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THE SMALL ISLAND SCARCELY HEARD: IRELAND'S MULTIPLE INTEGRATIONS AND IDENTITIES

GERARD W. BOUCHER

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
to the Department of Sociology,
University of Dublin (Trinity College)

October 2000, Revised August 2001

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the life and memory of Owen Gorman,

A good colleague and a great friend.

DECLARATION

This thesis has not been submitted to any
other university and is entirely my own work.

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

Gerard W. Boucher

October 2000, August 2001

SUMMARY

This dissertation develops a theory of loose multiple integrations that is applied to the Republic of Ireland. The theory focuses on the importance of analysing simultaneous loose integration processes on national and sub-national levels of societies in terms of actors' interpretation and structural influences on those interpretations. The specific integration processes include Ireland's national, British, European, global, Roman Catholic and international socialist integrations. The trajectory of Ireland's integrations and identities involves a move away from Britain towards the European Union. The argument focuses on the relative autonomy of Irish actors at the national and sub-national levels of society, and their uses of nationalism to interpret and respond to Ireland's multiple integrations. The argument stresses the continuing significance of the nation-state and nationalism for actors in EU states such as Ireland with respect to their responses to multiple integration processes.

The influence of Ireland's multiple integrations is analysed at the national level in terms of the Irish political elite, and at three sectoral levels of Irish society with respect to the organisational leaders of the Irish Farmers' Association, the Irish National Teachers' Organisation and Services Industrial Professional Technical Union. The analysis is conducted through an extensive literature review and qualitative interviews with the members of the Irish political class and the organisational leaders. In total, fifty four interviews were conducted between October 1993 and June 1994. The interviews are analysed using different methods of discourse analysis. The first identifies sectoral organisational logics or the strategies and identity choices of the three sets of organisational leaders. The second identifies the Irish political elite's dominant, residual and emergent versions. The third identifies a discursive structure underlying these versions. This discursive structure is referred to as the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency. The results of this cultural logic are compared to a structural transactional analysis of Ireland' contemporary British, European and global integrations. The roots of the cultural logic are traced to the construction of 'traditional' Irish nationalism and identity. The changes in the content of this cultural logic are analysed in independent Ireland and the contemporary period including the Celtic Tiger since 1994..

The principal results of the thesis are as follows. Of Ireland's loose multiple integrations, the organisational leaders and the members of the Irish political class primarily emphasise the

country's European integration in the organisational and cultural logics. At the sectoral level, the organisational logics of European integration vary due to the sector's level of integration, the degree of organisational autonomy in decision-making with respect to the EU, and the ability to forge alliances at the national level with the Irish state. The most successful organisation in this regard is SIPTU, positioned in a sector of middle level European integration with medium degree of autonomy. The leaders of SIPTU forged an alliance with the Irish state in the context of Ireland's national agreements and the state's reconstruction of Irish economic nationalism. This provided national support for SIPTU's organisational logic with respect to the sector's integrations. However, it also buttressed a national ideology of social partnership. Overall, the three groups of organisational leaders draw on elements from 'traditional' or the reconstructed form of Irish nationalism to interpret and respond to their particular sectoral integrations.

At the national level, the members of the Irish political elite in the dominant version overemphasise Ireland's European integration process, deemphasise the country's British integration and downplay the Republic's global integration. While emphasising the necessity of Ireland's European integration, the dominant version reacts to Europeanisation by focusing on a strong Irish culture with a core Irish national identity, propelling external identities onto the surface of Irishness. The residual version focuses on Ireland's national political autonomy from Britain, while stressing the Republic's economic dependence and dependency culture on Britain. The emergent version returns to the emphasis on Ireland's European integration, stressing the relative autonomy of Irish collective actors in areas such as gender, the environment and local communities. To explain the patterns of beliefs articulated in these versions, a cultural logic of autonomy and dependency is proposed. This cultural logic is based on Ireland's British dependency, revolving around issues of Irish autonomy and dependence. This cultural logic shapes the Irish political elite's beliefs about Ireland's multiple integrations. However, it focuses on external relations of domination, ignoring internal class, socio-economic and power based inequalities. In this way, it becomes part of a national ideology of social partnership that masks these inequalities. This is one of the main theoretical weaknesses of the theory of loose multiple integrations, limiting its applicability to the Irish experience and, more broadly, to the experiences of other European states.

CHAPTER ONE
LISTENING FOR THE VOICE OF THE IRISH NATION

1.1 The Irish Voice Among the Voices of the World

In 1933, eleven years after independence for twenty-six out of the thirty counties of Ireland ended British colonisation, the Prime Minister of the Free State, Eamon De Valera, broadcast a speech to the Irish people. The speech called 'The Values of the Spirit' (Moynihan 1980: 230-33) opened the new high-powered radio station in Athlone. In his address, De Valera announced that the radio station would 'enable the world to hear the voice of one of the oldest and, in many respects, one of the greatest of the nations'. According to De Valera, the free Christian and Gaelic voice expressed the Irish people's special task 'of helping to save western civilisation' through the 'Irish genius [of] spiritual and intellectual rather than material values'. Whatever his intentions, the heart of De Valera's speech lay in his 'traditional' nationalist appeal to the historical uniqueness of the Irish people, fusing Catholicism, rurality and agrarianism with Gaelic traditions which endowed the Irish with a global mission to save the materially driven, secular world from itself.

Almost seventy years after De Valera's speech, Irish people at the turn of the millenium live in a country two generations removed from his 'traditional' Gaelic, rural, agrarian and Catholic Irish state. The Ireland of the millennium is an urban and industrial society, Gaelic based yet influenced by Anglo-American and European cultures, predominantly Catholic but composed of a newer group of free thinking laity in a growing population of greater national, ethnic and racial diversity. Since 1993, the country has been experiencing an unprecedented economic boom popularly referred to as 'the Celtic Tiger', reversing the tide of emigration to in-migration and reducing unemployment from one of the highest levels in the OECD to one of the lowest in a space of five years. In many ways, the Ireland of the 1990s is driven by the material and secular values which De Valera sought to drive away from the world through Irish spiritual values, suggesting that it is not the world which has become more Irish but the Irish people who have become more worldly.

These changes in Ireland can be dated to 1958 when the leaders of the Irish state began to open up De Valera's protected economy, replacing an import substitution policy with a strategy of export-led industrialisation based on foreign-direct investment by overseas firms. The policy changes which followed included entering the then European Economic Community in 1973, negotiating European style national agreements with the social partners from 1987 and increasing the country's attraction of American Transnational Corporations (TNC) investment in a few high-tech sectors from the late 1980s. At the socio-cultural level, these changes involved the gradual opening up Irish society and culture through policies such as broadening domestic and foreign access to Irish media and telecommunications from the early 1960s; introducing educational reforms to increase participation and raise standards from the mid-1960s; ending de facto censorship in 1967; and liberalising Irish policies on divisive social issues like contraception, divorce and homosexuality from the late 1970s through the 1990s.

Irish people have responded to these changes by travelling, working, living and returning as emigrants from in wider range of countries than the traditional ones Britain and the United States. Many Irish artists and cultural products have achieved global recognition at least in the English-speaking world in poetry, plays, novels, acting, films, dance, music and the now ubiquitous Irish pub. One result of these changes in Irish society is that the Irish people are more self-confident in themselves and proud of being Irish. This is particularly evident among younger generations, reversing a dependency culture on Britain more evident in older generations - many of whom emigrated out of necessity or choice to Britain in the initial decades of Irish independence.

In less than a century Ireland has been transformed twice. In the first transformation, Ireland changed from a fully integrated colony of the United Kingdom and the British Empire to an independent country. This independent Ireland remained, for the most part, 'traditional' and rather insular, while retaining a post-colonial dependence on Britain. In the second transformation, Ireland has gradually become a more open, 'modern' industrial society, integrated into the European Union and a process of globalisation. Yet the country is still part of a partitioned island with a relatively small population on the northwest periphery of continental Europe. Further, Irish culture and society are significantly

influenced by events in Britain, the United States and, increasingly, the countries of European Union. Among all of these voices, what is the Irish voice saying now?

1.2 Ireland's Multiple Integrations and Identities

The title of the dissertation combines two phrases drawn from the interviews with members of the Irish political elite: 'small island' refers to Ireland, and 'scarcely heard' to the perception that the 'voice' of this small island is barely heard by others in the world.

The dissertation examines the influence of the Republic of Ireland's 'loose' multiple integrations on the logics, or pattern of strategies and identity choices, of fifty-four members from the Irish political elite at the national level and three sets of Irish organisational leaders at the sectoral level of Irish society. The general sectors of Irish society involved are agriculture, primary education and the trade union movement. The three sectoral level organisations included in the research are the Irish Farmers' Association or IFA, the Irish National Teachers' Organisation or INTO and Services Industrial Professional Technical Union or SIPTU. The research for the dissertation was conducted between October 1993 and June 1994, on the cusp of Ireland's change into a so-called 'Celtic Tiger'.

The research question arose from the limitations of analysing contemporary Irish society solely in terms of Ireland's European integration and identity construction process. This limitation is addressed by analysing other significant processes including Ireland's British, global, and national integrations alongside the country's European integration. At the organisational level, these integration processes are considered along with global 'food regimes' for Irish agriculture and the IFA; the Roman Catholic Church for Irish primary education and the INTO; and international socialism for the Irish trade union movement and SIPTU. The multiple integration processes for the national and sectoral levels are examined in historical, comparative and contemporary empirical terms drawing on an extensive literature review of available primary and secondary material. The national and organisational logics of the Irish political elite and the three sets of organisational leaders emerged from an actor centred approach based on discursive analyses of qualitative interviews with members of these elite groups. Overall, the broad trajectory of Ireland's

integrations shows a move from a British towards a European integration process. The research reflects this trajectory in Ireland's integrations by focusing directly on the movement from Ireland's British to European integration.

Chapter Two develops a theory of loose multiple integrations, drawing on Shils's concept of integration within the Durkheimian tradition in sociology. This theory modifies Shils's concept of loose integration in a national society, and addresses limitations in theories of European integration, globalisation and nationalism. The theoretical argument stresses the relative autonomy of actors in EU member states to devise strategies and make identity choices with regard to the multiple integration processes they experience. In particular, collective actors at the national and sub-national levels of societies, like Ireland, often use forms of nationalism in their collective logics of integrations and identities. One limitation of this theory is that it focuses on national and ethnic based conflicts, downplaying those based on class, socio-economic background and power.

Chapter Three identifies the central issue in researching loose multiple integrations as the relationship between actors' interpretations and structural influences on those interpretations. To address this issue, research methods were devised to sample actors' interpretations of multiple integrations; find relevant structural indicators of those integration processes; assess the accuracy of the actors' interpretations given these structural indicators; and assess any structural influence on the actors' interpretations. Specifically, the methods used balance an interpretive actor centred approach with historical, transactional and discursive structural indicators of Ireland's multiple integrations. The interpretations of the organisational leaders and the political elite are analysed as organisational logics and discursive versions. The interpretations are further analysed in structural terms, using a literature review of Ireland's national and sectoral integrations; a transactional analysis of the country's contemporary integrations; and an analysis of a deeply embedded discursive structure.

Chapter Four compares the discussion of loose Irish agricultural integrations to the organisational logic adopted by leaders of the IFA. With respect to the sector's European integration, Irish agriculture can be characterised as a sector with a high level of

integration, low degree of organisational autonomy in decision-making for the IFA and a high level of dependence. In response, the IFA's organisational logic adopts a pragmatic strategy based on protecting European support for Irish farmers. There is also an idealised alternative strategy in which farmers or Irish agri-firms export competitive goods onto the global market. In terms of identity, the IFA's organisational logic views farmers as entrepreneurs. In the alternative strategy, however, this entrepreneurial identity is combined with elements of 'traditional' Irish nationalism in reaction to the sector's European dependence and low degree of autonomy. A theory of loose multiple integrations explains this organisational logic better than theories of European integration, allowing for cultural reactions by sub-national actors against integration processes, even in sectors of high integration.

Chapter Five compares Ireland's loose educational integrations at the primary level to the interviews with leaders of the INTO. Irish primary education is part of a European sector with a high degree of autonomy and low level of dependence. The organisation is fairly dependent and constrained in its autonomy by the Irish state and the Catholic Church. The INTO's organisational logic responds through a strategy based on 'keeping an eye on the European yardstick' or using Europe as leverage to secure the organisation's interests in national-level negotiations over policies for Irish primary education. In terms of identity choices, the INTO's organisational logic draws on elements from Irish nationalism, arguing for the preservation Irish national cultural identity in the face of Ireland's British, European and global integrations. Yet the leaders of the INTO articulate their future vision of Ireland's national school system through European models of partnership, subsidiarity and secularisation, suggesting that their emphasis on Irish national identity is framed within a broader European perspective. The leaders' strategy of using Europe in national conflicts and negotiations over Irish primary educational policy reflects the 'looser' integration of the educational sector in EU member states relative to their 'tighter' national integrations.

Chapter Six examines the organisational logic of leaders from SIPTU in light of the trade union movement's loose integrations. The change in the labour movement's opposition to European integration in the early 1970s to one of support by the mid-1980s shows the

dynamic aspect of loose integrations (Shils 1982: 40, 42-3, 45). While EU institutions have increasing powers over areas of the labour force in this mid-range sector of European integration, nation-states still retain substantial control. This provides more opportunities for national and sub-national alliances. For SIPTU, this opportunity was realised through national agreements from 1987, involving a reconstruction of Irish nationalism to overcome Ireland's national economic crisis. This suggests that national alliances are a means for organisations to achieve their strategies with respect to loose sectoral integrations, and that these alliances are strengthened by a common use of nationalism. However, this reconstructed nationalism may also function as an ideology against the interests of the working classes and the socially excluded. SIPTU's organisational logic is based on a strategy of using a European model of social democracy to repel Thatcherism, regulate TNCs and reconstruct Irish socialism. The preferred identity choice is that of Irish trade unionists within Europe.

Chapter Seven analyses the interviews with the Irish political elite at the national level in terms of dominant, residual and emergent versions (Williams 1981) of Ireland's integrations. Further analysis of these discursive versions indicates the existence of an underlying cultural logic of autonomy and dependency. Giddens's theory of structuration (1984; 1993) is used to explain the continued reproduction of this cultural logic among the generations of the political elite. The cultural logic structures the dominant version through the political elite's fear of becoming dependent on the EU, or a type of relationship analogous to Ireland's historical dependence on Britain. With respect to Irish identity, the Irish political elite asserts the existence of a strong Irish culture with a core Irish identity that has survived through British colonisation of Ireland. This strong Irish culture indigenises external influences or propels them onto the surface of Irishness. This strong cultue and core Irishness compensates for the country's political and economic dependency on the EU.

Chapter Eight examines the contemporary evidence for Ireland's loose multiple integrations and identities in light of the political elite's discursive versions. The results of the transactional analysis suggest that the cultural logic systematically distorts the beliefs of the Irish political elite with respect to the structural indicators of Ireland's British,

European and global integrations. In the post-1958 period, the empirical evidence suggests that the main trajectory of Ireland's integration processes is a move away from Britain towards the Europe Union and globalisation. Ireland's integration into the EU has proceeded most clearly in politico-legal terms followed by economic integration. However, Ireland's economic integration into the EU market largely involves attracting global American TNCs to Ireland who want to export to Europe. Globalisation in the Irish case mainly concerns the opening up of Ireland to American economic and cultural influences through TNCs and the culture industry respectively. The American cultural influence is intermixed with British culture in an English-speaking, Anglo-American global culture. Further, the British influence is strengthened by Ireland's social integration into British society and the importance of the British market for Irish domestic firms.

Chapter Nine examines changes in Ireland's national integration process from the 1870s to the millennium, focusing on the construction and reconstruction of Irish nationalism and identity in three periods: 1870-1921; 1922-1957; and the post-1958 contemporary era. The goal is to identify the roots of the Irish political elite's cultural logic of autonomy and dependency in the construction of 'traditional' Irish nationalism and identity, and to trace the continuing significance of this cultural logic in the reconstruction of nationalism and identity in the contemporary period. In the post-1994 period, analysis of political elite and popular attitudes shows the continuing significance of the cultural logic in the Celtic Tiger. The Irish desire for autonomy and fear of dependency has been transferred from Britain to the EU. Further, the dominant version's belief that Ireland achieved political equality within the EU has been transferred to its global American integration. This cultural logic ignores class and socio-economic inequality in Irish society, focusing on power relations in Ireland's external integrations. This contributes to a national ideology of social partnership in Ireland, masking the increased inequality of the Celtic Tiger, while transforming Ireland's dependency on American TNCs into a successful exercise of Irish national autonomy.

Chapter Ten is divided into five parts. The first defines Ireland's principal trajectory of loose integrations as a move from a British colonial to a European integration in the context of globalisation, mediated through the country's national integration by the Irish

state. The second suggests that there is an optimal level of loose integration with regards to European, national and sub-national autonomy. The third focuses on the defensive and proactive uses of Irish nationalism, tracing the defensive uses to the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency, and suggesting that proactive uses are best understood in terms of Irish interdependence. The fourth examines the Irish uses of nationalism in a broader European context following Smith (1995) and highlights the generally negative portrayal of nationalism within the expanded Europe of the post-cold war period. Finally, the fifth part assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the theory of loose multiple integrations as applied to the Irish experience, arguing that the main weakness of theory is its inability to account for non-nationalist interpretations of integrations such as those based on class, socio-economic interests, power, status and culturally salient issues. A revised theory incorporating these factors would be more applicable to other European states.

1.3 Clarifying Some Research Issues

This summary of the chapters raises a few issues that should be addressed in more detail before proceeding to the main text. These issues are: the use of the terms 'traditional' and 'modern'; the final choice of national level integration processes for the Irish case; and the shift in the empirical chapters from the organisational strategies of European integration to versions of Irish nationalism and national identity.

The Usage of Traditional and Modern

The use of 'traditional' and 'modern' in the thesis follows the usage of these terms by those interviewed to describe and evaluate two periods of Irish society in the post-independence era. For those interviewed, the 'traditional' period usually spans the era from the early 1920s to the late 1950s and is characterised by a rather insular, narrow-minded and closed Irish society, culturally centred around an Irish national identity based on rurality, agrarianism, Gaelicisation and the Roman Catholic Church. Those interviewed often symbolically embody this 'traditional' Ireland in the form of Eamon De Valera. By contrast, the 'modern' period encompasses the era roughly from the early 1960s to the mid-1990s (to the time of the interviews) and represents a transition from the traditional era. This 'modern' period is characterised by a more liberal and outward looking Irish society, centred on Ireland's internal opening up and opening outwards to the rest of the

world. For those interviewed, the 'traditional' period tends to be evaluated in largely negative terms while the 'modern' period is judged for the most part in positive terms.

For the purposes of the thesis, this simple 'modernisationist' based dichotomy between the 'traditional' and 'modern' periods is used in the chapters with the terms bracketed by quotes to suggest that the author does not necessarily agree with their usage by those interviewed (see, also, McCarthy 2000). This does not resolve the further issue of reifying the terms by continually using them as 'real' in the text to characterise the two periods in Irish society. Perhaps the 'traditionalism' of the earlier period is better understood as an ideology (Thompson 1990: 7) that buttressed the domination of society by farmers, indigenous capitalists, professionals, the Catholic Church and the Irish state. As Fallon suggests, this ideology masked internal 'complexities and conflicts' and 'deep social and cultural change' in Irish society, including the practical rejection of rurality for urban living and values by large numbers of Irish people (Fallon 1999: 1, 267).

The Choice of Integration Processes

The choice of which integration processes to examine was guided by the initial literature review. The significance of Ireland's colonial and contemporary relationship with its 'large neighbour' Britain made it the most obvious integration process to examine. With respect to 'Europe', the choice of the European Union is based on the community's importance to Ireland in the post-1973 period. While this narrowing of Europe to the European Union reduces the geographical and historical comparability of the study in terms of integration processes, it allows for a more sustained analysis of Ireland's European integration process from the 1970s. The choice of globalisation requires clarification because of the issue of conflating Americanisation with globalisation. While there is a case to be made for the separation of these processes, particularly in terms of Ireland, those interviewed tended to mix the terms together depending on the topic discussed. For the purposes of this thesis, globalisation is intended to incorporate Americanisation except in the cases where those interviewed clearly distinguish between the processes. Finally, the interviews contained questions (and the initial drafts of the thesis contain sections) about Ireland's Developing World integration as a post-colonial country. However, those interviewed said little about

Ireland's integration into the Developing World, and those sections have been deleted from the final version of the thesis.

Shift From European Integration to Irish Nationalism and Identity

The shift in emphasis in the empirical chapters from the organisational strategies for European integration to the discussion of Irish nationalism and identity reflects the differences between the interview results at the sectoral and national levels. The three sets of organisational leaders are primarily focused on their sector's European integration, while the members of the Irish political elite are more concerned about national level issues such as Irish nationalism and identity. Thus, the shift in emphasis in the empirical chapters from European integration to Irish nationalism and identity follows from the different levels of Irish society studied in the research.

On the other hand, the choice of methods may have influenced the interview results. The sampling choice was designed to compare the beliefs of elite actors at the Irish national and sectoral levels towards Ireland's multiple integrations. The interview questions were designed to include 'sectoral' and 'national' questions about the organisation's and Ireland's integration processes respectively. The specific sectoral questions were excluded from the interviews with the non-sectoral members of the Irish political elite. In this way, the differences in the empirical chapters between the organisational strategies towards European integration and the political elite's emphasis on Irish nationalism and national identity may be artefacts of these methodological choices.

CHAPTER TWO
TOWARDS A THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTEGRATIONS

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is divided into five parts. The first examines the development of the concept of integration in sociological theory, emphasising theories of societal and national integration in the Durkheimian and, to a lesser extent, the Conflict traditions of sociology (Collins 1994). The second and third parts analyse the extent and limits of European integration and globalisation respectively, focusing on the relative autonomy of national actors. The fourth discusses the resilience of national identity and nationalism and the uses of nationalism by national actors in response to integration processes. The final part develops a theory of multiple integrations by analysing the relative autonomy of actors within EU member states to respond to simultaneous processes of integration. In particular, this section discusses the responses of actors at the national and sub-national levels of EU member states like Ireland to their particular multiple integration processes.

2.2 The Concept of Integration

The concept of integration has a long pedigree in the discipline of sociology, primarily within the Durkheimian tradition, focusing on issues like societal, national, systems, institutional, normative, cultural, value and individual integration among others (see, for example, Durkheim 1964, 1968; Eisenstadt 1967; Kluckhohn 1963; Merton 1968; Parsons 1967, 1982; Shils 1982; and Sorokin 1967). To a lesser extent, there is discussion of the concept in the Marxist strand of the Conflict tradition such as by Mannheim in terms of class (1957), by Lockwood with respect to structural and social integration (1992) and Habermas in terms of social and systems integration (1987). While not directly called 'integration', there are also some parallels in other strands of the Conflict tradition with respect to individual and group integration into society in Simmel's 'The Stranger' and 'The Metropolis and Mental Life' (Simmel 1950); in the Chicago School's ecological approach to the integration of social groups from isolation to assimilation (Park and Burgess 1969); and in Weber's discussion of differentially integrated societies according to traditional, charismatic and bureaucratic authority (Weber 1968). For our purposes, we will focus on two central discussions of the concept of integration in sociological theory:

Durkheim's classical analysis of macro and micro-societal integration and Shils's more contemporary discussion of 'tight' and 'loose' concepts of national societal integration.

Durkheim's Concept of Macro and Micro-Societal Integration

Within sociological theory, the concept of integration can be traced back to the work of Emile Durkheim, particularly in his *The Division of Labour in Society* originally published in 1893 and to a lesser extent *Suicide* first published in 1897. There are two interrelated components to Durkheim's concept of integration. The first involves a macro-societal interest in the functional and normative integration of the different structures of 'society' as society becomes 'organic' or more complex and differentiated in its division of labour (1964: 61-63, 353, 365, 398, 401). Durkheim asks 'if the division of labour would...in contemporary societies...have as its function the integration of the social body to assure unity' (p62). This first component includes a concern for anomic forms of the division of labour in organic societies or those which do not normally 'produce social solidarity' (p353) such as 'criminal occupations' (ibid), 'industrial or commercial crises' (p354) or 'the conflict between capital and labour' (ibid). With respect to these anomic forms, Durkheim expresses concern that 'the division of labour could...be pushed farther...becoming a source of disintegration' (p357) for society.

The second component involves a micro-societal interest in the integration of individuals into these modern 'organic' societies, particularly in the loss of normative individual integration into the structures of society, producing a 'state of anomy' (p368). This may result in forms of deviant behaviour such as crime or suicide of the anomic or egoistic type (1968: 152, 241, 277-294).

Durkheim's discussion of the concept of integration primarily operates at the abstract level of the 'society', although his comparative empirical discussion of suicides in a European context suggests that in practice the term 'society' tends to mean nation-states (1968). This equivalence between society and the nation-state is implied in the conclusion of *The Division of Labour in Society* which discusses the achievement of 'human fraternity' by resolving 'intersocial conflicts' between societies through the progressive evolution of the division of labour (p405). Thus, Durkheim states it is 'possible that

societies of the same type may come together' (ibid) by moving from a division of labour based on national societies to one formed by a 'European society' followed by 'the formation of a single human society' (pp405-406). In this way, Durkheim suggests the contours - without delving into the content - of a concept of integration which extends beyond national societies to include European and global dimensions.

Shils's Concepts of 'Tight' and 'Loose' Integration

Following Durkheim, there have been a number of theorists in the Durkheimian tradition who have discussed aspects of the concept of integration. These theoretical discussions do not usually have Durkheim's comprehensive macro-sociological and micro-sociological range, with the exception of Talcott Parsons (see, for example, Eisenstadt 1967; Kluckhohn 1963; Merton 1968; Parsons 1967, 1982; Shils 1982; and Sorokin 1967). Most of these discussions work within the structure of Durkheim's conception of integration at the macro-sociological societal level, but focusing on sub-societal levels of integration - or potential disintegration - in terms of systems, institutional, cultural, value and individual integration into society (ibid). However, such theorists rarely move from a theoretical discussion of the integration of abstract societies to theorising about the integration of historical and empirical national societies. There are a few exceptions to this pattern including Eisenstadt (1967: 216-219) and, most significantly for our purposes, Shils's discussion of 'The Integration of Society' in his *The Constitution of Society* originally published in 1972 (1982).

Introducing his discussion, Shils argues that the concept of integration has been largely rejected 'as reactionary' by those in the Marxist Conflict tradition. Further, he notes that, in spite of some interest by those in the Durkheimain tradition, 'modern sociologists have not devoted much attention to the study of the integration of society as a whole' (1982: 5). In addressing this relative lack of attention, Shils is concerned to devise a concept of societal integration which is theoretically applicable to contemporary issues faced by both long established and newer national societies. These societies include those facing 'the urgent problem of the integration of whole societies' in 'the new sovereign states in succession to the former colonial empires' (p6), the 'crisis of national integration...in the

longer established states of the West' and the attempt by 'the major European states' to integrate 'into a transnational community' (p7).

To encompass this range of issues, Shils constructs a multifaceted concept of integration that includes what might be called 'tight' and 'loose' concepts of societal integration. The 'tight' concept follows the more or less standard Durkheimian macro-sociological interest in normative integration in which integration is concerned 'with the bonds and structures which form parts...into a society' (p9). More specifically:

> A society is integrated if its various parts are indirectly and directly in interaction with each other beyond the ties of lineage, intermarriage, and procreation through a planned or unplanned division of labour and through the network of exchange of goods and services. It is integrated if it has a pattern of distribution of rewards which is seen as spanning the "entire society" - the population residing within the significantly delineated territory. It is integrated if those living on the territory are at one time or another under common authority which is exercised in accordance with a conception of legitimacy attributed to it by many persons living in the territory who regard it as the rightful authority over that territory. It is integrated if those who live in its territory have a common culture. Finally, it is integrated on the ground that they possess "qualities" conferred simply by regularly living on the bounded territory which defines the outer limits of the society. They are "affectively"...attached to each other on the basis of their common possession of those qualities - whether they are in direct interaction with each other or act toward each other only indirectly and at a distance (pp25-26).

Thus, the components of an integrated society include geographical, social, demographic, economic, political, cultural and psychological processes that interact with each other. The 'tightness' of this concept of societal integration lies in the presumed 'fit' between the different component parts of the society interacting with each other 'smoothly' - like pieces in a machine - to continually reproduce over time the state of integration for the people in the bounded space of the society.

Having established what a tightly bound society might look like, Shils proceeds to unbind this conception to theorise about a more 'loosely' integrated society or one that is 'an extremely incomplete affair...labile, shifting [and] intermittent' (p45). He argues that:

> It is impossible for any society to be fully integrated. It is also impossible for it to be completely unintegrated...The integration of a society is the outcome of a number of independent processes or factors. They do not all operate in the same direction. Each of them, furthermore, has contradictory results: they both increase and decrease integration...Integration is not homogenous over the entire society. It is never more than partial. It is not constant or continuous. It is frequently shifting from one part of the society to others...Sometimes it is high in the relations of one sector of society to the center, at others it might be suspended or loosened; at other times in the same sector...integration might be modified into some degree of conflict, with some measure of integration persisting in that as well as in other spheres. Similarly, between points of time, parts of society which have been relatively closely integrated to the center can cease to be so, while others which have been relatively unintegrated might become more integrated (pp40, 42-3, 45).

In this 'loosely' integrated conception of society, each part has a degree of autonomy or independent action relative to the other parts of society. Overall, the sometimes 'rough' interactions between these interdependent parts of society manage to reproduce a relatively permanent state of integration, overcoming in the process the parts which at any point in time are in a state of disintegration or that remain relatively unintegrated. Shils characterises the 'loosely' integrated society as an 'unevenly dense network of integration' (p35) in which the parts 'are in a state of partially autonomous interdependence' (ibid) with each other (ibid), resulting in a state of integration in which 'unintegratedness works within the limits of integration' (ibid).

More concretely, Shils discusses how specific parts of society may be loosely integrated with each other. Of particular importance are those that have to do with cultural and social integration. Thus, Shils notes that 'the culture of society is never completely uniformly shared by all the members of that society' (p36) and that 'in most societies there is much cultural heterogeneity, even where elements of a common culture are widely shared' (p38).

Further, he argues that 'even in societies with a high degree of ecological [demographic and economic] integration' with legitimate political 'authority' and a 'common culture', 'pluralism and privacy...provide islands which are free from conflict with other parts of society and from integration into society' (pp45-46).

In this loosely integrated society, group differences from the common culture may combine with the private pluralism of group members in their everyday lives into socio-cultural institutions or 'cultural - religious and secular intellectual - centers' (p35). These institutions and their agents collectively articulate group needs with respect to the institutions of the center, acting to maintain their partial autonomy from 'the centers of power, authority, wealth and deference' (ibid). These group differences 'in degrees of authoritative and cultural integration' may correspond 'generally to positions in the stratification of the society' (p41), to the collective disadvantage of the culturally different group, heightening its sense of cultural difference.

In relating these cultural and social differences to the social stratification - as opposed to the class position - of peripheral group members in the loosely integrated society, Shils draws on the Weberian strand of the Conflict tradition in sociology. Specifically, there are parallels to Weber's discussion of the origins and uses of cultural differences by ethno-national groups for 'monopolistic closure' in terms of class position, social status and political power within national societies (Weber 1968: 385-398; 2000: 238-252). There are also direct parallels with Hechter's discussion of the 'cultural division of labour' in Britain's internal colonisation of its Celtic Fringe (1975: 9, 38-40, 314-15). Shils's concept of 'loose' integration is more open and less deterministic than Hechter's more Neo-Marxist account of the relationship between economic and cultural integration. Further, Shils specifies the functional need for confluence of a number of partially autonomous yet interdependent factors and allows for a greater range of responses by actors (see below).

Thus, Shils argues that in a loosely integrated society 'increased economic integration does not necessarily increase [social] solidarity even though it integrates the society ecologically and heightens awareness of the centre and intensifies its self-denomination'

(p26). In other words, given this confluence of specific factors - group cultural differences, private pluralism, separate institutions and disadvantaged stratification - increased economic integration the center of a society may or may not lead to a cultural reaction by members of the 'peripheral' group against the center's common culture or even against the total process of integration into the center.

The likelihood of this cultural reaction is increased, however, if one adds 'territorial peripherality' (p29) to this confluence of factors. The result may be 'separatism' (ibid), expressed in the form of a movement for 'the most dramatic form of disintegration of societies, namely, secession' from the center (p10). The secessionist movement often draws on the 'culture' of the territorial peripheral group which is often 'incompletely assimilated' into the center's common culture and tends 'to retain...[the group's] own traditions and some sense of their past distinctiveness and separateness' (p29).

Yet, Shils stresses the complexity of the individual situation for secessionists in a loosely integrated society, who 'wish to cease being members of the society which they dislike' while acknowledging 'that they are members of it until their secession is successful' (p29). These integrated secessionists may as 'individuals...dislike being members of that society, they can disparage and refuse to accept its culture, but they remain members of it nonetheless - nominatively, ecologically, and even authoritatively and culturally' (ibid). In this way, no matter how 'much they wish to escape from it or however profoundly they wish to change it, they are integrated into their society' (ibid). Further, if a territorial secessionist movement achieves national independence from its former center, some of these complex forms of loose economic, political, social, cultural and psychological integration may continue into the post-independence period in the relationship between the two 'countries' or distinct national societies.

Shils suggests some of the pre-independence complexity of loose integration between the center and periphery of national societies in a discussion of the 'separation of southern Ireland from the United Kingdom' in the period after the first world war compared to the secessions of 'India, Pakistan and Ceylon from the British Empire after the second world war (p12). For Shils, the main difference between is that:

> Southern Ireland was more integrated...economically and demographically into British society than were India, Pakistan or Ceylon. There was a nearly completely shared common language; there was much more overlapping of religious belief and of religious institution. They were separated from each other by a relatively small body of water with no other societies intervening between them (p12).

However, Ireland's greater overall integration into Britain was not interpreted by enough Irish 'nationalists' to mean that Ireland was an integral part of British society like a less developed English county or others 'nations' within the United Kingdom such as Wales or Scotland. For these Irish 'nationalist' actors the remaining cultural differences between the 'Irish' and the 'British' merited a politically autonomous Irish society. Thus, Shils argues:

> Despite the community of the English language...that community did damage to the "true" language of Ireland. Despite the fact that both were Christian countries, the secessionists stressed the differences between Roman Catholics and Protestants within Christianity. The important thing [here] is that a boundary around a population bearing a common culture and a distinctive name is thought to be indispensable to the formation of an autonomous society. Natural, geological, or geographical barriers might aid in this territorial definition but they are not decisive (p13).

For Shils, it is decisive that enough Irish nationalist actors interpreted Ireland's extensive integration into the United Kingdom to mean that the perceived boundary between Irish and British culture was being eroded, threatening to fully assimilate a distinctive Irish culture and 'national' identity into British culture and identity. This interepretation was then politically used by these nationalist actors in the secessionist movement for Ireland's 'independence' from Britain.

What is ultimately decisive for Shils's analysis of secession from a loosely integrated society is not the level or degree of economic, political, social and cultural integration between a national core and its periphery, but the cultural meaning attributed to the integration process by significant collective actors, which informs their choice to organise into nationalist movements and their strategy to struggle for secession from the core. The

cultural meaning that the actors assign to the integration process informs their identity choices and their strategies in response to the process of integration. In attributing meaning to the periphery's integration into the national core, these secessionist actors have at least two identity choices to make: accept the peripheral culture's continued assimilation into the core culture or reject this assimilation in favour of a reactive peripheral nationalism that protect the peripheral culture (see, also, Hechter 1975: 10, 38-43, 314-315).

Shils's concept of loose integration, however, does not necessarily reduce the choices of nationalist actors to either of these two options. The partial interdependent autonomy of societal institutions and the incomplete assimilation of nationalist actors provides interpretive space for a range of different meanings, identity choices and strategies with respect to the national process of integration. Thus, the bipolar cultural choices of either full cultural assimilation or reactive cultural nationalism may be reinterpreted as a range of cultural choices, for example, Gordon's seven types of assimilation - cultural, structural, marital, identificational, attitude receptional, behavior receptional and civic (1978: 169). Thus, one can support 'their' distinctive group culture while believing in the civic values of the larger national society. Nationalist actors can also adopt different strategies with respect to the various types of integration. For example, they can support continued national economic integration to the extent that it benefits the 'people' in the peripheral nation, while opposing increased national political integration because it reduces their political autonomy. Similarly, the strategies of nationalist actors can include struggle for various levels of cultural, economic and political autonomy or specific national policies such as laws in support of institutional pluralism, multiculturalism, anti-discrimination or positive action.

Shils's loose concept of integration significantly decouples the structure or types and level of an integration process from how an actor interprets the meaning of and acts towards the integration process. The actor's meaning, identity choices and strategies are not strictly determined by the structure of the integration process. This does not mean that one can not identify general patterns of actor meanings, identity choices and strategies as corresponding to a particular confluence of factors in a specific integration process. Shils here incorporates Weber's methodological focus on actors' 'interpretive understanding' of

'the phenomena of life in terms of their cultural significance' expressed as 'ideal types' (Weber 1962: 29, 52-53; 1949: 76, 90) into his discussion of integration in the Durkheimian tradition (see, also, Chapter Three).

Thus, Shils and Hechter both identify a pattern of secessionist cultural nationalism in peripheral regions by 'nationalist' collective actors against a national core integration in which peripheral group cultural differences interact with economic stratification to the disadvantage of the peripheral group. For Shils, though, as opposed to Hechter, this confluence of structural factors in the integration process can lead to any number of meanings, identity choices and strategies by peripheral actors with respect to the integration process.

Further, Shils's concept of loose integration does not determine the end-state or goal of an integration process given that societal integration is always partial, shifting and intermittent. Independent factors simultaneously increase and decrease integration in different parts of the society and at different rates. It is thus better to conceptualise the process of societal integration as a range of constantly shifting states in a more or less similarly bounded space. At one end of this range lies an almost completely disintegrated society at the point of becoming a society integrated at a lower level or one broken up into a number of different societies (1982: 10). At the other lies Shils's 'tightly' integrated society following more closely Durkheim's concept of macro and micro-societal integration. In this sense, the 'tight' normatively integrated Durkheimian society represents less an empirical reality for national societies than a logical ideal. At the same time, peripheral secession represents a special case based on a confluence of particular structural factors and actor responses in a loosely integrated national society, not representative of the state of loose integration in most national societies most of the time.

A weakness in Shils's approach is that it is primarily limited to the integration of national societies, whether created through national secession from the former European Empires, the integration of post-colonial nation-states, cases of civil war and revolution or national minorities in developed Western nation-states (pp7, 11-19). Shils mentions the issue of European transnational integration as one of importance to the concept of integration (pp7-

8), but does not specifically address the issue in his theoretical discussion of the concept of loose integration or in his application of this concept to specific cases. Nor does he address the more complex issue of simultaneous multiple integration processes, particularly for collective actors at the national level. In contemporary Ireland, for example, these 'multiple integrations' could include the country's on-going process of national integration, a continuing post-colonial relationship with Britain, transnational European integration and global integration. Have theorists of European integration, globalisation and nationalism constructed theories of 'multiple integrations'?

2.3 The Levels and Limits of European Integration

Theorists of European integration often portray the process of European integration as proceeding, in varying form and pace, from national states and national identity to a European political and economic union with its own common culture and shared identity (see, for example, Deutsch et al 1969; Etzioni 1974; Haas 1968; and Lindberg and Scheingold 1971). They assume that the only integration process experienced by collective actors in national states is that of European integration. This is not to say that they are unaware of the importance of linkages between national, European and global integration processes. Thus, one of the classical theorists of European integration, Ernst Haas, proposes a 'field of "linkage politics" – as a conceptual bridge between theories of the international system and theories of national behaviour' (in Lindberg and Scheingold 1971: 5). Haas further argues that 'relations between the regional system' and the global system 'can be of immense importance in explaining integration' (p16). Nonetheless, theorists of European integration are generally more concerned to study the process of European integration from the national to the European level than to theorise the linkages between a number of integration processes such as those between national, European and global integrations. This limitation of European integration theories is recognised by Michaelmann and Soldatos who claim that:

> The absence of an "integrated" model, representing the relations tying the European integrative system to the national subsystems, on the one hand, and to the global international system, on the other, constituted a major limitation in the theoretical approaches to European integration (1994: 7).

Within this 'major' limitation, there is extensive analysis of both the extent and limits of European integration above the national level specifically with respect to the dimensions of legal, economic, political, social and cultural integration. The extent of European integration varies considerably both between and within these dimensions of European Union societies. At present, legal integration is probably the most integrated dimension of European national societies through the actions of the European Court of Justice from the 1960s in establishing the direct effect and supremacy of European law (Temple Lang in Laffan 1996). As a result of European legal integration, 'each member state has two interlocking constitutions: its own constitution and the Community constitution which it shares with the other member states' (Laffan in Laffan 1996: 26).

Economic integration has been increasing since the late 1980s with the introduction of the single market followed by the Maastricht guidelines, the establishment of the European Central Bank and the planned implementation of the single currency by 2002. Yet national governments remain in control of substantial areas of socio-economic policy including budgets, taxation, defence, education and social welfare. They have capped the EU budget since 1992 to 1.27 per cent of total EU GNP (Swann 1996: 143). Further, in spite of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform packages since the late 1980s, roughly half of the EU budget is still consumed by the programmes associated by the CAP (p162). The agricultural sector is the most integrated part of the European economy and will remain so until the introduction of the single currency.

In terms of political integration, Laffan characterises the European Union as 'a part-formed political system' (in Laffan 1996: 14). In this partly formed polity, policy-making is 'highly fragmented and segmented into a myriad of policy networks around the core institutions' (ibid). The fragmented and 'segmented nature of EU policy-making' revolves around 'three pillars operating on the basis of different decision rules and institutional prerogatives' as well as at least 'twenty-two decision-making procedures' (p11). These procedures range from those which are primarily intergovernmental in nature, such as foreign policy-making, to those which involve the 'pooling of sovereignty' in some form or another, as in the Common Agricultural Policy. Decision-making mechanisms include 'eleven legislative procedures, two budgetary procedures, three procedures for

international agreements and two procedures for the appointment of members of EU institutions' (ibid).

As a partly formed 'state', Laffan argues that the EU 'may now be referred to as a "regulatory state" as many of its policies are designed to regulate the behaviour of public agencies and private firms' (p17). While EU regulatory behaviour primarily involves 'economic regulation' with respect to the functioning of the single market, the Union's institutions have become increasingly involved in "social regulation" largely following the introduction of the social chapter in the Maastricht Treaty (ibid). EU social regulation primarily involves areas 'such as health and safety in the workplace, consumer protection, product safety, public health and environmental policy' (ibid). Nonetheless, it remains very limited. Most areas of national societies are still controlled by national governments, subject to the limited Treaty policy interventions, decision-making procedures for those policies and rulings by the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.

Compared to other spheres of European integration, it is arguable that European national societies are least integrated in terms of culture, particularly with respect to the construction of a European cultural identity. Part of the difficulty here is shown by the Council of Europe's contradictory phrase of 'unity in diversity' to express a pan-European cultural identity. For Ahrweiler, the 'unity of Europe is more a mental construct, the foundation myth of a pluralist civilisation, than it is a reality that may be experienced' (in Garcia 1993: 31). In fact, one could argue that there is both a myth of European unity and a myth of European diversity. The myth of European cultural unity combines a series of discrete elements - places, events, institutions and values - into a narrative of a core European identity. These elements include Ancient Greece, Rome, Christendom, the Renaissance, the Reformation, Capitalism and Modernisation from which arose democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, individualism and a critical spirit (Bance 1992; Nelson et al 1992; Rijksbaron 1987). The myth of European cultural diversity draws on romantic nationalism, essentialising the cultures of the various peoples of Europe within the shifting political boundaries of the European region, resulting in discrete 'culture peoples' based on ethnicity, culture or religion (Nelson et al 1992).

The reality appears to be both more complex and yet simple. There is no European cultural identity. The term 'Europe' does not refer to a geographical, ethnic, racial, linguistic or religious unit (Nelson et al 1992; Rijksbaron 1987; Wallace 1990). However, there is real cultural diversity between and within European nation-states and cultural areas, based on nationality, regions, communities, ethnicity, language, religion, race, core and peripheral regions and a North-South as well as an East-West divide (Garcia 1993; Gillespie 1996b; Wilson and Smith 1993). Of these the one which appears to be the most empirically salient is nationality or national identity. A Eurobarometer survey conducted during the interviews for this study showed that 40 per cent of the people surveyed across the EU member states saw themselves solely in terms of their nationality, with 45 per cent seeing themselves as their nationality first and European second, while only 4 per cent saw themselves as being just European (Eurobarometer 40 1993: 83). The continued significance of national identity for the overwhelming majority of the people in the EU member states has led Llobera to conclude that:

> National identities, at whatever level, will continue to exist. Bavarian, Scottish and Catalan identities have survived for a long time, alongside German, British and Spanish identities. There is no reason why things should be different in the future (in Garcia 1993: 78).

Nonetheless, the European institutions have been increasingly involved in a top-down attempt to construct a European cultural identity, particularly since the advent of the single market project in mid-1980s. Thus, the Adonnino Committee Reports on a 'People's Europe' and the Commission's Bulletin on those reports recommended a number of policies for the construction of a European common identity (Bulletin 2/88). They included the creation of common symbols like a European flag and anthem; human, organisational and institutional exchanges in education, youth and sport; and legislation to free cross-border access and workers' rights of movement, establishment, residence and voting (ibid). While these policy recommendations were subsequently enacted, the construction of a European cultural identity remains elusive.

Yet the salience of the issue has become more significant since the late 1980s, reflecting a perceived need among the Union's leaders to move beyond the prior emphasis on economic integration towards a 'new legitimising framework at both popular and elite

levels' (Gillespie 1996b: 42). This is required to overcome the negative reactions of some member states' electorates to increased integration as expressed in Treaty referenda or European Parliament elections in Denmark, France and Britain as well as to address the so-called democratic, legitimacy and knowledge deficits in the Union. Gillespie argues that it is:

> Important to find a new definition of the European project within which the concept of a European cultural identity [assumes] a central significance. It coincides with a realisation that the "permissive consensus" of popular attitudes that underwrote previous phases of elite and mainly economic integration will no longer suffice in new circumstances which raise political union as an explicit objective (p41).

At the academic level, there have been a number of attempts to re-conceptualise the meaning of a European cultural identity. One of the main difficulties has been to acknowledge both the reality of European cultural diversity and the continued salience of national and other collective identities in EU member states, while a sense of Europeanness that fosters affective and utilitarian support. Some of concepts introduced to address this issue include multiple loyalties, multiple allegiances, multiple identities, shared identity, layers of identity and concentric identities (Garcia 1993; Haas in Lindbergh and Scheingold 1971; Hewstone 1986; Moxon-Browne in Laffan 1996; Wilson and Smith 1993). They have in common an attempt to construct a European identity that incorporates the most significant collective identities from the cultural diversity within the nations of the member states including gender, class, ethnicity, race, family, community, region, nation, Europe and the world. These theorists stress that 'almost all EU citizens have multiple identities' (Moxon-Browne in Laffan 1996: 86). That is, the contemporary reality of collective identities in European nation-states is already characterised by multiple identities, even if the peoples of the European Union do not readily acknowledge this. From this perspective, the introduction of a European identity becomes less of an issue, assuming that one abandons a zero-sum concept of identity in which a European identity constructed is seen as replacing national identities in the member states. Whatever the merits of this perspective, the result is still the same: that European cultural integration remains the least successful sphere of integration within the European Union.

Overall, the extent of European economic, legal, social, political and cultural integration has led to debates about the erosion of national sovereignty and autonomy both from above by the EU institutions and below from the increasing role of regions, local communities and transnational interest groups in the integration process (Laffan 1996: 18). In particular, Laffan notes the 'expansion of the Union's regulatory capacity and its possession of financial resources'; the rise of 'regionalist political and cultural movements in Europe' such as 'the Catalan CiU, the Welsh Plaid Cymru, the Scottish Nationalists and the Lega Lombarda'; the increasing importance of regions in the most federal states including 'the German Lander, the Belgian regions and the Spanish autonomous communities'; and the emergence of transnational interest groups like 'environmental groups, women's groups and networks of "carers" and anti-poverty groups' which 'serve to reduce the gatekeeper role of national governments and to create horizontal linkages among Western European polities' (pp18-19).

Laffan suggests that this gradual 'erosion' of national sovereignty and autonomy from above and below represents a profound transformation of traditional European nation-states. Specifically, she argues that:

> The Union is part of a new multi-levelled system which extends political space beyond the level of the state and hence alters the institutional configuration of the traditional nation-state in a profound manner. The nation-state has not been transcended but is being transformed by the process of European integration and the wider internationalisation of economics and politics (p195).

On the other hand, she accepts that the limits of European integration are largely defined by the member states. In terms of European policy-making, she acknowledges that 'choices are made not on the basis of "values", political programmes and preferences but on the so-called "national interests"' (p20). In this way, 'policy outcomes are based on coalitions of national interests' with the result that 'defending the "national interest", bringing home the bacon and scapegoating the Union serve the...interests of national political actors' (p22). Further, Laffan accepts the centrality of nation-states in the European integration process, stating that:

> The member states provide the basic building-blocks of the Union, pooling their sovereignty within treaty defined limits. The national or domestic dimension of integration is seen in the dominance of territorial representation

> in this system. Intergovernmental bargains between the member states, especially the larger ones, establish the framework for EU politics by means of the treaties (p14).

The tension between arguing that national sovereignty is being eroded by European integration, and arguing that nation-states contain European integration, leads Laffan to suggest that one of the main political conflicts in the EU is 'the issue of integration itself, the balance between sovereignty and integration' (p16). While the extent of European integration has been increasing at least since the late 1980s, national collective actors in the member states still retain significant levels of relative autonomy with respect to the process of European integration in terms of the EU Treaties, institutions and decision-making mechanisms and procedures.

The relative autonomy of collective actors within EU member states is argued from a 'realist' perspective on international relations by Milward in *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (1992). For Milward, the European integration process has not entailed the erosion of national sovereignty in member states. Instead, he argues that 'the evolution of the European Community since 1945 has been an integral part of the reassertion of the nation-state'(p2) in that the:

> Development of the European Community, the process of European integration was...a part of that post-war rescue of the European nation-state, because the new political consensus on which this rescue was built required the process of integration, the surrender of limited areas of national sovereignty to the supranational (p4).

While primarily concerned with the period from 1945 to 1968, Milward shows how the collective actors within states involved in the process of European integration chose both to become more interdependent, through pooling their sovereignty in certain areas, and to increase the range of the nation-state in domestic policies largely through the development of the social welfare state (p10). Focusing on the choices, Milward stresses that:

> Integration was not the supercession of the nation-state by another form of governance as the nation-state became incapable, but was the creation of the European nation-states themselves for their own purposes, an act of national will...there has surely never been a period when national government in Europe exercised more effective power and more extensive control over its citizens than since the Second World War (p18).

For our purposes, the importance of Milward's perspective is his emphasis on the relative autonomy of collective actors within the EU member states to choose either to further the European integration process or 'to erect finite barriers to the process of interdependence' (p19). Further, Milward stresses that these choices are made by the smaller, weaker states like Ireland as well as the larger, more powerful European states like Germany. Specifically, he discusses the potential benefits of choosing interdependence for a smaller nation-state with respect to overcoming its vulnerability:

> A small power's vulnerability to interdependence might actually be reduced by extending the range and complexity of the transactions in which it engages, and conceivable also that the formalisation of such transactions in international treaties and agreements would further reduce its vulnerability. Thus the serious costs of interdependence to a weaker state could be...reduced by the formalisation of rules of interdependence, of which one specific example could be the process of European integration (ibid).

Milward's argument suggests the usefulness of analysing the relationship between EU nation-states and the process of European integration in terms of a perspective based on interdependence. From this perspective, there is no need to reduce the type of national-European relationship to the total erosion of national sovereignty through European interdependence or the retention of complete national sovereignty by the nation-state through the exercise of its independence. For smaller states like Ireland, this also avoids an undue focus on the country's vulnerability or dependence on external collective entities such as the European Union.

2.4 The Levels and Limits of Globalisation

The meaning of the term 'globalisation' is very much contested with respect to its temporal span and the scope of its application. Some theorists discuss globalisation largely in terms of the rise and expansion of Western capitalism from the mid-1500s (Wallerstein in King 1991; Sklair 1991). From this perspective, the globalisation process is based on the economic sphere, driven by the economic and technological developments characteristic of global capitalist epochs, led by hegemonic nation-states such as Britain and the United States or more directly in recent times by multinational and transnational corporations (Sklair 1991).

Other theorists discuss globalisation from a longer and broader perspective, viewing the globalisation process in historical terms beginning with the rise of human civilisations, and increasing with the rise of the West from the mid-1500s along economic, political, social and cultural spheres (Robertson 1992; see also Holton 1998). Thus, Robertson discusses a globalisation process which is world historical in temporal terms, emerging with 'the rise of...world religions two thousand years ago' (pp6-7) and increasing in intensity over five phases from the mid-1400s to the present day (pp58-9). Robertson's use of the concept is broader in scope referring to 'the objectiveness of increasing interconnectedness' as well as 'cultural and subjective matters' (p183), incorporating economic as well as political and socio-cultural spheres of global integration. Holton discusses the broadness of globalisation through the concept of multidimensionality, which refers to 'seeing multiple aspects of social life – economic, political, cultural, and so forth – together with multiple centres of action and multiple players within the global field,' (pp190-1).

However, the main theorists of globalisation seem to agree that we live in an era of accelerating globalisation, whether driven largely by economic, political or socio-cultural factors, which began in the late 1960s with the first cracks in the post-war Bretton Woods system and continued with increasing rapidity through the 1980s and 1990s (Hannerz 1996, 1992; Holton 1998; Featherstone et al 1995; Featherstone 1990; Robertson 1992; Sklair 1991). Arguably, we now live in a world that is more interdependent than ever before in human history. Not surprisingly, this theoretical agreement about the increasing levels of global interdependence has led to a debate about whether the sovereignty of nation-states, the relative autonomy of national collective actors and the significance of nationalism and national identity have been gradually and irrevocably superseded by global collective entities and processes.

While much of this debate stresses the inevitable erosion of national sovereignty, autonomy and identity, Holton (1998) offers a more balanced analysis, weighing the extent of global integration against the limits of contemporary globalisation with respect to nation-states. Of particular importance is Holton's use of the concept of conditional

sovereignty (p120, p123) to emphasise both the extent of globalisation and the national limits to global integration. Conditional sovereignty primarily refers to national limits to global political integration. Thus, while showing the extension of 'transnational political and legal institutions' such as the UN, the EU and international NGO's (p109, p122), he argues that nation-states retain a significant level of conditional sovereignty with respect to these institutions. Specifically, he claims that:

> National sovereignty remains intact in an ultimate juridical sense, but is increasingly conditional upon compliance with a range of transnational regulatory regimes. This reflects increased international interdependency and the growth of problems that nation-states believe...can only be effectively addressed through international co-operation and transnational agreement (p123).

While Holton uses the term conditional sovereignty primarily to discuss the limits to political globalisation, the concept can be extended to his analysis of the national limits to global economic integration. Here he examines the rise and growth of multinational enterprises (MNE's) or transnational corporations (TNC's), post-war transnational regulatory bodies such as the IMF, World Bank and the former GATT or present WTO as well as transnational economic chains and alliances based on diasporas, organised crime and migratory labour (pp50-107). We will focus on the relationship between nation-states and MNE's and between nation-states and transnational regulatory bodies.

With respect to MNE's, Holton demonstrates their considerable economic power in the global economy, pointing out for example that 'the value of production by multinational companies now exceeds that of world trade itself' (p54). On the other hand, he also argues 'that MNE's and nation-states need each other' and that 'the relationship between the two allows for significant elements of bargaining between them' (p101). In specifying the nature of the typical relationship between nation-states and MNE's, Holton notes that MNE's:

> Do not typically operate outside national jurisdiction, whether at home or abroad. Rather, they depend on state structures to guarantee stable property rights...In addition, states may also provide infrastructural support and favourable fiscal treatment. Given that MNE's depend or rely on nation-states in this manner, it might well be supposed that the nation-state is alive and well rather than in decline (p83).

However, Holton also suggests that a nation-state's conditional sovereignty relative to MNE's is unequally distributed in favour of the Developed countries of the world. Thus, he notes the capitalist basis of the global economy and the neo-liberal bias to the system accrue disproportionate benefits to the countries of the Developed World, particularly those 25 countries or so in which MNE's are located (p94). Developed nation-states receive more benefits as well as exercise more conditional sovereignty with respect to MNE's (p101):

> A range of policies [have] emerged to limit MNE autonomy, including controls on inward investment, incentives to domestic industry, and product standards for environmental protection. Such limitations are conditional in scope. That is to say, they rarely go so far as to threaten a capital 'strike', involving MNE's in the wholesale abandonment of their investments (p101).

With regards to the post-war transnational regulatory bodies, Holton highlights the 'Western' and neo-liberal bias in these institutions which tend to function 'in the interests of the powerful' (p73). Tracing the development of these regulatory institutions in the post-war period up to the 1990s, he claims that they have become 'a constitutive part of the global economy' (p68), providing a level of regulation for substantial areas of the global economy including world trade through the WTO, exchange rates via the IMF and economic development in terms of the World Bank (ibid). On the other hand, Holton specifies the national limits, and the continuing Developed world bias, to these transnational regulatory bodies, stating that:

> Nation-states have been major players in the foundation and continued funding of the regulatory bodies...As with the UN itself, participation in the IMF or WTO is through nationally based representation. Those nations which provide disproportionate funding of these organisations exert disproportionate influence on their objectives and functioning (p78).

In terms of economic globalisation, then, Holton shows the extent and limits of global economic integration, arguing for both 'the continuing resilience of the nation-state' (p103) as well as for the position that 'certain aspects of the national sovereignty, but not the institution of the nation-state, have undoubtedly been eroded by economic globalisation' (p101). In this way, he balances the arguments for the erosion of the nation-state with those for the retention of sovereignty by nation-states and the relative autonomy of national collective actors with respect to global economic integration:

> While I have argued that state sovereignty is highly conditional on global patterns of interdependence, the state is far from being submerged, either by global capitalism or by transnational political organisation (p134).

While this argument could be further extended to the socio-cultural sphere of global integration, Holton tends to characterise the role of nationalism particularly with respect to national cultures and national identity in rather negative and reactive terms. He emphasises national reactions and resistance to the 'threat' of external integrations such as globalisation, as well as the role of 'nationhood' in 'retaining identity and security in situations of challenge, destabilisation and crisis' (p135, pp150-151). Reactive or defensive forms of nationalism by national collective actors remain significant responses to external integration processes such as European integration and globalisation. As will be shown, the study of the Irish case amply demonstrates the importance of these uses of reactive forms of nationalism by collective actors at the national and sub-national levels of Irish society. However, in discussing socio-cultural global integration, it is useful to also examine proactive uses of nationalism, providing a more balanced analysis of the subject and to choose from among a range of cultural components, identity constructs and forms of nationalism in response to external integration processes. While globalisation may be perceived as a threat to be defended against by national collective actors in Holton's analysis, socio-cultural global integration also opens up opportunities for these collective actors to respond in proactive, independent ways within the constraints of global interdependence.

One of the main debates about global culture is whether globalisation is leading to the homogenisation of national cultures and societies across the world. However, this question often becomes conflated with another one about whether global cultural integration is leading to the Americanisation of national cultures and societies. Holton's discussion of the issue is useful here as a starting point (see, also, Sklair 1991: 150-5). For Holton:

> The Americanisation thesis builds on a number of key points. One is the theme of predominant American ownership of key resources for the manufacture and transmission of culture, including satellite systems, information technology, manufacture, news agencies, the advertising industry, television programme production and export, and the film industry. Cultural homogenisation, in this sense, is linked with the predominant role of the USA in the export of television, film and news information (p166).

Further, Holton suggests that this Americanisation thesis includes two other themes. The first is the 'USA's role in constructing a regulatory framework within culture and information industries that favours US interests' (p167). The second involves a wider American 'diffusion of cultural practices across...a number of settings, moving beyond culture and information industries, to the very characteristics of modern social organisation' (ibid). In this way, the Americanisation thesis of global socio-cultural homogenisation is interpreted as being an all-pervasive phenomenon which levels the differences between national cultures and societies, refashioning them into mirror images of American society and culture.

Holton has a number of criticisms of the Americanisation thesis of global cultural and social homogenisation. One concerns 'the trap of assuming that any message sent is necessarily received in the manner intended' (p168) or the assumption that American socio-cultural messages, for example, about the ubiquity of the American dream, are received and interpreted by all consumers in the countries of the world as intended by the American producers of those messages. The second criticises the conflation of Americanisation with capitalism since 'it is capitalism rather than Americanisation that is becoming globalised' (ibid). For instance, Holton notes the importation of Japanese organisational and management techniques such as 'the Toyota "just-in-time" system of work organisation, total quality management, and quality work circles' (p169) into American companies and public bodies in the 1980s and 1990s. He suggests that the Americanisation thesis is overstated and that instead, 'the global field is multicentred...There is no single dominant centre, in spite of the dominance of the USA or certain American symbols in particular markets and sectors' (pp169-70).

While not as sanguine as Holton about the emergence of a multicentred global field, Sklair (1991) also criticises the Americanisation thesis along similar lines. In particular, he focuses on the role of national cultural autonomy within the global capitalist culture based on what he refers to as 'the culture-ideology of consumerism' (pp48-49). With respect to the Americanisation thesis and national cultural autonomy, Sklair emphasises that:

> First, what is often identified as 'US cultural and media imperialism' is really just advanced professional practice. Second, there are quite different processes at work in different countries and national variations can be more important than global patterns. Third, all countries develop internal cultural and media forces which counteract the external influences of US cultural products. Fourth, US media flows may work for as well as against national autonomy (p151).

From Sklair's perspective, the focus on the Americanisation thesis is 'a profound and profoundly mystifying error' (p153), conflating American cultural dominance with the global spread of the culture-ideology of consumerism into the national cultures and societies across the world. Significantly, Sklair argues that the global spread of this culture-ideology of consumerism does not necessarily result in global cultural homogenisation since the globalisation of capitalist consumerism can be adapted by TNCs to the local markets and national cultural practices or readapted by national collective actors to suit the interests of national cultural autonomy (p152).

Drawing on the Japanese business term roughly translated as 'glocalisation' or 'a global outlook adapted to local conditions', Robertson extends the debate on global cultural homogenisation by focusing on the glocalisation of global and local national cultures (in Featherstone 1995: 28). For Robertson, one of the main issues in the debate is to avoid a simplistic either/or polarity in the 'global/local problematic':

> Which assumes...that we live in a world of local assertions against globalising trends, a world in which the very idea of locality is sometimes cast as a form of oppression of resistance to the hegemonically global (p29).

Instead, the real issue involves 'spelling out the ways in which homogenising and heterogenising tendencies are mutually implicative' (p27). He uses the concept of glocalisation to identify 'the extent to which what is called local is in large degree constructed on a trans- or super-local basis...in terms of generalised recipes of locality' (p26). Global construction of the local is almost total in the sense that 'the local...can be regarded, subject to some qualifications, as an aspect of globalisation' (p30). By the local, Robertson means the production and reconstruction 'of "home", 'community' and 'locality'' (ibid).

In developing this argument, Robertson draws on the example of the rise and global spread of nation-states and nationalism, claiming that both are inherently implicated in the process of globalisation (see, also, Billig 1995; Greenfeld 1992). Specifically, Robertson suggests that:

> Much of the apparatus of contemporary nations, of the national-state organisation of societies, including the form of their particularities - the construction of their unique identities - is very similar across the entire world (p34).

