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Glück

in the Narratives of Jörg Wickram

Ph. D. thesis presented by

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May 2001
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Summary

In this thesis I want to consider the concept of *glück*, the German equivalent of Fortuna, in the narratives of the sixteenth century author Jörg Wickram. I will focus on two major themes in Wickram's representation of *glück*. First, I will consider the occurrence of *glück* in relation to another major force, God. Second, I will consider two types of *glück* that we may distinguish in the narratives, one operating externally and the other operating internally, the former affecting characters from without, the latter originating more in their own actions. My aim is to define the impact which *glück* has on the lives of the characters, and the extent to which the characters may in turn influence *glück*.

My approach is twofold: I begin the exploration of each theme by close textual analysis of the narratives; the findings of the textual analysis are then related to a historical background. This background is constituted by various sources, both medieval and early modern, that dwell on the nature of *glück*, or Fortuna. The medieval aspect is represented by the views of Boethius, whose account of Fortuna may be regarded as formative for the Middle Ages. Boethius' scepticism stands in contrast to certain exponents of Renaissance thought, such as Petrarch, Poggio Bracciolino and Enea Silvio Piccolomini. The latters' emphasis on human control over Fortuna differs markedly from the pessimism advocated by Sebastian Brant and Hans Sachs. By evaluating Wickram's *glück* against the background of these diverse accounts, I will determine his position in a wider historical context.

In order to determine the relation between *glück* and God, I will look for patterns according to which either force is credited as the source of crucial incidents in the characters' lives. As we shall see, the incidents are distributed consistently between the two forces. *glück* is generally the source of negative developments, while God is the source of positive developments. As a result, the question of which force will eventually emerge as superior, and precisely at which point and how this will come about, contributes substantially to the tension inherent in the narrative structure. The answer to this question is shaped both by the characters' contribution and by the genre of each narrative. The hierarchy between the two forces will be put into a wider perspective by comparing Wickram's model with the Boethian account of Fortuna's subordination to God.

Once a firm grip on the extent of *glück*'s intervention in the narratives has been established, I will focus on the two manifestations, internal and external, of *glück* as

such. Externally operating *glück* is in charge of incidents which are external in that they are clearly beyond the control of the person they affect. *glück* as an external force resembles the traditional force of Fortuna as a superhuman force. Distinct from this is internally operating *glück*. The incidents which are attributed to this type of *glück* usually arise from culpable negligence on the part of the affected person. In this sense, the affected person has the potential to control these instances of *glück*. As well as demonstrating the difference between the two types of *glück*, I will consider to what extent each type influences the protagonists' development. Notably, internally operating *glück* is of greater significance in this respect than its externally operating counterpart, and this, I shall argue, serves to underline the need for the characters to take control of their development. In order to consider how this account of *glück* relates to contemporary fifteenth and sixteenth century views, I will finally compare it to the conceptions of *glück* and Fortuna which form the historical background, and complement them with further literary examples from the same period. Ultimately, my aim is to show both that Wickram's representation of *glück* combines medieval and modern elements and may therefore be considered as a true product of a transitional age, and that it is truly original when considered against a wider spectrum of conceptions of *glück* or Fortuna.

A brief outline of the thesis:

Chapter 1 provides a summary of the present state of Wickram research, in particular with reference to the concept of *glück*. Part I (chs. 2-4) establishes a background against which to evaluate Wickram's representation of *glück*. Here I provide an overview of the concept of Fortuna, briefly tracing it from its roots in the Greek concept of *tyche*, but focusing especially on its appearance during Wickram's times as observed in texts influenced by the Renaissance and the Reformation. Part II (chs. 5-9) examines the relation between *glück* and God in each of Wickram's five narratives (*Ritter Galmy, Gabriotto und Reinhart, Der Knabenspiegel, Der Goldfaden, Von guoten und boesen Nachbaurn*). I also compare my findings to traditional views of the relation between the two powers, in particular those of Boethius. Part III (chs. 10-12) distinguishes two types of manifestations of *glück*. In addition to the traditional, externally operating type of *glück*, I argue that there is another, internally operating aspect to *glück*. This leads me to examine whether and to what extent *glück* is tied up with the internal states of the characters and their individual actions. Chapter 13, finally, considers Wickram's representation of *glück* against the background of contemporary conceptions. I attempt to establish how his representation is related to medieval thinking on the one hand and modern thinking on the other, and especially to what extent it may be considered as bearing the marks of a transitional age.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to: Timothy Jackson for his generous support; Ingrid Kasten, who first interested me in medieval literature, for her suggestions along the way; John Connolly for his helpful proof-reading; finally, my husband and daughter.

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Introduction

O du großmåchtigs falsches Glück/
Was vbst solch trotz vntrew vñ tück:
Erkiest das arg/ veriagst das gůt/
Håltst kain trew deiner gab vnd můt.
Die vnschuldigen du verheergst/
Die vnuerdienten ehrreich sterckst.
Die grechten zwingst zur armůt joch/
Die schelck sålgest/ vnd wirdigst hoch

Die jungen tödst auß gramem haß/
Die alten håltst auff vbert maß.
Schaydest vorteylig alle zeyt/
Machst frumer hab der argen beyt.
Håltst nit die du geadlet hast/
Jagst auch nit stet die du verlast.
Wirf hoch wied wilt/ stürtz ab in grūd
Noch helt all gschöpfft got in seim pūd

This poem, written by J. B. von Marckdorff, may be found at the beginning of the 1532 German edition of Petrarch's *Von der Artzney bayder Glueck, des guten und widerwertigen*.[1] In 1994, Alain de Botton's *The Romantic Movement* presents the reader with the following passage:[2]

Alice's outlook on life [...] was that represented by the *tumble-dryer*. The crucial feature of the dryer was that it was a cyclical machine whose inner drum revolved in time. Put a certain number of garments inside and they would settle along the rim while the drum spun; at one moment, a pair of jeans would be visible through the toughened-glass window, then would come socks, then perhaps a shirt, a dishcloth and so on. Not all items would be visible at every point, but the spin of the drum would force them to make an appearance at regular intervals. If the jeans stood for happiness, the socks for elation, the shirt for boredom, and the dishcloth for screaming misery, then the drying process stood to be compared with the living process, where what came around once would inevitably come around again, suggesting there were repetitive givens in a human life, that existence was a cyclical affair (82ff).

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[1] Franciscus Petrarcha, *Von der Artzney bayder Glueck, des guten und widerwertigen*, (ed.) Manfred Lemmer, (Hamburg/Leipzig: Friedrich Wittig Verlag, 1984).
[2] Alain de Botton, *The Romantic Movement* (New York: Picador, 1995).

Although these passages are separated from one another by an interval of more than 450 years, they nevertheless share a common theme: the impact that *glück*, or Fortuna has on human life. Von Marckdorff explicitly addresses the workings of *glück*, which is said to inflict injustice on a universal scale, turning human deserts into their opposite. De Botton, presumably so as to accommodate the tastes of a modern readership, thinly disguises the image of Fortuna's wheel behind that of the tumble-dryer; nevertheless, his reference to the cyclicity which shapes human life points to the presence of Fortuna in an unmistakable way. Notably, the sixteenth century poem juxtaposes the workings of *glück* with the protection afforded by the presence of God. By contrast, the outlook of de Botton's heroine has no room for God. This suggests that while over time the belief in God came to lose its appeal in popular literature, there is still room in lighthearted fiction at the end of the twentieth century for the concept of Fortuna and the changes it causes.

What is it that made this concept, which originated in antiquity, never quite vanish from people's minds? Obviously it must have been more than a mere learned conceit: "Fortune as nothing more than a literary figure, as a conventional symbol of use to those who had some contact with the classics, would have been worn threadbare long since; but her meaning was really vital to everybody, and so, in spite of the vast number of allusions to her, and the frigid repetition of the formulae associated with her, she persisted".[3] What vital need does the concept of Fortuna address to make it relevant to human life? Both the above-quoted passages indicate that Fortuna is held responsible for change and turmoil in human life. At the same time, they suggest a certain regularity, which, somehow paradoxically, is inherent in the guaranteed irregularity of Fortuna's workings. That is, the idea of regularity being present in the midst of rapid change and disorder, however much concealed, may be part of what makes the concept of Fortuna so alluring. For it may provide some structure, and as such sense, to the chaos which human life is often perceived to be. Moreover, the presence of a powerful superhuman force which, in operating randomly, disregards individual merit may help account for the experience of injustice: the occurrence of developments which are perceived as undeserved may be mitigated by the notion of their inevitability from the point of view of human action. The concept of Fortuna may be used to establish a pattern in the midst of the contingency of human life. Through employing this pattern as an interpretation of one's life, one may attempt to gain a certain amount of control over an apparently

[3] Howard R. Patch, *The Goddess Fortuna in Medieval Literature* (Harvard: University Press, 1927), p. 9. While this comment refers to the continuity of Fortuna's presence from antiquity to the Middle Ages, it may to some extent be applied also to the transition from Middle Ages to (early) modernity.

random existence, and thus partly overcome the plight of being the passive victim of an externally inflicted course of events. Hence the enduring appeal of Fortuna could be related to the fundamental human experience of life as incomprehensible chaos, and the equally fundamental desire to impose an intelligible, roughly predictable pattern onto this chaos.

In this thesis I want to consider the concept of *glück*, the German equivalent of Fortuna, in the narratives of the sixteenth century author Jörg Wickram.[4] I will focus on two major themes in Wickram's representation of *glück*, both of which play a central role for our understanding of the character's development in the narratives. First, I will consider the occurrence of *glück* in relation to another major force, God. Second, I will consider two types of *glück* that we may distinguish in the narratives, one operating externally and the other operating internally, the former affecting characters from without, the latter originating more in their own actions. My aim is to define the impact which *glück* has on the lives of the characters, and the extent to which the characters may in turn influence *glück*.

My approach is twofold: I begin the exploration of each theme by close textual analysis of the narratives; the findings of the textual analysis are then related to a historical background. This background is constituted by various sources, both medieval and early modern, that dwell on the nature of *glück*, or Fortuna. The medieval aspect is represented by the views of Boethius, whose account of Fortuna may be regarded as formative for the Middle Ages. Boethius crucially maintains that Fortuna is subordinated to God. Further, he is convinced that it is within man's choice to encounter or avoid the motions caused by Fortuna's wheel. Thus in *De consolatione philosophiae*, Fortuna addresses the narrator in the following way: "rise up on my wheel *if you like*, but don't count it an injury when by the same token you begin to fall, as the rules of the game will require" (book 2, prose II; my emphasis).[5] Boethius' scepticism regarding the power of Fortuna stands in contrast to Renaissance thought, an important exponent of which is Petrarch. I shall consider Petrarch's account of Fortuna in *De remediis utriusque fortunae*, but also the views of Poggio Bracciolino and Enea Silvio Piccolomini. The latters' emphasis on human control over Fortuna differs

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[4] On the congruence between Fortuna and *glück*, cf. Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1958), vol. 4, section I, part 5: "*glück* ist ursprünglich 'schicksal, geschick, ausgang einer sache' " (col. 230). This basic meaning may more specifically mean "schicksalsmacht, die günstiges oder ungünstiges schickt [...] besonders seit dem humanismus macht sich hier stark der einflusz von lat. fortuna geltend" (col. 232). Further, "im anschlusz an die dem mittelalter geläufige vorstellung der *vrou Saelde* und insbesondere an die immer wieder neu belebte der göttin *Fortuna* werden dem *glück* zahlreiche persönliche Züge beigelegt; sie treten in den epochen antiken einflusses besonders hervor" (col. 249).

[5] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, (trans.) V. E. Watts (London: The Folio Society, 1998 [reprint of 1969 edition]).

markedly from the pessimism advocated by Sebastian Brant and Hans Sachs, whom we may on the other hand associate with the Reformation. By evaluating Wickram's *glück* against the background of these diverse accounts, I will determine his position in a wider historical context.

So as to determine the relation between *glück* and God, I will examine significant occurrences of the two so as to establish patterns according to which either force is credited as the source of crucial incidents in the characters' lives. As we shall see, the incidents are distributed consistently between the two forces. *glück* is generally the source of negative developments, while God is the source of positive developments. This is summed up for instance when the protagonist of *Galmy* expresses the following sentiment: "Darvor [from harm] wôlle uns Gott bewaren/ [...] wo mich aber ye das glück betriegen wolt/ [...] Wolt ich warlich ee mein leben verliesen" (102f).[6] The distinction between those incidents that arise from the will of God and those that stem from the interference of *glück* differ not only in their quality, but also in the way in which they are regarded by the characters. The tension between *glück* and God is of considerable importance. While the characters are immediately affected by this tension, it equally presents itself as a structural device to the reader. That is, the question of which force will eventually emerge as superior, and precisely at which point and how this will come about, contributes substantially to the tension inherent in the narrative structure. Although the will of God ultimately prevails in most narratives, the answer to this question is never simply the same. It is shaped both by the characters' contribution and by the genre of each narrative. The hierarchy between the two forces, and the impact which the characters' actions have on this, is one of the focal points of my analysis. It will be put into a wider perspective by comparing Wickram's model with the Boethian account of Fortuna's subordination to God.

Once a firm grip on the extent of *glück*'s intervention in the narratives has been established, I will focus on the two manifestations, internal and external, of *glück* as such. Externally operating *glück* is in charge of incidents which are external in that they are clearly beyond the control of the person they affect. This applies for instance to sudden illness, natural phenomena, or unforeseeable malice on the part of other people. *glück* as an external force resembles the traditional force of Fortuna as a superhuman force as it was viewed in Roman antiquity and later by Boethius. Distinct from this is internally operating *glück*. The incidents which are attributed to this type of *glück* are directly related to the behaviour of the affected person, that is, they usually arise from culpable negligence on his or her part. In this sense, the

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[6] Georg Wickram, *Ritter Galmy*, (ed.) Hans-Gert Roloff, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967).

affected person has the potential to control these instances of *glück*. As well as demonstrating the difference between the two types of *glück*, I will consider to what extent each type influences the protagonists' development. Notably, internally operating *glück* is of greater significance in this respect than its externally operating counterpart, and this, I shall argue, serves to underline the need for the characters to take control of their development. This appears to be an original trait in Wickram's representation of *glück*. The emphasis on the internal, or psychological nature of *glück* provides Wickram's representation with a certain modernity. In order to find out how this account of *glück* relates to contemporary fifteenth and sixteenth century views, I will finally compare it to the conceptions of *glück* and Fortuna which form the historical background, and complement them with further literary examples from the same period. Ultimately, my aim is to show both that Wickram's representation of *glück* combines medieval and modern elements and may therefore be considered as a true product of a transitional age, and that it is truly original when considered against a wider spectrum of conceptions of *glück* or Fortuna.

A brief outline of the thesis.

Chapter 1 provides a summary of the present state of Wickram research, in particular with reference to the concept of *glück*.

Part I (chs. 2-4) establishes a background against which to evaluate Wickram's representation of *glück*. Here I provide an overview of the concept of Fortuna, briefly tracing it from its roots in the Greek concept of *tyche*, but focusing especially on its appearance during Wickram's times as observed in texts influenced by the Renaissance and the Reformation.

Part II (chs. 5-9) examines the relation between *glück* and God in each of Wickram's five narratives (*Ritter Galmy, Gabriotto und Reinhart, Der Knabenspiegel, Der Goldfaden, Von guoten und boesen Nachbaurn*). I also compare my findings to traditional views of the relation between the two powers, in particular those of Boethius.

Part III (chs. 10-12) distinguishes two types of manifestations of *glück*. In addition to the traditional, externally operating type of *glück*, I argue that there is another, internally operating aspect to *glück*. This leads me to examine whether and to what extent *glück* is tied up with the internal states of the characters and their individual actions.

Chapter 13, finally, considers Wickram's representation of *glück* against the background of contemporary conceptions. I attempt to establish how his representation is related to medieval thinking on the one hand and modern thinking on the other, and especially to what extent it may be considered as bearing the marks of a transitional age.

Chapter 1

Forschungsbericht

I will begin by depicting some general tendencies of the research on Wickram's narratives, and relate them to my own approach to the extent that this is possible, or relevant. First, I will focus on three issues in particular, which appear to be of central importance to Wickram research to date: first, the socio-historical aspects of Wickram's writing, second, the relation between their didactic and their aesthetic qualities, and third, Wickram's representation of the individual characters and their internal states.[1] At this stage, I merely want to highlight the general outlook of the publications under consideration; I will deal with them more explicitly as necessary in the course of my own observations. In the subsequent part of this chapter, a more focused analysis will be given of those publications which are of particular interest for my own undertaking in that they specifically deal with *glück* in Wickram.[2]

Especially in the earlier criticism of Wickram, starting towards the end of the nineteenth century, there is one strand which, with varying degrees of sophistication, focuses on the socio-historical aspects of his writing. Thus Gertrud FAUTH, for instance, remarks: "Es ist wichtig zu wissen, daß der Künstler mit romantischen Stoffen beginnt, - wo etwa nur die Erwähnung eines mitgebrachten "krom", das abendliche Kühlen eines Bierkrugs am Brunnen Wickrams Bürgertum verrät - und daß er sich erst in vorgeschrittenem Alter von den idealen Stoffgebieten zu einem gewissen Realismus in Stoff und Gestaltung durchringt; ein Übergang, der sicher mitbedingt wurde durch die allgemeine Stärkung des bürgerlich-demokratischen Bewußtseins jener Zeiten".[3] Behind this kind of criticism, there seems to be an implicit equation of the assumed circumstances of Wickram's own life with the circumstances depicted in his fiction. At the same time, what is taken to be the historical reality appears to be very much the result of projecting the fictional circumstances onto history. This leads to a circular argument which rests on a rather vague, and disputable, notion of *Bürgertum*. Similar assumptions appear to be at the bottom of the following statement by Wolfgang LIEPE, who claims that "[e]rst bei

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[1] Needless to say, there are both critics and publications whose scope cuts right across this divide.

[2] There is a number of publications that are of relevance to my own observations only with regard to specific points; these will be referred to in the course of my own analysis.

[3] Gertrud Fauth, "Wickram als Quelle für die Kulturgeschichte seiner Zeit", in G. F., *Jörg Wickrams Romane* (Straßburg: Trübner, 1916), pp. 115-136 (p. 115).

[Wickram] wird der Prosaroman zum organischen Ausdruck einer inzwischen gefestigten bürgerlichen Kultur".[4] On a more sophisticated level, Hannelore CHRIST sees the significance of Wickram's narratives in the way in which they reflect certain socio-economic developments in contemporary society: "Die Bürgerlichkeit des "Knabenspiegel" ist die der Handelskapitalisten [...] Demgegenüber ist die bürgerliche Gedankenwelt des "Nachbarn"-Romans dem Manufakturbürgertum zuzuordnen".[5] In making this claim, Christ, too, bends the texts to fit pre-established concepts which do not seem sustainable in the narratives themselves, and perhaps not even in a sixteenth century context.[6] On a more cautious note, Ulrich MACHÉ intends to show "wie der Wunsch nach sozialer Erhöhung in Wickrams Romanen zu Konflikten führt, welche die Satzungen der mittelalterlichen Städteordnung erschüttern; wie aber auch - unter dem Einfluß neuer wirtschaftlicher und sozio-politischer Entwicklungen - ein nahezu konfliktloser Aufstieg möglich ist"[7]. The forces which mainly facilitate this advancement are defined as "der soziale Ehrgeiz des erstarkenden Bürgertums" as well as "die wachsende Bedeutung eines wissenschaftlich-humanistischen Bildungswesens für die spätmittelalterliche Staatsordnung" (195). This reading of Wickram appears to be less biased by an ideological agenda than the previous ones. Historical issues, given proper treatment, are obviously important for the understanding of Wickram's narratives, although it goes without saying that the relation is more subtle than the narratives' simply mirroring historical reality. While these issues are not of crucial concern for my analysis of *glück*, it still seems possible to relate the innovative aspect of Wickram's representation of social advancement to his representation of *glück*. This could mean that one might have to look to certain extra-literary historical changes as a condition for the peculiar impact which *glück* is shown to have on the characters' development.

Another core issue of Wickram research are the didactics of Wickram's fiction and their implications, particularly how they relate to the aesthetic qualities of the

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[4] Wolfgang Liepe, "Die Entstehung des Prosaromans in Deutschland", *Zeitschrift für Deutschkunde* 36 (1922), pp. 145-161 (p. 148).

[5] Hannelore Christ, *Literarischer Text und historische Realität. Versuch einer historisch-materialistischen Analyse von Jörg Wickrams "Knabenspiegel"- und "Nachbarn"-Roman* (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann, 1974), p. 109.

[6] This has been shown extensively by e.g. Jan-Dirk Müller, "Frühbürgerliche Privatheit und altständische Gemeinschaft. Zu Jörg Wickrams Historie *Von Guoten und Boesen Nachbaurn*", *IASL* 5 (1980), pp. 1-32 and Jan Knopf, "Versicherung des Mitmenschen. Arbeit, Freundschaft und Glück in Jörg Wickrams Romanen", in J. K., *Frühzeit des Bürgers. Erfahrene und verleugnete Realität in den Romanen Wickrams, Grimmelshausens und Schnabels* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1978), pp. 25-57.

[7] Ulrich Maché, "Soziale Mobilität in den Romanen Georg Wickrams", in (eds.) Joseph Strelka and Jörg Jungmayr, *Virtus et fortuna: zur deutschen Literatur zwischen 1400 und 1720, Festschrift für Hans-Gert Roloff zu seinem 50. Geburtstag* (Bern: Lang, 1983), pp. 184 -197 (p. 195).

narratives. Hans-Gert ROLOFF states:[8] "Literatur ganz allgemein hat nach Wickrams Vorstellung eine eminent pädagogische Aufgabe und ist gleichzeitig auch das angemessene Medium zu sittlicher Unterweisung" (266). Roloff considers Wickram as a typical exponent of general tendencies of sixteenth century literature as he sees it.[9] He considers Wickram as a representative of pedagogical optimism in the Christian tradition, whose aim it is to lead man towards the salvation of his soul by instructing him in the virtues of Christianity. In addition to this, Wickram supposedly intends to instruct his readers in the attainment of "ein gutfunktionierendes, sinnerfülltes und christlich-orientiertes Gemeinwesen" (266). While all of this seems plausible enough, Roloff takes the view of rigid didacticism in Wickram's narratives to extremes: he claims that the sequence of the narratives illustrates "keine innere Entwicklung des Autors"- instead, each narrative illustrates a separate schematic "Lehrmodell".[10] However, the representation of *glück*, for one thing, would seem to suggest otherwise. Not only does its full complexity become obvious only when the narratives are related to one another, it is also possible, as I hope to show in the subsequent analysis, to detect a development in the characters' dealing with *glück* when considering the narratives' sequence. Erich KLEINSCHMIDT takes a stance similar to Roloff.[11] He, too, points out "[den] lehrhafte[n] Zug" (248) as a characteristic of Wickram's narratives, which he relates to the tradition of preaching through *exempla*. Moreover, he maintains that through his "paradigmatischen Erzählgestus", Wickram aims at providing "Muster für die Bewältigung gegenwärtiger Lebenssituationen" (248).[12]

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[8] Hans-Gert Roloff, "Überredung - Unterricht - Ergetzung der Leute. Zur Funktion der Romane Georg Wickrams", *Recherches Germaniques* 9 (1979), pp. 263-277.

[9] Cf. Hans-Gert Roloff, "Anfänge des deutschen Prosaromans", in (ed.) Helmut Koopmann, *Handbuch des deutschen Romans* (Düsseldorf: Bagel, 1983), pp. 54-79: "Ihre [= literarische Prosatexte des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts] Funktion ist [...] in der figurativen Exemplifizierung eines moralischen Pragmatismus zu sehen, der sehr allgemeine ethische Postulate der Patristik und Scholastik in weite Laienkreise transportiert, der eine transzendentale Popularisierung betreibt, die in hausbackene Frömmigkeit und ökonomischen Rationalismus münden. Das humane Wertsystem, das seine bildlich-figürliche Realisierung im einzelnen, in sich geschlossenen Textkosmos erfährt, tendiert auffällig zu einem harmonisierten Weltbild christlicher Prägung, und zwar auch dann, wenn im Sinne der *speculum vitae*-Vorstellung gewisse Abnormitäten zur Darstellung kommen" (59).

[10] Hans-Gert Roloff, "Bemerkungen zu Wesen und Funktion des Romans im 16. Jahrhundert" (p. 44); in (eds.) Leonard Forster and Hans-Gert Roloff, *Akten des V. Internationalen Germanisten-Kongresses: Cambridge 1975*, (Bern/ Frankfurt: Lang, 1976 [Jahrbuch für internationale Germanistik/ A]), Heft 3, pp. 41-46.

[11] Erich Kleinschmidt, "Narratives Ordnungsdenken und urbane Bildungsdidaktik: Jörg Wickram", in E.K. *Stadt und Literatur in der frühen Neuzeit: Voraussetzungen und Entfaltung im südwestdeutschen, elsässischen und schweizerischen Städteraum* (Köln/Wien: Böhlau, 1982 [Literatur und Leben/ Neue Folge; 22]), pp. 238-261.

[12] Cf. also Erich Kleinschmidt, "Jörg Wickram", in (ed.) Stephan Füssel, *Deutsche Dichter der frühen Neuzeit: 1450-1600; ihr Leben und Werk* (Berlin: Schmidt, 1993), pp. 494-511. There, he refers to Wickram's intention to provide "Orientierungshilfen" (502). Further, cf. Harald Fricke, "Realismus und

Similarly to Roloff, Kleinschmidt further implies that Wickram's overt didactics result in aesthetic shortcomings: "Die metaphorische Textebene bleibt ästhetisch unter dem gelehrten Ausdrucksniveau der Epoche auf einer eher plakativen Stufe stehen und macht eine artifizielle Texthermeneutik unnötig" (247). This view does not seem to do Wickram's narratives justice at all.[13] While their didacticism is indeed evident to the point of occasionally being obtrusive, they nevertheless display a certain intricacy as regards their aesthetic side. Thus the representation of *glück*, in spite of being tied up with didactic purposes, can be seen to constitute a metaphorical, or quasi-metaphorical layer that is both rich and subtle, as I hope to demonstrate in my analysis.

The above views, which appear to be somewhat pejorative, contrast with those that detect subtlety in Wickram despite his clear didactic intentions. Jan-Dirk MÜLLER perceives a certain twist within these didactics.[14] While he agrees, here with specific regard to *Nachbaurn*, that the intention of Wickram's narratives is mainly didactic, what distinguishes Müller from those like Roloff and Kleinschmidt is that he claims the didactic concept to be not as straightforward as it may seem. For, he considers the depicted world to be so labile that the values advocated through it may not be realized under all circumstances:

In einer Welt des Mißtrauens und des Egoismus sind jene Freundschaftsbündnisse und jene nachbarliche Solidarität im strengen Sinne ja gar nicht generalisierbar, setzen sie doch die Zufälligkeit bestimmter äußerer Lebensbedingungen ebenso voraus wie die Zufälligkeit affektiver Übereinstimmung. Sie sind an besondere Lebensgeschichten gebunden, können gelingen oder auch nicht, da sie eben nicht mehr auf der Sicherheit kollektiver Ordnungen aufbauen (30).

Müller's evaluation states the loss of previously reliable security mechanisms. As such, it seems to acknowledge an element of instability within Wickram's didactics,

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Utopie bei Jörg Wickram", in H. F., *Norm und Abweichung: eine Philosophie der Literatur* (München: Beck, 1981), pp. 230-238: "Die [...] verstärkte Individualisierung der Personen im "Knabenspiegel" und in den "Nachbaurn" verstärkt aber zugleich wegen der weiterbestehenden Fiktionalität den Zwang zur aktiven Auffüllung der semantisch normwidrigen Leerstellen durch individuelle Erfahrung des Lesers - und damit den persönlichen Appellcharakter solcher fiktionaler Darstellung menschlicher Möglichkeiten. Die neue Organisation der *internen* Funktionen des Erzählzusammenhangs ermöglicht so die neuartige *externe* Funktion der sozialen Utopie" (236).

[13] Yet in a different publication, Kleinschmidt refers to "die hochrangigen literarischen Erzähltexte eines Wickram" (p. 90) ("Literatur und städtische Gemeinschaft. Aspekte einer literarischen Stadtkultur in der Frühen Neuzeit", in (ed.) Horst Brunner, *Literatur in der Stadt: Bedingungen und Beispiele städtischer Literatur* (Göppingen: Kümmerle, 1982 [Göttinger Arbeiten zur Germanistik; 343]), pp. 73-93).

[14] Jan-Dirk Müller, "Frühbürgerliche Privatheit und altständische Gemeinschaft. Zu Jörg Wickrams Historie *Von Guoten und Boesen Nachbaurn*", *IASL* 5 (1980), pp. 1-32.

which, as a result of detracting from the narratives' predictability, might be seen to contribute to their aesthetic value. This view could be related to the interpretation of *glück* to the extent that we might ask whether *glück* could be seen as a further disruption to traditional forms of order, and whether as such it might be considered as adding to the unpredictability of human life expressed by Wickram's didactics.

While recognizing the complexity of Wickram's didactics, Müller is keen to point out also the restrictions imposed by them on the individual.[15] With regard to love and marriage in the narratives, he observes that the tales of marriage, i.e. *Knabenspiegel* and *Nachbaurn*, are totally conventional (cf. 29), whereas the tales of love, i.e. the other narratives, challenge the boundaries of class (cf. 30). It is clear which kind of tale is intended as a positive model for the reader: Legitimate obstacles to marriage in *Galmy*, *Gabriotto* and *Goldfaden* imply, according to Müller, "daß die Passion auf gefährliche Weise gesellschaftliche Institutionen herausfordert" (35). Hence these narratives are construed as warning examples of destructive passion (cf. 35). The lovers are able to realize their love only when marriage, which depends on society's approval, is possible (cf. 39). Therefore, the narratives offer only limited freedom for the individual; individual passion, detached from the demands of society, is suppressed (39f). Thus Müller points out the conservative, cautious aspect of Wickram's stance on individual self-fulfilment. It is certainly important to keep in mind that the individual's self-fulfilment remains subordinated to the structures of worldly authority in the narratives. Yet Lewfrid and Galmy do manage to realize their love by eventually convincing this authority of their valour regardless of their inferior background. In this respect, Müller may be underestimating the extent to which the individual is able to contribute to the realization of his aims. Although rules restrict the individual's development in the first place, abiding by these rules by and large allows him to achieve what he wants. This notwithstanding, the maxims of discipline and self-control as established by Müller are undoubtedly crucial to Wickram's outlook, so much so that one might apply them as criteria to the characters' interaction with *glück*.

There have been various other attempts to acknowledge the aesthetic and narrative qualities of Wickram's narratives. G.J. MARTIN-TEN WOLTHUIS detects "eine dichterische Verfahrensweise bei Wickram [...], aus der eine enge Verknüpfung von Form und Gehalt ersichtlich wird" (85).[16] He attempts to show this by tracing an elaborate structure behind the composition of *Goldfaden*. While the results of this

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[15] Jan-Dirk Müller, "Jörg Wickram zu Liebe und Ehe", in (eds.) Heide Wunder and Christine Vanja, *Wandel der Geschlechterbeziehungen zu Beginn der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), pp. 27-42.
[16] G.J. Martin-ten Wolthuis, "Der *Goldfaden* des Jörg Wickram von Colmar", *ZfdPh* 87 (1968), pp. 46-85.

interpretation appear forced, they are commendable in their appreciation of the intricacy of the narratives. Dieter KARTSCHOKE makes a more successful claim for the narrative qualities of Wickram's works.[17] Claiming that "[e]s wäre [...] falsch, unter dem Eindruck des unübersehbaren Exempelcharakters der Romane Wickrams ihre narrativen Qualitäten zu unterschätzen" (723), Kartschoke points out how Wickram creatively adapts certain humanist *topoi*. This is relevant for the consideration of *glück* in that Wickram's familiarity with humanist thought and modes of expression suggests a certain framework for considering his representation of *glück*. It is also relevant in that Kartschoke's findings imply that Wickram composed his narratives with a certain amount of aesthetic deliberation. This deliberation is important for the assessment of *glück* in that it would seem to grant it the status of a genuinely meaningful concept rather than that of a carelessly formulated *floskel*.

The third among the issues under consideration here, and probably the one most directly connected to what I am about to investigate, is the representation of the individual in Wickram's narratives. Ingeborg SPRIEWALD maintains that the representation of the characters' development is increasingly psychological when compared to earlier fiction:[18] "das Abenteuer [wird] in den Erzählungen Wickrams [...] bereits weit mehr in den 'Handlungsinnenraum', d.h. in die Motivierung der jeweiligen Liebes- und Freundschafts- bzw. Entwicklungsgeschichte des Helden verlagert und damit zugleich stärker mit der Gefühlswelt der handelnden Personen verknüpft" (102).[19] In view of this general emphasis on the characters' internal states, it seems plausible to ask whether *glück*, too, may partly be represented as a force operating within the individual's mind. A different angle of the internal dimension characteristic of Wickram's characters is highlighted by Peter FREI. He defines the internal dimension as follows:[20] "[Eine Grenze] verläuft zwischen [...] dem Selbstbild

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[17] Dieter Kartschoke, "*Bald bracht Phebus seinen Wagen* ... Gattungsgeschichtliche Überlegungen zu Jörg Wickrams *Nachbarn*-Roman", *Daphnis* 11 (1982), pp. 717-741.

[18] Ingeborg Spriewald, "Sensibilisierung und Entwicklungsbetonung als Komponenten differenzierter werdender Menschenauffassung", in I. S., *Vom "Eulenspiegel" zum "Simplicissimus". Zur Genesis des Realismus und den Anfängen deutscher Prosaerzählung* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1978), pp. 103-126. Cf. also Liepe, *op. cit.*: "In Wickrams Werk ist auch in Motiv wie individualpsychologischer Einstellung bereits Geist und Vorbild der Renaissancenovelle wirksam geworden" (159).

[19] Spriewald, somewhat misguidedly, is inclined to read Wickram's narratives as a statement of revolutionary intent: "Die Freundschafts- und vor allem auch die Liebesbündnisse seiner Helden, die sich gegen die bestehenden Klassenschranken richten [...] sind eine Widerspiegelung der Kampfansage des Bürgertums gegen das Feudalsystem" (Spriewald, *op. cit.*, p. 110).

[20] Peter Frei, "Zur Konstituierung von Innenwelt in Jörg Wickrams 'Goldtfaden' ", in (eds.) André Schnyder et al., *"Ist mir getroumet mîn leben?":Vom Träumen und vom Anderssein; Festschrift für Karl-Ernst Geith zum 65. Geburtstag* (Göppingen: Kümmerle, 1998), pp. 31-47.

des Subjekts und seiner Fremdwahrnehmung durch den anderen, zwischen Innen(-) und Außen(perspektive). Es wird durch diese Grenze ein Innenraum gegen außen abgeschlossen; mit ihrer Setzung konstituiert sich Innenwelt" (31). The establishing of this *Innenraum* Frei attributes to the individual's self-control, which amounts to control over one's affects (cf. 38f). While self-control is certainly an important element in Wickram's representation of his characters' psyche, it is not the only element of this representation. Both in *Goldfaden* and in the other narratives, the characters' lack of of control over themselves is just as important. It is only through the tension between control and lack of it that the psychology of Wickram's characters, and as such, I will argue, their interaction with *glück*, is defined. In this respect, Frei's account is marked by a significant limitation.

The analysis of the characters' internal states is taken further in Walter HAUG's interpretation of *Galmy*:[21]

Es ergeben sich Hiate nicht nur zwischen den Aktionen, sondern auch zwischen Wort und Antwort, so daß der Lauf des Geschehens durch das zögernde, schweigende Sich-Besinnen in der auffälligsten Weise skandiert wird. Es öffnen sich dadurch psychische Innenräume, deren Präsenz sich um so mehr aufdrängt, als sie gewissermaßen abstrakt bleiben (99) [...] [Es kommt zu einer] Wende in die Innerlichkeit, wobei der Verzicht auf die körperliche Erfüllung über diese neue Erfahrung der Liebe geradezu zur Entdeckung des Innenraums der Seele führt (108).

Haug asserts the autonomy of the soul, or the inner life of the characters. He claims the medieval correspondence between internal and external states to be dissociated in *Galmy*, and as a result detects dangers and problems with regard to the relation between body and soul, private and public life, subject and world (cf. 113). Although Haug restricts the autonomy of the individual's internal state to the feeling of love, his claims may be extended to a more general level. The autonomous, almost anarchic existence of erotic feelings might be seen as indicative of the characters' general awareness of a distinction between 'inside' and 'outside', which could lead to the perception of that which is outside of the individual as something potentially hostile to their inner life and the aims that derive from it. This would result in a feeling of isolation while at the same time opening up the possibility of the individual's emancipation. The aspect of the individual's isolation has been explored also by Jan-

[21] Walter Haug, "Jörg Wickrams >Ritter Galmy<. Die Zähmung des Romans im Ursprung seiner Möglichkeit", in (eds.) W. Haug and Burkhard Wachinger, *Traditionswandel und Traditionsverhalten* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1991 [Fortuna vitrea; 15]), pp. 96-120.

Dirk MÜLLER in his reading of *Nachbaurn*.[22] He claims that the basic notion of this text is "die Erfahrung der Vereinzelung" (11). This entails not only the experience of living, as a small group of individuals, within a hostile social environment (cf. 12), but also that of being, on occasion, remote from God. Such isolation may only be alleviated through the support of kindred spirits. They offer loyalty in worldly affairs, and moreover mediate between man and God, as "selbst die metaphysischen Ordnungsgarantien sind abhängig von der funktionierenden menschlichen Gemeinschaft" (14). According to this view, the characters' harmonious place in the world is not a given. In order to achieve it, they have to negotiate both the brittleness of the world and its fragile metaphysics. Perhaps the activity which is employed to compensate for this overall fragility could be seen as an attempt to re-establish the congruence of inner and outer life as described by Haug. Generally speaking, the distinction between internal and external dimension of the characters' life, and the relation between these two dimensions, could serve as an important tool in examining the characters' dealing with *glück* and determining to what extent this process is represented in a 'modern' as opposed to a medieval way.

The difference between Wickram's narratives and their medieval predecessors, which in one form or another seems to run through most of the criticism dealing with the representation of the individual, is stressed also by Harald FRICKE: "In [Wickrams Romanen] wird [...] die teleologische Erzählweise des Mittelalters aufgelöst und die neuzeitliche Form fiktionaler Individualitätsdarstellung entwickelt" (236).[23] By this, Fricke means that in the courtly epic, all elements of a narrative refer to its conclusion, which is not only predetermined, but also present from the beginning. By contrast, the development of Wickram's characters is not, within the frame of the narrative, predetermined by a certain outcome, but results as it were spontaneously from the characters' individual disposition. This juxtaposition leads to the claim that "die handelnden Personen entwickeln sich von kollektiv schematisierten und in gewissen Grenzen beliebig ersetzbaren Funktionsträgern zu echten Individuen, deren einzelmenschliche Unverwechselbarkeit aus ihrer ganz persönlichen und nicht vom Ergebnis her vorbestimmten *Entwicklung* resultiert" (236). This claim appears to be exaggerated, as the *Unverwechselbarkeit* of Wickram's characters is clearly limited. Nevertheless Fricke's emphasis on the individuals' contribution to their development seems appropriate. Thus Fricke proposes a certain

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[22] Jan-Dirk Müller, "Frühbürgerliche Privatheit und altständische Gemeinschaft. Zu Jörg Wickrams Historie *Von Guoten und Boesen Nachbaurn*", *IASL* 5 (1980), pp. 1-32.

[23] Harald Fricke, "Realismus und Utopie bei Jörg Wickram", in H. F., *Norm und Abweichung: eine Philosophie der Literatur* (München: Beck, 1981), pp. 230-238.

freedom of will as a premise for the narratives' development, which might serve as an important premise also to an account of the characters' interaction with *glück*.

Wickram's distance from medieval tradition is pointed out once more by Jan-Dirk MÜLLER in an analysis of allegorical structures in Wickram.[24] According to Müller, allegorical structures in Wickram's narratives, a prime example of which is the lion in *Goldfaden*, are marked by a twofold representation, i.e. by belonging to both an allegorical and an empirical order. Moreover, they are marked by a certain kind of internalization:

> Das Zeichen wird reflexiv, das heißt, es geht ins Bewußtsein der Figuren ein und wird dadurch auf der Handlungsebene erneut wirksam. Es wird Element in einem subjektiv verantworteten Lebensentwurf. Im Extremfall kann es sich ganz in das individuelle Interpretationssystem einer Figur zurückziehen. In ihm tritt nicht mehr objektiv >Sinn< ans Licht, sondern es ist ein poetisches Signal, das auf einen >Sinn< verweist, den der Leser entziffern muß (278f).

Undoubtedly, the lion comes across as a symbol of Lewfrid's development to a large extent because the characters initially interpret it as marking his excellence, and act accordingly. Thus the way in which the lion is employed as a sign by the narrator could be seen as a further mark of the process of internalization pointed out in the above publications, here concerning signs and their meaning. Although *glück* is obviously distinct from the signs in question in that it lacks the empirical, concrete presence of, for instance, the lion, could it not perhaps be seen to share with them an important characteristic, namely their internal nature? In other words, it seems worth examining to what extent *glück* derives at least some of its significance from the way in which the characters who perceive it interpret, enact, and react to, it. The other main characteristic of allegorical structures in Wickram, according to Müller, is that their presence lacks continuity. The lion is brought onto the scene only when its presence is needed to highlight a certain incident; otherwise, it is removed from both the characters' and the reader's attention, such as when it is sent to the royal zoo. The question of whether *glück* occurs in a similarly isolated fashion, marking it as a mere poetic element (cf. 278), or whether it accompanies the protagonists' development in a continuous way could be helpful in determining the ontological status of *glück*. Moreover, one might ask if *glück* could be characterized by a similar "awkwardness" as the one Müller attributes to signs which belong to both an allegorical and an empirical order at the same time (cf. 273). Generally speaking, Müller's observations

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[24] Jan-Dirk Müller, "Transformation allegorischer Strukturen im frühen Prosa-Roman", in (eds.) Wolfgang Harms and Klaus Speckenbach, *Bildhafte Rede in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit: Probleme ihrer Legitimation und ihrer Funktion* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1992), pp. 265-284.

suggest that when attempting to pin down the meaning of the concept of *glück*, we should keep in mind that, in the sixteenth century, traditionally rigid structures of meaning may have loosened in comparison to medieval standards, allowing for a more flexible usage.

Next, let us turn to more specific observations regarding *glück* in Wickram's narratives. It is worth noting some interesting points on the general importance of *glück* in the early prose narrative, as made by Jan-Dirk MÜLLER in his extensive survey of the German *Prosaroman*:

Erst im Spannungsverhältnis vorgegebener Ordnungsentwürfe und einem - sie bestätigenden, nachholend-begründenden, überschreitenden oder fiktionalisierenden - Erzählvorgang können die Wirklichkeitsmodelle des frühen Romans beschrieben werden. Das Problem tritt am schärfsten an einer das Geschehen vorweg determinierenden >Ganzheit< hervor, deren Verhältnis zu den übrigen paradox ist: der Fortuna. Unvorhersehbarer Glückswechsel als Verlaufstypus ist regelhafte Wiederholung eines Prinzips, aber dieses Prinzip besteht gerade in Regellosigkeit: Fortuna ist die zur Notwendigkeit mythisierte Erfahrung radikaler Kontingenz. Die Ordnung, die sie angibt, ist also keine wirkliche Ordnung, unter dem Namen des >Glücks< kann die >Offenheit< des Geschehens gefaßt werden: von *Trojabuch* bis zu Wickram... So radikalisiert [wie im *Fortunatus*] ist die Erfahrung der Fortuna sonst kaum; nachweisbar ist sie meist: [...] [in] dem Verhängnis der Sterne und dem jähen Glückswechsel der *Melusine*, den Wechselfällen der Liebe (*Pontus, Magelone*) bis hin zur >> brüchigen Kette<< von Zufällen und Fügungen, aus denen bei Wickram die Ganzheit der Handlung resultiert; denn noch dort, wo das Geschehen sich sinnvoll rundet, findet sich jene Kontingenzerfahrung im Bewußtsein der Figuren, die am Glück verzweifeln. Gewiß steht hier für den Leser die Wiederherstellung der Ordnung außer Frage. Aber es bleibt doch jeweils zu untersuchen, wieweit sie aus dem Geschehen erkennbar (oder ihm nur nachträglich unterlegt) wird und worauf sich die Ordnungsgarantien in der kontingenten Realität noch erstrecken: den christlichen Ordo, einen politischen Verband oder bloß noch das Glück eines Liebespaares, d.h. wieweit sie den Wirklichkeitsentwurf insgesamt tragen (95ff).[25]

This passage acknowledges the important role occupied by *glück* in Wickram's narratives, and places it within a wider context. Notably, Müller considers Fortuna, or *glück*, as a force in its own right, even if this force seems to be more impersonal than the traditional goddess-figure. The emphasis on the sense of instability emanating from the presence of *glück* suggests that the narratives in which it features express, to a greater or lesser extent, a spirit of change. This in turn might constitute their partly transitional nature. As *glück* represents the experience of contingency in

[25] Jan-Dirk Müller, "Volksbuch/Prosaroman im 15./16. Jahrhundert - Perspektiven der Forschung", *IASL* 1, Sonderheft (1985), pp. 1-123.

human life, the core issue that arises from its impact seems to be to what extent it is generally possible for the characters to control it. The issue of control appears to be crucial also for the definition of *glück* in Wickram; trying to determine to what extent human deliberation can oppose contingency will be part of my analysis of the narratives.

There have been a number of attempts to analyze the significance of *glück* in Wickram, none of which, however, take the complete body of his narratives into account in a systematic and exhaustive fashion. In fact *glück* sometimes is brushed aside as "cliché de la prière",[26] or as mere rhetorical figure[27]. The first serious attempt to evaluate *glück* was made by Clemens LUGOWSKI. He arrives at the conclusion that the importance of *glück* is limited:[28]

Es ist nun einerseits für Wickram [...] charakteristisch, daß keine seiner Figuren auf ihr Glück >>baut<<, sondern daß das Glück immer erst dann angerufen wird, wenn eine Zukunft Gegenwart geworden ist. Wenn ein Unheil hereingebrochen ist, dann wird das Glück verwünscht. Das >>auf das Glück bauen<< ist also immer nur als sein eigenes Ergebnis erzählerisch realisiert. Andererseits findet sich jene Unsicherheit und Fragwürdigkeit begrenzt in der Begrenztheit der Hindernisse. Niemals wird das >>glück<< dann erwähnt, wenn sich eine glückliche Wendung ereignet; nur wo eine unheilvolle Wendung eintritt, wo ein *Hindernis* sich zeigt, wird man sich des >>glücks<< bewußt. Wie die Unsicherheit des Verlaufs gleichsam von außen her gesichert ist dadurch, daß es nur bestimmte Hindernisse geben darf, so gilt auch für das an diese Hindernisse gebundene >>glück<< und seine Unsicherheit solche Begrenztheit. Damit soll nichts weiter gesagt sein, als daß das Glück seines Zukünftigkeitscharakters soweit entkleidet ist, als es an die in ihrem Ausmaß streng beschränkten Hindernisse und damit an die ergebnishaft orientierte Handlung gebunden scheint (103f).

According to this evaluation, the effect of *glück* is static. Rather than being related to the affected individual's actions, it is determined *a priori*. Such predetermination is not to be confused with the kind that naturally precedes the writing of every narrative. What Lugowski seems to have in mind affects the characters in a more immediate way. That is, he considers *glück* as a force employed by the narrator to shape a character's development in the following sense: it is completely external to such an extent that there is no interaction between it and the affected character. The

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[26] Gertrud Jaeke, *Jörg Wickram. Analyse seiner Prosaromane*, Diss. Tübingen 1953, pp. 55f.

[27] Cf. Reinhold Jacobi, *Jörg Wickrams Romane. Interpretation unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der zeitgenössischen Erzählprosa*, Diss. Bonn 1970, pp. 249f: "Die verblaßte Gestalt der Fortuna wird als willkommenes rhetorisches Mittel für Klagereden benutzt".

[28] Clemens Lugowski, *Die Form der Individualität im Roman* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1994 [reprint of 1932 ed.]).

manifestations of *glück* are seen as impossible to anticipate by the characters; they can only ever be determined in retrospect, but not even then is it possible to draw conclusions from them that might serve as precautions against future blows. Thus Lugowski assigns to Wickram's narratives a static quality. He does not grant the possibility of the impact of *glück* being at least moderated by the characters' reactions to its manifestations. Moreover, he completely ignores what I will argue is a vital characteristic of *glück*, namely its internal manifestation within the scope of a character's own thoughts and actions. This attitude may need to be understood against the background of Lugowski's general view of Wickram's works. According to this, it is characteristic of Wickram's narratives that they do not manage to develop beyond the limits of the *mythisches Analogon* (cf. e.g. p. 13), which supposedly shapes fiction up to, and throughout the medieval period. By the concept of the *mythisches Analogon*, Lugowski means that the characters of a work of fiction are subordinated to an overriding idea, "ein[...] [sie] überschattende[s] welthafte[s] Sein" (97), "eine Ganzheit" (13); as such, they are prevented from expressing their individuality through separating themselves from this totality. While Lugowski acknowledges some attempts to overcome this tradition in Wickram's narratives, particularly in the representation of friendship, he claims that they are altogether too feeble to effect a genuine transformation of the above pattern. He even goes as far as to claim that the world represented by Wickram is devoid of "der Ernst, das Gefährliche, Ungewisse, Zeithafte" (73), since any threats, in their obvious artificiality as generated by the 'mythical analogon', cannot be taken seriously. Hence Lugowski completely disregards the dynamic qualities of Wickram's narratives; in what respects this view is untenable will be shown by the subsequent analysis of *glück*.

A far more substantial role in the narratives is granted to *glück* by Jan KNOPF.[29] Knopf considers the presence of *glück* in Wickram's narratives as a genuine threat to the characters; it marks the disintegration of a divine order which, in medieval times, was considered to guarantee the well-being of every human being (cf. p. 49):

Das Glück erscheint, auch da, wo sich alles zum Guten wendet, als objektive Qualität der Welt, der der Mensch ausgesetzt ist und die ihn zu verderben droht. Das Glück stellt - als selbsttätige, als handelnde Kraft über den Menschen - die Providenz infrage und verweigert auch da Sinn und Ordnung, wo sie herstellbar sind. Die Glückserfahrung wird zum Ausdruck einer als nicht mehr verläßlich und dem

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[29] Jan Knopf, "Versicherung des Mitmenschen. Arbeit, Freundschaft und Glück in Jörg Wickrams Romanen", in J. K., *Frühzeit des Bürgers. Erfahrene und verleugnete Realität in den Romanen Wickrams, Grimmelshausens und Schnabels* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1978), pp. 25-57.

menschlichen Geschick förderlichen Welt empfunden [*sic*]; die Welt hat Risse bekommen, die nicht mehr zu verdecken sind (49).

Knopf notes a pervading sense of uncertainty that accompanies the presence of *glück*. The way to cope with this, according to him, is to behave in an exemplary way, to display ">>exemplarisches<< Verhalten" (46). Knopf considers friendship and love as the only guarantee for stability and earthly happiness in the face of *glück* (cf. 56). While I agree with Knopf on the general fragility of Wickram's world, and on the fact that a remedy for the painful experience of this world can only be found within man himself, his view appears to be somewhat too optimistic. Are friendship and love really enough to combat the characters' loss of stability? Even if *Nachbaurn* could suggest so, *Gabriotto* seems to be a clear example to the contrary. This might be dismissed by pointing out that there are certain tragic necessities imposed by *Gabriotto*'s peculiar narrative pattern, which are in no way binding for the other narratives. However, the development which characters like Galmy, and Lewfrid in *Goldfaden*, have to undergo until they can successfully cope with *glück* indicates that there is continuity between the treatment of *glück* in *Gabriotto* and in the other narratives; initially, Galmy and Lewfrid are as inept at dealing with *glück* as Gabriotto, but they gradually reach a more mature way of dealing with it. The lesson to be drawn from this development, against which both Gabriotto and the characters' of *Nachbaurn* may be measured, is that caution and practical wisdom are just as important in dealing with *glück* as friendship and love. In disregarding this, Knopf seems to underestimate the full impact of *glück*, which may thwart the individual's plans however well secured they may be by a mutual understanding with fellow characters. Since such an understanding can never go beyond a limited group of people, it invariably leaves a scope for insecurity within which *glück* may wreak havoc unless additional measures are employed to control it. Further, Knopf seems to some extent to ignore the difficulties which are attached to achieving the somewhat vaguely defined "exemplary behaviour", that is, difficulties which may arise from within the characters. Instead, Knopf's emphasis is on the external aspect of *glück*. This becomes obvious when he claims that it is Wickram's intention "die Schilderung der äußeren Ereignisse, des >>Geschehens<< [...] nicht als notwendigen, festgefügten Ablauf erscheinen zu lassen, sondern ihm das Ansehen einer brüchigen Kette von (unglücklichen) Zufällen und Fügungen zu geben, also die Welt der äußeren Erscheinungen ungeordnet, vom Wankelmut des Glücks beherrscht, vorzuführen" (48). Thus Knopf assigns the pessimism which he detects in the narratives to the experience of dire external circumstances. In relation to this view, my intention will

be to extend the criterion of the disintegration of traditional forms of security to the internal states of the characters. This may reveal to what extent psychological fragility or human fallibility can, just as much as *glück* as an external force, undermine the stability for which the characters are striving.

