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
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Thesis

8171

Comparative Ministerial Turnover in Canada: 1867-2000

Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. in
Political Science to the University of Dublin, Trinity College

Matthew Kerby

January 2007

Declaration

This dissertation has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at any other university.

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Matthew A. J.", with a stylized, cursive script.

Acknowledgments

Although my name appears as the single author of this work and I take full responsibility for any of its inadequacies, a dissertation is anything but a singular effort. First, I would like to thank my dissertation adviser Professor Kenneth Benoit who was supportive and persistent in his efforts to keep me on track until the very end. I would also like to thank all of the staff and administration in the Department of Political Science at Trinity College Dublin for their support and assistance. Encouragement and constructive criticism from Michael Laver and Keith Dowding were very much appreciated.

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Summary

This dissertation presents a model of ministerial turnover in the Canadian federal cabinet for the period 1867 until 2000. The dissertation begins with a review of the existing literature of ministerial and legislator turnover in Canada and establishes that the study of ministerial turnover is typically relegated to a peripheral discussion in the wider study of prime ministerial power in Canada. This is largely due to the absence of an accurate and complete account of when and why ministers exit the cabinet. In order to overcome this hurdle a unique dataset that comprises the complete career paths of each and every minister that served in cabinet from the formation of the Canadian state in 1867 until 2000 was assembled. A review of the existing literature combined with the information provided in the dataset reveals that ministers typically leave the cabinet for one of three broad reasons: to accept an offer of patronage, to retire from federal politics or as a result of a cabinet reshuffle. Exits because of electoral turnover are not examined.

The theoretical basis of the dissertation specifies that a longitudinal approach should be adopted to study ministerial careers as they move through space and time and that discrete events and the duration that a minister serves in the cabinet should impact when and how a minister exits the cabinet. Second, it is argued that it is necessary to simultaneously consider each type of exit in order to approximate the true pattern of turnover observed in the cabinet. A Cox proportional hazards, competing risks event history model is put forward as an ideal method to connect theory to practice as presented in the dataset of ministerial careers. Event history models are suited to handle the longitudinally organized data structure while the competing risks specification is especially useful as it is able to consider the multiple forms of exit by which a ministerial career may end.

The conditions that contribute to a minister's exit from cabinet exist at three levels: the individual, parliamentary and political environmental levels. Based on these conditions a series of hypotheses are proposed and tested by the event history model. The

results systematically confirm that Canadian prime ministers are indeed powerful vis-à-vis their cabinet ministers. But, this power is not without constraints particularly when faced with a capable opposition party determined to bring down a wayward minister. The results also point to the continued relevance of constitutional convention in political life in Canada. In particular, the need for regional representation in the cabinet still plays a central role in ministerial appointment and dismissal process. The dissertation concludes with recommendations for further research.

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Chapter 1

The Problem of Ministerial Turnover

This dissertation addresses the subject of cabinet minister turnover in the Canadian federal government between the years 1867 and 2000. The research questions asked are, why, when and how do cabinet ministers leave the cabinet? By focusing on these questions, a number of secondary issues are also addressed. First, this dissertation addresses the matter of ministerial duration and "survivability". That is to say, what explains the durability of cabinet ministers - Why is it that some cabinet ministers are able to remain in cabinet for long periods of time while others are merely afterthoughts on the political timeline? Do some ministers possess certain characteristics that make them more durable than others?

It also addresses the rules that inform and allegedly guide political life in Canada. Canadian cabinet ministers serve in the cabinet at the pleasure of the crown on the recommendation of the prime minister. The rules that inform cabinet membership, although not written in the Canadian constitution, stem from constitutional conventions, some of which are native to Canada, others that were inherited in a constitution that is "similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom." (Constitution Act, 1867, preamble)

The dissertation addresses the question of ministerial exit. That is to say, what causes ministers to leave the cabinet? On one hand the answer may be very simple: ministers leave the cabinet when they die in office, when the government loses the

confidence of the House of Commons (following an electoral defeat or a vote of no-confidence in the governing party) or when an individual cabinet minister loses his or her seat in an election. These explanations are of course true but they are akin to a coach saying that his team lost the game because the other team scored more points; the explanatory power of such answers while valid fails to account for pre-termination exit.¹ Ministers leave the cabinet for many other reasons: they retire, the prime minister sacks them, they decide to leave politics because they are dissatisfied with their job or they simply decide to return to the backbenches. Many of these explanations are valid but they can also hide more nuanced aspects of the ministerial dynamic. Samuel E. Finer, writing about British ministers, famously suggested that ministers only leave if they choose to, if the prime minister demands it or the party clamors for their dismissal.(Finer, 1956) At the same time, commentators have facetiously suggested that any ministers who claim that they want to spend more time with their families are perhaps less than genuine in their reasons!² Or, as Sharon Sutherland observes, “the public manifestation of trouble in cabinet is exit.” (Sutherland, 1991a)

This last observation also suggests that ministerial tenure says something about prime ministers and prime ministerial power. The selection and appointment of ministers is decided by the prime minister and the prime minister alone - this power gives the prime minister considerable influence over those ambitious backbenchers who aspire to move up the greasy pole. It also gives the prime minister considerable leverage over those ministers who wish to remain in cabinet. The exclusive right to appoint and dismiss ministers reinforces the point that the prime minister may not be *primus inter pares* but rather *supra inter pares*. A closer examination of this relationship and the constraints and opportunities that the prime minister faces as far as the composition of the cabinet is concerned will reveal some insights into the changing nature of prime

¹The quote is most commonly attributed to legendary basketball coach Bobby Knight.

²Observation made by Stephens over resignation of Alan Milburn – Minister of Health who was caught in the crossfire between Tony Blair and Gordon Brown.

ministerial power in Canada.

All of these points suggest that the process of ministerial turnover is multifaceted. Ministerial turnover cannot be explained by simply examining the power of the prime minister, the context in which a ministerial career takes place, constitutional rules or through a close examination of the individual ministers themselves. Rather, a combined and unified framework which considers all of these aspects needs to be developed in order to fully understand ministerial turnover and its consequences.

Political scientists should take notice of ministerial careers and the manner in which these careers end. First, the termination of a ministerial career is an important aspect of government survival. Usually when one minister's career ends, another begins. With the introduction of a new minister the collective dynamic of the cabinet is altered and its efficacy is enhanced or diminished thus affecting the cabinet's overall durability. If the cabinet's durability is sufficiently low it runs the risk of being defeated by a vote of confidence or in a general election; if sufficiently high, the risk of government turnover is low. Too much or too little turnover threatens both the legitimacy and perhaps the efficacy of the government.

Ministerial turnover also sheds some light on the nature of a ministerial career and vice versa. Graham White observes that the characteristics of individual ministers themselves can affect their career paths which in turn affect the operation and internal dynamics of cabinet.

On an individual level, for example, a minister whose entire cabinet team has been spent in the same portfolio will bring qualitatively different experiences, perspectives and resources to bear in cabinet processes than a minister who has served in several portfolios.

The collective characteristics of cabinets may also vary according to ministers' career patterns. For example, cabinets composed largely of ministers who have remained in the same portfolios for extended periods likely func-

tion differently from cabinets in which most ministers have limited experience in their portfolios. (White, 1998)

The endgame of a ministerial career-path is also fundamentally important in Westminster parliamentary democracies. Woodhouse observes the termination of a ministerial career contains a significant element of accountability. "The severity of an occasional capital penalty is justified in a system in which routine accountability is weak, and the symbolism afforded by resignation is appropriate in the theatrical confrontation politics of Westminster." (Woodhouse, 1993) She adds, "Resignations provide reassurance of an underlying morality, acting as an indicator of the rules that operate beneath the surface of public life and the values held by those in public office."

If one is primarily interested in ministerial turnover, then it is necessary to move beyond the boundaries of the legislator career path literature and study ministers on their own terms. The difficulty is that the processes that produce these different forms of exit may be distinct or interdependent. Unless an approach that considers all of the different forms of exit is adopted, an incomplete comprehension of ministerial and prime ministerial behaviour and cabinet dynamics will continue and affect existing and future scholarship in this field. It is therefore necessary to bring the different forms of exit together under the umbrella of a ministerial career; then we can have an "integrated view" of the pattern of turnover in the Canadian cabinet. This is the purpose of this dissertation.

1.1 The significance of ministerial turnover

One of the problems that plagues the current enthusiasm over the study of ministerial resignations is the distinct lack of theoretical guidance. There exists few theories of ministerial turnover, let alone a unified theory of ministerial turnover in Canada. Huber and Martinez-Gallardo demonstrate that government type affects the frequency of

ministerial turnover; apart from this single study, comparative research on ministerial careers that could point to a unified theory has yet to be undertaken.³ Instead, most scholars continue to develop country case studies that examine the effects of local, and often country-specific, influences that contribute to ministerial turnover. In time, it is likely that these studies will be pooled into a large-scale comparative study of ministerial turnover capable of developing a unified theory of ministerial turnover but that is not likely to take place in the short term. In Canada, the systematic study of cabinet ministers *sui generis* and the corresponding development of a theory of ministerial turnover is slowed by a less-than-enthusiastic embrace of the study of political behaviour. Everitt and O'Neill (2002, pp. 6-7) write,

But in keeping with trends towards independence from the 'sleeping elephant' to the south, the study of political behaviour in Canada never achieved a similar level of dominance among political researchers and even in its heyday came under significant criticism. The Canadian behavioural 'revolution' was mediated by strong adherence among a significant number of academics to neo-institutional and neo-Marxist approaches and by the continued support for public policy analysis. The American influence was also tempered by a conscious desire to adopt a uniquely 'Canadian' approach to the discipline."

Despite the dearth of theory, commentators such as Blondel (1985) and DeWinter (2002) have suggested that more scholarly work be undertaken to determine why ministers come and go. This has left the current crop of ministerial enthusiasts in the un-

³ Huber and Martinez-Gallardo argue that single party majority governments produce higher rates of ministerial turnover. They reason that distrust among parties in coalition governments creates an environment in which greater attention is paid to the ex-ante screening of potential ministers and members of the coalition. They write, "When distrust is greatest, so will the screening that occurs, with the "distrusting parties" paying the most attention to the specific individuals that are assigned key portfolios. Thus we expect distrust to decrease turnover." (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2003) Also, prime ministers in coalition governments are constrained in their ability to dismiss ministers, especially, those who are not members of their own party, for fear that a change in the coalition government's makeup will negatively affect the equilibrium that keeps the government together.

enviable situation of knowing that they are on the right track, but not knowing where to go with the analysis. As such, much of the existing literature on ministerial turnover is exploratory and lacks theoretical depth. Nevertheless, cues from other related areas of political science help to draw attention to the significance of this area of study and indeed they assist in setting out the boundaries for the development of a general theory of ministerial turnover.

1.1.1 Turnover

Understanding how ministerial careers end is important for understanding how the composition of the government changes over time; when ministers leave the cabinet they are usually replaced by another, perhaps a new, minister. The nature of this turnover may reflect the representational requirements of the House of Commons, the policy preferences of the governing party or of the prime minister or indeed the influence held by the new minister himself or herself. If the nature of ministerial career terminations can be better understood, then inferences regarding the health of the legislature, the governing party and the cabinet can also be made.

1.1.2 Government Stability

The current wave of research on ministerial turnover owes a considerable debt to the government stability/survival debates that took place in the 1980s and 1990s. This debate was characterized by two competing approaches: an events approach that focused primarily on external factors that enhanced or detracted from cabinet survival, and a structural approach that considers the *ex ante* internal conditions that may affect the likelihood of government breakdown.

A middle ground approach introduced by King et al. (1990) attempted to combine both the event and structural approaches into a single unified "hazard" approach. The hazard approach offered by King et al. settled the ongoing controversy between

advocates of the events approach and advocates of a structural factors approach by reconciling the two approaches in a synthesis that "introduces a statistical model embedding structural factors within the context of a stochastic process." (Van Roosendaal and Grofman, 1997) Central to the structural, event and hazard approaches is the notion of a terminal event - that is, what exactly constitutes the end of a government - a six fold typology introduced by von Beyme (1985) and developed further by Woldendorp et al. (1998; 2000) is widely employed and generally accepted by the scholarly community.

Despite the interest generated by the King et al article, a number of subsequent concerns has been raised. First, the government termination categories are not precise enough to distinguish between qualitatively different forms of government termination. As Carol Mershon (1996) notes, Italy has experienced a considerable number of government terminations; yet each "new" cabinet consisted of many of the same cabinet personnel as the previous one. Conversely, it is also possible to have long-standing cabinets that experience high levels of personnel change - a condition that hardly exemplifies stability. Second, the government survival literature does not address what goes on inside the cabinet between terminal events. Changes in cabinet personnel can dramatically affect the performance and duration of a government. Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2003), for example, argue that the reshuffling process exists so that prime ministers can piece together a perfect cabinet - one that is presumably durable. However, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's frequent reshuffling of cabinet ministers who he suspected were challenging his authority in the Progressive Conservative Party or consorting with the Liberals certainly contributed to the government's electoral disintegration only two terms after winning the most one-sided election victory in Canadian history.

Alderman and Cross observe that frequent ministerial turnover runs counter to democratic government. They note

Ministers need to be able to stay sufficiently long in their department both

to master the details and, vital to democratic government, to see policy proposals through. The general expectation of a brief tenure, by contrast, can lead to the temptation to win an “instant reputation” with ill-thought out politics or, alternatively, reluctance to embark on projects which will mature after the minister has left the department. (Alderman and Cross, 1987, p. 2)

Writing in a separate article, the authors also argue that, “an enforced ministerial departure may or may not upset the balance of the government, but it has a high potential to undermine the public projection of a united team.”(Alderman and Cross, 1985, p. 390) Following from this, former British cabinet minister and diarist Richard Crossman notes that too many reshuffles can give the government a bad reputation as they suggest “that politicians don’t really know anything about anything and are just shoved around as part of a political game.”(Crossman, 1976, p. 487) Crossman also argues that frequent ministerial turnover lowers the government’s prestige with the civil service, especially when “one of the few members who can really come to grips with his department has been whipped out just at the moment when he was becoming dangerous.”(Crossman, 1976, p.49)

Large scale ministerial turnover may also have an impact on a party’s electoral fortunes. The high levels of ministerial exit that typically accompany prime ministerial departures can result in a significant loss of institutional knowledge at precisely the point in time that governing parties most need political and strategic guidance. The departures of Prime Ministers Saint Laurent, Trudeau and Mulroney were accompanied by a large number of ministerial exits as patronage appointments were bestowed on long serving and loyal supporters; those that did not receive a patronage appointment often chose to return to private life rather than serve under a new prime minister. This resulted in electoral disaster as already struggling parties were forced to compete in upcoming

elections without their most skilled and experienced campaigners and organizers.⁴

As Rose (1987) notes, “Ministers and ministries are the building blocks that constitute the centre of central government.” If one is to understand the stability and durability of governments, one must also understand what contributes to the stability and durability of its constituent parts.

1.1.3 Elite Circulation

Ministerial turnover is important for theories of elite circulation. Ministerial exits and appointments are the two sides of the same "turnover" coin. As ministers exit the cabinet, new ministers are usually appointed to replace them. Sometimes these replacements have previous ministerial experience; sometimes new talent is selected from the backbenches to infuse the cabinet with a fresh face, new ideas and perhaps a new direction for some aspect of public policy. Without regular circulation at the apex of power the cabinet runs the risk of experiencing stagnation, inertia and atrophy that in turn undermines the legitimacy of the government. (Atkinson and Docherty, 1992; Atkinson and Thomas, 1993; Jackson, 1994)

The Canadian political science literature has frequently addressed the issue of amateurism in the House of Commons. The arguments suggest that Canada experiences an unusually high level of turnover especially among amateur members of parliament. A number of competing and complementary hypotheses have been suggested to explain this phenomenon. Among the most common explanations is that the majority of Canadian MPs are for the most part excluded from the governing process, defined as

⁴ Saint Laurent's departure in 1957 was followed by the electoral decimation of the Liberals under Pearson in the 1958 general election. When John Turner succeeded Pierre Trudeau in 1984, Trudeau promptly appointed the experienced core of his cabinet to patronage appointments leaving the Liberals to battle the Progressive Conservatives four months later with a largely inexperienced Cabinet. The result was the second largest win in Canadian history for the Progressive Conservatives under Mulroney. When Mulroney stepped down in 1993, he followed Trudeau's lead and appointed a considerable portion of his veteran cabinet ministers and backbenchers to patronage positions. The result was even worse for the party as it was effectively destroyed when the Progressive Conservatives, a founding party of Canada in 1867 was reduced to two seats in the House of Commons.

becoming a member of the cabinet. Dissatisfied with their lack of career advancement on the backbenches, many MPs choose to leave Ottawa and return to their previous occupations. (Atkinson and Docherty, 1992; Docherty, 1994; Franks, 1987) Ministerial exits provide the windows of opportunity for amateurs on the backbenches to "move up", gain experience and offset the negative effects of amateurism and high legislative turnover.

1.1.4 Representation

Ministerial turnover is also important because the process ensures that the highest level of government remains representative of the legislature and in turn of the population as a whole. As societal values change, elite turnover in a cabinet that draws its membership from an elected legislature ensures that individuals who embody changes in the wider population are able to have an impact on policy and decision-making. Increased religious and ethnic diversity, the increased presence of women and visible minorities as well as changes in the number of people living in rural and urban areas are reflected in governing bodies as the leaders of these groups seek to influence the political process in government. (Bakvis, 1991; Megyery, 1991)

1.1.5 The Prime Minister

The issue of ministerial turnover is of central interest to students of prime ministerial power and the prime minister's relationship with the cabinet. The ability to appoint and dismiss ministers to and from the cabinet gives prime ministers in Westminster parliamentary systems a considerable degree of power over their fellow MPs both inside and outside the cabinet. (Bakvis, 2001; Savoie, 1999; Weller, 1985, 1994) Attention paid to the dynamics that inform prime ministerial decisions in the area of cabinet appointment and dismissal reveals much about individual prime ministers as well as the constraints and opportunities contained in their office. These constraints and opportunities are to

a large degree shaped by constitutional rules and conventions that guide and enforce political behaviour. They are also shaped by the wider political environment in which governments exist. The study of ministerial turnover serves as a useful barometer to gauge the extent to which certain constitutional rules and conventions are adhered to, violated or indeed the degree to which they change over time. (Bogdanor, 1997; Dowding and Kang, 1998; Finer, 1956; Sutherland, 1991*a*)

A more developed examination into the motivations that drive prime ministerial decision-making as far as cabinet membership is concerned may also contribute to the larger, macro debates that characterize the discipline of political science as a whole. For example, to what extent are prime ministerial decisions regarding ministerial turnover driven by policy, office or vote/seat seeking considerations? (see Müller and Strøm, 1999) One can easily imagine situations where ministers are appointed or dismissed as a means to reward or punish prime ministerial or party supporters; indeed, even a ministerial resignation to a patronage position may be regarded as a political reward for a job well done. Alternatively, the dismissal and replacement of a minister in a particular portfolio may signal an attempt by the prime minister or party to shift government policy in a particular direction. Lastly, there are numerous examples of cabinet reshuffles that take place several months before a scheduled election in which the prime minister constructs his or her cabinet not on the basis of policy or political reward but rather to put the party's best face forward in order to maximize its vote/seat return in the upcoming election. By thinking of ministerial exits in these terms, this dissertation's contribution moves beyond the immediate realm of Canadian politics or the specific phenomena of ministerial careers.

1.1.6 Public Policy

The exit of a particular individual from cabinet may also signify a shift in public policy. If politicians are motivated by policy issues, then one can assume that their appointment

to a particular cabinet position will result in their preferences rising to the surface in the form of the policy that is introduced and realized. Therefore, the introduction or change in cabinet personnel may signify a change or emphasis in policy direction. Indeed the departure of two cabinet ministers at the height of the 1944 Conscription Crisis coincided with an abrupt change in Prime Minister Mackenzie King's policy. (Dawson, 1962)

1.1.7 Constitutional Convention

The study of ministerial turnover provides insight into the changing nature of constitutional conventions. Theoretically, the British constitution's unwritten conventions were inherited by the Canadian state in 1867 when it adopted a constitution "similar in principal to the constitution of the United Kingdom." (Constitution Act, 1867, preamble) As in the United Kingdom, the relevance and applicability of constitutional conventions have been challenged in the Canadian academic and public forums in recent years. For example, the twin conventions of individual and collective ministerial responsibility make periodic appearances in the academic press. Both T.M Denton (1979) and Kenneth Kernaghan's (1980) contention that ministers do not resign for reasons of malfeasance seem to lend credence to Finer's dictum that ministers resign only if they want to, if the prime minister demands it or the party clamours for blood to be spilt. Their contention also reflects Dowding and Kang's belief that "resignations signify little more than the needs of the Prime Minister and the governing party and the falling political standing of the ministers concerned." (Dowding and Kang, 1998)

The Canadian constitution also possesses a number of its own unique conventions tailored for the Canadian polity. A study of Canadian ministerial turnover also helps to shed light on the efficacy of conventions such as the requirement of a federally representative cabinet.

A closer examination of ministerial exits, especially those exits that fall under the

rubric of individual and collective ministerial responsibility, can help to reveal the evolution of constitutional conventions as well as evaluate the extent to which the constitutional rules are adhered to.

The systematic analysis and theoretical understanding of comparative ministerial turnover is, even 20 years after Blondel's initial comment that "the study of ministers and ministerial careers was in its infancy", still limited.(Blondel, 1985 quoted in Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding, 2005, p. 1) The existing systematic research of Canadian ministerial turnover is still in its early stages. The research that does exist for the most part is exploratory and consists of descriptive analysis and historical recollections. By far, the bulk of what is known of ministerial turnover in Canada is derived from historical biography and autobiography. Canadian prime ministers and cabinet ministers have a long tradition of writing their memoirs when they leave office. Canadian political historians, journalists and pundits have, for a long time, enjoyed recalling the lives of prime ministers in ever-increasing detail.⁵ And finally, Canadian political scientists have relied extensively on this work to fuel their own research on the Canadian executive.

There is also an obvious absence of systematic analysis in the Canadian study of ministerial exits. The reason for the primarily descriptive nature of Canadian research on cabinet ministers likely stems from constitutional convention which stipulates that the inner workings of the cabinet and the ministerial decision-making process is confidential. Information on the cabinet and its members is typically only accessible to insiders. Cabinet confidentiality requires that cabinet ministers keep their mouths shut, and as a consequence most information is anecdotal or reminiscent in nature and scattered at best. These insiders are, for the most part, not political scientists - and so the study of cabinet ministers in Canada has remained for the most part descriptive. Donald Savoie's work (1999; 2005) on the relationship between the civil service and the polit-

⁵Peter C. Newman's most recent contribution (2005) to this collection is a compilation of transcribed and unedited interviews that he had with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney between 1984 and 1993

ical executive is a notable exception to this trend and reflects his personal connections and previous experience working in the federal government.⁶ The historical absence of quantitative studies of ministerial turnover can also be explained by the lack of data on ministerial career paths. This dissertation marks the first attempt to assemble a complete dataset of all Canadian ministerial career paths based on official information provided by the Canadian government.

Despite these hurdles, the study of cabinet ministers in Canada and elsewhere is currently experiencing a renaissance in the political science community. International networks have been established to share ideas, methods and data; articles that address ministerial career paths are beginning to appear in the top scholarly journals.

1.2 Early Research

Early writings on ministerial turnover in the Canadian and comparative literature are highly descriptive and narrowly focused on the power of the prime minister to dismiss ministers and the relationship between ministerial exit and the individual and collective ministerial responsibility. References in the Canadian academic literature to ministerial exit are scant and theoretical conjectures are virtually non-existent. Even R. Macgregor Dawson's classic text *The Government of Canada* which includes three chapters dedicated to the workings of the cabinet includes virtually no reference to ministerial exit apart from Prime Minister Laurier's famous dismissal of Israel Tarte over a public disagreement on tariff policy, used as an example for collective cabinet responsibility. (Dawson, 1964, p. 190)

In order to locate a theoretical discussion of ministerial exit one must turn to the British literature in the 1960s for inspiration. Finer's oft-cited 1956 article introduced the testable argument that the political reality of ministerial turnover may not conform

⁶ In addition to a prestigious academic career Savoie has also held senior positions at the Treasury Board and the Canadian Centre for Management Development.

to the theoretical or constitutional norms set out in convention ministerial responsibility.(Finer, 1956) Finer's troika of criteria for a minister's exit: that the minister himself or herself, the minister's party and the prime minister all must want the minister to leave serves as the benchmark against which successive British and comparative studies are tested and expanded.

Finer's work helped to inspire a second generation of studies which examined the cabinet and cabinet ministers. Thick descriptive studies of individual ministerial exits were (and are still) common but a noticeable change took place after the publication of Finer's article. Herman and Alt's 1975 edited volume *Cabinet Studies: A Reader* certainly contained examples of classic ministerial reminiscences, but it stands out for including an early empirical and positivist contribution by James E. Alt (1975) that introduces the idea that the length of ministerial tenure may be related to a series of conditional variables. This first piece, although limited in terms of its scope, nevertheless, cleared a path that is visibly reflected in the government survival literature and which current researchers of ministerial turnover are only now beginning to develop.

Surprisingly, parallel research initiatives were not introduced in the Canadian academy. Instead, Canadian political scientists, perhaps a little overwhelmed by the institutional and bureaucratic changes introduced by Pierre Trudeau after 1968, typically include descriptive discussions of ministerial turnover within the context of increasing prime-ministerial government in the 1970s and 1980s.

What the Canadian literature currently lacks is the level of sophistication that Australian, and especially British, ministerial enthusiasts adopted in the 1990s. When and under what conditions ministers resign and the relationship of ministerial exit to constitutional convention are concerns shared by all Westminster polities. Although limited in scope, studies such as those conducted by Woodhouse (1993; 1994) and Page (1990) set an important precedent for the current round of research. These studies do not only consider multiple resignations simultaneously and conceive them in terms of individual,

legislative and political conditions. By dividing ministerial exits into resignations and non-resignations they thus avoid selection bias on the dependent variable. The research by Page and Woodhouse is also significant in so far as it challenges and expands on Finer's earlier foundation and breaks rank to study ministerial turnover as an interesting phenomena on its own.

The only recent work that focuses directly on Canadian ministerial turnover has been written by Sharon Sutherland.⁷ In her first piece (1991a), Sutherland uses the official record of ministerial resignations provided by the Library of Parliament in Ottawa to highlight that ministers seldom resign for reasons associated with individual ministerial responsibility. Sutherland's second piece (1991b) on the subject delves into the topic of ministerial amateurism. Using the same dataset, she observes that experienced ministers are less likely to resign for reasons pertaining to individual ministerial responsibility although the political environment and personal qualities may offset or enhance the likelihood that ministers will resign for events associated with individual ministerial responsibility.

Although Sutherland's conclusions intuitively and historically make sense, her dataset presents a number of problems. First of all, the dataset is noticeably incomplete and at times inaccurate.⁸ *Ministerial Resignations 1867 to Date* (2002) only contains ministers who formally resigned from the cabinet as well as the "official" reasons for exit; reasons that are specified in the letter of resignations. Official reasons may shadow the real reasons for a minister's departure. Second, the dataset fails to fully consider other forms of ministerial exit such as retirements, patronage appointments, election losses or government defeats. Many of these forms of exit may hide ulterior motives for leaving the cabinet.

⁷ Christopher Kam is currently researching comparative cabinet reshuffles. Canada is included among his cases.

⁸ *Ministerial Resignations 1867 to Date* suggests that Henry Robert Emmerson was dismissed from cabinet after it was reported in the press that he had been caught with a "person of ill-repute" in a Montreal hotel in 1907. In fact, the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* notes that Emmerson was caught with two persons of ill-repute.

The current crop of ministerial turnover studies relies on the construction of long-term, detailed longitudinal datasets and sophisticated econometric techniques to determine the causal factors that contribute to ministerial duration and turnover. Recent work on turnover in the United Kingdom best exemplifies this trend. Using a dataset that records every resignation and non-resignation from 1945 to 1997 Dowding and Kang (1998) reveal that British ministers resign because they are forced to by the prime minister to meet political ends and not because they are obliged to by constitutional convention. In effect, this research sounds a partial death knell for constitutional convention in the academic study of ministerial turnover and sets the foundation for a new way to study turnover, which takes place through the lens of incentives and constraints for those who stand to benefit from resignations and non-resignations. This new approach has been widely used. Recent studies that examine the effects of public opinion on ministerial resignation (Dewan and Dowding, 2005), comparative ministerial reshuffles (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2004), horizontal movements within the cabinet (Kam and Indridason, 2005) as well as turnover in a host of new countries and regions have been published and presented at international conferences. This dissertation falls under the umbrella of this current wave of scholarship.

1.3 What needs to be done?

Sutherland's research on ministerial resignations in Canada highlights the current vacuum in the Canadian literature on ministerial turnover. The first matter that requires attention is the way in which ministerial resignations are conceived. Resignations do not occur out of the ether, rather they are the culmination of a ministerial career. If puzzles pertaining to legislative amateurism, the changing nature of prime ministerial power *vis-à-vis* the cabinet and the evolution of constitutional convention are to be adequately addressed then resignations must be considered as part of the longer-term process that is a ministerial career and not simply a fixed point in time. Following from

this, a more systematic approach to understanding ministerial turnover must be adopted whereby all exits are considered and not simply those exits that confirm preconceived descriptive accounts of ministerial resignation.

In order to accomplish the task of conceiving ministerial turnover in a new light, a new dataset of ministerial careers must be constructed. This dataset must include all ministers who served in the Canadian cabinet no matter what form of exit they take - this is necessary if the focus on ministers is to shift away from an exclusive examination of exits to a perspective that includes the career paths that led to a particular kind of exit. Furthermore, the span between the ministerial start date and end date must also be recorded in order to consider not only duration but also a minister's durability under different conditions. (Laver, 2003) By adopting a longitudinal approach to ministerial careers, a minister's level of durability at different points in his or her career can be compared with other ministers and, indeed, at different stages in Canadian political history or different ministries thus providing a more systematic insight into the amateurism, prime ministerial power and constitutional convention discussions.

The existing research on Canadian ministerial turnover remains highly descriptive. This trend is fueled by the shortage of political scientists who study Canadian politics and employ empirical positivist methods, the historical absence of rich datasets as well as the lack of computational technology to employ advanced statistical techniques. These trends have reversed in recent years as more Canadian political scientists are trained in advanced econometric methods and are using these techniques in their research. Also, the academic and especially the government communities have taken steps in recent years to address the dearth of publicly available datasets suitable for political research.

1.4 Project Goals

This dissertation has three primary objectives. The first objective is to develop a general model of ministerial turnover in the Canadian cabinet that considers each and every form of ministerial exit. The second objective is to distinguish this approach from the variety of other works that directly and indirectly address the question of why ministers exit the cabinet by highlighting the factors that work together to cause a ministerial exit. Lastly, the dissertation will illustrate how the results generated by the model of ministerial turnover address the often-debated issues of amateurism in the Canadian legislature, prime ministerial power and constitutional conventions.

This dissertation does not intend to develop a unifying theory of ministerial turnover in Canada - yet. The current state of research (or lack of research) in Canada combined with the newness of the research programme in the comparative realm make this an impossibility at this stage. Rather this is an exploratory effort that sets out the foundation for more extensive theory building by ascertaining what causes ministerial turnover and in what circumstances. In doing so, the key assumptions to building a unified theory of ministerial turnover can be identified and the data used to test such a theory are gathered.

Canada has been selected as a single case study for a number of reasons. First, and perhaps most obvious, the Canadian case has yet to be examined. As indicated, research on Britain is already underway. By choosing a second Westminster parliamentary democracy, this study is able to borrow and share many of the key assumptions regarding constitutional conventions as well as executive motivation in the management of cabinet personnel. Given that Canada and Britain share a common *lingua franca*, the relevant scholarship that can be applied to both polities is quite extensive and accessible. Furthermore, because Canada and Britain share similar political institutions, conventions and structures, the dataset compiled for this dissertation can merged with the British dataset with reasonable effort or modification. This in turn will facilitate

future comparative research.

Canada is an interesting case in its own right. Canada's federal division of powers distinguishes it from Britain. As will be demonstrated later, ministers and prime minister face key constraints and opportunities based on not only regionalism but also ethnicity. While these qualities make Canada an interesting case they also set out the framework for future comparative studies with other federal Westminster parliamentary democracies such as India and Australia.

Lastly, as the oldest existing Dominion, Canada also includes the largest number of observations over the longest period of time providing a substantial dataset. On a related note, Canada is also an ideal country to examine due to the amount of information electronically accessible. The Canadian Library of Parliament maintains a full-time staff dedicated to transferring materials into an electronic format and making these materials available to the public free of charge. The base dataset used in this study was provided by the Library of Parliament; the data was transferred from official government records thus ensuring their accuracy and authenticity. Furthermore, the Library of Parliament provided other personal, contextual as well as electoral data, also in electronic format. This data has required a limited amount of manipulation and modification to make it compatible with the statistics software used to generate the event history models used in this dissertation.

