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Host(ile) Country: Immigrants and the Populist Right Surge

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Doctor of Philosophy

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this dissertation is entirely my own work and that it has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at this or any other university.

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Abstract

The rise of populist right parties represents one of the most significant political transformations in contemporary Western European politics. Following the refugee crisis, these formerly marginalised parties entered the political mainstream, positioning themselves as defenders of national values and issue-owners on immigration. While extensive research has documented the sources of populist right support and its effects on party systems, public opinion, and policy-making, less attention has been paid to how this political shift impacts immigrants. This dissertation addresses this gap by examining the relationship between electoral support for populist right parties and three outcomes related to immigrant integration: political trust, generalised social trust, and mental health. The theoretical framework argues that all three outcomes depend on whether immigrants perceive the host-country context as benevolent, open, and accepting. The central argument is that populist right electoral support and legitimisation signal increasing hostility toward immigrants, which is negatively associated with all three outcomes.

Chapter 1 investigates the relationship between populist right electoral support and immigrants' political trust. The argument is that electoral support signals the credibility of the populist right to undermine the procedural fairness principles that support immigrants' political trust. Using two-way fixed effects and heterogeneous event studies with European Social Survey data, the analysis demonstrates that overall political trust remains unrelated to higher electoral support for populist right parties. However, a robust negative relationship is found for trust in law and order institutions—particularly the legal system—especially among first-generation immigrants. This suggests that the credibility of the populist right threat depends on the type of institutions that immigrants evaluate.

Chapter 2 examines how populist right support relates to generalised social trust. The argument is that higher electoral support signals increasing hostility toward immigrants and is associated with eroding institutional quality, contributing to their sense of exclusion. Using two-way fixed effects and heterogeneous event studies, the findings reveal that negative relationships emerge primarily during periods of heightened populist right salience following the refugee crisis after 2015, rather than uniformly across the observation period. Perceived discrimination and Muslim identity moderate this relationship among first-generation immigrants. Higher levels of populist right support are also related to lower levels of generalised social trust among second-generation immigrants in the post-2015 period, though this relationship is not moderated by perceived discrimination.

Chapter 3 explores the association between mental health and legitimisation of the populist right. The argument is that legitimisation lowers the costs of expressing anti-immigrant prejudice and shifts immigrants' appraisal of discrimination toward more pervasive, stable, and internal attributions—heightening stress and worsening mental health among immigrants. Using United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study data for 2010 and 2015, the study examines the association between immigrant self-reported mental health and the first entry of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) into the House of Commons. Before-after event studies comparing 2010 (when UKIP held no seats) with 2015 (when UKIP first won seats) reveal no statistically significant relationship, a null result attributed to the distinctive circumstances of UKIP's entry into the House of Commons in 2015.

Keywords: immigration, political trust, generalised social trust, mental health, populist right

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Declaration of Generative AI in the Writing Process

I used Cursor to assist with debugging and optimising the code written for the data analysis underlying this dissertation. I used Claude to assist with grammar and spelling corrections during the preparation of this work. I reviewed and edited all content afterward and take full responsibility for the final manuscript.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In 2023, the German media reported a significant spike in support for the populist far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD, Alternative für Deutschland). This openly anti-immigrant party recorded a sudden increase in support in opinion polls, jumping from 16% of national support to 22% within a course of several summer months in 2023 (POLITICO 2022). Following the spike in polls, German public broadcaster, Deutsche Welle (DW) interviewed a number of immigrants and minority individuals in eastern parts of Germany (Glucroft 2023). Interviewed immigrants from Thuringia reported an increase in incidences of open racism against them and most of them reported feeling less safe in public due to increased support for the AfD (Glucroft 2023). Both reporters and interviewed immigrants connected increased worries of immigrants with surging AfD support. For a lot of immigrants, sharp turn on immigration in Germany and elsewhere in Europe may bring changes that leave them in a precarious and insecure position regarding their social status and their future.

What makes this story rather interesting is that it represents one of the rare media reports on how immigrants perceive and feel about the rising support for the populist right. The fate of immigrants in Europe has been a subject of concerns and debate ever since the Syrian refugee crisis (Mandić 2023).¹ increased the visibility of culturally diverse immigrants in Western Europe. The inflow of immigrants during the refugee crisis came just as a continuation of a long process of mass labour immigration, which intensified in Western Europe in the aftermath of WWII that boosted the renaissance of devastated economies (Dancygier and Laitin 2014). Post-WWII migrations differed from the previous modern migration waves in Europe, as for the first time former colonial subjects started moving into their former colonial metropole, bringing the level of racial diversity Europe has not experienced before (Favell 2022).

With this in mind, the number of immigrants in Europe is on the rise. According to the International Migration Report, around 57 million immigrants resided in Europe in 2015, a number which increased to 87 million in 2020 (IOM 2024). Data from the Eurostat indicate net migration in Europe is also increasing, from three million people in 2012 to seven million in 2022 (Eurostat 2024). Along with increase in numbers, the pool of immigrants coming to Europe in the first two decades of the 21st century also diversified, with growing number of immigrants from Africa, Asia and Latin America (IOM 2024). Despite a long historical processes of mass immigration, the process that started with the refugee crisis differed by bringing in a large pool of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries (Mandić 2023; Hackett et al. 2019).

The jump in influx of culturally diverse immigrants increased the salience of immigration as a social topic

¹I label the term just as the refugee crisis, as numerous immigrants came to Europe from other countries affected by conflicts, hunger and economic difficulties, such as Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, etc.

(Hatton 2021; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2019). As culturally diverse immigrants came to Europe to stay, the question of integration of a large number of a culturally diverse immigrants came into the centre of a heated political debate about immigration (Hutter and Kriesi 2022). On one hand, European policy-makers observed the emergence of the new pool of potential voters, whose salience will grow with time and whose preferences and identities will have to be accounted for (Dancygier 2017). On the other hand there were lingering fears of immigrants' capabilities to integrate, considering cultural differences, specifically in relation to gender norms, religious tolerance and support for democracy (Statham and Tillie 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2002).

Integration of immigrants still took place despite such ambivalent political atmosphere and doubts about immigrants' capabilities and willingness to integrate. Despite significant generational differences, the literature recorded several persisting traits of immigrants. Among the main traits are on average higher levels of political trust and confidence in institutions (Röder and Mühlau 2012; de Vroome, Hooghe, and Marien 2013; Sun et al. 2024; Quaranta 2025) and less euroscepticism (Isani and Schlipphak 2017). Compared to the natives, immigrants are more religious, especially immigrants from the Muslim-majority countries (Glas 2021; Kogan, Fong, and Reitz 2020; Glas 2021). Paradoxically, immigrants over time usually support left-leaning parties, while they retain conservative social attitudes (Dancygier and Saunders 2006; Strijbis 2014; McCann and Chávez 2016; Moriconi, Peri, and Turati 2022). Finally, the research suggests that immigrants are open to identifying with their host-countries, but that such process can be heavily impeded by perceived discrimination and social isolation (Verkuyten 2005; Verkuyten and Marti-novic 2012; Igarashi 2023; Geurts and Phalet 2025).

Attitudes towards immigration also exist in a sensitive balance between acceptance and rejection. Robust evidence suggests that attitudes towards immigration are rather stable and positive in the long run (Kustov, Laaker, and Reller 2021; Claassen and McLaren 2022). The situation of conditional acceptance was labeled as the immigration consensus (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Valentino et al. 2019; Iyengar et al. 2013). This term denotes a stable preference among residents of immigrant-receiving countries in the Global North for immigrants who are highly educated, skilled and capable of becoming self-sufficient soon after moving in. Attitudes towards individual immigrants can also diverge from more general attitudes towards immigration (Iyengar et al. 2013), while different set of motivations can drive approval of different immigrant groups (Newman et al. 2015; Neureiter and Schulte 2024; Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016). In general, attitudes towards immigration demonstrate ambivalence with parallel appreciation of immigrants contribution to the host society and concerns about the cultural impact of immigrants (Raffaelli 2025).

Common ambivalence about immigration points out that disapproval of immigration can be easily triggered due to negative attitudes, which originates from stereotypes towards immigrants (Turnbull-Dugarte, Ortega, and Hunklinger 2025) and perceptions of value (López-Rodríguez et al. 2023; Frese 2025) or normative incongruence (Choi, Poertner, and Sambanis 2022; Krakowski et al. 2025) between immigrants and natives. Perceptions of sudden increase of incongruent social groups in social space activate prejudices, but also anxieties and anger (Enos 2017; Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes 2017). As estimates of the size of out-groups rely on heuristics, individuals can easily mislead and overestimate (Guay et al. 2025) the number of immigrants (Lutz and Bitschnau 2023; Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva 2023). Inflated estimates, specifically in situations where heightened influx is actually happening, lead to increased sense of threat and anxiety about immigration (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Huddy et al. 2005; Gadarian and Albertson 2014; Riaz, Bischof, and Wagner 2024; Dunwoody and McFarland 2018; Neureiter and Schulte 2024; Schmidt 2021).

Combination of high influx of culturally distinct immigrants, misperception about their numbers, concerns about their capabilities to integrate coupled with ambivalence in immigration attitudes provided a fertile ground for the emergence of political entrepreneurs willing to seize the opportunity (Valentim 2024a). Populist right parties used the momentum created by refugee crisis and entered political mainstream after decades on the fringes (Mudde 2013). These parties gather around the common nativist key in which the polity is defined as an ethno-nationalist corpus of the "pure people", with exclusion from 'the people' on symbolic grounds, through the lack of ancestry or cultural heritage, that draw the lack of entitlement to economic benefits (Meijers, Huber, and Zaslove 2025; Mudde 2013; Trittler 2017; Kaufmann 2019). The common populist element supplements the nativist key through distancing of the pure people from corrupt, globalised elite (Meijers, Huber, and Zaslove 2025; Mudde 2013). Some authors noted the populist right parties emerged from the realm of post-materialism, just on the other side of the Silent revolution—ending in ethnic and religious particularism in the midst of the globalising world (Ignazi 1992).

Utilising the nativist key with the increasing number of immigrants accompanied by deep concerns about immigration, the populist right parties provided a politically articulated answer to piling issues of European voters about immigration. They position themselves as defenders of national (and sometimes liberal) values (Dennison and Geddes 2019; van Spanje 2011; Akkerman 2005). Coating the immigration into a language of deservingness and essentialised identities, populist right parties set a course for the rejection of immigrants based on the lack of right ancestry (Martinović and Verkuyten 2024; Szebeni et al. 2025) and by marking them as a threat to established social security of the deserving native citizens (Ferwerda, Marbach, and Hangartner 2024; Nijs et al. 2023). Anti-immigrant agenda, therefore, symbolically fortifies the host-country nation as immigrants can never hope to achieve the ancestral (and other) requisites of membership (Bail 2008; Trittler 2017; May 2023; Yang, Eger, and Link 2023). For immigrants the anti-immigrant agenda implies that they can settle in a host-country, but they can never fully belong.

Besides the nativist key, contemporary populist right parties rely on potent populist key. Following already rich scholarship on the radical right (Zaslove 2009; Mudde 2013; Rydgren 2017), I acknowledge that parties I signified as the populist right indeed share the same nativist core with the radical right parties.² However, contemporary set of parties that use the nativist key, commonly rely on the populist key to mobilise their voters. Therefore, the right-wing populists recycle the populist dichotomy of pure people and the elites using a nativist key to decide what people to exclude, while the level of populism defines the margin of exclusion, with more populist parties being more exclusive (Meijers, Huber, and Zaslove 2025). It is possible to say that immigrants are excluded on two bases, the first is their lack of ancestry and cultural similarity with the native citizens, while the second is their connection with elites (Bonikowski 2017), which automatically positions them against the pure people. Although nativism and populism represent two distinct mechanisms, with nativism being the "thick" ideological element of the populist right, I take them together as they both matter in determining the level of their hostility towards the immigrants.

The populist right as such differs from an array of similar parties on the right and on the left. The literature that explains ideological differences commonly notes that the populist left, such as Podemos in Spain or Unbowed France take their inspiration from the populist left movements from Latin America, which insist on stronger delineation between the people and the elites, while not insisting on nativism (Cevera-Marzal 2024). It could be said that compared to the populist right, the populist left prioritises

² Acknowledging this difference during the writing of the thesis I constructed an alternative measure of the support for the radical right, discarding the measure of populism. However, the alternative measure contained almost all parties classified as the populist right, making these two measures practically indistinguishable, and a substantive contribution to my analysis negligible.

anti-elitism, but also attain to pluralism. For that reason, the populist left parties are recognisable more as vocal opponents of global financial institutions or supporters of ecological and social movements than in their opposition to immigration (Cevera-Marzal 2024). That is the primary reason why my analysis is focused on the populist right. Indeed it is important to note that the literature finds how voters of the populist left also display anti-immigrant attitudes, although they remain more lenient when it comes to income redistribution, egalitarianism, and granting immigrants social benefits (Kopyciok and Silver 2021; Rama and Santana 2020). The success of the populist right also facilitated the emergence of distinctly anti-immigrant populist left, such as Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance in Germany, but not in other countries.

Relying on the anti-immigrant agenda, populist parties achieved a relatively quick rise on the polls in a matter of a decade (Valentim 2024a; Norris and Inglehart 2019). The depth of change that increased support for the populist right brought was seen in the emergence of these parties in countries that were previously considered immune to the emergence of the right populism due to burdens of their political heritage, such as Germany (Arzheimer 2015; Arzheimer and Berning 2019), Spain (Dinas, Martínez, and Valentim 2024) or liberal and immigrant-welcoming countries such as Sweden (Loxbo 2014). Prior to the populist right surge in Western Europe, they have already had a history of electoral success in Eastern Europe and established themselves as carriers of "illiberal democracy" (Ehin and Talving 2021). Researchers observing these electoral successes focused heavily on explaining the consequences, reasons and roots of the populist right support.

An important line of research documents the evidence of the populist right impact on party systems, voters and public opinion, and policies. Electoral success of the populist right caused a "contagion" among the mainstream (dominantly right-wing) parties which started accommodating populist right anti-immigration rhetoric, although without devotion to nativism and populism (Rooduijn, Lange, and Brug 2012; Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020; Hadj Abdou, Bale, and Geddes 2022; Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2025). Parliamentary presence of the populist right is shown to have a polarising effects on the electorate (Bischof and Wagner 2019). Their presence in the public space also fosters an increase in negative attitudes towards immigration (Vrănceanu and Lachat 2021; Gul 2023; Koning and Kaushal 2024) and decreases willingness to maintain contact with immigrants (Ditlmann and Turkoglu 2025). Populist right parties, even without a direct success in policy making, continue to shape the policy narrative about deservingness in welfare, that also draws mainstream parties to acquire such rhetoric and impact immigrants social opportunities (Keskinen 2016; Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016; Krause and Giebler 2020; Fischer and Giuliani 2023).

Another line of literature mapped numerous socio-economic and psychological factors that impact the support for the populist right. Among the socio-economic factors, rising inequalities (Riaz, Bischof, and Wagner 2024; Riaz 2024; Gugushvili, Halikiopoulou, and Vlandas 2026; Jacobs and Kayser 2025) were identified as one of the key drivers of the populist support. Declining social services (Iversen and Xu 2026) coupled with scarce and unaffordable housing (Held and Patana 2023; Cremaschi et al. 2024; Gennaro 2025) mostly push disappointed voters of the left, who feel left-behind, to the hands of populists (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013; Gingrich and Häusermann 2015). Voters who see themselves as comparatively more deprived than their neighbours or incoming immigrants are more likely to vote for the populist right (Burgoon et al. 2019; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018). Positional deprivation also fosters the sense of status threat or the feeling that one has lost something they were entitled to. This leads voters to the populist right, as the populist right connects such entitlement to the national belonging (Ferrari and Smith 2025; Hochschild 2016). Immigrants in that setting become cultural, but also economic and sometimes security threat (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Valli et al. 2026; Giavazzi et al. 2024).

In comparison to the literature that focuses on the increasing support for the populist right, the impact of this support remained less explored. The literature indeed took interest in the impact of the populist right on immigrants in cases such as the US or Austria, where anti-immigrant rhetoric had brought the populist right candidates into the office. This literature mostly focuses on the impact of anti-immigrant rhetoric of the populist right (Pérez 2015; Hobbs and Lajevardi 2019; Grewal and Hamid 2024; Schmuck and Tribastone 2020) or their visual communication (Schmuck, Matthes, and Paul 2017) on immigrants' identification, perceptions of discrimination, the use of public spaces or radicalisation. This line of research underlines the significance of the content of anti-immigrant messages for the self-perception of immigrants, which contributes to increased sense of discrimination and the loss of self-worth among immigrants. As this line of research emerged with increased electoral salience of the populist right parties, the results they generated definitely speak back to importance of the populist electoral support, but they do not explicitly study the effects of this support on immigrants.

In this thesis, I argue that electoral support for the populist right is also a pathway of their impact on immigrants. In the same manner as the mainstream political parties accommodate the populist right policy positions (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020), or the voters express more anti-immigrant prejudice (Newman et al. 2021), immigrants also interpret the support for the populist right as a signal about political trends in the host-country. With the populist right parties being recognisable issue-owners of the anti-immigrant platform for more than 15 years (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2019; Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2019), immigrants create an overall impression that higher support for the populist right indicates lesser approval of immigration in the host-country. In this thesis I focus on the electoral support as the share of national vote which the populist right parties receive in parliamentary elections. Taken as a vote share in national parliamentary elections, the electoral support carries three distinct signals, important for both native citizens and immigrants alike.

Electoral support represents a signal of the influence of the populist right over policies. Primarily it is a signal of the organisational capacities of the populist right and the experience to attract sufficient support for the anti-immigrant platform on their own (Dinas, Riera, and Roussias 2015; Held 2023). Further, high national vote share signals the populist right parties represent a credible threat to the multicultural policies by influencing other parties (Lutz 2019; Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2025; Krause, Cohen, and Abou-Chadi 2023) into changing their rhetoric towards immigration and including restrictive immigration or welfare chauvinist policies into their portfolios (i.e. by attenuating the diversity, equality and inclusion policies or curtailing the rights of asylum seekers) (Lutz 2019; Gruber and Rosenberger 2023). Since their capacities to impact policies stem from the electoral support, I deem the clearest view of the signal will be the strongest after the electoral results have been published. On the other hand the accommodation by other parties may take some time and it is contingent on the fact that visibility of the populist right anti-immigrant platform and its negative tone which pushes voters to prioritise immigration. This is reflected in the polls (Vrânceanu and Lachat 2021; Wirz et al. 2018), to which mainstream parties react during the entire electoral cycle (Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016) and particularly in the campaign period (Pereira 2019), giving the populist right signal durability beyond the immediate aftermath of the elections.

Electoral support also represents a measure of aggregate support towards the anti-immigrant platform. As discussed, the literature records that over time, majority of the populist right electorate casts their votes as ideological, that is due to concerns about immigration and in support for anti-immigrant platform (Fennema 2003; Loxbo 2014; Ortiz Barquero, Ruiz Jiménez, and González-Fernández 2022). With the issue of immigration firmly in the hands of the populist right (in spite of accommodation by the mainstream

parties), it is easy to discern that voting for the populist right signals the support for the anti-immigrant platform. I argue that, as the core of the anti-immigrant platform is nativism, the support for the populist right is translated into outright support for exclusive concept of the host-nation built on ancestral and racial belonging (Simonsen 2016a; Betz 2019). Individual voters can, therefore, infer aggregate political positions of other social groups even in the presence of minimal information through attitude attribution (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). More informed voters usually use substantive knowledge of policies to infer political positions of others, while less informed voters rely on heuristics, such as *likability* heuristics, that tells them how far are others from themselves in ideological space (Brady and Sniderman 1985). The key change that the visible presence of support for the anti-immigrant platform brings is the change in public opinion towards immigration, which gradually rolls-out over time (Vrânceanu and Lachat 2021; Koning and Kaushal 2024). Periods directly after the elections are important as they may be regarded as milestones in the change of public opinion, therefore reactions to such change should be readable immediately. The populist right discourse has the same potency to change the public opinion (Wirz et al. 2018; Schmidt-Catran and Czymara 2023), however, the electoral support does not drive the media coverage (Murphy and Devine 2020).

Electoral support further signals that norms towards immigration have changed. The normative theory of political supply, suggests that high electoral support for the populist right translates into lower pressure to abide by anti-prejudice norms and express previously stigmatised preferences without a fear of consistent social sanctions (Valentim 2021). In the policy realm, this change reflects as the anti-immigrant agenda being just one of the options available for citizens, now equal to other policy options, which in return attract more moderate voters (Balcells, Martínez, and vanderWilden 2025). In line with this, the public opinion sways towards stronger anti-immigrant prejudice, as the pool of voters (i.e. low-income voters) who can vocally express their support for the populist right expands (Jaziri-Arjona 2025). Such changes can be rather quick, registered in the days immediately after elections (Valentim 2021). Normative change also brings incentives that prejudicial behaviour in public also drive more voters towards unrestrained expression of anti-immigrant sentiments. Evidence from Europe suggest that such changes happen over time and are visible in expressive acts such as the display of political symbols (Dinas, Martínez, and Valentim 2024), while the evidence from the US indicates that the change can be quicker and lead to direct confrontation and violence (Feinberg, Branton, and Martinez-Ebers 2022).

Although electoral support sends three different signals, I argue they are all clearly readable for immigrants as: potential policy change, support for the anti-immigrant platform and normative change. As I previously discussed, this argument rests on the idea that all three aspects are distinctly relatable to the populist right parties by the immigrants, through their clear issue-ownership of the anti-immigration platform. The signal is clear because the aggregate support of the national electorate is expressed through a single number. The signal is accessible because results commonly get published on the day after elections (or sequentially during the vote counting) and transmitted as such through the media system. Electoral results are also reliable as they are transmitted from a single source, and, in democracies, generated according to a transparent procedure. Polls on the other hand can come from an array of different sources, relying on different methodologies, and may remain obscured unless debated in the media, in which case exposure would depend on individual interest in politics (Roy et al. 2015).³ Clarity, accessibility and reliability of electoral results provide an unambiguous information about the support for the populist right.⁴

³The exception is the campaign period, when polls are more accessible and frequently debated among the electorate (Stoetzer, Leemann, and Traunmueller 2024; Bhatti and Pedersen 2016; Sinclair and Plott 2012).

⁴An additional aspect worth mentioning is also efficiency and safety of this signal. Immigrants do not have numerous other cost-effective ways of learning about aggregate political preferences in their host-country. Immigrants are commonly referred to their minority social networks or immigrant-approving social networks (Bratsberg et al. 2021), which limits their exposure to diverse

Immigrants indeed rely on heuristics in attributing the support for the anti-immigrant platform to the voters of the populist right, which may lead to misperception about particular voting groups (Bursztyn and Yang 2022). Still, the aggregate nature of the electoral results does not provide space for misperception about the support among the national electorate, making all three signals act as a thermostat of the mood towards immigrants in the country.

This dissertation represents a contribution to better understanding of the impact of electoral support of the populist right on immigrants. Compared to the previous research which covered important identity-related aspects of immigrant integration, I focus on the factors that are recognised in the literature as baseline elements of immigrant integration: political trust (Maxwell 2010a; Röder and Mühlau 2012) and generalised social trust (Dinesen and Hooghe 2010; Dinesen 2012; Dinesen and Sønderskov 2018) and mental health, as a crucial component of immigrants' well-being (Bhugra 2004; Castañeda et al. 2015; Kronick, Jarvis, and Kirmayer 2024). Political trust represents a form of acceptance which signals that immigrants deem the host-country institutions as legitimate and that they are ready to follow directives of these institutions (Devine et al. 2025; Hetherington and Husser 2012; Tyler 2006). Generalised social trust enables immigrants to establish social contact more easily and to integrate into social networks in the new environment (de Vroome, Hooghe, and Marien 2013; Breidahl and Gustavsson 2022). Health is particularly important outcome as migration and integration represent periods of increased stress which has long term impacts on overall well-being of immigrants (Bhugra 2004; Castañeda et al. 2015; Kronick, Jarvis, and Kirmayer 2024).

This thesis proposes that optimal outcomes for political and social trust, as well as for mental health depend on the evaluation of the host-country context as benevolent, open and accepting. The literature on political trust ascertains that in overall terms immigrants demonstrate trust in institutions when they perceive them as inclusive and impartial (Tyler 2006; Marien and Werner 2019). Perceived impartiality of institutions fosters the sense that institutions also "work for immigrants," which can inspire a sense of positive social self among immigrants, or feeling that their contributions and roles in the host society are valued (Dierckx, Valcke, and Van Hiel 2021; Valcke et al. 2020). The positive effect of institutions also overflows on social trust in the process of generalisation of this experience on social relations (Sønderskov and Dinesen 2016; Nannestad et al. 2014). The sense of shared identity and acceptance also fosters generalised social trust (Breidahl and Gustavsson 2022; Tanis and Postmes 2005). Finally, perceptions of hostile environment are related to continuous exposure to stress which over time deteriorates immigrants' mental health (Dotsikas et al. 2025; Thoits 2010). The overarching argument is that electoral support and legitimisation of the populist right both represent a signal of increasing hostility against immigrants in the host-country and that such signal is related to lower levels of political and generalised social trust and less optimal mental health outcomes. The thesis is organised in three chapters which develop separate arguments on how populist right electoral support relates with each of the outcomes.

In [chapter 2](#) I study the relationship between the populist right electoral support and political trust. The argument in this paper stipulates that political trust of the populist right is largely fostered by multicultural policies that enable procedural fairness, which guarantees equal access to institutions and prevents discrimination against immigrants. The anti-immigrant agenda of the populist right represents a form of backlash against multicultural policies of equal access and instead advocates for policies such as welfare chauvinism (Nijs et al. 2023; Abts et al. 2021). In its essence, welfare chauvinism calls for exclusion of

attitudes that follows active political participation (Mutz 2002). Exposing oneself to different opinions about immigrants would for some immigrants lead to exposure to discrimination, even if the contact is not in-person but via the Internet (Hobbs and Lajevardi 2019; Lajevardi 2020).

immigrants from participating or benefiting from the host-country institutions and establishes a preferential treatment for natives (Lubbers and Seibel 2022). I argue that electoral support represents a signal of credibility of the populist right to revert the multicultural policies and procedural fairness that foster immigrants' political trust.

A study of the relationship between the populist right electoral support and generalised social trust is presented in [chapter 3](#). This chapter builds on rich evidence that public presence of the populist right impact institutional quality and impartiality of the street level bureaucracy that have a critical impact on the development of generalised social trust (Bellodi, Morelli, and Vannoni 2024; Lange and Böckmann 2025; Huber and Schimpf 2016). Besides the institutional aspect, I argue that exclusionary anti-immigrant agenda increases levels of perceived discrimination which decrease the levels of shared identities between immigrants and natives, resulting in lower levels of generalised social trust (Simonsen 2016b,a; Breidahl and Gustavsson 2022; Tanis and Postmes 2005). The argument follows two lines, first that voters associate electoral support for the populist right with lower quality of institutions and therefore revoke their trust; second that higher levels of support for the populist right indicate that a significant number of people supports the anti-immigrant agenda of the populist right and that they are ready to discriminate against immigrants which is associated with lower levels of generalised social trust.

The final chapter focuses on the relationship between legitimisation of the populist right and self-reported mental health of immigrants. This chapter combines insights from the public health literature on detrimental effects of discrimination on mental health and well-being with the theory of normalisation of the populist right (Valentim 2024a, 2021). I argue that legitimisation of the populist right signals to immigrants that the costs of prejudice expression are lowered and that consequently more people are going to engage in open expression of anti-immigrant political preferences (Newman et al. 2021; Williams and Medlock 2017). Observing the change in social norms and experiencing more prejudice, immigrants change their appraisal of the host-country context and perceive discrimination as more pervasive, stable and internal which is related to lower levels of mental health (Schmitt and Branscombe 2002; Schmitt et al. 2014; Branscombe et al. 1999; Eccleston and Major 2006).

Chapter 2

In the System We Trust! Electoral Support for the Populist Right and Political Trust Among Immigrants in Western Europe

2.1 Introduction

Political trust is considered as one of the key indicators of immigrant integration (Maxwell 2010a; Röder and Mühlau 2011). Paradoxically, its decrease over time indicates that immigrants indeed get closer to the ways of host-country people (Röder and Mühlau 2012; Bilodeau and Nevitte 2003). On the other hand, immigrants overall higher levels of political trust are praised as a fresh pool of support for institutions that are losing their traditional sources of support (Sun et al. 2024; Wilkes and Wu 2019). The increase in the number of immigrants in Western Europe made their political trust even more salient for the public. At the same time, the increase in support for the populist right across Europe has signalled that native citizens trust institutions less and that they feel less represented by traditional political parties (Vachudova 2021; Kriesi 2025). Though implications of the populist right support and political trust for native citizens are studied, it is not clear how this shift in party support towards open praise for openly anti-immigrant parties relates to immigrants' political trust.

This paper studies how electoral support for the populist right impacts immigrants' political trust. Previous literature focused mostly on institutional trust among immigrants (Röder and Mühlau 2011, 2012; Quaranta 2025), but it did not take into account the expansion of the populist right. Similarly, the literature on the populist right commonly focuses on sources of support (Rydgren 2008; Dunwoody and McFarland 2018; Kokkonen and Linde 2023; Gugushvili, Halikiopoulou, and Vlandas 2026) or various effects of the populist right (Hawkins and Mitchell 2025; Juon and Bochsler 2020; Lange and Böckmann 2025; Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020), which rarely take into account the experiences of their most common targets, immigrants. Even when the effects of the populist right on immigrants are studied, they are studied as the effects of discriminatory messages or rhetoric and not as effects of their electoral support (Pérez 2015; Schmuck, Matthes, and Paul 2017; Hobbs and Lajevardi 2019; Besco et al. 2022).