The significance of *glück* in Wickram's works is acknowledged also by Xenja VON ERTZDORFF.[30] She points out that Fortuna's effect on the development of the individual was a major concern at the time in which the narratives were written (cf. 113). Hence she suggests that ">Galmy< und >Gabriotto und Reinhart< könnten aus der Perspektive von [...] Petrarcas >De remediis utriusque fortunae< aufeinander bezogen werden" (113), and claims that the other narratives could also be understood against the background of this text. The reference to Petrarch, whose treatise on dealing with the vagaries of *glück* enjoyed great popularity in sixteenth century Germany, may provide an illuminating background to the reading of *glück* in Wickram.[31] However, the limits of von Ertzdorff's evaluation of Wickram's *glück* emerge from her subsequent analysis of *Gabriotto und Reinhart*. She claims that this narrative displays the virtues of the protagonists, "in ihrer Unbedingtheit bewundert und ernstgenommen als Wahrung höchster Tugenden und persönlicher Vollkommenheit in den Unbilden einer launischen Fortuna" (116f). That is, they supposedly manage to retain their internal virtues even though their life is disintegrating on an external level; in doing so, they withstand *glück*. But, the question arises whether the protagonists may really be seen as withstanding *glück*. For it seems that by submitting to the external circumstances imposed by *glück*, they rather bow to its force, especially given the extent to which they let themselves be affected inwardly by the external circumstances. This kind of submission cannot really be how Wickram advises his readers to deal with *glück*, since the narrative's foreword announces the lovers' story as a negative exemplum. Von Ertzdorff, like Lugowski and Knopf, appears to limit *glück* to its external manifestation when she describes its occurrence as "Unbilde[...] einer launischen Fortuna". At the same time, she restricts the characters' reaction to *glück* to a psychological level by implying that they are generally unable to influence in practical terms the external development as caused by *glück*. But, is there not the possibility of the characters' interacting more productively with *glück*? While general passivity in dealing with *glück* may be an appropriate diagnosis of the characters' actual behaviour in *Gabriotto*, it does not seem

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[30] Xenja von Ertzdorff, *Romane und Novellen des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland* (Darmstadt: WBG, 1989).

[31] Its first German translation was published in 1532 in Frankfurt. I will deal with the treatise in detail in chapter 4.

to be what Wickram would advocate either in this or in the other narratives. In claiming that Wickram commends the way in which the characters deal with *glück*, von Ertzdorff draws what seems to be a limited picture of the importance of personal responsibility in the narratives. Instead of focusing on the characters' endurance in the face of *glück*, it could be more illuminating to try and determine to what extent Wickram represents *glück* and the characters' action as being intricately tied up with one another.

The most recent account of *glück* in Wickram is that of Otto NEUDECK.[32] While restricting his textual analysis to *Goldfaden*, Neudeck nevertheless makes claims which concern Wickram's poetics in general. The importance which Neudeck assigns to *glück* becomes clear when he characterizes it, together with *von ungeschicht*, as "Prinzipien [...], die [from the point of view of the characters] die Ereignisfolge des Geschehens und damit den Lauf der Welt steuern" (257). According to Neudeck, the term *glück* is supposed to function as a mirror of the readers' astonishment, which must have been evoked by the miraculous, improbable quality of Lewfrid's career:

Das Erstaunen signalisiert [...] eine Differenzerfahrung, die sich angesichts der verwunderlichen Karriere und des Liebesglücks eines Hirtensohnes ergeben haben muß, und zwar vor dem Hintergrund der lebensweltlichen Erfahrung von Erzähler und Leser. Nur durch die zunächst nicht weiter hinterfragbaren Kategorien Zufall und Schicksal [...] läßt sich das Märchenhaft-Unwahrscheinliche des Erzählten begründen (261).

Subsequently, Neudeck attempts to explain these categories:

Als nächstes wäre zu fragen nach dem Bewertungsmaßstab für die Wahrnehmung des Unwahrscheinlichen, das heißt nach dem verursachenden Prinzip von Zufall und Schicksal. Zu konstatieren ist das Nebeneinander zweier Ordnungen: Das Wunderbare, *glück* und Zufall können sowohl von einer immanenten als auch von einer transzendenten Perspektive aus semantisch besetzt werden. Letztbegründungsprinzip und damit Gradmesser des Erstaunlichen, Zufälligen, Schicksalhaften ist zwar primär die lebensweltliche Erfahrungswirklichkeit mit ihrer Kausallogik beziehungsweise Kontingenz; parallel dazu wird aber immer wieder auf die providentielle Ordnung einer heilsgeschichtlichen Kosmologie verwiesen (261).

Neudeck perceives two alternative sets of explanations, or discourses, behind the concept of *glück*. On the one hand, *glück* may be considered as a phenomenon located

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[32] Otto Neudeck, "*Verwunderung, glück, von ungeschicht*. Zur Poetologie des Fiktionalen in Jörg Wickram's *Goldtfaden*", in (eds.) Wolfgang Harms and C. Stephen Jaeger, *Fremdes wahrnehmen - fremdes Wahrnehmen: Studien zur Geschichte der Wahrnehmung und zur Begegnung von Kulturen in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit* (Stuttgart/ Leipzig: Hirzel, 1997), pp. 255-275.

within the causality of secular existence, which means that it simply arises from human action, or, more generally, as a by-product of the goings-on of the world. On the other hand, and simultaneously, *glück* may be traced to divine intervention in the characters' lives, i.e. to a transcendental level (cf. 262). This definition of *glück* appears to be lacking in important respects. Neudeck does not acknowledge *glück* as a force in its own right, i.e. as an external force in the tradition of Fortuna which is neither an extension of divine will nor mere secular chance. Hence the notion of *glück* as a genuine threat to the individual's development that is both external and random is present only, if at all, in its being an element of secular contingency. By insisting on the possibility of divine providence being continuously present behind *glück*, Neudeck disregards the genuinely negative aspect of *glück*'s manifestations. This makes his theory of *glück* incompatible with the representation of this phenomenon in Wickram's narratives other than *Goldfaden*. In *Goldfaden*, there are few negative manifestations of *glück*, and even they may be regarded as incorporated into a divine plan. However, in the other narratives, *glück* not only manifests itself mainly in a negative way, it also, in doing so, is distinct from, or even diametrically opposed to, the workings of God. The account of *glück* as a parallel presence of divine providence and secular contingency appears to be not fully satisfying in the light of the other narratives; it is doubtful whether it could cover the structure of *glück* in the whole body of Wickram's narratives. The continuous divine presence behind the manifestations of *glück* jars with the destructive energy frequently emanating from this concept. Instead of attempting to locate a superhuman discourse, it may be more fruitful to consider the possibility of *glück* operating from within the human being. Yet for Neudeck, *glück* is restricted to being a phenomenon which occurs externally in the sense of outside the affected person's mind. Although in assigning *glück* to the realm of worldly contingency Neudeck may by implication acknowledge the contribution made by the characters to *glück*, he nevertheless neglects what I will argue is a crucial aspect of *glück*, namely an element of uncertainty lurking within the characters themselves.

There is no comprehensive analysis of *glück* that takes into account all of Wickram's narratives. On a broader level, the internalization of Wickram's narratives, as regards the representation of the characters and their internal states, and the way in which these internal states relate to the external world, has been recognized, although not exhaustively researched, for some time. The novel aspect of this internalization is often considered as marking Wickram as a transitional figure of a certain kind, i.e. as an author whose writings could be seen to reflect the transition between medieval and modern writing. Thus Wickram research to date is focused on

two crucial issues, although neither of them is undisputed: first, internalization as regards the representation of characters, and second, transition as regards the narratives' position in the history of literature. I will keep these issues in mind, and in due course examine whether and to what extent they are characteristic of the way in which *glück* is represented in the narratives. With regard to the first issue, an exhaustive analysis of *glück* should generally improve the understanding of the internalization in Wickram's narratives. With regard to the second issue, this analysis aims at clarifying the narratives' position between medieval and modern writing and placing them within sixteenth century thought.

Part I

Background

Chapter 2

Wickram's Life and Times

Jörg Wickram was born in Colmar approximately in 1505 as the illegitimate son of a patrician. His illegitimate status meant that he would almost certainly have been excluded from any kind of prestigious career within the establishment. It also meant that his education was limited and somewhat erratic; he had no Greek, and what little Latin he had appears to have been self-taught.[1] It was not before 1546, when he inherited a house from his father, that Wickram was granted the civil rights of the town. His career was limited to lowly positions within the municipal administration. He worked as *Stadtweibel* and *Ratsdiener* in Colmar, until, in 1554, he moved to the small town of Burkheim to take up a position as *Stadtschreiber*. About Wickram's private life little is known except for the fact that he was married. Following severe illness, Wickram died in his mid-fifties around the year 1560.[2] Generally speaking, his life appears to have been marked by struggle in more than one respect. Not only do the circumstances of his career appear to have been mediocre, maybe even humiliating, but his health must also have been causing him distress. If the stigma of his illegitimate status never left him completely however hard he may have tried to compensate for it, there is at the same time another, more positive aspect to Wickram's life. Despite his lowly rank in the communal hierarchy, he appears to have been strongly involved in the cultural life of his town. Thus many of Wickram's plays were staged by Colmar's municipal theatre. Moreover, he acted as a literary agent for one of the town's authorities when he travelled to Frankfurt and Speyer in 1542 in order to generate publicity for translations published by Colmar's *Stadtschultheiß*. In 1546, Wickram founded a *Meistersängergesellschaft* in Colmar. Functioning as its artistic director, he also composed some of the hymns and lyrics for the society's use, as well as acquiring an important codex. His artistic activities further included painting and woodcuts. All of this suggests that Wickram's literary credentials must

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[1] Cf. Wickram's remark at the beginning of *Metamorphosen*: "ich deß Lateins gar unkundig binn" (Georg Wickram, *Ovids Metamorphosen*, (ed.) Hans-Gert Roloff (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990), p. 5). In *Die sieben Hauptlaster*, Wickram states "[s]o hab ich [...] wenig Latein/ Gstudieret" (J.Wickram, *Die sieben Hauptlaster*, (ed.) H-G. Roloff (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1972), p. 17).

[2] For an account of Wickram's life, cf. Erich Schmidt, "Wickram", in (eds.) Historische Commission bei der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften (München)/ Historische Kommission, *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. 42, (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1897 [reprint Berlin: D&H, 1971]), pp. 328-336.

have been genuine, and not insignificant, even if they were confined to a regional scope. Apart from Wickram's social and artistic standing, it is necessary to mention his religiosity. It goes almost without saying that in the first half of the sixteenth century, someone whose life was so closely entwined with that of his community should have been religious in some way. This is implied by the central and very public role that religion played during this time; it is also immediately evident from the subject matter of many of Wickram's plays,[3] and from the religious orientation of the *Meistersängergesellschaft* as apparent in the manuscripts that it had in use.[4] Moreover, Wickram's use of popular Reformation subjects such as *Der verlorene Sohn* and *Tobias* may allow us to assume that he was generally inclined towards Protestantism in the widest sense. It does not seem possible, however, not least because of the complex and fluctuating nature of demarcation between confessions at the time, to make a more specific claim about Wickram's confession.[5]

When looking over Wickram's career, one does not get the impression of someone who made an obvious success of his life. Instead, struggle and discontent seem to be very much in evidence. Why, for instance, would a fifty-year-old give up his job, leave his home town and move to an insignificant small town simply to take up another lowly position, if it were not for some kind of difficulties encountered in the earlier situation? While such an evaluation belongs to the realm of conjecture, it seems nevertheless plausible to imagine Wickram as a person who found that he was given only limited scope to realize his ambitions, a person, moreover, who had to work hard to attain to even small achievements in life and retain them. His experience is more than likely to have resulted in an awareness of the link between a person's status by birth on the one hand, and his social advancement on the other.[6]

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[3] Thus there is *Der Verlorene Sohn*, *Tobias*, *Apostelspiel*, and *Die sieben Hauptlaster*; there is also the epic poem *Der irr reitende Pilger*.

[4] Cf. Christoph Petzsch, "Jörg Wickrams Singergesellschaft und ihre große Liederhandschrift", *Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Colmar* XXV (1975/76), pp. 91-119.

[5] Hannes Kästner, for instance, claims that "[b]ei Wickram [...] wird eine reformerische Haltung deutlich, die auf eine Reinigung, Erneuerung und Rückbesinnung der katholischen Kirche abzielt, einen Bruch mit ihr jedoch vermeidet" (cf. Hannes Kästner, "Der irr reitende Pilger", *GRM* 36 (1986), pp. 380-398/ p. 388). Kästner, more specifically, arrives at the conclusion, based on "Der irr reitende Pilger", that "[n]icht Luther oder gar Calvin [...] sind die geistigen Väter von Wickrams Reformvorstellungen und seiner bibelbezogenen Theologie. Wickram orientiert sich in seinem Spätwerk vielmehr an Erasmus von Rotterdam" (388). This claim may have to be modified when considered in relation to the narratives. Christoph Petzsch advises the following: "Die Frage der Konfession sollte mit Zurückhaltung geprüft werden. Dazu rät die wechselvolle Geschichte der Konfessionen im Elsaß des 16. Jahrhunderts, wechselte das Straßburger Münster sie doch mehrmals" (Christoph Petzsch, "Jörg Wickrams Singergesellschaft und ihre große Liederhandschrift", *Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Colmar* XXV (1975/76), p. 94).

[6] That this relation has been complicated by religious matters has been assumed, albeit never convincingly argued, by various critics. For an account of these, cf. Kästner, *op. cit.*, p. 380f.

At the same time, the need for caution may have been at the core of Wickram's attitude towards life. Hence when it came to the concept of Fortuna, the glittering promise of yoking Fortuna to one's own benefit as voiced by certain representatives of Renaissance thought must have met with a good deal of scepticism in Wickram's outlook. He must have been too well acquainted with the destructive nature of the forces that could emerge from the world around him, sometimes even in spite of his personal efforts, to believe in the possibility of directing them to his own benefit.

Yet the extent to which Wickram seems to have been rooted in the regional literary scene of his day suggests that literature may have been an aspect of his life within which he felt it possible to express himself in the confidence that his voice would be acknowledged. What were the literary conditions, then, within which Wickram's writings were produced and received? Jan-Dirk Müller points out that Wickram did not belong "zur politisch-sozialen oder gelehrten Elite der >schreiber<".[7] This has implications as regards his readership: "Adressat ist ein Laienpublikum, das nicht die Zutrittsbedingungen zur Gelehrtenkultur erfüllt [...] und das für die umfassende schriftsprachliche Erschließung von Traditionsbeständen: höfisch-ritterlichen, gelehrten, alltagspraktischen, schwankhaft unterhaltsamen usw. der Hilfe jener >Kommunikationsspezialisten< [i.e. the non-elitist type of author in question] bedarf".[8] According to this, by adapting these traditions to a level on which they could easily be understood, authors like Wickram acted as mediators between a certain stock of traditional knowledge and a lay audience that was not overly erudite. This process of adaptation may have been crucially shaped by a further change in the conditions of literature, namely the fact that unlike in medieval times, narrative literature was no longer produced as a result of someone's commission: "Entscheidend ist, daß [die Erzählliteratur] - bei aller regionalen, ökonomischen und institutionellen Beschränkung - sich nun über einen >Markt< an eine anonyme Öffentlichkeit wendet".[9] This obviously had certain consequences for the way in which the narratives were written. That authors were liberated from the specific expectations of a particular employer could mean an increase in artistic freedom. At the same time, they were bound by the need to render their narratives appealing to anonymous recipients in order to gain a readership, and hence may have found themselves under a different kind of pressure.[10]

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[7] Jan-Dirk Müller, "Volksbuch/Prosaroman im 15./16. Jahrhundert - Perspektiven der Forschung", *IASL* 1. Sonderheft (1985), pp. 1-123 (p. 30).

[8] *ibid.*, p. 31.

[9] *ibid.*, p. 43. This excludes literature that was produced for official purposes, such as plays.

[10] Nevertheless literature remained unaffordable for large parts of the population: "Eine Erzählliteratur, deren Reproduktion relativ kostspielig ist, die mehr als rudimentäre rezeptive

If we look at the general characteristics that mark the era in which Wickram's narratives originated, the following issues emerge. The sixteenth century was ushered in by a number of events which were to change man's view of the world. Columbus' discovery of America, and Copernicus' account of the solar system meant that both the way in which man viewed his existence on earth and the way in which he viewed the earth within the context of the universe were challenged significantly. There were also unsettling developments on a more palpable and immediate level. Thus the emergence of syphilis in Germany must have been perceived as a great scare by the general population. Even greater helplessness would have been felt in the face of the numerous military conflicts which the house of Habsburg brought on the whole of Europe, as the havoc wreaked by them must have been unavoidable as well as incomprehensible to a large number of people. All of these incidents would seem to have resulted in a feeling of general bewilderment and uncertainty around the turn of the century as far as a major part of the population was concerned.

On a more abstract level, the sixteenth century was marked by two major intellectual and theological tendencies, namely humanism and the Reformation. While I will give only a brief account of these tendencies at this stage, the texts in chapter 4 will illustrate the outline provided here with more specific detail. Originating in fourteenth century Italy, humanism was initially marked by a renewed interest in the literature of classical antiquity. Apart from this, humanism crucially focused on human achievement as a force in its own right:

> Wie eng auch immer die Bindung einzelner Humanisten an die christliche Lehre gewesen sein mag, war doch der Humanismus als geistige Bewegung anthropozentrisch ausgerichtet. Obgleich die Humanisten im allgemeinen die christliche Religion nicht in Frage stellten, verstanden sie die Kultur als das >>regnum hominis<<, d.h. als einen auf der Schaffenskraft des Menschen begründeten autonomen Bereich, der neben die von Gott erschaffene Natur tritt. Die menschliche Tätigkeit an sich stellt einen Wert dar, der nicht der Rechtfertigung durch einen transzendenten Bezug bedarf.[11]

The anthropocentrism described here echoes the formula traditionally associated with the Italian Renaissance, which is often synonymous with humanism, i.e. Jules

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Fertigkeiten und vor allem Muße voraussetzt, macht ohnehin gegenüber religiösem, alltagspraktischem, oder theoretischem Schrifttum nur einen schmalen - noch nicht klar abgrenzbaren - Sektor aus; für ihre Verbreitung in Mittel-und Unterschichten [...] fehlen um 1500 die ökonomischen (Bücherpreise, Einkünfte), technisch-medialen (Zugänglichkeit auf einem nationalen >Markt<) und bildungsgeschichtlichen Voraussetzungen; sie fehlen [...] für weite Teile der Bevölkerung bis ins 18. Jahrhundert hinein" (Müller, *ibid.*, p. 41).

[11] August Buck, "Einleitung: Renaissance und Barock", in (ed.) A. B., *Renaissance und Barock* (Teil I), *Neues Handbuch der Literaturwissenschaft*, vol. 9 (Frankfurt/Main: Athenaion, 1972), pp. 1-27 (p. 15).

Michelet's definition of it as "la découverte du monde, la découverte de l'homme".[12] While man and the world were being discovered as entities in their own right, the transcendental perspective which had previously been of foremost importance in their evaluation was receding into the background. This led to a process of secularization, which affected political, social and economic institutions as well as the way in which the world was interpreted in science, philosophy and art.[13] This is not to say that humanism as a whole was removed from Christianity: at the bottom of the celebration of human achievement lay usually the belief in God as the giver of the skills enabling the individual. Yet the focus shifted away from this basic fact to the individual's possibilities of making creative use of the God-given resources. In other words, human free-will became the focal point of humanist interest.[14]

In Germany, humanism had been present, albeit somewhat erratically, throughout the fifteenth century. Early manifestations of a Renaissance movement in Bohemia, the presence of Enea Silvio Piccolomini in Heidelberg, as well as numerous translations of Latin and Italian prose suggest that there was a certain spectrum of humanist thought available in Germany which was mostly derived from Italian sources. Among its most representative texts are Arigo's complete translation of Boccaccio's *Decamerone* (1472/3), and Niclas von Wyle's *Translationen* (1478), which have been considered as "repräsentatives Lehr- und Lesebuch humanistischer Literatur für den deutschen Laien".[15] From the end of the fifteenth century onwards, a distinctly Germanic brand of humanism began to emerge, represented by thinkers as geographically and ideologically diverse as Sebastian Brant, Ulrich von Hutten and Erasmus. While joining their Italian counterparts in the quest for increasing human self-determination, what distinguished them from the latter was the fact that they were more explicitly religious in their orientation, that is, religious matters were among their central concerns. This religious orientation had important consequences as regards the position assigned to man in the world: human achievement and individual self-fulfilment played a decidedly more subdued role when compared to the majority of Italian views.

When the Reformation originated in Germany in the sixteenth century, this had a significant impact on the development of humanism. On first sight, both

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[12] Cf. Jules Michelet, *Renaissance, Histoire de France*, Tome Septième (Paris: Flammarion, 1869), p. 8. This formula is present also in Jacob Burckhardt's famous *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* (Basel: Schweighauser, 1860), which provides another classical evaluation of the Italian Renaissance.

[13] Buck, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[14] Cf. Eugene F. Rice Jun. and Anthony Grafton, *The foundations of early modern Europe, 1460-1559* (New York/London: Norton, 1994 [reprint of 1970 ed.], p. 88f.

[15] Max Wehrli, *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1997), p. 881.

movements might seem to be diametrically opposed to one another. The humanists' emphasis on the individual's contribution to his own development would not have sat easily with the religious fervour of the Reformation and the rigid piety it demanded in the shape of the individual's submission to divine authority. The tension caused by this clash may be illustrated by the opposition between Erasmus and Luther. This opposition culminated in the debate on free will. Erasmus believed human will to be essentially free to do good; his view, as expressed most forcefully in his *Diatribe de libero arbitrio* (1524), was marked by ethical optimism.[16] Luther did not share this belief; instead, in a reply to Erasmus, entitled *De servo arbitrio* (1525), he held that human beings so lacked control of their will that they would inevitably commit sin.[17] He believed that it was not by virtue of individual merit that man was saved, but by virtue of his faith, which in turn was a gift of divine grace.[18] While this debate focuses in the first place on the individual's capacity to contribute to his salvation, there is also a more worldly aspect related to it. Luther, in the more mature stages of his intellectual career, believed that it was a Christian's duty to endure whatever plight he was faced with during his life on earth. Thus his model for human behaviour could be seen as advocating passivity; in effect siding with the powerful, he could be seen as opposing social change as well as the notion of taking control of the external circumstances of one's life. Erasmus, however, generally stresses the power of human free-will in connection with a person's ability to shape, at least to some degree, the circumstances of his life on earth. The confrontation between these

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[16] Cf. Erasmus, *On the Freedom of Will*, (trans.). E. Gordon Rupp, in *Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation*, The Library of Christian Classics, Vol. XVII (London: SCM Press, 1969): "I ask what merit can a man arrogate to himself if whatever, as a man, he is able to achieve by his natural intelligence and free choice, all this he owes to the one from whom he receives these powers? And yet God himself imputes this to our merit, that we do not turn our soul away from his grace, and that we apply our natural powers to simple obedience. And this surely goes to show that it is not wrong to say that man does something and yet attributes the sum of all that he does to God as its author, from whom it has come about that he was able to ally his own effort with the grace of God" (p. 84f).

[17] Cf. Martin Luther, *On the Bondage of the Will*, (trans.). Philip S. Watson, in *Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation*, The Library of Christian Classics, Vol. XVII (London: SCM Press, 1969): "When it has been proved that salvation is beyond our own powers and devices, and depends on the work of God alone [...], does it not follow that when God is not present and at work in us everything we do is evil and we necessarily do what is of no avail for salvation?" (p. 139); "it is evident that there can be no such thing as free choice" (p. 332).

[18] Cf. Martin Luther, *Über das 1. Buch Mose. Predigten 1527*, chapter 3: "das man alleine durch den glauben from und selig werde, Darnach, das an diesem hangt, das kein mensch durch seine werck fur Gott gerecht werde"; in the Latin version, this is expressed as "ex *sola fide* nos justificari" (*D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Weimarer Ausgabe, vol. 24, Weimar: Böhlau, 1964 [reprint of Weimar 1900], pp. 98f, my emphasis). See also *Dictata super Psalterium. 1513-16*: "ita quilibet fidelis nullo opere humano, sed *sola gratia dei* et operatione spiritus sancti iustificatur at renascitur" (*D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Weimarer Ausgabe, vol. 24, Weimar: Böhlau, 1966 [reprint of Weimar 1885], p. 468, my emphasis).

two eminent figures suggests how the sixteenth century was marked by a tension between worldliness based on confidence in human free-will and reason on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the kind of religiosity that conceived of man as completely dependent on God.[19] Nevertheless the juxtaposition of these tendencies was not an absolute one in Germany. Although Erasmus, for one, acknowledged the power inherent in man, he was also aware of the need for man to submit to the superior power of God. That is to say, the overall religious angle of German humanism meant that the confrontation with Reformation thought was somewhat tempered. Moreover, despite differing on the issue of free will, the Reformation might be considered alike to humanism in that it, too, brought a certain emancipation of the individual. For the individual was spiritually autonomous to the extent that there was no worldly authority between him and God, his reception of Scripture offering direct access to the divine, as proposed by Luther's maxim of *sola scriptura*. The immediacy of this relation to God, and the importance it gave to the individual's conscience contributed to the formation of a new self-confidence attainable by anyone regardless of class or money.[20] Although this self-confidence did not entail the kind of self-fulfilment celebrated by Italian humanists since it ultimately subordinated the subject to God, it still meant that the subject was liberated as a spiritual being, and as such was being offered a possibility to actively endow his life with meaning.

What, then, were the broader consequences of the convergence of humanism and the Reformation for German literature at the time? It may seem as if the advent of Luther put an end to the indigenous development of humanism in Germany, since the dissemination of Protestantism meant that both science and the arts to some extent re-entered into submission to theology.[21] Yet the effect of the Reformation may merely have solidified certain tendencies that already existed in German humanist literature, most importantly its strong element of didacticism. Especially as a result of the belief in human free-will that may be educated to choose virtue, the aim of instructing one's readership on how to master their life was at the heart of humanist endeavour. This didactic aim found a continuation in Reformation thought, although the latter based it on the consideration that education was a necessary

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[19] Cf. August Buck, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[20] "God gave faith directly to the individual. No mediator, except the Word of Scripture, was necessary. The individual human soul stood alone before its Savior and creator [...] Religious individualism is necessarily disruptive of established beliefs and practices" (Eugene F. Rice Jun. and Anthony Grafton, *The foundations of early modern Europe, 1460- 1559* (New York/London: Norton, 1994 [reprint of 1970 ed.]), p. 157).

[21] Cf. Barbara Könneker, "Deutsche Literatur im Zeitalter des Humanismus und der Reformation", in (ed.) A. Buck, *Renaissance und Barock* (Teil II), *Neues Handbuch der Literaturwissenschaft*, vol. 10 (Frankfurt/Main: Athenaion, 1972), pp. 145-176, (p. 159).

means to establishing the new church. That is, didacticism in literature was supposed to contribute to the establishment of new rules according to which a Christian's life was to be led. Incidentally, this process brought with it also the widening of the exclusive scope of humanism.[22] While the view that literature should be of practical use to its readers was given an explicit religious slant by the Reformation, it nevertheless retained some of its original humanist purpose, namely to make the individual's life both more transparent and more manageable to himself: "Der Anspruch des humanistischen Wissenschaftsbetriebs, durch Erschließung aller verfügbaren Historien die Erkenntnisse und Erfahrungen, kulturellen Normen und Techniken der Geschichte für die Praxis bereitzustellen [...], wird auf der Ebene des alltäglichen Lebens aufgenommen".[23] Generally speaking, humanist and Reformation thought seem to have been able to coexist to some extent, even if the influence of the Reformation may have been in a pre-eminent position. It might be worth keeping in mind this coexistence as a significant characteristic of the literary atmosphere in which Wickram's narratives originated. In due course, we may consider to what extent his narratives reflect either, or both, tendencies.

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[22] Cf. Barbara Könneker, who points out that the Reformation placed literature "in den Dienst des Aufbaus und der Festigung der neuen Lebensordnung" (Könneker, *op. cit.*, p. 160).

[23] Jan-Dirk Müller, "Frühbürgerliche Privatheit und altständische Gemeinschaft. Zu Jörg Wickrams Historie *Von Guoten und Boesen Nachbaurn*", *IASL* 5 (1980), pp. 1-32 (p. 8).

Chapter 3

The Concept of Fortuna

As I have suggested, Wickram's *glück* may be considered as the German equivalent of Fortuna. Therefore, to help us define the role of *glück* in Wickram's narratives, I will provide an overview of the main characteristics of the concept of Fortuna as it was perceived through the ages.

The belief in a deity of chance originates in ancient Greece in the shape of the goddess *tyche*.[1] The concept of *tyche* as a superhuman force originally implied destiny, or the one who brings destiny, derived from the verb τυγχάνειν, the basic meaning of which is 'to hit the mark'.[2] As such, there was a tendency to subsume *tyche* under divine agency. When this was the case, acceptance was proposed as the adequate way of dealing with what *tyche* inflicted.[3] Only later, mainly in the Hellenistic period, did *tyche* come to represent a power who performs the act of bringing destiny in a capricious way, i.e. her image moved closer to that of a goddess of chance.[4] This development seems to coincide with an increase in *tyche*'s autonomy: it was not unusual for *tyche* to be considered as more powerful than all other Greek gods.[5] She also stands out from them in that she does not share the mythological history attached to them, and is not endowed with family history or adventures.[6] Nevertheless there is an important characteristic which *tyche* has in common with the other gods, viz. the tendency to act as they pleased rather than out of consideration for human need. Man was regarded as powerless to move the gods by his offerings, hence what they decided to inflict invariably materialized. Thus mediation between *tyche* and her decree on the one hand, and man on the other appears to have been limited, despite a full-blown cult which included altars, images and sacrifices. By the

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[1] Cf. St. Georg Stock, "Fortune (Greek)", in (ed.) James Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 6 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1913), pp. 93-96: "Fortune is [...] a home-growth of the Greek intellect" (p. 93).

[2] Cf. e.g. Wilhelm Gemoll, *Griechisch-Deutsches Schul- und Handwörterbuch*, 9th edition (München: G. Freytag Verlag, 1954), p. 752.

[3] For references, cf. Gertrud Herzog-Hauser, "Tyche", in (eds.) Georg Wissowa and Wilhelm Kroll, *Paulys Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaften*, 13. Halbband, (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler 1912), col. 1643-1689; cf. also Stock, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

[4] Herzog-Hauser, *ibid.*, col. 1659.

[5] Herzog-Hauser, *ibid.*, col. 1665.

[6] Cf. Stock, *op. cit.*, p. 93. Herzog-Hauser claims that it is impossible to define *tyche* clearly against related concepts such as *moira*, or *anangke* (cf. Herzog-Hauser, *op. cit.*, col. 1646).

same token, a more aggressive stance such as struggling with *tyche* in order to modify the nature of her gifts for one's own good seems to have been largely non-existent.[7] As blind wilfulness evolved as *tyche*'s main characteristic, her reduced approachability must have been experienced in a particularly acute way since it meant the inevitability of change that more often than not tended to be for the worse. However, while the Olympian gods were to a large extent characterized by malevolence, *tyche* was regarded as a force whose workings were not related to the purpose of punishment or reward.[8] That is, if *tyche* inflicted something negative on a person, she did not do so with moral intent, but simply because it was her nature to do so. Nevertheless there was no way of understanding why *tyche* dealt her blows. That is, precisely her lack of intention must have made *tyche*'s workings seem terrifying, since it meant that they were remote not only from human pleading, but also from human understanding.[9] Those who believed in her autonomous presence must have felt completely powerless when confronted with her. What, then, was left for a human being to do in the face of exposure and powerlessness? In extreme cases, the belief in *tyche*'s power could lead to a fatalistic, pessimistic attitude which negated the existence of human responsibility and free-will altogether. Exponents of this attitude are, for instance, political orators, who frequently shifted personal responsibility onto *tyche*.[10] Opposed to this approach was one represented by men like Thucydides and Diodor, who were inclined to view *tyche* as a "the irrational [...] element in things, which is not under the control of human forethought" rather than a genuine deity.[11] They held that man ought to be judged not by the outcome of an undertaking, but by the qualities he employs in attempting it. Thus by concentrating on one's virtues, it was considered possible to liberate oneself at least to some extent from the influence of *tyche*. However, despite this relatively optimistic approach, the nature of *tyche* was regarded as predominantly destructive.[12]

In Roman culture, *tyche* was replaced by the friendlier goddess Fortuna. Originally, Fortuna appears to have been "the deity presiding over the incalculable

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[7] Cf. Herzog-Hauser, *op. cit.*, col. 1669f.

[8] Cf. Stock, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

[9] Cf. Albert Doren, "Fortuna im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance", in (ed.) Fritz Saxl, *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, II, Vorträge 1922-23, I. Teil (Leipzig/Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1924), pp. 71-144; p. 73.

[10] Cf. Herzog-Hauser, *op. cit.*, col. 1660.

[11] Stock, *op. cit.*, p. 95; for references, cf. Herzog-Hauser, *op. cit.*, col. 1663.

[12] It goes without saying that there were more overtly rationalist accounts of chance, too. A prime example of these may be found in Aristotle's *Physics* ii. 4ff, where he states the source of chance to be in undesigned collocations. To Aristotle, chance is something within the sphere of mind or human agency which is not due to that agency (cf. Stock, *op. cit.*, p. 95). However, since my main interest lies with concepts that deify chance, I am not concerned with views like Aristotle's in this context.

element in human life, not a mere personification of Chance itself".[13] Since Fortuna was the deity presiding over chance (*fors*), she was occasionally considered as a power working to a definite end. The meaning of Fortuna seems to have shifted between fortune, chance and fate. Initially, Fortuna appears to have carried characteristics reminiscent of Fate.[14] In time, she came to be widely regarded as the goddess of fortunate chance, with fickleness evolving as one of her main characteristics.[15] As such, there was an endless number of specific Fortunae to whom the Romans addressed their hopes in relation to particular activities or critical situations.[16] This specialization of the cult of Fortuna may indicate its success rate, as well as the goddess' importance in daily life. Later, the status that Fortuna held among the Roman gods became even more important; she was frequently being referred to as Fortuna Panthea, which denotes a goddess who ranks higher in hierarchy than all other gods.[17] Fortuna was regarded as accessible in a way in which *tyche* was not. Generally, Roman gods, "so far from being capricious, were always open to supplication, and practically bound to yield to it if approached in precisely the right way".[18] Thus the cult of Fortuna, in which prayers and offerings were performed to elicit the goddess' favour, ensured that the Romans did not need to consider themselves to be at the mercy of chance. The positive aspect of chance was said to prevail in Fortuna's image; she was pictured as "launisch-wetterwendische Schutzgöttin in den tausend Wechselfällen des Lebens"[19], who supported man by bestowing material goods and worldly honours. The concept of an anthropomorphous deity in control of chance must surely have been useful in the attempt to gain control over a phenomenon which is by definition uncontrollable.

Just as there were differing conceptions of Fortuna, there were different views on how exactly to control her. Among those who associated Fortuna closely with Fate, there was a tendency to discredit human endeavour as an influence on crucial developments in life.[20] This notion was taken to an extreme by the followers of Epicureanism, who proposed individual selfishness and *laissez faire* as the reaction to

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[13] W. Warde Fowler, "Fortune (Roman)", in (ed.) James Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 6 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1913), pp. 98-104; p. 98.

[14] Cf. Howard R. Patch, *The Goddess Fortuna in Medieval Literature* (Harvard: University Press, 1927), p. 10; also Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

[15] Cf. Doren, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[16] Cf. "Fortuna", in (eds.) Georg Wissowa and Karl Mittelhaus, *Paulys Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaften*, 14. Halbband (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1943), col. 12-42; col. 16ff.

[17] Cf. e.g. Doren, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

[18] Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

[19] Doren, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[20] Cf. Fowler, *op. cit.*, pp. 101f, 103.

an omnipotent Fortuna.[21] Human endeavour was viewed quite differently by those Romans who viewed Fortuna as unrelated to Fate. For while Fate predetermines a person's life in a way that cannot be altered, Chance leaves the possibility for a person to interact with its offerings and thus contribute to the shaping of his own life. The existence of Fortuna in the sense of chance may therefore provoke the individual into exercising *virtus* so as to retain at least some amount of control over his development. The potential effect of human endeavour in dealing with Fortuna is expressed clearly in one of Appius Claudius Caecus' *sententiae* (c. 300 BC): "Est unusquisque faber ipse suae fortunae".[22] This view, which equates human endeavour with Fortuna, seems to rule out the existence of Fortuna as an active power in its own right, in favour of free-will.[23] The advocates of the superior power of human free-will, among them Livy and Seneca, maintain that Fortuna may be overcome by human free-will and *virtus*.[24] As such, chance might be considered as opening up a certain scope for a person to exercise his free-will. In this sense, Fortuna may actually further the individual's plans, provided he is able to direct her influence into the required shape.

Over time, the concept of Fortuna shifted in focus from her positive to her negative aspects such as fickleness and volatility. At the same time, the human potential to control her was regarded critically. Cicero, in *De Officiis*, is among the first to speak of Fortuna in terms reminiscent of the Hellenistic *tyche*, describing her as *volubilis*, *inconstans* and *caeca*.[25] Even if Cicero may not genuinely have believed in her power, he formulated the negative aspects emanating from the fickleness of Fortuna which became more and more prevalent in subsequent centuries. Cornelius Nepos, in *Dion*, 6, for example, claims that Fortuna demotes the hero whom she has just exalted. Elsewhere, Fortuna is even spoken of in terms of the Greek Nemesis.[26] Against the blows of this goddess, human skills were considered useless. Thus the concept of Fortuna and man's interaction with her undergoes a change from confident optimism to pessimism and dejection. Notably, this change has a parallel in the course of Roman history: the decline of the Roman Empire ties in with an increasingly negative view of Fortuna. This suggests that a particular conception of Fortuna could be seen as a barometer of the general atmosphere marking the society in which that conception was prevalent.

Faced with the inconstancy associated with the exposure to Fortuna, the Stoics

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[21] Cf. Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
[22] Quoted after Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
[23] Cf. Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
[24] Cf. Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
[25] Cf. Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
[26] Cf. Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

advocated their own peculiar way of dealing with her. In order to free themselves of the disturbing influence of this force, they proposed an ascetic retreat from the world. Engaged exclusively in the *vita contemplativa*, they thought it to be impossible to be touched by the whims of Fortuna. *Apatheia*, or *aequa mens* was considered as the only viable attitude which could keep at bay good and bad fortune alike.[27] In this context, virtue was equivalent with inner detachment, or autonomy from external developments which could affect a person's life in a negative way. While confirming the existence of Fortuna as an autonomous power in the world, Stoicism claimed that one could deal with her disrupting influence by shunning the realm in which it is at work, viz. the material realm. Even though this could be seen as the acknowledgment of defeat on the material level, it at the same time implies disregard for what happens on this level and for the goods with which it is concerned. Thus Stoicism admits human powerlessness with regard to the material aspects of life. On the other hand, by withdrawing to a supposedly superior inner life of the mind, it ascribes to Fortuna and the realm of her influence a minor importance, maybe even a secondary reality. In this sense, Stoicism may propose the most radical approach to Fortuna so far. Still, even though the various Greek and Roman views of a force in charge of chance which I have considered so far are marked by significant differences, they nevertheless share a crucial feature. They all consider *tyche*, or Fortuna, as a genuine force, whose gifts are equally genuine, even if only of limited existence. As such, they perceive the need to find genuine strategies for dealing with her.

With the advent of Christianity, Fortuna turned into a serious problem. In a world that is supposed to be governed by the one and only God who is both just and good, there seems to be no room for an arbitrary, wilful power in its own right. How could God permit Fortuna to cause sinful men to live in prosperity and righteous men to perish? Augustine (354-430), in *De civitate Dei*, was among the first to attack what he considered to be the pointless belief in the wilfulness of Fortuna. In IV, 18, he ridicules the whole concept of Fortuna: "[...] why is she worshipped, when she is so blind that she runs up against anyone whatever at random, and clings even to those who despise her?"[28] Augustine accounts for injustices on earth by claiming that whatever suffering and misery is manifest to human eyes may be explained by two reasons. Suffering may either be due to human sin: "the forbearance of God invites the wicked to repentance, just as the chastisement of God teaches forbearance to the good" (I, 8). Or, it may be perceived as a result of the limited nature of human vision:

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[27] Cf. Herzog-Hauser, *op. cit.*, col. 1670.

[28] Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, (ed. and trans.) R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: CUP, 1998). Cf. also V, I, where the existence of Fate is denied.

"deep is [...] the providence of the Creator and Ruler of the world, and 'unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out' " (I, 28).[29] Although God gives earthly power to evil persons as well as to good ones, he does so according to a hidden plan. Moreover, during life on earth, true happiness "does not consist simply in the total satisfaction of all desires [...] the satisfaction of evil or perverse desires gives no ultimate happiness" (*De Trin.* XIII, 3, 6-9). Therefore, injustices on earth which could appear to show the intervention of Fortuna are insignificant. For God makes sure that in eternity only the good are granted blessedness (XIX, 10/27), while the wicked are consigned to perpetual torment of the soul (XIX, 28). Thus any injustice encountered in this life is corrected by focusing on the afterlife.

Regardless of Augustine's arguments against the existence of Fortuna, belief in her was by no means eradicated. Subsequently, Boethius made a significant attempt to integrate Fortuna into a Christian cosmos. Triggered by Boethius' personal experience of great injustice, *De consolatione philosophiae* (c. 523) was written as he was awaiting death in prison.[30] Boethius acknowledges the existence of Fortuna in the world as governed by God. He claims that the connection between God and Fortuna is such that Fortuna is ultimately subordinated to divine providence (book 1, prose VI). Most importantly, Boethius emphasizes the element of free-will in dealing with Fortuna: man is free to choose whether or not he wants to step onto Fortuna's wheel, i.e. submit to her workings. If he chooses to do so, he may enjoy her transient gifts, but has to equally accept Fortuna's wilfulness and suffer the losses she inflicts, as is explained in a statement attributed to Fortuna herself:

Inconstancy is my very essence; it is the game I never cease to play as I turn my wheel in its ever-changing circle, filled with joy as I bring the top to the bottom and the bottom to the top. Yes, rise up on my wheel if you like, but don't count it an injury when by the same token you begin to fall, as the rules of the game will require (book 2, prose II).[31]

Alternatively, in order to remain internally untouched by the whims of Fortuna, one may focus on God (book 3, prose X). This amounts to the juxtaposition of a sensual, material realm permeated by Fortuna on the one hand, and a spiritual realm which is immune to her workings on the other, which is of course reminiscent of the Stoic interpretation of Fortuna's influence in the world. What is new is that the realm of the

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[29] Here, Augustine quotes Rom. 11, 33.

[30] Cf. Friedrich Klingner, "Einführung", in (trans. and ed.) Karl Büchner, Boethius, *Trost der Philosophie* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1971 [1992]), pp. 5-39; p. 7ff.

[31] All quotations are taken from Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, (trans.) V. E. Watts (London: The Folio Society, 1998 [reprint of 1969 edition]).

spirit has its centre in God. God is the essence of happiness (book 3, prose X), hence true happiness is internal to the extent that it consists in the appreciation of God (book 2, prose IV). Through the hierarchy among the two realms, Boethius makes the pagan concept of Fortuna as a force in her own right compatible with a Christian framework. Doren describes Boethius' stance as follows:

[Es ist der Punkt] von dem aus der christliche Grundgedanke einer über der Menschenwelt waltenden, nur dem reinen Glauben, keinerlei menschlicher Bildkraft erreichbaren Vorsehung mit der bildhaft-anthropomorphen Vorstellung eines Auf und Nieder des Daseins beherrschenden, scheinbar nach launischer Willkür handelnden dämonischen Zwischenwesens in Einklang gesetzt werden konnte; eines Wesens, das die menschliche Seele brauchte, um sich in dem scheinbaren Chaos dieses Geschehens, seinen Ungerechtigkeiten, Grausamkeiten und Plötzlichkeiten zurechtzufinden. Es geschah dies, indem Fortuna von der Kirche in das Reich jener merkwürdigen Zwischenwesen aufgenommen wurde, die, bald als Engel, bald als Dämonen, warnend und hemmend, zwischen Gott und Menschheit walten und bei der Ausbildung des mittelalterlichen Dogmas eine so bedeutende Rolle zu spielen berufen sind.[32]

Since Fortuna is considered as a tool of divine providence, she gains an ethical dimension. Being directed by God, all of Fortuna's workings ultimately lead to a positive end, however negative they appear to be in the first place (book 4, prose VII). Echoing Augustine's argument, Boethius maintains that human experience of injustice is simply due to limited judgment (book 4, prose VI). Boethius focuses on *fortuna adversa* as the more genuine phenomenon that may more easily lead to salvation provided it is endured in the Christian spirit. *fortuna felix* is considered to be more threatening because she may lead one astray in the way that everything material, sensual lures the spirit away from God (book 2, prose VIII). For the more positive Fortuna's gifts are, the harder it is to bear their loss for those who attach themselves to them as if they were of enduring reality. Yet the transience of Fortuna's gifts may ultimately serve to point out the value of eternal bliss in the kingdom of God (cf. book 2). It is in this sense that everything inflicted by Fortuna, whether *felix* or *adversa*, may lead to a good end on the spiritual level. Her workings test the human soul in respect of its enduring faith in God both through grievances and temptations (IV, prose 7). Mastering this test is rewarded with spiritual bliss.

While harmonizing the presence of Fortuna with that of God, the devaluation of *fortuna felix* means that the Boethian concept has lost the sense of adventure and successful enterprise associated with the Roman incarnation of Fortuna. What once

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[32] Doren, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

was an active attitude towards Fortuna has given way to one of endurance. Human free-will, for Boethius, figures only as far as the decision to ignore Fortuna's gifts and focus one's attention on God is concerned; inner tranquillity is supposed to be the sole thing which man is able to control (book 2, prose VI). For Boethius, the true significance of Fortuna's existence lies in its relation to the life of the spirit, whose main importance is revealed only in life after death. In ancient Roman times, by contrast, human free-will played an important role in turning the gifts of Fortuna to one's own advantage. Thus the individual had a much greater part in shaping his or her own fortune in life on earth. Unlike Augustine, Boethius acknowledges the existence of injustice, if only on a temporary basis. Yet he denies any direct correlation between a person's worldly status and God's disposition towards him or her. By attributing the occurrence of injustice to the concrete figure of Fortuna, Boethius extricates the injustice from the direct responsibility of God. Hence Boethius uses the concept of Fortuna to circumvent the problem of suffering in a world governed by God, which may account for the fact that his view gained far greater popularity than that of Augustine.

Boethius' account was to shape attitudes towards Fortuna for centuries to come. *De consolatione* was widely circulated, and became part of every well-stocked library's inventory.[33] The treatise was translated into many languages, including German (in the eleventh century by Notker), and was regarded as a popular classic throughout the Middle Ages. Only with the emergence of humanism did the concept of Fortuna undergo another major change. This change was typical of the period's orientation towards ancient Rome as well as its focus on human achievement. Since the following chapter will deal in detail with the humanist attitude towards Fortuna available in German sources, I will at this stage merely point out a few exponents of the changed view of Fortuna so as to provide a general impression. The new concept of Fortuna found expression first in Petrarch's *De remediis utriusque fortunae* (1366). Viewing Fortuna as a force which is independent from God, this compendium distinguishes itself from the prevailing Boethian tradition by advocating a more active stance in dealing with her, namely by employing *virtus* and *ratio*. Pontano's *De fortuna libri* mark another important contribution to the Renaissance concept of Fortuna. Pontano (1426-1503) claims the joint existence of God and Fortuna, with Fortuna's irrationality complementing God's rational and just nature. The existence of Fortuna is justified by the consideration that God cannot possibly attend to all banal

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[33] Cf. Walter Haug, "O Fortuna", in (ed.) W. H., *Fortuna* (Tübingen: Niemeyer 1995 [Fortuna vitrea; 15]), pp. 1-22 (pp. 8f).

changes in human life.[34] Most importantly, *De fortuna libri* acknowledge Fortuna's gifts as a crucial part of human happiness. Thus Pontano abandons the gloomy assumptions of Stoicism and medieval Christianity, displaying instead an optimistic and positive perception of Fortuna and her gifts. Any notion of divine providence is dispelled by the view that man may fight with Fortuna for a positive outcome of his affairs. Notably, Fortuna's influence affects only those aspects of life that are associated with the possibility of human consideration and decision, and with the uncertainty that characterizes such factors as man might take into consideration.[35] This indicates that human reaction is regarded as a defining element of the concept of Fortuna. As for the means of forcing Fortuna into submission, Pontano regards *ratio* and *virtus* to be of limited use in struggling with her due to her irrationality.[36] Instead, one may be better off fighting for one's advantage with means that are unconventional in that they draw on instinct, flexibility, and practical skills, which suggests that a person's individual talent is at the centre of the confrontation with Fortuna.

An approach to Fortuna that relies even more strongly on human ability is advocated in Machiavelli's *Il Principe* (1513). Machiavelli envisages Fortuna's machinery not as the single wheel of Boethian tradition, but as a multitude of wheels which move in different directions. By choosing the right moment to jump from a downward moving to an upward moving wheel, man can supposedly outwit Fortuna and overcome her whims.[37] The notion of human control over Fortuna is equally characteristic of another image of Fortuna which Machiavelli depicts in chapter 25 of *Il Principe*, entitled "On Fortune's Role in Human Affairs and How She Can Be Dealt With":

I judge it to be true that fortune is the arbiter of one half of our actions, but that she still leaves the control of the other half [...] to us. And I compare her to one of those ruinous rivers that, when they become enraged, flood the plains, tear down the trees and buildings, taking up earth from one spot and placing it upon another; everyone flees from them, [...] unable to oppose them in any way. But although they are of such a nature, it does not follow that when the weather is calm we cannot take precautions with embankments and dikes, so that when they rise up again either the waters will be channelled off or their impetus will not be either so unchecked or so damaging.

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[34] Cf. Doren, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

[35] Cf. Doren, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

[36] The notion that wisdom or *ratio* no longer guarantee success is illustrated also by the outcome of a symbolic tournament staged in 1488 at Bologna: Fortuna gains victory over the traditionally victorious Sapienza (cf. Doren, *op. cit.*, p. 130). Fortuna's victory suggests that skills like risk-taking and detecting opportunities are more likely to succeed than conventional virtues.

[37] Cf. *Asino d'oro*, quoted by Doren, *op. cit.*, p. 115ff.

The same things happen where fortune is concerned: she shows her force where there is no organized strength to resist her; and she directs her impact there where she knows that dikes and embankments are not constructed to hold her.[38]

Even more than that of his humanist predecessors, Machiavelli's approach suggests that Fortuna has regained some of the autonomy that marked her ancient equivalent. She is no longer subordinated to another power, nor are her gifts regarded as part of a secondary reality any more. At the same time, however, Fortuna is said to be able to exert her power only where there are no human forces to oppose her. This suggests that the awareness of a conflict between the wishes of the individual on the one hand and determination through an arbitrary external force on the other is borne with an increase in human self-reliance. The individual asserts himself in his struggle with Fortuna:

it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, in order to keep her down, to beat her and to struggle with her. And it is seen that she more often allows herself to be taken over by men who are impetuous than by those who make cold advances (p. 84).