This dissertation is organized in the following manner. Chapter two presents a review of the existing literature on Canadian cabinet ministers with reference to its place in the comparative literature. This chapter highlights how the lack of systematic analyses of ministerial career paths in Canada has resulted in a literature in which the study of cabinet ministers and their exits is usually relegated to a subsection of the more-developed literature on prime ministers. Chapter two recommends that an accurate record of all ministerial careers and the ways that ministers leave office be established in order to properly situate ministerial turnover as subject worthy of study in its own right.

To accomplish this task, the Canadian and comparative literature on cabinet ministers is reviewed to identify the multiple ways that ministers leave the cabinet. Three forms of ministerial turnover are put forth: exit by Order-in-Council (to take up a patronage appointment), exit by government turnover and exit by reshuffle to the backbenches.

Chapter three sets out the major theoretical components how ministerial careers should be studied. First, a longitudinal approach is argued to be the ideal way to study ministerial turnover as ministerial careers move through both space and time and both discrete events and the duration that a minister serves in the cabinet should impact when and how a minister exits the cabinet. Second, it is argued that it is necessary to simultaneously consider each type of exit in order to approximate the true pattern of turnover observed in the cabinet. The last part of Chapter three reviews some of the methodologies employed by similar studies of ministerial careers in the comparative literature and sets them apart from the Canadian case examined in this dissertation.

Chapter four presents an event history model of Canadian ministerial careers and their terminations. The chapter begins with a brief introduction to event history analysis and then moves onto the precise model used in this dissertation: a competing risks Cox proportional hazards model. Event history models are ideally suited to handle the longitudinally organized data structure advocated in Chapter three while the competing risks specification is especially useful as it is able to consider the multiple forms of exit by which a ministerial career may end.

Chapter five considers the conditions that produce a minister's exit from cabinet. The conditions exist at three levels; the individual, parliamentary and political environmental levels. Based on these conditions a series of hypotheses are introduced to be tested by the event history model set out in Chapter four. In addition, the original dataset compiled for this dissertation is more fully elaborated.

Chapter six presents the results from the event history models of the different types of Canadian ministerial turnover. The chapter presents summary statistics and results

for two separate periods: the first model encompasses the complete time period 1867-2000 but does not include variables for which data is only available for the 1957-2000 period. The second model includes these variables but considers only the shorter 1957-2000 period. The results largely confirm the hypotheses set out in Chapter five.

Finally, Chapter seven concludes the dissertation by reviewing the results presented in Chapter six and highlighting the contribution of this research to Canadian political science and, more broadly, comparative politics. The chapter ends by making recommendations for further research in this area of study.

Chapter 2

The Study of Ministerial Resignations

2.1 Introduction

The study of ministerial careers and their terminations at the federal level of government in Canada is a neglected topic in the Canadian political science canon. This is partially due to a preoccupation among Canadian scholars and others who study Westminster parliamentary system with the central role and power held by the prime minister. Most discussions that pertain to cabinet ministers and the cabinet in general revolve around the prime minister and the constraints and opportunities that he or she possesses *vis-à-vis* the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. The current wave of writing among prime minister observers stresses the prime minister's total dominance over the cabinet to the point that cabinet ministers have been rendered politically impotent and serve primarily as a "sounding board" for policy drafted by the prime minister and his or her supporters in the central agencies. (Savoie, 1999) This literature reflects the considerable power held by Prime Minister Chrétien and the Prime Minister's Office following the 1993 election, but the argument is not without critics and does not reflect Paul Martin's ministry which was a minority government from 2004 until 2006. Numerous examples of strong and secure ministers can be found throughout Canadian political history and well into the Chrétien ministry.

The literature on prime ministers also extends into the realm of constitutional convention where the conventions of individual and collective ministerial responsibility are supposed to guide both the prime minister and ministers themselves as far as cabinet tenure is concerned.

The absence of an independent focus on ministerial turnover is also influenced by the Canadian legislative career path/turnover literature. Cabinet ministers in Westminster parliamentary democracies are usually drawn from the pool of representatives elected to the House of Commons. This is the core of the principle of representative government on which Canadian democracy rests. Given that an existing and dominant literature on the prime minister exists and stresses the dominance of the prime minister over his or her cabinet ministers, the study of ministerial career paths has been overlooked in favour of a more broad-based examination of member career paths. A strong Canadian legislative career path literature has developed in the 1990s and early 21st century. The central thrust of this literature highlights the high levels of turnover in the Canadian House of Commons which stems largely from member's lack of experience usually measured in terms of temporal duration. This literature touches on the subject of cabinet ministers in so far as ministers are categorized as legislative leaders who are less likely to experience an involuntary exit from the House by electoral defeat; instead, they typically choose their own exit path: retirement, a return to private life or the acceptance of a patronage appointment from the prime minister.

The lack of attention to ministerial careers and ministerial turnover is reflected by the absence in the academic literature of an accurate and systematic count of the total number of ministerial exits that have taken place. Combined with a dearth of causal models and statistical sophistication, a trend that is mirrored in the legislative turnover literature, a considerable opportunity to move this line of research in a forward direction exists.

To date, the greatest challenge to systematically studying Canadian ministerial ca-

Table 2.1: Breakdown of Exits


Exit Type	1867-2000		1867-1957		1957-2000	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Order in Council	98	15.83	67	22.64	31	9.6
Exit Federal Politics	92	14.86	40	13.51	52	16.1
Reshuffled	74	11.95	20	6.76	54	16.72
Censored	355	57.35	169	57.09	186	57.59
Total	619	100	296	100	323	100

reers is the lack of data. Sharon Sutherland’s oft-cited 1991 pieces are the only materials in the Canadian literature that make an attempt at a systematic study.¹ Even so, her compilation of ministerial exit based on entries found in the Ministerial Resignations to date register provided by the Privy Council Office in Ottawa is incomplete and at times inaccurate. Furthermore, the list also does not provide any information on ministerial duration which can be used as an indicator to assess the success and performance of individual ministers.

Table 2.1 , Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 provide a first look at the new dataset compiled for this dissertation. They reveal that there is considerable variation in the ways that ministers exit the cabinet and that an exclusive focus on any one type of exit, or the amalgamation of all exits into a single exit-type runs the risk of providing an incomplete explanation of ministerial turnover. After all, not all ministerial turnover stems from the prime minister’s ire or the wrath of the voter. Ministers also voluntarily exit the cabinet to take up patronage appointments offered by Order-in-Council, to return to private life or to retire. However, these voluntary forms of exit may be anything but voluntary when their surface is scratched. For example, a political scandal might also prompt a prime minister to relocate a wayward minister to a patronage appointment depending on the minister’s status within the party and the severity of the scandal. The best, and most recent, example is that of Minister of Public Works Alphonso Gagliano who left the Cabinet in 2002 to take up the ambassadorship to Denmark amid allegations


¹ In an informal conversation with Stephan Dion, Minister of the Environment (2004-2006) when told of the subject of this dissertation, he asked if I had read Sutherland’s works. (24 November, 2005)

Figure 2.1: Ministerial Turnover Rates 1867-2000



Graphs by Ministerial Exit

Figure 2.2: Choice Tree of Canadian Ministerial Turnover



of spending hundreds of millions of dollars of government money to Liberal Party-friendly advertising firms to promote Canada in Quebec following the 1995 referendum on sovereignty. Gagliano, a close personal friend of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's as well as the government's Quebec lieutenant, was subsequently recalled from Denmark by Chrétien's successor Paul Martin and expelled from the Liberal Party in 2005 when the full extent of the sponsorship scandal was publicly revealed.

The rest of this chapter will provide a review of the key themes and arguments that have been presented in the literature on ministerial turnover in Canada; it will also borrow somewhat from the comparative literature. First, there is the outcome of electoral turnover on cabinet ministers - this literature is of course closely associated with the literature on MP turnover which makes up the bulk of the material in the turnover field. Second is the literature on voluntary exit from the cabinet. Third is the issue of promotion through Order-in-Council. Finally there is departure at the hand/demand of the prime minister. This last area of the literature is closely linked to the subject of prime ministerial power. Chapter three reviews some of the recent work in the comparative literature that has adopted new approaches to examining the turnover issue in cabinets to see how they might be applicable or linked to the material in Canada.

While there is a great variety in the kinds of research that exist on the subject of ministerial turnover in the comparative literature, the bulk of it, at least in so far as the subject addresses Westminster parliamentary systems deals with the subject of constitutional convention - why and when ministerial turnover should take place.

The subject of ministerial turnover in the area of constitutional convention is important for the foundation of democracy on a number of counts. Specifically, conventions dealing with ministerial turnover are important for issues dealing with responsibility and accountability - and it is in these areas that debate tends to be centred.

2.2 Why should ministers resign?

2.2.1 Individual and collective ministerial responsibility

Explanations for why individual ministers *should* resign fall under the purview of individual ministerial resignation. Heard (1991) points out, individual ministerial responsibility can roughly be divided into the classic and modern interpretations of the convention. The classic convention which originated in Britain and was transported to Canada in the Constitution Act, 1867 rests on the need for a minister to take blame for actions without compromising the government. Its central point is that ministers are responsible for actions in their departments; it also dictates that ministers are responsible for their own personal actions. Debate in Britain, Canada and Australia seems to centre on the extent to which the classical definition is reflected in modern use.

2.2.1.1 Individual ministerial responsibility

The convention of individual ministerial responsibility holds that ministers must answer questions in the House of Commons pertaining to issues for which their department/portfolio is responsible; ministers are culpable for wrongful action undertaken in their departments and must correct the wrong or suffer the consequences which at the extreme end may result in his loss of office. Finally, ministers can be held accountable for personal errors which may include private indiscretions which are believed to interfere with the minister's public credibility or political misjudgements where ministers act in their public capacity but without the backing of their department. (Heard, 1991; Woodhouse, 1993) The modern theory is less strict. Members of the legislature still direct questions to ministers concerning their administrative responsibilities but a substantial debate has emerged over whether or not ministers are politically responsible for everything that happens in their departments.

The debate began in the United Kingdom when Samuel Finer (1956) argued that the

practice of ministerial resignation did not match up with the constitutional convention.² He concluded that there was no rule that individual ministerial responsibility compelled a minister to resign because of the actions of his or her officials; the rapid and sizable expansion of government in the twentieth century has made it impossible for ministers to know what goes on in every corner of their portfolios.³ Finer concluded that even if a constitutional basis of fault can be determined, whether or not a resignation will follow ultimately depends on three key actors and their willingness to push for a resignation: the minister in question, the prime minister and the party - the extent to which a political misjudgment is serious enough to warrant a resignation will depend on how the misjudgment affects each actor's interests.

Nevertheless, there is some debate over the extent of individual ministerial responsibility. Philip Norton (1982) writes that a distinction needs to be made between the acts that a minister could have reasonably known and the illegal or incompetent acts carried out by an underling that he or she could not have known. He specifies that, "in the former case, the minister would be expected to resign. In the latter case, the minister would probably be expected to answer questions in the House of Commons, explain what happened, and announce the taking of corrective actions." (Norton, 1982) Marshall and Moodie (1971) argue that ministers bear some responsibility for the actions of their underlings, but only when the matter may be 'construed as a personal fault' of the minister. Heard (1991), in summarizing these views, writes that the minister is not being held culpable for the actions of an official but for own personal failings in directing the department.

The view in Canada, as in Australia, is similar to Britain. Most Canadian scholars agree that ministers are not politically responsible for the actions of their underlings. T.M. Denton (1979) writes that he has not found a single incident in Canadian politics

²The debate has since spread to other political systems that employ the Westminster parliamentary tradition and its conventions.

³This view has for the most part been adopted by others who study British politics – it has also been adopted by Canadians and Australians who study this subject too.

where a minister has been forced to resign because of the actions of an underling. Kenneth Kernaghan (1980) argues that ministerial culpability for departmental underlings does not happen in the modern Canadian politics. He writes, "In practice, ministers do not resign to atone for either serious mismanagement by their officials or personal administrative mistakes." (Kernaghan, 1980) Heard (1991) dismisses the thought that personal morality might also prompt ministers to resign for administrative errors, even if they were directly involved as in the case of Lord Carrington in Britain.⁴ He points out that both Robert Coates and John Fraser resigned following their respective departmental incidents but in both cases, the rationale for resignation stemmed not from convention but from personal or party politics - much more in the mode suggested by Finer.

If individual ministerial responsibility still exists in the culpable sense, then it occurs in so far as ministers now should resign when they have done something personally rather than administratively wrong. Kernaghan (1980) argues that culpability may still linger on as a vestige of individual ministerial responsibility as "a number of recent cases in Canada show that a minister will almost invariably resign if personal misconduct in the form of unethical, immoral or illegal activities is revealed."

Heard argues that these "personal wrongdoings" still hold the individual culpable to parliament in so far as they "demonstrate the basic unfitness of an individual to be entrusted with the management of the affairs of state." (Heard, 1991) He writes, "the doctrine of individual responsibility clearly still has force in applying to a minister's personal wrongdoings, and often entails resignations when an alleged conflict of interest and personal enrichment are plainly apparent." (Heard, 1991)

One other area where the obligation of resignation or culpability has generated debate is over whether or not the minister of finance is obliged to resign in the event that

⁴Carrington resigned as Minister of Defence after the outbreak of the Falklands War because he believed that he (via his subordinates in the Ministry of Defence) had provided inaccurate information to the Cabinet regarding Argentina's war making capabilities.

the budget is leaked. Experience in Canada has not followed the British example despite the clamouring for several finance ministers to resign when parts of the budget or indeed, the entire budget was revealed ahead of schedule. Only a few political scientists seemed to holler from the galleries that, according to convention, the minister ought to resign.(Heard, 1991)

If the boundaries and perimeters of the debate over individual ministerial responsibility have been laid to rest over the last fifty years, why does debate still continue to linger? Heard (1991) argues that political observers and practitioners “have misperceived the operation of the basic principles involved.” He notes that ministers are still culpable but not in such an obvious way, primarily because of the evolution of party discipline. Collective ministerial responsibility has shifted the way that individual ministerial responsibility is brought to light and enforced and moved it away from the House of Commons to the prime minister. He writes, “the difficulty in placing this sanction with the Prime Minister is that the rule operates as a question of the Prime Minister’s internal morality as much as a rule of critical morality. The Prime Minister, however, can ultimately be held responsible to the legislature for his or her handling of ministerial malfeasance.”(Heard, 1991) He also notes that it has become empirically more difficult to determine when the convention is employed because the prime minister may not dismiss a minister at the time of the transgression or indeed may choose not to dismiss the minister at all - punishment may be silent but well recognized by the minister in question, who may be demoted or shuffled out at a later date or passed up for a plum reward or Order-in-Council appointment. Individual ministerial responsibility has, therefore, not fallen out of favour even though it might not be as publicly employed as it was in the past. (Heard, 1991)

The frequency and patterns of ministerial resignation as a consequence of individual ministerial responsibility suggest that Canadian ministers are inspired by office-seeking rather than policy-seeking motivations. Writing of British ministers Anthony King ob-

serves,

British prime ministers are not looking for specialists when they make ministerial appointments; indeed they are probably less interested in specialized knowledge and expertise than heads of government in any other democratic country. (Blondel 1985; 277). Instead they are looking for intelligence, political acumen, a capacity for hard work, acceptability to the governing party, presentability on television, at least a minimal level of competence in the House of Commons and possibly personal loyalty - all stocks in trade of career politicians. This lack of interest in subject specialization is reinforced by the British practice of moving ministers from one department to another at frequent intervals.(1994, 204)

The same can be said of Canadian cabinet ministers. Although, nobody has come forward to dictate that Canadian ministers are office seers, the similarities between the Canadian and British systems certainly point in this direction. Furthermore, the very low number of ministerial exits for reasons pertaining to policy disagreements, especially in light of the frequent examples of policy turnovers by governing parties (free trade (the Progressive Conservatives), price freezes (the Liberals), GST retention (the Liberals)) suggests that ministers are willing to roll with policy reversals as they occur without incident or affront to their convictions.

Furthermore, the extent to which ministers are matched with portfolios that fall outside of their areas of expertise as well as the extent to which ministers are reshuffled within the cabinet suggests that a ministers ability to deal with unexpected shocks, push through government priorities and get the job done is a most desirable asset in the eyes of the prime minister. It is also an asset that is more likely to be rewarded at the end of a parliamentary career than a steadfast commitment to a particular policy position.

2.2.1.2 Collective Ministerial Responsibility

Marshall and Moodie (1971) write that “collective responsibility provides a definition of what a government is in our system: The substance of the Government’s collective responsibility could be defined as its duty to submit its policy to and defend its policy before the House of Commons, and to resign if defeated on an issue of confidence.” If on one hand a minister may exit the cabinet for reasons related to individual ministerial responsibility, the minister also faces the possibility of exit for reasons pertaining to the convention of collective ministerial responsibility. Marshall (1984) identifies three rules of collective ministerial responsibility: the government stands and falls as one administration, the government speaks with one voice, the government collectively resigns or the government requests a dissolution if defeated in the Commons on a matter of confidence. Heard (1991) echoes Marshall when discussing collective responsibility in the Canadian context; he notes his own rules of collective responsibility: the cabinet is responsible to the monarch, to itself and to the elected chamber in the legislature. It is true that in theory ministers serve only at the pleasure of the crown; however, the governor general may only remove a minister from the cabinet as a consequence of the minister having lost the confidence of the prime minister or of the entire cabinet having lost the confidence of legislature or of the electorate in a general election.

There appears to be little debate over the issue of the elements of collective ministerial responsibility (Heard identifies three of them: solidarity, confidentiality and confidence) - this is probably because violations of cabinet solidarity are infrequent in Canadian political history but clearly defined. Although, when they occur they tend to be highly visible and extremely disruptive.(Punnett, 1977)

As Heard notes, the most immediately visible aspect of cabinet solidarity is the united face members present in public. Ministers must not dispute collective decisions outside of the cabinet chamber. Stemming from this, ministers must also vote in favour of all government policies. Heard writes, “If a government is held collectively respon-

sible to the legislature, one cannot have individual ministers saying: ‘Well, don’t condemn me along with the rest of the Cabinet, because I disagree with that decision, and argued all along that another course of action should be followed.’”(Heard, 1991)

The evolution of cabinet solidarity has produced a number of additional rules which have been elaborated by Eglington and Forsey.(1985)

- Government advice to the Crown must be unanimous, even if arrived at after consideration of strongly held but opposed views ;
- A minister must loyally support and defend any cabinet decisions and not quaver by suggesting he was compromised or was reluctantly persuaded;
- must be prepared not only to refrain from publicly criticizing other ministers but also to defend them publicly;
- must not announce a new policy or change in policy without prior cabinet consent - if he does so cabinet may adopt the policy and save him from resignation, but if it does not, he must resign;
- must not express private views on government policies;
- must not speak about or otherwise become involved in a colleagues portfolio without first consulting him and gaining his approval and probably that of the prime minister;
- must not make speeches or do acts which may appear to implicate the government, and must not express personal opinions about future policy except after consultation;
- must carry out the policy decided upon by cabinet so far as it affects his own portfolio;
- must vote with the government, whether it is in danger or not;

- must speak in defence of the government and any of its policies if the prime minister insists.

The Forsey-Eglinton analysis alludes to the relationship between collective ministerial responsibility and ministerial turnover. Violation of the rules may result in a sanction and the power of sanction ultimately lies with the prime minister. The worst sanction is of course expulsion from the cabinet. However, breaches of cabinet solidarity are infrequent. Savoie(1999) notes, “the prime minister appoints Cabinet ministers ... and tradition, and more importantly, political realities, require that they are loyal to him and in particular to government policy. Should a minister ... disagree with government policy, he or she has two choices - keep quiet and bear it or resign from the post.” The historical record demonstrates that cabinet ministers are usually willing to bite their tongues. Forsey and Eglinton (1985) only found six instances of ministerial exit for lack of solidarity in the period 1867-1985; Sutherland (1991*a*) found 28 (19 percent of the total resignations) in the period 1867-1990.⁵ Sutherland (1991*b*; 1991*a*) writes that resignations resulting from ministers not agreeing with cabinet policy are rare to vanishing in Canada. When they do occur they tend to be quite spectacular; ministerial tantrums over cabinet solidarity marked by an impressive display of political fireworks (e.g.. Turner, Martin, Bouchard, Kierans, Tarte). Matheson (1976) writes, “the consequence of a minister resigning are extremely serious in terms of his political career. If he resigns, he risks losing the favour of the party and will probably have difficulty in securing the party’s nomination at the next election ... When a minister resigns from the cabinet over policy he is likely to be written off politically by the party and he can look forward to a bleak political career.” Perhaps the most impressive statement regarding cabinet solidarity was provided by Sir Wilfred Laurier in the House of Commons.

The gentlemen who are assembled at the Council Board are not ex-

⁵The difference between the Sutherland and Forsey-Eglinton counts is indicative of the poor data collection that plagues this area of research in Canada.

pected to be any more unanimous in their views because they sit at Council than would be expected from any other body of men ... the Council acts for the purpose of examining the situation and, having examined it, then to come to a solution, which solution becomes a law to all those who choose to remain in the Cabinet... the necessary solidarity between the members of the Cabinet is absolute, that the moment a policy has been determined upon it then becomes the duty every member of the administration to support it and support it in its entirety. (Canada, 1903)

Heard's second element of collective cabinet responsibility is cabinet confidentiality which stipulates that cabinet discussions and materials must remain secret. This confidentiality extends to ministers as well as civil servants. The rationale for confidentiality is that this will permit and encourage "free and open discussion on politically sensitive issues." (Heard, 1991) While not of direct importance as far as ministerial turnover is concerned, the subject of cabinet confidentiality has attracted some attention from scholars. As Heard (1991) observes, "In Canadian political practice Cabinet solidarity appears to be generally respected because there are very few times when ministers have publicly spoken out against decided government policies, or broken confidences in any attributable fashion."⁶

Heard's third and final element of collective ministerial responsibility is confidence. The government's need to retain the confidence of the legislature is perhaps the most defining feature of Westminster parliamentary democracy. Should the government lose this confidence it is required to resign *en masse*, or call an election where the citizenry will declare its confidence or lack thereof in the government. Party discipline ensures that a bill of confidence will always be passed by the legislature when the governing party holds a reasonable majority. Governments have only lost votes of confidence six

⁶Clever politicians and senior civil servants know how to leak dissenting views to the media without attribution.

times in Canada - in each case the government was a minority government.⁷ Confidence is of course extremely relevant for ministerial turnover in so far as loss of confidence in the House of Commons will bring down the entire cabinet; this may result in electoral turnover either of the entire cabinet in the event that another party secures the largest number of seats in the legislature or a major reshuffle as a consequence of a change in legislative arithmetic.

Ultimately, ministerial turnover arising from collective ministerial responsibility reflects the professional expectations of individual ministers as well as the ability of prime ministers to manage their cabinets. Woodhouse (1993) writes that resignations that take place under the auspice of collective responsibility “reveal information about the workings of government and the style of the prime ministers. Their purpose is essentially political, to preserve the solidarity of government and hence its survival.”

The literature on constitutional convention highlights a number of aspects of ministerial turnover in Canada. The twin constitutional conventions of individual and collective ministerial responsibility highlight precisely when ministers *should* resign. The extent to which ministers follow these rules or the extent to which prime ministers enforce them has received considerable attention among political scientists. In Canada, the general conclusion appears to follow the British tradition. Compliance with individual ministerial responsibility has changed so that ministers are presently not required to resign for the actions of their officials. Canadian ministers are more likely to resign for personal fault, or lapses in personal or political morality. Collective cabinet responsibility appears to be strong and readily enforced. Cabinet ministers in Canada are still bound to abide by cabinet solidarity and confidentiality. Failure to abide by these conventions result in a minister’s resignation or dismissal. However, the record indicates that most ministers are willing to abide by the convention in order to remain at the apex of power. Exits for breach of collective ministerial responsibility tend to be

⁷ The most recent case was Paul Martin’s Liberal Party government 2004-2006 which lost a vote of confidence in December 2005.

quite spectacular. The principle of representative government is still maintained by the government's need to retain the confidence of the House of Commons. Although, votes of non-confidence are infrequent because of party discipline, they are not impossible, and careful consideration of the legislative arithmetic must be entertained, especially during periods of minority government.

2.2.2 Ministerial Turnover (retirement, Order-in-Council (patronage), decide not to run)

A number of different definitions of turnover have been employed in the literature. Matland and Studlar (2004) in their comparative study define turnover as the “aggregate level of exit, from one general election to the next, of elected candidates in the popularly elected lower house of the legislature in a bicameral system or the sole chamber in a unicameral one.”

If the literature on constitutional conventions provides us with insight as to when ministerial turnover should take place, yet also reveals that ministers do not always depart when the rules dictate they should, we must turn to another literature to discover when ministers do exit the cabinet. Some of the answers to these questions can be found in the literature on legislative turnover. Ministers in Westminster parliamentary systems are, after all, also members of parliament. As members of parliament they are therefore subjected to the same factors that contribute to turnover as non-cabinet ministers, although the effects may vary. It is important to remember that this section focuses not on ministerial turnover from the cabinet *per se*, but rather legislative turnover, an event that any MP, including cabinet ministers can face.

The comparative research on legislative turnover specifies that Canada is unique. Matland and Studlar (2004) even go so far as to write that Canada “presents a genuine puzzling phenomena” and “deserves special study to determine why turnover rates there have been higher than in other countries.” A cursory review of the literature on

turnover in Canada reveals different explanations for the high levels of turnover among members of parliament. Canadian political scientists (Atkinson and Docherty, 1992; Atkinson and Nossal, 1980; Franks, 1987) point to a variety of reasons: weak connections between political parties and the electorate result in a distinct lack of loyalty which contributes to electoral volatility. Unlike the United States, the lack of seniority system fails to reward progressive ambition so that MPs move around rather than up the ladder as their parliamentary careers progress. Strict party discipline from above has also limited the ability of individual MPs from making a personal difference in the construction of policy. The electoral system - the single member plurality in Canada also makes incumbent MPs very sensitive to national and regional voting trends. (Atkinson and Docherty, 1992)⁸ The concerns generated from this research start from a general view that inexperienced MPs are more easily dominated by the longer-serving parliamentary elite. (Kornberg and Mishler, 1976; Porter, 1965; Ward, 1950) In so far as the legislative turnover literature has addressed the question of ministerial turnover the material is sparse. This is probably due to the fact that those studying ministerial turnover are more interested in ministerial resignations, and less interested in run-of-the-mill turnover - although, the electoral defeat of a minister usually generates a great deal of interest in the public realm.⁹ Likewise, the exit of cabinet ministers from the House of Commons for voluntary (retirement, promotion by Order-in-Council) or involuntary reasons is only touched upon on the periphery of the literature, yet they also generate a great deal of speculation as was the case when Brian Tobin departed the cabinet and the Commons to "spend more time with his family" after it became clear that he lacked the necessary financial resources to realistically challenge Paul Martin for the Liberal Party leadership.

Docherty (1994) addresses this question of ministerial turnover in a wider study of

⁸In the United States gerrymandering ensures that more and more seats in the House of Representatives are party fiefdoms without the likelihood of electoral defeat - see the recent 2004 battle in Texas

⁹The defeat of the highly visible Minister of Defence Doug Young came as a surprise in 1997 as was Defence Minister McCallum's electoral defeat in 1994.

legislative turnover in Canada during the 1988 election. He observes that parliamentary leaders (MPs who have served in the Cabinet at some point in their political career) are more likely to exit the cabinet for voluntary rather than involuntary reasons. He also notes that these leaders buck the trend in that they also tend to be long-serving members unlike their backbench colleagues. Parliamentary leaders tend to have significantly higher margin of victories and are less vulnerable to electoral defeat. When they run, they usually win. He also notes that leaders are more likely to leave by their own hand rather than at the hands of others - that is, they are more likely to retire, and not run for re-election. Finally, he notes that veteran voluntary retirees were more likely to receive a patronage position or some form of federal largesse.

The only pieces dedicated exclusively to the subject of ministerial turnover are written by Sutherland (1991*b*; 1991*a*). She asks whether or not a minister's accumulated experience has any effect on the way that the minister exits the cabinet and concludes that "of the resignations that have come about on the basis of individual ministerial responsibility, a disproportionate percentage have been by those ministers almost completely new to parliamentary politics." (Sutherland, 1991*b*)¹⁰ Unless a minister intends to permanently leave politics, a minister might be better off waiting for the axe to fall than to voluntarily exit to the back benches.

2.2.3 Promotions and Patronage

Sutherland observes. "Ministers also resign in order to be able to accept an appointment offered by the prime minister under Order-in-Council (OIC)." (Sutherland, 1991*b*) In her study of ministerial exits she notes that such appointments are frequent occurrences, 35 percent of ministerial exits are to accept patronage appointments offered by the prime minister. This high figure is not surprising. Schindler writes, "the distribution of patronage was the most important single function of government." (Schindler, 1977)

¹⁰Sutherland modifies Porter's criteria of four years' legislative experience at the provincial or federal level and reduces it to two years.

Patronage was a function of the need to keep the country together in the early years after Confederation as well as to ensure a working majority in the House of Commons. Exits by patronage appointment have also shown some regional variation. Matheson writes that, "the exits of ministers from Quebec show a pattern somewhat different from the rest of Canada." (Matheson, 1976) He notes that French Canadian ministers are less likely to leave the cabinet at the hands of electorate either through a personal defeat at the polls or as a member of the cabinet in a government defeat. Rather, ministers from Quebec "are more likely to enjoy a patronage reward on leaving the cabinet than most members of the cabinet." (Matheson, 1976) The difference is possibly explained as an extension of the traditional constituency focus held by French Canadian ministers which posits that the provision of local patronage in exchange for electoral support is an extension of their representative role. (Hoffman and Ward, 1970)¹¹

Order-in-Council appointments may be used to cover up exits for other reasons. Henri Courtmanche resigned from his seat at the cabinet table to take up a seat in the Senate in 1960. Courtmanche's official reason for accepting the prime minister's offer had to do with the toll government life had on his health. No mention is made in the official record provided by the Library of Parliament of the conflict of interest Courtmanche found himself in when it was publicly revealed that he was the director and treasurer of a Montreal hospital receiving government funding let alone the furor this created in the House of Commons. (Sutherland, 1991*b*) More recently, Public Works Minister Alphonso Gagliano's acceptance of the ambassadorship to Denmark at the onset of the sponsorship scandal might be regarded with some scepticism. The scandal in his department significantly contributed to the Liberals loss of majority government in 2004 and subsequent threats to the party's hold on government; Gagliano's exit can be interpreted less as a direct reward for service to the nation and more of an opportunity to remove a controversial minister to the cool waters of the North Sea.

¹¹See Jean Chrétien, *Straight from the Heart*, which makes reference to this pattern of largesse in Quebec, especially during the Duplessis era.

Ministers also voluntarily leave for a variety of other reasons ("accidental factors" as Punnett (1977) calls them). Ministers may choose to retire, or to step down for ill health - or perhaps they are tired and wish to return to private life - the tribulations of a parliamentary job simply having taken their toll. They may also simply choose not to run again in election. As the examples above demonstrate, one must be careful not to take all cabinet exits at face value. As Sutherland (1991a) notes, "the public manifestation of trouble in cabinet is exit." In a similar vein, Philip Stephens, writing about the Blair cabinet, observes, "Tradition says that the only politicians who want to spend more time with their families are those who do not have another option." (Stephens, 2004)

2.2.4 Prime Ministerial and Cabinet Turnover (sackings)

It comes as no surprise that the prime minister plays a central, if not pivotal role in influencing ministerial turnover. That the prime minister is by far the most powerful member of the cabinet and indeed the focal point of the government is not under dispute, and the Canadian prime minister dominates his cabinet like no other prime minister in the Westminster parliamentary system. Hockin (1977) writes, "there should be little doubt ... that the prime minister is more powerful any of his cabinet colleagues. Since 1867, the prime minister's power to appoint and dismiss ministers has always conferred considerable influence to him in his daily dealings with colleagues."

Cabinet turnover is a double-edged sword for prime ministers. On one hand turnover can help the prime minister to establish his or her position in the cabinet by allowing him to unload the old guard to whom he may be indebted and to restock the cabinet with individuals loyal to himself. On the other hand high turnover that takes place close to an election can hurt the party's chances of holding onto the government if the once familiar face of government changes dramatically. (Punnett, 1977) This exclusive power to appoint and dismiss ministers is the link between the prime minister and cabinet

turnover. Weller (1985) writes, "All ministers are chosen by the prime minister and depend on them for their jobs. Even though, some ministers may be chosen because of their position in the party, prime ministers can keep out those whom they do not want."

