, a system of domination can therefore merely remain stable, if legitimated and supported by those governed by it, otherwise it will become unstable and will collapse. [12] (Mommsen, 1974, pp 84-85; Weber, 2001, WG, p.122).

On the other hand, Mommsen (1989, p. 21) further interpreting Weber suggests that illegitimate domination is non-existent but that domination could be given consent to a greater or lesser extent. According to Mommsen, Weber indicates that the very foundation on which the legitimacy of the political system rests is that political rule is conducted

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[12] [.... jede Herrschaft über eine Vielzahl von Menschen bedarf normalerweise (nicht: absolut immer) eines Stabes von Menschen (Verwaltungsstab, s. Kap. I, § 12), d.h. der (normalerweise) verläßlichen Chance eines eigens auf Durchführung ihrer generellen Anordnungen und konkreten Befehle eingestellten Handelns angebbarer zuverlässig gehorchender Menschen. Dieser Verwaltungsstab kann an den Gehorsam gegenüber dem (oder: den) Herren rein durch Sitte oder rein affektuell oder durch materielle Interessenlage oder ideelle Motive (wertrational) gebunden sein. Die Art dieser Motive bestimmt weitgehend den Typus der Herrschaft. Rein materielle und zweckrationale Motive der Verbundenheit zwischen Herrn und Verwaltungsstab bedeuten hier wie sonst einen relativ labilen Bestand dieser. Regelmäßig kommen andere — affektuelle oder wertrationale — hinzu. In außeralltäglichen Fällen können diese allein ausschlaggebend sein. Im Alltag beherrscht Sitte und daneben: materielles, zweckrationales, Interesse diese wie andere Beziehungen. Aber Sitte oder Interessenlage so wenig wie rein affektuelle oder rein wertrationale Motive der Verbundenheit könnten verläßliche Grundlagen einer Herrschaft darstellen. Zu ihnen tritt normalerweise ein weiteres Moment: der Legitimitätsglaube.
Keine Herrschaft begnügt sich, nach aller Erfahrung, freiwillig mit den nur materiellen oder nur affektuellen oder nur wertrationalen Motiven als Chancen ihres Fortbestandes. Jede sucht vielmehr den Glauben an ihre »Legitimität« zu erwecken und zu pflegen. Je nach der Art der beanspruchten Legitimität aber ist auch der Typus des Gehorchens, des zu dessen Garantie bestimmten Verwaltungsstabes und der Charakter der Ausübung der Herrschaft grundverschieden. Damit aber auch ihre Wirkung. Mithin ist es zweckmäßig, die Arten der Herrschaft je nach dem ihnen typischen Legitimitätsanspruch zu unterscheiden. Dabei wird zweckmäßigerweise von modernen und also bekannten Verhältnissen ausgegangen. (Weber, 2001, WG, p.122)

according to procedures by which rules are enacted and political decisions reached. (Weber, 2001; Mommsen, 1989, p. 47).

It appears to be possible to project most theoretical aspects of domination and legitimacy onto contemporary Austrian society and its political system. For the specific case of the Austrian political and everyday interdependence system a number of theoretical connections can be found.

In this respect, the application and interconnection of the Weberian theory to the Austrian 'Proporzsystem' and 'Lagermentality' will be explained. The proportionate division of political power in the subunits of society could be seen as a strong form of domination. On the other hand in terms of the legitimating process, it could be argued that the strong traditional 'Lagermentality' and loyalty of the Austrian regional everyday actors, somewhat being interconnected with the Proporzsystem, could be understood as the strong legitimation (in Weberian terms) of political units. The theoretical correspondence of domination and legitimacy appears to show parallels to the interactive relationship of Proporz, Lagers and 'Lagermentality'. It could further be suggested that Austria was a passivity submissive support culture (Plasser et al, 2000). Such an argument could be directly interpreted in Weberian terms and related to the 'Lagermentality' (legitimation process), and 'Proporzsystem'. In that sense people were not only loyal to a certain Lager by being passive and being dominated, but also by passively, through e.g. influence of family tradition legitimating the supported political Lager. In this respect people could be understood as drifting along within their own cleavage following the support of a certain party as the parents and the family had always done. Further, they could be understood as legitimating one of the political parties, also in their domination, uncritically and without question.. However, Plasser *et al* (2000) further argue that the passive support culture is in a transformation stage from a passive to an active participation culture. This is a relevant sign of a crumbling Proporz and 'Lagermentality', however, some elements of society (also indicated by Plasser and Ulram) still remain situated in the traditional Lager and 'Proporzsystem' and hence Weberian theories, to a large extent, appear to continue to be applicable and theoretically interlinked to the specific dynamics of the Austrian political system.

Given the argument of a transformation from passive support to an active participation culture, and the crumbling of the Proporz and 'Lagermentality', a further theoretical connection could be drawn between the Austrian political system and Habermas's previously indicated theory of the legitimation crisis[13]. Habermas's prediction of a crisis of legitimation of the political sphere and domination as a result of economic growth coming to an end, resulting in a loss of faith in late capitalist developments, could possibly be observed in Austria. It could thus be suggested that when the 'Lagermentality' and proportionally support and divisions of society began to unravel in Austria, this might be partly a result of stagnation due to too much progress as well as the dissatisfaction of the everyday support groups due to stagnation in the political system; or, alternatively, the economic over satisfaction and saturation point achieved in society. Such oversatisfaction and dissatisfaction in stagnation amongst the people, could be understood in respect of the increasing strong economic growth in Austria after the Second World War, particularly in the 1950s to early 80s, the time period which coincides with the strongest 'Lagermentality' and legitimation of political parties as well as the stable 'Proporzsystem' and a stable submissive passive voting behaviour according to the 'Lagermentality'. However, this voting behaviour and 'Lagermentality' as well as 'Proporzsystem' began to disintegrate in the mid to late 1980s when the economic growth period was slowing down or stagnating. Habermas's theory might be applicable, but only partially, mainly in interpreting the theoretical writings describing the breaking down of traditional elements of 'Lagermentality'. As suggested by Plasser & Ulram previously, despite the partial collapse, the 'Proporzsystem' and the 'Lagermentality' continue to exist. Nevertheless, Weber's theories appear to continue to be applicable to the dynamics of the Austrian political system which remain situated in the traditional conditions and framework of the Lagers and Proporzsystem.

Particularly, given that Weber's leaders and rulers could be understood and interpreted as democratic political parties, his three types of domination appear to be applicable to the specific agendas and organisational structure of the four main Austrian parties. Firstly, however, the Weberian types of leadership will be introduced and critically investigated. These are the ideal typical ones of the legal-rational leadership type, the traditional leadership type, and the charismatic leadership type. Secondly, the corresponding concept of the legitimation of each of these leadership types will be critically analysed and

13 The disintegration of these political conditions however do not indicate that Weber's theories are not applicable or integratable in Austria. Despite a partial decrease of the before described features of the Austrian political system, the system has not collapsed completely and continues to exist on a lessened basis.

developed further. Thirdly, a new form of domination and corresponding legitimacy will be developed. The new, also ideal typical form of governance developed could be entitled 'utopian' and its counterpart 'dystopian' domination and legitimacy. Furthermore, those concepts will be theoretically applied and demonstrated within a framework of organisational structure and the agendas of the Austrian political parties.

Weber focused on three pure types of legitimate domination, arguably manifested in contemporary Austrian political parties. The legal-rational type is expressed as 'the belief in the formally correct enactment of laws'...and 'it would be administered by an almighty bureaucracy in accordance with a closely-knit network of laws and regulations of a purely formalistic nature' (Mommsen, 1974, pp 81-82; Weber, 2001). Traditional domination could be understood as leadership guided by traditions, in Weberian terms, for example by religious traditions. The content of commands is expressed within the boundary of traditions and traditional values, often ethical traditional morals, instead of formal laws (Mommsen, 1974; Weber, 2001). Charismatic domination, charisma, is described as 'the quality in a person which creates a willingness in his followers to subject themselves unconditionally to his leadership' (Mommsen, 1974, p. 78; Weber, 2001)[14].

[14] 1. rationalen Charakters: auf dem Glauben an die Legalität gesatzter Ordnungen und des Anweisungsrechts der durch sie zur Ausübung der Herrschaft Berufenen ruhen (legale Herrschaft), — oder
2. traditionalen Charakters: — auf dem Alltagsglauben an die Heiligkeit von jeher geltender Traditionen und die Legitimität der durch sie zur Autorität Berufenen ruhen (traditionale Herrschaft), — oder endlich
3. charismatischen Charakters: auf der außeralltäglichen Hingabe an die Heiligkeit oder die Heldenkraft oder die Vorbildlichkeit einer Person und der durch sie offenbarten oder geschaffenen Ordnungen (charismatische Herrschaft).
Im Fall der satzungsmäßigen Herrschaft wird der legal gesatzten sachlichen unpersönlichen Ordnung und dem durch sie bestimmten Vorgesetzten kraft formaler Legalität seiner Anordnungen und in deren Umkreis gehorcht. Im Fall der traditionalen Herrschaft wird der Person des durch Tradition berufenen und an die Tradition (in deren Bereich) gebundenen Herrn kraft Pietät im Umkreis des Gewohnten gehorcht. Im Fall der charismatischen Herrschaft wird dem charismatisch qualifizierten Führer als solchem kraft persönlichen Vertrauens in Offenbarung, Heldentum oder Vorbildlichkeit im Umkreis der Geltung des Glaubens an dieses sein Charisma gehorcht. (Weber, 2001, p.124)
Die bürokratische Herrschaft ist spezifisch rational im Sinn der Bindung an diskursiv analysierbare Regeln, die charismatische spezifisch irrational im Sinn der Regelfremdheit. Die traditionale Herrschaft ist gebunden an die Präzedenzien der Vergangenheit und insoweit ebenfalls regelhaft orientiert, die charismatische stürzt (innerhalb ihres Bereichs) die Vergangenheit um und ist in diesem Sinn spezifisch revolutionär. Sie kennt keine Appropriation der Herrengewalt nach Art eines Güterbesitzes, weder an den Herren noch an ständische Gewalten. Sondern legitim ist sie nur soweit und solange, als das persönliche Charisma kraft Bewährung »gilt«, das heißt: Anerkennung findet und »brauchbar« der Vertrauensmänner, Jünger, Gefolge, nur auf die Dauer seiner charismatischen Bewährtheit. (Wener, 2001, WG, p.141)

Weber's three pure types of domination could be understood as in some form interlinked. It must be noted that Weber suggests that the pure ideal types do not exist as stand alone types in an empirical reality (Weber, 2001, WG, p.124; Mommsen, 1989, p. 47) [15]. For example, in regard to legal-rational domination (and its legitimacy) Weber argues that:

> 'domination within the 'legal' type is never purely legal. [But, the belief in legal- rationality is 'indigenous', hence itself bound to tradition].'
>
> ‚Er ist bei der »legalen« Herrschaft nie rein legal. [Sondern der Legalitätsglauben ist »eingelebt«, also selbst traditionsbedingt]: -‚..'.(Weber, 2001, WG, p.154).

On the other hand, Weber argues that charisma is a feature that occurs in all leadership types, particularly in the political leader himself (ibid.).

It is important to critically examine Weber's viewpoints on domination and its debatable relationship to concepts of legitimacy further. The interconnection between a specific exercised ideal typical form of domination and the way in which regional actors might legitimate this specific type is outlined below.

Legal rational leadership is described as the most pragmatic and faces the danger of stagnation and petrification. No dynamic leaders exist in the legal rational type of domination. Legal rational rule indicates that the omnipotent administrative apparatus, legal rational purpose orientated but not morally based laws, are the basis for legal rational domination. The legitimacy of this type of domination is based on the assumption that all its laws are legal, to the extent that they have been enacted in a formally correct way. Legal legitimacy depends on the belief that everything that has been enacted in accordance with established procedures may be considered legitimate. (Weber, 2001, WG, pp 125-130; Mommsen, 1989, pp 21-23; p. 47).

On the other hand, Weber argues that traditional leadership can be described as the sanctity of good old customs. Yet, traditional leadership can be exposed to erosion by the over-routinisation of traditional principles. Traditional domination and rule is most ambiguous, being halfway embedded in legal forms of government, patrimonial and also ascribed to

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[15] ‚Daß keiner der drei, im folgenden zunächst zu erörternden, Idealtypen historisch wirklich »rein« vorzukommen pflegt, darf natürlich hier sowenig wie sonst die begriffliche Fixierung in möglichst reiner Ausprägung hindern.(Weber, 2001, WG, p.124).
§ 13. Das Gesagte kann keinen Zweifel darüber gelassen haben: daß Herrschaftsverbände, welche nur dem einen oder dem andern der bisher erörterten »reinen« Typen angehören, höchst selten sind. (Weber, 2001, WG, p.153)

the traditional ideals of a person. Traditional legitimacy can be seen as the permanency of charismatic leadership, in the sense of what has traditionally been legitimate remains legitimate. (Weber, 2001, WG, pp 130-149; Mommsen, 1989, pp 21- 23; p. 47).

Charismatic domination is the least institutionalised, most dynamic and ripe for change. Charismatic rule is unpredictable and creative as well as very effective in its initial stages, but is unstable as well as susceptible to change. Charismatic leadership originates in the personality of the leader. (Weber, 2001, WG, pp 140-146; Mommsen, 1974). Weber (2001) additionally theorised further about charismatic domination, being the most complex of all leadership types. Weber discussed the institutionalisation of charisma, in which case charisma can mix with for example bureaucratic domination. For example, distinctions were drawn between different types of charisma, amongst others also 'Erbcharisma' or 'Amtscharisma'. (Weber, 2001, WG, p.142).

Following on from these arguments, Breuer (1994) interpreting Weber, indicated that the charisma of reason and institutionalised charisma were two mutant forms of charismatic domination. The first is described by Breuer as charisma being disconnected from an individual persona, who then only serves the purpose of being a carrier of ideas. Charisma then changes into a reasonable concept, holding features of ideas and programmes. (Breuer, 1994). On the other hand, Anter (1993) interpreting Weber, theorises about the '*Amtscharisma*', which described charisma embedded in a modern state, being the changed, rational, institutionalised, and de-personalised charisma. In contrary genuine charisma is the charisma of an individual, which is somehow used and as an individual becomes the game ball. Then again the charismatic leader is in a way de-personalised and this person is exchangeable and replaceable. (Weber, 2001, p. 156; Anter, 1993, pp 75-76).

According to Weber's (2001) definition, the legitimacy of charisma appears to be granted by the followers because of accepting what the leader represents and the orders issued by that leader. The followers consider these as absolutely binding (Mommsen, 1989, p. 47). Forms of charismatic leadership as described are said to be legitimated by followers through belief in the leader, but with the acceptance of the exchangeability of the leader (Weber, 2001; Breuer, 1994; Anter, 1993).

In regard to the illegitimacy of domination, Mommsen as previously suggested, seemed to interpreted Weber to not suggest the existence of illegitimate leadership. Nevertheless Weber appears to indicate that illegitimately achieved leadership exists, even though he appears to argue this point in a different context than domination and legitimacy:

> The specifically 'worldly' notorious 'Omaijden' were supporters of the predestined beliefs, because they expected their own illegitimately achieved domination to be legitimated by the predestined will of Allah'.
>
> 'das als spezifisch »weltlich« verschriene Omaijadengeschlecht Anhänger des Prädestinationsglaubens gewesen, weil es seine eigene illegitim erworbene Herrschaft durch den prädestinierenden Willen Allahs legitimiert zu sehen erwartete:' (Weber, 2001, WG, p. 329)

To develop this further, it could be argued that in a way charismatic domination could also be illegitimate or illegitimately legitimated. For example, one form of charisma could be the 'puppets' of major governments in which the political leader serves the purpose of attracting the masses and their votes, by him being a charismatic, possibly attractive individual or 'puppet', a congenial front for the party. Then the genuine and '*Amtscharisma*', is put in place and legitimated by the legitimation of charisma, even though the leader is a replaceable figure who is manufactured as charismatic. Such charisma appears to be illegitimately legitimated in that the leader is not really a leader who exercises forms of domination but is a fake in which the masses believe and which the masses legitimate, so they do not legitimate the actual form of domination but its fake For example, dictators could be understood as charismatic, and one-way leaders who carry out domination according to their principles with the tool of a military or administrative apparatus. However, dictators could often be understood as illegitimately legitimated also -in their charisma- as they frequently use strong power of force to propel the legitimation process of their domination. For example, a fake legitimacy appears to have existed to a large extent (not a full extent) in Iraq with Saddam Hussein who was not legitimated by a large majority of the population, while he kept his military and administration apparatus under control and forced the legitimation of his charismatic leadership. Some of this could also apply to other authoritarian leaderships, such as that of Hitler, even though the extent to which the masses actually believed in the form of exercised control and charismatic or other domination remains doubtful, and the extent to which dictatorships or authoritarian leaderships compel such domination over the large majority of the masses.

Given the above outlined relations of domination and legitimacy it could be argued that Weber suggests that domination is legitimated in its corresponding specific characteristics, and that the process of legitimation of leadership types has to be critically investigated further[16]. In that sense it could be suggested that Weber theorised that tradition is legitimated through belief in tradition, and in traditional characteristics and features of dominations. However, this concept of the legitimation of specific characteristics appears to be debatable. One form of domination does not necessarily have to match with the legitimation of this specific type of domination. In fact domination could be legitimated as such but not necessarily for the type of its enactment. To develop this argument, for example, on the one hand it could be said that leaders might be perceived in different ways and legitimated for reasons other than their leadership types. That is, the perception and reasons for legitimating a leadership type or a form of domination can possibly be different from the actual intention of the leaders and elites of their form of leadership. For example, a leader or politician might not see himself as charismatic, nor follow a charismatic leadership type or form of domination, yet might be legitimated solely by the perception of being charismatic by a segment of everyday actors who are perceiving him as good looking, and are swayed by his charisma. Simultaneously a party or leader ruling by traditional features mainly could be considered rationally beneficial to a segment of regional actors and thus be legitimated, not for traditional elements, but purely out of calculating rational reasons of the people or for a perceived enactment of legal rationality. This could be the case for a segment of the population who is interested in one specific aspect of a political elite's policy, such as the liberalisation of the housing market. This however could be indicated by an elite who is dominated by traditional elements, but the regional actors legitimate the leadership due to their own rational advantages they would gain by the liberation of the housing market or the perceived rational or legal effect of this. Equally it could be argued that legitimation is always traditional in itself when it is done out of the traditional support for a party, which was the case in the Austrian 'Lagermentality' and loyalty by subunits of society for the specific party representing them.

In this respect it could then be suggested that legitimacy can occur indirectly. For example, it could be possible, on a theoretical basis, that a leadership considers itself rational-legal, while this element becomes traditional. If so, the supporters might legitimate the traditional part of legal rationality, rather than the legal rational element. In

[16] This theoretical discussion was triggered by a comment by Dr. Brian Torode in a supervisory session

the three pure forms, if we only look at the pure forms of domination, the legitimation of such could occur in nine ways. A leadership type might continue in existence past its 'expiry' date such that the followers legitimate the expired leadership type but not the new form of leadership. For example, an old socialist party might consider itself rationalistic or reflect rational elements in leadership but its followers might drift away, believing it to represent outdated traditionalist old fashioned socialism. Hence, in Austria it could even be suggested that a party dominating by rational principles, or by their own self interpretation rational principles, could be legitimated by its supporters due to the traditional 'Lagermentality' loyalty rather than the regional actors' beliefs in the rational type of domination. It could however also be argued that legitimation by traditional motivation, but the beliefs and traditional legitimating of rational forms of domination are intermingled (intermixed) and not necessarily seen as separate.

5.0 A fourth ideal-typical leadership type

The concept of charisma and charismatic domination is relatively complex. In this respect a further type of leadership, a fourth ideal type, could be debated about, either emerging from charismatic domination, or being entirely independent. It must be noted that Weber suggested that the three ideal types introduced so far are the only existing forms of legitimate governments, but occur in mixed forms (Mommsen, 1989, p. 47, Weber, 2001, WG, p.124).

This fourth ideal typical form of domination and legitimacy appears not to be a type which exists as a legitimate government under normal circumstances. Rather it could be seen either in connection with other types of domination or, theoretically, as a stand-alone type which is legitimated by followers in its own right but legitimated as a form of governmental domination only in exceptional cases. In that respect it could firstly be suggested that connected to charisma, concepts of utopia and dystopia exist[17]. The connection of utopia and dystopia with charisma and charismatic domination will be explained later, however, firstly 'utopia' and 'dystopia' need to be defined.

The word 'utopia' first occurred in Sir Thomas More's Utopia, published in Latin as *Libellus . 'de optimo reipublicae statu, deque nova insula Utopia* '('Concerning the highest

[17] Idea was triggered off by a comment on the thesis by Dr. B. Torode in a supervision meeting, 14.12.2004.

state of the republic and the new island Utopia'; 1516). Utopia is hence defined as an imaginary island, depicted by Thomas More as enjoying a perfect social, legal and political system. 'Utopia' derived from the Greek words '*ou*' ('not') and '*topos*' ('place') and thus means 'nowhere'. Further it is defined as a place, state or condition ideally perfect in respect of politics, laws, customs, and conditions. (Oxford English dictionary).

The counter pole to utopia is 'dystopia' defined as an imaginary place or condition in which everything is as bad as possible. For example, Aldous Huxley's '*Brave New World*', or George Orwell's '*Nineteen Eighty Four*' could be understood as dystopias. (Oxford English dictionary).

It must be noted that theoretically, also the concept of '*eutopia*' ('*eu*'- '*topos*'- the 'good place') exists. It could be argued that '*eutopia*' deriving from its Greek original meaning, could be interpreted as the place being the ultimate 'paradise', the ideal-typical world. On the other hand, 'utopia' by its translation means 'no' 'place', a non existing place. However, given the contemporary definitions and understanding of 'utopia' above, '*eutopia*' and utopia could be understood as almost identical in their contemporary meaning. Due to this, for the purpose of this work, '*eutopia*' as a separate concept will be neglected.

On the other hand, Karl Mannheim (1936) suggests that utopias provide the vision of an alternative order and encourage political change. Perdue (1986) indicates that for Mannheim '*utopian*' means that total systems of thoughts are forged by oppressed groups interested in the transformation of society. Utopia is connected to the purpose of social thought in order not to diagnose the present reality but to provide a rationally justifiable system of ideas to legitimate and direct change. (Perdue, 1986).

In this respect, the meaning of social and possibly political change is attached to the concept of 'utopia', according to Mannheim. On the other hand, Weber does not seem to discuss utopian or dystopian forms of leadership, nor does he appear to connect utopia with charisma, yet he indicates that charisma can be revolutionary. More specifically Weber (2001, p.155) argues that charisma can be reinterpreted as an antiauthoritarian force. Weber (2001, WG, p.142)[18] then suggests that charismatic domination can be understood –

[18] ‚Das Charisma ist die große revolutionäre Macht in traditional gebundenen Epochen'.

amongst other forms -as a revolutionary force within traditional historical eras. He suggests that:

> ,....charisma can be a transformation from within, which, born out of need/necessity or enthusiasm, can mean the change of fundamental attitudes or doings under the condition of complete reorientation of all attitudes to all existing forms of life and to the world as such.'
>
> .....'kann Charisma eine Umformung von innen her sein, die, aus Not oder Begeisterung geboren, eine Wandlung der zentralen Gesinnungs- und Tatenrichtung unter völliger Neuorientierung aller Einstellungen zu allen einzelnen Lebensformen und zur »Welt« überhaupt bedeutet.' (Weber, 2001, WG, p.142).

Weber additionally appears to connects utopian ideas with revolutions. Weber appears to connect revolutions with the influence of 'utopian' principles:

> 'The utopian influence of all revolutions has its natural basis in this. This is also the limit of rationality of the administration of modern times,....'
>
> Der utopische Einschlag aller Revolutionen hat hier seine naturgemäße Grundlage. Hier liegt auch die Schranke der Rationalität dieser Verwaltung in moderner Zeit, ...'(Weber, 2001, WG, p.157).

Based on the above, it could be possible that Weber indirectly connects the two concepts of utopia and charisma.

In respect of utopian ideas, additionally, Mannheim (1936/1968) suggested a categorisation of 'utopian mentality' types. He suggests that early religious sects (such as the Anabaptists) joined with other oppressed groups in the "spiritualization of politics." Their revolutionary conception of society was fixed on the establishment of a millennial kingdom on earth. 'Utopian mentality' took the form of a "liberal-humanitarian" ideals, or the "conservative mode," bent on controlling the anarchism of "inner freedom" that threatens the utopian dream. ([1936] 1968, p.247).

Given that Weber indirectly appears to interconnect revolutions, charisma and utopian ideas, and that Mannheim suggests 'utopian mentality' groups as well as utopian ideas to play a role within oppressed groups, the following could be suggested: It could be suggested that charisma, revolution, utopia and utopian mentalities are interlinked and that utopian and also dystopian elements could possibly form part of charismatic domination, and specifically arise from revolutionary charisma or form part of revolutionary charisma. If such elements can be part of charismatic leadership and domination, then it might also be, that utopian as well as dystopian concepts form a leadership type or are by themselves forms of domination which people may or may not obey and legitimate. For the purpose

of this thesis the concepts of utopia and dystopia are understood as emerging out of charisma and are treated as either being interlinked with charisma or being stand alone concepts. Hence, on a theoretical basis the new leadership type of either 'utopia' or its counterpart 'dystopia' exists. Utopian forms of domination can occur by themselves, and so too can dystopian forms. Nevertheless, due to dystopia forming the counter concept of utopia, the two different concepts still make one leadership type. Additionally, the possibilities of a charismatic-utopian, or a charismatic-dystopian leadership type also exist which theoretically exhibits combined characteristics of charisma and either utopian or dystopian elements.

More specifically, on a theoretical basis it could be argued that stand-alone utopian domination could be characterised by being unstructured with loose hierarchies involved, but need not be characterised by such. Further it can be understood as flexible, not pragmatic, not rule bound, but manifested in utopian principles. Utopian principles are taken to mean that domination is based on principles not possible to be situated in a practical setting, almost like wishes and dreams. In the past this could be seen as the utopian dreams of great conquerors, who were unable to rule the whole world. For example, the portrayal of such a utopian goal in leadership might be legitimated due to sharing that utopian dream. On the other hand, to situate utopian leadership in a contemporary political system, it could be understood as a belief in relatively unrealistic policies which could not ever be achieved in any contemporary society. It could further be argued that utopian domination might also be related to a form of anti domination, a form of chaos, or even anarchistic tendencies[19]. In that sense utopian leadership and domination could either occur in anarchistic organisation, such as terrorist organisations, or it could in principle occur in organsiations which include any form of fanaticism, like religious groups which are highly organised and can be businesses-like. Mannheim (1936/1968) also, as suggested earlier, argues that utopian mentality can be found in religious sets or groups with anarchistic tendencies. Utopian leadership in that sense would usually not attract a majority of followers and obeyers, but a minority group.

The concept of dystopia, treated as a stand-alone leadership type, could be seen as the domination by a leader holding on to the past and attempting to revitalise past utopias, in the sense of past nostalgic utopian ideas. Despite the definition of 'dystopia' of being the counterpart to utopia (in the sense of creating 'bad' utopias), 'dystopia' could also be

[19] In this respect utopian leadership could be understood as a revolutionary force being interlinked with the concept of 'revolutionary charisma'.

interpreted as being the revitalisation of a failed utopia which in itself might have been bad. Hence, dystopia is a creation of failed utopias. It is connected to utopia as without utopias that have failed already, dystopia would not exist. Consequently, utopia and dystopia do not form two independent new ideal typical leadership types but only one. In spite of this they can exist without their counterparts. Dystopian elements, the romanticising of past utopias, or the nostalgic wish to reinvent past utopias which have existed but have failed, could be part of such domination. The feature 'dystopia' could either form part of the charismatic leadership as described above, or alternatively also form a leadership of its own, not necessarily in a legitimate government. The dystopian leadership might be characterised by the same features as the utopian leadership, but however with the belief in a failed utopia. The wish to revitalise the failed past adds up to the dystopian leadership type. For example, extremist left and right groups with few of followers, which might believe in past but failed fanatic ideologies such as Nazism; belief in biological superiority, or contemporary colonialists who believe in the reinvention of empires and the reinstatement of imperial rule, possibly dominating the world order, belong to this category.

In regard to the legitimacy of utopian leadership, it could be argued, that utopian leadership would depend on the belief of those governed in the utopian principles portrayed. It could even be argued that fanatism could fall into this category, meaning that fanatics, would be even more inclined to legitimate utopian leadership. Further it could be suggested that the legitimation of this utopian leadership type would be related to the disbelief in principles and systems (belief in chaos and anarchistic tendencies) almost a form of anti belief which would legitimate this leadership type. On the other hand the legitimacy of the dystopian leadership type could be seen as manifested in the belief in governance or rulers who want to revitalise past nostalgic utopias which were tried out but had failed.

It is necessary to situate the ideal types of 'rule' in relation to each other including the concepts of utopia and dystopia. As suggested earlier, Weber argues that the three pure types of legitimate domination do not occur as stand-alone concepts in an empirical reality. Rather, they are interlinked and occur in mixed forms (Weber, 2001; Mommsen, 1989). In spite of such combined occurrence, it could be suggested that domination is carried out to an exceptional extent by one of the three ideal types. In other words, despite the occurrence of mixed types, leadership is almost always dominated by one of the types.

Weber (2001) appears to imply that different types of domination alternate. Furthermore, as suggested previously, he indicates that all revolutions have utopian character (Weber, 2001, WG, pp 156-157). This could lead to the following discussion. The outstanding forms of leadership have alternated in the course of history. Changes of leadership could then be seen as initiated and triggered by marginally moving utopian or dystopian guided segments of society. Utopian or dystopian guided segments of society should then be understood as small scale segments on the peripheries of social political systems, serving as triggers of change to existing leadership types or existing forces of domination[20]. Utopian or dystopian segments could then be understood as the key functions and processes leading (or aiming to lead) to political and social changes; in that respect changes of domination. However once this change might occur or be triggered off, the utopian or dystopian elements of leadership within that segment could be understood as mutating into one of the three classical types of domination. In this respect utopian or dystopian leadership elements do not have the ability to continue in this form of leadership once a change has been achieved. In fact, theoretically two possibilities of the continuity of utopian and dystopian elements can be identified. Once the utopian/dystopian segment has initiated change, either an utopian/dystopian guided segment mutates into one of the classical types of domination and institutionalises itself, or alternatively it disappears and loses its function. Due to utopian or dystopian leaderships as such not being able to survive as legitimate governments, they could be understood as triggers for social movements which might gain power for a short period of time only. Utopian and dystopian leadership might be very short-lived and provide a stopgap for legitimate governmental forms of domination between the three other types alternating their domineering role in legitimate governments.

For example, monarchies in Europe prior to 1918 were mainly traditional leaderships, most notably, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The First World War was initiated by a Serb nationalist movement, which might be viewed as an utopian element in society at the time. Nevertheless, guided by utopian elements this movement did not gain major influence after the start of the First World War. In this respect, the utopian nationalist movement served as a trigger to change. If the nationalist movement had gained power in a political system it could have mutated to charismatic or another type of leadership and could have become a legitimate form of government after the First World War. Utopian ideas would have

[20] This key function of change could be re-connected to the previously mentioned revolutionary type of charisma.

turned into an empirical reality of a governance led by charisma and/or bureaucracy. Hence the utopian leadership as such cannot exist in a legitimate governmental form, but turns into a governmental legitimate form of domination of one of the three pure types.

On the other hand, it can be suggested that as a result of the First World War, former monarchies were then replaced by democratic governments, for example the Weimar Republic, or in the Austrian case, the First Austrian Republic. These new governments could be characterised as bureaucratic and legal-rational dominated governments. In the course of history, due to economic depression, a small group believing in at that time utopian ideals for re-inventing a universal German nation, and believing in biological superiority, formed at first a small-scale political movement or party. By way of institutionalising itself, it became an institutionalised form of, initially, utopian and later charismatic government. In fact, from the institutionalisation of 'utopia' emerged a charismatic leadership without utopia once the utopian ideals had been implemented in an empirical reality. Hitler then was historically short-lived and again not just overthrown by the allied forces defeat but also by the small scale utopian resistance movements within Germany at that time. Hitler's charismatic rule was then replaced once again by a bureaucratic form of domination in post war Germany and Austria.

Following this discussion, several conclusions can be drawn. Firstly utopia is connected to charisma and that charisma with utopia can, but need not be legitimate. Consequently, Weber's earlier arguments indicating that the three pure types of leadership are the only legitimate governments can also be applied to the above example, despite the role of utopia within Hitler's dictatorship and in spite of the debatability of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of his charismatic domination. Consequently, utopia and dystopia can be understood as emerging from charisma, being elements of change in political social settings. Secondly, it can be concluded that outstanding types of leadership rule, appear to alternate in history. For example, in the context of Austria and Germany, traditional leadership of the pre- First World War empires were replaced by bureaucratic and legal rational leaderships (Weimar Republic or First Austrian Republic), which then were replaced with the charismatic one (Nazims and Hitler). The charismatic one was short lived and replaced by yet another bureaucratic legal-rational one (Second Austrian Republic, BRD).

Furthermore, it could be suggested that utopian lead groups continue to exist in multiple forms. For example, nationalist movements in general could be understood often as

including utopian leadership forms, who aim for change of political domination. One example could be the Basque nationalist movement. On the other hand, organisations such as the Red Army Fraction ('Rote Armee Fraktion'), who aimed for political and social changes, but never achieved to be the trigger segment for a change of domination, could be mentioned here.

In the Graph (1.4) on the next page the interdependence between the three pure types of leadership can be seen and the role which utopia and its counterpart dystopia play is illustrated.


Bureaucratic
Traditional
Charismatic
Utopia
Dystopia

Before applying the different leadership types to the four main Austrian parties, the following graph (1.5) has been designed and illustrates the above discussed theoretical insights. The leadership types, their legitimation and their possible form of appearance have been illustrated in their ideal typical appearance. Meanings are attached to the linings of the graph. Those are significant and indicate the interdependence of the leadership types. The linings intend to show that leadership types are interconnected and this indicates that mixed forms of the three ideal types occur in the Austrian political party setting within each party also. This could be understood as in that every leadership type incorporates charisma, traditional aspects and legal rational aspects, as has previously been suggested. Or that, illustrated in the graph traditional–legal-rational, or traditional-charismatic types can exist. Further, on a theoretical basis the charismatic- legal rational or the charismatic-traditional type could be exist.

Furthermore, it is indicated that the utopian and dystopian leaderships are interconnected as they can be understood as a pro and contra feature, or the plus and minus complementing each other, and in that sense exhibit a permeable lining. On the other hand, in spite of utopia and dystopia forming ideal types and hence stand alone types of leadership, yet, the utopian and dystopian elements can also be understood as either emerging from charisma, or being interconnected to charisma. The position below charisma with permeable lining indicates this, and suggests that a pure ideal typical utopian and a pure ideal typical dystopian as well as a mixed charismatic-utopian and a charismatic-dystopian leadership type could exist. Utopian and dystopian elements can be interlinked with charisma even more than with the other types, even though on a theoretical basis it is possible that all elements can exist in multiple combinations.

Bureaucratic legal – rational Leadership Type

based on:
-bureaucracy
-laws and rules
-enactment of laws not morals

omnipotent administrative apparatus
pragmatism
stagnation
no dynamism (leaders)
petrification and stagnation

legitimated by belief in laws and rules

Democratic leadership
power obtained by elections

Traditional Leadership type

traditional
based on:
-religious tradition
-ethical traditional morals
-sanctity of good old customs

over routinisation
ambigiuous-some aspects of legal rational

Legitimated by tradition
what has always been legitimate remain legitimate

Power obtained by inheritance (kings) or from God
head of major world religion churches, Vatican

Charismatic Leadership

one charismatic individual
quality in person to have unconditional legitimation by people
least institutionalised
most up to change
unstable
unpredicable
initially effective but often vulnerable to collapse
can be institutionalised

Legitimated by charisma (dictators)
belief in individual or also the in insitutionalised charisma, then belief in the exchangeabiltiy of the leader with charimsa in agendas
Keeps power with dictatorship

Utopian leadership

anarchistic
consists of wishes and dreams
unstructured, but need not be
lose hierarchies, chaos, but need not be
no morals or laws
extremism

legitimated by belief in an utopia and the sharing of this with leaders
the belief in chaos

anarchistic groups, terrorist groups
fanatic groups like religious sects

Dystopian leadership

the belief in a failed utopia
the belief in failed systems
the wish to reinvent past but failed utopias or charisma

legitimated by the belief in a failed utopia or charisma and sharing that with leaders

right and left wing extremist groups

6.0 Austrian political parties and ideal typical leaderships

Following from the theoretical discussion of the three Weberian and one newly emerged leadership types and their legitimation, it could be suggested that within the Austrian political parties the three pure types of domination can be identified - and possibly the fourth newly emerged leadership type also. Weber (2001, WG, pp 167-168) suggests that domination and legitimacy can be applied to political parties. He further argues that political parties can use any means to achieve power. He argues that political parties can have personal interests or material interests. Further he suggests that political parties can generate charismatic, rational or traditional leadership and support groups who correspondingly legitimate the political parties for their type of leadership. He suggests that different types of political parties exist, for example the 'Patronage - Parteien' ('Patronage-parties), the 'Klassen –Partei' (class –parties) or the 'Weltanschauungs-Parteien' (philosophy of life- parties). The 'class parties' are acting in the interest of a specific status group or class. The 'philosophy of life' parties are mainly based on specific principles, and the 'patronage parties' are interested in the achievement of political power of their leader and the placement of their leader in a powerful position.[21]. (Weber, 2001, WG, pp 167-168). His account of the three types of political parties could indicate that the three types of leadership are found correspondingly within those parties. For example, the interest of the 'patronage party' possibly reminds of the promotion of a charismatic leader. The interest of the 'philosophy of life' party (*'Weltanschauungs Partei'*) rests upon tradiontal principles, and the interest of the 'class party' could be based on legal rationality.

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[21] Parteien sollen heißen auf (formal) freier Werbung beruhende Vergesellschaftungen mit dem Zweck ihren Leitern innerhalb eines Verbandes Macht und ihren aktiven Teilnehmern dadurch (ideelle oder materielle) Chancen (der Durchsetzung von sachlichen Zielen oder der Erlangung von persönlichen Vorteilen oder beides) zuzuwenden. Sie können ephemere oder auf Dauer berechnete Vergesellschaftungen sein, in Verbänden jeder Art auftreten und als Verbände jeder Form: charismatische Gefolgschaften, traditionale Dienerschaften, rationale (zweck- oder wertrationale, »weltanschauungsmäßige« Anhängerschaften entstehen. Sie können mehr an persönlichen Interessen oder an sachlichen Zielen orientiert sein. Praktisch können sie insbesondere offiziell oder effektiv ausschließlich: nur auf Erlangung der Macht für den Führer und Besetzung der Stellen des Verwaltungsstabes durch ihren Stab gerichtet sein (Patronage-Partei). Oder sie können vorwiegend und bewußt im Interesse von Ständen oder Klassen (ständische bzw. Klassen-Partei) oder an konkreten sachlichen Zwecken oder an abstrakten Prinzipien (Weltanschauungs-Partei) orientiert sein. Die Eroberung der Stellen des Verwaltungsstabes für ihre Mitglieder pflegt aber mindestens Nebenzweck, die sachlichen »Programme« nicht selten nur Mittel der Werbung der Außenstehenden als Teilnehmer zu sein. Parteien sind begrifflich nur innerhalb eines Verbandes möglich, dessen Leitung sie beeinflussen oder erobern wollen; jedoch sind interverbändliche Partei-Kartelle möglich und nicht selten. Parteien können alle Mittel zur Erlangung der Macht anwenden. Der Organisation nach können Parteien den gleichen Typen angehören wie alle andren Verbände, als charismatisch-plebiszitär (Glauben an den Führer) oder traditional (Anhänglichkeit an das soziale Prestige des Herren oder präeminenten Nachbarn) oder rational (Anhänglichkeit an die durch »statutenmäßige« Abstimmung geschaffenen Leiter und Stäbe) orientiert sein, sowohl was die Obödienz der Anhänger als was die der Verwaltungsstäbe betrifft.

Weber mentioned many examples of his three pure types of domination, often related to historic eras, nevertheless his theories can be understood as timeless on a theoretical level and will be critically investigated, on the basis of introducing the structure of Austrian political parties, their organisational model, history and party orientations.

All Austrian political parties appear to show aspects of all three pure types of domination and therefore themselves exhibit mixed types of domination. This argument is not contradictory as in theory Weber identified pure types which undoubtedly exist, in Austrian political parties as will be shown later. However, he also argues that elements of other leadership types can normally be found in one form of domination. The occurrence of mixed leadership types can be understood firstly in that, every political party leader demonstrates charisma, regardless of which party the leader belongs to. Secondly, each modern party is embedded within a social system of laws, administration and bureaucracy. Finally, each party is constructed by internal long-standing political orientational traditions[22], such as 'Austro-Marxism' in the SPÖ, 'Catholic and traditional humanitarian values' in the ÖVP, and 'Pan Germanism' (more recently replaced by Austrian nationalism) with elements of Pan Germanism in the FPÖ.

Nevertheless, each Austrian party could be characterised even further by one pure type of domination to an exceptional extent than by any other type. By this is meant that one of the three pure types of leadership type dominates each specific party, while traces of the other types can still be found but to a lesser extent[23]. Thus, it could be suggested that the legal rational leadership type can predominantly be found in the Social Democratic Party as indicated by its organisational structure, as well as in its policies. Further it could be suggested the SPÖ could be considered a 'Klassen-Partei' (class-party) due to their acting in the interest of the working –class. The traditional type is specifically exhibited within the ÖVP agendas in that they are influenced by somehow Catholic and humanitarian and economic values. In turn it could be suggested that the ÖVP exhibits Weber's type of the 'Weltanschauungs –Partei' due to their following of the above mentioned principles. The FPÖ could be understood as being built on charisma, presently, exhibiting charismatic

[22] Traditional is not implied in the sense of being connected to religious sanctity; Rather it is defined as the tradition of 'good old customs', or 'routinisation' in the sense of 'what has always been there continues to be there'.

[23] Additionally, some of the leadership features hold within them other types of leaderships. For example, the traditional forms of leadership as indicated above, can hold within them charismatic aspects, or charismatic-dystopian aspects as in the case of the Pan Germanism of the FPÖ.

features through the political charisma of J. Haider and charismatic and populist slogans. Luther (1997) has shown that largely as a result of Haider's charisma, the recent 1999 FPÖ election success has occurred. However, this charismatic popularity has declined somewhat since the most recent elections held in November 2002. It could further be suggested that the FPÖ could be understood as a 'Patronage –Partei' aiming to achieve political power by placing their leader in a powerful position. In respect of the Green Party, it is difficult to suggest a leadership type. It could be argued that being an anti-establishment party, certain unstructured tendencies and a mildly charismatic-utopian agenda are evident, and that in this respect, the new form of domination or leadership could be applied. This is applicable also as the Green Party is relatively new and was founded as a result of small group of people who were critics of the governmental policies. Hence the element of utopia, as described above, could be somewhat assigned to this party.

Additionally, to connect Weber and Austrian political parties in further detail, Mommsen (1989, p. 21) argues that 'charismatic rule is unpredictable and creative as well as very effective in its initial stages, and unstable as well susceptible to change. On the other hand charismatic domination is least institutionalised and most dynamic and up to change'. Such arguments could specifically be applicable to the FPÖ, as the FPÖ faced a sudden uprise in voting figures and a new parliamentary position after 1999. However, in the next elections their failure and downfall occurred. Hence it could be concluded that a certain instability as well as susceptibility to change can be identified. It is further argued by Mommsen (1989, pp 21-23; p. 47) that 'traditional leadership is most ambiguous, half way embedded also in legal forms of government, patrimonial and also ascribed to traditional ideals of a person. Traditional leadership can also be described as the sanctity of good old customs'. Yet, traditional leadership can be exposed to erosion by the over-routinisation of the principles. (Mommsen, 1989, p. 21). This could be viewed in the ÖVP. It could certainly be argued that on the basis of their political orientations, a certain routinisation and welcoming of the 'good old customs' can be viewed. Furthermore, Weber suggests that the legal-rational rule, indicates that omnipotent administrative apparatus, legal rational purpose orientated laws not morally based are the basis. No dynamic leaders exist in the legal rational type of domination. The legal rational leadership is most pragmatic and faces danger of stagnation and petrification'. (Mommsen, 1989, p. 21; Weber, 2001). Whether and to what extent the SPÖ is embedded in such legal norms and its levels of pragmatism will be investigated, as one of the attributes commonly attached to the SPÖ in theory is pragmatism and rule-bound party structure.

Thus, in summary, it could be suggested that due to occurrence of mixed leadership types, not only can the above mentioned outstanding types of leadership be identified in each of the Austrian parties, but another combined type is usually found. In fact, elements of tradition often exhibit the outstanding leadership types in themselves. The SPÖ exhibits the traditional and legal-rational type, traditional due to each party's long-standing historical party agendas, such as that of Austro-Marxism and legal rational as outlined above. The ÖVP exhibits a traditional-traditional type, traditional in its long-standing agendas, which show outstanding features of traditionalism in the form of Catholic and humanitarian principles. Further the ÖVP could be exhibiting traditional features of leadership due to their long-standing focus on the economy, their humanistic ethics and morals and the focus on good old values and customs such as the family and Austrian patriotism. The FPÖ could be understood as typical of the traditional and charismatic and charismatic-dystopian type; traditional because of its historical establishment from the remnants of the former NSDAP-Party (W.Weber, 1996), which was described as being charismatic also; The charismatic- dystopian categorised predominantly because of the nostalgic belief in past ideals of for example pan-Germanism reflecting dystopia at least for one 'hard core' segment of the party; and charismatic as outlined previously due to Haider's charisma. Consequently it is possible to argue that the FPÖ exhibits purely charismatic, combined charismatic–dystopian as well as traditional elements of leadership type. The Green Party possibly largely exhibits an utopian leadership type. The Green Party however, being a 'young' political party can only be assigned the traditional leadership type to a certain extent, even though it could be suggested that in spite of its relatively late establishment, its agendas have by now become associated with traditional elements. Furthermore due to their establishment on two separate platforms, one element could be understood as charismatic utopian, the other as legal rational focused.

This point as well as the other previously established features of the different forms and characteristics of leadership type and its legitimacy will be critically applied to the Austrian political parties by explaining the organisational background, history and party agendas. In Chapters Four, Five and Six, these theoretical established types will be critically investigated within the specific setting of discourses about migrants.

6.1 Social Democratic Party- SPÖ

The Social Democratic Workers Party (SDAP) was founded in 1889 (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000; Ucakar, 1997). The political orientation of the party at that time was based on the premise of society being divided into classes of 'bourgeoisie' and workers ('proletariat'). The party saw itself as a socialist workers movement, and later on the programme of the party was influenced by and based on, the well-known philosophy of 'Austro-Marxism'. The goal of the party was to establish a socialist economic and societal order. Already in the core orientational elements of the party, traditional concern for the workers and the working class existed, at that time the 'proletariat'. It was meant to free the politically disadvantaged from their lack of rights, and from economic dependence[24]. (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000, Ucakar, 1997). On a theoretical basis it can be suggested that in the past, the political orientational principles and concerns for those with a 'lack of legal rights' can be identified as an indication of the belief in the enactment of laws and rights, reminiscent of the legal rational elements of leadership type.

After the end of the First World War, and the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, the Socialist Party governed Austria in coalition with the 'Bürgerlichen' or 'bourgeoisie', later the ÖVP (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000). Their main aim at the time was to combat lack of housing, and to ensure the provision of unemployment benefits from the state for the unemployed. Traditionally the SPÖ has always been the 'Lager' of the workers and lower level employees (blue collar workers), theoretically reminding of Weber's concept of a 'Klassen-Partei'. After the Second World War the party rebuilt itself and became the Social Democratic Party of Austria. The first post-Second World War government was a grand coalition between the ÖVP and SPÖ, and in 1966 the SPÖ formed the opposition. In 1967 Bruno Kreisky, an important figure in Austrian politics, became chairman and led the party in a stand-alone government until 1983. In 1971 Kreisky established Austro-Keynesianism with the goal of achieving full employment in the so called 'Austrian way'. After years of forming a stand-alone government (1971-1983) in 1983 the SPÖ went into coalition with the FPÖ, and then governed in coalition again with the ÖVP. Since 1999 the party has remained in opposition which can be understood as a new situation for them in the time period of the Second Austrian Republic. (Ucakar, 1997, Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000).

[24] This point will be taken up again in the next few sections and gain considerable significance.

The party organisational level is very structured and includes a certain set of duties for party members. For example, several sub organisations within the party exist; the 'Freie Wirtschaftsbund' (voluntary economic club), the 'Arbeiterbauernbund' (worker farmers' organisation), organisation of the Social Democratic Academics (Bund Sozialdemokratischer Akademiker). There are also teacher's organisations, pensioners clubs, and student organisations. On the basis of its organisational structure, the SPÖ, can be observed as hierarchies which could be described as tight, the duties of each individual being well defined. This could also be described in some form as partly bureaucratic. (Ucakar, 1997). Weber's legal-rational leadership principles can be identified in such a structure, based on the argument that the administrative apparatus is a strong indication of legal rational leadership. Another indication of legal rationality leadership types manifests itself further in the pragmatism and stability of the administrative apparatus of the party. Ucakar (1997) suggests that there is strong continuity within the party chairmanship, Franz Vranitzky having been elected seven times in a row as chairman. The regulations for party members themselves indicate a very stagnating, rule-bound and inflexible party organisation which is tightly situated within rules, specific rights and duties. For example, the income has to be openly declared and the political orientational principles of the party have to be followed at all times (ibid.).

In terms of party membership, in 1970 the party had 700,000 members which had decreased to 604,000 by 1989 (Fischer, 1992, p. 340). Of those members, 66 % were men and 33% women (ibid.). In 1995 only 490,000 members but left, and the party gained 1,843,679 voters in the election result (Ucakar, 1997, p. 257). The obvious decrease in the membership corresponds to the previously described crumbling of 'Lagermentality'. In this respect it could be argued that the crisis of legitimacy explained by Habermas can be observed. However this does not necessarily indicate that Weber's leadership types cannot be traced within the agendas or organisation of the party as such, nor does it indicate that Weber might not be applicable. To critically investigate the applicability of legal rational and traditional elements of Weber's leadership types, the political agendas and party orientation within the SPÖ has to be further explained and analysed.

6.2 Political orientation of SPÖ and Austro-Marxism

The traditional political orientation of the SPÖ is based on the Austro-Marxists and their philosophical traditions. The school of Austro-Marxism has to be explained, as firstly, the element of 'tradition' (in terms of traditional aspects of party agendas) within the SPÖ and secondly has to be analysed regarding legal rational elements held within those agendas. The way in which the Austro-Marxists' theoretical viewpoints might exhibit possible anticipations about the portrayal of contemporary SPÖ discourses concerning 'migrants' will then briefly be demonstrated. The latter point will be discussed with specific reference to the agendas regarding ethnic minorities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire as portrayed in Austro Marxist material. These could facilitate an indicator for contemporary discourses on migrants.

The Austro-Marxist tradition was first implemented and publicised in the 'Linzer manifesto', most notably Karl Renner and Otto Bauer. Austro-Marxists thought of the state as an instrument or tool for 'class fights' (Klassenkämpfe). They believed that the capitalist class was in power economically and politically, and their goal was for the working class to achieve participatory rights ('Beteiligungsrechte') especially political rights including the right to vote. (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000, Ucakar, 1997, p. 250). Therefore one of their agendas and goals was to create the political preconditions for the social emancipation of the working class (Bottomore and Goode, 1978). The Austro-Marxist manifesto included a focus on rights and the acquisition of these. This subsequently indicates the legal-rational, or rights based approach of the party[25]. However, as mentioned previously, traditions and traditional agendas of political parties (being an indication of Weber's traditional type of domination) might in turn also hold the outstanding characteristics of a party. In the SPÖ's case the traditional agendas of the Austro–Marxists, firstly, indicate the traditional element of leadership and secondly, indicate the legal rational elements within this traditional element.

The content of the SPÖ's agenda might additionally reveal or allow for anticipation of possible contemporary discourses about 'migrants'. For example, the Austro-Marxist based traditional but also contemporary SPÖ's understanding of themselves as protectors of the class without rights, the then 'working class' or 'proletariat', could theoretically be substituted with the element of the new class without rights, 'new migrants'. In this

[25] Legal- rationality is understood as indicated by the enactment of laws, which also include the rights of individuals, or hold the concept of 'right'.

respect Miles's (1998) arguments have to be introduced briefly. He states that in Britain, a relationship between class and racism, or class and migrants exists. Secondly, he argues that in Britain the low paid and unskilled labour force consists wholly of migrants. He argues that migrants have been racialised into this role of the class or class position, the indigenous majority being prejudiced against them. Further migrants have been racialised into the lower levels of society. (Miles, 1998). Following this argument, it could then be suggested in respect of Austria that on a theoretical basis the former class without rights, or working class, now not having the status of a class without rights any more, due to the SPÖ's establishment of a social welfare state has been replaced with the new class without rights - the new migrants. These new migrants are those without political rights, without rights to housing or other benefits. Due to the traditional fight or engagement of the SPÖ for classes without rights, it could be expected that the SPÖ would see itself as the protector of the new class without rights, the migrants, and hence apply its traditional viewpoints, historically expressed in regard to the 'proletariat', to the new migrants.

Furthermore, regarding the SPÖ's political agendas, it can be said that the party stood for principles of social democracy (Ucakar, 1997). Being preconditioned with social democracy stands for the abolition of class borders, and expresses social emancipation and equality, as well as interest in common equal voting rights ('allgemeine gleiche Wahlrecht'). In 1958 a turning point was reached in the political agendas, portrayed in the manifesto of that time, in which the party changed from being a party in favour of the 'proletariat' to one which represents all 'working' people. Political pragmatism formed part of the SPÖ, and again elements of legal rationality can be observed. (Ucakar, 1997).

Some aspects of the Austro-Marxist philosophies will be highlighted below in more detail, specifically the writings by Otto Bauer and Karl Renner about the minorities of the Habsburg Empire[26]. This demonstration will show some legal-rational elements within Austro-Marxist perspectives on immigrants and minorities.

Otto Bauer attempted to provide a theoretical and historical analysis of the national problem within the framework of Marxist sociology (Bottomore & Goode, 1978). He strongly emphasised the subordination of the national question to the interests of the working class. Commenting on the Brünn programme he observed that 'a social

[26] It is argued that seven different minorities formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Renner, 1902, p.41)

democratic programme concerning nationalities has to start from the position of the working class in society; it has to incorporate the particular national problem of Austria in the great social problem' (Bottomore & Goode, 1978, p. 32). He followed these ideals until the First World War when the rise of Slav nationalism then led him to advocate a policy of national dependence and separate national states. On the other hand, Renner focused his attention on legal and constitutional aspects. Renner and Bauer differed in the theoretical as well as the practical solution to the problem of nationalities within the Empire. (Bottomore & Goode, 1978).

Karl Renner focused on the situation of minorities in the Empire in his writings. This might be seen as the result of his experiences in the army when young during his service with the multinational Empire military (Bottomore & Goode, 1978). His early writings were devoted to the national problem of the minority issue in the Empire, and two themes were predominant in his work. Firstly, the need for proper constitutional and legal regulations concerning the position of various nationalist minorities in the Empire. (Bottomore & Goode, 1978). In his opinion these legal regulations would have rendered the struggle for power embodied by nationalist movements needless (ibid.; Riesbeck, 1996). The second theme dominating his work was the idea that the Empire might be transformed into a state of nationalities which could eventually provide a model for the socialist organisation of the world as a whole. Thus, in the work 'the self proclamation of rights for nations'- ('Selbstbestimmungrecht der Nationen') he indicates that his aim was to give substance to the legal concept of the nation, first within the narrow framework of the state of nationalities in order to present an example for the future national order of mankind'. Renner's aim was to 'preserve the multi-national character of the Empire, as something valuable in itself, in a democratic federal state' (Bottomore & Goode, 1978, p. 32). His writings indicate an appreciative opinion towards minorities within the Empire as well as valuing their existence and the proposal that minorities be granted equality. (Bottomore & Goode, 1978).

It is significant to outline and refer to some of Karl Renner's writings dating from 1902[27] published under a pseudonym at the time. As can be seen from the excerpts below, they indicate a very strong legal-rational leadership (within the traditional agendas of the political party) approach on the basis of the emphasis on 'rights'. Secondly, the references

[27] Der Kampf der Österreichischen Nationen um den Staat, 1902 (,the fight of the Austrian nations for the state'

also indicate the traditional understanding of minorities by the predecessor of the contemporary SPÖ. Specifically, Renner's writings serve as theoretical anticipation of contemporary discourses about migrants. In Chapter Four these will be compared to contemporary discourses in order to investigate the extent to which continuity and discontinuity in discourse about migrants exists. Continuity in discourse indicates the continuing existence of tradition within contemporary discourses and would serve as a sign of traditional leadership.

For example, Renner argues that:

> 'a development of Austria is only imaginable if the nations [minorities in the Empire] are granted irreversible positions of rights.....which enable them to focus on economic and social tasks.'
> [ein Fortschritt Österreichs ist überhaupt nur denkbar wenn den Nationen untentziehbare Rechtspositionen eingeräumt werden, die ihnen die ständige Erhaltung einer nationalen Kampftruppe im Parlament ersparen und es ihnen möglich machen, sich wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Aufgaben zuzuwenden] (1902, p. 29)

As can be seen, Renner's focus is clearly on the concepts of granting rights, which can in turn be connected to the legal-rational principles of leadership, and further indicates the possibility of a 'rights based' approach towards migrants in contemporary Austria.

On behalf of Austro-Marxists and the predecessors of the SPÖ, Renner indicates his understanding of the concept of rights and duties of the citizens of a state. He argues that all citizens have rights and duties, and those rights and duties are the laws to follow. Again the focus is on law and order, rights and duties. This could be seen as yet another indication of the legal-rational basis within the traditional elements of the Social Democratic Party.

Renner indicates:

> '....As citizens the natural individuals and then the group individuals have to be seen. Norms which allocate citizens rights and duties are called laws: groups of individuals must hence be organised and must be facilitated with the competence to be subjects of rights'.
>
> [...theil derselben begründet Rechte und Pflichten der Staatsbürger. Als Staatsbürger gelten dann zunächst die natürlichen Personen und sodann Personenviehleiten. Normen welche den Staatsbürgern Rechte und Pflichten zuteilen nennt man Gesetze: Personenmehrheiten müssen daher organisiert und von den Rechtsordnungen mit der Fähigkeit, Rechtssubjekt zu sein ausgestattet werden.] (ibid.).

In the following quotation the Austro-Marxist view on minorities of the Empire will be demonstrated. States within states, as Renner argues, indicate appreciation of minorities as well as the concept of equality for majority and minority groups within the Habsburg Empire. Minorities could be seen to have been granted autonomy status, and possibly legal

and cultural autonomy. Whether those concepts of legal and cultural autonomy are still used and related to migrants in contemporary Austria by the SPÖ will be critically tested and discourse continuity or discontinuity will be tested in Chapter Four.

Renner argues:

> 'The nations must be factors of rights in the state, state rights based potential factors, or to speak out loud the word, states within the states, if peace and development should be sustained or rekindled in Austria.'
>
> [Die Nationen müssen staatliche Rechtsfaktoren, staatsrechtliche Potenzen oder, um das gefürchtete Wort auszusprechen, Staaten im Staate sein, wenn Friede und Fortschritt in Österreich einkehren sollen. Es nützt den Nationen nichts und schadet dem Staate wenn sie fortfahren, nichts als politische Parteien zu sein....da gerade diese Auffassung sie gezwungen hat, politisch zu rüsten und ihre Staatsrechte zu vindizieren.] (1902, p. 29)

Renner further argues that:

> '....the feeling and awareness of the feeling, that someone who has the same language and culture belongs to us, that 'we' are different....,.. that we have to stand with our own people, and against foreigners, is naïve nationalism: that primitive, certainly genuine, and in a sense, eternal impulse in the life of emotions.....neither hospitality, nor the preference shown by particular classes .for foreign culture, nor the preference of ruling classes for foreign languages, nor the historical frequent immigration and acceptance of foreign customs by the masses. That indefinite feeling of rejection of what is foreign has always been misused by the ruling class without any difficulty...this high valuation of the nation has always been dear to all conservative classes. .....'there is no class which is intrinsically more emancipated from all national values than the proletariat, which has been totally liberated from tradition by the disruptive, destructive power of capitalism, and excluded and excluded from enjoyment of the national culture; and which rises up to struggle against all the historically given traditional powers'.(Bottomore & Goode, 1978, pp 119-120)

In this reference, Renner very specifically argues that foreigners are rejected by the ruling class and that acceptance or rejection, and views of foreigners are strongly connected to the issue of class. So in this case the views and definition of 'foreigners' are strongly related to a class perspective and it is indicated that the 'proletariat' is free from prejudice and views foreigners on an equal basis. It could be anticipated that contemporary SPÖ discourses imply similar concepts of equality.