That is, submission to a given set of rules, whether sacred or profane, in order to overcome Fortuna, gives way to the expression of a person's unrepressed virility, employing every possible skill no matter how immoral it may be. The individual's power and freedom in determining his or her destiny are emphasized here to a great extent, making Machiavelli's account a prototype of the often quoted anthropocentric tendencies of the Renaissance.[39]

On the level of pictorial representation, the changed view towards Fortuna found expression in the fact that the wheel, which had characterized her representation for centuries was often substituted by a sail.[40] This indicates a change in the movement occasioned by Fortuna: the previously circular movement of the wheel is replaced by a linear, forward one. Moreover, instead of being subordinated to the relentless motion of the wheel, the individual was now considered to be at the helm of the metaphorical ship powered by Fortuna's sail. As a result, the achievements resulting from a person's encounter with Fortuna were no longer followed by inevitable defeat or reversal; given the requisite skills, one could establish continuous progress. The concept of Fortuna became especially important

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[38] Ch. XXV, "On Fortune's Role in Human Affairs and How She Can Be Dealt With", p. 82, in Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, (trans.) Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa (Oxford: OUP, 1984 [1998]).
[39] Cf. e.g. Doren, *op. cit.*, p. 124.
[40] Cf. Doren, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

for people whose success depended on self-reliance and risk-taking, such as merchants.[41] While this attitude reflects the optimism inherent in the view of Fortuna prevalent in ancient Rome, there is an important difference between the Fortuna of the Renaissance and the Roman conception. In Rome, Fortuna was widely regarded as a genuine goddess with a religious cult of her own. In the Renaissance, the presence of Christianity obviously ruled out the belief in Fortuna as a genuine goddess. Instead, Fortuna appears to have been considered as an allegory, or personification of chance, which may have increased the extent to which human control was thought to be possible in relation to earlier incarnations of this force.

As a contrast to the positive attitude towards Fortuna held by humanist thinkers, I will round off this chapter by taking a look at how, at roughly the same time, Fortuna was regarded from a theological point of view. In order to get an idea of the other extreme of the spectrum, I will consider Jean Calvin's doctrine. Probably most famous for the view on predestination, his doctrine is mainly concerned with what happens to man in the afterlife. According to Calvin, God determines prior to a person's life whether they will go to heaven or to hell. In addition to this, Calvin also holds that divine providence governs all life on earth. This entails more than mere divine foreknowledge; for Calvin, "providence consists in action: What many talk of bare prescience is the merest trifling" (I.xvi.4, 82)[42]. The kinds of incidents that are actively determined by God are illustrated in the following passage from *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (1536) in which Calvin opposes divine providence to what is commonly perceived as Fortuna:

> If one falls among robbers, or ravenous beasts; if a sudden gust of wind at sea causes shipwreck; if one is struck down by the fall of a house or a tree; if another, when wandering through desert paths, meets with deliverance; or, after being tossed by the waves, arrives in port, and makes some wondrous hairbreadth escape from death - all these occurrences, prosperous as well as adverse, carnal sense will attribute to fortune. But whoso has learned from the mouth of Christ that all the hairs of his head are numbered (Matt. 10. 30) will look farther for the cause, and hold that all events whatsoever are governed by the secret counsel of God (I.xvi.2, 80f).

According to this statement, the opinion that events are fortuitous must not be shared by a true Christian. Nothing happens fortuitously:

> it was a true saying of Basil the Great, that Fortune and Chance are heathen terms; the

[41] Doren remarks that Fortuna is adopted by aristocrats and merchants "als glücksverheißendes Symbol" (Doren, *op. cit.*, p. 129).

[42] All quotations refer to Jean Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, (trans.) Henry Beveridge (Chicago et al.: *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1990).

meaning of which ought not to occupy pious minds. For if all success is blessing from God, and calamity and adversity are his curse, there is no place left in human affairs for Fortune and chance (I.xvi.8, 85).

Thus Calvin emphatically rejects the notion of Fortuna, or chance as a power in its own right.[43] Nor does he allow for the existence of impersonal chance in the sense of a random element in human affairs. Although Calvin acknowledges that "though all things are ordered by the counsel and certain arrangement of God, to us, however, they are fortuitous" (I.xvi.9, 85), this merely arises from the fact that "the order, method, end and necessity of events are, for the most part, hidden in the counsel of God" (I.xvi.9, 85). To illustrate the gap between human understanding and divine intention, he gives the example of a merchant who, on travelling through a forest, leaves his companion behind and is subsequently killed by robbers. While the practical reason for this death is obvious, even if it may strike one as unjust, it actually occurs out of a deeper necessity which is hidden from human insight. A true Christian, "[t]hough he will consider that every circumstance which occurred in that person's death was indeed in its nature fortuitous, [...] will have no doubt that the Providence of God overruled it and guided fortune to his own end"[44] (I.xvi.9, 85). Echoing the Augustinian argument, Calvin claims that the reasons for this kind of terrifying incident are to be found in God's intention to edify man:

[I]f [...] we were disposed to learn, the issue would at length make it manifest [...] that [God's] purpose was either to train his people to patience, correct their depraved affections, tame their wantonness, inure them to self-denial, and arouse them from torpor; or, on the other hand, to cast down the proud, defeat the craftiness of the ungodly, and frustrate all their schemes (I.xvii.1, 87).

The belief in divine providence extends to the perception of evil. It implies that anything harmful, including Satan, is under God's control (cf. I.xvi.3, 82); the wicked, albeit unwittingly, fulfil the will of God. Therefore, man can rest safely in God's protection and need not fear anything. Because every incident is considered to result from God's just intervention, there can be neither reason nor possibility to oppose the

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[43] Cf. also the following quotation which Calvin attributes to Augustine, not, however, giving specific reference as to where this passage may be found: "I regret having so often used the term fortune; although I intended to denote by it not some goddess, but the fortuitous issue of events in external matters, whether good or evil. Hence, too, those words, Perhaps, Perchance, Fortuitously, which no religion forbids us to use, though everything must be referred to Divine Providence [...] perhaps, that which is vulgarly called Fortune, is also regulated by a hidden order, and what we call Chance is nothing else than that the reason and cause of which is secret" (Jean Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, (trans.) Henry Beveridge, book I, XVI, 8., p. 85 (Chicago et al.: *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1990).

[44] *fortune* here seems to be used in the sense of chance.

course of the events that one encounters.

Since Fortuna does not exist, ways of coping with her are obviously not an issue for Calvin. Instead, he proposes that one should accept everything as God-given, and while doing so, attempt to behave as virtuously as possible. The latter is limited by the fact that a person can employ only as much prudence or folly as God has willed. Calvin rules out the individual's free will as the source of positive developments in life (cf. II.ii.4, 110); he claims that even to aspire to salvation, and as such exhibit righteousness in profane actions is not within the power of a human being (cf. II.ii.26, 122f). On the other hand, he insists that humility towards providence does not allow one to blame God for one's own wickedness (cf. I.xvii.3, 89).[45] Hence Calvin's stance on the extent to which a person may influence his or her own development is extremely conservative when compared to the aggressive views of certain Renaissance thinkers. Yet Calvinism does not necessarily result in idleness, since the desire to recognize in one's earthly success the sign that one is chosen by God may actually spur one into productivity. Nevertheless this kind of law-abiding productivity is clearly different from the creative possibilities potentially inherent in the interaction with Fortuna. However, the positive attitude towards Fortuna which contrasts so sharply with that of Calvin was by no means the only one held in humanist circles, even though often declared to be typical of Renaissance thought. The diversity that existed in this respect will be demonstrated in the following chapter, which deals in greater depth with conceptions of Fortuna in the Renaissance.

[45] Although the possibility of free-will as far as doing evil is concerned may seem to contradict the belief in predetermination, this contradiction may stem from the moral necessity of preventing any form of laissez-faire in the negative direction.

Chapter 4

The Concept of *glück* in and around Wickram's Time

In this chapter, the diachronic view of Fortuna laid out in the previous one will be complemented by a synchronic view, focusing specifically on the German equivalent of the concept, viz. *glück*, as represented in various texts from Wickram's time. The five texts I have chosen appeared in Germany from the late fifteenth century onwards; of these, three originated in Italy, and two are German originals. I will look at a German version of Petrarch's *De remediis utriusque fortunae*, two shorter texts by Poggio Bracciolino and Enea Silvio Piccolomini respectively, both in the translation of Niclas von Wyle, at Sebastian Brant's *Das Narrenschiff*, and finally at a poem by Hans Sachs. In these texts, the phenomenon of *glück* is dealt with in a focused, deliberate way rather than surfacing within the context of what is a narrative plot in its own right. The texts' diversity in length, structure and genre may be taken as an indication of the variety of approaches to the concept of *glück* that existed between the mid-fifteenth and mid-sixteenth century in Germany. The German publication of these texts either coincides with or is in temporal proximity to the period in which Wickram wrote his narratives. Thus it seems justified to assume that even if it cannot be shown that Wickram had direct knowledge of all of these texts, that is, their German versions, they nevertheless constitute important elements of the general cultural atmosphere within which his own works originated.

Petrarch's *De remediis utriusque fortunae* is widely considered as one of the most important treatises, maybe even the most important treatise on Fortuna of the whole Renaissance period. Although the original was completed in 1366, it did not appear in German translation until the sixteenth century. The first complete edition was translated by Peter Stahel and Georg Spalatin and printed in Augsburg in 1532. Its title is *Von der Artzney bayder Glück/ des gůten und widerwertigen Unnd wes sich ain yeder inn Gelück und unglück halten sol*. As such, the title generally establishes *glück* as the German equivalent of *fortuna*. It moreover implies that at the time, the term *glück* had an ambiguous meaning *per se*, as opposed to the exclusively positive one that is associated with it today. The book is divided into two parts which deal with positive and negative *glück* respectively. In the *Vorred* to the first part, dealing with instances of positive *glück*, the author sums up the gist of his approach to *glück*:

Wie groß ist diser kriege/ vnnd wie gar vnauffhörlich/ den wir habenn mit dem

Glück/ wôlliches vberwynder môcht vnns allain die tugent machenn/ Aber wir seyndt abgefallen von yhr willigklich vnnd wyssentlich [...] das [Glück] vnns gleych als etwas grymmigs auff vnnd nyder würfft/ vnnd als in ayn krayß umbtreibet/ vnnd treybet seyn affenspyl mit vnns (I, p. 2)[1]

This passage illustrates the significance, the enormous influence which *glück* is supposed to have on human life. Its presence is a violent one, and can only be contained by employing virtue. The tension between virtue and *glück* is at the bottom of the whole treatise. The extent to which *glück* affects human beings is great: "das Glück/ das da hatt ein grossenn thail (alls man sagt) des gewalts der menschlichenn sachenn/ das hat dich geschickt inn ein meer das dieff vnnd ungestům ist/ von den weltlichenn sorgenn vnnd geschåfftenn" (I, p. 3). That is, *glück* is generally present in the secular aspects of human life. So what exactly is *glück*? What kind of ontological status does it have, is it considered as deity, allegory or mere figure of speech? Petrarch sheds some light on his terminology in the preface to the second part, where he addresses the reader in the following way:

Dich sol auch nicht bewegen/ das d' namen des glücks/ nicht allain in den titteln/ sonder auch im bůch [...] repetiert/ vnd widerumb genent ist/ Du hast wol offt von mir gehôrt/ waz ich vom glück halte/ Weil ich dann mit disem bůch/ hab den leüten wôllen rathen/ vnd helffen/ die nicht mit sonderlicher lere vñ kunst beuestigt sind/ hab ich mich des worts vnd namens/ der jnen bekant vnd gemain ist/ gepraucht/ vnd waiß wol was daruon die andere inn die lenge/ vnd sant Jeronimus auffs kürzest geschriben hat/da er saget/ Es ist weder der notzwange der gestirn/ noch das glück/ Darumb wirt gemainer verstannd/ seynen bruch vnd gewonheit zů reden/ selbs erkennen/ Aber die gelertenn/ [...] werdenn wol wissen was ich damit gemaint hab/ vñ werden durch den gemeinen zůnamen nit entsetzt werden (II, p. 12)

In this statement, Petrarch, perhaps surprisingly, implies that he himself does not believe in the existence of *glück* as a genuine force in its own right. Rather, his consistent use of the term is explained as a mere concession to the less enlightened, who seem to consider *glück* as a genuine external presence in their lives. However, Petrarch's denial of the existence of *glück* as such does not entail his denial of certain phenomena covered by this term. After all, he considers these phenomena to be problematic enough to dedicate a whole book to remedying them. Petrarch accepts certain human predicaments as genuine, but he rejects the label *glück* which most humans attach to them. This has wider implications as far as his belief in the human ability to cope with these predicaments is concerned: Petrarch does not believe in an

[1] All quotations are taken from Franciscus Petrarcha, *Von der Artzney bayder Glück, des guten und widerwertigen*, (ed.) Manfred Lemmer (Hamburg/Leipzig: Friedrich Wittig Verlag, 1984).

externally operating force which determines a person's life. As we shall see below, he is firmly convinced of the individual's potential to shape his or her life.

Bearing in mind the reservations that Petrarch has as to the term *glück* itself, let us look at how he further characterizes the phenomenon behind it. *glück* appears in both positive and negative manifestations: "wir haben einen zwifachen kampff mit dem glück/ vñ ist zů beiden seytten ein gleiche wagnus" (I, p. 4). Notably, Petrarch considers positive *glück* to be more difficult to cope with than its negative counterpart: "vnnd der gemain man hat nur den ain tail allein erkeñt/ dz ist die widerwertigkeit des glücks/ Aber die weisen/ [...] halten [...] doch den/ von dem yetz gesagt ist/ für dē schwererē" (I, p. 4). He distinguishes his view from that of Aristotle, according to whom it is more difficult to endure suffering than to remain composed in the face of positive events: "so schåtz ich vil schwerer sein/ dz regiment des gůtē glücks/ dañ des bősen od' widerwertigē/ [...] so ist dz schmaichlēt glück mer zů fürchten/ vñ wissenlich offt mer schadē pringt/ weñ dz drőwent glück" (I, p. 4). It is not theoretical reflection, but practical experience, "der tåglich brauch d' menschlichē sachen/ vñ die beyspyl od' exempel vnsers lebens" (I, p. 4), which has led the author to this belief; he claims to have seen many people suffer with composure, but none who retain their balance when faced with a positive development (cf. I, p. 4). "Dann ich wayß fürwar nicht wie es zů gehet/ als pald so sich das glück senffter od' milter erzaigt/ so hept vnser gemůt an waich zů werden / vñ geschwellen/ vñ empfahen mit der glückseligkait ein vergessung seines stands" (I, pp. 4f). The major danger associated with positive *glück* is that one might forget one's general sense of one's station, and as a result lose one's footing in life. The danger of imbalance and moral uncertainty also, if perhaps to a lesser degree, arises from the experience of negative *glück*. In the face of these dangers, a strong need for caution emerges. Such caution, recommended equally in dealing with positive and negative *glück*, is one of Petrarch's major concerns throughout the treatise.

How, then, should one deal with either kind of *glück*? The treatise is intended as a comprehensive guide to coping with *glück* in the following ways: "Das gůt Glück bedarff allweg eins zaumbs/ vnnd das widerwertig aines trosts/ In jhenem ist die erhebunnge des gemůts nider zů trucken/ vnnd inn disem ist die schwachait zů bestercken vnnd auff zů hebenn" (I, pp. 5f). Notably, Petrarch promises remedies against "geprechen des gemůts" (I, p. 8). Thus he seems to identify as the real problem behind the term *glück* certain deficiencies inherent in the human character, rather than an external power. Petrarch's aim is to alert the reader to "wie die vier vermårten vñ angepornen anfechtunnge leyden vnnd anmůttigkeyt des menschlichenn gemůts/ zů allen theylen gegenn einander allzeyt kriegen/ das ist Hoffnung oder die begir/

vnnd die freüde/ die forcht/ dye bekümernus oder der schmertzen" (I, p. 8). That is, the four affects, namely hope or desire, joy, fear, and worry or pain, fight each other within the human mind, wreaking havoc as they do so. So how are these affects related to *glück*? It seems that it is their immoderate, uncontrolled reaction to certain incidents which causes these incidents to be experienced as either devastating, should fear, pain or worry be involved, or unduly exhilarating, should hope, desire or joy be at work. Both kinds of experience, devastating or exhilarating, are ultimately destructive in their extremity. In this sense, the affects themselves seem to constitute the manifestations of *glück*. This is for two reasons. First, the affects attribute certain incidents to the intimidating force of *glück*, which as it were would not exist were it not for their perception of it. Second, the affects' immoderate reaction to these incidents as such grants the incidents an unnecessarily dramatic effect on the affected individual's life. According to this process, *glück* consists in the affective reaction to certain incidents as much as in the experienced incidents themselves. At the same time, *glück* might be considered to work through the affects to the extent that it causes their aggravated response. All this indicates that the real level on which *glück* occurs is a person's mind. How, then, may a person contain his affects? They may be opposed by reason: "die Vernunfft die das menschlich gemůth regieret/ wirdt denen [den Anfechtungen des Glücks, i.e. the affects] allenn mit einander antworten/ mit jrem schildt vnnd helm/ auch mit jhrer kunst/ vnnd aignem gewalt/ Aber am allermaysten durch dye hymlisch hilffe/ außschlahende dye seysenden pfeyl der feind" (I, p. 8). Since a person's reason may suppress the affects, his willpower and determination are crucial to their suppression. However, according to the above quote, the individual also depends on divine assistance to realize his intention to keep the affects at bay. This suggests the belief that the individual's power alone is not sufficient in combating *glück*, i.e. that a divine force is needed as a continuous backup to human achievement. Yet it seems that provided the individual behaves in the proper way, this backup is more or less a given rather than something that it is difficult to obtain. Moreover, divine support does not free a person from the need to choose the right behaviour himself in order to extinguish the influence of *glück*. While Christian values underlie Petrarch's account of *glück*, it generally emphasizes the internal, psychological aspect of the phenomenon over the intervention of any superhuman force.

The second part of *Von der Artzney*, concerned with the negative manifestations of *glück*, is even more explicit on the extent to which internal forces are supposed to constitute the biggest source of conflict in human life. In the "Vorred [...] in das Ander Bůch/ von der Artzney des bősen glücks", Petrarch explains his basic

view of the world by referring to Heraclitus' dictum of war as the father of all things. He brings a peculiar slant to this attitude by claiming that the conflict between the individual on the one hand, and external forces on the other pales into insignificance against the war that is being waged within the individual himself:

Wie groß ist der jñerlich vñ ynwendig krieg/ dañ nit allein wider einand/ sond'n auch wider sein aigne gestalt/ [...] vñ [...] wider sich selbs/ [...] vnnd in den ynnerlichsten gemåchen/ der seelen/ hat ein yeder mit jm selbs ein krieg/ [...] Mit wie mancherley/ mit wie wid'wertigē/ anmůtikeiten vñ erwegūg dz gemůt mit jm selbs streit/ frag ein yed' [...] sich selbs vm̄/ vñ antwort jm selbs/ mit wie mācherlay/ mit wie wid' umb kom̄enden anstoß des gmůts/ yetzo er dahere/ yetzo dorthin getribē wirt/ an keinē ort gantz/ an keinem ort ainig mit jm selbs/ zwiträchtig vñ sich selbs zerreyssent/ Dañ andere bewegnus zů geschweygen wőllen/ nit wőllen lieb habē/ hassen/ schmaichlen/ drewē/ verspottē/ betriegen/ erdichten/ [...] abgesetzt werden/ erhőcht werden/ schwanckeln/ stillsteen/ fürfaren/ vmb kerē/ [...] verschmåhen/ ern/ vnd was dergleichen ist/ die vngezweyfelt dermassen sind/ das nichts vngewisers mag erdacht werden/ dadurch on alle růw vom eingang biß zum außgāg/ ditz tődtlich leben/ auff vnd ab getriben wirt/ Wye ist es auch endtlich ein vngewitter vnd toben/ der vier anmůtigkait/ oder leiden des gemůts/ hoffenn oder begern/ vnd sich frewen/ főrchten vnd schmertzen/ wőlliche das armtsålig gemůt zwischen den felsen/ ferr vom gestatt vnd vfer/ mit vnbeståndigen windē beschwern/ vnd peynigen (II, pp. 11f)

The internal aspect of *glück* is particularly noteworthy in this passage, which shows how internally operating *glück* may undermine any kind of successful development in human life. The fact that the term *glück* itself is not mentioned any more in the introductory passage to the second book, which appears under the heading *Von der Artzney des bősen Glücks*, may indicate the extent to which Petrarch focuses on the internal aspect of the phenomenon here. The elaborate description of the distress caused by the affective reactions suggests that Petrarch's attitude towards *glück* draws on the Stoic tradition. However, he does not share the Stoics' distinction between *glück* on the one hand and the detrimental effect of the affective reaction to it on the other. That is, Petrarch's account is highly original in that it places emphasis on the internal aspect of *glück*. At the same time, Petrarch's intention to curb the workings of *glück* by controlling the affects and to strive for mental equilibrium, or equanimity, an aspiration which is as such again reminiscent of Stoicism, applies to both internally and externally operating *glück*.

What, then, are the specific manifestations of *glück* that Petrarch seeks to provide a remedy against? First, a look at examples of positive *glück*, the term denoting 'good fortune' rather than randomness. They cover many aspects of human

life, ranging from common as well as fundamental experiences to the more exotic, and also banal. The examples of positive *glück* are supposed to demonstrate the potential danger inherent in incidents that appear to be the cause of pure joy. To get an idea of the reasoning characteristic of the first book, let us look at chapter 71. Entitled "von einem zierlichen oder kurtzweyligen kind", it contains the following exchange between *Freud* and *Vernunfft*: "Freud. Ich frew mich meins jungen knabens. Vernunfft. Frew dich als ein künfftiger trawrender/ ob dir der [...] durch pyttern tod abgehet". *Vernunfft* aims at tempering the outburst of the affect *Freud* by assuming the worst potential development of the apparently joyful event. While this development may appear to be unlikely, it is by no means unrealistic. The possibility of a sudden death is a universal one, and particularly so in the context of life expectancy in the fourteenth century. The outburst of *Freud* is undermined, and its boundless optimism exposed as being founded on uncertainty. The implication of this is that it would be safer for the affected person's state of mind to guard itself against any kind of blow from the beginning, rather than make itself vulnerable by indulging in uninhibited joy. So where exactly does positive *glück* come into this situation? On first sight, it would appear that positive *glück* consists simply in having a delightful child. Yet *glück* here is more than having such a child; it is constituted also, at least to some extent, by *Freud*'s supposedly excessive reaction to having the child. For it is *Freud* that regards the situation as positive *glück* in the first place, and, perhaps more importantly, it is from the unguarded state of mind brought about by *Freud* that the affected individual becomes in an extreme way vulnerable to any change for the worse. Hence positive *glück* is in its own way as dangerous and upsetting as its negative counterpart. Further, *glück* is intricately tied up with the affected individual's state of mind. In order to safeguard oneself against positive *glück*, one must therefore adopt a certain attitude: one must be prepared for positive events to develop in the worst possible way. For danger and destruction may lurk behind every event, however positive it may appear. In this respect, Petrarch's view casts a definite gloom over human life, although this is balanced by confidence in man's ability to deal with it.

The scepticism, or pessimism which emanates from the above case is characteristic of the whole first part of *Von der Artzney*. Another example to illustrate this is chapter 90, "Von gerůwigem stand". *Freud*'s claim, "Ich hab meine sachen bestelt vnnd růwe wol" is met with the following counter-arguments by *Vernunfft*:

Dye summa menschlicher handlung ist arbeit vnd trawrigkeit/ hierum̄ wyrdest du inn dysen dinngen růwen/ ein hertes haupt auff einem eysern tůch/ dornichten küssen růwend [...] Wenigen ist widerfaren/ das sy zů gewünschten dingen/ kom̄en

seyen/ vnd den selben also bald der geprauch tåglichen gewins empfůrt/ also dz die kurtze der freüd/ sey gleich als etwa ein zůgang des schmertzēs.

This passage warns the reader against any idle optimism he might have. The emerging pessimism is closely tied up with the general need for caution. Petrarch's intention seems to be to strip the reader's frame of mind of all layers of false contentment and make him face the bare truth about life, namely that it consists above all in trials and tribulations. The recognition of this fact grants the peace of mind which Petrarch associates with the absence of *glück*. Consequently, it is only from a point of view from which all unfounded hope is absent that life may be experienced in a positive way, i.e. undisturbed by unexpected and hence psychologically destructive blows. This becomes clear for instance from chapter 109, "Von gůter Hoffnung". There, *Freud* makes another claim that is soon to be undermined: "Auff den außganng lůge das glück/ Ich will mich freüwen inn hoffnung".[2] The following exchange ensues:

Vernunfft. Syhe darauff dz du nit etwa villeicht in der sach layd tragest/ vnd dich reüwe gewünschet/ vnd gehofft/ auch gehoffte ding erfolgt haben/ Hofnung hat vil leüt verderbt/ wŏlliche sie verzyehent peyniget [...] es sey ein grosse anzaygung der leuchtfertigkayt/ vnd vnsinnigkayt vberal begegnende hoffnung vmbfahen/ sich domit zů stund/ als mit gewisen gůttern zů speysen [...] wirdestu geen vnder das joch einer wandelparn vnd vngůttigen frawen. [...] Freud. Ich hab den ancker der hoffnung geworffen will den nit aufflŏsen [...] Vernunfft. Es pflegen auch die schyfleüt/ so ein gewitter entstet den ancker/ des schyffs ab zů hauen/ wann der nit mag gelŏst werden/ so lassen sie jhnen denn lygen vnnd nemen die flucht/ dann es ist nit wie auff stillem Mŏre/ [...] das der ancker mit heltigen zan grundtfestnet die schyff/es geschicht auch in grossen bewegungen des Mŏres do der ancker/ die schyff nit vestnet/ sonder hŏfftet sie gar an/ gibt sie also gebundenn dem schyffpruch/ fürware die hoffnung anderst jn den wellen/ menschlicher ding angehŏfftet vnd hăltig/ hat vil menschen jhn verderbung zogen/ wŏlche so abgeschniten vnd die hoffnung hin weg geworffen weren sie gesundt vnnd on beschedigt darvon komen/ darumb ist der ancker der hoffnung offt zů entziehen [...] wañ sich aber das auch nit will zym̄en abzůschneyden vnnd vndter den flüssen menschlicher handlungen zůverlassenn/ dass du das schyff des lebens mit dem růder der fürsichtigkait laytest zů dem port vnnd gestat des heils.

Here, positive *glück* appears to consist in the experience of hope. The destructive effect which hope may have on human life is described through the metaphor of shipwreck. Hope is depicted as the anchor which ties down the boat of life. While this

[2] Here the term *glück* is used in a slightly different way from the usual, denoting a superhuman force of sorts.

is very well in fair weather, it is fatal in case of a storm: to be tied down causes the boat to be destroyed by the force of the storm, when the only thing that may save it is to cut it loose. With this image, the author appeals to the reader to be realistic in the sense that he should see life for what it is, namely full of unexpected turns many of which are for the worse. As a result of this view, extreme pragmatism is advocated. Hope should be cast aside, since it is essentially destructive. Focusing on hope numbs one's perception since it prevents one from preparing for negative events both psychologically and practically. Instead, one should be aware of the potential or actual occurrence of adverse events, and be able to adjust one's behaviour as necessary and without fear of radical breaks. Hope is opposed to *fürsichtigkait*, which asserts the importance of caution once more. *fürsichtigkait* further entails alertness and flexibility in dealing with whatever obstacles one might encounter. In this respect, the remedy to this particular instance of *glück* provides a model for dealing with a large variety of experience, which is based on an understanding of the psychological mechanisms of the internal aspect of positive *glück*.

The specific cases of negative *glück*, too, deal with a wide range of incidents. Among those chapters which deal with what could be termed externally operating *glück*, that is, *glück* which is associated with other people's doings, there are some whose topics coincide with what will turn out to be specific critical events in Wickram's narratives - such as chapter 31, "Von den beschwerlichen nachbawren", or chapter 44, "Von einem ungehorsamen sun". Below I will compare Petrarch's solutions to these predicaments to the solutions found by Wickram's characters. At this stage, I will merely try to sum up what generally characterizes the Petrarchan way of coping with such negative incidents. It is characterized by a certain cautious optimism, making it seem like the reverse of Petrarch's attitude towards the manifestations of positive *glück*, which as we have seen is characterized by a peculiar pessimism. Optimism in the face of negative *glück* is provided by the consideration that things might change by themselves, or that they could be changed through a modification in the affected person's behaviour. Apart from that, *Vernunfft* often suggests that an apparently negative incident could lead to positive consequences, such as that the affected person might subsequently learn from his mistakes, or, due to the affliction experienced, might be prevented from suffering other, greater misfortunes. Failing either of these options, a person affected by negative *glück* is urged to resign himself to negative incidents in view of the fact that they are part of human experience and as such cannot be avoided, and moreover may have been brought about at least partly by himself. In short, the pragmatic view of life present in the first part of *Von der Artzney* re-emerges, even though the way in which *Vernunfft*

rebuts perceived misfortunes by way of rational arguments could appear to be somewhat forced in some instances. Just as *Vernunfft* refuses to lose its composure in the face of joyous events in the first part, it here refuses to despair in the face of disaster; patience and tolerance are represented as crucial virtues in order to cope with the negative incidents in question. Hence the presence of *glück* regarding events whose origin is external to a person's mind may be kept at bay by simply shutting it out of one's mind. This has both psychological and practical consequences. By not acknowledging an incident as negative *glück*, one prevents it from figuring as such in one's mind. This in turn helps to view the incident with composure, which may serve to limit the damage suffered on a practical level, and in doing so further negates the presence of *glück*.

There is also a large number of chapters in book II that expound the importance of the internally operating manifestations of *glück*, as stated previously in the *Vorred* to this part. This is obvious already from the titles of these chapters. Thus we find "Von der zwitracht des irrigen vnd zweyfelhafftigen gemůths" (chapter 75), "Von der trawrigkeit vnd trůbseligkeit" (ch. 93), "Von dem verdrieß des lebens" (ch. 98), "Von dem gebruch vnd mangel der tugent" (ch. 104), and "Von dem Zoren" (ch. 107), to name but a few. From these chapters emerges the belief that man has the ability to control certain mental processes with the aim of getting the better of negative emotions, such as the ones mentioned in the chapter headings. In doing so, he may control his experiences to a significant extent. In chapter 104, for instance, *Vernunfft* states that lack of virtue is the result of the individual's slackness: "ist doch dise armůt vn gezweyffelt/ wyllig vnd willkürlich [as opposed to e.g. poverty of intellect or memory, which are "wie eynes yeden glück das mitbringt"]/ [...] dyse eynige armůt stehet im willen/ wölchen ein yeder nach seinem gefallen regieret/ vnd machet". The reasoning behind this is that otherwise virtue would not be laudable, nor lack of it punishable.[3] The peculiar nature of internal shortcomings is illustrated also by the following exchange between *Schmertz* and *Vernunfft* in chapter 107: "Schmertz. Aber ich bin zornig. Vernunfft. Ich sage den widerwertigen dingen/ vñ wider die widerwertigkeit hülff zů/ vñ nit wider die laster/ Dañ die laster seind nit vngeferlich vñ zůfellig/ sonder willig/ vñ in ewrer gewalt". Anger may be self-inflicted to the extent that it arises from the individual's vices, which are internal deficiencies, and hence may be righted by the individual himself. Thus the

[3] Nevertheless the freely chosen will to virtue is regarded as "ein gab vnnd gnad Gottes" (ch. 104), while its opposite is said to result from the devil. Although this line of thought could simply be a way of classifying the two types of behaviour with regard to their religious merits, rather than diminishing the element of free will, things may be theologically more complex. That is, theological values may ultimately underlie humanistic ones, as I have already hinted at above (cf. p. 48).

appearance of negative *glück*, here the experience of anger, may be erased through a person's determination to banish it. The instances of internally operating negative *glück* generally express the belief that this kind of *glück* may be contained by exercising willpower. This entails controlling the irrational elements of one's mind which include affects and emotions in the widest sense, with regard to both their autonomous origin, and their reaction to external incidents. Since it is the combination of a certain incident, whether external or internal, and the affected person's immoderate and misguided way of viewing this incident that constitutes *glück*, the remedy against *glück* alway lies within the person himself. *Von der Artzney* is marked throughout by quiet optimism as to the achievement of this remedy. Although *glück* itself is considered as a threat to man, and life as something of a valley of tears, confidence in human reason employed to suppress *glück* emerges as a central characteristic of the treatise.

However, behind such optimism about the possibility of a person's control over himself lies awareness of the limitations of man. This becomes apparent, for instance, from chapter 120, "Von dem unzeytlichen Tod". There, *Vernunfft* criticizes man's inability to realize the ever-present possibility of an abrupt end to his life. Instead, "hie die kürtze des lebens/ vñ die flucht des zeyt/ dórt der gewalt des glücks/[4] vnd die manchfeltige verenderung der menschlichen zůfelle machet/ Vnd o der wundersamen blindtheyt/ das jr doch nicht eynest inn den andern lernet/ was jr für euch selbst zůverhoffen habt" - that is, a sudden death. According to *Vernunfft*, acceptance and awareness of one's own mortality are called for in order to face the prospect of an untimely death with composure. Passages like this suggest that whatever confidence Petrarch has in man's ability to control *glück* is marked by clear limitations. It is tempered by a deep-rooted awareness of human mortality and of the limited dimensions of the individual's abilities when considered against the bigger framework of creation as a whole. Hence Petrarch's view of the world, while exhibiting certain traits which might be regarded as anthropocentric and are thus in keeping with a central characteristic of the Renaissance, remains cautious and level-headed throughout in a way that is reminiscent of medieval piety.

Another importance source to further our understanding of *glück* in and around Wickram's time are Niclas von Wyle's *Translationen*, published in 1478, which render into German some texts that might be considered representative of the Italian Renaissance. These include two chapters from *De remediis* (cf. *Translatze* No. XV), which are concerned with the untimely death of one's wife and with undeservedly bad reputation respectively. Since the general attitude towards *glück* advocated in *De*

[4] Cf. note 2.

remediis has just been dealt with, there is no need to go over the contents of these chapters, as they provide no significant deviation from the Stahel/Spalatin-translation. Nevertheless this *Translatze* contains a feature that is noteworthy in its own right. In his introductory remarks, von Wyle acknowledges the presence of *glück* in his own life: "Sidher hăt das liebkosend falsch trugenlich gelücke, so schnell vnd vnuerwändt sin schützlich angesicht mir entecket, daz not was mir zů troste dises bůches artznie zesůchen" (315).[5] This statement not only suggests that *glück* is considered as a genuine presence in the author's life, it also suggests that he regards Petrarch's treatise as a genuine remedy for this presence. Thus it provides an example of the significance generally attributed to *glück* in the late fifteenth century. This is reinforced by the fact that each *Translatze* concerned with *glück* begins with a dedication to von Wyle's current sovereign, relating the content of the text which he is about to render into German to the specific needs of the addressee. According to this, strategies for dealing with *glück* appear to have been regarded as a practical necessity at the time.

The fourth *Translatze* is the translation of a text by Poggio Bracciolino. It was written originally to console and strengthen the distressed ruler Lorenzo di Medici, who had been afflicted by *glück* in the following way: "du hăst enpfunden des gelückes laidsamen fale vnd des boshait vnd widerwertikait" (104). The author's aim is to show Lorenzo di Medici the right way of coping with the blows meted out by *glück*. There are two potential reactions to such distress. On the one hand, one may remain "die schos vnd pfyle des gelückes verschmachende vnd verachtende" (104). Such calm may spring from the realization that "mer stercke sin in hilffe der tugend danne in zytlichem gůte" (104). On the other hand, there is the possibility "daz dise schnelle endrung vnd vngestümikait des gelückes (dar vnder ouch etwenne die aller gelertisten dar nider gelegen sint) dich etwas zů vil vnd v̈ber gebürlichs betrübent, So ist dir zefliechen in die höche diner vernunft" (104). The author naturally advises the former possibility. The primacy of virtue and patience is supposed to guard one in the face of adversities. Poggio Bracciolino's position is clarified further by the following passage, which distinguishes those attributes that *glück* can affect from those that it cannot:

[...] dann wirdikait eere gewalt rychtum gesunthait vnd anders des gelychen sint also gestalt, daz in Inen die craft des gelückfals vnd der vinden sturm vnd an rennen vil vermugen. Aber wyszhait grösse des gemüts, vestikait, fromkait, trüw vnd tugend, wyle die rechtlich vnser aigen sint, vnd vns nit von fremder hilff noch gaube geben

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[5] Quoted after Niclas von Wyle, *Translationen*, (ed.) Adelbert v. Keller (Stuttgart: Litterarischer Verein, 1861 [= BLVST; 57]).

werden✓ so enpfahent sy kainer vszwendiger dingen vnd rechten gewalt vnd mugent ouch durch kain craft des gelückes gefellet noch vsser ir statt verrucket werden. darumb wyle du dir die selben zůgericht vnd beraitet hăst alz veste vnd aller sichroste hilff wider all widerwertig zůfell des gelückes✓ so gebürt sich dir mer zefröwen dins aigen gůtes✓ dann laid zetragen, vmb vsswendiger fremder dingen, gewalt abzug vnd beroubung. (105)

This approach to *glück* is fairly straightforward. *glück* seems to be consigned to an external level, that is, it is referred to as an externally operating force which affects *vsswendige[...] fremde[...] dinge[...]*. External attributes, such as worldly possessions and honours are juxtaposed with all shapes of virtue, such as magnanimity, wisdom, loyalty, etc. The former are bestowed on a person by an external force, namely *glück*, and may therefore be taken from him at any time. By contrast, the manifestations of virtue are internal to the extent that they are tied up with a person's own endeavours. As such, they cannot be touched by an external force such as "der frefel vnd můtwill des gelückes" (105). A person's internal qualities are not only inviolable by *glück*, they also play an important role in coping with the whims of this fickle force. To exercise virtue results in a clear conscience, which in turn provides strength against the blows of *glück*: "Danne [ain gůt gewissne vnd conscientz recht getăner dingen bede der worten vnd der wercken] sint gewon ain starckes vnüberwintlichs gemüt zegeben✓ hin zenemen trurikait vnd trost in widerwertigkait zemachen [...] Die [...] sind dir năchfolgend, fürnemer vnd höcher zeschetzen, danne die gauben des gelückes vnd aller gunst des püfels vnd gemainen folckes" (106). A person's internal accomplishments are repeatedly posited against external misfortunes: "das gemüt des wysen menschen, gantz sin vsserthalb alles gelückfals✓ sunder wyle sölich gemüt fryg syg✓ daz dann kain vsswendig craft, darjn komen mug vnd daz die tugend syg das best vnd oberst gůte" (107). Hence Poggio Bracciolino maintains a clear-cut distinction between internal and external states, between what is controlled by man and what is controlled by *glück*. This distinction indicates great confidence in man's ability to keep the effects of *glück* away from his person, i.e. from what essentially constitutes his existence as opposed to secondary, peripheral attributes.

It ties in with Poggio Bracciolino's confidence in human virtue that he acknowledges a positive aspect contained in the experience of adverse *glück* - "aller maist darvmb, daz erschynen wurd, die tugend dins gemütes" (108).[6] The infliction provides Lorenzo di Medici with "ain statt ains kampfs, In dem [...] du dich erzögest

[6] Another reason is "vmb daz du etlicher diner fründen trüw (oder gebürlicher zerden vntrüw) Innen brăcht werden möchtest" (108). This aspect is reminiscent of Petrarch's tendency to discover unexpected benefits arising from the manifestation of apparently negative *glück*.

durch des gelückes widerwertig wetter vnd vngestümen wöllen, In ain sicher rüwig port vnd stade ouch komen mugen" (109). Poggio Bracciolino goes even as far as to suggest that there is reason to be thankful for *glück*'s blows as they provide the opportunity to prove one's virtue: "Darvmb sich dir, der also mit den aller lobsamisten tugenden vmbgeben bist, nit gebürt zezürnen, sunder danck zesagen sölicher endrung des gelückes vmb daz es dich zů derselben tugenden übung hăt erwecket vnd in ainen andern stryte gefüret. Dar Inne du erlangen wirst ewig glori lob vnd eere" (112). While such enthusiasm for the power of *glück*, which is after all destructive on a material level, may appear to be somewhat overly zealous, it probably needs to be understood against the background of Stoicism. Within the Stoic tradition, the blows of Fortuna could be considered as a challenge to man's ability to remain untouched by them by ignoring them; this model was later modified by Boethius who believed that man could succeed in ignoring Fortuna by focusing on God. However, Poggio Bracciolino's version of the challenge through Fortuna not only disregards the religious aspect, but also goes beyond the Stoic approach by turning the necessity of coping with negative *glück* into an opportunity to glorify human virtue.

Generally speaking, Poggio Bracciolino's advice on dealing with *glück* seems to owe a lot to Petrarch, even though it misses some of his finer points. Thus the addressee's commendable way of ultimately retaining his equanimity bears resemblance to the Petrarchan ideal. Lorenzo di Medici's attitude is described as "weder in gelücklichen dingen erhept oder gehochfertiget, noch in widerwertigen, entricht abgeworffen oder verzaget, sunder allwegen ains glychen angesichts vnd gemütes, yetwedern fale söliches gelückes, gebürlich tragende" (109). The need for an even mind in the face of both positive and negative *glück* might be taken straight from *De remediis*. But, while the primacy of virtue is reminiscent of Petrarch, Poggio Bracciolino's account of the relation between *glück* and the human mind is less sophisticated than that of his compatriot. The clear separation between human mind on the one hand and external *glück* on the other means that the notion of internally operating *glück* is missing from Poggio Bracciolino's account. It lacks the notion that *glück* might at least to some extent be constituted by the workings of the affected individual's mind. Whereas for Petrarch *glück* manifests itself to a large degree in such things as the despair felt at the loss of material goods, for Poggio Bracciolino, it manifests itself in the loss as such. While dealing with *glück* is in both cases a question of qualities of character, the fact that Poggio Bracciolino considers the human mind impervious to *glück* suggest a more overtly optimistic, yet possibly also more simplistic view of man.

Poggio Bracciolino's account of *glück* is complemented by a text by Enea Silvio Piccolomini, which is rendered into German in the twelfth *Translatze*. Again, the introductory comment by von Wyle heightens the interest of this piece. As before, the author acknowledges the presence of *glück* in his own life, stating, with regard to his literary production, "[d]ar zů mich gelück vnd můsz wöll fürdern" (232). The ontological status which von Wyle attributes to *glück* is touched on when he remarks that among "wir yetzigen menschen" are "vil ander vnd ăn zale in [dem] anligen das selb gelücke vmb hilff besprechent vnd anrüffent, als ob es syg ain ding vnd wesen des macht vnd gewalt habende" (231). The phrase "als ob" suggests a stance towards *glück* which is at best ambiguous; it could imply that von Wyle considers the widespread attitude towards it as mere superstition, "als ob" suggesting that *glück* is not actually a genuine force. In any case, von Wyle, similar to Petrach, seems to perceive an impropriety in considering *glück* as a genuine power in its own right. At the same time, he acknowledges that its presence is nevertheless experienced as genuine in the lives of many people, including, it seems, his own. Ultimately, the exact status of *glück* remains unclear, its vagueness perhaps being typical of the way in which this concept was regarded at the time.

The actual translation is of a text in which Enea Silvio recounts a dream he has had of Fortuna, here *frŏw gelück*. Having recently witnessed the humiliation of a friend at the hands of *glück*, Enea Silvio is initially full of resentment towards this force: "darumbe so schuldiget ich das gelücke, das da wirt geloubet sin, ain vsgeberin eeren vnd gůtes/ vnd krieget deshalb erzürnt vil mit mir selbs wider das selb gelücke, vmb daz es die gůten menschen so oft niderdruckt vnd die bösen erhebet" (233). The ensuing text may be seen as an attempt to come to terms with, and make sense of the apparent fundamental injustice of *glück*. In his dream, Enea Silvio visits the realm of *glück*. It is described in paradisiacal terms: "Allda wăren geblümpt wisen vnd matten vnd bechhe yetz fliessend von milch vnd danne von win" (234). To gain access to this paradise, one depends on *frŏw gelück*'s favour, as Enea Silvio's friend Vegius, who is an inhabitant of her realm, explains: "niemant hier Inne belyben mag ăne miner frŏwen haissen [...] [Enea Silvio:] Wer ist dise frŏw dero berüffung man also warten můs? Min frŏw gelück sprach Vegius von dero gauben und genăden wir alle so hie sint selenklich leben tůnt. Dero ist vndertenig der gantz vmbkraisz diser welte" (235). What is described here is a kind of mythical realm. The status of its inhabitants seems to be a reflection of their worldly success. Thus the mention of Vegius' worldly success as a cardinal, as well as examples of other inhabitants indicate that the favour which a person receives from *glück* in this realm mirrors his position in the real world. Hence we might read the description of the relation between *frŏw gelück* and

her protégés in this mythical realm as an allegory for the way in which *glück* affects human beings during their life on earth. The allegorical representation distinguishes this text from Poggio Bracciolino's, or Petrarch's account of *glück*; its mode appears more literary, and its contents more fictional than those of the other two texts.

A detailed description of *frŏw gelück* sitting on a royal throne (cf. 239) elaborates the allegorical aspect:[7]

frŏw gelück was [...] zwayerlay angsichten. Yetz ains gütigen vnd denne ains erschrockenlichen [...] Vnd hatt grŏsse ougen vnd doch die oft beschlossen. In iren oren sach Ich wachse. Vmb daz sy (als Virgilius schribt) mit verschopten oren nit horte das anrüffend geschraye der Jemrigen vsz den schiffen in sorgfeltikait gesetztet. Vnd hatt in Ir lingken hande ain rŭten zů straffung gerichtet. Aber in jr rechten hande, sŏssen eer, wirde, gunst, fröid, ämpter, hochmůt, gelechter, liebe, vermechelschaft, craft, stercke, gezierd, gesang, spys, trancke. Vnd nit an ainer nidern statt sŏssen ouch rům, günlichkait, sige, adel, wirdigkait, frid, můte, gewalt, macht, hüpsche, lob, genŏd, gütikait, hoffart, wollust, brutlŏf, troste. Vnd zů jren füssen, gelycher wyse als megt vnd dienerin ir nŏchfolgende stůnden rychtum, gelte, můtwill, liebkoserye, vnd mit vfgeregten oren vflosende, ob ir frŏw sy ützit hiesz. daz sy das hortent vnd schnell tetten volbringen. (240)

frŏw gelück is pictured as blind and deaf to her claimants' pleas. Her endowments include the gifts traditionally attributed to Fortuna, such as aristocratic birth, power and high social standing (cf. also 237ff). They extend also to less traditional attributes, such as love, beauty and joy, as well as to things that appear minor by comparison, such as laughter, food and drink. The scope of *frŏw gelück*'s gifts suggests that her influence is considered as all-embracing, although one cannot help wondering at the extraordinarily disparate mixture of innate qualities and acquired features. The same scope characterizes the range of negative gifts. There, "sas armůt vneere verspotung vnrecht, siechtum, alter, kestigung gefencknüsz, hunger, schmertz, frost, forcht, schame, nyd, hasz, verzwyflung, krieg, sterbend, ainikait, straich, sorg, angst, nott Vnd tusentfaltigerlay vbels zenennen" (245). This list includes disadvantages as diverse as dishonour and injustice, sickness and hunger, and shame and fear. *glück* is generally held in charge of internal as well as external qualities in a person's life. Attributes such as courage on the one hand, and fear on the other clearly belong to the internal level of human existence, whereas social attributes, not to mention food and drink, complement them on the external level. Thus Enea Silvio's view of *glück* is distinct from Poggio Bracciolino's, which restricts its effects to the external level. The

[7] For similar descriptions of Fortuna ruling her realm, cf. e.g. Alanus de Insulis' *Anticlaudianus* and Heinrich von dem Tuerlin's *Die Crône*.

interrelation between *glück* and the human mind is vaguely reminiscent of the Petrarchan conception. Yet Enea Silvio does not present his reader with an attitude towards *glück* that is as psychologically complex as Petrarch's. While Petrarch seems to believe that certain internal states actually constitute *glück* in the first place, Enea Silvio implies a separation between *glück* as a force which is external to the human mind, and its gifts which may be internal to it. Moreover, Petrarch believes that a person's internal qualities may control or suppress *glück*. Enea Silvio, however, seems to believe the reverse, viz. that *glück* may grant or withdraw certain internal qualities.

Further, Enea Silvio is more accepting of the impact of *glück* than either Petrarch or Poggio Bracciolino. The traditionally problematic relation between exercising virtue and being gifted by *glück* is acknowledged, and *glück* exculpated:

Ist aber das Ir vil tugendrych sint, die noch dann min frŏw gelück fürgeet vnd sy nit edelt. So sol ir darumb niemant zürnen. Dann dise frŏw mag das gůte so ir ist, vstaillen vnd geben wem sy wil. Dwyle die menschen geborn werden in dise welt nit zů besitzung rychthůms, oder zů messung wollustes, sunder zů arbait vnd daz sy dem ertrich nit als Inwoner sunder als fremd geste vnd bilgri leben söllen, Vnd durch wercke der tugend Ir künftig haimant erfolgen. Aber in grossem gelücke wirt nit lichtenklich funden grosse tugend. (238)

This statement grants *frŏw gelück* the right to be capricious and wilful. At the same time, Enea Silvio finds a rational, or even moral reason for why such capriciousness may be a challenge necessary to man, namely as a contribution to the *arbait* which characterizes human experience. He goes as far as to have Vegius momentarily express the possibility of indifference towards *glück*'s favour: "wo wir ains wysen gemütes weren, so tetten wir ee vnd me des gelückes hasse, Danne des gunste begeren, Danne sin gunste vnd süsz erzögung tůnt vns zü füren aller gröste hindrung zů erfolgung ewigs lebens" (238). This attitude is illustrated by reference to saints Hieronimus and Antonius, who followed God rather than *glück* (cf. 238), and in doing so secured their salvation. But, such high-mindedness only goes so far. Vegius cuts short his thoughts on the virtue that lies in disregarding *frŏw gelück* because he is afraid to lose her favour lest she should feel offended by his remarks (cf. 238). This passage suggests an element of playfulness, or coquetry in dealing with *glück*, which is absent from the other accounts. The attitude to *glück* expounded here is marked by ambivalence; despite being aware of an alternative way of life that implies independence from *glück*, the hold which *glück* has over the average well-educated person, as represented by Vegius, is considerable. While the above passage reflects awareness of the tension between *glück* and virtue, virtuous disregard for *glück* seems to be considered as a state of mind which belongs only to the ascetic and sage. Such

ambivalence is absent from Petrarch and Poggio Bracciolino's approach, as well as from the views expressed by Sebastian Brant and Hans Sachs which I will consider below. In embracing the capriciousness of *glück*, Enea Silvio allows for a certain optimism, even though choosing to submit to her may be tinged by some resignation in view of her power. Enea Silvio's attitude emanates self-confidence and daring, for to put one's trust in *glück* seems to entail heightened confidence in one's own ability to deal with her blows, and make the most of her gifts. In exhibiting self-confidence, Enea Silvio's approach to *glück* illustrates the anthropocentric component of the Italian Renaissance.