The prime minister's power to appoint and dismiss ministers is not actually mentioned in the Canadian constitution; in fact the *Constitution Act, 1867* fails to even make a reference to the position of the prime minister. It simply states, "There shall be a Council to aid and advise in the Government of Canada, to be styled the Queen's Privy Council for Canada; and the Persons who are to be Members of that shall be from Time to Time chosen and summoned by the Governor General and sworn in as Privy Councillors, and Members thereof may be from Time to Time removed by the Governor General." The prime minister's power stems more from the Constitution Act's preamble that states that Canada's constitution will be "similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom." The role of the prime minister as the chair of the cabinet and the powers vested in that office by convention are therefore based on the same principles and conventions that inform the powers of the British prime minister.¹² The prime minister's power *vis-à-vis* the other members of the cabinet stems from the duty to advise the sovereign on ministerial appointments. It is revealing that ministers willingly or unwillingly submit their resignations to the prime minister, even though the Governor General theoretically appoints them. Pearson, when he demanded Dupuis's resignation in 1965, told him, "I'm asking for your resignation. I am the prime minister. I name my ministers. I'm demanding your resignation. I have the right to do so." (Matheson, 1976)

¹²The debate over the power of the prime minister usually divides into three camps, prime ministerial government, cabinet government and ministerial government. In Canada it is generally agreed that cabinet and ministerial government does not exist except during minority government situations. Those who argue in favour of non-prime ministerial government include Jones, Walker, Butt, Gilmour. Note that in all occasions they are all writing about Britain. In Canada only Matheson hints at the prime minister not being all that powerful. His last major publication on the matter came out in the early years of the Trudeau government in the early 1970s and even then the seeds of doubt can be detected in his writing. In Canada most in both academic and journalistic circles have accepted what Weller refers to as the presidentialisation of the prime minister. Weller observes that the debate now tends to fall into one camp; there is an acceptance that the power of the prime minister has increased, and the question now is how much power does the modern Canadian prime minister actually have. Since the 1980s, there appears (to be a general acceptance that prime ministerial government is the norm in Canada.

Chrétien, when he was prime minister, wrote that a minister “may have great authority within his department, but within Cabinet he is merely part of a collectivity, just another adviser to the Prime Minister. He can be told what to do and on important matters his only choice is to do or to resign.”(Savoie, 1999)

The Canadian prime minister’s power rests on a solid foundation. The prime minister is selected by the national party, not the parliamentary caucus; prime ministerial tenure is reaffirmed in a leadership review, usually after each general election. Given that prime ministers contribute greatly to their party’s success or failure at the polls, a prime minister whose party wins a general election is usually secure in his or her position. Matheson writes, “As long as the party is convinced that the Prime Minister has the ability to win elections, his power remains unchallenged.”(Matheson, 1976)

The prime minister is also responsible for distributing largesse among the party faithful. Even though this responsibility usually comes after close consultation with the caucus and the parliamentary party, in fact there is no formal requirement that a prime minister must abide by the recommendations of those who may want to direct patronage to deserving members in their constituency. Given that many MPs and cabinet ministers enter politics with the hope of someday receiving a patronage plum, it is therefore unwise to bite the hand that feeds them and challenge the prime minister.(Franks, 1987)

The prime minister is the chair of the cabinet and is therefore the chief agenda setter. Collective cabinet responsibility should theoretically afford senior cabinet ministers the right to determine what can be considered a matter of confidence but, in fact, the prime minister dominates the proceedings.(Sutherland, 1991a) Weller(Weller, 1985), writing about prime ministers in general, notes that the prime minister maintains the right to control the cabinet’s structure and proceedings. “Prime ministers control access to cabinet through the agenda, chair the meetings, summarise the decisions, decide the composition and subject matters of cabinet committees and may limit decisions to meetings of inner or partial cabinets.” He adds that the nucleus of prime ministerial

power has been strengthened in recent years by the development of disciplined political parties, increased media access, a greater range of largesse and the strengthening of central agencies such as the Prime Minister's Office which provide independent sources of information and manipulation independent of the cabinet or the bureaucracy. Following from Weller, Savoie (1999) notes that in the Canadian experience cabinet ministers tend to be docile and fairly quiet. Other than going down in a general election, there is little leverage that a minister can hold over the head of the prime minister. The historical record indicates that unless the prime minister is ejected by the electorate, he or she is virtually impossible to expel, and as such, cabinet revolts in Canada are rare indeed. (Weller, 1994) Given that the prime minister will probably not exit and that any sign of disunity within the cabinet will be pounced upon by the opposition and the media, and make governing more difficult, cabinet ministers are therefore more likely to keep their mouths shut and toe the line. (Matheson, 1976; Weller, 1985)

2.3 Constraints

Despite the popular belief that prime ministers can act as “friendly dictators” should they choose to, the literature is nevertheless inundated with discussions of the constraints that prime ministers face in terms of their decisions, especially in regards to cabinet personnel.¹³ Weller (1985), for example, observes that “prime ministers cannot act purely as dictators. They may get away with what they can; but they cannot habitually ignore their supporters and expect to survive.” He notes, “It is therefore crucial to discover how extensive that freedom to act is and in what circumstances it can be used.” Cabinet ministers may be well aware that it is the prime minister who chooses them to serve in the cabinet in the first place but, as Hockin writes, ministers can of course resign of their own free will and should enough ministers resign *en masse*, then the prime minister may find himself in trouble. (Szablowski, 1977) Furthermore, ministers with

¹³The term “friendly dictator” is borrowed from Jeffrey Simpson’s book of the same name.

their own power base, either within the party, as representatives of certain groups or in particular regions may be in a stronger position if the party or the government is dependent on their support. Even agenda setting power of prime ministers and their ability to determine what is a matter of collective responsibility may be compromised if they find that their own positions are distant from those views of the ministers. Although, the prime minister's control over the cabinet agenda and procedure usually ensures that in most cases the final position adopted collectively by the cabinet is not too far a field from his or her own. (Doern, 1977; Szablowski, 1977) Ministers are of course free to resign if they cannot abide by the prime minister's authority - in fact, according to the convention of collective ministerial responsibility, they are required to. It is not usually the prime minister who resigns from the cabinet - although the threat to do so is often an effective tool to keep ministers in line.

Prime ministers are also constrained by convention although there is a debate over just how much convention actually constrain their actions in managing cabinet personnel once they have been appointed. (Heard, 1991; Punnett, 1977) Sir John A. Macdonald set precedent in 1867 with what is perhaps the most obvious and longstanding convention - representation - which dictates that every province should in theory have a seat in the cabinet, that the number of francophone ministers should roughly reflect the English/French ratio in Canada, the cabinet should reflect the religious breakdown of the country and finally that the cabinet should consist of as few senators as possible as senators are not elected by the public. (Heard, 1991)¹⁴ When combined with the need to draw ministers from the House of Commons, the representation convention presents the prime minister with two pre-existing constraints against total freedom to design the cabinet and he or she wants - prime ministers are restricted to filling their cabinet from a limited talent pool. Matheson (1976) writes that the representation convention "imposes limitations on the Prime Minister's ability to appoint and dismiss ministers because it

¹⁴This religious requirement is no longer adhered to and has been replaced by the need to have women, ethnic and visible minorities represented in the cabinet.

requires that he constantly avoid offending one bloc or segment of the Canadian community and thus may require him to take into his cabinet people who are objectionable to him or who are his personal enemies.”¹⁵ Savoie (1999) notes that because of convention “no Canadian prime minister would appoint a Cabinet that lacked a proper regional, linguistic and gender balance; some have even turned to the Senate to ensure regional balance if the party failed to win a Commons seat in a province or region.”

Just as the representation convention constrains a prime minister’s ability to allocate cabinet seats, so too does it constrain a prime minister who might want to dismiss a minister, but for whom the representation convention does not provide a suitable or viable alternative. Members from small provinces or regions or linguistic groups where the party only won a small number of seats are more likely to be appointed to cabinet and once in, more likely to remain. (Savoie, 1999)

2.4 Ministerial Sackings (resignations)

If prime ministers are caught between the unlimited power of their office and constitutional conventions as far as their relationship with their cabinet ministers is concerned, the questions that remain are when and why do prime ministers dismiss their ministers? The literature on constitutional convention answers this question to a limited degree in so far as the prime minister ultimately has the authority to decide when the convention should be applied.¹⁶(Weller, 1985) For example, Pierre Trudeau experimented briefly by allowing his ministers to voice their internal cabinet differences publicly without any sanction. The experiment quickly came to an end when the disagreements proved

¹⁵This challenges the view put forward in the comparative literature by Huber and Martinez that cabinet personnel management is a trial and error process of finding the most experienced person to handle the job. It also perhaps reinforces Franks’ view that Canadians should be concerned about who governs them because they are for the most part inexperienced amateurs.(Franks, 1987)

¹⁶Weller makes an interesting point when he writes that there is nothing binding about conventions. “A convention is a generally accepted practise that helps make a system work smoothly. Once that general acceptance declines, so that its maintenance is no longer of benefit to all practitioners, its lifespan is limited. If the benefits to be gained from breaking conventions outweigh the costs incurred by the condemnation or ignoring them, conventions will be of little value.”

embarrassing for the government and the Liberal Party.(Heard, 1991)

The power to sack a minister is used as a personnel management tool. Prime ministers drop ministers who fail to make the grade in their portfolios or in cabinet, or remove embarrassing or difficult ministers. In these situations the prime minister acts as an agent for the cabinet, looking out for its best interests to guarantee its survival. Prime ministers also rearrange the cabinet in order to signal changes in policy or to reinforce backing for the prime minister's policy preferences.(Alderman and Cross, 1985) The threat of removal can also ensure compliance with prime ministerial authority. Jean Chrétien famously told his cabinet in their first meeting after the 1993 election that the first cabinet minister to "screw up" would be relegated to the backbenches.(Savoie, 1999) Ministers may also serve as sacrificial lambs and take the blame for government policy failures in order to direct attention away from the prime minister although prime ministers must be careful not to make too many scapegoats lest his own cabinet turn on him. Prime ministers may also sack ministers in order to inject new blood into the cabinet to let backbenchers know that there is upward mobility for ambitious and loyal members. Writing about the United Kingdom, Alderman and Cross (1985) note that the prime ministers use their power to dismiss ministers to sack party rivals and dissident ministers in order to maintain and demonstrate their authority. While it is certainly true that Canadian prime ministers are not likely to surround themselves in cabinet with their enemies, it is nevertheless accurate to say that challengers to the party leadership often find themselves appointed to cabinet and presented with a senior portfolio. By bringing leadership challengers into cabinet, prime ministers are able to silence their staunchest opponents by giving them and their supporters a stake in government and a responsibility to defend it. Of course, by inviting party leadership rivals into the cabinet, prime ministers tie their own hands. The removal of leadership challengers to the backbenches can unleash dissent, divide the parliamentary caucus and make governing more difficult especially if the former minister decides to challenge the government. (Savoie, 1999)

Prime ministers may only be able to sack challengers when they are sure they pose no danger to their position. This was certainly the case with Jean Chrétien who finally dismissed his finance minister Paul Martin Jr. after the date of his retirement had been confirmed.¹⁷

While resignations may be a sign of “determination and steel” needed to be a leader, dismissals may also present certain problems for prime ministers and in fact convey the opposite image.(Punnett, 1977) The prime minister’s job is to keep the government together and not let it fall apart. While most resignations generate little long term attention or consequence, prime ministers nevertheless must tread carefully; too many resignations may indicate a loss of prime ministerial control and can lead ultimately to the loss of government as it did for Bowell and Diefenbaker.(Savoie, 1999) Furthermore, resignations may reflect badly on the prime minister, as the dismissal may suggest his or her poor judgment when appointing the cabinet in the first place. Personnel changes may have a negative consequence on the operations of government, especially if they occur too frequently. In addition, the delicate balance required by the representation principle may not be easily met as the provincial talent pool may be severely drained for the governing party. Savoie (1999) writes, “Dismissing a minister from a region that is underrepresented in the party can create new, more serious political problems for the prime minister as he tries to juggle his cabinet to ensure regional balance.” Ultimately, as Punnett (1977) observes, “the impact of a ministerial resignation will be dependent on a variety of factors - the minister, the issue, the timing, public feeling on the issue, and the manner in which it is handled by the Prime Minister. Most resignations cause little more than a momentary flurry, and Cabinet history is littered with examples of largely inconsequential resignations.” Dissent against the prime minister is very limited. Even prime ministers who were enormously unpopular in their later

¹⁷In their comparative study of cabinet reshuffles Kam and Indridison note that prime ministers use cabinet reshuffles to offset the rules on leadership selection and cabinet management. They argue that reshuffles are most likely to take place when the rules leave prime ministers vulnerable – reshuffles can also be used to undercut cabinet ministers’ incentives to engage in empire building

years (Trudeau and Mulroney) were able to remain in the centre seat without fear of usurpation. The prime minister of course can remove a minister by more subtle means than the demand for a letter of resignation. Ministers whose cabinet worthiness has faded can be given a patronage appointment by Order-in-Council such as elevation to the Senate (if a Senate seat is available) or an extra-parliamentary posting such as the head of a crown corporation, an ambassadorship or a lieutenant governorship.

2.5 Conclusion

The major results from the various literatures that peripherally address the subject of ministerial turnover have been reviewed in this chapter. The key finding that needs to continue into the next chapters is that the process of ministerial turnover is complex. There are a multitude of personal, institutional and political factors that contribute to a minister's exit from the cabinet whether it is voluntary or involuntary. While some of these factors may be restricted to a single form of turnover they may also mutually affect all of the different forms. So far, none of the existing research on ministerial turnover, whether it be Canadian or otherwise, has attempted to account for the independence and/or mutual dependence of factors that produce ministerial turnover. This is largely due to the fact that the different literatures exist independently of one another. Chapter three sets out the groundwork for a theoretical perspective of Canadian ministerial careers that considers all forms of turnover.

Chapter 3

A Longitudinal Perspective of Ministerial Careers and Turnover

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter the four strands of literature examining the different ways a minister's career can end were discussed. Each of these strands has provided insight into how any given form of turnover can take place. However, the major deficiency in most of the literature discussed in Chapter two with respect to understanding ministerial careers is that the three separate strands generally do not interact with each other. A great deal is known about constitutional conventions, legislative turnover and about prime ministerial decision-making but we know very little about how the processes that elicit one form of turnover relate to the processes generating another.

This is a problem if a full picture of ministerial careers is to be developed and understood. A second problem in most of the literature that is reviewed in the previous chapter is the absence of an explicit temporal dimension. Some of the works employ data that spans several years but information on a minister's full career history is not exploited. Of the works that are not exclusively descriptive in nature, these use cross-

sectional data, or cross-sections pooled for only a few time periods. If the dynamics on which ministerial careers rest are to be properly understood, if the interrelatedness among the various forms of turnover is to be derived, then it is necessarily to consider the complete time lines of ministerial careers rather than a snapshot or a piece of a ministerial career.

This chapter develops a theoretical perspective on ministerial careers that will be used in the analyses that follow. The first part of this chapter argues that a longitudinal approach is the best way to conceptualise ministerial careers. This is followed by a proposal that a more complete understanding of ministerial careers can be achieved if each of the different ways that a ministerial career can end are considered simultaneously.

3.2 The Longitudinal Basis of Ministerial Careers

Consider two cases of ministers, one who resigned and one who did not. In 1976 the *Globe and Mail* broke a story in which it was revealed that Jean Chrétien, then the Treasury Board President, had contacted a judge in his riding to "enquire" about the slow pace of criminal proceedings regarding a constituent. Despite the intense media coverage, Chrétien was able to survive as a minister and never exited the cabinet. In 1990, Jean Charest, the minister of state for youth and amateur sport found himself in a similar situation after having contacted a judge about a sports related case. Charest resigned from the cabinet almost immediately.

Here are cases of two cabinet ministers.¹ Both of them were tainted by a political scandal for interfering in the judicial process, yet only one of them was ejected from the cabinet. Both of the cases share similar attributes, the rationale offered by the cabinet ministers was much the same - each was trying to help out a constituent. So why did one

¹Both nevertheless became highly successful politicians. Both eventually led their respective parties. Chrétien served as PM over three consecutive Liberal majority governments; Jean Charest inherited the leadership of the Progressive Conservative Party from Kim Campbell and subsequently left federal politics to take up the leadership of the provincial Liberal Party in Quebec in 1998. He was elected provincial premier in 2003.

minister survive while the other was relegated to the backbenches when both shared a similar exposure to scandal? The answer is simple. Chrétien, already a political veteran in 1976 was a much more difficult target to hit than Charest, a first time junior minister and an amateur. Over the course of a ministerial and parliamentary career, ministers accumulate experience, power and political capital. The scandals that can cut short an amateur minister's promising ministerial career may only have a minor impact later on during that same career when the minister has acquired sufficient experience and resources to handle the press, conduct damage control, demand or collect protection from the cabinet or indeed avoid slipping up in the first place. Hence the more experienced Chrétien survived and the amateur Charest did not.

Despite these examples, it is somewhat puzzling that the majority of students of legislative and cabinet studies in Canada continue to base their conclusions on pooled or cross-sectional accounts of parliamentary behaviour that fail to take into consideration a temporal dimension. If the accumulation of experience enhances a minister's "survivability", why have academics failed to model the phenomena in this manner?

Ministerial careers are not static or stationary affairs. As members of parliament move through portfolios and experiences, whether in parliament or cabinet, they build up experience and influence. At the same time a minister may blunder, make enemies, change parties or shift alliances; attitudes may change as prime ministers come and go. A career is dynamic and many different things can happen to a minister over the course of a career.

Ministers have to face cabinet reshuffles; they may be forced into portfolios that are political hot potatoes, portfolios that can make or break a career. The legislative balance of power in the House of Commons may also challenge a minister's durability. The minority status of a government will impinge upon a prime minister's ability to protect a minister in the event that the House of Commons demands a resignation. Sutherland, for example, considers many of the resignations in Pearson's minority gov-

ernments in the 1960s to be minority casualties.(Sutherland, 1991*b*) Ministers may also encounter personal problems or tragedies that force their exit.² Finally, if the representation principle is to be taken seriously, changes in the seat distribution in the House of Commons may force out, or guarantee the survival of a minister in Cabinet who hails from a particular region or represents a certain community.

Ministerial careers are longitudinal and not discrete events. Discrete events such as scandals can and do occur throughout the course of a career, but the impact these events will have on tenure or turnover is likely related to when they happen within a career. A scandal, all other things being equal, is less likely to have as lasting an effect on a longstanding minister or parliamentarian as it would on an amateur.

If ministers' pasts affect their career paths, then a longitudinal approach to the study of ministerial turnover should be adopted. A sample of the comparative literature (Dowding and Kang, 1998; Woodhouse, 1994; Thompson and Tillotsen, 1999) suggests that a member's prior experience and behaviour will shape/affect future outcomes. For example, Dowding (1998) suggests that ministers who do not resign when caught in a resignation-inducing incident are less likely to survive a second resignation incident.³ Ministers' histories are therefore important as far as their future and their form of exit is concerned. One need not only focus on the negative example of political scandal. Changes in the ministers' careers, such as a reshuffle from low to high importance portfolios will also rearrange the probabilities of exit whether by convention, at the hands of the electorate or by the prime minister.

Unless a longitudinal approach is adopted the possibility of addressing these types of issues is problematic. For example, cross-sectional studies fail to observe when the

²Donald S. McDonald for example, widely considered to be one of the possible successors to Trudeau resigned from Cabinet to spend more time with his wife who was diagnosed with cancer.

³This dissertation does not replicate the Dowding and Kang study in so far as identifying Canadian "resignation issues" in a media content analysis. However, it does record the total number of calls for resignation that a minister faces from the opposition benches in the House of Commons with the hypothesis that ministers who accumulate "many" calls for resignation are more likely to exit the cabinet by way of a reshuffle than their counterparts who are not asked to resign (or asked only infrequently). A more detailed discussion appears in Chapter five and results are provided in Chapter six.

changes in a ministerial career actually occur. As a result, one is unable to judge the impact of time on duration or durability before a change in the member's status occurs. If the career history of a minister is important, the only way to examine ministerial careers and turnover is to conceptualize them longitudinally. Previous studies have made major contributions to the study of tenure but unless these studies are integrated into a new longitudinal framework they are at best incomplete and at worst misleading.

3.3 Ministerial Careers in Time and Space

Studies that employ a longitudinal approach abound in political science and they have become increasingly more popular as tools to study career paths. Advancements in computer technology mean that statistical software applications can now accommodate large longitudinal datasets and estimate models using increasingly sophisticated and computationally intensive statistical methods.

The event history methodology used in this dissertation is elaborated with more detail in Chapter four. However, it is a good idea to briefly outline why a longitudinal approach has been adopted to study ministerial careers. In this thesis I am primarily concerned with the length of time that a minister serves in the cabinet and the manner in which a minister leaves the cabinet after that length of time. The amateurism thesis developed by Sutherland (1991*b*) suggests that as ministers acquire experience they are less likely to make errors that may result in their dismissal. Also, one can hypothesize that more capable ministers will survive in cabinet longer than their less capable colleagues who will be sacked and replaced. (Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding, 2005; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2003) In addition to duration, the characteristics that enhance or diminish ministers' durability should also be considered. Personal characteristics such as a minister's background or province of origin may have a considerable effect on their durability. Likewise, ministers may encounter scandals or other exogenous shocks which may shorten their ministerial tenureship. Finally, the wider political or institu-

tional environment may also play a part in determining whether or not a minister exits the cabinet and in which manner. Traditional cross-sectional data designs are adequate for exploring the effects of covariates that remain static over the course of a minister's career. However, if one hypothesizes that majority status or public opinion also affect ministerial duration, then one needs to adopt a longitudinal approach as there is no way to establish how the presence of the time-varying factors affect durability.

For the purposes of this dissertation three levels of explanatory influences that affect the probability that a minister will resign are considered: the individual characteristics of the minister himself or herself (age, gender, experience), the institutional characteristics of the government and parliament in which the minister serves (majority status, proportion of seats held by the party in the minister's home province, government popularity) and the wider, external political environment. A more detailed treatment of these three levels is provided in Chapter five.

3.4 Integrating the forms of turnover

The previous section outlined why a longitudinal perspective should be adopted to study ministerial careers. This section outlines what precisely will be examined using the longitudinal perspective. Chapter two presented the idea that ministerial exits were the equivalent to ministerial turnover. Why should anyone care about how, why and when ministerial careers end? When a ministerial career ends, we are observing ministerial turnover. However, turnover can manifest itself in a number of mutually exclusive different ways. Ministers can exit because they are obliged to under the rules of the constitution, they may be dropped from cabinet by the prime minister, they may choose to leave voluntarily or accept an offer of a patronage appointment by the prime minister or the minister may leave the cabinet at the hands of the electorate, either through a personal defeat in an election, or a change of government to another party.

As presented in Chapter two there is strong literature concerning these different

forms of turnover, but the literature has developed with a focus on each of these individual forms of turnover. If we are interested in understanding how ministerial careers come to an end, then we need to combine these different forms into a single analysis.

Imagine that one is interested in understanding ministerial turnover and recognize that ministerial turnover can be manifested by ministerial sackings, voluntary retirement/acceptance of Order-in-Council or by constitutional convention (collective or individual ministerial responsibility). How might we study these different events? As demonstrated in Chapter two, most of the existing analyses exclusively examine one or the other form of turnover. Docherty (1994) and Atkinson and Docherty (1992) are interested in legislator turnover, Sutherland is primarily interested in ministerial resignations for individual ministerial responsibility, and numerous authors describe prime ministerial decision-making. There are of course implications with this kind of research design. If, for example, this study were to take Sutherland's approach and focus on ministerial resignations, the simplest strategy would entail taking a cross section of the ministers and then modeling the probability of their exiting the cabinet using logistic regression.⁴ This approach may provide some insights into the frequency of different kinds of ministerial resignations, but the method also presents biased results. First of all, Sutherland's dataset includes only those ministers who actually resigned. By failing to include all of the incidents when ministers do not resign, Sutherland is unable to actually highlight the actual causes of ministerial resignation. Furthermore, Sutherland's dataset includes only those resignations recorded by the Library of Parliament in the record of cabinet attendance. Not only does this record not include every ministerial resignation, it also fails to include cabinet exits for reasons that include electoral

⁴Note that Sutherland does not take this approach. She only presents a descriptive table of the "resignations" recorded by the Library of Parliament. Also note that "resignation" has been defined as the discontinuation of a minister's presence in the cabinet before dissolution of parliament, or before the end of a ministry. Those ministers who were in the cabinet but who subsequently resigned as a result of failing to hold a seat in parliament have not been included. The same is true for those not included when a new parliament was summoned.

defeat, government turnover or retirement.⁵ This presents a problem, as the processes that produce ministerial sackings are not completely independent from the processes that produce exits for constitutional, electoral or personal reasons so that inferences drawn from the censored sample may be biased. Of course there are good reasons to believe that some of the factors that heighten the probability of ministerial sacking also heighten the probability of other forms of exit. It is fairly easy to imagine that minority government status might influence the probability of all the different forms of turnover. Minority status can influence a prime minister to sack a minister who is in trouble and is facing pressure in the House of Commons because he is unable to guarantee collective protection since the opposition can bring down the government on a motion of no confidence or failure to pass a money bill. Minority prime ministers cannot afford to high-handedly ignore all opposition calls for a minister's resignation for fear that failure to take action may in fact bring down the government.

A change in prime minister may also have an effect on different forms of turnover. A minister may choose to accept an offer of a patronage appointment to the Senate or other form of prime ministerial largesse at the time of a prime minister's retirement. Other ministers may decide that a change in prime minister provides a good point in time to retire or step away from politics altogether. This may also be related to an unwillingness to work with the incoming prime minister.⁶ A prime minister may also choose not to include certain ministers in his or her new cabinet either because of personal, professional or political reasons. In effect, these incumbent ministers are sacked. What is seen in the example of prime ministerial change is how a single factor can affect three different kinds of exit. The factors that generate one kind of ministerial exit are not, therefore, independent of the processes that bring about other kinds of exit

⁵There is also the problem that Sutherland's dataset, even when these ministers are excluded is incomplete.

⁶Judy LaMarsh is a well-known case here. One of the key women in the Pearson cabinet, she vowed that she would never serve in a cabinet headed by Pierre Trudeau. When Trudeau won the Liberal Party leadership in April 1968, she was not included in his new cabinet and she chose not to run in the July election.

The best way to handle the multiple forms of exit is to consider each of them simultaneously. By taking this approach (considering exit for constitutional, prime ministerial and personal reasons), the problem that occurs when each exit form is considered in isolation can be avoided and valid inferences of the impact that the various factors have on the different forms of exit can be made. Furthermore, by taking the integrated approach the underlying process of ministerial turnover is more accurately modeled. On any given day, ministers are “at risk” of receiving an Order-in-Council appointment, of being reshuffled to the backbenches or of choosing to voluntarily exit the cabinet. Given that any one form of exit only accounts for 11 to 15 percent of all of ministerial turnover, an accurate model of ministerial turnover must consider all forms of cabinet exit. The same holds true for ministerial sackings. Since the Canadian political system allows for both voluntary and involuntary forms of exit, any model of ministerial turnover must consider this phenomenon.⁷

The first section of this chapter argued in favour of a longitudinal approach to the study of ministerial turnover. The second section argued in favour of simultaneously considering all of the different forms of turnover. When considered together these two components form the basis of a suitable depiction of ministerial careers. Given that it is known that ministers can exit the cabinet in one of several different ways and that the factors that contribute to one form of exit also contribute to the other forms of exit, and lastly that a minister’s history or place in their career path can affect the way that they exit, therefore the best way to understand ministerial careers and turnover is to adopt a longitudinal approach that simultaneously accounts for all forms of exit. This is how ministerial careers are considered in this dissertation.

⁷The voluntary and involuntary theoretical aspect is highlighted in Matland and Studlar.

3.5 Revisiting the literature

To date there have been no attempts to examine ministerial turnover in Canada from a longitudinal perspective. However, longitudinal analyses have been used to examine other forms of turnover among political actors in the comparative literature, especially the American literature. The longitudinal approach has been widely used to examine congressional turnover (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004) presidential appointments (Martinez-Gallardo, 2003) and Supreme Court justice turnover (Zorn and Van Winkle, 2000) in the United States. The longitudinal approach is also the foundation for the most recent work on government termination and survival. (King et al., 1990; Laver, 2003; Warwick, 1992) Nor have longitudinal studies of ministerial career paths been ignored in the comparative literature. In fact, this dissertation has developed at the same time as academic attention has focused on both this subject and the methodology to study it effectively. The compilation of country specific and comparative longitudinal data sets of ministerial duration and the examination of turnover and ministerial movement using both statistical and *a priori* formal models has increased significantly in recent years. In the remainder of this chapter some of the important recent works that take a longitudinal approach to the study of ministerial turnover will be discussed. In particular it will focus on the work of Dowding and Kang (1998), Dewan and Dowding (2005) and Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2003; 2004). None of these works address Canadian ministerial turnover specifically, although Huber and Martinez-Gallardo's pieces are comparative studies that use some Canadian data.⁸

Dowding and Kang initiated the current trend of studying ministerial resignations systematically with the publication of an article presenting a new dataset of every ministerial resignation in the United Kingdom from 1945 to 1997.⁹ In this dataset they

⁸Huber and Martinez-Gallardo's dataset is compiled from a different source from the dataset assembled for this study. Their longitudinal dataset is also organized differently from the dataset used in this study. These differences are detailed below.

⁹Note that like Sutherland they truncate their dataset, they do not include turnover caused by retirement, changes in government following a general election or uncontroversial reshuffles.

record the proximate reason for each ministerial resignation assigning each minister one of eight resignation exit types. Information for each minister is recorded on a yearly basis. By taking into consideration every instance of ministerial resignation, Dowding and Kang settle some of the on-going debate over the extent to which ministers abide by the constitutional conventions of individual and collective ministerial responsibility in the United Kingdom. As they note, “constitutional convention is created through customary behaviour and not defined by one or two cases. To understand when ministers should resign through constitutional convention one needs to discover when they do resign, through the systematic analysis of past cases.”(Dowding and Kang, 1998)

In addition to resignation data, the Dowding-Kang dataset differs from most previous studies of ministerial resignations not only in the scope of the study but also in terms of their organization and methodology. They avoid the common methodological error, present in most previous studies of ministerial resignations, of selection bias on the dependent variable, by including incidents of when ministers do not resign. Dowding and Kang write, “One cannot claim that the causes of ministerial resignation are such-and-such if one examines only the cases where ministers have resigned and those conditions obtain, for there may be a significant number of cases where such-and-such occurred yet the ministers did not resign.”(Dowding and Kang, 1998) These “non-resignations” which fall under the same eight headings as resignations are defined by Dowding and Kang as “any case where the press, a non-political organization or MPs in the House of Commons have suggested that minister should resign ... [n]on-resignations are just as important as resignations if there is to be any attempt to understand the causal process of resignation.”(Dowding and Kang, 1998) In 1998 Dowding and Kang were two of only a few academics interested in ministerial resignations that systematically examined ministerial career paths to determine whether or not a minister’s experience, or the changing environment around them, had any impact on their mode of exit. (See Woodhouse, Page and to a lesser extent Sutherland) The data used in their exploration is a

longitudinal dataset on British ministers from 1945 to 1997. The observations in the dataset are yearly observations of each "resignation incident" combined with a record of whether or not the minister resigned. Throughout the article Dowding and Kang consider the changing trends in ministerial resignation, although they do not include many explanatory variables for a future causal model of ministerial resignation. The article, therefore, remains primarily an influential exploratory work.

The major findings that Dowding and Kang obtain from their exploration are not directly applicable for a study of Canadian ministers as the data is uniquely British and speaks primarily to that experience. For example, Dowding and Kang note that ministers are most likely to exit the cabinet for solidarity purposes, something that only infrequently affects Canadian cabinets where ministers are more likely to "put up and shut up" in the face of personality conflicts in the cabinet. They also point out the effect of the British tabloid press and its hounding of ministers, especially in the Major government which suffered an unprecedented number of resignations in the face of sex scandals. The trend in Canada indicates that Canadian ministers are less frequently caught up in sexual scandals and the press is less likely to pursue incidents of sexual impropriety by cabinet ministers in same manner as the tabloid press in Britain.¹⁰ Dowding and Kang also confirm many previous studies' assertion that ministers do not resign for the errors of their subordinates.(Finer, 1956; Woodhouse, 1994) In fact they argue that ministers do not voluntarily resign even for their own personal errors, rather they have to be forced out by the prime minister.

Perhaps Dowding and Kang's most important contribution is their identification of and call for long term datasets to investigate changes in the adherence to constitutional convention but even more important the establishment of a research design for the study of ministerial turnover that includes not only incidents where ministers resign, but also those incidents where resignations do not take place.

¹⁰Money, influence peddling and conflict of interest appear to excite the press more in Canada

Some of Dowding and Kang's observations are of considerable use for a Canadian study of ministerial turnover. They note for example that the accumulation of non-resignations may deplete a minister's political capital such that even if the prime minister does not wish to sack the minister, the minister may have to go in order to preserve the integrity of the cabinet. This kind of analysis clearly requires a temporal dimension in order to effectively consider the build-up effect of accumulated non-resignations that may or may not precede a resignation.¹¹ Dowding and Kang also observe that the increased number of British resignations is undoubtedly a function of the increased number of portfolios and cabinet ministers who administer them.¹²

They also highlight that the number of ministerial resignations appear to drop off in the period preceding and following a general election. This trend is matched in the Canadian experience.¹³ Prime ministers are unlikely to reshuffle their cabinets in the period immediately preceding an election lest it serve as an indication that something is wrong with the government. Also, prime ministers need not do any severe reshuffling immediately after an election as the winning government usually experiences a honeymoon period in the polls while the media and opposition parties are usually a little less venomous in their attacks on the government.