The concept of the nation propounded by Otto Bauer gives rise to an analysis of the perception of minorities within the Empire. He argues that 'common descent only establishes a race, never a nation'.

> 'common laws certainly are an important means of forming the common character, but the latter can exist or develop without them, provided that the other elements are effective enough to unite the individuals in a cultural community. Diversity of creed can make two nations out of peoples with the same language, where the diversity of religion is an obstacle to cultural community. A common religion is the basis for a common culture as it was with the Serbs and Croats. But the Germans remained one people despite their religious divergences because the religious divisions could not prevent the development and persistence of a universal German cultural community'. (Bottomore & Goode, 1978, pp 102-103)

He further argues that:

> 'without a community of language, no cultural community and consequently no nation. But a common language still does not make a common cultural community and prevents from a nation. Common language is a the mediator of a common culture, both its producer and its product. Other important aspects include a common history, common descent, common culture to form a nation...a community. A nation can be based on common descent but need not be, then only race, but not a nation.' (ibid.)

This concept of the nation in turn possibly indicates how concepts of the 'other' are understood by Austro-Marxists and hence the Socialist Party at that time. Common descent is not seen as the determining factor in the establishment of the nation, and it could be claimed that 'ius sanguinis' is *not* followed. It could hence be anticipated that the contemporary SPÖ might have similar views, such as the rejection of 'ius sanguinis' in the naturalisation process, or the contradictions belief in 'ius soli'[28]. Further the inclusion of 'laws' in the nation-forming process indicates that legal aspects are implied, but are not a priority. Common religion is understood as an important, but not a necessary, aspect of a common cultural community, and is not prioritised. It could therefore be suggested that religious freedom is implied.

Bauer argues that:

> 'it was important to detect a United States of Greater Austria similar to the United Kingdom and the United States of America, being an imagined community of the Austrian Habsburg dynasty'(Bottomore and Goode, 1978 [1907], p.32).

The Austro-Marxists' aim was to preserve the multi national character of the empire, as something valuable by itself, in a democratic federal state. He further emphasises the importance of the channels of communication, similar to Anderson's (1983) argument that a nation is linked through administrative channels of communication to form an imagined community. This indicates firstly a past belief in the equality of minorities of the Empire, as well as welcoming perspectives towards minorities. It might also indicate welcoming the movement of peoples within the Empire. It could be anticipated that these discourses are exhibited in the form of pro-immigration arguments as well as the concept of equality by the contemporary SPÖ.

[28] ' ius soli' is defined by Castles and Miller (1987, p.238) as the right to citizenship if born in the territory of the country . ius sanguinis is based on which is based on descent from a national of the country concerned.

6.3 The People's Party (ÖVP)

Originally titled the Christian Social Party, the party changed its name in 1945 to People's Party (Müller, 2000). This change was implemented because in 1945 the long-standing strong links to the Catholic Church were officially severed. The early stages of the Christian Social party during the Empire were founded on a loose collection of diverse clubs which stood for social reformation based on the social philosophy of the Catholic Church, and were based on humanitarianism[29], theoretically reminding of Weber's 'Weltanschauungs-Partei'. Before the elections in 1907 the 'petty bourgeoisie' Christian Socials joined with rural farmers' conservative clubs/societies and became a bigger party, which advocated/disseminated political Catholicism. Those two subunits of the regional social sphere formed the basis of loyal support groups for the party. At least at that time the party was interested in close ties between church and state. However, conflict between Catholicism and secularism, church and politics was very evident in the early stages of the party. It aimed to distance itself from the etiquettes of Christian church and religion, as well as to develop stronger links with Austrian nationalism and patriotism. Continuity within the party was reflected in the targeting of traditional support groups, such as farmers, small business entrepreneurs, civil servants and white collar employees. Historically, a connection with the church was retained because of the church is support for the party. The connection remained until after 1945 because spiritual, and particularly political orientational ties to the church were publicly known. One particular traditional aspect of the party was that it had always distanced itself from Marxism and combined concepts of 'liberalism' (economic liberalism)[30], 'conservatism' and Catholic social doctrine. (Müller, 2000, Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000).

Subsequently, the two features of the party already identified, consist of traditional religious and humanitarian principles as well, possibly, as the long-standing focus on 'economic liberalism'. Both contribute to the theoretical application of Weber's traditional leadership type and indicate traditional-traditional aspects of the ÖVP. As stated previously, traditional leadership, according to Weber, is characterised by a religious

[29] Catholicism and humanitarianism go hand in hand in this case.

[30] Economic liberalism could be understood as a initially charismatic agenda, but by routinisation having become an ultimate value and hence traditional again.- Even though, economic liberalism is not traditional, it is still used in a traditional sense as an ultimate value. It could be argued that within OVP even change is justified by reference to traditional values, such as those of the Catholic Church. Hence not every act or agenda is determined traditionally, but that the „ultimate values" of the party, used to justify action, were the traditional ones.

component as well as by an element of routinisation and belief in old customs. More specifically, the definition of the sanctity of good old customs can be traced not only in Catholicism, but also in Austrian patriotism. Other indicators include the party's focus on 'family' and humanitarianism, and also ethical traditional morals all of which are theoretically ascribed to traditional domination.

Between 1945 and 1970 the Christian Social Party was a leading force in government, being the strongest party, and in sole governmental power (Müller, 2000). Müller (2000) states that from 1970 onwards the party remained in opposition and since 1987, has re-entered government in coalition mainly with the SPÖ. In 1999 as mentioned in Chapter One the ÖVP re-entered in a different coalition with the FPÖ and this governmental alliance was re-established in the election of 2002.

From an organisational perspective, the ÖVP is not as hierarchical or as structured as the SPÖ, which proves that the legal rational leadership principles formulated by Weber cannot be traced to any particular extent within the Christian Democrats. In fact, the organisational structures and hierarchies are mainly based on between counties and districts, political districts, and cities as well as court districts ('Gerichtsbezirke') (Müller, 1997). The party is therefore geographically and territorially structured. The functional distinction and subsystems within the party are divided between several clubs which have gained considerable influence in the party, and the party can be understood as run by the interaction and interdependence of these functional clubs. Three classical 'Bünde' (clubs) are the 'Bauernbund' ('farmers' association), the 'Wirtschaftsbund, ÖWB and the 'Arbeiter und Angestelltenbund, ÖAAB. These are the three main organisations. Three smaller organsiations exist, the 'österreichische Frauenbewegung ÖFB' (the Austrian women's movemement), the 'Junge ÖVP, JVP'(young Christian Democrats), and the 'Österreichische Seniorenbund, ÖSB' (the Austrian Pensioners' Association). One further related association is the Austrian Academics' Association ('Akademikerbund'). (Müller, 1997; 2000; Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000).

This organisational structure explains the reasons for farmers being the dominant support group for the ÖVP, and because of the inclusion of farmers, the agrarian mini city structure is also a party consideration. (Müller, 1997). This structure indicates a loose hierarchy and an openly spread system of networks, and is an indicator of a non legal rational dominated party organisation.

Even though it is difficult to ascertain exact numbers of members, it is documented that in 1994, the ÖVP had between 430,000 and 580,000 members (Müller, 1997), and is said to be a large-scale party apparatus, with extensive personnel. The financing of the party is partly by way of public donation, and partly by state funding (Müller, 2000). Party membership is only granted by joining one of the associations. The party can also be characterised by its active communal 'life' based on community and association meetings. This is contrary to what seems to take place. Contrary to the ÖVP which is loser in its organisation and operates on a smaller scale level, the SPÖ is more organised and structured (Busek, 1995). It could be suggested that the ÖVP's sub-organisations and structures are less bureaucratic and rule-bound. The associations are also signifant in regard to the previously outlined Proporzsystem, as they facilitated ways of disseminating and placing representatives in the micro social spheres, though party life takes place. (Busek, 1995).

ÖVP characterising features are evident in the conflict between separate sub systems, or different party associations. Conflicting and contradictory interests exist between the party subsystems as for example, the civil servants' organisation has very different interests from those of the farmers, the agrarian association or the entrepreneurs' association. Possibly significant is that the 'ÖCV', a Catholic student organisation, is also part of the associations related to the ÖVP. (Müller, 1997). This possibly substantiates the Weberian leadership type of tradition in form of religious elements due to visible and invisible ties with the Catholic church.

6.4 Political orientation of ÖVP

Müller (2000) writes that the ÖVP's political orientation indicates a strong loyalty to the church and Catholicism. While in opposition phase, the political orientation was shaped by Christian Social reform (Müller, 2000), and this also extends to regional party supporters. It corresponds to the theoretical argument of traditional leadership aspects of religious tradition, ethical morals, and the sanctity of good old customs defining this form of domination. Catholicism in itself could be understood as incorporating ethical morals, humanistic values and ethics and good old customs and in turn is connected to the traditional leadership features. On the other hand, it is argued that the party was never built on a strong manifesto, and was largely run by personality and strong leadership.

Particularly in the most successful period of its history it was seen as governing Austria as a result of its charismatic leaders. This indicates a form of charisma in the party, firstly due the flexibility of the agendas not being strictly defined in a rigid manifesto, and secondly due to the charismatic leaders which enhanced the success of the party. Theoretically, this ties in with the argument that charisma can be found in every leader and hence in every political party. Nevertheless, it does not imply that the established application of the Weberian types of domination to this party have become obsolete.

In the 1950s the ÖVP underwent a minor move to the 'right' and in economic terms followed Keynesian theories (Müller, 2000). Furthermore 'technocratic conservatism' took place. However, political orientation retreated to traditional principles of religion and family, especially when these were endangered for a while by the state. The focus on religion, but especially on family, indicates that the ÖVP might follow the old traditional customs and use them for their domination, a further indication of traditional leadership. In the 1970s, a progressive interpretation of Christianity and a strong distancing from the socialists and their Marxist principles was observed. The 1980s saw a return to neo-conservatism, the economic focus on neo-liberalism, and socially, moralistic conservatism, with a general focus on family and church as previously indicated. In the 1990s the general trend of an eco-social economy and environmental politics was adopted in policies and agendas, and an additional focus was placed on integration with the European Union. The focus on Catholicism and the church decreased. (Müller, 2000).

Busek (1995) also argues that Austrian patriotism and Christian values are ÖVP principles. Generally, democratic principles and 'freedom' are goals, and the Christian philosophy of life is of continuing importance in the agendas of the ÖVP. (Busek, 1995). In terms of the People's Party, its linkage to Catholic values and the church as well as its focus on humanitarianism could indicate a 'help' and support-based, as well as humanistic approach in discourses about 'migrants', full of ethics and 'good morals'. Further it could be suggested that Austrian patriotism is discernible, which might lead to anti-migration discourses, but also indicates the traditional aspects of the Weberian leadership once again.

6.5 The Freedom Party (FPÖ)

The Freedom Party is traditionally the so-called third party, or third Lager (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000; Luther, 1997). Before and during the Second Austrian Republic the party was entitled the German Nationals (ibid.). During the annex ('Anschluss') to Germany between 1938 and 1945, the Freedom Party merged with the National Socialist Worker's Party (NSDAP- Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei). In 1949 the party was reinvented as the VdU (Verband der Unabhängigen') and then in 1956 became the Freedom Party (W. Weber, 1996). Traditionally, in its political orientation, the FPÖ is focused on being anti-clerical, anti-socialistic, and being liberal and nation orientated (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000), if not to say formerly German national, now (German and)[31] Austrian national.

From a historical point of view, it formed a minority governmental coalition partner with the SPÖ in 1970, and again between 1983 and 1987 (Frischenschlager, 1992). After internal conflicts following 1986, Jörg Haider was made BPO ('Bundesparteiobmann'- head of the Freedom Party) and the Freedom Party then entered a period of populist protest (Luther, 1995).

Voters for the party are predominantly men, academics, Protestants, those of no particular or declared faith, 'Kleinbürger' (petty bourgeoisie), 'Kleinstädter' (urban lower middle class), protest voters, and individuals who favour authoritarian ways of thinking. There were often internal conflicts within the Party, Haider took power and the conflicts were upended, which, according to Lukas, could be ascribed to Haider's charismatic personality. As a result of this charisma, his political orientational smartness, and his irregular behaviour, the party became successful. (Luther, 1997). This attributes appear to be indicative of the strongly charismatic tendencies of the FPÖ. Further they are indicative of Weber's concept of the 'Patronage- Partei'. Haider's charisma and his actions were the subject of much debate and were occasionally scandalous, and since his departure the FPÖ produced scandals during the course of the recent coalition government. Some of these scandals included the shock effects of arguing against ÖVP coalition partners, or the petition against Temelin, a nuclear power station in the Czech Republic, threatening to veto its membership of the EU if the allegedly unsafe nuclear power station was not closed

[31] German national tendencies in the party are an important element of investigation. Those can be observed in the hard core wing of the party, but not in all elements of the contemporary party.

down. Other scandals included Haider's claim to have been attacked by a stalker, and his repeatedly relinquishing of party leadership and subsequent reinstatement. His erratic behaviour, the sudden successes and controversial slogans, and the instability of the party in the system can all be filed under Weber's charismatic leadership type. This can be defined as 'charismatic rule is unpredictable and creative as well as very effective in its initial stages, and unstable as well susceptible to change', as referred previously. However, it could further be suggested that this lack of structure, and irregular behaviour could also, perhaps dubiously, indicate elements of utopian leadership. Despite the theoretical argument made previously that utopian leadership is treated as a stand-alone form of domination, in this case the utopian elements should rather be considered not as a separate type of domination, as they form only a minor part of the leadership type. In this case the utopian elements could be seen as strongly interlinked with the charismatic feature and stemming from this. Furthermore, the charismatic aspects are clearly predominant. Hence, the one indication of utopia is not sufficiently dominant to be able to attach the concept of charismatic-utopian to the FPÖ.

On an organisational basis, the following associations form part of the FPÖ. The 'Ring Freiheitlicher Wirtschaftstreibender' (liberal economic entrepreneurs' club), 'Freiheitliche Arbeitnehmer' (liberal employees), 'Ring Freiheitlicher und Unabhängiger Arbeitnehmer' (liberal and independent employees' club), Jugend und Seniorenring (youth and pensioner club), Freiheitliche Studenten (liberal students), 'Freiheitliche Akademiker' (liberal academics). (Luther, 1997).

One important organisational feature indicating the charismatic leadership type is the fact that Haider runs the FPÖ in a loose organisational way. For example, decisions were made by Haider without the committees being involved. He often decided to bring in new members to the party who had previously neither been party members nor had they gone through the process of hierarchical upward movemement within the bureaucratic apparatus. These new members were usually of benefit to Haider as well as supporting his agenda and orientational position in the party. Simultaneously, Haider created a personal loyalty by bringing in personally preferred and specially chosen individuals. These new members remained loyal to him and to the FPÖ's political orientational basis, and were supportive of Haider in internal conflicts. Haider runs the party. (Luther, 1997). This organisational structure and basis exhibits features of charismatic domination, as charismatic domination is characterised by being least institutionalised and most dynamic

and subject to change, as well as being attached to one individual leader. So far the charismatic aspects of domination in the Freedom Party have been clearly indicated. By describing the political orientation of the party, its traditional aspects and possible dystopian elements, the Freedom Party leadership will be identified.

6.6 Political orientation of FPÖ

On political orientational basis, the Freedom Party has traditionally been characterised by its favouring of pan-German ideals and belief in a pan-German cultural community. However recently the belief in the Austrian nationalism[32], has replaced this. The FPÖ is considered an anti mainstream party, which wanted to abolish the Proporzsystem. Two contradictory traditions can be traced in the party nationalism, pan-German ideals including a connection to the former VdU; and on the other hand, liberalism, anti-establishment, reform of the 'Proporzsystem' and other long-standing Austrian features. These contradictory elements often lead to inner party conflicts. Since Haider took power in 1986, the conservative pan- German wing, core and layer of the party has been dominant[33], and the nationalist agenda is favoured over the liberal. (Luther, 1997). It could therefore be argued that in addition to Haider's charismatic leadership type and the importance of charisma, the FPÖ shows elements of traditional and charismatic-dystopian characteristics. The fact that the traditional orientations of pan-Germanism (often replaced by concepts of Austrian patriotism and nationalism) still exist in the party serves as an indication that one stream or core of the party[34] could be considered traditional in itself but also charismatic-dystopian. The nostalgic belief in the reinvention of former pan-German ideals, for example in the concern about German-speaking minorities in South Tyrol or in Hungary, appear to be promoted. However this idea has existed in the past, but has failed and is probably not likely possible to be reintroduced. This element is further traceable by the establishment of the Freedom Party on the lines of the former VdU, as previously described. The reintroduction of belief in biological superiority could also be considered a dystopian element, even though only disseminated unofficially and hidden by a small

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[32] For example, the party manifesto indication regarding South Tyrol or German speaking minorities in contemporary Hungary or other countries, of the FPÖ being the Schutzherr of those German speaking people indicated a mixed Pan German but also Austrian nationalism.

[33] This lead to the splitting off of a liberal wing of the FPÖ, and led to the formation of the Liberal forum, mentioned earlier.

[34] As indicated previously there are two main streams or cores within the party, the more liberal economic orientated one and the conservative hard core Pan German thinking one. Depending on who runs the party one stream can become dominant for a certain amount of time which indicates charisma as the ruler implements his interests and promotes his part of the party (ibid.).

segment of the party. On the other hand, anti establishment tendencies and interest in abolishing the 'Proporzsystem' could indicate predominantly charismatic elements, with trace concepts of utopia. It is important that Luther claims that most FPÖ voters are influenced and impressed by Haider's charisma and protest slogans, including the scapegoating of minorities, but not necessarily by the FPÖ traditional orientations. It could then be suggested that in terms of the legitimating of the Freedom Party by regional actors, discourses of charisma, such as scapegoating and the problematisation of foreigners, might even be more so legitimated than the traditional dystopian elements of discourse of pan-German national or nationalism as such.

Regarding anticipations about the contemporary discourses about foreigners it could be argued that Pan Germanism could indicate an assimilationist perspective towards 'migrants as well as a general anti-foreign perspective. Citizenship rights and rights to any welfare benefits might not be propagated.

6.7 The Green Party

The Green Party is the most recently developed and also influential party in Austria and was established on the basis of the unification of two green parties or movements. The Green movement in Austria originated in the national referendum on nuclear energy on November 5, 1978. As a result of the anti nuclear success, environmental activists began to run in local elections, and in 1982 two national Green parties were formed. One - the United Greens of Austria (Vereinigte Grüne Österreichs - VGÖ) - wanted to change environmental policies within the existing political system. The second was the Alternative List of Austria (Alternative Liste Österreichische-ALÖ) founded in 1982 and which could be described as an anti establishment and system challenging party. Both stood for a guaranteed national income, a thirty-five-hour workweek, and greater government ownership in certain areas of the economy. (The Green Party, 2004). Those two different wings of the later unified Green Party indicate characteristics of Weberian leadership types. The VGÖ could be considered to have adapted to existing political conditions, but still interested in the implementation of its agendas. This could arguably be interpreted as a sign of legal-rational leadership, based on the fact that the party remained within the system and was interested in legally implementing policies and agendas. On the other hand, the ALÖ is seen as more radical and an anti establishment and system-challenging party and could be understood as utopian, but possibly utopian connected to charismatic

orientated. In this respect the earlier established hypothesis of the Green Party being a charismatic – utopian leadership party has to be supplemented with the Green Party also being a legal- rational party. This is contradicting in respect of the theoretical concepts of legal-rational characteristics of leadership and the counterpart of charismatic and utopian. This is a theoretical contradiction because legal rational can be described as stagnating and rule bound, as well as pragmatic and inflexible, while theoretically charismatic utopian can be described as flexible, dynamic, unstructured to a certain point, maybe even provocative. However, given that the united Green Party was formed by two different groups of 'activists' with very different agendas, it is plausible that each their characteristics co-exist in the contemporary Green Party, but that possibly the charismatic features have not survived with the further institutionalisation of the Green Party, whilst the utopian could have survived. In that sense it is possible that the party exhibits both, legal- rational as well as (charismatic)-utopian features of leadership types.

For the first time in November 1986 the two parties participated as one group called the 'Green Alternative - Freda Meissner-Blau List' Green Alternative' and gained 4.8 % of the votes. This describes the newly formed fourth party system in Austria (The Green Party, 2004; Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000). However, the two wings of the Green Alternative had many conflicts.

The political orientation of the Green Party could be characterised the following way. Environmental issues were prioritised, including topics of energy, traffic, economy, health, education and culture. The basic slogans of the Green Party consist of equality, freedom, and solidarity. Agendas of anti-discrimination, upholding freedom of speech, and democracy of all aspects of social life is promoted, as is social security by right. (Dachs, 1997). This latter indicates a rights based and legal approach of leadership.

Dachs (1997) also characterises the Green Party in its organisational type as a mini party, and argues that whereas traditionally an opposition party, it is now seen by many as an agenda setters and a control party. On the other hand it could be understood as a protest party and one campaigning change. The orientation towards change and protest, the relatively disorganised structure of the party and its anti establishment agendas, indicate utopian elements. Some legal rational elements are discernible also, which have been indicated previously.

It is worth noting that 50% of Green voters felt close to a Green Party, and roughly 35% of Green votes came from floating voters who had lost interest in either the ÖVP or SPÖ. Traditional Green Party supporters are academics, intellectuals, students, and protest voters. Based on this support for the party, it could further be suggested that traditional Lagermentality, and therefore Weber's legitimation concept, might not be as applicable here as within the other parties.

7.0 Summary

In summary, it could be suggested that the Austrian 'Proporzsystem' and 'Lagermentality' are features of the Austrian political system, and that these features strengthen the theoretical applicability of Weber's theory of domination and legitimacy. The correspondence of political parties and the everyday actors as manifested within the traditional Lagermentality as well as the Proporzsystem can be understood as the equivalent correspondence of domination and legitimacy. Despite the disintegration of Lagermentality and the Proporzsystem in recent decades, political conditions of the Austrian system continue to exist at least partially, and Weberian theories still appear to apply. The theories appear to be even more applicable in regard to Weber's theory of the three pure types of domination, applied to Austrian political parties in their pure and mixed forms. Arguably, a fourth pure or mixed type of domination and legitimacy exists which could be understood as solely developed by itself or stemming from the concept of charismatic domination. Such a fourth type of leadership, consisting of utopian or dystopian elements, appearing in its pure form or in a combined form as a charismatic-utopian or a charismatic dystopian leadership type, can also be found in the contemporary political parties.

It could be suggested that each of the respective parties exhibits combined forms of leadership types; - the legal-rational and traditional aspect for the SPÖ, the traditional-traditional aspect for the ÖVP, and the charismatic, traditional, and charismatic-dystopian aspect for the FPÖ, and the Green Party could be seen as a combination of legal-rational, and utopian.

On a political continuum scale the Green Party would be situated or commonly associated with the extreme left, the socialists with the centre left, ÖVP with the centre right and FPÖ with the extreme right. It could even be argued that in the left to right political continuum scale, Weberian types of leadership could be situated correspondingly. Extreme left and

right parties could then be characterised as charismatic, while on the right, extreme dystopian elements can be found, and on the left, extreme utopian. Charisma (and also utopian/dystopian) might be a feature of the political extreme or oppositional parties. So therefore it could be argued that charisma, including or excluding – dystopia and utopia, is situated in the left or right extreme, whereas legal rational and pure traditional would be situated in the centre, given the position of the ÖVP and SPÖ parties. This indicates that theoretical parallels of charisma, as well as utopia and dystopia, are most unstable when compared with traditional leadership, which appears most stable. Extreme parties, left or right, exhibit this instability.

Chapter Four investigates such hypotheses on the basis of the findings of political discourses as portrayed by each of the parties outlined here.

Chapter Three:

Methodology

1.0 Introduction

The field research was carried out over a nine month period between September 2001 and May 2002. The research consisted of qualitative and quantitative methods in two different areas using two main methodological research tools. First, qualitative analysis of political manifestos and parliamentary debates to investigate national political discourses; and second, qualitative semi structured interviews of 37 people categorised by socio-demographic background to investigate regional discourses of everyday actors. Additionally, a quantitative supplement to the qualitative analysis of the material was added. It should be noted that each sphere was treated as a separate case study, almost like a separate entity in itself and only once the case studies had been completed, were the results critically compared to each other. In that sense the case study of the political sphere solely analysed discourses about 'foreigners', aiming to set the differing opinions of the four Austrian political players on a discourse continuum, identifying and testing hypothetically and theoretically existing established forms of Weberian leadership style. On the other hand, the case study of the regional sphere analysed discourses by everyday actors taking into consideration possible determinations of discourse by the socio demographic background of the interviewees. It was then intended to use these findings to identify interrelationships and interdependencies between the official national macro and the unofficial everyday sphere supporting the analysis of the applicability of the Weberian types of domination and legitimation or illegitimation.

The case study was carried out in the province of Upper Austria, as opposed to Vienna, the capital. The reasons for locating the research within one of the nine provinces were the following. Predominantly the aim of comparing regional with national discourses was facilitated. In fact, a comparative study of this kind has not been undertaken before, and is an academically original attempt to include features of *regional* discourses about migrants and immigration of the everyday within the province of Upper Austria in a study and compare them to the national political discourses. Further reasons included that in spite of Vienna offering more cultural diversity than that found in any of the provinces, having the highest percentage of ethnic minorities (17.4% equivalent to 273,000 people (www.ooe.gv.at 2000)), Vienna has been over-used as the location for research projects with regard to ethnic minorities and racist discourses (e.g. Wodak). In addition, Vienna as opposed to Upper Austria did not offer any access to rural populations and hence could

neither facilitate the analysis of the rural-urban divide (in terms of discourses), nor facilitate easy access to the most traditional Christian Democrat voters, who were expected to be located within rural areas.

Situating the regional case study within the province of Upper Austria was additionally beneficial due to the political profile of the province. In this respect, Vienna is traditionally a 'red' (socialist) capital, which in 1999 was confirmed by the following voting percentages of the election: 38% of the Viennese population voted for the Socialist Party, whereas 16.9% voted for the ÖVP and 24% for the FPÖ (www.ooe.gv.at 2000). By contrast, Upper Austria reflects the national average of support in percentages for each of the three main parties, voting with 33% for the Socialist Party, 28.6% for the ÖVP and 27% for FPÖ (ibid.).

Furthermore, the socio-demographic profile of Upper Austria can be described as follows. The percentage of ethnic minorities living in Upper Austria accounts for 7.1% of the population, which is roughly 97,000 members of minority groups out of a population of 1,273,000 Upper Austrians (www.ooe.gv.at 2000). This is the fourth highest percentage of ethnic minorities within the nine Austrian provinces, the third largest of the Austrian provinces in population, and the second largest in size.

Another general point to note is that the design of this research overcomes lacks that opinion polls about attitudes towards 'foreigners' indicate. Opinion polls often portray results and studies on the negatively expressed views on 'foreigners', but do not investigate or indicate the existing positive opinions in the overall spectrum of probable opinions. On the other hand the opinion polls discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Two often do not qualitatively analyse how these discourses are constructed and reasoned for. For example, in an opinion poll a respondent can choose within a range of extremely positive to extremely negative, but will not be able to explain the reasons for these choices. Such an opinion poll cannot connect the elitist political discourses with the discourses of the micro sphere. This study, on the contrary, used a predominantly qualitative research design to overcome such lack.

2.0 Applied research methods and the formation of codes applicable for both the political sphere (A) and the everyday sphere (B)

In the following paragraphs aspects of the research methods used for each of the two investigated spheres of research are explained. For each of the case studies, structured qualitative content analysis was used as the main research method. However peripherally grounded theory due to the partial usage of open coding was intermixed with the content analysis. Grounded theory was undertaken in the sense that the research was conducted, and a theory presented, following which theories were established. Resulting from those processes, the data were analysed again and the established theories were then developed in greater detail. However, an established hypothesis existed, and thus the project can be seen as a combination of hypothesis-testing and grounded theory theorising and development.

Regarding structured qualitative content analysis Mayring (1999) argues that the goal of this method is to filter out particular aspects of a whole set of data and to find structure in the data material. According to Mayring (1999, p. 92) ' structured qualitative content analysis's goal is to extract certain aspects of the material, by certain predefined criteria, ...and to be able to estimate the material under certain criteria'. The aim of this research was to filter out the set of data relating to 'foreigners' in Austria perceived by the political parties and everyday actors. This method was particularly useful since large sets of data had to be managed. Mayring further argues that this method favours the creation of categories and exhibits similarities to the method of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1996, 1999) regarding the open coding. In this regard, as part of the content analysis, codes are meant to be subsumed into the categories to which they belong. However, in this project, 'categories' were instead titled thematic groups, and two separate forms of categorisation were used. Firstly, codes were assigned to thematic groups, and secondly within those thematic groups consisting of individual codes, *theoretical* codes were formed consisting of a set of similar smallest entity codes. In some form the thematic groups were somewhat preconditioned, by for example, targeting certain topics in the questions of the semi-structured interviews. In part, these topics then served as a basis for the formation of thematic groups. However, some flexibility remained, and a form of open coding was applied since the thematic group boundaries were not rigid and new thematic groups were created depending on the outcome of the coding. The latter could be considered grounded theory methods. In terms of the coding of the data, the smallest entities were identified, to

then actively create and passively be subsumed to the appropriate thematic groups. The coding could therefore be filed under qualitative content analysis, but also grounded theory. Grounded theory open coding was applied in the sense of identifying as many codes as existed and to then create the categories to which they belonged. However as a result of the established hypothesis and development of Weber's theories in Chapter Two, the approach to the research data was intermingled with qualitative content analysis. Allowing for the negative testing of the hypothesis, to some extent the coding had to be undertaken openly and a fuller explanation will follow later.

Mayring further argues that the advantage of content analysis is that the results can be interpreted qualitatively as well as quantitatively, the latter by counting and testing which codes were used most often. It was considered useful for this research design to add to the qualitative analysis a quantitative supplementary one, by counting codes to substantiate arguments for both the national macro findings as well as those of the regional case study. The quantitative aspects, however, should be understood as testing and either substantiating or disqualifying the more important qualitative analysis. Chapter Four hence includes both qualitative as well as quantitative elements. Chapter Five describes a quantitative approach to the respondents' micro sphere case study and Chapter Six describes a mixed quantitative and qualitative approach.

3.0 The coding process and appendices

The following paragraphs explain research characteristics of this thesis applying the above methodological insight in a practical setting of data. In this respect, the forming of codes, the assigning of codes as well as the creation of theoretical codes was undertaken according to specific rules accounting for both spheres of research. The methodological and data analysis characteristics not shared by the two spheres will be highlighted in later sections when specifically focusing on either one of the spheres of research.

At this point the Appendices (spreadsheets) have to be explained and introduced[35]. All codes, theoretical codes and thematic groups can be viewed in Appendix One to Four with regard to the political parties, as well as in Appendix Five to Nine with regard to the case study of the regional everyday discourse. Furthermore, Appendix One indicates the codes,

[35] It is significant to mention that the data material consisted exclusively of material in colloquial German. Translations of the data might not at all times be grammatically correct, but this was done on purpose. The aim was to obtain the closest possible transfer of data in regard to its meaning in German into the English language.

theoretical codes as well as thematic groups identified for the material investigating the SPÖ. Appendix Two indicates the same for the ÖVP. Appendix Three demonstrates this for the FPÖ and Appendix Four identifies the above for the Green Party. Appendix Five presents the overall counts of codes used by the different socio demographic background groups. Appendix Six presents an overview of the codes, theoretical codes and thematic groups of the regional everyday discourses as well as the frequency of usage divided by socio demographic background (political support, age, gender, rural/urban background, professional background (class), and educational background). Appendix Five and Six served as a basis for Chapter Five. Appendix Seven explains the usage of codes by the respondents of the case study, specifically divided by political support, and focusing on the individual usage of codes. Appendix Eight explains the respective for the Green Party supporters. appendix Nine can be understood as a discourse mapping of regional actors discourses divided by political support. it served as a basis for a comparative analysis of legitimating leadership types. Appendix seven to nine served as a basis for chapter Six. Appendix Ten to Fourteen exhibits transcripts of data material used for a qualitative analysis.

Below examples of how codes were formed, how they were combined in theoretical codes and then filed under thematic groups are given. Generally, the smallest entities of the data were identified and were subsequently divided between A positive, B neutral and C negative codes. For example, the criteria for codes situated within the A (positive) group of codes was a clearly expressed positive opinion within the given set of data in relation to 'foreigners'. A discourse or code indicating a pro-immigration opinion was then located within the A range of codes. The following example is taken from the case study interview material and can be viewed in more detail in Appendix Six:

> CR: 'we need immigration, otherwise noone will be working anymore in 10 years time...(laughter)'
>
> CR: ‚Wir brauchen ja die Einwanderung sonst gibt's eh in 10 Jahren einen mehr (Lachen) der arbeitet, ...'

Clearly, the interviewee indicated a positive opinion towards immigration, specifying the need for immigration and the reason for the necessity for it. The above example formed the code A5 = 'need immigration for the labour market' (see Appendix Six). This code was then subsumed in the thematic group of 'immigration, labour market and welfare system'. The codes which were similar, for example, all codes indicating the reasons for needing immigration, the rationale for these beliefs, were added together to form a

theoretical code. In that respect the A5 code also became part of the theoretical code 'need immigration'. The forming of theoretical codes will be explained later.

The B codes, or neutral expressions, included all codes and expressions about 'foreigners' which indicated a certain indecisiveness or neutrality towards the given topic in the set of data available. For example the code B3 'immigration remain as it is, ok now' was typically expressed in the following way. HH argues that:

> HH: 'I think, presently it is just about right, neither too many, nor too little (im)migrated. So –from my point of view, one can argue my opinion is neutral.'
>
> HH: ‚Ich glaube, es hat momentan das richtige Ausmaß, es sind nicht zu viele, es sind nicht zu wenige gekommen. Das ist – kann man aus meiner Sicht neutral bezeichnen'.

This identified B3 code was subsumed into the thematic group 'immigration, labour market and welfare system' (as above); however in combination with similar B codes, formed the theoretical code 'neutral on immigration'.

The criteria for filing a code within the range of negative C codes consisted of clearly expressed negative opinions with regard to any topic or theme in relation to 'foreigners'. For example, the C17 code 'sponge, know how to sponge' was expressed by the interviewee in the following way:

> GU: 'some time ago we had a colleague [migrant], and his father in law was- one has to say that very openly- has exploited the state. '
>
> GU: ‚früher haben wir einen Arbeitskollegen gehabt, den seine – also dem sein Schwiegervater hat – muss man ganz offen sagen – den Staat ausgenutzt. Ja.'

The C17 code was filed under the thematic group 'immigration, labour market, and welfare system', as it indicated a code relating to the topic of the welfare and social system, as well as combining with similar C codes the theoretical code 'burden on the welfare system'.

Both in the political as well as in the everyday sphere the codes were then filed under thematic groups, depending on their content. By subsuming and creating different thematic groups, six themes evolved and facilitated the possibility for a detailed cross-comparative analysis of the political as well as the everyday discourses. The emergence of these themes originated from a combination of the open coding of the data as well as from pre-set interview questions and criteria which were discussed earlier. They consisted of the theme of immigration including the impact on the labour market, and the welfare/social system, integration, culture, religion, national identity as well as (solely in the everyday case study) the association of migrants by everyday actors, and personal experiences with

minority group members. In Appendix Six, these thematic groups were titled: 'how they perceive foreigners', 'immigration, labour market and social system', 'culture', 'integration[36]', 'religion' and 'identity' as well as 'personal experience'.

To give an example of the creation of a theoretical code, the following procedure was used: The theoretical code 'need for immigration' included all positive and pro immigration codes, consisting of codes A2-A6 (including the A5 code already described). This theoretical code was then formed in the following way:

A2 'need immigration; need more immigration; it is ok to open borders' +
A3 'immigration with some regulations' +
A4 'need immigration to support pension system' +
A5 'need immigration for labour market' +
A6 'need skilled labour migration' +
A2+A3+A4+A5+A6 = Need immigration

In the above it is obvious that all codes expressed opinions identifying the need for immigration, although with differing reasons for the opinions. Hence the similar codes were added together to form a group of codes similar in content, then a theoretical code.

Another theoretical coding example consisted of the theoretical code 'cultural neutral' and this was formed by the following codes:
B12 'do not care about culture; no benefit' +
B13 'no disturbance; culture has positive and negative aspects; culture will merge' +
B14 'culture has no impact; or neutral impact'
B12+B13+B14 = cultural neutral

Or to give a third example, it could be argued that the theoretical code 'religion is a benefit' was formed by the following codes:
A35 'religion is no problem' +
A36 'religions freedom' +
A38 'respect their religions' +
A37 'religion is benefit'

[36] Similar to the in Chapter One mentioned way of defining ‚foreigner' for the purpose of this thesis, concepts of integration are also defined passively by way of the data material rather than by the author's choice of a theoretical definition.

In the case of the occurrence of overlapping codes which were suitable for more than one of the thematic groups, the code was then filed under the more suitable thematic group. Regarding the analysis of the political manifestos and parliamentary debates, only the paragraphs relating to migrants and to the topic of this thesis were included in the data.

4.0 The national political discourses - the macro sphere data

In terms of the political sphere, the general political manifestos of each party (SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ, Grüne) were collected. These have not been amended in the past 15 years and hence give an insight into the longer standing, but also more ideal typical party orientations than for example parliamentary debates which more so facilitate interactional settings as well as momentum snapshots. National manifestos rather than regional ones were chosen in order to be able to compare discourses occurring at the national macro sphere of society as opposed to those occurring at regional micro everyday sphere. These manifestos outline each party's policies towards, and representation, of migrants in Austria. These manifestos indicated a strong ideal typical discourse. Thus, the sample had to be supplemented with other less ideal typical research material. Consequently, material in the form of parliamentary debates was collected, most of which was found on the internet. The interactional natural setting of the debates was considered to be an advantage, being more realistic than the propaganda-orientated discourse of a party manifesto. The benefit of the parliamentary debates was the possibility they afforded to observe discourse in action and the contemporary discourses after the change of governmental alliances in 1999.

The parliamentary debates found, consisted of three main policy areas concerning integration, naturalisation, and immigration with regard to ethnic minorities between the years 1999 and 2002. Included as data material were the 109. Sitzung (parliamentary debate) on 9.07.2002 (p.58-92, www.parlament.gv.at), about the passing of the 'Integrationsvertrag' (integration law/policy and pact), the 97. Sitzung (PD), on 20 und 21.03. 2002 (p.28-38) on the topic integration and immigration, and the 69. Sitzung (PD) (10.May.2001, p.31-47) on immigration laws and labour market, as well as the 2nd debate (18.Nov. 1999, p.51-67) on the subject of family reunification. It should be noted that the three first mentioned debates cover the period of the present governmental alliance (ÖVP-FPÖ), while during the 2nd parliamentary debate in 1999, the SPÖ and ÖVP governmental alliance was still in power, with the FPÖ and Green Party in opposition. In the data this second debate was purposely included in order to compare discourses of parties in either an oppositional or a governmental position and hence analyse continuity or interruption of

discourses. It was additionally aimed to test whether Weber's types of leadership styles could be located in spite of changed governmental or oppositional positions. The inclusion of the analysis of the second debate investigated the extent to which continuity or discontinuity could be identified in debates stemming from 1999 versus those following the formation of contemporary alliances.

4.1 Specific coding characteristics regarding the parliamentary debates and political manifestos

The material from parliamentary debates excluded material where speeches attacked the other political party speakers on their previous speech. Another data determining factor took account of the fact of opposition parties being granted less speaking time than the governmental alliance parties' allocation. Hence the amount of data available for analysis was greater for governmental parties than for the opposition.

Some examples of how codes investigating the political data material were formed are given below. As described above, these codes were based on the smallest content entities, as well as filed under A, B and C categories. Subsequently they were mutually subsumed into thematic groups. For each of the parties the following codes were found. In total in the material for the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) 70 codes were formed, 65 in the Freedom Party material, 80 in the Christian Democratic Party material and 49 based on the Green Party data available.

The example below can be viewed in Appendix Two for the ÖVP codes:

> 'Unlimited immigration to the expense of the Austrian population is not acceptable. Not every 'foreigner' who strives for the permission of residency in Austria can be granted such.' (ÖVP manifesto, p. 97).

> ‚Unbeschränkte Einwanderung zu lasten der österreichischen Bevölkerung kann es nicht geben nicht jeder Ausländer der dies ansterbt kann die Berechtigung zum Aufenthalt in Österreich erhalten.' (ÖVP manifesto, p. 97)

Based on the above data two codes were formed, namely the code C5 'unlimited immigration at the expense of the Austrian population cannot exist', as well as the code C8 'not every 'foreigner' has the right to stay in our homeland - not every 'foreigner' can obtain a visa'. Both codes were subsumed under the thematic category of 'immigration, labour market and welfare system' and became part of – amongst other codes - the theoretical code 'immigration'. This can be viewed in more detail on Appendix Two.

Another example taken from Socialist Party discourse is indicated below (Appendix One):

> 'You should think about what immigration means for Austria, ..., and what it will mean in future. We will need immigration. We will need regulated immigration, we will need sensible (rational) immigration, but without immigration it will not be possible to survive.' (Pilz, 109th Debate, p.78)
>
> ‚Sie sollten wirklich daran denken dass Einwanderung für Österreich, auch für einzelne Mitglieder ihrer Partei bedeutet hat, und was sie auch in Zukunft bedeuten wird. Wir werden Einwanderung brauchen. Wir werden geregelte Einwanderung brauchen, wir werden vernünftige Einwanderung brauchen, aber ohne Einwanderung wird es schlicht und einfach nicht gehen.'(ibid.)

In the above quote the code A14 'need immigration', A15 'we depend on immigration' as well as A20 'regulated immigration', were formed and then subsumed into the thematic group of 'immigration, labour market and welfare system' and formed part of the theoretical code 'immigration'. This can be viewed in Appendix One.

Yet another example, taken from the Socialist Party discourse consists of the following:

> 'Integration is more than just learning German, we look at this from a broader perspective. Humane housing, a right to work and access to education are part of it (integration).'(Gaal, 109th debate,p.88)
>
> ‚Für uns ist Integration mehr als nur Deutsch zu lernen wir sehen das umfassender. Es gehören dazu auch menscherwürdiges Wohnen, ein Recht auf Arbeit und Zugang zu Bildung.' (ibid.)

The following codes were formed based on the above data A49 'integration in housing market', A52 'right to work' and A50 'integration in education system'. These were subsumed into the thematic group integration. This can be viewed on Appendix One.

A Freedom Party example of parliamentary speech discourse is indicated below:

> 'I have to repeat that, it is the wrong strategy to call in skilled labour migrants to Austria, one should take advantage of the Austrian labour reserve first. We do not need the immigration waves as we can cover the labour market with Austrian labour force.'(Schweitzer, 69th Debate, p.43)
>
> 'Ich wiederhole es, kurzfristig ausländische Fachkräfte nach Österreich zu holen ist der falsche Weg, man soll zuerst die Reserven in Österreich nutzen...wir brauchen den Zuwanderungsstrom nicht weil wir den Arbeitsmarkt mit qualifizierten Leuten aus Österreich abdecken können.' (ibid.)

The code C21 'take Austrian (labour) first' and A22 'we can cover the labour market with Austrians and do not need foreigners' were formed based on the above data. Appendix Three exhibits this example.

The Appendix One to Four were the result of the coding of the material for all four political parties (Appendix One: SPÖ; Appendix Two: ÖVP; Appendix Three: FPÖ; Appendix Four: Green Party). The codes were peripherally divided also into (A), (B) and (C) codes, though not in as much detail as for the case study of the everyday regional

discourses, since it was not necessary to distinguish the codes so clearly. The codes were also allocated to thematic groups. These thematic groups will be outlined in following sections. These Appendices formed the basis for a detailed qualitative analysis of the macro political discourse discussed in Chapter Four. They also formed a partial basis for a comparison of political and everyday discourses found in Chapter Six. To add more qualitative substance to the above described an additional extract of a parliamentary debate was translated and added including an interpretative analysis of the discourse in action. This was undertaken to substantiate the above described overall analysis of the material even further; to demonstrate the discourses used in interaction of the four parties (their speakers) with each other highlighting the irony often used and illustrating the attack made on the other parties' expressions and speakers. Greater and more detailed analysis of this debate was then demonstrated and also provided counter arguments or further substantiation for the results which were generated out of the study as described thus far.

Furthermore it must be noted that the data results additionally generated a quantitative analysis of the material. The reasons for the possibility and suitability of conducting qualitative combined with quantitative analyses of the material due to the usage of content analysis have been outlined previously. Consequently, within the national political discourse data the occurrence of key words was tested. This was undertaken in order to test for the Weberian types of leadership established and developed in Chapter Two. This part of the research evolved relatively late during the writing up of the thesis. In this respect the study can again be considered as being peripherally grounded theory orientated, since during the research, the theories were developed, referred back to the theory and then developed further. Consequently features established in the previous theory chapter, such as those in regard to the SPÖ's leadership style of legality and rationality, the occurrence of words and phrases around the concept of rights, or law and order was tested. However this was used as a cross-comparative test. In that respect the concepts in the form phrase occurrences were also counted and tested in the material of the other parties, in order to be able to compare whether in the other parties this concept was present and if so, to what extent it compared the usage by the SPÖ. For example the occurrence phrases concerning 'rights' or 'law' was counted in the SPÖ material and indicated a frequency of some 50 times in the overall material. The same word, concept, or phrase usage was tested for in the material of the ÖVP, as well as for FPÖ and Green Party. For example the frequency of usage in the FPÖ was 2. This then indicated a self-evident and clear result (see Chapter Four). In terms of the ÖVP and the hypothesis of their traditional leadership style,

concepts or phrases including 'economy' or 'humanitarian' or 'religious' or 'help' contexts were tested, which were then cross-tested and compared with results for the other parties. In terms of the FPÖ, charismatic features (see Chapter Two: charismatic leadership style), such as talk about fear and problems, the problematisation of 'foreigners', or concepts of Germanism and assimilation to the German culture were also tested. Again the Green Party was the exception to the rule as it was included in the study at a later stage. However, it should be noted that this quantitative analysis is somewhat incomplete since the volume of data collected between the different parties varied considerably. Nevertheless it can be seen that the quantitative study does contribute to the overall testing and establishment of the theories of this thesis, as will be shown in the next chapter.

It is further significant to mention that overlapping discourses between political parties were identified and this phenomenon was considered and critically analysed. This will be discussed in the next chapter, situating the parties' discourses within a 'left' to 'right' continuum scale.

5.0 The unofficial everyday discourses - the micro sphere

In this section the following topics will be outlined: (a) the reasons for choosing semi structured qualitative interviews for the investigation of discourses; (b) the sampling method; (c) the manner in which the interviews were conducted; (d) the role of the researcher in conducting such interviews; and (e) analysis of the data and specific characteristics of the coding process for the interview data - regional micro sphere; (f) the specific sample of respondents - the socio-demographic background and its inclusion in the study - an explanation of the spreadsheets - the specific characteristic of the coding process of the interviews (data analysis).

5.1 Semi structured qualitative interviews

Thirty-seven semi-structured qualitative interviews. The advantages of using interviews as a research method are identified by Denscombe (1998). He argues that interviews provide in depth information, give the researcher access to valuable insights, facilitate informant's priorities, facilitate flexibility during the interview, and the validity of data can be checked throughout the interview process. Additionally, Denscombe (1998) argues that by conducting semi-structured interviews the researcher is able to locate particular ideas with

specific people and hence locate certain information very quickly and directly. Because of the open format of the interview and the interview questions, the interviewee was able to expand on opinions he/she held (ibid.). In consequence, it was possible for the researcher to elaborate and gather data which was considered significant.

In Denscombe's view the disadvantages of interviewing are that they are fairly time consuming, the open format of the data analysis adds complexity, and the reliability of data is not very high. The interviewer effect might impact on the data, since what people do in reality and say in an interview can differ very strongly. It could be argued that interviews are not capturing the everyday adequately. However, alternative methods such as participant observation appeared to be too limited by the dubious reliability of the data (researcher too involved in study) and by possible doubtful representatives of the data (generalisations from the data are difficult). In addition ethical problems between the researcher and those interviewed could have emerged. (Denscombe, 1998). An ethnographic study appeared to be limited severely by stand-alone descriptions and the poor reliability of the data, as well as by the impossibility of relating the data to the overall framework of the study. On the other hand, focus groups as one form of interview technique appeared to facilitate interactional (interactive) talk, and hence could have provided more reliable results on behalf of respondents who might have revealed their honest beliefs more truthfully in a mixed interactive discussion. However, focus groups appeared to be too unstructured to gather specific information. Focus groups were peripherally included in the study to test the reliability and validity of the interview data which will be explained later. As a result of the possibility of testing the reliability and validity of interview data by using focus groups, the major disadvantages of conducting interviews were largely eliminated. Interviews were thus considered to be the most suitable research method for researching everyday discourses.

5.2 Sampling method

Thirty-seven (33+3+1)[37] people in three sample groups drawn from the pillars of the Austrian '*Proporz*' society were interviewed. In order to gain access to the different interviewees, a sampling method was devised whereby 'gatekeepers' within Upper Austria according to the Austrian '*Proporz*' divisions were identified. According to May (1997, p. 54) 'gatekeepers' are 'those who control access to the information which the researcher seeks'. While in this case the gatekeepers do not control information, they do, however,

[37] A more detailed explanation will be provided later.

control access to the interviewees and hence information sources. The sampling method used cannot adequately be described by any of the textbook sampling methods. However, the closest textbook sampling method would be that described as cluster sampling. Denscombe (1998, p.14) argues that 'the logic behind cluster sampling is, in reality, it is possible to get a good enough sample by focusing on naturally occurring clusters of the particular thing that the researcher wishes to study'. The aim for the researcher is to get a representative cluster with the difference that instead of random or stratified sampling (as explained in textbooks). Arguably, snowball sampling, defined by Denscombe (1998, p.16) as 'a sample emerging through a process of reference from one person to the next', has also been significant for the study. Gatekeepers in industrial institutions (traditionally SPÖ – Social Democratic), in rural communities (traditionally ÖVP – Catholic/rural) and gatekeepers in financial institutions such as banks (each associating themselves somehow with a political camp) were identified. Initially individuals from within these institutions were contacted through family connections and asked whether they could either provide names and contact numbers of people as possible gatekeepers or whether they would undertake to become gatekeepers themselves. The sampling additionally attempted to create a balance between old and young age groups, gender groups, as well as groups from different class backgrounds and a balance between respondents from rural and urban backgrounds. The reason for ensuring that a balance between gender, age, class, education and rural/urban backgrounds was included to investigate the possibility of the determination of discourses by each one of the above features. It was assumed that despite the assumption of a determination of discourses by political support, the discourses could equally have been determined by age, or gender, class or education, or by rural/urban background.

The interview questions corresponded with the overall identified themes as outlined previously and were based on themes arising from the sociology of ethnic and racial relations. The questions asked the respondents about their definition of ethnic minorities, their personal experiences with ethnic minorities, attitudes towards concepts of integration, attitudes towards cultural and religious differences as well as their beliefs about 'migrants' and the welfare state, the labour market and criminality. The questions can be found in the appendix. The questions in the interview were arranged in this sequence, but the interviewer was allowed to enter into a dialogue with the interviewee and to further investigate the interviewee's response when appropriate. This method correlates with May's (1993, p.111) argument that: 'qualitative information about the topic can be

recorded by the interviewer who can seek both clarification and elaboration on the answers given. .....information about age, gender..... can be asked in a standardised format'. To give an example of the interview tequniques, the first question asked about the association of the respondent with the term 'ethnic minority'. Such question was designed to investigate the respondents of 'non Austrian' , 'foreign', 'migrants' and allow for the interviewee to clarify their usage of the terminology without being directly asked. Depending on the first interaction with the respondent the further interaction was altered.

At the end of each interview, the respondents were required to complete a questionnaire for the purposes of identifying their socio-demographic profiles (age, gender, profession, education, religion, citizenship, residency), and their political support. With regard to their political support, they were not asked to state for whom they had voted in the most recent political elections, or for whom they generally voted, but were asked which party they mostly closely identified with in terms of the political orientation and agenda of that party. In this respect, it was not the intention or purpose of the study to identify voting behaviour, but to highlight political support. Such information was of importance as the research design of the study was partly based on and equally questioned the 'Proporzsystem'. Thus, it was important to establish the individual respondent's political orientational party support. Prior to conducting the research, one concern was that the respondents might either be deceptive about their support for a political agenda or might refuse to admit to any allegiance altogether. Such concern proved to be invalid. Only one of 37 people interviewed refused to reveal their political orientational party support. This was subsequently eliminated from the sample.

As outlined previously, aside from the sampling of political support, the aim of this study was to cater for age, gender, class, educational and rural/urban differences within the respondents' group. In fact, before the research began it was expected that there might be a strong age or gender determination of discourses. Gender determination of discourses means that similar features of discourse might have been clearly identifiable within the female group of respondents as opposed to being equally clearly identifiable within the male respondents' group. The findings of this analysis will be outlined in Chapter Five. Thus, it was important to design the research with these theoretical assumptions in mind.

5.3 The role of the researcher

It is undeniable that the role of the researcher is significant in the conduct of interviews and in the interpretation of qualitative data. The researcher's identity, gender, age, and beliefs all play an important part when conducting interviews as well as when analysing interview data. Denscombe (1998) argues that there are two possibilities of confronting the role of the self when conducting qualitative research, specifically qualitative interviews. Either the researcher integrates the self into the process of the research and accepts or even benefits from the involvement of the self in that process acknowledging that the individual can contribute positively to a privileged insight into social issues. This could be the case with gendered approaches to research. Alternatively, 'the researcher's identity, values and beliefs play a role in the production and analysis of qualitative data and therefore researchers should be on their guard to distance themselves from their normal, every day beliefs and to suspend judgements on social issues for the duration of their research (Denscombe, 1998, p. 208)'. Denscombe further argues that in this case the researcher is aware of the interactive role of the self, but is however controlling personal beliefs and identity to an extent that they can operate on a detached basis from the research object, so that their personal opinions are not influencing the investigation, analysis and interpretation of data.

In this respect, the role of the researcher has to be taken into consideration with regard to all spheres involved. Wodak (1993, 1989) and Menz (1989) argued that the researcher is forced to take sides and that the subjects under investigation cannot be treated as objects. On the other hand Wodak (1999, p. 12) argues that 'critical' (in Critical Discourse Analysis) means critical self reflection while doing research. She indicates that: 'researchers have to keep the distance to the object of investigation , they must be constantly aware of what they are researching, which allows constant self reflection. Thus research means a constant balance between theory and empirical phenomena'. This study takes the position of the latter argument (1999). The researcher plays an interactive role in the research, but must, however, keep a distance and as much academic objectivity as possible. However, as Max Weber argues, the researcher is a human being, and cannot step out of his/her own cultural backgrounds and his/her interest in the given area at a given point of time. The researcher serves the role of the interpreter of the given topic and data. Preventative steps have been taken to limit the amount of subjectivity.

5.4 Conducting the interviews - the reliability and validity of the data

The practical part of interviewing left questions open as to the research ethics and the process of interviewing. It also left questions open as to the relationship between interviewer and interviewees, especially given that the research topic was a sensitive one. Lee (1993, p.102-104) argues that: 'where the topic of the research is a sensitive one, presenting it to respondents may not be easy. As a matter of strategy the researcher must decide whether or not the topic of the interview should be described in detail at the outset.....defining the boundaries of the research topic too tightly may inhibit respondents from defining it in their own way.....Such interviews provide a means of getting beyond surface appearance and permit greater sensitivity to the meaning contexts surrounding informant utterances. This is particularly so when sensitive topics are studied'. Since the topic of ethnic minorities is highly political, it was deemed best to make the interviewees feel relaxed and then introduce them to the topic. Even though the topic of the research was a sensitive one, it was possible to inspire interviewees to talk openly and freely about their perceptions. It was beneficial to mention to them that the researcher (myself), was undertaking this study on behalf of an international institution and not a national one. The interview sessions showed that the interviewees did not have any problems expressing themselves honestly. It was also important to minimise disturbing effects such as tape recorders, though the use of a tape recorder for this study was however essential.

Denscombe (1998) argues that in interview settings, the interviewer effect can occur, which means that individuals are likely to tailor their statements as they can be influenced/biased by the identity of the researcher. The data obtained are based on what people said that they do, rather than on observing and seeing what they really do. Saying what they think and do might not necessarily reflect the truth. The interviewer effect is one of the major drawbacks of the interview method. This problem was overcome by testing the reliability and validity of the data. Interviews with one focus groups were conducted with individuals from each party who had previously been interviewed on a one-to-one basis. This was meant to test whether in a focus group discussion the interviewees would reveal the same opinion as previously expressed on a one-to-one basis. It was anticipated that if they had been honest, they would express their original opinions in a pressurised heated debate, while if they had presented a different opinion in the one-to-one interviews, the focus group would reveal this. The focus group interviews was conducted with 1 FPÖ, two ÖVP and one SPÖ supporter. The outcome of this 'focus

group test' revealed that all participants' opinions corresponded with those expressed in the conducted individual interviews previously.

When conducting the interviews, the interviewees were informed that participants would be anonymous. For ethical reasons, the interview questions were asked overtly and very directly. It can be said that the interviewees had no difficulties in admitting their positive or negative perceptions, or in talking about perceived conflicts with ethnic minorities in Austria. The reliability and validity of their answers was tested by observing to their attitudes outside the interview and these matched with their answers during the interview. However, there was one notable incident with an FPÖ supporter. This particular interviewee asked after the conducted interview whether some of the interviewees have been dishonest and whether this could be tested. The individual then revealed her true attitudes about 'foreigners' and repeated that she had not mentioned all of these 'things' during the recorded interview since these were only others' opinions. In a situation like this notes were made after the interview.

Additionally, a test of the interviewees' true attitudes was made and hence the validity and reliability of data ascertained, within the interview questions. This, revealed one area of positive involvement by the interviewer. Within a short period of time, it was possible to sense whether the respondent was being honest or was withholding his/her true opinions during the investigation of personal definitions of ethnic minorities. Hence, a strategy was developed to test whether the interviewee was being honest or not, and if he/she was dishonest, to encourage him/her by actions and behaviour to answer truthfully without him/her being aware of the strategy. This was undertaken the following way. When the second question of the interview arose which read 'do you have any personal experiences with ethnic minorities and in what way, positive or negative?', the respondent would talk for approximately 3 minutes and then a story presented by the interviewer was told to test their opinions and to reveal their true beliefs. They were told of the researcher's personal experiences with ethnic minorities in this case a neighbouring Turkish family and that this had been a negative experience. Based on the negative effect example, two types of responses from the interviewee were anticipated. Either, if they had been telling the truth beforehand, and had so far been 'positive' about ethnic minorities argue that such can happen. But if they had so far been 'negative', they would take the story as an example to reveal even greater negative opinions. However, if they had been pretending to be 'positive' and in reality were not, then the negative effect story was the turning point to

reveal the interviewees' true opinions, in that case negative. Thus, this negative effect story encouraged the interviewee to reveal his/her honest beliefs and demonstrated that in reality he/she might not have been all that open-minded towards ethnic minorities as previously indicated. From this point in the interview, all respondents would then be consistent in their general opinion of being open- or closed-minded in their opinions.

The interviews took between 20 and 90 minutes and have all been fully transcribed.

5.5 Analysis of the data and specific characteristics of the coding process for the interview data

The material consisted of 36+1 fully transcribed interviews. The material was coded, open coding, according to grounded theory and then recoded three times. The smallest entities were identified, to in order actively create and passively be subsumed to the appropriate thematic groups. The coding could therefore be filed under qualitative content analysis, but also grounded theory. Open coding was applied in the sense of coding finding as many codes as there were and then to create the thematic groups to which they belonged. As a result of the established hypothesis and development of Weber's theories in Chapter Two, the approach to the research data was intermingled with qualitative content analysis. Allowing for the negative testing of the hypothesis, to some extent the coding had to be undertaken openly. The details regarding the A-positive, B-neutral and C-negative codes, as well as the formation of theoretical codes has already been described.

The codes were then categorised, subsumed to thematic groups and listed on a spreadsheet, then filed in the Appendix Six, under the socio demographic factors, or also on Appendix Seven (detailed coding by political support). The codes were marked under the certain interviewee 's column (top down range), either in the form of a red S for an SPÖ interviewee or a black V for a Christian democrat interviewee, or a blue F for an FPÖ interviewee. However this will be explained in far more detail in the next section.