The optimism inherent in Enea Silvio's view becomes clearer through a number of specific cases which illustrate how to benefit from *glück*. The capriciousness of *frŏw gelück* emerges from the following lines which she addresses to Emperor Friedrich: "Fridrich belyb vnd gibe dich mir⁄So wirt niemant vnder allen küngen seliger danne du. Wo du mir gefölgig bist vnd losest. Ist aber daz du mich flüchest, so flüch ich ouch dich" (242). *Frŏw gelück* appears to demand absolute devotion from those who expect to be favoured by her. Consequently, those who are "süne" (243) of *frŏw gelück* should adhere to the following rule: "Gůt [...] ist das gelücke Irs yetklichen so ferre, din herre miner frŏwen stimm vnd worten loset vnd folget Aber vnstett wandelbar vnd vngelych jst es Inen wo Er jr stimme tůt v̈ber hören" (243).[8] That is, *frŏw gelück* "ist hochfertig vnd wil ee gebetten werden, dann bitten" (242). How can the image that emerges from these descriptions be translated into practical behaviour? It seems that acute awareness of *glück*'s presence in one's life is the basic condition for gaining its benefits. Further, it seems necessary to devote a great amount of energy to detecting its specific influence, that is, to make room for it in one's life, and shape one's actions to accommodate its manifestations. Approaching *glück* may reach almost violent intensity, as the example of King Alfonsus of Aragon shows. He grabs *frŏw gelück* by one of her locks,[9] and states: "Du bist gefangen, du wöllest oder wöllest nit [...] Du bist mir gnůg lang widerwertig gewesen Nu main jch du werdest mir ain ander angesicht erzaigen vnd mir gütiger sin⁄oder jch wirt dir alles din hăre vszrouffen" (243). To this, *glück* replies: "Du hăst mich v̈berwunden bekenn jch, vnd wirst mich füro nit me finden dir widerwertig" (243). This incident

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[8] Thus a ruler who did not heed *glück*'s calling lost his land and would have lost even more - "wo natürlich miltikait nit gebrochen hett die tröwung miner frŏwen des gelückes" (244). This surprisingly humane touch, however, is put into perspective by other examples of those whom *glück* has humiliated completely.

[9] This image is reminiscent of the ancient Greek god, or allegory, of *kairos*. *Kairos*, originally denoting the moment of opportunity, was depicted with a head that was bald at the back and had a lock at the front. In order to seize an opportunity, a person had to get hold of the lock.

suggests that through actively confronting *glück*, a person may change his situation for the better. The fact that Alfonsus has not been favoured by *frŏw gelück* prior to his attack on her suggests that it is possible to persuade her to grant her favour, or even to coerce her into doing so, provided one shows a sufficient amount of determination. In other words, anyone may belong to the *süne* of *frŏw gelück*, if only he wants to be among them strongly enough; alternatively, determination to achieve *glück*'s favour might in itself be a characteristic of being a son of *glück* in the first place. In any case, what the example of Alfonsus seems to advocate in practical terms is fierce determination to make the most of whatever circumstances and events one encounters in life. If it may be difficult to envisage a mode of action that corresponds to the aggressiveness of the allegorical encounter, it is obvious that a pro-active approach is called for in order to achieve a positive outcome in the confrontation with *glück*. In this respect, Enea Silvio's approach differs significantly from the contemplative approach as advocated by Petrarch and Poggio Bracciolino. While their attitude is ultimately marked by resentment of *glück*, Enea Silvio focuses on what may be gained from its workings.

The possible ways of dealing with *glück* are summed up in a final exchange between Enea Silvio and *frŏw gelück* herself:

[Enea Silvio:] Mit welchen künsten mag man dinen gunst v̈berkomen? Mit kainen sprach sy, dann allain mit türstikait mit frefel vnnd mit wăgen. Wer behept dich Im vor andern? Wer min gebotte mit sterckerem vnd grosserm gemüt trait vnnd lydet. Wem bist du aller findest? Dem zagen vnnd klainmütigen. Wer mag dich verachten? Vnd verschmăchen? der wyse. [...] Wer ist dir der aller annemest vnder allen die da lebent? der so mich Jaget vnd nit der so mich flüchet. (247)

According to this statement, there are two basic ways of coping with *glück*. One is to ignore *glück*. However, this possibility, reminiscent of the Stoics, and perhaps also the Petrarchan approach, is restricted to the sage, and is not given much room throughout the text. The emphasis is instead on affirming the presence of *glück* by attacking it, and thus making the most of it. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to be both strong and flexible, seizing opportunities as they arise. Weakness and timidity are fatal since they prevent one from asserting oneself in the confrontation with *glück*. Still Enea Silvio's view of *glück* is not devoid of caution. Statements such as "Die zyt zemmet vnd bringet alle ding Vnd ist kainem dinge das gelück ewenglich gůt vnd werend" (246) indicate that despite his positive attitude towards *glück*, he is aware of the limitations of human life, as well as of the fickleness of *glück*. The major difference in Enea Silvio's view of *glück* when compared to *De remediis* is that he

perceives no limits to the enjoyment of *frŏw gelück*'s gifts for the duration of her favour. Even though they may not be everlasting, *glück*'s gifts are considered as genuine, and hence worth fighting for. Despite her autonomous, and largely positive role, *frŏw gelück* is integrated into an overall Christian framework. This is indicated when she dismisses Enea Silvio with the formula "Got behüt dich" (247), thus implying that she naturally acknowledges the superior power held by God over a person's life. Moreover, *frŏw gelück*'s workings are said to extend to "gaistlichen dingen" (244), especially in that she influences the careers of dignitaries within the church. Vegius, for instance, has been made cardinal by her grace. The fact that Enea Silvio himself was a man of the church, becoming pope in later life, may be taken as further indication of how well this representation of *glück* is compatible with a religious viewpoint.[10] On a general level, the fact that Niclas von Wyle's *Translatzen* contain Enea Silvio Piccolomini's pro-active and optimistic approach to *glück* side by side with the more cautious accounts of Poggio Bracciolino and Petrarch suggests the diversity of views on *glück* that were in circulation in Germany towards the end of the fifteenth century.

Another important publication of the time featuring *glück* is Sebastian Brant's *Das Narrenschiff*. Brant's familiarity with what seems to have been a predominant tendency in the contemporary discourse on *glück* is obvious from the fact that he wrote an introduction to the Augsburg edition of *De remediis*, as well as translating parts of the treatise for a different edition. Published first in 1491, *Das Narrenschiff* is a satire which sets out to unmask all kinds of contemporary fools and follies. In the face of the imminent end of the world, the book advises that one save one's soul by attaining knowledge of oneself and following *wisheit*. This process involves confronting the phenomenon of *glück*, which is covered in three chapters. It first occurs in chapter 23, entitled "vō vberhebūg glucks" (p. 59f).[11] The chapter is headed by the following motto: "Wer meynt das jm gantz nütz gebrest // Und er glück hab vffs aller best // Den trifft der klüpfel doch zů lest". Here, the term *glück* is used in the sense of a mere object, and seems to have an exclusively positive meaning in the

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[10] The ease with which an originally pagan figure seems to exist within a Christian framework, albeit in an allegorized shape, may reflect the pluralism inherent in Renaissance discourse. While this is not to say that the combination of Christian and pagan elements of discourse did not exist also in medieval texts, the unproblematic combination of both Christian-ascetic and ancient-pagan-heroic elements is a peculiar characteristic of the Renaissance (cf. Albert Doren, "Fortuna im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance", in (ed.) Fritz Saxl, *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, II, Vorträge 1922-23, I. Teil (Leipzig/Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1924), p. 118). This is partly related to the Renaissance tendency to somehow compartmentalize different aspects of life, here Christian religion on the one hand and pre-Christian heritage on the other.

[11] Quoted after Sebastian Brant, *Das Narrenschiff*, (ed.) Manfred Lemmer (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1968).

sense of fortunate worldly circumstances experienced by a person. This conception of *glück* marks a significant divergence from the conception in our previous sources, where *glück* is represented as a force in its own right, even if its nature as subject might ultimately be considered allegorical or rhetorical rather than genuine. By disregarding the tradition that views *glück* as a force in its own right, Brant assigns a rather subordinate place to the phenomenon. That *glück* has only the status of an object nevertheless does not limit the importance of this text with regard to the overall discourse on *glück*. Even though, as object, *glück* is a much less potent concept than it is as subject, and even though the significance of the whole Fortuna-tradition is closely tied up with Fortuna, or *glück* being represented as subject, each meaning of *glück* must be considered equally important. The following passage may shed some light on the semantics of the term *glück*: "Eyn narr ist/ wer do schryget dyck // O glück wie lostu mich/ o glück // Was zychstu mich/ gib mir so vil // Das ich eyn narr blib noch eyn wil // Dann grosser narren wurden nye // Dann die allzyt glück hatten hye" (l. 29ff). Here *glück*, after having previously been referred to as an object, is suddenly addressed as a force in its own right (*O glück*). Yet the expression *glück haben* in the same sentence implies the use of *glück* as an object. This suggests that the distinction between *glück* as object, and *glück* as subject may occasionally be blurred. Due either to rhetoric or to something that is inherent in its nature, it seems that the term *glück* may cover both the giver and its gifts. This shift in perspective means that the nature of *glück* is somewhat amorphous, which may be due to an echo of traditional images of *glück* surfacing in Brant's restrained representation of the phenomenon. At the same time, the simultaneous presence of both objective and subjective features would seem to be definitive for allegorical figures in general, including, to some extent, traditional concepts of the Fortuna-figure. But, the subjective features of *glück* are suppressed to too great an extent here when compared to traditional allegories of Fortuna to attribute the status of allegory to Brant's *glück*.

Brant's attitude is linked to that of Petrarch and Poggio Bracciolino through the view that *glück* cannot be trusted: "Der ist eyn narr der rümen gtar// Das jm vil glücks zů handen far" (l. 1f). Brant goes as far as claiming that an abundance of *glück* indicates the absence of divine grace: "Vnd er glück hab jn aller sach// Der wardt des schlegels vff dem tach // Dann glückfal der zergenglicheyt // Eyn zeychen ist vnd vnderscheyt // Das got des menschen sich verrůcht // Den er zů zytten nit heymsůcht" (l. 3ff). The reasoning behind this is that God punishes those he loves for their own good. Because of this, the experience of *glück*, which amounts here to the absence of earthly toils must equal absence of divine grace, which in turn amounts to moral deprivation. In fact *glück* may even be sent by the devil: "Als wån der tufel

bschissen wil // Dem gibt er glück/ vnd richtum vil" (l. 23f). To the extent that Brant considers positive *glück* as the main danger to the spiritual well-being of man, he follows in the Petrarchan mould. To Brant, *glück* is positive only in its manifestation, i.e. only on a superficial level. Its actual effect is negative in that it is almost certain to undermine a person's strength of character and his faith in God.

How, then, are *glück* and God related to one another? While the devil seems to be able to dispense *glück*, God has ultimate control over its presence in a person's life: "Sins glücks sich nyemands vberhab // Dann wenn gott will/ so nymbt es ab" (l. 27f). This suggests that God's main interaction with *glück* consists in taking it away from a person previously benefitting from it, which would make the devil the tempter of man with *glück* being a pawn in the operation. By claiming that the mere presence of *glück* may approximate divine punishment (cf. l. 7f), Brant asserts the omnipotence of God, who somehow admits the devil into the world in his function of challenging man. The hierarchy between *glück* and God faintly echoes the Boethian notion of Fortuna's being employed by God so as to challenge man's faith, even if this might be done via the devil. In order to cope with the experience of *glück*, i.e. with a fortunate situation, Brant advises the reader not to get taken in by this situation since it will not last and as such is deceptive. The demand that one should remain mentally untouched by the manifestation of *glück* is generally in accordance with the remedies advised by Boethius' modification of the Stoic tradition. What sets Brant apart from this tradition, however, is that he does not perceive disadvantageous situations as being sent by *glück*, and hence is not concerned with them. While the Boethian approach to Fortuna is motivated mainly by the upheaval caused by negative manifestations, Brant's central concern is the occurrence of good fortune. This concern is so deeply ingrained in his view that he seems to prefer the absence of *glück*, i.e. of superficial advantage, in order to be safe from the possibility of divine punishment (cf. l. 7f). In this respect, Brant's view is unequalled in its pessimism.

The transitoriness of *glück* and the dangers arising from it are depicted further in chapter 37, "Von gluckes fall" (p. 91f). The motto of this chapter describes the radical changes in human life that are implied by the traditional image of the wheel of Fortuna: "Wer sitzet vff des glückes rad // Der ist ouch warten fall/ mit schad // Vnd das er ettwan nåm eyn bad". These lines are accompanied by an illustration of the wheel of Fortuna.[12] The stations on the wheel, which in traditional illustrations are occupied by kings at various stages of their reign, are here taken over by jackasses. This seems to be an indication of the folly that Brant associates with

[12] Fortuna herself is not depicted in the illustration, which is not unusual for pictorial representations of her wheel (cf. Alfred Doren, *op. cit.*, Tafel IIff).

mounting Fortuna's wheel, as a subsequent passage explains: "Der ist eyn narr der stiget hoch //[...] Vnd gdencket nit an glückes rad // Eyn yedes ding wann es vffkunt // Zům hőchsten/ felt es selbst zů grunt // Keyn mensch so hoch hie kumen mag // Der jm verheiß den mornden tag // Oder das er morn glück soll han // Dann Clotho loßt das rad nit stan" (l. 1ff). The perpetual circular motion of the wheel, and the unsteadiness of one's position on it mean that "wer verloßt sich vff syn glück // Der vellt offt jn eym ougenblyck" (l. 33f). While the reference to Clotho (cf. l. 8) may appear somewhat curious, it could simply result from a mythological mix-up: Clotho and her sisters, together known as the Fates, were believed to decide over human fate, and as such were in close mythological proximity to Fortuna.[13] Possibly Brant saw no fault with the reference to Clotho since she was assigned a role in human life similar to that of Fortuna. Given Brant's general reluctance to grant *glück* the status of subject, he may have considered the mention of a force moving the wheel as a purely literary conceit, which could be served by one mythological figure as well as by another. Regardless of these inconsistencies, the wheel of *glück* comes across as the predominant image in the chapter. In this respect, Brant's representation of *glück* follows once more in the Boethian tradition. The lesson to be drawn from the motion of the wheel is equally traditional, repeating advice already uttered in chapter 23: one must not take *glück* at face value, i.e. rely on it and build one's life on it. Instead, one should focus on God, honour and obey him (cf. l. 23f; l. 30). This kind of juxtaposition of *glück* as the source of vanity and deception and God as the source of truth and permanence means that *Das Narrenschiff* is much closer in spirit to the Boethian tradition than the Italian sources are. It shares with this tradition the view that while man is unable to control *glück* on a material level, he is able to do so on a spiritual level. Nevertheless, *Das Narrenschiff* lacks the reliance on the individual's strength so crucial to Petrarch, Poggio Bracciolino and Enea Silvio Piccolomini. Instead, it expounds a different tradition, which has at its core the individual's submission to God. In doing so, *Das Narrenschiff* may be seen to illustrate the peculiar German tendencies during the Renaissance.

The illustration depicting Fortuna's wheel is replicated in chapter 56, which is entitled "von ende des gewalttes" (p. 135ff). This chapter focuses on the instability of power. Thus the motto reads "So groß gewalt vff erd nye kam // Der nitt zů zytten/ end ouch nam // Wann jm syn zyl/ vnd stündlin kam". Subsequently, the notion of the transitory nature of *glück* is repeated: "Har by mercken jr gwaltigen all // Ir sitzen zwor jn glückes fall // Sindt witzig/ vnd trachtend das end// Das gott das

[13] In any case the mention of Clotho seems to suggest not only the wealth of images that lie behind the concept of Fortuna, but also the negligence with which they are occasionally drawn upon.

radt/ üch nit vmb wend" (l. 39ff). Notably, it is God, rather than Clotho, or *glück*, who turns the wheel here. Consequently, one should "Vǒrchten den herren/ dyenent jm // Wo uch syn zorn ergryfft/ vnd grym // Der kurtzlich wurt entflāmen ser // Würt üwer gwalt nit blyben mer // Vnd werden jr mit jm zergan" (l. 43ff). The fact that God is now said to turn the wheel leaves merely an insubstantial role for *glück*. *glück* is mentioned only once in this chapter, in the phrase *jn glückes fall*, its status apparently being restricted to that of an object. Nevertheless the fact that the image of the wheel is previously used in connection with *glück* prompts a closer look at this chapter. God's taking over the wheel from *glück* suggests how minor the author considers the power which *glück* really has over human life. While substituting God for *glück* as mover of the wheel may be intended to make the experience of radical change for the worse more acceptable to the person affected, the picture that emerges is rather grim: it is the picture of a God whose wrath threatens to descend on man at any time. In this respect, the assumption of the role of *glück* by God may be consoling only from a deeply committed Christian point of view. In fact it may give rise to an even harsher view of the world. The ruling out of *glück* eradicates the notion of arbitrary and thus undeserved injustice. Everything that happens to man, however bad it may be, supposedly originates in divine will; as such, it is just and deserved, and one cannot but accept it. Such austerity distinguishes Brant's view of *glück* significantly from the representation of this phenomenon in the sources previously considered. It ties in with the inconsequential nature thus attributed to *glück* that it is represented as an exclusively external concept, denoting as it does material advantages of some kind which come and go regardless of the affected person's contribution. This is a further respect in which Brant is distinguished from Petrarch, and to some extent from Enea Silvio, who in recognizing *glück* as an internally operating phenomenon grant it a much deeper influence on human life. As regards the attitude which man is supposed to take towards *glück*, Brant is closer to the calm cautiousness of Petrarch or Poggio Bracciolino, than he is to the bold optimism of Enea Silvio. However, Brant is worlds apart from the confidence in the individual's self-control as propagated by the Italians. Instead, he recognizes a person's ability to cope with *glück* only to the extent that he may subordinate himself to God. Because of this, *Das Narrenschiff* comes across as being decidedly closer to medieval tradition than the Italian approach to *glück*.

To round things off, let us look at another, more poetic text, illustrating the vitality that marks the concept of *glück* in sixteenth century thought. The following poem is contained in the corpus of Hans Sachs' *Meisterlieder* and *Spruchdichtungen*. Written between ca. 1511 and 1527, it is entitled *Das waltzend Glück*:

Blind war doch sie, daucht mich im traum
Und het inn irem mund ein zaum
Des Zügel hielt ein starcke hendt
Hoch oben inn dem firmament.
Derhalb sie kein erhub noch sprenget
Denn so weyt ir die hand verhenget [...]
Ein yeder Christ sol aber glauben
Das glück sey an im selber nicht
Mehr, denn ein heydenisch gedicht,
Zeigt die hand im gewülcken fein,
Der muß das glück gehorsam sein. [14]

What is notable here is the strong link between *glück* and God which takes the shape of subordination. The fact that *glück* is harnessed with God holding the reins means that *glück* may intervene in human life only to the extent that God permits. *glück* as such is considered to be no more than a heathen figment of the imagination, *ein heydenisch gedicht*; it is only in relation to God, as his handmaid as it were, that *glück* exists at all. The blindness of *glück* may be somewhat confusing: why is *glück* blind, if it is in any case subservient to God? Possibly Sachs incorporates blindness into the description of *glück* simply in order to evoke a traditional attribute of the pagan goddess. Alternatively, *glück*'s blindness, in conjunction with its being harnessed by God, may be seen as contributing to the impression of passivity rather than that of wilfulness traditionally associated with this feature. Apart from being far removed from any kind of autonomous existence, the nature of *glück* is fairly unspecified, which potentially allows for both positive and negative manifestations. *glück* comes

[14] Quoted after Hans Sachs, *Werke*, (eds.) Adelbert v. Keller and E. Goetze (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1964, vol. IV [reprint of Tübingen: Litterarischer Verein; BLVST, 115]), p. 157f. There are other passages in Sachs' work in which *glück* is mentioned, not all of them strictly consistent with the picture drawn in the above poem. The following passage is the conclusion from *Historia: Magnus der dritte könig in Nortwegen* (1513): "Aus der warhafftigen histori/ Mag man wol fassen zu memori,/ Wie wanckel sey das waltzend glück,/ So es eim gleich in allem stück/ Heuchelt, gibt gwalt, macht, gut und ehr,/ Samb könn es im nicht fehlen mehr/ Und steh im aller-höchsten glück./ Plötzlich wend Fortuna den rück/ Und entzeucht all freundschafft und gnad/ Und kehret ihm umb das glückrad,/ Stürtzt in von gwalt, macht, ehr und gut/ In alle hartsel und armut,/ In kranckheit, nembt darzu das leben./ Drumb sol niemand sein hoffnung geben/ Auffs glück, ob es gleich frölich schein,/ Sonder hoffen auf gott allein,/ Welicher pestendige gab/ Den menschen geit auff erd herab,/ Darauß im lob und ehr erwachß/ Von allen Christen, wünscht Hans Sachs" (quoted after Hans Sachs, *Werke*, (ed.) A. v. Keller and E. Goetze (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1964, vol. XVI [reprint of Tübingen: Litterarischer Verein; BLVST, 191]), p. 324). That a more active role appears to be attributed to *glück*/Fortuna here may be due to certain conventions of historiography. The basic juxtaposition of *glück* and God, with God providing a form of remedy against *glück*, is consistent with the poem considered above as well as with more general tendencies such as represented by Brant.

across as an exclusively external concept. That is, it seems to denote certain states experienced by a person, which do not directly arise from the person's thoughts or actions. The notion of *glück*'s being forced into obedience by God goes beyond the Boethian submission of Fortuna to God. For Boethius grants Fortuna independence of some sort despite her being employed by God, while the above poem depicts *glück* as having no scope for independent action whatsoever. This restriction means that the concept of *glück* loses much of its potency, which may be indicative of the way in which Sachs attempts to keep *glück* at bay. The poem could be read as both warning and consolation. It warns the reader not to take *glück* seriously as a force wilfully affecting human life, since it is no genuine force in its own right. In doing so, the poem offers consolation that it is not after all a spiteful, inhuman force that afflicts man with certain changes, but rather the continuous presence of God. As with Brant, this form of consolation could result in bleakness in that it implies the need to accept everything as just deserts. Yet the divine *hendt* depicted by Sachs as ruling human affairs from above seems more benign than Brant's *klüpfel*. While the latter threatens to destroy such earthly happiness as is caused by *glück*, it is possible to interpret the hand of God as acting in a caring way, and mainly to restrain the destructive impact of *glück*. Sachs's attitude parallels that of Brant, however, in that he does not acknowledge the individual's contribution to, let alone control over, his own development that is so central to the Italian attitude towards *glück*. This attitude ties in with the Lutheran belief held by Sachs, according to which the notion of the individual's, as opposed to God's control over his development is deeply mistaken, and might even be regarded as blasphemous.[15] This suggests that the Germans' approach to *glück* may have been shaped by the grip in which they were held by their religious convictions. Although Sachs' Protestantism must obviously have differed in certain respects from Brant's religiosity, there seems to have been a common denominator resulting from their respective belief: the refusal to take seriously *glück* and the states that it imposes on man. This attitude could stem from the insistence on the absolute omnipotence of God as well as from the recognition of life on earth as both transitional and inferior to the afterlife in God's kingdom; in the case of Brant, the latter may derive from a general religious pessimism that views life on earth as *irdisch jammerthal*. Both accounts are notable for the exclusiveness which with they attempt to ban the presence of *glück*.

Generally speaking, there is a significant divide between the German views on *glück* as expounded by Brant and Sachs on the one hand, and their Italian

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[15] Cf. e.g. Martin Luther, *On the Bondage of the Will*, (trans.) Philip S. Watson, in *Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation*, The Library of Christian Classics, Vol. XVII (London: SCM Press, 1969).

counterparts, i.e. Petrarch, Poggio Bracciolino and Enea Silvio Piccolomini, on the other. First, there is the hierarchy between *glück* and God. While the Germans consider *glück* to be totally subordinated to God, to the extent that God commands *glück* as an object, the Italians seem more ready to accept that both concepts may coexist as forces in their own right. While only Enea Silvio's text exhibits genuine optimism regarding the effect of *glück* to the extent that he actually welcomes it, the other authors' scepticism about *glück* varies greatly. Brant and Sachs distinguish themselves from Petrarch and Poggio Bracciolino by the severity with which they dismiss *glück* and its gifts, as well as - especially in Brant's case - those who enjoy the latter. The severity of this dismissal seems to result from the stark juxtaposition of *glück* and God implied by the hierarchy among them. While Sachs considers it improper for a Christian to acknowledge *glück* as a genuine force in human life, to Brant enjoyment of *glück* is tantamount to sin. Petrarch and Poggio Bracciolino, by contrast, while acknowledging the dangers of *glück*, are mainly concerned about their implications for the affected individual himself rather than for his religious conscience. In this respect, the Italians focus more on the individual's needs than the Germans, who tend to consider the individual only within a bigger framework, here the Christian universe, which in turn dictates certain rules for its inhabitants. Likewise, the Italian sources place their hopes regarding control over *glück*, be it internally or externally operating, mainly in the affected individual himself. The Germans, however, seem to suppress the possibility of the individual's contribution to shaping his development, advocating instead more or less explicitly devout acceptance of one's afflictions and, as far as Brant is concerned, contempt for the experience of life's pleasures. In other words, the Italian stance is more secular than that of the Germans. A further issue which divides the authors into two camps is the distinction between the internal and the external manifestation of *glück*. Here, Petrarch stands out from all the others. Not only for Brant and Sachs, but also for Poggio Bracciolino and, albeit in a more ambiguous way, Enea Silvio, *glück* is external to the extent that its impact is marked by the presence or absence of certain conditions in or from a person's life. Petrarch, by contrast, considers *glück* to affect human life through both external and internal manifestations; in fact he emphasizes the internal manifestations of *glück*. He is acutely aware of the psychological dilemmas fighting within the human soul. Thus Petrarch's view proves to be the most modern of the views of *glück* considered here. Yet regardless of how they might rate when tested for their modernity, all of the texts considered suggest that *glück* was an important concept to fifteenth and sixteenth century thought in Germany, shaping the choices of both writers of original material and translators. The time span covered

by these texts may indicate that the phenomenon of *glück* created an ongoing discourse, for centuries fascinating thinkers and poets who felt the need to seek answers to the problems it raised. While these texts may have differed in their influence, their coexistence is nevertheless telling. The variety of models of *glück*, as well as of solutions to dealing with it, suggests both that *glück* was a multi-faceted problem, and that there was a wealth of attitudes towards it available for Wickram to draw on.

Part II

The Relation between *glück* and God

Chapter 5

Ritter Galmy

In this second part, I will analyze the relation between *glück* and God in each of Wickram's narratives in chronological order, with particular reference to the characters' development.[1] That is, I will consider how *glück* and God each affect this development, by looking at major references made to either power in the order of their appearance, and tracing the way in which they intervene in the narrative. Is it possible to observe certain patterns according to which crucial incidents are attributed to one force or the other? And, to what extent do these incidents determine the characters' development? Once the answers to these questions are established, I will compare them to traditional views of the two forces' coexistence as described in the previous part, particularly to Boethius' account. Describing *glück*'s relation to God constitutes the first of two major steps in assessing its significance in Wickram' s narratives. This will provide a better understanding of the role of *glück*, which is generally defined as the source of certain negative incidents, and thus as a major antagonist to God. The impact which *glück* and God have on the characters' lives will lead, in Part III, to the complex question of whether *glück* is partly constituted by the characters' own actions.

I will concentrate on such passages that refer to actual and specific interventions of either *glück* or God. This means leaving aside a number of references to either power which are insignificant to the extent that they appear to be formulaic, or merely refer to potential impact. The passages in which the potential intervention of God is referred to include such that are concerned with the life-span of a person.[2] *glück* is never mentioned with regard to the duration of the entire human life; this seems to be God's exclusive domain. In *Ritter Galmy*, for instance, that God decides a person's time of death is implied by utterances such as the protagonist's claiming that his love will last "so lang mir Got mein leben erstrecken thůt" (18f). Because utterances like this are made before the actual death of the respective person, they come across as mere figures of speech, which have no crucial bearing on the development of the narrative. That God assigns a certain lifespan according to a person's virtue is confirmed by a narratorial remark at the conclusion of *Galmy*.

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[1] All quotations refer to Hans-Gert Roloff's edition of Georg Wickram's narratives (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967ff; for individual titles, cf. bibliography).

[2] Cf. also ch. 6, footnote 4.

Because Galmy and the duchess are virtuous in every respect, "dardurch in Gott der allmechtig/ ir leben lang erstrecket" (228). Since the narrator has an overview of the life of his characters up to their death, his statement could be seen to be made, as it were, after their death has actually occurred. His statement suggests a connection between a person's virtue and the time God allows him or her to live. Although this particular instance could be considered as an actual intervention on the part of God, it is irrelevant for the development of the narrative's plot. The sense of proportion between a person's virtue and the gifts meted out to him is nevertheless indicative of the representation of God throughout the narrative.

Ritter Galmy, Wickram's first narrative, was published in 1539. The central story of *Galmy* is the growing love between the knight Galmy and an unnamed duchess at a French court up to the realization of their love. This development is initiated by a number of challenges in which Galmy proves his outstanding chivalric skills. In the course of the development, the lovers have to separate so as to avoid the court's discovery, even though their love has yet to be consummated. Subsequently, a new strand in the plot is introduced: because the duchess rejects the sexual advances of the *marschalck* who is supposed to look after her during her husband's absence, he attempts to defame her by accusing her of adultery. As a result, she is sentenced to death by her own husband. She is only saved because Galmy rescues her in a trial by combat. Eventually, the duke dies, and the duchess marries Galmy.

The first relevant passages to refer to either force mention *glück* in conjunction with God. These passages may offer some initial insight into the nature of both powers. The context of the passages, which occur early in the narrative, is this: Galmy falls ill, and the duchess is persuaded by his friend Friderich to visit his bedside in order to express her sympathy. This meeting lays the foundation for their subsequently emerging relationship. Thus it is of considerable importance for the development of the plot. Galmy's illness is attributed to the superhuman powers in question when the duchess states that even though she would prefer Galmy to be well, "die weyl aber Gott und das glück/ die ding ye also schicken und haben wôllen/ sond irs mit geduld vertragen/ und eüch nit also in ein verzagnüß kummen lassen" (15). This remark is interesting because it gives an insight into how the characters feel they should deal with what has been inflicted by *glück* and God. It suggests they should be patient and accepting when afflicted with something negative. While it is necessary from a moral point of view that Galmy accept his illness, it makes sense also from the point of view of the narrative's development. For Galmy's illness creates the opportunity for the duchess to visit him, and hence for him to declare his affection for her. This creates the impression that the suffering inflicted

might carry a positive meaning in the sense that it triggers a sequence of positive events. According to the duchess' remark, *glück* and God are working side by side in afflicting Galmy with illness. Yet it is not clear if they do so with the same intention. While the positive consequences of the illness could be the expression of a benign plan, this plan might be inherent in God's intervention only. *glück*'s working in agreement with God might be purely accidental, its intentions possibly spiteful. However, because it is perceived to coincide with God's workings, the potential negative aspect of *glück*'s intervention appears not to be felt as such by the characters. As we will see, the notion of acceptance never comes up when negative incidents are attributed to *glück* exclusively. This suggests that only because God, too, is considered to be in charge of Galmy's illness is its occurrence considered acceptable, or even necessary.

Because Galmy's illness leads to the contact with the duchess, a positive aspect is subsequently attributed to the workings of both *glück* and God. When the duchess pays him a visit, the love-sick Galmy comments: "[d]ieweil mir aber Gott und das glück günstig geweßt/ eüch mein liebste fraw zů mir geschafft zů kummen/ ich [...] mein langwirigs trauren gantz hindan setzen [will]" (20). Thus *glück* and God are credited with generating the meeting which is crucial for the development of the protagonists' relationship. The question that arises from both this and the above passage is whether it is more than mere coincidence that God and *glück* are said to work in conjunction in these instances. Although it could simply be negligence on the author's part that makes them appear that way, their simultaneousness can be seen to demonstrate an important aspect of the workings of both powers. For it is confined to the initial stages of the narrative. Subsequently, *glück* and God come to be more and more in opposition to one another. While the above passages suggest that the protagonists' relationship is licensed, perhaps even generated, by both *glück* and God, their increasing divergence will reveal this simultaneousness as merely temporary. Even though *glück* and God may on this occasion cause the same effect, they do so for reasons that are quite different from one another: while God's intervention may stem from his benignity, the intervention of *glück* appears to be purely random. At this stage, their working in unison establishes a basis against the background of which *glück*'s subsequent destructiveness may strike both characters and reader with particular force.

Soon after the initial sequence of events, *glück* and God emerge as forces working separately from one another. The first occasion on which *glück* is said to have an independent effect on a character is in connection with Galmy's success in combat. To the extent that *glück* is considered to be active with regard to the

tournaments in which Galmy contends, it makes a significant contribution to his development. For the tournaments constitute an important element in the narrative. Through them, chivalric qualities of the protagonist are revealed, which in turn influences his development. Galmy's success in the early tournaments secures the duchess's love. Thus *glück* is temporarily working in favour of Galmy to the extent that his victories establish his martial excellence. Aided by *glück*, Galmy wins both tournaments in question; the narrator comments that "das glück/ sich so gåntzlich/ in aller miltigkeyt/ gegen dem Ritter erzeygen thet" (47; cf. also 95). *glück*'s support in this respect is genuine, i.e. Galmy's chivalric success as such is at no stage undermined. Hence *glück* makes a genuinely positive, albeit limited contribution to the protagonist's overall development. However, the course of the narrative will show that the positive nature of *glück*'s intentions as displayed in this instance does not endure throughout the narrative.

In addition to *glück*'s effect on the protagonist's chivalric success, there is also an instance of divine intervention in combat, which is somewhat different in nature. When Galmy's rivals at the court feel humiliated because he has won the first tournament, they decide to seek revenge at the following one. It is with regard to this tournament that God is shown to intervene. On the fact that various knights hope for Galmy to be disgraced in the tournament, the narrator comments "das aber Gott/ und sein [i.e. Galmy's] mannlich hertz fürkummen thet" (37). Since the remark refers to Galmy's success in combat, we might wonder why this is not attributed to *glück* as in the above cases. In other words, in what respect does God's intervention differ from that of *glück*? Because Galmy's rivals consider the tournament as an opportunity to humiliate him, it has an explicit moral aspect attached to it. God's intervention appears to be related to a moral reason on the level of the characters' actions, its function being to support the virtuous protagonist. This moral angle is absent from the instances of *glück*'s intervention in combat. The distinction between *glück* and God in these instances becomes even more obvious when, for a moment, we skip forward in the narrative and compare the early tournaments with the later trial by combat, which is supposed to determine the accused duchess' guilt or innocence. There, *glück* as an active force is not mentioned in connection with the fight; instead, the outcome is associated with God. Likewise, Galmy's success in the previous tournaments is, with the above exception (cf. 37), not associated with God. This distribution seems to be due to the fact that the trial by combat is a fight which is far more meaningful and serious than the chivalric tournaments in which Galmy takes part earlier. It is a fight that involves not merely the participants' strength, but also their moral stance as regards the object of their fight, i.e. the duchess' guilt or innocence respectively. By

contrast, even though the ordinary tournaments may be based on the assumption that the winner's strength is somehow proportional to his moral excellence, the morals which are at work there do not prove a specific point; instead, physical skills are the decisive factor. This suggests that as regards supporting a character, *glück*, being involved merely in the outcome of the ordinary tournaments, is generally working on a more profane level than God.

The seeming harmony between *glück* and God is not disturbed until the feelings between Galmy and the duchess have been established. At one stage, Galmy's friend Friderich states that "das glück [Galmy] mit einem schǒnen bůlen begabt het" (53). This instance of *glück* is complemented by the workings of God, when halfway through the narrative, the duchess assesses her and Galmy's mutual love: "Ich glaub [...] sicherlich/ das sollichs alles ein schickung von Gott sey/ und das er fast groß wunder mit uns beyden würcken werd/ es schick sich zů gůtem oder bǒsem" (102). By attributing their mutual love to God, the duchess attributes a central element of the plot to God. The conviction of divine intervention may at first seem surprising, considering that it is expressed by a married woman with regard to her love for another man, something which might conventionally be regarded as morally wrong even though the relationship is not consummated. On the other hand, it may be precisely because of the apparent inappropriateness of the lovers' feelings for one another that reference to divine providence is crucial in order to hold out the prospect of their conduct being legitimate and even necessary.[3] Such reference may be intended to pave the way for the eventual union of the duchess and Galmy which succeeds the duke's death. Through this reference to God, which stands uncontradicted throughout the narrative, the possibility of the two protagonists' entertaining any unworthy or frivolous motives is annihilated. That Galmy's love for the duchess is considered as genuinely *züchtig* is emphasized as early as in the narrative's title, which reads "Ein schǒne und liebliche History/ von dem edlen und

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[3] While this constellation may be reminiscent of the support which Tristan and Isolde receive from God despite the illegitimacy of their relationship, the crucial difference between them on the one hand and Galmy and the duchess on the other is that the latter do not engage in sexual relations. Walter Haug considers the dissociation of love and sex in *Galmy* as an important characteristic of the narrative: "Handlungstechnisch ist diese Trennung zwischen Liebe und Sexualität die Voraussetzung dafür, daß die Konfrontation zwischen dem radikalen Anspruch des Eros und den Bedingtheiten der Gesellschaft vermieden werden kann [...] das neue Problem wird [anders als in z.B. Tristan die tödliche Auseinandersetzung im Rahmen einer Dreieckssituation] [...] darin bestehen, ob und wie die Liebe als reine Innerlichkeit sich gegen die von ihr abgelöste Körperlichkeit und überhaupt gegen alles Äußere [...] zu bewahren vermag" (Walter Haug, "Jörg Wickrams >Ritter Galmy<. Die Zähmung des Romans im Ursprung seiner Möglichkeit", in (eds.) Walter Haug and Burkhard Wachinger, *Traditionswandel und Traditionsverhalten* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1991), pp. 96-120; p. 101). This suggests the general importance of the development's internal dimension, to which I will turn in part III.

theüren Ritter Galmien/ uñ von seiner züchtigen liebe/ So er zů einer Herzogin getragen hat". By having the duchess claim divine intervention, the narrator may moreover allude to the exemplary function of their love. Notably, the duchess' belief in divine intervention means that both good and bad outcome seem acceptable to her (cf. 102); that is, God's inflicting negative things is suggested as a possibility. That the characters are fully prepared to accept this possibility seems to stem from their trust in the divine justification of any potential suffering.

The anticipation of suffering, albeit to a positive end, finds a more concrete expression when the duchess interprets the contents of a dream as the anticipation of the lovers' God-sent development (cf. 103). In the dream (cf. 89f), she is a unicorn which, after a brief spell in the company of other *edlen thierle* (89) is threatened by a wolf and a bear. While the wolf is eventually caught in a trap, the bear keeps pursuing her until she is faced with burning woods framed by deep waters. Eventually, she is rescued from her distress by a lion. The lion, covered in sheepskin, pushes the bear into the fire. The lion then leaves; shedding the sheepskin, it takes on the shape of a knight resembling Galmy, while the unicorn is transmogrified into the duchess' human shape. The dream is interpreted both by the duchess and by the narrator as a premonition of things to come (cf. 90f). Thus the bear represents the *marschalck*, whose subsequent accusation drives the duchess into a seemingly hopeless situation.[4] The lion's part is taken by Galmy, who saves her from imminent death by fire, while concealing his identity as saviour until the end of the narrative.[5]

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[4] The wolf might represent the envious courtier Wernhart, as Erich Schmidt points out ("Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur im Elsass", *Archiv für Literaturgeschichte* 8 (1878), pp. 317-357; p. 350).

[5] Bolte points out that the dream is reminiscent of a tradition of anticipatory dreams featuring animals, which may be found in old French epics ((ed.) Johannes Bolte, *Wickrams Werke*, vol. 1, Tübingen: Litterarischer Verein, 1901 [=BLVST, 44], pp. V- XXI (p. XI)). Christine Pfau ("Drei Arten, von Liebe zu träumen. Zur Traumsemantik in zwei Prosaromanen Jörg Wickrams", *Zeitschrift für Germanistik N.F.* 2 (1998), pp. 282-301) claims that the dream consists of two parts. Part two supposedly starts when the lion has left the unicorn after his rescue mission; "[e]rzählt wird fortan nicht mehr ein im Traum vorweggenommener Handlungsverlauf, sondern eine lokal und sozial nicht einzuordnende Imagination der Herzogin" (291), which is characterized by an "erotische Konnotierung" (292) created by the disguised lion shedding the sheepskin and turning into an armoured knight. Nevertheless the dream supposedly desexualizes the duchess and Galmy, and purges them of their desires (cf. 293). Consequently, it expresses their "Begehren nach Ehre" (294). Yet the incidents following the lion's departure, namely his shedding the sheepskin and eventual transformation into the knight correspond to subsequent events in the narrative, viz. Galmy's taking off the monk's habit, and later revealing himself to the duchess as her saviour. Therefore, even though it is possible that there is an erotic connotation underlying the dream as a whole, it is difficult to accept that the final sequence of events should be an erotic fantasy in its own right as Pfau implies. On a different note, Walter Haug claims that the dream has not so much "prophetische[n] Sinn [...], als daß er jene Wirklichkeitsebene signalisierte, auf der der zweite Teil [des Romanes, welcher nach Abreise Galmys einsetzt] im Grunde anzusiedeln wäre: das traditionelle Schema würde als Vehikel eines nunmehr rein psychisch zu

When relating the dream to Galmy, the duchess states: "ich meyn Gott solchs [i.e. the contents of her dream] nach seinem Gőttlichen willen schicken thů" (103). By anticipating elements of the plot through the duchess' dream, and having her interpret them as elements of divine intervention, the narrator suggests that the whole chain of incidents subsequently triggered by the *marschalck*'s accusation is determined by God. Considering the full story as anticipated in the dream, the chain of events may seem to be determined by God with a particular end in mind, viz. to test both Galmy and the duchess. The outcome of this test, which in time reveals the duchess' faith in God, and Galmy's loyalty and bravery in rescuing her, might ultimately be rewarded by their subsequent marriage, which in turn could be seen to justify the protagonists' suffering.

The above passages indicate a dominance of God's intervention over the narrative's development. Up to this point, *glück* might still be considered to be contributing, or conforming to the will of God to the extent that the coming into being of the protagonists' love is supported, or at least unobstructed by *glück*. So far, *glück* can be seen, at least superficially, to be close to its initial agreement with God, even if it is not acting simultaneously with him. But, the coexistence of *glück* and God is given a new turn in the context of the above evaluation of the lovers' relationship as *schickung von Gott* (102). In response to the duchess' anticipation of God-sent suffering, Galmy expresses the hope that God will protect them from harm (cf. 102). At the same time, he is aware of the possibility "wo mich aber ye das glück betriegen wolt/ und ich in sorgen sein můßt/ eüch etwas widerwertiges von meinent wegen zů leiden" (102f), in which case he would rather die in the first place. Note the difference between things inflicted by *glück* and things inflicted by God as implied by the passage: what *glück* sends is considered spiteful and senseless, whereas what is sent by God is considered genuine and purposeful. Galmy's remark seems to dissociate God from potential suffering, and in doing so ascribes a considerable role to *glück*. This suggests that divine presence in the lovers' life does not rule out a certain scope for *glück* to interfere in. While it is generally possible that *glück* could be a force that coexists with God and may potentially undermine his workings, we will have to pay specific attention as to how this could be compatible with the duchess' anticipation of certain major developments as divine will.

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verstehenden Prozesses fungieren" (Haug, *op. cit.*, p. 109); "[d]ie Wiederholung des Traummotivs [in der Wirklichkeit] signalisiert, mit welcher Macht die Innenwelt ihre eigene Wirklichkeit durchzusetzen beginnt und dabei zugleich doch nach außen drängt" (103). Thus Haug considers the entire second part of the narrative to be an enactment of the characters' psychological conflicts that arise from the problematic dissociation of internal and external events. This view leaves aside the impact of superhuman forces, and instead focuses exclusively on the events' internal dimension.

When *glück* subsequently interferes, this first manifests itself in an incident which is not included in the chain of events anticipated as God's *schickung*. That is, the incidents leading to the lovers' separation precede those represented in the dream sequence. Negative intervention by *glück* is feared by Friderich, who comments on the happiness enjoyed by Galmy in the following way:

Solche dein freüd mir warlichen sorg und schmertzen geberen thůt. Dann ich fôrcht/ das glück/ so sich in dem anfang frôlich gegen dir erzeygen thůt/ es werd dich zů letst in grossen schmertzen und trůbsal verlassen. Deßhalb mein aller liebster Galmy/ wôllest mit fleiß bedencken/ den ußgang des schmeychlenden glücks (99).

That is, Galmy's general success and happiness prompt the fear of his suffering reversal at the hand of *glück*. No obvious reason is given for this fear. It seems to be aroused simply because it is the nature of *glück* to cause abrupt downfall in the life of someone who has just been exalted. Friderich's attitude evokes the image of the wheel of Fortuna, which changes human life for the worse; hence all the incidents in Galmy's life are viewed as connected in a certain way. In the light of subsequent incidents, this attitude appears to be justified. Things take a turn for the worse when the lovers' secret is threatening to be revealed; they blush in each other's presence, and thus give rise to the court's suspicion. This process is attributed to *unstet glück* (cf. 111; 117). Considering that *glück* is earlier credited with a part in bringing the two lovers together, its sudden turn against them now makes it appear as a force that is willful. As such, *glück* can no longer be regarded as the mere instrument of God or a moralistic narrator, employed to support the good and restrict the bad characters. Instead, the representation of *glück* is reminiscent of the traditional concept of Fortuna as a spiteful and unreliable power, as signaled by the attribute *unstet*. This suggests that there are two different patterns at work in the narrative: the constancy of God on the one hand, and the inconstancy of *glück* on the other. God's intervention appears to be occasioned and directed throughout by moral principles. It reveals a consistency which indicates the moral value of the characters with regard to whom it intervenes, even though this consistency may temporarily be concealed, as the duchess' imprisonment will show.[6] By contrast, *glück*'s intervention, be it positive or negative, appears to be marked by arbitrariness; although it supports Galmy in the tournaments and during the initial stages of his relationship with the duchess, it

[6] At another stage, Galmy expresses the following hope with regard to his enemies: "ich hoff und traw zů Gott der mein hertz und liebe am basten erkennen mag/ er werd sye zů sollichen schanden kummen lassen/ dahin sye mich underston zů bringen" (100). The fact that to some extent this does happen eventually, although it is not explicitly attributed to God, confirms the notion that God can be trusted to help the virtuous characters.

works against him on other occasions. Thus *glück* may potentially cross the workings of God. The parallel existence of these patterns supplies the story with a degree of suspense: will *glück*, or will God retain the upper hand with regard to the characters' development?

As a result of the near discovery occasioned by *glück*'s intervention, Galmy decides to leave the court.[7] In order to do so without raising further suspicion, he is in need of a good reason for leaving. Just at this moment, he receives a letter from his father, asking him to return to Scotland. On receiving the letter, Galmy comments: "Almechtiger Gott/ wie seltzam bist du inn dein wunderwercken" (122). For it is the first letter from his father in eight years and arrives at exactly the right time. Yet the absence of the genuine letter would not have created a serious problem on the practical level, as Galmy had already contemplated arranging for a counterfeit letter to be sent to himself (cf. 114). Why, then, does the arrival of the letter merit reference to God? The fact that Galmy's secret reason to leave coincides with an external, unrelated reason for leaving is notable. This coincidence seems to be interpreted as a sign that Galmy's departure from the court is indeed meant to happen, by God; the fact that external details conform to Galmy's internal decision seem to indicate God's influence. Although less important for the general development of the narrative, this instance of divine intervention is nevertheless revealing. For it suggests that God is associated with the protagonists' negative experience, i.e. the threat of discovery, only in that he helps to resolve it. In other words, God helps to resolve a dilemma supposedly created by *glück*. Still, God does not undo the predicament created by *glück*: he does not erase the court's suspicion, but rather facilitates a way to avoid the consequences of this suspicion. Thus God is seen to limit rather than annihilate the damage inflicted by *glück*. This would suggest that *glück*'s workings have a certain autonomy. On the other hand, *glück*'s possibility of interfering is limited because Galmy leaves the court before he is trapped by *glück*. That is, Galmy's action complements God's intervention to the extent that his own evaluation of the situation combines with a divine sign, viz. the letter, to effect his rescue.[8] How, then, is

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[7] According to Haug, the lovers' separation is caused "nicht durch eine massive Bedrohung oder gar eine Entdeckung in flagranti, sondern aufgrund von Überlegungen, die zur Einsicht geführt haben, daß man die Liebe nicht restlos innerlich unter Kontrolle halten kann" (Haug, *op. cit.*, p. 105). According to this, the separation may not be attributed to *glück*, but is rather the result of conscious decisions arising from certain psychological necessities. However, it is the lovers' psychological frailty that makes them vulnerable to incidents like the moment of mutual blushing in the first place; they come across as victims rather than deliberate agents.

[8] Maybe a minor counter-example to Galmy's considerate reaction to *glück* is the case of the kitchen-hand, whom the *marschalck* subsequently uses to simulate the duchess' adultery. He claims that "sollich groß glück [mich] umgeben hât" (147), stating the apparently positive influence of *glück* on his life which manifests itself in large amounts of money that are supplied by the *marschalck*. This perception is

Galmy's departure from the court related to the general notion of his relationship with the duchess having been willed by God? Though it is not anticipated through the dream as an element of divine providence, Galmy's departure is vital for the couple's eventual union. For it prevents the lovers' discovery and any harsh measures that might result from it.[9] Hence God's supposed sending of the letter might be considered as a sign of the consistency with which he supports the positive development of the protagonists' love in spite of *glück*'s intervention, in other words, as confirmation of their love being indeed a *schickung* from God.

Subsequent to Galmy's departure, the duchess is left in the *marschalck*'s care by her husband. As a result of her spurning his sexual advances, the *marschalck* tries to defame the duchess as an adulteress. This leads to her imprisonment and impending death sentence, which poses an obvious threat to Galmy and the duchess both as a couple and as individuals. The *marschalck*'s harassment of the duchess is part of the chain of events represented in her dream. After the turn for the worse has occurred, *glück* is referred to by the characters as the major cause of the duchess' misery. Having been wrongfully imprisoned, the duchess writes to Galmy, who by now is separated from her by hundreds of miles: "du nymmer glauben würst/ in was grossen nôten mich das wanckelmůtig glück verlassen hatt" (181). Learning of the duchess' situation, Galmy reacts in a similar way, opposing the workings of *glück* to the duchess' virtue: "O du unstâts glück/ Wie magst du ein solche züchtige Fraw mit solchen schwâren lâsten beladen?" (185). While on a factual level the duchess' predicament is caused by the *marschalck*'s frustrated desire and the false accusations by which he seeks to protect himself, the lovers relate it to *glück* and refer to it as the sole cause of the duchess' misery. This reinforces the notion of the duchess' helplessly suffering through incidents which are beyond her control; such helplessness is all the more severe in that, being a woman, the duchess seems to be unable to make herself heard in order to rectify the situation.

The negative workings of *glück*, despite their tremendous impact, are overturned eventually. God is frequently referred to in relation to the revelation of the duchess' innocence. The references start long before the trial by combat which is to prove her innocence, and before it is even decided that such a combat will be held

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deluded, since the kitchen-hand's affluence is caused by the *marschalck*'s treachery which will lead to his execution. Thus he is unable to evaluate the nature of *glück*'s gift correctly. The incident suggests that since what a character perceives to be the intervention of *glück* is not necessarily genuine, caution is advisable. In this respect, a character's reaction to *glück* can make a vital difference to his or her development.

[9] For examples of such measures, cf. comparable situations in *Goldfaden* and *Gabriotto*, which lead to the protagonist's life being threatened.

at all. By accumulating some of these references, I want to demonstrate the intensity with which God is referred to by the characters as the power who they believe will resolve the duchess' predicament. The duchess asks God "ir Eer zů bewaren/ darmit sye nit also unschuldig ir gůten limůt und eer verlür" (159). She believes that God will respond to her appeal: "Ich aber treüw Gott dem allmechtigen/ der anschlag gůt oder bőß verborgen ist/ er werd mein unschuld an tag bringen/ und ob ich schon darumb sterben můß" (159; cf. 161; 168; on p. 195, she refers to God as "mein erlőser und helffer"). Such trust in a manifestation of divine justice is reinforced by Friderich's assurance: "Wissendt ir eüch in der sach unschuldig/ so seind getrőst/ Gott [...] würdt eüch nimmermer verlassen" (166). The duchess tells the treacherous *marschalck* "du warlich vor Gott dem Almechtigen antwurt geben můst" (160); she is convinced that God will avenge her innocence on him ("Gott würdt mein unschuld schwerlich an dir rechen", 203). As regards those who may help her, namely Galmy and her husband (cf. 202), the duchess expresses the wish that "Gott gebe [in] mein unschuld zů erkennen" (182).[10] The frequency of these references to God is notable; while they are merely potential at this stage, the fact that they are subsequently confirmed seems to merit their mention here.

