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**Essays on the Impact of Military Recruitment
Policies on Gender and Ethnic Relations**

Submitted for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

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Supervised by
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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at this or any other university and it is entirely my own work. I agree to deposit this thesis in the University's open access institutional repository or allow the Library to do so on my behalf, subject to Irish Copyright Legislation and Trinity College Library conditions of use and acknowledgement.

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SUMMARY

This dissertation examines the broader societal ramifications of military recruitment policies on groups that are typically, either explicitly or implicitly, exempt from military institutions: women and ethnic minorities. The dissertation is structured into three chapters, each supporting the argument that military recruitment policies simultaneously reflect and shape gender and ethnic relations and contribute to the marginalization of specific groups, based on their identities.

The first chapter, *The Overlooked Intersectional Impact of Selective Military Conscription: Interview Evidence from Israeli Ethnic Minority Women*, demonstrates that the systematic exemption of specific groups of citizens from mandatory military service generates distinct patterns in their national identification and political interest, as well as systemic disparities in their economic opportunities, language proficiency, professional development, and social opportunities. The chapter employs an inductive, explanatory, and theory-building approach, and draws on 33 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with various groups of Israeli citizens, conducted in the summer of 2023. Through qualitative analysis of variations based on gender, ethnicity, and military service experience, the chapter identifies patterns specific to Israeli Circassian and Druze women who are systematically exempt from the practice, unlike their male counterparts and Israeli Jewish women.

The second chapter, *Ethnic Military Recruitment: Introducing a New Dataset*, presents an original dataset on state-mandated military recruitment of ethnic groups, designed at the ethnic group-year level. The dataset covers military recruitment methods applied by legitimate governments on ethnic groups in 134 countries between 1946 and 2010. The dataset is the first-ever source addressing ethnically selective conscription. As such, it complements existing datasets on state-level military recruitment methods and ethnic stacking in military institutions in specific regions, as well as theoretical works on the topic. The chapter outlines the importance of conscription in the context of ethnic relations, explain the coding strategy, and provide a summary of the data. It also demonstrates the application of the dataset by identifying the characteristics of ethnic groups typically exempt from conscription and propose several avenues for future research.

The third chapter, *Fighting the Prejudice? The Effects of Opening Combat Roles to Women on Gender Stereotypes Among the Public*, examines the impact of integrating women into combat roles on

public gender stereotypes. The key argument of the chapter is that the decision to open military roles to women is often driven by efforts to address gender inequality rather than reflecting its actual achievement. Consequently, women's military integration may occur in contexts that are unprepared for women in traditionally masculine roles, potentially resulting in backlash evidenced by reinforced gender stereotypes. To test the argument, the chapter presents a statistical analysis of public attitudes in five out of the 21 countries that allow their female citizens to serve in combat roles within their military institutions; as well as statistical analysis of gender stereotypes in selected national contexts. The analysis demonstrates that the effects of opening combat roles on gender stereotypes are significant, yet highly context-dependent.

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INTRODUCTION

As of 2024, military recruitment has been receiving unprecedented attention. While the ongoing discussions undoubtedly relate to the evolving security landscape, they also highlight that military service encompasses much more than securing manpower. Denmark is currently getting ready to introduce gender neutral conscription for the first time in 2026, in hope to safeguard “*full equality between sexes*,” following the example of existing practice in Norway and Sweden (Bryant 2024). In Ukraine, a growing number of women are voluntarily joining the military alongside conscripted men to fight in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Some argue that it was mainly civil society pressure what has helped remove barriers to the employment status and education available to female soldiers, while there has been a simultaneous shift in public attitudes towards women in military roles (Matthers and Kvit 2023). In June 2024, Israel’s Supreme Court lifted the military service exemption for its 13% of ultra-Orthodox Jewish population, stating that yeshivas will not receive funding unless their students serve in the Israeli Defense Forces. The Court ruled that selective conscription violated the rule of law and the principle of equality (McKernan 2024). However, the exemption from mandatory military service for Israel’s Christian and Muslim citizens, who make up 20% of Israel’s population, gendered service of Israeli Circassians and Druzes, or the gendered availability of roles within the Israeli Defense Forces have not been addressed in the ongoing debate.

While seemingly unrelated, the publicized examples illustrate two points central to this dissertation. First, military recruitment policies tend to be selective, explicitly or implicitly including or excluding specific groups of citizens from military institutions based on their identity. Second, the significance of military service extends beyond the state’s need to secure a sufficient number of military personnel. In addition to maintaining the state’s internal and external security, military institutions play a central role in shaping the relationship between the state and its citizens. Existing research has deemed military service relevant in the context of political behaviour, political attitudes, acculturation, educational opportunities, economic opportunities, political rights, and citizenship. Accordingly, existing research concerning military recruitment typically focuses on its implications for military personnel or its link to internal and external state security.

I argue that there is a significant gap in our understanding of the broader ramifications that military recruitment policies, given their selective nature, have on society and politics. The two groups that typically remain outside the walls of military bases are women and ethnic

minorities. Accordingly, I pose the overarching research question: *What is the impact of military recruitment policies on gender and ethnic relations?*

The central argument of this dissertation posits that military recruitment policies, due to their selective nature, simultaneously shape and reflect gender and ethnic relations within national contexts. This selectiveness manifests in two distinct forms: *explicit* and *implicit*. Explicit selectiveness involves differential treatment in the recruitment process, such as the outright exclusion of certain groups based on identity or the imposition of different recruitment rules. This might include mandating military service for one group while offering voluntary service to another. Implicit selectiveness refers to the application of norms and practices that influence career opportunities for military personnel, stemming from a misalignment between their identity and the ideal image of a soldier. This may include assigning individuals to specific units or restricting their access to certain military roles.

This selectiveness is inherent in both mandatory and voluntary military service. Both forms of service involve highly specific experiences that demand unconditional loyalty to the state within environments characterized by hierarchy, obedience, collective identity, and close collaboration with other military personnel. These experiences are linked to individual-level effects, such as the development of social capital and the formation of patterns in political behaviour, engagement, participation, and attitudes. Additionally, both forms of service are associated with recognition, whether in the form of societal respect or economic benefits from the state. However, in contexts where explicit or implicit selective military recruitment is employed, this process is not universally accessible to all citizens. Specifically, it is systematically unavailable to those who, due to their identities, face some form of explicit or implicit exclusion from the military. Ultimately, selective military recruitment generates differential treatment, which may contribute to or exacerbate the marginalization of specific population groups. Therefore, military recruitment policies are pivotal in understanding the complexities of gender and ethnic inequality. The goal of this dissertation is to explore the scope and broader societal ramifications of these selective military recruitment policies.

This dissertation is interdisciplinary, with all three chapters broadly contributing to the study of the military and society. As defined by Forster (2005: 9), the field of military and society encompasses “*all aspects of relations between armed forces, as a political, social, and economic institution, and the society, state, or political ethnic movement of which they are a part.*” The two main disciplines within this field are Civil-Military Relations and Military Sociology.

Civil-Military Relations typically focuses on the relationship between military institutions and political power, particularly the interaction between the military and civilian government. The discipline is concerned with the extent of military influence on politics and the degree of civilian control over military forces, as explored by pioneers of the discipline like Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1964).

Military Sociology, on the other hand, approaches the military as a social institution, examining its internal social dynamics and interactions with broader society. It explores topics such as public attitudes towards the military, military families, and the challenges of diversifying military recruitment by opening it to women and ethnic minorities, as discussed by scholars like Resteigne (2022) and Moskos et al. (2000).

Accordingly, the variables of military service and military recruitment are prominent in the study of gender inequality and ethnic conflict. In the context of gender studies, the key focus is on the ongoing process of women's military integration and the barriers they face due to their implicit exclusion from specific military roles. As several critical scholars have emphasized, there is no consensus on whether the military integration of women promotes equality by providing equal rights and duties to both men and women or merely reflects existing gender inequalities in the civilian sphere (e.g., Enloe 2023; Sasson-Levy 2003, 2007; Kennedy-Pipe 2008).

Other questions explore the factors that determine the levels of women's military integration (e.g., Segal 1995; Carreiras 2006; Obradovic 2014; Percy 2019; Soules 2020) and the challenges women face in traditionally masculine military institutions, such as sexual harassment (e.g., Bonnes 2019; Pershing 2003), barriers to professional development (e.g., Larsson and Alvinus 2019; Best et al. 2021; Sasson-Levy 2003; Yuval-Davis 1985), and prejudice from male soldiers regarding female soldiers' abilities (e.g., Archer 2012; Vogt et al. 2007).

Research involving military institutions within the field of ethnic relations typically underscores the significance of military recruitment in the context of political rights and citizenship. This is particularly relevant for ethnic minorities, as military recruitment can provide a pathway to overcoming potential marginalization (e.g., Krebs 2004; Peled 1994; Enloe 1983). The field also explores the implications of ethnic military recruitment for the state, with particular emphasis on how ethnic military integration can impact state security (e.g., Lyall 2020; Johnson and Thurber 2017; Morency-Leflamme and McLaughlin 2019; Harkness 2022; Enloe 2022).

While both the fields of gender relations and ethnic relations demonstrate that military institutions and recruitment play an integral role in citizens' equality, a closer examination

reveals significant gaps in our existing knowledge. First, the two fields of research are largely separate, with each focusing on the interaction between military policies and a single aspect of identity, despite addressing similar mechanisms. The importance of studying military institutions through the intersectional lens of gender and ethnicity has been emphasized only by Sasson-Levy (2007), Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989), and hinted at by Enloe (1983: 202). In other words, neither women nor members of specific ethnic identities are monolithic groups. If military recruitment policies interact with the marginalization of groups whose identities are associated with some form of disadvantage, how much do military recruitment policies affect those who experience compounded marginalization?

Second, existing research largely focuses on the consequences and challenges associated with the military inclusion of either women or ethnic minorities, often suggesting that such inclusion represents progress toward equality for these groups. However, military recruitment remains selective, which underscores the need to understand the implications of non-inclusion. In other words, what are the reasons behind the systematic exclusion of certain groups from the military, whether implicit or explicit? Who are these excluded groups, and what are the consequences they face as a result of their exclusion from military service?

Third, the integration of military institutions with groups whose identities are not traditionally associated with the role of a soldier is often seen as a step toward equal rights and opportunities. Research typically focuses on the implications of this integration for the included groups or on how the process is perceived by military personnel. However, we lack understanding of whether this process also reinforces broader societal changes in how these specific groups are viewed. In other words, does military integration challenge broader gender or ethnic relations by addressing societal norms and stereotypes associated with these identities?

Many of these research gaps stem from a general lack of data. Information on military recruitment and military organization within specific national contexts is often unavailable. Data sources providing disaggregated information on ethnicity or gender within military institutions are rare and typically only cover specific regional contexts. Additionally, global longitudinal surveys such as the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey do not include questions on respondents' military experience or their attitudes toward military institutions. Consequently, much of the existing research relies on qualitative methods or original surveys, which limits the ability to test hypotheses from a comparative perspective.

This dissertation consists of three separate chapters, each contributing to our understanding of the explicit and implicit selectiveness of military recruitment policies and addressing the aforementioned gaps in existing research. Due to the limited availability of existing data, the dissertation primarily relies on original data collected for the purpose of this study. Given the diverse range of data used, the dissertation employs a mixed-methods approach, combining both qualitative and quantitative analyses.

The first chapter, *The Overlooked Intersectional Impact of Selective Military Conscription: Interview Evidence from Israeli Ethnic Minority Women*, is aimed at identifying the individual-level consequences of explicit exclusion in contexts where military service is otherwise mandatory. The chapter generates the first-ever set of testable implications regarding the individual-level consequences associated with selective military recruitment, which can be applied in different contexts or tested in future surveys. It builds on existing research that has demonstrated both mandatory and voluntary military service profoundly affect various aspects of individuals' relationships with the state, society, and politics, with the most pronounced effects consistently observed among ethnic minority soldiers. Given this intersectional impact, I expect that that explicit military exemption may have the most significant impact on ethnic minority women. To understand this impact, I focus on the case of Israel, which has a long-standing practice of ethnically selective mandatory military recruitment, with differential treatment of various citizen groups based on their gender and ethnic identity. At the same time, military service is a crucial aspect of being considered a good citizen in Israel. To understand the consequences of explicit military exclusion, I specifically focus on ethnic minority women from Israeli Circassian and Druze communities, who are systematically exempt from service, unlike their male counterparts and Israeli Jewish women. This focus allows for an intersectional analysis of the impacts of selective military recruitment.

Given the lack of previous research on this topic, the study is designed as inductive, exploratory, and theory-building. The chapter is based on qualitative interview data I gathered during independently planned fieldwork in Israel during the summer of 2023. In total, I conducted 33 semi-structured, in-depth, one-on-one interviews with various groups of Israeli citizens, with sampling based on their gender identity, ethnic identity and military service experience.

The second chapter, *Ethnic Military Recruitment: Introducing a New Dataset*, presents an original dataset on ethnically selective mandatory military recruitment. This dataset addresses the gap caused by the lack of data disaggregated by ethnicity, which has limited research on the

determinants and consequences of this phenomenon. The new Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset is structured in a time-series, ethnic group-year format, covering all politically relevant ethnic groups in 134 countries between 1946 and 2010. The chapter provides a theoretical justification for the dataset, details the coding procedure, presents summary statistics, and offers an application that uses logistic regression to identify the common characteristics of ethnic groups typically exempt from otherwise universal conscription.

The third chapter is titled *Fighting the Prejudice? The Effects of Opening Combat Roles to Women on Gender Stereotypes Among the Public*. It is aimed at understanding the broader societal ramifications of the ongoing process of women's military integration. Such process represents overcoming of implicit exclusion of specific groups of citizens from military institutions. I argue that the decision to open military roles to women is often driven by efforts to address gender inequality rather than reflecting its actual achievement. Consequently, women's military integration may occur in contexts that are unprepared for women in traditionally masculine roles, potentially resulting in backlash evidenced by reinforced gender stereotypes. To test the argument, I conduct a statistical analysis of public attitudes in five out of the 21 countries that allow their female citizens to serve in combat roles within their military institutions; as well as individual country-case analysis. In doing so, the chapter relies on several statistical methods, specifically synthetic control method, fixed effects regression models, and regression discontinuity design.

In sum, the main contribution of this dissertation is its extension of the study of military and society by shifting the perspective from the internal workings of military institutions to the broader implications of selective military recruitment policies for society and politics. Additionally, it provides new data to further study this topic. Through this approach, the dissertation significantly enhances our understanding of the role military institutions play in the empirical study of gender and ethnic relations.

Given that this dissertation focuses on gender and ethnicity, it is essential to conceptualize both concepts within the context of this work. Gender is approached categorically, reflecting the gendered nature of military institutions (Nuciarì 2006; Acker 1990) and following common practices in research on this topic. Accordingly, in this dissertation, the terms woman/female and man/male are used interchangeably.

The concept of ethnicity is relevant in Chapters 1 and 2, but it is approached differently in each. In Chapter 1, which is a case study of Israel, ethnicity is understood in line with state policies that determine the differential treatment of citizens based on their ethnic backgrounds (Zeedan 2019; Ophir 2021). In Chapter 2, ethnicity is conceptualized according to the Ethnic

Power Relations Dataset, which follows the Weberian tradition, defining ethnicity as a “*subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture*” (Vogt et al. 2015), which may include common language, faith, similar phenotypical features, etc.

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CHAPTER 1:

The Overlooked Intersectional Impact of Selective Military Conscription: Interview Evidence from Israeli Ethnic Minority Women

Abstract

Military service is central to one's relationship with politics, society, and the state. However, conscription frequently applies to selected groups of citizens based on gender and/or ethnicity. Through the case of Israeli Circassian and Druze women, I examine the implications of selective conscription in a militarized context, where military service is the norm. I demonstrate that selective conscription generates systemic disparities among various groups of citizens: in national identification, political interest, economic opportunities, language proficiency, professional development, and social opportunities. The study underscores the importance of integrating military recruitment policies into research on citizenship, political behaviour, and gender and ethnic inequality.

Introduction

Conscription is compulsory military service mandated by the state in peace or wartime. Existing research has established its economic, political and social individual-level effects, including a positive impact on various aspects of civic-political engagement (Choi et al. 2022; Fize and Louis-Sidois 2020; Koch et al. 2021; Leal 1999; Teigen 2006) and the formulation of political attitudes (Fize and Louis-Sidois 2020; Grossman et al. 2015; Horowitz and Levendusky 2011; Jennings and Markus 1977; Pollock et al. 1975; Schreiber 1979; Erikson and Stoker 2011; Weiss 2022).

The practice of conscription frequently applies on citizens of specific gender and/or ethnicity, leaving out others. Research on its individual-level effects has primarily focused on male subjects, leaving a gap in understanding of its broader societal ramifications for relationship with politics, society and the state among other population groups. Filling this gap is particularly important for understanding of gender and ethnic inequalities in militarized contexts where conscription holds substantial economic, political, and social significance.

Given that the individual-level effects of military service are consistently most pronounced among ethnic minority members (Ellison 1992; Koch 2022; Koch et al. 2021; Leal 1999; Nesbit and Reingold 2011), the system of selective conscription might have particularly strong and observable impact on ethnic minority women systematically exempted from the practice. This

assumption leads to the following research question which has not yet been addressed: *How does systematic conscription exemption affect ethnic minority women's civic-political lives, and what are the contributing mechanisms?*

Given the novelty of the research question, I adopt an inductive, intersectional approach aimed at generating exploratory findings and theory. In the context of this study, civic-political life is disaggregated into *political interest, political participation, political efficacy, identity and acculturation, social capital, and citizenship quality*. The goal is to identify and understand the specifics of civic-political life of ethnic minority women in comparison to conscripted populations, while identifying the mechanisms through which these specifics relate to conscription exemption.

Conscription holds particular importance in militarized settings. Israel consistently ranks among most militarized countries (Von Boemcken et al. 2023). It has implemented conscription since its establishment in 1948. Until today, military service remains a fundamental aspect of being a good citizen (Sasson-Levy 2003), even though the state applies varying military recruitment policies to different citizen groups based on their gender and ethnicity.¹ Israeli Jewish men and women are obligated to military service, whereas Bedouins, Christians, and Muslims are exempt. Circassian and Druze males are conscripted, unlike their female counterparts.

The gendered and ethnicised military recruitment system with varying treatment of different citizen groups creates additional divides in Israeli society: within Circassians and Druzes, and within women with Israeli citizenship. Given the combination of high militarization levels, the continuity of conscription, the significance of military service, and the presence of two ethnic groups facing identical treatment, the case of Israeli Circassians and Druzes is suitable for identifying the impact systemic conscription exemption on ethnic minority women.

The study relies on interview evidence collected in the summer of 2023 in Israel. The participants included primarily Circassian and Druze women, as well as Circassian and Druze men and Jewish women, allowing for comparisons based on variation in gender, ethnicity, and service experience. I conducted a total of 33 qualitative, in-depth, semi-structured, one-on-one interviews, both in-person and online, which I then transcribed, coded, and analysed using qualitative content analysis.

¹ While some of these groups share religion and language, each has distinct characteristics, and Israel treats them as separate entities. Therefore, in this study, I adapt Israel's classification and approach them as unique ethnic groups.

The paper contributes to the research emphasizing the importance of integrating new perspectives into the study of politics and security. I find that selective military recruitment generates disparities among various groups of citizens: in national identification, political interest, economic opportunities, language proficiency, professional development, and social opportunities. The study therefore raises the topic of relevance of military recruitment policies in understanding citizenship and political behaviour, as well as in various aspects of gender and ethnic inequality. This opens the path to addressing previously unidentified systemic disadvantages specific citizen groups might face. Second, it expands research in the field of civil-military relations by highlighting the need to generate data disaggregated by gender and ethnicity. Thirdly, it adds to our understanding of political behaviour among intersectional identities, specifically of ethnic minority women from economically disadvantaged and conservative backgrounds, who tend to be underrepresented in data collection and research, hindering insights into their unique situation and behaviours.

Conscription, Ethnicity, and Gender

Military recruitment policies are tied to politics of citizenship and political rights (Ingesson 2017, 2020; Levi 1997), highlighting their importance in the research on gender and ethnic relations. However, the two strands of literature remain disintegrated, limiting our understanding of their intersectional impact.

Research on ethnic dynamics considers military recruitment policies significant in the context of multi-ethnic states, where they have been used strategically to differentiate among ethnic groups to optimize state security, as well as by ethnic minorities to negotiate access to first-class citizenship (Krebs 2004; Peled 1994; Enloe 1983). While Enloe (1983: 202) acknowledges that addressing ethnic minorities as aggregate communities is insufficient as it overlooks the potential gendered ramifications of their military service, this aspect remains unaddressed.

The gendered nature of military institutions has been widely recognized. Existing research has examined the challenges associated with the progressing integration of women into military forces, whether in states where they are subjected to some form of conscription (including Israel, Norway, Sweden) or in contexts enabling their voluntary service. While feminist research largely focuses on the implications of military institutions being traditionally perceived as masculine (Enloe 1983; Eichler 2014; Kronsell 2011; Snyder 2003; Yuval Davis 1985; Lomsky-Feder and Sasson-Levy 2018; Perez and Sasson-Levy 2015; Sasson-Levy 2003; 2007), empirical studies highlight the challenges faced by women within these institutions, particularly

sexual harassment (Reis, Menezes 2019) or conditions under which women are recruited (Segal 1995; Carreiras 2006; Obradovic 2014).

A growing body of research exploring societal implications of gendered conscription focuses on its influence on national identity formation (Kwon 2010; Lowe 2019), public attitudes (Bae and Lee 2024a; 2024b), and its absence from gender equality indices despite implications for gender parity (Heikkilä and Laukkanen 2020).

To date, only two studies recognize the need to analyse military contexts through the lens of both ethnicity and gender. Sasson-Levy (2007), Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989) argue that intersectionality of various identities results in diverse implications for men and women in the context of military institutions, while interacting with broader social hierarchies.

Individual-Level Effects of Military Service

Research has shown that military service is central to individual relationship with politics, society, and the state. Studies on both conscription (Choi et al. 2022; Fize and Sidois 2019; Koch et al. 2021; Leal 1999; Leal 2003) and voluntary enlistment (Ellison 1992; Nesbit and Reingold 2011; Koch 2022; Teigen 2006; Wilson and Ruger 2020) highlight its impact on multiple aspects of civic-political engagement and participation along with political attitudes (Fize and Louis-Sidois 2020; Grossman et al. 2015; Horowitz and Levendusky 2011; Jennings and Markus 1977; Pollock et al. 1975; Schreiber 1979; Erikson and Stoker 2011; Weiss 2022). Despite potential selection bias in voluntary enlistment, studies on both types reveal consistent positive effects.

Several studies consistently show that military service has most pronounced effects on ethnic minority members, increasing their political knowledge, voter registration (Koch 2022); likelihood of voting, donating (Leal 1999); volunteering (Nesbit and Reingold 2011); and participation in high-level political activities (Ellison 1992).

Beyond individual level, it has been established that countries employing conscription have a tendency towards higher turnout (Choi et al. 2022). Identical tendency is observed on group level among conscripted cohorts, who are also more prone to adapting more conservative and nationalistic values (Fize and Sidois 2020).

Existing literature identifies four key pathways through which military service impacts individuals' relationships with politics, society, and the state. First, military training enhances

socio-economic mobility by developing skills such as communication, confidence, and organizational competence, which foster new career ideas (Sharp and Krasnesor 1968), enable higher-status jobs (Nesbit and Reingold 2011), and increase civic capacity and motivation to reciprocate (Koch et al. 2021; Verba et al. 1995; Mettler 2002; 2005).

Second, military institutions provide economic benefits (education, loans, or job placement), enabling for socio-economic mobility, and fostering the motivation to reciprocate (Mettler 2002; 2005). However, research also shows a negative impact of military service on secondary education enrolment (Keller et al. 2010) and varying effects on earnings: negative (Angrist et al. 2011; Bauer et al. 2012; Grenet et al. 2011), lacking (Angrist 1990), or significant primarily among conscripts with lower education levels (Card and Cardoso 2012). For ethnic minority conscripts, there are positive and increasing earnings effects over time, attributed to social connections formed during military service (Asali 2017).

Third, most significantly in multi-ethnic contexts with conscription, military fosters intergroup contact. Through intense interaction, cooperation and equal status, military service enables overcoming mutual distrust and nurturing shared identity (Allport 1954; Putnam 2007; Krebs 2005; Samii 2013; Amir et al. 1973), resulting in political engagement (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; Janowitz 1983). For ethnic minority conscripts, intergroup contact fosters social capital and socio-economic security (Asali 2017); and acculturation, which manifests through friendships with majority group members, reduced perceptions of discrimination, and increased use of the majority language at home (Leal 2003).

Fourth, military fosters socialization through employing system of authority and control to replace personal identities with a collective one (Goffman 1961), fostering cohesion and shared expectations of normativity among soldiers (Manekin 2017; Kümmel 2018; Connor 2010). This process is pronounced with greater performance dependence, combat exposure, and service length (Krebs 2004), highlighting the significance of reservist service. Military socialization prompts individuals to engage in civic-political behavior aligned with patriotic values and the needs of the institution, which represents the state.

The impact of military on individual-level relationship with politics, society and the state is likely multifactorial. Yet, existing research on the topic has only focused on the experience of male subjects, leaving a gap in our understanding of the broader societal ramifications. Limited research on the topic suggests that areas with higher number of ethnic minority draftees evince increased political engagement at the group level (Koch et al. 2021) which might imply

transmission of specific values or behaviours. Additionally, conscription has economic implications for women due to their substitutability with men in the job market (Torun 2009).

Analytical Framework

Both mandatory and voluntary military service is associated with various forms of civic-political engagement and participation, particularly among ethnic minority members. However, military service is frequently characterized by selectiveness based on gender and ethnicity of various citizen groups. Given that this selectiveness has not yet been considered in research on citizenship, political behavior or gender and ethnic inequality, there is a gap in our understanding of broader societal ramifications of military recruitment policies.

Consequently, the goal of this study is to understand the impact of systemic conscription exemption on the civic-political lives of ethnic minority women in highly militarized contexts where conscription holds economic, political, and social significance. Considering that this topic has not yet been addressed, I adapt inductive approach aimed at generating exploratory findings and theory. Accordingly, the study employs two-step analytical strategy.

First, I focus on identifying the specific patterns in civic-political life among ethnic minority women. The concept, created for this purpose encompasses the following indicators: *political interest*, *political participation*, *political efficacy*, *identity and acculturation*, *social capital*, and *quality of citizenship*. These variables align with existing findings from research on individual-level effects of military service. However, the very specific indicators were selected to capture multiple dimensions of political involvement among various population groups; their perceived relationship and role within the state and society; as well as to understand the underlying factors which impact the way they navigate the relationship with politics, state and society. Given the qualitative character of the study, the variables were operationalised to provide a foundation for in-depth interviews that explore the possible complexities of civic-political life.

In order to identify and understand the specifics of civic-political life of the specific population group, I compare the experience of ethnic minority women to experience of members of the two groups which share one of their key identities, while being subjected to systemic conscription: ethnic minority men and ethnic majority women. With most of the aspects of civic-political life being too complex to be measured or scaled, I search for evidence of unforeseen patterns, as well as for evidence suggesting patterns of modest or robust civic-political life, as operationalized in the Table 1.1.

Concept:	Evidence:	
	Modest:	Robust:
Political interest: general interest; leaning towards specific topics (local/ethnic/national/global level, conceptual topics); shifts over time.	Lacking interest in politics	Intense interest in politics; curiosity about multiple topics
Political participation: perceived importance; participation in various types of activities (general/civic/political/activist); shifts over time.	Lacking political participation	Perceived importance of political participation; political participation through multiple activities
Internal political efficacy: confidence in understanding politics (self-reported scale 1-5) External political efficacy: trust in political institutions (self-reported scale 1-5).	Low self-reported political efficacy	High self-reported political efficacy
Identity and acculturation: identification with available identities; personal experience with identity conflict; self-perceived compliance with national identity.	Strong identification with ethnic identity; lacking identification with national identity	Strong identification with national identity; lacking identification with ethnic identity
Social capital: satisfaction with social connections; opportunities available to create social connections.	Dissatisfaction with social capital; lacking opportunities to form social capital; homogenous network	Satisfaction with social capital; multiple opportunities to form social capital; diverse network
Quality of citizenship: perceived adherence to being considered a good citizen; sense of equal opportunities in comparison to other population groups.	Sense of inequality; lacking opportunities	Sense of equality; available opportunities

Table 1.1. Analytical framework.

As a second step, I focus on identifying the mechanisms through which conscription exemption contributes to specific patterns in civic-political life of ethnic minority women. Existing research suggests that the individual-level impact of military service operates through socio-economic mobility via personal development, socio-economic mobility via economic benefits, intergroup contact, and military socialization. While these findings are important and suggest what populations exempted from military service might be systematically lacking, inferring from these findings is problematic due to intersection of additional, distinct identities of ethnic minority women. Therefore, I opt for an inductive approach aimed at identifying previously unexplored mechanisms specific to ethnic minority women. I anticipate that the mechanisms specific to the group might interact with factors such as their economic situation or cultural norms.

Methodology

Case Selection

Military Recruitment in Israel

Israel is a multi-ethnic state with 9.784 million citizens, of which 73.2% are Jewish (CBS 2023) and come from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds, such as Mizrachi, Ashkenazi, or Ethiopian. The remaining population is commonly grouped and labelled as “Israeli Arabs,” yet disaggregated into the following groups by the state: Bedouins, Circassians, Christians, Druze, and Muslims.

As shown in Table 1.2, the state employs selective military recruitment policies on different groups of its citizens. Conscription initially included Jewish men and women, yet it was extended to Druze men in 1956, and to Circassian men in 1958, leaving out Druze and Circassian women, Bedouins, Christians, and Muslims (Geller 2012).

Ethnic group:	Male conscription:	Female conscription:
Bedouins	X	X
Circassians	✓	X
Christians	X	X
Druzes	✓	X
Jews	✓	✓
Muslims	X	X

Table 1.2. Israel’s differential military recruitment policies.