Examples of the forming of codes are:

> HEL: 'well, in regard to this subject [immigration] I would say, my opinion is that immigration is clearly too high. Immigration numbers are far too high, we have in my opinion in Austria, well what I really have to say is that one can identify a form of foreign swamping in Austria- foreign swamping can partly be identified.'

HEL: 'Also dazu muss ich sagen, meine Meinung ist, sie ist eindeutig zu hoch. Sie ist viel zu hoch, wir haben in Österreich meinem Gefühl nach, ist schon sehr fort – also was ich auf jeden Fall sagen muss, es hat schon eine gewisse ah Überfremdung in Österreich – ist eine Überfremdung schon teilweise feststellbar.'

The codes C4 'too much immigration' as well as C 45 'foreign swamping' were identified in the above example. On Appendix Seven the specific interviewees name on the top of the spreadsheet indicated his synonym, then the codes were ticked in the box (on the top-down column the interviewee was indicated, and on the left to right row the code was ticked). For example, in the above case, on spreadsheet x the boxes C4 and C45 were marked with a blue F for the interviewee 'HEL'.

In the following quote the code C39 'Islam is a problem' could be identified was marked under the interviewee AFF with a blue F.

AFF: 'Well, religion, definitely with regard to the Moslems, well Islam will most likely be the biggest problem, because the religion of Islam is not so much tolerated in Austria.'

AFF: ‚Naja, die Religion sicher puncto Moslem, also Islam wird wahrscheinlich das größte Problem sein, weil eben die Religion vom Islam eher weniger in Österreich toleriert wird

5.6 The presentation of Codes

Overall, of the 37 conducted interviews, only 33 + 3[38] (36) were used for the data analysis. One remaining interview was not used because the interviewee did not want to admit to any political affiliations.

With regard to the socio demographic background of the interviewees, it was not possible to balance the numbers of interviewees in each of the socio demographic categories. The group of respondents could be divided between political support, age, gender, class (economic professional background) as well as by educational background and rural/urban; however an imbalance within some of the socio economic groups occurred. In the context of the explanation of the tables in the Appendices, the imbalance within socio demographic groupings will be highlighted. However, before this explanation, the Appendices will be explained further.

Appendix Five, exhibits the overall amount and usage of codes, divided by political support, as well as by age, gender, class, rural/urban, educational and professional

[38] Green party

background of the interviewees. Graph 1 (in Appendix Five) exhibits the overall number of codes used and Graph 2 (in Appendix Five) shows the absolute number of codes used divided by the differing socio demographic backgrounds. The frequency of usage of a certain code (in this case the A, B or C codes in total) was counted for each socio demographic group separately. Each interviewee was allocated the appropriate socio demographic background feature and subsequently each code used by that particular interviewee was filed under the relevant socio demographic category. Then the total number between codes was counted for each of the socio demographic features. Imbalance of some socio demographic factors (gender, rural/urban, educational and class) occurred. For example, the sample consisting of interviewees divided by their gender background, included 24 men and 9 women. This imbalance made it impossible to compare the usage of codes accurately. To overcome this problem, weighted averages were calculated based on the specific imbalance of the socio-demographic background sample. These were calculated by taking the larger participant number of the group and dividing it by the smaller number. The factor x was then multiplied with the smaller participant number in the group which generated a result of y. y was the factor the codes were then outbalanced with. In fact the absolute number of codes by the larger participant sample was kept and the codes used by the smaller participant sample was outbalanced with y. For example, the group of gender consisted of 9 women and 24 men. Based on the above, the following calculation was undertaken: 24:9=2.66666. 2.6666 was factor y. Then the absolute number of codes used by women (the smaller participant number of the sample) were multiplied with this factor y (2.666). However, the calculation of a weighted average based on a very small sample is doubtful. However, to calculate the weighted averages was the best suitable possibility to achieve a standardisation of the socio demographic dependent usage of codes. In fact these calculations enabled relatively reliable testing of socio demographic influences on the usage of codes and the frequency of this usage. It is significant to mention that the case study and its results particularly the quantitative aspects and results, are under no circumstances to be understood as representative, and are only relevant in the regard to this particular case study. Graph 3 on Appendix Five exhibits the calculated weighted averages calculated based on Graph 2 which shows the absolute number of codes used. Appendix Five served as a basis for Chapter Five.

Appendix Six presents the number of occurrences of codes, theoretical codes (calculated by adding up individual codes) and thematic groups. It includes both the absolute numbers of codes used as well as the weighted averages for the purposes of standardising the results

for the imbalanced socio demographic factors in the participant number. The codes and theoretical codes can be viewed on the vertical axis and the socio demographic factors are presented horizontally. The frequency of usage for the codes is divided by socio demographic factors. It must be noted that the categories 'political support' and 'age' were evenly balanced between interviewees and hence only the absolute numbers were indicated on the spreadsheet. For example, on Appendix Six, the code A7 can be viewed. Reading the row to the right and based on weighted averages, the frequency of usages between the different categories becomes clear. It can be seen how often the a. SPÖ b. ÖVP. c. FPÖ, d. old, c. young, d. men, e. women, f. urban, g. rural, h. working class, i. middle class, j. farmers, k. primary school, l. secondary school, m. academically educated, interviewees, have used the codes. For each of the theoretical codes (indicated in green), calculated from the previous theoretical code, the numbers were added up vertically for that specific theoretical code. From left to right the total occurrence of the code was calculated, based on the absolute occurrence of that specific code only. For the theoretical codes, the individual code usage was summed. Appendix Six served as a basis for Chapter Five.

Appendix Seven, exhibits the codes used by the individuals of different political party background and formed the basis for Chapter Six, the qualitative detailed analysis of the correspondence or dissimilarities of political party and everyday discourses. Appendix Seven only exhibits absolute usage of codes and indicates which codes were chosen by each individual. Each individual's usage was counted only once. Frequently, within one set of data, several different codes were used by the interviewees. These were often contradictory, ranging between A and C codes. For example, an interviewee might have used the code A2 ' need for immigration' as well as A5 'need for immigrants for the labour market', but also C8 'no immigration for unskilled labour'. By doing so, the respondent specified the general opinion of needing immigration as such and specifically for the labour market, but rejected or excluded the possibility of unskilled labour migration as part of overall migration. In practice all three codes (including A and C codes) were allocated to the specific individual. Therefore contradictions in talk occur and were taken into consideration. This means of analysis gave the opportunity to review the data and the discourse in detail, rather than neglecting the contradictory discourses or in-depth specification of respondents' opinions as simply the general response of an individual whose opinion was positive towards a certain theme. Hence, all discourses of all data were considered and not just the predominant part of the answer to a certain question.

5.7 The socio demographic background of the interviewees

1. Political support background

The sample group of 36 (33+3), 11 plus 11 plus 11 was divided by political support, with three (+ 3) interviews conducted with Green Party supporters, as it was considered unnecessary to include a larger group of Green Party respondents. In Appendix Seven individuals' political support was indicated by the colouring of red, black and blue and marked with S, V or F. Therefore in the main sample only the 33 respondents are included and counted in the socio demographic background profile, while the Green Party group was analysed separately to this part of the case study.

Of the 33 interviewees, 27 indicated support for one party only, whereas the other 6 supported two parties. However, they stated a preference for one of the two supported parties and were included in the sample of their preferred party. In the data analysis in Chapter Six this dual support was taken into consideration and analysed separately. Thus, 11 SPÖ supporters were interviewed of whom 3 implied that they also supported the Green Party, but felt closer to the SPÖ in terms of political orientation. Eleven ÖVP supporters were interviewed of whom one also felt close to the SPÖ, while however preferring the ÖVP. Eleven FPÖ supporters were interviewed; two of these also felt close to the ÖVP. This shared support was also interesting in terms of the analysis of data, since it enabled a direct access to party divided discourses, given the opportunity to specifically analyse the extent of party political influence on the discourse of the respondents which might possibly exists. This sample was the most important one as it served as a basis for Chapter Six, the qualitative analysis. The discourses of the interviewees were tested in detail.

The selection process for all socio–demographic background factors was supported by the gatekeepers in the sampling process since the particular socio demographic categories being sought had been indicated. Where, for example, another male interviewee was necessary, the gatekeepers were frequently able to meet this requirement in their recommendation of possible interviewees.

2. Age factor:

In terms of age groups, the age division between old and young age groups has been drawn from respondents older than 50 and those younger than 50. The standard was set at the age of 50 since people older than 50 (at the time of the conduction of research those were

people born 1951/52) might somehow have been influenced by the Second World War ethics and by the post-War era, either by their parents or as a consequence of their own experiences in that particular time period. Hence they could hypothetically have been influenced in their beliefs by Nazi orientations which were prevalent at that time. At the same time those younger than 50 were hypothetically influenced by a different generation already. Of the sample of 33 people, 17 above 50 years of age and 16 younger respondents were interviewed. Hence approximately half of the sample was above 50 years of age. The largest numbers of the older age group respondents were FPÖ supporters, followed by the number of ÖVP supporters, with fewest of this age group being SPÖ supporters.

3. Gender factor:

In terms of gender differences, of the 33 respondents 9 women and 24 men were interviewed, again roughly a third of the sample consisted of female respondents. Of these, 3 were SPÖ supporters, and 3 each ÖVP as well as FPÖ supporters. One Green Party supporter was also a female respondent.

4. Educational background:

In terms of educational background, 9 respondents had obtained third level education, and 2 were in the process of completing final examinations. Thirteen had completed secondary education and 11 had only finished primary level education. Primary school level included the legal minimum required amount of school years either 'Volksschule' or 'Hauptschule' up to the age of 15. Two secondary school pupils who were 16 and 17 were included in the primary school level as they had not yet completed the secondary level. Plasser and Ulram (in Pelinka 2000) divide educational levels into three ranges: the 'Pflichtschule' (primary school plus 4 years up to the age of 16); colleges ('Fachschule') and second as well as third-level educated. In this study the distinctions were drawn slightly differently, and a further distinction of secondary 'Matura' and third level academic education was included.

5. Rural vs. urban factor

In terms of a possible determination of discourse by either rural or urban background, the sample of 33 included 13 people who stemmed from a rural background and 20 remaining who had an urban background. Again, about a third of the respondents interviewed derived from a rural background.

6. Socio economic/class/ professional background

Under the heading 'socio economic background', the interviewees were divided into the working (manual labour) background, the employee background (lower- and upper-middle income level) and farmers (entrepreneurs). In the sample, 6 manual workers, 23 employees and 4 farmers were identified.

This form of class definition and framework was related to the theoretical discussion in Chapter Two concerning cleavages of class (farmers, employees, workers, and entrepreneurs) (Müller, 1997). Plasser and Ulram (Pelinka, 2000, p. 139) distinguish between self-employed, farmers, 'Beamte' (bureaucrats), employees, workers (blue- and white- collar), housewives, and pensioners.

It is significant to mention that because the respondents' group was a relatively small sample, the socio demographic background features naturally overlapped, including in one case a number of socio demographic categories applying. Thus, it could be expected that some results generated by the quantitative analysis of the case study in Chapter Five might be self-explanatory, particularly if one group of respondents was principally displaying two or more socio demographic backgrounds, as for example, of 11 SPÖ supporters 10 were also from an urban background.

7. Ethnic background of the interviewees

The aim of this thesis was to portray and investigate majority member discourses (in the case study) in regard to immigration and minorities. The majority population was defined by citizenship. Those claiming Austrian citizenship were chosen for interview. In the respondents group, four interviewees held Austrian citizenship, but had parents from a different citizenship background.

In chapter Six a comparative analysis of the legitimation of leadership types was added. This analysis is based on Appendix Nine, a mapping of discourses used by the regional everyday actors.

Chapter Four

An investigation of the discourses expressed by political elites about the '*Ausländer*' in Austria

In the following sections the discourses and expressions regarding foreigners by the four main political players of the Austrian party system, namely the Social Democratic Party of Austria, the People's Party of Austria, the Freedom Party and the Green Party will be investigated, described and critically analysed.

Firstly, the general discourses of each party will be explained within subsections divided by the thematic groups. The data sources and research methods have already been explained in Chapter Three, but all codes referred to can be found in Appendices I to IV. Forms of exercised leadership types based on Weber's concepts of domination might be traceable within the discourses portrayed by the diverse political players. In that sense, established theories and possible hypotheses outlined in Chapter Two will be critically analysed. Specific attention will be given to the possibility of contradictory discourses occurring prior to the governmental changes (1999/2000). This comparison will show continuity and change within expressions used and either strengthen or weaken the applicability of the theoretically developed arguments. Furthermore, overlapping discourses between different parties will be identified and will enable the possibility to situate the parties by way of their discourses and their similarities in expressions on a 'left' to 'right' discourse continuum scale. Such a continuum scale could be understood as equivalent to situating political parties on a liberal left-wing to conservative right-wing political scale. Additionally, this facilitates a situating of Weberian leadership types on a 'left' to 'right' continuum scale. Furthermore recommendations for future research will be given.

1.0 Introduction

A, B, and C codes demonstrate how positive, neutral and negative discourses in Austria are used in the parties' portrayal of opinions about 'migrants'. The following graphs show the usage of codes of the diverse political parties. In Graph 4.1 the parties are situated from left to right in their (a) coalition positions, that is Green Party and SPÖ forming the oppositional parties at present, and (b) ÖVP and FPÖ which are in the government. It can be observed that the parties are situated according to their positions in the 'left' to 'right' political spectrum. The Green Party being traditionally most liberal is situated furthest left, while the centre parties SPÖ and ÖVP (respectively centre left and centre right) are situated next to each other, and the Freedom Party is located at the right or extreme right side of the scale.

In the Graph 4.1 below the frequency of usage between positive (A), neutral (B) and negative (C) discourses about foreigners by the different parties is shown. It can be seen that the A positive code usage almost exponentially falls from left to right, implying that the A codes are used more by the left oppositional parties than by the contemporary governmental parties. The usage of C codes is increasing from the left of the graph to the right-hand side, indicating a higher usage of codes by the ÖVP, peaking the FPÖ's usage. The B codes appear to be a specific ÖVP or centre party feature. The Graph 4.1 below also displays the absolute number of discourses used. In turn, this indicates that the SPÖ and Green Party are exceptionally positively opinionated towards migrants. The FPÖ is exceptionally negative opinionated, and the ÖVP appears to use predominantly neutral expressions. The SPÖ uses A codes 60 times, followed by the Green Party's usage of 49 A codes, while the Freedom Party only makes use of these three times. On the contrary, 51 negative expressions were used by the FPÖ, in comparison for example to only once within the SPÖ data material, and the Green Party did not use these codes at all.

Graph 4.1: Usage of Codes demonstrating the Left to Right Continuum Spectrum



Graph 4.2 describes the specific usage of A, B, and C codes by political party. The frequency of code usage by each of the parties is indicated in colour. As before, the absolute number of discourses used is also indicated.

4.2 Usage of A, B, and C Codes Allocated to the Political Parties



2.0 The discourses of the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ)

2.1 General

The SPÖ expresses predominantly pro-foreign discourses, the dominant codes within the complete set of the thematic groups consisting of A codes. Out of a total of 70 codes used, 60 belonged to the positive A codes, 9 B codes were used and 1 negative C code. In the course of this chapter, particular attention will be given to the exceptions to the rule, in the SPÖ's case the usage of the neutral B and negative C code. As for the usage of the positive A codes, this generally indicates very welcoming and positive discourses about 'foreigners'. Not only does the usage of A range codes indicate this pro-foreign tendency but a further meaning attached to it can be seen in the increased usage of those within the left side of the political continuum scale as outlined earlier.

2.2 Thematic group 'definitions and associations'

Difference in discourses between the party manifesto and parliamentary debates existed in that the party manifesto discusses 'minorities' and not 'foreigners'. In parliamentary debates the definition of 'foreigners' was used; however, the concept of the 'other' is defined as 'foreigners', 'foreign fellow citizens', 'immigrants', 'skilled labour migrants' or 'saisonaires', but without giving a specific definition of the difference between 'minorities' and 'foreigners'. This suggests an all inclusive approach towards the definitions of foreigners, reminiscent of Hall's definition explained in Chapter One (Hall, 2000).

Specifically codes A1-A13 describe the discourses portrayed regarding the definitions and association of foreigners (see Appendix One). In principle, it was argued that racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism are to be condemned (codes A11-A13), understanding racism as a threat to peaceful co-existence as well as endangering the dignity and security of human beings. It is significant that the SPÖ also argues that minorities should be equal in various rights and duties, as are native Austrians (codes A6-A10). Here, the concept of 'equality' as well as that of 'rights and duties' is of importance. Often the mention of minorities and foreigners was connected to the right to work, political rights, or the right to education. Concerning the focus on the rights of migrants, discussed in greater detail later, it could be argued that this concept is interlinked with the earlier established theories of the SPÖ demonstrating legal-rational forms of leadership based on the concepts of legal regulations and bureaucratic rule. In turn, such legal-rational focus appears to be

interconnected with the traditional principles found in the SPÖ closely tied to Austro-Marxist traditions. This is further demonstrated in Renner (1902, p. 63) explaining that:

> 'The 'personality principle' demarcates the national groups amongst each other and towards the state, it portrays them in their factual being. But the nation is not only a solely factual sociological creation, but also is [the nation] a phenomenon of rights (laws), and therefore conditions of legal positions for the individual member of the nation and the nation as an entity exist. This....leads to equality...'
>
> [Das Personalitätsprinzip grenzt die nationalen Gruppen untereinander und gegen den Staat ab, es stellt sie in ihrem faktischen Dasein rein dar. Aber die Nation ist nicht nur ein rein faktisches, soziologisches Gebilde, sie ist auch ein Rechtsphänomen, und darum fließen Postulate der Rechtstellung für den einzelnen Nationsgenossen und das Nationsganze. Dies .....führt...zu Gleichberechtigung.]

He is clearly concerned with two issues. Firstly, the phenomenon of rights regarding the nation, which secondly, leads to the theoretical understanding of 'equality' of minorities in the Empire. He connects 'rights' with 'equality'. Additionally, it has been outlined in Chapter Two that both concepts formed part of the views on minorities of the Empire. Presently, both concepts form basic agendas in regard to 'migrants' in SPÖ party manifestos and discourse, which indicates the strong continuity of discourses within the party. Hence the Weberian traditional elements of domination, including legal-rationality, continue to exist in contemporary discourses about 'migrants'.

2.3 Thematic group 'immigration, labour market, welfare/social system'

This thematic group covers codes expressed in relation to immigration, the labour market as well as the welfare system. These include codes A14-A28, and the B code 29 ('we have to help the socially weak') as well as the one C code of the entire set of data C24 ('threat to locals as migrants are cheap labour').

Immigration

With regard to immigration, the SPÖ argues for clear criteria to identify a threshold level of immigrant numbers rather than an arbitrary quota. However the party argues for the need for immigration, with specific focus on labour migration. The SPÖ aims to regulate immigration by way of law with the implementation of specific rules indicating a legal and bureaucratic approach to immigration issues. Subsequently, they suggest forming a commission to calculate an immigration quota depending on the needs of the labour market as well as on the waiting lists for the family reunification programme. Furthermore, in a rational approach, the Social Democratic Party claims that immigration could be a

compensation mechanism to balance out the likelihood of a future deficiency in Austrian labour. Immigration is thus understood as a tool to compensate future labour shortages. This can be seen in the 109th parliamentary debate (Kuntzl, p. 65):

> 'For specific qualifications and under fair conditions we must bring immigrants into the country. ...we need them bitterly. Sixty per cent of the nursing personnel in the Austrian hospitals are not born in Austria and we need those people desperately. How can we otherwise cover this demand in future.'
>
> [Für bestimmte Qualifikationen und unter fairen Bedingungen müssen wir Leute ins Land holen. ....., aber wir haben sie bitter notwendig. In Wiener Spitälern sind 60% des Pflegepersonals nicht in Österreich geboren und wir brauchen diese Leute dringend. Wie sollen wir künftig den Bedarf decken.] (Kuntzl, 109, p. 65).

Or (ibid.):

> 'Enormous immigration demand...you know that there are jobs in which we cannot fill the positions with Austrians, but in which we depend on immigration.'
>
> [Riesenbedarf...sie wissen das das ein Beruf in dem wir die nötigen Stellen nicht durch Österreicher besetzen können, sondern in dem wir auf Einwanderung angewiesen sind (Pflegepersonal).]

In the 69th debate Kuntzl indicates:

> 'We need to regulate and calculate immigration based on the WIFO statistics....so as to manage the situation on the labour market. We urgently need skilled labour migration. '
>
> [Wir brauchen gezielte Zuwanderung auf Grund der Wifo Statistiken...um die Situation auf dem Arbeitsmarkt besser zu bewältigen...Wir brauchen dringend Fachkräfte.]

Codes such as A19, A20, A15 and A16 are represented. The focus on the pro immigration argument is substantiated by the deficiency of certain labour resources in Austria. It is further suggested that immigration be regulated and numbers calculated. The need for immigration is expressed very rationally by taking into consideration statistics and future projections. A dependency on immigration is expressed. The topic can be described as being covered from a legal and rational perspective. It could be suggested that such a focus on regulating immigration by specified criteria indicates that SPÖ discourses about immigration are situated within the framework of a legal state apparatus, administration and utmost within bureaucracy. Or, in other words the topic of immigration is understood as closely tied into a system of regulations and laws within an administrative and bureaucratic system. In this case it appears that Weber's legal-rational leadership can be traced.

As argued in Chapter Two, the Austro-Marxists indicated a pro multi-national Empire perspective, appreciating the different minorities of the Empire. Renner's and Bauer's descriptions of the worth of minorities corresponds to contemporary pro-immigration

views. Again this serves as an indication for traditional and legal-rational leadership characteristics of the SPÖ and verifies the arguments of Chapter Two.

Labour market

The only C code in the SPÖ data is situated in the 'labour market' theme, C24, 'threat to Austrians by migrants being cheaper labour'. One possible explanation of the code in this respect is that the SPÖ has traditionally, based on Austro-Marxist ideas, seen itself as the protector of the working class. In this respect, this one negative code could relate to those traditional principles since any threat to the working class would be condemned. Consequently, the only negative point regarding migrants identified by the SPÖ is connected to a perceived threat to their traditional object of protection, the working class.

The previous section has already included the labour market in connection with immigration. One aspect is worth repeating; the emphasis of the SPÖ on needing skilled labour migration such as that of nurses to counterbalance nursing deficiencies in the labour market. This identified need for skilled labour migration to counterbalance nursing deficiencies demonstrates a situating of discourse within calculations, logic and rationality, consistent with the legal-rational leadership type.

Welfare system

It is argued that foreigners should be integrated into the labour market and the social system have the right to benefits of the welfare system. The A positive code discourse (A27) is that of 'foreigners, especially seasonal workers, are exploited in terms of being denied certain access rights to unemployment benefits'; 'whereas such workers pay tax, they are not included in the benefit system'. This important issue addressed by the party is that concerning the exploitation of foreigners for Austrian economic purposes. It can be seen below how this particular view is expressed.

Silhavy argues in 69th parliamentary debate, p. 37:

> 'Saisonaires.... in Austria, have to pay into the welfare system, but have no rights, no claims, to get anything out of the welfare system.... this is exploitation'
>
> [Sechs Monate Aufenthalt in Österreich, einzahlen in die Sozialkassen, aber auf Grund der Dauer keine Rechte, keine Ansprüche, aus diesen Sozialkassen auch wieder etwas herauszubekommen.....Das ist Ausnutzen.]

This extract from Silhavy's speech indicates very clearly the rights-based focus of the political party, once again validating the legal-rational characteristics of the SPÖ,

embedding discourses about migrants within the framework of a bureaucratic state apparatus based on the enactment of laws, rights and duties.

Additionally, one of the main and core arguments (A25) consists of the claim that foreigners are not considered as consumers of the welfare state and therefore are said to be willing to work. It could be suggested that the SPÖ belief in non-exploitation of the welfare system by foreigners was predictable. Their traditional concern was based on the fight for working class rights and social benefits. This agenda continues to exist with a focus on 'migrants'. If the Austro-Marxist agenda 'looking after the interests of the class without rights', formerly the 'working class' or ' proletariat' could be replaced by the term 'foreigners' or 'migrant', then contemporary SPÖ arguments used are almost indistinguishable in their content between past and present.

2.4 Thematic group 'culture'

This thematic group appears to be interconnected with the thematic group integration. This theme consists of A and B codes, with the focus on cultural rights (A30-A37) and on the majority and minority coexistence in a state (B44-B48). The general perception and principle of the SPÖ is that human beings have a basic right to a home-land, tradition, and to language and culture. Once again, this intense rights based approach to 'foreigners' indicates the situating of SPÖ discourses within the framework of a legal-rational leadership concept, as well as within the traditions of Austro-Marxism, and hence a Marxist framework, fighting for the rights of the 'class without rights'.

Other discourses include acceptance and tolerance, those of supporting and sustaining culture and language, but also mutual tolerance and respect. The aspect of language will be treated in more depth later. The following extract demonstrates a clear indication of tolerance and the valuing of respect and understanding, as well as of cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity in identities. A positive perception of cultural diversity, and consequent cultural respect is clearly demonstrated, and the usage of 'mutual' further indicates 'equality'.

This can be seen in the SPÖ Party manifesto (p. 9):

> 'The co-existence of minority and majority requires the promotion of the spirit of tolerance and dialogue, as well as measurements for the promotion of mutual respect, mutual understanding and the team work between all human beings regardless of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity'.
>
> [Das zusammenleben zwischen Minderheiten und Mehrheit erfordert die Förderung des Geistes der Toleranz und des Dialoges sowie Maßnahmen zur Förderung der gegenseitigen Achtung des

gegenseitigen Verständnisses und der Zusammenarbeit zwischen allen Menschen unabhängig von deren ethnischer, kultureller, sprachlicher oder religiöser Identität].

The Austro-Marxist principles of 'equality' of minorities in the Empire as well as legal and cultural autonomy for the minorities, pointed out in Chapter Two, correspond to contemporary SPÖ discourses.

2.5 Thematic group 'integration'[39]

This theme overlaps in many ways with the theme of culture and identity. The codes applied consist of A38-A43 and B44-B48, code B44-B48 being equally relevant to the thematic group culture.

The SPÖ understands integration as an inclusionary concept, one of mutual respect and tolerance. The party focuses predominantly on the issue of migrants' role in the integration process and bases the idea of a successful integration on the granting of rights to foreigners as well as to the concept of equality by way of the granting of those rights. Their main idea of integration is the concept of voluntary integration, arguing that integration is undertaken by foreigners themselves and that foreigners seek to integrate and do not need to be obliged to integrate. They argue that foreigners have the right to integration but that their identity should be preserved and sustained. Further, migrants should also have the right to their own language, culture, work and traditions. In other words, the Social Democrats argue for the practical integration of foreigners into the housing market, the education system, the social system and the labour market.

The concept of voluntary language learning (A54) as part of a successful integration procedure indicates traditional leadership characteristics. Traditional characteristics of Austro-Marxism and the basis for such contemporary political orientation are formulated by Renner (1902) about bi-lingualism in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He argues that in the multi-ethnic empire it is essential to accept bi-lingualism or multi-lingualism, and to learn a second language for the understanding between the different peoples of the Empire. In fact language appeared to be essential in Renner's opinion for the survival and continued prosperity of the Habsburg Empire. He indicated that the monarchy will only

[39] For the purpose of this thesis concepts of integration have been used in their terminology as they were presented within the data material.- a more detailed explanation can be found in Chapter Five.

survive if the different nationalities of the empire are governed by their own language[40]. His philosophy was based on the mutual understanding of peoples and on their respect and acceptance of other cultures and peoples including the diverse languages of the empire[41]. A multiculturalist-pluralist integrationist perspective and the concept of mutual understanding can thus be observed. Continuity in regard to the discourses about the aspects of language and integration can be substantiated by the 69th debate (p. 42), when it was argued that:

> 'Let's talk about the importance of language for integration. Language plays a very important role for integration. One could offer far more language courses, and would not have to force foreigners to attend language courses - on the contrary, they crave it and take every opportunity.'
>
> [Reden wir doch einmal über die Bedeutung der Sprache für die Integration. Die Sprache hat einen sehr hohen Stellenwert für die Integration. Man könnte viel mehr Kurse anbieten und bräuchte die Ausländer nicht dazu zwingen, Sprachkurse zu besuchen- im Gegenteil die gieren danach und nehmen jedes Angebot an.]

A further integration topic to be pointed out is the discourse on inclusion in political life, the labour and housing markets, as well as in the education and social welfare systems (A49-A52). In the 109th (p. 88) debate the following is expressed:

> 'For us integration is more than just learning German. Further included should be humane housing, the right to work, access to education, and political rights. Respect towards each other and living with each other.'
>
> [Für uns ist Integration mehr als nur Deutsch zu lernen. Dazu gehören menschenwürdiges Wohnen, Recht auf Arbeit, Zugang zu Bildung, politische Rechte. Respekt voreinander und Leben miteinander.]

The focus on the access and right to education can be traced within the Austro-Marxist philosophies. The Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer (Bottomore & Goode, p. 107) was of the following opinion: 'The nation is defined by the ruling educated elites, the class which had access to education, language and culture'. In turn, it could be assumed that the Austro-Marxists were interested in fighting for the accessibility of education for the 'working class'. Although conceptualised at the turn of the twentieth century, it is however traceable in present-day SPÖ declarations.

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[40] Renner (1902, p.68): ‚Doppelsprachlichkeit in Bildung wäre ein wahres glück für den Staat.....schneiden mit der Deutschsprachlichkeit du Einsprachigkeit dem Zwang ins eigene Fleisch ....Österreichs Völker sollen in deren Muttersprache regiert werden (dann auch bessere Erwerbsmöglichkeiten, wirtschaftlich besser).- Durch Vermehrung jeder Sprachenkenntnis wäre sie nicht entnationalisiert worden, nicht in Gefahr, hätten noch lange Österreichs Völker in Mehrsprachigkeit regieren können.

[41] In Chapter Two it was also indicated how Otto Bauer perceives 'language' to contribute to the nation building process. In fact, language is understood as a necessary concept for the nation building process, but in combination with other concepts. Language is understood as the producer and product of culture.

On the other hand, the quote above also shows the views on rights to vote and inclusion in the political community ('...Integration is....access to political rights...'). The SPÖ's focus on the inclusion of migrants and the granting of access to political rights could be intended to give access to citizenship on a '*ius soli*' basis as well as to loosen citizenship procedures and shorten waiting times for the naturalisation process[42]. This was anticipated based on the Austro-Marxist beliefs, and indicates continuity between past and present in Chapter Two.

In addition to the above views regarding political rights, it is further significant that the SPÖ views integration from the perspective of foreigners, rather than from the point of view of Austrians. For example, the SPÖ's policies are based on the belief in the creation of a friendly atmosphere for migrants. In the 69th parliamentary debate (p. 42) the following statement was made:

> 'In future they will be able to choose which country they want to migrate to, and will prefer countries which signal that they are welcome, and will avoid countries in which the governmental parties signal that they are not welcomed.'
>
> [Sie werden sich in Hinkunft aussuchen können, in welches Land sie gehen, und werden Länder bevorzugen, die ihnen signalisieren, dass sie willkommen sind, und Länder meiden, in denen ihnen die Regierungsparteien deutlich signalisieren, dass sie nicht erwünscht sind.]

It could be interpreted that the focus of SPÖ discourse is on welcoming and benefiting migrants and not on the effects on Austrian locals. Marketing Austria as an immigration destination demonstrates the belief that Austria needs immigration.

As shown in this section, discourses on integration are embedded in a legal-rational and traditional leadership framework, verifying the theoretical predictions of Chapter Two.

2.6 Thematic group 'religion'

This thematic group consists of the codes A59 to A62 which summarise full religious autonomy and freedom. It should be noted that the party explicitly indicates its opposition to religious or political fundamentalism. It should also be noted that religion is a feature of Austro-Marxist theories and plays a role in the definition of a national identity. Outlined in Chapter Two, it is suggested by Austro-Marxists that the common religion is understood as an important, but not a necessary, part of a common cultural community. Additionally,

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[42] Jandl and Kraler (2003, p.3) state that a new naturalisation act was passed in 1998. In this act, the concept of 'ius sanguinis' was still included, while the ability of the migrants to integrate sufficiently was significant for the naturalisation process. Approximately a waiting period of 10 years before naturalisation could also be expected also.

religious divisions do not limit the development of a cultural community[43]. Although religious freedom is subtly indicated here, no overemphasis is given to the agenda of religion. This is possibly reflected in the contemporary disappearance of discourses about religion.

2.7 Thematic group 'identity'

Codes A63-A70 demonstrate the general opinions and basic principles of the SPÖ and express the appreciation of the other and the other's identity. The minorities' identity is valued in a positive way and possibly viewed as a contribution. Two main points of view can be seen in the material; firstly, the emphasis on the Austrian multi ethnic past, stating that in turn Austria's identity continues to be shaped by the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity of a multi ethnic Empire. Kiermaier in the 109th (p. 90):

> 'Ladies and gentlemen! Look into the Viennese phonebook you will find large numbers of foreign names and noone was disturbed by these names up to now. These are the true, real and important things'.
>
> [Meine Damen und Herren! Schauen sie einmal in das Wiener Telefonbuch! Es gibt darin jede Menge an ausländischen Namen, und niemanden haben sie bis jetzt gestört. Das sind die wahren, wirklichen und wichtigen Dinge].

Not only do the Social Democrats appear to value the 'other' identity, but it appears that for them, mutual respect for identity and cultural values is necessary. The SPÖ appear not to perceive any danger in the presence of a diversity of cultures within Austria. In fact they support the development and sustaining of those other cultures and languages. The argument of tolerance and dialogue appears to make the SPÖ believe in the possibility of creating an understanding between different social, cultural and linguistic backgrounds.

Secondly the emphasis is put on the granting to individuals of rights to identity and the preservation of the minorities' identities, again relating to the rights-based approach indicated in regard to other topical themes. These rights to identity, in turn indicate a non perceived threat. Continuity in tradition as well as in the rights-based leadership type can once again be identified.

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[43] Bauer (Bottomore & Goode, 1978, p.102-103): 'A common religion is the basis for a common culture as it was with the Serbs and Croats. But the Germans remained one people despite their religious divergences because the religious divisions could not prevent the development and persistence of a universal German cultural community'.

2.8 Contradictory elements

Not many contradictory elements could be identified. Possibly this is related to the fact that in comparison with other parties the SPÖ is very clear cut and explicit. The outstanding C negative code as mentioned previously was that of C24, indicating the threat of labour migration to the local labour force, which however could also be understood or interpreted as the SPÖ's traditional interest in supporting and protecting the working class.

2.9 Summary

Overall it could be argued that migrants might have become the new objects of Social Democratic orientations replacing the traditional interest of protecting the former social group considered to be without rights, the working class. The working class was traditionally understood to be the group of people who did not have equal rights and whose case was argued in order for equality to be won. Presently the new class without rights and needing protection appears to be the group of 'migrants'. Traditional discourses of the Austro-Marxists correspond strongly with contemporary SPÖ discourses. On the other hand, the contemporary discourses about migrants are often situated within a legal rational framework of a rule-bound administrative and bureaucratic state apparatus. Subsequently, both the legal-rational rights-based leadership type approach as well as traditional aspects of Austro-Marxism can be traced within contemporary political discourse about minorities.

2.10 Continuity and change

The second parliamentary debate of 1999, during which time the SPÖ still formed a coalition government with the ÖVP, indicated some differences in discourse. As will be shown and explored during the analysis of discourses of the Green Party and the ÖVP, the discourses of the SPÖ appear to change slightly depending on which party is in alliance with the SPÖ.

In 1999, the SPÖ's discourses indicated a less liberal approach and could be seen as more closely linked with the ÖVP discourses than post 1999/2000. Nevertheless rights-based and legal-rational leadership types were continuing forces behind the discourses of the SPÖ, which indicates that the fundamental leadership types remain unchanged despite political discourses being changeable depending on a left or right shift in an alliance position.

The main differences identified were that certain threats and fears in regard to migrants were indicated in 1999 but were not evident in the post-1999 data. Codes such as 'no more immigration as it could overstretch the housing capacity or the labour market capacity' were used pre-1999 - a discourse to be found in contemporary ÖVP and FPÖ principles. 'No to new immigrants' as well as the belief that 'foreigners want to come to Austria as they are attracted by the better living standard and are hoping for better economic chances' were used pre –1999. These discourses disappeared post-1999 and were replaced by the more pro-migrant and pro-immigration discourses discussed in the previous paragraphs.

For example, in 1999 the SPÖ was strictly against opening borders and disapproved of social sponging, further alienating foreigners due to the high number of immigrants, whereas today these discourses have vanished from the agenda. However, the necessity for regulation of immigration pre-1999 was still identified and the rights-based approach towards integration was consistently implied pre-1999 also. Another argument proving continuation in discourse was that of imposing quotas and the regulation of immigration numbers pre 1999. Consequently, continuity in regard to the legal-rational leadership type can be identified.

The pre-1999 discourses appear to be similar to those of the ÖVP, their former governmental alliance partner. Presently the SPÖ's agenda has changed and moved closer to the discourses of the agenda of the Green Party, its contemporary opposition alliance partner. This will become self-evident during the investigation of the other party's discourses. It could therefore be suggested that political discourses depend on governmental alliance partners and change accordingly. However, this does not alter the form of leadership and governance exercised by a political party.

3.0 The discourses of the People's Party (ÖVP)

3.1 General

Unlike the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats make use of the word 'foreigner' in both parliamentary debates as well as in their manifesto. Their use of discourses around 'foreigners' centres on humanitarian concepts of tolerance as well as on the relationship of foreigners with the Austrian economy. Either it is suggested to use them as a tool for the labour market, or they are perceived as a threat to the labour market. However, in either

case discourses about foreigners centre around the security of Austrians and the foreigners' impact on Austrians. The discourses are not focused on foreigners and their situation .

In contrast to the SPÖ, ÖVP discourses are based on A, B and C codes. Of 81 codes[44] identified, 17 were A codes, 20 C codes, and 44 B codes (see Appendix Two). The ÖVP's overall discourses can be understood as primarily situated in the neutral range of expressions. Considering the range of codes used, the ÖVP could be understood as fairly wide-ranging in discourses, implying positive, neutral and negative expressions. While the SPÖ could be considered one-sided in its tendency to use discourses (predominantly A codes), the ÖVP can be situated in the middle, with tendencies to combine B with A and C codes. This is mirrored in the political continuum scale as will be outlined in more detail later.

3.2 Thematic group 'definitions and associations'

The perception of migrants included 1 B and 2 C codes, incorporating problematisation of foreigners by saying that 'problems will arise if large numbers of foreigners are accepted' (C3).

3.3 Thematic group 'immigration, labour market, welfare/social system'

This thematic group consisted of 4 A, 10 B and 10 C codes.

Immigration

The immigration issue is tackled from various perspectives. Firstly, it is understood that 'Austria is not an immigration country' (C4). Contrary to the SPÖ, the ÖVP's main concern is the well-being of the Austrian population. The Christian Democrats understand immigrants to pose a threat and that unlimited immigration at the expense of the Austrian population cannot be permitted (C5). On the other hand, immigration is problematised, arguing that the immigrant problem has to be taken seriously, while at the same time focusing on the labour market and the impact of foreigners on the economy (C5-C9).

The negative C discourses are mainly employed with regard to any form of immigration, while the neutral B (B10-B12) and positive A (A13-A14) discourses are portrayed in relation to the economy, to labour migration, skilled labour migration or even the

[44] The reason for the largest number of codes identified overall by comparison with those of the other parties is the result of the ÖVP being the governmental party in power and hence, more data was available in regard to parliamentary debates as their allotted speaking time was longest.

acknowledgement of foreigners as a support for the Austrian economy. It could be argued that contradictory discourses are implied since earlier the ÖVP indicated that Austria was not an immigration country, while they also argue for specific forms of migration such as skilled labour migration intended to be of benefit to the Austrian economy.

For example, extracts from the ÖVP manifesto and 109th parliamentary debate suggest that:

> 'Unlimited immigration at the expense of the Austrian population cannot exist.' (97.4)
>
> 'Our policies should ensure that the numbers of foreigners does not overstretch the threshold limits of our Austrian economy labour market, of the school system or of the regional housing markets.' (97.5)
>
> 'Austria is not a typical immigration country' (109, p. 87)
>
> 'Immigration only to the extent that the labour market and the economy needs and can tolerate.' (109, p. 87)

Labour market

In terms of the labour market or employment, the manifesto stresses the importance of not overstretching market capacity, while also aiming to permit immigration to the extent that the labour market can tolerate it (B11-B12). It is further noted that Austrians should have primary consideration ('be taken first for jobs' (C18)) and that the party acknowledges that Austrians have fears about foreigners taking jobs away (C17), a rather centre right stance reminiscent of similarities to discourses of the FPÖ, which will be outlined later.

Overall it can be suggested that the ÖVP discourses exhibit characteristics of the traditional-traditional leadership type of the ÖVP by connecting the topic of migrants and migration strongly with an economic perspective[45]. The angle by which the topic of migrants and migration is approached consists of securing the Austrian labour market for Austrians, while secondly emphasising the role of the migrant in being beneficial to the Austrian economy. Hence a certain bi-polar orientation of discourses, a contradiction and ambiguity can be identified. This ambiguity is a feature which has been ascribed to the traditional leadership type and is therefore a sign for the existence of this type in contemporary ÖVP governance.

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[45] it has to be noted that traditional in regard to economics is not meant in the Weberian sense of the tradition connected to religious sanctity. Rather tradition is meant in terms of 'good old customs', or 'the routinisation of what has always been there continues to'. This can also be applied to the long standing historic traditions of any party which, in the ÖVP's case includes a long standing focus and concern about the economy. Similar accounts for the Austro-Marxists, being the traditional basis of political orientation for the SPÖ.

Welfare

In terms of the welfare system, the code C24 'social sponging happens' should be noted. This response indicates that the ÖVP believes in the potential danger and damage to the social and welfare system by migrants. In turn, it is further argued that such sponging should be prevented (C25). A group of codes (C30-C33) indicates perspectives on asylum seekers.

In sum it could be argued that the ÖVP is very much focused on the labour market and the economy in its discourses. The conclusion to every aspect in regard to foreigners has a greater concern for the economic interests of Austria and its labour market and economy than to any cultural aspects. This can be allied with the traditional leadership of the ÖVP, as the economy has always been a major focus and concern for this party. The ÖVP debates centre around whether foreigners are a hindrance or a benefit to the local economy, while the SPÖ centres its perspectives around the rights, well-being, benefits and interests of the foreigner more than on the locals' concerns or on concerns about the economy.

3.4 Thematic group 'culture'

In terms of culture, the emphasis is on the role of the state to make just provisions for the weakest members of society, as well as on the discourse of respect, tolerance, understanding and humanity, corresponding to the traditional humanitarian principles of the ÖVP (B34-39). It is significant that the ÖVP demonstrates a rights-based approach in its discourses, with rights of immigrants taking second place to the safeguarding of the rights of Austrians to a homeland, cultural identity, and security (B41-43). The rights-based approach coincides with the SPÖ discourses, which, on the contrary, focus on the rights of foreigners and not on the rights of Austrians. The following reference, taken from the party manifesto, indicates the securing of rights for the Austrian people, while following party traditions in recommending humanity, respect and understanding, key concepts of the ÖVP's principle agendas.

In the parliamentary debate 97 the following is indicated:

> 'With our political agendas, we want to secure the right for Austrians to a homeland, cultural identity, and security, simultaneously, however, we want to secure respect and understanding as well as humanity towards foreigners and strangers.' (97.1)
>
> [Wir wollen mit unserer Politik das Recht der Österreicher auf Heimat, kulturelle Identität und Sicherheit gewährleisten, gleichzeitig aber haben wir in unserer Gesellschaft das Verständnis den Respekt und die Mitmenschlichkeit gegenüber den fremden und Ausländern sicherzustellen. (97.1)]

Hence the principles of the ÖVP are directed in both ways, towards foreigners as well as Austrians, while the SPÖ appears to be more focused on foreigners. The existence of a rights-based approach, in spite of being directed towards Austrians rather than foreigners, at first might appear contradictory, indicating legal rational leadership type features. However, this is not contradictory. It has been argued in Chapter Two that theoretically, traditional leadership can appear ambiguous and can contain legal rational and bureaucratic elements. The rights- based approach towards Austrians can be explained in this way, and validates even further the theoretical hypothesis of the ÖVP being a traditionally governing party.

3.5 Thematic group 'integration'

Eight A codes, 2 C codes, and 15 B codes were used. The concept of integration is firstly connected to the ÖVP traditional key concepts of tolerance and respect. On the other hand integration is also a concept of force for the ÖVP (C51-C52). Again, the party understands integration as a dual concept, the integration of foreigners also being viewed with regard to the benefits of the Austrian economy. In the 99th parliamentary debate the following was suggested and demonstrates 'respect' and 'peaceful co-existence' indicating humanitarian and pluralistic tendencies:

> 'The peaceful co-existence as well as mutual respect between locals and foreigners is the relevant basis for the functioning of modern societies in Europe. In this regard we stand for the active integration into our society of foreigners living long-term and legally in Austria.' (99).
>
> [Das friedliche Zusammenleben sowie die gegenseitige Achtung zwischen in und Ausländern ist die wesentliche Grundlage für das funktionieren der modernen Gesellschaften in Europa. In diesem Sinne bekennen wir uns zur aktiven Integration von langfristig und legal in Österreich lebenden Ausländern in unserer Gesellschaft. (99)]

and:

> 'the right to integration of foreigners living in Austria also presents the obligation to accept duties. Hence the knowledge of our language is a precondition for integration, as well as compliance with law and order and social tradition and rituals.' (99)
>
> [Das Recht auf Integration der in Österreich lebenden Ausländer setzt aber auch die Übernahme von Pflichten voraus. So ist das beherrschen unserer Sprache ebenso Integrationsvorrausetzung wie die Beachtung der Verfassung und Gesetze sowie der gesellschaftlichen Sitten und Gebräuche. (99)]

Significant is the discourse of the Austrian 'we group' versus the 'out group' of foreigners in Austria. A strict 'we' and 'them' discourse can be observed. Furthermore, unlike the SPÖ, the ÖVP argues for the right of foreigners to integration, but stresses the obligation to duties, such as learning German, or the acceptance of social and traditional Austrian values. Very clearly, certain demands are put on foreigners as preconditions for

integration, such as for example knowledge of German. Here, the rights and duties approach is implied, as previously indicated, being an ambiguous legal-rational element of the traditional leadership type. Furthermore, it could be suggested that the duties demanded from foreigners imply an assimilationist perspective of compliance with the traditions, language and values of Austrian society. Simultaneously, the discourses are situated within a framework of morals and traditional customs by mentioning the Austrian traditional customs and values. This ties in with Weber's concept of the traditional leadership, arguing that morals and ethics as well as good old customs are part of the characteristics of this leadership.

In the following extracts the focus on the benefits of integration for the Austrian state, and in that respect the Austrian economy, is indicated (109th PD, p. 91 and p. 61):

> 'The state profits from rapid integration, as foreigners will get jobs faster.'
>
> [Staat profitiert weil zügigere Integration konkret durchgesetzt wird, sie werden schneller Jobs bekommen. (109.91)]
>
> 'If you want to stay here, then learn German, if you do not want to learn German, then go back to where you came from - integration with soft pressure-(109.61)
> 'forced language courses, incentives are not enough.' (109, p. 71)
>
> [Wenn du hier belieben willst so lerne deutsch, wenn du nicht deutsch lernen willst bitte gehe wieder dorthin zurück wo du hergekommen bist. Integration mit sanftem druck 109.61
> Verpflichtende Deutschkurse...zwang druck Anreiz genügt nicht (109.71)]

The integration procedure, as demonstrated above, includes the partial assimilation to Austrian culture which is further intended to be covertly enforced on them. This includes forced language courses. In fact it is implied that migrants should be returned to their countries of origin if they do not learn German.

Integration means also understood by the ÖVP (109, p. 77) in:

> 'Integration is that people have work, that people understand our language, our culture, that they have access to educational institutions, that they have access to housing markets, and that the dignity of our foreign fellow citizens is respected. Integration is to remove obstacles and achieve a peaceful and sensible co-existence'.
>
> [Integration ist: dass Menschen Arbeit haben. Dass Menschen unsere Sprache verstehen, unsere Kultur verstehen. Dass sie zu Bildungseinrichtungen zugelassen sind, dass sie Wohnmöglichkeiten haben, Integration ist die Würde der Menschen und unserer ausländischen Mitbürger zu achten. Integration ist Barrieren abzubauen zu einem friedvollen und sinnvollen zusammenleben.'] (109, p.77).

The above quote contradicts the previously mentioned understanding of integration by the ÖVP. It is directed towards benefits for, and well-being of, foreigners. In fact, the indication of granting access to educational institutions and housing, is similar to the SPÖ

discourses; but without the concept of rights. These contradictions are firstly a sign for traditional leadership due to its ascribed ambiguity, or secondly it could be a sign of the long-term influences the SPÖ as a governmental alliance partner had on the discourses of the ÖVP, while the previous approach could have been influenced by the contemporary alliance partner FPÖ.

With regard to integration the key words of understanding, respect and dignity could be understood as a sign for a certain pluralist focus. It could be argued that the ÖVP wished foreigners to speak German and assimilate in public to Austrian behaviour and cultural codes, but that in the private sphere, foreigners could maintain their own traditions, customs and identity, as indicated in the concepts of respect towards them. The concept then implied by the ÖVP would be based on a pluralistic assimilationist or a pluralist view on integration.

3.6 Thematic group 'religion'

Freedom of religion and the acceptance of other religions is strongly emphasised between codes A71-A73 and B74. The anti fundamentalism agenda is also indicated. As can be expected, the concept of religious freedom forms part of the range of opinions in regard to this thematic group. The significant points of tolerance for other churches and religious communities as well as the enhancement of these is expressed below.

> 'We respect other churches and religious communities in order to create a climate of tolerance and humanity (61)'
>
> [Anerkennen wir die Bedeutung von Kirchen und Religionsgemeinschaften zur Schaffung eines Klimas der Toleranz und Mitmenschlichkeit (61)]
>
> ,We stand for the free development of churches and religious communities under the rules of law and the state (61)'
>
> [Wir treten für die freie Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten der Kirchen und Religionsgemeinschaften ein im Rahmen von Verfassung, Gesetzen sowie Verträgen (61)]

As indicated in Chapter Two, one of the main features of this party is its close ties with the Catholic Church. In the previous discourses it appears that this traditional aspect of the party is exhibited in its discourses about foreigners. However, overall, given that the ÖVP is traditionally strongly connected to the Catholic Church, the ÖVP expresses surprisingly little discourses regarding 'religion'.

3.7 Thematic group 'identity'

In terms of identity, again the focus point is directed towards the securing of Austrian identity and future, while also wishing to sustain foreigners' identity to some extent.
The following references express this:

> 'We want to sustain and ensure the right of Austrians to their homeland, cultural identity and security. At the same time, however, we have to maintain respect, understanding and humanity towards strangers. Every foreigner has the right to fair and humane treatment (97)'
>
> [Wir wollen mit unserer Politik das recht der Österreicher auf Heimat, kulturelle Identität und Sicherheit gewährleisten. Gleichzeitig aber haben wir in unserer Gesellschaft, das Verständnis, den Respekt und die Mitmenschlichkeit gegenüber en fremden sicherzustellen. Nicht jeder Ausländer kann ein recht auf Aufenthalt in unserer Heimat erhalten. Jeder Ausländer aber hat einen Anspruch auf gerechte und menschenwürdige Behandlung.97]
>
> 'We want to maintain Austria as a home for the future want to foster and encourage its spiritual, cultural and historic identity. We have a responsibility towards the Austrian citizens.'
>
> [Wir wollen Österreich als ein zuhause bewahren und auch in Zukunft seine geistige kulturelle und geschichtliche Identität bewahren und fördern. Wir haben Verantwortung für die österreichischen Bürger (109.63)]

In this respect, it could certainly be argued that Austrians are the predominant focus for the ÖVP. This accords well with its traditional views on family and home, indicating the following of 'good old customs' and routines of the Austrian tradition and cultural identity.

3. 8 Summary

In summary it could be argued that between all the thematic groups it can firstly be seen that the ÖVP mainly implies B range or centre discourses, while largely focusing on the benefits to Austrians and their economy as well as guaranteeing Austrians' right to work or to their homeland. In turn the key concepts and traditional agendas of the ÖVP, such as economy, family, and humanitarian traditions, traditional morals and ethics, including principles of tolerance, respect and understanding, appear to be traceable within the contemporary discourses of the topical area of migration. However, surprisingly few discourses were connected to religious ethics and morals. Few contradictory and bi-polar discourses could be identified, which appear to alike to some FPÖ discourses. This could be a result of the governmental alliance and the influence of the FPÖ on the ÖVP, particularly as those new FPÖ-like discourses appear only in the ÖVP speeches in parliamentary debates, but not in their party manifesto. Additionally, some discourses were situated within a legal-rational framework. Nevertheless this verifies the traditional governance of the ÖVP because ambiguity and legal-rational elements are ascribed to the

traditional leadership also. The hypothesis of ÖVP discourses about migrants being situated within a traditional-traditional Weberian leadership type is validated.

3.9 Continuity and change

In regard to debates prior to 2000, it can generally be said that the ÖVP exhibited continuity in discourse. This continuity of discourse was predominantly expressed in the continuing of focus on economic aspects in regard to foreigners before and after 1999. It appears to be the case that the ÖVP's expressions were milder in regard to foreigners, immigration and integration procedures prior to 1999. Governmental alliance prior to 1999 between the SPÖ and ÖVP might have influenced ÖVP expressions. Unfortunately, the second parliamentary debate permitted only limited speaking time for the ÖVP, and data for a more detailed analysis was not available.

4.0 The discourses of the Freedom Party (FPÖ)

4.1 General

It can be seen that in general the codes were predominantly within the C region (51 C codes), with 11 B codes and 3 A codes used. This certainly indicates a relatively balanced discursive position in the centre to extreme right range of codes, mainly expressing rejection of migrants. It could be suggested that the few A and B discourses might be a result of the two streams within the FPÖ party, already discussed in Chapter Two, competing with each other in discursive approaches.

4.2 Thematic group 'definitions and associations'

One of the main discursive connections between the topic and the expressions used is the recurring identification of foreigners as a problem.

4.3 Thematic group 'immigration, labour market and welfare/social system'

One of the main arguments (code C5) of the Freedom Party is that Austria is not an immigration country. This is substantiated by a number of reasons: (a) Austria is not an immigration country because of its topography (C6); (b) because of its population density (C7); and (c) because of its limited resources (C8). In fact the FPÖ is exclusively

concerned about the well-being of Austrians, and therefore views foreigners from that perspective. In this way, foreigners are almost solely identified as a problem in terms of immigration. For example, in the manifesto point (10-11.4) it is argued that:

> 'Austria is not an immigrant country due to its topography, its population density, and its limited resources.'
>
> [Österreich ist kein Einwanderungsland auf grund der Topographie, seiner Bevölkerungsdichte und seiner beschränkten Resourcen. 10-11.4]

Further it is argued that unlimited immigration would be seen as irresponsible (C10), and that immigration might endanger the security of the homeland (C11). It is also stated that immigration has a negative impact on the labour market in terms of competition for locals. This can be seen as a contradictory argument in relation to the ÖVP which argues that skilled immigration is beneficial to the labour market and the economy. An issue is made of criminality and threat to the security of Austrians by the numbers of immigrant foreigners. Therefore immigration is problematised and could be interpreted as a burden, a charismatic action-orientated slogan of propaganda and use of discourse. In the quote above for example the identification of a threat and the concern for the local population is clearly indicated. The word 'endanger' incorporates in turn the perception of migrants as the subject and also the object of danger. The reference indicates this (manifesto):

> 'Unlimited immigration would overstretch the capacity of the local population in terms of their integration abilities and would endanger the right to security and sustaining of the homeland.'
>
> [Eine unbeschränkte Zuwanderung würde die ansässige Bevölkerung hinsichtlich ihrer aktiven Integrationsfähigkeit überfordern und dadurch ihr Recht auf Wahrung und Schutz der eigenen Heimat gefährden.]

A further example for the perception of danger can be found in the 97th parliamentary debate (p. 36):

> 'Many thousands of illegal [migrants] are in our country, many of whom push into the labour market on an illegal basis, or become criminals and endanger our security, these are the problems of this country'.
>
> [Hundertausende Illegale, die sich in diesem Land befinden, die teilweise illegal auf den Arbeitsmarkt drängen, die teilweise in die Kriminalität fallen und somit unsere Sicherheit gefährden, -das sind die Problem in diesem Land (97.36)]

One significant aspect above is the security of 'us', in that sense the strategy of the usage of out-group and in-group discourses. In the above theme and topic it appears that traditional and charismatic elements of the FPÖ can be explored. Fears, dangers, threats and a form of scapegoating is created which is presented and charismatically used. This is also part of the tradition of the FPÖ, the exclusion of others – non-Austrian descent people

and the perception of a threat to 'us'- the 'we' group. The traditional elements, the exclusion of the others and also the discourse on Austria not being an immigration country (C5) could also be connected to the concept of dystopia, but on a minor basis. Consequently, these elements could be seen as an indication for a charismatic-dystopian leadership, additionally being based on traditional forms of leadership. Possibly as a result of the charismatic slogans being generated by a charismatic leader, nevertheless, the charismatic element in this leadership is dominant to the dystopian. Additionally, dystopian agenda are not overtly strongly exhibited.

Just to mention briefly, at this point it becomes clear that a continuum of discourses can be identified. The SPÖ focused on the rights and well-being of foreigners, and the ÖVP on the well-being of Austrians. The most extreme position is taken by the Freedom Party, which perceived no benefits, but solely fears and threats, as well as concerns for the Austrian population. The situating of discourses by the parties will be specifically analysed later in this chapter.

Labour market

Code C21 indicates that Austrians should be given first consideration for employment. This code corresponds to the one used by the ÖVP. The preference for Austrian labour indicates the focus on the well-being of Austrians. FPÖ Austrian patriotisms and the traditional exclusion of foreigners, also party being an element of the traditional exclusion of people of non-German descent, can be observed. For example, the focus on Austrians and the labour migration discourses are demonstrated below:

> 'High unemployment rates do not allow for labour migration of a non essential skilled or unskilled nature' (69).
>
> [Hohe Arbeitslosenzahlen gestatten daher keine Zuwanderung von Arbeitskräften mit ist nicht nachgefragten Qualifikationen]
>
> 'We can adequately supply the labour market with Austrians, and hence do not need immigration' (69.44)
>
> [Können den Arbeitsmarkt mit qualifizierte Österreich abdecken, brauchen keine Zuwanderung (69.44)]

Welfare/social system

The code on social sponging (C29 'social sponging – we have to fight it') occurs three times and is strongly emphasised. Immigration is understood as a threat in terms of migrants' motivations to enter Austria solely to sponge from the Austrian welfare system.

It is argued that social sponging should be resisted. The concept of 'burden' is implied in this discourse, the party indicating that the foreigner becomes the burden of the Austrian tax payer. Again, charismatic slogans, such as the 'burden agenda' can be observed in the FPÖ discourses. In the 69th parliamentary debate (p. 31) the following is expressed:

> 'The majority of migrants immigrated for the purpose of the social system not for the purpose of the labour market. '
>
> [Ein Grossteil der Zuwanderer ist in das Sozialsystem eingewandert nicht in den Arbeitsmarkt (69.31)]

and continued (p.32):

> 'that they [foreigners] cannot all their lives be a burden to the social state and system'
>
> [[Ausländer] Können nicht ein Leben lang dem Sozialstaat anheim fallen (69.32)]

Some of the most extreme views implied by the party are codes C25 and C26, which indicate that health tests should be carried out as a precondition for visas, and also that restrictions on the numbers of foreigners should be imposed to avoid public health endangerment. These two codes are in some form reminiscent of traditional party agendas possibly even of agendas of the 1930s, and could also be considered as charismatic-dystopian in this respect. Charismatic–dystopian leadership is possibly expressed here due to the desire to revitalise past policies and practices implemented at that time on individuals of non-German descent.