Nevertheless their basic conclusion resonates throughout the remainder of this dissertation: "We can see that there is great variation in ministerial reactions to resignation issues, but generally speaking ministers resign when they are forced to, rather than because of constitutional conventions they feel the need to abide by. Resignations signify little more than the needs of the Prime Minister and the governing party and the falling political standing of the ministers concerned." (Dowding and Kang, 1998)

A direct replication of the Dowding-Kang dataset using Canadian ministerial data

¹¹As indicated above, Dowding and Kang's resignation dataset which consists of resignation and non-resignation events is not replicated in this dissertation. Although, a minister's accumulated calls for resignation are considered and discussed in more detail in Chapter five.

¹²A similar pattern existed for Brian Mulroney who presided over the largest cabinets in Canadian history.

¹³This does not include the spike that occurs in the event of a government turnover or electoral attrition.

would be unwise without some modification and amendment. Their dataset does not take into consideration unique Canadian constitutional conventions that affect cabinet composition. Additional variables based on provincial representation, ethnic or linguistic background and gender are needed to take constitutional conventions into consideration.

There is also a concern over Dowding and Kang's unit of observation. Their dataset is broken down by "resignation incident." These observations record whether or not the minister implicated in the incident resigns following the incident itself. By adopting this unit of observation instead of using a minister/period under observation, Dowding and Kang are unable to consider the effect of a minister's portfolio, cabinet or parliamentary experience on whether or not they resign in the face of the resignation incident. Given that ministerial experience undoubtedly has an impact on the probability of exit, this factor should be included.

Third, Dowding and Kang's dataset is not sufficiently set up to consider time-varying covariates such as public opinion or changes in the balance of power in the House of Commons. Were they to breakdown their resignation incidents into temporal units, time-varying covariates could be factored into their analysis. The adoption of individual temporal units would also bypass the need to identify non-resignations; if the units of observation are sufficiently small enough such as a day or a week, then any observation that does not contain a resignation or turnover episode is by definition a "non-resignation". It is then only necessary to carefully identify those independent variables that prompt ministerial turnover whatever its form. By taking this approach one can also include all of the omitted ministers and consider their ministerial experience even though their tenure did not end in a resignation.

Lastly, Dowding and Kang do not actually systematically account for how, why or when ministerial careers actually end. The development of a causal model was not the purpose of their article. Instead they intended to present the dataset that might serve

as a foundation for future research. This point is raised simply to highlight how this particular research project differs from Dowding and Kang's.

A recent work that more directly bears on certain aspects of this dissertation can be found in Dewan and Dowding (Dewan and Dowding, 2005). The authors derive an empirically tested instrumental variables (IV) model of prime ministers' decisions to dismiss ministers in order to offset the negative effects of a resignation issue as reflected in public opinion polls. Dewan and Dowding's work can be thought of as a significant advance in the study of ministerial turnover because they not only utilize a longitudinal dataset of ministerial resignations but they also develop a predictive model of ministerial resignation. Their study also sheds considerable light on the prime minister's decision-making balancing act.

Before discussing the findings of the Dewan and Dowding, it might be useful to set out the differences between their study and the research conducted in this dissertation. First of all, Dewan and Dowding's model is a model of government popularity change. They are interested in the factors that affect a prime minister's decision to sack or not sack their ministers with the expectation that ministerial resignations will have an effect on government popularity.

They do not model the likelihood of exit by electoral defeat or voluntary removal, rather they model change in government popularity. The approach adopted in this dissertation accounts for both voluntary and involuntary termination of ministerial careers. In addition, the approach to understanding how ministerial careers end in this dissertation is not presented as a study of government popularity or an exclusive study of prime ministerial decision-making. Instead, it demonstrates which political factors produce the patterns of ministerial turnover by accounting for all types of turnover. In this capacity, the topic addressed in this dissertation is broader than what is considered by Dewan and Dowding.

A second major difference between this work and the work of Dewan and Dowding

has already been addressed. In the analysis that follows in Chapter six, an attempt is made to capture the longitudinal nature of ministerial careers by using the full career path data of all of the ministers in the sample. Dewan and Dowding do not have full career path data for each of the ministers in their dataset so they are not able to flesh out any conclusions related to time duration in the cabinet or careers in parliament

Despite these differences, the results that Dewan and Dowding produce are very important to the model developed in this dissertation, particularly in regard to ministerial exit at the hands of the prime minister. Dowding and Dewan do not attempt to provide a longitudinal account of ministerial careers, although they do make use of a longitudinal dataset. Rather they attempt to “estimate the corrective effect on government popularity of a resignation where there has been a resignation issue.”(Dewan and Dowding, 2005) They expect that resignation issues negatively affect government popularity although the extent to which government popularity varies will depend on the corrective effect of the corresponding resignations should one take place. They estimate the corrective effect using a variety of political and economic variables by employing an instrumental variable (IV) regression; their dependent variable is the government’s quarterly lead in the public opinion polls. Dewan and Dowding discover that if a resignation receives front page or editorial coverage, then government support drops 21 percent, this figure adjusts upward by 37 percent if there is a corresponding resignation. However, they also find that the effect of a resignation issue which does not receive front page or editorial coverage has a positive effect on government support with a corresponding resignation having a downward effect. Indeed, if the resignation issue has not received high media coverage, then the effect of a corresponding resignation reduces support overall by two percent.

Dewan and Dowding’s article sets the stage for a question that is more closely related to this dissertation, which is effectively the inverse of the research question they ask. Rather than ask what effect ministerial resignations have on government popular-

ity, this dissertation introduces the question what effect does public opinion (and other variables) have on different forms of ministerial turnover. In order to answer this question Dewan and Dowding's dataset and methodology require rearrangement.

The last major works that I want to consider are two pieces (2003; 2004) recently written by John D. Huber and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo. Both pieces address the subject of ministerial duration, albeit in individual portfolios rather than the cabinet as a whole. Specifically, Huber and Martinez-Gallardo are interested in determining the political factors that affect cabinet experience measured as portfolio duration; they are also interested in determining how these factors differ from the factors that influence overall government survival. Their research is very closely related to the government survival literature in that they employ many of the same variables used to estimate models of government survival given that the factors that bring about the termination of a government can be the same that bring about the end of an individual minister's tenure in a government portfolio. Huber and Martinez-Gallardo write

Although cabinet stability and experience are related, they are not the same thing and they are not necessarily related to the institutional environment by the same mechanisms. In the literature on cabinet instability, for example, Westminster systems and single party majorities increase cabinet duration, while minority governments decrease it. Our tests on cabinet experience indicate that minority government has no effect and Westminster systems and single party majorities lead to less experience. But the cabinet instability literature also shows that fractionalized party systems lead to short-lived cabinets and we find that the same effect exists for cabinet experience. (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2004)

Pointing to Canada and the United Kingdom, they note that while Canadian and British cabinets are famously durable, the members of the cabinet frequently leave or change from one ministry to another. At any given point in time the cabinet membership will

probably be quite different from the first cabinet formed when the party came to power, or when the government ends.(Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2004)

Huber and Martinez-Gallardo's work is related to the research conducted in this dissertation in a number of ways. First, their study of ministers is expressly concerned with ministerial tenure - specifically, they are interested in why ministers last as long as they do in certain key portfolios. This dissertation is not specifically concerned with portfolio duration *per se* although it does recognize that ministers who hold certain portfolios are more likely to remain in cabinet longer than others. Instead, this dissertation is concerned with overall ministerial duration in the cabinet measured from the point that a minister is first appointed to cabinet until he or she exits voluntarily or involuntarily. From this perspective Huber and Martinez-Gallardo's interest in portfolio duration is only a single element of overall ministerial duration. There is one key difference between their study and the present one. Ministerial duration is important in this dissertation in so far as duration has an end point and this dissertation is interested in explaining how, when and why this endpoint comes about. The Huber-Martinez-Gallardo data is only concerned with the actual duration of the portfolios; how the ministers themselves leave is of no concern. The individual attributes of the minister, apart from the overall government and portfolio experience, are of no consequence for Huber and Martinez-Gallardo.

This difference between duration and exit is reflected in the way that the datasets in both studies are organized. Huber and Martinez-Gallardo's data is impressive. They have collected data on every "major" portfolio change in nineteen parliamentary democracies. The time frame of their study is 1945-1999.¹⁴ The units of observation are recorded as portfolios held by individual ministers. A new observation is added to the dataset every time a portfolio changes hands; each observation includes an indicator of the first day that a minister holds the portfolio as well as the last day that they hold the

¹⁴For a detailed description of the dataset see Huber and Martinez-Gallardo

portfolio. By breaking down each portfolio to a day-by-day level Huber and Martinez-Gallardo are able to determine the composition of any individual cabinet at any point in time as well as determine the changing levels of ministerial experience in individual portfolios at any point in time. The organization of the Huber-Martinez dataset corresponds to what Peterson (1991) refers to as “duration” data. Each observation records the unit of analysis (unique minister in a portfolio) and the start and end dates of their tenure. The span between the start and end dates is the dependent variable in Huber and Martinez’s ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of portfolio duration.¹⁵ Huber and Martinez’s decision to employ an OLS regression is surprising given the well-known limitations (problems associated with left censoring and the shape of the distribution of the residuals around the time variable which are seldom normal) associated with OLS when working with duration data.¹⁶

The dataset constructed for this dissertation follows a similar longitudinal model as Huber and Martinez. However, this dataset is organized along the lines of what Peterson (1991) calls the “event history approach.” Here the dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator that records whether or not an event, in this case an exit from the cabinet, occurred. At each observation point a unique individual, regardless of portfolio, is coded as either a zero (if they did not exit the cabinet) or a one (if they exit the cabinet). There are as many zero and one codings as there are days/weeks/months for each individual minister. Rather than concentrating on the actual span between start and end dates, each minister in the cabinet is allocated an observation for each day (or whatever time period is selected) that they are present in the cabinet. The sequential number of time units experienced by each individual minister records duration. By adopting an event history approach this dataset is able to incorporate time-varying covariates such as public opinion into the dataset and ultimately the model of ministerial tenureship. Further-

¹⁵Huber and Martinez actually take the average of the durations in the ten most important portfolios for each country and regress the average duration on a series of independent variables.

¹⁶This concern is to an extent remedied in their 2003 article when they employ an event history model using the same dataset.

more, organizing the data in this matter suitably prepares the data to be examined using event history modeling techniques instead of ordinary least squares regression. This methodology will be discussed with more detail in the next chapter.

Many of the concerns raised above regarding the use of OLS regression to model duration data were subsequently addressed by Huber and Martinez-Gallardo in 2003.¹⁷ This paper more closely resembles the approach taken in this dissertation. Using the same data, Huber and Martinez-Gallardo examine factors that influence individual turnover in the cabinet. This time they argue that cabinet turnover is “the result of a talent allocation problem faced by party leaders.” They argue that party leaders engage in a process of trial and error involving the appointing, dismissing and reshuffling of ministers until the best talent is discovered. Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2003) The goal of the paper as the authors point out is to identify the political variables that influence the way in which the talent allocation process unfolds. Huber and Martinez-Gallardo identify a series of variables as well as utilize the well-known variables used in the government survival literature to model this process as government turnover often but not always results in ministerial turnover.

In order to model this process Huber and Martinez-Gallardo switch from using an OLS regression and adopt a Cox semi-parametric competing risks event history model. This is the same econometric technique that is used to model Canadian cabinet minister turnover in this dissertation; a full specification of the model is outlined in Chapter four. As alluded to earlier, event history models are more appropriate tools to examine phenomena in which the variable of interest is the time until an event occurs. The Cox semi-proportional method allows the authors to model portfolio duration without having to make assumptions about the shape of the hazard function.(Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2003) Finally, by choosing to use a competing risks framework, the relationship between selected covariates and the rate of occurrence of failures of more

¹⁷For more on the problems associated with modeling duration data using ordinary least squares regression see: Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004), Allison (1984)and Cleves et al.(2002)

than one type can be modeled. In this way Huber and Martinez-Gallardo are able to treat reshuffled ministers as “absorbing events.” That is to say when a minister is reshuffled, he or she does not experience a terminal event and is not removed from the dataset as in a non-competing risks model. By adopting this approach Huber and Martinez-Gallardo are able to move beyond simply looking at portfolio duration without consideration for the individual in the portfolio and instead start to consider ministerial tenure in the cabinet until the minister experiences a terminating event. This is the same approach adopted in this dissertation although a different set of terminating events to mark ministerial turnover is used.

Huber and Martinez-Gallardo use the same dataset from their 2004 article to estimate their talent allocation model.¹⁸ They also choose to continue organizing their data as duration data rather than event history data still making it impossible to incorporate time-varying covariates into the model. This means that the key variable of interest is still the span between the start and end dates in each portfolio held by a unique individual. The time units are measured in weekly intervals. However, instead of averaging out the portfolio durations into a single record for each country, Huber and Martinez decide to leave their dataset as is and introduce an event variable which records whether or not the portfolio terminated with a cabinet termination event or if the minister was simply reshuffled.

Huber and Martinez continue to restrict their observations to the top ten portfolios as determined by their index of longest held portfolios and the Laver and Hunt country index of portfolio importance. (Laver and Hunt, 1992) The authors contend that the most important portfolios are those that possess the longest durations as these portfolios will have the best and most talented individuals at their helms and will therefore experience fewer turnovers. This appears to be a logical train of thought but its applicability to the Canadian case may be inappropriate given that prime ministers need to fill cabinet

¹⁸They omit France for this piece.

positions by the representational criteria and not always according to who is the best person for the job. Indeed a cursory examination of cabinet portfolio durations (excluding the prime minister and portfolios held by the prime minister) in Canada since 1957 reveals some obvious major posts at the top of the list (finance, foreign affairs, treasury board) but also some oddities – the President of the Wheat Board which tops the list! It is possible that Canada's unique nature and constitutional conventions necessitate a focus away from simply the portfolio to the individual who holds the portfolio. Indeed, many ministers often hold multiple portfolios, or certain regionally specific portfolios (President of the Wheat Board, Minister of Fisheries) are given to certain individuals by virtue of the representation principle or the lack of alternative candidates for the position.

Another major contribution made by Huber and Martinez-Gallardo is their inclusion of a variety of variables "that measure the uncertainty that party leaders face about individual talent, the importance of skills and experience among ministers, the degree of trust among ministers and the constraints on appointing and dismissing ministers."¹⁹ In addition to these variables Huber and Martinez-Gallardo also include the standard set of variables used to model government survival and termination. Many of these variables are only useful when employed in a comparative perspective and so serve little or no value in a single case study of Canadian ministerial turnover. However, some of them are very useful indeed and are included in the model of Canadian ministerial turnover. Variables included are: minority government, effective number of parties, electoral volatility, last election, size of minister's party and size of assembly. The selection and measurement of these variables will be reviewed with more detail in Chapter five. Variables included in the Huber and Martinez-Gallardo model but left out of the model of Canadian ministerial turnover include variables pertaining to coalition government status since there have been no coalition governments in Canada, government

¹⁹For a complete list of variables see: Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2003); the government survival variables are also included in Huber and Martinez-Gallardo or can be found in King et al.

heterogeneity owing to lack of data for the time period under examination, investiture requirement as there is no investiture requirement in Canada, age of democracy which is perfectly correlated with the time variable, ministerial autonomy, policy value of portfolios, extreme minister, minister left-right owing to lack of data for the total time period under consideration.

What do Huber and Martinez-Gallardo discover in their new model? The findings in the second article echo those found in the first: ministers in coalition governments are more stable than those in single party majorities. The value of the Huber-Martinez paper for this dissertation may not be in their results but rather their questions. As they note, "our measures of these variables are often crude and indirect." They add that, "the results ... suggest that an important pathway for further research will be to develop better empirical measures of how personnel decisions are made across different types of parties, of the autonomy that prime ministers have in making dismissals and appointments, and of the institutional prerogatives of ministers themselves to shape policy outcomes." (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2003)

Huber and Martinez Gallardo's conclusions, although informative, need not be adopted as gospel truth when considering the Canadian case. Their analysis is comparative by design; Canada is only one of eighteen countries in the study. Their primary conclusions regarding political systems that employ proportional representation electoral systems or coalition governments are not applicable for this study as the Canadian case is characterized by a majoritarian electoral system and has never experienced a coalition government. Huber and Martinez-Gallardo's conclusions are used to explain that cabinet appointments and dismissals are roughly a talent allocation process; although the authors admit that "our measures of [the] variables are often crude and indirect." (2004: 27).

The appointment and dismissal of Canadian cabinet ministers certainly contains elements of the talent allocation dynamic. Nielsen and Goldenberg provide numerous ex-

amples regarding the consideration that prime ministers and their senior advisors take into account when appointment their (first) cabinets. It is clear that great efforts are made to ensure that cabinet ministers are at least marginally competent and that they will not embarrass the prime minister or the governing party. However, and with the exception of ministers appointed to prestige portfolios, ministers are not regularly appointed to cabinet based on their occupational or policy expertise. In this manner, Canadian MPs, cabinet ministers and prime ministers echo and reflect their British counterparts who Anthony King has described as office motivated and generally without hardcore policy preferences.

Huber and Martinez-Gallardo's assertion that unsuitable cabinet ministers are characterized by shorter ministerial careers is a perspective shared in this dissertation. However, the variables that they employ to explain the differences between political systems are for the most part inappropriate for this study. Variables more suitable for the Canadian example are introduced in Chapter 5 and operationalized in Chapter 6.

3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have sought to layout the two major theoretical components of how ministerial careers should be studied. In the first section, I argued that a longitudinal approach should be adopted. The rationale for this stems from the idea that ministerial careers move through time and space. Discrete (spatial) events can occur over the course of a career that can alter the probabilities of experiencing one kind of cabinet exit relative to another. Also, careers move through time. This suggests that the duration of time spent in cabinet or the legislature may be fundamentally related to the factors that bring about any given form of a cabinet-exiting event. This is indeed one of the central pillars of the amateurism debate.

The second theoretical component highlights the necessity of considering each form of turnover jointly. Because the factors that produce one type of cabinet-exit event may

also affect other forms, this dissertation argues that it is necessary to simultaneously consider each type of exit in order to approximate the true pattern of turnover observed in the cabinet. For example, long serving ministers are less likely to be reshuffled by the prime minister and more likely to leave voluntarily either to return to private life or to take up a patronage appointment offered by the prime minister. On the other hand, inexperienced ministers with shorter durations and therefore less experience are more susceptible to scandal or policy failure. As a consequence they face a higher risk of being removed to the backbenches either as a punishment or as a means to deflect critical attention away from the government.

Finally, the last portion of this chapter reviewed some recent works that bear on the analysis which is provided in the next chapters. Each work produced interesting results; however, each work also departs in significant ways from the scope of the analysis that follows. Up until now a great deal of care has been taken to address what has been done and what needs to be done concerning modeling ministerial careers. From this point forward an original conceptualization of Canadian ministerial careers will be exclusively discussed.

Chapter 4

An Event History Methodology

4.1 Introduction

Chapter three presented the case that ministerial careers and cabinet exits should be studied longitudinally. In this way both the full ministerial career and multiple forms of cabinet exit can be taken into consideration. Having presented the case for the longitudinal approach to the study of ministerial resignations, it is now necessary to present a methodology that can best approximate this phenomenon.

This chapter presents an event history model of Canadian ministerial careers and their terminations. Event history analysis is the most appropriate econometric tool to study not only the causal mechanisms of ministerial exit but also the length of time of a minister's duration in Cabinet prior to an exit. The discussion begins with a brief review of event history analysis; it is followed by the presentation of the precise model used in this dissertation. To jump to the conclusion, Canadian ministerial careers will be modeled using a Cox proportional hazard competing risks model.

Event history models are a class of econometric models that are concerned with the patterns and determinants of the occurrence of an event. Yamaguchi (1990) writes that event history analysis is concerned with the patterns and causes of change. Cleves et al. (2002) write that event history analysis is concerned with analyzing the time to

the occurrence of an event. Jones (1994) notes that event history analysis “allows us to assess the factors that produce events.” The use of an event history model allows researchers to make and examine hypotheses regarding the distributional nature of time as it relates to a series of covariates (both static and time-varying) to the occurrence of an event.

Event history analysis is not a new statistical methodology although its widespread use among political scientists is recent. Event history analysis’ origins are found in the realms of demography, biostatistics and engineering: the focus of study in these areas is mortality, whether it be the death of an individual patient or a mechanical process. Researchers in these areas have used event history analysis (sometimes named survival, duration or time-to-event analysis) to assess the effectiveness of a treatment or a process on extending the lifespan of a patient or a mechanical process; economists have also used the technique to study employment and unemployment trends. The terminology may seem somewhat morbid when dealing with phenomena in the social sciences but the logic still applies. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) point out that “the premise of event history analysis is to model both the duration of time spent in the initial state and the transition to a subsequent state...” Certainly, this premise is as applicable to social phenomena as it is to medical or mechanical phenomena.

4.2 Why Event History Models?

The rationale for the use of event history models over other statistical techniques to model time to event phenomena is well documented. Allison (1984) writes, “Although event histories are ideal for studying the causes of events, they typically possess two features - censoring and time-varying explanatory variables - that create major problems for standard statistical procedures such as multiple regression.”

4.2.1 Censoring

Censoring takes place when an individual's full duration is truncated, either at the beginning, at the end, or both the beginning and the end. Right censoring occurs when an individual's duration is cut off at the end (on the right hand side of the time line). Right censoring is fairly common in event history analysis as many studies end before the completion of the subjects' duration. Indeed, this is the case for this study which concludes on January 1, 2000 while Prime Minister Chrétien's Cabinet was still in office. Right censoring can be problematic if not properly accounted for.

Consider two hypothetical cabinet ministers. Both were appointed to Cabinet following the 1997 election. On January 1, 2000 one of the cabinet ministers is reshuffled to the backbenches and the second one does not- she survives. However, because the study ends on January 1, 2000 both ministers are recorded as having the same "duration" (30 months) as their start and end dates in the dataset are identical, even though the two cases are clearly different: one minister has experienced a terminating event and the other has not. In this case, the minister who remains in Cabinet is treated as censored because her span, although ended in the dataset, continues into the unknown future in reality. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) caution, "... if censored and uncensored cases are treated equivalently, then parameter estimates from a model treating the duration time as a function of covariates may be misleading (that is, the relationship between the covariates and the duration times may be under- or over-stated)." Table 4.1 provides a list of the censored and uncensored observations in the dataset; also, recall Figure 2.2 from Chapter two that graphically depicts the different forms of cabinet exit.

Left censoring refers to an individual's span being truncated at the beginning (on the left hand side). In this case, the researcher is left unaware of whether or not an individual has been at risk of experiencing an event for a short or long period of time prior to the onset of the study. Left censoring presents more of a challenge for the researcher to accommodate. However, in the case of this dissertation, the problem of

Table 4.1: Censored and uncensored exits

	1867-1957	1957-2000	1867-2000
<i>Uncensored</i>			
Order in Council	67	31	98
Exit Federal Politics	40	52	92
Reshuffled	20	54	74
Subtotal	127	137	264
<i>Censored</i>			
Government Turnover	91	67	158
Election Defeat	58	81	139
Died	20	3	23
End of Study	0	35	35
Subtotal	169	186	355
Total	296	323	619

left censoring has been averted by starting the dataset in 1957 when the Progressive Conservatives were elected to government for the first time since 1930. By selecting this date, none of the incoming ministers had previous ministerial experience and thus none are left-censored. Event history analysis is capable of handling both left and right-censored models whereas OLS regression is unable to distinguish between uncensored and censored observations.¹

4.2.2 Time-varying covariates

Event history analysis provides another advantage over regression models because it is able to consider the effects of time-varying covariates whereas regression models treat all covariates as static. Even though time-varying covariates are easily incorporated into event history models, a number of caveats have been raised. Allison (1984) notes that the inclusion of time-varying covariates increases the computational costs of the event history model depending on the frequency and number of the covariates as well as the number of observations at risk of an event. On a related matter he warns that the

¹For more on how censored observations are considered by event history models see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004)

use of time-varying covariates also necessitates obtaining information not only for the explanatory variable each time it occurs but also for each individual in the dataset. “If an event occurred at time 10, and 15 individuals were at risk at that time, the values of the explanatory variables at time 10 must be known for all 15 individuals. Typically, that would require that the explanatory variables be measured continuously over time.” (Allison, 1984) While this poses no problem when the time intervals in the continuous process match those of the time-varying covariate, the situation is seldom the case and approximating assumptions (lags) or linear interpolation needs to be employed. Despite Allison’s concerns, most researchers who use time-varying covariates can breathe a sigh of relief knowing that computer technology has developed considerably since his concerns were first raised in 1984. Most computer hardware and statistical software packages can now handle time-varying covariates although extra resources may be required depending on the size of the dataset.

A final note regarding the usefulness of event history models is raised by Cleves et al. (2002) who observe that although the problem of censoring does indeed create problems for OLS regression and its application to duration data, they can, for the most part be overcome. Rather, they suggest that the most significant reason why event history analysis is more appropriate to study duration data lies with the assumed distribution of the residuals. They write, “In linear regression, the residuals are assumed to be distributed normally ... the simple fact is that the assumed normality of time to an event is unreasonable for many events.” They add, “One other problem is that a time-to-failure problem is always positive, while theoretically, the normal distribution is supported on the entire real line.” (Cleves, Gould and Gutierrez, 2002)²

²This was a problem that was faced in the early studies of cabinet duration which sometimes predicted cabinets with negative durations. For more on the distinction between duration and durability see Laver (2003).

4.3 Continuous vs. discrete time methods

Event history models fall into two categories: continuous time and discrete time models. Continuous time models assume that the transition from one state to another can happen at any point in time whereas discrete time models specify that the transition can only take place within or at the end of discrete intervals. The difference between the government turnover process in Canada and the United States highlights the difference between the continuous and discrete time formation. In Canada, parliament can be dissolved at any point in time should the government lose the confidence of the House of Commons or the prime minister request a dissolution of parliament to call an election. If the duration of the Canadian government were to be adequately modeled using an event history model the continuous time approach should be adopted otherwise there would be no way to distinguish between short and long-lived governments. Alternatively, government duration in the United States is ideally suited for the discrete time approach as each government is constitutionally mandated to last only four years. As the Canadian-American example demonstrates, whether or not to use a continuous or discrete time formulation depends entirely on the research problem at hand. One should also note that discrete time models might actually approximate their continuous time counterparts depending on the unit of time under observation. Allison (1984) writes, "In practice, time is always measured in discrete units, however small. When these discrete units are very small, it is usually acceptable to treat time as if it were measured on a continuous scale. On the other hand, when the time units are large - months, years, or decades - it is more appropriate to use discrete-time methods." He also notes that discrete time models almost always give results that are similar to continuous time models and that the decision to use either a discrete-time or continuous-time model should be made on the basis of computational cost and convenience. (Allison, 1984) One reason in favour of using a discrete time approach stems from the intuitive ease with which these models can handle time-varying covariates. As long as the data is

available, time-varying covariates can be included at each of the discrete intervals. This is an advantage that simple continuous time models cannot accomplish. Although, it should be noted that proportional hazards models can be easily extended to allow for time-varying covariates.

4.3.1 The dependent variable?

Peterson (1991) observes that there appears to be some confusion as to what precisely constitutes the dependent variable in event history analysis. This confusion probably stems from one of two points of contention. The first is Allison's early, inaccurate remark that the dependent variable in event history analyses is the hazard rate.³ The second arises from the differences in the continuous and discrete time approaches. According to Peterson (1991) and later Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004), the dependent variable when using event history analysis is one of two things: when using the 'event history' approach, typically associated with discrete time approaches, the dependent variable is a binary indicator, a 0 or a 1, that indicates whether or not an event occurred during that time period. Describing the dataset and application of the event history approach to states' adoption of abortion legislation, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones observe,

The first column of data gives an identification number for each state. The second column of data is comprised of a sequence of zeros and ones. A zero denotes that in the legislative session, no restrictive abortion legislation was adopted - i.e. no event occurrence is observed. A one denotes the adoption of restrictive abortion legislation - i.e. the event occurs. For discrete-time data, this is generally the form of the dependent variable used in an event history model. Finally, the third column gives the year of the legislative session in which the policy was adopted. For discrete-time

³Allison (1984) writes, "It is important to realize that the hazard is an unobserved variable, yet it controls both the occurrence and the timing of events. As such, it is the fundamental dependent variable in an event history model."

data, the dependent variable, although different in form from the actual duration time, conveys the same information as the duration time.(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004)

When using the duration approach, which is associated with continuous time models, the dependent variable records the total duration before the event occurs. Clearly, the use of time-varying covariates requires the dataset to be organized using the event history approach. If there are no time-varying covariates which influence an individual's probability of experiencing an event then results derived from the event history and duration approaches should be identical.

4.3.2 States, durations and events

Three basic concepts in event history analysis are: states, duration and events. States simply refers to the condition or status in which the unit of analysis exists at any given point in time. In the case of cabinet ministers they exist in one state only: they serve in the Cabinet. Durations are the lengths of time in which the unit of analysis spends in a specific state. In order to define duration it is necessary to identify the state, the time of entry to the state and the time of exit. In the case of cabinet ministers this is a straightforward process. The time of entry is defined as the date that the MP is appointed to the Cabinet and the time of exit is the date that they leave. Complications may arise when dealing with cabinet ministers who after having served and exited from the Cabinet, return at a later date. This situation will be discussed later. Lastly, the event marks the transition from one state to another. In the case of cabinet ministers the event is marked by the minister's exit from the Cabinet. Event history data tracks individuals from a starting point until they experience an event. In the circumstance that an individual does not experience an event before the last observation period ends, then the individual is treated as right-censored.

The preceding paragraph alludes to the existence of a risk set which consists of a

sample of individuals who are at risk of experiencing an event. In continuous event history models, individuals are at risk of experiencing the event at any point in time whereas in discrete event history models, individuals only face the risk of experiencing an event at discrete points in time. However, once the individual experiences the event, they exit the risk set. Should any individuals remain in the risk set at the end of the period of study, they are treated as right-censored.

The nature of the risk set raises some considerations.⁴ A well-thought out starting point for the study must be established. Failure to do so can result in left-censoring problems which may bias results. Left censoring is an issue when observations begin after the individual has entered the risk set. Event history models are predicated on the belief that the duration spent in some state has an effect on the individual experiencing an event. This duration affects the probability of exit. In the event that an individual's duration is not fully observed (i.e. it is truncated at the beginning), coefficients generated from this incomplete duration can result in biased estimates of the covariates. (Yamaguchi, 1990)

4.3.3 Hazard Functions

Peterson's earlier clarification of the dependent variable draws attention to one of the central concepts in event history analysis: the hazard function. Before one is able to specify the hazard function a few preliminary steps are in order.⁵ First, T is defined as a non-negative random variable that denotes the time until the failure of an event - the actual survival time is t . The possible values of T have a probability distribution $f(T)$ and a cumulative distribution function, $F(t)$ which are expressed as:

$$f(t) = \frac{dF(t)}{d(t)} = F'(t) \tag{4.1}$$

⁴These considerations are discussed with more detail by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004)
⁵This process is directly borrowed from Cleves et al. (2002) Similar processes can be found in Box Steffensmeier and Jones and others with a slightly different notation.

and

$$F(t) = \int_0^t f(u)du = \Pr(T \leq t) \quad (4.2)$$

However, rather than referring $f(t)$ or $F(t)$ most researchers prefer to use T 's survivor function $S(t)$ or the hazard function $h(t)$. The survivor function is the probability that there is no failure event prior to t and is simply the reverse cumulative distribution function of T . The survivor function is expressed as:

$$S(t) = 1 - F(t) = \Pr(T > t) \quad (4.3)$$

Note how the probability distribution, cumulative distribution function and survival function are related:


$$f(t) = \frac{dF(t)}{dt} = \frac{d}{dt}\{1 - S(t)\} = -S'(t) \quad (4.4)$$

Figure 4.1 presents the Kaplan-Meier survivor function for all uncensored ministerial durations in the dataset. The Kaplan-Meier estimator provides a non-parametric estimate of the survival function $S(t)$. The graphical representation of the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival function is presented as a series of descending horizontal steps, which when a large enough sample is taken increasing approximates the true survival function of the population. The Kaplan-Meier estimate at any time t is given by

$$\hat{S}(t) = \prod_{j|t_j \leq t} \left(\frac{n_j - d_j}{n_j} \right) \quad (4.5)$$

Figure 4.1 reveals that when all forms of ministerial exit are pooled together, about fifty percent of the cabinet will have exited after fifty months (a little over four years). However, the pooled model may be somewhat misleading as will be demonstrated below in the discussion on competing risks.