Military service typically begins at age of 18, lasting 32 months for men and 24 months for women and may entail additional reservist training and service. Apart from systemic gender/ethnicity-based exemptions, individuals may be individually exempt due to their religious beliefs, conscientious objection, health, residency outside the country, and pregnancy or marriage for women (IDF 1986; IDF n.d.). Additional adjustments apply, such as the possibility to defer military service until after completing university studies, allowing for service in a more expert role (ibid), or the possibility of shortened or exempted service due to acquiring citizenship later in life (Government of Israel 2021).

Individuals not conscripted for any reason may complete state-mandated national service instead, which entails volunteering in public institutions associated with education, healthcare, environmentalism, etc. Absolvents of military and national service receive a discharge grant, with total amount depending on service type and duration. The grant can be used for academic or professional development, marriage, business financing, driving lessons, or housing (Ministry of Defense 2024).

Israeli Circassians and Druzes

Despite their distinct identities and unique historical developments, Israeli Circassians and Druzes share multiple characteristics, with military service playing a pivotal role in their positions within Israeli society. Both groups are small, with the Druze community totalling 150,000 members (CBS 2023a). The Druzes are primarily concentrated in the northern regions of Carmel, Galilee, and Golan Heights, residing in municipalities exclusively Druze or shared with other communities.² Circassians, numbering approximately 4,300 people, reside in the northern villages of Kfar Kama and Rehaniya.³ Both Druzes and Circassians are close-knit, endogamous, culturally distinct groups, with transnational ties. The Druzes are ethnically Arabs who emerged as a unique religious group after seceding from Islam in the 11th century. Circassians are Muslims who were expelled from the Northern Caucasus in the 19th century due to Russian genocide and settled in the former Ottoman Empire.

Before discussing both groups' relationships with the state and their internal dynamics, it's crucial to acknowledge that their historiography frequently mirrors the narratives of Arabism and Zionism, resulting in conflicting interpretations of events. While research on the Druze has been thorough, the Circassians have been understudied, which has been further compounded by the lack of publicly available data. Consequently, the following discussion is more focused on Druzes rather than Circassians.

Both groups have had separate educational systems since 1976 (Amer and Davidovitch 2020). While instruction in Druze schools is in Arabic, Circassian schools prioritize Hebrew over their native language Adyghe, which is viewed by the community as a precondition for success in a predominantly Hebrew-speaking landscape (Halabi 2018; Isleem 2019;). Regarding military service, consensus is lacking on whether conscription of Circassian and Druze men was demanded by groups' leaders, or by the state (Firro 2011; Ben-Dor 1979; Geller 2012; Zeedan 2019). Until 1970, Circassian and Druze soldiers served in a *Minorities Unit* commonly referred to as a *Covenant of Blood* by politicians and media to symbolize the special relationship between Druzes and Jews. Some stress that the unit was segregated and often assigned the least favoured tasks (Peled, 1998). Only after 1982 were they allowed into the air force and intelligence and began reaching higher military ranks (Frisch 1997). The Minorities Unit was

² The Druze residing in the annexed territory of the Golan Heights typically do not hold Israeli citizenship and are exempt from conscription. They are therefore not included in this study.

³ Due to the absence of official data, the figure is an estimate calculated by the author based on population sizes in Circassian localities as of 2016 (Government of Israel 2016).

dissolved in 2015 after a number of judicial proceedings (IDF 2015).

The enduring significance of military service for both groups is highlighted by recent Israeli legislation such as the Kamenitz Law (2017) and the Nation State Law (2018). The former, while aiming to enforce construction regulations, disproportionately impacts non-Jewish minorities due to state's failure to address systematic discrimination in land planning (Adalah 2017). For the Druzes, who place importance on their unique identity, the law exacerbates land shortage issues and hinders the non-negotiable practice of men entering marriage only after gaining house ownership, accelerating crisis among youth. The latter Nation State Law constitutionally codifies Israel's Jewish character, which, given the context of selective conscription which distinguishes Druzes and Circassians from other non-Jews, implies that both groups share obligations equal to Jewish majority, but not rights. Since codification of the Law, both groups demand equality in the allocation of resources and the commitment of the state to protect their rights (Eilat 2023).

Socio-economically, the Druzes compare to Christians and Muslims. With 15.1% of Druzes holding university degrees, their education levels are lower than those of Jews and Christians, but higher than Muslims. Between 2009/10 and 2020/21, there has been a rapid increase in women's education, with an 80% rise in BA and a 353% increase in MA degrees (Winckler 2023), resulting in higher proportion of women than men holding degrees (Falah 2023), as well as women's growing presence in the workforce. In 2015, the number of employed Druze women with BA degrees surpassed their Jewish and Muslim counterparts (Winckler 2023). These trends are attributed to a continuous decline in fertility rates, recently sharply falling below the level needed to sustain their population long-term (CBS 2023; Winckler 2023).

A recent analysis of voting patterns among Druzes (Shanan and Eilat 2021) reveals that the aforementioned changes (dismantling of the Minorities Unit, rising living standards, increasing rates of educated women, intensified integration into Israeli society) resulted in significant shifts between 1996 and 2020: overall drop in voter turnout, a move towards centrist voting, and shift towards individualistic rather than ethnic considerations in voting behaviour. While the study offers valuable insights, the absence of gender-disaggregated data prevents analysis of whether these patterns differ between men and women.

Data Collection

The study is based on 33 semi-structured, one-on-one, in-depth, face-to-face interviews with Israeli Circassians, Druzes, and Jews, conducted between July 6th and October 4th, 2023. The

goal of these interviews was to draw comparisons in participants' civic-political life based on their gender, ethnicity, and conscription experience, understand how military recruitment policies contribute to possible differences, and identify patterns unique to ethnic minority women exempted from conscription.

Given the exploratory character of the study, I relied on two sampling strategies: purposeful, enabling me to identify and recruit respondents with specific characteristics; and snowball, essential for my position of an outsider in establishing trust and connections with members of close-knit ethnic groups. In order to maximize my scope of reach and minimize possible bias, I employed multiple strategies to recruit participants from various networks: connecting with local NGOs, educational organizations, research institutes, cultural centers, and municipalities; distributing calls for participants on social media and in public spaces; and leveraging my own network in Israel.

Upon establishing initial connection, each potential participant was provided with a participant information leaflet⁴ and consent form⁵ several days in advance of the arranged interview.⁶ Both documents were primed as a study on factors explaining possible differences in civic-political life among various Israeli population groups, and the research question was explained in detail in the beginning of every interview. The interviews concerned questions aimed at understanding various aspects of participants' civic-political life, as well as discussion about their experience regarding military service and other exploratory factors.⁷

The interviews took place online and in-person. Initial interviews were crucial for evaluating the interview guide's effectiveness. The majority of interviews occurred in Israel, either in public spaces such as coffee shops or in participants' homes, or online. Interviews typically lasted 60 to 120 minutes and all were conducted in English. All were recorded (except for one which was noted down as per participant's request), transcribed, and anonymized.⁸

The data were hand-coded and analysed using qualitative content analysis. I first defined coding categories which allowed for structured analysis of responses. Next, I compared answers across various population groups, considering their gender, ethnicity and conscription

⁴ Participant information leaflet is attached as Appendix 1.

⁵ Consent form is attached as Appendix 2.

⁶ All documents and procedures for this study were developed and conducted in accordance with good research practices. The study received the highest level of ethical approval from the Ethics Committee at Trinity College Dublin in May 2023, reference number 2489.

⁷ Interview guide is attached as Appendix 3.

⁸ List of interviews is attached as Appendix 4.

experience. By doing so, I was able to identify the experiences and patterns unique to ethnic minority women exempted from conscription.

Reflecting on my role as a researcher, three key elements helped me throughout the data collection process, particularly in recruiting participants and having open discussions with them, despite limited time for rapport building. First, my experience and familiarity with Israeli society, politics, and geography meant I was not a complete outsider, allowing for discussions to be more informed and personal. Second, all interviews were conducted in English (with occasional use of Hebrew vocabulary or an online translator for clarification). Despite initial concerns, using a neutral language instead of one of the local languages supported consistency and neutrality during interviews. Third, my own identity as a female academic was central in gaining mutual understanding and trust among ethnic minority women. Participants, particularly those who prioritize education, were supportive of my research, often referring me to their friends in an effort to recruit more participants, likely introducing a bias in the sample towards being more educated.

To mitigate personal bias related to data analysis, I noted emerging themes through the data collection process. The analysis took involved several rounds of looking into identical topics to ensure consistent interpretation. Throughout the whole process, I regularly reflected on my consistency and findings and discussed them with peers and supervisors.

Findings

Who were the Participants?

Out of 33 interview participants, 11 were men and 22 were women: four Circassians, 23 Druzes, and six Jewish. Although the sampling did not include Jewish men, I had the opportunity to interview one, adding variation to the data. The small Circassian sample size reflects the geographic remoteness and close-knit nature of the community, as well as Circassian leaders' reluctance to promote research within the population. This limitation, along with the lack of empirical data on the Circassian community, restricts the ability to generalize the findings further.

Regarding service experience, I interviewed 10 individuals with conscription experience, nine with national service experience, and 14 with exemptions due to gender/ethnicity or other reasons. This variation allowed for an expanded perspective by including individuals who did not undergo conscription despite belonging to systematically conscripted groups (e.g., a Jewish

woman who relocated to Israel during her adulthood; ethnic minority man exempt from service due to medical reasons; or ethnic minority man who refused military service on grounds of conscientious objection). Overall number of participants, their ethnicity, gender and service experience are shown in Table 1.3.

Ethnic group:	Male participants:		Female participants:		
	Military service	No service	Military service	National service	No service
Circassians	1	0	0	1	2
Druzes	6	3	0	7	7
Jews	1	0	2	1	2
Participants:	11		22		
	33				

Table 1.3. Number of participants.




Figure 1.1. Participants' location.

The average participant age was 35, with educational backgrounds ranging from high school to PhD. Three interviews were conducted with elite participants active in local politics or with professional experience with young ethnic minority members. These conversations provided broader insights yet focused less on individual behaviours.

Participants' locations are visualised in Figure 1.1. The figure visualises participants answers to my question: "What is the place you consider your home?". The map reflects geographical distribution of Circassian and Druze communities in north of Israel.

Findings Summary

The following section provides a summary of the findings that emerged from the interviews. The data suggest that conscription exemption does impact ethnic minority women, as it creates a distinct pattern in their civic-political life. Selective conscription is also associated with a set of gaps stemming from the practice: economic opportunities, language proficiency, skills development, social opportunities. Below, I outline the specifics of civic-political life of ethnic minority women, followed by evidence of each of the associated disparities.

The reported findings stem from comparisons made between interviewed population groups based on gender, ethnicity, and conscription experience, yet I report on findings related to ethnic minority women.

Civic-Political Life

The data suggest distinct patterns in civic-political lives of ethnic minority women, notably lack of or ethnocentric political interest, frequent civic participation through volunteering, limited national identification, a strong emphasis on gender and ethnic identity, and a limited perception of discrimination.

In terms of **political interest**, ethnic minority women are significantly less interested in politics than Jewish women and ethnic minority men. While interviews with Jewish participants reveal their primary interest in national and conceptual topics (such as democracy or the separation of state and religion), ethnic minority participants tend to focus on issues related to ethnic minority rights. This tendency is particularly prevalent among ethnic minority women, with more than half explicitly expressing either a lack of interest in politics or an interest solely in topics affecting their ethnic group. The trend is illustrated below by two responses from Circassian and Druze women:

“I’m not interested in politics. I don’t even listen to the news. I know that in Israel there is little bit of chaos politically right now, but I’m not listening to the news. It’s far away from me here. Here in Kfar Kama, we live in a bubble, in utopian world.” (CW3)

“Regarding politics, I think about the topics of where do Druze people stand in this country? It’s important to me to know where we stand as a population, a minority in a minority in this small country ... So, I can identify to the people in this country, abroad, everywhere.” (DW5)

The data demonstrate that for ethnic minority men, changes in political interest are linked to the experience of military service, stating that it provides exposure to new ideas and an

awareness of their unequal position relative to the Jewish population. For ethnic minority women, increased political interest typically comes from gaining new perspectives through interactions with people from other ethnic groups during university studies or national service. Another important factor mentioned by most ethnic minority participants as a motivation to follow politics is the codification of the Nation-State Law.

Regarding **political participation**, the data demonstrate that, unlike other population groups, young ethnic minority women are drawn to civic participation through youth programs and national service. While the interviews suggest that older ethnic minority women, in particular, are actively involved in political affairs, this observation may be due to pre-selection. Women's political participation is perceived as increasing yet still uncommon among both Circassians and Druzes.

In terms of **political efficacy**, a key finding is that the ability to follow and understand politics depends significantly on language skills. Below is a response from one of the four Druze women, who attributed their challenges in keeping up with the latest happenings to their insufficient Hebrew proficiency and lack of confidence:

"I would like to think that I have a good understanding, but definitely could be better. Even though my Hebrew is much better now, some things are not as accessible, just because they're in very high Hebrew, or I don't know, it's not the easiest. I guess it could be better."
(DW10)

Identical challenges were reported by a Jewish woman who relocated to Israel in adulthood. Circassian women, on the other hand, did not report language barriers in understanding politics. The difference is likely due to Circassian high school education being conducted in Hebrew, unlike Druze education, which is in Arabic.

Although each participant was asked to numerically assess their own political efficacy, drawing conclusions from these observations is limited due to the small sample size.

Identity is universally considered "complicated" by members of both ethnic groups. However, the sources of identity challenges differ between ethnic minority men and women. Men (and women residing and working among the majority population) see the main challenge in their relationship with the state. They experience their Israeli identity as ambiguous due to inability to fully identify with the state and its symbols, disappointment over state ethnic policies, and lack of state support despite completing military service. Nearly all ethnic minority men reported and discussed their experience of identity conflict.

For ethnic minority women, the topic of identity pertains to navigating their gender identity within the conservative frameworks of their communities, as well as their identification as Arab/Palestinian and Israeli. However, unlike their male counterparts, most women do report a finding a clear hierarchy in their identities and lacking or resolved experience of identity conflict. Below are four responses of both Circassian and Druze women. Two describe challenges associated with being a woman in conservative frameworks. Two explain navigating the relationship between their ethnic and national identity.

“The Israeli approach of going out together and hanging out is normal. But in the Circassian culture, I cannot go out alone with a guy who’s not my family. I have to stop, explain: ‘I cannot be like... I want to be friends with you and all, but I cannot be fully... Just normal, like your friends.’” (CW1)

“Being Druze and conservative it’s hard, because I want to develop myself and I can’t do it in where I was born. And this country’s safety doesn’t allow me going anywhere because my parents are so afraid. And that’s why being a woman is hard. Being a Druze woman.” (DW6)

“The Druze identity is who I am, my beliefs. It describes me better than Israeli identity. My Israeli identity is like... Just doing national service and participating in voting and stuff. But I don’t have an Israeli identity more than that.” (DW8).

“I have managed to make this work just because I accepted that for the time being, as long as this conflict goes around, this is my identity, an Israeli Palestinian Druze woman. I would understand that for most people, this is not an identity that they would think of. Or that they would think that Israeli and Palestinian go hand in hand. I think that sometimes they do. (DW10).

These patterns suggest that compared to ethnic minority men, women have a weaker yet less complicated relationship with the state. They are strongly limited by conservative frameworks within their communities and are more attuned to their ethnic identities.

The findings on **citizenship** align with those on identity. They suggest that compared to ethnic minority men, women perceive discrimination to a lesser extent. Nearly all ethnic minority men reported not feeling equal to other groups of citizens. In contrast, women hold nuanced opinions. Only four expressed a sense of inequality, while 10 reported feeling either equal to or sometimes better and sometimes worse off compared to other groups of Israeli citizens. The perspective is illustrated in the following response from two Druze women:

“Being a Druze woman in Israel probably gives me more advantages than other Arab Israeli citizens who are not Druze. It does give me privilege but not the same privilege as Jewish Israeli citizens.” (DW10)

“Here in Israel they see people as Druze, Jewish, and Arab. As three different communities, they don’t take all of us like Israeli. So I think being a Druze has some good things because sometimes, people look at you a different way just because you say that you are Druze and not Arab or from another religion. So, that’s the thing that will probably have a good effect for you, even though it shouldn’t be like this. When people hear me speaking Arabic and then they get to know I’m Druze, they will start actually being nicer to me. Just because they know I’m not of another religion. Which is something that people might find good, but personally I think it’s a bad thing.” (DW3)

In terms of **social capital**, the data demonstrate the importance of both military and national service. Conscripted individuals universally express satisfaction with their networks. Most ethnic minority women who completed national service, particularly those who served in ethnically mixed environments, appreciate its role in connecting them with new people.

Economic Gap

The data show that selective military recruitment is linked to the economic situation of specific population groups, as well as to the influence of conservative frameworks within those groups. These factors create distinct challenges for both ethnic minority women and men, ultimately impacting entire communities.

Following their military service, conscripts qualify for a discharge grant that can be used for a wide range of purposes, including covering university tuition fees. This practice creates a systemic disadvantage for young Circassian and Druze women for whom, unlike to their male counterparts, this support is systematically unavailable. However, the economic disparity additionally interacts with the limitations posed on these women due to the conservative character of their communities.

As evidenced by the interviews and other sources, the systemic exemption of Druze women from military service is due to the preferences of their religious leadership, which the state respects. Several participants explained that this stance as a form of protection, preventing women from interacting with men from other population groups and potentially being involved in war. While I have not secured relevant evidence, it is likely that a similar situation exists in the Circassian community.

The interviews also demonstrate the popularity of national service among both Circassian and

Druze women. Participation in the program provides its participants with economic benefits identical to those of military service, helping to mitigate the disparity associated with the gendered distribution of the military discharge grant. Table 1.4 shows that national service is particularly popular among Druze and Circassian women compared to women from other groups. This trend is likely influenced by the unique context of military recruitment policies in Israel, where only Druze and Circassians face gendered treatment in the context of conscription.

Ethnic group:	Female participants, 2023:	Total group population size, 2023:	Participation rate:
Christian	153	187 900 (CBS, 2023c)	0.081%
Circassian	14	4 300 (estimate based on Government of Israel, 2016)	0.326%
Druze	1 175	150 000 (CBS, 2023a)	0.783%
Jewish	10 402	7 208 000 (CBS, 2023d)	0.144%
Muslim	3 894	1 746 000 (CBS, 2023b)	0.223%

Table 1.4. Participation in national service.⁹

However, within the Druze community, the participation of young women in national service was considered taboo until about ten years ago and remains so for some. The reasons are similar to concerns regarding women's participation in military service - there is an ongoing fear that participants in national service might be compelled to engage in wartime efforts. Below is a response from an elite Druze participant, revealing the conservative yet pragmatic approach of the Druze community to national service:

“Our concern is that it may lead to women serving in the army. It may be the first step. But also, we are a very poor community. We don’t have support. We are very poor. So, we can’t give our young people the support or money to start their education. So, we see that national service is the first step for them to gain money for education.” (DW11)

To illustrate this further, below is also a response from a Druze woman in her mid-20s, whose parents did not allow her to do national service, despite her desire for the economic benefits it would provide; and of a Druze woman in her late 20s who was not allowed to do national

⁹ Data for the “Female participants, 2023” column were shared with me via email by Ksenya Kagan from the Authority for the National-Civic Service. Time-series data on participation in national service were not provided to me. “Total population size” refers to the overall population size of ethnic groups, as reported by the Central Bureau of Statistics or the Government of Israel, due to limited availability of disaggregated population data by ethnicity and age. “Participation rate” reflects the involvement of women from ethnic groups in national service relative to their total population size. No data on the Bedouin population are included due to the lack of an official count of Bedouins in Israel.

service either.

“It is not acceptable for me to do national service because of my parents, because I would get the degree that I would do in the military. So, in a war I would be forced to be with the military. They (parents) understand it like that. It’s not like that, but they understand it like that.” (DW7)

“I think it’s a good thing (national service), nowadays. When I was young, it would be like a taboo to go to a national service. Nowadays, it’s fine. Many, many girls are doing it.” (DW2)

Nevertheless, the evidence demonstrates that national service is a popular and important opportunity for young ethnic minority women, particularly those under the age of 30 (born after 1994). Of the eight interviewed ethnic minority women who participated in the program, all but one cited economic incentive as their primary motivation, as their participation provided them with the opportunity to have their university tuition fees covered. Only one of these women expressed contributing to her community as a key motivation to volunteer. The following response from a Druze woman in her 20s outlines the key benefits she perceives as central to national service:

“National service offers to pay, if you do two years, for your education almost in full, and I seized that opportunity. It helps a lot. It gives you a lot of privileges. Like free transportation and when you’re considered for a job, they see if you did national or military service. And it’s a bonus, you know what I mean? I don’t want to say I did it love for the country, but I did it for a selfish reason.” (DW8)

The three interviewed ethnic minority women under the age of 30 who did not participate in national service stated having alternative sources of university funding available, underscoring the economic relevance of national service even further.

It must be noted that the topic of national service was also discussed with Jewish participants. None of them, including one who completed national service, mentioned associated economic benefits. This suggests that the opportunity to participate in national service holds varying importance and motivations for different ethnic groups based on their economic situation.

However, the military discharge grant is not the only way in which the practice of selective service generates inequality. Several participants reported that the experience of military service is also considered in the evaluation of applicants for scholarships or dormitories. Below is a response from a female Druze academic who perceives this as an inequality:

“For some, it is really a barrier. Especially for people who are 18 and they have to apply for grants or for the dorms. Or anything like that. This is like what? Come on, she’s a girl. You know she cannot serve in the Army. So why is she disadvantaged for this?” (DW1)

Others stated that for ethnic minority women who may not qualify for some opportunities, there are other options available, including national service. This still suggests that young people’s opportunities are systematically conditioned by their gender, ethnicity, and military service experience. As evidenced above, ethnic minority women also face the additional factor of not being able to participate in available opportunities due to restrictions posed by their conservative communities or parents. While men can use the discharge grant for university education, women depend on their parents’ financial situation or approval to secure funding.

The centrality of selective conscription in generating economic inequalities can be further evidenced by the varying significance that different gender and ethnic groups assign to military service. Economic benefits (tuition fee coverage or the possibility of obtaining certifications such as driving license for free), were among the most frequently cited factors by Druze women. In contrast, Druze men primarily emphasized military service as a factor in achieving equality and respect. Economic considerations were not mentioned by Jewish or Circassian respondents, which similarly to the observations made about national service, suggest that military service holds varying importance to ethnic groups based on their economic situation.

Below are responses from two Druze women who stressed the economic benefits of military service:

“Military gives you a lot of good things. Really good things, they give you a piece of land sometimes, they give you ma’anak (military discharge grant) ... It’s important to go with a degree and you’ll have the best life, I’m telling you.” (DW8)

“In general? Nothing. And personally? Maybe better experience for them. What is being Israeli and maybe some benefits ... They are brainwashed.” (DW12)

While this might suggest that the system of selective conscription results in men receiving more education than women, the link between military service, economic inequality, and conservative frameworks is more complex. Ethnic minority men start 32 months of military service after finishing high school. Upon completion, they receive the discharge grant and return to their communities. However, within the Druze community, men are obligated to secure land and build a house prior to marriage, which may deter them from investing additional years into pursuing education. Additionally, recent state ethnic policies restrict land ownership among minorities, further complicating this process and contributing to young

men's frustrations with their economic situation. In contrast, young Druze women prioritize education. Two elite participants consider these dynamics as a central factor in varying perspectives and preferences among men and women, leading to high divorce rate and low birth rate:

"While the soldier must serve, the young woman finishes high school, and thinks about her life. During his three years of service, she can finish her first university degree. So, they cannot be equal ... The other reason is that in our community, there is a tradition that the man builds the house, and the woman comes to his house like a queen ... But we are in minus now. Every couple thinks about having one, maximum two children. So, we are going down and we have a problem from the point of population. After being released from the army, the man will think what he should do with his life. He doesn't have the privilege to go to college because he must build the house. With his own money and maybe a little help from his parents. So, he gets to work. And usually it's a hard, physical work. He is not educated enough to get another job, so he starts his life by making money ... Meanwhile the young woman finished her first degree and what she should do next, go to another degree." (DW11)

Language Gap

The data underscore that in the multiethnic context of Israel, the military plays a central role in social integration by disseminating use of the majority language, Hebrew. The system of selective conscription poses a challenge for those for whom Hebrew is not their native language. While this experience was raised by interviewed Druze women, who are educated in their native Arabic, it was not mentioned by Circassian women, who are educated in Hebrew. Selective conscription therefore interacts with educational and language policies.

During their military service, ethnic minority men are compelled to communicate in Hebrew. Meanwhile, young ethnic minority women often remain within their conservative communities, which limits their opportunities to practice the language. Consequently, several Druze women stressed their proficiency in Hebrew as a challenge or as a significant aspect of men's military experience. Below is a response from a Druze woman in her early 20s, who considers language as part of the identity transformation men undergo during military service (an experience also described by some male participants). Additionally, a response from a Circassian woman in her 30s describes her sense of exclusion due to her friends' occasional use of military slang.

"Because they have a lot of Jewish friends in the military, they change their whole perspective about politics. I think they start seeing the real side of the country because they serve. They get affected by their friends who also serve ... For example, the boys my age who were serving, when we were in high school, they were totally different people from who they were after serving

... Most of them didn't want to serve, but they had no choice. And after, they all got affected. They all started speaking only Hebrew, using a lot of Hebrew words in their in their conversations. And they all started hating the Arabs. So affected from military. They all now support Israel 100%.” (DW6)

“The language in the army, they have a slang, and we don't even know it. And my friends that did the army, sometimes they... I don't understand what they are saying. When they start to speak in the army language, or how you want to call it.” (CW3)

As evidenced above, Hebrew proficiency is crucial for following the news and political efficacy. Some women reported that both university education and national service had positive impacts on their language skills, among other benefits. Below is a response of a Druze woman in her 40s, who recalled her limited Hebrew at the age of 18, as well as lacking opportunities to meet Jewish people; a Druze woman in her 20s who repeatedly stressed her lacking Hebrew as a significant limitation; as well as a Druze woman in her mid-20s from secular family who spent much of her childhood among the majority population, yet still considers her national service in a public institution in one of the biggest cities in the country central to her ability to learn Hebrew.

“When you ask me about being an Israeli at the age of 18, I have met few Jews. I didn't even speak Hebrew, it was not good, I had to go to the university ... And when I met Jews, it was very interesting, I have very good memories of that when we were in the sixth grade, about 12 or 14 years old ... It was very interesting for me to meet people, even though I couldn't speak Hebrew well, but it was good to meet, to get familiar. Because we live in the same place. We share the same experience. Do you know what I mean? To get more and more integrated.” (DW12)

“As I said, politics here is broadcasted in Hebrew. So, I didn't have strong Hebrew at the time (during high school). But then I got into the university, and my Hebrew got much better, and I was much more interested in what's happening in Israel. Also my English got better, which means access to sites that speak about global things that are happening in English I would say it was dependent on my, on my mastering of certain languages. I made it work.” (DW10)

“Yeah, especially in the first year (of national service) I improved my Hebrew a lot. I had good Hebrew, but I talked to people there more” (DW13)

Skills Gap

The interviews show that the system of selective conscription generates unequal distribution of skills, reinforcing gendered divide of work. Through military service, conscripts gain personal and professional development, not as readily available to those who are systematically exempt from service.

Participants from all groups stressed military service for personal and professional development and acquiring skills like planning, logistics, networking, and confidence. Some highlighted it as a prerequisite for employment in sectors such as security. Below is a response from a Druze woman in her 20s who considers gendered conscription as a limitation to her career prospects:

“It’s a disadvantage, because there is a lot of jobs that require military service and the military experience. And as my dad says, there is a lot of things that you could only learn in the IDF. You couldn’t learn them in any other place.” (DW13)

Simultaneously, the interviews highlight that national service plays an important role in bridging the disparity. Absolvents of the program expressed its positive effects on their confidence, independence, and professional skills. Below are responses from a Circassian woman and a Druze woman in their 20s who recall positive impact of the experience:

“First of all, it made me more independent and made me trust myself more to make decisions that I usually just would go around and ask people ... It gave me the confidence and the knowledge so I can do whatever I want as long as I put my thought and my efforts into it.” (CW1)

Waking up every day so early and going there, there’s something about coming in and interacting with people from different backgrounds. They actually pushed me... I wasn’t a guide; I was just helping ... One day one of the guides told me: Okay, what do you say you do now? The tour was sometimes in Hebrew sometimes in English. I didn’t think that someone would give me this opportunity or believe that I can do it. They gave it to me, and I think this strengthened my personality even more.” (DW13)

However, an elite participant with insights into youth volunteering stated that while national service helps young ethnic minority women develop their work-related and interpersonal skills, it typically occurs in the field of education, leading to a growing concern that it may limit their opportunities in other professional fields.

Social Gap

The interviews show that the experience of military service is a key opportunity to interact with people from other population groups. This makes the experience particularly significant for ethnic minority members who reside in localities shared exclusively with their co-ethnics and are educated in separate educational systems unique to their communities. However, this opportunity is missed by women systematically exempt from conscription.

For young ethnic minority men, staying in military bases for 32 months after completing high

school presents an opportunity to form friendships, as well as romantic and sexual relationships with individuals from other population groups, exposing them to new ideas and perspectives. It is likely due to this experience that they primarily perceive military service as central to achieving equality, respect, and equal citizenship.