While the duchess trusts God to end the predicament into which she has been brought by *glück* to the extent that he will reveal her innocence, she does not seem to mind whether this revelation takes place before or after her death (cf. 159). This suggests that she accepts the possibility that God's intervention may not reverse the immediate circumstances which contribute to her physical suffering. Not her life, but her reputation as a virtuous woman is her priority. That is, something of higher value than physical life is at stake for her. The protestation of her innocence is more than a social convention; it appears to relate to her identity as wife, woman and Christian. Her willingness to die in the belief that God will protect her reputation indicates the strength of her faith. God's workings, in addition to concerning themselves with moral issues in the world, seem moreover to apply to a spiritual level as opposed to the purely material level of *glück*'s activity. The workings that take place on this spiritual level may not always make sense to the affected individual, that is, God may appear to tolerate situations in which virtuous characters experience negative things undeservedly.[11] The duchess' acceptance -in spite of the enormous odds against her-

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[10] Galmy realizes her innocence as soon as he hears of the accusation, while the duke is convinced only after Galmy has defeated the *marschalck*.

[11] This notion might be detected also in the abbot's comment on the fettered duchess who is about to be burned should the *marschalck* win: "Gott [...] [the duchess] also haben will" (204). Possibly this statement is mere rhetoric which the abbot, who manages the appearance of the disguised Galmy, employs in order to enable Galmy to talk to the duchess under the pretense of hearing her confession.

of whatever God will send in order to resolve the situation inflicted by *glück* indicates that she is aware of the element of concealment inherent in God's ways. In submitting completely to divine authority by accepting the possibility of death, she seems to recognize a spiritual reality behind material life which is ultimately more meaningful. This attitude makes the intervention of *glück* bearable, seemingly regardless of whether or not *glück* will prevail in the duchess' life on the material level which, at least for a certain period of time, is only of secondary importance to her.

Divine help promptly manifests itself in the fact that a count persuades the duke to hold a trial by combat, thus providing an opportunity for the duchess' name to be cleared. The duchess regards the count's help "für eine sundere genad von Gott" (167). This is echoed by the count's stating that he will "mit der Gotts hilff" (171) reveal her innocence. Since a trial by combat is based on the assumption that God will demonstrate the innocent party's victory, one might say that the possibility of the duchess' execution is ruled out as soon as the performance of a trial by combat is established. However, uncertainties remain so that neither characters nor readers can wholeheartedly embrace this assumption. Thus it remains unclear to the duchess herself until the very last minute whether there will be a knight representing her at all. Moreover, the spiritual assumption underlying the concept of a trial by combat is not necessarily consistent with the material world as depicted in the narrative, that is, it is by no means certain that the knight defending her should win. Yet despite uncertainty as to the outcome of the trial by combat, the characters remain unfazed in their belief in God's influence. Galmy rushes to the duchess' rescue, albeit in the guise of a monk. He explains that in the fight he will "Gott den allmechtigen zů hilff nemen/ welcher die warheyt und unschuld erkent und beystat" (189). The abbot who oversees Galmy's disguise instructs him on how to proceed in case "gibt dir dann Gott gegen dem schantlichen mann [...] /sig" (192). Likewise, the abbot explains to Friderich that given the help of God, Galmy will rescue the duchess (cf. 198). Galmy repeats that he will rescue the duchess "wann mir Gott der almechtig glück geb" (199)[12]. These statements suggest that while the characters are convinced of Galmy's victory should he be supported by God, there remains an element of doubt as to whether God will actually grant his help. Subsequently, however, the characters' expectations in God are confirmed. Galmy defeats the *marschalck* and hence proves the duchess' innocence to the court. Although the duchess does not recognize Galmy,

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Alternatively, the remark might express the notion that God, by not intervening sooner, is testing the duchess' faith and endurance. In this respect, it could illustrate the concealed nature that can sometimes accompany the workings of divine governance.

[12] Obviously the term *glück* is used as an object or state here, and as such has quite a different meaning from those instances where *glück* is referred to as an active power.

she is nevertheless convinced that her defender has been sent by God. She claims that in spite of what she perceives as Galmy's desertion, "noch hat mich Gott/ zů dem dann all mein hoffnung stůnd/ mit einem weydlichen kåmpffer versehen" (217). Thus God proves to fulfill the hopes of the virtuous characters. He comes across as reliable as well as life-saving, effecting the delivery of the duchess from the suffering inflicted by *glück*. God not only saves the duchess, but in doing so also facilitates the happy continuation of the story, which entails the duchess' eventual marriage to Galmy. The outcome of the trial by combat finally confirms the prophetic nature of the duchess' dream. The burning woods correspond to the stake which had already been prepared for the duchess, but from which she is saved by the intervention of the disguised Galmy, represented in the dream by the sheepskin-clad lion. The correspondence is complete when the *marschalck* is thrown onto the fire by Galmy just as the bear had been pushed into the burning woods by the lion. By attributing the duchess' actual rescue to God, the characters' view of the dream contents as an anticipation of a *schickung von Gott* is reinforced. God's intervention finally puts an end to the interference of *glück* in the characters' lives, and as such reasserts his superiority.[13]

God is generally seen as a positive force correcting the negative works of *glück*. Since the works of *glück* are undeserved by the duchess, God's intervention can be seen as maintaining justice. However, the fact that *glück* is ascribed such a substantial role in the characters' development poses a problem. How can the influence of *glück* be compatible with the duchess' previously attributing the whole development to God, including the threat to her life for which *glück* is now being held responsible? Could *glück* be part of the divine plan, employed by God in order to test the characters? Yet characters and narrator generally refer to *glück* in a way which suggests that they consider it as a force unrelated to God. Moreover, in her rendition of the dream and its ensuing interpretation, the duchess does not once mention *glück*. This indicates that *glück* is an autonomous force which is not employed by God. In this case, the duchess' early remark on the omnipresence of divine governance might be considered as an exaggeration which is proven wrong by the actual development.

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[13] The appeal to God's support is not limited to the virtuous characters. The treacherous *marschalck* equally refers to "der hilff Gottes" with regard to fighting the duchess' defender, i.e. Galmy (cf. 177). When the *marschalck* has been defeated, he acknowledges that "Gott mein boßheyt nit lenger vertragen wil" (209). Obviously God does not support evil characters, but only those who, like Galmy, are on the side of truth and innocence. At an earlier stage, Galmy's rival Růpert claims that "so wor mir Gott helff", he will be the first who will Galmy "anwenden" (82). However, his hope is in vain. It might be interesting to note that while Růpert refers to the support of God, Galmy, in the same situation, merely refers to the support of *glück*. This could indicate that Galmy, unlike Růpert, realizes that the tournament which they are about to fight is too profane to invoke the support of God, who intervenes only in select circumstances.

But the fact that the predicament attributed to *glück* is as such prefigured in the dream implies that *glück*'s manifestation is somehow included in the divinely approved sequence of events. This could suggest that God, whether by necessity or by choice, tolerates the intervention of *glück* up to a certain extent. While in general anticipation, suffering is attributed to God, and as such is deemed acceptable, its actual occurrence is attributed to *glück* and hence deemed unacceptable. The reason for the change from God to *glück* may be that while the duchess' predicament seems acceptable from an ideal, theoretical or contemplative point of view, this view cannot be sustained when the experience becomes reality. Since in reality it seems too painful to genuinely accept, the characters might feel that the duchess' predicament must originate from *glück*. In other words, the perverse nature of *glück* may be used as a way of getting around the paradox of virtuous people suffering undeservedly, even if this means some narratorial inconsistencies. Therefore, *glück*, from the characters' point of view, seems to have substantial power to interfere in human life.

The fact that Galmy eventually succeeds, that despite *glück*'s interference everything turns out well as predicted, leads to the question of whether Galmy's success is predetermined, as the dream might suggest. Does his success result exclusively from God's support to the extent that his courage, strength, etc., are predetermined as such? Or, does God-sent success coincide with Galmy's own actions, i.e. is God's plan complemented by the character's innate virtues? Or, is what the characters perceive as God's support actually to a greater extent constituted by the virtue and courage inherent in Galmy's personal efforts? The effect which God has on the protagonists' development is endorsed by a reference to God at the conclusion of the narrative, which relates to the narrative structure as a whole. When, through marrying the duchess, Galmy has been made duke, he states that "mich Gott der Allmechtig/ durch seine milte gůtigkeyt begabt hat/ und mich [...] [his former enemies] zů einem herrn gesetzt" (226f). Thus Galmy associates his advancement, which on the level of individual action results from proving his moral and physical excellence, with God, the disruptive influence of *glück* obviously being negligible at this stage. How, then, are individual action and divine determination related to one another? Galmy's statement could imply either that God has created the opportunities for him to prove himself, or that God has given him the strength which he displays in doing so, or both. In any case, the whole development of the story appears to have been planned by God in order to lead to a particular end. However, submission to divine providence does not mean passivity on the part of the characters. If the development of the story is planned by God in order to facilitate a particular end, this is done on condition of the characters making appropriate

contributions, which must include dealing with the effects of *glück*. Among these contributions are: Galmy's decision to leave the court before it is too late; the duchess' fight for the right to have someone defend her name; Galmy's returning to the court; and, finally, his determination to give his best in the combat and thus redeem the duchess. It is only through these actions and through the choices that lead to them that what is both in advance and in retrospect attributed to God is made to happen. God's intervention leaves room for the individual characters to prove themselves; his intervention does not deprive the protagonists of opportunities, or even necessities, to influence their development, often in order to prevent a change for the worse which *glück* threatens to induce. The full significance of certain crucial situations for the characters' development arises only from the way in which they react to them. That is, God seems to leave certain blanks which the characters have to fill in out of their own initiative in order to realize what they perceive to be his will.

The next question is whether God guides the characters to their deserved end in spite of the intervention of *glück*, or whether he incorporates *glück* into the process. To answer this question, let us look at how the characters react to the workings of *glück*. Events inflicted exclusively by *glück*, be they negative or positive in appearance, as, for instance, the accusations against the duchess or the kitchen-hand's sudden affluence, seem to imply the possibility of their being opposed. It seems possible for the characters to control the influence of *glück*, depending on their ability to recognize the traps which it sets for them. While the kitchen-hand is too naive or too greedy to counteract the manifestation of *glück*, the duchess is able to successfully employ a strategy to save herself. In contrast to the decree of God, which cannot be altered or successfully opposed, the workings of *glück* may be opposed. Therefore, they appear to be somehow less real, less determined phenomena than the workings of God. This, for one thing, establishes God as the superior power of the two. God's superiority manifests itself in a further respect. He reacts to *glück*'s interventions in a way that restricts its effect, either by suggesting certain actions to the characters, as in the case of the letter from Scotland, or by accompanying and supporting them in their actions. Notably, *glück* is not mentioned any more after the duchess' predicament has been resolved. This indicates that *glück* has been ruled out with regard to the protagonists' lives by a superior influence, viz. God in conjunction with the characters. Hence God ultimately executes his will in spite of or regardless of *glück*.

Determining the role of God and *glück* respectively, it is notable that their supposed intervention can sometimes be accounted for by human action; on a practical level, both cause and relief of the duchess' suffering may be attributed to a character, i.e. the *marschalck* and Galmy. The coincidence of the good characters'

actions with what is perceived as God's intervention, and the bad characters' actions with what is perceived as *glück*'s intervention may suggest that to some extent God is seen to work through the good, and *glück* through the evil characters in order to bring about certain situations. By defeating the *marschalck*, Galmy crushes the exemplary evil character; the agents of *glück* suffer a crucial blow from which *glück* is not shown to recover. Thus the good characters in conjunction with God defeat *glück*. Since it seems that the characters do not merely carry out as instruments, but significantly contribute to many of the incidents that are interpreted as acts of God and *glück* respectively, it could be that the workings of either force are to a certain extent internalized by the characters. Consequently, the notion might arise that some of the alleged manifestations of superhuman power are constituted by the characters' actions in the first place, and only in the second place are given the label of God's or *glück*'s working. The fact that the characters themselves interpret their experiences according to superhuman patterns may suggests an amalgamation of human and superhuman causes. However, this process is not of immediate relevance for the relation between *glück* and God and will therefore be put aside until the following part of the thesis.

Generally speaking, God is shown in an altogether more favourable light than *glück* since he is exempted from being responsible for negative things happening to good characters. This attribution of negative and positive events to different causes, one moral and one amoral, might indicate the optimistic nature of Wickram's fictional world. However, Wickram's outlook is not so optimistic as to eliminate completely the occurrence of negative things in the experience of virtuous characters. *glück*, be it as deity or as impersonal phenomenon, has a genuine presence in this fictional world, even though its consequences may not be of lasting significance. By distributing crucial events in this way, Wickram eschews the difficulties that might arise from an account of the events of the world as being caused solely by God, such as Calvin's, for instance, which attributes any suffering experienced by virtuous persons to God while still maintaining the belief in divine justice.

How, then, does the relation between *glück* and God in *Galmy* compare with existing concepts of both forces as described in the previous part? It is a distinctive feature of *Galmy* that to each of the main aspects of *glück*'s intervention there directly corresponds an element of divine intervention. The coexistence of God and Fortuna may be traced back to a tradition that was started by Boethius. As we have seen, Boethius justifies the existence of Fortuna by claiming that God employs her in order to test man's ability to resist the temptations of a frail material world, and thus test his faith. At the same time, God supposedly offers a level of experience which may serve

as an antidote to the anxiety associated with the experience of Fortuna. How does Wickram's representation of *glück* and God relate to this tradition? The first major difference between Boethius' and Wickram's approach is that, in Wickram, *glück* and God do not generally appear to be related to one another. While *glück*'s power to interfere with the characters' lives is obviously inferior to that of God, God is never shown to have any direct command over *glück* itself as opposed to the results of its workings. Hence God does not directly employ *glück* in order to test the characters. Nevertheless *glück*'s workings seem to function as challenges to the characters in a certain respect. But these challenges, with the exception perhaps of the duchess' wrongful persecution, are not strictly spiritual as in the Boethian model, but mainly relate to the characters' abilities to cope with life on a practical level. Moreover, the challenges are set by a force other than God: *glück* is employed by a force invisible from within the narrative, viz. the author. This suggests that as far as the context of the narrative is concerned, the author transfers onto himself certain functions of omnipotence that were traditionally associated with God.[14] From a point of view from within the world depicted in the narrative, this means that *glück* as a power in its own right is autonomous, which significantly distinguishes this fictional world from the Boethian account.

Another difference between Wickram and Boethius is that according to Boethius, God does nothing to alleviate, let alone end the suffering inflicted by Fortuna on a profane level. In *Galmy*, God is seen to do just that. Therefore, God works mostly on the same level as *glück*, which makes the realm of his influence appear decidedly more material than that of the God of Boethian tradition. In *Galmy*, the difference between God on the one hand and *glück* on the other lies mainly in the consistency and motivation with which they support the protagonists. According to Boethius, on the other hand, God and Fortuna are forces working in strictly opposed ways to the extent that they work on different levels of human experience. What is more, acknowledgment of or involvement with the gifts of Fortuna separates a person from the redeeming impact of God, which operates on a purely spiritual level. It is this opposition which makes it possible, for Boethius, to uphold the concept of God offering rescue from the realm of Fortuna. In *Galmy*, God and *glück* intervene on the same level of human experience; God provides rescue from the impact of *glück* on an equally material level. An exception to this is formed when the duchess accepts her death sentence because she trusts in God to protect her innocence. In doing so,

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[14] For an account of the author's God-like functions in another prose narrative, cf. Stephanie B. Pafenberg, "Vorsehung, Zufall und das Böse in der *Melusine* des Thüring von Ringoltingen", *Colloquia Germanica* 28 (1995), pp. 265-284; pp. 278ff.

she mentally seeks refuge on a spiritual level of experience, which makes this moment of the narrative reminiscent of the Boethian approach to Fortuna. However, the narrator does not follow through with this challenge; the duchess does not have to die, and her former status is fully restored. When considered against the characters' development as a whole, the occurrence of *glück* as a spiritual challenge is confined to an episode. Generally speaking, the spiritual effort demanded from Wickram's characters in order to attain God's rescue from *glück* is significantly less than it is according to Boethius; although Wickram's characters are God-fearing Christians in their overall orientation, they are never required to take an extreme leap of faith. Instead, the virtues which they are supposed to exercise are within a more spiritually 'normal' range.

Finally, another distinctive feature of *Galmy* is that its representation of *glück* seems to serve another, structural purpose in addition to the ethical purpose of testing the characters. That is, the representation of *glück* does not focus exclusively on the characters' resisting or opposing *glück*, as it might be according to strict Boethian tradition. *glück*, as a power that is opposed to the perfect justice of God, seems to be employed by the author to create narrative suspense. This means that there is tension between, on the one hand, the unpredictability of *glück* and, on the other, the sense that God ought, at least, to favour the good. This tension may be based on the difference between the world as it is and the world as we would like it to be. Wickram has the narrative ultimately conform to the second pattern, that is, he reassures the reader of the presence of divine justice in the world. Thus he might be trying to reconcile the demands of a 'good story' with a morally conservative view of the world. Alternatively, Wickram could be aware that the conservative view according to which justice ultimately prevails may not be fully adequate. In this case, the existence of an unjust force would be more than an element of suspense: it would be an element of realism in the sense that it represents the reality of undeserved suffering. Although this element of realism is eventually subdued in favour of an idealistic outlook in *Galmy*, the intervention of *glück* as such nevertheless seems to carry a threat to the belief in a safe world that is governed and protected by God in every aspect. By suggesting that not everything results from God's will, since *glück*, too, intervenes in human life, Wickram may intend to demonstrate that the world is not as safe a place as the characters initially think it to be.

Chapter 6

Gabriotto und Reinhart

The central story of *Gabriotto und Reinhart* (1551), set at the English court, is the tragic development of the clandestine love-affair between Gabriotto and Philomena on the one hand, and of that between Reinhart and Rosamunda on the other. While Gabriotto and Reinhart are ordinary knights, the ladies are of higher rank; Philomena's brother is the king of England, and her lady-in-waiting Rosamunda is the daughter of a count. After an auspicious start for the lovers, the king grows to suspect both affairs. Although various attempts are made to defuse his suspicions, Gabriotto's love for Philomena ultimately cannot be concealed. Because of his inferior social status, their relationship is considered unacceptable by the king. As a result, Gabriotto has to leave the court with no prospect of ever returning. He dies of a broken heart. The other three protagonists are emotionally devastated, and subsequently die as well.

A significant feature of this narrative is that references to divine intervention are less frequent than in *Galmy. glück*, by contrast, seems to have considerable importance for the development of the story. The extent to which external forces affect the protagonists is suggested as early as the first meeting of the lovers-to-be, which takes place at a ball held by the king:

> also Gabriotto unnd Reinhart die beyde ihren junckfrawen freündtlichen umbfiengen/ das sye leyder zů einer unglücklichen stunden angefangen hatten/ warumb ich [i.e. the narrator] aber das sprich/ ir nachend wol vernemen werden (21).[1]

The expression *zů einer unglücklichen stunden* suggests that external forces are disposed against the lovers as early as their first meeting, which forms the starting-point of the whole story culminating in their death. As the unfavourable disposition of *glück* is gradually revealed in the course of the narrative, the above description turns out to be an accurate prediction. While the characters are as yet unaware of the

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[1] Gabriotto's father Gernier later draws the same conclusion as regards the external determination of this situation. When he learns about the danger that Reinhart's love for Rosamunda poses for his existence at the court, he retrospectively evaluates the above situation as follows: "ich mag wol sprechen/ das wir zů einer unseligen stund in Engeland kummen seind/ dieweil sich das glück also mit ungestůmem lauff gegen uns gewendt hat" (122).

threat inherent in their situation, the reader is warned in explicit terms that despite both couples' initial happiness, their development will take a negative direction under the influence of *glück*:

aber es mocht in nit also nach irem willen zů end gon/ dann das schmeichlend gelück/ welches uns also lieblich anlachet/ aber zůletst mit bitterem angesicht sich von uns keret/ das selb in zůletst auch ein bittern unnd trůbseligen außgang geberen thet/ wie ir [i.e. the reader(s)] dann ein solchs eygentlich in diser History bericht werden solt (61f).

Thus *glück* is held to be in charge of positive as well as negative developments in the protagonists' lives. However, its deceptive nature means that positive developments are ultimately not genuine and conclude in permanent misery.[2] While *glück* occupies a dominant role in the narrative, divine intervention is less frequent. The distinct infrequency of divine intervention means that *Gabriotto* is of particular interest with regard to the relation between *glück* and God. It gives rise to the question whether *glück*'s workings extend to the incidents which in *Galmy* are ascribed to God, or whether these kinds of incidents do not exist in *Gabriotto*. Also, it might be worth looking for certain factors that restrict divine intervention, in particular whether it could be because the contents of *Gabriotto* conform to a different narrative pattern than a narrative like *Galmy* that the intervention of God is reduced.

How exactly do *glück* and God affect the lovers' development? In what appears to be a prelude to their actual story, the overall destructive effect of *glück* is suggested by reference to famous tragic love-stories, which are supposed to dissuade the lovers from pursuing their love. Examples of love that cannot be sustained are held up as warning analogies to Gabriotto and Philomena. Thus Reinhart points out that Tristrant and Ysald drank "das unglückselig trunck" (36) with tragic outcome. Likewise, he refers to Bianceffora and Florio, who after much danger were able to indulge their love only for a brief moment until "das unstet wanckelmůtig glück aber inen nit lang solcher freüd vergünnen mocht" (38). In a similar vein, Rosamunda urges Philomena to contemplate the miserable fate of Pyramus and Thisbe: "wie lang vergundt inen doch das unstandhafftig gelück ir liebe zů gebrauchen/ für war ein kleine zeit" (46). In these examples, negative *glück* figures at the core of amorous loss, while God is not mentioned as having any part in the respective development.[3]

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[2] The double-facedness of *glück* is reminiscent of a crucial feature of the allegorical figure of *Frau Welt*.

[3] The association of *glück* and love is in keeping with a widespread literary tradition of Fortuna; cf. e.g. Howard R. Patch, *The Goddess Fortuna in Medieval Literature* (Harvard: University Press, 1927), p. 29, where Patch points out the presence of this conception in the courtly literature of France. As regards the role of God, note that in Gottfried's *Tristan und Isolde* God intervenes in favour of the lovers, thus

Because the exempla are presented by way of analogies, they indicate the likelihood of Gabriotto and Philomena, and by implication also Reinhart and Rosamunda suffering a similar intervention from *glück* should they pursue their love. The fact that the protagonists still choose to pursue their love suggests that *glück* will play a decisive role in their development.

Tracing the intervention of *glück* and God step by step, let us first consider to what extent each force affects the formation of the protagonists' love.[4] When the lovers-to-be meet for the first time, they conceal their love for one another - "biß sich zů letst/ das glück über sye erbarmen thet/ wie ir nacher wol vernemen werdt" (21). How does *glück* cause the lovers to become aware of each other's feelings? First, *widerwertig glück* causes Gabriotto to have a riding accident (cf. 26). Then, "das unsteht und wanckelmůtig gelück [mocht] der edlen junckfrawen Philomena/ den unfal des jünglings Gabriotto nit verhalten/ damit sye im ihr mitleiden het mögen entziehen" (28). Having learned of the accident, Philomena is moved to confess her love to Gabriotto, to which he replies with his own confession. In this respect, *glück*'s intervention, in spite of its negative attributes, triggers a fortunate development for both characters. Thus the chain of events shows that what at one moment appears to be a negative manifestation of *glück*, namely the accident and the suffering derived from it, turns out to have an at least temporarily positive effect for the characters. *glück* creates the situations which ultimately lead to the genesis of the love-affair, which means that the lovers' communication depends to a large extent on *glück*. Hence *glück* is shown to support the lovers, prompting the earlier reference to its *erbarmen*. But the benevolence of *glück* will turn out to be a mere episode within its overall unreliability.

Besides *glück*, God too is associated with the development of both love-affairs. For instance, Rosamunda asks God to safely direct a secret love-letter to Reinhart (cf. 81). The reason for this is that God supposedly recognizes the propriety of their love ("dieweil du [i.e. God] doch erkennest/ uns ein erliche liebe zůsamen tragen/ in deren kein falsch noch betrug nymmer gespürt werden soll", 81). This indicates an

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postponing their demise. Wickram's characters may refer to a different version of the story, which is indicated also by the spelling of the names.

[4] As before, I omit here the numerous references to God that seem to be no more than figures of speech, e.g. those beginning with "Gott wol". For they seem to express not a genuine intervention of God, but a mere formulaic hope that something should happen. I also omit the instances in which characters refer others to the protection of God (e.g. "hiemit aller liebste junckfraw/ befihl ich euch in den schirm Gott des allmechtigen", 178). This phrase is often used at the end of letters or speeches. It, too, seems to be formulaic in nature, and while reflecting the general Christian framework of the narrative does not have any particular meaning for its development. Likewise, the constant reference to God regarding the preservation of one's health (cf. e.g. 20) and life (cf. e.g. 111), the gift of beauty and wealth (cf. 160), and the experience of good weather (cf. 195), seem to be limited to a formulaic meaning.

important distinction between the support of God on the one hand, and that of *glück* on the other. While *glück*'s support comes across as arbitrary, or accidental, God's disposition towards one is considered to be marked by justice; it is to this justice that Rosamunda appeals to in the reference to the propriety of her love. A similar instance of divine involvement occurs when Philomena refers to a secret meeting with her beloved as something that it is in God's power to grant (cf. 83). While these references are to God's potential influence only, this influence is confirmed by subsequent events, when both the delivery of the letter and the secret meeting are achieved.[5] Hence God supports the characters in the early stages of their love. Another instance of divine intervention which takes place during the beginning of their courtship is when Gabriotto wins first prize in a ball-game. This is commented on by Philomena with "ich glaub euch ein sundere gnad von Gott verleyhen sey/ dann euch yederman auff disen tag den preyß geben thůt" (59). To the extent that Gabriotto's victory confirms the love that Philomena feels for him, the incident is an important element in their courtship's development. Yet this instance of divine intervention appears to be hardly more than an accessory to the lovers' development as such, not least because of the trivial nature of the game.[6] The incident might be a remnant of medieval tradition to the extent that excellence in chivalric activities was traditionally considered as a gift from God. But, the activities with which Gabriotto and Reinhart prove their skills are extremely tame when compared to those of the medieval epic, where such activities are often of considerable importance to the plot. This generates the impression that God's support, although associated with moral reasoning to the extent that it is reserved for the virtuous, is presented as decidedly more casual than in the case of Galmy and the duchess, whose love is depicted as a divine *schickung*.

Since both *glück* and God are involved in the genesis of the love-affairs, their workings may coincide on a practical level. Thus at one point, the ladies attribute the opportunity to talk to their knights in private to the fact that "uns Gott und das

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[5] Cf. also p. 134, where Philomena hopes that God will reveal her feelings regarding Gabriotto's temporary absence, as expressed by her in a letter, which happens in due course.

[6] On the scale of the whole narrative, the aspect of physical strength and its successful manifestation is relatively unimportant. Even though Gabriotto has to fight for his life both on a minor occasion in France, and when the king later attempts to assassinate him, all that his fighting does is keep him alive, i.e. maintain his status quo and ensure the continuation of the story. The fights have no major impact on the overall development, not least because they lack a courtly audience. There is no occasion on which the characters effect a significant turn or development of the story by employing their skills in combat. Jan-Dirk Müller claims with regard to Wickram's *Ritterhistorien* that "von der Rolle des ritterlichen Helden [ist] nur noch die des Liebhabers übrig" (Jan-Dirk Müller, "Volksbuch/ Prosaroman im 15./16. Jahrhundert - Perspektiven der Forschung", *IASL* 1. Sonderheft (1985), p. 104). However, there is a clear distinction between *Gabriotto und Reinhart* and *Ritter Galmy* in this respect, both of which Müller classifies as *Ritterhistorien*. Galmy, unlike Gabriotto and Reinhart, participates in tournaments. Moreover, Galmy proves his chivalric skills in the life-or-death situation of the trial by combat.

gelück also vergunnet hat mit einander zů reden" (78). This remark shows that the actions of *glück* and God merge occasionally, regardless of the immanent distinction between their respective disposition towards the courtship and their support for it.[7] In fact their actions might even appear to be interchangeable, which suggests that the influence of God is not as pronounced and as distinct from that of *glück* as it is in *Galmy*. In the early stages of the protagonists' love, both forces appear to agree in their support of the lovers. The agreement between both forces means that a certain suspense is built up as to whether and when either force will desert the lovers, whether they will begin to work against one another, and which force will eventually succeed. This situation is not unlike the initial agreement of *glück* and God in *Galmy*. However, the ensuing development is quite different from the latter narrative. As we shall see, the influence of God subsequently appears to be almost subordinated to that of *glück*.

The lovers' development takes a turn for the worse when their love is discovered. The narrator introduces this turn by reference to *glück*:

als sich nun das glück anhůb von inen zů wenden/ und ir heymliche liebe an wolt fahen außbrechen/ begab sich einest in dem Meyen/ das die Künigin dem Künig einen schőnen [...] son geberen thet/ [...] darnach der Künig einen mechtigen hoff außrůffen ließ/ [...] so bald nun die beyden junckfrawen von dem hoff vernummen hatten/ wol gedachten/ ire Ritter sich auch darzů rüsten würden/ deshalben si inen [...] yede eine schőne liberey machen ließ (94f).

Thus a complex chain of events is associated with *glück*. As a result of the fact that Rosamunda has Reinhart's armour adorned with roses, the king's suspicion is aroused. Although Gabriotto denies this connection, he is unable to defuse suspicion, which leads the king to set spies on Reinhart. This is again attributed to *glück*, this time by Reinhart himself: "das uns das glück nun zůmal gantz widrig ist/ unnds ist das die ursach/ es hat mein aller gnådigster Herr der Künig/ ein mercklichen argwon auff uns beyde geworffen" (110).[8] Soon afterwards, a courtier who has been spying on the lovers reports a tête-à-tête between them to the king (cf. 115). The *glück*-induced suspicion is confirmed, leading to a situation in which it is impossible for Reinhart to stay at the court. According to this, *glück* is ultimately responsible for the lovers' discovery. After an auspicious start, it has now turned against the protagonists, just as it does in *Galmy*. But, unlike in *Galmy*, there is no way in which God intervenes on behalf of Reinhart and Rosamunda in order to counteract the effect

[7] Cf. also Rosamunda's statement: "wie mőcht ich [...] die sach mit verzagtem gemůt underston/ eh will ich darumb leiden alles das mir Gott und das gelück zůsendet" (82).

[8] This complaint about *glück* is repeated by Rosamunda on p. 112.

of *glück*, e.g. by averting suspicion. In an attempt to avert the court's attention, the two knights leave the English court to spend a year in France. Rosamunda considers their departure as another spiteful intervention of *glück* (cf. 131f) rather than as a necessary means of coping with *glück*'s original affliction, viz. the discovery. By contrast, Galmy's departure from the court following *glück*'s betrayal was associated with God. *Gabriotto*'s characters, by associating the knights' departure as such with *glück*, display a tendency to interpret events more negatively. From their point of view, *glück* is given greater presence in their lives than God. Moreover, although Galmy's and Gabriotto's departure are marked by a certain parallelism, only the one associated with God, viz. Galmy's, leads to genuine success.

After Reinhart and Gabriotto have left England, *glück* continues to harass the ladies:

Das unstet und wanckelmůtig glück sich noch nit benůgen ließ/ an dem schmertzlichen [...] abscheyd/ [...] die edlen und züchtigen junckfrawen noch in vil mer leyd und schmertzen setzet/ dann [...] inen eine fast leydige [...] bottschafft von [den Rittern] kam (145).

That is, the knights, on their journey across the sea, experience severe storms which wreck their boat. They escape unscathed but, through a coincidence, the ladies gain the impression that they have died. It is for creating this impression that *glück* is held responsible by the narrator in the above statement, thus reinforcing its role as the source of negative events. However, when the ladies finally learn of the knights' survival, this is equally attributed to *glück*: the narrator claims that "sich zůletzt das glück über sye erbarmet/ inen all ir klag in freüd verkeren thet" (148; cf. also 157). Hence *glück* is seen to inflict suffering on the characters, as well as reverse this suffering with regard to the above instance.[9] This is noteworthy because, against the background of *Galmy*, one might expect the reversal of a negative situation which is caused by *glück* to be attributed to God.[10] Although God is credited with the knights' rescue as such when Philomena comments on it with "das alles [...] Gott der

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[9] Von Erztdorff, in an attempt to account for the two modes of *glück*, distinguishes between *mala* and *bona fortuna* (cf. Xenja von Ertzdorff, *Romane und Novellen des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland* (Darmstadt: WBG, 1989), p. 114).

[10] According to Scherer, the whole incident is meaningless: "Verschiedene retardirende [sic] Momente sind nur retardirend, aber sie bedeuten nichts, es folgt nichts daraus, die Verwickelung löst sich gleich wieder: so der Schiffbruch [...] und die daran geknüpfte Vermutung vom Tod beider Freunde: es folgt daraus nichts, als dass man sich bis zum Eintreffen guter Nachrichten um sie grämt" (Wilhelm Scherer, *Die Anfänge des deutschen Prosaromans und Jörg Wickram von Colmar: Eine Kritik* (Straßburg: Trübner, 1877); p. 45). This view appears to be rather simplistic to the extent that it ignores the pattern of *glück* that is manifest in the events surrounding the shipwreck.

Allmechtig fürkummen hat" (167), he is not mentioned with regard to the specific predicament inflicted by *glück* or its reversal.[11] This suggests that in *Gabriotto*, *glück* is represented as more autonomous than in *Galmy*. In fact the influence of *glück* to some degree extends to the role which in the other narratives is occupied by God, i.e. that of relieving a character from a negative situation initially caused by *glück*. This could indicate that *Gabriotto* is set in a more secular framework than a narrative like *Galmy* in so far as God is represented as being somewhat withdrawn from the characters' lives. The ladies' predicament arising from the ship-wreck shows the characters to be at the mercy of *glück*. Relief does not come because they are, owing to their virtue or to a principle of justice, in some way entitled to it, rather it comes accidentally. The fickleness inherent in *glück* means that its support is only of limited reliability; that *glück* and not God comes to the ladies' relief suggests that there is no guarantee of the general insecurity which marks their situation being abolished permanently. Indeed *glück*'s intervention for the better does not indicate a turn in its disposition, but rather is no more than a momentary diversion from its overall course of destruction.

After the knights' return from France, rumours of Gabriotto's love for Philomena begin to surface. As a result, the king employs someone to gain Gabriotto's confidence in the guise of a jester. Gabriotto falls for the ploy and discloses his continuing love for Philomena to the jester, who promptly relates it to the king. Gabriotto attributes the discovery of his secret to *glück*: "wer mag doch mich unnd mein aller liebste junckfraw also schandtlich verrahten haben/ O du schandtliches glück/ wer soll auff dich hoffen/ wer soll dir vertrawen/ fürwar nyemandts" (176). As a result of the discovery, the king plots Gabriotto's assassination. He instructs the jester to kill Gabriotto by tricking him into eating a poisoned apple. But, when the jester receives his briefing, a servant happens to overhear the conversation between him and the king. The righteous servant is intent on helping Gabriotto and expresses the wish: "O Gott/ hilff das ich von nyemandts gesehen werd/ so will ich underston den grossen mordt zů wenden" (179). Indeed he emerges unnoticed, and manages to reveal the murderous plan to Gabriotto. Gabriotto acknowledges the servant's revelation as an instance of divine intervention:

"O Gott/ wie seind deine wunder so manigfaltig/ nun sih ich wol das all mein hoffnung gar umb sunst/ dieweil also schwere unnd sorgliche netz gespannen sind/ denen ich in keinen weg empfliehen würd/ ich wôll mich dann meiner liebsten junckfrawen gåntzlich verwegen" (181f).

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[11] Philomena's comment complements a statement made by Gabriotto prior to the journey, in which he counters her fears by assuring her that it is in the hand of God to determine the moment of his death (cf. 136).

Thus Gabriotto considers his learning about the plan as a work of God. This view is later repeated when Philomena declares the king's intention to poison Gabriotto to have been thwarted by God (cf. 207). Realizing the king's intentions, Gabriotto is able to anticipate the assassin's movements and overwhelm him; moreover, he understands that there is absolutely no way for him to stay at the court and pursue his love. Without the servant's communication, he would certainly have been caught in the king's snares. Hence God is credited with setting right an injustice triggered by *glück*, viz. the discovery of the affair and the ensuing persecution, by averting an incident which would have resulted in the irreparable damage of Gabriotto's death. By making Gabriotto realize that he has to leave the court, God's supposed intervention keeps him alive and ensures the possibility of the lovers' eventual union. Therefore, the incident may be considered as a rare instance, in *Gabriotto*, of God counteracting the damage which *glück* inflicts on the lovers.

How is the above instance of divine intervention related to the lovers' development as a whole? Is it part of a general endeavour on God's part to secure the lovers' happiness, or merely an isolated incident? Throughout the narrative, the characters entrust God with their hopes regarding the lovers' eventual union. Earlier on, Philomena's confidante Laureta states "ich beger nit mer von Gott/ dann das er ewer fürnemmen/ [...] nach dem aller besten und glückseligsten schicken wôll" (91). Gabriotto, before his first departure from the court, envisages the possibility "das villeicht der Künig abgoht/ oder uns Gott durch ander weg helffen mag" (127). Later, when the situation has become so serious that Gabriotto may have to leave the court for good, Philomena keeps up her hope by reference to God: "ich hoff Gott werd an unserem leyd bald ein verniegen haben/ unnd uns unsern trůbsal in grosse freüd verkeren" (189). None of these expectations are realized.[12] The protagonists' love remains unfulfilled while they are alive: following his departure, Gabriotto dies from a broken heart. Hence God could be seen to disappoint the characters in not responding to their pleadings. In this context, the above incident appears as an isolated instance of support in the characters' struggle with *glück*. This contrasts with the role of God in *Galmy*, where the protagonists, trusting God with their central concern, viz. the rescue of the duchess, are eventually saved from the destruction associated with *glück*. However, the absence of divine intervention as such may need to be considered in conjunction with the characters' own actions. For the characters

[12] Compare p. 199, where Gabriotto, approaching his death, wishes that God may grant his father and Reinhart a happier time than himself. Cf. also p. 217, where Philomena wishes the same to Rosamunda. In both instances, the wishes are to no avail.

themselves might be said to be lacking in determination to attain the end they so desire. Gabriotto displays no more initiative after having left the court. Instead, he puts his hope in the affair with Philomena in *glück*: "wer weyßt/ glück mag sich villeicht zů letst mein erbarmen/ und mich als meins leyds mit hauffen ergetzen" (182). The same hope is repeated twice on p. 188. Thus Gabriotto resigns from any active attempt to realize his love for Philomena and instead remains passive, apparently waiting for *glück* to change the situation in his favour, which it does not. Therefore, *glück*'s destructive effect on the lovers is unimpeded not only on the superhuman, but also on the human level. While *Galmy*'s protagonists join God in ruling out *glück*, in *Gabriotto*, the absence of God as a counter-force to *glück* is aggravated by the characters' inertia.

Regardless of the lack of divine support which the lovers experience during their life-time, Philomena links Gabriotto's death to the will of God. On receiving his heart which has been cut out of his dead body she comments:

"dieweil nun Gott das also gefůgt/ das du edles und ußerwôltes hertz/ in leiblicher gstalt nimmer zů mir hast môgen kummen/ und aber on mich nit hast môgen vergraben werden/ so danck ich Gott solcher reichen gaben" (216).

Thus Philomena seems to accept Gabriotto's death as the work of God. In fact the arrival of Gabriotto's heart puts her in a state of amorous rapture, culminating in her willing herself to death so as to join him. At this stage, Philomena regards her and Gabriotto's development as a divinely determined sequence which finds fulfilment in their joint death. That Philomena perceives divine governance to be present throughout their development might be implied by the following conclusion, which she earlier draws from the knights' rescue at sea: "dardurch gewißlich ewer wolfart mag erkennt werden/ also das Gott der Allmechtig noch vil wunder mit euch wircken will" (167). This acknowledgment of divine determination ties in with Gabriotto's explicitly linking the moment of his death to the will of God (cf. 136) when he is faced with the uncertainty of the journey by sea. Against this background, the tragic outcome of the lovers' development could be considered by them as having been intended by God from the beginning of their acquaintance. Philomena seems to regard Gabriotto's death as a climactic element in their relationship in that it prompts her to realize the intensity of her love and follow him into death; to her, their joint death results in a deeper union than they were ever able to have during their life-time. These perceptions run along the lines of traditional representations of tragic

love.[13] Together with the acceptance of Gabriotto's death as God-sent, they mean that the cruel effect which it might be expected to have on Philomena is diminished. However, Philomena's view forms an exception. She is the only character to evaluate the death of her beloved in such a positive light, which suggests that this attitude is not one to be attained to easily.

Among the other characters, the general consensus is that Gabriotto's death is a wrong. The king, whose murderous plot forces Gabriotto away from the court and towards his death, eventually acknowledges that through these actions, he himself is responsible for Philomena's death. He realizes that he has acted against the laws of God: "O Gott/ wer würt mich gegen dir immer und ewiglich entschuldigen" (218). This suggests that the king's cruel actions are opposed to the will of God.[14] Hence it is possible, in the world depicted in this narrative, to act against the laws of God and cause irreparable damage in doing so. To his remaining friends, Gabriotto's death is unbearable. They are devastated: Reinhart dies because he cannot accept it, and is promptly followed by a grief-stricken Rosamunda. Rosamunda's parents evaluate their daughter's sad end as a definite wrong, and are not willing to accept it as sent by God (cf. 226). Instead, her father addresses their outrage with regard to the humanly inflicted injustice to God ("ich Gott von hymmel klagen můß [...]", 226). Thus the bereaved raise the problem of how God can let it happen that a human being should inflict irreversible injustice on another while breaking divine laws. That this problem is raised, and that the characters who articulate it cannot reconcile themselves to its existence is a remarkable feature of *Gabriotto und Reinhart*, which has no equivalent in Wickram's other narratives.[15] Rosamunda's distraught parents have the last word;

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[13] Cf. e.g. Gottfried von Straßburg's *Tristan und Isolde*.

[14] Philomena's point of view obviously differs from this attitude.

[15] This view is also held by Jan Knopf: "Die Glückserfahrung markiert die neue Qualität der Welt: diese erweist sich als unzuverlässig [...] Der göttliche Heilsplan bürgt nicht mehr für die Gewähr, daß das Gute Zeichen setzt und das Böse bestraft wird; er ist fehlbar und wankelmütig; auf den guten Menschen ist in der Welt keine Rücksicht genommen" ("Versicherung des Mitmenschen. Arbeit, Freundschaft und Glück in Jörg Wickrams Romanen", in J. K., *Frühzeit des Bürgers* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1978), p. 46). With regard to the conclusion of the narrative, Knopf comments: "[Wickrams] Figuren [bleiben] bar der Demut: sie verklagen Gott, der es nicht zuließ, daß die 'Ehrlichkeit' der Liebenden über die Konvention zu siegen vermochte. Gott wird angerufen, aber zugleich in seiner Güte bezweifelt. Die moralische Beurteilung bleibt aus, keine Mahnung, kein Einlenken erfolgt; die Warnung, die der Titel ausspricht, wird eingelöst damit, daß die Liebenden und nicht Gott recht behalten: das Glück ließe sich schon auf Erden arrangieren, wenn Gott die Möglichkeit dazu eröffnet (das heißt, den Tod der Liebenden nicht zugelassen) hätte" (p.46). Knopf is certainly right in pointing out the fact that this narrative does not end on a humble note. The remaining characters do not accept what has happened, there is no reconciliation of their grief with a higher sense of what is right. However, it is hard to see that they accuse God of actually *preventing* the lovers' happiness. Nor would such an accusation accord with the absence of narratorial comments regarding God's direct responsibility for the chain of events.

the narrator, while not taking an explicit stance on the matter, concludes the narrative by referring to life on earth as *zergengliche[s] jamerthal* (226). This indicates that the disconsolate attitude towards the outcome of events, and by implication also towards God, is the predominant one in the narrative. It differs significantly from that of Philomena, which in turn suggests that the workings of God are open to interpretation and to a certain extent depend on the respective character's point of view. The fact that there is no agreement among the characters about the will of God in relation to the protagonists' lives might be further indication of the fact that God's presence is far from tangible, and may even be ambiguous when compared to *Galmy*.

How does the supposed absence of God from the characters' demise go together with his intervention earlier in the narrative? In other words, why does God intervene in some cases which are adverse to the couples' future happiness, most notably the attempted poisoning, but not in others such as Gabriotto's expulsion from court and his death as well as the deaths of the others? The reason for this may be that God influences only situations that are, in various ways, external, i.e. situations which originate independently of a person's conscious involvement such as the murder plot. Opposed to these situations are internal situations which are generated by the affected characters' own thoughts and actions, and as such are within their control. These would include the king's disapproval of Gabriotto's social standing, his discovering the continuation of the love-affair, and most importantly Gabriotto's boundless grieving for Philomena which eventually results in his death. While God seems to be in charge of external circumstances in the above sense, he might not have the same degree of involvement in internal, emotional causes. Hence Gabriotto's death could ultimately be self-inflicted.

The notion that the lovers' untimely death could be seen to result from certain shortcomings in their own behaviour is reinforced when we consider their development as a whole. While the question of whether the lovers actually have a choice as regards pursuing their love despite being warned through terrifying exempla remains ambiguous,[16] their subsequent carelessness seems entirely

[16] According to Müller, the fact that Gabriotto does not apply the warning examples to his own situation suggests that "Exempla sind nicht eindeutig, sondern von der Situation her auszudeuten" (Jan-Dirk Müller, "Volksbuch/Prosaroman im 15./16. Jahrhundert - Perspektiven der Forschung", *IASL* 1. Sonderheft (1985), p. 83). Hence Gabriotto's demise "erscheint nicht als exemplarische Strafe: Es löst nicht Genugtuung über das bestätigte Gesetz aus, sondern Anteilnahme [...] und appelliert daher auf eine Ausnahme wenigstens diesmal: Solche vorbildliche Liebe dürfte nicht an den Verhältnissen scheitern. Das Interesse am besonderen Fall verdrängt die verallgemeinerbare Lehre [...] Dem Leser wird zugleich Distanz und Identifikation mit einem Geschehen zugemutet, das den schlichten Verlauf der Exempel überschießt" (83). What is more, "[d]as vorbildhafte Leiden (statt Handeln) kann sogar durch [...] mangelnde Affektkontrolle [...] mitverschuldet sein, ohne daß dies die einfühlende Teilnahme beeinträchtigte: Sie ist nicht auf die Repräsentanz allgemeiner Normen im besonderen

avoidable. Despite theoretical awareness of the dangers inherent in a love such as theirs, they are unable to exercise the necessary caution, even though they are repeatedly warned in more specific ways. Thus Laureta, after addressing her hopes for the couples to God (cf. p. 91), continues: "[ich] will [...] euch nach meinem besten beduncken einen raht anzeygen/ wo ir dem also nachkummen/ bin ich der hoffnung/ euch nymmer übels davon bekummen soll" (91). According to this advice, the lovers should do everything to keep their love a total secret. Moreover, Gabriotto should make himself indispensable to the king in order to get promoted so that the social gap between him and Philomena would no longer present a problem to their union. Laureta's speech implies that divine support in no way eliminates the need for the characters to act with consideration and care in order to achieve their aims. In other words, divine support on its own is not sufficient to realize these aims. Had the lovers followed Laureta, they might have prevented their discovery or eliminated the reason for the king's resentment of Gabriotto. Yet they do not seem to heed any of her advice, for they carry out neither of the suggestions. It seems feasible that the king's resentment of Gabriotto might have been corrected, if only Gabriotto had held out for a while or had actively tried to prove his valour.[17] But, Gabriotto does nothing to change the climate adverse to his relationship. Therefore, the lovers may be considered to contribute strongly to their own predicament. This and the fact that Gabriotto might have prevented his death and hence that of the others if only he had controlled his excessive emotions,[18] suggests that the development of the narrative owes more to the characters' actions than to specific intervention by God. That is, the lovers' lack of ability to achieve their aims may clear God of his responsibility. Yet the fact that it is possible for incidents as crucial as a character's death to happen without

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Einzelschicksal angewiesen" (106). This evaluation suggests that there is a certain ambivalence in the narrator's attitude: the appeal to exercise self-control is balanced with the need for empathy with the lovers.

[17] That this is indeed practicable might be suggested by the fact that it is successfully practised by Lewfrid in *Goldfaden*.

[18] Roloff juxtaposes the emotional demands of the protagonists with the demands of society: "Die Konvention der Gesellschaft erweist sich als stärker und wichtiger als der Gefühlsanspruch des einzelnen. Wer sich ans Gefühl verliert, erleidet solch ein Schicksal, deshalb sind Vernünftigkeit und Läuterung der Affekte erforderlich. Allerdings übt Wickram eine deutliche Kritik an diesem moralischen Rationalismus, indem er die Hofgesellschaft angesichts des Todes der Liebenden in [...] Reue und Klagen ob ihres eigenen Verhaltens ausbrechen läßt. Die Speculum-Funktion des Romans liegt in der Warnung zur Abkehr von solchen Verhaltensweisen auf beiden Seiten. Schrankenlose Emotionalität und starrer moralischer Rationalismus führen zur Katastrophe; das angestrebte Ziel soll in der vernünftigen Synthese beider Extreme liegen, um derartige 'Unfälle' zu verhindern" (Hans-Gert Roloff, "Anfänge des deutschen Prosaromans", in (ed.) Helmut Koopmann, *Handbuch des deutschen Romans* (Düsseldorf: Bagel, 1983), p. 77). Hence Roloff, similarly to Müller, suggests that the narrative implies both that the lovers should, or could have controlled themselves, and that the courtly society should have been more accommodating.

God's having directly effected them implies that the link between God and his creatures is loosening. God's presence consists not so much in definite physical and hence visible intervention as in tacit acceptance of the characters' own plans and activities. In other words, the characters' actions seem to be relatively self-contained, pushing God towards the margin of the narrative framework. In *Gabriotto*, God is represented as withdrawn from human affairs when compared to the concrete divine intervention that appears to affect the characters in *Galmy*.

In the absence of God, to what extent is *glück* implicated in the lovers' failure to fulfil their love? As we have seen, *glück* is constantly associated with situations which further the lovers' negative development. In this respect, *glück* might be said to contribute towards their eventual demise. However, the most significant impact of *glück* appears to result from the characters' perception of it, rather than from *glück* itself. Even after they have repeatedly experienced severe inflictions at the hands of *glück*, the characters do not cease to hope for a change in its disposition. When there is no prospect of happiness left, i.e. when Gabriotto realizes that he has to leave the court for an indefinite time, he puts his hope in the affair with Philomena in *glück*: "wer weyßt/ glück mag sich villeicht zů letst mein erbarmen/ und mich als meins leyds mit hauffen ergetzen" (182; cf. also p. 188). This is his last word on the situation: he subsequently abstains from even considering any remedies, practical or psychological, for their predicament. However, there is no mention of an actual intervention of *glück* after the jester has betrayed Gabriotto's feelings to the king. It affects neither positively nor negatively the events spanning the period from Gabriotto's departure from the court to his death. Rather, Gabriotto's death seems to stem from his unwillingness or inability to act or even to sustain his vitality. This situation is created not by *glück*, but by Gabriotto's belief in *glück*, i.e. by Gabriotto himself. It appears to be a certain fatalism resulting from the belief in the overwhelming power of *glück* on Gabriotto's part that effects his demise and, as a result, that of the other protagonists. Hence the characters' perception of *glück* would seem to be at least as important for their development as the instances of *glück*'s actual intervention. But, unlike God, *glück* as such has an important role in initiating the protagonists' course towards destruction.

