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'All Strings Attached: Migrant Poverty, Legal Status and the Welfare State'

Conditionality of Legal Status and the Determination of Third-country national Poverty in Western Europe

OWEN CORRIGAN

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

Summary

The thesis sets out to account for variations in migrant poverty across states in Western Europe, specifically the poverty of third-country nationals (TCNs). The intersecting literatures on the welfare state, migration and migrant legal status make clear that the position of TCNs is qualitatively different from natives and from other types of migrant. Extant accounts such as welfare regime theory fail to explicate cross-national variations in poverty when TCNs are the unit of analysis. For TCNs, full and secure access to the welfare state is contingent on holding long-term residency (LTR) status and transition to a more secure legal status is subject to a process governed by conditionality. Extant literature has neglected to account for this process. The thesis asks what role conditionality of legal status can play in explaining TCN poverty outcomes and what this means for extant understandings of welfare in Europe.

States impose conditions on moving between legal statuses, and the stringency of these conditions varies cross-nationally in a manner held to be an explanatory factor capable of accounting for cross-national variation in TCN poverty outcomes. Where rights-granting legal status is difficult to attain migrants will subsist in insecure life positions without recourse to the supports of the welfare state. The employment-contingency of presence in the state means that disadvantageous labour market attachments may be tolerated so as not to jeopardise the right to reside in the host country. The theoretical framework thus conceptualises conditionality as impacting on the poverty of TCNs in *interaction* with features of the work—welfare nexus. The generosity of the welfare state will act to reduce poverty, but this effect will be moderated by the difficulty of attaining the legal status granting access to welfare protections.

This conceptualisation is arrived at by building on existing literature and by drawing on new primary data collected by means of expert survey. The results of the survey clearly demonstrate the existence of substantial variation at state level between LTR status and its antecedent 'temporary' status both in terms of security and welfare state access. They also demonstrate variation in the contingency of legal status and highlight the consequences for migrants of weak labour market attachment or of making claims on the welfare state. This serves to motivate the explanatory account and to underscore the conceptualisation of a hierarchy of differentiated legal statuses as having empirical support. Differences in legal status for migrants have material implications and these differences obtain in fact.

With this framework established the next task is to measure the explanatory phenomena of interest, namely conditionality of legal status. Drawing on existing data on the conditions states apply to migrant legal status transitions, an index of conditionality is specified both for the transition from temporary to LTR status and for the transition from LTR status to citizenship

status. These indexes are assessed for unidimensionality, internal consistency and external validity and are found to meet all standard criteria. Other independent variables and relevant indicators are drawn from existing data sources.

To integrate the novel concept of conditionality of legal status into extant understandings of welfare in Europe, the possibilities for advancing a migrant-specific welfare regime account are explored. Using a range of exploratory and analytic quantitative techniques it is seen that a useful regime typology of the policies which determine migrant poverty can be advanced drawing on conditionality and welfare effort as the constitutive dimensions. The nature of conditionality itself is also explored so as to contextualise this potential regime account and to deepen our understanding of this under-theorised explanatory factor. It is seen to be subject to determination in certain cases by short-run political or economic factors, prompting caution in advancing the typology as an immutable 'regime' and encouraging reassessment of the empirical and structural regularities uncovered in the analysis as further data come to light.

The central analytic task of the thesis is to test for the hypothesised interactive impacts of conditionality on migrant poverty outcomes, and other dependent variables of relevance to the theoretical framework, utilising large-scale microdata drawn from across Europe. Multilevel modelling allows us to control for relevant factors at both the level of the individual migrant and at the state level. Six key hypotheses are tested and the results provide evidence: That conditionality and welfare effort interact in the determination of 1. migrant poverty, 2. migrant type of labour market attachment, 3. migrant legal status transitions; That conditionality and insecurity of legal status also interact in the determination of 4. migrant type of labour market attachment, but not of 5. migrant legal status transitions; That, finally, 6. conditionality on its own helps to explain migrant legal status transitions.

In conclusion, the thesis adduces evidence in line with the central hypothesis that conditionality of legal status plays a vital explanatory role regarding TCN poverty. This has implications for ongoing debates over the welfare state, the life situations of migrant communities, how we understand the welfare of residents of Western Europe, how we talk about the relationship of migrant policy to social policy and how we account for the differences between countries in terms of TCN poverty outcomes. The legal status held by migrants and the conditionality states impose on attaining legal status are advanced here as key terms of reference in the ongoing debate over the welfare of TCN migrants in Europe, forcing a novel and refined understanding of the institutional and policy processes that work to produce migrant poverty.

Acknowledgments

First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor, Anthony McCashin. Tony's door was always open to me throughout the process of writing this thesis and I am sincerely grateful for all of his advice and for the time of which he gave so unsparingly. Beyond his academic advice, his words and guidance in helping me to chart a course for myself post-thesis were most valuable, always helpful and entirely welcome. For all his help, supervisory and personal, official and unofficial, I am extremely thankful.

To Trinity College itself I owe many thanks for providing me with the financial support which made this research possible and thanks are also due to Eoin O'Sullivan of the School of Social Work & Social Policy for his advice in that regard in those early days. Trinity is a wonderful institution in which I have been lucky to spend many years, both as an undergraduate and a doctoral student. A true college, and not simply a campus. Quite apart from the many excellent teachers I encountered in its various departments, Trinity brought me together with some of the most interesting and intelligent people one could ever hope to know and has given me lifelong friendships.

Did I ever expect to look up from my own academic furrow fully ten years after I first stepped through Front Arch and find myself still toiling in the groves of academe? I don't know that I did – but I do know that it never would have happened were it not for a select few people. Dr. James L. 'Eddie' Hyland opened my eyes to a possibility of which I had been completely ignorant until I stepped into his classroom: the possibility that the world of Ideas could be every bit as vibrant, demanding and arresting as the world outside the lecture hall. Perhaps the greatest thing I learned in his classroom was a *philos* for *sophia.*

If the world of Ideas came ablaze for me elsewhere, then the teachers in the Philosophy department certainly pushed me into the flames. It is always a privilege to enjoy the time and space to reflect on and engage with the foundational concepts of life, the world, and our understanding of it. To do so under their tutelage was more than that, it was a joy and at the same time an object lesson in quite how exacting the life of the mind could be and quite how consequential even the smallest conceptual, semantic or logical infelicity could become. Education is not just about the filling of the head with facts but is, in a very real way, about change; change in the way one sees the world, change in how one thinks about it and, ultimately, change in the person. In that regard I can gladly say that I received a true education in Trinity's classrooms, for it was transformative for me.

Sometimes, of course, one learns more outside the classroom than in it, and the friends I have met have been equally transformative. Certainly, on the topic of logical infelicities, I learned more at the dinner table with Joseph than even AJ Ayer himself could have taught me. His relentless tenacity defending even the most indefensible debating points, his dogged dexterity with the slipperiest of concepts, and his (almost) imperceptibly subtle sleights of semantic hand – quite apart from driving me up the walls with frustration – amounted to a masterclass in the art of argument and the power of words. It was one of the most valuable things I ever could have hoped to learn and, for that, I thank him. For everything else – for his generosity, his friendship and, above all, for the endless nights of face-aching, chest-hurting laughter – no word of thanks can ever be sufficient.

For everyone else, I thank my mother and father for bringing me into this world and for keeping me in it; my mother's tireless insistence that school was all-important seems to have left an impression, and without my father's tireless financial support I don't know where I'd be. I also thank my Granny, who unfortunately never lived to see her grandson become a 'non-medical Doctor' – a concept she could never quite get her head around. To everyone who submitted themselves to enduring my obscure academic ratiocinations or who made time to address themselves to my questions on statistical arcana, many thanks: to Eoin, Alana, Kate, Zbyszek, Nicolas Motz, Ronnie Pingel and Dr. Jos Elkink. To those academics not mentioned earlier who gave me their encouragement and helped me get to where I wanted to be, I am grateful: Prof. Michael Marsh, Dr. Raj Chari, Dr. Paul O'Grady, Ross Skelton, Kenneth Macdonald. As for the research that went into the thesis itself, I thank all those academics and policy aficionados who took the time to complete – or even attempt – my expert survey, and also those who helpfully directed me to other possible respondents. I am grateful to the staff at Eurostat, particularly Karien Reinig, for getting the data to me in a timely manner.

And to those who made my time in college so endlessly fun: to Pamela, with whom I thrashed out the most compelling political philosophy the walls of Lemon café have ever heard; to the proprietor of Lemon café itself, who kept me caffeinated for most of the last decade; to Jon, who could never quite accept that the state in capitalist society was not necessarily a capitalist state; to Ronán, who could give even Joseph a run for his argumentative money were he minded; and to all the other Phist-pollers who kept it interesting; to the BHG boys, for being a larf; to Cyrus, for telling me yes I could, in fact, do this; to Peter, for all the lolz in CG; and to David, for making my office such a happy place to be, and simply for being himself – Thank You.

To J.

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Introduction

Why are migrants poor? For modern European welfare states migration is not only an established demographic fact but a contentious political issue, a challenge for societal integration and an ever-present policy concern. In global terms, the wealthy, pluralist, democratic West – and the generous social protections that are a feature of the European political settlement – has long served, and continues to serve, as a beacon-like 'pull factor' for people from all across the world. Most come in search of a better life. Yet many, by the standards of their host country, fail to achieve that better life and end up on the margins of society, in poverty. Research has shown that migrant households experience poverty with much greater frequency than native households (Morissens and Sainsbury 2005). This presents itself not just as an issue of basic social justice but also has broader implications. The exclusion of those who will always constitute a permanent minority may well foment social discord, where migrants adopt 'oppositional stances' to their host countries and natives resent perceived welfare abuse and dependency, with consequences for support for the welfare state itself and for social cohesion more generally (Portes 1997; Banting and Kylmicka 2006a; Nannestad 2007; Crepaz 2008).

In Europe, third-country nationals (TCNs) face specific challenges regarding poverty. Quite apart from the deficits of language-skills, cultural capital and social networks that such migrants experience next to intra-European migrants, TCNs suffer an added legal disadvantage insofar as they are often denied access to the protections of the welfare state by virtue of their legal status. While EU-citizen migrants have recourse to supranational legal directives at Union level guaranteeing their access to the social protections of their host countries, TCNs have no such recourse.

The failure of classic welfare regime theory in the vein of Esping-Andersen (1990) to account satisfactorily for the welfare outcomes of migrants has been established by now, as we shall see. Though it remains puzzling as to *why* exactly such stark differentials in, say, the poverty-alleviating capacities of welfare states should obtain even where states share similarities and belong to the same welfare regime.

Fig. 1 - 'Pre- & post-transfers & tax poverty rates for citizen and migrant households'



Note: first two columns (from left) per country are pre- & post- poverty rates respectively for *citizen* households, next two columns per country are pre- & post-poverty rates for *migrant* households.
Source: Morissens and Sainsbury (2005, 646).

Fig. 1 records this interesting cross-national variation. Of note is the fact that in the two highly decommodifying Scandinavian regime countries of Denmark and Sweden the effectiveness of social transfers in reducing migrant poverty should be so different. Starting with roughly similar proportions of migrant households living in pre-transfer poverty, the Swedish welfare state records a poverty reduction effectiveness of over 83%, while the Danish welfare state manages a reduction of only 44%.

Looking at proportions of TCNs in income poverty we also see little patterning by welfare regime type (Table 1) for post-transfer poverty rates. The generous Scandinavian regime reports a low poverty rate of 12.6% for Denmark, but for the sample of TCNs living in Finland over 34% are in poverty. There is also variation in the Southern regime countries of the Mediterranean, with Spain and Greece recording high levels of TCN poverty but Portugal relatively low levels. The Conservative regime countries likewise report much intra-regime variation.

Table 1 – Poverty rates of TCN migrants: Country & Welfare Regime

[SOUTH]	POR	16.1	[SCAND]	NOR	24.1
	SPA	33.1		DEN	12.6
	GRE	34.9		SWE	24.4
				FIN	34.3
[CON]	AUS	23.6	[LIB]	IRE	18.0
	SUI	24.0		UK	24.3
	BEL	40.3			
	FRA	27.3			
	ITA	25.5			
	GER	25.0			
	NED	11.1			

Note: Data from EU-SILC 2006 and 2007 merged, for third-country nationals only, relative income poverty variable; N = 24,066; Data interpolated for SUI and GER, see Chp. 3 for more details.

Such cross-national variation in TCN outcomes is interesting for other reasons. Some authors have perceived a general convergence in the modes by which rights, specifically social rights, accrue to migrants. Soysal (1994) argues that rights-expansion for migrants has occurred at the supranational level and she points to the proliferation of international human rights norms and the imperatives of supranational institutions as having undermined the importance of the nation-state in regulating the membership modes of non-nationals, who are now claimed to enjoy all of the rights of citizenship without necessarily possessing that legal status. Others perceive a general convergence in the modes by which citizenship status is ascribed to non-nationals in Europe (Bloemraad 2000; Castles 2002; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Klusmeyer and Aleinikoff 2000; Joppke 2007). Meanwhile, still others claim that rights, including social rights, for migrants have long been enjoyed merely by virtue of 'denizenship' – or 'helotry', 'residence' or 'membership' – in the host country, where presence-in-the-country is the basis on which rights-claims are actualised (Hammar 1985; Cohen 1987; Brubaker 1989; Feldblum 2000). In light of these arguments we might expect to see rather more convergence in migrant outcomes than divergence. And yet the issue remains: migrants are poor, and in ways that defy the expectations we might have given our knowledge about countries' institutional and welfare state configurations. So the question arises: Why are third-country nationals poor and how can we account for cross-national variation in their poverty outcomes?

Sainsbury (2006) has remarked on the stratifying effects of different types of entry category for migrant outcomes. Across Europe, the empirical reality of those frameworks which function to formalise and categorise the migrant-state relationship is one of differentiated legal statuses varying in the nature and expansiveness of rights they afford;

this much is made clear by recent international comparable data on migrants and migration policy collected by the Mipex[1] project (Niessen, Huddleston, and Citron 2007). This stands as a challenge to those who would maintain that simple presence-in-the-country is sufficient to secure rights. Certain legal statuses afford rights that are more secure and/or more expansive than other types of legal status, in ways that vary cross-nationally. Elucidation of these differences seems a necessary first step before such claims about residence in the country, and the implications of same, can be properly evaluated. The acknowledgment of such variation in rights expansiveness and security across countries presents itself as one possible explanation for cross-national variation in TCN poverty, and is in line with Sainsbury's (2006) observation on the stratifying potential of variable entry categories.

However, what has been neglected to date in studies of migrant poverty is the processual nature of migrant engagement with the regulatory frameworks which determine entry into different types of legal status. It is not the case that legal status is a static characteristic of migrant lives. The incentives offered by acquiring a more secure or expansive type of status can naturally be expected to impact on migrant actions and evaluations. The Mipex data make clear that secure enjoyment of social rights and welfare entitlements in Europe accrues to those holding long-term residency (LTR) status, as various authors have maintained (Brubaker 1989; Dörr and Faist 1997; Bauböck 2006; Hammar 1990). This LTR status also offers much greater security than other inferior statuses (more on this in a later chapter) and so its acquisition can be expected to play a substantial role in securing TCN welfare.

Available data also make clear that the acquisition of progressively more secure legal status is not simply a matter of box-checking or *pro forma* approval on the part of the state. Rather, the acquisition of such status is a contingent process, conditional on fulfilling a set of specified requirements which themselves vary in the stringency of the demands they make on migrants on a state by state basis. It is the recognition of this 'conditionality' of rights-granting legal status and the specification and testing of a theoretical model identifying its relevance to the determination of TCN poverty that constitutes the central analytic task and academic contribution of this thesis. Does variation in conditionality levels allow us to account for cross-national variation in TCN poverty outcomes?

[1] Migrant Integration Policy Index.

Formally, the research question this thesis seeks to answer is:

> *RQ*: Why does cross-national variation in the poverty of third-country nationals occur across Western European states despite their application of similar welfare policies; what role does legal status, and specifically the conditionality states attach to the acquisition of rights-granting legal status for migrants, play in this; and with what implications for how we conceptualise the determination and underpinning of the welfare of inhabitants of Western Europe?

Acknowledging, measuring and testing the effects of this conditionality variable constitutes an important original contribution in its own right, and no study of TCN poverty, to the author's knowledge, has sought to account for cross-country differences with reference to conditionality of legal status before. As such, this thesis draws on the social policy and welfare state literature as well as the broad literatures on both migration and legal status, in the form of citizenship, to arrive at a novel theoretical synthesis specifically attuned to the life situations of third-country nationals. This synthesis conceptualises status acquisition as a process subject to incentives and constraints delimited by the work and welfare institutions of the state. As such, this viewpoint recognises migrant agency, placing them at the centre of a complex and multiply determinative web of interconnecting policy measures which, together with characteristics and attributes at the micro-level of individual migrants, work to structure poverty outcomes.

To ground the theoretical assumptions made concerning the process and incentives governing legal status acquisition, first-hand data was collected by means of a preliminary pilot study designed to elicit information by means of expert survey. This demonstrates sufficient variation in the security and expansiveness of rights associated with different types of legal status to empirically bolster the motivation for the ensuing investigation.[2]

Utilising comparable data collected to the highest international standards on the conditions states attach to attaining legal status, two original measures of conditionality are constructed; one measuring conditionality attached to attaining LTR status and the other measuring conditionality attached to attaining the status of naturalised citizen. These measures are then deployed on large-scale micro-datasets to test various hypotheses concerning the implication of conditionality in poverty determination, as derived from our theoretical framework. It will also be possible to test other hypotheses around status acquisition itself, subjecting important theoretical assumptions to empirical scrutiny. The

[2] The pilot study was designed to elicit information relevant to this study that was not available in the Mipex project.

data used for these testing purposes is also of the highest international standards, collated and harmonised by Eurostat, and is analysed using a powerful tool of statistical analysis, multilevel modelling, that allows the researcher to test hypotheses in a setting of statistical control at both the contextual (state) level and the level of the individual migrant.

This allows us to control for factors at the country level which are highly likely to be implicated in the determination of migrant poverty alongside the central factors of state institutions and migrant-oriented policy measures; these other controls include the extent of hostility towards migrants, a country's political complexion, general economic and labour market indicators, and features of a state's historical experience of migration and other unique and time-invariant characteristics. To anticipate the results of the later empirical analysis, the theorised role of conditionality of LTR status – to be outlined in detail in Chp. 2 – finds clear empirical support here and the results are consistent with our central hypothesis.

Alongside this central concern with the explication of variations in TCN poverty, we are also concerned with how this theoretical addition of the role of conditionality impacts on how we conceptualise the broader frameworks within which we locate poverty and welfare outcomes in Europe. Regime theory has been a central reference point in discussions of the welfare state for thirty years, both as a theoretical statement of the reasons for variation in the modes of social protection employed by European states and as an empirical tool for explication of welfare outcomes for those states' citizens. For non-citizens, however, these frameworks fail theoretically to account for the qualitative differences of the TCN situation.

A natural question to ask, then, is whether the insights afforded by the augmented, TCN-specific theoretical conceptualisation advanced here, with its focus on conditionality, allows us to advance similar accounts of broad frameworks of TCN-migrant welfare. Are there 'migrant-specific welfare regimes' to be perceived in the concatenation of work, welfare and conditionality policy measures, as well as other migrant-relevant characteristics of European welfare states? Does the designation of different regime types defined by differences in conditionality and differences in welfare effort entail predictive power as regards migrant outcomes? And what is the theoretical basis on which we place our understanding of conditionality itself (something which will have implications for how we perceive any regime-like account of migrant welfare)? Utilising our new measures of conditionality and drawing on the literature pertaining to migration policy formation, another aim of the research undertaken here is to explore the possibilities for advancing a

regime-like account of welfare in Europe which takes cognisance of the specificities of the TCN experience. At the same time, assessing the determinants of conditionality variation across states presents itself as a necessary and relevant intellectual task given the important theoretical role accorded to conditionality in the determination of TCN poverty, a role supported by the later empirical results.

The findings to be discussed later have implications not just for the multiple academic literatures touched on in this thesis and for the future research agenda, but also for policymakers and society more broadly. Migrant populations are here to stay. It has long been established that many migrants do not return home even in times of recession (Slater 1979) and, to take Ireland as a single example, recent census data clearly showed that a predicted mass exodus of recent inward migrants had not occurred despite the economic downturn (Gilmartin 2011). Migrant populations are, rather, an extant feature of modern European states, provoking unique policy challenges.

The impoverishment of sections of these permanent minority populations stands not only as an indictment of the structures of the state where poverty and exclusion from the mainstream life of society is held to be an undesirable outcome in general, but also poses greater challenges in terms of social cohesion. Impoverished migrants may well form oppositional stances to their host country (Portes 1997), leading potentially to ghettoisation, social tensions and disintegrative pressures. Not only that, but where migrants raise families – and family reunification is now the primary route of TCN entry to Europe (SOPEMI 2008, 36) – poverty may well spill over into long-term, engrained problems for society consolidated by mechanisms of intergenerational poverty transmission (Moore, Hulme, and Shepherd 2001), and compounded by the extension of the negative effects of poverty from childhood through to later adult life (Hayward and Gorman 2004).

The structure of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chp. 1 will explore and discuss relevant academic literature so as to locate our task intellectually. The discussion will proceed under three headings dealing, firstly, with welfare states and the challenges posed by migration, then with migration policy and the means by which such policy is formed, and finally with the literature around legal status, specifically debates over the nature and future of citizenship status.

Chp. 2 addresses itself to two tasks: first, presenting the results of the preliminary pilot study on legal status and the rights and security attaching to different types of legal status. Specifically, the focus here is on differences between long-term resident, LTR, status and

what is here labelled 'temporary' migrant status, i.e. any migrant who is a non-LTR migrant and who is not a naturalised citizen. This empirical data serves to motivate some of the suppositions made in the theoretical framework, which is then formally sketched in the second part of this chapter.

Chp. 3 discusses the methodology to be employed in the empirical analysis. Research design, case selection and operationalisation of the variables are discussed, as well as some relevant methodological points. The other key task of the chapter is to undertake an analysis of the Mipex policy indicators data on LTR-status acquisition and on citizenship acquisition by means of multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), a cognate of principal components analysis (PCA). This allows us to construct measures of conditionality that maximise variance between the set of cases and also allows us to test these measures for unidimensionality. The measures are assessed for reliability and validity.

Chp. 4 specifies a basic typology of migrant-specific welfare regimes.

Chp. 5 undertakes an exploration of the available macro-level data with a view to assessing whether we can in fact speak meaningfully of migrant-specific welfare regimes. The indicators are explored using a battery of multivariate and analytic data techniques to assess the extent of systematic or empirical regularities between countries and to determine the nature and extent of a typology of regime types. An integral part of this task involves testing hypotheses about conditionality itself, as drawn from the literature on state policy responses to the challenges of diversity, and seeking to account for cross-national variation in conditionality levels. This allows us to set conditionality itself on a firmer theoretical – and empirical – footing, elucidating the policy and political processes which shape state responses to migrant populations, and with implications for how we can conceptualise broader frameworks of welfare in Europe.

Chp. 6 constitutes the empirical core of the thesis, testing our central hypotheses using microlevel data, made available by Eurostat, by means of multilevel modelling. A continuous indicator of material deprivation is taken as the dependent variable in most models. Other models test subsidiary hypotheses relevant to our theoretical framework involving the labour market and naturalisation. To reiterate, the central analytic task of this empirical section is to test for the hypothesised role of the conditionality attached to legal status as being determinative of migrant poverty, in interaction with the level of state welfare effort. The final chapter concludes the thesis and discusses the implications of the findings for extant academic literature, for future research, and for policymakers.

1. Parameters of Poverty: Locating Migrants in the Welfare State

In seeking to address the 'why' of migrant poverty, and the why of different policy approaches to migrant incorporation, it is essential to understand the complex interplay of political, structural, economic and other factors that inform national debates about belonging, legal status, and the place of migrants *vis-à-vis* state, nation, and welfare state. This chapter explores three areas of literature which will serve to theoretically motivate the later empirical analysis of migrant poverty and the determinants of migration policy in the form of conditionality attached to rights-granting legal status. The first section explores debates on welfare states and welfare regimes in the context of diversity and immigration. The next section addresses itself to the formation of migrant policy and provides general context relevant to any discussion of migration to Europe and the policies which affect migrant lives. The final section engages with debates over legal status and citizenship in the context of migration. These discussions, apart from their obvious contextualising role, set the scene for the theoretical synthesis to be presented in the next chapter. They highlight the complex and interlocking set of institutional factors which render the TCN situation qualitatively different from that of European natives or intra-European migrants. Finally, they underscore the importance of legal status to the quality of TCN lives.

While this chapter delineates the intellectual landscape within which the discussion to follow is situated, and advances the *conceptual* importance of legal status with regard to migrant poverty, the subsequent chapter advances the *empirical* relevance of legal status on the basis of the results of a pilot study in conjunction with important secondary data on the nature of legal status. This pilot study serves to empirically motivate the focus on legal status, and the conditions imposed by states on migrants seeking to secure rights-granting legal status, as a legitimate analytic approach with clear explanatory potential. The latter section of that subsequent chapter weaves together the threads of the literature discussed here to arrive at a more formal statement of the theoretical framework wherein this project locates the determination of migrant poverty, making clear the key role that legal status and the conditionality of legal status are held to play in this regard.

The redistribution of resources from one segment of the community to another implied and demanded by the existence of the welfare state is a highly contested process which has come to define the nature of politics in liberal Western democracies, often resulting in bitter struggles between opposing factions. This happens despite a shared sense of community or a shared national identity and despite shared socio-political traditions and practices. Migrants, who do not share these practices or identity, who are 'others' in the eyes of the community, and yet who reside there and are implicated in the social and economic life of their host country, have often found any redistributive claims they might make sidelined, resisted, disregarded or politicised depending on prevailing circumstances. Below, we explore the nature of those circumstances hypothesised to have a determinative bearing both on the poverty outcomes of migrants, specifically third-country nationals whose life positions are held to be qualitatively distinct from natives and other migrants, and on the policy approaches that states employ with regard to regulating access to the social rights that are synonymous with modern welfare states. By policy approaches we specifically refer to the conditionality that states attach to securing rights-granting legal status. This requires exploring the attitudes and interactions both migrants and natives have with regard to state welfare systems and with migrant incorporation into those systems.

The term 'incorporation' is not as straightforward as it sounds and debates in the migration literature are characterised by a complex and contested terminology which has frequent, and inconsistent, recourse to various concepts including integration, incorporation and assimilation. In this preamble, then, it will be useful to clarify some of these concepts, many of which share close conceptual space with each other. The latter concept of assimilation may well be "dead" (Glazer 1993, 122), with state practices of demanding conformity from migrants falling into disfavour next to a perceived consensus on the need to recognise and protect diversity, leading Glazer (1997) to maintain that we are 'all multiculturalists now'. It has been observed that assimilation as a concept – with its intimations of ethnocentrism and its imposition of demands on minorities who may be struggling to retain their ethno-cultural identities – has fallen out of popularity and into "disrepute" in academic and public discourse, in the American context at least (Alba and Nee 1997, 826). This occurred due to difficulties with the concept, quite apart from its alleged inherent ideological bias, which raise questions such as: what are migrants assimilating into?; how do we measure and assess when any given migrant can be considered 'assimilated'?; how many dimensions are there to assimilation (e.g. economic,

cultural, spatial)?; is it a one-way process or might some form of creolisation simultaneously obtain?; assuming it is a one-way process, does it occur in a linear, 'bumpy-line' or segmented fashion?; et cetera (Alba and Nee 1997).

Alba and Nee (1997) do not feel the concept should be rejected entirely, however, and call for its continued use in a more refined form, on the grounds that to invent a new vocabulary for the various facets of assimilation would be to foreclose examination of the issue with a terminological circumlocution. Although this debate is germane, it is not critical to the discussion here. What is relevant is that some countries, e.g. France, do in fact retain assimilatory approaches when it comes to citizenship, naturalisation and the extension of other legal statuses and rights. As we shall see, assimilatory demands are still made of migrants through the nature and extent of conditionality that states attach to the acquisition of legal status. Bearing this in mind, we set aside the fraught issue of 'assimilation' to focus on what is more pertinent to migrant impoverishment, concepts of 'integration' and 'incorporation'.

For the purposes of this discussion, the major difference between notions of integration and notions of incorporation subsists in the criterion of relativity. 'Integration' is a relative concept; as such it demands a standard by which it can be evaluated. The poverty line is one such obvious evaluative standard. Those migrants below the poverty line exist on the economic margins of their host society and where lives are patterned by social exclusion, deprivation, or marginality relative to the prevailing standards of their host society then these migrants cannot rightly be considered 'integrated'. Systematic exclusion and socio-economic disadvantage may have implications for integration conceived of more broadly or in non-economic terms such as social/cultural acceptance, labour market integration, or disposition towards the host society, with the potential for poverty to spur the growth of 'oppositional cultures' (Portes 1997), 'segmented assimilation' (Portes and Zhou 1993) or other stratifying or divisive outcomes that may be corrosive of the social fabric.

While integration has been conceived of in relative terms 'incorporation' has, to date, been conceived of largely in binary terms, i.e. migrants are either incorporated or they are not. It is in this binary sense that we use the term throughout this discussion. In a broad sense 'incorporation regime' can be thought of as referring to the various policies, formal and informal, that governments adopt with regard to migrant minorities, with the regulation and granting of citizenship, or other rights independent of formal citizenship status, central to the concept. Although 'incorporation' is a term frequently bandied about,

the term has taken on specific meanings for different authors. Soysal (1994), for example, was not interested in the degree to which migrants integrated with the host society, but observed that whether or not they integrate, it is necessarily the case that they become incorporated into the institutionalised modes of membership and the organisational structures of the state. Integration is, for Soysal, secondary to the fact that migrants undoubtedly become incorporated into the labour, housing, welfare and political systems of the polity. Incorporation is thus seen as both a wider process than integration and also as something that is independent of it (1994, 31).

Not everyone is convinced of the utility of conceiving of incorporation in terms of regimes however, and Freeman (2004) argues instead that incorporation is better seen as a product of the intersection of migrant strategies with regulatory frameworks in four domains: 1. State, 2. Market, 3. Welfare, 4. Culture. Society, in his view, should be conceived of not as a unitary entity but as a set of multiple, autonomous, interdependent systems. Conditionality of legal status is advanced here as a key part of the regulatory framework governing access to the welfare system for migrants and with implications for engagement with the (labour) market also. Indeed, all four of Freeman's interdependent systems are conceptualised as working in parallel and in interaction with each other in the determination of migrant poverty outcomes, as will be presented later in the formal schema of our theoretical understanding. If the conditionality determining incorporation into 'welfare sub-systems' was seen to manifest systematic similarities and differences across states, this may point to the utility of an incorporation 'regime' approach, *pace* Freeman's preference for a more loosely defined concept of "syndromes" (2004, 945). Whether this is in fact a desirable or justifiable epistemological or analytic approach to the explanation of migrant poverty is the subject of a later chapter. Now, we consider the literature on migrants and the welfare state.

1.1. Welfare States

1.1.1. Welfare Regimes

Welfare Regime theory is a central reference point in the study of social policy. This found perhaps its fullest modern expression with the work of Esping-Andersen (1990), though earlier contributions in the same vein can be traced to Wilensky and to Titmuss (Titmuss and Abel-Smith 1974; Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958). The key arguments of Esping-Andersen's account are by now well known. Starting from the insight that dissimilar contexts produce dissimilar outcomes, resulting in intra-contextual similarities and inter-contextual differences, Esping-Andersen identified the key factors which work to structure welfare states as: class mobilisation, class-political coalition structures and the historical legacy of regime institutionalisation, also known as the 'power resources' model (1990). Social citizenship he defined as the core idea of the welfare state, differentiable according to whether practical entitlements were granted on the basis of *right* or on the basis of performance; if the former, then this can be said to entail a 'decommodification' of the individual as regards the market, though the role of the market and the family with regard to social provision must also be taken into account if we wish to theoretically specify the welfare state. Apart from decommodifying individuals to a greater or lesser extent, welfare states also have the effect of actively stratifying and ordering social relations.

Thus, welfare regimes can be defined according to the twin pillars of decommodification and stratification. With this approach, Esping-Andersen identified three distinct regime types: Liberal, with low decommodification, the role of the market encouraged by the state, a relative 'equality of poverty' among welfare recipients and a class dualism between recipients and non-recipients, e.g. US; Conservative, with the state apparatus prepared to displace the market as welfare provider and decommodify sections of society, though in a manner directed towards preserving status differentials, with social insurance and a commitment to traditional families playing a key role, e.g. Germany; Social Democratic, with high levels of decommodification and the extension of this principle to the new middle classes resulting in relatively little stratification, where this arrangement is committed to guarantee full employment while also being dependent on its attainment, e.g. Sweden.

This sparked much academic debate, with some authors accusing Esping-Andersen of neglecting gender issues in welfare provision, others identifying a separate regime type for

Southern European countries, and still others advancing alternative dimensions and indicators on which to classify regimes (Abrahamson 1999). Of import here, it seems clear that this theoretical understanding of the extension of social rights and the implementation of social protections must apply in a qualitatively different way to migrants. Migrants may find themselves decommodified to a greater or lesser degree in different welfare states, but only once they have first, as a preliminary, undergone an ontological transformation in the eyes of the state – where having recourse to the welfare state moves from being an impossibility to a mere possibility – by attaining the necessary legal status, something which is mediated by conditionality.

Morissens and Sainsbury (2005) have looked at migrants, poverty rates and social transfers, in comparative context with host-country natives, in a selection of OECD countries. Taking Esping-Andersen's (1990) concept of 'decommodification' as an indicator of the extent to which social protection is afforded as a right, allowing migrants to maintain an acceptable living standard (which they define as being above the poverty line), they find that the decommodifying effects of welfare states vary by migrant and native status across welfare regimes (2005, 648). They also explore the stratifying effects of 'conditions of eligibility' with regard to migrants and find that migrants have poorer access to pensions and unemployment benefits (2005, 649). The absolute level of benefits migrants had recourse to was also seen to be lower than that enjoyed by citizens for typical social insurance benefits, though migrants' usage of social assistance (non-contributory) was higher and they relied more on means-tested benefits; the authors observe that where such benefits are associated with stigma and inadequate levels of support then migrants' social rights suffer and there is no parity with the social rights of citizens (2005, 650-53). In general, the study is an arresting and blunt indication of the failure of Western welfare states to engender equal social citizenship outcomes for migrants. In all countries, the pre- and post-transfer poverty rates for migrants far exceed the equivalent poverty rates for natives.[3] Even after welfare states have effected income redistribution, migrants remain disproportionately impoverished compared to natives.

Sweden is, perhaps, different in this regard and its welfare state does the best job by far of equalising migrant-native outcomes, despite truly enormous pre-transfer poverty differentials. Pre-transfers, 30.8% of natives were impoverished compared to 58.2% of migrants, yet after transfers only 5.5% of natives were below the poverty line compared to 9.8% of migrants. Not quite parity of outcome, but a substantial amelioration nonetheless.

[3] The countries included in the analysis were: the UK, the US, Germany, France, Denmark and Sweden.

However, Sweden remains the exception here. Compare this to the situation in Denmark where, after social transfers, the poverty rate of natives (6.2%) is extremely similar to the poverty rate of Swedish natives (5.5%), yet the *post-transfer* poverty rate of migrants remains extremely high at 36.4% (from a pre-transfer rate of 65.2%). Undoubtedly, there are many potential factors at work here and the composition of the migrant cohort(s) in each country at the time these data were collected, for example, must be taken into account.[4] As the authors conclude of migrants in Denmark and Sweden, "the stratifying effects of social policies run counter to the minimal stratification that supposedly typifies the social democratic welfare regime" (Morissens and Sainsbury 2005, 654).

What seems to emerge clearly is that the standard Welfare Regime typology is insufficient and inadequate for any comprehensive analysis of the social rights of migrants. Serious doubts arise as to whether countries usually grouped together in Esping-Andersen's typology can be said to belong to the same 'regime' at all when migrants are the specific focus of the analysis. Morissens and Sainsbury (2005) themselves contend that variations in immigration and incorporation regimes are more likely to account for variations in migrant social rights across countries and, thus, if we want to situate migrant social rights more convincingly we must focus on the dynamics between welfare and incorporation/immigration regimes. It is maintained here that the conditionality of migrant legal status is a key element in this dynamic and that variations in conditionality can account for variations in migrant social citizenship outcomes. As will be seen, there exists wide variation in entitlement to welfare system access for third-country nationals, depending on the legal status they hold, and also wide variation in the consequences migrants face if they become a drain on public resources. Evidence will be presented in the next chapter to sustain this claim.

1.1.2. Challenges of Immigration for the Welfare State

What is the fundamental logic of the modern welfare state? And what are the necessary conditions it requires to function effectively? Freeman (1986) maintains that this logic is *necessarily* a logic of closure. Redistributive possibilities are, and must, be limited because resources are finite, and so the welfare state is defined by boundedness. In the context of permeable borders in an age of global migration, this boundedness is challenged

[4] For instance, if the cohort of migrants to Denmark were possessed of significant human-capital or linguistic deficits in comparison to the cohort in Sweden then we might naturally expect poorer outcomes in terms of labour market placement and subsequent social citizenship outcomes. But this is a matter for empirical verification, and not necessarily a confounding factor for our purposes.

and the question arises as to who constitutes the 'legitimate community of welfare receivers' (Bommes and Geddes 2000).

There is a wide literature on the issue of what diversity means for the welfare state and the community that it serves. Citizenship *qua* legal status is the key criterion by which in- and out-groups are delineated. But as Crepaz (2008) observes, citizenship *qua* identity raises difficult yet unavoidable issues of a cultural nature, pulling diffuse and contested concepts such as race, ethnicity, and religion into the discourse. The negative corollaries of these concepts then come to play a role, and racism, intolerance and chauvinism assert themselves as necessary, if undesirable, terms of reference in the debate.

It has been argued that societal homogeneity plays a crucial role for the effective functioning of the welfare state (Crepaz 2008). This has been maintained on the grounds that parting with a fraction of one's income by means of social redistribution will be made more acceptable if the recipients of your income-fraction look and act like you (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). This sort of cultural or ethnic-difference argument has been characterised as a 'primordialist' view of racial and ethnic differences which sees such differences as reflecting and constituting "fundamental, ascriptive and immediate identities" (Crepaz 2008, 19). In other words, these identities are seen as 'set', a view which stands opposed to the constructivist view which sees race and ethnicity as socially and/or politically constructed categories. While social constructivism has become the academic orthodoxy, and primordialism as an academic concept is now seen as something of an embarrassing intellectual holdover, Crepaz maintains that ordinary people in the course of their daily lives nonetheless adhere *de facto* to primordialist conceptions of race and difference. Whether they do or not is a source of contention which admits of no easy resolutions.

What can be asserted unproblematically however is that racial diversity exists, that people apprehend racial differences, and that people can and do make value judgments on the import of these differences. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) examine why the American welfare state developed to be so much smaller and less inclusive than welfare states across Europe. On the basis of their analysis they conclude that about half of the difference in welfare state size between Europe and America can be accounted for in terms of racial diversity, with the other half accounted for in terms of different institutions. The authors then recount at length how political parties in the United States of the 19th century explicitly set out to 'racialise' issues of social redistribution by appealing to racial prejudices

in an attempt to (successfully) block efforts towards the creation or maintenance of redistributive social programs.

The overarching difference between Europe and America on this issue has been one of divergent historical trajectories with regard to race and migration. In Europe, the challenge of diversity presented itself to the generally socially homogeneous European polities at a point in time when European welfare states had already reached maturity. In contrast, the American welfare state had to contend with diversity and racialised poverty, due to the historical experience of slavery, from its earliest beginnings, thus hampering chances for its future development in any comprehensive fashion (Crepaz 2008). Unlike in Europe, the issue of class did not become the most important societal dividing line, and the absence of strong unions and other indicators historically associated with the development of Left politics has been ascribed to the difficulties of mobilising coherent and unified social groupings in the context of racial and ethnic diversity where minority-group ties reduce the scope for the formation of broader-based coalitions (Wilensky 1975).

Diversity in society may spur 'welfare chauvinism' on the part of natives, where welfare chauvinism has been defined, by Faist, as "the fear among groups in the native population ... that certain new immigrant groups take away jobs, housing, and social services" (Faist 1994, 440). Crepaz (2008) has looked at public attitudes towards migrants and their use of public resources in Europe. While he acknowledges some of the many potential problems with attitudinal data[5] Crepaz's investigations remain useful insofar as they illustrate an often highly politicised issue from the natives' point of view. It is worthwhile drawing out some of this context within which debates over redistribution and social rights take place.

Looking to the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), Crepaz first considers attitudes of natives on the question of whether migrants take away jobs (2008, 67-69). Comparing results in 1995 to those in 2003 – a period in which it is claimed that there was a 'general increase' in the salience of migration issues – Crepaz finds that in 7 of 11 OECD countries fewer people in 2003 thought that immigrants take away jobs than in 1995. Interestingly, this period coincides with Ireland's immigration boom and Ireland is one of

[5] Some of these problems include the fact that survey responses can be highly sensitive to particular events (Crepaz 2008); that cultural biases might mean that similarly worded questions do not have the same meaning in different contexts, leading to patterning of measurement error; that attitudinal questions may not have a rank order in any meaningful sense (Morgan and Sonquist 1963, 415); and that survey data are generated from a sample, adding sample variability to measurement error and also entailing that where sample sizes are too small then (in a given country, say) then the attitudes reflected in the data may not be an accurate reflection of the true population values (Morgan and Sonquist 1963).

the few countries to experience an increase in the sentiment that migrants take away jobs. Similarly, on the broader question of whether people agree that immigrants are 'good for the country', Ireland reflects the largest decline in this sentiment of all of these countries; a 16% decline (from 56% agreeing in 1995 to 40% in 2003). The 'traditional' immigration countries (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, US) all manifest broadly pro-migrant attitudes and attitudinal changes in this time period.

The European Social Survey (ESS) is another source of information in this regard. Crepaz's analysis of the 2002 wave of this data reveals that "large segments of European societies display xenophobic and anti-immigrant tendencies" (2008, 70-71). Of several questions asked [6], the question on whether respondents agree that 'Immigrants take out more than they put in' is the most striking indicator (in terms of large numbers reporting anti-immigrant sentiments) and appears to be the leading concern in most of the 13 countries under consideration.[7] Of all these countries, Ireland again leads in terms of negative sentiment with just over 60% of respondents agreeing with the statement, though the UK, Germany, Finland, Denmark and Belgium all display negative sentiments in the 50th-60th percentile range.

It may be the case that large influxes of migrants affects either the distributive capacity of the welfare state or the distributive willingness of those who fund it, i.e. diversity may affect people's *general* support for the welfare state. Banting has explored such issues in his writings on the effect of multicultural policies on national welfare states (Banting and Kymlicka 2006a; Banting 2000; Banting and Kymlicka 2006b; Banting 2005). Intuitively, it is of course highly plausible that dominant societal groups may resist or eliminate any *migrant-specific* social entitlements that may be made available by the state, simply on the basis of primordialist conceptions of difference. Banting (2000) also suggests that dominant groups may abandon the idea of a wider set of entitlements and may disengage from the welfare state in a general way in the face of high levels of societal diversity.

Crepaz (2008, 59-61) takes issue with this suggestion on several grounds. First, he advances an argument on the basis of perceived path dependency, pointing to the entrenched nature of modern welfare states in Europe which are deeply embedded not only in the legal-institutional framework of states but also in the political culture of individual states. Second, he observes that in centralised states it is difficult for populist

[6] The questions ask whether: immigrants make a country a worse or better place to live; immigrants take out more than they put in; immigrants bring down average salaries and wages. (Crepaz 2008, 70).
[7] The 13 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK.

anti-immigrant sentiments to "bubble up" to the level of national public policy, predicting that tighter controls over immigration policy are more likely to result in such states than are broad-based welfare cuts. Third, he argues that those who lose most in the context of high levels of immigration are low-skilled and blue-collar workers who are likely to be squeezed out of the bottom end of the labour market by immigrants willing to work for lower wages. Also, processes of 'deindustrialisation' (Iversen 2001), i.e. the shift to post-Fordist forms of economic organisation and the greatly increased importance of the service sector over more traditional economic sectors, have left these blue-collar groups more exposed than any other group. In light of this pincer-like squeeze in which these groups find themselves, it seems highly unlikely that they will withdraw support from their most obvious source of protection, the welfare state (Crepaz 2008). However, it remains highly possible that such insecure groups might vent their frustrations in other ways, perhaps by joining or supporting right-wing, anti-immigrant political parties or agitating for tighter immigration controls.

What is interesting for present purposes is how conditionality of legal status – as a policy instrument – may add to our understanding of diversity, the welfare state and migrant welfare usage. Crepaz may be right about anti-migrant sentiments not bubbling up sufficiently to result in broad-based welfare cuts, but it may yet be the case that such sentiments bear on conditionality of legal status, with implications for migrant access to welfare. This will be directly testable later.

Banting (2000) maintains that while welfare use by immigrants always entails the potential for backlash from the wider political community there is nothing inevitable about this, and Bommes and Geddes (2000) similarly argue against the idea that migrant welfare use will stimulate a public backlash. Of course, much of this will depend on context. The welfare regime prevailing in the state is likely to be a major institutional variable determining support for state-provided welfare in diverse societies (Esping-Andersen 1990). It has been observed that means-testing of welfare benefits, for example, would be detrimental to societal integration insofar as it highlights those groups in need of state assistance, something which universalistic (i.e. Social Democratic) forms of assistance effectively work to conceal (Crepaz 2008; Titmuss 1976).

Also, van Oorschot (2010) has observed how people's orientations towards the role of governments and the welfare state in general are closely bound up with their attitudes towards immigrants. For Dutch respondents, ideational factors such as views holding that social insurance should be properly the responsibility of the government not the individual,

or that benefit levels (and thus taxes) should be increased as opposed to decreased, were correlated with tolerant or at least non-stigmatising views on migrants and welfare magnetism. Likewise, those who strongly disagreed that migrants should have *less* rights to social assistance than Dutch people also perceived fewer negative economic or moral consequences, and more positive social consequences, to the operation of the welfare state (van Oorschot 2010).

In broader comparative context van Oorschot (2008) has found that social solidarity towards migrants relative to other welfare-recipient groups in society, e.g. the elderly, is low. This could have implications for migrants in times of austerity, for example, where choices have to be made about welfare state expansiveness. Another study found that levels of relative concern for migrants were higher in high-spending European welfare states, and that high levels of immigration may have a socialising effect on natives accepting foreign out-groups (van Oorschot and Uunk 2007). It is an interesting question whether such socialised responses would withstand welfare policy changes that saw high-spending states retrenching or becoming otherwise less expansive. Were public opinion to turn against migrants for economic or other reasons (e.g. terrorist attacks) then low levels of solidarity or reduced relative concern may facilitate unfavourable welfare state policy responses. Van Oorschot (2008) mentions the possibility of de-linking permanent residency from welfare entitlement and imposing longer waiting times on welfare eligibility, though this is not something that has been seriously attempted. However, it is plain to see the relevance of conditionality in this regard, where conditionality *de facto* determines welfare eligibility and may present itself as a ready tool for policymakers to satisfy hostile public opinion.

The official stance of the state towards its immigrant minorities, and the degree to which the state puts in place special supports and protections specifically for migrants (i.e. the degree to which the state subscribes to multiculturalism), is also relevant to perceptions of migrants and of the welfare state. Multicultural policies stem from a recognition that appealing to ethnic bases of identity, in the post-War era, will no longer suffice in political debate (Hansen and Koehler 2005). But strongly multicultural, as opposed to assimilationist, policies may work to single out and highlight those groups in need (or receipt) of welfare benefits, and such high visibility may work to the detriment of immigrants in difficult economic times, for example, or under conditions of high unemployment. Other mechanisms by which multicultural policies may work to erode

support for the welfare state have been suggested (Banting and Kymlicka 2006b): 1. The Crowding-Out Effect; 2. The Corroding Effect; 3. The Misdiagnosis Effect.

The 'crowding-out' effect is a claim to the effect that time and energy spent securing and defending multicultural policies has left less time in civil society for the pursuit of socially redistributive measures, i.e. energies that could have been used to form redistributive coalitions were dissipated in the defence of multiculturalism. However, this assumes the existence of a politically active coalition able and willing to defend the welfare state, although this assumption is not necessarily true, and the view of time and political 'energy' as being zero-sum is arguably a grossly reductive simplification.

The 'corroding effect' claims that the official recognition of differences increases the salience of minority groups at the expense of feelings of social solidarity and commonality and again presumes a sort of primordial favouritism towards 'people like us'. The existence of separate institutions for migrants may be especially corrosive insofar as it singles out a discrete group for *special* treatment not enjoyed by natives. By way of objection, it can be noted that the assumption that there existed high levels of inter-ethnic trust in society prior to the adoption of multiculturalism, levels which were afterwards eaten away, is questionable (Banting and Kymlicka 2006b). Also, how is this corrosion meant to happen? Is the simple fact of brute preference convincing enough as a mechanism?

The 'misdiagnosis effect' arises when the ideology of multiculturalism encourages people to explain inequalities as the result of cultural misunderstandings, and thus to offer cultural solutions. These solutions will be useless, however, where the causes of disadvantage actually lie elsewhere, in exogenous factors such as racism or the class structure. The point of the misdiagnosis effect is that attention focused on cultural solutions diverts attention away from these important exogenous factors. (Banting and Kymlicka 2006a; 2006b, 289). However, this argument appears to be predicated on a zero-sum conception of justice, which is another questionable assumption. To focus on cultural inequalities does not preclude an appreciation of racial and socio-economic inequalities. It may be the case that sensitivity to one form of injustice heightens sensitivity to other forms, or that those who do not detect one form of injustice will likewise not detect other forms. In short, none of the above mentioned mechanisms by which multiculturalist policies might harm socially redistributive efforts are self-evident. (Banting and Kymlicka 2006b).

In their empirical analysis of the effect of multicultural policies Banting et al. (2006) look at levels of inequality in market incomes and in disposable incomes, before and after

taxes and social transfers, and they also consider supplementary measures of child poverty and the level of income inequality. They find that there is no consistent or systematic relationship between multicultural policies and welfare state 'erosion'. The possibility that multicultural policies may mediate attitudes towards migrants with implications for migration policy outputs, i.e. conditionality levels, will be explored later.

On the integrative benefits of such policies, Banting and Kymlicka (2006a) argue that there is much scope for tension where multicultural policies are advanced by the state as an ideology but where migrant groups, who claim the right to difference, are not seen to make any concomitant effort to integrate with the host society. This is something that is likely to violate the citizenry's sense of fairness, and thus may create political pressures towards stricter immigration control or welfare state retrenchment, or may find expression in the imposition of higher levels of conditionality. These same authors also recognise, however, that multicultural policies can play a role – as one element in a larger constellation of factors – in securing the political and socio-economic integration of migrants, where those policies are designed with explicitly nation-building aims in mind to foster broader social solidarity and to discourage the rise of welfare chauvinism on the part of the native populace (Ibid.).

The extent to which this happens will naturally depend on how expansive or otherwise are the protections states offer and on the specific make-up of the policies. Banting (2005, 102) observes that while multiculturalism is "a social reality throughout Western countries", three basic models of state interactions with diversity can be identified: 1. Liberal, where a hard line is drawn between the public and private spheres and where equal public rights are guaranteed but diversity is tolerated in private; 2. Nationalist, which demands assimilation to a common culture; 3. Multicultural, where there is no hard private/public line drawn and where diversity is celebrated with official public support. Multicultural policies can be more or less 'radical' and their strength can be classified according to various criteria (Banting et al. 2006; Banting 2005; Banting and Kymlicka 2006b).[8]

[8] Banting et al. (2006) suggest eight emblematic forms of policy which could be used to gauge the strength of multiculturalism in a given country. These include: 1. Constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at central and/or regional levels; 2. The adoption of multiculturalism in the national school curriculum; 3. Inclusion of ethnic representation in the mandate of the public media; 4. Exemptions from dress codes, Sunday closing legislation etc. for minorities; 5. Whether dual citizenship is permitted or not in a given country; 6. State funding of ethnic groups or organisations to support cultural activities; 7. Funding of bilingual education; 8. Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.

1.1.3. Welfare State Usage

Public hostility to granting full and equal welfare system access to migrants is often predicated on a presumption that migrants abuse the welfare system or constitute an especial drain on public resources. Accordingly, it is important to consider how far such claims are supported, or undermined, by the empirical research on this topic. The literature explored below is by no means exhaustive; there are dozens of Western welfare states where this is a live political issue and each individual state will have had dozens of studies conducted on its own particularities. However, key studies in the field are discussed, and a central point that emerges here is that there is a broad diversity and variety of nation state experiences with migrant welfare usage, making it difficult to advance broad generalisations. The contextual contingency of migrant welfare usage is hardly surprising given the multitude of historical, social and political factors that work to shape migrant flows into any given country, and also given the diversity in economic and welfare arrangements that obtain across the region.

Borjas has explored many facets of the interactions of migrants and welfare systems in the American context. He advances a theory of 'negative self-selection' which holds that migrants will have below-average earnings in both source country and host country, if the correlation between the return to skills in the two countries is high and if the dispersion in the earnings distribution is higher in the source than in the host country (Borjas 1999, 1689). As welfare systems normally act to reduce the dispersion of the income distribution by means of transfers and progressive taxes, the dispersion of the earnings distributions in Western welfare states will tend to be less than in many potential source countries (Nannestad 2007, 515). Hence Borjas expects immigration into Western welfare states, which usually involves poorer or less-developed source countries, to consist predominantly of negatively self-selected individuals, i.e. those with below-average skill levels relative to mean skill levels in both source and host countries.

An application of this stylised micro-economic model of migrant behaviour is the 'magnet-effect' which holds that migrant relocation decisions are influenced by the relative generosity of welfare states, a theory for which Borjas (1999) finds some empirical support in terms of migrant clustering in high-benefit areas of the US. McCormick et al. (2002) concluded that some generous welfare states in Europe do act as migrant magnets. However, it has been noted that Borjas' results were on the margin of significance and that there are general difficulties with discounting other possible explanations such as pre-

existing networks of migrants in high-benefit areas exerting a determinative effect on migrant inflows (Barrett and McCarthy 2009; Nannestad 2007).

In the absence of reliable data concerning migrant relocation decisions, it has often proven difficult to satisfactorily assess the 'magnet effect' thesis. But it is certainly the case that, following relocation, migrants find themselves embedded in a network of incentives and constraints determined by the social, political and institutional configuration of the host country. These incentives are similar to those faced by all inhabitants of modern welfare states, where some degree of moral hazard is unavoidable (Okun 1975; Sinn 1995), but incentives towards moral hazard are possibly greater for migrants given migrant-specific integration costs which may lead some to opt, rationally, to maximise their income by means of social transfers and not through the labour-market (Nannestad 2007). If such processes obtain then higher levels of welfare generosity would be negatively correlated with migrant integration, with concomitant higher welfare dependency for migrants than for natives.

A migrant-native welfare dependency gap was detected in the US by Borjas and Hilton (1996) who state that the difference in probabilities of receiving cash-transfers was small, but positive, for migrants over natives, but that this gap widened to 7% when other forms of social assistance were included. Similarly, Borjas and Trejo (1991) found that migrants retained an average level of welfare usage higher than that of natives. In Europe McCormick et al. (2002) found a marginally significant correlation between migrants' 'residual dependency' on unemployment benefits and a measure of welfare generosity. In line with Borjas et al. they define 'residual dependency' as the migrant-native gap in welfare dependency after observable characteristics have been controlled for, and find a positive gap (i.e. migrants were more likely to be in receipt of welfare) for Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, and the Netherlands. Apart from this finding that migrant dependency on welfare is more extensive than their socioeconomic characteristics predict these authors also find that the existence of benefit programs distorts the composition of migrant streams (McCormick et al. 2002).

In terms of country-specific studies, a detailed consideration of Denmark revealed that although migrants tend to assimilate out of welfare over time, there remained an appreciable welfare gap insofar as migrants stabilised after 15-25 years at a dependency baseline that was still high relative to natives (Blume and Verner 2007). Sweden, too, was found to experience a migrant-native disparity in welfare usage after controlling for characteristics (Hansen and Lofstrom 2003). Castronova et al. (2001) found, for Germany,

that despite migrants' higher eligibility for welfare benefits given their income levels and household size they were no more likely than natives to enter into receipt of welfare. Comparing Britain, Germany and Sweden, Kesler (2006) found larger migrant-native joblessness gaps in (high-generosity) Sweden than in the other countries, controlling for characteristics and sending country. Kogan (2003) assessed outcomes for similar groups of migrants, ex-Yugoslavs, in two different countries, finding that welfare availability depressed labour force participation in Sweden compared with Austria.

Recent research finds a lower probability of migrants in Ireland being in receipt of any form of cash benefit, relative to natives, and concludes that migrants appear not to be a burden on the Irish welfare state (Barrett and McCarthy 2009; 2007). The same authors also found a higher probability of welfare receipt for migrants in the UK relative to natives, controlling for characteristics (Ibid.). This latter finding contrasts with other recent research which found no significant migrant-native welfare gap (for unemployment benefits) in the UK (McCormick et al. 2002). Recent comparative research completed by the present author looked at how similar cohorts of migrants utilise state-provided welfare in the context of dissimilar incentive structures in Ireland and Britain and found that simple moral hazard views may be overstated and inaccurate (Corrigan 2010). Disaggregating welfare use into three distinct concepts of 'usage', 'participation' and 'dependency' revealed that migrants to Ireland's more generous welfare state were no more likely to be wholly dependent on state-provided cash transfers than migrants to less generous Britain[9], although they were more likely to be in receipt of *any* form of welfare benefit (i.e. 'participation') than their counterparts in Britain and also more likely to form marginal labour market attachments.

Evidently, a given country's experiences of migrant welfare use will be contingent on various socio-economic factors including national structural particularities, the scale and composition of migrant inflows, prevailing macro-economic conditions etc. All of these factors should, and can, be controlled for in an empirical investigation of the determinants of the conditionality of legal status. The salience of migration and migration-related issues, in terms of factors like the size and nature of inflows, and whether and how they draw on public resources, is likely to bear on the nature of states' policy outputs in terms of variations in level of conditionality imposed on migrants seeking to attain a more secure legal status.

[9] The United Kingdom, excluding Northern Ireland.

While the focus of most of the studies discussed above has been not on poverty *per se* but on migrant engagement with the welfare system and the question of dependency on welfare benefits, this project moves the discussion forward by highlighting the hypothesised mediating role of legal status with regard to this welfare system engagement. If we seek to account for cross-national variation in migrant poverty then, of course, we must attend to the role of the welfare state in alleviating this poverty. This alone is not sufficient, however, and the conceptualisation advanced here points out that welfare states, no matter how expansive, may simply be irrelevant to large numbers of migrants where they are precluded from having recourse to those institutions by virtue of their legal status, and demands an appraisal of outcomes with reference to welfare state effects in interaction with rights-granting legal status and the conditionality governing entry into that status.

1.2. Migration Policy

1.2.1. Migration Policy Formation

Freeman's 'client politics' account (1995; 2002; 2004) of immigration policy has been canonical in the field of migration research.[10] Freeman observes that whether the benefits and costs attached to a particular course of action are concentrated or diffuse will incentivise groups in certain ways and will thus influence whether groups organise to pursue a course of action (2002). He maintains that the politics of immigration can be characterised as client politics insofar as the benefits of securing a broadly concessionary immigration policy are concentrated, i.e. for the discrete group of a state's migrant population (usually not more than one-tenth of a state's total population) *or* for employers and businessmen who rely on the availability of a cheap and pliable workforce. Meanwhile, the costs of such a policy are diffuse and spread across the rest of the populace.

Freeman claims that this form of politics has led to migration policies that are typically expansionary and concessionary (2002). Although public opinion may often be opposed to liberal intakes and inflows of migrants this opposition is often poorly articulated. As vote-maximisers, politicians can afford to ignore such poorly and fragmentally articulated sentiments and favour the policy preferences of those committed to expansionary migration policy (Freeman 1995). Politicians are also generally constrained by what Freeman (1995, 885) terms the "strong antipopulist norm", i.e. politicians in liberal democracies tend not to foment xenophobic sentiment in the construction of their public policy discourse.[11]

Others have maintained, however, that Freeman omitted to account for other important sources of expansiveness and inclusiveness towards migrants (Joppke 1999). Guiraudon claims that these kinds of concessionary rights are unlikely to be secured in the democratic arena and argues that the venue in which rights are sought or debated will have a material impact on whether and how they are granted (Guiraudon 2002; 1998). She disagrees with Freeman's explicitly political account of the control of migration policy claiming that overt politicisation of the issue is often risky, for several reasons. As different institutions will privilege different groups in different ways it is not self-evident that open public debate is the best forum to secure expansionary migration policy. Far-right parties,

[10] It should be clarified here that 'immigration policy' generally refers to the policies states employ to control and structure immigration inflows.

[11] Labelled 'antipopulist', as the 'populist' impulse is held to be anti-immigrant.

for example, would be privileged by such an open forum, moving their otherwise marginal political proposals to centre stage in the public arena. Politicians, likewise, can occasionally be motivated more by mercenary political calculation than by noble ideals, perhaps falling prey to more populist sentiments as elections draw near. Media coverage will play a significant role in how issues like migration are constructed in the public domain. Finally, public opinion on migration issues is likely to prove volatile depending on economic and other conditions. Guiraudon (1998) argues that these three elements together – public opinion, politicians' motives and the media – can give rise to a self-reinforcing negative dynamic, leading her to conclude that restricted loci of debate may be better for securing migrant rights. In essence, her contention is that different venues result in different policy outcomes.

There are two types of situation Guiraudon (1998) delineates where debate on migration policy might move beyond the executive realm. The first is 'rule-induced debate expansion'. Some types of right may need to be formally approved by the national legislature, and this is likely to be the case with political rights, for example. However, Guiraudon points out that other types of rights, like social rights, may not require legislative change; welfare benefits and eligibility for same are often determined merely by regulatory change within governmental departments. So we see how the interstices in the bureaucratic rule-structure open up space for the discussion and possible extension of rights by a sort of 'under the radar' process (Guiraudon 1998).

The second situation Guiraudon refers to concerns 'conflict-based debate expansion'. Here, as the number of actors involved in the politico-legal process, and thus the potential for conflict, increases, the scope of the debate is likely to expand also. She cites the example of Germany where migration law is a federal concern. This denies the Länder the right to disagree and to implement their own interpretations of the law, but it remains the case that the Länder exert control over social policy, education and cultural policies, thus multiplying the number of policy venues. The extent of competition between these various venues and the extent to which policymaking is coordinated within a state will determine the kinds of migration policy output that governing élites produce. Obviously the type of decentralisation captured in the Länder example creates the potential for intra-national variations in policy outputs which run contrary to the universalism implicit in the notion of 'rights'.

However, particular institutional configurations may also make it easier to secure certain types of rights like *social* rights, which Guiraudon holds are more compatible with

stealth-driven, i.e. non-public, processes of debate and extension. Guiraudon's conclusion on the basis of the discussion outlined above is that the state makes a contribution to migration policy that is independent of political parties or political ideology. In a similar vein, though on a different topic, others have found that a state's constitutional structure has very robust effects on welfare state effort with clear implications for poverty (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Moller et al. 2003). They argue that dispersion of political power offers multiple points of influence on the making and implementation of policy, something which will be inimical to welfare state expansion, thus reducing welfare effort, and the results of their empirical analysis bear this out (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993, 722).

Guiraudon also maintains that policy change on immigration issues is only possible if it is elaborated by officials who are working in a context of no or low publicity. This is why, like Joppke (1999), she contends that national legal/court systems have been so important in the securing and extension of rights for migrants, as judges were free to intervene in the debate and set standards – in accordance with broad-based human rights principles – for those rights, in a way that set limits on state power (Guiraudon 1998).

The independence of the policy venue involved and the extent to which it can operate by 'stealth' will most likely, as these authors maintain, have a bearing on the scope of rights afforded to migrants. But this view and Freeman's client-politics view need not be thought of as mutually exclusive accounts. Both accounts arguably explain different sides of migration policy change. Stealth matters, but so too do the exigencies of politics and the salience of political demands. However, both accounts could also be criticised on the grounds that they assume a linear development of migration policy change in an increasingly expansionary and concessionary direction. There is no clear reason to assume such expansionary linearity.

Applying the client politics model in another way, taking social rights as the focal point, we can see how the theory could equally well account for contractionary, perhaps conditional, changes to the welfare entitlements afforded by social rights. This all depends on how the 'client base' is defined. Under certain conditions the diffuse nature of the (welfare) costs imposed on the populace at large may come to be perceived as unduly burdensome. When this cost-bearing majority segment of the populace constitutes the 'client base', the political imperatives created for the government may be too great to ignore if opposition to cost-bearing becomes voluble. As vote-maximisers, politicians can equally well be expected to contract previously expansionary policies where this is deemed politically expedient. Guiraudon (1998) similarly observes that governments may be simply

pragmatic in their approach to 'rights' for migrants, perhaps not seeing them as rights at all but rather as sticks and carrots to be used to incentivise people in ways that ultimately obey an economic rationale. She also contends that stability and an absence of social unrest may be goods more highly valued by pragmatic governments than the protection at all costs of 'rights' extended to migrants (Ibid.).

Just as the client politics account can be held to cut both ways for migrant social rights, so too can the policy venue account. Policy venues insulated from the disapprobation of public discourse cannot be presumed to be automatically biased towards an expansionary rights agenda. Likewise, we cannot presume immutability of motivation on the part of the élites who control these policy venues. Processes of stealth will facilitate the retraction of social rights and entitlements to welfare access just as readily as they facilitate their extension. Whether and how the conditionality of legal status for migrants can be pegged to the prevalence of stealth-driven policy processes, perhaps contingent on populist and retractionist public sentiment, is something to be explored empirically later.

There seems to be ample theoretical scope here to hypothesise that such factors will indeed have a determinative bearing on migration policy outputs. The results will have implications for how we conceptualise migrant incorporation into social rights and welfare state access and for the very idea of 'Incorporation Regimes'. It may not even prove possible to convincingly speak of incorporation in terms of 'regimes' where the processes involved demonstrate no discernible 'elective affinities' (Shalev 2007, 264) or where the bureaucratic-institutional framework governing incorporation is not characterised by sustained temporal projection. This is the subject of a later chapter.

Some have pointed to potential sources of conditionality and social rights-retraction other than anti-immigrant sentiment. Feldblum (2000) maintains that there are several broad trends with regard to citizenship and membership in modern states, including the growing salience of dual nationality, the changing rights and benefits afforded to residents/denizens, and the seeming convergence of citizenship acquisition policies across states. Within this context she argues that states pursue strategies to 'manage membership' within their borders, and that some of these strategies involve attempts to revalorise citizenship. The distinction to be made between citizenship *qua* identity and citizenship *qua* legal status is relevant here, and Feldblum acknowledges that debates about nationhood and identity may impact on policy debates in ways that seek to actively promote the 'value' of citizenship.

One such means by which this could happen might involve the imposition of disincentives on migrants or potential migrants, including such measures as limiting access to social services, imposing harsher controls on migrants and imposing obstacles to full labour market integration (Feldblum 2000). Qualifying rights, i.e. imposing conditionality, can also be seen as a means of managing membership, and this may be tied to other trends in the management of access to citizenship and the formal rights attached to citizenship, such as limitations on *jus soli* rules for example (Ibid.). This raises questions, however, as to whether moves towards the qualification of rights actually result in outcomes that are congruent with the political rationale of such moves.

It may be the case that moves to revalorise citizenship in an assimilationist vein result in outcomes that could be seen as multiculturalist. Feldblum (2000) gives the example of the moves in the US to tighten migrant eligibility for welfare benefits leading to a surge in migrant numbers applying for naturalisation and thus to an increase in the heterogeneity of the community of citizens, an outcome which may not have been fully intended. Analogously, TCNs in Europe may naturalise to avail of the various subsidiary benefits of holding EU citizenship status, something which Feldblum suggests may not be in line with EU policymaker intentions. In a similar vein, it could be the case that state attempts to manage membership of migrants through the imposition of conditionality on attaining a more favourable legal status may have unintended consequences. Migration policy frameworks designed to exclude migrants from full access to the protections afforded by the state may incentivise them to seek even greater security, depending on the settings of the other parameters of the state's broader policy superstructure such as the generosity of the welfare state or openness of the labour market. Generous welfare state supports may, for example, interact with currently held legal status and the nature of (in)security delimited by that situation to spur migrants into the seeking of a more favourable position within the state-institutional/legal-status nexus.

Leaving aside the intentions or otherwise of state policymakers acting to protect or revalorise the status of citizenship specifically, what other factors are relevant to the determination of migration policy more broadly? There is a wide consensus ascribing economic concerns a central role, if not *the* central role, in this policymaking process. Some have claimed that in Europe all policy roads now lead to the "flexible labour market" where migrants slot in and out in the fulfilment of purely functional economic roles (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006, 79), a situation that conflicts with the idea of a 'Social Europe' or a meaningful European social citizenship (Ryner 2000). The flexibility

demanded of migrants in the European context is the core of an emergent EU regime, these authors say, representing "a common conditionality to which the member states are bound to adapt" (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006, 80). However this is not held, by these authors, to augur the end of the historical plurality of citizenship, welfare and other policy regimes in Europe.

Sassen (1999) also considers the impact of economic factors on migration policy and argues that processes of economic globalisation have changed the nature of state sovereignty resulting in a '*de facto* transnationalism' in the handling of both domestic and international immigration issues. The attempt to form a truly global economy has required a huge effort of legal innovation, Sassen says, and this set of legal innovations and practices has resulted in a reconstitution of the power structures within which the state finds itself. This has resulted in a shifting of responsibility for elements of immigration policy away from the state and on to supranational institutions in the EU, and has also resulted in an increase in the use of international human rights instruments in the legal adjudication of migration issues, similar to Soysal's (1994) argument (Sassen 1999, 179). The exigencies of a globalised economy have led to the formation of privatised regimes for the circulation of certain types of workers in countries with free-trade agreements; Sassen (1999) cites the example of Japan which, in the 1990s, and as a result of the increasing internationalisation of its professional work-world, banned immigration that met only 'simple labour' needs to focus instead on the admittance of certain high-skilled categories of Western labour.