However, this opportunity is not available to ethnic minority women who remain in their localities, under the influence of conservative, endogamous communities. Therefore, several ethnic minority women who participated in national service consider it a central opportunity to connect with people from other population groups. This is illustrated by a response from a Druze woman in her 20s who was asked about the impact of national service on her life:

"I can't even recall. First, it is good for your education. It pays for education. It helps you to get to know people ... People socialize, that's why it really affected my personality. I advise everyone to go because it will really change you." (DW9)

Additionally, several women stated that interacting with people from other population groups as part of their national service broadened their perspectives on politics. However, these experiences might depend on the context in which the service took place. Below are responses from three Druze women in their 20s who recalled that the interactions they had with other people during their national service as important to their political views:

"I'm an Arab. And, you know the Palestinians and stuff. So, I thought that Israel is a cruel country, and I didn't watch a lot of news. I didn't know what the Jews are doing. I had a different idea about Israel. But after I started seeing people, I started to understand how this country works, what are the benefits they give you ... I didn't know I was in a comfortable country that wants to help me. After seeing those people and, understanding what the rules are here, it really changed my mind. I see this country really cares about you. Sure, it has some hard rules. In the end, it's a Jewish country." (DW9)

"It gave me some new perspectives, some new understanding of politics. There are many things that we don't hear about, and we don't know in our community because it's less interesting to us. So, I think that Jews have more perspective. They know more ... Of everything that goes on in this country." (DW5)

"I didn't think it (national service) would affect my political opinions because I thought it's gonna be only in my village, but when they gathered us with Jews and Muslims, and then we started talking, and we actually experienced... We fought. Not with hands and violence, but we fought talking, we argued. And that's how my opinions got stronger." (DW6)

Additional Observations

Two other observations must be explicitly noted. First, both Circassian and Druze

communities are conservative, expecting women to prioritize household and family responsibilities over education and work. Despite that, several participants noted a generational shift, with women pursuing university-level education and increasing their engagement in political initiatives.

Second, the data indicate that the majority of participants across all population groups (a total of 17) perceive their fathers as the primary influence on their political engagement. Specifically, the influence of fathers involved in activism, politics, or the military was frequently mentioned.

Discussion

The interviews reveal the profound impact of selective military recruitment policies on relationship with politics, society and the state among ethnic minority women. The conscription exemption shapes their civic-political lives, yet also contributes to systemic, previously unaddressed disparities in economic opportunities, language proficiency, professional development, and social opportunities.

The interviews underscore previous findings that the experience of mandatory military service plays a central role in acculturation (Leal 2003), forming national identity, political interest (Koch 2022), and political attitudes (Fize and Sidois 2020) of those who underwent the experience. However, those who are exempted from the practice due to their identity lack this development. Accordingly, in the examined context of Israeli Circassians and Druzes, the selective treatment contributes to gendered differences in identification, as well as in political interest. The data suggest that the gendered differences might be mitigated by other experiences, such as university education, national service, or the opportunities enabled by family members (particularly fathers), thereby partially compensating for conscription exemption.

Thorough the interviews, I also identified four systemic disparities associated with conscription exemption. These disparities are broad, and their impact extends beyond civic-political life. While some of these gaps may be case-specific, the fact that both examined communities face identical treatment adds to the generalizability of these findings and the possibility of outlining a theoretical framework.

The **economic gap** relates to the mechanism of socio-economic mobility through economic benefits. The findings demonstrate that due to its connection to economic rewards, military service holds varying significance for various groups based on the economic opportunities

available to them and on their overall economic situation.

In the Israeli context, military service is associated with discharge grant, which may pose significant importance in opportunities available to young people. Selective military recruitment results in disparity in the availability of economic support, negatively impacting ethnic minority women by hindering their access to education and increasing their dependency on parents. While there is an alternative opportunity available to overcome the economic disparity through participation in state-mandated national service (which undoubtedly adds to continuous female empowerment), some women are limited in this opportunity due to the conservative views of their community, further disadvantaging these women. Accordingly, ethnic minority women perceive both military and national service primarily through the economic lens, which was less prevalent among ethnic minority men and lacking among Jewish participants.

The link between conscription, the economic situation, and conservative frameworks also impacts ethnic minority men. While the conscription experience provides them with financial support, conservative expectations within their communities and state land policies limit their opportunity to use it for educational purposes. With military service lasting 32 months, during which they cannot engage in economic productivity, they are pressured to enter the workforce immediately upon completion, instead of obtaining education in their youth, adding to gender gap within one of the ethnic groups. This observation was unique to Druze participants, which may suggest that economic status of an ethnic group underscores the economic significance of military service for various ethnic groups. Confirmation of this claim is challenging due to lacking data on economic disparities among various ethnic groups.

Regarding civic-political life, ethnic minority women may perceive less inequality than men due to their limited contact with other population groups, reducing their awareness of economic disparities.

The **language gap** demonstrates that military institutions play a central role in multi-ethnic contexts by promoting the use of a single language. As a result, selective military recruitment interacts with educational and linguistic policies, creating a particular disadvantage for those whose native language is different from the majority one, who are not educated in the majority language, and who are exempt from military service.

In the context of this study, the language gap is demonstrated by varying experience of Druze and Circassian women. While Druzes' education is in Arabic, Circassians study in the majority

language, Hebrew. After completing high school, men are conscripted and compelled to master the majority language. Women, who typically remain in their communities following high school, do not gain this experience unless they have other opportunities such as parental support to leave the community, national service in mixed environments, or university education.

Language proficiency is also highly relevant in the context of civic-political life. Lacking proficiency in Hebrew hinders the ability to follow news, contributing to lower political efficacy and limited political interest among ethnic minority women.

The **skills gap** closely relates to the established link between military service and socio-economic mobility through personal and professional development, which may not be available to those who are exempted from the practice, impacting confidence and limiting professional opportunities. In the context of this study, the skills gap is reinforced by the influence of conservative values, limiting alternative options of professional and professional development for women. While the role of alternative service is perceived as central in bridging the skills gap, it may also generate long-term consequences stemming from large numbers of women using alternative service to gain experience in identical fields.

The **social gap** is associated with the role of military in promoting intergroup contact. Particularly in multi-ethnic contexts, military service is central to promoting interactions among various population groups. Selective recruitment makes these opportunities only available to some, resulting in limited opportunities to practice majority language, gain diverse social capital, and develop interest beyond happenings within the specific population groups. Identically to previously listed gaps, also social gap can be mitigated through university education and alternative service.

The gaps and their contributing factors are outlined in Table 1.5. It constitutes a theoretical framework which outlines the individual-level consequences of conscription exemption in environments that apply selective military recruitment policies with differential rules based on gender and ethnic identity.

The study demonstrates that military recruitment policies do deserve scholarly attention. Their selective nature generates a number of perceived gaps among various populations, whether these are disparities among men and women or various ethnic groups. Accordingly, given the study's novel perspective and exploratory nature, its findings lay the groundwork for numerous future

research avenues.

Gap:	Contributing factors:
Economic	Economic inequalities among ethnic groups. Existence of economic support for conscription absolvers. Paid university education. Consideration of service in scholarship and dorm applications. Conservative frameworks limiting members' opportunities.
Language	Multilingual environment. Separate educational systems. Insufficient education of majority language in ethnic educational system. Conservative frameworks limiting members' opportunities.
Skills	Centrality of military service in professional development. High relevance of military service on job market. Conservative frameworks limiting members' opportunities.
Social	Geographic isolation of ethnic communities. Separate educational systems. Conservative frameworks limiting members' opportunities.

Table 1.5. Disparities associated with selective military recruitment.

The study demonstrates that military recruitment policies do deserve scholarly attention. Their selective nature generates number of perceived gaps among various populations, whether these are disparities among men and women or various ethnic groups. Accordingly, given the study's novel perspective and exploratory nature, its findings lay the groundwork for numerous future research avenues.

First, although this study focused on ethnic minority women, its findings have relevance beyond an intersectional perspective. The observed mechanisms may relate to women in the context of gendered military recruitment (e.g. in Turkey), as well as to ethnic groups with both male and female members exempt from conscription (e.g. Christians and Muslims of Israel). Additionally, conducting similar replication studies in other contexts would enable expanding the theoretical framework beyond the Israeli context, allowing for a more nuanced and complex understanding of the identified gaps, as well as identifying additional ones.

Second, given the exploratory and theory-building character of this study, the next logical step is determining the extent of its findings in a large-N survey. Generalization is also central to formulating specific policy recommendations aimed at reducing the disparities I identified.

Finally, while the body of empirical and critical literature on military service is substantial, research is lacking on its alternatives, such as the phenomenon of national service in Israel, limiting our understanding of its implications on both individual and group level.

Conclusion

The goal of this study was to understand the impact of systematic conscription exemption on ethnic minority women. While the aim was to identify its impact on various aspects of civic-political life, the selected inductive approach enabled identification of broader, previously overlooked ramifications of selective military recruitment policies. The identified disparities in economic opportunities, language proficiency, job-related skills, and social opportunities are crucial to both gender and ethnic dynamics and deserve scholarly attention. Additionally, I have identified the importance of other state-mandated initiatives, such as national service in the Israeli context, in navigating these gaps. The study met its goal to generate exploratory findings and deliver first ever framework of the specific gaps associated with selective military recruitment. As such, it provides a foundation in form of testable implications for further exploration of the impact of selective military recruitment through empirical research and quantitative methods, as well as in greater depth through qualitative methods within comparable contexts.

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CHAPTER 2:

Ethnic Military Recruitment: Introducing a New Dataset

Abstract

Why are certain ethnic groups systematically excluded from military service in contexts where conscription is otherwise mandatory? The demographic composition of the military symbolizes the relationship between the state and various groups of its citizens. Accordingly, the demographic layout of military institutions has been considered in research related to democracy, economy, and security. Despite the consensus regarding the importance of the absence, underrepresentation, and overrepresentation of ethnic groups in the context of military recruitment policies, a systematic source on ethnic military recruitment has been lacking. The Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset is the first-ever source enabling intra- and inter-state comparisons of ethnic military recruitment, offering ethnic group-level observations on recruitment methods applied by central governments to ethnic groups in 134 countries between 1946 and 2010. The Dataset's use is demonstrated by statistical analysis of ethnic groups' unique characteristics in national contexts with selective mandatory military recruitment, showing a strong relationship between military service exemption and several factors including distinct group customs, emigration, transnational dispersion, and lack of representation in the executive. The chapter presents several avenues for future research relying on the novel data introduced.

Introduction

Military recruitment policies are central to understanding the relationship between the state and its citizens. Existing research demonstrates their significance across wide range of topics concerning democracy, economy, and security. Both empirical and critical social science research stress and show that within these broad topics, military recruitment policies are particularly significant in the context of ethnic relations dynamics.

However, previous attempts to understand the relationship between military recruitment policies and ethnic relations have been hindered by lack data on the topic that would enable for systemic comparisons on various levels of analysis. The absence of such data likely stems from general lack of information on military institutions and associated policies. Although most states do have standing military institutions, the specifics of the demography in their manpower policies are typically not publicly disclosed. This lack of transparency prevents our efforts to identify patterns associated with military recruitment, particularly in terms of ethnicity which may be associated with broader socio-economic inequalities.

The goal of this chapter is to address the gap in understanding the patterns associated with military recruitment of various ethnic groups. To do so, the chapter introduces the Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset, the first-ever source to provide time-series observations on military recruitment methods applied by central governments to politically relevant ethnic groups in 134 countries between 1946 and 2010. This dataset allows for systematic intra- and inter-state comparisons of ethnic military recruitment policies. The chapter then uses the Dataset to explore the unique patterns associated with the characteristics of ethnic groups that tend to be systematically excluded from military institutions in contexts with otherwise mandatory conscription.

Given its reliance on a novel dataset, the chapter makes a significant empirical contribution by offering a new resource for future empirical research on ethnicity in military institutions. In doing so, the Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset expands upon previous data sources associated with the topic of military recruitment. While there have been critical and empirical studies, typically qualitative, focusing on single case- or comparative case-studies related to this issue, there have been few other sources of data on military recruitment. The *Ethnic Stacking in Africa Dataset* by Harkness (2021) and the *Security-Force Ethnicity Project* by Johnson and Thurber (2017) detail the actual representation of various ethnic groups in military institutions in specific geographical contexts. The *Military Recruitment Dataset* by Toronto (2014) offers aggregate country-year observations on military recruitment policies. However, there has not yet been a publicly available dataset that demonstrates states' decisions to fully include or exclude specific groups from mandatory military recruitment. Such evidence is crucial, particularly in multi-ethnic states, where differential rules applied to ethnic groups in military recruitment may reflect the broader relationship between states and their citizens.

In addition to its empirical contribution, the chapter makes significant theoretical contribution by exploring the research question of why are certain ethnic groups systematically excluded from military institutions in contexts where conscription is otherwise mandatory. In doing so, the chapter advances existing debates on the relationship between military institutions and the question of various types of inequalities in ethnic integration and political rights. Given their role of the school for the nation, military institutions are central in creating and maintaining political communities (Gaub 2010; Krebs 2004; 2006, Peled 1994). Accordingly, the involvement of a specific ethnic group in military institution demonstrates state's trust in this group by including it in its security apparatus. This means that the position of a specific ethnic group position within, as well as its over-representation, under-representation, or absence from

military forces is symbolic of its position within the state (Enloe 1983). Simultaneously, there has been historically, theoretically and empirically established relationship between citizens' participation in military service, and their access to citizenship and ability to take part in political decision making (Snyder 1999; 2003; Levi 1997; Ingesson 2017), which is particularly relevant to ethnic minorities which might be striving for improving their political rights (Ingesson 2020; Krebs 2006; Peled 1994).

However, the ability of existing research to understand the patterns associated with states' decision to include or exclude specific ethnic groups in its military institutions has been limited by lack of systemic data which would enable both inter- and intra-state comparisons. Although military recruitment is typically presented as universal, it tends to be ethnically (and frequently also gender) selective and, as such, may generate differential economic and political implications among various groups of citizens. Although existing research has established that, in the context of the former British Empire, ethnic selectiveness in security institutions is often tied to political exclusion (Jeong and Jeong 2023; Ray 2019), we still lack an understanding of the broader patterns driving the practice of exclusion itself. Specifically, we need to investigate why states choose to include certain ethnic groups while excluding others in the first place. This paper argues that addressing this question requires examining the long-term characteristics of ethnic groups that make them more or less likely to be included in military institutions.

While much of the existing scholarship focuses on specific cases, a comparative and global perspective is crucial to identifying generalizable patterns and understanding the broader implications of ethnically selective military recruitment. This chapter contributes to filling this gap by offering a global analysis that explores these dynamics across all contexts that opted for ethnically selective conscript during the observed period.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I explain the significance of military recruitment policies in the context of ethnic relations. Second, I evaluate existing sources of data on the topic and explain their role in the completion of this Dataset. Third, I describe the coding procedure. Fourth, I provide a summary and description of the data. Fifth, I demonstrate the Dataset's application by testing the statistical relationship between unique ethnic group characteristics and their status regarding military conscription in contexts that opted for ethnically selective conscription during the observed period recorded in the Dataset. Sixth, I propose several possible ways to expand the Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset into a comprehensive source on military policies, for which no consistent data currently exists, and

outline avenues for future research. Finally, I include comprehensive codebook including country-level narratives.¹⁰

The Significance of Military Recruitment for Ethnic Relations

Theoretical Significance of Conscription

In this section, I first differentiate conscription from voluntary enlistment. Second, relying on existing literature, I outline the theoretical, historical and empirical significance of military recruitment policies.

Conscription can be defined as “*forced military recruitment of citizens for temporary military service for little or no compensation*” (Ingesson et al. 2017). Regarding scope, conscription can be either universal or selective, based on factors such as ethnicity or gender, and can be employed during wartime as well as peacetime. In contrast, voluntary enlistment involves individuals choosing to serve as professional soldiers, creating a professional military force.

While often viewed as a tool to secure military manpower, conscription has been a significant element in the context of political rights. The connection traces back to the archetypal concept of citizen-soldier, which dates back to ancient Greece. It asserts that an individual’s participation in political decision-making is linked to their active engagement in protecting the nation (Snyder 1999: 2; Snyder 2003: 187). The link is reflected in the republican conception of citizenship, as considered by thinkers such as Machiavelli or Rousseau. It posits that freedom, in contrast to slavery, should be guaranteed in the legal status of a citizen, involving their active participation and military virtue to preserve the fragile republic. Contrary to this, the liberal conception approaches citizenship as a universal legal status aimed at the protection of citizens regardless of their military contribution (Honohan 2017).

In the modern sense, the link between republican conception of citizenship and conscription pioneered in post-revolutionary France with the introduction of the *levee en masse* in 1793, which involved compulsory enlistment of all unmarried men aged 20 to 25. Despite being driven by the state’s need for manpower, the new measure intertwined with the ideals of revolution and appealed to the notions of national defence and republicanism (Ingesson 2020: 5-6; Levi 1997: 46). As such, conscription gradually became a rite of passage to citizenship for young French males (Levi 1997: 12) and served as a pre-condition for men born to foreign parents in

¹⁰ Codebook is attached as Appendix 5.

achieving French citizenship (Balfour 1967: 223 in Choi et al. 2022). Throughout the 19th century, the model of republican citizenship was adopted by most European countries as a common practice and conscription was widely accepted as a patriotic duty and a symbol of the nation (Wilson 1980). In some countries, the system of conscription was only abolished in the early 2000s, while in others, it continues to be employed or reintroduced.

Being a common practice thorough 19th and 20th centuries, conscription coincided with the expansion of political rights. As part of the broader strand of literature on the relationship between conscription and democracy (Adam 2012; Asal et al. 2017; Pfaffenzeller 2010; Ingesson 2020), Ingesson et al. (2017) examined the relationship between conscription and political rights. They found a clear link, as during the observed period of 1817 to the early 2000s, more men gained voting rights if more men were conscripted during wartime.

Another strand of predominantly qualitative research focuses on the significance of conscription specifically in the context of intrastate ethnic dynamics. As a *school for the nation*, military institutions employing conscription have the potential to serve as social agents promoting citizenship and patriotism among conscripts with diverse ethnic identities (Gaub 2010; Krebs 2004, 2005). Accordingly, military recruitment policies are an indicator of state's commitment to grant specific ethnic groups with political rights, as well as of which ethnic groups are seen as loyal enough to be included in security apparatus.

Consequently, existing research does explore ethnic conscription (Peled 1994; Krebs 2004; Enloe 1983). Peled (1994) categorizes ethnic military recruitment policies employed by leaders or states and suggests they reveal a careful balancing of manpower needs and recruitment strategies, resulting in three distinct patterns. First, conscription by force provides rules with mass armies, but results in low military morale of ethnic soldiers, instability and economic devastation. Second, conscription by ideology is motivated by ethnic soldiers' conviction to take part in revolution on defence against foreign invader, yet it might also provoke their nationalistic awakening which poses a challenge for government unwilling to provide equal rights to veterans from all ethnic groups. Third, conscription by contract involves a deal between the state and ethnic group leaders, where the state gains manpower in exchange for accommodating the group's special needs, such as providing economic benefits for veterans. This results in military recruitment policies being used to differentiate between groups. For example, during WWI, the British Empire refrained from conscripting the Irish, fearing that it would provoke violent opposition without yielding significant manpower gains. In Israel, the Druze community participates in conscription, contributing to the state. However, community

leaders highlight the high casualty rates and demand the end of social and economic discrimination in return for their service (ibid).

Krebs (2004) and Enloe (1983) focus on these patterns in greater detail. Krebs (2004) asserts that, in accordance with the republican citizenship discourse, military service provides ethnic minorities with a rhetorical advantage which might result in concessions from ethnic majority politicians and the higher possibility of being granted first-class citizenship. While focusing on the case of the Druzes in Israel and Blacks in the US, the research is rare in its depth of analysis, yet it only approaches military service as one-way process and does not consider the possible motivations and subsequent gains state might get from co-opting a specific ethnic minority into military service. Enloe (1983), on the other hand, focuses on how do states use ethnicity in their military recruitment policies in order to maintain political order. Enloe argues that states use conscription for exploiting their ethnic cleavages to optimize their own security. She posits that states create ethnic state security maps to determine which groups should be included in or excluded from conscription. These decisions are based on determining the ratio between specific group's political dependability and its saliency for state security. The ethnic groups most ideal for conscription are those both militarily competent and reliable.

Beyond the above presented literature, the topic of ethnicity in the context of military recruitment policies is highly relevant to other strands of research which relate to ethnic dynamics and conflict. Large body of literature focuses on ethnic stacking as a factor in securing loyalty and preventing of coups d'état (Harkness 2022; Johnson and Thurber 2020). Ethnic composition of military is central to understanding why some military institutions perform better than others (Lyall 2020). Ethnic representation in various state institutions is also central to understanding access to political power as part of the study of colonialism and its continuing legacies. This has been previously explored in the context of the former British Empire, demonstrating that inclusion in security organizations during colonialism reduced the risk of exclusion in the postcolonial period (Ray 2012, 2019; Jeong and Jeong 2024).

Overview of Existing Sources on the Topic

The Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset follows up on existing work of other authors. Namely, it draws on the *Military Recruitment Dataset* by Nathan Toronto (2014), the *Security-Force Ethnicity (SFE) Project* by Paul Lorenzo Johnson and Ches Thurber (2017), and *Ethnic Stacking in African Militaries* by Kristen Harkness (2021).

The *Military Recruitment Dataset* (Toronto 2014) provides global time-series data with country-

year observations on states' method of military recruitment, with temporal coverage from 1816 to 2008. In doing so, the dataset distinguishes between conscription or voluntary military recruitment. The Military Recruitment Dataset does not consider possible variation in treatment of various social groups, as it provides aggregate data, which makes it unfit for group level analysis which would reflect differential treatment of various ethnic groups within specific national context. The novel Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset presented in this chapter overcomes this limitation of the Military Recruitment Dataset by adding ethnic group-level observations to each of Toronto's country-year observations.

The *Ethnic Stacking in African Militaries* dataset (Harkness 2021) provides time-series data with both leader-speak and country-year observations of which ethnic groups were promoted to control security institutions (both military and paramilitary) in African countries, with temporal coverage from gaining postcolonial independence to 2018. The dataset brings unique and valuable, yet spatially limited data, which prevents the possibility to do cross-country comparison beyond the African context. Furthermore, the data report solely ethnic stacking, with no attention given to military recruitment method applied on ethnic groups. The Ethnic Stacking in African Militaries dataset is therefore a valuable source, which enabled me to identify the ethnic groups explicitly included in military institutions in various African national contexts across different temporal periods. Using this information, I then cross-referenced other sources to investigate the status of excluded groups, determining whether their absence indicated complete exclusion from military institutions.

Similarly, the *Security-Force Ethnicity (SFE) Project* (Johnson, Thurber 2017) provides time-series data with group-level measures of the ethnic composition of military forces in the Middle East and North Africa region, with temporal coverage 1946-2013. The dataset offers coding for ethnic groups participation rates in officer corps, comparing these with their population numbers. Just as the preceding one, this dataset lacks a variable on actual military recruitment method and only offers spatially limited data. The Project was therefore used to determine which groups were included in military institutions in specific periods of time and which groups should be researched in greater detail to identify their possible complete exclusion from conscription.

Besides these datasets, the new data on ethnic military recruitment draws from number of other sources. The attached codebook for the Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset includes list of nearly 140 books, papers, articles, and reports. Although many more sources were consulted while completing the dataset, I only list those which contained the information of

interest.

Among the most important books used for completing the dataset were *World Armies* by John Keegan (1979) and *Conscription: a world survey* by Devi Prasad and Tony Smythe (1968) published by the organisation War Resisters International. The former of the stated books provides comprehensive account of all national military institutions, including their history, strength, budget, recruitment etc. and proved itself to be extremely useful. The latter book provides overview of military recruitment policies in all countries with existing military institutions. Despite being useful for understanding the overall context on the organisation of recruitment in specific states, the latter book curiously lacks any information on ethnicity, not mentioning ethnically selective conscription in relation to any country. This observation demonstrates that ethnic military recruitment has been largely overlooked phenomenon which requires thorough and systemic investigation.

Among other sources were academic papers and policy reports on discrimination against specific ethnic groups, published by various institutions such as *UNHCR*, *International Fellowship of Reconciliation* or *Minorities at Risk* project. One of the most valuable sources were reports by an anti-war organisation *War Resisters International*. Besides, I drew from official state documents such as constitutions, as well as from media articles.

Coding Procedure

(1) Using the Ethnic Power Relations dataset

The Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset is structured in accordance with the *Ethnic Power Relations* (EPR) dataset of politically relevant ethnic groups (Wimmer et al. 2015). The EPR data were selected for this purpose due to three reasons.

First, it follows Weberian definition of ethnicity that understands it as “*subjectively experienced sense of commonalty based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture*” (ibid). In accordance with this definition, the dataset is coded based on the assumption that ethnicity can originate from various social identities, such as religious faith, language, or race. This conceptual approach towards ethnicity recognises shared identities unique and typical for given country, which is convenient for the purpose of a dataset aimed at either inter- or intra-state comparisons.

Second, the EPR data include all politically relevant ethnic groups in given country, meaning that groups which are either represented on national level or groups whose members are systematically and intentionally discriminated (ibid). Third, the use of the EPR data ensures

compatibility with the EPR dataset family, as well as with datasets that also use the data as a skeleton for their original data.

The other variables I adapted from the EPR data are country code (*concode*) and country name (*country*), which are both coded in accordance with the *Correlates of War* project variables, ethnic group (*group*), year of observation (*year*), and year of observation combined with country code (*yearc*).

(2) Introducing the key variable

The core contribution of the novel Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset is the *recruitethnic* variable which indicates whether members of a specific ethnic group were subject to conscription in military forces in given year, based on a decision made by central, legitimate government of given country. If so, the variable is coded as 0. If members of an ethnic group were not subject to conscription the variable is coded as 1. The coding of this variable therefore covers the absence of an ethnic group from the military due to number of reasons:¹¹

- The country has professional army and military service is voluntary;
- The country does not have a standing military institution;
- The country employs conscription, but the ethnic group is either exempt or banned from the duty to perform a military service.

The coding is synoptically outlined in Table 2.1.

Military recruitment system:	Ethnic group:	Coding:
Conscription	Conscripted	0
	Exempt	1
	Banned	1
Voluntary recruitment / professional army		1
Military does not exist		1

Table 2.1. Coding of the *recruitethnic* variable.

In the context of this dataset, conscription is understood as mandatory military service which

¹¹ Although the dataset assigns a value of 1 to multiple categories (exempt from conscription, banned from conscription, and voluntary recruitment) in the *recruitethnic* variable, this can be easily filtered or recoded using additional variables such as *recruitgeneral*, which indicates whether the country relied on conscription or voluntary recruitment. Researchers can further adjust the coding to suit specific research needs, ensuring the flexibility and adaptability of the dataset.

can only be avoided at personal cost, whether it is an alternative service, fine, or imprisonment. This coding includes both universal and lottery-based conscription systems. The variable only considers military institutions, leaving out enlistment to paramilitary forces. The condition of central, legitimate government leaves out decisions made by occupying forces, unrecognised governments (such as the case of Austria after the second World War, or the government formed by Taliban in Afghanistan), or decisions made on regional level.

(3) The process of coding the key variable

The process of coding the core *recruitethnic* variable is as follows. First, I adopted country-year observations coded as voluntary service in the Military Recruitment Dataset (Toronto 2014). These observations were extended to all ethnic groups within a given country-year, as they indicated the application of voluntary enlistment to all ethnic groups. Country-year observations identified by the Military Recruitment Dataset as employing conscription were left blank in the novel Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset. These cases required in-depth research to determine whether conscription was applied equally to all ethnic groups within the national context for each year in the observation period.

Second, I conducted country-level research on countries identified by the Military Recruitment Dataset (Toronto, 2014) as employing conscription. The aim of this research was to understand the overall military and political context in each country and to establish the scope of conscription. During this phase of data collection, I first consulted the previously introduced datasets, *Ethnic Stacking in African Militaries* (Harkness 2021) and the *Security-Force Ethnicity (SFE) Project* (Johnson & Thurber 2017). Although these datasets do not primarily focus on military recruitment methods, they provide information on the ethnic groups represented in military institutions across various national contexts in Africa and the Middle East during different time periods. In some cases, their data allowed me to identify groups requiring further investigation due to their absence from military institutions, while ruling out those with significant military presence. At this stage, I also utilized the referenced books, *World Armies* (Keegan 1979) and *Conscription: A World Survey* (Prasad & Smythe 1968).

Third, when the country-level search did not provide evidence of exemptions from conscription based on ethnicity, I conducted research on individual ethnic groups within the given country. This research focused on sources that provided information about the overall position of the ethnic group in the national context or potential violations of their civic and human rights. To gather this information, I relied on academic papers, reports from various

non-governmental organizations, and media outputs related to the specific ethnic group.

The coding procedure can be demonstrated with examples from two selected countries. Colombia has relied on conscription throughout the entire observed period (Toronto 2014). Relevant country-level sources did not reveal any variation in military recruitment policies applied to the three ethnic groups identified as politically relevant in the EPR data: Colombians, Indigenous peoples, and Afro-Colombians. Ethnic-level research of reports from non-governmental organisations indicated that Indigenous peoples were formally exempted from conscription in 1993 (WRI 2017; Infobae 2021; Bonilla Mora 2021), while no evidence of such an exemption was found during the observed period covered by the Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset.

A second case illustrating how the dataset was completed is Turkey. The state employed conscription throughout the entire observed period (Toronto 2014). During the state-level search, the SFE (Johnson & Thurber 2017) dataset was consulted, which revealed that Turkey adopted universal conscription of citizens from all ethnic groups, specifically in response to Kurdish rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s. The universality of conscription in Turkey was confirmed by other sources, such as a 2018 report by the UK Home Office (2018).

(4) Associated challenges

Naturally, number of issues arose while collecting data for the *recruitethnic* variable, typically due to the lack of empirical evidence on the phenomenon of ethnically selective conscription. First, despite the goal to capture *de iure* exemptions from conscription, it is rare for states to explicitly state which groups are exempt from military service. Constitutions or laws on military service would usually state that all citizens are subject to conscription, with no evidence of exemptions. However, these exemptions do exist, whether based on ethnicity or gender. This illustrates that military recruitment policies tend to be vague or informal and therefore challenging to assess. In the current version of the Dataset, the *recruitethnic* variable on military recruitment of ethnic group might therefore include both cases of *de iure* and *de facto* ethnicity based exemptions from military service.

Second, given the general lack of evidence on the topic, careful examination of each case is necessary before concluding that the phenomenon does not occur or that the evidence is not sufficient. My decision in such cases is based on general clarity of each case – if there is generally enough of evidence on both military institutions and ethnic minorities' conditions in given country, yet no evidence of the ethnically selective conscription, it can be concluded that

the phenomenon does not occur. If the evidence is not sufficient and fundamental information (such as on military recruitment system in observed period) are generally confusing, the case would be coded as NA.