Figure 4.1: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Function 1867-2000 - Pooled Exits



The hazard function is the most commonly referred-to function in event history analysis. Recall that the main interest of event history analysis is the analysis of the time to the occurrence of an event. To this, one can add a series of covariates to determine what effects they have on the probability of an event occurring. The hazard function is simply the probability that an individual survives until time t given that they have not experienced an event prior to that point in time. It is expressed as:

$$h(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{\Pr(t + \Delta t > T > t | T > t)}{\Delta t} \quad (4.6)$$

The relationship between the hazard function, the survival function and the probability density function can be expressed as:

$$h(t) = \frac{f(t)}{S(t)} \quad (4.7)$$

Many problems in the social sciences can be thought of in terms of event history analysis. In the case of this dissertation, the research questions can easily be rephrased in event history terms: given that a minister has served in the Cabinet for t periods, what is the probability that he or she will exit in the next period (how)? Or, given that a minister has served in the Cabinet for t periods, what is the probability that he or she will exit the Cabinet in the next period in a particular manner (when)? The “why do ministers exit the Cabinet?” question requires that a series of covariates be included into the model to determine how the hazard rate changes when the covariates are included. It can then be determined, given the different values in the covariates, how much the risk of an event occurring increases or decreases. When the hazard rate is shaped by both time dependence and covariates then the hazard rate can be expressed as:

$$h(t|X) = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{\Pr(t + \Delta t > T > t | T > t, X)}{\Delta t} \quad (4.8)$$

where X are the covariates.

4.4 Parametric event history models

One of the advantages of using event history models is the ability to assume different parameterized shapes for the hazard function if the risk of an event occurring is believed to conform to a particular distribution.⁶ Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) observe,

Parametric models for political analysis would seem most reasonable when there exists a strong theoretical expectation regarding the ‘shape’ of the hazard rate (or by extension, survival times), conditional on the covariates included in the model. Under such conditions, correctly specifying the distribution function will yield slightly more precise estimates of the time dependency in the data as well as more precise estimates of covariate parameters than nonparametric approaches in small samples.

For example, researchers interested in phenomena in which the risk of an event occurring is believed to be flat, or constant over time can adopt an exponential model which can be expressed as.

$$h(t|X_j) = \exp(X_j\beta_x) \tag{4.9}$$

7

In circumstances where the risk of an event is believed to be monotonically increasing or decreasing, a Weibull model can be adopted. The Weibull model can be expressed as

⁶Note that the hazard rate need not take any parametric form. Non-parametric models are commonly used in bio-medical research where researchers are often inclined to “let the data speak for itself.” The approach is often employed in well-controlled experiments where the effects of time are fully accounted for or completely understood. Non-parametric models are typically used when no covariates exist or when the covariates are qualitative in nature and comparison between groups is desired. Alternatively, they can also be used to estimate the probability of survival past a certain point in time.

⁷Cleves et al. note that the exponential model’s constant hazard rate means that the failure rate is independent of time and in effect ‘lacks memory’ which leaves it useful only for the most simple of tasks.

$$h(t|X_j = pt^{p-1} \exp(\beta_0 + X_j\beta_x) \quad (4.10)$$

where p is an ancillary shape parameter estimated from the data, and the scale parameter is parameterized as $\exp(\beta_0)$. Alternatively, the log-logistic or Gompertz distributions can be used when the hazard function is believed to be increasing or decreasing with respect to time.

In fact any parameterization can be used if the shape is believed to match the distribution of time to the event. Indeed, the government survival literature has witnessed considerable debate over the nature of time dependency and the processes that lead to government termination. Browne, Frendreis and Gleiber (1986) and King et al. (1990) have argued that the probability of government termination is constant throughout its tenure and that exponential models should be adopted to model government survival whereas Warwick (1992) noticed evidence of positive time dependence in the process that generates cabinet failure in most European democracies. Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) recently contributed to the government survival literature and pointed out that hazard rates for government termination cannot be adequately estimated unless the different forms of government termination are addressed separately. Diermeier and Stevenson observe that hazard rate takes on different shapes depending on the form of government termination.

Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2003) observe that although debate over the proper hazard rate parameterization is a hallmark of the government survival literature such controversy does not exist when tackling the subject of individual ministerial turnover. They write, "In the case of turnover within the cabinet ... it is not clear that there is a relationship between the risk to a particular minister leaving the cabinet and time." In order to deal with the lack of precision Huber and Martinez-Gallardo employ a Cox proportional hazard model.

4.5 Cox Proportional Hazard Models

Cox proportional hazard models are precisely useful when there are no *ex-ante* assumptions about the parametric shape of the distribution of time of an individual's risk of exiting the risk set. Because the shape of the hazard is often not easily identifiable for a variety of social phenomena, the Cox proportional hazard model has been widely employed in the social sciences and in political science in particular. Applications include: regime duration in Africa (Bienen and van de Walle, 1989), leadership duration (Bienen and van de Walle, 1992) strategic position taking (Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold and Zorn, 1997), judicial turnover (Zorn and Van Winkle, 2000) and government survival (Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999) and most recently ministerial resignations (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2003; Kerby, 2003).

The Cox proportional hazards model has a hazard rate expressed as

$$h(t|X_j) = h_0(t) \exp(X_j \beta_x) \tag{4.11}$$

where X are the covariates and β is the vector of parameters to be estimated.

Box-Steffensmeier and Jones(1997) note that “the term ‘proportional hazards’ refers to the effect of any covariate having a proportional and constant effect that is invariant to when in the process the values of the covariate changes. That is, each individual's hazard function follows exactly the same pattern over time, but there is no restriction on what this pattern can be.”

Cox proportional hazard models can be easily extended to include time-varying covariates by re-expressing the model (in this case with one constant and one time-varying covariate) as

$$h(t) = h_0(t) e^{\beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2(t)} \tag{4.12}$$

Despite the several caveats raised by Yamaguchi (1990), Box-Steffensmeier and Jones recommend using the Cox proportional hazards model when time dependence is not of central importance in model construction. They write, “our view is that given imprecision in how time is measured coupled with the pronounced emphasis in understanding how covariates related to the hazard rate, time dependency in and of itself should be of less interest to analysts than parameter estimates of important covariates. For this reason, the Cox model ... seems naturally suited for problems involving duration data in the social science.” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004)

4.6 Competing risk models

The event history models that have been considered so far only allow individuals to experience a single kind of event. While this condition may describe some social phenomena, reality is not so limiting and individuals are often at risk of transferring from one state into a variety of alternative states. Furthermore, to pool the different forms of exit into a single terminal event may risk being too simplistic, or indeed, it may overlook other interesting aspects of the event process.

Competing risks event history models allow for an individual to exit the risk set for two or more reasons. Chung, Schmidt and Witte (1991) in Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) write, “The competing risks model is designed to provide estimates of the effects of explanatory variables on the cause-specific hazard functions, so that the effect of a variable on the timing of one type of failure can be distinguished from its effect on the timing of other types of failures.” For example, in the case of ministerial turnover, cabinet ministers can exit the cabinet because of electoral defeat, a ministerial sacking, retirement or the acceptance of patronage from the prime minister. The notion

⁸Collett (1994) observes that in this case, the proportional hazard assumption is no longer valid as the relative hazard varies over time with the variables. Thus, Cox models with time-varying covariates are usually referred to as Cox regression models.

of competing risks was introduced to the political science lexicon by Diermeier and Stevenson when they argued that government terminations must be broken down into sub-categories as the hazard rate for one form of exit is considerably different from another.(Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999) Competing risks models are also appropriate when covariates are believed to contribute to one form of exit and not another or when the covariates have opposite effects on the form of exit.

The hazard rate for the competing risks model can be seen in the following way. Consider that there are $K, k = 1, 2...r$ possible events that an individual can experience. Taking K into account, the hazard rate is expressed as

$$h_k(t|x) = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{\Pr(t + \Delta t > T > t | T > t, x)}{\Delta t} \tag{4.13}$$

Note that the hazard rate is subscripted to consider each of the k events that can take place.

Box-Steffensmeier and Jones observe that the competing risks hazard rate does not condition on the state occupied prior to the occurrence of the k th event. They write that the competing risks model presumes that all observations occupy the same state and progress through time until one of k possible events are experienced and that over time, the risk set decreases as observations experience one of the k events. To use an example, all ministers at the beginning of their cabinet careers share the same ‘state’ - they are all sitting cabinet ministers. Over time, as ministers retire, lose elections, are sacked, are kicked out of office or are appointed to the Senate, the risk set gradually diminishes.


One problem that is typically encountered when using competing risks models in the social sciences entails the assumption of the independent risks. This assumption specifies that the hazard associated with each of the different risks of exit is assumed to be independent of the other risks, conditional on the effects of the independent variables. (David and Moeschberger, 1978) As far as ministerial careers are concerned it means that the risk of a minister exiting for an Order-in-Council appointment (e.g. an ambas-

sadorial appointment) is independent of the risk of being sacked in the face of a scandal (or any other event). While the independence assumption is held to be true, there is the possibility that in unique circumstance it might not always hold. In cases where the independence assumption is violated, it might lead to inconsistent parameter estimates and artificially small standard errors. (Gordon, 2002) Gordon introduces a Generalize Dependent Risks specification to address the independence problem identified in the literature. The results are encouraging although they have not been thoroughly tested, replicated or employed in the social science literature. Examples from the biostatistics and applied mathematics literature suggest that overcoming the identifiability problem in competing risks is still a challenging hurdle to overcome (Crowder, 1997); Gordon's article is certainly a step in the right direction in the attempt to resolve the problem and bridge the gap between the natural and social science in terms of quantitative methodology. However, following from Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2003), I believe that there is no current practical alternative to making the independence assumption and Gordon's (2002) study of stochastic independence of risks finds that violations of the independence assumption may only have minor consequences. I expect that future research will entail the employment of Gordon's generalized dependent risk specification but it will have to wait until further replication of his results is conducted.

Figure 4.2 presents the Kaplan-Meier survivor function for each of the different competing risks used in this dissertation. Recall that the Kaplan-Meier estimator is a non-parametric estimate of the survivor function - or the probability that a subject, in this case a minister, will survive past time t given that he or she has survived until time t . In the case of Figure 4.2 the probabilities that a minister will survive and not exit to take an Order-in-Council appointment, not exit to leave federal politics or not exit by way of a reshuffle to the backbenches are individually presented. The purpose here is to justify the need for a competing risks specification by demonstrating that the survivor functions for the individual risks are different from that in the pooled model presented in Figure

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Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by exit 1867-2000



4.1. Indeed, this appears to be the case; the curves are noticeably steeper in Figure 4.2 suggesting that a solitary focus on “ministerial exit” may be inadequate to explain the durability of ministerial careers. Chapter five provides a detailed examination of the variables that influence the different competing risks and Chapter 6 will present event history models for each risk.

4.7 Conclusion

Chapter two presented a literature review of the relevant literature on ministerial turnover in Canada. A number of insights were made into what precisely influences cabinet ministerial career termination. The argument was made in Chapter three that ministerial careers should be understood through the lens of a longitudinal framework. In this way the terminal event that culminates a ministerial career can be understood as the end point of the career process. Chapter four has briefly presented the econometric tools required to accommodate the longitudinal framework set out in Chapter three. The event history model’s competing risks specification is especially useful as it is able to consider the multiple forms of exit by which a ministerial career may end.

Presently, the research problem looks like this: prime ministers appoint ministers to the Cabinet. Every minister is continuously at risk of having his or her cabinet career ended by prime ministerial sacking, Order-in-Council appointment, or retirement from federal politics. The longitudinal perspective proposed in Chapter three suggests that the duration that a minister spends in the Cabinet may be related to the risk of experiencing a particular kind of event.

But, the purpose of this dissertation is not to simply outline and describe ministerial duration. Rather, the goal is to determine which factors actually influence ministerial duration and the different forms of exit that a minister may or may not follow. Failure to follow this path results only in the replication of earlier research that this dissertation is attempting to surpass. For this reason, discrete and time-varying covariates, the ex-

ogenous factors that affect ministerial durability, need to be introduced and elaborated.

This is the purpose of Chapter five, which follows next.

Chapter 5

Hypotheses and Data

5.1 Introduction

Chapter four presented a statistical method that could be used to approximate the longitudinal perspective of ministerial careers that was set out in Chapter three. However, the goal of this dissertation is not simply to determine the effect of ministerial duration on cabinet exit; this dissertation intends to highlight how changes in a minister's personal characteristics, the institutions in which he or she serves as well as the wider political environment enhance or diminish the chances that a minister will experience one of several kinds of exit.

In this chapter, the conditions that contribute to a minister's exit from the cabinet are considered. Section 5.2 presents the original dataset created for this dissertation. The different forms of ministerial exit as well as the justification for the breakdown of the dataset into two temporal groups are outlined here. Section 5.3 suggests that the conditions that affect the hazard of ministerial exit can be divided into three categories: individual characteristics unique to each minister; parliamentary conditions that each minister is collectively exposed to by virtue of being a member of parliament; and finally, wider political conditions which exist outside of the personal and institutional realms but which also affect a minister's durability in the cabinet. The de-

pendent variable and the variables contained in the three categories outlined in Section 5.3 are discussed with more detail in Section 5.4. Section 5.4.1 reviews how the dependent variable was constructed and presents descriptive statistics for each of the different forms of exit. Each of the independent variables and the hypotheses associated with them are presented in Sections 5.4.2-5.4.4. Chapter five concludes with a review of the hypothesized effects of each of the independent variables for the three different forms of exit.

5.2 Data

The data assembled for this dissertation has been organized so as to capture the complete range of a ministerial career. Data compiled by the Library of Parliament in Ottawa provides the foundation for the dataset used to construct the event history of cabinet ministers. This dataset contains data on the start and end dates of every portfolio that each and every minister has held since 1867. The names of the ministers are also matched to the portfolios. Unfortunately, the Library of Parliament does not provide information on how the minister exited the cabinet, although other sources can be used to verify these details. Using these sources, five broad categories of cabinet exit can be defined and are presented in Table 5.1: exit by Order-in-Council, exit because of government turnover, exit because of electoral defeat, exit to leave federal politics and exit via a reshuffle to the backbenches. Ministers who reach the end of the study period without experiencing an exit event, leave parliament because of government turnover and/or election defeat or who die in office are coded as “Censored”.

Complete career path data was collected on every minister to have served in the federal cabinet from the first cabinet in 1867 until 01 January, 2000. All ministers were tracked from the first day they were appointed until the day that they exited the cabinet. The ministers are observed on a daily basis to determine whether or not they experience a terminating event, at which point they exit the cabinet, or whether they move on to be

Table 5.1: Ministerial Exits 1867-2000

Exit Type	1867-2000		1867-1957		1957-2000	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Order in Council	98	15.83	67	22.64	31	9.6
Exit Federal Politics	92	14.86	40	13.51	52	16.1
Reshuffled	74	11.95	20	6.76	54	16.72
Censored	355	57.35	169	57.09	186	57.59
Total	619	100	296	100	323	100

observed on the subsequent day. Once a minister experiences a terminating event, he or she exits the risk set and is no longer observed in the dataset.

A minister's removal from the dataset creates a peculiar situation for those cabinet ministers who serve in a cabinet, experience a terminating event, and then return to the cabinet at a later date.¹ Failure to accommodate these returning ministers would mean that a sizable proportion of the total number of ministers, especially those ministers with long careers and interesting exits, would be dropped from the risk set prematurely. For example, Brian Tobin served as the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans from 1993 until 1996 when he resigned from the cabinet to run for the premiership of the province of Newfoundland and Labrador. At this point Tobin's record in the risk set stops and he is no longer tracked. However, Tobin subsequently returned to federal politics in 2000 and resigned again in 2002, this time to "spend more time with his family."² How can the duration of ministers who return to cabinet after an absence be considered if they have already experienced a terminating event? To overcome this problem, returning ministers are treated as clones of their previous incarnations. They possess all of the same qualities and history as the minister who exited the risk set with the exception that they are assigned a new identification number upon their return.³

¹The most obvious example of this scenario would include those ministers who leave the cabinet because of a government turnover and then return to the cabinet when their party is re-elected to government.

²Tobin allegedly resigned because he felt that he could not effectively compete against Paul Martin Jr. for the leadership of the Liberal Party of Canada once Jean Chrétien retired as prime minister.

³This cloning technique has been used by Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding. (Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding, 2005) However, there may be a problem in so far as their duration is effectively reset to zero on their return at the start of each ministry. This means that when the minister returns to cabinet for the

Every parliament from the first parliament in 1867 until the thirty-sixth which ended on 27 November 2000 is considered in this dissertation. The study begins in 1867 for a number of reasons. The first and most obvious reason is that it is possible. The Library of Parliament dataset is a phenomenal resource and allows for the kind of analysis only dreamed of in other polities. The ability to include the entire population of ministers instead of a sample is too good an opportunity to pass up. On a related note, by starting the study in 1867 and progressing to the present, long term changes in the patterns of ministerial exits and their relationship to constitutional convention can be observed. As indicated in Chapter two, conventions of individual or collective ministerial responsibility do not change over night or as a result of one or two resignations. Only with a systematic analysis of all resignations can the changes in constitutional conventions be adequately assessed. By including every minister and accounting for every exit, this systematic analysis is possible.

There are concerns when working with such a large and extended dataset particularly in the realm of data collection. Data collection for many of the covariates is only possible when working back to particular points in time. For example, the impact of monthly changes in government popularity on ministerial exit can only be considered dating back to the mid 1950s. Likewise, economic indicators such as inflation and unemployment rates can only be traced to 1914 and 1976.

The rationale for concluding the study on 01 January 2000 stems from practical considerations with the data. Public opinion poll data was provided by the Maps, Data and Government Information Centre (MADGIC) at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. Carleton University is a Gallup poll repository. Unfortunately, the Gallup Corporation stopped providing Canadian public opinion data to the repositories in 2000 and the January 2000 poll is the last one publicly available. Also, the period 2000-2005 has been highly charged, politically speaking. The period saw the emergence of the sponsorship

second time they might subsequently exit in a manner which is typically associated with a long duration while only having a year or two under the belt.

scandal as well as the battle for the leadership of the Liberal Party. Current ministers, many of whom served in cabinet in this period are bound by cabinet confidentiality or are tight-lipped and reliable information is difficult to obtain particularly given the divisions in the Liberal Party.

The goal of this dissertation is to obtain insights not only on how ministerial careers end, but also to determine how changes in parliament and in the wider Canadian political environment limit or enhance the probability of different forms of ministerial exit. The time frame covered in this analysis is well suited for this purpose. By starting the analysis in 1867 and working to the near-present, the evolution of the Canadian parliament can be fully taken into consideration. Over this time period parliament has expanded in size and depth to include a variety of political parties as well as minority and majority governments. This period has seen the inclusion of women as representatives in the House of Commons and in cabinet as well as visible minorities who have changed both the 'look' and indeed the interests of parliamentarians and cabinet ministers. Parliamentary rules, regulations and conventions have been introduced, reformed, revoked and abandoned as have parliamentary salaries and pensions.

The cabinet has also evolved over time. The most noticeable change has been the size of the cabinet. What began as a small collectivity with a membership of ten in 1867 expanded to over forty under Brian Mulroney and finally thirty-four by the end of the study. The expansion reflects the extent to which the business of government has also expanded, especially in the areas of social welfare provision. The constitutional conventions that guide cabinet membership have also changed over time; religious affiliation, once considered important is now virtually obsolete while ethnic and gender representation has taken on greater importance in recent years. A cursory glance at the patterns of exit when broken down by decade (Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1) or party ministry⁴ (Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2) reveals that certain forms of ministerial exit have

⁴A party ministry is an uninterrupted span in which a single party is the governing party. Several prime ministers can serve in a single party ministry.

Table 5.2: Ministerial Exits by Decade

decade	OIC		Exit Federal Politics		Reshuffle		Total
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	
1860	3	3.06	0	0.00	1	1.35	4
1870	9	9.18	3	3.26	0	0.00	12
1880	5	5.10	4	4.35	0	0.00	9
1890	8	8.16	1	1.09	3	4.05	12
1900	7	7.14	0	0.00	5	6.76	12
1910	6	6.12	6	6.52	5	6.76	17
1920	7	7.14	12	13.04	1	1.35	20
1930	7	7.14	4	4.35	1	1.35	12
1940	8	8.16	7	7.61	4	5.41	19
1950	7	7.14	4	4.35	0	0.00	11
1960	11	11.22	10	10.87	10	13.51	31
1970	6	6.12	7	7.61	13	17.57	26
1980	9	9.18	8	8.70	21	28.38	38
1990	5	5.10	26	28.26	10	13.51	41
Total	98	100.00	92	100.00	74	100.00	264

Figure 5.1: Ministerial exits by decade





Table 5.3: Ministerial Exits by Party Ministry

Party Ministry	OIC	Exit Federal Politics	Reshuffled
1867-1873 (C)	7	0	1
1873-1878 (L)	5	3	0
1878-1896 (C)	13	5	3
1896-1911 (L)	8	1	5
1911-1921 (C)	7	12	6
1921-1926 (L)	4	5	0
1926-1926 (C)	0	0	0
1926-1930 (L)	2	0	0
1930-1935 (C)	6	2	1
1935-1957 (L)	15	12	4
1957-1963 (C)	4	4	3
1963-1979 (L)	13	14	20
1979-1980 (C)	0	0	0
1980-1984 (L)	7	5	8
1984-1993 (C)	3	23	16
1993-2000 (L)	4	6	7
Total	98	92	74

(C) Conservative, (L) Liberal

Figure 5.2: Ministerial exits by party ministry



fallen out of vogue while others have remained constant and still others have become more common. Lastly, the cabinet has been headed by twenty different prime ministers, four Francophones and sixteen Anglophones.

The wider national conditions have also varied considerably since 1867. The national economy has experienced both boom and bust periods. Canadians have experienced periods of war and peace. Constitutional crises periodically rise to the surface and threaten national integrity. The changing media has focused Canadian attitudes for government in a variety of competing manners. To sum up, not only is there a wide variety of cabinet ministers included in the dataset; the span of time covered in this analysis is sufficiently long to capture some of the important changes in modern Canadian politics.

5.3 Individual, legislative, cabinet and environmental conditions

Chapter three set out a perspective of ministerial careers that is longitudinal in nature. However, the kind of exit that a cabinet minister may experience is not determined by duration alone. The perspective of ministerial careers provided in this dissertation needs to be expanded to include a wider range of factors that affect a minister's ability to remain in the cabinet over time. The literature review presented in Chapter two suggested a series of factors that might be and have already been considered; also, by accounting for ministerial careers from a longitudinal perspective, hypotheses that take time and timing into consideration can be formulated.

5.3.1 Individual Conditions

The first set of conditions is related to the individual minister himself or herself. Prime ministers select individual MPs to serve in the cabinet precisely because they believe that the MP will do a good job and continue to do well as they progress. Alterna-

tively, prime ministers appoint certain individuals because they believe they have limited choice but to appoint the specific individual to cabinet because of constitutional rules or because of political necessity. Once a member is in the cabinet, a minister's career progresses through time and space. Over the course of the career numerous events may take place that can shape the likelihood of several kinds of career termination. However, different kinds of ministerial exit may be conditioned by factors unique to the individual minister. A minister's age may determine whether or not the minister chooses to retire from federal politics or is willing to accept a reshuffle to the backbenches. Likewise, the length of a minister's parliamentary career may help to determine whether or not an Order-in-Council appointment is offered. The point to stress is that characteristics unique to the individual minister play a role not only in establishing a minister's durability but also the form of exit that is experienced.

5.3.2 Parliamentary Conditions

In addition to individual characteristics, a minister's ability to remain in cabinet is shaped by his or her ability to remain a member of parliament; only parliamentarians, whether they be members of the House of Commons or Senators can serve in the cabinet. Durability as a minister therefore depends on the individual's ability to survive as a MP. For this reason, the factors that contribute to legislator turnover are significant and must be considered. The Canadian literature highlights that legislator turnover in Canada is comparatively high. Although, as MPs acquire experience, and especially leadership experience, the risk of involuntary turnover through electoral defeat diminishes considerably. The longer MPs survive in their job, the more likely it is that they will determine their own means of exit, whether it be to retire, to not run in an election or to accept a patronage appointment.

The ability to remain a member of parliament, whether a cabinet minister or not, is also shaped by other factors found 'outside' the House of Commons. The single

member plurality electoral system which is used in Canada to elect representatives to parliament is famously susceptible to electoral swings which can adversely affect individual MPs' ability to hold onto their seat, especially if their party is not faring well in the polls. A considerable portion of a minister's ability to remain in cabinet is determined outside of the cabinet where the wider impact of legislator survivability comes into play before the subject of ministerial duration or exit can be addressed.

In addition to the concern over legislator turnover, ministers may find themselves expelled from the cabinet not because they lost their seat in a general election, or indeed owing to anything that they have done, but rather because the government, of which they were a member lost the confidence of the House of Commons. Prime ministers and their ministers only serve as long as the government collectively maintains the confidence of the House of Commons. The emergence of disciplined political parties in the nineteenth century has for the most part ensured that majority governments do not fall on votes of confidence. But, adjustments in the legislative arithmetic following a general election still bring about changes in government and can move a minister from the apex of power to the opposition benches overnight. Government fortunes can fundamentally shape ministerial longevity. How do the institutions of parliament, both the House of Commons and the Cabinet, as well as individual ministerial qualities, affect ministerial durability and the various kinds of exits that ministers experience?

The frequency and type of ministerial turnover may also reflect changes within the institutional personality of the Canadian House of Commons. The early years of the Canadian state have been characterized as a "parliamentary government" in which parliament had a greater deal of control and influence over the government. Although there were no instances of minority government that could pressure the prime minister to sanction and possibly dismiss a minister, members of the government backbench had considerably greater leverage vis-à-vis the prime minister. Prior to 1919 for the Liberal Party and 1942 for the Progressive Conservatives, the prime minister was selected

not by the extraparliamentary party but rather by the parliamentary caucus. Once the leader's mandate was removed from his immediate political peers, the need to abide by the will of the caucus for fear of removal dissipated, as did the need to abide by demands and requests within the parliamentary party to remove wayward ministers. The trend is reflected in the considerably higher number of ministerial exits for reasons pertaining to individual impropriety in the period that dates from Confederation until the late 1880s and early 1890s when parliamentary government evolved into a cabinet government. (see ?)

This early period and the "cabinet government" period that succeeded it were also characterized by the departmentalized nature of the cabinet. According to this understanding the prime ministers power was curtailed by strong cabinet ministers whose power resided in their status as a regional minister. In the era before mass electronic communication it was physically impossible for the prime minister to personally deliver his message to the party and to supporters. Rather, he relied on key cabinet ministers to spread the good word and reward the faithful. These ministers retained their own bases of support and regional loyalties that prime ministers had to be mindful of for fear that should the minister grow dissatisfied, so too would their supporters. The power of the regional minister has greatly diminished with the development of electronic mass communications that allows the prime minister to by-pass the regional minister. One might expect that as parliament came to be characterized by an institutionalized rather than departmentalized government the security of regional ministers diminished.

Lastly, it is worth pointing out that special or unusual parliamentary circumstances may also affect ministerial exit and its forms. Periods of crisis such as war or constitutional turmoil may be characterized both by an unwillingness of the prime minister to dismiss his members of his key decision making team in order to present both the face of stability as well as the need to maintain institutional consistency throughout the crisis. Also, opposition parties may be willing to pull their partisan punches in times of

crisis to give the government the opportunity to more freely make and pass decisions often with greater consultation with the opposition parties.

Although, it is not addressed in this dissertation an indicator to assess the effect of crisis on prime ministerial decision making vis-à-vis the cabinet could be created by ascertaining the start and end dates during which the War Measures Act was in force and granted the cabinet a considerable degree of power over parliament.

5.3.3 Political Environment Conditions

Not all of the conditions that shape ministerial career paths are situated in parliament or in the cabinet. Cabinet minister duration may be directly and indirectly affected by wider political conditions such as the state of the national economy, a condition of crisis or indeed the popularity of the prime minister or the governing party. All of these factors may have an impact on a minister's ability to remain a serving member of the cabinet or indeed a representative in the House of Commons. Whether or not these conditions affect ministerial or legislator tenure is not in question. By taking a longitudinal approach to the study of ministerial careers the question of when these conditions are important and who is most likely to be affected by them can be addressed.

Up to this point three types of conditions that affect ministerial duration and exit have been reviewed: conditions that are directly related to the individual minister, conditions that are contextualized in parliament and wider extra-parliamentary political conditions. This perspective of ministerial careers is unique to this dissertation. There already exists material on how individual qualities affect the prospects of certain kinds of turnover. Likewise there are a considerable number of references to the way that institutional attributes affect turnover, both legislator and ministerial. Finally, the economic voting and public opinion literatures regularly address how extra-parliamentary factors affect elections and turnover. Indeed a recent article on ministerial turnover in Britain has linked ministerial turnover to public opinion change. Dewan and Dowding

(2005)

The problem with all of these approaches is related to a point raised in Chapter three regarding ministerial careers: there is considerable knowledge about the different ways that ministerial careers end, but there are no studies that take an integrated approach that combine the different forms of exit. Similarly, there is considerable knowledge about how different clusters of conditions affect forms of turnover, but there has been no attempt to combine these clusters or to determine how these clusters work together to produce different kinds of ministerial exit.

The approach adopted for this dissertation most closely approximates the approaches pioneered by Christopher Zorn, Steven Van Winkle and Bradford Jones and Janet Box-Steffensmeier. Zorn and Van Winkle examine three classes of factors believed to influence Supreme Court vacancies: personal considerations, institutional context and political influences. (Zorn and Van Winkle, 2000) These factors are assessed to determine their affect on Supreme Court vacancies due to either mortality or retirement. Jones and Box-Steffensmeier's study of congressional turnover simultaneously considers how congressmen and women experience electoral defeat, re-election, retirement and ambition while examining how local contexts, member attributes, institutional attributes and national conditions work together to effect turnover. (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004) To date, no such study has been adopted to study legislator, Supreme Court justice or ministerial turnover in Canada.

5.4 Variables

In the previous section the structure of the dataset was reviewed. In this section the variables and covariates used to extend the event history model of ministerial duration and exit are considered, the dependent variable is considered first.

5.4.1 The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable used in the models below is a categorical variable that encapsulates the three different ways that a minister can exit the cabinet. The organization of the dependent variable works like this. On any given day, every minister in the cabinet is at risk of experiencing one of three kinds of exit events: a patronage appointment by Order-in-Council, an exit from federal politics or a reshuffle to the backbenches. Each exit is mutually exclusive. If a minister's cabinet career does not end on the given day, then the minister has 'survived' and he or she moves onto the next day where they are once again at risk of experiencing an event. Ministers are observed until they either experience an event or they are censored.⁵ The dataset is organized in such a way that on each day, a minister is coded as "0" if he or she does not experience an event and survives to move onto the next day. If the minister receives a patronage appointment by Order-in-Council then the minister is coded as "1"; if the minister exits the cabinet to leave federal politics altogether then the minister is coded as "2"; and finally, if the ministers are reshuffled to the backbenches then they are coded as "3". Ministers who reach the end of the study period (01 January 2000), who are part of a government that turns over, who are defeated in a general election or who exit the cabinet because they died in office are treated as censored and are coded as "4". The coding scheme is arbitrary and the categories are assumed to be unordered. The exit codes are presented in Table 5.4.

The observations in the dataset are organized on a minister-day basis. For each day that a minister survives, he or she contributes a "0" to the dataset; clearly a minister can only contribute one non-zero observation.⁶ If a minister has not experienced an event by 01 January, 2000, then the event history indicator column for that minister consists

⁵Censored ministers exit the risk set for non-political events such as death or because the end of the study was reached.

⁶In the cases of electoral defeat and government turnover, which can occur simultaneously, electoral defeat takes precedent over government turnover on the basis that the minister loses his or her seat in the House of Commons before the prime minister tenders the resignation of the cabinet.

Table 5.4: Exit Variables and Labels

Exit Type	Exit Code
Order in Council	1
Leave Federal Politics	2
Reshuffled to Backbenches	3
Censored (Election defeat)	4
Censored (Government turnover)	4
Censored (End of study)	4
Censored (Died)	4

only of zeros.

The dataset consists of 938,493 minister-day observations. The total number of ministers under observation in this study is 619. The distribution of the different ministerial exit events for the entire period under study as well as the periods 1867-1957 and 1957-2000 is presented in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2.

Several observations can be made when looking at Table ?? . First, cabinet exit via a reshuffle to the backbenches only accounts for a little under twelve percent of the total number of exits in the data. Turnover due to OIC appointments accounts for almost sixteen percent while exits to leave federal politics altogether account for fifteen percent. Electoral defeat and government turnover each account for twenty-five and twenty-two percent of the total ministerial exits. What is evident is that turnover is widely dispersed across the multiple forms of exits. Students of ministerial turnover who are only interested in studying one form of turnover, reshuffles for example, pay a price for that narrow focus. If this study were restricted only to reshuffles almost ninety percent of the observations would have to be omitted or censored.

This degree of censoring has consequences for the way in which ministerial careers are studied. Any individual study of ministerial exits whether by patronage appointment, government turnover, electoral defeat, an exit from federal politics or a reshuffle from the backbenches effectively censors 75 percent or more of the remaining ministers in the risk set. The problem stems from whether or not the conditions that produce the exits that are *not* considered are actually exogenous to the conditions that are consid-

ered. If they are not, then failing to consider those ministers outside of the study may provide biased results.