In this way we see how the increased circulation of capital and goods that is so integral to processes of globalisation forced the issue of the circulation of people onto the agenda. The idea that states adapt policy to facilitate the circulation of people so as to meet the needs of their post-Fordist, service-based economies chimes with the position of Schierup, Hansen, and Castles (2006) on the central importance now ascribed to the 'flexibility' of modern labour regimes. Sassen observes on the irony of migrant-receiving countries bending to the economic imperatives of globalisation by filtering migrant inflows towards the higher end of the skills spectrum, when the technological and communications infrastructure, as well as the high-skilled workforce needed to operate that infrastructure – the features of globalised late capitalism in the developed world – are concentrated in urban centres, necessitating the simultaneous existence of an attendant low-skilled workforce providing essential low-tech services (Sassen 1998).

Indeed, if economics really is the driving force behind the making of much migration policy then there is a substantial case to be made on economic grounds for all Western

countries to liberalise their approaches to the inward migration of low-skilled migrants. There are, for example, vast productivity gains to be made by people moving from poor to rich countries (Legrain 2006). Legrain (2006, 64) provides the cogent example of a poor farmer tilling by hand in Africa who, upon moving to Western Europe, gains access to the superior capital and technology available there, enabling him to produce more food, earn a higher wage and ultimately increase global food production. Large productivity gaps imply large potential gains to be made by facilitating migration on a vast scale. Some calculations have estimated these gains to be of truly gargantuan proportions, with one study (Moses and Letnes 2004) using 1998 data positing a global gain from completely liberalised worldwide migration in the order of US$55 trillion – a figure in excess of the world's GDP in that year!

Such gains accrue for a number of reasons. In a basic sense an influx of new people amounts to an influx of new consumers. With more people to sell their goods to, host country businesses benefit and can employ more staff. Higher output and higher employment mean higher GDP and increased tax takes for governments to spend. With the importation of low-cost labour to perform low-skill jobs workers may be displaced, but this frees them for redeployment to more productive ends elsewhere while simultaneously keeping the cost of labour-intensive services low in the host country (Legrain 2006). Similarly, complementarities between workers can also result in productivity gains, e.g. where hiring an affordable nanny allows a currently inactive mother to enter or return to the labour force (Ibid.).

Immigrants obviously come from different cultural, social and economic backgrounds, and this very difference allows consumers in the host country to enjoy goods and services not previously available, or to enjoy them at a much lower price (Legrain 2006, 82). Difference can likewise facilitate economically beneficial innovation, where a diversity of viewpoints drawn from those not shaped by the cultural status quo can result in the application of novel solutions to problems. Short to medium term migration of those engaged in business can foster deeper cultural understandings and facilitate the development of international social networks with all of the information-disseminating gains that such social capital entails (Granovetter 1973). Beyond this, difference also entails softer benefits, such as contributing to the cultural life of cities and countries; who can imagine a New York or a London devoid of immigrants?

One of the most compelling reasons for the liberalisation of migration has a special relevance in the context of Western European welfare states. Put simply, European

populations are ageing, and in ways that threaten the future viability, or at the very least the future capacity, of welfare states to provide social protections. The dependency ratio, i.e. the number of younger working-age people potentially able to support each older and economically inactive person (Cohen 2003), is predicted to deteriorate over time with fewer young people to support an increasingly old population (Legrain 2006). Projections for the OECD countries[12] estimate that from about 2015 onwards the size of the incoming (20-24) and outgoing (60-64) working-age cohorts will hit equilibrium temporarily as the size of the younger cohort continues on a downward trajectory while the older cohort continues to increase in size, resulting in an eventual disparity of 13% by 2030 (SOPEMI 2010, 26). In order to maintain its population at current levels the EU would have to admit 47.5 million immigrants by the year 2050, fewer than it receives at present (Legrain 2006, 157). While immigration alone cannot solve problems around the deteriorating dependency ratio – with increases in the retirement age already ongoing across Europe – it certainly has a positive role to play in this regard.

Apart from what appear to be the marked economic benefits of migration, it seems clear that states do not develop migration policy solely on economic grounds. If there is a purely economic rationale at work in the determination of the modes by which states adapt to the requirements of labour market flexibility then we would not expect to see restrictive skills-based criteria working to structure migrant inflows, such as are imposed by certain of these migrant-receiving countries. This raises questions as to whether European states really are "bound to adapt" – in the sense of such an adaptation being a functional *necessity* – to the "common conditionality" of flexible labour markets (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006, 80). In terms of the conditionality of legal status, it also opens up conceptual space allowing us to go beyond accounts couched merely in terms of the vagaries of historical contingency, to explore other possible reasons behind variations in state adaptations to the requirements of the flexibility that modern economies are held to demand.

Of course, complex social phenomena are likely to be the result of multiple determination and causal heterogeneity (Shalev et al. 2007). Many of the accounts discussed here have pointed to the constraints which bind states to respond in certain ways, ranging from the economic and political to the legal and the normative. Undoubtedly, states must respond to these and they do so in different ways, contingent upon their historical and structural particularities. These structural particularities lend

[12] Excluding Mexico and Turkey.

themselves to strategic trajectories which challenge the constraint-centric view of state action. Certainly with regard to the phenomenon of interest here – the conditionality of legal status faced by migrants and its role in the determination of their poverty outcomes – states can and have acted in unconstrained ways. The foregoing discussion serves to theoretically motivate later explorations of reasons for variations in the levels of conditionality imposed by states.

1.2.2. Migration Policy and the EU

Since the Single European Act of 1986, the free movement of people, goods and capital across EU member-state borders has been established, and this convention also applies to those non-member states which are part of the European Free Trade Area. Morris (1997) observes that there has been significant resistance on the part of the member-states to allowing the same freedoms for TCNs and opposition by some to any form of supranational settlement in this area. Easy intra-EU passage for "clandestine ... migrants, or even asylum seekers" has not been acceptable to member states (Morris 1997, 195), potentially because migration streams of this sort tend to originate at the Southern and Eastern frontiers of the Union, i.e. where poverty of potential migrants is likely to be higher and skill levels likely to be lower than in the developed, wealthy core of Europe.

To facilitate free movement of TCNs from these areas would be essentially to remove control from individual member-states, as the practices of states with less stringent admissions policies would then rebound on the entire community (Morris 1997). The existence of this "soft underbelly" of Europe has facilitated abuse of Schengen Treaty norms on border control (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006, 104), and this may arguably have contributed to state fears of a creeping supranational regime working to constrain state sovereignty over the important and contested policy domain of migration control, while also explaining state intransigence as regards the ceding of power from the domestic level to the Community level.

It has been widely remarked that the EU is *not* in fact a supranational entity for the most part but, rather, an 'Inter-governmental' entity (Hansen 1998; Morris 1997; Koslowski 1998; Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006; Schuster and Solomos 2002). The Schengen Treaty, for example, which removes internal border checks between 25 European countries, three of them outside the EU, was originally negotiated (between five members of the European Community in 1985) at an inter-governmental, non-Community, level, thus avoiding the specific legal criteria attaching to Community level

agreements and also placing the agreement beyond the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (Morris 1997). However, in the time since Morris was writing, the EU has shifted immigration and asylum concerns from the inter-governmental Pillar to the Community Pillar of the Union thus making these concerns subject to qualified majority voting, with the passing of the Amsterdam Treaty (Bommes and Geddes 2000; Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006). While this Community-level agreement produced important guiding principles in the area of immigration/asylum, such as the principle of 'first safe country' or that of non-*refoulement* [13], it did not, however, specify the *how* of nation-state dealings with asylum seekers or TCNs.

Accordingly, and perhaps unsurprisingly, states have tended to be guided in their dealings with these types of migrants by material considerations and motivations in the *national* interest. It has been claimed that previous inter-governmental agreements, like Schengen and the Dublin convention (see last footnote), weakened the right to asylum, and led to an EU-wide contest at the nation-state level centred around constructing the most restrictive residence permit and visa systems possible in an effort to dissuade unwanted non-nationals (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006). Even following the end of inter-governmentalism with regard to EU migration policy, it still remains within the power of member states to determine the restrictiveness of their residency regimes; conditionality is advanced here as a measure of the extent of that restrictiveness as it applies to TCNs, and the import of these state practices will be assessed empirically later.

Also, where member states had previously entered into bilateral agreements with migrant-sending countries (for TCNs), e.g. for agricultural and seasonal work, the European Commission accepted this and, as a natural consequence, accepted the attendant inferior working conditions and wage standards that applied to TCNs working under these agreements (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006). There is an extent to which these moves could be construed as "social dumping" (Alber and Standing 2000; Castles 2006; Rhodes 1996) with regard to economic migrants and asylum seekers. Indeed, for the latter category such moves arguably contravene the spirit of international refugee law (Morris 1997).

All of this is set within a wider context of what Schierup, Hansen and Castles (2006) term the move towards a 'post-national workfare regime' in the EU (it should be noted that these authors do not use the term 'post-national' in the same sense as Soysal (1994)).

[13] Non-*refoulement* requires that receiving countries cannot send asylum seekers back to their country of origin where this is likely to place that asylum seeker in danger (Joppke 1998); the 'first safe country' principle derives from the Dublin Convention and requires that asylum seekers must make their claim for refugee status in the first safe country of the Union in which they arrive, and other countries retain the right to return asylum seekers to their country of first arrival (Morris 1997).

They perceive in the European Union a drift away from the Enlightenment ideals which informed the development of the European project – ideals of universalism, humanism and equality for all – towards a new ordering principle of economic rationality and self interest wherein 'The Market' has taken priority over all other concerns.

This feeds into a 'double dilemma' at the heart of Europe: the first concerned with the tension between corporate economic interest and the necessity of social solidarity or redistribution; the second concerned with continued migration, racism, and the racialisation of social exclusion. The reality of social exclusion gives the lie to claims about the central importance of Europe's 'social dimension', and migrants often find themselves bereft of occupational choice, reduced to mere cogs serving the "much-hailed flexibility" of production and labour regimes and the new service economies (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006, 15).

This has implications for social cohesion in the Union, which the authors maintain is vitally important for the maintenance of political stability in the "enormously heterogeneous multinational and multi-ethnic cultural conglomerate of Europe" (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006, 14). They perceive a shift in the overarching discourse and conceptualisation of the political coalitions at the heart of Europe, away from the old Conservative-Social Democratic coalition and towards a new Neo-Communitarian–Neo-Liberal coalition focused on maintaining market efficiency, above all, while at the same time attempting to engender social solidarity. This has come at the expense of traditional European conceptions of social inclusion and protection which, by virtue of a broad understanding of what 'substantive citizenship' entails, afforded these protections as a matter of right. It is this broad understanding, the authors say, which has characterised the EU's approach to social inclusion until very recently in its history. This understanding has now been narrowed to one in which social inclusion/exclusion takes engagement in paid work or employment (or self-employment) as its defining criterion, something which has resulted in the sidelining and hollowing out of social rights (Ibid., 16-17).

Guiraudon (1998) has claimed that, for migrants, Marshall's (1963) triptych of civil, political and social rights accruing to citizens in that order over the course of history (see next section) has been 'reordered'; social and civil rights are now the first to be afforded to migrants, while political rights remain denied. In contrast to this position, Schierup, Hansen, and Castles (2006) maintain that in the context of the EU the triptych has not been 'reordered', but has in fact been set the 'right way up' again. This represents a 'return to history' at the supranational level of the Union where civil rights, and possibly some

political rights[14], are secured by virtue of a *market-bound* civic citizenship, but this does not entail any guarantee of an evolution towards a meaningful *social* citizenship of the Union (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006). The role of legal status in the securing of social citizenship for migrants is the subject of the next section.

[14] Some European states, like Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands, afford local voting rights simply by virtue of permanent residence in the state (Hansen 1998).

1.3. Legal Status

In this section we discuss the importance of legal status for the quality of migrant lives. Many of the rights traditionally afforded by citizenship status have come to be detached from the formal holding of that status and are secured now for migrants by virtue of residence in the country. This situation has naturally spawned a large literature around the nature and concept of citizenship in the age of global migration, its continued relevance, implications of this shift for the nation state, and implications for our understanding of the basis and legitimacy of membership and rights in modern societies. These rights, specifically the set of social rights comprising (a part of) the core of citizenship, matter directly for the analytic concern of this project, migrant poverty.

As such, where residency has essentially become a *de facto* form of citizenship entailing all of the latter concept's important social elements, it then becomes necessary to consider more deeply the concept of citizenship and to contextualise the importance of legal status that is claimed here within the set of broader debates around citizenship and migration. This section will begin by discussing the concept of citizenship and cognate concepts of denizenship and membership which more accurately capture the situation of not-yet-naturalised migrants who still enjoy a comprehensive set of social supports and protections on a par with citizens. We will then consider how the unmooring of rights from citizenship has been conceptualised and debated, before discussing in the context of the European Union, the possibility of a specifically 'EU-citizenship'.

The distinct practices of diverse nation states as regards the formal ascription of citizenship status will be instructive insofar as this is directly analogous to the practices by which states ascribe formal long-term residency status, with both also subject to the imposition of conditionality. Citizenship, and not residency status *per se*, has been central to the academic discussion of legal status and rights-ascription for migrants, presumably on the grounds of its greater theoretical import. Accordingly, this will by necessity be the focus of the discussion here also. However, in the next chapter we present the results and primary data from a pilot survey conducted on the links between the welfare state, residential security, long-term residency status, and citizenship status, serving to motivate and ground the focus on legal status and the conditionality of same as a justifiable and appropriate explanatory apparatus. A formal sketch of the theoretical framework within which we locate migrant poverty outcomes is presented following that section.

1.3.1. Migrant Social Rights: Citizenship, Denizenship, Membership?

TH Marshall's (1963) tripartite conceptualisation of citizenship has been foundational to contemporary debates about social rights and social citizenship. Marshall perceived in modern social history an evolutionary development from Civil Rights, largely secured in the 17th century (in Britain at least), through Political Rights, progressively expanded through the 18th century, through to the modern day development of Social Rights in the 19th century. His views stemmed from the perception that there was a basic kind of equality associated with the concept of 'full membership' of the community, and that this concept of membership had become wholly identified with citizenship. Citizenship, he claimed, was the 'architect of inequality' insofar as it afforded formal equality while at the same time justifying post-market inequalities. Of course, many critiques have been levelled at his account and Marshall has been charged with both androcentrism and ethnocentrism; indeed, by our modern sociological standards he could also be labelled an anachronism, writing as he was at a time before the advent of globalisation, with its attendant social and economic transformations, including the normalisation and facilitation of the processes of mass migration.

A distinguishing feature of the tripartite view is how each of the elements are interlocking and mutually (though perhaps not symmetrically) supportive, i.e. securing Civil Rights is a necessary precondition for securing Political Rights, and there would be little point for example in choosing political leaders, through whatever governance mechanism obtained in that society, if the rights to freedom of speech, or freedom of property or association, were not secured. Similarly, it can be argued that Social rights are a necessary precondition for the *effective* exercise of Political Rights (cf. Fabre 2000, who argues this point in another context); the idea being that people will not engage with political discourse as a priority if they are unable to feed or clothe themselves, i.e. social rights have a clearly "enabling" aspect (Faist 2001, 55).

The logical, perhaps teleological, securing of rights Marshall discusses does not always run from the Civil through the Political to the Social. As Bloemraad et al. (2008) point out, women had been afforded social rights in Marshall's Britain long before they were afforded political rights. Similarly, for migrants, the progression of rights has not followed this linear path, but has tended to move from the Civil often – though not always – to the Social, while postponing, perhaps indefinitely, the securing of Political rights (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008). Guiraudon (2000) has labelled this the 'Marshallian

triptych reordered', with social rights accruing first of all while political rights remain contested.

This is hardly a mysterious or inexplicable set of circumstances, given the important symbolic dimensions of citizenship, with political rights attaining a special significance in this symbolic context insofar as they afford determinative agency over the polity to the *Demos*. That migrants are not, and maybe should not be, members of the *Demos* immediately on their arrival in the host country is unlikely to prove a controversial standpoint, at least amongst those who are not committed to radically cosmopolitan views of citizenship of the type explored, for example, by Dannreuther and Hutchings (1999). But it also seems highly unlikely that migrants can expect to be denied, simply by virtue of their migrant status, the set of *civil* rights prevailing in any given host country (certainly not in the Western liberal democracies at least). Social rights are a more complicated issue, both conceptually and politically. What does seem clear, however, is that migrant minorities in society will force a re-evaluation of what comprises the 'essential core' of citizenship for that society. Normative arguments concerning the necessity of securing and protecting social rights for 'citizens' are often designed on the assumption of a unitary citizenry, without recognition of the fact that many societies today contain large numbers of non-citizens whose status *vis- à-vis* social rights is uncertain and insecure.

Indeed, this very uncertainty raises questions, in a communitarian vein, as to what exactly society owes to these non-citizens, and what these non-citizens owe to society (see e.g. Bader 1997). It also prompts philosophical reflection on the utility of the concept 'citizen' and how that concept might be challenged and changed by the existence of migrant minorities. Some authors have advanced the concept of 'denizenship' in opposition to citizenship, highlighting that many of the rights of citizenship accrue to these denizens simply by virtue of their residency in the country, specifically civil and social – though not political – rights, and that residency has now become a legally enforceable basis on which to make claims of the welfare state (Brubaker 1989; Hammar 1990; Hansen 1998; Freeman 2004). For Brubaker (1989) the organisation of state membership is conceived of as two concentric circles, with the inner circle representing membership of the political community, of citizens, and the outer one representing membership of the national, social and economic community, of denizens, i.e. permanently resident aliens.[15]

Arguably, this situation is itself problematic, and Castles (2000) suggests that a form of denizenship which excludes permanent minorities from the political sphere is

[15] And citizens of other member states, in the European Union.

inconsistent with democratic rule and thus undesirable in the long term. Also, even where political rights are afforded *de jure* they can often be ineffective where permanent minorities, such as the Aboriginals in Australia, can never hope to hold determinative agency over the mainstream political process (Castles 2000), something which raises the issue of justified special rights for discrete groups (Miller 2002; Kymlicka 1995). Besides, the claim that denizens fully enjoy civil and social rights is questionable. Castles (2000) observes that civil rights guaranteed *de jure* to migrants are often not realised, or are violated, *de facto*. State institutions like the police service, courts system or prison system cannot be presumed to be wholly impartial at all times in their dealings with non-nationals, and the prevalence of embedded institutional racism could be seen as a constraint on migrants' civil rights (Castles 2000).

In the case of social rights in Europe for third-country nationals the claim that *all* denizens fully enjoy social rights is belied by the existence in fact of qualitatively different legal statuses, certain of which are functional pre-requisites for the enjoyment of rights and entitlements made available by the (welfare) state and on which conditions of entry varying in type, scope and extent are imposed. Who are the 'denizens'? It is insufficient to simply claim that 'residency' is the basis on which rights are ascribed without attending to the multiplicity of forms such residency can take and the numerous obstacles states can and do impose on attaining the most secure and expansive forms. In line with the approach and views of other authors (Dörr and Faist 1997; Morris 2003; Niessen, Huddleston, and Citron 2007), the assumption made here is that *permanent* residency – i.e. officially sanctioned long-term residency – is this most expansive form, presenting no barriers to social rights.

Brubaker (1989) accords with this view also and his conception of membership, as noted above, emphasises the permanency of residency as especially important for the life chances of migrants; at the same time he acknowledges that citizenship still confers significant advantages, even beyond the political sphere. Bauböck likewise recounts, in reflecting on the recent history of migration to Europe, how the rights of "permanent residents" in these major migrant-receiving states were substantially upgraded or "equalised with those of citizens" (Bauböck 2006, 9). To the extent, then, that migrants are prevented from attaining the security of this legal status we might naturally expect them to manifest undesirable or disadvantageous life outcomes.

Castles (2000) observes that ethnic minorities have experienced weakening social rights and that incorporation into social rights for migrants may only be partial. This partial

incorporation into mainstream social and economic structures may lead to social segmentation, something possibly exacerbated for certain sub-groups of migrant owing perhaps to a weak legal position (i.e. undocumented immigrants will be in a much weaker position relative to those holding work permits), relative human capital disadvantages, or simply due to racial stigmatising (Castles 2000). In this sense Castles is here acknowledging that the particular category of residency held by the migrant is key to their life outcomes. These concerns lead Castles to conclude that the Marshallian triad is now insufficient, and that at the very least we must take other migrant-specific rights issues into account if we wish to employ a meaningful concept of citizenship in a world of mass migration.

It is important to differentiate between contending meanings of the concept 'citizenship'. The *de jure vs. de facto* distinction introduced earlier with regard to the enjoyment of rights can also be usefully applied to understanding citizenship. Legal ascription of citizenship status naturally implies that a form of equality obtains across all holders of this status. Yet this legal status may not result in comparable experiences of citizenship, with socio-economic inequalities serving as an obvious metric for comparison in this regard (Morissens and Sainsbury 2005). This contrast has also been conceived of as the difference between 'formal' and 'substantive' citizenship (Brubaker 1989; Fabre 2000). Baub • k (1994) advances a similar distinction between 'nominal' (equivalent to 'formal' in the discussion here) and 'substantial' citizenship, where the basic elements of substantial citizenship comprise generalised rights within a political community.[16] The use of a term like 'substantive' here suggests the need for an external standard of 'substantiveness' in the context of citizenship.

In Marshall's (1963) original formulation, citizenship was held to require "a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession". For those who hold legal citizenship status and yet are still subject to severe socio-economic disparities relative to other citizens, how likely is it that they will experience this sense of 'community membership'? And, how accurate then is it to apply to them the label 'citizen'? The use of Marshall here as the external standard by which

[16] Social (in)equality is not inherent in Bauböck's concept of 'substantial' however and he points out that citizenship can be substantially equal, even when the scope of the rights it affords are minimal. For example, in a libertarian minimal state citizenship may consist only of property rights and negative liberties of free speech etc., and under this system both plutocrats and paupers would be substantially equal. Under a different societal construction, however, where some idea of democratic government under popular control were important, then social inequality becomes relevant insofar as the state would have to assist paupers so as to allow them effectuate their democratic rights. Both societal constructions here afford substantially equal rights of citizenship; the difference subsists in the number, scope and type of rights afforded under each construction. (Bauböck 1994, 26-7).

citizenship might be measured highlights some limitations of his original account. Marshall did not subscribe to *post facto* equalitarianism, something he was quite explicit about in *Citizenship & Social Class.* In other words, Marshall was not arguing for equal outcomes for all, but was trying to make continuing inequality seem tolerable, while simultaneously promoting a set of universally held rights; equality of opportunity was what mattered (Marshall 1963; Dwyer 2000).

'Legitimate inequality' would be accepted, he claimed, provided that there was sufficient open social mobility in society (Marshall 1963). His Anglocentric approach does not readily integrate the specific concerns of non-nationals here. Where the incorporation of migrants into the set of rights attached to citizenship is only partial or is otherwise qualified or conditional, can it then be justifiably maintained that migrants enjoy the same equality of opportunity as national citizens? And where socio-economic disadvantages attach themselves consistently to a discretely bounded and identifiable group, such as non-nationals, can it then still be maintained that such inequality is 'legitimate'? These shortcomings do not suggest that Marshall failed when he addressed these issues; they merely highlight his error of omission in dealing solely with the concerns of (male) Britons within a narrowly delimited temporal frame.

The larger point here is that there does seem to be both justification and utility in disaggregating citizenship into both legal and substantive forms. Furthermore, taking socio-economic inequality as an indicator of what 'substantive citizenship' might mean seems justified. Indeed, the European Union[17] recently made comments to the effect that social exclusion can be considered the "negation of citizenship" (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006). This is not to say that economic concerns are the fundamental absolute when we speak of substantive citizenship, but in the context of analysing processes of migrant incorporation into social rights, socio-economic outcomes naturally present themselves as a key indicator. We can again appeal to Marshall (1963) for an external standard by which socio-economic outcomes can be judged.

He defines *social citizenship* as "that whole range [of rights of citizenship] from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society" (1963, 74). One of our central analytic concerns here is how access to the rights of social citizenship that has been qualified or rendered *conditional* for migrants may come to affect the "modicum of welfare" they enjoy as well as their chances of living "the life of a

[17] The European Union Poverty Programme (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006).

civilised being" according to prevailing societal standards. Marshall, despite his various shortcomings, may yet prove useful.

1.3.2. Citizenship as legal status: Converging, Diverging, or Irrelevant?

For other authors, the simple denizen/citizen duality may not be sufficient in a globalised world which contains pressures and trends towards increased supranational modes of governance. Soysal (1994) argues that nation state citizenship is increasingly being superseded by Postnational forms of membership. She points to the proliferation of international human rights norms, and of supranational institutions (like the European Court of Human Rights), as decentring the importance of the nation state as the locus of rights-claims, and challenging nation-state sovereignty in the process.

This claim can be objected to, however, on the grounds that although international liberal norms may have some force, it remains the province of the nation state to actively secure and provide for the rights-claims of citizens. It is difficult to see how social rights – such as benefit claims or the right to education for example – could ever be provided supranationally, that is to say outside of the framework of a social security, educational, or healthcare system, all of which are necessarily located in a nationally-based bureaucratic-institutional nexus. Although the EU has made some tentative moves in this direction with its rules facilitating the portability of state pension and child benefits across Member State borders (e.g. Regulation 1408/71), it remains the case that these benefits are, and must be, claimed in a national context. In Joppke's (1998) words, Postnationalism is a status which ascribes nothing and which is possessed of no institutional apparatus that would make it a viable alternative to national citizenship.

The broader arguments of the proponents of Postnational accounts amount to two key claims. First, that the nation state has found its sovereignty challenged by mass migratory processes. Second, that national citizenship is no longer relevant and has been undermined by the fact that security is now guaranteed to citizen and non-citizen alike.

An important distinction relevant to understandings of citizenship pertains to the difference between citizenship as a legal status and citizenship as an identity. Postnationalism has been seen as a challenge to understandings of citizenship *qua* legal status, while Multiculturalism, where there is a high degree of official or unofficial support for migrant groups by the state, has been seen as posing a challenge to understandings of citizenship *qua* identity (Joppke 1998).

On the challenge to citizenship as a legal status, Joppke (1998, 25) is deeply dissatisfied with what he perceives to be the implicit "advocacy" of the Postnational account. Beyond advocating (implicitly) for internationalism in this post-socialist world, the postnationalists, worryingly in Joppke's (1998) view, reinterpret the guestworker experience in a positive light, transforming the vice of second-class membership into a virtue. Exclusion from the nation state is certainly not seen as a bad thing in the Postnational account – despite the potential for partial and incomplete incorporation into the material aspects of citizenship that this may entail and which was alluded to earlier – but Joppke interprets this as potentially placing non-nationals in a vulnerable and inferior ("second-class") position which is difficult to reconcile with the democratic principle of equal rights (1998, 25). There are several other reasons for thinking that the challenge of Postnationalism to the relevance of citizenship as a legal status may be overstated.

It may be the case that proponents of Postnationalism have drawn a wrong dualism between nation states and individual rights; i.e. the protection of individual rights is arguably an inherent feature of nation-states *qua* liberal-constitutional states, so rights should not be understood as obtaining due to the force of some external imperative (Joppke 1998, 26). Guiraudon (1998) affirms the continued importance of the nation state when she observes that liberal international norms will be institutionalised in particular states subject to context-specific national variation which will lead to non-uniformity in policy outputs. Member states of the EU will interpret EU directives in light of existing legal and institutional constraints and remain the ultimate arbiters of their own legislative outputs. The nation state, Guiraudon says, can prefer 'its own' in legislation, and this applies to socio-economic rights insofar as these aim to protect the national labour market.

Joppke also maintains that the Postnational account lacks 'temporal markers' (1998). His argument is that the Postnationalists have overdrawn what was a historically finite episode of immigration and represented it as a fundamental transformation in the nature of the nation-state. So, while Postnational membership has a clear beginning – in the post-war era – its proponents do not see it as having any identifiable end; this seems highly unlikely given that Postnational membership is seen, Joppke claims, as an "intolerable anomaly" which is "detested" by the immigrant-receiving states themselves (1998, 28). He also maintains that the spatial concentration of the Postnational model in Western Europe is not due to the greater receptiveness of these nations to international human rights norms imposed exogenously from on (supranational) high, but is explicable by the fact that the

shifts leading to the adoption of these norms were in fact endogenous to the nation-states in question and came about due to the pursuit of identifiably *national* goals.

The broad diversity of distinct national approaches to the regulation of entry into citizenship stands as a challenge to the view of nation states as being somehow disempowered in the face of an irresistible Postnational or supranational impulse. Brubaker finds interesting the extent to which member states' citizenship models continue to travel along divergent trajectories despite the existence of supranational entities such as the EU (Brubaker 1992). Such divergence has given rise to much research on the nature of these 'citizenship regimes'. In line with much of the literature on this issue, Koopmans and Statham (1999) conceive of citizenship regimes as differentiating themselves along two dimensions: a. Criteria necessary for gaining formal access to citizenship status, b. Cultural obligations this access to citizenship entails. The latter dimension refers to the degree to which migrants are expected to assimilate to the host-country culture, i.e. Assimilationism, or the degree to which migrant group differences are officially or unofficially recognised and supported by the state, i.e. Multiculturalism.

Brubaker (1992) accounts for the continuing divergence in state approaches in terms of the cultural foundations of nation states which bind a community through nationhood. In this sense he is close to Favell (1998) who identifies broad 'philosophies of integration' which nation states adopt in their efforts towards including non-nationals in the polity. Brubaker (1992) contrasts *jus sanguinis* citizenship traditions, where citizenship is derived through ethnic descent, with *jus soli* traditions, where it derives from birth within a delimited territory. France is Brubaker's model of a dominant *jus soli* country, though there are strains of *jus sanguinis* present as well, and Germany is taken as a case of pure *jus sanguinis*. Both *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* constitute the criteria dimension of citizenship regimes, with the latter ethnocultural model generally taken to be more 'closed' while the former civic model is generally taken to be more 'open'. Combining the two dimensions above produces three ideal types of citizenship regime: 1. The Ethnocultural exclusionist model (e.g. Germany); 2. The Civic Assimilationist model (e.g. France); 3. The Multicultural Pluralist model (e.g. UK, Netherlands) (Koopmans & Statham 1999). (For similar accounts see also e.g. Castles 2002; Castles 1995; Hagan 2006; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Sainsbury 2006).

In Joppke's later work (2007) he moves away slightly from the view of state integration and citizenship practices as being characterised by a broad heterogeneity to claim now that there has been a general convergence in the ways national citizenship

regime models work to integrate migrants; this is similar to the view shared by other authors that there has been convergence between European citizenship policies over recent years (Castles 2002; Bloemraad 2000; Klusmeyer and Aleinikoff 2000).[18] As an interesting counterpoint, Hansen (1998) maintains that there has been no such similar trend towards convergence in requirements for formal *residency* in Europe, highlighting the analytical and empirical distinctness of these two legal statuses of citizenship and residency. Indeed, Sainsbury (2006), in discussing migrant integration outcomes, argues that the convergence in *citizenship* regimes renders them not very useful for purposes of explanation; this observation, coupled with Hansen's (1998) point, opens up clear theoretical space for legal residency status to play an explanatory role.

Furthermore, in light of the foregoing debate, even if Postnationalists like Soysal (1994) are correct and the important rights affecting life chances that were traditionally associated with citizenship have become detached from that status, the fact that the secure realisation of those rights has simply become contingent on the holding of another legal status – long-term residency – stands itself as an indication of the continued central role of the nation state in the ascription of rights and the regulation of membership for non-nationals.[19] The role of supranational institutions cannot, of course, be discounted entirely and EU citizenship could potentially be seen as having relevance to the inclusion of third-country nationals as members in their host societies of the EU.

EU citizenship was given formal legal expression in the Maastricht Treaty, linking four fundamental freedoms – free movement of goods, persons, services and capital – with citizenship of the Union and attaching various political rights also, including *inter alia* the right to move freely within the EU/EEA and to vote and stand in local and European elections in the state of residence (Hansen 1998). The formalisation of this status in law was something of a disappointment however, as it did nothing to address the situation of millions of denizen, long-term resident, migrants who held social and other rights, but were afforded no new substantive political rights *vis- à-vis* the host member state.

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[18] Joppke's concern here is not citizenship *per se* but rather the broader models which work to integrate migrants of which citizenship is a component part; see his (2007) article for full details. Joppke's focus is less on the formal 'criteria' dimension and more on the 'cultural obligations' dimension of immigrant integration regimes.

[19] It is acknowledged that within the EU states must take cognisance of Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals, making available long-term residency after a defined period of 5 years of lawful residence in an EU member state has elapsed. Within this constraint, however, states remain free to interpret and apply the regulation as they will, free to impose a shorter minimum period of lawful residence, as some do, and free to apply other economic and cultural conditions at whatever level of stringency they deem appropriate.

Another flaw in the nature of EU citizenship was held to be its "derivative" nature (Hansen 1998; Morris 1997; Schuster and Solomos 2002; Joppke 1998). Quite simply, EU citizenship is a secondary status, dependent for its ascription on the holding of national citizenship in an EU member-state. This fact has implications for Postnational accounts, with Joppke (1998) claiming that EU citizenship could only be considered Postnational if and when the status is ascribed to non-EU immigrants in the EU member-states. But this seems highly unlikely given the clear desire on the part of EU member states to retain control over their migration policies (Morris 1997).

It should be acknowledged, however, that the Union has recently made some minor moves towards affording limited freedom of movement rights within the EU to TCNs who have been officially accorded 'long-term resident' status in any member-state, something Schierup, Hansen, and Castles (2006) have labelled 'civic citizenship'. However, while this civic citizenship may seem to epitomise some of the principles and values laid down in the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights, these authors think it highly unlikely that the status will ever replace nationality with residency as the key criterion for attaining EU citizenship.

Leaving that particular peculiarity aside, the convergence of nationally-based citizenship and integration practices as perceived by Joppke (2007) has been interpreted as eliding old distinctions, producing a new duality of Civic Integration and Antidiscrimination which renders the traditional national models view increasingly unhelpful. Integration of migrants is not, for Joppke, a two-way process, but rather two separate one-way processes where Civic Integration places the burden of integration wholly on the migrant who must gradually 'earn' the rights of full membership. Antidiscrimination is the second of these one-way processes, amounting to a tacit acknowledgment that Civic Integration has failed and shifting the burden of integration to the state which attempts to remedy post-migration inequality by means of legislation.

However, Joppke does not claim that national differences in dealing with immigrants will disappear, and he acknowledges that national differences will obtain due to historical contingency and the efforts of those allied to the old models to mould "the new in the image of the past" (2007, 272). On historical contingency, Guiraudon (1998) observes that French citizenship-traditions subscribe to a civic republican model with its historical roots in the first days of French nation-building, when the newly unitary state sought to forge a unitary national identity by pursuing policies to turn peasants into Frenchmen. Similarly, modern day multicultural approaches to citizenship and migration in Britain may have

roots in past experiences as a colonial and imperial power, with path dependence contributing to modern policy approaches (Hansen 2002). Joppke does, however, argue against such grand 'philosophies of integration' as assimilationism and multiculturalism having continued relevance to the debate (Joppke 2007; Joppke and Morawska 2003).

Civic Integration is held to entail an obligatory side, making demands of migrants in exchange for the ascription of the desired legal status. This "illiberalism in pursuit of a liberal goal" (Joppke 2007, 253) has amounted to coercive, paternalistic measures whereby rights to residency were made *conditional* on fulfilling certain cultural obligations: e.g. in France the renewal of the 10 year residency card was tied to a concept of 'Republican Integration' as measured in terms of migrant knowledge of French civics and the French language; in the Netherlands, Civic Integration emerged as a response to past failures of integration, and new policies obliged migrants to receive 600 hours of Dutch language instruction and education in Dutch civics in preparation for entering the labour market; German policy measures also required that newcomers learn the national language.

Obligations of this type act as functional prerequisites for attaining permanent residency, the necessary condition for full membership of the host society. What Joppke has identified here is one aspect – what he calls the cultural obligations aspect – of what is referred to in this project as conditionality, upon which full access to rights-ascribing legal status is made contingent. Conditionality is here conceived of as broader than mere cultural aspects, however, and also involves economic and other issues, of which more will be said in the methodology chapter. Conditionality can thus be seen as an assertion of power by the sovereign state over the management of its own membership and over the definition of the legitimate community of those who would make claims upon it.

1.3.3. Naturalisation: Seeking Security of Status

On the issue of why it is migrants naturalise there is a rich theoretical debate and multiple contrasting empirical approaches. Bloemraad (2000, 13) observes that there is a "strong split" in the literature between academics working in the Western European tradition and those working in the American tradition of immigrant-receiving states, with the former emphasising citizenship acquisition within a framework of legal regimes, while the latter take a micro-level focus on why migrants choose to naturalise. The former, Bloemraad observes, sees the state as the grantor of citizenship, something it accomplishes according to its own logic, while the latter consider how the motivations and characteristics of migrants lead them towards naturalisation. The approach taken here will amount to

something of a bridging of these two traditions. On the one hand, a focus on the relevance of state-level factors, like conditionality, is central to our analytic concerns; however, this will be complemented by taking account of micro-level factors, such as the attributes of migrants and the incentives they face, all of which play a role in the complex theoretical framework of multiple determination within which migrant decisions about legal status are made, with implications for their poverty outcomes.

Van Hook et al. (2006) discuss why naturalisation itself may be a desirable course of action for certain migrants to take, identifying two broad perspectives on citizenship, with parallels to Bloemraad's (2000) distinction, which they term the Instrumental-Legalistic (IL) view and the Social-Contextual (SC) view. In the IL view citizenship is understood primarily as a status affording political and economic rights through which migrants gain (often economic) advantages, with the trade-off that they are then expected to conform to uniform national identities.

Meanwhile the SC view attends more to the personal and symbolic aspects of citizenship, where migrants value not just economic factors but also links to their homeland, for cultural or other practical reasons, perhaps holding dual citizenship (Faist 2000) or practicing transnational modes of engagement (Bauböck 1994; Kivisto 2001; Portes and Curtis 1987), and may be influenced by the 'context of reception' they enjoy in the host country, i.e. in terms of institutional support for settlement and cultural adaptation (Bloemraad 2002), or by desires to assimilate for less tangible reasons of belonging, integration or identity construction (Diehl and Blohm 2003). For instance, Diehl and Blohm (2003) find that for a specific group of migrants in Germany, Turks, naturalisation rates could not be explained simply by the legal advantages to be gained by naturalising, and they ascribe the difference with other migrant groups to Turkish migrants' desire for perceived upward mobility and assimilation.[20] Bloemraad (2000, 15) problematises accounts like these latter, however, saying that approaches employing psychological frameworks have been the "least successful" explanation of naturalisation with little empirical support for the idea that identity shift is central to naturalisation decisions.

The view of the naturalisation decision process adopted here lies somewhere between the IL and SC views, but with an emphasis more so on the IL side and the economic benefits which are held to accrue by virtue of holding citizenship status, while allowing that context, of course, matters for the how and why of decisions migrants make. Indeed,

[20] They also note that peripheral immigrants are more likely to pursue social and legal integration, accepting the legitimacy of the core group, if they perceive the system of status attainment in the host country to be as open as possible.

conditionality of status could be seen as an analogue of the 'contexts of reception' view insofar as it constitutes a key part of the legal-institutional apparatus with which migrants must contend on arrival in the host country.

More formally, citizenship status – in the poverty equation – is conceptualised as a moderator of the rights-relationship of individual and state (Bloemraad 2000) that entails clear economic benefits for holders in a manner that may incentivise non-holders, conditional on various other factors, to acquire that status. In Bloemraad's words, "while states set policies, immigrants must choose legal citizenship" (2000, 15). There is a clear and explicit assumption here of migrants undertaking cost-benefit evaluations around the naturalisation decision and behaving in line with rational choice models, though the limitations of such approaches[21] are at the same time acknowledged (Simon 1955).

Citizenship is assumed to entail both tangible and intangible economic benefits and economic benefits are assumed, in line with van Hook et al. (2006), to increase the likelihood of naturalisation. Tangible benefits include eligibility for certain types of employment open only to national citizens as well as eligibility for certain types of state support (van Hook et al. 2006).[22] This hypothesis, with welfare system differentials providing the tangible benefits, will be directly testable later. Non-tangible benefits accruing from citizenship may also spur migrants to naturalise, where such benefits include the role of citizenship status as a signal for language competency and also as a means of reducing (or communicating the reduction of) cultural distance (DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2005). This entails clear benefits not only for subjective feelings of integration but, more relevant under our economic-motivation framework, also for labour market opportunities. Naturalising and the reduction of cultural distance may help migrants to generate new social networks or to gain access to existing social networks among the native population, with all of the attendant benefits for information flows and labour market awareness that such weak ties can generate (Granovetter 1973). Indeed, Liang (1994) found explicit support for the importance of such social capital effects in the determination of naturalisation decisions among six immigrant groups. The tangible and intangible benefits of naturalisation demonstrate not only why naturalising might be a desirable choice for

[21] These limitations mostly consist in making sometimes untenable assumptions, such as: assuming that the choice maker is aware of all alternatives to the option before them; that they have complete information about all of those alternatives; that they are capable of computing consequences (and unintended consequences) for those options; and that they are capable of fully rank-ordering the options following such computations (Simon 1955).

[22] The 1996 PRWORA (Welfare Reform Act) in the US tied welfare benefit eligibility explicitly to citizenship status (Hook et al. 2006); meanwhile, in Europe, certain types of welfare benefit are qualified in amount or duration for non-citizen migrant recipients (see expert survey in section 2.1).

migrants but also highlight the implication of citizenship in the determination of migrant outcomes for employment and, thus, poverty.

Other sociodemographic factors at the individual level have been found to increase the likelihood of migrant naturalisation. One of the earliest studies found that immigrants with higher income and education levels as well as higher occupational status, i.e. those who were more like native inhabitants of the host country and less like traditional immigrants, were more likely to naturalise (Bernard 1936). Portes and Curtis (1987, 355-56), working mostly on American data and often with a focus on the specific situation of Mexican immigrants, identify four families of relevant independent variables: a) *Background characteristics,* incl. age, marital status, family size, education, length of residence in host country, work experience; b) *Skills and resources acquired in the host country*, where such factors are held to be good indicators of long-term commitment to the host country, incl. present occupation, home ownership, knowledge of host country language; c) *Residential factors and social relations*, drawing on the social capital approach, incl. ethnicity of neighbourhood, number of friends, opportunities to interact with indigenous host-country residents; d) *Attitudes and orientations*, i.e. subjective migrant evaluations of life satisfaction, willingness to return home, perceptions of discrimination etc. Contingent on data availability the later empirical analysis will be able to control for many though not all of these relevant factors.[23]
To summarise the argument outlined above regarding migrant naturalisation decisions:

> -Citizenship is a legal status which entails a set of tangible and intangible economic and non-economic benefits;
>
> -Migrants, acting rationally, are capable of evaluating and responding to the set of incentives and constraints presented to them by constellations of state-level and other contextual factors;
>
> -These constellations include levels of welfare support, the conditions attached to seeking citizenship status, the availability of employment and other factors and specific combinations will make naturalisation more or less desirable for a given migrant, thus rendering the transition to citizenship status more or less likely;
>
> -This migrant's attributes and characteristics (i.e. at the micro-level) will also condition the likelihood of attaining citizen status;
>
> -Migrants in insecure or economically disadvantageous situations are thus expected to be more likely to seek the greater security and economic advantages offered by citizenship.

[23] EU-SILC, while containing much detailed information on socio-demographics and poverty-relevant factors and measures, is not a migrant-specific dataset and as such does not contain data on e.g. length of time in the host country, ethnicity of respondents or those whom they associate with, or subjective migrant thoughts and evaluations on their life positions.

This economic argument applies, *mutatis mutandis* and *a fortiori*, to the situation regarding long-term residency status when compared to the more insecure situation of temporary migrants. Why *a fortiori*? The answer is because with LTR status none of the identity and affective considerations that feed in to the decision to naturalise seem likely to be of relevance. Long-term residency can be seen as 'just a legal status', conferring strictly functional benefits, in a way that citizenship can not. While many of the economic benefits of citizenship accrue to long-term residents few, if any, of the 'downsides' associated with naturalisation, like the deep-rooted symbolic, psychological, homeland-orientation and identity issues noted earlier, seem likely to impinge on the decision of migrants to seek and attain long-term residency status. These economic benefits include unfettered access to the labour market[24] in a manner which temporary migrants, who are often tied in to employment-specific work permits, do not enjoy, as well as to certain welfare benefits and other social rights (as we shall see later). This accords with the interpretation of other authors noted earlier (Brubaker 1989; Bauböck 2006) who perceive an equalising of the rights of residency with the (social) rights of citizenship.

Beyond Europe there are other examples of countries attaching social rights to holding a specific legal status and in Israel, for example, the right to welfare benefit is determined primarily by the individual's "belonging to a socially defined category" (Gal and Oser 2011, 232). This fact, coupled with the universalistic impulse of Israeli social protection, has led to what has been described as a "categorical universalism" which benefits specific social categories and has worked to the especial advantage of migrants to Israel (Gal and Oser 2011, 238). Similarly, US reforms making migrant receipt of welfare contingent on holding formal citizenship status, denying benefits even to long-term residents, resulted in a surge of applications for naturalisations from migrants (Klusmeyer and Aleinikoff 2000). That migrants are often highly aware of their entitlements and capable of negotiating the policy-institutional nexus of the state in response to incentives and so as to secure their access to available protections is in line with recent research (Timonen and Doyle 2009; Corrigan 2010).

[24] The Mipex (2007) microindicators (indicator #64) show that for the 16 countries of interest here almost all granted "equal access" to employment on a par with nationals and "equal working conditions" while only one country, France, imposed "other limiting conditions".

2. Theoretical Role of Legal Status and Conditionality

2.1. Legal Status & the Welfare State

The foregoing discussion of academic debates about migrants, welfare states and legal status has served to identify the intellectual parameters of this analysis. Using these building blocks, a formal theoretical conceptualisation of the determinants of migrant poverty, focusing on the role of legal status, will be advanced shortly. While the discussion to this point has highlighted the conceptual importance of legal status, it is also vitally important to understand the *empirical* reality of legal status as it relates to migrant work and welfare experiences, within and across Europe, before any accurate theoretical framework can be advanced.

Data, both primary and secondary, was examined with a view to answering several significant questions. Is there a *prima facie* case to assume that legal status can play an explanatory role regarding poverty insofar as it determines access to welfare? Specifically, are there qualitative differences in terms of access to the welfare system between those who hold long-term residency status and those migrants of a temporary nature who do not hold this status? Once access to the welfare system has been secured, are there differences in the quality of welfare supports enjoyed by migrants relative to natives? Do different types of legal status, i.e. long-term residency and citizenship, vary in terms of the security they offer in a way that might reasonably be held to incentivise migrants? Is there sufficient variation across countries to posit legal status(es) as potential explanatory factor(s)?

To answer these questions we rely on both secondary sources and on primary data collection by means of expert survey. The comprehensive, detailed and standardised work undertaken by the Mipex (2007) project will allow us to make broad comparisons across countries in terms of rights and security afforded by different legal statuses and will be discussed in the next sub-section. However, for the level of detail we require on legal status and welfare access specifically it was necessary to supplement the Mipex data with data collected first-hand by means of expert survey (see the Methodology section).

2.1.1. Expert Survey: Status, Welfare Access & Migrant Security

Data collected by this means were not available or forthcoming for all of the 16 countries of interest here, although sufficient responses were received from experts surveyed to allow us to answer the questions outlined above, to draw conclusions about the face validity of legal status as an explanatory factor, and to explore relevant aspects of migrant welfare receipt as determined by legal status.

The countries for which responses were received were as follows: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, la Suisse (Switzerland). Though not a 'complete set' this nonetheless represents a satisfactory number for preliminary consideration and this set of ten countries also manages to encompass at least one member of each of Esping-Andersen's (1990) three 'worlds of welfare' plus – depending on how one categorises – a fourth Mediterranean type as well (Arts and Gelissen 2002):

Table 2.1 : Mapping of Expert Survey results to Welfare Regimes

Liberal	**IRE**
Conservative	**AUS, BEL, FRA, NED, SUI**
Scandinavian	**DEN, FIN, SWE**
Mediterranean	**ITA**

Although some of this information could have been gleaned from a reading of secondary literature also, much of this information was only to be found partially for individual countries in a variety of disparate sources and, in any event, may not have been collected according to the same definitions and criteria. Some of the requisite information may not have been available to the researcher, given the nature of some of the regulations in question which a) may not exist in a translation from the original national language, or b) may not be codified in legislation but rather recorded only in internal migration-oriented administrative or bureaucratic departmental regulations or guidelines. The standardisation and control over the information-eliciting process offered by a survey instrument was deemed preferable to the potential for inaccuracy or opacity that exists with the collection of information from numerous secondary sources which may or may not be out of date.

The point of departure here concerns the social rights attached to LTR status which Mipex (2007, indicator #65) records as follows, Table 2.2:

Table 2.2 : Social rights accorded by Long-term residency status, 16 countries (Mipex 2007)

#65: Long-term resident: Access to social security, social assistance, health care, housing	**Country coding**
3. *Equal access with nationals*	AUS, BEL, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, GRE, ITA, NED, NOR, POR, SPA, SWE, SUI, UK
2. *Priority to nationals/ EEA citizens*	IRE
1. Other limiting conditions apply	

As can be seen, holders of this status in all countries gain access to a broad set of social rights on a par with natives, with a minor exception in Ireland where, with these 2006 data, Mipex found that priority was accorded to non-TCNs for access to some of these rights. The indicator here is somewhat broad however and we wish to know more about how access to the first two aspects of social rights listed, social security and assistance, varies with legal status. The next table presents information from the expert survey recording differences between LTR and non-LTR ('temporary') third-country national access to different types of welfare support (benefit and assistance) and the security of that status when welfare supports are sought.

Table 2.3 clearly shows substantial variation across legal status in terms of security of presence in the country and in terms of the state's indulgence towards those who have become a drain on public funds. Long-term residents, as expected, enjoy a security of status that is resilient to the claiming of either contributory (unemployment) benefits or non-contributory social assistance, although there are one or two minor qualifications to this, see the table footnotes. On the other hand, third-country nationals who do not hold LTR status face a much less secure situation. Claiming of unemployment benefits may or will result in expulsion of the migrant in a majority of the cases for which data was returned by experts. The grace period afforded to migrants who lose their job also seems highly variable for non-LTRs, from 3 months in Sweden to one year in the Netherlands.

Table 2.3 - Expert survey: welfare access/security by legal status (pt. I)

		LONG-TERM RESIDENT	*'TEMPORARY' MIGRANT*
Is migrant free from possibility of expulsion if claiming *unemployment benefit*?	Yes	AUS, BEL, DEN, FIN, FRA, IRE, ITA, NED, SWE, SUI	BEL, DEN, FIN, FRA
	No, expulsion after (months) if unemployment persists		AUS(52)[a], ITA(6), NED(12)[b], SUI(11-23)[c], SWE(3)
	No, expulsion possible		IRE[d]
If unemployment benefits exhausted, or migrant not entitled to same, can migrant claim *social assistance*?	Yes	AUS, BEL, DEN, FIN, FRA, IRE[e], ITA, NED[f], SWE, SUI	BEL, DEN, FIN, FRA, IRE[e], SUI(?)[g], SWE
	Yes, but claim is possible reason for expulsion		AUS[h], NED
	No, expulsion after period (months)		ITA(6)
	No, but expulsion does not occur		SUI(?)

Notes to above table: **a**: Austria's grace period seems very long at 52 months, the respondent may have entered this value as 52 'weeks', i.e. one year or 12 months; **b**: One respondent answered in error for 'social assistance', not unemployment benefit, this answer was disregarded; **c**: Both respondents for Switzerland agreed on this point, but gave different lengths of time for the grace period; **d**: Depending on nature of work permit the migrant may be deemed 'available for work' and thus entitled to benefits, but if not available for work then deportation is a matter for the immigration authorities; **e**: The 'habitual residence condition' will apply, as it does to Irish nationals, though the respondent notes that each case is assessed on its own merits; **f**: One of the two respondents for this case notes that expulsion may depend on other migrant-specific circumstances; **g**: Swiss respondents differed on this point with one answering 'Yes' until non-renewal of the permit, and the other answering 'No, but can remain in country'; **h**: Respondent notes that "deportability depends on individual situation of the immigrant" but is not explicit that temporary migrants may claim social assistance.

Table 2.3 - Expert survey: welfare access/security by legal status (pt. II)

		LONG-TERM RESIDENT	*'TEMPORARY' MIGRANT*
What happens if all welfare options are *exhausted* and migrant remains unemployed?	Can remain indefinitely	AUS, BEL, ITA, NED, SWE, SUI	BEL
	Situation could not arise (e.g. no limit on certain benefits)	DEN, FIN, FRA, IRE[e]	DEN, FIN, FRA, SWE[i]
	Expulsion after period (months)		ITA(6), SUI[j]
	Possible Expulsion		AUS, IRE[k], NED
Are welfare benefits subject to *qualifications* when migrants, not natives, are the claimants?	Benefits not qualified	AUS, BEL, FIN, FRA, IRE, ITA, NED, SWE, SUI	AUS, BEL, FIN, FRA, IRE, ITA, SWE
	Different rates	DEN[l]	DEN[l]
	Different duration		NED[m], SUI[n]

Notes (cont.): **i:** no limit on social assistance but other detailed rules apply regarding renewal or not of work/migrant permit; **j**: Until residence permit expires; **k**: "Matter for immigration authorities", depends on work permit rules; **l**: rate of social assistance is 40% less than the rate paid to natives of Denmark; **m**: social assistance; **n**: sickness benefit.

On the issue of social assistance we also see substantive differences depending on the legal status held by the migrant. While some countries allow temporary migrants to claim assistance, others may or may not use this as a reason for expulsion while still others apply a grace period and then initiate expulsion procedures. Even among those countries who allow temporary migrants to claim assistance there are other qualifications that obtain such that in Denmark, for example, the amount of benefits made available to migrants is 40% less than that made available to natives, while in Ireland the habitual residence condition applies and each claim is assessed on a case-by-case basis. Thus we see the inherent contingency and uncertainty of the process of claiming social assistance for migrants who do not possess the more expansive rights-status of long-term resident.

There are several clear linkages here implicating legal status in the determination of poverty. For temporary migrants in most countries their legal status is precarious and very much tied to insertion in the labour market nexus. The threat of expulsion from the host country is real and must surely act as a major disincentive for temporary migrants who become unemployed to report this to the relevant authorities[25], resulting in the possibility that they will tolerate employment below their skill level, accept poor remuneration or even resort to finding work in the black economy with all of the attendant potential for exploitation and subjection to poor pay and working conditions that implies. This seems likely to be the main mechanism by which the likelihood of TCN poverty in less secure legal statuses is greater than that for other statuses. Specifically, this likelihood is assumed to be greater for those non-naturalised migrants not holding long-term residency status. Beyond this, a more prosaic reason for greater poverty could be due to the qualification of benefit entitlements to the detriment of migrants. Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland for example apply either differential monetary rates or differential effective durations to certain benefits when migrants, as opposed to natives, are the claimants.

Given the higher likelihood of poverty for those living under a less secure legal status and/or those with only partial access to social supports, the conditionality of attaining a more secure legal status thus comes to take on a clear theoretical role with observable implications. Higher conditionality will force migrants to subsist in a less secure situation for longer while the various conditions – be they time-based (minimum residency requirements), economic (requiring the saving or guarantee of a sufficient amount of financial resources) or cultural (requiring a time investment so as to pass any relevant language or integration tests) – are individually fulfilled as the migrant attempts to move to a position of greater economic and social security.

Beyond security of status and security of presence in the country, fulfilling the conditions imposed on attaining long-term resident status also grants unqualified and comprehensive access to the full gamut of social rights a state has to offer. Full access to the welfare state will entail access to employment-related benefits, like child benefit in some countries for example, which will also contribute to better living standards and less poverty, contingent on migrants retaining links to the labour market. Full access to state social rights also entails access to health and housing alongside the social security and social assistance aspects we have been discussing. Given the correlations of health and living

[25] It is acknowledged that depending on the nature of the work permit system involved it may rest with the employer, and not the migrant, to report this to the relevant authorities.

conditions with poverty (Wilson 1987; Hayward and Gorman 2004), we expect those who hold LTR status to be less impoverished than those who do not, even in the event that status should be lost due to, say, unemployment.[26]

All of this implies a predictive role for conditionality in the determination of migrant poverty outcomes. High conditionality is expected to be associated with higher poverty and low conditionality with lower poverty and, accordingly, we expect conditionality to allow us to account for some of the puzzling cross-national variation in migrant poverty noted earlier with reference to Morissens and Sainsbury (2005). This is not the whole story however and obviously the level of social supports made available by the welfare state also plays a role in the determination of poverty, such that more generous welfare states can be expected to reduce poverty to a greater degree than less generous states. Of course, the poverty reduction effectiveness of a given level of generosity will be contingent upon the level of conditionality obtaining in the same state, and thus our explicit expectation is that welfare generosity and conditionality of legal status will *interact* in the determination of migrant poverty and that this will be reflected in micro-level poverty outcomes for migrants.

The results of the expert survey have allowed us to establish that a) 'temporary' status and LTR status do manifest differences in fact in terms of the security and the expansiveness of rights they afford, b) there are thus clear reasons to hold that one status will be more beneficial to migrants than the other, c) the theoretical understanding advanced wherein legal status constitutes a clear hierarchy of security finds empirical support, rendering it a credible and functional explanatory account, opening up further explanatory space for d) the relative ease or difficulty of securing legal status, i.e. conditionality, to assume its own explanatory role. This part of the research performs a crucial function in underscoring the existence of necessary cross-national variation in the factors held to be relevant to the phenomenon of interest, underpinning key assumptions about the explanatory account to be advanced shortly. This will draw on the central concepts of security, legal status and conditionality in the context of the welfare state. The expert responses collected here justify this account as having real-world relevance, while also elucidating the theoretical framework within which we locate the determination of TCN migrant poverty.

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[26] If LTR status becomes jeopardised due to unemployment then we still expect this migrant to have a lower likelihood of impoverishment than someone who has never held LTR status as this migrant will have had recourse to a diverse set of social rights and entitlements in the period immediately preceding the onset of unemployment.

2.1.2. Existing data on Migrant Security & Legal Status

Long-term residency status is undoubtedly more secure than alternative temporary arrangements, while also entailing a more comprehensive set of social rights and entitlements. However, the next move in this analysis will now be to consider in what ways LTR status is itself qualified or insufficient to the task of securing migrant quality of life. Where LTR-status is itself insecure relative to other legal-regulatory options like full naturalised citizen status then, just as in the foregoing discussion, we can expect this insecurity to incentivise migrants to explore and pursue those other advantageous options. But just how insecure is LTR status?

Table 2.4 is taken directly from the set of micro-indicators used by the Mipex 2007 report in the construction of their index and relates specifically to the security of LTR status. The situations denoted by 'Option 1' are the least favourable to migrants. Some of the facts recorded in the table are, perhaps, surprising and cast doubt on quite how 'long-term' so-called long-term residents can expect to be in their host country. None of the 16 countries we are considering confine themselves to the finding of fraud in the application process or the committing of serious crime by the migrant as the only criteria on which to base decisions of withdrawal of LTR status, where these are the 'best practice' criteria from the normative framework upon which the Mipex project bases its evaluations. Rather, every country also reserves the right to withdraw the status from someone posing a security threat, quite apart from any crime committed. Fully one-quarter of the cases – France, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland – reserve the right to withdraw LTR status in the event the migrant becomes unemployed (or for some reason other than fraud, crime or security threat). Such withdrawal would leave migrants in the less secure legal position of the temporary migrant, without full recourse to the comprehensive set of social rights assured by long-term residency status and on a path that may ultimately lead to expulsion.

For an astonishing 10 of these 16 wealthy, developed Western European countries expulsion of the migrant is *not* precluded even if the migrant in question has been long-term resident for 20 or more years in the host country. For this same set of 10 countries it is likewise the case that even minors or those migrants who have spent their formative years, from the ages of 10-18 years, in the host country are *not* precluded from expulsion. In the case of withdrawal of long-term residency or the making of an expulsion order against a migrant, it is the case in Italy that said migrant is not guaranteed one of either a) a fair hearing, b) a reasoned decision on the part of the authorities, or c) a right to appeal,

while in Denmark migrants are not guaranteed a right to representation before the decisive body.

This is hardly a state of affairs likely to inspire confidence in European migrant communities, even where individuals are designated long-term residents. The potential insecurity of LTR status for certain migrants, coupled with the various tangible and intangible benefits of citizenship outlined earlier in the literature on naturalisation, imply that seeking citizenship status will be a rational act depending on the conditions migrants face. Although it is not crucial to our argument here it is interesting nonetheless to note that holding citizenship status is not an absolute and final guarantee of security for third-country nationals in Western Europe. What is important for our argument however is to note that naturalised citizenship is certainly a relatively more secure status than that of residency, long-term or otherwise. Nonetheless, fully 10 of the 16 countries considered here reserve the right to refuse or withdraw citizenship *at any time* for reasons other than proven fraud in the application process or the migrant's posing an 'actual and serious threat' to national security[27] (though five of these countries prohibit by law withdrawal of citizenship where it would lead to statelessness), see Table 2.5.

[27] Three countries confine themselves solely to these two reasons.

Table 2.4 - Security of Long-term residency status, Mipex (2007) indicators

#	Security of LTR-Status Indicators	*Option 3*	*Option 2*	*Option 1*	AUS	BEL	DEN	FIN	FRA	GER	GRE	IRE	ITA	NED	NOR	POR	SPA	SWE	SUI	UK
57	Renewable permit	*Automatically*	*Upon application*	*Provided original requirements are still met*	2	3	3	3	2	3	2	1	3	2	3	2	2	2	3	3
58	Periods of absence allowed for renewal, after granting of status (continuous or cumulative)	*≥ 3 years*	*< 3 > 1*	*≤ 1*	2	1	1	2	3	1	3	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
59	Grounds for withdrawal: a. proven fraud in the acquisition of permit b. sentence for serious crimes, c. actual and serious threat to public policy or national security, d. unemployment	*No other than a-b*	*Grounds include c but not d*	*Grounds include d or other than a-b-c*	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2
60	Protection against expulsion. Due account taken of: a. personal behaviour b. age of resident, c. duration of residence, d. consequences for both the resident and his or her family, e. existing links to the Member State concerned f. (non-)existing links to the resident's country of origin (including problems of re-entry for political or citizenship reasons), and g. alternative measures (downgrading to limited residence permit etc.)	*All elements*	*At least b, c, d and e*	*One or more of b, c, d or e are not taken into account*	2	3	2	3	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	1	2	3	3	2
61	Expulsion precluded: a. after 20 years of residence as a long-term residence permit holder, b. in case of minors, and c. residents born in the Member State concerned or admitted before they were 10 once they have reached the age of 18	*In all three cases*	*At least one case*	*None*	1	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	3	2	1	3	3	1	1
62	Legal guarantees and redress in case of withdrawal or non-renewal of permit or expulsion order, including the right to: a. fair hearing, b. reasoned decision, c. appeal and d. representation before an independent administrative authority and / or a court.	*All elements*	*All but d*	*One or more of a, b or c are not guaranteed*	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3

Table 2.5 – Security of Naturalised Citizenship

Withdrawal of Citizenship	**Country coding**	*Relation to LTR status*
→Time-limited	NED, SWE	
	FIN	*Country also reserves right to withdraw LTR status even after 20 years of residency*
→At any time	BEL, FRA, NOR, SPA	
	AUS, DEN, GER, GRE, IRE, ITA, POR, SUI, UK	*Countries also reserve right to withdraw LTR status even after 20 years of residency*

Source: Mipex (2007) micro-indicators.

In six of these ten countries no account is taken in the withdrawal decision of one or more of: age of resident, duration of residence, consequences for migrant and their family, links to host country, or lack of links to home country. There are a *total* of 13 countries in this set of 16 that reserve the right to withdraw citizenship at any time regardless of how long the migrant has been a citizen. However, almost all of the countries guarantee that a reasoned decision will be provided to the migrant while also guaranteeing a right to appeal in the event of a decision to withdraw citizenship.

Tables 2.6 and 2.7 represent the qualifications to the security of citizenship status for various countries. It is perhaps surprising the extent to which citizenship is not a fully 'safe' status and at first blush the number of countries not taking account of important aspects of the migrant's situation or reserving the right to remove citizenship at any time seems much less favourable than the constraints on LTR status. However, the tables also make quite clear the fact that there exist *qualitative* differences between LTR and citizenship status that belie this apparent imbalance.

Table 2.6 – Insecurity of legal status

Withdrawal of Citizenship	**Country coding**	*Protection against Statelessness*
→One or more of the following *not* taken into account in decision to withdraw status: -Age of resident; -Duration of residence and holding of nationality; -Consequences for resident & family; -Existing links to host country; -(Non-)existing links to the resident's country of origin (including problems of re-entry for political or citizenship reasons);	FIN*, GER, NED*, POR AUS, GRE, ITA	*Withdrawal that would lead to statelessness <u>not</u> protected by law*
→All above elements taken into account	BEL, DEN, FRA, IRE, NOR, SWE*, SUI, UK SPA	*Withdrawal that would lead to statelessness <u>not</u> protected by law*

Source: Mipex (2007) micro-indicators; *these countries are the only ones where citizenship can not be removed 'at any time' (see previous table).

For example, 12 of the 16 countries apply some sort of legal protection[28] against withdrawal of citizenship where this might lead to statelessness for the migrant concerned. No such legally enshrined protections apply to LTR status, simply because the award or withdrawal of LTR status has fewer legal ramifications. Similarly, several countries place limits on the length of time for which naturalised citizens are exposed to the possibility of having their citizenship withdrawn, after which time 'de-naturalisation' is no longer a possibility. Indeed, one of these countries (Finland) reserves the right to expel migrants who have held LTR status even if they have been resident for more than two decades. A further nine countries also reserve this right of expulsion, meaning that in almost two-thirds of these cases long-term residents do not enjoy long-term security.

[28] Even if discretionary and contingent on the particular situation.

Table 2.7 – Protections applicable to legal status

Legal Redress & Protection	*Citizenship Status*	*LTR status*
→Right to Appeal, and to reasoned decision on case, *guaranteed*	AUS, BEL DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, IRE, ITA, NED, NOR, POR, SPA, SWE, SUI, UK	AUS, BEL DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, GRE, IRE, NED, NOR, POR, SPA, SWE, SUI, UK
→*Not* guaranteed*	GRE	ITA
→Migrant has a right to representation before independent authority or court	AUS, BEL DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, GRE, ITA, NED, NOR, POR, SPA, SWE, SUI, UK	AUS, BEL, FIN, FRA, GER, GRE, IRE, ITA, NED, NOR, POR, SPA, SWE, SUI, UK
→Migrant does *not* have a right to representation	IRE	DEN

Source: Mipex (2007) micro-indicators;*One or other not guaranteed; with LTR status the non-guaranteed right may be to a 'fair hearing'.

By contrast, while seven countries disregard one or more important aspects of the migrant's situation when assessing whether or not to withdraw citizenship status, four of these apply legal protections against inducing statelessness.

In conclusion, it should be clear from the foregoing that there exists sufficient variation in the expansiveness and security of rights afforded by the same and different types of legal status across countries to justify hypothesising an explanatory role for these factors, and to legitimate aspects of the theoretical framework to be advanced in the next section. To summarise the exposition to this point, having established and outlined a research problem by drawing on the relevant literatures around TCNs, the welfare state, legal status, and conditionality, the next analytic move is to motivate the explanatory apparatus of the thesis. While the discussion of the literature puts in place the conceptual building blocks for this apparatus, placing legal status at its centre, the expert survey works to underscore the empirical relevance of legal status to TCN security and welfare state protections. Meanwhile, the secondary data from the Mipex project draws attention to the hierarchical nature of security and legal status acquisition, while also highlighting the reality that states impose conditionality on migrants seeking to transition to more secure legal statuses. The expert survey serves a dual function here in both assisting in the refinement of the explanatory apparatus and in providing empirical substantiation of it. The next section relates this apparatus more formally and precisely to the phenomenon of interest: Poverty.

2.2. Theoretical Framework

2.2.1. Poverty as concept and measure

Before specifying the theoretical role we accord to conditionality of legal status in the determination of migrant poverty we must first clearly state what it is we mean by poverty and how best we might measure that concept for the purposes of empirical analysis in this study. The concept of poverty and the most appropriate means by which it should be measured has been long contested, with Nolan and Whelan (1996, 243) referring to this measurement issue as one of the "most intractable problems" in social research and public policy generally. There exists an extensive literature on poverty measurement of which Callan and Nolan (1991), and Callan, Nolan and Whelan (1993) and Nolan and Whelan (1996) provide good overviews.

Conceptually, how do we define poverty? Townsend's highly influential formulation maintains that 'poverty' refers to the characteristic state of those whose "resources are so seriously below" those of the average individual or family that they are "excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities" in the societies to which they belong (Townsend 1979, cited in Nolan and Whelan 1996, 11). This 'exclusion' focus, with its 'inclusion' correlate, constitutes an obviously relative understanding of what poverty is, a view that has now become dominant in the literature (Nolan and Whelan 1996). The opposing view of 'absolute' poverty has largely fallen out of favour as being inapplicable beyond the limited instance of the subsistence level, where impoverishment is so severe as to constitute an existential threat by means of starvation (Ibid.) – something unlikely to obtain in developed Western welfare states.

Allowing for this relative concept, one must then choose an appropriate yardstick by which to relate individuals or families. This has manifested as a resources vs. consumption distinction, with e.g. Atkinson distinguishing between attainment of "a *minimum standard of living* and a concern with people's rights as citizens to a *minimum level of resources*" (1985, cited in Nolan and Whelan 1996, 12; original emphasis).

Atkinson's use of the term 'citizen' is interesting with regard to third-country nationals. Despite their not holding this formal legal status, should migrants too have a right to a minimum level of resources? Such normative questions are beyond the reach of this project, though elsewhere in this chapter – and later in the empirical analysis – we consider directly whether and how formal legal status, and the acquisition thereof, is

implicated in determining the extent to which migrants are impoverished and thus excluded from the society of which they are a part. Migrants lacking formal citizenship may yet be 'social citizens', where this related concept has also been defined in terms of inclusion and exclusion. Marshall (1963, 74), as stated earlier, has defined social citizenship as encompassing the rights to a "modicum of economic welfare and security [and] the right to ... live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society".