(5) Additional variables included in the Dataset

The dataset includes other, additional variables. Including a variable from the Military Recruitment Dataset (Toronto 2014) *recruitgeneral* which represents the general military recruitment method and enables to spot the difference between aggregate and disaggregate data on applied military recruitment.

A variable *recruitethnigeneral* combines *recruitethnic* and *recruitgeneral*. It indicates the same as *recruitethnic* while filling missing values with aggregate country-year observations from Toronto's dataset (2014).

Two additional binary variables are on the existence of temporal variation (*timevar*) and ethnic variation (*ethnicvar*) in military recruitment. The former indicates whether a change in military recruitment method on state level occurred anytime during the observed period and sorts all included countries in five categories: conscription; alternation (from conscription to voluntary recruitment or vice-versa); voluntary recruitment; no military institution; no evidence. The variable on ethnic variation indicates whether ethnically selective conscription occurred in year of observation. For clarity, I also included Toronto's (2014) variable on existence of military institution in given year (*milexist*).

Summary and Data Description

The Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset presents observations on military recruitment method as applied by central governments on politically relevant ethnic groups between 1946 and 2010, with 134 countries recovered. During the observed period, 33 of these countries only applied conscription, 4 altered military recruitment method from conscription to voluntary military recruitment or vice versa at least once, 22 only ever applied voluntary military recruitment, four did not have a military institution, and 27 were assessed as lacking sufficient evidence necessary for further analysis (Figure 2.1).




Figure 2.1. Military recruitment in 134 countries covered in the dataset, 1946-2010.

Given the purpose of the dataset to assess which ethnic groups were subject to ethnically selective conscription and what are their characteristics, from now on, I will only focus on two categories of countries: the 48 countries that altered from conscription to voluntary military recruitment or vice versa anytime during the observed period (such as the United Kingdom that altered from conscription to voluntary military recruitment in 1946); and the 34 countries that only applied conscription in the observed period (such as Austria).

Among countries with some kind of alternation in military recruitment method, 43 applied conscription universally on all citizen groups, and five excluded specific ethnic groups from the duty. Among countries employing conscription during the whole observed period, a total of 24 conscripted all ethnic groups and 9 employed ethnically selective conscription, as evident from Figure 2.2. In sum, ethnically selective conscription can be traced in 20.9 % of countries that ever-employed conscription during the observed period of 1946 to 2010.

Figure 2.3 presents the same data as Figure 2, yet on ethnic group-level. In total, there were 24 ethnic groups exempt from conscription in the observed period: 12 in countries with alternation in their military recruitment method, and 12 in countries employing conscription thorough the entire observed period.



Figure 2.2. Universal and ethnically selective conscription, country-level.




Figure 2.3. Universal and ethnically selective conscription, group-level.

Figure 2.4 shows what are the countries employing ethnically selective conscription, providing list of those that resorted to this practice during the observed period. It also shows total number of ethnic groups in each of these countries and total number of ethnic groups exempt from military service.




Figure 2.4. Ethnic groups in countries which employed ethnically selective conscription.

Table 2.2 presents list of countries which have ever employed ethnically selective conscription; as well as list of exempted ethnic groups. The groups can be divided in three groups: exempted due to their indigenous status; exempted due to conflict; and exempted due to unclear reasons.

Country:	Exempted ethnic groups:
Australia	Aborigines
Azerbaijan	Armenians (inhabitants of Nagorno Karabakh which has its own conscription system)
Brazil	Indigenous peoples
Colombia	Indigenous peoples
Croatia	Serbs (exempt from 1997 to 2001)
Greece	Muslims (exempt until 1960)
Israel	Israeli Arabs and Palestinian Arabs
Mali	Tuaregs (exempt until 1996)
Moldova	Transnistrians (inhabitants of Transnistria which has its own conscription system)
New Zealand	Maori
Paraguay	Indigenous peoples
South Africa	Asians, Coloreds, Zulu, Xhosa, Other Black African (until abolishment of conscription in 1994)
Thailand	Hill Tribes, Chinese, Malay Muslims
United Kingdom	Asians, Afro-Caribbeans, Protestants in Northern Ireland, Catholics in Northern Ireland (exempt until 1960 when conscription was abolished)

Table 2.2. Ethnic groups exempted from conscription.

It should be noted that I identified five additional countries that should be on the list of countries employing ethnically selective conscription. However, the ethnic groups exempt from military service in these countries are not included in the EPR dataset, as they are not considered as politically relevant by the EPR criteria. The list of these groups is in Table 2.3.

Country:	Exempted ethnic groups:
Georgia	Inhabitants of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
Israel	Christians and Muslims
Finland	Inhabitants of Aland Islands
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Inhabitants of Brcko region
Syria	Jews and Druzes (with the former being subjected to long-term exemption and the latter to short-term exemption)

Table 2.3. Ethnic groups exempted from conscription, lacking from the dataset.

While the goal of this chapter is to understand the relationship between ethnic group characteristics and conscription exclusion, the Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset allows for simultaneous cross-country comparisons. Existing research suggests that implementation of conscription is less likely in democracies, yet more likely in former British colonies (Asal et al. 2015). Therefore, I include summary statistics on the prevalence of ethnically selective conscription across different regime types and colonial legacies. To visualize the occurrence of ethnic conscription in various regime types, I use the Autocratic Regime Data from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) and first year of when the practice of ethnic conscription is reported in the Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset. As visualised in Figure 2.5, most of countries employing ethnically selective conscription were democracies.




Figure 2.5. Regime type in countries which employed selective conscription.

To visualize the occurrence of ethnic conscription in contexts with various colonial legacies, I use Becker's (2019) Colonial Dataset on duration of European colonial empires. As visualised in Figure 2.6, ethnically selective conscription occurred in four former colonies of British Empire (as well as in the United Kingdom itself, which is not coded as a colony). Ethnically selective conscription was also employed in two French and two Spanish colonies, and by one

in Portuguese and Dutch empires. This suggests that the practice of ethnic military recruitment is not linked to a single colonial legacy; and indicates continuity of this practice into the postcolonial period, demonstrating a form of path dependence.




Figure 2.6. Colonial past of countries which employed ethnically selective conscription.

As part of the literature on colonial legacies, research suggests that in former British colonies, ethnic groups' involvement in various security forces during the colonial period reduces their chances of political exclusion in the postcolonial period (Jeong and Jeong 2024; Ray 2019). I therefore use the EPR data (Wimmer et al. 2015) to visualize the link between ethnic conscription and ethnic groups' access to state power. The EPR data include three power categories, based on the degree of political representation in state executive.

- (1) Absolute power for ethnic groups whose members hold monopoly or dominant power.
- (2) Power sharing for ethnic groups who are either junior or senior partners.
- (3) Exclusion for ethnic groups which have regional autonomy on subnational level, are powerless or discriminated.

Including only the 14 countries with ethnically selective conscription, I compare access to state power between ethnic groups subjected to conscription and groups exempt from the duty. As clear from Figure 2.7 in detail and in Figure 2.8 on aggregate level, ethnic groups exempt from conscription are often powerless or discriminated against.




Figure 2.7. Ethnic groups' access to state power in countries which employed ethnically selective conscription.




Figure 2.8. Ethnic groups' access to state power in countries which employed ethnically selective conscription, aggregate.

I also test whether changes in ethnic groups' access to state power correlate with changes to their involvement in military recruitment policies. I do so through focus on those ethnic groups that were included in conscription after period of exclusion (Serbs in Croatia, Tuaregs in Mali, Muslims in Greece, non-white groups in South Africa, and Asians, Afro-Caribbeans, Northern Ireland's Protestants and Catholics in the United Kingdom) and find that the change does not lead to any changes in power status.

Finally, with the new Ethnic Military Recruitment dataset offering time-series data, Figure 2.9 indicates the percentage of countries employing ethnically selective conscription between 1946 and 2010. The drop in prevalence of ethnically selective conscription in 1960s seems to be related to abolishment of conscription in the United Kingdom in 1960. Up until then, there

was a total of four ethnic groups exempt from mandatory military service. In identical period, Greece ended ethnicity-based exemption of its Muslim citizens.



Figure 2.9. Percentage of countries which employed ethnically selective conscription, longitudinal perspective.

Application

Expectations

Why are certain ethnic groups systematically excluded from military service in contexts where conscription is otherwise mandatory? I next employ a brief application of the Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset, examining the ethnic group-level factors associated with the exemption of an ethnic group from otherwise mandatory military service. The analysis is driven by two expectations.

First, I expect that state decision to exempt specific ethnic group from its military apparatus is related to concerns regarding ethnic group loyalty. Hence, states are likely to avoid military recruitment of ethnic groups with transnational ties to co-ethnics in other countries, particularly if these co-ethnics hold significant amount of political power. In the event of an interstate conflict, transnational ties might pose a source of loyalty conflict for ethnic groups who could face the dilemma of fighting against their own people or fighting for their country. While majority of existing research approaches ethnicity in the context of military recruitment policies as an independent variable, these sources consistently demonstrate its significance in the context of military loyalty. However, most research is concerned with the role of ethnicity in maintaining internal security, as a form of protection against coups d'état (Enloe 1983; Johnson and Thurber 2017; Harkness 2016; 2022; Horowitz 1985). Regarding external security, research suggest complex relationship between ethnic stacking and defection

(Morency-Laflamme and McLauchlin 2019). Given the lack of attention given to exemption of specific ethnic groups from military service, we are yet to test whether concerns regarding external or internal security are driven by specific features these groups have.

Second, I expect that exemption of specific ethnic groups from military service in various national contexts correlates with their position of being politically disadvantaged. This assumption stems from findings of existing research which suggest that unlike participation in communal legislature, participation of ethnic groups in security apparatus during colonialism reduces the risk of their political exclusion in post-colonial period in the context of former British Empire (Jeong and Jeong 2023; Ray 2019). It has also been established that such political exclusion of specific ethnic groups consequently enhances the risk of their engagement in armed conflict against the state (Ray 2019; Roessler 2011; Cederman et al. 2010). Accordingly, it can be expected that conscription exemption strongly correlates with political exclusion as military inclusion often signifies a form of state recognition and integration. The exclusion of politically disadvantaged groups from conscription can therefore be seen as both a cause and consequence of their marginalization, reflecting and perpetuating broader patterns of political inequality.

Data

To test my assumptions that exemption of an ethnic group from military apparatus is associated with its transnational character, and with its position of being political disadvantaged, I use the Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset as well as the All Minorities at Risk Dataset (AMAR) (Birnie et al. 2017). AMAR contains socially relevant minority and majority ethnic groups. It covers 1,202 groups from 1945 to 2006, spanning nearly entire period covered by the Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset. Although the overlap between the AMAR and Ethnic Military Recruitment Datasets is not identical, the 30.85% overlap reflects that while the former is on a group-year level, the latter has fewer observations, typically recorded every five years.

The use of AMAR is motivated by its set of variables on ethnic group characteristics, which enables testing my assumptions while accounting for a number of relevant controls. I include four sets of categorical variables in my analysis, relating to group distinctiveness, group concentration, group disadvantages, and group organization and representation.

The set of variables on group distinctiveness allows me to control for the unique characteristics of ethnic groups exempted from military service by capturing relatively stable specifics in

comparison to the majority group in the state. The *language* distinctiveness variable indicates the extent to which an ethnic group is linguistically assimilated with the plurality group. The *customs* variable identifies whether an ethnic group shares the same customs as the plurality group or whether at least 25% of its members follow distinct customs (e.g., marriage customs, dressing traditions, or nomadic lifestyle). The *race* variable shows whether an ethnic group has a distinct physical appearance and the extent of intermixture between groups. Finally, the *religious belief* variable reflects whether an ethnic group's religion is the same as, related to, or different from the religion of the plurality group.

The set of variables on group concentration includes two key indicators allowing me to test my first assumption that ethnic group exemption from military service is associated with the presence of transnational groups, which may threaten group loyalty, particularly if these transnational groups hold significant power. The *transnational dispersion* variable captures whether an ethnic group has a kindred group across state borders and whether these kindreds adjoin the ethnic group's regional base from one or more neighbouring countries. The *transnational dispersion to groups in power* variable measures the extent to which these kindreds hold political power, ranging from none to dominating a state coalition. The set of variables on group concentration includes measures of *spatial distribution* within the country, therefore indicating its level of assimilation, and the degree of *rural or urban distribution* of the ethnic group.

The set of variables on disadvantages is included to assess whether military exemption is associated with being a target of specific types of discrimination. The key variable for testing my second assumption is the *political discrimination index*, which indicates the extent of political discrimination the group faces, ranging from none, through various levels of neglect and under-representation, to complete exclusion and systemic repression compared to other groups. Similarly, the *economic discrimination index* measures the degree of economic discrimination, from none to the presence of formal policies aimed at restricting the group's economic opportunities relative to other groups. The *emigration* variable shows the percentage of the group that has emigrated for political or economic reasons, while the *displacement* variable indicates the percentage of ethnic group members affected by internal displacement.

Finally, the set of variables on group organization and representation provides a more nuanced understanding of my second assumption regarding the potential political disadvantages of groups systematically exempted from the military apparatus. The *autonomy* indicates whether the central government recognizes the administrative autonomy of an ethnic group. *Political representation in the legislature* reflects whether the ethnic group is represented in the legislative

branch of the central government, including representation through group members who may belong to non-ethnic political parties. *Political representation in the executive* shows the same for the executive branch of government. The *guaranteed position in government* indicates whether group members are appointed to specific political roles, reflecting the state's willingness to promote their share of political power.

To account for potential temporal variations in ethnically selective military recruitment, I include *year* as a categorical control variable in the model, allowing for the assessment of changes across different time periods.

Analysis

To identify the unique characteristics of ethnic groups systematically excluded from military service in contexts where conscription is mandatory, I conduct an ethnic group-level analysis. The analysed sample includes all ethnic groups in countries that employed conscription, covering only the years during which conscription was in effect in these contexts. This sample allows for a direct comparison between ethnic groups included in military service and those excluded. Using regression analysis, I examine the specific traits that distinguish excluded groups from those conscripted. This approach enables me to identify common characteristics among groups exempted from conscription either entirely or partially during the observed period.

After merging AMAR with the Ethnic Military Recruitment dataset, I manually checked the ethnic groups affected by ethnically selective conscription (listed in Tables 2.2 and 2.3) to ensure that the names of the most relevant groups align (e.g., changing “Catholics in N. Ireland” to “Catholics in Northern Ireland”) and assigned them a new variable capturing the period of their conscription exemption, making them distinct from other ethnic groups.

As shown in Table 2.4, I performed several logistic regression models, each using a different set of independent variables from AMAR while controlling for temporal variations during the observed period from 1946 to 2010. Model 3 employs independent variables related to various aspects of group concentration. In line with my first theoretical assumption - that a state's decision to exclude specific ethnic groups from its military apparatus may stem from concerns about ethnic group loyalty - the model demonstrates a strong positive relationship between transnational dispersion and military exemption. Contrary to my assumption, Model 3 shows no relationship between military exemption and transnational connections to ethnic groups in power, suggesting that exemptions are not influenced by ethnic groups' ties to foreign elites.

The relationship between military exemption and transnational dispersion may, therefore, be explained either by concerns about ethnic group loyalty or by the concentration of ethnic groups near a state border, which could pose logistical challenges. However, given that the model does not show any effects of an ethnic group being tied to a regional base or being spatially concentrated, the former explanation is more likely.

Models 2 and 4 present results related to various disadvantages ethnic groups may face and aspects of their representation. In accordance with my second assumption that the exemption of specific ethnic groups from otherwise mandatory conscription is associated with political disadvantage, Model 4 shows a negative, statistically significant relationship between military exemption and representation in the central legislature, yet no relationship with representation in the central executive. This corresponds to previous findings that military exemption is associated with political exclusion (Jeong and Jeong 2023; Ray 2019), as well as the descriptive statistics in the previous section of the chapter. The model also shows a positive, though weak, statistically significant relationship with ethnic group autonomy, likely related to ethnic groups with regional autonomy, such as the case of Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh which is exempt from conscription system in Azerbaijan. The model shows no relationship between conscription exemption and guaranteed representation. Model 2 shows a positive relationship between military exemption, emigration for political or economic reasons, and internal displacement, but there is no relationship with political or economic discrimination.

Model 1 shows a strong influence of all types of ethnic group distinctiveness on conscription exemption. Specifically, groups with distinct languages and racial characteristics are less likely to be exempt, which suggests that states do not perceive linguistic or racial diversity as a significant barrier to military command. Conversely, groups with distinct customs or religions are more likely to be exempt. This suggests that concerns about military cohesion may be particularly related to potential conflicts arising from tensions between distinct group practices and the demands of military service. The model also shows that the occurrence of conscription exemption was significantly less likely in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 1960s and 1970s, which underscores the data visualization in Figure 2.9 above.

	Model 1: Distinctiveness	Model 2: Disadvantages	Model 3: Concentration	Model 4: Organisation, Representation	Model 5: Best Fit
Distinct Language	-0.616** (0.266)				
Distinct Customs	3.677*** (0.670)				3.739*** (0.728)
Distinct Race	-1.289*** (0.283)				-0.501*** (0.299)
Distinct Religion	1.584*** (0.252)				
Emigration		1.584** (0.642)			
Internal Displacement		0.914* (0.533)			
Political Discrimination		0.336 (0.223)			
Economic Discrimination		0.194 (0.247)			
Spatial Concentration			0.269 (0.238)		
Urban/Rural Distribution			-0.338** (0.153)		
Regional Base			0.213 (0.620)		
Transnational Dispersion			0.648** (0.275)		
Transnational Dispersion (Power)			0.209 (0.249)		
Autonomy				1.340* (0.754)	
Rep. in Central Legislative				-1.564** (581)	-2.151*** (0.713)
Rep. in Central Executive				-0.943 (0.589)	-1.238* (0.695)
Guaranteed Rep.				0.221 (0.858)	
Years: 1960s	-1.191 (1.579)				
Years: 1970s	-1.191 (1.579)				
Years: 1980s	-2.971** (1.318)		-18.574 (1,400.824)		
Years: 1990s	-2.935** (1.264)	-0.175 (2,801.054)	-0.836 (0.716)	0.384 (2,759.405)	
Years: 2000s	-1.739 (1.267)	18.395 (1,979.359)	-1.385** (0.607)	19.696 (1,953.400)	
Constant	-1.015 (1.365)	-20.621 (1,979.359)	-0.024 (0.876)	-19.696 (1,953.400)	-0.618 (0.582)
Observations	400	301	177	277	227
Log Likelihood	-112.399	-63.618	-85.394	-58.552	-54.876
Akaike Inf. Crit.	244.798	141.237	188.788	131.103	119.753
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

Table 2.4. Regression tables of logit regression models.

Model 5 highlights the most significant predictors of ethnic exemption from military service, which warrant further attention in future research. The consistent positive significance of distinct ethnic group customs suggests that states refrain from conscripting groups with specific cultural practices that might hinder their military integration. In contrast, the negative statistical significance of racial distinctiveness indicates that ethnic groups with racial differences are less likely to be exempt, possibly because states view racial diversity as less of a barrier to military cohesion or command than cultural practices.

Model 5 shows a strong negative statistical significance for both representation in the central legislative and executive branches, suggesting a generally negative relationship between ethnic exemption from conscription and political representation, although each of the variables captures a different dimension of representation. The consistently significant relationship between military exemption and political representation in the central executive supports previous findings by Jeong and Jeong (2023) and Ray (2019), indicating that ethnic groups' military participation reduces the risk of political exclusion. However, this may occur across various dimensions of political representation and extend beyond the previously examined context of former British colonies. Temporal effects are not included, as they are not significant in the context of this model.

The analysis suggests that a state's decision to include or exclude specific ethnic groups in conscription is related to the unique characteristics of these groups. While the analysis did not confirm my first assumption that the likelihood of exclusion increases with the transnational ties of specific ethnic groups. It did confirm my second assumption that exclusion is associated with the politically disadvantaged position of an ethnic group. Additionally, the analysis demonstrates that states tend to exclude groups with distinct customs rather than those with unique racial characteristics, which suggests state concerns about accommodating the unique practices associated with ethnic group membership.

The multicollinearity test indicated no significant issues, confirming the stability of Model 5. Sensitivity tests were conducted by removing outliers using hat values and studentized residuals, and robust standard errors were calculated. The results across these tests remained consistent, underscoring their reliability, as shown in Table 2.5.

To illustrate the effect for each of the independent variables for Model 5, I attach plots for predicted probabilities as Appendix 6; as well as plot of marginal effects as Appendix 7.

	Model 5: Best Fit	Model 6: Sensitivity Test	Model 7: RSE
Distinct Customs	3.739*** (0.728)	3.7388*** (0.7279)	3.73881*** (0.61819)
Distinct Race	-0.501*** (0.299)	-1.5013*** (0.2993)	-1.50132*** (0.33422)
Rep. in Central Legislative	-2.151*** (0.713)	-1.2385 (0.6952)	-1.23845 (0.81201)
Rep. in Central Executive	-1.238* (0.695)	-2.1513. (0.7134)	-2.15130 (0.85351)
Constant	-0.618 (0.582)	-0.6183** (0.5823)	-0.61831* (0.70469)
Observations	227		
Log Likelihood	-54.876		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	119.753		
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

Table 2.5. Summary of logit regression Model 5, sensitivity test, results with robust standard error.

Conclusion and Avenues for Future Research

In this chapter, I presented the Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset. The dataset is the first-ever source enabling intra- and inter-state comparisons of ethnic military recruitment policies. Accordingly, it makes a significant empirical contribution by providing new data for future research on the ethnic composition of military institutions from a time-series perspective, making it a valuable resource for both qualitative and quantitative research.

The application of the dataset, as presented in this chapter, also brings a theoretical contribution to existing research concerning state decisions to include or exclude specific ethnic groups in military institutions. The presented analysis of politically relevant ethnic groups in contexts that employed ethnically selective conscription during the observed period revealed that a state's decision to exclude specific ethnic groups from otherwise mandatory military recruitment is associated with several factors. Most notably, the distinctiveness of customs increases the likelihood of exclusion from conscription. This suggests that states are more likely to exclude groups with unique customs, likely due to difficulties associated with accommodating their unique practices.

Contrarily, an increase in racial distinctiveness decreases the likelihood of exclusion from conscription, which suggests that states do not consider the unique racial characteristics of ethnic groups when making decisions related to the ethnic composition of their military institutions. Finally, in accordance with previous research (Jeong and Jeong 2023; Ray 2019), the analysis suggests that the exclusion of specific ethnic groups from conscription is associated with their exclusion from representation in both the legislature and the executive.

Working on this chapter revealed several avenues for future applications of the data, as well as for the future development and expansion of the Dataset. Regarding possible applications, the

new data available in the Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset can be used in various ways, with the key variable on military recruitment of specific ethnic groups used both as a key factor influencing other variables and as an outcome influenced by other variables. As demonstrated, groups exempt from conscription have specific characteristics; the findings of this chapter could be explored in greater detail through qualitative analysis aimed at understanding the causal mechanisms associated with states' decisions to include or exclude specific ethnic groups from conscription.

Another possible application is an analysis aimed at understanding the consequences of conscription exemption on various aspects of the lives of members of the ethnic group, such as access to education, healthcare, connections with other ethnic communities, and the level of development in their localities. Consequently, given the time-series nature of the dataset, the source also provides the opportunity to focus on the impact of changes to military recruitment policies on ethnic relations. For example, it may be used for analysing possible changes in interethnic relations and social cohesion following the introduction or abolishment of mandatory military service. Finally, the dataset could be used for further explorations of the relationship between ethnic recruitment, conflict, and colonialism.

Regarding possible future development of the Dataset, I have identified several ideas for its future expansions. First, while the ethnic group-year level coding of the dataset relies on EPR's list of politically relevant groups, the versatility of the data would be improved by expanding the dataset beyond that. This can be demonstrated by the case of Israel. The EPR coding does not reflect the state's treatment of various ethnic groups in the context of military recruitment. For example, Israeli Circassian and Druze communities are conscripted, unlike Israeli Christians and Muslims. However, the EPR dataset categorizes all these groups as Israeli Arabs, which is insufficient and limits our understanding of selective military recruitment. Therefore, a potential improvement would be to add an alternative list of ethnic group-year observations based on AMAR, which includes socially relevant groups. The EPR and AMAR lists are not identical, which limits their compatibility and the possibility of employing statistical tests with more observations.

Second, the dataset could be expanded by including more variation in military recruitment methods as employed by states. This expansion could consider whether conscription is universal or selective. For instance, while Turkey currently practices universal conscription for all males, Norway and Sweden employ gender-neutral conscription policies that apply only to fill specific quotas within their populations.

Third, since military recruitment policies are not only ethnicized but also strongly gendered, the dataset could be enriched by including variables related to gender. This could encompass the extent to which women are integrated into military forces (e.g., employment, deployment, combat roles), as well as the year of each change in their integration. This would transform the dataset into a comprehensive source on selective military recruitment.

Finally, the dataset could potentially include other pertinent information essential for understanding military recruitment policies and institutions, which are challenging to obtain. This might involve aspects such as the opportunity for military personnel to engage in political debate, the possibility for potential conscripts to identify as conscientious objectors, the availability of alternative service for potential conscripts, and the potential for members of specific societal groups to achieve certain military ranks.

Given the general lack of information on military recruitment policies and military organisation in general, these expansions could be achieved by transforming this project into a collaborative effort involving multiple researchers with diverse language skills for archival research. Additionally, given that this project complements existing datasets detailing the scope of representation of various ethnic groups in military institutions (Harkness 2021; Johnson and Thurber 2017), as well as military recruitment methods applied on a state aggregate level (Toronto 2014), these four datasets could eventually be merged.

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CHAPTER 3:

Fighting the Prejudice? The Effects of Opening Combat Roles to Women on Gender Stereotypes Among the Public

Abstract

What is the effect of opening combat roles to women on gender stereotypes among the public? I argue that such policy intervention is driven by efforts to address gender inequality than by its actual achievement. Consequently, extending military opportunities to women may lead to backlash, potentially evidenced by a reinforcement of gender stereotypes held by the public, who may be unprepared for women in traditionally masculine roles. To test this argument, I conduct a statistical analysis of public attitudes in five out of 21 countries that opened combat roles to female citizens between the 1950s and 2016. The results show that the relationship between women's military integration and shifts in public beliefs about gender norms is strong, yet context-dependent. The analysis highlights the need for further research on the topic, as well as for policy considerations in the area of women's military integration.

Introduction

The role of a soldier has been traditionally perceived as masculine. As of 2024, military institutions remain gendered, characterized by an absence of female military personnel. Despite ongoing efforts to introduce a more gender-neutral approach through encouraging women's military participation, women are integrated into national military forces to varying extents. Cross-national differences in women's military participation are evident not only in the percentage of female personnel but also in the level of their military integration. For instance, as of 2023, Ireland had 7% and Sweden 22% of female military personnel (EUROMIL 2023). Sweden and Norway treat men and women equally in the context of military recruitment by employing gender-neutral conscription, while United Kingdom and France offer military service on voluntary basis with opportunities irrespective of gender. Turkey and Greece conscript men while allowing women to serve on voluntary basis. South Africa and Israel limit women's access to specific units.

The trend of women's military integration has received substantial amount of scholarly attention, focusing on the determinants of opening of military roles, and on the challenges female soldiers face. However, despite the lasting controversies surrounding women's integration into the traditionally male-dominated institution, we do not yet understand the

broader societal ramifications of the process. Accordingly, the goal of chapter is to identify the effect of opening combat roles to women on gender stereotypes held by the public.

Existing research demonstrates that the process of women's military integration is driven by international or domestic efforts to address gender inequality, rather than reflecting an achievement of it. I argue that extending women's military opportunities may provoke a backlash in societies unprepared to accept women's presence in traditionally male-dominated roles, potentially reinforcing existing gender stereotypes. I propose and test the causal mechanism suggesting that the effect of backlash may be reduced in contexts where women hold more political power, as (1) society may be more accustomed to women in traditionally masculine roles, and (2) women in such contexts may have more opportunities to advocate for gender-equal opportunities.

Between 1950s and 2016, 21 countries expanded combat roles to include women (Percy 2019). The analysis in this chapter focuses on five of them: Australia, Germany, New Zealand, Romania, and the United States. To estimate the causal effects of the policy intervention, I employ a range of statistical methods, including synthetic control, fixed effects regression model, and regression discontinuity design model (RDD).

Time-series, cross-national data on gender stereotypes are scarce but available in the World Values Survey (WVS) (Inglehart et al. 2022). Using a common questionnaire across all surveyed contexts, the project provides unique, comparable, nationally representative data on public attitudes collected in nearly 100 countries between 1981 and 2022. I examine the impact of policy intervention on beliefs in two stereotypes: *Men make better political leaders than women* and *Men should have more right to a job than women*.

The chapter findings show that while the relationship between women's military integration and gender stereotypes is statistically significant, and highly context dependent. The effects of policy intervention vary depending on the type of belief and the context. Accordingly, the chapter presents specific recommendation for future research in the area, as well as findings relevant to policy-making. This is important given the ongoing controversies surrounding women's integration into traditionally masculine military environments, which challenge long-standing norms. The chapter contributes to scholarly debates on gender and security, emphasizing the need to incorporate gender perspectives into the study of the military.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, I provide literature review on existing research on

women's military integration and gender stereotypes. Second, I present the theoretical framework and hypotheses. I then introduce the data, variables, case selection, and research design. Finally, I present and discuss the results.

Women's Military Integration

The process of women's military integration is multifaceted and controversial topic which has been approached from various perspectives. Below, I outline the determinants and challenges associated with the process to demonstrate its continuity and ambiguity. I show that opening of military roles to women is driven by domestic and international pressure to promote gender equality, rather than being result of previously achieved progress in this area.

Women have always played an essential, yet invisible, part in war efforts, for example as nurses or cooks, yet their support services have been overlooked by mainstream military history (Hacker 1981; DeGroot 2007; Kennedy-Pipe 2000; Carreiras 2006). The narrative that women stay at home while men fight was first challenged during the First World War due to the unprecedented demand for military manpower and high casualties (Petö 1999). Given the extensive mobilization of the male population, women took over their civilian jobs, as well as auxiliary roles in the military, on top of their domestic duties (Grayzel and Proctor 2017; Hook and Oane 2022). Although these contributions helped expand female suffrage during the first half of 20th century, the willingness to include women in military efforts was temporary. For example, the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, which was the first official opportunity for women to serve in the British Army in other roles than nurses, was disbanded after the First World War and only revived during the Second World War.