This paper draws an argument that the electoral support for the populist right signals the possibility of

revoking multicultural policies and principles of procedural fairness (Tyler 2006; Schnaudt, Hahn, and Heppner 2021). These principles are recognised as the key bridge that allows immigrants to experience the quality of government in their host countries, by observing that "institutions work for them." Through their backlash against multiculturalism and integration policies, the populist right erodes the foundations that support immigrants' political trust by designating institutions and their benefits as reserved to the native citizens (Abts et al. 2021; Lubbers and Seibel 2022; Careja and Harris 2022). In response to such threat, immigrants trust institutions less as they deem their equal position in access and benefits as insecure.

This paper utilises the data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the V-Party datasets (European Social Survey 2019; Lührmann et al. 2020) in two different approaches, two-way fixed effects and a heterogeneous event study. The evidence in the paper demonstrates that electoral support for the populist right is not associated with the overall political trust, but with its more particular aspects, specifically trust in the law and order institutions. I argue the relationship is not detected for other aspects of political trust because the equal treatment of immigrants within the law and order institutions is determined by impartiality principle and multicultural policies and because the populist right intentionally undermines these principles exactly in these institutions. Revocation of the trust in law and order seems to be more prevalent in the first generation, while the second generation in response to the populist right electoral support puts their trust in supranational institutions.

The paper is further divided into sections covering relevant streams of literature about political trust and the populist right policies. After that, I develop the argument and provide an overview of the data and methods. After that I present the findings and discuss potential implications of the results before I conclude the paper.

2.2 Literature Review

Political trust represents a domain-specific, relational form of political support (Easton 1975; Seyd 2024; Devine 2024; Devine et al. 2025; Citrin and Stoker 2018). It takes the middle ground between specific and diffuse forms of political support, because evaluations of institutions are often difficult to disentangle from the evaluations of their incumbent agents (Easton 1975; Citrin 1974; Citrin and Stoker 2018; Seyd 2024; Devine et al. 2025). Political trust comprises of positive and negative evaluations (and affects) citizens hold towards different institutions, principal agents and norms of a political system; high political trust translates into belief that institution would not defect from established normative principles, even without direct oversight (Devine et al. 2025; Citrin and Stoker 2018; Seyd 2024; Hetherington and Husser 2012). Oriented towards institutions, political trust represents an indicator of political legitimacy which leads to easier acceptance of political decisions, especially when they come with higher material costs, and impacts outcomes such as vote choice, policy preferences and electoral turnout (Devine 2024; van der Meer and Janssen 2025; Hetherington and Husser 2012; Hetherington 1998). Expanding line of literature records a global decrease in political trust over the past decades, although some recent accounts just find the decrease for representative, but not for implementing institutions, or do not detect decrease it at all (Hetherington 1998, 2007; Citrin and Stoker 2018; Valgarðsson et al. 2025; van der Meer and van Erkel 2024). This literature also suggests political trust is stable in the long run, but reactive in the short-term due to information shocks such as political scandals or elections (Devine and Valgarðsson 2024; Hether-

ington and Husser 2012).¹

Immigrants usually demonstrate higher political trust compared to native citizens (Sun et al. 2024; Wilkes and Wu 2019; Maxwell 2010a,b). Higher levels of trust are associated with the first generation of immigrants and they decrease with time spent in the host-country; among the second generation, they become equal to the trust levels of native citizens (Sun et al. 2024; Wilkes and Wu 2019; Maxwell 2010a,b; Röder and Mühlau 2011, 2012; Gonnot and lo Polito 2021).² Higher levels of trust among the first generation are explained through differences in institutional performance between the host and the origin countries. The experience of lower institutional performance in the country of origin installs weak expectations among the first generation immigrants, inspiring favourable evaluations of institutions in the host-country (Röder and Mühlau 2011, 2012; Sun et al. 2024; Litina 2014; Zhou 2024; Schneider and Devitt 2018; Quaranta 2025). Immigrants' political trust also changes as a result of experience and social learning, which over time sets more realistic expectations from political institutions among immigrants (Röder and Mühlau 2012; Bilodeau and Nevitte 2003). Perceived discrimination represents one of the strongest factors in the process of social learning for immigrants (Warren 2010; Dilmaghani 2019; Wilkes and Wu 2019; Isani 2018; Evangelist 2022).

The increase in overall number of immigrants in Western Europe³ came coupled with steady increase in support for the populist right (Valentim 2024a, see also Figure 2.1).⁴ Sharp increase in electoral support brought higher media visibility and legitimacy to populist right anti-immigration agenda, allowing them to enter political mainstream and impact the structure of political cleavages in European countries (Vachudova 2021; Gingrich and Häusermann 2015; Schain 2006; Berning, Lubbers, and Schlueter 2019). The populist right built its electoral support by activating the existing immigration anxieties and framing immigration as a zero-sum game between endangered, but deserving natives and threatening, and undeserving immigrants (Dennison 2020; Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2019; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2019; Burscher, van Spanje, and de Vreese 2015). Main policy proposals of the populist right gravitate towards preventing immigrants from settling in through more restrictive immigration policies and limited assistance they receive from the host country, such as integration programmes and welfare for immigrants (Bergmann, Hackenesch, and Stockemer 2021; Rossell Hayes and Dudek 2020; Krause and Giebler 2020; Careja and Harris 2022; Abts et al. 2021). Electoral success of the populist right also inspired mainstream parties on the right and left to acquire harsher anti-immigrant rhetoric (Rooduijn, Lange, and Brug 2012; Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020; Hadj Abdou, Bale, and Geddes 2022; Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016), while their public presence contributed to the increase in negative attitudes towards immigrants (Vrăncianu and Lachat 2021; Gul 2023; Larsen 2023; Koning and Kaushal 2024). Despite high electoral performance, populist right parties were successful in changing some aspects of integration policies and to an extent welfare policies, but not overall immigration policies (Gruber and Rosenberger 2023; Rossell Hayes and Dudek 2020; Krause and Giebler 2020; Lutz 2019; Fischer and Giuliani 2023).

¹Devine and Valgarðsson (2024) connect the stability of long-term trust with the stability of diffuse support and individual dispositions to trust, while short-term changes reflect evaluation of current incumbents dependent on the available information about the performances of political system.

²Indeed, some pieces do not find differences between immigrants and natives (de Vroome, Hooghe, and Marien 2013) or inter-generational differences (Litina 2014) for immigrants.

³Data from the International Migration Report indicate the number of immigrants in Western Europe increased from 57 million in 2015 to 87 million in 2020 (IOM 2024)

⁴Plotted trends from V-Party dataset in Figure 2.1 also indicate that electoral performance of populist right greatly varies across European countries, although in many countries we can see increase in their support.




Figure 2.1: Trends in Total Populist Right National Vote Share by Country

2.3 The Argument

High electoral support enabled the populist right to enter political mainstream, giving them the opportunity to exert pressure on state institutions and entire party systems. The appearance of the populist right pressures on institutions opened a completely new avenue of impact on immigrants' political trust. Policy proposals intended to limit the access and participation of immigrants in institutions have the possibility of shaping the overall quality of institutions and experience they provide for immigrants. Therefore, this paper connects literatures on effects of the populist right on institutions with the literature on underlying factors of political trust in an attempt to answer if the electoral support for the populist right is related to immigrants' political trust.

The literature on political trust among immigrants provides solid evidence that the difference in the quality of institutions between the host and origin country determines higher levels of political trust, particularly among the first generation of immigrants (Röder and Mühlau 2012, 2011). Due to low institutional performance in the country of origin, immigrants come with low expectations which are translated into overconfidence and favourability of host-country institutions, buttressed by the lack of experience with the host-country institutions. (Bilodeau and Nevitte 2003; Dilmaghani 2019). Host-country institutions further foster high political trust through procedural fairness (Schnaudt, Hahn, and Heppner 2021; Noordzij, De Koster, and Van Der Waal 2021; Marien and Werner 2019; Zmerli and van der Meer 2017; Grimes 2006). Tyler (2006) indicates that impartiality, good faith and the consideration of opinions are cornerstones of procedural fairness. For immigrants, procedural fairness entails the idea they are not going to be treated differently than the native citizens (Urbanska, Pehrson, and Turner 2019). Equal institutional treatment contributes to the maintaining of positive social self among immigrants, or the idea that they are valued members of the community (Dierckx, Valcke, and Van Hiel 2021; Valcke et al. 2020). Besides procedural fairness, institutions also demonstrate public commitment to multiculturalism, providing a signal to immigrants they are better off in the host-country than in their country of origin because institutions also "work for them as well" (Isani and Schlipphak 2017; Isani 2018; Dilmaghani 2019; Evangelist 2022).

Main populist policy proposals are directed against multicultural policies—very foundations of procedural fairness that keep immigrants included. The underpinning component of the populist right backlash against multiculturalism is their devotion to nativism (Meijers, Huber, and Zaslove 2025; Trittler 2017; Mudde 2013). This idea translates into entitlement over the land and institutions, due to ancestry claims, which also resonate with their voters' ideas of the national boundaries (Szebeni et al. 2025; Martinović and Verkuyten 2024; Nijs et al. 2023; Zhirkov 2014). In more practical terms, populist right advocates that native citizens have advantage in accessing the state institutions and benefiting from them. Welfare chauvinism is a set of policy proposals that excludes immigrants from the welfare benefits in aforementioned nativist key (Abts et al. 2021; Lubbers and Seibel 2022; Careja and Harris 2022). As an example, during the electoral campaign in 2015, the UKIP advocated for revoking the services of the NHS to the asylum seekers, claiming that it has to serve the British citizens first (Dennison and Goodwin 2015; Ford and Goodwin 2014). Proposals in the immigration policies are adjacent to the welfare chauvinist agenda, as pressure on public service and housing is a common place against increase in immigration (Gennaro 2025). Compared to immigration and welfare policies, integration policies are more closely tied to multiculturalism (Wright and Bloemraad 2012; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Green and Staerklé 2023). These policies usually include integration courses, assistance in learning the host-country language or help with accessing the labour market (Wright and Bloemraad 2012; Bartram and Jarochova 2022). This strong backlash against multicultural integration policies happens because populist right parties and their voters feel that immigrants are "skipping the line" (Hochschild 2016), meaning that multicultural policies allow them to harvest benefits to which the native citizens were previously only entitled. Discarding multicultural policies, populist right signals procedural fairness should be applied only on the "deserving" native citizens.

Cornerstone of this argument is that increased electoral support for the populist right makes the threat to procedural fairness of institutions credible. High electoral support raises credibility of the threat due to possible incumbency or coalition participation (Akkerman and Lange 2012; de Lange 2012), henceforth enactment of stricter integration, welfare or immigration policies and changing the principles by which institutions operate. Facing increasing support for the populist right, Immigrants retract their institutional trust due to uncertainties that quality and high-performing institutions will keep them included. Increasing evidence shows that populist right parties exert negative effects on the quality of government, including civil liberties, horizontal accountability and minority rights as incumbents (Hawkins and Mitchell 2025; Juon and Bochsler 2020), but in the opposition as well (Lange and Böckmann 2025; Huber and Schimpf 2017, 2016).⁵

Despite being poor performers in changing the immigration (Schain 2018, 2006; Bergmann, Hackenesch, and Stockemer 2021) or welfare policies (Keskinen 2016), in line with their general impact on the quality of government, populist right is successful in eroding integration policies. Higher electoral performance enabled the populist right to successfully exert pressure on integration policies even in the opposition (Lutz 2019; Schain 2018), sometimes through pressurising mainstream right parties to contract integration policies (Akkerman 2012) or by mainstreaming more restrictive policies towards asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants (Natter, Czaika, and de Haas 2020). Although national incumbency of the populist right parties in Western Europe is still a rarity, examples of Italy and Austria indicate the extent of policy change in case populist right becomes an incumbent (Fischer and Giuliani 2023; Gruber and Rosenberger 2023; Minkenberg 2016). As incumbents the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) further eroded integration policies through active legislation and by contracting welfare benefits for immigrants and other "unde-

⁵I plotted trends in the Quality of Government Indicators from V-Party Dataset for each country over time in Figure A.1. Graph demonstrates decreasing trend in overall Quality of Government.

serving" groups such as long-term unemployed (Fischer and Giuliani 2023; Gruber and Rosenberger 2023).

Electoral support for the populist right becomes evident after the electoral results are published. Publication of the results provides the first and most important signal about the credibility of the threat. In the period after elections, this threat is amplified due to potential coalition agreement between the populist right and mainstream parties, but diminishes as coalitions and governments are formed (Akkerman and Lange 2012). I hypothesise that high electoral support for the populist right is more likely to cause feelings of uncertainty about procedural fairness among immigrants immediately after elections.

H1a: The association between greater support for the populist right and lower political trust is stronger in the first three months after the elections than in the period after.

H1b: The association between greater support for the populist right and lower political trust after elections decreases over time.

Even though populist parties as incumbents and in the opposition impact quality of institutions that serve all, evidence suggests that their presence in national parliaments does not cause decrease in political trust among natives (Larsen 2023); due to their persistent targeting of integration policies, I hypothesise high support for the populist right will be associated with lower political trust among immigrants compared to natives. Following Valgarðsson et al. (2025) I also assume that decrease in trust among immigrants may reflect the global trend of decreasing trust in representative institutions, but not in implementing (law and order) institutions. Immigrants are also highly confident in supranational institutions, such as the European Parliament (Isani and Schlipphak 2017). Functioning of these institutions is commonly not affected by national elections, so I hypothesise that higher electoral support for the populist right will still be associated with high levels of support for these institutions. Populist right parties, however changes party systems and inspires mainstream parties to take harsher stances towards immigration (Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2025; Krause, Cohen, and Abou-Chadi 2023; Hadj Abdou, Bale, and Geddes 2022; Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020), which can lead immigrants to decrease their levels of trust in political representatives overall.

H2a: Greater electoral support for the populist right is associated with lower political trust among immigrants compared to natives.

H2b: Greater electoral support for the populist right is associated with lower levels of trust in national representative institutions compared to law and order institutions among immigrants.

H2c: Greater electoral support for the populist right is associated with higher levels of trust in supranational institutions among immigrants compared to natives.

H2d: Greater electoral support for the populist right is associated with lower levels of trust in political representatives among immigrants compared to natives.

As differences in trust between the first and second generation immigrants are well documented (Maxwell 2010a; Röder and Mühlau 2012; Sun et al. 2024), I hypothesise that the second generation of immigrants is more sensitive to threat of changes in procedural fairness due to integration paradox (Steinmann 2019; Verkuyten 2016; Lajevardi et al. 2020). Due to socialisation in the host country and familiarity with social norms, second generation immigrants become more aware of prevalent discrimination, but also the significance of policies that prevent discrimination. The literature also suggests that revoking multicultural policies and imposing rules that target specific groups of immigrants, such as burqa bans for Muslim women (Abdelgadir and Fouka 2020), produces negative outcomes such as dropping from school or the

labour market for women, but not for men. Therefore, I hypothesise higher electoral support will be associated with greater mistrust among women compared to men. Additionally, multicultural policies are designed to help integration of culturally distinct immigrants, such as Muslim immigrants or non-Western immigrants (Wright and Bloemraad 2012; Green and Staerklé 2023); I hypothesise that credible threat to procedural fairness and revoking multicultural policies affects political trust of these immigrants more than immigrants from the EU, as they are more dependent on these policies.

H3a: Greater electoral support for the populist right is associated with lower political trust among second generation immigrants, compared to the first generation.

H3b: Greater electoral support for the populist right is associated with lower political trust among immigrant women compared to immigrant men.

H3c: Greater electoral support for the populist right is associated with lower political trust among non-EU immigrants compared to EU immigrants.

2.4 Data and Methods

2.4.1 Data

This paper uses the European Social Survey (ESS, European Social Survey 2019) as the source of individual data collated with electoral data from V-Party dataset (Lührmann et al. 2020) and country-level data from World Development Index (WDI) and World Value Survey (WVS) (World Bank 2025; Inglehart et al. 2022). Individual level data come from a nationally representative samples in each of participating countries (European Social Survey 2023). Country-level data were collated with individual data based on unique country-year identifiers, while electoral data were collated based on country information and interview dates so that each respondent is matched with the first elections prior to their interview. The collation procedure provides a time series cross-sectional data (TSCS) data structure where unique individual observations are nested within 175 country-year clusters. Country cases include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom as traditional and novel destination countries for immigrants; the period covered spans from 2002 to 2019 and includes Waves 1 to 9 of the ESS. Due to differences in rollout, not all countries have equal number of waves included, but I include all available waves.

The ESS is not designed to provide a representative sample of immigrants. Due to its expanding scope, it has been used in research on immigrants' political trust for over a decade (Maxwell 2010a; Röder and Mühlau 2012). As an immigrant I defined a respondent with at least one parent was born outside of their country of residence.⁶ Generations of immigrants were defined based on respondent's birthplace - the first generation immigrants were born outside their country of residence, while the second generation immigrants were born in the country of residence. Further disaggregation was made on immigrants from other EU countries, non-Western immigrants from South America, Africa and Asia and Muslim immigrants. These subsamples were made because populist right commonly targets immigrants along religious and racial lines, potentially making these immigrants more sensitive to potential violations of procedural justice.

⁶Other papers use slightly more conservative definitions—Röder and Mühlau (2012) define immigrants as those whose both parents were born outside of their country of residence.




Figure 2.2: Trends in Political Trust over Time by Population Group

The main outcome is an index of total political trust that includes indicators of trust in the national parliament, political parties, politicians, police, judicial system, European Parliament and the United Nations. Confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated that all dimensions reliably represent one factor, with a high scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach $\alpha = 0.89$). To account for differences between political institutions, I created separate scales for trust in political representatives (political parties and politicians; Cronbach $\alpha = 0.92$) trust in law and order institutions (trust in the police and judicial system; Cronbach $\alpha = 0.75$), trust in supranational institutions (trust in the EP and the UN; Cronbach $\alpha = 0.78$) and I kept a single scale for trust in the national parliament. Separate scales also account for different trends in trust between representative and implementing institutions, and also for higher support for supranational institutions among immigrants (Valgarðsson et al. 2025; Isani and Schlipphak 2017). The index of total political trust ranges from 0 to 70. Trust in political representatives, trust in law and order institutions and trust in supranational institutions can take values 0 to 20 and trust in national parliament can take values from 0 to 10. In all cases lower values mean less trust. Plots in Figure 2.2 indicate that on average the first generation immigrants are more trustworthy than the natives and the second generation immigrants (in line with Röder and Mühlau 2012; Sun et al. 2024; Wilkes and Wu 2019). In line with general findings about the divergence of trust, (Valgarðsson et al. 2025) shows overall higher trust in law and order institutions compared to national parliament (descriptive statistics is provided in Table A.2).

The treatment represents the total vote share of all populist right parties in a given country in particular electoral year. Non-electoral years take values of the first preceding electoral year. I classified all parties along three dimensions: populism, cultural liberalism and immigration approval measured on customised 0-100 scales that combine indicators⁷ from V-Party dataset (Lührmann et al. 2020). Lower ends of cultural liberalism and immigration approval indicate more conservative and anti-immigrant positions, while higher end of populism scale indicates more populism. As populist I regarded all parties in lower two quartiles of cultural liberalism and immigration approval and in the upper most quartile of the populism

⁷Populism scale contains indicators for positions towards the elite and towards the people, the anti-immigration scale consists of indicators for stances towards minorities and immigrants, and the scale of cultural conservatism encompasses indicators for positions towards LGBT+ rights, women and welfare.

scale.⁸ This classification takes into account that populist-right elements, such as strong anti-immigration stances and elite-people divide, may appear among parties regularly classified as the mainstream right (i.e. Brothers of Italy) in specific elections, apart from traditional populist right parties (i.e. Mudde 2013). Descriptive statistics for control variables per population are provided in Table A.4.

2.4.2 Research Design

Heterogeneous event study⁹ is utilised to study the immediate effects of the right populist electoral support on immigrants' political trust in hypotheses H1a and H1b. By varying the timespan around the elections, I am able to determine the durability of immediate association of electoral support for the populist right. Heterogeneous element this association is that it accounts for respondents surveyed in different countries and different electoral years, but at the same time after the elections. This means that the strength of the populist right electoral support varies for respondents surveyed in different countries and years. Therefore, heterogeneous event study model takes the following form:

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha + \beta_1 RWP_{ct} + \beta_2 \mathbf{1}[0 \leq d_{ct} \leq D] + \beta_3 RWP_{ct} \times \mathbf{1}[0 \leq d_{ct} \leq D] + \mathbf{X}'_{ict} \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \delta_c + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{ict} \quad (2.1)$$

where Y_{ict} stands for a political trust outcome for individual i in country c in year t , while RWP_{ct} is the vote share of right-wing populist parties in country c in year t . The element $\mathbf{1}[0 \leq d_{ct} \leq D]$ is an indicator which equals one if a respondent was surveyed in the period between zero and D days after the election date in country c in year t ; cutoff parameter D can take values of 30, 60, 100, 200, and 365, while the equation is estimated for each time window separately. The interaction coefficient of interest, β_3 , captures the association between political trust outcome Y_{ict} and support for a populist right party (RWP_{ct}), conditional on being surveyed in period between 0 and D days after elections. Because the term $\mathbf{1}[0 \leq d_{ct} \leq D]$ is a binary indicator, interaction coefficient β_3 also represents a marginal effect of RWP_{ct} in that particular time window on Y_{ict} . The term δ_c stands for country fixed effects, while the term λ_t represents time fixed effects, and ε_{ict} is the error term. Vector of individual and country-level control variables is denoted by $\mathbf{X}_{ict}$. Standard errors are clustered on country-year level. Models are estimated for native, immigrant (both generations), first-generation immigrant and second-generation immigrant samples respectively, across different political trust outcomes.

Hypotheses H2a - H2d test for the direct relationship between the populist right electoral support and political trust of immigrants, while hypotheses H3a - H3c tests for heterogeneous aspects of this relationship. I rely on two-way fixed effects in TSCS setting, with country and year fixed effects, to account for residual variation related to different country contexts and over time. Recent literature indicates that two-way fixed effects perform as efficiently as multilevel models when applied to TSCS data (Bell, Fairbrother, and Jones 2019; Clark and Linzer 2015). The equation for these models has the following form:

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha + \beta RWP_{ct^e} + \mathbf{X}'_{ict} \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \delta_c + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{ict} \quad (2.2)$$

where terms are interpreted in the same manner as in equation 2.1 except for the RWP_{ct^e} is the vote share of the right-wing populist parties in country c in electoral year t^e . This term denotes that the year of elections may be different from the year t in which the respondent was surveyed. In the data collation process, each respondent was matched based on their date of interview, with the results of the first previ-

⁸Details on party classification and cross-validation with PopuList data are provided in section A.1

⁹I borrow the term heterogeneous event study from Mitts (2019).

ous elections. In equation 2.1 all effective respondents surveyed in the period between 0 and D days were also surveyed in the same year in which the elections took place and there was no need for such differentiation. Coefficient of interest is β and it captures the association between the right-wing populist electoral support (RWP) in country c in electoral year t^e and individual level of political trust (Y) for respondent i in country c and year t . Models were estimated using the same clustering and disaggregation principles. For heterogeneous effects estimation related to hypotheses H3a - H3c, the disaggregation principle was extended to Muslim, Non-Western and EU immigrants, as well as samples disaggregated for gender.

As an alternative strategy, I estimated the relationship between populist right electoral support and political trust of immigrants by interacting a specific immigrant group with the vote share for the populist right. The equation takes the following form:

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha + \beta_1 RWP_{ct^e} + \beta_2 \mathbf{1}[G_i = g] + \beta_3 RWP_{ct^e} \times \mathbf{1}[G_i = g] + \mathbf{X}'_{ict} \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \delta_c + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{ict} \quad (2.3)$$

where $\mathbf{1}[G_i = g]$ is a binary indicator equal to one if respondent i belongs to group g , and zero if it is otherwise. This equation is estimated separately for each group g : native, immigrant (both generations), first generation immigrant and second generation immigrants. The principle was extended on other immigrant samples from equation 2.2. All other terms have the same interpretation as in equations 2.1 and 2.2. The coefficient of interest is β_3 . I interpret the interaction coefficient as a measure of association between reported levels of political trust (Y) of a respondent i , in country c , and year t and electoral support for the populist right (RWP), in country c , from electoral year t^e , conditional on belonging to group g , relative to the rest of the sample. Because the term G_i represents a binary indicator of group belonging, interaction coefficient β_3 represents a marginal effect of RWP_{ct} on Y_{ict} in that particular group.

All models follow the same underlying logic of two-way fixed effects estimation which brings the focus on *within* variation (Huntington-Klein 2022). Following the structure of TSCS data where individuals are nested within countries across years, fixed effects have the purpose to absorb all the remaining variation that is not accounted for with the control matrix, but relates to different country contexts and years. By absorbing heterogeneity related to country and year contexts, I identify how different levels of support for the populist right in a given country, over time relate to individual levels of political trust. This interpretation is also applicable to heterogeneous event study and group interaction model, with a caveat that the relationship is conditional on the time of surveying or group membership. The main source of variation for such identification in all cases is the change in populist right electoral support within countries over time. Standard errors are clustered on country-year level because respondents were interviewed in their respective countries, therefore they share an unobserved common source of variation (e.g. unaccounted cultural and economic factors or historical legacies). Years were included because context of the interview also changes over time, therefore, unobserved factors related to particular time of survey also represent a source of common variation for respondents. Additionally, the electoral support was measured on the national level for different electoral years, while years are the smallest time units that contain a sufficient number of observations for reliable estimation of TWFE models.

To resolve the key issues of relatively small number of observations (specifically for Muslim and Non-Western immigrants) across 175 country-year clusters, I used pooled estimation. Pooled estimates within two-way fixed effects framework rely on over-time, within-country variation in the populist electoral support and show how much individual political trust changes in relation to it *on average*, for the entire sample, given that a respondent was surveyed in a particular year and country. This has two implications. The first implication is that country-specific trends remain shrouded in pooled estimates. To address this

issue, I estimate a version of equation 2.2 where I interact the populist right electoral support with a country indicator. This effectively estimates separate country-specific slopes of the relationship between the populist right electoral support and political trust, instead of giving the average association across all countries. The second implication states that because electoral support varies over time and across countries, some countries may have a greater level of variation compared to others. Consequently pooled estimate will reflect their variation more than that of countries with less change in support for the populist right. To address this issue, I estimate a series of leave-one-country-out (LOCO) models where I estimate equation 2.2 by sequentially dropping country cases. Both country-slope and LOCO models are estimated as robustness checks for models related to hypotheses H2a to H2d and H3a to H3c.

Another possibility is that pooled estimates depend on the regional differences inside observed countries. Regional differences in voting for the populist right were documented across Europe (Schraff, Vergioglou, and Demirci 2023), particularly in Germany (Schaub, Gereke, and Baldassarri 2021; Weisskircher 2020). Although the results of local elections, as well as, granular data that trace local voting patterns on national elections exist (Schraff, Vergioglou, and Demirci 2023), I face two important obstacles in estimating the association between local levels of support for the populist right and political trust. The first is that the number of immigrants in subnational units, such as NUTS-3 regions is very small. This limitation is partially related to the fieldwork organisation in the ESS. Usually, majority of respondents are surveyed in the first year, while follow-ups are done in the next year (European Social Survey 2023). In surveying immigrants, this translates into as much as 50 immigrant respondents in a country-year cluster for the follow-up years. Dividing such small number across small territorial units would risk in obtaining unreliable estimates, due to the loss of power. Additional concern is that anti-immigrant sentiment and consequential support for the populist right occurs without the presence of immigrants (Zaviršek and Rajgelj 2019) while, areas in which immigrants reside usually have lower levels of support for the populist right (Kellermann and Winter 2022). For that reason, focusing on smaller territorial where immigrants reside may result in targeted selection of units where support for the populist right is lower, which would in the end misrepresent the national level of support for the populist right.

Despite potency of two-way fixed effects to absorb heterogeneity, my identification strategy has several limitations that prevent the causal interpretation of coefficients across all models. First reason is that the ESS provides TSCS data and not a panel of repeated individual observations. With the TSCS data it is not possible to observe the change of outcome within an individual; even with country fixed effects, there still remains a good deal of individual-level heterogeneity which can bias the causal identification. Second reason is that majority of observed countries (with exceptions of Germany, Spain, Sweden and Ireland) did not have years without populist right parties running in elections. Without a larger number of non-treated years across all countries, the treated cases would be compared to a handful of years in these four countries. With significant differences between the countries, the validity of such comparison is questionable.¹⁰ Third and final reason speaks to clarity of the electoral results as a signal (see chapter 1). Because elections represent a period of heavy campaigning, media often report about polls with an intention to create a "horserace" view of the elections (Bhatti and Pedersen 2016; Witzenberger and Diakopoulos 2024). Such reporting can bring polls into the public eye and consequently draw the attention of immigrants. As discussed in chapter 1, immigrants are commonly less attentive to host-country politics (also see Elis 2026), while information seeking as response to polls depends on individual sophistication and political interest (Roy et al. 2015). Nevertheless, due to the significance of the polls it is reasonable to

¹⁰There are two other options that I acknowledge, that is to compare years in when populist right participated in elections with years in which it did not, or to compare pairs of similar countries, (e.g. Sweden and Denmark) that would differ in participation of the populist right in the elections. Although plausible, these endeavours are limited by a small number of immigrant observations (over time in particular countries).

assume that the effect of electoral support of the populist right published after elections can be attenuated because voters were already exposed to predictions of this support through polls.