This globalisation of nation-states and nationalism from 'the late eighteenth century' explains much of the current socio-cultural heterogeneity or 'diversity and hybridisation' across the world (pp40-1). The specific explanatory factor in this case involves national collective actors who chose, through a process of 'selective incorporation' to select, 'copy' and import certain 'ideas and practices' from other societies' to use in their construction of nationalism and, if successful, the building of their own nation-states based on earlier successful national models (p41). Yet, in choosing from these generalised national recipes, national collective actors across the world 'have tended to promote discourses concerning their own unique difference' (ibid).

From this perspective, the globalisation of the local in the contemporary period represents a second, sub-national stage of producing global homogeneity within heterogeneity, based on the first stage of the globalisation of national homogeneity within national socio-cultural diversity. Glocalisation is simply an extension of the earlier stage of selective incorporation practised by national collective actors. The main difference is that in the contemporary era of global socio-cultural integration, a broader range of transnational, national and local collective actors may participate in the selective incorporation of the global ideas and practices that produce home, community and locality within nation-states. In this way, Robertson's discussion of glocalisation emphasises the relative autonomy of collective actors within nation-states in terms of global socio-cultural integration, furthering Holton's argument about the conditional sovereignty of national collective actors with regard to global economic and political integration.

Yet, Robertson's approach suggests that national diversity between nation-states is primarily the result of differences in the choices made by national collective actors in their selective incorporation of 'national' components from the global template of nationalism and nation-states. As such, global national diversity between national cultures and societies is largely the result of top-down differences in the choices by national collective actors in the construction of nationalism and the building of nation-states.

On the other hand, Hannerz (1992) argues that the global interconnection and diversity of national cultures reflects a more open ended historical and contemporary process of 'creolisation' within a 'global ecumene', involving top-down, bottom-up as well as side-to-side constructions by a multitude of sources and actors. The concept of the global ecumene refers to the 'cultural interconnections [that] increasingly reach across the world' (p218). By creolisation, Hannerz means that national cultures are 'intrinsically of mixed origin, the confluence of two or more widely separate historical currents which interact in what is basically a centre/periphery relationship' (p264). In this way, Hannerz counters the common nationalist belief about the uniqueness or purity of one's own national culture, arguing instead that the 'boundedness of cultures must nowadays be understood as a matter of degree' (p261). He also suggests that the historical nationalist claim about the distinctiveness of national cultures is highly dubious, claiming that national 'creole cultures' arise from 'multidimensional cultural encounters' producing over time 'generations of people [who have been] formed from birth by the creole systems of meaning' (ibid).

Pieterse claims that creolisation is an 'odd' term which in the 'Caribbean and North America stands for the mixture of African and European...while in Hispanic America 'criollo' originally denotes those of European descent born in the continent' (in Featherstone et al 1995: 54). The mixed meanings and geographical boundedness of the term 'creole', as well as its lack of an explicit emphasis on the 'asymmetry and inequality in global relations'(ibid), limit its usefulness in a global context. Instead, Pieterse prefers to use the term 'hybridisation' which refers to:

> A cross-category process...The categories can also be cultures, nations, ethnicities, status groups, classes, genres, and hybridity, by its very existence,

> blurs the distinctions among them. Hybridity functions, next, as part of a power relationship between centre and margin, hegemony and minority, and indicates a blurring, destabilisation or subversion of that hierarchical relationship (p56).

Pieterse's concept of hybridisation incorporates much of Hannerz's approach within a broader perspective that applies beyond global culture to 'the structural forms of social organisation' too (p49). For our purposes, we will focus on Pieterse's cultural uses of hybridisation, incorporating these uses in a concept of cultural hybridity. At the global cultural level, Pieterse like Hannerz stresses that:

> Cultural hybridisation refers to the mixing of Asian, African, American and European cultures: hybridisation is the making of a global culture as a global melange...Hybridisation as a perspective belongs to the fluid end of relations between cultures: it's the mixing of cultures and not their separateness that is emphasised (p60, p62).

Further, Pieterse like Hannerz emphasises the significance of centre/periphery relationships, such as those between Britain and Ireland, within global hybridisation as well as the relative autonomy of collective actors to construct and reconstruct cultural meanings from among the range of global, national and local cultural components (pp60-3). However, Pieterse provides a more specific framework with which to analyse centre/periphery relationships compared to Hannerz. In particular, Pieterse develops:

> A continuum of hybridities: on one end, an assimilationist hybridity that leans over towards the centre, adopts the canon and mimics the hegemony, and, at the other end, a destabilising hybridity that blurs the canon, reverses the current, subverts the centre. Hybridities, then, may be differentiated according to the components in the melange. On the one hand, an assimilationist hybridity in which the centre predominates...And on the other hand, an hybridity that blurs (passive) or destabilises (active) the canon and its categories (p57).

These uses of the concept of cultural hybridity are especially helpful for the study of the Irish case. On the one hand, Pieterse's perspective retains the relative autonomy of collective actors in Hannerz's approach through his use of global cultural hybridisation. On the other hand, he provides a range of responses by 'peripheral' collective actors to the centre, which are neither wholly negative nor positive, through his use of the continuum of hybridities. Significantly, the range of these responses by peripheral actors may all be

viewed as 'normal' in that each falls within the continuum of possible responses to being peripheral relative to a particular dominant centre. In this way, a peripheral actor's choice to assimilate is as normal and makes as much as sense as another actor's choice to actively destabilise the centre/periphery relationship through art or even violence. This range of responses will be particularly useful in the study of the Irish case at the national level.

From Pieterse's perspective, national cultures are culturally hybrid in a global sense, while peripheral national cultures tend to be characterised with respect to the continuum of hybridities. While not discussed by Pieterse, we can add that hybrid national cultures can be characterised in terms of multiple identities, as discussed in the section on European cultural identity, providing collective actors with a range of choices from among cultural components and identity constructs. In this way, Pieterse's approach continues the argument for the relative autonomy of national collective actors with respect to global social and cultural integration, avoiding the global homogenisation thesis or the position based on the complete autonomy of national collective actors within nation-states. Further, he extends Hannerz's discussion of centre/periphery relationships in a very specific fashion through the continuum of cultural hybridities, which when supplemented by the concept of multiple identities, will provide a useful framework with which to analyse the responses by Irish collective actors to the country's multiple integration processes.

2.5 The Uses of Nationalism in Relatively Autonomous States

The theorists of globalisation and European integration assume for the most part that national cultures remain loosely integrated, whatever their differences about the relative strength and distinctiveness of these national cultures. As such, the extent of global and European cultural integration in nation-states is in some ways limited by the continued resilience of loosely integrated national cultures, or at least the continued cultural importance attached by national actors in Europe to their 'nation' and 'national identity' relative to their 'Europeanness' and their global 'humanity'. The important point is that national cultures are neither as open ended as suggested by Hannerz in the global ecumene nor as globally hybridised as indicated by Pieterse.

Instead, as Smith argues, 'the obstinate fact is that national cultures...are particular, time-bound and expressive' and are based on a specific 'sense of continuity', 'shared memories' and 'sense of common destiny' among a national population, normally drawn from a range of 'one of more shared cultural characteristics (usually customs, language or religion)' (in Featherstone 1990: 178-9). More specifically, Smith defines the concepts of 'national culture', the 'nation' and 'national identity' as a cluster of 'complex constructs composed of a number of interrelated components – ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political' (1991: 15). From this perspective, the concept of 'national culture' is one component in the construct of the 'nation' and is part of the interrelated concept of 'national identity'.

The interrelated meanings of the 'nation' and 'national identity' are based on common 'fundamental features' in their definitions involving a 'named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties' (p14). The difference between the two concepts is that the 'nation...draws on elements of other kinds of collective identity' such as 'class, religious or ethic' identity (ibid). In this way, the concept of 'national identity' is a subset of the wider concept of the 'nation'. At the same time, 'national identity' is a flexible multidimensional concept that 'can be combined with these other types of identity' (pp14-15).

For Smith, this conceptual flexibility is important since:

> It is this very multidimensionality that has made national identity such a flexible and persistent force in modern life and politics, and allowed it to combine effectively with other powerful ideologies and movements, without losing its character (p15).

Further, Smith claims that 'today national identification is the main form of collective identification' relative to the other collective identity choices available to people in the world (p170) and that the contemporary appeal of national identity, 'the nation and the nationalism is global' (ibid).

By 'nationalism', Smith and Hutchinson mean an ideological movement that incorporates 'political and cultural dimensions' and strives for the autonomy, unity and identity of a people perceived to be a nation (1994: 4-5). This definition is broadly similar to Gellner's more elegant, and slightly modified, statement that 'nationalism is primarily a political [and cultural] principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent' (1983: 1). In this sense, nationalism is the 'glue' that binds the 'nation' or the national culture and national identity of a people into its own autonomous, unified state.

For Smith, nations, nationalism and national identity are usually ''built' and 'forged' by state elites or intelligentsias or capitalists' (p177; see, also, Alter 1989; Gellner 1983; Greenfeld 1992; Hobsbawm 1991) in a top-down fashion, constrained by the specific historically embedded socio-cultural characteristics which form the basis of the identity of the population from below (Smith in Featherstone 1990: 179). To this perspective, we can add the socio-cultural characteristics drawn from the specific external integration processes that have influenced the 'national' culture and society, resulting in a hybridised culture along the lines suggested by Pieterse. These hybridised cultural characteristics provide a broader range of cultural identity options that can be selectively incorporated in Robertson's terms by the members of the national elite in their construction of nations, nationalism and national identity.

Further, Smith suggests that these elite constructions of nationalism and national identity do not necessarily remain static and can be reconstructed by newer generations of national elites to better fit changes in internal and external conditions confronted by the nation-state (in Hayward and Page 1995: 63-4). Thus, in the post-1989 period, he argues that national elites adapt 'the values, myths, memories and symbols of each nation to the changed circumstances of a fluid post-communist world, without loss of their separate identity' (ibid). Similarly, Llobera claims that 'national identities are resilient', retaining a 'facility for adapting to new circumstances' (in Garcia 1993: 75).

In reconstructing nationalism and national identity, however, national collective actors draw from the broad range of hybridised cultural characteristics and multiple identity options, not just those features that characterised the national ethnic core in Smith's sense

of the term. In this way, national elites are not reduced to the option of simply returning to the values, myths, memories and symbols of the older or 'traditional' national cultural identity in order to respond to external integration processes such as globalisation or European integration. National collective actors retain the relative autonomy to use nationalism in both reactive and defensive ways as suggested by Holton and in proactive or adaptive ways as indicated by Smith and Llobera.

The range of the possible responses by national collective actors reflects the variety of nationalisms which have developed since the English nationalism of the 1500s (Greenfeld 1992), including civic, ethnic, 'Western', 'Eastern', risorgimento, reform, integral, secessionist and anti-colonial forms of nationalism to cite some of the nationalist types discussed in the literature on nationalism (see Alter 1989; Hobsbawm 1990; Kellas 1991; Periwell 1995). For Llobera, the historical varieties of nationalism indicate that:

> Nationalism has no predetermined content; as a container of meaning, it can refer to both the good and the evil realities of the nation. There is a liberal and democratic conception of the nation, as there is one tainted with totalitarianism and/or religious fundamentalism (in Garcia 1993: 75).

For our purposes, the possible use of nationalism by national collective actors in response to external integration processes such as globalisation and European integration will be of direct importance to the case study of Ireland. In the Irish case, the development of 'traditional' Irish nationalism involved a national secessionist as well as anti-colonial movement against British rule in Ireland, built around an ethnic core based on religion, language, agrarianism and rurality. The responses by Irish national collective actors to contemporary integration processes may reflect the historical influence of the hybridity continuum raised by Pieterse as well as the 'traditional' Irish nationalism that developed against Britain.

In summary, the present levels and limits of the global and European integration processes provide relative autonomy for EU national collective actors to respond to all the spheres of these external integrations, within the nation-state, the European institutions or transnational organisations. While the levels of European and global integrations across the economic, political and socio-cultural dimensions of EU national societies continue to

increase, this does not mean that national collective actors lack autonomy in their decision-making. Further, the reduction of national sovereignty or the pooling of sovereignty at the European or global levels in certain spheres does not mean that national sovereignty has been replaced by a relationship of European or global dependence. Similarly, EU moves to foster a European cultural identity and increased global cultural hybridity do not mean that national cultures or identities are about to be eliminated. Instead, the retention of relative autonomy by national collective actors allows for national responses to external integration processes such as globalisation and European integration.

2.6 Towards a Theory of Multiple Integrations

We can now sketch a theory of multiple integrations and identities by focusing on the relative autonomy of collective actors in the EU national states in terms of the constraints and opportunities provided by multiple 'loose' integration processes. Shils's concept of 'loose' integration is useful, if the concept is extended beyond a single process of national core integration to multiple integration processes, for two principal reasons. First, his focus on partially autonomous yet interdependent parts of a constantly shifting, loosely integrated society assumes that even a single process of integration has differentiated effects across sectors or parts of a society over time. This differentiation effect is important because it suggests that a number of simultaneous integration processes will have a differentiated effect over time on a society at the national level and potentially different effects at the same time on the component parts of the society. Second, his emphasis on the cultural meaning attributed by national actors to a process of integration in terms of their identity choices and strategies is extremely relevant to the more complex situation experienced by national actors who must respond to processes of multiple integration. That is, the relative autonomy that Shils's concept of loose integration provides to national actors from the structural effects of a single process of integration is arguably even more important in the context of the potentially over-determining structural effects of multiple processes of integration.

In developing a theory of multiple integrations from Shils's concept of loose integration, the relative autonomy of actors can be analysed in terms of their 'logics' or their strategies and identity choices with regard to the multiple integration processes most relevant to their

position at the national or sub-national level of their society. From this perspective, collective actors at the national or sub-national levels of EU member states are not simply confronted with a single integration process such as European integration, but encounter a number of cumulative and interrelated integration processes at the same time. Collective actors interpret and respond to these simultaneous multiple integrations, devising strategies to suit their interests with regard to these integrations, and making identity choices with respect to the many identity options available from among the multiple integration processes.

In developing these 'logics' of strategies and identity choices, actors at the national and sub-national levels of their society interpret the relative significance of each integration process, attaching specific meanings to each process as a result. These interpretations may be understood through the use of categories such as the relative levels of the integrations, the dimensionality of the processes, the degree of autonomy provided by each integration process, and the particular identities expressed through each integration process. These interpretations can lead to a variety of results which range from prioritising one integration process over the others, equalising all of the integrations or denying the influence of all of these processes within the national society. For example, in prioritising one integration process over the others, actors may overemphasise a specific integration, and in the process de-emphasise, downplay or even deny the significance of other integrations.

For instance, actors may ascribe positive features, devise a strategy to justify or choose an identity associated with a prioritised integration process. On the other hand, actors may ascribe negative characteristics, strategise against and choose to protect their identity from a de-emphasised or denied integration process. Further, the meanings attached by actors to specific integration processes may vary within as well as between national and sub-national groups and can change over time. In this study, the meanings attached to Europeanisation or globalisation vary within the Irish political elite, between the IFA and INTO leaders and over time for the SIPTU elite from the early 1970s to the early 1990s.

However, the actors' interpretations should not be accepted at face value. They are better understood when put in the structural context of actors' logics or their strategies and

identity choices. These logics may reflect a number of factors including national and sub-national interests based on material gain, power, status or cultural issues along with a fairly accurate assessment of the relative influence of the integration processes encountered by the actors at the national or sub-national level of their society (Lindberg and Scheingold 1971). In order to assess the accuracy of the actors' logic and to account for the above factors, it is also useful to provide an independent structural assessment of the specific integration processes such as a literature review or transactional analysis.

These assessments can be applied to the logics of the actors to help account for the influence of material, power, status and cultural interests in the development of the logics. While economic, political and social interests are important and are expressed by the Irish organisational leaders and the Irish political elite, the most significant factor overall for these groups appears to be the cultural factor of nationalism. The organisational leaders and the Irish political elite use elements from a 'traditional' and a reconstructed Irish nationalism in their logics to interpret and attach meanings to Ireland's integrations. The specific uses of Irish nationalism will be discussed in detail in the empirical chapters. Of importance here is that actors at national and sub-national levels in other EU member states may also respond to European integration and globalisation through the language and voice of nationalism.

2.7 Conclusion

In developing a theory of multiple integrations, the extension of Shils's sociological concept of 'loose' integration focuses theoretical interest on the influences of multiple integrations on partially autonomous sectors and relatively autonomous actors within loosely integrated national societies. This modification of Shils's concept of loose integration is useful in overcoming limits in the theories of European integration, globalisation and nationalism. Specifically, these theories neither explain the differential effects of these multiple processes on national societies in Europe nor account for the relative autonomy of national actors in EU member states to respond to these multiple integrations. The development of a theory of 'loose' multiple integrations can be usefully applied to the sectoral and national levels of the Republic of Ireland, analysing the logics

devised by members of the Irish political elite and three sets of Irish organisational leaders in response to Ireland's multiple integration processes.

However, there are limitations to this theory of loose multiple integrations. Shils's original discussion of integration in 1972 is historically situated in debates concerning the emergence of post-colonial societies in the 1950s and 1960s and the rise of ethnic nationalist movements in countries of the West in the 1960s. In both cases, the issues of secession and national integration are of central importance. So too are the roles of nationalist movements, cultural nationalism and nationalist elites. This helps to explain why these topics figure significantly in his discussion of the concept of integration.

This emphasis downplays the importance of non-nationalist or non-ethnic based conflicts, for example, between classes over the means and distribution of production in Marxist terms (Marx 2000) or between classes, status groups and parties over wealth, status and power in Weberian terms (Weber 1968). Yet this too may be related to the historical context: to the 'end of ideology' debate among American academics in the 1960s (Waxman 1969). For Daniel Bell, the creator of the phrase, the end of ideology meant that nineteenth century ideologies of social equality, freedom and class revolution had become 'exhausted' by the 1950s (Bell 1967: 373). Politically, this exhaustion reflected the containment of class conflict in Western Capitalist societies through the Welfare state, the mixed economy and political pluralism (ibid). These old ideologies had been replaced in post-colonial countries with 'new ideologies' including those based on nationalism (ibid). This also helps to explain why Shils's discussion of loose integration is concerned with the importance of nationalist ideologies in post-colonial and Western societies.

A fully developed sociological theory of loose multiple integrations should address these conceptual limitations by incorporating Weberian conflict and Marxist class based perspectives into Shils's nationalist based theory. This issue will be discussed in the concluding chapter of the thesis.

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCHING LOOSE MULTIPLE INTEGRATIONS

3.1 Introduction

The theory of loose multiple integrations developed in the previous chapter focuses on the cultural interpretations that actors in nation-states assign to integration processes. As such, one issue involved in researching multiple integrations is the choice of methods to sample and analyse actors' interpretations of integrations. This issue is addressed by adopting an interpretive actor centred approach, using qualititative elite interviews with three sets of organisational leaders at the sub-national level, and with individual members of the Irish political elite at the national level.

However, this actor centred approach privileges individual and intersubjective interpretations of loose multiple integrations. It does not acknowledge the structural bounds to actors' discursive and practical knowledge (Giddens 1993: 126), including historical, economic, political, social and cultural influences on actors' interpretations of their actions. It also does not acknowledge that actors can systematically misinterpret the structural influence of loose multiple integrations. These misinterpretations may reflect the structural influence of factors such as nationalism and national identity on actors' discourses. Actors' misinterpretations may also reflect the 'relations of domination' in a loosely integrated society, functioning as an ideology (Thompson 1990: 7).

To address these issues, the structural contexts of actors' interpretations are incorporated into the research process. Thus, historical, comparative and contemporary literature reviews of primary and secondary material are used to identify and measure the most salient Irish national and sectoral integrations. Further, the discourse analysis of the interviews considers structural influences on the actors' interpretations of their respective integrations. These include historical and contemporary integration processes; the Irish state, the sectoral organisations; Irish nationalism and national identity; and, where appropriate, relations of domination. These structural influences are considered in the analysis of the sectoral and national interviews (Chapters Four to Seven). Structural influences are also considered in the comparison of the political elite's interpretations with

measures of Ireland's integrations (Chapter Eight), and in the discussion of the continuing significance of Irish nationalism and identity on the discourses and ideologies of the Irish political elite (Chapter Nine).

There are many limitations to this methodological approach to researching loose multiple integrations. These include the potential biases and lack of generalisability from single qualitative 'elite' interviews; the selection of the three sectoral level organisations; the definition and sample of the Irish political elite; and the temporal limitations of the interviews conducted in 1993/94. This last limitation has been partly addressed by updating the discussions of social partnership in Chapter Six, and the analysis of the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency in Chapter Nine to include events since 1994.

3.2 Reflexive Issues and an Actor Centred Approach

In *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Weber argues that a researcher is a 'cultural being' influenced by his or her 'cultural reality' to choose a research topic that has 'cultural significance' for him or her (1949: 81-2). In my case, the idea for this research topic arose during my last year as an undergraduate at Trinity College Dublin in the 1986/87. There was a national crisis in the economy, with high unemployment and the highest emigration rates since the late 1950s. Most of my friends, regardless of their socio-economic background, accepted that they would emigrate. As a dual American-Irish citizen, I accepted this too and readied myself to go back 'home' to America. I did not think too much about this until I discovered that many of my friends were migrating to continental European countries, and not just to the traditional countries of emigration, Britain and the USA. When I asked them why, most had no ready answer. It simply seemed 'normal' to them to choose to migrate to 'Europe', particularly since Ireland's membership of the then EEC meant that they did not need a visa as they did for the USA. The apparent normality of this choice surprised me, and got me thinking about Ireland's interrelationships with Europe, Britain and America.

What surprised me even more was that many of my rural and urban friends expressed a sudden longing for a 'traditional' Ireland that most had studiously rejected, if not vigorously attacked, during their years as Trinity undergraduates. Some of my friends had

even gone so far as to change their accents and appearance to 'pass' as 'Dublin 4' denizens, denying their rural and agrarian backgrounds. It was as if their impending migration had heightened their sense of Irishness, which they could only express through the 'traditional' categories of Irish cultural nationalism. It did not matter where they were migrating to or what their backgrounds were in Ireland: their heightened sense of 'traditional' Irishness united them in a way I had not seen before. This got me thinking about the use of Irish nationalism and identity as a means to interpret Ireland's European, British and American relationships.

After returning to the US and working there for some time, I became a graduate student at Temple University in Philadelphia. Having completed my course work and comprehensive exams, my thoughts returned to Ireland and the topic of the relationship between Irish nationalism and what I now referred to as Ireland's multiple integrations. In the meantime, Ireland had changed rapidly. It had resolved its national economic crisis; adopted social partnership; become the recipient of billions of pounds in European structural and cohesion funds, and continued to attract more than its fair share of American high technology firms. Irish emigrants were returning home again, although unemployment remained high amidst concern about economic growth without job creation.

Of these changes, the one that seemed most significant to me in the long-term was the deepening of Ireland's relationship with the then European Community. As my emigrating friends had pointed out, 'Europe' gave Ireland a third choice between Britain and America. Europe represented a new home for Ireland between its close but ambivalent post-colonial relationship with Britain, and its distant, mutually rose-coloured relationship with America. In this way, Ireland's new structural integration into the EC provided new symbolic opportunities to reinvent Ireland, Irish nationalism and Irishness. Or so I thought. It also occurred to me that these were the thoughts of an Irish-American outsider who had been let into the Irish sitting room, but kept away from the rest of the house. I did not know what the 'real' Irish thought or did in the privacy of their physical and mental homes.

In public at least, Ireland's relationship to Europe was often reduced to the large net material benefits the country received from its membership of the EC. Thus, Albert Reynolds, the Taoiseach or Prime Minister, literally sold the 1992 Maastricht Treaty referendum to the Irish electorate on the basis of the six billion Irish pounds he claims the Commission promised him in structural and cohesion funds from 1994 to 1999. I wondered if members of the Irish political elite actually believed that the meaning of Ireland's European integration could be reduced to material benefits? Did they think about the meaning of Ireland's European relationship relative to the country's changing post-colonial British and global American relationships? And did they interpret Ireland's multiple integration processes through the lens of Irish nationalism and identity?

These reflexive issues informed the initial choice of an interpretive, actor centred approach for the research methods, focusing on how elite leaders at the national and sub-national levels of Irish society interpret Ireland's multiple integrations. Given Ireland's new social partnership model, I was particularly interested in similarities and differences between the interpretations of Ireland's integrations made by the Irish political elite at the national level and by leaders of sectoral organisations involved in partnership. Since certain European sectoral integration processes, like agriculture, were far more advanced than others, such as education, I was further interested in whether organisational leaders in these sectors have different interpretations of Ireland's integrations. My interest in the influence of Irish nationalism and identity on these actors' interpretations also led me to choose sectors of society with different positions with respect to 'traditional' Irish nationalism, and with different levels of European integration (see below).

Theoretically, the choice of an interpretive, actor centred approach was influenced by Weber's interpretive sociology 'which aims at the interpretive understanding of social behaviour' by a person or persons who 'engage in some subjectively meaningful action' (1962: 29). In terms of contemporary sociological theory, the choice was further influenced by Shils's concept of loose integration (1982) discussed in Chapter Two. Shils's concept incorporates a Weberian interpretive, actor centred approach into a Durkheimian functionalist framework. He also focuses attention on the interpretations and actions of elite leaders at the national and sub-national levels of a society.

There was also support for this choice in the work of early European integration theorists, particularly those in the neo-functionalist tradition (see Lindberg and Scheingold 1971). An actor centred approach to large-scale integration processes like European or global integration focuses on '"in-the-mind" phenomena such as [the] perceptions, attitudes, incentives and beliefs' of elite leaders (Lindberg in Lindberg and Scheingold 1971: 105-6). Elite leaders usually refer to national or sub-national actors in institutions directly involved in or influenced by the formal integration process at the political, economic or socio-cultural levels of national societies (pp. 93, 97, 105-6; Schmitter in Lindberg and Scheingold 1971: 260-1). This approach looks at how 'in-the-mind phenomena' relates to the actors' 'goals, values, strategies, identifications and behaviours' with respect to integration processes such as institutional decision-making (Lindbergh in Lindberg and Scheingold 1971: 55). Further, this approach assumes that actors' can 'change their minds' and 'redefine their interests', for example, in response to the formation of 'new institutions' at the European level (Haas in Lindbergh and Scheingold 1971: 35).

As discussed above, an actor centred approach privileges actors' interpretations and does not necessarily consider structural influences on these interpretations or, in Giddens's terms, the continuous interrelationship between structure and agency (1984). Weber too discusses this issue, addressing the potential cultural relativism of his interpretive, actor based position by arguing for the construction of 'ideal types' or generalisations of 'subjective meaning attributed to a hypothetical actor in a given type of conduct' (1962: 29, 52). For my purposes, the first structural issue involved identifying and measuring the most salient Irish national and sectoral integrations, going beyond what I thought or what others told me.

3.3 Identifying and Measuring Multiple Integrations

The initial literature review facilitated the identification of the multiple integration processes relevant to the respective Irish national and sectoral levels of Irish society. This literature review included the use of a basic transactional analysis of Ireland's integrations (see Chapter Eight). As developed by early European integration researchers, transactional analysis is an empirical tool providing approximate statistical measures of the 'directions' and 'intensities' of various economic, political and socio-cultural flows in and out of a

defined area such as a country or a region (Puchala in Lindberg and Scheingold 1971). Since an actor-centred approach tends to focus on 'actor perceptions of facts rather than the facts themselves' (Schmitter in Lindberg and Scheingold 1971: 234), a transactional analysis is useful to identity the 'facts themselves' with respect to the directions and intensities of simultaneous integration processes.

Following Puchala, the Irish transactional analysis uses international, European regional, Irish governmental, academic and periodical sources to outline the 'directions' and 'intensities' (ibid) of Ireland's multiple integrations and identities in multi-dimensional terms, and to identify the facts themselves compared to the actors' perceptions of those in the political elite's discursive versions (see Chapter eight). For this study, the literature review includes academic texts; journal articles; Irish government, European, World Bank and other official publications; sectoral organisational materials; and newspapers in particular *The Irish Times*.

The historical literature review revealed the central significance of Ireland's British integration and the limits of Ireland's separation from Britain up to the contemporary post-1958 period. It also showed the importance of other types of integration processes including those with continental European countries, the United States, the Roman Catholic Church, colonial and post-colonial countries as well as international socialism. In general, the review indicated that any discussion of Ireland's contemporary integration processes must begin with the country's full integration into and continuing separation from Britain.

In contrast, the contemporary literature review of the comparative and empirical evidence for the post-1958 period revealed the increasing significance of Ireland's European integration as well as the country's global American integration. This review also provided evidence about the extent and limits of Ireland's national integration from a 'traditional' country to today's more open, outward looking society. Overall, the historical and contemporary literature reviews indicated that Ireland has moved from almost singular focus on the country's British integration towards an emphasis on the Republic's European and, to a lesser extent, its global American integrations.

3.4 Selecting the Organisations at the Sectoral Level

The sampling choice of the three organisations at the sectoral level of Irish society was based on the sector's significance in 'traditional' Irish society, the sector's changing role in contemporary Ireland and the level of the sector's integrations.

I chose Irish agriculture because it is one of the most integrated European and global sectors, and the Irish Farmers' Association or IFA because farmers formed the socio-economic base of 'traditional' nationalism. However, the significance of Irish farmers in contemporary Ireland has been steadily declining in the post-1958 period, and its overall share of the European Union's budget has been declining since the late 1980s under the Delors' packages. Since the MacSharry reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the early 1990s, farmers' benefits have also shifted from price to income supports adding a social welfare dimension to the CAP which threatens Irish farmers' view of themselves as independent entrepreneurs. Finally, the Irish agricultural sector has been and remains highly integrated with Britain and the global economy. The IFA was selected as the farming sample group because it is the largest and most effective of the Irish farmers' organisations in Ireland, and it is a social partner in the national agreements.

I selected primary education because it is one of the least integrated European and global sectors, and the Irish National Teachers' Organisation or INTO because teachers in schools had the significant cultural role in 'traditional' Irish nationalism of officially transmitting Irish nationalism and identity to students. From independence until the early 1970s, the Irish state mandated that Irish primary education instil Gaelic and Catholic cultural nationalism into Irish school children. Nonetheless, Irish primary education remains structurally based on a colonial agreement between the British government and the Churches. At the European level, member states originally chose to protect their national cultures by keeping Europe away from education, especially at the primary and secondary levels (De Witte 1990: 191). The Maastricht Treaty altered this agreement, adding a nominal 'European dimension' to secondary and primary education. Nonetheless, the educational sector remains one of the least integrated in Europe, and the primary level remains the least integrated in the sector. The INTO was selected as the second sample

group because it represented primary school teachers in Ireland, and was an educational partner and, through ICTU or the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, a social partner too.

Finally, I chose the trade union movement because the social aspects of employment were emerging as a distinct policy area of increasing European integration. The emergence of social partnership had strengthened this tendency in Ireland, increasing the influence of the trade union movement as a social group in policy-making. Historically, the trade union movement has had a conflictual relationship with 'traditional' nationalism and with farmers, leading it to develop a class based nationalist perspective of Ireland. Yet, Irish trade unions were modelled on British craft unions, and have only recently begun to develop European style structures. As a sample choice, Irish trade unions were also interesting because most of the trade union movement opposed Ireland's entry into Europe in 1972, but switched to support Europe by 1993 (Keogh, 1990: 241, 246-48, 270-1; Holmes, 1993: 109). The switch was partly explained by the increasing integration of trade unions into Europe through higher levels of social funds, and the inclusion of the social chapter in the Maastricht Treaty. SIPTU was selected as the third sample group because it was largest and arguably the most influential Irish trade union in the social partnership process.

After completing the studies of the IFA, INTO and SIPTU, I considered conducting a separate study of employers, interviewing organisational leaders in IBEC or the Irish Business and Employers' Confederation. However, my research funding and time ran out before I could complete such a study. This limits the potential of a class or socio-economic based analysis of the research findings by, for example, analysing interviews with IBEC and SIPTU leaders as representatives of the 'capitalist' and 'working' classes respectively.

3.5 Sampling the Irish Political Elite

The concept of the Irish political elite derives from Bottomore's discussion of elites (1993). For Bottomore, the political elite in a society includes social groups whom he refers to as political and counter-elites or:

> those individuals who actually exercise political power in society at any given time (ibid). Counter elites are individuals who are politically active and influential

> including: the leaders of political parties which are out of office, and representatives of new social interests or classes such as trade union leaders, as well as groups of businessmen, and intellectuals who are active in politics (p7).

This broad concept of the political elite including political, counter and functional elites was applied in the Irish context for the national level sample. Other concepts such as political 'class', 'status group' or 'party' were considered, but did not describe the relevant social groups as well as political 'elite'. For example, Weber distinguishes between 'classes' that 'are stratified according to their relations to the production and acquisition of goods'; 'status groups' that 'are stratified according to the principles of their consumption of goods as represented by special 'styles of life'; and 'parties' that orient their action 'toward the acquisition of social 'power'' (in Boudon and Cherkaoui 2000: 250). Bottomore's broad concept of political elite straddles Weber's three social groups, and includes political parties as well as representatives of class and social interests. As such, it is a better collective term to describe these particular social groups.

This concept of the Irish political elite was seen as particularly relevant in the context of the post-1987 national agreements, negotiated between the 'social partners' or the government, business and trade unions and including direct or indirect consultations with other sectoral interest groups such as farmers and teachers. The broad concept is also relevant in a smaller and less populous national society like Ireland in which access to a wide range of 'elite' members is arguably easier to arrange, and frequent social contact simpler to sustain in a capitol like Dublin compared to London, Berlin or Washington D.C.

The usefulness of this concept of the Irish political elite to the study was that the three groups of organisational leaders could be included in the national level sample as members of the political elite. To minimise the overlap between the organisational and national level samples, the analysis of the interview results in Chapter six focuses primarily on the members of the Irish political elite who are not leaders of the three sectoral level organisations.

The main limitation of this sampling choice based on the broader concept of political elite is that the final sample may not be representative of the Irish political elite at the time due to the under-representation of members from the political and counter elites. At the organisational level, the sampling of leaders within each of the three main organisations limits the generalisability of the research to the whole organisation under study, particularly in terms of identifying inter-organisational diversity and conflicts over the organisational logics or strategies and identity choices. On the other hand, the sampling choice of organisational leaders at the time of the study increases the confidence of identifying the leaders' organisational logic with respect to the organisation's sectoral integrations.

The final sample contains fifty four members of the Irish political elite, including eleven high ranking SIPTU members, thirteen executive members of the IFA and eleven top officials from the INTO. The remaining nineteen interviews consist of representatives from Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, the Labour Party, Progressive Democrats, Democratic Left, the Department of the Taoiseach, the Department of Education, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Irish Business and Employers' Confederation, the Chambers of Commerce of Ireland, the Council for the Status of Women, the Economic and Social Research Institute, the National Economic and Social Council, the National Platform, the Irish Council of the European Movement, the European Parliament and the European Commission.

3.6 Designing and Conducting the Interviews

To discover the actors' perspectives of the relevant Irish multiple integrations, in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted with the organisational leaders and the rest of the members of the Irish political elite. In-depth interviews are particularly useful to elicit and explore the beliefs, hopes, fears, doubts and contradictions expressed in a groups' or a person's thinking about complex topics such as multiple integration process (Marshall and Rossman 1989: 82-83).

The main topic areas for the interviews were chosen to probe the political elite's attitudes about Ireland's relationship with the EU, Britain (including Northern Ireland) and globalisation as well as 'elite' explanations of Ireland's socio-economic development since

the late 1950s. Specific topic areas were developed based on the three sectoral level organisational integrations. The IFA's topics focused on the potential decline in agriculture and rural areas from the effects of CAP reform, the global GATT talks and European enlargement. SIPTU's topic areas centred on the effects of global restructuring and European integration for the trade union's relationships to the EU, foreign multinationals, other Irish interest groups and the Irish working class. The INTO's areas involved the Irish government's attempts to secularise control of Irish education, the possible effects of the Maastricht Treaty on Irish primary education and the influence of global cultural patterns on Irish education.

The following questions represent ideal types of the specific, national level topic interview questions for all fifty-four members of the Irish political elite:

A. European Integration

1. What does it mean to be a European?
2. Do you support a Federal Europe?
3. Do you have any fears about the European Union?
4. There are some people who argue that movement towards an integrated Union will create a homogenous, European culture. Other people say that movement towards the Union will protect and preserve distinct national cultures. Which position do you agree with most?
5. Do you think that Irish support for the European Union is based primarily on material self-interest?
6. Do you see a difference in your work between pursuing an Irish policy and a European one?

B. Ireland's National Integration and Development

1. Do you think that there is an urban/rural divide in Ireland?
2. There are some people who say that the traditional basis of Irish identity in terms of being Catholic, Gaelic and rural has changed since the Irish economy became free market oriented in 1958. On the other hand, there is no real agreement on what it means to be Irish today. Does it mean being more urban, liberal and pluralistic? Do you see these changes going on? If so, how would you explain them?

C. Ireland's British, Global and Developing World Integrations

1. Do you think that Ireland's involvement with Europe has led to a move away from the centrality of the Republic's relationship with Great Britain and Northern Ireland?
2. There are some people who claim what is really going on in Ireland is the globalisation of Irish culture through the influence of Anglo-American values. Do you agree?
3. There are many Irish people who oppose Europe because they say that Ireland is a post-colonial nation-state which has more in common with Third World countries. Do you agree?

Gatekeepers facilitated entry into three main sample organisations and the initial interviews with the organisational leaders. Gatekeepers were identified based on entries in the *IPA Yearbook*. Each interviewee was guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity. The interviews with the leaders of the three organisational sample groups were conducted from November 1993 to March 1994, followed by the interviews with the other members of the Irish political elite. Within each organisation, the selection of leaders was based on a number of factors including rank, location and gender. The final sample for each organisation primarily includes leaders from the same level in their organisation. Regional balance was achieved by selecting individuals from the highest executive level of each organisation in Dublin and from the next highest regional or county level of the group. In spite of concerted effort, the final sample includes just eight women: four from the INTO, one each from SIPTU and the IFA, and two from other organisations. Fifty-one of the fifty-four interviews are tape recorded with the remaining three recorded in note form. The length of the interviews ranged from twenty minutes to an hour and a half. The name of each individual interviewed has been changed in the empirical chapters.

3.7 Analysing the Interviews

The interviews were analysed using different methods of discourse analysis. The first method involved identifying, categorising and explaining discursive patterns and inconsistencies (Potter and Edwards 1992; Potter and Wetherell 1987). Following Potter and Wetherell, the transcribed interviews were analysed as a discourse that may express differing versions of the same topic without being necessarily inconsistent (1987). In this way, Potter and Wetherell argue that discursive inconsistencies are normal, reflecting impermanent and shifting mental states such as attitudes and that a method of discourse

analysis can be applied to grasp these discursive inconsistencies and contradictions (ibid). This method of discourse analysis is particularly useful for interpreting apparent inconsistencies or contradictions emerging from the interviews.

At the sectoral level, the identification, categorisation and explanation of these discursive patterns formed the basis of the organisational 'logics' expressed by the leaders in the interviews. The term 'logics' combines the actors' strategies and identity choices with respect Ireland's sectoral and national integration processes. Thus, the discursive analysis of the interviews with the leaders of the three sectoral organisations identified distinctive 'organisational logics' analysed in Chapters Four, Five and Six.

The interviews with the members of the Irish political elite were first analysed at the individual level, then by organisation and, where possible, by class or socio-economic status. Much to my surprise, there were very few distinctive organisational or class based discursive patterns with respect to interpretations of Ireland's multiple integrations. However, there were highly consistent common patterns among almost all of the members of the political elite, strongly indicating a collective cultural interpretation of Ireland's integrations.

This initial discourse analysis identified a common pattern that could be broken down into three distinctive yet temporally related sub-patterns. To address the greater complexity of three distinct sub-patterns, a second method of discourse analysis was applied to the political elite's interviews. Specifically, Williams's (1981) discussion of dominant, residual and emergent cultural forms was modified and applied to the interviews. Williams argues that a number of social groups with distinctive cultural ideologies compete for cultural dominance within a society at a particular time. At any point in time, Williams claims that there is: a dominant cultural ideology based on the predominance of particular social group; a residual cultural ideology based on a previously dominant social group; and emergent cultural ideologies expressed by a newer social groups, one or a number of which may become dominant in the future (see also Peillon 1982).

Williams's approach was modified to confine the analysis to one social group - the Irish political elite - as opposed to a number of competing social groups. Further, the competing social groups' ideologies were changed to the Irish political elite's dominant, residual and emergent discursive versions. This change was intended to preserve a distinction between critical and neutral conceptions of ideology (Thompson 1990: 5-7). In Thompson's terms, Williams uses a critical conception of ideology 'in which meaning serves...to establish and sustain relations of power which are systematically asymmetrical' (p7; see, also, McLellan 1995: 7-8; Van Dijk 1998: 11). The use of discursive versions was meant only to reflect the pattern of beliefs within the discourse of the Irish political elite about Ireland's multiple integrations. In this way, it is similar to Thompson's conception of neutral ideology or 'systems of thought', 'systems of belief' or 'symbolic systems' which pertain to social action or political practice' (1990: 6). I prefer to use the concept of ideology in Thompson's critical sense, and use the term discursive versions instead of neutral ideologies. This critical conception of ideology is applied to the political elite's discursive versions in Chapter Nine, and to Ireland's social partnership in Chapter Six.

The terms dominant, residual and emergent versions are used to refer to the relative prevalence of components of these versions in the fifty-four interviews. The dominant version is the most prevalent, expressing an outward looking, open Ireland. At the same time, the dominant version is concerned to preserve a core Irish culture and is wary of Ireland becoming too dependent on the country's European and global integrations. The residual version is less prevalent, drawing on the older nationalist perspective of an insular, self-contained Ireland predominant during the De Valera era from 1932 to 1958. The emergent versions are least prevalent in the interviews, representing issues like gender, the local community and environmentalism that may become part of future dominant versions. All of these versions are 'ideal types'. No single interview fully expressed any one of the versions.

At this point, I thought that the discourse analysis of the political elite's interviews was complete. However, a more thorough analysis of the discursive versions indicated a common structural pattern underlying the versions, shaping the content of each. Further, when this discursive pattern was applied to the historical literature review of Irish

nationalism and identity, it appeared to shape much of the content of those discourses too. I decided to call this discursive structure the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency, drawing on Giddens's theory of structuration to explain how actors could continuously reproduce such a discursive structure (see Chapter Seven). This cultural logic is used to explain specific beliefs expressed by the Irish political elite in the discursive versions in Chapter Seven. The cultural logic of the dominant version is compared to the transactional analysis of Ireland's contemporary integrations in Chapter Eight. The historical development and contemporary forms of this cultural logic of autonomy and dependency are analysed in Chapter Nine.

3.8 Conclusion

One of the central issues in researching loose multiple integrations concerns the relationship between actors' interpretations and structural influences on those interpretations. This is a variant of the classic sociological issue of the relationship between 'agency' and 'structure' (Ritzer 1996). To address this issue, research methods were devised to sample actors' interpretations of multiple integrations; find relevant structural indicators of those integration processes; assess the accuracy of the actors' interpretations given these structural indicators; and assess any structural influence on the actors' interpretations.

Specifically, the methods used in this study balance an interpretive actor centred approach with historical, transactional and discursive structural indicators of Ireland's multiple integrations. The interpretations of the organisational leaders and the members of the Irish political elite are analysed in intersubjective terms as organisational logics and discursive versions. Further, the interpretations are analysed in structural terms, using historical and contemporary literature reviews of Ireland's national and sectoral integrations; a transactional analysis of the country's contemporary integrations; and an analysis of a deeply embedded discursive structure.

Following Giddens (1984; 1993), a research project on loose multiple integrations should also address the actors' ability to transform the structures that influence their actions. That is, the central issue should be the recursive interrelationship between agents and structure with respect to multiple integration processes. Methodologically, this might involve an

elite cohort analysis over time, interrelating agents' actions and interpretations with structural changes in integration processes. However, the research for this project is limited to single interviews with the organisational leaders and members of the political elite conducted during one period of time. Thus, the study is unable to assess any recursive influence between the actors' and structures involved.

While not overcoming this limitation, there is a discussion in Chapter Nine that relates structural changes in Ireland's integrations since 1994 to statements made by members of the Irish government about these changes, and the possible influence of these statements on the electorate during the Nice Treaty referendum. These statements and the referendum result suggest that the political elite's dominant version of 1993/94 may no longer be dominant, and that the cultural logic continues to shape the political elite's interpretations of Ireland's multiple integrations.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE IFA AND IRELAND'S AGRICULTURAL INTEGRATIONS: STANDING UP TO EUROPE BY SITTING DOWN AT THE TABLE

4.1 Introduction

Chapters Four, Five and Six apply Shils's concept of loose integration to sub-national, sectoral levels of Irish society, namely Irish agriculture, primary education and the trade union movement respectively. In particular, these three sub-national sectoral levels of Irish society are analysed as 'partially autonomous interdependent' (Shils 1982: 35) sectors in Ireland's 'unevenly dense network' (ibid) of multiple Irish national, British, European and global integrations processes. After analysing the historical and contemporary evidence for each sector's multiple integrations, the chapters focus on the role of leading organisations in these three sectors – the IFA in Irish agriculture, the INTO in primary education and SIPTU in the trade union movement – in terms of articulating the organisation's interest with respect to their respective sectoral integration processes.

The remainder of each chapter analyses interviews with leading members from the three sectoral organisations, identifying the cultural meaning that the organisational leaders attribute to their respective sectoral integration processes (p13). The analysis of the interviews focuses on the organisational leaders' cultural interpretations of their dense but uneven sectoral integrations expressed through the partially autonomous organisational logics. In this way, the 'structural' based sectoral and organisational level analyses of these sub-national integration processes are interpreted by the organisational actors who give cultural meaning to the sectoral integration process through their organisational logics.

Chapter Four examines Ireland's agricultural integrations and the organisational logic developed by the leaders of the Irish Farmers' Association, set in the historical context of the development of Irish agriculture and the formation of the IFA. The main trajectory of Ireland's agricultural integrations from the 1600s to the present day involves a move from a British to a European integration mediated by global agricultural and Irish state influences. Specifically, Ireland's British agricultural integration spans the period from the 1600s to independence in 1922. Over this long period of British rule, however, certain

European and global agricultural factors influenced Irish agriculture. From 1922 to 1972, the Irish state primarily directed Irish agricultural policy, mediated first by British, then global American and finally European influences. From 1973, Irish agricultural policy has been basically transferred from the Irish state to the EU through the CAP policy, with increasing influence from global factors such as the GATT talks. With respect to Ireland's European integration, Irish agriculture functions within a highly integrated sector, with a low degree of autonomy for the IFA in decision-making at the European level, resulting in a comparatively high level of dependence.

The IFA's organisational logic responds to these sectoral factors of integration principally through a strategy of protecting the interests of Irish farmers within the European Union. In the interviews, however, an alternative strategy emerges in which Irish farmers regain their independence from the EU through adopting a new role as efficient entrepreneurs exporting globally competitive agricultural products world-wide. With respect to collective identity, the IFA's organisational logic views farmers primarily as entrepreneurs. In the alternative strategy, though, this entreprenurial identity combines with elements of 'traditional' Irish nationalism in reaction to the agricultural sector's dependence and relative lack of autonomy.

4.2 From a British Region To a European District Within The Global Economy

The island of Ireland shifted from a predominantly woodland to a mainly agrarian society during the early 1600s (Cullen 1987: 9). The societal shift began about the time of the Elizabethan conquest and settlements of the late 1500s (Dooney 1988: 2) and was largely completed by the Cromwellian plantations of the mid-1600s. Not surprisingly, Irish agriculture developed as a British region serving Britain's domestic and transatlantic colonial markets (Cullen 1987: 11)[1]. Irish agriculture remained primarily dependent on British markets from the 1700s to the early 1970s, reflecting Ireland's general economic dependence on Great Britain[2] and agricultural dependence on Britain's cheap food policy

[1] Cullen emphasises that Irish farmers also exported to the French colonial markets in the West Indies and to countries on the European continent particularly to France, Spain and Portugal (1988: 11-12). Haughton adds that in 1690, 'almost half of all exports went to continental Europe, notably to France' (in O'Hagan 1995: 3).
[2] O'Grada claims that Irish trade with Great Britain 'increased fourfold in real terms between 1700 and 1780' to the point that `Britain accounted for 74% of Irish imports and 79% of Irish exports' by 1780 (1994: 43).

(Kennedy 1988: 214)[3]. Ireland's trade dependence on Britain began to change with Ireland's entry to the European Union in 1973, particularly with the integration of Irish farming into the European regional market through the Common Agricultural Policy or CAP[4]. In this sense, the Irish farming community[5] has been transferred from the country's historical dependence on the British market to a new dependence on the EU as a European agricultural district providing for the European market.

Of particular importance within this long-term transference from British to European agricultural dependence is the development of the British based first food regime from the 1870s to the First World War. In response to increased 'foreign competition created by the transoceanic steamship and the opening up of new agricultural land overseas' (Cullen 1987: 149) particularly from Britain's white settler colonies, the British government allowed cheap agricultural goods onto the British home market to feed Britain's industrial working class, lowering the costs of British industrial products (Friedmann and McMichael 1989). As prices dropped, one result of the first food regime was initial global agricultural recession particularly for newly uncompetitive agricultural systems such as the Anglo-Irish landlord-tenant system in Ireland. With a rise in agrarian activism allied to political nationalism, the British government responded with a series of Land Acts from

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[3] Kennedy explains that 'Britain combined the continuance of its traditional cheap food policy with domestic agricultural protection by subsidising its own farmers...Given the intense competition on the relatively open British market, the prices received by Irish farmers were often unattractive' (1988: 214). Thus, Britain kept food prices low for its citizens on the domestic market by allowing foreign competitors to drive down prices while protecting English farmers by paying them above market prices for their goods. Britain's cheap food policy formed an important part of the first food regime in which white settler states such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand exported low cost `meat and wheat' to Europe which, `provisioned the growing European proletariat with wage-foods' (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989: 94-95).

[4] Ireland's general economic dependence on Britain has declined dramatically since the mid-1950s but remains significant. From 1955 to 1992, Irish exports to Britain declined from 89.1% to 32% and British imports to Ireland fell from 52.6% in 1955 to 40.9% in 1989; Correspondingly, Irish exports to EU countries rose from 4.5% in 1955 to 43% in 1992 while EU exports to Ireland doubled from 12% in 1955 to 24% in 1989 (O'Donnell in Keatinge 1991:170; and Haughton in O'Hagan, 1995: 39). Similarly, Irish beef and beef products exports to Britain and EU countries in 1986 amounted to 40% and 25% respectively. Ireland's new dependence on the EU becomes clearer in the fact that, 'In 1990 over 40% of [Ireland's] beef production and over 50% of skimmed milk powder and butter were sold into intervention' through the CAP (*Government of Ireland*, 1992: 88).

[5] 'Farming community' refers in the broadest sense to all of the social groups associated with farming, agriculture and rural areas including various categories of farmers, agri-industries and rural dwellers. The leaders of the IFA claim to speak for these groups within the farming community in spite of at times clear differences in the interests, resources and ideologies of the groups (see Peillon 1982: 9-18, 60-68). As such, the term 'farming community' in this chapter reflects the IFA leaders' ideological usage and is not meant to deny the differences between groups within farming, agriculture and rural areas in Ireland.

1870 to 1909[6] which rescued Anglo-Irish and English landlords in Ireland and transformed Irish agriculture into a 'peasant proprietor' model based on a rural bourgeoisie. This British resolution of the Irish agrarian question in favour of Irish proprietary family farmers underlies the structure of Irish landholding into the 1990s and underpinned Irish farming until the spread of the second food regime in the 1960s and 1970s. In this way, the British led first food regime largely structured the Irish agricultural system from the 1870s until Ireland's entry into the EEC depending on the area of the country, type of farming and size of the farm.

As such, the Irish state emerged from Independence with an agrarian, dualistic, family farm based economy largely resulting from the Land Acts, although rural de-industrialisation and emigration among the landless and poorer tenant farmers from before the Famine also contributed to the structure of the Irish farming community. Depending on the government in power, successive Irish governments adopted agricultural policies to favour either large, more efficient and competitive farmers or small, non-viable farmers before agreeing to support both groups from the late 1940s (Kennedy et al 1988; Breen et al 1990). Similarly, state policies to support rural Ireland alternated before achieving political consensus in the post-war era (ibid). Nonetheless, Irish governments have not been able to reverse rural decline, significantly reduce inequality between large and small farmers or maintain the number of farmers in the country (ibid). On the other hand, state policies have set the conditions for Ireland's economic development largely in cities and towns and Irish multinational agricultural firms in rural Ireland. In a European context, these Irish state policies and their results with respect to farming and rural areas are broadly similar to countries like France, Italy, Spain and Portugal (see Yruela, Capo and Baptista in Sociologia Ruralis 1995: 3/4; Coulomb and Delorme in Goodman and Redclift 1989).

In global terms, Irish agricultural policies from the late 1940s to the early 1970s reflected the productionist model of the American second food regime These policies favoured state

[6] The various Land Acts, passed in 1870, 1881, 1885, 1903, 1907 and 1909, reduced rents and loaned Irish tenants money to purchase land from their landlords. The system moved from a voluntary to compulsory sale by the early 1900s so that 'by 1917 almost two-thirds of the tenants had acquired their holdings' (Cullen 1987: 154).

regulation of export driven, capital intensive agriculture within protected national markets led by the globalisation of the wheat, durable food and livestock/feed complexes (Friedland et al 1991; Lowe et al 1994; McMichael 1996; Symes and Jansen 1996). More specifically, states' adopted common policies such as price supports, export subsidies and farm modernisation schemes which under the Pax Americana increased global agricultural production and facilitated a more integrated global market (ibid).

Ireland's entry into the then EEC coincided with the tail end of the second food regime, which fell into crisis from overproduction, long-term decline in agricultural prices and increasing regulation of global agricultural production by transnational firms instead of national governments (McMichael 1996). The resulting global agricultural crisis has led to policy shifts, by countries such as the United States and members of the Cairns group, to eliminate state regulation of agriculture and to liberalise agricultural markets (Lowe in Lowe et al 1994). The EUs CAP reform and the GATT agreement are in part responses to this neo-liberal policy shift and the resulting pressures on the European Union particularly from the United States (McMichael in Lowe et al 1994). At another level, CAP reform and the GATT agreement is an attempt by national governments to 're-regulate' agriculture using regional and global forums (Lowe in Lowe et al 1994) in reaction to 'an emergent global strategy on the part of the transnational food companies' (McMichael in Lowe et al 1994: 164).

In this context, the Irish farming community must be aware of and respond to the actions of the Irish government, domestic transnational agri-firms, the European institutions, trans-European organisations and transnational food companies. Similarly, the IFA leaders' responses to the Irish farming community's present dependence on Europe make more sense in the historical and contemporary context of Ireland's colonisation by Britain and the phases of the global food regimes. The next section of the chapter examines the development, structure and role of the Irish Farmers' Association as an organisational interest before discussing the leaders' main organisational strategy with respect to Ireland's agricultural integrations and in particular the sector's European integration.

4.3 The IFA: Protecting the Interests of Irish Farmers within Europe

> At local, national, and EC level, IFA is standing up for your rights to ensure reward or hard work and a decent livelihood for all farm families (IFA, *Delivering for Farmers* 1994).

The Irish Farmers' Association was founded in 1972 in part as a response to Ireland's impending accession to the European Economic Community (The IFA, *Information Note*, January 1995: 2). The IFA officially emerged out of an amalgamation of the National Farmers' Association and three other farmers' groups. However, the NFA is described as the organisational precursor to the IFA with the result that the NFA's foundation in 1955 is often cited as the beginning of the IFA (Dooney 1988: 50)[7]. At the height of Ireland's economic depression in the 1950s the IFA was formed. The meeting[8] that formed the NFA 'agreed that what Irish farmers desperately needed was one single, strong, united national voice' (*Information Note:* 2).

The emergence of a national 'voice' for farmers first required the development of an extensive organisation all across rural Ireland between different types of farmers. Since the mid 1950s, the farmers' association has been extremely successful in organising farmers and establishing almost nine hundred local branches throughout the Republic of Ireland which represent approximately 85,000 subscribers in 1994 (IFA, *Defending Farm Families in the 1990s,* 1994). Above the local branches, the organisational structure includes twelve regional offices, twenty-nine county executives, twenty-two national committees representing different farming interests, a sixty-nine member national council, an elected board of national officers, fifteen full-time experts and a Brussels Office (ibid)[9].

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[7] More specifically, Macra na Feirme, a rural organisation whose mission is primarily educational, formed the NFA. The leaders of Macra na Feirme wanted to develop a separate organisation 'to deal with economic policy and agricultural development' (Dooney 1988: 50).

[8] Ironically, the meeting to create the farmers' association was convened at the 'Four Provinces Ballroom' in the northside of inner city Dublin (*Information Note*: 2). Perhaps aware of this irony, the IFA's headquarters was built on the western outskirts of Dublin, pointedly removed from but close enough to the Ireland's other important national organisations and the main offices of the Irish government in and around Centre City Dublin.

[9] Excluding the professional experts and administrative staff, the members of the committees, executives, council and board including the president are full-time farmers. This membership profile facilitates communication, policy-making and accountability between the various levels of the organisation. The branch structure is consciously designed to foster horizontal and vertical connections between working farmers, 'As many farmers do not have the time...the branch is a critical link in the IFA structure, maintaining direct

The cumulative effect of the organisational efforts has been to largely overcome the distances between farms and the divisions between farming interests[10] in order to influence farming and agricultural policies[11]. In the process, the IFA has worked to transcend the relative spatial, communicative and infrastructural isolation of rural living for farmers by creating social and cultural bonds between them beyond their common political and economic interests[12]. In this way, the IFA represents more than the organisation and farmers' interests, becoming also a focal point for farmers, for farming as a way of life and for rural living in general.

A second factor in the emergence of a national voice for Irish farmers concerned winning governmental recognition and gaining access to the Irish state and governmental bodies responsible for agricultural and economic policies. The Irish government at first refused to recognise the farmers' association as the political voice of Irish farmers, precipitating a march on Dublin in the autumn of 1966 by 30,000 farmers and a twenty-day sit-in on the steps of the Department of Agriculture (*Information Note:* 2). The government finally relented, negotiating the association's recognition, which has led to direct links and meetings with the government officials of the main political parties and the relevant civil servants in the Irish state. At present, the IFA represents farmers' interests in the national wage agreements, and negotiates with the government and departments in the Irish state over budgetary and policy issues affecting farmers and rural areas,[13] (IFA, *Delivering For*

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contact between you the member and the Association...[and] provid[ing] the facility for all members to have their voices heard on any issue affecting them' (*Defending Farm Families in the 1990s*, 1994).

[10] The twenty-two National Committees and sections represent the various farming interests from livestock, dairy and grain to salmon growers and forestry (*Defending Farm Families in the 1990s*, 1994). The IFA also stresses that the association's 'members come from all walks of rural life, from the commercial sector and low-income backgrounds' (IFA, *The Economic Voice of all Farmers*, 1994).

[11] Other Irish organisations which represent categories of farmers, agribusiness and rural dwellers include The Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers' Association, The National Land League, Macra na Feirme, Muintir na Tire and co-ops like Kerry, Waterford and Avonmore (Peillon 1982: 63-67).

[12] I attended a monthly county executive and the annual meeting of the IFA in December 1993 and January 1994 respectively. At both meetings, I was extremely impressed by the high level of camaraderie between the farmers, large and small, successful and marginal, many of whom had travelled from remote parts of rural Ireland just for the day. The day clearly meant more to them than policy-making in the interests of the farmers who they represented. During dinner at both meetings, members roamed from table to table, greeting friends and catching up on news and gossip.

[13] The budget issues include the state's fiscal policies such as taxation, particularly income, inheritance and capital gains taxes, and social welfare payments and benefits to farmers and their families (*Delivering For Farmers*, 1995). The IFA is directly involved in governmental policy areas such as rural development, disadvantaged areas, the Common Agricultural Policy, GATT, and Structural Funds (ibid). In its negotiations, the IFA also competes for governmental monies with other sectoral interests. For example, the

Farmers 1995). In this sense, the IFA has linked the interests of farmers at the local level to the Irish government and state at the national level through the organisation's structure and the association's lobbying of governmental officials and civil servants in Dublin.[14]

Soon after recognition by the Irish government, the farmers' association prepared for Ireland's entry into Europe. The NFA heard the voice of Irish farmers saying, '"Our future is in Europe"' (*Information Note:* 2), and campaigned strongly for Ireland's accession into the EEC in the 1972 referendum to the point of setting up a permanent office in Brussels the year before (ibid). For Irish farmers, the future lay in Europe because the past had been constrained by independent Ireland's continued dependence on Britain's agricultural market and policies. Specifically, Ireland's farmers wanted 'to free Irish agriculture from the retarding influence of the British cheap food policy' (Dooney 1988: 51). The shift from British to European markets and agricultural policies has been extremely beneficial to Irish farmers overall since 1973 with even the IFA admitting that 'EU membership has meant more to farmers than to other sections of the community' (IFA, *The Economic Voice of all Irish Farmers,* 1994). 'Meaning more' in this case refers primarily to monies transferred from the EU to Irish farmers. The IFA's figures project that 'By 1997, 50% of net farm income will come in the form of direct premium and headage payments from Europe' (IFA, *Defending Farm Families in the 1990s*, 1994).

Correspondingly, Irish farmers' new dependence on EU monies means that the most important policy-making decisions about Irish agriculture and the farming community come from Brussels at the European level and not from Dublin at the national level, indicating the low degree of organisational autonomy for the IFA in the EU decision-making about the agricultural sector. The IFA does not conceal this political fact from its members stating bluntly that, 'All the major decisions that affect your business are now

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association claims that 'In the battle for EU Structural Funds, [the] IFA took on the unions and anti-farmer interests and secured an 17.3% allocation for rural development and the agri-food sector' (ibid).

[14] In European and global terms, the Irish government's inclusion of an Irish farmers' organisation into a corporatist process from the late 1960s was rather belated (see Wilson in Newby 1978) with respect to the 'corporatist alliances' associated with the second food regime (Goodman and Redclift in Goodman and Redclift 1989: 9). On the other hand, the belated incorporation of Irish farmers' groups reflects Ireland's status as a late industrialiser and the Irish state's slow but steady expansion of corporatist practices beginning the late 1950s to the 'social partnership' arrangements of the late 1980s (Peillon in Clancy et al 1995: 370-74).

made in Brussels' (ibid). Given this reality, the IFA not surprisingly stresses the organisation's direct connections to the European institutions and interest groups[15] in order 'to fully represent [farmers'] interests at all levels in Europe' (ibid). The sheer number of the IFA's links with European level organisations coupled with its efforts to impress the association's perspective on European officials provides the IFA with political influence beyond that merited by the small number of Irish farmers in Europe (*Members' Benefits 1993/94*)[16]. As such, the IFA prides itself on the organisation's lobbying efforts in protecting the interests of Irish farmers within the EU[17], arguing that it 'is regarded as one of the most effective farmer organisations in Europe' (*Defending Farm Families in the 1990s*, 1994).

The IFA's effectiveness within Europe is directly aided by the EU which contributes 48% of the IFA's annual income through the European Involvement Fund[18] (*Defending Farm Families in the 1990s*, 1994). Membership fees account for a further 47% of the association's income (ibid). The income percentages almost directly correspond to the IFA's expenditures - 49% of which is spent on 'European issues' and 47% on National and Local issues (ibid). The result of all these interconnections is that Irish farmers earn almost half of their income from Europe, paying part of that amount to the IFA, which

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[15] Besides the permanent office in Brussels, IFA representatives have `formal meetings with the Commissioner for Agriculture, cabinet officials, and daily contact with top civil servants' (IFA, *Members' Benefits 1993/94*, 1993); 'direct...representation on over 20 official EC Advisory Committees' (ibid); make `policy briefings and representations to the European Parliament Economic and Social Committee, GATT and OECD' (ibid); conduct `constant press briefings for European journalists' and have 'reciprocal meetings with farm organisations in other EC member states' (ibid); Further, the 'IFA represents Irish farmers in COPA (the European Farmers' Organisation and IFAP (International Federation of Agricultural Producers - The World Farmers' Organisation)' (*Defending Farm Families, 1994*). Finally, the IFA counts the number of European journeys taken by the associations' representatives, recording over 300 every year (*Members' Benefits* 1993/94, 1993).