Fortunately, the extent of censoring described above is avoided in this study as almost all of the different forms of exit are taken into consideration. It must be pointed out that those ministers who leave the cabinet because they died in office are treated as censored. The rationale for not including these ministers stems from the apolitical nature of the exits - that is to say that the factors that contribute to these forms of exits really have nothing to do with the politics of being a cabinet minister. For this reason, when a minister dies they are not removed from the sample; rather, their final event indicator is coded as a zero. This means that the career paths of those ministers who died in office still contribute to the overall study.

While Table ?? is useful for examining how ministerial exits are broken down across the different forms of exit, an understanding of how the different exits distribute themselves over the duration of a ministerial career more closely approximates the purpose of this dissertation.

Table 5.5 presents a life table of the distribution of ministerial exit events according to the span of a minister's career broken down into yearly blocks. It is difficult to observe any overt duration effects in Table 5.5; however, a few general comments can be made. It is evident that the bulk of electoral defeats occurs early in a ministerial career and that ministers with limited experience typically are members of governments that are defeated. Sutherland's observations that inexperienced ministers are more likely to be reshuffled to the backbenches appears to hold up as does Docherty and Atkinson's belief that parliamentary veterans with leadership experience leave the House of Commons (and the cabinet) by their own willingness.

The interpretation that accompanies Tables ?? and 5.5 is a rather unsystematic analysis. In the models below, more precise estimates of the duration effects are obtained. That said, it is evident that the bulk of exits takes place in the first five years of service

Table 5.5: Life Table of Ministerial Exits

Years	Order in Council	Exit Federal Politics	Reshuffled	Censored
0-1	5	1	8	113
0-2	14	8	14	20
0-3	11	13	13	36
0-4	17	18	12	41
0-5	20	12	6	49
0-6	8	4	7	26
0-7	2	7	4	26
0-8	3	5	3	12
0-9	5	14	2	6
0-10	7	6	2	5
10-11	4	1	2	5
11-12	0	0	0	0
12-13	1	1	1	4
13-14	0	2	0	1
14-15	1	0	0	1
15-16	0	0	0	7
16-17	0	0	0	1
17-18	0	0	0	0
18-19	0	0	0	0
19-20	0	0	0	0
20-21	0	0	0	0
21-22	0	0	0	2
Total	98	92	74	355

as this block roughly conforms to the constitutionally mandated limit on government terms before an election must be held.

Together, Tables ?? and 5.5 provide a glimpse of the data used to derive a model of ministerial careers and turnover. The next step is to outline the covariates used to inform this model. Several covariates are hypothesized to be related to the likelihood of any given type of ministerial career ending event. The literature on cabinet ministers provides some guidance in determining which factors cause the events listed above. To facilitate this process hypotheses and covariates are presented in the context of the three conditions outlined earlier in this chapter: individual conditions, parliamentary conditions and political environmental conditions. Tables 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 present the hypotheses and their predicted effects.

Table 5.6: Hypotheses and Predicted Effects (a)

	Type of Exit	Cause of Exit	Independent Variable	Variable Measure	Predicted Effect
H1a	OIC	Older ministers are more likely to be rewarded for long service to the prime minister or the party.	Age	Age (years)	+
H1b	Exit Federal Politics	As ministers grow older they will grow tired of political life and seek opportunities in the private sector or retire	Age	Age (years)	+
H1c	Reshuffling	Older ministers have acquired political know-how and are less likely to make mistakes that will result in a demotion to the backbenches.	Age	Age (years)	-
H2	Reshuffling	Female ministers are less likely to be reshuffled from the cabinet because of the strong gender imbalance in the House of Commons.	Female	Dummy variable (Male = 0, Female = 1)	-
H3	Reshuffling	Ministers with legal background are less likely to be reshuffled because their training makes them valuable legislative assets	Lawyer	Dummy variable (Lawyer = 1)	-

Table 5.7: Hypotheses and Predicted Effects (b)

	Type of Exit	Cause of Exit	Independent Variable	Variable Measure	Predicted Effect
H4	Reshuffling	Ministers from provinces that elect more MPs from the governing party face a greater risk of being reshuffled because there are potential replacements	Proportion of seats in province	# governing party seats / total seats in province	+
H5a	Order-in-Council	Political culture in Quebec emphasizes patronage in exchange for political service	Francophone	Dummy variable (Francophone = 1)	+
H5b	Exit Federal Politics	Prime ministers less likely to demote francophone supporters.	Francophone	Dummy variable (Francophone = 1)	-
H6a	Reshuffle	Prime ministers do not remove party leadership challengers to the backbenches	Leadership challenger	Dummy variable (Leadership challenger = 1)	-
H6b	Order-in-Council	Prime ministers do not reward party leadership challengers with patronage appointments.	Leadership challenger	Dummy variable (Leadership challenger = 1)	-
H7a	Reshuffle	Prime ministers do not reshuffle ministers who hold important portfolios to the backbenches.	Important portfolio	Dummy variable (Important portfolio = 1)	-
H7b	Order-in-Council	Ministers who hold important portfolios are more likely to exit the cabinet to take up a patronage appointment.	Important portfolio	Dummy variable (Important portfolio = 1)	+

Table 5.8: Hypotheses and Predicted Effects (c)

	Type of Exit		Cause of Exit	Independent Variable	Variable Measure	Predicted Effect
H7c	Exit Politics	Federal	Ministers who hold important portfolios are more likely to exit the cabinet to return to private life.	Important portfolio	Dummy variable (Important portfolio = 1)	+
H8a	Order-in-Council		Ministers with longstanding House of Commons experience are more likely to be rewarded with a patronage appointment.	House experience	Dummy variable (Important portfolio = 1)	+
H8b	Exit Politics	Federal	Ministers with longstanding House of Commons experience are more likely to return to private life.	House experience	Dummy variable (Important portfolio = 1)	+
H9a	Order-in-Council		Ministers with provincial legislative experience are more likely to take up an offer of patronage.	Provincial experience	Dummy variable (Provincial Experience = 1)	+
H9b	Exit Politics	Federal	Ministers with provincial legislative experience are more likely to exit federal politics.	Provincial experience	Dummy variable (Provincial Experience = 1)	+
H10a	Reshuffle		As ministers accumulate days in which the opposition calls for their resignation, they are more likely to be demoted to the backbenches.	Scandal	Total number of days that the minister faced calls for his or her resignation	+

Table 5.9: Hypotheses and Predicted Effects (d)

	Type of Exit	Hypothesis	Independent Variable	Variable Measure	Predicted Effect
H10b	Order-in-Council	As ministers accumulate days in which the opposition calls for their resignation, they are more likely to be appointed to a patronage position.	Scandal	Total number of days that the minister faced calls for his or her resignation	+
H11	Reshuffle	Ministers who serve in minority governments are more at risk of being reshuffled to the backbenches because the Cabinet cannot protect wayward ministers under the umbrella of collective responsibility	Minority government	Dummy variable (Minority government = 1)	+
H12	Reshuffle	Ministers are more likely to reshuffled to the backbenches when the popularity gap between the government and main opposition parties is high	Public opinion	Government popularity - main opposition party popularity	+

5.4.2 Individual Qualities

Individual characteristics contribute a great deal to the probability of whether or not a minister will depart from the cabinet. While it is impossible to list every personal characteristic that may or may not contribute to ministerial survivability, included here are some of the most obvious and oft-cited characteristics found in the comparative literature on ministerial resignations and turnover.

5.4.2.1 Age

On the surface, one of the most obvious individual characteristics that can play a part in ministerial termination is their age. As a minister grows older, the probability that he or she will retire or die increases simply by virtue of their age. As ministers grow older they may increasingly become tired of political life or the stress associated with serving as a cabinet minister; their priorities may change as they wish to retire to spend more time with family or pursue other activities. Related to retirement, successful ministers (those who have made a significant contribution to the government or the party), or ministers with a close relationship to the prime minister may also be rewarded with an Order-in-Council appointment such as elevation to the Senate, the chairmanship of a crown corporation or an ambassadorship. One expects to find a positive relationship between age and departure for reasons pertaining to patronage appointment by Order-in-Council (**H1a**) or retirement (**H1b**).

The age issue has only been scantily addressed in the literature on ministerial resignations in the United Kingdom and virtually ignored in the Canadian literature apart from a discussion on the amateurism of ministers. Alderman and Cross (1985) observe that in the United Kingdom the age excuse for dismissal is used but that it is used as a technique to soften the blow of dismissal “since *anno domini* is a factor beyond the control of either the Prime Minister or the minister being dismissed.” Age has been cited as reason for MPs to step down in Canada. Atkinson and Docherty (1992), for ex-

ample, demonstrate that age is indeed a strong predictor for voluntary retirement among members of parliament: “[t]he older the members are, the more likely they will be to step down from elected office than be defeated.” As far as individual ministers are concerned, the *Ministerial Resignations* record reveals only three ministers who officially declared that they were giving up their positions to make room for “younger ministers.” Only one minister is on the record stating that he stepped down to “retire from politics.” The age variable may be less than conclusive given that age alone may not be a strong predictor of ministerial dismissal. With age comes experience and the know-how to remain in cabinet. In this way, the very thing that age brings with it -experience - may be the very thing that prevents one from being easily dismissed. Therefore, we expect age to be positively related to exit by retirement and patronage appointment but negatively related to exit for reasons related to exit by reshuffle (**H1c**). In the event that the null-hypothesis is not rejected and age does not have an effect on any of the forms of turnover this may then raise some interesting questions regarding maturity and experience as a desirable ministerial quality. Indeed it may suggest that competence or institutional memory is a secondary requirement for ministerial duration and that qualities pertaining to representation and internal party politics trump policy or executive ability.

5.4.2.2 Gender

Gender is a second “obvious” individual characteristic. Women have served in the cabinet since Ellen Fairclough was appointed to John Diefenbaker’s cabinet in 1957. In much the same manner that women are severely underrepresented in the House of Commons so too are they underrepresented in the cabinet. Only eleven percent of the total number of ministers since 1957 have been women. Despite the imbalance, no modern prime minister could fail to appoint a women to cabinet without facing fierce criticism. Given the low number of potential replacements in the House of Commons

and the political (if not ethical) requirement of including women in the Cabinet, it is hypothesized that women face less of a risk of ministerial exit by a reshuffle to the backbenches than men (**H2**).⁷ The failure of the gender variable to have an effect on the different forms of turnover may have a mixed message. It would of course suggest that there is no unwritten affirmative action program that treats female ministers differently from their male counterparts and that women are just as likely to be sacked for their errors or incompetencies as anyone else. Prime Minister Mulroney's suggestion that there may be an unofficial affirmative action program for women to get into the cabinet but once in, they are judged equally may bare out. Of course, the lack of adequate replacements for women following an initial cull of the cabinet suggests that there may be a systemic problem as far as women's representation in cabinet is concerned.

5.4.2.3 Legal Background

Ministers who have legal training are hypothesized to have a higher chance of remaining cabinet ministers and are less likely to exit via a reshuffle (**H3**). Ministers are responsible for creating law and the experience provided by a law degree should make those that possess this background desirable assets in the eyes of the prime minister. To test for the effect of legal training a separate dummy variable was created where "1" indicates completion of a law degree. The legal background variable also reflects arguments that the highest echelons of government are dominated by an elitist group of individuals who share similar educational, professional and class backgrounds. (Porter, 1965) Should the legal background variable prove to be insignificant in its contribution towards a minister's reshuffle from cabinet, the argument that the cabinet is managed by a dominant class, represented by one of the wealthiest and insulated occupational

⁷The hypothesis is positively reinforced by a study conducted in the United States which demonstrated that women were more likely than men to "survive" a political scandal due to gendered assumptions which hold women politicians more trustworthy than their male counterparts. (Capelos and Huddy, 1999) The inclusion of women in the cabinet can be considered as a means to improve the public image of the cabinet.

groups in Canada may not hold up.

5.4.2.4 Provincial Constituency

A third uniquely distinguishable characteristic among individual ministers is their provincial constituency. Canadian constitutional convention dictates that prime ministers must ensure that their cabinets be regionally balanced. (Heard, 1991) In its ideal form this means that every province should have at least one representative in cabinet and that the provinces with larger populations such as Quebec and Ontario have more representatives around the cabinet table than smaller provinces such as Prince Edward Island. Of course, the legislative arithmetic does not always make this balancing act feasible. In the event that a province or a region has not elected a member of parliament to the House of Commons who is a member of the government party, prime ministers, as a last resort, have appointed a member of the Senate from that province to sit in Cabinet. The representation convention also places a constraint on any prime minister who might want to dismiss a minister from a province that is underrepresented on the government side of the House of Commons. Just as members of parliament from small provinces have better odds of making it into Cabinet due to a smaller selection pool, so too do they have better odds of remaining in the cabinet - especially if a viable or competent replacement is not available. One should expect that ministers from provinces that elect low numbers of MPs from the governing party to the House of Commons to be more secure in their tenure of office. A positive relationship should exist between number of provincial members elected to the House of Commons and ministerial exit by reshuffling (**H4**). The provincial constituency variable is constructed by dividing the total number of seats won by the governing party by the total number of seats in the province. The result is then assigned to every minister from that province. The failure of this variable to have an effect would have a profound effect on how Canadians, and indeed prime ministers, have traditionally regarded the federal nature of the state as well

as the historical necessity to ensure that all geographical regions of the country are represented, even marginally, at the highest level of government. Even though the federal government is by far the dominant partner (in most cases) in the federal union, failure to provide even lip-service to the provinces by guaranteeing provincial representation in the cabinet would certainly reflect and point to the confirmation of a prime ministerial government that can not only circumvent consultation with the cabinet and parliament but also the provinces as a whole.

5.4.2.5 Francophone

Francophone ministers from Quebec are more likely to exit the cabinet by way of a voluntary resignation, either to an Order-in-Council appointment (**H5a**) or an exit from federal politics (**H5b**). The political culture in Quebec is traditionally associated with patronage. Quebec MPs and ministers are expected to deliver constituency plums and ministers themselves have traditionally expected to be rewarded upon their exit from politics in exchange for their support. (Matheson, 1976) The expectation that Francophone ministers will exit the cabinet on their own terms or accept an Order-in-Council appoint is enhanced by the close relationship that contemporary prime ministers have had with their Francophone colleagues. Five of the last ten prime ministers were from the province of Quebec and they relied extensively on the party machines in that province both to govern and remain in power. Furthermore, of the five non-francophone prime ministers, three of them served for less than a year before facing defeat in a general election. In the event that the francophone variable proves to have no effect on either exit by order in council or exit from federal politics then one might conclude that some kind of sea change in Canadian politics has taken place. Either, the political culture in Quebec has changed such that patronage no longer serves its historical purpose or that these types of exits are no longer possible because of the discontent that it may cause either with other cabinet ministers or the electorate.

5.4.2.6 Leadership Challenger

Whether or not a minister previously challenged the prime minister in a party leadership convention may also enhance their chances of cabinet survival. Rather than relegate leadership challengers to the backbenches, prime ministers often choose to appoint them to cabinet and often to manage senior portfolios. In doing so at least two purposes are fulfilled: first, all cabinet ministers are bound to publicly support every government position through collective cabinet responsibility. By giving leadership challengers a stake in government prime ministers effectively silence (at least in public) their most ardent critics within the party. Second, the presence of a leadership challenger in the cabinet also silences or brings on board their supporters within the party who otherwise might be vocal critics in caucus, or worse, openly criticize the government in the House of Commons or in the media.

The historical record attests to the presence and long duration of leadership challengers in the cabinet. Every prime minister since Mackenzie King (who ran in the first Canadian leadership convention in 1919) has included at least one contender for the top party job in the cabinet; in all cases they have held a portfolio of some importance.

Party leadership contenders are coded with a dummy variable where a “1” indicates that the cabinet minister ran for the party leadership against the current prime minister in the most recent party leadership convention. One expects there to be a negative relationship between party leadership contender and cabinet departures by way of a reshuffle to the backbench (**H6a**).⁸ At the same time, one should not expect prime ministers to reward their longstanding competitors with a patronage appointment when they leave the cabinet (**H6b**). A rejection of the party leadership variable’s impact on exit by reshuffling would suggest that the prime minister faces few constraints vis-a-vis both his cabinet and, more importantly, the parliamentary party. The prime ministerial thesis advocated by Savoie and others suggests that the prime minister’s power is indeed

⁸Paul Martin Jr. is a recent exception to this hypothesis. Martin either resigned or was sacked by Prime Minister Chrétien for staging an all-too-open challenge to the prime minister’s authority in 2003.

unconstrained but that he must nevertheless be somewhat responsive to the demands of factions within the party lest they break from the party whip.

5.4.2.7 Portfolio

Government departments are usually quite resistant to the disruption caused by cabinet reshuffles and ministerial changes. Indeed it is a pillar of cabinet government that ministers are “responsible” for a portfolio but that the deputy ministers who are permanent members of the civil service are responsible for their management and institutional continuity. (Savoie, 1999) However, some portfolios, and indeed the government and the nation as a whole, do not handle change well. There are two primary reasons for this resistance to change. First, ministers are given a certain degree of leeway in terms of management and policy development within their portfolios. Certain portfolios and their policies take on characteristics of the ministers that are responsible for them. For example, Canada’s foreign policy between 1996 and 2000 was based on the principles of “human security” espoused by the then Minister of Foreign affairs Lloyd Axworthy. Likewise, Paul Martin’s “beat the deficit” fiscal policy in the 1990s was personified by the Finance Minister himself. In both of these cases consistency, stability and durability are required in order for the policies to be recognized as credible at both the domestic and international levels. Prime ministers may, therefore, be constrained in their desire to dismiss or remove a minister who holds a senior portfolio by the need to project the image and indeed ensure a steady path in these portfolios. Additionally, the departure from cabinet of a minister holding one of these portfolios might also be construed as a policy or management failure within that particular portfolio.

Table 5.10 presents a list of twelve cabinet portfolios compiled by Laver and Hunt and provides the basis for identifying “priority portfolios.” (Laver and Hunt, 1992) These portfolios are matched against the portfolios held by ministers when they departed the cabinet. Each match is coded as “1”; the remaining portfolios are coded as

Table 5.10: Portfolio Importance

Rank	Portfolio
1	Finance
2	Treasury Board President
3	External/Foreign Affairs
4	Trade
5	Environment
6	Defence
7	Transport
8	Energy, Mines and Resources
9	Health and Social Welfare
10	Agriculture
11	Justice
12	Labour
13	Communication
0	All others

“0” as they were not included on the list. The “rank” column identifies level of importance assigned to each portfolio column in the original Hunt and Laver data. The Laver and Hunt list is admittedly a rough approximation of what constitutes a priority portfolio. For example, several portfolios in Table 5.10 did not even exist in 1867. Furthermore, it would be unwise to assume that portfolios remain constantly “important” over time, among ministries, or indeed, even within ministries. However, the Laver and Hunt data provides the best and only systematic account of what might possibly be considered an important portfolio. Furthermore, many of the portfolios identified by Laver and Hunt consistently appear throughout the dataset. Finally, should the data and methods used in this dissertation be used to predict ministerial exists in future governments, then the portfolios identified in 1992 should not be too far off the mark.

A negative relationship should be observed between ministers who hold “priority portfolios” and cabinet departures related to a reshuffle to the backbench (**H7a**). Ministers who hold priority portfolios are expected to leave the cabinet on a high note to take up a patronage appointment (**H7b**) or to return to private life (**H7c**) rather than be demoted to the backbenches. A rejection of these hypothesis would suggest that

a hierarchy in the cabinet, a hierarchy in which the senior ministers are rewarded for their efforts does not exist and that ministers are simply cogs in a machine. Although, Savoie hinted that Chretien's cabinet was organized as a sounding board for initiatives that emanated from the Prime Minister's Office, he nevertheless also made it clear that there were senior and indisposable ministers who presided over key portfolios. This point was reinforced by Chretien's Chief of Staff Eddie Goldenberg who considered it his mission to ensure that lines of communication remained open between the Prime Minister and his key ministers - often on a daily basis. (Goldenberg, 2006)

5.4.2.8 House Experience

A minister's value in cabinet may be reflected by whether or not they served the party in the House of Commons while in opposition or on the government backbench. House experience is a key indicator that separates amateurs from experienced MPs and is a benchmark for ministerial appointment. At the same time, a minister's House experience can reflect his or her overall political experience which may not be captured by ministerial duration. For example, Erik Nielsen served as the most senior and trusted member of Brian Mulroney's cabinet when the Progressive Conservatives returned to government in 1984. Nielsen's durability stemmed not from his ministerial experience, in fact he had none, but from his long career in the House of Commons; he had been a member of parliament since 1957 and knew his way around the House of Commons better than any other member of the Progressive Conservative caucus.⁹ One expects that ministers with House experience, characterized by the total number of years that they have served in the House of Commons, will have a higher probability of voluntary cabinet exit either by an Order-in-Council appointment (**H8a**) or an exit from federal politics (**H8b**). Prime Minister Lester Pearson writing about prime ministers but in a

⁹In his 1996 autobiography former Ontario premier Bob Rae provides a telling description of running a government with ministers who have no cabinet experience whatsoever. He understated explains, "Learning to play the violin in front of ten million people is not the easiest thing in the world." (Rae, 1996, p. 134)

manner equally attributable to potential ministers, "... it is a great help to have had a long parliamentary experience; to have risen in the ranks of Parliament here you can acquire, if you have not had it instinctively, a feeling for Parliament, of its importance and tradition." (Hockin, 1977) In a manner similar to the age variable, should the predictions regarding the house experience variable fail this would suggest that political experience has no effect on the manner in which a minister exits the cabinet. This result would fly in the face of the office seeking assumption that is typically assumed to characterize Canadian MPs and ministers. If political actors are not motivated by the perks of office that are often realized once out of office, and they are not motivated by a strong sense of policy fulfillment, then this presents a conundrum as to what actually motivates political actors in Canada.

5.4.2.9 Provincial Legislative Experience

Another personal condition worth considering is whether or not the minister has previous experience serving in a provincial legislature. Barrie and Gibbons observe that aspiring politicians typically do not follow a linear political career path which begins with municipal politics, moves up through provincial politics and then culminates at the federal level. (Barrie and Gibbons, 1989) This means that newcomers to Ottawa are usually bereft of previous political experience. While previous provincial legislative experience should be considered an asset for those MPs who wish to enter the cabinet, it should also be regarded as a career enhancer that sets ministers with experience apart from those without. Ministers with provincial experience are few in number and their experience and insight into the politics within their own province may well be cherished by prime ministers who seek an advantage in the push and pull of federal politics. Ministers with previous provincial experience are hypothesized to exit the cabinet voluntarily by an Order-in-Council appointment (**H9a**) or to leave federal politics altogether (**H9b**). In the event that provincial experience fails to have an effect on exit by order in council

or an exit of federal politics, this may say more about the prime minister's need not for experienced ministerial handlers in the cabinet and more about the need to adhere to conventions such as representation as well as the need to accommodate members of the party.

5.4.2.10 Scandal

The last variable which clearly affects the probability of whether or not individual ministers will exit the cabinet is scandal. Prime ministers are wary when cabinet ministers are embroiled in scandal as scandals not only tarnish individual ministers and their ministries but also the government and the governing party as a whole.¹⁰ In their examination of ministerial resignations in the United Kingdom, Dowding and Kang observe that sex and financial scandals take a heavy toll on those ministers embroiled in them: 83 percent of ministers caught in sex scandals and 50 percent of those caught in financial scandals resigned from cabinet. (Dowding and Kang, 1998)¹¹ A similar study using Canadian cases and sources has yet to be conducted but a cursory glance at the *Ministerial Resignations* record reveals that 15 of the 46 resignations that took place in between 1963-1990 occurred for reasons classified by Sutherland as private misconduct or misconduct in office. Sutherland (1991a)

Nevertheless, scandals are difficult phenomena to operationalize and study systematically. This is due, in part, because they vary in degree and consequence over time and space. What was considered scandalous fifty years ago may be considered acceptable behaviour today, e.g. divorce; what is considered scandalous in one country may be considered perfectly ordinary conduct in another. Scandals (political or otherwise) are, as John Thompson describes, "mediated events". Scandals are events which pass through a medium which in turn determines their effect as scandalous. (Thompson,

¹⁰John Major's Conservative Party realized this in the 1990s when it found the label of sleaze particularly difficult to shake off

¹¹Dowding and Kang's dataset spans from 1945 to 1997

2000) A scandal cannot be a scandal in private, it must, by its very nature be exposed and have an audience.

For the purposes of this dissertation an intentionally conservative approach to dealing with scandals and political controversies is adopted. Scandals exist only in so far as they become politicized through opposition calls for a minister's resignation.¹² This may be a crude measure but surely it is better to err on the side of scepticism than untamed abandon which would be the case if every newspaper article in Canada from 1867 to 2000 were to be reviewed for ministerial criticism. Furthermore, calls for resignation are not all that frequent and for the most part are not that frivolous. When calls for resignation take place, it is usually a sign that the opposition parties are onto something as they are only allocated a limited amount of time to challenge the government in the House of Commons. From an opposition party perspective, it is better to have one arrow land on the target than to waste arrows in a flurry.

Each day that a minister receives a call for his or her resignation is recorded so that by the time he or she exits the cabinet a total number of "days-under-fire" can be tallied. A positive relationship should exist between the number of "call-for-resignation-days" that a minister faces and their exit from cabinet to the backbenches (**H10a**). A positive relationship may also exist between resignation-days and Order-in-Council appointments as prime ministers sometime offer an exit-opportunity to beleaguered cabinet ministers who do not wish to return to the backbenches (**H10b**). Should the scandal variable prove insignificant then one would need to reconsider first the principle of individual ministerial responsibility and its place as a central convention in Canadian political life. While many observers are willing to admit the core of the principle that requires that ministers resign for the fault of both their own and their subordinates' in-

¹²As far as I can tell, the only other way to deal with this would be to scour the national newspapers in Canada (e.g. The Globe and Mail) and look for every instance that a ministers name appears on the front page or in an editorial. Even then, it would be difficult considering that all the newspapers in Canada tend to have a particular political bent and may therefore be less willing to be critical of some parties and more critical of others.

adequacies has withered, the convention nevertheless lives on in so far as severe enough lapses in judgment or management may force a prime minister to sack a minister in order to preserve the integrity of the ministry. It is a circuitous route to accountability, but a route nonetheless. The absence of an effect associated with the scandal variable would also point to a severe curtailment of the powers of parliament to influence and pressure the prime minister, especially during periods of minority government.

5.4.3 Institutional Conditions

5.4.3.1 Minority Government

The only institutional characteristic focuses on the majority/minority status of the government. Whether the governing party commands a majority of the House of Commons or serves as a minority government also affects whether or not ministers are more or less likely to resign. Descriptive statistics provided by Sutherland reveal that the dismissal rate among majority governments is considerably less than minority governments. She writes that in the case of Pearson's first government (1963-1965) at least two of the ministerial departures (Tremblay and Lamontagne) came about "on the grounds that they had been so damaged by opposition tactics that they could no longer serve effectively; they were victims of minority government." (Sutherland, 1991*b*)

The idea of minority government victimization does make sense. Were a government to control 100 percent of the seats in the House of Commons it would not face any opposition from across the floor in the form of criticism or calls for resignation. The prime minister would be free to keep his or her cabinet as he or she chooses without any credible threat from within the House of Commons (except for perhaps a back bench revolt). On the other hand, prime ministers who preside over a minority government must tread carefully; not only does the opposition wield a credible threat in the form of a vote of confidence but the prime minister's own back bench holds a wider range of options to make demands of their own party that are not as easily constrained by

the whip. Prime ministers then face greater pressure to give in to opposition demands to dismiss wayward ministers for fear that the failure to do so may result in increasing difficulties in the passing of legislation and, in the worse case scenario, the failure to pass a vote of confidence.

Minority government status is coded as a dummy variable whereby ministers serving in a minority government are coded as “1” and those serving in a majority government are coded as “0.” A positive relationship should exist whereby the probability that a minister will be reshuffled to the backbenches is higher for ministers serving in a minority government than for those serving in a majority government (**H11**). Should the minority government variable turn out insignificant in the reshuffle model then this would pose some difficult question regarding the extent to which the opposition benches are able to influence or indeed threaten a government and prime minister over issues pertaining to ministerial mismanagement or conduct.

5.4.4 Political Characteristics

The final category of variables included in the analysis of ministerial turnover includes variables that exist separately from both the individual minister and the legislature in which he or she resides. These variables consist of national political characteristics, namely public opinion.

5.4.4.1 Public Opinion

Public opinion has only recently been introduced into the study of ministerial turnover and to that extent only in the United Kingdom.¹³ However, national characteristics and elements such as public opinion and the media have been alluded to by some scholars as an important consideration in any discussion of ministerial turnover for some time. (Page, 1990; Woodhouse, 1994)

¹³see Dewan and Dowding (2005)

Ministerial departures are more likely to take place when government popularity is low and, conversely, less likely to take place when it is high. This is not to say that public opinion alone will determine whether or not a minister exits the cabinet but prime ministers do take polls seriously and cabinet management is influenced not only by the capabilities of ministers but also by the perception of the public. If public opinion indicates that the public is content with the performance of the government and were an election to be held “tomorrow” they would vote them back into office, the prime minister would normally try to keep the government on course by not rocking the boat or making any unnecessary changes to the composition of his or her cabinet. On the other hand, a government plagued by scandals, policy failures and bad press may need a face-lift in order to boost its image and convey a fresh look to the public before heading into an election. In this case, public opinion can be seen to be negatively related to the odds that a minister will depart cabinet in a cabinet reshuffle (**H12**).

Public opinion is measured as the popularity gap between the governing and main opposition parties based on the question “If an election were held tomorrow which party would you vote for?” The data for this variable is derived from Canadian Gallup poll data which spans from 1945 to 2000. Monthly data collection did not begin until the 1970s so missing months were filled using linear interpolation.

5.4.5 Hypothesized Effects

Several covariates are hypothesized to produce the patterns in the distribution of the cabinet exit events. Because the number of covariates is quite large, they are presented in Table 5.11. This table summarizes the effects of the covariates on the likelihoods of each cabinet exiting event.

Table 5.11: Summary of hypothesized effects

	Order in council	Exit federal politics	Reshuffled
	P	P	P
Age	0	+	0
Female	0	0	-
Lawyer	0	0	-
Government seats in province	0	0	+
Francophone	+	0	0
Leadership challenger	-	0	-
Important portfolio	0	+	-
House experience	+	+	-
Margin of victory	0	0	0
Provincial Experience	0	0	-
Minority government	0	0	+
Calls for resignation	-	0	+
Public opinion	0	0	-

A “+” sign indicates a hypothesized positive impact of the covariate on the odds of experiencing a given event. A “-” sign indicates a hypothesized negative impact of the covariate on the odds of experiencing a given event. A “0” indicates no hypothesized impact. Note that calls to resign and public opinion are only applicable in the 1957-2000 model.

5.5 Conclusion

Chapter five began by describing the original dataset that was constructed for this dissertation. Data that considers the complete career paths of each and every minister who served in the Canadian federal cabinet from 1867 until 2000 was included. At the core of the dataset are the start and end dates of each ministerial tenure as well as an indicator that specifies the manner in which the minister left the cabinet.

By breaking down the ministerial career spans to individual day-observations and organizing the data longitudinally one is able to take a bird's-eye-view of each minister's career on a day-by-day basis. In addition to the data assembled on ministers' cabinet durations and exits, further information was collected on ministers' individual qualities (age, gender, legal background, provincial constituency, linguistic background, status within the party, portfolio, previous House and provincial legislative experience and exposure to political scandal) the institutional characteristics of the parliament in which they serve (minority government status) as well as the wider political environment (government popularity).

These variables reflect a series of hypotheses, presented in Tables 5.6-5.9, that will be tested using a competing risks, Cox proportional hazards model in Chapter six. The predicted outcomes of the model are presented in Table 5.11. Now that the data has been sufficiently discussed and the explicit hypotheses have been put forward, Chapter six will address the model of ministerial career terminations.

Chapter 6

A Longitudinal Model of Ministerial Turnover

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter the event history model of ministerial turnover is presented. The covariates, hypotheses and data used to estimate the model were discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter is organized so that the summary statistics and the event history model for the period 1867-2000 are presented first. This is followed by the presentation of the summary statistics and the event history model for the period 1957-2000 which includes additional variables. A table of summary statistics for the 1867-2000 where all forms of exit, including censored exits (death and end-of-study), are combined is presented in Table 6.1.