A central tension in the poverty literature has been between competing approaches of either 'counting the poor' or of assessing the intensity of poverty, where the former is a task of identification and designation with reference to a poverty line and the latter is a task of establishing the quality of poverty often in terms of basic needs or enforced lack of consumable goods. The choice between taking a resources (income) or a living-standards (deprivation) view is not trivial, and those in possession of what for some may be an adequate level of resources might still find themselves materially impoverished, contingent on other factors, e.g. family size, and lacking in access to certain goods or services generally deemed necessary according to societal standards. Income and consumption levels do not overlap to the extent widely assumed, rendering income measures of poverty as exclusion from society unreliable (Ringen 1988).

The concept of poverty, then, is closely bound up with the means or method by which it is measured. Assuming one arrives at an acceptable yardstick, the next task is to 'cut' that yardstick at a point below which certain people will be characterised as being 'in poverty'. On setting this poverty line, there are various possible approaches that have been taken with regard to income poverty, including the 'budget standard approach', reliance on aggregate income and expenditure constructs pegged to perceived essential baskets of goods, i.e. the 'food ratio' method, 'official poverty lines' pegged to social security protection levels, 'consensual' income poverty lines, and 'relative' income poverty lines, and none are unproblematic (Callan and Nolan 1991; Nolan and Whelan 1996, 14–22).[29]

[29] The budget standard approach has been used in the construction of the US official line and is derived from the specification and costing of a diet held to be nutritionally adequate (Callan and Nolan 1991; Nolan and Whelan 1996, 14-22). The required extent of judgment(s) on the part of the researcher are onerous however, militating against the putative objectivity of such an approach, and no scientific study can determine or prescribe precise amounts or types of foods required for all people of different health, age, weight, etc. Also, the imposition of a fixed and time-invariant 'food standard' does not allow for adjustments as societies evolve and standards (presumably) rise (Ibid.); The food ratio methods defines necessities and picks a cut-off point for income at which households will not be able to purchase these necessities. However, questions are raised about what constitutes a necessity, and the approach has been criticised in practice for often arbitrary selection of cut-off points (Ibid.); Benchmarking poverty in relation to the supports offered by a state's social security system, on the basis of an assumption that this provides a subsistence level of income, produces problems given that social security systems are

Problems with relative income poverty lines include the fact that any "improvement in living standards of low income groups which are shared by the rest of the population are discounted" and also that "a general decline in prosperity, even if it leads to a lot of additional people in misery, will not show up as an increase in poverty" if the relative situation remains unchanged (Sen 1983, cited in Callan and Nolan 1991, 253). Also, it is hardly the case that socially-perceived needs rise in lockstep with average income; given this, uniform income growth would be guaranteed to eliminate poverty entirely at some future point depending on an arbitrary starting point (Ibid.). There is, further, an inescapable arbitrariness about setting the relative poverty line at a certain percentage of median income, as is common – this is the approach taken for the relative income measure in the SILC dataset to be analysed later in this project; less than 60% of median income (Eurostat 2006) – leading to questions of 'Why 60%?' or 50% etc. However, relative income measures like this have obviously been popular given their simplicity and transparency.

In the European context there have been calls to develop EU-wide measures of income poverty, given that wide income gaps obtain across the large, diverse group of member states now numbering 27 since the last expansion (Fahey 2007). Poverty measured by means of a median pan-European income line could draw better attention to the patterning of poverty and disparities in standards of living across member states, something that relative poverty lines defined nationally (the approach taken in SILC) fail to account for. Fahey (2007) looks at deprivation indicators, objective and subjective, and shows that such an EU-wide measure would be empirically meaningful as it would reflect the low standards of living and strong personal sense of deprivation felt by large proportions of people in the poorest member states. Partly, such variations in income across states have been accounted for in the design of this research, wherein the 'established' and developed countries of Western Europe were chosen for comparative

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simply not always pegged perfectly what are truly subsistence levels of income but are affected in a complex manner by various socio-political factors. Politicians may amend welfare rates not out of any overriding concern for the poor, but simply because an election is looming. Further, the fact that under this approach poverty could be entirely 'eliminated' were welfare rates to be set at zero is obviously conceptually anomalous (Ibid.); Consensual poverty lines essentially ask people – i.e. by means of large-scale surveys – what they perceive to be the minimal income needs of the society, what income level they personally feel they need to make ends meet, or ask them to provide minimum income levels for hypothetical families of different sizes or compositions. Such approaches become problematic in the face of poor information held by non-experts about other people's minimum needs. Other problems concern the relationship between what people perceive to be 'making ends meet' and what most in society would regard as 'poverty', and ignore the fact that there may simply not be a broad social consensus on minimum needs. (Ibid.)

purposes as being most alike.[30] Fahey's approach highlights the utility of a deprivation focus.

Use of income itself poses other challenges and difficulties including (Nolan and Whelan 1996, 39–45): the time period over which income is measured, with asset accumulation and erosion over long time periods influencing current living standards; income data as collected in large surveys may not always be reliable at the upper and lower bounds of the distribution, and certain types of income like self-employment or investment income tend to be underreported; the choice of recipient unit will matter as, although income generally accrues to individuals, these individuals will live in households and will often have dependents who we expect to share in these resources, though the extent to which intra-household sharing of resources actually occurs has been a contentious topic, especially for feminist authors (Jenkins 1991); the choice of equivalence scale applied to the reported income figure for a given household, a matter for researcher judgment, will affect whether a family is deemed in poverty or not; the choice of cut-point based on mean or median income levels will matter, with the mean sensitive to large outliers in the data in a way the median is not, but with the mean arguably more transparent and interpretable to non-specialists.

Deprivation measures have focused instead on the absence or lack of the sorts of diet, clothes, living conditions, activities, facilities and social conditions deemed customary or generally desirable in society, without which an individual can be said to be excluded, though Nolan and Whelan (1996, 71-72) maintain that a simple focus on 'lack' of items misses the point and that what is really at stake, conceptually, is that this lack must represent an *inability* to participate in society such that that those we label as deprived are in fact *denied* access to these items.

Deprivation measures have been subject to various criticisms. Imposing a threshold on an index measure of deprivation at which respondents are classified as 'in poverty' has been described by Piachaud (1988, cited in Callan and Nolan 1991, 255), as "intrinsically implausible" and divorced from the reality of great wealth and chronic poverty occupying distinct places on a long continuum. Another issue is the amount of judgment left up to the researcher in choosing the set of lifestyle or deprivation indicators from which the measure is to be constructed. This may be questionable where other researchers evaluate

[30] Fahey (2006, 38) presents data indicating that one of the countries under analysis here, Greece, was actually ranked *behind* one of the most recent additions to the EU, Slovenia, in terms of GDP per capita (PPS) in 2001. However, the logic advanced above still holds given that Greece was a member state for a much longer period of time and thus can be presumed to have had stronger 'pull' factors by virtue of being a gateway to the European Union.

differently the relevance of a given indicator to deprivation and previous research (e.g. Townsend 1979) has been criticised for selecting deprivation indicators in an *ad hoc* manner and without paying sufficient attention to the multidimensionality of the phenomenon of deprivation (Nolan and Whelan 1996). Similarly, divergent 'taste' evaluations regarding what really constitutes deprivation will affect survey respondents and some people may actively choose to go without things that others regard as necessities – poverty is "not simply deprivation" (Callan, Nolan, and Whelan 1993, 167).

A central concern of Nolan and Whelan's (1996) work was to explore the relationship between deprivation and income so as to assess to what extent income alone would be adequate as a summary indicator of poverty and to identify those who find themselves suffering from deprivation *owing to a lack of resources.* Recent work in this vein has also attempted to marry the resources and deprivation approaches into a single measure, or what have been called consistent poverty indicators (Maître, Nolan, and Whelan 2006; Whelan and Maître 2007; Whelan and Maître 2010).

Related to this discussion of poverty, and sharing much overlap, is the broader concept of 'social exclusion'. This contested term has gained prominence in the last decade or two; for some it is simply another way of talking about poverty, while for others it is a broader conception not focused primarily on scarcity of resources but touching on other issues such as polarisation, differentiation, inequality, lack of enforceable rights or constraints on the enforcing of those rights (Burchardt, Le Grand, and Piachaud 2002). Given this diversity of conceptualisation, causal frameworks and empirical approaches to the study of this phenomenon have naturally been similarly diverse.

Causally, some emphasise agency and the role of individual behaviours in determining exclusion ('underclass' debates), while others focus more on the lack of enforced rights, and still others highlight the role of institutions and systems, be they national, sub-national or supra-national (Burchardt, Le Grand, and Piachaud 2002, 3). Empirically, more attention has been paid to the multidimensional nature of disadvantage than has tended to be the case with resource- or consumption-focused analyses; a traditional emphasis on static analysis has been somewhat displaced with a keener focus on dynamic analysis; other levels of analysis beyond the micro-level have been integrated in the research agenda; most importantly, some say, the phenomenon of interest extends beyond non-participation in society simply due to lack of material resources (Ibid., 5). At the same time, it must be recognised that these approaches are explicitly building on the tradition of poverty research and measurable outcomes will be similar, if not identical, with a social exclusion focus.

The extent to which legal status and the difficulty of attaining same are factors contributing to non-participation in society for migrants is the primary focus of this thesis. Institutional and policy interactions as well as other macro-level factors in the determination of micro-level poverty outcomes are all considered here, with the role of migrant agency in seeking out greater security and protections in response to incentives taking a central place in our conceptualisation. In this regard, the research is in line with a social exclusion approach. It may well be the case that holding an unfavourable legal status amounts to a form of 'double exclusion', excluding migrants formally in the legal sense by depriving them of access to the full set of rights enjoyed by native inhabitants of migrant host countries, and excluding them socially to the extent that barriers placed around the acquisition of secure legal status are implicated in the production of greater deprivation and poverty.

Given the central research question and its alignment (broadly) with a social exclusion approach focused on process, agency and context, the deprivation approach seems justified insofar as it allows one to explain *effects* of variables in terms of their contribution to 'more or less' deprivation, something not possible with a binary variable. The thesis aims not simply to categorise migrants as poor or not-poor – it is not a head-counting exercise – rather the interest lies in assessing how structural parameters and the dynamics created by legal status, and the conditions attached to legal status, interact to produce poverty outcomes that vary in intensity for third-country nationals across Europe.

It is also arguable that the cut-off point for the SILC relative income measure, which necessarily amounts to an arbitrary standard as noted earlier[31], may be suitable for natives but less justifiable for migrants, whose situation is inherently different given language barriers, under-recognition of foreign educational qualifications, barriers to full labour market assimilation etc. Also, when coming from poorer source countries, different subjective evaluations of consumption necessity and/or desire to send remittances home also matter; one Westerner's poverty may be a third-country national's adequate standard of living.

In light of the foregoing discussion, the approach taken here will be to utilise an index of deprivation in line with Whelan and Maître (2007) whose research, also utilising EU-SILC data, found such an index to be robust and with desirable properties pertaining to internal reliability and predictive utility. Alongside this we employ the relative income

[31] As Callan and Nolan (1991, 254) point out "there is no firm basis for the selection of any particular ratio to serve as 'the' poverty line."

poverty measure from SILC (60% median income) and a derived binary measure of consistent poverty as complementary dependent variables. We must also consider the broader institutional and other macro parameters within which poverty – for third-country nationals – is determined. The theoretical schema to be presented shortly will outline specifically how these institutional factors, along with legal status and the conditionality attached thereto, interact in the production of TCN poverty in Western Europe. Previous research accounting for cross-national variation in poverty is a useful guide to other macro-level factors relevant to the analysis.

Moller et al. (2003) discuss the determinants of poverty in advanced industrial societies in the *longue durée* and with a non-migrant-specific focus. A central assumption and contention of the present project is that the determination of migrant poverty is *qualitatively different* to the determination of poverty for native inhabitants, with legal status and conditionality playing key roles in this, and accordingly not all of the macro factors these authors identify will be relevant to the present project. Also, their analysis contains a time element (panel data over multiple time points) and so some of their processual variables will be likewise less relevant to the cross-sectional analysis undertaken here. Nevertheless, they identify poverty-relevant factors, many of which are implicit in the discussion elsewhere in this chapter, which include: economic aspects such as gross domestic product, the supply of educated workers, unemployment, labour market issues, and political issues such as the nature of welfare policies, i.e. welfare generosity, the constitutional structure of states, and the holders of political power in those states (Moller et al. 2003, 23-28).

A Eurostat report on macro-determinants of poverty in regions of Europe also utilise some of these measures, finding significant effects for unemployment rates and economic growth rates (Reinstadler and Ray 2010). The methodology in that study also allowed for the inclusion of individual level determinants and these covered a standard set of socio-demographic indicators held to be generally relevant in poverty research, which will also be used in the present study, including: Age, sex, education, household type, marital status, employment status (Nolan and Whelan 1996; Cappellari and Jenkins 2002; Reinstadler and Ray 2010). For migrants specifically, research has shown that those who have acquired naturalised citizenship status also have lower poverty rates and so controlling for citizenship, and indeed testing hypotheses where the data is disaggregated by citizenship status, will be important at the micro-level (Lelkes 2007).

2.2.2. Theoretical Framework and Conceptualisation

On the determination of migrant poverty, the theoretical understanding adopted here shares a close conceptual affinity with the very latest work conducted in the field of migration and welfare in Europe, on social protection and the 'challenges of integration' (Carmel, Papadopoulos, and Cerami 2011). This work takes as one of its central themes the "*interaction* of migration, migration policies and social protection in Europe" (Cerami and Carmel 2011, 1; emphasis original). These authors perceive variations in policy combinations, in contexts and settings and in the institutional levels across which the interactions between migration policy, welfare policy, labour market structures, migration histories and opportunities for social, political and cultural integration are played out, with the end result being to produce differentiated but co-existing modes of integration and segregation for migrants.

This focus on the *interaction* of state structural and policy features is precisely the approach taken here with regard to, first, hypothesising and, second, testing the effects of conditionality on migrant poverty. What is emphatically *not* hypothesised here is an abstracted, mono-causal framework wherein conditionality plays the primary role in the determination of poverty. The inherent complexity of the institutional and policy superstructure within which migrants are embedded on arrival in the host country is explicitly acknowledged and the later empirical analysis will attempt to account for this complexity in its exploration of the central interactions of interest. But what does this complex superstructure look like, or how might it be conceived? Papadopoulos (2011, 37) provides a schematic representation of the institutional dimension of migrant integration, as articulated at the national level of governance, see Fig. 2.1 overleaf.

Fig. 2.1 - 'The embeddedness of a national migrant integration regime in the EU'



Source: Reproduced from Carmel, Papadopoulos, and Cerami (2011, 38).

The above figure represents the various facets of policy at the national level that comprise the institutional dimension[32] including migration policies, welfare policies and labour market policies, set within the context of the national political economy. Papadopoulos incorporates these various elements here under the label 'migrant integration regime'. In this regard Papadopoulos has taken an avowedly functional view of

[32] This institutional dimension is one of three dimensions within which Papadopoulos conceives of the unfolding of social processes. His conceptualisation of a social process involves the playing out of power dynamics between social agents in this institutional dimension, and also in what he terms the relational and discursive dimensions (Papadopoulos 2011). The *relational* dimension involves "a multiplicity of practices in the economic, political, cultural and inter-personal domains that, at the micro-level, establish the multiple relationships" between the migrant and the host society (Ibid., 37). These relationships in turn are regulated by a "dense web of policy interactions" in the *institutional* dimension both between different levels of governance and across different policy domains. The final dimension is where different *discursive* constructions of the 'integrated migrant' are produced contingent on these micro-level and institutional processes.

integration, over a normative one, where his concept of 'integration' is essentially synonymous with the definition of 'incorporation' encountered at the beginning of the last chapter (e.g. Soysal 1994), and refers to migrants playing a specific role in relation to a society, e.g. being 'integrated' into a specific country's labour market, regardless of whether the nature of this integration could be construed as 'favourable' or 'unfavourable' for the migrant in question (Ibid., 43 fn. 2). For the purposes of clarity we here maintain our earlier distinction of incorporation as referring to denoting the state of being 'in' or 'out', while integration refers to a state of being 'more' or 'less' integrated relative to some evaluative standard.

The above schema is a sensible and useful framework according to which national policy configurations may be understood and on the basis of which we may begin to sketch the process of migrant poverty determination. The precise configuration of the policy measures obtaining in a given country can of course be taken to delineate the parameters within which migrant lives are lived, and whatever the balance of a specific configuration all will present both constraints and opportunities. What is of interest to the present project, however, is not simply the configuration of broad institutional parameters at the macro level, or their concatenation in the form of a 'migrant integration regime', nor is it in the simple fact of whether migrants are incorporated into those institutions. Rather, it is in the effects of micro-level factors and macro-level parameters working together in a complex interplay to act on the lives of third-country nationals, producing variable poverty outcomes. The above schema serves as a useful heuristic device with which to frame our conceptualisation of the macro-determinants of poverty.

However, the aims of the research question addressed here demand the articulation of an augmented theoretical viewpoint. Poverty – as it is conceptualised here – is taken to be one of several end-points of a process unique to the experience of third-country nationals.

Fig. 2.2 – Conceptual hierarchy of legal status



This processual focus introduces a dynamic element to the above schematic, with state regulations around legal status hypothesised to play a key role in this regard. In line with the broadly held view, supported by evidence from other research, an explicit assumption and contention here is that migrants' rights are clearly separate from those of prior residents, i.e. native inhabitants, in welfare systems and that among migrants there are "clear distinctions made between legal and policy categories or status of migrant and the rights that attach to these categories" (Cerami and Carmel 2011, 6). Legal status is conceptualised here as a hierarchically delimited continuum with TCNs at different points on that continuum being subject to varying levels of security and having recourse to different sets of rights. The constraints imposed on transitioning from a less secure or expansive point to a more secure or expansive point on that continuum have been characterised here as conditionalities, see Fig. 2.2 above.

Specifically, the conditionality attached to securing a more favourable legal status is held to be partially determinative of poverty for migrants, in two ways. Directly, high conditionality attached to long-term residency status, the status to which unconstrained access to social rights accrues, will act to prevent full access for migrants to the welfare system. Indirectly, high conditionality attached to a more favourable legal status will act to constrain migrants to subsist in a state of greater insecurity. This insecurity has implications for the quality of migrant lives where, for example, employment below a migrant's skill level or inferior pay or working conditions may be tolerated so as not to jeopardise

presence in the host country where this is, as is usual, contingent on holding employment. As such, conditionality is centrally located in the nexus of third-country national poverty determination, playing a key mediating role for migrants *vis-à-vis* both the welfare system and the labour market.

Alongside the policy measures attached to legal status imposed at the national level we also expect other national level characteristics to impact on poverty outcomes and to facilitate explanation of cross-national variation in these outcomes. Such characteristics include the prevalence of anti-migrant attitudes, an inhospitable political environment, the general economic situation including (un)employment, the aggregate skill-level of a country's migrant cohort – all of which factors were discussed in the literature earlier. In recognition of the complex interactive framework within which we posit these factors it is also acknowledged that such characteristics are likely to bear on the shape of migration-policy outputs themselves, of which conditionality is one such output. Such interactions are the focus of a separate chapter later. In addition to these macro-level factors are micro-level determinants which previous research indicates are likely to be correlated with poverty. These include socio-demographic characteristics such as age, sex, education level, marital status, employment status and family structure.

The theoretical schematic within which we locate migrant poverty is sketched below (Fig. 2.3). In this conceptualisation, the poverty of TCN migrants is determined at the intersection of labour market and welfare state policies, with these institutions delimiting the broad structural parameters of migrant lives in interaction with the conditionality attached to legal status, in a manner determinative of migrant poverty both directly and indirectly. At the same time, characteristics at both micro-level[33] and macro-level[34] bear directly on migrant poverty in a relationship of multiple determination.

Macro-level factors impact on the shape of migration policy, with politics, attitudes and economics all being relevant to the manner in which state policymakers opt to facilitate or constrain migrant opportunities, or opt for the setting of policy levers in desirable or expedient configurations. Migration policy also works to shape micro-level characteristics of migrants and other aspects of migration policy apart from conditionality will structure things like skill levels of migrant cohorts, or age composition etc. Specific policy approaches will naturally be informed by the nature of migrant micro-level

[33] Poverty is implicated in the determination of micro-level characteristics, e.g. those living in poverty will be less likely to pursue higher education due to lack of resources.

[34] High levels of anti-migrant attitudes may lead to greater poverty due to fewer or poorer opportunities for finding e.g. employment, or habitation in a desirable area, or social capital.

characteristics in aggregate, which itself implies the intimate connection of characteristics at both micro- and macro-levels.

It should be stressed that this conception is concerned specifically with the role of *conditionality of legal status*, and not with legal status itself. This seems at first like a fine distinction and may require some elucidation and justification. A schematic addressing the role of legal status itself would show the interactive relationships between labour market and welfare state institutions with (the box labelled) legal status. But absent any data at the micro-level sufficient to disentangle long-term resident migrants from migrants resident on a more temporary basis from migrants who are naturalised citizens – and indeed the micro-data to be used in this project does not allow for such granularity of identification – it would simply not be possible to assess the direct effects of holding different legal statuses on poverty.

To this, it could be objected that adequate, aggregated data at the macro level recording the proportions of TCNs comprised of temporary, LTR and other categories could be used as macro-level indicators in the prediction of cross-national migrant poverty rates. However, this is inadequate on two counts: 1. 'Legal status' is not a *policy*, and the aim here is to assess the role of state policies in the determination of migrant poverty; 2. A *post facto* indicator of the proportions of those holding specific legal statuses might well account for variation in poverty rates, but would do so without any reference to *process*, and so would fail to adequately engage the 'why' question. Divergence in the levels of conditionality that states impose amounts to divergence in state policy approaches and it is the relevance of this fact to migrant poverty that we seek here to examine.



Fig. 2.3 - Theoretical schematic of role of conditionality in determination of migrant poverty

Fig 2.4 - Relationship of conditionality of LTR status to migrant poverty



Note: Thin arrow denotes indirect effect, thick arrows denote direct effect.

The relationship, of conditionality to migrant poverty, denoted in the previous figure by the thick solid black arrow, is given more attention in Fig. 2.4. The mediating relationship of conditionality and poverty is characterised by both direct and indirect elements. The direct relationship, on the right, indicates that conditionality can constrain access to welfare state supports, insofar as full access to these supports is tied to the holding of long-term residency status; where conditionality is high migrants may be forced to live without the social supports enjoyed by the rest of society for longer periods of time, with implications for the cumulative development and embedding of poverty.

Indirectly and with regard to the labour market, the contingency of remaining in the host country, coupled with high conditionality of LTR status, will force migrants to exist in a state of greater insecurity which is held to have a direct effect on the determination of poverty, through labour forcing or the toleration of inferior employment situations. Alongside the insecurity-inducing effect of conditionality Caponio and Graziano (2011) observe that different types of labour market organisation can force categories of migrants to work in conditions of continuous uncertainty which, in combination with difficult

working or contractual conditions, often result in higher levels of working poor. The "degree of regulation over labour market entry" and how closely this is linked to migration policies are "significant" factors with implications both for migrant incorporation into state institutions and for poverty outcomes (Carmel, Cerami, and Papadopoulos 2011, 248).

Alongside these direct and indirect effects of conditionality, certain of the conditions imposed are themselves potentially poverty-inducing or, at least, likely to contribute to a scarcity of resources for third-country nationals, e.g. excessive costs attached to the application itself, or requirements to obtain expensive health insurance, or to accumulate large savings, or to undergo perhaps costly language acquisition courses or other integration requirements. On the basis of our theoretical understanding of how and why conditionality seems likely to matter we derive an overarching hypothesis which this thesis will seek to test:

> *Hypothesis*: Conditionality of legal status is a moderating variable implicated in the determination of poverty for third-country nationals, interacting with labour market aspects and welfare state institutions, capable of accounting for cross-national variation in migrant poverty outcomes in Western Europe.

This hypothesis can be broken down into a series of several key sub-hypotheses, viz:

- *H1*: Conditionality of legal status in interaction with a state's level of welfare effort significantly explains variation in TCN migrant poverty.
- *H2*: Conditionality of legal status in interaction with a state's level of welfare effort significantly explains variation in the types of labour market attachment held by TCN migrants.
- *H3*: Conditionality of legal status in interaction with the insecurity of TCN migrant life situations significantly explains variation in the types of labour market attachment held by TCN migrants.
- *H4*: Conditionality of legal status alone significantly explains variation in TCN legal status transitions.
- *H5*: Conditionality of legal status in interaction with a state's level of welfare effort significantly explains variation in TCN legal status transitions.
- *H6*: Conditionality of legal status in interaction with the insecurity of TCN migrant life situations significantly explains variation in TCN legal status transitions.

The focus here will be on long-term residency status as primarily implicated in the determination of poverty, though other hypotheses will also be tested concerning the role of citizenship status and the conditionality attached thereto. Why 'primarily'? The theoretical understanding advanced here does not hold that both types of conditionality impact *simultaneously* on third-country nationals in the determination of poverty outcomes. Conditionality and status acquisition is a stepwise process, with one status placed both logically and temporally anterior to the acquisition of the other.[35] The difficulties of attaining citizenship are likely to have little relevance and/or impact on the determination of poverty for a migrant who is not yet a long-term resident.

As such, certain policy measures are of relevance only on defined stretches of the continuum along which migrants travel towards status acquisition. Causally, our conceptualisation also entails that while LTR-conditionality has an ambit of effect that is relevant both to those who have naturalised and those who have not, citizenship conditionality cannot have an ambit of effect on those who have not attained the prior necessary status. As the effect of LTR-conditionality is both broader and more general it is accorded a prior and focal role in the analysis. The final part of the research question, not covered in the list of sub-hypotheses above, concerns the possibilities for advancing a regime type account of migrant welfare. This issue is addressed and explored in a discrete chapter concerning migrant welfare regime typologies, and not in the central empirical analysis. Before testing the effects of conditionality on welfare, on work and on legal status it will be necessary to measure our explanatory phenomena of interest. This is the task of the next chapter.

[35] It is acknowledged that special groups of citizenship claimers in certain circumstances in some countries, e.g. returning ethnic Germans, may be able to circumvent this stepwise process. The simplifying assumption is made that this will not unduly affect the later regression coefficients and it remains nevertheless the case that the data to be used does not allow for identification of such special groups.

3. Methodology and Data

3.1. Research design

This chapter gives an overview of the research design and also discusses concepts, samples, data, measurement and operationalisation of the variables relevant to the later empirical analysis. The core part of the empirical analysis will proceed by means of multilevel modelling; the interested reader can find full and comprehensive details pertinent to issues regarding the use of this methodology in the Appendix (A.2.5). First, however, it will be important to consider how the elements of the research strategy fit together to answer the central research question.

Having identified an important and unanswered question in the broad research area of migration and the welfare state, concerning cross-national variation in migrant poverty rates, the first step is to begin to sketch a theoretical conceptualisation that might address this question and help to account for this variation. Drawing on the distinct but intersecting literatures on the welfare state and migration facilitates contextualisation of the research problem with reference to broader academic debates but also, vitally, allows us to begin to tease out a conceptual understanding of why extant explanatory accounts are insufficient to the task. This discussion highlights the qualitatively different nature of migrants – specifically TCN migrants – in comparison to native inhabitants of European countries. A focus on these qualitative differences reveals the theoretical importance of legal status for TCN migrants in securing the protections of the welfare state, affording legal status a key role in our evolving conceptualisation of the determination of TCN migrant poverty and the role therein of the welfare state.

Of course, theoretical understandings are necessarily informed by empirical realities. Moving beyond consideration of the literatures that define this area, the next step in the research strategy is to expand and to bolster our theoretical conceptualisation of how migrants gain access to the welfare state with reference to the institutional and legal empirical reality that TCNs face in Europe; this is the function of the Expert Survey. Research by the Mipex project makes clear that securing the legal statuses that bring welfare protections is a process differentiated across countries by the stringency or otherwise of the conditions that states impose on migrants moving from one status to the

next. Such cross-national variation in conditionality presents itself as a possible explanatory factor for cross-national variation in migrant poverty.

However, what is also needed is empirical evidence that differences in legal status (i.e. LTR status vs. 'temporary' status) amount to differences *in fact*. Those differences are held to have material implications for migrants in terms of security and welfare state expansiveness, as the theoretical framework makes clear. Where no differences obtain across distinct types of legal status: there would be no reason to expect different legal statuses to be associated with different poverty outcomes; there would be no incentive to seek to change one's legal status; there would – logically – be no reason to expect variations in the conditionality governing transition from one legal status to another to be associated in any way with poverty; and there would be no empirical basis on which to advance an account of migrant poverty wherein legal status and the conditionality of legal status played an explanatory role. The collection of data by means of Expert Survey allows us to answer the question of whether differences obtain in fact.

Having validated the explanatory framework and theory as plausible, the next step in answering the research question is to measure the novel independent variable of interest: conditionality. Drawing on existing, high quality, comparable international data on indicators of conditionality collected by the Mipex project, the next analytical step is to construct measures of two types of conditionality, to test these measures for desirable statistical properties, and to assess their validity. This is the task of the present chapter. As the theoretical process envisioned is an interactive one between conditionality and the welfare state in the determination of migrant poverty it is also necessary to have a measure of welfare state effort. Drawing on previous research in this area it is possible to construct an indicator of welfare state generosity that has previously been tested for reliability etc. and deployed in peer-reviewed research. The measure is re-specified in this analysis to account for three countries of interest not present in the original measure, and utilises more up to date data.

With these measures, capturing two dimensions within which migrant poverty can be conceptually located, the research strategy turns to address that part of the research question asking what the "implications [are] for how we conceptualise the determination and underpinning of the welfare of inhabitants of Western Europe?" As such conceptualisation has been characterised broadly in terms of 'regimes' in much academic discourse we will have reference to such regimes here. The measures of welfare effort and conditionality of access to rights-granting legal status are posited as two constitutive

dimensions of a TCN-specific welfare regime, the quadrants of which are labelled and advanced as a potentially useful form of explanatory shorthand (Chp. 4).

An integral part of how we conceptualise the welfare of migrant inhabitants of Western Europe in terms of regimes concerns how we understand those regimes themselves and how we further understand their constitutive dimensions. In order to comprehensively address this part of the research question, the next move is to explore other country-level data so as to assess the empirical regularities and elective affinities that characterise the hypothesised regimes and thus to arrive at a deeper understanding of the contexts within which TCNs find themselves. These contexts extend beyond the policy measures which are of central interest here and encompass other aspects of nations which bear upon the lives of migrants. A part of these explorations seeks to make a positive case for the relevance of conditionality as an explanatory factor in itself, and not just as a redundant emanation of other structural-institutional state configurations. The next exploratory component seeks to assess whether other state characteristics might be usefully added to any typology of migrant welfare, so as to ensure that the typology advanced is fully specified. The final concern of this chapter (5) is to explore the nature of conditionality itself, testing in a systematic way – using analytic and hypothesis testing techniques – how and why variations in conditionality across states obtains and with what implications for conceptualising migrant welfare as being determined in 'regime-like' terms, i.e. in a regular, sustained and predictable manner.

Having thus addressed the broader conceptual implications for the theorised role of conditionality in the determination of migrant poverty the thesis turns to the central analytics task: the explicit testing of our central interactive hypothesis on large-scale micro-data utilising our constructed measures and controlling for other factors. This allows us to adduce evidentiary support for the central contention of the thesis in the context of testing hypotheses on large-N, internationally comparable, high quality, trans-European data relevant to the lived experience of resident TCN migrants. This key analytic section also tests sub-hypotheses around aspects of the theoretical framework advanced earlier in the thesis, specifically hypotheses concerning labour market engagement and migrant transitions to more secure legal statuses. These analyses produce results in line with the central explanatory apparatus and are further subjected to a series of prudential re-specifications which *inter alia*: control for other relevant factors; disaggregate the sample in relevant ways according to type of migrant; re-estimate the models using alternative estimation methods (see A.3); and re-estimate the models using alternative

operationalisations of key independent variables (see A.4). The evidence adduced from these analyses supports the central hypothesis of the thesis and allows us to draw conclusions about the role of conditionality of legal status in the determination of TCN poverty and about the broader implications of these findings for extant conceptualisations of welfare in Europe and for ongoing academic debates.

3.1.1. Concepts, Cases, Data

We turn now to consider the practicalities of addressing the research question in an empirical sense. The conceptualisation of migrants in terms of three categories of 'temporary', long-term resident and citizen is a theoretical simplification of a complex reality that necessarily excludes consideration of other categories of migrant about which timely and important questions concerning poverty outcomes could be asked.

The concept of 'migrant' itself is a multifaceted one, potentially denoting many different types of people who relocate geographically, not necessarily across national borders. Moving from the countryside to the city in one's own country has for centuries been a means by which rural dwellers sought greater economic opportunity. In the development of nations, rapid rural to urban migration has been thought to be a desirable process whereby surplus rural labour withdrew from traditional agriculture to feed industrial expansion (Todaro 1980). Such migrations may be massive in scale and are thus capable of producing vast social and economic transformations. Witness the situation in China where, from 2000-2005, 96 million internal migrants moved either rural-to-urban or urban-to-urban, contributing to increased economic inequalities in that country (Chan 2008). Even national citizens who have left their home country and re-migrate may be officially counted in national statistics as 'migrants' upon their return, as is the case in Ireland and elsewhere.

In the 'first wave' countries of migration in Europe like Germany, which officially recruited migrant "guestworkers" in the post-war era, there was an assumption at work that these migrants would simply return home, though of course that proved not to be the case (Soysal 1994; Ryner 2000). Thus, temporary vs. permanent-type migration is another germane term of reference to be acknowledged if we wish to speak with clarity about what exactly it is we mean by 'migrant'. Permanent migration itself is something that may be problematic to identify, especially in the context of supranational entities like the EU which grant rights of free movement to EU-citizens (SOPEMI 2010). This type of free

movement migration accounted in 2010 for 44% of *all* migration in the European Economic Area (SOPEMI 2010, 29). Nor does the use of the term permanent by any means denote a concomitant right to permanent residence, as we saw earlier in our exploration of the contingency of legal status.

Though so-called permanent migration may sound like the type of stream associated with safer or more reliable migrants, it is not the case that temporary migration is necessarily low-skilled and in fact this stream also consists of highly skilled intra-company transfers and the circulation of highly remunerated professionals (Sassen 1999; SOPEMI 2010). Sometimes these workers are recruited to meet seasonal or cyclical needs, at the lower end of the skills spectrum, or sometimes simply because the processes associated with securing permanent-type entry would cause intolerable delays to employers (SOPEMI 2010). Other migrants who may fall into an intermediate category, being temporary in nature but usually remaining for 3-4 years in the host country, are students. Indeed, this category of migrant has recently been the single biggest category of non-EU migrant to the UK (ONS 2012).

All of the above discussed types of migrants are of course mostly economic in nature. Migrants also move for non-economic reasons, perhaps fleeing persecution or war zones, such as seeking asylum in the host country. Other reasons include family reunification, a major inward route of migration to the EU now, and the only category of migration to register an increase according to latest available figures (by 3%, for 2008) (SOPEMI 2010). Finally, there are also migrants who relocate out of essentially emotional or affective reasons, seeking a return to the homeland of their ethnic forebears. For example, Greek law distinguishes between *homogenis* and *allogenis* Greeks, i.e. ethnic-Greeks and non-ethnics or naturalised foreigners, giving special consideration (especially with regard to naturalisation) to *homogenis* Greeks who seek to 'return' to their ancestral homeland (Christopolous 2006), while Germany allows a right of return and of citizenship to persons of German descent (see Article 116 of the Basic Law).

We now turn to discuss the specific sense with which the term TCN migrant is used in these pages. It should be noted that the use of the term 'temporary' here is not intended to express anything about the likely duration of stay of migrants thus designated, nor does it imply that these migrants are destined to return to their home countries. Rather, it is merely a designation of those migrants who, by virtue of their lacking LTR status, do not enjoy full access to social rights in the host country; they are 'temporary' only because they are 'not long-term resident'. It is acknowledged that certain types of migrant in the sample

may not be quite so embedded in the nexus of work, welfare and legal status as our framework assumes, or the transition to a more secure legal status may be precluded for them on the basis of their entry category or visa type etc., e.g. students who are obliged to return upon completion of qualification. While it is desirable to utilise as much data as possible in testing our hypotheses, this issue can be addressed by disaggregating the sample so as to test hypotheses on specific sub-groups.

There are some other sample issues to bear in mind. Asylum seekers, for example, constitute another category whose status and welfare is frequently contingent, often in ways that deprive them of the basic social protections and safeguards enjoyed by other categories of migrant. In Ireland, asylum seekers are forbidden from working and forced to live in direct provision accommodation on a less-than-subsistence cash benefit per week, while in other European countries asylum seekers are entitled to enter the labour market while their applications are being processed. The specific situation of asylum seekers in Europe is an interesting analytical focus in itself though given their usual placement outside of the work and welfare nexus they must remain beyond the scope of this study.

As regards the later analysis, it is important to note that the SILC microdata only elicit information from private households and so asylum seekers, often housed in specialist accommodation centres, will not have been surveyed. One wrinkle in this qualification is that it remains a logical possibility that the sample contains respondents who entered the state (any state) as refugees and who, having been granted asylum, now reside in the state but have bypassed the mechanisms of legal status ascription at the heart of our theoretical framework. Unfortunately, given data limitations, there is nothing we can do about this.

Similarly, there is nothing to be done about the presence of irregular migrants in the sample. Given their precarious legal status and the very real possibility of expulsion they face if caught, it seems unlikely that irregular migrants would consent to providing the sort of in-depth survey information requested in the SILC interview process. Where any irregulars have in fact been surveyed then obviously we would not expect their lives to be subject to the same dynamics as other migrants who are embedded in the nexus of *legal* entitlement and constraint. The presence of such migrants in the sample entails the logical possibility that they might affect the regression coefficients in undesired ways but given that their number is likely to be negligible this does not present itself as a substantive cause for concern. At this point, what is needed is a way to quantify the relative differences that obtain between states in their national approaches to conditionality of legal status for TCN migrants. An operational definition of conditionality is as follows:

> 'Conditionality' is a function of the intensity of the set of status-specific conditions and preconditions which must be fulfilled in order for a migrant to attain that legal status.

The approach taken here is to develop a scale or index[36] which captures the relative differences between states in the intensity of the conditionality they impose on TCNs seeking to move between legal statuses. The universe of cases in this study comprises 16 developed Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. Data is collected for 16 cases and all are analysed in our exploration of the possibilities for regime typology construction and the determinants of conditionality though unfortunately, due to limitations in the microdata made available by Eurostat, the later multilevel analysis of the determinants of migrant poverty is constrained unavoidably to 14 cases (Germany and Switzerland excluded for reasons made clear later).

These countries were chosen on the basis of two explicit selection criteria and also in line with general concerns about comparability. To discuss the general concerns first, there are many good reasons for choosing this set of countries and not a broader set of, say, the 27 current EU member states. Explanatory models in later chapters which seek to elucidate systematic processes by means of testing explicit hypotheses will assume a workable comparability and similarity of cases on certain broad dimensions. While, of course, this research is oriented towards excavating and accounting for the important *variation* that obtains across states in terms of migrant poverty outcomes and conditionality levels, it is nevertheless the case that similarity on key features of those states is a desirable quality. This sort of similarity makes the difficult task of attempting to isolate causal processes not necessarily 'easier' but certainly less fraught. The logic at work here – in a broad sense – takes its cue from the 'most similar systems' comparative research design (Dogan and Pelassy 1984; Peters 1998). The point of this approach to comparative research is to use the research design to conceptually 'hold constant' as many possible sources of extraneous variance and, thus, to avoid muddying the inferential waters.

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[36] Technically the correct term is 'index' and not 'scale', as the various conditions that states may apply to migrant welfare receipt constitute a broad pool of items which may or may not apply in a given state and which do not follow any *necessary* logic in terms of the sequencing of their application. In other words, Guttman scaling considerations – where if condition C applies we can be completely certain that conditions B and A also apply – are not relevant here. We can not necessarily infer anything about the likely pattern of the data for a given state simply by knowing that it applies one particular condition. The ability to predict the likely overall pattern of the data from a given datum is a defining characteristic of scales, but not of indexes (Gorden 1977).

The similarities of the countries within this set of 16 are in some ways quite obvious. For a start, all of the countries listed are clearly modern, economically and politically developed countries with established histories of democracy and experience of inward migration, though to varying degrees. Due to the fact that these countries are some of the 'rich' countries of the Western world they will obviously have been similarly desirable destinations for third-country nationals considering relocation and, importantly, they will arguably have been desirable in a substantively different manner to other, poorer, European countries. The pull factors of rich, economically buoyant Sweden, for example, will presumably have been greater, and qualitatively different, than any pull factors that might be held to obtain in a country with a lower standard of living, or a less generous welfare system, such as many of the countries which acceded to EU membership in 2004.

Leaving aside these generalities, several explicit criteria were employed in the selection of cases. The countries considered in this analysis were drawn from the set of OECD countries, within which non-EEA/EFTA[37] countries were excluded. Of the remaining countries, it was important that they should have had some experience of participation by foreign nationals in the labour market. This criterion was set at a minimum of 3% participation in the labour market according to latest available data (OECD 2009a, 30–31). The other criterion was an economic one designed to exclude less economically developed countries from the analysis; only countries recording a minimum GDP per capita (in US$ at current exchange rates) of US$21,000 – precisely half the average value for the Euro area, as a minimum threshold – were selected (OECD 2009a, 12–13).

Applying these two criteria to the EEA/EFTA countries produced the set of 16 countries listed above. In fact, all of these 16 countries, bar Switzerland, are members of the EEA (and Switzerland is a Schengen Agreement signatory), thus ensuring similarity in the broad rules and regulations regarding migrants and their rights to reside, work and travel within the EEA. The focus here is on nation states and policies enacted at the national level, and not on statelets or principalities. Extreme cases such as Luxembourg, with its abnormally high concentration of foreign nationals in the labour force (46.5% in 2007 (OECD 2009a, 30)), are also excluded. The average values for the selection criteria for the 16 countries were as follows: average foreign labour force participation, 12.05%; average GDP per capita (US$ at current exchange rates), US$49,719 (OECD 2009, own calculations).

[37] EEA: European Economic Area; EFTA: European Free Trade Association.

The microdata utilised in the analysis come from the cross-sectional EU-SILC dataset for the years 2006 and 2007, merged into one dataset, provided by Eurostat under a research contract (EUSILC 2007; EUSILC 2006). This is a dataset collected across all the members of the EU containing socio-demographic, income and poverty variables. Eurostat describe the dataset as follows:

> The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) is an instrument aiming at collecting timely and comparable cross-sectional and longitudinal multidimensional microdata on income, poverty, social exclusion and living conditions. This instrument is anchored in the European Statistical System (ESS). ... The instrument aims to provide two types of data: Cross-sectional data pertaining to a given time or a certain time period with variables on income, poverty, social exclusion and other living conditions; Longitudinal data pertaining to individual-level changes over time, observed periodically over, typically, a four year period.
>
> Social exclusion and housing condition information is collected at household level while labour, education and health information is obtained for persons aged 16 and over. The core of the instrument, income at very detailed component level, is mainly collected at personal level but a few components are included in the household part of SILC. (Eurostat 2011)

The data also provide, vitally, information on country of birth and citizenship status. In this way, it is possible to identify those who were not born in their current country of residence, to isolate specifically those who were born in a non-EU country, and also to identify those respondents who have chosen to naturalise and assume the citizenship of their host country. According to the Commission Regulation on sampling and tracing rules (N°1982/2003 of 21 October 2003), the sample selection has to fulfil the following requirement: "data shall be based on a nationally representative probability sample of the population residing in private households within the country, irrespective of language, nationality or legal residence status." For more on this see the SILC supporting documentation (e.g. Eurostat 2006).

'Country of birth' [pb210][38] is defined as the country of residence of the mother at the time of birth with the variable taking three values (Eurostat 2006, 156):

> LOC: same country as country of residence
>
> EU: Any European union country (EU25) except country of residence
>
> OTH: Any other country. (Eurostat 2006)

[38] This is the variable name in the official Eurostat SILC codebook; all such variable names will be given in square brackets.

Third-country nationals were defined as all those taking the value 'OTH' on the country of birth variable. Citizenship [pb220a] is defined for SILC by Eurostat (2006, 157) as:

> [T]he particular legal bond between the individual and his/her State acquired by birth or naturalisation, whether by declaration, option, marriage or other means according to the national legislation. It corresponds to the country of which the passport is used. For persons with multiple citizenship and where one of the citizenship is the one of the country of residence, that citizenship should be coded.

It takes the same values as for [pb210] – LOC, EU, OTH – to designate the country for which citizenship is held. Naturalised citizens referred to throughout this chapter, then, correspond to survey respondents who take the value of OTH on country of birth [pb210] and LOC on citizenship status [pb220a]; the variable is coded '1' if respondents take both these values, and zero otherwise.

These two years of cross-sectional data (2006, 2007) are merged, allowing us to boost sample numbers at the individual level (level-1) but also to boost sample size at the second level (level-2), which is important for multilevel modelling (see Appendix A.2.5). Unfortunately, there are some data limitations with the SILC dataset for these years and data were not available or were not useable for two of our 16 countries. Although provision is made by Eurostat for the inclusion of Swiss data in the set no such data were included for these years, for reasons known only to the national data collection authorities in Switzerland. More inexplicably, though data are provided for Germany for both years, the decision was taken somewhere in the German data collation process to aggregate, from 2005 onwards, data for both EU and non-EU migrants into one undifferentiable variable for 'non-nationals', thus rendering all of these cases unusable for present purposes.[39] A model of German efficiency this is not and, as painful as it is to forgo the use of so much data, it is simply impossible to use these cases when we cannot isolate TCN migrants.

Nevertheless, this leaves us with data from 14 countries, spread over 28 country-years, and a total effective sample size of about 24,159 TCNs.[40] The dataset is unbalanced insofar as some country-years contain more individual-level observations than others, averaging about 840 per country-year cluster, with a minimum of 150 observations and a maximum of 1,745.[41]

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[39] i.e. all 'EU' values grouped into 'OTH' category on variable pb210 for Germany (Eurostat 2006, 156).
[40] Also excluded are those who had no information or 'missing' information recorded under the 'Year of survey' variable, or who had recorded a year other than 2006 or 2007 (a minuscule number of cases). Not all models will use this number of cases due to missing data on some of the independent variables.
[41] Due to unbalancedness, REML estimation is preferred to other estimation methods; see next section.

3.2. Data collection for construction of indexes

3.2.1. Collection of new data: Expert Survey

The indicators used in the Mipex project are of direct relevance and interest to the present project and remove the necessity to collect all of this detailed information first-hand. However, while the indicators provide much useful and necessary information on the nature and expansiveness of rights enjoyed by long-term residents and on the security afforded to that status in different European states, it does not provide information regarding the same issues for what we here call 'temporary' migrants, i.e. those not in possession of LTR status. The insecurity of temporary migrant situations plays an important role in our theoretical framework, acting as a spur to migrants to seek more secure status, with variation across countries in insecurity hypothesised to help account for variation in migrant poverty outcomes.

A research instrument was designed to plumb in greater depth relevant detail around the security of different migrant situations and the contingency and consequences of having recourse to the welfare state. The instrument was exploratory in nature; a pilot study to determine whether there existed, in fact, sufficient variation to empirically legitimate the assumed theoretical understanding.[42] This instrument took the form of an expert survey, a full copy of which can be found in the Appendix, along with the supporting documentation that accompanied the call for responses (A.1). Before detailing the construction of the research instrument it will be necessary to comment on the implications of adopting the expert survey methodology and to highlight: the rationale behind it; the previous uses to which this approach has been put; and the limitations imposed by this particular methodological approach. It is also important to note how the standard application of the expert survey methodology differs in some key ways from the manner in which the approach is to be applied here.

Expert surveys have gained popularity in recent years in political science where they were first applied to a major research project in the early 1980s (Castles and Mair 1984). Their standard use has involved attempts to locate the positions of political actors in policy or ideological spaces for purposes of comparative research (Mair 2001). Usually this has called upon the expert respondents to arrive at subjective estimations of the relative positioning of political parties on the left-right scale. What are the advantages of such an approach over, say, a systematic evaluation of secondary literature?

[42] Or, if not to 'legitimate' it, then at least to bolster the case for the theoretical framework.

As Mair (2001, 24) observes, expert judgments acquire a certain "weight and legitimacy" precisely because they are the judgments of experts – people who we assume to be informed, well-read, intellectually capable, and intelligently engaged with the subject matter involved. Also, there are clear practical benefits advantageous to the researcher in adopting this methodology; experts can provide information in a quick, easy and comprehensive manner, producing data that is at once highly comparable and in a standardised format (Ibid.). Mair (2001, 25) concludes that expert judgments can be fruitfully and justifiably seen not as an alternative to other methods of deriving information about, e.g., party policy positions – methods which make assessments on the basis of amassed experience, in-depth knowledge, familiarity with mass and elite perceptions etc. – but rather as a "synthesis" of these methods, filtered through the perceptions of intelligent observers. In other words, this method constitutes not an alternative, but a short-cut to the required knowledge and information (Ibid.).

Of course, no methodology should be embraced uncritically and without due regard to its limitations. Some of the most obvious questions that arise, as has been noted in work that takes a critical stance towards expert surveys (Budge 2000), are, first, what is being judged and, second, what are the criteria on which these judgments are made? On the first point, the issue at stake here is obvious; if an expert is evaluating, say, party policy positions, what is meant by the term party? Is it the party leaders, the party's elected representatives, or the party's activists (Budge 2000; Steenbergen and Marks 2007)? On the second point, and sticking with the example of left vs. right party positions, are experts judging how 'left' a party is on the basis of economic criteria, or on the basis of individual liberties and property rights, or on other criteria such as social liberalism as opposed to social conservatism (Budge 2000, 104–105)? And if different experts in different jurisdictions are making judgments on the basis of non-uniform criteria, can the evaluations arrived at really be considered comparable? However, while these concerns should be foremost to the mind of anyone designing an expert survey, it is not the case that all such surveys are necessarily compromised by the possibility of such pitfalls. Steenbergen and Marks (2007, 362) show by means of statistical analysis that, for their own data collected by means of expert survey, the experts showed remarkable consistency in their responses when analyses were performed on things like inter-expert variation, the inter-correlation between expert judgments, and the correlation of expert placements.

However, the concerns raised by Budge (2000) remain relevant to the present study. If expert respondents were asked to subjectively rate the relative 'conditionality' of TCN

migrants entering into social security in Europe, it may prove difficult to ensure that all respondents understand what is meant by the concept 'conditionality'. Likewise, if judgments amount to subjective evaluations whereby countries are 'graded' on a ten-point scale of 'stringency' (of the relevant condition) or equivalent, this may be rather opaque with negative consequences for the validity of the measure. What is considered a 'stringent' requirement by one expert may not be so considered by another expert.

For these reasons, the present study employs expert surveys in a different manner to their standard application in political science. The survey utilised here is not concerned with eliciting the *opinions* or subjective evaluations of experts, but rather with seeking to measure objective facts-about-the-world. Instead of asking experts to position countries on ten-point scales, those experts are instead asked to answer a series of simple yes/no questions, with relevant follow-up questions where appropriate, concerning whether certain kinds of conditions apply to receipt of welfare benefits for TCN migrants in their country. Experts were asked only to provide information for the country in which they were deemed to have expertise.

This approach retains validity for the same reason observed by Mair (2001) above, and we assume that people with a deep knowledge of a given country's migration/welfare system will be capable of providing accurate information regarding the rules that apply. This approach also has desirable practical benefits insofar as it negates the need to source copies of social welfare legislation, migration-related legislation, and civil service or administrative rules, regulations and guidelines for secondary analysis, some of which may not be publicly available and many of which will not have been translated into the English language. It is, in other words, a useful short-cut to relevant data that strikes a balance between research constraints, like time, and the need for reliable and useful data.

Another relevant point, in a general sense, to be made about this approach concerns the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the eventually collected data. Mair (2001, 19) has observed that previous studies employing expert surveys, including his own, went on to have an "absurdly long shelf-life" and were used (to estimate party left-right placement) many years, if not decades, after the original data were collected. One must attend closely to the temporal specificity of the information elicited by these kinds of surveys.[43] Major national social policies, and related migration policies, are not cast in stone, and political events or other social, economic or demographic changes should

[43] This assumes that we are not polling our expert respondents for their opinions and/or knowledge about events, situations, systems or phenomena in a defined past historical period which, in the case of the present study, we are not.

naturally be expected to result in state-level reconsiderations of legal and policy approaches. As such, data collected about migrant insecurity or welfare state access at a particular point in time cannot and should not be seen as revealing some sort of eternal truth.

Indeed, the Mipex project itself was set up with the aim and intention of reassessing migrant integration policies every two years, and this would seem a sensible approach to the sort of research problem this project seeks to address. The present project, then, constitutes not the definitive answer – as no such definitive answer can be given in the context of a constantly shifting and evolving policy area – but rather a necessary brick in the wall. There is a broader point to be made here about typologies in general. Esping-Andersen's (1990) canonical 'three worlds of welfare' typology – or at least the uses to which it has been subsequently put – can be criticised for veering too close to reifying the typological categories involved and also for unduly characterising the composition of those categories as static. Typologies, however, are not ends in themselves, rather they are means to an (explanatory) end (Arts and Gelissen 2002). Accordingly, they should be seen as a temporally-specific aid in understanding and testing hypotheses about the social world, and not as a final, comprehensive and unchanging description of that world.

The research instrument utilised here was designed to ask questions pertaining to long term residents and temporary migrants. As the instrument was deployed as part of a pilot study at an exploratory stage of the research some questions were posed that were not ultimately deemed relevant to the concerns of this project in its final shape. The questions asked across each category of migrant were similar and comparable. The employment-related benefits about which questions were asked in the survey, and the operational definitions of same (clearly defined in the survey itself, see the Appendix, A.1.2), were as follows:

- Unemployment benefit, i.e. contributory benefits paid when someone becomes unemployed
- Social assistance benefits, i.e. non-contributory benefits that may be paid after entitlement to contributory benefits has expired or in the event that the payment of contributory benefits to migrants is not facilitated
- Sickness benefits, i.e. benefits paid to recipients in lieu of salary/wage for a (usually limited and temporary) time during which the recipient is ill and unable to work. (Not to be confused with 'disability benefits' where the recipient is permanently disabled and unable to work because of this.)

- Other questions pertaining to 'what if' scenarios that may be relevant to particular migrant categories were also asked in order to elicit a clear picture of the (potential) consequences of claiming welfare benefits for migrants. For example, detail was requested in some questions as to whether or not claiming a certain benefit could jeopardise a migrant's residence status or lead to potential expulsion from the host country.

The survey was administered online through the Surveymonkey website[44] and was completed directly by the expert providing information for that country. The survey employed 'skip logic' so that where earlier answers to specific questions rendered later questions redundant, these redundant questions were not asked. Two experts per country, for each of the 16 countries in the study, were asked to complete the survey, for purposes of cross-validation, though response rates precluded systematic comparison of answers.

Potential expert respondents were ascertained using a number of complementary criteria. It is important to note at this juncture the point of administering expert surveys in the context of the present research project. While many people may convincingly claim to be 'experts' in the field of migration or welfare systems in a given country, a particular person's level of expertise may not meet the specific demands imposed by the current research question. A detailed knowledge of refugee appeals process case law, for example, will not be useful when attempting to answer questions concerning migrant entitlement to unemployment benefits. A typical expert respondent, in this instance, would ideally have knowledge and/or research experience of both migration-specific and welfare system-specific issues for the country in question.

As a starting point for 'where to look', the *Times Higher Education Supplement* global academic rankings of universities 2009-2010 was used as a guide, on the basis that reliable data were likely to be elicited from reputable institutions. However, this was a guide merely; some countries did not have universities in the top 100, and other countries had specific research institutes employing specialist researchers in the relevant areas which it seemed counterproductive to ignore. On the basis of information made publicly available on university and research institute websites, potential respondents were selected where they appeared most likely to have the requisite information (or access to that information) on the basis of their stated research areas and published work, and country-experts who had contributed to the Mipex 2007 report were also contacted (all listed by name in Annex 1 of that report).

[44] http://www.surveymonkey.com

The introductory email (Appendix, A.1.1) asked respondents who felt they did not possess the requisite expertise to indicate this by means of return email, and a follow up email attempted to ascertain whether that non-respondent could indicate another likely academic/researcher with the requisite expertise to answer the questions involved, in a type of quasi-'snowballing' approach drawing on the goodwill of the international community of scholars so as to identify suitable respondents.[45] It should be clear, then, that the point of this exercise was not to locate *the* undisputed national expert in the field of migration, but to locate *an* expert capable of providing the quite detailed information sought in the survey questions.

Another important point to make here concerning the survey responses is that all of the information sought was objective and factual in nature. No opinions were sought from the expert respondents. Rather, the research instrument was oriented towards eliciting accurate statements of the rules, regulations and legally imposed conditions obtaining with regard to TCN-migrant receipt of welfare benefits in defined national jurisdictions. The objective nature of the data sought in the survey should allay doubts that some have expressed with regard to the reliability of expert surveys which have employed subjective interpretations of various socio-political phenomena, for example rating the relative pro- and anti-European integration positions of political parties in Europe (Steenbergen and Marks 2007). The respondents in the present study were asked to provide factual information for one country only.

Advantages of self-completion surveys are obvious, as they are quick, cheap and convenient with no interviewer effects, though disadvantages include limitations on the extent of prompting or probing respondents in the questioning process, inability to collect additional data, the risk of missing data and not knowing who the respondent is (Bryman 2008). This last point was not relevant as the survey requested email addresses from respondents, though assured confidentiality in the treatment of the responses. Some standard concerns of survey methodologies are not relevant here, as we are not, for example, trying to elicit a random sample of a population. Use of the internet as a means of collecting data may bring its own considerations though, again, these arise more so in the context of attempting to draw reliable probability samples where issues such as coverage error, frame/sample mismatch, selection bias in those who have access to the internet or a personal computer etc. are all highly relevant (Couper 2000).

[45] Some respondents provided such information without prompting in their emails of decline.

On the issue of web-based surveys Van Selm and Jankowski (2006) draw on their own research experience of online surveys to identify three specific issues that may affect respondent participation: Confidentiality; Cost, where some respondents have expressed unwillingness to participate due to time spent online costing money; Language issues, where assumptions regarding universality of English may be unwarranted. Supporting documentation for the survey deployed here assures confidentiality; cost issues are unlikely to figure where the desired respondents are likely to be from an academic or professional background with access to institutional resources; and while language barriers may indeed have proved problematic for this survey, especially given the specificity and complexity of some of the information being sought, it remains the case that the international language of academia (publication, etc.) is English and that there was good reason to assume this would not be unduly problematic.

In the event, the specific nature of the subject matter coupled with lack of interest or professed unsuitability for the task meant that we could not amass responses for all of the countries. The original intention was to collect at least two full responses per country for purposes of cross-checking, however for most countries two responses were not forthcoming. Respondents were, however, helpful in suggesting other suitable participants, usually colleagues or professional acquaintances. The call for respondents went out on Feb. 9th 2010 and responses were collected until the end of May. Of 28 people who commenced the online survey only 13 furnished full and complete sets of useable responses. Responses for 10 countries were collected, with three of these countries recording responses from two experts each.[46]

[46] Finland, Netherlands, Switzerland; the Irish respondent had difficulty with the online survey so completed a printout version of same and returned it by email.

3.2.2. Pre-existing data: Utilisation of Mipex indicators

The Migrant Integration Policy Index (Mipex) project provides a highly useful starting point for the approach taken here of attempting to quantify the conditionality of legal status for TCNs. The Mipex report was first produced in 2004, with a limited set of countries, then again in 2006 with a larger set, with the intention of producing the report biannually so as to facilitate policy analysis and policymaking with regard to integration policies across Europe (and in three non-European countries). The most recently available report (for 2006 at time of writing, published in 2007) provides a succinct summation of what precisely Mipex is:

> Mipex measures policies to integrate migrants in 25 EU Member States and three non-EU countries. It uses over 140 policy indicators to create a rich, multi-dimensional picture of migrants' opportunities to participate in European societies. Mipex covers six policy areas which shape a migrant's journey to full citizenship: labour market access, family reunion, long-term residence, political participation, access to nationality and anti-discrimination. Best practice for each policy indicator is set at the highest European standard, drawn from Council of Europe Conventions or European Community Directives (where these are only minimum standards, European-wide policy recommendations are used). Since policies are measured against the same standards across all Member States, Mipex is a 'benchmarking' tool to compare performance ...
>
> (Niessen, Huddleston, and Citron 2007, x).

The Mipex indicators cover many of the relevant areas, over many of the focal migrant categories, which are central to the analytical concerns of this project. These indicators will be most useful in constructing measures of the conditionality of transitioning from one legal status to another. Specifically, the indicators chart various aspects of the conditional requirements for transitioning from: a. temporary (i.e. non-long term resident) status to long-term resident status; b. long-term resident status to naturalised citizen status. We will detail shortly the precise indicators chosen from the dataset that were deemed relevant to the concept and measurement of conditionality.

The Mipex dataset also contains indicators related to the rights and security associated with given legal statuses. Given that a central part of this study is to be built on the pre-existing data collected by the Mipex project it is important to say something about the methodology employed in that project and the quality of the data. Again, the best description of this comes directly from the 2006 Mipex report itself:

> Mipex is produced by a consortium of 25 organisations. Amongst them are universities, research institutes, think-tanks, foundations, NGOs and equality bodies ... Mipex is led by the British Council and Migration Policy Group (MPG). The research is designed, coordinated, and undertaken by MPG in cooperation with its research partners ... Answers for each indicator were provided and peer reviewed by a network of expert scholars and law practitioners in the field of migration (names listed in Annex 1). Follow-up research was also requested of the national experts or conducted by MPG. The publication was written by MPG in cooperation with the British Council. The national partners reviewed the country profiles and participated in consultations throughout the research process. The project is co-financed by the European Community under the INTI Programme - Preparatory Actions for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals. (Niessen, Huddleston, and Citron 2007, xi).

The individual indicators used in Mipex can take one value across three categories, where a country recording a value in category 1 for a given indicator is deemed to place the most restrictive/stringent demands on migrants for whatever aspect that indicator is measuring. Countries assigned a category 2 value for that indicator place some demands on migrants, though these are fewer and less stringent than countries in category 1 on that indicator. Finally, countries in category 3 have the most accommodating and least restrictive requirements for migrants with regard to that indicator. This means that each of the indicators take a numerical value from 1 to 3, where 1 indicates 'high conditionality'.

For the purposes of this study, however, and in the context of the manner in which the term 'conditionality' has been used thus far, it will aid interpretation if we construct measures where low values are consonant with low conditionality and high values are consonant with higher levels of conditionality. So, the polarities of the numerical values recorded for each indicator have been reversed to achieve this. The precise indicators explored for the construction of each of the conditionality indexes, along with qualitative descriptions of the situations denoted by the numerical values, are recorded in the following tables.

The conditions applied for attaining each of the statuses below fall into broadly similar categories: many of the conditions states impose are connected to questions of the economic viability of the migrant, designed to minimise the chances the migrant becomes a drain on public resources; other conditions are more concerned with the level to which the migrant is deemed to have integrated with the host society. This manifests itself generally in the imposition of tests, either culture or language related (or both). Such tests can be more or less stringent, and may impose costs to greater or lesser degrees on migrants,

depending on the jurisdiction in question. Other germane factors concern time limits: the length of time a migrant must be resident before certain statuses can be applied for, or indeed the length of time an application is likely to take before a decision is made, are both factors liable to impact on the social protections and social citizenship outcomes enjoyed by migrant populations. Conditions in place to attain what is presumably the highest level of security – citizenship, by naturalisation – are, as we might expect, the most demanding of all, and may also include requirements like the absence of a criminal record, or the possession of private health insurance, before an application will be approved.

The indicators chosen here are the ones deemed most relevant to present analytical concerns, and not all indicators made available by Mipex will have been included. The criterion for inclusion at this point was simply whether or not an indicator could accurately be characterised as a 'condition'. Some of the Mipex indicators clearly conform to this concept; for example, indicator #38 in the Mipex dataset asks about 'required time of habitual residence [in order to attain LTR status]', with answer options provided for greater and lesser degrees of time. Attaining LTR status is made conditional upon residing for the mandated period of time in a given country. However, indicator #42, for example, asks whether 'periods of absence [are] allowed previous to granting of [LTR] status'. This indicator serves a descriptive function, and it is clearly not measuring something upon which the attaining of LTR status is conditional. In a similar vein, other indicators in the dataset were excluded where they could not accurately be characterised as referring to something on which attaining a particular status was *conditionally dependent.*

Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) – a form of non-linear principal components analysis (NLPCA) – was employed to aid in the selection of indicators for the purpose of constructing discriminative measures, and also to assess the effectiveness of certain indicators in explaining variation in the overall dataset. More will be said about this method, and the rationale behind it, later. A list of the variables to be used in the MCA, with scoring methodology and the raw values for each variable by country, is presented next. Correlations of these ordinal variables – Somer's d, Cramér's V – can be found in the Appendix (A.2).

LTR Conditionality	**1**	**2**	**3**
Required time of habitual residence, disregarding work activity **(a)**	*≤ 5 years*	*> 5 ≤ 8 years*	*> 8 years*
Required time in legal employment or exercising a duly registered self-employed activity **(b)**	*≤ 3 years*	*> 3 ≤ 5 years*	*> 5 years*
Integration measures **(c)**	*None*	*Other integration measures*	*Passing of test*
Imposition of integration course	*None*	*Voluntary*	*Conditional for status*
Language assessment	*None*	*Simple, (A1 [see 3 below]) oral, multiple-choice interview*	*Written and/or high level language test (ex. A2, B1, B2, C1,*
Content of integration assessment	*None*	*With social aspects (knowledge of legal/political*	*With cultural aspects (culture, customs, traditions)*
Cost of test (blank if not applicable)	*Free*	*Minimal cost*	*Any higher costs*
Economic resources requirement: a. Employment related-criteria **(d)** b. Stable & Sufficient means for applicant and dependents	*None*	*A*	*A and/or B*
Insurance requirement **(e)**	*None*	*Simple sickness insurance required*	*Other type of insurance (all risks etc.)*
Length of application procedure **(f)**	*≤ 6 months*	*> 6 ≤ 9 months*	*> 9 months or no regulation on maximum length*
Costs of application and/or issue of permit or renewal **(g)**	*None*	*Administrative fee as charged for issue of identity card*	*Any higher costs or prerequisites at high indirect costs (for ex. Medical records, degrees and their translation)*

Table 3.1 – Pool of Mipex indicators for index construction: LTR status

Citizenship Acquisition		**1**	**2**	**3**
First generation immigrants	(l)	*After ≤ 3 years of residence*	*After > 3 ≤ 5 years of residence*	*After > 5 years of residence*
Language/integration requirements	(m)	*None*	*Language requirement*	*Language and integration requirement (i.e. personal, professional, social or generally sufficient)*
Language test (blank if not applicable)		*Simple, (A1 or A2) oral, multiple-choice interview or*	*Simple (A1 or A2), oral interview or test (either standardized or based on general administrative discretion)*	*High level (B1, B2, C1, C2) written test with open-ended questions*
"Citizenship test" (black if not applicable)		*Oral, multiple-choice test on knowledge of rights/political*	*Oral, multiple-choice test on detailed knowledge of rights/political system and of history/culture/traditions*	*Written test with open-ended questions on detailed knowledge of rights/political system and of history/customs/traditions*
Cost of test (blank if not applicable)		*Free*	*Minimal*	*Any higher costs*
Economic resources requirement	(n)	*None*	*Minimum income (i.e. acknowledged level of poverty threshold)*	*Additional requirements (i.e. employment, higher levels of income)*
Health insurance requirement	(o)	*None*	*Simple health insurance required*	*All risks health insurance required*
Criminal record requirement	(p)	*Rejection of application for serious crimes (clearly specified in*	*Rejection of application for repeated or serious offences/crimes*	*Rejection of application for other offences (i.e. misdemeanours and minor criminal offences) or threat to public security and order*
Good character' clause	(q)	*None*	*Yes, no rules of application*	*Yes, detailed rules of application*
Maximum length of application procedure	(r)	*≤ 6 months*	*> 6 months*	*No regulation on maximum length*
Costs of application and/or issue of nationality title	(s)	*None*	*Administrative fee as charged for issue of identity card*	*Any higher costs*

Table 3.2 – Pool of Mipex indicators for index construction: Citizenship status

Table 3.3 – Concordance of indicators with variable names to be used in MCA analysis and variable raw values by country

LTR-Conditionality	Citizenship-Conditionality
(a) lchabres	(l) ccres
(b) lctimempl	(m) ccintegavc*
(c) lcintegavc*	(n) ccecresourc
(d) lcecresourc	(o) ccinsure
(e) lcinsure	(p) cccriminal
(f) lcapplength	(q) ccgoodhcar
(g) lcappcost	(r)ccmaxlength
—	(s) ccappcost

* These variables represent the average of values for the set of integration conditions and test requirements in each case.

col1	lchabres	lctimempl	lcintegavc	lcecresourc	lcinsure	lcapplength	lcappcost
AUS	1	1	3	3	3	1	3
BEL	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
DEN	2	1	2	2	1	1	1
FIN	1	2	1	3	1	1	2
FRA	1	1	2	3	2	3	3
GER	1	2	3	3	1	3	3
GRE	1	2	3	3	2	2	3
IRE	2	2	1	1	1	1	2
ITA	1	1	1	3	2	1	2
NED	1	2	3	3	2	1	3
NOR	1	1	2	3	1	2	2
POR	2	1	1	3	1	1	2
SPA	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
SUI	3	1	2	3	1	1	3
SWE	1	1	1	3	1	1	2
UK	3	2	1	1	1	2	2

col1	ccres	ccintegavc	ccecresourc	ccinsure	cccriminal	ccgoodchar	ccmaxlength	ccappcost
AUS	3	2	3	3	3	3	2	3
BEL	1	1	1	1	2	1	3	3
DEN	3	3	3	1	3	1	3	3
FIN	3	2	2	1	3	3	3	3
FRA	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	1
GER	3	3	3	1	3	1	3	3
GRE	3	2	1	1	3	2	3	3
IRE	2	1	2	1	2	2	3	2
ITA	3	1	3	2	3	1	2	2
NED	2	3	1	1	3	3	1	3
NOR	3	2	1	1	3	3	3	2
POR	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	3
SPA	3	2	1	1	3	2	3	2
SUI	3	3	3	1	3	2	3	3
SWE	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	3
UK	2	2	1	1	3	2	3	2

3.3. Multiple Correspondence Analysis

3.3.1. Methodological notes

Before any results of the multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) are presented it is important to make clear the implications of using this particular methodology. MCA is used here, for reasons to be detailed shortly, as the non-linear cognate of principal components analysis (PCA), a standard tool in the social sciences often used to reduce higher-dimensional vector spaces (of indicators) to lower-dimensional constructs which may then be used as indexes. In particular, it is necessary to discuss the following issues with regard to this methodology: the purpose to which the methodology is here being put; the suitability of applying this methodology to these particular data; the reasons for using this specific methodology (and not another cognate method); and various other technical details that should be borne in mind insofar as they have a bearing on all that follows.