4.4 Thematic group 'culture'

Foreigners are connected to threats and problems. The codes C38-C41 indicate the fear of swamping, as well as the problematisation of foreigners and the need to protect the Austrian population. The priority of the Freedom Party is to ensure continuation of Austrian traditions and the safety of its population. Specific emphasis is put on Austrian patriotism by stating that Austrian cultural heritage has to be safeguarded and protected. The further argument that Austrian culture belongs to a pan-German heritage due to the shared language of German, together with the safekeeping of Austrian heritage indicates the traditional element to be found within the FPÖ party. It can be suggested that the patriotic discourses are bi-polar, either focusing on Austrian patriotism or occasionally exhibiting subtle elements of a pan- German thinking and patriotism. This is demonstrated in the references:

> 'Austrian patriotism shows itself in the will to sustain and look after the cultural heritage of Austria.'
>
> [Österreicherpatriotismus äußert sich als Wille zur pflege und Aufrechterhaltung des kulturellen Erbes Österreichs. (8-9.1)]

'Due to the large role played by the old Austria in pan-German and pan European history, and the cultural heritage stemming from that time, it is legitimate to portray ourselves with self confidence.- as a result of this for Austrians the belonging to the pan-Germane cultural nation can be identified.'

[Angesichts des großen Anteils des alten Österreichs an der gesamtdeutschen und gesamteuropäischen Geschichte und des hiervon herrührenden kulturellen Erbes ist es legitim mit Selbstbewusstsein international aufzutreten. 8-9.4. Daher ergibt sich für die Österreicher eine Zugehörigkeit zur deutschen Kulturgemeinschaft. 42-43.2]

In turn the bi-polar situating of discourses can be seen as contradictory but can be understood as a reflection of the two different streams within the FPÖ the more liberal wing, and the remnants of the conservative wing who favour traditional nationalist agendas, as indicated in Chapter Two. Hence the party exhibits traditional and charismatic-dystopian elements in both discourses, but more so the charismatic–dystopian element, in subtly and covertly implying pan-German nationalism. Thus those who are not Germanic in origin are considered a threat or are treated as scapegoats, as is demonstrated in the general opinions towards migrants. The implication of 'burden' slogans and problematisation discourse could be interpreted as action orientated propaganda, often indicating an element of unpredictability in discourse and the possibility of sudden changes of propaganda strategies. Unpredictability, sudden change, flexibility, instability and dynamism are characteristics ascribed to charismatic domination; another connection to the charismatic leadership type can be traced.

4.5 Thematic group 'religion'

In terms of religion, little is indicated in the data material except for the problematisation of Islam, hence Islamophobia. The following code (C56) expresses this:

'The increasing fundamentalism of radical Islam and its penetration into Europe.....endangers and is a threat to the ethical values which seem to be lost as a result of this.'

[Der zunehmende Fundamentalismus eines radikalen Islam und dessen vordringen nach Europa.....bedrohen den Wertekonsens der deshalb verloren zu gehen scheint.]

Of all party discourses about indigenous religion and the other religion, the FPÖ is the only political party which targets a specific religious background as well as identifying a specific threat. Whilst the SPÖ and ÖVP argue against religious fundamentalism, the FPÖ takes matters a step further and condemns the perceived threat of Islam. Hence Islamophobia can be identified. Again the traditional agendas of the FPÖ can be observed due to past condemnation of Jews and their personal and religious freedom. Within that FPÖ agenda dystopian elements can be found. The revitalisation of strong condemnation

of a certain group of people, be that on religious or other grounds, is an indication of dystopian elements of this specific party. However, it must be noted that the revitalisation of past utopias are expressed covertly and in a form of subtle 'threat' discourse.

4.6 Thematic group 'integration'

The most obvious and defining aspect of the perception of integration within the FPÖ is the outspoken anti-multiculturalist perspective and the condemnation of multicultural opinions. Multiculturalism is understood as a threat, triggering social conflict, as indicated in code C47. The party manifesto argued that:

> 'Multiculturalist experiments are rejected, because they are purposely stirring up social conflict.'
>
> [Multikulturelle Experimente werden abgelehnt weil durch sie mutwillig gesellschaftliche Konflikte geschürt werden.]

A further example of 'scapegoating' discourse, specifically directed towards Turks is demonstrated below. The usage of the 'we' and 'them' discourse is observable. In the 109th parliamentary debate it is argued that:

> 'Austrian school pupils have to learn Turkish in some schools so that they can communicate with their Turkish colleagues...this is grotesque.'
>
> [Österreichische Schüler müssen an machen Schulen türkisch lernen, damit sie sich mit türkischen Klassenkameraden unterhalten können ...grotesk (109.80)]
>
> 'Foreign integration communities teach us their traditions and rituals. Grotesque; where one can learn belly dancing!'
>
> [Ausländerintegrationsvereine bringen uns die Sitten und Bräuche der Ausländer bei. Grotesk. Wo man dann Bauchtanz lernen kann. (109.80)]

Furthermore, integration is understood as a process to be forced on migrants. The party argues for forced language courses (C48). It is argued that foreigners have to adapt to the cultural standards of the Austrian, or in other words assimilate. This assimilation perspective (C51, C54) corresponds with the party traditions.

The code C50 is also significant (below) as it demonstrates the belief in the need for force and pressure on foreigners to attend language courses (97th parliamentary debate, p. 29):

> 'The pressure is not taken seriously by foreigners'
>
> [Druck sonst wird es von Seiten der Ausländer nicht angenommen (97.29)]

4.7 Thematic group 'identity'

C codes, the problematisation discourse of 'foreign swamping' is demonstrated by the FPÖ. It has been indicated previously that a further focus is either on Austrian patriotism or the pan-Germanic nature of Austrians as well as on Austrians belonging to the German cultural nation. The arguments made in the thematic group 'culture' can correspondingly be applied to the thematic group 'identity'.

In turn, the FPÖ denies all citizenship and hence political rights to migrants. The concept of '*ius sanguinis*' is followed, the rejection of all migrants as Austrians due to the non Germanic descent.

4.8 Summary

It can be suggested that the traditional and charismatic-dystopian leadership type is for the most part validated. It can be argued that charisma is exhibited strongly, based on charismatically used propaganda slogans using scapegoating discourses about foreigners. Additionally the charismatic elements of leadership are strongly exhibited due to the charismatic personality of J. Haider. On the other hand the dystopian elements within the discourses of the FPÖ are not so strongly verified, and if expressed then only in a subtle and covert form.

4.9 Thematic group 'continuity and change'

In terms of continuity and change in discourses prior to and following the switch in governmental positions, it could be argued that the FPÖ exhibited the most consistent opinions of all parties so far. It could be suggested that as a result of the stagnating extreme right position of the party, less flexibility in discourse could be observed. This stagnation and inflexibility is an element of leadership that is ascribed to the legal-rational leadership. In fact, inflexibility and stagnation are the counter-characteristics of charisma. In this respect the theoretical established hypothesis of the FPÖ following a charismatic leadership is not validated. However it could be interpreted that extreme party positions on the political left-right spectrum are bound to stagnate in their position. Possibly they are less supported parties due to extreme positions and hence do not alter their propaganda and

agendas in order to attract more supporters. This strategy might be followed more by centre parties.

5.0 The discourses of the Green Party

5.1 General

The Green Party used 49 codes, all of which were A codes, except for one B code. This indicates that the Green Party can be described as the most positive party regarding opinions towards foreigners.

5.2 Thematic group 'definitions and association'

A2-A12 and B1 describe these definitions and associations. The well-being and welcoming of the migrant are important issues portrayed by the party. A significant code to be noted is that of preventing discrimination and marginalisation of migrants (A12). Further codes A2-A5 indicate the interest of the Green Party in preventing migrants from exclusion from social, cultural, linguistic and economic nature. The focus of the party is directed towards the granting of rights to foreigners, which indicates also a rights-based approach (A8-A10). Specifically, the Green Party argues for the granting of cultural, social and political rights. Code A11 indicates the concern of the party for the understanding of 'migrants' being legally equal to Austrians. The rights-based approach corresponds with the one by the SPÖ. It could therefore be argued that the left parties indicate legal-rational rights-based leadership types. This rights-based approach is indicated below (party manifesto):

> 'Foreigners are discriminated against and foreigners are denied access to cultural and political rights'
>
> [Ausländer werden in Ausländergesetzen diskriminiert- Ausländern werden soziale, kulturell, und politische Rechte vorenthalten.]

5.3 Thematic group 'immigrant, labour market and welfare/social system'

Immigration

Austria is understood as an immigration country (A13). A significant and unique argument is that immigration is supposed to be in the interests of, and to the benefit of foreigners and not locals. It is meant to offer migrants a better home (A19). Code A20 indicates that migrants need to find a home in Austria. However, a legal-rational approach similar to that

of the SPÖ is indicated in the expressions about demanding structure and transparent policies. On the other hand some utopian elements can be found in extreme expressions such as 'open all borders', or 'migrants need to find a new home', or 'family reunification without a quota'.

Labour Market

Two specific topics are dealt with here, firstly the need to offer migrants a new home and not overemphasise benefits of migration to Austria or the Austrian economy (A18-A19); and secondly, the focus on the need for labour migration due to the needs of the Austrian economy and labour market. Hence their discourse is double-edged (A17). Bi-polarity in discourse, as suggested earlier, indicates dynamism flexibility and a lack of structure, which demonstrates charismatic elements of leadership. This element shows a contradiction to the previous thematic group which indicated legal rational elements. Here, the theoretical established argument of the Green Party as being established on two activist groups, one interested in the legal implementation of agendas within the bureaucratic system and the other being more provocative and anti-establishment and more radical orientated, can be viewed and is reflected in the traceability of legal-rational and charismatic-utopian leadership. Nevertheless, the utopian elements appear stronger than the charismatic elements. For example, charismatic elements are not as dominant as in the FPÖ, possibly because the FPÖ is more strongly attached to a charismatic and action orientated leader.

Welfare/social system

The principle of equality is seen in terms of promoting the notion of foreigners being granted legal equity with Austrians in regard to social benefits. No distinction should be made regarding the social system between foreigners and locals, and codes A21 and A23 indicate this.

5.4 Thematic group 'culture'

A2-A5 argue for the prevention of foreigners from exclusion from their cultural heritage and for advancement and preservation of foreigners' cultural traditions; A7-A9 indicate the complaint that foreigners are denied access to social and cultural rights. The quote (party manifesto) below demonstrates that the Green Party wants to build a platform to

allow for individual development of the minority group members, and it is indicated that the petrification and marginalisation of minorities should be stopped.

> 'Green minority politics intends not to preserve the cultural identity of minorities and the petrification of the existence/being of minorities, but intends the abolition of such marginalisation....which includes life in the midst of society as well as the sustaining of all opportunities to foster the development of one's own individuality and identity.'
>
> [Grüne Minderheiten Politik bezweckt nicht die Konservierung der kulturellen Identität von Minderheiten und die Versteinerung des Minderheiten Daseins sondern die Aufhebung desselben (marginalisierungen) ...was sowohl das Leben in der Mitte der Gesellschaft als auch die Wahrung aller Chancen beinhaltet, die eigenen Individualität und Identität ausbilden zu können]

5.5 Thematic group 'integration'

Codes A31-A48 indicate an integrative approach, which could be described as multiculturalist or very open. To some extent the discourses (for example A46-48) exhibit a rights-based approach, similar to that of the SPÖ, while a discursive focus on the concept of equality can also be observed. Codes 34-42 describe this. Specifically, integration is favoured in terms of legal rights, and social, political and legal equality, therefore integration through right of equality to the same social position as that of Austrians. The Green Party argues for the full acceptance of other cultures and language as demonstrated in the idea of a bi-lingual school system (code A31 and A32). The concept of equality is indicated in the quote below:

> 'Integration is only possible with the legal, social, and political equality of migrants.'
>
> [Integration nur machbar mit rechtlicher, sozialer und politischer Gleichstellung von Migranten.]

A further significant aspect is the concept of citizenship. The Green Party promulgates dual citizenship (code A42 and A44). They are the only political party mentioning dual citizenship. Additionally, the party indicates a concept of a 'ius soli' citizenship basis. They also argue for the shortening of the waiting times for citizenship.

The bi-lingualism in all schools suggested by the Green Party could be considered a utopian element of leadership, at least in contemporary Austria. Nevertheless it is an indication of utopian elements of leadership types.

5.6 Thematic group 'religion'

Nothing is said about religion.

5.7 Thematic group 'identity'

The Green Party incorporates the concept of multiple and hybrid identities arguing that these would benefit Austrian society (A49). They further argue that minorities should be given the chance to develop their own identity. Multiple and hybrid identities are seen as a learning opportunity, and codes A48-A49 demonstrate the above. The expression of a need for hybrid and multiple identities could be considered another indication for a utopian leadership in the context of contemporary Austrian society.

Overall, the Green Party can be identified as a rights-based legal-rational, but also utopian party, indicating the most liberal opinions and expression about foreigners.

5.8 Thematic group 'continuity and change'

Similar to the extreme right position of the FPÖ, the extreme left position of the Green Party is just as stagnant and inflexible as that of the FPÖ in its discursive position. Hence no specific changes between past and present could be identified in the Greens' discourses and continuity was visible. Overall the Green Party could be seen as displaying similarities to the SPÖ party in the rights-based leadership type. The charismatic and utopian aspects in the 'shock effect' discourses or 'open all borders' concepts can be traced more obviously.

6.0 Summary of all parties and their leadership types

It could be suggested that the parties are identified in their leadership types and the theoretical arguments made in Chapter Two can be understood for the most part as validated. Theoretically the SPÖ has been identified as the traditional and legal-rational leadership type. In the above findings of the study this has been validated. The ÖVP has been identified as the traditional-traditional leadership type, which for the most part has been validated. On the other hand the Green Party and the FPÖ have also been validated in their hypothesised leadership types but have to be discussed further. It is significant that the two parties associated with charisma show strong continuity in discourse. This indicates stagnation. Charisma is associated with flexibility, dynamic and sudden change. Hence, a contradiction occurs. This could be explained by way of arguing that those two parties' charismatic elements have been institutionalised and have lost some of their

flexibility. Further it could be argued that the FPÖ, theoretically and empirically identified as charismatic-dystopian, appears more charismatic than dystopian. This can be assumed because the dystopian pan-German elements are only implied subtly and do not dominate the party discourses. However, more domineering are Haider's usage of charismatic problematisation and scapegoating discourses as well as his charismatic personality. On the other hand the FPÖ appears more charismatic than the Green Party. The Green Party, theoretically identified as charismatic-utopian, appear to be more utopian than charismatic. This can be suggested because the utopian discourses appear more domineering than the charismatic ones. It could be possible that this is a result of the institutionalisation of charisma. Additionally, the Green Party exhibits contradictions and bi-polarity in being situated within legal-rationality as well as within charismatic-utopia. This could be understood as a result of the two founding groups of the party, one being a group aiming to legally implement policies within the existing bureaucratic system, and the other being based on agendas of anti-establishment and rebellious provocation.

7.0 Comparison of Features of Leadership Types

A quantitative comparative approach to leadership features described and developed earlier will be undertaken. The following core concepts were used for the comparative analysis[46]: concepts of rights, law, legal-rational and associated key words within the SPÖ. Concepts of economy, help, humanitarianism, tolerance, Christian principles and associated key words within the ÖVP; the concepts of assimilation, fear, burden, threat and associated key words within the FPÖ[47]. All of these concepts were sought in connection to the topic of foreigners and migration and also in the other parties to standardise the findings and to be able to highlight exceptionally high usages of the concepts and make more comparisons between the parties. In this respect, the specific characteristics of each party were analysed from a party's material and then the characteristics of the opposing parties were investigated using the same data material. For example, within the SPÖ, data material for legal-rational characteristics were tested; then in continuation the characteristics of other parties, such as tradition or economy (ÖVP) were tested from within the SPÖ material, before investigating the same characteristic in the other groups. All characteristics were

[46] The Green Party was included to compare the other parties feature in their material but was not included with their own specific characteristics due to the late inclusion of this party.
[47] By the time the concept of utopia/dystopia was theoretically developed, this quantitative count and study had already been undertaken. Therefore the concept of utopia is not included.

tested for all parties in all available material. This analysis was supplemented with a graphic illustration, this approach is described further in Chapter Three.

The graph 4.3 below demonstrates the quantitative approach to all parties in a comparative model. The graph 4.3 shows the usage of the leadership type features, while the second graph indicates the same data seen by political party to demonstrate differences between party-specific usage. It can clearly be viewed that the features which are allocated to each of the parties are strongest when compared to those occurring within the other parties. In other words, it is validated that legal-rational leadership characteristics are outstandingly often used within the SPÖ (45 times) and Green Party (25 times), and seldom used by the other parties. Alternatively, the charismatic FPÖ leadership characteristics are most often used by the FPÖ (32 times) and not used by the Green Party or SPÖ. Overall, it is clear that the hypothesised leadership types appear to be validated; this graph supplements the previous discussions in this chapter about leadership types.

4.3 The Comparative Usage of Leadership Type Features



	right's based	economy	help tolerance	assimilation, threat
SPÖ	45	9	8	0
ÖVP	8	30	17	12
FPÖ	7	17	1	32
GREEN PARTY	25	3	6	0

Graph 4.4 indicates very clearly how the usage of the FPÖ features rises the further right the party is situated, and by contrast also shows how the usage of the rights-based approach is highest in the oppositional left discourses and diminishes further to the right. No FPÖ

threat-based discourse was used at all by the opposition parties. The left parties exhibit legal-rational based approaches.

4.4 Usage of Concepts of Leadership Type Features- A Comparative Approach between Political Parties



The findings of this quantitative count are described briefly below.

(1)The SPÖ and its usage of the concept of legal-rational concepts and its comparison to the usage of features of the other parties

- legal-rational concepts - the SPÖ specific leadership features

The concept of 'rights' and 'law' and associated key words was employed 45 times within the data of parliamentary debates and the manifesto of the SPÖ.

- Concept of economy (ÖVP feature) in the SPÖ data:

The concept 'economy', an ÖVP allocated concept, was used only once in the manifesto in regard to foreigners and 8 times in parliamentary debates, that is a total of 9 times.

- Concept of 'humanity, tolerance and help' (ÖVP feature) in the SPÖ data:

The second ÖVP concept, that of help, tolerance and humanitarianism was used only 8 times.

- Concept of 'assimilation, fear and threat' (FPÖ feature) in the SPÖ data:

This was not used at all.

(2)The ÖVP and its usage of the concept of (a) economy and (b) humanitarian principles such as 'help, tolerance and respect' – the comparison of the ÖVP leadership features to other parties

- Economy:

This concept was used 30 times in relation to immigrants and migrants.

- Humanitarian Principles:

This determining feature of the ÖVP was used 17 times.

- 'Legal-rational' approach (SPÖ characteristics) in the ÖVP data:

A rights-based approach was used 8 times in the data.

- 'Fear, assimilation, threat, burden' (FPÖ characteristics) in the ÖVP data

The concept of fear and problematising foreigners was used 12 times, apparently more often than it was used by the SPÖ. This indicates a close linkage between the ÖVP and the FPÖ.

(3)The FPÖ and its usage of concepts such as 'assimilation', 'fear', 'burden' and 'problematisation' discourses- the comparison of the FPÖ leadership features to the usage by other parties

- Fear and problems in the FPÖ data

The concept of 'threat and danger' occurred 10 times, and 'assimilation' a further 22 times, in total 32 times.

- 'Legal-rational' (SPÖ characteristics) in the FPÖ data:

These were used 7 times only.

- 'Economy' (ÖVP characteristics) in the FPÖ data

The 'economy' concept was used 17 times. The fact that SPÖ specific discourses were implied less often than ÖVP-specific ones proves the linkage of governmental alliance as well as the right and right centre spectrum of the two parties. Hence, their principles are also linked.

- 'Humanitarian principles' (ÖVP characteristics) in the FPÖ data

This discourse was used only once in the FPÖ data.

(4)The Green Party

No real typical Green Party features had been identified at the time of this quantitative count. Nevertheless the features of the other parties were tested in the data of the Green Party.

- 'Legal-rational' (SPÖ characteristics) in the Green Party material:

This was used 25 times in total. This is the second highest usage of the rights-based approach after the SPÖ usage and indicates the political orientational linkage to the SPÖ as well as the linkage in oppositional party terms.

- 'Economy' (ÖVP feature) in the Green Party data

This feature was used three times only.

- 'Humanitarian Principles' (ÖVP features) in the Green Party data

This feature was used 6 times, more often than in the other two parties.

- 'fear and assimilation' (FPÖ features) in the Green Party data

This feature was not used at all.

8.0 Identifying and situating overlapping discourses – the allocation of discourses within a left to right continuum scale corresponding to the A - C code range

The discursive approaches by the diverse political players will be situated in a left-to-right (A-C) discourse as well as on a political left-to-right continuum scale. This will be undertaken from a thematic group perspective. Overlapping discourses will be analysed and opposition parties compared to governmental parties. Contradictory discourses within each party can be identified and will be pointed out.

Generally speaking the SPÖ and Green Party form one opposition block, while the ÖVP and FPÖ constitute the other governmental block. Even though precise corresponding discourses within the SPÖ and Green Party cannot be seen, the tendencies and arguments are often similar. However the ÖVP and FPÖ seem to have bonded more strongly.

Graph 4.5 exhibits the A, B and C discourses used by the political parties. The SPÖ and Green Party score highest usage of A discourses, while the FPÖ scores highest in the C discourses. Correspondingly the ÖVP's main discourse type is the B discourse. The SPÖ and Green Party hardly use C discourses at all.

4.5 Usage of Codes Visualising the Left to Right Party Spectrum



	GREEN PARTY	SPÖ	ÖVP	FPÖ
A-POSTIVE	49	60	17	3
B-NEUTRAL	1	9	44	11
C-NEGATIVE	0	1	20	51

4.6 Usage of Codes Divided by Political Parties



Graph 4.6 indicates the same, but viewed by the discourses. It can be seen how the A discourses score highest in the centre left and left parties, the opposition and how the C discourses score best in the centre right and extreme right governmental parties.

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a. Thematic group 'definitions and associations'

Opposition parties

In the continuum scale the SPÖ and the Green Party exhibit similar discourses. For example, the SPÖ indicates that different human beings are equal in dignity and rights, while the Green Party argues for a legal and rights-based equality for foreigners. The main differences are that the Green Party emphasises the denial certain rights to foreigners, whereas the SPÖ describes what they intend to do for foreigners. Both parties are very much in favour of the establishment of equal rights in regard to diverse issues for foreigners.

Governmental parties

The governmental parties could also be described as alike in terms of applying the B and C range of discourses, while not using A codes. Contrary to the two opposition parties, the governmental parties similarly perceive foreigners as a problem. While the FPÖ clearly state that foreigners are a problem, the ÖVP argues that a high percentage of foreigners might pose a problem, implying the corresponding viewpoint in a more subtle way. Thus these discourses could be understood as similar. On the other hand, both parties are fear and threat orientated, the FPÖ in terms of foreign swamping, while the ÖVP expresses concerns about the Austrian population's fear of ghettos and other anxieties relating to foreigners.

The discourses for this theme were marked on the discourse continuum scale as follows:

X.....SPÖ

X .....ÖVP

X.....FPÖ

X.....Green Party

Perceptions:

Rights-based (A)	(B)	(C) problem, fear
X X		X X

b. Immigration –

Green Party and SPÖ

Within the immigration cluster the two parties are distinct the Green Party being more liberal while the SPÖ includes some restrictions, possibly partly because prior to 1999 the restriction of immigration was their viewpoint. Presently the SPÖ seem to have assimilated more with the Green Party. In that respect both argue for immigration, yet the Green Party claims that Austria is an immigration country, and the SPÖ argue that immigrants are needed but with certain regulations. The Green Party is concerned about foreigners, indicating that migration is for the purpose of migrants finding a new home and implying that foreigners should be not seen as any form of 'selfish benefit to the economy'. The SPÖ are predominantly concerned with the legal and rational aspects of immigration, the imposition of an immigration quota and the rational necessity of immigration in terms of the contribution to the welfare system or possibly also the labour market. These differences are expressed in the Green Party being more left, and SPÖ being more centre left on the continuum scale (see below).

Immigration in governmental parties

The discourses of FPÖ and ÖVP correspond strongly. Both parties state that Austria is not an immigration country. FPÖ argues that Austria is not an immigration country, while the ÖVP argues that Austria is not a typical immigration country. Further corresponding arguments and codes exist in the FPÖ viewpoint that 'unlimited immigration is irresponsible', while the ÖVP argues that 'unlimited immigration is not possible'. The FPÖ indicates that 'illegal immigration is a problem', and the ÖVP expresses the same opinion, claiming 'we do not want illegal immigration'. Additionally, both argue that the immigration threshold levels might endanger Austria's labour market or social system and hence immigration should be limited'. Both parties also argue for the granting of asylum. Most significant is that the FPÖ emphasises anti-immigration discourses very similar to those of the ÖVP. However the ÖVP makes a further five arguments in which they are using A and B codes in an almost contradictory way in favour of migration and immigrants related to the labour market. One explanation of this could be that the ÖVP might have taken up the FPÖ corresponding discourses during their period of governmental alliance.

As demonstrated below, the parties take very characteristic positions in terms of the left to right scale, with the exception of the ÖVP who might have assimilated parts of their discourses to the alliance partner FPÖ

Immigration:

A	B	C
Concerned about foreigners- Not exploiting them Austria is an immigration country	Immigration with some regulations- Concerned about rational impact	Immigration for labour market	Limited immigration Against immigration Austria is not an immigration country
X	X	X	X X



c. Labour market

While the Green Party is arguing for equal opportunities in the labour market for foreigners, expressing some concern for the chances of the migrants, the SPÖ argues for the need for immigration to cope with labour deficiencies but is also concerned about Austrians and wage pressure created by foreign labour. On this subject, the SPÖ takes a more negative approach.

The two governmental parties show similar discourses in respect of the labour market. Both parties indicate preference for Austrians in the labour market. They argue that Austria does not need foreigners, it can use its own labour force. While the ÖVP argues for skilled labour migration, the Freedom Party does not make reference to this at all. Again, the ÖVP exhibits contradictory discourses in some form. The argument of 'wage pressure' is used by the SPÖ, the FPÖ and the ÖVP and indicates a significant shared code.

As can be seen in , the stagnating position is taken by the Green Party, while the SPÖ is in an uncharacteristically bi-polar position, and the governmental parties can be found on the extreme and medium right spectrum of the Graph.

A	B	C
Equaltiy for foreingers in labour market	Need immigration for labour market	Employ Austrian work-force first, Need skilled labour migration	Threat of wage pressure
X	X	X X	X X X

Extreme liberal (+) A liberal B (0) conservative C extreme conservative (-)

d. Welfare system

The Green Party argues that equal access to social benefits should be established for foreigners. The SPÖ emphasises that sponging by foreigners does not exist but rather that they contribute to the welfare system by paying taxes. Both indicate that foreigners should be integrated in the social system. A difference exists because the Green Party, unlike the SPÖ, does not mention the code 'no sponging'.

Both governmental parties are concerned about the threat of social sponging: they argue that this must be eradicated.

As can be seen in the following spectrum, no centre positions are taken, but the centre parties ally very strongly in the extreme discourse regions with their extremist partners. It could be argued that the centre parties, SPÖ and ÖVP, have assimilated their discourses either to their opposition partner or their governmental partner.

A	B	C
Equal access to benefits No social sponging		Social sponging Must be eradicated
X X		X X

Extreme liberal (+) A liberal B (0) conservative C extreme conservative (-)

e. Culture

In terms of culture, the Green Party mainly argues that they want to prevent exclusion and marginalisation of migrants, whether of a linguistic, cultural economic or social form. The

SPÖ is more rights-based in their approach, in the sense of proposing that all individuals have a right to a home, and the right to tradition and language.

In terms of culture, the two governmental parties demonstrate the following similarities and differences. Strongly differing opinions between the allied parties can be seen. The ÖVP focuses on humanitarian ideals, such as tolerance and understanding, as well as humanity towards foreigners, while emphasising the safeguarding of Austrian culture, homeland, and traditions. The FPÖ perceived foreign culture solely as a problem or threat and problematised it in terms of overwhelming the host nation. Austrian patriotism and belief in German cultural heritage and their protection and continuation is revealed in this theme.

In the chart below, the way in which the different parties ally with each other more traditionally can be seen. Significant is that the chart reflects the pre 1999 alliances, by the indication that Green Party with SPÖ, and SPÖ with ÖVP show similarities. The FPÖ takes a stand-alone extreme right position. It can also be seen that the extreme left and extreme right parties take recurring stagnating extreme positions while on the contrary the centre parties appear more flexible.



f. Integration

The SPÖ is focused on a voluntary approach to integration as well as a rights-based approach. At the same time, the concepts of tolerance, mutual understanding, dialogue and respect are strongly valued by the party. However the Green Party takes a more practical approach to integration and focuses on the equality perspective rather than on the rights perspective. They indicate a practically applied integration approach such as the multiculturalist benefits of bilingual schooling.

In terms of integration, the ÖVP takes a softer view on integration than the FPÖ, and envisages a peaceful coexistence between foreigners and Austrians, valuing assimilation and pluralism equally. The FPÖ again is very strongly opinionated. The FPÖ demands

forced integration and emphasises anti-multiculturalism, arguing for assimilation to Austrian culture in every respect. The only similarity to be found is that both ÖVP and FPÖ express that integration is the foreigners' responsibility and that forced language courses are beneficial.

The following table demonstrates that the centre parties, ÖVP and SPÖ, have centre left and centre right positions, while also assimilating their discourse to their more extremist alliance partners

A		B		C
Equality Multiculturalism	Rights based	Tolerance and understanding Soft pressure Pluralism		Forced integration Assimilation
X	X	X	X	X X

Extreme liberal (+) A liberal B (0) conservative C extreme conservative (-)

g. Religion

In terms of religion it can be said that all of the parties locate themselves uncharacteristically with the exception of the FPÖ. While the Green Party does not state any opinions regarding religion, the SPÖ promotes religious freedom, but rejects religious fundamentalism. The ÖVP is strongly in favour of religious freedom but also against fundamentalism. The Freedom Party is Islamophobic, perceiving Islam as a threat. In that sense all parties with the exception of the Freedom Party favour religious freedom.

A		B	C
Religious Freedom	Against fundamentalism		Islamophobia
X X	X X		X

Extreme liberal (+) A liberal B (0) conservative C extreme conservative (-)

h. Identity

The identities approach by the SPÖ is based predominantly on a rights perspective while the Green Party argues for the benefits of multiple identities, as well as equal chances in society.

The governmental parties exhibit controversial discourses and usage of codes in this respect. The Freedom Party again problematised foreigners and perceive a threat in foreign swamping. At the same time they are concerned about the protection of Austrian cultural heritage. The ÖVP does not show any problematisation discourse. However, the ÖVP shows similarities to FPÖ in terms of focusing on the right of Austrians to their identity and homeland, and the state's responsibility towards Austrian citizens. Contrary to the SPÖ and Green Party, the focus is on Austrians, the locals, and not on foreigners.
In the below the stagnating Green Party position can be viewed, as well as the traditionally extreme and stagnating FPÖ position. The SPÖ and ÖVP take also characteristic positions.

A		B		C
Equal Chances For foreigners	Rights based For foreigners	Protecting Austrian population	Threat of swamping Protection of Austrian heritage (slightly pan-German)	
X	X	X		X

Extreme liberal (+) A liberal B (0) conservative C extreme conservative (-)

If the material in all the graphs were amalgamated, the discourses would be seen to overlap and the extent to which the political parties assimilate with their allies, and how they take inflexible and stagnating positions could be seen.

9.0 Summary

In summary it could be argued that the Green Party takes the least flexible position, while the centre right and left parties often either locate themselves characteristically or/and exhibit assimilation in discourse with that of their allies. The Freedom Party again appears inflexible in its position.

It might also be suggested that the Weberian leadership types can be situated in this left to right continuum. Left or right extreme parties exhibit charisma, either charisma in dystopian or in utopian terms, the Green Party utopian and the FPÖ dystopian. The centre parties are based more on tradition or situated within a bureaucratic legal rational framework. This can be seen in the context of the theoretical arguments in Chapter Two which indicated that utopia and dystopia are leadership types of groups or organisations positioned more on the margins of the continuum. These serve as triggers. They trigger the disintegration of established types of governance. In this respect they are the stimulus for social change, rather than being leadership features of long-lasting domination themselves. This can also be applied to the Austrian political parties. The extreme parties, traditionally not as influential and stagnant in their positions, are those which can cause a change and disrupt the long established and domineering centre parties who follow traditional and rights based leadership types. The FPÖ has served as this kind of trigger, causing a change in government in 1999 and serving as a disruptive force to the long established centre parties, and hence being a disruptive or disturbing force to the stagnating rights based, bureaucratic and traditional mainstream leadership types. It could further be observed that the charismatic party FPÖ is commonly said not to integrate well in governmental alliance. This could be a result of their charismatic and dystopian orientation. As argued in Chapter Two, charismatic-dystopian elements are rarely able to mutate from being part of a marginal organisation to that of a legitimate mainstream governmental organisation. If they are able to do so, they need to institutionalise themselves and often lose their dystopian agendas, and possibly also elements of their charismatic features. In this respect it could be argued that the inability of the FPÖ to integrate in the government can be understood as signalling the inability to institutionalise their charismatic features, because they remain action orientated and unstable. Furthermore, it might not be possible to integrate or institutionalise their dystopian agendas in a legitimate government.

10.0 Additional analysis of an excerpt from a parliamentary debate

In addition to the above analysis, an excerpt from a parliamentary debate substantiates the arguments in a qualitative form, and was added to conduct a qualitative comparison of the differing political party discourses. This debate can be found in Appendix Fourteen.

109th Debate (p.87-89): included a speech by the ÖVP parliamentary speaker (Karl Freund), the SPÖ (Anton Gaal) and the FPÖ. See Appendix Fourteen.

This debate is concerned with the new integration law which it proposed to pass. It is further concerned with the new law about the contingent of *saisonaires*. It is apparent that the speakers relate to the other's speech, however often bring up other issues not directly related to either the topic of the debate or the previous speaker, but rather relate their arguments to general points of the opposition party.

In more detail, the Christian Democrat speaker debates the new regulations concerning migration laws. A further important statement was that he insisted that Austria was not an immigration country. With regard to immigration, the standpoint of the party is that immigration is needed, being beneficial to the Austrian population, with an emphasis on Austrian economy and labour market needs. Further in the speech, an important emphasis is put on Austrians and their need for help with farming so that the produce is guaranteed for Austrians. Emphasis again is on the benefit to Austrians, in terms of the Austrian population as well as its economy and the strengthening of the location of Austria for its economy. Such focus on the traditional aspects of the Austrian home population and economy indicates the traditional Weberian leadership type. In this excerpt legal and rational elements can be traced (immigration regulation), but also the characteristic FPÖ point of 'Austria not being an immigration country' is taken up. Furthermore, the bi-polar discourse of 'Austria is not an immigration country' and ' immigration for the benefit of the labour market' can be viewed. The concept of anti immigration and Austria not being an immigration country appears to be a discourse newly influenced by the governmental alliance.

In response to the opposition parties, the speaker without a direct indication argues that jobs will not be taken away from Austrians and reacts by saying that Austrians are chosen

first for jobs, and only if no local labour force is available, then will 'foreigners' be brought in.

The SPÖ speaker argues more strongly about issues of integration not directly related to the topic discussed by the ÖVP speaker. In fact the socialist speaker reveals major SPÖ perspectives on the concept of integration, at the same time marginally also referring to the topic discussed by the previous speaker. For example in regard to the new law discussed by the ÖVP, the SPÖ indicates that this entails immigration of a class without rights, and deprives of new migrants of rights. An important concept here is the concept of a class without rights, an important focus of the SPÖ in regard to their general agendas. For example the Austro-Marxist and the basic traditional principles of the SPÖ are based around class and the rights of the working class which have now been replaced by the new migrants. And the fight and concern about their rights. This indicates a legal-rational leadership type (according to Weber) including the traditional aspects of Austro-Marxism.

On the other hand in terms of immigration and integration, the SPÖ argue that integration is a concept of living with each other and respecting each other, and not just about learning German. They find the compulsory learning of German and the threat of deportation unacceptable. Further integration to them, or the concept of it, includes proper housing and access to it, as well as rights, for example the right to work and access to education. Again, the concept of rights and a rights-based approach is included indicating a traditional (Austro-Marxist) as well as right based legal rational leadership approach.

It is significant that the SPÖ appear to complain that their experience of integration policies and politics in Vienna was ignored for the formulation of the new laws. Furthermore the SPÖ speaker indicates that integration is concerned with the well-being of all individuals living in Austria, which in some form could be influenced by the opposition Green Party partner which are more concerned in their manifestos about the well-being of foreigners than the SPÖ is in their manifesto.

In terms of the Freedom Party speaker, clear statements are made only marginally relating to the previous speakers. The first point to be mentioned is that Austria is not an immigration country in comparison to other countries. The FPÖ argues strategically by citing examples about other countries like New Zealand in order to justify their idea of introducing health tests for immigrants. They defend themselves with the argument of

stigmatising migrants. Further they clearly argue that public health and the Austrian population might be endangered by migrants' health. In regard to these arguments the tradition of the FPÖ of judging non- Austrians as less valuable human beings, the problematisation of them as well as their scapegoating can be viewed. This usage of action–orientated slogans is an indication of the charismatic leadership tendencies as well as the traditional aspects of former views on non- Austrians. In this respect, charismatic-dystopian elements are exhibited in this speech also in regard to the policies suggested, covertly reminiscent of the FPÖ's former viewpoints.

11. Recommendations and future research

As was indicated earlier in this chapter, variations in discourse can occur in different governmental periods. One recommendation for a future follow-up study would consist of a research focus on a comparative analysis of parliamentary debates and manifestos from different historical periods, such as for example from the early 1920s, the 1950s, the 1970s and the 1990s. The aim of such research would be to determine to what extent the left and right continuum was flexible and open to change with time, and specifically to establish and identify the extent to which the traditional core aspects of political parties exhibited continuity. A follow-up study of this kind could also be used as a further test to substantiate theories of political domination and leadership type established and validated above which were reflected in the discourses of the diverse political parties in regard to the theme of migration.

A further in-depth study of the discourses of parliamentary debates of the 1990s is recommended in order to identify further comparative material, which could then test in detail the extent to which everyday actors respond or legitimate change and flexibility in the discourse of the political players. The graphs showing leadership types and continuity and change, as well as those displaying the general usage of discourses within the political parties could be compared in an in-depth study of historic material and possibly contrasted with standardised data which was not possible to achieve in this study owing to time and space limitations.

A further recommendation for future research projects might be to analyse the above findings on the basis of the national state of Austria in the context of a broader European Union perspective. A comparative research project analysing political party discourses of other political players in European Union national states could also be designed for other

continents. What would discourses about foreigners in other democratic societies, such as other EU member states, demonstrate? Would the rights-based approach be displayed in other EU labour or socialist parties? Would the identification of the same fears and threats be obvious and correspond within other EU member states' far right parties, and what differences or similarities could be found? Is there a chance that in other EU member states more discontinuity over recent decades has appeared? To what extent have other labour parties changed their characteristic positions in the right-to-left spectrum, and if so, for what reasons? Are political parties' change of agenda dependent on a specific society and competition for support from the people, or do other factors, such as the global economy, have an impact on the political parties? In what way can Max Weber's theories be traced in other societies' empirical data? Further research, as described above, could provide answers for many of these questions.

Chapter Five:

Case study of the Regional Everyday Discourses in contemporary Upper Austria

The previous chapter described and analysed discourses occurring in the political national macro sphere. Considering the aims and objectives of this thesis, this chapter will outline the discourses portrayed by the everyday actors of the regional micro sphere in order to compare political national expressions with the everyday individual expressions about 'foreigners'. Expressions by everyday actors about immigration and related topics will be outlined with particular focus on the possible occurrence of socio demographic dependencies of the opinions portrayed. Particular attention will be given to variations and dependencies of discourses as a result of political support, gender, age, or class (economic professional background), or because of rural/urban or educational background differences[48].

The data findings and the results of the case study with regard to the socio demographic dependencies of discourses will be highlighted and described. In support of explaining and introducing the findings of the case study, Appendices 5, and 6 are particularly relevant to this chapter. The Appendices firstly explain all the identified codes, theoretical codes as well as socio demographic categories and were used as the basis for the description of the data results. The analysis of the possible socio demographic dependencies of expressions additionally served the purpose of testing whether, and to what extent, the choice of different codes was dependent on the political support background of everyday actors in comparison with possible influence of other socio demographic features of the everyday actors. In this respect, this chapter will form the basis for Chapter Six, in which the extent of correspondences or dissimilarities between political party discourses, and the expressions of the regional actors sampled by political support will be explained and tested on a qualitative basis. Chapter Five also serves as a basis for testing the legitimacy of political domination.

[48] It should be noted, as already explained, that the case study sample cannot be and is not representative. Further methodological insights about this chapter were discussed in Chapter Three.

1.0 Introduction[49]:

The introduction presents the allocation of codes categorised by socio demographic background in the complete set of data. Expressions and allocated codes were distinguished between positive (A), neutral (B) and negative (C).

In the following sections, the complete set of data within the case study will be introduced and critically analysed. This can be viewed in Appendix Five. This Appendix describes all of the codes and their distribution by socio demographic background features taken from the complete set of data, the combination of all thematic groups, theoretical codes and individual codes. As can be viewed in Graph 1, a total of 136 codes was identified; 45 A codes within the given set of data, 22 B codes, 59 C codes. Another 23 separate codes were related to the thematic group 'association of foreigners' and treated separately, and were not included in the calculations of Graph One, Two and Graph Three in the Appendix Five.

These 136 codes (excluding the 23 'association of foreigners' codes) were used 519 times in total by all interviewees. This frequency of code usage can be subdivided into the use of 212 times A (positive), followed by the volume of C (negative) expressions (186). B (neutral) codes were used least often, only 121 times.

Graph Two (Appendix Five) explains the usage of codes by their absolute number. The usage was divided by the socio-demographic background of the interviewees, as described previously.

Graph Three (Appendix Five) illustrates the usage of codes by their weighted averages. The usage was divided by socio-demographic background of the interviewees, as described previously. The methodological usage of 'weighted averages' and its possible impacts on the results was critically expressed in Chapter Three.

[49] The green party supporters was not included in this study. Within their small sample of three respondents it was not possible to identify any socio-demographic dependencies.

2. Usage of codes categorised by political support groups

Of the 519 codes used, the SPÖ supporters used 194 codes in total[50], the ÖVP 144, and the FPÖ supporters 181. This can be viewed in Graph 2, Appendix Five. Out of 194 SPÖ usages, 154 were A codes, while the ÖVP used the A-codes 39 times and the FPÖ group only 19 times. In turn, the C codes were most often used by the FPÖ supporters, 139 times in total and least by the SPÖ supporters (19 times). The ÖVP support group most often used the neutral B codes.[51] The graph 5.1 below indicates this usage of codes within the regional micro sphere.

5.1 Overall Usage of Codes Categorised by Political Support



	A	B	C
SP	154	18	21
VP	39	79	26
FP	19	23	139

This usage of positive, neutral and negative codes appears to indicate that, in general, the SPÖ supporters exhibit the most positive expressions about foreigners while the FPÖ supporters' views are most negative. This result coincides with the findings described in the previous chapter, with the SPÖ being the most positive minded party, the ÖVP the most neutral and the FPÖ the most negative. In that respect, it could then be suggested that a certain correspondence of discourses can be identified between the political sphere and the regional everyday setting. The political domination of discourses and its legitimation will be specifically analysed and explained in Chapter Six.

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[50] The calculations and graphs in this section were based on the absolute numbers of codes in Graph 2, Appendix Five.

[51] In terms of the Green Party, which will be treated in a separate section, the A codes were most relevant. The Green Party will be treated separately because the sample of the group was too small to be included in the overall calculation of the study.

3.0 Usage of codes categorised by gender

Concerning gender determination of discourses, in general, no outstandingly distinctive variations between the discourses of men and the codes used by women could be found. The usage of A, B and C codes is very evenly divided between men and women, even though men more often used C (negative) codes than women. Positive opinions (A-codes) were used by more women than men[52]. However, these were only slight variations, which did not necessarily exhibit any particular gender-dependent usage of discourses in any apparent way. Gender appears not to play a major role in the choice of codes or formulation of discourses about 'migrants' and immigration, at least in this particular case study of respondents. This can be viewed in the Graph 5.2 below.

5.2 Usage of Codes categorised by Gender



4.0 Usage of codes categorised by age

The overall data of the case study revealed a minor age-dependent usage of codes and discourses. Interviewees belonging to the younger age group (-50) used more positive (A) codes while in turn older respondents (+50) used more negative (C) ones. C codes were used 112 times by those over 50 people and 74 times by those younger[53]. On the contrary, A codes were used 93 times by those over 50 and 119 times by those younger. Those older than 50 appear to be more negatively opinionated towards migrants while, the younger generation could be described as more welcoming and possibly more open minded, even

[52] The calculations for this section have been based on weighted averages, described in Graph 3, Appendix Five. This is a result of the imbalance of 24 male and 9 female respondents in the case study group. Additionally this was explained in chapter Three.

[53] This section is based on the absolute numbers of codes used, because the age factor was balanced evenly in the respondents' group. Graph 2 , Appendix five.

liberal. Jaakkola (1995) argues that elderly people are generally more opinionated and less tolerant than younger people. The findings of this study correspond to her findings. However, the varying usage of discursive codes was dependent to a lesser degree on the age socio-demographic feature than for example the choice of codes dependent on the political background of the interviewees.

5.3 Usage of Codes categorised by Age



One reason for the result appears to show in Austrian history as well as is attributable to differences in forms of upbringing at different times. For example, the upbringing and socialisation process of respondents older than 50, was perhaps influenced by the post-war orientations of earlier Nazism. Based on the fact that the present day post 50 generation either witnessed Nazism themselves or had parents who were firsthand witnesses of Nazism, the respective orientations might have been transmitted. These experiences could have influenced negative discursive polarisations towards immigration within those over 50. One interpretation of the above result could be the possible inflexibility of older people as well as their inability to accustom themselves to changes in a nation state embracing the immigration waves of the 1990s. On the contrary, due to the majority of the Austrian respondents belonging to the younger age group growing up in a United Europe or being educated with, and being socialised into, a different view of Austrian history, preferences for positive opinions become predominant. The interaction between individuals stemming from different cultural backgrounds, possibilities for travel and the influences of modern means of communication might have influenced the shaping of positive opinions towards the 'other'. Additionally, many second-generation migrants (e.g.

children of the guestworker migration waves) belong to the younger Austrian generation. With their presence in society, particularly in primary and secondary schools as well as universities, they might have enhanced their positive perception by regional respondents. Daily interactions with, as well as personal experiences of migrants contribute to the choice of discourses expressed. Young Austrians had predominantly positive experiences (9) and only 3 had negative experiences. Older respondents expressed 7 positive experiences, and 7 negative experiences. Consequently, in the public sphere young people intermixing with immigrants and individuals from different cultural backgrounds had predominantly positive experiences and rarely described negative ones, whereas the older respondents appear to have had more negative experiences. The socio demographic factor of age therefore appears to influence the choice between A and C codes.

5. Usage of codes categorised by rural/urban background

Urban interviewees exhibited more positive opinions than rural respondents. Positive A codes were largely used by urban respondents, while usage of B and C codes was fairly even between urban and rural respondents. This corresponds with the results of Jaakkola's (1995) study, who suggests that individuals with an urban background are more tolerant and open –minded in general than those stemming from a rural background.

5.4 Categorisation by Rural vs. Urban Background



The rural/urban determination of discourses could be understood as self-explanatory. Urban preference for positive expressions can be explained due to the SPÖ supporters, whose predominant choice of opinion was positive discourses. Coincidentally, the SPÖ supporters were predominantly of urban socio-demographic background. Of 11 SPÖ supporters, 10 stemmed from an urban background. Additionally, urban positive

utterances could be interpreted as owing to greater personal experience and interaction in the public sphere between culturally differently determined individuals and the local. This interaction could lead to positive opinions as a result of enlightening experiences or as the result of accustomed interaction with foreigners. It should therefore be noted that the rural population, on the contrary, might be deprived of these interaction opportunities with foreigners, the percentage of foreigners living in a rural setting is much lesser than that in an urban setting. For example, the rural interviewees indicated only 14 personal experiences with foreigners in total, while urban respondents expressed 24 such experiences. Of these, the rural population expressed equal positive and negative experiences and the urban interviewees indicated 12 positive and only half of that (6) negative experiences. Thus, it could be said that the interviewees from a rural background relied on outside sources for their choice of discourses. On the contrary, the urban individuals who might have formed their opinions from personal experience.

6. Usage of codes categorised by professional/class/socio-economic background

Those from lower economic income backgrounds (e.g. working class background) appeared to be predominantly negatively opinionated. They were employing C codes, 3 times more often than the higher income (middle class) background respondents. On the contrary, the A-codes were predominantly used by interviewees from a middle class or higher income background. Despite B codes being predominantly used by respondents with a farming background, B codes were more evenly employed across all professional income/class socio demographic backgrounds. In the Graph 5.5 below (W) stands for working class background, (MC) for middle class, and (F) for farmers.

5.5 Usage categorised by Professional/Class Background



The above results can partly be explained by the socio demographic profile of the respondents group. Politically, farmers predominantly supported the ÖVP, subsequently the outstanding B code usage amongst them could be explained. This can be viewed as a result of the traditional feature of 'Lagermentality' also, through which farmers are traditionally strongly linked to the ÖVP. The ÖVP traditionally forms a platform for the rural population with 10 times more support from rural population than for other parties (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000; Plasser *et al.,* 2000).

The SPÖ supporters were predominantly of middle class background and that in turn could explain the high usage of positive codes amongst the middle class. Despite the middle class not being the traditional support group of the SPÖ, according to 'Lagermentality', it is argued that middle class support for the SPÖ on a national level could be described as average and corresponding to middle class support for other parties (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000; Plasser *et al*, 2002, p. 139).

The majority of working class background interviewees, using the negative C discourses exceptionally strongly, were also supportive of the FPÖ in the case study sample. In terms of the case study sample, this could be viewed as an indication of the correspondence of discourses exhibited by the political parties (in this case the FPÖ) and the regional actors.

However, it is significant to point out, firstly, that working class support for the FPÖ and in turn their usage of negative discourses contradicts the principles of 'Lagermentality'. Traditionally, the working class was the main support group of the SPÖ, and not of the FPÖ. This is a sign of the breaking up of the traditional 'Lagermentality'. Pelinka & Rosenberger (2000, p. 139) argue that presently, particular working class background people are supporters of the FPÖ, in comparatively higher numbers than supporters for other parties. However, this has to be viewed in the light of the 1999 general election, when the FPÖ gained the largest support ever. Political scientists argue that the FPÖ received exceptionally high support from working class people in the 1999 elections[54]. It was argued that this was as a result of dissatisfaction with the SPÖ-ÖVP governmental alliance and Haider's charismatic slogans (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000; Plasser *et al*, 2002).

[54] This study however does not investigate voting behaviour, still it this voting behaviour was considered essential in this particular

Secondly, however, despite the switch of voting support, this could also be a sign of a continued 'legitimacy' in Weberian terms. Working class supporters, who changed Lagers and supported the FPÖ, might have felt more protected by the FPÖ agendas. In more detail, the SPÖ traditionally protected the working class, but possibly the working class might have felt threatened by foreigners in regard to competing for jobs or 'wage dumping'. They felt somewhat neglected by the SPÖ in this agenda, and felt more protected by the FPÖ agendas in this matter. This could be a sign of the fact that regional actors support and legitimate specific agendas or discourses they find worth legitimating, and not necessarily the type of domination exercised by a political party. Charismatic domination exercised by the FPÖ by way of 'threat' discourses might not have been the reason for legitimation of the FPÖ by the regional actors. Rather they might legitimate the FPÖ for a rational leadership perceived by them. They might legitimate discourses such as 'threat to the Austrian labour market', 'threat to jobs', 'take Austrians first for jobs' due to a rational-legal element perceived by them. This might be taken into account on the basis of the working class feeling threatened in their jobs and hence finding legitimation reasons for a perceived rational leadership which in reality is charismatic leadership.

Alternatively, due to the working class background being often connected to a primary education background, the above generated results could indicate that a lower level of education might lead to the usage of those negative discourses. It could be suggested that the lower level of education leads to the possibility of interviewees being more receptive to external action, such as charismatic political party slogans. Access to higher education levels by the middle class background interviewees and greater intellectual ability then might result in more positive opinions about foreigners, which can be viewed in the next section. Again Jaakkola's (1995) study also revealed that people from lower income backgrounds, are less tolerant than people with high income class backgrounds.

7. Usage of codes categorised by the educational background

In the graph below it can be seen that A codes are mostly used by interviewees with third level education, closely followed by interviewees with a secondary school education. B codes were relatively evenly used, but still dominated by third level educated interviewees, while C codes, or negative expressions, were predominantly used by interviewees with only primary education level. In the Graph 5.6 below (PS) indicates primary school education, (SL) secondary school education, and (TL) third level education.

5.6 Educational Background



In contrast with the above economic background, educational background appears to be strongly interlinked. In this respect, coinciding with the professional income level/class background the results demonstrated that primary school educated respondents gave most negative and least positive portrayals of immigrants. Again this can be explained to some extent by the profile of the FPÖ support group including working class as well as primary educated interviewees, which corresponds to the profile of the voting support groups of the FPÖ on a national basis (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000). The findings correspond with Jaakkola's (1995) study also.

In summary, it could be argued that the clearest determination by socio demographic background was indicated by the political support background of the interviewees. However, other socio demographic features also partially influenced or appeared to determine the preferences for positive, neutral or negative opinions expressed by the interviewees. A codes were given preference by young interviewees of SPÖ, urban, and middle class background. Neutral B codes were predominantly used by ÖVP supporters, and by farmers. Negative C codes were mainly used by FPÖ supporters, elderly people, people of working class background as well as those with only primary education. Furthermore, it could therefore be suggested that in general the political parties are legitimated by the regional supporters. The socio-demographic background of people, as has been explained, corresponds with traditional support preferences for political parties. For example, farmers are traditionally the regional Lager and support group of the ÖVP. One significant element of the generated results was that the working class respondents, a

traditional SPÖ support group, were strongly negatively opinionated, using FPÖ corresponding C codes. However, this coincides with the FPÖ supporters in the sample of respondents being mainly of working class and primary education background.

The previous sections explained the data results in general terms, focusing on the overall usage of codes as well as on the dependence of A, B or C codes according to the socio demographic profile of the interviewees. The next sections gives more detailed description and analysis of the thematic groups, theoretical codes as can be seen in Appendix Six. The extent to which theoretical codes and individual codes correspond with general tendencies will be explored as will significant exceptions in usage and determination by socio demographic background.

8. Thematic groups and usage of codes

Certain thematically related A, B or C codes added together formed the theoretical codes used which, when added together, formed thematic groups. These groups consisted of the allocated codes as well as the theoretical codes, as described in chapter Three and illustrated in Appendix Six. The thematic groups consisted of:

1. 'immigration, labour market and welfare system'
2. 'culture and integration'
3. 'religion'
4. 'identity'
5. 'associations in relations to immigrant
6. 'personal experience'

Each of these thematic groups will be explained in the following section and the theoretical codes forming the thematic groups will be described and analysed by socio demographic dependences.

8.1 Thematic group 'immigration, labour market and welfare system'

The theme consisted of several subsections: codes and groups of codes which expressed positive opinion towards immigration (A2-A18); codes expressing neutral ideas (B3-B11) and those summing up negative opinions (C2-C19). Those codes formed several theoretical codes explained in greater detail in the following sections.

In sum the C codes within this thematic group were used 66 times, the B codes 49 times, and the A codes 76 times. This indicates that amongst the 33 interviewees, the majority of discourses expressed were of a positive nature and pro immigration, with anti immigration expressions following.

Corresponding to the above overall data results, the political support feature appeared to have most impact on the choice of codes: SPÖ supporters used A codes 61 times, the ÖVP supporters used B codes 31 times, while C codes were most often used by the FPÖ supporters (49 times). On the other hand, the A codes were used only 10 times by the ÖVP supporters and 5 times by FPÖ supporters; B codes were used 9 times each by SPÖ and FPÖ supporters. C code usage was highest by FPÖ supporters (49 times), used only 9 times by SPÖ supporters and 8 times by the ÖVP supporters. Such patterns coincide and correspond with the overall tendencies of the study, and indicate how political elites and the regional everyday sphere correspond strongly within this thematic group also. This is illustrated in graph 5.7.

5.7 thematic group immigration-usage of codes by political party support



Regarding other socio demographic features, in the overall total usage of codes for this thematic group no outstanding gender distinctions exist. However, minor age factor dependent usage of discourses could be observed. In this respect, older people exhibit a higher usage of negative codes than younger people (39 C codes as against 27 C codes), whereas younger people use more A codes (46) compared with only 30 used by older interviewees. In terms of rural and urban differences, urban discourses are concentrated within the positive codes (64 times). On the other hand middle class discourses are distinctly positive, while working class discourses are clearly negative, interlinked with the primary educated being most negative and the academics being most positive. Thus, this thematic group's tendencies correspond with the overall results of the study, as described earlier.

8.1.1 A codes in this thematic group 'immigration, labour market and welfare system'

The group of positive expressions in this thematic group consisted of the following theoretical codes.

NEED IMMIGRATION
BENEFIT FOR THE LABOUR MARKET
BENEFIT FOR THE WELFARE SYSTEM
RIGHTS AND DUTIES

As seen in Appendix 6 and above the first theoretical code 'need for immigration' includes all positive and pro immigration codes (A2-A6). This is demonstrated below.

A2	Need immigration, need more immigration, it is ok to open borders
A3	Immigration with some regulations
A4	Need immigration to support pension system
A5	Need immigration for labour market
A6	Need skilled labour migration
=	**NEED IMMIGRATION**

The theoretical code 'need immigration' was used in total 14 times by SPÖ supporters and only once by the ÖVP, while FPÖ supporters did not use it at all. Further, this theoretical code could be described as predominantly used by women, urban as well as middle class background interviewees.

It is significant that women used the code A5 'we need more immigration for the labour market' more often than men. On the contrary, in terms of gender differences, it could be observed that the code 'need immigration, immigration is no problem and ok', is a

predominantly male based code. Therefore (SPÖ and urban) men appear to find immigration necessary, but do not specify the reasons for such an opinion.

The theoretical code 'plus for the labour market' consisting of one code A7 'foreigners do jobs Austrians do not do' indicated that respondents understood immigration to be a benefit for the labour market. This code and the subsequent theoretical code are significant in indicating one of the most frequently occurring codes (13 times). Its particular significance is clear as it is used evenly between all political supporters and other socio demographic backgrounds. Consequently this code contradicts the general tendencies of the overall results of the study. Thus it could considered an uncharacteristic code in its usage.

The theoretical code 'Immigration is a benefit for the welfare system' included codes A8 to A11, which can be viewed in Appendix 6. Discourses claim that foreigners support the state with their taxes, and their work and do not sponge, and that they are therefore a support to the system, rather than a drain on it. Again this theoretical code could be described as an SPÖ discourse (16 times compared to 3 times ÖVP to 1 FPÖ usage), and also be seen as predominantly urban and academic discourse. It is significant that the discourse is used most often by third level educated people.

One particularly remarkable code was identified in this set of codes. The code 'foreigners support the state with taxes when working and therefore support the system' was used solely by SPÖ supporters and by an urban middle class background interviewees. This code and its significance will be analysed in Chapter Six. In terms of a gender analysis it could be argued that the code A10 'no sponging why would they leave home' was used only by men. For example, to give an idea of how the code A10 was expressed:

> DIET: No I don't think they migrate with the goal of sponging money from the Austrian state, I think that is illogical, because I think they leave their home and environment and personal relations, I mean, what they have given up?- and that for a few Schillings paid by the Austrian social welfare system? Well, I think that is laughable.

> DIET: Nein, also ich glaube nicht, dass da irgendwer herkommt mit dem Ziel, den österreichischen Staat auszunutzen, ich meine das ist ja absolut unsinnig so was, weil ich meine, die verlassen ihre (W) Heimat und ihr Umfeld und ihre persönlichen Beziehungen, ich meine, was die aufgeben – und (W) das für ein paar ah Schilling da vom österreichischen Sozialsystem? Ich meine, das ist doch lachhaft.

Or[55]:

ST: Yes, I think they support the social system, because I do not think that they abuse the state and deprive the state of money i think most of them live relatively poorly and have to make sure that they can feed themselves.

St: Ja, ich finde schon, dass sie es unterstützen, weil ich finde nicht, dass die das irgendwie ausnutzen und dem Staat ein Geld ah wegnehmen, ich meine, da leben auch auch die meisten relativ arm und müssen schon schauen, dass sie sich halt ernähren und

I: well, so you think-

I: Also du glaubst –

St: with the children, that is not a financial advantage to them, they are definitely not counting on this.

St: Mit den Kindern, dass da irgendein finanzieller Vorteil ist, auf das sind die sicher nicht aus.