6.2 1867-2000 Summary Statistics

The years 1867-2000 account for almost the entire period of modern Canadian political history. Over this period of analysis 506 individuals have served as ministers in the

Table 6.1: Summary Statistics, 1867-2000

	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Age	53.89	0.35	53.20	54.59
Female	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.07
Lawyer	0.25	0.02	0.22	0.29
Government seats in province	0.57	0.01	0.55	0.59
Francophone	0.24	0.02	0.21	0.28
Leadership challenger	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.06
Important portfolio	0.33	0.02	0.30	0.37
House experience	11.32	0.29	10.76	11.88
Margin of victory	0.25	0.01	0.23	0.26
Provincial experience	0.22	0.02	0.19	0.25
Minority government	0.25	0.02	0.21	0.28
N	619			

federal cabinet.¹ On average, ministers serve for a little more than four years in the cabinet. The average age at the time of ministerial exit is 52.9 although age ranges from 28 (Jean Lapierre) to 79 years old (William Anderson Black). Of the 506 ministers 31 (6.13 percent) are women and all of the women have served in cabinet since 1957. One quarter of the ministers in cabinet have possessed some kind of legal training, although, of the 31 women, only five completed law school. Francophones constitute almost 25 percent of all cabinet ministers. However, the proportion of francophones in each cabinet varies. Only 26 ministers have put forward bids for the party leadership. Ministers usually have between ten and eleven years of experience in the House of Commons by the time they exit the cabinet. Thirty-three percent of the ministers who exit the cabinet also leave while in possession of an “important” portfolio while only 23 percent of ministers can claim to have previous political experience at the provincial legislative level prior to their cabinet appointment. Ministers typically have a 28 percent margin of victory over the runner-up in the previous election prior to their exit from cabinet. They also tend to come from provinces where the governing party performs well in federal elections. On average, the governing party secures 62 percent of the seats in the minister’s province. Lastly, 14 percent of ministers serve in minority governments.

Tables 6.2 and 6.3 shows that when broken down by party, Conservative and Liberal ministers share roughly the same attributes. The difference in the francophone variable reflects the historical difficulty that the Conservative Party has had recruiting and maintaining support in the province of Quebec.

Specifically, the purpose of this thesis is to consider and examine the different kinds of cabinet exit that a minister may face. The means and standard deviations of the variables for each event-type for the period 1867-2000 are presented in Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. What are the results? First, and not surprising, one observes that ministers who serve the longest amount of time in the cabinet are also those who exit federal politics on

¹ This number differs from the total number of minister-observations (619) because of the “cloned” ministers who exit the cabinet and return in the same or subsequent ministries.

Table 6.2: Summary Statistics 1867-2000 by political party (Conservative)

<i>Conservative</i>	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Age	54.24	0.55	53.16	55.32
Female	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.07
Lawyer	0.23	0.03	0.18	0.28
Government seats in province	0.52	0.02	0.49	0.55
Francophone	0.17	0.02	0.12	0.21
Leadership challenger	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.06
Important portfolio	0.32	0.03	0.26	0.38
House experience	10.75	0.43	9.91	11.58
Margin of victory	0.23	0.01	0.20	0.25
Provincial experience	0.24	0.03	0.19	0.29
Minority government	0.29	0.03	0.24	0.35
N	275			

Table 6.3: Summary Statistics 1867-2000 by political party (Liberal)

<i>Liberal</i>	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Age	53.62	0.46	52.71	54.52
Female	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.09
Lawyer	0.27	0.02	0.22	0.31
Government seats in province	0.61	0.01	0.58	0.64
Francophone	0.30	0.02	0.25	0.35
Leadership challenger	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.07
Important portfolio	0.35	0.03	0.30	0.40
House experience	11.78	0.39	11.02	12.54
Margin of victory	0.26	0.01	0.24	0.29
Provincial experience	0.21	0.02	0.17	0.25
Minority government	0.21	0.02	0.17	0.26
N	344			

Table 6.4: Summary Statistics 1867-2000, by exit type (Order-in-Council)

<i>Order in Council</i>	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Age	57.51	0.81	55.91	59.11
Female	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Lawyer	0.17	0.04	0.10	0.25
Government seats in province	0.59	0.03	0.54	0.65
Francophone	0.34	0.05	0.24	0.43
Leadership challenger	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.05
Important portfolio	0.34	0.05	0.24	0.43
House experience	13.58	0.79	12.02	15.14
Margin of victory	0.31	0.03	0.26	0.37
Provincial experience	0.31	0.05	0.21	0.40
Minority government	0.13	0.03	0.06	0.20
N	98			

Table 6.5: Summary Statistics 1867-2000, by exit type (Exit Federal Politics)

<i>Exit Federal Politics</i>	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Age	57.34	0.86	55.63	59.04
Female	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.12
Lawyer	0.27	0.05	0.18	0.36
Government seats in province	0.64	0.03	0.59	0.69
Francophone	0.23	0.04	0.14	0.32
Leadership challenger	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.12
Important portfolio	0.33	0.05	0.23	0.42
House experience	12.76	0.74	11.28	14.24
Margin of victory	0.27	0.02	0.23	0.32
Provincial experience	0.20	0.04	0.11	0.28
Minority government	0.16	0.04	0.09	0.24
N	92			

Table 6.6: Summary Statistics 1867-2000, by exit type (Reshuffle)

<i>Reshuffle</i>	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Age	50.08	0.86	48.38	51.79
Female	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.16
Lawyer	0.31	0.05	0.20	0.42
Government seats in province	0.66	0.03	0.61	0.72
Francophone	0.30	0.05	0.19	0.40
Leadership challenger	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.06
Important portfolio	0.31	0.05	0.20	0.42
House experience	10.11	0.78	8.56	11.66
Margin of victory	0.30	0.03	0.24	0.35
Provincial experience	0.20	0.05	0.11	0.30
Minority government	0.12	0.04	0.05	0.20
N	74			

their own terms (tenure = 5.42 years). The duration for the exit-federal-politics model is closely followed by the duration for ministers who leave to take on a patronage appointment by Order-in-Council (tenure = 4.66 years). Also, and as expected, ministers with less ministerial experience tend to exit the cabinet to return to the backbenches (tenure = 3.81). These results roughly correspond to the hypotheses regarding MP and ministerial amateurism put forward by Atkinson and Docherty (1992) and Sutherland (1991*b*). Each of the results should be considered in light of their large standard deviations.

The average age of ministers who leave to take up an Order-in-Council appointment is 57 years. The same is true for ministers who leave federal politics altogether. This contrasts with the lower average age of exit to return to the backbenches - 50 years. The means for the gender covariate are somewhat misleading and lopsided for the 1867-2000 data. It is true that women only constitute five percent of all ministers in the federal cabinet, but one needs to consider that women have only been a presence in the cabinet since Prime Minister John Diefenbaker first appointed Ellen Fairclough to his cabinet in 1957. The second set of summary statistics and event history models accounting for the period 1957-2000 is presented in Section 6.4 and provides a more accurate assessment of the gender variable.

Ward (1950) and Porter's (1965) observations that the cabinet is disproportionately made up of members of the legal profession is reflected in the summary statistics which show that lawyers constitute 28 percent of the ministerial total. The individual exit results indicate that ministers with legal training exit the cabinet in more-or-less equal proportions. However, only 17 percent of ministers with a legal background exit to take up an Order-in-Council appointment. This may be indicative of the claim that lawyers use a political career as leverage or a stepping-stone to further enhance their legal careers than as a gateway to a continued life in politics. Note that the standard deviations are not presented for dummy variables. For these covariates, the mean simply reflects the proportion of observations scored as a "1". Thus the .27 value for the variable denot-

ing legal experience in the exit federal politics column implies that of all the ministers who left the cabinet, 27 percent were lawyers.

The proportion of seats held by the governing party in a minister's province also appears to influence the type of exit a minister will experience. Ministers who exit the cabinet because they are demoted to the backbenches are typically from provinces that have the highest concentration of MPs from the same party. This suggests that prime ministers may have greater liberty to shuffle these ministers than those who are from provinces where the party has a more limited presence.

The hypothesis that francophone ministers are more likely to exit the cabinet to take up a patronage appointment is also reflected in the summary statistics. Thirty-four percent of francophone cabinet ministers have received a patronage appointment by Order-in-Council whereas only 23 percent left to return to private life.

The summary statistics for the party leadership challenger variable is surprisingly low for all of the different exit types. The leadership challenger variable may suffer from a similar distortion as the gender variable as leadership conventions with identifiable leadership races for the Liberal Party begin only in 1919. Prior to 1919 the party leader was selected by the parliamentary caucus behind closed doors. The Conservative Party held its first leadership convention in 1927 and like the Liberals, the parliamentary caucus selected its party leader behind closed doors prior to this date. This means that for a sizable period (1867-1919 for the Liberals and 1867-1927 for the Conservatives) the leadership challenger variable is coded as a "0" and is likely distorting the mean values. Note that leadership challengers are less likely to be rewarded with a patronage appointment by those they challenge. As expected, few leadership challengers are demoted to the backbenches where they can stir up trouble in the caucus.

Ministers who hold important portfolios as defined by Laver and Hunt (1992) appear to leave the cabinet to the different exit destinations in equal proportions. Although, within the narrow band (31-33 percent), ministers who held important portfolios were

the least likely to be reshuffled to the backbenches.

As predicted, ministers with longer political tenure, measured as the total number of years served in the House of Commons, more commonly exit the cabinet to take up a patronage appointment (13.58 years) or to leave federal politics (12.76 years) than their counterparts who are reshuffled (10.11 years).


The means for the margin of victory variable hover between 27 and 31 percent. Ministers with high margins of victory are more likely to be rewarded with patronage appointments (30 percent) or they choose to leave federal politics on their own terms (27 percent). However, ministers who are reshuffled to the backbench on average have a margin of victory of about 30 percent. Once in cabinet, a minister's durability may not be enhanced by a strong electoral performance in his or her riding.

6.3 The Event History Analysis 1867-2000


The statistical methodology used in this dissertation was extensively discussed in Chapter four so it is not necessary to reproduce that discussion here. For the ministerial turnover model presented here, a discrete-time competing risks event history model is estimated using the Cox proportional hazards specification. Because the competing risks model is used, three estimating equations are obtained and measured against a baseline "non-event" of not experiencing a terminal event. Each of the three equations provide estimates of the hazard function of experiencing one of the three possible terminating events. As each outcome is reflected as an individual dependent variable (the event indicator), each of the three equations is expressed in terms of the same set of covariates. This does not imply that every covariate in each equation is hypothesized to be non-zero, indeed many "0" effects are predicted (see Table 5.11).

Figure 6.1 presents the hazard function based on all ministerial spells in the sample when all forms of exit are pooled together. Figure 6.2 presents the hazard function when the data is broken down by party ministry. When broken down by party ministry the

Figure 6.1: Ministerial Hazard Function, 1867-2000, pooled exits



Smoothed hazard estimates, by ministry2



Years

Graphs by ministry2

differences between the two dominant political parties in Canada are apparent. First, Conservative Party ministries stand out because of their brevity compared to the Liberals.² Sir John A. Macdonald's strategy of rewarding supporters who help to stabilize the first post-confederation government with patronage positions is evident in the rising hazard in the 1867-1873 graph. Likewise, the dropping hazard in the latter years of the ministry points to increasing stability before the governments abrupt termination due to the Pacific Scandal in 1873. The level hazard for the 1878-1896 reflects the dominance of Macdonald and his close coterie of ministers who dominated the Conservative Party until Macdonald's death in 1891 and the sort-lived Conservative governments afterwards. The dramatic jump in the ministerial hazard rate in the later half of the 1911-1921 period suggests that the stable wartime coalition of ministers who made up the "Unionist" government fell apart once the war ended and the Liberal defectors returned to the fold.³

Surprisingly, John Diefenbaker's (1957-1963) reputation as having a cabinet that was largely dissatisfied with his leadership is not characterized by an increasing overall hazard for his ministers. If anything, the hazard rate is flat and stable. On the other hand, the hazard rate for the period 1984-1993 when Brian Mulroney served as prime minister is adequately reflected by the hazard rate. r cabinet was characterized by a number of high profile exits but the slope of the pooled hazard rate for this period suggests that his ministers were really no more at risk than any other minister serving under any other prime minister. The difference in this hazard rate is the steep ascent at the end of the curve which reflects the large number of ministers who chose to leave the cabinet, and ultimately the House of Commons, when Mulroney retired down in 1993.

² Indeed, the graphs for the Conservative 1926 and 1979-1980 minorities governments are not included in this graph because of their brevity which resulted in no ministers exiting the cabinet except when the governments terminated.

³ The Liberal Party split along linguistic lines when Robert Borden's Conservatives passed the *Military Measures Act*, conscription bill that was unpopular in French Canada. English speaking Liberals left the party temporarily to join and support the Conservatives while French speaking Liberals remained with the opposition 'Liberals'.

The hazard rate curves for the Liberal Party ministries also reflect common wisdom regarding ministerial tenure throughout Canadian political history. The steep ascending curve in the 1873-1878 graph, like the 1867-1873 graph reflects Alexander Mackenzie's need to reward the party faithful who supported him and remained loyal in the immediate years following Confederation. The bulk of the exits that contribute to this hazard are made up of Order-in-Council appointments. The remaining Liberal hazard curves are both extended and largely flat; they mirror both the long and stable tenures that characterize the "Governing Party". Only the scandal-plagued first minority ministry of Mackenzie King (1921-1926) which ended with the prime minister's abrupt resignation during the King-Byng affair and Trudeau's second round as prime minister from 1980 to 1984 deviate from the traditional path. In the case of Trudeau, his decision to retire in 1983 prompted many of his long standing supporter in Cabinet to plan their own voluntary exits from political life. The final graph, 1993-2000, also stands out from the other Liberal hazard rate. The zig-zag pattern suggests that life in the Chrétien cabinet may not have been as stable as some suggest.⁴ It also reflects the cabinet movement that took place in the build-up and aftermath to the 1995 referendum on Quebec secession.

The results for the Cox proportional hazards competing risks model for the period 1867-2000 are displayed in Table 6.7.⁵ The entries in Table 6.7 reflect the parameter estimates for the type-specific hazard probabilities for ministerial career termination. There are many parameter estimates to address here; 39 estimates are presented in Table 5.11. Fortunately, most of these covariates are assumed to have zero impact on the event type so these can be conveniently ignored.

As a general rule of thumb, a negative coefficient indicates that the covariate is negatively related to the hazard of experiencing a given event relative to the baseline.

⁴ Mulroney remarked that Chrétien's style was markedly different from his own and that Chrétien "got rid of nobody." Interview with Brian Mulroney (May 17, 2006)

⁵ Both the 1867-2000 and 1957-2000 Cox proportional hazards models handle tied failures (exits that occur at the same time) by using the Breslow approximation specification. For more on this subject see Cleves, Gould and Gutierrez (2002, pp. 131-132).

Table 6.7: Cox Proportional Hazards Model, 1867-2000

	OIC			Exit Federal Politics			Reshuffle		
	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	P>z	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	P>z	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	P>z
Age	1.07	0.02	0.000	1.06	0.02	0.000	0.95	0.02	0.002
Female	0.00	.	.	1.46	0.65	0.397	1.97	0.82	0.102
Lawyer	0.55	0.15	0.027	0.92	0.23	0.730	1.11	0.29	0.694
Government seats in province	0.50	0.22	0.121	2.01	0.96	0.146	2.11	1.16	0.171
Francophone	2.32	0.53	0.000	1.02	0.27	0.948	0.95	0.26	0.854
Leadership challenger	0.26	0.19	0.069	0.85	0.39	0.718	0.58	0.43	0.460
Important portfolio	0.87	0.19	0.537	0.76	0.17	0.238	0.85	0.22	0.521
House experience	1.02	0.01	0.252	0.98	0.02	0.309	1.01	0.02	0.723
Margin of victory	2.35	1.02	0.049	0.78	0.42	0.644	0.98	0.52	0.970
Provincial experience	1.05	0.25	0.850	0.74	0.21	0.284	1.28	0.41	0.445
Minority government	1.12	0.35	0.725	2.04	0.62	0.018	1.03	0.38	0.934
Subjects	619			619			619		
Failures	98			92			74		
Prob > chi2	0.000			0.0005			0.0000		
Log Likelihood	-493.62182			-459.61297			-402.58908		

Whereas, a positive coefficient implies the covariate is positively related to the hazard of experiencing an event relative to the baseline.⁶ So, for example, the age covariates' positive coefficient of 1.06 for the exit federal politics model implies that as a minister grows older, the hazard of his or her voluntarily exiting the cabinet increases. The magnitude of this effect will be considered later. Let us now turn to the substantive results. Table 6.8 presents the predicted relationships in Table 5.11 with the actual outcomes in the event history model for 1867-2000.

6.3.1 Order-in-Council Appointment

How do ministerial attributes work to produce the pattern of ministerial exit for Order-in-Council appointments that is observed in the dataset? Five variables emerged as significant in the Order-in-Council model: age, legal experience, francophone, leadership challenger and margin of victory. Of these, predictions were only made for the francophone and House experience variables. The francophone covariate was highly significant and in the predicted direction while the House experience variable, although in the predicted direction failed to pass any significance tests. Figure 6.4 presents the hazard curves for each of the significant variables in the Order-in-Council Appointment model.


Age: A minister's age turns out to be highly significant and positively related to exit by Order-in-Council despite the initial absence of a prediction. As ministers grow older the hazard of exiting the cabinet to accept an offer of patronage increases by .07 for each year added to the calendar. In retrospect the significant result makes considerable

⁶ The baseline hazard curves for each of the competing risks are presented in Figure 6.3. Recall that the y axis depicts the hazard rate for the different competing risks; that is, the probability that a minister survives until time t given that they have not experienced an exit event prior to that point in time. The graphs suggest that all things being equal the hazard of reshuffling remains constant throughout a minister's career as well as comparatively low compared to the other forms of exit. Not surprisingly, the hazard of exiting federal politics continuously increases as a ministerial career progresses and jumps dramatically after six year. This six-year mark coincides with the buildup to a second election run where experienced ministers may decide that they want to retire or move on to a post-political career. The exit by Order-in-Council graph has taken on a dromedary shape suggesting that the "risk" of exiting the cabinet to take on a patronage position typically increases before elections and falls between elections.


Figure 6.3: Hazard Functions 1867-2000 by exit type

Hazard Rates 1867–2000 by Exit Type

Order in Council
1867–2000



Exit Federal Politics
1867–2000



Reshuffle
1867–2000




Table 6.8: Predicted and Actual Outcomes 1867-2000

	Order in council		Exit federal politics		Reshuffled	
	P	A	P	A	P	A
Age	0	+***	+	+***	0	-***
Female	0		0		-	
Lawyer	0	-**	0		-	
Government seats in province	0		0		+	
Francophone	+	+***	0		0	
Leadership challenger	-	-*	0		-	
Important portfolio	0		+		-	
House experience	+		+		-	
Margin of victory	0	+**	0		0	
Provincial Experience	0		0		-	
Minority government	0		0	+**	+	


P = Predicted

A = Actual

Figure 6.4: Ministerial Hazard Function, 1867-2000, Order-in-Council

Ministerial Hazard Function

1867–2000 Order in Council



sense. Older ministers, serving at the end of their political careers presumably face a higher likelihood of receiving a patronage appointment after long service to the prime minister or the party. Figure 6.4 visually confirms that the hazard is noticeably higher for older ministers and that ministers serving in the retirement decade (60-69) face the highest hazard of combining their exit with a patronage appointment.

Law: According to Table 6.7 a negative and significant relationship exists between ministers who possess legal training and exit to take up an Order-in-Council appointment. Like the age covariate, no initial prediction was made for legal training; yet in hindsight the significant result also has intuitive appeal. In their explanation for the high turnover levels in the Canadian House of Commons, Atkinson and Docherty (1992) note that MPs with legal training often consider their political career as a stepping-stone to a more rewarding career outside of politics. If this understanding of legal-political career paths is true, then most cabinet ministers with legal training would have either left federal politics before becoming an attractive candidate for a political reward, or in the face of an Order-in-Council appointment would have chosen to return to the legal profession instead. Figure 6.4 presents the comparative survival curves for exits by Order-in-Council appointment for those ministers with and without a legal background.

Francophone: The hypothesis that francophone ministers are more likely to leave the cabinet to take up an Order-in-Council appointment than non-francophones is borne out by the event history analysis. The hazard ratio for the francophone variable indicates that francophones are two times as likely to receive a patronage appointment than non-francophones. The result is significant at the .01 level. Figure 6.4 presents the comparative survival curves for the francophone indicator.

Leadership Challenger: The hypothesis regarding leadership challenger status for the Order-in-Council model also turned out to be significant and in the predicted direction. Prime ministers are indeed less likely to reward their party rivals with patronage appointment when they exit the cabinet. Indeed, leadership challengers face a negative

hazard of 74 percent compared to those ministers who chose not to run for the party's top job.

Margin of Victory: The last variable to turn out significant was the margin of victory variable. Ministers who win their constituencies with wide margins are more likely to receive a patronage appointment from the prime minister than those ministers who only scrape by. The hazard ratio of 2.35 indicates that each percentage point added to the margin of victory more than doubles the minister's hazard of receiving an Order-in-Council appointment. Although, the hazard curves presented in Figure 6.4 demonstrate that the distance between the margins is very small and suggests that margin of victory only plays a small role in the prime minister's decision to appoint a minister to an Order-in-Council appointment.

6.3.2 Exit Federal Politics


The original predictions for the exit federal politics model expected that age, important portfolio and House experience should each be positively related to a minister's voluntary exit from the cabinet. While the hypothesis regarding age was confirmed, the other variables failed to pass any significant tests and indeed, the relationships exist in the opposite direction. In addition, the minority government variable emerged as significant at the .05 level and positively related to voluntary exit. Figure 6.5 presents the hazard curves for the significant variables in the exit federal politics 1867-2000 model.

Age: The hypothesis regarding age for the exit federal politics model was confirmed and is highly significant (.01). As expected as ministers grow older they are more likely to choose to leave politics on their own initiative, for example to retire. The 1.06 hazard ratio indicates that a one-year increase in age increases the hazard by six percent.

Minority Government: The minority government variable unexpectedly turned out to be significant at the .05 level and positively related to voluntary exit from federal politics. In fact, the hazard ratio of 2.04 indicates that ministers in minority govern-

Figure 6.5: Ministerial Hazard Function, 1867-2000, Exit Federal Politics

Ministerial Hazard Functions 1867-2000 Exit Federal Politics



ments are twice as likely to leave and suggests that the constraints that ministers face in managing a portfolio in a minority government may take their toll on ministerial duration.

6.3.3 Reshuffle


The results for the reshuffle model for the period 1867-2000 are noticeably disappointing. Only one variable, age, was significant even though no prediction was made for this variable. For the other predictions, the coefficients failed to pass any significance tests and in many instances the relationship proved to be in the opposite direction than was predicted (female, law degree, House experience and provincial experience).

Age: As noted, only age turned out to be significant (at the .01 level) and negatively related to exit by reshuffling even though no hypothesis was made for this variable. The hazard ratio of 0.95 indicates that for each additional year added to a minister's lifespan the corresponding hazard of experiencing a demotion to the backbenches decreases by five percent. While age in and of itself is not likely to influence whether or not a minister will be reshuffled, it is most probable that the qualities often correlated with age: better judgment, experience, recollection of past errors and successes are the very qualities that will enable a minister to avoid the political crises, mishaps and scandals that would otherwise contribute to his or her premature dismissal to the backbenches. Figure 6.6 shows the different survival curves for the age variable in the reshuffle model for 1867-2000.

6.3.4 Conclusion

The results for the competing risks models for the period 1867-2000 are rather discouraging. Of the 14 predictions, only three turned out to be significant and in the anticipated direction. Furthermore, a considerable number of unpredicted results emerged as significant. Part of the reason for the poor results might have to do with changing

Figure 6.6: Ministerial Hazard Function, 1867-2000, Reshuffle



trends and patterns in Canadian political history. 1867-2000 is a long period of time in which significant political changes have taken place, not least of which is the increased role that women play in the cabinet. A model that considers this extended period of time may face other difficulties as certain relationships may exist in one sub-period and not in another. The gender example is only one. Another might be minority government status: Canadians did not experience their first minority government until 1921 - 54 years after Confederation. Additionally, certain covariates cannot be considered in the 1867-2000 event history model because data did not exist for the complete time period. For example, public opinion polls only achieved a degree of reliability and regular usage by political parties in the 1950s. Likewise, persistent calls for ministers' resignations is a relatively recent phenomenon that has accompanied the increased theatrics that accompanied the introduction of electronic media into the realm of parliamentary debate and the political process since the mid-1900s.

6.4 1957-2000 Summary Statistics

In this section a second event history model, one that only considers the period 1957-2000, is presented and discussed. 1957 marks the beginning of the modern era of Canadian politics. In June 1957, John Diefenbaker returned the Progressive Conservative Party to government after over 23 years of Liberal Party domination in Ottawa. Diefenbaker's 1957 minority government win was quickly followed the next year by the Tories' massive election victory in which they secured the largest majority government in Canadian history. Together with the arrival of new faces in Ottawa, the 1958 victory also marked a generational change in the Liberal ranks as the party sought to renew itself. It was the immediate post-1958 period that saw the arrival of new Liberal blood in the form of Pearson, Turner, Chrétien and of course Trudeau. These individuals, and those who made up their cohort would dominate the Canadian political arena for the next forty years. This period also witnessed the radical transformation and expansion

of the Canadian state both in terms of increased population as well as the increased role that government played in the day-to-day lives of the Canadian people. The decisions and actions made early in this period set the tone for the tumultuous political environment in which Canadians currently exist. For this reason, a closer examination of the period is warranted.

The 1957-2000 model is also presented for a second, more technical purpose. The data for variables that consider the effects of public opinion and the more confrontational, indeed more public environment in which the drama of political life takes place are only available for this period. Finally, a more precise picture of the effects of gender, leadership status and portfolio importance can be ascertained by breaking-down the time periods. These variables have undergone dramatic change since 1867 and by considering them in the contemporary period alone, the distorting effects of earlier data can be minimized.

Table 6.9 presents the means and standard deviations for variables in both the 1957-2000 as well as the 1867-2000 period when the different forms of exit are pooled together. For the most part, the variables remain fairly constant whether one is looking at the period as a whole or simply the 1957-2000 period. The noticeable differences rest with the gender, legal and provincial experience variables. It comes as no surprise that the proportion of female cabinet ministers jumps considerably when looking only at the post-1957 period as there were no women ministers in cabinet prior to 1957. It also appears that the legal profession is the profession of choice among cabinet ministers in the post 1957 period. More than 40 percent of ministers have legal training, up from 25 percent when the whole dataset is considered. Lastly, the number of ministers with provincial legislative background appears to have dropped considerably. Only eight percent of ministers since 1957 moved up from the provincial ranks compared to 22 percent for the 1867-2000 period.

When the data is broken down by exit type some noticeable differences between the

Table 6.9: Summary Statistics, 1957-2000, 1867-2000 Pooled Exits Compared

	1867-2000				1957-2000			
	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Age	53.89	0.35	53.20	54.59	52.27	0.46	51.37	53.18
Female	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.07	0.11	0.02	0.07	0.14
Lawyer	0.25	0.02	0.22	0.29	0.41	0.03	0.35	0.46
Government seats in province	0.57	0.01	0.55	0.59	0.60	0.02	0.57	0.63
Francophone	0.24	0.02	0.21	0.28	0.28	0.02	0.23	0.32
Leadership challenger	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.03	0.08
Important portfolio	0.33	0.02	0.30	0.37	0.34	0.03	0.29	0.39
House experience	11.32	0.29	10.76	11.88	10.94	0.36	10.23	11.64
Margin of victory	0.25	0.01	0.23	0.26	0.24	0.01	0.22	0.27
Provincial experience	0.22	0.02	0.19	0.25	0.08	0.02	0.05	0.11
Minority government	0.25	0.02	0.21	0.28	0.24	0.02	0.19	0.29
Calls for resignation					1.30	0.19	0.92	1.68
Public opinion					0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.02
N	619				323			

Table 6.10: Summary Statistics 1957-2000, by exit type (Order-in-Council)

	Order-in-Council			
	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Age	57.10	1.42	54.20	59.99
Female	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Lawyer	0.45	0.09	0.27	0.64
Government seats in province	0.69	0.04	0.59	0.78
Francophone	0.55	0.09	0.36	0.73
Leadership challenger	0.03	0.03	-0.03	0.10
Important portfolio	0.48	0.09	0.30	0.67
House experience	15.14	1.47	12.14	18.14
Margin of victory	0.33	0.03	0.27	0.40
Provincial experience	0.06	0.04	-0.03	0.16
Minority government	0.23	0.08	0.07	0.38
Calls for resignation	2.42	1.23	-0.09	4.93
Public opinion	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.10
N	31			

models emerge. Tables 6.10 , 6.11 and 6.12 show that the expected difference in the female variable for both models still holds true. What is perhaps most obvious is that no women have been appointed to patronage positions directly from the cabinet.⁷ The number of ministers with legal experience roughly doubles for voluntary exits when the 1957-2000 model is considered alone. This should not come as too much of a surprise given the large proportion of lawyers who served in the cabinet in this period. That said, the proportion of ministers with legal background who were reshuffled to the backbenches only increased by eight percent.

There is a noticeable increase in the proportion of francophone ministers who leave to take up patronage positions after 1957. The proportions jump from 34 to 55 percent while the proportions for francophones who exit for other reasons remain more-or-less the same. One explanation for this increase may reside with the disproportionate number of prime ministers from French-speaking Quebec who served in this period. It is likely that these prime ministers rewarded those who were closest to them both

⁷ Note that women cabinet ministers have received patronage appointments after they left. For example, Barbara McDougall was appointed as the head of the immigration court after she lost her seat in the 1988 election.

Table 6.11: Summary Statistics 1957-2000, by exit type (Exit Federal Politics)

	Exit Federal Politics			
	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Age	57.85	1.08	55.67	60.02
Female	0.12	0.04	0.03	0.21
Lawyer	0.46	0.07	0.32	0.60
Government seats in province	0.63	0.03	0.56	0.70
Francophone	0.25	0.06	0.13	0.37
Leadership challenger	0.10	0.04	0.01	0.18
Important portfolio	0.29	0.06	0.16	0.42
House experience	13.73	0.92	11.88	15.58
Margin of victory	0.28	0.03	0.23	0.34
Provincial experience	0.06	0.03	-0.01	0.12
Minority government	0.19	0.06	0.08	0.30
Calls for resignation	2.21	0.63	0.95	3.47
Public opinion	-0.01	0.02	-0.04	0.02
N	52			

Table 6.12: Summary Statistics 1957-2000, by exit type (Reshuffle)

	Reshuffle			
	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Age	48.67	0.94	46.78	50.55
Female	0.13	0.05	0.04	0.22
Lawyer	0.39	0.07	0.25	0.52
Government seats in province	0.71	0.03	0.66	0.76
Francophone	0.33	0.06	0.20	0.46
Leadership challenger	0.04	0.03	-0.01	0.09
Important portfolio	0.28	0.06	0.15	0.40
House experience	9.01	0.74	7.51	10.50
Margin of victory	0.29	0.02	0.24	0.33
Provincial experience	0.09	0.04	0.01	0.17
Minority government	0.17	0.05	0.06	0.27
Calls for resignation	1.78	0.42	0.93	2.63
Public opinion	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.07
N	54			

politically and geographically.

Less surprising is the increase in the proportion of ministers who hold important portfolios who leave to take up offers of patronage. The collection of cabinet portfolios in this time frame and their importance relative to each other more closely approximates the list provided by Laver and Hunt. However, the small decrease in the proportion of ministers who are dismissed to the backbenches stands out as one might expect that ministers who hold “important” portfolios are both capable and durable.

The dramatic decrease in the proportion of ministers who began their political careers at the provincial level and then moved on to the federal level is well-documented and reflected in the 1957-2000 dataset. The proportion of ministers who have provincial experience drops by more than half for the exit by Order-in-Council, government turnover, exit federal politics and reshuffle models. The proportion of ministers with provincial legislative experience who are defeated in federal elections drops from 12 to seven percent.

The last variable shared by both the 1867-2000 and 1957-2000 model is minority government. Here, one observes that the proportion of ministers who leave to take up the offer of a patronage appointment during a minority government increases from 13 to 23 percent. The proportion of minority government ministers who choose to exit on their own terms or when a government is defeated remains roughly the same for both models.

6.5 The Event History Analysis 1957-2000

Figure 6.7 presents the ministerial hazard function for pooled exits in the 1957-2000 period and compares it to the hazard function for pooled exits for the 1867-2000 period. There is hardly any difference between the survival curves when the multiple forms of exit are pooled together. However, when the exits are broken down the differences emerge. Figure 6.8 presents the hazard function curves for each exit type in the 1957-

Figure 6.7: Ministerial Hazard Function, pooled exits, 1867-2000, 1957-2000 compared





Figure 6.8: Ministerial Hazard Function, 1957-2000, by exit type



2000 period contrasted with the hazard curves for the 1867-2000 period. The hazard curve for the 1957-2000 Order-in-Council model is considerably shorter having lost the second peak that reaches its maximum between nine and ten years in the 1867-2000 model. Instead, the 1957-2000 hazard plateaus under .05 and terminates at the nine year mark. The difference between the two hazard curves is likely explained by a shift in legislative career paths whereby MPs and cabinet ministers are appointed to Order-in-Council positions after they have left federal politics. The trend is reflected in the 1957-2000 exit federal politics and reshuffle hazard curves which see a jump at points where the 1867-2000 descend. After a short dip at ten years the hazard one again increases suggesting that ministers, once they serve for the equivalent of two consecutive terms, are looking to exit the cabinet on their own terms. At this point, many long serving ministers may be rewarded with a patronage appointment that commences after they have left. A similar pattern exists for the 1957-2000 model which like its 1867-2000 counterpart possesses a low hazard but sees a dramatic increase at the eight year point. This increase, like the 1957-2000 exit federal politics curve, represents a voluntary withdrawal from the cabinet. Both the Trudeau and Mulroney governments saw a large number of long-serving ministers resign from the cabinet at the same time that the prime ministers announced their retirements. These ministers, whose careers were closely tied to the prime minister, were not interested in serving under a successor, felt that their time in federal politics had come to an end or did not want to run in another election. Many were subsequently rewarded with patronage appointments upon their exit.