The purpose of this section, §3.3, is to explore the structure of the collected data on conditionality of social security access for migrants in each of our three focal categories. The exploratory nature of this exercise is important for a couple of reasons. First, we remain agnostic at this point as to whether the range of indicators assembled here coherently describe the concepts at issue and as to whether measures can be fruitfully constructed from the indicators in a way which allows us to differentiate between countries.

There is a second, technical, reason why the exploratory nature of this analysis is important. This relates to the theoretical differences between principal components analysis and another very similar technique, factor analysis. Both of these methods share broad similarities but there are important differences between them. Relevant to the current point is the fact that factor analysis assumes an underlying causal, theoretical model. This model assumes that each variable in the dataset can be expressed as a linear combination of hypothetical unobservable common factors plus a factor unique to that variable. This stands in contrast to PCA which makes no causal assumptions about the underlying structure of the data and where the emphasis instead lies on expressing each principal component in terms of linear combinations of the individual variables (Lewis-Beck 1994). As the purpose of our analysis at this point is exploratory and our analytic concerns do not require or justify the imposition of a causal model on the set of indicators, PCA seems the more appropriate methodology for reducing our vector space.

However, in this instance straightforward PCA would be methodologically inappropriate given the nature of the data to be analysed. The variables here are not scale variables but rather ordinal variables, taking values from 1 to 3, corresponding generally to 'low', 'medium' and 'high'. Standard PCA assumes multivariate normality in the variables used (Lewis-Beck 1994), but categorical and ordinal variables, such as we have here, violate that assumption. MCA is a technique applicable to categorical/ordinal data that produces results analogous to PCA by analysing the correspondences between rows and columns in a data matrix.

The technique is descriptive and exploratory, providing a geometric model of the data which summarises relationships between the variables; thus MCA can be thought of as the counterpart of PCA for categorical variables (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004, 180). Whereas in standard PCA the quality of a solution is affected by sample size (though see MacCallum et al. 1999 who maintain that the effect of sample size is mediated by other considerations of 'high communalities' and 'overdetermination') in correspondence analysis sample size is not relevant to the construction of the map charting the relationships between variables (Greenacre and Blasius 2006, 14). A key concept in MCA is that of 'inertia', which is essentially the same as 'variance' in the context of PCA, and so the more inertia explained by the MCA solution the better a fit that solution is. Inertia is closely related to the Chi-square statistic for goodness of fit. The formula for that statistic holds that the expected frequencies in a table are equal to the respective column total times the row total, divided by the grand total of frequencies (assuming complete independence of rows and columns); any deviations from these expected values[47] will contribute to the overall Chi-square (StatSoft 2002). Inertia is formally defined (Greenacre and Blasius 2006, 13) as

$$Inertia = Chi\text{-}square/N$$

and so MCA can be thought of as a method for decomposing the overall Chi-square statistic by identifying a low-dimensional space in which the deviations from the expected values can be represented (StatSoft 2002). For a full and comprehensive treatment of MCA, its variants, its applications and its mathematical and statistical underpinnings the interested reader should see Greenacre and Blasius (2006).

It is important to state clearly at the outset the purpose of employing this methodology and also to specify some guidelines to be borne in mind at those points where subjective judgments must be made concerning which components and/or variables to retain or drop from the analyses. We apply MCA to the set of indicators for LTR

[47] Expected under the hypothesis of complete independence of the row and column variables.

migrants in order to reduce the dimensionality of our vector space for this migrant category and to arrive at a coherent, justifiable, and rationally defensible measure (or set of measures) which allows us to discriminate between cases. The MCA analyses conducted here are not ends-in-themselves directed towards producing the 'perfect' measure, rather they serve to aid in understanding the structure of the data and the relationships between the variables with the aim of producing a tool with practical utility.

Social scientific measures of this nature are unavoidably imperfect insofar as they are reliant upon subjective judgments made by the researcher. Seemingly minor decisions concerning where to place the cut-off point for the retention of individual principal components, for example, or whether to exclude individual variables as being unfit for purpose, may cumulate in ways that substantively affect the sensitivity of the index and its utility as an instrument of classification and differentiation (Schmidtlein et al. 2008). Bearing these issues in mind, the indexes of LTR conditionality and citizenship conditionality will be tested for external validity as far as possible.

Where variables are seen to contribute little to our understanding of conditionality, whether because there is not enough variation between cases or because the variable appears to be measuring 'something else', they will be dropped from subsequent MCA analyses. It may be the case that a simple eyeballing of the variables, and the manner in which the values group across cases, would be sufficient to allow the researcher here to choose a suitable set for combination in an additive index. However, the opacity of such a method renders it undesirable next to a rationally defensible method such as maximising variance explained, by means of MCA/NLPCA. Ultimately, however, this exploratory method (for it is exploratory, not confirmatory) is best seen as performing a useful qualitative check on the set of variables we retain for combination in the final additive index(es). Other standard methods to assess how variables 'scale together' for the purposes of index construction, like Cronbach's alpha, will be used parallel to the MCA analyses to aid in decisions regarding which indicators to exclude from the final indexes.

Cronbach's alpha is a standard measure of internal consistency of a scale or index, i.e. of instrument reliability, in the social sciences (Ibid.). Values of alpha ranging from 0.72 – 0.88 have been cited as indicating acceptable to high reliability (John and Benet-Martínez 2000). Other factors beyond the alpha score are relevant for selecting items to be used in the instrument and so one must also attend to scale length and inter-item correlation (Cortina 1993). A scale (index) with a large number of items will have a higher alpha score than a shorter scale, but simply adding items to increase putative homogeneity will mean

the inclusion of many redundant items. As alpha can sometimes be high even with low inter-item correlation among items, these correlations should also be taken into account in choosing which items to include in the index (Ibid.).

Critics of alpha point out that it "often reflects not only general factor saturation but also group factor saturation" (Zinbarg et al. 2005, 132), implying that dimensionality of the measure should be assessed separately. Cortina (1993) found that alpha can remain high even in the presence of multidimensionality, which is undesirable as multidimensional scales or indexes do not have an unambiguous interpretation. Alpha can then be used as a "confirmatory measure of unidimensionality ... once the existence of a single factor has been determined" (Cortina 1993, 103).

In terms of concrete criteria to apply when evaluating the results of the MCAs there are various established approaches one could take. Schmidtlein et al. (2008, 1106) identify several methods used in standard PCA including: 1. Kaiser (1960) criterion, whereby only components with eigenvalues greater than one are retained; 2. Percentage of variance explained, whereby a sufficient number of components are retained such that they explain a pre-determined amount of variance in the data, e.g. 80% in the case of the index these authors were discussing; 3. Expert choice, whereby a set of components were retained according to whether or not they facilitated a subjectively meaningful set of subject area interpretations, i.e. each component was measuring, in the researcher's estimation, qualitatively differentiable constructs.

In the case of MCA, as opposed to standard PCA, eigenvalues are reported as 'principal inertias' and their sum equals the total inertia (a cognate of 'variance' as noted above). Parsimonious solutions which explain the greatest percentage of inertia will be favoured as far as possible. Where solutions appear to be multidimensional, as opposed to the more desirable unidimensional, graphical techniques will be used to detect potential outliers. Obviously if these indicators do indeed tap the same latent construct we would expect to find unidimensional solutions that account for the set of variables. Where multiple dimensions to the data present themselves attempts will be made to account for these deviations from expectations. If certain types of conditionality are seen to be characterised by multiple dimensions this in itself does not refute the idea that conditionality can be measured as a coherent latent construct, but suggests perhaps the utility of considering the effects of certain variables in isolation to the proposed summary measures.

Some notes on terminology follow. In MCA 'quality' is a term denoting how well a point in the vector space is represented by the *n*-dimensional solution specified by the researcher. It is similar to the idea of 'communality' in standard PCA analysis, where communality refers to the proportion of variance in a given variable explained by the common factor(s), with very high communalities implying very low amounts of unexplained variance in the factor solution (MacCallum et al. 1999). While quality is a metric for the overall solution, within each dimension the 'squared correlation' metric indicates how well a particular point is represented by that specific dimension, i.e. it can be thought of as a dimension-specific communality metric.[48]

The term 'loading' most often encountered in factor analysis and standard PCA is analogous here to 'squared correlation'. In standard PCA the extent to which components are 'overdetermined' increases one's confidence that the solution generated is reliable, where 'overdetermination' has been defined as the degree to which each factor is clearly represented by a sufficient number of variables; meaning in practice that at least three or four variables should have sufficiently high loadings on the factors and exhibit clear simple structure (MacCallum et al. 1999, 89-90).[49]

In general, the most encouraging results would indicate high overall quality for each of the points[50], with a unidimensional solution explaining the greatest part of the inertia (variance). At minimum it would be hoped that a unidimensional solution could account for at least a majority (>50%) of total inertia, while at least two-thirds of inertia accounted for would constitute a generally more satisfactory solution. In terms of the quality of points (i.e. loadings on the principal dimension), a minimum loading of 0.4 for at least two of the three points (categories) per variable will be taken as a guideline, representing a better-than-average fit.

[48] Where the solution has been constrained to only one dimension then the overall quality metric and the squared correlation metric will be identical.

[49] Simple structure entails that variables do not load highly and simultaneously on more than one factor.

[50] Where a point is a response category for a given variable.

3.3.2. MCA Results: Conditionality of Long-term residency status

The results of the final solutions for each index are presented here; results of the first iteration of each MCA analysis, i.e. utilising all indicators for a given index, are presented in the Appendix (A.2) to save space. In order to interpret the results of the MCA analyses it is necessary to know the abbreviated variable names for each of the policy indicators that were listed in Tables 3.1 - 3.2 earlier. The names of the variables recorded in the output below were matched with the policy indicators (a) to (s) in Table 3.3.

The first analysis on all seven indicators for LTR status showed generally poor overall quality for the 'time employed' variable, which also had the undesirable quality of being distributed evenly across more than one dimension (factor/component), i.e. it is not cleanly identified with any single dimension. Similarly, the 'length of application' variable showed poor overall quality for two of its response categories, while also being distributed across more than one dimension. The poor quality of these indicators made them immediate candidates for elimination. A subsequent analysis of the remaining variables showed that the first dimension accounts for 55% of overall inertia in the solution, which is to be expected and which further makes a good case for unidimensionality here. However, elimination of further variables at this point is not quite so clear cut, with all variables recording high overall quality, but for a *two*-dimensional solution.

Consulting Cronbach's alpha, a standard means of computing inter-item correlations and a test statistic for the scale formed from a set of variables, we saw that the 'length of habitual residence' indicator is in fact poorly correlated with the rest of the items and with the overall index. In fact, to form a scale using this variable at all it was necessary in the computation to reverse the sign of this variable, as the output results indicate. This suggests that this indicator is not suitable for inclusion in the measure, and indeed overall alpha increases to a respectable .80 when this indicator is excluded. The closer the alpha value is to 1 the better the items are at measuring a unidimensional construct. We have thus excluded three variables as being unsuitable for inclusion in the index. The 'time employed' variable also has the undesirable statistical quality that it has relatively low variance; in fact it has the lowest variance of all of the conditionality indicators considered here (variance = 0.25). The other two excluded variables do not suffer from this shortcoming, though they do record very few cases in the highest conditionality category (i.e. where the indicator takes on the value of '3') for each variable, see Table 3.3. Nonetheless, it may be prudent to test for possible effects of these excluded indicators alongside the conditionality index (see Appendix A.4 for details of these models).

A final MCA analysis of the remaining four variables indicates broad unidimensionality (in the sense that the first component accounts for over half of the inertia/variance) but, somewhat perplexingly, indicates an important second dimension to the data (accounting for 33% of inertia) with high squared correlations recorded on this dimension for the lower response categories of three of these variables. This may be more comprehensible if represented visually, and MCA analysis in Stata allows us to plot these variables in the reduced, two-dimensional, vector space generated by this last solution.

Table 3.4 – Cronbach's alpha, set of LTR-conditionality indicators

Item	Obs	Sign	item-test correlation	item-rest correlation	average inter-item covariance	alpha
lchabres	16	-	0.5724	0.3498	.2868056	0.8027
lcecresourc	16	+	0.7643	0.5616	.2104167	0.7426
lcinsure	16	+	0.7637	0.6395	.2368056	0.7200
lcappcost	16	+	0.7625	0.6423	.2395833	0.7210
lcintegavc	16	+	0.8193	0.6616	.1909722	0.7004
Test scale					.2329167	0.7803

Fig. 3.1 – MCA plot of retained LTR conditionality indicators in two-dimensional space



Table 3.5 – Two-dimensional solution for LTR-conditionality index

Categories	mass	overall quality	%inert	dimension_1 coord	dimension_1 sqcorr	dimension_1 contrib	dimension_2 coord	dimension_2 sqcorr	dimension_2 contrib
lcecresourc									
1	0.063	1.029	0.076	1.418	0.926	0.126	0.612	0.103	0.023
2	0.016	0.778	0.156	0.417	0.010	0.003	-4.807	0.769	0.361
3	0.172	0.993	0.032	-0.554	0.912	0.053	0.214	0.082	0.008
lcinsure									
1	0.172	1.018	0.037	0.613	0.977	0.065	-0.162	0.041	0.005
2	0.063	1.012	0.049	-1.169	0.974	0.085	0.298	0.038	0.006
3	0.016	0.900	0.043	-2.068	0.858	0.067	0.593	0.042	0.005
lcappcost									
1	0.016	0.778	0.156	0.417	0.010	0.003	-4.807	0.769	0.361
2	0.141	0.887	0.081	0.897	0.775	0.113	0.441	0.112	0.027
3	0.094	0.907	0.116	-1.416	0.902	0.188	0.140	0.005	0.002
lcintegavc									
1	0.125	0.891	0.089	0.980	0.749	0.120	0.552	0.142	0.038
2	0.063	0.946	0.056	-0.298	0.055	0.006	-1.555	0.892	0.151
3	0.063	0.922	0.109	-1.662	0.883	0.173	0.450	0.039	0.013

Dimension	principal inertia	percent	cumul percent
dim 1	.3424706	55.62	55.62
dim 2	.2046437	33.24	88.86
dim 3	.0013257	0.22	89.07
Total	.6157168	100.00	

Fig. 3.1 shows the relationship of the four remaining indicators to the two dimensions of the MCA solution. Across the top of the diagram we see the first dimension increasing, from right to left, in a manner which can be readily interpreted as recording increasing conditionality of attaining LTR status. The second, vertical dimension, seems to be driven almost entirely by two response categories: the lowest-conditionality ('1') response category for the 'application cost' indicator; and the medium-conditionality ('2') response category for the 'economic resources requirement' indicator. A quick glance at the distribution of cases across the response categories reveals that both of these responses occur only once and that furthermore they both occur for the same case, Denmark. So the second dimension of this MCA solution is being driven almost entirely by the outlying case of Denmark. How to interpret this?

It is firstly not the case that Denmark is 'extreme' in any of its recorded values. Looking at the additive index to be derived by combining these four variables Denmark records a low value of 6 on an index which ranges from a theoretical minimum of 4 to a maximum score of 12. As a variance-maximising technique, the type of analysis conducted here seeks merely to best represent the variation between indicators in a low-dimensional space. Denmark, in this context, is indeed highly 'variant' insofar as it records unique responses for two of the indicators being examined. However, on a substantive level it is not unique and exhibits merely a low (but not the lowest possible) level of conditionality. Mathematically the MCA solution is correctly accounting for Denmark's putative difference, but this solution does not cohere with what we know already to be the case. Excluding Denmark and reanalysing would seem to convincingly confirm this interpretation, with the first dimension accounting for over 92% of inertia (variance) in the data, and with all points recording very high overall quality. Denmark's misclassification in the MCA analysis can be represented graphically, see Fig. 3.2 below, in a simple scatter of the four-item additive index against the weighted[51] two-dimensional composite index (generated in the MCA).[52]

The exploratory MCA analyses conducted here have served their function as a qualitative check on the justifiability of combining these variables in a single additive measure. As noted earlier this additive measure records a respectable .80 value for

[51] Dimensions weighted according to the proportion of overall inertia explained by the solution (see e.g. Schmidtlein et al. 2008 or Decanq and Lugo 2009 for similar approaches adopted in standard PCA.).

[52] The polarity of the measure generated by the MCA was reversed by multiplying by -1 to aid in interpretation (i.e. to ensure that high values imply high conditionality, as in the additive index) and this adjustment is merely for presentational purposes, with no effect on the substantive meaning of the index.

Cronbach's alpha. The correlation between the final index and the index that would have been constructed by simply adding together all available seven indicators for this migrant category is high (.90). This indicates that we have lost little of the information in the data by excluding those variables deemed unacceptable insofar as they do not fit with the unidimensional framework adopted here. For deployment in the later analytical models we subtracted 4 from the theoretical variable running from 4 to 12 so as to orient the empirical minimum of the variable with the origin ('0') to aid interpretation.

Fig. 3.2 – Scatter of additive LTR index vs. 2-dimensional composite index



3.3.3. MCA Results: Conditionality of Citizenship Acquisition

Eight indicators from the Mipex dataset were deemed potentially relevant to the conditionality of acquiring citizenship status for TCN migrants, including the averaged 'integration conditions' indicator. An initial MCA solution indicates that, for this set of eight indicators, a two-dimensional solution accounts for just under 50% of total inertia, with the first dimension accounting for 31.8% of total inertia. Three variables ('max length of application', 'cost of application', 'good character clause') stand out for their lack of clean identification; their loadings (squared correlations) are distributed to a high degree *across* dimensions, and even this two-dimensional representation of the vector space does not result in high overall quality for these indicators. Consulting Cronbach's alpha scores and inter-item covariances confirms that these indicators fare very poorly at discriminating between cases and do not possess sufficient covariation with the other variables to merit inclusion in a unidimensional index. (Also, the 'application cost' indicator's sign was reversed to have it cohere with the notional 'scale' generated in this alpha analysis, indicating further unsuitability.)

Excluding these variables, the subsequent MCA analysis – which we constrain to generate a one-dimensional solution – indicates that the categories of the 'insurance requirement variable' are the ones identified most poorly with the single dimension. Cronbach's alpha scores indicate too that exclusion of this variable would improve overall scale reliability (to .727), and so we drop this variable from the final index. A final unidimensional representation of the four remaining indicators accounts for over 70% of inertia, and all of the variable-category 'points' meet minimum acceptable loading standards on the final dimension.

Table 3.6 – Cronbach's alpha, Citizenship conditionality index

Item	Obs	Sign	item-test correlation	item-rest correlation	average inter-item covariance	alpha
ccres	16	+	0.6146	0.4220	.2111111	0.6899
ccecresourc	16	+	0.8078	0.5904	.1340278	0.6216
ccinsure	16	+	0.4995	0.3000	.2423611	0.7271
cccriminal	16	+	0.7842	0.6285	.15625	0.6073
ccintegavc	16	+	0.6878	0.4678	.1833333	0.6724
Test scale					.1854167	0.7168

Table 3.7 – One-dimensional solution for Citizenship conditionality indicators

Categories	mass	overall quality	%inert	dimension_1 coord	sqcorr	contrib
ccres						
1	0.016	0.708	0.143	3.035	0.708	0.144
2	0.078	0.865	0.021	0.580	0.865	0.026
3	0.156	0.965	0.040	-0.593	0.965	0.055
ccecresourc						
1	0.125	0.548	0.037	0.480	0.548	0.029
2	0.031	0.392	0.053	0.976	0.392	0.030
3	0.094	0.834	0.074	-0.966	0.834	0.087
cccriminal						
1	0.031	0.392	0.095	1.304	0.392	0.053
2	0.031	0.733	0.211	2.648	0.733	0.219
3	0.188	0.822	0.070	-0.659	0.822	0.081
ccintegavc						
1	0.078	0.843	0.152	1.526	0.843	0.182
2	0.109	0.455	0.044	-0.508	0.455	0.028
3	0.063	0.769	0.059	-1.019	0.769	0.065

Dimension	principal inertia	percent	cumul percent
dim 1	.2613591	70.44	70.44
dim 2	.0227386	6.13	76.57
dim 3	.0094819	2.56	79.12
dim 4	.0011195	0.30	79.42
Total	.3710516	100.00	

Predicted scores from this unidimensional solution graphed against the additive index constructed from these four indicators demonstrates visually the broad unidimensional agreement between both these methods of dimensionality reduction (Fig. 3.3). No cases are obviously misclassified by the MCA solution, and the correlation between the additive measure and the MCA solution is high at .908.[53] There would seem to be clear justification for using these variables in an additive measure and the MCA analysis here clearly supports this. The correlation between the final index and the index that would have been constructed by simply adding together all of the indicators for this migrant category is high (.91), indicating that little loss of information has resulted from the exclusion of the variables deemed lacking in terms of unidimensionality. For deployment in the later analytical models we subtracted 4 from the theoretical variable running from 4 to 12 so as to orient the empirical minimum of the variable with the origin ('0') to aid interpretation.

[53] The polarity of the measure generated by the MCA was reversed by multiplying by -1 to aid in interpretation (i.e. to ensure that high values imply high conditionality, as in the additive index) and this adjustment is merely for presentational purposes, with no effect on the substantive meaning of the index.

Fig. 3.3 - Additive Citizenship conditionality index vs. unidimensional index



3.3.4. Validity & Reliability

Any attempt to construct an index for purposes of social scientific deployment must have regard to the validity and reliability of the research instrument. Broadly, validity refers to whether or not the instrument actually measures what it purports to, while reliability refers to the consistency of the measurement procedure. Validity has been conceptualised as consisting of several different aspects (John and Benet-Martínez 2000):

> **Face validity**: does the proposed instrument *appear* to measure the underlying construct, does it 'look valid' on its face, and do the constituent items bear at least a superficial relationship to the underlying theory?;
>
> **Content validity**: are the items to be used in the construction of a measure *relevant*, do they adequately address all facets of the theorised construct and are they of a sufficient technical quality to be useful?;
>
> **Construct validity**: does the instrument actually correlate with what it set out to measure, is it a *satisfactory operationalisation* of the underlying construct, and is there a common underlying factor to be discerned among the instrument's constituent items?;
>
> **External validity**: this concerns whether results found using the measure can be generalised to other cases or contexts, but is also related to construct validity insofar as both can be, at least in part, assessed by means of assessing the correlations of the instrument with other known measures of the construct, though John and Benet-Martínez (2000) remark that it is difficult to identify a single criterion of external validity.

With regard to conditionality of legal status, we will address each of these issues in turn with reference to the tables earlier in this chapter listing the pool of indicators for each index, drawn from several strands of the Mipex data in each instance. Firstly, face validity: do the items chosen as relevant to the determination of conditionality appear on their face to relate to the difficulty of attaining the legal status in question?; does placement in specific response categories describing distinct legal situations for a given country make it more difficult *in fact* for migrants in that country to attain the legal status in question?; and, do these distinct legal situations themselves have implications for migrant poverty?

At a glance, the answer to these questions would appear to be: Yes. For example, on LTR status the response categories for the 'economic resources requirement' denote situations wherein the state imposes one of a set of conditional requirements – of a) having stable and sufficient means for the applicant and any dependents as well as meeting other possible employment-related criteria, or b) meeting only criteria related to employment without having to prove sufficient means, or c) having no obligation to meet either of

these conditions – on migrants, to be fulfilled before the status will be granted. It should be uncontroversial to state that the requirement of having a job, which may mean a certain kind of job under a certain type of contract depending on how a state implements this requirement, poses a greater challenge to the migrant affected by this condition than for a migrant living in a country where no such requirement exists (e.g. Belgium[54]).

Finding a job is likely to be more difficult for migrants for a whole host of reasons to do with skill levels, people's attitudes to migrants, the prevailing economic situation, etc. Furthermore, the necessity of holding 'a job' in order to satisfy state authorities may result in trading down on the part of migrants, or labour forcing, and accepting jobs below their skill level so as to meet requirements. In addition, the most restrictive requirement in this example (a situation found in e.g. Austria[55]) demands 'sufficient means', placing greater demands on migrants where their means, which may be subjectively sufficient, do not meet state expectations or definitions of sufficiency.

Similarly, conditions pertaining to integration and testing requirements seem likely to render the attainment of LTR status more difficult, where gaining the knowledge in order to pass the test may represent a burdensome opportunity cost for migrants who may feel that they do not have sufficient time to invest, thus consigning them to a less secure legal status. Likewise time-based conditions, around the length of the application procedure or the required period of residence in the country or in employment, prolong existence in a more insecure position. This less secure status entails fewer welfare state protections in general as well as fewer labour market opportunities in addition to the opportunity foregone of building the social networks that integration can entail, with clear implications for poverty outcomes.

Other conditions have more direct costs; application fees may be high, or certain insurance requirements ('all risks' as opposed to simply 'sickness') may be financially burdensome or, if income is low, insupportable for a given migrant. When the choice lies between purchasing expensive health insurance in order to complete a process at some future date, or feeding one's family today then there are clear qualitative differences in the difficulties and obstacles to be overcome before transitioning to a more secure legal status. This reasoning applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the situation with regard to acquiring citizenship status and the individual conditions states impose on doing so. It is important to note that while some of the conditions imposed on attaining each status share similar names and are

[54] Mipex 20
[55] Mipex 2006 data.

conceptually very close, the pool of indicators for each index is separate and so similar indicators cannot be seen as redundant, either conceptually or to the measurement process. Both statuses may impose, say, economic conditions but, with the requirement of several years of legal/long-term residence before application for citizenship becomes possible, the fulfilment of any conditions at an earlier point in time is no guarantee that they will remain fulfilled several years later, under changed circumstances due to economic fluctuations at both micro and macro levels.

On the face of it, then, these indicators appear valid. It also seems reasonable to maintain that they have content validity for the concept of 'conditionality' insofar as they touch on multiple diverse domains within which states can make demands of migrants at varying levels of severity. Unlike early efforts at building indexes in this vein, specifically to measure aspects of citizenship policy (e.g. Howard 2005, of which more later), which relied heavily on the temporal aspect, these indicators address other important facets alongside the temporal, including economic, language, cultural, behavioural, prospective, and monetary aspects. In terms of the technical quality criterion of content validity (John and Benet-Martínez 2000), the large expert-driven research team – comprised of universities, think-tanks, research institutes etc. – providing answers, that were subsequently peer reviewed by a network of expert scholars and law practitioners in the field of migration, supported by a central coordination unit, and with financial support from a major international research funding body, should all inspire confidence that the data recorded in Mipex were accurate and of high quality, at least as much as can be hoped for in the social sciences.

Given the multiple domains from which the indicators are drawn, construct validity and the unidimensionality (or otherwise) of the resulting measure is of course a relevant concern. Is the measure representing a single construct as is intended, or is it actually capturing multiple dimensions of a complex phenomenon, thus necessitating a different approach? These issues were addressed earlier in the MCA analysis. Another concern of construct validity is that the measure is internally consistent, implying that the data are homogenous and that measurement error is low, and thus that they are sufficiently correlated to scale together usefully; when internal consistency is high this can be taken as an indication of construct validity[56] (John and Benet-Martínez 2000).

The last aspect of construct validity concerns whether the new measure correlates with other indicators of the same phenomenon. On conditionality of legal status, several

[56] But not other types of validity.

previous attempts have been made to construct indexes that capture barriers to naturalisation, though attempts to index conditions around residency status specifically have been extremely rare. Some of these indexes will be useful for purposes of assessing construct validity and also for external validation of the indexes of conditionality to be used in this study. Use of these other indexes in the project itself is precluded for various reasons however, primarily due to missing data on some of the cases of interest to this study, or other developments which supersede those indexes or render them out of date or logically problematic.

In assessing whether these measures have construct validity we will have recourse to the concept of convergent validity. This concept is based on the idea that a measure has construct validity where it shows a large and statistically significant correlation with other measures of the same construct arrived at using different methodologies (Campbell and Fiske 1959). Factor analytic techniques have also been widely deployed in assessing whether measures which should be theoretically similar in fact load on the same latent construct (Peter 1981).

On naturalisation, Waldrauch and Hofinger (1997), Howard (2005) and most recently Janoski (2010) have all compiled indexes of one form or another. Janoski (2010) also cites other work undertaken by Geddes, Niessen and others (Geddes et al. 2005) as relevant to the indexing of naturalisation policies. This work, utilising 2004 data, was in fact the precursor to the Mipex project on which our conditionality index is based, using many of the same authors and the same methodological approach but for a more limited set of countries and with fewer indicators.

Waldrauch and Hofinger attempted to index the Legal Obstacles of Integration (LOI-index) of migrants in eight countries of Western Europe (Waldrauch and Hofinger 1997). Similar to the Mipex index (2007), these authors present different domains pertaining to the legal obstacles faced by migrants, with these five domains covering: Residence, Labour market access, Family reunification, Naturalisation, and Legal status of the second generation.[57] Unlike Mipex, they do not sum all of the domains to form a single summary measure. Higher scores on this index (running 0-1, but which we multiply by 100 to

[57] In terms of comparability to the strict focus adopted here on the *conditions* that must be fulfilled before a more secure legal status will be granted, the index compiled by Waldrauch and Hofinger does not provide a perfect analogue. For example, the 'Naturalisation' domain takes as one of its indicators whether or not the granting of naturalised citizen status is on a 'discretionary basis'. While this is descriptive of the naturalisation process and may arguably assist us in conceptualising of naturalisation in different countries as being broadly 'favourable or unfavourable' this does not amount to a strict condition which must be fulfilled before the legal status is attained. Also, the data these authors drew on, from 1997, is now 15 years old and may no longer be accurate.

facilitate comparability) indicate more restrictive legal obstacles, so we would expect a positive correlation with our index of naturalisation conditionality which runs from low to high.

Howard's (2005) index of citizenship policies runs in the opposite direction (0-6) with high values indicating open policies – so we expect a negative correlation with our naturalisation conditionality index. He looks at three aspects of citizenship policies for the EU-15 (incl. Luxembourg): whether citizenship is afforded by birth (*jus soli*), whether the country facilitates dual citizenship and how long the residency requirement is before naturalisation (Howard 2005). Janoski's (2010, 37) "barrier to nationality index" focuses specifically on the naturalisation process and *jus soli* and comes conceptually closer to the citizenship conditionality index used here.[58] These indexes share a broad conceptual affinity with the citizenship conditionality index used here, without sharing a conceptual identity.

Turning now to residency conditionality, there appear to be very few possibilities to attempt external validation of the index. It would appear that Mipex is the only game in town for sufficient reliable, cross-national data on the conditions attached to attaining long-term residency. It may be useful to assess the relationship between our index and both the Geddes et al. (2005) precursor and the 2010 instantiation of Mipex which became available in the closing stages of this research project. As we are interested solely in conditionality we do not take the headline Mipex scores for each country nor do we take the single aggregated dimension score, 'Long-term residency', that seems most relevant to our concerns. Rather, we look to one of the constituent 'strands' comprising this dimension, the 'conditions' strand. There are minor differences of operationalisation across the different instantiations of Mipex, as the index was developed and refined over time, and some of the questions asked are not the same across time points, though the concepts addressed are clearly the same.

The LTR-conditionality index used in this study is essentially a reduced form of the LTR 'conditions' strand of Mipex 2006-07 – reduced to the set of indicators that were found to best discriminate between our cases and which possessed satisfactory internal reliability – and it is questionable whether correlation tests on an index with itself at a different time point amounts to an *external* 'validation' of said index. However, the identical

[58] Janoski's 12 requirements are: 1) good conduct, 2) willingness to integrate, 3) language skills, 4) dual nationality, 5) application complexity, 6) application fees, 7) state discretion, 8) residency requirements, 9) *jus sanguinis* law preventing *jus soli* naturalisation of children, 10) *jus sanguinis* concerning children of parents born in country (double *jus soli*), 11) women allowed to maintain citizenship after marrying a foreigner, 12) mothers when married to a foreigner being able to transfer citizenship to their children (Janoski 2010, 37).

theoretical basis of the measures allows us to expect convergent validity and to ensure that the reduced index generated from the full set of available indicators is neither misrepresentative of the situation those data represent nor simply a *sui generis* artefact of the measurement and indicator-selection process. The LTR-conditionality index will be correlated below with the full scores for the 'conditions' strand of the 'Long-term residence' dimension of Mipex for the 2010 data collection period, the 2006 data collection period, and the 2004 data used in the Geddes et al. (2005) study.

Beyond the Mipex project, Waldrauch and Hofinger (1997) come closest to providing relevant information with their 'Residence' domain though this information is dated. The score for the 'Residence' domain is comprised of two sub-domains for 'limited' and 'settlement' residence permits, analogous to the distinction made here between 'temporary' and 'LTR' residence status, but the indicators that comprise each sub-domain do not readily fit into the conceptual category of 'conditions'. As we cannot be sure of the weighting applied to the two sub-domains here we do not look at the separate scores for 'settlement' residence permits and 'limited' ones, even though this may be more in line with our analytic concerns.[59]

Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present index scores for each of the indexes mentioned above. Table 3.10 displays correlations between the citizenship conditionality index and the three external measures in the first column. The table shows that the index of citizenship conditionality is significantly correlated with each of the other measures with all correlations running in the expected directions. Despite the age of some of the data used for the other measures, all the indexes are clearly strongly correlated.

The next table (3.11) shows correlations among the LTR-conditionality index and similar measures. The expected positive correlation with the Waldrauch and Hofinger index is not significant. The LTR index is very highly correlated in the expected direction with the 'conditions' strand of Mipex 2006, from which it is drawn, indicating that it is not misrepresentative of those data, and is also correlated significantly with the Mipex 2010 data, though to a lesser degree, due to policy shifts in the intervening four years.

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[59] Length of residency requirement (before granting of more secure status) was an essential component of the weighting scheme applied by these authors in the calculation of this domain. However, since that time the EU has passed Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. This directive sets a 5-year residency period (continuous legal residence) as the legal maximum for TCNs, after which time long-term residency must be recognised, subject to the migrant meeting some other conditions concerning stable resources etc., (and also subject to the provision that member-states can impose further integration conditions and may adopt regulations more favourable to the migrant). This reduces expectations of detecting a significant correlation between this measure and the LTR conditionality index used here.

Table 3.8 – Index raw scores

Case	CitCon	LOI_nat	Howard	Janoski
AUS	7	68	0	87
BEL	1	49	6	38
DEN	8	.	1	75
FIN	6	49	3	74
FRA	6	.	6	50
GER	8	78	3	47
GRE	5	.	2	.
IRE	3	.	6	22
ITA	6	.	2	49
NED	5	38	6	49
NOR	5	.	.	69
POR	2	.	4	.
SPA	5	.	0	36
SUI	8	72	.	99
SWE	1	49	4	59
UK	4	43	6	16

Table 3.9 – More index raw scores

Case	LTRcon	LOI_res	Geddes04	Mipex06	Mipex10
AUS	8	79	1.8	21	38
BEL	1	31	2.4	80	88
DEN	2	.	2.6	77	33
FIN	3	40	2.2	70	50
FRA	6	.	1.8	19	46
GER	6	59	1.6	24	8
GRE	7	.	1.6	24	22
IRE	1	.	2.2	90	50
ITA	4	.	2.2	60	73
NED	7	48	2.2	33	47
NOR	4	.	.	50	44
POR	3	.	2.2	70	53
SPA	1	.	2.2	90	88
SUI	5	69	.	46	13
SWE	3	29	2.2	70	50
UK	1	75	2.4	80	17

Table 3.10 - External validity of Citizenship Conditionality index

	CitCon	LOI_nat	Howard	Janoski
CitCon	1.0000			
LOI_nat	0.6847*	1.0000		
Howard	-0.5296*	-0.7261*	1.0000	
Janoski	0.5519**	0.5332	-0.5918**	1.0000

**p<.05, *p<.10

The LTR index is also highly correlated with Geddes' Mipex precursor, utilising data from two years previously. This is further encouraging insofar as it can be taken as an indication that the conditionality index for 2006 is also relevant to the years preceding measurement of this index. While the index will be applied later to the analysis of cross-sectional data it can not, of course, be assumed that cause and effect are instantaneous. The high correlation here with temporally antecedent data nods in the direction of this dynamic conceptualisation and acts as something of a buttress against some of the obvious deficiencies of cross-sectional data.

A final means of assessing convergent validity concerns whether similar measures are all seen to load highly on the same factor, giving us confidence that individual indexes are in fact all tapping the same underlying latent construct. In a factor analysis (table not shown) on the four citizenship indexes, a single unrotated factor solution was seen to account for 87.7% of variance in the measures; only one factor recorded an eigenvalue greater than one and all factor loadings were between 0.63-0.97. Similarly, in a factor analysis (table not shown) on the five LTR indexes, a single unrotated factor solution was seen to account for 81.3% of variance in the measures; only one factor recorded an eigenvalue greater than one and all factor loadings were between 0.60-0.96. These results are most encouraging and this seeming convergence of the measures around the underlying theorised constructs in each case gives us confidence that the measures are indeed valid.

Table 3.11 - External validity of LTR-conditionality index

	LTRcon	LOI_res	Geddes04	Mipex06	Mipex10
LTRcon	1.0000				
LOI_res	0.4170	1.0000			
Geddes04	-0.7684**	-0.4064	1.0000		
Mipex06	-0.9637**	-0.4804	0.8192**	1.0000	
Mipex10	-0.4421*	-0.7299**	0.4218	0.4933*	1.0000

**p<.05, *p<.10

3.4. Construction of Welfare Generosity Index

Having constructed the indexes of status conditionality we can now begin to explore the relationship between conditionality and the generosity of state welfare systems. However, in order to do this we need a measure which captures the relative differences in the expansiveness of welfare effort or welfare generosity across countries. As we are primarily interested in the work-welfare nexus as mediated by conditionality and legal status, and its effect on TCN poverty outcomes, a focus on welfare supports directly associated with loss of employment seems appropriate. Focusing on other aspects such as pensions may be inappropriate when the focus is specifically on migrants given their often incomplete work histories and sometimes tenuous labour market attachments which would militate against the full enjoyment of benefits accorded on a contributory basis over time (Dörr and Faist 1997).

Scruggs and Allan (2006a, 2006b) have, in their replications and extensions of Esping-Andersen's (1990) decommodification index, produced a measure capturing the relative differences in unemployment benefit generosity (in 2000) for a set of OECD countries on the basis of empirical data in five areas: replacement rates, the duration of benefits, the qualifying conditions that apply to receipt of those benefits, waiting days that may be imposed before claimants receive benefits, and the percentage of the population covered by the benefits in question. Unfortunately, however, these authors do not address themselves to all of the countries in this study. Specifically, they omit consideration of Greece, Portugal and Spain, making it difficult for us to arrive at a clear sense of how benefit generosity and the conditionality of migrant legal statuses may be inter-related.

However, applying the methodology employed by these authors to more recent and readily available data on the five empirical areas mentioned above, it is possible to reconstruct the benefit generosity index to include the three omitted countries. The reconstructed index also entails the added advantage of being somewhat more up-to-date than the authors' original index, as the data used are more current.[60] To reconstruct the index, and for purposes of consistency and comparability, the Scruggs-Allan approach was

[60] It is acknowledged that even more recent data would have been desirable and also that this is not the only way that this variable could be operationalised. Some alternative operationalisations were in fact utilised in the analysis of the microdata, see the Appendix (A.5). Other operationalisations may be equally valid and different operationalisations may be more appropriate for specific sub-groups of migrants, a task which future research might explore. Also, while all aspects of a welfare state's supports may not be *perfectly* correlated it remains the case that they are frequently and positively correlated nonetheless (Scruggs and Allan 2006a).

followed as closely as possible. While Scruggs and Allan were interested in generating benefit generosity scores across three different programs, i.e. unemployment, sickness and pension benefits, the focus here is solely on unemployment benefits. In their own words, the procedure employed operated thusly (Scruggs and Allan 2006b, 891–92):

> We created an aggregate generosity score … using a modified form of the procedure used in Esping-Andersen's (1990) decommodification index. First, for each program characteristic except insurance coverage, we standardized the scores … after eliminating a few large outliers. To the standardized scores for the program *replacement rates*, we add 2, so that the standardized scores range between 0 and 4 (thus, a country with an average replacement rate … is scored 2, the country with the highest replacement rate is scored 4, and the country with the lowest is scored 0). For the other characteristics (again, except coverage), we coded countries 1, 2, or 3: 1 if the score was greater than one standard deviation below the mean, 2 if it was within one standard deviation of the mean, and 3 if it was greater than 1 standard deviation above the mean. In all cases, coding accords the more generous condition—e.g., shorter wait, longer duration, or shorter qualifying period—a higher score. …
>
> The benefit generosity score for each program is the sum of the four characteristic scores for each program multiplied by the coverage rate for that program. However, to reflect its greater presumptive importance, we doubled the replacement rate scores when computing the unemployment … benefit [score]. Thus … the unemployment … benefit score is equal to (with score ranges in parentheses):
>
> **[2 × Replacement rate score (0 to 8) + benefit duration score (1 to 3) + benefit qualification period score (1 to 3) + waiting period score (1 to 3)] × Insurance coverage ratio (in labor force).**

Data were collected from several sources: the OECD (OECD 2004a; OECD 2009b), the International Social Security Association (ISSA 2008), and the most recently updated data from the Scruggs dataset on welfare state entitlements made available on that author's website[61] (Scruggs 2004). The raw data used to compute the updated unemployment benefit generosity index are presented in the annotated table below.

[61] http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/wp.htm

Table 3.12: Raw data for unemployment benefit generosity index recalculation

Country	*Replacement Rate (%)*	*Duration (weeks)*	*Qualification Period (weeks)*[62]	*Waiting Period (days)*	*Population Coverage Ratio*
AUS	55	30	156	0	.666
BEL	65.7	*none*[63]	78	0	.840[64]
DEN	59.4	208	52	0	.826
FIN	57.4	100	43	7	.738
FRA	70.1	130	61	7	.587
GER	60	52	104	0	.696
GRE[65]	48	44	48	6	.680
IRE[66]	29	65	39	3	1.00
ITA	45.1	26	104	0	.462[67]
NED	78.1	104	208	0	.888
NOR	64.6	156	4	3	.932
POR[68]	78	192	90	0	.752
SPA[69]	69	144	432	0	.702
SUI	72.2	30	26	5	.840[70]
SWE	74.8	60	52	5	.846
UK	18.5	26	10	3	.856
Mean	59.06	91.13	71.67	2.44	.769
S.D.	16.98	62.08	54.75	2.78	.136
Lo-cut	42.08	29.05	16.92	0	-
Hi-cut	76.04	120.18	126.42	5.22	-

Sources: ISSA 2008; OECD 2004, 2005, 2009; Scruggs 2004. See individual footnotes for further detail.

[62] Mean and std. dev. here were calculated excluding the extreme outlier value for Spain, in line with Scruggs and Allan's approach (2006b). Spain was coded the highest value of '3' on this characteristic for purposes of index calculation (see next table). The value recorded here is indeed very high, but is not erroneous, as it is calculated for the *maximum* possible benefit, assuming a fully-insured 40 year old worker, in line with Scruggs and Allan's (2006b, fn. 8) assumption in their original work using this data.

[63] Belgium applies no limit to the duration of this benefit (Scruggs 2004); it was coded the highest (most generous) value of '3' on this characteristic for purposes of index calculation (see next table).

[64] While this is drawn also from the Scruggs (2004) dataset, the latest Belgian data is for 1999.

[65] Replacement rate data drawn from (OECD 2004a); qualification period data from (ISSA 2008); Coverage ratio data is an estimate using data from (OECD 2004b) to exclude self-employed persons from the total labour force as per (ISSA 2008) which indicates that such persons do not qualify for this benefit under the Greek system.

[66] Coverage ratio adjusted from 1.044 to 1. The impossible situation of more than 100% of the population being covered by a welfare benefit arises in the data here only because Scruggs and Allan rely on "estimates" of coverage rates from a variety of different data sources for various countries (Scruggs and Allan 2006b, 58).

[67] Bizarrely, the Scruggs (2004) dataset only contains coverage ratio data for Italy from 1980.

[68] Replacement rate data drawn from (OECD 2004a); qualification period data from (ISSA 2008); Coverage ratio data is an estimate using data from (OECD 2004b) to exclude self-employed persons from the total labour force as per (ISSA 2008) which indicates that such persons do not qualify for this benefit under the Portuguese system.

[69] Replacement rate data drawn from (OECD 2004a); qualification period data from (ISSA 2008); Coverage ratio data is an estimate using data from (OECD 2004b) to exclude self-employed persons and using (OECD 2009b) data to also exclude public sector workers from the total labour force as per (ISSA 2008) which indicates that such persons do not qualify for this benefit under the Spanish system.

[70] While this is drawn from the Scruggs (2004) dataset, the latest Swiss data available is for 2000.

Table 3.13: Standardised scores and score-brackets used in recalculation of Unemployment Benefit Generosity Index, with final Index scores

Country	*Replacement Rate (0-4)*	*Duration (1-3)*	*Qualification Period (1-3)*[71]	*Waiting Period (1-3)*[72]	**Benefit Generosity Index**
AUS	1.76	2	1	3	6.34
BEL	2.39	3	2	3	10.74
DEN	2.02	3	2	3	9.95
FIN	1.90	2	2	1	6.50
FRA	2.65	2	2	1	6.05
GER	2.06	2	2	3	7.73
GRE	1.35	2	2	1	5.23
IRE	0.23	2	2	2	6.46
ITA	1.17	1	2	3	3.86
NED	3.12	2	1	3	10.87
NOR	2.33	3	3	2	11.79
POR	3.12	3	2	3	10.70
SPA	2.59	2	1	3	7.84
SUI	2.77	2	2	2	9.70
SWE	2.92	2	2	2	10.03
UK[73]	0	1	3	2	5.14

Source: author's own calculations using Scruggs-Allan formula, on basis of data presented in preceding table.

Where it was the case that standard deviation scores did not exceed -1 or +1 deviation around the mean the value of '1' was assigned to those cases recording the minimum standardised score and the value of '3' was assigned to those cases recording the maximum standardised score, in line with the Scruggs-Allan (2006) approach. Where characteristics like the qualification period or the benefit duration varied according to the age of the recipient, or the number of social insurance contributions paid etc., it was assumed – again in line with the Scruggs-Allan approach (2006b, fn. 8) – that the recipient was in all cases a fully-insured 40 year old worker. Replacement rate data for all of the original European countries in the Scruggs-Allan index were drawn from Scruggs' (2004) dataset and pertain to 2002 (unless otherwise indicated); replacement rate data for Greece, Portugal and Spain

[71] Scoring reversed here as high score implies less generosity (Scruggs and Allan 2006b, 59); countries with shortest qualification period, e.g. Norway, are most generous and so receive high score of '3'.

[72] Scoring reversed here as high score implies less generosity (Scruggs and Allan 2006b, 59). See immediately previous footnote.

[73] UK value for replacement rate here adjusted from -0.38 to 0 as a negative value would not make conceptual sense. This adjustment does not affect the *relative* differences between the cases and retains the UK's position at the bottom of the league in terms of replacement rate generosity.

were drawn from OECD (2004) and, again in line with the Scruggs-Allan approach, pertain to a single person with no children earning 100% of the Average Productive Worker wage in 2004.

The theoretical maximum score on the index, assuming a 100% coverage rate and a 100% replacement rate with maximum scores on all other characteristics, is 17 points. The mean score for the updated Benefit Generosity Index (BGI) was 8.06 with a standard deviation of 2.48. The empirical minimum value was 3.86 (Italy) and the maximum was 11.79 (Norway). The correlation with the Scruggs and Allan (2006a, 892) unemployment benefit generosity index in 2000 (for the original 13 cases) is 0.827 ($p<.001$), indicating broad congruity although also indicating some shifting of generosity on unemployment benefit over the short period of time that separates the original index and the updated index. Fully ten of the original thirteen cases show a diminution of generosity on this benefit when comparing original and updated indexes; only Germany, Norway and Switzerland record an increase in generosity, with Norway recording the biggest increase (nearly one point on the scale). The biggest decrease was recorded for Italy, which dropped by 4.54 points on the scale.[74]

[74] Though we should be cautious in our interpretation of this, given that we must rely on replacement rate data from 1980.

3.5. Operationalisation of Variables

3.5.1. Operationalisation of Dependent Variables

Raw values for the level-2 indicators to be used in the analysis, two-way correlations for all variables at both levels of the analysis, as well as two-way scatterplots of select variables with national TCN poverty rates[75], to help sketch the broad outlines of the relation of poverty to structural and contextual indicators, are presented in the Appendix (A.2.4). In order to operationalise **material deprivation** we follow Whelan and Maître's (2007) approach, with one amendment. They formed an 8-point index using indicators from the 'economic strain' in the set of EU-SILC's deprivation items, where this strain deals with deprivation relating to the inability to afford (or experiencing the enforced lack of) various basic needs. The specific eight items on which deprivation was measured were: regular healthy meals, having a car, telephone, PC, or annual one-week holiday, the inability to cope with unexpected expenses, inability to adequately warm the home, and 'arrears relating to mortgage/rent or hire-purchase'. The indicators are mostly binary outcomes and the index was formed by assigning a score of 1 to those people recording deprivation for that indicator and then summing the responses to form an index where higher scores indicate greater deprivation.

The methodological advantage of following this approach is that these authors have already analysed and assessed the reliability, consistency and loadings of the index generated by utilising these items, finding that the items load on a single factor in a "homogeneous manner" with a satisfactory Cronbach's alpha score of 0.76 (2007, 157). The amendment to this procedure made here entailed dropping one of the items, the 'arrears relating to mortgage, rent or hire-purchase' item, due to data scarcity and inconsistency issues.[76]

In Whelan and Maître's approach this arrears item is taken together as one indicator; however in the cross-sectional 2006-07 SILC dataset these data are recorded in two

[75] Headcount poverty measure, recording relative income poverty.

[76] The specific variables, with their codebook names and descriptions, used in the construction of the 7-point index are as follows: [hh050] "Ability to keep home adequately warm"; [hs040] "Capacity to afford paying for one week annual holiday away from home"; [hs050] "Capacity to afford a meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day"; [hs060] "Capacity to face unexpected financial expenses"; [hs070] "Do You have a telephone (including mobile phone)?"; [hs090] "Do you have a computer?"; [hs110] "Do you have a car?" (Eurostat 2006, 92)

separate indicators (Whelan and Maître 2007).[77] Furthermore, each indicator is characterised by severe missing data problems, with 4,835 cases recording missing data for the mortgage arrears item and 14,061 cases recording missing data for the hire-purchase item. Given that Cronbach's alpha for internal reliability barely changes with the exclusion of 'mortgage arrears', and given the obvious undesirability of losing 20% of one's sample (or 59% were the hire-purchase item to be included), the arrears item was dropped from the index, resulting in a final 7-point index.[78]

Another indicator used as a dependent variable is the **relative income poverty** indicator included in the SILC dataset. It describes respondents as 'in poverty' (=1) if they earn less than 60% of median equivalised disposable income.[79] This indicator categorises 26.3% of the sample as being in poverty. This variable was also used to generate a dependent variable – the poverty rate – for use in the macro-level regressions of poverty rates on country-level determinants (§6.2). A TCN poverty rate was generated separately for each country; it is the total proportion per country categorised as 'in poverty' according to this measure in the pooled SILC dataset. As such, these are sample-driven measures applicable to the pooled dataset for 2006-07. The samples per country in most cases were more than adequate to arrive at reliable estimates, however some caution should be exercised regarding the estimate for Portugal, which was generated from a relatively small sample of about 300 migrants. It was necessary to interpolate new data for Germany as they do not differentiate by TCN-specific status in the SILC dataset, and for Switzerland as SILC for these years did not include any Swiss data. The German rate was drawn from a report by the German Institute for Economic Research (Tucci and Wagner 2005, 73).[80] The Swiss rate was interpolated from a 2008 report on the foreign population in Switzerland by the Office Federal de la Statistique (OFS 2008, 55).[81]

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[77] One for 'arrears on mortgages or rent' and the other for 'arrears on hire-purchase'.

[78] For this sample of migrants alpha is 0.66 including mortgage arrears item and 0.65 excluding the item.

[79] The EU-SILC 'poverty indicator' in the dataset(s) is variable **hx080**. The EU-SILC 2006/2007 dataset documentation defines equivalised disposable income [**hx090**] as: ((Total disposable household income*Within-household non-response inflation factor)/Equivalised household size), or **((hy020*hy025)/hx050)**. Equivalised household size is defined by the formula: **[hx050 = 1+ 0.5 * (HM_{14+} -1) + 0.3 * HM_{13-}]** where HM_{14+} = number of household members aged 14 and over (at the end of income reference period); HM_{13-} = number of household members aged 13 or less (at the end of income reference period). The EU-SILC documentation states that the within-household non-response inflation factor [**hy025**] is the factor by which it is necessary to multiply income to compensate the non-response in individual questionnaires, and that it is "necessary to correct the effect of non-responding individuals within a household" otherwise "income of individuals not interviewed is not added up into the total household income." (Eurostat 2006, 108)

[80] Second column of figures, Table 2, row labelled 'Foreign nationals'.

[81] Table G3.1.1, averaging the rates for the two columns labelled 'Turquie et oust des Balkans' and 'Autres nationalités'.

The '**consistent poverty**' measure is essentially a cross-categorisation of both the income and deprivation measures. This requires choosing a cut-off point for the 7-point deprivation index. In line with the approach taken by Whelan and Ma美re (2007, 158), building on the comprehensive analysis of an appropriate threshold undertaken in previous research the authors collaborated in which also used SILC data (Maître, Nolan, and Whelan 2006), this threshold was set at three or more (3+) items on the index. The measure thus defines 'consistent poverty' (=1) where respondents are categorised as in poverty according to the SILC income measure and simultaneously record a value of 3+ on the 7-point index of deprivation. This indicator categorises 14% of the sample as being in consistent poverty.

Another dependent variable in the analysis concerns '**type of labour market attachment**'. To assess this we use the ISCO-88 categorisation of jobs and job types as compiled by the International Labour Organisation (ILO).[82] The ILO categorises jobs on the basis of two dimensions, skill levels and skill specialisation, to group occupations on the basis of the similarity of skills required to fulfil the tasks and duties of the jobs. The SILC dataset contains a variable for the ISCO-88 classification, where low values denote the most prestigious jobs in society – legislators, corporate managers (value 11 on the variable) – while high values denote low pay, low skill jobs in the 'elementary occupations', e.g. labourers in mining and transportation (value 93). Conceptually, we can treat this as a scale variable, a sort of 'job desirability index', and run a regression model to test how different levels of conditionality affect the sorts of jobs migrants hold. Where higher conditionality predicts higher values on the index, controlling for other likely determinants of holding a poor job, then this can be interpreted as evidence in support of the labour forcing account theorised here. Those serving in the armed forces[83] are excluded from analysis in the regression models.

Finally, a binary variable capturing whether a migrant has naturalised or not in the host-country is the indicator used to model **legal status transitions**.

3.5.2. Level-2 Independent Variables

The variables to be used in the multilevel analysis and the data sources are listed below, in the order they appear in the analysis. The shortened variable names as used in the

[82] ISCO: International Standard Classification of Occupations. See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/index.htm

[83] Variable pl050 in the SILC data = 01.

analysis dataset are given in square brackets – [ ] – after full name of the variable in question. Centred variables in the dataset share the same names with the addition of the suffix '_c'.

Long-term Residency Conditionality[ltrcon]: author's own calculations, see §3.3.2. The theoretical role of this variable has been outlined in Chapter 2 above.

Citizenship Conditionality [citcon]: author's own calculations, see §3.3.3. The theoretical role of this variable has been outlined in Chapter 2 above.

Welfare Benefit Generosity (2002) [bga]: author's own calculations, see §3.4. Theoretically, and in line with conventional views on the relationship of welfare effort to poverty (e.g. Kenworthy 1999), we expect more welfare to be associated with less poverty, but specifically that this effect will be moderated by the level of conditionality attached to rights-granting (i.e. LTR) legal status for TCN migrants.

Labour Market Flexibility [EPL]: this variable is a measure of the degree of flexibility in a country's labour market. As noted earlier, the "degree of regulation over labour market entry" has been identified as a significant factor with implications both for migrant incorporation into state institutions and for their poverty outcomes (Carmel, Cerami, and Papadopoulos 2011, 248). Rigid and inflexible labour markets are likely to work to the detriment of outsiders, especially migrants, thus predicting higher poverty. Labour market flexibility is operationalised as the degree of strictness of that country's employment protection legislation [EPL] as captured in the OECD EPL index Version 1[84] pertaining to 2003 (OECD 2004c, 117). The index draws on data from three main areas to produce an index where higher values indicate more extensive levels of protection (i.e. a less flexible labour market).

The three main areas the index takes account of are as follows: protections against individual dismissals; requirements for collective dismissals; and the regulation of temporary forms of employment (OECD 2004c). In countries with highly flexible labour markets we might expect this liberal approach to employment law to be correlated with an equally liberal approach to the laws and regulations concerning migrant access to residency, and thus social, rights. It might equally well be the case, however, that countries with highly flexible labour markets have less need, or only short-term need, for migrant labour and thus impose high levels of conditionality on migrants seeking more secure statuses, and the rights that accompany such statuses. It may similarly be reasonable to expect that countries

[84] Version 1 differs from Version 2 only insofar as it is more restrictive, and hence a more conservative measure. The correlation between both versions is 0.98.

imposing high levels of employment protections on their labour markets would also be likely to protect workers from the encroachments of migrant labour on the market. Whatever direction the relationship runs is a matter for empirical determination later.

Unemployment rate (2005) [unemp05]: This variable captures the unemployment rate of the civilian population overall for the year preceding collection of our microdata, i.e. 2005. As individuals experience a loss of income due to unemployment, and because real wages often decline during economic downturns, the natural theoretical expectation is that higher rates of unemployment will be correlated with higher levels of poverty (Moller et al. 2003). Data are taken from *OECD in Figures 2007* (OECD 2007, 36–37); in the pooled cross-sectional OLS analysis data relevant to the set of observations for 2004 (i.e. 2003 data) were taken from a similar report (OECD 2004b, 20–21).

Anti-migrant sentiment [migsbad02; migsbad06]: High levels of anti-migrant attitudes are likely to result in greater discrimination against migrants, leading to greater social distance in a way that impacts hiring decisions and thus results in greater poverty (DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2005). Also, greater social distance reduces the scope for migrants to exploit the weak ties of social networks that help to disseminate information about opportunities in the labour market (Granovetter 1973). To gauge the extent to which native populations in our countries of interest express negative sentiments towards migrant populations we have recourse to directly collected, first-hand survey data in the form of the European Social Survey (ESS). This survey has been conducted most recently in 2006 and 2002 and the survey draws on respondents in many EU member states as well as some European non-EU states.[85] The 2006 version contained no relevant data for three countries of interest to this project, Greece, Italy, Switzerland, so data was interpolated for these countries from the 2002 survey.

Many questions asked about migration could be interpreted as indicating anti-migrant attitudes but, for present purposes, we take a general question which covers broad attitudes that individuals might hold towards migrants, whether due to economic, cultural or other concerns. The question wording was as follows: "Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?", with respondents asked to respond on a scale from 0 to 10 where '0' corresponds to 'Worse place to live' and '10'

[85] From the official website, www.europeansocialsurvey.org : "The ESS is an academically-driven social survey designed to chart and explain the interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of its diverse populations. ... [T]he survey covers more than 30 nations and employs the most rigorous methodologies. A repeat cross-sectional survey, it has been funded through the European Commission's Framework Programmes, the European Science Foundation and national funding bodies in each country."

corresponds to 'Better place to live'. Recoding this scale into a binary variable such that responses 0 through 4 were assigned a value of '1' and all other responses assigned a value of '0' it was possible to determine the proportion of total respondents in each country subscribing to these anti-migrant sentiments (i.e. taking a value of '1' on the binary recoded variable). These proportions were taken as the values for the final indicator. Looking at the correlation between the 2002 variable and the 2006 variable utilising only the 13 cases available in the latter year reveals that 'anti-migrant' sentiment remained more static than not from the earlier to the later period. The correlation for these 13 cases at the two time points is .78 ($p = .002$) with only one country recording an increase of over 10% in anti-migrant sentiment (Austria: +12.3) and only one country recording a decrease of over 10% (Portugal: -10.3). (Overall change can be summarised as: $\mu = -0.228$, $\sigma = 6.43$). For use in the pooled cross-sectional analysis the 2002 data was used for the 2004 observations and the 2006 data was used for the 2006 observations.

Security of LTR-status [security]: This is drawn from the 'security of status' dimension of the 'long-term residency' strand of the Mipex report for each of our countries (Niessen, Huddleston, and Citron 2007). The values on security were originally recorded as percentages but these were re-scaled to an 8-point scale by dividing by 100 and multiplying by 8 so as to render the index intelligible alongside the 8-point conditionality indexes. The theoretical role of this variable has been outlined in Chapter 2 above.

'Immigrant Welfare Regimes': defined in Chapter 4.

3.5.3. Micro-level Independent Variables

All level-2 independent variables to be used – conditionality types, benefit generosity, labour market flexibility etc. – have been defined already. Level-1 independent variables drawn from SILC include a range of standard socio-demographic controls: sex; age; education level; marital status; employment status; type of household; citizenship status. The binary 'sex' variable was recoded as follows: females = 1; males = 0. Age was treated as three broad binary categories of roughly equal number of years (*vis- à-vis* labour market active years): 50+ years; 30-49 years (reference category); <30 years (minimum survey age 16). Age was calculated by subtracting the 'Year of birth' variable [pb140] from the 'Year of survey' variable [pb010] then recoding into groups accordingly. Education was recoded

from the 'Highest ISCED level attained' variable [pe040] which takes 6 distinct values in the SILC dataset[86] (Eurostat 2006, 162):

0: Pre-primary
1: Primary education
2: Lower Secondary education
3: (Upper) Secondary education
4: Post-secondary non tertiary education
5: First stage of tertiary education (not leading directly to an advanced research qualification) and second stage of tertiary education (leading to an advanced research qualification).

These values were recoded into a smaller set of binary variables as follows: 0 & 1 → 'Primary' category; 2 → 'Lower Secondary'; 3 & 4 → 'Upper Secondary'; 5 → 'Tertiary'. The 'Tertiary' category serves as the reference category in all models.

The recoded binary 'marital status' variable used in the models simply denotes the state of being presently married (=1) relative to all others, i.e. those who are listed in the original marital status variable [pb190] as being Single, Separated, Divorced or Widowed. Similarly, the recoded 'single parent' indicator is coded = 1 if the original 'household type' indicator [hx060] takes the value '9' (i.e. 'Single parent household, one or more dependent children')[87]; accordingly this variable captures the effect of being a single parent relative to all other household types.

The 'unemployed' indicator is a dummy coded 1 if the respondent reported the value '3' (i.e. 'Unemployed') in the 'Self-defined current economic status' variable [pl030] and coded zero otherwise.[88] This variable captures the person's own perception of their main

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[86] "Educational attainment of a person is the highest level of an educational programme the person has successfully completed and the study field of this programme. The educational classification to be used is the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997) coded according to the seven ISCED-97 categories. The basic unit of classification in ISCED-1997 is the educational programme. Educational programmes are defined "on the basis of their educational content as an array or sequence of educational activities, which are organised to accomplish a pre-determined objective or a specified set of educational tasks". ISCED-1997 provides an improved set of criteria for assigning individual programmes to 'levels' of education. The more practical steps for the coding according to ISCED-97 will be found in the ISCED-97 manual published by UNESCO in November 1997. The expression 'level successfully completed' must be associated with obtaining a certificate or a diploma, when there is a certification. In cases where there is no certification, successful completion must be associated with full attendance. When determining the highest level, both general and vocational education/training should be taken into consideration. Persons who have not completed their studies should be coded according to the highest level they have completed ... Value "5" correspond to usual ISCED values 5 and 6" (Eurostat 2006, 162).

[87] 'Dependent children' defined as: Household members aged 17 or less; Household members aged between 18 and 24; economically inactive and living with at least one parent (Eurostat 2006, 132).

[88] Accordingly, this variable is evaluated relative to all non-unemployed respondents, i.e. [from pl030 description 2006] Working full-time or part-time; Pupil, student, further training, unpaid work experience; In retirement or in early retirement or has given up business; Permanently disabled or/and unfit to work; In compulsory military community or service; In compulsory military community or service; Fulfilling domestic tasks and care responsibilities; Other inactive person (Eurostat 2006).

activity at present and is related to 'current' activity in the sense of the situation obtaining on the day of the survey, thus overriding any concept of averaging over any specific reference period (Eurostat 2006, 173).[89]

3.5.4. Other Level-2 Variables used in Exploratory Analysis

These variables are presented in alphabetical order and pertain mostly to the explorations of the determinants of conditionality and of possibilities for a migrant-specific regime typology. As they are utilised here for exploratory purposes, not all of these variables have or require a theoretical motivation; rather they can be thought of in many cases as descriptive variables that allow us to characterise the nature of different potential migrant-specific welfare regimes. They allow us to assess the elective affinities of different social, economic and demographic features of states and thus to understand the contexts within which TCNs find themselves. The general approach taken has been to attempt to isolate hypothesised determinants of conditionality (at time t, where t = 2006[90]), where the determinants pertain to time t-1. In other words, the data underpinning our measures of the hypothesised determinants are all collected at a time temporally prior to the phenomenon of interest (conditionality), in this case 2005 – as far as was empirically possible given available data sources.

Decentralisation [decentral]: This binary variable is derived from the *Database of Political Institutions* as compiled by The World Bank (T. Beck et al. 2001). It is a measure of the power of state/provincial governments in each of the countries in our universe of cases and thus of the extent to which political power is decentralised in a state. This variable is derived from the 'STATE' variable in the DPI, part of that dataset's family of Federalism variables, which is coded as follows[91]: "0 if neither local executive nor local legislature are locally elected. 1 if the executive is appointed, but the legislature elected. 2 if they are both locally elected."

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[89] From the 2006 database description: "It differs from the ILO concept to the extent that people's own perception of their main status differs from the strict definitions used in the ILO definitions. For instance, many people who would regard themselves as full-time students or homemakers may be classified as ILO-employed if they have a part-time job. Similarly, some people who consider themselves 'unemployed' may not meet the strict ILO criteria of taking active steps to find work and being immediately available." (Eurostat 2006, 173)

[90] As the Mipex data on which the constructed conditionality indexes are all based pertained to 2006.

[91] From the Handbook accompanying download of the *Database of Political Institutions 2009*, p. 20, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-1107449512766/DPI2009_variable_definitions.pdf [Accessed Sept 16th 2010.]

The handbook goes on to state:

> If there are multiple levels of sub-national government, we consider the highest level as the "state/province" level. Indirectly elected state/province governments, where directly elected municipal bodies elect the state/province level, are not considered locally elected. Indirectly elected state/province governments elected by directly elected state/province bodies are considered locally elected. (Ibid.)

For present purposes, we recode the variable into two categories to simplify matters, as only one of the cases (Portugal) takes on a value of '0' in the original coding schema. Portugal retains its original value and the countries Finland, Greece, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden are recoded from '1' to '0', with all other countries recoded from '2' to '1'. This variable, then, contrasts those countries where both local executives and legislatures are elected, with all of our remaining countries, none of whom elect local executives. It is ultimately a measure of the dispersion of political power in a state. Our earlier theoretical discussion of stealth-driven processes of rights expansion (Guiraudon 1998) and client politics accounts (Freeman 2002) could be construed as competing accounts when we seek to apply the dispersion of political power to the novel concept of conditionality. If Guiraudon is right and stealth facilitates rights expansion then countries with more veto points (i.e. presence of local government structures) would be expected to impose higher conditionality. However, if Freeman is right then the client base of pro-business, and hence pro-migrant, actors might be expected to gain more leverage in countries with more veto points, thus imposing more lenient (lower levels of) conditionality. The effect, if any, and the direction of same is something to be empirically ascertained later.

Foreign-born Population [foreignpop]: This variable measures the foreign-born population of a country as a percentage of that country's total population; where foreign-*born* data was not available the foreign population figure was used (more on this distinction below).[92] This measure does not discriminate between TCN migrants and intra-European migrants, a distinction that may be important given that a) most of the migrant population of Western European countries will have come from within Europe, and b) we are trying to account for variations in the conditionality faced *specifically by TCN migrants* across countries. However, in terms of mechanism, the measure is justifiable insofar as it holds true that public discourse around migration generally does not distinguish between TCN and EU migrants; i.e. where public discourse holds that migrants have a deleterious effect

[92] Foreign population (*not* Foreign-born population) used for the following cases: Greece, Italy.

on the host country it may simply be the visibility of migrants in general, in terms of their absolute numbers, undifferentiated by area of origin, that informs such discourse.

Accurately measuring the foreign-born population is a difficult and contentious task even for the largest and most well-funded international organisations. The OECD remark that there are "major differences in how immigrants are defined" with some countries using foreign-born residents as the criterion, a definition that the OECD view as indicating first-generation migrants, and others using 'foreign population', a criterion which may include "persons born abroad who retained the nationality of their country of origin but also second and third generations born in the host country" (SOPEMI 2008, 322). There are also measurement issues to be aware of; the number of different data sources – population registers, residence permits, labour force surveys and censuses – will colour the accuracy of estimates, with survey or census data likely to underestimate the number of immigrants especially where migrants are not registered for census purposes (Ibid.). Data pertain to 2006 in all cases except Germany where the latest available data come from 2003 and are available in *OECD in Figures 2008* (OECD 2008a, 6–7) which is based on SOPEMI (2008) and OECD labour force data; see SOPEMI (2008, Statistical Annex) for more information on estimation techniques, definitions and individual country-sources.