Acknowledging these limitations to the causal interpretation, specifically the incapacity of country fixed effects to absorb the individual variation, results may suffer from reversed causality issue. As majority of voters of the populist right are native, sometimes immigrants can also express anti-immigrant sentiment and support such policies (Strijbis and Polavieja 2018). Studies among the native citizens demonstrate that lower political trust predicts support for the populist right (Geese 2025). Therefore, even among immigrants, voting for the populist right could be an expression of already lower political trust, although this still remains more probable for the natives. Without a stronger causal design, I limit the interpretation of estimates as measures of relationship or association between political trust and the populist right electoral support. Additionally, the results may also be sensitive to contingent historical circumstances such as economic shocks, terrorist attacks or the global migration waves. While terrorist attacks commonly happen in a specific country (therefore their effect in that country can be absorbed by the country and year fixed effect), their impact travels to other countries as well. Economic shocks and global migration flows, on the other hand, hit multiple countries over time. To check the sensitivity of my results to these shocks, I estimate models without the years of economic crisis (2008–2012), the refugee crisis (2015–2016) and the years of major terrorist attacks.¹¹

2.5 Findings


The first set of findings presented in Figure 2.3, specifically in Figure 2.3a answers to hypotheses H1a and H1b. Results indicate that neither hypothesis has sufficient support. The first three months after elections are not associated with lower levels of political trust for immigrants on a statistically significant level. In Figure 2.3 statistically significant coefficients have full coefficient symbols, while non-significant coefficients are left hollow. Results also do not show decreasing trends in the manner predicted by hypothesis H1b. Results for specific measures of political trust also do not support proposed hypotheses. In Figure 2.3c an opposite trend is noticed. Higher levels of trust in law and order institutions are associated with populist right support in the first two months after elections for the immigrant population. The effect indeed decreases over time, but in the different direction than hypothesised.

As an additional check to these analyses I applied the binning estimator approach (Hainmueller, Mumolo, and Xu 2019). Compared to the approach taken in the heterogeneous event study where the span of each time window expands, the binning estimator divides the period of 365 days after the elections into four equal bins, which approximate for four three-month periods. Additional difference is that four equal bins do not account for respondents from preceding bins as in expanding heterogeneous event study time windows. Results presented in section A.6 suggest that higher levels of trust in law and order institutions in the first two months after elections are not robust to alternative specifications (Figure A.5). I also checked if small subsamples of immigrants surveyed in the short time windows after elections are systematically different from wider immigrant samples. Results of balance tests are presented in section A.5. Plots indicate that subsamples around elections are balanced, with the exception of average distance towards immigrants per country and Migration Policy Inclusion Index.


¹¹I exclude the years of all major cases of terrorist attacks related to Islamic fundamentalism: Spain (2004, 2017), UK (2005, 2017), France (2015, 2016), Belgium (2016), Germany (2016). As an additional check, I also estimate models in which only countries where the terrorist attacks happened were excluded in these years.




(a) Total Political Trust




(b) Trust in National Parliament



(c) Trust in Law and Order Institutions



(d) Trust in Supranational Institutions



(e) Trust in Political Representatives

Figure 2.3: Heterogeneous Event Study: Political Trust

Note: Each panel shows how the interaction effect between RWP vote share and the time indicator varies across different time windows (30, 60, 100, 200, and 365 days since event). Shaded regions show 90% (darker) and 95% (lighter) confidence intervals. Filled points indicate statistically significant effects ($p < 0.05$); hollow points indicate non-significant effects.


The second set of results addresses hypotheses H2a to H2d with disaggregated models for immigrants and natives in [Figure 2.4](#). The figure also provides disaggregated results per immigrant generation, relevant for hypothesis H3a. Each point estimate represents a β coefficient of total populist right vote share and interprets as the measure of association between one percentage point increase in total vote share for the populist right parties in a given country and year, and individual level of political trust in the group. Models do not provide support for hypothesis H2a. Null effect among the natives is expected (i.e. Larsen 2023), contrary to the hypothesis H2a about the lower levels of political trust, confidence interval of coefficient for immigrants lies mostly above zero ([Figure 2.4a](#)). Checks in LOCO models indicate that these results are not sensitive to the exclusion of particular country cases (see [Figure A.18](#)) or to contingent historical events (see [Figure A.27](#)). However, in countries such as the UK, the Netherlands or Sweden, higher levels of the populist right support are positively and significantly related to overall political trust of immigrants, whereas in Germany this relationship is significant and negative (see [Figure A.10a](#)).

Hypothesis H2b is not supported. Coefficient for the trust in national parliament among immigrants is not statistically significant ([Figure 2.4b](#)), but its confidence interval lies mostly above the zero point. On the other hand, coefficient ($\beta = -.012$) for immigrants in [Figure 2.4c](#) is statistically significant at .05 level. Results suggest that higher levels of support for the populist right are associated with lower levels of trust on law and order institutions, but without any association with representative institutions. This result is robust to an alternative modelling strategy where the measure of association is estimated as the interaction between the total vote share of the populist right and immigrant population indicator; results are provided in [Figure A.9c](#). These results, although robust, are sensitive to country cases of Austria, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany ([Figure A.18](#)). Without these countries the coefficient moves towards the zero point and loses statistical significance. The association in particular countries is mostly negative, though insignificant, whereas there is a stark contrast between Germany where the relationship remains negative and significant, and the UK where the relationship is positive and significant (see [Figure A.10a](#)). Results are also robust to historical contingencies (see [Figure A.27](#)).

Hypothesis H2c is not supported, as coefficients for both natives and immigrants are not statistically significant ([Figure 2.4d](#)). Confidence interval of the coefficient for immigrants is mostly found above the zero point. Country specific coefficients, however indicate that hypothesised relationship is only observed in the Netherlands and Sweden, while in majority of other countries the results are insignificant (see [Figure A.10d](#)). In Germany and Italy, the relationship is reversed, with immigrants being less trustworthy towards supranational institutions than natives. LOCO models also indicate that if Germany is dropped from the sample, the relationship for immigrants would become positive and statistically significant (see [Figure A.18](#) and [Figure A.17](#)). The results are not sensitive to historical contingencies (see [Figure A.27](#) and [Figure A.26](#)).


Hypothesis 2d is not supported as immigrants demonstrate higher levels of trust in political representatives compared to natives. Coefficient ($\beta = -.011$) is statistically significant on .1 level, although not robust to alternative estimation strategy ([Figure A.9e](#)). Associations across different countries indicate that the negative association is observable only in Spain and Italy (see [Figure A.10b](#)). LOCO models indicate that results are not sensitive to specific country cases (see [Figure A.18](#)), nor to historical contingencies (see [Figure A.27](#)).

Hypothesis 3a does not have sufficient support. Coefficient for the first generation of immigrants is not statistically significant, while coefficient for the second generation ($\beta = .047$) is positive on .05 level (see [Figure 2.4a](#)). Results from interaction models indicate this result is not robust to the alternative modelling




(a) Total Political Trust

(b) Trust in National Parliament



(c) Trust in Law and Order Institutions

(d) Trust in Supranational Institutions



(e) Trust in Political Representatives

Figure 2.4: Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Political Trust

strategy (see [Figure A.9a](#)). LOCO models suggest the results for the second generation are sensitive to the case of Austria, since dropping this country gives a statistically insignificant coefficient for the second generation (see [Figure A.20](#)), whereas no sensitivity has been detected for the first generation (see [Figure A.19](#)). Only the Italian case provides evidence for negative relationship between total political trust and the support for the populist right as hypothesised, while cases such as Spain, Germany and Denmark suggest that lower levels of trust are a trait of the first generation (see [Figure A.10](#)). Results for the first generation are not sensitive to contingent historical events ([Figure A.28](#)), while the results for the second generation lose statistical significance when the years of the refugee crisis and year of the major terrorist attacks are dropped (see [Figure A.29](#)).

Coefficients for all types of trust, except the trust in law and order institutions, among the second generation in [Figure 2.4](#) are positive and statistically significant, but only one is confirmed in robustness checks - trust in supranational institutions ([Figure A.9d](#)). This suggests that high levels of populist right electoral support are associated with higher attainment to supranational institutions for the second generation of immigrants. Only Italy demonstrates a negative, statistically significant association (see [Figure A.10](#)). LOCO models on the other hand suggest that significance of this relationship is significant on dropping Austria or Belgium from the sample ([Figure A.20](#)). Out of historical contingencies, this relationship becomes insignificant when years of the major terrorist attacks are discounted from the analysis (see [Figure A.29](#)). This sensitivity suggests these events buttress the trust in supranational institutions in the second generation of immigrants.

For the first generation, on the other hand, increase in electoral support for the populist right is related to lower trust in law and order institutions. This coefficient is robust to a different modelling strategy (see [Figure A.9c](#)). Results presented in the [Figure 2.4c](#) are statistically significant at $p < .1$ level. Further investigation shows that such results would turn statistically significant at $p < .05$ level if either Spain, Norway, Sweden or the UK were dropped from the sample, which suggests that respondents in these countries put more trust into law and order institutions in relation to the populist right electoral support (see [Figure A.19](#)). Upon checking specific country slopes, it is evident that Sweden and Spain have a positive association for the first generation immigrants (see [Figure A.10](#)). Results are also sensitive to historical events and the graphs in [Figure A.28](#) suggest that by dropping either the period of the economic crisis, the refugee crisis or the years of the terrorist attacks, the association would turn significant at $p < .05$ level. Such results suggest that times of uncertainty decrease the negative association between the populist right support and the trust in law and order institutions.

Further disaggregation on baseline indicators of political trust indicates that increase in trust among the first generation immigrants is driven by their trust in the EU institutions, particularly the European parliament ([Figure A.8c](#)), which expands available evidence on support for the EU institutions among Muslim immigrants (Isani and Schlipphak 2017), to immigrants in general. Lower trust in law and order institutions stems from lower trust in legal system ([Figure A.8a](#)). Coefficient for the first generation immigrants ($\beta = -.007, p < .1$) and the coefficient for all immigrants ($\beta = -.006, p < .05$) are suggestive of this relationship. Specific country coefficients for all immigrants are mostly insignificant ([Figure A.11](#)), while for the first generation, coefficients for Spain and Sweden are statistically significant and positive. Hypothesis H2b is derived with respect to global trends (Valgarðsson et al. 2025), which immigrants indeed follow as over time the trust in law and order (or implementing) institutions does grow ([Figure 2.2](#)). Finding that lower trust in legal institutions is associated with higher levels of populist right further, despite overall trend in increase of trust for the implementing institutions, only strengthens the argument of this paper—that the populist right is an important player in shaping immigrants’ political trust, albeit differ-

ently across generations.






Figure 2.5: Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Men




(a) Total Political Trust

(b) Trust in National Parliament



(c) Trust in Law and Order Institutions

(d) Trust in Supranational Institutions




(e) Trust in Political Representatives


Figure 2.6: Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Women

A final set of results is related to hypotheses H3b and H3c. Results disaggregated along gender lines are presented in [Figure 2.5](#) and [Figure 2.6](#). Hypothesis H3b is not supported in this analysis as coefficients for immigrants among both men and women relating to total political trust are not significant ([Figure 2.5a](#) and [Figure 2.6a](#)). Among particular countries, statistically significant relationship between lower political trust and higher support for the populist right is found only in Germany and Spain (see [Figure A.16](#)), however, in Germany men demonstrate lower trust, while in Spain the relationship for men is insignificant (see [Figure A.15](#)). LOCO models suggest that results are not sensitive to a particular country cases ([Figure A.25](#) and [Figure A.24](#)), nor to contingent historical events ([Figure A.33](#) and [Figure A.34](#)).


In relation to the results from the previous section, both immigrant men and women of the second generation strongly support supranational institutions ([Figure 2.5d](#) and [Figure 2.6d](#)) in the face of higher populist right electoral support. However, results in both genders are not robust to alternative specifications ([Figure A.9d](#)). Evidence about lower trust in law and order institutions among immigrant men and women in the first generation are not statistically significant ([Figure 2.6c](#) and [Figure 2.5c](#), interacted models are presented in [Figure A.9c](#)).




(a) Total Political Trust




(b) Trust in National Parliament



(c) Trust in Law and Order Institutions




(d) Trust in Supranational Institutions




(e) Trust in Political Representatives

Figure 2.7: Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Muslim Immigrants




(a) Total Political Trust

(b) Trust in National Parliament




(c) Trust in Law and Order Institutions

(d) Trust in Supranational Institutions




(e) Trust in Political Representatives

Figure 2.8: Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Non-Western Immigrants




(a) Total Political Trust

(b) Trust in National Parliament



(c) Trust in Law and Order Institutions

(d) Trust in Supranational Institutions



(e) Trust in Political Representatives

Figure 2.9: Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: EU Immigrants

Results based on disaggregation along the origin of immigrants are provided in [Figure 2.7](#), [Figure 2.8](#) and [Figure 2.9](#). Hypothesis H3c is not supported as neither Muslim nor non-Western immigrants demonstrate lower levels of total political trust associated with the high populist right support. Coefficients are insignificant for all groups hypothesis H3a refers to. Hypothesised relationship is only evident in cases of Italy and Spain where lower levels of political trust are significantly associated with higher populist right electoral support, only for Non-Western Immigrants (see [Figure A.13](#) and [Figure A.14](#)); In Germany the association is statistically significant and negative for both groups. LOCO models indicate that insignificant results would largely remain if country cases are dropped sequentially. In rare cases where the results would turn significant, the coefficient moves in the positive direction ([Figure A.23](#) for EU immigrants; for Non-Western immigrants [Figure A.22](#); for Muslim immigrants [Figure A.21](#)). Results also seem not to be sensitive to contingent historical events for Muslim and Non-Western immigrants ([Figure A.30](#) and [Figure A.31](#)), while for the EU immigrants dropping the years of the economic crisis turns the relationship between the populist right and political trust more positive and statistically significant ([Figure A.32](#)).

Disaggregated analysis in [Figure 2.8c](#) and [Figure 2.7c](#) indicates that higher support for the populist right is not associated with higher levels of trust in law and order institutions among these immigrant groups. Interacted models are available in [Figure A.9c](#) and they are suggestive of a negative relationship between high support for the populists and trust in law and order institutions among the non-Western immigrants and their first generation. Disaggregated analysis also shows that the relationship is negative among the EU immigrants across generations ([Figure 2.9c](#)), but robustness checks confirm this only for the 2nd generation of the EU immigrants ([Figure A.9c](#)). More focused analysis on just trust in legal institutions in both disaggregated and interacted setting suggests that these relationships are not robust ([Figure A.35](#)).

The only robust relationship that the more specific focus on legal institutions brought is that higher levels of support for the populist right are associated with lower levels of trust among the first generation Muslims ([Figure A.35a](#) and [Figure A.35b](#)). These results suggest that insignificant coefficients for the first generation Muslims in disaggregated ([Figure 2.7c](#)) and interacted ([Figure A.9c](#)) approach for trust in law and order institutions may come due to their trust in the police. I also checked robustness of these results, although they need to be taken with precaution due to the small number of observations getting even smaller in these checks. Dropping France, Germany or Sweden moves the coefficient away from zero and renders it significant at $p < .05$, while dropping other countries moves the coefficient to zero, which suggests that respondents in these countries show greater trust in the legal system than in other countries ([Figure A.36a](#)). The relationship is toned down in the years of the refugee crisis or the years of terrorist attacks ([Figure A.36c](#)). Country trends show that in the majority of countries the relationship is insignificant, while it has a reverse and statistically significant sign only in Spain ([Figure A.36b](#)).

Available evidence about the trust in supranational institutions indicate that positive robust relationship between high trust in these institutions and support for the populist right exists among the second generation EU immigrants ([Figure 2.9d](#) and [Figure A.9d](#)). When focused on just the trust in the European Parliament, this relationship is positive and robust for all EU immigrants ([Figure A.35c](#) and [Figure A.35d](#)). Contrary to the available evidence (Isani and Schlipphak 2017), EU immigrants emerged as a more consistent source of support for the EU institutions through higher trust. These results are robust to LOCO estimation (with one exception: dropping Belgium renders the coefficient insignificant, see [Figure A.37a](#)), but sensitive to historically contingent events — the relationship turns insignificant and the coefficient moves towards zero when the years of the refugee crisis or major terrorist attacks are discounted ([Figure A.37c](#)). Among particular countries, the relationship is statistically significant and negative only in France ([Figure A.37b](#)).

I ran two additional analyses available in the [section A.16](#) with an aim to check if the quality of government in the host country moderates the association of the populist right electoral support and political trust and if political trust may be associated with the electoral support for the mainstream right due to their positive track record in enacting anti-immigrant policies (Akkerman 2012; Abdelgadir and Fouka 2020). Results in [Figure A.39j](#) suggest that the quality of government in the host country moderates the association between populist right electoral support and political trust, but not for trust in law and order institutions. This suggests that higher levels of the quality of government do not diminish the relationship between populist support and trust in law and order institutions, unlike for other types of trust. More granular approach with focusing just on trust in legal system and the application of the binning estimator confirm the insignificance of this moderation.

Mainstream right is associated with lower levels of political trust among the second generation of immigrants ([Figure A.38](#)). Statistically significant relationship appears for total political trust ([Figure A.38a](#)), but also for the trust in supranational institutions and political representatives ([Figure A.38d](#) and [Figure A.38e](#)). Among the first generation, it seems that higher support for the populist right is only negatively associated ($\beta = -.020$; $p < .05$) with trust in law and order institutions among the first generation ([Figure A.38c](#)). This evidence is suggestive that for the entire immigrant population radical right is still distinctive compared to mainstream right. However, negative and statistically significant relationship is found for both mainstream and populist right among the first generation immigrants, which could indicate the convergence of these parties in the eyes of this particular immigrant group.

2.6 Discussion

Analysis in this paper demonstrated that the relationship between populist right electoral support and political trust does not encompass all different aspects of political trust. Hypothesised relationships within different immigrant groups and between immigrants and natives were not supported in the data. In light of such results the credibility of the populist threat needs to be taken with caution. The literature shows that impact of the populist right on quality of government indeed spans from the realm of civic politics and accountability to political representation in numerous states (Hawkins and Mitchell 2025; Juon and Bochsler 2020; Lange and Böckmann 2025; Huber and Schimpf 2017, 2016), which makes support for the populist right a comprehensive and credible threat to the foundations of immigrants' political trust.

I argued that lower levels of trust among immigrants are connected to the threat of revoking procedural fairness, as the link that enables access to quality and high performing institutions. Negative association between high populist right electoral support and trust in law and order institutions focuses the initial argument. The lack of hypothesised negative associations with other forms of political trust and a robust association with trust in law and order institutions suggest that the credibility of the threat may be related to the elements of institutional system that indeed produce favourable outcomes for immigrants once procedural fairness is in place, which rests on an open and accessible legal system for immigrants. However, the threat does not seem to overspill to other elements of political system. This may be related to the open rhetoric of the populist parties, which vocally advocate changes in integration policies and welfare systems, without referring to political representation. Limits to the credibility also come from the fact that electoral success does not come with equivalent guarantees of imposing one's policies.

An additional explanation entails that immigrants adapt their levels of trust in accordance with the threat

they face. Living in their respective countries, they over time gain awareness of the limitations of populist right reach in changing the institutions. Because populist right is vocal and the mainstream right is expedient in changing the institutions, lower levels of trust in law and order institutions among the first generation of immigrants are related to both mainstream and populist parties. This suggests that vocality about changing the institutions and revoking procedural fairness is important, but no less than capability and willingness to enact changes.

Another potential avenue for understanding the robust relationship between immigrants' political trust and support for the populist right is that not all elements of political system are regarded equally important when forming a trusting relationship (Hetherington and Husser 2012). As not all immigrants can vote, representative system may be less important for their overall trust, while legal institutions may be more important as immigrants depend more on them, particularly the first generation immigrants. Robust relationship in trust for law and order institutions might reflect that populist right targets exactly the institutions that immigrants value more and build more profound trusting relationship with them.

The analysis also demonstrated a continuous significance of immigrant generations for understanding of immigrants' political trust. The first generation of immigrants demonstrates lower levels of trust in law and order institutions in the face of populist right electoral support and they likely drive the association for all immigrants. More granular analyses also show that lower levels among the first generation are due to their lower levels of trust in legal institutions, a relationship particularly robust for the first generation Muslim immigrants. This is yet another piece of evidence that the trust of immigrant groups dependent on open and accessible institutions is sensitive to the threat of revoking procedural fairness. Dependency on open institutions among Muslims is more emphasised due to high levels of prejudice and discrimination they face in Western Europe (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2017; Ward 2019; Solivetti 2024; Abdelgadir and Fouka 2024). On the other hand, second generation immigrants place their trust in supranational institutions in relation to populist right electoral support. Disaggregation by origin provides evidence that immigrants from other EU countries are the reservoir of this trust. These results are suggestive of potential importance of the EU integration for preserving political trust in Europe's increasingly diverse population in the face of right wing populist surge.

Results from heterogeneous event study stipulate there is no immediate effect after the elections. The lack of hypothesised association may be understood in several ways. The literature (Turnbull-Dugarte 2023) suggests the type of elections may imply its effect on political trust. As the data counted in all elections and did not target snap elections or elections with surprising outcomes, the lack of robust association between political trust and populist right electoral support may be due to a lack of major uncertainties. Further, as populist right has been participating in elections for a number of years (Mudde 2013; Valentim 2024a), their track record shows that, despite increasing support, they are potential but not likely candidates for coalition or governing partners (Akkerman 2012), which also tones down the uncertainty. In some countries, such as Germany this lack of surprise also comes from the vocality of other parties not to co-operate with the populist right on national level (de Lange 2012; Arzheimer and Berning 2019). Populist right parties are also known to tone down after they enter the office (Rooduijn, Lange, and Brug 2012; van Spanje 2010) which may also impact the lack of significant association between political trust and support for the populist right after the elections.

It is worthy to mention the scope conditions of the analysis presented in this chapter. Analysed countries represent a subset of developed European countries with an increased inflow of immigrants in the past 20 years. Countries indeed have different histories of immigration regimes and different structure

of immigrant populations. Some countries such as the UK, France or the Netherlands have large racially different immigrant communities from their former colonies, while countries such as Slovenia have immigrants from countries of former Yugoslavia. Although not all immigrants are racially different, they in all countries bring cultural and religious diversity. Therefore, an expectation is that results from this chapter are relevant for developed countries that experience an inflow of culturally diverse immigrants. The pool of analysed European countries mostly consists of parliamentary regimes with proportional representation. Systems with proportional representation commonly push populist right parties to campaign across their respective countries, making them visible to a large portion of national electorate. Prevalence of parliamentary regimes also signals that these parties even with limited support have impact on national policies. Therefore, my analysis speaks to cases where political system supports national visibility of the populist parties and also gives them some political power, even if they end up in the opposition. Another caveat is that most of the analysed parties are centralised. Not all of them have recognisable leaders, but their ambitions target the national policy-making, which makes my insights transferable to cases where the populist right has the intention of making an impact at the national level.¹²

2.7 Conclusion

In this paper I analysed the relationship between the populist right electoral support and immigrants' political trust. Relying on two-way fixed effects estimation and heterogeneous event study I test the argument that higher levels of electoral support for the populist right are associated with lower levels of political trust among immigrants. The argument stipulates that such relationship is meaningful because the populist right parties vocally advocate for contraction of the multicultural policies and procedural justice principles that enable equal access to institutions for immigrants and therefore support their political trust. High electoral support for the populist right therefore signals to immigrants that the threat to procedural fairness is credible and that institutions might cease to deliver quality and inclusion for immigrants.

Results in this paper suggest that the credibility of the populist right threat has its limits and that it does not affect overall political trust of immigrants. The threat is credible within the realm of institutions which deliver to immigrants due to established procedural fairness rules. Institutions that particularly depend on procedural fairness include law and order institutions and in particular the legal system. This association is driven by the first generation immigrants whose lower levels of trust are robustly associated with higher support for the populist right. The analysis suggests that second generation immigrants more often place their trust in supranational institutions, specifically the EU institutions when facing a populist right electoral support. The paper suggests the threat to political trust is limited to the set of legal institutions that are important to immigrants in their process of integration, as they implement or oversee the implementation of policies (such as integration policies) which the populist right targets in their backlash against multiculturalism. The populist threat may not be (yet) comprehensive, but it does hit its target.

This paper opens several potential avenues of further research. Although heterogeneous aspects of associations between populist right support and political trust of immigrants related to gender and origin were not supported in this research, they call for additional research, as the literature documents significant differences among immigrant groups, which intersect with immigrant generation and gender. Intersec-

¹²Even for parties that have regional origins, such as Lega Nord in Italy, proportional representation can uplift them into a national policy-maker, though their base may be regional. Also in Germany, parties may have distinct local leaders with particular focus on specific issues, they remain harmonised with national party leadership.

tional approaches would tell us more about more particularised approaches to political trust, which this research only opens. Future research may also rely on causal designs to study the effects of entrance of the populist parties into electoral arena or their entrance to parliament on political trust of immigrants. Another avenue could also exploit within-unit designs that account for changes in the levels of trust over time due to populist right electoral success.

This research raises an additional question—instead of finding a relationship of populist right electoral support with wider aspects of political trust, this paper established a relationship in just one, although very relevant, aspect of trust in law and order institutions. Finding that just one aspect of political trust is related to the populist electoral support, in spite of numerous evidence that the presence of the right wing populists decrease an array of governance indicators, opens the question of whether relations to other forms of trust are any different. In the following chapter I disentangle the relationship between generalised social trust and right wing populist electoral support.

Chapter 3

How To Trust Them After I Saw Who They Voted For? Electoral Support for Populist Right and Social Trust Among Immigrants in Western Europe

3.1 Introduction

Generalised social trust represents one of the key preconditions of cooperation and tolerance. For immigrants, generalised social trust is important in their process of integration by lubricating the establishment of new connections and ties in the new country (Dinesen and Hooghe 2010; Dinesen 2012). Substantive evidence supports the claim that high performing institutions in the Western European countries are responsible for the increase in the levels of generalised social trust for immigrants from low-trusting countries after they immigrate (Dinesen 2013; Nannestad et al. 2014). Levels of generalised trust increase because high-performing institutions foster tolerance and equal opportunity, which immigrants then transfer to other social connections (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Experimental research also demonstrated the crucial impact of street level bureaucrats in this process (Martinangeli et al. 2024).

In [chapter 2](#) I provided the evidence that despite negative effects of the populist right on the quality of government indicators throughout different countries (Huber and Schimpf 2016; Juon and Bochsler 2020) and their backlash against multiculturalism (Norris and Inglehart 2019), the electoral support for the populist right is limited only to trust in law and order. This posed a question of whether populist right because of their negative impact on the institutional foundations of trust can impact social trust that among immigrants also depends on high performing institutions. Additionally, the literature confirms that exposure to the populist right campaigns raises the levels of perceived discrimination among immigrants (Pérez 2015; Schmuck, Matthes, and Paul 2017; Hobbs and Lajevardi 2019), which can also contribute to lower levels of generalised trust. This poses a question of whether populist right may impact immigrants levels of generalised social trust through sense of exclusion and by creating more hostile environment for immigrants?

Building on [chapter 2](#) this paper builds on somewhat paradoxical findings about a narrow impact of the

populist right electoral performance on the political trust and extends it to generalised social trust. Considering that generalised social trust also depends on the sense of belonging (Breidahl and Gustavsson 2022), there are more reasons to believe that populist right support may be related to generalised social trust of immigrants. The paper relies on the same data sources in the previous chapter (European Social Survey 2019; Lührmann et al. 2020) and utilises established estimation strategies: two-way fixed effects models and a heterogeneous event study

This paper provides evidence that the relationship between the populist right electoral performance and immigrants' generalised social trust emerges only when the momentum of the populist right is accounted for, which coincides with the period in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis (Gessler and Hunger 2021; Downes, Loveless, and Lam 2021). The paper provides the evidence that generalised social trust of immigrants is negatively associated with the increase in support for the populist right. Analysis of heterogeneous aspects also confirms that sense of perceived discrimination and Muslim identity moderate this relationship, especially among the first generation immigrants. Unexpected findings include that lower levels of generalised social trust among immigrants are found without finding the moderating effect of discrimination for the second generation, which is expected due to Integration paradox (van Tubergen 2025; Verkuypen 2016).

The paper is further divided into Literature Review, followed by an argument and methods sections. After that I present the results which are discussed in the following section. In the conclusion I summarise the findings and maps further avenues of research.

3.2 Literature Review

Generalised social trust represents a belief that others will act with good will and benign intent (Evangelist 2022; Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994; Jones 1996). Generalised social trust forms in a situation of mutual interdependence and unknown outcomes towards individuals about whom a trustee does not have any particular information or does not know them personally, (Nannestad 2008; Uslaner 2000; Robbins 2016). Strong evidence suggests that impartial and consensus-facilitating institutions develop generalised trust by fostering belief that other fellow citizens will also benevolently and abide social norms in uncertain situations (Herrerros 2023; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Freitag and Bühlmann 2009; Sønderskov and Dinesen 2016). Experimental evidence supports that corruptibility of street levels bureaucrats is crucial in preventing development of high generalised social trust (Martinangeli et al. 2024). The literature also recognises family surrounding, as a prism of other social influences during childhood (Uslaner 2000; Nannestad 2008), shared identity (Gustavsson and Stendahl 2020; Wamsler 2023; Tropp et al. 2006; Tanis and Postmes 2005) and informal social ties in civic society foster generalised trust (Putnam 1995; Nannestad 2008; Glanville, Andersson, and Paxton 2013). Another line of literature substantiates the evidence that generalised trust is shaped through generalisations of adult experiences and interactions (Paxton and Glanville 2015; Glanville and Paxton 2007; Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Glanville and Shi 2020)

Generalised trust represents one of the key conditions of successful immigrant integration by enabling immigrants to establish social contact and participate in out-group social networks (Dinesen and Hooghe 2010; Nannestad et al. 2014; Dinesen 2013, 2012). Although mixed evidence exists about the levels of immigrants' trustworthiness, the literature agrees that the same set of factors shapes generalised trust of both groups (Dinesen 2011; de Vroome, Hooghe, and Marien 2013). The most significant changes in the levels of trustworthiness experience immigrants who migrate from low-trusting to high-trusting societies

and in the process of acculturation increase their social trust (Dinesen and Hooghe 2010; Nannestad et al. 2014; Dinesen 2013; Dinesen and Sønderskov 2018). A large pool of empirical evidence points to experiences of tolerance, fairness and equal opportunities (Dinesen and Hooghe 2010; Rothstein and Uslander 2005; Rothstein and Stolle 2008) that immigrants generalise to social relations as responsible for the effects of acculturation (Glanville, Andersson, and Paxton 2013; Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Freitag and Bühlmann 2009). Experiences of belonging and shared identities also contribute to generalised social trust (Tanis and Postmes 2005; Tropp et al. 2006), while the sense of exclusion and high perceived discrimination prevent the development of generalised social (and other forms of out-group) trust (de Vroome, Hooghe, and Marien 2013; Wilkes and Wu 2019; Evangelist 2022).