During the Second World War, circumstances forced some states to include women in combat or near-combat roles. However, following the war, the practice of women's participation in combat was seen as inappropriate. For example, Germany explicitly banned female combat in its constitution; the USSR forced women to sign a pledge of silence regarding their wartime service in combat and banned them from military academies (Percy 2019). Subsequently, developments have varied cross-nationally. Some states eventually enabled women's non-combat military service. While the United States and United Kingdom introduced women's voluntary service in 1948, Germany only incorporated women into Bundeswehr in 1975 (Fieseler and Ladwig 1985).

Accordingly with the historical development, research has focused on the determinants of women's military participation. Many argue that the military is an extremely masculine context

which sets limitations for women's integration (Moore 2020; Segal 1995; Soules 2021; Kennedy-Pipe 2000). Segal (1995) proposes a systematic theoretical framework of the driving forces behind women's military participation, including factors related to military organization and security situation, social structure, and culture. Carreiras (2006) expands the framework by adding political factors: the level of women's social and political participation, political system, civil-military relations, and political ideology; and demonstrates that progress towards women's qualified military participation in NATO member states relates to pressures to achieve gender equality in the military. Obradovic (2014) adds the factor of international pressure, and shows that women's military integration is context-dependent, yet driven by international agreements regarding gender equality, and by domestic demands of women's movements. For example, in Eastern Europe, women's military integration is best explained by their desire to join NATO and by perceived level of security threat.

Others' have focused specifically on women's integration into combat roles. Percy (2019) argues that the norm against women's participation in combat remains socially resilient despite states' efforts to overturn it. The narrative of men as protectors and women as requiring protection is culturally universal. Therefore, overturning the norm necessitates challenging other gender-related norms. Percy demonstrates that the norm persisted after the Second World War, even though women were needed in combat thorough its duration. Percy (ibid) shows that as of 2019, women were allowed into combat roles in 21 national contexts, largely as a consequence of legal tension between the anti-female combat norm and gender equality legislation. Similarly as Heikkilä and Laukkanen (2020), Percy (2019) points out that while it may seem that changing the norm is associated with gender equality, the process is not necessarily supported by the public, nor it correlates with existing measures of gender equality. For example, although Germany scores high on gender equality indices, it only opened combat roles to women in 2000. The policy change followed the decision of European Court of Justice that laws restricting the roles available to women in the Bundeswehr violate EU anti-discrimination laws (Harries-Jenkins 2002; Xydias 2020).

Soules (2020) examined the impact of various factors associated with women's participation in social, political, and economic activities and institutions on opening of combat roles to women between 1970 to 2016. His results suggest that the opening of combat roles to women is associated with their integration into political, economic, and civil society institutions. In her analysis of the Asian context, Obradovic (2015) demonstrates that cross-national differences in women's military participation can be explained by states' need for manpower and

individual-level economic incentives for military service, as seen in North Korea and China. In contrast, prevailing gender norms prevent higher levels of women's military participation in Japan and South Korea. Her analysis shows that the relationship between gender and the military is complex and unaligned with Western ideas of equality.

Since 2000, one of the key factors in the continuous trend of women's military integration is the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. The resolution is aimed at adding a gender perspective to the field of security through commitment to increase the number of female military personnel by establishing frameworks for women's inclusion in security-related decision-making, military institutions, and peacekeeping (Moore 2020; Duncanson and Woodward 2015). As of 2020, 44 of 194 member states have adopted a National Action Plan (Kaptan 2020). Accordingly, some countries have launched initiatives aimed at increasing women's participation in military forces and ensuring equal, non-discriminatory rights for male and female personnel. For example, as part of its commitment to the resolution, Hungary introduced a new Military Service Law and because of new measures, women's participation in its army rose from 4.3 % in 2005 to 17.56 % in 2006. However, the implementation lacks coherence and remains dependent on specific priorities of national contexts. Accordingly, process measurement remains limited by the lack of data provided by national institutions (UN INSTRAW 2010; Kaptan 2020).

Although previous paragraphs may suggest that women's military integration is a step towards gender equality, feminist scholars stress that the process is ambiguous. While it can be seen as a path towards liberation by establishing equality between the citizenship of men and women, it may also contribute to institutionalized gender inequality, reflecting the sexual division of labour in the civilian sphere (Enloe 2023; Sasson-Levy 2003, 2007; Snyder 2003; Kennedy-Pipe 2008). Accordingly, critics of the Resolution 1325 argue that it has turned into a set of technical issues, such as increasing the number of women in military institutions, without addressing the specific challenges associated with the process or the impact of conflict on women (Duncanson and Woodward 2015).

Among the most researched challenges associated with women's military integration are the prevailing issues of adversity, particularly sexual attacks and harassment; post-traumatic stress disorder; and marginalization in an environment where masculinity is expected and reinforced (Reis and Menezes 2020). The marginalization extends into the public sphere. Media overlook female service members' achievements, focusing on their gender instead (Ette 2013). Female veterans lack recognition for their service, limiting their leadership opportunities (Best et al.

2021; Nicol and Nicol 2024).

Gender Stereotypes

Stereotypes are “*sets of beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people*” (Ashmore and Del Boca 1981). Gender stereotypes are tendency to ascribe a set of characteristics or expectations to people based on their gender. Unlike other stereotypes that tend to be fluid or context-dependent, gender stereotypes are relatively fixed, which is given by the salience of gender in our perception. We continue to see gender as binary, allowing for comparisons and polarizing views of the categories “man” and “woman.” The binary perception leads to the persistence and reinforcement of differences between the two categories (Ellemers 2018; Bordalo et al. 2016).

Gender stereotypes ultimately stem from the characteristics we ascribe to men and women. Psychological studies agree that women are seen as passive, kind, gentle, and warm, while men are viewed as aggressive, assertive, and tough (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Koenig et al. 2011; Rudman et al. 2012; Smith et al. 2019). Accordingly, women and men work in different occupational fields, leading to segregation or concentration of specific genders in particular professional fields and generating systemic patterns (e.g., women having systematically lower wages than men) (Blackburn and Jarman 2006).

As suggested by the social role theory (Eagly and Wood 1999, 2012), gender stereotypes can be explained by the different roles we expect from men and women based on their physical attributes. Men, being stronger and bigger, have social roles associated with activities such as warfare. Women’s social roles are associated with and limited by their reproductive functions, even though availability of advancements like contraception and baby formula made these aspects irrelevant. The differences that place men and women in distinct positions within the division of labour further support and reinforce gender stereotypes that emerge from observing men and women in roles typical for them. Women’s integration into traditionally male-dominated fields thus contends with prevailing beliefs about what it takes to succeed in such roles and with gender stereotypes. The theory suggests that gender stereotypes are challenged by women taking on typically masculine roles (Haines 2016; Diekmann and Eagly 2000; Koenig and Eagly 2014).

The opposite may be expected in line with the backlash theory (Rudman and Glick 2001; Rudman et al. 2012), which suggests that cultural beliefs set a normative standard. “Vanguards” who challenge the standard by entering roles culturally atypical for them (e.g., a woman running

for president or man on paternal leave) typically face backlash rather than being rewarded for challenging the stereotypical status quo. The backlash entails scrutiny which may take form of social rejection, economic sanctions, etc. The backlash enables reinforcing the stereotype by preventing visibility of existing vanguards and preventing potential vanguards from challenging the norm.

Empirical evidence regarding challenging gender stereotypes remains mixed. While Haines et al. (2016) suggest durability of gender stereotypes despite significant progress in women's integration into male dominated fields, Seguino's (2007) analysis suggest that gender stereotypes and norms are shifting towards gender-equitable norms due to increases in women's paid employment. Similarly, evidence regarding the impact of policy/practice interventions provides evidence of either lacking (Clayton 2018) or positive (Lawson et al. 2022; De Paola et al. 2010; Omidakhsh et al. 2020; Farre et al. 2023; Kerevel 2019) effect on gender stereotypes.

Research on gender stereotypes towards female soldiers (typically conducted within military organisations), suggests that gender stereotypes about women in military roles are pervasive, particularly among men (Trut et al. 2023; Boyce and Herd 2003; Biernat et al. 1998; Laurence et al. 2016). Stevens and Gardner (1987) and Durning (1978) find that male soldiers become more tolerant to female soldiers in time, likely due to fostered collaboration and contact.

Although evidence regarding the impact of women's military integration on gender stereotyping among public is limited, it suggest positive effects. In Ukraine, which continuously opens more military opportunities to women, there has been trend of increasing support for equality among men and women in the military, supported by 53 % of Ukrainians in 2018 and by 80 % in 2022 (Martsenyuk 2022). In Germany, combat roles were opened to women in 2000, following a ruling by the European Court of Justice prompted by Tanja Kreil's complaint against the Bundeswehr for employment discrimination. The decision led to a significant shift in public opinion between October 1999 and January 2000, with 60% of the public supporting the change. Due to increasing public support, even politicians from parties previously opposed to women in combat began to reconsider their positions on the issue (FrauenMediaTurm n.d.). In the United States, the support for women in combat roles was 66 % in 2013, following opening of combat roles to women in 2012, demonstrating a shift from data collected in the 1990s (Collins-Dogrul and Ulrich 2018). Additionally Cohen et al. (2020) found that news of women dying in combat enhance pro-gender equality attitudes, particularly among women, suggesting that women's military integration may influence public views on women's

capabilities.

Theoretical Framework




Figure 3.1. Expected causal mechanism.

The goal of this chapter is to identify the effect of opening of combat roles to women on gender stereotypes held by the public. The starting point of the theoretical framework (as visualised in Figure 3.1) is that the process of women's military integration is ambiguous, controversial, context-dependent, and largely driven more by international and domestic pressure for gender equality than being reflection of an actual progress in this area (Obradovic 2015, 2014; Percy 2019; Soules 2021; Carreiras 2006). I expect that policy interventions in favour of extending women's military integration may frequently occur in contexts where the public is not yet prepared for women in typically masculine roles. Accordingly, societal preparedness may be reflected in gender stereotypes.

Existing theories suggest that the effect of opening of combat roles to women on gender stereotypes could be either reduction or reinforcement in beliefs. The social role theory predicts that extending of women's military integration may reduce existing gender stereotypes by demonstrating that women are capable of taking on traditionally masculine roles (Eagly and Wood 1999, 2012; Diekmann and Eagly 2000; Koenig and Eagly 2014; Haines 2016). Conversely, the backlash theory predicts that such policy change may reinforce gender stereotypes, as the idea of female soldiers is not yet acceptable cultural norm (Rudman and Glick 2001; Rudman et al. 2012; Haines 2016; Seguin 2007).

Accordingly, the process of either reduction or reinforcement of gender stereotypes may be context dependent. Existing research suggests that women's military integration correlates with various aspects of women's empowerment. I expect that extending women's military integration in contexts with higher levels of women's access to political power may be associated with two important factors. First, society may be accustomed to women's presence in roles typically perceived as masculine, therefore accepting of the idea of women in traditionally masculine profession of a combat soldier. Second, access to political power may provide women with opportunity to advocate for interventions in direction of greater gender

equality, allowing the public to consider various perspectives on the topic on equal opportunities. Accordingly, I formulate the first hypothesis that:

H1: *In contexts with higher levels of women's political power, opening of combat roles to women reduces gender stereotypes.*

Conversely, I expect that in contexts with lower levels of women's access to political power, the policy intervention may have the opposite effect due to the unpreparedness of society to accept women in traditionally masculine roles, including the role of combat soldier. Therefore, I formulate a second hypothesis:

H2: *In contexts with lower levels of women's political power, opening of combat roles to women reinforces gender stereotypes.*

Finally, I examine the effect of opening combat roles to women on the continuation of trends in gender stereotypes. While existing research on the impact of various policy interventions on gender stereotypes generally shows positive results, studies specifically focused on gender stereotypes within military contexts reveal that the norm against female soldiers is particularly strong. Accordingly, it may be expected that reduction of gender stereotypes against women's military integration depends on direct contact with female military personnel, which the public typically lacks. Therefore, I expect that despite opening of combat roles to women, the public continues to perceive the role of soldier as typically male. In accordance with this expectation, I test the hypothesis that:

H3: *Policy interventions in favour of extending women's military integration tend to reinforce or have no significant impact on existing gender stereotypes.*

Data and Research Design

Data and Dependent Variables

The analysis relies on the WVS data (Inglehart et al. 2022). The WVS includes nationally representative samples from nearly 100 countries, allowing me to conduct cross-national comparison in individual-level attitudes. The data were collected in a total of seven rounds between 1981 and 2022, allowing for analysis of temporal trends and changes. Although the lack of annual data is a major limitation of this chapter, the WVS is only source providing cross-national measures of gender stereotypes in a time-series format.

From the WVS, I draw my dependent variables, which are two statements capturing gender stereotypes on individual-level: *Men make better political leaders than women do* and *Men should have more right to a job than women*. Both dependent variables have been available since the third round of data collection, which began in 1994. Both variables are measurable due to their numeric coding, with higher numbers indicating greater agreement with the stereotype.

Despite the availability of other gender stereotype-related variables in the WVS, these two statements are highly relevant to be challenged by the opening of combat roles to women. The first stereotype that *Men make better political leaders than women do*, provides a suitable measure of the rejection or acceptance of the belief that women are equally suited for positions of power as men. The statement reflects the societal belief that men are inherently better leaders due to their leadership traits, such as assertiveness, decisiveness, and strength, over those stereotypically attributed to women, such as empathy, nurturing, and caring (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Rudman et al. 2012; Smith et al. 2019; Koenig et al. 2011). Research has established that male candidates are perceived by voters as more competent in military and economic policies, whereas female candidates are seen as better qualified in areas such as education and healthcare, which are more closely related to their traditional domestic and caregiving roles (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993).

At the same time, military service provides an additional advantage to political candidates, as it signals expertise in security matters (McDermott and Panagopoulos 2015; Glaurdić and Lesschaeve 2021; Teigen 2013). However, this advantage is not equally conferred to male and female candidates. The relative rarity of female veterans perpetuates the stereotype that women do not serve in combat roles, limiting their ability to leverage military experience in pursuing political goals, thereby reinforcing gender inequality (Best et al. 2021). Therefore, political leadership is a domain where gender norms are actively shaped, directly associated with visibility and the perceived legitimacy of women in positions of power.

Similarly, the second stereotype, that *Men should have more right to a job than women*, provides a measure of the acceptance or rejection of gender equality in professional development and the economic market. This statement reflects the stereotypical belief that, due to their perceived traits, men and women should occupy different roles within economic structures. Not only such belief results in women being overrepresented in occupations related to caregiving, such as nursing or education, while men are seen as more suitable for careers associated with leadership or physical strength, it also encompasses the belief that women should primarily be responsible for domestic tasks, such as cooking, cleaning, and caregiving, while men are

expected to serve as the primary breadwinners (Lordan and Pischke 2021; Thébaud 2010; Heilman et al. 2024; Cislighi et al. 2022), resulting in women's economic dependency. Since the role of a soldier has historically been perceived as inherently masculine, the opening of combat roles to women challenges these traditional norms by promoting the idea that both men and women are equally capable of pursuing any profession, regardless of the traits or social roles traditionally assigned to them. Accordingly, the policy intervention of opening of combat roles to women reinforces the notion that individuals should be free to excel in whatever career path they choose, irrespective of gender.

Case Selection

Between 1950s and 2016, combat roles were opened to female citizens in 21 countries (Percy 2019).¹² However, the scope of the WVS does not allow to include inclusion all relevant countries: some were not covered in the data collection, or there is no sufficient amount of data to compare gender stereotypes before and after the policy intervention. Considering the limitations, I analyse data from five countries in which the policy intervention occurred and for which there are relevant data available: Australia, Germany, New Zealand, Romania, and United States. The availability of data for each of the context, data collection dates and number of survey respondents are shown in Table 3.1.

Country:	Policy year:	Wave 3: 1994 -1998	Wave 4: 1999 -2004	Wave 5: 2005 -2009	Wave 6: 2010 -2014	Wave 7: 2017 -2022	Respondents total:
Australia	2013	2048	0	1421	1477 (Aug-Oct 2012)	1813 (Mar-Aug 2018)	6769
Germany	2000	2026 (Mar-May 1997)	0	2064 (May-Jun 2006)	2046	1528	7664
New Zealand	2007	1201	0	954 (Nov 2014-Feb 2005)	841 (Nov 2011-Feb 2012)	1057	4053
Romania	2002	1239 (Jun 1998)	0	1776 (Sep-Oct 2005)	1503	1257	5775
United States	2012	1542	1200	1249	2232 (Jun-Jul 2011)	2596 (Apr-May 2017)	8819

Table 3.1. Data availability, number of respondents, periods of data collection in selected countries.

The remaining 16 countries which did open combat roles to women, for which the data are lacking are fully exempt from the analysis. Given that they underwent the policy intervention

¹² Australia 2013-2016, Belgium 1981, Canada 1989, Denmark 1988, Eritrea 1995, Estonia 2008, Finland 1995, France 2000, Germany 2000, India 2017, Israel 2000, India 2017, Lithuania 2000, Netherlands 1982, New Zealand 2007, North Korea 1950s, Norway 1985, Poland 2004, Romania 2002, Sweden 1983-1989, United Kingdom 2016, United States 2012 (Percy 2019: 133)

treatment, they cannot be included as control group.

Research Strategy and Control Variables

I employ several methods, including the construction of a synthetic control, fixed effects regression, and RDD. This combination of methods was chosen due to data limitations and a lack of suitable control units, which prevented application of alternative approaches such as difference-in-differences or matching. Selected combination of methods enables controlling for various individual and country level confounders, helping to address the limitations associated with data availability.

I begin with a pooled analysis, followed by an illustration of country case findings to explore and discuss the possible complexity of the results.

Synthetic Control Method

The synthetic control method is used to account for time-varying factors that may have influenced gender stereotypes in the five selected countries. These time-varying factors, such as the election of a female president or the governance by a conservative political party, could impact trends in social attitudes related to gender stereotypes and norms, independently from the policy intervention of opening combat roles to women.

Given the limitations of the WVS, including the absence of annual time-series data and gaps between data collection points, the synthetic control method provides a solution to generate a counterfactual scenario. This scenario mimics the characteristics of countries where the policy intervention of opening combat roles to women did not take place. By constructing a synthetic control, I am able to compensate for the irregular timing of data points, enabling a more continuous assessment of trends in gender stereotypes over the observed period.

To implement the synthetic control and generate the counterfactual scenario, I compare temporal trends in gender stereotype variables from each of the five selected countries with those from a control group of countries that did not open combat roles to women. The synthetic control estimates are then used to adjust the individual-level data for next steps of the analysis. This adjustment allows the gender stereotype variables to better reflect the differences between their actual observed values and the counterfactual scenario predicted by the synthetic control.

To implement the synthetic control and match the characteristics of countries that underwent

the policy intervention to those that did not, I use a range of predictors. My choice of predictors is partially guided by Seguino's (2007) analysis of the WVS data, in which she identifies country-level factors influencing global trends in gender stereotypes.

I include a predictor for the *female share of the labor force* (World Bank). By doing so, I account for women's engagement in economic activity, which reflects their economic status, as well as the institutional and social support available to them. Accordingly, I ensure that the estimated effect of opening combat roles to women on gender stereotypes is not biased by underlying differences in women's economic engagement across countries.

With predictor of the *proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments* (World Bank), I account for women's presence in the decision-making process, as well as for overall institutional and societal support for gender equality.

I incorporate predictors that account for the economic context of each country, as stronger economies may create conditions that directly impact both women's roles in the workforce and societal attitudes toward gender. With a predictor for *GDP growth* (World Bank), I control for the overall level of economic development, which may be associated with higher demand for labor, creating more economic opportunities for women. Higher GDP growth may also signal increased investments in sectors like education and healthcare, which can enhance women's independence and access to economic opportunities, ultimately contributing to a reduction in gender-stereotypical beliefs. Similarly, I include *GDP per capita* (World Bank). Higher levels of economic standards are likely to provide more opportunities for women to be economically active, as well as to provide more of institutional and social support, contributing to more equitable gender norms.

By adding predictor of the *total share of the urban population* (World Bank), I control for socio-economic development, which may represent the range of opportunities available to women. Higher levels of urbanization are expected to provide more education and employment opportunities compared to rural areas, thereby creating more economic opportunities for women. Urbanization also provides greater access to various sources of information, ultimately contributing to more progressive societal norms.

A predictor of *annual military expenditure* reflects the allocation of human and material resources to the military (GMI). With this variable, I account for the overall emphasis on military priorities in national contexts. Stronger military expenditure may indicate country's ability to

implement and effectively communicate reforms related to military recruitment policies, including integration of women into military institutions. Given the binary character of military institutions, countries with higher levels of military expenditure may also be more pressured to signal their commitment to gender equality.

Finally, as a standard practice to address temporal dynamics and reduce bias from omitted variables, I include *lagged dependent variable* as a predictor (McClelland and Gault 2017).¹³

Fixed Effects Regression

To test Hypotheses 1 and 2 which relate to the relationship between public reaction to the opening of combat roles to women and women's access to political power, I use a country- and year-specific fixed effects regression. This approach allows me to control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries and over time. Specifically, I am able to account for country-specific factors that are stable over time, such as cultural attitudes or historical contexts, as well as year-specific factors that may impact gender stereotypes across all countries, such as global economic shocks. In doing so, I also address limitations related to the availability of time-series data by focusing on the variations that are present in the data.

To account for within-country correlation, I apply clustered standard errors at the country level. This technique addresses the likelihood that individual responses within a country are more similar to each other than to those from other countries. By clustering standard errors, I correct for these intra-country correlations, improving the reliability of my inferences. This method generates more robust estimates by mitigating potential bias caused by the non-independence of responses within each country.

The key independent variable is an interaction between a *policy intervention* and the *women's access to political power*. This interaction helps to understand how the effects of the policy intervention vary depending on the national context. The policy intervention variable is binary: it is set to 1 for respondents in the five selected countries, in observations following the policy intervention; and to 0 in for observations prior to the policy intervention, as well as for respondents in countries where combat roles were not opened to women. The variable representing the access of women to political power held by women is sourced from the *power distributed by gender* variable V-Dem dataset. It is coded as an ordinal variable, with higher values indicating a more gender-equal distribution of political power (Coppedge et al. 2022). The

¹³ Results related to the synthetic control method are provided in Appendix 9, as they were used for data preparation and are not central to testing the primary three hypotheses.

distribution of the variable is visualised in Figure 3.2. The variable is centered to address and reduce possible multicollinearity in the interaction terms.

In the fixed effects regression, I include both individual- and country-level confounders. The individual-level controls include personal characteristics which may have an impact on perceptions about gender norms, specifically *gender*, *age*, *income category*, *education level*, and *religiosity*. Country-level confounders reflect the broader social, economic and political factors which may impact these perceptions systematically. The selected country-level confounders are identical to those previously used as predictors in the synthetic control method, and include the *female share of the labour force*, *GDP growth*, *GDP per capita*, the *proportion of parliamentary seats held by women*, *annual military expenditure*, and *the share of the urban population*.




Figure 3.2. Distribution of the power distribution by gender variable.

RDD

To test Hypothesis 3, I employ a RDD. The logic of this method is particularly suited for analysing the effect of the policy intervention on gender stereotypes. It allows me to observe sharp discontinuities in the dependent variables within the pooled sample of individual-level data from the five selected countries, both before and after the opening of combat roles to women (Cattaneo and Titiunik 2022; Hausman and Rapson 2018). However, it must be noted that RDD is most effective with continuous, finely grained data. As previously discussed, the empirical analysis in this chapter is constrained by the lack of annual time-series data. Given the data limitations, I use RDD as a complementary method alongside the fixed effects model and interaction terms to provide a more comprehensive analysis.

The RDD model specification includes the dependent variables reflecting gender stereotypes, which has been adjusted using the synthetic control method, to measure temporal trends in

public attitudes. The threshold for analysis is centered on the year of the policy intervention of opening of combat roles to women. As indicated in Table 3.1, there is variation in the timing of this policy intervention across the selected countries. To address this variation, the time-series data are standardized by setting the intervention year to zero for all cases. This adjustment facilitates consistent comparisons while accommodating the distinct timing of policy interventions in each context (Bertanha 2019).

The bandwidth for the analysis is set to a standardized five-year period to provide a balanced examination of trends before and after the policy intervention. A broader bandwidth was chosen to ensure a sufficient number of observations around the temporal threshold, which enhances the robustness of causal effect estimation within the time-series model (Hausman and Rapson 2018).

Before performing the RDD analysis, I first employ a fixed effects model to control for unobserved heterogeneity. This model incorporates both country- and year-specific effects to account for factors that are unique to each country as well as for time-varying influences that affect all countries in a given year. To further enhance the validity of the RDD, I also control for individual-level variables from the WVS, including *gender*, *age*, *income category*, *education level*, and *religiosity*. This ensures that the analysis controls key individual characteristics that might influence gender stereotypes independently of the policy intervention. The residuals from the fixed effects model are then used to construct the RDD. This approach isolates the variation in gender stereotypes that is not explained by the country or year fixed effects, thereby allowing for a more precise estimation of the causal impact of opening combat roles to women.

Robustness Checks

To ensure the robustness and reliability of the first fixed effects design, I include both country and year fixed effects and apply clustering at the country level to control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries and over time. Clustering at the country level adjusts the standard errors to account for potential correlations within countries over time, thereby providing more reliable inferences and mitigating the risk of biased estimates due to within-country serial correlation.

To ensure the validity and reliability of the RDD, I conduct several robustness checks, following Hausman and Rapson's (2018) guidelines for implementing RDD with time as the running variable. To assess whether the results remain consistent across various bandwidth choices, I perform sensitivity tests with different bandwidths. To determine if the observed

discontinuity at the threshold is genuinely related to the treatment, I conduct a placebo variable test by recreating models with an alternative dependent variable.

Empirical Analysis and Results

Hypotheses 1 and 2

To test Hypothesis 1, which posits that in contexts with higher levels of women's political power, opening combat roles to women reduces gender stereotypes, and Hypothesis 2, which posits the opposite mechanism in contexts with lower levels of women's access to political power, I conducted several fixed effects regression models. The results provide partial support for both hypotheses, suggesting that the effect of policy intervention on public attitudes is context-dependent and influenced by both individual and country-level characteristics, with potential variations across different gender stereotypes.

For each of the stereotypes, I conducted three country- and year-specific fixed effects regression models. All models use a clustering approach to account for within-group correlation, leading to more robust standard errors and more reliable inferences. The key variables of interest in all models are the interaction terms between the opening of combat roles to women and women's access to political power, along with individual-level and country-level confounders. The results are presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.

Focusing on the stereotype that *Men make better political leaders than women*, I first isolated individual-level confounders. The results of Model 1 in Table 3.2 demonstrate a negative, highly statistically significant effect of the policy intervention, indicating that the opening of combat roles to women is associated with a reduction in gender stereotypes regarding women's political leadership. The interaction terms between the policy intervention and women's access to political power have a positive, statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that in contexts with more equally distributed political power, the effect of the policy intervention on stereotype reduction is less significant than in contexts where women have less access to political power. The model also shows a negative, highly significant effect of gender, indicating that women are much less likely than men to endorse the stereotype; a negative, highly significant effect of income, suggesting that higher-income individuals are less supportive of the stereotype; and a positive, highly significant effect of age, showing that the stereotype is more prevalent among older individuals.

In Model 2, I isolated country-level confounders. The model does not provide statistically

significant evidence for the effect of the policy intervention or its interaction with women's access to political power, indicating that this factor is only relevant at the individual level and becomes irrelevant when considered alongside country-level confounders. The model reveals a negative, statistically significant effect of military expenditure, suggesting that women may be more accepted as political leaders in countries with higher investments in their military organizations. This could indicate a possible relationship between military expenditure and state's capacity to effectively communicate its military policies, potentially including initiatives to present women as soldiers and leaders. Alternatively, the observed effect of military spending may reflect underlying social, political, and economic dynamics that are not directly observable in this analysis. The model also shows a negative, significant effect of the share of female legislators, suggesting that a higher percentage of female political representation helps reduce gender stereotypes.

	Model 1: Individual-level confounders	Model 2: Country-level confounders	Model 3: Individual- and Country-level confounders
Policy intervention*Power distributed by gender	0.17048546 * (0.07592553)	-8.4431e-02 (9.1272e-02)	-1.4689e-01 (1.0574e-01)
Policy intervention	-0.29942082 *** (0.07696544)	-6.3683e-02 (1.1083e-01)	-6.0971e-02 (1.2525e-01)
Power distributed by gender	-0.09868072 . (0.05197783)	-3.3228e-02 (3.5903e-02)	-2.1799e-02 (4.3002e-02)
Gender	-0.25389154 *** (0.01439257)		-2.5821e-01 *** (1.4346e-02)
Age	0.00277150 *** (0.00045077)		2.8059e-03 *** (4.5724e-04)
Income	-0.01624464 *** (0.00230389)		-1.4227e-02 *** (1.8913e-03)
Education	-0.00097860 (0.00300638)		-7.8775e-03 ** (2.8517e-03)
Religiosity	-0.01106825 . (0.00594946)		-1.5542e-03 (1.0994e-02)
Share of urban population		-6.7026e-03 . (3.8162e-03)	-8.4671e-03 * (4.2685e-03)
GDP growth		3.5218e-03 (4.6352e-03)	5.2379e-03 (4.9027e-03)
GDP per capita		5.9105e-06 * (2.6546e-06)	6.2706e-06 ** (2.3527e-06)
Share of female force participation		-1.7702e-02 (1.3380e-02)	-1.7984e-02 (1.4975e-02)
Military expenditure		-1.7476e-01 * (7.8965e-02)	-1.7091e-01 * (8.2349e-02)
Share of female legislators		-6.9854e-03 * (2.8013e-03)	-8.9918e-03 ** (3.0910e-03)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.2. Fixed effect regression models with clustered standard errors; *Men make better political leaders than women*.