Finally, to sum up the relation between *glück* and God in *Gabriotto*: *Gabriotto* depicts the existence of *glück* in the most extreme form of all of Wickram's narratives. The instances of *glück*'s intervention outnumber those of God's. More importantly, *glück* is not counteracted by God at crucial points of the protagonists' development. While *Galmy* was marked by a complementary distribution of certain critical incidents between *glück* and God, by and large attributing positive incidents to God and

negative incidents to *glück*, this kind of distribution is, barring one incident, absent from *Gabriotto*.[19] *glück* is never defeated for good; there is an unresolved tension between *glück* and God, in fact, one might even say that *glück* prevails in the end. How, then, does this pattern relate to the traditional Boethian account of the coexistence of *glück* and God according to which *glück* is subordinated to God? The fact that God does not counteract what results from the workings of *glück* on the same profane level of human existence could be considered as a Boethian feature. But it is perceived by the majority of the protagonists as God's failure to reverse the destructive effect of *glück*. As a result, *glück* appears to be separated from God, which means that genuinely bad things may affect the characters at random. However, a very different view is held by Philomena. She perceives God's workings on an altogether different, i.e. transcendental level, leading her to interpret Gabriotto's death as God-sent. To her, it is the otherworldly significance of his death rather than its physical implication which is important. Philomena feels that their love, after having been to some extent prevented on a material level by *glück*, is meant to be fulfilled in a transcendental realm. The relation between two parallel realms of existence, material on the one hand and transcendental on the other, which is further characterized by the latter's potential to compensate for shortcomings of the former, might strike one as reminiscent of Boethius. Still Wickram provides it with a peculiar twist in that Philomena sees Gabriotto's death as a challenge to her commitment to Gabriotto rather than God, as one would expect in Boethian fashion. Although Philomena's view makes it possible to reconcile the incidents attributed to *glück* with a view of the world as governed by God, the majority of characters as well as the narrator do not recognize the transcendental perspective of divine presence. This gives the overall impression that God fails to intervene in critical moments of the protagonists' development, including those stemming from *glück*. The fact that God is generally perceived to be detached from *glück* means that *glück* is invested with an autonomy which is not contained in the Boethian account. Therefore, disillusionment with God pervades crucial parts of the narrative. This may disappoint the reader's sense of justice, as there is no assurance in the narrative that God favours and protects the good. The peculiar representation of *glück* might result from its being part of a literary formula. That is, this narrative represents a different genre from *Galmy*, namely the tragic romance. As such, the four protagonists' development would be the result of their succumbing to the 'death of a broken heart'. The pattern of fickle and ultimately destructive *glück* might be inherently tied up with the pattern 'death of a

[19] Cf. von Ertzdorff's evaluation of *glück* in *Gabriotto und Reinhart* as "eigentliche lenkende Instanz" (Xenja von Ertzdorff, *op. cit.*, p. 114).

broken heart', and with the genre in which the latter is incorporated. However, the uncontrolled intervention of *glück* could have meaning that goes beyond literary categories.[20] For it suggests an element of increased realism in the representation of human affairs in *Gabriotto* when compared to *Galmy*. Realism might be detected in the extent to which God is represented as withholding his concrete intervention from the lives of the characters when compared to the ultimately protected world of *Galmy*. The fact that the presence of *glück* emanates uncertainty and injustice means that the idealistic parameters of *Galmy* are left behind in favour of a harsher view of the world, which is somewhat less black and white.

[20] In any case, *glück* in this narrative is infinitely more significant than Fauth's evaluation would suggest: "Zur Ausschmückung in Gespräch und Erzählung nimmt Wickram auch hier [i.e. in *Gabriotto*] wieder die Glücksanrufe" (Gertrud Fauth, "Wickram als Quelle für die Kulturgeschichte seiner Zeit", in G. F., *Jörg Wickrams Romane* (Straßburg: Trübner, 1916) pp. 115-136, p. 85).

Chapter 7

Der Knabenspiegel

Der Knabenspiegel (1554) recounts the disobedience of aristocratic Wilbaldus towards his parents and teacher, his descent into poverty and eventually, his reform and reunion with his family. The framework of this narrative is loosely based on the parable of the prodigal son. Wilbaldus' development is juxtaposed with the smooth advancement of his childhood companion, peasant-born Fridbert, who is represented as a typical *Aufsteiger*.[1] Both *glück* and God are referred to by characters and narrator in the course of the narrative. Again, I will look for a pattern according to which certain turns of the narrative are attributed to either force. That is, is there an element of coordination between the two forces, or are they characterized by antagonism, and if so, which force prevails?

The narrative begins with Fridbert and Wilbaldus growing up in identical circumstances. Since Wilbaldus' father Gottlieb has taken Fridbert into his care, they receive exactly the same upbringing. But, Wilbaldus soon starts to exhibit signs of disobedience: he falls in with bad company and shows disrespect towards his parents. Shocked by his son's attitude, Gottlieb makes the first significant reference to a superhuman force:[2]

"O du mein himmlischer Vatter wie seind doch deine gaben so wunderbarlich under die menschen außgeteylt/ Dann diser mein son mir des ein war exempel ist/ ich wolt in gern auff kunst und tugend aufferziehen lassen [...] so nimpt er im anders für" (25).

Thus Gottlieb accepts Wilbaldus' waywardness as God-given, which may need to be considered against the background of earlier, general acknowledgments of children being a gift from God (cf. e.g. 9). This reference to God may be surprising in that, given Gottlieb's endeavours in raising his son, Wilbaldus' disobedience might seem

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[1] The protagonists' names speak for themselves. 'Wilbaldus' suggests wilfulness; thus Müller claims that the name Wilbald "[bringt] die reformatorische Skepsis gegen den Willen zum Ausdruck" (Jan-Dirk Müller, "Transformation allegorischer Strukturen im frühen Prosa-Roman", in (eds.) Wolfgang Harms and Klaus Speckenbach, *Bildhafte Rede in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit: Probleme ihrer Legitimation und ihrer Funktion* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1992), p. 282). 'Fridbert' implies tranquillity and obedience.

[2] There is previous reference to a superhuman power when Gottlieb's predecessor dies and thus leaves a vacancy to be occupied by him. The *Hochmeister* comments on the situation: "nun hat sich das glück jetz gleich gegen im [i.e. Gottlieb] erblicket" (8). However, this instance of *glück*'s positive intervention is in no way relevant for the narrative's central story, which is why it is not given further consideration here.

undeserved; as such, it would fit into the category of incidents that in the romances considered previously are usually attributed to *glück*. The fact that Gottlieb nevertheless attributes the situation to God suggests that *Knabenspiegel* adheres to a more distinctly Christian interpretation of events than the romances, which ties in with the biblical inspiration of this narrative. Accepting Wilbaldus' disobedience as sent by God means that Gottlieb does not perceive it as unjust. Considering that Wilbaldus is being brought up under exactly the same conditions as virtuous Fridbert, his negative development may be an example of the unpredictability inherent in human affairs, whose outcome it is futile to question.[3]

Wilbaldus' disobedience subsequently increases in severity. He attacks his teacher Felix with a knife and then runs away with his evil friend Lottarius. This prompts Gottlieb to hold *glück* responsible for his son's negative development, even though he had previously attributed it to God:

"O Fortuna, wie bistu so ein unstanthaffte Gŏttin/ [...] hab ich [Wilbaldus und Fridbert] beid mit einem [...] Pedagogen versehen/ welchem ich meines Sones halben/ kein schuld mehr geben kan/ [...] was ist aber geschehen/ diser meines meyers son/ den hastu O glück mit deinen gnaden angesehen/ den andren meinen Son/ so von adelichen geblůt erboren/ den hastu schmehlichen under deine fůß getretten/ Darumb dir dann gar nichts zů getreüwen/ O du ungetrewes glück/ wie hastu mich armen Ritter in so grosses ellend gesetzet/ Dann ich all mein hoffnung auff disen Son gestelt hab" (42f).

In this elaborate passage, Gottlieb attributes the differences in the boys' development, which arise in spite of similar conditions, to *glück*. In doing so, his previous submission to the course of events gives way to a certain amount of bitterness. Lamenting the spitefulness of *glück*, he expresses elements of the traditional view of Fortuna as a malicious, fickle force. By attributing to *glück* a situation which he experiences as unjust, Gottlieb's view of *glück*'s effect on human life seems to conform to the one generally held by the romances' protagonists. But Gottlieb's view is distinguished by the fact that he does not regard *glück*'s intervention as being in opposition to, or separate from the will of God. For he draws the following conclusion:

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[3] Maché remarks on Gottlieb's view on the peculiar distribution of divine gifts: "Es ist offenkundig, daß Wickram hier die Lieblingsthese des Adels von der Erblichkeit edler Eigenschaften widerlegen will; denn eben die *wunderbarliche* Verteilung göttlicher Gaben verbindet der Dichter aufs engste mit sozialer Mobilität und dem Recht des Einzelnen auf eine bestmögliche Entwicklung seiner Anlagen" (Ulrich Maché, "Soziale Mobilität in den Romanen Georg Wickrams", in (eds.) Joseph Strelka and Jörg Jungmayr, *Virtus et fortuna: Festschrift für Hans-Gert Roloff zu seinem 50. Geburtstag*, (Bern: Lang, 1983), p. 193).

so wil ichs Gott meinem schöpffer befelhen/ und meinen Son gantz auß meinem hertzen schliessen/ Disen meinen angenummen Son Fridbertum für meinen rechten und lieben Son haben/ dieweil es veilicht also Gottes willen geordnet hat (43).

Gottlieb does not perceive a clash between *glück*'s workings and the will of God. He is prepared to accept what is caused by *glück* as part of God's bigger plan. He even considers it possible that the result of *glück*'s workings may be part of God's explicit will. Consequently, he detects a challenge in the painful situation which might point him to a meaningful development, namely to accept Fridbert in Wilbaldus' stead.[4] Despite the ultimate dominance of God, the mention of *glück* in this instance deserves a closer look. It is important that although God is credited with a possible positive design regarding the outcome of the situation, Wilbaldus' negative development is no longer directly attributed to him, but to *glück*. The fact that *glück* is brought in not immediately, but only at the advanced stage of Wilbaldus' descent into disobedience may suggest that his development has taken a turn for the worse so extreme that it is inconceivable that God should have inflicted it. Thus a direct association of God with negative things is avoided while the notion of his omnipotence is maintained. That is, the relation between *glück* and God, at this stage, is clearly reminiscent of the Boethian tradition; both with regard to the subordination of *glück* to God, and in as far as *glück* is used to relieve God from being directly associated with negative incidents. The explicit recognition of divine presence behind the workings of *glück* further underlines the Christian orientation of *Knabenspiegel*.

While *glück*, according to Gottlieb, causes Wilbaldus to live a life of debauchery, Fridbert and Felix excel in their studies. They are such remarkable students that Gottlieb would like to send them to university, only, he cannot afford the cost of doing so. Then, Gottlieb's employer, the *Hochmeister*, decides to provide the necessary funding. This incident, which is the first positive thing to happen to Gottlieb in a long time, is initially associated with *glück*. The narrator introduces it with the following words: "Das unstet wanckelmůtig gelück wolt sich doch zů lest eins teils über den gůten [...] Ritter erbarmen/ unnd dis geschach semlicher gestalt [...]" (44). However, when Fridbert and Felix learn of the decision, they relate it to a different source: "Sie danckten Gott umb solch grosse gůtat" (46). This interpretation of the incident as the work of God points out the young men's piety and, more importantly, conforms to a pattern familiar from the previous narratives, i.e. the

[4] Wilbaldus' mother, however, cannot bear her husband's submission to what he perceives as divine will, and dies - perhaps a sign of her inability to meet the challenge set by God, but also a further element in Gottlieb's suffering (cf. p. 43).

tendency to attribute positive events to God. How is the reference to God compatible with the point of view earlier assumed by the narrator? Leaving aside the possibility of accidental inconsistency, the difference in interpretation may be related to the way in which the *Hochmeister*'s decision affects the character in question. The narrator's description of the incident refers to how Gottlieb is affected by the news; since the impact of *glück* looms large in Gottlieb's life in the shape of Wilbaldus' disobedience, his employer's decision might appear to Gottlieb in the first place as a sign of sudden change for the better in *glück*'s attitude. Fridbert and Felix, by contrast, have not been afflicted by *glück* so far, which may be why it does not occur to them to refer to *glück*, but rather to what may be considered as the ultimate source of positive things, namely God. Besides, Gottlieb does not personally address *glück* with regard to the matter, while Fridbert and Felix do. The difference in attribution may be due to the distinction between narratorial voice on the one hand, and the voice of the characters themselves on the other. It is appropriate for the characters to thank God even if *glück* might have intervened, since *glück* may ultimately be subordinated to God, as implied by Gottlieb's earlier statement. The narrator, however, may be exempt from this convention, resulting in different interpretative strategies.

Fridbert and Felix' success contrasts with the decline of Wilbaldus. After a period of intense debauchery, he finds himself penniless and socially isolated. When he realizes that even his evil companion Lottarius is about to desert him, Wilbaldus complains: "O unglück/ wie hast du mich in so ein grosse fortun gefürt" (50). Assuming that *unglück* is a variant expression for negative *glück*, this comment continues the tendency to attribute negative developments to *glück* rather than God. Objectively, Wilbaldus' misery is not unjust or pitiful. Rather, his reference to *glück* expresses the injustice which he feels characterizes his suffering. This suggests how the experience of injustice associated with *glück* may be purely subjective. Wilbaldus' suffering is later associated with God when it has become clear that it was the condition for his reform. At this stage, however, Wilbaldus is unable to see the hand of God due to a lack of spiritual insight. In this respect, *glück* comes across as a force which genuinely opposes the protagonist's aims and well-being.

Having blamed *unglück* for bringing him into his misery, Wilbaldus later associates God with the possibility of rescue:

'wolan ich will mein hoffnung und trost zů Gott meinem Herren setzen/ ich weyß er würt mich nit verlassen/ und mich wider in meines Vatters hauß bringen/ wie er dann auch dem verlornen Son geton" (77).

Thus God is credited with the potential to help Wilbaldus out of the situation into

which he has been led by *glück*. This reasserts the positive bias towards God and negative bias towards *glück* with which we are familiar from the earlier narratives. God is credited with being able to undo the harm done by *glück*, which suggests that God is considered to be more powerful as well as more beneficial than *glück*. While this stands unchallenged, a more detached, and spiritually perceptive interpretation later claims that God is involved in both Wilbaldus' hardship and its resolution. This indicates that the dichotomy expressed by references to *glück* and God as made at this stage of the narrative stems from the limitations of Wilbaldus' narrow perception. In other words, self-indulgence may temporarily prevent Wilbaldus from seeing the full effect of divine will.

For the time being, let us consider God's part in Wilbaldus' rescue. Wilbaldus bases his trust in God's redemptive power on a biblical precedent, the parable of the prodigal son (Luke 15, 11-32). The pattern provided by this story demands that God ultimately favour Wilbaldus. By tracing Wilbaldus' reform step by step, we may consider how God actually shapes it, and how this is related to *glück*. After realizing the wrongfulness of his behaviour, Wilbaldus goes through a period of extensive humility during which he earns his keep as a herdsman. With regard to Wilbaldus' extremely impoverished situation, we learn that "in Gott ziblen und knoblauch bereit" (66), i.e. that God provides him with some -however frugal- nourishment. Thus it is with the help of God that Wilbaldus just about manages to survive. As he is struggling to eke out a living, he receives a significant blow which is introduced by reference to *glück*: "es wolt aber das unstet und wanckelmůtig gelück noch nit vernůgt sein" (66). The passage continues with "dann [...]", and relates how wolves approach Wilbaldus' flock while he is asleep and kill most of it. Hence the appearance of the wolves is attributed to *glück*. While God is credited with providing essentials and in doing so supporting Wilbaldus' status quo, *glück* manifests itself in disrupting this status. As a result of *glück*'s interference, Wilbaldus feels compelled to flee from his employer for fear of being accused of negligence, forcing him to spend a horrific night in the woods. Subsequently, he has to look for a new job, which means enduring more humiliation. Coming at a point when Wilbaldus is in the process of atoning for his faults, this disruption to his life may seem somewhat undeserved. Therefore, the reference to *glück* is in keeping with what has emerged as the general pattern of distributing negative and positive incidents between *glück* and God respectively. Since it is the narrator who attributes the character's experience to *glück*, rather than the character himself, the injustice appears to be more objective than in the earlier instance where the impact of *glück* was stated only by Wilbaldus himself. This could mark an improvement in Wilbaldus' moral status. The reference to *glück*

could possibly express the narrator's pity for the reformed Wilbaldus, and as such be supposed to stimulate similar feelings in the reader. However, there is a limit to such pity. The instance might after all be acceptable as part of Wilbaldus' penance. Hence the narratorial reference to *glück* could be seen to result from a point of view whose limitations are similar to that of Wilbaldus to the extent that it does not as yet consider his temporary suffering as a condition for his eventual advancement. This suggests that the narrator's point of view is not necessarily superior to that of the characters; in other words, the narrator may not always display a greater amount of insight or foresight than the characters do.

Not long after Wilbaldus expresses the hope of being received back into his family, this hope actually becomes true. After a period of hardship spent looking after various sorts of animals, Wilbaldus' reintegration into his family and good society has its source in an apparently coincidental meeting with Fridbert and Felix. Prior to this meeting, *glück* is invoked by the narrator:

Wan das glück einen stürtzen will/ kan er zů hoch nit sitzen/ es wirfft in zů boden/ will es dann einen erheben/ mag er so dieff im kot nit ligen/ es kan im haraußß helffen/ also wird es dem gůten Wilibaldo jetzundt auch gon (80).

This comment implies that the subsequent incident, i.e. Wilbaldus' meeting with Fridbert and Felix, is due to *glück*. What happens is that Fridbert and Felix, by now in the *Hochmeister*'s service, attend a congress in Vladißlavia, and it is in the very same place that Wilbaldus tries to earn a living as a newly established musician. Wilbaldus walks into the inn at which Fridbert and Felix are staying, and reveals his story in a song. His former companions recognize a change for the better in Wilbaldus, and consequently persuade him to return home with them and face his father. This eventually leads to Wilbaldus' reintegration, in the process of which he gains a respected position both in his family and in society. According to the narrator's comment, the train of events in question illustrates a characteristic of *glück*, i.e. its turning the situation of a person into its opposite, apparently regardless of the person's own actions. This characteristic seems to point to the motion of the wheel of Fortuna, which constitutes a passive process as far as the affected person is concerned. The above incident is rare in Wickram's narratives in that it depicts *glück* as effecting an overall change for the better, relieving Wilbaldus from the misery attributed to *glück* in the first place. The positive impact of *glück* is also unusual in light of traditional views of the wheel of Fortuna, which tend to focus on the negative consequences of the wheel's downward motion. Within the context of the narrative, the intervention of *glück* may be surprising in view of the fact that Wilbaldus earlier

entrusts his hope of redemption to God. Yet this reference to *glück* could be explained when considering that the last significant development experienced by Wilbaldus prior to the meeting was occasioned by negative *glück*, which is why the above passage might simply relate back to the discourse on *glück*. Moreover, the reference might stem from the fact that the narrator at this stage is not concerned with gauging the spiritual resonance of events. Instead, he may be using the reference to *glück* as a means to imbue the narrative with a certain melodrama.

A different point of view is reached later in the narrative, when Wilbaldus himself gives an account of the crucial meeting. Having been received back into the family, he is moved to the following statement:

"Gott sey gedancket/ der mich zů Vladißlavia zů uch [i.e. Fridbert and Felix] gefůret/ und mir wider zů sollichem schwert geholffen/ so das mich mein Herr und vatter in gnaden auffgenummen/ und ich euch alsampt in grossen wirdin und eren funden" (98).

In retrospect, God is now credited with virtually the same action with which *glück* is attributed before by the narrator. Thus the pattern that marked the references to the boys' being sent to university by the *Hochmeister* recurs. Again, what could the differentiation mean? Given the Christian framework of the narrative, we may exclude the possibility of the narrator revealing that the characters are deluded in their attributing an incident to God. At the same time, it would be absurd to assume that the narrator, in referring to *glück*, is deluded, while the characters are in possession of greater insight than his. Therefore, neither attribution should be considered as wrong. Instead, both *glück* and God could be working simultaneously, without necessarily doing so on the same level, or with the same intention. Their apparent simultaneousness could be explained by *glück* being subordinated to God. The alternation between *glück* and God as the source of an event would then be due to a difference in the respective speaker's perception as regards the intentions of the responsible force in question. While the intentions of *glück* might be considered as rather temporary, the intentions of God would seem to transcend the moment of intervention by being part of a larger plan; this is suggested for instance when Wilbaldus thanks God not merely for arranging the meeting with the others, but also for supporting his subsequent reintegration into his family. Further, *glück*'s intervention seems to be considered as random, that is, even though it results in Wilbaldus' reintegration into society, this may not have been deliberately intended by *glück*. By contrast, the intervention of God appears to be guided by a moral principle, according to which Wilbaldus is rewarded for his atonement. Therefore, the different

perceptions of Wilbaldus' reunion with Fridbert and Felix could simply reflect a difference in the level on which it is perceived, rather than juxtaposing incompatible and mutually exclusive alternatives.

However helpful *glück* is initially considered to be by the narrator in furthering Wilbaldus' reintegration, the view that the positive turn in his development is caused by God ultimately prevails. Thus the notion that God has effected Wilbaldus' return is expressed also by the *Hochmeister*:

so aber Gott der almechtig der sach wider dahin het kummen lassen/ das Wilbaldus der verloren son wider funden und zů land kummen wer/ deßgleich vil angst und noth můh und arbeit erlitten/ wer er [der Hochmeister] der hoffnung er solt seine kindtschůh [...] zerbrochen haben (108).

Since the *Hochmeister* represents the highest authority among the characters, and since his evaluation of events provides the final, undisputed word on Wilbaldus' aberrant phase, it is of particular significance. The above statement expresses the belief that God not only arranged Wilbaldus' return to his family, but that he also (*deßgleich*) caused him to suffer poverty and misery. He is believed to have done so for a good reason, viz. that Wilbaldus should learn obedience. This retrospective account attributes God with the undoing of what, according to earlier remarks, is the work of *glück*, i.e. Wilbaldus' suffering. In this respect the reference fits the already established pattern of crediting God with the resolution of a negative situation caused by *glück*. But the above evaluation overrules earlier statements both by Wilbaldus and the narrator that attribute Wilbaldus' misery to *glück*. That is, the *Hochmeister* recognizes divine causation even behind Wilbaldus' suffering. This recognition may be due to the purpose of this suffering's having finally been accomplished. In the light of this outcome, earlier instances of referring Wilbaldus' suffering to *glück*, mainly on the part of Wilbaldus himself, are revealed as superficial, or premature. Hence a characteristic trend emerges from the alternation between references to *glück* and God respectively: later statements tend to show more spiritual insight with regard to the causation of events than earlier ones, often made at the actual time of an event in question. The increase in insight means that the experience of suffering is resolved in a satisfactory way.

Due to this resolution of *glück*'s apparently negative workings in the will of God, the balance between *glück* and God seems perfect towards the end of the narrative. God is credited with directing the central development to a positive

outcome, thus outweighing the role of *glück*.[5] Following his return, Wilbaldus is employed as *Forstmeister*, a positive development which, perhaps due to its relative banality, is attributed to *glück*: "das glück meynet es fast gůt mit mir/ dann mich mein gnådiger Herr zů einem [...] Forstmeister auffgenummen hat" (100). In time he gains an important position at the court; moreover, he is happily married and becomes a father. Gottlieb is overjoyed at these developments, and one might expect the narrative to end on a note of undiluted happiness as the suffering previously inflicted by *glück* on both Gottlieb and Wilbaldus appears to have been eliminated for good. But, *glück* is still active: just before the close of the narrative, the reader is presented with a rather unexpected example of its disruptive nature:

aber daß unstet glückrad/ welches seinen ungewissen lauff nicht verlaßt/ mocht dem gůten alten man solche freüd nicht lang vergunnen/ dann eh das kind eines jars alt was worden/ legt sich der gůt frum alt Ritter nider zů beth und [...]/ ist [...] verscheiden (116ff).

The sense of injustice emanating from this passage is clear. After having suffered intensely through Wilbaldus' disobedience, which even led to the death of his wife, Gottlieb would seem to deserve a longer period of enjoying his now virtuous offspring complete with grandchild. Although, generally speaking, it is obviously within God's power to determine a person's life-span, as numerous references throughout Wickram's narratives testify, Gottlieb's death is attributed to *glück*. It seems to be the injustice of this particular timing that brings to the narrator's mind *glück* rather than God in the context of Gottlieb's death. This suggests that the narrator's reference to *glück* is due not so much to the belief that *glück* is the power which actually causes the death, but is due to the point of view from which the death is considered. This point of view seems to be defined by a specific sense of justice, which is exclusively human in that it disregards the aspect of divine order which would make such a death, as it would make any death, acceptable. Reference to *glück* may be used to convey the subjective experience of injustice. In view of the equilibrium previously established between *glück* and God, the above reference to *glück* may come as something of a surprise. It implies that *glück* is continuously active in human life, its wheel never standing still even when its influence momentarily

[5] Sometimes, the characters' tendency to interpret the will of God can go into overdrive. Thus Gottlieb expresses surprise over the works of God when, towards the end of the narrative, Wilbaldus kills three bears without proper equipment: "ey du lieber Gott wie seind deine urteil so wunderbarlich/ diser mein Son můß gewißlich noch grosse far beston/ dieweil du in in so manchen und grossen geferden bewarest/ ich glaub das er zů einer seltzammen stund an die welt sey kummen/ wolan ich bitt dich/ bewar in alzeit vor schand und laster" (102). The fact that Wilbaldus never experiences the dangers anticipated by Gottlieb makes this statement seem rather pointless.

cannot be felt. According to the above incident, the destructive effect of *glück* on human life may never be ruled out. The experience of injustice, however subjective, remains a permanent threat to the characters, making perfect happiness seem an extremely difficult achievement. For although it is vaguely implied that Gottlieb will receive some form of compensation in heaven ("ist er gantz lieblich auß disem jamertal verscheiden/ wie man dann gemeinlich spricht/ welcher wol låbt der stürbt auch wol", p. 118)[6] , this compensation does not directly counteract the injustice inflicted by *glück* during life on earth. The fragility of earthly happiness could tie in with a religious conviction behind this narrative: if it is part of God's will that life on earth should be a *jamertal*, then to assume otherwise might almost be blasphemous. In this respect, *glück* may be considered to work as an instrument of God, the function of which is both to draw negative incidents away from his scope of action, and to challenge man, thus echoing once more Boethius' account.

Before we sum up the relation between *glück* and God in *Knabenspiegel*, we may consider how this narrative compares to the biblical parable by which it is inspired. The most obvious difference between Wickram's version and the original may be that, in the biblical story, the father is full of unadulterated joy on his repentant son's return and welcomes him back into the family with unconditional love, which serves to illustrate the boundless and forgiving love of Christ. In Wickram, this important aspect is missing. Although Wilbaldus, similar to his biblical predecessor, practises humility, obedience and industry before returning home, his father, on his return, initially acts in an almost hostile way towards him. Wilbaldus is fully accepted back into his family only after a lengthy period of humiliation and penance. This could suggest that Wickram's interpretation of the New Testament episode is rather narrow-minded. Alternatively, it might be that the genre chosen by Wickram demands that the episode be treated in a more realistic way than in the case of parable. While in the New Testament the father, though human, represents the heavenly father, Gottlieb's character is entirely human. This may explain his reluctance to forgive. Instead of demonstrating the superior generosity of God as opposed to man, the narrative opposes Wilbaldus' power to that of Gottlieb. Moreover, Wickram may intend to use the story as an educational means of a certain rigidity; its aim is more profane than that of the original, applying as it does to the necessity of obedience among humans.[7] Apart from this, there is another difference

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[6] Cf. also the narrator's closing remark on the relation between life on earth and the after-life, "Gott der almechtig verlüh allen gleübigen die ewig freüd und seligkeit" (120).

[7] Cf. Jan-Dirk Müller's comment on the relation between the narrative and the parable: "Nimmt man sie [i.e. the parable] beim Wort, dann handelt sie nicht von Erziehung, sondern von Gnade [...] Sie ist daher nur bedingt tauglich als Modell für die Einübung des Einzelnen in die durch die väterliche

between Wickram's narrative and the New Testament, which is more specifically relevant in the context of our considerations. In Wickram's narrative, the negative elements of the prodigal son's development, i.e. his debauchery and subsequent hardship, are attributed to *glück*. *glück* naturally has no place in the New Testament; there, these negative incidents are not assigned to any superhuman source but exclusively to the weakness of the affected person, as befits the instructive purpose of the parable. Wickram's references to *glück* may to some extent stem from the novelist's demand for elaboration and rhetoric. The fact that he must have deemed references to a superhuman, non-Christian force to be compatible with the religious orientation of the original model suggests the importance or popularity which *glück* commanded as an explanatory pattern for Wickram and his readership. Reference to *glück* goes to emphasize the artfulness or artificiality of the narrative, as opposed to the parable, which limits its story to the bare essentials.

If we consider the distribution of positive and negative events between *glück* and God in *Knabenspiegel* as a whole, it is notable that a number of times *glück* and God are being referred to alternatively and independently of one another with regard to the same incident by narrator and character respectively. Because of this, the two forces, as we have seen, come across as working in a parallel and almost interchangeable way, even though, being referred to by separate voices, they are not explicitly represented as concurring. Although their parallelism could be merely accidental, the accordance of *glück* and God's intervention gives the impression of being more than coincidence. The parallelism could suggest that at certain stages of the narrative there is no antagonism between *glück* and God: in retrospect, *glück* appears to support, however deviously, Wilbaldus' reformation rather than genuinely obstructing it. Hence the alternation between *glück* and God may result from a difference in viewpoint. The references to *glück*, which in the cases in question tend to be made by the narrator, might stem from a perspective which is superficial in that it merely relates the incident in question with regard to its immediate impact on the affected person without considering its long-term consequences. Thus reference to *glück* in a negative situation seems to express the spontaneous experience of injustice or suffering, whereas reference to positive *glück* might express the experience of a sudden 'windfall'. The level on which *glück* is perceived could be described as subjective in that it focuses on a character's immediate emotional response. By contrast, reference to God tends to be made when the characters evaluate an incident

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Autorität garantierte Ordnung" (Jan-Dirk Müller, "Vertauschte Väter und Verlorene Söhne. Versuch der sozialhistorischen Entzifferung eines literarischen Motivs bei Jörg Wickram", *Akten des VI. Germanisten-Kongresses Basel 1980 (Jahrbuch für Internationale Germanistik,* Reihe A, vol. 8, 4), Bern: Lang 1980, pp. 247-255 (=1980/III), p. 248.

in retrospect. For they have reached a position of increased maturity and insight. They are aware of the long-term effect of a certain incident, such as Wilbaldus' suffering leading to his rehabilitation, and are therefore more likely to recognize its spiritual importance and consequently its divine source. To the extent that it goes beyond the spontaneous emotional reactions of a person, reference to God might be considered as relatively objective. The compatibility of reference to God and reference to *glück* relies on the assumption that *glück* is subordinated to God. On first sight, it may be surprising that it is often the narrator who refers to *glück*, leaving to the characters the acknowledgment of deliberate consequences as associated with God's working. One might have expected the narrator to represent a perspective which is more mature than that of the characters, rather than the other way around. However, it seems safe to assume that rather than occupying a position of omniscience, the narratorial voice, in the instances in question, is merely reporting events as they occur. The narrator is not removed from the incidents experienced by the characters through engaging in a process of reflection. As such, it is perfectly plausible for him to account for an incident in terms of *glück*'s intervention instead of God's, if this is appropriate in the context. By the same token, the virtuous characters' reference to God does not make them superior to the narrator, since their utterances must in general be in accordance with his view.[8]

A slightly different explanation for the double working of *glück* and God might be that they belong to altogether different discourses, in the sense that different but parallel patterns are employed to explain the origin of certain incidents. This would take the above explanation further. Previously, I have assumed that *glück* merely occupies one level in a two-tiered system of causation which is dominated by God. According to the discourse based on *glück*, *glück* would be the only source of the

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[8] Cf. Ingeborg Spriewald's evaluation of the relation between the narrator and his characters. She claims that the sixteenth century narrator by and large "[bleibt] zwischen (naiv-realistischem) Berichterstatter und Erzieher stecken [...] Der Erzähler ist immer der Autor, [...] er erstattet Bericht und will erziehen, belehren, vergnügen o.ä., er sagt seine Meinung und erhärtet sie mit [...] Beispielen bzw. auch umgekehrt: Er leitet seine Stellungnahme aus dem Erzählten ab. Diese Erzählhaltung [...] ermangelt der (ironischen oder wie immer gebrochenen) Distanz, dabei aber auch der Souveränität der Fiktion; sie ordnet sich der Wirklichkeit spontan und naiv zu [...] Schon, daß es kein fiktives Erzählermedium gibt, engt die erzählperspektivische Gestaltung ein [...] In der Regel berichtet der "allwissende" Erzähler (identisch mit dem Autor) von den Figuren und über ihre Schicksale. Das Bezugssystem zwischen Autor und Erzähler ist naiv-direkt, ebenso sein Verhältnis zum Leser oder Hörer" (Ingeborg Spriewald, "Sensibilisierung und Entwicklungsbetonung als Komponenten differenzierter werdender Menschenauffassung", in I. S., *Vom "Eulenspiegel" zum "Simplicissimus". Zur Genesis des Realismus und den Anfängen deutscher Prosaerzählung* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1978), pp. 58f). This suggests that there is not necessarily much of a distinction between the viewpoints of narrator and characters respectively, which means that their utterances could, on occasion, be interchangeable.

incident under consideration; the same would apply to the discourse on God. While the narrator, in the instances in question, seems to be engaged in a discourse on *glück*, the characters express themselves in a discourse on divine intervention. The fact that this does not prevent them from engaging in the discourse on *glück* with regard to other instances seems to suggest that the coexistence of the discourses cuts across the character-narrator divide. For the moment, let us consider the possibility of parallel discourses in those instances where the narrator's reference to *glück* is juxtaposed with the characters' reference to God. Since the narrative as a whole is moulded on a biblical story, it is appropriate that the characters should refer to God as a central cause of crucial events. For the same reason it is highly improbable that the narrator's attitude should be any less pious than that of his characters. Instead, the narrator's engaging in a *glück*-based discourse could imply that his position as somewhat uninvolved reporter allows for an outlook more profane than that of the characters. The narrator seems to lack a persona in that his utterances are of no consequence for his personal standing. The characters, by contrast, may be measured by their evaluation of a certain incident as to the state of insight they have reached. Wilbaldus' lament to *glück*, for instance, is clearly a sign of his immaturity and delusion. At the same time, the narrator is able to provide the emotional colouring emanating from the reference to *glück* without diminishing his competence. How, then, is it possible for the *glück*-discourse on the one hand, and the God-discourse on the other to coexist? The level on which *glück* is seen to shape the characters' development could be merely rhetorical; as such, it would not pose a threat to the genuine existence of God. The reason for invoking this rhetorical level could be first and foremost the desire to account for those incidents which because of their perceived negative nature are not immediately mentioned in conjunction with God. Reference to *glück* is employed to highlight a person's suffering; it focuses on the injustice caused by the incident in question as perceived by the affected person. This means that reference to *glück* has a subjective component, which is apparent, for instance, in Gottlieb's disappointment over Wilbaldus' misbehaviour, or Wilbaldus' subsequent hardship. This subjective component explains also why *glück* may spontaneously be evoked in cases of unexpected positive development. By comparison, the level of God's presence seems to be considered as real, hence reference to it is literal. Because previously negative incidents once attributed to *glück* are recognized for what they are, viz. as positive, they are attributed to God. The distinction between these two levels of intervention offers a solution for those instances in which characters are shown to perceive a discrepancy between the supposed justice of God and their actual experience. To the extent that reference to *glück* seems to distance a speaker

from the belief in divine determination, the *glück*-based discourse might at first sight be thought to be more 'modern' in outlook than the discourse that refers crucial incidents to God; the *glück*-based discourse acknowledges the existence of randomness in the world. On the other hand, one could argue that references to *glück* display an attitude which is old-fashioned in that it still subscribes to the pagan concept of Fortuna as an explanatory pattern. By the same token, the God-based discourse could be regarded as being liberated from this belief by perceiving the just and rational influence of God; in this respect, it bears the mark of the Reformation and consequently *it* might be said to be more modern. While the question as to which of these two options is closer to the truth depends to a great extent on the exact meaning attributed to *glück*, which we shall consider in the following part (part III), the simultaneous presence of the two discourses in any case suggests that *Knabenspiegel* reflects the parameters of a transitional age.

With regard to the outcome of the core problem of the narrative, God is generally more powerful than *glück*.[9] While Wilbaldus' descent into disobedience is attributed to *glück*, his reform arises at least to some extent from experiencing the hardship which is attributed first to *glück* and then to God. That is, even though *glück* is charged with causing the initial problem, the subsequent development is ultimately governed by God and *glück* revealed as subordinate to God.[10] Nevertheless *glück* is said to perform a certain number of disruptive actions throughout the narrative, even though its autonomy in doing so is limited. Although these actions do not undermine the central moral of the narrative, they provide an antagonistic element to the justice of God. Especially *glück*'s unexpected blow just before the end suggests that *Knabenspiegel* is not a completely idealized account of human life. While Wickram eschews potential accusations of a flawed Christian framework by subordinating *glück* to God as regards the central part of the story, this does not necessarily mean that the characters live in a flawless world in the sense that they encounter no

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[9] To what extent the Christian framework dominates the protagonist's development is suggested by Roloff's comment: "Daß die Reintegration [Wilbaldus'] möglich ist, basiert nicht auf einem Akt vernunftgegründeter Humanität, sondern auf den fundamentalen ethischen Grundsätzen des christlichen Wertsystems. Die Typologie der Figuren ist letztlich nicht im Geschichtlichen, sondern im Biblisch-Tropologischen verankert. Nicht ohne Grund war der filius perditus eine Lieblingsfigur des 16. Jahrhunderts! Auch Wickrams Erziehungskonzept versucht, für die soziale Zukunft die Restitution des ordo christianus anzusetzen" (Hans-Gert Roloff, "Überredung - Unterricht - Ergetzung der Leute. Zur Funktion der Romane Georg Wickrams", *Recherches Germaniques* 9 (1979), p. 270).

[10] Nevertheless we should not forget the educational purpose of the narrative, which can really only work on the assumption of individual free-will. In other words, the degree of divine predetermination as well as that of *glück*'s intervention must ultimately be limited, just as the New Testament's prodigal son is characterized by his independently motivated remorse and reform. This issue will be dealt with in part III.

genuine injustice. As I have shown, *glück* can easily be considered to help carry out the will of God with regard to Wilbaldus: he seems to get his just deserts by experiencing a life of hardship following his severe disobedience. Likewise, the change in *glück* that manifests itself in his meeting of Fridbert and Felix appears to be fair in that he deserves a second chance following his humiliation and reform. However, Gottlieb, who experiences Wilbaldus' misbehaviour as a blow dealt him by *glück* that makes him suffer undeservedly, is affected by *glück* in a different way. Although his suffering is later reversed, it is not completely annihilated in that Gottlieb's wife has died from worry over Wilbaldus. Later, Gottlieb's abrupt death manifests itself as an even more decidedly undeserved blow at the hands of *glück*. This goes to show that even in a world which is governed by God to the extent that *glück* is largely subordinated to him, *glück* is a disruptive presence. In other words, the presence of God is no guarantee for the absence of suffering. Perhaps one might dismiss Gottlieb's suffering by arguing that it is as it were the bigger picture, viz. Wilbaldus' story, which is an unproblematic exemplum of *glück*'s subordination to God, that matters most of all. But even so, the above elements in Gottlieb's development, however minor their importance, mean that the narrative is provided with a touch of realism in so far as a character may suffer irreversibly for no apparent moral fault of his own. This means that *Knabenspiegel* is more than a polished exemplum of the glorious works of God, but also admits a glimpse of a more troubled existence.

How does all this compare to traditional accounts of the effects of God and Fortuna on human existence? As before, Boethius' model may serve as a foil against which to examine the coexistence of God and *glück* characteristic of this narrative. *Knabenspiegel*, similarly to the previous narratives, differs from Boethius in that the narrative shows no sign of distinguishing between levels of intervention in the way that Boethius does. Instead of assigning the workings of *glück* to a material, and those of God to a spiritual level, Wickram represents the intervention of both powers as manifesting themselves on a material level. The fact that they supposedly intervene on the same level renders them more equal, and thus potentially more antagonistic, although this antagonism is limited since Wilbaldus' development is ultimately shown to be shaped by God. Nevertheless, a Boethian trait may be recognizable throughout the narrative, starting with Gottlieb's acceptance of the suffering caused by *glück* as part of a divine plan. On a more general level, the fact that the workings of *glück* are, bar one or two instances, eventually integrated into the will of God, suggests that *glück* is granted less autonomy than in *Galmy* and *Gabriotto*. The strict subordination of *glück* to God suggests a common denominator with Boethius, which

is less apparent in the other narratives. This more exclusively Christian orientation may be tied up with the fact that the narrative development of *Knabenspiegel* functions on different premises. Unlike the romances, be they tragic or not, there is no evil counter-force threatening the desired development of the protagonists from the outside. Instead, the development of Wilbaldus is more markedly internal. The tension between *glück* and God as regards his development may largely be reduced to a tension between different stages of perception. That is, the story is marked by Wilbaldus' development from immaturity to a state of spiritual insight as regards the presence of *glück* and God. It is only towards the end that Wilbaldus recognizes the hand of God behind what had previously been attributed to *glück*, and acts accordingly. Thus the distinction regarding *glück* and God relates to the manner in which they are perceived. This is again reminiscent of Boethius in that the perception of *glück* is based on a consideration of the immediate material impact of an event, while the perception of God stems from a more spiritual point of view. The fact that the tension between *glück* and God is to some extent internalized may be related to *Knabenspiegel*'s strong educational orientation. The instructive purpose is more prominent, and more closely tied up with religious connotations, than in the previous narratives, and entertainment value is not the priority. As a result, the threat immanent in the presence of *glück* as an uncontrollable force is somewhat reduced. Nevertheless, it is only towards the end of the narrative that the suspense inherent in the confrontation between *glück* and God is fully revealed as imaginary: even in the adaptation of a biblical motive, Wickram may feel obliged to satisfy the demands of a good story.

Chapter 8

Der Goldfaden

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of *Der Goldfaden*, written, like *Knabenspiegel*, in 1554, is that its protagonist, Lewfrid, is marked for success from the beginning of the narrative.[1] When his mother is pregnant with him, a tame lion appears at her side; when he is born, Lewfrid displays a birth-mark that is shaped like a lion's paw.[2] These incidents are interpreted by the other characters as indicating Lewfrid's special status, which supposedly consists in being destined to achieve extraordinary success. Thus a merchant named Hermanus, who intends to take Lewfrid into his care, comments: "gewißlich würdt ein mannlicher und theurer held auß disem kind werden/ dann dise und andere zeichen so an im gesehen/ geben des genůgsame und gewisse kundtschafft" (6). Predictions like this provide the story with a special character. Lewfrid's development does indeed turn out accordingly. Starting out as a peasant's son, Lewfrid after trials and tribulations finally marries a socially superior woman and succeeds her father as count. In the light of this peculiar relation between anticipation and completion of the protagonist's development, the influence of *glück* and God is of particular interest: is Lewfrid's development marked by predetermination as divinely ordained fate, and, what role does *glück* play within this framework?

Fascinated by the presence of the lion (cf. 4ff), Hermanus takes the young Lewfrid into his house, thereby exchanging his underprivileged peasant background for that of a well-to-do family. As a result, Lewfrid is given an education which would have been well out of his peasant family's reach. While Hermanus' decision to adopt Lewfrid is not attributed to a superhuman force, it is at least in part triggered by his interpretation of the lion. This suggests that Lewfrid's development depends

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[1] Although *Goldfaden* was the last of Wickram's narratives to be published, it was written before *Von guoten und boesen Nachbaurn*, which is why I generally consider *Nachbaurn* as the last in the sequence.

[2] The lion-motif is a recurrent literary motif. It recalls certain saints' legends, e.g. the legend of St. Jerome. It is also popular in secular works of German fiction, both medieval and early modern. Hartmann von Aue's *Iwein*, for instance, is a prominent example of a text in which the presence of a lion indicates a character's extraordinary gifts. A more explicit parallel to Lewfrid's situation may be found in the story of Herpin, whose new-born son is nursed by a lioness, and is therefore named Lew (cf. *Der weis ritter*, Straßburg 1514, as mentioned by Johannes Bolte in his edition of *Goldtfaden* (*Jörg Wickram: Werke*, vol. 2, Tübingen: Litterarischer Verein, 1901 [= BLVST, 51], p. XXVIII)). An overview of related motifs is provided by Reinhold Jacobi, *Jörg Wickrams Romane. Interpretation unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der zeitgenössischen Erzählprosa*, Diss. Bonn 1970.

substantially on the presence of the lion as a sign of his future success, which, by implication, would appear to originate from a superhuman source as far as the characters are concerned. During his childhood, Lewfrid displays exceptional talents at school. But, his situation soon takes a turn for the worse. Having been made a 'king' by his class-mates, he becomes involved in a fight. The outcome of this fight puts him in an awkward position due to the ensuing hostile atmosphere, and he feels forced to run away from his foster parents.[3] Desperate to find a place to live, Lewfrid finally finds employment at a count's castle.[4] Soon after taking up the position of a kitchen-hand, Lewfrid falls in love with the count's daughter, Angliana. When she does not reciprocate his love, Lewfrid addresses his misery to *glück*:

"O glück [...] /wie bist du so wanckelmůtig gegen mir/ du hast mich in meiner kindheit/ auß meines vatters [...] hüttlin genummen/in welchem mir vil baß gewesen wer/ so ich der zarten [...] tag nit empfunden hett/ so wer ich jetzund meins vatters/ oder eins andern hirten diener/ [...] diser ding aller můß ich armseliger Lewfrid beraubt ston/ daran ich aber niemant dann dich (O glück) zů schelten weyß/ dieweil du mich bey meinem lieben Herren und ernerer nit erhalten wôltest. Hey warumb hast du mich dann auß meines vatters hauß genommen. Darzů hast du nit ein vernůgen gehabt ann dem/ das ich von meinem Herren so reülich und wol erzogen worden bin/ sonder hast mich in meiner jugent under meines gelichen knaben zů einem Kônig und regierer haben wôllen/ welche regierung ein ursach ist alles meines trůbsals/ in welchem ich jetzund gantz hart verstrickt und gefangen bin [...]"(19f).

Here, Lewfrid holds *glück* responsible for previous, significant changes in his life, all of which are perceived as negative. *glück* is blamed first for removing him from his natural parents, and secondly for removing him from his foster-parents by making him a 'king' among his school-mates. Notably, *glück* is not mentioned by either characters or narrator at the time at which these incidents actually occur; it is only in Lewfrid's retrospective interpretation that *glück* is said to have deliberately

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[3] Spriewald observes that "Leufrid ist nicht ein Musterknabe vom Schlage des Fridbert und Felix" (Ingeborg Spriewald, "Sensibilisierung und Entwicklungsbetonung als Komponenten differenzierter werdender Menschenauffassung", in I. S., *Vom "Eulenspiegel" zum "Simplicissimus". Zur Genesis des Realismus und den Anfängen deutscher Prosaerzählung* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1978), p. 121); instead, his figure is used to demonstrate "das Aufbegehren gegen das Festgefügte und Gegebene der Lebensumstände" (121). Although Lewfrid will eventually embrace conventional values, it is true that there are certain elements in his development that defy convention, most notably his intention to pursue the love of a woman who is socially far superior to him.

[4] Before finding employment, Lewfrid expresses the following hope: "mocht mir durch das glück sovil gnad verlihen werden/ das ich auff das Schloß an hof kommen mocht/ ich wolt mich gantz muckerlich halten/ Damit ich mit der zeit ein reysiger knecht werden mocht" (15). This hope comes true. But, since *glück* is not explicitly credited with its fulfilment, I will disregard this reference to *glück*, as well as similar instances. Since they refer only to the potential effects of *glück*, they appear to be mere set phrases, or *Floskeln*.

caused the changes in his life. The fact that *glück* is not mentioned at or around the time of the incidents' actual occurrence seems to make its influence less real, creating instead the impression that its existence is limited to Lewfrid's interpretation. Thus *glück* might be considered as a poetic means employed by the narrator to give the character's speech deeper significance; as such, it would be a figure of speech which emphasizes the subjective injustice felt by the speaker. Further, it is notable in this context that Lewfrid's adoption through Hermanus is described as positive at the time of its occurrence. It is only after Lewfrid's situation has taken a turn for the worse that he considers the initial change in his development as something negative, and establishes a causal connection between his current misery and the fact that he was removed from his birth family. That *glück* is associated only years later with this incident, as well as with Lewfrid's being made king by his class-mates, may be because it is only then that the negative character of the incidents becomes apparent to Lewfrid, since he views his life as a general failure. From this point of view, one could say that Lewfrid simply does not recognize *glück*'s impact at the time of its occurrence. Alternatively, one might say that it is only because of his current misery that Lewfrid views earlier incidents in a negative light and hence attributes them to *glück*. In any case, the subjective nature of the perception of *glück* becomes obvious.

What, then, are the consequences of *glück*'s manifestation in the above incidents? From Lewfrid's point of view, *glück* occupies the negative role in the protagonist's development. This reinforces a pattern established from the analysis of Wickram's previous narratives. But, in the other narratives, with the exception perhaps of *Knabenspiegel*, the negative workings of *glück* are genuine impediments, however temporary, to the protagonists' happiness. Here, by contrast, the incidents attributed to negative *glück* seem to be necessary conditions for the protagonist's ultimately positive development. That is, had Lewfrid not been removed from his birth family, and had he not subsequently been involved in the fight, he would not have arrived at the court. This in turn would mean that he would never have met Angliana, or succeeded the count, as he does eventually. Thus being removed from his natural surroundings is the condition for Lewfrid to advance and make the initial prediction of extraordinary success come true.[5] However, Lewfrid himself is ignorant of the miraculous omen of his development - he is not aware of the lion's early presence, nor of its implications. This may prevent him from acknowledging the

[5] On the fact that Lewfrid, a peasant's son by birth, is raised by a merchant, Roloff comments: "der Mensch scheint hier nicht mehr zu sein als ein Produkt causalgenetischer Naturvorgänge, das beliebig transferierbar ist; es ist sozusagen pädagogische Rohmasse, aus der durch Bildung und Unterweisung etwas gemacht werden kann" (Hans-Gert Roloff, "Überredung - Unterricht - Ergetzung der Leute. Zur Funktion der Romane Georg Wickrams", *Recherches Germaniques* 9 (1979), p. 273).

possibility of long-term benefit behind the workings of *glück*. As it is, it is only towards the conclusion of the narrative that the benefits inherent in the workings of *glück* are revealed. At this stage, Lewfrid's *glück*-induced distress is genuine. Therefore, *glück* comes across as a negative force in the narrative whose role it is to thwart the protagonist's happiness.

In time, things change in favour of Lewfrid. Angliana begins to return his love. Having received Angliana's ring and a declaration of her love, Lewfrid comments on the newly changed situation: "Nun freuw dich Lewfrid/ dann zů diser stund hat dich das glück hoch erhaben/ Wer mőcht doch glückseliger sein auff gantzem erdtrich dann ich glückhaffter Lewfrid" (42). Here, *glück* is referred to as having produced a major positive turn.[6] The change in *glück*, which is previously blamed for causing Lewfrid great misery (cf. 19f), is expressed in terms reminiscent of the wheel of Fortuna (*hat dich das glück erhaben*). The suggestion of the wheel's motions may indicate that Lewfrid's happiness could be a mere interlude in his development. Indeed, the realization of their love is subsequently threatened. In this respect, the positive impact of *glück* at this stage serves to heighten the protagonist's vulnerability in that it increases the height from which he will fall in due course.

Subsequently, Lewfrid is sent on an errand by the count. He loses his way in the forest, and eventually comes across a white dog. The dog follows him back to the court. Lewfrid relates this chain of events to *glück*: "als ich in meines gnedigen Herrn geschefften geritten bin/ hat mich der unval oder das gelück in einen mechtigen [...] wald [...] gefůrt/ darin ich gentzlich verirret/ so das ich nicht wußt heraus zů kummen/ als ich mich aber verwegen hat die nacht in dem waldt zů beliben/ kumpt von ungeschicht diser edel Prack zů mir" (56).[7] That this incident is positive in nature becomes clear when Lewfrid gives the dog to Angliana: she is so impressed by the gift that she declares the dog her favourite pet and calls it *Traw*, faithfulness, so as to symbolize the love between her and Lewfrid. Thus the dog's acquisition can be seen to mark an important step in the lovers' relationship in that it provides them with an external token of their love and commitment. Hence *glück* once more appears to further Lewfrid's happiness to the extent that it leads him into the forest where he comes across the dog. Yet *glück* does not cause the positive development in a straightforward way. Initially, the *glück*-induced incident, i.e. Lewfrid's losing his

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[6] This is not to say that God is completely excluded from this turn of events. After Lewfrid has received a ring and a declaration of Angliana's love, he comments further: "So mir [...] Got und das glück gnad verlihen/ will ich sie [his friends] meiner freud alsampt theilhafftig machen" (42). Thus the favour of both God and *glück* is associated with the joyful event; God and *glück* appear to work in unison for once.