Immigrants in Europe face high levels of discrimination, particularly immigrants from Muslim majority countries and Africa (van Tubergen 2025; Ananthi and Hewstone 2013; Esses 2021; Di Stasio et al. 2021). Discrimination represents all types of unfair treatment in interactions with other people or state institutions that result purely because of (perceived) identities of immigrants (Oskooii 2020, 2016). It stems from widespread negative stereotypes about immigrants (Turnbull-Dugarte, Ortega, and Hunklinger 2025; Zhang, Gereke, and Baldassarri 2022), that are related to natives perceptions value and normative incongruence between themselves and immigrants (López-Rodríguez et al. 2023; Frese 2025; Choi, Poertner, and Sambanis 2022; Krakowski et al. 2025). Anti-immigrant sentiments are further intensified due to misperceived, inflated size of immigrant population (Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes 2017; Guay et al. 2025; Lutz and Bitschnau 2023; Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva 2023), that easily leads to anxiety about immigration and inspire sense of threat from immigrants (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Huddy et al. 2005; Gadarian and Albertson 2014; Riaz, Bischof, and Wagner 2024; Dunwoody and McFarland 2018; Neureiter and Schulte 2024; Schmidt 2021; van der Zwan, Bles, and Lubbers 2017). Prejudice towards immigrant men is particularly prevalent in Western Europe (Ward 2019; Zhang, Gereke, and Baldassarri 2022). On the other hand immigrant who perceive host country as a closed community and the second generation immigrants who are more sophisticated in understanding the host-country norms tend to perceived more discrimination (Simonsen 2016b,a; Genoni and Ruedin 2024; Steinmann 2019; Gelepithis and Giani 2025; Verkuyten 2016).

Discrimination and unfair treatment of immigrants have been consistently supported by the populist right parties and their issue ownership of immigration (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2019; Gessler and Hunger 2021; Hutter and Kriesi 2022; Dancygier and Margalit 2020). Populist right exploited the existing immigration scepticism politically articulating it into a zero-sum game between endangered, deserving natives, and threatening, undeserving immigrants (Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2019; Dennison 2020; Dennison and Geddes 2019; Kustov 2023; Burscher, van Spanje, and de Vreese 2015). The anti-immigrant agenda also explicates a disbelief that immigrants, especially from Muslim-majority countries can integrate into European societies and rejects them by drawing national boundaries in a nativist (ancestral) key (Lutz and Bitschnau 2023; Trittler 2017; Kaufmann 2019; Simonsen and Bonikowski 2020; Martinović and Verkuyten 2024). Prejudiced portray and exclusionary treatment of immigrants in populist right political communication increases sense of perceived discrimination among immigrants (Matthes and Schmuck 2017; Schmuck, Matthes, and Paul 2017), although this can depend on individual identification with the host-nation (Pérez 2015). The effects of anti-immigrant discrimination further dissipate to disengagement from communities (Simonsen 2021), withdrawal from the public (Hobbs and Lajevardi 2019) or political participation (Tyrberg 2020), although some evidence point to increase in mainstream political participation and radicalisation (Besco et al. 2022; Grewal and Hamid 2024; Mitts 2019).

The literature review points to two open gaps. The first gap is that the literature on populist right discrim-

ination does not study the effects on generalised social (or political trust). Another, more important gap is that even when studying the effects of the populist right, the literature is mostly focused on the effects of anti-immigrant rhetoric or messages (Matthes and Schmuck 2017; Schmuck, Matthes, and Paul 2017; Pérez 2015; Grewal and Hamid 2024). The underlying assumption of this research is that discriminatory content of these messages creates the effects on immigrants' sense of perceived discrimination. Messages are usually tailored based on actual statements and they carry a negative message about immigrants, but often leave out the aspect of populist right support from the prompts. While the literature recognised support as important - it was very interested in the sources of support, but not consequences for immigrants and other targeted groups. Also, in real-world setting, immigrants can moderate their exposure to discriminatory messages, while the electoral presence of the populist right is becoming a new normal (Vachudova 2021; Valentim 2024a; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Recognising that generalised social trust is an important asset of immigrants that might be related to populist right discrimination, this paper addresses the gap in the literature by studying the relationship between the populist right electoral support and generalised social trust among immigrants.

3.3 The Argument

I theorise there are two mechanisms of populist right impact on immigrants' generalised social trust. The first mechanism works through erosion of high-performing institutions that underpin high generalised social trust among immigrants. Evidence from cross-country studies indicate that populist presence in the government is associated with decrease in the quality of government, particularly in the role of oversight, checks-and-balances and the rule of law (Hawkins and Mitchell 2025; Kyriacou and Trivin 2024; Grassi, Memoli, and Elshoura Abouzied 2022; Vittori 2022). Populist right presence in the opposition on the national level also shows a negative impact on an array of quality of governance indicators (Juon and Bochsler 2020; Lange and Böckmann 2025; Huber and Schimpf 2017, 2016). Crucially, evidence supports that populist incumbency on the local level causes decrease in bureaucratic performance through replacement of professional with preferred less skilled bureaucrats, slower repayment of debt and loose public spending (Bellodi, Morelli, and Vannoni 2024; Sasso and Morelli 2021). Less skilled bureaucracy allows local populists incumbents to engage in embezzlement and institutional capture in order to secure their re-election (Chesterley and Roberti 2018). Populist right support on the national level can serve as a signal of possibility of national, but also local populist incumbency which may erode efficacy and impartiality of street-level bureaucracy that would have consequences for immigrants' generalised social trust. Therefore, I hypothesise that higher levels of populist right electoral support will be associated with lower levels of trustworthiness among immigrants.

H1: Higher levels of populist right electoral support are associated with lower levels of generalised social trust among immigrants.

The second mechanism stipulates that higher levels of electoral support signal that the host-country is becoming more hostile to immigrants because more and more citizens support anti-immigrant agenda. In Western European countries, the populist right spent 15 years establishing itself as a clear owner of the immigration issue (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2019; Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2019) - despite mainstream right enacting majority of restrictive immigration policies (Akkerman 2012; Lutz 2019). Clear issue ownership makes these parties distinguishable even to immigrants with low levels of political knowledge or sophistication. Knowledge of voting preferences on aggregate level triggers attitude attribution

through different heuristics (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Bartle and Laycock 2012; Bartels 2002). Following heuristics (such as likability) in attitude attribution immigrants can easily pinpoint that voters of the populist right do not support immigration. As the national vote share of populist right parties provides aggregate information only, immigrant may instead use it to draw conclusions about hostility towards immigration in the host-country. Numerous evidence about the centrality of immigration concerns for the populist right voters would support the interpretation of the populist right electoral support as support for the anti-immigrant agenda (Kustov 2023; Neureiter and Schulte 2024; Danieli et al. 2022). Another contributing factor to such interpretation of the populist right electoral support rests on ideological voting, or voting due to agreement with policies and ideology of the populist right, which by default includes anti-immigration positioned as one of their central issues (van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2000; van der Brug and van Spanje 2009; Loxbo 2014; Ortiz Barquero, Ruiz Jiménez, and González-Fernández 2022; Vishwanath 2025).

The aspect of increased hostility in support for the populist right is that immigrants can attribute pervasive discrimination and exclusion to it. The nativist key of the populist right agenda constructs that host-country nation is a closed community in which native citizens should have the advantage and priority on the job market or in the access to welfare, while the state should protect the symbolic boundaries and cultural (Christian) heritage of the host-country nation (Betz 2019; Bonikowski 2017; Meijers, Huber, and Zaslove 2025; Mudde 2013; Schulte-Cloos 2022; Trittler 2017). Nativism of the populist right resonates well with widespread beliefs about collective ownership of the nation and autochthony - which to immigrants signal that they could never be fully accepted as equal members of the host nation as they lack common ancestry with the natives (Martinović and Verkuyten 2024; Szebeni et al. 2025; Nijs et al. 2023; Hasbún López et al. 2019).

Increasing electoral support for the populist right therefore signals pervasive support for exclusion of immigrants and appraisal of discrimination as more pervasive, internal and stable (Simonsen 2016b, 2018, 2016a; Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey 1999; Schmitt and Branscombe 2002; Bourguignon et al. 2006). Such appraisal of discrimination harms self-esteem of immigrants by threatening the value of their ethnic or religious identities which are regarded as incompatible with that of the host nation (Turnbull-Dugarte, Ortega, and Hunklinger 2025; Tartakovsky and Walsh 2020; Phinney et al. 2001; Eccleston and Major 2006). In an attempt to reclaim their self-esteem immigrant may engage in stronger identification with their stigmatised ethnic or religious identities (Tajfel and Turner 2010, 2004; Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002; Doosje, Spears, and Ellemers 2002; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007) or reject the host-nation identity (Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, and Solheim 2009). Drawing a stricter bound decreases the level of shared identity as one of the foundations of generalised trust for immigrants and fosters estrangement from the widest pool of "immediate strangers" (Breidahl and Gustavsson 2022; Gustavsson and Stendahl 2020; Tanis and Postmes 2005; Tropp et al. 2006; Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011).

H2: Higher levels of populist right electoral support are associated with lower levels of trustworthiness in other people among immigrants.

H3: Perceived discrimination moderates the relationship between populist right electoral support and the generalised social trust of immigrants.

However, not all immigrant groups are equally discriminated against. Compared to other immigrants groups, Muslims are the most frequent targets of the populist right anti-immigrant rhetoric, constructed as a historic enemy, which now threatens national identities and christian heritage from within (Kallis 2018;

Arzheimer 2025; Helbling and Traunmuller 2020; Kunst et al. 2016; Lean 2012). Exposure to Islamophobia causes high levels of disengagement from the out-groups among Muslims, that can affect their generalised social trust (Lajevardi 2020; Martin 2017; Kunst et al. 2016). Evidence does not suggest that populist right discriminates immigrant groups based on their gender. However, public opinion research indicates that prejudice against men is more widespread and mistrust towards them higher (Ward 2019; Zhang, Gereke, and Baldassarri 2022; Gereke, Schaub, and Baldassarri 2020), which could make them more sensitive to the populist right discrimination. The same applies for the second generation immigrants as they perceive more discrimination due to their better understanding of cultural codes and norms of the host country (Genoni and Ruedin 2024; Steinmann 2019; Gelepithis and Giani 2025; Verkuyten 2016). Based on these differences I test the following hypotheses:

H4: Higher levels of populist right electoral support are associated with lower levels of generalised social trust among Muslim compared to immigrants in general.

H5: Higher levels of populist right electoral support are associated with lower levels of generalised social trust among immigrant men compared to immigrants women.

H6: Higher levels of populist right electoral support are associated with lower levels of generalised social trust among the second generation of immigrants compared to the first generation.

Elections represent the opportunity to express the support for the populist right. Numerically expressed electoral results provide a clear signal of support for the anti-immigrant agenda due to distinctiveness of anti-immigrant parties as issue owners of immigration (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2019; Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2019). Electoral results are also an efficient way of learning because they represent a timely and accurate update about the aggregate preferences of the electorate based on their party endorsements, which diminishes potential misperception about the magnitude of the support for the populist right anti-immigrant agenda (Stoetzer, Leemann, and Traunmueller 2024; Bursztyn and Yang 2022; Lee and Kevins 2025; McDermott 2006). Another aspect of their efficiency in the situations of high immigration salience is in diminishing the risks of exposure to discriminatory attitudes that follow political participation through cross-cutting ties (Mutz 2002; Lajevardi 2020). Therefore, I propose that higher levels of the populist right support are associated with the lower levels of immigrants' trust directly after receiving the information update - that is to say after elections, but that the effect over time decreases. Following the literature on the durability of the information updates from political campaigns (Hill et al. 2013; Carnahan, Bergan, and Lee 2021), I hypothesise that stronger negative relationship between lower levels of generalised social trust and higher levels of electoral support for the populist right persists in the first 2 months after elections.

H7: Higher levels of populist right electoral support are associated with lower levels of generalised social trust among immigrants in the first 2 months after elections.

H8: After the first two months the strength of association between lower levels of generalised trust and populist right electoral support decreases.

3.4 Data and Methods

3.4.1 Data

This paper uses the same dataset as in [chapter 2](#). This dataset contains individual data from the European Social Survey [ESS] (European Social Survey [2019](#)) collated with electoral data from V-Party dataset (Lührmann et al. [2020](#)) and country-level data from World Development Index (WDI) and World Value Survey (WVS) (World Bank [2025](#); Inglehart et al. [2022](#)). Individual data are nested within 175 country-year clusters, as the dataset encompasses period from 2002 to 2019 (Waves 1 to 9) for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. The definition of the immigrant population resembles the definition used in [chapter 2](#), where immigrants are defined as respondents whose at least one parent was born outside of their country of residence. Immigrant population is further disaggregated along the gender lines and generation. The first generation is defined as all respondents who were born outside their country of residence, while the second generation respondents were born in a country of residence, but at least one of their parents was not. An additional identifier was added for Muslim immigrants. The treatment is defined in exactly the same way as in [chapter 2](#) and represents a total vote share of all right wing populist parties that participated in these elections. Parties were classified along three dimensions: populism, cultural liberalism and immigration presented in scales 0-100. Populist parties are regarded as those in lower two quartiles of cultural liberalism and immigration approval and in the upper most quartile of the populism scale. Details on party classification and cross-validation with PopuList data are presented in [section A.1](#).

The main outcome in this paper is an index of generalised social trust. This composite scale was created by summing three separate indicators for trustworthiness, helpfulness and fairness, available in the ESS. Each of these items ranges from 0 to 10, where lower levels represent less trust. The index of generalised social trust therefore takes values from 0 to 30, where lower values represent less trust. Factor analysis substantiates that all items gather under a single dimension and that the scale is very reliable with Cronbach $\alpha = 0.70$. Besides using the index, I also test for the relationships between the populist electoral support and each indicator of social trust on its own. Items were formulated in the following way:

Trustworthiness: Would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

Helpfulness: Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?

Fairness: Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?

Trends in generalised social trust are presented in [Figure 3.1](#) show differing trajectories of social trust across countries and over time. Compared to trends in political trust for, social trust trends indicate that in numerous countries social trust of the natives is higher than that of immigrants. Southern European countries and Ireland seem to diverge from this trend. Descriptive statistics for the trust variables and control variables for natives and immigrants (across generations as well) is provided in the Appendix [B.1](#).

3.4.2 Research Design

I rely on the same estimation strategy as in [chapter 2](#). I test hypotheses H1-H5 in a two-way fixed effects setting, with country and year fixed effects. The equation resembles the mirroring equation used in the



Figure 3.1: Social Trust Trends by Country and Population Group

estimations of models for political trust:

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha + \beta RWP_{cte} + \mathbf{X}_{ict}'\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \delta_c + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{ict} \quad (3.1)$$

where Y_{ict} is the social trust measure for individual i in country c at time t , RWP_{cte} stands for the vote share of right-wing populist parties in country c in electoral year t^e , $\mathbf{X}_{ict}$ is a vector of individual and country-level control variables, δ_c stands for the country fixed effects, λ_t term represents the time fixed effects, and ε_{ict} term represents the error. Coefficient β captures the association between the right-wing populist electoral support RWP_{cte} and social trust Y_{ict} . Standard errors are also clustered on country-year level. As in [chapter 2](#) models were estimated through disaggregation and interaction. For heterogeneous effects estimation related to hypotheses H4 and H5, the disaggregation principle was extended to Muslim immigrants and immigrants disaggregated by gender. As an alternative strategy, I estimated the relationship between populist right electoral support and social trust of immigrants by interacting a specific immigrant group with the vote share for the populist right. The equation takes the same form as in [chapter 2](#):

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha + \beta_1 RWP_{cte} + \beta_2 \mathbf{1}[G_i = g] + \beta_3 RWP_{cte} \times \mathbf{1}[G_i = g] + \mathbf{X}_{ict}'\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \delta_c + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{ict} \quad (3.2)$$

where $\mathbf{1}[G_i = g]$ is a binary indicator equal to 1 if respondent i belongs to group g , and zero otherwise. This equation is estimated separately for each group g : native, immigrant (both generations), first generation immigrant and second generation immigrants, as well as for Muslim immigrants and gender groups. The coefficient of interest, β_3 , captures the measure of association between reported levels of political trust (Y) of a respondent i , in country c , and year t and electoral support for the populist right (RWP), in country c , from electoral year t^e , conditional on belonging to group g , relative to the rest of the sample. Because the term G_i is a binary indicator of group belonging, interaction coefficient β_3 also represents a marginal effect of RWP_{cte} on Y_{ict} in that particular group.

Hypotheses H6 and H7 are tested in a heterogeneous event study. Heterogeneous event study follows the

specifications set in [chapter 2](#). The treatment in the heterogeneous event study represents the interaction term between total support for the populist right and a dummy for the period after elections in which the respondent was interviewed. The regression equation takes the same form as in [chapter 2](#):

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha + \beta_1 RWP_{ct} + \sum_{d \in D} \beta_2 \mathbf{1}[d_{ct} = d] + \sum_{d \in D} \beta_3 RWP_{ct} \times \mathbf{1}[d_{ct} = d] + \mathbf{X}'_{ict} \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \delta_c + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{ict} \quad (3.3)$$

where Y_{ict} stands for a social trust outcome for individual i in country c in year t , while RWP_{ct} is the vote share of right-wing populist parties in country c in year t . The element $\mathbf{1}[0 \leq d_{ct} \leq D]$ is, again, the indicator which equals 1 if the respondent was surveyed in the period between 0 and D days after the election date in country c in year t ; cutoff parameter D can take values of 30, 60, 100, 200, and 365, while the equation is estimated for each time window separately. The interaction coefficient of interest, β_3 , captures the association between social trust outcome Y_{ict} and support for a populist right party (RWP_{ct}), conditional on being surveyed in period between 0 and D days after elections. Because the term $\mathbf{1}[0 \leq d_{ct} \leq D]$ is a binary indicator, interaction coefficient β_3 also represents a marginal effect of RWP_{ct} in that particular time window on Y_{ict} . The term δ_c stands for country fixed effects, while the term λ_t represents time fixed effects, and ε_{ict} is the error term. Vector of individual and country-level control variables is denoted with $\mathbf{X}_{ict}$. Standard errors are clustered on country-year level. Models are estimated for native, immigrant (both generations), first-generation immigrant and second-generation immigrant samples respectively, across different political trust outcomes.

Models in this chapter rest on the same set of foundations as models in [chapter 2](#) and consequently they share the same set of biases. For models in this chapter I also estimate a set of models equivalent to models from [chapter 2](#) with intention to check for the country specific trends that are hidden in the pooled estimates; I further estimate a series of LOCO models to check for impacts of specific countries on pooled estimates; finally, I estimate the equivalent set of models that account for external economic and migration shocks, and major terrorist attacks related to Islamist fundamentalism. As in [chapter 2](#) the results remain susceptible to reversed causality, as my modelling strategy does not exclude the possibility that voting for the populist right is a consequence of low trust (Berning and Ziller 2017). Still, this problem remains more probable in the native sample, than in any of the immigrant samples. Following the same limitations of the data: the lack of repeated individual observations, a very small number of years without the populist right running in elections and the possibility (albeit small) that immigrants were exposed to public opinion polls prior to the elections, I interpret the coefficients as measures of association, instead of indicators of causal relations.

3.5 Findings

The first set of results that relies on two-way fixed effects estimation is presented in [Figure 3.2](#). Plotted coefficients provide no support for hypotheses H1 and H2. The insignificance of coefficients for all measures of generalised social trust across all immigrant samples indicates no relationship between electoral support for the populist right and generalised social trust. Trustworthiness as the key underlying aspect of trust also does not seem to be related to populist right electoral support. Coefficients were obtained through disaggregated analysis for each group (natives, immigrants, first generation immigrants and second generation immigrants). However, coefficients obtained using group interactions, instead of disaggregation, available in [section B.3](#) suggest that the association between the populist right electoral support and social trust index and trustworthiness is negative and statistically significant for all immi-

grants (see [Figure B.4a](#) and [Figure B.4b](#)). LOCO models in [section B.6](#) and check for coincidental events in [section B.7](#) suggest that results from disaggregated models are not sensitive to a specific country or historical events. Analysis of particular country slopes indicates that social trust index and trustworthiness are positively ($p < .05$) associated with the support for the populist right in this country (see [section B.5](#)), therefore the presence of Belgium in the sample has the power to sway the results for trustworthiness towards more positive (hence, statistically insignificant) results.

In a set of additional analysis I tested for the relationship between populist right electoral support and generalised social trust of immigrants in a subsample spanning from 2015 to 2019. The literature substantiates such additional analysis as the relevance of immigration indeed existed during 2000s (Dancygier and Margalit 2020), but the populist right started gaining traction only with the refugee crisis in 2015 (Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2019; Hutter and Kriesi 2022; Valentim 2024a). The results of this analysis are presented in the Appendix [section B.2](#) and they provide a partial support for the hypothesis H1, but not for hypothesis H2. The association between the populist right electoral support and the index of generalised social trust is statistically significant and negative ($\beta = -.045, p < .05$). The set of interacted models, confirms this finding as robust (see [Figure B.5](#)). Analysis of social trust items suggests the relationship with generalised social trust stems from statistically significant relationship between the populist right electoral support and lower levels of helpfulness across all immigrant groups (see [Figure B.1c](#)), however, this is not robust to alternative interaction specification in [Figure B.5c](#). These results suggest the effect of electoral support for the populist right may be related to its overall salience in the public space. Considering that the number of observations in these models is smaller, LOCO models show that estimates lose their statistical significance and move towards zero when Belgium, Germany, Spain or Ireland are excluded (see [Figure B.31](#)). I also estimate country specific slopes which suggest that France and Austria may have different country specific dynamic.




Figure 3.2: Two-way Fixed Effects: Generalised Social Trust

The results of the analysis pertaining to hypothesis H3 are presented in [Figure 3.3](#). Plotted coefficients represent the interaction between a binary indicator for belonging to a discriminated group based on race, ethnicity, religion and language—as the common types of discrimination immigrants may face due to their distinct identities. Results in [Figure 3.3](#) suggest no relationship between perceived discrimination and the populist right electoral support. These results also suggest the exposure to discrimination does not moderate this relationship—or in other words levels of social trust among immigrants are not lower in relation to populist right support when their exposure to discrimination is accounted for. As in the previous case, I tested this hypothesis with respect to increase in overall public salience of the populist right in the period 2015–2019. Results are presented in [Figure B.2](#) and suggest that discrimination moderates the relationship in the case of index of social trust ($\beta = -.034, p < .1$). Relationship with particular items shows the moderation for trustworthiness and fairness, particularly for the first generation of immigrants.




Figure 3.3: Two-way Fixed Effects: Discrimination as Moderator

Further, I substantiate the evidence of heterogeneous aspects of relationship between the populist right electoral support and immigrants' generalised trust. The analysis related to hypothesis H6 is already presented in the Figure 3.2. Coefficient for these models were obtained through disaggregated analysis for each immigrant group. Results in Figure 3.2 provide no support for hypothesis H6 for the entire observed period, while alternative estimation through interaction confirms this and suggests that the relationship is negative and statistically significant for the first generation ($\beta = -.018, p < .05$), while it is insignificant for the second generation, as in Figure B.4. In both cases, the results are not sensitive to contingent historical circumstances (see Figure B.39 and Figure B.40), but LOCO models for the second generation suggest that the coefficient for this group becomes statistically significant and shifts negatively when Belgium is dropped from the sample (see Figure B.14), while results for the first generation are not sensitive to specific country cases (see Figure B.13).

On the other hand, coefficients from Figure B.1 show that in the period 2015–2019 the relationship between the populist right electoral support and social trust index ($\beta = -.066, p < .05$), helpfulness ($\beta = -.042, p < .01$) and fairness ($\beta = -.027, p < .05$) is negative for the second generation, as proposed in hypothesis. On the other hand, the relationship in the first generation of immigrants is not significant for the index of generalised trust or fairness, but it is for the helpfulness ($\beta = -.020, p < .05$). Interaction models provided in Figure B.5 point that this relationship is not robust to alternative specification, therefore it cannot be said that hypothesis H6 has sufficient support even in the period 2015–2019. LOCO models suggest that results for the second generation from disaggregated model are sensitive to country cases of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain and Slovenia (see Figure B.33).






Figure 3.4: Two-way Fixed Effects: Generalised Social Trust (Muslim Immigrants)


Results for Muslim immigrants are presented in Figure 3.4, and they do not lend support for hypothesis H4, as the relationship among Muslim immigrants is not statistically significant. Alternative specification through interaction models also confirms this finding (see Figure B.6). Although disaggregated models suggest that no other relationship is statistically significant among the Muslim immigrants, the interacted models show the populist right electoral support is negatively related to trustworthiness among Muslims ($\beta = -.007, p < .1$) and particularly in first generation of Muslim immigrants ($\beta = -.010, p < .1$). Further analysis of the data from 2015–2019 (see Figure B.3) also do not lend support for hypothesis H4, but provide more insights about the first generation of Muslim immigrants. Among this generation, increased levels of populist right electoral support are negatively associated with social trust index ($\beta = -.036, p < .05$), trustworthiness ($\beta = -.020, p < .05$) and fairness ($\beta = -.020, p < .05$). Moreover, populist electoral support is associated with lower levels of trustworthiness for all Muslim immigrants ($\beta = -.012, p < .05$). I did not estimate a disaggregated version of models for Muslims for 2015–2019 period, because the number of observations would be severely diminished and estimates unreliable. LOCO models indicate that results for the first generation are largely robust to the impact of particular countries (see Figure B.35), while results for the entire Muslim sample are very sensitive to dropping particular country cases (see Figure B.34). The analysis again underlines the importance of overall salience of the populist right for leaving an imprint on social trust, particularly of the first generation of Muslim immigrants.




(a) Social Trust Index



(b) Trustworthiness




(c) Helpfulness




(d) Fairness


Figure 3.5: Two-Way Fixed Effects: Generalised Social Trust (Men)




(a) Social Trust Index



(b) Trustworthiness



(c) Helpfulness



(d) Fairness

Figure 3.6: Two-Way Fixed Effects: Generalised Social Trust (Women)

The last set of models that test for heterogeneous aspects focuses on gender. Hypothesis H5 states that lower levels of generalised social trust are going to be observed among immigrant men compared to women. Evidence presented in [Figure 3.5](#) and [Figure 3.6](#) does not support this hypothesis. Relationship between lower generalised social trust and the populist right support for men is statistically significant and positive ($\beta = .023, p < .01$, see [Figure 3.5](#)), while it is negative for women ($\beta = -.023, p < .01$, see [Figure 3.6](#)). Alternative specification ([section B.4](#)) with interaction models also indicate that the result for women is more robust ($\beta = -.019, p < .01$) than for men ($\beta = -.011, p < .05$). Coefficients in [Figure 3.6a](#) and [Figure 3.6c](#) indicate that for all generations of immigrant women lower scores for social trust index and helpfulness indicators are associated with higher levels of support for the populist right; while the association for fairness exists for all immigrant women, but it is likely driven by the second generation (see [Figure 3.6d](#)). Alternative specifications in [Figure B.8](#) also support these findings and suggest that disaggregated samples potentially underestimate the relationship for trustworthiness across generations of immigrant women and fairness for the first generation. A final note of caution is that these results are sensitive to contingent historical events ([section B.7](#)). LOCO models do not provide clear pattern of sensitivity, but that results in general are sensitive to dropping particular country cases out ([section B.6](#)).




Figure 3.7: Heterogeneous Event Study: Generalised Social Trust

The final set of results is obtained through a heterogeneous event study estimation. Results are presented in [Figure 3.7](#) provide no consistent support for hypothesis H7, as only single coefficient is significant for all immigrants (100 days after elections). Hypothesis H8 is also not supported for all immigrants, as point estimates are not significant. This analysis substantiates evidence for generational differences among immigrants. Higher levels of populist electoral support are indeed associated with lower levels on index of social trust [Figure 3.7a](#) and helpfulness among the first generation immigrants [Figure 3.7c](#). On the other hand, lower levels of fairness are associated with populist right electoral support in the aftermath of the elections for the second generation of immigrants (see [Figure 3.7d](#)), and to lesser extent with their social

trust index [Figure 3.7a](#).