The theoretical code 'rights and duties' consisted of codes A12-A18. This theoretical code expressed discourses connecting immigration and migrants with concepts of rights and duties. SPÖ supporters used this discourse 26 times. No FPÖ supporters and only 2 ÖVP supporters used this discourse. A significant emphasis by SPÖ supporters was put on the 'rights and duties' of foreigners in relation to immigration, the role of the state and foreigners within the state. Further it was expressed that political, and cultural rights should be granted to foreigners. Additionally, discourses expressing that foreigners should be equal to Austrians in legal matters were included. This emphasis on rights and duties by the SPÖ support group corresponds strongly to the discourses of the political party. It further indicates that both the political as well as the regional actors situate their discourses in a legal-rational bureaucratic state apparatus. Furthermore this correspondence suggests that the leadership type exhibited by the SPÖ is legitimated by the supporters. This will however be specifically analysed in the next chapter.

8.1.2 B codes in the thematic group 'immigration, labour market and welfare system'

The sum of all the B codes within this section was made up by the following theoretical codes.

NEUTRAL ON IMMIGRAITON
NEUTRAL ON THE LABOUR MARKET
NEUTRAL ON THE WELFARE SYSTEM
HELP

[55] [I] is the abbreviation for the Interviewer.

The interviewees using these codes expressed a general and not very opinionated view on immigration. In these theoretical codes highest usage occurred within the ÖVP and the third level educated interviewees. The ÖVP support group usage of this code indicates a correspondence between the political elite and the regional micro sphere.

The theoretical code 'neutral on immigration' was used 13 times by ÖVP, three times by FPÖ and not at all by the SPÖ supporters. Again, this response pattern corresponds with the overall tendency of the study, allying B codes with the ÖVP supporters. Middle class people, a comparatively high number of farmers as well as academics and higher educated interviewees used this discourse. Interviewees using this code generally expressed that immigration numbers were acceptable, but should not necessarily increase.

It is worth noting that the code B4 'need certain labour migration and not others' is an exclusively middle class discourse, whereas the code 'immigration should remain as it is' is used predominantly by farmers. Again this could be explained by the middle class urban mind focusing on the labour market and employment. Farmers do not perceive foreigners as connected with the labour market, but rather perceive the concept of immigration in a more abstract way than people in cities who might have daily interaction with migrants.

The theoretical code 'neutral on the labour market', in common with general tendencies for B codes, is predominantly used by ÖVP supporters. This discourse is used by the ÖVP supporters on 8 occasions, and only once used by SPÖ supporters. The theoretical code could also be seen as a male gender biased code with 8 occurrences, as well as being preferred by farmers. It could further be pointed out that the code 'no threat to or impact on the labour market' is not used by any women, but only by men and therefore could be described as a male discourse. Respondents who used this code believed that migrants had no impact on the labour market.

The theoretical code 'neutral on the welfare system' does not exhibit any outstanding socio demographic dependencies. Appearing in total 15 times, the code B7 'some sponge, others don't and Austrians sponge just as much' is one of the most frequently used codes, while the positive counterpart code A10 'no sponging' is used only 6 times in total. It is however significant that the code B7 is used equally by men and women, while the positive counterpart code A10 was used only by men. Contrary to the overall tendencies of this study, this theoretical code is not significantly dependent on political background.

The theoretical codes on 'help' include the opinion that foreigners have to be supported in different ways. This theoretical code was not used by the FPÖ, and only on 3 occasions each by SPÖ and ÖVP supporters, while at the same time being a purely urban, middle class, and academic discourse. Additionally it could be argued that this discourse is clearly not politically determined, and hence is significant as a result of contradicting the general trends of the results. It is used only by middle class and urban academic respondents without the socio demographic feature being connected to a political support group.

8.1.3 C codes in the thematic group 'negative on immigration, labour market and the welfare system'

The C codes within the negative expressions ranged from C2-C9 forming the theoretical code 'against immigration', C10-C16 forming the theoretical code 'threat to the labour market', and C17 - C19 adding up to the theoretical code 'burden on the welfare system'.

AGAINST IMMIGRATION
THREAT TO LABOUR MARKET
BURDEN ON THE WELFARE SYSTEM

The codes mainly express threats and fears perceived by the interviewees in relation to migrants and immigration issues. The subtotal of all C theoretical codes about foreigners illustrate significant usage by predominantly FPÖ supporters, as well as those of working class and primary educational background.

The theoretical code 'against immigration' is dominated by the FPÖ (18 occurrences), while the SPÖ is represented 4 times and ÖVP supporters only twice within this code. The theoretical code can also be described as male, urban and working class, and no discrepancies in educational background could be identified. The individual code 'too much immigration' is a purely FPÖ, male and working class discourse and is significant to note. It is also the one used most often (6 times) and therefore the dominant way of expressing anti immigration opinions.

To give an example:

> PET: 'Well I think the immigration numbers are far too highly pitched, we have too many foreigners here already ah- yes, well that should really,-as I said previously, should be more restricted. We have too many.'

PET: ‚Also meiner Meinung nach ist die Einwanderungszahl viel zu hoch angesetzt, ah wir haben schon viel zu viele herinnen und ah – ja also das sollte wirklich (W) – wie ich schon vorher gesagt habe, viel mehr gesiebt werden. Wir haben zu viele.'

The theoretical code 'threat to labour market' expresses fears that Austrians are disadvantaged in the labour market. This theoretical code could be described as an FPÖ discourse, male dominated, urban and working class. The code C14 'Austrians are disadvantaged in the labour market' is of particular significance, being used mainly by working class background interviewees. Hence, this specific usage could be related to the fears and dependencies of working class people on the labour market. The fear of losing jobs and competing for wages was a concern to this group of respondents.

A FPÖ, but specifically academic discourse, is 'support our people in education so that they can do the jobs'. It is of interest as third level educated persons appear to relate labour market issues and the fears of foreigners taking jobs from Austrians to the subject of education and training facilities for the local population. The code used by third level trained respondents also exhibits a focus on, and appreciation for education as the better basis for labour market competition. For example:

Andi: 'Then Austrians should be encouraged to be educated properly and more highly,...it is not acceptable to say, well, our people do not want to do such and such, and our people do not want to work at such and such, so we have to bring in cheap labour, he [the migrant] can do it.'

Andi: ‚dann soll man halt Österreicher dazu bringen sich ordentlich ausbilden zu lassen und die entsprechenden Berufswahlen zu präferieren, der Markt, ich bin Betriebswirt, wird den Preis regeln, dass das attraktiver wird, diese Jobs zu ergreifen, ah es kann aber nicht so sein, dass man sagt, bei uns wollen die Leute das und das nicht mehr arbeiten, jetzt holen wir irgendeinen Billigen herein, der wird das schon machen.'

The theoretical code 'burden on the welfare system' was exhibited largely by the FPÖ supporters and persons of working class background. Concern about the welfare system and dependence on the state and financial support from the state was of primary importance to the working class. Immigrants were perceived as a threat, or as competitors, possibly taking resources away from the local population.

The code 'foreigners sponge and know how to sponge' was one most often employed, with a usage of 14 times. As in the counterpart codes of 'foreigners do not sponge' or 'foreigners and Austrians sponge' this code was evenly spread amongst all socio-demographic backgrounds. It is significant that the concept of 'sponging' is not socio-demographic background related within this sample of respondents.

On the other hand, one distinctive code of this section is that of 'they are a burden, we do not only want to pay for them' which was used by FPÖ supporters and by women.

8.2 Thematic group 'culture and integration'

The thematic group 'culture and integration' investigated discourses expressed in relation to different cultures and the cultural values of 'migrants'. It further investigated perceptions of the concept of 'integration' within the regional respondents. This theme included codes which were used in relation to the immigrants' culture, as well as to concepts of integration viewed from different perspectives.

The same general tendency is demonstrated again, in that the A codes were predominantly used by SPÖ supporters, neutral B codes by ÖVP and negative C codes by FPÖ supporters. In more detail the A codes were SPÖ, urban, middle class, secondary school and academic background related, the B codes ÖVP, rural, middle class and academic; and the C codes FPÖ, older people, working class and primary education related. The extent to which political support usage of discourse mattered, and how clearly A, B and C codes were determined by different political parties, can be seen in the following chart 5.8.

5.8 Thematic group culture and integration by political support



In terms of the codes, the A codes consisted of positive perceptions of the 'other' culture as well as the perception of integration in terms of multiculturalism, or a mixed form of

multiculturalism and pluralism[56]. The neutral B codes mainly consisted of a neutral judgement about other people's culture as well as being unconcerned or having no opinion. In respect of the B codes, discourses on integration consisted of pluralistic values as well as varying pluralistic and assimilation values; that is, some assimilation in the public sphere, while more or less freedom in the private sphere. On the contrary the C codes described all negative opinions on cultural differences. The concept of integration was understood as a pure form of assimilation in public and private.

8.2.1 A codes in the thematic group 'culture and integration'

The thematic group 'culture and integration' consisted of the theoretical codes illustrated below.

CULTURE POSITIVE
INTEGRATION = MULTICULTURALISM = POSITIVE CONCEPT

The theoretical code 'culture positive' consisted of foreigners being seen as 'no problem, interesting, a benefit, especially a cultural benefit'. Interviewees who used these discourses showed great appreciation and valued immigrant culture highly. The SPÖ supporters used these codes 32 times, with 7 ÖVP usages and only 4 FPÖ examples.

In line with the overall tendency of the study, it has been shown that women use this positive opinion of culture more often than men, and it is significant here that code A24 'mutual cultural benefit' is used exclusively by women. Therefore, it appears that women focus on the mutual exchange of values and cultural features more than men, who perceive it as a one-way issue. The codes A20 'foreigners are no problem' and A23 'culture is of benefit and more would be nice' are notable as purely urban discourse, independent of political or other socio demographic backgrounds.

To give an example of code A23:

[56] For the purpose of this study multiculturalism is understood in the following terms: migrants should ideally practice their culture in public and private to the full desired extent without any limitations; Pluralism is taken to mean that migrants are supposed to assimilate to some extent in public, in terms for example of language, while in private full autonomy is granted. The concept of assimilation is defined as full assimilation in public and private with the host's values and traditions. These definitions were formed based on the range of respondents' discourses about and associations with the concept of integration. For example, different variations of each concept were identified. The usage of the concepts then overlapped in its definitions. As a result the following codes were used: 'multiculturalism'(A30), 'multiculturalism-pluralism'(A33), 'pluralism'(B15), 'assimilation-pluralism'(C33) and 'assimilation'(C32). For example, in the respondents discourse concepts ranged from assimilation in public and in private, but with religious autonomy (C33) to very strong assimilation of almost becoming Germanic (C32).

MGH: 'well, how should I express this, everybody can learn from another culture and, well, mh, can simply see or learn positive things……'

MHG: ‚naja, wie soll ich das jetzt sagen, jeder kann aus einer anderen Kultur lernen und einfach positive Sachen, weiß ich, ahm, sehen oder herausholen.'

FE: 'this [culture] can be an enrichment, and I have benefited myself, because I have experience with foreigners, especially in a relationship, it is a great chance to experience more. If we can recognise and take it. There is a great chance in this- it is not easy, but it is a chance.'

FE: ‚Das kann eine Bereicherung sein, und ich habe selber, weil ich eben ah mit Ausländern Erfahrungen gehabt habe, speziell in der Partnerschaft, es ist eine mords Chance um mehr zu erfahren. Wenn wir diese Chance wirklich – in einer Reife? - erkennen und wahrnehmen wollen. Da steckt eine Chance dahinter – es ist nicht leicht, aber es ist eine Chance.'

On the other hand positive expressions about integration range from 'integration should be a voluntary process without intervention from the state' to 'multiculturalism in Austria should create a positive climate into which to welcome foreigners'. Claims that 'everybody should be free' and 'they should participate in public life and learn the language' were also made. As has been repeatedly demonstrated, these opinions about integration were mostly found within the SPÖ support group, as well as coming from individuals of urban background, middle class and post primary education. Again these codes were not used at all by people with only primary school education, working class people or farmers. The most frequently used code was A29 'integration should happen voluntarily' and 'they should participate in public life' as well as 'we have to offer them something like an incentive' appeared 10 times.

In terms of the concepts of integration, there was a tendency to favour multiculturalist principles or a combination of multiculturalism and pluralism, arguing for total freedom and autonomy of culture in private and public life. The second version of the understanding of the integration perspective was the concept of autonomy in private and public with the stipulation of learning German for the purpose of public communication. However here the respondents argued for voluntary language learning rather than enforced language learning and specifically rejected any forceful or imposed intervention by the state. In that respect the interviewee Krenner agued that:

Krenner:' everybody should be able to live (practice) their culture and traditions'.

Krenner: ‚jeder soll seine Kultur ausleben und seine Traditionen ausleben

8.2.2 B codes about culture and integration

The B codes of this group formed two theoretical codes.

CULTURE NEUTRAL
INTEGRATION = POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE; CONCEPT OF PLURALISM

The theoretical code 'cultural neutral' consisted of expressions by respondents such as B12 'do not care about culture, no benefit no disturbance', or B14 'culture has no impact, or neutral impact'. Corresponding to the general results, B codes were used most frequently by the ÖVP supporters.

This theoretical code of integration consisted of interviewees expressing 'pluralism and compromise, some assimilation in public, autonomy in private' (B15), 'accept them, tolerate them'(B17), 'should learn and speak German' (B18). Integration was linked with the concept of pluralism, cultural freedom in the private sphere and cultural assimilation in the public sphere. A further aspect of integration in this group of people was that German should be learned and used. The discourse of tolerance and acceptance was also part of this theme, mainly in terms of mutual acceptance. ÖVP supporters and farmers were the main users of this code. The code most frequently applied was that of 'pluralism', being used 12 times, and the code 'they should learn and speak German'. This latter was also significant in being used mainly by farmers. For example:

> Aff argues that: 'well, yeah, so that one can speak German, here in Austria, that one can speak German with them and that they also have the will to learn German.'
>
> Aff: ‚schon ah, dass man Deutsch reden kann, in dem Fall in Österreich, dass man Deutsch reden kann mit ihnen und (W) dass sie auch den Willen haben, dass sie Deutsch lernen.'

8.2.3 C codes in the thematic group 'culture and integration'

Two theoretical codes were formed.

CULTURE IS NEGATIVE - A THREAT
FORCED INTEGRATION - CONCEPT OF ASSIMILATION

The expressions in the theoretical code 'culture is negative and a threat' are illustrated below.

	Culturally disturbing
C21	Their culture in public is disturbing
C22	Austrians should not be disturbed by them
C23	Cultural threat, foreigners take our culture away
C24	Their culture will be a problem in future
C25	Foreign ghettos are negative
C26	Turks have an aggressive mentality
C27	Turks have no culture and should go home
C28	Turks are a problem

These codes portray the fear factor, ranging from perceiving a cultural threat, for example, of foreigners taking Austrian culture away, to the problematisation of foreigners' culture. Significant is that the Turks were the only specific group of migrants who were mentioned in relation to a perceived threat to Austrian culture and were seen as a disturbance. Hence, the concept of Islamophobia emerged from within the range of C codes and appears to be of concern to the respondents.

It can be seen that the usage of discourses was dominated by the FPÖ supporters, with 27 occurrences. By contrast they are used only 4 times by the SPÖ group and 3 times by the ÖVP. Significant is that codes C26 'the Turks have an aggressive mentality' as well as C23 'culture is a threat' are both FPÖ and working class discourses. The three Islamophobic codes (C26-C28) indicate a fear of Turks and were used by more women than men, despite the overall theoretical code showing equal usage between either gender. The three codes about culture being disturbing (C20-C22) are used only by men. It can be seen that in terms of gender, the migrants' culture is perceived as a disturbance mostly by men, while women feel threatened by a specific group of Turks. While men associate other cultures with a disturbance factor, women interpret 'otherness' as a threat accompanied by fear.

The problematisation of Turks and the expressed fear of Turks in discourse can be seen in the following example:

> HG argues that:'.....for example, if one looks at a Turk, they have different laws and they are more aggressive, isn't that right?'
>
> HG:'Dann gehört er zu uns, finde ich, weil sobald er das nicht tut, z. B. wenn man Türken nimmt oder was, die (W) haben andere Gesetze und sind aggressiver und so, nicht?'

The expressions in the theoretical code 'forced integration-assimilation' are centred around the concepts of assimilation as well as the need for enforced integration. The concepts of integration by the interviewees were expressed in for example, 'if foreigners do not assimilate they should go home' (C29), 'they have to behave as we do, take up our culture and language' (C30), and 'they should live as we do' (C31). On the other hand, concepts of integration were viewed by way of assimilationist principles, or in terms of a combination of assimilationist and pluralist concepts.

In terms of the socio demographic breakdown with regard to the use of the above codes, substantial characteristics were identified. The theme was FPÖ dominated, having been used 27 times but only 4 times by the ÖVP and 3 times by the FPÖ. In addition, this

theoretical code was mainly used by men, older people, and working class people coming from a primary educational level. This usage pattern corresponds with the overall results in terms of working class people using predominantly negative discourse, older respondents using more negative than positive expressions, and the general usage of negative codes by those with primary education.

One of the codes most often used was that of 'assimilation pluralism' which was used 10 times and expressed desire for assimilation in public and private, but allowing for religion and its practice in private. Only men used codes C34 and C35, requiring foreigners to integrate and learn German. This might be seen as women condemning forceful actions, state intervention and being fearful of integration. The code 'forced language courses' was mostly used by farmers, with working class people solely using codes C31 and C32 (pure assimilation) and claiming that 'they should live as we do'.

8.3 Thematic group 'Religion'

In this thematic group 'religion', the perceptions and expressions by respondents about migrants' religious background was investigated. This thematic group consisted of the following theoretical codes.

RELIGION POSITIVE
RELIGION NEUTRAL
RELIGION BEING A PROBLEM AND A THREAT

8.3.1 A codes 'religion positive'

The theoretical code 'religion positive' ranged from the code A35 'religion is no problem' to A3 'religious freedom', to A38 'respect their religions' to A37 'religion is benefit'. It was used in total 18 times by the SPÖ supporters, 11 times by ÖVP supporters and 6 times by FPÖ supporters. A slightly less significant usage than before in terms of political distinction was identified. Code A35 'Religion is no problem' was used by those with further than primary education. 'Religious freedom' was used most often, 12 times in total. The exception was that the ÖVP usage of A codes appeared to be greater than the usage of A codes by the ÖVP supporters in the other thematic groups. This is significant because it suggests that the ÖVP supporters legitimate the traditional elements of the ÖVP's leadership types. However, this will be analysed in more detail in Chapter Six.

8.3.2 B codes in the thematic group 'religion'

The theoretical code ' religion neutral' consisted of only one code B19 'Religion do not care, no benefit, no disturbance'. ÖVP usage was most frequent (6 times) with an FPÖ usage of 4 times and only once by the SPÖ. No other clear socio demographic dependencies were found and it was notable that this code was used very evenly across all socio demographic backgrounds.

8.3.3. C Codes in the thematic group 'religion'

In the theoretical code 'religion is a problem or threat', the identified codes ranged around concepts of threat, fear, disturbance, problematisation as well as Islamophobia. While Turks were never seen in a favourable light by the interviewees, they did however form a large part of the negative expressions. In this theme, the subtotal of code usage doubles between 4 times in the SPÖ group to 8 times in the ÖVP group, and 16 times in the FPÖ group. It is also important to point out that within this theme, negative opinions about religion are clearly working class related. The discourse most often used was code C40 'Turkish fundamentalism is a problem'. Code C40 'Turkish fundamentalism is a problem' could be described as rural discourse, but C37 'religion is a threat' and C41 'Turks have an aggressive mentality' were both used by respondents predominantly from a working class background. It is surprising that code C38 'Islam is a problem as it suppresses women' was only used by men, even though it might have been expected that it would be women who would criticise this perceived aspect of Turkish culture more than men.

8.4 Thematic group 'identity'

In this thematic group the regional interviewees' views on migrants' relation to Austrian identity was investigated. In this respect, whether 'foreigners' were understood as beneficial to Austrian society and cultural values or perceived as a threat to these was investigated. This theme consists of three theoretical codes.

CONTRIBUTION TO IDENTITY
NO THREAT; NO CONTRIBUTION TO IDENTITY
THREAT TO THE AUSTRIAN IDENTITY

In this thematic group, the A codes were SPÖ dependent, and the C codes were very strongly dependent on FPÖ supporters.

5.9 usage of codes wihtin thematic group identity divided by political support



8.4.1 A Codes in the thematic group 'identity'

The expressions in the theoretical code ' contribution to identity' manifested themselves in the expression 'Austrian identity historically has grown by the diversity of people as a result of the Habsburg Empire or its legacy' (A40). This is very interesting as it is a code connected with Austria's imperial past and will be discussed further in Chapter Six. The code 'cultural merging' (A41, A42) expresses offering favourable opportunities and portraying foreigners as non threatening. This theoretical code is dominated by male, urban, middle class and SPÖ supporters with a usage of 15 times. The most popular discourse was the 'no threat to identity'(A43) code used 13 times in total.

8.4.2 B codes in the thematic group 'identity'

They consisted of the theoretical code 'no threat, no contribution to identity'. This theoretical code was used by ÖVP supporters, farmers and people with rural backgrounds.

8.4.3 C codes in the thematic group ' identity'

The negative codes were dominated by FPÖ and working class. The code most often used was the discourse on 'foreign swamping is a threat' (9 times), of which 7 times it was used by FPÖ supporters.

8.5 Thematic group 'definitions and associations'

This group of codes focused on how respondents defined what is a 'foreigner' for them, and what characteristics they associated with 'foreigners'. The most favoured

interpretation and association of foreigners was the code D1 'foreigners are those without citizenship' (10 times) and conversely, D2 'foreigners are Austrians once they have obtained Austrian citizenship'. That discourse was used 9 times; The interpretation 'foreigners have a different religious background' was used by 10 respondents. Fourteen people claimed that 'foreigners have a different language and linguistic background' and that that is what makes them foreigners, while 13 claimed that foreigners were Austrian if they spoke the language properly.

The concept of defining foreigners as linguistically different was used most often (14 times). The same number of respondents stated that if foreigners spoke even some German, then they would be accepted in society as Austrian. The code D18 'Austrian if they speak language' was predominantly a male view, and in terms of political party background, the codes were spread evenly and did not exhibit any specific political determination with a few exceptions. The exception to the rule was the SPÖ supporters' response and was significant in the use of code 1 and 2. Concepts of citizenship are closely allied with concepts of rights, particularly political rights, and will be considered in Chapter Six. On the contrary, negative definitions of foreigners, expressed for example in D20 and D21, 'foreigners are defined by not assimilating' or 'foreigners will never be Austrians due their birth and genes', was FPÖ dominated.

Further associations and definitions of 'foreigners' were expressed by their 'other mentality' (D8) or by exhibiting other physical and/or cultural characteristics (D7, D12, D13). FPÖ supporters indicated discourses about the foreigner's mentality, assimilation related issues as well as general physical characteristics. The expressions of defining 'foreigners' by another religious background, another cultural background, or other physical characteristics were male based. The codes 'other religion' and 'other looks' as markers of what is foreign was expressed by young people. Crime was associated with foreigners by rural people.

It is significant to point out that the citizenship discourse used by the SPÖ supporters indicates a belief in legal procedures, an administrative apparatus and the enactment of laws. In turn, the legal rational leadership exercised by the SPÖ is legitimated by the SPÖ supporters. On the other hand, the ÖVP supporters used the expressions about foreigners being defined by another religion more often than other support groups. The importance of religion for the ÖVP supporters is in turn an indication of the legitimation of the ÖVP's

traditional leadership. On the contrary, the belief that 'foreigners have another mentality' or 'foreigners can never be Austrians due to their different genetic descent' legitimates dystopian elements and charismatic elements in the leadership of the FPÖ. This will be addressed in Chapter Six.

8.6 Thematic group 'personal experience'

Most people seem to have had positive experiences, and the majority of codes used reflected this. They were used 16 times. Negative personal experiences were recorded ten times. It should be noted however that several people had had both 'positive and negative experiences'. Four ÖVP supporters, only one SPÖ and 2 FPÖ supporters responded in this manner. However, again most negative experiences were encountered by FPÖ supporters, but were little different from the responses of ÖVP supporters.

Six people recorded no personal experiences of foreigners, three from the FPÖ and three from the ÖVP groups. Older people have had more negative experiences. Teun van Dijk's arguments that the media play a role in the shaping of discourses, and that individuals formulate their opinions based on the propaganda portrayed in the media, or by the political elite. This study, even though not representative, contradicts these arguments and demonstrates that personal experiences and contact between foreigner and local, guest and host, influence and shape opinions to a considerable extent, and that their discourses might be dependent on everyday interaction between individuals. In regard to a more qualitative analysis, the next chapter explores the extent to which discourse might be seen in light of personal experience and investigates the importance of socio demographic background and political correspondence.

9. Summary

In summary it could be argued that in all themes, political background of the respondents was of paramount importance. Other socio demographic background features had some relevance, though with less weight than the political support features. The theoretical codes 'plus for the labour market', 'neutral on the welfare system' or 'help' were not determined by the background of the political support. Other features identified were that age did influence the usage of discourse slightly; for the most part, gender did not determine discourses, while positive discourses were often determined by urban background and better education.

C codes were mostly used by those of a working class background and with only primary education. These results can be more clearly understood when combined with the profile of the case study respondents and the political support groups. It could further be argued that personal experience with foreigners also occurs very frequently and might influence the formulation of opinions and expressions about the migrants' groups. This suggests that arguments, such as those of Neo-Marxist schools that regional actors are solely dominated are not validated. Nevertheless, it appears that the political discourses and the discourses of the regional actors correspond very strongly. This is an indication that political parties are not only interdependent with the regional actors, but also that one outstandingly influential factor in the formulation of discourses about foreigners appears to be political support, or political parties. This indicates that, firstly, Parson's outlined theory of the interdependence of different social systems is applicable, but more strongly that Weber's theory of domination and its corresponding legitimation is applicable.

Chapter Six will discuss and lead to a qualitative and in-depth analysis of the respondents' group by political background, analyse their discourse and relate them to correspondences and dissimilarities of discourse between political party and everyday respondents. This will be tied in with a critical discussion of Weber's concept of 'legitimacy' and the legitimation process of domination theoretically discussed in Chapter Two. Chapter Six will test the theories established in Chapter Two.

Chapter Six:

A comparative analysis between the regional everyday and the political elite discourses

The previous chapters facilitated the basis for this findings chapter. Chapter Four investigated the political elites' discourses establishing an application and a validation of Weberian leadership types considered in Chapter Two and traceable in the contemporary Austrian political players based on the discourses about 'migrants'. Chapter Five served as an investigation of the everyday case study and demonstrated how the choice of discourses by the respondents group inter-depended with socio-demographic factors. As indicated in the Introduction, the aim of this thesis was to analyse and investigate in detail the correspondence and dissimilarities between the national elite and regional everyday discourses, as well as to draw conclusions based on those findings. The objective of the project was to critically investigate the extent to which discourses of the political sphere were legitimated by everyday actors. The sample survey sought to investigate whether Weber's developed types of leadership to be found in contemporary Austrian political parties were legitimated, and if so, in what ways. Is a rights-based and legal-rational approach in regard to migration indicated by the SPÖ supporters? Do features such as humanitarianism, tolerance, religion and economics in the ÖVP regional supporters' discourses exist? And if so, will this legitimate the political party discourses? Is the FPÖ in its charismatic propaganda discourses and its traditional views of assimilation legitimated by contemporary regional supporters? Or is there perhaps no legitimation of the political parties at all? These research questions will be addressed in this chapter. The chapter explains the respondents' discourses sampled by their political orientations and in turn analyses the dependencies, correspondences and dissimilarities of the political sphere and the regional everyday spheres, hence the legitimating of political domination. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of the occurrence of the legitimation by the regional actors of leadership types was conducted. Consultation of the Appendices 7 to 9 will illuminate the discussion in this chapter and display interviewees' responses according to their support group.

1. Introduction

The chart 6.1 below shows how discourses categorised by political party support groups are used[57]. While SPÖ supporters clearly favour the positive range of discourses, FPÖ supporters lean towards the negative, and ÖVP supporters are the most ambiguous and spread their discourses more evenly, with a slight preference for the neutral B discourses. The Green Party supporters exhibit mainly positive discourses[58]. In general, this trend corresponds with the usage of discourses by the political parties. In Appendix 9 the usage of discourses by the political support respondents becomes even more visible and transparent. As can be seen SPÖ, FPÖ and Green Party discourses are most transparently situated in the A and C zones of the chart and the Appendix, while ÖVP discourses are concentrated in the B field but also spread within the A and C regions. This could be an indication of the strong correspondence of discourses between the first three mentioned parties and their support groups, and a legitimation of those parties by the regional support groups. However, it could also be an indication of a partial legitimation only of the ÖVP party.

6.1 Usage of Codes allocated by political party Support group



Even though at first sight the trend appears to correspond with that of the political parties, this would have to be analysed in more detail by testing the thematic groups and theoretical codes, as well as the codes themselves. The way in which the discourses and usage of

[57] The total amount of codes used within all thematic groups has been added up for the chart 6.1.

[58] Only 3 respondents have been interviewed for the Green Party support group compared to 11 for each of the other parties. Subsequently, overall a lesser absolute amount of codes was used by the Green Party supporters.

codes corresponds will also be investigated with a specific focus on the occurrence of possibly leadership legitimating elements in the respondents' expressions .

2.0 The SPÖ regional support group

In this section to what extent SPÖ party discourses about 'migrants' corresponded with the discourses of the regional actors was analysed. In theory, in order for the political party to be legitimated in its legal-rational leadership type and rights-based approach regarding migrants, SPÖ supporters would have to have exhibited traditional Austro-Marxist as well as rights-based and legal-rational concepts in their discourse.

The SPÖ political support groups' usage of discourses is mainly situated within the A range of codes, and it can be seen in Appendix 9 that there was a trend for 10 of the 11 supporters to use A codes. Only one supporter [GRH] from this group was the exception to the rule, employing predominantly C negative codes or FPÖ-like arguments. This respondent was of working class background and belonged to the older age group. Two SPÖ supporters ([Steph] and [Diet]) indicated a dual party support, predominantly for the SPÖ, but also for the Green Party. Their discourses were given specific attention to test whether their dual political support became transparent in their usage of discourses.

2.1 Thematic group: 'immigration, labour market and welfare system'

2.1.1 Immigration

With the exception of one supporter ([GRH]) within the theme 'immigration', all supporters agreed that immigration was desirable and that there was a need for immigration. Seven people expressed simply that immigration is needed (A2) while 4 respondents gave the reason that 'we need immigration for the labour market' (A5) or qualified their responses in claiming 'we need skilled labour migration' (A6). One person argued that immigration was needed for the pension system (A4), and one other that immigration is needed but with some regulations (A3). This situating of discourses is strongly reminiscent of the discourses used by the SPÖ party. As is demonstrated in the chart 6.2 below, the trend in the usage of codes corresponds with the political party usage.

6.2 Thematic Group Immigration-SPÖ support group



Despite the general agreement on the need for immigration, only a few respondents indicated legal-rational reasoning for this need, or embedded their discourses in a legal-rational framework. One respondent expressed the argument of immigration numbers having to be regulated, calculated and implemented by way of a quota system for immigration. This can be observed in [RU]'s response:

> '...and - yeah of course, I mean, one does have to regulate this (immigration), somehow- also, so that it will not get out of hand and turn into chaos.'

This particular concern of the interviewee corresponds with the legal-rational situating of discourses by the SPÖ party. Furthermore, respondents believed immigration to be a mechanism for sustaining the future of the Austrian labour market, and identified a need for immigration expressly for this purpose. In the quote below, the interviewee further implies that Austrians have a low rate of birth and need immigration to counterbalance this decline in the indigenous population. Again a rational reasoning for immigration can be observed, as in the interviewee's answer indicated below:

> Cr: 'We need immigration, otherwise in 10 years time (laughter) there will be no one working here, as we will all be too old'
>
> CR: Wir brauchen ja die Einwanderung sonst gibt's eh in 10 Jahren keinen mehr (Lachen) der arbeitet, weil wir alle schon so alt sind,.....

The rational reasoning for the need for immigration as well as the approach to immigration regarding regulations exhibits a sign for the legitimating of the SPÖ by the regional support group. The two non legitimated discourses of the political party are code A21

'right to asylum' and A22 'family reunification', which were not used by any of the supporters.

2.1.2 Labour market

Five supporters agree that 'migrants do jobs Austrians do not want to do any more' (A7). This is not mentioned by the SPÖ, however some respondents believed in migrants being needed for the labour market which is a discourse also used by the SPÖ party. The code is expressed in for example, [We] articulating that there are jobs Austrians do not want to do anymore:

> We: 'there are things that Austrians just do not do, or do not want to do and e.g.- our restaurant keeper, who is looking for a cook or a waiter or something else, he does not get any Austrians (locals), he only gets foreigners, and I hardly think that there are many Austrians, who want to work in the canal system (laughter), yeah, well it is just like that.'

> We: Ich weiß nicht – es gibt Sachen, die machen die Österreicher einfach nicht oder wollen sie nicht machen und z. B. – unser Wirt, der sucht einen Koch oder einen Kellner oder sonst was, der kriegt keine Inländer, der kriegt nur Ausländer (lachen) und ah ich glaube kaum, dass es recht viele Österreicher gibt, die im Kanal herumgraben wollen (Lachen) ja, das ist so.

Unusually in this support group, one supporter used the C16 code 'threat by migrants' being cheap labour', which was used by the SPÖ party (C24). Consequently, the negative discourse by the political party is not legitimated. This is significant because it shows how traditional elements of the SPÖ, such as the protection of the working class, are not legitimated, despite the overall legitimation of the discourses of the party. Nevertheless it could be an indication either of a breaking up of cohesion between traditional Lagers of the SPÖ such as the working class, or it could be a sign of strong legitimation for the SPÖ, due to this discourse being the only non typical SPÖ discourse while typical SPÖ discourses appear to be legitimated.

In chart 6.3 it can be viewed how to the thematic group labour market the SPÖ respondents indicated relatively unusual scattered positive, neutral and negative discourses. Comparatively the FPÖ supporters exhibited the clearest usage of codes.

6.3 Thematic Group Labour Market



2.1.3 Welfare/social system

In terms of discourses about the welfare system, the code 'foreigners do not abuse the system' (A10) is used by the SPÖ as well as by its supporters and is legitimated 5 times. However, five people also argued that 'both foreigners and Austrians sponge' (B7). Discourses therefore corresponded but were also dissimilar, with one respondent the only exception to the general trend, arguing that ' foreigners abuse the system' (C17).

All except one of the respondents agreed that 'foreigners contribute to the state with taxes by working'(A8) and imply this code in its variations. For example [Diet] expresses that:

> 'I think, well, I believe, if foreigners pay their taxes (social contribution –taxes), then one has to also grant them social benefits (pension, health, insurance, unemployment), that is - one cannot let them pay and then not give them anything. Therefore they have the right, if they approach a difficult situation, that one supports them also.' (6)

The above quote indicates very clearly the similarities and legitimation of the SPÖ party and leadership by using a 'rights-based' discourse reminiscent of the Austro-Marxist tradition and of the classic agendas of a state based on social welfare. [Diet] indicates very clearly 'they have the right' based on the fact that they also contribute. This is not just an indication of the traditional Austro-Marxist views reflected, but also an indication for a rights based approach, corresponding to that of Social Democratic party.

The discourse of 'helping the socially weak' (B29 party discourse) was portrayed in similar form from within the support group. Three people expressed this in three different ways, using codes B9, B10, B11, which claimed that the state must afford to help and look after them. For example, [GRA] clearly indicates that work has to be provided for

migrants, that the state is further responsible for organising housing for them; in that respect the respondent indicates that the state has to help, and not hinder migrants:

> GRA: 'that we still organise, -really, well make sure, that they have work, or that we do not hinder them, that they can get access to a flat, ...well, in this respect the state...is responsible.'

> GRA: ‚Dass wir trotzdem schauen – genau, also schauen, dass sie vielleicht eine Arbeit haben, oder dass wir sie nicht behindern, dass sie eine Wohnung kriegen, aber ob sie sich wohlfühlen, oder – also da ist der Staat ..verantwortlich.'

Only one person, [GRH], portrays exceptional discourses, whose responses were mainly from the category of negative C discourses. His background was working class, and primary school educated, and his negative opinions might also be explained by those background features which played a role in the choice and formulation of negative C discourse. In his case political support determination of discourses had less possibly impact than his social background of primary school and working class.

The political code 'Austria exploits foreigners' (A28) was not articulated by any supporters.

In this theme the party was legitimated in the agendas of foreigners working and paying tax, as well as having rights to social benefits. In turn this indicated the legitimation of the legal-rational as well as traditional elements of the SPÖ leadership type by some supporters. The other regional discourses were corresponding in the positive usage of expressions by the SPÖ in general, but did not exhibit any elements of tradition or legal-rationality. In this case it could be argued that the legitimation process was pursued by indirectly corresponding legitimation, or legitimation for other reasons. It might be that the party was legitimated only as it had become a routine to believe in their agendas and possibly reduplicate or alternatively legitimate them regardless. This could be indicative for a continuing Lagermentality, by way of which a party is legitimated out of the traditional belief in them. Based on these findings the legitimation process was not necessarily connected to the corresponding form of domination. For example, it was suggested in Chapter Two that a type of domination could be legitimated for other reasons than the exercised type of domination. It could be suggested that in the findings above rational leadership elements could have been legitimated out of tradition or that traditional leadership elements could have been legitimated out of rationality. Nevertheless, since these two forms of domination appear in a mixed form, it could also be suggested that the legitimation process can occur in a mixed form.

2.1.4 'Rights-based approach'

As mentioned previously, the rights-based approach was a sign of a legal-rational bureaucratic domination which appeared to be legitimated by supporters when focusing on rights to citizenship, rights to political participation and to culture and religion - parallel to the party discourse. This was evident within the SPÖ respondent group in terms of arguing that citizenship defines Austrians and who is Austrian, as well as stating that citizenship should be granted on a '*ius soli*' basis.

Six of 11 people argued for citizenship rights for 'migrants', while 7 of the 11 used at least one of the rights-based codes A12-A18. For example, a typical response by the supporters was:

CR: They are Austrians simply by way of citizenship, Austrian citizenship.
CR: Naja, Österreicher sind sie für mich dadurch, dass sie einfach Staatsbürger österreichische sind.

The rights-based approach also tied in with the Austro-Marxist tradition of legal equality for ethnic minorities in the Empire, as described previously. The SPÖ political party is strongly legitimated, both in its traditional as well as legal-rational elements of domination by the respondent groups' embedment of discourses about migrants within the a legal framework.

Regarding the 2 individuals who supported both SPÖ and Green Party, the following can be said. It is interesting that one supporter [Diet] argued more strongly for the rights of foreigners than any other SPÖ supporter. This is significant because the 'rights based' approach was more strongly implied by the Green Party than by the SPÖ; this could be understood to strengthen the assumption that a strong mutual relationship between parties and the everyday exists; and that political parties are not just legitimated but are legitimated for the specific elements of leadership they exhibit. In turn this could be understood as a verification of a strong cohesion between poltical elites and the regional actors in the specific case of Austria. The other supporter did not show any other differing tendencies.

Overall it could therefore be argued that with one exception, in the thematic group 'immigration, labour market and welfare', the predominant positive A discourses of the political party were correspondingly legitimated by 10 out of 11 supporters. The basic traditional and legal-rational elements of the party's leadership were reflected in the

discourses about foreigners. The focus on the enactment of laws, or the situating of migrants within a framework of rights within the state's bureaucratic administration verifies this. Identified Austro-Marxist traditional elements of domination were also found in the discourses of the everyday supporters, whether focusing on the welfare system or the payment of taxes. However, in some of the codes a general legitimation occurs, not a legitimation of the legal-rational approach, but an overall correspondence of positive discourses. This could be interpreted as a form of legitimation not corresponding directly to the type of leadership exercised.

2.2 Thematic group 'Culture and Integration'

Of the 11 respondents, 10 mainly chose A discourses, with one exception [GRH], who used solely negative C codes, perceiving foreigners as disturbing. The majority of respondents expressed interest in the foreigners' culture, seeing an opportunity in cultural diversity and perceiving such difference as beneficial, even something from which to learn. In addition, three respondents perceived culture as positive, using neutral B code culture expressions. To give an example of the positive usage of codes, 'cultural diversity is a chance' (A21) is expressed by FE:

> 'I would say that it [culture] is a huge chance. One has-... again, if we would learn to understand that, it is a chance.'
>
> ‚Ich würde sagen, es ist eine mords Chance. Man muss –... immer wieder, wenn wir das verstehen lernen würden, es ist eine Chance.'

One important view shared by three respondents was that cultural freedom should be allowed (A25), and allowed to the fullest extent possible within Austrian law. Even though this particular discourse was not found within the SPÖ party, the code again expresses a tendency towards situating discourses within a legal framework. This is expressed by RU:

> 'Yes, I think, there are limits, certain limits, which we have in a state under the rule of (Austrian) law and so, and so then everybody has to obey to those.'
>
> ‚Ja, ich meine, es gibt halt gewisse Grenzen, die wir haben in einem Rechtsstaat und so und die muss halt dann schon jeder einhalten auch.'

A further corresponding discourse 'foreigners have a right to their own culture' (party code A34) can be found within expressions of the respondents' group (A17).

> We: 'no, yes-it (culture) should be seen as interesting and yes-they definitely have the right to cultivate and maintain their culture, this is for sure.'

We: ‚Nein, ja – eher einmal interessant zu sehen und ja – sie haben sicher auch das Recht, dass sie ihre Kultur pflegen, das ist ja ganz klar.'

It could possibly be argued that the codes A22-A26, including mutual or cultural respect, and used by 5 interviewees, are identical to the political party's usage. It is significant that these are also politically shared codes between ÖVP (B35-B39) and SPÖ. The SPÖ expresses these views in the codes B44-B48; for example 'majority and minority demands mutual respect in one state' (B45). [Gra] appears to use almost identical expressions to the political party as indicated below:

'Mutual respect and tolerance , exactly, yeah exactly, we respect and tolerate their culture and they should also tolerate us-well they should tolerate us too…'

‚Ein gegenseitiger Respekt und eine Toleranz genau. Genau, ja. Wir respecktieren und tolerieren ihre Kultur und die sollen aber uns auch – als die sollen uns auch .... ahh –,

Code A34 (SPÖ) which is identical to the code A37 (support group) 'create a positive foreign climate' was used by three SPÖ supporters. The quote below is an identical expression to the SPÖ party and has been described in Chapter Four:

'By all means, we have to establish the basis, by creating a positive foreign climate.'

‚Auf jeden Fall, wir müssen jetzt den Grundstein dafür (W) legen, indem wir jetzt ein ausländerfreundliches Klima zu Stande bringen.'

Despite the overall correspondence of expressions within this theoretical code, it should be noted that the SPÖ party was more rights focused in its discourses than the supporters. The supporters generally expressed themselves positively about culture as a concept in day-to-day interaction, stressing its positive aspects and believing it to be of interest and beneficial. The supporters view culture and other peoples' culture more within an interactional setting to live with and benefit from. On the other hand the SPÖ party perceive culture in terms of its legal and constitutional aspects. However, the legal-rational approach was partly legitimated, and traditional aspects of the political SPÖ party additionally legitimated due to the correspondence of Renner's writing on the appreciation of the equality of ethnic minorities in the Empire as well as appreciation of language (as part of culture).

2.3 Thematic group 'Integration'

All 11 respondents, with the exception of [GRH] who argues for assimilation, exhibit A-positive codes in relation to the concept of integration. However 4 people also used a combination of A and B codes in their responses. Positive codes were used 28 times, B codes 5 times, and C codes only 4 times by the exceptional supporter [GRH]. B codes

were chosen in combination with A codes, hence the majority of supporters (10) used positive codes.

For the SPÖ supporters the concept of integration is dominated by a number of characteristics. Supporters argued that foreigners should participate in public life as such a contribution would be seen as a benefit. Five people stated that 'foreigners should not be forced to integrate but should do so voluntarily' (A29), believing also that foreigners have an interest in integrating. It was suggested that integration should be promoted by the state on a voluntary basis. Of seven supporters, three disputed enforced integration and sanctions imposed by the state (A32). These opinions are strongly corresponding to the political view of the SPÖ. The code A32 'state sanctions are not practicable' is directly corresponding to the political party and legitimated by the supporters. For example:

> 'Well, I mean, like I said, I think it is not a bad thing, if they somehow know the language, because it is better for them, so in principle I think it (the language courses) are good, only the way it is undertaken, by the government, I think is not good, because, well, it is done by way of sanctions and prohibitions, and not, by way of incentives and mutual engagement, well, one should offer them something, yes, something accommodating, so that well, so that it is not such a one sided thing.'
>
> ‚Na ja ich meine, wie gesagt, ich finde das schon nicht schlecht, wenn sie die Sprache kennen irgendwie, weil es ja auch für sie selber besser ist, also das im Prinzip finde ich ja gut, nur die Art und Weise, wie es halt gemacht wird von der Regierung findet ich eben nicht gut, weil (W) ja, weil es eben über Verbote und Sanktionen irgendwie geführt wird und weniger über (W) Gegenseitigkeit und über Anreize. Also es ist weniger – also, ich weiß nicht, ich meine, man sollte den Ausländer auch halt einmal etwas dafür anbieten irgendwie, ja, also dass das ein Entgegenkommen ist, dass das irgendwie, dass es nicht so eine einseitige Sache ist irgendwie.'

Or:

> 'Yes, well, in my opinion, I do not think these exams are useful. That one says, now they have an exam, like in school, but I think, it is simple.- there should be excellent courses on offer and they should take up their opportunities themselves.'
> FE: ‚Ja, aber von so Prüfungen usw. halte ich persönlich nichts. Dass man sagt, jetzt werden sie geprüft wie in der Schule, sondern ich glaube, es ist einfach – es sollte ein tolles Angebot sein, das sollten sie selber aufnehmen lernen.'

Furthermore, it can be suggested that the respondents' choices of argument corresponded directly to the party's orientations, on the topics of voluntary language learning, foreigners wanting to integrate, and mutual respect (A53-A57). The discourse about language being an important aspect of integration and voluntary language learning occurs 5 times. [ST] argues that foreigners will find that it is beneficial for them to have some knowledge of German and indicates that they will be motivated to learn German motivated without having to be forced to learn it. Again this is an identical discourse to the SPÖ party and has been exemplified in Chapter Four:

> St: ..I think foreigners who are working, well, then they are always told there, that they cannot speak German properly, and then I think they try, to learn German. Well, it must be initiated from their side.
>
> St: Es ginge schon mehr, aber ich glaube es bringt generell nicht so viel, ich meine die

> die Ausländer die irgendwo in der Berufswelt tätig sind und ah da erfahren sie dann auch immer, dass sie nicht gescheit Deutsch können und dann sind die glaube ich auch bemüht dran, dass sie das lernen. Also es müsste von ihnen selber kommen.

One important element of possible integration is that 5 SPÖ supporters believe that 'language knowledge is vital in promoting foreigners' integration potential' (A31). Code A31 is very significant as it validates the SPÖ discourses and traditional elements of leadership considering Karl Renner's writings on the theme of bi-lingualism in the Habsburg Empire.

On the other hand, the most favoured concept of integration was considered as a two way concept by the respondents. Two codes were used to support this, 'multiculturalism' (A30) and 'multiculturalism-pluralism' (A33). Respondents who used code A33 believed that integration should grant migrants full autonomy in cultural, religious and other respects, but assimilation in respect to the ability to speak German in public. Six out of 11 respondents use the code A30, 'multiculturalism understood as total freedom of culture', and the same number used A33. Two respondents used both codes, while the remaining four used either one. In total, of the 11, 10 argued for either one or both concepts, while one supporter [GRH] again argued contrary to all others, stating that assimilation is the best concept of integration.

Unlike the political party arguments for integration in practical terms, either on the basis of granting rights or establishing a support structure such as housing access or access to education (A49-50), the supporters did not associate integration as related to those kinds of tangible practical issues, or to issues of rights as much as the SPÖ does. However the general tendencies of the political party discourse were legitimated. Again the party appeared to follow a more rights-based approach while the support group was concerned about the day-to-day aspects of integration. Nevertheless, identical approaches were seen in the emphasis on the voluntary integration approach. This indicates a legitimation of the party which does not directly correspond to the exercised leadership type. Again, the legitimation process could have occurred due to motivations out of tradition of legitimating domination, not corresponding to the exercised leadership type. On the other hand, in this thematic group, the traditional agendas of Austro-Marxism were legitimated.

2.4 **Thematic group 'Religion'**

The theme 'religion' was largely perceived positively by the SPÖ supporters and labelled with A codes. Nine of the 11 respondents chose A codes, or A codes in combination with

others and the remaining 2 interviewees preferred the choice of C codes. In chart 6.4 this can be viewed in comparison to the usage of codes within the other regional support groups.

6.4 Thematic group 'religion'



Most often used were codes (A36) 'religious freedom' (5 people) and (A38) 'respect their religion' (4 times). Four people considered the influx of different religions beneficial (A37). The code 'religious freedom' used by 5 supporters was also the one identically corresponding to the SPÖ party (A59 in the SPÖ discourses). [St] argues that diversity of religions is beneficial to society.

> 'I think it is beneficial, that there are a number of religions (religious denominations) in Austria, ah- I find- ah- it can, it is certainly possible, that in a country there are more religions.- everybody goes their way and I think, partly one can connect that, but one should not be narrow minded on this. Everybody has their own religion and why should anybody be able to say, that only one religion is the right one.'
>
> St: Also ich finde es gut, dass es in Österreich mehr Religionen gibt, ah – ich finde – ah, es kann, es ist durchaus möglich, dass in einem Land mehrere Religionen sind, jeder seinen eigenen Weg geht und ich meine, teilweise kann man es eh verbinden, aber man soll das nicht so eng sehen. Jeder hat seine eigene Religion und wieso sollte man da unbedingt sagen, nur die Religion ist richtig.

Two interviewees [GRH] and [FK] did not use A codes, and chose solely negative opinions, that is [GRH] (C36, C42) and FK (C40). One supporter [Diet] indicated A, B and C code usage and focused on the fact that 'Islam suppresses women'. However, it is significant that the C40 code 'Turkish fundamentalism and fanaticism is a problem', despite its location in the negative discourses, is similar to the SPÖ's code considering general fundamentalism a problem. On the other hand the discourse C40 is fully identical to the FPÖ's discourse on Turkish fundamentalism and on Islam being a problem. In

general, both interviewees claimed that fundamentalist Islam was a problem or that it suppressed women. FK argues that:

> 'all I want to say is that I am against all types of fundamentalism, this has nothing to do with Islam, I am against all types of fundamentalism, and of course also against Islamic fundamentalism.
>
> möchte nur sagen, ich bin gegen jeden Fundamentalismus, hat aber nichts mit Islam zu tun, ich bin gegen jeden Fundamentalismus und natürlich auch beim islamischen,

A code connecting religion and law was used stating that religious freedom was acceptable within the limits of the law. Only one of the respondents used that discourse, indicating the rights and law-based focus legitimating the leadership type of the political party. [Ru] emphasises state rules and laws as boundaries for religious freedom in his discourse:

> 'well I think there are certain limits [to religious freedom], which we have in a state ruled by law, and one has to comply with them.'
>
> 'Ja, ich meine, es gibt halt gewisse Grenzen, die wir haben in einem Rechtsstaat und so und die muss halt dann schon jeder einhalten auch.'

A significant feature of the thematic group 'religion' is that both the party as well as the respondents' group indicated a number of discourses about religion. This result had not been expected due to the SPÖ party not including religion as a prioritised part of its political orientation. Traditionally the SPÖ wanted to split the church and religion from the state and in its traditional orientations is an anti clerical party (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000).

2.5 Thematic group 'Identity'

Ten of the 11 respondents used A positive codes, with the exception of one person who used a B code. One respondent [GRH], who had used C codes in all thematic groups and had provided the exception to the rule, followed the general trend of using positive discourses for this thematic group. There was full agreement in the group on positive discourses about identity of foreigners and the identity impact on Austrian national and cultural traditions. The exceptional interviewee in this case was of rural background, which could explain the B code choice.

The majority of supporters (8) stated that foreigners and their traditions were no threat to Austrian identity (A43). Generally the discourse of 'no threat' (A43) was typically expressed in the following way. [FE] very clearly identifies that he cannot find dangers in migrants' 'other identity'.

> Fe:.... I think this will all sort itself out, and I do not find any dangers, on the contrary, I think, if life arrives and starts, that is a sign that life will continue....

FE: Ja, das ist vielleicht das Extrem und das ist wieder das andere Extrem und ich glaube, dass die ausländischen Kinder, die groß werden, sicherlich auch lernen ahm vielleicht so bei der Geburtenregelung etwas zu reduzieren, und ich glaube einfach, dass sich das von selber irgendwie regelt und ich sehe das als keine große Gefahr, im Gegenteil, ich denke mir, wenn Leben kommt und Leben aufbricht, das ist ein Zeichen, dass immer wieder Leben da ist.

While the political party emphasised the right for migrants to identity, the support group preferred to discuss the impact of foreigners' identity on the Austrian population. On the other hand, the claim that Austria as a nation has historically been enhanced by the diversity of its/her people (A40) is a directly corresponding discourse between one supporter and the party. [OGZ] expresses that Austria is historically a melting pot, subtly indicating the imperial past of the Habsburg Empire. Further he suggests that different groups of people [migrants or minorities or foreigners], with different backgrounds, are still all Austrian.

'Austria would not be Austria if it had not always been a melting pot.....all melts strongly together. Each group has their needs, each lives them according to their own ways, but in principle they are all Austrians.

OGZ: Die Frage ist einfach zu beantworten: Österreich wäre nicht Österreich, wenn es nicht schon immer ein Schmelztiegel gewesen wäre. Damit merkt man eigentlich kaum irgendwelche Unterschiede?, im Gegenteil, mir persönlich kommt es eigentlich fast so vor, als würde die Nuance ....., wenn das nicht international wäre. Das gehört schon fast dazu zum Tagesablauf, da eine Moschee, da eine evangelische Kirche, da eine römisch-katholische Kirche, spielt eigentlich keine Rolle mehr. Das ganze verschmilzt eng miteinander. Jede Gruppierung hat ihre Bedürfnisse, jeder lebt sie eigentlich auf seine Art und Weise aus, aber im Prinzip, sie sind Österreicher.

The above quote strongly indicates a legitimation of the traditional Austro-Marxist leadership elements of the SPÖ. As indicated in previous chapters, they appreciated cultural diversity in a multi-national empire.

2.6 The thematic group 'definitions and associations'

In this thematic group the discourses are not easily comparable with those of the political counterpart. Supporters stated that foreigners were mostly defined by citizenship, and in turn became Austrians as soon as they had gained citizenship status. This could be interpreted as a '*ius soli*' approach, particularly since some interviewees believed that those born in Austria were Austrian. The situating of discourses within a right-based framework corresponds to the political party and its leadership. Furthermore, the concept of '*ius soli*' could be traced in the Austro-Marxist traditions and again a correspondence and legitimation of the SPÖ can be observed. Other associations and definitions discourses included those of four people who defined foreigners by their separate language which could be interpreted as corresponding to the focus on language in the tradition of the SPÖ. Three further interviewees defined foreigners because of another religion, and two others each by way of another culture or different customs. Further to the citizenship status and

becoming Austrian, 2 people also indicated that foreigners would be considered as Austrians if they spoke German. Only one supporter, [GRH] argued for full assimilation of foreigners in order to make them Austrian.

Dual Party supporters:

The two respondents supporting both the SPÖ and the Green Party exhibited no exceptional discourses except for the one supporter indicating a stronger situating of his discourses within a rights-based legal rational framework. As discussed previously this could be an indication of strong cohesions between political party and regional supporters.

2.7 Summary

In summary, the SPÖ support group discourses and the party discourses corresponded very strongly and the supporters', as well as the party specific, usage of codes is situated in the positive A range of expressions. Most important to note is that the legal and rights-based approach of the SPÖ was legitimated by the supporters, while at the same time the traditional aspects of the discourse were legitimated also. Those were legitimated particularly in respect of the focus on bi-lingualism and the expressions about language, in the discourses by respondents about the imperial past, and about the ius soli citizenship approach. Hence Weber's previously hypothesised concepts of a traditional legal-rational approach of the SPÖ, based on historic development of the party as well as on thematic discourses, is for the most part legitimated by the supporters. However, the party was not always legitimated in its specific leadership elements, but more in its overall positive discourses. This could indicate that legitimation might occur but not necessarily for the exercised type of domination or leadership, but for other unknown reasons. For example, the SPÖ might be legitimated out of tradition, or the perceived tradition in their leadership type, even though it might exercise the rational-legal type of domination. Furthermore, this latter result could be explained by 'Lagermentality'. It could be argued that the political orientation and traditional points of view of a specific political party are deeply ingrained within individuals, or that the traditions of the party are specifically legitimated as a result of long-standing 'Lagermentality' and hence loyalty of the supporters. In any case, the latter result of a non corresponding legitimation of a party could indicate at the very least that regional actors are not only dupes who reduplicate discourses of the elites in power, which is argued by neo-Marxist schools of thought, but who are actively legitimating a political party for their own reasons. These reasons might also include for example, the formulation of discourses by day-to-day interaction and personal experiences

with migrants, or alternatively as just indicated out of the traditional belief in a party, or might be influenced by other socio-demographic features of the respondents, such as age, or class background.

2.8 In-depth interview analysis

To support the above argument, a further qualitative analysis has been added. An analysis of an interview with the interviewee [Diet] who supported both the SPÖ and the Green Party has been added below. The translation of the interview transcript can be viewed in Appendix 10.

This interviewee (Diet) a young, urban, male, third level educated, and predominantly an SPÖ supporter but also by his own admission a sometime Green Party supporter.

The interviewee was not clear in his answer to the question of immigration numbers, except to indicate that more immigration would be acceptable, and that the limits had not been overstretched. At the same time he blamed politicians for not acting. It is significant that he attacks politicians in this manner. The reaction might be related to his sometime support of the Green Party as an anti establishment party. Such discourse could hence legitimate the Green Party and its utopian elements. The answer on further immigration being acceptable and limits not being overstretched falls more into the discourses of the SPÖ than the Green Party because the Green Party wants 'immigration to be beneficial for the immigrant', whereas the SPÖ wants immigration to be beneficial to the Austrian labour market also. So overall both parties' discourses are legitimated, but with the SPÖ to a higher degree.

In turning to questions about the labour market and immigration, he relates these topics to the concept of integration and the climate which is created for foreigners in Austria. The reasoning for that is that migrants will be needed in future, but will want to have choice of movement. Diet suggests that Austria must therefore provide a welcoming climate, and positive and encouraging ways for integration in order for people to be attracted and migrate. This idea could almost be seen as a marketing slogan, Austria as a destination for migrants being marketed in a form that people will choose this product and not another one. In this respect the issue of integration is defined as needing the creation of a positive climate, possibly providing scope for a form of multiculturalism. In this respect again the respondent legitimates the discourses of both his supported parties, the term 'creating a

positive climate for foreigners' (A37) being used by the SPÖ, and 'the well-being and benefit of the 'migrants' by immigration' (A19) being a discourse directly corresponding to that used by the Green Party.

On the other hand, the interviewee defined minorities or 'migrants' as 'foreigners' and also talked about 'foreigners' who pay tax. in fact he exhibits a 'we and them' discourse which was not predominant in the SPÖ, who define 'foreigners' as foreign fellow citizens. For a liberal such as the respondent claimed to be, a clear distinction between foreigners and Austrians was drawn, while other interviewees despite the provocative use of 'foreigners' by the interviewer, frequently reminded the interviewer not to use this concept, but rather to use definitions such as 'Austrian of other descent', or 'Austrians by citizenship'.

In respect to the welfare system and related questions, it could be argued that this respondent very clearly indicates, or even in some cases ridicules, the suggestion that foreigners abuse the system, claiming instead that there was so much that they had left behind. Also the concept of rights and help come into play in this setting. The interviewee's belief is that Austrians cannot make demands of foreigners and then not give anything in return. This is connected to the concept of rights. Foreigners have rights, or must have rights, and also must get something in return for their contribution to the host society and should be helped in this. SPÖ like discourses are discernible here. For once, the discourse by the party that 'foreigners do not abuse the system' is directly related and legitimated. Also the discourse on helping the socially weak corresponds (B29). The concept of 'rights' is substantiated by the interviewee's argument that foreigners have rights, even though the interviewee does not clarify what specific rights these might be, but it could be argued that the general concept of rights occurs in his discourse. Hence, his expressions legitimate the SPÖ in its discourses, including legal-rational domination, by using the concept of rights.