[7] For an account of how *von ungeschicht* is related to the term *glück*, cf. chapter 10.

way in the forest, might seem disturbing. The benefit arising from it, namely the acquisition of the dog and its effect on Angliana, becomes obvious only later in the narrative.[8] However, since the incident turns out to be a meaningful, positive element in Lewfrid and Angliana's relationship, it might qualify as an instance of intentional *glück*, albeit a roundabout one. To the extent that the incident constitutes a positive element in the protagonists' development, the upward movement of Fortuna's wheel might be said to continue. Consequently, suspense as to when the protagonists' descent will occur is increased further. The fact that the positive elements in Lewfrid's development up to this point seem to be determined by *glück* rather than God suggests a sense of instability.

On a later errand, Lewfrid comes across the lion, which by then is lodged at the royal zoo. They reacquaint themselves, and the lion follows Lewfrid back to the count's court. Angliana is so impressed by its fondness for Lewfrid that she concludes: "hie bei [...] můß ich klerlich abnemen/ das diser Jüngling mit sunder genad von Gott begabt ist/ dieweil (von dem an das in sein můtter erstlich empfangen/ unnd noch under irem hertzen getragen) diser Lew sich zů seinem vatter geselt [...] hat" (92). In this statement, Angliana relates the lion's presence to Lewfrid's being distinguished by God through extraordinary talents. This assumption reinforces her love for Lewfrid to the extent that she proposes to him. Perhaps Angliana's belief in Lewfrid's being divinely chosen annihilates the class difference that exists between them, which so far might have presented itself to her as an obstacle to marriage. Since the lion's presence is interpreted as divine intervention, God may indirectly be held responsible for Angliana's intention to marry Lewfrid. Yet God affects the protagonist's development only by implication. That is, while the lion's presence is attributed to God, the details of Lewfrid's positive development in the above case are constituted by human actions which are triggered by the supposed divine nature of the lion's presence. Thus the influence of God may be limited to providing the general foundation to Lewfrid's career by singling him out for exceptional advancement. *glück*, by contrast, operates on a more practical level, which coincides with the level of the characters' actions.

It is in keeping with this pattern that when Angliana has declared that she will marry him, Lewfrid relates the new turn of events to *glück*: "dieweil mich [...] das glück so gnediglich ansehen/ deßgleich mir ewer gnad so wol wil/ So versprich ich

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[8] That *glück* is used here almost synonymously with *unval*, the modern German equivalent of which is *Unheil* (cf. Alfred Götze, *Frühneuhochdeutsches Glossar*, 7th ed., Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967), suggests that *glück* may be less the deliberate force which it appears to be in other instances, and more a variation of chance.

euch von disem tag an allen meinen fleiß dohin zů wenden/ damit ich [...] in Ritterspielen geprisen unnd gelobt werd" (94). Thus *glück* is again credited with a major positive step in Lewfrid's development. The love between Lewfrid and Angliana comes across as being the domain of *glück*.[9] So far, *glück* appears to be almost solely responsible for the emotional aspect of the protagonist's development. Because of this, their relationship could appear to be different from those narratives where love is more explicitly related to the will of God. That is, the protagonists may be more strongly exposed to the whims of *glück* than if their love was more closely integrated into a protective divine framework. The fact that *glück* is almost exclusively responsible for this love grants this force a certain autonomy and elaborates its presence when compared with the other narratives. While *glück* seems steadily supportive with regard to the protagonists' love up to this point, this may only serve to set up the lovers even higher for their subsequent fall.

After a limited period of happiness, in which Lewfrid's career is blossoming to the extent that he is promoted to the position of Angliana's personal valet, things begin to take a turn for the worse. Although Lewfrid's colleagues, according to the narrator, are willing to tolerate the count's favouritism, the interference of *glück* is inevitable: "[sie, i.e. the colleagues] schwigen derhalb zůr sachen/ so lang daß Lewfrid von dem glück gantz schål angesehen ward" (102). This remark introduces a full account of disaster striking Lewfrid:

Als aber das unsteht glück nit lenger gedulden noch leiden mocht/ das dise zwey liebhabenden [i.e. Lewfrid and Angliana] ir liebe in so stiller weiß verborgen trůgen/ hat es sich gantz von ihnen gewandt/ sie mit allem unfal umbgeben. Dann es begab sich auff ein zeit/ das Angliana irem [...] Jüngling ein [...] ring [...] schanckt/ in beywesen irer Nerrin/ nit gedacht noch sorget/ das ir heimligkeyt unnd liebe an tag kommen/ und offenbar werden solt. Die Nerrin aber aller ding gar eben war nam (103).

According to this statement, *glück* is turning against the lovers. Its unwillingness to tolerate their secret love any longer is said to manifest itself in Angliana's carelessness when presenting Lewfrid with a ring. This is referred to as *unfal*, here obviously denoting an unfortunate accident.[10] The whole chain of events seems to be regarded as a process in which the lovers have no active involvement, which is reinforced by use of the phrase *es begab sich*.

Subsequently, the narrator comments on Lewfrid's attempt to put things right:

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[9] Cf. also the passage where Lewfrid states that he is prepared to wait "biß das uns der tag eines das glück in stiller weiß zůsammen bringet" (106).

[10] Cf. footnote 8.

"er [Lewfrid] gedacht aber nicht das ihn das glück in irem anschlag so gantz widersins erscheinen wirdt/ wie ihr dann wol vernemmen werdt" (104). This statement refers to the fact that the count intercepts a love-letter which Lewfrid has entrusted to the jester, while trying to undo the predicament caused by the ring. The narrator indicates that Lewfrid did not anticipate the unfavourable disposition of *glück*, thus suggesting a lack of insight into the true nature of this force on the characters' part. This points to the narrator's higher level of insight. Nevertheless narrator and character are joined in the conviction that Lewfrid's life is strongly influenced by *glück*. Hence the possibility of spiteful *glück* being a mere poetic element employed to elaborate the characters' expressions, as mentioned above, becomes implausible: *glück* is genuinely held responsible for a major negative turn in the protagonist's development, i.e. for his separation from Angliana. The previously positive impact of *glück* is revealed as deceptive, or at least unstable. Although the emergence of *glück*'s negative impact might seem abrupt, it may be considered inevitable from the point of view of the wheel's motion: what goes up must come down.

When the count is convinced of the existence of the love-affair, he plots Lewfrid's assassination on the grounds of his social unsuitability. Lewfrid overcomes the assassin, but realizes that he has to flee from the court and leave Angliana behind. In retrospect, he evaluates his altered situation as follows:

"O glück wie bistu mir so gantz zůwider/ [...] du hast mich jetzund gar offt und dick felschlichen angelachet/ mich mit deinem sůssen und glantzenden schein angesehen/ und so ich meyn dir jetz am angenemsten sein/ so überschütest du mich mit aller bitterkeit/ niemant solt sein getrawen und hoffnung zů dir unstetigen glück setzen/ du bist gantz wanckelmůtig/ unbleiblich/ undanckbar/ dann so man dich meynet am aller nechsten zů sein/ so bistu eim am aller ferristen/ hastu mich armseligen Jüngling nit auß niderem staht/ gleich in meiner kindtheyt zů einem gůten anfang gebracht/ do mein (nach dem ich eines årmisten Hirten son was) gantz herrlich gepflegen ward/ [...] hettest du mich also in solchem anfang beliben lassen/ und nit mit falschem schein angelachet/ dann du woltest mich auß einem Jungen kind zů einem Kônig haben/ das aber nit lang geweret hat/ dann ich bald auß meinem Reich entlauffen můßt/ ward also auß einem Künig in kurtzer zeit zů einem kuchenbuben/ noch liessest du mich auch nit lang in solchem stand ich můßt in dem Frawenzimmer ein diener werden. Aldo thet Cupido auch das sein darzů/ verwundt/ unnd schoß seinen scharpffen strol auff mich/ dermassen das ich in brinnender liebe hart entzündet ward/ gegen meiner [...] Junckfrawen/ bey deren du mich dermassen angesehen/ so das ich und sie in hoffnung waren/ unser liebe solt unzertrent/ und unablôßlich bleiben/ was hastu aber mir yetzund durch deine falschen tück angericht/ Ja anders nichts/ dann das ich mich von meiner [...] Junckfrawen sunder alles urlub hab scheiden můßen" (131f).

Like the narrator, Lewfrid blames *glück* for his misery. At the same time, he holds Cupid responsible for his falling in love with Angliana. Cupid's influence, while restricted to making a singular, specific contribution to the workings of *glück*, seems to be further beyond Lewfrid's control than the influence of *glück* - how could he have avoided falling in love? Hence Cupid functions on a level that is more superficial, and less complex, than *glück*. While *glück* could be said to be a genuine power in human life, reference to Cupid comes across as a more artificial conceit reminiscent of humanist tradition, suggesting that Cupid's presence is limited to the realm of the rhetorical.[11] Lewfrid repeats his earlier accusations against *glück*, namely removal initially from his natural parents and subsequently his foster family. On top of this, he blames *glück* for his having been promoted to Angliana's *kammerbůbe*, as this enabled him to become close to her. These accusations lead up to the main one, which has *glück* responsible for his separation from Angliana. Thus Lewfrid reinforces the

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[11] For further comparison between *glück* and certain mythological figures, cf. the following passages from *Nachbaurn*. At one stage, Lasarus remarks to Amelia: "Zů dem hat dich Pallas die gőttin mit iren lieblichen brüsten und honig sůsser milch geseugt und ernert/ des gibt mir zeugnis das kunstlich stuckwerck [...]/ damit du mich begabt [...] hast" (108). At the margin, there is the following explanatory note: "Pallas die Gőttin/ ist eine sundere künstliche wirckerinn gewesen/ Darumb Lasarus setzt/ sie hab sein junckfraw mit der honig sůssen milch künstlicher arbeit getrenckt". The break of dawn is introduced as "Als nůn die finster nacht vergangen/ der Gőttin Palladi oder Minerve nachtfogel sich verschloffen und verborgen het/ dagegen die sůs singend fraw Nachtigal den liechtscheinenden tag/ mit sůssem gesang verkünden ward" (142; cf. also 46, 117). There is also a reference to the god of sleep: "Diser Gott des schlaffs ligt in Cimmeria in einem nüblingen und finsteren hol/ [...] für und für ist gantz stille zeit darin/ damit der Gott seinen schlaaff mit rhůen haben mag [...] Es ist einer under vil hunderttausent trewmen/ so umb den Gott des schlaffs wonen/ der aller listigest genant Morpheus/ welcher sich inn eines yeden menschen bild verwandlen kan" (151).

These mythological figures are all gods from ancient Greek or Roman mythology. Given his firm Christian belief, Wickram cannot possibly have believed in the existence of these gods. Instead, they might be considered as a stylistic device typical of a humanist, or Renaissance outlook, which would have been readily available to Wickram. What, then, justifies our assumption that *glück* is any more genuine a phenomenon than these gods? There are specific differences between the two, which indicate that *glück* has by far the more significant presence. The mythological figures are mentioned only sporadically; their presence does not have the same continuity as *glück*. Further, unlike *glück*, the mythological figures are never credited with any significant turns in the characters' development. They merely serve to illustrate certain moments, or even details, in this development. However, Kartschoke claims "daß diese Natureingänge [that are described by reference to mythological figures] [...] gewisse affektive Höhepunkte markieren" (Dieter Kartschoke, "*Bald bracht Phebus seinen Wagen ...* Gattungsgeschichtliche Überlegungen zu Jörg Wickrams *Nachbarn*-Roman", *Daphnis* 11 (1982), pp. 730f). He concludes his observations in the following way: "Es kann also nicht die Rede davon sein, daß Wickram die Mythologica als mehr oder minder zufällige Lesefrüchte über seinen *Nachbaurn*-Roman ausstreut, ohne Rücksicht auf den Erzählungszusammenhang und ohne Funktion in ihm. Richtig ist vielmehr, daß durch solche Signale die Erzählung von Vorgängen und Ereignissen ermöglicht werden soll, die bislang in dieser Form als nicht literaturfähig galten. Die Beliebigkeit eines oder mehrerer bürgerlicher Schicksale, wie sie Wickram zu erzählen unternimmt, konnte verbindlich gemacht werden also nur über die in ihnen zutage tretende moralische Wahrheit oder durch die emphatische Verknüpfung mit traditionellen Erzählformen" (p. 733).

narrator's evaluation of *glück* having caused the major negative turn in his development. He even goes as far as subsuming what he previously perceived as positive incidents, such as the promotion, under the heading of *glück*'s false smiles: such instances are at this stage interpreted as examples of the fickleness of *glück*, which is essentially malicious. Lewfrid establishes a continuity between what he perceives as the instances of negative *glück* at various stages of his life. This means that he relates the present events back to his initial painful experiences, and in their context considers the period of happiness as illusory. Hence negativity prevails. *glück* seems to rule undisturbed, while God, in so far as he is not mentioned, appears to be absent at this stage of Lewfrid's development; whether or not this impression is genuine will only be revealed in the course of the narrative.

As a result of Lewfrid's departure, Angliana is inconsolable. In her refusal to forget him, she comes close to dying. Worry over her causes her father to react in the following way: "Will mich dann das glück also haben/ wolan so trôst ich mich dannocht das mein Tochter ir einen solchen Jüngling erwôlt hat/ der mit tugend und mannheyt hoch von Gott begabt ist. Ach wer mir doch nur die sach vor langem zů wissen gewesen/ ich wolt wol bey dem Künig zůwegen bracht haben/ das er in zů Ritter geschlagen [...] het" (129f). According to the count, it is *glück* which has caused the miserable situation in which he and his daughter find themselves, *viz.* his daughter's pining for a socially inferior man.[12] It is notable, however, that what the count considers as the *glück*-inflicted misery is in a certain way entwined with the will of God. For God is said to have gifted the man whom *glück* has inflicted on Angliana and her father with exceptional talents. This could be an early, vague indication of *glück* being incorporated into a divine plan. Not unlike Lewfrid's initial expulsion, this situation might be an instance of the beneficial, divinely approved nature of *glück*'s workings, which is discovered only at a later stage. That is, when Lewfrid's qualities eventually become fully apparent to the count, Angliana's *glück*-inflicted love for Lewfrid is revealed to be fortunate for him in that his daughter finds a courageous husband, and he a worthy successor. At this stage of the narrative, however, there is unresolved tension between earlier predictions regarding Lewfrid's unprecedented advancement and the current situation which sees him as an outcast. Hence *glück* comes across as having a purely negative effect on all the characters' development, even though its workings will eventually lead to overall happiness.

In reaction to Angliana's misery, the count sends a messenger to fetch Lewfrid

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[12] From Lewfrid's point of view, contrary to that of the count, the expulsion, rather than Angliana's love for him, has been caused by *glück*. This indicates the subjective nature of *glück*, of which more in part III.

back to the court. But, Lewfrid suspects another attempt on his life, and contemplates the count's invitation with the following thoughts: "nu můß ich sorgen dieweil mich das glück vor solchem unfal [i.e. the ambush in the forest][13] bewart/ mir môcht ein ander bad übergehangen sein/ mein Herr môcht mich durch gůte worte wider underston zů ihm zů bringen/ und als dann sein zorn an mir rechen" (135). This comment attributes Lewfrid's escape from the assassination to *glück* rather than to God. From the analysis of the other narratives, we might expect the opposite, as they tend to depict negative incidents inflicted by *glück* as being generally reversed or remedied by God. That it is *glück* itself which is credited with saving Lewfrid's life here, after supposedly inducing his downfall, puts *glück* back into a favourable light with regard to his development, providing it with a more positive role than in the other narratives. While the sudden shift in *glück*'s disposition might result from its inconstancy, it is notable that this inconstancy appears to be working to the protagonist's advantage. As mentioned before, the wheel of Fortuna is traditionally considered to be moving towards a person's destruction. This ties in with the representation of *glück* in the other narratives, at least in *Galmy* and *Gabriotto*, where *glück* gradually emerges as a genuinely destructive force. In *Goldfaden*, this motion seems to be reversed. Spiteful *glück* does not figure in the remaining part of the narrative. Hence *glück* seems to have turned into, or turned out to be, a force which is perceived to truly favour the protagonist.

Safely back at the court, Lewfrid apologizes for the distress he has caused to the count. The count replies:

"[...] dir ist alles vergeben/ so du je wider mich gethon hast/ [...] Dieweil [...] das gelück dir der massen so gar günstig ist/ kan ich je nit darwider fechten/ ich sihe das alle menschlichen Ratschleg wider den willen des allmechtigen nichts vermögen außzůrichten/ Darumb so laß ich es alles faren/ und wirt jetz nichts nôters sein/ Dann das wir ratschlagen/ wie doch der sachen zů begegnen sey [...]" (166f).

The count interprets the past events, mainly Lewfrid's escape from the assassination, as amounting to the fact that *glück* genuinely favours Lewfrid, thus concurring with Lewfrid's own account.[14] In fact the count considers *glück*'s favour to be so strong

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[13] Here, the distinction between *glück* and *unfal* becomes quite clear; *glück* is an active force, whereas *unfal* is the 'bad luck' which might have befallen the protagonist, i.e. a mere object.

[14] For Neudeck, the count's decision is determined by divine providence rather than *glück*: "Handlungskonstitutierende Funktion erhält die göttliche Vorsehung schließlich sogar, wenn sie dem Grafen als das entscheidende Argument dafür dient, den Hirtensohn als Schwiegersohn zu akzeptieren und dessen Aufstieg endgültig zu ebnen" (Otto Neudeck, "*Verwunderung, glück, von ungeschicht*. Zur Poetologie des Fiktionalen in Jörg Wickram's *Goldtfaden*", in (eds.) Wolfgang Harms and C. Stephen Jaeger, *Fremdes wahrnehmen - fremdes Wahrnehmen: Studien zur Geschichte der Wahrnehmung und zur*

that it is pointless to oppose it. He goes beyond Lewfrid's interpretation of events in that he considers the positive intervention of *glück* to be directly linked to the will of God (*de[r] wille[...] des allmechtigen*); the terms *glück* and God seem almost synonymous in the above passage. While it is not clear whether *glück* is operating for itself or as a tool of divine providence, *glück*'s workings are clearly considered to fulfil the will of God. The fact that *glück* is after all considered to support Lewfrid's advancement gives rise to the question as to how genuine were earlier instances of its negative intervention. Has Fortuna's wheel simply stopped at the most opportune moment or have the workings of *glück* secretly been in accordance with God throughout the narrative? To what extent is divine intervention behind Lewfrid's *glück*-shaped development? That the count in the above instance relates the work of *glück* to divine will may result from his earlier interpretation of the lion's presence ("gewißlich wirdt dir [i.e. Lewfrid] diser Lew vil gůts bedeüten", 84), which is elsewhere linked to the will of God (cf. Angliana's comment on the lion, p. 92); the notion that Lewfrid is chosen by God seems to implicitly underlie the narrative as a whole. Notably, the count's belief in Lewfrid's success as the expression of divine will causes him to act in such a way as to partly lay the foundation for the protagonist's actual success: he accepts Lewfrid back into his service, and provides him with an opportunity to prove himself in combat, which paves the way for his promotion to a higher rank of society. These chances are vital for Lewfrid's making good the promise of advancement. The fact that the count grants them solely on the grounds of his belief in a superhuman influence in Lewfrid's life suggests the considerable hold which the perception of divine power has over the characters. The count's decisive actions mean that it is at least as much human as it is superhuman influence which prompts the fulfilment of the initial prediction of Lewfrid's success. Hence the way in which the author employs divine providence in *Goldfaden* is marked by the characters' subjective interpretation making it appear as a force that objectively determines the narrative structure. At the same time, a closer look may reveal this structure to result originally from actions on the part of the characters, which are triggered merely by their own perception of providence.[15] That is, the manifestations of divine providence may exist merely in and by virtue of the characters' perception. Still, the possibility of providence existing on an objective level may not be ruled out. Hence earlier manifestations of *glück*, which are considered negative at the time, may not

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Begegnung von Kulturen in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit (Stuttgart/Leipzig: Hirzel, 1997), p. 271). Here, Neudeck seems to ignore the impact of *glück* as a force in its own right.

[15] While to some extent, this might be the case in the other narratives also, it is especially noticeable in *Goldfaden*.

have been genuine. For *glück* ultimately conforms to the will of God, which to the characters reveals itself to have been present throughout Lewfrid's development.

After Lewfrid's return, he accompanies the count on a military campaign. This provides Lewfrid with an opportunity to prove his formidable valour.[16] As a result, he is promoted by the king, and is finally given the count's consent to marry Angliana. But, there is one more obstacle to the protagonist's complete happiness. A rival suitor is plotting to kill both the count and Lewfrid. When the count is held captive by the rival, it is Lewfrid who frees him, and puts the rival in his right place. He explains: "Es hatt aber Gott semlichs [i.e. the rival's envy and its consequences] nit mügen vertragen/ dann er je kein ubels ungestraffet laßt/ dann er mich darzů hat lassen kommen/ das ich mein liebsten Herren ledig gemacht/ euch hergegen an seiner statt gefangen hab" (199). This statement depicts God as being a just and levelling force to the extent that he averts the count's peril. He is shown to discipline evil and put an end to undeserved suffering of the righteous among the characters. Notably, this is the first instance of God being credited with a specific positive incident in the characters' development. Up to this point, God's influence seems to occupy a level different from *glück;* his presence has so far been defined as providing the general framework of Lewfrid's development. Why is it, then, that God rather than *glück*, unlike previous comparable instances, is now held responsible for the positive turn in Lewfrid's life? Could it be that *glück* no longer figures in Lewfrid's development because his advancement is more or less completed? That is, the impact of positive *glück* may only be needed up to a certain stage of Lewfrid's development. As we have seen, *glück* helps Lewfrid, somehow miraculously, to overcome certain obstacles. Since Lewfrid has attained a state of equilibrium to the extent that he has overcome all obstacles associated with his position in society, *glück* may be redundant. Instead, God may now be solely in charge of his life.

The distinction between situations in which the support of *glück*, and those in which the support of God is needed may become clearer when we take a look at the life of Lewfrid's parents. Compared to Lewfrid, their life is very straightforward. *glück* never interferes; instead, their development is governed exclusively by God. Thus the narrator introduces Lewfrid's father Erich with the following remark about his children: "die selbigen kinder aber Got mit wunderbarer schöne an die welt kommen ließ/ so das [...] Erichen aller arbeit/ angst und armůt gar nit beschweret"

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[16] When about to go to war, Lewfrid explains to Angliana: "wir hoffen Glück werd auff unser syten sein/ domit mir unsere feind Ritterlich erlegen/ Mit grossen Triumph wider zů land kummen" (179). These hopes are realized, but *glück* is not mentioned by either character or narrator at the time of their fulfilment. Nevertheless this reference to *glück* may be seen to contribute to the overall impression of *glück* favouring Lewfrid for good.

(1). When Erich and his wife later receive the lease of a farm, the narrator again relates this to God: "Dann Gott gab inen beiden sonderlich groß glück/ dieweil sie Gotsfôrchtig/ frum/ und gerecht lebten/ begerten auch ihr herrschafft keines wegs zu veruntreuwen" (8).[17] After they have been given half of the farm as a present, Lewfrid's parents themselves acknowledge the benign impact which God has on their life: "sie [...] beflissen sich hernach/ [...] das sie in allen treuwen haußhielten/ und Gott allzeit umb sein verlihne gůthat danck sageten/ Es was alles glück so sie anfingen" (55). The fact that Erich's initial poverty has been remedied by the gift of the farm is summed up by another character as his having been poor "biß in Gott seines leyds ergetzen wolt" (72). Erich's life appears to be shaped by a simple principle. He works hard and conscientiously, and is in turn rewarded by God. While these rewards improve his situation to some extent, Erich's status never surpasses that of a member of the agricultural class; his advancement is reasonable when compared to the exceptional career of Lewfrid. In Erich's story, there seems to be an echo of the medieval God-directed world-order, in the context of which the intervention of *glück* is essentially unnecessary. Contrary to Erich's relatively static position, Lewfrid's is marked by movement within the social system of the world which he inhabits. Lewfrid's development goes beyond the reasonable: his falling in love with a socially superior woman and rising several classes in society is extraordinary and to some extent controversial. It may be this deviation from the static nature of a divine world-order that occasions reference to *glück* as an agent of change. Assuming that the function of positive *glück* consists in aiding Lewfrid's 'miraculous' advancement and, by doing so, in accounting for irregularities in his development, there is no need for *glück* any more once Lewfrid's development is completed. Once he is accepted as the count's son-in-law and successor, his status is stable and self-contained. Seen in this light, an incident like the above one would naturally merit reference to a divine presence, as Lewfrid's life has now become as simple or straightforward as Erich's life is throughout.

At the end of the narrative, when Lewfrid has succeeded the count and brought his parents to live with him, he reflects on his achievements. He credits God with the totality of his success:

das im aber Got zů solchem hohen stand geholffen/ het er im grôßlich umb zů dancken/ dann er het sunst auch in den Ackern seine narung suchen můssen: "Aber Gott hat mich auß seiner gnedigen fürsehung dahin kummen laßen/ so das ich

[17] In this passage as well as in the following one, *glück* is of course used with an entirely different meaning from those passages where it appears as an active force, viz. as an object denoting happiness or success.

meinem vatter und meiner můtter auch zůstatten kummen mag [...]" (212).

The term *fürsehung* expresses the fact that God is credited with the ultimate and overall responsibility for the plot's development. It is obvious from the fact that *glück* is not mentioned in Lewfrid's summary of his achievements that God rather than *glück* is considered to be the decisive force in his advancement. Hence God is clearly superior to *glück*. In fact Lewfrid implies that God presided over his development all along. This suggests that God's workings are present on a different, more abstract level than those of *glück*. This is reinforced by the conclusion of the narrative, where the overall positive influence of God is referred to again. As Angliana and Lewfrid lead a life of virtue and piety, this results in the following: "Darumb inen [...] groß glück und såld zů handen ging/ Biß sie Gott auß disem jamerthal zů der ewigen freud und seligkeyt berůfft/ Zů deren alle die kommen werden/ so in dem willen Gottes leben" (215). In return for hard work and fear of God, the protagonists receive *glück*, here an object in the sense of success or happiness; they presumably do so by the grace of God.[18] *glück* as a force in its own right does not feature any more during the concluding stages of the characters' life, which may be explained by Lewfrid's development having reached its full potential, and the story having thus come to an end. All that remains for the characters to do is maintain their status quo. Therefore, neither beneficial *glück* is needed to further the protagonists' advancement, nor spiteful *glück* to generate obstacles. When the protagonists' life on earth has finally come to an end, God grants them eternal bliss. Hence the overall effect which God has on the characters during their life on earth is carried over into the after-life. Thus *Goldfaden* ends on an explicitly Christian note, against which the presence of *glück* might seem to pale into insignificance.

Let us now characterize the relation between *glück* and God in *Goldfaden* in a general way. As we have seen, the overall support of God, even if stated only in retrospect, may be considered to defeat the attempts made by *glück* to thwart the protagonist's advancement. At the same time, Lewfrid's development is accompanied by positive manifestations of *glück*. This raises the question to what extent *glück* cooperates with God, i.e. whether the negative instances of *glück* are in fact incorporated into the divine plan in that they are actually necessary to bring about certain developments in Lewfrid's life.[19] Thus the most significant intervention of

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[18] As before, this type of *glück* has nothing in common with the concept of *glück* as an active force evident in the manifestations of both negative and positive *glück* that we have frequently encountered in the narrative.

[19] Neudeck maintains that the term *glück* denotes alternatively contingency and providence. He claims that *glück* may "zum einen als Kürzel für die Kontingenz eines Geschickes dienen, das aus einer

negative *glück*, Lewfrid's expulsion from the court, may be considered vital in order to move the count to appreciate Lewfrid's presence. The incident moreover seems to be important as a challenge both to Lewfrid's endurance and to the subsequent assertion of his talents.[20] Hence the opposition between *glück* and God may be merely temporary. This differs from the opposition characteristic of the relation between *glück* and God in Wickram's other narratives, which is more permanent, and as such more extreme. There, the way in which *glück* opposes God may be seen to represent a genuine threat to divine justice in the world. In *Goldfaden*, this threat is moderated, as *glück* eventually proves to be in favour of the protagonist. Thus *glück* comes across as a force that ultimately conforms to divine will rather than being defeated by it, hence a force that need not be feared.[21] While the negative manifestations of *glück* constitute a challenge for Lewfrid, the positive manifestations prevail. They are explicitly integrated into a Christian framework to the extent that they are directly associated with God. Although towards the end of the narrative, beneficial *glück*, having fulfilled its purpose, disappears, its effects remain stable throughout Lewfrid's life. This suggests that beneficial *glück* may in fact be an agent of genuinely positive change which is used by God to realize his will. This representation of *glück* is very different from the thoroughly negative principle which

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immanenten Perspektive gerade durch seine Undurchschaubarkeit und Beliebigkeit definiert ist: Vor allem wenn Lewfrid oder Angliana in längeren Monologen [...] über ihr Los klagen, klingt das an. Andererseits macht der Erzähler in Zusammenhang mit dem Werdegang Lewfrieds wiederholt deutlich, daß trotz der vermeintlichen Wechselfälle des Geschicks die göttliche Vorsehung den Lauf der Welt lenkt" (Otto Neudeck, "*Verwunderung, glück, von ungeschicht*. Zur Poetologie des Fiktionalen in Jörg Wickram's *Goldtfaden*", *op. cit.*, p. 262). Neudeck names "vom Erzähler nicht reflektierte[s] Nebeneinander zweier Ordnungen von Welt und ihren Letztbegründungen" (p. 262) as a characteristic of Wickram's fiction. Assuming that there are two simultaneous discourses present in *Goldfaden*, the disruptive nature of *glück* cannot be incorporated into the workings of God. Consequently, the divinely ruled outcome is only one possible reading of the story, the patterns of contingency and providence supposedly questioning one another. However, the fairytale advancement of Lewfrid could suggest that the pattern of providence is the more authoritative one after all.

[20] To the extent that Lewfrid's development is marked by orientation towards the final result, there is something very medieval about it - compare e.g. the suffering which the protagonist of *Gregorius* has to undergo in order to eventually become pope.

[21] Maybe this is what Scherer has in mind when he comments: "Ängstliche Spannung will Wickram nicht erregen" (Wilhelm Scherer, *Die Anfänge des deutschen Prosaromans und Jörg Wickram von Colmar: Eine Kritik* (Straßburg: Trübner, 1877), p. 58). On a different note, Knopf claims that the concealed positive nature of *glück* is never acknowledged: "eine [...] Richtigstellung erfolgt am Ende des Romans nicht, die positive Umdeutung des Glücks, so nahe sie zu liegen scheint, bleibt aus. Das Glück wird beschuldigt, und dabei bleibt es, auch wenn sich die Beschuldigungen vom Ende her selbst widerlegen" (Jan Knopf, "Versicherung des Mitmenschen. Arbeit, Freundschaft und Glück in Jörg Wickrams Romanen", in J. K., *Frühzeit des Bürgers. Erfahrene und verleugnete Realität in den Romanen Wickrams, Grimmelshausens und Schnabels* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1978), p. 49). But, both Lewfrid's and the count's remarks suggest that to them, the positive aspect of *glück* prevails. Although they do not explicitly rectify earlier references to negative *glück*, *glück* ultimately does not appear to be as genuine a threat as Knopf claims it to be.

glück is characterized as in the other narratives. To the extent that *glück* in *Goldfaden* is credited with helping the protagonist in crucial aspects of his development, which by himself he might not have been able to deal with as successfully, it appears to have an almost miraculous quality. *glück*'s miraculous support puts *Goldfaden* in proximity to a fairytale, which makes it unique among Wickram's narratives.[22]

Given the continuous presence of God, the question arises to what extent Lewfrid's development is predetermined. The initial appearance of the lion, and the characters' interpretation of this as an omen of success provides a very definite shape to Lewfrid's development. Because this shape is realized in due course, not least because the other characters act according to their own predictions, Lewfrid's development may appear to be the result of predetermination. God is associated with the presence of the lion, and the characters' concluding, retrospective references to divine influence could be seen to confirm the presence of divine providence from the beginning of Lewfrid's development. By comparison, the other narratives' endings are determined more gradually, namely through the protagonists' actions and the way in which these interact with the workings of *glück* and God. The fact that *glück* ultimately favours Lewfrid of its own accord, as when it averts the assassination, means that it appears to contribute to the achievement of the predetermined ending. However, although the workings of negative *glück* might seem to be cancelled out eventually, negative *glück* as such is not a redundant force in the narrative. The manifestations of negative *glück* serve not only as a challenge for the protagonist to display his talents in coping with them, they also act as a narrative device which creates suspense, however temporary. For it is only in retrospect that the course of events may be recognized as having been predetermined. The narrative process provides sufficient disruptive moments to undermine the impression of smooth

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[22] Geulen calls it the "märchenhafte[r] und providentiell verankerte[r] Aufstieg[...] der Hauptfigur" (Hans Geulen, "Tendenzen der epischen Darbietungsformen von den Volksbüchern bis zu Fischart", in H. G., *Erzählkunst der frühen Neuzeit. Zur Geschichte epischer Darbietungsweisen und Formen im Roman der Renaissance und des Barocks*, Tübingen: Rotsch, 1975, pp. 21-45; p. 29). Kleinschmidt detects "unverkennbar märchenhafte Züge" in *Goldfaden* (Erich Kleinschmidt, "Jörg Wickram", in (ed.) Stephan Füssel, *Deutsche Dichter der frühen Neuzeit: (1450-1600); ihr Leben und Werk* (Berlin: Schmidt, 1993), p. 503), while Neudeck refers to "Wickrams märchenhaft-utopische[r] Entwurf" (Otto Neudeck, *op. cit.*, p. 256). Cf. also entry for *Glück* in *Enzyklopädie des Märchens. Handwörterbuch zur historischen und vergleichenden Erzählforschung*, (eds.) Kurt Ranke et al. (Berlin/ New York: de Gruyter, 1977ff), col. 1299-1305, where "Glücksfähigkeit des Helden" is named as a "Grundvoraussetzung für das Zaubermärchen" (col. 1300). Further characteristics are that the hero's fortunate development is prophesied at his birth; moreover, "alle Hindernisse, die Mißgünstige ihm in den Weg zu legen meinen, dienen nur seiner Erhöhung" (1300). Change for the better is brought about partly through the hero's contribution (*Bewährungsproben*) (cf. 1301). While the concept of *glück* in this definition may be closer to an object than to an active force, the way in which *glück* supports Lewfrid's development displays certain parallels with how the fairytale hero experiences *glück*.

fulfilment.

Finally, what is the relation between *glück* and God in *Goldfaden*, when compared with traditional accounts of Fortuna? The subordination of *glück* to God once again evokes the Boethian model. Boethius' attempt to resolve the threats of negative *glück* by interpreting them as God's hidden means of testing man may be present in the narrative to the extent that instances of negative *glück* serve as challenges to the protagonist's valour. Yet the challenges are secularized in that they are not explicitly conducted by God, but rather by the author. Hence God is here more remote from the workings of *glück* than according to Boethius. *Goldfaden* is further distinguished from Boethius, and indeed from Wickram's previous narratives, in that *glück*, as a divine instrument, ultimately contributes to the protagonist's stable material well-being as sanctioned by God. *glück* in *Goldfaden* may be said to be somewhat reminiscent of a certain Renaissance view of Fortuna as a means of positive self-fulfilment. This is suggested by the positive nature of *glück* as such, as well as by the fact that several of the incidents caused by *glück* are opportunities for Lewfrid to improve his situation by his own will: it is only because he knows how to use these opportunities to his advantage that he is as successful as he is. For instance, it is *glück* that removes him from his natural family, but it is only because of Lewfrid's good behaviour that his foster family holds him in high esteem and gives him a head-start in life. It is *glück* that removes him from his foster family and forces him to find work elsewhere, but it is only because of Lewfrid's ability to adapt to the new situation and his industry that he gradually rises in the esteem of the count. On a less significant level, the white dog which *glück* sends Lewfrid's way helps consolidate Angliana's love for him only because he decides to give it to her as a gift. Similar examples may be found among *glück*'s negative manifestations, which occasion Lewfrid's acting in a considerate and courageous way. From this point of view, *glück* would seem to be enabling rather then determining. To the extent that the initiative and creativity displayed by Lewfrid in confrontation with *glück* shape his development in important ways, one may be reminded of the view of Fortuna as expounded by Enea Silvio Piccolomini, or Machiavelli (cf. chapter 4). Moreover, in depicting *glück* as furthering a development which is unconventional as far as social boundaries are concerned, *Goldfaden* comprises an element of adventure also associated with the latter view of Fortuna. *Goldfaden*, of all of Wickram's narratives, is the one that is furthest removed from the Boethian account: the narrator seems for once to abstain from depicting the workings of *glück* as a serious threat. The genuinely positive nature of beneficial *glück* distinguishes it from its deceptive counterpart in the other narratives, which appears to be more closely derived from the inherently pessimistic Boethian Fortuna-concept.

In this respect, *Goldfaden* could be said to be the most free-spirited of Wickram's narratives, which also takes the most positive stance towards *Aufsteigertum*. At the same time, the Renaissance attitude towards *glück* is firmly integrated into a Christian framework. Lewfrid's self-fulfilment is defined by Christian principles. Any selfish or reckless tendencies implied by a notion of dealing with Fortuna such as Machiavelli's have no place in the narrative. Nevertheless the unusually positive representation of *glück* permits a deviation from the predictable rigidity of a God-given world-order in the medieval tradition. *Goldfaden* could be considered as a fantasy, in which *glück* functions as something of a magic wand in one person's attempt to overcome social boundaries.

Chapter 9

Von guoten und boesen Nachbaurn

Let us finally consider the relation between *glück* and God in *Von guoten und boesen Nachbaurn* (1556). This narrative centres around the lives of two merchant families and the ever-growing friendship between them. The first, most shocking instance of an external power's intervention occurs at the very beginning. The merchant Robertus and his family are being severely harassed by their neighbours. Despite this problem, they are able to continue with their life in a happy and self-contented vein. Until, that is, *glück* deals them a horrendous blow:

Es mocht aber das wanckelmůtig und unsteht glück/ dem gůten frumen Roberto die freud nit lang vergunnen/ sunder vermischt im die mit bitterem trawren und schmertzen/ Dann erstlichen ward im Sophia/ sein liebste gemahel/ mit tődtlicher kranckheit beschwert/ [...] wiewol sie in kurtzen tagen wider zů gesuntheit [...] kumen ist/ [...] sturben im alle [neun kinder] nacheinander/ [...] das ihm nůr die jüngst tochter [...] belib (17f).

According to this narratorial statement, *glück* is responsible for the illness of Robertus' wife, as well as the sudden death of nine of their children. There is no reason on the level of human action that could have led to the multiple deaths. Nor is there any indication in the text that Robertus' family could in any way have deserved this severe interference of *glück*, as they are depicted as virtuous in every respect. Thus the concept of *glück* that emerges from the description of the incident is close to the traditionally amoral concept of Fortuna in so far as it strikes people regardless of, or even in spite of their deserts. While *glück* is held responsible for inflicting negative things on Wickram's characters throughout the narratives, this instance is extreme in its cruelty: In *Galmy* and *Goldfaden*, *glück* has no lasting effect, in *Gabriotto*, the manifestations of *glück* may be explained by the characters' negligence, and in *Knabenspiegel*, the suffering inflicted by *glück* is shaded towards being morally inoffensive because Wilbaldus seems to deserve it. The blow received by Robertus is unique in that it is blatantly unjust. Initially, Robertus is heart-broken and unable to overcome his loss. Subsequently, however, he gives the following account of the incident: "mir Gott durch sein milte gnad/ zehen schőner kinder beschert/ [...] die selbigen/ hatt mit Gott der Herr in gar kurtzer zeit einander nach genumen/ bis an mein jüngste tochter" (21f). Thus Robertus retrospectively attributes the children's

death to God, although the narrator had previously attributed it to *glück*. It is highly unlikely that the narrator in this way attempts to indicate that Robertus is deluded in attributing his suffering to God. The fact that Robertus' way of relating his loss is not corrected by the narrator suggests that it is fully adequate to attribute the incident to God. Indeed Robertus' interpretation of his children's death as the work of God might constitute the first step in a process of adjusting to this loss. By attributing the tragic incident to God, it may be possible for Robertus to salvage at least a minimum of sense from what on first sight, as depicted by the narrator, appears to be entirely senseless and unacceptable. Since God is considered as the real cause behind the children's death, the question emerges whether the intervention of *glück* should be viewed as a mere delusion, and whether, consequently, the narratorial standpoint is deluded, too. As I have suggested before, the narrator's reference to *glück* may simply be the result of a spontaneous as opposed to a reflective point of view, and as such does not in any sense devalue his point of view. Alternatively, the near simultaneous reference to both *glück* and God might suggest that *glück* and God belong to different kinds of discourses. That is, the narrator, by referring to *glück*, could explicitly be operating a narrative system which is moulded in the Renaissance tradition. On this may be superimposed a more explicitly Christian understanding of events as expressed by the characters. However, although it seems plausible to observe the simultaneous presence of two explanatory patterns in this particular incident, this distinction between narrator's and characters' point of view is not consistently borne out in the narrative.

Robertus' view is marked by the fact that even when he acknowledges the incident as having been sent by God, he initially refuses to accept it. In order to help Robertus overcome his dejection, friends advise him on the necessity to humbly embrace rather than reject what has been caused by God. A theologically well-versed acquaintance names an abundance of cases such as Job's and David's whose children died young and unexpectedly, and draws the conclusion that one must submit to the ways of God (cf. 22ff). This includes accepting that life on earth is a "zeitliche[s] jamerthal" (24). Eventually, Robertus resigns himself to this interpretation. It not only subordinates the workings of *glück* to those of God, but makes the supposed manifestation of *glück* appear as a mere apparition behind which lies the genuine intervention of God. This suggests that God sanctions, or even causes the occurrence of apparent injustice in the world as experienced by the characters. There are two ways of understanding this. The exempla provided by Robertus' pious friends imply that man, due to his inferior knowledge, cannot understand the divine reasoning which is hidden behind apparent injustice. Therefore, one must consider such

incidents as tests of one's faith and courage, and consequently submit to what is inflicted on one. According to this view, divine will negates the possibility of injustice. At the same time, there is the less optimistic interpretation of the incident implied by Robertus' initial reaction: the incident might represent the experience of genuine, as opposed to apparent injustice in a world governed by God. This would mean a significant step away from the medieval notion of every human being obtaining his or her just deserts, however concealed, by virtue of God's intervention, something we find, e.g., in *Galmy*. Although the first, optimistic interpretation may ultimately prevail among the characters, the ambivalence inherent in the interpretation of the children's death suggests that the narrative includes an element of doubt as regards the guaranteed security traditionally associated with the workings of God.[1]

The next instance of active divine intervention in the narrative occurs when another character, Richart, falls dangerously ill.[2] Richart is a fellow merchant whom Robertus meets aboard a ship. Robertus befriends the sick man and takes charge of his medical treatment, "mit vormittel der hilff gottes/ der selb ist auch der gewiss artzet zů leib und zů seelen" (30). When Richart is cured, he attributes his health to God (cf. 34), thus crediting him with positive intervention. Although references to God as being in charge of a person's health are frequent and usually of limited significance in Wickram's narratives, this one is different. Richart's health is not merely preserved, it is restored. The importance of his recovery lies in the fact that

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[1] According to Jan Knopf, the passage about the *zeitliche[s] jamerthal* is remarkable, "nicht weil sie [die Passage] theologisch die Welt als Jammertal ausweist, sondern weil sie den weltlichen Schicksalsschlag mit der göttlichen Gnade und der göttlichen Weltordnung nicht im Einklang, weil sie Glück und Providenz im Widerstreit liegen sieht. Der Tod der Kinder erscheint zunächst als 'Tat' des selbsttätigen Glücks, das erst durch die ausführliche theologische Rede des Gelehrten mit der göttlichen Ordnung versöhnt zu werden vermag und also gerechtfertigt wird. Robert verzweifelt an der ihm ungerecht erscheindenden Welt [...], er verläßt die 'christliche Bahn', indem er mit dem Schicksal hadert und sich seiner Verzweiflung überläßt; nur mit großem Aufwand ist er wieder zu Demut und Glauben zurückzubringen, indem ihn der Gelehrte das 'unstete Glück' als Ausdruck göttlicher Providenz, als Ausweis göttlichen Willens dartut; in der Welt gibt es keinen Anspruch auf göttliche Güte" (Jan Knopf, "Versicherung des Mitmenschen. Arbeit, Freundschaft und Glück in Jörg Wickrams Romanen", in J. K., *Frühzeit des Bürgers.Erfahrene und verleugnete Realität in den Romanen Wickrams, Grimmelshausens und Schnabels* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1978), p. 45). But, is it true that Robertus "hadert mit dem *Schicksal*" (my emphasis), when he in fact attributes his losses to God? And, how is it that the description of the world as "jamerthal" can imply that *glück* and providence are in conflict with one another, when at the same time, the *Gelehrter* explains that what has apparently been inflicted by *glück* is really the result of providence? It seems to me that the ideological crisis experienced by Robertus cuts deeper than according to Knopf's observation: instead of finding fault with the unruly presence of *glück* in a world which is supposed to be governed by God, Robertus is having difficulties accepting the intervention of God *per se*.

[2] By 'active', I mean the kind of intervention which brings about a particular incident, as opposed to the static intervention which manifests itself, e.g., in God's granting a person life, nourishment, etc.

the subsequent development of the plot depends on his being alive: Robertus' friendship with Richart is the cornerstone of the narrative. In due course, Richart becomes part of Robertus' family by marrying his daughter. Through Richart, Robertus' family then develops a friendship with a second family, headed by Lasarus; the growing relations between the two families form the core of the narrative. Hence divine intervention at this stage ensures the continuity of the protagonists' development, which concludes in Richart's daughter marrying Lasarus' son. Therefore, God's intervention may be considered as crucial for the narrative structure as well as for the fulfilment of the characters' happiness. The fact that God is credited with averting, or reversing a negative development means that a pattern familiar from the previous narratives is repeated here. However, this positive instance of divine intervention is linked only vaguely, if at all, to the negative one experienced earlier by Robertus. Although it is possible to view Richart's being cured as a compensation for Robertus' loss to the extent that Richart's presence provides him with friendship and support, the brutality of the earlier instance remains nevertheless unmitigated.

It is in the following way that Richart makes Lasarus' acquaintance. When he is attacked in the street by two hired assassins, Lasarus comes to his rescue and saves his life. The absence of *glück* or God at the incident is notable when compared to other narratives. Contrary to what one might expect, there is no explicit attribution of Richart's predicament to *glück*, nor of Lasarus' rescuing him to God. Still Richart, looking back on the event, draws the following conclusion: "dieweil im [Richart] Gott sein leben günnet/ das er in [Lasarus] für einen brůder und freundt/ ansprechen wolt" (55). Thus God is ultimately held responsible for the preservation of Richart's life, although there is no direct acknowledgment of God's sending Lasarus to Richart's rescue, as is the case, e.g., when Galmy saves the duchess in the trial by combat. This may indicate that while God is credited with protecting the characters in a general way, his responsibility stands in a more abstract relation to vital incidents than in previous narratives. While characters may implicitly carry out the will of God, divine influence is not specifically linked to certain actions. In this sense, the workings of God in *Nachbaurn* may be somewhat internalized. This means that God's influence, rather than specifically originating on a superhuman level, originates from within the characters' own actions, which are in turn informed by their Christian belief.

glück subsequently interferes with the characters' lives in the following way. Richart and Lasarus travel on business to Spain; "[i]n diser zeit/ wolt danocht das glück nicht gar für und für mit diesen zweien gůten gesellen sein/ sunder inen auch

etwas überzwerchs under die fůss legen" (63). That is, Lasarus is tricked into stepping aboard a Turkish ship, where he is trapped in order to be sold as a slave. Lasarus reacts by praying to God to help him out of his misery (cf. 65). He is freed by Richart, who swiftly calls the port authorities to Lasarus' rescue. In retrospect, Lasarus declares "mir Gott durch [Richart] geholffen hat" (81; cf. also 82). Hence *glück* continues its negative intervention by putting the character into danger, while God is said to help the character out of the situation. To the extent that God undoes the negative works of *glück*, the pattern familiar from the previous narratives is reinforced. Through divine intervention, the smooth continuation of the plot is ensured once more. Lasarus can return home with his friend, and the relations between both families continue to blossom. Hence divine intervention is now characterized by securing and re-establishing justice and stability: virtuous Lasarus in no way deserves to be sold into slavery, nor does Richart deserve to be deprived of his friend. As we shall see, God's support for the two characters and their families remains consistent throughout the ensuing part of the narrative, making the children's death appear as an exception.

God's intervention in the above instance suggests that divine justice exists as a corrective to the injustice of a world in which *glück*, and other human beings, present a considerable threat to man. Why, then, one might ask, does divine justice not annul the workings of *glück* in the case of the death of Robertus' children, which after all is originally associated with *glück*? Apart from the fact that even God could hardly bring the children back to life,[3] God's benign intervention may be withheld in this instance because *glück* is not genuinely the cause. That is, what on first sight looks like the intervention of *glück* is authoritatively explained by the characters as the intervention of God. Since it is in God's power to give things and take them away, there is obviously no reason for God to reverse what he himself, as opposed to *glück*, has caused. Alternatively, the presence or absence of divine intervention could be related to the characters' ability to cope with the respective incidents more than to the impact of superhuman forces. In other words, the instances of God's benign action depend on the actions of the characters: Richart is only cured because Robertus, on the basis of his Christian belief, takes care of him; he is saved from his attackers only because Lasarus, out of similar motives, steps in; and Lasarus is only freed because

[3] In medieval fiction, God could have brought the children back to life. In Konrad von Würzburg's *Engelhard*, for instance, God brings Engelhard's children back to life after their father has sacrificed their lives to cure his friend Dietrich who is suffering from leprosy. Apart from the fact that this train of events is very different from the unprompted death of Robertus' children, the story of *Nachbaurn* would have been much more difficult to tell had there been ten children of Robertus' throughout the narrative, rather than just the one who survives, who subsequently becomes Richart's wife.

Richart, moved by the duties of friendship, comes to his rescue. By contrast, no character could have saved Robertus' children when stricken with what appears to be a terminal disease. Moreover, Robertus at that point does not have a friend who is as devoted to him as he and Richart later are to each other, and who therefore might be committed to helping him, which further stresses the importance of human contribution. Seen in this light, what is referred to as direct positive divine intervention may to some extent be the result of human intervention based on friendship and Christian belief.

The next instance of *glück*'s intervention occurs when Amelia, Richart's daughter, and Lasarus Jun., Lasarus' son, fall in love with each other. For a while, they enjoy their feelings in secret, until *glück* puts an end to this state: "Das unstet glück aber/ welches kein bestendige freud haben mag/ wolt disen zweyen jungen liebhabenden/ ir heimliche freud/ [...] nit lenger vergünnen" (89). That is, Richart overhears Amelia talking to herself about her beloved and decides to take certain steps. Yet despite the negative introduction of this incident, the expected crisis does not take place. The lovers' parents are delighted and merely make some arrangements for the proper conduct of the relationship. Although the discovery may at first be a blow to the sensitive souls of the lovers, it ultimately does them a favour by furthering the development of their relationship. This suggests that the experience of a negative intervention of *glück* is here limited to a subjective point of view as well as to a particular moment in time. However, comparison with other narratives, namely *Gabriotto*, *Galmy* and *Goldfaden*, shows that the unintended discovery of a secret love may genuinely lead to disastrous consequences for the lovers in question. Perhaps it is because of this association that *glück*'s intervention is lamented here in the traditional mode, even though the non-aristocratic environment of *Nachbaurn*, contrary to the courtly one in the other narratives, restricts the severity of *glück*'s interference considerably.