I conduct several additional tests presented in the [Appendix B.8](#). I conduct balance tests and obtained Cohen's d coefficient of standardised mean difference which tells how much time-window subsamples diverge the mean of that particular group (i.e. first generation immigrants surveyed in the first 30 days after elections and all first generation immigrants). Results of this analysis suggested consistent imbalance among time window subsamples only for Gini index and for citizenship among the first generation. To account for this, I re-estimate heterogeneous event study models without these variables, but initial results are not changed. Following a recommendation from (Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu 2019) I estimated a heterogeneous event studies using an alternative binning strategy with 4 equal 60-day bins. Results in [Figure B.54](#) and [Figure B.56](#) confirm the robustness of the relationship between helpfulness and populist right electoral support in the first 60 days after elections for the first generation immigrants, while [figure Figure B.57](#) confirms robustness for fairness among the second generation immigrants in the first 60 days after elections. Unlike the initial estimates, coefficient for trustworthiness for the first generation immigrants indicates negative and statistically significant relationship in the first 60 days after elections ([Figure B.55](#)).

As a final test I estimate heterogeneous models with interactions for three periods before elections (100-150, 150-200 and 200-300 days) and the populist right vote share. Results are presented in [Figure B.58](#). No coefficients for fairness and helpfulness are statistically significant, implying that association observed in the heterogeneous studies indeed emerges after elections. Placebo tests deliberately leave out campaign periods as campaign efforts may interfere with the effect of the populist right electoral support.

3.6 Discussion

The analysis in this paper did not find support for a single tested hypothesis. However, the analysis provided more nuanced insights about generalised social trust of immigrants in the face of the populist right electoral support. The analysis does not support that the populist right impacts immigrants' trust by decreasing the quality of governance. Longitudinal studies which detect a negative impact of the populist right on the quality of governance used the data from the nineties and even largely missed the period populist parties gaining traction around the time of the refugee crisis; Juon and Bochsler (2020) study the time period between 1990 to 2016, while Huber and Schimpf (2017) study the period between 1990 to 2012. Not finding the association between immigrants' generalised social trust and populist right electoral support relying on the data from the entire observed period, but only in the period between 2015 and 2019 is indicative that other factors than the impact on the quality of government may be more important in explaining this relationship.

I offer three potential explanations for the reasons why the populist right impact on the quality of government may lack importance for understanding the relationship between the populist right electoral support and immigrants' generalised social trust. The first explanation could be that immigrants do not connect the populist electoral support on the national level with the decrease in the quality of government, but with other more pressing issues that are related to their agenda (welfare, immigration or identity questions). The second explanation is that the demise in quality of street-level bureaucracy may be more connected to local incumbency (Bellodi, Morelli, and Vannoni 2024; Sasso and Morelli 2021), which does not have to be directly related to the national support for the populist right parties. The third potential explanation could be that immigrants do not associate lack of impartiality of the street level bureaucrats with the right wing

populists, as this discrimination, even just as a higher administrative burden for immigrants, happens also when populist are not dominant local incumbents (Hemker and Rink 2017; Olsen, Kyhse-Andersen, and Moynihan 2022; Bell and Jilke 2024).

Additional analyses ascertain the relationship between the momentum of the populist right in politicising immigration created after 2015 (Gessler and Hunger 2021; Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2019; Hutter and Kriesi 2022). Results provide more nuanced accounts about social trust than assumed in hypotheses. Namely, following the Integration paradox (Genoni and Ruedin 2024; Steinmann 2019; Gelepithis and Giani 2025; Verkuyten 2016), lower levels of generalised trust are expected because the second generation perceives more discrimination, due to their socialisation in the host-country and proficiency in understanding the subtle forms of discrimination. My evidence confirmed the second generation immigrants have (statistically significant) lower levels on generalised trust index, fairness and helpfulness. However, I find that discrimination moderates the relationship between trustworthiness and fairness, and the populist right electoral support for the first generation of immigrants only. Furthermore, the populist right electoral support is not at all related with trustworthiness among the second generation immigrants.

Following the normalisation of the radical right literature, significant results in this period can be regarded as a result of a combination of high salience of immigration and increased agency of the populist right (Valentim 2024a). A growing pool of evidence suggests the major impact of the populist right happens through lowering the costs of expressing political opinions that were stigmatised prior to the electoral rise of the populist right (Valentim 2024a; Alvarez-Benjumea and Valentim 2025; Dinas, Martínez, and Valentim 2024). More opportunity to express the prejudice also leads to more discrimination expressed towards the immigrants (Newman et al. 2021). The Integration paradox underlines, that second generation immigrants perceive more discrimination exactly because they are more skilled and equipped in understanding host-country social norms. However, discrimination does not seem to moderate the relationship between their generalised social trust and populist right electoral support, neither there is a direct relationship with core element of trustworthiness. Strong and negative association with fairness and helpfulness may indicate the association between populist right electoral support and immigrants' index of social trust actually accounts for their adjusted perception of the normative change towards immigrants in the host country.

Items in the ESS were developed to measure trust as an individual predisposition, but also to catch the experience-related aspects of trust (Breyer 2015). Items included in the ESS were initially developed to measure misanthropy (Rosenberg 1957, 1956), and they come from Rotter (1967), who understands generalised social trust as generalised expectancy that words and promises can be relied on. Social learning approach entails these expectations are socialised through experience of cooperation and defection (Rotter 1967; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994; Glanville and Paxton 2007; Paxton and Glanville 2015). If social norms that guide behaviour towards immigrants are changed in the process of normalisation of the populist right, according to the social learning theory, immigrants will acquire this experience and adjust their levels of generalised trust accordingly. The appearance and quick electoral success of populist right parties in states which were considered immune to right wing populist, such as Germany (Arzheimer and Berning 2019) or Spain (Dinas, Martínez, and Valentim 2024) is telling about the depth of normative changes happening in Western Europe (Valentim 2024a). Understanding the normative change may require more cognitive sophistication, hence the association is found only among the second generation immigrants specifically related to expectations that may be affected by the normative change.

Heterogeneous event study brings evidence the elections for immigrants function as an information up-

date mechanism about the support for the populist right. Following the previous argumentation, it seems that this information update does not have a consistent effect on trustworthiness, as an individual disposition. However, the aftermath of the elections is related to fairness among the second generation and helpfulness among the first generation of immigrants. Results point to the diverging priority of fairness and helpfulness for different immigrant generations. An argument that explains this diverging relationship is that the second generation of immigrants may be more sensitive to the violation of social norms that guarantee equal chances, which they connect with the electoral support for the populist right. On the other hand the first generation immigrants may depend more on other people's openness to help them, as they may not have extensive networks of support, therefore they may associate lower expectancy of helpfulness from other people with electoral support for the populist right. It may also be that fairness and its subtle degrees require more cultural sophistication to be understood, so the first generation focuses on signals that is more readable, straightforward and salient to them - willingness to help.

Findings about the moderation effect of perceived discrimination and being a Muslim are in line with current knowledge. The time frame again indicates that momentum of the populist right is needed for the electoral support for the populist right to appear as a significant predictor of social trust. Negative association between populist electoral support and generalised trust among women also do not defy the current knowledge of gendered discrimination, however, the lack of robust association among men diverges from theoretical expectations grounded in empirical trends of discrimination among immigrants. A potential explanation might be that men have more means to counter populist right discrimination and that their attribution to discrimination might differ from that of women. In other words it may be that men simply perceive discrimination as less pervasive and less stable than women do. A reason for this could be that men are not exposed to the same intersecting types of discrimination in the same way women are (Crenshaw 1989; Weichselbaumer 2020). Additionally, men and increasingly young men (Milosav et al. 2026) are the pool of ideological supporters of the populist right, which leaves a possibility that even immigrant men support them for their gender policies or even in backlash against other immigrants (Strijbis and Polavieja 2018).

Because the analysis in this chapter resembles the analysis in [chapter 2](#), the same set of scope conditions apply. I deem that my analysis speaks to countries with different histories of immigration and immigration regime, which all share the situation of increased inflow of culturally diverse immigrants. Also, my analysis is based on countries in with mostly parliamentary regimes and proportional electoral systems. From this point, my analysis speaks mostly to countries in which the populist right is a nationally recognised political contestant. Apart from having to campaign in national elections across the country to enter the representative bodies. This suggests that populist parties are commonly present over several electoral cycles in the national electoral arena, which makes them distinguishable from competitors, however, my results speak even to cases in which the populist parties are not the only players who use the populist rhetoric. The analysis actually speaks to all the cases in which the blend of nativist and populist rhetoric is used to draw a firm line between deserving native citizens and undeserving immigrant.

3.7 Conclusion

In this paper I explored the relationship between immigrants' levels of generalised social trust and support for the populist right in Western Europe. Relying on two-way fixed effects estimation and heterogeneous event study methods, I tested two arguments that higher levels of the populist right support are related to lower levels of generalised social trust among immigrants. The first argument proposes that the pop-

ulist right impacts generalised social trust among immigrants because it erodes the institutional quality and impartiality of institutions that underpin the acculturation of generalised social trust among immigrants, especially if they come from low-trusting countries. The second argument states the populist right through its policies and anti-immigrant platform makes immigrants feel more discriminated against and therefore displaying less trust. In the first argument the support for the populist right may signal the institutional erosion to immigrants, while in the second argument that numerous other people support anti-immigrant platform, and consequently the discrimination against them, which they feel as more pervasive.

The analysis offered several insights about nuanced relationship between generalised trust among immigrants and the populist right electoral support. The main finding is that the relationship of the populist right with immigrants' generalised trust appears more consistently when the momentum of relevance of the populist right parties is accounted for—specifically the one related to the emergence of the populist right in the mainstream politics around the time of the refugee crisis. Findings suggest that perceived discrimination indeed moderates the association between generalised trust and populist right electoral performance, more specifically, it moderates the association in the case of fairness and trustworthiness for the first generation immigrants. The analysis also substantiated evidence that lower levels of trustworthiness are related to populist right electoral performance among Muslim immigrants, with stronger association, again, among the first generation of Muslim immigrants.

In accordance with expectations, lower levels of generalised trust were detected among the second generation immigrants, but the underlining theory that this might be due to Integration paradox is not supported as discrimination does not moderate the relationship for the second generation immigrants. Additionally, the analysis did not find the relationship between the dispositional measure of trust, but only with measures related to expected behaviour (fairness and helpfulness) for the second generation immigrants. I offered an explanation that the observed negative relationship reflects normative changes in behaviour towards immigrants that come from the normalisation of the populist right which the second generation immigrants can comprehend better due to their higher cultural competences compared to the first generation for which the relationship is detected only for helpfulness.

Heterogeneous event study also support the idea that elections function as an information update mechanism for immigrants. Results ascertain the diverging importance of fairness and helpfulness for different generations of immigrants. I offered an explanation that fair behaviour is more salient to the second generation of immigrants, as they expect equal treatment because of their socialisation in the host-country. On the other hand, the first generation immigrants without developed support networks may be more dependent on helpfulness of other people and perceive less helpfulness when in association with high electoral support for the populist right. Analysing gender disparities I find that lower levels of generalised social trust are associated with populist electoral support for women, but not in the consistent manner for immigrant men. This insights diverges from expectations based on the recent literature about immigrant men being more exposed to discrimination than women. This topic requires further analyses, but I note that men may appraise discrimination differently than women because they less often face discrimination regarding multiple identities.

The major limitation of this research is the lack of representative immigrant sample that would enable generalisability of the results across national contexts. This paper points to several potential avenues of further research. The literature on normative changes was mostly focused on the way host-country citizens change their behaviour towards immigrants in the light of lowered costs of expression for the

populist right support. The impact of these changes on immigrants also needs to be studied more. Future research also needs to include more recent data, as the significant increase in salience of immigration and support for the populist right happened after 2019. Future scholarship may also benefit from implementing more robust causal designs on immigrant focused data, that could provide more insights about within-individual changes and mechanisms through which the populist right impact happens.

Chapter 4

When Normalisation Comes at No Cost? Legitimisation of the Populist Right and Mental Health of Immigrants

4.1 Introduction

Mental health represents one of the key individual resources that enables immigrants to navigate the integration process and everyday experiences in their host country. Mental health is closely related to overall individual well-being (Keller 2020; Maier 2025), which represents capabilities of coping with normal stresses of daily life (Herrman, Moodie, and Saxena 2005). More recent approaches also add that mental health represents a dynamic state of functioning in which an individual can develop their capacities in harmony with universal¹ social values (Galderisi et al. 2015). Welcoming circumstances of the host-country may well determine immigrants' levels of attaining to social values. As a key political change that followed the increase in numbers of immigrants in Europe and salience of immigration is the increase in support and consequential legitimacy of the populist right parties (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Strong anti-immigrant rhetoric and entrance of these parties into political mainstream over time signalled that voters in Western Europe are becoming increasingly suspicious and malcontent with immigration, creating more hostile social circumstances for all immigrants.

Previous research demonstrated that anti-immigrant rhetoric negatively impacts immigrants' health by triggering a sense of discrimination and lower self-worth, which consequently increases levels of stress among immigrants (Williams and Medlock 2017; Grainger 2018). Immigrants are also in a higher risk of continuous exposure to stress due to the challenges of the integration process, which can decrease both their mental and physical health (Bhugra 2004; Thoits 2010). Studies on health among immigrants oftentimes bring evidence about blended effects of anti-immigrant rhetoric and populist anti-immigrant policies (Rosenberg 2025; Morey 2018). On the other hand, research in political science that disentangles these effects brings clear evidence that even before enacting policies, populist right parties can create more hostile climate just through anti-immigrant rhetoric alone. This rhetoric inspires the expression of

¹ Authors indicate these values are: respect and care for oneself and other living beings; recognition of connectedness between people; respect for the environment; respect for one's own and others' freedom (Galderisi et al. 2015).

prejudice and anti-minority violence (Newman et al. 2021; Feinberg, Branton, and Martinez-Ebers 2022). However, research in political science mostly does not address health outcomes of immigrants.

In this paper I argue the normalisation of the populist right creates hostile climate for immigrants that results in their lower mental health. Normalisation of the populist right represents a process of lowering the costs of expression of anti-immigrant (and other) prejudice due to continuous public presence and electoral success of populist parties (Valentim 2024a). Parliamentary presence of the populist right denotes that these parties have enough organisational capacity and support to turn their agenda into just another available political option, which implies the erosion of norms related to tolerance towards immigrants or anti-prejudice (Valentim 2021; Bischof and Wagner 2019). As normative change encourages people to be more open in expressing their prejudice, immigrants are faced with more frequent and more intense cases of discrimination or perception of the national context as more closed to immigrants (Newman et al. 2021; Simonsen 2016b).

This paper explores the case of the first entrance of populist right, UK Independence Party (UKIP) to the House of Commons after General elections in 2015. This was the first time that a populist right party entered the lower chamber of the Parliament, which confirmed the relevance of UKIP in the national politics. The study utilises the data from Understanding Society: The UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) (University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research 2024). This panel dataset brings repeated observations of respondents in 2010 and 2015, making a good opportunity to compare immigrants' health outcomes between 2010, when UKIP ran in elections, but did not pass the threshold and in 2015, when UKIP passed the threshold. I rely on before-after event study models estimated through two-way fixed effects specifications to determine the relationship between immigrants' self-reported mental health and UKIP's entrance to the HoC in 2015.

Results presented in the paper indicate that legitimisation of the populist right is not related to lower self-reported mental health among immigrants in the UK. The evidence suggests the relationship does not exist even among particular immigrant groups. Further evidence is found that UKIP's entrance to the HoC was not related to the increased sense of perceived discrimination, nor did campaign period coincide with lower health outcomes for immigrants. I explain these results by analysing the specificities of UKIP's entrance to the HoC, that shaped the public perception of significance of their legitimisation.

In the next section I cover the relevant public health and political science literatures. Afterwards I offer theoretical elaboration of the relationship between immigrants' health and normalisation of the populist right, followed by a case description of the UKIP, particularly their history of electoral contestation and the development of their anti-immigrant platform. In the following order, I present the findings of the study and discuss them before concluding the paper.

4.2 Literature Review

Migration represents one of the key factors that can put people's health at risk (Kirkbride et al. 2024; Bhugra 2004; Castañeda et al. 2015; Kronick, Jarvis, and Kirmayer 2024). Stress diathesis model stipulates that migration causes health deterioration among immigrants due to chronic exposure to stress, followed by a loss of psychological support, such as family or friends (Bhugra 2004; Tinghög, Hemmingsson, and Lundberg 2007; Thoits 2010). Structural inequalities, such as systemic racism, create more opportunities for immigrants to be exposed to social exclusion and discrimination which proliferates stress (Levecque

and Van Rossem 2015; Thoits 2010; Castañeda et al. 2015). Some research suggests that stress proliferates throughout the life course of an immigrant (Mason et al. 2024; Thoits 2010). For these reasons, immigrants (especially the first generation) experience elevated amounts of stress (Bhugra 2004), but only a small number of studies records their overall worse health and well-being compared to that of natives (Solé-Auró and Crimmins 2008).

A number of studies indicate the first generation immigrants are indeed in higher risk of specific mental health condition, such as depression, anxiety, addictive behaviours (drugs, alcohol and gambling), somatic symptoms and eating disorders, suicide attempts and psychosis (Lievrouw, Myin-Germeys, and Achterhof 2025; Pignon et al. 2018; Levecque and Van Rossem 2015; Carta et al. 2005). Higher risks of mental health conditions for immigrants remain even after accounting for their socio-economic status, while women suffer greater risks than men (Nazroo 2003; Tinghög, Hemmingsson, and Lundberg 2007). Another line of literature provides evidence that health and well-being of the first generation of immigrants is better than that of the second generation or natives—supporting so called healthy immigrant hypothesis (Glaesmer et al. 2009; Swinnen and Selten 2007; Krupinski and Cochrane 1980). However, La Parra-Casado, Stornes, and Solheim (2017) find that second generation of immigrants self-reports better health, with higher levels for more educated respondents and women. Worse health of the second generation immigrants may be explained by the complexity of integration challenge, not the mere amount of stress (Bhugra 2004), or attempts to fulfil high external expectations, such as fitting into the image of a model minority (Hussen et al. 2025).

The literature agrees discrimination represents a common risk factor to the mental health and well-being of all immigrants. Discrimination represents negative evaluation of an individual due to their group membership (Oskooii 2020). Discrimination impacts health through group-level social and economic deprivation that results in lower access to quality healthcare and withdrawal from education or job market (Krieger 1999). On more individual level, discrimination impacts mental health in numerous ways, ranging from addictive behaviours and higher amounts of stress due to hyper-vigilance to withdrawal from support networks and harder establishment of social contact (Williams and Mohammed 2013; Johnston and Lordan 2012). Discrimination also impacts physical health through elevated blood pressure and increased body mass index (related to eating disorders) (Williams and Mohammed 2013; Johnston and Lordan 2012).

Negative impact of discrimination on health is commonly explained through withdrawal from social life due to internalised negative self-image and lowered self-esteem (Oskooii 2020). Effects of discrimination are severe because they combine the effects of chronic stress with the lack of (institutionalised) social support to cope with that stress (Levecque and Van Rossem 2015; Carta et al. 2005). Social contact, intense identification with stigmatised identity and the sense of community are recognised as factors that mitigate harmful effects of discrimination by cultivating dispositional traits of well-being: optimism, self-esteem and resilience (Bak-Klimek et al. 2015; García-Cid et al. 2020; Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, and Schkade 2005). However, continuous exposure creates a sense that discrimination is pervasive and wider social environment hostile—which demotivates individuals with lowered self-esteem to reach out for help outside of their stigmatised community (Schmitt et al. 2014; Oskooii 2020; Cvetić 2026). Discrimination is oftentimes intersectional and racialised, which means its effects are more detrimental for immigrants with multiple disadvantaged statuses (i.e. religion and sexuality), especially in cases when they perceive cultural distance of out-groups or doubt the possibility of integration (Morey 2018; Denise 2014; Bobo and Fox 2003).

On the forefront of the anti-immigration agenda, populist right parties represent a factor of increasing significance for the health of immigrants (Stronks and Agyemang 2021). Punitive immigration laws that

populist right parties support and enact deteriorate immigrants health, through hypervigilance, anticipatory stress and avoidance of social contact (Vargas, Sanchez, and Juárez 2017; López-Hinojosa et al. 2024; Rhodes et al. 2015). Populist right parties also support and implement welfare spending cuts, specifically for the populations they deem undeserving, such as immigrants and long term unemployed (Chueri 2021; Rinaldi and Bekker 2021; Morey 2018). The language of undeservingness further impacts stances of voters towards out-group redistribution (Findor et al. 2023), as well as welfare positions of the mainstream parties (Krause and Giebler 2020; Abts et al. 2021; de Koster, Achterberg, and van der Waal 2013).

Anti-immigrant rhetoric of the populist right creates the social climate of hostility towards immigrants that has detrimental effects on their health (Rosenberg 2025; Grainger 2018). Public devaluation of immigrants' identities raises their levels of stress because it represents a threat to social acceptance (Branscombe et al. 1999) and raises the level of stigma and communal prejudice towards immigrants (Williams and Medlock 2017; Morey 2018). Widespread support and sympathies for the populist right also signal pervasiveness of discrimination towards immigrants (Rosenberg 2025). Creating hostile social climate also normalises the anti-immigrant aggression, which takes various forms from individual insults, micro-aggression or attacks, to backlashes against entire communities (Rojas Perez et al. 2023; Sue et al. 2007).

The revised literature on the effects of the populist right parties on immigrants' health has significant limitations. Surveyed literature on populist right impacts on immigrants' health dominantly relies on the evidence from the US, which represents somewhat unique case. A significant spread of social hostilities during the electoral campaign in 2016 was quickly followed by Donald Trump's first mandate and subsequent changes in immigration policies (also applicable to Trump's second mandate) (Williams and Medlock 2017; Grainger 2018; Morey 2018; Rojas Perez et al. 2023). Such sequence of events represents a difficulty in disentangling distinct effects of policies from distinct effects of anti-immigrant rhetoric on immigrants' health, as they both reinforce the hostile climate towards immigrants. Rosenberg (2025) uses the World Value Survey data from 2017 to find the association between more hostile social climate and lower levels of self-reported health and visits to healthcare professionals among ethnic minorities. Due to timing of the survey, hostile social climate easily subsumes both the effects of preceding electoral campaign in 2016 and more restrictive immigration policies in 2017 (i.e. Executive Orders 13769 and 13789 labeled as the Muslim ban). Authors in the public health and legal literature seem to be aware of distinct, but reinforcing effects of policies and anti-immigrant rhetoric, as they are commonly discussed together. Still, they put little effort in studying anti-immigrant rhetoric and discrimination on its own, while they study effects of punitive immigrant policies extensively (Young, Beltrán-Sánchez, and Wallace 2020; Young, Crookes, and Torres 2022; López-Hinojosa et al. 2024).

4.3 Argument

4.3.1 Normalisation of the Populist Right and Immigrants' Health

This research contributes to the existing literature by disentangling policy-related from non-policy-related populist right impact on immigrants' health and well-being. Studies from the US substantiate evidence that more hostile social climate emerged during 2016 presidential campaign before the first policies were enacted. Newman et al. (2021) find that Trump's racially-charged rhetoric caused individuals to express more prejudice publicly, while Feinberg, Branton, and Martinez-Ebers (2022) prove that Trump rallies increased the numbers of hate-motivated incidents in counties where they took place. Hobbs and Lajevardi (2019) find that anti-immigrant rhetoric during the 2016 electoral campaign caused a withdrawal of

Muslim American from online and public spaces, which intensified after enactment of the Muslim ban in 2017. This evidence is suggestive that the impact of anti-immigrant rhetoric on health may be distinct from the impact of policies. This paper also shifts focus to the UK beyond Brexit, which had its harmful effects on immigrants' health (Rienzo 2024), by studying the effects of the populist right which shaped the immigration debate, without the power to impose the policies.

Combining insights from public health and political science, I propose that normalisation of the populist right creates hostile social climate that incurs detrimental effects on immigrants' health. Normalisation of the populist right represents a process of lowering the costs of expression of (previously) stigmatised political preferences (Bischof and Wagner 2019; Valentim 2024a; Alvarez-Benjumea and Valentim 2025). The result of this process is a normative change in which any breaking of the anti-prejudice, anti-racist or intercultural tolerance through open expression of social hostilities, prejudice and aggression is no longer consistently publicly sanctioned (Bischof and Wagner 2019; Valentim 2024b; Dinas, Martínez, and Valentim 2024).² The erosion of norms signals that anti-immigrant political preferences are socially acceptable, which results in more intense and frequent discrimination against immigrants and more instances of anti-immigrant violence (Newman et al. 2021; Feinberg, Branton, and Martinez-Ebers 2022; Romarri 2020; Armaly and Enders 2022). Due to historical and cultural reasons, the most intense prejudice is expressed towards immigrant men, particularly from Muslim-majority countries (Ward 2019; Gereke, Schaub, and Baldassarri 2020; Zhang, Gereke, and Baldassarri 2022).

This normative change impacts immigrants' health by building a new framework for appraisal of inter-group hostilities. Apart from having to deal with increased stress of more frequent and intense discrimination on its own, witnessing normative change also sends a signal that prejudice towards immigrants is pervasive, stable, internal and uncontrollable (Schmitt and Branscombe 2002; Schmitt et al. 2014). Stable and pervasive attribution to prejudice contributes to intensified sense of social exclusion (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey 1999), which reinforces perceiving more discrimination (Simonsen 2016b). In other words, normative change makes (an increasing number of) individual instances of discrimination convey a widespread disapproval of immigrants (Schmitt et al. 2014). Detrimental effects of widespread discrimination on health and well-being also come from conveying threats to social identity value and acceptance (Branscombe et al. 1999) which fosters internalisation of negative self-image (Eccleston and Major 2006), but also negative appraisal of their social group (Tartakovsky and Walsh 2020).

The key difference between the US and Western Europe is the relationship between normative change and elections. In the US normalisation largely happened prior to the elections (Hobbs and Lajevardi 2019; Newman et al. 2021; Feinberg, Branton, and Martinez-Ebers 2022; Williams and Medlock 2017; Rojas Perez et al. 2023), as open prejudice and hostilities were expressed during the campaign. On the other hand, normalisation of the populist right in Western Europe represents a lengthy process often involving the populist right parties running in multiple electoral cycles. Valentim (2024a) explains three phases of this process: latency, activation and surfacing. Each phase provides different cost structure for expression of stigmatised preferences. In the latency phase costs of expressing the preference are high even at the ballot boxes (Valentim 2024b,a; Jaziri-Arjona 2025), which changes through public presence and entrepreneurial approach of populist in exploiting situations of norm ambiguity to push their agenda (Valentim 2024a). Continuous public presence and electoral success of populist right ends in surfacing where contested preferences are destigmatized on ballot boxes and in public (Valentim 2024a).

²Newman et al. (2021) and Williams and Medlock (2017) label the lack of sanctions as "emboldment" to engage in racially-charged language. The literature building on the US case also calls this the "Trump Effect."

In European context, legitimisation represents a clear signal that normalisation of the populist right is achieved (Valentim 2024a). Legitimisation happens when populist right parties gain enough support to secure seats in national parliaments (Valentim 2021). Legitimisation allows populist right parties to impact policies of interest (i.e. integration policies, see Lutz 2019), but not enact them directly. To voters this signals that norms are changed, inspiring readiness to openly express support for the populist right (Valentim 2021). To other parties this signals organisational capabilities to contest prevalent immigration policies and norms (Dinas, Riera, and Roussias 2015) and growing support for such contestation. Signals are additionally strengthened through willingness of experienced politicians from other parties to join the populist right (Valentim 2024a). Parliamentary presence also brings media attention, that contributes to increasing support and normalisation (Berning, Lubbers, and Schlueter 2019; Murphy and Devine 2020; Ekström, Patrona, and Thornborrow 2020). Normalisation is further deepened when mainstream parties start engaging in anti-immigrant rhetoric (Valentim, Dinas, and Ziblatt 2025; Krause, Cohen, and Abou-Chadi 2023; Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2025; Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020).

4.3.2 Case Description: UKIP

General elections in 2015 represent a turning point in normalisation of the populist right in the UK. In these elections, populist right UK Independence Party (UKIP) entered the parliament for the first time, winning more than 3.8 million votes, or 12.8% of the national vote³(Cutts, Goodwin, and Milazzo 2017). These results represent an increase of 9.5 percentage points, compared to general elections in 2010 (Bogdanor 2016). Despite high vote share, UKIP secured only a single seat in the House of Commons (HoC) for the constituency of Clacton in Essex (Bogdanor 2016; Tournier-Sol 2015; Cutts, Goodwin, and Milazzo 2017), even though it was expected the UKIP had a chance of winning up to 8 seats in HoC and becoming the fourth largest party in the HoC. However, UKIP finished second in 120 constituencies (114 of them in England), which is the most impressive for an incoming party since the rise of the Labour Party in 1920s (Cutts, Goodwin, and Milazzo 2017). As local elections were held on the same day, UKIP also won its first local council in Thanet (Tournier-Sol 2015). Prior to entering the HoC, UKIP won 25.5% of the national vote in 2014 elections for the European Parliament (EP) (Bogdanor 2016; Treib 2014; Parau 2014).⁴ Timeline of the major elections that contributed to UKIP's normalisation with campaign times in days is provided in Figure 4.1.

Normalisation of UKIP as a populist right party coincides with the period between 2010 and 2015, during the leadership of Nigel Farage and a great increase in salience of immigration (Valentim 2024a). UKIP emerged in 1993 as a single-issue party focused on contesting the Maastricht Treaty and by 2010 it was mostly running in EP and local elections (Parau 2014). By 2010 UKIP had over 100 local councillors and even two affiliated members of the House of Lords (Parau 2014). Before General elections in 2010, UKIP published a manifesto, "Empowering the People" - which presented mass immigration as the main source of social problems in the UK, connecting it with issues such as crime rates and incapacities of the National Health Service (Dennison and Goodwin 2015; Parau 2014). UKIP pledged to curb the net immigration by imposing stricter rules for asylum seekers and permanent settlers alike, as well as withdrawing the UK from the European Convention on Human Rights and ending the promotion of multiculturalism (Parau 2014). UKIP also underlined the problem of immigration will only be solved if the UK leaves the EU and regains full control over its borders (Bogdanor 2016; Dennison and Goodwin 2015).