In Model 3, I control for both individual- and country-level confounders, for a comprehensive view of the topic. The results show that both the direct effect of the policy intervention and the interaction between the policy intervention and women's access to political power are statistically insignificant. This finding aligns with observations from Models 1 and 2, suggesting that the effect of opening combat roles to women is nuanced and influenced by a wide range of factors beyond individual-level characteristics. The model indicates that agreement with the belief that *Men make better political leaders than women* is less prevalent among women, more educated individuals, those with higher income levels, and younger individuals. The country-level confounders suggest that the stereotype is less prevalent in national contexts with higher levels of urbanization, greater economic development, higher military expenditure, and a greater share of female legislators. Therefore, Model 3 indicates that reducing the stereotype that *Men make better political leaders than women* is associated with individual characteristics, higher levels of socio-economic development, and women's political representation.

Models 1, 2 and 3 do not provide sufficient evidence to either support or reject Hypotheses 1 and 2. The results of Model 3 are visualised in Figure 3.3 which shows the confidence intervals of tested variables; and in Figure 3.4 which shows interaction effects with confidence intervals.




Figure 3.3. Model 3: confidence intervals; *Men make better political leaders than women*.




Figure 3.4. Model 3: interaction terms between policy intervention and power distribution by gender; *Men make better political leaders than women*.

Regarding the second stereotype, *Men should have more right to a job than women*, I employ an identical strategy. Corresponding Models 4, 5 and 6 are visualised in Table 3.3. The results of Model 4 in which I isolate individual-level confounders, suggest a positive, highly significant effect of the policy intervention. This indicates that opening combat roles to women leads to an increase in agreement with the stereotype, thereby reinforcing it. However, the interaction terms with power distributed by gender are negative and statistically significant, demonstrating that in contexts with higher levels of women's access to political power, the policy intervention contributes to a decrease in the stereotype. The model also shows that other statistically significant factors include gender, with women much less likely to agree with the stereotype; income, indicating that individuals with higher income levels are less likely to endorse the stereotype; age, where older individuals are more likely to agree with the stereotype; and education level, with more educated individuals less likely to agree with the stereotype (similar to the models concerning leadership stereotypes). Therefore, the results of Model 4 support Hypotheses 1 and 2, but the relationship must be assessed in a more complex perspective, incorporating country-level factors as well.

Model 5 incorporates country-level confounders. Regarding the impact of the interaction terms, it suggests effects opposite to those observed in Model 4. Specifically, while the policy intervention is associated with a reduction in the stereotype, it may be reinforced in contexts where women have higher levels of access to political power. This suggests a possible backlash

effect of opening combat roles to women on gender stereotypes. The model also shows a negative effect of GDP per capita, indicating that the stereotype may be less prevalent in more economically developed countries. Therefore, Model 5 provides evidence that contradicts Hypotheses 1 and 2.

	Model 4: Individual-level confounders	Model 5: Country-level confounders	Model 6: Individual + Country level confounders
Policy intervention*Power distributed by gender	-0.97535459 *** (0.07202349)	4.7404e-01 *** (6.7011e-02)	4.2397e-01 *** (7.1749e-02)
Policy intervention	0.47393205 *** (0.06784263)	-4.3221e-01 *** (7.9632e-02)	-4.7074e-01 *** (8.1561e-02)
Power distributed by gender	-0.12668107 (0.07961636)	-1.7319e-02 (2.9194e-02)	-2.1248e-03 (2.5178e-02)
Gender	-0.08071657 *** (0.01035855)		-7.1219e-02 *** (1.2941e-02)
Age	0.00142783 ** (0.00052029)		1.9215e-03 *** (3.0027e-04)
Income	-0.01057954 *** (0.00208311)		-8.4750e-03 *** (1.7366e-03)
Education	-0.02028340 * (0.00948088)		-1.1695e-02 *** (2.2096e-03)
Religiosity	-0.00748204 (0.00464924)		-2.2682e-03 (5.0410e-03)
Share of urban population		4.0981e-03 (3.5950e-03)	1.4315e-03 (3.4391e-03)
GDP growth		-4.7285e-03 (3.7070e-03)	-3.0442e-03 (3.8477e-03)
GDP per capita		-1.0030e-05 *** (1.4286e-06)	-9.6365e-06 *** (1.5062e-06)
Share of female force participation		-9.7116e-04 (6.7763e-03)	-4.0308e-03 (7.5284e-03)
Military expenditure		-6.9322e-02 (7.1852e-02)	-6.9839e-02 (6.8920e-02)
Share of female legislators		5.9464e-05 (2.3973e-03)	-1.8917e-03 (2.0537e-03)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

Table 3.3. Fixed effect regression models with clustered standard errors; *Men should have more right to a job than women.*

Finally, Model 6 combines both individual- and country-level confounders for a comprehensive understanding. It suggests that the statistically significant effect of the policy intervention is negative, but it is positively moderated by how power is distributed by gender. This indicates that while the policy intervention itself significantly reduces the gender stereotype that *Men should have more right to a job than women*, its effect is smaller in contexts where

power distribution is more gender-equitable. The highly significant positive coefficient of the interaction terms suggests that as the distribution of power becomes more gender-equitable, the intervention has less impact in contexts where women hold more of political power. Additionally, the model shows a negative, significant effect of gender, income, education, and GDP per capita, and a positive effect of age. Overall, Models 4, 5, and 6 demonstrate the significant impact of individual-level characteristics as well as the overall level of economic development.

Although Model 4 provides support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, the findings are nuanced by the results of Model 6, which incorporates both individual- and country-level confounders. Therefore, the models do not provide sufficient, consistent evidence to either fully support or reject Hypotheses 1 and 2. The results of Model 6 are visualised in Figure 3.5 which shows the confidence intervals of tested variables; and in Figure 3.6 which shows interaction effects with confidence intervals.




Figure 3.5. Model 6: confidence intervals; *Men should have more right to a job than women*.




Figure 3.6. Model 6: interaction terms between policy intervention and power distribution by gender; *Men should have more right to a job than women.*

Hypothesis 3

To test Hypothesis 3, which posits that policy interventions favouring the extension of women’s military integration either reinforce or have no significant impact on existing gender stereotypes, I conducted two RDD models. This involved performing a pooled analysis of individual-level data from countries that have opened combat roles to women. While the analysis finds strong evidence of statistically significant effects of the policy intervention on gender stereotypes, the results are nuanced, with varying effects observed across the different statements analysed.

Regarding the stereotype that *Men make better political leaders than women*, the results indicate that opening combat roles leads to an increase in agreement with this statement. As shown in Table 3.4, the coefficient is positive and highly statistically significant. In contrast, for the stereotype that *Men should have more right to a job than women*, the effect is the opposite, with a decrease in agreement following the opening of combat roles to women. As shown in Table 3.5, the coefficient is negative and highly statistically significant.

The differential effects of opening combat roles to women on each of these gender stereotypes are graphically visualized in Figures 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10. The red fitted lines in these figures illustrate the trend in agreement with each stereotype before and after the intervention, highlighting the varying impacts of the policy change on each stereotype immediately following

the intervention.

Consistent with the results of the fixed effects models used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, the findings from the RDD models suggest that the opening of combat roles may have varying effects on different gender stereotypes or may be highly context-dependent, influenced more by factors unique to each national context rather than by individual-level characteristics.

Both RDD models pass both sensitivity and placebo variable robustness checks.¹⁴

RDD: “Men make better political leaders than women”					
Method	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-Value	p-Value	95% Confidence Interval
Conventional	0.734	0.127	5.765	0.000 ***	[0.484 , 0.983]
Robust	-	-	7.391	0.000 ***	[5.944 , 10.233]
Number of Observations	31324				
Bandwidth	5				
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

Table 3.4. RDD model; *Men make better political leaders than women*.

RDD: “Men should have more right to a job than women”					
Method	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-Value	p-Value	95% Confidence Interval
Conventional	-1.246	0.097	-12.787	0.000 ***	[-1.437, -1.055]
Robust	-	-	-15.762	0.000 ***	[-1.937, -1.508]
Number of Observations	34332				
Bandwidth	5				
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

Table 3.5. RDD model; *Men should have more right to a job than women*.




Figure 3.7. Linear RDD model; *Men make better political leaders than women*.

¹⁴ Robustness checks are attached in Appendix 10.




Figure 3.8. Quadratic RDD model; *Men make better political leaders than women.*




Figure 3.9. Linear RDD model; *Men should have more right to a job than women.*




Figure 3.10. Quadratic RDD model; *Men should have more right to a job than women.*

Country Case Analysis

For a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between women's military integration and gender stereotypes, I include descriptive statistics on gender stereotypes across all countries in the analysis to explore potential variation in their development across different national contexts. Additionally, I conduct regression analyses of both individual- and country-level factors in selected countries to examine the potential context-dependence of the effects

of military integration on gender stereotypes.

Figures 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.14, and 3.15 below illustrate the mean values over observed time period for the two analysed gender stereotypes: “*Men make better political leaders than women*” and “*Men should have more right to a job than women*.” The colourful lines in each plot represent the trends in agreement with these stereotypes, while the dotted line indicates the timing of the policy intervention.

The plots demonstrate significant variation across selected cases. While there is a general decrease in agreement with the stereotype that “Men make better political leaders than women,” there is no universal direction of change for the stereotype that “Men should have more right to a job than women.” For example, in Australia, there is a sharp decrease in agreement with the former stereotype but an increase in agreement with the latter. A similar pattern is observed in New Zealand, though the changes are less pronounced. In Romania, there is a sharp decrease in agreement with the stereotype about women in political leadership, but no significant changes are observed in the stereotype regarding job rights, even in relation to the policy intervention of opening combat roles to women.




Figure 3.11. Australia: agreement with analysed gender stereotypes; mean values.




Figure 3.12. Germany: agreement with analysed gender stereotypes; mean values.




Figure 3.13. New Zealand: agreement with analysed gender stereotypes; mean values.




Figure 3.14. Romania: agreement with analysed gender stereotypes; mean values.




Figure 3.15. USA: agreement with analysed gender stereotypes; mean values.

Below are two additional plots, 3.16 and 3.17, each comparing trends in agreement with the stereotype across all five analysed country cases. The plots lack years on the x-axis because the treatment date is unique for each case - instead, the treatment year is standardized to 0 for all cases to allow for clear visualization. Both plots further illustrate that no universal trends exist across all countries for which data were available for analysis.




Figure 3.16. All country cases: comparison of trends in agreement with the stereotype.




Figure 3.17. All country cases: comparison of trends in agreement with the stereotype.

To further explore the potential context-dependence of the effects of women's military integration on gender stereotypes, I conduct additional regression analyses of selected country cases. Specifically, I focus on three cases: USA, Romania, and Germany. These countries were

selected to provide geographical variation and variation in overall levels of agreement with gender stereotypes, as demonstrated by Figures 3.12, 3.14, and 3.15.

The execution of the analysis is similar to the pooled models (country and fixed year effects with clustering at the country level), with two key differences: (1) each of the country-case analyses is based on a subset of data from the selected national contexts of the USA, Romania, or Germany, examining periods both before and after the policy intervention of opening combat roles to women. These cases are compared to a control group consisting of all countries that have not yet introduced this policy intervention; (2) the analyses exclude the interaction terms and the variable measuring power distributed by gender, due to missing data in some of the samples, caused by reduced number of observations. The analysis therefore focuses primarily on the effects of policy intervention of opening of combat roles to women, as well as on possible effects of included control variables.

Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present findings from regression analyses clustered at the country level, with each table reporting results for the analysed gender stereotypes. Table 3.6, which presents results for the gender stereotype that “*Men make better political leaders than women*,” demonstrates significant variation in the effects of opening combat roles to women on agreement with the gender stereotype. The coefficient for the policy intervention is negative yet not statistically significant in the case of the USA (country-case model 1), which suggests that opening combat roles had no significant effects on belief in the stereotype; this may indicate that women are generally accepted in military roles in the USA. On the contrary, in Romania (country-case model 2), the policy intervention has a negative, statistically significant effect, suggesting a substantial impact of opening combat roles to women on reducing belief in the gender stereotype. This may indicate that, due to generally high levels of agreement with gender stereotypes (as visualised in Figures 3.16 and 3.17), society in Romania is receptive to similar interventions. In Germany (country-case model 3), the coefficient of the policy intervention is positive and statistically significant, suggesting substantial backlash effects of opening combat roles to women on gender stereotypes. This may be associated with the longstanding exclusion of German women from the Bundeswehr and the fact that the decision to open combat roles followed a ruling by the European Court of Justice (as discussed on pages 83–84 and 87).

In addition to that, the country-case models 1, 2, and 3 demonstrate consistent and statistically significant effects of gender, age, income, and education (with men, older individuals, those with lower incomes, and those with lower education levels being more likely to agree with the stereotype). Additionally, all three models show a consistent relationship between the share of

female legislators and gender stereotypes, reflecting that an increase in the share of female legislators is associated with a significant reduction in agreement with gender stereotypes. Although some of the controls remain stable across all three contexts, the models demonstrate significant context dependence in terms of the effects of the political intervention on the gender stereotype that “*Men make better political leaders than women.*”

	Country-case model 1: USA	Country-case model 2: Romania	Country-case model 3: Germany
Policy intervention	-3.7793e-02 (4.9718e-02)	-5.3136e-01*** (6.3366e-02)	5.8616e-01*** (4.1175e-02)
Gender	-2.6011e-01*** (1.2088e-02)	-2.6097e-01*** (1.2246e-02)	-2.6077e-01*** (1.2159e-02)
Age	2.4867e-03*** (3.9951e-04)	2.5116e-03*** (4.0717e-04)	2.5139e-03*** (4.0347e-04)
Income	-1.0266e-02*** (1.7581e-03)	-1.0007e-02*** (1.7134e-03)	-9.9686e-03*** (1.7003e-03)
Education	-8.9212e-03*** (2.3904e-03)	-9.4410e-03*** (2.3873e-03)	-8.2453e-03** (2.5182e-03)
Religiosity	-1.2521e-02 (7.7706e-03)	-9.6480e-03 (7.6695e-03)	-1.1834e-02 (7.7332e-03)
Share of urban population	-2.0645e-03 (3.5724e-03)	-2.2631e-03 (3.6149e-03)	-2.2900e-03 (3.6087e-03)
GDP growth	5.4292e-03 (3.7315e-03)	5.6014e-03 (3.7032e-03)	4.7901e-03 (3.8254e-03)
GDP per capita	-4.3613e-06 (2.8393e-06)	-6.5998e-06* (2.8328e-06)	-5.2154e-06 . (2.8534e-06)
Share of female force particip.	-9.7133e-03 (1.1749e-02)	-8.3875e-03 (1.1415e-02)	-9.6289e-03 (1.1731e-02)
Military expenditure	-9.5190e-02 (6.4444e-02)	-1.0885e-01 . (6.4764e-02)	-1.0452e-01 (6.5682e-02)
Share of female legislators	-8.1745e-03** (2.6909e-03)	-8.1999e-03** (2.6969e-03)	-7.5925e-03** (2.7035e-03)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

Table 3.6. Country-specific models for the USA, Romania, and Germany; *Men make better political leaders than women.*

Table 3.7, with country-case models 4, 5, and 6, presents the results of regression analysis for the stereotype that “*Men should have more right to a job than women.*” The coefficient of the key independent variable, policy intervention, is negative in the case of the USA, positive in the case of Romania, and marginally significant in the case of Germany, suggesting a slight decrease in agreement with the gender stereotype. These results underscore the previously suggested context dependence of the effects, with the relationship between women’s military integration and agreement with gender stereotypes being largely dependent on the context in which the policy intervention occurs, as well as the differential effects of the intervention on various gender stereotypes.

Models 4, 5, and 6, however, underscore the consistent importance of individual-level factors such as gender, age, income, and education. Notably, in all three analysed national contexts,

the stereotype that “*Men should have more right to a job than women*” is consistently associated with religiosity, with more religious individuals being more likely to agree with the stereotype. This is not the case for the stereotype that “*Men make better political leaders than women.*” This distinction suggests that while family and economic roles are closely tied to religious beliefs, political leadership appears to operate independently of religiosity. These findings highlight how gender stereotypes are embedded in diverse socio-cultural factors and demonstrate that different stereotypes are influenced by policy interventions to varying extents; underscoring the context-dependent nature of policy intervention effects on various gender stereotypes.

Additionally, models 4, 5, 6 also demonstrate consistent effects of GDP per capita, as well as of the share of female legislators, which corresponds to results of analyses of the effects of policy intervention with the statement that “*Men make better political leaders than women.*”

	Country-case model 4: USA	Country-case model 5: Romania	Country-case model 6: Germany
Policy intervention	-5.6433e-02 (4.4583e-02)	5.4799e-02 (3.9524e-02)	-6.8805e-02 . (4.0035e-02)
Gender	-9.3624e-02*** (1.1199e-02)	-9.5721e-02*** (1.0598e-02)	-9.5146e-02*** (1.0680e-02)
Age	1.9519e-03*** (2.8202e-04)	2.0265e-03*** (2.8276e-04)	2.0308e-03*** (2.7888e-04)
Income	-8.2269e-03*** (1.6826e-03)	-8.6930e-03*** (1.7015e-03)	-8.3901e-03*** (1.6916e-03)
Education	-1.4420e-02*** (1.8607e-03)	-1.4516e-02*** (1.7999e-03)	-1.3971e-02*** (1.8313e-03)
Religiosity	-1.1850e-02* (5.7086e-03)	-1.2933e-02* (5.8145e-03)	-1.2587e-02* (5.7028e-03)
Share of urban population	-2.8916e-04 (2.9115e-03)	-2.7902e-04 (2.9095e-03)	-2.0833e-04 (2.9301e-03)
GDP growth	-3.3913e-03 (2.3882e-03)	-3.4612e-03 (2.3538e-03)	-3.4780e-03 (2.3845e-03)
GDP per capita	-5.5970e-06* (2.2160e-06)	-5.1457e-06* (2.6200e-06)	-5.4854e-06* (2.5046e-06)
Share of female force particip.	6.7707e-03 (7.7309e-03)	5.9103e-03 (7.5774e-03)	6.4648e-03 (7.6889e-03)
Military expenditure	-8.0354e-02 (5.0237e-02)	-8.4863e-02 (5.2754e-02)	-7.8272e-02 (5.2904e-02)
Share of female legislators	-3.4579e-03* (1.3899e-03)	-3.4795e-03* (1.3854e-03)	-3.2131e-03* (1.3930e-03)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

Table 3.7. Country-specific models for the USA, Romania, and Germany; *Men should have more right to a job than women.*

Discussion

The results of this chapter do not provide unified evidence to fully support or reject any of the three hypotheses that guided the analysis. Nevertheless, the analysis brings several worthwhile findings regarding the effects of opening combat roles to women on agreement with gender stereotypes among the public. Additionally, the findings presented in this chapter suggest

several promising directions for future research contributing to both study of the interaction between the military and society, as well as of the effects of similar policy interventions on gender equality.

The findings from the pooled analysis presented in this chapter suggest that the policy intervention of opening combat roles to women does not have a consistent effect on gender stereotypes. Instead, the analysis indicates that the effects of this policy intervention vary across national contexts and in relation to different gender stereotypes. Additional analysis of three selected country-cases of the USA, Romania, and Germany demonstrates that the relationship between opening combat roles to women and public gender stereotypes is highly context-dependent and closely associated with additional factors at both the individual and country levels.

At the individual level, the analysis revealed significant and consistent effects of several factors. Higher levels of agreement with both analyzed gender stereotypes are more likely among individuals who are men, older, have lower income, and possess lower levels of education. However, the focus of this chapter on two distinct gender stereotypes also reveals that while gender stereotypes related to women's political leadership are associated with individual religious beliefs, those related to women's economic opportunities are not. This suggests that different types of gender stereotypes are shaped by distinct socio-cultural factors.

Simultaneously, the analysis highlights significant effects of country-level factors on gender stereotypes. Gender stereotypes related to women's political leadership are strongly influenced by socio-economic conditions and women's visibility in politics, while stereotypes concerning women's economic opportunities are largely shaped by the overall economic wealth of a given national context. These findings from the pooled analysis were reinforced by the country-case analyses of the USA, Romania, and Germany. This further demonstrates that trends in gender stereotypes across different national contexts do not respond uniformly to identical policy interventions, as they are shaped by both individual-level and country-level characteristics.

Accordingly, regarding the effects of the key independent variable of the policy intervention of opening combat roles to women on gender stereotypes, the analysis suggests significant context dependence. The effects vary not only across specific stereotypes but also across different national contexts. The results from selected country cases show that opening combat roles to women is particularly significant in relation to the stereotype of women in leadership. However, the effects differ: there are no significant effects in the USA, a significant positive effect in Romania, and a significant negative effect in Germany.

This variation in both the direction and strength of effects can be explained by three factors: (1) differences in the historical tradition of women's participation in military institutions, exemplified by Germany's long-term exclusion of women from the Bundeswehr and their consistently low representation overall, which may contribute to public resistance to the idea of women in traditionally masculine roles, such as combat soldiers; (2) the overall significance of the military in society, with Germany scoring very low in militarization levels compared to both the USA and Romania (as measured by the GMI), leading to varying perceptions of the institution's importance; and (3) the framing of the policy intervention to the public by the government. Public perception may differ substantially depending on whether the intervention is communicated as an economic opportunity for women, as a step toward ensuring equal opportunities for both men and women, or implemented with no consistent communication strategy.

Overall, the results of this chapter demonstrate a strong yet multifaceted relationship between the process of women's military integration and gender stereotypes. In doing so, the chapter highlights several avenues for future research to explore the specific causal mechanisms underlying the observed dynamics.

First, future research should compare public perceptions across contexts with varying levels of military presence or traditions of women's association with the military, enabling a more nuanced understanding of the broader contextual factors shaping these perceptions.

Second, research should focus on the individual-level formation of gender stereotypes to better grasp how policy interventions impact different stereotypes. This could involve a combination of focus groups to uncover context-specific mechanisms, followed by experimental surveys to evaluate the strength of these relationships across various countries included in the analysis.

Third, research should examine how policy interventions were framed in specific national contexts, such as those presented in this chapter. Media analysis during the time surrounding the policy intervention would be particularly effective in uncovering how narratives may have influenced public perceptions and reinforced or challenged existing stereotypes.

Conclusion

The goal of this chapter was to empirically explore the societal ramifications of women's military integration by analysing the effects of opening combat roles to women on gender stereotypes in selected contexts. Although the results did not consistently support the hypothesized causal mechanisms, additional statistical tests performed on a subsample of

selected countries revealed significant context dependence in the relationship between women's military participation and gender stereotyping, suggesting several causal mechanisms for future investigation.

The analysis employed in this chapter relied on several statistical methods to examine the relationship between the opening of combat roles to women and gender stereotypes. These methods included synthetic control variable construction, pooled RDD, pooled fixed effects models, and country-specific fixed effects models. Each method was chosen to address specific aspects of the analysis: synthetic control variables allowed for better adjustment of confounding factors, pooled RDD provided a framework for identifying causal effects, pooled fixed effects models accounted for unobserved heterogeneity across units and time, and country-specific fixed effects models enabled a more nuanced examination of within-country variation.

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CONCLUSION

The primary goal of this dissertation was to examine the broader societal implications of selective military recruitment policies on gender and ethnic relations. The dissertation demonstrated that military recruitment policies play an important role in perpetuating existing gender and ethnic inequalities. The findings from the three separate chapters provide interdisciplinary contributions to the fields of military and society, gender studies, and ethnic conflict. In doing so, the research conducted as part of this dissertation opens new avenues for future research projects.

In the first chapter, *The Overlooked Intersectional Impact of Selective Military Conscription: Interview Evidence from Israeli Ethnic Minority Women*, I identified the individual-level consequences of exclusion from military service. The analysis draws on original empirical evidence collected during independently planned and executed fieldwork in Israel. In total, I conducted 33 in-depth interviews with various groups of Israeli citizens, with particular interest in experiences of Israeli Circassian and Druze women. Through an inductive and exploratory approach, the data were used to uncover distinct patterns in how selective conscription affects ethnic minority women's sense of identity and political efficacy, as well as their access to economic opportunities, language proficiency, professional development, and social opportunities. The data analysis then led to the development of the first theoretical framework concerning marginalization associated with selective military recruitment. The novel framework presents a set of testable implications that can be applied to other populations in comparable contexts and further expanded. The chapter brings significant contributions to several research fields, including military sociology, by showcasing the previously unexplored interaction between military recruitment policies and broader societal structures; as well as to the fields of gender inequality; ethnic conflict; Israeli and Druze studies. Additionally, the chapter demonstrates the importance of intersectional analysis.

In the second chapter, *Ethnic Military Recruitment: Introducing a New Dataset*, I presented the first comprehensive source on ethnicity in the context of mandatory military recruitment by introducing a novel dataset on military recruitment methods applied to all politically relevant ethnic groups across 134 national contexts, spanning from 1946 to 2010. Other than explanation of the theoretical motivation, the dataset creation process, and summary statistics, the chapter also demonstrates potential application of the data by conducting analysis aimed at understanding of the variation of the characteristic of conscripted versus non-conscripted

groups in contexts which employ ethnically selective conscription. The analysis suggests that exemption of an ethnic group from otherwise mandatory military service is strongly associated with its distinct customs, yet negatively associated with distinct racial characteristics and political representation in both legislative and executive. The findings of the chapter make significant contributions to the field of ethnic conflict by highlighting that ethnically selective conscription is a common yet overlooked practice, especially prevalent in nations with a colonial heritage, and affecting ethnic groups with specific characteristics.

In the third chapter, *Fighting the Prejudice? The Effects of Opening Combat Roles to Women on Gender Stereotypes Among the Public*, I analysed the societal ramification of integrating women into combat roles beyond the military context. It examined how opening combat roles to women influences overall levels of agreement with gender stereotypes among the public. In the context of this dissertation, this chapter is unique for relying on existing, publicly available data. Through the use of a wide range of quantitative research methods, including the synthetic control method, RDD, and fixed effects regression on both individual- and country-level variables, as well as analyses of multiple country cases, I demonstrated that opening of combat roles for women has profound effects of gender stereotypes. However, the relationship is context-dependent, varying across countries and across different types of gender stereotypes. The results of the chapter underscore the importance of military policies in shaping gender relations and highlights the need for further research which would enable establishing more detailed causal mechanisms associated with the statistical relationships. Consequently, this chapter makes a significant contribution to the fields of gender inequality and military sociology, adding to the ongoing discussion concerning the unique role and perspective of women in the field of security.

Overall, this dissertation fills a critical gap in existing research by shifting the focus from internal processes within military institutions to their interactions with broader society. While up-to-date research typically investigates the effects of the military environment on those performing service within it (e.g., the effects of women's military integration on agreement with gender stereotypes among male soldiers or the effects of military service on political behaviour and attitudes), all three chapters of this dissertation examine how military recruitment policies shape gender and ethnic relations within broader society. While addressing various aspects of these interactions, the dissertation provides a comprehensive mosaic of the implications of military recruitment being implicitly or explicitly selective. By demonstrating the interplay between military institutions and social hierarchies, the dissertation bridges the

narrow fields of military sociology and civil-military relations with the broader fields of gender relations and ethnic conflict. Given the focus of the first chapter on ethnic minorities in Israel, the dissertation also contributes to the field of Israeli studies, as well as the currently developing field of Druze studies.

The findings of this dissertation also provide a foundation for several future research avenues. First, drawing from the first chapter on the societal ramifications of ethnicised and gendered conscription, future research should focus on expanding the research framework presented in this dissertation through a similar study in a comparable context or by conducting a large-n survey to validate the exploratory findings of the first chapter in the context of Israel. This would help answer the posed research question regarding the consequences of selective conscription for those who are systematically exempt from it, particularly in terms of their relationship with politics, the state, and society, as well as their economic, educational, or professional opportunities.

The first chapter also highlights the previously overlooked importance of national service, particularly among young women. Given that there are no data on which countries enable national service, future projects should focus on this and investigate whether there are variations in the individual-level effects of military and national service, as well as the economic incentives associated with each across various national contexts.

The dataset presented in the second chapter offers an opportunity for expansion to create a larger dataset on military inclusion and organization from a historical perspective, including information on norms regarding the inclusion of women, LGBTQ+ individuals, or the possibility of conscientious objection. Such a dataset would help overcome the general lack of data and could serve as an important resource for several research fields. This could be achieved through an expert survey and by collecting data from NGOs, ministries of defence, military historians, and other relevant sources.

Drawing on the findings of the third chapter, future research should focus on cross-national variation in the relationship between women's military integration, not necessarily into combat roles, and gender stereotypes. This could involve exploring causal mechanisms through in-depth interviews or focus groups, as well as establishing statistical relationships across various contexts to examine the context dependency identified in this chapter through experimental studies.

APPENDICES: CHAPTER 1

Appendix 1. Participant Information Leaflet

Participant Information Leaflet

Project: Explaining Differences in Political and Civic Life of Israeli Jewish, Druze, and Circassian Populations

Author: Markéta Odlová

Contact: odlovom@tcd.ie

Funding: TRISS Postgraduate Research Fellowship, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland

Invitation

You have been asked to participate in a research study on factors explaining differences in political and civic life of Israeli Jewish, Druze and Circassian populations. The study is part of author's PhD dissertation project, conducted at Trinity College Dublin in Ireland.

Before deciding whether you wish to participate in the study, it is important for you to understand why it is being done and what taking part in it involves. Please read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please ask if anything is not fully clear.

What is the purpose of this study?

The goal of the study is to examine the factors that explain differences in the political and civic life between women and men from Israeli Jewish, Druze, and Circassian populations. The interview questions will cover topics such as political interest and participation, acculturation, citizenship, political efficacy, and social capital, and potential explanatory factors including military service, community, or education. You will **not** be asked about your political opinions or preferences (such as which political party you support).

This study has received ethical approval from the School of Social Sciences and Philosophy's Research Ethics Committee in Trinity College Dublin.

Do you have to take part in this study?

It is your choice whether you would like to take part in this study or not. You are not obligated to provide a reason and can change your mind at any time. In such case, please contact the author to withdraw.

What are the benefits of taking part in this study?

There are no direct benefits to participants. However, the results of the study will help us to understand what are the factors that affect political and civic life of Israeli citizens.