For use in the pooled cross-sectional OLS models data for the year 2004 came from another OECD report (SOPEMI 2006, 2006:45); however data for Greece, Italy and Spain pertain to 2001 and France pertains to 1999.

GDP growth (2003, 2004, 2005) [gdpgth03; gdpgth04; gdpgth05]: This variable records the year-on-year growth rates in GDP for the set of 16 countries using the seasonally adjusted growth rate in the previous quarter expressed in annual terms and employing the 'GDP expenditure approach' (i.e. GPSA measure). Data extracted on 26 Aug 2010 17:19 UTC (GMT) from stats.OECD.org website. For the pooled cross-sectional analysis the variable was operationalised with a one-year lag, i.e. using 2003 and 2005 data. Similar to the unemployment rate variable discussed above in another section, this variable seems likely to be correlated with conditionality levels insofar as economic concerns feed into the migration policy process; a poor economic context may lead to less favourable policy configurations for migrant populations.

High-skilled migrants [oecdskill]: this indicator captures the proportion of TCNs in a country that have completed tertiary education. Where skill levels are high or inward-selection of TCNs is geared towards the highly-skilled then the economic risk posed by migrants is likely to be less, which may be reflected in more favourable approaches to the

imposition of conditionality. Data is taken from the OECD's *Profile of Immigrant populations in 21st Century* (OECD 2008b, 82–83).[93]

Inflows of foreign nationals (2003, 2004, 2005) [inflow03; inflow04; inflow05]: High levels of inflows may capture public attention and feed into attitudes about migrants generally in a way that has a bearing on conditionality levels. The variable uses rounded standardised figures of foreign national inflows to 15 of the set of 16 countries for 2005, and 14 of the 16 countries for 2004. No data was available for Greece in 2005, so data (for 2004, based on a 2005 Greek National Statistical Service editmation) was interpolated from the 2007 Mipex report (Niessen, Huddleston, and Citron 2007, 81). No data was available for Greece or Belgium in 2004. Where used, the variable was employed redefined in units of thousands ('000s), though the effect of the variable is also tested taking the natural log transformation ($\log_e$) of the raw inflow figure.[94] This transformation 'stretches' the distribution, rendering the variable more tractable for use in OLS regression. Data were accessed from the OECD website via the Statlink in *International Migration Outlook 2008*[95] (SOPEMI 2008, 2008:29). For the pooled cross-sectional analysis the variable was constructed at a one-year lag, i.e. using 2003/2005 data.

Migrant unemployment rate (2004-05) [migunemp0405]: This captures the unemployment rate of the 'foreign-born' in the period 2004-05. Data available for download in 'Statlink' form, from the report *International Migration Outlook 2007* (SOPEMI 2007, 2007:71); in the pooled cross-sectional OLS analysis (Chp. 5) data for the year 2004 were taken from a similar report (SOPEMI 2006, 2006:75).

Naturalisation rates [natur]: the number of persons acquiring the nationality of the country as a percentage of the stock of the foreign population at the beginning of the year 2005, from OECD statistics (SOPEMI 2007, 359). Closest year of data available for France and Italy was 2006 (SOPEMI 2008, 354). Data were not available from this source for Ireland and Greece. Irish data interpolated from figures made available in the work of Baubock et al. in *Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: policies and trends in 15 European states*, and based on Irish census data (Bauböck et al. 2006). The latest data available for Ireland was 2003 and so this year was used (2004 data was an estimate only, and thus deemed undesirable). Greek data is very hard to come by and the OECD itself does not record the

[93] The pooled cross-sectional analysis uses the same data for both observation-years (2004, 2006), as more temporally specific data is not available.

[94] The names of these variables in the dataset are: lninflow03, lninflow04, lninflow05.

[95] The following special note for Spain was included by the OECD: "Data refer to a combinaison [sic] of 'autorizacion de residencia inicial' for citizens of non-EU countries and of change of residence statistics from the municipal registers for citizens of EU countries." (OECD 2008, fn. 1)

rate of naturalisations in Greece for any year. This is tied up with historically very low levels of foreigner naturalisation, due to the traditionally overwhelming ethnic orientation of Greek naturalisation law which distinguishes between *homogenis* and *allogenis* Greeks, with the former referring to Greeks of ethnic-Greek descent, and the latter to non-ethnic Greek minorities within Greece as well as to naturalised foreigners (Christopolous 2006). Naturalisations of *allogenis* applicants have been exceedingly low; Christopolous, writing in 2006, noted that there had been less than 15,000 such naturalisations in the preceding 25 years (Ibid.).

Others, working on the basis of official communiqués from Greek government departments, note that only about 300-400 foreigners of non-ethnic Greek descent are naturalised on an annual basis (Rotte and Stein 2002). Naturalisation of *homogenis* Greeks brings the total number of citizenship acquisitions up from this very low figure somewhat, with Eurostat recording that such acquisitions totalled 1711 in 2005 (Vasileva and Sartori 2008). Dividing this figure by the total foreign population in Greece in that year (rounded to 553,100 (SOPEMI 2007, 343)) brings us to an estimate of the percentage of acquisitions of citizenship by the foreign population of 0.31% in Greece in 2005. This is not the lowest number of naturalisations in the sample, as Portugal extended citizenship to only 0.2% of its foreign-born population in 2005. Obviously the fact that this is only an estimate should be borne in mind when interpreting results and the earlier caveats attached to measurement of the foreign-born population size will be relevant here also.

This variable is relevant to the prediction of levels of citizenship conditionality. The theorised relationship of these variables will be complex and mutually interdependent here, leading to an unavoidable degree of endogeneity. In other words, the causal arrow runs in both directions and as much as high conditionality attached to naturalisation can obviously be expected to reduce the number of citizenship acquisitions in a given country, it can likewise be expected that the rate of naturalisations will inform the policy process. High numbers of naturalisations may spur policymakers to subsequently restrict access to citizenship if, perhaps, public discourse comes to see this as a devaluation of citizenship in need of correction. This variable is not a key part of our theoretical account of the determinants of citizenship conditionality but it will doubtless play a role and so is an important control variable in the equation.

Right-wing vote [rightvote]: this variable measures the percentage vote share of right-wing parties, on the theoretical assumption that right-wing parties are more likely to impose more restrictive conditions on migrants gaining access to social rights and

residency. Data used is primarily taken from the Chapel-Hill dataset on party-positioning from 2006, a research project conducted at the University of North Carolina at Chapel-Hill. This project uses expert surveys, ongoing at varying intervals since 1999, to position political parties across Europe on a left-right scale (Hooghe et al. 2010). 'Right-wing' is here defined as taking a value ≥7 on the Chapel-Hill dataset's 'LRGEN' variable, where LRGEN measures the "position of the party in 2006 in terms of its overall ideological stance' with '0' indicating extreme Left and '10' indicating extreme Right." The vote share of all parties, in the last national general election closest to 2006, registering a value of '7' or higher on this scale was summed on a country-by-country basis. Data was not available in the Chapel-Hill dataset for Norway or Switzerland.

However, given the objective and publicly available nature of voting data, it was possible to readily interpolate scores on this variable for these two missing countries. First, it was necessary to position political parties in Norway and Switzerland on the left-right scale. This has been done very recently by Benoit and Laver, of Trinity College Dublin, in their work *Party Policy In Modern Democracies* (Benoit and Laver 2006). This research also relied on expert surveys to position political parties across 47 countries. Benoit and Laver's (abbrev: 'BL') methodology resulted in the production of a 20-point scale, unlike the Chapel-Hill scale which runs to 11-points (from 0 to 10 inclusive). To re-scale the BL measure for purposes of comparability the following minor mathematical adjustment was made: ([(BL)*(11/20)] – 1)

This retains the relative positions of the political parties in each country accurately. As before, we take the party vote share of those parties with a value ≥ 7 on this adjusted left-right scale in the closest national general election to 2006; for Norway this was the 2003 election, for Switzerland the 2005 election. The vote share of political parties is information in the public domain. For present purposes, percentage vote share was drawn from ElectionResources.org.[96] The effect of this predictor in the regressions should be interpreted with the usual caveats pertaining to measures relying on interpolated data.[97]

TCN migrants as % of total Migrant Population [percentTCN]: This variable is similar to the immediately previous variable, though this measure focuses solely on TCN migrants. The measure is calculated by expressing TCN migrants (i.e. those from all regions of the world except Europe) as a proportion of the total foreign-born population.

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[96] For Switzerland: http://electionresources.org/ch/nationalrat.php?election=2003 ; For Norway: http://electionresources.org/no/storting.php?election=2005

[97] For the pooled cross-sectional analysis the same voting data was used for 2004 as 2006; not all countries will have had elections in the intervening period.

Data extracted on 17 Sep 2010 17:23 UTC (GMT) from stats.OECD.org website.[98] This OECD data relies heavily on census data collected by OECD member states and so the year of measurement for this variable will in many cases have been from the 2000 round of censuses. This is not ideal as we would prefer data closer in time to our focal year, 2006, though in the absence of more reliable data we proceed while bearing in mind that the coefficients for this variable should be interpreted accordingly (and cautiously).[99]

TCN migrants as % of total National Population [TCNnationalpop10]: This variable multiples the **percentTCN** variable by the **foreignpop** variable to produce a measure expressing the number of TCN migrants in a country as a percentage of that country's total national population, i.e. including natives and all other non-national groups.

[98] http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DIOC_DURATION_STAY

[99] For full information on OECD souring of this data see the OECD methodological note available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/44/40136955.pdf

3.6. Analytic Techniques: Methodological Notes

Later, in our small-N macro-level analysis, we will assess both the determinants of variation in conditionality levels and the effect of conditionality levels on poverty outcomes across countries. This part of the analysis will proceed by means of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. This analytical technique is not without its limitations of course and it will be worthwhile to briefly consider these before proceeding. Shalev (2007) notes that in small-N comparative work regression, with its focus on variables over cases, renders those cases invisible. Often the cases themselves are of direct interest in work comparing nation states and so this approach may be unhelpful. Other perceived shortcomings include the inability of regression models to account for causal heterogeneity, where multiple pathways can lead to the same outcome; problems with adequately accounting for elective affinities, where individual variables are really part of a broader constellation of causally relevant factors; and limited (and limiting) conceptualisations of the social process in strictly linear causal terms (Ibid.).

Opportunities for remedying these issues with, say, use of interaction effects or non-linear functional forms are constrained in small-N designs where degrees of freedom are limited. For these reasons Shalev favours more qualitative, low-tech approaches to the analysis of welfare state data, such as simple tabular analysis or multivariate statistics, and demonstrates their utility with a re-analysis of (part of) Esping-Andersen's (1990) data by means of principal components analysis. This is held to be a preferable approach to Esping-Andersen's original approach utilising regression.

Responding to this critique Esping-Andersen (2007) allows that researchers should often be more careful in their use of regression, perhaps triangulating with qualitative inspection and so forth, but he is not convinced that substitution of regression with lower-tech alternatives will yield any more analytical insight than careful assessment of residual plots. Such plots also render it straightforward to identify dependence of observations, which may be theoretically interesting where it suggests that some cases follow a similar logic by perhaps mutually influencing each other (Ibid.). Esping-Andersen also maintains that more qualitative case-specific methods have no special advantage over regression as regards methodological issues like selection bias, which may be a problem even when N=1, or endogeneity.[100] The only solution to these problems is to think carefully about one's

[100] On this point about selection bias being a possibility even when N=1, Esping-Andersen quotes de Tocqueville's observation that "revolutions do not seem to change anything" and continues: "The reason might be that they occur only in countries where it is difficult to change society in the first place.

theory and to elaborate it on the basis of counterfactuals. Lower-tech alternatives may even be at a disadvantage in this regard given that they cannot benefit from statistical distributions or information about covariation that can be gleaned from regression and which might be used to construct counterfactuals (Ibid.).

Ultimately, Esping-Andersen (2007) makes the sensible suggestion that we should favour whichever method provides superior information and exhorts researchers to focus on one of the central goals of social science – the search for true causal mechanisms – leaving aside the fetishism of seeking ever bigger R^2 values which is often a feature of regression-based analyses. On another preoccupation in regression analysis Kenworthy (2007, 349), writing in the same volume, observes that many macro-comparative analyses would be "substantially improved by paying more attention to the direction, size, and robustness of regression coefficients and less to statistical significance."

Indeed, the use of p-values and significance testing is a subject of much contention and controversy among statisticians. Now ubiquitous in the discipline, since Fisher's systematic exposition of the subject beginning 1920-30 (Fisher 1925; Fisher 1935; Fisher 1955), statisticians nonetheless complain that it is often the subject of misinterpretation and misuse, something which has led to significant confusion amongst students and researchers and a sometimes unhelpful, dogmatic approach of the "p = .05 or nothing!" variety (Goodman 2003; Royall 1986; Blume and Peipert 2003; Hubbard and Lindsay 2008). This is a large and ongoing debate; for present purposes we must simply take cognisance of the nature of p-values and the practical purposes to which we seek to put them. Specifically, given the small-N nature of aspects of the research undertaken here, we must attend to the interplay between p-value and sample size. A common misinterpretation is that "equal p-values represent the same amount of evidence against the null hypothesis", when in fact statistical significance "depends critically" on sample size and cannot be considered independently of it (Blume and Peipert 2003, 442).

It is well known that it is 'easier' to find significant relationships between variables in very large samples, undermining the utility of p-values in such research situations (Hubbard and Lindsay 2008, 75). This has led some researchers to claim that one can be "more confident" of significance when arrived at with a small N rather than a large N (Bakan, cited in Royall 1986, 314). This claim is grounded in the fact that a tiny effect (i.e. so small

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Accordingly, even studies based on N=1 may suffer from selection bias: the French revolution may have been caused by the same conditions that made social change so difficult. It is possible that a revolution in a country where social relations are easier to change would have provoked change. But then a revolution would not have been necessary." (Esping-Andersen 2007, 340).

as to be of no analytical or 'real-world' interest) could test significant with an enormous sample, though an effect of the same magnitude could not test significant with a small sample. So, small-sample statistical significance will be *ipso facto* substantively significant as well, though the same cannot be said of large-sample results. Wooldridge (2009, 136-7) puts this insight to a slightly different use, observing that larger significance levels can be entertained in applications with small sample sizes, reflecting the greater difficulty of detecting significance in small samples. Furthermore, Wooldridge maintains that in small sample size situations one can sometimes make the case for p-values "as large as .20" (2009, 137). In light of this discussion, and given the small sample size of N = 16 that we work with in some models, we will take 'statistical significance' to denote a correlation where $p \leq 0.10$ at least, while also noting that larger p-values are sometimes acceptable.

A full treatment of issues relevant to the use of multilevel modelling techniques, including estimation methods, sample sizes and statistical power, can be found in the Appendix (A.2.5).

4. Typology Specification

4.1. Conditionality and Welfare State measures

This chapter begins to explore the relationships between the different facets of welfare systems, conditionality, and migrant legal status in the countries of interest. Having generated our measures of the conditionality of attaining various migrant statuses, this section of the chapter explores how the status-conditionality of some categories of TCN migrant may relate to the conditionality applicable to other categories of migrant, and also to structural aspects of the states in our universe of cases such as welfare system generosity and unemployment rates. The conditional phrasing – '*may* relate' – is intentional here and this chapter serves merely to begin to render the data and measures assembled thus far more readily interpretable. Explanatory analysis, testing specific hypotheses in a context of multivariate statistical control, will be a later task.

Let us examine the relationships between different types of conditionality. Is it the case that countries that place high demands on their TCN-migrant populations to attain, say, LTR status place equally high demands on migrants seeking citizenship status? Or are countries more variable in the approaches they take to different types of status? Fig. 4.1 graphs between the conditionality attached to attaining full citizenship of the host country and LTR status as a simple scatterplot which also shows, for illustrative purposes, the line of best fit between the two measures.

Fig. 4.1 – Relationship of types of conditionality



The figure shows a loose association between these two indexes. Assuming that states take a coherent approach towards the conditionality of migrant status across migrant categories we would expect to see a line rising steadily in the graph from bottom left to top right. Some countries clearly group at either end of the low conditionality—high conditionality spectrum. Belgium, Portgual, Sweden, and perhaps Ireland too, group together as low conditionality countries for both of these migrant categories, while Austria, and also other countries like France and Germany, group together as countries that impose generally demanding conditions on both migrants seeking LTR status and on those seeking to naturalise. Other countries show little association between indexes, with Denmark for example imposing relatively low conditionality on those seeking Long-term resident status while at the same time imposing the most demanding conditions for this set of countries on those migrants wishing to naturalise. Two-way regressions between these indexes show a relationship significant at the 10% (p=.058). A one-point increase on the LTR conditionality index predicts almost a half-point increase in the level of conditionality attached to attaining citizenship status. The LTR index accounts for almost one-fifth (18%) of variance in the Citizenship-status index. Of note is the fact that the top left quadrant of

the graph is empty; no country imposes high levels of LTR-conditionality while imposing simultaneously low levels of citizenship conditionality.

The relationship between conditionality and the welfare system is a central consideration here and is the basis on which we can advance a simple typology of migrant-specific welfare regimes. These 'regimes' are defined along two axes: the level of LTR-status conditionality, as the primary social rights-granting status; and the expansiveness of welfare supports and protections made available by the state. Whether these regime types and their constituent dimensions entail any predictive power as regards poverty outcomes will be assessed later in the empirical analysis.

Fig. 4.2 – Hypothesised typology of migrant welfare regimes



Fig. 4.3 – Empirical reality of hypothesised typology



The figure above, Fig. 4.3, graphs welfare effort (unemployment benefit generosity) against the conditionality of attaining LTR status for 16 European countries. Reference lines have been added at the mean values for both axes, dividing the graph into quadrants. The random scatter nature of the pattern indicates no relationship between LTR conditionality and benefit generosity; it does not appear to be the case that states offering the most generous unemployment benefits also impose the most stringent conditions on TCNs seeking to attain long-term residency.[101] This lack of an explanatory relationship between these two variables is interesting in itself. It indicates that the two phenomena are independent and thus that conditionality of status is not simply a function of the generosity of the state welfare system. If variation in relative conditionality levels across states could be accounted for wholly, or largely, in terms of variation in benefit generosity levels across states then there would be little left to explain – but this does not appear to be the case. To the extent that conditionality is seen to be a useful predictor of migrant poverty outcomes this finding strengthens one of the central arguments of this thesis, that 'conditionality matters' and that existing accounts of incorporation into social rights for migrants

[101] In a bivariate regression (not shown) this result was wholly non-significant with the LTR conditionality index not accounting for any of the variance in benefit generosity for this set of countries.

unjustifiably neglect its relevance as a separate and distinct phenomenon. The four quadrants of the graph are empirically populated (i.e. no cell is blank), suggesting that qualitative differences do, in fact, obtain across state approaches to these issues. Later chapters explore *why* these qualitative differences may obtain and explores whether these different approaches may be held to constitute a 'regime'.

The general situations described by each quadrant could be characterised as follows: quadrant (1) describes a regime where social protections are low but likewise the level of conditionality imposed on TCN migrants seeking LTR status is also low, indicating a 'Liberal' approach wherein state intervention is limited on both counts; quadrant (2) describes a regime where the welfare state is more expansive but where the conditionality of attaining LTR status is low, indicating an 'Inclusionary' approach by the state whereby migrants can attain this more secure status relatively easily and also, presumably, enjoy the benefits of more extensive social protections; quadrant (3) suggests a 'Protective' approach on behalf of the state whereby welfare effort is high but is also accompanied by high conditionality attached to LTR status; finally quadrant (4) describes a regime that could be thought of as being 'Exclusionary' towards TCN migrants, where levels of social protection are low but a relatively high level of conditionality is nonetheless attached to attaining the more secure LTR status.

As previous research would lead us to expect (Morissens and Sainsbury 2005), the empirical distribution of states across these hypothesised regime types does not readily gel with pre-existing accounts of welfare regime typologies, like Esping-Andersen's (1990) Three Worlds account of welfare capitalism. Take for instance the relatively generous Nordic states run on the Social Democratic model – Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and let us also include the Netherlands (as Esping-Andersen himself did, but other authors have quibbled over this given the hybrid nature of the Dutch case) (Esping-Andersen 1990; Arts and Gelissen 2002; Bambra 2006). These four cases, on this data, operate at a level of welfare effort roughly one standard deviation above the mean[102], and are certainly amongst the relatively most generous states in this study. However, they vary significantly in terms of LTR-status conditionality, with Norway and the Netherlands located in the Protective regime while Denmark and Sweden are classified as Protective country-types. Why this might be so is an issue of interest to be addressed later.

[102] From 0.94 standard deviations above the mean (Denmark) to 1.50 standard deviations above the mean (Norway).

5. Immigrant Welfare Regimes & Determinants of Conditionality

5.1 Introduction

This thesis concerns itself with the role of conditionality in the determination of poverty for migrants to Europe. One aspect of this involves how our findings on the role of conditionality affect extant understandings of poverty and welfare at the level of nation states. How do we integrate the concept and phenomenon of conditionality into these understandings? How and where does conditionality lie in the terrain of the modern European state, both as welfare state and as migration state? A common impulse in social science as in science generally is to seek regularities and similarities amidst diversity, and to group according to defining characteristics. The recognition of distinct logics producing families of similar nations underpinned Esping-Andersen's (1990) 'three worlds of welfare capitalism' thesis and has also been seen in efforts to describe e.g. 'varieties of capitalism' (Hall and Soskice 2001). Here, we explore the idea that there are distinct regimes specific to TCN-migrants that determine their welfare. This chapter addresses itself directly to that part of the research question which asks what the implications are for how we "conceptualise the determination and underpinning of the welfare of inhabitants of Western Europe."

In the next chapter it will be shown that conditionality of long-term residency status is implicated in the determination of migrant poverty in interaction with the welfare system. The idea explored here is that conditionality and welfare effort are two dimensions defining a typology of migrant poverty determination. In this regard, it is clearly assumed that conditionality is *constitutive* of a typology of immigrant welfare regimes. However, a prudent next step in the analysis is to pose questions about conditionality itself and about the nature of typologising. There are three main questions that this chapter seeks to address:

1. Is conditionality part of a broader regime-like configuration, something sharing elective affinities with other institutional and structural factors?
    a. To the extent that this is true then it may be more intellectually justifiable to speak of conditionality as itself constituted by a regime (as opposed to

being constitutive), the characteristics of which a full and comprehensive understanding must attend to. If conditionality is collinear with other features of modern welfare states or migration contexts then it may well be epiphenomenal to these underlying factors and thus be seen as conceptually and explanatorily redundant. These explorations will allow us to make a positive case for the relevance of conditionality.

2. Insofar as conditionality is constitutive of a regime typology in tandem with welfare effort, are there other factors that should be considered alongside this one so as to more fully specify the typology's property space?
    a. The expansion of a typology's property space is what Lazarsfeld (cited in Elman 2005, 308) calls "substruction" and it allows for a full account of a typology's property space by 'reverse engineering' the classification. Such expansion may allow the researcher to spot important combinations of attributes that may be relevant to the typology while also highlighting observations in the data requiring further study or explication.
3. Drawing from theory on the place of migration in society and policy responses thereto, what are the factors that contribute to variation in conditionality itself, and what implications might these have for regime-typological accounts?
    a. Where variations in conditionality are attributable to variations in short-run political, economic or other indicators prone to fluctuation then this may problematise usage of the term 'regime' insofar as conditionality will arguably lack the potential for sustained temporal projection that regime-like regularities imply.

This last point leads us into a broader discussion of some of the disadvantages of typologising. On short-run determinants, where such factors feed into the policy process in a manner that may be determinative for a country's level of conditionality then this will have implications even in temporally proximal instantiations of the typology, based on different yearly data, for the placement and classification of countries within its cells. The danger of reification is a common one with typological approaches, referring to the possibility that theoretical constructs that do not exist empirically will be 'reified' and treated as real (Bailey 1994, 15). Where country cases are liable to be reclassified at different points in time due to shifts in conditionality levels, in light of new data, this could conceivably leave 'empty' a previously filled cell in the typology. Where there is reason to

believe that such shifts may occur in response to fluctuations in volatile aspects of the politico-economic context, this further calls into question the utility of a 'regime' typology.

Bambra (2006) has levelled the criticism that welfare regime accounts have tended to characterise the 'three worlds' in static terms, and that recent evidence of intra-regime change does not support this contention. Meanwhile Kasza (2002) has criticised regime theorists for excluding the policymaking process from their research and observes that variations in the policy process will move policy in different directions. Such process variation means that in different states given policy outputs may be due to any of:

1. a cognitive process, where policymakers identify then seek to solve a policy problem;
2. a political process, where the victors of group competition can compel governments to act on an issue; 3. an artefactual process, where certain circumstances led to a period of dynamic responsive policymaking resulting in unpredictable outputs; 4. an inertial process where policy simply evolved in response to external factors (Kasza 2002).

The approach taken here will be to a) explore explicitly the effect that temporally determinative factors may have on conditionality, and b) to acknowledge implicitly the policymaking process by drawing on theory around the likely determinants of migration policy approaches so as to test hypotheses concerning their effects on variations in conditionality, all with a view to extrapolating as to consequences for 'regime' accounts of the determination and explication of migrant poverty.

This latter term, 'explication', is not just a throwaway qualifier. Another frequent criticism made of those who would typologise is that this classificatory exercise is merely descriptive and as such is pre-explanatory or, even, non-explanatory. Bailey (1994) counters such claims by observing that classification is in fact a pre-requisite for theorising, and that social scientists should understand this as foundational to explanation. Others go further, holding that if typologies based on Weberian ideal-types like Esping-Andersen's are to have any use whatsoever then they must seek to explain the social world, and as such must encompass a series of theoretical statements with testable implications (Hempel, cited in Arts and Gelissen 2002). The typological explorations undertaken here are not ideal-typical in the Weberian sense whereby abstract speculation produces ideal types against which existing countries can be measured (see e.g. Marradi 1990 for more on this). Rather, they are predicated on existing knowledge about the empirical world concerning the variation in levels of conditionality and in welfare effort which is a feature of modern European welfare states. In this sense, the typology is more a form of explanatory shorthand for the hypothesised moderating effect of one variable on another, allowing for potentially useful

empirical classification, i.e. the reduction of complexity which may prove scientifically efficient.

Elman (2005) discusses *explanatory* typologies specifically, and their relevance to the social sciences, and notes the proliferation of labels and nomenclature around typologising as methodology. All of these labels and sub-labels need not detain us, but suffice it to say that explanatory typologies are accorded a naturally weightier status than those typologies which merely seek to place like with like. Although, of course, an element of description remains, that categorising function is "heavily modified by its theoretical purposes" and the descriptive question being asked under an explanatory typology shifts from one of "What constitutes this type?" to one of "If my theory is correct what do I expect to see?" (Elman 2005, 296-98). The dimensions of the property space reflect alternative values of independent variables such that a given cell defined by these dimensions is associated with predicted values of our theory's dependent variable, and the contents of the cell come from the logic of the theory (Ibid.).

In the approach taken here, the underlying theory concerns the moderating role of status conditionality, specifically long-term residency status, on a state's welfare system as reflected in migrant poverty outcomes. We expect these outcomes to be negative (more poverty) in the most disadvantageous situation for migrants, where conditionality is high but the level of welfare effort is correspondingly low. This will be our comparator category when testing regime differences in the next chapter. Elman stated, above, that the contents of the cell come from the logic of the theory; this is true in our approach in the sense that country placement is defined according to the empirical values each country takes on these two dimensions. As such, the exploration of typologising undertaken here is not simply the sort of abstract 'conceptual typology' delineated by Bailey (1994), but rather seeks to populate the cells of this typology by drawing on the available empirical data to position countries along the relevant axes, and also by having recourse to somewhat more systematic quantitative methods of classification like cluster analysis. This will aid in further explorations of the property space of the typology, allowing us to assess if further dimensions may be usefully added.

Beyond typologising efforts, an analysis of the determinants of conditionality will allow us to deepen our understanding about the dynamics of migrant policy formation and of the macro-level characteristics of poverty-inducing contextual configurations for TCNs. As we shall see, conditionality plays a role in poverty determination in line with our theory and as supported empirically by the later analysis. With this in mind, it becomes important

to assess the determinants of conditionality itself so that we may subsume this within a broader framework of understanding. Many of the hypothesised determinants explored can be expected to impact directly on migrant poverty, like anti-migrant attitudes for example, where high levels of these may lead to discrimination and poor labour market outcomes. Evidence that such attitudes also feed into the policy process would add to our understanding of this variable as also having indirect effects, allowing us to more broadly contextualise, to deepen and to broaden, our understanding of migrant poverty.

5.2. Multivariate Analysis of Country-level Data

In light of Shalev's (2007) critique of multiple regression we here submit our country-level data initially to some simpler multivariate techniques, so as to explore our set of countries and get a handle on how some are similar and others are different. A simple categorising exercise of this sort will allow us to assess the extent to which certain of our hypothesised country features 'hang together' – or not – with conditionality and our other TCN welfare-related measures of interest. It will also allow us to assess whether, or to what extent, conditionality of access to welfare can be seen as having an elective affinity with the social, economic and political factors we hypothesise play a role in its determination. Is it the case that, given a certain constellation of factors constituting a loose 'syndrome' as Freeman (2004) would have it, conditionality tends to be high (or low)? Or is it that conditionality is seen to be unyoked from any sort of 'conjunctural causation' (Shalev 2007) and varies with fluctuations in a set of shorter-term factors playing largely independent roles?

Perhaps the most basic means by which this could be assessed, with only 16 cases involved, would be to simply eyeball the data. However, given that there are quite a number of variables hypothesised to play a role with regard to conditionality, eyeballing may be impractical and would furthermore raise concerns as to quite how systematic would be the assessment arrived at by the researcher. Cluster analysis, however, is a simple technique that facilitates the categorisation of cases into clusters defined by their similarity on a set of specified measures.[103] The cases are treated as points in a multidimensional space taking positions determined by their values on the specified variables, and the method groups these points into similar clusters in what is essentially a multidimensional join-the-dots exercise. For an accessible introduction to cluster analysis see e.g. Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984) or Bailey (1994).

This is an exploratory means of data analysis – there is no statistical null hypothesis – and methodological concerns amount mainly to settling on a 'linkage measure' and deciding where to 'cut' the cluster tree, thus defining the operative number of groups. On the first point, all linkage measures do the same thing, but in somewhat different ways. Some, such as the 'single-linkage' measure merely chain together the cases one after the other, resulting in long stringy 'trees' of cases, while others take the average of values

[103] Strictly, this is hierarchical cluster analysis, creating hierarchically related sets of clusters, as opposed to partition clustering (e.g. k-means) where the purpose is more so to identify the *number* of groups.

within groups as they build in size before deciding on which case to amalgamate next, and to which group. 'Ward's linkage' method is mildly different, taking reduction in variance, as opposed to spatial proximity, as its amalgamation criterion. Practically all use Euclidean square distance as the metric for assessing dis/similarity, and indeed some authors caution that this is generally the only valid metric when linking cases using Ward's method or some other methods (for a useful list of sources on choice of linkages see: StataCorp 2009b, 91).

We utilise this technique to assess how our 16 countries cluster on various social, economic and political factors and, grouping them accordingly, we can then examine summary statistics by group on the policy measures of interest and compare them to assess the presence or absence of group differences. The raw values of the indicators to be used were presented at the end of the last chapter.

Let us begin by considering the two-way relationship of the LTR-conditionality variable and the welfare effort indicator which formed the basis of a migrant welfare regime typology as we saw earlier. Dividing this scatterplot at the empirical midpoints for both variables (or at their means) produced a quadripartite division of country cases in a high-low pattern of conditionality-welfare.

Fig. 5.1 – 2-variable scatter: LTR-conditionality & Welfare Effort



Fig. 5.2 3-variable Dendrogram (Ward's linkage)



Note: results for complete linkage method are identical.

A basic cluster analysis showed the borderline cases to be grouped according to the pattern in Fig. 5.1, with each of the four groups circled.[104] While conditionality is hypothesised here to be constitutive of a regime-based approach allowing us to account for migrant poverty, it may be the case that conditionality itself is determined in a regime-like manner. Can conditionality be seen to be determined as part of a wider framework wherein it shares an elective affinity with broad structural indicators of societal and workforce organisation? Does this grouping of countries hold up when we take account of our other key structural determinant of migrant poverty, access to the labour market? In a cluster analysis conducted on welfare effort, LM flexibility and LTR-conditionality, the membership of countries within each group remains precisely the same, as represented in the above dendrogram.[105] These groups are part of two broader families; on the left of the dendrogram the common factor the groups have in common is that they are the 'low welfare' countries in this analysis. The two groups on the right-hand side of the dendrogram meanwhile have higher levels of benefit generosity. The fact that group

[104] Italy and Norway are borderline; Cluster analysis on welfare and LTR-conditionality, Ward's linkage.
[105] Italy remains something of a borderline case.

membership does not change with the addition of labour market (LM) flexibility suggests a correlation of this variable with the other two indicators.

This relationship is assessed in Fig. 5.3 (Welfare Effort mean-centred).There is indeed a broad pattern to be discerned here and in fact the relationship of welfare effort to LTR-conditionality is seen to vary from positive to negative depending on LM flexibility. ('Flexible' defined here as below the mean for this variable.) The association is fairly clear; in flexible labour markets, low levels of welfare are complementary to similarly low levels of conditionality, but as benefit levels increase so too does conditionality. Meanwhile in inflexible or rigid labour markets, the most generous countries are seen to apply low levels of conditionality.

Given that such benefits are often highly employment-contingent, and that the receiving migrants are probably more likely to be skilled given that they have met the conditions imposed by a rigid labour market, this seems like a fitting policy response, at least if we conceptualise the state as a bounded entity with finite resources rationally interested in their efficient deployment.

Fig. 5.3 – Welfare Effort and LTR-conditionality by LM flexibility



What is less explicable in simple rational actor terms is why the final group, of France, Germany, Greece, should impose high conditionality given that their available benefits are low and that their labour market is already relatively difficult to access. Be that as it may, this is how these three policy measures hang together. Of course, states are not simply rational entities acting coherently with regard to the raft of policy programs they pursue – this is the substance of Bambra's (2006) above critique – and we should not necessarily expect a broad congruence between the universally applicable policy domains of welfare state and labour market and the minority concern of legal status and migrant rights. That conditionality is not simply an emanation of broader state structural features accords with the theoretical conceptualisation advanced here of conditionality playing its own primary, as opposed to secondary, role in the determination of migrant poverty.

There are 'outliers' in the above graph too which do not adopt the labour market/welfare state patterning of conditionality that seems generally characteristic; Austria, Denmark and Spain for example. Also, the above graph is based on a somewhat crude dichotomy, splitting 'rigid' and 'flexible' labour markets at the mean for this group of countries. This dichotomy belies the existence of a broad middle ground, with all of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden hovering about the mean for the LM-flexibility variable. In terms of accounting for variations in conditionality at the state level it should be evident that supplementary explanatory factors are needed.

In the last chapter we specified a simple typology of immigrant welfare regimes defined along the axes of conditionality and welfare effort. It will be noted that each regime type was populated with precisely the same set of countries as was identified in the last three-variable dendrogram (Fig. 5.2). The four regime types identified were labelled:

1. **Inclusionary**: low conditionality—high welfare;
2. **Protective**: high conditionality—high welfare;
3. **Exclusionary**: high conditionality—low welfare;
4: **Liberal**: low conditionality—low welfare.

Grouping the countries according to this pattern it is possible to produce summary statistics for each group on a range of political, economic, social, demographic, long-term structural and other indicators which will allow us to identify empirical regularities across or between groups that may suggest the relevance of other factors to 'regime-like' configurations which are held to impact on migrant poverty. This may allow us to augment and deepen our understanding of what exactly these regimes consist in, and what their defining features are.

Table 5.1 Tabular analysis of characteristics (as numbered in Fig. 5.2)

-> Group 1 = BEL, DEN, NOR, POR, SWE [INCLUSIONARY]

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
rightvote	5	21.6	11.1	7.3	36.2
migsbad02	5	33.4	14.3	15.6	50.3
gdpgth04	5	3.04	1.11	1.56	4.23
gdp3yrs	5	1.97	1.04	.461	3.24
foreignpop	5	9.36	3.2	6.1	12.9
unemp05	5	6.7	1.76	4.6	8.4
migunemp0405	5	12	2.99	9.37	16.1
lninflow05	5	10.1	.594	9.35	10.9
oecdskill	5	24.2	4.04	19.3	30.5
citcon8	5	3.4	3.05	1	8
decentral	5	.4	.548	0	1
mcp	5	.4	.548	0	1
colonial	5	.4	.547	0	1

-> Group 2 = NED, GER, SUI [PROTECTIVE]

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
rightvote	3	19.7	11.9	7.5	31.2
migsbad02	3	31.7	9.64	21.4	40.4
gdpgth04	3	1.99	.696	1.21	2.53
gdp3yrs	3	1.26	.591	.581	1.66
foreignpop	3	15.7	7.45	10	24.1
unemp05	3	6.9	3.75	4.3	11.2
migunemp0405	3	11.6	3.75	8.44	15.7
lninflow05	3	11.6	.723	11	12.4
oecdskill	3	19.27	4.40	14.9	23.7
citcon8	3	7	1.73	5	8
decentral	3	.667	.577	0	1
mcp	3	.333	.577	0	1
colonial	3	.666	.577	0	1

However, we also expect some of these factors to be linked with the level of conditionality obtaining in a country, something we will explore in a later section. The theoretical relevance of these indicators has already been discussed in the earlier literature section drawing on the migration policy literature. Looking at the summary statistics, we see that the Exclusionary group has the highest right-wing vote on average, though with high variability (high standard deviation). Other groups show little distinct patterning for this variable.

Table 5.1 (cont.)

-> Group 3 = AUS, FRA, GRE, ITA [EXCLUSIONARY]

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
rightvote	4	34.5	21.9	2.2	49.5
migsbad02	4	43	12.7	34	61.7
gdpgth04	4	2.79	1.3	1.53	4.62
gdp3yrs	4	2.19	1.49	.724	4.27
foreignpop	4	8.1	4.22	5	14.1
unemp05	4	8.15	2.19	5.2	10
migunemp0405	4	11.6	2.42	9.4	15
lninflow05	4	12.1	.96	10.9	13.3
oecdskill	4	14.375	3.18	11.3	18.1
citcon8	4	6	.816	5	7
decentral	4	.75	.5	0	1
mcp	4	0	0	0	0
colonial	4	.5	.577	0	1

-> Group 4 = FIN, IRE, SPA, UK [LIBERAL]

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
rightvote	4	11.1	18.2	0	38.3
migsbad02	4	31.8	7.47	24.3	41.1
gdpgth04	4	3.73	.758	2.95	4.6
gdp3yrs	4	3.5	1.05	2.64	5.01
foreignpop	4	10	4.62	3.6	14.4
unemp05	4	6.62	2.54	4.3	9.2
migunemp0405	4	11.5	6.66	6.03	20.7
lninflow05	4	11.5	1.56	9.45	12.8
oecdskill	4	28.975	10.71	18.9	41.1
citcon8	4	4.5	1.29	3	6
decentral	4	.75	.5	0	1
mcp	4	.25	.5	0	1
colonial	4	.5	.577	0	1

Anti-migrant attitudes are also highest in the Exclusionary group by a clear margin, which is interesting given that this group also actually has the lowest average foreign population size. This same group, however, is also characterised by high general unemployment, which may correlate with higher antipathy towards out-groups (Crepaz 2008). Migrant-specific unemployment is also high in this group, with the smallest standard deviation of all groups on this measure, and this group recorded the highest levels of migrant inflows in the preceding period. Overall the Exlusionary group could be characterised as right-wing and opposed to migrants with a comparatively poor employment situation and a poorly-skilled cohort of TCNs. Citizenship-acquisition conditionality also tends to be as high in this group as the already high conditionality

attached to securing long-term residency status. This group contains one of the 'outliers' (Austria) from the account of conditionality in terms of simply the labour market and the welfare state, as graphed in the above Fig 5.3; it may be the case that some of the characteristic factors for this group could help account for variations in conditionality for these outliers. This possibility will be explored shortly.

More pressingly for our typology of migrant poverty regimes, might any of these characteristics be implicated in the determination of poverty? Certainly it is to be expected that the extent of anti-migrant attitudes, for example, will be implicated in migrant poverty; where such attitudes are high, discrimination may lead to difficulties in finding or keeping a job, refusal of benefits or ghettoisation in areas of dense migrant population, areas often at higher risk of deprivation (Wilson 1987). Other characteristic factors such as a high (perhaps migrant-specific) unemployment rate will obviously be correlated with more poverty, and a strong right-wing political presence may feed into the policy process – under certain circumstances – to produce policy outputs that are less migrant-friendly.

However, none of these aspects qualify for inclusion in the 'regime' typology as extra dimensions, simply because they are not policy levers over which the state has control. Rather these factors are characteristics of the hypothesised regime types which are highly subject to change and fluctuation, and are at the same time relevant variables which must be controlled for when seeking to explain migrant poverty. Interestingly, they are also theoretically implicated in the determination of conditionality levels themselves, of which more shortly.

Turning to the Inclusionary group, which contains other 'outliers' (Belgium, Denmark), we see that migrant-specific unemployment is highest on average here. This is perhaps unexpected given that this group is also one of the two regime-type groupings with the highest levels of skilled migrants. However, anti-migrant attitudes are high in three of the five countries (Portugal gets as high as 50.3% of people expressing such sentiments in 2002) here, though more tolerant in the two Scandinavian states. This group had the lowest levels of inflows in the year preceding measurement of the LTR-conditionality indicator. Levels of citizenship conditionality are also very low, with the one exception of Denmark which scores the highest possible value on this measure.

The Liberal group, containing the 'outlier' of Spain, is characterised by the highest economic growth in this period, as measured by both growth at a two-year lag and a measure of growth averaged for the three-year period immediately preceding 2006. This group contains Finland, the single country with the highest level of migrant-specific

unemployment of all of these countries, though general unemployment is also on average relatively low for the group as a whole and migrant-specific unemployment is relatively 'normal' in the other countries. The Liberal group is the other regime type possessing a high proportion of skilled migrants and anti-migrant attitudes are not disproportionately high here. Citizenship conditionality levels are low, in line with LTR-conditionality levels.

The Protective group is in the mid-range on many indicators though it has the largest foreign population on average (inflated by Switzerland's very large value here), which is relatively poorly skilled, and the group had little economic growth for the period. Its citizenship conditionality levels are also as high as those imposed on attaining LTR status.

Indeed, citizenship conditionality is another important element in the nexus which is held to determine migrant poverty outcomes. The earlier two-way scatter of both types of conditionality showed a high correlation ($r = .48$)[106] between these measures, see Fig. 4.1. In some ways, the addition of this policy measure in a substruction of the typology's property space may seem desirable. However, given the high concordance between both types of conditionality, the addition of an extra dimension to the typology would result in a large number of empty cells, without empirical content. Furthermore, it is not in the nature of the theoretical understanding advanced here that both types of conditionality are held to impact *simultaneously* in the determination of migrant poverty. Conditionality and status acquisition is a stepwise process, with one status placed both logically and temporally anterior to the acquisition of the other.[107] The difficulties of attaining citizenship are likely to have little relevance and/or impact on the determination of poverty for a migrant who is not yet a long-term resident.

As such, there are discrete pathways along which migrants travel towards status acquisition, with certain policy measures having relevance only on defined stretches of those pathways. Refer back to the theoretical framework for more detail. Causally, our conceptualisation also entails that while LTR-conditionality has an ambit of effect that is relevant both to those who have naturalised and those who have not, citizenship conditionality cannot have an ambit of effect on those who have not attained the prior necessary status. As the effect of LTR-conditionality is both broader and more general it is accorded a prior and focal role in the analysis; expansion of the typology to simultaneously

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[106] $p = .058$

[107] It is acknowledged that special groups of citizenship claimers in certain circumstances in some countries, e.g. returning ethnic Germans, may be able to circumvent this stepwise process. The simplifying assumption is made that this will not unduly affect the later regression coefficients and it remains nevertheless the case that the data to be used does not allow for identification of such special groups.

include citizenship conditionality is deemed inappropriate. Finally, the last three indicators in each group, below the dashed line, are binary structural indicators measuring decentralisation of political power, official multiculturalism, and history of colonialism. The distribution of almost all of these features across every group is interesting, implying that conditionality itself is not coterminous with a set of broader structural-institutional state characteristics. Only in the Exclusionary group do we see the complete absence of one of these characteristics, official multiculturalism. But, regarding the first question posed at the outset of this chapter, when we take into account a set of other constitutional, institutional and historical factors, which admittedly are not exhaustive, it cannot be said that these factors show a clear patterning with regard to high/low affinities with conditionality.

What is interesting is that we can also perform a cluster analysis on these structural-institutional factors alongside welfare state, labour market and conditionality indicators and the results of this analysis return four groupings with *exactly* the same group membership as in our earlier three-variable dendrogram.[108] This suggests that the addition of these factors in a substruction of the property space would be more or less redundant. Adding an 'official multiculturalism' dimension alongside the three dimensions explored above would increase the number of cells to 16 ($2^N = 16$ where n is the number of dimensions, see Bailey 1994), but most of these would be empty and candidates for empirical compression anyway seeing as only four countries of our 16 employ official multiculturalism with regard to their foreign populations. Similarly, we can graph the patterning of LTR-conditionality by welfare regime types, Fig. 5.4.[109] This shows that conditionality levels are not simply an emanation of welfare regime types: for example, Conservative type states may be 'often high', but Italy is a borderline case here and Belgium imposes conditionality at the lowest levels and the variable ranges from 1-8 for this type; also Southern type states also show divergent approaches, ranging from 1-7.

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[108] Six-variable dendrogram not shown as it is identical to the dendrogram presented earlier.

[109] The exploration of welfare regime typologies has been rightly referred to as a "modelling business" (Abrahamson 1999; Arts and Gelissen 2002), and many competing typologies have been advanced in recent years. Arts and Gelissen's (2002, 149-150) comprehensive review of recent efforts identifies scholarly consensus on the proper placement of certain countries in key regime types. For example, Leibfried, Siaroff, Bonoli, and Ferrera all consistently place Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in the highly decommodifying and generous 'Social Democratic/Scandinavian' welfare regime (Leibfried 1993; Siaroff 1994; Bonoli 1997; Ferrera 1996). Likewise, Esping-Andersen himself, Ferrera, Korpi and Palme, and Bonoli all place Ireland and the United Kingdom in the 'Liberal' regime (Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera 1996; Korpi and Palme 1998; Bonoli 1997). The three countries omitted from Esping-Andersen's account have all been consistently placed, by Leibfried, Siaroff, Bonoli and Ferrera in a Southern/Latin Rim regime (Leibfried 1993; Siaroff 1994; Bonoli 1997; Ferrera 1996). We designate regime types in line with this consensus and assign the remaining seven countries to a general 'Conservative' regime type.

Fig. 5.4 – Conditionality and welfare effort by welfare regime type



In sum, this tabular analysis clearly indicates some broad associations of certain state structural factors with the conditionality of legal status for third-country nationals in Europe. Ultimately, the two-way cluster analysis of countries along the dimensions of conditionality and welfare effort produces a classification of countries that remains stable and invariant to the inclusion of other factors. As such this appears to represent a parsimonious delimitation of the conceptual space within which we locate migrant poverty.

In seeking to understand patterns in the data it may also be helpful to simplify the association among policy measures specifically and relate this graphically to other state characteristics. One way of doing this is by means of a simple principal components analysis. Performing this on five policy measures of direct relevance to the determination of migrant poverty allows us to explore how broader state policy configurations hang together with each other and also whether they share affinities with other non-policy state characteristics. The five measures used are: LTR-conditionality, welfare effort, labour market flexibility, security of LTR-status, and the selectivity of a country's immigration system (as reflected in the skill levels of national migrant populations).

Table 5.2 – PCA, 5 variables

Principal components (eigenvectors)

Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Unexplained
ltrcon8	0.5133	-0.3268	.3036
bga	0.0566	0.7107	.2604
EPL	0.4972	0.2326	.4136
oecdskill	-0.6018	0.2771	.1446
security	0.3521	0.5072	.3719

Note: table shows loadings for each variable on components 1 and 2, as well as variance unexplained by these components for each variable

This last measure is essentially a proxy as it measures the proportion of high-skilled migrants and not selectivity itself. However, it can be seen as a 'policy' measure insofar as the composition of migrant cohorts in terms of skills is the cumulative end result of successive selection policies. We will reflect further on this point at the end of this chapter. The PCA table above shows the factor loadings for an unrotated two-factor solution, where component 1 explains 41% of variance in the cases for these variables and component 2 explains a further 29%, for a total of 70% of variance explained by these two components.[110] This is in line with our earlier discussion which found broad regularities in the association of state institutional features. Looking to loadings above 0.4, the first component broadly identifies an association where high-conditionality, high-labour market inflexibility and low-skills are to be found together (e.g. in Germany), with low-conditionality, flexibility and high-skills (e.g. Ireland) to be found at the other end of this continuum. This could be thought of as broadly identifying an 'Accessibility' dimension, liberal and open though perhaps selective at one end and closed and illiberal at the other. The second component identifies a generosity—security continuum where both are generally high together (e.g. Norway) or both are low together (e.g. Italy). This could be thought of as broadly identifying an 'Inclusiveness' component, ranging from high to low inclusiveness. We can also explore associations of these components with the other political, social, economic and migration features of states discussed above in the tabular analysis to seek perhaps clearer indications of patterning or evidence of elective affinities.

[110] Eigenvalues for component 1: 2.05; component 2: 1.45; component 3: 0.67.

Fig. 5.5 – Associations of component 1 with other indicators



In Fig. 5.5 we plot the 'Accessibility' component against various indicators. Neither the size of the foreign population nor migrant inflows appear to share any clear pattern here, both amounting to random scatters. Level of GDP growth is correlated with more liberality on this component though this may be largely due to Ireland's high value for economic growth in this period. Unemployment levels, whether in general or migrant-specific, are clearly associated with the liberality of policy approaches to work and legal status: lower unemployment is associated with greater liberality. The counterbalance of greater selectivity alongside greater liberality might be thought to be the reason for this association, i.e. there is less migrant unemployment where states have selected the most

Fig. 5.6 - Associations of component 2 with other indicators



skilled individuals at point of entry, though the association also holds up for the general unemployment rate.

Anti-migrant attitudes (high levels of) also show a clear association with an illiberal approach to status granting for migrants. Fig. 5.6 shows weak associations between the 'Inclusiveness' component and all of these variables except for migrant inflows. High levels of inflows are associated with low security for long-term residents and low levels of welfare supports. The positive association of migrant unemployment is driven largely by Belgium's outlying large value on this indicator and is not significant (p=.43). The other indicators show no clear associations or groupings of countries into 'families'.

Again, these explorations reveal some broad structural regularities in the policy approaches states adopt towards migrants, with some groups of countries displaying similarities in approach that are distinct from other groupings. LTR conditionality tends to be high where skill levels are low. At the same time, LTR conditionality is distributed across a range of values for welfare effort and labour market flexibility. In terms of elective affinities with other social and political indicators there was seen to be much variation across countries. Few regularities clearly stand out except for the association of high unemployment levels and attitudinal hostility to migrants with policy configurations that are generally not to migrants' advantage. The existence of these affinities suggests that these factors may have fed into the policy process in a manner determinative of policy outcomes, specifically conditionality levels. The next section will test hypotheses in this vein.

On the first question of the three posed at the outset of this chapter, it seems fairly clear that conditionality is not simply the emanation of other relevant structural-institutional factors and that, its variation being inexplicable in these long-run structural terms, it can justifiably be seen as a phenomenon in its own right that, in interaction with welfare effort, delineates four distinct typological categories all of which are empirically populated. On the second question, we have seen that the typology's property space appears to be adequately specified for present purposes, though it must of course be allowed that some of the structural-institutional factors seem likely to moderate the relationship of certain hypothesised determinants to conditionality itself, the focus of the third question. This third question asks about the causes of variation in conditionality and the implications of this for regime-typological expressions of these state characteristics and configurations. It is to this aspect that we now turn, with relevance to both the second and third questions posed earlier.

As further tabular or multivariate analysis on numerous variables simultaneously becomes conceptually difficult and intractable to graphical representation we will next explore various hypothesised determinants of conditionality by means of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Systematic exploration in this way will allow us to test for relationships while controlling for the existence of some of the broad regularities that we have now established, allowing us to isolate other effects that may be substantively interesting or would otherwise not be apparent. The next section will also be able to test for the existence of conditional (i.e. interactive) relationships between determinants and conditionality.

5.3. Determinants of Conditionality

Bivariate regression models will not be presented for all variables here as a full table of Pearson correlations for all variables used in the analysis is presented in the Appendix with significant associations clearly marked (A.3).[111] The table below (5.3.1) begins building our model of cross-national conditionality variation. This section addresses LTR-conditionality, and a separate section will address citizenship conditionality. Interaction effects are marked with the suffix INT in square brackets. Models with LTR-conditionality as the dependent variables are labelled L1, L2 etc., while later models on citizenship conditionality are labelled C1, C2 etc.

It should be noted at the outset that given our cross-sectional focus on only 16 countries, available degrees of freedom are very limited. In line with general convention, a minimum ratio of cases-to-variables will be observed of about four to one (Kenworthy 2007). Obviously, it would be desirable if a parsimonious model in line with theoretical expectations was seen to explain a reasonable proportion of variance in the dependent variable. An elegant and powerful explanation (model) of the dependent variable is a central motivation of any social scientific endeavour. At the same time, however, it must be recognised that data limitations constrain the nature of such explanation. The earlier theoretical discussion around potential determinants of migration policy, of which conditionality is a part, ranged over multiple diverse domains, from the attitudinal to the political to the economic to the structural. Scruggs' statement that there is rarely a "single, isolated cause for a phenomenon of interest" is surely uncontentious and we take it as a guiding principle in this analysis (Scruggs 2007, 310). Accordingly, with so few degrees of freedom it is simply not possible to control for and take account of all hypothesised independent variables and all possible two-way, three-way and higher-level interactions.

One tactic for working around this constraint is to pool available cross-sections of data from different, contiguous years so as to increase available degrees of freedom, see e.g. Beck (2001) for more information on time-series-cross-section (TSCS) modelling. The difficulty with this approach in the current instance is quite simply the lack of available, reliable and comparable data on the conditionality states attach to attaining legal residency status in Europe. In other words, we don't have enough observations on the dependent variable in these models – conditionality – at different time points; Mipex has only

[111] Readers interested in the R^2 of these associations can simply square specific correlation coefficients in that table to determine the amount of common variance shared by two variables.

collected data in 2006, though their 2011 report (using 2010 data) will be relevant to future research in this regard. What did prove possible was to use the Geddes and Niessen (2004) precursor to the Mipex project to extract comparable indicators from that report for conditionality in that year. We will say more in this in the relevant later section. The end result of this pooling exercise was to produce a dataset of 32 country-year observations (2 year observations for 16 countries), facilitating the exploration of greater complexity with regard to modelling the determinants of conditionality. The analysis is still 'cross-sectional' in nature and is distinct from methods of panel data analysis which involve sampling over a usually small number of time points and have different properties (Beck 2001).[112]

In the long term, when sufficient data on variations in the conditionality of legal status or related aspects of migrant policy become available, it will be possible to offer much stronger analyses of the hypotheses to be tested here and future iterations of the Mipex project will be key in this regard. The analysis here must be seen at best as an exploratory first pass, and is at best a very preliminary form of TSCS, as most such analyses utilise cross-sections from many, many more time points than are available here. For the present, however, we work with what we have and the analysis in this section will serve as an exploratory assessment of the determinants of conditionality as an aspect of migration policy. Statistical significance may also be hard to come by given the limited number of cases but insofar as this analysis can be thought of as referring, in fact, to a *population* of countries and not a *sample* then this is not an issue of concern (cf. last footnote).

Scruggs observes that a frequent failing of applied statistics in the social sciences concerns researchers not attending to such distinctions and erroneously reporting statistical estimates from a 'sample', when in fact what they have actually done is describe their population of cases by means of regression with no intention of generalising to a broader population. However, a contrary viewpoint holds that this selection of 16 cases may also be conceived of as a 'sample' from a 'superpopulation' of these countries extended through time (Hartley and Sielken 1975). In this manner, any results revealing structural, systematic or conditional relationships may serve as a lodestar or signpost for future research conducted on the same issue in a different temporal context. Bearing in mind these relevant methodological issues, results are presented overleaf.

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[112] In panel data "the people observed are of no interest; all inferences of interest concern the underlying population that was sampled ... TSCS data are exactly the opposite; all inferences of interest are conditional on the observed units. For TSCS data, we cannot even contemplate a thought experiment of resampling a new 'Germany,' although we can contemplate observing a new draw of German data for some year" (Beck 2001, 273).

Table 5.3.1 – Regressions of hypothesised determinants on LTR conditionality

Dep Var: LTR-conditionality (8-pt)

	L1	L2	L3	L3a	L4	L4a	L5	L5a	L6
Welfare Effort (UB-BG)	-0.167	-0.145	-0.153	-0.210	-0.194	-0.243	-0.049	0.118	-0.147
	(0.262)	(0.248)	(0.244)	(0.245)	(0.279)	(0.264)	(0.268)	(0.289)	(0.254)
LM flexibility	0.797	0.647	0.575	0.512	0.868	0.795	0.134	-0.060	0.567
	(0.837)	(0.795)	(0.786)	(0.777)	(0.961)	(0.804)	(0.963)	(0.878)	(0.826)
[INT]Welfare*LMflexibility		-0.554^	-0.591^	-0.597^	-0.511^	-0.504^	-0.655*	-0.675*	-0.486
		(0.343)	(0.339)	(0.334)	(0.368)	(0.345)	(0.360)	(0.333)	(0.369)
GDP Growth Rate ('04)			-0.629						
			(0.545)						
GDP growth (3yr avg)				-0.630					
				(0.473)					
Foreign Population %					0.067				
					(0.151)				
TCN: % of Migrant Pop.						0.228			
						(0.219)			
Anti-migrant Attitudes ('02)							0.062		
							(0.066)		
Anti-migrant Attitudes ('06)								0.099^	
								(0.064)	
Right-wing vote %									0.024
									(0.039)
Constant	3.875***	4.085***	4.099***	4.101***	4.068***	4.066***	4.123***	4.025***	4.059***
	(0.616)	(0.596)	(0.588)	(0.577)	(0.618)	(0.594)	(0.599)	(0.565)	(0.613)
Adj.R-sq	-0.063	0.054	0.080	0.111	-0.013	0.061	0.047	0.154	0.003
N	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
F-test	0.588	0.323	0.321	0.277	0.472	0.348	0.371	0.224	0.443
AIC	76.961	75.804	75.975	75.415	77.519	76.291	76.543	74.630	77.260

^ p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The first table presents results building the model from the bottom up, beginning with welfare effort and labour market flexibility. Independently, these variables explain little of the variance in conditionality (L1) but in interaction they begin to have an effect (L2), as the earlier graphical analysis suggested, with the interaction term weakly significant (in line with Wooldridge's (2009, 137) criterion). Alongside these broad and embedded structural parameters we control for more short-run and volatile hypothesised determinants, like economic growth, lagged (L3) and averaged over three preceding years (L3a); this allows us to explain about 10% of variance. The effect indicates that in countries with strong economic growth the barriers to gaining LTR status are low. Controlling for another determinant prone to fluctuation, size of foreign population, adds nothing under this specification (L4), though an alternative measure focussed specifically on third-country nationals (L4a), to the exclusion of e.g. EU foreigners, does explain some variance. Both effects are positive, with larger foreign populations associated with higher barriers to gaining long-term residency. The next model indicates that anti-migrant attitudes predict higher conditionality with the 2006 attitudinal measure explaining some variance and being very weakly significant. The share of right-wing vote is positively correlated with LTR-conditionality, controlling for labour market and welfare state relationships, but this association is not significant.

The next three models (L7-L9) account for longer-term structural features of states, such as the openness of its political structure, its application of official multicultural policies, or its history of colonialism. We are faced with a seemingly intractable methodological constraint here, however, insofar as we have already arrived at the limit of variables we can include in the regression equation if we are to maintain a sensible ratio of observations-to-variables.

This means that we cannot tease apart the individual effects of certain variables which, due to this constraint, must remain 'unobserved' in the following regression models. For example, the 'anti-migrant attitudes' variable is tested when controlling for the welfare and labour market variables as we wish to assess what other factors matter alongside this central structural relationship. However, anti-migrant attitudes are likely to bear some relationship with the state of the economy, and so we would prefer to control for an economic measure alongside the attitudinal measure so as to assess the independent effect of attitudes. This is not possible here, but it will be possible in the next section, where we pool data and thus double the number of available degrees of freedom.

Table 5.3.2 – Determinants of LTR conditionality continued

Dep Var: LTR-conditionality (8-pt)

	L7	L8	L9
Welfare Effort (UB-BG)	-0.228	-0.136	-0.159
	(0.259)	(0.275)	(0.262)
LM flexibility	0.271	0.620	0.745
	(0.868)	(0.869)	(0.892)
[INT]Welfare*LMflexibility	-0.619^	-0.546^	-0.516
	(0.347)	(0.367)	(0.379)
Decentralisation (0,1)	-1.493		
	(1.417)		
Multiculturalism (0,1)		-0.160	
		(1.577)	
Colonialism (0,1)			-0.403
			(1.365)
Constant	5.043***	4.121***	4.271***
	(1.086)	(0.720)	(0.886)
Adj.R-sq	0.063	-0.031	-0.024
N	16	16	16
F-test	0.346	0.502	0.490
AIC	76.266	77.789	77.678

^ p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

We see that with regard to structural factors of long duration a more open political system, subscription to official multiculturalist policies, and a history of colonialism all predict lower conditionality, though these associations do not attain statistical significance. It is likely that these latter factors play a moderating role in any explanation of conditionality levels we might wish to advance.

In other words, in those countries where colonialism, for example, has been a feature of history it might reasonably be expected that certain political or other phenomena will be associated with aspects of migration policy like conditionality in a manner qualitatively different to that seen in countries without that colonial history. Such possibilities will be explored in the next section.

Table 5.3.3 – Determinants of LTR conditionality continued

Dep Var: LTR-conditionality (8-pt)

	L10	L11	L12	L13
Welfare Effort (UB-BG)	-0.292	-0.148	0.020	-0.098
	(0.291)	(0.254)	(0.232)	(0.331)
LM flexibility	1.492	0.819	-0.300	0.631
	(1.183)	(0.858)	(0.833)	(0.831)
[INT]Welfare*LMflexibility	-0.678*	-0.642^	-0.243	-0.536^
	(0.367)	(0.377)	(0.336)	(0.366)
Unemployment Rate ('05)	-0.407			
	(0.421)			
Migrant Unemployment ('04-05)		-0.119		
		(0.185)		
High-skilled(%Tertiary)			-0.187*	
			(0.089)	
Foreign Pop Inflow ('05, log)				0.151
				(0.672)
Constant	4.131***	4.118***	3.967***	4.078***
	(0.599)	(0.613)	(0.528)	(0.621)
Adj.R-sq	0.049	0.006	0.264	-0.027
N	16	16	16	16
F-test	0.367	0.438	0.119	0.496
AIC	76.498	77.216	72.393	77.731

^ p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The variables considered in Table 5.3.3 are also likely to be subject to moderation by intervening factors in their relationship to conditionality. Increases in unemployment and migrant-specific unemployment both seem hypothetically likely to be associated with higher levels of conditionality, though this association is likely to be contingent on the composition of the migrant cohort in terms of skill levels. It is only this latter variable, skill levels as measured in terms of the percentage of TCNs possessing tertiary education, that shows a significant association with conditionality here, accounting for over a quarter of variance in conditionality when its associations with the welfare system and labour market are known. An increasing proportion of high-skilled migrants is correlated with a decreasing level of conditionality imposed by the state on attaining long-term residency. The table considers a final volatile hypothesised determinant, the level of foreign inflows to a country (logged), and the association is positive but not significant; higher inflows of migrants is associated with higher conditionality. This too seems likely to be subject to moderation, however, and we cannot expect its association to be monotonic across all countries under consideration here, with their widely differentiated experiences of inward migration and historical associations with foreign nationals.

5.3.1. Pooled cross-sectional analysis

In this section we pool two cross-sections utilising the LTR-conditionality index based on 2006 data, which is the central focus of this project, but also utilising the Geddes et al. (2005) data which was collected in 2004.[113] Specifically we utilise the 'conditionality of acquisition' scores for 14 of 16 countries which are all available in the printed report country by country. The focus in Geddes et al. was on countries of the EU and so Norway and Switzerland were not included. Given the high general correlation over time amongst conditionality from all iterations of the Mipex project which was noted earlier it seems reasonable to interpolate the 2006 conditionality scores for these two countries into the 2004 time points.[114]

This produced a new dataset with 32 observations over two years, and each of the independent variables employed in the analysis was modified so as to ensure the variables utilised the most temporally proximate and relevant data available. Broad structural parameters such as history of colonialism etc. of course remain time invariant and so were unmodified.[115] The models in the next two tables (prefixed '32' to distinguish them) are based on models that seemed promising earlier but here they take advantage of the greater number of available degrees of freedom so as to control for more variables of interest, specifically every model now controls for the GDP growth rate at a one-year lag.

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[113] The 2010 data from the latest issue of the Mipex project (Mipex 2011) was not used for two reasons: firstly, it became available after the data analytic part of this project had been completed; secondly, it is arguably undesirable to use this specific data in some sort of time-based comparison (including the limited instance of the cross-sectional time-series pooling of only two years of data undertaken here) given that it occurs after/during a major structural break in the time series, i.e. the worldwide economic crash of 2008-2010. This event results in measures that are vastly out of sync with the data we have for these measures at previous time points, e.g. unemployment rates will spike dramatically in this period. To model variation in our variable at such an extraordinary time point would essentially amount to an attempt to model the structural break or, in other words, to model the exception rather than the norm, with obvious consequences for the generalisability of the analysis.

[114] The Geddes et al. scores were recorded in the format where '3' implied 'good practice', or low conditionality, and '1' implied 'bad practice' with these scores arrived at by averaging the scores for individual policy indicators in the 'conditions of acquisition' strand for the Long-term Residency dimension. These scores for each country were re-scaled upwards and placed on a scale from 0-8 by using the following simple transformation: {([Score]*4) – 4} and this was re-polarised so that low scores imply low conditionality by subtracting 8 and multiplying by -1.

[115] All models in this section were estimated with the inclusion of a 'year' dummy variable to distinguish one year's data from the next and to capture any specific time effects, though the coefficient for this variable is not reported in the models.

Table 5.3.4 – Determinants of LTR conditionality (N=32)

Dep Var: LTR-conditionality (8-pt), pooled cross-sections

	L32a	L32b	L32c	L32d
Welfare Effort (UB-BG)	-0.080	-0.263*	-0.310*	-0.179
	(0.161)	(0.137)	(0.153)	(0.141)
LM flexibility	-0.020	0.508	0.899^	0.291
	(0.494)	(0.435)	(0.568)	(0.464)
[INT]Welfare*LMflexibility	-0.452**	-0.270^	-0.492**	-0.406**
	(0.185)	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.191)
GDP growth rate	-0.388*	-0.614***	-0.443**	-0.445*
	(0.217)	(0.218)	(0.205)	(0.219)
Anti-migrant attitudes	0.043			
	(0.035)			
Colonialism (0,1)		-1.381*		
		(0.712)		
Unemployment rate			-0.309^	
			(0.185)	
Migrant Unemployment				-0.017
				(0.086)
Constant	4.021***	4.643***	4.036***	4.004***
	(0.312)	(0.446)	(0.305)	(0.321)
Adj.R-sq	0.193	0.257	0.231	0.147
N	32	32	32	32
F-test	0.073	0.032	0.046	0.123
AIC	131.615	128.956	130.054	133.397

Note: 'Year' identifier included in all models but not shown
^ p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

When controlling for this alongside the structural parameters of welfare state and labour market we see that the addition of anti-migrant attitudes, history of colonialism or the unemployment rate (this last is non-significant at standard levels) allows us to account for about one quarter of the variance in LTR-conditionality. Migrant-specific unemployment alone does not seem to have any significant association with conditionality in this configuration, but we will explore how it might be moderated shortly.

Testing some of these significant variables in somewhat larger combinations is now possible. In the next table we see that a still fairly parsimonious account of variations in conditionality in terms of just three factors alongside our labour market-welfare state account – GDP growth, history of colonialism and inflows of foreign population in the preceding year – allows us to account for about one third of variance. The next model, controlling for anti-migrant attitudes in place of inflows, does a similar job accounting for about 30% of variance though the variable is very tenuously associated in this specification. The unemployment rate still shows no independent effect in this expanded configuration. Examination of the residuals from select models illustrates how combinations of explanatory factors allow us to account for variations in conditionality for some cases but not for others.

Table 5.3.5 – Determinants of LTR conditionality continued (N=32)

Dep Var: LTR-conditionality (8-pt), pooled cross-sections

	L32e	L32f	L32g
Welfare Effort (UB-BG)	-0.138	-0.145	-0.322**
	(0.148)	(0.153)	(0.151)
LM flexibility	0.667^	0.184	0.838^
	(0.425)	(0.470)	(0.562)
[INT]Welfare*LMflexibility	-0.137	-0.325*	-0.359*
	(0.190)	(0.182)	(0.208)
GDP growth rate	-0.654***	-0.551**	-0.569**
	(0.210)	(0.216)	(0.224)
Colonialism (0,1)	-2.193**	-1.524**	-1.050
	(0.812)	(0.698)	(0.797)
Foreign Pop. Inflow (-1yr, log)	0.660*		
	(0.361)		
Anti-migrant attitudes		0.052^	
		(0.033)	
Unemployment rate			-0.190
			(0.204)
Constant	4.997***	4.735***	4.511***
	(0.468)	(0.437)	(0.469)
Adj.R-sq	0.321	0.299	0.253
N	32	32	32
F-test	0.018	0.025	0.044
AIC	126.770	127.811	129.819

Note: 'Year' identifier included in all models but not shown
^ p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

For example, knowing the extent of hostility towards migrants and the general growth rate in the economy, alongside key work-welfare institutional parameters, (L32a) explains slightly under a quarter of variance in conditionality. However the residual plot for this model (Fig 5.3.1) shows that it does not do a good job for several cases, like Austria-2006, Norway-2004 (top of graph), Belgium-2006, Spain-2006 (bottom of graph). Replacing extent of anti-migrant attitudes with information about a country's history of colonialism (L32b) draws all of these observations towards the zero residual line, explaining them better, except for Austria-2006; meanwhile this view (model) does not now do a very good job accounting for conditionality levels in Netherlands-2006.