[16] The IFA itself argues this point, suggesting that 'While Ireland has only 1.2% of the European Community's 10 million farmers, [the] IFA's influence in Europe is far greater than simple numerical strength' (*Members' Benefits 1993/94*, 1993).

[17] For example, the IFA claims to have almost single-handedly changed the GATT agreement against the demands of the United States. From the farmers' association perspective, 'As a result of IFA pressure in Dublin, Brussels and Geneva, the final GATT decisions involved considerable "damage limitation" when compared with the original proposals' (Delivering For Farmers, 1995), 'with the result that the deal finally struck was far less damaging to Irish farming than had been originally planned by the Americans' (*Information Note*: 3).

[18] The IFA explains that 'The European Involvement Fund was established in the early 1970s specifically to finance Irish farmers' representation in Europe. The fund is collected at the point of sale on all farm produce at the rate of 0.1%' (*Defending Farm Families in the 1990s*, 1994).

receives about half of its funds from Europe to spend half of the association's money lobbying for the interests of Irish farmers in Europe.

The high level of direct economic and political connections between Irish farmers, the IFA and the European state undermine the farmers' association claim to solely represent the national voice of Irish farmers at the European level. The dependence of both the farmers and the IFA on European subsidies and political links creates a feedback loop in which a European voice expressing European interests becomes an IFA voice-over expressing the Irish farmers' national voice. Thus, neither Irish farmers at the local level nor the IFA at the national level had any real policy choice about the fact of European level CAP reform and the shift of agricultural monies to the Structural Funds[19]. Yet, the EUs subsequent focus on farming policies such as the early retirement scheme, agri-tourism and rural development have become part of the Irish farmers' vocabulary of their own interests and the IFA's national claim to deliver for Irish farmers[20]. In this way, the IFA sometimes represents the European interest to Irish farmers and the Irish farmers' interest to the European Union.

4.4 Analysis of the IFA Interviews

The analysis of Ireland's agricultural integrations and the organisational development of the IFA provides a context for the interviews with the leaders of the IFA. In particular, the analysis indicates the continuing significance of external integration processes - British, European and global - on Irish agriculture and Irish farmers from the 1600s to the present day. From this perspective, Irish agriculture was primarily directed by 'Irish' interests, principally the Irish state, for a relatively short period from independence to 1972, in spite of the ideology of the independent Irish farmer. The emergence of the IFA as an organisation through a farming conflict with the Irish state is indicative of the power of the

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[19] The IFA's best claim about their influence on CAP reform is to have modified the original proposals of the EU's Irish Commissioner of Agriculture, Ray MacSharry: 'While the CAP reform being implemented is not the reform advocated by the IFA, the final decisions were a major improvement on the original MacSharry proposals' *(Delivering For Farmers*, 1994). Of course, any Commission proposal is modified in negotiations between the European Council, Council of Ministers, Commission, European Parliament and relevant interest groups.

[20] In the interviews, the IFA's representatives articulate dissent against the shift to a direct income support policy as opposed to the pre-reform price support system. The IFA's voice-over serves to put a good face on a bad situation, saving face for the organisation and for farmers.

state over Irish agriculture at the time. The transfer of agricultural policy to the EU relieved this struggle with the Irish state while moving its site from Dublin to Brussels and further abroad in terms of the GATT talks. In this context, Irish farmers are used to the importance of external integration processes to Irish agriculture as well as dealing with agricultural policy-making as a political process at the national, European and global levels. At the same time, Irish farmers are intent on preserving their independence in Irish national and in individual or family enterprenurial terms.

This section of the chapter analyses the interviews with thirteen high-ranking members of the Irish Farmers' Association. The interviews were conducted between November 10, 1993 and January 26, 1994 at the IFA's national headquarters in Bluebell, an IFA annual function and at hotels in Dublin and around the country. The sample of leaders from the IFA includes members of the permanent staff, the National Executive representing different sectors of Irish agriculture and county officials dispersed geographically to sample the main types of Irish farming. The analysis primarily focuses on the leaders beliefs, hopes and fears about Ireland's multiple integrations, especially relationship with the European Union in the context of CAP reform and the GATT talks. In this sense, the restructuring of European agriculture and Europe's integration into the global economy directly influences the national concerns of the organisational leaders of the IFA. Besides linking national, European and global levels, the leaders of the IFA are also interested in how these wider integrations influence Ireland's relationship with Great Britain and the problem of rural redevelopment in the Republic. In this way, the perspective of the leaders of the IFA on Europe reflects the layers of Ireland's multiple integrations, interconnecting the European Union with the farm leaders' interpretations of global, national and sectoral interests.

The Small Dependent Island Saved by Europe

The leaders of the IFA prioritise Ireland's European integration through an argument based on economic necessity to overcome Ireland's geographical position, size and economic limitations. Consistently, the members interviewed stress that Ireland is a 'small island' which is both geographically 'peripheral' and economically 'dependent' on larger countries for agricultural markets. Ireland's smallness in this case relates to the size of the

population and to the domestic market for agricultural products as well as the size of the country. Since the Irish people cannot consume enough domestic produce to maintain agricultural incomes, Irish farmers have to export an extremely high proportion of their goods out of necessity. Kevin expresses one example of this perspective among the leaders of the IFA:

> We have a tiny population on a relatively small island cut off from the mainland. The food industry has to export 80 percent of what it produces. Irish farmers have a strong sense of Ireland's peripherality.

Further, Ireland's small economic size and lack of any market leading indigenous industry means that the country is a price-taker for most consumer and capital goods, increasing the cost of inputs for Irish export goods. This cost problem is compounded by the country's distance from its main agricultural markets in Europe, raising Irish transportation costs relative to continental European countries. Thus, Ireland's 'high cost' economy puts Irish farmers at a competitive disadvantage in the European market. As Kathy explains the problem, the seas around the island become an economic barrier:

> It is a costly exercise that we have to cross the sea to sell a lot of rural produce, and it puts added costs in comparison to say the likes of France, Spain, Belgium, Germany...where they have the whole food market there at their doorstep but we have to export our produce out there.

To overcome the island's natural barrier and the resulting high cost society, the leaders of the IFA argue that Ireland must be part of the European Union. More specifically, Irish farmers need to be part of a Europe which lowers farmers' costs through subsidies, thereby increasing the competitiveness of agricultural producers in the market. Denis links these themes together in an argument for continued European support of Irish agriculture:

> Since Ireland is a small island which exports 80 percent of it produce with added transportation costs, Irish agriculture needs extra support and premiums from Europe to remain competitive.

In Denis' version of the argument, EU subsidies to Irish farmers have become almost an entitlement if not a right because of Ireland's island barrier to markets. However, this sense of entitlement is very much a minority view among the IFA leaders who prefer to stress the competitiveness of Irish agriculture given fair market conditions.

Fair market conditions in this case means continued European agricultural subsidies to compensate for Ireland's comparative disadvantages. From this perspective, Seamus explains the benefits of EU support and the costs of not having EU subsidies:

> If we were selling out to the world...at unsupported prices, we would have about half the income that we have today...Europe is extremely important to Ireland because the country does not have the resources to support agriculture...We need to be part of Europe from an economic point of view because we live in a high cost society...it would be very difficult for us to live without the various support measures that come from Europe.

The dilemma here for the leaders of the IFA is to argue for EU subsidies because of comparative disadvantage without admitting that the agricultural transfers may have created a new dependency on Europe. To support this argument, Denis compensates for Ireland's dependency by turning EU subsidies into Irish 'rights' in Europe. This is not say that the other IFA leaders do not recognise Ireland's dependent position on the EU. Ted clearly states Ireland's agricultural dependency, adding that Ireland's has no options outside of Europe: 'We rely totally on the EU. If we were to remain outside of the EU, where would we sell our produce?'

This acceptance of Ireland's European dependency raises the country's former colonial dependency on Britain as well as Ireland's similarities to Developing World countries. Kevin expresses both these points suggesting that:

> Without the EUs policies, Ireland would probably still be a Third World producer of bulk commodity products without a market...The EU is crucial to...Irish farm families particularly since Ireland has moved away from its post-colonial dependency on the British economy by its membership in the EU.

Thus, Ireland's smallness, peripherality and dependence refer to more than the country's present relationship with the European Union. These characteristics also refer historically to Ireland's colonial and post-colonial relationship with Great Britain and globally to the countries of the Developing World. From this perspective, Europe has saved Ireland from a post-colonial and Third World status. More positively, Europe has helped Ireland to save itself and become one of Europe's fastest growing economies in the mid-1990s. At the same time, Europe represents a potential threat to Ireland's continued position as small, European state in the developed world. The idea of Europe as a threat to Ireland's 'place

among the nations' is specifically revealed in the leaders' fears about EU enlargement and institutional changes. For example, the leaders stress Ireland's European integration partly because they have 'no choice' given the economic reality of Ireland's place in the world, but also in reaction to the other perceived options of Ireland as a post-colonial dependency of Britain or a developing country producing only bulk agricultural commodities.

'Paddies on a Little Island' Left Behind by Europe

Kevin's provocative phrase about the little island encapsulates the IFA's fears about Ireland becoming 're-peripheralised' through the Union's enlargement to Eastern Europe as well as fears about Treaty changes to the EUs institutions favouring bigger over smaller states. Kevin best expresses this:

> The fear of enlargement to the East is that the Germans will invest their capital and build food processing plants in Eastern European countries for their cheap labour and low cost food. The result would marginalize Ireland in the market, re-emphasising Ireland's peripherality in Europe as the one remaining island member state.

If the leaders' fear of enlargement is the loss of capital and markets, the fear of institutional change concerns the loss of EU transfers. Specifically, the farm leaders' worry about the bigger states using their political power to reduce the level of subsidies to smaller states. For Stephen, it is a case of the piper calling the tune:

> We've already seen some cracks in the European Community in that the bigger powers are going to become stronger and have more say in running the community...When things begin to get tight, those who are paying the money may well decide, 'What are we getting out of it? It's time we started dictating the policies. Since we pay the piper, why shouldn't we call the tune?'

This fear of losing subsidies through institutional reform is part of a more widespread doubt about the bigger wealthier states' long-term commitment to their poorer European neighbours. Jack articulates this general anxiety:

> There is a fear about whether the UK, Germany and the other industrial nations will continue to contribute to Ireland. We are always looking for reassurances because we are so dependent. I think the figure is about 60 percent subsidies as part of the price.

In terms of collective identity, the IFA leaders' fears about EU enlargement and institutional change suggest that they identify Ireland as a peripheral instead of a developed European country, although the meaning of this collective identification for Ireland's relationship to the Developing World is left unsaid. It is clear, though, that the negative reference group for the leaders of the IFA is other peripheral countries and regions in the EU not in Eastern Europe or the Third World.

Thus for Denis, it is a question of Ireland not becoming, 'the Sicily of Europe. We are a peripheral state. We could be forgotten about very easily by a strong, Federal Europe'. Kevin, on the other hand, reserves the negative stereotypes for the Irish themselves who, 'are described around the EC...in disparaging terms as the people with the begging bowl'. In this way, the fear of becoming re-peripheralised raises the cultural self-doubts and insecurities of the residual version, in this case about Ireland's 'real' place in Europe and what other Europeans really think about the Irish. For Kevin, the projection of Ireland's negative European future is wrapped in a self-imposed stereotype drawn from Ireland's British colonial past, 'The EC is eventually going to water itself down and we're going to be left back out where we were - Paddies on a little island'.

From the Subsidised Market to the Subsidised Society

The leaders' fears about Ireland's future in an enlarged more centralised European Union sets the context for more immediate worries about the restructuring of Irish agriculture within Europe and the global economy. In 1993-94, these IFA concerns centered on the effects of CAP reform and the GATT agreement on Irish farmers and rural areas. At the European level, the leaders of the IFA were still making sense of the changes from intervention to premium based agricultural policies. Specifically, the Irish farm leaders were worried about the long term implications of the European move away from an agricultural system based on commercial subsidies to farm entrepreneurs producing for the market towards a rural system of non-commercial social payments to former farmers in order to maintain rural society. At the global level, the IFA's high ranking members believed that the GATT agreement would create unfair competitive advantages for non-European producers, who would be able to sell their subsidised produce on the European market as European farmers had their subsidies reduced to world market prices.

From the IFA's perspective, CAP reform and the GATT agreement would threaten the survival of entrepreneurial family farming in Ireland by reducing agricultural subsidies, giving away market advantages to foreign competitors and turning farmers into rural dwellers dependent on social welfare payments. In identity terms, these criticisms adopt elements of the agricultural fundamentalist discourse with respect to the American agri-firm domination of the global agricultural market and the entrepreneurial discourse in terms of the emphasis on the productive family farm. One result of these criticisms is that the leaders of the IFA would prefer to produce within the subsidised European market than to dwell within a subsidised Euro-society. Another result is that the farm leaders tend to identify the global economy in negative terms viewing it as 'fixed' by the American government and companies and essentially 'unfair' to Irish and European producers.

Despite these criticisms, the IFA's assessment of the CAP reform package and the GATT proposals includes a very specific acceptance of one of the agreements' broad goals. In line with the entrepreneurial discourse of a farmer's identity, the most important goal for the leaders of the IFA is to help farmers become more competitive, self-sufficient entrepreneurs in the global market. For Ted, it is natural that:

> If we are getting a sufficient price for our product, farmers will be happy. We would not need any support systems from the EU, and that would be what farmers would generally prefer.

This goal of non-subsidised, globally competitive Irish farmer partly reflects the desire of Irish agricultural producers to be independent of as opposed to dependent on Europe. To this extent, the desire expresses a nationalist vision of self-sufficient Ireland instead of the European picture of a dependent, peripheral island. Thus, if the global economy was 'fair' and based on 'merit', then Irish farmers could compete and globalisation might be seen in a more positive light. At another level, the goal of the sufficient farmer expresses the belief that Irish farmers are really 'entrepreneurs' and not simply 'farmers' or even 'agricultural producers', again reflecting the dominance of the entrepreneurial discourse among the farm leaders. For Owen, this belief has become a commonplace reality in the sense that, 'There is hardly a farmer out there who is not an entrepreneur'.

Of course, no matter how the IFA's leaders choose to interpret the goals of CAP reform and the GATT agreement, they have to implement the terms of the agreed proposals, given their self-admitted dependence on European policies at the national and farm gate levels. From this perspective, the leaders of the IFA have to realign their interests to match the goals, rules and regulations of the new agricultural policies in spite of their idealised vision of the Irish farmer as entrepreneur in a fair global agricultural economy. Or as Charles expressed it, 'Our job is to try to make the best use of that policy on the ground'.

One aspect of this interest realignment process is to understand how the new policies work in practice for the benefit of Irish farmers. For Pat, the old intervention system centred on the annual price fixing negotiations between Christmas and the end of March which determined the prices for intervention which usually rose at least in line with inflation. However, with the new CAP regime:

> The level of payments was more or less capped at a level, and within that level we have to sort out the different commodities. You don't get anymore overall but the level of supports was changed from the intervention system to the premium system...From the beginning of 1993, intervention started to be phased out in a major way and premium supports came in instead. Basically it switches the amount of money that was being put into intervention into premiums but there is a cap....There was no upper limit to intervention...Now we have to sell it onto the market. The theory is that the consumer will get cheaper produce and our incomes will be topped up by the premium.

Another component of the CAP reform policies in line with the GATT agreement are measures to reduce the number of farmers, particularly smaller, less efficient and older ones, to increase the viability of those farmers who remain as well as to move more farmers into non-farm and off-farm activities. These accompanying measures include early retirement, agri-environmental, tourism, forestry and horse-breeding schemes among those specifically discussed by the leaders of the IFA. For Owen, many of these schemes are positive opportunities to restructure Irish farming if not to redevelop rural areas. The early retirement scheme addresses the age structure problem in which:

> More than 50 percent of our farmers are more than 50 years of age. So this early retirement scheme is offering a chance for farmers aged between 55 and not yet 66 a chance to get out of farming full stop and handover the farm to a younger farmer who will enlarge their farm.

As opposed to the leaders of the IFA, Owen also embraces the neo-rural discourse in which farmers become 'custodians of the countryside' and 'rural dwellers' alongside a reduced role as agricultural producers. For him, the custodian role follows from the various environmental schemes with respect to fertilisers, pesticides, waste management and natural heritage areas:

> This agri-environmental scheme will actually compensate farmers who undertake to manage their farms in an environmentally friendly way...there are quite a lot of farmers who would like to have that payment coming in. You are going to have your primary product that is the core business of your farm. But your other role, your role as manager of the countryside is now going to be compensated for and that should bring you up to a realistic income...That person, even though he is on a small income, is going to have a reasonable expectation out of farming for the next thirty years.

Continuing with this neo-rural discourse, Owen views other supplemental schemes such as agri-tourism policies for holiday homes, pony treks and nature walks as part of a 'whole environmental knowledge package'. In Owen's neo-rural vision, the knowledge based economy could redevelop rural areas in the near future through the benefits of technological advances in sectors like telecommunications, providing off-farm employment for farmers and other rural dwellers:

> In the next twenty five years, I as a farmer or as a rural dweller could participate in the technological advancements that have been made and I could be doing work at home...I think that we could still live out in our remote rural areas and make our contribution to working life...We have an experience like that in Kerry where people are actually doing insurance claims for a firm in New York, which again is a cottage industry working in the telecommunication system.

In Owen's vision of the future, he even foresees a time when farming will be a 'hobby' totally unattached to the present roles of agricultural producers or the more idealised entrepreneur. In keeping with the neo-rural discourse, Owen's willingness to realign his beliefs to the new CAP within GATT vision of farmers in rural areas hinges on his future projection of a technologically redeveloped rural Irish society in which small farm families prosper through a mixture of farming, subsidies, non-farm and off-farm employment. On these terms, Owen accepts the new European and global agricultural policies providing they will result in a better future for farmers and rural society. To adapt to this new vision, Owen's interest realignment also entails reinterpreting the meanings of 'farming',

'farmers' and 'the rural'. In the same way, Owen's realignment of his interests leads to a reconstruction of his self-identity and his collective identity as a 'farmer'. In the end, Owen's neo-rural realignment of his interests to suit the new European and global agricultural vision means that he chooses to idealise the future of rural Ireland instead of idealising the role of the entrepreneur farmer like his fellow IFA leaders.

Finally, Owens' articulation of the neo-rural discourse reflects a certain amount of tension within the leadership of the IFA with respect to European and global changes in agriculture, rural society and farmers' collective identity. For the other leaders of the IFA, the understanding and implementation of Europe's new agricultural policies in Ireland involves some detailed criticism of CAP reform and the GATT agreement. However, their criticisms are usually not directed at the European Union or the Irish national government. Instead, the GATT agreement in general and countries like the United States, New Zealand and Australia become the focus of the leaders concerns. The common strand of these critiques is that the above countries claim to have liberalised their agricultural policies in favour of the free market while either continuing to subsidise farmers or to overproduce goods on the world market lowering prices for all farmers.

Ted even accepts that the CAP intervention system led to overproduction but that the premium system has helped to limit production more in line with actual demand. However, the quota system has not been extended to other countries through the GATT agreement. So, for Ted:

> The worry of it is that with the whole GATT agreement...America, New Zealand and Australia have continued to produce, that there is no strict quotas on farmers out there. There isn't much point in having strict quotas on farmers here if people outside the community are able to produce away and flood the market within the EU.

From Eddie's perspective, the United States is the principal culprit by promoting a market based agricultural system while dumping agricultural produce:

> How many people will be able to produce at world prices? What the U.S. calls world prices are really the prices at which they dump surplus on the world market. Another of the Irish problems with the American ideal of the agricultural free market is that the system benefits American style, large-scale capitalist farms over smaller scale, European type family farms.

More specifically, Eddie expresses this concern with respect to milk powder:

> We export an enormous amount of milk powder, but we would not be able to export it to Mexico...because the Americans have taken over the market. Americans produce milk from thousands of cows under the same roof.

According to Eddie, a real solution at the global level would centre on policies to increase prices for all producers in the developed and the developing world. In this way, an Europeanised managed market in which states' collectively intervene to benefit family farmers is preferable to an Americanised free market leading to capitalist and subsistence farming. Thus, Eddie says:

> Personally, I would like to see schemes at the world level where you would rise all boats...where you would think of Mexican farmers and South American farmers who are tied to producing for North America at a very subsistence level. If you could rise them and rise all boats...you could talk about world trade on a level playing pitch.

In this global context, the IFA's leaders also appreciate the collective strength of the European Union in negotiations with large, powerful countries like the United States or ideological blocs of countries based on the free market such as the Cairns group. For Cathy, Ireland's small, peripheral status is overcome to a large extent within the EU:

> We would be very weak on our own and it's only within the bloc of the EU that we would be able to fight against the Americans and the New Zealanders.

Seamus also extols the benefits of the EU for the member states who can negotiate a better deal as a collective group presenting one argument as opposed to fifteen individual states offering their own arguments. Seamus sees this benefit in the GATT talks:

> Where the United States has a strong lobbying group. From that point of view, I would feel that it is important that we have the European Union because if we were all operating as individual states, I think we wouldn't make a very coherent argument.

Thus, IFA leaders do not criticise the European Union for the policies arising from the GATT agreement because the farmers accept that the European Union negotiated the best deal that it could in the global forum, and earned a better deal than if the Irish government had negotiated alone. On the other hand, part of the IFA's lack of criticism reflects the organisation's financial dependence on the EU and on Ireland's agricultural dependence

on Europe. This is not to say that the IFA leaders are mute with respect to Europe's role in the GATT talks and CAP reform. The type of criticism which is voiced, however, represents more of a fear about the farmer's position in the future European society than a direct critique of European policies or negotiating positions.

Kevin worries about the long-term economic impact on farmers of the interrelationship between CAP reform, the GATT agreement and the Maastricht Treaty's social policies. While GATT reduces European prices to the world level, the CAP and the Maastricht Treaty add social costs 'from the labour side to safety, work, environmental restrictions, energy policies, taxes and tariffs'. When compounded by Ireland's already high cost economy such as the country's 'high ratio of public service costs to private sector costs', one result is further competitive strain on Ireland's commercial farmers. However, Kevin is more concerned about the long-term effects of these new policies on further reducing the number of commercial farmers in Ireland and on exacerbating the dualistic structure in Irish farming between viable and non-viable farms. From this perspective, the real long-term problem for all European farmers is social dependency:

> The commercial end of farming is getting smaller and smaller. We probably only have about 50,000 farmers who would be full time commercial farmers. There is an awful lot of part time farmers and off-farm income, and there is an awful lot of dependency now on EC direct aids and on social welfare within Ireland. There would be two different sectors among the farming community in Ireland. So what's happening increasingly is that there are structures being built into the EC's policies which are making farmers, even those who would be considered up to now as commercial farmers, more dependent on getting compensation for their loss of income from a cheque in the post.

Thus fear of social dependency is not about the immediate loss of income since there is acceptance among the IFA leaders that the premium system and the accompanying measures will 'top up' farmers' incomes to their previous levels. For Kevin, the main problem is that the money for the 'cheque in the post' will be more directly traceable to the EU taxpayer compared to the higher prices for consumers in the intervention system. In this sense, the new system is:

> Totally transparent and therefore open to enormous political influence for the long-term future. For instance, the taxpayers of Hamburg and Hampshire will revolt and say, 'No!'. They will drive political initiatives to say, 'No! Cut them off totally'.

Kevin's dramatic portrayal of a Euro-taxpayer revolt against farmers disguises the fact that both the European intervention and premium systems are highly politicised, subject to political influences from groups and institutions at sectional, national, regional and global levels. The crucial difference is that the leaders of the IFA believe that their case for sustaining farmers' income levels in the EU is much weaker as 'part time farmers', 'rural dwellers' or the 'rural unemployed' than as farmer 'entrepreneurs'. In this sense, the leaders of the IFA worry about the position of farmers in the move from the subsidised market to the subsidised society.

Perhaps more importantly, the Irish farmers' fear about social dependency expresses a larger concern that the basis of their collective identity in Irish society as 'peasant proprietors' and 'family farmers' is being slowly yet irrevocably undermined by global agricultural restructuring and European CAP reforms. It is ironic then that the Irish farmers' ideology of independence and self-sufficiency emerged out of a previous intersection of global political and economic interests under the British Empire as discussed above (Friedmann and McMichael 1989). The irony is that British Imperial policies constructed the basis for the Irish farmers' beliefs in their independence, self-sufficiency and entrepreneurialism while European Union policies and global agreements such as the GATT talks have contributed to the undermining of this 'traditional' Irish nationalist collective identity for farmers.

Buying Into European Companies for Green, Value Added Products (While Redeveloping Rural Ireland)

The organisational leaders' belief in the entrepreneurial role for farmers is part of an alternative organisational strategy within the IFA's organisational logic to reconstruct Irish agriculture and, in the process, redevelop rural Ireland. The organisations driving this alternative strategy are Irish agricultural firms. The plan to achieve this strategy is based on Irish agri-firms producing high value added, environmentally friendly goods[21], buying into companies in the British and Continental markets, and distributing the green value

[21] Of course, the subsequent BSE crisis has dented Irish farmers' attempts to market their green image to the consumers of other European and non-European countries.

added goods through the companies to the retail sectors of different countries. Rural redevelopment results from the jobs created, agricultural goods used and money spent by the rural based Irish TNCs in Ireland. Interestingly, this alternative strategy reaffirms the 'traditional' nationalist goal of a self-sufficient, independent Ireland. To achieve this goal, however, Irish agri-firms must become transnational and competitive in global agricultural markets. In this way, the leaders of the IFA assert that Ireland's economic dependence on Britain, the European Union and overseas firms can be overcome and that the country's economic development and rural regeneration can be internally generated through Irish entreprenurialism. Significantly, this alternative strategy also provides a domestic resolution to the problem of the small, peripheral and dependent island. On the other hand, the cost of this new form of agrarian nationalism is that large Irish firms become the entrepreneurs instead of the family farmers and global interdependence replaces self-sufficiency and independence.

To achieve this alternative strategy in practice, Irish farming must be viewed as part of the larger agricultural sector. As such, Ted stresses that agriculture is not simply composed of:

> The ordinary farmer on the ground - there is a lot of people getting employment say as a result of factories and creameries and all of the various commodities that are being processed here in this country.

This reorientation of Irish farming away from the family farmer to the agri-firm includes developing competitive agricultural products whose export sales will compensate for Ireland's high cost economy. For Kevin, the lesson is that Irish agri-firms must adapt to the 'changing market scenario' by marketing Irish products better, 'getting a premium price' for Irish goods and, 'trading on our green image, our environmentally friendly way of farming'.

Similarly, Irish farmers and firms must learn from their competitors how to lower production costs within Irish conditions in order to take full advantage of changing demands in the global market. For Denis, this means that producers in the milk sector must learn from their liberalised New Zealand competitors, even if the IFA has criticised their unfair competitive advantages under the GATT agreement. Thus, Denis says:

> The only thing that we can do is lower our production costs...We had agricultural advisors here from New Zealand and what we wanted to do was

> transfer the knowledge that they had to produce milk cheaper. Then the dairy coops would assist us to make the milk cheaper.

In the end, though, the implementation of the IFA's alternative strategy of redeveloping rural and agrarian Ireland depends on the successful expansion of Irish agri-firms abroad. For Pat, the strategy is becoming reality:

> All of our agri-firms and our coops...are buying companies in Europe now. They're buying into companies all over Europe. Avonmore have even bought into Poland...So the people see that they're aggressive and they'll keep working for Avonmore. They'll be off farms a lot of them.

After buying companies in Europe, the Irish TNCs must sell their new processed goods through these firms, further increasing rural Irish employment. Pat explains this process with respect to vacuum packing, beef burgers, pizzas and ready-made meals:

> We are trying to get more value added in our exports...The coops like Avonmore are public companies but they're Irish controlled, and they're doing a good job in getting into the supermarkets of Europe. They're buying the carcasses at factories and getting the meat cut up into vac-packs. They have a fairly big market for it in Germany in supermarkets...We have quite a number of beef burger companies now. They are making burgers for export. We have pizza companies. That would take Irish meat and cheese...We have a couple of very good industries in town now...The young fellows and young girls are working around the clock on pizza and ready made meals for export. That's the way we need to go.

Pat's example shows that Irish agri-firm benefit young people and part-time farmers from towns. From Cathy's experience, Irish TNCs can also solidify entire rural areas, reversing rural depopulation and ensuring the viability of small farmers. In Cathy's rural region:

> Over 60 percent of the farmers have less than fifty acres...To exist, most of those farmers need off-farm income or alternative enterprises. On the borders of these two counties, the population hasn't gone down and the households are still viable units. The reason is because a great proportion of the people work for Avonmore and they also farm. Avonmore is agriculturally based. It would be producing food and using the products of the farmers...It seems to have consolidated the whole area of the population. I think that is the way forward really. We need to look for industries like that.

Of course, the problem is that looking for agricultural industries does not mean that Ireland will find enough of them to create self-sustaining economic development and rural

regeneration. Into this loophole in the vision, foreign TNCs step in to create more of the needed jobs. As Pat says:

> Whether we like it or not, foreign multinational companies have the power and the money to produce that sort of value-added. Fair enough, they might take out profits but they sure give a lot of employment. We'd prefer if we were able to do it ourselves.

However, neither Irish agri-firms nor overseas firms have been able to successfully redevelop rural Ireland particularly along the western seaboard. This lack of success is not surprising given the historical context of rural industrial decline in Ireland from the late 1700s and the early 1800s, followed by the various political interventions by the British colonial government, the Irish state and the European Union. Nonetheless, the IFA leaders' alternative strategy of mixing industrial work with farming replicates the model of economic development which sustained Irish rural society until competition from larger, more efficient British firms began the process of rural depopulation and decline. The leaders' alternative strategy addresses the cottage industries' lack of competitiveness by basing rural development on globally competitive Irish TNCs. In the process, the farm leaders' reject 'traditional' protectionist nationalism for a form of economic nationalism adapted to the restructuring global markets of the 1990s

Logical Good Europeans, Nationalist to a Degree

In spite of the vision of developing Ireland through domestic TNCs, the farm leaders fully accept that Ireland's economic success and the farmers' livelihood depend on continued European economic integration. Yet, the leaders do not want to reduce Irish farmers' support for the European project to the material benefits received by farmers. Instead, the IFA leaders' belief that farmers and the Irish people as a whole are 'good Europeans' whose support for Europe is wider and deeper than the level of EU transfers to Ireland. At the same time, the farmers' economic interest in market access to the EU underlies to a certain extent the goodness of their Europeanness. For Charles, the question is:

> Are we real Europeans? I think that obviously the money is the major issue on the farmers' side...But the Irish people in general are good Europeans...You have to look at it with an outward looking view. I mean we have a 340 million-consumer market in Europe. We export 80 percent of our food. So it is logical that we would be good Europeans.

In one sense, then, the logical good Europeans are simply protecting both the farmers' and the national interest by supporting Europe. In another sense, the farm leaders' nationalism is muted because of Ireland's dependence on the European Union and the acknowledged benefits of the European transfers to the Republic. For Ted, the result is that:

> We are nationalist to a degree. At the same time, we have to be sensible and see that there is no way that we could survive without being members of the EU. We rely on it for things like infrastructure and roads.

This mixture of good Europeanness and nationalism is expressed by IFA leaders with respect to the organisation's relationship with European level institutions and other national organisations in Brussels. For Owen, the IFA's relationship with the European Union means that:

> National policy is curbed just because of Europe, everything that we do nationally has to be taken in the context of a broader Europe.

On the other hand, James does not believe in a curbed national interest. He argues that concessions result from each nation pursuing their own interests:

> The national interest would be a priority because we find that other nations in the EU are looking after their own interests as well...getting all sorts of concessions. We're keeping an eye on them certainly. We don't begrudge them anything, but we want to get a fair share of the slice at all times.

For Charles, though, the IFA's pursuit of its national interest and the resulting concessions can be broadened out to include common European interests through COPA and the Commission:

> From time to time, we try to put a national edge on our lobbying efforts at the EU level and try to wheel out something for Ireland. The other nations do the same thing...but, in general terms, we are able to pursue a policy which is pro-European. The IFA works through COPA, the link up of all the European farmers' organisations. They would always try and adopt a pro-European policy. They also work very closely with the Commission. If we're pursuing just a policy for one country, we always try to broaden it out a bit and make it pro-European to encompass everybody, and to keep the spirit of the European thing going.

The blending of the farmers' national interest into a broader European interest 'to encompass everybody' extends to support for further European economic integration, particularly for the single currency. For Stephen, the goal is to, 'see more monetary

stability in Europe'. Ted supports monetary union for the benefit of travellers, 'because financial institutions are the one gaining from different exchange rates'. Pat stresses the importance of having a European Central Bank, 'to regulate the currency...and keep every country on its toes'. However, the leaders' support for monetary union becomes the limit of their support for further European economic and political integration. Specifically, the farm leaders' accept economic integration to the point of the single currency, but would like to restrict political integration and do not feel threatened by greater cultural integration.

For some of the leaders of the IFA, increased political integration at the European level infringes on national sovereignty and independence. For Cathy, it is simply that, 'Our government comes first'. In Ted's case, every national government wants to maintain sovereignty and 'would be very slow to give away their own independence'. For others, the problem is increased Federal power to the Brussels' bureaucracy or the European parliament. In a general sense, James expresses, 'reservations about giving too much power to a Federal government in Europe'. More specifically, Stephen simply, 'wouldn't support a federal Europe where the European Parliament made decisions for each country'. Eddie is also wary because:

> There is always a danger of bureaucratic control. I mean you talk about the European Parliament, 546 members and we have 16 members at the most. We are only going to be a drop in the ocean.

With respect to European cultural integration, the general consensus among the leaders of the IFA is that Irish cultural identity will remain strong if not become strengthened within Europe. The explanations, however, for this national cultural strength differ between the leaders. For Kevin, the reason is that Irish farmers do not identify with European culture:

> Our disposition to European culture isn't strong in the farming community...Farmers are by and large conservative people, and their strong sense of identity would be very definitely a clearly expressed Irish identity. There would not a great empathy with European culture.

Surprisingly, James and Seamus believe that the geographically peripheral island which is deemed an economic cost is also a cultural benefit as a barrier to other cultures. For Seamus, this means that, 'because we are an island country, we can retain our identity

within the greater Europe', while James insists that the Irish will have, 'no difficulty protecting our national culture because we have a sea right around us all over the island'.

Other leaders accept that Europe will become more culturally integrated over time, but that increased integration will actually benefit national cultures because people will place more emphasis on their cultural distinctiveness. Thus, Owen thinks, 'that by being a stronger Europe, we will be more into our own national cultures', while Pat claims that, 'even if Europe became fully integrated, we'd still have our own identities...because people make their own nationality'. Finally, Cathy accepts that, 'European culture will be a conglomerate of all of the cultures...but that each individual culture will still be noticeable'.

This assertion of strong national cultures alongside fears of losing political sovereignty must be viewed in the context of their beliefs and fears about Ireland's overall relationship to Europe. For the farm leaders, Ireland's dependence on the EU leads them both to portray Ireland as the small peripheral island and to react to the country's European dependence by creating a vision of Ireland's independence based on indigenous agri-firms. Similarly, the IFA's leaders fear that Ireland's economic dependence on the EU will also result in the Republic's political dependence on Europe is compensated for by the belief that Ireland has a strong culture resistant to integration into a broader European culture. In this way, the leaders of the IFA react in the alternative strategy and their favoured identity choice as an independent entrepreneur to the agricultural sector's dependence on the EU by developing a nationalist response to European integration which limits the integration process to the economy.

4.5 Conclusion

The IFA's organisational logic with respect to the agriculture sector's multiple integrations is primarily directed to the sector's European integration process. In response to the sector's high level of European integration, low degree of organisational autonomy and high level of dependence, the leaders of the IFA have developed a two-sided strategy. The main pragmatic strategy is based on protecting the interests of Irish farmers within Europe. The alternative ideal strategy desires a situation in which independent, autonomous Irish

farmers or agri-firms export competitive goods onto a fair global market. In terms of identity, the leaders of the IFA prefer to view themselves as entrepreneurs in both the pragmatic and the alternative strategy. However, the identity of farmers as entrepreneurs is reinforced in the alternative strategy by drawing on the farmer's role in 'traditional' Irish nationalism, expressed as a reaction to the sector's European dependence and the new non-farming roles being forced onto farmers by the EU CAP reforms.

Irish farm leaders choose to express their nationalist reaction to Ireland's European dependence using an older cultural model constructed against British imperial rule in Ireland in the late 1800s. This 'traditional' nationalist model allied the land, home rule and Gaelic movements or, more generally, versions of Irish economic, political and cultural nationalism respectively. In this agrarian nationalist model, economic self-sufficiency through ownership of the land is tied to political sovereignty on the island and the cultural uniqueness of the Gaelic people. The main difference between the older agrarian and the newer IFA nationalist model is that the farm leaders' construct their revised nationalism against Europe instead of Great Britain. Another significant difference is the desire to build economic self-sufficiency through domestic agri-firms in order to preserve family farm ownership of the land against European policies and global agricultural competition. Culturally, the farm leaders' retain the cultural distinctiveness of the Irish people derived from the traditional model while adding that Irish culture is resistant to European cultural integration not just British cultural assimilation.

With respect to global agriculture, the Irish farm leaders' measured embrace of the European Union extends to the global economy but to a much more limited extent. From the perspective of the IFA's leaders, the restructuring neo-liberal market is unfair to Irish farmers at the moment and further attempts at liberalisation favouring the US and the Cairns group should be resisted politically through the European Union. On the other hand, a fairly restructured global market offers opportunities to Irish farmers particularly through high value added products developed by Irish agricultural firms for export markets. From this perspective, the global culture does not even register and therefore does not require a 'traditional' cultural defence mechanism, while the global economy should be very carefully embraced through the EU and Irish agri-firms.

Finally, the IFA's organisational logic as expressed in the alternative strategy has bearing on theories of European integration, and to a theory of loose multiple integrations derived from Shils's concept of loose national integration. Classical theories of European integration assume that increased levels of integration between member states will lead to higher levels of identification with Europe. The Irish farm leaders' nationalism against Europe suggests that the most integrated sectors of European society are not necessarily the most Europeanised in terms of either support for further integration or identification with Europe. In fact, groups within highly integrated sectors may fear that further integration will weaken their nation's voice in the European project, resulting in nationalist reactions to Europeanisation by sectoral organisations such as the Irish Farmers' Association.

Classical theories of European integration are unable to fully account for these cultural reactions by organisational leaders in highly integrated sectors of European integration. A theory of loose multiple integrations is better able to account for the organisational logics devised by sectoral organisational leaders, explaining both the cultural interpretations of highly integrated European sectors that lead to higher levels of European identification and, more importantly, those that lead to cultural reactions to European integration in the context of other significant integration processes. In this way, a theory of loose multiple integrations better explains why the Irish Farm leaders' believe that standing up to Europe means voicing one's nationalist fears about losing control to the EU, while pragmatically sitting down at the table to negotiate the best deal possible for one's national group 'to keep the spirit of the European thing going'.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE IRISH NATIONAL TEACHER'S ORGANISATION: KEEPING AN EYE ON THE EUROPEAN YARDSTICK (AND THE IRISH STATE, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, PARENTS' AND BUSINESS GROUPS)

5.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the sectoral integrations for Irish primary education and the organisational logic developed by the leaders of the Irish National Teachers' Organisation. In comparison to Irish agriculture and the IFA, the primary educational sector within the EU is a sector of low-level integration, with a high degree of autonomy in decision-making, resulting in a higher level of independence. However, most of this autonomy and independence is retained in the Irish case by the Irish state and to a lesser extent the Roman Catholic Church. However, as one of the educational partners[1], the INTO has some influence in national decision-making for primary education in Ireland.

In terms of the sector's loose multiple integrations, Irish primary education is more 'loosely' integrated into the European Union than agriculture, while at the same time the sector is more 'tightly' integrated into the Irish nation-state. Further, the present structure of the primary educational system in terms of relationship between the Irish state and the main Churches is based on an accommodation between the British state and the Catholic and Protestant Churches in the nineteenth century, highlighting the continuing structural significance of this post-colonial legacy of Ireland's former integration into Britain. The sector's global integration is very limited relative to that of Irish agriculture. Nonetheless, many of the INTO's organisational leaders interpret an Anglo-American global culture as a threat to Irish national identity. This perceived 'global' identity threat reflects the organisation's 'traditional' cultural interest as a protector of Irish culture and identity and is relatively distinct from the organisation's material interest articulated primarily at the national level with regards to the Irish educational partners.

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[1] The term educational partner derives from the broader European concept of social partnership. In this Irish context, social partnership is primarily a neo-corporatist term for those interest groups involved with the Irish state in the national wage agreements from 1987. The Irish educational partners include the Irish state, the Churches, teachers' organisation, business groups and parents' groups involved in negotiations and agreements over the Irish educational system from the primary to the tertiary level.

The historical and contemporary framework for the chapter encompasses the creation of the Irish primary educational system as part of a 'concordat' between the British imperial state and the Irish Churches; the British state's cultural Anglicisation policy for the national schools; the Irish state's replacement Gaelicisation curriculum after independence; the new national curriculum of the early 1970s to prepare Irish children for the global economy; and more recent moves to end the structural concordat and to institute European awareness in Ireland's primary schools in the 1990s.

The present structure and content of the Irish primary educational system reflect the historical and contemporary struggles resulting in accommodations between various global, European and national institutions over the role of education in Irish society. These institutional conflicts and compromises can be grouped into four periods. The first from the 1830s to 1921 is based on a form of concordat between the British state and the Churches in Ireland involving state supervised but church managed primary schools and a cultural Anglicisation policy alongside a religious perspective in the curriculum. The second period from 1921 to 1971 substitutes Gaelicisation for Anglicisation in the curriculum within the old state-church concordat, expressing an alliance between the Irish state, the Catholic Church and cultural nationalists. The third period from 1971 to 1991 centres on the introduction of the new child-centred curriculum in the primary schools in the context of more radical changes to the secondary and tertiary sectors of Irish education resulting in part from Ireland's global and pending European integrations. The fourth period from 1991 to 1994 involves proposals to end the state-church concordat by redistributing control of the schools between the educational partners, thereby reducing church power, as well as increasing the European and global content of the curriculum. In general, Ireland's British and Roman Catholic integrations still provide the basic structure of the primary school system, while the curriculum reflects the newer alliance between Irish nationalists and the Catholic Church and the increasing influence of Ireland's global and European integrations within the national control of educational systems.

The INTO's organisational logic responds to these specific European and national level patterns of integrations. The dominance of the Irish state and the Catholic Church over the

national schools and the comparatively limited European integration tend to direct the INTO's organisational logic onto the national as opposed to the European level. As such, the INTO's leaders' strategy is primarily devised with respect to the Irish state, the Catholic Church and the other main educational partners such as parents' and business groups. In particular, the leaders of the INTO have developed an organisational logic based on the strategy of 'keeping an eye on the European yardstick' or using 'Europe' as a lever in national level political negotiations. The leaders' strategic use of Europe as resource draws on European standards as well as models based largely on the concepts of partnership, subsidiarity and secularisation. In terms of identity choices, the INTO's organisational logic is mainly devoted to preserving Irish national cultural identity in the context of Ireland's British, European and global integrations. Yet the INTO's leaders articulate their vision of Ireland's national school system in part through European models, suggesting that their organisational identity is framed within a European perspective.

5.2 A Concordat, Gaelicisation, Globalisation and European Awareness

The first period of modern Irish primary education involves a form of 'concordat' between the British Imperial state and the main Churches in Ireland to create a state supported but church managed primary school system[2] (Coolahan 1981: 13-17; Inglis 1987: 110-115, 121-25). The educational compromise reflected Church policy based on first concordat reached between the Catholic Church and Napoleon in 1801 (Holmes and Bickers 1983: 218-19; Heyer 1969: 107) and evolving state-church agreements reached in continental European countries such as Austria, Denmark, Germany and Switzerland (Heyer 1969: 113-18).

The curriculum in this period largely mirrored the structure of the concordat mixing the content of Anglicisation within the teaching of a Catholic world order (Coolahan 1981; Inglis 1987: 118, 124, 165). With respect to Anglicisation, the curriculum rejected the Irish language as a school subject and used books which rarely referred to Ireland and the Irish (Coolahan 1981: 21). In a wider sense, the Anglicisation policy in the Irish primary

[2] While funding the primary school system, the state allowed the Churches control over the management of the schools in issues such as the selection of principals and teachers. The state retained control of the administration of the system, created the rules and regulations, devised the curriculum and produced the textbooks (Coolahan 1981: 13).

schools formed part of a larger attempt to legitimise British rule in Ireland by 'cultivating attitudes of political loyalty and cultural assimilation' (p4). At the same time, Catholic management of national schools serving the Irish Catholic populace allowed the Church to control 'the civil and moral education of Irish Catholics' (Inglis 1987: 157), creating good Catholics who followed the 'rules and regulations' of the Church as well as 'clean-living, orderly, well-managed, self-controlled, literate people' (p157, p165). In this context, the educational compromise over schools in Ireland is part of mainstream European developments at the time in the changing relationship between European states and the Roman Catholic Church. In a wider sense, the Irish educational 'concordat' is an example of the meeting point between an earlier phase of globalisation represented by Roman Catholicism and a successor phase manifested in the British Empire (Robertson 1992).

The second phase from 1922 to 1971 centres on a cultural alliance between the Irish state, the Catholic Church and cultural nationalists (Hutchinson 1987: 304-7) in the replacement of an Anglicising for a Gaelicising curriculum in Irish primary education (Coolahan 1981: 7, 38-39, 43; O Buachalla 1988: 342-3). While retaining the British centralised model and the state-church structure of the system, the Irish state dramatically altered the national curriculum and the goals of education based on 'the ideology of cultural nationalism' (p7). The new national school curriculum promoted the ideals of the Gaelic League (O Buachalla, p342-3) by:

> Allotting...a much more central role to the Irish language with an Irish emphasis in courses in history, geography, music etc..Cultural nationalism...held that the schools ought to be the prime agents in the revival of the Irish language and the native tradition which it held were the hallmarks of nationhood and the basis for independent statehood (Coolahan, p38).

With minor revisions, Irish national schools emphasised learning the Irish language and the 'Gaelic' tradition until 1971 (p43).

The third period from 1971 to 1991 centred on the introduction of the new 'child-centred' curriculum[3] (p170) within the pre-existing state-church structural alliance. Curricular

[3] According to Byrne and Cremin, the new curriculum `focuses on...language (Irish and the English languages); mathematics; social and environmental studies (incorporating history, geography, elementary

revision at the primary level followed extensive reforms of the Irish secondary and the tertiary educational sectors in the late 1960s resulting from a watershed OECD report on Irish education published in 1965. This report, *Investment in Education*, emphasised the serious class and regional inequalities in access to education (Breen at al 1990: 126-7; Coolahan 1981: 166). The report also highlighted the disjunction between the academically biased, culturally nationalist educational system and the technical, scientific needs of Ireland's industrialising economy (Breen et al 1990: 126-7). The Irish reform of the whole educational sector reflected the country's increasing integration into the global economy through overseas firms and its preparation for membership into the then EEC.

However, the new national school curriculum largely limits the roles of European and global dimensions to the initiative of individual teachers within the time allotted for social and environmental studies (Byrne and Cremin in Tulasiewicz and Brock 1994: 139). With respect to Europe specifically, there are some recommended European topics of study for teachers in the geography section and 'the move towards European unity' in the civics syllabus but even here the emphasis is mainly on 'Ireland's involvement in the move towards European unity rather than on any wider treatment of the theme' (p140). Thus, despite recognition of the importance of European and global dimensions in Irish education, the new curriculum is still significantly nationalist in orientation incorporating elements from the older cultural and the newer economic nationalism. In this sense, the basic curricular goal of Irish primary education remains the transformation of school children into 'citizens with a specifically Irish identity' (Lynch and Drudy 1993: 26).

The fourth period from 1991 to the present[4] revolves around a broadening of the institutional partners in the national educational alliance to include more local groups such as parents and supranational organisations like the EU. At the same time, proposed institutional reforms include shifting the power balance away from the Catholic Church in structural terms and from cultural nationalists in curricular terms. The proposed structural changes followed another OECD report on Irish education in 1991. The report

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science and civics); physical education; arts and craft; and music. There is also the area of religion, for which there is no state syllabus' (in Tulasiewicz and Brock 1994: 139).

[4] In retrospect, the fourth period may end up being categorised as a continuation of the third phase depending on the result of the proposed structural and curricular reforms to the primary system.

recommended greater representation of business, teachers and parental representatives in the school system (Lynch and Drudy 1993: 28). The government responded in a 1992 Green Paper by, among other proposals, challenging Church management of primary and secondary schools. A specific proposal in the paper removes the Churches' voting majority on boards of management in the schools by requiring equality of representation between Church representatives, teachers and parents' groups (ibid). The curricular reforms include the introduction of a European or non-European foreign language as well as greater European and global dimensions into a revised national curriculum under another review by the Irish state's National Council for Curriculum and Assessment[5]. The result is that the Irish state at the time seemed more willing to restructure Irish primary education along more European lines with respect to the separation of church and state, educational partnership, subsidiarity as well as European and global dimensions to the curriculum.

Yet the structure of Irish primary education continues to be based on the 'concordat' between the British Imperial state and the Roman Catholic Church of the 1830s. In this way, Ireland's British and Roman Catholic integrations continues to directly structure Irish primary education to the present day. This point is supported in a comparison with the Northern Irish primary educational system in which the 'concordat' of the 1830s remains British policy, providing the Catholic Church with even more control over primary education than currently exists in the Republic (see interviews). Similarly, Irish state continuation of a primarily nationalist curriculum preserves the still influential role of Irish cultural nationalism in the national schools. The strength of cultural nationalism is perhaps best shown today in the curricular time devoted to the teaching of the Irish language as a foreign language to overwhelmingly English speaking Irish school children. The partial 'opening up' of the new curriculum to the needs of the global economy and the European Union have not significantly altered the nationalism of the primary school system. From this perspective, the Irish primary educational system is perhaps best characterised in terms of a largely nationalist curriculum within a state-church structural alliance inherited from British colonial rule.

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[5] In an earlier review from 1987 to 1990, the NCCA rejected the introduction of another language into the national curriculum citing 'Pressures relating to time, curriculum overload, as well as the demands of the two languages currently included in the present programme' (Byrne and Cremin in Tulasiewicz and Brock 1994: 141).

In a European Union context, the Irish system of state support for a denominationally managed primary educational system is rather unique in the extent of church control of the national schools[6]. At present, the closest approximation to the Irish structure of primary education is found in the regionalised Belgian system, although the Catholic Church's influence over primary schools is significant although no longer dominant in other predominantly Catholic European countries like Spain and Italy[7]. Thus, Irish primary schools are presently an outlier in a European Union context in terms of the general secularisation of primary school systems.

On the other hand, the Irish concern to preserve the cultural nationalist basis of primary education within revised curricula including global and European awareness is common to a greater or lesser extent throughout European Union countries (see, for example, the country studies in Tulasiewicz and Brock 1994: 47; 72; 93; 215; 235). For example, the Danish neo-liberal educational reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s attempted to internationalise and Europeanise the educational system while returning to an emphasis on the teaching of Danish history, literature and values in the schools (Winther-Jensen in Tulasiewicz and Brock 1994: 47)[8]. In this area, the Irish primary educational system is in the European mainstream with respect to curricular changes to include European and global elements while maintaining the basic emphasis on the imparting of a nationalist perspective to the nation's school children.

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[6] 3,225 out of 3,325 primary schools in Ireland are denominational with 93 percent of that number owned and managed by the Catholic Church (Lynch 1993: 76).

[7] In the Belgian system, approximately 70 percent of school children in Flanders and around 50 percent in Wallonia attend Catholic primary schools supported by the province and the communes (Rochette in Tulasiewicz and Brock 1994: 223). In Spain, the Catholic Church exercised controls similar to the Church in Ireland until the 1970 introduction of the General Law of Education (Esturla and Bragado in Tulasiewicz and Brock 1994: 257). Presently, `Thirty-five percent of pupils go to private schools of which 43.4% are run by the Church' (p263). Further, a new state-church 'concordat' makes it 'compulsory to teach the Catholic religion in all schools, but it is an optional choice for pupils' (Ossenbach-Suater in Benner and Lenzen 1996: 102). In Italy, the concordat from 1929 to 1989 made the teaching of the Catholic religion compulsory in both primary and secondary schools except for students from other religions (Monasta in Tulasiewicz and Brock 1994: 164). After the revised concordat, as in Spain, 'all children could choose whether or not to include this aspect of education' (ibid).

[8] Another example comes from the preamble to the Portuguese Comprehensive Law of 1986. The preamble justifies educational reforms in order to `fulfil the complex requirements that our education system must satisfy both at national and international level...while preserving national identity... [and] meeting the challenge of modernisation raised by our joining the EC' (Belard and Matos in Tulasiewicz and Brock 1994: 235).

This common European pattern of a nationalist education with European and global components in the curriculum directly reflects European Union policy with respect to national control of education. From the Treaty of Rome, the then EEC and the member governments implicitly accepted 'that educational policy is not a matter for the Commission but falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the national governments' (Husen et al 1992: 18). This agreement expressed a wider policy concord in which economic and cultural spheres were formally separated in terms of European integration with national control over culture and education strictly maintained (De Witte in Wallace 1990a: 204). Until the late 1980s, this agreement left vocational education as the only part of national educational systems directly influenced by European level policies under Treaty provisions for job retraining for displaced workers (Husen et al 1992: 18).

With the move to the Single European Market, the Delors' Commission successfully argued for increased European involvement in tertiary and secondary level programmes of cooperation and exchange such as ERASMUS, LINGUA and TEMPUS (Chisholm in Bailey 1992: 138-9). In terms of primary education, the main policy initiative has been guidelines for cooperation in education adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1989 (Tulasiewicz and Brock 1994: 17-18). These guidelines involve the development of 'European awareness' in primary schools principally through the voluntary adoption of 'Knowledge about Europe' and 'Knowledge about Language' programmes (p10). In addition to gaining relevant European knowledge, skills and attitudes, the guidelines also include 'a global education dimension, such as peace, equality, ecology and citizenship education' (p18). Drawing on these guidelines, national educational authorities have simply been implementing agreed European policies on European and global awareness into their national curricula albeit according to national priorities with respect to primary education.

The Maastricht Treaty codifies this increased involvement of the EU in national educational systems while redrawing the line in terms of cultural integration in education. Thus, the Treaty states that:

> Community action shall be aimed at: developing the European dimension in education' by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems (Treaty on European Union 1992: 47).

Within this revised separation between economic and cultural spheres, European educational integration particularly at the primary level remains limited based primarily on the inter-governmental guidelines on the European level discussed above as well as national or regional level agreements between educational authorities depending on the nature of the educational system in the respective member state. One result of the present European policy of limited educational integration is that organisations at the national level tend to mediate their interests with respect to European policies through national authorities such as the state instead of directly to European institutions like the Commission.[9] The INTO is a good example of this particular type of national organisation within a sector controlled by nation-states and a limited amount of European integration.

5.3 The INTO: A Teacher's Union for National Education in Europe

> What the INTO is trying to achieve is a fair deal for all our pupils...we would like them to be the leaders in a new Europe, to create a new Ireland, and also to improve the quality of life for all (Joe O'Toole, General Secretary, INTO in *Celebrating 125 years of I.N.T.O.*, 1993: 12).

Founded in 1868, The Irish National Teachers' Organisation represents 20,000 primary school teachers in the Republic of Ireland's national schools and over 5,000 in Northern Ireland's primary schools[10] (*Irish Independent*, Celebrating INTO's 125th Birthday, Oct. 18 1993: 2). Throughout the organisation's history, the INTO has managed conflicts between teachers, the Catholic or Protestant Churches and the British or Irish state (O Buachalla 1988: 86). The INTO's principal conflict throughout most of the organisation's history involved salary disputes with first the British and then the Irish state (pp91-96)[11].

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[9] With respect to Irish teachers' organisation, one exception to this general rule would be their participation in the European Trade Union Congress.

[10] According to Colin's interview, the Northern membership has a separate annual conference to discuss primary school issues within a British Northern Ireland context. Representatives from the INTO's Central Executive Committee attend the Northern conference.

[11] In terms of the Irish state, the government cut teachers' salaries in 1923, 1933 and 1934 (O Buachalla 1981: 91) while the INTO called for strikes in 1918, 1933 and 1946 (p91). INTO policy until 1940 mainly focused on restoring the pre-independence salary scales; on cost of living increases from 1941 to 1950; and salary parity with other civil servants as well as increased numbers of teachers from 1951 to 1968 (pp93-96).

The other main issues of contention between the INTO and the state revolved around pensions and the role of the state controlled inspectorate (p63, pp89-91; Coolahan 1981: 32). Historically, teachers' conflicts with the Churches centred on issues of national school management, such as the hiring, firing and promotions of teachers (O Buachalla 1981: 96-101) and the conditions of school buildings (pp101-104)[12].

A more recent example of the INTO's conflict management between the state and church involves the government's proposed equality of representation for the religious, parents and teachers on school boards of management. The organisation must weigh the teachers' interests in equal representation, work within the Churches' de facto local control and support the state's legal efforts to change the boards of management. At the European and global levels, the Irish state and the INTO can ally in their strategic use of information such as the common European model of state-church separation in education and the OECD's recommendation of the inclusion of other educational partners in Irish school management. Nonetheless, the main conflict remains at the national level and it is within this arena that the INTO must direct the organisation's interests and strategies. The INTO's national position, then, within the Irish primary educational system is rather like a junior interest group between the more powerful state and church blocs. From this perspective, the INTO's organisational logic of using Europe as a resource can be viewed as an extension to the European level of the organisation's historical national strategy with respect to the state and the churches in Ireland.

During this period, the INTO also fought for the end of the married teachers' ban, enforced from 1933 to 1958 (Coolahan 1981: 46). After the introduction of the new curriculum in 1971, the government and the teachers' unions agreed to a common salary scale for primary and secondary teachers in 1973 and for equal pay for married and single teachers in 1977 (INTO: A Decade Of Progress 1991: 4-5).

[12] The INTO sought contractual fixity of tenure from the Churches until the 1946 strike significantly reduced the numbers of teachers' dismissals (O Buachalla 1988: 96-104). Since the late 1940s, the INTO has struggled with the Churches for improved physical conditions, greater teacher/parent participation in school management, and more lay promotions in new large urban schools (pp96-104). The churches and the state agreed to more lay promotional posts in 1970 and 1973 (p100). Further, the churches accepted boards of management with minority teacher and parent members for the first time in 1975 and more equal representation within continued church control of the board in 1980 after intensive INTO lobbying (Coolahan 1981: 172, 175). More recently, the conflict between lay and religious teachers has lessened following the rapid decline of religious personnel in Ireland. By 1992, religious members composed only 5 per cent of primary school teachers and 9.6 per cent of school principals (Lynch and Drudy 1993: 92, 98).

On a daily basis, the INTO's main policies are designed to serve the interests of its membership of Irish primary school teachers. On this day-to-day organisational level, the INTO is a mix between a professional interest group and trade union. At this level, the organisation serves the professional and material interests of Ireland's primary school teachers in terms of salaries, pensions, promotions and other issues related to work conditions (O Buachalla 1988: 88). National schoolteachers number over half or 20,410 of all the 40,000 full time primary and secondary teachers in Ireland (p91). As a group, primary teachers are overwhelmingly lay (95%), predominantly women (76.5%) and disproportionately from middle class and farming families (ibid, pp92-94). On the other hand, the teaching profession remains 'largely administered and managed by men' (p92)[13] within schools and by the state. Despite efforts to study and remedy the gender imbalance, the INTO Executive Committee in 1993/94 reflected the larger gender problem in the educational sector by electing 2 women out of 22 committee members.

As such, the INTO can also be viewed as another European example of a national organisation in a predominantly female profession administered mostly by men. Certainly, the four women interviewed for the sample group raised the significance of gender for the structure of the organisation as well as for the INTO's relationship with the European Union. In general, though, the significance of gender for the analysis of the interviews is limited mostly to women's issues such as equality in pay scales as opposed to a broader women's perspective on the changing role of primary education in national societies, the European Union and a globalised economy. This compartmentalisation of gender may reflect the predominance of men in the interview sample and the form of gender analysis in the organisation at the time of the research.

With respect to the teaching profession as a whole, Irish teachers at the primary, secondary and third level 'represent the largest professional group in Ireland' (Lynch and Drudy 1993: 90)[14]. Further, the teachers' unions are well represented within the decision-making

[13]For example, 51.9% of national school principals were men in 1992 (Lynch and Drudy 1993: 99). More starkly, `Women make up over three quarters of the teaching force in primary schools, yet just 11.5% of female primary teachers are principals (p100).

[14]As an occupational category, teachers represent 4% of Ireland's workforce; as a trade union, teachers form the second largest trade union grouping within the Irish Congress of Trade Unions – next to SIPTU (Lynch and Drudy 1993).

bodies of the Irish state which administer education[15]. The three main teachers' unions have also been involved in ongoing discussions to create a single federation of teachers with the goal of increasing their collective bargaining power and to better address the new set of demands on teachers in the wake of Ireland's continued societal development (ibid). For national schoolteachers, these new demands include providing more specialised services for a wider range of students without adequate training or resources (*Irish Independent*, Oct. 18 1993: 12) and coping with the increased hiring of temporary and part-time teachers. The new demands have also been accompanied by increased scepticism about the required teaching of religion and the Irish language in the schools (ibid). The pressures on teachers to adapt to a rapidly modernising society in an integrating Europe and global market have led to some doubts among national school teachers about the continued significance of a nationalist curriculum within schools imbued with a religious ethos.

At the organisational level, these doubts have become part of the INTO's official policy which encompasses progressive and outward looking educational goals in the course of adapting to Ireland's open economy and modernising society[16]. For example, the organisation favours an increased European perspective and the inclusion of a modern, continental language in a revised national school curriculum, balanced by the present requirement to teach Irish, English and religion (*Irish Independent*, Oct. 18 1993: 5; *Foreign Language Teaching In Primary Schools* 1991: 31-33)[17]. This official policy reflects the practical needs of a small, European economy and the development of 'a new young generation, which will be sceptical, challenging, progressive and active' (Irish Independent, Oct. 18 1993: 2).

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[15]Lynch and Drudy (1993: 106) note that the INTO has monthly meetings with the Department of Education, and regular meetings with its staff. The teachers' union are also represented on state committees and review bodies set up to study specific areas of education. She concludes that `special interest representation on such bodies...is so strong that teachers' unions and other special interest groups...enjoy a virtual veto on the formulation of national educational policy' (ibid).

[16]In this regard, the organisation publicly fights to lessen the various inequalities in Irish education and for increased European involvement in primary education. See the bibliography for some of the more recent INTO publications concerned with overcoming the effects of poverty, gender, disability and other forms of discrimination in the Irish primary system.

[17] There was, however, some dissension among members of the executive on this issue at the time of the interviews (see below).

On the other hand, one must temper the INTO's official support for increased European involvement in primary education with the organisation's use of Europe as a strategic resource in national level struggles with the other 'educational partners'. This is perhaps best illustrated in the organisation's call for more European funding of the primary school system. Officially, increased European Union transfers is one of the INTO's policy objectives, especially since:

> Primary education is the only sector never to have received as much as one penny of support from European funds. The other sectors managed to get support under the guise of training as opposed to education (*Irish Independent*, Oct. 18 1993: 2).

On the one hand, this straightforward claim for a larger share of European funds for education may derive from the organisation's material interest in tapping into European monies above and beyond government resources. On the other hand, the organisation's call for more European funds becomes a strategic resource in the context of the INTO's factual claim, expressed in the media and to the Irish state, that the primary system is extremely under funded relative to the tertiary sector and the educational system as a whole is under funded compared to other developed countries. From this perspective, the INTO has to call for more European funding because the Irish state does not provide adequate funds relative to the rest of the developed world in order to educate its own children. Thus, the organisation's call for more European funding becomes a political strategy to force the Irish government to spend more money on primary education and on the educational system as a whole.