What are the disadvantages of taking part in this study?

The interview will take approximately 45 minutes of your time.

What will happen to your data?

If you consent to audio-recorded interview, the interview will be recorded. After the interview will be transcribed by the author of the study, the recording will be destroyed. If you do not consent to audio-recorded interview, the author will write down your answers.

The transcripts will be anonymized for all personal data that could potentially be used to trace the interview back to you. Every transcript will be labeled with a specific code and stored on secured online cloud drive.

The consent forms will be scanned, labeled with another set of codes, and stored on another cloud drive.

The author of this research will create a document linking each consent form to the correct transcript. However, this document will be stored separately from transcripts and scanned consent forms.

Your data will only be accessed by the author of this study. No personal information will be shared with anyone else.

What will happen to the results of this research?

The information from this study may be published in scientific papers and used for presentations in academic conferences. Your identity will always remain confidential.

Do you have further questions?

If you have any questions or concerns regarding your participation in the study, please contact Markéta Odlová.

Thank you.

Data Controller:



Data Protection:

Data Protection Officer - Secretary's Office,
Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland
Email: dataprotection@tcd.ie
Website: www.tcd.ie/privacy

Research Affiliation:



Appendix 2. Consent Form

Consent to Participate in Research

Explaining Differences in Political and Civic Life of Israeli Jewish, Druze, and Circassian Populations The goal of the study is to examine the factors that explain differences in the political and civic life between women and men from Israeli Jewish, Druze, and Circassian populations. By investigating factors such as military service, community, or education, the study aims to understand their effects on political and civic life of various groups.	
○ Ivoluntarily agree to take part in this study. ○ I understand that even if I agree to participate now, I can withdraw at any time or refuse to answer any question without any consequences. ○ I understand that I can withdraw permission to use data from my interview. If I do so, the material will be deleted. ○ I have had the purpose and nature of the study explained to me in writing and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study. ○ I understand that participation involves being interviewed by an interviewer who is also the author of the study. The interview can take up to one hour. ○ I understand that I will not benefit directly from participating in this research. ○ I agree to my interview being audio-recorded or noted down. ○ I understand that all information I provide for this study will be treated confidentially. ○ I understand that in any report on the results of this research my identity will remain anonymous. This will be done by disguising any details of my interview which may reveal my identity or the identity of people I speak about. ○ I understand that disguised extracts from my interview may be quoted in an academic paper authored by Markéta Odlová. ○ I understand that if I inform the researcher that myself or someone else is at risk of harm, they may have to report this to the relevant authorities - they will discuss this with me first but may be required to report with or without my permission. ○ I understand that original audio recording will be destroyed once they are transcribed, which will not be later than 31st of December 2023. ○ I understand that anonymized transcription of the interview and signed consent form will be stored for potential future use by the author of this study. ○ I understand that under freedom of information legalization I am entitled to access the information I have provided at any time while it is in storage as specified above. ○ I understand that I am free to contact any of the people involved in the research to seek further clarification and information.	
Name of the author: Markéta Odlová Name of the university: Trinity College Dublin Name of the funding body: Trinity College Dublin Name of academic supervisor: Jesse Dillon Savage	
I confirm that I have read, understand and consent to take part in the research. Signature of participant Date	I believe the participant is giving informed consent to participate in this study. Signature of author Date

Appendix 3. Interview Guide

Interview guide: Political and Civic Life of Israeli Jewish, Druze and Circassian population											
PART 1: Interview information											
Welcome	Hello. Thank you very much for deciding to take part in this research. My name is Markéta, I am a PhD candidate at Trinity College Dublin in Ireland and the goal of these interviews is to collect data for my PhD dissertation. I would like to understand what are the factors that have impact on people's political and civic life, and I am particularly interested in how this can be impacted by inclusion or exclusion from military service, based on people's ethnicity and gender. We will get to this later, during the interview. I appreciate that you decided to talk to me. This is not a test where I would expect you to give me some correct answers, all I want to know is your specific experience and the way you see things around you. If there is anything unclear to you, please tell me straight away. If you need time to think about your answers, that's okay.										
Consent	Before we start, I need to make sure that everything in the consent form is clear to you, so both of us can sign it. Would you like to go through the consent form together and have me explain it more in detail? BOTH SIGN 2 COPIES OF CONSENT FORM										
Recording	Do you agree with this interview being recorded? The recording is just for me, and it will be destroyed once I process the data and transform them into text. START RECORDING / MAKING NOTES										
Structure	To begin, I will ask for you demographic details, then I will have some questions about your political and civic life, and finally, we will discuss what might have some impact on it.										
PART 2: Demographic details											
Demographic details	First, I would like to know who you are as a person. Is there anything you would like to tell me about yourself? <table border="0"> <tr> <td>⇒ What is your gender?</td><td>⇒ What is your profession?</td></tr> <tr> <td>⇒ What is your year of birth?</td><td>⇒ What is your relationship status?</td></tr> <tr> <td>⇒ What is the place you consider home?</td><td>⇒ What is your religion?</td></tr> <tr> <td>⇒ What is your education?</td><td>⇒ Do you consider yourself religious?</td></tr> <tr> <td>⇒ Have you served in the IDF or done sherut leumi?</td><td></td></tr> </table>	⇒ What is your gender?	⇒ What is your profession?	⇒ What is your year of birth?	⇒ What is your relationship status?	⇒ What is the place you consider home?	⇒ What is your religion?	⇒ What is your education?	⇒ Do you consider yourself religious?	⇒ Have you served in the IDF or done sherut leumi?	
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PART 3: Political and civic life											
Interest in politics	What does it mean for you to be interested in politics? Are there some specific topics that are important for you? Would you say that you are interested in politics or not really, compared to other people? ⇒ Have there been some changes in the way you are interested in politics over time? ⇒ Would you say that these changes were linked to a specific experience, event, or a person?										
Political participation	What does it mean for you to participate in politics? Would you say that compared to other people you know, you participate in politics more or less often? We will now go through a list of activities related to political and civic participation. Please tell me which ones you do and how often: <table border="0"> <tr> <td> General: ⇒ Following politics in media (how often?) ⇒ Talking about politics (online? in person? to whom?) Civic engagement: ⇒ Volunteering for your community when asked ⇒ Organizing social events for people ⇒ Collaborating with members of your community to bring positive changes for everyone ⇒ Working with young people to promote change </td><td> Political engagement: ⇒ Voting in municipal or national elections ⇒ Becoming a member of political organization ⇒ Running for an office on municipal or national level Activist engagement: ⇒ Signing a petition ⇒ Joining a demonstration or a protest ⇒ Organizing a protest ⇒ Civil disobedience or sabotage </td></tr> </table> Are there any activities we might have missed?	General: ⇒ Following politics in media (how often?) ⇒ Talking about politics (online? in person? to whom?) Civic engagement: ⇒ Volunteering for your community when asked ⇒ Organizing social events for people ⇒ Collaborating with members of your community to bring positive changes for everyone ⇒ Working with young people to promote change	Political engagement: ⇒ Voting in municipal or national elections ⇒ Becoming a member of political organization ⇒ Running for an office on municipal or national level Activist engagement: ⇒ Signing a petition ⇒ Joining a demonstration or a protest ⇒ Organizing a protest ⇒ Civil disobedience or sabotage								
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Political efficacy int.	Would you say that you have good understanding of politics or not really? In other words, do you think that you have the knowledge and skill to make decisions related to politics? ⇒ Why? Could you elaborate on that? ⇒ On a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 being the highest, how confident are you make decisions related to politics?										
Political efficacy ext.	Would you say that the political institutions in Israel consider what the citizens want, or not really? In other words, do you believe that the actions of regular people like you or me can actually influence how political decisions are made? ⇒ Why? Could you elaborate on that? ⇒ On a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 being the highest, how much do political institutions consider what citizens want?										
Acculturation	What does it mean for you to be an Israeli and a Circassian / Druze / Jewish woman / man? ⇒ Have you ever experienced any conflict between these two identities? When? What experiences, characteristics, or qualities do you think are commonly associated with Israeli identity? ⇒ Do you think that you meet these experiences, characteristics, or qualities?										
Social capital	Do you think to have a good life in Israel, it is important to have many social connections, or not really? For example, knowing people from different religious groups, or people with different professional background. ⇒ Why? Would you say that you have a good network of connections, or not really? For example, when you search for a new job, are there some people who would help you?										

	⇒ Who are those people? Where did you meet them?		
Quality of citizenship	What do you think is the most important for a person to be considered a good citizen in Israel? ⇒ Why? Would you say that your citizenship gives you the same opportunities as to other Israeli citizens? ⇒ Why?		
PART 4: Explanatory variables			
Military service overall importance	I have mentioned before that in this research, I am interested in whether military service has some impact on how people participate in and are interested in politics, and the next questions are related to that... <table border="0"> <tr> <td style="vertical-align: top;"> NON-CONSCRIPTED: ⇒ You previously told me you were not in the military, could you please tell me more about that? ○ Would you say that you missed out on something? ⇒ Do you think that except for providing security to the country, it is important for people in Israel to serve in the military? ⇒ Based on your observations, what do you think makes the experience of military service unique, compared to other experiences in life? ○ How does it impact people's lives in long term? ⇒ What do you think about the fact that only some people in Israel have to serve in the military? ○ Would you say that people who do not have to serve in the military face some kind of an advantage or disadvantage? ⇒ What is your opinion on Sherut Leumi? ○ Why did you decide to do / not to do it? ○ Was in an important experience? </td><td style="vertical-align: top;"> CONSCRIPTED: ⇒ You previously told me you were in the military, could you tell me more about that? ⇒ Do you think that except for providing security to the country, it is important for people in Israel to serve in the military? ⇒ From your own experience and observations, what do you think makes the experience of military service unique, compared to other experiences in life? ○ How does it impact people's lives in long term? ⇒ What do you think about the fact that only some people in Israel have to serve in the military? ○ Would you say that people who do not have to serve in the military face some kind of an advantage or disadvantage? ⇒ What is your opinion on Sherut Leumi? ○ Do you think it is important? ○ Do you know many people who have done it? </td></tr> </table>	NON-CONSCRIPTED: ⇒ You previously told me you were not in the military, could you please tell me more about that? ○ Would you say that you missed out on something? ⇒ Do you think that except for providing security to the country, it is important for people in Israel to serve in the military? ⇒ Based on your observations, what do you think makes the experience of military service unique, compared to other experiences in life? ○ How does it impact people's lives in long term? ⇒ What do you think about the fact that only some people in Israel have to serve in the military? ○ Would you say that people who do not have to serve in the military face some kind of an advantage or disadvantage? ⇒ What is your opinion on Sherut Leumi? ○ Why did you decide to do / not to do it? ○ Was in an important experience?	CONSCRIPTED: ⇒ You previously told me you were in the military, could you tell me more about that? ⇒ Do you think that except for providing security to the country, it is important for people in Israel to serve in the military? ⇒ From your own experience and observations, what do you think makes the experience of military service unique, compared to other experiences in life? ○ How does it impact people's lives in long term? ⇒ What do you think about the fact that only some people in Israel have to serve in the military? ○ Would you say that people who do not have to serve in the military face some kind of an advantage or disadvantage? ⇒ What is your opinion on Sherut Leumi? ○ Do you think it is important? ○ Do you know many people who have done it?
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Military service and political and civic life	Based on your observations / experience, would you say that military service changes how people participate in and are interested in politics? <table border="0"> <tr> <td style="vertical-align: top;"> YES: ⇒ What is it that happens during military service that makes a difference? ⇒ When did you realize this? ⇒ Can you give me some examples? </td><td style="vertical-align: top;"> NO: ⇒ Could you elaborate on that? What made you answer no? ⇒ What about veterans who typically lead protests, and former combat soldiers who became leading politicians? </td></tr> </table>	YES: ⇒ What is it that happens during military service that makes a difference? ⇒ When did you realize this? ⇒ Can you give me some examples?	NO: ⇒ Could you elaborate on that? What made you answer no? ⇒ What about veterans who typically lead protests, and former combat soldiers who became leading politicians?
YES: ⇒ What is it that happens during military service that makes a difference? ⇒ When did you realize this? ⇒ Can you give me some examples?	NO: ⇒ Could you elaborate on that? What made you answer no? ⇒ What about veterans who typically lead protests, and former combat soldiers who became leading politicians?		
Druzes and Circassians	Now I would like to talk about the Druzes and Circassians. ⇒ EXTRA QUESTION TO PEOPLE FROM OTHER GROUPS: Do you know some people from these communities? ⇒ Do you think there is a difference in how men and women from the community participate in political and civic life? ○ Why is it so? What makes the difference? ○ If due to community dynamics / religion... Could you tell me more? Is there a difference what is expected of women or allowed to them, when it comes to being active in the community or politics? ○ Can you give me some examples? ⇒ Do you think there are some differences in how women from Jewish / Druze / Circassian community think about and participate in politics? ○ What do you think causes these differences? ○ Can you give me some examples?		
Other explanatory factors	We spoke a lot about military, but I would like to ask what you think are some other important factors that might affect one's political and civic life... ⇒ FAMILY: Do you or did you discuss politics with your family of origin? Is / was it important for you? ⇒ PARTNER: Do you or did you discuss politics with your partner? Is / was it important for you? ⇒ COMMUNITY: Would you say that growing up as ... in ... community had some impact on this? ⇒ EDUCATION: Would you say that there is / was something about your education that had some impact on this? ⇒ PROFESSION: Would you say that there is / was something about your education that had some impact on this? ⇒ Is there anything else we have not yet mentioned?		
PART 5: Closing the interview			
Closing	There are no more questions, thank you very much for you time and for your answers. Is there anything you would like to ask me or anything you would like to add to what we have already said? STOP RECORDING		
Snowballing	I am still searching for more participants for this project. Do you know someone who might be interested in talking to me?		
Results	As I have mentioned before, all of this is for my dissertation. Would you like me to send you the paper when it is finished?		
Goodbye	If you ever need to ask me anything regarding this interview, you can find my contact details in the document we signed before the interview.		

Appendix 4. List of Interviews

Interview date:	Interview type:	Participant code:	Gender:	Ethnicity:	Service:	Note:
06/07/2023	online	DM1	M	Druze	None	
07/07/2023	online	DM2	M	Druze	None	
10/07/2023	online	JW1	F	Jewish	National service	
18/07/2023	online	DM3	M	Druze	Military service	
19/07/2023	in-person	JW2	F	Jewish	None	
21/07/2023	online	DM4	M	Druze	Military service	
21/07/2023	in-person	JM1	M	Jewish	Military service	
26/07/2023	online	JW3	F	Jewish	None	
06/08/2023	in-person	DW1	F	Druze	None	
07/08/2023	in-person	DM5	M	Druze	Military service	Elite participant
07/08/2023	in-person	DW2	F	Druze	None	
08/08/2023	online	DW3	F	Druze	None	
09/08/2023	online	DM6	M	Druze	Military service	
10/08/2023	in-person	CM1	M	Circassian	Military service	
11/08/2023	online	DW4	F	Druze	None	
11/08/2023	online	DM7	M	Druze	None	
14/08/2023	in-person	DW5	F	Druze	National service	
15/08/2023	in-person	JW4	F	Jewish	Military service	

15/08/2023	in-person	DW6	F	Druze	National service	
16/08/2023	online	DW9	F	Druze	National service	
17/08/2023	online	DW7	F	Druze	National service	
17/08/2023	online	CW1	F	Circassian	National service	
18/08/2023	online	DW8	F	Druze	National service	
21/08/2023	in-person	CW2	F	Circassian	None	
21/08/2023	online	JW5	F	Jewish	Military service	
22/08/2023	online	DM8	M	Druze	Military service	
22/08/2023	in-person	DW10	F	Druze	National service	
23/08/2023	in-person	DW11	F	Druze	None	Elite participant
25/08/2023	in-person	DW12	F	Druze	None	
26/08/2023	in-person	DM9	M	Druze	Military service	
27/08/2023	in-person	DW13	F	Druze	National service	
12/09/2023	online	CW3	F	Circassian	None	
04/10/2023	online	DW14	F	Druze	None	Elite participant; no consent to record interview

APPENDICES: CHAPTER 2

Appendix 5. Codebook and Country Narratives

Ethnic Military Recruitment dataset: Codebook

Details

Version: November 2022

Author: Markéta Odlová

Contact: marketa.odlova@gmail.com

Overview

This global dataset provides time-series, group-level observations on military recruitment method (conscription or voluntary military recruitment) applied by central government on politically relevant ethnic groups between 1946 and 2010. The goal of the project is to address the lack of systematic data on which ethnic groups were conscripted in the observed period. Key variable on politically relevant ethnic groups comes from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset 3.01 which ensures the compatibility of the Ethnic Military Recruitment dataset with other projects.

Citation

Odlová, Markéta. 2022. Ethnic Military Recruitment Dataset, version November 2022. Available from the author at marketa.odlova@gmail.com.

Sources

The project follows up to existing datasets, which also serve as valuable sources. Complete list of all references including books, academic articles and media sources is below.

- **Military Recruitment Data set by Nathan Toronto (2014):** global time-series data with country-year observations on states' method of military recruitment (conscription or voluntary military recruitment), temporal coverage 18??-2008. The dataset does not consider variation in treatment of various social groups.
- **The Security-Force Ethnicity (SFE) Project by Paul Lorenzo Johnson and Ches Thurber (2017):** time-series data with group-level measures of the ethnic composition of military forces in the Middle East and North Africa region, temporal coverage 1946-2013. The dataset does not consider military recruitment method and only provides limited spatial coverage.
- **Ethnic Stacking in African Militaries by Kristen Harkness (2021):** time-series data with leader-country observation of ethnic stacking of security institutions in African countries, temporal coverage 1942-2018. The dataset does not consider military recruitment method and only provides limited spatial coverage.
- **Ethnic Power Relations 3.01 by Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min (2015)**

Coding procedure and Variables

The Ethnic Military Recruitment dataset follows the structure of the Ethnic Power Relations 3.01 data (Wimmer et al. 2015), offering key variables: *cowcode*, *country*, *year*, *yearc* and *group*:

- *Cowcode* is numerical country code according to and compatible with the Correlates of War Project.
- *Country* is country name according to and compatible with the Correlates of War Project.
- *Year* is year of observation.
- *Yearc* is a combination of *year* of observation and *cowcode*.
- *Group* includes all ethnic groups identified as politically relevant in observed country in observed year. Ethnicity is defined in accordance with Weberian tradition as “*subjectively experienced sense of commonalty based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture*” (Wimmer et al. 2009), with various markers such as religion or common language acceptable as an indicator of shared ancestry and culture. An ethnic group is perceived as politically relevant if it is represented on national level or if its members are systematically and intentionally discriminated (ibid).
- The dataset comes up with a new variable *recruitethnic*, accompanied by number of additional variables: *recruitethnicgeneral*, *recruitgeneral*, *milexist*, *timevar*, *ethnicvar*:
- *Recruitethnic* indicates what was the military recruitment method applied by central government on the ethnic group in the year of observation. The basis for *recruitethnic* comes from the Military Recruitment Data set (Toronto 2014). Toronto’s aggregate observations coded as voluntary military recruitment were adopted for all ethnic group in observed country/year. Toronto’s aggregate observation coded as conscription were researched further to examine whether de iure conscription enforced by centra government applied on all ethnic groups; 0 = conscription, 1 = voluntary recruitment.
- *Recruitethnicgeneral* indicates the same as *recruitethnic*, however it lacks missing values as these were filled with aggregate country-year observations from the Military Recruitment Data (Toronto 2014). 0 = conscription, 1 = voluntary recruitment.
- *Recruitgeneral* indicates the aggregate military recruitment method applied in the country in the year of observation, lacking possible ethnic variation. The variable comes from the Military Recruitment Data (Toronto 2014); 0 = conscription; 1 = voluntary recruitment.
- *Milexist* indicates the existence of standing armed forced in given year. The variable comes from the Military Recruitment Data (Toronto 2014); 0 = army non-existent; 1 = army existent.
- *Timevar* indicates variation in military recruitment method in the observed period (1946-2010); 0 = conscription; 1 = alternation; 2 = voluntary recruitment; 3 = no military; 10 = no evidence.

- *Ethnicvar* indicates variation in military recruitment method applied on ethnic groups in the year of observation; 0 = universal military recruitment; 1 = ethnically selective military recruitment.

Summary of Variables

Variable name:	Variable description:	Variable type:	Variable source:
<i>cowcode</i>	Country code according to and compatible with the Correlates of War Project	num	Ethnic Power Relations 3.01 (Wimmer et al. 2015)
<i>country</i>	Country name according to and compatible with the Correlates of War Project	string	Ethnic Power Relations 3.01 (Wimmer et al. 2015)
<i>year</i>	Year of observation	num	Ethnic Power Relations 3.01 (Wimmer et al. 2015)
<i>yearc</i>	Year of observation combined with country code	num	Ethnic Power Relations 3.01 (Wimmer et al. 2015)
<i>group</i>	Ethnic group name	string	Ethnic Power Relations 3.01 (Wimmer et al. 2015)
<i>recruitethnic</i>	Military recruitment method applied by central government on the ethnic group in the year of observation; 0 = conscription; 1 = voluntary recruitment	num	original
<i>recruitethnicgeneral</i>	Military recruitment method applied on the ethnic group by central government in the year of observation; missing values filled with aggregate country-year observations from <i>recruitgeneral</i> variable; 0 = conscription; 1 = voluntary recruitment	num	original
<i>recruitgeneral</i>	Aggregate military recruitment method applied in the country in the year of observation; 0 = conscription, 1 = voluntary recruitment	num	Military Recruitment Data Set (Toronto 2014)
<i>milexist</i>	Existence of standing armed forces in year of observation; 0 = army non-existent, 1 = army existent	num	Military Recruitment Data Set (Toronto 2014)
<i>timevar</i>	Variation in military recruitment method anytime in the observed period (1946-2010); 0 = conscription; 1 = alternation; 2 = voluntary recruitment; 3 = no military; 10 = no evidence.	num	original
<i>ethnicvar</i>	Variation in military recruitment method applied on ethnic groups in the year of observation; 0 = universal military recruitment, 1 = ethnically selective military recruitment.	num	original

Coding Example

cowcode	country	year	yearc	group	recruitethnic	recruitethnicgeneral	recruitgeneral	milexist	timevar	ethnicvar
666	Israel	2008	2008666	Israeli Arabs	1	1	0	1	0	1
666	Israel	2008	2008666	Ashkenazim (Jewish)	0	0	0	1	0	1
666	Israel	2008	2008666	Ethiopians (Jewish)	0	0	0	1	0	1
666	Israel	2008	2008666	Mizrahim (Jewish)	0	0	0	1	0	1
666	Israel	2008	2008666	Russians (Jewish)	0	0	0	1	0	1

666	Israel	2008	2008666	Palestinian Arabs	1	1	0	1	0	1
666	Israel	2007	2007666	Israeli Arabs	1	1	0	1	0	1
666	Israel	2007	2007666	Ashkenazim (Jewish)	0	0	0	1	0	1
666	Israel	2007	2007666	Ethiopians (Jewish)	0	0	0	1	0	1
666	Israel	2007	2007666	Mizrahim (Jewish)	0	0	0	1	0	1
666	Israel	2007	2007666	Russians (Jewish)	0	0	0	1	0	1

Country Narratives

Country:	Military recruitment (time var.):	Military recruitment (ethnic var.):	Details	Sources
Afghanistan	Alternation	Universally applied	1939-1953 - attempts to build a modern conscript army, looking at secular Turkey as a model. Government attempted to conscript tribes, which led to armed revolts, especially among Pashtuns in southern and eastern Afghanistan (Meyerle et al. 2011). 1954 - Conscription Act, military service made mandatory for all men aged 22-28 (the length depended on various factors such as education). In fact, conscription was selective as provinces were responsible for draft and certain tribes were exempted in return for agreement to provide tribal levies in times of emergency (Keegan 1979). Evidence from the London Embassy 1959 and the Bonn Embassy 1964 confirm compulsory military service (Prasad, Smythe 1968). 1960s-1970s - growing resistance of tribes; USSR's help with training and organization led to collapse of Afghan government and Soviet invasion in 1979. 1980s - Soviets approached conscription as a mean to prevent coups attempts which led to extremely high desertion rates. Conscription was heavily resisted by large segments of the population, especially by Pashtuns. (Meyerle et al. 2011). Reports from 1990 - no regulated system of conscription, yet arbitrary system handled by the central government or Mujahedin fighters (Refworld 01/04/1990). 1992 - collapse of communist government, all serving conscripts were discharged, which marks official end of conscription (War Resisters International 10/03/1998). 1994 - Taliban army which pushed across the country relied on volunteers, yet after casualties in 1997, it began conscripting young men. 2002 onwards - both Toronto 1997 and Meyerle et al 2011 indicate voluntary enlistment, yet there are cases of forced conscription (Refworld 2002-04-30). Recently debate over whether conscription should be introduced, yet it has not happened (Meyerle et al. 2011).	Keegan 1979; Meyerle et al. 2011; Refworld 01/04/1990; Refworld 30/04/2022; WRI 10/03/1998
Albania	Alternation	Universally applied	1927 – presumed introduction of conscription (Danopoulos, Skandalis 2011).	Stolwijk 2005; Zickel,

			No evidence of any changes in military recruitment method between 1946 and 2009, except for changes in the length of mandatory military service (Zickel, Iwaskiw 1992). 2010 – conscription abolished due to reforms enforced by NATO (WRI 22/08/2008). However, conscription is still included in Article 166 of the 1998 constitution. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Iwaskiw 1992; WRI 22/08/2008
Algeria	Conscription	Ethnicity based exemptions	Universal conscription has remained in place since 1969 (Refworld 04/10/1999) Military service is de iure mandatory for all male Algerian citizens (Refworld 01/04/1999; People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria Consulate General of Algeria in New York; Landinfo). However, according to Harkness (2021) and Johnson and Thurber (2017) Berbers have been underrepresented in the military since the state gained its independence, yet there is no evidence of complete exemption.	Harkness 2021; Landinfo 2018; Refworld 04/10/1990; Refworld 01/04/1999;
Angola	Alternation	Universally applied	No evidence of military ethnic stacking according to Harkness (2021). Military recruitment method coded in accordance with Toronto (2014).	Harkness 2021; Toronto 2014
Argentina	Alternation	Universally applied	1853-1947 - military conscription of all men between aged 20 to 47, 10 years of military service. 1947 – Universal Military Service Law established that all citizens aged 12 to 50 are liable to military training; in reality, it only applied to men, the length of military service was one year for the army and air force and 2 years for the navy (Prasad, Smythe 1968; WRI 14/04/1998). According to Galiani et al. (2011), there was conscription of men between 1901 and 1995, utilising lottery system with no evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity. 5 January 1995 - Law on Voluntary Military Service established that military service is voluntary. Religious minorities demanding exceptions are given the option to perform unarmed military service.	Galiani et al. 2011; Prasad, Smythe 1968; WRI 14/04/1998
Armenia	Conscription	Universally applied	Military service was mandatory both before and after Armenia gained independence from the USSR in 1991. 1995 – conscription of all men codified in Article 47 of the 1995 constitution (WRI 15/05/2005). Nagorno-Karabakh which is currently recognised as part of Azerbaijan has its own conscription system (Stolwijk 2005).	Amnesty International 09/1999; Papazian 2008; Stolwijk 2005; WRI 15/05/2005
Australia	Alternation	Ethnicity based exemptions	1951-1959 - National Service Training providing military training for young Australian men. 1964-1972 - National Service Scheme due to the war in Vietnam. All 20-year-old men had to register. Proportion of registered men would be selected by the birthday ballot which obliged them to two years of military service in regular army and three years of being part-time reservist. There were exceptions for Aborigines, Torres	Australian War Memorial 2020

			Strait Islander people, for medically unfit men and theology students (Australian War Memorial 2020).	
Austria	Conscription	Universally applied	Conscription de iure place over the whole observed period, starting in the Austrian-Hungarian period. 1945-1955 conscription was abolished due to Austria being administered by the occupying powers. National Service Act reintroduced conscription for all male citizens. No changes regarding military recruitment, except for the length of military service. No evidence of ethnic selective conscription. Conscription is only mandatory for male citizens.	Prasad, Smythe 1968
Azerbaijan	Conscription	Ethnicity based exemptions	Universal male conscription established in 1991, enshrined in article 76 of the 1992 constitution and further regulated by the 1992 Law on the armed forces. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity. However, in early 1990s, the government needed conscripts in early 1990s and it had to cope with Lezgins' unwillingness to be drafted. There is no evidence that they would not be conscripted. Nagorno-Karabakh (inhabited mostly by Armenians) which is currently recognised as part of Azerbaijan has its own conscription system.	Mehdiyev 2021; Suleimanov 2002; Stolwijk 2005; Matveeva, McCartney 1998;
Bangladesh	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Belarus	Conscription	Universally applied	Conscription enshrined in article 57 of the 1994 constitution. Conscription applies on all men aged 18 to 27 (18 months is a standard length, 12 months for university and college graduates). No evidence of ethnic selective conscription. Conflicts over conscientious objection, as it is not sufficiently defined in the law.	WRI 15/05/2005
Belgium	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription since 1870s. Suspended in the end of 1992, starting voluntary military enlistment in 1993. Since March 1995 Belgium only has professional soldiers. It is one of the first countries to acknowledge the right to conscientious objection. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Prasad, Smythe 1968
Benin	NA	NA	1960-1981 coded as NA, 1981-2008 coded as conscription by Toronto (2014). According to Harkness, there was ethnic stacking in the military, regarding officer corps (Harkness 2021), but there is no evidence that specific ethnic groups would be excluded from conscription. According to Pew Research (Desilver 2019), Benin currently has selective conscription. It is however unclear when any changes were made and there are no details on ethnic groups, so the case is considered as NA due to general lack of information.	Harkness 2021; Toronto 2014; Desilver 2019
Bolivia	Conscription	Universally applied	Universal conscription since 1904, applies to all men, but in reality, only a proportion of the annual contingent is enlisted and these are mostly Indians (Keegan 1979). Since 2017, there is the option of voluntary military service for women. According to Gill (1997), indigenous populations is	Gill 1997; Keegan 1979: 73; WRI 01/07/2017

			conscripted. Unclear since when so I code indigenous population as conscripted for the whole observed period.	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Alternation	Ethnicity based exemptions of groups absent from the dataset	1992-2005 conscription. The military proclaimed itself to be secular, multinational, and multicultural in nature. Conscription applied to all men, without distinction according to nationality, i.e. Bosnian Muslims, Croats, Serbs were subject to military service obligations. However, certain local minorities were exempt, such as specific villages with Serbian populations. Residents of Brcko region are excluded.	Stolwijk 2005; Refworld 06/03/1985
Botswana	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Brazil	Conscription	Ethnicity based exemptions	Mandatory military service since 1908. All men are obliged to register, but only proportion of them is selected to serve in the military. At the same time, people who do not live in recruitment areas (fora da area de recrutamiento) are exempt. Individuals who do not register are considered dead or lose their civil rights (WRI 06/05/1998) There is no evidence of indigenous people being or not being conscripted so I assume their areas are seen as independent. Their military service seems to be seen as uncommon, yet there seem to be cooperation between military and indigenous tribes. (Defasanet 18/01/2018)	WRI 06/05/1998; Defasanet 18/01/2018
Bulgaria	Alternation	Universally applied	1960-1990 conscription, the length of military service was two years for Army and Air Force and three years for the Navy. Unclear whether there was conscription before 1960 as another paper suggests that conscription was introduced in 1944, as a tool of societal transformation in accordance with ideological spirit (constitutions from 1947 and 1971 state that "defense of the fatherland is the supreme duty and honor of every citizen"). 1990-2007 conscription reduced to 18 months. Ethnic minorities are conscripted and there is no evidence that it has ever been different in past. However, before the democratic transition, conscripts from ethnic minorities would commonly be placed in construction or transportation troops. Conscription abolished in 2008. Previous years coded in accordance with Toronto (2014).	Council of Europe 1998; Yanakiev 2006; Yanakiev 2020
Burundi	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Cambodia	Alternation	Universally applied	No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity. Coded in accordance with Toronto.	Toronto 2014
Cameroon	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription until 1982. According to Harkness (2021) Fulani Muslims and Peuhl were disproportionately recruited into military institutions but there is no evidence that certain groups were fully excluded.	Harkness 2021
Canada	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Central African	NA	NA	Lack of evidence.	