In terms of the respondent's support for the Green Party, the utopian anti establishment elements of the party are legitimated, as is the creation of a positive climate for foreigners which appears in both the SPÖ and Green Party discourse. The rights-based approach that appears in the Green Party is legitimated to a lesser degree than the rights-based approach proclaimed by the SPÖ as the Green Party connects its rights-based discourses with the denial of rights for foreigners, whereas the SPÖ argues for rights for foreigners. The tendencies outlined in the overall respondents group were exhibited by Diet also.

3.0 The ÖVP regional support group

Firstly, the support group by itself will be introduced and secondly, compared to the supported party. To identify possible legitimacy of the political party, the following characteristics had to be specifically investigated. The first feature to analyse within the respondents' group was that of an economic focus in regard to the topic of foreigners. Discourses exhibiting traditional values of the political party; humanitarianism, tolerance, humanistic values, ethics and morals, the adherence 'good old customs' or Catholic help were given particular attention. Whether the respondents situated their discourses about migrants in either of the above mentioned frameworks was investigated.

A significant part of the analysis consisted of an attempt to identify FPÖ-like discourses used by the ÖVP in its support group[59]. There was an expectation that if the traditional humanitarian or economic elements were legitimated, then the traditional leadership type could be understood as legitimated and interpreted as inter-dependent to the 'Lagermentality', the traditional loyalty to the party. However, if FPÖ-like charismatic discourse which did occur in the ÖVP party as a possible result of the governmental alliance, as outlined earlier, were even more legitimated, then the regional everyday actors could have been influenced by recent political propaganda and do not legitimate traditional elements of the ÖVP, but legitimate the party for other reasons. Furthermore this result would indicate that supporters are easily influenced and reduplicate political propaganda slogans, possibly being dominated by political elites, as is argued by the neo-Marxist school.

3.1 Thematic group: 'Immigration, labour market and welfare system'

The ÖVP support group discourses were mainly based in the B (neutral) range. They were not as clearly placed in the neutral B discourses as were the SPÖ supporters within the positive A discourses. A small number of ÖVP discourses was also found within the positive A and negative C region. One supporter [Kapp] predominantly indicated support for the ÖVP but also for the SPÖ .

[59] It was indicated in Chapter Four that the ÖVP portrays contradictory arguments and bi-polar discourse and appears to have assimilated some of its discourses with its governmental coalition partner FPÖ.

3.1.1 Immigration

Eight supporters claimed that they had neutral views on immigration (B3) and that 'immigration numbers were at about the right level and further immigration was not needed'. Four of those additionally indicated that 'certain labour migration is needed and other types were not' (B4). One supporter indicated that skilled labour migration was needed while two separate supporters argued for a negative C-code, claiming that 'immigration was a threat due to too high immigration numbers' as well as that 'the borders should be closed to unskilled labour'. For example, the typical discourse (B3) by the ÖVP respondents was indicated by:

> HH: I think it (immigration) at the moment has the right amounts, it is not too many, not too little.
>
> HH: Ich glaube, es hat momentan das richtige Ausmaß, es sind nicht zu viele, es sind nicht zu wenige gekommen.

The discourses corresponded to those of the ÖVP party to some extent. For example, a corresponding discourse was that about the labour market and needing skilled labour migration, as well as the necessity of immigration for the economy and certain other immigration (B10-12, A13-14). Hence the traditional elements of the party were, at least partly, but not fully, legitimated, while the discourses on anti immigration within the party (C4-C9) were also legitimated, but by two people only. This can be seen as an indication of the legitimation of traditional elements of a party more than the legitimation of new elements, such as the charismatic FPÖ slogans. Thus this is an indication also of a continuing 'Lagermentality'. This strengthens the argument that the process of legitimation can be understood as inter-dependent on political domination. In the ÖVP's case, the traditional elements are legitimated, but not the newer recently developed FPÖ-like ones. It could then be argued that this indicated that political domination did not take place, because if it had, then new charismatic elements had to be legitimated correspondingly. Furthermore the above result is an indication that the party is legitimated for one part of its elements of domination, but not for another, as some of the discourses implied by the regional actors were non-corresponding to the political party except for also being neutral discourses. One significant result is that both the political party and support group appear to exhibit contradictory discourses and reflect ambiguity in their choice of

discourses which by itself can be tied to the ambiguity of the type of traditional domination.

3.1.2 Labour market

In terms of the labour market, 4 people thought that immigration had neither negative nor positive impacts (B5). A further four stated that no threat to the labour market (B6) could be identified. In total 6 people argued for the neutral issue on the labour market, 2 implying both discourses, which can be viewed in chart 6.5.



Furthermore, 'foreigners do jobs Austrians do not do' was expressed 4 times. However 'foreigners are a threat to the labour market' (C11) was used only once. The code 'need certain labour migration, and skilled labour' (B4), was used four times by ÖVP supporters, and is identical to the ÖVP code A13. However, it could be argued that the political party in its traditional features of the economy and benefits of immigration for the Austrian economy were not fully legitimated. The supporters used general arguments in relation to labour market issues and did not focus unduly on the economy. For example, the common judgement that 'labour migration has neither a positive nor a negative impact' substantiates this. However, a few respondents used ÖVP party corresponding discourses of the appreciation of skilled labour migration and therefore the party is partially legitimated. The discourses on the perception of threats to the Austrian labour force were not legitimated, as it was indicated by one person only. It appears that a partial legitimation of

the ÖVP can be identified, that is the traditional discourses were in some elements legitimated, while the newly FPÖ-assimilated discourses (C15-C19), such as threat-based charismatic concepts, were not legitimated. Specifically, arguments like 'Austrians fearing job losses' (C17) as well as 'employing Austrians first' (C16), were not taken up by the support group at all. Equally the issue of integration being more important than immigration (B29) was not used by the supporters. Such slogans were popular during debates about the new integration law, but were not transmitted or communicated to the everyday people. Hence, as previously, it could be suggested that the new discourses of the party have not influenced the people, or, that the people did not support or legitimate the party for its popular discourses, but rather, if so, then continued to believe in the traditional political orientational foundations of the party and hence legitimated it for those.

3.1.3 Welfare system

Concerning the welfare system, 7 people think that 'foreigners abuse the system just as much as Austrians' (B7), while the remaining four interviewees indicated that 'they abuse the system' (C17). Amongst ÖVP supporters, the discourse 'they abuse the system' (C17) occurs in total five times. The typical usage of 'foreigners abuse the system just as much as Austrians' is exemplified below:

> HH: I would rather believe that, I think- well one hears those stories again and again, that well, 15 children are listed, well quite possible, I think could be possible, well, but I think, that in Austria there are many, -locals, who know exactly how to exploit the social welfare system., well I think, through all classes, well want to get out of the state as much as possible, well, and definitely- on both sides-in both groups there are people who sponge illegitimately-and well surly there are foreigners who do not ask for certain state benefits due to not knowing about them..-

> HH: Das würde ich eher glauben, ich glaube – ich meine die Geschichten hört man immer wieder – dass, was weiß ich, 15 Kinder angegeben werden und (W) – gibt's wahrscheinlich, das glaube ich durchaus, ah nur ich glaube, es gibt auch in Österreich sehr viele, sehr – Einheimische, die auch genau wissen, wie man (W) den Sozialstaat, ich meine – durchgehend auch durch alle ah Schichten, wie man sich halt vom Staat halt das herausholt was möglich ist, nicht und es wird sicherlich eben auch – ah, auf beiden ah – in beiden Gruppen eben auch Leute geben, die sich Leistungen irgendwo erschleichen oder ahm und wahrscheinlich gibt's eben manche, die halt – da sind sicher bei den Ausländern auch genug dabei die Leistungen aus irgendwas Unwissenheit oder sonst aus – weil sie sich eben nicht so gut auskennen ah, nicht einfordern, also ich glaube da -

On the contrary, the political party expressed its concern that abuse of the welfare system did happen and had to be guarded against(C24). Again this only partially corresponds to the support groups' expressions. The party concept of granting asylum and family reunification (A31, A32, B34, C33) was not taken up as an issue by the respondents at all.

3.1.4 'Help'-discourse

Two ÖVP supporters argued that Austria and her nationals should look after the immigrants and establish a basis for them by organising accommodation and employment (B9), and one supporter stated 'we are well and need to help them' (B11) and that Austria had the potential in the welfare system to help (B10). However despite expectations, the infrequent usage of these codes indicated a non-legitimating of the ÖVP.

It is significant that the interviewee [Kapp] supportive of both the SPÖ and the ÖVP, used the 'help' discourse and by arguing in favour of organising housing and establishing access to welfare, indicated a corresponding discourse to the ethics of the SPÖ regarding their concerns about rights to welfare and housing; that being an indication of strong cohesion of political party and supporters.

3.2 Thematic group 'Culture'

In terms of culture, the ÖVP supporters chose mostly neutral codes; however 4 persons used negative discourses and 6 used positive discourses, which were combined with neutral choices. Nine respondents perceived the culture of foreigners as mostly neutral, or of little importance (B12). Ten of the 11 indicated that culture had neither a positive nor a negative impact (B13). A further three people added that people of different cultural backgrounds would slowly merge with the local population without much impact (B14). For example, [HH] indicates the typical, 'no problem' and 'I am neutral' response of the ÖVP supporters.

> HH: I think, one notices it, but I have to say, I am very neutral, but in principle-well I think, all should in terms of dressing and religion and so on, do their own thing, it is no problem.

> HH: Ich meine, wahrnehmen tut man es, aber ich muss sagen also, da bin ich ziemlich neutral, also das ist mir im Grunde genommen – ich meine, jeder soll da ahm ( ) bekleidungsmäßig oder halt seinen religiösen Verpflichtungen oder wie auch immer, nachgehen können, kein Problem.

ÖVP supporters combined neutral choices of discourses with positive codes of 'cultural merging is positive', 'foreigners are no problem', 'mutual respect', 'cultural freedom' and 'cultural merging is positive and a benefit to the Austrian identity and future'. On the other hand the additional choice of negative codes included the sentiment that Turks were a problem (C28) or that they have an aggressive mentality (C26). These two codes were used by one person only and combined with other codes. Another respondent used the code 'they are a threat to culture' (C23). Adjustment of the education system (A44) was not used by supporters at all.

The ÖVP is only partly, if at all, legitimated by the supporters. More specifically, the political elite discourses of 'the right to homeland within Austria and tradition' (B41-43) is simply not legitimated. The party opinion, like the FPÖ discourses, that 'foreigners are a threat to Austrian identity' is partly legitimated, as 3 ÖVP supporters argued that foreigners were in some form a threat to Austrian identity. However, the majority of supporters did not.

The discourse of creating understanding, respect and humanity towards foreigners (B34-B39), part of the humanistic tradition of the party, has been used three times by two ÖVP supporters, and hence surprisingly the traditional elements of the ÖVP leadership were not fully legitimated. However it is significant that the help and tolerance discourse was used 5 times by SPÖ supporters. In this respect it could be argued that the SPÖ supporters corresponded in their discourses to some of the ÖVP party discourses, and legitimated their non supported party in this. Not only did they legitimate the discourses but they legitimated the ÖVP in their traditional leadership elements strongly, more strongly than the ÖVP support group did.

The one SPÖ and ÖVP supporter [KAPP] exhibited a typical SPÖ positive A discourse argument that foreigners were of cultural benefit; thus the dual party support portrayed itself in the individual.

3.3 Thematic group 'Integration'

Similar to the previous thematic groups, the ÖVP support group discourses were situated within the neutral expressions in the thematic group 'integration'. However, corresponding to the above thematic group some neutral discourses were also combined with positive or negative discourses. Only one of 11 people did not use any B discourses but instead used A and C (RJ). Again, ÖVP supporters are least clear in their opinions and most spread out in the range of discourses. No significant difference could be found in the one respondent who supported two parties, except by his use of one SPÖ discourse of the A region, that is 'integration should happen voluntarily' (A29). Most significant were the use of code B15, 'pluralism', which was used by 9 of the 11 respondents and 'language should be learnt' (B18), was indicated 7 times. C codes of assimilation-pluralism (C33) appeared twice and 'forced language courses' (C34) was used once. In chart 6.6 it can be viewed how regional supporters comparatively exhibited discourses about integration.

6.6 Thematic Group Integration



Seven out of the 11 argued that foreigners should learn and speak German to a reasonable extent. The discourse 'should learn and speak German' (B18) and which occurred 7 times did legitimate the party as it also appeared in the party. However, simultaneously the party exhibited contradictions by arguing the above as well as stating that language courses should be a requirement, so in a way this was legitimated by the supporters also using both concepts. Respondents articulated that the language would be beneficial to foreigners in terms of employment, and that if they want to remain in Austria they would have to learn German. The code of mutual respect was also used by the political party, and by the SPÖs, and used by 1 ÖVP supporter and hence although used not legitimated. The concept of enforced integration 'integration with soft pressures' (C51) was not used, and therefore not legitimated by the supporters. The quote below indicates the perceived requirement that foreigners speak German. It is indicated how the interviewee suggests that language is the main element of integration, as without language, communication is not possible and in consequence living within society is not possible.

> HH: Integrating is to live together somewhere, and that is only possible by talking to each other, and as I said- well
>
> HH: Integrieren tut man sich indem man halt irgendwo zusammenlebt und das geht halt nur über (W) halt ah, übers reden und wie gesagt –

Of the 11 supporters, 9 argued that pluralism was the favoured view of integration, which respondents defined as assimilation within the public sphere and autonomy in private. One person not using any B discourses [RJ] used contradictory explanations for cultural

merging and assimilation/pluralism. Two supporters used the concept of pluralism (B15) and assimilation-pluralism (C33), the second concept including full assimilation in public and the retention of the migrants' culture in the private sphere. For example [He] and [EP] argue that in the private sphere foreigners have full cultural autonomy, while in the public sphere they should be able to speak German. [He] argues:

> well, what they do at home, that is their thing- well and on the other hand it is logical, and understandable, if they want to live and work here, they have to know the language.
>
> He: Genau, die was es privat daheim machen, das ist im Grunde jedem seine Sache –und auf der anderen Seite irgendwie logisch, ich meine, ist auch verständlich, wenn die da wohnen wollen und arbeiten wollen, müssen sie auch unsere Sprache beherrschen und –(B15)

[EP] argues:

> well, what concerns the public sphere, what concerns the work, if they do not assimilate then this[integration] will not work out, because then there will be no integration in this respect, what they do with their religion and culture what they do in their spare time, then they have to sustain and cherish their culture and religion, otherwise they lose their roots.
>
> EP:na ja, was Öffentlichkeit angeht was Arbeit angeht, wann sie sie da net anpassen dann wird des nie funktionieren, weil dann wird's da keine Integration geben, was nachher in ihrer Religion , in ihrer Kultur, was ja an sich in ihrer Freiheit machen, also da müssen erne Kulturen und Religionen pflegen weil sonst, sonst's sans entwurzelt.(C33)

On the other hand RJ indicates the concept of assimilation:

> RJ: well, i think one has to assimilate here, if one wants to live here and if that does not happen then I would have a problem with it.
>
> RJ: Also ich denke, dass man sich hier anpassen muss, wenn man hier leben will und wenn das nicht passiert, dann würde ich auch dagegen Stellung nehmen. (C33)

The code 'integration voluntarily by them' (A29) was used four times by ÖVP supporters, and once by the respondent who also supported the SPÖ. This discourse is reminiscent of the SPÖ and the concept of voluntary integration. Only three people really legitimated the party discourse those who argued for obligatory language courses and assimilation-pluralism. Since the ÖVP promotes mandatory language courses and enforced integration, once again the ÖVP discourses were not fully legitimated, but more legitimated in the integrationist understanding of respondents than in the previous thematic groups.

Again, the supporters only legitimated part of the party's discourse, and similar to the party, were often found spread across the range of discourses, contradicting themselves often. However, no indication of a traditional element of discourse in the support group could be found which might have indicated a legitimating of the party leadership. The only indication for a legitimation of leadership could be the bi-polarity and ambiguity of the

discourses of the respondents. This ambiguity and contradictory usage of discourse was also part of the ÖVP party reasoning and an element of traditional leadership.

3.4 The thematic group 'Religion'

In terms of the thematic group 'religion', the discourses of the ÖVP supporters were again spread between all sections, this time more often in the A region than in the B or C region. The majority of case study participants combined A and B, or B with A and C codes, while no typical code could be identified for the ÖVP group. In chart 6.7 the usage of codes can be viewed comparatively.



Only 2 people used negative codes, while the others used B and C or A and C codes, showing contradictory patterns in the selection of discourses. Only one person solely used A codes, and three others A and B codes. No continuity amongst the group itself could actually be identified. Six participants argued 'religion does not matter' (B19), and usage of 'respect their religion' (A38) was articulated four times. Two people thought religion was a benefit (A37), three implied 'religious freedom' (A36), and a further two claimed that religion was no problem (A35).

Examples of the usage of codes (A37) and (C40) are indicated below. The interviewee suggests on the one hand that religion is a benefit, but on the other hand that fundamentalism is dangerous and frightens him.

RP: Well, I do not think that this is religion, religion is always a parameter for education and behavioural codex, and if those are ones who believe, well all religions do indicate that one has to behave well, I would think religion is a benefit. Well for me it would be too much, for me too much, I think the fundamentalists are the only ones one has to fear.

RP: also ich glaub net das des die Religion is, d Religion is immer ein Parameter für Erziehung und Benehmen, und ob des Gläubige so oder so san, jede Religion schreibt vor dass ma ordentlich sein muss in irgendeiner Form, I würde die Religion da eher gut heißen. Für mich wär's halt zuviel , so fanatisch, wär mir zuviel, wenn noch ein Frage is also die Fundamentalisten seins die einzigen die ich fürchten würde.

The negative discourse of some supporters centred around Islam being a problem, either because of its suppression of women, or because fundamentalism was a problem or because Turks were seen as a problem (C38-C40). Further, these discourses consisted of Islamophobic discourses, twice using fundamentalism (C40) as being a problem, and twice 'religion is a threat' (C37), even though of the four people who used negative discourses two also chose B and A expressions. 'Islam is a problem as it suppresses women' (C38) appeared twice, and only two people used solely negative discourses. An example of the concern about the suppression of women in Islam is indicated below:

RJ: well, I think, if women are suppressed, I think it is bad, well, I think this is a form of suppression, even though it happens voluntarily, well it is something I do think about but it does not influence my life as such.

RJ: Na ja, ich finde halt, wenn ein – wenn Frauen unterdrückt werden, finde ich es an und für sich mal schlecht, also – und ich halte das für eine Form der Unterdrückung, auch wenn es unter Anführungszeichen freiwillig passiert und es ist schon etwas, wo ich mir Gedanken darüber mache, aber es beeinflusst mein Leben nicht insofern.

The ÖVP claims to oppose intolerance and fundamentalism of any kind (similar to SPÖ), in codes (B74) while arguing for religious freedom and the enhancement, protection and development of other religions (A71-A73). Thus, the discourses of the supporters partly legitimated the political party, even though their discourses were very scattered. Respondents' discourses such as 'religious freedom' were identical to those used by the party, and it could further be suggested that the traditional Catholic and tolerant views of the ÖVP were legitimated. However, the ÖVP as indicated in Chapter Four, was focusing surprisingly little on the theme of religion, so despite the legitimation by the few regional discourses, yet, the traditional domination cannot be understood as legitimated.

3. 5 Thematic group 'Identity'

ÖVP supporters were the most widely spread in their usage of discourses by comparison with the other parties. The ÖVP group was, in the main, concentrated in the B field; however participants also chose either positive or negative codes. In total 6 A codes, 8 B and 4 C codes were used. As demonstrated in the graph below, the choice of codes was

spread very evenly within the ÖVP participants' group, compared with a clear spread of discourses amongst the other parties. In chart 6.8 this can be viewed comparatively. Again it is illustrated how scattered the ÖVP respondent discourses are compared to the SPÖ and FPÖ whose discourses are relatively clearly situated.

6.8 Thematic Group Identity



Five interviewees claimed that the Austrian identity was not under threat (B20, B21) either by just arguing that no threat was identifiable (B21, A43) or by adding that cultural merging should be understood positively (A41). Another 7 people (3 use both discourses) stated that either they were not aware of a threat, or that there was none, and made no particular contribution either (B21). There were also claims that the different cultures would merge in any case, but that such a merger would have no impact (B22). In total, 9 persons indicated that no threat to Austrian identity by foreigners was clearly identifiable. For example, EP and secondly [AJ] argues that:

> EP: well, they change and we possibly change, and then something new emerges.
>
> EP: ja, wobei sie de verändern und wir uns vielleicht verändern und dann kommt was neues aussa.
>
> AJ: I think that cultures will merge together and develop, and that has to be understood as positive, because by that- yes, the culture, which does not change dies.
>
> AJ: Ich glaube, die Kulturen werden sich vermischen und weiterentwickeln und dadurch ist das positiv zu sehen, weil dadurch –Ja, die Kultur, die sich nicht verändert, stirbt.

The dual party supporter [KAPP] did not exhibit any specific significant usage of codes.

In terms of connection to party specific discourses it could be argued that the party's viewpoint was based on the concept of safeguarding Austrian identity. This was only legitimated by one participant implying a threat of being swamped by an influx of foreigners.

Overall however, this thematic group was not legitimated as a 'positive perception of cultural influences' or a 'non impacting of others' culture' was mainly claimed by the supporters. furthermore it could be suggested that the FPÖ-alike 'threat' discourses were not legitimated, with the exception of one person only using threat based expressions.

3.6 Thematic group 'associations and definitions'

Six people defined foreigners as those speaking a different language (D3), and 4 people described them as having another religion (D5). On the other hand, 5 people argued that foreigners were Austrians if they spoke German to some extent (D18).

3.7 Personal experiences

In terms of the personal experiences of ÖVP supporters, 5 people had positive experiences, 3 neutral ones and three did not have any personal experience, while 4 had negative experiences. Hence 8 people had experience of some kind. Four people indicated both positive and negative experiences.

Dual Supporters:
In the dual party supporters discourses this dual support was reflected.

3.8 Summary

Overall it could be argued that the SPÖ as a party is much more legitimated in its leadership type and discourses than the centre right party ÖVP. On the one hand the party is for the only partly legitimated in its traditional elements of a focus on economic issues, but only in the thematic group of immigration and the labour market. On the other hand, in discourses about 'identity and migrants', or 'integration and culture', the ÖVP is only partly or not at all legitimated, specifically in its traditional discourse. The party is not at all legitimated in the FPÖ assimilated charismatic discourses with the exception of a few usages of single expression. Hence it could be suggested that overall, long-standing

traditional elements were only marginally legitimated. However, if only the traditional elements of the ÖVP, but not the FPÖ-like charismatic ones were legitimated then it could be suggested that 'Lagermentality' here could play a role, as the supporters might at least marginally have legitimated the ÖVP out of a long-term loyalty to their 'Lager', described in Chapter Two. Furthermore, this finding could indicate that regional actors are not dominated as suggested by neo-Marxist schools, and possibly individuals might also form their opinions based on other external influences, such as for example day-to–day interactions. It is also significant to point out that both the party as well as the support group are the most contradictory groups of this study. Both, but particularly the regional supporters, exhibit bi-polarity and contradictions in discourse, and in their corresponding usage of neutral codes in combination with positive and negative codes show similarities. However, in terms of content, it appeared difficult to judge the legitimation of the party by the supporters. Furthermore, it must be noted that a characteristic of the ÖVP respondent group appeared to favour the use of a neutral or no opinion code on a given topic. Very often they were either 'not bothered' in regard to the content of a given topic, indicating that they could not answer the question, gave little information or decided that the topic was of no relevance in regard to migrants. This could indicate a general crisis of legitimating any political elites and relates to Habermas's arguments of a crisis of legitimacy of political systems and processes outlined in Chapter Two.

3.9 In –depth interview analysis

To illustrate the above better, the following qualitative analysis was included. Transcripts of the two interview sections included can be seen in Appendix 11.

In analysis the following could be said. [HE] was a young, male, rural and secondary school educated, middle class ÖVP supporter. Overall it could be argued that the interviewee seemed hesitant in his answers to the questions, and kept them very short.

In answer to the question about immigration he argued that immigration is needed for two reasons. Firstly, because Austrians do not do certain jobs, and secondly that skilled labour migration (information technology labour force) is needed. In respect of the ÖVP, his second argument of needing skilled labour migration matched with the party discourse. On the other hand he did not legitimate the discourse of the ÖVP arguing that Austria is not an immigration country and that immigration numbers should be decreased.

In regard to the question about social issues and welfare, the interviewee seemed to answer questions that had not been asked. For example, he remarked that he would not like to pay for children who do not even live in the country in spite of the fact that this topic had not been mentioned by the interviewer.

When prompted by asking if this happens, he answered that foreigners sponge and abuse the system, but without giving much explanation for his response. This legitimated the ÖVP discourses which claim that social sponging happens. However this did not legitimate the ÖVP in its traditional leadership type of domination as this discourse could not be considered in any way related to any traditional issues of the party.

In his response to matters of culture and religion, he indicated that he was not concerned as he was not confronted with these issues in his daily life. This indicated a neutral perspective towards culture and religion. In some form this legitimated the ÖVP discourse as the ÖVP stands for mutual tolerance and coexistence; however, since the ÖVP has been influenced by the FPÖ in its discourse, the ÖVP also often indicated negative discourse about the culture of 'migrants'. Similar to the general trend of the complete support group, those newly established party discourses are not legitimated by the respondent. In fact, it could be argued that in all the answers he gives, the traditional perspective of the ÖVP is legitimated, but not the newly developed FPÖ-assimilated charismatic discourses.

The transcript for the interview analysis below with [AJ] can be viewed in Appendix 11. [AJ] is a young, male, urban, secondary school educated ÖVP supporter. He legitimated the ÖVP by arguing for immigration having reached its limits. In this way [AJ] legitimated traditional discourses of the ÖVP. He further argued that immigration should remain as it is and that somehow the immigration quota is slightly too high but tolerable. Here he was contradicting himself to some extent, again a typical feature of the support group and the political party.

On the other hand he argued that he did not care about migrants' culture, and did not see it as a benefit or as a disturbance. He reasoned that as long as no one bothers him with it, or tells him what to do, he was not concerned about what other people do. This coincides with the typical ÖVP support group discourse. With regard to Islam [AJ] considered women to be suffering and suppressed and did not indicate any form of religious tolerance discourse, as portrayed by the political party. In that sense he did not legitimate the ÖVP party who argue for tolerance and religious freedom.

The two examples of ÖVP supporters correspond to the overall results of the case study of the ÖVP support group.

4.0 The FPÖ regional support group

Traditional and charismatic concepts occurring in the FPÖ were tested within the regional support group. These were the pan-Germanism assimilation discourses for traditional as well as charismatic-dystopian elements within the support group and the 'threat', 'fear', 'burden', 'problematisation' discourse as an indication for the legitimation of the charismatic elements. If these were found in the participants' expressions, then the FPÖ would be legitimated. Due to the existence of two wings, a liberal and a conservative traditional one, it could be anticipated that one of those wings might be more legitimated than the other.

Three supporters were identified who indicated dual support, one [Andy] supporting FPÖ and ÖVP, a second [Sigi], SPÖ and FPÖ, and a third [Gu] supporting FPÖ and ÖVP. Their discourses were closely studied. In summary it could be argued that [Gu] and [Sigi] did exhibit dual support discourses, while [Andy] did not.

4.1 Thematic group: immigration, labour market and welfare/social system

In the specific thematic group, negative discourses were used 49 times, neutral discourses 8 and positive A discourses 9 times.

4.1.1 Immigration

In was clear that 10 people had anti immigration opinions which were expressed in different ways. The discourse of 'too much immigration' (C4) was used most often by five people, and some of these added that certain problems and burdens but particularly threats could be seen in immigration. No significant variations of discourse were seen between the three dual party supporters, with the exception of [Gu], the dual party supporter, using one neutral expression of 'needing certain labour migration'. However overall no contradictions occurred in the group as a whole, which strongly emphasised the negative perception of immigration.

For example the most typical and strongest example was Pet:

Pet, in my opinion, the immigration number is far too high, we have far to many in Austria already, and ah- yes, that should really- as I have said before-should be more sifted out. we have too many. Because there are definitely labour market disadvantages for the Austrians.

PET: Also meiner Meinung nach ist die Einwanderungszahl viel zu hoch angesetzt, ah wir haben schon viel zu viele herinnen und ah – ja also das sollte wirklich (W) – wie ich schon vorher gesagt habe, viel mehr gesiebt werden. Wir haben zu viele. Weil es sind schon berufliche Nachteile für viele Österreicher schon gegeben.

Or:

Hel argues that: well i have to say, in my opinion, the immigration number is definitely too high. Far too high, we have in Austria in my opinion, -well what I have to say- foreign swamping can be identified. One can see this in schools, where only Turkish children are placed and Austrian children cannot attend anymore, because they cannot keep the level of education in there, as the Turkish kids cannot speak German well, well and then our children, for whom I pay tax are disadvantaged.

HEL: Also dazu muss ich sagen, meine Meinung ist, sie ist eindeutig zu hoch. Sie ist viel zu hoch, wir haben in Österreich meinem Gefühl nach, ist schon sehr fort – also was ich auf jeden Fall sagen muss, es hat schon eine gewisse ah Überfremdung in Österreich – ist eine Überfremdung schon teilweise feststellbar. Ah man sieht das in verschiedenen Schulen, ah wo eigentlich nur mehr türkische Kinder drin sind und Österreicherkinder können da nicht einmal mehr reingehen, ah weil sie überhaupt nichts und die können nicht einmal das Niveau halten, weil die türkischen Kinder ah nicht gut Deutsch können, da werden unsere Kinder, für die ich Steuer zahle ah, werden hier benachteiligt.

Both interviewees indicate that immigration numbers are far too high and that high immigration is a consequent threat to Austrian society. [Pet] interprets immigration as a threat to the labour market, while [Hel] identifies it as a threat to Austrian society in general, but particularly to institutions of education. Further he identifies the fear of being swamped.

It is significant that the FPÖ claimed that immigration was endangering Austrian culture and that the Austrians' own homeland was being threatened by immigration. It can be suggested that the discourses of the political party and the supporters corresponded. This was implied by corresponding expressions regarding anti-immigration opinions, and the legitimation of the burden and threat expressions by the political party. The party argued for a cessation of immigration and the supporters predominantly perceived immigration and its related issues as a threat. Thus the charismatic problematisation and threat expressions, and in consequence the charismatic part of the leadership, were legitimated by the participants. On the other hand the traditional aspects of the party are indirectly legitimated due to the traditional preference for homogenous societies naturally seeing immigrants as obstacles. This argument was subtly validated by the supporters. However no clear legitimation of the traditional element of leadership could be observed.

4.1.2 Labour market

In this group, reasoning for less or no immigration was often related to the labour market and the perception of a threat to it. Fifteen negative C discourses, no neutral B discourse and 4 positive A discourse 'Austrian do jobs foreigners do not do' were used. Of 11 participants 7 answered with negative discourses indicating a threat to the labour market, a further two did not indicate any opinion with specific regard to the labour market. Positive discourses were used four times. [Andy], the ÖVP-FPÖ dual supporter, implied both positive and negative discourse, an indication for dual support; [Sig] (SPÖ-FPÖ) answered with positive discourse only, which would legitimate her support for the SPÖ, and indicate cohesion between support group and political party.

In more detail, four people argued that foreigners were a threat to the labour market (C11) and combined this discourse with statements that 'foreigners take jobs from Austrians' (C10 used once) or 'we have enough Austrians for the jobs and do not need foreigners' (C12), as well as 'Austrians are disadvantaged in the labour market' used by three respondents. Further it was argued that 'foreigners are cheap labour and therefore a threat' (C16). A typical example of these expressions, indicating the perceived threat for the labour market by foreigners can be seen in the following:

> Pet: well, I am of the opinion, that we have enough Austrian labour force. look at the unemployment statistics, if one gives all those work, and the early pension retirements, well, we do not need foreigners for that, well we can certainly integrate this (our people). And hence, I have to say, there are many foreigners who take jobs from Austrians. Specifically, right now in my second job, as a waiter, well one just has to look at it, everywhere are foreigners who work cheaper, cheaper labour, and they certainly take jobs fro Austrians.
>
> PET: Also da bin ich der Meinung, dass wir genug österreichische Arbeitskräfte haben. Schauen Sie sich die Arbeitslosenzahlen an, wenn man denen alle eine Arbeit und die Frühpensionierungen, die stattfinden, da brauchen wir keine Ausländer dazu, ah die können wir durchaus unterbringen. Und daher muss ich sagen, es sind viele Ausländer die den Österreichern den Job wegnehmen. Und zwar, grad jetzt wieder in meinem Neben – ah Nebenarbeit, die ich da mache als Kellner, ah da braucht man sich es ja nur anschauen, überall sind die Ausländer weil sie viel billiger arbeiten, zu günstigeren Preisen, ah und die nehmen durchaus den Österreichern die Arbeit weg.

It is significant that the above discourse expressed that low skilled labour jobs were taken from Austrians, while the SPÖ respondents see it the other way round, indicating that low skilled jobs are not done any more by Austrians and hence foreign labour was a necessity.

Comparatively speaking, discourses about the labour market were strongly legitimated and corresponded to the FPÖ party discourses. Specifically, codes such as 'wage dumping', 'we have enough Austrians who can do the job' and 'should take Austrians first' and 'too

many foreigners endanger the labour market' (C20-C24) are identical between supporters and political elite. These statements legitimate only the charismatic features of the FPÖ leadership type, but not the traditional or dystopian.

4.1.3 Welfare and social system

In terms of the welfare system in general and discourses of 'sponging', the following feature emerged. Nine of the 11 people interviewed agreed that foreigners did abuse the system and knew how to sponge (A17). Additionally, 3 people indicated that foreigners were a burden to the social system (A18) and four further people indicated that foreigners made demands on the welfare system (A19). The charismatic 'burden' element is clearly legitimated. An exceptional discourse chosen by one supporter claimed that: 'Some foreigners do work and then they pay tax', which is the exception to the rule and indicates a typical SPÖ party and support group discourse.

The quote below indicates expressions ridiculing the foreigner who went on sick leave. The interviewee indicates that the foreigner knew very well that he was purposely abusing the system.

> Aff: well, that is the case with the one who was living in my house, well about a year ago he went into sick leave, well was unemployed or in sick leave, well he knew very well how to do that. Yes.

> Aff: Na ja, das ist eben bei dem einem, den ich in meinem Haus drinnen gehabt habe, der ist wahrscheinlich auch vor einem Jahr, ich schätze einmal acht Monate im Krankenstand, also in der Arbeitslose gewesen oder im Krankenstand, ah der hat das sicher verstanden, wie er das machen muss. Ah ja. Also hättest du da jetzt noch irgendwas zum fragen dazu.

Below [SI] argues that she had been told by a friend who was working in a police station that foreigners are trying to claim extra children's benefits by claiming to have more children than was the case. She indicated that nowadays this was not possible any more, or not so easy as the claimants have to bring the relevant children along. It is significant that she indicated that the source of her information for this and for her opinion was not related to a political party but was based on a friend telling her about these 'sponging' cases.

> SI: Well that was then revealed- yes, and i know somebody at the police registration station, she is in the police force, - well she was really telling me some incredible things. well that with so many children. And then yes, the children have to accompany them, when they get registered- the kids, they have to come along. Well it is not that easy anymore (sponging). Mh.

> SI: Das ist aufgeflogen – ja und ich kenne ja eine die am Meldeamt, die auf der Polizei ist, ja – die hat uns auch so verschiedene Stückeln erzählt. Ja das ist ja das mit den vielen Kindern, nicht. Und dann ja, die Kinder müssen aber mitkommen, wenn sie einen Meldezettel, die Kinder – da brauchen jetzt die Kinder, die müssen da sein. Das geht nicht mehr so leicht. Mh.

However, in general, the majority of participants legitimated the political elite discourses. the regional discourses 'foreigners come to Austria to sponge' (C17) and 'they are a burden on the welfare system' (C18) are identical expressions, similar to political party expressions and of 'sponging has to be challenged', ' they cannot sponge all their lives, and 'they came for the social system' (C33, C32, C29). The burden and problematisation charismatic propaganda was accepted and supported by the regional participants of the case study.

4.2 Thematic group 'culture'

Within the thematic group culture, negative discourses were used 19 times, neutral discourses 4 times and positive discourses 4 times. The negative association and perception of the 'other' culture was thus predominant.

Nine of the 11 expressed negative opinions about culture and only 2 people stressed positive aspects to culture. Three people indicated that a cultural threat existed and that 'foreigners would take Austrian culture away' (C23). In general the FPÖ and supporters' discourses are similar.

Of those 9 people perceiving foreigners' culture as negative, the most popular expression used five times was that 'Turks have an aggressive mentality' (C26). Three participants perceived Turks as problem (C28). Problematisation discourse and Islamophobia occured. An identical code would be 'Islamophobia' occurring in the FPÖ (C56) and in the supporters. Thus, traditional as well as charismatic slogan leadership was legitimated. In the first two quotes below the interviewee connected 'problems' with 'Turks':

> AFF: and that really will go further,- well as far as I know it- it can be a problem- I don't know why- but I think it is connected to the Turks. (C28)

> AFF: Und das geht sicher eher – also die was ich kenne, es dürfte schon eher ein Problem sein, ich weiß nicht warum, aber es dürfte schon eher mit den Türken zusammenhängen.

> Aff: well, religion yes, in regard to Moslems, well Islam will be the biggest problem, because this religion is not really tolerated in Austria.

> Aff: Na ja, die Religion sicher puncto Moslem, also Islam wird wahrscheinlich das größte Problem sein, weil eben die Religion vom Islam eher weniger in Österreich toleriert wird und –

In this quote the interviewee connects 'Turks' with 'danger' and 'crime':

> Anni: yes, and I think that the Turks and so on, the southern types, are more dangerous. Well as people have often said, they stab you with the knive.

> Anni: Ja und ich finde auch, dass die Türken und so, die Südländertypen gefährlicher sind. Wie sie oft erzählt haben, die haben alle ein Messer eingesteckt.

The 'Islamophobia' discourse and dislike of Turks strongly corresponds to the FPÖ party discourses who argue that Islam is a threat to Christian values and the western world. Hence the discourses can be observed as identical.

Two people perceived 'foreign ghettos to be disturbing' (C25), and found 'displays of their culture in public distasteful' (C21).

[Andy] supporting 2 parties, exhibited no difference in usage of codes from the majority of the respondents. [Gu], also a dual supporter, indicated significant differences by using positive codes, of 'finding culture beneficial'. [Sig] demonstrated positive discourses of cultural freedom, which coincides with her support for the SPÖ.

Strong correspondence and similarities between political elite discourses and regional everyday discourses can be identified. The FPÖ argues that foreigners are a problem and that Austrian culture has to be protected (C39, C40, B41-43). These arguments indicated that the foreigners' culture was a threat to the traditional values of the Austrian, in their opinion people of German descent. The supporters legitimated charismatic forms of discourse and in continuation leadership by perceiving threats and in turn indirectly suggesting that Austrian culture should be protected. However, they did not legimtate the pan-German, both dystopian as well as traditional element. So far, only the charismatic characteristics of the FPÖ leadership have been legitimated, but not the traditional, or charismatic-dystopian.

4.3 Thematic group 'Integration'

Twenty seven negative C expressions were used, 5 neutral ones and one positive expression. In chart 6.9 it can be viewed how the FPÖ discourses are clearly situated. Again the SPÖ support group discourses are also situated clearly, however, not the ÖVP ones.

6.9 Thematic Group Integration



Four interviewees indicated that 'German should be spoken and learnt'. Four respondents indicated that 'language courses should be forced upon migrants' The FPO's statements on forced language courses - an important concept in their discourse - are therefore only partially legitimated. The 'forced integration' discourse was only taken up by one person and therefore not legitimated.

In terms of concepts of 'integration', the majority of participants, 8 persons, argued for strong assimilation indicating that 'migrants' should fully assimilate in public and private and take up Austrian traditional values to the fullest' with the exception of religion which they could pursue in the private sphere. Three people argued that if foreigners do not assimilate they should be sent back home (C29), a further three people explained assimilation in that they should live as we do and take up our culture' (C31). As the FPÖ party argues for full assimilation (C51), the party is legitimated in its discourses. In the quote below the interviewee justifies his belief in the requirement of assimilation to the host culture by arguing that Austrians have also to assimilate to other host cultures when not in their own country. He further indicates that they can continue to practise their religion, but he condemns their publicly displayed cultural characteristics, such as clothes. It appears that he is talking about Turkish migrants.

Hel: Well, I have no problems with ethnic food restaurants, that is a contribution. But what strikes me as negative, that is the clothes, well I think, that does not have to- well not all Austrians turn up in the traditional dirndl, or ride Lippizaner, but if I live in Austria, then I of expect, that I do dress like an Austrian. If I am in Saudi Arabia and work there for a long time, then I also have to assimilate. Otherwise they will kick me out or decapitate me. well and I expect it from them, they can carry out their religion, they can have their mosques, with such I have no problem. but if they come over here with their masques and all that stuff- then they do not belonging here. They can do this at home. Or they can stay at home then.

HEL: Also gegen ethnische Restaurants habe ich einmal prinzipiell überhaupt nichts, das ist schon eine Bereicherung. Ah was mir negativ auffällt, das ist die Kleidung. Ah ich meine, das muss nicht – auch wir Österreicher kommen nicht alle mit dem Gamsbart und mit dem Steireranzug ah gehen wir und reiten auf Lipizzanern da herein, aber wenn ich in Österreich lebe, dann erwarte ich mir schon, dass ich mich auch kleide, wie ein Österreicher. Wenn ich in Saudiarabien bin und dort die längste Zeit arbeite, habe ich mich auch anzupassen. Sonst schmeissen sie mich hinaus oder köpfen mich dort. Ah und das erwarte ich von denen auch, die können ihre Religion ausüben, die sollen ihre Moscheen haben, damit habe ich überhaupt kein Problem, aber wenn sie mir daher kommen ah mit (W) ihren Masken und mit ihren ganzen – dann gehören sie nicht hierher. Das können sie zu Hause machen. Oder dann sollen sie zu Hause bleiben.

Assimilationist perspectives are indicated below. Very clearly, the interviewee indicates that 'they' should live as 'we' do. The we and them discourse can also be observed.

Anni: Well, the language and with the Turks, the women. The ones with the headscarf's and they should integrate, they should live as we do if they want to live here. Well I think so.

Anni: Na sicher die Sprache und bei den Türken, die Frauen. Die mit dem Kopftuch und so und die sollen sich halt integrieren, die sollen so leben wie wir, wenn sie da leben wollen. Das finde ich auch.

The following interviewee suggests that if they are not prepared to assimilate to Austrian culture and values, they can stay at home.

PET: Well i think they have to assimilate to our Austrian culture, yes, if they want to live in Austria, then they should take up our culture, otherwise they can stay home.

PET: Also ich meine, sie müssten schon die österreichische Kultur annehmen – Ja, schon. Wenn sie in Österreich leben wollen, dann sollen sie unsere Kultur annehmen, weil sonst können sie ja zu Hause bleiben.

The above quotes indicate the wish of the interviewees for foreigners to assimilate to Austrian culture. In these discourses the FPÖ is legitimated possibly in its traditional characteristics of Austrian nationalism, but not pan-German nationalism. In fact, this would be an indication that traditional elements are partially legitimated, but certainly not any dystopian elements. The only discourse that subtly implies a legitimation of pan-German agendas is that arguing that assimilation also includes migrants changing their name into German names, and can be viewed below:

ML: They have to fully assimilate, from name to everything else.- I would say most of them should go back to where they came from, but one has to make them understand that and make them accept assimilation.

ML: die müssen komplett assimilieren, aber komplett von Namen bis zu allem I würde sie die meisten von ihnen sollen zurückgehen wo's herkommen. aber, der einzige Weg is , daß man ihnen verständlich macht daß nur Assimilation überhaupt akzeptabel ist.

Due to the legitimation of the charismatic leadership elements, but not the dystopian or even traditional ones, with few exceptions, it could be argued that the new charismatic stream of the party is more legitimated than the traditional more conservative pan-German orientated one.

4.4 Thematic group 'Religion'

Positive A discourses were used six times, neutral B discourses 4 times, and negative C discourses 15 times. The discourses were spread most evenly in this theme.

In more detail, three people did not use any negative discourses, while two used only positive and one supporter one positive and one neutral discourse. Four people exclusively used negative discourse.

The codes, 'religious freedom' (A36) or 'religion being of no problem' (A35) were used 6 times. Four people (in combination with other discourse) expressed that they did not care about religion (B 19). Islam was perceived as a problem 8 times, while religion was perceived as a threat or disturbing only four times.

The political party was legitimated due to the supporters' strong emphasis on Islamophobia and the perceived threat from Turkish migrants. As indicated previously, the FPÖ party also condemns the Islamic religion and hence strong correspondence can be observed. This was outlined in the previous section.

4.5 Thematic group: Identity

Negative C discourses were used 28 times, while only 1 neutral B and three positive A codes were used, and this can be viewed in the chart 6.10 below:

6.10 Thematic Group Identity



A popular discourse amongst the support group was the one about 'foreign swamping'. Seven people argued that 'foreign swamping is a threat' (C45) which mirrored the party discourse (C57). Five of those seven identified this 'swamping' as a threat to Austrian national identity (C46). The code exactly matches the FPÖ party's usage (B41, C40). A further four of these correspondents combined usage of the above and argued that there was a 'swamping threat due to foreigners' higher birth-rates than those of Austrians' (C44). This argument was not used by the political party, and is only cited to substantiate the supporters' basic fears of a threat to Austrian identity. The first interviewee argued that foreigners have a higher birth rate and hence eventually he thought that Austrians would be in the minority and their culture swallowed.

> HEL: well a decrease of birth rates in Austrian or by Austrians, that is a problem for me, as you expected. And will one day be very very important, that the foreigners, of they are Austrians, ort stay in Austria long term that they assimilate. That I have said a few times and that really influences us a lot. Because they all can do what these want, there are no limits, well, that means with the birth problems (Austrian only low birth rates) we end up, we already had this point of swamping, foreign swamping. And this should be combated, radically combated.

> HEL: Also ah der Geburtenrückgang in Österreich oder von den Österreichern, das ist wie Sie es richtig erkannt haben, für mich sicher ein Problem. Ah und es wird einmal sehr sehr wichtig sein, ah dass die Ausländer, wenn sie Österreicher sind oder sich in Österreich länger aufhalten wollen, sich bei uns anpassen. Das habe ich schon einige Male gesagt und das beeinflusst uns im Augenblick sehr wohl. Weil jeder kann tun und lassen was er will ah, es gibt da keine (W) Einschränkungen, d.h. wir haben durch diese ah Geburtenproblematik ah kommen wir hin – haben wir schon vorher irgendwann einmal diesen Punkt gehabt – ah das Wort Überfremdung. Und dem sollte entgegen getreten werden, aber entschieden.

This interviewee suggests that in 20 years' time, no Austrians will be left because of the overwhelming numbers of foreigners.

> There are more and more foreigners and Austrians are obviously driven back. I think, that I have said previously, that I think, that in 20 years we will not have a single Austrian left.

> es werden immer mehr Ausländer und die Österreicher werden deutlich zurück gedrängt. Ich glaube, das habe ich vorhin ja auch schon einmal gesagt, dass ich glaube, dass wir in zwanzig Jahren keinen Österreicher mehr haben werden.

In this thematic group corresponding discourses can once again be observed. The party indicates that Austrian culture and tradition as well as the Austrian homeland has to be preserved. This indication of Austrian patriotism is legitimated by the supporters. The situating of these discourses by the FPÖ party within a framework of Austrian and pan-German nationalism is only subtly legitimated to the extent of Austrian nationalism. On the contrary, any traditional pan-German or dystopian elements expressed by the party are not legitimated.

4.6 Thematic group 'associations and definitions'

Six respondents indicated that foreigners had a different mentality, and a further three indicated that they associated foreigners with other looks. Three participants associated foreigners with different physical characteristics. The association of foreigners with 'mentality' and 'physical characteristics' reminds of ideas of blood ancestry and descent to be Austrian as opposed to being foreign. In comparison with other parties, the concept of citizenship defining an Austrian or a non Austrian was not legitimated at all. Six people believed that if migrants spoke German they would then be Austrian, while one person thought if they fully assimilated they would then be Austrian (D20). Two respondents thought that others could never be Austrian as this would be only possible by birth or genetic relation to Austrian ancestors. The last code D23 was very significant. Even though used by only 2 persons, it was still a strong discursive indication of old beliefs in genetic ancestry as well as very clearly an adherence the '*ius sanguinis*' citizenship elements and their legitimation. SPÖ supporters held strong views on the '*ius soli*' concept, which was clearly revealed, and also expressed by ÖVP supporters to a lesser extent. The '*ius soli*' approach was not used by any FPÖ supporters, but instead the '*ius sanguinis*' approach was preferred.

4.7 Personal experiences

FPÖ supporters had the fewest positive personal experiences, only three people of the eleven responding. On the other hand they had the most negative experiences, with 5 of the 11 people describing these. Three persons had no personal experiences, while 1 had a neutral personal experience. This was indicative that the majority of respondents had had negative experiences. It could be a coincidence which influenced the supporters' negative

discourses about migrants, but could also be seen as a negative experience based on negative pre-occupations and opinions. This could be an indication of the partial influence of personal experiences on the formulation of discourses also.

Dual party support:
The same as in the other parties could be observed. Dual party supporters reflected this dual support in their discourses, an indication for a strong cohesion between party and regional actors. And possibly an indication for the existence of a Lagermentality.

4.8 Summary

In summary it could be suggested that modern slogans, the charismatic problematisation and 'burden' discourse of the FPÖ was legitimated more than the traditional elements within the party. Elements of dystopia and tradition, except for a marginal use of Austrian patriotism discourses by the supporters in the FPÖ leadership, could not be traced within the support group, with the exception of the traditional element of assimilation. Nevertheless the FPÖ and its support group exhibited very similar and corresponding opinions which legitimated the party overall very strongly.

4.9 in – depth interview analysis

Below an example of an extract of an interview with one FPÖ supporter and a qualitative analysis will be given to illustrate the flow of his arguments and support the previously outlined approach and discussion. The translated text can be viewed in Appendix 12.

This person [PET] is an FPÖ supporter, primary school educated and working class and a man of urban background.

The interviewee's answer indicated a very clear and straightforward expression about immigration. The interviewee's opinion gave the clear indication that immigration numbers were too high and that too many 'migrants' had entered Austria. In his opinion immigration should be limited. His reasons for this limitation of migration were that 'there are too many foreigners in Austria' and stressed that by making the argument twice. Secondly, he was concerned about the Austrian labour market and the meaning of immigration for Austrians and their jobs. His main concern was that Austrians might be disadvantaged in the labour force and in competing for jobs.

He elaborated on this issue in his next longer answer by indicating that local labour source was plentiful and that no foreign labour was needed. He reasoned for this by arguing that Austrian unemployment levels were rising and by the indication that foreign labour is a threat to Austrians and the Austrian labour market because foreign labour or migrant labour is cheaper. He argues twice that Austrians are deprived of many jobs due to immigration.

In his response negative opinions toward immigration and foreigners in relation to the labour market can be identified. Further it could be suggested that the main fear of this person is a perceived threat of 'foreigners' depriving Austrians of job opportunities and them being cheaper labour. No contradiction in the persons discourse can be identified.

In his discourse the elements of 'fear' and perceived 'threat' occur. This legitimates the charismatic slogans of the Freedom party. However, alike to the majority of the respondents he does not legitimate the traditional and charismatic-dystopian FPÖ elements of pan-Germanism. The subtly implication of 'immigration is too high and should be stopped' also corresponds to the contemporary charismatic political party discourses. He specifically connects this anti immigration discourse to the labour market which the party also does, but to a lesser degree. In fact the discourse on foreigners depriving Austrians of jobs and cheaper labour is a perceived threat and as such very significant. Firstly, the FPÖ correspondingly indicates that no labour migration is required and that the labour market can be covered by Austrian native labour first. Further, they argue that the high unemployment rate does not allow for labour migration without needed qualifications. This argument corresponds to that of the respondent, without focusing on the elements of 'unneeded qualifications'. The party further argues that, 'we cannot let them in if we do not have enough jobs for ourselves', which corresponds to Pet's expressions.

In this respect overall the FPÖ is legitimated in its charismatic leadership elements of fear and problematisation discourses. The one exception was the discourse of 'wage dumping' and foreigners being cheaper labour, a by the SPÖ used code. The interviewee was of working class background and possibly this was the reason for his concern. This is significant as it can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, he could be traditionally by 'Lagermentality' a loyal SPÖ supporter who was in his overall discourses convinced by Haider's charismatic slogans of scapegoating foreigners. Or alternatively, he legitimated

Haider's or the FPÖ's charismatic leadership by almost identical discourses with the exception of the cheaper labour discourses.

In his response to the theme of culture and the other's culture he paid particular attention to the aspect of language, but stated clearly that the public appearance of different clothing or religion does not affect him. This indicated tolerance towards and acceptance of other religions, uncharacteristic of the FPÖ. On the other hand in regard to his focus on language he emphasises on the aspect of communication in his language. The usage of the in and out-group discourse of 'we' and 'them' indicated a marginalizing of the 'foreigner', the 'other'. In fact he refers to the foreigners even as 'this one'. He identifies a threat in regard to language. Then his statement of 'they should behave as we do' really invalidates his previous claims about free clothing and religion.

[PET]'s responses correspond to the FPÖ's political discourses, specifically the FPÖ's expressions that foreigners have to assimilate to the Austrian state. Despite the legitimation of the concept of assimilation, still the traditional and dystopian elements of the party were not legitimated by [PET].

5.0 The Green Party regional support group

Since the Green Party sample only consisted of 3 respondents, the number of discourses was insufficient to allow identification of strong discursive trends, or to compare the group adequately with the other parties. Some tendencies of discourse were however identifiable and hence certain results can be shown.

5.1 Thematic group 'immigration, labour market and welfare system'

5.1.1 Immigration

That immigration is needed in some form was expressed 13 times, a neutral B discourse was indicated 4 times, and anti immigration discourses were not used at all. All three people agreed that Austria needed immigration for the labour market. One respondent argued that borders should be opened. Below it is indicated how [PAV] expresses this:

> Pav: 'well very quickly, I have said that for myself, a while ago for me the principle 'open all borders' ahm, well, was necessary.
>
> Pav: Na, ganz kurz – ich habe ja gesagt, früher für mich war – für mich hat der Grundsatz gegolten, ah alle – Grenzen offen

This particular discourse of 'open borders' could be considered as utopian and as legitimating utopian elements of Green Party leadership.

Furthermore, the political party argued that Austria was an immigration country (A13), that skilled labour migration was needed (A19), and that immigration should be of benefit to the foreigners and not necessarily always to the host (A19). The party discourses were legitimated by being more in favour of immigration than the other parties, as the supporters exhibited strong pro-immigration discourses.

5.1.2 Labour market

Two of the three respondents believed that 'foreigners did jobs which Austrians would not do'. In terms of abusing the social welfare system, all three people claimed that no sponging takes pace, however one interviewee combined this with the discourse that both locals and immigrants sponge. One Green Party supporter also employed the 'help' discourse which could in some form be related to party beliefs as they argue that Austria should provide care and protection and that immigration is of benefit to locals and migrants alike. The equal opportunities views expressed by the Green Party (A24) were not really legitimated by the supporters.

5.2 Thematic group 'Culture'

Green Party respondents predominantly exhibited positive cultural expressions, appreciating cultural diversity and difference. They further believed that future cultural diversity would have a positive impact on society. This corresponded to the Green Party, in that they clearly stated that foreigners should not be stagnating in their culture and become marginalised, but should rather be protected and encouraged to progress (A28). The rights-based approach by the Green Party does not correspond because only 1 interviewee indicated the necessity for political rights by arguing for a more liberated approach to the citizenship procedures.

Exceptional expressions were exhibited by one supporter, who argued that 'Turks have an aggressive mentality' (C26).

5.3 Thematic group 'Integration'

Generally the respondents agreed on a non forced and voluntary form of integration. Furthermore, the respondents' discourses were situated within the understanding of

integration being of a multiculturalist or pluralist nature. The correspondence of discourse can be identified in that the party also argued for a voluntary integrationist approach.

5.4 Thematic group 'religion'

No comparative factors and codes were available as the Green Party had not specifically expressed any opinion in regard to the concept of religion. The supporters preferred concepts of religious freedom (A36) as well as seeing 'religion to be a benefit' (A37). It is significant that two supporters indicated some form of negative perception of the Turks in regard to religion, one arguing that women were suppressed by Islam. Since the statement was made by a woman, its use could be explained by the socio demographic of gender.

5.5 Thematic group 'identity'

The supporters mainly used positive codes, with one usage of a neutral code. Generally cultural diversity was seen as beneficial. On the other hand the party's discourse on the appreciation of hybrid and multiple identities was not adopted by the supporters.

5.6 Personal experience

All three interviewees indicated having had positive experiences with 'foreigners', only one supporter reporting a negative experience.

5.7 Summary

Green Party supporters partly legitimated the party in its leadership and in expressions used. However support for utopian elements was not apparent, with the exception of the discourse on 'open all borders', and support for legal and rational features was very slight. It could be argued that the Green Party was legitimated in its overall discourses, but not necessarily in its leadership features.

5.8 In-depth Interview analysis

Below an example of a typical green supporter: the transcript can be viewed in Appendix 13.

[PAV] was a young, male, urban, Green Party supporting, third-level educated interviewee.

In response to the question about immigration and immigration numbers, he gave clear and liberal perspectives. He stated that the borders should all be open and that immigration to Austria was easier in the 1970s. This coincides with Green Party statements that Austria is an immigration country and the party has argued in the past that borders should be opened. This respondent's discourse could be described as utopian; he later affirmed this in discussion when he thought that his views might not be absolutely realistic. Later in his responses, the interviewee proposed some regulations, not really to limit immigration, rather to provide clearer rules. Again this corresponded with the Green Party as it argues for transparent immigration policies and laws. It could be interpreted that neither the interviewee nor the party stress the legal-rational aspect so much as transparency and clarification of the issues. It could also be argued that this was a tendency towards the SPÖ party, both by the Green Party as well as by the interviewee, due to the discourse on regulations. Nevertheless this interviewee legitimated the legal-rational element of the Green Party with this discourse, which had also been theoretically identified.

Furthermore he argued that immigration was needed due to the declining birth-rate in Austria. This was a discourse indirectly used by the SPÖ and the Green Party, who argued that 'migrants' were needed for the social system and the labour force. [PAV]'s statement that Austrians were dying was utopian in some form, as well as indicative that he subconsciously distinguished between the 'in' and the 'out' group.

The respondent's point of view on the sponging issue was that it can happen; he clearly indicated that the welfare state and social benefits were important to him and that both Austrians and 'migrants' abuse the system in some cases.

This interviewee did not really legitimate the party. Rather he possibly followed the ÖVP's point of view. His preference for a welfare state under any circumstances indicated that he regarded himself and legitimised the opposition parties.

One interesting aspect that emerged was that he shared the same opinion as [diet], the SPÖ /Green Party supporter who argued that foreigners left much behind just to migrate and take advantage of the welfare benefits. This might be seen as pure coincidence or it could be suggested that this was a Green Party specific argument. Even though the Green Party did not directly imply this discourse, concern for the well-being of foreigners (A19), in that

respect the thinking of the benefits. The way of thinking of those two interviewees showed their concern about the other's life and well-being.

This respondent also indicated his welcoming of cultural diversity, identifying it as a benefit. This was a legitimation argument for the Green Party, but could also be identified in the SPÖ, even though neither of the parties directly implied it.

6.0 Comparative analysis of the legitimation of leadership types

In turn a comparative investigation of the features of all leadership types of all parties and their legitimation was comparatively analysed. It was analysed how the support groups in comparison to each other legitimate the political parties. This is illustrated in Appendix 9. For this comparison only the ideal typical theoretical codes were used for an investigation. That is the theoretical code 'rights-based' to compare the usage of this legal rational legitimation approach between the different support groups. Further the theoretical code 'religion positive' was used to compare the occurrence of legitimation of traditional ÖVP leadership features. The theoretical codes 'threat to our identity' and 'assimilation' were used to compare the legitimation of the FPÖ charismatic leadership type. For the purpose of this comparison the Green Party's elements of legitimation were not included as the sample was too small. The elements of the legitimation of (charisma)-utopia and its comparative analysis were not included for the same reason. The element of charisma dystopia was considered by the usage of code D12 'foreigners are foreign due to their birth and genetically descent' and the frequency of its occurrence amongst all support groups.