As an organisation, then, one of the INTO's main policy responses to increased European involvement in the education sector has been to extend the pre-existing national policy as an interest group between the Irish state and the Churches to the European level, leading to the use of Europe as political resource within national conflicts between the educational partners over issues such as the funding and management of the system. At the same time, the INTO has begun to articulate a more proactive Europeanisation policy in support of greater EU influence in the primary schools with respect to monies and, importantly, the curriculum. Of course, the analytical difficulty here is to separate active support for greater European integration from the organisation's material interest and political use of Europe

in national educational struggles. The interview results show that the Europeanisation of the INTO's policies are both more complex and embedded than this organisational analysis of the INTO's national, European and global relationships suggests.

5.4 Being Aware of Europe and of One's own Interests

Keeping an eye on the European Yardstick

The following analysis compiles the results of interviews with eleven high-ranking members of the Irish National Teachers' Organisation between October 11th, 1993 and March 24th, 1994. Nine members of INTO's Central Executive Committee (CEC) and two Officers at the Dublin Headquarters have been interviewed for the sample. The CEC members represented regions across Ireland including Northern Ireland. There are four women in the final sample.

The leaders of the INTO were well aware of the EU's history with respect to the restricted role of education as well as the new possibilities arising from the Maastricht Treaty. In this regard, Niall, a CEC member, notes that in the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome:

> The big power brokers of Europe, and that would be conservative governments and church interests, insured that education wasn't included...It just dealt with training.

However, Article 126 of the Maastricht Treaty changes the relationship between mainstream national education and Europe in that:

> The European end of it would be to support and supplement the initiatives and policies of the member states...I think that's precisely the way it should be.

Niall's telling phrase 'that's precisely the way it should be' expresses the INTO leaders' support for the revised separation of powers between national and European institutions over education[18], providing that European educational integration remains fixed within the present Treaty terms of national control of educational policy. This applied example of subsidiarity suggests that the INTO's organisational interest coincides with the state's

[18]Aideen, an officer at the Dublin Headquarters, is more specific about the uses of the Structural funds in primary education: 'the main areas could be school buildings which are the infrastructure of education; in-service training which could be linked to job training; and also possibly...illiteracy which is a big European priority'.

national interest in restricting Europe's influence in national education to one of 'support'. Further, it clearly limits the scope of the INTO's official support for increased European involvement in issues like funding and the curriculum to the role of 'supporting' national educational policies. In this way, the organisation is more nationalist than Europeanist, reflecting the national focus of the INTO in a European sector of restricted integration.

The leaders' support for strictly limited European educational integration, however, does not extend to European awareness about models of best practices in other EU countries. The INTO's use of European models for Irish primary education followed a newfound organisational awareness of Europe in the early 1980s. According to Paul, 'before that we tended to be kind of isolated. Now there's an awareness of what's happening in Europe and we want to be as good and we want to have the same standards'. The INTO's awareness of Europe led to the realisation that based on some comparative measures the Irish primary system did not meet European standards. The realisation, though, did not result in a reappraisal of the Irish national schools or, more specifically, the role of teaching and teachers in a comparatively below average European educational system. From the INTO perspective, the collective identity and role of teachers were not threatened by the negative EU comparisons. Instead, the INTO blamed the Irish state for Ireland's comparative educational disadvantage and used the negative comparisons 'as a leverage in lobbying our own government' to quote Aideen. In this way, the INTO's increased European awareness initially led to the development of the Europe as a resource strategy.

More specifically, the policy attempts to 'better your own lot' using the European standards. For Colin, the strategy involves pointing out negative comparisons and saying:

> Look this is how badly off we are compared to our European colleagues. From that, we will list all the areas where we are much worse off whether it is in class size...pupil/teacher ratios...provision of psychological services or remedial education...we are always trying to improve things. We would use that as a yardstick.

By adopting this organisational strategy, the reality that Irish primary schools come up short on the European yardstick becomes a positive fact for the INTO in the organisation's struggle for more state funds. The strategy assumes that the Irish state remains solely to

blame for Ireland's negative comparisons to the European standard. Do the teachers bear no responsibility at all? From the INTO's perspective, the teachers are the overburdened public servants of a national school system badly under funded by the Irish state, a fact which became more apparent to them with the INTO's awareness of European standards.

Whoever shoulders the blame, remaining aware of the European standard means that the INTO members must keep abreast of European organisations and their meetings, policies, publications and statistics. According to Andrew, 'keeping an eye' on Europe is facilitated by direct linkages to European organisations such as the INTO's membership in the European Trade Union Congress' Conference on Education and a new international teachers' organisation called Education International. The ETUC holds colloquia and conferences which allows the INTO direct access to other educational organisations across Europe. The INTO's General Secretary sits on the executive committee of the ETUC, further facilitating the INTO's access and information via the General Secretary to the CEC down to the organisation's district and branch levels. The INTO has also been involved in the development of a merger of teachers' unions across the world into an international organisation with a European sub-grouping.

Other organisations which the INTO members cited by name include the OECD in Paris and the European Commission in Brussels. Roland, an INTO member from Northern Ireland, states matter-of-factly that when he worked on the problem of disadvantage, he turned first to the OECD 'to get a European perspective as to what was actually going on inside the various European countries'. For Andrew, on the other hand, the INTO's continued awareness of Europe becomes a careful monitoring of the EU:

> We would watch European trends. For instance, the European Commission recently published a Green Paper on Education with a number of headings for...developing support services for schools, the kind of curricular areas that will be within schools' broad education policy...So from that point of view, we would certainly be keeping an eye on what's happening within the European Union.

Further examples of the INTO's direct engagement with Europe include student and teacher exchanges between schools in different European countries arranged through the European Commission's programmes. Sarah, on the INTO executive, talked about her

national school's pairing with a primary school in France, and of her participation in a teacher exchange programme in which representatives from European countries discussed reports on their respective educational systems. Aideen also mentioned learning about Europe by travelling via exchanges or participating in other European schemes. She adds that 'students have a higher motivation to have contacts with other European countries' after being involved in European sponsored programmes.

In the cases of European models, institutional linkages and exchanges, then, the INTO membership exhibit a much wider and deeper European integration compared to the leaders' strictly limited view of educational integration and their use of Europe as a strategic resource. The INTO's main purpose remains to further the organisational interests of national school teachers within Ireland, but the teachers' interests have already been redefined in comparative European terms. Further, European educational standards have quickly overtaken the Irish or even the British models as the measure of excellence in the Irish national school system. In this sense, the INTO's awareness of Europe has profoundly affected the organisation to the extent that its members must keep an eye on the European standard first, and then compare Irish educational practices to that ideal. In this sense, Europe has become an integral part of the INTO's perspective on Irish primary education, a wider perspective which is not solely reducible to the organisation's interest in national educational struggles.

Carefully Preserving the Irish Language

However integral Europe is to the INTO's wider perspective, most of the leaders interviewed stated that Europe had no direct influence on their daily work as representatives of the organisation. There was division, however, about Europe's impact on the national school curriculum. Liam, another CEC member, claims that Europe 'hasn't impinged...to date on the curriculum used in the primary school'. Andrew, on the other hand, remarks that:

> Within the curriculum, there are certain European dimensions in terms of...geography, certain elements of history...there would also be within the English reading scheme...mentions of Europe or a European dimension. There was a promotion in the last school year by the European Commission of an activity book/workbook...about the Commission and the Parliament.

Part of the disagreement might stem from differences between schools since, as Aideen notes, much of what could be called European studies in the primary schools depends on the individual initiative of teachers working on an 'ad hoc basis' (see also Byrne and Cremin in Tulasiewicz and Brock 1994: 139-41).

In terms of the near future, though, the INTO's members express broad agreement that the revised curriculum[19] presently being developed will include a specific European dimension, most likely the introduction of a European language into the national schools. For Aideen, there is no doubt that:

> European awareness will be introduced into the new curriculum for the primary schools... I think the argument in the end would be in favour of a European awareness which will include language awareness as well as the teaching of languages.

However, the details of implementing a European language raise a number of related conflicts for the national schools. Some of these problems are teaching a language vs. language awareness, language overload, and time constraints. To teach a foreign language in school requires more time for students to speak proficiently compared to language awareness programmes which expose students to the language through basic words and phrases (INTO, *Foreign Language Teaching In Primary Schools*: 17, 19).

Further, national schools already teach Irish and English as languages which means, according to Andrew, that 'forty percent of our timetable in raw terms is for languages'. The addition of a third language, European or otherwise, to the curriculum necessitates either cutting back on Irish and English or on other subject areas. In this case, the necessity of having to teach the native language of Irish as a foreign language to English speaking pupils as well as the teaching of English to the national school pupils becomes a clear hindrance to the Europeanisation of the curriculum. At a more general level, the conflict which arises from teaching three languages in the national schools represents a direct conflict between the system's traditional cultural nationalism, Irish participation in an

[19] As cited earlier, the new curriculum introduced in 1971 for its child-centred approach to primary education has been under review by the National Council for Curriculum and Assessment (NCCA), a state body with representatives from the major educational partners.

English speaking world defined largely by the former extent of the British Empire and the necessity to prepare Irish school children for a life in the European Union.

Thus, part of the technical debate over language intensiveness, overload and time constraints masks a larger struggle over the place of the Gaelicising tradition, particularly the Irish language, in modern Irish education[20]. More specifically, the real concern of those minority of the INTO leaders' opposed to a European language in the schools could be the Irish state's continued willingness to sacrifice the Irish language to achieve its modernising goals for national education[21]. Their ultimate fear would be the end of the mandatory requirement to learn the Irish language in the schools, thereby eliminating the basis of the state's 1922 Gaelicising policy for Irish education.

For most of the INTO's leaders, though, the question is no longer if but how a European language will be introduced into the national school curriculum[22]. In this case, the INTO's organisational support for a modern foreign language in the national schools is backed by business interests and parents' groups along with the Irish state and the EU. With respect to business interests, Colin suggests that business and industry groups:

> Believe that...a way around our unemployment would be to get involved in European languages, introduce them at an early age at school...they see it as hugely important for our future that our people who pass through school have a good command of European languages.

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[20]Siobhan tells a common story about the teaching of Irish in post-independence Ireland. She explains how `in the twenties, almost all of the primary education would be conducted through the Irish language, even though a lot of the teachers weren't fluent in the language'. Many teachers became upset at this compulsory element, and reacted by `shoving it down people's throats'. This led to `growing resentment towards the language' by both teachers and pupils, particularly when corporal punishment was administered to students for wrong answers. In fact, the teaching of Irish was often used as a threat by teachers, who might say things like, `If you're not good, we're going to do Irish and not arts and crafts!' The result has been that, until recently, `children grew up taking in subliminally the message that Irish is bad, Irish is dreadful'.

[21]O Buachalla documents the decline in state support for the Irish language since the early 1960s (1988: 352-355). Particularly, he notes the closure of the Irish language preparatory colleges for teachers in 1961 and the government's 1973 policy shift `whereby Irish is no longer required as an essential subject in state examinations and as an entry requirement to the Civil Service' (p353). The latter change reduced the need for students to learn Irish in the schools in order to obtain one of the scarce jobs and safe careers in the Irish state.

[22]Significantly, many of the INTO members interviewed mentioned a large Department of Education pilot project to introduce a European language into the curriculum of 5% of the national schools in 1995 or 1996.

In terms of parents' groups, Liam points out that some parents have developed 'a consciousness for a European language to be taught in primary school'. Byrne and Cremin affirm Liam's claim noting that the National Parents' Council in 1990 'called for the recognition of parents' wishes in regard to the inclusion of a modern European language as part of the work of primary schools' (in Tulasiewicz and Brock 1994: 141)[23].

In this instance, the common interest in a European language has created an alliance between the European institutions, the Irish state, the INTO, domestic business interests and parents' groups against the interests of 'traditional' cultural nationalists[24]. On an ideological level, this specific alliance expresses a merger of economic nationalism with Europeanisation against the Gaelicisation policy of the cultural nationalists. On a more practical level, this alliance also reflects the confluence of the 1960s Irish educational reforms, increased European awareness in the primary educational sector from the 1980s and the inclusions of more educational partners based on the 1991 OECD report.

On the other hand, the issue of introducing a modern foreign language into Irish primary schools does not appear to have been publicly discussed in a comparative European perspective by any of the main Irish educational partners. Certainly, the INTO's leaders did not point out that, in comparative European terms, the teaching of a modern European language at the primary level is extremely common[25] even for countries which have to teach 'minor' European languages to their school children. In the Irish case, however, the specific dilemma expressed in stark terms is whether the cultural benefit of continuing to teach a non-spoken yet national language as a foreign language to the nation's school children outweighs the economic and cultural benefit of introducing a modern European language into the curriculum?

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[23] Byrne and Cremin also report that `in the absence of official support, as much as 21 per cent of schools were already providing foreign language tuition as an extracurricular activity' (p141).

[24] Of particular relevance is the fact that the Catholic Church has not taken a clear stand on either side of the issue, preferring instead to fight for the preservation of the religious ethos of the national schools.

[25] A foreign language is presently taught in the primary schools in at least the EU countries of Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (Tulasiewicz and Brock 1994). Like Ireland, France has introduced a national experiment in the teaching of a modern foreign language in primary schools following EU guidelines (p72). Britain is the outlier in this case, introducing a modern foreign language only at the secondary level.

In the end, Europe's place in the national school's revised curriculum seems ensured at some level, ranging from greater European awareness in topics like history or geography to the full introduction of a European language. Whatever the final curricular choice, one result has been to further question the validity of a primary school policy still largely premised on re-Gaelicising Ireland through Irish school children. In this sense, the introduction of a European language becomes a proxy for the larger struggle to redefine Irish national identity through the schools from Gaelic, Catholic and rural ideals to more secular, urban and European values.

Gender Equality Through Europe

Another area in which Europeanisation has contributed to the 'opening up' of Irish society has been in gender relations. The large proportion of women in the INTO increases the importance of gender for the organisation. As the INTO's leaders point out, Europe has directly affected gender relations in the Irish workplace and the professions. The INTO's awareness of Europe has been heightened by European legislation against gender inequality, particularly for the women who compose 75% of the organisation's membership. For example, Jessica, one of the two women on the CEC at the time, expresses a distinct gender consciousness of Europe beyond the organisational level:

> I would be very conscious of the importance of Europe in...areas for women. We would definitely get equal pay through Europe. There were other major cases for women in Europe too. It changed socially. I would be aware of it to that extent.

The INTO's men have also become more aware of Europe's role in gender relations within the Irish education. Paul directly relates the issue of equal pay to teaching in Ireland, where until 1977[26] 'there were two salary scales, one for married men and one for single men and women. So it didn't matter if a woman was married...she was on the single men's scale'. He then adds that 'within our union, there is equality right across the board' except for the

[26]The INTO handbook, *A Decade of Progress*, describes the Irish government's equivocation in these terms: 'In the early seventies the INTO sought the implementation of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome which provided that EC member states apply the principle of equal pay for equal work. The Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act became law in 1974. However, the government of the day sought postponement of equal pay for public servants, including teachers, on economic grounds...Equal pay was finally achieved on July 1, 1977' (1991: 4-5).

INTO's Central Executive Committee where 'women are not prepared to contest the elections because the workload is too heavy'.

The women interviewed agreed with Paul's assessment given the almost full-time demands of the unpaid job. Nonetheless, the European Commission's gender initiatives have contributed to greater equality in the Irish workplace and to greater awareness of gender bias in the INTO and Irish society as a whole. Of course, this greater awareness does not mean that gender inequalities in the teaching profession and at the organisational level have been adequately addressed particularly with respect to equal representation in leadership position. In this regard, the INTO and primary educational sector is faced with a common problem of gender equality in Irish society as well as in most other European countries.

The Northern 'Time-Capsule'

According to the one INTO leader interviewed from Northern Ireland, the INTO's increased involvement with Europe has heightened awareness of the differences between Britain, Northern Ireland and the Republic as opposed to leading to an increased understanding of common European problems. More specifically, Roland suggests that Ireland's Europeanisation has emphasised the Republic's move away from Britain towards Europe and Northern Ireland's increased integration into Great Britain resulting from the imposition of British direct rule in the province. From Roland's perspective, then, Northern Ireland has become isolated from the Republic, remaining trapped in time.

The North's British focus is directly seen in the INTO's work in Northern Ireland. Despite the all-Ireland INTO, Roland points out that:

> Our main focus...would be on the British dimension as opposed to an Irish dimension. Certainly our salaries and our conditions of service are all determined in Britain, and our linkages are with Britain rather than with the Republic.

This British perspective also leads to more comparisons between Irish and British working conditions for primary teachers in the Republic and the North as opposed to the emphasis on the European yardstick in the South. For example, Roland notes that, in spite of

Britain's higher standard of living, teachers' salaries and working conditions are better in the Republic than in Northern Ireland because of the impact of Thatcherism in Britain.

Similarly, the European model of social partnership which has been applied in the Republic hardly exists in Great Britain, where 'the government in Britain hasn't spoken to the TUC [Trade Unions' Congress] since 1979'. Within Northern Ireland, however, Roland explains that the province's military conflict has altered the internal relationships between the British state, the Churches, trade unions and other groups. The British state seeks social 'stability' in the North by allying itself with 'stable players' who oppose terrorism such as the Churches and unions. One result has been greater Church power over education:

> In the school system, the role of the Church is almost all powerful...It would be much more authoritarian in its use of power than they might be in the Republic, where there would be a greater constituency willing to stand up to [the Church]...The control of the school system by the Church is one of their raisons d'être in Northern Ireland.

In this case, Europe clearly does not influence the church-state relationship in Northern Ireland. Instead, the church-state 'concordat' of the 1830s continues to directly determine the structure of the Northern primary educational system with 'The Troubles' having led to a strengthening of the church-state alliance. From this perspective, the Republic's acceptance of the European standard in education, including the reduction of church power in the schools, further isolates the divided North from the South. Paradoxically, the British state reinforces traditional catholic control of education in the North even as the Irish state struggles to break catholic management of the Republic's schools[27]. One ironic result is that the British state fosters a traditional Irish identity in the Northern nationalist community which the Irish state has sought to displace for more European and global awareness appropriate for Ireland's place in Europe and the developed world.

This reinforcement of the North's British integration within a divided society leads Roland to describe Northern Ireland as 'isolated' and ossified as if caught in a 'time capsule' compared to the Republic. He attributes the difference not just to the troubles but to

Northern Ireland's political 'statelessness' compared to the Republic, whose 'involvement...in the European Community has been its real emergence as a nation, from being regarded as very much of a second rate place'. From Roland's northern nationalist viewpoint, the South may celebrate the country's official independence from Britain in 1922, but the Republic of Ireland's real independence as a nation-state only began after the country's 1973 accession into the European Community.

A comparison to Northern Ireland, then, highlights the Republic of Ireland's British and Roman Catholic integrations with respect to the structure of the South's national schools, as well as the continuing influence of the cultural nationalist reaction to British Anglicisation. In this case, the Republic remains to a certain extent very British, Catholic and nationalist at the same time. The Northern comparison, however, also raises the importance of Irish independence for the Republic's political class in terms of their capacity to move externally away from Britain and internally away from traditional nationalism and Catholic control of society by opening up the country to European and global influences.

Control? What Control?

The expression 'educational partners' has recently become the norm in discussing the educational relationships between the Irish state, Churches, teachers, parents' groups and business interests. The term derives from the European neo-corporatist expression of 'social partners' officially adopted by the European Union in the Maastricht Treaty's social chapter and in Ireland to describe the groups involved in the national wage agreements since 1987. As such, the use of terminology arising from the concept partnership by Irish educational organisations can be one indicator of the Europeanisation of Irish primary education and the move away from British and Catholic models.

On the other hand, the word 'partners' tends to mask conflicts between organisations over policy issues. In Irish education, two conflicts hidden by the use of the expression 'educational partners' are the centralisation of the educational system and the separation of

[27]In this sense, the British state shows remarkable continuity of public policy in Ireland, supporting Catholics and Protestants to further the state's interest as the ruling power.

Church and state in the control of education. Both issues strike at the heart of the 1840s compromise between the Church and state. The Irish government's attempts in the 1990s to decentralise the educational system and democratise school boards of management have pushed these educational conflicts into the public domain.

As a teachers' union, the INTO's interests would be served by greater decentralisation in the national administration of education as well as by increased separation of Church and state in the local management of primary education. In this instance, INTO also finds itself in an alliance with the Irish state, parents' groups, business interests and the EU. The difference here is that the opposition is not cultural nationalists fighting to preserve the Irish language in the national schools but the Catholic and Protestant churches struggling to maintain the state-church structural alliance and a religious ethos in the national schools. Thus, the INTO's pursuit of its organisational interest becomes part of a broader alliance to restructure the Irish primary educational system away from the Churches, specifically the Catholic Church.

As of 1994, the government's subsidiarity proposals with respect to decentralisation involved the formation of eight regional educational councils (REC's) to administer the educational system instead of the centralised administration of education from the Department of Education in Dublin (Walshe 1999: 72-76). The separation of Church and state primarily referred to the government's proposed equality of representation on the local schools' boards of management. In this way, the conflict over control of Irish education focused on reducing the role of the Catholic Church in Irish society by increasing the jurisdiction of the regional and national state authorities through a form of subsidiarity, as well as expanding partnership by including more societal interests in the management of the national schools. At a European level, the successful implementation of these Irish educational reforms would bring Ireland's primary educational system more in line with the European mainstream practices (see Tulasiewicz and Brock 1994: 40-1, 81, 163, 176-7, 230, 251-2, 259-61) and OECD prescriptions. From this perspective, the Irish state's proposed educational reforms suggest a larger project to restructure Irish education away from the British-Church structural alliance to a more secular, statist and participatory European basis.

At the national organisational level, this European and OECD perspective on Irish primary education has become part of the INTO's discussion of the issue of educational control. For example, Barry, a member of the INTO's executive committee, explicitly refers to a European model of administration and management to the Irish case. He believes that the Irish educational system should be primarily administered and funded at the local or regional state levels based on the European norm for national education. He also believes that professional state management again based on the European standard must replace local church management of schools. Barry even has a slogan for the reformed system: 'Education as good as in Europe at half the cost!'

Further, Paul applies a European perspective to the Irish conflict over the boards of management. He describes the proposed equality of representation on the boards as the 'start of the loss of control by the Churches and the takeover by the state of primary education'[28]. He then links this statist and secularist analysis to a hypothesis about the real reasons for the state's under funding of the national school system:

> We have always suspected that the...government wasn't prepared to put a significant amount of money into a Church controlled system. In fact, I'm not so sure that...Europe would be prepared to put money into a Church controlled educational system. The money from Europe is very carefully earmarked for state controlled projects.

Once again, these INTO comments that the use of European models extend well beyond comparing Irish educational standards to European norms with respect to categories such as per capita funding and pupil/teacher ratios. At the national level, the European model

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[28]The INTO members interviewed also raised other issues of Church/state separation in the national schools. Siobhan discussed the increasing number of national schoolteachers who do not want to teach religion and who wondered whether religion should be taught at all as a subject? Jessica described two distinct worldviews in the schools, one involving teachers concerned about education and the other including church managers more concerned about Catholicism. For example, she explains, `if a bishop were to look [in on a teacher's class] and say, "Look, is this Catholic?", you couldn't say whether it was or not. It's generally if the kids are being educated'. Further, Andrew questions the whole Catholic ethos of the schools, arguing that there should be `consultation with the other education partners, because ethos is more than just the religion of the school. It's the whole behavioural system in the schools...and the support expected of parents'. Finally, Liam links the conflict in the schools to larger changes in Irish society. Specifically, the people are more educated now, and do not depend on the priests for `guidance on non-religious matters, and of course the vocations - nuns, brothers, priests - are just disappearing'. Nonetheless, Andrew remarks that the Church prefers to deny the extent of the problem. He notes for example `an article written recently by a catholic manager, titled *Control? What Control*?'.

can be used to project a societal standard which in Ireland means partnerships between organisations and sectoral interest groups, a political movement towards decentralisation in Ireland based on the European concept of subsidiarity, and the secularisation of society by reducing Church influence by sharing state and interest group control over major institutions in Ireland.

In this example too, the European model as a standard meshes with the INTO's organisational interest in primary education. The model has been carefully constructed, intentionally or not, to further Irish interests and exclude those elements which centralise more power in Europe. In this way, the European model furthers the INTO's organisational interest in relationship to the Catholic Church in terms of secularisation and partnership as well as the Irish state with respect to subsidiarity and partnership. The INTO's model also provides for European funds with national control of educational policy or subsidiarity. It is on this last issue of national control of education that the INTO's organisational interest conflicts with its official support for the increased Europeanisation of Ireland's primary educational system. In this specific area, the organisation's nationalism is more important than its support for Europeanisation in the primary school sector of the educational system.

High Quality Irishness

The INTO's leaders nationalism is further expressed in their desire to limit the extent of further European political integration, specifically the attempts to increase the Federal nature of the European Union. As with the IFA, though, the INTO's leaders belief in the importance of national sovereignty is allied to an acceptance of greater economic integration represented directly at this time in the move towards a single currency. In this regard, the leaders of both organisations express a mixture of the dominant version in their recognition of Ireland's economic reliance on Europe and the residual version in their emphasis on protecting national political independence within the EU.

In cultural terms, the INTO's leaders reflect to a large extent the dominant version's strong culture thesis including the belief that a European cultural identity will remain weak and will not threaten the national cultural identities of the member states. For example,

Andrew states that he is 'proud to be Irish' and would support national cultures 'retaining a strong sense of peoples' national identity'. Further, while he accepts that one can be European too, he does not believe 'that we have to move into a position where we all start calling ourselves European at the end of the day'. From a national schoolteachers' perspective, Colin projects this belief into a potential Irish emigrant's future, saying that:

> I can't see the children I teach in school, the ten year olds, going off to Australia or going some place around the world in fifteen years time and saying, 'I'm European or I'm an Irish-European. I am Irish but I am European.

In this interpretation of the strong Irish culture, the strength of Irishness extends to the Irish abroad whereas Europeanness is too weak to travel let alone to become a bicultural component of an Irish person.

The distinctiveness of the INTO's perspective on cultural integration and identity arises in the leaders' emphasis on the importance of the media and communications industries in constructing collective identities, specifically the industries' role in creating an Anglo-American global culture with a site in Ireland. The strongest statement of this global cultural threat to Irishness comes from Colin. For him, 'there is nearly a western world culture developing...a very common cultural strand going through...all of the English speaking parts of the world'. This English language based culture is transmitted primarily through the media, television and cinema and is 'hugely influential...creat[ing] its own global culture'.

For Colin, one direct result of this global cultural influence on Ireland is television's negative impact on the Irish language:

> I can not see the Irish language surviving in the long term because of the influence of television...the community that would be trying to preserve it is too small to have enough money, power and sufficient resources to give children at a vulnerable age what they would demand from television. What is happening is that your two year old native Irish speaker back in West Kerry or Connemara will be sitting in front of 'Baywatch' and that's the reality of it. They are more familiar, even though it might be their second language, with 'Coronation Street', 'Baywatch' or Australian television programmes than they would be of anything coming from an Irish context.

This perceived threat of the global culture to traditional Irish identity as defined by the Irish language raises the spectre of the weak Irish culture expressed in the residual version. Thus, for Jessica, Ireland's position between Britain and America means that 'we are not as sure of ourselves...we've suffered because we've thought that we had a very strong cultural identity but it's not as strong as we thought it was'. Interestingly, from this perspective, Europe returns as a model for as well as a protector of national identities in a global culture.

For instance, Jessica believes that Europe can be an alternative model for the Irish who travel and live in continental European countries, experiencing multilingual and multicultural societies in which national cultures can coexist with more than one language and ethnic group. From Aideen's perspective, this European awareness of diversity among the Irish creates a 'balance' to the homogenising influence of the Anglo-American global culture. Extending this argument, Andrew believes that the EU should protect national cultures by legislating for a broader mix of national and European television shows and films alongside the Anglo-American products. In this way, the weakness of a common European culture is offset by the strength of the different national cultures and the political role of the EU in preserving this national cultural diversity from the more powerful Anglo-American global culture.

Further, in an interesting counter to Colin's position, Europe can also be the means through which the Irish language may be revived and within which Irish identity can be preserved. In this context, Aideen claims that:

> The Irish language would be strengthened in a European context, in that people would not want to be identified as say British. They'd want to differentiate themselves. An important way of doing that would be to have the Irish language, so that they can be different and they can maintain their Irish identity within a European context.

On a more experiential level, Liam speaks of his daughters who have chosen to talk to him and others only in Irish, rejecting the English language as a means of interpersonal communication. He traces this decision to their experiences of working abroad, particularly to one daughter who 'has worked in France for two years, in Germany for two

years and in Scotland for one year'. The result is that 'maybe because of being exposed to these places, she's more conscious of the fact that she has her own language'.

From this perspective, the perceived Anglo-American global cultural threat to European national cultures, and to Irish culture specifically, is best fought at the European level through legislation and the application of European models of cultural diversity within cultural unity to the Irish context. Thus, while rejecting a federal Europe and a common European culture, the INTO leaders' accept the usefulness of EU protection of national cultures against the greater threat of a global culture as well as the practical European example of how other countries maintain national distinctiveness within multilingual and multicultural societies. The point of European protection and the European model, however, remains a nationalist one: to revive and preserve a distinctive Irish culture and national identity against the global culture. Once again, Europe is mainly useful to the INTO's leaders when it serves either an organisational or a national interest not when it meets a solely European interest.

In terms of collective identity, one result of the INTO's cultural position is that it reaffirms a 'traditional' nationalist construct of Irish identity in which Irishness is internally homogenous and distinct from all other cultural identities. In particular, this means that one cannot be, for example, Irish and European, Irish and British or Irish and American. Following the strong culture thesis of the dominant version, the best that one can hope for is a surface Europeanness, Britishness or Americanness floating above a core Irish identity.

From a Northern Irish perspective, this reductionistic view of Irish identity would have difficulty accommodating Roland's view of himself as both Irish and British:

> I would perceive myself to be Irish and would hold an Irish passport; yet all my life has basically focused on Northern Ireland and Britain as opposed to the Republic...I've been an Irish citizen since I was a teenager, which was by choice. But I must say that I enjoy being a citizen of the UK and if I had the choice of living in Northern Ireland or the Republic, I think that I would prefer to live in Northern Ireland.

For Roland, the bicultural basis of his identity is normal and makes him as Irish as any person born and raised in the Republic of Ireland. The difference is that his Britishness is an integral part of his Irishness. In fact, he states rather dryly that his 'duality wouldn't be 50-50. If you were going to dissect it, I would say it's 15-85 for Britishness. But maybe the 15 per cent that is Irish is high quality'. In this sense, perhaps what the INTO's leaders should seek is not the preservation of a distinct core Irish cultural identity but the construction of various high quality Irish identities inclusive of European, British, American and Majority world cultural components.

5.5 Conclusion

The Irish primary educational system can be viewed as the product of the continuous interplay between various global, European and national forces such as the Roman Catholic Church, the British Empire, Irish cultural nationalists, the Irish State, the OECD, the European Union and parents' and business groups. The common threads between the four periods identified in this chapter are the Church-State concordat and the emphasis on controlling the cultural content of the primary curriculum in order to construct a sense of collective identity among Ireland's school children. In the post-independence period, the basis of the content has been based on 'traditional' Irish cultural nationalism expressed specifically with respect to the Irish language. Ireland's global and European integrations have led to attempts to incorporate global and European components into the Irish primary school curriculum as well as to restructure the Church-State concordat in favour of the Irish state. These attempts have also led, however, to identity reactions by the Churches in Ireland and within the INTO's leaders to the cultural threat posed by European languages and more generally by an Anglo-American based global culture.

With respect to the INTO's organisational logic, the leaders' strategy of using Europe in national conflicts and negotiations over Irish primary educational policy reflects the 'looser' integration of the educational sector in EU member states relative to their 'tighter' national integrations. On the other hand, the INTO's use of European models applied to the Irish educational context expresses the increasing influence of the EU on national educational systems even at the primary level, albeit from a much lower base of integration than in the agricultural sector. In this regard, it is interesting that the leaders of

both the IFA and the INTO exhibit a similar discursive pattern with respect to Ireland's European integration. That is, both sets of leaders support greater economic integration but not increased political integration and both believe in Ireland's strong culture. This result suggests that the level of integration is not the best predictor of a national organisation's support for increased European integration. In this case, what seems to be more relevant is that both 'farmers' and 'teachers' have been assigned a particular role in protecting Irish 'traditional' culture and national identity. In this sense, a theory of loose multiple integrations which focuses on the cultural meanings assigned by actors to simultaneous integration processes better explains this use of nationalist discourse by these Irish organisational actors compared to a theory of integration that assumes that actors' interpretations are more directly related to the level of structural integration.

At the same time, the varying levels of agricultural and educational integration might explain certain differences between the two groups. In this sense, the IFA's more explicitly European orientation with respect to the organisation's principal strategy is best explained by the highly integrated agricultural sector, while, the INTO's nationally based strategy is a product of limited European educational integration. On the other hand, the INTO leaders' use of European models of partnership, subsidiarity and secularisation to express the organisation's national goals suggests that Europeanisation has become an integral part of the leaders' collective identity with respect to their explanation of the organisation's policies. In this case, one early indicator of European integration at the national organisational level in a fairly limited sector of society may be the articulation of policies using concepts derived from European models.

Finally, the INTO leaders' emphasis on the identity threat of the global culture as opposed to the IFA leaders' concern about the global economy reflects the primarily cultural and economic basis of the two sectors. Both groups of leaders, though, view the European Union as a mediator between perceived global threats to the national farming community and cultural identity respectively. In this context, the EU becomes a political 'protector' of the national economy and culture, expressing a shift of sovereignty not explicitly acknowledged by the leaders of either group. With respect to cultural identity, however, the INTO's vision of Irishness remains embedded in an older 'traditional' construct of

national identity instead of moving to reconstruct Irishness to incorporate the multiple Irish identities of contemporary Irish people. As such, the 'teachers' have neither had to rethink the meaning of their own role to the same extent as the 'farmers' nor in a larger sense to reconceptualise what it means to be 'Irish'. This result may also reflect the different sectoral levels of loose multiple integrations.

CHAPTER 6

FROM RESISTING TO INSISTING ON EUROPE: SIPTU'S USE OF EUROPEAN MODELS TO REPEL THATCHERISM, REGULATE TNCS AND RECONSTRUCT IRISH SOCIALISM

6.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the integrations of the Irish trade union movement and the organisational logic developed by the leaders of Services Industrial Professional Technical Union's (SIPTU)[1]. Historically, the chapter locates the emergence of SIPTU in 1990 in the wider context of the development of the Irish trade union movement[2]. The historical section is divided into six parts. The first traces the origins of British based Irish trade unions from the 1820s to the adoption of moderate nationalism by Irish trade unions up to 1907. The second examines the interrelationship between socialist trade unionism and separatist nationalism from 1908 to 1923. The third analyses the alliance between conservative Irish nationalism and inward-looking socialism from 1924 to 1957. The fourth details the gradual move to a more European style of industrial relations led by the Irish state from 1958 to 1981. The fifth discusses the short but intense period of retrenchment from 1981 to 1986 in the context of a national crisis. The sixth focuses on the contemporary period from 1987, mixing European models of neo-corporatism[3] and

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[1] SIPTU was founded in 1990 through the merger of the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union (ITGWU) and the Federated Workers' of Ireland (FWI). As a result of the merger, SIPTU became the largest trade union in the Republic of Ireland, representing almost 200,000 workers or 41.5% of union membership in 1992 (Gunnigle et al 1995: 112-13).

[2] In 1993, the Irish trade union movement included fifty-two unions totalling 463,647 workers (McPartlin in Murphy and Roche 1997: 95). The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) is the 'central co-ordinating body' for Irish trade unions and is the social partner representing 'labour' in the national agreements from 1987 (Gunnigle et al 1995: 110). As the largest trade union, SIPTU has a significant influence in the ICTU, although SIPTU's 'voice' is but one among many at the national level. Historically, the Irish trade union movement has been characterised by its fragmented structure in terms of the number and types of unions as well as divisive 'splits' between Irish and British based unions in general and between the ITGWU and the FWI in particular (see, for example, Gunnigle at al 1995; Murphy and Roche 1994; Nevin 1994). The historical section of this chapter does not focus on Irish trade union fragmentation. Instead, the section emphasises the role of certain patterns in the Irish trade union movement which are useful in explaining the policy and identity choices of the members of the SIPTU elite in the interview section. As such, the argument assumes an element of continuity between the history of the Irish trade union movement and the SIPTU strategies elaborated in the analysis of the interviews.

[3] Following Gallagher et al (1994), neo-corporatism describes a specific type of decision making between social partners in certain post-war Western European democracies, particularly Austria, Norway, Sweden and The Netherlands (pp360-1). As an ideal type, neo-corporatism involves the monopolisation of representation by organisations in a sector of society like labour, employers or farmers; a hierarchical structure of these organisations frequently in a 'peak' organisation; and the formal integration of these

social partnership[4], along with American TNC models of HRM, into the continuing British based system of Irish industrial relations.

In comparison to Irish agriculture and education, the Irish labour movement has a medium degree of autonomy and a middle level of dependence vis-à-vis European integration. While EU institutions have increasing policy powers over areas of the labour force, nation-states still retain substantial control over these specific policy areas, providing more opportunities for national and sub-national alliances in terms of devising labour strategies and identity choices with respect to multiple integration processes. In SIPTU's case, this opportunity was realised through the national agreements with the Irish state, the trade union movement and the other social partners from 1987 to overcome Ireland's national economic crisis.

In terms of a theory of loose multiple integrations, the analysis of the SIPTU case as part of the integrations of the Irish labour movement highlights three points not emphasised in the IFA and the INTO chapters. First, the change in the labour movement's interpretation of Ireland's European integration from one of opposition in the early 1970s to one of support by the mid-1980s shows the dynamic aspect of loose integrations in terms of cultural interpretations by actors (Shils 1982: 40, 42-3, 45). Second, the practise of social partnership between the leaders of the trade union movement, the Irish state and other social partners in national agreements since 1987 suggests that national level alliances are a means for organisations to achieve their strategies with respect to their multiple sectoral integrations (pp35, 41). This type of alliance is more probable if there is a common interpretation of loose sectoral and national integrations among the organisational leaders and national political elite. Third, the SIPTU case indicates that the common interpretation of nationalism is an effective 'bond', linking the sectoral and national level interpretations by collective actors of their multiple integration processes in pursuit of a national strategy.

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organisations in the political system especially with respect to the 'formulation and implementation of major political decisions' (p360). Within this range, post-1987 Ireland may be classified as a 'medium' corporatist state along with countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Germany (pp373-4).

[4] In the post-war era, social partnership or Sozialpartnerschaft arose first in Austria and then Germany as part of national agreements for societal redevelopment 'based on close cooperation between the state, capital and labour' (Traxler in Fermer and Hyman 1992: 270). With the inclusion of the social chapter in The Treaty On

SIPTU's organisational logic reflects debates about strategies within Irish trade unions leading to the movement's participation in the national agreements. At the same time, the organisation's logic is a response to an older ideological alliance within the movement between conservative nationalism and inward-looking socialism; the Irish state's reconstructed form of economic nationalism; and the increasing Europeanisation and globalisation of the Irish labour force and trade union movement.

Specifically, SIPTU's organisational logic is based on a strategy of using a European model of social democracy to repel Thatcherism, regulate TNCs and reconstruct Irish socialism. SIPTU's organisational logic views the adoption of European models at the national and organisational levels as a means to increase their political power and material resources with respect to union members, the socially excluded, other social partners, Irish Thatcherist organisations and foreign TNCs in Ireland. In terms of identity choices, the trade unions' increased use of European models and the movement's accommodation of HRM policies[5] has to a certain extent expanded the identity of trade unionists to include European and American TNC based roles alongside existing Irish and British based roles of trade union members. However, the preferred identity is of Irish trade unionists within Europe. Thus, while there are clear political and economic motives for the new trade union strategy at the organisational and national levels, the analysis of the interviews suggests that Europeanisation and globalisation have become more deeply entrenched in the Irish trade union movement since the mid-1980s in terms of policies, day-to-day practices and the collective identity of trade unionists.

European Union in 1994, social partnership has been institutionalised as a European model for national agreements between the state, business groups and the labour movement.

[5] With respect to European models, Hardiman cites a 1990 ICTU policy document which states that, 'The overall aim of the long-term strategy should be the development of a modern efficient market economy in Ireland similar to Germany...In devising this strategy we should also learn from the achievement of small open economies such as Austria, Denmark and Finland which have more developed economies...achieved through National Programmes agreed centrally but implemented with a high level of worker participation' (in Goldthorpe and Whelan 1992: 352). This policy document was preceded and followed by ICTU publications which directly outlined the union movement's new strategy. These publications include: *Trade Unions and Change: Shaping the Future* (1989); *Ireland 1990-2000: A Decade of Development, Reform and Change* (1990); *Making Europe Work for Us* (1990) and *New Forms of Work Organisation: Options for Unions* (1993). In terms of HRM, Roche states that the last publication 'is a clear indication of [the ICTU's] wiliness to work with the new industrial relations' (in Murphy and Roche 1994: 296).

6.2 From British To European Models Of Industrial Relations

The British Model and Moderate Trade Unionism in Ireland

Irish trade unions and industrial relations developed along British models following Ireland's full integration into Great Britain with the Act of Union in 1801. After Britain ended the prohibition of trade unions in 1824, British amalgamated unions recruited Irish workers. One result of this recruitment drive was that 'by 1894 the majority of Irish trade unionists were members of British trade unions' (D'Arcy in Nevin 1994: 9-10). The structure of trade unions in Ireland also followed British patterns moving from primarily craft based to amalgamated and then to general unions from the 1820s to the early 1900s, leading to a fragmented union structure (pp10-17).

Legally, British law regulated industrial relations between employers and employees in Ireland. Of particular importance was the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 which created an industrial relations system based on voluntary collective bargaining between employers and employees within a 'system of immunities in tort to trade unions, their officials and members' (Redmond in Nevin 1994: 101). The 1906 Act remained the legal basis for Irish industrial relations, subject to Irish court interpretations of the Irish Constitution of 1937, until replaced by the Industrial Relations Act of 1990 (pp101-3)[6]. The British model included a mixed type, fragmented union structure and an industrial relations system 'based on strong unions, arms-length dealing between management and managed, collective bargaining and adversarialism' (Roche in Nevin 1994: 137).

With the rise of Parnell and the Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster, the Irish trade union movement introduced Irish nationalism into the British based model. From the 1880s to 1910, Irish trade union leaders favoured moderate Irish nationalism of the constitutional form, supporting the political efforts of the IPP for Home Rule and repeal of the Act of Union (D'Arcy in Nevin 1994: 13). This constitutional Irish nationalism was

[6] According to Von Prondzynski, 'Irish industrial relations law is still built on the basic notion of immunities first introduced under the British Trade Disputes Act of 1906' (in Ferner and Hyman 1992: 85). The Industrial Relations Act of 1990 retained 'the principle of immunities' subject to restrictions for 'secret pre-strike ballots', picketing and 'strike codes of practice' (ibid) notable for their similarity to changes made to British labour law under Thatcher.

allied to a similarly 'cautious, reformist and moderate' form of 'old unionism' in the Irish Trade Unions Congress, the first national level organisation of trade unions in Ireland which was founded in 1894 (Keogh in Nevin 1994: 20).

New Unionism, International Socialism and Irish Nationalism: 1908-23

The radicalisation of the Irish trade union movement with regards to socialism and nationalism followed the arrival of James Larkin and James Connolly to Dublin in 1907 and 1910 respectively. Larkin founded the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union in 1908, introducing British 'new unionism' to southern Ireland through organising unskilled workers and casual labourers into a general union and employing confrontational tactics against employers (Keogh in Nevin 1994: 26-7). By 1911, Larkin's ITGWU had succeeded in taking over the ITUC from the old trade unionists and led the trade union movement into the ultimately unsuccessful lock-out of 1913-14 (p29; Plunkett in Nevin 1994: 36-41).

ITGWU leaders including Connolly created 'an alliance between trade unions and socialism' for the first time in the Irish trade union movement (Keogh in Nevin 1994: 26-28). Of particular importance at the ideological level was Connolly's vision of a synthesis between Irish nationalism and international socialism within the context of fighting global capitalism in Ireland, Britain, Europe and the rest of the world (Connolly 1983). Connolly also introduced militant Irish nationalism into the trade union movement with the formation of the Irish Citizen Army and his participation in the Easter Rising in 1916. In the end, Connolly's death and Larkin's exile in the USA weakened this new alliance between Irish nationalism and international socialism in the trade union movement.

Politically, the war of independence from 1918 to 1921 divided the trade union movement between those supporting 'Dublin nationalism' or 'Belfast internationalism' on the issue of partition (Keogh in Nevin 1994: 28-9). In response, the trade union leadership devised a policy of 'emphasising social and economic issues and carefully avoiding the national issues of independence' (Farrell in Nevin 1994: 43-4). Partly as a result of this policy, the

Labour Party[7] was marginalized at subsequent elections and the trade union movement's social agenda was incorporated by Sinn Fein, the new nationalist party (Farrell in Nevin 1994: 45-52). By the end of the second period the alliance between Irish nationalism and international socialism within the trade union movement had been severely weakened, with the emphasis turning to the achievement of the trade union's social agenda within the Irish national context of the twenty-six counties.

Conservative Nationalism and Inward-Looking Socialism: 1923-57

Given the divisive conflicts and rapid changes of the prior fifteen years, the trade union movement, along with the rest of Irish society, turned to the gradual process of stabilising and building the new nation. However, the cost of securing a place in independent Ireland included the marginalisation of strands in the trade union tradition based on international socialism in favour of a new alliance between conservative nationalism and an inward-looking socialism.

Inward-looking socialism in this context refers to the reduction of Connolly's broader vision - synthesising Irish nationalism and international socialism in British imperial, European and global capitalist settings - to the Irish national level of the twenty six counties. The insularity of the socialism refers to the narrow focus of the trade union movement on the Free State, the unions' accommodation to the Irish state's institutionalisation of the goals, values and policies of 'traditional' Irish nationalism and the trade unions' reduction of socialism to the achievement of a limited social agenda in the Irish state. With regards to identity, the movement's inward-looking socialism emphasised the Irishness of trade unionists as opposed to a multiple identity construct including the Belfast internationalism of unions in Northern Ireland, the Britishness of British based unions in Ireland (Murphy and Roche 1994: 8-9, 17, 86-7), and, after the second world war, the pan-Europeanism of many continental trade unions (Haas 1958).

Fianna Fail's long spell of power from 1932 to 1948 crystallised this alliance between conservative nationalism and inward-looking socialism in the trade union movement, largely through progressive legislation such as the 1934 Workmen's Compensation Act

[7] The Irish Labour Party and the ITUC formed one organisation until 1930 (Nevin in Nevin 1994: 89).

and the 1936 Conditions of Employment Act among others (Nevin in Nevin 1994: 92). This progressive legislation formed part of Fianna Fail's reconstruction of Irish economic nationalism based on protectionism and import substitution industrialisation. The trade union movement benefited from Fianna Fail's reconstruction of Irish nationalism directly through the labour laws and a rise in membership, as well as indirectly through the movement's increasing acceptance as an integral part of Irish national society. Thus, Allen argues that 'by the end of the 1930s there was...[a broad] identification with the 26 county state and Catholic nationalism' by the Irish trade union movement (1997: 180).

At the same time, Fianna Fail's progressivism and economic nationalism tended to a state centralism which many in the trade union movement and the Catholic Church opposed, particularly with respect to increased state intervention in society (Allen 1997; Daly 1992). In terms of industrial relations, the main proponent of state centralism in Fianna Fail was Sean Lemass, the Minister for Industry and Commerce from 1932 to 1945 and deputy leader of the government thereafter (Horgan 1997: 65). According to Girvin, Lemass wanted to 'concentrate power in the state and to exercise it through the civil service and legislation' (1994b: 121). Thus, Lemass 'was anxious to consult with interest groups but he did not conceive of either as social partners with the government' (ibid).

Yet one of Lemass' most successful acts in this regard - the Industrial Relations Act of 1946 - had the unintended effect of reducing state centralism in terms of Irish industrial relations. Lemass had in part intended that the proposals for the act would move Irish industrial relations in the European neo-corporatist direction emerging in continental European countries at the time (Roche in Nevin 1994: 137). Conservative nationalist opposition to Lemass' proposals, however, resulted in the Labour Court and wage rounds becoming 'instead the cornerstone of so-called free collective bargaining and industrial relations adversarialism' (ibid) based on 'British ideas and practices' (p136).

More specifically, the Industrial Relations Act of 1946 created the Labour Court and facilitated a series of wage rounds[8] beginning in 1946 between employers and trade

[8] Roche adds that the wage rounds were also facilitated by the industrial relations practices developed during the second world war (in Murphy and Roche 1994: 55). In particular, Roche cites 'the involvement of unions

unions. The wage rounds were negotiated in various forms from 1946 to 1969 approximately every two years (Gunnigle et al 1995: 176)[9], and thus span the third and fourth periods discussed in this chapter. According to Roche, the Labour Court's activities encouraged 'the spread of collective bargaining' and union recognition by employers as well as the development of a 'pluralist model of industrial relations' in both the private and public sectors (in Murphy and Roche 1994: 20). In practice, then, the operations of the Labour Court and wage rounds neutralised Lemass' state centralism. The irony was that an Irish trade union movement still split along Irish-British fault lines retained a British based model of industrial relations in Ireland.

National Crisis, Wage Agreements and Understandings: 1958-80

By the mid-1950s, Ireland was facing a national crisis due in part to the continuation of Fianna Fail's protectionist ISI policy in the post-war era. The national crisis provided the opportunity for Fianna Fail led by Lemass, and influential members of the Irish state such as T. K. Whitaker, to reconstruct Irish economic nationalism for the second time in twenty-five years. The basis of this new economic nationalism was an economic strategy focused on export led industrialisation and foreign direct investment by overseas firms introduced from the late 1950s. As part of this reconstructed economic nationalism, Lemass involved the trade union movement in a minimal form of social partnership through trade union 'rights to sit on various quasi-state agencies' (p182).[10]

The economic success of the new strategy during the 1960s increased trade union membership to 61.8% of the employed workforce - the highest level since the founding of

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in statutory wage control machinery' from 1942 which may 'have accustomed union officials and members to the notion of a general "norm" or a "going rate" of pay rises as well as the fact that in 1946 all unions came to the "starting line" together...for the purposes of negotiating improvements in pay and conditions of employment' (ibid).

[9] There were twelve wage rounds in all, eight of which were 'negotiated at either plant or industry level' with the 'remaining four negotiated between the Federated Union of Employers and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions at national level' (ibid). Open-ended agreements with regard to the end of each round were the norm until the 'mid-1960s when fixed-term agreements became standard' (ibid). From 1959 to 1970, the process normally included initial settlements reached by the 'more powerful bargaining groups' setting a 'minimum rate of increase', followed by supplemental settlements by 'competing unions seeking to restore relativities' (p177).

[10] Thus, the ICTU was included in the establishment of the Committee on Industrial Organisation in 1961, the Employer-Labour Conference in 1962 and the National Industrial and Economic Council in 1963 (Girvin 1994b: 127).

the state (Roche in Murphy and Roche 1994: 50, 61). Further, the collective bargaining of the wage rounds were successful in increasing the wages and benefits of their membership, particularly in the more powerful private and public sector unions. By the late 1960s, however, the Irish government and employers were concerned about some of the negative effects of the wage rounds including wage inflation and high strike rates, both of which appeared to threaten the economic policies underpinning Ireland's new economic nationalism[11]. According to Roche, the result was 'a widely shared recognition that the system of free-for-all bargaining was too costly and therefore unsustainable' (in Nevin 1994: 151).

In order to address some of the negative outcomes of the wage rounds, a revised system of collective bargaining was instituted based on National Wage Agreements (NWA) from 1970 to 1978[12] and National Understandings from 1979 to 1981[13]. Initially, the NWA's were negotiated from 1970 to 1976 directly at the national level between employers and the unions with the government 'represented only in its capacity as a public-sector employer' (ibid). By 1976, however, the government became involved in tripartite negotiations for the NWA by 'trading budgetary concessions' for 'specified pay increases' (Von Prondzynski in Ferner and Hyman 1992: 79)[14]. With the National Understandings, the government built on the 1976 NWA by extending the use of trading pay increases for budgetary concessions while also becoming 'directly involved in national negotiations

[11] Thus, Roche argues that 'industrial relations conflict and union wage pressure appeared to the government and employers to be intractable to the existing industrial relations practices...The wage-price spiral came to be seen...as a chronic threat to competitiveness, and the trend in industrial conflict as a serious discouragement to foreign investment - the cornerstone of the State's strategy of industrialisation and economic development' (in Murphy and Roche 1994: 26).

[12] There were seven national wage agreements ratified in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1978. These centralised agreements 'were negotiated through the Employer-Labour Conference' with 'disputes required to be referred to the Labour Court' (Gunnigle et al 1995: 180-1). The NWA's were based on 'two-tier' agreements with a centrally 'agreed rate of pay increase for the entire national workforce in all industries and sectors' (Von Prondzynski in Ferner and Hyman 1992: 78). The central agreements were supplemented by allowances for the 'above the norm' increases related to 'productivity-based claims' negotiated by local bargaining groups (Gunnigle et al 1995: 180).

[13] Two National Understandings were negotiated in 1979 and 1980. The shift from the NWA's to the National Understandings arose from the trade unions' rejection of an eighth national wage agreement due to dissatisfaction with the returns from the NWA's (Gunnigle et al 1995: 184). According to Von Prondzynski, though, 'the government was determined to secure industrial growth through centralized collective bargaining' and proposed a National Understanding based on a 'moderate pay agreement with social-contract style agreement on economic and social policy' (in Ferner and Hyman 1992: 79).

with the social partners in its own right, rather than simply in its capacity as an employer' (ibid).

From this perspective, 1970 marks a transition from British based decentralised collective bargaining in Irish industrial relations, while the 1976 NWA signals the addition of European style social partnership and neo-corporatism into the more centralised yet still British based system. In European terms, the Irish form of social partnership and neo-corporatism was fairly limited, mixing elements of state centralism and traditions of decentralised bargaining along with social partnership, while exhibiting few of the core components of full neo-corporatism such as the monopoly of representation, hierarchical structures, peak organisations and formal integration in policy-making and implementation.

Yet, even these limited moves to European social partnership and neo-corporatism were counter-balanced by the trade union movement's opposition to Ireland's membership in the EEC. Thus, most Irish trade unions campaigned against Ireland's European membership based on a mixture of fears about the swamping of Irish industry by TNCs and global capitalism, the loss of Irish national sovereignty, the abandonment of neutrality and Ireland's possible entry into a military alliance (Keogh 1989: 241). Keogh's discussion highlights the limits of Lemass' attempt to introduce European forms of social partnership into the relationship with the trade union movement through at least the early 1970s.

The trade union movement's opposition to the EEC may be partly explained by the continued strength of conservative nationalism and inward-looking socialism within the trade unions at the time. Yet the continued ideological strength of this inward-looking socialism within the trade union movement may itself reflect continued benefits which accrued to Irish trade unions from Ireland's growing economy during the 1960s and 1970s. That is, the success of Fianna Fail's new economic policy did not necessitate a change

[14] Significantly, this agreement was reached under a Fine Gael-Labour coalition government, suggesting a level of cross-party acceptance at the time for the use of European style social partnership and neo-corporatism in Irish industrial relations.

from the earlier ideological alliance with the trade unions in spite of Lemass' efforts to restructure Irish economic nationalism with an element of social partnership.

National Crisis, Organisational Decline And Thatcherism: 1981-86

The government's moves to introduce European forms of social partnership and neo-corporatism proved to be of limited effectiveness in terms of managing the national economy. By the mid-1980s, Ireland was confronting another national crisis[15], once again threatening the basis of the post-1958 economic policy and the restructured version of Irish economic nationalism.

At the beginning of this crisis, the employers pulled out of the centralised agreements in 1981, leading to a 'period of decentralised bargaining' until 1987 (Hardiman in Nevin 1994: 153). This was followed by a marked increase in traditional anti-unionism among Irish firms as well as moves towards union substitution strategies, based largely on human resource management policies, among American overseas firms in high technology sectors like electronics[16] (Roche in Murphy and Roche 1994: 282-4).

Politically, trade union leaders feared the rise of Irish Thatcherism based on Fine Gael's less than enthusiastic support for social partnership during the Fine Gael-Labour coalition between 1982 and 1987 and the emergence in the mid-1980s of the Progressive Democrats, an Irish neo-liberal party (Mac Sharry and White 2000: 127-9). At the organisational level, the trade union movement was confronted with a decline in membership for the first time since the 1920s, in part driven by structural changes in the economy towards services and high tech, foreign owned industry with their traditionally lower levels of union membership (ibid). As a result of these factors, Irish trade union

[15] Thus, Roche writes that 'the Irish economy was almost universally seen to have reached its nadir. The public finances had run virtually out of control; the level of unemployment was unprecedented in the State's history; emigration had risen sharply, and union membership has declined dramatically (in Murphy and Roche 1994: 31).

[16] Roche writes that foreign TNCs, especially American high technology firms, adopted HRM policies in which 'the use of new forms of work organisation, employee involvement and innovative payment systems [were] designed, in part at least, to render union organisation irrelevant unnecessary' (in Murphy and Roche 1994: 283). The two main state development agencies, the IDA and SFADCO, appeared to accept the TNCs union substitution strategies during the 1980s, having 'relaxed considerably, or even to have abandoned, their earlier policy of encouraging foreign MNCs to grant union recognition and adapt to local traditions of industrial relations (ibid).

leaders confronted both an internal crisis in terms of the movement's apparent political and economic marginalisation (Hardiman in Nevin 1994: 155) as well as the broader national economic crisis.

National Agreements and The European Model From 1987

The resolution to these crises began with the publication of a report by the National Economic and Social Council[17] which was adopted by Fianna Fail under Haughey for the 1987 general election and subsequently formed the basis for the government's economic strategy (Gunnigle et al 1995: 190). Following this lead, the ICTU proposed a return to centralised agreements which was further supported by the new government and led to the agreement on the Programme for National Recovery (PNR) between the social partners in October 1987.

To a large extent, the PNR[18] represented a return to the Irish version of limited social partnership and neo-corporatism developed in the mid-1970s. Thus, in comparative European terms, the PNR was more like a 'concertative agreement' (Hardiman in Goldthorpe and Whelan 1992: 347) in that the pay terms as well as the economic and social policies were not binding on the social partners, but were instead set as targets and guidelines (Gunnigle et al 1995: 192). Of particular importance to the trade union movement was 'tax reform, with the essential trade-off being pay restraint via moderate wage increases in return for tax cuts by the government to boost the real, after-tax income of workers' (Mac Sharry and White 2000: 125).

Further, many trade union leaders interpreted Ireland's national crisis as an opportunity to develop a European style social democratic strategy to tackle a number of interrelated issues confronting Irish trade unions. These issues included: the continuing strength of

[17] According to Hardiman, 'The 1986 NESC report, A Strategy for Development 1986-90, pointed the way forward, by setting out an analysis of policy priorities, including a prescription for tough remedies, to which all the main social partners agreed' (in Nevin 1994: 155).

[18] The PNR covered the three-year period from 1987 to 1990. The national agreement included annual set pay increases as well as commitments to reduce the ratio of debt to GNP, to achieve 'greater equity and fairness in the tax system', to 'generate employment opportunities' and to reduce social inequalities and working hours (Gunnigle et al 1995: 191-2). Significantly, the agreement also prohibited 'below the norm or above the norm payments', one of the sources of the wage inflation in the 1960s and 1970s (p192). The

conservative nationalism and inward-looking socialism within the movement; the on-going division between Irish and British based unions[19]; membership decline[20]; fears of Irish Thatcherism[21]; the creation of the European single market; a reversion to anti-unionism among Irish firms; and the introduction of HRM policies by American transnational companies in Ireland (Gunnigle et al 1995; Roche in Murphy and Roche 1994; Hardiman in Nevin 1994).

The trade union leaders' new strategy consciously moved the movement along European social democratic lines, participating in the national agreements to pursue 'social democratic objectives that challenge market outcomes in the common interest of working people' (Roche in Murphy and Roche 1994: 18). In spite of the consistently large minority within the ICTU opposed to collective agreements[22], the trade union movement as a whole has benefited from the national agreements, reversing the organisational decline of the 1980s and achieving greater political and economic power through the institutionalisation of social partnership and neo-corporatism.

On the positive side, the programmes[23] have provided the trade union movement with 'the opportunity to influence the wider terms political debate on issues of unemployment,

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perceived success of the agreement was based on the terms of the deal being 'largely satisfied' in the context of an improving national economy and a 'generally buoyant international economy' (ibid)

[19] British based unions accounted for 14% of total union membership in the mid-1980s (Roche in Murphy and Roche 1994: 17).

[20] Irish trade union membership declined from 527,000 in 1980 to 457,300 in 1987 (p50).

[21] Thatcherism in this context refers to a neo-liberal ideology of market dominance as well as the policies following this ideology under the British Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher from 1979. According to Gallagher et al, Thatcherism used 'legislation to weaken the power of trade union and then regulate the unions to roles of mere economic actors, with no explicit political function (1994: 371). Trade union fears of Irish Thatcherism were centred on the neo-liberal tendencies of the Fine Gael-Labour coalition from 1982 to 1987, the rise of the neo-liberal Progressive Democratic party and a return to market based industrial relations supported by business interests (Roche in Murphy and Roche 1994: 28-29).

[22] The 1987 referendum on the Single European Act highlighted some of these divisions, particularly between those who still adhered to the earlier alliance between conservative nationalism and inward-looking socialism and those who espoused the social democratic additions to the post-1958 version of Irish economic nationalism. For example, Keogh notes that the left side of the "No" campaign included 'some prominent individuals within the Labour Party, and large numbers of the trade union leadership' (1989: 271). However, larger numbers of other prominent trade union leaders supported the Treaty, and, according to Keogh, it was these internationalists in the Connolly sense 'who won out in the end' (p273). In particular, Keogh cites from a letter by Jim Kemmy, leader of the Democratic Socialist Party at the time, who wrote that 'the Irish left was out of line with the great European socialist parties...Irish socialism is out of touch and inward-looking. It can only benefit from the current, if minimal, move towards European Unity' (ibid).

[23] The success of the PNR led to the negotiations of a series of national agreements: the Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP) from 1990 to 1993; the Programme for Competitiveness and Work

education, income maintenance policy, and a host of other issues relating to economic and social policy' (293). In particular, trade union participation as a social partner in the national agreements has been accompanied by 'the maintenance of the structures of the welfare state, the preservation of the real value of welfare payments and significant increases in certain payments during the period of fiscal stabilisation' (O'Reardon in Catillon et al 2001: 113). Further, the agreements have meant that those on average industrial earnings have earned 'cumulative increases in real take-home pay over the whole period 1987-99' of 'over 35 per cent' (Hardiman in Nolan et al 2000: 292), and 80 per cent after tax reductions or 58 per cent including inflation (Mac Sharry and White 2000: 145).

Overall, Hardiman argues that Irish social partnership since 1987 has 'undoubtedly contributed to the remarkable turnaround in the economy' (Hardiman in Nolan et al 2000: 292). Specifically, she notes that:

> Real increases in disposable income were delivered while keeping industrial conflict at low levels; inflation was curbed effectively, at least until early 2000; the national finances were transformed. The national framework of pay bargaining made it possible for the far-reaching trade-offs between wage moderation and tax reform to take effect. Once growth began in earnest, the pay agreements helped to ensure that the gains were not dissipated by wage inflation and industrial conflict (ibid).