Republic				
Colombia	Conscription	Ethnicity based exemptions	Conscription introduced in 1945, but only for <i>"when public necessity demands it."</i> Members of the military are not allowed to engage in political debate (Prasad, Smythe 1968). Indigenous groups are formally exempt from conscription since 1993, yet their status prior to that is unclear and accordingly coded as NA. Conscription exemption for Afro-Colombians was only granted in 2021 (Moss 15/12/2021).	Moss 15/12/2021; Prasad, Smythe 1968; WRI 08/2009; WRI 20/10/2017; Infobae 22/07/2021; Bonilla Mora 2021
Congo	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied	Conscription does not exist in Republic of Congo / Congo-Brazzaville since 1969. 1960-1969 coded as NA in accordance with Toronto as it is unclear what kind of military recruitment system was in place before (2014). According to Harkness (2021), before 1969, the military was dominated by Mbochi, who were marginalised politically. However, no evidence of other groups being exempt from the military.	Harkness 2021; Toronto 2014
Costa Rica	No military force			Toronto 2014
Cote d'Ivoire	NA			Harkness 2021
Croatia	Alternation	Ethnicity based exemptions	1990-2008 conscription, enshrined in article 47 of the 1990 constitution. 1997-2001, Croatian Serbs were excluded from military service in Croatian army. (IWPS 07/01/2001). No evidence of other exemptions based on ethnicity.	Hedl 2001
Cuba	NA	NA	Conscription is mandatory (Refworld 28/03/2014). No details on military recruitment system before 1963, no evidence of any changes since 1963. Conscription of women.	Refworld 28/03/2014
Czech Republic	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription abolished in 2005 (Ministry of Defense). No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Ministry of Defense & Armed Forces 2004
Czechoslovakia	Conscription	Universally applied	Continuous military service from 1868 when it was imposed by the Austrian Hungarian empire. No evidence of ethnic minorities not being conscripted. German minority was subjected to conscription, and nothing says otherwise about other groups. (Kuthanová 2010)	Drož 2016; Kuthanová 2010; Ministry of Defence & Armed Forces undated; Pernica 2006; Prasad, Smythe 1968; Toronto 2014
Democratic Republic of Congo	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Dominican Republic	NA	NA	Mandatory conscription between 1947 and 1961 (WRI 30/04/1998). Unclear whether Haitians were conscripted in this period - coded as NA.	Prasad, Smythe 1968; WRI 30/04/1998
Ecuador	Alternation	Universally applied	1837-2008 conscription (Global Security undated). No evidence of exemptions based	Global Security

			on ethnicity; however military service of indigenous population had its specifics. 1940s - concerns that conscription in great numbers would cause indigenous populations' unwillingness to return to their rural communities. The 1942 law enabled young men to serve either the armed forces or in labor unit. This made indigenous population integrated and provided them with technical skills necessary to be an economic contribution. Between 1960 and 1970 and military forces seized power twice - military service became a unifying symbol; as conscription did not have public support, there were protests. 1960s - there was a new law on conscription, not mentioning Indians, but they were targeted as well, and the aim was to learn them agricultural methods. Their military service had certain specifics, such as that they could keep long hair.	undated; Poutvara, Wagener 2011; Selmeski 2007; WRI 21/04/1998
Egypt	Alternation	Universally applied	1955-2010 conscription, no changes since then (WRI 21/07/1998). Coptis have been conscripted since 1850s.	Johnson, Thurber 2017; Middle East Eye 2016; WRI 21/07/1998
Eritrea	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription of both men and women since 2003. Before voluntary recruitment (Toronto 2014). Historically no evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Harkness 2021
Estonia	Conscription	Universally applied	Conscription introduced after gaining independence in 1991. (Mannik 2002) Russians are conscripted and even more eager to serve than Estonians, however, there are concerns regarding their loyalty. No evidence that Ukrainians and Belarussians would be exempt from military service (Karabeshkin 2007).	Karabeshkin 2007; Männik 2002
Ethiopia	Alternation	Universally applied	1946-1977 voluntary military recruitment. 1978-1990 conscription of all citizens, no evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Harkness 2021; Toronto 2014; WRI 17/08/1998
Finland	Conscription	Ethnicity based exemptions of groups absent from the dataset	Conscription since 1832, changes made in 1950. (Visuri 1990) Inhabitants of Aland Islands are exempt (cca 10 % of total Swedish speaking population of Finland).	Stolwijk 2005; Visuri 1990
France	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription in effect since 1793 (first modern state to use conscription). Conscription gradually phased out between 1996 and 2001. No evidence of Basques, Corsicans or Roma groups being ever exempt.	Prasad, Smythe 1968; Toronto 2014
Gabon	NA	NA	Conscription, unclear current system. Altering influence of ethnic groups.	
Gambia	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014; Prasad, Smythe 1968
Georgia	Alternation	Ethnicity based exemptions of	Conscription abolished in 2016 (Library of Congress 2016). South Ossetia and Abkhazia have its own armed forces and own	Legislative Herald of Georgia 1997;

		groups absent from the dataset	conscription systems, which is also acknowledged in Georgian law (WRI 15/03/2005). No evidence that other minority groups would be exempt from military service.	Library of the Congress 2016; WRI 15/03/2005
Ghana	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Greece	Conscription	Ethnicity based exemptions	Conscription since 1914. Possibility to express conscientious objection and do alternative service, however the duration of service for all conscientious objectors is longer than ordinary military service of conscripted individuals (Roudemetof, Vasilos 2021). Muslims were exempt on a payment of a fee but included in 1960. (Prasad, Smythe)	Makrides, Roudemetof 2021; Prasad, Smythe 1968
Guatemala	Conscription	Universally applied	Mandatory conscription. Legal basis is not sufficient which leads to exploitation and forced conscription of indigenous population. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Commission on Human Rights 30/08/1993; WRI 30/04/1998
Guinea	NA	NA	Current military system is unclear, coded as NA. Altering influence of ethnic groups.	Harkness 2021
Guinea-Bissau	NA	NA	Conscription is applied selectively, unclear when introduced. Majority of draftees is from the capital city of Bissau. However, Papell and Balanta groups alter in dominating the military.	Harkness 2021; WRI 22/07/1998
Haiti	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied	Period before 1957 is unclear. 1957-1986 conscription was not enforced. 1987-1994 conscription not enforced. 1994 armed forces disbanded. (Toronto, WRI)	Toronto 2014; WRI 30/04/1998
Honduras	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription has not been enforced since 1994. Before it applied on all men, usually only the poorest ones were drafted (Cameron, Dorling, Thrope). No evidence that Garifunas would be excluded. Men are selected locally at random to make up the number of conscripts required; Mennonites were not included in the draft. (Prasad, Smythe 1968)	Cameron et al. 2000; Merrill 1995
Hungary	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription abolished in 2005. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity; both Jehovah's Witnesses and Nazarenes were object to it, undergoing great sufferings (Prasad, Smythe 1968).	Prasad, Smythe 1968
Chad	NA	NA	Conscription is currently not being used as the military does voluntary military recruitment. In 1960s and 1970s, military consisted of southerners, yet in 1979 it started altering to preference of northerners.	Harkness 2021; Refworld 01/05/2018
Chile	Conscription	Universally applied	Conscription since 1900 or 1931 (Prasad, Smythe 1968). Moral, religious, ethical and/or philosophical reasons of those who would prefer an alternative service are ignored by law. No explicit evidence on conscription of indigenous groups, yet Mapuche community is conscripted. (Course 2011) According to Keegan, the conscription system was also designed to combat illiteracy (Keegan 1979).	Prasad, Smythe 1968; Course, Magnus 2011; WRI 24/11/2017

China	Conscription	Universally applied	Conscription since 1949, but not really utilised, as the military gets enough soldiers via voluntary recruitment. Article 3 of the Military Recruitment Law stipulates that "All citizens of the People's Republic of China, regardless of ethnic status, race, occupation, family background, religious belief and education, have the obligation to perform military service according to the provisions of this Law."	AsianLII undated; Prasad, Smythe 1968; Shumei 2015; WRI 15/03/1998
India	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Indonesia	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied	Indonesia utilises both voluntary recruitment and highly selective conscription (details unknown). Coded as voluntary recruitment, in accordance with Toronto.	Toronto 2014
Iran	Conscription	Universally applied	1925-2010 conscription, current legal basis is the Military Service Act from 1984. (WRI 05/04/1998). No fundamental changes since 1925. (Iranwire 24/03/2015). Unlike in other countries utilising conscription, Iran does consider conscripts' education, career role or financial disadvantages in selection. Avoiding conscription leads to ban of severe actions, such as receiving working or health insurance, employment, receiving pension, obtaining driving licence etc (Moghadam 2022). 1946-1979 equal representation of ethnic minorities in the military. 1979-2010 after the Islamism revolution there was a series of purges in the military, targeted specifically at ethnic minorities. Military dominated by Persians, Azeris, Shia Kurds, Shia Arabs. Armenians are proportionally represented. Sunni Kurds and Balochs are underrepresented. Details and information on other groups are unclear due to selective conscription (Johnson, Thurber 2017). Current law does not provide any exemptions from conscription based on religious affiliation. Non-Muslims are forbidden from holding positions of authority over Muslim soldiers in the military (U.S. Department of State 2021).	Iranwire 24/03/2015; Johnson, Thurber 2017; Moghadam 2022; WRI 05/04/1998; U.S. Department of State 2021
Iraq	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription until 2003, abolished by US military governor (The Arab Weekly 02/09/2021). Until 1958 it was possible to buy an exemption and Sunnis were overrepresented, while Sunnis and Kurds were underrepresented. Rapid growth of military after 1973. Massive conscription after the 1980s. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity (Keegan 1979; Metz 1988), however, Kurds and Sunnis have usually been underrepresented in officer corps (Johnson, Thurber 2017).	Keegan 1979; Metz 1988; Johnson, Thurber 2017; The Arab Weekly 02/09/2021
Israel	Conscription	Ethnicity based exemptions	Universal conscription of both Jewish men and women since 1948. Druze men conscripted since 1956, Circassian men conscripted since 1958. In past, Mizrahi Jews were much less likely to reach officer corps.	Johnson, Thurber 2017
Italy	Alternation	Universally	Conscription abolished in 2005. No evidence	Keegan 1979;

		applied	of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Gilioli, Carnimeo 08/2018
Japan	No military force			Toronto 2014
Jordan	Alternation	Universally applied	Voluntary military recruitment system before 1976. 1976-1991 conscription. After Jordan gained independence in 1946, the military was dominated by the British. Palestinians who fled from Israel started joining around 1950. The preference was given to Bedouins, rather than to urban Palestinians and Transjordanians from Amman area. Issues due to Palestinian political activism (Keegan 1979). Their numbers in the military dropped in early 1970s, but the state answered with a new conscription drive for them - they were not fully excluded. Between 1992 and 2013, King Abdullah decided to purge Palestinians from all military roles, including auxiliary (Johnson, Thurber 2017).	Johnson, Thurber 2017; Keegan 1979; The Arab Weekly 2020
Kazakhstan	Alternation	Universally applied	Mismatch between Toronto (2014) and other sources. Conscription currently in place. There are several reasons for exemption, however there is no evidence of an exemptions based on ethnicity (Electronic government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2022). Russians and Ukrainians are conscripted (Smith 1998). No evidence of Uighurs or Volga Germans not being conscripted (Minority Rights Group International 06/2015; The New Humanitarian 01/02/2005).	Global security undated; WRI 28/04/1998; Electronic government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2022; Smith 1998; Minority Rights Group International 06/2015; The New Humanitarian 01/02/2005
Kenya	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Kosovo	No military force		Kosovo Military Force is a small, lightly armed security and civil defence force. It conducts tasks that are not appropriate for police. Serbian opposition is against creation of a fully operational army in Kosovo. No conscription, yet various ethnic groups are encouraged to join.	Global Security undated
Kuwait	Alternation	Universally applied	1961-2002 conscription. Kuwait is specific for high number of expats. Before the 1991 Gulf War, significant proportion of the military consisted of foreign volunteers and only 20-30 % were Kuwaiti citizens. After 1991, many non-Kuwaiti citizens were expelled from military forces for alleged collaboration with Iraq (notably Palestinians and Bedouins, who are Sunni). The reason why so many of Bedouins were in the military is because they were promised Kuwaiti citizenship in exchange for their service.	Johnson, Thurber 2017; WRI 31/03/1998
Kyrgyzstan	Conscription	Universally applied	No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity (Russians and Ukrainians are	WRI 02/2016; Smith 1998;

			conscripted). Specific religious groups are apparently entitled to the possibility to be recognised conscientious objectors, but details of this possibility are not public, so it cannot be misused.	Melvin 2011; Alymbaeva 2013
Laos	NA	NA	Periods utilising conscription based on Toronto and WRI. Unclear which groups are conscripted, given the atrocity between Lao government and Hmong community.	WRI 15/03/1998
Latvia	Alternation	Universally applied	1991-2006 conscription mandatory for all citizens, including significant Russian minority. However, it remains an issue that many members of the group do not hold Latvian citizenship (Muižnieks 2006).	Muižnieks 2006
Lebanon	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription from 1992 to 2007. No evidence that specific religious groups would be exempt. No census since 1930s.	Johnson, Thurber 2017; Refworld 2001; WRI 01/04/1998
Liberia	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Lithuania	Alternation	Universally applied	1991-2007 conscription. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity. Generally good relationship between the state and its Russian and Polish minority.	Coffey, Ranks 2015; Kasčiūnas, Komar 2018; WRI 22/09/2009
Macedonia	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription abolished in 2006. After it was introduced in 1992, young Albanians were boycotting it, but the state ignored the phenomenon. (Vankovska 2000). No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Vankovska 2000
Madagascar	Conscription	Universally applied	Conscription. However, it is unclear since when and whether it has been still in place. No evidence of preference for certain groups since Madagascar gained independence in 1960. Coded in accordance with Toronto.	Harkness 2021; WRI 29/07/1998
Malawi	NA	NA	Currently voluntary military service. Unclear whether there was conscription or voluntary military recruitment from 1964 to 1980.	Rupiya 2005; Toronto 2005
Malaysia	NA	NA	No conscription. Legally implemented in 1954, yet first draft came in 1964. No evidence that specific groups would be exempt. Chinese conscripts were refusing to register, however there is no evidence that they would get an exception. (WRI)	WRI 10/03/1998
Mali	Conscription	Ethnicity based exemptions	Selective conscription with unknown details. However, preference of certain groups has never occurred since Mali gained independence. In 1996, former rebel Tuareg groups were integrated into the armed forces. Previously repressed since Mali gained independence.	Harkness 2021; Toronto 2014; Minority Rights Group International undated; WRI 30/07/1998
Mauritania	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Mexico	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied	Enforces conscription yet it is coded as voluntary military recruitment system in accordance with Toronto.	Refworld 12/1999; Toronto 2014
Moldova	Conscription	Ethnicity	Conscription lasted after Moldova gained its	Conscience

		based exemptions	independence. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity. (OHC) Global Security (undated) states that: <i>"Thus, 86% of the total number of conscripts are Moldovan citizens, 6 % are Ukrainians, 4 % — Gagauz people, 2% — Russians, and 2% — represent other nationalities. Over 71% of conscripts come from villages and nearly 29% from cities."</i> Transnistria has its own conscription system.	and Peace Tax International 2011; Global Security undated; WRI 15/05/2005
Mongolia	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription abolished in 2005. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity, mandatory for all men.	Keegan 1979
Montenegro	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription abolished in 2006. No evidence on any exemptions based on ethnicity.	Toronto 2014
Morocco	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Mozambique	Alternation	Universally applied	1975-1992 conscription; suspended when the civil war ended. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity. Follow coding decision of Toronto - coded it as conscription from 1998 onwards.	Harkness 2021; Toronto 2014; WRI 31/07/1998
Myanmar	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied	Alternation, but lack of information on conscription.	Toronto 2014
Namibia	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		WRI 04/08/1998
Nepal	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied	Conscription has never existed in Nepal	WRI 14/04/1998
Netherlands	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription institutionalised for all male citizens in 1917, abolished in 1997. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Moelker et al. 2006
New Zealand	Alternation	Ethnicity based exemptions	Conscription abolished in 1973. 1961-1972 and 1949-1956 conscription but unclear to what extent it was enforced. Unclear status of native populations. Maori were conscripted during the WW1, but voluntarily recruited in WW2. No evidence they would be ever conscripted after the WW1. Maori's military service is however encouraged and seen as empowering.	Littlewood 2020; Scoppio 2018
Nicaragua	NA	NA	Conscription 1983-1990, no evidence of exceptions, no evidence of military recruitment in past	
Niger	NA	NA	Currently probably selective conscription for all men. Certain groups were favoured in 60s and 70s, but there is not enough of evidence.	ILO undated; Harkness 2021; Refworld 2001
Nigeria	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Pakistan	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Panama	No military force			Toronto 2014
Paraguay	Conscription	Ethnicity based exemptions	Unclear since when, but indigenous population (2 %) is exempt from conscription.	WRI 02/06/2021
Peru	NA	NA	It seems indigenous populations are conscripted but it should be double checked	
Philippines	NA	NA	Left unclear in accordance with Toronto (2014) and since there are no details on local indigenous population.	
Poland	Alternation	Universally	Conscription from 1950 to 2009. No evidence	Toronto 2015

		applied	of any exemptions.	
Romania	Alternation	Universally applied	No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Toronto 2014
Russia	Conscription	Universally applied	No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Refworld 14/11/2011
Rwanda	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Saudi Arabia	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied	Conscription has never existed in Saudi Arabia	Refworld 2001
Senegal	NA	NA	Unclear whether conscription has ever been applied - coded according to Toronto (2014). Consistent effort to maintain ethnic balance in the military.	Harkness 2021; Toronto 2014; WRI 05/08/1998
Sierra Leone	NA	NA	No data on period before 1991. 1991-2010 voluntary recruitment.	Toronto 2014
Slovakia	Alternation	Universally applied	1992-2005 conscription. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	WRI 23/10/2008
Slovenia	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription abolished in 2004. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Refworld 01/06/1994
South Africa	Alternation	Ethnicity based exemptions	1952-1954 conscription only mandatory for white population (coded as Afrikaners and English speakers in EPR dataset). Conscription abolished in 1994 (Harkness 2021, WRI 10/08/1998) which is when Mandela started the process of ethnic destacking as the military was predominantly white until then. (Harkness 2021)	Harkness 2021; WRI 10/08/1998
Spain	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription abolished in 2001 after 230 years. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity, conscription mandatory for all Spanish citizens including Catalans and Basques.	Bagues, Roth 2020; Cáceres-Delpiano et al. 2021
Sri Lanka	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Sudan	Conscription	Universally applied	Refworld: "The Senior Fellow stated that "forcible conscription is a real threat to any Sudanese," including those with a legal studentment (Senior Fellow 12 Sept. 2016). He also noted that the laws "are imposed wildly asymmetrically among ethnic groups" and that "good families from riverine Arab backgrounds can typically easily evade service" due to bribery and corruption (ibid.). The independent researcher similarly indicated that many wealthier families have "bought their way out of conscription one way or another" (Independent researcher 26 Sept. 2016)." Coded as universal conscription with no exemptions based on ethnicity.	Refworld 05/10/2016
Switzerland	Conscription	Universally applied	Conscription with no evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	ch.ch undated
Syria	Conscription	Ethnicity based exemptions of groups absent from the dataset	Conscription. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity (except for Jewish population not included in this dataset). Dominance of Allawi's and Sunnis as officers. In 2011, Druze got and exemption from military in exchange for their support to Assad (France 24 21/11/2018).	Johnson, Thurber 2017; WRI 25/04/1998; France 24 21/11/2018
Taiwan	Conscription	Universally applied	Conscription with no evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity (including Aboriginal indigenous population).	Li-chyun 2008

Tajikistan	Conscription	Universally applied	Conscription with no evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Toronto 2016
Tanzania	Alternation	Universally applied	1961-1972 coded as voluntary recruitment, 1973-2010 coded as conscription system in accordance with Toronto. Consistent effort to maintain ethnic balance in the military (Harkness 2021)	Harkness 2021; Toronto 2014
Thailand	Conscription	Ethnicity based exemptions	Conscription, tendency to exclude ethnic minorities. The army is almost exclusively composed of Buddhist Thais. Unclear what is the current situation. Chinese are exempt but it is not clear whether the exemption is de iure.	Keegan 1979; WRI 18/11/2009
Togo	NA	NA	Conscription in part of the observed period according to Toronto (2014), no details in the codebook. According to conscience and peace tax international there is conscription de iure but it is unclear whether also de facto. Other sources are very unclear so it is coded as NA.	Toronto 2014; WRI 06/08/1998
Trinidad and Tobago	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied		Toronto 2014
Turkey	Conscription	Universally applied	Conscription with no evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity. Universal military conscription in response to Kurdish rebellions.	Johnson, Thurber 2017; Home Office 2018; Refworld 20/03/1927
Turkmenistan	Conscription	Universally applied	Conscription with no evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Toronto 2017
Uganda	Alternation	Universally applied	No evidence of conscription from 1962 to 2010 (Toronto 2014). 1962-1971 ethnicity was the primary basis of conscription, yet since then, the situation has not been stable and the relationship between the military and country leaders has been changing (Harkness 2021).	Harkness 2021; Toronto 2014
Ukraine	Conscription	Universally applied	Conscription with no evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Home Office 2022
United Kingdom	Alternation	Ethnicity based exemptions	1939-1960 conscription, Asian British men, Black British men, and Northern Irish men were exempt. 1961-2010 voluntary military recruitment.	National Army Museum undated
Uruguay	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied	Conscription introduced in 1940, but only enforced for few years – coded as voluntary recruitment. One of first countries in the world to make provision for conscientious objection to military service. Attempts to integrate assure gender equality in the security sector (Brabant et al. 17/08/2021).	Toronto 2014; International Fellowship of Reconciliation 09/2013
USA	Alternation	Universally applied	Conscription abolished in 1973. No evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Toronto 2014; Murray 1971
Uzbekistan	Conscription	Universally applied	Conscription with no evidence of exemptions based on ethnicity.	Toronto 2014; Smith 1998; International Fellowship of Reconciliation 01/2020
Venezuela	NA	NA	Unclear when was conscription first introduced, yet it was in place before the revision of conscription law in 1978. While Venezuelans and Afro Venezuelans are	Segovia et al. 09/02/2022

			conscripted, it is not clear whether military service is mandatory for indigenous population. As there is evidence of indigenous population being subject to forced recruitment, I code them as 1 (Segovia et al. 09/02/2022).	
Vietnam	NA	NA	According to Keegan (1979), it is unclear which ethnic groups are serving in the military. Lack of information so I am using 0 in accordance with Toronto (2014).	Keegan 1979; Toronto 2014
Yemen / Yemen Arab Republic	Alternation	Universally applied	Coded in accordance with Toronto (2014), who indicates consistent conscription. Ended in 2001, reintroduced in 2007. The military must negotiate with tribes to support manpower, problems with loyalty (Meyerle et al. 2011).	Toronto 2014; Meyerle et al. 2011
Yugoslavia	Conscription	Universally applied	1946-1991 conscription of all male citizens of Yugoslavia, regardless of nationality.	Curtis 1990; Grlica, Šoba 2010; Pavković 2010
Zambia	Voluntary recruitment	Universally applied	No evidence of conscription from 1964 to 2010 (Toronto 2014). According to Harkness (2021), all leaders aimed at maintaining tribal balance in the military.	Harkness 2021; Toronto 2014
Zimbabwe	Alternation	Universally applied	Zimbabwe gained independence in 1965. Unclear whether there was conscription until 1979, if so, it only applied on whites of European descent, under the 1955 Defence Act (WRI 10/08/1998). According to Keegan (1979), military recruitment was voluntary. According to Harkness, only whites could become officers. However, there is no evidence of Blacks' exemption from the military. According to Toronto (2014), there was conscription from 1981 to 1982 and from 1986 to 1993. The then leader Mugabe established new units composed only of Shona soldiers, yet there is no evidence of Ndebele being exempt.	Harkness 2021; Keegan 1979; WRI 10/08/1998

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
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
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
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Appendix 6. Predicted Probabilities for Model 5






Appendix 7. Marginal Effects for Model 5



APPENDICES: CHAPTER 3


Appendix 9. Synthetic Control Results for Selected Countries



United States, pre-treatment characteristics of the treated unit and synthetic control; *Men make better political leaders than women.*

Predictor	Treated	Synthetic Control	Sample Mean
Urban Population Percentage	79.261	80.053	74.804
GDP Growth	2.955	3.061	4.891
GDP per Capita	39,893.56	5,352.54	12,095.87
Female Force Participation	45.905	42.677	38.726
Military Expenditure Indicator	1.870	1.157	1.239
Lower Chamber Legislators Percentage	14.358	23.601	16.459
D059 Lag 1	2.098	2.121	2.384

United States, synthetic control plot; *Men make better political leaders than women.*



United States, pre-treatment characteristics of the treated unit and synthetic control; *Men should have more right to a job than women.*

Predictor	Treated	Synthetic Control	Sample Mean
Urban Population Percentage	79.261	84.153	74.804
GDP Growth	2.955	2.913	4.891
GDP per Capita	39,893.56	32,018.72	12,095.87
Female Force Participation	45.905	40.967	38.726
Military Expenditure Indicator	1.870	0.916	1.239
Lower Chamber Legislators Percentage	14.358	12.220	16.459
C001 Lag 1	1.938	1.933	2.085

United States, synthetic control plot; *Men should have more right to a job than women.*

Appendix 10. RDD Robustness Checks

RDD: “Men make better political leaders than women do”					
Method	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-Value	p-Value	95% Confidence Interval
Conventional	0.392	0.066	5.962	0.000 ***	[0.263 , 0.521]
Robust	-	-	4.294	0.000 ***	[1.093 , 2.927]
Number of Observations	31324				
Bandwidth	6				
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

Bandwidth placebo test; *Men make better political leaders than women.*

RDD: “Men make better political leaders than women do”					
Method	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-Value	p-Value	95% Confidence Interval
Conventional	0.269	0.034	7.893	0.000 ***	[0.202 , 0.336]
Robust	-	-	10.265	0.000 ***	[0.708 , 1.042]
Number of Observations	31324				
Bandwidth	12				
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

Bandwidth placebo test; *Men make better political leaders than women.*

RDD: “Men make better political leaders than women do”					
Method	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-Value	p-Value	95% Confidence Interval
Conventional	0.129	0.129	0.999	0.318	[-0.124 , 0.383]
Robust	-	-	0.368	0.713	[-1.607 , 2.349]
Number of Observations	31324				
Bandwidth	5				
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

Placebo variable test; *Men make better political leaders than women.*

RDD: “Men should have more right to a job than women”					
Method	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-Value	p-Value	95% Confidence Interval
Conventional	-0.338	0.054	-6.278	0.000 ***	[-0.444 , -0.233]
Robust	-	-	-15.134	0.000 ***	[-5.844 , -4.504]
Number of Observations	31324				
Bandwidth	6				
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

Bandwidth placebo test; *Men should have more right to a job than women.*

RDD: “Men should have more right to a job than women”					
Method	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-Value	p-Value	95% Confidence Interval
Conventional	-0.856	0.029	-29.495	0.000 ***	[-0.913 , -0.799]
Robust	-	-	-8.363	0.000 ***	[-0.709 , -0.440]
Number of Observations	31324				
Bandwidth	12				
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

Bandwidth placebo test; *Men should have more right to a job than women.*

RDD: “Men should have more right to a job than women”					
Method	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-Value	p-Value	95% Confidence Interval
Conventional	0.206	0.126	1.635	0.102	[-0.041 , 0.454]
Robust	-	-	1.075	0.282	[-0.111 , 0.380]
Number of Observations	31324				
Bandwidth	5				
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

Placebo variable test; *Men should have more right to a job than women.*