It can be argued and clearly seen in Appendix 9 that all the codes within the rights-based approach were used only by SPÖ supporters with the exception of three usages by two ÖVP supporters. Hence the belief in legal-rationality and the embedding of discourses about foreigners within a legal rational framework only occurs within the SPÖ support group.

The theoretical code 'religion positive', supposedly indicating the legitimation of ÖVP traditional leadership, is significant. More SPÖ than ÖVP supporters use it. The code occurs 19 times within the SPÖ support group, but only 13 times within the ÖVP group and 8 times within the FPÖ group. This indicates that the SPÖ supporters legitimate the traditional ÖVP features more strongly than the ÖVP regional support group. This could be an indication of a breaking up 'Lagermentality', as traditionally the SPÖ would be anti

clerical, whereas it could have been expected that ÖVP supporters legitimated corresponding leadership types of their supported party. This could also be an indication of the legitimation of a type of domination for other reasons than the exercised type of leadership. If the SPÖ support group legitimates the discourses of 'religion positive', then it might not have been undertaken due to the belief in the exercised traditional elements of domination but out of a perceived rationality in the type of domination. For example, the supporters might have legitimated those humanitarian and religious elements due to their rational belief in the rights of foreigners to their own culture and religion. However, on the other hand this finding is also a reflection of the non-legitimation of the ÖVP by its supporters as discussed previously. Further, it could indicate a Habermas's argument of a general crisis of legitimacy of political elites, systems and processes as outlined in Chapter Two.

The theoretical codes 'assimilation' and 'threat to our identity' were clearly almost exclusively used by FPÖ supporters, indicating a corresponding legitimation and domination between party and regional actors. In fact the assimilation code is only used by one SPÖ supporter and 3 ÖVP supporters. In the case of 'threat to our identity', the FPÖ usage of this code is again very high, indicating its situating of discourses within a framework of threats, legitimating the charismatic leadership of the FPÖ, while only 2 ÖVP and no SPÖ supporter legitimates it.

It could be suggested that this comparison firstly validates the previous legitimation analysis It also indicates that the ÖVP is the comparatively least strongly legitimated party and the support group in which most contradictory discourses occur as indicated previously.

7.0 Model of legitimation

A model of domination within the Austrian political parties and corresponding legitimation or non-legitimation by the respondents' case study groups can be viewed below(6.11). The ways in which different types of domination were legitimated to varying degrees by the respondents and the extent to which small numbers of respondents might also have legitimated elements of domination in parties without support is illustrated. It can be seen how some elements of domination overlap between the different parties. This indicates how different leadership types occur within the parties and how they also overlap with each other.

Further, it is illustrated that the FPÖ was strongly legitimated for its charismatic leadership features, whereas its traditional or dystopian elements were scarcely evident. It is further indicated that the ÖVP is the least legitimated of all the parties and that the supporters either legitimated no party, or also gave credence to other parties' discourses. The ÖVP can be understood as marginally legitimated in its economic and humanitarian traditions. ÖVP respondents often used the SPÖ's discourses but did not legitimate the SPÖ in its rights-based and legal-rational elements. Within the ÖVP respondents group the discourses were most scattered and contradictory. The views of the ÖVP respondents often did not correspond to any political party, and neither did they legitimate any political party. One or two exceptional ÖVP respondents legitimated FPÖ-like charismatic statements, but only in some of the thematic groups. The SPÖ was strongly legitimated in its rights-based and legal rational leadership style. The dual supporters generally reflected this support in their discourses but have not been indicated in the graph. The Green Party was somewhat legitimated by the supporters, at least in the correspondence of discourses. However, it was not legitimated for its elements of leadership, or utopianism, and only marginally in its rights-based approach.



8.0 Conclusion

In conclusion it could be argued that correspondence of discourse exists between political parties and regional supporters. The discourses of positive and negative or neutral expressions correspond in principle. In spite of this general correspondence, the discourses portrayed do not always legitimate the leadership elements of the supported political parties.

The SPÖ is strongly legitimated in its discourses and exercised type of legal-rational and traditional leadership. Overall the respondents group exhibited rights-based discourses which legitimated the legal-rational elements of the SPÖ. They also exhibited views which corresponded to the Austro-Marxist elements within the SPÖ. Despite one supporter displaying exceptionally negative discourses, the majority of the respondents legitimated the SPÖ.

On the other hand, the ÖVP regional support group only partially expressed ÖVP party corresponding discourses. Overall the support group displayed 'not bothered' discourse, and either did not legitimate or correspond to any of the parties, or exhibited corresponding discourses to the SPÖ or occasionally FPÖ. Furthermore, of all the respondents' groups it was the most contradictory in its discourses. More specifically, the traditional elements of humanitarianism of the ÖVP were partly legitimated in some of the thematic groups, while the economic traditional elements of the ÖVP were more strongly legitimated in some thematic groups. FPÖ-like charismatic discourses were only legitimated in very few exceptional cases. On the other hand, positive expressions were also implied, not in an SPÖ leadership corresponding fashion, but in an SPÖ general discourse corresponding fashion.

Furthermore the FPÖ is strongly legitimated in its charismatic elements, being scarcely legitimated in its traditional elements and not at all in its dystopian elements. This could be indicative that supporters had been attracted by charismatic slogans, but had not been influenced by reasons of 'Lagermentality' and traditional loyalty. As argued by Luther (1997) most voters were influenced and impressed by Haider's charisma and slogans, and not by the traditional agendas of the FPÖ.

The Green Party can be understood as partly legitimated in its overall discourses, not at all in its utopian elements, and only partly in its legal-rational elements.

In terms of the general legitimation of political party discourses, it could be suggested that cohesion between parties and regional actors could be observed. Theoretically this indicates a number of conclusions. Firstly, given that a general correspondence between elite and regional discourses exists, Parson's outlined theory of the interdependence of different social systems is applicable. However, Weber's theory, as indicated in the theory chapter is more applicable due to the detailed account he gives about the different types of domination and their strong corresponding applicability to the Austrian elite and regional sphere. On the other hand, the results of this study could also be tied in with the continuity of the 'Lagermentality'. It might be that the parties were legitimated only because it had become routine to believe in their agendas and possibly reduplicate or alternatively legitimate them regardless. Based on these findings, the legitimation process was often but not necessarily connected to the corresponding form of domination, which indicates that it is possible that domination can be legitimated for other reasons than the exercised type of leadership. Furthermore, the fact that the dual party supporters appeared to exhibit dual support in their discourses is a further sign of a continuation of the Lagermentality system.

Additionally, it could be argued that overall, despite their correspondence of discourse to the supported political parties the respondents were certainly not dominated by them, or solely reduplicated elite discourses, as suggested by neo-Marxist or Marxist frameworks. This is indicated by discourses, such as those of the ÖVP supporters which did not correspond to any political party. Subsequently, it could further be argued that some of the discourses not explained by correspondence to a political party or support group might be the result either of traditional 'Lagermentality', or alternatively, of opinions based on personal experience or other influences, such as socio-demographic background factors. An indication for the formulation of discourse by personal experience might be that respondents often viewed thematic groups from a day-to day interactive perspective rather than from a political (party) perspective. The socio-demographic background influences have already been outlined in Chapter Five. The non corresponding discourses between parties and support group could also indicate a general crisis of legitimation of political processes, systems and elites, as indicated by Habermas and explained in Chapter Two.

Based on the above findings and conclusions, future research recommendations can be suggested. A case study with a larger sample of respondents to test the hypothesis further

could be carried out. A large scale representative quantitative study with national random sampling in order to produce representative results could be commissioned.

Chapter Seven

A Conclusion

In summary, it has been shown that based on recent immigration waves to Austria, consisting of 'guest-worker' migration, or the post Iron Curtain migration waves, the topic of 'migrants' has become hotly debated in public and private spheres. Political elites and regional every day actors have taken up the debate concerning 'migrants' with a multitude of opinions and expressions.

The aims and objectives of this thesis consisted of investigating firstly discourses about 'migrants' in Austria in different spheres, specifically the national political sphere, and secondly the regional everyday actors' sphere. Based on these discourses the aim of the thesis was to compare the discourses occurring in the two spheres and to illuminate correspondences and dissimilarities. A further aim was to trace Weber's theories of domination and legitimacy in the Austrian political climate as well as apply them to the Austrian political parties and the regional everyday sphere. Additionally, a new type of domination was developed, as a fourth ideal typical form of domination. In consequence the theories of domination and legitimacy were applied and critically investigated on the basis of the findings of political discourses and everyday discourse. The interdependence of the political elite and regional everyday sphere was investigated, both on a theoretical as well as on an empirical level. Within the regional micro sphere, other socio demographic factors possibly determining the choice of discourse were tested. With its aims, objectives and findings, this project contributed in an original way to the field. Firstly, it combined classical sociology with political sociology and the field of ethnic and racial studies. Secondly, it looked at the topic from a majority rather than from a minority perspective. Thirdly, despite the existence of opinion polls about 'foreigners' in the regional micro sphere, as well as the political parties' popular and commonly known propaganda, the project is original in qualitatively analysing discourses about 'foreigners' within the two spheres in a comparative investigation of this kind. Based on the generated findings, the application and testing of Weberian types of domination and legitimacy, and theorising about the Austrian political system, were further contributions to the field.

On a theoretical basis, the following could be suggested about the Weberian theory of domination and legitimacy and different ideal typical types of domination. Weber firstly identifies the interdependence of state and social micro structures by arguing that

domination is exercised by the political macro sphere which in turn has to be legitimated or is legitimated by the regional everyday actors, the 'governed'. Weber identifies three pure types of domination and legitimacy. These are the legal-rational, the traditional and the charismatic pure types. These describe traditional domination, consisting of rule by old traditional customs, and possibly religious sanctity, in which the leader is legitimated by belief in these forms of portrayed leadership. This leadership is often the sum of routinisation and old customs which are legitimated by the everyday actors. Traditional leadership is the most ambiguous, often exhibiting a tendency to employ legal aspects of leadership, but which overall could be characterised as fairly stable. On the other hand, the legal-rational type is based on domination by legal rule, bureaucracy and pragmatism, while the supporters' beliefs legitimate this form of leadership through trust in rational enactment of the law. The charismatic type of domination is that in which one leader usually rules by virtue of his charismatic personality; charismatic domination can also, however be institutionalised and include a routine. Charismatic domination is the most unstable, flexible and dynamic and is usually only effective in the short term. Weber also argues that mixed forms exist in which every leader would have to exhibit some form of charisma. Further to Weber's ideal types of domination and legitimacy, the fourth ideal typical leadership type, the utopian/dystopian, emerged. This type is connected to charismatic domination describing a form of leadership which is guided by utopian ideas, that can either end in provocation, fanaticism or chaos. Its counterpart can be seen in the dystopian leadership type, a type of leadership promoting and hoping to reinvent the same fanaticism or utopias that have failed in history; for example, previous regimes that have already existed, but which have failed.

In focusing on tracing and situating Weber in the Austrian political climate, his theories appeared to have been most applicable as the Austrian system which can be characterised by a 'Lagermentality' and 'Proporzsystem', both of which indicate strong and inflexible interaction between political parties and the micro sphere. For example, the proportional representation of political party representatives in the micro institutions of society, as well as the cohesion between a political Lager and its support regional Lagers is akin to an identity formation amongst the population, and indicates strong interdependence between political elites and the people. However it is significant to mention that the 'Proporzsystem' and 'Lagermentality' have been crumbling recently according to Austrian political scientists (Plasser & Ulram, 2000, 2002; Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2000). The Pedersen Index shows that since the 1970s, when Austria's voting patterns fluctuated least

and there was stronger support for the Lagers, today only 50% of supporters remain of the traditional loyalty voters. Subsequently, previously characterised as a 'konkordanzdemokratie' (concordance democracy), Austria has recently become more of a conflict democracy. (Plasser *et al*, 2002). Habermas (1973) predicted that when the period of steady economic growth came to an end, and increasing economic difficulties were imminent, a crisis of belief in late capitalistic societies and governmental systems was to be expected. It has been shown that changes are taking place including changes in the political system of Austria and its legitimation by the local population. This could be a result of the possibility of having reached economic and political saturation points. Due to the correspondence of concepts of 'Lagermentality' and 'Proporzsystem' to the concept of domination and legitimacy, it was critically analysed whether and in what form Weber's different types of domination were be found in the Austrian political sphere and their legitimation was investigated.

If Weberian theories are applied to Austria and situated in a contemporary Austrian political framework, then in theory the following hypothesis can be established. Contemporary Austrian political parties must carry out and exhibit forms of leadership types. If based on theory, it could be argued that the SPÖ could be filed under the legal-rational, but also traditional leadership type; traditional in that every party carries traditional orientations within it in the sense of historically traditional, or in Weber's sense, old routines. The SPÖ hence carries legal-rational aspects in it due to its bureaucratic and administrative pragmatism and agendas situated in a rule bound manner. This is so not only due to the agendas of the Austro- Marxists which indicate both the legal-rational aspect for the SPÖ as they are situated in legal-rationality, but also because the party maintains an element of tradition, being the old historical philosophical basis of its agendas. The ÖVP could be situated in the traditional-traditional range because of its ties with Catholicism as well as the traditional (in historical terms) focus on economy. The FPÖ is rooted in the charismatic–traditional leadership form, partly due to the recent success of the charismatic leader Haider, who uses discourses of problematisation, scandal and scapegoating as charismatic tools. Additionally, the FPÖ can also be understood as carrying elements of dystopia (in form of the old traditional beliefs in a leadership that failed) in its leadership. The Green Party could be considered utopian-(charismatic) and legal-rational; utopian as some of the agendas expressed carry shocking and provocative elements of an anti-establishment party emerging from one of its founding wings, and

legal-rational because the other founding wing of the party was interested in situating their agendas within the existing legal system.

Different methods were used to analyse and investigate the aims and objectives of the thesis. These were content analysis interconnected with grounded theory and open coding. Firstly, a qualitative analysis of the parliamentary debates and party manifestos of all four main political players was conducted. A case study with 37 (36+1) respondents from the regional everyday was carried out and respondents were interviewed using the technique of semi structured interviews. A complex coding system was developed (see Appendices 1-9), in which codes used by the different political parties and codes for the everyday sphere were identified. The material was divided into three basic types of codes, specifically the A positive, the B neutral, and the C negative range of codes. These formed the basis for the formation of the following thematic groups, with theoretical codes in both the macro and micro spheres. The thematic groups included 'immigration labour market, welfare system', 'culture and integration', 'religion', 'identity', 'personal experience' (micro sphere) and 'definitions and associations' (micro sphere). A comparative analysis was conducted of (a) the micro sphere case study of social demographic influences of different background factors on regional everyday discourses; (b) the four Austrian political players, and (c) a qualitative analysis of the micro regional discourses divided by political support in order to analyse the correspondence or dissimilarities of political and regional discourses. The study can however by no means be understood as representative owing to the small size of the sample.

In terms of the findings and data results generated from the study of the discourses of the political elites, it can be seen that Weber's developed concepts were situated and validated within the findings.

The SPÖ exhibited rights-based and traditional Austro-Marxist concepts about foreigners in its discourses. The primary focus, discursively expressed mainly in the A codes, was firstly the identification of the need for immigration for several reasons. The protection of 'migrants' and the granting of rights to them was enforced. The rights-based approach demonstrated itself in the emphasis on migrants' rights and their well-being, including rights to tradition, culture, language, access to housing and the labour market as well as the welfare system. This was also the way in which integration was understood. The rights-based approach revealed discourses situated within legal-rational boundaries of a

bureaucratic administrative state apparatus. The basis for this can be identified in Austro-Marxism. Traditionally, Austro-Marxists, such as Karl Renner and Otto Bauer focused on the diversity and appreciation of ethnic minorities within the Habsburg Empire, arguing that only with their acceptance by law could the Habsburg Empire have a chance of survival. Today's positive, welcoming and appreciative discourses about 'foreigners' could be interpreted as rooted in the writings of Austro-Marxists, who form a political orientational basis for the SPÖ. Correspondingly it could even be argued that general (Austro)-Marxist principles of fighting for working class rights has now been replaced with the new rightless 'class', the new migrants, in fact the fight for migrants has replaced the fight for the working class. Today, the SPÖ situates the topic of 'foreigners' within a rights-based as well as legal approach, including the traditional elements of Austro-Marxism.

Mainly, the focus of the ÖVP's discourse is directed towards the general well-being of Austrians and the Austrian state, that is in regard to benefits for the economy, understanding 'foreigners' and skilled labour as an economy tool, or in regard to the protection and securing of Austrian identity and homeland. However at the same time, still, the expressions of tolerance, respect, understanding and humanistic values and ethics are used to situate discourse within a humanitarian humanistic framework. For example, there is a focus on respect and appreciation of the others' identity and culture. Additionally some usage of legal and rights-based discourses occur. This concentrates on the rights for Austrians to have their homeland protected. Strong focus on the economy indicates traditional elements of leadership, as does the situating of discourses within the humanitarian tradition. On the other hand the focus on the homeland and the Austrian identity indicates the element of 'practising good old customs' being a component of traditional leadership. The usage of rights based discourses can be understood as a sign of the ambiguity of traditional leadership which in theory also exhibits legal rational elements. On the other hand the ÖVP exhibit some bi-polar contradictory discourses, in respect of partly showing new FPÖ-like discourses which can possibly be seen as a result of the governmental alliance and the influences of the FPÖ on the ÖVP.

The Freedom Party, the most right situated party in the political spectrum, predominated in the negative range of discourses. It was theoretically anticipated that the FPÖ was a charismatic traditional party, according to Weber's features of leadership style and domination. Further the FPÖ was also interpreted as exhibiting elements of charismatic-

dystopian leadership. Freedom Party expressions about migration and 'migrants' ranged from hostility and rejection to the many ways in which migrants might pose a threat or burden for Austrians. These included aspects of reassuring Austrians in terms of labour market issues and identity, highlighting fears as a result of overwhelming immigration numbers. Migrants were additionally associated with being a burden on the Austrian welfare state. FPÖ discourses strongly supported the use of the indigenous labour force to make up deficiencies in the labour market; also a higher standard of education for Austrians in order for the them to obtain a better positions and jobs. Foreigners were identified as threats to the labour market, culture and homeland of Austrians as well as Austrian identity which in some way was subtly equated with a pan- German idea and belonging to a pan-German nation, despite presently emphasising the Austrian nation and nationalism. These pan-German arguments in turn indicated a belief in assimilation strategies, the discourses exhibiting a tendency by the FPÖ to assimilate 'migrants' to the Austrian way of life. These aspects in themselves explain and validate theoretically established arguments. The charismatic elements of the party can be identified in Haider's charismatic populist slogans of threat, scapegoating, and fear- mongering. The traditional, but also charismatic-dystopian elements, can be seen in the discourse on identity and assimilation to German culture, the pan-Germans vs. the foreign identities, which could also be interpreted as the *'ius sanguinis'* citizenship approach. The above discourses indicate the charismatic and traditional and also intermingled dystopian leadership approach. However, in the charismatic-dystopian elements, the charismatic was exhibited much more strongly than the dystopian elements. Further, the flexibility, sudden success and instability of charismatic leadership is also demonstrated by the mixed fortunes of the FPÖ whose success diminished further in 2002 after early re-election.

The Austrian Green Party, the youngest of the parties, also used mainly A positive discourses and focused more strongly on the well-being of 'foreigners' than the SPÖ. For example the citizenship rights and rights-based approaches were very important, as was the desire for full equality for 'foreigners'. It was indicated that bi-lingualism and making a home for them were important issues for 'migrants'. Most importantly the Green Party was the only political party which mentioned appreciation of hybrid and multiple identities. The party could be considered (charismatic)-utopian, with utopia dominating charisma, - since the charismatic elements had decreased by way of institutionalisation of the Party over the years -, and rights-based in its orientation and discourse.

In a quantitative follow-up count, the key concepts of leadership as described above were comparatively counted and validated the qualitative analysis. Leadership types were identified in a cross-comparative analysis. Furthermore, the political party discourses were compared to each other because a number of overlapping codes existed. The party discourses were then situated on a left-right continuum scale, illustrating their changeable nature or overlapping positions within a left to right spectrum.

In terms of oppositional and governmental factions, besides continuity in discourses throughout the differing debates and centuries it can be seen that the centre parties which were formerly in a coalition government, are now linked to extreme parties and in discourse appear more assimilated to the far end of the left-to-right continuum scale. This can be observed in the discourse scales. While the Green Party and the FPÖ as the extreme left and extreme right parties appear to stagnate in being situated at the furthest extremes of the spectrum showing continuity in discourse, the centre right ÖVP has assimilated to its governmental partner FPÖ, and the SPÖ has assimilated to the Green Party. Yet in the SPÖ the traditional Austro-Marxist and rights-based principles are still prevalent while the ÖVP appears to have changed its discourse in some way. The religious and humanitarian focus appears to have lessened while the economic focus has gained, and in respect of 'foreigners' the relatively negative discourses appear in a predominantly assimilated version to that of the FPÖ. Yet, traditional elements still exist, but are found mainly in long-standing manifestos, while in the parliamentary debates the discourses have assimilated to the Freedom Party. In terms of Weber, it could even be argued that the diverse leadership types could also be situated in the left-to-right continuum spectrum. For example, the legal-rational and the traditional types in the centre, with possible legal aspects related to centre left, and traditional to centre right, while charismatic and utopian/dystopian leadership styles have tendencies of extremism, which ties in with the instability and recent sudden effective successes of opposition parties, whether of left or right origin. Furthermore, the theoretical elements of dystopian or utopian leadership are ascribed characteristics of short-term success and serve as 'triggers' for change. The existence of these elements in extreme positioned parties is therefore not surprising.

The discourses of the regional actors were analysed firstly by socio demographic influences on the interviewees' background. The purpose of this was to outline and test whether socio demographic factors such as age, gender, political support, class (professional income background), educational background and rural or urban background

factors contributed to or influenced discourses of the everyday about migration and 'migrants'. This part of the case study identified the frequency and usage of codes in order to see the impact of the different socio demographic features. This was tested by overall usage of codes, the theoretical codes and their usage as well as for the exceptional and significant single codes which were identified in the data material. The overall results of the study revealed that the gender factor did not have any significant impact on the selection of codes. Also within the diverse thematic groups as mentioned above, gender did not have any effect, the usage of codes between men and women being evenly spread. In terms of age background, minor variations were identified; however in the overall study, the result was very even. It could possibly be argued that young respondents exhibited slightly more positive opinions than older respondents, while in turn older interviewees exhibited slightly more overall negative opinions. In terms of rural or urban background, it was shown that urban discourses were formulated more positively than rural ones, while it also emerged that this was possibly a result of the profile of the sample of respondents or the higher personal interaction level of urban dwellers with migrants. In terms of class (professional-income), the working class background respondents exhibited significantly more negative discourses than the middle class or entrepreneurs (farmers). This could be seen in light of the working class being attracted to Haider's charismatic slogans, but also by feeling let down by their traditional protector the SPÖ and being concerned about competition for labour and wages with migrants. From an educational profile perspective, it could be argued that the higher the educational level, the more positive the discourse. Primary educated people, often belonging to the working class group of respondents, demonstrated the greatest number of negative discourses. Most important was the finding that the political support group background mattered most and revealed the strongest result in the choice of positive, negative or neutral discourses. In all thematic groups, except for a very few minor theoretical codes, political support was the most significant feature. In fact the results of the political support groups clearly demonstrated that the SPÖ support group used the greatest number of positive A discourses, the ÖVP used B codes most often, and the FPÖ negative ones most frequently. Even though not representative, this might be indicative that the support 'Lagermentality' still exists. Despite not having tested the voting behaviour which has changed and reveals more floating voters, and instead testing for the traditional political orientational lager support of the respondents, it could be argued that a strong correspondence between political party support and everyday people still prevails.

The discourses of political parties and their respective support groups at first appear to correspond strongly in the choice of discourses regarding the use of positive, negative or neutral expressions. However in a more detailed analysis, a qualitative approach was used to establish similarities or differences. What the findings revealed about the concept of the legitimation of political domination and the previously established leadership types was investigated. To what extent and in what ways the leadership types had been validated and legitimated was analysed.

It could be argued that for the SPÖ support group, A codes were predominantly used, expressing welcome for 'foreigners' on several levels. In particular, immigration was perceived as necessary, for the reason that the party welcomed 'foreigners'; Some identical code usage between party supporters and the political party was evident. A further important aspect to the SPÖ respondents' group was that the majority of them firstly emphasised in their discourse the granting of rights to 'migrants', as well as stressing the importance of culture being a benefit. While this support group viewed 'foreigners' from a more interactionist and practical perspective, the political party viewed 'foreigners' from a policy and legal perspective. Parallels consisted of the focus on legal-rational concepts by both the respondents and the party. Appreciation of ethnic diversity and bi-lingualism corresponds with the SPÖ's traditional legal-rational discourses, being partly based on Austro-Marxism. The SPÖ's political domination can be understood as legitimated for the most part. While the discourses in general corresponded strongly in being positive, yet, the SPÖ was not legitimated in its legal-rational traditional elements in all discourses. It could be argued that the SPÖ was not always legitimated in its exercised type of leadership, but was legitimated generally in its discourses. Additionally, other unknown reasons, such as for example the day-to-day personal positive experiences of respondents with migrants, or the socio-demographic background of the interviewees contributed to further variations in the formulation of discourses. However, this further strengthens Weber's theoretical applicability in that it is a clear indication that regional actors are not being dominated fully by the political elites to the extent that they reduplicate discourses, but demonstrates that they form their opinions taking account of other factors also and have the choice of legitimating elites, or not. Further it could be argued that based on these findings the legitimation process was not necessarily connected to the corresponding form of domination. This can be seen as an indication of the legitimation process taking place independently to the corresponding exercised type of leadership.

The ÖVP supporters demonstrated mostly neutral B discourse usage combined with positive or negative expressions which showed a corresponding trend with the ÖVP party. The respondents' group, again concurring with its political counterpart, was also the most ambiguous of the groups, as its responses ranged across the spectrum of possible opinions. In turn, contradictory and bi-polar discourses had also been identified for the ÖVP party. The arguments used by the respondent group were often of a 'no benefit-no disturbance' nature or a 'not bothered' nature. Other discourses consisted of the need for skilled labour migration, with the statement that levels of immigration and 'migrants' in Austria had now reached an upper limit. Further, a tolerance concept of culture and pluralistic integration values advocated. It could be suggested that the supporters seldom followed the party's humanistic tendency, and without much emphasis on economics, as had occurred in the ÖVP party. The ÖVP party was only marginally, if at all, legitimated in its traditional-traditional elements. Furthermore, the political party seemed closer to the charismatic FPÖ assimilated discourses than the support group. Those FPÖ-like slogans were not legitimated for the most part by the supporters at all. Overall the party can be understood as not legitimated, with the exception of a very few topics being marginally legitimated, such as the thematic group 'immigration, labour market and welfare system'. The only correspondence that can be observed is the contradictory usage of discourses within both the political and regional spheres in particular the latter. As Weber suggested, traditional-traditional leadership is the most ambiguous of all of these forms, partly legal orientated, partly routine, common custom and tradition orientated. Without this being a legitimation of the party, nevertheless this is reflected in the supporters' tendencies to combine neutral with positive and negative discourses. It could additionally be argued that scent support for the traditional humanistic and economic elements occurred, rather than support for the recently invented FPÖ-like discourses. This indicates that possibly the traditional loyalty, within the framework of 'Lagermentality' towards a political camp is identifiable. If the respondents were to support the newly established political party discourses, their support would be determined by and dependent on momentum snapshot propaganda for specific elections, and not for reasons of a traditional feeling of loyalty towards a 'Lager'. However, since the supporters chose the traditional discursive elements of the party, it could be suggested that their discourses are dependent on loyalty to the party, to which, according to Pelinka (2000), they are conditioned from birth.

The Freedom Party supporters used mainly C negative codes, identifying 'foreigners' as a threat and a burden. Islamophobia was frequently in evidence and Turks were strongly disliked and perceived as a threat. The discourse of wanting to send 'foreigners' back home, perceiving immigration and migrants to be a threat, a problem and a burden was also used and could be understood as a legitimation of the charismatic elements of the FPÖ. The FPÖ, in common with the SPÖ, and unlike the ÖVP, is strongly legitimated in its leadership style. Specifically, the charismatic elements portrayed by the FPÖ, such as the scapegoating and problematisation of foreigners, and the perception of 'foreigners' as threatening, were obviously accepted and re-duplicated as well as being used for further scapegoating. On the other hand, the support group argued for the full or partial assimilation of migrants to the Austrian culture. However, no pan-German elements were used in discourse. Therefore, the traditional and (charismatic)-dystopian elements of Pan-Germanism were very marginally, if at all, legitimated by the supporters. It could thus be suggested that such findings reflect the legitimation by new supporters for charismatic discursive elements and leadership, but not by the traditional and loyal party supporters for the dystopian Pan-German elements. This could be an indication of a breaking-up of the Lagermentality. Also, this ties in with Weber's arguments that charismatic leadership is the least stable and most flexible. His argument for the effectiveness of the charismatic leadership type was first seen in the sudden rise in popularity for the FPÖ in the elections in 1999, but reflects support for the charismatic element of the party, and not for its traditional element. Luther's (1997) argument that most FPÖ voters in the 1999 elections were influenced and impressed by Haider's charisma and protest slogans, but not by the FPÖ's traditional orientations, could also be true of this non-representative support group. In this respect, the FPÖ is the only party which is legitimated in its outstanding feature of domination, that being charisma. Furthermore, the party was not clearly, if at all, legitimated in its dystopian elements.

On the other hand, for the three political support groups described above, a common argument with regard to the legitimation of the parties and possible support from the regional actors is significant. Support and loyalty to the political 'Lagers' is particularly validated by respondents who sympathised with more than one party, and often, but not always, exhibited those tendencies also in their discourses. It could then be argued that 'Lagermentality' and traditional loyal support for one party goes beyond voting behaviour and would still be part of the political system of contemporary Austria.

The Green Party supporters of the case study indicated usage of positive A codes and liberal opinions which corresponds with their political counterpart. Supporters and party alike advocated welcome to 'foreigners', cultural diversity, multiculturalism and concern for the well-being of immigrants, rather than focusing on the well being of Austrians. The (charismatic)-utopian and legal-rational combination of leadership style was to some degree legitimated, even though the outstanding (charismatic)-utopian feature was not fully or strongly legitimated.

It could be said that the discourses of parties, political elites and the everyday correspond for the most part. Nevertheless the study substantiates the arguments that regional everyday actors are not solely dominated by elites in their formulation of discourses, which is argued by various neo-Marxist schools of thought. It appears that an interdependent relationship between governance and people, national elites and regional actors, can be identified. Parson's structuralist-functionalist 'system interdependence theory' is applicable in general, however, as hypothesised, Weber is more applicable due to his detailed account of the correspondence of leadership types and the legitimation of those. In respect of Austria, Weber's theories of the legitimacy of domination are particularly validated based on the empirical findings of this case study. The types of domination identified by Weber occurred in the Austrian political parties, and were also for the most part legitimated by the local support groups, with the exception of the ÖVP. Non-corresponding discourses can be explained by the supporters' personal day-to-day experiences which could have impacted on the formulation of discourses also, or alternatively can be explained by the socio-demographic background of the regional respondents. It was further indicated that the legitimation process identified by Weber can take place without the legitimation of the corresponding leadership type.

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			Appendix One - SPÖ
S	S	S	**SPÖ Codes**
			How they perceive foreigners:
		1	Freedom, equality, justice and solidarity
		2	We stand for human politics and the according behavioural codex with each other
	3		Different human beings are equal in rights and dignity
	4		Rights of minorities cannot be ignored in a democracy
		5	But minorities cannot endanger the rights of any other individual
	6		Equal chances
	7		Equal right to work
	8		Equal right to education
	9		Equal political rights
	10		Equal social and human rights
	11		Xenophobia, racism and anti-Semitism endanger the dignity and security of human beings
	12		Xenophobia, racism and anti-Semitism are a threat to peaceful and democratic co-existence
	13		We fight anti-Semitic and racist activities
			Immigration, labour market, social system:
			Immigration
	14		Need immigration
	15		We depend on immigration
	16		Need skilled labour immigration
	17		Need specific immigration (pflegebereich)
	18		We need immigration for our own shortage of labour (nursing)
	19		Controlled immigration quota
	20		Regulated Immigration
	21		Family reunification should be made possible
	22		Right to asylum
			Labour market
	23		Integration in labour market
		24	threat by migrants being cheap labour
			welfare
	25		Foreigners do not sponge
	26		Integration in social system
	27		Exploitation of seasonal workers (no unemployment money, no family reunification, no integration,no social rights)
	28		Austria exploits foreigners
		29	We have to help the socially weak

			Culture
30			All human beings have the right to a home (land), their traditions, their language and their culture
31			Right to homeland
32			Right to traditions
33			Right to language
34			Right to culture
35			Cultural linguistic development of minorities is naturally supported by us
36			Existence of minorities is naturally supported by us
37			we need to create a positive foreign climate
			majority and minority demand mutual tolerance
			majority and minority in one state demand mutual respect
			majority and minority demand dialogue
			majority and minority demand mutual understanding
			majority and minority demand cooperation...regardless of religious ethnic, cultural or linguistic identity
			Integration
38			Right to integration into society while sustaining foreigner's identity
39			Right to language
40			Right to culture
41			Right to traditions
42			Right and equal chances to education despite cultural or linguistic differences
43			Cultural linguistic development of minorities is naturally supported by us
			neutral....tolerance thematic group
	44		Majority and minority in one state demands tolerance
	45		majority and minority in one state demand mutual respect
	46		majority and minority demand dialogue
	47		majority and minority demand mutual understanding
	48		majority and minority demand cooperation...regardless of religious ethnic, cultural or linguistic identity
49			Integration in housing market-Integration is proper housing
50			Integration in education system- Integration is education
51			Integration in social system
52			Integration is right to work
53			No forceful integration- No sanction+
54			No forced language courses
55			Voluntary integration
56			Integration is more than learning German
57			Foreigners want to learn German
58			Functioning integration for all in Austria living people
			Religion
59			'religious freedom
60			religious freedom cannot be abused for political purposes or reverse
61			equal chances not dependent on religious denomination or ethnic membership
62			against religious or political fundamentalism
			Identity:
63			Austrian id shaped historical through linguistic, ethnic and cultural diversity
64			Sustaining of m's identity
65			Right to homeland
66			Right to tradition
67			Right to language
68			Right to culture
69			Right to identity
70			majority and minority cooperation ..regardless of ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity

Appendix Two - ÖVP

V	V	V	Övp codes:
			How they perceive foreigners:
	1		If we take in foreigners for labour purposes we will treat them equal to Austrians
		2	Austrian fear of ghettos
		3	Problem if having a high percentage of foreigners
			Immigration
			immigration
		4	We are not an immigration country-Austria is not a typical immigration country
		5	Unlimited immigration to the expense of the Austrian population cannot exist
		6	We have to take the immigration problem seriously
		7	We do not want illegal immigrants
		8	Not every foreigners has the right to stay in our homeland- Not every foreigner can obtain visa
		9	We cannot open borders
			immigration and labour market
	10		We need limited immigration
	11		Immigration in so far as the labour market can tolerate it
	12		Immigration in so far as the economy needs and can tolerate it
13			We need skilled labour migration- Certain labour migration- Deficiency in skilled labour migrants
14			We need to support the economy through foreigners- Labour migration supports the economy
		15	Employment problem with foreigners is serious
		16	Legally in Austria living individuals are given priority in employment to the ones wanting to immigrate
		17	Austrian have fears of migrants taking jobs away
		18	Take Austrians for jobs first
		19	Take the workforce we have before more immigration
	20		Our politics will secure that the amount of foreigners will not overstretch /exceed the threshold limits of the Austrian labour market
	21		The Austrian social system
	22		the Austrian school system
	23		the Austrian regional housing markets
			welfare
		24	Social sponging happens
		25	We want to safeguard social sponging
		26	against marriages on paper and abuse
	27		We have helped many refugees from eastern Europe who migrated
		28	Fear of ghettoisation
	29		Integration more important than immigration
			ASYLUM
30			They should have the right to family reunification
31			We want Austria to remain responsibilities as asylum country
		32	We will not allow that asylum laws are abused (by economic refugees)
	33		Specific groups of foreigners can obtain visa, political participation, settlement

			Culture:
	34		State has to support the weak and minorities
	35		Tolerant
	36		Understanding
	37		Respect
	38		humanity towards foreigners
	39		tolerance to others
40			We want to secure the understanding the respect and the humanity towards foreigners (while) below
	41		Want to sustain the right of Austrians to homeland
	42		Want to sustain the right of Austrians to cultural identity
	43		Want to sustain the right of Austrians to security
44			Adjustment of education system to differing linguistic mother tongue backgrounds
			Integration:
	45		Peaceful co existence is basis for functioning of foreigners and Austrians living together
	46		Mutual respect is basis
	47		Integration Is to respect the dignity of our foreign fellow citizens
	48		Foreigners and locals should live in peaceful symbiosis's
	49		Active integration of long term and legal foreigners in Austria
	50		Integration before immigration
		51	Integration with soft pressure
		52	If they do not want to integrate we sanction them
	53		Right to integration includes duties
	54		duties are the obedience and compliance to our laws
	55		Duties are the compliance with and respect for the Austrian traditions
	56		Duties are the ability to speak German
	57		Have to learn German to become part of the Austrian community
	58		If they want to stay they have to learn German
	59		Lack of German knowledge in foreigners
	60		To learn language is positive for foreigners to get job
	61		The legal foreigners should be able to work
	62		Advising and counselling of foreigners
63			Offers to women like looking after the children
64			integration . Learn about the Austrian everyday, Austrian laws, citizenship education
65			Turkish women have to be able to participate in public life
66			Integration is that they have a job
67			That they speak our language
68			That they understand our culture
69			That they can access education system
70			That they have housing
			Religion
71			We respect the meaning of churches and religious communities to create a climate of tolerance and human care
72			We stand for the free development of churches and real communities within state and law
73			Religious freedom
	74		Against intolerance and fundamentalism
			Identity
	75		Our diverse and cultural identity is a contribution to Europe
76			we accept the ethnic minority groups of our homecountry
	77		Right for Austrians to homeland
	78		To cultural identity
	79		To security sustain
	80		We want to sustain the Austrian cultural historic identity in future
	81		We have responsibility for the Austrian citizen

Appendix Three - FPÖ

F	F	F	FPÖ Codes:
			How they perceive foreigners
1			Peoples and ethnic groups have the right that rights to live will be sustained and
2			The development of their characteristics will be guaranteed peacefully
		3	Foreign swamping
		4	foreigners are a problem
			Immigration:
		5	Austria is not an immigration country
		6	A is not immigration country due to its topography
		7	...Due to its population density
		8	...Due to is limited resources
		9	We have to implement order into the immigration to Austria
		10	Unlimited immigration would be irresponsible
		11	right to one's home does not allow unlimited and uncontrolled immigration to Austria
		12	Unlimited immigration would overstretch the capacity of the locals for integration ability
		13	Unlimited immigration would endanger protection and sustainment of one's own homeland
		14	Unlimited immigration leads to extreme distortion of the labour market
		15	Unlimited immigration leads to pressure on wages
		16	The illegal immigration is a problem
		17	100000illegals in this country , in labour market harm, criminality, endanger security
		18	Asylum yes, but they can return if they want
	19		The 1956... refugees were accepted and found a home
			labour
		20	Prefer locals to foreigners in jobs
		21	Take Austrians first
		22	We can cover the labour market with Austrians do not need foreigners
		23	High unemployment does not allow for immigration of workers with non needed qualifications
		24	distortion of labour market situation and housing market situation endangers social peace
			welfare
		25	health tests as a precondition for visas
		26	measurements to avoid endangering the public health
		27	Unemployment within foreigners higher than in Austrians
		28	They cannot get jobs as they do not speak German
		29	Social sponging we have to fight against it
	30		Competition between locals and foreigners
		31	We can't let them in if we do not have jobs or housing
		32	Most of them came for the social system not for the labour market
		33	Cannot sponge for all their lives
		34	Sanctions
		35	Shorter visas
		36	Social benefit cuttings

Appendix Three - FPÖ

			Culture
		38	Foreign swamping
		39	foreigners are a problem
		40	protection of the Austrian population
	41		Austrian patriotisms sustain the Austrian cultural heritage
	42		We are part of the old Germanic and European history and the cultural heritage of it
	43		The majority of Austrians belong to the German cultural language and heritage
		44	Pathetic that we have to write waste product laws in Turkish or serbo-craotion so that the foreigners follow the laws
		45	Austrian children now have to learn Turkish in schools to be able to communicate 8patheitc)
		46	Pathetic that integration communities teach us the others traditions and rituals...we have to learn belly dancing
			Integration:
		47	multiculturalist experiments are rejected because they enhance purposely social conflict
		48	Forced language courses
		49	One has to pressure them
		50	Pressure otherwise they won't do things (language courses)
		51	Assimilate to Austria, to Austrian state and system to language to culture
		52	They have to integrate, it is their responsibility
		53	Put order into foreigners
		54	Foreigners who live in Austria should have same standards as the local
		55	Women should learn language
			religion
		56	Islam and Islamic fundamentalism are a threat to Europe and to our values
			Identity:
		57	Foreign swamping
		58	f s is problem
	59		Austrian patriotisms sustain the Austrian cultural heritage
	60		We are part of the old Germanic and European history and the cultural heritage of it
61			Each citizen can decide whether he belong and which group he belongs to
	62		protection interests der Austrian population demands souvereignity in Ausländerrechtangelegenheiten
	63		the province of south Tyrol could become part of Austria
	64		Language important sign of identity and cultural heritage
	65		Austrians belong to German cultural community due to language

Appendix Four- The Green Party

Green Party Codes:

G	G	G	**How the perceive foreigners:**
	1		Minority issue is a basic question of democracy
2			We stand for the preventing of economic exclusion of individuals or groups
3			We stand for the preventing of social exclusion of individuals or groups
4			We stand for the preventing of linguistic exclusion of individuals or groups
5			We stand for the preventing of cultural exclusion of individuals or groups
6			We want to support and enhance and sustain the equal chance to participation of minorities in society
7			Foreigners are discriminated against in foreigner laws
8			Foreigners are denied access to social rights
9			F are denied access to cultural rights
10			Foreigners are denied access to political rights
11			Legal and rights based equality for immigrants
12			We want to prevent marginalisation and discrimination
			Immigration:
13			Austria is immigration country (due to the immigration waves of the 1960s)
14			transparent Immigration policies and laws
15			Need security for refugees without quota
16			Need family reunification without quota
17			We need skilled labour migration due to the labour market and economic situation
18			The usage of migrants for the labour market cannot be the only reason to allow immigration
19			immigration not only in the interest /benefit to the immigration country but also to the migrants
20			Migrants need Austria to find a new home
21			No distinction in social system between local and foreigner-access to welfare
22			No segregation on the basis of ethnic divisions in the labour market
23			No distinction in social system between local and foreigner
24			Equal chances on the labour market
			Culture religion:
2			We stand for the preventing of economic exclusion of individuals or groups
3			We stand for the preventing of social exclusion of individuals or groups
4			We stand for the preventing of linguistic exclusion of individuals or groups
5			We stand for the preventing of cultural exclusion of individuals or groups
6			We want to support and enhance and sustain the equal chance to participation of minorities in society
7			Foreigners are discriminated against in foreigner laws
8			Foreigners are denied access to social rights
9			F are denied access to cultural rights
10			Foreigners are denied access to political rights
25			Definitions of cultural rights
26			Legal rooting of minority protection and promotion
27			steps to prevent and enhance the traditions
28			We do not want to conserve the cultural identity of minorities and the versteinerung, but want to lift them from marginalisation
29			We want them to live within society and keep equal chances to develop their individuality and identity.
30			Cultural rights

			Integration:
31			Bilingual education system,
32			showing of bilingualism
33			acknowledgement of minorities as an integrated and integrative part of the a society
34			Integration only through the legal equality of migrants
35			Integration only through the social equality of migrants
36			Integration only through the political equality of migrants
37			No segregation on the basis of ethnic divisions in the labour market
38			No distinction in social system between local and foreigner
39			Equal chances on the labour market
40			Housing market
41			Education
42			Citizenship
43			Courses should be offered
44			dual Citizenship made accessible
45			shortening of time limitation on the visa attainments
46			Right to not being discriminated+
47			Right to family
48			Rights
			Identity:
28			We do not want to conserve the cultural identity of minorities and the versteinerung, but want to lift them from marginalisation
29			We want them to live within society and keep equal chances to develop their individuality and identity.
49			Multiple identities are dynamic learning and developing opportunities of societies

APPENDIX FIVE

Graph 1:
Overall usage frequeny

	total
A-Positive Codes (45)	212
B-Neutral Codes (22)	121
C-Negative Codes (59)	185

Graph 2:
Absolte Numbers:

	SP	VP	FP	sum	M	F	sum	O	Y	sum	U	R	sum	A	MC	B	sum	GS	MS	AK	sum
A-Codes	154	39	19	212	150	62	212	93	119	212	168	44	212	21	184	7	212	31	100	81	212
B-Codes	18	79	23	121	92	29	121	57	64	121	66	55	121	10	89	22	121	29	52	40	121
C-Codes	21	26	139	185	143	43	186	112	74	186	118	68	186	67	98	21	186	82	63	41	186
Sum -total	194	144	181	519	385	134	519	262	257	519	352	167	519	98	371	50	519	142	115	162	519

M	24
F	9

Old	17
Young	16

Rural	13
Urban	20

A	6
MC	23
B	4

akad	9
MS	13
GS	11

Graph 3:
Weigthed Average

	SP	VP	FP	sum		M	F	sum		O	Y	sum		U	R	sum		A	MC	B	sum		GS	MS	AK	sum
A	154	39	19	212	A	150	165	315	A	93	119	212	A	168	67,7	236	A	80,5	184	40,3	305	A	36,6	100	117	254
B	18	79	23	121	B	92	77,3	169	B	57	64	121	B	66	84,6	151	B	38,3	89	127	254	B	34,3	52	57,8	144
C	21	26	139	185	C	143	115	485	C	112	74	333	C	118	105	386	C	257	98	121	559	C	96,9	63	59,2	398
Total	194	144	181	519		385	357	742		262	257	519		352	257	609		376	371	288	1034		168	115	234	517

Legend:
M.....Men
F.....Women
O.....Old
Y.....Young
U.....urban
R.....rural
A.....Workers
MC.....Middle class
B.....farmers
GS.....primary education
MS.....secondary edu
Akad.....third level

APPENDIX SIX

A	B	C	D	socio-demographic bachground (left to right, see legend spread	SP	VP	FP	M	F	% m	% f	O	Y	% o	% y	U	R	% u	% r	A	MC	B	% a	% ms	% b	GS	MS	Akad	% gs	% ms	% akad	total
				thematic group: personal exp-1																													
1				Positive Personal experience	8	5	3	10	6	41,667	66,6666667	7	9	41,176	56,25	12	4	60	30,7692308	2	14		33,33	60,87	0	2	8	6	18,18	61,54	66,67	16
	1			Neutral personal experience	3	3	1	7		29,167	0	4	3	23,529	18,75	6	1	30	7,69230769	1	6		16,67	26,09	0	2	2	3	18,18	15,38	33,33	7
	2			no personal experience		3	3	4	2	16,667	22,2222222	2	4	11,765	25	1	5	5	38,4615385	2	1	3	33,33	4,348	75	2	4		18,18	30,77	0	6
		1		negative personal experience	1	4	5	6	4	25	44,4444444	7	3	41,176		6	4	30	30,7692308	3	6	1	50	26,09	25	4	3	3	36,36	23,08	33,33	10

				thematic group immigration, labour market, welfare 2	SP	VP	FP	M	F	weighted average m	weighted average f	O	Y	weighted average o	weighted average y	U	R	weighted average u	weighted average r	A	MS	B	weighted average a	weighted average ms	weighted average b	GS	MS	AK	weighted average gs	weighted average ms	weighted average akad	
2				Need Immigration, need more I, I is no problem, I is ok	7			6	1	6	2,6666	4	3	4	3	7		7	0	1	6		3,833	6	0	1	4	2	1,182	4	2,889	7
3				immigration with some regulations, no chaos	1			1		1	0		1		1	1		1	0		1		0	1	0			1	0	0	1,444	1
4				need immigration to support pension system-die out	1				1	0	2,6666		1		1	1		1	0		1		0	1	0			1	0	0	1,444	1
5				need immigration for labour market	4			1	3	1	7,9998	2	2	2	2	3	1	3	1,538		4		0	4	0		3	1	0	3	1,444	4
6				need skilled labour migration	1	1		1	1	1	2,6666	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1,538		1	1	0	1	5,75	1	1		1,182	1	0	2
				NEED IMMIGRATION	14	1	0	9	6	8	15,9996	7	8	7	8	13	2	13	3,076	1	13	1	3,83	13	5,75	2	6	5	2,36	8	6,9	15
7				foreigners do jobs Austrians do not do	5	4	4	9	4	9	10,6664	7	6	7	6	7	6	7	9,228	1	12		3,833	12	0	2	7	4	2,364	7	5,778	13
				PLUS FOR LABOUR MARKET	5	4	4	9	4	9	10,6664	7	6	7	6	7	6	7	9,228	1	12		3,833	12	0	2	7	4	2,364	7	5,778	13
8				foreigners support state with taxes, pay tax	6			4	2	4	5,3332	3	3	3	3	6		6	0	1	5		3,833	5	0	2	2	2	2,364	2	2,889	6
9				foreigners work and (then) support the system	4			3	1	3	2,6666	1	3	1	3	4		4	0	1	3		3,833	3	0	1	1	2	1,182	1	2,889	4
10				no sponging -why would they leave home	5	1		6		6	0	3	3	3	3	5	1	5	1,538	2	4		7,667	4	0	2	2	2	2,364	2	2,889	6
11				if they work they support system	1	2	1	3	1	3	2,6666	1	3	1	3	2	2	2	3,076	1	3		3,833	3	0	1		3	1,182	0	4,333	4
				WELFARE SYSTEM PLUS	16	3	1	16	4	16	10,6664	8	12	8	12	17	3	17	4,614	5	15	0	19,17	15	0	6	5	9	7,091	5	13	20
	1			foreigners = no citizenship	6	1		5	2	5	5,3332	3	4	3	4	7		7	0		7		0	7	0		3	4	0	3	5,778	7
	2			foreigners =Austrian once they obtain with citizenship	7	1		6	2	6	5,3332	3	5	3	5	8		8	0	1	7		3,833	7	0	1	4	3	1,182	4	4,333	8
12				rights for foreigners, as they have duties	2			1	1	1	2,6666		2		2	2		2	0		2		0	2	0			2	0	0	2,889	2
13				equality for foreigners by law	2			1	1	1	2,6666		2		2	2		2	0		2		0	2	0			2	0	0	2,889	2
14				political rights = citizenship rights , Citizenship rights	2			1	1	1	2,6666		2		2	2		2	0		2		0	2	0			2	0	0	2,889	2
15				rights and duties are the same for foreigners and Austrians	3			2	1	2	2,6666	1	2	1	2	3		3	0		3		0	3	0		1	2	0	1	2,889	3
16				give and take, we have to offer them something	2			1	1	1	2,6666	1	1	1	1	2		2	0		2		0	2	0		1	1	0	1	1,444	2
17				right to their own culture, right to sustain their culture	1				1	0	2,6666		1		1		1	0	1,538		1		0	1	0		1		0	1	0	1
18				right to religion in state under the rule of law	1			1		1	0		1		1	1		1	0		1		0	1	0			1	0	0	1,444	1
				RIGHTS AND DUTIES	26	2	0	18	10	18	26,666	8	20	8	20	27	1	27	1,539	1	27		3,833	27		1	10	17	1,182	10	24,55	28
3				immigration remain as it is, enough now		9	1	7	3	7	7,9998	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	7,69		8	2	0	8	11,5	2	5	3	2,364	5	4,333	10
4				need certain labour migration and others not (specialisation)		4	2	5	1	5	2,6666	1	5	1	5	3	3	3	4,614		6		0	6	0	1	3	2	1,182	3	2,889	6
				NEUTRAL ON IMMIGRATION		13	3	12	4	12	10,6664	6	10	6	10	8	8	8	12,304	0	14	2	0	14	11,5	3	8	5	3,545	8	7,22	16
5				neutral on labour market	1	4		4	1	4	2,6666	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	3,076	1	3	1	3,833	3	5,75	1	2	2	1,182	2	2,889	5
6				no threat to labour market, no particular impact		4		4		4	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3,076		3	1	0	3	5,75		2	2	0	2	2,889	4
				NEUTRAL ON LABOUR MARKET	1	8	0	8	1	8	2,6666	5	4	5	4	5	4	5	6,152	1	6	2	3,83	6	11,5	1	4	4	1,182	4	5,778	9
7				both sponge, they (foreigners) but we (Austrians) also	5	7	3	10	5	10	13,333	8	7	8	7	9	6	9	9,228	1	12	2	3,833	12	11,5	3	8	4	3,545	8	5,778	15
8				organise a basis---some sponge others work and pay tax			3	3		3	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1,538	2	1		7,667	1	0	1	1	1	1,182	1	1,444	3
				NEUTRAL ON WELFARE SYSTEM	6	7	6	13	5	13	13,333	10	8	10	8	11	7	11	10,766	3	13	2	11,5	13	11,5	4	9	5	4,727	9	7,222	18
9				we/state should look after immigrants, organise flat, work	1	2		2	1	2	2,6666	1	2	1	2	3		3	0		3		0	3	0		1	2	0	1	2,889	3
10				we are well and the state can support foreigners	1	1		2		2	0		2		2	2		2	0		2		0	2	0			2	0	0	2,889	2
11				we need to help them	1			1		1	0		1		1	1		1	0		1		0	1	0			1	0	0	1,444	1
				HELP	3	3	0	3	1	5	2,6666	1	5	1	5	6	0	6	0	0	6	0	0	6	0		1	5	0	1	7,222	6
	2			immigration is /can be a threat			2	1	1	1	2,6666	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1,538		2		0	2	0		2		0	2	0	2
	3			no more immigration, stop immigration			3	1	2	1	5,3332	2	1	2	1		3	0	4,614	1	1	1	3,833	1	5,75	2	1		2,364	1	0	3
	4			too much immigration			5	6		6	0	4	2	4	2	5	1	5	1,538	3	3		11,5	3	0	2	2	2	2,364	2	2,889	6
	5			immigration Of that amount is a threat and causes conflict	1	1	2	4		4	0	1	3	1	3	3	1	3	1,538	1	2	1	3,833	2	5,75	2		2	2,364	0	2,889	4
	6			stricter immigration control, no family reunions			2	1	1	1	2,6666	2		2		2		2	0	1	1		3,833	1	0	1	1		1,182	1	0	2
	7			too many f foreigners in Austria (by way of immigration)			3	3		3	0	2	1	2	1	3		3	0	1	2		3,833	2	0	1	1	1	1,182	1	1,444	3
	8			no immigration of unskilled labour- close borders	1	1		2		2	0	1	1	1	1	2		2	0	1	1		3,833	1	0	2			2,364	0	0	2
	9			send them back	1		1	2		2	0	1	1	1	1	2		2	0	1	1		3,833	1	0	1	1		1,182	1	0	2
				AGAINST IMMIGRATION	4	2	18	20	4	20	10,6664	14	10	14	10	18	6	18	9,228	9	13	2	34,5	13	11,5	9	10	5	10,64	10	7,222	24
	10			Foreigners take jobs from Austrians			1	1		1	0	1		1		1		1	0	1			3,833	0	0	1			1,182	0	0	1
	11			Foreigners are a threat to the labour market	1	1	4	5	1	5	2,6666	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4,614	2	2	2	7,667	2	11,5	4	2		4,727	2	0	6
	12			we have enough Austrians for jobs, do not need foreigners			2	2		2	0	1	1	1	1	2		2	0	1	1		3,833	1	0	1	1		1,182	1	0	2
	13			take Austrians first for jobs	1			1		1	0		1		1	1		1	0	1			3,833	0	0	1			1,182	0	0	1
	14			Austrians are disadvantaged in the labour market	1		3	3	1	3	2,6666	3	1	3	1	3	1	3	1,538	3	1		11,5	1	0	3	1		3,545	1	0	4
	15			support our people in education so that they can do the jobs			2	2		2	0	1	1	1	1	2		2	0		2		0	2	0			2	0	0	2,889	2
	16			foreigners bring in cheap labour which is a threat	1		3	3	1	3	2,6666	2	2	2	2	3	1	3	1,538	1	3		3,833	3	0	2		2	2,364	0	2,889	4
				THREAT TO LABOUR MARKET	4	1	15	17	3	17	7,9998	11	6	11	6	15	5	15	7,538	9	9	2	34,5	8	11,5	12	4	4	13,18	4	5,778	20
	17			foreigners sponge , know how to sponge	1	4	9	10	4	10	10,6664	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	10,766	4	8	2	15,33	8	11,5	6	5	3	7,091	5	4,333	14
	18			they are a burden- we do not want to only pay for them		1	3	1	3	1	7,9998	4		4		2	2	2	3,076	2	2		7,667	2	0	2	2		2,364	2	0	4
	19			they will take over, they will demand things			4	3	1	3	2,6666	3	1	3	1	4		4	0	1	3		3,833	3	0	1	2	1	1,182	2	1,444	4
				BURDEN ON WELFARE SYSTEM	1	5	16	15	8	14	21,3328	14	8	14	8	13	3	13	13,842	7	13	2	26,83	13	11,5	9	9	4	10,64	9	5,778	22
				Sum positive	61	10	5	52	24	52	63,9984	30	46	30	46	64	12	64	18,456	8	67	1	30,67	67	5,75	11	30	35	13	30	50,55	
				Sum neutral	9	31	9	38	11	38	29,3326	22	27	22	27	30	19	30	29,222	4	39	6	15,33	39	34,5	8	22	19	9,454	22	27,44	
				Sum negative	9	8	49	51	15	51	39,999	39	27	39	27	46	20	46	30,76	25	35	6	95,83	35	34,5	32	21	13	37,82	21	18,78	