The results of the Cox Proportional Hazards, competing risk model for the period 1957-2000 are presented in Table 6.13 and the predicted and actual results for this period are presented in Table 6.14.⁸

⁸ Note that while the log likelihoods are presented for each of the model their utility as a comparative tool is restricted as log likelihoods cannot be interpreted in isolation as they involve a proportionality constant which is ignored as they do not vary as a function of the parameters. Log likelihoods can only be interpreted with comparing one model's results with another subject to the constraint that the models have the same dependent variable and that is not the case in this circumstance.

Table 6.13: Cox Proportional Hazards Model 1957-2000

	OIC			Exit Federal Politics			Reshuffle		
	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	P>z	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	P>z	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	P>z
Age	1.10	0.03	0.037	1.12	0.03	0.000	0.95	0.02	0.010
Female	0.00	.	.	1.45	0.72	0.457	1.24	0.54	0.617
Lawyer	0.86	0.38	0.638	1.28	0.41	0.434	0.70	0.21	0.224
Government seats in province	0.89	0.92	0.547	1.01	0.80	0.991	5.70	4.33	0.022
Francophone	8.20	3.70	0.000	1.62	0.62	0.208	0.98	0.32	0.963
Leadership challenger	0.08	0.09	0.033	0.53	0.29	0.251	0.49	0.37	0.348
Important portfolio	2.10	0.90	0.088	0.88	0.30	0.714	0.75	0.24	0.366
House experience	1.10	0.03	0.015	1.01	0.02	0.592	1.00	0.03	0.947
Margin of victory	2.10	2.79	0.311	0.84	0.82	0.859	0.41	0.38	0.337
Provincial experience	1.40	1.19	0.782	0.35	0.23	0.108	2.30	1.19	0.107
Minority government	1.76	0.85	0.050	2.30	0.97	0.049	1.34	0.52	0.459
Calls for resignation	1.05	0.04	0.839	1.04	0.03	0.204	1.10	0.04	0.004
Public opinion	3.35	5.13	0.018	0.22	0.28	0.240	0.95	1.01	0.959
Subjects	322			322			322		
Failures	31			52			54		
Prob > chi2	0.0000			0.0000			0.0869		
Log Likelihood	-123.20979			-116.26411			-258.58614		

Table 6.14: Predicted and Actual Results 1957-2000

	Order in council		Exit federal politics		Reshuffled	
	P	A	P	A	P	A
Age	0	***+	+	***+	0	***-
Female	0	.	0	+	-	+
Lawyer	0	-	0	+	-	-
Government seats in province	0	+	0	+	+	**+
Francophone	+	***+	0	+	0	-
Leadership challenger	-	**-	0	-	-	-
Important portfolio	0	*+	+	-	-	-
House experience	+	***+	+	+	-	+
Margin of victory	0	+	0	+	0	-
Provincial experience	0	+	0	-	-	+
Minority government	0	+	0	**+	+	+
Calls for resignation	-	+	0	+	+	***+
Public opinion	0	+	0	-	-	-

P = Predicted

A = Actual

6.5.1 Order-in-Council Appointment

Three of the four predictions (francophone, leadership challenger and House experience) made for the Order-in-Council appointment model were both confirmed and consisted of highly significant coefficients. In addition, two other variables (age and important portfolio) proved to be significant even though no initial predictions were made. Graphical representations of the survival function for all of the significant variables are presented in Figure 6.9 .


Age: The age variable for the 1957-2000 model turned out to be significant at the .01 level despite the lack of a prediction. A hazard ratio of 1.10 indicates that for each year that a minister ages the corresponding risk of exiting the cabinet to accept a patronage appointment from the prime minister increases by ten percent. In hindsight this highly significant and positive result makes sense. The pooled-exits summary statistics indicates that the average age of exit for ministers in the 1957-2000 period is about 52 years old, well ahead of the typical age of retirement. Ministers who wish to leave the hustle of legislative representative politics in Ottawa but not retire from politics altogether had best pursue the option of an alternative career in the Canadian government which can be provided by the prime minister. On the other hand, prime ministers may not want to entirely “lose” those individuals who desire to leave the cabinet altogether. One way to retain the legislative expertise of high-performing ministers is to offer them a patronage appointment such as a seat in the Senate which may keep them close to the prime minister, but not in the cabinet *per se*.

Francophone: The hypothesis that francophone ministers are more likely than non-francophones to leave the cabinet to take up a patronage appointment is confirmed in the 1957-2000 model. Despite this confirmation, the magnitude of the result is somewhat surprising; the hazard ratio is 8.20. Francophone ministers face a hazard of accepting an offer of patronage that is eight times that of their non-francophone cabinet colleagues. The explanation for this large hazard ratio was alluded to earlier. Three of the eight

Figure 6.9: Ministerial Hazard Function, 1957-2000, Order-in-Council

Ministerial Hazard Function

1957–2000 Order in Council



prime ministers who presided over the cabinet during this period were from Quebec: Trudeau, Mulroney and Chrétien. When combined, they governed for 27 of the 43 years covered in this dataset. In order to secure their political base in Quebec, promises and rewards were undoubtedly made to long-time supporters, including those who were already given seats in the cabinet. Even Trudeau could not avoid rewarding Transport Minister Jean Marchand with a promotion to the Senate after Marchand resigned in protest at the government's handling of the air traffic controller's dispute. Marchand and Trudeau were close friends, they were both drawn to Ottawa by Pearson in the mid 1960s to boost the French presence in the government. Marchand played key roles in Trudeau's bid for the Liberal Party leadership in 1968 as well as the 1968 and 1972 elections in Quebec. Mulroney also rewarded his francophone ministers with Order-in-Council appointments. Long-time supporter, party organizer and cabinet minister, Benoit Bouchard left the cabinet in 1993 to take up the plum ambassadorship to France.⁹

Leadership Challenger: The results for the leadership challenger variable came out as predicted and without contention. Prime ministers do not reward their own party competitors with patronage. In fact, leadership challengers face a 92 percent negative hazard of receiving an Order-in-Council appointment. This may in part stem from a prime minister's unwillingness to reward their political rivals but it is also likely that ministers who are able to contest the party leadership and secure a cabinet position also possess the necessary skills and talents to pursue a successful career outside of politics should they choose to leave.

Important Portfolio: Unlike the 1867-2000 model, the important portfolio variable turned out significant and in the predicted direction for the 1957-2000 model. Ministers who hold important portfolios are more than two times as likely (hazard ratio = 2.10) to leave the cabinet for a patronage position than those ministers who do not preside over any of the portfolios identified by Laver and Hunt. A graphical representation of the

⁹ Unfortunately, the bulk of Order-in-Council appointments officially take place after the minister has left cabinet and are therefore not recorded in the dataset.

survival function for the important portfolio variable can be seen in Figure 6.9.

House Experience: The House experience covariate also emerged significant and as predicted. Unsurprisingly, ministers with more parliamentary service face a “higher risk” of being rewarded with an Order-in-Council appointment. For each additional year of parliamentary experience that a minister is able to claim, his or her hazard of receiving patronage increases by 10 percent. Figure 6.9 presents the survival functions for the House experience variable.

6.5.2 Exit Federal Politics

Only one of the three predictions made for the exit federal politics model was realized; the age variable was both significant at the .01 level and in the predicted positive direction. The predictions for the other two variables (important portfolio and House experience) both failed to pass any significance tests. Although, minority government proved to be positively related to a voluntary exit from federal politics and passed a significance test at the .05 level. A graphical representation of the survival functions for these variables can be seen in Figure 6.10.


Age: It should come as no surprise that the age variable is both highly significant and positively related to a minister’s voluntary exit from federal politics. As ministers age they are more likely to retire or leave federal politics to pursue other opportunities. The result confirms Docherty’s assertion that older and more experienced MPs are more likely to choose the timing and form of exit themselves rather than be forced out in an election defeat.(Docherty, 1994) The hazard ratio of 1.25 indicates that for every additional year added to a minister’s age, the hazard of a voluntary exit increases by 25 percent.

Minority Government: The second variable to pass a significance test was the minority government variable. The positive result and corresponding hazard ratio of 2.30 suggests that ministers who serve in minority governments are more than twice as likely

Figure 6.10: Ministerial Hazard Function, 1957-2000, Exit Federal Politics

Ministerial Hazard Function

1957-2000 Exit Federal Politics



to leave federal politics than ministers who serve in majority governments. It is possible that the prospects of government turnover or serving in another, difficult, minority government may prompt many ministers to bow out and retire or return to private life.

6.5.3 Reshuffle

Ten predictions were made for the final model in the 1957-2000 series. Of these, seven of the hypotheses were confirmed but only two passed significance tests. Also, the unpredicted variable, age, proved to be highly significant and negatively related to exit by reshuffling. A graphical representation of the hazard functions for each of the significant variables can be seen in Figure 6.11.¹⁰

Age: As ministers grow older, they may indeed also grow wiser, or at least less likely to make errors that will see them relegated to the backbenches. The age variable proved to be significant at the .01 level and negatively related to exit by reshuffling. The hazard ratio of 0.95 suggest that for each year added to a minister age, his or her hazard of being reshuffled drops by five percent.

Proportion: The hypothesis that prime ministers are constrained in their personnel decisions by the provincial representation convention bares out. The proportion of seats held by the governing party in the minister's province variable is positively related to reshuffling and significant at the .05 level. A hazard ratio of 1.02 indicates that for each percentage point of the proportion of seats held by the governing party in a given province, the hazard that a minister from that province will be reshuffled increases by two percent. Thus, ministers from provinces where the governing party has a strong presence had best be careful as prime ministers have a larger pool of potential replacements from which to choose from in the event of a need for change.


Calls for Resignation: Finally, the expectation that ministers who face calls for their resignation in the House of Commons are more likely to be sacked than those ministers

¹⁰ An interaction term that combined difference in public opinion and minority government was also included but proved to be statistically insignificant with negligible change in the other covariates.

Figure 6.11: Ministerial Hazard Function, 1957-2000, Reshuffle

Ministerial Hazard Functions

1957-2000 Reshuffle



who face more favourable criticisms from the opposition benches. The calls for resignation variable was highly significant and positively related to exit by reshuffling. For each additional call for a minister to resign, that minister can expect his or her hazard of being returned to the backbenches to increase by ten percent.

6.5.4 Goodness of Fit


An evaluation of overall model fit for each of the competing risks models for both time periods can be conducted by using Cox-Snell residuals. Cleves et al. recount that, "It has been shown that if the Cox regression model fits the data, then the true cumulative hazard function conditional on the covariate vector has an exponential distribution with a hazard of 1." Cleves, Gould and Gutierrez (2002) When graphed, the cumulative hazard of the Cox-Snell residuals should follow a 45 degree line. Figure 6.12 presents graphical representations of the cumulative hazard of the Cox-Snell residuals for each of the competing risks models. Note that residuals closely follow the 45 degree line for each of the 1867-2000 models. There is somewhat more dispersion in the 1957-2000 models. Although, Cleves et al. point out that even well-fitting models see some variability about the 45 degree line, especially in the right hand tail due to prior failures and censoring. Nevertheless, the variability in the 1957-2000 models indicates that more detailed leverage analysis should be conducted in further research using this data.

6.6 Conclusion

Chapter six presented the Cox proportional, competing risks hazard models of Canadian ministerial turnover for the periods 1867-2000 and 1957-2000. The hypotheses and predictions set out in Chapter five were tested and the results emerged with varying degrees of success for each of the three different forms of ministerial exit: Order-in-Council appointment, exit federal politics and reshuffle. Of the 14 predictions set out

Figure 6.12: Cox-Snell Residuals for 1878-2000 and 1957-2000 Cox Proportional Hazards Models

Cox Snell Residuals



for the 1867-2000 model only three were realized with coefficients that passed significance tests (Francophone and leadership challenger in the Order-in-Council appointment model and age in the exit federal politics model). That said, four additional variables proved to be unexpectedly significant and, in hindsight, logical explanations can be conceived to interpret these results (age, legal background and margin of victory in the Order-in-Council appointment model; minority government in the exit federal politics model and age in the reshuffle model). The results from the 1867-2000 model are few in number but are exciting in that they systematically confirm what to date was only known intuitively or through anecdotal evidence. Despite these pleasant surprises, the extent to which the 1867-2000 reshuffle model failed to turn out predicted results is somewhat alarming.

The 1957-2000 models fared considerably better; six of the 17 predictions were confirmed and passed significance tests (age, francophone, leadership challenger and House experience in the Order-in-Council appointment model; age for the exit federal politics model and percentage of seats held by governing party in minister's province and calls for resignation in the reshuffle model). The improved results are likely due to historical contextualization whereby hypotheses made for the entire 1867-2000 period are really more applicable for the contemporary 1957-2000 period as attested in earlier discussions of the female and important portfolio variables. Still more encouraging were the additional four variables that turned out significant albeit unpredicted (age and important portfolio in the Order-in-Council appointment model; minority government in the exit federal politics model and age in the reshuffle model).

The 1957-2000 reshuffle model, like its 1867-2000 counterpart also failed to deliver on its predictions. What might explain this breakdown of the reshuffle models? The answer may be provided by Canadian constitutional convention. As it stands, ministers who are coded as "reshuffled" are those individuals who simply return to the backbenches; the reason or reasons for the removal from cabinet are not provided. We know

that ministerial responsibility comes in two shapes: individual and collective. Individual ministerial responsibility dictates that a minister may be removed from cabinet for a particularly egregious act or policy failure. In principle, the minister *should* resign if his or her actions threaten to compromise the integrity of his or her individual office or the cabinet as a whole. In fact, the prime minister usually conducts a political cost-benefit analysis to determine whether or not the minister has to go and acts accordingly. The point here is that it is the prime minister who ultimately decides whether to sack the minister or not.

In the case of collective ministerial responsibility, the choice to abide by the collective will/consensus of the cabinet or the authority of the prime minister falls on the minister. It is the minister who will bite his or her tongue or bid adieu to the cabinet. Both Eric Kierans (under Trudeau) and Lucien Bouchard (under Mulroney) were respected and competent cabinet ministers who resigned from the cabinet on their own initiative due to irreconcilable differences with the prime minister. The nature of these exits differs dramatically from the ministerial sackings of Minister of Defence Robert Coates who was caught visiting in a German strip bar while attending a NATO conference or Solicitor General Francis Fox who was identified signing the husband's name on a hospital document to procure an abortion for the woman with whom he was having an affair.¹¹ In much the same way that ministerial turnover is too broad an umbrella to cover Order-in-Council appointments, exits from federal politics and reshuffles, "reshuffle" may be too broad a label for both reshuffles for individual and collective ministerial responsibility. Once reshuffles are broken down into further competing risks, the predictions set out in Chapter five may be better realized. These risks may include: exit for policy failure, exit for personal misdeed (sexual peccadillo or financial related issue e.g. conflict of interest) The difficulty is that another element of collective ministe-

¹¹Mulroney remarked that at the height of the "new" cold war in 1984 his Minister of Defence had to be "purer than Caesar's wife" and that he had no choice but to dismiss Robert Coates in light of the scandal. Interview with Brian Mulroney (May 17, 2006)

rial responsibility, cabinet secrecy, makes it difficult to determine the precise source of a reshuffle, as attested to by the 2003 resignation/sacking of Finance Minister Paul Martin.¹²

Both the 1867-2000 and the 1957-2000 models attest to the conviction that ministerial turnover is driven largely by “politics as usual” whether it be policy, office or votes but that some of the constitutional conventions that are supposed to inform cabinet membership still exist, despite the nay-sayers cries that constitutional convention lies dead at the feet of prime ministerial government.

The strongest result to highlight the continued relevance of constitutional convention is the percentage of government seats in the minister’s province variable in the 1957-2000 reshuffle model. Despite Mulroney’s personal belief that regionalism “has absolutely no effect” on ministerial resignations, the strong and positive result for this variable suggests that regionalism is still a powerful consideration when a prime minister decides to reshuffle his or her cabinet. Likewise, the highly significant and positive relationship between calls for a minister’s resignation and reshuffling leads one to believe that question period and opposition attacks do play a role in bringing down a minister.

There were also some unexpected results in the 1957-2000 model. The positive and highly significant coefficient for the Francophone variable in the Order-in-Council model is both unexpected and somewhat disturbing on the surface. Although, the connection between Francophone ministers and patronage appointments following a ministerial career should not necessarily raise suspicions that the patronage politics that characterized political life in Quebec in the 19th and early 20th centuries still exists today. As alluded to above, the results for the Francophone variable may reflect the fact that the majority of prime ministers who have served in the later half of the 20th century hail from Quebec and they are likely to reward those ministers who are closest to them

¹²Chrétien claims that Martin resigned whereas Martin says that he was sacked.

and in this case, they also happen to be Francophones from Quebec. An extension of this research should include an indicator that specifies whether or not the prime minister and the minister hail from the same province.

The failure of the female variable to pass any significance tests for the reshuffle model was also surprising given the extensive literature that highlights how women are underrepresented in the House of Commons and in cabinet. The unpredicted positive relationship between the female indicator and exit by reshuffling was even more of a surprise suggesting that women do not benefit from an unwritten affirmative action policy. Rather, they face a higher risk of a return to the backbenches than their male counterparts. This may reflect a Thatcher-like situation whereby only women who are more masculine than the male-cabinet ministers themselves are likely to survive in cabinet for any extended period of time. There may also be a need to break down portfolios into senior and junior categories to determine whether or not women serve as ministers of state or preside over minor portfolios that are subject to higher levels of turnover.

The next, and final, chapter of this dissertation will recap the results ascertained in Chapter five and situate them at the nexus between prime ministerial power and constitutional convention to examine the relevance and salience of both schools of thought. The lessons learnt in this dissertation as well as recommendations for further research will be presented.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This dissertation sets out to develop a model of ministerial turnover in Canada for the period 1867 until 2000. By doing so it hopes to answer the questions of why and how do ministers exit the highest echelon of power in the Canadian political system. There are good reasons to take a closer look at ministerial turnover. Minister turnover sheds light on the subject of prime ministerial power, the evolution of constitutional convention, the nature of regional representation and the significance and permanence of elites; all topics which raise their heads in the Canadian political science literature and are a constant source of concern and discussion.

Despite the academic and popular interest in ministerial turnover, Canadian political scientists have generally ignored the subject or relegated turnover to the realms of prime ministerial decision-making or the much larger discussion of legislator turnover and its causes and effects. The trend stands apart from other polities that share the Westminster political tradition where ministerial scholars have engaged in a variety of qualitative and limited quantitative research endeavors over the past sixty years. The current wave of studies has taken on a more systematic nature as political institutions and individuals have started to collect and make data on ministerial career paths publicly available.

In order to overcome the dearth of systematic analysis on ministerial turnover in Canada, and indeed to spark a greater interest in the subject, the first step of this

dissertation was to construct an original dataset that records the career paths of every minister to have served in the Canadian federal cabinet from Confederation (1867) until 2000. By doing so, a more accurate picture of when ministers exit could be determined. A second step involved finding out how each of these ministers left the cabinet. A major obstacle in the existing sources involves incomplete or inaccurate records of ministerial exit. Once the “when” and the “how” have been established one can then turn one’s eyes to the question of why ministers exit the cabinet and start to develop a causal model of ministerial turnover.

Canadian ministers exit the cabinet for a variety of reasons. The literature on Canadian constitutional convention makes it quite clear that ministers should leave when mandated to by the twin conventions of individual and collective ministerial responsibility. However, there has been little analysis detailing when and how ministers actually do exit the cabinet. As in the United Kingdom, the Canadian experience suggests that although resignations for ministerial errors, policy failures or an inability to abide by the collective cabinet unanimity do take place, agency for these exits seldom rests with the minister who leaves but rather with the prime minister who makes a calculated political decision. Ministers leave the cabinet for other reasons as well. They leave to retire, to take up a patronage position or to return to private life. The literature on Canadian legislator career paths deals with each of these departures with considerable detail; while it provides useful insight into the means that ordinary MPs from every party end their careers, these studies do not provide details on how these exits are related to cabinet ministers. In fact, a close look at “non-political” exits suggests that they are closely associated to exits related to constitutional convention. Rather than succumb to the public demands for ministerial blood by removing a wayward minister to the backbench, prime ministers often provide loyal, yet troublesome ministers a softer landing. Likewise, a minister unwilling to abide by collective ministerial responsibility may choose to leave politics altogether instead of returning to the backbenches to sit as an ordinary member

of caucus.

The prime minister sits at the centre of the ministerial turnover process. The prime minister alone has the authority to appoint and dismiss ministers. Ministers are only able to directly circumvent the prime minister's authority should they decide to voluntarily remove themselves from the cabinet. This event seldom takes place given the ambitious nature of ministers who aspire to ascend to the top of the "greasy pole." The prime minister's power extends beyond his or her constitutional authority. As party leader he signs candidacy papers and a candidate's success at the polls is closely related to the leader's popularity. The prime minister is also the sole provider of political largesse; ministers who aspire to a post-cabinet career as an ambassador, senator or president of a crown corporation are advised to retain the prime minister's favour or expect their future hopes to be dashed.

Despite the considerable power that prime ministers possess they still face a number of formal and informal constraints that curtail them from doing whatever they please vis-à-vis their ministers. Purely dictatorial prime ministers run the risk that their cabinet will rise up in revolt. No Canadian prime minister has ever faced a cabinet that has resigned en masse but some have experienced major cabinet dissent which required a change in leadership tactics.

Prime ministers are also constrained by uniquely Canadian constitutional conventions that stipulate that particular interests, regions and minorities have a seat around the cabinet table. The best known specify that every province be represented and that the francophone minority have a sufficient presence in cabinet. A more recent trend points towards the need to ensure that women, ethnic minorities as well as urban/rural interests are also represented.

That the prime minister has considerable influence on the career paths of his or her cabinet ministers and that this influence may be constrained by constitutional conventions is not a new and exciting discovery. In fact, this discussion has been rehashed

in the Canadian political science canon several times in the last sixty years. However, what is lacking is a solid and systematic explanation of the prime minister's power of dismissal and its relationship to ministerial career paths. Chapter three puts forward the idea that if ministerial turnover is to be convincingly understood, then they must be viewed from a longitudinal perspective in which the static events and circumstances that ministers experience can be situated in the context of an entire career. It only makes sense that a minister's prior experience and behaviour has an effect on future outcomes and future forms of cabinet exit. Furthermore, by adopting a longitudinal approach the impact of time on a minister's duration and durability in cabinet can also be assessed.

A second idea put forward in Chapter three is that the different forms of ministerial turnover should be integrated into a single analysis. Up to this point the different forms of exit have usually been studied separately. Cabinet reshuffles typically fall under the umbrella of prime ministerial behaviour or decision-making while voluntary exits are covered by the career path literature for all members of parliament. Yet all of these activities constitute ministerial turnover. Moreover, the processes that produce one kind of turnover are not necessarily independent from the processes that produce the other kinds of exits. By considering each of the different kinds of cabinet exit simultaneously more accurate inferences of the impact that various factors have on the different forms of exit can be made.

An event history analysis was selected to model the longitudinal framework set out in Chapter three. Event history models are especially useful when the phenomena under investigation are concerned with the patterns and determinants of the occurrence of an event - in this case, a minister's exit from cabinet. They are also a more appropriate tool than ordinary least square regression because they are able to suitably handle censoring (when an observations duration is cut off at the beginning or end of their time line) as well as time-varying explanatory variables; OLS regression, on the other hand, treats all covariates as static.

For the purposes of this study a discrete time model was selected instead of a continuous time model. Whether to employ a continuous or discrete time model depends entirely on the nature of the research problem and how time is measured. In the case of ministerial careers, the discrete time approach was selected because of the discrete nature of the temporal unit used to measure the duration of a career (days) itself. The discrete approach, which records whether or not an event occurred for each temporal unit, easily accommodates time-varying covariates such as changes in public opinion.

The recommendation that a Cox proportional hazards competing risks model be used was also made in Chapter four. The Cox proportional specification was selected because there are no ex-ante assumptions about the parametric shape of the distribution of time before a minister exits the cabinet. The competing risks approach was employed because it allows for multiple forms of exit to be considered simultaneously and helps to avoid the bias that would take place if all of the different forms of exit were to be pooled together as a single indicator.

One of the major contributions of this thesis is the creation of an original dataset that consists of career path data for every minister who served in the Canadian federal cabinet from the creation of the Canadian state in 1867 until 2000. In order to accommodate the longitudinal data structure and the event history analysis set out in chapters three and four the dataset is organized so that every day that a minister serves in cabinet is accounted for. In addition to the duration data, additional covariates were also included in the dataset. These covariates were broken down into three categories: individual characteristics unique to the minister (age, gender, legal background, provincial constituency, linguistic background, leadership status within the party, portfolio, previous House and provincial legislative experience as well as exposure to political and personal mishaps), legislative characteristics that describe the parliament in which the minister serves (minority government status) and finally characteristics related to the extra-parliamentary environment (difference in public opinion between the governing

party and the main opposition party). Each of these variables are reflected in a series of hypotheses derived from the comparative literature on ministerial resignations as well as the more specific literature on Canadian parliamentary career paths and constitutional convention. The data was broken down into two subsets: one set comprises the entire 1867-2000 period but omits data on public opinion and calls for ministerial resignation in the House of Commons because this data can only be obtained from 1957 onwards. The second set consists of only those ministers who have served since 1957 and includes the omitted variables. This latter set more accurately reflects the contemporary period of Canadian politics.

The results of the Cox proportional hazards competing risks models for each of the different forms of ministerial exit and for the 1867-2000 and 1957-2000 periods were presented in Chapter six. Only three of the 14 predictions made for the 1867-2000 period were confirmed; although an additional four variables, for which no predictions were made, passed significance tests. The results for the 1867-2000 model, although sparse, are nevertheless encouraging as they do confirm many widely held accounts of ministerial turnover that up until this point were only known through personal accounts.

The results for the exit by Order-in-Council, the exit federal politics and the exit by reshuffle event history models were more encouraging in the 1957-2000 period: six of the 17 predictions were confirmed and four more variables with null predictions emerged as significant. However, the positive and highly significant coefficient for the francophone variable in the 1957-2000 exit by Order-in-Council model was unexpected although it may be partially explained by Quebec's persistent record at placing one of their own in the Prime Minister's chair in the cabinet chamber. Future extensions of this dissertation research should include an additional variable to identify ministers who are from the same province as the prime minister. The female variable's inability to pass any significance tests in the exit by reshuffle to the backbenches also proved puzzling given the disproportionate ratio of men to women in the House of Commons and the

unwritten need to ensure some level of gender equality in the cabinet. One way to explore this dynamic further is to link gender to portfolio and establish whether or not female cabinet ministers are more likely to serve as junior ministers or ministers of state who are more likely to experience turnover due to the short-term need to retain these portfolios.

Both the 1867-2000 and 1957-2000 reshuffle models performed less than exemplary. This is likely due to the need to breakdown the exit by reshuffle indicator into further risks: exit for individual ministerial responsibility, exit for collective ministerial responsibility as well as a basic reshuffle to shake up the cabinet and backbench ranks. Further data design is needed to break down the competing risks in order to reduce the possible effects of dependence between the risks.

Three primary objectives were set out in Chapter one. The first objective was to develop a general model of ministerial turnover in the Canadian federal cabinet that considers every form of ministerial exit. This objective has been met with the development of a Cox proportional hazards competing risks event history model that simultaneously estimates the "hazard" that a minister will exit the cabinet for one of three reasons: to accept an offer of patronage via an Order-in-Council appointment, to exit federal politics and return to private life or to be reshuffled to the backbenches. The second objective was to distinguish this research from previous research on Canadian cabinet ministers by highlighting the factors that work to cause one of these forms of ministerial exits. Following an extensive review of the Canadian and comparative literatures, a series of covariates that contain individual, legislative and extra-parliamentary characteristics was identified and used to extend the event history model. The final objective set out in Chapter one specified that the results of the event history model should address issues pertaining to ministerial career paths, prime ministerial power and constitutional conventions in Canadian political life. The results of the event history models presented in Chapter six demonstrate that ministerial experience does affect the different risks in

different ways. The hazard of experiencing an exit by Order-in-Council is considerably steeper for the 1867-2000 period than it is for the 1957-2000 reflecting the prime ministers overt decision to reward his supporters in the early years of the state; the hazard drops considerably in the 1957-2000 period where ministers are less likely to move on to patronage appointments directly from the cabinet and instead take up these appointments shortly after they have left the cabinet or politics altogether. Both periods see a rising hazard every four or five years when constitutionally mandated elections are held and ministers must choose whether or not to run for elected office and prime ministers must decide who to retain and let go from the cabinet.

A similar trend exists for the exit federal politics model. Ministers face a slowly increasing hazard in the buildup to a constitutionally mandated election at which point they decide whether or not to run. If the minister survives the election process and is retained in cabinet then his or her hazard spikes considerably in the buildup to the next election suggesting that two parliamentary terms are usually enough for ministers before they decide to exit federal politics or accept a patronage appointment. The steeper hazard curve in the 1957-2000 exit federal politics model clearly takes into account the flatter curve in the 1957-2000 Order-in-Council model as more ministers leave on their own accord before taking up a patronage appointment. The exit by reshuffle hazard for both the 1867-2000 and 1957-2000 models is comparatively low and flat throughout a minister's career suggesting that ministerial careers are for the most part stable and free from exogenous shocks. Once in cabinet, most ministers are secure in their tenure throughout their cabinet careers. The 1957-2000 curve sees a dramatic jump in the build-up to the ten-year mark which likely reflects those ministers in the Trudeau and Mulroney cabinets who voluntarily returned to the backbenches with no intention of running in the upcoming election.

That the Canadian prime minister wields considerable power vis-à-vis cabinet ministers is an uncontested truth; the prime minister's exclusive power to appoint and dis-

miss ministers at will attests to this fact. However, the results of the event history analysis demonstrate that while the prime minister is indeed powerful, this power is not without constraints. For example, the 1957-2000 reshuffle model revealed that ministers who face multiple resignation calls in the House of Commons have a noticeably higher hazard of being demoted to the backbenches than those ministers who receive few or no calls for resignation. There is no evidence here of a direct link between a prime minister's decision to sack a minister in trouble and electoral strategy; but, it is not so far fetched to expect prime ministers to dismiss problematic ministers whose actions or inactions may prove embarrassing or detrimental in an election campaign.

Perhaps the most significant revelation to come out of this dissertation is that constitutional convention still plays an important part in the political life of the cabinet. The regional representation convention is clearly alive and well; prime ministers do find it difficult to sack ministers from provinces where the governing party has a limited presence due to the need to retain provincial representation at the cabinet table. Likewise, the results for the calls for resignation variable suggests that individual ministerial responsibility still exists and that question-period in the House of Commons performs its function well in so far as ministers under opposition attack can and do face the "reluctant knife".

A number of unexplored avenues remain for future research. Some of these avenues were hinted at in the body of the dissertation. First and foremost, the dataset used to inform the event history models can be expanded and refined. A number of the variables are admittedly crude and already require updating. For example, a more specific important portfolio variable could be generated with more time and resources. One approach might entail the use of content analysis software to examine parliamentary debates and count the number of times that a minister speaks or is called to task during parliamentary debates. The assumption here is that ministers who preside over temporally significant portfolios will make more frequent appearances in Hansard. This approach would also

overcome the difficulty associated with portfolios whose importance changes over time e.g. Railways and Canals.

A second modification to the data should include the further breakdown of the exit by reshuffle competing risk to consider ministers who are dismissed, ministers who exit the cabinet for reasons related to individual ministerial responsibility and ministers who exit for reasons related to collective ministerial responsibility. Each of these exits are qualitatively different from the others and the existing pooled nature of a single reshuffle exit is likely contributing to bias in the event history analysis. This suggests that improved data design and specification should overcome or improve on some of the less than satisfactory results.

Future research should also consider the wider context of the full ministerial career, not simply ministerial exits. Ministerial careers understood as part of a wider legislator career path require further research into ministerial appointments. A similar dataset that consists of all governing party members of parliament can be used to develop an event history model that estimates the hazard of ministerial appointment. Hypotheses regarding constitutional convention, provincial representation, gender and ethnic backgrounds can be made and would undoubtedly provide additional insight to the results ascertained in this dissertation. Furthermore, such a study might serve to more adequately answer questions pertaining to the policy and office seeking motivations of both the prime minister and Canadian legislators in general.

Finally, this study should serve as a major contribution to the future comparative study of ministerial turnover and career paths in other Westminster parliamentary democracies. Comparative research may yield further informative insights in the nature of similar constitutional conventions, leadership decision-making and ministerial career paths. I hope that this dissertation is merely the first step in a much larger and rewarding research endeavor.

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