From this perspective, the national agreements have more fully institutionalised European social partnership and neo-corporatism into the British based system of Irish industrial relations. However, this institutionalisation was achieved as part of a 'patriotic' national strategy to overcome Ireland's national economic crisis of the 1980s (Hardiman in Nolan et al 2000: 290). In this sense, the social partners revised Irish economic nationalism for a third time since the foundation of the state, institutionalising European social partnership

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(PCW) from 1993 to 1996; Partnership 2000 from 1996 to 1999; and the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness scheduled to run from 2000 to 2003 (Hardiman in Nolan et al 2000: 291-2). PESP and PCW 'broadened the range of bargaining issues surrounding the central pay agreement' (p291), while the latter two agreements from 1997 have broadened 'the process of consultation itself...to include community and voluntary sector' (p293).

and neo-corporatism more fully into the post-1958 policy of export led industrialisation and foreign direct investment by overseas firms.

In an ideological sense, the trade union movement's adoption of a European social democratic agenda has reconstructed the relationship between Irish nationalism and international socialism again, returning the movement to Connolly's broader vision by incorporating a class based strategy towards Britain, Europe and the global capitalist economy from an Irish nationalist perspective[24]. Yet, the trade union movement's reconstructed relationship between nationalism and socialism is far removed from earlier, more radical versions of communism, syndicalism or socialism prevalent in the second period from 1908 to 1923. At the same time, it remains within the mainstream of European social democracy in the contemporary period.

In comparative European terms, the Irish use of national agreements between social partners to overcome a national crisis follows a fairly common European pattern from at least the 1930s. Thus, national agreements were reached to resolve national crises in Scandinavian countries with regards to global depression in the 1930s and after the Second World War for countries like Austria, Belgium, Germany and The Netherlands (see chapters in Ferner and Hyman 1992).

More specifically, the Irish experience in the late 1980s parallels similar attempts to reach national agreements for the first time in Australia, Spain, Portugal and Greece (Hardiman in Goldthorpe and Whelan 1992: 332). The latter three countries adopted social partnership strategies in the context of transitions to democracy, integration into the European Union and socio-economic restructuring for the global economy (Ferner and Hyman 1992). Like Ireland at the time, these European countries were peripheral economies in comparative EU terms. This suggests a common European pattern among peripheral EU countries in the 1980s in which national agreements based on European neo-corporatism and social partnership became part of national development strategies in the face of national, European, and global integrations after periods of national crisis.

[24] With regards to Connolly's vision, Keogh distinguishes between the 'traditions of James Connolly - the internationalist and James Connolly the nationalist' (1989: 273).

On the other hand, the trade unions movements' new position of strength in Ireland developed in an era of global economic restructuring, the decline of neo-corporatism in continental Europe and the rise of Thatcherism in Britain (see Ferner and Hyman 1994). In this context, the Irish trade union movement has achieved its greatest political influence in Ireland since 1922 at a time when most labour movements in the developed world have lost some of their political and economic power with respect to the state and capital in their respective countries (Ferner and Hyman 1992). In this sense, the Irish trade union movement's experience from the late 1980s is fairly uncommon compared to most developed EU and OECD countries.

This is not to claim, however, that the Irish experience of reconstructing nationalism through social partnership has been an unqualified success. Thus, after listing the successes of the social partnership model, Hardiman discusses some the unresolved 'stresses' in the model as practised in Ireland since 1987 (in Nolan et al 2000: 293-307). These stresses include industrial sectoral conflicts between traditional and modern high-tech manufacturing; differences between public and private sector bargaining systems; private sector conflicts between 'business interests and employees over workplace social partnership'; 'difficulties arising from growing income dispersions'; 'problems accommodating the priorities of the community and voluntary sector'; and 'conflict between governments' electoral priorities and the partnership process' (p293).

There have also been a number of books detailing the downside to the Irish Celtic Tiger, and addressing the limitations of the social partnership model with respect to issues of class, socio-economic inequality and poverty in Irish society (see, for example, Allen 2000; Cantillon et al 2001; O'Hearn 1997; and Nolan et al 2000).

In one of the earlier critiques, O'Hearn addresses these issues by analysing measures of Irish factor incomes; income distribution; income differentials; changes in the numbers of unemployed and other marginal people; the division of profits between indigenous and foreign capital; and the state's taxation and redistribution system (1997: 124, 140). With respect to factor incomes, he shows that between 1987 and 1997 'the wage share of non-

agricultural incomes fell by about 10 per cent and the profit share grew by the same amount' (p125). He also shows that Irish income distribution and income differentials measured in terms of income, wages and salaries have all 'rapidly become more unequal' from 1987 to 1995 (p131). For example, the disposable income of the lowest decile of households grew by around 1.4 per cent per annum, and 'the incomes of the second, third and fourth lowest deciles' grew 'at less than 1 per cent annually', while 'the disposable incomes of the top 40 per cent of households...grew twice as quickly as those on the bottom forty per cent' (pp131-2). In terms of wages and salaries, the figures for average hourly earnings indicate that 'the average wages of the bottom quarter fell from 73 per cent of the median income in 1987 to 67 per cent in 1994', while those for the top decile 'rose from 196 per cent of the median income in 1987 to 226 per cent in 1994' (p132).

Further, O'Hearn shows that much of Ireland's employment growth has resulted in low pay for workers (p133). Thus, he notes that 'three-quarters of low pay is accounted for by skilled and semi-skilled workers in manufacturing, clerical workers, service workers and employees in commerce, insurance and finance' and that 'the proportion of Southern Irish employees on low pay rose substantially between 1987 and 1994, from 20 to 24 per cent of workers' (ibid). In terms of poverty, he shows that 'the proportion of households experiencing both low incomes and enforced 'basic deprivation' stayed about the same between 1987 and 1994, at 15-16 percent' (pp135-6), while the proportion of individuals receiving less than 50 per cent of the average income increased from 19 to 21 per cent and the proportion at the 60 per cent level rose from 30 to 34 per cent (p135).

In class terms, O'Hearn claims that the 'main recipients of the fruits of economic growth in Ireland are a foreign capitalist class', repatriating 'the rapid rise in profits' from Ireland's export surplus 'at the expense of the consumption of the Irish people and even at the expense of reinvestment' (p127). Domestically, he argues that Ireland's dependent growth on mainly American TNCs has primarily benefited 'the professional classes who service the foreign sector and some indigenous capitalists in finance and construction who benefit most from general prosperity' (p129).

With regards to the role of the state, O'Hearn shows that the taxation and redistribution policies of the Irish state have reinforced Ireland's class and socio-economic based inequality. First, he notes that Ireland's taxation system is 'extremely regressive' relying 'heavily on working-class wage earners both through income and expenditure taxes' (p140). Second, he shows that, while the Irish 'state's revenues rose by 87 per cent, or 9 per cent annually' between 1990 and 1997, approximately 72 per cent of the increase 'came from taxes on incomes and expenditure' and only 18 per cent 'came from corporate profits taxes – despite the fact...that corporate profits made up such a large proportion of economic growth' (p141). Third, he shows that the 'proportion of GDP spent on social welfare has fallen since 1987' with, for example, a drop '36 per cent in 1992 to 34.5 per cent in 1996' and that as a result 'Ireland has the lowest per capita expenditures on social welfare in the EU except for Portugal' (p142).

More recent studies of the Celtic Tiger generally confirm much of O'Hearn's critique, while providing more detailed analyses of specific features of Ireland's class and socio-economic based inequality (Allen 2000; Cantillon 2001; Nolan et al 2000). Thus, O'Reardon addresses the question of 'how we can reconcile...increasing wage inequality with the practice of centralised wage bargaining after 1987?' (in Cantillon 2001: 134). His explanation includes a number of factors such as 'structural change among the Irish labour force' involving a 'strong increase in the supply of skilled workers' with 'post-secondary qualifications'; 'higher prices being paid for those skills' particularly at the 'top end of the distribution'; greater demand for skilled workers driven by technological change especially in the 'foreign-owned sector'; and reduced 'adherence to the centralised bargains' as the labour market tightened, particularly for highly skilled staff and for employees in new firms outside of the centralised agreements (pp135-7).

Overall, he claims that changes in the 'tax and social welfare systems' negotiated as part of the national agreements, along with the rise in employment and decline in unemployment, 'cancelled' out the increase in capital income share from 1987 to 1994 in terms of income inequality despite the increase in the numbers of those in relative poverty (p143). Yet, he also argues that income inequality and relative poverty increased 'considerably' between 1994 and 1997, as the incomes of those 'at the lower end of the

distribution of income have not increased at the same rate as the population as a whole...presenting a serious challenge to the social partnership model' (ibid).

O Riain and O'Connell focus more on the changing class basis of Ireland's Celtic Tiger inequality, arguing that a 'rising class of internationalised professionals' have been 'partly held in check' since 1987 by a social class of 'unionised workers', assisted by 'the structure of the Irish state' (in Nolan et al 2000: 338). They claim that the country's earlier development strategy from the late 1950s created these two classes, and that the professional class from the late 1980s 'formed a new developmental coalition with dissident elements from the IDA and other, more marginal state agencies', while the unionised workers formed a new distributional coalition with governments, other state bodies and social partners through the national agreements (ibid).

This distributional coalition has been able to 'safeguard the basic social rights guaranteed (at a low level) by the universalistic elements of the Irish welfare state' against the 'neo-liberal impulses' of the professional class, supported by 'the middle class's own self-interest in maintaining the subsidies provided to them by the pay-related welfare state' (ibid). However, since the social partnership agreements have been based on trading wage moderation for tax cuts, this 'has meant that both tax revenues and welfare state expenditures have fallen dramatically in relation to the rapidly growing national income' (p339). At the same time, Ireland's 'spiralling inequality in market incomes' has been fuelled by the 'new classes of technical professionals and self-employed small businesses' that 'largely fall outside the institutions of social partnership' (p338). They suggest that Ireland has reached the limits of the present social partnership model, and that reversing these class based inequalities 'would require a re-negotiation of the terms of social partnership...offering improved social services rather than tax cuts in exchange for wage moderation' (p339).

Finally, Allen argues that the evidence for Ireland's changing class based inequalities since 1987 indicates the existence of an ideology of social partnership (2000: 35). This ideology uses the social partnership deal of trading tax cuts for wage moderation to mask the economic reality that the 'main beneficiaries of the Celtic Tiger' have been 'the multi-

national companies', the 'Irish corporate elite, the directors of banks and the growing financial sector, the large property owners and building firms' and the 'new middle classes' (pp66-7). Further, he claims that the leaders of the Irish trade union movement, including those from SIPTU, have actively participated in the creation and practise of this ideology through their 'new consensus-based trade unionism' (pp113-14). This consensus unionism subordinates class conflict in the material interest of workers and the socially excluded for an illusory stake in developing the national economy (p114), disproportionately benefiting the foreign and indigenous capitalist classes and the new middle classes.

From this perspective, the Irish reconstruction of economic nationalism through social partnership represents a failure by the leaders of the Irish trade union movement to advance the class interests of Irish workers and the socially excluded through the national agreements. This would not be the first time that the Irish labour movement has subordinated working class interests for the national interest in an alliance with the Irish state (Allen 1997), although this time the ideological basis is not conservative nationalism and inward-looking socialism but reconstructed economic nationalism and a European social democratic model.

6.3 Analysis of the SIPTU Interviews

This historical discussion highlights a number of distinct patterns which bear directly on the analysis of the interviews with the leaders of SIPTU. Overall, the main pattern is the continuing yet lessening influence of Ireland's British integration on the Irish trade union movement. At the trade union level, the discussion shows the continued significance, from the second period to the present, of the relationship between Irish nationalism and international socialism. At the national level, the historical section details the centrality of the Irish state from the third period, and in particular Fianna Fail after 1932, in the development of the Irish industrial relations system after independence. From the fourth period, the Irish state led by Fianna Fail is also instrumental in adapting the British based Irish model of industrial relations to Ireland's British, European and global integrations. Further, the national level discussion raises the importance of reconstructing Irish economic nationalism in the face of national crises in the late-1950s and mid-1980s for

adapting Irish industrial relations to Ireland's loose multiple integrations, particularly the adoption of European models of social partnership and neo-corporatism. With respect to the above criticisms of the Irish social partnership model, the SIPTU leaders argued strongly that the national agreements were the best option at the time to advance the class interests of the workers and the socially excluded, while rescuing the national economy and building a new basis for Ireland's economic development.

The interviews with the eleven leaders of SIPTU were conducted between November 10, 1993 and February 11, 1994. This chapter also does not include a separate section dealing with SIPTU as an organisation. The main reason for this exclusion is that SIPTU's formation in 1990 meant that the organisation existed for only three years prior to the initial interviews. The 1990 merger of the ITGWU and the FWI into SIPTU may be viewed as one outcome of a new Irish trade union strategy[25] to cope with these issues, moving towards a northern European model of national unions and away from a British based model of fragmented, local trade unions. The interviews conducted three years after the SIPTU merger, and six years after the first national agreement, focus on the issues leading to the emergence of the new trade union strategy in the mid-1980s and the practical effects of this policy in practice. The analysis of the interviews with the leaders of SIPTU details the development of this new trade union strategy, addressing organisational, national, British, European and global economic issues prevalent at the time.

From Resisting to Insisting on Europe

The Irish trade union movement's initial opposition to Ireland's EU membership in the early 1970s was primarily based on the continued significance of the earlier ideological alliance between conservative nationalism and inward-looking socialism within the movement. Thus, for Ronan, Ireland's membership meant:

> A loss of independence...The Europe Community was seen at the time as anti-democratic. It was set up with the interests of business. It was an enterprise culture based on competition.

[25] The merger also represents the continuation of Irish state policy, particularly under the leadership of Fianna Fail's Sean Lemass after 1958, to reduce the number of trade unions in Ireland for more effective governance. Thus, trade unions declined from a high of 123 in 1960-64 to 58 in 1990-93 (McPartlin in Murphy and Roche 1994: 96).

Cathal added that this fear of a 'market dominated process' fed into a traditional trade union 'knee jerk' response of opposing instead of supporting new changes. Further, he noted the continued strength at the time of a 'very small Communist and left wing' group which had 'hugely disproportionate influence within the trade union movement'.

The two trade unions which eventually merged into SIPTU into 1990 actually divided over the question of Ireland's European accession in the campaign leading to the 1972 referendum. Referring to his place in the division, William claimed that:

> In our socialist past, we would have been very suspicious of the European agenda. For that reason, the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union opposed entry to the EC, whereas the Federated Workers' Union of Ireland supported it.

In spite of these various nationalist and left-wing objections to Ireland's European membership, the trade union movement nonetheless decided to 'deal with the reality' of Ireland's accession, adapting to the European perspective by trying to push the Irish trade union agenda within the then EEC. Thus, Richard explained that:

> As soon as the results came in, the unions began to deal with the reality...You try to tailor the new circumstances to your agenda and try to take advantage of where we were at rather than crying about it...From that time, we began to develop as best we could the links with European unions.

This pragmatic and self-interested response was soon confronted by the wider European reality of left-wing trade unions in other EEC countries who were ideologically committed Europeanists. This confrontation highlighted the inward-looking socialism of the Irish trade union movement at the time and led to a reinterpretation of Irish socialism and nationalism at least among certain members of the trade union elite. Cathal described part of this process with respect to the CGIL in Italy:

> As the leadership became part and parcel of the establishment, they began to look at [the EEC] in a different light. They were sitting down with trade unionists from different countries who were massively in favour, who were almost fanatical religious zealots in favour of Europe. People like the CGIL in Italy - the communist trade union - had been viciously pro-European to the point of obsession because they saw it as a bulwark against Fascism. [Irish trade unionists] found it difficult running around with people who were communists in other countries who were in favour of the European concept.

This gradual reorientation of the Irish trade union movement towards acceptance of the 'European concept' from the early 1970s to the early 1990s was cemented for many trade union leaders by the potential to regulate TNCs at the European level, the development of the social agenda in the Maastricht Treaty[26], and the desire to control neo-liberal, Thatcherist governments in European countries. In the case of TNCs, William was persuaded because he was convinced that TNCs could no longer be solely controlled at the national level and 'that it was only in the context of the European economy, with political control at the European level, that multinationals could be regulated'.

For Fiachra, on the other hand, the social chapter was the most important aspect of the Treaty and the decisive factor in his trade union's support for the agreement because 'it was important that improvements were made in the social agenda here with Europe being the example'. Politically, Cathal also stressed the importance of institutionalising the social agenda at the European level in order to strengthen workers' rights against conservative governments at the national level. As such, the social chapter for Cathal:

> Copper fastens workers' rights and protective legislation...[from] right-wing governments dismantling them. Britain is a good example. So the concept of a united Europe with workers' protection uniting the people of Europe has a lot of attraction to people in the labour movement.

For the leaders of SIPTU, then, the trade union movement's resistance to the reality of the European idea in the early 1970s evolved from pragmatic support for tactical organisational advantage to a much more complex insistence on continued European integration by the early 1990s based on a number of ideological and strategic interests. These interests included expanding outward from the Irish inward-looking socialism to the Europeanism of the European labour movement, regulating TNCs at the European level,

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[26] The agreement on social policy (pp196-201) in the *Treaty On European Union* (1993) builds on the European Council's Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. Article 1 of the agreement declares in part that 'The Community and the Member States shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of social exclusion' (p197). The areas covered by directives in the agreement include protecting workers' health and safety; working conditions; consultation with workers; gender equality in the labour market; and integrating the socially excluded (pp197-8). Other articles provide for 'promoting the consultation between management and labour at the Community level' potentially resulting in 'contractual relations, including agreements' (p199).

incorporating a social agenda into European integration and controlling Thatcherist governments or tendencies in those governments within EU member states.

While expressed from the individual point of view of the SIPTU leaders' in 1993-94, this internal account of the movement's shift towards Europe fits into the new social democratic strategy devised by the Irish trade union movement in the late-1980s in the face of the national crisis. More specifically, the Irish trade union movement's turn to the practices and ideology of continental European social democracy, as institutionalised in the national agreements and the movement's post-1986 policies, can be traced in part to the experiences of Irish trade union leaders in European institutions from 1973, particularly those involving members of the European left and the labour movement. In this way, the gradual Europeanisation of the Irish trade union movement provided the unions' leaders with a 'European' policy response to Ireland's national crisis which extended Fianna Fail's support for European models of industrial relations and further integrated Ireland into the mainstream of European social democracy, while marginalizing the neo-liberal, Thatcherist alternative to the national crisis.

The Sponge Versus The Triple High: That Sweat Shop Thing

The SIPTU leaders had specific concerns about Thatcherism were expressed in a number of areas including social policies, the British opt-out from the social chapter, foreign direct investment, industrial development policies and 'the triple high' - high tech, high paying, high skilled jobs. For Anne, the important issue was policy oriented since 'we depend quite a lot on Europe to develop social policies for workers which we try to link into'. However, if Thatcherism became dominant at the European level, 'then we would see the British model as one that has more negatives in it for us than positives'.

Fiachra linked this specific concern about social policies for workers to the issue of Britain's opt-out from the social chapter in the Maastricht Treaty. In particular, he cited the potential effect of the opt-out in attracting overseas firms. For example, he claimed:

> New industry coming in is opting for England and Scotland rather than Ireland. The development agencies there are actually pushing that they're not bound by the social chapter and that companies coming in can have a freer environment, not being hidebound by restrictive legislation.

William perceived the British opt-out in harsher tones as a clear example of Thatcherism in action at the European level, referring to Thatcherist Britain as a 'sponge':

> The ideological face of it is Thatcherism. We have the situation where the British, despite the fact that they have not signed onto the social chapter, are functioning with the all the benefits of European membership as a sponge to attract mobile investment to the detriment of other European economies.

In its widest application, the Irish trade union leaders perceived Thatcherism as a global economic development strategy based on a return to pure laissez-faire market competition, resulting in lower wages and skills for employees and lower costs and increased profits for employers, managers and shareholders. From their perspective, Britain was trying to lead this new market revolution by turning itself into a low wage, low cost national economy and, according to Cathal, encouraged a 'beggar thy neighbour approach to industrial development'. To refute this Thatcherist model, Francis subverted the logic of this position, arguing that 'if that were the hypothesis, then India should have full employment. But they don't. It's a low wage economy that's trying to create employment'. Furthering this argument, Sean added that 'England is turning itself into a Third World economy by saying that there should be lower wages'. In this sense, Thatcherism may have also represented for the leaders a fear of returning to Ireland's not so distant past of being underdeveloped yet economically dependent on Britain. As such, the clear aversion to Thatcherism expressed by the trade union leaders may have contained residual anti-Britishness from the earlier ideology of protectionist nationalism and inward-looking socialism.

In this context, the alternative European model became more than just an oppositional strategy to counteract Thatcherism. SIPTU's support of the European model in Ireland and the EU may have represented at one level the leaders' desire to view Ireland as part of the developed countries of Europe, detached from the colonial past with Britain and the potential neo-colonialism associated with Thatcherism. This may help to explain why the leaders tended to dichotomise the Thatcherist from the European model. Thus, the Thatcherist model was articulated in terms of development based on the triple lows - low tech, low wages and low skills - while the European model stood for the opposite or the

triple highs. For Sean, this dichotomy was obvious, leaving no choice for the Irish trade union leaders:

> If you look at the economies within the EC - Sweden and Norway - they're all high wage, high skill, high tech economies and their social benefits are very good. If we adopted the English model, we might as well as say, "OK, we're going to turn it into Taiwan". It still won't bring employment. We've worked ourselves away from that sweatshop sort of thing.

Being of Like Nature

Having rejected both the Thatcherist model and Ireland's similarities to countries of the Developing World, the leaders of SIPTU placed Ireland squarely in the European Union as a developed economy. In particular, the leaders stressed that Ireland should compare itself to the northern European countries with established traditions of social democracy, social partnership and neo-corporatism. Along these lines, Fiachra stated that:

> The union would look to countries like Sweden, Germany, Austria and Denmark, the general northern hemisphere countries as being economies that would be a proper comparison to here. We would often say that they have a social democratic economy...The union would therefore look to those as being countries of like nature, rather than, for example, America, the UK and Japan.

This Europeanisation of the leaders of SIPTU extended beyond the development of long-term strategic objectives directly into their day-to-day experiences as union officials with regards to activities like implementing industrial legislation, training, and gender equality. At this daily organisational level, their support for European integration based on the northern European model had become ingrained to a large extent into the routines and mentalities of many SIPTU officials. This suggests a process of Europeanisation by 1993-4 more far reaching than the adoption of the social democratic strategy.

For the trade union leaders, this general orientation to the northern European countries formed part of the organisation's broader integration into the European Union. Anne, for one, traced the long-term effects of this integration on Irish industrial legislation, pointing out that 'most of the industrial legislation, and therefore our policies, have really developed since 1973, effectively when we went into Europe'. She then cited specific policy areas addressed by EU directives and subsequently applied to Irish industrial relations such as 'women's issues or equal opportunities, holiday entitlements, protection

for part-time workers'. Ronan added that the training of union officials has been 'permeated by European developments', showing the extent of European integration at the organisation level. Another pragmatic link to the EU for SIPTU has been in the area of European funding for industrial relations projects. Specifically, Anne discussed the realisation among SIPTU officials that 'we can and should be tapping into Europe for development programmes such as Euroform, Horizon and Now projects.

However, union officials have not always been so supportive of European initiatives in Irish industrial relations, especially male officials in the area of gender equality. For example, William described the resistance of many 'prominent trade union leaders' in the late 1970s to the 'equality legislation and the whole process of equalising relationships at work', in particular 'equal pay for work'. According to William, these leaders in public promoted the equality agenda as a 'major improvement' while in private they 'were representing the equality legislation as the price that had to paid for participating in the benefits of the EC'.

The permeation of European policies and legislation into the workplace had reached the point that Anne felt the European perspective had become part of her subconscious:

> I say subconsciously [because] you have people like me who go into the workplace into everyday situations and reach automatically for EC directives to determine how to conduct negotiations. People don't reach into their briefcase for an EC directive, but it's surprising how much of our work is becoming dominated by legislation that originates in Europe.

This example highlights again the depth and extent of European integration within SIPTU at least for one of the leaders of the union.

Anne also provided a more detailed example of how Europeanisation in industrial relations had become part of the subconscious of union officials. Specifically, she described the process of European involvement at the national and union levels from the introduction of an EU directive to the training of union officials in the workplace. The first step in the process was that Irish 'legislation that has been introduced based on EC directives...comes in at the government end' and then 'we sit down to talk with the

government and with government departments about it'. The next step involved setting up an agency including trade unions 'which deals with the implementation of the legislation'. At the trade union end of the process, 'we train workplace representatives in the workplace', for instance, about 'changes in health and safety' which arose from the directive, national legislation and its implementation. From Anne's perspective, then, 'everything all links back to this European sense of creating fair conditions by legislation. So subconsciously Europe runs through much of what we're doing'.

The day-to-day subconscious impact of Europeanisation on the organisational level, though significant, was less important to most of the SIPTU leaders than the political effect on the national level of applying the European model in the national agreements. Returning to Anne, she stressed that the collective agreements, 'while tailored to meet the Irish situation...is very much a European model involving partnership with government rather than our traditional British based ethos'. In this case, the leaders of the union were very aware of their choice to move away from the British basis of the Irish industrial relations system, along with their rejection of the newer Thatcherist model, in favour of European models in both collective bargaining and in the national agreements.

Further, the success of the national agreements at the time of the interviews had led to a realisation that the European model was becoming part of the political culture among the social partners, further reinforcing the European influences in the national agreement. Thus, William stressed the significance of having 'maintained the consensus over the past six years'. As an example, he cited the discussions which led to the 1994 PCW national agreement where 'the people on the other side in industry, who had been rattling their sabres about what they could do with free collective bargaining, didn't want to see the consensus approach go either'. For William, this showed that from 'the period from the middle 1980s up to now, we've adopted the European model of consensus not only in pay bargaining but in thinking'.

This suggests that the trade union movement's strategic choice of the European model in the mid-1980s in order to overcome national and organisational crises had, by the early 1990s, become part of a much wider and deeper process of Europeanisation within Irish

trade unions and in the political culture developing between the social partners. In this sense, the movement's shift to the European model out of necessity in the 1980s had become, in less than ten years, central to the trade union's long-term strategy, policies, day-to-day routines and organisational culture.

They Flit from Country to Country: Subsidising the Difference

For the leaders of SIPTU, globalisation was primarily understood in economic terms and referred generally to TNCs and particularly to overseas firms in Ireland. In terms of devising an organisational, the leaders of SIPTU were concerned to politically regulate TNCs at the European level as part of the new social democratic policy. This strategic goal was underpinned by a number of interrelated fears about the global, European and national power of TNCs. These fears included the mobility of transnational companies, a potential alliance between TNCs and conservative Thatcherist European governments, the limitations of the triple high model in producing economic growth without employment, and the reliance of the Irish state on subsidies to attract overseas firms in order to fuel economic growth and create jobs.

At the national level, though, the leaders of the union recognised the importance of adapting the Irish workplace to new American based industrial relations policies such as HRM, particularly since many of the union's members appeared satisfied with these new practices. Further, the SIPTU leaders' acknowledged that the Irish state's subsidisation of TNCs for growth and employment was preferable to subsidising people not to work, fostering an Irish dependency culture. In this way, the leaders of SIPTU accepted the necessity of the TNCs for Ireland's continued economic development and were gradually adapting to the new work practices advocated in particular by American overseas firms in Ireland. Nonetheless, there were indications that the globalisation of SIPTU was also beginning to impinge on the subconscious of the union's leaders.

In discussing SIPTU's goal of regulating TNCs at the European level, Sean described the policy as 'more of a developing feature within the collective trade union movement in the EC as to how we coordinate our approach to transnationals'. Thus, the Irish trade union movement's strategy from the mid-1980s appeared to form part of a collective European

wide effort within the European Trade Union Congress or ETUC. For Sean, the need to regulate TNCs within the EU as opposed to just at the national level arose from the recognition of the 'mobility of multinational industries' and the perception that 'if they have a problem, they flit from one country to another, moving to another EC state'. From Sean's perspective, the solution to the problem lay at the European political level 'by retaining a degree of democratic control of a large marketplace, that's what social Europe is all about'.

However, this European political resolution to the problem required the support of the member governments as well as the European institutions. In 1993-4, the leaders of SIPTU were concerned about the number of conservative national governments in power across the EU, and the potential undermining of 'social Europe' by advocates of the Thatcherist model. This raised the possibility of the TNCs economic power being allied to the neo-liberal's political power, counteracting the ETUC's strategy to regulate TNCs through a social democratic model at the European Union level.

Even if the European trade union movement succeeded in regulating TNCs at the European level, the leaders of SIPTU doubted the long-term effectiveness of relying on the triple high strategy for Ireland's continued economic development. In particular, Francis pointed out that 'high tech can mean low skill and low pay' in that companies often used technology to replace high for low skilled employees who were then paid less for their work. Francis also raised the issue of secure employment, which he linked to the TNCs mobility, arguing that 'high tech is mobile tech, it can be done anywhere'.

Francis' concerns about relying on a triple high strategy based on attracting high technology TNCs to Ireland led him to express doubts about the continued viability of the Irish state's post-1958 economic policy. Specifically, he cited the issue of subsidising overseas firms in Ireland who often do not pay enough in wages to bring their employees up to the levels of social welfare payments. The result was that 'the state is paying large amounts to attract companies here. It's also in effect subsidising wage levels. You can't build a modern economy on that basis'. Further, William highlighted the issue of the TNC driven high rates of economic growth in Ireland since 1987 which had not led to the

expected increase in employment. For him, the reason for this lack of employment growth was directly related to TNCs use of technology to raise productivity of the existing workforce, thereby reducing the need to hire more workers.

Nonetheless, the leaders of SIPTU recognised the relative success of the post-1958 Irish economic policy in spite of the heavy reliance on attracting TNCs to Ireland through state subsidies. Of course, they were more supportive of the post-1987 restructuring of the policy to incorporate components of European social partnership and neo-corporatism than the continued dependence on transnational companies. Yet, the leaders of the union accepted the new package as a whole, preferring to stress the potential benefits of introducing European social democracy into the policy mix alongside the reliance on the TNCs which functioned in a global capitalist setting. In the end, the leaders of SIPTU realised that there were few alternative policy options available at the time to continue Ireland's economic development within the European Union and the global economy.

In spite of their fears, then, about the Ireland's dependence on TNCs in the national policy for Irish economic development, the leaders of SIPTU had by and large accepted the role of the TNCs in the Irish economy within the framework of the national agreements and the trade union movement's social democratic strategy. To this extent, globalisation had become an integral part of the leaders' general perspective and specific policies, representing a decisive break with the older ideological alliance between conservative nationalism and inward-looking socialism. In the area of work practices, though, globalisation seemed to have become integrated further into the day-to-day routines of a number of SIPTU members, pushing union officials to adapt to HRM type practices and policies.

According to Ronan, many rank-and-file members who worked in the overseas firms were happy with the new 'management strategies' such as world class manufacturing, total quality management, just-in-time production and quality circles. Union officials, however, were not so receptive particularly since these management strategies marginalized the officials' 'traditional role'. Ronan stressed, though, that as a 'democratic organisation, we have to listen to our members, and if you're members think something is good for them,

then maybe it is good'. One result was that SIPTU officials had to 'change and adapt our role to these changes'.

Francis, on the other hand, interpreted this process of adaptation and integration of the new management strategies into organisational practice as a result of initiative from the SIPTU officials. From his perspective, SIPTU had been 'working very hard to bring Ireland and the Irish industrial worker into the 21st century in terms of work practices'. This work included adopting 'the culture of the company that we bring here', balancing 'what we see as good industrial relations practice and what the companies see as efficient and effective'. This attempt to balance the protection of the workers with the company's interests reflects the strategy outlined in the ICTU policy documents cited above. Whatever the differences between Ronan and Francis on this issue, both accounts of the integration of HRM type practices into the organisational culture of SIPTU suggest a more deeply embedded globalisation into the routines and roles of union officials and members, extending beyond a strategic policy.

Yet when compared to Europeanisation, the leaders of SIPTU tended to portray globalisation at the time of the interviews in negative terms as the spread of global capitalism through the medium of transnational companies. Further, the leaders of the union tended to interrelate the threat of a British derived Thatcherist model to the global spread of TNC based capitalism. This portrayal of globalisation of harks back to the older strands of socialism within the trade union movement, articulated in the interviews with respect to Ireland's entry into the EEC in the early 1970s. At the time, this socialist rejection of Europe and global capitalism was often articulated through the language of 'traditional' Irish nationalism, modified by the trade union movement's alliance of conservative nationalism with inward-looking socialism. This suggests that there may have been a residual influence of this older perspective on the leaders of SIPTU with respect to their logic towards Ireland's global and British integration.

From this perspective, SIPTU's organisational logic emphasising the sector's European integration and identity is partly explicable by the leaders' negative portrayal of the sector's British integration as Thatcherism and global integration as a type of predatory

expansionist capitalism. In this way, the organisation's logic based on a strategy of repelling Thatcherism and regulating TNCs through a European model of social democracy and a subconscious European identity is in part a response to the cultural survival within the Irish trade union movement of the older ideological alliance between conservative nationalism and inward-looking socialism. On the other hand, the other part of the organisation's strategy to reconstruct Irish socialism through European social democracy indicates a clear move away from the older perspective of inward-looking socialism and 'traditional' nationalism towards a more radical, local Irish socialism yet one within the mainstream of the European left. Finally, SIPTU's alliance with the Irish state in reconstructing Irish economic nationalism indicates that the organisation's subconscious European identification has its limits too. In SIPTU's revised form local Irish socialism and reconstructed Irish nationalism, its members are Irish trade unionists within Europe not European trade unionists in Ireland.

6.4 Conclusion

The SIPTU case analysed in this chapter raises interesting comparisons with the IFA and the INTO chapters in terms of loose sectoral multiple integrations. The most striking point involves the relative success of the trade unions' social democratic strategy at the organisational, national, European and global levels compared to IFA and INTO strategies. While these two latter organisations have devised policies with respect to their sector of society, the Irish state, other interest groups, the European Union and the global economy or culture, they have been far less successful in achieving their goals and far more constrained in their actions compared to SIPTU and the Irish trade union movement.

The IFA's autonomy and its organisational success has been limited by the fact that Irish agricultural and rural policies are basically decided at the European Union level and increasingly at the global level through the GATT agreements administered by the new World Trade Organisation. On the other hand, the INTO has been more constrained at the national level by the continuation of the alliance between the Irish state and the Catholic Church over the structure, funding and control of Irish primary education in spite of moves by the Irish government to alter the terms of the long-standing concordat.

Similarly, the IFA and the INTO appear to have been far less successful than SIPTU in crafting new multiple identities for farmers, teachers or trade unionists to suit their respective organisational strategies, incorporating at least Irish, European and global components. One indication of this comparative lack of organisational success in identity reconstruction is the continued strength within the IFA and the INTO of more 'traditional' nationalist based identities for farmers and teachers compared to the marginalisation of the conservative nationalist and inward-looking socialist identity within SIPTU and the Irish trade union movement.

SIPTU's comparative organisational success may be due to the sectoral differences in the levels of sectoral European and global integrations, and differences between organisational and national level strategies with regard to Ireland's multiple integrations. In terms of loose sectoral integrations, SIPTU is in a middle range national sector of European and global integration compared to the high level of loose integration for the IFA in agriculture, and the low level of loose integration for the INTO in primary education. SIPTU's position in a middle range sector of loose integration seemed to have opened up the organisational leaders, through exposure and experience, to become more outward-looking with regards to the EU and the global economy compared to the leaders of the INTO, whose outlook remained focused largely on the national level. At the same time, the leaders of SIPTU, as part of the Irish trade union movement, appeared to have more autonomy in devising and implementing their social democratic strategy compared to the IFA elite, who had very little choice but to accept policies decided at the EU and global levels.

Further, the leaders of SIPTU benefited by the fact that their social democratic strategy emerged at the same time as the revision of Irish economic nationalism by the social partners to overcome Ireland's national crisis of the 1980s. In this way, the movement's strategy became an integral part of this restructured nationalism, greatly increasing its legitimacy to union members and to the Irish population. On the other hand, the IFA and INTO organisational strategies were not directly linked into a national strategy with cross-sectoral support from a range of interest groups including the Irish state. Instead, their respective organisational policies could be interpreted as expressing narrower

organisational interests that tended to support the more 'traditional' version of Irish nationalism.

This analysis suggests that organisations in national sectors of middle range integration may be more outward looking with respect to a country's multiple integrations, and have more autonomy to devise organisational policies, compared to organisations in high or low range sectors of loose integration. However, the comparative success of organisational strategies may have more to do with opportunities for the organisational elite to fit their strategy into a national one, supported by the state and other interest groups in the cause of that country's nationalism. In the SIPTU case, the incorporation of social partnership into Irish economic nationalism also functions as an ideology masking 'working class' interests, supposedly represented by the trade union movement (see Chapter Nine).

CHAPTER 7

ON THE EDGE OF EUROPE, A SMALL ISLAND OUT IN THE ATLANTIC: THE IRISH POLITICAL ELITE'S DOMINANT, RESIDUAL AND EMERGENT VERSIONS

7.1 Introduction

This chapter applies a theory of loose multiple integrations to a sample of Irish national actors, analysing their cultural interpretations of Ireland's multiple integrations at the national level. Specifically, the chapter analyses the interviews of fifty-four members of the Irish political elite, focusing on discursive versions of Ireland's multiple integrations and identities. The discursive analysis applies in modified form William's discussion of the concept of culture (1981) to the interviews: Identifying dominant, residual and emergent versions and analysing their components with respect to Ireland's multiple integrations and identities. Further analysis of the discursive versions indicates the existence of an underlying discursive structure referred to as the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency. Giddens's theory of structuration (1984; 1993) is used to explain the existence of this discursive structure. The cultural logic is applied to explain many of the specific claims articulated in the three discursive versions.

The Irish political elite's cultural logic of autonomy and dependency is structured by the remnants of Irish dependency culture that emerged during Britain's colonisation of Ireland. The main components of this dependency culture are articulated in the residual version. In the dominant version, the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency structures the Irish political elite's strategy and identity choices in part through a fear of dependency or the fear of losing Irish autonomy for a relationship analogous to Ireland's historical dependence on Britain. From this perspective, the Irish political elite overemphasises Ireland's European integration in the dominant version because the European Union preserves more of Ireland's political and economic autonomy relative to the country's relationships to Britain or global TNCs. One result of this strategy is that Ireland becomes susceptible to a European dependency. With respect to identity choices, the Irish political elite responds in socio-cultural terms to this fear of EU dependency by asserting the existence of a strong Irish culture with a core Irish identity that has survived through

British colonisation of Ireland. This strong Irish culture indigenises external influences or propels them onto the surface of Irishness. This protects Ireland's cultural autonomy by compensating for the fear of political and economic dependency.

The Irish political elite's dominant version links Ireland's geographic peripherality to the country's comparative smallness and to the belief that the Republic has no viable economic options outside of the European Union. This leads to a discussion of the need to be political pragmatists and 'good Europeans' within the European Union in order to maximise the benefits of Ireland's relative dependence on and autonomy in the EU. However, the minimal nature of Irish good Europeanness becomes apparent, focusing on pursuing the Irish national interest within Europe as opposed to pooling sovereignty and compromising for the good of the European common interest. The limits of Irish good Europeanness are further highlighted in the political elite's fears about the potential impact of EU enlargement and institutional reform on Irish national interests.

At the socio-cultural level, the Irish political elite clearly articulate Ireland's move towards Europe as a transition away from an older Anglo-American relationship in which Britain was perceived as Ireland's 'enemy' and America as Ireland's 'friend'. Further, the dominant version stresses that the Irish have a 'strong culture' which is flexible and adaptive with respect to European and Anglo-American global cultural influences, exporting Irish culture and cultural products abroad while preserving a 'core' Irishness at home.

In contrast, the political elite's residual version emphasises Ireland's geographical isolation for maintaining Irish national sovereignty, practising a policy of economic protectionism and preserving a distinct Irish culture. On the other hand, the residual focuses less on distinct Irish culture than on an Irish 'dependency culture', derived from the long-term effects of British colonialism in post-colonial, independent Ireland. This dependency culture is expressed in terms of a sense of cultural backwardness, feelings of inferiority and a lack of self-confidence. The residual version links the dependency culture to Irish emigration, particularly on Irish emigrants to England in the 1950s. For many, this dependency culture was compounded by anti-Irish prejudice and discrimination

encountered in England. Finally, compared to the dominant version, the residual version focuses on Ireland's continued dependent integration into Britain and the negative effects of British cultural influences on Irish identity.

Some of the differences between the dominant and residual versions may be due a 'generational effect'. The 'older' respondents were more likely to express components from the residual version in the interviews due to having personally experienced parts of the De Valera era in which beliefs about isolation, protection, sovereignty and a unique culture were ideologically dominant. Likewise, the 'younger' respondents of the following generations who grew up in the post-1958 Ireland of increasing cultural openness and socio-economic development were more likely to express components from the dominant version.

However, analysis of the interviews indicates that most of the interviews contain a mixture of components from both the dominant and residual versions, with the dominant components outweighing those from the residual. As such, a more suitable explanation would include both a generational and 'life course effect' in which most of the respondents either personally or socially experienced elements of the De Valera era and post-1958 Ireland. In this way, the apparently 'honest' accounts of the negative effects of the dependency culture may be due to reflections later in the course of one's life from a relatively secure position in the more culturally open and developed Ireland.

This suggests that the change from an inward-looking, underdeveloped to a more outward-looking, developed Ireland was less of a rupture than a gradual transition. In this transitional period, the structures and beliefs from the earlier era overlapped with those that have emerged in the post-1958 period, decreasing in significance only as the newer structures and beliefs became more dominant over time. As part of this gradual transition from the residual to the dominant version, the political elite began to emphasise Ireland's new European integration, turning away from the older emphasis on the country's dependent British relationship.

The analysis of the discursive is based on the transcripts of the interviews with the fifty-four members of the Irish political elite. The analysis focuses on quotes drawn from the nineteen members of the Irish political elite who represent national level organisations besides the IFA, the INTO and SIPTU. The analysis does include specific additions from members of the SIPTU elite, where these were most consistent with the discursive versions. These additions complement the earlier use of quotes from the IFA leaders with respect to a Federal Europe and the INTO elite in terms of the global culture (see Chapters Four and Five). By focusing mainly on the interviews with the nineteen other representatives of the Irish political elite, the goal is to stress the common 'cultural' interpretive pattern among its members from a broader range of Irish political, economic and socio-cultural organisations.

The analysis of the interviews does not indicate significant differences in the discursive versions between the individuals based on their 'class' or socio-economic position as high-ranking members of their respective organisations (see Chapter Three). Further, the analysis does not indicate separate Irish 'social projects' articulated by various 'social forces', 'social classes' or the state such as the farmers, trade unions, the bourgeoisie, teachers or civil servants (see Peillon 1982). This latter result may reflect the research focus on external loose multiple integration processes, instead of a Marxist class or Weberian conflict based analysis of different ideologies articulated by the main social forces and classes competing for dominance within Irish society. However, there is indication that the emergent version reflects a class based 'Red' and environmentally based 'Green' ideological alliance articulated by some leading members of the Democratic Left party at the time.

The interviews for this chapter were conducted over the period from November 5th, 1993 to May 23rd, 1994. The organisations represented include members from Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, the Labour Party, Progressive Democrats, Democratic Left, the Department of the Taoiseach, the Department of Education, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Irish Business and Employers' Confederation, the Chambers of Commerce of Ireland, the Council for the Status of Women, the National Economic and Social Council, the

Economic and Social Research Institute, the National Platform, the Irish Council of the European Movement, the European Parliament and the European Commission.

7.2 The Dominant Version: We have no Options Outside Europe but we have a Strong Culture

The Island Behind the Island: Floating out to Sea

The dominant version begins by emphasising Ireland's geographical status and position as part of an island off an island, thus, Aidan from the Irish Council of the European Movement stresses that 'we're an island behind a big island cut off from the continent'. In this version, Ireland's islandness results in a sense of peripherality both historically and in contemporary terms. For Ronan from SIPTU, Ireland's historical peripherality means that 'we weren't exposed to Europe', with this two way lack of exposure resulting in the current perception that 'a lot of other people in other European countries have scarcely heard of Ireland'. Ronan also fears that Ireland's peripherality as an island will become heightened with the Channel tunnel linking Britain and France: 'in a short while, we'll be the only country in the EC cut off by water'. This sense of Irish peripherality from Europe leads John from Democratic Left to question Ireland's ability to have its voice heard in Europe: 'from a weak peripheral position, our input in Europe would be negligible. In what forum would we say anything and who would have to pay any attention to anything that Ireland said?'

For other members of the Irish political elite, Ireland's peripherality as an island is less one of exposure to or being heard in Europe than an economic issue related to Ireland's smallness as a nation with a small population and a small domestic market. Thus, for Francis from SIPTU, Ireland has:

> A very small domestic market...If you do things on the basis of economies of scale, you can't sell very much in Ireland. You've got only, in this part of the country, three and a half million people. It's the size of a good country in Europe. Twice as many people live in New York than in the whole island of Ireland.

The 'logical' result, according to Conor from Fine Gael, is that

> We produce more than we consume. So we have to get rid of the excess and it's natural that you're going to rid of it in the most favourable economic terms to your exporters'.

For Adam from the Department of Education, the 'natural' outlet for Irish exports is the European market, which becomes from his viewpoint part of the European project: 'I see the European idea as opening up markets to Ireland...to access for our products into mainland Europe'.

For SIPTU's Francis, though, the question is less about the European idea and access to the European market than who is to do the manufacturing of Irish exports? While admitting that 'we're a very good manufacturing export-based country', he adds that

> We're not so good at developing our own indigenous industry. Although there are some exceptions, they're all natural resource based and they're all semi-state controlled bodies in the public sector.

One outcome of this lack internationally competitive indigenous industry is Ireland's post-1958 export led industrialisation strategy which continues to depend on foreign direct investment by overseas firms. Sean from SIPTU frankly admits this dependence but stresses the benefits to the Irish economy:

> We do depend on multinationals, whether we like it or not. And the more we attract, the better. At least we have the money in circulation from the employment and the country itself benefits from it.

In the dominant version, then, Ireland's islandness, peripherality and smallness lead to the Republic's relative economic dependence on access to the European market based on Ireland's membership in the EU as well as on foreign TNCs willing to export 'Irish' manufactured products to the EU market. Adam from the Department of Education makes this economic linkage between Ireland, the EU and foreign TNCs explicitly clear: 'Of course, by definition as members of the European Union, it has enabled us to attract large mobile industry and high tech industry which we would not otherwise be able to attract'.

Of the two external links, the members of the Irish political elite are also clear that access to the European market is the lynchpin, for the TNCs would be unlikely to come to Ireland without access to the European market. This leads to the belief, expressed almost unanimously by the Irish political elite, that Ireland has 'no options' outside of

membership in the European Union. Thus, for Padraig from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland's:

> Strong measure of support for the EU comes from the belief that there is quite simply no alternative. That on our own, we would not be able to survive as effectively as we could survive as members of the union.

Others, such as Neil from the Labour Party, cite and dismiss Ireland's alternative options. For Neil these options are either a return to De Valera's form of protectionism practised between 1932 and 1958 or becoming America's fifty-first state:

> There is always the option of backwardness and isolation - building a big wall around the country. It was done quite successfully in the 1930s and we got massive unemployment, mass emigration and an oppressive, culturally narrow society. We could of course become a client state of the United States. That's another option. I don't think either of those are realistic.

Brendan from the Irish Business and Employers' Confederation expresses the 'no options thesis' more starkly emphatically stating that 'if we had to leave the European Union, we might as pull the curtains down and all go to bed'. Finally, SIPTU's Richard ties Ireland's islandness and the no options thesis together by suggesting that if Ireland had not joined the EU and attracted TNCs to Ireland, the country would now be 'floating out to sea leaving the action behind us'.

The Good Europeans: Unmasking this Great Oracle of Bureaucracy

In the dominant version, the economic no options thesis leads to a political 'no choice' option. Thus, given Ireland's relative economic dependence on the EU, the Irish political elite has no choice save to work within EU institutions to protect the Irish national interest with respect to maximising autonomy and, in particular, Irish material benefits from membership. Thomas from the Progressive Democrats explains the basis of this pragmatic materialist Irish political strategy towards the EU when he says that:

> We think of the community as a cash cow. We think in terms of maximising our benefits not our membership... As a lobbyist in Brussels, I would find that people would come to you with petitions to a shrine - unmask this great oracle of bureaucracy and red tape...The Irish tend to be egalitarian and utilitarian Europeans. We want equality with everyone else and we want the benefits to flow towards us. So we take the money, tip our cap to them and say good-bye.

Yet this articulation of the Irish pragmatic materialist strategy is often intermingled with pride in the belief that the Irish are perceived to be good Europeans. To be a good European in this case means that the Irish political decision-makers at the EU level are perceived to be extremely skilful in penetrating EU institutions and influencing EU decisions to benefit Ireland, while at the same showing a particular willingness to compromise Ireland's national interest for the good of the European common interest. From this perspective, the Irish are good Europeans to the extent that Irish decision-makers in the EU are perceived to balance the Irish national with the European regional interest over a range of EU policies, fighting for the Irish interest on specific issues while conceding to the European common interest on others. In this way, the belief in the Irish as good Europeans minimises the pragmatic basis of the Irish political strategy in Europe.

Thus, Neil from the Labour Party claims that:

> We are very proud of the respect in which we are held in the European Union. The Irish government and the Irish position are held in great respect and we exert an influence way beyond our size either economically or numerically.

In this sense, the belief in the Irish as political good Europeans appears to overcome the cumulative disadvantages of islandness, peripherality, smallness and economic dependence through the disproportionate influence of Irish autonomous political skill within EU institutions.

A few members of the Irish political elite describe the functioning of Irish good Europeanness in practice, highlighting strengths and weaknesses of the approach. For Alan from the European Parliament, the political skill involved in the practice of Irish good Europeanness means listening to others first and knowing when and how to express the Irish voice:

> There are so many voices that have to be listened to in Europe when you are trying to push the Irish point of view. You can only push it so far and get a sympathetic hearing, which you won't have unless you've been doing a lot of listening.

For others, such as Brian from the Chambers of Commerce of Ireland, Irish penetration of EU institutions and skilful managing of information have been most important, resulting in respect for the Irish and a certain amount of envy from other European officials:

> We provide a much higher than our official ratio of functionaries or officials of the European Community. We are deemed good Europeans. Irish people get away with murder in terms of the amount of information that they suck up and the amount of grants they suck out. Many people from third countries have said to me that they think the Irish are much better at that than anybody else. The Irish mafia is the term that is used.

On the other hand, Brian believes that Irish good Europeanness is limited to maximising Irish influence for Irish benefits, unmasking the facade of the Irish as good Europeans:

> In terms of real political leadership, I've seen very few things emanate from the Irish government which were calculated to actually shape a fundamental vision of Europe or shape concrete policies in Europe.

For Brian, then, Irish good Europeanness is political strategy in itself used to maximise autonomous Irish influence in and benefits from the EU while paying lip service to European ideals such as the European common interest.

Alan from the European Parliament provides another example in which Irish good Europeanness is used as a political strategy to suit Irish interests, presenting themselves 'in Europe' as 'the great Europeans' and 'at home' as 'the great Irish champions':

> For example, the media can draw attention in two consecutive five second shots that the Minister before he went to Europe said in Dublin that he was not going to do x, y and zed, and then came to back to Dublin and said he hadn't agreed to it. He had to do it because they forced him. It was those rotten Europeans, those Eurocrats who made him do it.

Similarly, Doug from the European Commission pointed out that Irish ministers often 'claim credit for things which are properly speaking Europe's credit' or do not present the 'overall package that has been agreed to', instead picking out items which suit the national or party political interest.

For Matthew from the Department of the Taoiseach, though, these features of Irish good Europeanness are not necessarily negative. For him, Irish political decision-makers at the

EU level must not lose sight of the fact that 'our main concern is to pursue the Irish national interest in a European context'. While good Europeanness has been good to the Irish, it is more important that the Irish national interest remains broadly in line with the European common interest. From his point of view,

> There is a European common interest in economic and social cohesion, social stability, economic growth and the projection of Europe's overall interest in the trading area vis-à-vis the United States and Japan.

In general, the pursuit of these European common interests through 'deeper integration has been in Ireland's interest and further deepening is likely to be in Ireland's interest'. In this case, the Irish political strategy adopted in Europe, a straightforward pragmatic materialism or a more masked good Europeanness, is less significant than the continuing alignment of the European common with the Irish national interest. Both of these strategies can be jettisoned should these interests diverge in the continuing process of European integration.

Further, Matthew stresses other political benefits of Ireland's EU membership outside of the material ones such as enhancing Irish sovereignty as a nation-state. This is particularly important for him with respect to Ireland's relationship with Northern Ireland: the 'ruling class of Northern Ireland' now view 'the South as being an equal partner with its own voice in the European Union and as a separate state that derives a lot of benefits from the fact that it influences its own policies and plays its own role within the European Union'. Padraig from the Department of Foreign Affairs echoes this position, focusing on better controlling Ireland's national destiny through European membership:

> We can make a better impression on our destiny. Because we are an open economy, we are so much subject to decisions taken outside in the Union, that being members provides some opportunity to influence those decisions.

For Neil from the Labour Party, this idea of influencing decisions leads him to question traditional notions of national sovereignty. Of all the members of the political elite, Neil best articulates the concept of pooling sovereignty within the European Union, as opposed to preserving Irish sovereignty by pursuing the Irish national interest through the EU, regardless of whether or not one uses a pragmatic materialist or good European strategy.

> How can we be sovereign if we are isolated, cut off and without political clout outside our borders? That type of sovereignty is a fiction in the modern age.

> To be sovereign now means that you have to have an authority and an influence outside of your own borders so that you can influence decisions that will affect you whether you like it or not. If we exclude ourselves from the EU's councils and decision-making bodies, we diminish our sovereignty automatically because we have no influence whatsoever.

In this concept of sovereignty, Neil raises the possibility of a maximal view of Irish good Europeanness in which the good European shares sovereignty by compromising the national for the European common interest to benefit all European member states. This type of European vision is rarely expressed, however, by the members of the Irish political elite, and even Neil reverts below to a more minimal position of protecting the national interest in elaborating on his fears about EU enlargement.

While unmasking the great EU oracle for Irish benefits, then, the Irish as good Europeans are also unmasked as Irish nationalists, specifically post-1958 Irish economic nationalists. From this perspective, the political elite's belief in the Irish as good Europeans can be seen as an integral part of an Irish economic nationalist strategy incorporating export led industrialisation based on foreign direct investments by overseas firms and, since 1987, the neo-corporatism and social partnership of the national agreements. Thus, ELI and FDI attract foreign TNCs to Ireland who export to the European market, the national agreements restrain wage growth, control public spending and help to reduce the national debt, while the Irish as good Europeans maximise Ireland's EU benefits in terms of transfers and access to the EU market. Nonetheless, this Irish economic nationalism can not mask the political elite's belief that Ireland has no political choice except to pursue the Republic's national interest within the EU because the country has no economic options outside of the European Union this in turn, leads to fears about the European economic or political context changing to Ireland's disadvantage.

EU Enlargement and Reform: Our Influence is Likely to be Diluted

In 1993 and 1994, the main fears expressed by the members of the Irish political elite centred on the proposed European Union enlargement into Eastern Europe and corresponding institutional reforms of the European Commission and Parliament. The fears about EU enlargement focused on the probable loss of material benefits flowing into

Ireland in the form of transfers from the CAP as well as the Structural and Cohesion Funds. With regard to institutional reform, the fears concerned devolving more powers to the population based European Parliament and capping the number of Commissioners in favour of the larger nation-states. Underlying these specific fears was a more broadly based fear that Ireland would lose crucial political and economic influence as an equal member state in an enlarged and reformed European Union.

For Doug from the European Commission, the fear of EU enlargement to bring in countries from former Eastern Europe and Baltic states is 'the greater competition for Cohesion and CAP funds' between these new states and older member states like Ireland. Padraig from the Department of Foreign Affairs also believes that enlargement will threaten Irish benefits: 'agriculture will be in a less privileged position and we certainly won't be able to rely on development finance from the Union as we have been able to do for the last twenty years'. Yet the reduction of material benefits is to be expected given Ireland's recent socio-economic development and changes in the CAP programme. What is more worrying to Padraig is that 'enlargement will to some extent dilute our capacity to influence events in the Union quite simply because it is harder to get your voice heard among so many countries'.

The linkage between the Irish voice being heard in Europe and the fear of diluting Ireland's political influence in the EU is also expressed with respect to EU institutional reform. For Tony from Fianna Fail, the issue of institutional reform raises the prospect of a Federal Europe with increased powers for the European Parliament, threatening the Irish political voice:

> I wouldn't be particularly comfortable with a Federal Europe. I am only speaking from the gut here - people in Ireland might not be comfortable with too much power being devolved to this huge parliament...people wouldn't necessarily feel comfortable with our politicians having less power and leverage to express their political voice.

On the other hand, Neil from the Labour Party supports devolution to the European Parliament. At the same time, though, he believes that

> We must protect the Irish national interest through the Commission where are Commissioner has an equal vote, and in the Council of Ministers where we

> have one voice if not equal then comparable to those of Britain, France or Germany.

As shown above, this idea of political equality between EU members states in the European decision-making process is important for the members of the Irish political elite. For Helen from Democratic Left, this equality between small and large EU nation-states is threatened since 'institutional reform means that smaller nations will lose out'.

Matthew from the Department of the Taoiseach, however, proposes a solution to address these fears of losing Irish political influence as well as material benefits. For him, the proper response to increased political Federalism is effective fiscal federalism:

> If we were going towards full federalism in which the EP would have the final say in regard to legislation and putting in the Commission which would take all of the executive decisions about distributing money, we would be looking for stronger safeguards and for effective fiscal federalism such as that which operates in existing federations like Australia, Germany or the United States.

Of course, this solution accepts the relative dilution of Irish political influence in the EU institutions and assumes that the wealthier member states will agree to increase the EU budget for effective federalism. Further, it implies that Ireland will remain a net beneficiary in terms of transfers in a European fiscal system, which is unlikely given the comparatively high economic growth rates in Ireland since the interviews were conducted in 1993-4 and the outcome of the EU budgetary discussions for 2000-2006 after which Ireland is set to become a net contributor the EU budget (Irish Times March 19 1998).

Whatever the merit of these fears and of solutions to address them, they highlight the Irish political elite's ambivalence about Ireland's relationship with the European Union. The pride in Irish political autonomy and skills to influence EU decision-making to Ireland's material benefit sits uneasily alongside fears that Ireland will lose both its influence and benefits as European integration proceeds eastward and in a more federal direction. While desiring to be seen as equal members in the European project, the logic of the dominant version articulates an Irish dependence on the European Union, leaving Ireland vulnerable to political and economic changes in the European integration process which appear to threaten Ireland's disproportionate political influence and share of the material benefits. In turn, this perception of Ireland's European dependency may have reinforced Irish

nationalism among the Irish political elite, particularly in its economic form as discussed above. Even a revised Irish nationalism, though, does not disguise what the Irish political elite fears the most: the re-peripheralisation of Ireland within Europe - the small island nation floating back out to sea, the Irish voice no longer being heard.

Psychological Europeans: Between the Old Enemy and the Great Friend

The Irish political elite's ambivalence about Europe extends to the socio-cultural relationship between Ireland and the European Union. On the one hand, Europe as a socio-cultural influence in Ireland is portrayed positively by the Irish political elite in the dominant version as reorienting Irish national consciousness away from a 'traditional', rather narrow focus on Britain and the United States. On the other hand, the dominant version describes a strong Irish culture which preserves a core Irish identity, marginalizing external European and Anglo-American socio-cultural influences to the surface of Irish cultural identity. Another variant of this 'strong culture thesis' explains Irish socio-economic development from the late 1950s primarily as result of Irish social and cultural changes, downplaying external socio-cultural influences as well as internal politico-economic factors. This section discusses the political elite's construct of Europe as a mediating factor between Britain 'the old enemy' and America 'the great friend', specifically in moving Ireland away from Anglo-centricity towards a place in Europe.

In describing these relationships, Padraig from the Department of Foreign Affairs returns to the imagery of Ireland's islandness, geographical peripherality and smallness, evoking an Irish self-perception formed by these factors:

> To be Irish is to have our own distinct view of the world given our location. We see ourselves in two ways. We see ourselves on the edge of Europe as a small island out in the Atlantic. We are also here between Britain and the United States. We have an interest in Europe and we have strong historical ties with Britain and North America. So we have an in with both and a view of both.

For Alan from the European Parliament, though, Europe remained marginal to the 'traditional' Irish worldview of his youth, defined morally in terms of tripartite relationship with Great Britain and the United States of America:

> The Irish world up to my teenage years had two dimensions. One was Britain - the old enemy. The other was the United States - the great friend, who would eventually save us from the old enemy. Europe was a very distant place.

For Aidan, the English problem turned into an Irish problem not least at the socio-cultural level, creating an Irish dependency culture and a psychological inferiority complex towards Britain. From his point of view, this Irish dependency culture on Britain predominated in the Irish mind until confronted by Ireland's membership in the EEC beginning in the early 1970s:

> The EU has altered the Irish mental and moral image - the old dichotomy that we were stuck in - that we're not as good as the English because they are bigger and better. Everything from the outside world is filtered through them. The reverse side of our dislike of the English is that if we can do it like they do in the south of England, then we must be the world's greatest. The EU has provided new horizons - to literally fly over England going to Brussels.

This idea of bypassing England for the broader horizons of continental Europe and, in the process, reducing Irish dependency on Britain is expressed by a number of the Irish political elite in more general terms than simply the dependency culture. For Matthew from the Department of the Taoiseach 'a significant dimension' of Irish support for EU membership was 'that participation in the EU would reduce our dependence on Britain'. Padraig from the Department of the Taoiseach supports this claim, arguing that:

> Membership of the Union has made us less Anglo-centric and a little bit more inclined to see the world from a broader view than the view we have had given our geographic position between Britain and North America.

For Matthew from the Department of the Taoiseach, a significant aspect of the reduction of Irish Anglophobia and Ameriphilia has been the greater political equality achieved by Ireland through membership in the European Union:

> The EU has removed an obsessive concentration on Britain as almost the only major actor in the immediate geographical area. It has also perhaps reduced to a certain extent the concentration on America and the Irish diaspora as the available countervailing force to British power. I think people now see us much more in the perspective as one of the member states of the European Union, who has a minister sitting around the table with an equal position, albeit in a qualified majority situation, who has their own Commissioner, who is in a position of much greater equality than was the case in the past.

Further, Tony from Fianna Fail claims that this overall reduction in Irish Anglo-centricity can be seen in terms of a generational effect: 'Europe has reduced our Anglo-centricity to a considerable degree among the generations coming up, the post-accession generations'. Neil from the Labour Party provides a personal example of how European influence has reduced Irish Anglophobia and Ameriphilia for members of the pre-accession generations:

> I remember growing up in the 1960s, and it goes back to the war, that you had things like the Manhattan for the name of a restaurant or the Ritz for a cafe. We even had New York dry cleaners. In trying to exclude Britain, the only other contact that we had would have been with the United States. But now you have the Cafe de Paris, Bruxelles and the Swedish food company and all of these other continental names. Even at that level, it has gone into the national consciousness. It is a very positive thing in people's minds that they are transferring the association to some greater political entity outside of their own.

Both Neil and Aidan argue that Europe's socio-cultural influence has become part of the Irish national cultural identity, going into the national consciousness in Neil's terms and altering the Irish mental and moral image in Aidan's words. For the Irish political elite as a group, Irish identity in this case is defined in external terms to include Ireland's relationships with Britain, America and Europe, with the intervention of European broadening the Irish worldview away from a 'traditional' Irish dependency on Britain and a reactive socio-cultural association with America to counter Irish Anglo-centricity. But does Europe mean anything more to the members of the Irish political elite than a socio-cultural medium to weaken the predominance of a dichotomous Anglophobia and Ameriphilia in Irish cultural identity?