³According to some authors, this number is 12.6% (see Bogdanor 2016; Tournier-Sol 2015).

⁴These elections are held under the proportional representation principles, which made UKIP the most numerous UK party in the EP. They also became the first party after Labour and Tories to win a nation-wide elections in the UK since 1906 (Bogdanor 2016; Treib 2014; Parau 2014).




Figure 4.1: UK Elections Timeline

Hence, the immigration concerns represent the major impetus to the normalisation of UKIP. Fused eurosceptic and anti-immigration agenda brought almost a million votes, or 3.5% of the national vote (Cur-
tice 2010; Bogdanor 2016) to the UKIP in 2010. However, immigration was still not recognisable issue owned by the UKIP, as only 3% of the people who believed immigration is bad for the economy wanted to vote for the UKIP and 47% of them for Conservatives (Dennison and Goodwin 2015). Between elections, the UKIP imposed itself as the populist owner of the anti-immigrant agenda claiming that mainstream parties that welcomed globalisation, multiculturalism and neoliberalism do not respect the voices of common people (Bogdanor 2016). In 2015, 24% of people who believed immigration was bad for the economy were planning to vote for UKIP, while 35% wanted to vote for Conservatives and 26% for Labour (Dennison and Goodwin 2015). Although smaller compared to other parties, UKIP's electorate dominantly held anti-immigration views in 2015 (Dennison and Goodwin 2015).

Following the line of proposed argument and the case description of UKIP, I test the following hypotheses that legitimisation of the populist right in the form of UKIP's first entrance to the HoC will cause decline in perceived mental and physical health of immigrants:

H1: UKIP's first entrance to the HoC is associated with lower levels of perceived mental health among immigrants.

The literature covering the effects of Brexit on immigrants' health established that the health of EU immigrants suffered more than health of the Commonwealth immigrants after Brexit (Rienzo 2024), as this event made their future in the UK unpredictable. Because UKIPs eurosceptic and anti-immigrant speech inspired policies such as Brexit, I test if the entrance to the HoC might also have a heterogeneous effects among different immigrant groups:

H2: UKIP's first entrance to the HoC is associated with lower levels of mental health of EU immigrants compared to native citizens.

H3: UKIP's first entrance to the HoC is associated with higher levels of mental health of non-EU and Commonwealth immigrants compared to EU immigrants.

Finally, as it was demonstrated that UKIP achieved higher levels of support on 2014 EP elections (25.5%) than in 2015 General election (12.8%), I test the hypothesis that legitimisation of the populist right has a distinct effect compared to just high electoral support in elections that cannot enact legitimisation:

H4: UKIPs first entrance to the HoC is associated with lower levels of mental and physical health among immigrants compared to its electoral performance on EP elections.

4.4 Methods

4.4.1 Data

This paper utilises the data from UKHLS panel study (University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research 2024). The survey started in 2009 and continuously interviews a representative panel of British households on an annual basis (Fumagalli, Knies, and Buck 2017). The dataset contains several booster samples that ensure a representative coverage of minorities and immigrants.⁵ I subset the UKHLS panel to get two annual subsets for 2010 and 2015 (and additional one for 2014) of individual responses, regardless of the mode of responding. I classified native citizens and immigrants based on their birthplace and their parental birthplace (numbers of respondents per immigrant category are available in Table C.1). Native citizens are all individuals who were born in the UK and whose parents were born in the UK. First generation immigrants are individuals residing in the UK in the time of the survey, but who were born outside of the UK and whose parents were born outside of the UK. Second generation immigrants were born in the UK, with at least one parent born outside of the UK. Generations were differentiated based on a variable generation and data for the first generation were validated against available information about the country of birth (validation results are presented in Table C.2).

The main outcome variable is the GHQ-12 Caseness scale. GHQ questionnaire is designed as self-administered instrument for detecting psychiatric disorders that require clinical attention or other sorts of psychotherapeutic treatment (Goldberg and Williams 1988). The GHQ-12 Caseness scale ranges from 0 to 12 and sums up responses from 12 survey items (detailed wording of the questionnaire is provided in section C.2). Higher scores on this scale indicate more mental health distress (Goldberg and Williams 1988). As robustness measures I use GHQ-12 Likert scale (0-36) and SF-12 Mental Component Summary (Ware et al. 2005). Although available, the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale (Tennant et al. 2007) was not used due to low number of observations. I used SF-12 Physical Component Summary as a measure of physical health and general health item from UKHLS as a measure of overall health. Higher values on SF scales and general health item indicate better physical and mental health. Descriptive statistics of the outcome variables and control variables are provided in the Appendix C.1.

4.4.2 Research Design

Models in this study utilise the before-after approach of an event study with two-way fixed effects. Such design in some of its aspects resembles a difference-in-differences design. Resembling strategy was used in studying the impact of UKIP's first entrance to the HoC on willingness to report voting for UKIP after the 2015 general elections (Valentim 2021). The design exploited the fact that UKIP ran in 2010 and 2005,

⁵Ethnic Minority Boost (EMB) started in wave 1 in 2009, with 4.000 participating households (McFall, Nandi, and Platt 2017); Immigrant and Ethnic Minorities Boost (IEMB) with additional 2.900 participating households started in wave 6 in 2015 (McFall, Nandi, and Platt 2017); UKHLS also surveys ethnic minority respondents from Low Density Areas (LDA) that were not included in previous immigrant booster samples (McFall, Nandi, and Platt 2017).

but did not pass the threshold, which leaves voters after these elections effectively non-treated. Such timing of the treatment resembles difference-in-differences situation in both groups receiving the treatment (witness elections), but the treatment being only effective in one group.⁶ However, because the treatment is distributed in different times, there is no possibility to determine the difference between treated and non-treated group after the intervention. Without unit variation in exposure and the same treatment timing for treated and non-treated units, such approach offers only temporal variation.⁷

Apart from the dimension of time, this study utilises differences in between immigrants and natives, therefore the main effect can be regarded as group-by-time effect.⁸ In the absence of the non-treated group exposed at the same time as the treated group, difference-by-group effect does not have a causal interpretation. The effect points to the time-bound relationship between the exposure to legitimisation of the populist right and immigrants' health. The main analysis relies on a customised two-year panel from UKHLS from electoral years 2010 and 2015. The assumption that respondents are surveyed randomly to the election date is supported by the rollout strategy of UKHLS which does not prioritise between specific social groups throughout the year, as each monthly sample is representative of the entire UK population (Lynn 2009).

The main element of the treatment in this study represents being surveyed in the period after the elections in 2015, which spreads from 8th May to 31st December 2015. In the main set of models being treated after elections is interacted with a dummy for immigrant an immigrant group. In these models, the pre-treatment period effectively subsumes all observations prior to the election date in 2015 and the election date in 2010. The specification of the main set of models is presented as:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Immigrant}_i + \beta_2 \text{Post}_t + \beta_3 (\text{Immigrant}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + \delta_i + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (4.1)$$

The outcome Y_{it} represents a health outcome for individual i at time t . The equation includes α as the intercept, β_1 as the main effect of immigrant status, β_2 as the main effect of the post-treatment period, and β_3 as the interaction term capturing the differential impact of the treatment on immigrants relative to natives in the post-electoral period, which is at the same time my coefficient of interest. Individual fixed effects δ_i control for time-invariant individual characteristics, while month fixed effects λ_t control for common time trends in each month of the year, while ε_{it} represents the error term.

An alternative disaggregated set of models was estimated (resembling the Study 3 models from Valentim 2021) where the treatment only represents being surveyed after elections. Models for immigrants and natives are estimated separately. All other elements are the same as in Equation 4.1:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta \text{Post}_t + \delta_i + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (4.2)$$

A final set of models was estimated as a before-after event study for two annual UKHLS subsets (2010 and 2015). As annual samples do not contain repeated observation, I used fixed effects for UK government office regions (θ_i) and month of the survey (λ_t). The control matrix $\mathbf{X}_{it}$ contains time-varying individual characteristics, while γ represents the vector of corresponding coefficients. All other components (α , β_1 ,

⁶In the case of this research, treated and non-treated group are comprised of the same set of UKHLS respondents, exposed to elections in different time.

⁷Due to the fact the treatment timing differs between treated (post-elections in 2015) and non-treated group (post-elections in 2010), a group that post-treatment period for the untreated group is subsumed to the pre-treatment trend of the group that received the effective treatment.

⁸Difference in time, treated and untreated units (i.e. electoral districts in which populist right parties performed well and these where they did not win any votes) between social groups was an intended triple difference-in-differences set-up of this study. Due to data hosting concerns, relevant approvals for the use of geocoded data that contain a missing dimension of treated vs. non-treated units were not obtained by the time of writing.

$\beta_2, \beta_3, \varepsilon_{it}$) are the same as in Equation 4.1. The equation is developed in the following way:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Immigrant}_i + \beta_2 \text{Post}_t + \beta_3 (\text{Immigrant}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + \mathbf{X}'_{it} \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \theta_i + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (4.3)$$

4.5 Findings

Prior to estimating the main set of event study results, I tested for the parallel trends assumptions in two main years of interest 2010 and 2015. Plotted trends for the main outcome of interest, GHQ-12 Caseness, are provided in Figure 4.2. Plots indicate that mental health outcomes show a stable parallel trend both between observed years (Figure 4.2a) and in 2015 prior to elections (Figure C.2). I also conduct parallel-trends test with pretreatment time period and the results indicate that over time parallel trends assumption is not violated for the main and alternative outcomes (Table C.9). Plots of trends for all alternative outcomes can also be found in the Appendix C.3.




Figure 4.2: GHQ-12 Caseness Trends (2015)

The main set of results indicates no support for hypothesis H1. Hypothesised lower levels of perceived mental health are not supported as all models lack statistical significance. In the first model I estimated the effects using entire 2010, as well as pre-campaign and short campaign period (see Figure 4.1). In the second model I dropped the period of short campaign (1st April to 7th May) to exclude respondents who may have been affected by the ongoing campaign. In model 3 I attempted narrowing down the dataset by excluding all respondents who were surveyed in 2010 but dropped out until 2015. This restriction did not produce any improvement to the model. In the last model, I moved the treatment to the start date of the short campaign, 1st April 2015. With this I wanted to account for potential preceding impact of the electoral campaign and for the fact that anti-immigrant speech effect in other cases started having effects during the electoral campaigns.

Table 4.1: Main Results: GHQ Caseness

	Model 1: Full	Model 2: No Campaign	Model 3: Restricted Panel	Model 4: Campaign Effects
Post election*Immigrant	0.0886 (0.1211)	0.0911 (0.1244)	0.0911 (0.1244)	
Post campaign*Immigrant				0.0605 (0.1140)
Num. obs.	15584	13196	13196	15584
Num. groups: interview_year	2	2	2	2
Num. groups: pidp	7792	6598	6598	7792
R ² (full model)	0.6901	0.6907	0.6907	0.6900
R ² (proj model)	0.0003	0.0002	0.0002	0.0000
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.3800	0.3811	0.3811	0.3799
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.0000	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0002

Standard errors clustered at individual level. Year and individual fixed effects included.

Analysis of alternative outcomes that include GHQ-12 Likert, SF scales for mental and physical wellbeing and comprehensive measure of self-reported health that includes both physical and mental health also demonstrated no support for hypothesis H1. Results are available in the Appendix C.4. Further, I estimated disaggregated models for immigrants and natives separately. These models also do not demonstrate any support for hypothesis H1, as all coefficients lack statistical significance. Insignificance of coefficients for natives is not surprising, considering that events such as Brexit did not produce any durable consequences on perceived health of native UK citizens. Results of disaggregated models are provided in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3.

Table 4.2: Disaggregated Analysis: Immigrants (GHQ Caseness)

	Model 1: All Periods	Model 2: No Campaign	Model 3: Restricted Panel	Model 4: Campaign Effects
Post election	0.2864 (0.2062)	0.3023 (0.2382)	0.3023 (0.2382)	
Post campaign				0.1736 (0.2360)
Num. obs.	3552	3052	3052	3552
Num. groups: interview_year	2	2	2	2
Num. groups: pidp	1776	1526	1526	1776
R ² (full model)	0.6836	0.6882	0.6882	0.6833
R ² (proj model)	0.0016	0.0016	0.0016	0.0005
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.3667	0.3757	0.3757	0.3660
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.0010	0.0009	0.0009	-0.0001

Standard errors clustered at individual level. Year and individual fixed effects included.

Table 4.3: Disaggregated Analysis: Natives (GHQ Caseness)

	Model 1: All Periods	Model 2: No Campaign	Model 3: Restricted Panel	Model 4: Campaign Effects
Post election	0.0592 (0.0897)	0.0306 (0.1039)	0.0306 (0.1039)	
Post campaign				-0.0136 (0.0991)
Num. obs.	12032	10144	10144	12032
Num. groups: interview_year	2	2	2	2
Num. groups: pidp	6016	5072	5072	6016
R ² (full model)	0.6912	0.6911	0.6911	0.6912
R ² (proj model)	0.0001	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.3823	0.3819	0.3819	0.3823
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.0001	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0002

Standard errors clustered at individual level. Year and individual fixed effects included.

The final set of results related to hypothesis H1 also did not provide supportive evidence for this hypothesis. Event studies were now estimated separately for 2010 and 2015, calculating in only periods preceding elections in that calendar year. Models are presented in Table 4.4. Basic model provided only limited support for the Hypothesis H1 in 2015, as the coefficient is statistically significant and positive, indicating that post-electoral period is associated with higher levels of stress on .05 level among immigrants compared to natives. However, the effect disappears after the full control matrix is applied, indicating that hypothesis H1 cannot be supported. As an additional check I run an additional model for exposure to

electoral campaigns, where the treatment is set as being surveyed only during the short campaign. This analysis accounts for findings in the literature that campaign periods in general are stressful to the voters and for the fact that anti-immigration rhetoric gets intensified during the campaign. Results presented in [Table C.14](#) indicate that entrance of UKIP to the HoC is not associated with lower health of immigrants on statistically significant level.

Table 4.4: Annual Event Studies of UK Elections

	2010 (Basic)	2010 (Full)	2015 (Basic)	2015 (Full)
Post election (2010)*Immigrant	-0.0038 (0.0170)	-0.0111 (0.0269)		
Post election (2015)*Immigrant			0.0169** (0.0067)	0.0007 (0.0005)
Num. obs.	28672	15105	13767	8709
Num. groups: interview_month	12	12	12	12
Num. groups: factor(gor_dv)	12	12	12	11
R ² (full model)	0.0494	0.0632	0.0142	0.0024
R ² (proj model)	0.0374	0.0499	0.0112	0.0018
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.0484	0.0604	0.0121	-0.0025
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.0372	0.0485	0.0106	-0.0007

Standard errors clustered at region level. Month and region fixed effects included. Basic controls: female, age, age squared, higher education, log income. Full controls: all basic plus urban/rural, children, household size, marital status, employment, political interest.

Hypotheses H2 and H3 are tested also in two separate annual event studies for 2010 and 2015. The expectation is that interaction coefficients in different years would show the diverging relationship between health of different immigrant subgroups when UKIP did not enter the parliament compared to when it did. Results are presented in [Tables 4.5](#) and [4.6](#). No coefficient is statistically significant, indicating no relationship between post-electoral period and health of immigrants. This finding speaks to the literature on the effects of Brexit on mental health of immigrants in the UK, as this event embodied the UKIP's stances on immigration. While Brexit did have some negative effects on mental health of immigrants (Rienzo 2024), the UKIP's entrance to the parliament did not affect immigrants from different groups. Hence hypothesis H2 remains unsupported. As additional test, I conducted an analysis with discrimination as an outcome, as discrimination represents an underlying mechanism of health decrease presented in the argument. Results in [tables C.16](#) and [C.15](#) suggest there was no significant increase in perceived discrimination after UKIP entered the HoC in 2015, as two significant coefficients in the basic control setting lose significance in full control setting.

Table 4.5: UK Elections Event Study: Immigrant Subgroups (2010)

	EU (Basic)	EU (Full)	Non-EU (Basic)	Non-EU (Full)	Commonwealth (Basic)	Commonwealth (Full)
Post election (2010)*EU Immigrant	-0.2430 (0.1937)	-0.0675 (0.1387)				
Post election (2010)*Non-EU Immigrant			0.0129 (0.1429)	0.1286 (0.1207)		
Post election (2010)*Commonwealth Immigrant					0.2026 (0.1978)	0.2575 (0.1848)
Num. obs.	23222	14837	23222	14837	23222	14837
Num. groups: interview_month	12	12	12	12	12	12
Num. groups: factor(gor_dv)	12	12	12	12	12	12
R ² (full model)	0.0113	0.2219	0.0115	0.2219	0.0113	0.2220
R ² (proj model)	0.0094	0.2198	0.0096	0.2198	0.0094	0.2199
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.0100	0.2195	0.0102	0.2196	0.0100	0.2197
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.0091	0.2186	0.0093	0.2187	0.0091	0.2187

Standard errors clustered at region level. Month and region fixed effects included. 2010: Post-electoral period starts May 7. Basic controls: female, age, age squared, higher education, log income. Full controls: all basic plus urban/rural, children, household size, marital status, employment, political interest.

Table 4.6: UK Elections Event Study: Immigrant Subgroups (2015)

	EU (Basic)	EU (Full)	Non-EU (Basic)	Non-EU (Full)	Commonwealth (Basic)	Commonwealth (Full)
Post election (2015)*EU Immigrant	0.4588 (0.3142)	0.2938 (0.3619)				
Post election (2015)*Non-EU Immigrant			-0.0704 (0.1905)	-0.0075 (0.2036)		
Post election (2015)*Commonwealth Immigrant					0.1199 (0.3432)	0.3638 (0.4004)
Num. obs.	11968	8648	11968	8648	11968	8648
Num. groups: interview_month	12	12	12	12	12	12
Num. groups: factor(gor_dv)	12	11	12	11	12	11
R ² (full model)	0.0216	0.2268	0.0211	0.2268	0.0214	0.2268
R ² (proj model)	0.0192	0.2246	0.0187	0.2245	0.0190	0.2245
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.0191	0.2230	0.0187	0.2229	0.0189	0.2229
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.0185	0.2226	0.0181	0.2225	0.0183	0.2225

Standard errors clustered at region level. Month and region fixed effects included. 2015: Post-electoral period starts May 8. Basic controls: female, age, age squared, higher education, log income. Full controls: all basic plus urban/rural, children, household size, marital status, employment, political interest.

Final set of results addresses hypothesis H4 about the difference between legitimisation and high support without legitimisation. Results presented in Table 4.7 do not indicate any relationship between mental health and the aftermath of EP elections for EU immigrants. For non-EU immigrants, the coefficient in full sample is statistically significant ($\beta = .241, p < .1$), as well as for the Commonwealth immigrants ($\beta = .377, p < .01$). Positive coefficient indicates both groups reported lower mental health after the EP elections in 2014. Lack of significance in the basic model suggests that this relationship is contingent on controlling for specific variables. As such it does not represent a strong support for hypothesis H4, but it is suggestive that high support even without legitimisation may be related to lower mental health of immigrants.

Table 4.7: EP 2014 Event Study: All Immigrant Groups vs Natives

	EU (Basic)	EU (Full)	Non-EU (Basic)	Non-EU (Full)	Immigrants (Basic)	Immigrants (Full)	Commonwealth (Basic)	Commonwealth (Full)
Post EP 2014*EU Immigrant	-0.3371 (0.5302)	-0.2774 (0.5059)						
Post EP 2014*Non-EU Immigrant			0.0619 (0.1696)	0.2415* (0.1266)				
Post EP 2014*Immigrant					-0.0677 (0.0918)	0.0823 (0.1163)		
Post EP 2014*Commonwealth Immigrant							0.1872 (0.1126)	0.3778*** (0.1094)
Num. obs.	14357	10075	14357	10075	14357	10075	14357	10075
Num. groups: interview_month	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Num. groups: factor(gor_dv)	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
R ² (full model)	0.0232	0.2424	0.0224	0.2424	0.0226	0.2420	0.0225	0.2423
R ² (proj model)	0.0191	0.2392	0.0184	0.2392	0.0186	0.2388	0.0185	0.2391
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.0211	0.2391	0.0204	0.2391	0.0206	0.2387	0.0205	0.2390
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.0186	0.2376	0.0178	0.2375	0.0180	0.2372	0.0179	0.2374

Standard errors clustered at region level. Month and region fixed effects included. Basic controls: female, age, age squared, higher education, log income. Full controls: all basic plus urban/rural, children, household size, marital status, employment, political interest.

4.6 Discussion

This paper demonstrates there is no significant relation between UKIP's first entrance to the HoC and immigrants lower mental health. The first entrance to the parliament is taken as a clear signal of legitimisation of the populist right. Legitimisation in this perspective signals a normative change—or lower costs of expression of anti-immigrant and other previously stigmatised political preferences. Lower costs of expression of prejudice also mean that more people would be encouraged to express prejudices, therefore targeted social groups such as immigrants face more frequent prejudicial behaviour. The first explanation of the insignificance of these results could be that legitimisation of UKIP did not trigger the sense of discrimination among immigrants. Evidence in the analysis strongly suggests this is a plausible cause, as there was no statistically significant relationship between the sense of discrimination among immigrants in the period after UKIP entered the HoC.

Further reasons for the null findings in this research may relate to two important aspects of UKIP's entrance to the HoC. The first aspect is that outcomes of these elections for UKIP were regarded as a rather

puny outcome—enough that punditry and scholars designated this a "defeat" (Cutts, Goodwin, and Milazzo 2017). Despite its high electoral support, the UKIP secured only 1 seat in the HoC with 3.8 million votes, or 12.8% of the national vote share. On the other hand, Scottish National Party got 56 seats in the House of Commons (HoC) by winning 4.7% of the national vote (Bogdanor 2016; Tournier-Sol 2015). The second thing is that the single seat UKIP won was in Clacton, Essex, which had been held by UKIP because MP Douglas Carswell defected from the Conservative Party to UKIP in 2014 (Tournier-Sol 2015; Cutts, Goodwin, and Milazzo 2017). This fact made UKIP's victory in Clacton look like a re-election. On top of that it also indicated that UKIP cannot win a seat without the help of Tory defectors.

Despite substantive support UKIP received, it is possible that the magnitude of the victory was not as strong because of the first-past-the-post electoral system in the UK. The explanation of the "null results" points to importance of how legitimisation happens as potentially more important aspect than the mere fact of happening. Considering the usual outcomes in the legitimisation literature—such as the expression of party support or the open expression of political preferences (Dinas, Martínez, and Valentim 2024; Valentim 2021; Bischof and Wagner 2019), it may seem that for such outcome mere fact of passing the threshold has more significance than the number of seats secured or the vote share. Health outcomes, as being indirectly related to normalisation of the populist right through discrimination may need stronger and more concentrated signals of legitimisation of the populist right—i.e. a series of anti-immigrant rallies alongside the entrance to the parliament. Magnitude of event that signals legitimisation may also explain why there is no effect in immigrant subgroups, such as EU immigrants who were often targeted in the UKIP's campaigns. Consequential effects such as Brexit negatively affected mental health of immigrants. The analysis also provided very weak evidence (contingent on controlling) that high support even without prospects of legitimisation may be more related to immigrants' health than entrance to the parliament of the populist right. It is even possible that the poor manner of entering the HoC diminishes the significance of big electoral support the UKIP received in 2015.

A supporting explanation to the lack of the "victory" element for UKIP may also be found in their performance in the EP elections in 2014. UKIP became the largest UK party in the EP winning 25.5% of the national vote, which made them the first party to win a nation-wide elections besides Conservatives and Labour since 1906 (Bogdanor 2016; Treib 2014; Parau 2014). UKIP's campaign for the EP elections in 2014 focused on fusing the eurosceptic positions with anti-immigration (mostly through backlash against Eastern European immigrants), which made them distinct from other political parties, but also allowed them to claim the ownership over the immigration issue (Treib 2014; Dennison and Goodwin 2015). Repeating the same campaign in 2015, but winning less the half of what they won in 2014 EP elections, in national elections of greater salience (Dennison and Goodwin 2015; Hobolt 2015) may indeed send a signal that legitimisation came, just without the "victory." Additionally, UKIP has been participating in British politics for more than a decade, prior to coming out as populist right party, which could decrease their overall potential to create a shock with legitimisation. Countries such as Spain or Germany (Valentim 2024a; Dinas, Martínez, and Valentim 2024) where populist right parties were heavily stigmatised provide greater shock potential, specially as the rise of the populist parties was sudden and happened not long after these parties entered politics (Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Valentim 2024b).

Besides the focus on legitimisation, the analysis in this paper also addressed the relationship between electoral campaigns and immigrants' health. Considering that increased levels of discrimination and a decrease in health among immigrants have been detected due to anti-immigrant rhetoric in campaigns, and given that immigration is one of the central issues on UKIP's agenda, it would be expected that negative language affects immigrant respondents during the campaign. Non-significant relationship between

campaigns and immigrants health may again be explained with specificities of UKIP's electoral campaign. UKIP's campaign was designated as largely ineffective, lacking professionalism, organisation and experience in canvassing (Cutts, Goodwin, and Milazzo 2017; Tournier-Sol 2015), and the resources of other parties. At the beginning of the short campaign in 2015, UKIP decided to focus its limited resources to top ten districts that received several direct mail shots, billboard campaign and visits from Nigel Farage (Cutts, Goodwin, and Milazzo 2017). Relying on traditional and data-driven campaigning, in ten targeted districts UKIP achieved contact rates comparable to those of Conservatives and Labour, but having no manpower, nor resources its outreach rates fell behind in other districts (Cutts, Goodwin, and Milazzo 2017; Anstead 2017). The difference in campaign effectiveness and unequal exposure provide some reasoning on why campaign in 2015 was not related to immigrants' health, even though the literature would suggest it should be.

4.7 Conclusion

In this paper I studied the relationship between perceived mental health of immigrants and the legitimacy of the populist right. I focused on the case of UKIP, as this party entered the Parliament relying on anti-immigrant agenda for the first time in 2015. I exploited the fact that this party also ran in general elections in 2010, but did not pass the electoral threshold. I rely on UKHLS data as they offer representative samples of the UK population with several immigrant booster samples in both 2010 and 2015. The advantage of UKHLS is also a plausible assumption that both native and immigrant respondents are surveyed randomly around elections in both years. Using three different specifications of event studies I test if the entrance of UKIP to the HoC is associated with lower levels of self-reported mental health among immigrants.

My argument states that entrance to the Parliament signals the legitimisation of the populist right. The process of legitimisation is important, as it signals a normative change in which costs of expression of anti-immigrant prejudice are lowered for both political parties, but also for host country citizens. The theory suggests that lower costs indeed lead to more expression of prejudice and consequently to more stress, which has detrimental effects on immigrants' health. This research focused on a case that was previously neglected in the studies of immigrants' mental health—a situation when the populist right is normalised, but without the power to enact anti-immigrant policies shortly after being elected.

Results in this paper do not lend support to any of the tested hypotheses. Null findings suggest no relationship between perceived mental health of immigrants and legitimisation of the populist right. Moreover, the analysis also did not find supportive evidence that UKIP's first entrance to the HoC is related to higher levels of perceived discrimination and also did not find that electoral campaign is associated with lower levels of health among immigrants. Results largely diverge from available evidence about the normalisation of the populist right and its impact on expression of prejudice and inter-ethnic violence, which are all proven factors of immigrants' lower mental health outcomes. I explain findings by relying on specificities of UKIP's entrance to the HoC. What these results indicate is that UKIP's entrance to the HoC did not represent a significant shock for immigrants (and for natives for that matter). Having won just one seat in the HoC, despite a high vote share (12.8%), that was still below their support on EP elections in 2014 (25.5%) made UKIP's entrance seem less like a victory for the populists. A weak evidence from the analysis of EP elections in 2014 suggests that high levels of support might be more important than legitimisation, but this relationship seems contingent on specific control matrix and requires further study.

This paper has a significant limitation due to the treatment of 2015 General elections as a national shock,

instead of relying on subnational variation in electoral support on national elections. Differences in expressing the support for the populist right would signal that normative change is stronger in some electoral units than in others, also suggesting that levels of discrimination and shock for immigrants may be different. Relying on subnational support would also make analysis more sensitive to the fact that exposure to UKIP's campaigns was not equal in all parts of the UK. Finally, accounting for subnational levels of support would enable stronger causal evidence about the impact of populist right *per se*. Current setting with national elections as a treatment cannot exclude that other factors happening at the same time as the legitimisation of the populist right do not impact the health outcomes or curb the impact of legitimisation.

Despite limitations, this research does point out that effects may be conditional on the manner in which the legitimisation is happening - or in other words does legitimisation of the populist right affect health or other outcomes if it does not bring an element of victory or other markers of significance? Another potential avenue includes focusing on anti-immigrant speech of the mainstream parties and their impact on social norms (Valentim, Dinas, and Ziblatt 2025). Such approaches would account that one of the major effects of the populist right happens through their impact on the mainstream parties, which have more resources and greater potential to further erode the norms. As indicated in the limitations, using stronger causal methods would contribute to better understanding of normalisation of the populist right on immigrants' mental health.