Retaining colonialism and taking account of migrant inflows in the preceding year (L32e) does not help account for the outliers of the Netherlands and Austria (2006) though it does do a better job of predicting conditionality levels for e.g. Greece than the previous model. Replacing inflows with anti-migrant attitudes again (L32f) does succeed in drawing these outliers closer to the zero residual line, taking account of all of the other explanatory factors in this model as well. What this demonstrates is the broad diversity and complexity of factors that may feed into the determination of migration policy outputs like conditionality levels and the difficulty of advancing a univocal explanation of reasons for variations in the content of such outputs across European countries.

Fig. 5.3.1 – Residual plots for select models of LTR conditionality (N=32)



Notwithstanding the broad structural regularities we have identified with regard to conditionality and the welfare state, Papadopoulos (2011) may have a point when he remarks on the difficulty of speaking of 'regimes' of migrant integration in light of the unique particularities of national experiences of migration.

The situation is even more complex when we consider the contingent nature of some of the hypothesised relationships and their confinement to only certain sub-groups of cases. In the next table we consider some hypothesised moderating relationships between variables that may aid in our understanding. The first model (1) controls for the basic structural factors alongside migrant-specific unemployment and the skill composition of the migrant population in *interaction* with each other. The interaction is significant and in line with theory; higher migrant unemployment bears an association with the stringency of LTR-conditionality, but contingent on the skill levels of migrants themselves. The general rate of unemployment however, in the next model (2), actually accounts for more variance when we test for this same interaction, and also attains a more demanding level of significance. Conditionality's association with pressing socio-economic issues like employment seems more so to be defined in the generality of things as opposed to the specificities of migrant situations.

Both effects run in the same direction but the general unemployment effect is greater. To better understand the relationship here and its implications for regime-based conceptualisations defined by status conditionality we graph the association (Fig. 5.3.2). The graph shows the relationship of unemployment to conditionality by migrant skill level (percentage of migrants with Tertiary education; binary split at mean value) utilising all available data points.

Table 5.3.6 – Interaction effects in determination of LTR-conditionality (N=32)

Dep Var: LTR-conditionality (8-pt), pooled cross-sections

	L32_1	L32_2	L32_3	L32_4
Welfare Effort (UB-BG)	0.124	0.038	0.216^	-0.356**
	(0.153)	(0.167)	(0.159)	(0.150)
LM flexibility	0.196	0.691	-0.961^	1.111**
	(0.500)	(0.574)	(0.600)	(0.461)
[INT]Welfare*LMflexibility	-0.259	-0.325^	-0.350*	-0.578**
	(0.203)	(0.191)	(0.180)	(0.219)
Migrant Unemployment	-0.153^			
	(0.095)			
High-skilled (%Tertiary educ.)	-0.204**	-0.230***		
	(0.078)	(0.076)		
[INT]MigrantUnemp*Hi-Skilled	-0.032*			
	(0.017)			
Unemployment rate		-0.478**		
		(0.187)		
[INT]Unemployment*Hi-Skilled		-0.070**		
		(0.031)		
Multiculturalism (0,1)			-1.643*	
			(0.809)	
Anti-migrant attitudes			0.137***	
			(0.044)	
[INT]Multicult*Anti-migrant			-0.179**	
			(0.073)	
Colonialism (0,1)				-0.659
				(0.656)
Right-wing vote %				0.073**
				(0.027)
[INT]Colonial*Right-wingVote				-0.143***
				(0.049)
Constant	3.671***	3.340***	4.354***	4.417***
	(0.347)	(0.403)	(0.347)	(0.427)
Adj.R-sq	0.196	0.311	0.280	0.266
N	32	32	32	32
F-test	0.086	0.021	0.031	0.038
AIC	132.182	127.233	128.630	129.277

Note: 'Year' identifier included in all models but not shown
^ p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Fig. 5.3.2 – Unemployment vs. Conditionality, interaction



Some aspects of the relationship stand out clearly: unemployment and conditionality are both generally lower where migrants are relatively skilled; where skill levels are relatively low there has been wider variation in the conditionality states have opted to impose, though it has been at a relatively high level, though there is no clear correlation with the unemployment rate in this regard; the relationship appears to be negative in countries with skilled migrants. This negative relationship is being driven in large part by the Belgian observations. These cases need not be seen as outliers however and, were we here to ascribe regime-like characteristics to states, the imposition of selective entry mechanisms may be seen as a countervailing policy against a liberal approach to granting long-term residency. The implication of Belgium's rigid labour market structures in its relatively high unemployment rate coupled with poor labour market integration and mobility for migrants (Niessen, Huddleston, and Citron 2007, 28) may make the toleration of a liberal policy approach to migrants more politically palatable.

The degree to which the high-skilled population can or will change is relevant to how, and whether, we can speak of this factor as being constitutive of a 'regime' at all: to some extent the stock of skilled migrants is a given fact about the country over which the state has little control, while in another sense the skill levels of incoming (legal) migrants is

subject to definition and moulding by means of the policy lever of migrant entry criteria. There is something else interesting about this graph: note the changes over time, in the intervening two year period between measurement instances of conditionality. In very many of the cases (e.g. Austria , France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Sweden) increases in the general unemployment rate were accompanied by increases in conditionality. For our two perhaps unusual cases of Belgium and Spain, decreases in the unemployment rate were accompanied by decreases in the level of conditionality. To the extent that conditionality may be defined and redefined subject to such short-scale time horizons it again problematises the characterisation of migrants' structural context in stable and enduring 'regime' terms.

The next model (3) considers anti-migrant attitudes again, but this time explores the possibility that they hold a contingent relationship to conditionality levels. We expect this to be moderated by country and political context. Specifically, we might expect to see that in countries where multiculturalism is a goal officially pursued by state policy higher anti-migrant sentiment will not bear positively on conditionality levels or will have no relation. This is what the significant result here tells us, allowing us to account for 28% of variance in conditionality; the association can be visualised as follows in the graph below, though the Netherlands-2006 if not accounted for by this variable (Fig. 5.3.3). A similar hypothesis, model not shown here, that a history of colonialism might moderate the relationship between anti-migrant attitudes and conditionality found no support.

History of colonialism might be a better guide to politics, however, and we hypothesise that the nature of right-wing views on inward migration are likely to be qualitatively different in those countries where colonialism has been a feature of their past and where right-wing politics may focus more on free market issues and less on the anti-immigration scaremongering that is sometimes a feature of such political party views. The model (4) offers support for this contention and marginal effects computed from the model indeed suggests a positive relationship in non-colonial countries and a negative relationship in former colonial countries. In other words, a greater share of right-wing political power in former colonial countries equates to lower conditionality, while it equates to higher conditionality in countries without such a history. [116]

[116] Holding other variables at their means and allowing right-wing vote to vary about the mean by ±10% over former colonial and non-colonial countries. For non-colonial (std. errors in brackets, calculated using delta method): -10%, 3.393 (.487) ; Mean, 4.123 (.410); +10%, 4.853 (.492). For former colonial: -10%, 4.796 (.648); Mean, 4.101 (.457); +10%, 3.406 (.502).

Fig 5.3.3 – LTR conditionality vs. anti-migrant attitudes, interaction



Table 5.3.7 – More interaction effects in determination of LTR-conditionality (N=32)

Dep Var: LTR-conditionality (8-pt), pooled cross-sections

	L32_5	L32_6	L32_7	L32_8
Welfare Effort (UB-BG)	-0.292*	-0.090	-0.228	0.012
	(0.154)	(0.152)	(0.180)	(0.166)
LM flexibility	0.688^	1.058*	0.158	-0.264
	(0.495)	(0.515)	(0.564)	(0.564)
[INT]Welfare*LMflexibility	-0.309^	-0.364*	-0.394*	-0.577**
	(0.191)	(0.204)	(0.219)	(0.216)
Foreign-born Population %	0.167**	0.137*		
	(0.081)	(0.078)		
Decentralisation (0,1)	-1.411*		-1.606*	-0.989
	(0.783)		(0.914)	(0.774)
Multiculturalism (0,1)		0.632		
		(1.036)		
[INT]Multicult*ForeignPop		-1.093*		
		(0.573)		
Right-wing vote %			0.054	
			(0.050)	
[INT]Decentral*Right-wingVote			-0.030	
			(0.066)	
Anti-migrant attitudes				0.048
				(0.038)
[INT]Decentral*Anti-migrant				0.052
				(0.067)
Constant	4.849***	4.117***	5.075***	4.706***
	(0.586)	(0.363)	(0.737)	(0.598)
Adj.R-sq	0.185	0.186	0.095	0.130
N	32	32	32	32
F-test	0.080	0.096	0.227	0.167
AIC	131.929	132.589	135.977	134.717

Note: 'Year' identifier included in all models but not shown
^ p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Population fluctuations are another short term phenomenon that may be informative for typologising attempts around conditionality. It was seen earlier that inflows of migrants in the preceding year were positively associated with conditionality; bigger inflows correlated with more restrictive conditionality imposed by states. It may be the case that the size of the foreign population stock itself also shows a systematic relationship with structural aspects of a country's policy nexus such as conditionality (see e.g. Freeman 1986 for a similar point). As the size of the foreign population increases the potential for migrants to become a drain on the welfare state, with their often inferior or tenuous labour market attachments, also increases, which may lead policymakers to impose stricter conditionality.

The first model (5) in Table 5.3.7 finds strong support for the hypothesis that size of foreign population matters; we also control here for openness of the political system on the grounds that this is likely to be of special relevance where populations are large, giving migrants greater purchase on the political system.[117] In addition, we might expect size of foreign population to share an affinity with level of conditionality only in certain contexts, such as in situations where official state support for multiculturalism obtains. The next model (6) finds such a moderating effect, where the relationship of size of foreign population to level of conditionality is negative in officially multicultural countries but positive otherwise, and accounts for almost 30% of variance.

The final moderating structural parameter that we explore is the openness of the political system. Where political power is more diffuse and open, offering more opportunities for entrée into the political system, we might expect to find a more pronounced relationship between political positions opposed to migration and the types of migration policy and conditionality migrants are faced with. Testing this possible moderating relationship with the share of the right wing vote indicator (7) returns a non-significant interaction. This may be explicable in terms of what we have already discovered about right-wing political support with regard to migration however, namely that it is itself moderated by historical factors like a country's history of colonialism. In other words, there is a bifurcation of effect with regard to the mechanism presumed to be at the heart of the right-wing vote share indicator. A more direct test of the moderating potential of an open political structure may lie with the anti-migrant attitudes indicator (8) though this model does not explain very much and the interactive relationship does not attain significance.

[117] Though an explicit test of interaction returned a non-significant effect.

5.3.2. Determinants of Citizenship Conditionality

In this section we briefly explore the determinants of citizenship conditionality so as to assess whether and how the determinants of this form of conditionality may differ from those of LTR-conditionality and with what implications for any typological efforts that would seek to take citizenship conditionality as the explanatory focus. As this is not the approach taken here, where conditionality of long-term residency is the primary concern, this section will be exploratory in nature and does not claim to undertake an exhaustive treatment of explanations for citizenship conditionality, leaving this task instead to a future research project where such an analysis would be more appropriate and necessary.

The first model in the table over follows the lead of the earlier analysis, assessing how far the labour market—welfare state nexus can 'explain' the level of conditionality attached to naturalisation. This model does well, returning a significant interaction and explaining more than three times the variance than could be explained with this institutional account for LTR-conditionality. The next models in the table consider the effects of short-run volatile determinants, or determinants prone to a degree of fluctuation. The results are self-explanatory and we have encountered all of the variables here earlier, bar one. This one variable, specific to citizenship conditionality, measures a country's naturalisation rate at a one-year lag. It might be the case that policymakers respond to large shifts in the volumes of those seeking to naturalise and amend the level of citizenship conditionality obtaining accordingly. However, it is also acknowledged that it is difficult to test such an effect here given possible endogeneity issues (conditionality will affect naturalisation rates and vice versa) and given the paucity of data points. Again, a longer time-series and more data will allow future research to better test hypotheses like this one.

In the event, naturalisation rates (C6) do not explain any more variance than the basic model (C1). In fact, almost all of these short-run determinants contribute nothing to the basic model, with the exception of economic growth (one-year lag) and the proportion of highly-skilled migrants in the foreign population though neither attain significance at normal levels. Economic growth averaged over a longer period of the three preceding years (model not shown) does explain about 15% more variance than model C5, suggesting perhaps that factors over the longer duration may have more relevance to the determination of citizenship conditionality.

Table 5.3.8 – Determinants of Citizenship Conditionality

Dep Var: Citizenship Conditionality (8-pt)

	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9
LM flexibility	-0.725	-0.621	-0.826	-0.708	-1.055^	-0.939	-0.257	-0.650	-1.376^
	(0.716)	(0.902)	(0.732)	(0.749)	(0.738)	(0.772)	(1.094)	(0.785)	(0.811)
Welfare Effort (UB-BG)	-0.177	-0.196	-0.179	-0.226	-0.160	-0.121	-0.258	-0.178	-0.063
	(0.223)	(0.251)	(0.225)	(0.299)	(0.217)	(0.237)	(0.269)	(0.232)	(0.226)
[INT]Welfare*LMflexibility	-0.650*	-0.629*	-0.563^	-0.668*	-0.683**	-0.645*	-0.718*	-0.688*	-0.436
	(0.309)	(0.337)	(0.327)	(0.329)	(0.300)	(0.313)	(0.339)	(0.345)	(0.328)
Anti-migrant Attitudes ('02)		-0.013							
		(0.062)							
Right-wing vote %			0.030						
			(0.034)						
Foreign Pop Inflow ('05, log)				-0.160					
				(0.606)					
GDP Growth Rate ('05)					-0.575				
					(0.433)				
Naturalisation Rate ('05)						-0.229			
						(0.281)			
Unemployment Rate ('05)							-0.225		
							(0.389)		
Migrant Unemployment ('04-05)								-0.052	
								(0.169)	
High-skilled (% Tertiary educ)									-0.129^
									(0.087)
Constant	5.247***	5.239***	5.214***	5.254***	5.260***	5.245***	5.272***	5.261***	5.166***
	(0.537)	(0.561)	(0.543)	(0.560)	(0.521)	(0.545)	(0.554)	(0.560)	(0.515)
Adj.R-sq	0.176	0.105	0.161	0.107	0.226	0.153	0.128	0.109	0.252
N	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
F-test	0.158	0.285	0.215	0.282	0.150	0.225	0.255	0.280	0.128
AIC	72.483	74.423	73.377	74.382	72.103	73.542	74.003	74.349	71.555

^ p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 5.3.9 - Determinants of Citizenship Conditionality cont.

Dep Var: Citizenship Conditionality (8-pt)

	C10	C11	C12	C13
LM flexibility	-1.220*	-0.541	-0.765	-1.742**
	(0.601)	(0.810)	(0.806)	(0.645)
Welfare Effort (UB-BG)	0.001	-0.136	-0.171	0.103
	(0.190)	(0.242)	(0.237)	(0.188)
[INT]Welfare*LMflexibility	-0.488*	-0.618*	-0.665*	-0.597**
	(0.254)	(0.323)	(0.343)	(0.246)
Multiculturalism (0,1)	-3.025**			-3.822***
	(1.092)			(1.128)
Decentralisation (0,1)		0.728		
		(1.323)		
Colonialism (0,1)			0.165	1.601^
			(1.234)	(0.979)
Constant	5.942***	4.780***	5.170***	5.382***
	(0.498)	(1.013)	(0.801)	(0.577)
Adj.R-sq	0.471	0.126	0.103	0.541
N	16	16	16	16
F-test	0.024	0.258	0.288	0.020
AIC	66.012	74.049	74.457	64.224

^ p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

]Exploring fixed or time-invariant features of states specifically, we see in model C10 that adding official multiculturalism as an explanatory factor makes a very big difference indeed, allowing us to account for just under half of variance in this type of conditionality when also controlling for labour market and welfare state effects on conditionality. Neither decentralisation of political power nor a history of colonialism, however, seem to have much explanatory power. To the extent that we can push the boat out and add one more variable, while emphasising again the exploratory nature of this analysis, we see that considering history of colonialism alongside multiculturalism and the interplay of welfare state and labour market allows us account for 54% of the variance here. This finding, that citizenship conditionality appears to be explicable in terms of institutional and structural aspects of the state that admit of only secular change is in line with other findings to the effect that nationality laws are often fixed for long periods of time or change only slowly (Brubaker 1992; Bloemraad 2000). In light of this it may be more appropriate to speak of fixed citizenship 'regimes' in a manner that did not seem so appropriate with long-term residency, though to what extent such citizenship regimes would figure in the determination of migrant poverty is another question.

5.4. Conclusions

This chapter set out to explore the possibilities for forming a regime-typological account of migrant poverty determination taking conditionality of LTR status and welfare effort as its two key dimensions. The chapter employed a battery of exploratory and analytic, formal and informal, multivariate and hypothetico-deductive methods to address three broad questions concerning the nature of conditionality and implications for regime-typologising.

The analysis showed that there are some broad structural regularities, or 'elective affinities' (Shalev 2007), in terms of how the state policy measures deemed most relevant to migrant poverty hang together. States with flexible labour markets tended to apply high conditionality to residency status where welfare benefits were high, while this pattern was reversed in states with rigid labour markets. Various outliers to this account revealed how conditionality is not simply a redundant emanation of other features of the state, and does not share a perfect congruence with certain structural-institutional configurations (Question 1).

Cluster analysis on conditionality and welfare state indicators – both with and without a third labour market indicator – revealed the existence of four distinct groups of countries which were labelled as regime-types, the predictive power of which will be tested in the next chapter. Each of these regime types was explored by means of tabular analysis to ascertain each type's characteristics, with a view to determining whether any other factors might usefully be added to the typology and with a view to determining what factors should be controlled for when testing for the effects of conditionality on migrant poverty outcomes. The four-type regime account appears to be a parsimonious expression of some of the key factors we hypothesise to play a role in the determination of migrant poverty and enlarging the typology was deemed both intellectually and empirically unnecessary (Question 2). Further cluster analysis involving other political, historical, and legal-institutional features of the state found that the categorisation of countries remained stable, while the tabular analysis pointed to this in a different way with none of these variables sharing an affinity with any single conditionality configuration, i.e. no variable is coterminous with either 'high' or 'low' conditionality.

Fig 5.4.1 – Migrant Inflows, variation over time



Source: SOPEMI (2008, 295); data based on population registers.

Other political and economic determinants were held to be descriptive of the regime types and unsuitable for inclusion as extra dimensions in any typology given their propensity for short-term volatility and fluctuation; political vote-share and attitudinal preferences towards migrants are not static, nor are inflows or rates of economic growth. To illustrate this point in a more meaningful way we can consider Fig. 5.4.1, showing variations in inflows to select European countries over the last number of years.

To summarise some of these trends we can say over this short series of less than a decade there have been some major short-term shifts in foreign population inflows: inflows to Sweden more than doubled over the period; inflows to the Netherlands increased to a peak of about 90,000 per year before declining by about one-third in volume within three years; inflows to Austria almost doubled in the six years after 1998 before dropping back to a level about 20% below peak. These shifts are marked and, within each country, contextually rather large. They are dwarfed by inflow increases in e.g. Spain (not in graph) where inflows increased by about 800% from 1999-2006 (SOPEMI 2008, 295).

Leaving aside short-term volatility of determinants for the moment, are there any other possible indicators that could fruitfully be added as an extra dimension to this nascent typology? The only likely candidate amongst these indicators for potential substruction of the property space concerns migrant skill levels. The entry criteria applicable to TCN migrants constitute a policy lever with the potential to shape, over time,

the skills composition of the migrant cohort, with clear implications for efforts to predict migrant poverty. However, the addition of such a dimension could engender conceptual difficulties as well as posing severe measurement challenges: as it is, the simple two-way typology determining poverty consists of policy measures that apply only to migrants *actually residing* in the state, but the addition of an entry criteria dimension would need to have regard to the historical development of migrant entry policies for each country so as the quantify and test their effect. Such an effort would pose a severe challenge for accurate measurement, but the greater – conceptual – difficulty is that there would arguably exist a temporal disconnect between such an additional *retrospective* dimension and the existing dimensions which we conceive of as operating prospectively. Undoubtedly skill level matters for cross-national explanations of migrant poverty, but it seems here that the most satisfactory approach to addressing this is to control for skill level alongside other hypothesised (regime) effects.[118]

The final question posed at the outset of this chapter concerned the nature of conditionality itself and the implications this might have for proposed typologies using conditionality as a constitutive dimension. The migration theory and migration policy literature provides a theoretical basis on which to test hypotheses concerning the factors that may shape and determine the level of conditionality obtaining in a given state. Controlling for what we already know to be the broad structural parameters with which conditionality tends to share affinities within states, what else can we learn about the reasons for variation in conditionality across states?

There are some data constraints in this regard, already discussed above, but the analysis clearly indicated that volatile phenomena that we expect to feed into the policy process significantly predicted variations in conditionality across states. Things like economic, attitudes, inflows and political preferences all helped to explain a country's level of conditionality. Many of these phenomena were also seen to be moderated in the context of time-invariant state characteristics such as the political structure or the state's history, indicating that some of these short-term factors would not even have uniform effects across states.

That policies are liable to change is hardly a groundbreaking observation. But to the extent that our prior theoretical expectations with regard to certain variables and the results from the empirical analysis all support a view of conditionality as subject to fluctuation in

[118] Also both of the regime types with low conditionality (Inclusionary, Liberal) were seen to have the highest average skill levels of migrants relative to the other types and so this dimension would not be orthogonal to existing ones and would result in the production of numerous empirically redundant cells.

line with short-term aspects of the socio-economic and political context, then surely this must problematise the characterisation of conditionality as being 'regime-like' in the sense of taking a stable and predictable form. Conditionality attached to naturalisation on the other hand, though it is not the primary focus of our theoretical or empirical analysis here, was seen to be largely explicable in terms of fixed state characteristics.

The finding about LTR conditionality, that it is liable to short-run determination, directly addresses Kasza's (2002) concern that the policymaking process is often ignored by regime theorists and acknowledges Bambra's (2006) critique that policy measures are not often characterised by stasis. Its import for efforts to advance a regime typology with regard to migrant poverty determinants is to highlight the need to re-measure and reassess the empirical situation regularly as more data becomes available, while at the same time forcing an awareness of the qualitatively different situation faced by TCNs. Conditionality may be subject to rapid change in a manner that broader welfare state and labour market configurations, often characterised by path dependency (Pierson 2000), will not be; this is something with implications not just for academics wishing to discuss state policy approaches and build typologies, but for real-world migrant lives-as-lived.

In sum, there does appear to be some family-like grouping of similar countries on the policy measures and institutional factors explored here. Groups of states imposing unfavourable policy configurations on migrants were also seen to share other characteristics that may themselves, independently, impact on poverty outcomes while simultaneously retaining the capacity to influence conditionality levels. Caution should perhaps be exercised before labelling these regularities as 'regimes' however, given our findings on the short-run determinants of conditionality. Continuous monitoring of developments within these 'regimes', acknowledging their seeming protean nature, and careful attendance to the complexity and reflexivity of their multiple interlocking determinative pathways will be an ongoing research challenge for those interested in the description and theorising of migrant poverty. It is to the analytical testing of the hypothesised interactive effect of our key variables on such poverty that we now turn, in the next chapter.

6. Conditionality as a Determinant of Migrant Poverty

6.1. Introduction

In this chapter we bring the concept of conditionality of legal status to bear on the determination of TCN poverty. The chapter shows that the broad hypothesis explored throughout this thesis finds robust support insofar as conditionality is seen to interact with state institutional factors, notably the level of welfare benefits a state provides but also labour market factors, in a manner determinative of migrant poverty outcomes, even controlling for important covariates. We begin by looking at determinants of (income) poverty at the macro-level in small-N regressions before moving to the main focus of the chapter, analysis of the SILC microdata by means of multilevel modelling.

The central focus will be on poverty as material deprivation though other dependent variables will also be modelled including income poverty and consistent poverty. Aspects of our theoretical model will also be fleshed out by exploring the role of conditionality in determining transitions to more secure forms of legal status and also its theorised indirect impacts on poverty by means of labour market interactions. It will also be possible to test whether our regime type indicators have predictive capacity. Having explored each of these aspects in turn, select residual diagnostics will be presented at the end of the chapter, followed by concluding remarks.

6.2. Macro-level regressions

Table 6.1 – Macro-level poverty rate regressions

Dep Var: % TCNs in Poverty (SILC measure)

	1	2	3	4	5
Welfare Effort (UB-BG)	-0.935	-0.997	-0.989	-1.129^	-0.937
	(0.828)	(0.853)	(0.749)	(0.798)	(0.786)
LTR Conditionality		-0.549	-0.986	-1.072	-1.262
		(0.886)	(0.802)	(0.833)	(1.064)
[INT]LTR*BG			-0.820**	-0.698^	-0.730^
			(0.371)	(0.425)	(0.441)
LM flexibility				1.849	
				(2.872)	
High-skilled (% Tertiary)					-0.152
					(0.366)
Constant	24.906***	24.906***	24.364***	24.443***	24.423***
	(1.990)	(2.036)	(1.804)	(1.853)	(1.875)
Adj.R-sq	0.018	-0.027	0.209	0.168	0.150
N	16	16	16	16	16
F-test	0.278	0.470	0.127	0.208	0.228
AIC	113.658	115.192	111.739	113.147	113.488

^ p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

This table tests the underlying central hypothesis at the macro level. This is a preliminary analysis, constrained by the very small number of cases, and prior to the in-depth analysis of microdata in the next section. The dependent variable is the proportion of TCN migrants in each country classified as being 'in poverty' according to the SILC relative income poverty measure. First, we model the effect of welfare on the proportion in poverty (1) and note the expected negative effect, though this does not attain significance. The next model (2) adds the LTR-conditionality variable alone, and this too has no significant effect. However, in the next model (3) we test for the expected presence of interaction and note a significant interaction at the .05 level, accounting for over one-fifth of the variance in the dependent variable. This finding is consistent with our theoretical expectations. The residual plot below (Fig. 6.1) shows some clear outliers for this model (3) however, notably Belgium and Denmark. These two cases are very similar as regards the independent variables used here, with both states imposing low LTR-conditionality while having generous welfare systems. They have very different rates of TCN income poverty however.

Fig. 6.1 – Residual plots, select models



Belgium records the highest levels of income poverty for this set of countries at over 40%, despite having low conditionality and generous welfare supports, suggesting the relevance of other explanatory factors to poverty in this case. Denmark records a very low rate of income poverty (12%) in actuality, though the model predicts a much higher rate than this, overestimating the rate by almost 15 percentage points. Later controls may help close this gap. The final two models in the table test for the robustness of the interaction to the inclusion of other determinants relevant to the proportion of migrants living in income poverty. Inclusion of labour market flexibility (4) in fact adds nothing to the model – explaining less variance and not attaining statistical significance – while the interaction remains only very weakly 'significant'. This is not a helpful addition to the model. Likewise the addition of migrant skill levels as an explanatory factor at the macro level (5) adds nothing of value to the model.

Table 6.2 – Macro-level poverty rate regressions

Dep Var: % TCNs in Poverty (SILC measure)

	6	7	8	9
LTR Conditionality	-1.001	-0.974	-0.955	-0.985^
	(0.761)	(0.717)	(0.756)	(0.685)
Welfare Effort (UB-BG)	-0.696	-1.056^	-0.994	-1.681**
	(0.735)	(0.670)	(0.795)	(0.713)
[INT]LTR*BG	-0.540	-0.576^		
	(0.397)	(0.354)		
Unemployment Rate ('05)	1.357^		2.073**	
	(0.887)		(0.798)	
Migrant Unemployment ('04-05)		0.932*		0.708^
		(0.466)		(0.488)
[INT]LTR*Unemp			-0.477	
			(0.357)	
[INT]LTR*MigUnemp				-0.537*
				(0.275)
Constant	24.549***	24.525***	25.282***	25.246***
	(1.715)	(1.615)	(1.722)	(1.544)
Adj.R-sq	0.288	0.367	0.285	0.416
N	16	16	16	16
F-test	0.102	0.058	0.104	0.039
AIC	110.647	108.775	110.730	107.475

^ p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The next table controls for level of national unemployment, both in general and at the migrant-specific unemployment rate. In the general unemployment model (6) the interaction itself loses significance while the unemployment variable could be considered very weakly 'significant'. The migrant-specific model does better (7), with the unemployment variable significant (.10 level) and the interaction weakly significant. This latter model accounts for over 36% of variance. Denmark remains a clear outlier under this model (Fig. 6.1), though Belgium has moved closer to the zero-residual line indicating that poor labour market integration accounts for part of the large TCN poverty rate in that country.

Let us consider at this point how we expect the macro-level unemployment rate to impact on the proportion of TCNs in poverty. In general, as the unemployment rate increases and more people lose their jobs we naturally expect the proportion of the impoverished to rise. But this effect is likely to be moderated in the context of the developed European welfare state, by the extent to which migrant access to that welfare state is rendered contingent on legal status and subject to conditionality. Interacting conditionality with the *general* level of unemployment (8) here adds little of value.

However, given the specificities of the migrant position in the labour market, subject to discrimination, language barriers, social and human capital deficits, interacting conditionality with the migrant-specific rate is perhaps more justified. This model (9) reveals a significant interaction between conditionality and migrant-specific unemployment,

allowing us to explain over 40% of variance in the dependent variable. The residuals are also well behaved (Fig. 6.1), though Denmark remains something of an outlier. These are very encouraging results on the relevance of conditionality of legal status to the determination of migrant poverty, even though still at the small-N and macro levels of explanation.

Another central expectation of our theoretical framework is that conditionality will impact on migrant poverty indirectly, in tandem with the security attached to that status. Insecure legal status is implicated in labour forcing and the toleration of inferior pay or working conditions, where the right to remain in the host country may be jeopardised when migrants fall out of the labour market. The direct effect of the insecurity of legal status on poverty is also likely to be modified by the difficulties of attaining the next most secure legal status in the hierarchy (this specific hypothesis is tested in the next section utilising microdata[119]). Where that status is difficult to acquire migrants may subsist in inferior life situations, accepting conditions they otherwise may not have tolerated in order to attain the more secure legal status. Subsistence in inferior labour market positions, or underemployment, can have scarring effects which may damage future prospects by the erosion of human capital and has also been implicated in negative psychological and health outcomes for the underemployed which may have their own effects on poverty (Glyde 1977; Dooley and Prause 2004).

Table 6.3 – Macro-level poverty regressions, security of status

Dep Var: % TCNs in Poverty (SILC measure)

	1	2	3
LTR Conditionality	-0.648	-0.980^	4.418**
	(0.801)	(0.655)	(1.893)
Security of LTR status	3.790*	5.452***	5.080***
	(1.765)	(1.537)	(1.203)
Welfare Effort (UB-BG)		-1.904**	-1.835***
		(0.671)	(0.523)
[INT]LTR*BG			-0.713**
			(0.241)
Constant	24.906***	24.906***	24.434***
	(1.839)	(1.480)	(1.164)
Adj.R-sq	0.162	0.457	0.670
N	16	16	16
F-test	0.125	0.016	0.002
AIC	111.934	105.712	98.327

^ p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

[119] This hypothesis finds no support here where N=16.

The next table (6.3) looks at some of these hypothesised relationships. First we consider the effects of the conditionality and security alone (1) and, while security is significant, the result is positive, against expectations. This model says that greater security of long-term residency is associated with *higher* levels of income poverty. The next model controls for the effect of welfare generosity (2), which is significant and in the expected direction, though now security of LTR status is even stronger in magnitude and at the most demanding significance level. This model accounts for a large amount of variance in income poverty rates across Europe, at a little over 45% of total variance.

Finally we control for security alongside the central hypothesised interaction of conditionality with welfare effort; the interaction is significant and security of status remains positive and significant at the most demanding level. This model possesses a high degree of explanatory power, accounting for a very large amount – over two-thirds – of variance in TCN poverty rates across Europe. The residual plot (Fig. 6.1) is the 'best behaved' thus far. That higher levels of security in LTR status should correlate with higher levels of poverty is puzzling however. How to account for this?

It could be hypothesised, in line with 'welfare magnet' (Borjas 1999) arguments, that greater security leads to complacency and that some migrants opt for more tenuous labour market attachments or for greater reliance on welfare having achieved social rights-granting legal status. But this is mere conjecture and must await further study. Also, without knowing the precise ratio of temporary to LTR migrants in each country we are limited in what we can say about this. It should be borne in mind that the relationship of security to poverty is largely driven by a couple of cases, notably our outliers Belgium and Denmark but also by Ireland (Fig. 4.4). Removing these cases from that scatterplot may substantially attenuate the positive relationship.

Ireland's low levels of TCN poverty is probably better accounted for by the fact of the (relatively new) immigrants being exceptionally well-educated, with security of LTR status probably of less relevance to their welfare. The association of relatively low security of status with low levels of poverty in Denmark suggests a need for closer study of the hypothesised mechanism here perhaps at the case study level; it is possible that lack of security is a spur to deeper labour market integration and that, in itself, reduces the likelihood of poverty. While security is high in Belgium and other policy parameters are favourable, migrants there also face other unfavourable conditions, including a very high

rate of anti-migrant attitudes[120] and poor labour market integration measures which may make it difficult for migrants to find work (Niessen, Huddleston, and Citron 2007, 28).

Finally, there is only so much that macro-level aggregate poverty measurements can tell us. These data cannot get at the differentiation of migrant experience nor do they tell us anything about effects of these policy measures on the intensity of poverty. We will address these issues in the next section where we utilise microdata. What this section has clearly shown is substantive and significant empirical support, in line with our theoretical framework, for the hypothesis that conditionality of rights-granting legal status is implicated in the determination of TCN poverty at the macro level. Next, we turn to explore the effects of our hypothesised determinants on outcomes at the micro level.

[120] Addition of this indicator to a model not shown reduced Belgium's residual by about two percentage points.

6.3. MLM Results: Material Deprivation

6.3.1. Explaining Material Deprivation of TCN-migrants

As a preamble to building our model, it will be useful to demonstrate the import of the above methodological discussion on trade-offs in the choice of estimation method. Table 6.3.1 below presents baseline (null) models of the 7-point deprivation index, utilising GLS estimation with robust standard errors to correct for clustering of the 28 country-years within the 14 'country' units.[121] MLE estimation and REML are also presented.[122] As can be seen the standard errors on the constant (in parentheses) are higher and more exacting with cluster-corrected GLS estimation, though this does not impact on inference, i.e. significance levels (of the constant) remain the same across specifications. The baseline figure for the variance component here, .522 on the REML model, will serve as a means of computing R-squared values for level-2 as we add more variables; this value for the variance decreases as we add variables (generally) and the difference in variance explained by each variable can be used to calculate R^2.

Table 6.3.1 – Choice of estimation method

Dep Var: 7-point Deprivation Index

	GLS-Robust	MLE28	REML28
Constant	1.645***	1.645***	1.645***
	(0.142)	(0.098)	(0.100)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)		0.513***	
		(0.070)	
sd(Residual)		1.515***	
		(0.007)	
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)			0.522***
			(0.072)
sd(Residual)			1.515***
			(0.007)
N	23573	23573	23573
AIC	.	86602	86605
Chi-sq		0	.
Log-likelihood		-43298	-43299
Rho	0.106	0.103	

Note: random effect estimate for GLS = .521, Residual = 1.515
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

[121] The 'Rho' value, or intraclass correlation, in the table is the percentage of variance 'explained' by the country-year clusters alone, analogous to R^2 in linear regression.

[122] GLS estimation does not report standard errors on the random effects, though it does report estimates for these effects; they are reported in the note attached to the table.

The (REML) model is essentially saying that in the absence of any variables the predicted value, i.e. the intercept, on the deprivation index is 1.645, while the random effect (random intercept) value indicates that the country-year clusters vary in their intercepts around this value with an estimated standard deviation[123] of .522. Within the clusters, the estimated residual standard deviation around the cluster-specific regression lines is 1.515.[124] In the next table (6.3.2) we begin to add our key level-2 explanatory variables of interest. The first column (1) shows the effect of LTR-conditionality alone, which is no effect. Adding level of welfare effort in the next model (2) we see that increasing levels of benefit generosity significantly ($p<.10$) predicts lower levels of deprivation. However, in the final model of the table (3), interacting benefit generosity and conditionality, we note a highly significant interaction effect, indicating that the effect of welfare on migrant poverty is significantly moderated by level of conditionality attached to long-term residency status, the status granting *de facto* access to the welfare system *(H1)*. This is a most encouraging result. Other LTR-conditionality indicators that were not included in the index itself, mentioned in §3.3.2, were not seen to be significantly implicated in the determination of migrant poverty (see Appendix A.4).

Table 6.3.2 – Effects of Conditionality and Welfare Effort (Interaction) on Poverty

Dep Var: 7-point Deprivation Index

	1	2	3
L2: LTR Conditionality	0.025	0.014	0.024
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.030)
L2: Benefit Generosity		-0.075*	-0.097***
		(0.038)	(0.028)
L2__LTR*BG			-0.065***
			(0.014)
Constant	1.658***	1.703***	1.644***
	(0.103)	(0.100)	(0.074)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	0.529***	0.501***	0.364***
	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.055)
sd(Residual)	1.515***	1.515***	1.515***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
N	23573	23573	23573
F-test	0.549	0.121	0.000
AIC	86611	86614	86606
Chi-sq	.359	4.23	30.5
Log-likelihood	-43301	-43302	-43297

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

[123] We say 'standard deviation' as the estimated random effects are here reported as the square root of the estimated variance components, and the standard deviation is mathematically defined as the square root of the variance.

[124] On this interpretational point see Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal (2008, 154).

Table 6.3.3 – Check on estimation method of interaction

Interaction: REML vs. GLS w/ robust S.E.s

	REML28	GLS28-Robust
L2: Benefit Generosity	-0.097***	-0.097**
	(0.028)	(0.031)
L2: LTR Conditionality	0.024	0.024
	(0.030)	(0.035)
L2_LTR*BG	-0.065***	-0.065***
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Constant	1.644***	1.644***
	(0.074)	(0.081)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	0.364***	
	(0.055)	
sd(Residual)	1.515***	
	(0.007)	
N	23573	23573
F-test	0.000	0.000
AIC	86606.163	.
Chi-sq	30.5	24.2
Log-likelihood	-43297	
rho		.0553

Note: random effect estimate for GLS = .366, Residual = 1.515
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

The reduction in the random intercept from baseline value (.522) to .364 in this model indicates a level-2 R^2 of 51.4%, which is a large amount of variance to explain with a simple two-way interaction.[125] As a conservative check on this result, Table 6.3.3 briefly presents the same results side by side for both REML and robust GLS estimation; despite minor expected increases in standard errors with cluster correction, inference remains robust and substantive conclusions unchanged.

Using the results from this REML model we can also graph the interaction effect for a clearer understanding of the dynamic at work. As can be seen overleaf, Fig. 6.3.1, as welfare generosity increases to its highest levels poverty is predicted to converge to the same point regardless of level of conditionality.[126] This is as expected: more welfare means less poverty. More precisely, at mean conditionality (dashed line) the predicted level of deprivation decreases as welfare effort increases, as expected.

[125] Calculation as follows: $[((.522)^2 - (.364)^2) / (.522)^2]$

[126] Graph generated by taking derivatives of welfare effort at varying levels of LTR-conditionality and saving results to a matrix, for the slopes, and calculating intercepts at the empirically minimum value of welfare effort at the same levels of conditionality. "Derivatives of responses are themselves responses ... [and] are of interest because they are an informative way of summarizing fitted results. The change in a response for a change in the covariate is easy to understand and to explain." (StataCorp 2009b, 975)

Fig. 6.3.1 – Effect of welfare effort on poverty, varying levels LTR-conditionality



Note: Author's own calculations from model 'REML28', Table 6.3.3. Generated in Stata 11.1/SE

Two points below the mean (line A) the regression line is practically flat, indicating no significant effect, or that at low levels of conditionality predicted poverty is low regardless of level of welfare benefits. At maximum conditionality (D) the intercept for poverty is very high at low levels of welfare effort, and predicted poverty decreases as welfare levels increase. These results indicate a relationship between conditionality and welfare levels in line with theoretical expectations. They also indicate that higher conditionality affects TCNs most detrimentally in welfare systems with low levels of support and protection.

The first model in Table 6.3.4 controls for the set of determinants at the individual level. It is important to control for these factors in the context of multilevel modelling so as to be sure that any inter-group differences[127] detected in the outcome variable are not actually simply the result of differences in the composition of migrant groups from country to country (i.e. in the characteristics of the individuals comprising the groups), otherwise known as compositional effects (Snijders and Bosker 1999).

[127] i.e. Differences between the level-2 units.

Table 6.3.4 - Central lvl-2 interaction with lvl-1 controls

Dep Var: 7-point Deprivation Index

	1
L2: Benefit Generosity	-0.067**
	(0.025)
L2: LTR Conditionality	0.021
	(0.026)
L2__LTR*BG	-0.053***
	(0.012)
Naturalised (0, 1)	-0.520***
	(0.020)
Age (low)	-0.052**
	(0.026)
Age (high) [Ref: mid]	0.113***
	(0.023)
Sex (F = 1)	-0.039**
	(0.019)
Primary	0.927***
	(0.033)
LwrSecondary	0.539***
	(0.028)
UprSecondary [Ref: Tertiary]	0.182***
	(0.024)
Married (0, 1)	-0.317***
	(0.022)
Unemployed (0, 1)	0.731***
	(0.034)
SingleParent (0, 1)	0.786***
	(0.049)
Household size	-0.034***
	(0.006)
Constant	1.839***
	(0.073)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	0.317***
	(0.048)
sd(Residual)	1.428***
	(0.007)
N	23573
F-test	0.000
AIC	83886.943
Chi-sq	3018
Log-likelihood	-41926

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

As can be seen, all of these determinants are significant at 5% with most being highly significant. Addition of these level-1 determinants reduces the random intercept to .317, allowing us to account for 63.1% of level-2 variance. The individual level effects all run in the expected direction: those with lower levels of education relative to those with third-level education are all predicted under this model to experience higher levels of deprivation; the unemployed and single parent families are also predicted to have higher levels of deprivation, relative to all other employment and family structure statuses

respectively; those who are older/elderly experience more poverty than those who are of prime working age; marriage appears to entail advantages insofar as those who are married experience less poverty than those of any other marital status; larger households endure less deprivation, likely due to having more economically active members. Whether or not a migrant has naturalised and attained the citizenship of his or her host country is seen to be a highly significant factor with regard to material deprivation; TCN migrants who have naturalised experience less deprivation, in the order of over half a unit less on our seven-point index, than non-naturalised migrants, even controlling for age, sex, skill-level and family type.

The central level-2 interaction of interest remains significant even controlling for these other variables. Shortly, we will disaggregate the sample to look more closely at non-citizens and citizens separately. Substantively, the results presented in this table tell us that – even when controlling for the individual level determinants of poverty – the generosity of the welfare benefits system *in interaction with* the conditionality attached to receiving those benefits for TCN-migrants works to determine migrant deprivation in significantly different ways across countries. Benefit generosity plays an independent predictive role with regard to deprivation, as we would expect, though these results provide robust evidence that benefits are moderated by the conditionality attached to same, consistent with the overarching thesis of this research project.

In the next table (6.3.5) we control for some other possible level-2 determinants of migrant poverty alongside the central interaction. While all of these indicators are significant and of theoretical relevance to the dependent variable, none of them individually invalidates the central finding. The interaction of conditionality with welfare effort is robust to the inclusion of these other hypothesised determinants. The ratio of cases to variables here, at 7:1, is perhaps not ideal and some authors recommend a much higher ratio, e.g. in the range of 15:1 to 25:1 (Schmidt 1971). However, this is an issue of some contention (Green 1991) and the ratio in this instance remains within the range of accepted practice, with both Kenworthy (2007) and Tabachnick and Fidell (1989, cited in Green 1991) suggesting that a ratio of 5:1, at minimum, is sufficient. Given that this is a contested area, the models in Table 6.3.5 should perhaps be interpreted with more caution than the models reported elsewhere in this chapter. Also, it is worth observing that future research on this topic could avail of more level-2 data (i.e. new country-year observations) which would allow for the testing of these hypotheses in the context of a healthier case-to-variable ratio.

Table 6.3.5 – Other level-2 controls

Dep Var: 7-point Deprivation Index

	CitCon	EPL	Unemp	Anti-mig
L2: LTR Conditionality	0.045*	-0.006	0.014	-0.011
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.019)
L2: Benefit Generosity	-0.085***	-0.086***	-0.048**	-0.051**
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.017)
L2__LTR*BG	-0.050***	-0.040***	-0.036**	-0.046***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.008)
L2: Cit'ship Conditionality	-0.074**			
	(0.032)			
L2:Labour Market Flex.(EPL)		0.235**		
		(0.090)		
L2: Unemployment Rate (05)			0.081**	
			(0.034)	
L2: Anti-migrant Attitudes (02)				0.021***
				(0.004)
Naturalised (0, 1)	-0.521***	-0.520***	-0.521***	-0.520***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Household size	-0.034***	-0.034***	-0.034***	-0.034***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Constant	1.814***	1.840***	1.850***	1.798***
	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.056)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	0.293***	0.284***	0.289***	0.213***
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.034)
sd(Residual)	1.428***	1.428***	1.428***	1.428***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
N	23573	23573	23573	23573
F-test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
AIC	83889	83886	83889	83879
Chi-sq	3031	3036	3032	3100
Log-likelihood	-41927	-41925	-41926	-41922

Note: All level-1 variables included but some output suppressed
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

The first model controls for citizenship conditionality, finding that higher levels of citizenship conditionality significantly predicts lower levels of deprivation. This finding may be explicable where there is a correlation between citizenship conditionality and frequency of naturalisation[128]; in high citizenship-conditionality countries those migrants who do naturalise successfully are likely to be the secure, employed 'successful' migrants who can fulfil all of the relevant conditions and who are generally the types of migrants less likely to experience poverty – this would explain the correlation in the above table.

In the second model we see a significant and positive correlation between the inflexibility of a country's labour market and the level of material deprivation experienced by its TCN migrant population. Where inflexibility increases by one unit on the EPL index so too does material deprivation increase, by .235 units on our 7-point index; where it is difficult to enter into the labour market migrants are predicted, under this model, to experience more poverty.

[128] A later section in this chapter indicates that high citizenship conditionality significantly predicts lower odds of migrant naturalisation.

The next model controls for a country's unemployment rate. This rate can be taken as an indication of the general state of a country's economy and also provides an indication of labour market opportunity, demand, and capacity not just for TCN migrants but for society as a whole. As expected, increasing unemployment positively and significantly predicts higher levels of material deprivation.

The next model finds a highly significant effect for anti-migrant attitudes impacting on migrant deprivation, in the expected direction. This is in line with our theoretical framework and expectations that micro-level factors like attitudes feed directly into the process of migrant poverty determination, with widespread discrimination in a given society potentially increasing social distance and thus influencing hiring decisions (DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2005), or forcing migrants into geographical and spatial concentrations that themselves contribute to exclusion and poverty (Hills, Le Grand, and Piachaud 2002, 3). The anti-migrant attitudes model accounts for more variance (see reduction in random intercept) than any other model, explaining 83.3% of level-2 variance.

As a confirmatory check on the robustness of these findings we can re-specify the central model of interest using an alternative operationalisation of the welfare effort indicator. The results of this alternative approach, operationalising welfare effort as the amount of social spending assigned to income support, indicates a significant interaction in line with above findings and the results are reported in the Appendix (A.4).

We next vary the target of inference by disaggregating the undifferentiated sample of TCNs we have been working with so far into sub-groups defined according to labour-market status and citizenship status to assess whether the central finding holds up when looking at these different sub-groups. Table 6.3.6 looks firstly at those TCNs who do not hold the formal citizenship status of their host country.

The first two models show the results for, firstly, those whose self-defined economic status places them firmly within the labour market nexus, namely those employed in either full/part time work and those who are unemployed, i.e. not working but willing to work according to the 'self-defined current economic status' indicator,[129] and secondly those who are outside of the labour market nexus due to being one of the retired, a student, a homemaker or on compulsory national/military service.

[129] Variable pl030 in the SILC dataset.

Table 6.3.6 - Varying the target of inference by labour market status and legal status

Target of Inference: NON-Naturalised migrants

	All	Active	Others
L2: LTR Conditionality	0.009	0.016	0.007
	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.021)
L2: Benefit Generosity	-0.110***	-0.109**	-0.109***
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.022)
L2__LTR*BG	-0.071***	-0.066***	-0.078***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.011)
Age (low)	0.001	-0.076*	-0.049
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.066)
Age (high) [Ref: mid]	0.044	-0.078	-0.064
	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.066)
Sex (F = 1)	-0.120***	-0.193***	-0.236***
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.058)
Primary	0.861***	0.953***	0.648***
	(0.048)	(0.060)	(0.080)
LwrSecondary	0.505***	0.632***	0.289***
	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.074)
UprSecondary [Ref: Tertiary]	0.133***	0.258***	0.006
	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.072)
Married (0, 1)	-0.220***	-0.262***	-0.105*
	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.059)
Unemployed (0, 1)	0.651***	0.846***	
	(0.048)	(0.048)	
Household size	-0.051***	-0.068***	-0.058***
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.015)
SingleParent (0, 1)	0.832***	0.758***	0.994***
	(0.080)	(0.096)	(0.141)
Constant	1.862***	1.765***	2.269***
	(0.086)	(0.106)	(0.111)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	0.340***	0.433***	0.212***
	(0.054)	(0.067)	(0.050)
sd(Residual)	1.499***	1.432***	1.573***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.018)
N	11523	7534	3989
F-test	0.000	0.000	0.000
AIC	42203.040	26950.796	15039.849
Chi-sq	933	908	249
Log-likelihood	-21086	-13459	-7505

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

The effect for the central welfare effort-LTR conditionality interaction remains significant across both these categories of non-citizen TCNs. As expected, we detect some differences in effects at the individual level: e.g. for those who are not engaged with the labour market ('Others') the deprivation deficit for low levels of education is less than for those in the labour market, and being a single parent is more detrimental if one has no labour market involvement than otherwise.

Table 6.3.7 - Varying the target of inference by labour market status and legal status

Target of Inference: Naturalised citizens

	All	Active	Others
L2: LTR Conditionality	0.025	0.032	0.013
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)
L2: Benefit Generosity	-0.043*	-0.045*	-0.022
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
L2__LTR*BG	-0.051***	-0.045***	-0.058***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Age (low)	-0.126**	-0.042	-0.580***
	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.076)
Age (high) [Ref: mid]	0.180***	-0.085**	0.077
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.061)
Sex (F = 1)	0.038	-0.098***	0.077*
	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.045)
Primary	0.943***	0.893***	0.673***
	(0.046)	(0.061)	(0.071)
LwrSecondary	0.517***	0.523***	0.288***
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.061)
UprSecondary [Ref: Tertiary]	0.189***	0.300***	-0.044
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.059)
Married (0, 1)	-0.432***	-0.283***	-0.634***
	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.053)
Unemployed (0, 1)	0.809***	1.021***	
	(0.047)	(0.045)	
Household size	-0.011	-0.004	-0.024*
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.015)
SingleParent (0, 1)	0.711***	0.748***	0.859***
	(0.061)	(0.070)	(0.111)
Constant	1.222***	1.015***	1.898***
	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.112)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	0.296***	0.290***	0.281***
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.052)
sd(Residual)	1.341***	1.220***	1.446***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.015)
N	12050	7362	4688
F-test	0.000	0.000	0.000
AIC	41436.905	23982.834	16890.918
Chi-sq	1524	1283	493
Log-likelihood	-20702	-11975	-8430

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

For those TCNs who have attained naturalised citizen status (Table 6.3.7) we note that the central interaction remains significant, in line with our conceptualisation of LTR conditionality playing a primary role in the progressive, stepwise process of legal status acquisition. Other significant effects differ for naturalised citizens by labour market status: educational deficits translate into poverty deficits of a greater magnitude for those working compared to those not working; active females experience less poverty than males whereas female non-workers experience more poverty; older active citizens experience less poverty than the active in mid-age, perhaps due to possessing greater experience, marriage appears to bring distinct benefits in terms of poverty alleviation for those outside the labour market, certainly much more so than for those with a labour market attachment.

The theoretical framework outlined earlier also specified an indirect effect of conditionality on poverty through the labour market. This involved the role of insecurity, where the insecurity of residency status was theorised to induce poverty by means of labour forcing or toleration of inferior pay or work conditions to retain employment on which residency status is contingent. It is important to remark on our conceptual model here before proceeding. We test for the effect of the security of LTR status in interaction with *citizenship* conditionality – not LTR conditionality – as the expectation here is that the effect of (in)security of the presently held legal status on labour market attainment will be moderated by the conditionality attached to attaining the *next most secure* legal status in the hierarchy. In other words, the extent to which insecure LTR status is expected to tend towards labour forcing varies according to whether the next most secure status, i.e. citizenship, is difficult to attain or whether it is relatively easy to attain.

To assess this we take as our dependent variable in these models the ISCO-88 categorisation of jobs and job types by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). High values on this indicator denote poorly paid, low skill jobs, and so we can thin of this variable as a sort of 'job desirability index'. Where higher conditionality predicts higher values on the index, controlling for other likely determinants of holding a poor job, then this can be interpreted as evidence in support of the labour forcing account theorised here.

Table 6.3.8 – Conditionality of legal status and labour market attainment

Dep Var: Occupational Attainment (ISCO-88)

	1	2	3
L2: LTR Conditionality	0.058	0.267	
	(0.430)	(0.301)	
L2: Benefit Generosity	-0.070	-0.043	
	(0.436)	(0.289)	
L2: Security of LTR status	1.536		-0.222
	(0.986)		(1.045)
L2: Cit'ship Conditionality			0.045
			(0.442)
L2__LTR*BG		-0.737***	
		(0.140)	
L2__CitCon*LTRsecurity			-1.067**
			(0.398)
Naturalised (0, 1)	-8.228***	-8.192***	-8.256***
	(0.371)	(0.370)	(0.370)
Sex (F = 1)	-2.286***	-2.286***	-2.284***
	(0.340)	(0.340)	(0.340)
Primary	25.173***	25.161***	25.178***
	(0.610)	(0.609)	(0.609)
LwrSecondary	23.789***	23.799***	23.784***
	(0.505)	(0.504)	(0.504)
UprSecondary [Ref: Tertiary]	14.211***	14.225***	14.201***
	(0.431)	(0.431)	(0.431)
Constant	46.480***	45.568***	45.790***
	(1.220)	(0.958)	(1.146)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	5.172***	3.602***	4.508***
	(0.781)	(0.575)	(0.687)
sd(Residual)	22.841***	22.841***	22.841***
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)
N	18491	18491	18491
F-test	0.000	0.000	0.000
AIC	168282	168270	168276
Chi-sq	3891	3951	3909
Log-likelihood	-84124	-84118	-84121

Note: All level-1 variables included but some output suppressed
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

The first model in Table 6.3.8 tests the same set of level-1 indicators as were used to predict poverty and includes level-2 indicators for welfare effort, security of LTR status and different types of conditionality in varying combinations. On their own, without interaction, these contextual indicators have no independent effect (1). The next model (2) tests for the impact of the central welfare effort and LTR conditionality interaction on labour market outcomes. In line with theoretical expectations the extent of welfare system support, as mediated by the degree to which such support is rendered accessible by means of legal status conditionality, impacts significantly on the nature of labour market attachments held by migrants *(H2)*. Of perhaps more interest here is the hypothesised interaction between citizenship conditionality and security of long-term residency in the determination of labour market outcomes (3). The results show that the expected

interaction is indeed statistically significant *(H3)*. These findings are consistent with our theoretical account of the role of conditionality in the determination of migrant poverty due to labour forcing and insecurity. To better understand how changes in conditionality levels governing access to the next most secure legal status affect job type, we calculate predicted values from model 3 above for countries differentiated according to whether or not LTR status is 'secure' or 'insecure'. The results show (Table 6.3.9) migrants are predicted to hold less desirable occupations when LTR status is insecure and as citizenship conditionality increases.

Of course, in reality, the interplay of explanatory factors envisaged here is more complex than these models allow. The interaction of citizenship conditionality with insecurity of status is conceptually held to impact *alongside* the interaction of LTR conditionality with welfare state effort. However, available data do not allow for the testing of such a model due to insufficient degrees of freedom. Future research may seek to test models of greater complexity such as these as more data becomes available.

Table 6.3.9 – Predicted job-type outcome by conditionality and security (n=18491)

A: SECURE long-term residency status

	Margin	Delta-method Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Cit'shipCond						
-2	58.47477	1.299206	45.01	0.000	55.92837	61.02117
Mean	56.43027	1.636462	34.48	0.000	53.22287	59.63768
2	54.38578	2.587558	21.02	0.000	49.31426	59.4573

B: INSECURE long-term residency status

	Margin	Delta-method Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Cit'shipCond						
-2	54.65108	1.392941	39.23	0.000	51.92096	57.38119
Mean	56.87418	1.198117	47.47	0.000	54.52591	59.22244
2	59.09728	1.885966	31.34	0.000	55.40086	62.79371

Note: Higher predicted values denote less desirable, lower paid occupations. 'Insecure' in these calculations denotes 1 point below the mean (equivalent to 1 std. deviation) on the security of status index, while 'Secure' denotes 1 point above the mean; other covariates held at means.

Finally, we turn to consider whether the categorisation of countries into immigrant-specific welfare regimes defined by the two axes of conditionality and welfare effort is an analytic move entailing predictive power and explanatory utility. The first model (1) in the next table (6.3.10) estimates only the effects of the Immigrant Welfare Regime (IWR) variables on the seven-point index of material deprivation, taking the 'Exclusionary' regime as the reference category. (This regime type shall serve as the reference category in all models, unless otherwise indicated.)

As can be seen, all other regime types – which involve either greater benefit generosity, greater accessibility of benefits, or both – significantly predict lower levels of deprivation than the Exclusionary regime. The average difference between the Protective and Exclusionary regimes, i.e. varying on benefit generosity and holding conditionality constant, is the largest here, estimated at over one unit less deprivation on our 7-point index in the Protective regime.[130] Comparing the Inclusionary regime, which differs on both scores, we also see less deprivation than the Exclusionary regime. Likewise, the Liberal regime, differing only on conditionality, predicts less deprivation than the Exclusionary, though is less efficacious at ameliorating deprivation than the Inclusionary.

The next models are presented for illustrative purposes and show that the regime indicators remain robust to the inclusion of citizenship conditionality (2) and labour market flexibility (3). The Liberal indicator loses significance when controlling for labour market flexibility, indicating the labour market contingency of poverty in these liberal, low protection countries. Effect directions and magnitudes for these other policy indicators are in line with those established in previous models. Likewise, the significant findings for the regime indicators are in line with the findings presented above. The regime indicators are essentially a blunter operationalisation of this interaction. Indeed, model 1 accounts for 25.7% of level-2 variance in migrant deprivation, whereas the earlier model utilising the two-way continuous interaction, with its greater precision, accounted for about double this amount. Despite this, however, the regime categories have the benefit that they are easily interpretable, when category membership is known, and possibly more easily interpreted than the use of two abstract continuous variables. In this sense, the significant results here suggest that these TCN-specific 'regime types' may constitute a useful form of explanatory shorthand.

[130] It should be recalled here that our earlier operationalisation of the Protective regime, coupled with data constraints in the SILC dataset, means that there is only one country in this regime, the Netherlands.

At the same time the utility of this typological categorisation of countries should be viewed in light of the results of the last chapter, which showed that conditionality levels may be subject to determination by often volatile social and political phenomena. As such, the regime types explored here – though they clearly retain predictive power for these data when measured at this time point (i.e. 2006) – should be subject to an ongoing process of re-evaluation and updating as new data becomes available.

Supplementary analyses where the dependent variables modelled are 1. Income Poverty, 2. Consistent Poverty – both binary variables – are reported in the Appendix (A.5). The results are fully in line with the results presented above for the continuous indicator of material deprivation.

Table 6.3.10 – Effect of Immigrant Welfare Regimes on poverty

Dep Var: 7-point Deprivation Index

	1	2	3
L2:INCLUSIONARY	-0.553**	-0.632**	-0.379**
	(0.215)	(0.199)	(0.169)
L2:PROTECTIVE	-1.095**	-0.845**	-0.676**
	(0.359)	(0.288)	(0.283)
L2:LIBERAL	-0.450**	-0.489**	-0.179
	(0.227)	(0.189)	(0.189)
L2: Cit'ship Conditionality		-0.094**	
		(0.039)	
L2:Labour Market Flex.(EPL)			0.252**
			(0.097)
Constant	2.048***	2.203***	2.065***
	(0.160)	(0.134)	(0.133)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	0.450***	0.356***	0.351***
	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.053)
sd(Residual)	1.515***	1.428***	1.428***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
N	23573	23573	23573
F-test	0	0	0
AIC	86603	83885	83882
Chi-sq	12.2	3004	3006
Log-likelihood	-43295	-41924	-41923

Note: all level-1 variables included but some output suppressed
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

6.3.2. Explaining Legal Status Transitions

This section explores the incentives around holding more secure legal status and the impact of state policies, and the interplay between them, on the process of acquiring such status. Specifically, we explore the role of conditionality and the welfare state (controlling for other factors) in migrant naturalisation. Although the focus throughout this chapter has been on the rights-granting legal status of long-term residency, we do not model the determinants of acquiring that legal status as the available data preclude us from doing do. The data simply do not include relevant variables on the precise legal status held by migrant respondents, though they do of course include a variable denoting which migrants have acquired citizenship. The coefficients in the models below are odds-ratios.

The first model (Table 6.3.11) examines the effects only of conditionality. As we would theoretically expect, higher levels of citizenship conditionality significantly predict lower odds of being a naturalised TCN migrant who has attained citizenship status *(H4)*. (For every one-unit increase in citizenship conditionality the predicted odds of naturalisation decline by 12.4% under this model, controlling for the single other variable.) Most interestingly, increases in LTR conditionality are positively, and significantly, correlated with odds of being naturalised. As it becomes more difficult to attain long-term residency status in a country, the odds of a TCN migrant being a naturalised citizen are predicted under this model to increase. Specifically, a one unit increase in LTR conditionality increases the odds of naturalisation by almost 15%. This is a fascinating finding which is consistent with a narrative of migrants seeking more secure legal statuses in those countries where access to residency, and thus social rights and welfare protections, are difficult to attain or are subject to high levels of conditionality.

Furthermore, and very interestingly, citizenship conditionality is not a significant variable when controlling for LTR conditionality and level of welfare effort (model 2). Welfare effort and the stringency of regulations governing access to the welfare state appear to be the primary explanatory factors with regard to naturalisation, over and above the regulations governing access to citizenship itself.

Model 3 tests for the central interaction of welfare effort and conditionality controlling for level-1 sociodemographic variables. This interaction indeed significantly explains naturalisation even controlling for these other factors *(H5)*. Determinants at level 1 are all significant (except for Sex and Household Size) and operate as we might expect here. Again, insecurity can be said to play a large role.

Table 6.3.11 – Determinants of Naturalisation

Multilevel Logistic Model: odds of TCN-migrant Naturalising

	1	2	3	4
L2: LTR Conditionality	1.146**	1.144**	1.101**	1.128**
	(0.080)	(0.066)	(0.046)	(0.050)
L2: Benefit Generosity		1.206***	1.269***	1.245***
		(0.064)	(0.051)	(0.051)
L2__LTR*BG			1.068***	1.070***
			(0.021)	(0.020)
L2: Cit'ship Conditionality	0.876*	0.953		0.926
	(0.070)	(0.068)		(0.050)
Age (low)			0.663***	0.662***
			(0.027)	(0.027)
Age (high) [Ref: mid]			2.392***	2.392***
			(0.086)	(0.086)
Sex (F = 1)			1.039	1.039
			(0.030)	(0.030)
Primary			0.629***	0.628***
			(0.032)	(0.032)
LwrSecondary			1.139**	1.140**
			(0.048)	(0.048)
UprSecondary [Ref: Tertiary]			1.390***	1.390***
			(0.052)	(0.052)
Married (0, 1)			0.763***	0.763***
			(0.026)	(0.026)
Unemployed (0, 1)			0.876**	0.876**
			(0.045)	(0.045)
Household size			1.002	1.002
			(0.009)	(0.009)
SingleParent (0, 1)			1.258**	1.258**
			(0.095)	(0.095)
Constant	1.040	0.971	0.966	0.941
	(0.165)	(0.130)	(0.112)	(0.107)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	0.788*	0.653**	0.514***	0.494***
	(0.107)	(0.089)	(0.071)	(0.069)
N	23968	23968	23968	23968
F-test	0.096	0.000	0.000	0.000
AIC	30051	30042	28879	28879
Chi-sq	4.68	19.3	1136	1141
Log-likelihood	-15021	-15016	-14424	-14423

Note: reported coefficients are odds-ratios
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

Single parents, for example, are more likely to naturalise, while those who are married are less likely. The educational variables are interesting: those with only a Primary education are much less likely to naturalise than those educated to third level, perhaps due to human capital deficits and a lack of access to or awareness of relevant information; however, third-level graduates are themselves less likely than either those with lower or upper secondary education only to naturalise, which may be explained in terms of graduates occupying a more secure socio-economic position generally and having less need of the security which naturalised citizenship status brings.[131]

[131] Also, the presence of highly skilled but perhaps short term economic migrants in a country is another obvious and logical explanation for this finding.

The final model also controls for citizenship conditionality alongside the central interaction of interest, though as in model 2 this variable is not significant alongside welfare effort and LTR conditionality indicators. This is an interesting finding concerning the factors which spur TCN-migrants towards greater security by means of naturalisation. Factors related to welfare, both at the individual and state levels, can be said to offer a coherent and substantively meaningful account of variations in odds of attaining citizenship status, with LTR-conditionality a key variable in this regard. To elucidate the process at work we compute predicted probabilities of naturalisation at varying levels of LTR conditionality and benefits (Table 6.3.12, below).[132]

In a high benefits system (A), the model predicts that as conditionality increases – and thus generous benefits become more difficult to attain – the probability of naturalising increases substantially, from .54 at two points below the mean of conditionality to a probability of .79 at two points above the mean. Meanwhile, in the context of a low benefits system (B) the probability of naturalising is actually predicted to decrease, though the slope is so shallow as to indicate a non-significant relationship. These relationships are also graphed in Fig. 6.3.2. Overall, this graph shows that where welfare effort is high the probability of naturalising is much higher whatever the level of conditionality.

Table 6.3.12 – Probability of Naturalisation, varying Benefit Lvls and Conditionality

A: HIGH welfare benefits||LTR-Conditionality

	Delta-method				
	Margin	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]
LTR-Cond					
-2	.5453732	.0377221	14.46	0.000	.4714392 .6193073
Mean	.6764759	.0300805	22.49	0.000	.6175192 .7354326
2	.7856762	.0380475	20.65	0.000	.7111045 .8602479

B: LOW welfare benefits||LTR-Conditionality

	Delta-method				
	Margin	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]
LTR-Cond					
-2	.3963345	.0514716	7.70	0.000	.2954521 .4972169
Mean	.3516076	.0374887	9.38	0.000	.2781312 .425084
2	.3092606	.0465469	6.64	0.000	.2180303 .4004909

Note: 'High' benefits in these calculations denotes 3 points above the mean on the benefit generosity scale, while 'Low' denotes 3 points below the mean; predictions averaged over the other covariates.

[132] Values generated from model 3 in Table 6.3.11.

Fig. 6.3.2 – Probability of Naturalisation



Finally, we can also estimate predicted values at varying levels of citizenship conditionality and welfare benefits. These results (Table 6.3.12) show that, as we would expect, where citizenship conditionality increases to higher levels the probability of naturalising decreases. However, this varies substantially by welfare effort such that, in high generosity systems, the baseline probability of naturalisation is much higher than it is where welfare effort is low. Incentives to naturalise appear to be much higher where the welfare system is generous, regardless of the level of conditionality attached to attaining citizenship. These results support a narrative wherein TCNs for whom access to (generous) welfare supports has been made difficult respond by seeking out the more secure status of 'citizen'. We shall return to this in the conclusion.

Of course, this is not the whole story and central to our theoretical understanding of the reasons for seeking more secure legal status is the role played by the security – or otherwise – of the antecedent legal status. Specifically, we expect that the level of citizenship conditionality obtaining in a country will impact on the probability of naturalisation, but that this will be moderated by the security of LTR status. The rationale here is clear; where the rights-granting status of long-term residency is secure then the incentives to naturalise will be fewer.

Table 6.3.12 – Probability of Naturalisation,varying Benefit Lvls & Conditionality II[133]

C: HIGH welfare benefits||Citizenship Conditionality

	Margin	Delta-method Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Citizen-Cond						
-2	.6455607	.0258366	24.99	0.000	.5949218	.6961995
Mean	.6154053	.0299986	20.51	0.000	.5566091	.6742014
2	.5845428	.045522	12.84	0.000	.4953214	.6737642

D: LOW welfare benefits||Citizenship Conditionality

	Margin	Delta-method Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Citizen-Cond						
-2	.3994747	.0473565	8.44	0.000	.3066576	.4922918
Mean	.3653698	.0372547	9.81	0.000	.2923519	.4383877
2	.3325182	.0407363	8.16	0.000	.2526765	.4123598

Note: 'High' benefits in these calculations denotes 3 points above the mean on the benefit generosity scale, while 'Low' denotes 3 points below the mean; predictions averaged over the other covariates.

The next model (Table 6.3.13) tests for the effects of citizenship conditionality, security of LTR status and benefit generosity, with no interaction between level-2 terms. A more generous benefits system significantly predicts higher odds of naturalising, while an increasingly secure LTR status also predicts higher odds. Citizenship conditionality itself is not seen to significantly predict the outcome variable while controlling for these other variables. That LTR security should be positive is explicable in terms of e.g. Bloemraad's (2000) 'contexts of reception' account, whereby migrants are influenced by the institutional and support context facing them on arrival and through their first years in the host country. Where long-term residency is a secure experience, not threatened by possibilities of expulsion in times of perhaps tenuous labour market attachment etc., then this may foster positive affective orientations towards the host country on the part of the migrant resulting in more favourable evaluations of the desirability of committing to the host country's social and political communities through naturalisation.