For Neil the answer is clear: Irish 'people associate the European Union with modernity, progress, liberalism, development and cultural advance above and beyond the transfers'. These positive Irish associations with Europe include political, economic and socio-cultural factors, moving beyond the dominant version's previous construct of Ireland's relationship to Europe in terms of the small island's peripherality, no economic options and no political choice. Further, Alan from the European Parliament claims that Europe as a socio-cultural influence in Ireland has had an even more profound impact on Irish national identity than either positive associations or a medium to reduce Irish Anglophobia and Ameriphilia. For him, the influence of Europe has transformed the Irish into

perceiving themselves to be an integral part of Europe: 'Psychologically, the idea of being outside, detached and isolated from Europe is unthinkable. That's far more profound, lasting and important in every respect than economics'. This idea of the Irish as psychological Europeans reattaches Ireland to continental Europe, overcoming the country's islandness and peripherality so that, as Aidan from the Irish Council of the European Movement says, Ireland can 'take its place among the nations of Europe'.

It is Alan again, though, who best articulates this idea of the Irish as psychological Europeans, arguing in an extended statement that Ireland's 'traditional' attachment is to Europe and not to Britain or to the United States:

> The traditional Irish attachment to Europe is inspired partly by history - the wish to get out from under Britain's apron strings economically, socially, psychologically and geographically - not to be dependent on Britain or on the US as a place to migrate to. There is that traditional, deep, emotional psychological wish to commit as a people to this wider thing because it gets us out from under our history and geographical isolation...If there were no material benefits, I still think that we would have voted for Europe. If the United States offered us twenty times what the EU has been offering us, I cannot see us becoming a state in the United States. The emotional and psychological orientation is emphatically European.

The Strong Irish Culture: Surface Europeans and Cross-Pollenised Americans

In spite of this strong assertion of the Irish as psychological Europeans, the members of the Irish political elite at the same time express limitations to European socio-cultural influences on Irish national culture and identity, reflecting their general ambivalence about Ireland's relationship with Europe. Further, these socio-cultural limits are extended to the influence of an English language based, Anglo-American global culture. The Irish political elite articulates these socio-cultural limits in the dominant version by invoking a strong Irish culture which preserves the fundamental basis of Irish cultural identity and contains external socio-cultural influences to the surface of Irishness, while at the same time contributing distinctive Irish cultural experiences as well as products to the European and global cultures.

Originating in the Irish nationalist construct of 'traditional' Irishness, the Irish political elite's strong culture thesis extends in contemporary terms to pride in a renewed, self-

confident Irishness expressed particularly by the younger generations. This renewed sense of Irishness mixes 'traditional' and 'modern' features of Irish society and culture in a core Irish identity, while adapting European and global cultural components to suit Irish needs. This 'Irishisation' of external socio-cultural influences sets the limits to the newer construct of Irishness, protecting the essential core while flexibly adapting surface Irishness to incorporate European and global cultural influences where necessary. In this way, the Irish political elite tends to describe contemporary Irish identity in terms of a historically sedimented core/surface construct which 'Irishises' external socio-cultural influences as opposed to constructing shared multiple identities or cultural hybrids from Irish, European and global cultural components.

For many members of the Irish political elite, belief in a strong Irish culture has roots in a nationalist account of Irish history based on a Gaelic, Christian civilisation predating and surviving British domination. Thus, Adam from the Department of Education draws on the idea of an 'Ireland of saints and scholars' to explain the deep roots of Irish cultural traditions and the significant influence of these traditions in continental Europe:

> Going back in history, Ireland was sending people abroad in missionary work into Europe. There isn't a country in Europe where one does not find the antecedents of famous Irish saints, mythical or otherwise, involved in setting up education, arts, government or religious settlements.

For Neil from the Labour Party, this Irish cultural identity remained intact through the centuries of British influence and colonization in Ireland, producing a sense of Irish 'cultural independence' which continues to buttress Irishness in the contemporary period against European or global socio-cultural influences:

> We didn't have a separate state in effect for 800 to 900 years, but a sense of Irishness was not lost all through that period. It was maintained in the face of enormous odds in a very powerful Empire. We certainly consider that our situation at the moment would not lead to our cultural independence being swamped.

The Irish political elite's belief in a strong Irish culture, then, is largely derived from an Irish nationalist interpretation of a distinct Irish culture which was not fully eradicated by or assimilated to British culture. In comparative terms, this belief draws on the German romantic form of organic cultural nationalism based on the volk as articulated in the Irish

Gaelic revival (Hutchinson 1987). In broader terms, this belief also fits into Smith's theory of the ethnic origins of nations in which the ethnie is asserted through socio-cultural features such as myths of common descent as well as by beliefs in shared history and traditions (1986). From this perspective, if a distinct Irish culture could survive through centuries of British colonisation, the cultural survival of Irishness within the nation-state based European Union or the TNC driven global culture is a comparatively minor concern.

The Irish political elite's belief in Irish cultural strength is further bolstered by the belief that Irish culture is part of and contributes to both the European and global cultures, expressing a renewed sense of self-confident Irishness particularly among the younger generations. Thus, Neil from the Labour Party claims that:

> I think Irish culture is much prouder and stronger and sees itself as part of mainstream European culture. I think it is one of the reasons that the Irish are much more proud and self-confident in themselves now because they can see that they have common ground with other cultures, even ones as powerful as the French.

Thomas from the Progressive Democrats in terms of a modern 'young Irelander' echoes this sense of contemporary Irish cultural pride in Irishness:

> I think there is a different type of identity there now. There is a young Irelander there now, a lifestyle where young people are urban and liberal in their values and lifestyle. They are quite proud of their country. It has changed because of Irish achievements in arts, culture and sport. They can see that the Cranberries and U2 can hack it in the United States, in Europe and on world stage. If they can see our cyclists, golfers and football teams competing on equal footing and achieving, that is important.

In this sense, the Irish political elite's belief in the strong Irish culture refers not only to an historical sense of Irish cultural independence under British rule but to a contemporary sense of a self-confident Irishness able to contribute to European and global culture and to compete equally with other nations in both a European and global setting. For Matthew from the Department of the Taoiseach, this sense of contemporary Irishness expresses a resilient even a resurgent Irish national culture, drawing on 'traditional' sources:

> There is a considerable degree of resilience about national cultures and identities. In Ireland we have our own literature and a strong organisation of culture. There is also a resurgence of Irish traditional music.

However, the Irish political elite's belief in a contemporary strong culture based on a renewed, self-confidence in Irishness implies that there was a period in which Irish identity expressed a lack of confidence, suggestive of dependency culture discussed above by Aidan from the Irish Council of the European Movement. For most of the members of the political elite, though, this period is described as one of isolation and insularity and equated with the 'traditional' nationalism of the De Valera era from 1932 to 1958. Thus for Conor from Fine Gael:

> De Valera's idea of one Ireland, a free 32 county state which was self-supporting and self-sufficient expressed an insular view of Ireland very much caught up in the whole nationalist ideology.

The insularity of this traditional perspective is not inconsistent, though, with the belief in the strong Irish culture and a resilient sense of Irishness. It simply stresses the relatively narrow construct of Irishness dominant in the De Valera era. For the Irish political elite, the significant point is a process of transition from an inward looking to a more open Irish society and culture. This transition from insularity to openness is largely explained by the members of the Irish political elite through the influence of internal socio-cultural factors such as education, television, travelling and the return of emigrants.

For Sean from SIPTU, the main internal socio-cultural influence is the improvement in Irish education, particularly the provision of free secondary schooling from 1967 and increased participation rates at the third level, opening up Irish society from the late 1960s through a process of 'enlightenment':

> We have a more enlightened population now that has come out the system - particularly secondary education. Also, a lot more people are participating in third level of the educational system.

Matthew from the Department of the Taoiseach focuses on other issues:

> The change is primarily a function of communications - the opening up communications. The advent of television had a huge influence. The Irish are of course great travellers, whether to live or to holiday abroad, and the whole business of migration - combined with the modernisation of society in the countries to which the Irish emigrated like Britain and the United States - had a substantial influence through the backwash effect on people coming home. I do not think that membership in the European Union has been a very important influence.

From this point of view, external socio-cultural influences are contributory but not determining factors in the transition to a more open Ireland. Their contribution is mainly explained in terms of a process of Irishisation in which Irish people, whether at home and as travellers or emigrants abroad, integrated these external influences into the already strong Irish culture, and then used this strengthened culture to open up Irish society to a more 'modern', European and global perspective of Irishness. This internal autonomous socio-cultural explanation of Ireland's transition from an inward looking to an open society bolsters the strong culture thesis by minimising the role of external socio-cultural influences from the Britain, Europe and the United States in the transition. Further, it deflects analysis away from the existence of a 'traditional' dependency culture focused on Britain as opposed to a strong but inward-looking Irish culture specifically during the De Valera era.

On the other hand, the belief in a transitional period from an inward looking to a more open society provides a framework from which to explain changes in the components of Irish identity in the renewed sense of Irishness. For example, John from Democratic Left emphasises that the new self-confident Irishness is not simply based on the 'traditional' nationalist construct of Irishness in terms of Gaelicism, Catholicism, agrarianism and rurality. Instead, this reconstructed sense of Irishness expresses openness to the world, mixing identities as opposed to solely stressing a distinctive Irishness developed in isolation:

> Young people are more open and willing to mix identities, not just Catholic but also modernist, taking on board Anglo-Irish writers and an urban perspective. It is a more self-confident identity, not isolationist or backward-looking. It can feed into U2 or the Pope. It can feed into international culture and can contribute to a distinctive culture.

For Conor from Fine Gael, the mixing of elements from 'traditional' and 'modern' senses of Irish identity results in a complex, more contested Irishness extending to notions of dual nationality within Europe. From his point of view, this complexity of identity is articulated in the socio-cultural agendas of the two main Irish political parties:

> There has definitely been a shift away from the traditional view of Irishness towards a more complex view. In a sense, that traditional view of Irishness is

> still as much Irish as the more modern view, but there are now conflicting views and the consensus is very difficult to define. You have so many different views of being Irish that the modern Fine Gael view of being European and Irish - this dual nationality of being part of the European identity and also being part of the Irish identity - is as much part of the Irish experience as the traditional Fianna Fail view of being Gaelic, Catholic and rural.

Adam from the Department of Education is more of a traditionalist, stressing that Irish culture must maintain its fundamental values in the contemporary process of Irish socio-cultural evolution:

> I would like to think that Irish society has succeeded in maintaining certain fundamentals which underpin any society and has succeeded in evolving with those aspects as well. De Valera's 'Dancing at the Crossroads' speech [in 1943] rested on the wish to maintain an Irish culture - a unique Irish culture. I believe that for any nation to be strong, it has to appreciate its own culture. We should never give up on our culture - what is intrinsically Irish in terms of our heritage.

For Adam, the intrinsic fundamentals of a strong Irish culture are partly 'traditional' in the nationalist construct focusing on the Irish language and Catholicism, partly populist and elitist in terms of Irish music and the arts as well as partly local and communal rooted in the Irish historical experience:

> We always had in Ireland a great tradition of community spirit which came from our poor backgrounds - neighbourliness and the local support system of friends and neighbours which a community gives within itself to its members...The music, arts, language and religion - I would see them all as critical parts of our culture and identity. Building on those strengths in an outward-looking way is the model.

Part of the differences between Adam and Conor in describing contemporary Irish identity in the strong Irish culture may be due to the generational effect referred to by other members of the Irish political elite. In this case, Adam is the older and Conor the younger man. These differences show through again in Conor's portrayal of the specifically Irish components of Irish identity compared to the more general Anglo-American features, specifically with reference to popular music:

> You find it in rock music where Irish bands have emerged along the lines of Anglo-American culture but with an Irish dimension and context to it. For example, a lot of the songs are about emigration - this kind of spiritual empire abroad with a huge flux of people living outside the state and still tapping into

> the state with their ideals and their money. The success of the pop culture is that it is still distinctively Irish by way of its lyrics and mood.

In this case, Adam focuses on an internal sense of Irishness based on historical, national and local components within an evolutionary outward looking model. On the other and, Conor describes some of the features of this outward looking model of Irishness, emphasising multiple identities within the European Union and specifically Irish experiences such as emigration as well as connections to the Irish diaspora articulated in the Irish contribution to an English speaking, Anglo-American global culture through popular music. Further, Conor is more willing to mix 'traditional' and 'modern' senses of Irishness in a complex Irish identity while Adam is more concerned to preserve what he perceives as fundamental, intrinsic features of a unique traditional Irishness as expressed by figures such as De Valera.

Even some of the younger members of the Irish political elite, though, stress the need to protect important features of Irish national culture. For Tony from Fianna Fail, the strong Irish culture still requires some protection particularly from European culture:

> The notion of an homogenous European culture is not something that I am comfortable with. In terms of cultural identity, I believe that we have a strong and resilient cultural identity. But within that broader cultural framework, there are strands and sectors that need protecting in order to flourish.

Yet, while feeling threatened by a unified European culture, Tony does not believe that a homogenous European culture yet exists. Further, he supports the idea of a European identity above the various national identities of the EU member states:

> I am not too sure that there is such an animal as a broader European culture. We are all European and I think that the one thing the EU has done has been to foster a common notion of Europeanness, certainly among the younger generations. I mean you know you are Irish, French or English, but you have a sense of attachment to something larger and bigger, something to which you know you are connected - this thing called Europe.

In general, the members of the Irish political elite agree with Tony's perspective on European culture. For them, in 'this thing called Europe', the emergence of an homogenous European culture would be a threat from which Irish culture would need to be protected. Further, they do not support the idea of an homogenous European culture,

preferring to view Europeanness as a more diffuse sense of attachment to Europe above and beyond the primacy of national identities rooted in national cultures.

This diffuse sense of Europeanness is expressed by a few members of the Irish political elite with respect to a surface Europeanness. Thus Padraig from the Department of the Taoiseach says that:

> Being European is something on top of your nationality, rather than something you put your nationality on top of. It means sharing cultural commitments to democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the expectation that you get these rights.

Of course, these specific cultural commitments could be shared on a global basis, for example through belief in the principles and agreements underlying the United Nations. As such, these shared commitments are not specifically European, although they form the myth of European cultural unity projected in debates about a European cultural identity.

For Fiachra from SIPTU, the content of a European cultural identity is less important than preserving a strong sense of Irishness by pushing European influences onto the surface of Irish cultural identity:

> I think that the Irish ethos will stay strong for a long period. European influences will find it hard to penetrate that - they are very much on the surface. I don't think there has been any real tangible evidence of or tangible moves towards the Irish becoming more and more European. I think that the Irish will take on board what they largely see as beneficial to Irish culture from Europe but will reject certain amounts of it.

For the Irish political elite, Irish surface Europeanness limits the influence of an already fairly limited European culture to the top of Irish national identity preserving the core of Irish culture below. Elements from the broader European culture may be adapted to suit Irish cultural needs while other features may just as well as be rejected as unsuitable to Irish culture. From this perspective, Irish cultural autonomy is maintained within the European Union. Further, by limiting European culture to the surface of Irishness, the strong Irish culture protects the core in case a more dominant, homogenous European culture emerges in the future. This potential threat seems to be modelled on the nationalist perspective of Ireland's experience under British rule - that the Irish may have to fight

once again for Irish cultural survival, this time against an assimilative European culture. In this way, the Irish political elite's ambivalence about Ireland's relationship to the European Union is expressed in socio-cultural terms. The self-confident Irish of strong culture, who proclaim to be psychological Europeans, become surface Europeans warding off the potential threat from European culture.

If Europe represents a potential threat which must be protected against for the future, certain features of the global culture pose more of an immediate threat for members of the Irish political elite. For Thomas from the Progressive Democrats, changes in global technology, retail sales and the communications industries represent a far greater threat to Irish cultural identity than a homogenous European culture:

> I do not think that the European Union will make one iota of difference to the standardisation of cultures. I think that commercial and technological developments - the chain store, the push for economies of scope and distribution - mean that most of us will have similar outlets to buy common products. We are in the middle of a technological revolution, and I think that will remove some of our cultural identity. I think that sound-bite journalism and the technological revolution are threats to Irish identity in the long-term, for example, access to satellite television, the proliferation of British journals and the tendency to reduce news to sound-bites.

Helen from Democratic Left also sees more of a threat from the global communications industry than from a European culture, but for her the principal threats are Americanisation and media monopolies, both of which have European wide influences and which should therefore be regulated at the European Union level:

> The European Union will not destroy national cultures. On the other hand, over the past forty of fifty years, Europe has been adopting more of American culture, for instance, through films. More recently, there has also been increasing media concentration of the news, for example, through Murdoch and Springer with their transnational forms of media mixing disasters and feel-good news. There is a need to legislate at the European level against media monopolies.

While being concerned about the American penetration of the European media and audio-visual sectors, Brian from the Chambers of Commerce of Ireland is more worried by the Anglo-American domination of Irish culture, arguing for a better balance through the inclusion of more European based cultural products:

> I am becoming a bit of a cultural fascist in terms of seeing how heavily influenced my peers are by American and British culture. I think a bit of balance is beautiful. There should be more continental European television channels on cable television. The only channels that we are exposed to here in Ireland are in this Anglo-American cultural tradition. It weighs pretty heavily. I am not against too much Anglo-American culture. I am for balance, variety and access to other cultures.

For Neil from the Labour Party, the global culture provides both advantages and disadvantages for Irish culture. The advantages stem from the predominance of the English language in the globalised world: 'The fact that the vast majority of people are English speaking means that we have terrific advantages as regards business and economics through to the dominant world language at the moment'. The disadvantages derive from American dominance of the global culture specifically in terms of cultural products such as film and television, socialising Irish children into American culture and threatening to swamp Irish cultural products:

> I think seventy percent of the images on our screen emanate from America. Children speak the language of America re-circulated from television programmes which come non-stop onto our television screens because they are in English and therefore totally accessible. They are also much cheaper to produce and are turned out in vast quantities. So there is a very strong dominance there and a real danger that, if we do not produce our own programmes, we will be swamped.

To fight against this American domination, Neil follows Helen in arguing for European regulation of American cultural products as in the French stand in the recent GATT talks, and for greater Irish commitment 'to maintaining our film and television industry'. After discussing the American threat, though, he returns to themes of the strong culture specifically the idea of the Irish fixed yet flexible identity. Citing the global influence of Irish writers like Joyce and Beckett, he says that this:

> Shows that we can contribute to the wider world culture, but we can do it without forgetting our own culture, and in fact we can do it in a way which strengthens and maintains our culture.

As one of the children referred to by Neil, Tony from Fianna Fail recognises the threat to Irish culture from American socio-cultural domination, expressing in terms of Ireland being 'culturally colonisable'. On the other hand, he is not as concerned about the long-

term of American cultural colonisation of Ireland, citing once again the resilience of Irish national culture and, in a rare expression of support for cultural hybridity among the Irish political elite, the possibilities of 'cross-pollenisation' as opposed to Irishisation of external socio-cultural influences:

> I think American culture is something that we have to watch in terms of being utterly swamped by it. We share the same language which makes us more culturally colonisable, but I think that we are more resilient than we often give ourselves credit for. You see the superficial manifestations of American culture in burger joints and movies, but I do not think that there has been an Americanisation in terms of attitudes, habits and social norms. It is certainly there in the audio-visual sector. I mean I switch on a television and see a Warner's Brothers cartoon or an American serial rerun. Most people in Ireland have not been brought up on anything else. I do not necessarily think it is an insidious thing as long as our own culture is vital. But to think of it in terms of us versus them is wrong. There is room for a bit of cross-pollenisation.

For the members of the Irish political elite, then, the immediate threat from the global culture lies first in its scale, organisational capacity and spread, extending beyond the control of most individual nation-states even large European countries like France. More specifically, the threat derives from the power of commercially driven, cultural transnational corporations using technological advancements in the telecommunications, audio-visual and media industries to penetrate into national cultures, altering cultural identities through their influence. The second main threat from the global culture arises from American domination of these cultural TNCs, slowly assimilating individuals from their youth into American culture, weakening national cultures and identities in a global process of Americanisation. From this perspective, the contemporary threat of Anglicisation is less significant for the members of the Irish political elite than Americanisation, which is not surprising given that the Irish strong culture is believed to have survived through centuries of British colonial rule.

What is perhaps surprising is that many members of the Irish political elite view Europe as the best place to control the socio-cultural influence of the global culture at the national level, specifically through regulation by the European Union. Thus, while a homogenous European culture centred on the EU may represent a potential threat to Irish culture, the political institutions of the EU are perceived as potential protectors of Irish culture from

American dominated, global cultural organisations. This is another example of the Irish political elite's ambivalence about Ireland's socio-cultural relationship to the European Union. Whatever the ambivalence, though, the Irish political elite still believe that both the European and global cultural threats are minimal in the face of the autonomous and strong Irish culture rooted in a core Irish identity.

In the end, the members of the Irish political elite believe in a historically derived, national sense of Irish cultural identity with core or essential components as part of an Irish strong culture. The main debate between them concerns the nature of these core components and the relationship between the core elements of Irishness to more superficial or surface manifestations of external cultural identities. While accepting a core Irishness, both the younger and older members of the Irish political elite seem to agree that the components of the core are in a transitional period between the 'traditional' construct of Irishness and a 'modern' reconstruction of Irish identity based more on urbanism, secularism, liberalism as well as a broader European and global world-view, reflecting the pattern of changes in Irish society since the late 1950s.

This reconstruction of the Irish core identity attempts to integrate these 'modern' features into the 'traditional' core components such as Gaelicism, Catholicism, agrarianism and rurality, local elements such as communalism or, more broadly, Irish historical experiences like emigration or a struggle for Irish cultural survival under British rule. This integrative core Irishness is portrayed as part of a resilient, strong Irish culture which competes equally at the European or global levels on its own terms, either as a distinct culture based on indigenous sources or an adaptive culture which remoulds European and global cultural components into a specifically Irish framework for export abroad.

The apparent contradiction of this perspective is that the Irish political elite asserts that there is an historical core Irish cultural identity, while at the same time claiming that the components of this core Irishness change over time reflecting contemporary internal and external influences on Irish society. Thus, core Irishness is both essentialist and flexible. Yet the flexibility of core Irishness in the strong culture does not extend for most members of the Irish political elite to the construction of multiple identities in Ireland or to the

creation of Irish cultural hybrids out of Irish, European and Anglo-American global cultural features. The idea of sharing identities or cultures in a broader sense of cultural identity is marginalized in the dominant version's strong culture. Instead, a sense of Irish national cultural identity predominates in which external socio-cultural influences are 'Irishised' into Irishness if possible or portrayed as threats against which Irish cultural identity must be protected.

Further, the Irish political elite's belief in the strong culture which survived through British colonisation neither explains the existence nor the persistence of an Irish dependency culture on Britain - another apparent contradiction in the strong culture thesis. In other words, if a strong culture survived then how could a dependency culture thrive at the same time? One answer to this question may be that the Irish political elite's belief in the strong culture functions as an ideology serving the interests of the group (Van Dijk 1998: 8) by compensating for the reality of an Irish dependency culture which has only recently weakened during the lifetimes of many individuals in the Irish political elite.

The strong culture thesis may also function as an ideology in itself in the dominant version, providing socio-cultural compensation for the rather negative construction of Ireland's relationship to the European Union in terms of islandness, peripherality, smallness, no economic options and no political choice. In this way, the Irish political elite's belief that Ireland has no viable national options outside of membership in the European Union is compensated for by their belief in an autonomous strong Irish core national culture, which is independent of the economic dependency on EU benefits and the political necessity of playing the good European role to secure these benefits.

7.3 The Residual Version: The Weight Of The Oppression Of That Burden

The components that form the residual version are based mainly on the policies adopted during the De Valera era from 1932 to 1958. In particular, the residual version emphasises the benefits of economic protectionism and the political values of independence and sovereignty for the Irish nation. From a longer historical perspective, these features of the residual version can be traced back to the various strands that compose Irish nationalism, particularly to its late nineteenth and early twentieth manifestations in economic, political,

military and socio-cultural organisations and movements (Hutchinson 1987; Cronin 1981). Of course, De Valera was one of the individuals socialised into Irish nationalism during this era, so it is not all surprising that he should construct a version of nationalism articulating a number of these components into a political ideology which formed the dominant version of his time as the political leader of the country.

On the other hand, the residual version highlights a component of Irish cultural identity which is in direct contradiction to De Valera's construct of a strong and unique Irishness centred on the Irish nation - an Irish dependency culture expressing a sense of cultural backwardness, feelings of inferiority and a lack of self-confidence with respect to Britain and Britishness. The centrality of the dependency culture in the residual version also contradicts specific claims in the strong culture thesis in the dominant version, particularly the belief in a continuously existing strong Irish cultural identity in Ireland which survived centuries of British colonisation.

The quotes which form the residual version can be found in most of the individual interviews with the members of the Irish political elite, usually embedded in and around comments which support the dominant version. Many of the quotes which best articulate the residual version is expressed, however, in the interviews with the members of the SIPTU elite. This may be due in part to the Irish trade union movement's initial opposition to Ireland's accession to the European Union in the early 1970s and the movement's gradual acceptance of Ireland's membership in the EU by the mid-1980s. As such, members of the SIPTU elite may have retained beliefs in components of the residual version for a longer period of time compared to the other organisational representatives in the Irish political elite interviewed for this study. In this way, the individual 'life course effect' may have been slower for the members of the SIPTU elite in terms of moving from acceptance of the residual towards a belief in the dominant version.

Among the SIPTU elite, Ronan's interview provides a particularly good example of both this transitional life course effect and the embeddedness of the residual within the dominant version. In discussing the Irish trade union movement's opposition to the then EEC in the 1972 referendum on Ireland's accession, he stresses the value of Irish political

sovereignty and relates this value to support for De Valera's policy of economic protectionism, specifically for increased state intervention through Irish semi-state companies:

> The trade union movement felt accession would be a loss of independence - we already have an independent sovereign state. It was a matter of working out our own identity and our own objectives. The trade union movement saw the development of the Irish economy in terms of more state involvement based on the success of semi-state bodies such as Bord Na Mhona and the Irish Sugar Company.

On the other hand, he concedes that Lemass' shift in national economic policy towards export led industrialisation based on foreign direct investment by overseas firms succeeded in creating higher rates of economic growth and employment. However, he criticises the policy in terms of the residual version for not relying more on Irish national resources and Irish people, drawing on the meaning of Sinn Fein or ourselves alone to emphasise his point:

> In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the approach to job creation and industrialisation changed in the then Prime Minister Sean Lemass encouraged foreign multinational companies to set up in Ireland. His famous expression then was 'the rising tide will lift all boats'. It did work. I mean jobs increased. The economy's growth rate was very high. In the early 1970s, people began to have a rethink. Are we using our own natural resources? People thought that there was an outflow of profits that could be reinvested in Ireland. That was the attitude - let us rely on ourselves and our own resources.

Many members of the Irish political elite, though, stress that the protectionism and the focus on sovereignty during the De Valera era did not lead to a more independent, self-sufficient Ireland rooted in a strong Irish culture and national identity. Instead, the isolationism of the era heightened an Irish dependency culture and the country's dependence on Britain. Thomas from the Progressive Democrats provides an example of this Irish dependency culture in the 'Buy Irish' campaign which from his perspective devalued as opposed to valued Irishness:

> There was a time from the 1940s to the 1960s when to buy Irish meant buy it, it might not be as good but you know that we made it - which made Irishness something of secondary value and second class standard.

While valuing Irish sovereignty and economic self-sufficiency, Ronan also believes that one of the results of the De Valera era was a heightened Irish dependency culture on

Britain. One expression of the dependency culture at the time was an Irish inferiority complex:

> There was a tendency in the 1950s to have an inferiority complex. If we were not doing it like they were in doing it in England, it was the wrong way to go about doing it. I think that in the 1950s and 1960s, we were beginning to hide our Irish traits, saying that is not modern so we should not have it anymore.

Further, this sense of Irish inferiority was reinforced by Ireland's lower standard of living and economic opportunities relative to Britain, an inferiority which De Valera attempted to transform into a superior Irish spirituality, especially in his St. Patrick's Day radio address to the Irish nation in 1943. SIPTU's Cathal refers to this speech, parodying the glorification of Irish poverty into a spiritual value of Irishness: 'De Valera's comely maidens at the crossroads philosophy was Irish and poor and be proud of it. Poverty and deprivation - that was Irish. That was more important'. Sean from SIPTU provides a more personal example showing that this sense of Irish economic deprivation was marginalized by the main political parties, which instead continued to relive civil war politics dating to the early 1920s:

> I remember De Valera on the back of a horse and cart with the opposition on one side. It was just a shouting match between one side and the other. The country was on its knees, but there was no mention of the economy.

The rhetoric of civil war politics and frugal comfort in cosy homesteads belied the reality that there were no jobs for the comely maidens and athletic youths, who emigrated mostly to Britain instead. The extent of the emigration was vast with 'four out of every five children born in Ireland between 1931 and 1941' emigrating 'in the 1950s' (Lee 1989: 379). The scale of Irish emigration further reinforced the sense of an Irish dependency culture particularly among many of the immigrants to Britain.

In an extended example, Ronan again provides the best example of this relationship between Irish emigration to Britain and the dependency culture, detailing the negative effects of poverty, unemployment and discrimination on the Irish 'personality':

> We were to a certain extent the poor relations in Europe. Irish economic activity was very, very low. In the 1950s, there was a lot of economic, industrial activity in Britain when they were rebuilding after the war. Unemployment was practically unheard of. We were so close to that economy

> and we had little or no economic activity. Unemployment was a major problem. People just left school and went straight to England. They went as labouring people, as a kind of underprivileged people. They had to take on board all the underprivileges that went with the job that they did. I mean that had to have an effect on the confidence of the people. I come from Ireland. I can not get a living there, so you are going over to depend on somebody else. You know, there was an attitude to the Irish over there. Notices in the window, 'No Irish Need Apply'. When you go into a culture like that where there are notices like that, you try to hide your identity. It must have a detrimental effect on the personality of the people.

For Neil from the Labour Party, this detrimental effect extended back to Ireland, exacerbated by a blanket of protectionism which imposed a 'burden of isolationism' on Irish society, cutting off the country from continental Europe. From this perspective, Ireland was cut off from Europe by Irish political policies of protectionism not because of some geographical determinism of islandness and peripherality as articulated in the dominant version:

> From the 1930s to the 1950s, Irish economic policy was protectionist. But it was protectionist in more ways than economic. It was socially and culturally protectionist. There was a burden of isolationism which cut it off from the rest of Europe.

Further, Neil argues that the De Valera era was based on the fundamental contradiction in that policies intended to strengthen Irish economic, political and socio-cultural independence instead strengthened Ireland's dependence on Britain. For Neil, relieving the burden of Ireland's British dependency explains the Irish people's support for the country's membership in the EU, not the lack of economic options resulting from islandness, peripherality and smallness as argued in the dominant version:

> The people who were in charge of the political establishment then intended to make the country independent from Britain, but in actual fact it tied us closer to Britain economically and cut off trade and cultural links with the rest of Europe. Even if people do not articulate the weight of the oppression of that burden, I think that their behaviour since the 1960s - expressed in their admiration for Europe - is very obvious, not least in their political expression through support for every single European referendum that we have had.

While Ireland's European integration has contributed to a reduction in Irish economic dependency on Britain, this does not mean that the connections linking the countries have been severed or that the Irish sense of dependency on Britain has been eradicated. A

contemporary form of the residual version stresses the continuing linkages between Ireland and Britain, particularly at the socio-cultural level, and the continuation of the pattern of Irish Anglophobia and Anglophilia, derived from the dependency culture, to explain the Irish-British interrelationship.

For Noel, however, the Irish socio-cultural transition from viewing Britain as the old enemy to seeing Britain as the big neighbour is incomplete. In particular, he worries about the persistence of a personal Anglo-centricity which conjures up dependency culture memories of the Irish lack of self-confidence with respect to Britain:

> We still define ourselves a fair bit against Britain. It is something I try very hard to guard against. We perhaps define ourselves less so now. I think we have more confidence in ourselves than we had twenty five or thirty years ago.

This psychological persistence of parts of the dependency culture in at least a few members of the Irish political elite suggests that the focus in the dominant version on a renewed, self-confident Irishness reflects a wider socio-cultural transition from an earlier lack of self-confidence expressed in terms of the dependency culture on Britain. A generational effect could also apply here in that older members of the Irish political elite may still be experiencing the transition at a psychological level, while younger members may simply experience the newer, self-confident form of Irishness since they are less likely to have been socialised into the Irish dependency culture on Britain.

Cathal from SIPTU provides another, more detailed example of Britain as the big neighbour as well as the persistence of the Irish residual pattern of perceiving Irish and British relations in terms of an Anglo-centricity:

> England is a very short distance away. It speaks the same language as us, although listening you would not think so. And there is this natural pull of easy access. It is one of the few countries in the world that allows another nation-state to enter its country without a passport and take up work and be accommodated within the social welfare system and its health services as a right. That's an extraordinary situation. And the football - more people leave Dublin on the weekend to support British football clubs than support Irish clubs here on a Sunday. Twenty-eight thousand people turned up to watch the League of Ireland play Liverpool and twenty-seven thousand were supporting Liverpool! And of course you have the complex Irish-English history. On one

> level, it functions like I have just described. On another level, England are the old enemy, you know that sort of way.

The persistence of this pattern of Irish Anglo-centricity suggests that certain components of the residual version's dependency culture may in fact remain part of core Irish national identity. In particular, Irish Anglophobia and Anglophilia may form part of the protected core as opposed to being surface manifestations of an older British external socio-cultural influence which has been consigned to the surface of contemporary Irishness. A core Irish Anglo-centricity, then, would be a cultural survival within 'modern' Irish identity deriving from an Irish dependency culture formed during British rule instead of from a strong Irish culture which survived into post-independence Ireland. This is not to say, however, that a strong culture ideal based on Irish rurality, agrarianism, Catholicism and Gaelicism did not survive as an Irish nationalist construct of Irishness, just that Irish Anglo-centricity survived along with these other components of 'traditional' Irishness into the post-independence, contemporary period.

The cultural survival of components from the dependency culture in contemporary Irish national identity seems to be accompanied by the transference of Ireland's British dependency onto the country's relationship with the European Union. That is, a cultural logic of autonomy and dependency can be applied at the socio-cultural level to certain features of Irish-European relations such as Ireland's relative dependence on EU transfers to further the country's socio-economic development. Aidan from the European Council of the European Movement provides the best example of this Irish autonomy/dependency transference from Britain to the EU in his description of speaking at Irish public meetings about the European Union:

> When you ask people in a public meeting around the country what they think about Europe, they see all of this money coming in and they are very glad about that, but they do not really understand why it is coming and they feel a little bit ashamed or upset about it. They feel that we should be able to develop ourselves and wonder why are these people giving us all this money?

The larger significance of this Irish autonomy/dependency transfer from Ireland's British to the country's European relationship is that it seems to structure the Irish political elite's perspective on the multiplicity of Ireland's external relationships with Britain, European,

the United States and the globalisation process as well as to shape their views on Irish national identity. This cultural logic of Irish autonomy and dependency among the Irish political elite is discussed in more detail at the end of this chapter. The important point here is that perhaps the strongest cultural survival from the residual version in contemporary Irish identity is not components of the dependency culture but the structure of the dependency culture itself.

7.4 Emergent Versions: Opting Out Of The Mad, Competitive Malaise In The Land Of Saints, Scholars And Warts

With regard to the emergent versions, three main themes arose during the analysis of the interviews: one centred on gender, a second focused on the environment and a third based on local communities. In practice, though, these three themes tended to be interrelated in the interviews with the few members of the Irish political elite who most directly articulated them. It may be that these three themes are in the process of merging into a single, broader emergent version which may in the future challenge the dominant version, becoming incorporated into, modifying or, in Williams' terms, displacing the current dominant version. There also may be other emergent cultural ideologies in contemporary Irish society, articulated by rising socio-economic and political groupings, which have not been identified in the discourse of the Irish political elite for this study but which may already exist and become significant in the future.

This interpretation suggests that the future is ideologically open in Irish society with respect to dominant cultural ideologies and can not be directly projected with certainty from one's particular perspective within the contemporary period. Further, as shown in the analysis of the dominant and residual versions, one can not predict in advance the persistence of cultural survivals from earlier cultural ideologies, the adaptation of cultural ideological components to internal and external influences or the transformation of the content and structure of these ideological components from one cultural ideology into another.

In terms of the Irish political elite's emergent versions, a common element is the external support given by the European Union to the policy areas of gender equality, the

environment and local communities through a variety of means including Treaty commitments, directives, regulations, European networks, action plans and transfers. To a certain extent, this EU support has been driven by the European Commission's organisational strategy to identify and incorporate under EU remit relatively marginalized policy areas and constituencies in the member states, expanding European influence at the transnational, national and sub-national levels while broadening the support base for the European Union. Thus, the policy area of gender has been directly influenced since at least the mid-1970s through EU directives, the management of the natural environment has been incorporated into the Common Agricultural Policy through the MacSharry reforms and local communities have been integrated into the transfer of Structural and Cohesion Funds in the Delors I and II packages from 1989.

The analysis of the Irish political elite's emergent versions reflects the EU's external influence in support of gender issues, the environment and local communities, although the members of the Irish political elite who articulate the emergent versions adapt the European influence to the Irish context, integrating, modifying or even rejecting the EU's perspective to fit the Irish experience and concerns. As such, what emerges out of Europe is not necessarily what appears in the Irish political elite's emergent versions. While acknowledging EU support, the Irish emergent versions also express an internal autonomous national process of addressing the issues of gender, the environment and local communities which is at times critical of and at other times simply different from the European perspective. The Irish political elite's emergent versions suggests that by opening out to Europe and other external influences, Irish society now deals more openly with previously marginalized or 'hidden' issues.

This discursive analysis of the Irish emergent versions focuses on the contributions of the two members of the Irish political elite who best articulated an Irish perspective on the issues of gender, the environment and local communities, including the interrelationship between them. The two members of the Irish political elite in this case are John from Democratic Left and Lucy from the Council for the Status of Women.

John's discussion of these issues is composed of two interrelated parts. The first links the issues of local communities, the environment and gender through European social policy in general and through the EU practice of subsidiarity in particular. The second develops an alternative ideology to the neo-conservative market liberalism predominant in Europe and America in the 1980s and early 1990s. This alternative ideology is based on a 'red-green' alliance imbued with Irish values such as humanity as opposed to neo-liberal values like materialism. Interestingly, this alternative ideological construct modifies De Valera's belief that the strength of Irish culture lies in an Irish spirituality which rejects materialism. In this way, John's contribution to the Irish political elite's emergent versions fuses contemporary European political alignments between social democratic and green parties with 'traditional' Irish values contained within the residual version in a form of a progressive traditionalism.

More specifically, John applauds the role of the European Union in promoting a social dimension which includes policies for:

> Worker mobility, transferring qualifications, local and EU voting, environmental cooperation, the rights of women at work, sexual issues, family planning, access to health, immigration, racial and ethnic minorities as well as industrial democracy.

From his perspective, one of the roles of the EU is to protect the civil, political and social rights of European citizens through implementing policies to strengthen and expand the scope of these rights to other socially excluded groups within the EU member-states and these policy issues form part of a broader European social dimension based on subsidiarity or the balancing of powers between the European, national and local levels. In particular, John emphasises the European dimension in strengthening local communities with respect to 'local democratic traditions' and 'local identities' through 'frameworks and agreements to implement directives and regulations at the local level'. In a wider sense, John's emergent version envisions a form of European integration built on a comprehensive political, economic and socio-cultural subsidiarity which spreads power and transfers material resources between the European, national and local levels while accommodating the diversity of national and local cultural traditions and identities.

Given that national governments currently control most of the political, economic and socio-cultural resources in European societies, this means in practice that more control of these resources should be devolved both upwards to the EU institutions and downwards to regional and local organisations. From John's perspective, this federal form of comprehensive subsidiarity is the best way to ensure the long-term success of European integration built on democracy, economic equality and the construction of real multiple European, national and local identities at the individual level of the European citizen.

On the other hand, John is opposed to a form of federal Europe which simply increases centralisation to the EU institutions becoming 'over-bureaucratised' and 'swallowing up' both national and local democratic traditions as well as identities. This criticism of a particular form of European federalism represents the limit of John's support for European integration. For John, then, the EU must be built on progressive foundations which includes in this case protecting and extending civil, political and social rights, comprehensive subsidiarity and the preservation of national and local identities within a multiple identities construct.

In this way, John's emergent version articulates the construction of a European federal society as opposed to a European competitive market based on the neo-conservative liberal model. Thus for John, 'the market based economy separates the socially excluded from the socially included who have the means and the ability to compete', a process which he 'sees happening in Dublin as well as in most cities of Europe'. However, increased social division is only one result of a market based model of European integration:

> The neo-conservative liberal economic basis is a destructive one which will lead to continued social division and war, including violence in the streets, the drug culture, over consumption and environmental destruction.

From John's perspective, the alternative to this market model is a 'human growth model' based on cooperation between people and 'working in harmony with the environment'. John argues that this human growth model should be applied at the Irish, European and global levels, extending to the 'globalisation of markets and the economy' through 'adapting new technologies to enhance life and work' and developing 'new alternatives to

living in response to globalisation such as green products, organic foods and homeopathic medicines'.

Significantly, John believes that Irish culture has an important contribution to make to this 'new way of thinking' through its 'stress on the values of humanity and living over materialism and consumption'. Further, this return to Irish 'traditional' values as the underlying basis of the new human growth model includes the value of Irish communalism. Specifically, this value is applied in the human growth model to 'strengthening local communities' by 'providing the means to help people help themselves through collective community efforts' and in the process 'increasing people's self-confidence'. In these ways, Irish 'traditional' values contribute to the new human growth model by helping communities to 'opt out of the mad competitive malaise' which has resulted from the predominance of the neo-conservative liberal model within Europe as well as in the global economy and culture.

John's emergent version combines his vision of European integration with his Irish based human growth model in a comprehensive perspective which integrates local communities, nation-states, the European Union and the globalisation process in a progressive yet traditional framework. In this way, John's emergent version of progressive traditionalism offers a more positive Irish construct of Ireland's place within Europe and a globalised world compared to either the dominant version's small, peripheral island nation with no economic options outside of the EU, playing the good European for Ireland's material benefit or the residual version's protected and inward-looking Ireland, dependent nonetheless on Britain.

Further, John's Irish emergent version draws on European concepts such as subsidiarity and multiple identities, but modifies them to fit into his alternative ideology, while at the same time rejecting certain forms of European integration such as centralised federalism and a market based European Union. As such, he articulates an Irish vision of an Ireland interdependent with Europe and the rest of the increasingly globalised planet. This contrasts with the residual version's perspective of an Ireland protected yet dependent on

Britain or the dominant version's viewpoint of an autonomous Ireland opened out to Europe but afraid of becoming dependent on the European Union.

While the emergent version articulated by Lucy from the Council for the Status of Women does not develop an alternative Irish based political ideology, it does provide another example of how European concepts and practices can be adapted within a European context to the Irish experience, specifically with respect to gender and local communities. Lucy's emergent version also shows how external influences can help to unleash a dynamic internal Irish process without denying the significance of these external influences in this Irish internal process. In this case, the external influences arise from EU policies in support of women's issues and local communities and the dynamic internal process concerns dealing openly with previously marginalized or 'hidden' Irish social problems such as corporal punishment, rape and sexual abuse as well as Irish attitudes about social issues like family planning and homosexuality.

Drawing on the European context, Lucy discusses the development from the 1970s of an increasingly autonomous and dynamic process of addressing women's issues in Ireland, reflecting the specific Irish experience with respect to improving the position of women in Irish society. Thus, she argues that:

> The agenda has developed in Ireland from the 1970s when the main issue was equal pay legislation. While we have the legislation now, we still do not have equal pay. It has developed in Ireland in that there is a demand from women for access to employment and training. There is also recognition that in dealing with employment and training, there is a need to tackle childcare as well. Another development is that more and more women are becoming aware of Europe and what Europe has to offer women.

From Lucy's perspective, there is a distinctive Irish process of addressing women's issues in Ireland which at the same time interacts with and is influenced by the broader European context in terms of common European women's issues, EU legislation and organisational links with European institutions as well as other women's groups in European member states. The European influence is not minimised or denied in order to argue for an independent, internal explanation of social change in Ireland as in the strong culture thesis of the dominant version.

The autonomous yet interactive process which Lucy identifies in terms of women's issues is also articulated with respect to organisational links in Ireland. In discussing the links between Irish women's groups and European programmes, Lucy argues that these European linkages have spurred internal Irish links on the European model of social partners. Thus, she states that the Council for the Status of Women has:

> Thirty-three partnerships across the country which are very diverse in terms of their activities, ranging from entrepreneurs growing vegetables to those providing training, partnerships with semi-state bodies, with business, with FAS and with government departments.

Further, Lucy notes this independent yet interactive process in terms of women's groups and linkages in Ireland has become even more dynamic since 1987 with the adoption of the European social partnership model in the Irish national agreements, the creation of the single European market, Irish-European organisational linkages established through the Structural and Cohesion funds from 1989 and the election of Mary Robinson as President of Ireland in 1990. With respect to Irish women's groups, these European and national level influences have in turn spurred:

> A huge growth in the numbers of women's organisations over the past few years. Since 1987, the number of affiliated organisations has grown from around seventy to over one hundred and twenty. Besides that, there has been a large growth at the local level of community groups. Through a questionnaire, we have already identified eight hundred small groups who are not affiliated to us at all. They have identified in their community a gap in services or facilities or they simply want to introduce something totally new.

At the national level, Lucy emphasises the internal influence of Mary Robinson during the early years of her Presidency as 'one of the main political catalysts of this development'. Further, Lucy views Mary Robinson as 'a role model, who has opened a lot of doors for women psychologically and emotionally'. This 'Mary Robinson effect' greatly benefited the lobbying efforts of women's groups like the Council for the Status of Women to raise the national awareness of and interest in previously marginalized issues such as 'rape, child sexual abuse, homosexuality and family planning' along with other social issues like corporal punishment in the schools.

Of particular importance for Lucy is that the Mary Robinson effect intensified a significant socio-cultural change in Irish society in which from '1987 onwards, there has been more willingness to deal openly with issues which have been controversial'. In this way, the Irish opening up process means more than turning towards Europe the new friend and away from Britain the old enemy or arguing for a solely internal socio-cultural explanation of Irish social change through education, travelling, television and the return of emigrants. In Lucy's emergent versions, opening up means dealing openly with negative features of Irish society and culture such as rape and child sexual abuse which used to be hidden or denied and which some people still want to hide or deny:

> There has been a whole shift, not just one person's head above the parapet, in all of society. The backlash is to a certain extent a result of our success - the people coming out of the woodwork who are opposed to raising these issues have never felt threatened before. Because we are airing the things that are happening in our country, we are the land of saints, scholars, warts and vulnerabilities. For quite a number of years, we have tried to deny these things - that it could not happen in our society. And everyday that we are being challenged by things happening in our society, I think that as a society we are maturing. We are creating a society where victims can actually stand up and say, 'Yes, this happened to me!' But we have a lot more to do and we have to be careful about people who want to put the lid back on the box.

In confronting the Irish people who want to put the lid back on the box, Lucy's emergent version seems to articulate a second phase in the Irish opening up process from 1987, following the first phase of opening outwards to Europe in the post-1958 period discussed in the dominant version. This second phase includes accepting the importance of external influences in Irish socio-cultural change in interaction with a dynamic independent Irish process. In this sense, there are no barriers needed to protect the core of Irishness in the strong culture from external influences while pushing these influences onto the surface of Irishness. The strong Irish culture in this case is strong enough to deal openly with the negative features of a hidden Ireland which also form part of Irishness. In Lucy's emergent version, there is strength in admitting Irish weaknesses from opening up inwardly while remaining opened up outwardly to external socio-cultural influences.

When examined together, perhaps the greatest strength of these two emergent versions is that they appear to break free from the Irish dependency culture which composes much of

the residual version's content and structures the content of the dominant version. Whether or not the issues of gender, the environment and local communities become part of the Irish political elite's dominant version of the future, John and Lucy's emergent versions provide the basis for a dominant Irish cultural ideology which articulates Irish interdependence with Europe, the globalisation process and the natural environment. By detaching themselves from the Irish dependency culture, they open up an opportunity to reconstruct Ireland's relationship with Britain without the Irish Anglo-centricity.

Finally, both of the emergent versions focus broadly on quality of life issues instead of the residual and dominant versions' search for the best means to continue Ireland's socio-economic development - as a protected, isolated island or an opened island reattached to Europe. This suggests that Ireland's socio-economic development has already reached the point where the issue of the national standard of living is becoming less important than concerns about the Irish quality of life at least for certain members of the Irish political elite. Since Ireland's national development figures so centrally in the 'traditional' and contemporary forms of Irish nationalism, this suggests that Irish nationalism may be reconstructed again in the Irish political elite's dominant version of the future, becoming detached from increasing Irish socio-economic development to justify Ireland's place among the nations of the developed world, while focusing more on improving the Irish quality of life within a European and global interdependence.

7.5 Conclusion: The Cultural Logic of Autonomy and Dependency

Comparing the dominant, residual and emergent versions together highlights a number of significant points. First, the Irish political elite in the dominant version clearly chooses to emphasise Ireland's European integration over the country's British, US or global integrations. Second, the Irish political elite in the dominant version chooses to stress a core Irish national identity, rejecting for the most part an identity construct based on multiple identities and cultural hybridity. Instead of reconstructing Irish national identity to coexist with or mix components from British, European or global cultural identities, the Irish political elite either 'Irishises' them or pushes them to surface of Irishness protecting the core identity. However, the Irish political elite's construct of an Irish core identity is flexible enough to mix components from Ireland's post-1958 socio-cultural changes such

as urbanism, industrialism, secularism and liberalism along with elements from the 'traditional' construct of Irishness. The difference here is that the Irish political elite explains these socio-cultural changes by internal factors, minimising the role of external influences in Irish socio-cultural change.

The Irish political elite's choices appear to be structured by the remnants of an Irish dependency culture on Britain (see below), which emerged during Britain's colonisation of Ireland and is articulated within the residual version. In particular, the members of the Irish political elite seem to be motivated by a fear of becoming dependent once again, whether on Britain, Europe or global TNCs. This fear of dependency helps to explain the Irish political elite's choices of Ireland's European integration and core Irish identity.

In this political trajectory of Irish independence, the Irish political elite's ultimate goal appears to be Ireland's complete political, economic, social and cultural independence. The achievement of this goal would the fulfil the main aims of 'traditional' Irish nationalism for an independent Ireland, although the content of complete independence in this case would not be based on a rural, agrarian, Gaelic and Catholic unified Ireland. In this case, the structure of Irish nationalism remains the same while the content varies, reflecting the restructuring of Irish cultural nationalism by the Irish political elite in this chapter, mixing 'traditional' and 'modern' components of Irishness together to form the core of Irish national identity.

From this perspective, the Irish political elite chooses Europe over other integrations in part because the EU guarantees direct Irish political influence in EU decision-making, providing more Irish relative autonomy over Ireland's economic development compared to the lack of Irish political influence in decisions taken in Britain or by global TNCs. The Irish political elite believes that Ireland is more autonomous and less dependent in politico-economic terms as a member of the EU than the country would be as a stand alone post-colonial state or TNC export platform.

Further, the Irish political elite proclaims a strong Irish culture and the cultural survival of a core Irishness to compensate for Ireland's relative economic dependency on Europe and

American TNCs, asserting Ireland's continuing cultural autonomy in terms structurally equivalent to De Valera's claims with respect to Britain in the residual version. Given that the Irish dependency culture can be traced back beyond the De Valera era from 1932 to 1958 to at least the post-famine construction of 'traditional' Irish nationalism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the discursive analysis of the dominant and residual versions shows the strength of the Irish dependency culture in continuing to shape the Irish political elite's attitudes towards Ireland's multiple integrations and identities.

The two emergent versions indicate, however, that the grip of the dependency culture on the minds of the Irish political elite may have been broken at least for a few of its members. Yet, one could imagine another scenario in which the dependency culture is not replaced but strengthened. For example, the dependency culture could re-emerge if the Irish economy entered a period of prolonged recession with low growth rates, high unemployment and high rates of emigration.

The continuation of Ireland's 'Celtic Tiger' economy could also lead to a reassertion of Irish autonomy, particularly with respect to the European Union. In this scenario, the political elite's assertion of an autonomous strong Irish culture is aligned with Ireland's new economic autonomy and political fear of losing power within the EU decision-making institutions. This builds on the dominant version's argument that Ireland's political equality within the EU as a member state has been accompanied by the country's economic dependence on EU transfers, and the need to be political pragmatists and good Europeans to secure more EU funds.

However, the Celtic Tiger economy has significantly reduced Ireland's economic dependence on EU transfers, to the point that the country will soon become a net contributor to the EU budget. As such, there is less need for the members of the Irish political elite to be political pragmatists and good Europeans, providing scope for a reaction against the European Union in terms of issues like institutional reform and enlargement. This reaction could be expressed in a discourse of Irish autonomy against political domination by a Federal Europe, 'Brussels', 'Eurocrats' or larger member states.

This scenario may be useful in explanations of the political elite's role in Ireland's rejection of the Nice Treaty in June 2001 (see Chapter Nine).

The structural level of the discursive versions suggests that there is reoccurring cultural logic of autonomy and dependency that shapes but does not determine the content of the political elite's discourses about Ireland's multiple integrations. The analysis suggests that Irish political actors reproduce a cultural category based on the Irish desire for autonomy and fear of dependency, which emerged during Britain's colonial rule of Ireland. These actors unintentionally use this category to shape the content of their specific discourses about the country's current multiple integration processes (see Chapter Nine).

This type of argument is well developed in contemporary sociological theory, particularly in theoretical debates about the interrelationship between 'structure' and 'agency' (Ritzer 1996: 353- 425). While there is no resolution of this debate, there have been a number of influential contemporary theorists addressing the agency-structure relationship. These include Bourdieu's theoretical and empirical work on habitus and field (1977, 1984, 1992), Giddens's theory of structuration (1984, 1993), Archer's discussion of culture, structure and agency (1988) and Habermas's later work on communicative action (1987).

For our purposes, we will focus on Giddens's theory of structuration. For Giddens, the 'concept of structuration involves...the duality of structure, which relates to the fundamentally recursive character of social life, and expresses the mutual dependence of structure and agency' (1993: 122). He argues that 'Structure forms [the actor's] 'personality' and 'society' simultaneously – but in neither case exhaustively: because of the significance of unintended consequences of action, and because of unacknowledged conditions of action' (ibid). By this he means that actors 'in the moment of production' simultaneously reproduce the structural 'contexts of the day-to-day enactment of social life' (1984: 26); in so doing, actors draw on the unacknowledged structural conditions of previous actions, producing unintended consequences that feed back into further actions (p8). In this way, 'every process of action is a production of something new, a fresh act; but at the same time all action exists in continuity with the past, which supplies the means of its initiation' (1993: 122-3).

In Giddens's theory, structure refers to 'rules and resources' that are drawn on by actors in their production and reproduction of social life, and as such are 'recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems' (1993: 117). These structures are 'temporally 'present' only in their instantiation, in the constituting moments of social systems' (ibid). He defines social systems as 'structured totalities', and institutions as 'the most deeply-layered practices constitutive of social systems' both 'in terms of the historical duration of the practices they recursively organise, and the spatial 'breadth' of those practices' (ibid). History is then defined as the 'structuration of events in time and space: the interconnection of the mundane nature of day-to-day life with institutional forms stretching over immense spans of time and space' (pp362-3).

To connect the historical influence of past actors by 'the residues of their activities' (p37) on those in the present, we will focus more closely on the interrelationship between structure and agency. For Giddens, actors are knowledgeable about their actions but this knowledge is historically and spatially bounded (1993: 126). The knowledge of actors is bounded by the contexts of their day-to-day activities; by their 'memory traces' of 'how things are to be done', said and written (p117); by their 'interpretive schemes...whereby they are able to make accounts' of and 'offer reasons' for their actions (1984: 29); and by the unconscious conditions and the unintended consequences of their actions (1993: 126). Within these bounds, actors draw on their knowledge to 'constitute meaning', incorporating 'temporal and spatial features of encounters', structures, institutions and social systems (1984: 29).

More specifically, Giddens distinguishes between practical consciousness or 'knowledge embodied in what actors 'know how to do', and discursive consciousness or 'what actors are able 'talk about' and in what manner or guise they are able to talk about it' (1993: 126). While actors are able to talk about what they mean and do and why they mean and do it, their discursive consciousness is bounded by the above factors, limiting their ability to talk about all that they do or everything that constitutes their meaning. In particular, actors are not necessarily knowledgeable about how structural rules and resources influence their actions and their discursive consciousness about their actions. Similarly,

actors are not necessarily knowledgeable about how institutions, social systems or the historical residues of past activities influence their actions and consciousness.

Thus, there can be discursive structures from the historical residues of past activities that, through memory traces or interpretive schemes, orient the meaning and 'conduct of knowledgeable human agents' without their discursive knowledge (1984: 17). These historical discursive structures constitute part of the unacknowledged conditions of their actions and the unintended consequences of their actions on others. In this way, the discursive structure is reproduced over time and space by the situated social practices of actors, becoming deeply embedded in the institutions of the social system.

As such, Giddens's theory is useful in explaining how a discursive structure like the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency could be reproduced over time in Ireland through the discursive consciousness of the Irish political elite. Specifically, this reproduction could occur through the mostly unintentional discursive practises of generations of the Irish political elite, shaping the structure of an actor's discourse yet not determining the content of that discourse, or how the actor specifically talks about Ireland's loose integrations. The specific content of the discourse would in Weberian terms reflect individual or collective cultural interpretations of the integration processes experienced by members of the elite, shaped by the discursive structure of the cultural category of autonomy and dependence.

More specifically, we can trace this Irish cultural logic of autonomy and dependency to the structure of Irish nationalists' discourse under British colonial rule in Ireland until 1922; through the discourse of the dependency culture in the residual version up to 1958; and into the dominant version's discourses about the European Union and globalisation in the contemporary period. In the first period, the discursive cultural structure emerges from the Irish nationalist desire for autonomy from and fear of dependency on Britain and is articulated in the nationalist elite's discursive interpretation of Ireland's British integration (see Chapter Nine). In the second period, Ireland's political independence from Britain is accompanied by its continued economic and socio-cultural dependence on Britain. This results in the overemphasis of the category of autonomy in the discourse of the residual

version, as compensation for the Ireland's continued but less extensive dependence on Britain. In the contemporary period, Ireland has become even less integrated into Britain while becoming increasingly integrated into the EU and the global economy and culture. This results in a discourse that admits Ireland's relative economic dependence on the Europe, but fears that the country is becoming too dependent on the EU. In compensation, the dominant version's discourse overemphasises Ireland's cultural autonomy from the EU and an Anglo-American global culture.

Over the three periods, Britain's material significance to Ireland in terms of the country's multiple integrations has significantly loosened while its symbolic significance has remained 'tight'. In particular, the Irish cultural logic of autonomy and dependency interprets all of Ireland's integrations as potential colonisers of the country based on a British model of Ireland's full integration into the United Kingdom. Ireland's European and global integrations are symbolically interpreted through the autonomy/dependency interpretive scheme, with certain levels and types of integration being interpreted as dependency, triggering a reassertion of Irish autonomy. In this way, the long shadow of Ireland's colonial relationship with Britain continues to shape the discourse of the contemporary Irish political elite's attitudes towards the EU and globalisation, even as Ireland becomes increasingly less dependent on and more autonomous from Britain.

The reproduction of this discursive cultural structure among the generations of the Irish political elite could occur in a wide range of discursive social settings (Van Dijk 1997), reflecting the mostly unintentional socialisation processes of becoming 'Irish'. These settings include those which are face-to-face, private, and interactive involving homes, pubs, restaurants, committee meetings, reading the newspaper, watching television news, listening to the radio and learning in Irish 'national' schools (see Chapter Five). Thus, the reproduction of the cultural logic among the Irish political elite may reflect a broader national process of socialising members of the Irish population into 'their' national identity. As such, the cultural logic may be a real 'cultural survival' (Evans 1988) of British rule in Ireland, not the dominant version's strong culture. Yet even this 'cultural survival' could disappear if it is not reproduced by the discursive practises of the Irish political elite and the Irish people.

CHAPTER 8

TOWARDS A DISCOURSE OF IRISH INTERDEPENDENCE: A TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE IRISH POLITICAL ELITE'S DISCURSIVE VERSIONS

8.1 Introduction

This chapter applies a theory of loose multiple integrations at the 'structural' level of Irish society. In particular, the chapter compares the Irish political elite's cultural logic expressed in the discursive versions to the results of a basic transactional analysis (Puchala in Lindberg and Scheingold 1971) of Ireland's multiple integrations and identities. This transactional analysis is used a method to measure loose multiple integration processes. The comparison draws on empirical evidence to measure the comparative significance of Ireland's British, European and global integrations and identities along the multiple dimensions of the Irish economy, polity, society and culture. Following Puchala, the transactional analysis uses international, European regional, Irish governmental, academic and periodical sources to outline the 'directions' and 'intensities' (ibid) of Ireland's multiple integrations and identities in multi-dimensional terms. The main goal is to critically examine the historical, comparative and empirical basis for the application of the Irish political elite's cultural logic of autonomy and dependence underlying the discursive versions to explain Ireland's multiple integrations and identities.

The chapter argues that the continuing structural influence of the Irish cultural logic of autonomy and dependency in the Irish political elite's dominant version results in a number of beliefs about Ireland's multiple integrations and identities which are not fully supported by the available evidence presented in the transactional analysis. Most significantly, the evidence does not support the Irish political elite's primary emphasis on Ireland's European integration to the neglect of the country's British and global integrations. Further, the evidence does not fully support the Irish political elite's strong culture core/surface construct of Irish national identity. Instead, the evidence suggests that contemporary Irish culture is better understood with respect to cultural hybridity and that Irish national identity is better explained in terms of a core Irishness within a multiple identities construct.

The transactional analysis of the empirical evidence reveals a complex interdependence between Ireland's British, European and global integrations. In economic terms, the evidence suggests that Ireland's earlier British dependency has been replaced by an 'interdependent development' on British trade, EU funds and the European market as well global TNCs particularly from the United States. At the socio-cultural level, the analysis indicates that Ireland remains more integrated into Britain and to an Anglo-American, English speaking global culture than to a multi-lingual, culturally diverse European Union. Politically, Ireland is more directly integrated into European institutions through the country's membership of the EU than into either British or transnational political institutions, especially with respect to Irish input into European level decisions and the direct effect of European decision-making in Ireland.

The results of the transactional analysis raise doubts about the usefulness of the Irish political elite's dominant version, structured by the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency, to fully explain Ireland's contemporary multiple integrations and identities. Instead, the Irish political elite's dominant version does not accurately reflect the available empirical evidence on Ireland's multiple integrations and identities. This misinterpretation is reflected in the differences between the beliefs expressed in the dominant version and the evidence from the transactional analysis. It is argued that these differences are largely due to the continuing structural influence of the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency in shaping the Irish political elite's attitudes towards Ireland's multiple integrations and identities.

8.2 The Limits of British De-integration and De-identification

Let us first examine some of the empirical evidence of Ireland's British interrelationship, beginning with the continuing influence of British culture and society in Ireland. With respect to the media and popular culture, Ireland remains deeply penetrated by British newspapers, magazines, literature, radio, popular music, television, film and sports. For example, British newspapers in 1996 averaged almost twenty five per cent of daily sales during the week and about thirty three per cent of sales on Sunday (Irish Times Feb. 19 1997). As for tourism, Irish Tourist Board and Central Statistics Office figures from the

mid-1960s to the mid-1990s show that British tourists to Ireland, which includes the Irish living in Britain, have significantly outnumbered all other category of tourists to the Republic and that Irish tourists to Britain greatly outnumber those visiting either continental European countries or North America (Irish Tourist Board report for the year ending March 31, 1966; Irish Tourist Board Trends in Tourism 1980 to 1988; CSO Statistical Abstract 1998). Thus, CSO figures from 1994 show that 56.7% of tourists to Ireland arrived from Britain while 26.3% came from other European countries and 12.9% originated in the USA or Canada (CSO Statistical Abstract 1998). Further, the 1994 figures indicate that 68.5% of the total number of Irish tourists visited Britain, 24.9% went to other European countries and only 6.6% of the total left for North America (ibid).