			thematic group culture and integration: 3	SP	VP	FP	M	F	weighted average m	weighted average f	O	Y	weighted average o	weighted average y	U	R	weighted average u	weighted average r	A	MS	B	weighted average a	weighted average ms	weighted average b	GS	MS	AK	weighted average gs	weighted average ms	weighted average ak	
19			foreigners are interesting	2		1	2	1	2	2,6666		3	0	3	1	2	1	3,076		3		0	3	0		2	1	0	2	1,444	3
20			foreigners are no problem	7	1		6	2	6	5,3332	3	5	3	5	7	1	7	1,538	1	7		3,833	7	0	1	4	3	1,182	4	4,333	8
21			foreigners are a chance	1			1		1	0	1		1	0	1		1	0		1		0	1	0		1		0	1	0	1
22			mutual respect	2	1		1	2	1	5,3332	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1,538	1	2		3,833	2	0	1	2		1,182	2	0	3
23			Culture =benefit,more would be nice, we can learn	5			4	1	4	2,6666	3	2	3	2	5		5	0		5		0	5	0		3	2	0	3	2,889	5
24			mutual cultural benefit, cultural exchange=benefit,	3	2		2	3	2	7,9998	3	2	3	2	4	1	4	1,538		5		0	5	0		3	2	0	3	2,889	5
25			cultural freedom to the extent of what laws allow	3			2	1	2	2,6666	1	2	1	2	3		3	0		3		0	3	0		1	2	0	1	2,889	3
26			cultural respect	3			1	2	1	5,3332	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	1,538		3		0	3	0		2	1	0	2	1,444	3
27			cultural freedom	3	1	3	4	3	4	7,9998	3	4	3	4	4	3	4	4,614		6	1	0	6	5,75	2	3	2	2,364	3	2,889	7
28			cultural merging positive, mutual exchange	3	2		4	1	4	2,6666	2	3	2	3	5		5	0		5		0	5	0	1	2	2	1,182	2	2,889	5
			CULTURE POSITIVE	32	7	4	27	16	27	42,6656	19	23	18	24	34	9	34	13,842	2	40	1	7,667	40	5,75	8	23	15	5,909	23	21,67	43
29			integration voluntarily, they should participate in public life	5	4	1	7	3	7	7,9998	4	6	4	6	7	3	7	4,614	1	8	1	3,833	8	5,75	2	6	2	2,364	6	2,889	10
30			Multiculturalism, everybody free to live their culture, Chinatown	6			4	2	4	5,3332	2	4	2	4	5	1	5	1,538		6		0	6	0		3	3	0	3	4,333	6
31			Integration is language knowledge , voluntary language learning	5			4	1	4	2,6666	2	3	2	3	5		5	0	1	4		3,833	4	0	1	2	2	1,182	2	2,889	5
32			sanctions by state negative-sanctions/prohibitions inpracticable	3			3		3	0	1	2	1	2	3		3	0		3		0	3	0		1	2	0	1	2,889	3
33			Multiculturalism- Pluralism	6	1		6	1	6	2,6666	3	4	3	4	7		7	0	1	6		3,833	6	0	1	3	3	1,182	3	4,333	7
34			create positive foreign climate	3			2	1	2	2,6666	2	1	2	1	3		3	0		3		0	3	0		2	1	0	2	1,444	3
			INTEGRATION=MK-POSITIVE CONCEPT	28	5	1	26	8	26	21,3328	14	20	14	20	30	4	30	6,152	3	30	1	11,5	30	5,75	4	17	13	4,727	17	18,78	34
	12		cultural neutral..do not care,no benefit, no disturbance	3	9	3	12	3	12	7,9998	7	8	7	8	8	7	8	10,766	1	9	5	3,833	9	26,75	6	5	4	7,091	5	5,778	15
	13		culture has positive and negative aspects		2		1	1	1	2,6666	1	1	1	1	2		2	0	1	1		3,833	1	0		1	1	0	1	1,444	2
	14		culture will merge, but no impact, neutral		3	1	4		4	0	2	2	2	2	1	3	1	4,614		3	1	0	3	5,75		3	1	0	3	1,444	4
			CULTURE NEUTRAL	3	14	4	17	4	17	10,6664	10	11	10	11	11	10	11	15,38	2	13	6	7,667	13	34,5	8	9	6	7,091	9	8,666	21
	15		Pluralism: keep culture in private, adapt in public to some extent, cc	2	9	1	9	3	9	7,9998	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	9,228	1	9	2	3,833	9	11,5	4	5	3	4,727	5	4,333	12
	16		get good ones and bad ones, like everybody else	1	2		2	1	2	2,6666	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	1,538		2	1	0	2	5,75		1	2	0	1	2,889	3
	17		accept them, tolerate them		2	1	2	1	2	2,6666	1	2	1	2		3	0	4,614		3		0	3	0	1	2		1,182	2	0	3
	18		should speak and learn or know German	2	7	3	9	3	9	7,9998	6	6	6	6	7	5	7	7,69		9	3	0	9	17,25	3	5	4	3,545	5	5,778	12
			INTEGRATION = POS AND NEG: PL	5	20	5	22	8	22	21,3328	14	16	14	16	15	15	15	23,07	1	23	6	3,833	23	34,5	8	13	9	5,454	13	13	35
		20	culturally disturbing	1		2	3		3	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1,538		3		0	3	0	1	1	1	1,182	1	1,444	3
		21	their culture in public is disturbing			2	2		2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1,538		2		0	2	0	1	1	1	0	1	1,444	2
		22	Austrians should not be disturbed by them			1	1		1	0		1	0	1	1		1	0		1		0	1	0			1	0	0	1,444	1
		23	cultural threat, foreigners take our culture away		1	3	3	1	3	2,6666	3	1	3	1	1	3	1	4,614	3		1	11,5	0	5,75	3	1		3,545	1	0	4
		24	their culture will be a problem in future			1	1		1	0		1	0	1		1	0	1,538			1	0	0	5,75	1			1,182	0	0	1
		25	foreign ghettos are negative			2	2		2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1,538		1	1	0	1	5,75	1		1	1,182	0	1,444	2
		26	Turks have an aggressive mentality	2	1	5	4	4	4	10,6664	5	3	5	3	5	3	5	4,614	3	5		11,5	5	0	2	5	1	2,364	5	1,444	8
		27	Turks have no culture and should go home	1			1		1	0	1		1	0	1		1	0	1			3,833	0	0	1			1,182	0	0	1
		28	Turks are a problem		1	3	2	2	2	5,3332	2	2	2	2	3	1	3	1,538		3	1	0	3	5,75	1	2	1	1,182	2	1,444	4
			CULTURE IS NEGATIVE; A THREAT	4	3	19	19	7	19	18,6662	15	11	15	11	15	11	15	16,815	7	15	4	26,83	15	23	10	10	6	11,82	10	8,666	26
		29	if foreigners do not assimilate they should go home	1		3	4		4	0	3	1	3	1	4		4	0	2	2		7,667	2	0	2	1	1	2,364	1	1,444	4
		30	they have to behave as we do, have to follow our ways of life	1		2	3		3	0	3		3	0	3		3	0	2	1		7,667	1	0	2		1	2,364	0	1,444	3
		31	they should live as we do			3	2	1	2	2,6666	3		3	0	1	2	1	3,076	3			11,5	0	0	2	1		2,364	1	0	3
		32	assimilation			8	6	2	6	5,3332	5	3	5	3	4	4	4	6,152	3	5		11,5	5	0	2	4	2	2,364	4	2,889	8
		33	ASsimilation-PLuraism (religious autonomy in private)	1	2	7	8	2	8	5,3332	5	5	5	5	6	4	6	6,152	2	7	1	7,667	7	5,75	3	4	3	3,545	4	4,333	10
		34	forced language courses	1	1	3	5		5	0	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	3,076	1	2	2	3,833	2	11,5	4		1	4,727	0	1,444	5
		35	forced integration			1	1		1	0		1	1	0	1		1	0	1			3,833	0	0	1			1,182	0	0	1
			FORCED INTEGRATION; CONCEPT OF ASSIMILATION	4	3	27	29	5	29	13,333	23	11	23	11	22	12	22	16,456	14	17	3	53,67	17	17,25	16	10	8	18,91	10	11,56	34
			Sum positive	60	12	5	53	24	53	63,998	33	44	33	44	64	13	64	19,994	5	70	2	19,17	70	11,5	9	40	28	10,64	40	40,44	
			Sum neutral	8	34	9	39	12	39	31,999	24	27	24	27	26	25	26	38,45	3	36	12	11,5	36	69	14	22	15	16,55	22	21,67	
			Sum negative	8	6	46	48	12	48	31,9992	38	22	38	22	37	23	37	35,374	21	32	7	80,5	32	40,25	26	20	14	30,73	20	20,22	

			thematic group:Religion: 4	SP	VP	FP	M	F	m	f	O	Y	o	y	U	R	u	r	A	MS	B	a	ms	b	GS	MS	AK	gs	ms	ak	
35			religion is no problem	4	2	2	5	3	5	7,9998	4	4	4	4	5	3	5	4,614		7	1	0	7	5,75		5	3	0	5	4,333	8
36			religious freedom	5	3	4	8	4	8	10,6664	7	5	7	5	6	6	6	9,228	2	9	1	7,667	9	5,75	3	7	2	3,545	7	2,889	12
37			religion is benefit	4	2		5	1	5	2,6666	3	3	3	3	4	2	4	3,076	1	4	1	3,833	4	5,75	1	3	2	1,182	3	2,889	6
38			respect their religion, mutual religious respect	4	4		6	2	6	5,3332	4	4	4	4	5	3	5	4,614	2	6		7,667	6	0	2	3	3	2,364	3	4,333	8
39			resepct religion as much as law allows	1			1		1	0		1	1	0	1	1	1	0		1		0	1	0			1	0	0	1,444	1
			RELIGION POSITIVE	18	11	6	25	10	25	26,666	18	17	18	17	21	14	21	21,532	5	27	3	19,17	27	17,25	6	18	11	7,091	18	15,89	35
	19		religion whatever, no benefit, no disturbance	1	6	4	8	3	8	7,9998	6	5	6	5	7	4	7	6,152	2	8	1	7,667	8	5,75	4	4	3	4,727	4	4,333	11
			RELIGION NEUTRAL	1	6	4	8	3	8	7,9998	6	5	6	5	7	4	7	6,152	2	8	1	7,667	8	5,75	4	4	3	4,727	4	4,333	11
		36	religion is disturbing	1		2	3		3	0	1	2	1	2	3		3	0	1	2		3,833	2	0	1	1	1	1,182	1	1,444	3
		37	religion is a threat		2	2	2	2	2	5,3332	3	1	3	1	3	1	3	1,538	2	2		7,667	2	0	2	1	1	2,364	1	1,444	4
		38	Islam is a problem only as in religion suppresses women	1	2	2	5		5	0	1	4	1	4	4	1	4	1,538	1	3	1	3,833	3	5,75	3		2	3,545	0	2,889	5
		39	Islam is a problem		1	2	2	1	2	2,6666	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1,538	1	1	1	3,833	1	5,75	2	1		2,364	1	0	3
		40	Turkish fundamentalism is problem, Turks -fanatism is problem	1	2	4	5	2	5	5,3332	4	3	4	3	3	4	3	6,152	1	5	1	3,833	5	5,75	1	5	1	1,182	5	1,444	7
		41	*turks have aggressive mentality*		1	4	2	3	2	7,9998	4	1	4	1	3	2	3	3,076	2	3		7,667	3	0	1	3	1	1,182	3	1,444	5
		42	*Turks have no culture and should go home*	1			1		1	0	1		1	0	1		1	0	1			3,833	0	0	1			1,182	0	0	1
			RELIGION PROBLEM AND THREAT	4	8	16	20	8	20	21,3328	16	12	16	12	19	9	19	13,842	9	16	3	34,5	16	17,25	11	11	6	13	11	8,666	28
			Summe positive	18	11	6	25	10	25	26,666	18	17	18	17	21	14	21	21,532	5	27	3	19,17	27	17,25	6	18	11	7,091	18	15,89	
			Summe neutral	1	6	4	8	3	8	7,9998	6	5	6	5	7	4	7	6,152	2	8	1	7,667	8	5,75	4	4	3	4,727	4	4,333	
			Summe negative	4	8	16	20	8	20	21,3328	16	12	16	12	19	9	19	13,842	9	16	3	34,5	16	17,25	11	11	6	13	11	8,666	

			thematic group:identity: 5	SP	VP	FP	M	F	weighted average m	weighted average f	O	Y	weighted average o	weighted average y	U	R	weighted average u	weighted average r	A	MS	B	weighted average a	weighted average ms	weighted average b	GS	MS	AK	weighted average gs	weighted average ms	weighted average ak	
40			Austrian identity is diverse as a result of the habsburg monarchy	1		1	2		2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1,538		2		0	2	0		2		0	2	0	2
41			*cultural merging is positive, no threat*	5	2	1	6	2	6	5,3332	3	5	3	5	7	1	7	1,538	1	7		3,833	7	0	2	3	3	2,364	3	4,333	8
42			cultural merging is chance, no threat	1			1		1	0	1		1	0	1		1	0		1		0	1	0		1		0	1	0	1
43			no threat	8	4	1	11	2	11	5,3332	7	6	7	6	10	3	10	4,614	2	10	1	7,667	10	5,75	3	6	4	3,545	6	5,778	13
			CONTRIBUTION TO IDENTITY	15	6	3	20	4	20	10,6664	12	12	12	12	19	5	19	7,69	3	20	1	11,5	20	5,75	5	12	7	5,909	12	10,11	24
	20		neutral to threat, no threat, no harm and not positive either	1	4	1	3	3	3	7,9998	3	3	3	3	2	4	2	6,152	1	3	2	3,833	3	11,5	3	2	1	3,545	2	1,444	6
	21		no threat, (no contribution) to identity		1		1		1	0		1	0	1		1	0	1,538		1		0	1	0			1	0	0	1,444	1
	22		*culture will merge, but neutral*		3		3		3	0	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	3,076		2	1	0	2	5,75		2	1	0	2	1,444	3
			NO THREAT - NO CONTRIBUTION TO IDENTITY	1	8	1	7	3	7	7,9998	5	5	5	5	3	7	3	10,766	1	5	3	3,633	8	17,25	3	4	3	3,545	4	4,333	10
		43	threat as they create conflicts and a culture clash		1	4	5		5	0		5	0	5	2	3	2	4,614		3	2	0	3	11,5	2	2	1	2,364	2	1,444	5
		44	swamping generated by high birth rates, threat of birth rates			4	3	1	3	2,6666	4		4	0	2	2	2	3,076	3	1		11,5	1	0	2	1	1	2,364	1	1,444	4
		45	foreign swamping=threat		2	7	6	3	6	7,9998	6	3	6	3	5	4	5	6,152	3	5	1	11,5	5	5,75	3	4	2	3,545	4	2,889	9
		46	threat (to national identity)		1	5	4	2	4	5,3332	4	2	4	2	3	3	3	4,614	2	3	1	7,667	3	5,75	2	3	1	2,364	3	1,444	6
		47	austrians will die out, threat to identity, we need higher birth rates			2	2		2	0	1	1	1	1	2		2	0	1	1		3,833	1	0	1		1	1,182	0	1,444	2
		48	*cultural threat, they take our culture away*			2	1	1	1	2,6666	2		2	0	1	1	1	1,538	1	1		3,833	1	0	1		1	1,182	0	1,444	2
		49	*their culture will be a problem in future*			1	1		1	0		1	0	1		1	0	1,538			1	0	0	5,75	1			1,182	0	0	1
		50	cultural merging negative			3	2	1	2	2,6666	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	3,076	2	1		7,667	1	0	1	1	1	1,182	1	1,444	3
			THREAT TO OUR IDENTITY	0	4	28	24	8	24	21,3328	19	13	19	13	16	16	16	24,608	12	15	5	46	15	28,75	13	11	8	15,36	11	11,56	32
			Sum positive	**15**	**6**	**3**	**20**	**4**	**20**	**10,6664**	**12**	**12**	**12**	**12**	**19**	**5**	**19**	**7,69**	**3**	**20**	**1**	**11,5**	**20**	**5,75**	**5**	**12**	**7**	**5,909**	**12**	**10,11**	
			Sum neutral	**1**	**8**	**1**	**7**	**3**	**7**	**7,9998**	**5**	**5**	**5**	**5**	**3**	**7**	**3**	**10,766**	**1**	**5**	**3**	**3,633**	**8**	**17,25**	**3**	**4**	**3**	**3,545**	**4**	**4,333**	
			Sum negative	**0**	**4**	**28**	**24**	**8**	**24**	**21,3328**	**19**	**13**	**19**		**16**	**16**	**16**	**24,608**	**12**	**15**	**5**	**46**	**15**	**28,75**	**13**	**11**	**8**	**15,36**	**11**	**11,56**	

		Definitions and associations	SP	VP	FP	M	F	weighted average m	weighted average f	O	Y	weighted average o	weighted average y	U	R	weighted average u	weighted average r	A	MS	B	weighted average a	weighted average ms	weighted average b	GS	MS	AK	weighted average gs	weighted average ms	weighted average ak	
	1	F=no citizenship	6	2	1	7	2	7	5,3332	4	5	4	5	8	1	8	1,538		9		0	9	0		4	5	0	4	7,222	9
	2	F=Austrian with citizenship	7	2	1	8	2	8	5,3332	4	6	4	6	10		10	0	1	9		3,833	9	0	1	5	4	1,182	5	5,778	10
	3	F= other language	4	6	4	10	4	10	10,6664	7	7	7	7	8	6	8	9,228	2	12		7,667	12	0	3	7	4	3,545	7	5,778	14
	4	F=other language who do to want to speak German			2	2		2	0	2		2	0	2		2	0	1	1		3,833	1	0	1		1	1,182	0	1,444	2
	5	F=other religion	3	4	3	9	1	9	2,6666	3	7	3	7	6	4	6	6,152	2	6	2	7,667	6	11,5	4	2	4	4,727	2	5,778	10
	6	F=Turk, Islam, Moslem	1	2	3	5	1	5	2,6666	3	3	3	3	4	2	4	3,076	3	2	1	11,5	2	5,75	5	1		5,909	1	0	6
	7	F=other culture	2	3	1	6		6	0	3	3	3	3	4	2	4	3,076	1	3	2	3,833	3	11,5	2	2	2	2,364	2	2,889	6
	8	F= other mentality		3	6	7	2	7	5,3332	5	4	5	4	4	5	4	7,69	5	3	1	19,17	3	5,75	6	3		7,091	3	0	9
	9	F=who do not assimilate		2	2	3	1	3	2,6666	2	2	2	2		4	0	6,152	2	1	1	7,667	1	5,75	2	1	1	2,364	1	1,444	4
	10	F=crime		1	1	1	1	1	2,6666	1	1	1	1	2		2	0		2		0	2	0	1	1		1,182	1	0	2
	11	F=cliques		1	2	2	1	2	2,6666	3		3	0	1	2	1	3,076	3			11,5	0	0	3			3,545	0	0	3
	12	F=other looks		3	3	6		6	0		6	0	6	2	4	2	6,152		5	1	0	5	5,75	1	3	2	1,182	3	2,889	6
	13	F=other physical characteristics	1	2	3	6		6	0	3	3	3	3	5	1	5	1,538	2	4		7,667	4	0	2	2	3	2,364	2	4,333	6
	14	F=brith and genes			2	2		2	0		2	0	2	2		2	0		2		0	2	0		1	1	0	1	1,444	2
	15	F=name			1	1		1	0		1	0	1	1		1	0		1		0	1	0		1		0	1	0	1
		F=																												
	16	F=A if born in Austria		1			1	0	2,6666	1		1	0		1	0	1,538		1		0	1	0		1		0	1	0	1
	17	F=A if they participate in Austrian public life,integrates,works		3	1	4		4	0	1	3	1	3	3	1	3	1,538	1	3		3,833	3	0	2		2	2,364	0	2,889	4
	18	F=A if they speak German to some extent	2	5	6	11	2	11	5,3332	4	9	4	9	7	6		9,228	2	10	1	7,667	10	5,75	4	5	4	4,727	5	5,778	13
	19	F=A in the long run	1	1	1	3		3	0	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	1,538	2	1		7,667	1	0	2		1	2,364	0	1,444	3
	20	F=A if they full assimilate	1		2	3		3	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1,538	1	2		3,833	2	0	1	1	1	1,182	1	1,444	3
	21	F=A if they assimilate and accept to German culture			1	1		1	0	1		1	0	1		1	0		1		0	1	0			1	0	0	1,444	1
	22	F=never A (even with citizenship), if no assimilation			1	1		1	0	1		1	0	1		1	0		1		0	1	0			1	0	0	1,444	1
	23	F=never A because of birth and genes		1		1		1	0		1	0	1	1		1	0		1		0	1	0	1			1,182	0	0	1
		F=A IF																												

APPENDIX SEVEN

A	B	C	D	interviewees of all parties: red =SP, blue=FP, black=VP	DD-Andi-KA	RU-JA-AJ	ST-WW-RJ	MH-GU-STPh	FK-AFF-heinz	OGZ-HEL-Hr	FE-PET-HP	GRH-ZD-EP	MGR-HEP-Ef	CR-anni-MAR	WZ-SIG-ROS	SP	VP	FP	tot
				thematic group: personal exp-1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1				
1				Positive Personal experience	F V	S	S V	F V	S		S	S	S V	S	S F V	8	5	3	16
	1			Neutral personal experience	S	V		S		S F V	V					3	3	1	7
	2			no personal experience			F		V			F V	F	V			3	3	6
		1		negative personal experience	F V		V		F		F	S	V	F	F V	1	4	5	10
				thematic group immigration, labour market, welfare 2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	SP	VP	FP	
2				Need immigration, need more I, I is no problem, I is ok	S		S	S	S	S	S		S			7			7
3				immigration with some regulations, no chaos		S										1			1
4				need immigration to support pension system-die out										S		1			1
5				need immigration for labour market							S		S	S	S	4			4
6				need skilled labour migration					V				S			1	1		2
				NEED IMMIGRATION												14	1	0	15
7				foreigners do jobs Austrians do not do	F	S	F	S V	S V	V	S			F	S V F	5	4	4	13
				PLUS FOR LABOUR MARKET												5	4	4	13
8				foreigners support state with taxes, pay tax	S		S		S			S	S	S		6			6
9				foreigners work and (then) support the system	S		S		S					S		4			4
10				no sponging -why would they leave home	S		S	S	S	S	V					5	1		6
11				if they work they support system	V			S V						F		1	2	1	4
				WELFARE SYSTEM PLUS												16	3	1	20
			1	foreigners = no citizenship		S	V	S	S	S			S	S		6	1		7
			2	foreigners =Austrian once they obtain with citizenship		S	S V	S	S	S			S	S		7	1		8
12				rights for foreigners, as they have duties	S									S		2			2
13				equality for foreigners by law	S									S		2			2
14				political rights = citizenship rights , Citizenship rights				S						S		2			2
15				rights and duties are the same for foreigners and Austrians	S				S					S		3			3
16				give and take, we have to offer them something	S								S			2			2
17				right to their own culture, right to sustain their culture											S	1			1
18				right to religion in state under the rule of law		S										1			1
				RIGHTS AND DUTIES												26	2	0	28
	3			immigration remain as it is, enough now	V	V	V F	V		V		V	V	V	V		9	1	10
	4			need certain labour migration and others not (specialisation)	V	V	V F	F							V		4	2	6
				NEUTRAL ON IMMIGRATION													13	3	16
	5			neutral on labour market		S		V		V	V		V			1	4		5
	6			no threat to labour market, no particular impact			V	V		V		V					4		4
				NEUTRAL ON LABOUR MARKET												1	8		9
	7			both sponge, they (foreigners) but we (Austrians) also	V	S V		S V F		V	S F	V	S V	V	S F	5	7	3	15
	8			organise a basis---some sponge others work and pay tax			F			F	F							3	3
				NEUTRAL ON WELFARE SYSTEM												5	7	6	18
	9		stat	we/state should look after immigrants, organise flat, work	V		V						S			1	2		3
	10			we are well and the state can support foreigners	V			S								1	1		2
	11			we need to help them	S											1			1
				HELP												3	3	0	6
		2		immigration is /can be a threat				F					F					2	2
		3		no more immigration, stop immigration					F					F	F			3	3
		4		too much immigration	F	F				F	F	S F				1		5	6
		5		immigration Of that amount is a threat and causes conflict	F		V		F			S				1	1	2	4
		6		stricter immigration control, no family reunions							F		F					2	2
		7		too many f foreigners in Austria (by way of immigration)		F				F	F							3	3
		8		no immigration of unskilled labour- close borders		V						S				1	1		2
		9		send them back		F						S				1		1	2
				AGAINST IMMIGRATION												4	2	18	24
		10		Foreigners take jobs from Austrians							F							1	1
		11		Foreigners are a threat to the labour market		F		F	F		F	S		V		1	1	4	6
		12		we have enough Austrians for jobs, do not need foreigners		F					F							2	2
		13		take Austrians first for jobs			S									1			1
		14		Austrians are disadvantaged in the labour market		F					F	S		F		1		3	4
		15		support our people in education so that they can do the jobs	F					F								2	2
		16		foreigners bring in cheap labour which is a threat	F			S			F			F		1		3	4
				THREAT TO LABOUR MARKET												4	1	15	20
		17		foreigners sponge , know how to sponge	V	F	V F		V F	F	F	S F	F	F	V F	1	4	9	14
		18		they are a burden- we do not want to only pay for them							F		V	F	F		1	3	4
		19		they will take over, they will demand things		F				F	F		F					4	4
				BURDEN ON WELFARE SYSTEM												1	5	16	22

				DO-Andl-KA	RU-JA-AJ	ST-WW-RJ	MH-GU-STF	FK-AFF-heir	OGZ-HEL-H	FE-PET-HP	GRH-ZD-EP	MGR-HEP-E	CR-anni-MA	WZ-SIG-ROS					
			thematic group culture and integration: 3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		SP	VP	FP	
19			foreigners are interesting	S			F							S		2		1	3
20			foreigners are no problem		S	S	S	S	S V				S	S		7	1		8
21			foreigners are a chance							S						1			1
22			mutual respect			S						S		V		2	1		3
23			Culture =benefit,more would be nice, we can learn	S			S	S		S		S				5			5
24			mutual cultural benefit, cultural exchange=benefit,	V				S				S	S	V		3	2		5
25			cultural freedom to the extent of what laws allow		S		S					S				3			3
26			cultural respect						S				S	S		3			3
27			cultural freedom		S		S F	F				S V		F		3	1	3	7
28			cultural merging positive, mutual exchange	S	V	V				S		S				3	2		5
			CULTURE POSITIVE													32	7	4	
29			integration voluntarily, they should participate in public life	V	S V	S	F			S	V	S V		S		5	4	1	10
30			Multiculturalism, everybody free to live their culture, Chinatown		S		S	S	S				S	S		6			6
31			Integration is language knowledge , voluntary language learning	S	S	S				S		S				5			5
32			sanctions by state negative-sanctions/prohibitions inpracticable	S	S					S						3			3
33			Multiculturalism- Pluralism	S	S	S	S		V	S		S				6	1		7
34			create positive foreign climate	S						S		S				3			3
			INTEGRATION=MK-POSITIVE CONCEPT													28	5	1	
	12		cultural neutral..do not care,no benefit, no disturbance	F	V	S V	S V	V F	V	S V	V	V	V	F		3	9	3	15
	13		culture has positive and negative aspects	V								V					2		2
	14		culture will merge, but no impact, neutral				V F		V		V						3	1	4
			CULTURE NEUTRAL													3	14	4	
	15		Pluralism: keep culture in private, adapt in public to some extent, c	V	V		S V F	V	V	V	V	S V		V		2	9	1	12
	16		get good ones and bad ones, like everybody else	V	S								V			1	2		3
	17		accept them, tolerate them				F			V				V			2	1	3
	18		should speak and learn or know German	S V F	V	F		V F	V F		V	S V		V		2	7	3	12
			INTEGRATION = POS AND NEG: PL													5	20	5	
		20	culturally disturbing			F			F		S					1		2	3
		21	their culture in public is disturbing			F			F									2	2
		22	Austrians should not be disturbed by them	F														1	1
		23	cultural threat, foreigners take our culture away					V		F	F		F				1	3	4
		24	their culture will be a problem in future					F										1	1
		25	foreign ghettos are negative					F	F									2	2
		26	Turks have an aggressive mentality	F	F						S F	V F	F	S		2	1	5	8
		27	Turks have no culture and should go home								S					1			1
		28	Turks are a problem	F				F				V F					1	3	4
			CULTURE IS NEGATIVE; A THREAT													4	3	19	
		29	if foreigners do not assimilate they should go home		F				F	F	S					1		3	4
		30	they have to behave as we do, have to follow our ways of life						F	F	S					1		2	3
		31	they should live as we do							F	F		F					3	3
		32	assimilation	F	F	F			F	F	F		F	F				8	8
		33	ASsimilation-PLuraism (religious autonomy in private)		F	V F	V	F	F	F	S	F		F		1	2	7	10
		34	forced language courses					V F	F	F	S					1	1	3	5
		35	forced integration							F								1	1
			FORCED INTEGRATION; CONCEPT OF ASSIMILATION													4	3	27	
			thematic group:Religion 4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4		SP	VP	FP	
35			religion is no problem	V			S F		S		V	S	S	F		4	2	2	8
36			religious freedom		S	S F		F	V F	S V		S		S V F		5	3	4	12
37			religion is benefit	S		S	S			S	V			V		4	2		6
38			respect their religion, mutual religious respect	V	S	S	V			S V		S		V		4	4		8
39			resepct religion as much as law allows		S											1			1
			RELIGION POSITIVE													18	11	6	
	19		religion whatever, no benefit, no disturbance	S V F	V			V	V	V F		F	V	F		1	6	4	11
			RELIGION NEUTRAL													1	6	4	
		36	religion is disturbing	F	F						S					1		2	3
		37	religion is a threat			V				F		V	F				2	2	4
		38	Islam is a problem only as in religion suppresses women	S	V	V		F		F						1	2	2	5
		39	Islam is a problem					F		F		V					1	2	3
		40	Turkish fundamentalism is problem, Turks -fanatism is problem	F		F		S F			F	V		V		1	2	4	7
		41	*turks have aggressive mentality*	F							F	V F	F				1	4	5
		42	*Turks have no culture and should go home*								S					1			1
			RELIGION PROBLEM AND THREAT													4	8	16	

				DD-Andi-KA	RU-JA-AJ	ST-WW-RJ	MH-GU-STPH	FK-AFF-heinz	OGZ-HEL-HH	FE-PET-HP	GRH-ZD-EP	MGR-HEPER	CR-anni-MAR	WZ-SIG-ROS					
			thematic group identity 5	s	s	s	s	s	s	s	s	s	s	s		SP	VP	FP	
40			Austrian identity is diverse as a result of the habsburg monarchy				F		S							1		1	2
41			*cultural merging is positive, no threat*	S	V	V	F			S	S	S	S			5	2	1	8
42			cultural merging is chance, no threat							S						1			1
43			no threat	S	S V	S	S V	S	V	S	S V	S		F		8	4	1	13
			CONTRIBUTION TO IDENTITY													15	6	3	
	20		neutral to threat, no threat, no harm and not positive either	V				V		V		F	V	S		1	4	1	6
	21		no threat, (no contribution) to identity				V										1		1
	22		*culture will merge, but neutral*				V		V		V						3		3
			NO THREAT ; NO CONTRIBUTION TO IDENTITY													1	8	1	
		43	threat as they create conflicts and a culture clash	F	F	F		V F									1	4	5
		44	swamping generated by high birth rates, threat of birth rates						F	F	F		F					4	4
		45	foreign swamping=threat	F	F			F	F	F	F	V	F	V			2	7	9
		46	threat (to national identity)		F			F	F		F	V	F				1	5	6
		47	austrians will die out, threat to identity, we need higher birth rates	F						F								2	2
		48	*cultural threat, they take our culture away*						F				F					2	2
		49	*their culture will be a problem in future*					F										1	1
		50	cultural merging negative	F							F		F					3	3
			THREAT TO OUR IDENTITY													0	4	28	
			Definitions and associations	DD-Andi-KA	RU-JA-AJ	st-WW-RJ	MH-GU-steph	FK-AFFheinz	OGZ-HEL-HH	FE-PET-HP	GRH-ZD-EP	MGR-HEPER	CR-anni-MA	WZ-SIG-ROS		SP	VP	FP	
		1	F=no citizenship		S	V	S V	S	S F			S	S			6	2	1	9
		2	F=Austrian with citizenship	F	S	S V	S	S	S V			S	S			7	2	1	10
		3	F= other language	S V	S V		V F		V	S V F		F		S V F		4	6	4	14
		4	F=other language who do to want to speak German						F	F								2	2
		5	F=other religion	S	S	V F	V	V F		F	S	V				3	4	3	10
		6	F=Turk, Islam, Moslem		V F			V		F	S		F			1	2	3	6
		7	F=other culture	F	S			V	V		S V					2	3	1	6
		8	F= other mentality		V F	F		F		S V F	S F		F	V			3	6	9
		9	F=who do not assimilate				V	V			F		F				2	2	4
		10	F=crime		V							F					1	1	2
		11	F=cliques							V F			F				1	2	3
		12	F=other looks	V	F	F	V F	V									3	3	6
		13	F=other physical characteristics		F	V	V		F	F	S					1	2	3	6
		14	F=brith and genes	F	F													2	2
		15	F=name		F													1	1
			F=																
		16	F=A if born in Austria											V			1		1
		17	F=A if they participate in Austrian public life,integrates,works	V	V		V			F							3	1	4
		18	F=A if they speak German to some extent	V F	S V	S F	V F	F	V	F		V		F		2	5	6	13
		19	F=A in the long run	F		S				V						1	1	1	3
		20	F=A if they full assimilate			F			F		S					1		2	3
		21	F=A if they assimilate and accept to German culture						F									1	1
		22	F=never A (even with citizenship), if no assimilation						F									1	1
		23	F=never A because of birth and genes		V												1		1
			F=A IF																

APPENDIX EIGHT

A	B	C	D	interviewees of green party-separate to case study	pavel	suchi	gabi	
				Thematic group personal exp-1				
1				Positive Personal experience	GR	GR	GR	3
	1			Neutral personal experience				
	2			no personal experience				
		1		negative personal experience		GR		1
				thematic group:immigration, labour market, welfare 2				
2				Need imm, need more I, I is no problem, I is ok open border	GR			2
3				immigration with some regulations, no chaos				
4				need immigration to support pension system-as ow w die out	GR		GR	2
5				need immigraiton for labour market	GR	GR	GR	3
6				need skilled labour migration			GR	1
7				f=jobs austrians do not do	GR	GR		2
8				f support state with taxes, pay tax				
9				they work and (then) support the system		GR		1
10				no sponging -why would they leave home	GR		GR	2
11				if they work they supprt system				
			1	f- no citizenship		GR		1
			2	f=A with citizenship				
12				rights for f, as they have duties				
13				equality for f by law				
14				political rights = citizenship , p etnitle them				
15				rights and duties..the same for f and a				
16				give and take, we have to offer th sth,				
17				right to their own culture, right to sustain their culture				
18				right to eligiomn im rechtstaat.				
	3			immigraiton remain as it is, ebough now				
	4			need certain labour migration and others not (need spec)				
	5			neutral in labour market				
	6			no threat to labour market, no particular impact				
	7			both sponge, they but we also	GR			1
	8			organise a bassis---some sponge others not		GR		1
	9			we should look after th-organise flat, work, do not hold th back		GR		1
	10			we are well and the state can support th to establish themselves				
	11			we need to help them		GR		1
		2		immigration is can be threat				
		3		no more immigration, stop immigration				
		4		too much immigration				
		5		immigr. Of that amount is a threat and causes conflict				
		6		stricter immigration control, no family reunions				
		7		too many f in a (though immigraiton)				
		8		unskilled labour close borders, no i of unskilled I				
		9		send them back				
		10		F take jobs from A				
		11		F=threat to labour market				
		12		we have enough austrians for jobs, do not need f				
		13		take austrians first for jobs				
		14		austrians are disadvatntaged in the labour market				
		15		supprt our people in education so that they can do jobs				
		16		f=cheap labour =threat				
		17		sponge , know how to sponge				
		18		they are a burden- we do not want to only pay for them				
		19		they will take over, they will demand thing				

				thematic group: culture and integration: 3				
19				foreingers are interesting	GR			1
20				foreingers are no problem		GR		2
21				foreigners are a chance	GR			1
22				mutal respect				
23				Cultre =benefit,more would be nice we can learn,	GR GR			2
24				mutual cultural benefit,cultural exchange=benefit,				
25				as the a law allows-grenzen sind rechtstaat, od pers. Freiheit		GR		1
26				cultural respect				
27				cultural freedom	GR	GR		2
28				cultural merging positive	GR		GR	2
29				i vol by th, they should particiapte in pub life, offer th sth	GR	GR	GR	3
30				MK, evyb free to live their c, chinatown, jeder wie er will in k	GR GR		GR	2
31				integration is language knowledge , vlunatr< language learning	GR		GR	2
32				bad i by state with sancitons -verbot, st sanct not practicable	GR			1
33				MK -PL			GR	1
34				create pos f climate				
	12			cultural neutral..do not care,no beenfit, no disturbance				
	13			culture has positive and negative aspects				
	14			culture will merge, but no impact, neutral				
	15			PL: keep c in private, adapt in public to s ext, mittelweg in i				
	16			good f and bad f, like indiv, get good ones and bad ones		GR		1
	17			accept them,tolerate them				
	18			should speak and learn or know german		GR		1
		20		culturally disturbing				
		21		their culture in public is disturbing				
		22		austrians should not be disturbed by them				
		23		cultural threat, take our culture away				
		24		their culture will be a problem in future				
		25		foreing ghettos are negative				
		26		Turks is aggressive mentality		GR		1
		27		turks have no culture and should go home				
		28		turks are a problem				
		29		if foreingers do not assimilate they should go home				
		30		th h to behave aswedo, take up our c and I, have to follow o c				
		31		they should live as we do				
		32		assimilation				
		33		AS-PL (keep very very few things in private -religion)				
		34		forced language courses				
		35		forced integraiton				
				thematic group: Religion :4				
35				religion ia no problem				
36				religious freedom	GR			1
37				religion is benefit	GR	GR	GR	3
38				respect their religion, mutual religious respect, as much as				
39				law allows				
	19			rekigion whatever, no benefit, no disturbance				
		36		religion is disturbing				
		37		religion is threat				
		38		islam is problem only as in religion surpresses women			GR	1
		39		islam is problem				
		40		turkish fundamentlaism is problem, turks - fanatism is prob				
		41		*turksis aggressive mentlaity*		GR		1
		42		*turks have no cultre and should go hom*				

				thematic group: identity 5					
40				austrian id. is historically grown thru diversity of p-monarchy	GR		GR		2
41				*cultural merging is positive, no threat*	GR	GR	GR		2
42				cultural mergin is chance, no threat					
43				no threat		GR			1
	20			neutral to threat, th r no threat, no harm and not pos either					
	21			no threat, (no contribution) to idenetity					
	22			*culture will merge, but neutral*		GR			1
		43		threat as they create conflicts, culture clash					
		44		swamping through brith rates, threat of birth rates					
		45		foreign swamping=threat					
		46		threat (to national identioty)					
		47		a die out, threat to id, we need better children poltics, o d o					
		48		*cultural threat, they take our culture away*					
		49		*their culture will be a problem in future*					
		50		cultural merging negative					
				definitions and associations					
			1	F=no citizenship					
			2	f-a with citizenship		GR			1
			3	f= other language					
			4	F=other language who do ot want to speak german					
			5	f=other religion					
			6	f=turk, islam, moslem					
			7	f=other culture	GR				1
			8	f= other metnality					
			9	f0who do not assimilate					
			10	f0crime					
			11	f0cliques					
			12	f0other looks					
			13	f0other physical charachteristics					
			14	f0brith and genes					
			15	F=name					
			16	F=a if born in austria					
			17	f=a if they particiapte in austrian public life,integrates,wokrks					
			18	F=a if they speak german to some extent					
			19	F=a in the long run					
			20	F=A if they full assimilate					
			21	F=a if they assimilate and accept to german culture					
			22	F=a if they speak proper and perfect german					
			23	F=never A (even with citizenship), if no assimilation					
			24	F=never a because of brth and genes					
				F=A					

APPENDIX NINE

SUPPORT GROUPS DISCOURSE MAPPING

A	B	C	D		DBV	such	gab
				theamtic group: personal exp-1			
1				Positive Personal experience	GR	GR	GR
	1			Neutral personal exüperience			
	2			no personal experience			
		1		negative personal expereince		GR	
				thematic group: immigration, labour market, welfare 2			
2				Need imm, need more i, i is no problem, i is ok	GR		
3				immigration with some regulations, no chaos			
4				need immigration to support pension system-die out	GR		GR
5				need immigraiton for labour market	GR	GR	GR
6				need skilled labour migration			GR
				NEED IMMIGRATION			
7				foreigners do jobs austrians do not do	GR	GR	
				PLUS FOR LABOUR MARKET			
8				foreigners support state with taxes, pay tax			
9				foreigners work and (then) support the system		GR	
10				no sponging -why would they leave home	GR		GR
11				if they work they supprt system			
				WELFARE SYSTEM PLUS			
			1	foreigners= no citizenship		GR	
			2	foreigners =Austrians once they obtain citizenship			
12				rights for foreigners as they have duties			
13				equality for foreingers by law			
14				politcal rights = citizenship rights, citizenship rights			
15				rights and duties are the same for foreigners and austrians			
16				give and take, we have to offer them something			
17				right to their own culture, right to sustain their culture			
18				right to religion in state under the rule of law			
				RIGHTS AND DUTIES			
	3			immigraiton remain as it is, eNough now			
	4			need certain labour migration and others not (specialisation)			
				NEUTRAL ON IMMIGRATION			
	5			neutral in labour market			
	6			no threat to labour market, no particular impact			
				NEUTRAL ON LABOUR MARKET			
	7			both sponge, they (foreigners) but we (Austrians) also	GR		
	8			organise a basis---some sponge others work and pay tax		GR	
				NEUTRAL ON WELFARE SYSTEM			
	9			we/state should look after immigrants, organise flat, work		GR	
	10			we are well and the state can support foreigners			
	11			we need to help them		GR	
				HELP			
		2		immigration is7can be threat			
		3		no more immigration, stop immigration			
		4		too much immigration			
		5		immigration of that amount is a threat and causes conflict			
		6		stricter immigration control, no family reunions			
		7		too many foreigners in Austria (by way of immigration)			
		8		no immigration of unskilled labour-close borders			
		9		send them back			
				AGAINST IMMIGRATION			
		10		foreigners take jobs from Austrians			
		11		foreigners are a threat to the labour market			
		12		we have enough austrians for jobs, do not need foreigners			
		13		take austrians first for jobs			
		14		Austrians are disadvantaged in the labour market			
		15		support our people in education so that they can do the jobs			
		16		foreigners are cheap labour which is a threat			
				THREAT TO LABOUR MARKET			
		17		Foreigners sponge , know how to sponge			
		18		they are a burden- we do not want to only pay for them			
		19		they will take over, they will demand thing			
				BURDEN ON WELFARE SYSTEM			


thematic group: culture and integration: 3
foreigners are interesting
foreigners are no problem
foreigners are a chance
mutal respect
Cultre =benefit,more would be nice, we can learn,
mutual cultural benefit,cultural exchange=benefit,
cultural freedom to extent of what the laws allow
cultural respect
cultural freedom
cultural merging positive, mutual exchange
CULTURE POSITIVE
integration voluntarily; they should participate in public life
Multiculturalism, everybody free to live their culture, Chinatown
Integration is language knowledge , voluntary language learning
sanctions by state negative-sanctions/prohibitions inpracticable
Multiculturalism-pluralism
create positive foreign climate
INTEGRATION=POSITIVE CONCEPT=MK
cultural neutral..do not care,no benefit, no disturbance
culture has positive and negative aspects
culture will merge, but no impact, neutral
CULTURE NEUTRAL
Pluralism: keep culture in private,adapt in public to some extent
get good ones and bad ones, like everybody else
accept them,tolerate them
should speak and learn or know german
INTEGRATION= POS AND NEG: PLURALISM
culturally disturbing
their culture in public is disturbing
austrians should not be disturbed by them
cultural threat, Foreigners take our culture away
their culture will be a problem in future
foreing ghettos are negative
Turks have an aggressive mentality
turks have no culture and should go home
turks are a problem
CULTURE IS NEGATIVE=A THREAT
if foreingers do not assimilate they should go home
they have to behave as we do, have to follow our ways of life
they should live as we do
assimilation
Assimilation-pluralism (religious autonomy in private)
forced language courses
forced integration
FORCED INTEGRATION CONCEPT OF ASSIMILATION
Religion cluster:4
religion is no problem
religious freedom
religion is benefit
respect their religion, mutual religious respect
respect their religion as much as law allows
RELIGION POSITIVE
religion whatever, no benefit, no disturbance
RELIGION NEUTRAL
religion is disturbing
religion is threat
islam is problem only as in religion surpresses women
islam is problem
turkish fundaamentalism is problem, turks - fanatism is problem
turks have aggressive mentality
turks have no culture and should go hom
RELIGION PROBLEM AND THREAT
Thematic group: identity 5
austrian identity is diverse as a result of the habsburg monarchy
cultural merging is positive, no threat
cultural merging is chance, no threat
no threat
CONTRIBUTION TO IDENTITY
neutral to threat, no threat, no harm and not positive either
no threat, (no contribution) to identity
culture will merge, but neutral
NO THREAT,NO CONTRIBUTION TO IDENTITY
threat as they create conflicts and a culture clash
swamping generated by high birth rates, threat of birth rates
foreign swamping=threat
threat (to national identity)
austrians will die out, threat to identity, we need higher birth rates
cultural threat, they take our culture away
their culture will be a problem in future
cultural merging negative
THREAT TO OUR IDENTITY


1 O=no citizenship
2 fO-a with citizenship
3 fO=other religion
4 fO=turk, islam, moslem
5 fO=other culture
6 fO= other metnality
7 f0who do not assimilate
8 f0crime
9 f0cliques
10 f0otehr looks
11 f0other physical charachteristics
12 f0brith and genes
13 fO= other language
14 O=other language who do ot want to speak german
15 fO=a if they particiapte in austrian public life,integrates,wokrks
16 O=name
17 O=a if born in austria
18 O=a in the long run
19 O=A if they full assimilate
20 O=a if they assimilate and accept to german culture
21 O=a if they speak proper and perfect german
22 O=never A (even with citizenship), if no assimilation
23 O=never a because of brth and genes
24 O=a if they speak german to some extent

274

Appendix Ten:

I: 'ahm. Labour market and economy, the following question: well, Austria has a statistically proven and statistically seen, a high immigration number. And well, I think one of the highest within the EU, well, calculated based on the overall population density. Do you think the number is too high or too small? Well, do you think one should stop now and rather limit and shut down the border slightly, because there are already negative side effects in the past few years, or do you think it can go on like that, or can easily go on like that, or do you think, well it cannot go on like that but we need more 'migrant's, because it is possibly positive?

DIET: well, if one looks ahead in the long run, then of course one needs more people, that is for sure, well but no politician is ready to and has the guts, to somehow do something, something that is longer lasting than the next elections. Well, this is the drama, that- well, unfortunately-....

I one could say a catastrophe- this is what you mean.

Diet: well yes, the populism. All the time.

I: well, and then we have mh, the theme with labour market and immigration, also related to the immigration figures. Well there is this propaganda theme, once it is said we need desperately more people, as we do not have enough local (Austrian) skilled labour or labour in 5 ten, 15 years time. That means, more in, as otherwise the economy will have problems here, or the second point of view is, well, yes, no more people in, they all take our jobs away, that is the other extreme. What is your view? Do you think this can be true?

Diet: well, I find that, the most important is, to set the preconditions, well, that one does a lot, - for integration, so that- ahm, well later-ahm-well that the people when we need do want to come, because once the people can choose (where to migrate to) the qualified foreigners where they go, then it will be of importance- how integrate- which climate is in the country and how they are accepted and how they are integrated, and if nothing is done in this respect now then they will not come to Austria but they will go to other countries.

I: well, then does that mean that in principle you do think that in future we might need more people. Well.-

Diet: of course, definitely, we now have to build the basis by building a pro foreign friendly climate.

I: Mh.ok. then we have socials and welfare theme. Often it is talked about then social system and the welfare state. And that in direction of one the one hand of the sponging, well that the foreigners come , and do not want to work anyways and want to get the unemployment benefits, well and then it is often said, in fact a number of my interviewees Tate that they have 15 children and then they get a certificate for that and cash in the children benefits and take advantage of the social system. On the other hand it is argued that no, that cannot be said like this, they work in the country, they support our social system (taxes9 and hence, support the unemployed. Ahm,what do you think? Do you think one can put it that way, that foreigners arrive here, partly to sponge or do you think this is not at all the case? Well which direction of argument would you follow?

Diet: well, sponging, and using , no definitely not. Well, I think, I mean, if the foreigners pay their taxes (social taxes), then one has to also give them social benefits, that is- one cannot pay them for it and then not give them anything. Well, so they have the right, if they approach a difficult situation, that one helps them.

I: so practically, that what i mentioned second, - that they support the social state, and by that- well sorry i always interrupt....

Diet: that's ok.

I did you want to say something else? Something, I think there was something else you wanted to say- when I interrupted.

Diet: no, I do not think anybody arrives in Austria with the mission of sponging off the Austrian state, I think this is absolutely stupid, because well I think they leave their homes and their environments and their personal relations, I think, what they give e up- and that for a few schillings from the Austrian social welfare? Well I think this is laughable.

Appendix Eleven:

I: well, - yes. With the labour market and economy, there are a number of view points by the media or politics, well, I have two questions here, the first one is in relation to the migration number and figures, there are people in the media and politicians, who say, either that the rate is too high, too low or that the immigration number has no effects. What is your opinion in general?

HE: Ahm, well, let's say, there is enormous amount of work which our people would not do anyways, because they are too good for it, they think, so therefore we need them anyways, and then, at the moment, we lack a lot of people in the IT branch, well-

I: do you think that somehow conflicts arise or problems arise , due to so many people entering then, or having entered in the past, or will in future?- that a percentage-

He: that xenophobia arises?

I: yes, no- no not really-

HE: that jobs are taken from our people?

I: nono, just that conflicts could arise due to the other cultures, in some way, that one could say, that if more and more enter, that it could be too much or problematic.

HE: ahm ok. Well, yes, I do think that, well that somehow in some ghettos, well, a nasty expression- but if they are always put together in some areas of town, that they are amongst each other, so that there is no integration. Integration does not exist. well, then it can be.

I: that then conflicts arise, you think, because, the foreigners might then think, why am i exposed to this-

HE: because with us- it just does not go with our culture.

I: MH

HE: then it definitely comes to

I: problems yes, well then to the question of the labour market and jobs, well you already answered this in a way, well it would have been is it positive or negative or neutral on the labour migration, the immigration number- well you said before there are jobs we do not do or you talked about IT branche

HE: they need that.

I and that is why we have already answered that. Then we have politics and social issues, well there is this theme of the sponging off from the state, and there is this thing , some say, well a majority of foreigners does not want to work, or let's say, sponges the unemployment money or the children's benefits-

He. I would say I would also not pay children money for children who do not live here. I would also not pay- this is logic.

I: well is this paid for?

He: yes, of course. And well, I think this is not logic and makes no sense.

I well, yes, if they are not here.

He: because, it is rather difficult to prove how many children are here and exist.

I: well I have heard according to my other interviewees that in Vienna there are safe incidents, where they went to other doctors and got certificates for children, or that they bribed somebody, so that more children existed.

He: well, don't know, but I am sure there are many of those. I am also against this.

I: well, ok. Then we have culture and religion. Well this is a about special cultural different characteristics. For example, well, clothing, of these women ahm, or also, for example ethnic restaurants, ahm well, what do you think of that, ahm well do you see it in everyday life, do you perceive it as disturbing, well that it leads to some conflicts, or is it a benefit, well do you even see it at all? Well it could also be that,-

He: well this does not disturb me at all, as long as I have nothing to do with it directly, and I have nothing to do with it-

Interview Transcription AJ:

I: so then, we have the theme- economy and labour market. These are two questions, the first one is: well Austria has a statistically high immigration number, in relation to other eu states.

AJ: yes, I know.

I do you think that it is too high, that one can see negative effects, that this is just happening and it is really not mattering if it get higher or lower, do that it is too little, because we ,w ell- maybe need more people?

AJ: well one has to look t this historically. – of course before we had, in the 60s we need all those people, in the 50s and 60s. that they stayed is logical. Because of this we now at this moment, we have a too high 'foreigner' quote, well one has to say that. But one can, that is all in the region of being ok and it should remain as it is.

I: would u say , not more now, and if it gets more now, it would be a bit too much?

AJ: well, I don't know if the work is not here.

I: mh, ok, culture. That is a simple question, quick and easy, how do you perceive the cultural practices of minorities for example, ethnic food, slam, the clothing with women, maybe the showing of the Islam in public, do you see it as positively , a benefit or as negative, something that disturbs you or do you not care about it at all?

AJ. I do not care at all, as long as no one tells me that i.....ahhmmmmmm ethnic. well if i have to judge it, that with the women is not ok, but other than that i do not care about it.

I: And why do u think this is not ok.

Aj: well because it is a downgrading of the quality of life for women.

Appendix Twelve:

I: OK. Well, so there we are. – ahm, i have taken up diverse issues and arguments from the media and political discourses. the first would be – Austria has a relatively high immigration number, that is statistically proven, specifically in the 1990s, in comparison to other EU member states, do you think, if one looks at it from a general perspective, do we have a too high immigration number already in relation to the effects of immigration, or is it small or normal and so that we certainly have space for more people or the ah – well the leaving the borders open? I

PET: well in my opinion the immigration number is far too high, ah we have far too many in already and ah-yes, this should really, really- as I have said before, should be limited (sifted out) (gesiebt). We have too many. Because this means disadvantages for the Austrians on a professional basis in the labour market.

I: so , it appears to me that you observe negative effects practically speaking.

PET: Yes, I see that.

I: yes, i have the next question, and well, it is publicly communicated about (TV, radio) of the labour market and economy. Concretely it is argued that we need- well we will in future not have enough local skilled labour from Austria, due to the education etc,- we must import labour, be that on a seasonal basis, be that on a long term basis. On the other hand it is argued- well, ah, that we have an increasing unemployment rate and one does not know what will happen and they take our jobs away. Ah, what is your perspective on that?

PET: well, I am of the opinion, that we have enough Austrian labour. Look at the unemployment figures, if one gives them all work and the early pensioneering, which happen, for that we do not need foreigners. And hence, I have to say that there are many foreigners who take jobs away from Austrians. And , exactly again, in my second- second job, which I do as a waiter, ah, well one just has to look at that, everywhere are the foreigners because they are cheaper labour, they work for less pay, ah, and they take, the jobs away from Austrians.

I: ok, then the theme culture. How do you observe and feel about the cultural practices of foreigners in the everyday. My question is, do you see any of that, and if so, is it positive or negative, beneficial or disturbing? I include in this ethnic food, other types of clothing, Islam and women, or also other languages, for example in the public sphere. How would you reflect on this?

Pet: well, I do observe quite a lot, mainly because of the language. They do not want to accept our language. The clothing I do not care about, am not bothered. The religion they can keep, if they want, only they should behave as we do here and therefore for me all this is negative, i am-for me one of the most important things – he (this one) must be able to communicate in my language, that is important for me. What he does otherwise I do to care about. Well, he must behave like we do.

Appendix Thirteen:

I: So- then we have a few more questions, in which i will outline black white argumentation types out of the media or discussed by politicians. The first one is economy, labour market- it is like that Austria has a high immigration number, that is statistically proven, do you think, that such is too high, or that is not a problem for society? Ahm, just form your personal perspective- it is often discussed- to not let foreigners in or that we do not need them anymore, that is the other argument.

Pav: I do not even know, if the foreigners- well the immigration quota is high, I think it is not- or is it? I think it is 7 or 8 % or so?- mh, well, -ah- I have always ah- or let's say, in the past, maybe not so much now anymore, but before I was of the opinion , that in principles all borders should be opened , well because I think I would not be here, or possibly- I don't know- if I had not had the possibility myself- as it was back then- I think- that in the beginning of the 70s or something like that, in the 70s, it was in the 70s, that it was relatively easy , I think to immigrate to Austria.

I: yet, with the immigration- you already answered this. That –there are some more detailed questions- well- with the labour market.

Pav.: Well, just shortly- I have already said, back then for me it was- for me the principle was, well all-

I: borders open

Pav.: yes, exactly- all yes. But I think that is not realistic, well yes there should be some regulations, well yes I think that, but this should not be strengthened, but rather into a different direction, well I think so. I think the birth rate in upper Austria or what I have read just recently, I think it is at 1,4 or 1,5 children per couple, per married couple, well per reproduction couple – yes (laughter) and that is relatively little, well if then noone comes (migrates), then we will all die out, in a few years.

I: ok, then let's move on with this, because otherwise,- well there is still more. Politics and social stuff, well there is anger that with the welfare state and well that the social state, well there is again this argument, people who are here and work support the social state, regardless of whether they are Austrians or immigrants, whatever, yes-well, the immigrant' is let's say positive for us, because he pays also, he supports the system just the same way, as everybody else. So no difference. The second – propaganda, or whatever one wants to call it, the immigrant' just sponges- well so that- where the distinction is drawn, us and they who immigrate- well often it is said, or well my people, my interviewees, the people I have interviewed often said, yes the Turks with the many children etc. and want children's benefits, or bribe doctors and all those things, ah well, what do you think of all of this- well all these propaganda slogans on both sides?

Pav: well I do not know exactly, how it really is. I think, whether the people come to Austria only due to the fact that they think, the golden west, now I will never have to work again or so, that I do not really think, because I think, well I believe, to leave one's own country, yes, where you actually grew up, well that is quite something. Either it is interest in travel or so or simply desperation, that you have to go away and it can surly be, that one or the other takes a bit advantage of that, well this possibility exists, for example- I do not know- unemployed or so or the ones who get social benefits, well they exist, yes. But I still think, again this is- I think, this is just part of it, well I think one cannot do anything about it.

I: if an Austrian

Pav: well exactly, Austrian do exactly the same, this you can never suppress, if there is something like that in a welfare state, there is always some, who take advantage of it, and those are only a few percent and that- that is part of it, yes. Well, this is part of it and for me I prefer that- the welfare state exists and a few take advantage of it, than not having a welfare state and a few really are disadvantaged, yes.

I: well, I do not think- myself- that much will change- well now we have culture. Cultural practices, that is ethnic restaurants, other clothing, women in Islam.

Pav: I consider this to be wonderful, meaning cultural diversity.

I: well do you mean this is a benefit then.

Pav : for me this is a benefit. For the people who come here it is definitely very difficult.

I: to go through –

Appendix Fourteen:

109th Debate (p.87-89): included are a speech by the ÖVP parliamentary speaker (Karl Freund), the SPÖ (Anton Gaal) and the FPÖ.

Karl Freund (ÖVP)

Mister president! My federal ministers! High house! With the new and modern law(s) about foreigners we are top in Europe. It is innovative, just, and will also be a guidance for many other European union member states. Austria is not a typical immigration country, and we do have an interest in regulated immigration- that Minister Strasser has already indicated -, a form of immigration which the labour market and economy in Austria can tolerate and needs.

Particularly in the farming economy, stability has been achieved with the new saisonaires regulation. To me, as a farmer, this is this very well known. I am always confronted how important saisonaires are for the farming industry. For a saisonaires no immigration right nor right to family reunification exists.

Fact is that in the local labour market too little availability exists for harvest helpers. If Austrian locals are available those will be chosen first, of course. Hence, the argumentation of the opposition that jobs would be taken jobs away from Austrians is not valid.

.....

through the enlargement of the contingent to 8000 and the establishment of a special harvester force for the farmers of 7000 per year, we can expect a massive improvement. one has noticed the signs of the times. Without a necessary contingent of harvester helpers the harvesting at peak times would be almost impossible for certain products, and a lot of vegetables and fruits would get rotten on the fields. With this new reglementation the economic location of Austria is strengthened.

The criticism about the exploitation of foreign saisonaires is useless. ....no talk about income slavery, which was argued here.

With the new regulation the so far common usus, which did not bring in enough contingents (resources) of labour force in peak times, will be changed. In regard to the eu-enlargement this new regulation is very important. To remain competitive we need those harvest helpers. And the securing of the local harvest for the Austrian population has to be guaranteed with the top products of our farming!- thank you.

Gaal (SPÖ):

Mister president!mister minister! Ladies and gentlemen! I think colleague egghart is not present, but I can only say: Vienna is the positive proof evidence for sensible and successful integration politics, and the election results, the agreement of the Viennese , proves such. For us, integration is more than just to learn German. We see this more in depth. Included are also human dignified living circumstances, the right to work, the accessibility of education. Ladies and gentlemen our human perspective is: respect towards each other and a living with each other.

But when one looks at this new law, mister federal chancellor, then one has the impression that for the government integration is just: who does not learn German will be deported- and this is what this looks like.

What really disturbs me from the view point of a Viennese parliamentary minister, is that you did not at all look at the topic from the Viennese side indicated objections. Our objections were NOT considered in the forthcoming law.

Non of our ideas, non of our suggestions or amendment suggestions were considered. But especially Vienna could have made very positive impulses and beneficial international politics, or considerations. Improvement suggestions in the interest of everybody were not valued obviously by the governmental alliance.

....

Ladies and gentlemen, especially this law allows for the immigration of rightless cheap labour , with this law the immigration is enhanced. The existing problems are not solved with this. This situation will be enforced, and that is why the abreiterkammer demands that such will be debated again.

Ladies and gentlemen, this law, has such weaknesses and contradictions, that it is not only doubtful under the state of law, but it has to be denied in regard to the negative consequence to the labour market.

A functioning integration can only exist to the benefit of all in Austria living individuals. This law is objected to because it does not make integration easier, it builds up obstacles and makes integration more difficult. This is objected to by ourselves. This law does not get our agreement.

FPÖ:

Ladies and gentlemen! Austria is not a classic immigration country! In contrary to the Us, Australia or Canada.

Ladies and gentlemen! in April of this year I had the opportunity to discuss foreign policies with parliamentary members from Canada. In Canada every year 250000 people immigrate every year. And what do the immigration laws and policies in Canada look like? In Canada there is point system, in which age, education, labour market experience, language abilities relations to the court of Canada as well as health is checked upon.

The security speaker of the Spö. Pargnioni, said to this subject, a health test is a stigmatisation as well as a terrorisation. I cite standard of the 11.11.99:

'No residence for aids patients. Immigrants with aids will not be able to get residency visas in new Zealand anymore from July 2000 onwards. The immigration ministry declared on Wednesday in Wellington that ministers had decided for an aids test for immigrants and refugees who were in the country for longer than 2 years'.

Ladies and gentlemen!- health test as a compulsory test for the first residence visas and staying in the country also exist in Belgium, France, Greece, great Britain, Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, Australia Canada and the US:

Ladies and gentlemen, the health test for the first stay in Austria is neither stigmatisation, noir terrorisation, but it is a ultimately necessary measure for the avoidance of the endangerment of the public health in Austria.