The hypothesis to be tested, however, is that the effect of security on the naturalisation decision is moderated by the conditionality states attach to citizenship, and this is assessed in the next model (2). The hypothesised interaction is not significant in this model *(H6)*. However, it should be borne in mind that our *conceptual* model of these effects is more complex than the model tested here. It was established in the last table that LTR conditionality and welfare effort also interact in the determination of migrant naturalisation

[133] Predicted values estimated from model 4 above.

decisions. Ideally we would test for our hypothesised citizenship conditionality interaction alongside the previously established interaction. However, the number of level-2 units available for analysis here is insufficient to this task. Future research should bear in mind the interesting theoretical possibility advanced here and may be able to specify this more complex model as new and further data become available.

The final model here (3) is an exploratory model with four level-2 terms, testing for the effect of security of LTR status alongside the previously established interaction of LTR conditionality and welfare effort. The LTR security effect remains significant and positive in this specification, as in model (1) of this table, and the central interaction of interest is also significant. This suggests a role for security of status in the determination of migrant naturalisation decisions, though this result must be interpreted subject to the caveat that a greater number of level-2 units would here be desirable. Future research utilising more data could also explore this possibility.

Table 6.3.13 – Role of security of LTR status in naturalisation

Multilevel Logistic Model: odds of TCN-migrant Naturalising

	1	2	3
L2: Cit'ship Conditionality	1.015	0.950	
	(0.062)	(0.063)	
L2: Security of LTR status	1.285**	1.292	1.275**
	(0.144)	(0.204)	(0.110)
L2: Benefit Generosity	1.179**		1.218***
	(0.061)		(0.047)
L2__CitCon*LTRSecurity		0.938	
		(0.056)	
L2__LTR*BG			1.073***
			(0.019)
L2: LTR Conditionality			1.079**
			(0.041)
Constant	0.930	0.967	1.019
	(0.127)	(0.151)	(0.109)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	0.608***	0.696**	0.453***
	(0.083)	(0.095)	(0.063)
N	23968	23968	23968
F-test	0.000	0.000	0.000
AIC	28888	28895	28874
Chi-sq	1117	1106	1155
Log-likelihood	-14429	-14433	-14421

Note: coeffs are odds-ratios; lvl-1 vars output suppressed
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

6.4. Residual Diagnostics

Table 6.4.1 below records residual diagnostics for a selection of the key models explored above. These models all control for determinants at both levels of the analysis and are namely: 1. The two-way interaction of LTR-conditionality and a state's welfare effort; 2. The three-way interaction of both types of conditionality with welfare effort; 3. The three-way interaction of labour-market flexibility with LTR-conditionality and welfare effort; 4. The two-way interaction of LTR-conditionality with welfare effort for non-naturalised TCNs who are active in the labour market; 5. And the same model for those who have become naturalised citizens; 6. The two-way interaction of security of LTR status with citizenship conditionality.

There is non-normality in the residuals for the random effects (i.e. at level-2) however, as was stressed earlier, this is not an issue with regard to inferences made on the effects of variables in the fixed part of the model; the fixed part is the only part of substantive interest in this chapter, so we disregard non-normality at this level. The residuals at both levels 1 and 2 are uncorrelated, in line with the assumptions of multilevel modelling (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). We also note skewness in the level-1 residuals. However, just as in ordinary regression – where some form of significant association is more likely to be detected as sample size increases – it will also be the case here that even minor deviations from normality under this test will show up as significant given our very large sample size.

Table 6.4.1 - Residual Diagnostics; selected multilevel linear models

Models (Table: Model)	*LTR_BG*	*Active non-Cit*	*Active Citizens*	*ISCO-88*
Test	*(6.3.4: 1)*	*(6.3.6: 2)*	*(6.3.7: 2)*	*(6.3.8: 3)*
Level-2 Residuals				
Normal?	NO	NO	NO	NO
p = [Joint]	.000	.000	.000	.000
Level-1 Residuals				
Normal?	NO	NO	NO	NO
p = [Skew]	.000	.000	.000	.197
p = [Kurtosis]	.591	.234	.241	.000
Lvls-1 & 2 Residuals				
Uncorrelated?	YES	NO	NO	YES
r =	/	-.064	.018	/
p =	.470	.000	.006	.393
Homoskedasticity?				
[Lvl-1]	YES	YES	YES	YES

Note: 'No' indicates a problem with the residuals. Significant tests (p≤.05) indicate a problem. Level-2 residual non-normality (i.e. non-normality of the random effects) is not a problem for coefficient and std. error estimates only for variance components, which are not the focus of this analysis. Formal test for violation of homoskedasticity assumption not available, reliance is on assessment of graphs of fitted values vs. residuals for fixed part of model.

Fig. 6.4.1 - Diagnostics: Level-1 Residual Normality



Fig. 6.4.2 - Diagnostics: Absence of Heteroskedasticity



Graphical representation (of residuals from the single model in Table 6.3.4) shows this to be the case and as we see in Fig. 6.4.1 the deviation from normality in question, which is confined to one tail, is minor and gives little cause for concern.[134] Likewise, graphical

[134] This pattern would also suggest skewness in the dependent variable and, indeed, the deprivation measure is leftward skewed, with most migrants in the sample experiencing low levels of material deprivation. The skewness was invariant to attempted standard transformations (i.e. reciprocal) however.

analysis indicates constant error variance and we have no problems with heteroskedasticity. This could be demonstrated for any model but we demonstrate it for the central LTR-conditionality—Welfare Effort interaction (Fig. 6.4.2).

For the remaining logistic models, modelling binary outcomes through non-linear link functions (i.e. the logit: natural log of the odds-ratio), we do not (because we cannot) present diagnostic information pertaining to residuals and normality. Binary outcomes, by definition, do not follow normal distributions. We can, however, provide another indication of model fit: how well the model classifies cases in the dataset. This is simply done by: 1. calculating predicted probabilities (for the fixed part of the model only) from each of the continuous-interactive logistic models (naturalisation, consistent poverty, income poverty); 2. assigning individuals to take the value of '1' on the dependent variable where the predicted probability of being categorised thusly exceeds 0.5, coding all other cases '0'; and, 3. Cross-tabulating the actual dependent variable with this model-generated version of itself and noting the percent of cases classified correctly and incorrectly (results below). Only the naturalisation model does well and predicts on a better than average basis, accurately classifying more than 58% of cases. The consistent poverty model and the income poverty model both fail to accurately classify more than even 10% of people in these categories, which should prompt further reflection for future studies.

Table 6.4.2 - Residual Diagnostics; non-linear (logistic) models

Models / *Outcome*	*Naturalisation*	*Consistent Poverty*	*Income Poverty*
Accurately classified	54.4%	3.9%	9.62%
N =	(6,703)	(130)	(608)
Misclassified	45.6%	96.1%	90.38%
N =	(5,610)	(3,188)	(5,711)
Total *N* =	12,313	3,318	6,319

Note: Naturalisation model used is (3) from Table 6.5.1; Income Poverty and Consistent Poverty models used are the models with full sets of level-1 indicators in Appendix A.5; the total N refers to all those categorised as taking the value of '1' on the dependent variable in question for each model.

Fig. 6.4.3 - Lvl-2 residual plots



We can also examine select residual plots for the level-2 residuals, i.e. the country-year units. These show how far the level-2 units are from the overall model regression line. For example in Fig. 6.4.3, controlling for all level-1 variables as well as the central welfare system/conditionality interaction, Spain (ES, 2006 data) deviates from the overall regression line by about 0.4 units on the dependent variable (7-point deprivation index), while Denmark (either year) deviates by just over 0.5 units. We now move from model diagnostics to conclude this chapter.[135]

[135] One final diagnostic issue concerns the use of the Hausman test as a test for the appropriateness of using a random effects model in the first place, though this is not entirely relevant in this case. The procedure is to estimate a fixed effects model and then an identical model incorporating random effects and to perform the Hausman test using both sets of results; where the test is significant then this has been taken to indicate that the fixed effects model should be preferred (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). However, use of only a fixed effects model here is precluded as that would prevent us from estimating the effects of level-2 covariates – which is the entire point of the modelling exercise. For the record, re-estimating the key 'LTR_BG' model (Table 6.3.4) using GLS for both a fixed effects and random effects specification and performing the Hausman test on these two sets of results returns a significant test statistic with a Chi^2 of 39.62 for 11 degrees of freedom. Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008, 123) imply that this is an intractable issue where the between-cluster variation is of interest, counselling cautious interpretation of the estimates when the Hausman test is significant as said estimates "may be inconsistent unless the covariates are exogenous".

6.5. Conclusions

Having explored many different permutations of TCN-migrant poverty and deprivation, with numerous variations on the sets of predictors and their interactions as well as other variations on the target of inference, how best to sum up what the results have shown? The fundamental finding revealed by the analysis has been the following: Conditionality matters.

We have seen that the level of welfare benefits a country makes available impacts material deprivation as experienced by TCNs in the expected manner, where high benefits implies less poverty. However, a heretofore neglected, undertheorised and unquantified hypothesised determinant of migrant poverty – the conditionality attached to entry into more secure and rights-granting (LTR) legal status – was seen to play a central role in modifying the effect of welfare effort on poverty.

Where conditionality is high – meaning that the conditions attached to attaining the status of long-term resident, and *ipso facto* the status of a potential welfare recipient, are onerous and demanding – this was seen to impact on the level of poverty experienced by TCNs in a manner detrimental to their welfare. This effect of the conditionality attached to LTR status is in line with the theoretical framework advanced earlier. That central interaction was seen to hold up even when controlling for other determinants of migrant poverty, and when disaggregating the sample to focus on those with different labour market attachments and on those who held formal citizenship status of the host country.

Regarding the hypothesised indirect effect of conditionality on poverty through the labour market and the insecurity that characterises LTR legal status in some countries, the analysis undertaken here adduced evidence consistent with that effect. Type of labour market attachment held by migrants was seen to be significantly determined by security of LTR status in interaction with the level of conditionality states attach to attaining citizenship.[136] The generosity of the welfare state, as moderated by the conditions governing access to its protections, was also seen to be implicated in the determination of type of labour market attachment.

In sum, context matters, and the structure of state policy regimes like regulations governing the labour market and the institutional set-up of the welfare state, which are constructed without any reference to the specificities of the situations experienced by non-

[136] i.e. the more secure legal status relative to LTR status.

nationals, have been seen in these results to interact with conditionality in the shaping of migrant outcomes in ways perhaps not actively intended by policymakers.

The designation of TCN-specific welfare regime-types defined along the axes of conditionality and welfare effort proved instructive insofar as the regime indicators were seen to hold predictive power and to entail deprivational consequences for TCNs. The use of these indicators may allow for an efficient means of comparison, description and explanation of migrant poverty outcomes and the indicators themselves may find use as independent variables in other future research. Comparisons with what was theoretically expected to be the least favourable regime for TCN-migrant welfare with low levels of welfare support and yet high levels of conditionality, the Exclusionary type, showed several things:

→Holding *conditionality* constant by design (at high levels) greater benefit generosity was seen to entail a robust and substantively large reduction in deprivation, greater than that noted for other regime contrasts [Protective type];

→Holding *benefit levels* constant by design (at low levels) lower conditionality was seen to entail a marginally robust and moderate reduction in deprivation, however this effect was not robust to the inclusion of a relevant labour market indicator, highlighting the centrality of labour market engagement where state welfare supports are low [Liberal type];

→Varying *both* conditionality and benefit levels by design was seen to entail a robust and substantial reduction in deprivation, controlling for other determinants [Inclusionary type].

Alongside these central findings on the importance of conditionality for poverty outcomes, the available data allowed us to focus on the acquisition of secure legal status itself and the incentives that may obtain around such processes, contingent on state policy approaches to the regulation of legal status acquisition and to the expansiveness of welfare state protections. Given the seemingly clear benefits of holding more secure legal status it should perhaps be unsurprising that each type of conditionality also significantly helped to explain the odds of migrant naturalisation and adoption of the host country's citizenship.

Increasing barriers to naturalisation in the form of higher citizenship conditionality lowered the odds that migrants would be naturalised, while increasing barriers to social rights predicted significantly higher odds of naturalisation. Conditionality of access to welfare was furthermore seen to interact with the generosity of a country's welfare benefits

in predicting naturalisation outcomes and an interesting process was uncovered whereby increasingly high barriers to receipt of benefits in a generous welfare system predicted an increasingly high probability of naturalisation for TCNs in that system. Where access to long-term residency and the social security that entails is difficult and highly conditional for migrants then seeking full citizen status may be the rational response.

A picture begins to emerge of citizenship status itself acting as a means of simultaneously enjoying security and avoiding poverty for TCN-migrants. These material advantages to being a naturalised citizen accrue even after one accounts for the effects of other determinants that might be assumed to be implicated in disadvantage, like age, education, sex and family type etc. But alongside the obvious incentive of material advantage must be set the macro-institutional context within which naturalisation decisions are taken. The redistributive capacity of the welfare state within which naturalisation occurs – conditional on the migrant-specific policy framework circumscribing that capacity – seems to determine the shape of naturalisation decisions. Certainly these results are consistent with such a process. The implications of these findings for extant literature will be discussed in the next, and final, concluding chapter, where we will also discuss the limits of this research as well as policy implications and the possibilities for future research.

Conclusion

Here we conclude the thesis, beginning firstly with a section offering a summary of the main findings and outlining the originality of the contribution the thesis makes to our understanding of third-country national poverty in Europe. The next section will discuss in detail the implications of these findings for extant literature on migration and the welfare state. Acknowledging some of the limitations of the approach adopted here allows us to develop the scope for future research presented by these findings, which is the focus of the following section. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of this research.

1. Summary

The modern welfare state is a defining feature of the social and political landscape in Europe, so much so that the term has come to be practically synonymous with the state itself. Comparative research on welfare states is deeply embedded and well established, with scholarly accounts of differences and similarities across states a defining feature of academic debates. Such accounts, insofar as they draw contrasts between the modalities of social protection in Europe, have also facilitated the explanation or prediction of variable life and work outcomes and trajectories of European inhabitants. Yet with continued disparities of wealth and living standards obtaining globally, with the complex historical interconnections between these states and those global regions where once they may have exerted power and influence, and with the secular transformation of human society such that transglobal communication and transportation are now possible, it is no longer the case that the inhabitants of Europe are all European inhabitants. One in ten of those inhabitants, on average, will not have been born in the country where they live, while many will not have been born in Europe at all.

These third-country nationals occupy a unique and qualitatively different position with regard to the structural, institutional and legal frameworks at the national and supra-national levels which govern access to the protections, resources and safety nets enjoyed by the native, or other European, inhabitants of these welfare states. As such, the modalities of social protection in Europe are of little relevance to explicating the welfare outcomes experienced by TCNs, and many extant academic accounts are inherently partial and insufficient to the task. A central aspect of this qualitative difference inheres in the role

played by legal status in the regulation of TCN rights and entitlements. Recent research has acknowledged the differential stratification experienced by migrants with regard to accessing certain types of welfare state benefits, resulting in differential poverty outcomes at variance with the outcomes welfare regime accounts would lead us to expect (Morissens and Sainsbury 2005), and has highlighted the importance of the type of 'entry category' in securing social rights for migrants (Sainsbury 2006). Others have maintained that denizenship in the host country – specifically long-term residency – is the basis on which most of the rights traditionally associated with citizenship are now enjoyed by migrants (Brubaker 1989; Hammar 1990; Hansen 1998; Freeman 2004).

Beginning from these insights, and in line with Morissen's and Sainsbury's (2005) injunction to attend to the dynamics between welfare and immigration regimes, this research set out to explore the role of legal status in determining the outcomes of migrant lives and to account for cross-national variation in TCN-migrant poverty. Such variation is perhaps puzzling given not only the fact that it defies the expectations of welfare regime theory (Esping-Andersen 1990) but also that it should obtain in the face of academic claims regarding the convergence of national approaches to the extension of citizenship, the incorporation of migrants, and the accrual of rights by virtue of supranational imperative (e.g. Soysal 1994; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Sainsbury 2006; Joppke 2007). The insight that the relationship of TCNs to the welfare state is qualitatively different for state nationals is itself a theoretical challenge to existing regime-based accounts of welfare.

This thesis aimed to advance a more formal account of the role of legal status in determining migrant welfare, in terms of poverty outcomes, and to assess whether and how this focus could provide the basis for an alternative conceptualisation of migrant welfare. The aim was not simply to advance an account highlighting differences in poverty rates by legal status however, but rather to focus on the theoretically more interesting issue of the *process* by which differential legal statuses and the means of acquiring more secure or expansive legal status in discrete European states might work, in interaction with existing features of the state institutional apparatus governing work and welfare, to structure migrant poverty outcomes.

Expanding on previous research, a theoretical conceptualisation was advanced here allied to the twin observations that, first, the extension of rights-granting legal status is part of a temporally extended process which TCNs must navigate and that, second, that process is itself subject to substantial variation across states in terms of the conditions imposed on migrants seeking to secure a legal status advantageous to their welfare. Variation in this

conditionality, in the extent and nature of the demands states make of their resident migrants, was hypothesised as a key part of the dynamic relating the welfare state and migration policy to migrant poverty outcomes.

The observation that conditionality varies substantially across states was bolstered by means of preliminary first-hand data collection undertaken so as to motivate the rest of the analysis and to justify the focus on conditionality of legal status as an important variable in its own right. An expert survey revealed much variation across a number of European welfare states in terms of: the rights which accrue to those holding long-term resident legal status; the security of a migrant's continued presence in the country if recourse is had to welfare state supports; and the employment-contingency of migrant presence in the country for those who do not hold LTR status. Cross-referencing this valuable information with the findings presented in the Mipex (2007) report it was possible to sketch a theoretical picture of a hierarchy of legal status differentiated by the expansiveness of rights and security each affords to its holder, beginning with the insecure and non-expansive rights enjoyed by those TCNs not in possession of long-term residency status, here labelled 'temporary' migrants, moving through the more expansive, i.e. social rights-granting, and secure long-term residency status, through to the most expansive, i.e. political and other rights-granting, status of a formal citizen. It is interesting to note that even citizenship status for naturalised migrants is itself subject to insecurity, though the implications of this must await further research.

Utilising these preliminary empirical findings and building on the high-quality, cross-comparable, international data collected by the Mipex project on migrant security and rights by legal status, including the conditions attached to securing different types of legal status, it was then possible to construct a measure capturing these cross-national variations in the conditionality attached to securing these progressively more advantageous legal statuses. The indexes thus constructed were seen to meet all standard criteria in terms of dimensionality, internal consistency and external validity, and were then deployed to two ends: first, to assess whether and how LTR conditionality might be used to advance a new framework for understanding the poverty outcomes and welfare of third-country nationals in Europe by means of a new regime typology; and second, to test directly on a large-scale micro-dataset whether the hypothesised effects and interactions of conditionality with other aspects of state policy structures and institutional configurations found empirical support as regards the determination of TCN-migrant poverty.

The first aim demanded an exploration of the relevant macro-level policy indicators for our set of countries and further demanded a rigorous analysis of the determinants of conditionality as grounded in the literature on migration policy formation. Without assessing the determinants of conditionality any new framework advanced here would be lacking a theoretical underpinning and claims regarding the regime-like characteristics, or otherwise, of sets of countries *vis-à-vis* TCN poverty would be indeterminate and subject to uncertainty. Whereas Esping-Andersen's (1990) welfare regime account was theoretically grounded in the power resources model, accounting for welfare regime differences in terms of class mobilisation, political coalitions and the historical institutions that are their legacy, no such account can be advanced with regard to conditionality.

Quite simply, migrant rights are a minority concern, and attempts to secure and extend them have never reached the epic scale of the 19th and 20th century struggle towards an accommodation between labour and capital. As an often sideline policy issue there is no grand theory that can account for the shape of migrant policy, of which conditionality is a part. Rather, migration policy is buffeted by multiple competing pressures and is often shaped *sub rosa*, subject to non-legislative change by means of regulatory rule adjustment or non-political change by means of expansively oriented judicial systems (Guiraudon 1998). Such claims regarding the inherent expansiveness of the policy produced by these means, and other claims by the likes of Freeman (1995) to the effect that migration policy is the result of client politics – taking an expansionary bent in response to pressures from well-organised and resourced members of the business community in need of cheap labour, facilitated by politicians acting in line with a 'strong antipopulist norm' – must be tempered by the findings presented here.

Those findings showed that variations in migration policy in the form of conditionality (of LTR status) could be explained, in partial but substantive proportion, by economic, social and indeed populist political factors. Immigration is very much a live political issue and one that has often attracted hostile public sentiment (Crepaz 2008), and to the extent that policy outputs are responsive to such factors it becomes difficult to maintain that those outputs will always be expansionary or that they will be characterised by regime-like stability. As much as conditionality is in part determined by the vicissitudes of economic cycles, and the extent to which public attitudes towards migration track such developments, it is also itself conditional – on the broader and time-invariant parameters that are the product of European nation state development. In those countries with a history of colonialism, for example, a greater share of the vote for right-wing parties –

indicative of Freeman's business community perhaps – predicted lower conditionality, but this effect ran in the opposite direction for those countries without such history.

Insofar as we have good theoretical reasons to believe that such volatile factors feed into the policy process in a manner determinative of the levels of LTR conditionality that a state applies, and insofar as the available data on country-level institutions, policies and characteristics are consistent with these theoretical expectations, as the earlier analysis revealed to be the case, then we must conclude that conditionality is perhaps an unstable bedrock on which to build an account of migrant welfare and poverty in terms of 'regimes'. The *historical* legacy of regime institutionalisation so central to Esping-Andersen's account finds no cognate in the world of the third-country migrant for whom 'history', if not quite written by the victors, is certainly headlined by the host country. Too few in number to effectively oppose disadvantageous changes to the policy measures which stand between security and insecurity, safety-net and safety-not, the migrant constituency can have but marginal effect on the apparatus of state.

The qualitatively different nature of the minority-oriented policy measures which delineate the ambit of migrant life trajectories suggests a far more ephemeral 'regime account' of third-country national welfare in Europe. This account acknowledges the necessity to reassess and re-designate regime type categories as and when new evidence and data come to light, while at the same time undermining notions of any historical cross-national underpinning to these regimes or of their being characterised by any sort of temporal projection, and thus perhaps undermining their very 'regime-ness'. In this regard, Freeman's (2004) designation of looser 'syndromes' characterised by the similarity of their concatenation of policy, structural and institutional parameters and describing migrant incorporation into the sub-systems of the state, in this case the welfare and labour market sub-systems, may be more apt.

Of course, the utility of even adumbrating regime-like similarities between sets of nations lies not just in the descriptive and classificatory functions of that exercise, as helpful as they may be, but also in the predictive and explanatory possibilities such efforts afford. The empirical analysis revealed that indeed sharp contrasts could be drawn between different regime-types, and that states which imposed more favourable combinations of conditionality or welfare effort or both were associated with more favourable poverty outcomes for third-country nationals.

At the level of greater detail and precision entailed by utilising our continuous indicators of conditionality, the multilevel empirical analysis returned results consistent

with the central hypothesis regarding the mediating role of the conditionality of long-term residency status and its implication in migrant poverty determination. This result stood up even controlling for other determinants of migrant poverty.

Disaggregating the sample by type of labour market engagement and by citizen status, the central interaction of interest was also seen to hold up. Conditionality was also seen to be implicated in the type of labour market attachment migrants hold. Finally, evidence was adduced regarding the significant impact of conditionality on the naturalisation decisions of migrants.

In sum, these results provide convincing support as to the implication of conditionality in the determination of TCN-migrant poverty; specifically with the implication of LTR-conditionality as the centrally important factor in this, capable of explaining the lion's share of level-2 variance in TCN poverty outcomes. At the same time, they suggest support for our conceptualisation of legal status as a hierarchically delimited continuum: TCNs at different points on that continuum are subject to differential levels of security, with recourse to different sets of rights. The constraints imposed on transitioning from a less secure or expansive point to a more secure or expansive point on that continuum have been characterised here as conditionalities. The evidentiary support adduced – for the hypothesis that cross-national variation in these conditionalities allows us to explain cross-national variation in migrant poverty – constitutes the central finding of this research and amounts to an original contribution to the academic debate in its own right, placing an onus on those who would seek to account for third-country national poverty to engage with these findings, to integrate them, or to challenge them.

The import of these findings for broader debates in the literature will be dealt with in the next section. The research presented here also makes several other original contributions: by advancing a formalised statement of the theoretical determinants at both macro- and micro-levels of *specifically* third-country national poverty in Europe, with a focus not just on the importance of legal status but on the process of legal status acquisition; by collecting original first-hand data by means of expert survey so as to motivate the proposed theoretical account with direct evidence of the hypothesised cross-national variation in the expansiveness and security of different types of legal status; by highlighting the central theoretical importance of the process of legal status acquisition and of the policies states interpose to regulate this process, i.e. conditionality, and advancing this as a unique and as yet under-theorised and untested explicans of TCN-migrant poverty; by utilising existing data and indicators collected to the highest cross-national

research standards, by the Mipex project, in a novel way so as to construct, test, and assess for reliability and validity, new measures of the conditionality attached to attaining two discrete legal statuses, long-term residency and citizenship; by directly testing expectations deduced from our theoretical framework of TCN poverty determination using these measures in a context of multilevel statistical control on some of the highest-quality cross-national data available for the purposes of poverty research, data which have not to the author's knowledge been utilised before for such purposes, where TCN-migrants are the specific focus of analysis, and with such methodology, utilising macro-level measures of conditionality of legal status in the prediction of micro-level outcomes; by demonstrating the relevance of *both* measures of conditionality to the process of legal status acquisition, specifically naturalisation, in a way that adds to that literature; by exploring the possibilities for the advancement of a new regime-like account of TCN-migrant welfare in Europe, utilising these novel measures of variation in the policy approaches states employ to regulate entry into different types of legal status as one of the regime's defining dimensions; and by advancing an account of the determinants of cross-national variation in these policy approaches, so as to provide a theoretical context within which any such new regime account might be understood and to deepen our understanding of the nature of conditionality, of the constraints on advancing a regime-like account of TCN poverty, and of the external non-policy factors which may structure such state policy approaches and thus impact, indirectly, on TCN-migrant poverty.

2. Discussion

How do these findings regarding the explanatory relevance and utility of conditionality to migrant welfare mesh with broader debates concerning the challenges of diversity to the welfare state and to the state itself? The claim has been made that the unfolding of policy dynamics in Europe in response to immigration has been categorically different to that which occurred elsewhere – specifically the US where racial diversity has been a defining feature since the inception of the state – because European welfare states had been well established and had developed in a context of social homogeneity long before inward migration, and its ensuing fractionalisation of society, became a relevant feature (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Crepaz 2008).

In one view this meant that European welfare states built up stocks of trust and solidarity over time that blunted the potential for nativist resentment of foreigners, providing policymakers "room to produce immigration policies that are not only less pressured by virulent anti-immigrant public opinion but are also more 'honest' in the sense that fewer policies need to be channelled through venues ... obscured from public view" (Crepaz 2008, 251). This analysis may need some reconsidering in light of our findings and Europe's response to the challenges of diversity may be more 'Americanised' than some have maintained, at least in the specifically delimited instance of the third-country national. Our earlier empirical analysis of reasons for variation in conditionality, and its location within the broader complex of state social and political factors, showed that conditionality was significantly and positively correlated with anti-immigrant public attitudes in repeated specifications.

Added to this, and against Crepaz's claim, conditionality of legal status is precisely the sort of policy measure most tractable to (re)formulation in obscure back channels of regulatory rule making of the type described by Guiraudon (1998). Partly this is because the interested constituency who might oppose undesired changes is too small to be effective. In the set of 16 countries considered here, TCNs constituted only a fraction of a country's total migrant population, and when expressed another way TCNs amounted in almost every case to less than 1.5% of a country's total *national* population.[137] Another reason is that the constituent elements – the conditions – that cumulatively make up a country's conditionality approach, including aspects like the costs of application for legal status, the precise type of medical insurance TCNs must acquire, the contents and scope of

[137] Total national population comprising both migrants and natives. One exception is Switzerland, where TCNs amounted to 2.2% of total national population (in 2006).

integration or language tests etc., are unlikely to be enshrined in national legislation or to require parliamentary approval, leaving the door open to short-term or perhaps on-the-fly adjustments.

That conditionality should be so insulated and yet track public opinion closely is interesting, suggesting a responsiveness of policymakers to the sorts of attitudes traditionally allied to welfare chauvinism (Faist 1994). It is an open question whether and to what extent changes to policies governing access to legal status for TCNs are effected for purposes of political point-scoring, one which detailed case studies of policymaker motivations and actions with regard to TCNs may be able to answer. Given their minority-of-a-minority status, it may be easy for policymakers to scapegoat TCNs specifically and to appease xenophobic constituencies by means of retracting or rendering unattainable certain legal statuses and the rights that go with them, rights which include access to the social protections of the welfare state. In the European context, migrants of EU origin are guaranteed by law to enjoy many if not all of the social protections of whichever member state they may choose to live in, unlike third-country nationals.[138] Thus, rule changes regarding the accessibility of rights-granting residency status will only have implications for the welfare of TCNs and not for the EU nationals who make up the vast bulk of migration to EU states.

This raises other questions with which future research might engage: is it the case that policymakers conceive of such actions in these terms and seek to appease such constituencies?; is it the case that the anti-migrant constituency indeed find such rights-denying policy approaches politically satisfactory?; do such policy adjustments gain sufficient salience with the public to impact on attitudes, or are they in fact confined to the obscure back channels in which Guiraudon (1998) and to a lesser extent Freeman (1995) place them?; and what are the greater implications for the welfare state and support for the welfare state when such welfare-chauvinistic preferences are indulged?

On this last point, research has shown that those who espouse welfare chauvinist views and express anti-immigrant sentiments are also the ones most likely to see welfare fraud as unproblematic and to express reluctance to pay their full share of taxes to the state (Crepaz 2008). Resentment at those 'foreigners' who make claims on the welfare system may play a part in this, but how likely does it seem that the indulgence of such policy preferences will bring about a concomitant decrease in the desire on the part of welfare

[138] Outside the Union even EEA members have agreed to the basic 'four freedoms' of the EU and have undertaken to enact legislation drawn from the EU's old 'first pillar' including social policy provisions, while the EFTA member Switzerland has signed bilateral treaties with the EU guaranteeing other rights.

chauvinists to defraud the state of welfare benefits, where that desire exists, or an increase in willingness to play the part of a good and proper tax-paying citizen? Can policies which sectionalise society and mark out certain groups as undeserving or requiring special regulation and treatment really foster social solidarity?

It seems much more likely that differentiating policies entailing the imposition of high conditionality might act as flags or signals to society that exclusionary approaches to difference are acceptable and condoned. This has the potential to stoke levels of anti-immigrant sentiment even higher, with implications not just for migrant poverty and exclusion but for the very basis of support of the welfare state itself. Without sufficient social solidarity – something the designation of out-groups clearly militates against (Titmuss 1976) – there can be little hope for a viable welfare state (Banting and Kymlicka 2006a). This signalling potential of state policies has been discussed in the literature on state multiculturalism and the potential for immigration-induced diversity to erode welfare state support (Banting and Kymlicka 2006a; Banting and Kymlicka 2006b; Banting 2005). Multiculturalism policies can help to destigmatise immigrants by highlighting their salience but in a way specifically designed to educate people and to signal that all inhabitants of society should be seen as equal inhabitants (Banting and Kymlicka 2006a).

Allowing that policies geared towards exclusion and the denial of rights will also entail an educative signalling component then the imposition of high-conditionality strategies must be assessed with regard to their potential disintegrative effects and wider societal consequences. Also, as much as immigration may modify support for the welfare state, the welfare state also modifies attitudes towards immigration. Expansive welfare states engender greater tolerance of migrants (e.g. van Oorschot and Uunk 2007), but the politics of austerity that characterises much of Europe today may undermine this. To the extent that the erosion of social solidarity towards even a single discrete out-group is the thin end of the wedge this will be a non-trivial issue, whether that out-group constitutes only 1.5% of the population or not. Other possible consequences of this erosion can be conceived of in terms of stimulating greater poverty, fomenting discontent among the migrant minority, tearing at the social fabric, when discontent turns into outright hostility or the growth of resentment against the host country, encouraging engagement in the black economy, and eroding support for the welfare state not just amongst native inhabitants but also among those whom, by dint of tenacity, may one day find themselves official long-term residents – or citizens – and who may then look less kindly on the paying of taxes and the declaring of all incomes to a system the protections of which they were denied for so long.

In parallel to this discussion on public attitudes to migration and the welfare state we find another broad literature on whether, how and to what extent migrants actually utilise the welfare state and benefits system with numerous examples of both comparative studies (McCormick et al. 2002; Kesler 2006; Kogan 2006; Kogan 2003; Corrigan 2010) and single-country studies (Borjas and Hilton 1996; Borjas and Trejo 1991; Borjas 1999; Castronova et al. 2001; Hansen and Lofstrom 2003; Blume and Verner 2007; Barrett and McCarthy 2009). Findings for many of these studies were variable and from country to country migrant usage or dependency on welfare was sometimes greater than for natives and sometimes showed no difference.

The centrality afforded to conditionality in this analysis throws much of the above cited studies into a new light. Many of the findings discussed above will have been contingent on the legal status of the migrants analysed and on the questions of whether or not access to the welfare system for those migrants was a technical or legal possibility, though the studies may not have acknowledged this explicitly (e.g. Hansen and Lofstrom 2003; Blume and Verner 2007; Castronova et al. 2001).[139] The conditionality perspective and focus on the relevance of legal status adopted here has clear implications for this literature and future cross-national research would do well to integrate conditionality as an important independent variable with implications not just for poverty, the focus of this study, but for other questions concerning migrant interactions with the welfare state in general.

One specific question of relevance to the literature on the welfare magnet thesis (Borjas 1999) concerns the extent to which migrants are cognisant of variations in conditionality levels or the security or expansiveness of different types of legal status in different countries. The magnet thesis holds that differentials in welfare state generosity may factor into migration decisions and incentivise relocation to specific jurisdictions over others, implying that migrants are aware of the existence and nature of such differentials. Whether or not they are aware of the complicating factors of entitlements and rights

[139] For example, the Hansen and Lofstrom study was constrained to using Swedish data collected in such a way as to preclude the analysis of any migrants not holding a residence permit (2003, 80; fn. 7). This does not allow for the likely different rates of welfare participation by those holding a different or less secure status (The data utilised in our earlier empirical analysis was collected without reference to the residency or legal status of a country's migrants and so was not subject to this constraint. See EU-SILC supporting documentation.) Also this study simply designates all 'foreign-born' survey respondents in the dataset as the migrants of interest, without attending to the qualitatively different nature of the third-country national migrant experience in Europe. In this respect, the study shares something in common with the studies by Blume and Verner (2007) and Castronova et al. (2001).

differentiated by legal status, and associated conditionality levels, is a logical progression of this view and a worthy question in its own right.

The importance not only of legal status but of the policies by which states regulate entry to more secure and expansive legal status stands as a direct challenge to those who would perceive a diminishing role for the nation-state with regard to the management and extension of rights to their migrant communities, where the imperatives of supranational obligations have been claimed to play the bigger role (i.e. Soysal 1994). Others have maintained that the nation-state still retains a central role in 'managing membership' (Feldblum 2000), and that the rights extended to migrants are an inherent feature of nation-states *qua* liberal-constitutional states, i.e. nothing to do with the supranational (Joppke 1998). The findings here regarding the role of conditionality serve to add nuance and depth to our understanding of the *process* by which states manage their members and the *means* by which states exercise their sovereignty so as to extend (or retract or deny) rights, while simultaneously highlighting the consequences of different membership management strategies.

Of course, state-level actions and the imposition of policy frameworks for the regulation of legal status acquisition by national governments is only one side of this story. The other involves migrant assessments of the utility of holding a specific legal status and micro-level interactions with these policy frameworks in the context of differential incentives. Analysis of the data used here revealed that indeed welfare system incentives, as moderated by the level of conditionality states attach to entering into LTR status, impact on the probability of whether or not a migrant will be naturalised, controlling for other factors. In line with much of the literature on this topic (e.g. van Hook et al. 2006), this finding confirms the importance of economic benefits to the naturalisation decision and highlights the relevance of conditionality as a hitherto neglected independent variable.

It would be trite, of course, merely to observe that the conditions attached to attaining citizenship status affect the likelihood of entering into that status; this much is obvious. What is interesting in this analysis is that the conditionality attached to long-term residency status – as the logical and temporal antecedent to full naturalised citizen status – was itself seen to bear on the naturalisation decision. The level of support on offer in a state's welfare system likely functions as an incentive to attain the most secure legal status possible, citizenship, so as to avail of those supports, though the effect of these incentives on naturalisation outcomes is moderated by the ease of access to those supports in the first place. It should be acknowledged here that an alternative interpretation of these findings

could account for these effects in terms of commitment to the host country, where high LTR-conditionality might be correlated with higher probability of naturalisation due to the likelihood of those migrants who have the time, dedication, resources and capacities to fulfil the onerous demands of high LTR-conditionality being naturally more likely to be capable of fulfilling the demands of the naturalisation process. Such migrants are also more likely to be integrated more effectively with their communities and with the labour market and thus may feel more of an affective attachment to the host country, spurring them into naturalisation for non-economic reasons.

The nature of the available data limits how much we can say about this, as we do not possess data extended through time that might give us a clearer indication of the dynamics at work in migrant naturalisation decisions, nor do we possess information on other relevant variables such as language capacities, time spent in the host country, number of friends and frequency of social interactions, subjective evaluations of one's life position and intentions regarding the source country, etc. (Portes and Curtis 1987). Detailed longitudinal data, cross-national and comparable, recording migrant legal status at each point in time as well as socio-economic position and other relevant demographic information would allow future research to more accurately chart the life trajectories of migrants, their movements in and out of different types of legal status and the extent to which differential incentive structures (i.e. conditionality, welfare) allow us to account for cross-national variations in TCN naturalisation outcomes.

It should be clear that what is of interest here is not solely the acquisition of citizenship status *per se*, but rather the broader import of these findings on the role of conditionality for our understanding of the complex of factors surrounding 'legal status' more generally and the reasons for migrant engagement with the process of status acquisition. Citizenship status, and the analysis of the determinants of naturalisation, is taken to be emblematic of the process of transitioning from one form of less secure legal status to a more secure legal status, with direct and obvious parallels between this process and the process that would obtain where migrants transition from what we have labelled here as their 'temporary' status to the status of fully fledged long-term resident. Although presumed to be emblematic of the broader process there are, inevitably, complications with the focus on citizenship given the affective and emotional determinants of naturalisation decisions that were flagged earlier in our discussion of the literature. In this regard it may not be justifiable to assume that the effects of incentives and constraints on naturalisation

will map perfectly to the process whereby migrants seek to attain LTR status, though clearly the analysis here can be considered instructive in this regard.

In fact, it could be argued that for many the acquisition of citizenship status and all of its pursuant rights may not offer sufficiently strong incentives to attain that status where social rights have already been secured by means of attaining long-term residency. In this sense, an analytical focus on the determinants of the acquisition of LTR status may have been more appropriate, and indeed would have been more clearly in keeping with the focal role that has been accorded to LTR status and LTR-conditionality in the determination of migrant social outcomes throughout this analysis. However, explicit tests of the determinants of transitioning to LTR status, and the role of conditionality, the welfare system and socio-economic outcomes and incentives in that process, were not possible as the available data does not record whether or not migrant respondents are long-term residents. Future research could produce a fitting complement to this analysis by addressing this dependent variable problem and looking in more detail at migrant orientations and evaluations around transitioning to a different legal status, perhaps by means of qualitative life-history research on smaller selections of migrants in different countries where the research is designed to elicit much more specific information on legal status and the migration experience than is the case in most large-scale quantitative datasets.

Nevertheless, the results on citizenship acquisition and the role of (both types of) conditionality are themselves substantively interesting. Theoretically, these results suggest the need to refine existing views on the determinants of naturalisation. The simple Instrumental-Legalistic view of citizenship acquisition (van Hook et al. 2006) sees citizenship as a status affording political and economic rights through which migrants gain advantages. However, these findings suggest that citizenship in one country is not quite the same as citizenship in another or, more accurately, that the advantages that accrue to citizens in one jurisdiction may be relatively less incentivising than the advantages accruing elsewhere, with implications for how we account for cross-national variation in naturalisation outcomes (cf. Janoski 2010). These relative advantages will be contingent on the expansiveness of long-term residency both as the logical and temporal antecedent and as the primary social rights-granting status; where migrant access to the protections of the welfare state is relatively difficult to attain naturalisation may be desirable, especially where the welfare protections on offer are relatively generous in scope. The findings here supported such a narrative.

This view manages to reach across the strong split in the literature on this topic perceived by Bloemraad (2000), pitting micro-level evaluations against macro-level institutional constraints, and to embed the migrant naturalisation decision within a broader macro-micro framework which acknowledges the necessity that migrants "choose legal citizenship" (Ibid., 15) while highlighting the importance of national policy configurations. These configurations work not only to regulate entry into citizenship status but, through their interactions, to produce differential incentive structures characterised by complex contingency and perhaps resulting in outcomes unanticipated by policymakers. The theoretical challenge for future research is to integrate these insights, to account for these interactions and to take cognisance of the processual nature of migrant movement along the differentiated path of legal status.

None of this is to advance a view of migrants as pinballs in a deterministic machine and an acknowledged shortcoming of the account of naturalisation explored here is an absence of relevant controls for the 'intangibles' (Diehl and Blohm 2003) that factor into such major life decisions., such as continued source-country engagement or subjective evaluations and opinions held by migrants towards the host-country. For the present study this is a 'data problem' in two respects; firstly, the available data do not include all variables that would be relevant to explanations of the dependent variable and, secondly, the cross-sectional approach limits the number of available level-2 units where adding a vast number of controls would consume valuable degrees of freedom. Again, a longitudinal focus and more specifically tailored data would ameliorate some of these issues.

In the broader view, these findings regarding the interplay of welfare state, legal status and the conditionality attached thereto force a re-evaluation not only of how we view the tools of social policy but of how we can hope to properly designate those tools when third-country nationals are the focus of their application, and how we can even differentiate them from migration policy. National 'migration policies' defining the regularisation of residency and the path to citizenship are formed with an eye on the size, composition and character of present and future migrant populations, as well as on germane political and economic concerns. But such policies appear *de facto* to structure the quality of migrant lives, casting doubt on the credibility or utility of designating distinct policy domains while placing an onus on policymakers to take cognisance of this fact. Neglect of these subtle and almost certainly unanticipated interactions between welfare state institutions and sub-domains of state policy would be consequential not only for social cohesion, were unfavourable policies to result in social exclusion leading ultimately perhaps to

ghettoisation or other failures of integration, but also for the efficacy of control over vital functions the state reserves to itself alone.

The functions in question concern the ability to define not only the legitimate community of receivers, *vis-à-vis* the welfare state, but also the legitimate community constituting the *polis*, with all of its concomitant rights to determinative agency over that *polis* at the ballot box and elsewhere. Where disadvantage spurs more people into attaining the status of 'citizen' then migrant social citizenship, defined negatively, in the interstices of state institutional and regulatory action, takes on positive consequences for the concept and status of citizenship, with implications for the nation and national self-identity.

3. Future Research

Some of the possibilities for future research arose naturally in the last section where we discussed ways in which these findings problematise the existing literature. By considering some of the limitations of the current project we can also anticipate some of the other ways in which the research agenda on migrant poverty might be developed. One obvious point is the cross-sectional nature of this analysis. Put simply, cross-sectional data tell us how things stand at a specific moment in time and, lacking a dynamic component, cannot tell us how things change over time. Changes with regard to migrant moves in and out of different legal statuses and corresponding shifts in socio-economic position and exposure to poverty occurring in contiguous time periods would doubtless constitute the core of an interesting research project, were suitable longitudinal data available.

This thesis, however, while theorising in processual terms about the effects and interactions of legal status and the policies surrounding access to such status, nevertheless focuses on cross-sectional data. This approach is not, of course, contraindicated by the nature of the theoretical framework or research question. Even where dynamic processes are involved, all cross-sectional data can be seen as a snapshot of those process(es) in action or, for some respondents in the dataset, of their position in relation to that process and their accompanying characteristics at that point in time. What is of relevance here is simply that the data used record information on TCNs at different points in their individual trajectories and subject to different state-level constraints; it is on the basis of these differences that we can draw inferences about the underlying process(es).

Even were longitudinal data available, such data may not be fit for purpose where third-country nationals are the specific focus of the analysis. Indeed the SILC dataset does

come in a longitudinal version, though sample sizes are a fraction of those collected for cross-sectional purposes, and we must add to this the fact that TCNs will constitute, on average, only about 10% of national samples, assuming the samples are representative, and so will amount to a fraction of that fraction. The small sample sizes that would naturally ensue may be insufficient to the task of robust inference. Another possibility is to focus not on individual migrant trajectories but to explore the mechanisms advanced and tested here in the context of much longer TSCS (time-series-cross-sectional) data series, perhaps pooling together other cross-sections over a longer duration, as was adverted to in a previous chapter. Of course, this requires contemporaneous, reliable and comparable data on the conditionality levels obtaining cross-nationally; the collection, collation and dissemination of such data take time. The Mipex project has produced two iterations in five years, not counting its reduced-form precursor, and so researchers interested in undertaking what would doubtless be valuable analyses of this sort will have several years to wait before this will be a feasible proposition.[140]

Others might maintain that a more appropriate research strategy to understand the how and why of migrant transitions into different legal statuses, the role of subjective evaluations and objective constraints in this regard, and the implication of this for welfare outcomes would be to focus in depth at the micro level on the situations faced by migrants in individual countries, perhaps by means of case studies or much smaller-scale qualitative interview analysis of migrant decisions regarding legal status. However, although such studies would be useful additions to the literature and would complement the account advanced here, they could not by definition account for the interesting cross-national variation in TCN poverty that is our focus. In a research area like migration, awash with single-country studies, an analytic *gestalt* of the type advanced here, possessing explanatory power across numerous diverse countries, amounts to a welcome synthesis and a parsimonious reduction of complexity. Grounded as it is in a recognition of the commonalities that tie countries together – commonalities of differentiated legal status as regulated by variable conditionality levels – this account, in a sense, rubs against the grain of contentions by the likes of Papadopoulos (2011) who maintain that European 'migrant integration regimes' are characterised by *sui generis* diversity from country to country, with implications to the effect that explanatory synthesis must thus remain elusive. In another sense, of course, the results of Chp. 5 accorded with that contention, finding much contingent shared variation and highly diverse linkages between structural and policy

[140] Feasible using Mipex indicators at least.

indicators that problematise the designation of 'regimes'. Nonetheless, legal status matters and the empirical reality is that states impose conditionality on attaining different legal statuses; these observations stand out as universal features of migrant-state interactions, unifying strands amid an often chaotic heterogeneity. Findings with broad macro-level applicability such as these can serve both to re-contextualise and reinvigorate the research agenda for country-level and other more narrowly delimited studies.

But how generalisable are the findings presented here? Possibilities for generalisation are either temporal or geographic. Temporally, it would be a straightforward task to attempt to replicate these findings for the countries analysed here and assess whether they still stand up utilising new data as it becomes available at a later point in time, though such analyses could be complicated by global economic shocks such as the recession which hit the world economy in the closing years of the last decade. Geographically, it would of course be possible to apply a similar model to the one advanced here utilising both Mipex and SILC data for the new and relatively new EU countries of Eastern Europe and to ask whether these findings hold up in that distinct cultural and economic region.

However, this is likely to be complicated by the fact that the countries of Eastern Europe have not tended to attract third-country nationals to the same extent as the countries of Western Europe, given their relative undesirability as migration destinations due to economic under-development and their close proximity to other relatively more comfortable host countries; this may render sample sizes too small for analysis. Extension of this model to the United States does not seem possible, despite promising state-by-state variations in welfare levels, due to the imposition of rules attached to permanent residency (Green Cards) at the federal, not state, level; this entails zero variation in the independent variable of interest negating possibilities for its deployment.

Also, it should be recalled that the model(s) here did not account perfectly for all of the cases and that there were some clear outliers that may require further study. In the macro-level regressions of the income poverty rate on conditionality and welfare determinants the two cases of Belgium and Denmark did not accord neatly with model expectations. Naturally we do not expect conditionality to be the whole story about the determination of migrant poverty and our theoretical framework explicitly acknowledges the likely direct and indirect effects of other variables. Inclusion of some of these allowed us to partly explain reasons for outlying cases.

Moving away from headline poverty rates to look in greater detail at poverty with much richer data, the analysis of the intensity of poverty (deprivation) revealed that the

central interaction of interest was a powerful explanation on its own Spain did not fit the model perfectly (Fig. 6.6.2) though the speed with which Spain became a country of heavy inward migration may have something to do with this, with low skill levels helping to account for some of the difference, and it will be interesting to observe how policy responses evolve in that country. Already in the summer of 2011 Spain had begun to impose restrictions on certain types of labour migration even from within the EU (Reuters 2011). Detailed case study of some of the outliers from this macro-comparative account of migrant poverty could supplement the findings presented here and would constitute novel contributions in their own right where refracted through the hitherto neglected lens of conditionality.

Another issue, touching on both generalisability and limitations of these findings, concerns choice of independent variables or operationalisation of same. The decision was made to operationalise the welfare effort indicator as unemployment benefit generosity after Scruggs and Allan (2006), essentially a form of Esping-Andersen's (1990) decommodification index. Given our concern with the position of TCNs in the work-welfare nexus, this type of welfare benefit seemed appropriate in light of the employment-centric and employment-contingent nature of TCN habitation in the host country, where many TCNs may not have resided long enough to avail of old age pension benefits or sickness or disability benefits. The dynamics applying to migrants who are in receipt of old-age pensions or who remain in the country yet are long-term disabled are likely to be much different from the dynamics of employment, security, status and rights acquisition that are of interest here.

However, given the importance of family-reunion as a mechanism for inward TCN migration to Europe (SOPEMI 2008), it may be of interest to consider the role played by family-related welfare benefits. It is not the case, as Bambra (2006) has observed, that all types of welfare policy measure within countries track each other perfectly in terms of decommodifying potential or generosity, with intra-state and intra-regime variation obtaining in welfare policy packages, and we cannot presume that unemployment benefit generosity will be a proxy for the generosity of family benefits.

Shifting the focus in this way would entail some specific considerations in what would be an analogous though distinct research design compared to the one adopted here. Focusing on family benefits, or attempting to integrate them into any study alongside other benefits, would naturally reduce the sample to only those migrants who have family members living with them, omitting single migrants from the frame. Such family migrant

households would be expected to be characterised by different dynamics to other types of migrant – given the host country commitment and long-term or stable outlook implied and suggested by the relocation of one's family members – in a way that seems likely to demand modification of the conceptual and inferential model of migrant welfare-determination advanced here.

Also, family reunification migrants are themselves subject to a specific form of conditionality above and beyond the conditionality their sponsor (spouse, usually) in the host country must fulfil in order to secure long-term residency and the rights that attend on that status. Integration of this fact is another complicating factor for any study seeking to take a family-specific focus towards the study of TCN welfare and poverty. It is the case that Mipex records data on the conditions attached to family reunification. This suggests possibilities for developing and testing the effects of a third index of conditionality, building on this project and taking the theoretical and empirical framework advanced here as a solid foundation for any such enterprise.

Another possibility would be to extend conditionality to explanations of other dependent variables, something touched on at several points earlier where the focus shifted to supplementary issues around the central focus of poverty. The relevance of conditionality to naturalisation decisions and labour market engagement already noted underscores the potential for use of conditionality as an explanatory factor in migration research more broadly, beyond a concentration on welfare issues.

4. Policy Implications

It was noted earlier that distinct combinations of state-level policy parameters worked in interaction with conditionality to structure migrant poverty outcomes in qualitatively different ways. Given the universal intra-state applicability of welfare and labour market policies, and the path dependence likely to characterise such national frameworks and practices, this finding will be of interest to policymakers concerned with the reduction of TCN-migrant poverty who may find, in conditionality, a readily accessible and relatively expeditious policy lever. Adjustment of this to a position beneficial to migrants seems likely, in light of these results, to play some part in the ameliorative structuring of TCN poverty over the medium term.[141]

[141] Medium term as we must allow for migrants working their way through the time-delimited processes and pathways leading to progressively more secure legal status(es).

Another potential policy lever, also readily accessible, concerns the *security* of LTR-status. This too was seen to be implicated in the determination of migrant poverty, in line with our theoretical framework, and evidence consistent with the hypothesised indirect labour market linkage – of labour forcing under conditions of low security of status coupled with high conditionality of the next status up the 'ladder' – was presented earlier. The security of long-term residency was seen to impact on the type of occupation held in interaction with the level of conditionality attached to securing citizenship; poor security of LTR-status predicted increasingly poorly paid or insecure jobs for migrants where the more secure status of citizenship was placed out of reach by high conditionality.

To the extent that policymakers may wish to avoid imposing such potentially precarious life situations on migrant minorities then addressing the legal safeguards and qualifications surrounding the holding of long-term residency status may be an effective means of shifting policy in this regard. Of course, such policy shifts on the part of immigration regulatory authorities, while they have the potential to arrest in part the mechanisms of impoverishment, may conflict with the aims or intentions of other policymakers charged with labour market responsibilities. Insofar as TCN migration is not now subject to high-skill streaming, it is often facilitated precisely because migrants perform vital, yet menial, labour such as in the agricultural sector. Again, we encounter a 'mouse vs. elephant' scenario, of minority concerns running up against national imperatives.

Indeed, the issue of policy coordination as regards national migrant populations presents itself as a natural consideration in light of these findings. To what extent are policymakers aware of these subtle interactions that can – as these results indicate – work to produce TCN poverty? Insofar as the conditionality attached to legal status is implicated in determining the welfare of a country's migrants then the rules and regulations around the extension of legal status, the tools of migration policy, can legitimately be seen as *de facto* tools of social policy. Such an analytical reappraisal may provide sufficient impetus for policymakers to seek a greater coherency of purpose regarding the macro-structural parameters delineating the welfare outcomes of migrant populations, where the alleviation of poverty is an active policy concern. Of course, protection of the state from the possibility of non-nationals becoming a drain on public resources, quite apart from being a popular and justifiable political platform, is a guiding aim of much immigration policy[142]

[142] Immigration policy construed as the frameworks governing entry for TCNs into sovereign nation states, as opposed to 'migration policy' which can be understood as encompassing a broader remit.

today. This has often been achieved by means of filtering mechanisms applied at the point of entry, with migrants selected for admission probabilistically, on the basis of skill levels, points-systems, etc. It might be argued that, given the existence of such mechanisms, attending to the poverty-inducing dynamics of legal status and conditionality will be a second-order concern.

However, the existence of such mechanisms does not in itself absolve policymakers of responsibility for inhabitants of the state nor does it negate the import of poverty as a social phenomenon. Point-of-entry filtering systems are irrelevant to the reality of already-present migrants living and working in the state, some of whom may have entered under a different system, or under a different status which has subsequently been subject to change. Such systems cannot protect against the vagaries of life, the economy, or personal preference, and the migrant who once conceived of him- or herself as merely a temporary interloper nonetheless engages in an ongoing process of assessment and re-evaluation in the face of the opportunities and constraints presented to them in and by the host country. Seemingly safe bets lose their jobs, just as surely as reluctant economic migrants adapt to their new lives, put down roots and make commitments, economic and affective, to their new homes. In the oft-quoted words of Swiss playwright Max Frisch: "We asked for workers, but people came" (Frisch 1990, cited in Motomura 2006, 103). Where high conditionality may play an active part in damaging the welfare of migrant inhabitants then there is a clear onus on all those concerned with the quality of life in society, for migrants and natives alike, to take cognisance of this fact in their formulation of policy responses and regulatory frameworks.

Designating the poverty of third-country nationals as a form of temporary problem to be solved by re-migration or deportation will not address the issue either, as the reality of migration in Europe today is such that family reunification migrants comprise a substantial proportion of inflows; up to 40% of *total* inflows in 2006 was comprised of family-based migrations[143] (SOPEMI 2008, 2008:36). The experience of poverty, then, has ripple effects – not just for the single economic migrant, but for the family unit of which s/he may be a part. Even in the event of re-migration, children born in the host country may under certain circumstances (e.g. *jus soli* citizenship rules) retain rights to remain or return.

The scarring effects of poverty on childhood are well documented: early-life socio-economic conditions affect health and mortality in adulthood (Hayward and Gorman 2004), which may contribute independently to poverty where poor health circumscribes

[143] including intra-EU free movement migration and humanitarian admittances

employment opportunities; income and poverty status are strongly associated with the cognitive development and behaviour of children (Duncan, Brooks-Gunn, and Klebanov 1994); and add to this the discrimination that is specific to the migrant experience and second-generation immigrants may translate their experiences of blocked mobility into an "oppositional stance to mainstream society" (Portes 1997, 815), with further implications for social cohesion and solidarity.

Ultimately, the implication of conditionality in the determination of migrant poverty would appear to be both a justified theoretical addition and an analytically useful tool allowing us to address the key task of the research question outlined in the first chapter: accounting for variation in migrant poverty outcomes across Europe. From a technical standpoint the measurement, description and deployment of our central conditionality variable in this analysis has indeed allowed us to account for a high degree of variation obtaining at the macro-level, underscoring the utility of the variable and the concept while laying the groundwork for further research building on these findings.

At the level of substantive meaning this new and nuanced viewpoint forces a conceptual relocation of the locus of migrant welfare out of the Work—Welfare nexus, within which native inhabitants find themselves, into a more complex nexus delimited by the complementary interconnections of Work—Conditionality—Status—Welfare. This relocation not only serves as the basis for a more refined understanding of TCN poverty, with implications for policy, but also highlights the contingency of third-country national welfare in Europe, underscoring the fact that such welfare is essentially different in nature, often uncertain and arrived at, if at all, only conditionally — with all strings attached.

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Appendix

A.1. Expert Survey supporting documentation

A.1.1. Call for respondents

UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN

TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL POLICY
ARTS BUILDING
TRINITY COLLEGE
DUBLIN 2
IRELAND

Telephone: +353-1-896 2001
Fax: +353-1-671 2262
Email: socpol@tcd.ie
Web site: http://www.socialwork-socialpolicy.tcd.ie

Dear Sir/Madam

Feb 1st 2010

This is an official call for expert respondents for the research project to be completed by Ph.D. candidate Mr Owen Corrigan provisionally entitled 'Citizenship and Migrant Social Rights: Processes of Incorporation into Social Rights for Migrants in Europe and Implications for Citizenship' as funded by the University of Dublin, Trinity College, by means of an Ussher Fellowship. This project is under the supervision of Mr Anthony McCashin at the School of Social Work and Social Policy. Mr McCashin may be contacted directly with any enquiries at his Trinity College email address (amccshin@tcd.ie).

On the basis of your professional/research experience you have been identified as a suitable respondent for the survey part of this project. This self-completion survey is to be administered online through the surveymonkey.com website. The relevant link to the online survey has been included in the introductory email that accompanies this call for respondents. All individual survey responses received will remain strictly confidential.

Your participation in this project would be greatly appreciated at the personal, professional and institutional levels by all those involved.

Yours sincerely,

Owen Corrigan

Owen Corrigan B.A. (Dubl) M.A. (Oxon) M.Sc. (Oxon)

School of Social Work and Social Policy, Trinity College, Dublin 2, Ireland.
+35387 4144 636
corrigoj@tcd.ie

A.1.2. Expert Survey, Online data collection

This section includes the expert survey that was used to elicit information about the security and welfare access of third-country nationals in different legal categories in Europe. The survey employed skip logic so that, depending on the answers provided, respondents will not have had to answer all questions listed here (i.e. redundant answers were avoided). While the surveymonkey.com website allows users to save a precise copy of the questions as they were presented digitally to users (this is what is presented below), it unfortunately does not record the skip logic directions. Each numbered heading in grey, of which there are 31 beginning with '1. Migrant Social Security in Europe – Introduction', represents a different 'screen' and respondents were presented with each screen individually for response before being moved, or skipped, to the next screen in the sequence. The responses consisted mostly of radio button selection with occasional provision of extra information in text boxes. The survey responses were downloadable only by the researcher in spreadsheet (.xls) format.

As the survey was a form of pilot study with an exploratory element, used in the refining of concepts and narrowing of focus early in the research project, not all of the responses were presented earlier in the text as they will not have been relevant to the ultimate concerns of this thesis.

1. Migrant Social Security in Europe - Introduction

Thank you for agreeing to complete this survey. As stated in the introductory email, the purpose of this survey is to gather information on the conditions which Third Country Nationals (TCNs) must fulfil to access social security benefits in Western European countries. The survey also gathers information concerning the differences between how TCNs receive benefits and how natives receive benefits.

You have been selected to answer questions on one specific European country in which you have research expertise or professional experience. This country was identified in the introductory email. Please use this page to identify yourself, using your email address, and to identify the country for which you will be providing responses from the drop-down menu.

It is highly important to remember that in ALL cases the questions relate to Third Country Nationals ONLY, and never to EU citizens. Also, the focus is on WORKING migrants with an attachment, or the possibility of an attachment, to the labour market, and so the questions mostly concern unemployment- related benefits. No questions will be asked on entitlement to pensions or child/family-related benefits. (Asylum seekers, children or other non-economic migrants play no role in this study and should be disregarded when answering questions.)

Questions will be asked on three distinct categories of Third Country National migrant: 1. Long-term residents; 2. Temporary migrants; 3. Family Reunification migrants.

1. LONG-TERM RESIDENTS: these are migrants who have been given official 'long term resident' status. Usually this will mean that the migrants have lived in the country for a period of time defined in law (often 5 years, but this varies by country) and have met other conditions, often financial or integration related.

2. TEMPORARY MIGRANTS: this term is used in a specific sense in this study to denote all those primary worker migrants who simply do NOT have long term resident status. These migrants may often have less security, fewer protections and more limited access to social security, though this will vary by country.

3. FAMILY REUNIFICATION TCNs: This category denotes those TCNs of working age who have followed their partner/spouse to the host country. Usually this will mean that they are dependent on their partner/spouse and live in the host country subject to the conditions of their partner's work/residence permit.

Questions proceed in blocks according to these categories, so all of the questions related to Long Term Residents will be asked first, before moving on to Temporary migrants and finally Family Reunification migrants. Also, the questions here employ 'skip logic' and so, depending on the answers provided to earlier questions, certain redundant later questions will be automatically skipped over. Where the available response options do not accurately capture the situation in your country, text boxes are available for you to indicate this or to provide more detail.

Thank you once more for your participation.

1. Please enter your email address here.

Page 1

2. In the introductory email you have been asked to answer questions concerning a specified country's welfare system. Please identify this country using the drop down menu.

Country

Please select country

2. Long-term Resident Migrants (LTRs): Contributions

The questions that follow on the pages in this section relate to the rules and conditions associated with social security (employment-related) benefits for third country nationals with Long Term Resident (LTR) status. Please answer with reference to this category of migrant ONLY.

LONG-TERM RESIDENTS: these are migrants who have been given official 'long term resident' status. Usually this will mean that the migrants have lived in the country for a period of time defined in law (often 5 years, but this varies by country) and have met other conditions, often financial or integration related.

1. Are Long Term Resident migrants (LTRs) required to pay contributions to the country's social security system?

- YES
- NO

3. Long-term Resident Migrants: Expulsion

1. If Long Term Resident migrants (LTRs) become unemployed, they may be entitled to claim social security benefits or in some cases they may become liable to expulsion, or expulsion after a grace period etc., depending on the rules operating in your country. Please indicate what would happen to an LTR migrant if they became unemployed in your country

- IMMEDIATE EXPULSION
- EXPULSION AFTER PERIOD OF TIME ('Grace Period')
- NO EXPULSION

4. Long-term Resident Migrants: Confirm expulsion

1. Please CONFIRM that migrants with Long-Term Resident status will be expelled from your country if they lose their job/employment:

- YES: loss of employment means loss of status and the migrant will be expelled immediately
- NO: long-term residents do not need a job to reside here (if a time limit applies please specify this in the Text Box)

Specify time limit details if applicable

5. Long-term Resident Migrants: Grace Period

1. Please enter the maximum number of MONTHS that LTR-migrants can remain in the country while unemployed:

6. Long-term Resident Migrants: Unemployment benefit

1. For those Long Term Resident migrants (LTRs) who become unemployed, are they entitled to claim unemployment benefits for which they have PAID contributions?

- YES
- NO

7. Long-term Resident Migrants: Unemployment benefit - Details

1. Is the rate of unemployment benefit paid to LTR migrants (i.e. the amount of money given to migrants) different from that paid to natives?

- YES
- NO

If YES please give details of the amounts involved, if possible

2. What is the maximum extent of benefit duration in WEEKS?

3. Is the number of weeks specified in the last question different from that which applies to natives of your country?

- YES
- NO

4. Are there age limits, either lower or upper, on migrants who can claim these benefits?

- YES
- NO

If YES please give details

5. How many WEEKS of contributions must be paid before Long Term Resident migrants (LTRs) are eligible to claim unemployment benefits?

6. Is the number of weeks specified in the previous question different from that which applies to natives of your country?

- YES
- NO

Other (please specify)

8. Long-term Resident Migrants: Social Assistance

1. LTR migrants may not be entitled to unemployment benefits, or they may exhaust those benefits for which they have paid social insurance. Will these migrants be entitled to claim any other non-contributory benefits, i.e. minimal levels of 'social assistance' or 'dole' [excluding child/family-related benefits]?

- NO: cannot claim social assistance AND will be expelled from country
- NO: cannot claim social assistance BUT can remain in country
- YES: can claim social assistance
- NONE OF THE ABOVE

If NONE OF THE ABOVE, please specify

9. Long-term Resident Migrants: Social Assistance - Details

1. How long in WEEKS can unemployed LTR migrant claim social assistance? [Note: enter a number, 'indefinitely' or 'N/A']

2. Is the length of time in the previous question different from the length of time which applies to natives?

- YES
- NO
- N/A

3. Is the rate of social assistance benefit paid to LTR migrants (i.e. the amount of money given to migrants) different from that paid to natives?

- YES
- NO
- N/A

If YES please give details of the amounts involved, if possible

10. Long-term Resident Migrants: Benefits Exhausted

1. What will happen if an LTR-migrant has exhausted all forms of welfare benefit/assistance and remains unemployed?

- EXPULSION
- CAN REMAIN FOR FURTHER DEFINED PERIOD (Please specify in Text Box)
- CAN REMAIN INDEFINITELY
- SITUATION COULD NOT ARISE
- OTHER (Please specify in Text Box) Text

Box:

11. Long-term Resident Migrants: Sickness Benefit

1. If an employed LTR migrant becomes sick and is unable to work, will they be entitled to claim SICKNESS BENEFIT for the time spent out of work?

- YES
- NO

12. Long-term Resident Migrants: Sickness Benefit - Details

1. For how long in WEEKS will the LTR migrant be entitled to claim sickness benefit?

2. Is this period of time different from the period of time that natives are entitled to claim for?

- YES
- NO

3. Is the rate of sickness benefit paid to LTR migrants (i.e. the amount of money given to migrants) different from that paid to natives?

- YES
- NO

If YES please give details of the amounts involved, if possible

13. TEMPORARY MIGRANTS - NEW SECTION

The questions that follow on the pages in this section relate to the rules and conditions associated with social security (employment-related) benefits for third country nationals who DO NOT HAVE Long Term Resident (LTR) status. These migrant have been labelled TEMPORARY MIGRANTS in this study. Please answer with reference to this category of migrant ONLY.

TEMPORARY MIGRANTS: this term is used in a specific sense in this study to denote all those primary worker migrants who simply do NOT have long term resident status. These migrants may often have less security, fewer protections and more limited access to social security, though this will vary by country.

1. Are TEMPORARY migrants (i.e. migrants who no NOT have long-term residence status) required to pay contributions to the social security system while working?

- YES
- NO

Other (please specify)

14. Temporary Migrants: Expulsion

1. If TEMPORARY migrants become unemployed, they may be entitled to claim social security benefits or in some cases they may become liable to expulsion, or expulsion after a grace period etc., depending on the rules operating in your country. Please indicate what would happen to a temporary migrant if they became unemployed in your country

- IMMEDIATE EXPULSION
- EXPULSION AFTER PERIOD OF TIME ('Grace Period')
- NO EXPULSION

15. Temporary Migrants: Grace Period

1. Please enter the maximum number of MONTHS that temporary migrants can remain in the country while unemployed:

16. Temporary Migrants: Unemployment Benefit

1. For those TEMPORARY migrants who become unemployed, are they entitled to claim unemployment benefits for which they have PAID contributions?

- YES
- NO

17. Temporary Migrants: Unemployment Benefit - Details

1. Is the rate of unemployment benefit paid to TEMPORARY migrants (i.e. the amount of money given to migrants) different from that paid to natives?

- YES
- NO

If YES please give details of the amounts involved, if possible

2. What is the maximum extent of benefit duration in WEEKS? [Note: this may be identical to the grace period, if applicable, identified in a previous question]

3. Are there age limits, either lower or upper, on migrants who can claim these benefits?

- YES
- NO

If YES please give details

4. How many WEEKS of contributions must be paid before TEMPORARY migrants are eligible to claim unemployment benefits?

5. Is the number of weeks in the previous question different from that which applies to natives of this country?

- YES
- NO

Other (please specify)

18. Temporary Migrants: Social Assistance

1. Temporary migrants may not be entitled to unemployment benefits, or they may exhaust those benefits for which they have paid social insurance. Will these migrants be entitled to claim any other non-contributory benefits, i.e. minimal levels of 'social assistance' or 'dole' [excluding child/family- related benefits]?

- NO: cannot claim social assistance AND will be expelled from country
- NO: cannot claim social assistance BUT can remain in country
- YES: can claim social assistance
- OTHER

If OTHER, please give details

19. Temporary Migrants: Social Assistance - Details

1. How long in WEEKS can unemployed temporary migrants claim social assistance? [Note: enter a number, 'indefinitely', or 'N/A']

2. Is the length of time in the previous question different from the length of time which applies to natives?

- YES
- NO
- N/A

3. Is the rate of social assistance benefit paid to temporary migrants (i.e. the amount of money given to migrants) different from that paid to natives?