Britain has also been the first choice for Irish emigrants since the 1930s, reversing the flow to the United States since the famine in 1845-49 (NESC 1991). By the 1970s, Britain received eighty five per cent of the gross outflow of Irish emigrants, which dropped to roughly sixty per cent in the early 1980s before rising to around seventy per cent again by the late 1980s (ibid). One result of this pattern of migration is that 850,000 Irish born citizens reside in Britain (Irish Times Feb. 25 1997), or 1.5 million Irish if one includes the second generation Irish in Britain (Irish Times June 11 1994). In percentage terms, the first figure represents over 23 per cent or almost one quarter of the roughly 3.6 million population of the Republic of Ireland.

Further, the Irish in Britain have been treated as virtual citizens by the British government since Irish independence in 1922, with Irish immigrants to Great Britain retaining complete access to British rights with respect to travel, immigration, work, residence, citizenship, voting and social welfare benefits. The British government has also not applied the country's increasingly restrictive immigration laws of 1962, 1971 and 1981 (Smith and Blanc in Martiniello 1995) to the Irish from the Republic, who live in a non-Commonwealth nation-state, in spite of the laws' application to Commonwealth countries, especially to the 'black' member states of the new Commonwealth (ibid). The Irish also enjoy greater rights in Britain compared to citizens of the European Union from the other member states, particularly in terms of voting in British national elections.

Politically, however, the situation is quite different. As a sovereign nation-state, the Republic of Ireland is politically separate from Britain, although Irish political and legal institutions derive from and retain much of their original British character (Chubb 1992). Historically, Ireland's formal political separation from Britain begins with the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921, and continues through the creation of the Free State within the British Commonwealth in 1922, membership of the League of Nations in 1932, unilateral revision of the Constitution in 1937, the country's neutrality during the second world war, declaration of a Republic and cessation of British Commonwealth membership in 1949, participation in the United Nations from 1955 and accession to the EEC in 1973. More recently, the 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement and the 1998 'Good Friday' agreement suggest the development of a new more equal political relationship between the Irish and British governments over the issue of Northern Ireland. The inter-governmental institutions created by these agreements also indicate a certain level of Irish political reintegration into Britain because of Northern Ireland, albeit based on Irish sovereignty and independence.

Economically, Ireland's separation has been substantial since the late 1950s, although on balance the Republic remains partially integrated into the British economy. With respect to trade flows, Irish exports to Britain have declined from 89 per cent of the total in 1955 to 22 per cent in 1996, while British imports to Ireland have fallen from over 52 per cent of the total in 1955 to almost 32 per cent in 1996 (CSO Statistical Abstract 1998; Haughton in O'Hagan 1995; and O'Donnell in Keatinge 1991). Despite the large decline in Irish exports to Britain, traditional Irish domestic industry remains heavily dependent on the British market for exports (Government of Ireland 1992). Further, one can argue that the Irish labour market has been virtually coterminous with the British labour market to the extent that Irish emigration to Britain tends to be directly related to the differences in wage levels and job prospects between the two countries (NESC 1991).

In monetary terms, the Irish currency had been fixed at parity to the British pound from 1826 to 1979 until the Irish punt was floated separately within the European Monetary System (O'Donnell in Keatinge 1991). Further, the Irish pound became one of the eleven EU currencies to join the European single currency in 1999 while British sterling was one of the four EU currencies which did not participate in the project. Nonetheless, Irish

domestic industry's trade dependence on the British market meant that, prior to Ireland's entry into the European single currency in 1999, the Irish Central Bank had to carefully monitor and react to British monetary policy and fluctuations in sterling (ibid). On the other hand, British multinationals' share of foreign direct investment in Irish industrial employment has declined from over fourteen per cent of the total in 1973 to almost six per cent in 1994, reflecting a tripling in American and non-European as well as a doubling in German multinationals' investments in Ireland (O'Sullivan in O'Hagan 1995).

Overall, this transactional analysis of the Irish-British relationship suggests that the empirical reality is much more complex than the dominant version's de-emphasis of Ireland's British integration and Britishness. More specifically, the transactional analysis reveals contemporary Ireland's substantial socio-cultural integration into British culture and society, a lessened but still significant integration into the British economy and the Republic's political independence from Britain. On the other hand, the dominant version's de-emphasis of Ireland's British relationship is more accurate from an historical perspective. Thus, Ireland has been experiencing a gradual process of de-integration from Britain since independence, compared to the country's complete integration into the United Kingdom through the Act of Union from 1801 to 1921. Further, Irish de-identification with Britishness began prior to independence in the cultural nationalist movement of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, specifically with the construction by the Irish nationalist elite at the time of a 'traditional' Irish identity defined explicitly against an imperial version of Britishness (Hutchinson 1987).

Ideologically, this desire for and belief in the processes of de-integration and de-identification can be traced historically to the 'traditional' Irish nationalism which emerged in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Thus, even in the period of Ireland's full integration into Britain, the Irish nationalist elite could turn to an ideology which stressed processes of Ireland's de-integration from Britain and Irish de-identification with Britishness. This suggests that the contemporary Irish political elite continues to draw on this part of the nationalist ideology, adapting it to Ireland's contemporary relationship with Britain, but, in so doing, overemphasising the extent of Irish de-integration and de-identification. As such, while the Irish political elite is historically accurate in highlighting

Ireland's relative de-integration and de-identification processes, by drawing on the Irish nationalist model, they are at the same time inaccurate in their assessment of Ireland's contemporary British integration and the British influence on Irishness. Of particular importance in this regard is the disjunction between the significant British socio-cultural influence in Ireland and on the Irish in Britain and the Irish political elite's de-identification with Irish Britishness. The extent of the political elite's de-identification with Britishness in the face of substantial evidence to the contrary is a marked indicator of the continuing relevance of the both the nationalist ideology in contemporary Ireland and the structural effects of the Irish cultural logic of dependency expressed in the dominant version.

8.3 Over-Emphasizing European Integration and Identity

The Irish political elite's belief that Ireland is moving away from Britain towards Europe is almost a truism within Irish social sciences and, to a lesser extent, in the arts and humanities. In the field of history, Lee argues that Irish elite should model its policies on other small European states instead of inappropriate British models (1989). Within economics, O'Hagan simply announces as a given that Ireland is a small, European state whose economy will be analysed within this context (O'Hagan in O'Hagan 1995). In politics, Chubb stresses Ireland's strong British connection while stating that, 'The addition of a continental European dimension to Irish life had its converse in a waning of the British influence' (1992: 27). Within sociology and social studies, Breen et al claim that Ireland's, 'Membership of the European Community (EC) solidified an economic, as well as cultural, re-orientation away from Britain' (1990: 5). Further, Kearney (1988) argues from the arts and humanities that Ireland can overcome its obsessive struggle with Britain by, 'entering into a new relationship with Europe which may enable us...to redefine our cultural identity positively rather than negatively' (p22). Thus, Irish academia to a large extent reinforces the Irish political elite's claim, expressed in the dominant version, that Ireland is increasingly moving towards Europe and away from Britain.

In support of this viewpoint, there is substantial evidence to show that Ireland has become more integrated into Europe particularly with respect to economics and politics. In terms of trade flows, Irish exports to continental EU countries rose from over four per cent in

1955 to almost forty eight per cent in 1994, while continental EU imports to Ireland almost doubled from over twelve per cent in 1955 to over twenty five per cent in 1994 (CSO Statistical Abstract 1998; Haughton in O'Hagan 1995; and O'Donnell in Keatinge 1991). Further, EU transfers to Ireland in the late 1980s and early 1990s averaged about five to eight percent of Ireland's GNP or around ten percent of GNP if 'trade gains paid for by EU consumers' are added to the total (Matthews 1994: 31-32). One result is that the Ireland received by far the most transfers per capita than any other EU member state through 1994 (ibid).

With respect to politics, Ireland is politically integrated into the European Union to the same extent as the other member states in terms of representation in the EU institutions, participation in EU decision-making and the applicability of EU legislation as well as court decisions within the member states. Legally, the supremacy of EU law in the Republic and its direct effect and applicability in Ireland has led Irish political scientists to suggest that the Republic now has an 'external constitution' (Keatinge and Laffan 1992 in Coakley and Gallagher 1992) or, more strongly, 'two constitutions' (Chubb 1992). Further, Ireland's political integration into the EU has been popularly ratified through referenda on accession in 1972, the Single European Act in 1986, the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.

In terms of society and culture, though, Ireland is less integrated into Europe than into Britain. To gauge Ireland's socio-cultural integration, we will consider evidence with respect to tourism, migration and language learning. In terms of tourism, the CSO figures discussed above for 1994 show that over twice as many 'British' tourists travelled to Ireland as tourists from continental Europe. However, this proportion represents a significant reduction from mid-1960s when over nine times the number of British compared to European tourists arrived in Ireland (Irish Tourist Board 1966).

With respect to Irish migration, a EU study in 1994 suggested that twelve percent of Irish citizens lived in other EU member states, compared to eight per cent for Portugal, and roughly four per cent for Luxembourg and Greece, the third and fourth countries in the table (Irish Times Nov. 23 1996). This figure, though, includes the 850,000 Irish citizens

living in Britain, and also seems to seriously undercount the percentage of Irish born people living in Britain (approximately eighteen percent of the total). A more accurate NESC study of Irish migration shows that the percentage of Irish migrants in the 'other overseas' category, which includes continental Europe, averaged eighteen per cent over the period from 1981-1990, while the American percentage reached fourteen per cent, corresponding to the decline in the percentage of Irish emigrants to Britain from eighty five per cent in the 1970s to sixty eight per cent in the 1980s (NESC 1991). In this case, there is some evidence to suggest that the proportion of Irish migrants living in continental EU countries increased during the 1980s, although the figure of eighteen per cent includes migration to non-European countries such as Australia and Canada as well to regions such as Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.

With regard to language learning, a 1990 Eurobarometer survey of young Europeans from the ages of 15 to 24 shows that, in terms of languages learned, the young Irish averaged less than one (0.9) foreign language, which ranked the Irish next to last just ahead of young former East Germans (0.7) and just below young Greeks (1.1) (pp73, 78, 87). In the category of languages spoken, however, the young Irish tied for last place with the former young East Germans (0.4), who mostly learned and spoke English while the young Irish primarily learned and spoke French (ibid). Within Europe, then, the Irish are well below average in language learning with respect to the adolescents and young adults - the social groups whose members are more likely on aggregate to speak continental European languages.

Further, a 1999 Eurobarometer extends this result to the Irish population as whole, showing that only 31 per cent of Irish people 'can take part in a conversation in a foreign language' compared to 98 per cent in Luxembourg, 83 per cent in The Netherlands and 50 per cent in Germany (Irish Times April 5 1999). In this case, the Irish figure is the second lowest among the fifteen member states with only the British percentage at 21 per cent being lower (ibid). The main difference between the EU countries in both of these examples appears to be that all of the native non-English speaking countries teach English to their young first, except for Luxembourg and Portugal where English is a close second to French (ibid). This reflects the relative dominance of the English language in the

contemporary global economy and culture, and hence the comparative reluctance of Anglophone countries such as Ireland to teach other languages at the elementary, secondary and tertiary levels of the educational system.

On the whole, the transactional analysis of Ireland's relationship with the European Union indicates that the dominant version overstates the extent of Ireland's contemporary European integration and European identification, especially with respect to the level of Irish socio-cultural integration into Europe. On the other hand, there is political and economic evidence to support a longer-term perspective that in general Ireland has been moving towards Europe and away from Britain, particularly since the Republic's accession to the European Union. Yet, even the economic evidence of the increased trade with the EU and the high per capita flow of EU funds to Ireland do not lessen the importance of British trade for the Irish economy, especially for indigenous industry. When comparing Ireland's contemporary British and European integrations, then, the dominant version's belief in a move towards Europe away from Britain seems less significant than the Republic's interdependence on both Britain and the EU, with Irish socio-cultural integration into Britain and political integration into the EU joined to an economic integration into Britain as well as the European Union.

As we have seen, though, the Irish political elite's focus on Ireland's European integration in the dominant version is not without reservations, particularly with respect to fears about future EU enlargement into Eastern Europe, institutional reforms and changes in the EU budget. Thus, as expressed in the dominant version, the Irish political elite is concerned about maintaining Ireland's institutional position in the EU with regard to decision-making and transfers. As a small peripheral, island state with a small population and little power in Europe, the Irish political elite is very protective of its influence within EU institutions like the European Council, Council of Ministers and the European Commission in which relative equality between the states is practised in decision-making.

As such, proposed EU institutional reforms to deepen and widen the EU by diluting the institutional power of small states and increasing the power of the popularly elected European Parliament are often perceived as direct threats to Ireland's disproportionate

political influence in the EU (Irish Times Oct. 26 1996). Similarly, Ireland's high proportion of EU transfers and access to the European market seem threatened by the inclusion of Eastern European countries whose geographical location, greater need for EU transfers and comparative market advantages may pull industry, capital and labour out of Ireland. However, this particular fear is less relevant in the late 1990s in light of Ireland's rapid economic development which has increased the country's GNP per capita to over ninety percent of the EU average. This rapid economic development has disqualified most of Ireland from full 'Objective 1' status for the next round of structural and cohesion funds after 1999 (Irish Times Nov. 7 1996; Dec. 7 1996), thereby removing part of the future threat of competition with Eastern European countries for EU funds. Nonetheless, the Irish political elite's fear of losing European markets, in particular foreign TNCs, to lower cost Eastern European competition remains relevant concerns following EU expansion early in the next century.

Whatever the empirical merit of these fears, one can draw an analogy between the Irish political elite's fears about an enlarged and reformed EU and those expressed in the residual version about Ireland's prior dependence on Britain. More specifically, the Irish political elite's fear of new European dependency in the dominant version can be traced back to the recognition of, and the desire to end, the country's earlier dependence on Britain expressed in the residual version. The root of the fear, then, is not simply about becoming marginalized within the EU, but in replacing the older British with a newer European dependency. In turn, this fear of a new European dependency may help to explain the Irish political elite's divided European identification with its mixture of a surface Europeanness and a strong Irish core culture resistant to Europeanisation. Thus, the spectre of an Irish dependency on Europe analogous to the previous dependency on Britain may result in a cultural reaction among the Irish political elite against European cultural integration. This cultural reaction against Europeanisation is minimised, however, compared to Irish de-identification with Britishness, perhaps reflecting the material benefits of Ireland's European integration, the limited extent of contemporary European integration as well as relative control of members states over the European integration process.

The main transactional difference between Ireland's contemporary British and European integrations is that the Irish government has no direct control over British policy making which affects Ireland, while the EU provides the Irish elite relatively equal access to political institutions which craft common policies applicable to all member states. For the Irish political elite, Europe, unlike Britain, symbolises Ireland's autonomy in terms of its political equality as a EU nation-state. Further, the Irish political elite associates the European Union with the Republic's successful economic development, particularly in the post-1987 period. In these ways, Europe expresses the Irish political elite's image of Ireland as a autonomous, developed, modernised nation-state within Europe, as opposed to a former British colony, a post-colonial developing county, or a TNC export platform. Thus, the Irish political elite chooses to focus on Ireland's move towards Europe, despite the reality of the country's interdependent integrations and the political elite's lack of European identity, precisely because Europe allows the political elite to construct a more positive Irish national identity given the range of alternative images of Ireland's relative dependence.

At the same time, Irish culture must be protected from the possibility that the European integration process will extend too deeply into Irish society producing reminders of Ireland's colonial integration into Britain. The Irish political elite neutralises this potential European threat by invoking an autonomous form of Irish cultural nationalism which restricts European identity to a surface identification stretched over the top of a protected core Irishness. Overall, the Irish political elite chooses European integration and a European identity over the 'other' integrations and identities on offer. However, the political elite's protects 'Ireland' from its choice of Ireland's European integration by also choosing to ideologically limit the European integration process on Irish society through a modified use of 'traditional' cultural nationalism.

8.4 De-emphasising Ireland's Global Integration And Identity

Ireland's membership of the global political community as an independent state began with the country's membership of the League of Nations in 1923 and election to the Presidency of the Council of the League in 1930; continued with Ireland's post-war participation in the OEEC from 1947 (the OECD after 1962) and the Marshall Plan from

1947 to 1952; and achieved its fruition with respect to political sovereignty with the Free State's declaration of a Republic and resignation from the Commonwealth in 1949, followed by the Republic's membership in the United Nations from 1955 after the removal of the Soviet veto (Keogh 1990; Lee 1989; Raymond in Drudy 1985).

The important point is that earlier cohorts of the Irish political elite - in particular during the De Valera era from 1932 to 1958 - used Ireland's global political integration to emphasise Ireland's autonomous 'place among the nations' as a equal and sovereign nation-state (Keatinge 1978). In particular, Irish governments' developed an independent foreign policy which stressed Ireland's non-aligned status, neutrality and Irish spiritual values with respect to the European empires and later with regard to the American and Soviet superpowers (ibid; Moynihan 1980: 233). In this way, the earlier cohorts of the Irish political elite attempted to move away from Ireland's British colonial past and post-colonial dependency by developing a global construct of Irishness which focused on Ireland's independent political and cultural contributions to the world. This is not to say, however, that specific Irish policies such as neutrality during the Second World War were fully accepted by other countries, particularly the American, British and Soviet allies (see Raymond in Drudy 1985).

To an extent, then, successive cohorts of Ireland's political elite could draw on the country's autonomous global political integration as a model of Irish political independence and sovereignty with regard to issues such as the Anglo-Irish agreement in 1985, Irish participation in UN peace-keeping forces from 1964 as well as Irish membership in the European Union. In this sense, Ireland's global political integration serves as a positive political model which can be used by members of the Irish political elite to stress the global political acknowledgment of Irish independence, sovereignty and cultural values.

While in global political terms, the Irish political elite has developed a policy of non-alignment, Ireland's global cultural integration has been significantly influenced by Irish participation in a largely Anglo-American, English language based global popular culture. As a predominantly English speaking society with a large diaspora in both Britain and the

US, Ireland has benefitted from the spread of the English language through the British empire and in the post-war era by the United State's position as a global superpower. This has meant the products of Irish cultural activity tend to be over-represented in the global culture, given the small size of Ireland's population. Nonetheless, Irish success in particular forms of globalised high and popular culture is fairly remarkable such as Ireland's four Nobel prize winners for literature this century, the popularity of Irish pop/rock musicians such as Van Morrison, U2, Sinead O'Connor, The Cranberries and The Corrs, film makers like Neil Jordan and Jim Sheridan and actors such as Richard Harris, Liam Neeson and Pierce Brosnan among others. There is also the successful exports of a hybridised mixture of folk and popular culture in the music of Enya and the theatre production of Riverdance as well as the hybrid mix of 'traditional' with mass consumer culture in the franchising of Irish pubs abroad.

On the other hand, Irish culture and society has been greatly influenced by the cultural products of the same English language based, Anglo-American global culture. The evidence for British socio-cultural influence have already been discussed, along with the numbers of American tourists arriving in Ireland and the percentage of Irish people still migrating to the US. As such, the American influence is also profound, based in part on the almost forty million Americans who claim Irish descent, the broad range of American consumer products in Ireland and, not least, the impact of contemporary American popular culture in Ireland through cultural products such as television, journals, books, music and films. To use one particularly striking example - American films accounted for 91% of Irish audiences in 1993 (Irish Times Oct. 16 1993).

The accumulated evidence suggests that, in socio-cultural terms, Ireland remains most integrated into Britain. However, if British culture is viewed as part of a broader Anglo-American global culture, then Ireland is well integrated both as a participant and recipient into this global culture. Further, Ireland is more integrated into either the British or the global culture than into the emerging European common culture based largely on the European Union. Finally, American culture, separate from its part in the English speaking global culture, forms an important independent influence on Irish culture and society, arguably even more so at the present time than the developing European common culture.

This American influence is even more evident in Ireland's global economic integration, raising once again the issue of dependency. Ireland's integration into the global economy is often dated from government's 1958 adoption of an export led industrialisation policy based on foreign direct investment by transnational firms (Jacobsen 1994). The Republic's reliance on overseas firms to fuel Ireland's economic development since the late 1950's has led to many discussions of the Republic's dependence on transnational companies (Wickham in Holl 1983; Jacobsen 1994; O'Hearn in Clancy 1995), particularly American high tech TNCs in the post-1987 period (O'Hearn in Crowley and MacLaughlin 1997). The evidence to support this claim is fairly overwhelming, although one must bear in mind that Ireland's global economic dependency is perhaps more accurately described as one of 'interdependent development' on Britain, the TNCs and Europe.

Some recent statistics show the extent of Ireland's industrial dependence on its 'overseas firms'. By 1994, the share of total industrial employment by TNCs in Ireland was 44 per cent (O'Sullivan in O'Hagan 1995). Of this forty four percent, American firms employed 23.2 per cent, UK companies 5.8 per cent, German enterprises 4.7 per cent, other European firms 6.9 per cent, and other non-European companies 3.4 per cent (ibid), which indicates the globalisation of Ireland's industrial economy. More strikingly, overseas firms accounted for roughly 75 per cent of gross Irish exports in 1987, and over 86 per cent of Irish exports to continental EU countries, while non-EC firms exported almost 94 per cent of their output in the same year (ibid). This last figure is a clear indicator of the fact that American and non-EU overseas firms invest in the Republic largely because Ireland provides the TNCs with access to the European market (McAleese in Drudy 1985).

More starkly, overseas firms accounted for more than 80 per cent of manufacturing investment in the 1990s (O'Hearn in Crowley and MacLaughlin 1998) and represent almost all of Ireland's high tech manufacturing industry as well as a large proportion of the country's high value added service sector jobs (O'Sullivan in O'Hagan 1995). On the other hand, domestic industry is dominated by the production of food exports and low tech, low value added industrial goods principally for the British market (ibid). The result is a dual Irish industrial structure in which, 'a modern sector with high productivity which

is for the most part foreign owned coexists with a traditional indigenous sector characterised by low productivity that has been in decline since the 1970s' (p. 370).

Further, O'Hearn shows that American TNCs have become dominant in manufacturing in Ireland, accounting for 75 per cent of manufacturing investment and a full 40 per cent of Irish economic growth in the period from 1990 to 1996 (in Crowley and MacLaughlin 1998). This American dominance is particularly clear in the rapidly expanding, high tech sectors of computers, chemicals and electrical engineering, 'who use Ireland as a low-tax and low-cost staging point to get their goods onto the continental market' (pp. 24-5). This evidence leads O'Hearn to conclude that, 'It is barely and exaggeration, then, to say that the difference between Ireland being a 'tiger economy' and just another average European economy boils down to a few US corporations in computers and pharmaceuticals' (p. 25).

These figures clearly show Ireland's economic dependence on overseas firms for the country's economic development, especially on high tech American TNC's in the 1990s. Yet when compared to the economic evidence for Ireland's British and European integrations, the overall figures also confirm Ireland's multiple economic dependencies on Britain, Europe and the global economy. Specifically, Ireland's interdependent development means that Irish agriculture is dependent on EU funds, Irish traditional industry is dependent on the British market, while the industrial and post-industrial sectors are dependent on primarily American foreign transnational firms exporting to the European market.

Nonetheless, the extent of Ireland's global economic dependence on American firms for the country's economic development in the post-1987 period is frankly striking, undermining the idea of a Celtic Tiger, which might be more aptly called the American Tiger in Ireland. Given the Irish political elite's fear of dependency, it is perhaps not surprising that the Irish political elite in the dominant version downplays the Republic's global economic integration, stressing that Ireland has no options outside Europe, as opposed to the more accurate assessment that Ireland at present has few options outside of attracting high tech American firms to Ireland who want to export to the European market. Interestingly, even the post-1987 reconstructed Irish economic nationalism discussed in

the SIPTU chapter does not fully account for the significance of American high tech firms in Ireland's recent economic success, emphasising instead the importance of European models of neo-corporatism and social partnership in the national agreements.

Further, the Irish political elite in the dominant version de-emphasises the importance of Ireland's global integration as a whole in favour of the Republic's European integration. As such, the members of the contemporary Irish political elite also neglect the role of Ireland's global political integration in providing a political model for Irish independence, sovereignty and cultural values on a world stage as well as the influences of the Anglo-American global culture on Irish society. The dominant version does emphasise, though, the influence of autonomous Irish cultural products in the English speaking global culture, but in the context of the strong culture thesis in which the core strength of Irish culture is manifested in the export of Irish culture to the world through a variety of cultural products.

In this case, the Irish political elite's emphasis on the influence of the strong Irish culture in the global culture appears to compensate for both Ireland's global economic dependency on American overseas firms and the extent of Anglo-American global cultural influence on Irish society. Once again, the operative factor seems to be the Irish political elite's fear of dependency, harking back to the earlier British dependency expressed in the residual version and the difficult questions that the recognition of dependency raises for Irish nationalism. In order to avoid addressing this new American based global dependence, the Irish political elite instead invokes an autonomous Irish cultural nationalism, emphasising the Irish strong culture capable of being exported abroad. Further, this strong culture preserves the core components of Irishness at home while keeping external global cultural influences on the surface of Irish identity.

The cultural reaction is thus similar to the Irish political elite's response to the potential fear of a European dependency, although the extent of the reaction is much more intense with regard to Ireland's global integration. The difference in the reaction may be Ireland's greater current economic dependence on American firms and meaning of the inter-relationship between British and American culture in the English speaking global culture. With respect to the latter, the significant point may be the negative association of

American cultural components in the global culture with the British socio-cultural influence in Ireland. Another relevant point might be that the English speaking global culture is much more 'real' and therefore more of a threat to Irish society than is the European common culture which is more of a 'fiction' at the moment than a coherent cultural system practised by large social groups. A further impetus may be that the Irish political elite has no direct political input into the decisions of foreign TNCs in Ireland, whether or not these firms are American. This highlights once again the similarity between Ireland's British and global integrations as opposed to the country's European integration in which the Irish political elite participates in EU decisions which affect Ireland.

Overall, the Irish political elite's de-emphasis of Ireland's global integration appears directly related to the fear of dependency raised by the extent of Ireland's economic dependence on American high tech TNC's in Ireland and, to a lesser extent, by the influence of an English speaking, Anglo-American global culture on Irish society. From this perspective, if Ireland's European integration represents to the Irish political elite the Republic's autonomous political equality as a sovereign nation-state and the country's desired status a member of the developed world, the Republic's global integration appears to symbolise Ireland as a TNC export-platform and an Anglo-American cultural appendage. The Irish political elite's invocation of a strong Irish culture and its focus only on Irish cultural influences in the global culture appear to function as a form of compensation, over-emphasing Irish autonomous cultural nationalism instead of addressing Ireland's interdependent development linking the country's British, European and global integrations with respect to the Irish economy, polity, society and culture.

8.5 Conclusion

The transactional analysis of the Irish political elite's discursive versions shows the relevance of examining the Irish case in terms of multiple integrations identities along multiple dimensions. The relevance of the analysis arises from the direct comparisons of a number of 'loose' simultaneous processes of integration across the political, economic and socio-cultural levels of Irish society. Overall, Ireland's interdependence is clearly shown in the country's overlapping British, European and global American economic integrations,

political integration into the European Union and the predominant Anglo-American socio-cultural integrations.

Second, the relevance is shown by the significant differences revealed in the comparison of the 'actors' perspective' of the Irish political elite with the evidence for Ireland's integrations and identities. The main differences are that the Irish political elite's dominant version over-emphasises Ireland's European integration and identity, overstates the country's British de-integration and de-identification, and de-emphasises the Republic's global integration and identity. To explain these differences in the contemporary Irish case requires a broader historical perspective on Ireland's integrations and identities. As discussed in the previous chapter, this perspective involves applying the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency, rooted in the Irish-British colonial relationship, to account for the differences in content between the Irish political elite's discursive versions and the transactional analysis. The application also highlights the political elite's over-reliance on a 'dependence-independence' cultural logic instead of an 'interdependence' logic emphasised by the transactional analysis of Ireland's multiple integrations and identities. This focus on Irish interdependence instead of dependence situates Ireland within the framework suggested by Holton (1998) in which the issue of balancing economic, political and socio-cultural independence within increasing regional and global interdependence is one confronted by all nation-states.

Third, the relevance is shown with respect to the transactional evidence for the socio-cultural interdependence, or 'hybridity' of contemporary Irish culture, and for a 'multiple identities' construct of Irishness. As discussed in the theory chapter, the concept of hybridity is understood in terms of Pieterse's 'continuum of hybridities' including a range of hybrid cultural forms from assimilation to destabilisation (in Featherstone et al 1995: 56-7). In Irish historical terms, cultural hybridity would include Irish mimics of British culture, nationalists who dichotomise Irishness from Britishness as well as those who attempt to 'destabilise' the dominant Irish-British cultural relationship. In the contemporary period, the transactional analysis indicates that the hybridity of Irish culture is most apparent in relation to Irish-British cultural interpenetration; and, in wider sense, to a global Anglo-American cultural interaction with Irish culture. However, the hybridity of

an Irish-European culture is limited by the lack of a real distinctive 'European culture'. In this case, the evidence for the hybridity of contemporary Irish culture contradicts the Irish political elite's focus on a strong core Irish culture that is 'pure' or not influenced by any external cultures.

The evidence for the hybridity of contemporary Irish culture supports a construct of Irishness based on 'multiple identities', incorporating Ireland's internal diversity and external influences, instead of the core/surface identity construct favoured by the Irish political elite in the dominant version. The notion of multiple identities draws on Hall's notion that each individual incorporates 'multiple social identities' in any society (in King 1991: 57). This suggests a contemporary construct of Irishness that includes, for example, rural and urban dwellers as well as Protestants, Catholics and secular liberals. It also draws on theories of European integration which argue that individuals adopt multiple loyalties to, or share identities between, local, national, European and global levels (Garcia 1993; Hewstone 1986; Wilson and Smith 1994). In Ireland, the analysis suggests a multiple identities construct of Irishness which includes British, European and global American identities alongside local and national ones. This argument for Irish cultural hybridity and a multiple identities construct of Irishness will be more fully developed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER NINE

THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF IRISH NATIONALISM: THE ROOTS OF THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF AUTONOMY AND DEPENDENCY

9.1 Introduction

This chapter examines changes in Ireland's national integration process from the 1870s to the millennium, focusing on the construction and reconstruction of Irish nationalism and identity in three periods: 1870-1921; 1922-1957; and the post-1958 contemporary era. The goal is to identify the roots of the Irish political elite's cultural logic of autonomy and dependency in the construction of 'traditional' Irish nationalism and identity, and to trace the continuing significance of this cultural logic in the reconstruction of nationalism and identity in the contemporary period. This is intended to provide historical and contemporary evidence to support the claim that the cultural logic is a deeply embedded discursive structure in Irish nationalism and identity, reproduced by the social practices of generations of the Irish political elite, if not by the actions of the Irish population (see Chapter Seven).

With respect to Ireland's multiple integrations, the discussion shows the dominant structural and symbolic influence of Ireland's British integration in Irish nationalism and identity, and on the reproduction of the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency. In the first period, Britain was politically, economically and socio-culturally dominant in structural and symbolic terms. In the second period, Britain's direct political dominance ended while its economic, socio-cultural and symbolic significance remained. In the third period, Britain's economic dominance has ended, and while its socio-cultural influence is no longer as dominant, its symbolic dominance continues to structure Irish interpretations of the country's multiple integration processes through the cultural logic. Overall, Britain's symbolic influence on the cultural logic continues even as its structural influence on Ireland has gradually declined.

In terms of a theory of loose multiple integrations, this suggests that one integration process may dominate other processes structurally and symbolically in the interpretations of actors in national societies. It also suggests that symbolic dominance is separable and

may have effects independent from structural dominance. These forms of dominance are more likely under certain conditions such as long-term relationships between geographically proximate countries, large states and small ones, and countries that have been under imperial rule, colonised or occupied and those that have been the imperial power, coloniser or occupier. Under these conditions, it is more likely that national actors will use nationalism to interpret this dominant relationship, applying the interpretation to their country's multiple integrations. It is also more likely that the discursive structure of these interpretations will reflect 'the structures of domination built into social institutions' involving 'regularized relations of autonomy and dependence' (Giddens 1984: 16).

9.2 Internal Diversity and External Influences: 1870-1921

The construction of 'traditional' Irish nationalism and identity from the 1870s to independence resulted in a narrow, inward-looking version of 'traditional' Irish nationalism and identity which remained dominant in the post-independence era up to 1958. However, there were a fluid range of internal and external options available to Irish nationalists and the Irish people during this period, including outward-looking, diverse forms of nationalism and Irish identity as well as insular, homogenous types. This section considers some of the external influences on and internal diversity in Irish society during this formative period before the narrowed construction of 'traditional' nationalism and identity.

With respect to European influences, Hutchinson (1987) cites a number of specific cases including Norwegian and German influences on Yeats's concept for an Irish national theatre (p134); German, Belgian and French models for the UCD Jesuit's plan for a reinvigorated Catholic community in Ireland (p138); a Danish model for Russell's programme for Irish rural co-operatives (pp142-3); the Czech example for the founders of the Gaelic Athletic Association; the support of English, German, Danish and French scholars of Celtic Europe during the controversy over the role of the Irish language in the educational system in the early 1900s (p167); and the Austro-Hungarian, German and French influences on Griffith's political economic proposals for Ireland's economic development (pp170-2).

Kiberd also analyses the European influence on nationalists and thinkers ranging from Synge, Wilde, Joyce, Yeats, Gonne, Gogarty, Moore, Connolly, Davitt, Plunkett, Russell and Pearse (pp14-15). He cites in particular the role of Paris in the 1890s as a European model for ideas of Irish freedom, providing a wider perspective on Ireland than the British-Irish relationship (p15). Further, he stresses the importance of Ireland's European connections in the early 1900s, arguing that those involved believed that:

> Ireland had never been more fully Irish than when she had been European...This is the real contribution made by thinkers in the first two decades of this century - not a pat version of national identity, but the assumption of a European perspective after a century of dreary provincialism (1984: 14).

There were also extensive American influences during this period, particularly on Irish nationalists. The American connection stemmed from the large Irish-American immigrant population in the United States 'who may have numbered as many as 20,000,000, or almost 19 per cent of the total United States population' by 1920 if one includes the third and fourth generation descendants (Carroll in Drudy 1985: 272). According to Carroll, the American influence on Irish nationalism during this period derived from the use of the United States as a 'base from which nationalists, both Irish and Irish-American, could plan, formulate policies, influence public opinion and raise money' (p289).

At the organisational level, Irish-Americans were mobilised from the 1860s to Irish independence in a succession of groups including the Fenian Brotherhood, Clan na Gael, the American Land League, the United Irish League, the Friends of Irish Freedom and the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic (Walsh and Carroll in Drudy 1985). Fund-raising was largely conducted through these organisations, spurred on by prominent Irish nationalists who either lived in or toured the United States such as Davitt, Parnell, Clarke, Connolly, Pearse, MacBride, Gonne, Sheehy-Skeffington, Plunkett, Casement and not least De Valera who was born in America (pp255, 277-8). Further, the funds raised by Irish-Americans were at times instrumental to Irish nationalist groups including the United Irish League's subsidies to the Irish Parliamentary Party; Clan na Gael's contributions to the Irish Republican Brotherhood and the Irish Volunteers prior to the Easter Rising; and De Valera's eighteen month tour of the United States during the

War of Independence which helped raise five million dollars in 'Irish republican bond-certificates' (Carroll in Drudy 1985: 273-84).

However, it was Britain as the dominant power which exercised the most internal and external influence on the construction of Irish nationalism and national identity. Hutchinson relates the development of Irish cultural nationalism to British domestic and imperial reforms enacted in Ireland in the post-famine era in 'an extensive attempt to modernize and integrate Catholic Ireland into the British state' (1987: 259). The institutionalisation of these reforms contributed to the emergence of a rural and urban Catholic elite in Ireland based on occupational groups like farmers, lawyers, doctors, teachers, civil servants and shopkeepers (pp268-276). While these reforms were intended to quell nationalist opposition to the Union, anglicise Irish Catholics and wed them to Ireland's place in the British Empire, 'blocked mobility' based on 'ethnic closure' turned many members of this new Catholic elite towards Irish nationalism (pp266-7). At the same time, these reforms also threatened the position of the Anglo-Irish elite in Ireland, many of whom adopted a conservative form of Unionism particularly in the northeast of the country, while a significant minority turned to forms of Irish nationalism.

In response to these reforms, Hutchinson describes possible socio-cultural, political, economic and military options for the two main Anglo-Irish and Irish Catholic groups (pp37-9, 199, 209, 236). The political options varied from conservative Unionism and militant nationalism to international socialism with goals ranging from continued integration into the Britain, Home Rule within the British Empire, an independent united Ireland, and a socialist republic within an international Communist world-order (ibid). Economically, there was support for maintaining Ireland's industrial and agrarian role within the British imperial free trade system, promoting Irish industrial and agrarian self-sufficiency through state protectionism or local co-operatives as well as creating a socialist economy based on nationalising the means of production under workers' control (ibid). Socio-culturally, the specific responses ranged from support for the continued Anglicisation, de-Anglicisation and the Gaelicisation of the Irish people expressed through educational policies, literature and organisations such as the GAA, Gaelic League, the Dublin University Review and the Abbey Theatre (ibid).

Of course, it was far more likely that Irish Protestants would select the options which advocated continued integration and Anglicisation within the Britain and the Empire, while Irish Catholics would choose the options which supported forms of independence from Britain and policies of Gaelicisation in Ireland and, that in class terms, those from the working class would select from the socialist options. Yet there is an emerging body of work which suggests that a significant proportion of Irish Catholics supported part or all of the range of British options, particularly those Irish Catholics who served the British Empire in various capacities either in Ireland or abroad as soldiers, police, church officials and settlers (Akenson 1996; Bredin 1987; Fitzpatrick 1997; Herlihy 1997; Jeffery 1996). Thus, Akenson argues that:

> Instead of postulating that resistance to imperialism was the natural Irish response, one should accept the view that there was a great variety of responses and that one of these was wholehearted participation in the imperialist enterprise (1996: 146).

At the individual level, the issue could become more complex with 'individuals...often interchanging positions...in response to specific cognitive and practical problems' (Hutchinson 1987: 39). More specifically, Hutchinson details case-studies of individuals from the Irish Catholic and Protestant nationalist elite during the cultural revival who either mixed a number of these options or changed their positions over the course of their life (Chs. 4-5). In this way, Hutchinson provides examples Irish-British cultural hybridity along Pieterse's 'continuum of hybridities' (in Featherstone et al 1995: 56-7) as well as of forms of Irish 'multiple identities' in the late 1800s and early 1900s.

The broader point is that there were a wide variety of responses among the Irish Catholic and Protestant populations at the individual and group levels to Ireland's British integration during this period. That a militant form of Gaelic-Catholic separatism became the predominant version of Irish nationalism after the 1916 Easter Rising does not lessen the significance of the substantial internal diversity which existed among Irish nationalists and the population as a whole for much of the period from the 1870s to independence with respect to positions on Ireland's integration into Britain and the Empire. Further, the

possible 'Irish' political, economic and socio-cultural options included those influenced by continental Europe and the United States of America.

Dichotomisation, Racialisation and the Dependency Culture

This raises the question of how the 'traditional' version of separatist nationalism based on a rural, agrarian, Gaelic and Catholic identity construct eventually became predominant over the other available internal and external options? To answer this question, Hutchinson links blocked mobility and ethnic closure to the construction by Anglo-Irish Protestant and Irish Catholic nationalists of an Irish identity dichotomised against Britishness (1987; see also Freine's discussion of 'national parallelism' 1965: 108). For Hutchinson, the genesis of this socio-cultural dichotomisation process can be traced back to the 'first' Anglo-Irish cultural revival of the late 1700s, evolving in complexity and importance through the 'second' revival in the 1830s and 1840s, before becoming ideologically dominant in the Irish nationalist movement during the 'third' revival from the late 1800s to independence (p49). According to Hutchinson, dichotomisation in its general form:

> Sought...to 'return' to an identity in Ireland's Gaelic past that would dichotomise Ireland from England, unite members of its different religious and social groups, and provide alternative models for national economic, social and political development (ibid).

For the Anglo-Irish originator's of this process in the first revival, the motivations behind dichotomisation included a 'drive for equality' with and 'legislative autonomy' from Britain along with a desire to defend against 'an English perception of the Irish as inherently inferior...and racially 'adulterated by residence in Ireland'... and hence excluded from sharing in the full benefits of British civilisation' (pp 62-3).

For our purposes, the importance of this discussion is that Hutchinson identifies in the largely Anglo-Irish Protestant revival of the late 1700s many of the themes raised by the Irish political elite in the dominant version - namely a search for equality and a place among the nations of the developed world, the emphasis on Ireland's independence and cultural distinctiveness as well as a dependency culture based in part on a an Irish inferiority complex towards Britain.

Hutchinson also directly links the emergence of the Irish dependency culture to a British racialisation of Irishness, a connection not made by the contemporary Irish political elite in their discursive versions of Ireland's integrations and identities. At the same time, Hutchinson's account shows an Irish desire for and recognition of what we might now refer to as culturally hybridised Irish-British culture in Ireland, mixing Irish and British cultural traits into a distinctive form of Irishness based on multiple identities.

The 'second' revival from 1830 to 1848 continued many of the themes originated in the first, while developing two influential arguments in the construction of a dichotomised Irishness and Irish racialisation. The first argument advanced by George Petrie and Samuel Ferguson connected the Gaelic-Irish heritage to a rural Christian civilisation opposed to the advances of a British secular manufacturing civilisation led by a centralising state (pp 75-6, 90-2). The second developed by Thomas Davis rejected the direct connection between Gaelic-Irishness and rurality, arguing instead for a linkage between Gaelic heritage and Irish rural as well as industrial development in a struggle against Britain's manufacturing civilisation (pp95-104). Davis also believed that the Irish people - Catholic and Protestant - 'represented an intermixture of races, for all of their differences, coloured by the natural and cultural environment of the country' (p98). In this sense, Davis viewed the 'Irish' as a culturally hybrid people - not as two divided racialised Anglo-Irish Protestant and Irish Catholic groups - in which cultural intermixing between the Catholic Irish, Anglo-Irish Protestants and the British was 'normal'.

While variations of these options were expressed by Irish Catholic and Anglo-Irish nationalists during the 'third' revival from 1890 to 1921, the ideological constructs of Irish nationalism and identity which became dominant was based on an 'ethnic populism' (p253), strongly dichotomising Irishness from the British imperial identity. Rejecting both the internal diversity in and external influences on Irish society, this dichotomised construct defined Irishness primarily in terms of Gaelicness, rurality, agrarianism and Catholicism opposed to a British imperial identity construct based on Anglo-Saxonism, urbanism, industrialism and secular liberalism.

Hutchinson explains the development of this narrowed 'traditional' Irish identity construct through a number of interrelated factors. These include the institutional influence of organisations such as the GAA, the Gaelic League and the Catholic Church who articulated this version of Irishness (pp 287-93); the need for the urban nationalist elite to seek alliances among the rural elite and popular support rural areas (p287); Ireland's relative 'underdevelopment' based on an agricultural dependence on Britain outside the more Protestant industrial Northeast (p286); the rise of a British 'official nationalism' based on Anglicisation as well as heightened British anti-Irishness (pp 277-8); and the belief that Anglicisation 'had transformed the Irish into a hybrid or mongrel people: nominally hating Britain but actually imitating her in every way' (p283).

This strongly dichotomised version of Irish identity explicitly rejected cultural intermixing between Irishness and Britishness, interpreting hybridity as negative Irish mimicry of all things British. As such, one of the goals of this version of cultural nationalism was to purify the Irish of their Britishness through a process of de-Anglicisation and re-Gaelicisation, expressed by nationalists such as Hyde and Moran (p283). This suggests that the contemporary Irish political elite's assertion of the cultural survival of a unmixed Irish core culture during British colonisation is a product of the continuing ideological influence in Irish society of the 'traditional' Irish nationalism constructed during the third revival.

But why there was such an intense reaction to the already existing forms of cultural hybridity in Irish society during the third revival by Irish nationalists? Part of the answer lies in some of the factors cited by Hutchinson to explain the strongly dichotomised version of Irishness constructed during the third revival, in particular the increased British anti-Irishness and heightened Anglicisation of Ireland. Of particular importance may be that Irish nationalists perceived Britishness in the form of Anglicisation as an hegemonic identity imposed on the Irish with British cultural identity being viewed as being superior and Irish cultural identity as inferior (Tovey et al 1989; Pieterse in Featherstone 1995). This perception was certainly valid with respect to nineteenth century British anti-Irishness and anti-Catholicism (Samuel 1989), which itself formed part of a much longer history of English anti-Irishness dating from the Norman era (Curtis 1984).

Moreover, the Irish nationalists' perception was further buttressed by a particularly virulent form of British racialisation of the Irish during the Victorian era in which ethnic and national differences between the Irish and the British were racialised in terms of physical or biological differences between the Celtic and Anglo-Saxon races (Curtis 1968: 5). Thus, ethnic or cultural differences involving religion or language and national differences over the political status of Ireland were often characterised by members of the British elite and in public opinion as inherited, immutable racial distinctions between the Irish and the British.

Given the general level of British anti-Irishness and the specific form of simianised Irishness, it is not surprising that many Irish nationalists viewed Irish-British hybrids as expressing an internalised inferiority complex (Fanon 1967) and exhibiting an Irish dependency culture (Memmi 1990). In order to rid the Irish of this cultural dependency and internalised inferiority, an Irish cultural identity had to be constructed which overturned the valuation of Irishness versus Britishness in which being Irish was superior to being British (Memmi 1990). The simplest means to achieve this aim was to construct a version of Irishness which was the polar opposite of Britishness, revaluing Irish identity (ibid) while clearly demarcating the division between the two identities for Irish people - especially the cultural hybrids.

From this perspective, the Irish nationalist belief in a strong unmixed core Irish culture dichotomised from British culture was a reaction to the 'traditional' nationalist's perception of an Irish dependency culture on and inferiority complex towards Britain, manifested principally by Irish-British cultural hybrids in Ireland. However, the difficulty in this colonised construction of identity is that the strongly dichotomised identity is structurally based on 'the colonizer as a model or as an antithesis' (Memmi 1967: 206) and can not truly be autonomous or equal until the colonised 'cease[s] to define himself through the categories of the colonizer' (p218).

In this way, the 'traditional' nationalist construct of Irish identity tied Irishness directly to the imperial form of Britishness. This nationalist construct denied both Irish internal

diversity and the external influences on Irishness, instead of drawing on the multiple internal and external sources of Irishness which existed in Irish society during the third revival. By defining 'traditional' Irishness against imperial Britishness, this nationalist construct emphasised an Irish dependency culture on Britain and an inferiority complex towards the British, marginalizing the Irish-British (Irish-European and Irish-American) cultural hybrids who might have provided a more empirically accurate form of Irish national identity alongside the Irish Catholic, Gaelic, rural and agrarian identity.

9.3 Protecting the Strong Irish Culture (of Dependency): 1922-1957

The Irish state institutionalised 'traditional' Irishness between 1922 and the passing of De Valera's 1937 constitution (Hutchinson 1987: 304-24). The Irish state's institutionalisation process was greatly facilitated, as Lee notes, by the fact that:

> Thanks to partition, it had no racial problem. The racial and religious antagonisms that disfigured the face of Ireland were safely banished beyond the border. But for partition, the new state would have had to undertake genuine nation building. Reconciling Irish nationalists and unionists would indeed have required the building of a 'new nation' (in The Princess Grace Library 1988: 111).

One result of partition was that Protestants who had 'comprised one quarter of the population of the entire island' in 1920, composed only '7.4% of the population of the twenty-six counties' in 1926 (Brown 1985: 84), declining by one-third in the counties of the Free State between 1911 and 1926 (Hutchinson 1987: 311). In the reduced form of a relatively small minority, the Protestant community remained economically powerful (Fitzgerald in The Princess Grace Library 1988: 198-9) while at the same time 'shar[ing] a sense of isolation and political impotence' in the new Free State (Brown 1985: 85).

This perceived isolation and political impotence were certainly heightened by the some of the Catholic based legislation passed by the new Free State government in the 1920s including the 1923 Censorship of Films Act, the 1925 Divorce Act and the 1929 Act establishing the Censorship Board (Hutchinson 1987: 310). The impact of this legislation on the more 'liberal' Protestant community was exacerbated by the Irish Catholic Church's continuation of the controversial 1908 Ne Temere decree 'which declared null and void mixed marriages (between Catholic and Protestant) not solemnised by the

Catholic Church' (Lee 1989: 11) and mandated Catholics in these mixed marriages to raise their children as Catholics. De Valera's 1937 constitution further increased the Catholic basis of the Free State by incorporating Catholic beliefs, values and doctrine particularly with respect to 'family, marriage, education and property' (Hutchinson 1987: 322). These included an explicitly Catholic preamble and clauses which enshrined the special position of the Catholic Church and prohibited abortion (Bunreacht na Eireann 1937). However, the constitution did provide for a certain level of 'institutional pluralism' with regard to religion, guaranteeing freedom of worship, banning discrimination and the state endowment of any religion and preserving the British based Church-State 'concordat' on educational provision (ibid).

The state's institutionalisation of the Catholic component of 'traditional' Irish identity was greatly facilitated by the institutionalisation of an ultramontane form of Catholic Church in Ireland in the post-famine era under Cardinal Cullen, and the 'role played by Catholicism in confirming a sense of national identity' (Brown 1985: 23-6). As a result, the Catholic Church by independence was 'the most extensive non-governmental organisation in the society' (Lee in The Princess Grace Library 1988: 110), and had used this position to construct the linkage between Catholicism and Irishness. In this way, the Irish state allied itself with the Irish Catholic Church, building upon the Church's earlier institutionalisation of an Irish Catholic identity. Overall, this Church-State institutionalisation of Catholicism would prove to be the most successful and durable of all the attempts to institutionalise the components of 'traditional' Irishness in independent Ireland.

With respect to the institutionalisation of the Gaelic heritage, the primary basis of the state's Gaelicisation policy was the teaching of the Irish language in the educational system. Brown writes that:

> It was determined that all teachers leaving training colleges should be expected to have a knowledge of Irish; preparatory boarding schools were established to prepare young people for careers in the teaching profession which would emphasize the language; school inspectors were required to study Irish, and no further appointments were offered individuals who lacked proficiency in Irish; Irish was made compulsory for scholarships in the Intermediate and Leaving Certificates in the secondary schools; and financial and other encouragements

were offered to schools and individuals alike to use Irish more frequently (1985: 40).

Outside of the educational system, however, the institutionalisation of the Irish language was limited. According to Lee, while 'a knowledge of Irish was made compulsory for certain state posts...no genuine attempt was made to gaelicise either politics or the civil service, prerequisites for the survival of the revival' (1989: 135). For Lee, this lack of a state sponsored institutionalisation of the Irish language throughout the rest of the Irish state and into civil society showed to Irish people that the 'revival was a sham' (ibid) or, in Brown's words, a 'concealed disaster' (1985: 44). The limit of the Gaelicisation policy is even more starkly shown in the decline of native Irish speakers in the Gaeltacht areas (46). Lee shows that 'the number of [native] Irish speakers fell from about 200 000 in 1922 to 100 000 in 1939 to 50 000 in 1964' (1989: 134). As such, the state's attempted institutionalisation of the Gaelic component of 'traditional' identity through the medium of the Irish language was a relative failure, particularly when compared to the institutionalisation of a Catholic identity.

With respect to rurality and agrarianism, the result of the state's process of institutionalisation was more mixed. Since the partition of Ireland removed the more industrialised Northeast of the island from the Free State, it emphasised the rural and agrarian character of the country. The 1926 census revealed that '61 percent of the people lived outside of towns and villages' while '53 percent of the state's recorded gainfully employed population lived outside towns or villages' (Brown 1985: 17). As such, the Irish state did not have to do anything in particular to institutionalise a rural and agrarian identity because the country was already predominantly rural and agrarian.

Fianna Fail's rise to power from 1932 led to a policy shift towards a protectionist economic strategy based on mixed industrial and agrarian development. This policy change incorporated ideas articulated by Davis in the 1840s and Griffith in the early 1900s (Hutchinson 1987: 169-71). While institutionalising industrialisation to some extent as a component in Irish national identity, the economic strategy retained a level of anti-

urbanism in support of the 'traditional' construct of rurality and male employment (Daly in The Princess Grace Library 1988: 99)

The limits of Irish protectionist, decentred industrial development were exposed after the 1938 Anglo-Irish Trade agreement. According to Daly, the trade agreement 'marked a major stepping stone back from the concept of economic independence and a formal recognition of the strength of the British economic connection' in Irish development especially for the Irish agricultural sector (p103). As a result, Fianna Fail largely reverted to institutionalising rurality and agrarianism in line with the 'traditional' construct of Irishness, and de-emphasised the short-lived attempt to institutionalise industrialism, while re-emphasising Ireland's political independence and cultural distinctiveness from Britain.

Nonetheless, the Irish state's institutionalisation of rurality and agrarianism had largely collapsed by the 1950s, due in no small part to the country's comparative lack of economic growth and job creation in the post-war era. Employment in agriculture still accounted for almost 43 per cent of total employment and roughly 30 per cent of Ireland's GDP at current factor prices in 1949 (Jacobsen 1994: 62). As a result, agrarianism became largely discredited as a component of 'traditional' Irishness despite the continued agrarian basis to the Irish economy. With respect to rurality, the Irish economic crisis led to high rates of rural internal emigration to towns and cities such as Dublin, and external Irish emigration especially to England. Brown cites figures showing that this emigration was primarily based on the 'rural depopulation' of counties particularly in 'the northwest and along the western seaboard', arguing that it expressed 'a widespread rejection of rural life' (1985: 162). Internal migration meant that the percentage of people living in Dublin increased dramatically, rising to above 20 percent of the population by 1951, with about one-third of those people having been born in rural areas, increasing again to over 30 percent by 1971 (pp162-3).

This rural depopulation also heightened Ireland's socio-cultural integration into Britain due to the large number of first-generation Irish emigrants to Britain in the 1940s and 1950s. For Brown, Ireland's socio-cultural integration into Britain during this period represented more of a continuation of the reality following independence, since:

> Despite all the efforts of the Irish Irelanders, Gaelic revivalists and apostles of a distinctive Irish way of life, the twenty-six counties had remained in many aspects a social province of the United Kingdom (p166).

This heightened sense of Ireland as a British social province in the 1950s, the country's continued economic dependence on Britain and the collapse of 'traditional' sources of Irish identity outside of Catholicism raise the issue of the Irish dependency culture on Britain. The fact that from the mid-1940s to the late 1950s large numbers of Irish people chose either to internally emigrate to Irish towns and cities like Dublin or to externally emigrate to the 'old enemy' Britain seems to express not simply a rejection of Irish rural life but a wholesale rejection of life in 'traditional' Ireland. Instead, many Irish people clearly turned to urbanism in Ireland and industrialism in Britain - two of the components specifically rejected by the 'traditional' nationalist construct of Irish identity.

In this sense, 'Irishness' had once again become a negative identification compared to Britishness, representing inferiority towards and dependence on Britain. This time, however, the inferiorisation of Irishness was not primarily the result of British anti-Irishness or the racialisation of Irishness. This inferiorisation was mainly the result of indigenous Irish factors, principally the relative failure of the Irish state to attain the aims of 'traditional' Irish nationalism, resulting in Irish de-identification with 'traditional' Irishness. Arguably, the Irish state contributed more to strengthening the Irish dependency culture on Britain than to building a strong, distinct and independent Irish culture.

The strength of the Irish dependency culture is clearly articulated in the Irish political elite's residual version among the older members of the group, particularly those who emigrated to England during this period. Yet, the Irish political elite in the dominant version hails a strong Irish culture based on core survivals from the period of British colonialism. In this way, the Irish political elite in the dominant version preserves the structure of the Irish-British dichotomised construct of Irishness, revaluing Irishness while denying the dependency culture on Britain.

9.4 Reconstructing Irish Nationalism and Identity: The Post-1958 Period

From the Failure to the Success of the Irish State

In comparison to the 1922 to 1957 period, the changes in Irish cultural identity during the contemporary period reflect a process of separating the 'traditional' components of Irish identity by the Irish state in response to internal and external influences. More positively, the role of the Irish state can be viewed as gradually institutionalising a form of Irish pluralism, extending De Valera's institutional pluralism for religious groups to cover more sections of Irish society. In particular, this extension of pluralism involved recognising the internal diversity of Ireland, particularly with respect to socio-cultural divisions between rural and urban dwellers, expressed in terms of conflicts over the ideological dominance of Catholic versus secular liberal values in Irish society. The Irish state's pluralism represents a political attempt to reach an accommodation between the 'traditional' Catholic and the 'modern' secular liberal sections of Irish society about issues such as contraception, divorce and abortion.

More broadly, the Irish state has played a significant role in the socio-cultural changes of the past forty years or so by initiating and guiding Ireland's socio-economic development, helping to 'open up' Irish society both internally and externally. This is not to argue, however, that the Irish state is the causal source of all of Ireland's socio-cultural changes since the late 1950s. The economic development, socio-cultural forces and external influences unleashed by the Irish state have over time contributed their own independent dynamics to the general process of Irish socio-cultural changes. As such, one could argue for a multi-causal, sequential and interactive process of Irish socio-cultural change involving the Irish state, the influences cited in the dominant version such as education, television, travelling and the return of emigrants, along with the substantial British, global American and European influences. This type of argument clearly rejects the assertion by the Irish political elite in the dominant version that Ireland's contemporary socio-cultural changes are solely the product of Irish internal socio-cultural influences based on a strong Irish culture.

Let us briefly cite some of the major political initiatives carried out by the state in the contemporary period. The Irish state began the process of internally and externally 'opening up' Ireland in 1958 through the publication of Whitaker's Economic Development; founded Irish television in 1961; signed the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement in 1965; virtually ended censorship of publications in 1967; established free primary education in 1967-8; created a vocational and technological third level sector of higher education in the 1970s; held referenda to join the then EEC and to abolish the special position of the Catholic Church in the Irish Constitution in 1972; joined the EEC in 1973; revamped Irish industrial policy in the mid-1970s to attract high tech foreign firms; permitted restricted access to contraceptives in 1979; held referenda on abortion 1983 as well as divorce and the Single European Act in 1986; signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985; negotiated the first social partnership agreement in 1987; and held further referenda on abortion and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, divorce in 1995, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and the 'Good Friday' Agreement in 1998. While this list is not intended to be exhaustive, it highlights the state's role in the multi-causal, sequential and interactive process of opening up Ireland in the economic, political and socio-cultural realms.

The opening up process includes allowing the Irish people to choose in referenda whether or not to 'open up' or liberalise 'traditional' Irish Catholic social thought on issues such as divorce and abortion. The point is not that the Irish electorate chose to prohibit abortion in 1983 and 1992 as well divorce in 1986 or to permit divorce in 1995 but that the Irish state provided a number of political opportunities over the course of almost a decade and a half to choose the pace of the Irish internal opening up process with respect to the maintenance or modification of significant elements of 'traditional' Catholic social teaching which had become part of Irish public policy and law.

Of particular importance is the Irish state's gradual reconstruction from the early 1970s of 'traditional' political nationalism away from the irrendentist claim to Northern Ireland. The 'Good Friday' Agreement or the *Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations* is the most recent articulation of this reconstruction of Irish political nationalism. If fully implemented, the agreement will establish a North/South ministerial council and a British-

Irish council for the first time and amend Articles Two and Three of the Irish Constitution to remove the Republic's irrendendist claim to the six counties of Northern Ireland (1998).

In the context of the Irish state's reconstructed economic nationalism discussed in the SIPTU chapter, this reconstruction of Irish political nationalism suggests that the post-1958 Irish state and the successive generations of the Irish political elite have been engaged in a much broader reconstruction of 'traditional' Irish nationalism since the late 1950s. In terms of sequencing, economic nationalism was reconstructed first in 1958 and again in 1987, followed by the more recent shifts in political nationalism in 1972, 1985 and particularly 1998. One could argue that the state's relative success in achieving the goals of reconstructed economic nationalism provided the state more scope to gradually reconstruct political nationalism, including in this case the socio-cultural attempts to liberalise Irish social policy along a pluralist basis in order for the Republic to be more attractive to Protestant Unionists in Northern Ireland.

However, one should not assume that there is a direct correlation between Ireland's relative economic success and the Irish political elite's willingness to confront 'traditional' political and socio-cultural aspects of nationalism. Thus, the first divorce referendum and the signing of the Anglo-Irish agreement both occurred during Ireland's economic crisis from 1981 to 1986 as part of the Garrett Fitzgerald led coalition government between Fine Gael and the Labour Party from 1982 to 1987. What is important is that the Irish state reconstructed Irish economic nationalism and largely achieved the new goals set in the strategy outside of the 1981-86 period, accruing enough 'political capital' to extend the reconstruction project to other areas of Irish 'traditional' nationalism.

The Irish state's relatively successful role in guiding Ireland's political and socio-economic development in the post-1958 period can be directly contrasted to the relative failure of the Irish state to achieve any of the main goals of 'traditional' nationalism by the late 1950s. One important factor has been the apparent willingness and ability of successive generations of the Irish political elite to reconstruct the goals and content of Irish nationalism to better fit the conditions of a more pluralist and externally oriented Irish society. This perspective, however, contradicts the account articulated by the

members of the contemporary Irish political elite in the dominant version which minimises the role of the Irish state and their own contributions to the changes in Irish society, let alone the significant interactions with external British, European and global American influences. Instead, the Irish political elite explains these societal changes solely through the strong Irish culture in a mono-causal, non-sequential and isolated fashion.

One explanation for the Irish political elite's culturalist account of Irish societal changes could be the 'cultural survival' of the state's failure in the 1922 to 1957 period among the members of the Irish political elite. This 'cultural survival' has its origin in the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency as articulated in the residual version, emphasising a strong Irish culture to compensate for a sovereign yet weak Irish state. The discursive structure of this cultural logic of autonomy and dependency survived into the contemporary period among the Irish political elite, leading them to emphasise the role of the strong Irish culture despite the fact that the empirical 'content' of the post-1958 period supports the argument for a strong state.

The Declining Significance of Traditional Identity

We will now consider the empirical evidence for socio-cultural changes in Irish society in the post-1958 period with respect to the strong culture and 'traditional' components of Irishness. With respect to the Irish language, there are a number of trends of particular relevance. First is the apparent levelling of and stabilisation in the gradual decline in the number of native Irish language speakers Brown notes that 'in 1966 there were less than 70,000 native speakers in the state' (1985: 206), while a recent analysis by O hEallaithe of the 1996 census 'shows that 71,000 adults, under 3 per cent of the State's population, said that they spoke Irish on a daily basis' (Irish Times Jan. 12 1999). The figures are similar to those presented in a 1993 national survey which showed that roughly 2 per cent of the Irish population had 'native speaker ability' in the Irish language with a further 9 per cent who could follow 'most conversations' (O Riagain and O Gliasain 1994: 5).

Of these native Irish speakers, O hEallaithe's study estimates that only 36.5 per cent or 21,000 of the native speakers in 1996 live in the Gaeltacht areas (Irish Times Jan 12 1999). This raises the second point that the stabilisation in the numbers of native Irish

speakers derives to a large extent from the spread of the Irish language from the Gaeltacht to Irish towns and cities particularly among certain sections of the more highly educated middle, upper middle and professional classes (Brown 1985: 211; Tovey et al 1989: 23-4). The third point is that this geographical and class change in native speakers represents a long-term trend begun in the 1940s during which:

> Awareness grew among concerned individuals and in the organizations they founded that the only hope for its future was to encourage interest in the language in the towns and cities...espoused by educated, socially aware men and women (Brown 1985: 149-50).

One result of this change is that the future revival of the Irish language became less focused on the Irish state through the educational system and more devolved in a voluntaristic sense to communities, organisations, families and individuals.