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Appendix A

A.1 Populist Right Parties

Table A.1: Parties Classified as Populist Right-Wing per Country and Year

Country	Party	Years	PopuList
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	2008	✓
	Freedom Party of Austria	1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017, 2019	✓
Belgium	Team Stronach	2013	P
	Flemish Block / Interest	1999, 2003, 2007, 2010	✓
	Flemish Interest	2019	✓
	New Flemish Alliance	2010, 2014, 2019	?
Denmark	Danish People's Party	2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019	✓
France	National Front	2002, 2012, 2017	✓
	The Republic Onwards!	2017	?
Germany	Alternative for Germany	2013, 2017	✓
Ireland	Sinn Fein	2002, 2007	P
Italy	Brothers of Italy	2013, 2018	✓
	Five Star Movement	2013, 2018	P
	Forward Italy (2013)	2018	?
	Go Italy	2001, 2006	?
	List Di Pietro – Italy of Values	2006, 2008	?
	National Alliance	2001	?
	North League	2001, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2018	✓
	The People of Freedom	2008, 2013	P
	Fortuyn List	2002, 2003	P
	Party for Freedom	2006, 2010, 2012, 2017	✓
Norway	Centre [Agrarian] Party	2013, 2017	×
	Progress Party [Anders Lange's Party]	2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017	✓
Slovenia	List of Marjan Sarec	2018	P
	New Slovenia – Christian People's Party	2000, 2004, 2014, 2018	?
	Slovenian Democratic Party	2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2018	✓
	Slovenian National Party	2004, 2008	✓
Spain	Slovenian People's Party	2000, 2004, 2008, 2011	?
	Citizens – Party of the Citizenry	2015	?
	Voice	2019	✓
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	2010, 2014, 2018	✓
Switzerland	Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland	2011	?
	Swiss People's Party	1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019	✓
United Kingdom	Conservatives	2015, 2017, 2019	×
	United Kingdom Independence Party	2001, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2017	✓

Note: ✓ = Party classified in PopuList as populist and far-right. P = Party classified in PopuList as populist but not far-right. × = Party found in PopuList but classified as neither populist nor far-right. ? = Party not found in PopuList dataset.

A.2 Trends in Quality of Government for Western European Countries




Figure A.1: Trends in Quality of Government: Western European Countries

A.3 Descriptive Statistics: Political Trust by Population Group

Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics: Political Trust by Population Group

	(1) Native				(2) Immigrants				(3) Immigrants (1st gen.)				(4) Immigrants (2nd gen.)			
	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max
Total Political Trust	34.39	13.01	0	70	35.83	13.09	0	70	37.05	12.98	0	70	34.35	13.08	0	70
Trust in National Parliament	4.81	2.44	0	10	5.15	2.47	0	10	5.37	2.47	0	10	4.87	2.44	0	10
Trust in Law and Order Institutions	12.02	4.26	0	20	12.35	4.37	0	20	12.73	4.35	0	20	11.87	4.35	0	20
Trust in Supra-national institutions	9.74	4.30	0	20	10.11	4.48	0	20	10.35	4.52	0	20	9.81	4.40	0	20
Trust in Political Representatives	7.72	4.45	0	20	8.24	4.53	0	20	8.60	4.60	0	20	7.79	4.40	0	20


Note: Statistics for composite trust measures by population group.

A.4 Heterogeneous Event Study: Descriptive Statistics of After-Elections Subsamples


Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics by Population Group and Time Window

	Overall		30 days		60 days		100 days		200 days		365 days	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Natives												
Gender (female)	0.518	0.500	0.510	0.500	0.507	0.500	0.509	0.500	0.519	0.500	0.520	0.500
Age of respondent, calculated	49.268	18.639	51.887	19.377	50.167	19.408	49.182	19.060	49.114	18.855	49.265	18.814
Discrimination	0.015	0.121	0.011	0.104	0.011	0.102	0.009	0.096	0.014	0.117	0.013	0.112
Years of full-time education completed	12.761	4.014	12.642	4.634	12.374	4.367	12.483	4.151	12.629	3.980	12.493	4.080
Income decil	5.855	2.677	5.813	2.526	5.960	2.515	6.113	2.538	5.928	2.591	5.651	2.649
Source of income	1.621	0.912	1.696	0.945	1.656	0.932	1.619	0.918	1.628	0.920	1.638	0.920
Speaking host-country language at home	0.956	0.206	0.957	0.203	0.968	0.175	0.976	0.153	0.977	0.151	0.948	0.223
Citizenship	0.998	0.039	0.999	0.028	0.999	0.031	0.999	0.029	0.999	0.032	0.998	0.042
Country Evaluation	16.317	5.558	16.438	4.988	16.328	5.013	16.398	5.086	15.610	5.257	15.701	5.420
GDP per capita (log)	10.676	0.360	10.551	0.403	10.492	0.407	10.511	0.382	10.520	0.328	10.581	0.340
Multiculturalism Policy Index	3.040	1.897	4.184	2.142	4.826	2.107	4.998	2.146	4.369	2.174	3.266	2.003
QoG in Co. of origin	8.549	1.939	8.410	2.333	8.505	2.291	8.748	2.205	8.331	2.117	8.014	2.269
Distance towards Immigrants (cntryr)	14.393	1.677	12.843	1.848	12.960	2.128	12.885	2.125	13.946	2.171	14.337	1.873
N	184260		3826		7258		11532		22965		47719	
Immigrants												
Gender (female)	0.524	0.499	0.541	0.499	0.531	0.499	0.528	0.499	0.538	0.499	0.523	0.499
Age of respondent, calculated	43.671	17.167	45.295	17.788	44.061	17.753	43.876	17.597	43.685	17.299	43.464	17.359
Discrimination	0.111	0.315	0.108	0.311	0.093	0.290	0.093	0.290	0.094	0.292	0.105	0.307
Years of full-time education completed	13.106	4.242	13.094	4.682	12.997	4.279	12.992	4.235	13.004	4.160	12.867	4.202
Income decil	5.542	2.745	5.666	2.657	5.843	2.537	5.931	2.553	5.712	2.604	5.406	2.668
Source of income	1.446	0.805	1.470	0.833	1.468	0.836	1.456	0.826	1.442	0.811	1.446	0.806
Speaking host-country language at home	0.717	0.450	0.752	0.432	0.768	0.423	0.759	0.428	0.761	0.427	0.727	0.446
Citizenship	0.696	0.460	0.774	0.419	0.812	0.390	0.816	0.388	0.790	0.407	0.701	0.458
Country Evaluation	17.435	5.679	17.363	5.236	17.283	5.372	17.339	5.374	16.843	5.536	17.099	5.704
GDP per capita (log)	10.747	0.350	10.559	0.413	10.502	0.413	10.531	0.383	10.542	0.333	10.648	0.370
Multiculturalism Policy Index	3.101	1.994	4.487	2.192	5.138	2.066	5.268	2.115	4.725	2.177	3.477	2.163
QoG in Co. of origin	2.414	5.527	1.752	5.702	2.663	5.970	2.733	6.177	2.037	5.762	2.153	5.438
Distance towards Immigrants (cntryr)	14.253	1.709	12.803	1.976	12.870	2.185	12.765	2.149	13.836	2.269	14.204	1.970
N	38858		766		1506		2479		4905		9712	
First Generation												
Gender (female)	0.526	0.499	0.531	0.500	0.535	0.499	0.532	0.499	0.536	0.499	0.520	0.500
Age of respondent, calculated	44.712	16.280	47.339	16.309	46.861	16.757	46.511	16.783	45.790	16.687	44.749	16.484
Discrimination	0.139	0.346	0.140	0.347	0.128	0.335	0.131	0.338	0.128	0.334	0.141	0.348
Years of full-time education completed	13.080	4.563	12.840	5.114	12.934	4.743	12.836	4.621	12.760	4.567	12.740	4.519
Income decil	5.263	2.743	5.274	2.675	5.489	2.549	5.647	2.564	5.406	2.607	5.111	2.647
Source of income	1.437	0.796	1.489	0.837	1.512	0.858	1.509	0.856	1.474	0.829	1.439	0.797
Speaking host-country language at home	0.587	0.492	0.614	0.487	0.626	0.484	0.612	0.487	0.610	0.488	0.598	0.490
Citizenship	0.502	0.500	0.624	0.485	0.678	0.468	0.685	0.465	0.642	0.480	0.516	0.500
Country Evaluation	18.312	5.525	18.058	5.497	18.239	5.467	18.241	5.385	17.755	5.567	17.951	5.606
GDP per capita (log)	10.769	0.353	10.580	0.376	10.546	0.382	10.570	0.356	10.565	0.316	10.669	0.364
Multiculturalism Policy Index	3.143	1.979	4.420	2.139	5.051	2.052	5.212	2.100	4.752	2.142	3.498	2.104
QoG in Co. of origin	1.786	5.617	1.000	5.440	1.904	5.934	1.838	6.178	1.295	5.741	1.599	5.482
Distance towards Immigrants (cntryr)	14.168	1.711	12.624	1.791	12.517	1.924	12.473	1.933	13.649	2.252	14.123	1.968
N	22040		451		842		1385		2667		5626	
Second Generation												
Gender (female)	0.522	0.500	0.554	0.498	0.526	0.500	0.523	0.500	0.540	0.499	0.528	0.499
Age of respondent, calculated	42.310	18.172	42.368	19.369	40.508	18.348	40.538	18.040	41.180	17.681	41.699	18.349
Discrimination	0.075	0.264	0.063	0.244	0.048	0.214	0.044	0.205	0.053	0.224	0.056	0.230
Years of full-time education completed	13.139	3.785	13.455	3.971	13.077	3.615	13.187	3.687	13.291	3.600	13.040	3.721
Income decil	5.907	2.706	6.209	2.538	6.305	2.449	6.288	2.496	6.079	2.552	5.808	2.643
Source of income	1.457	0.817	1.443	0.827	1.414	0.804	1.389	0.784	1.404	0.787	1.456	0.818
Speaking host-country language at home	0.887	0.316	0.949	0.220	0.947	0.224	0.945	0.228	0.940	0.237	0.904	0.294
Citizenship	0.949	0.220	0.987	0.112	0.983	0.128	0.982	0.134	0.968	0.177	0.955	0.206
Country Evaluation	16.359	5.681	16.428	4.712	16.114	5.015	16.251	5.156	15.810	5.316	16.002	5.642
GDP per capita (log)	10.717	0.345	10.528	0.460	10.446	0.443	10.482	0.410	10.514	0.349	10.619	0.375
Multiculturalism Policy Index	3.045	2.013	4.598	2.277	5.278	2.084	5.353	2.136	4.689	2.223	3.447	2.248
QoG in Co. of origin	3.635	5.130	3.897	5.905	4.433	5.682	4.795	5.665	3.683	5.460	3.482	5.091
Distance towards Immigrants (cntryr)	14.363	1.701	13.059	2.193	13.318	2.405	13.133	2.345	14.059	2.270	14.315	1.967
N	16818		315		664		1094		2238		4086	


A.5 Heterogeneous Event Study: Balance Plots of After-Elections Subsamples




(a) Natives



(b) Immigrants



(c) First Generation



(d) Second Generation

Figure A.2: Heterogeneous Event Study: Balance Plots of After-Elections Subsamples

A.6 Heterogeneous Event Study: Marginal Effects Across Time (Alternative Binning Strategy)






Figure A.3: Alternative Binning Strategy: Total Political Trust


Note: Marginal effects of RWP vote share on total political trust across 4 quarterly time bins (0-90, 90-180, 180-270, 270-365 days).




(a) Natives



(b) Immigrants




(c) First Generation




(d) Second Generation

Figure A.4: Alternative Binning Strategy: Trust in the National Parliament


Note: Marginal effects of RWP vote share on trust in the national parliament across 4 quarterly time bins (0-90, 90-180, 180-270, 270-365 days).




(a) Natives



(b) Immigrants




(c) First Generation




(d) Second Generation

Figure A.5: Alternative Binning Strategy: Trust in Law and Order Institutions


Note: Marginal effects of RWP vote share on trust in law and order institutions across 4 quarterly time bins (0-90, 90-180, 180-270, 270-365 days).




(a) Natives



(b) Immigrants




(c) First Generation




(d) Second Generation

Figure A.6: Alternative Binning Strategy: Trust in Supranational Institutions


Note: Marginal effects of RWP vote share on trust in supranational institutions across 4 quarterly time bins (0-90, 90-180, 180-270, 270-365 days).




(a) Natives



(b) Immigrants



(c) First Generation



(d) Second Generation

Figure A.7: Alternative Binning Strategy: Trust in Political Representatives

Note: Marginal effects of RWP vote share on trust in political representatives across 4 quarterly time bins (0-90, 90-180, 180-270, 270-365 days).


A.7 Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Descriptive Statistics

Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables by Population Group


	Native				Immigrants				Immigrants (1st gen.)				Immigrants (2nd gen.)			
	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max
Gender (female)	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00
Age of respondent, calculated	49.27	18.64	14.00	123.00	43.67	17.17	14.00	114.00	44.71	16.28	15.00	114.00	42.31	18.17	14.00	98.00
Discrimination	0.01	0.12	0.00	1.00	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00	0.08	0.26	0.00	1.00
Years of full-time education completed	12.76	4.01	0.00	60.00	13.11	4.24	0.00	56.00	13.08	4.56	0.00	56.00	13.14	3.79	0.00	48.00
Income decil	5.85	2.68	1.00	10.00	5.54	2.75	1.00	10.00	5.26	2.74	1.00	10.00	5.91	2.71	1.00	10.00
Source of income	1.62	0.91	1.00	3.00	1.45	0.80	1.00	3.00	1.44	0.80	1.00	3.00	1.46	0.82	1.00	3.00
Speaking host-country language at home	0.96	0.21	0.00	1.00	0.72	0.45	0.00	1.00	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.89	0.32	0.00	1.00
Citizenship	1.00	0.04	0.00	1.00	0.70	0.46	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.95	0.22	0.00	1.00
Country Evaluation	16.32	5.56	0.00	30.00	17.44	5.68	0.00	30.00	18.31	5.52	0.00	30.00	16.36	5.68	0.00	30.00
GDP per capita (log)	10.68	0.36	9.37	11.54	10.75	0.35	9.37	11.54	10.77	0.35	9.37	11.54	10.72	0.34	9.37	11.54
Multiculturalism Policy Index	3.04	1.90	0.00	7.00	3.10	1.99	0.00	7.00	3.14	1.98	0.00	7.00	3.05	2.01	0.00	7.00
QoG in Co. of origin	8.55	1.94	2.98	11.34	2.41	5.53	-14.70	11.82	1.79	5.62	-14.70	11.82	3.63	5.13	-14.70	11.76
Distance towards Immigrants (cntyr)	14.39	1.68	10.44	20.00	14.25	1.71	10.44	20.00	14.17	1.71	10.44	20.00	14.36	1.70	10.44	18.41

Note: Statistics for control variables by population group.


A.8 Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: ESS Indicators




(a) Trust in Legal System




(b) Trust in Police




(c) Trust in European Parliament



(d) Trust in United Nations



(e) Trust in Political Parties



(f) Trust in Politicians

Figure A.8: Two Way Fixed Effects Study: ESS Indicators

Note: Each panel shows coefficient estimates with 95% (thin line) and 90% (thick line) confidence intervals.

A.9 Two-way Fixed Effects Study: Interaction Models




Figure A.9: Two-way Fixed Effects Study: Interaction Models

Note: Interaction effects of RWP vote share with population group across trust outcomes.
Each panel shows coefficient estimates with 95% (thin line) and 90% (thick line) confidence intervals.

A.10 Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Pooled vs Country-Specific Slope Estimates







Figure A.10: Pooled vs Country-Specific Estimates: Baseline Models




(a) Trust in the National Parliament



(b) Trust in the Legal System




(c) Trust in the Police




(d) Trust in Politicians

Figure A.11: Pooled vs Country-Specific Estimates: ESS Indicators




(e) Trust in Political Parties

(f) Trust in the European Parliament




(g) Trust in the United Nations

Figure A.11: Pooled vs Country-Specific Estimates: ESS Indicators (continuation)




(a) Total Political Trust

(b) Trust in Political Representatives




(c) Trust in Law and Order Institutions

Figure A.12: Pooled vs Country-Specific Estimates: Muslim Immigrants




(d) Trust in Supranational Institutions




(e) Trust in the National Parliament

Figure A.12: Pooled vs Country-Specific Estimates: Muslim Immigrants (continuation)




(a) Total Political Trust

(b) Trust in Political Representatives




(c) Trust in Law and Order Institutions

Figure A.13: Pooled vs Country-Specific Estimates: Non-Western Immigrants




(d) Trust in Supranational Institutions




(e) Trust in the National Parliament

Figure A.13: Pooled vs Country-Specific Estimates: Non-Western Immigrants (continuation)




(a) Total Political Trust

(b) Trust in Political Representatives




(c) Trust in Law and Order Institutions

Figure A.14: Pooled vs Country-Specific Estimates: EU Immigrants




(d) Trust in Supranational Institutions




(e) Trust in the National Parliament

Figure A.14: Pooled vs Country-Specific Estimates: EU Immigrants (continuation)




(a) Total Political Trust

(b) Trust in Political Representatives




(c) Trust in Law and Order Institutions

Figure A.15: Pooled vs Country-Specific Estimates: Immigrant Men




(d) Trust in Supranational Institutions




(e) Trust in the National Parliament

Figure A.15: Pooled vs Country-Specific Estimates: Immigrant Men (continuation)




(a) Total Political Trust

(b) Trust in Political Representatives



(c) Trust in Law and Order Institutions

Figure A.16: Pooled vs Country-Specific Estimates: Immigrant Women



(d) Trust in Supranational Institutions

(e) Trust in the National Parliament

Figure A.16: Pooled vs Country-Specific Estimates: Immigrant Women (continuation)

A.11 Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Leave-One-Country-Out Robustness Checks




Figure A.17: Leave-One-Country-Out: Natives




Figure A.18: Leave-One-Country-Out: Immigrants




Figure A.19: Leave-One-Country-Out: First Generation Immigrants



Figure A.20: Leave-One-Country-Out: Second Generation Immigrants




Figure A.21: Leave-One-Country-Out: Muslim Immigrants




Figure A.22: Leave-One-Country-Out: Non-Western Immigrants




Figure A.23: Leave-One-Country-Out: EU Immigrants




Figure A.24: Leave-One-Country-Out: Immigrant Men




Figure A.25: Leave-One-Country-Out: Immigrant Women

A.12 Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Sensitivity Checks for Coincident Events




Figure A.26: Sensitivity Checks: Natives




Figure A.27: Sensitivity Checks: Immigrants




Figure A.28: Sensitivity Checks: First Generation Immigrants




Figure A.29: Sensitivity Checks: Second Generation Immigrants




Figure A.30: Sensitivity Checks: Muslim Immigrants




Figure A.31: Sensitivity Checks: Non-Western Immigrants




Figure A.32: Sensitivity Checks: EU Immigrants




Figure A.33: Sensitivity Checks: Immigrant Men






Figure A.34: Sensitivity Checks: Immigrant Women


A.13 Two Way Fixed Effects Study: Disaggregated and Interaction Models (ESS Indicators)




(a) Trust in Legal System - Disaggregated



(b) Trust in Legal System - Interaction



(c) Trust in European Parliament - Disaggregated



(d) Trust in European Parliament - Interaction

Figure A.35: Two Way Fixed Effects Study: Interaction Models (ESS Indicators)

Note: Disaggregated models estimate separate coefficients for each population group (natives, immigrants, first generation, second generation). Interaction models include interaction terms between RWP vote share and population group indicators in the separate models. Each panel shows coefficient estimates with 95% (thin line) and 90% (thick line) confidence intervals.

A.14 Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Robustness Checks for ESS Indicators




Figure A.36: Robustness Checks: First Generation Muslim Immigrants — Trust in Legal System







Figure A.37: Robustness Checks: EU Immigrants — Trust in European Parliament


A.15 Two-way Fixed Effects Study: Mainstream Right




(a) Total Political Trust




(b) Trust in the National Parliament



(c) Trust in Law and Order Institutions



(d) Trust in Supranational Institutions




(e) Trust in Political Representatives


Figure A.38: Two-way Fixed Effects Study: Mainstream Right

Note: Alternative treatment is maximum vote share of the mainstream right party. Effects of RWP vote share with population group across trust outcomes. Each panel shows coefficient estimates with 95% (thin line) and 90% (thick line) confidence intervals.


A.16 Two Way Fixed Effects Study: Quality of Government as a Moderator




(a) Total Political Trust




(b) Trust in the National Parliament




(c) Trust in Law and Order Institutions



(d) Trust in Supranational Institutions




(e) Trust in Political Representatives




(f) Trust in Legal Institutions


Figure A.39: Two-way Fixed Effects Study: Quality of Government as a Moderator




(g) Trust in Law and Order - First Generation (Alternative Binning Strategy)



(h) Trust in Law and Order - Second Generation (Alternative Binning Strategy)



(i) Trust in Legal Institutions - First Generation (Alternative Binning Strategy)



(j) Trust in Legal Institutions - Second Generation (Alternative Binning Strategy)

Figure A.39: Two-way Fixed Effects Study: Quality of Government as a Moderator (continuation)

Appendix B

B.1 Descriptive Statistics


Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics: Social Trust by Population Group

	(1) Native				(2) Immigrants				(3) Immigrants (1st gen.)				(4) Immigrants (2nd gen.)			
	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max
Social Trust Index	16.85	5.37	0	30	16.26	5.42	0	30	16.28	5.50	0	30	16.24	5.33	0	30
Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful	5.43	2.31	0	10	5.22	2.33	0	10	5.22	2.35	0	10	5.22	2.31	0	10
Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair	6.05	2.12	0	10	5.80	2.20	0	10	5.73	2.25	0	10	5.89	2.13	0	10
Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves	5.36	2.17	0	10	5.24	2.25	0	10	5.33	2.30	0	10	5.13	2.18	0	10


Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables by Population Group

	(1) Native				(2) Immigrants				(3) Immigrants (1st gen.)				(4) Immigrants (2nd gen.)			
	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max
Gender (female)	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00
Age of respondent, calculated	49.27	18.64	14.00	123.00	43.67	17.17	14.00	114.00	44.71	16.28	15.00	114.00	42.31	18.17	14.00	98.00
Age (squared)	2774.73	1893.19	196.00	15129.00	2201.86	1653.10	196.00	12996.00	2264.20	1604.80	225.00	12996.00	2120.37	1710.81	196.00	9604.00
Years of full-time education completed	12.76	4.01	0.00	60.00	13.11	4.24	0.00	56.00	13.08	4.56	0.00	56.00	13.14	3.79	0.00	48.00
Income decil	5.85	2.68	1.00	10.00	5.54	2.75	1.00	10.00	5.26	2.74	1.00	10.00	5.91	2.71	1.00	10.00
Source of income	1.62	0.91	1.00	3.00	1.45	0.80	1.00	3.00	1.44	0.80	1.00	3.00	1.46	0.82	1.00	3.00
Speaking host-country language at home	0.96	0.21	0.00	1.00	0.72	0.45	0.00	1.00	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.89	0.32	0.00	1.00
Citizenship	1.00	0.04	0.00	1.00	0.70	0.46	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.95	0.22	0.00	1.00
Discrimination	0.01	0.12	0.00	1.00	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00	0.08	0.26	0.00	1.00
How often socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues	5.10	1.46	1.00	7.00	5.08	1.49	1.00	7.00	4.92	1.52	1.00	7.00	5.28	1.42	1.00	7.00
Take part in social activities compared to others of same age	2.79	0.90	1.00	5.00	2.74	0.94	1.00	5.00	2.68	0.95	1.00	5.00	2.80	0.93	1.00	5.00
Religious Service Attendance	2.39	1.49	1.00	7.00	2.51	1.56	1.00	7.00	2.70	1.62	1.00	7.00	2.28	1.44	1.00	7.00
How satisfied with life as a whole	7.41	2.00	0.00	10.00	7.25	2.11	0.00	10.00	7.21	2.14	0.00	10.00	7.31	2.08	0.00	10.00
Placement on left right scale	5.01	2.08	0.00	10.00	4.69	2.09	0.00	10.00	4.72	2.07	0.00	10.00	4.66	2.10	0.00	10.00
Social Trust (native mean)	16.84	1.96	10.67	21.32	16.96	1.77	10.67	21.32	17.03	1.76	10.67	21.32	16.86	1.79	11.07	21.32
Gini Index	30.60	3.09	23.70	36.20	30.64	2.89	23.70	36.20	30.85	2.91	23.70	36.20	30.36	2.85	23.70	36.20


B.2 Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Main Results (2015–2019)




(a) Social Trust Index



(b) Trustworthiness




(c) Helpfulness




(d) Fairness


Figure B.1: Two-Way Fixed Effects: Social Trust (2015–2019)




(a) Social Trust Index



(b) Trustworthiness




(c) Helpfulness




(d) Fairness


Figure B.2: Two-way Fixed Effects: Discrimination (2015–2019)




(a) Social Trust Index



(b) Trustworthiness



(c) Helpfulness



(d) Fairness

Figure B.3: Two-Way Fixed Effects: Social Trust (Muslim Immigrants, 2015–2019)

B.3 Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Interaction Models







Figure B.4: Two-Way Fixed Effects: Interaction Models (Full Sample)




(a) Social Trust Index



(b) Trustworthiness




(c) Helpfulness




(d) Fairness


Figure B.5: Two-Way Fixed Effects: Interaction Models (2015–2019)




(a) Social Trust Index



(b) Trustworthiness



(c) Helpfulness



(d) Fairness

Figure B.6: Two-Way Fixed Effects: Interaction Models — Muslim Immigrants (Full Sample)

B.4 Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Gender Disaggregation



Figure B.7: Two-Way Fixed Effects: Social Trust (Men, Interaction)




Figure B.8: Two-Way Fixed Effects: Social Trust (Women, Interaction)

B.5 Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Pooled vs Country-Specific Slope Estimates




Figure B.9: Pooled vs Country-Specific Slope Estimates

Note: Country-specific slope estimates from models interacting RWP vote share with country indicators alongside the pooled TWFE estimate. Coefficients represent within-country over-time variation for each country. Thick lines show 90% CIs; thin lines show 95% CIs. Clustered standard errors at country-year level.




Figure B.10: Pooled vs Country-Specific Slope Estimates (2015–2019)

Note: Sample restricted to 2015–2019. Country-specific slope estimates from models interacting RWP vote share with country indicators alongside the pooled TWFE estimate. Coefficients represent within-country over-time variation for each country. Thick lines show 90% CIs; thin lines show 95% CIs. Clustered standard errors at country-year level.