- YES
- NO
- N/A

If YES please give details of the amounts involved, if possible

20. Temporary Migrants: Benefits Exhausted

1. What will happen if a temporary migrant has exhausted all forms of welfare benefit/assistance and remains unemployed?

- EXPULSION
- CAN REMAIN FOR FURTHER DEFINED PERIOD (Please specify in Text Box)
- CAN REMAIN INDEFINITELY
- SITUATION COULD NOT ARISE
- OTHER (Please specify in Text Box) Text

Box:

21. Temporary Migrants: Sickness Benefit

1. If an employed temporary migrant becomes sick and is unable to work, will they be entitled to claim SICKNESS BENEFIT for the time spent out of work?

- YES
- NO

22. Temporary Migrants: Sickness Benefit - Details

1. For how long in WEEKS will the temporary migrant be entitled to claim sickness benefit?

2. Is this period of time different from the period of time that natives are entitled to claim for?

- YES
- NO

3. Is the rate of sickness benefit paid to temporary migrants (i.e. the amount of money given to migrants) different from that paid to natives?

- YES
- NO

If YES please give details of the amounts involved, if possible

23. FAMILY REUNIFICATION MIGRANTS: NEW SECTION

The questions that follow on the pages in this section relate to third country nationals who have moved to their host country for purposes of FAMILY REUNIFICATION. Only migrants of working age (i.e. not children) should be considered in providing responses. Please answer with reference to this category of migrant ONLY.

FAMILY REUNIFICATION TCNs: This category denotes those TCNs of working age who have followed their partner/spouse to the host country. Usually this will mean that they are dependent on their partner/spouse and live in the host country subject to the conditions of their partner's work/residence permit.

1. Are Family Reunification TCNs allowed to work while dependent on their sponsor/spouse?

- YES, completely free access to labour market (ignore government jobs)
- YES, but other conditions apply (please specify in Text Box)
- NO, access to labour market is denied

Text Box:

24. Family Reunification TCNs: Contributions

1. Are Family Reunification TCNs required to pay contributions to the social security system while working?

- YES
- NO

25. Family Reunification Migrants: Unemployment Benefit

1. If a Family Reunification TCN becomes unemployed are they allowed to claim unemployment benefits for which they have PAID social insurance contributions?

- YES, in all situations
- YES, but with conditions (please specify in Text Box)
- NO, not entitled to claim benefits even if contributions have been paid

Text Box:

26. Family Reunification Migrants: Unemployment Benefit - Details

1. Is the rate of unemployment benefit paid to Family Reunification TCN migrants (i.e. the amount of money given to migrants) different from that paid to natives?

- YES
- NO

If YES please give details of the amounts involved, if possible

2. What is the maximum extent of benefit duration in WEEKS?

3. Is the number of weeks specified in the last question different from that which applies to natives of your country?

- YES
- NO

4. Are there age limits, either lower or upper, on migrants who can claim these benefits?

- YES
- NO

If YES please give details

5. How many WEEKS of contributions must be paid before Family Reunification TCN migrants are eligible to claim unemployment benefits?

6. Is the number of weeks specified in the previous question different from that which applies to natives of your country?

- YES
- NO

Other (please specify)

27. Family Reunification Migrants: Sickness Benefit

1. If an employed Family Reunification migrant becomes sick and is unable to work, will they be entitled to claim SICKNESS BENEFIT for the time spent out of work?

- YES
- NO

28. Family Reunification Migrants: Sickness Benefit - Details

1. For how long in WEEKS will the Family Reunification migrant be entitled to claim sickness benefit?

2. Is this period of time different from the period of time that natives are entitled to claim for?

- YES
- NO

3. Is the rate of sickness benefit paid to Family Reunification migrants (i.e. the amount of money given to migrants) different from that paid to natives?

- YES
- NO

If YES please give details of the amounts involved, if possible

29. Family Reunification Migrants: Social Assistance

1. Family Reunification TCN migrants may not be entitled to unemployment benefits, or they may exhaust those benefits for which they have paid social insurance. Will these migrants be entitled to claim any other non- contributory benefits, i.e. minimal levels of 'social assistance' or 'dole' [excluding child/family-related benefits]?

- NO: cannot claim social assistance
- YES: can claim social assistance AFTER a defined period of time (please specify time period in Text Box)
- YES: can claim social assistance as long as their sponsor retains residence permit
- OTHER (please detail situation in Text Box) Text

Box:

30. Family Reunification Migrants: Social Assistance - Details

1. How long in WEEKS can unemployed Family Reunification migrants claim social assistance? [Note: enter a number, 'indefinitely', or 'N/A']

2. Is the length of time in the previous question different from the length of time which applies to natives?

- YES
- NO
- N/A

3. Is the rate of social assistance benefit paid to dependent Family Reunification migrants (i.e. the amount of money given to migrants) different from that paid to natives?

- YES
- NO
- N/A

If YES please give details of the amounts involved, if possible

31. End Page: Thank You

Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey.

Your participation is very much appreciated.

A.2. Methodological Appendix

A.2.1. Bivariate correlations of variables used in MCA

Somers' *d* values for LTR-conditionality indicators[144]

	lchabres	lctimeempl	lcintegavc	lcecresourc	lcinsure	lcapplength	lcappcost
lchabres	_						
lctimeempl	.05	_					
lcintegavc	-.25	.2	_				
lcecresourc	-.34	-.07	.4*	_			
lcinsure	-.41*	0	.43*	.42*	_		
lcapplength	-.21	.2	.25	0	.04	_	
lcappcost	-.26	.25	.6*	.53*	.61*	.3	_

*p<.05

Somers' *d* values for Citizenship-conditionality indicators

	cc res	cc integavc	cc ecresourc	cc insure	cc criminal	cc goodchar	cc maxlength	cc appcost
ccres	_							
ccintegavc	.34	_						
ccecresourc	.34	.29	_					
ccinsure	.06	-.10	.39*	_				
cccriminal	.37	.53*	.32	.29*	_			
ccgoodchar	.09	.30	-.09	.15	.58*	_		
ccmaxlength	.14	.20	0	-.59*	.27	.04	_	
ccappcost	.18	.19	-.03	-.39	-.21	-.12	-.06	_

*p<.05

[144] Somers' *D* is an asymmetric measure of association between two variables, which plays a central role as a parameter behind rank or nonparametric statistical methods (Newson 2006). It is extremely close to Kendall's tau conceptually, and has the range -1 to +1.

Cramér's V values for LTR-conditionality indicators

	lchabres	lctimeempl	lcintegavc	lcecresourc	lcinsure	lcapplength	lcappcost
lchabres	_						
lctimeempl	.10	_					
lcintegavc	.30	.55	_				
lcecresourc	.43	.23	.50	_			
lcinsure	.32	.23	.43	.32	_		
lcapplength	.31	.20	.27	.29	.20	_	
lcappcost	.43	.26	.71	.79	.43	.37	_

Cramér's V values for Citizenship-conditionality indicators

	cc res	cc integavc	cc ecresourc	cc insure	cc criminal	cc goodchar	cc maxlength	cc appcost
ccres	_							
ccintegavc	.31	_						
ccecresourc	.27	.33	_					
ccinsure	.18	.27	.44	_				
cccriminal	.54	.61	.43	.20	_			
ccgoodchar	.31	.52	.24	.34	.39	_		
ccmaxlength	.25	.34	.40	.59	.41	.27	_	
ccappcost	.32	.37	.28	.53	.23	.36	.37	_

A.2.2 Citizenship conditionality MCA results, first iteration

Dimension	principal inertia	percent	cumul percent
dim 1	.0905805	31.83	31.83
dim 2	.0508136	17.86	49.69
dim 3	.044146	15.51	65.20
dim 4	.0120081	4.22	69.42
dim 5	.0071776	2.52	71.94
dim 6	.0007946	0.28	72.22
dim 7	.0001592	0.06	72.28
Total	.284575	100.00	

Statistics for column categories in standard normalization

Categories	mass	overall quality	%inert	dimension_1 coord	sqcorr	contrib
ccres						
1	0.008	0.501	0.052	3.240	0.501	0.082
2	0.039	0.002	0.025	-0.068	0.002	0.000
3	0.078	0.122	0.017	-0.290	0.122	0.007
ccecresourc						
1	0.063	0.506	0.026	0.810	0.506	0.041
2	0.016	0.050	0.028	0.532	0.050	0.004
3	0.047	0.449	0.053	-1.258	0.449	0.074
ccinsure						
1	0.102	0.516	0.018	0.542	0.516	0.030
2	0.016	0.369	0.076	-2.377	0.369	0.088
3	0.008	0.319	0.041	-2.296	0.319	0.041
cccriminal						
1	0.016	0.318	0.062	1.989	0.318	0.062
2	0.016	0.377	0.070	2.295	0.377	0.082
3	0.094	0.597	0.025	-0.714	0.597	0.048
ccgoodchar						
1	0.047	0.310	0.049	1.005	0.310	0.047
2	0.047	0.183	0.031	-0.614	0.183	0.018
3	0.031	0.105	0.033	-0.586	0.105	0.011
ccmaxlength						
1	0.016	0.309	0.038	1.535	0.309	0.037
2	0.031	0.284	0.066	-1.373	0.284	0.059
3	0.078	0.050	0.029	0.242	0.050	0.005
ccappcost						
1	0.008	0.466	0.067	-3.549	0.466	0.098
2	0.039	0.021	0.025	-0.206	0.021	0.002
3	0.078	0.217	0.024	0.458	0.217	0.016
ccintegavc						
1	0.039	0.405	0.067	1.473	0.405	0.085
2	0.055	0.481	0.042	-1.073	0.481	0.063
3	0.031	0.000	0.037	0.037	0.000	0.000

A.2.3. LTR conditionality MCA results, first iteration

Statistics for column categories in standard normalization

Categories	mass	overall quality	%inert	dimension_1 coord	dimension_1 sqcorr	dimension_1 contrib	dimension_2 coord	dimension_2 sqcorr	dimension_2 contrib
lchabres									
1	0.098	0.861	0.022	0.608	0.817	0.036	0.188	0.044	0.003
2	0.027	0.865	0.066	-1.878	0.703	0.094	-1.205	0.162	0.039
3	0.018	0.280	0.019	-0.530	0.128	0.005	0.771	0.152	0.011
lctimempl									
1	0.089	0.517	0.016	-0.318	0.277	0.009	-0.395	0.240	0.014
2	0.054	0.517	0.026	0.530	0.277	0.015	0.659	0.240	0.023
lcecresourc									
1	0.036	0.868	0.058	-1.174	0.413	0.049	1.650	0.456	0.097
2	0.009	0.764	0.121	-2.802	0.284	0.070	-4.875	0.480	0.212
3	0.098	0.874	0.026	0.682	0.849	0.046	-0.157	0.025	0.002
lcinsure									
1	0.098	0.905	0.028	-0.707	0.865	0.049	0.204	0.040	0.004
2	0.036	0.926	0.043	1.483	0.903	0.079	-0.318	0.023	0.004
3	0.009	0.503	0.034	1.846	0.436	0.030	-0.967	0.067	0.008
lcappcost									
1	0.009	0.764	0.121	-2.802	0.284	0.070	-4.875	0.480	0.212
2	0.080	0.775	0.056	-0.758	0.402	0.046	0.976	0.373	0.077
3	0.054	0.817	0.090	1.604	0.748	0.138	-0.652	0.069	0.023
lcapplength									
1	0.089	0.517	0.013	-0.344	0.405	0.011	-0.243	0.113	0.005
2	0.036	0.587	0.020	-0.063	0.003	0.000	1.088	0.583	0.042
3	0.018	0.848	0.040	1.844	0.736	0.061	-0.962	0.112	0.017
lcintegavc									
1	0.071	0.776	0.060	-0.818	0.389	0.048	1.094	0.388	0.085
2	0.036	0.638	0.053	-0.341	0.039	0.004	-1.797	0.599	0.115
3	0.036	0.785	0.089	1.978	0.768	0.140	-0.390	0.017	0.005

Dimension	principal inertia	percent	cumul percent
dim 1	.1444754	48.87	48.87
dim 2	.0807409	27.31	76.18
dim 3	.0069182	2.34	78.52
dim 4	.0029678	1.00	79.53
dim 5	.0009065	0.31	79.83
Total	.29563	100.00	

A.2.4. Variable correlations and summaries

Correlation of variables at Level-2 (N=16)

	ltrcon8	citcon8	bga	EPL	unemp05	mig~0405	migsb~02
ltrcon8	1.0000						
citcon8	0.4829	1.0000					
bga	-0.1188	-0.2558	1.0000				
EPL	0.2231	-0.2301	0.2093	1.0000			
unemp05	0.1525	-0.0374	-0.2482	0.6420*	1.0000		
migunemp0405	0.0746	0.0352	0.0362	0.3322	0.6674*	1.0000	
migsbad02	0.2455	-0.2005	-0.2070	0.4586	0.2964	-0.1805	1.0000
migsbad06	0.3815	-0.0001	-0.4687	0.3230	0.3567	-0.1391	0.8804*
percentTCN	0.2181	0.2269	0.3206	-0.0812	0.1041	-0.0202	-0.1480
rightvote	0.3114	0.2999	0.0342	0.1875	-0.0858	-0.0831	-0.2322
oecdskill	-0.6511*	-0.3796	0.1829	-0.4757	-0.5672*	-0.4534	-0.2574
security	0.1290	-0.1511	0.3599	0.3173	0.3405	0.5959*	-0.0257
gdpgth04	-0.2568	-0.4052	-0.0481	-0.0766	-0.1305	0.0487	-0.0931
gdp3yrs	-0.2755	-0.3027	-0.2293	-0.1618	-0.1435	-0.1175	-0.0714
lninflow05	0.2087	0.1775	-0.6198*	-0.0466	0.3330	-0.2083	0.3549
foreignpop	0.0359	0.0964	0.2484	-0.4085	-0.3427	-0.2789	-0.4287
natur	-0.1167	-0.1801	0.2129	-0.2838	-0.2716	0.2744	-0.5710*

	migsb~06	percen~N	rightv~e	oecdsk~l	security	gdpgth04	gdp3yrs
migsbad06	1.0000						
percentTCN	-0.0968	1.0000					
rightvote	-0.0600	-0.0249	1.0000				
oecdskill	-0.3425	0.0174	-0.3471	1.0000			
security	-0.0087	0.2755	0.1153	-0.2110	1.0000		
gdpgth04	-0.1164	-0.4866	-0.2648	0.4937	0.1598	1.0000	
gdp3yrs	-0.0418	-0.4526	-0.2701	0.5441*	-0.0474	0.9326*	1.0000
lninflow05	0.5904*	0.2168	0.0651	-0.1120	0.0418	-0.0021	0.2024
foreignpop	-0.2757	0.5026*	0.2126	0.2503	0.0596	-0.0136	0.0437
natur	-0.4504	0.0249	0.1891	0.2508	0.5312*	0.3084	0.1590

	lninf~05	foreig~p	natur
lninflow05	1.0000		
foreignpop	0.1188	1.0000	
natur	-0.2345	0.0896	1.0000

Note: *p<.05; All variable names are self-explanatory, except for: 'natur' = naturalisation rate; 'bga' = benefit generosity; for others see operationalisation section of Chp.3.

Variable Summaries, Level-2

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ltrcon8	16	3.9	2.4	1	8
citcon8	16	5	2.3	1	8
bga	16	8.1	2.5	3.9	12
EPL	16	2.1	.78	.7	3.5
unemp05	16	7.1	2.3	4.3	11
migunemp0405	16	12	3.8	6	21
migsbad02	16	35	12	16	62
migsbad06	16	35	12	17	62
percentTCN	16	4.7	3	.79	11
rightvote	16	22	17	0	49
oecdskill	16	22	8	11	41
security	16	62	14	29	79
gdpgth04	16	3	1.1	1.2	4.6
gdp3yrs	16	2.3	1.3	.46	5
lninflow05	16	11	1.2	9.4	13
foreignpop	16	10	5	3.6	24
natur	16	3.4	2.1	.2	8.2

Correlation of variables, Level-1

	silcpov7	conspov	Income~v	nat	Age_lo	Age_hi	Sex
silcpov7	1.0000						
conspov	0.5646*	1.0000					
IncomePov	0.3619*	0.6795*	1.0000				
nat	-0.2244*	-0.1230*	-0.1175*	1.0000			
Age_lo	0.0501*	0.0370*	0.0587*	-0.1120*	1.0000		
Age_hi	-0.0080	-0.0007	-0.0160*	0.2001*	-0.3419*	1.0000	
Sex	0.0007	0.0114	0.0127*	0.0048	-0.0112	-0.0128*	1.0000
Primary	0.1858*	0.1077*	0.0973*	-0.0716*	-0.0744*	0.1413*	0.0182*
LwrSecondary	0.0909*	0.0509*	0.0507*	-0.0258*	0.1542*	-0.0532*	-0.0059
UprSecondary	-0.0658*	-0.0676*	-0.0692*	0.0548*	0.0232*	-0.0911*	-0.0152*
Married	-0.1123*	-0.0436*	-0.0282*	-0.0178*	-0.3813*	0.1084*	-0.0247*
Unemployed	0.1573*	0.1509*	0.1398*	-0.0327*	0.0284*	-0.0443*	-0.0106
HHsize	-0.0226*	0.0549*	0.1190*	-0.0716*	0.0761*	-0.2375*	-0.0221*
SingleParent	0.1061*	0.0892*	0.0802*	0.0319*	0.0170*	-0.0753*	0.1013*

	Primary	LwrSec~y	UprSec~y	Married	Unempl~d	HHsize	Single~t
Primary	1.0000						
LwrSecondary	-0.2096*	1.0000					
UprSecondary	-0.2809*	-0.4032*	1.0000				
Married	0.0497*	-0.0828*	-0.0205*	1.0000			
Unemployed	0.0197*	0.0122	-0.0065	-0.0258*	1.0000		
HHsize	0.0397*	0.0626*	-0.0391*	0.1900*	0.0405*	1.0000	
SingleParent	-0.0313*	0.0286*	0.0113	-0.2112*	0.0487*	-0.0730*	1.0000

Note: *p<.05; All variable names are self-explanatory, except for: 'conspov' = binary indicator for consistent poverty; 'nat' = naturalised citizenship status.

Variable summaries, Level-1

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
silcpov7	23672	1.7	1.6	0	7
conspov	23670	.14	.35	0	1
IncomePov	24066	.26	.44	0	1
nat	23968	.51	.5	0	1
Age_lo	24068	.22	.42	0	1
Age_hi	24068	.29	.45	0	1
Sex	24068	.54	.5	0	1
Primary	24068	.13	.33	0	1
LwrSecondary	24068	.23	.42	0	1
UprSecondary	24068	.35	.48	0	1
Married	24068	.63	.48	0	1
Unemployed	24068	.085	.28	0	1
HHsize	24068	3.5	1.7	1	14
SingleParent	24068	.04	.2	0	1

Variable correlations across both levels

	silcpov7	conspov	Income~v	ltrcon8	citcon8	bga	EPL
silcpov7	1.0000						
conspov	0.5646*	1.0000					
IncomePov	0.3619*	0.6795*	1.0000				
ltrcon8	0.0361*	-0.0037	-0.0437*	1.0000			
citcon8	0.0404*	-0.0159*	-0.0413*	0.4982*	1.0000		
bga	-0.1018*	-0.0210*	-0.0177*	-0.1461*	-0.4854*	1.0000	
EPL	0.1593*	0.0860*	0.0569*	0.2761*	0.0639*	0.2626*	1.0000
unemp05	0.2024*	0.1156*	0.0957*	0.0700*	-0.0435*	-0.1273*	0.7818*
migunemp0405	0.0648*	0.0751*	0.0706*	0.1042*	-0.1674*	0.3348*	0.5535*
migsbad02	0.1653*	0.0860*	0.0437*	0.2303*	0.1947*	-0.3624*	0.0838*
migsbad06	0.1612*	0.0793*	0.0465*	0.3415*	0.3325*	-0.5783*	-0.0150*
percentTCN	-0.1705*	-0.0702*	-0.0499*	-0.0904*	-0.3100*	0.3155*	-0.0019
rightvote	0.0520*	0.0082	-0.0104	0.4212*	0.4758*	-0.0900*	0.4817*
oecdskill	-0.1665*	-0.0629*	-0.0169*	-0.6592*	-0.4965*	0.2693*	-0.4697*
security	-0.0372*	0.0331*	0.0543*	-0.0978*	-0.4866*	0.5997*	0.3801*
gdpgth04	0.0033	0.0301*	0.0560*	-0.2017*	-0.5236*	0.3772*	0.1149*
gdp3yrs	0.0247*	0.0249*	0.0479*	-0.2577*	-0.3588*	0.1817*	0.0821*
lninflow05	0.0579*	0.0120	0.0251*	-0.2262*	0.1554*	-0.6545*	-0.0881*
foreignpop	-0.0572*	-0.0109	0.0015	-0.1549*	-0.4203*	0.4533*	-0.0715*
natur	-0.2291*	-0.0918*	-0.0379*	-0.1080*	-0.4182*	0.3997*	-0.3121*
nat	-0.2244*	-0.1230*	-0.1175*	0.0516*	-0.1395*	0.1946*	-0.0639*
Age_lo	0.0501*	0.0370*	0.0587*	-0.0478*	-0.0477*	0.0438*	0.0223*
Age_hi	-0.0080	-0.0007	-0.0160*	0.0745*	0.0233*	-0.0205*	0.0101
Sex	0.0007	0.0114	0.0127*	-0.0206*	-0.0061	0.0035	-0.0063
Primary	0.1858*	0.1077*	0.0973*	0.0465*	0.0122	-0.0177*	0.2079*
LwrSecondary	0.0909*	0.0509*	0.0507*	0.0943*	0.1240*	-0.0743*	-0.0244*
UprSecondary	-0.0658*	-0.0676*	-0.0692*	0.0548*	0.0203*	-0.0509*	-0.0361*
Married	-0.1123*	-0.0436*	-0.0282*	0.0699*	0.0508*	-0.0272*	-0.0023
Unemployed	0.1573*	0.1509*	0.1398*	-0.0027	-0.0096	0.0221*	0.0706*
HHsize	-0.0226*	0.0549*	0.1190*	-0.0503*	-0.0384*	0.0548*	0.0914*
SingleParent	0.1061*	0.0892*	0.0802*	-0.0242*	-0.0256*	0.0264*	-0.0251*

Variable correlations across both levels (Cont.)

	unemp05	mig~0405	migsb~02	migsb~06	percen~N	rightv~e	oecdsk~l
unemp05	1.0000						
migunemp0405	0.6467*	1.0000					
migsbad02	0.1314*	-0.3053*	1.0000				
migsbad06	0.0742*	-0.3320*	0.8804*	1.0000			
percentTCN	-0.0253*	0.0724*	-0.1031*	-0.1488*	1.0000		
rightvote	0.2915*	0.1775*	-0.2621*	-0.0730*	-0.1464*	1.0000	
oecdskill	-0.4613*	-0.3043*	-0.1619*	-0.2083*	0.4782*	-0.6325*	1.0000
security	0.2978*	0.6134*	-0.1701*	-0.1998*	0.5422*	-0.1082*	0.2158*
gdpgth04	0.0682*	0.2372*	-0.1468*	-0.1658*	0.0139*	-0.4859*	0.4661*
gdp3yrs	0.0554*	0.0432*	-0.0716*	-0.0443*	0.0069	-0.4588*	0.4987*
lninflow05	0.1918*	-0.4068*	0.3737*	0.5190*	0.1937*	0.1256*	0.0772*
foreignpop	-0.2868*	0.0169*	-0.3992*	-0.2192*	0.1712*	0.0807*	0.3155*
natur	-0.3339*	0.2245*	-0.6561*	-0.4868*	0.5365*	-0.1144*	0.4515*
nat	-0.1043*	0.0573*	-0.1243*	-0.1405*	0.2701*	-0.0354*	0.1068*
Age_lo	-0.0062	-0.0179*	-0.0163*	-0.0353*	-0.0774*	-0.0272*	0.0083
Age_hi	0.0334*	0.0512*	0.0313*	0.0538*	0.1586*	0.0105	0.0131*
Sex	-0.0043	-0.0060	0.0056	-0.0051	-0.0048	-0.0150*	0.0069
Primary	0.2247*	0.1160*	0.0226*	0.0095	0.0316*	0.1205*	-0.1093*
LwrSecondary	-0.0649*	-0.0871*	0.0249*	0.0686*	-0.0981*	0.1002*	-0.1054*
UprSecondary	-0.0211*	-0.0458*	0.0029	0.0182*	-0.0436*	0.0199*	-0.0704*
Married	0.0029	0.0289*	0.0366*	0.0564*	-0.0017	0.0212*	-0.0350*
Unemployed	0.0777*	0.0987*	-0.0185*	-0.0177*	-0.0304*	0.0365*	-0.0380*
HHsize	0.0731*	0.0672*	-0.0447*	-0.0366*	-0.0240*	0.0427*	-0.0023
SingleParent	-0.0206*	0.0166*	-0.0374*	-0.0403*	0.0298*	-0.0229*	0.0441*

	security	gdpgth04	gdp3yrs	lninf~05	foreig~p	natur	nat
security	1.0000						
gdpgth04	0.4994*	1.0000					
gdp3yrs	0.3493*	0.9203*	1.0000				
lninflow05	-0.1360*	-0.2949*	0.0184*	1.0000			
foreignpop	0.3824*	0.3459*	0.3815*	-0.0676*	1.0000		
natur	0.5588*	0.3238*	0.1687*	-0.2313*	0.4833*	1.0000	
nat	0.1853*	0.0242*	-0.0468*	-0.1056*	0.0918*	0.2751*	1.0000
Age_lo	-0.0163*	0.0558*	0.0446*	-0.0554*	0.0077	-0.0257*	-0.1120*
Age_hi	0.0817*	-0.0308*	-0.0296*	0.0493*	-0.0078	0.0696*	0.2001*
Sex	-0.0024	-0.0037	-0.0005	0.0050	-0.0034	-0.0112	0.0048
Primary	0.0521*	-0.0123	-0.0021	0.0666*	-0.0493*	-0.0857*	-0.0716*
LwrSecondary	-0.1054*	-0.1045*	-0.0942*	0.0114	-0.0215*	-0.0451*	-0.0258*
UprSecondary	-0.0509*	-0.0418*	-0.0377*	0.0220*	-0.0128*	-0.0069	0.0548*
Married	0.0012	-0.0183*	-0.0257*	-0.0165*	-0.0117	-0.0032	-0.0178*
Unemployed	0.0354*	0.0189*	0.0041	-0.0417*	0.0092	-0.0158*	-0.0327*
HHsize	0.0644*	0.0612*	0.0607*	-0.0106	0.0617*	0.0009	-0.0716*
SingleParent	0.0134*	0.0184*	0.0121	-0.0252*	0.0200*	0.0394*	0.0319*

	Age_lo	Age_hi	Sex	Primary	LwrSec~y	UprSec~y	Married
Age_lo	1.0000						
Age_hi	-0.3419*	1.0000					
Sex	-0.0112	-0.0128*	1.0000				
Primary	-0.0744*	0.1413*	0.0182*	1.0000			
LwrSecondary	0.1542*	-0.0532*	-0.0059	-0.2096*	1.0000		
UprSecondary	0.0232*	-0.0911*	-0.0152*	-0.2809*	-0.4032*	1.0000	
Married	-0.3813*	0.1084*	-0.0247*	0.0497*	-0.0828*	-0.0205*	1.0000
Unemployed	0.0284*	-0.0443*	-0.0106	0.0197*	0.0122	-0.0065	-0.0258*
HHsize	0.0761*	-0.2375*	-0.0221*	0.0397*	0.0626*	-0.0391*	0.1900*
SingleParent	0.0170*	-0.0753*	0.1013*	-0.0313*	0.0286*	0.0113	-0.2112*

	Unempl~d	HHsize	Single~t
Unemployed	1.0000		
HHsize	0.0405*	1.0000	
SingleParent	0.0487*	-0.0730*	1.0000

Note: *p<.05

Raw values of level-2 indicators

col1	ltrcon8	citcon8	bga	EPL	unemp05	migunemp0405	migsbad02	migsbad06	percentTCN	colonial
AUS	8	7	6.3	1.9	5.2	11	34	46	1.5	0
BEL	1	1	11	2.2	8.4	16	43	39	3.9	1
DEN	2	8	9.9	1.4	5	11	23	20	3.8	0
FIN	3	6	6.5	2	8.4	21	24	21	.79	0
FRA	6	6	6	3	10	15	37	42	6.9	1
GER	6	8	7.7	2.2	11	16	33	41	11	1
GRE	7	5	5.2	2.8	9.6	11	62	62	2.1	0
IRE	1	3	6.5	1.1	4.3	6	28	26	2.4	0
ITA	4	6	3.9	1.9	7.8	9.4	39	39	1.8	1
NED	7	5	11	2.1	5.2	11	40	31	7.3	1
NOR	4	5	12	2.6	4.6	9.4	36	33	4.2	0
POR	3	2	11	3.5	7.7	9.4	50	40	4.9	1
SPA	1	5	7.8	3.1	9.2	12	34	35	3.5	1
SUI	5	8	9.7	1.1	4.3	8.4	21	21	9.5	0
SWE	3	1	10	2.2	7.8	14	16	17	5.5	0
UK	1	4	5.1	.7	4.6	7.3	41	46	6.2	1

col1	rightvote	oecdskill	security	gdpgth04	gdp3yrs	lninflow05	foreignpop	natur	decentral	mcp
AUS	49	11	57	2.5	1.9	11	14	4.4	1	0
BEL	15	23	79	3.2	1.9	10	13	3.5	1	1
DEN	24	24	50	2.3	1.7	9.8	6.6	3.8	1	0
FIN	0	19	71	4.1	3	9.4	3.6	5.1	0	0
FRA	46	18	71	2.5	1.8	12	8	4.2	1	0
GER	7.5	15	64	1.2	.58	12	13	1.6	1	0
GRE	2.2	16	64	4.6	4.3	13	5.3	.31	0	0
IRE	4	41	29	4.6	5	11	14	1.8	1	0
ITA	41	12	43	1.5	.72	12	5	1.3	1	0
NED	21	19	71	2.2	1.5	11	10	4.1	0	1
NOR	36	31	71	3.9	2.5	10	8.7	5	0	0
POR	7.3	19	50	1.6	.46	9.4	6.1	.2	0	0
SPA	38	21	71	3.3	3.3	13	12	2.2	1	0
SUI	31	24	64	2.5	1.7	11	24	2.6	1	0
SWE	26	24	79	4.2	3.2	11	13	8.2	0	1
UK	2.2	35	64	3	2.6	13	10	5.7	1	1

Fig. A.2.1 - Relationship of selected Level-2 variables to Income Poverty Rate



A.2.5. Notes on Multilevel Modelling with Random Effects

The microdata will be analysed by means of multilevel modelling with random effects. Multilevel modelling, or MLM, is a technique which allows the analyst to take account of the inherent hierarchical structure of the data, or the fact that individual observations are nested within larger units. In this instance, individual TCN-migrants are nested within country units (technically country-year units in our approach), where different country-level policy measures obtain pertaining to conditionality and the welfare system. Neglecting or ignoring the hierarchical structure of the data and simply using standard techniques of regression analysis like OLS is not advised. OLS has been shown to underestimate the size of the standard errors when faced with hierarchically structured data, leading to a higher rate of Type I error, i.e. claiming there is an effect when in fact there is none.

Random effects models assign portions of the variance to cluster-specific effects, and for this reason are also known as variance components models. In this instance we estimate only random intercept models (not random coefficient models) which allow each cluster a specific intercept on the dependent variable and within each cluster there will also be residual (level-1) variation around the cluster-specific regression line. Later exposition will make the import of this clearer. In a way, the choice of random effects modelling is pre-determined as the substantive point of this modelling exercise is to estimate the effects and interactions of a defined set of level-2 variables on the poverty outcome indicators. The modelling of level-2 independent variables would not be possible in fixed effects models, as the inclusion of a complete set of country/country-year dummy variables would engender perfect collinearity were one then to attempt to introduce level-2 covariates. For more on the differences of fixed and random effects models see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008, 124).

Moving away from ordinary least squares estimation, MLMs can be estimated in a variety of ways though the choice of estimation method is not trivial and various impinging factors will determine the efficiency of the standard error estimates and thus will bear directly on the reliability of inferences drawn from hypothesis tests. Given the highly unbalanced nature of the dataset used here (unequal cluster size), maximum likelihood (ML) and restricted maximum likelihood (REML) are the "preferred methods of estimation" over other alternatives (Marchenko 2006). Without getting mired in the statistical arcana – which involves REML adjusting for the number of degrees of freedom utilised, in a manner which standard ML does not – suffice it to say that REML is

preferable when the number of level-2 units is small, but that the differences between ML and REML will be trivial as the level-2 N increases. Also, contrary to common belief, REML is not unbiased for the estimation of the variance components where data are unbalanced (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 72), though it can be seen as the prudent and conservative choice. Generalized least squares (GLS) is another popular method of estimation which involves weighting OLS estimates using weights that depend on the variance-component estimates (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).

On what constitutes a 'small' level-2 N there is some disagreement. Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal state that a sufficient number of clusters (i.e. level-2 units) for random effects MLM is "typically more than 10 or 20" (2008, 62). The variance components will be poorly estimated with a smaller number of clusters, though if one is interested solely in the effects of the variables, i.e. the regression coefficients for the fixed (non-random) part of the model – as we are in this case – then this is not of pressing concern and "a smaller number of clusters may suffice" (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 62). Maas and Hox take a small level-2 sample size to mean a sample of 50 or less (Maas and Hox 2004a), though they have also shown in a simulation study elsewhere that with 30 level-2 units, using REML estimation, the fixed regression coefficients and standard errors were perfectly reliable (Maas and Hox 2005). This is encouraging, as we will have 28 level-2 units in our analysis; 14 countries over 2 years (more on this later).

Also, the choice of one estimation method over another often involves a trade off, insofar as some estimation methods are not technically capable of generating often desirable and useful information; for example, in Stata 11.1, GLS estimation allows the researcher to call for *robust* standard errors for the covariates, which maximum likelihood techniques do not allow, but cannot provide standard errors on the level-2 variance component estimates, unlike maximum likelihood; meanwhile, REML/MLE can provide level-2 residuals in post-estimation, while GLS cannot (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).

Given the large and international scale of the data collection, with national statistical organisations taking control of data collection separately by country, the reader may rightly enquire as to the cross-comparability of data. Of course, given that Eurostat undertake a comprehensive data harmonisation process after data collection, this is not an issue of concern. What may remain legitimate issues of concern, however, are those of sampling, adequacy of sample size, variations in effective sample size across national jurisdiction and representativeness of those sampled. Simple random sampling is a fundamentally important assumption in ordinary regression analysis and equally so in multilevel analysis.

On representativeness, it seems fairly safe to claim that the very large sample size (24,000 approx.) will ensure that those sampled will be representative of 'TCN migrants in Western Europe in 2006/2007'. However, leaving aside this meta-representativeness, it may be the case that TCNs sampled for certain countries may not be representative of TCNs generally for that country. There are various reasons for this: the TCN community in that country may be largely irregular and thus unwilling to answer official-seeming questions to representatives of the state; certain migrant communities in a given country may possess poorer language skills than average leading to a higher rate of non-response; migrant communities may be geographically clustered in a way that country nationals are not, something the sampling design may not account for. Whatever the reason, there are large differences in absolute numbers of migrants sampled from country to country in the SILC data which means that some country-year clusters will provide less information than others in the analysis. For example, in the Netherlands, where TCNs make up the largest percentage of the total foreign population (7.32%) of all the countries used in this multilevel analysis, we have a national sample consisting of 1,316 TCNs; or 182.8 third-country nationals per percentage point of TCNs in the total foreign population. Compare this with Portugal where we have a sample size of 305 migrants, or only 62.2 third-country nationals per percentage point of TCNs in the total foreign population (4.9%).

Unequal probability of selection for some respondents due to design issues is the standard justification for the use of sampling weights in ordinary regression based analyses to ensure coefficients are not biased. However, while the EU-SILC data does include a set of weights to correct for just this, it must be remembered that these weights have been constructed with reference to the full population, i.e. on the basis of *all* respondents in the data, both nationals and non-nationals. Accordingly their application to a migrant-specific analysis would not be justified and, far from making the sampled migrants more representative of the migrant population, we could well make the sample less representative (Barrett and McCarthy 2007, 807). Furthermore, utilising weights in the context of a *multilevel* regression analysis is a fraught enterprise, both technically and statistically.

Due to unequal probability of selection across higher-level units and lower-level units in multistage sampling procedures, normal weighting techniques will be insufficient to the task of correcting for possible bias in the estimates (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2006). This is the statistical issue. Some authors, e.g. Pfefferman et al. 1998, have outlined weighting techniques specific to multilevel modelling that correct for this. Those same

authors, however, also observe that a common practice in MLM is simply to ignore sampling schemes and that this is often justifiable given that "multilevel models can incorporate as covariates certain characteristics of the sampling design such as strata and cluster indicators, and that conditionally on these characteristics the sampling design is ignorable in the sense of Rubin (1976)" (Pfefferman et al. 1998, 23–24).

The technical issue is rather more mundane, but by no means trivial. Put simply, not all computer programs can apply sampling weights to MLM in the required manner, and within those programs that can combine MLM with weighting, not all estimation methods (GLS, MLE, REML etc.) allow the application of sampling weights.[145] Furthermore, the computational burden engendered by utilising sampling weights in certain circumstances is, for various reasons[146], so intensive and time-consuming that it places a serious practical constraint on the researcher, amounting in this instance to a non-viable research strategy.

Fortunately, it does not seem likely that weighting is necessary at all and the approach taken here will be to ignore sampling schemes, in line with the above quotation from Pfefferman et al. (1998). Firstly, it is arguable that inherent in the very nature of a random-effects approach we are already accounting for sampling variations from country to country and year by year (with random intercepts defined by country-year clusters); i.e. the peculiarities of sampling in, e.g., Portugal-2006 will be reflected in the random intercept estimated for that country-year cluster.[147] Gilardi's conclusion that including country *and* year as random effects in multilevel models does indeed help to capture significant

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[145] REML estimation in Stata 11.1 (through the 'xtmixed' command) does not facilitate the use of sampling weights. Only the fixed effects models allow the application of these weights, with the caveat that they must be constant within cluster; it has already been remarked that fixed effects models are useless for present purposes. GLS estimation (through the 'xtreg' command) allows one to control for clustering of the country-year units under the 'country' variable, but this entails the downside that GLS estimation is not the estimation method of choice for unbalanced data such as we have here. (The Stata-savvy reader will be aware that use of 'iweight' is facilitated with 'xtreg', however these weights, called 'importance weights' in the Stata literature, are merely programmer weights and not analyst weights; they are useless for present purposes.)

[146] The Stata add-on 'gllamm' [Generalized Linear Latent And Mixed Models] allows sampling weights with MLM, but because gllamm relies on numerical integration – unlike xtmixed which exploits "the closed form of the likelihood for random-effects models with normally distributed continuous responses" (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 67) – it is extremely slow, especially with continuous dependent variables, which we use in most of the models in this chapter, and in higher-dimensional models, i.e. models with large numbers of independent variables. Anecdotal evidence indicates that gllamm estimation of such complex models often takes many, many hours, if not days, to converge on a solution, depending on available computing power.

[147] Interpretation of this point need not weigh too heavily on us, as the focus of this chapter will be on assessing the effects of hypothesised independent variables (i.e. the regression coefficients), not on the meaning of estimated random intercepts.

unobserved heterogeneity is consistent with this view ('country-year' random effects will be no different) (Gilardi 2010, 657).

Secondly, concerns that a too-small sample size in countries like Portugal might bias the results in some way can be set aside given that we know that REML estimation deals appropriately with such unbalanced data. Even with relatively small clusters, where minimum cluster-size is about 150 TCNs, the large sampling error associated with small sample size need not be a concern, as larger level-2 units will feed more information into the estimation of the parameters (Kogan 2006).[148] In other words, it all comes out in the maximum-likelihood wash. Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008, 62) observe that "in random-effects models it is only required that there are a good number of clusters of size 2 or more" and a cluster will still inform the estimates even when small. A study conducted by Carle on weighting/non-weighting in MLM finds that bias of coefficients decreases substantially, whether weighted or not, as cluster sizes become sufficiently large; Carle also found that differences (of estimates and standard errors) between weighted and unweighted analyses were minimal, not leading to different inferential conclusions (Carle 2009). Other research has found negligible or no bias of the regression coefficients and their standard errors even when the cluster size is as small as 5 (Maas and Hox 2005). In short, we can be confident that our cluster size is indeed sufficiently large for our purposes and, given that we are modelling country-year clusters as the random effects, we can be confident that sampling variations by country and by year should not unduly influence the results.

On the choice of clustering at the country-year level, there are one or two other things to note. The choice was made to model the random effects in this way, and not just by country, so as to increase our level-2 'sample size' from 14 to 28, i.e. taking all 14 countries over 2 years (2006/2007). Pooling cross-sections is a standard practice in all types of regression modelling where the sample size may be too small for comfort, and this number of units is desirable as outlined above. The analyses conducted will still be cross-sectional in nature; there is no need to control for 'year of survey' in the model, as one would do with OLS regression, as this is already implicit in the modelling of country-year clusters as random effects (Jensen and Lindstadt 2005). It should be noted that the respondents were different in each year of the survey used, and are thus independent observations; the data does not constitute a panel. Utilising country-year clusters and individual responses is by now an established practice in multilevel social scientific research, of which there are many

[148] The average number of TCNs sampled in each country-year cluster is 842 in most models.

examples (e.g. Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009; Jensen and Lindstadt 2005; Kogan 2006; LaFree and Tseloni 2006; Loewenberg, Mishler, and Sanborn 2010; Solt 2008 etc.).

In the foregoing, we have made it clear that the focus of the analysis will be on the effects of the hypothesised level-2 variables on social citizenship outcomes, and not on the peculiarities of MLM models, however interesting they might be to the methodologist. Our concern is with the estimated effects of conditionality and welfare benefits on poverty and other indicators, controlling for a set of independent variables at both levels; i.e. we are interested in the magnitude and direction of specific regression coefficients and in their statistical significance. Given this, sample size also plays a central role in the determination of one other important concern for any quantitative researcher : Power.

Statistical power is defined as the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact false. It is distinct from the significance level, or 'alpha' (α), which tells us the probability of committing a Type I error (i.e. drawing a false positive, or concluding that there is an effect where there is in fact none). The conventional alpha cut-off value of .05 is the probability of detecting an effect where none actually exists. Power, by contrast, is the probability of rejecting the null when the null is in fact false, or of detecting an effect that *does* exist. Power is defined as $(1 - \beta)$, where β = probability of Type II error (i.e. of drawing a false negative). (Cohen 1988).

Power depends, under normal circumstances, on various factors including the alpha level selected for the statistical test in question, the magnitude of the effect under consideration ('effect size'), and the sample size used to detect this effect. Sometimes a finding of non-significance – a failure to reject the null – does not imply that the hypothesised variable has no effect on the dependent variable, rather this finding could be due to the fact that the sample size was simply too small to detect the size of effect one had in mind, or that the alpha level was too stringent, or that the data were just too variable. Another way of phrasing any of these contingencies is by saying that the test lacked statistical power. A conventional value for power is 0.80, and one way of thinking about this, is to say that in repeated tests (or repeated 'experiments') on our given sample we would detect significant results (i.e. p-values below the specified alpha level) 80% of the time. Increasing the sample size (thus decreasing standard errors and variance), or setting a more lenient alpha level, will under normal circumstances increase the statistical power of a test. (Cohen 1988; Scherbaum and Ferreter 2009).

Things are substantially more complex with MLM however, where we essentially have two 'sample sizes' in a two-level model, and where intra-cluster correlation, cluster size and

number of clusters will all impact on power. Existing practices for single-level models do not translate readily to the MLM context and although work continues to be done on what Scherbaum and Ferreter (2009, 347) refer to as this "problematic" issue, the existing literature tends to be highly technical and not always accessible (Snijders and Bosker 1999; Snijders 2005; Hox 2002). Some rules of thumb have appeared, however, and it has been suggested that the '30/30' rule, 30 units at both levels 1 and 2, giving a total sample size of 900, should produce satisfactory levels of statistical power for effect sizes that are Medium or Large according to Cohen's categorisation (Scherbaum and Ferreter 2009; J. Cohen 1988).

Scherbaum and Ferreter (2009, 355) provide formulas for the calculation of statistical power in a two-tailed test where alpha, the effect size and the standard error of the effect are known; $Z_{(1-\beta)}$ is the z-score associated with the desired level of statistical power (i.e. z = .85 for power = .80; 1.29 for power = .90 etc.[149]), while $Z_{(1-\alpha/2)}$ is the z-score associated with the chosen level of a Type I error (i.e. 1.96 if α =.05):

$$Power\left[Z_{(1-\beta)}\right] \leq \frac{Effect\ Size}{Std.Error} - Z_{(1-\alpha/2)}$$

Using data specific to their research interests these authors present power curves showing how the statistical power of their tests varies depending on effect size, cluster size and the number of clusters, with the latter factor playing by far the biggest role as far as sampling parameters go. However, the ability of bigger samples at either level to increase power was heavily contingent on effect size and, where the effect size was Small, power remained rather low (Scherbaum and Ferreter 2009). It will also be possible to plot power curves for this research project utilising the software made available by Raudenbush et al. (2009), however first it will be necessary to estimate an approximate effect size for our multilevel variable(s) of interest.

Again, this is not as straightforward for MLM as for single-level models, with Peugh observing that "currently no consensus exists as to the effect sizes that are most appropriate" for MLM (Peugh 2010, 97). Peugh outlines a method based on previous research called the 'proportional reduction in variance statistic', a local (i.e. confined to one level of the analysis) effect size statistic (2010, 98). For our purposes this would be the

[149] Most standard statistics textbooks will include a printed table of z-scores from which these relationships can be readily inferred or calculated.

proportion of level-2 variance explained by the addition of the relevant level-2 indicator(s) of interest, controlling (in both instances) for the relevant level-1 indicators also. A key model presented in Chp. 6 reports a 20% reduction in level-2 variance with the addition of the central level-2 interaction (and level-2 main effects) of interest.[150]

Hox (2002, 163) refers to 9-10% of variance explained in a regression model as a Medium effect size and, on the basis of his logic, we can infer that 20% can be considered a Large effect.[151] Accordingly, we can be confident that our testing of regression coefficients with these level-1 and 2 sample sizes will have sufficient power.

Fig. A.2.2 - Post-hoc Power Analysis for Multilevel Modelling



[150] Model 1, Table 6.3.4.

[151] Hox utilises the correlation coefficient effect size (r), standard in single-level analysis, where 0.3 is defined as Medium. Squaring this gives us R^2=.09, or an R^2 of 9%, from which he rounds up. Working backwards from our finding of 20% (take the square root) we arrive at an effect size of .45, where Cohen (1988) defines r = .10 (Small), r = .30 (Medium), r = .50 (Large).

Utilising the software from Raudenbush et al. (2009) we present below post hoc power curves for our analysis (Fig. A.2.2), with the three lines representing the relationship of number of level-2 units to power for different effect sizes (δ)[152], holding cluster size at their average value, as per Scherbaum and Ferreter (2009, 356), of n= 842, ϱ = .10 and α = .05.[153] As can be seen, at either Large (line A) or Medium (B) effect size and 28 level-2 units, power is sufficiently high at over 0.90 for 28 clusters.

The usual assumptions made in regard to regression modelling also apply to MLM and so we assume linearity in the relationship of the variables to the dependent variable, normality of residuals (at both levels), and homoskedasticity of residuals. There are also two MLM-specific assumptions the model makes: zero correlation between residuals across levels; and independence of observations at the highest level (Maas and Hox 2004b). On normality of residuals at level-1, departures from normality (i.e. skewness, kurtosis) should not be problematic given the large overall sample size available and given the desirable properties of the maximum likelihood estimator (consistency, efficiency, asymptotic normality) in large samples (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 71). The only MLM-specific issue is that level-2 random effects are assumed to take on a multivariate normal distribution. However, violation of this assumption only matters for the standard errors on the random effects; once again, this is not the focus of our analysis and we are interested only in the regression coefficients and their standard errors, i.e. the fixed effects. Maas and Hox are quite clear on this point, stating:

> Non-normal distributed residual errors on the second (group) level of a multilevel regression model appear to have little or no effect on the estimates of the fixed effects. The estimates of the regression coefficients are unbiased, and both the ML [maximum-likelihood] and the robust standard errors are accurate. There is no advantage here in using robust standard errors. This corresponds to the general belief that ML estimation methods are generally robust (Maas and Hox 2004b, 437).

This point about the method being 'generally robust' should also assuage concerns regarding the MLM-specific assumption above, independence of observations at the highest level. Despite the widespread use of this methodology, in conjunction with sample-

[152] Effect sizes in the software use Cohen's 'd' (δ), not 'r' as used here, though the values obviously still reflect Small (0.3), Medium (0.5) and Large (0.7); one can convert from r to d using formulas found in Cohen (1988).

[153] The intra-class correlation (ρ) is assumed to be 0.10, on the basis of prior research cited in Scherbaum and Ferreter (2009, 351) holding that a conservative estimate of ICC should usually lie between 0.10 and 0.15; an unconditional random effects GLS model (Table 6.4.1) run on our data confirms this, reporting a value for 'rho', i.e. the intraclass correlation, ρ = .106.

pooling and defining country-year clusters as the level-2 units, it is obviously simply not the case that the unit 'France-2006' is independent of 'France-2007'. While separate years can be conceptualised as distinct observations, at the very least we should here be cluster-correcting the 28 units for intra-country correlation. In an analogous MLM situation[154] Gilardi (2010, 655) notes that this clustering on country entails non-independence but that virtually all studies deal with this problem simply "by computing robust standard errors for clustering"; Gilardi also quotes Bennett and Stam who acknowledge this complication but conclude that "there is no obvious fix for the problem". We place our faith in the robustness of maximum likelihood estimation methods and take heart that other MLM researchers have not seemed unduly concerned about this issue.[155] However, in the interests of absolute transparency, a selection of the most substantively interesting statistical models advanced here are re-estimated using the less desirable GLS method, while cluster-correcting standard errors by country; see the Appendix (A.3).[156]

The level-2 continuous indicators are centred at their grand means. Mean-centring in MLM entails certain statistical advantages in terms of ameliorating collinearity problems, when they exist, and stabilising estimates in the presence of cross-level interactions (Paccagnella 2006). Centring variables at level-1 takes on a special significance in MLM depending on whether or not the level-1 predictors are centred at the cluster mean or at the grand mean for the entire sample, with each of these methods producing different parameter estimates and answering different substantive questions. However, no centring of level-1 predictors is undertaken here. The centring of level-2 predictors poses no specific complications and essentially mimics "prescribed practice" in the OLS regression literature (Enders and Tofighi 2007, 121). Hox (2002, 51-52) also observes that centring in MLM allows interpretation of the variance components for the 'average' subject, where this is of analytical interest, while also entailing computational advantages and engendering fewer convergence problems.[157]

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[154] Analogous though not identical as Gilardi's situation deals with country-year dyads.

[155] For example, some of those cited earlier: Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009; Jensen and Lindstadt 2005; Kogan 2006; LaFree and Tseloni 2006; Loewenberg, Mishler, and Sanborn 2010; Solt 2008.

[156] Cluster-corrected std. errors shows that 3-way interactions and 2-way interactions of continuous variables of interest remain significant, and the IWR indicators remain as significant as in non-robust models, though the significance of one or two control variables is attenuated.

[157] Though, because none of the level-1 dummies are centred, the intercepts and variance components must be interpreted as if all of the dummies are set to zero, with all level-2 variables at their mean. 'Convergence problems' refers to fewer technical problems in converging on an estimation solution for the model.

The functional form of the equation, simplified, in all models utilising the continuous measure of material deprivation as the dependent variable is as follows:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_i + \beta_j + \zeta_j + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where, y_{ij} denotes the responses for individual **i** in level-2 unit[158] **j**; α denotes a constant; β_i is a vector of covariates at level-1, the individual level; β_j is a vector of covariates at level-2, the state level; ζ (zeta) is the level-2 unit-specific deviation from the overall regression line, i.e. the random intercept, specific to each unit **j** and constant across all individuals **i** within that unit; and ϵ is the error term specific to each individual **i** in each contextual unit **j**. Together ζ and ϵ comprise the total residual in the multilevel model, with both assumed to have zero population mean; the former assumed to be independent over level-2 units; and the latter assumed to be independent over both individual (level-1) and contextual (level-2) units (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).

[158] i.e. country-year

A.3. Alternative estimation methods: Chp.6

Below we see (robust std. error) GLS variants on key models outlined in the main body of Chp. 6, with standard errors cluster-corrected by country, utilising 14 level-2 units in the first table and 28 level-2 units in the second. The tables are self-explanatory with the key point being that the central interaction remains significant even subjecting the data to this more unforgiving analysis. The first column in each table is simply the central level-2 interaction of interest controlling for the set of level-1 indicators; the next column is a model of the same variables though applied only to labour market active non-citizens; and the final column is a model of the same variables applied only to labour market active citizens.

GLS estimation w/ 14 lvl-2 units; Std. errors cluster-corrected by country

	1	Active_NonCit	Active_Cit
L2: Benefit Generosity	-0.061**	-0.150***	-0.039
	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.025)
L2: LTR Conditionality	0.002	-0.053	0.019
	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.026)
L2__LTR*BG	-0.053***	-0.101***	-0.037**
	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.013)
Naturalised (0, 1)	-0.594***	0.000	1.023***
	(0.094)	(.)	(0.109)
Age (low)	-0.051	-0.052	-0.046
	(0.039)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Age (high) [Ref: mid]	0.105**	-0.119	-0.087
	(0.049)	(0.076)	(0.059)
Sex (F = 1)	-0.029	-0.177**	-0.099**
	(0.022)	(0.057)	(0.039)
Primary	0.953***	1.130***	0.871***
	(0.114)	(0.079)	(0.224)
LwrSecondary	0.518***	0.691***	0.515***
	(0.094)	(0.065)	(0.095)
UprSecondary [Ref: Tertiary]	0.180***	0.324***	0.282***
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.065)
Married (0, 1)	-0.328***	-0.295***	-0.284***
	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.076)
Unemployed (0, 1)	0.734***	0.782***	1.070***
	(0.058)	(0.093)	(0.088)
Household size	-0.033	-0.056	-0.009
	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.020)
SingleParent (0, 1)	0.738***	0.644***	0.754***
	(0.048)	(0.094)	(0.080)
Constant	1.904***	1.710***	0.000
	(0.107)	(0.127)	(.)
N	23573	7534	7362

NB: models contain dummy Year variable (2006/07), not reported.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

GLS estimation w/ 28 lvl-2 units; Std. errors cluster-corrected by country

	1	Active_NonCit	Active_Cit
L2: Benefit Generosity	-0.067**	-0.127**	-0.045*
	(0.027)	(0.040)	(0.027)
L2: LTR Conditionality	0.021	-0.005	0.032
	(0.030)	(0.046)	(0.027)
L2__LTR*BG	-0.053***	-0.077***	-0.045**
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.014)
Naturalised (0, 1)	-0.522***	0.000	1.015***
	(0.090)	(.)	(0.101)
Age (low)	-0.051	-0.062	-0.041
	(0.034)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Age (high) [Ref: mid]	0.113**	-0.094	-0.085*
	(0.048)	(0.066)	(0.049)
Sex (F = 1)	-0.039*	-0.190***	-0.098**
	(0.022)	(0.056)	(0.038)
Primary	0.928***	1.001***	0.893***
	(0.120)	(0.059)	(0.213)
LwrSecondary	0.538***	0.643***	0.522***
	(0.095)	(0.090)	(0.089)
UprSecondary [Ref: Tertiary]	0.182***	0.270***	0.300***
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.056)
Married (0, 1)	-0.318***	-0.269***	-0.284***
	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.069)
Unemployed (0, 1)	0.731***	0.826***	1.022***
	(0.045)	(0.093)	(0.078)
Household size	-0.034*	-0.067**	-0.004
	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.019)
SingleParent (0, 1)	0.784***	0.721***	0.747***
	(0.049)	(0.075)	(0.084)
Constant	1.839***	1.739***	0.000
	(0.098)	(0.103)	(.)
N	23573	7534	7362

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

A.4. Alternative Operationalisations

A.4.1. Welfare Effort

Table A.4.1 – Macro-level regressions, N=16

Dep Var: % TCNs in Poverty (SILC measure)

	1	2	3
LTR Conditionality	5.365	1.221	6.221^
	(6.810)	(6.182)	(3.546)
Net Social Expend. (OECD)	1.643^		
	(1.167)		
[INT]NetSocial*LTR	-0.267		
	(0.299)		
Public Social Expend. (OECD)		0.949	
		(1.154)	
[INT]PublicSocial*LTR		-0.079	
		(0.265)	
Income Support Spend (OECD)			4.704^
			(3.259)
[INT]IncomeSupport*LTR			-1.372*
			(0.682)
Constant	-8.919	5.319	1.954
	(25.753)	(26.334)	(18.231)
Adj.R-sq	-0.041	-0.121	0.101
N	16	16	16
F-test	0.515	0.716	0.250
AIC	116.121	117.312	113.777

Note: variables not centred
^ p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The table above shows alternative operationalisations of welfare effort and their interactions with LTR-conditionality at the macro-level, regressing the migrant poverty rate on these determinants. Data are drawn from the OECD's figures on social spending for the closest year available, 2007 (OECD 2011).[159] The first model (1) utilises 'total net social' expenditure by country, which includes health, pensions and other social expenditures; the interaction is not significant. The next model (2) looks only at 'public social expenditure' and again the interaction is not significant. In the final model (3) however, utilising 'income support to the working age population' the interaction is, as expected, significant.

[159] Data HE5.1 Public social spending by broad policy area and total net social spending, in 2007, in percentage of GDP.

Table A.4.2 – Multilevel models with alternative operationalisations of welfare effort

Dep Var: 7-point Deprivation Index

	1	2	3
L2: LTR Conditionality	0.006	0.014	0.023
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.029)
Net Social Expend. (OECD)	0.010		
	(0.032)		
L2__NetSocial*LTR	-0.011		
	(0.012)		
Public Social Expend. (OECD)		0.005	
		(0.028)	
L2__PublicSocial*LTR		-0.004	
		(0.010)	
Income Support Spend (OECD)			-0.138**
			(0.048)
L2__IncomeSupport*LTR			-0.082***
			(0.020)
Constant	1.887***	1.865***	1.785***
	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.076)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	0.434***	0.446***	0.310***
	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.047)
sd(Residual)	1.428***	1.428***	1.428***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
N	23573	23573	23573
F-test	0.000	0.000	0.000
AIC	83902	83904	83883
Chi-sq	2985	2983	3021
Log-likelihood	-41934	-41935	-41925

Note: All level-1 variables included but some output suppressed
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

This is in line with the rationale advanced earlier that certain forms of social expenditure may be less relevant to the specificities of the migrant situation, given incomplete work histories, the relative youth of migrant cohorts, and the centrality of labour market attachment. The table directly above utilises the same operationalisations of welfare effort in the context of multilevel modelling and the results are substantively the same as those just discussed. The interaction with LTR-conditionality is only significant in the case of social spending as income support levels. These two tables together indicate that the central finding of this thesis stands up even when utilising alternative measures of welfare effort.

A.4.2. Alternative LTR conditionality indicators

Table A.4.3 – Models testing previously excluded LTR conditionality variables

Dep Var: 7-point Deprivation Index || Alternative LTR-Conditionality vars

	1	2	3
L2: Benefit Generosity	-0.142*	0.051	-0.111
	(0.075)	(0.100)	(0.092)
L2_ResidencyReqmt	-0.196		
	(0.127)		
L2___ResReq*BG	0.065		
	(0.054)		
L2_TimeEmployedReqmt		-0.133	
		(0.174)	
L2___TimeEmployed*BG		-0.086	
		(0.074)	
L2_ApplicationLength			0.113
			(0.129)
L2___AppLength*BG			0.043
			(0.059)
Naturalised (0, 1)	-0.520***	-0.520***	-0.521***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age (low)	-0.052**	-0.052**	-0.052**
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Age (high) [Ref: mid]	0.113***	0.113***	0.113***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Sex (F = 1)	-0.039**	-0.039**	-0.039**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Primary	0.926***	0.928***	0.928***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
LwrSecondary	0.539***	0.540***	0.541***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
UprSecondary [Ref: Tertiary]	0.182***	0.183***	0.183***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Married (0, 1)	-0.317***	-0.317***	-0.317***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Unemployed (0, 1)	0.732***	0.732***	0.732***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
SingleParent (0, 1)	0.786***	0.786***	0.786***
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Household size	-0.034***	-0.034***	-0.034***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Constant	2.160***	2.038***	1.727***
	(0.192)	(0.261)	(0.208)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	0.389***	0.413***	0.418***
	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.062)
sd(Residual)	1.428***	1.428***	1.428***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
N	23573	23573	23573
F-test	0.000	0.000	0.000
AIC	83891.138	83892.779	83894.577
Chi-sq	2994	2989	2987
Log-likelihood	-41929	-41929	-41930

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

This table considers conditionality indicators that were excluded from the final LTR-conditionality index. Utilising these indicators themselves in place of the conditionality index we see that they do not interact significantly in the prediction of migrant poverty (Table A.4.3).

Table A.4.4 – Models testing previously excluded LTR conditionality variables

Dep Var: 7-point Deprivation Index || Alternative LTR-Conditionality vars	1	2	3
L2: LTR Conditionality	0.005	0.023	0.021
	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.027)
L2: Benefit Generosity	-0.071**	-0.053**	-0.066**
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.026)
L2_LTR*BG	-0.048***	-0.069***	-0.052***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
L2_ResidencyReqmt	-0.115		
	(0.128)		
L2_TimeEmployedReqmt		0.313**	
		(0.156)	
L2_ApplicationLength			0.012
			(0.104)
Naturalised (0, 1)	-0.520***	-0.520***	-0.520***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age (low)	-0.052**	-0.052**	-0.052**
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Age (high) [Ref: mid]	0.113***	0.113***	0.113***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Sex (F = 1)	-0.039**	-0.039**	-0.039**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Primary	0.926***	0.928***	0.927***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
LwrSecondary	0.539***	0.540***	0.539***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
UprSecondary [Ref: Tertiary]	0.182***	0.183***	0.182***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Constant	1.994***	1.386***	1.822***
	(0.187)	(0.236)	(0.167)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	0.318***	0.297***	0.324***
	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.050)
sd(Residual)	1.428***	1.428***	1.428***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
N	23573	23573	23573
F-test	0.000	0.000	0.000
AIC	83890.409	83886.979	83891.645
Chi-sq	3018	3028	3016
Log-likelihood	-41927	-41925	-41928

Note: all variables included but some output suppressed
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

Utilising them alongside the central interaction of interest from previous models we see that none of these variables invalidate that central interactive finding (Table A.4.4). The only significant variable in these models is the one measuring the required time in legal employment before one can apply for LTR status. Moving from lower to higher degrees of stringency (through Low, Medium, High categories), this variable significantly predicts higher deprivation in the order of 0.3 units on our 7-point index. This result may be worth bearing in mind for any future analyses concerning conditionality and poverty.

A.5. Logistic MLM: Other Poverty Measures

A.5.1. Relative Income Poverty

As a check on our previous findings related to material deprivation we also utilise the EU-SILC's own binary poverty indicator, which describes respondents as in poverty if they earn less than 60% of median equivalised disposable income (the 'median' cut-off line is a national line, defined separately for each country).[160] The results are presented overleaf (Table A.5.1) for the entire sample of TCN migrants and they offer no surprises, being in line with earlier results. The central interaction is significant.[161] Poor education, unemployment, being a single parent, and holding citizenship status are seen to be the most important (significant, substantive) level-1 determinants of income poverty, in line with previous findings. As conditionality increases towards high levels when benefits are low we see, in line with our other results, an increasing probability of being 'in poverty' according to the SILC measure (Table A.5.2).

[160] The EU-SILC 'poverty indicator' in the dataset(s) is variable **hx080**. The EU-SILC 2006/2007 dataset documentation defines equivalised disposable income [**hx090**] as: ((Total disposable household income*Within-household non-response inflation factor)/Equivalised household size), or **[((hy020*hy025)/hx050)]**. Equivalised household size is defined by the formula: **[HX050 = 1+ 0.5 * (HM_{14+} -1) + 0.3 * HM_{13-}]** where HM_{14+} = number of household members aged 14 and over (at the end of income reference period); HM_{13-} = number of household members aged 13 or less (at the end of income reference period). The EU-SILC documentation states that the within-household non-response inflation factor [**hy025**] is the factor by which it is necessary to multiply income to compensate the non-response in individual questionnaires, and that it is "necessary to correct the effect of non-responding individuals within a household" otherwise "income of individuals not interviewed is not added up into the total household income." (Eurostat 2006, 108).

[161] Interpretational note: where the odds-ratio is more than 1 then this should be interpreted as that variable increasing the odds of the binary outcome occurring, i.e. increasing the odds of naturalising. For example, an odds-ratio coefficient of 1.5 for variable X would imply that the odds of the outcome occurring are increased by 1.5 times, or 50%, for a one-unit increase in X, controlling for the other model variables. A coefficient of 3 would mean that the odds of the outcome occurring are three times greater with a one-unit increase in X. Coefficients below 1 imply a reduction in the odds of naturalising, e.g. a coefficient of 0.85 would imply a 15% reduction in the odds of the binary outcome occurring.

Table A.5.1 – TCNs in Income Poverty, SILC measure

Multilevel Logistic: odds of being in Income Poverty

	1	2
L2: LTR Conditionality	0.961	0.970
	(0.034)	(0.029)
L2: Benefit Generosity	0.936**	0.935**
	(0.031)	(0.027)
L2__LTR*BG		0.965**
		(0.013)
Naturalised (0, 1)		0.633***
		(0.021)
Age (low)		1.242***
		(0.052)
Age (high) [Ref: mid]		1.293***
		(0.051)
Sex (F = 1)		1.037
		(0.032)
Primary		1.866***
		(0.096)
LwrSecondary		1.414***
		(0.064)
UprSecondary [Ref: Tertiary]		0.989
		(0.042)
Married (0, 1)		0.908**
		(0.033)
Unemployed (0, 1)		2.435***
		(0.120)
Household size		1.165***
		(0.011)
SingleParent (0, 1)		2.618***
		(0.192)
Constant	0.325***	0.154***
	(0.028)	(0.014)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	0.428***	0.353***
	(0.062)	(0.055)
N	24066	23966
F-test	0.097	0.000
AIC	27217.730	25733.881
Chi-sq	4.66	1268
Log-likelihood	-13605	-12851

Note: reported coefficients are odds-ratios
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.2 – Predicted Probabilities of Income poverty, SILC measure

A: HIGH welfare benefits

	Margin	Delta-method Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
LTR-Cond						
-2	.253296	.020399	12.42	0.000	.2133154	.2932781
Mean	.207358	.0159825	12.97	0.000	.176033	.2386831
2	.167684	.0220403	7.61	0.000	.1244858	.2108822

B: LOW welfare benefits

	Margin	Delta-method Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
LTR-Cond						
-2	.2479957	.0279942	8.86	0.000	.1931281	.3028633
Mean	.2761151	.0227486	12.14	0.000	.2315288	.3207015
2	.3060622	.0318324	9.61	0.000	.2436718	.3684526

Note: 'High' benefits in these calculations denotes 3 points above the mean on the benefit generosity scale, while 'Low' denotes 3 points below the mean; predictions averaged over the other covariates; from model (2) in Income Poverty table.

Table A.5.3 – Probability of Consistent Poverty, varying Benefit Lvls and Conditionality

A: HIGH welfare benefits

	Margin	Delta-method Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
LTR-Cond						
-2	.1333997	.0140928	9.47	0.000	.1057784	.1610211
Mean	.0966883	.009819	9.85	0.000	.0774434	.1159332
2	.0690284	.0118751	5.81	0.000	.0457535	.0923032

B: LOW welfare benefits

	Margin	Delta-method Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
LTR-Cond						
-2	.1070964	.0162322	6.60	0.000	.0752819	.1389109
Mean	.1470757	.0159071	9.25	0.000	.1158983	.178253
2	.1980762	.0262488	7.55	0.000	.1466295	.2495229

Note: 'High' benefits in these calculations denotes 3 points above the mean on the benefit generosity scale, while 'Low' denotes 3 points below the mean; predictions averaged over the other covariates.

A.5.2. Consistent Poverty

Table A.5.4 – Determinants of Consistent Poverty

Multilevel Logistic: odds of being in Consistent Poverty

	1	2
L2: LTR Conditionality	0.993	1.000
	(0.046)	(0.033)
L2: Benefit Generosity	0.921*	0.919**
	(0.040)	(0.029)
L2__LTR*BG		0.938***
		(0.015)
Naturalised (0, 1)		0.543***
		(0.024)
Age (low)		1.093*
		(0.058)
Age (high) [Ref: mid]		1.356***
		(0.068)
Sex (F = 1)		1.029
		(0.041)
Primary		2.209***
		(0.142)
LwrSecondary		1.654***
		(0.099)
UprSecondary [Ref: Tertiary]		1.014
		(0.058)
Married (0, 1)		0.795***
		(0.037)
Unemployed (0, 1)		2.846***
		(0.158)
Household size		1.082***
		(0.013)
SingleParent (0, 1)		3.042***
		(0.256)
Constant	0.143***	0.087***
	(0.016)	(0.010)
RANDOM:sd(Intercept)	0.562***	0.388***
	(0.080)	(0.063)
N	23670	23571
F-test	0.174	0.000
AIC	18570.077	17287.561
Chi-sq	3.5	1112
Log-likelihood	-9281	-8628

Note: reported coefficients are odds-ratios
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

The next table (A.5..4) tests the effects of our key variables on the measure of consistent poverty, combining both deprivation and relative income poverty. The results show that conditionality in isolation does not contribute to our understanding of consistent poverty. The two-way interaction of welfare system and conditionality is highly significant. The probabilities of being in consistent poverty across different welfare systems and at

varying levels of conditionality run in the same direction as established in the last section for income poverty. Where levels of available social supports are low, increasing conditionality predicts an increasing probability of being in consistent poverty (Table A.5.3, above). At the individual level, unemployment and being a single parent are the most powerful predictors, with single parents three times more likely to find themselves in consistent poverty controlling for other factors.