The fourth point is that the change in emphasis by Irish language activists from state intervention in the educational system to forms of voluntarism followed from the Irish state's gradual disinterest in and de-institutionalisation of the Irish language in the public sector outside of the national school system. Lee claims that 'the government largely ignored the recommendations of the commission on the revival of the language that reported in 1963' (1989: 673), while Brown notes that the Cosgrave government in 1973 removed:

> The requirement that pupils should pass in Irish in order to merit the secondary school Leaving certificate...[and] the necessity for a pass in the Leaving certificate for entry to the Civil Service (1985: 207).

On the other hand, the Irish state has not fully retrenched from promoting the language revival as evidenced by its establishment of official bodies such as Comhairle na Gaeilege in 1961 and Bord na Gaeilge in 1975, the creation of an Irish language radio station in 1972 and an Irish language television station in 1997, and continued support for Irish language only schools. Nonetheless, the pattern is gradual state de-institutionalisation of the Irish language in Irish society compared to the early decades of Ireland's independence up to the late 1950s.

The fifth and final point is that Irish public survey responses towards the Irish language reflect what Brown calls a 'schizophrenic set of attitudes' (1985: 211). For example, the

National Survey on Languages shows that roughly two-thirds of the respondents support the ideal of English and Irish bilingualism in Ireland, while in practice 39 percent of the respondents believe that in the future the Irish language 'should be preserved for its cultural value as in music and arts', 77 per cent admit that 'People in my circle just don't use Irish at all', 84 per cent state they never 'Listen to...radio programmes in Irish' and 93 per cent claim to never read 'Books in Irish' (O Riagain and O Gliasain 1993: 9-12). The evidence presented here supports Brown's suggestion that for most Irish people the Irish language is more important as a symbol of Irish ethnic and cultural identity than as a practical, native national language spoken in Ireland.

With respect to rurality, the empirical evidence shows continued rural depopulation with a corresponding increase in rates of urbanism in Irish towns and cities. The 1996 census indicates that rural decline has continued unabated from the 1950s with roughly 53 per cent of the Irish population living in rural areas in 1951 compared to only 34.5 in 1996 (CSO 1998: 26-28). The population of Dublin has gradually increased to over 29 per cent of the total with the greater Dublin area accounting for approximately one-third of the Irish population (ibid). Over the course of the 1990s, though, there have been significant increases in the numbers of people living in towns and cities in the west and southwest. For example, Irish towns and cities of over 10,000 people have increased their proportion of the population from 3.6 per cent in 1951 to 10.5 per cent in 1996, especially in regions with urban centres such as Cork in the Southwest, Galway in the West and Limerick in the Mid-West (Irish Times Sept. 22 1997). The causes for this trend include the decline in agricultural employment, rises in manufacturing and service sector employment based on dispersed industrial growth with firms hiring skilled graduates from the universities and institutes of technology located in these areas, and of course the Celtic Tiger boom (ibid).

As such, the decrease in rurality and the rise in urbanism is related to the decrease in Irish agrarianism in the post-1958 period. The statistical evidence shows that the agricultural sector's share of GDP at 1994 constant prices has decreased from 25 per cent in 1960 to 9 per cent in 1994 while industry's proportion has risen from 30 per cent to 38 per cent and the service sector's contribution has increased from 45 per cent to 53 per cent over the same time period (Forfas 1996: 3). Further, the agricultural share of total employment has

rapidly decreased from 36 per cent in 1961 to 11.8 per cent in 1994 compared to a gradual increase in the proportion of industrial employment from 24.4 per cent in 1961 to 27.9 percent and a large rise in the percentage employed by services from 39.5 per cent to 60.2 per cent over the same time (Forfas 1996: 18; Jacobsen 1994: 62). These latter figures compare to EU averages for 1994 of 5.5 per cent for agricultural, 30.6 per cent for industrial and 63.9 for services employment (Forfas 1996: 18).

The Irish figures include agricultural industry as well as those for farms. If we focus on Irish family farms, the total numbers of farms and farm workers have been declining steadily in the post-war era. The number of Irish farms has declined from 246, 805 in 1946 to 209, 574 in 1961 and to 147, 800 by 1997 (Breen et al 1990: 189-191; Irish Times Feb. 24 1999). Over the same period, the number of farm workers has fallen from 559, 000 in 1946 to 369,000 in 1961 and 281, 900 by 1997 (ibid). The evidence strongly suggests that Ireland is no longer primarily a rural and agrarian country. In fact, one could argue that the Ireland has successfully made the transition from a rural, agrarian to urban, industrial society and is well along the process of completing the next transition to a largely urban if not suburban, service sector based society.

Yet, this does not mean that Irish cultural attitudes have changed at the same pace as the socio-economic changes in Irish society. This is particularly so for certain social groups who have not been at the forefront of these societal transitions such as the older generations, those still living in rural areas, the less educated, those in more traditional occupations and the socially excluded. For many members of these particular groups, the 'traditional' beliefs and values of Irish Catholicism have remained more culturally significant than those associated with an urban, industrial and secular liberal society interpenetrated by British, European and global American influences. At least, this is the fairly standard public interpretation offered to explain the Irish urban-rural cultural conflict from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s over issues such as contraception, divorce and abortion.

While this apparent urban-rural divide has been overstated, there is evidence from the abortion and divorce referenda to suggest that the division was more than simply a media

creation or an artefact of public 'common sense'. To cite one example, Girvin's analysis of the constituency returns for 1992 abortion referendums shows that:

> Rural, western and lower income areas tend[ed] to express stronger conservative views on these issues than elsewhere in the country...[while] urban, middle class constituencies, especially in or adjacent to Dublin, appear[ed] to have voted against the abortion issue on liberal grounds...the results do tend to confirm that there are now quite distinct liberal and conservative constituencies and regions in Ireland (1994a: 123-4).

On the other hand, Girvin states that the same analysis indicates that 'not a single constituency returned a Yes majority on the abortion issue' with the overall result recording 65 per cent against the referendum question concerning the restricted right to abortion. Further, Girvin's analysis shows that of the five constituencies which rejected this proposed amendment by over 70 per cent majorities, three were in the Dublin area - Dublin South, Dublin South-West and Dun Laoghaire (p123). These results suggest the need for a more complex understanding of the urban-rural divide between 'traditional' Catholicism and 'modern' secular liberalism, particularly given Ireland's increased urbanism outside of Dublin during the Celtic Tiger boom of the 1990s.

Let us now analyse the evidence for the socio-cultural changes with respect to Irish Catholicism in the contemporary period. The religion question on the 1991 census indicated that Catholics composed 91.5 per cent , Protestants roughly 3 per cent and Jews about .04 per cent of the total population at the time (CSO 1998: 57). This evidence shows that Ireland remains an overwhelmingly Catholic country in religious identification. Further, if one considers that the number of Protestants has declined from 219,927 thousand to 107,322 from 1926 to 1991 (ibid) and that Jewish numbers have decreased from 3,686 to 1,581 over the same period (Keogh 1998: 9), it is clear that Ireland has become even more Catholic with regard to basic religious identification since independence.

Finally, if one adds the approximately 22,000 members of the Travelling community in 1994 (Mac Laughlin 1995: 43), the 8,000 or so refugees and asylum-seekers who have entered the country from 1994 to 1999 (Irish Times Feb. 9 1999), the approximately 10,000 'foreigners' living in the country in 1996 (Irish Times June 6 1997) and the 11,000

Muslims (Irish Times June 28 1999) to the numbers of Protestants and Jews, the total of roughly 160,000 out of an Irish population approaching 3.7 million (Irish Times Dec. 1 1998) is only 4.3 per cent of the total. While these numbers may not be strictly comparable given that they range from 1991 to 1999 and include overlaps between certain categories, the rough proportion indicates that Ireland remains a relatively homogenous country in socio-cultural terms not only in the population's religion but also with respect to minority ethnic groups, non-nationals and non-white peoples in Ireland. This suggests that 'Catholicism' is the only component of 'traditional' Irishness to have survived relatively intact into the contemporary period, becoming the primary marker of Irish ethnic national identity in the Republic of Ireland.

However, a more detailed examination of the evidence beyond simple religious identification reveals that this initial conclusion is not as clear-cut as it first seems, particularly for the last few years of the 1990s. Among the Irish Catholic intelligentsia, Brown traces a series of debates beginning in the late 1950s related to how the Irish Catholic Church should best respond to Ireland's industrialisation, urbanisation and modernisation in the context of a more secular and materialist Europe, the creation of a global consumer culture and the institutional and liturgical reforms of the Roman Catholic Church (1985: 225-237). He discusses debates among the Catholic intelligentsia from the late 1950s to the early 1980s about the Irish Church's authoritarianism; support for censorship; 'the sociological implications of secularisation that...attended urbanization almost everywhere in Europe'; the 'church-building programme' in Irish urban areas; the decline in vocations; changes in Irish Catholic religious beliefs among the laity; the religious revival in the 1970s culminating in Pope John Paul II's visit to Ireland in 1979; the beginning of the 'traditional' Catholic versus 'modern' secular liberal conflict from the late 1970s; and the introduction of the concept of pluralism into the Church's internal discussions (ibid). The point is that there was an awareness of the need to understand and respond to Ireland's socio-economic and cultural changes at least among the Catholic intelligentsia. For our purposes, we will focus on two issues directly related to the Catholicity of the Irish population - the decline in vocations and changes in the beliefs and practices of the Catholic laity in Ireland.

Brown shows that 'between 1966 and 1974 vocations to the priesthood and religious life declined from 1,409 in 1966 to 547 in 1974' with a 83 per cent reduction in the numbers joining communities of brothers, 70 per cent in nuns and 31 per cent in the priesthood (1985: 230). While there was some improvement in the numbers of men entering the priesthood from 1975 to 1979 (ibid), the decline returned in the 1980s resulting in net losses to the priesthood by the mid-1990s. Thus, the Irish Times reported that '100 priests were lost to the Irish church in 1997, compared with 47 ordained. The figures were similar to those in 1996, while the 41 seminary entrants in 1997 were an increase of four on the previous year' (Jan. 24 1998). Further, 'there were no new seminarians in Dublin in 1997, compared with an intake of three in 1996' (ibid). According to Brown, research in the late 1960s suggested that the main reasons for the decline in religious vocations overall included the oath of celibacy, the attraction of a secular, consumer society and the availability of good jobs in the growing economy (1985: 230-1). While these reasons remain relevant in terms of explaining the large decline in vocations in the mid-1990s 'Celtic Tiger' society, a significant additional factor may be the sexual scandals - especially those of sexual abuse - which have severely damaged the Church's moral authority in Ireland over the course of this decade. We will discuss in more detail the probable impact of these scandals on the Irish Catholic population below. Nonetheless, despite the rapid recent decline in vocations to the priesthood, the Irish Times article noted that 'Ireland still has more priests than a century ago, and the numbers per head of the population are still much higher than the international average' (Jan. 24 1998).

With regard to changes in the beliefs and practices, Brown reports results from a large-scale survey in 1974-5 which concluded that:

> Religious belief, particularly among the well-educated young, had begun to be experienced less as an all-embracing reality within which life must be ordered and as an immutable aspect of Irish national identity than as a personal expression of individual commitments and values (1985: 231).

Corresponding to this value change in the well educated young, the survey also showed that '25 per cent of single men and women in the 18-30 age group had forsaken this religious obligation [attending mass at least once a week], while 30 per cent of those aged 21-25 had done so' (ibid). Yet the national average for weekly mass attendance by all Irish

Catholics at this time was 90 per cent (ibid), basically the same as in the late 1800s (Irish Times Feb. 7 1998).

The Irish report of the European Values Study conducted in 1981 provided another comprehensive survey of Irish beliefs and practices with respect to religion (Fogarty et al 1984). In European terms, the study concluded that Ireland remained 'a country of strong religious belief and by the standards of most others of high religious practice' (p89). The survey indicated a cumulative 94 per cent church attendance rate with an 87 per cent rate of weekly church attendance for Catholics in the Republic of Ireland (p99). While that latter figure suggested a relative decline of 3 per cent in the weekly church attendance rate from the mid-1970s, a comparative perspective showed that 'more people attend[ed] church once a week in Ireland than in any country in the world' (ibid). Further, when asked in the survey:

> How important God was in their lives, the Irish were far ahead of any nation in Europe...[and] when it comes to belief in "the soul", in "life after death", in heaven and in prayer, the Irish are so far ahead of the rest of the western world that any comparisons are totally irrelevant (ibid).

However, there was a certain degree of diversity among Irish social groups. Thus, Ryan reported that:

> Women are more religious than men; older people more so than younger; rural dwellers more religious than urban; those with primary education have less difficulties with Church teaching than those with third-level. In general the indicators show a clear and in several cases a strong shift towards vaguer beliefs, lower religious practice, and a more critical attitude to the Church as one moves from the older to the younger age-groups (pp99-100).

In explaining these differences, Ryan cited both the relative decline in the older 'traditional' social groups and that Ireland was 'rapidly changing from a traditional rural ethos, which [had] been the backbone of Irish Catholicism, to a young and urban technologically oriented society for whom religion [was] less important' (p100).

To account for this diversity, Ryan posited the emergence of a 'new type of Catholic, as yet a minority in Ireland...one who seeks sacramental ministry from the Church but who is free to ignore the rules when they seem impractical' (p104). For Ryan, these new Catholics wished 'to remain within the Church', were for the most part 'weekly church-goers', but

questioned 'the Church's authority over their private lives...retain[ing] an independence of mind mainly on moral matters' (ibid). This analysis suggests that the real socio-cultural basis of the conflict was between 'traditional' and 'new' Catholics within Irish Catholicism not between 'traditional' Catholics within and 'modern' secular liberals outside of the Catholic Church. From this perspective, urban-rural location, age, education, occupational status and gender were secondary factors to the primary division within Irish Catholicism itself. This argument appears more convincing if we consider that, in the 1991 census, the total number of those who chose 'no religion' or who did not state a religious affiliation totalled only 149,645 or 4.2 per cent of the Irish population, a proportion roughly twelve and a half times too small to achieve the 50.3 per cent vote in favour of divorce in the 1995 referendum.

The patterns identified in the 1981 survey were largely reproduced in the 1990 Irish survey section of the European Values Study (Whelan 1994). Thus, Irish Catholic weekly attendance rates or more in the Republic of Ireland declined only slightly to 85 per cent (p22), representing a 5 per cent decrease since 1974-5. In comparative European terms, this meant that the Irish proportion of weekly Church attendance was more than double the European average for Catholics of 42 per cent (p21). Further, Whelan's analysis found a:

> Cumulative impact of social-demographic influences on church attendance, with age and urban versus rural location having the strongest effects, followed by third-level education, unemployment, being a housewife, sex and poverty (p29).

Specifically, the survey showed 'lower levels of church attendance...by men, the young, those in urban areas, and those with third-level education' (p28). Whelan's analysis also revealed an interaction between age and third level education with 57 per cent of those with third level education under 40 attending Church weekly or more compared to 86 per cent of those over 40 with the same level of education (ibid). This led Whelan to 'suggest...that over time, social class will come to have an unambiguously negative effect' on Church attendance rates.

Overall results showed that compared to the 1981 survey:

> There has been no overall change in the level of belief in traditional Christian values or religiosity, a modest decline in confidence in the church, a significant increase in permissiveness, and a modest strengthening of civic morality (p31).

Once again, this meant that 'the Irish respondents' scores on the religious dimensions [were] far above those for the other countries; they also display[ed] lower levels of permissiveness and a slightly more absolutist view on civic morality' (ibid). On the other hand, Whelan found that 'Irish Catholics [were] much less distinctive in relation to...confidence in the church' reporting 'a general collapse in the 'moral monopoly' of the church, or, at a minimum, a loss of at least some moral authority' (pp40-1). Finally, Whelan supports Ryan's argument about the emergence of an Irish 'new Catholic, arguing that this development is more significant in the Irish case than secularisation (p44).

Since the 1990 European Values Study, however, the moral authority of the Irish Catholic Church has been seriously damaged by a series of scandals, most of them sexual in nature involving a bishop, priests and members of religious orders. While a bishop and a priest were 'outed' for having fathered children, the worst sexual scandals have centred on the sexual abuse of predominantly male children by various priests and brothers in the orders from the 1950s to the present day. The rapid decline in the numbers of Irish men becoming priests has already been cited as one possible result of these scandals, along with other factors such as the celibacy oath, the attraction of a secular consumer society and increasing availability of good jobs in the booming economy.

The mixture of scandals and economic prosperity also seem to have significantly influenced the Irish Catholic Church over the course of the 1990s with weekly attendance rates declining rapidly from 85 per cent in 1990 to 77 per cent in 1994 and 60 per cent in 1998 (Irish Times Feb. 4 1998). The same survey reported that the majority of Irish Catholics 'disagree with official church teaching on contraception, divorce, priestly celibacy and women priests' (Irish Times Feb. 7 1998). Yet, as befits the new Irish Catholic, the survey also showed that 'more than eight out of ten considered religion as important in their lives' (Irish Times Feb. 4 1998).

For our purposes, the significance of these socio-cultural changes is that the last component of 'traditional' Irish national identity to maintain mass popular appeal appears to be in rapid decline. This is not to say that the new Irish Catholicism is in decline too. Instead, it seems that the transition from the older to the newer form of Catholic has become ideologically dominant for the majority of Irish Catholics. Nonetheless, this raises the question of what does it mean to be 'Irish' in Ireland after the decline in all four major components of 'traditional' Irishness?

The Contested Meanings of Contemporary Irishness

One reply to the question of what Irish identity means in contemporary Ireland is to emphasise the rise of 'modern' components, particularly those which are more or less the opposite to the 'traditional' basis of Irish identity. In this way, contemporary Irishness is defined in terms of being urban, industrial, secular, liberal and English-speaking instead of being rural, agrarian, Catholic and Gaelic or Irish speaking. However, this reproduces the dichotomisation process of the traditional construct and assumes a simplistic transition from a 'traditional' to a 'modern' Ireland. It also extends the discursive structure of the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency by redefining Irishness in terms of binary opposites, making Ireland more like Great Britain of a century or so ago – an urban, industrial, liberal and English language speaking country.

Further, the assumption of a simple transition from a traditional to a modern society ignores the complex interrelationship between tradition and modernity (Smart 1993), including processes of de-traditionalisation or re-traditionalisation (Heelas et al 1996). In particular, it ignores the specific pattern of Irish modernisation in the post-famine era to the early 1920s (Hutchinson 1987; Lee 1973), and the intermingling of the 'modern' and 'traditional' in Ireland since that time (Gibbons 1996; Kearney in The Princess Grace Library 1988; Keogh 1996). What is required is not a reconstructed form of 'modern' dichotomised Irishness but a new construct which is based on the specific intermixture of 'traditional' and 'modern' components of Irish society and culture in the contemporary post-1958 period.

The empirical evidence indicates that Irish society is predominantly urban with almost two-thirds of the population living in towns or cities. Yet this means that just over one-third of the people still live in rural areas. With respect to economic activity, Ireland is an industrial society which is on the verge of becoming a fully-fledged post-industrial, service sector society similar to other developed countries in the EU and the OECD. On the other hand, the agricultural sector and in particular agri-industry remain an important part of the economy for employment, exports and balance of payments. Further, while Ireland is without doubt an English-speaking country, the numbers of Irish speakers have stabilised and diversified, and the majority of Irish people express symbolic support for a continued role for the Irish language. In terms of religion, Ireland has become both less internally diverse with the decline in the numbers and proportion of older ethnic minority groups such as Protestants and Jews, and more diverse with the recent increase in the numbers of newer ethnic minority groups like Muslims. Finally, while Ireland remains overwhelmingly Catholic in terms of religious affiliation, 'new Catholics' have largely displaced 'traditional' ones. Overall, the evidence supports a new construct of contemporary Irishness based on the 'modern' components of Irish society but including the changed 'traditional' components of Irish identity. This new construct of Irishness is similar to the core aspect of the core/surface identity construct articulated by the members of the Irish political elite in the dominant version.

However, the external empirical evidence presented in the previous chapter does not support the surface part of or the core/surface identity construct itself. The external evidence indicates that contemporary Irish cultural identity is better understood in terms of cultural hybridity and multiple identities without a core Irishness based on a strong Irish culture. Further, the discussion in this chapter suggests that the Irish state in the post-1958 period has been 'opening up' Irish society and culture to external influences and inwardly diversifying Irish society through reconciling the 'traditional' and 'modern' social bases of Irish culture. More broadly, these state are part of a political agenda to reconstruct Irish nationalism in its economic, political and cultural forms.

This new construct emphasises a relatively successful Irish state instead of a relatively failed state as in the dominant version. This construct is also not rooted in the cultural

logic of autonomy and dependency in that Irishness is not dichotomised against Britishness. Thus, there is no need to overemphasise the 'traditional' non-British components of an Irish identity; stress the ideological survival of a strong culture to compensate for the real survival of a dependency culture; focus on a core Irishness to repel British or proxy British cultural threats; or rely solely on an internal cultural explanation of Irish socio-economic change.

However, this interpretation of contemporary Irish identity is by no means the only option available in Ireland. Irish academics and other members of the Irish intelligentsia have been vigorously discussing Irish contemporary socio-cultural changes and the new meaning of 'Irishness' since at least the beginning of the 1960s (see, for example, De Paor in Crane Bag Vol. 3 No.1 1979; Gibbons 1996; Kearney 1985; 1988; 1990; 1997; Kiberd 1996; Knight 2001; Lee 1989; Logue 2000; O'Toole 1998; Princess Grace Irish Library 1988; Studies Vol. 75 No. 300 1986; Tovey 1989). While there is much diversity in these debates, the discussions tend to view contemporary Irish culture as between an 'identity crisis' resulting from the relative decline of the traditional components of Irishness and an 'identity transition' towards a reconstructed Irishness which is more internally diverse and externally influenced than the traditional construct.

O'Toole breaks this tendency, arguing that by the mid-1990s 'the only fixed Irish identity and the only useful Irish tradition is the Irish tradition of not having a fixed identity' (1998: xv). Further, he claims that 'the disappearance of a fixed Irish identity' has seen 'the emergence of a set of provisional, contingent identities…in Irish life in the 1990s' (p. xvii). Instead of a new construct of 'modern' Irishness mixed with traditional elements, O'Toole suggests that contemporary Irish identity is more open-ended, allowing individual and collective actors to construct a range of hybrid and multiple identities combining various internal and external components in novel ways (see, also, Logue 2000).

To explain this change from a fixed to open Irish identities, O'Toole analyses Ireland's changing relationships with Britain, the European Union and the globalisation process during the 1990s. He argues that the 'illusion of fixity' in Irish 'traditional identity was based on Ireland's 'overwhelming' relationship with Britain 'with which Ireland could be

defined' (p. xv). In 1996, however, the Celtic Tiger economy 'produced more wealth per head of population than the United Kingdom' (p. xvi). This transformation in Ireland's economic relationship with Britain means that it 'became impossible to understand the Republic of Ireland by reference to Britain...arguably for the first time in recorded Irish history' (p. xv).

Yet, this means that the country has address the 'paradox' that 'its national independence is underwritten by [American] transnational corporations and by a supra-national European Union' (pp. xvi-xvii). Further, while Ireland's 'cultural distinctiveness' is no longer 'fixed' in tradition, its distinctiveness now lies 'in the particular way it...[takes] possession of Anglo-American norms, putting its own stamp on them and exporting them back to England, America and the rest of the world' (p. xvii). This suggests that Irish identities are more open-ended and shaped by Ireland's changing structural relationships or multiple integrations with the EU, an Americanised globalisation and Britain. While Irish identities are no longer simply defined by Ireland's overwhelming relationship with Britain, they are nonetheless defined, albeit much more loosely by Ireland's European, global and British integrations.

The last section of the chapter analyses these changes in Ireland from the mid-1990s, and asks whether the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency is applicable to the Celtic Tiger if, as O'Toole asserts, Ireland can no longer be understood by reference to Britain?

The Cultural Logic of the Celtic Tiger

O'Toole's argument is based on the symbolic significance to Irish national identity of a change in Ireland's economic development relative to the UK, namely Ireland's higher GDP per capita in 1996. That Ireland has become wealthier than Britain measured in these terms is symbolically significant, suggesting that Ireland's economic dependence on Britain may have finally come to an end. In terms of Irish identity, the cultural significance is that the 'Irish' may consider themselves as the economic equals of the 'British', a dramatic historical event given Ireland's long-standing economic dependence on Britain.

Politically, Ireland's comparative economic equality with Britain has been reinforced by the equality accorded Irish governments by British governments in relation to Northern Ireland, evidenced by 'The Good Friday Agreement'. There is also evidence that this relative political equality within the British Isles has been extended to the EU level, illustrated by an emerging 'Anglo-Irish axis' on economic policy particularly over taxation (Prospect July 2001: 71).

Following O'Toole, this suggests that Irish national identity can no longer be understood by reference to Britain because Ireland is now more equal to and less dependent on Britain than it has arguably ever been. As such, there is a prima facie case for an end to the Irish cultural logic of autonomy and dependence as a discursive structure shaping the way the Irish view themselves in relation to others.

If Ireland has finally realised its relative autonomy vis-à-vis Britain, what is the country's position relative to its European and global American integrations, and what does this suggest about the death knell of the cultural logic? For, as O'Toole argues, Ireland is now better defined by reference to its relationship with the European Union and the United States of America than to Britain.

Perhaps as significant an economic event as Ireland becoming officially 'wealthier' than the UK is Irish trade data, released in late 2000, showing that 'the United States has overtaken Britain as the Republic's most important trading partner' and that 'for the first time since trading records were kept, Britain is not the biggest buyer of Irish goods' (Irish Times Nov. 13 2000). However, this historic economic shift in Ireland's economic integrations is not based on the exports of Irish companies to the USA. Instead, it is based on the exports of American TNCs in Ireland to the American market, particularly of organic chemical products like Viagra and personal computers made by Gateway and Dell (ibid).

One might expect that this would lead to a cultural reaction by the Irish political elite against Ireland's increased economic dependence on the US, specifically against American TNCs. Yet, as the above article shows, the main cultural interpretation focuses on

Ireland's increased economic autonomy relative to Britain, not its corresponding increased economic dependence on America. This indicates the continuation of the noticeable and yet unexplained silence among the Irish political elite about this aspect of Ireland's economic integrations, briefly discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight. It also suggests that the cultural logic is alive if not kicking.

Part of the explanation involves other events and interpretations of Ireland's changing relationships with the USA and the European Union. In the summer of 2000, two Irish ministers made well-publicised speeches concerning Ireland's relationships with the EU and the US. Both of these speeches questioned the Irish public political consensus in favour of continued European economic, political and cultural integration, though notably neither questioned enlargement.

The first speech was made in July by Mary Harney, the Tanaiste or Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Department of Enterprise, Trade & Employment, from the Progressive Democrats, the neo-liberal junior partner in the coalition government with the populist Fianna Fail party. In the most quoted part of her speech, she directly compared Ireland's European and American relationships, claiming that 'Geographically we are closer to Berlin than Boston. Spiritually we are probably a lot closer to Boston than Berlin' (Harney 2000). She then focused on Ireland's American economic integration, suggesting that Ireland has used its political autonomy to carve out a 'little America' within Ireland in socio-economic terms, attractive to American TNCs:

> What really makes Ireland attractive to corporate America is the kind of economy which we have created here. When Americans come here they find a country that believes in the incentive power of low taxation. They find a country that believes in economic liberalisation. They find a country that believes in essential regulation but not over-regulation. On looking further afield in Europe they find also that not every European country believes in all of these things (ibid).

What most other European countries believe in is 'the European way...built on a strong concern for social harmony and social inclusion' (ibid). This means that European governments are 'prepared to intervene strongly through the tax and regulatory systems to achieve their desired outcomes' (ibid). However, Ireland as a country spiritually closer to Boston has 'tended to steer a course between the two', yet has 'sailed closer to the

American shore than the European one' (ibid). Having symbolically chosen the American over the European model of economic development, Harney asserts Ireland's political and economic autonomy vis-à-vis the EU, claiming that further European integration is against Ireland's national interest:

> We have succeeded because even though we are members of the European Union...we still retain very substantial freedom to control our political and economic destiny...This model works. It allows us to achieve our full economic potential for the first time in our history as an independent state...There are some who want to create a more centralized Europe, a federal Europe, with key economic decisions being taken at Brussels. I don't think that that that would be in Ireland's interests...I believe in a Europe of independent states, not a United States of Europe (ibid).

Thus, Ireland has become economically successful - despite its EU membership – by exercising its political autonomy, and consciously choosing the American over the European model of development. There is no mention of social partnership, reducing the national agreements to neo-liberal tax cutting exercises. And, somewhere along the way, Ireland's FDI for exports policy became an American FDI for American exports policy, necessitating the creation of a little America out of Ireland. After all, who needs a United States of Europe when there is a little United States of Ireland?

With respect to the cultural logic, Harney suggests that Ireland is not economically dependent on America because Ireland has autonomously chosen to become dependent on America, as part of Ireland's national development strategy. In this way, the dominant version's fear of re-dependency on a British substitute becomes symbolically transformed into Irish autonomy. American dependency becomes Irish autonomy. Further, Ireland's economic dependency on America is re-interpreted as autonomy because it has 'ended' Ireland's historic economic dependency on Britain, and has buttressed Ireland's political autonomy to choose its own socio-economic policies vis-à-vis the European Union.

In September 2000, the government's critique of the EU was extended to include a European threat to Irish culture and identity. This second speech by Eamon de Valera's granddaughter, Sile de Valera, Minister for Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands, was made at Boston College in the United States. She begins by arguing that a 'combination'

of Irish state policies 'brought about' the Celtic Tiger, before adding that 'our ability to take advantage of our membership of the European Union has also been an important factor' (De Valera 2000). While she accepts that the European Union 'has been good for Ireland', she also claims that 'it is not the cornerstone of what our nation is and should be' (ibid).

Explaining this point, she acknowledges that 'when we joined [the EEC] in the early 1970s, there were fears that membership would make us less Irish, would damage our unique identity, culture and traditions' (ibid). She admits that this 'didn't happen', but adds that it did not occur because the EEC's policy focus 'in those earlier years was on economic progress and development' (ibid). However, as the EEC turned from the EC to the EU, 'decisions, other than economic ones, were taken' (ibid). Apparently, these decisions were made without the agreement of Irish governments or, if agreed to, 'seemed secondary to us at the time' (ibid).

Now, she proclaims, 'we have found that directives and regulations agreed in Brussels can often seriously impinge on our identity, culture and traditions' (ibid). This new European threat to Irish culture and identity leads her to reject 'closer integration' as 'a move I would not personally favour' and one that 'is not necessarily in our interests' (ibid). Instead, she desires 'a future in which Ireland will exercise a more vigilant, a more questioning attitude to the European Union', while embracing 'our close and very important ties with the United States of America' (ibid). These ties include the historical 'deep bonds between us' and recent 'American investment in Ireland' (ibid).

As a descendant of Eamon de Valera, it is not surprising that Sile de Valera articulates a 'traditional' cultural nationalist position. It is surprising that the Anglo-American global cultural threat, expressed in the dominant version, has been transferred to the European Union. It is also surprising that the 'close ties' between Ireland and the US do not include contemporary America's global mass consumer culture in which Irish artists play a subsidiary and contributory bit part.

For De Valera, the unspecified EU cultural directives and regulations have become the new threats to Ireland's cultural autonomy and national identity. She does not make clear, though, how Ireland's 'strong' culture is threatened by EU policies, which have been accepted by the Irish government including Minister De Valera. The EU's cultural policies are interpreted as political domination over Irish culture, suggesting a fear that Ireland may become culturally dependent on European culture and identity. This questions the dominant version's belief that Irish political equality is best achieved within the EU, transforming this equality into potential EU political domination over Ireland.

In this context, it is significant that De Valera and Harney explain Ireland's Celtic Tiger success internally as the result of Irish state policies, including those based on attracting American TNCs. For Harney, the EU is a socialist rock to be steered away from on course for the American way, while De Valera thinks that EU membership is good for Ireland as long as the Irish take advantage of membership in pursuit of the national interest.

This substantially changes the dominant version, explaining Ireland's socio-economic development by the autonomous actions of the Irish state and the political elite, instead of indirectly through an Irish strong culture. It also reverses the pillar of the dominant version, that peripheral Ireland has no economic options outside of the EU. Ireland's economic dependency on Europe has been turned into Ireland's economic autonomy to choose the 'right' neo-liberal policies, transforming Ireland from a peripheral part of Europe with no options to a dynamic little America in Europe. It is the EU that has become peripheral to Ireland, except as a market for American exports from Ireland.

This is buttressed by the fact that Ireland will become a net contributor to the EU for the first time in the next few years. The coming end to the massive net transfers to Ireland means that the EU is more readily reduced to a process of economic integration, as a big market for large American firms in little Ireland. To continue attracting these firms, Ireland must maintain its neo-liberal socio-economic policies, fighting against European social democratic demands to increase economic integration to cover policy areas like taxation. In particular, Ireland must fight to preserve its low corporation tax, arguably the main attraction for American TNCs to locate in Ireland.

Charlie McCreevy, the neo-liberal Fianna Fail Minister of Finance, has been at the forefront of this battle against the EU to harmonise tax policy, in alliance with the British Labour government (Irish Times Nov. 30 1998; Feb. 16 2001; May 29 2001; July 11 2001). He also led Ireland into an official budget reprimand by the European Commission in Februrary 2001 over the inflationary effect of his December 2000 budget, breaking economic policy guidelines agreed to by the Minister (Irish Times Feb. 14 2001; Feb. 17 2001).

In waging this political battle, he has made a number of controversial statements, contributing to the 'Eurosceptic' comments of his ministerial colleagues, Mary Harney and Sile de Valera. In one statement, he argued that 'member-states should retain full responsibility for all direct tax policies', before provocatively adding: 'Some would say that the attempt to introduce stamp duty led also to the American revolution' (Irish Times July 11 2001).

This bizarre comparison between British imperial taxation of American colonists and Europe's attempt to harmonise taxation policies is nonetheless revealing. It reinforces the view that the EU wants to politically dominate Ireland, by suggesting that Ireland is like an EU colony being unfairly taxed without equal political representation. It also symbolically reinforces the closer ties between Ireland and the USA, associating America with the political equality that the political elite associated with the EU in the dominant version.

Taken together with the comments by Harney and De Valera, it transfers Ireland's British dependency to the European Union, and reassigns to America the role of protecting Irish political equality and autonomy. In a final reversal of roles, Britain becomes Ireland's ally in a 'neo-liberal Atlanticist alliance' (Irish Times Feb. 17 2000) against political domination by a social democratic European Union. This shows that the symbolic effect of the cultural logic does not depend on the level of Ireland's structural integration with Britain. Even if Ireland is no longer dependent on Britain, it can still fear dependency on other integration processes, and may even ally with Britain as an autonomous equal

against these other integrations. Is there not a clearer expression of the Celtic Tiger's cultural logic than this?

However, there are a number of limits to this discussion of the Celtic Tiger's cultural logic. First, the analysis is based solely on published statements from three government ministers, not interviews with fifty-four members of the Irish political elite. Second, there are clear political biases in the small sample, reflecting the opinions of two neo-liberals and one 'traditional' cultural nationalist. It is doubtful whether this sample is representative of the present Irish government, let alone the wider political elite. Yet, the results do suggest a change in the present political elite's cultural logic away from the dominant version of 1993-94, re-interpreting Ireland's multiple integrations to better fit the rapidly changing conditions of the Celtic Tiger. In brief, Europe has replaced Britain as the enemy, and America has replaced Europe as Ireland's best friend.

Whether or not this is the political elite's new dominant version is debateable. It is certainly unlike the emergent versions identified in the earlier discursive versions, reflecting a socialist red-green and feminist interpretation of Ireland's integrations. It certainly does not appear that these emergent versions have become part of the political elite's re-interpretation of Ireland's multiple integrations in the Celtic Tiger.

It does appear, though, that the political elite's re-interpretation has become widely diffused among the Irish population. Specifically, the Irish electorate's rejection of the Nice Treaty referendum on June 7th, 2001 by a 54 to 46 per cent majority indicates a popular change in attitudes towards Ireland's European integration (see Irish Times June 9 2001; Irish Independent June 9 2001; Sunday Independent June 10 2001). However, it is difficult to interpret the meaning of the referendum result, given the low turn out of 35 per cent, and the fact that 53 per cent of the Yes vote in the 1998 Amsterdam referendum did not turn out to vote in the Nice referendum (Irish Times June 23 2001).

Nonetheless, there is statistical evidence to suggest that a 'pro-independence' attitude 'was the biggest factor leading to a No vote', ahead of other factors such as opposition to Ireland's 'participation in the Rapid Reaction Force and the unacceptability of the

provisions on the commissionership and the reweighting of votes' (Irish Times June 9 2001). Other factors cited in the media debate include concerns for Irish neutrality, laws on abortion, sovereignty and national identity, and agreement with the 'Eurosceptic' attitudes expressed above by Irish government ministers on taxation, the budget reprimand, Irish culture, an Ireland spiritually closer to America and a Europe of independent states (ibid; Irish Independent June 9 2001; Sunday Independent June 10 2001). This suggests that Ireland's autonomy from and dependence on the European Union has become a predominant issue among the Irish political elite and population in the Celtic Tiger.

This does not mean that Irish people have turned against the EU, or further European integration including enlargement. For example, the Eurobarometer survey conducted in April and May 2001, before the June referendum, shows that 'Irish people remain more enthusiastic about EU membership than other Europeans', with 72 per cent believing that 'EU membership is a good thing', 83 per cent agreeing that the EU has benefited Ireland, and 59 per cent supporting enlargement' (Irish Times July 18 2001). These figures are well above the EU averages of 45 per cent who believe that membership is a good thing for their country, 48 per cent who agree that membership has benefited their state, and 43 per cent who support enlargement (ibid).

This contradictory evidence of Irish attitudes to the EU may be explained by the salience of Irish national identity in Irish attitudes, and by the significance of the cultural logic in discursively structuring these attitudes in the Celtic Tiger. In terms of national identity, Irish national pride in the spring of 2000 was the highest in the EU at 98 per cent compared to an EU average of 83 per cent, while the percentage of those feeling Irish only was 56 per cent, the third highest in the EU, significantly above the EU average of 41 per cent (Eurobarometer 53 2000: 82-3). These figures are not surprising given the socio-economic success of the Celtic Tiger, and indicate the continuing salience of Irish national identity to Irish people, whatever the content of that identity. Yet one can be proud of being Irish and feel Irish only, while believing that EU membership is good for Ireland and that the EU benefits Ireland.

This does not in itself explain the change in Irish attitudes to the EU shown by the Nice Treaty referendum results. What does explain this change in attitudes is the political elite's re-interpretation of Ireland's multiple integrations during the Celtic Tiger, and the diffusion of this re-interpretation to the Irish people. Ireland's socio-economic success has heightened the salience of Irish national identity and a pro-independence nationalism among the Irish people. The Irish government, as the dominant group in the political elite, has drawn on the symbolic resources of Irish identity and nationalism to re-interpret Ireland's British, European and global American integrations along neo-liberal and 'traditional' cultural nationalist lines.

In this re-interpretation, the desire for Irish autonomy and fear of dependency has been transferred from Britain to the European Union, while the dominant version's belief that Ireland best exercised its political autonomy within the EU has been transferred to the country's global American integration. Thus, Irish people can be proud of being Irish, believe that EU membership has been good for Ireland, and fear that the country is surrendering its autonomy to and becoming dependent on the EU. These contradictory attitudes can be held at the same time by individual actors, and be used to explain why the Irish electorate chose to vote No to the Nice Treaty or, more significantly, chose not to vote all.

What does this mean for Ireland's reconstructed economic nationalism based on incorporating social partnership into the country's development model? The Irish cultural logic focuses on Ireland's loose external integrations, shaping the way the Irish political elite and people interpret the country's British, European and global American integrations in terms of Irish autonomy and dependence. It is fundamentally concerned with 'the reproduction of the structures of domination' (Giddens 1984: 258) or 'power relations...of autonomy and dependence' (1993: 243) affecting Ireland in an international context. This makes sense given the origins of the cultural logic in the nationalist struggle for independence from Britain and the British Empire.

The cultural logic does not, however, focus on the structures of domination in an Irish national context. Specifically, it does not address internal power relations of autonomy and

dependency within Ireland in Marxist class or Weberian socio-economic terms. As discussed in Chapter Six, Ireland's Celtic Tiger economy has resulted in growing class and socio-economic inequality in Irish society (Allen 2000; Cantillon et al 2001; O'Hearn 1997; Nolan et al 2000; see, also, UN Human Development Report 2001). The government's attempts to turn Ireland into a little America has increased these inequalities, distorting an already distorted tax system in favour of companies and the rich, while reducing the social welfare component of the budget in real terms. This has led Allen to argue that the dominant classes and state bodies in the Celtic Tiger economy use an ideology of social partnership, masking these inequalities in a cloak of national consensus about Ireland's development (2000: 35).

From this perspective, Ireland's reconstructed economic nationalism is an integral part of the ideology, overriding class and socio-economic concerns about rising inequality with a resurgent nationalism and pride in being Irish. The cultural logic contributes to this ideology by over-emphasising fears of a European dependency, and transforming Ireland's real economic dependency on American TNCs into a bulwark of Irish autonomy. It has also contributed to ignoring the class and socio-economic based dependency of a significant minority of the Irish people, focusing on Ireland's external power relations to the neglect of its internal structures of domination. In this sense, the Celtic Tiger's cultural logic is an integral part of a national ideology of social partnership, that emerged as the Irish political elite's dominant ideology (Turner and Abercrombie in Giddens and Held 1982) in 1987, and diffused through the organs of the state and civil society to become a hegemonic ideology (Gramsci 1971) during the 1990s.

9.5 Conclusion

The historical discussion of Irish cultural nationalism is significant for a number of reasons. First, many of the specific beliefs and attitudes articulated by the members of the contemporary Irish political elite in the discursive versions can be directly traced to earlier generations of the 'Irish' elite during the first to the third revivals. These include an Irish search for equality with and autonomy from Britain; a desire for a place among the nations of the developed world; a belief in Irish cultural distinctiveness; and an inferiority complex towards and a dependency culture on Britain. In this sense, the roots of the Irish

cultural logic autonomy and dependency extend deep into Irish history while continuing to penetrate right into the contemporary period.

Second, the discussion of the period from 1870 to 1921 shows that the construction of 'traditional' nationalism was rooted in this cultural logic of autonomy and dependency, defining Irishness in categories opposite to those of imperial Britishness. This dichotomisation is not simply explicable in terms of the domination of a small by a large neighbouring state or of an ethnic nation by a multi-national empire built around an ethnic core. While both are certainly cumulative factors in the Irish construction of 'traditional' Irishness, the key additional factor seems to be the intensification of the British racialisation of Irishness during the late Victorian era.

Third, the analysis of Irish cultural nationalism in the 1870 to 1921 period indicates that Irish society was both more internally diverse and externally influenced than in the following period from 1922 to 1957. The complex socio-cultural interactions between Irish Catholic, Anglo-Irish Protestant, British, European and American cultures suggests that Irish society from 1870 to 1921 was better understood in terms of cultural hybridity and multiple identities than an essentialist 'traditional' identity. The extent of Irish internal diversity and external influences provided 'Irish' nationalists from 1870 to 1921 with a wide range of political, economic and socio-cultural strategies and identity options. However, these were greatly reduced by 'traditional' nationalists in their dichotomisation of the Irish-British relationship, reducing Irish strategies and identity choices.

Fourth, the contemporary period from 1958 represents a return to the internal diversity and external influences of the 1870 to 1921 period, subject to differences between the periods. For example, contemporary Irish internal diversity reflects the decline of Irish Protestants and Jews, the rise of new Catholics, and an even newer Muslim ethnic group. Ireland's external influences also include a European Union and a global American culture, both unheard of in the earlier period. Arguably, if one adds the years from 1870 to 1921 to those from 1958, the norm for Ireland over the last one hundred and thirty years is a society based primarily on internal diversity and external influences, not the protectionist socio-cultural homogeneity of the 'traditional' period.

Finally, analysis of Irish political elite and popular attitudes shows the continuing significance of the cultural logic in the Celtic Tiger period after 1994. Ireland has ended its structural dependency on Britain, and has achieved relative political equality with the British state. This has not meant the end of the symbolic influence of the cultural logic on Irish attitudes to the country's loose multiple integrations. The Irish desire for autonomy and fear of dependency has been transferred from Britain to the EU. Further, the dominant version's belief that Ireland achieved political equality within the EU has been transferred to its global American integration. This cultural logic ignores class and socio-economic inequality in Irish society, focusing on power relations in Ireland's external integrations, interpreted through the prism of Irish nationalism and identity. This contributes to a national ideology of social partnership in Ireland, masking the increased inequality of the Celtic Tiger, while transforming Ireland's dependency on American TNCs into a successful exercise of Irish national autonomy.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION: LOOSE INTEGRATIONS AND THE USES OF NATIONALISM

10.1 Introduction

This concluding chapter is divided into five parts. The first compares the Irish sectoral and national integrations, clarifying the trajectory of Ireland's loose integrations. Ireland's principal trajectory of loose integrations is defined as a move from a British colonial to a European integration in the context of globalisation, mediated through the country's national integration by the Irish state. The second part considers the relationship between levels of European integration, degrees of autonomy and type of relationship at the sectoral levels of Irish society. This suggests that there is an optimal level of loose integration with regards to European, national and sub-national autonomy.

The third part examines the uses of Irish nationalism by the organisational leaders and the members of the Irish political elite compared to those indicated by the literature reviews. It focuses on the defensive and proactive uses of Irish nationalism, tracing the defensive uses to the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency, and suggesting that proactive uses are best understood in terms of Irish interdependence. The fourth part discusses the contemporary role of nationalism and nation-states particularly in European countries with respect to multiple integration processes. This section examines the Irish uses of nationalism in a broader European context following Smith (1995) and highlights the generally negative portrayal of nationalism within the expanded Europe of the post-cold war period. Finally, the fifth part assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the theory of loose multiple integrations as applied to the Irish experience, and as a theory that may be more broadly applicable to other European nation-states.

10.2 Ireland's Trajectory of Loose Integrations

One of the main similarities between the organisational and cultural logics of integrations is that the organisational leaders and the members of the Irish political elite choose to emphasise Ireland's European integration process relative to the Republic's British and global integration processes. This emphasis on Europe is especially clear in the organisational strategies and in the beliefs articulated in the dominant version. These

logics indicate that the principal trajectory for these actors is Ireland's move towards Europe or, more specifically, the European Union.

The literature reviews of the national and sectoral integrations support this general trajectory in the contemporary period. However, the historical literature reviews clearly reveal the significance of Ireland's British integration. The importance of Ireland's British integration process is discussed in the dominant version to support the political elite's belief in the necessity of Ireland's move towards Europe in the contemporary post-1958 period. Further, the residual version explicitly focuses on the significance of Ireland's British integration in the post-independence era up to at least 1957, stressing the country's economic dependence and dependency culture on Britain as well as the Irish state's nationalist reaction against Irish dependency. In this sense, the principal trajectory of Ireland's integrations and identities is better understood as a move from the country's British towards a European integration.

The literature reviews also show the relative influence of Ireland's global integrations at the national and sectoral levels of Irish society in historical and contemporary terms. While not as significant compared to Ireland's historical British or contemporary European integrations, globalisation processes are significant for sectors of Irish society and at the national level. The globalisation of agriculture clearly influences the Irish agricultural sector and the IFA's organisational logic. Economic globalisation influences the Irish trade union movement and the Irish national economy, and figures in SIPTU's organisational logic and the political elite's dominant version. Further, the INTO's leaders and the political elite respond to the influence of an English speaking, Anglo-American global culture. As such, we can revise the principal trajectory of Ireland's integration processes to a move from a British towards a European integration in the context of globalisation.

One of the main similarities between the sectoral and national integrations is the influence of the Irish state in mediating these external integrations in independent Ireland. At the sectoral level, the literature reviews show the significant role of the Irish state in Irish agriculture until Ireland's accession to the EEC; the state's predominant position in Irish primary education through the concordat with the Churches; and the state's increasing

influence in shaping changes in the trade union movement particularly in the post-WWII period. At the national level, the literature review also shows the influence of the Irish state in the post-1958 period in guiding the internal and external 'opening up' of Ireland to the country's external integrations. The state's opening up of Ireland has developed in tandem with its continuing reconstruction of Irish nationalism, adapting the country's national integration to the changing conditions of the Republic's British, European and global integrations. However, the Irish state's role in these areas is not readily acknowledged by either the organisational leaders or the Irish political elite in their logics, except by the leaders of SIPTU in its capacity as a participant in the national agreements. Nonetheless, this necessitates a final revision of Ireland's principal trajectory of integrations as a move from a British colonial to a European integration in the context of globalisation, mediated through the country's national integration by the Irish state.

10.3 Is There an Optimal Level of European Integration?

A comparison of the three Irish sectoral integrations into the European Union suggests that levels of European integration influence collective actors' degrees of autonomy in decision-making. At the sectoral levels of Irish society, the high level of agricultural integration into the EU constrains the IFA's organisational autonomy and makes the farming community dependent on EU policies and monies. This occurs despite the fact that EU decision-making in agriculture is based on 'pooled sovereignty' for this sector at the European level through the EU institutions. The Irish state, like the other member states, participates in the European level decision-making for the agricultural sector as relatively equal partners.

At the other end of the scale, the low level of European educational integration, particularly for primary education, results in a high degree of autonomy with respect to European institutions. Yet this relative autonomy is primarily retained by the Irish state, leaving the INTO constrained its organisational autonomy and fairly dependent on the Irish state, even though the organisation is referred to as an educational partner. In this case, greater European integration may benefit the sectoral level, increasing the INTO's autonomy with regard to the Irish state by raising the organisation's access to European

institutions and policy-makers as well as its use of European models and standards in national level negotiations.

In between these two sectors, the European integration of trade union movements can be characterised in terms of a medium level integration resulting in a medium degree of autonomy. As a dominant part of the Irish trade union movement, the leaders of SIPTU used their relative autonomy and independence to devise an organisational logic which is outward-looking, responding to the sector's British, European and global integrations. Further, SIPTU's leaders developed their organisational logic in the context of an alliance with the Irish state and other social partners in response to Ireland's national crisis of the 1980s. The development of SIPTU's logic also coincided with the Irish state's reconstruction of economic nationalism in response to the country's national crisis, adding European models of neo-corporatism and social partnership to the state's 1958 policy of export led industrialisation based on foreign direct investment by overseas firms. The Irish state's reconstruction of economic nationalism changed Ireland's national integration by explicitly Europeanising the management of the economy through an Irish form of neo-corporatism and social partnership. Yet, it also Americanised the Irish economy and society by depending on high-tech US TNCs to drive economic growth and employment, resulting in increased social inequality. In this way, Ireland's reconstructed nationalism contributed to a national ideology of social partnership to mask this inequality.

This alignment of SIPTU's organisational logic with the state's reconstructed economic nationalism was fortuitous, emerging under the exceptional circumstances of the country's national crisis. Yet the success of SIPTU's organisational logic compared to those developed by the leaders of the IFA and the INTO suggests that the sector's medium level European integration may have contributed to this success. The relative autonomy afforded to the organisation with respect to European institutions and the Irish state provided an opportunity for the leaders of SIPTU to devise a strategy that was not dependent on EU or national policies. Instead, the SIPTU's leaders could develop their own organisational logic, drawing on European and national level alliances, models and policies.

This comparison between the Irish sectoral integrations into the European Union suggests that there may be an optimal level of European integration in terms of providing the highest degree of organisational autonomy at sectoral levels of society relative to the national state and European institutions. In particular, a medium level of integration appears to provide the relative autonomy for actors in sectoral level organisations to successfully devise their own logics in response to loose multiple integrations.

One must be careful not to generalise too much from the SIPTU example, given the exceptional circumstances of Ireland's crisis. It may be that the relative success of SIPTU's organisational logic within the sector's medium level of European integration has as much to do with its alliance with the Irish state, boosted by the state's use of Irish nationalism to bring the new social partners together in the national agreements to overcome the country's national crisis. From this perspective, the level of sectoral European integration may be less significant in terms of organisational autonomy than the opportunity for sub-national actors to ally with the state in a national cause furthered by the use of nationalism.

10.4 Organisational and National Uses of Irish Nationalism

The Irish organisational leaders and members of the political elite primarily use Irish nationalism in their logics of integrations with respect to their identity choices. At the sectoral level, one of the main results is that the level of integration cannot predict the uses of nationalism. Thus, the leaders of the IFA and the INTO both respond to their high and low levels of European integration by defensively using 'traditional' Irish cultural nationalism to protect Irish culture and Irish identity from European and global identities. While the leaders of SIPTU are less defensive, incorporating European and American HRM roles for Irish trade unionists, their organisational logic still exhibits a residual rejection of British and global identities, negatively associating each with Thatcherism and TNC driven global capitalism. Further, the leaders of SIPTU selectively focus on a European identity that they prefer: one based on the European social democratic model. In the process, they reject a European identity construct that incorporates neo-liberalism, despite the fact that a neo-liberal Americanisation of Ireland has been incorporated alongside European social partnership in the Celtic Tiger.

The members of the Irish political elite in the dominant version also use Irish cultural nationalism defensively against British, European and global identities. This is most clearly expressed through their beliefs in the cultural survival of a strong Irish culture and a core/surface identity construct of Irishness. Yet, the historical and contemporary literature reviews indicate that Irish nationalism can been used in a more proactive sense, expressing varieties of Irish nationalism adapted to Ireland's internal diversity and external influences, and to Irish cultural hybridity and multiple identities. For example, a number of Irish nationalists expressed forms of Irish nationalism more suited to Ireland's internal national and ethnic diversity, and to the country's British, European and American influences in the latter stages of Britain colonial rule from the 1870s to 1921. Further, the literature review of the contemporary post-1958 period indicates that the Irish state has been engaged in a reconstruction of Irish economic, political and cultural nationalism, adapting Ireland's national integration to the 'opening up' of the country internally and externally.

As such, Irish national and sub-national actors have responded to Ireland's multiple integrations by using Irish nationalism **defensively** to protect Irish cultural identity, and **proactively** to adapt the country's national integration to the influences of Ireland's external British, European and global integrations. Without doubt, the principal use of Irish nationalism has been a defensive one, reflecting the continuing influence of the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency within Irish cultural nationalism on Irish collective actors at the national and sectoral levels of Irish society. This defensive use of nationalism is seen culturally in the dominant version against the EU and the global Anglo-American culture, and politically in the cultural logic of the Celtic Tiger against the European Union.

However, the defensiveness of these reactions by the Irish political elite neither accurately reflect the empirical reality of Ireland's multiple integrations, nor the state's on-going reconstruction of Irish nationalism, a process of revision almost wholly unacknowledged by the Irish political elite themselves. In this way, the social survival of the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency within Irish nationalism distorts the reality of Ireland's

contemporary integration processes even for members of the political elite in the Irish state, leading to their defensive use of nationalism against the country's external integrations.

This distortion can be addressed by using a proactive Irish nationalism, drawing on the contemporary evidence for Ireland's multiple interdependencies presented in the transactional analysis, and the varieties of Irish nationalism discussed in the review of the 1870 to 1921 period. Nonetheless, Irish national and sectoral actors use defensive and proactive forms of Irish nationalism to interpret Ireland's loose multiple integrations. These Irish uses of nationalism to interpret Ireland's loose multiple integrations may also have relevance for actors in other EU member states.

10.5 Nationalism, European States and Loose Multiple Integrations

Following Smith (1995), the Irish uses of nationalism can be viewed as part of a wider, common response by actors within European nation-states to external influences such as European integration and globalisation. For Smith:

> The ethnic cultural values that underpin nations are unlikely to disappear, even when they take new forms or change direction. Each generation of the nation redefines its understanding of those cultural values, of the national heritage it has received, in the light of changed economic, social and political conditions, including perceived threats and opportunities outside its borders (p64).

Smith's position is relevant to the Irish experience in at least four senses. First, he highlights the construction and on-going reconstruction of nationalism by collective actors within nation-states based on national cultures. Second, he indicates that the reconstruction of nationalism by collective actors within nations-states is often in response to changing conditions such as processes of European and global integration. Third, he suggests that the response of national actors to changes in external integrations may be expressed in the language of nationalism as a threat or opportunity. Fourth, he argues that European integration and globalisation have not superseded nation-states or subsumed nationalism.

For our purposes, we can interpret the use of nationalism by actors in response to an external threat as a form of defensive nationalism, and a response to an external opportunity as a form of proactive nationalism. In this way, Smith's position allows for at least two 'nationalist' responses by actors with respect to external integrations. This supports the result that the level of integration is not a good predictor of the logics devised by actors within states, since any level of supranational integration can lead to a defensive or proactive use of nationalism.

This does not mean that these two nationalist responses to integrations are the only ones possible. National and sub-national actors in European states can respond to multiple integrations in a variety of ways. For example, they can devise logics based on their rational interests in terms of material gain, political power, social status or non-nationalist cultural issues. Further, actors may respond by devising logics that support further integration in their state, for example, using the values of Europeanism with respect to European integration. These actors may also respond to multiple integrations by devising logics that mix nationalist, interest based, European and global motives.

Within this range, the Irish experience supports Smith's argument concerning the continuing influence of nationalism for actors in European states in the expanded Europe, and increasingly interconnected world of the post-cold war period. Of particular importance in this period has been the tendency to focus almost exclusively on the use of defensive forms of nationalism by actors within EU member states, and in the newer states created from the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc.

In this new Europe, nationalism is often characterised solely in negative terms, associated with ethnic chauvinism, tribalism, racism, isolationism, aggressive militarism or secessionism as expressed by former communist leaders, leftist, right-wing, nationalist and extreme right political parties, and 'traditional' social groups. In this way, nationalism is interpreted as a wholly negative phenomena, applied in a broad brushstroke to tribalism in the Balkans or the Caucasus; the aggressive militarism of Serbia; the ethnic chauvinism of Hungary or Turkey with regard to minority ethnic groups; the separatism of the IRA in

Ireland or ETA in the Spanish Basque country; the racism of the French National or the Austrian Freedom Party; and the isolationism of the British Conservative Party.

What is singularly missing in this caricature is a balanced portrayal of the uses of nationalism by actors in European states. To a certain extent, the Irish experience offers an example of how actors can use nationalism defensively and proactively in response to multiple integrations. The Irish state's on-going reconstruction of Irish nationalism from 1958 to better fit the conditions of the country's integrations shows that even actors in small, peripheral European states such as Ireland have the relative autonomy to act within increasing levels of European and global interdependence. This suggests that actors in older and newer European states can use nationalism proactively in response to the structural constraints and opportunities of loose multiple integrations. Could this be the new Irish voice broadcast from a small island on the periphery of Europe to the edges of the post-cold war world?

Yet, the Irish experience shows that the use of nationalism by actors to interpret external multiple integrations can become part of a national ideology, masking relations of domination and silencing the voices of those made internally dependent. This ideological use of nationalism is not explained by the theory of loose multiple integrations, and limits its applicability to the Irish experience. This issue is addressed in the last section of the conclusion that assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the theory of loose multiple integrations as applied to the Irish experience and, more broadly, as a theory that could be applied to other European states.

10.6 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Theory of Loose Multiple Integrations

There are a number of strengths to the theory of loose multiple integrations in terms of explaining the Irish experience of multiple integrations. First, the theory allows one to consider the historical and contemporary interrelationships between a number of integration processes across economic, political and socio-cultural dimensions. This is a particular strength compared to theories of European integration, globalisation and nationalism that tend to focus on one integration process.

Second, the theory provides for the differential effects of integration processes on national and sub-national levels of society. The three Irish sectors in the study confront different sets of integration processes, and the sectoral sets differ from those that are significant at the national level. Thus, economic globalisation is significant in the set of agrarian integrations, but not for primary education; a Roman Catholic integration is important for primary education, but not for the other two sectors; and international socialism is a factor in the trade union movement's integrations, but neither for the other two nor for Ireland at the national level. Further, similar sets of integrations do not necessarily have the same structural effects. For example, the literature reviews show that the structural effects of European integration differ within the three sectors and between these sectors and the country as a whole.

Third, the theory allows for different interpretations of these integrations by national and sub-national actors. These different interpretations are shown in the organisational logics expressed by the leaders of the IFA, INTO and SIPTU in Chapters Four, Five and Six, and in the discursive versions articulated by the members of the political elite in Chapter Seven. The organisational leaders develop different logics to interpret and respond to their specific sectoral integrations, and these organisational logics differ from the discursive versions of the political elite in response to the country's integration processes. Further, these different interpretations can be independent of the structural effects of integrations.

Fourth, the theory provides for changes in the structural effects of integrations. The literature reviews show that a certain integration process may structurally and symbolically dominate a sector or the country for a period of time, but that this dominance may recede in stages or abruptly. There also may be a transfer in dominance over time periods from one process of integration to another. Thus, Ireland's British integration has been structurally and symbolically dominant since the colonial period, but its dominance has gradually receded since independence. On the other hand, Europe's dominance of Irish agriculture occurred abruptly with Ireland's accession, continuing a series that transferred dominance from Britain and the Irish state to the EU.

Fifth, the theory allows for changes in actors' interpretations of integrations. Thus, the leaders of the Irish trade union movement changed their response to European integration from opposition in the early 1970s to support by the mid-1980s, re-interpreting Ireland's European integration as a positive benefit to trade unions and the country in the process. Further, the existence of the residual and dominant versions among the same members of the Irish political elite shows that the generations of the elite can change their collective interpretations of Ireland's integrations. It also shows that individual members of the political elite can change their interpretations over their life course, and that an individual member may hold seemingly contradictory interpretations at the same time.

Sixth, the theory can support the existence of a discursive structure, like the cultural logic of autonomy and dependency, that is deeply embedded in the language of Irish cultural nationalism, and reproduced by the Irish political elite and people through the socialisation process of becoming Irish. Specifically, the theory's functionalist origins in the Durkheimian tradition via Shil's concepts of integration allows for the continuous reproduction of structures in a national society, shaping the collective interpretations of actors, and in the process 'binding' them into their loosely integrated society.

Finally, the theory provides for the use of nationalism by Irish national and sub-national actors to interpret and respond to Ireland's multiple integrations. This is both one of the main strengths and weaknesses of the theory, and follows from its origins in Shils's concept of loose integrations developed in the historical context of post-colonial and Developed World ethnic nationalist movements. It is a theoretical strength because it explains why actors would use the language of nationalism to interpret loose multiple integrations over other potential 'interpretive schemes' (Giddens 1984: 29).

It is a theoretical weakness because it limits the theory's ability to account for non-nationalist interpretations of integrations such as those based on class, socio-economic interests, power, status and culturally salient issues. It also does not allow actors to mix nationalist interpretations with these other interpretive schemes in response to integrations. Further, it limits the theory's ability to explain nationalist misinterpretations of loose

structural integrations, and ideologies that systematically distort internal social reality in favour of dominant classes, socio-economic groups and state bodies.

Another weakness is that the theory does not adequately conceptualise conflict and relations of domination between the different 'parts' of a loosely integrated society, particularly over non-nationalist issues such as those above. It also does not consider the influence of these conflicts and relations between actors, social groups, organisations and institutions in terms of the integration logics developed by actors, and the uses of these logics in these internal conflicts and relations of domination.

To overcome these theoretical weaknesses would require building a revised theory of loose multiple integrations that incorporates these factors as structural influences and interpretive schemes. For example, a revised theory that incorporated factors such as class, gender, the environment, ethnicity and racism along with nationalism would be more applicable to other European states in which nationalism is not as dominant an issue as in a post-colonial country like Ireland. Building this revised theory is beyond the scope of the present project.

What does this mean for the Irish voice among the voices of the world? Arguably, the success of the Celtic Tiger has meant that the Irish voice is no longer scarcely heard, and that others want to overhear what the Irish are saying, particularly other smaller peripheral states in Europe and the Developing World. But what is the Irish voice saying to them? Is it saying that actors can use nationalism proactively and defensively, in response to the structural constraints and opportunities of loose multiple integrations, to develop their economies and societies while protecting their cultures? Or is it saying that actors can use nationalism in these ways to develop their countries while ideologically masking social inequality, silencing the voices of those left behind? And where is the voice of De Valera's spiritual and intellectual values amidst Ireland's materialism and social inequalities?

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