B.6 Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Leave-One-Country-Out Robustness Checks




Figure B.11: Leave-One-Country-Out: Natives




Figure B.12: Leave-One-Country-Out: Immigrants




Figure B.13: Leave-One-Country-Out: First Generation Immigrants




Figure B.14: Leave-One-Country-Out: Second Generation Immigrants




Figure B.15: Leave-One-Country-Out: Natives (2015-2019)




Figure B.16: Leave-One-Country-Out: Immigrants (2015–2019)




Figure B.17: Leave-One-Country-Out: First Generation Immigrants (2015–2019)




Figure B.18: Leave-One-Country-Out: Second Generation Immigrants (2015–2019)




Figure B.19: Leave-One-Country-Out: Muslim Immigrants




Figure B.20: Leave-One-Country-Out: Muslim Immigrants (1st Generation)




Figure B.21: Leave-One-Country-Out: Muslim Immigrants (2nd Generation)




Figure B.22: Leave-One-Country-Out: Native Men




Figure B.23: Leave-One-Country-Out: Immigrant Men




Figure B.24: Leave-One-Country-Out: Immigrant Men (1st Generation)




Figure B.25: Leave-One-Country-Out: Immigrant Men (2nd Generation)




Figure B.26: Leave-One-Country-Out: Native Women




Figure B.27: Leave-One-Country-Out: Immigrant Women




Figure B.28: Leave-One-Country-Out: Immigrant Women (1st Generation)




Figure B.29: Leave-One-Country-Out: Immigrant Women (2nd Generation)




Figure B.30: Leave-One-Country-Out: Natives (2015–2019)




Figure B.31: Leave-One-Country-Out: Immigrants (2015–2019)




Figure B.32: Leave-One-Country-Out: First Generation Immigrants (2015–2019)




Figure B.33: Leave-One-Country-Out: Second Generation Immigrants (2015–2019)




Figure B.34: Leave-One-Country-Out: Muslim Immigrants (2015–2019)




Figure B.35: Leave-One-Country-Out: Muslim Immigrants (1st Generation, 2015–2019)




Figure B.36: Leave-One-Country-Out: Muslim Immigrants (2nd Generation, 2015–2019)

B.7 Two-Way Fixed Effects Study: Sensitivity Checks for Coincident Events




Figure B.37: Sensitivity Checks: Natives




Figure B.38: Sensitivity Checks: Immigrants




Figure B.39: Sensitivity Checks: First Generation Immigrants




Figure B.40: Sensitivity Checks: Second Generation Immigrants




Figure B.41: Sensitivity Checks: Muslim Immigrants




Figure B.42: Sensitivity Checks: Muslim Immigrants (1st Generation)




Figure B.43: Sensitivity Checks: Muslim Immigrants (2nd Generation)




Figure B.44: Sensitivity Checks: Native Men




Figure B.45: Sensitivity Checks: Immigrant Men




Figure B.46: Sensitivity Checks: Immigrant Men (1st Generation)




Figure B.47: Sensitivity Checks: Immigrant Men (2nd Generation)




Figure B.48: Sensitivity Checks: Native Women




Figure B.49: Sensitivity Checks: Immigrant Women




Figure B.50: Sensitivity Checks: Immigrant Women (1st Generation)




Figure B.51: Sensitivity Checks: Immigrant Women (2nd Generation)

B.8 Heterogeneous Event Study: Descriptive Statistics

Table B.3: Descriptive Statistics by Time Window: Natives

	(1) Overall		(2) 30 days		(3) 60 days		(4) 100 days		(5) 200 days		(6) 365 days	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Gender (female)	0.518	0.500	0.510	0.500	0.507	0.500	0.509	0.500	0.519	0.500	0.520	0.500
Age	49.268	18.639	51.887	19.377	50.167	19.408	49.182	19.060	49.114	18.855	49.265	18.814
Age squared	2774.726	1893.192	3067.586	2012.207	2893.333	1982.880	2782.109	1931.344	2767.705	1910.732	2780.995	1913.995
Years of full-time education completed	12.761	4.014	12.642	4.634	12.374	4.367	12.483	4.151	12.629	3.980	12.493	4.080
Income decile	5.855	2.677	5.813	2.526	5.960	2.515	6.113	2.538	5.928	2.591	5.651	2.649
Source of income	1.621	0.912	1.696	0.945	1.656	0.932	1.619	0.918	1.628	0.920	1.638	0.920
Speaking host-country language at home	0.956	0.206	0.957	0.203	0.968	0.175	0.976	0.153	0.977	0.151	0.948	0.223
Host-country citizenship	0.998	0.039	0.999	0.028	0.999	0.031	0.999	0.029	0.999	0.032	0.998	0.042
Discriminated	0.015	0.121	0.011	0.104	0.011	0.102	0.009	0.096	0.014	0.117	0.013	0.112
How often socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues	5.098	1.456	5.225	1.450	5.192	1.451	5.187	1.444	5.104	1.461	5.074	1.476
Take part in social activities compared to others of same age	2.793	0.904	2.813	0.928	2.807	0.916	2.821	0.913	2.775	0.941	2.773	0.909
Religious service attendance	2.393	1.489	2.309	1.462	2.324	1.415	2.284	1.389	2.266	1.413	2.489	1.536
How satisfied with life as a whole	7.414	2.001	7.622	1.819	7.576	1.854	7.599	1.847	7.451	1.922	7.380	2.003
Placement on left-right scale	5.011	2.082	5.030	2.296	5.037	2.325	5.055	2.316	5.027	2.225	4.995	2.169
Social Trust Index (mean)	16.841	1.962	17.096	2.208	17.090	2.336	17.270	2.261	16.660	2.038	16.440	1.959
Gini index	30.603	3.090	29.265	3.350	28.429	3.447	28.056	3.086	28.926	3.268	30.197	3.275
N	184260		3826		7258		11532		22965		47719	

Table B.4: Descriptive Statistics by Time Window: Immigrants

	(1) Overall		(2) 30 days		(3) 60 days		(4) 100 days		(5) 200 days		(6) 365 days	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Gender (female)	0.524	0.499	0.541	0.499	0.531	0.499	0.528	0.499	0.538	0.499	0.523	0.499
Age	43.671	17.167	45.295	17.788	44.061	17.753	43.876	17.597	43.685	17.299	43.464	17.359
Age squared	2201.862	1653.095	2367.653	1731.773	2256.289	1697.472	2234.587	1691.154	2207.570	1656.695	2196.395	1671.150
Years of full-time education completed	13.106	4.242	13.094	4.682	12.997	4.279	12.992	4.235	13.004	4.160	12.867	4.202
Income decile	5.542	2.745	5.666	2.657	5.843	2.537	5.931	2.553	5.712	2.604	5.406	2.668
Source of income	1.446	0.805	1.470	0.833	1.468	0.836	1.456	0.826	1.442	0.811	1.446	0.806
Speaking host-country language at home	0.717	0.450	0.752	0.432	0.768	0.423	0.759	0.428	0.761	0.427	0.727	0.446
Host-country citizenship	0.696	0.460	0.774	0.419	0.812	0.390	0.816	0.388	0.790	0.407	0.701	0.458
Discriminated	0.111	0.315	0.108	0.311	0.093	0.290	0.093	0.290	0.094	0.292	0.105	0.307
How often socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues	5.078	1.489	5.114	1.513	5.139	1.503	5.161	1.499	5.118	1.505	5.081	1.517
Take part in social activities compared to others of same age	2.735	0.943	2.729	0.953	2.745	0.945	2.781	0.962	2.741	0.980	2.726	0.950
Religious service attendance	2.515	1.556	2.418	1.530	2.310	1.423	2.295	1.404	2.401	1.505	2.503	1.560
How satisfied with life as a whole	7.252	2.113	7.376	2.069	7.404	2.077	7.396	2.052	7.287	2.083	7.215	2.143
Placement on left-right scale	4.692	2.087	4.727	2.370	4.724	2.352	4.691	2.272	4.699	2.191	4.684	2.146
Social Trust Index (mean)	16.958	1.774	17.161	2.265	17.217	2.377	17.446	2.269	16.844	2.055	16.679	1.915
Gini index	30.635	2.895	29.009	3.295	28.242	3.314	27.934	2.926	28.652	3.082	29.999	3.133
N	38858		766		1506		2479		4905		9712	

Table B.5: Descriptive Statistics by Time Window: First Generation

	(1) Overall		(2) 30 days		(3) 60 days		(4) 100 days		(5) 200 days		(6) 365 days	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Gender (female)	0.526	0.499	0.531	0.500	0.535	0.499	0.532	0.499	0.536	0.499	0.520	0.500
Age	44.712	16.280	47.339	16.309	46.861	16.757	46.511	16.783	45.790	16.687	44.749	16.484
Age squared	2264.203	1604.799	2506.386	1644.116	2476.421	1669.311	2444.750	1669.861	2375.040	1642.863	2274.141	1622.439
Years of full-time education completed	13.080	4.563	12.840	5.114	12.934	4.743	12.836	4.621	12.760	4.567	12.740	4.519
Income decile	5.263	2.743	5.274	2.675	5.489	2.549	5.647	2.564	5.406	2.607	5.111	2.647
Source of income	1.437	0.796	1.489	0.837	1.512	0.858	1.509	0.856	1.474	0.829	1.439	0.797
Speaking host-country language at home	0.587	0.492	0.614	0.487	0.626	0.484	0.612	0.487	0.610	0.488	0.598	0.490
Host-country citizenship	0.502	0.500	0.624	0.485	0.678	0.468	0.685	0.465	0.642	0.480	0.516	0.500
Discriminated	0.139	0.346	0.140	0.347	0.128	0.335	0.131	0.338	0.128	0.334	0.141	0.348
How often socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues	4.924	1.524	4.896	1.579	4.971	1.552	5.000	1.555	4.973	1.552	4.939	1.556
Take part in social activities compared to others of same age	2.684	0.948	2.667	0.965	2.704	0.955	2.716	0.983	2.682	0.986	2.672	0.947
Religious service attendance	2.696	1.617	2.572	1.562	2.448	1.462	2.424	1.455	2.533	1.560	2.647	1.613
How satisfied with life as a whole	7.211	2.139	7.342	2.157	7.356	2.187	7.345	2.182	7.222	2.189	7.148	2.184
Placement on left-right scale	4.719	2.074	4.641	2.320	4.700	2.333	4.691	2.261	4.716	2.214	4.692	2.141
Social Trust Index (mean)	17.030	1.756	17.180	2.153	17.420	2.234	17.631	2.127	16.967	2.016	16.704	1.898
Gini index	30.846	2.912	29.636	3.388	29.089	3.388	28.540	3.029	29.030	3.154	30.434	3.110
N	22040		451		842		1385		2667		5626	

Table B.6: Descriptive Statistics by Time Window: Second Generation

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Overall		30 days		60 days		100 days		200 days		365 days	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Gender (female)	0.522	0.500	0.554	0.498	0.526	0.500	0.523	0.500	0.540	0.499	0.528	0.499
Age	42.310	18.172	42.368	19.369	40.508	18.348	40.538	18.040	41.180	17.681	41.699	18.349
Age squared	2120.366	1710.806	2169.022	1834.516	1977.057	1693.051	1968.420	1681.183	2008.226	1651.375	2075.387	1729.422
Years of full-time education completed	13.139	3.785	13.455	3.971	13.077	3.615	13.187	3.687	13.291	3.600	13.040	3.721
Income decile	5.907	2.706	6.209	2.538	6.305	2.449	6.288	2.496	6.079	2.552	5.808	2.643
Source of income	1.457	0.817	1.443	0.827	1.414	0.804	1.389	0.784	1.404	0.787	1.456	0.818
Speaking host-country language at home	0.887	0.316	0.949	0.220	0.947	0.224	0.945	0.228	0.940	0.237	0.904	0.294
Host-country citizenship	0.949	0.220	0.987	0.112	0.983	0.128	0.982	0.134	0.968	0.177	0.955	0.206
Discriminated	0.075	0.264	0.063	0.244	0.048	0.214	0.044	0.205	0.053	0.224	0.056	0.230
How often socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues	5.280	1.417	5.427	1.355	5.351	1.411	5.365	1.400	5.290	1.429	5.278	1.438
Take part in social activities compared to others of same age	2.802	0.933	2.814	0.930	2.796	0.931	2.862	0.929	2.809	0.968	2.800	0.949
Religious service attendance	2.279	1.439	2.200	1.459	2.137	1.355	2.133	1.320	2.244	1.422	2.305	1.462
How satisfied with life as a whole	7.307	2.077	7.425	1.938	7.466	1.930	7.460	1.874	7.366	1.947	7.306	2.082
Placement on left-right scale	4.660	2.103	4.843	2.434	4.754	2.377	4.691	2.286	4.680	2.165	4.674	2.152
Social Trust Index (mean)	16.863	1.792	17.134	2.418	16.959	2.525	17.212	2.418	16.697	2.091	16.644	1.937
Gini index	30.362	2.849	28.095	2.929	27.173	2.883	27.181	2.606	28.208	2.934	29.413	3.068
N	16818		315		664		1094		2238		4086	

B.9 Heterogeneous Event Study: Additional Results and Robustness Checks







Figure B.52: Heterogeneous Event Study: Balance Plots




(a) Social Trust Index



(b) Trustworthiness




(c) Helpfulness




(d) Fairness


Figure B.53: Heterogeneous Event Study: Reduced Models




(a) Natives



(b) Immigrants




(c) First Generation




(d) Second Generation


Figure B.54: Alternative Binning Strategy: Social Trust Index




(a) Natives



(b) Immigrants




(c) First Generation




(d) Second Generation


Figure B.55: Alternative Binning Strategy: Trustworthiness




(a) Natives



(b) Immigrants




(c) First Generation




(d) Second Generation


Figure B.56: Alternative Binning Strategy: Helpfulness




(a) Natives



(b) Immigrants




(c) First Generation




(d) Second Generation


Figure B.57: Alternative Binning Strategy: Fairness




(a) Social Trust Index



(b) Trustworthiness



(c) Helpfulness



(d) Fairness

Figure B.58: Heterogeneous Event Study: Placebo Time Periods

Appendix C

C.1 Summary and Descriptive Statistics

Table C.1: Immigrant Classification Summary - BHPS Panel Data (2010, 2014, 2015)

Classification	2010	2014	2015	Total
Total N	35,843	19,316	16,953	72,112
Native	22,121	11,661	10,240	44,022
Immigrant	8,812	5,016	4,272	18,100
1st Generation Immigrant	5,633	3,118	2,658	11,409
2nd Generation Immigrant	3,179	1,898	1,614	6,691
EU Immigrants	1,195	811	703	2,709
Commonwealth Immigrants	4,126	2,573	2,171	8,870
Non-EU Immigrants	7,617	4,205	3,569	15,391

Note: EU immigrants include those born in EU countries or with EU-born parents. Commonwealth immigrants include those born in Commonwealth countries or with Commonwealth-born parents.

Table C.2: Validation of 1st Generation Immigrant Classifications - BHPS Panel Data (2010, 2014, 2015)

Year	Total 1st Gen	Valid Cases	Invalid Cases	Validation Rate
2010	5,633	5,431	202	96.4%
2014	3,118	3,111	7	99.8%
2015	2,658	2,652	6	99.8%

Note: Validation based on birthplace data. 1st generation classification requires respondent born outside UK and at least one parent born outside UK.

C.2 GHQ-12 Questionnaire Items

Item 1: Have you recently been able to concentrate on whatever you're doing?

- 0 = Better than usual
- 1 = Same as usual
- 2 = Less than usual
- 3 = Much less than usual

Item 2: Have you recently lost much sleep over worry?

- 0 = Not at all
- 1 = No more than usual
- 2 = Rather more than usual

- 3 = Much more than usual

Item 3: Have you recently felt that you are playing a useful part in things?

- 0 = More so than usual
- 1 = Same as usual
- 2 = Less so than usual
- 3 = Much less than usual

Item 4: Have you recently felt capable of making decisions about things?

- 0 = More so than usual
- 1 = Same as usual
- 2 = Less so than usual
- 3 = Much less than usual

Item 5: Have you recently felt constantly under strain?

- 0 = Not at all
- 1 = No more than usual
- 2 = Rather more than usual
- 3 = Much more than usual

Item 6: Have you recently felt that you couldn't overcome your difficulties?

- 0 = Not at all
- 1 = No more than usual
- 2 = Rather more than usual
- 3 = Much more than usual

Item 7: Have you recently been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities?

- 0 = More so than usual
- 1 = Same as usual
- 2 = Less so than usual
- 3 = Much less than usual

Item 8: Have you recently been able to face up to problems?

- 0 = More so than usual
- 1 = Same as usual
- 2 = Less so than usual
- 3 = Much less than usual

Item 9: Have you recently been feeling unhappy and depressed?

- 0 = Not at all
- 1 = No more than usual

• 2 = Rather more than usual

• 3 = Much more than usual

Item 10: Have you recently been losing confidence in yourself?

- 0 = Not at all
- 1 = No more than usual
- 2 = Rather more than usual
- 3 = Much more than usual

Item 11: Have you recently been thinking of yourself as a worthless person?

- 0 = Not at all
- 1 = No more than usual
- 2 = Rather more than usual
- 3 = Much more than usual

Item 12: Have you recently felt reasonably happy, all things considered?

- 0 = More so than usual
- 1 = Same as usual
- 2 = Less so than usual
- 3 = Much less than usual

The GHQ-12 can be scored in two ways:

1. **Likert Scale (0-36):** Sum of all 12 items (0-3 each)
2. **Caseness Scale (0-12):** Binary scoring where responses 0-1 = 0, responses 2-3 = 1

Higher scores on both scales indicate greater psychological distress and potential mental health problems.

Table C.3: Descriptive Statistics for Health and Wellbeing Scales by Population Group (2010)

Variable	Full Sample	Natives	Immigrants	1st Gen	2nd Gen	EU	Non-EU	Commonwealth
GHQ Likert Scale	11.15 (5.42)	11.16 (5.34)	11.11 (5.52)	10.96 (5.51)	11.33 (5.53)	11.22 (5.35)	11.09 (5.55)	10.9 (5.61)
GHQ Caseness Scale	3.97 (3.27)	3.99 (3.31)	3.87 (3.16)	3.75 (3.09)	4.04 (3.24)	3.79 (3.21)	3.88 (3.15)	3.82 (3.09)
SF-12 Physical Component	49.58 (11.38)	49.19 (11.66)	50.56 (10.53)	50.09 (10.92)	51.36 (9.79)	49.98 (11.09)	50.66 (10.43)	50.33 (10.64)
SF-12 Mental Component	50.21 (10.01)	50.49 (9.91)	49.74 (10.12)	49.76 (10.15)	49.7 (10.08)	50.28 (10.02)	49.64 (10.14)	49.72 (10.3)
WEMWBS Composite Scale	25.19 (4.54)	25.24 (4.46)	25.16 (4.69)	25.47 (4.68)	24.67 (4.66)	25.16 (4.49)	25.16 (4.74)	25.15 (4.85)
Comprehensive Health Scale	3.39 (1.13)	3.36 (1.12)	3.46 (1.15)	3.42 (1.18)	3.52 (1.09)	3.43 (1.13)	3.46 (1.15)	3.43 (1.19)

Table C.4: Descriptive Statistics for Health and Wellbeing Scales by Population Group (2014)

Variable	Full Sample	Natives	Immigrants	1st Gen	2nd Gen	EU	Non-EU	Commonwealth
GHQ Likert Scale	11.17 (5.63)	11.11 (5.52)	11.33 (5.88)	11.11 (5.71)	11.63 (6.09)	11.67 (5.9)	11.25 (5.87)	11.4 (5.99)
GHQ Caseness Scale	4.09 (3.37)	4.07 (3.39)	4.22 (3.42)	4.05 (3.37)	4.46 (3.49)	4.54 (3.58)	4.15 (3.38)	4.33 (3.44)
SF-12 Physical Component	49.64 (11.08)	49.38 (11.37)	49.34 (10.76)	48.51 (10.76)	50.44 (10.67)	48.84 (11.47)	49.45 (10.59)	49.02 (10.68)
SF-12 Mental Component	49.08 (10.1)	49.34 (10.01)	48.64 (10.16)	49.24 (9.72)	47.83 (10.68)	49.13 (10.18)	48.52 (10.16)	48.18 (10.32)
WEMWBS Composite Scale	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Comprehensive Health Scale	3.43 (1.12)	3.42 (1.11)	3.35 (1.15)	3.27 (1.16)	3.48 (1.12)	3.34 (1.16)	3.35 (1.15)	3.26 (1.16)

Table C.5: Descriptive Statistics for Health and Wellbeing Scales by Population Group (2015)

Variable	Full Sample	Natives	Immigrants	1st Gen	2nd Gen	EU	Non-EU	Commonwealth
GHQ Likert Scale	10.99 (5.47)	10.95 (5.38)	11.1 (5.61)	10.85 (5.41)	11.47 (5.88)	10.94 (5.26)	11.14 (5.69)	11.38 (5.97)
GHQ Caseness Scale	4.02 (3.32)	4.03 (3.35)	4.08 (3.32)	3.88 (3.25)	4.35 (3.39)	3.96 (3.25)	4.1 (3.33)	4.33 (3.48)
SF-12 Physical Component	49.69 (11.18)	49.33 (11.5)	49.48 (10.77)	48.66 (10.88)	50.68 (10.5)	50.05 (10.93)	49.35 (10.73)	48.59 (10.73)
SF-12 Mental Component	49.34 (10.2)	49.56 (10.16)	49.01 (10.18)	49.58 (9.74)	48.19 (10.73)	49.35 (10.15)	48.93 (10.19)	48.53 (10.49)
WEMWBS Composite Scale	24.84 (5.3)	24.67 (5.14)	24.68 (5.82)	25.16 (5.84)	24 (5.74)	24.25 (5.26)	24.79 (5.95)	24.41 (6.5)
Comprehensive Health Scale	3.46 (1.11)	3.42 (1.11)	3.45 (1.12)	3.41 (1.14)	3.53 (1.08)	3.43 (1.12)	3.46 (1.12)	3.39 (1.14)

Table C.6: Control Variables Descriptives (2010)

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Age	45.7	18.63	15	100	35,843
Age squared	2435.11	1833.89	225	10000	35,843
Female	0.54	0.5	0	1	35,843
Urban	0.76	0.43	0	1	35,818
Number of children	0.32	0.78	0	10	33,314
Household size	2.95	1.53	1	16	35,843
Married/cohabiting	0.62	0.49	0	1	35,843
Higher education	0.3	0.46	0	1	35,843
No qualifications	0.17	0.38	0	1	35,843
Low education	0.48	0.5	0	1	35,843
Employed	0.46	0.5	0	1	35,843
Unemployed	0.06	0.24	0	1	35,843
Retired	0.21	0.4	0	1	35,843
Student	0.08	0.27	0	1	35,843
Long-term sick	0.04	0.19	0	1	35,843
Low density area	0.54	0.5	0	1	22,902
Political interest	2.27	0.97	1	4	33,181
Log net income	6.82	1.06	-4.61	10.91	33,378
Life satisfaction	5.22	1.49	1	7	27,913

Table C.7: Control Variables Descriptives (2014)

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Age	46.44	18.97	16	101	19,316
Age squared	2516.89	1861.58	256	10201	19,316
Female	0.53	0.5	0	1	19,316
Urban	0.78	0.41	0	1	19,305
Number of children	0.29	0.75	0	6	17,242
Household size	3.07	1.6	1	13	19,316
Married/cohabiting	0.61	0.49	0	1	19,316
Higher education	0.35	0.48	0	1	19,316
No qualifications	0.14	0.34	0	1	19,316
Low education	0.44	0.5	0	1	19,316
Employed	0.46	0.5	0	1	19,316
Unemployed	0.05	0.22	0	1	19,316
Retired	0.22	0.41	0	1	19,316
Student	0.09	0.28	0	1	19,316
Long-term sick	0.04	0.19	0	1	19,316
Low density area	0.58	0.49	0	1	12,456
Political interest	2.24	0.98	1	4	17,192
Log net income	6.95	1.09	-4.61	12.08	17,947
Life satisfaction	5.09	1.52	1	7	15,497


Table C.8: Control Variables Descriptives (2015)

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Age	46.88	18.98	15	102	16,953
Age squared	2557.82	1870.87	225	10404	16,953
Female	0.53	0.5	0	1	16,953
Urban	0.78	0.41	0	1	16,951
Number of children	0.29	0.75	0	7	15,255
Household size	3.05	1.64	1	14	16,953
Married/cohabiting	0.62	0.49	0	1	16,953
Higher education	0.36	0.48	0	1	16,953
No qualifications	0.12	0.33	0	1	16,953
Low education	0.42	0.49	0	1	16,953
Employed	0.47	0.5	0	1	16,953
Unemployed	0.05	0.21	0	1	16,953
Retired	0.23	0.42	0	1	16,953
Student	0.08	0.27	0	1	16,953
Long-term sick	0.03	0.17	0	1	16,953
Low density area	0.6	0.49	0	1	10,613
Political interest	2.32	0.98	1	4	15,146
Log net income	7.01	1.08	-3.22	12.87	15,877
Life satisfaction	5.23	1.46	1	7	14,476


Table C.9: Pretreatment Trends Test Results

Outcome	F-value	Prob > F
Health Status (1-5)	0.887	0.3464
GHQ Likert (0-36)	0.269	0.6038
GHQ Caseness (0-12)	0.514	0.4736
SF-12 Physical	0.720	0.3961
SF-12 Mental	0.374	0.5408


C.3 Pre-treatment Trends




(a) Overall Health




(b) GHQ: Likert Scale



(c) GHQ: Caseness Scale




(d) SF-12: Mental Health Component




(e) SF-12: Physical Health Component


Figure C.1: Parallel Trends Analysis: 2010




(a) Overall Health



(b) GHQ: Likert Scale



(c) SF-12 Mental Health Component



(d) SF-12 Physical Health Component

Figure C.2: Parallel Trends Analysis: 2015

C.4 Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks

Table C.10: Main Results: All Periods

	Health Status	GHQ Likert	SF-12 Physical	SF-12 Mental
Immigrant:Post	0.0353 (0.0348)	0.1215 (0.2134)	0.2188 (0.3299)	-0.2166 (0.3614)
Num. obs.	19688	15584	17662	17662
Num. groups: interview_year	2	2	2	2
Num. groups: pidp	9844	7792	8831	8831
R ² (full model)	0.7993	0.7254	0.8237	0.7267
R ² (proj model)	0.0001	0.0002	0.0004	0.0001
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.5986	0.4507	0.6474	0.4532
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.0001	-0.0000	0.0002	-0.0002

Note: Standard errors clustered at individual level. Year and individual fixed effects included. Sample includes all periods: 2010 (pre-treatment) and 2015 (post-treatment). Post-treatment period: May 8-December 31, 2015.

Table C.11: Main Results: Restricted Panel

	Health Status	GHQ Likert	SF-12 Physical	SF-12 Mental
Post election*Immigrant	0.0325 (0.0358)	0.0973 (0.2189)	0.1572 (0.3423)	-0.2723 (0.3750)
Num. obs.	16694	13196	14952	14952
Num. groups: interview_year	2	2	2	2
Num. groups: pidp	8347	6598	7476	7476
R ² (full model)	0.7981	0.7227	0.8182	0.7270
R ² (proj model)	0.0001	0.0002	0.0005	0.0001
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.5960	0.4453	0.6363	0.4539
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.0001	-0.0001	0.0003	-0.0002

Note: Standard errors clustered at individual level. Year and individual fixed effects included. Sample restricted to individuals observed in both 2010 and 2015. Excludes campaign periods. Post-treatment period: May 8-December 31, 2015.

Table C.12: Main Results: No Campaign

	Health Status	GHQ Likert	SF-12 Physical	SF-12 Mental
Post election*Immigrant	0.0325 (0.0358)	0.0973 (0.2189)	0.1572 (0.3423)	-0.2723 (0.3750)
Num. obs.	16694	13196	14952	14952
Num. groups: interview_year	2	2	2	2
Num. groups: pidp	8347	6598	7476	7476
R ² (full model)	0.7981	0.7227	0.8182	0.7270
R ² (proj model)	0.0001	0.0002	0.0005	0.0001
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.5960	0.4453	0.6363	0.4539
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.0001	-0.0001	0.0003	-0.0002

Note: Standard errors clustered at individual level. Year and individual fixed effects included. Sample excludes campaign periods (April 13-May 6, 2010 and April 1-May 7, 2015).

Table C.13: Main Results: Campaign Effects

	Health Status	GHQ Likert	SF-12 Physical	SF-12 Mental
Immigrant*Post Campaign	0.0441 (0.0326)	0.0757 (0.1994)	0.3376 (0.3124)	-0.1040 (0.3422)
Num. obs.	19688	15584	17662	17662
Num. groups: interview_year	2	2	2	2
Num. groups: pidp	9844	7792	8831	8831
R ² (full model)	0.7994	0.7254	0.8238	0.7266
R ² (proj model)	0.0002	0.0001	0.0007	0.0000
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.5986	0.4506	0.6475	0.4531
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.0000	-0.0002	0.0005	-0.0002

Note: Standard errors clustered at individual level. Year and individual fixed effects included. Treatment period includes campaign (April 13-May 6, 2010) and post-election period.

Table C.14: Campaign Effects Event Study: Immigrants vs Natives

	2010 (Basic)	2010 (Full)	2015 (Basic)	2015 (Full)
Campaign 2010*Immigrant	-0.0325 (0.0241)	-0.0371 (0.0237)		
Campaign 2015*Immigrant			-0.0009 (0.0156)	-0.0006 (0.0004)
Num. obs.	28672	15105	13767	8709
Num. groups: interview_month	12	12	12	12
Num. groups: factor(gor_dv)	12	12	12	11
R ² (full model)	0.0495	0.0632	0.0136	0.0023
R ² (proj model)	0.0375	0.0498	0.0106	0.0017
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.0485	0.0604	0.0115	-0.0026
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.0372	0.0485	0.0100	-0.0009

Note: Standard errors clustered at region level. Month and region fixed effects included. 2010 Campaign: April 13-May 6, 2010. 2015 Campaign: April 1-May 7, 2015. Basic controls: female, age, age squared, higher education, log income. Full controls: all basic controls plus urban/rural, children, household size, marital status, education levels, employment status, long-term sick, political interest, life satisfaction.

Table C.15: UK Elections Event Study: Discrimination (2010)

	Immigrants (Basic)	Immigrants (Full)	EU (Basic)	EU (Full)	Non-EU (Basic)	Non-EU (Full)	Commonwealth (Basic)	Commonwealth (Full)
Post 2010*Immigrant	-0.0038 (0.0170)	-0.0111 (0.0269)						
Post 2010*EU Immigrant			0.0164 (0.0161)	0.0284 (0.0232)				
Post 2010*Non-EU Immigrant					-0.0168 (0.0223)	-0.0407 (0.0354)		
Post 2010*Commonwealth Immigrant							-0.0519 (0.0532)	-0.0435 (0.0716)
Num. obs.	28672	15105	28672	15105	28672	15105	28672	15105
Num. groups: interview_month	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Num. groups: factor(gor_dv)	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
R ² (full model)	0.0494	0.0632	0.0179	0.0266	0.0655	0.0906	0.0580	0.0666
R ² (proj model)	0.0374	0.0499	0.0055	0.0128	0.0537	0.0776	0.0461	0.0534
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.0484	0.0604	0.0168	0.0238	0.0646	0.0879	0.0570	0.0639
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.0372	0.0485	0.0052	0.0113	0.0535	0.0763	0.0458	0.0520

Note: Standard errors clustered at region level. Month and region fixed effects included. Post-electoral period starts May 7, 2010. Basic controls: female, age, age squared, higher education, log income. Full controls: all basic controls plus urban/rural, children, household size, marital status, education levels, employment status, long-term sick, political interest, life satisfaction.

Table C.16: UK Elections Event Study: Discrimination (2015)

	Immigrants (Basic)	Immigrants (Full)	EU (Basic)	EU (Full)	Non-EU (Basic)	Non-EU (Full)	Commonwealth (Basic)	Commonwealth (Full)
Post 2015*Immigrant	0.0169** (0.0067)	0.0007 (0.0005)						
Post 2015*EU Immigrant			0.0138 (0.0188)	-0.0001 (0.0001)				
Post 2015*Non-EU Immigrant					0.0160** (0.0067)	0.0011 (0.0007)		
Post 2015*Commonwealth Immigrant							0.0176 (0.0148)	0.0023 (0.0015)
Num. obs.	13767	8709	13767	8709	13767	8709	13767	8709
Num. groups: interview_month	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Num. groups: factor(gor_dv)	12	11	12	11	12	11	12	11
R ² (full model)	0.0142	0.0024	0.0080	0.0021	0.0124	0.0027	0.0093	0.0037
R ² (proj model)	0.0112	0.0018	0.0050	0.0014	0.0094	0.0021	0.0062	0.0030
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.0121	-0.0025	0.0059	-0.0029	0.0102	-0.0022	0.0071	-0.0013
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.0106	-0.0007	0.0044	-0.0011	0.0088	-0.0005	0.0057	0.0005

Note: Standard errors clustered at region level. Month and region fixed effects included. Post-electoral period starts May 8, 2015. Basic controls: female, age, age squared, higher education, log income. Full controls: all basic controls plus urban/rural, children, household size, marital status, education levels, employment status, long-term sick, political interest, life satisfaction.