The *glück*-induced discovery of the young people's feelings leads Richart to announce their love as the work of God, which suggests that *glück*'s intervention may incidentally contribute to revealing a divine plan: "Ich aber gedenck dise ding also/ von Gott geordnet sein/ damit sich unser früntschafft des orts meren/ und zůneme" (96). Richart's declaring the children's love as God-sent means that once more, an important positive element of the plot is attributed to God, against whose influence previous interference by *glück* in the matter pales into insignificance. The love between Lasarus and Amelia constitutes an important element of the plot to the extent that the ensuing half of the narrative is structured around the families' long-term preparations for the wedding, and with this event the narrative concludes. That

Richart himself interprets the incident as the work of God, employed to reinforce the two families' friendship, ties in with the fact that divine will or approval is frequently associated with relations between the families. Thus Amelia, when talking about her commitment to Lasarus Jun., relates it to the condition "wann es Got also wolt fůgen/ das wir in ehlichen stand zůsamen kumen" (102). Similarly, Lasarus Sen. attributes Richart's friendship to the fact "das uns Gott durch manigfåltige und vil gůtthaten begabt hat" (103). These statements illustrate the characters' awareness of the importance of God's steady support for their happiness and fulfilment. Divine support is associated with maintaining the status quo in the characters' lives rather than with any drastic changes in their development.

Notably, *glück* does not once interfere with the friendship between the families by causing internal disruption through, e.g., rivalry or misunderstanding. This suggests that the characters' friendship is stabilized by virtue of their own behaviour, i.e. by their adhering to certain Christian principles such as honesty, loyalty and caring. External disruptions, such as the ones caused by society, or forces of nature, which might also be attributed to the disrupting influence of *glück*, are equally absent. In this respect, too, relationships in *Nachbaurn* differ from those in the other narratives set in a courtly environment. This seems to be at least partly because the relationships in *Nachbaurn* are among social equals, which means that a central source of conflict is banished. Yet stable friendship does not automatically arise from any human contact just because those concerned are not aristocratic, as is evident from the harassment which Robertus initially suffers from his troublesome neighbours. Individual effort on both sides is an essential condition in order to establish and maintain a proper friendship. Further, such friendship cannot be attained through human effort alone. The characters' awareness of this emerges, for instance, from a comment by Amelia: "Das mich dann nit kleine und schlechte gab von Got sein beduncket/ wo er solche freundtliche nachbaurschafft zůsamen/ verfůgt" (132). This attitude, which is common among the protagonists (cf. also p. 103), suggests that God's blessing is a prerequisite for friendship. Since friendship is a central element of the protagonists' lives, God's influence on the narrative's development in this respect must be considered extensive. At the same time, this influence is less concrete than it is in previous narratives. It comes across as a general blessing more than as specific intervention, given that once divine approval is granted, it is within the characters' control as well as within their responsibility to preserve the friendship thus blessed.

In the remaining part of the narrative, some critical incidents take place that pose a threat to the conclusion which the characters desire, i.e. the marriage of Lasarus and Amelia and, following that, the merging of the two households into one.

All of these incidents happen during the period of the lovers' separation, when Lasarus spends a year in Spain in order to complete his training. Lasarus falls seriously ill with *melancoley*, he is suspected of theft, and he is finally exposed to an attempt on his life. The incidents threaten his reputation, and his life. Notably, none of them is attributed to either *glück* or God. Instead, they are represented as resulting exclusively from human motives or dispositions, i.e. Lasarus' longing for Amelia, and other characters' envy of his success. The incidents are resolved, ensuring that the intended conclusion may be reached. Again, neither *glück* nor God are held directly responsible for the incidents' resolution, which instead is depicted as resulting from human action and, to a lesser extent, coincidence. It is only when Lasarus, on his safe return from Spain, recounts his adventures culminating in the attempted murder that the other characters link these incidents to God: "sie [...] danckten und lobten Got aus grundt ires hertzens/ das er irem sůn also gesunds leibs wider in sein vatterland geholffen het" (175). This statement may be read as the characters' retrospectively attributing the resolution of Lasarus' predicaments to God, and thus as a further example of the consistent support provided by God for the virtuous. However, the fact that God is mentioned only in a general and rather vague way suggests that the characters' actions as such must be considered to contribute to Lasarus' development in an important way. This means that in addition to *glück* and God, human action, and with it individual motivation, is coming into play as a force in its own right. Where, then, does human action stand in relation to the two superhuman influences? Could it be that it occupies a middle ground between the role of God and that of *glück*? First of all, autonomous human actions may constitute another, substantial source of danger in addition to the workings of *glück*: regardless of his being essentially virtuous, Lasarus is exposed to various instances of human evil, such as when he is accused of theft, and, later, put in danger of being murdered. Although he is saved from disaster by well-meaning third parties, his rescue is to some degree accidental in that it depends on being surrounded by the right people at the right time. This means that Lasarus himself has to negotiate the dangers emanating from human sources; he cannot rely on a superhuman power, God, to protect him, but instead depends on the support of fellow human beings. Hence the autonomy of human behaviour gives rise to unpredictability, which in turn may create a sense of insecurity. At the same time, the issue of Lasarus' personal and professional survival reinforces the importance of reliable friendship, as protection may be provided by well-meaning friends or acquaintances. Generally speaking, the absence of *glück* from the above period of Lasarus' development is made up for by the emergence of human action, which is equally destructive in its own right. Moreover, God's withdrawal

from the details of a person's development makes his or her life appear more insecure than it would be in a world in which major incidents are divinely sanctioned, as represented, e.g., in *Galmy*: even the positive actions of human beings are in no way as predictable and reliable as the workings of God. The fact that Lasarus nevertheless escapes unharmed from the threats he encounters might indicate Wickram's optimism, or the idealization of this account of human life which finds expression in the general rule of the virtuous' faring well.

The disengagement of God's will from worldly incidents is not accompanied by a detachment from Christian belief. Apart from the fact that God is credited with indirectly intervening in some incidents and thus facilitating the undisrupted continuation of the story, *Von guoten und boesen Nachbaurn* in some ways displays the most explicitly Christian framework of Wickram's narratives. This is expressed particularly strongly in the closing passages of the narrative, when Amelia and Lasarus are finally married and the two families decide to become one household. Laying down the ground-rules for their newly united household, Richart insists that the two families need a head of the house in order to live in harmony:

"[...] kennend ir den obman noch nit/ nůn hat er dannocht jetz ein lange zeit umb und bey uns gewonet/ Es hatt in auch Christus unser lieber Herr und erlőser/ seinen ausserwelten and allerliebsten jungeren zů einer sáligen letze gelassen. Nit allein seinen jüngeren/ sunder allen Christ gleubigen menschen. [...] diser obman [...] haißt Frid [...]" Also ward ein gemeine fridliche und früntliche haushaltung under disem vőlckle angericht/ Die sie auch mit der gnad/ und hilff/ Gott des Almechtigen beyeinander erhielten (177f).

That is, the families are supposed to honour peace, as given by Christ to his disciples, as the head of their household. Thus a new view of God's presence in the world emerges.[4] His presence crucially depends on the characters' awareness of and

[4] While the above passage could be seen to illustrate a Protestant point of view, it is difficult to relate it to a specific denomination. Jan-Dirk Müller remarks: "Unfruchtbar ist die Zuordnung [Wickrams] zu einer bestimmten Konfession, zumal diese damals noch nicht dogmatisch und institutionell verfestigt sind und gerade die Straßburger Reformation um Martin Bucer eine vermittelnde Position einnimmt" (Jan-Dirk Müller, "Frühbürgerliche Privatheit und altständische Gemeinschaft. Zu Jörg Wickrams Historie *Von Guoten und Boesen Nachbaurn*", *IASL* 5 (1980), p.14). Nevertheless Müller stresses Wickram's proximity to the Reformation movement (cf. p. 13), identifying the communal household as a concept that was crucial to the Reformation ideal of society as proposed by Luther and Bucer (cf. p. 18). The fact that Wickram abstains from more concrete political or theological references Müller attributes to the "Selbstschutz des Autors in einer vom Kontroversschrifttum beherrschten literarischen Szene, zumal in der gespannten Situation des Interim" (p. 13). Franz Podleiszek perceives a more decisive stance in the religious orientation of *Nachbaurn* when he claims that "[i]n seinem letzten Roman hat Wickram das Ideal von Luthers innerweltlicher Askese ganz durchgeführt" (Franz Podleiszek, *Anfänge des bürgerlichen Prosaromans in Deutschland* (Darmstadt: WBG, 1974 [reprint of edition Leipzig 1933]), p. 24). By contrast, Ingeborg Spriewald claims that "für [Wickrams]

practical contribution to it. It manifests itself in a combination of human action and submission to certain principles of Christianity on the one hand, and divine grace on the other. God's presence seems gradually to increase in strength during the narrative as the characters approach the formation of the ideal Christian household. How does the way in which the characters contribute to God's presence influence the impact of *glück*? It is notable that towards the end of the narrative, *glück*, as opposed to other characters, no longer intervenes in a negative way - in fact it no longer intervenes at all. The characters' disharmonious experience of superhuman interference in their lives, caused earlier on by the death of Robertus' nine children and to some extent by the abduction of the elder Lasarus, seems to be erased completely. Although from a factual point of view, this may be mere coincidence, the eventual absence of spiteful *glück* may nevertheless be deliberately employed by the narrator to suggest that closeness to God in word and deed keeps *glück* at bay.

What, then, is the general relation between *glück* and God in *Nachbaurn*? Identifying as the central story the ever-strengthening alliance between the two families, one might say that with regard to it, God is more powerful than *glück*, with the characters themselves strongly contributing to this development. At the same time, *glück*'s disruptive interventions provide an antagonistic element to the justice of God, albeit not a substantial one. God is seen ultimately to annul *glück*'s workings. With regard to the death of the children which cannot, or will not be annulled by God, *glück*'s working is interpreted as being subordinated to the will of God. That is, the characters cope with what is initially seen as *glück*'s malign activity by attributing it to God, hence the incident is really seen as stemming from the intervention of God rather than of *glück*. While *glück* is therefore depicted as being no serious antagonist to God, its initial, irredeemable blow may still result in the presence of a continuous menace. The hostility towards the protagonists displayed by *glück* from the beginning by its being associated with the children's death is quite distinct from the other narratives, in which *glück* tends to go through an initial phase of working in the characters' favour. In *Nachbaurn*, this beneficial phase seems to be missing, suggesting

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Gesellschaftsbild die Ausrichtung des Bürgertums auf den Kalvinismus bereits Voraussetzung ist" (Ingeborg Spriewald, "Historien und Schwänke: Die deutsche Erzählprosa von 'Till Eulenspiegel' bis 'Doktor Faustus' ", in (ed.) Robert Weimann, *Realismus in der Renaissance. Aneignung der Welt in der erzählenden Prosa*, Berlin, Weimar: Aufbau 1977, p. 378). Erich Kleinschmidt considers the notion of a communal household in a sociological rather than in a theological context: "Dieses 'reformatorische' Konzept [...] ist weniger konfessionellem Denkeinfluß verpflichtet, als daß es den Horizont einer um Sicherung des Errungenen bemühten Lebenseinstellung erkennen läßt, wie er allenthalben in den frühneuzeitlichen Stadtgesellschaften anzutreffen ist" (Erich Kleinschmidt, "Narratives Ordnungsdenken und urbane Bildungsdidaktik: Jörg Wickram", in E. K., *Stadt und Literatur in der frühen Neuzeit:Voraussetzungen und Entfaltung im südwestdeutschen, elsässischen und schweizerischen Städteraum* (Köln and Wien: Böhlau, 1982), p. 251).

that the destructive impact of *glück* is viewed with greater severity. But the disruptive potential of *glück* fades into the background in the course of the story and never re-materializes. As a consequence, any suspense that might be created by juxtaposing *glück* and God is somewhat limited in this narrative. Moreover, there is not a single incident of *glück* as an active power supporting, however randomly, the overall development sanctioned by God. *glück* never intervenes in a positive way. Thus it is devoid of the kind of fickleness traditionally associated with *glück*, fickleness, that is, which consists in turning an apparently positive situation into its opposite. Therefore, the suspense generated by the representation of *glück* as such is also limited in *Nachbaurn* when compared to the other narratives: *glück* is unchanging to the extent that when it does appear, it is negative without exception, and its workings may be taken at face value. That is, both in relation to God and when considered on its own terms, the representation of *glück* in *Nachbaurn* is less elaborate than in Wickram's other narratives.

Another peculiar feature of *Nachbaurn* is that it contains an incident which is notable in the apparent severity of injustice associated with it. It is the devastating blow which deprives Robertus of all of his children but one, which has no equivalent in the other narratives. Robertus initially perceives the children's death as an injustice dealt him by God, which suggests that he would normally expect God to shield him from this kind of devastating experience. Injustice seems to be constituted by the fact that Robertus is flawless, that neither he nor his children have done anything to deserve such a blow. In the other narratives, by contrast, no character suffers undeservedly through an external force, or if they do, their suffering is ultimately reversed.[5] Even if one might suggest that Robertus is ultimately compensated through finding new friends that make up for his lost children, there is a genuine sense of precariousness emanating from his suffering. As we have seen, the characters' way of coping with this precariousness consists in ascribing the children's death to God. This is reminiscent of the Boethian approach to worldly suffering, which advocates the acceptance of things inflicted by *glück* as being ultimately sanctioned by God. Yet Wickram's account differs in a specific respect from the Boethian one. After the narrator, presumably voicing a superficial perception of the incident, initially ascribes the children's death to *glück*, Robertus, with the help of some theological lecturing, comes to accept their death as the immediate result of divine action. That is, *glück* no longer figures as a cause of the incident, hence the will

[5] The protagonists' death in *Gabriotto* might come to mind here as an example of suffering similar to that of Robertus. But, their deaths, unlike Robertus' suffering, are linked to their own inadequacies, as I will show in part III.

of God is considered to be present in a more direct way than it is according to Boethius. Moreover, those negative incidents that are genuinely attributed to *glück* subsequent to the children's death are reversed by God. This could suggest that the intervention of *glück* may only be condoned, and as such be considered as genuine, if its effect is reversed. That is, explaining the children's death as a work of God might be the characters' somewhat desperate attempt to avoid the awkwardness that would be created by God's apparent inability or unwillingness to reverse a work of *glück*, rather than their genuine conviction. The view upheld by the characters with regard to the children's death seems to be more problematic than it would be according to Boethius. Boethius, by crediting God only with the general approval of *glück*'s workings, avoids directly associating God with the deliberate infliction of suffering. Therefore, the image of God remains relatively untainted by negative things. It is precisely the problem which Boethius avoids that arises from the representation of the incident in *Nachbaurn*, as God is held directly responsible for it. While Robertus is able to resolve this problem, after initial difficulties, by renewed submission to the will of God, such submission presupposes unshaken belief in both the omnipotence and the complete justice of God, however concealed they may be. Although Robertus just about manages to embrace this belief, his initial reluctance to do so might be read as an indication that this belief was beginning to be questioned in the world in which Wickram was living. The question of how, if at all, one can deal with God's inflicting things which, from a human point of view, seem undeserved, cannot be withdrawn. As Jan Knopf points out,

> *[d]aß* die Frage [nach der Güte Gottes, nach seiner Allmacht und den [*sic*] gerechten Ausgleich der Welt] hier schon gestellt wird, daß sich der Zweifel an der göttlichen Weltordnung rührt, macht Wickrams Roman bedeutsam: leise, aber unüberhörbar deutet sich die pagane Konsequenz an, zeigen sich die ersten Niederschläge eines Atheismus.[6]

Attributing a negative and at first unacceptable incident to God intimates the possibility, or even necessity of questioning not only the competence of God in the presence of *glück*, but of questioning God's competence as such. By having the characters attribute the genuine responsibility for the children's death to God, Wickram may endeavour to eliminate problems that could be caused by the autonomous impact of *glück* in such a grave matter. That is, he may seek to avoid the notion of a deficiency in God's omnipotence, which he may consider to be less

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[6] Jan Knopf, "Versicherung des Mitmenschen. Arbeit, Freundschaft und Glück in Jörg Wickrams Romanen", *op. cit.*, p. 45.

appropriate in a story set in a contemporary situation than in the courtly narratives set in a distant, non-specific past. Ironically, it is exactly this endeavour which implies trouble of a more serious sort: it gives room to the view of divine will as being inherently flawed, rather than being merely threatened by an external and lesser rival.

Generally speaking, it is notable that *Nachbaurn*, although comparable in length to the other narratives, contains much fewer references to the intervention of *glück* and God respectively. This could be explained by the difference in the circumstances in which the narratives are set. *Nachbaurn* is the only narrative which is set exclusively in non-aristocratic surroundings.[7] None of the characters is aristocratic. This means that the crucial values upheld in the narrative are different from those that mark the other narratives. Most importantly, there is only one set of values to which all relevant characters subscribe. By contrast, the narratives set in a courtly surrounding, with the exception perhaps of *Knabenspiegel*, depict two clashing sets of values, which are based on noble extraction on the one hand and personal achievement on the other. That is, the protagonists' values are based on the emotional appreciation of a person's inner virtues as well as class-independent attributes such as beauty and martial skills. They clash with the values of those characters who are in a position of power, to whom nobility is the condition for accepting a person as their equal. This creates a major source of difficulty for the protagonists, such as when the lovers have to contend with the hostility directed towards their union by those in power. In *Nachbaurn*, by contrast, all central characters agree with regard to the crucial values that both determine and enable their coexistence.[8] These values are based on the individual's virtuous behaviour rather than on his or her extraction. They include industriousness, conscientiousness, loyalty and respect, all of which are based on Christian belief, possibly pointing to a brand of Protestantism. In this sense, these values are not exclusive, and anyone can conform to them if he or she so desires. At the same time, the above-mentioned virtues appear to be essentially *bürgerlich*, which adds a further, somewhat less inclusive dimension to the characters'

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[7] Cf. Reinhold Jacobi: "Die 'Nachbarn' zeigen keinerlei Beziehung mehr zu Rittertum und höfischer Welt. Wickram hat sich von der Tradition der 'Volksbuch'-Stoffe gelöst; schon der 'Knabenspiegel' weist auf dieses Stadium in Wickrams Entwicklung hin" (Reinhold Jacobi, *Jörg Wickrams Romane. Interpretation unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der zeitgenössischen Erzählprosa*, Diss. Bonn 1970, p. 202). On a slightly different note, Xenja von Ertzdorff remarks that unlike in the earlier narratives, references to the novella genre are more or less non-existent both in *Nachbarn* and in *Goldfaden* (cf. Xenja von Ertzdorff, *Romane und Novellen des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland* (Darmstadt: WBG, 1989), p. 117). This suggests that the novella genre is somehow bound up with a courtly setting.

[8] The disharmony caused by the bad neighbours is a threat which is merely peripheral. On the other hand, Robertus' concerns in this respect appear to be peculiarly *bürgerlich*, resulting as they do from his living in a house in a town which entails proximity to his neighbours.

communal existence (cf. fn. 12).

The religious belief that shapes *Nachbaurn* differs from that of the courtly society in a way that is crucial with regard to the presence of God. The values practised in *Nachbaurn* are not merely framed by a vague awareness of divine power, as the class-based values of the courtly narratives seem to be. Rather, they are the practical application of the characters' belief in God. Because this belief has as a central aspect the respect of and care for others, provided they satisfy a certain moral profile, it contrasts with the belief of those who value class more than personal virtue, thus focusing mainly on their own welfare. It is notable that Christ is mentioned in *Nachbaurn* for the first and only time in Wickram's narratives (cf. 177). This suggests a Christo-centric belief, which in conjunction with the demand to prove one's faith in practice distinguishes Protestantism from medieval Christianity, and to a certain extent perhaps also from Catholicism. In other words, *Nachbaurn* seems to depict a contemporary theological outlook, which comes across as both stricter and more concrete than the piety of the courtly narratives' characters. The fact that Richart refers to Christ's giving peace as a guiding principle to his disciples indicates that the characters consider faith as involving a certain kind of immediate interaction between God and man. By repeating the acts of the early Christians, most notably their communal life, the characters seem to believe that they may re-enact that original interaction with God. It could be because of this peculiar approach to God that the appearance of both *glück* and of God as we have encountered it in the previous narratives is limited in *Nachbaurn*. The specific intervention of God might be ruled out by the fact that his presence, under the given circumstances, is considered to work through active human commitment. The appearance of *glück*, on the other hand, might be largely ruled out because *glück* cannot possibly be considered as a genuine force from the point of view of contemporary theology: there could simply be no room for the concept of *glück*, however far removed from its pagan origin, in the minds of people who believe in God according to Reformation thought. As a result, *Nachbaurn* comes across as more 'modern' with regard to the presence of superhuman forces in people's lives than the other narratives in so far as the characters' moral and social autonomy seems to increase.

As we observe a more distinctly and more contemporary Christian view manifesting itself in *Nachbaurn* by comparison with the earlier narratives, the question emerges whether Wickram became more explicit in his religious beliefs in the course of his literary career, i.e. whether the development should be seen as the result of a gradual change in Wickram's personal attitude. Yet his continuous involvement in religion in the function of choir-founder and hymn-writer in Colmar

seems to suggest that Wickram's personal commitment to contemporary theology was more constant than the narratives might indicate. As for the difference in religious contents, Max Wehrli remarks:

Der Geist des Nachbarn-Romans kann einleuchtend mit der in Straßburg und in Burkheim [wo Wickram Stadtschreiber war], nicht aber im mehrheitlich katholischen Colmar [wo Wickram Ratsdiener war und eine Meistersingerschule begründete] möglichen reformiert-kalvinistischen Frömmigkeit zusammengebracht werden. So steckt [...] hinter den volksbuchhaften Verfremdungen doch wahrscheinlich eine jeweils recht konkrete Ideologie oder doch Mentalität. Und von daher gewinnen Wickrams Romane zwar nicht einen hohen literarischen Rang, aber eine geschichtliche Repräsentanz.[9]

Since Wickram had moved to Burkheim by the time *Nachbaurn* was published, it may be possible either that he did not feel free to voice Protestant concerns before, or that it was not until then that he made these concerns his own. However, the narratives themselves may provide a more solid explanation for the distinction between *Nachbaurn* on the one hand and the other narratives on the other. That is, the distinction could be explained as arising from the fact that they represent different types of narratives, or even different genres.[10] While the earlier narratives, with the exception of *Knabenspiegel*, may be classed under the genre of courtly romance, and exhibit traces reminiscent of the Renaissance novella,[11] *Nachbaurn* must be considered as a narrative which is distinctly *bürgerlich*, and removed from the patterns and

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[9] Cf. Max Wehrli, *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1997), pp. 1141f.

[10] The significance of the change in genre to be observed in the sequence of Wickram's narratives is emphasized by Dieter Kartschoke: "Es ist an der Zeit, den Übergang zur bewußten *invention*, zur Fiktion und zur in ihr verarbeiteten Welterfahrung, zum nicht mehr traditionell ständisch sondern moralisch geadelten Personal als nicht bloß (wenn auch staunenswerte) inhaltliche Neuerung zu verstehen, sondern als einen gattungsästhetischen Umschlag von tiefgreifenden Konsequenzen. In Wickrams späten Romanen treten bürgerliche Personen in ihrer bürgerlichen Umwelt auf, aus der sie nicht mehr hinausstreben wie Hug Schapler, Fortunatus oder noch Lewfrid; in der sie ihre Identität finden ohne mehr das feudale Gegenbild zu ihrer eigenen Definition zu bedürfen, wie noch Fridbert erst durch den verlorenen Sohn Wilbaldus zu dem wird, der er ist [...] Philisterschicksale, gewiß, denen aber zum erstenmal eine Dignität zugebilligt wird, die bislang nur die 'hohen Helden' für sich in Anspruch nehmen durften, - dies eben ist die epochale Bedeutung von Jörg Wickrams *Nachbarn*-Roman" (Dieter Kartschoke, "*Bald bracht Phebus seinen Wagen*. Gattungsgeschichtliche Überlegungen zu Jörg Wickrams *Nachbarn*-Roman", *Daphnis* 11 (1982), p. 727).

[11] For characteristics of the Renaissance novella, cf. e.g. Reinhold Jacobi, *Jörg Wickrams Romane. Interpretation unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der zeitgenössischen Erzählprosa* (Diss. Bonn 1970), and Xenja von Ertzdorff, *Romane und Novellen des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland* (Darmstadt: WBG, 1989).

traditions of the earlier ones.[12] *glück* might appear more frequently in the romance-type narratives because their contents are moulded on a certain model which is set in a world which is courtly and to a certain extent characterized by the presence of Fortuna. It might be for similar reasons that in these narratives God's will is manifest in specific interventions, sometimes approximating the *deus ex machina*- mode, while this is no longer the case in *Nachbaurn*. Generally speaking, there seem to be two types among Wickram's narratives: those that seek primarily to entertain, and those that seek primarily to educate their readers. *Galmy*, *Gabriotto* and *Goldfaden* are shaped in the chivalric tradition. By contrast, *Knabenspiegel* and *Nachbaurn* are overtly educational in their intention, when compared with the entertainment value of the above.[13] Hence their moral is much narrower: a strict demonstration of the importance of obedience and a particular kind of virtue. *glück* is employed mainly as a means of illustrating this moral. In the 'chivalric' narratives, one of *glück*'s main purposes seems to be to contribute to the entertainment value; the characters' confrontation with *glück* creates suspense. In this sense, Wickram's changing representation of *glück* and God would reflect a literary rather than a religious development. That is, those narratives whose contents are inspired by traditional forms of narratives set in distant conditions might reflect also these traditions' account of how *glück* and God affect human life. By contrast, the more closely the narratives recall Wickram's own society and the problems addressed in it, the more clearly Wickram may have expressed the beliefs which he or the society in which he lived held regarding these superhuman forces and their effects on man.

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[12] According to Max Wehrli, the sequence of Wickram's narratives illustrates "wie der Erzähler Motive der ihm zugänglichen Volksbücher und späthöfischen Romane kombiniert, um sie dann zunehmend durch stoffliche Elemente seiner eigenen bürgerlichen Welt abzulösen" (Max Wehrli, *op. cit.*, pp. 1138f).

[13] Cf. Neudeck on the difference between *Galmy*, *Gabriotto* und *Goldfaden* on the one hand, and *Knabenspiegel* and *Nachbaurn* on the other: "[passionierte Liebe in höfischem Ambiente und damit verbunden die Möglichkeit einer glänzenden Karriere des Protagonisten] wird in weitaus höherem Maße durch Erstaunen, Zufall oder *glück* markiert als das moralisch-didaktische Exempelstück von der rechten oder falschen Erziehung junger Menschen [...] oder Wickrams Idealentwurf eines harmonischen Zusammenlebens in der stadtbürgerlichen Großfamilie" (Otto Neudeck, "*Verwunderung, glück, von ungeschicht.* Zur Poetologie des Fiktionalen in Jörg Wickram's *Goldtfaden*", in (eds.) Wolfgang Harms and C. Stephen Jaeger, *Fremdes wahrnehmen - fremdes Wahrnehmen: Studien zur Geschichte der Wahrnehmung und zur Begegnung von Kulturen in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit* (Stuttgart/Leipzig: Hirzel, 1997), p. 259). This distinction agrees with Jacobi's evaluation of the later narratives: "Die beiden letzten Erzählungen [i.e. *Knabenspiegel* and *Nachbaurn*] [...] geben sich als quasihumanistische Werke - erstere als Ganzes, ihrer klaren pädagogischen Absicht wegen, letztere durch ihre gleichfalls pädagogische Funktion, zu welcher eine bis dahin unbekannte Fülle verhältnismäßig weitläufig vorgetragener humanistischer Verweise hinzutritt" (Reinhold Jacobi, *op. cit.*, p. 366).

Part III

Manifestations of *glück*

Chapter 10

Externally Operating *glück*

Now that we have established a clear picture of the narratives' contents and *glück*'s position in them, we may, in this final part of the thesis, try to determine the exact ways in which *glück* manifests itself. There are essentially two types of manifestations, externally operating *glück* on the one hand, and internally operating *glück* on the other. Externally operating *glück* is associated with incidents, such as shipwreck or severe illness, that arise in a way that is impossible for the affected person to control. Internally operating *glück* is manifest in incidents that originate in either the affected person's actions or his failure to act, hence lie within the scope of a person's control. I will trace the impact of either type of *glück* on each narrative, focusing on the most important instances. As we will see, internally operating *glück* outweighs its externally operating counterpart. This suggests that Wickram emphasizes both the need for and the possibility of a person contributing to his or her development in a significant way. I will argue that the individual's contribution is indeed the decisive factor in the outcome of each narrative. In the next and final chapter, I will argue that this internalization of *glück* is a feature that distinguishes Wickram's representation of *glück* from the more conventional views of many of his contemporaries.

Here, I will look at the externally operating type of *glück*. It is manifest in instances in which what a character experiences as *glück*'s intervention is the genuine result of an external force as opposed to arising from the character's own actions. Instances of externally operating *glück* are characterized by the affected character's powerlessness as regards the causation of an incident. Starting with *Ritter Galmy*, the first instance of externally operating *glück* would seem to be the following passage at the beginning of the narrative: Commenting on Galmy's illness, the duchess states that "die weyl aber Gott und das glück/ die ding [i.e. Galmy's illness] ye also schicken und haben wôllen/ sond irs mit geduld vertragen/ und eüch nit also in ein verzagnüß kummen lassen" (15). In this instance, *glück* may be considered as external in that an illness is something over which the affected person has no control. Although Galmy's illness might be considered as psychosomatic to the extent that it stems from his suffering from so far unrequited love for the duchess, he is not shown to have any possibility of controlling his love. At this stage of the narrative, there is no room for the question whether Galmy could not at least have avoided being struck

by love to such an extent through exercising greater self-control; it seems that it is a case of love choosing him, as it were, rather than him choosing love. That is, even though his distress affects his internal state, it may be categorized as external in that it is beyond his control. The origination of Galmy's illness may be considered as resulting from an external force as regards both psychological conditions and physiological consequences. Galmy's affliction seems to be not only uncontrollable, but also unforeseeable, in other words, there is nothing he could have done to prevent it. All this makes the kind of *glück* to which Galmy's illness is attributed appear to be close to the traditional concept of Fortuna as an externally operating force. The intervention of externally operating *glück* is significant in that it creates the situation from which the protagonists' development unfolds. For it is because the duchess is moved by Galmy's being ill for her sake that she begins to gradually reciprocate his love. Hence the intervention of *glück* in this instance could be seen to trigger Galmy's path to eventual happiness. Notably, the duchess' interest in Galmy is also attributed to *glück*. After Galmy interprets her appearance at his bed-side as *glück*'s favour (cf. p. 20), his friend Friderich later comments on the lovers' newly-found happiness as "das glück [Galmy] mit einem schônen bůlen begabt het" (53). Since the duchess' love for Galmy is clearly beyond Galmy's control, this may be considered as a further instance of externally operating *glück*, which for Galmy is similar in significance to the earlier one.

Externally operating *glück* does not re-appear until much later in the narrative, when the duchess is about to be executed for wrongly suspected adultery. She writes to Galmy by way of explaining her situation: "du nymmer glauben würst/ in was grossen nôten mich das wanckelmůtig glück verlassen hatt" (181). Galmy comments: "O du unstâts glück/ Wie magst du ein solche züchtige Fraw mit solchen schwâren lâsten beladen?" (185). In both instances, *glück* is referred to as the sole factor that causes the duchess' misery. The reason for the duchess' predicament is the *marschalck*'s treachery; as such, it would appear to be beyond her control. In this respect, the incident may be seen to constitute the intervention of an external power. Nevertheless there may have been a possibility, however remote, for the duchess to avoid the disaster. For it originates on the level of human action, and there is a connection between the *marschalck*'s earlier encounter with the duchess and the situation in which she finds herself. That is, if only she had been able to recognize the *marschalck*'s evil character in time, she might have anticipated his treacherous plans, and thus protected herself from them. This suggests that the impact of externally operating *glück* is somehow tied up with the affected individual's way of dealing with the world around her. In view of the narrative as a whole, the duchess' imprisonment

is a crucial incident, challenging as it does both her and Galmy's courage. As with Galmy's initial illness, externally operating *glück* has a considerable effect on the protagonists' development in that it brings about a crucial situation. At the same time, it is up to the characters themselves to decide the outcome of this situation. Hence the impact of externally operating *glück*, while structurally important, may not necessarily reach into the core of the characters' development, leaving aside the association of *glück* and love. It may be this detachment from externally operating *glück* that allows the characters to eventually turn into something positive those situations attributed to it which strike them with undeserved suffering.

In *Gabriotto und Reinhart*, manifestations of externally operating *glück* are similarly limited. It first appears when, through a chain of events, Philomena learns of an accident suffered by Gabriotto: "das unsteht und wanckelmůtig gelück [mocht] der edlen junckfrawen Philomena/ den unfal des jünglings Gabriotto nicht verhalten" (28). It is because those talking about the accident are unaware of Philomena's presence that she overhears the news: "Reinhart seinen knecht in die statt nach einer rosszboren schicken thet/ Sich von ungeschicht begab/ das Gernier der Ritter zů hoff bei dem Künig in dem Frawen zimmer was" (28). Since Philomena is passively exposed to this communication due to a spatial constellation, the kind of *glück* at work here must be considered as externally operating. This is reinforced by the use of the terms *von ungeschicht* and *sich begeben*, which indicate that the incident's causation lies outside of the control of the persons involved. As a result of overhearing Gabriotto's misery, Philomena is moved to express her sympathy, leading ultimately to the recognition of mutual amorous feelings. In this respect, the *glück*-induced situation is important, yet it gains its full significance only from the way in which the affected character reacts to it.

Later in the narrative, when Reinhart and Gabriotto have to leave their beloveds so as to conceal their socially unacceptable love-interests, *glück*, according to the narrator, sets out to make the ladies suffer thoroughly: "Das unstet und wanckelmůtig glück sich noch nit benůgen ließ/ an dem schmertzlichen [...] abscheyd/ [...] die edlen und züchtigen junckfrawen noch in vil mer leyd und schmertzen setzet/ dann [...] inen eine fast leydige [...] bottschafft von [den Rittern] kam" (145). The "leydige bottschafft" consists in news of the young men's death, the impression of which is created accidentally. Reinhart and Gabriotto suffer shipwreck, and manage to swim ashore. However, their dogs remain on a rock among the wreckage: "sich von ungeschicht begab/ das ein ander schiff so in Engelandt faren wolt/ noch bei den felssen anckern můst/ darauff sich die gedachten hund erhůlten" (146). The dogs are found by the crew of the ship and taken to England, where they

are recognized by members of the court, and their arrival is interpreted as a sign of Gabriotto's and Reinhart's death, of which Philomena and Rosamunda are duly informed. The ladies' pain, which appears to be completely undeserved, is thus due to false information. The elaborate combination of incidents which leads to the impression of the young men's death lies completely outside of the ladies' control. Even though it might have occurred to Gabriotto and Reinhart to let the ladies know instantly that they are alive and well despite the shipwreck (cf. 148ff), instead of contacting them only after several weeks, not even they could have anticipated the unlikely concatenation of unforeseeable events. This suggests that the incident is caused by externally operating *glück*. Its external nature is again underlined by the phrase *von ungeschicht*, which marks the fact that another ship happens to drop anchor at the very same rock as coincidental. With regard to the narrative as a whole, the incident is not particularly significant. The ladies are subsequently relieved from their misery, hence the occurrence of *glück* appears to have had no lasting impact. Externally operating *glück* appears to be marginalized in *Gabriotto und Reinhart*. This could indicate that the focus of this narrative is not so much on the danger inherent in external circumstances as on a force more closely related to the affected characters' own actions.

In *Knabenspiegel*, externally operating *glück* manifests itself after Wilbaldus has been deserted by Lottarius. Eking out a living as a herdsman, he thinks that things could not possibly get any worse, when "das unstet und wanckelmůtig gelück" (66) inflicts a severe blow on him. It is held responsible for the sudden appearance of wolves from the woods, which seize Wilbaldus' flock while he is asleep. This incident means that Wilbaldus' life and livelihood are endangered as a consequence. The appearance of the wolves is clearly beyond Wilbaldus' control. Even if he had been awake, there is not much that he could have done to preserve his flock from the wild animals, let alone to prevent their appearance as such. To this extent, *glück* is operating as an external force here. How, then, is the incident related to the development of the narrative as a whole? Prior to the incident, Wilbaldus goes through a period of waywardness, which eventually results in extreme desolation. But at the time of the wolves' attack, he is in the process of repenting his former misbehaviour. Because of this, *glück* could be regarded as striking him undeservedly, thus evoking the traditional concept of Fortuna as an unjust and arbitrary force which marks its manifestations in the previous narratives. In relation to a broader framework, externally operating *glück* in this instance could be seen to contribute to Wilbaldus' penance rather than mocking his newly found humility. Although *glück*'s impact on the character is painful, it is not as instrumental to his suffering let alone

his social decline as his own previous misguided action. It is only as a result of his own action, which brought him into the position of impoverished herdsman, that Wilbaldus is exposed to such wilfulness of externally operating *glück*. In this sense, externally operating *glück* may be considered to deepen, rather than initiate, a development, namely Wilbaldus' descent into utter destitution, as this is already under way.

Subsequently, externally operating *glück* manifests itself in a positive manner in that it seconds Wilbaldus' rehabilitation. When Wilbaldus meets Felix and Fridbert at the inn in which the latter are staying, this is represented as the work of *glück*. It is preceded by the following comment: "Wan das glück einen stürtzen will/ kan er zů hoch nit sitzen/ es wirfft in zů boden/ will es dann einen erheben/ mag er so dieff im kot nit ligen/ es kan im haraus helffen/ also wird es dem gůten Wilibaldo jetzundt auch gon" (80). This comment on Wilbaldus' advancement, which may strike one as typically medieval, suggests the idea of the wheel of Fortuna which relentlessly turns people's lives up and down more or less regardless of their own actions.[1] The meeting is in fact the unforeseen starting-point of Wilbaldus' upward movement. For he would otherwise not have plucked up the courage to return to his home, which, being synonymous with civilized society, is the only place for his rehabilitation to start. Although Wilbaldus advances by virtue of his own efforts once he is back home, meeting Fridbert and Felix is the condition for this to happen. The condition is fulfilled only because of *glück*'s support. That is, Wilbaldus' rehabilitation is shown to depend on an external force over which he has no control whatsoever: the meeting initially takes place entirely without his contribution, or, for that matter, the contribution of the other characters. Not surprisingly, then, the chapter describing the incident is entitled "Wilibaldus kumpt *von ungeschicht* in die herberg/ dorin [Fridbert and Felix] ligen" (80; my emphasis)[2] : once more, the phrase *von ungeschicht* signals that the incident occurs without either character's deliberate participation. This underlines that it is much more difficult to recover from misery than to fall into it. Thus the narrator may want to demonstrate that once a person has seriously

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[1] Contrary to the medieval concept of Fortuna, which tends to be related to people of power and high social standing, this passage relates the concept to 'ordinary' people. This may illustrate Wickram's concern for non-aristocratic matters, such as would be part of his audience's experience. As Erich Kleinschmidt points out, "[d]ie literarische Fiktion, die auf die Erfahrungswelt der Rezipienten Rücksicht nimmt und nicht nur eine unkontrollierbare, ferne Wunder- und Feudalwelt entfaltet, ist die entschiedene Leistung Wickrams gewesen, die eine pragmatische Mentalität städtischer Prägung nicht verleugnen kann" (Erich Kleinschmidt, "Narratives Ordnungsdenken und urbane Bildungsdidaktik: Jörg Wickram", in E. K., *Stadt und Literatur in der frühen Neuzeit: Voraussetzungen und Entfaltung im südwestdeutschen, elsässischen und schweizerischen Städteraum* (Köln/ Wien: Böhlau, 1982), p. 245).

[2] Later, Fridbert and Felix comment on their journey: "das wir ein wunderbare reyß gehabt/ dann von ungeschicht/ haben wir meinen lieben brůder eüweren son Wilbald funden" (91).

misbehaved, there is no guarantee that by changing his ways he will be able to return to where he was, in other words, that the damage caused by wrong choices may be irreparable. This may well reflect general social issues of Wickram's time, and the effort he associated with keeping one's position in a society whose norms were in the process of changing.[3] Notably, the positive impact of externally operating *glück* causes a genuine turn in Wilbaldus' development, while its negative impact, as manifest in the appearance of the wolves, merely intensifies a given state. In this sense, positive external *glück* occupies a more important role in the protagonist's development than its negative counterpart, which, given *glück*'s traditionally negative image, may be somewhat surprising. The way in which Wilbaldus is affected by *glück* moreover differs from the traditional concept of Fortuna's wheel in that he is 'turned' first down and then up in the course of his development, which reverses the traditional Fortuna-induced movement. These modifications might reflect the didactic nature of *Knabenspiegel*, which relies on the premise of genuine repentance, even though not sufficient on its own, being rewarded. But, however significant externally operating *glück* may be for Wilbaldus by setting up the meeting with Fridbert and Felix, it does no more than provide the conditions for his rehabilitation. In the end, it is up to Wilbaldus himself to prove his true worth. Finally, despite ultimately supporting Wilbaldus, externally operating *glück* is by no means purged of its negative side: it re-emerges in an incident affecting Gottlieb. With Wilbaldus' rehabilitation successfully completed, Gottlieb is enjoying newly-found happiness, when he suddenly dies. This is explained by the narrator as the fact that "daß unstet glückrad/ welches seinen ungewissen lauff nicht verlaßt/ mocht dem gůten alten man solche freüd nicht lang vergunnen" (116f). Gottlieb's sudden and unexplained death is a particularly obvious example of externally operating *glück*; its occurrence is both unrelated to Gottlieb's actions or behaviour, and completely undeserved. While this is a rare case of externally operating *glück* affecting a character's development in a substantial way, its importance is diminished by affecting merely a marginal character. Generally speaking, externally operating *glück* appears to be somehow inferior to the characters' own actions to the extent that its scope is limited to providing certain conditions the outcome of which may be determined by the

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[3] The coincidental meeting may be an instance of Wilbaldus, rather than Fridbert being ultimately favoured by the author, as Geulen claims: "Einer voreiligen Betonung und Favorisierung des fraglosen gesellschaftlichen Aufstiegs Fridberts darf die Tatsache entgegengehalten werden, daß gerade der Sohn des Ritters Fall, Wandlung und Aufstieg in einer Weise verkörpert, die seine versteckt elitäre Rolle in einem konventionellen Sinn betont" (Hans Geulen, "Tendenzen der epischen Darbietungsformen von den Volksbüchern bis zu Fischart", in H. G., *Erzählkunst der frühen Neuzeit. Zur Geschichte epischer Darbietungsweisen und Formen im Roman der Renaissance und des Barock* (Tübingen: Rotsch, 1975), p. 27).

characters themselves.

In *Goldfaden*, externally operating *glück* makes an early appearance. Having left his familiar surroundings behind, Lewfrid begins

über daß unstet wanckelbar glück zů klagen: "O glück [...] /wie bist du so wanckelmůtig gegen mir/ du hast mich in meiner kindheit/ auß meines vatters [...] hüttlin genummen/in welchem mir vil baß gewesen wer/ so ich der zarten [...] tag nit empfunden hett/ so wer ich jetzund meins vatters/ oder eins andern hirten diener/ [...] diser ding aller můß ich armseliger Lewfrid beraubt ston/ daran ich aber niemant dann dich (O glück) zů schelten weyß/ dieweil du mich bey meinem lieben Herren und ernerer nit erhalten wôltest. Hey warumb hast du mich dann auß meines vatters hauß genommen. Darzů hast du nit ein vernůgen gehabt ann dem/ das ich von meinem Herren so reülich und wol erzogen worden bin/ sonder hast mich in meiner jugent under meines gelichen knaben zů einem Kônig und regierer haben wôllen/ welche regierung ein ursach ist alles meines trůbsals/ in welchem ich jetzund gantz hart verstrickt und gefangen bin [...]"(19f).

Here, Lewfrid holds *glück* responsible for crucial changes in his life, namely for removing him from his natural parents as well from his foster-parents. How are the two incidents related to Lewfrid's control? First, why is it that Lewfrid does not grow up in his parents' house? Hermanus, a wealthy merchant, decides to take in Lewfrid as a foster child. He does so because he is childless, and because he is impressed by the presence of the tame lion in the vicinity of pregnant Felicitas (cf. 4). Both Hermanus' childlessness, and the presence of the lion are beyond Lewfrid's control. So is Hermanus' decision to take in the newborn child. The second incident for which Lewfrid blames *glück*, i.e. the separation from his foster parents, is equally beyond his personal control. Lewfrid is made a king by his class-mates because they are deeply impressed by his intelligence (cf. 10), which may be considered as the gift of a superhuman power the attainment of which is beyond his control. Moreover, his class-mates' decision to make him their king is an action over which Lewfrid has no control. As a result of being 'king', Lewfrid is held responsible for a fight that takes place between different groups of pupils; because of the hostile atmosphere that ensues, he feels compelled to leave his foster-parents.[4] To the extent that Lewfrid's removal from both his natural family and his foster family are beyond his scope of action, they may be interpreted as further instances of externally operating *glück*.[5]

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[4] Note that it is Lewfrid's personal decision to leave as a result of the hostile atmosphere following the fight. This decision seems rushed and not completely justified by the external circumstances, which underlines the significance of a character's individual reaction to the intervention of *glück*.

[5] In this context, there is also a reference to the potential intervention of externally operating *glück*. After Lewfrid has run away from home and finds himself outside the castle of his future employer, he expresses the following hope: "môcht mir durch das glück sovil gnad verlihen werden/ das ich auff

Similar things apply to Lewfrid's promotion to Angliana's *kammerbůbe* which he later blames on *glück*, considering it as the prerequisite for making Angliana's acquaintance and thus falling in love with her (cf. p. 132). The promotion takes place because the count notices Lewfrid's extraordinary singing voice.[6] This happens in the following way: "eines tags begab sichs von ungeschicht/ das [Lewfrid] in dem garten saß [...]/ Er sang [...]/Von ungeschicht begab sichs/ das der Graff [...] inn gemeldtem Garten spatzieren gieng" (21). That the count overhears Lewfrid singing is due to the characters being in a certain place at a certain time - not by their own choice, but *von ungeschicht*. Because the count is impressed by Lewfrid's singing, he subsequently promotes him to Angliana's *kammerbůbe*. That is, although Lewfrid's talent plays an important role in this situation, the actual incident is ultimately beyond his control: following the coincidental encounter, it is the count who decides to make Lewfrid Angliana's servant. Although in the latter three incidents, externally operating *glück* is constituted by the actions of other characters, these manifestations of *glück* are nevertheless beyond the affected person's direct scope of action and as such come across as stemming from an externally operating force. What is peculiar about these interventions of *glück* is that they in the long run turn out to be for Lewfrid's good. Since only his presence at the count's court allows Lewfrid to meet Angliana and eventually advance to a superior position in society, externally operating *glück*, by putting him into the said situations, is instrumental in paving the way for his future development.

A further, somewhat different instance of externally operating *glück* is Lewfrid's encounter with the white dog, as related by himself in the following way: "als ich in meines gnedigen Herrn geschefften geritten bin/ hat mich der unval oder das gelück in einen mechtigen [...] wald [...] gefůrt/ darin ich gentzlich verirret/ [...] als ich mich aber verwegen hat die nacht in dem waldt zů beliben/ kumpt von ungeschicht diser edel Prack zů mir" (56). That Lewfrid loses his way in the woods seems to be due to external rather than internal factors: there is no obvious reason in Lewfrid's behaviour, resulting, e.g,. from negligence or misunderstanding, which could account for it. The external nature of his disorientation may be implied also by what appears to be synonymous use of *unval* and *gelück*.[7] This instance of externally

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das Schloß an hof kommen môcht/ ich wolt mich gantz muckerlich halten/ Damit ich mit der zeit ein reysiger knecht werden môcht" (15). Lewfrid's hope becomes realized as there happens to be a vacancy in the kitchen, and the head of the kitchen staff is willing to employ him. Since these events are beyond Lewfrid's control, *glück* might be said to be operating externally here, even though its actual intervention is not stated.

[6] One might also say that Lewfrid is able to display his exceptional voice only because it has been given to him by a superhuman force.

[7] Cf. chapter 8.

operating *glück* differs from the previous ones in *Goldfaden* in that there is no explanation for it on the level of human action. It happens, as it were, completely out of the blue. The incident is meaningful because it is only as a result of losing his way that Lewfrid comes across the white dog which follows him back to the court. To the extent that the dog's appearance is said to happen *von ungeschicht*, it, too, is an incident to which Lewfrid is passively exposed. The encounter with the dog helps consolidate Lewfrid's 'knightly' image in the eyes of the reader since he subsequently displays his bravery in a fight against the dog's previous owner: "von ungeschicht begab sich" (45) that Lewfrid has to stay overnight at an inn; the inn-keeper recognizes the dog and promptly informs the *Forstherr* who reported it missing. This leads to a fight between one of the *Forstherr*'s servants and Lewfrid, from which Lewfrid emerges victorious. Consequently, Lewfrid gets to keep the dog, which has further positive effect on his development in that Angliana accepts the dog from him as a token of his love. Hence the incident triggered by an apparently random intervention of externally operating *glück* is integrated into the protagonist's advancement; this happens partly through another constellation of events marked as occurring *von ungeschicht* over which he has no control either. But, despite the mystery emanating from Lewfrid's being subject to external circumstances in this episode, it constitutes not much more than an ornamental detail in his development: the acquisition of the dog merely reinforces tendencies that are already established.

When Angliana subsequently declares that she will marry Lewfrid, he reacts with the following reference to *glück*: "dieweil mich [...] das glück so gnediglich ansehen/ deßgleich mir ewer gnad so wol wil/ So versprich ich euch von disem tag an allen meinen fleiß dohin zů wenden/ damit ich [...] geprisen unnd gelobt werd/ hoff auch ein semlichs soll mir zů gůtem end gerathen" (94).[8] While it is not clear here whether Lewfrid considers Angliana's love as being specifically caused by *glück*, or rather as a manifestation of *glück*'s general favour, he crucially relates the generation of love to *glück*. From a medieval point of view, by contrast, there may be very definite reasons as to why a person falls in love with another, namely certain superlative attributes as depicted e.g. in the courtly epic: a knight falls in love with the worthiest, most virtuous, and most beautiful of all ladies, and *vice versa*. That Lewfrid, although adorned with at least some superlative attributes, instead acknowledges the intervention of *glück*, may be due to his modesty. While individual

[8] Cf. also Lewfrid's earlier exclamation, on being presented with a ring by Angliana: "Nun freuw dich Lewfrid/ dann zů diser stund hat dich das glück hoch erhaben/ Wer mőcht doch glückseliger sein auff gantzem erdtrich dann ich glückhaffter Lewfrid!" (42). This reference to Lewfrid's having been exalted by *glück* may lead the reader to expect his inevitable fall.

action, such as Lewfrid's courtesy and bravery, may partly account for his being loved by Angliana, there is nevertheless an uncontrollable and inexplicable element evoked in his utterance. By referring to *glück*, Lewfrid seems to consider an incalculable element as vital to the coming into being of erotic love, thus suggesting that there is an element of inexplicability inherent in matters of the heart. This may be prompted by the lovers' social inequality: *glück* could be seen to step into the gap left by the absence of conventional chivalric rules. Externally operating *glück* is manifest in Angliana's choice of beloved from the count's point of view also. He reflects on the social inadequacy of this choice in the following way:

"[...] will mich dann das glück also haben/ wolan so trôst ich mich dannocht das mein Tochter ir einen solchen Jüngling erwôlt hat/ der mit tugend und mannheyt hoch von Gott begabt ist. Ach wer mir doch nur die sach vor langem zů wissen gewesen/ ich wolt bey dem Künig zůwegen bracht haben/ das er in zů Ritter geschlagen/ [...] het [...]" (129f).

This statement expresses human powerlessness with regard to Angliana's love for Lewfrid in two ways. First, Angliana is depicted as having, due to the irresistible force of love, involuntarily chosen him for a husband-to-be. To the extent that her love for the protagonist is represented as an act that is somehow beyond her control, the kind of *glück* associated with it is externally operating. Second, the count himself, to whom the above statement relates in the first place, is even more powerless than his daughter when it comes to her being attracted to Lewfrid. In this sense, his predicament is clearly the result of externally operating *glück*. The fact that love is explicitly associated with *glück* could be seen as further indication of the comparatively high significance which external forces have in *Goldfaden* for interpreting the characters' development, since Angliana's love for Lewfrid is one of its key elements. Unusually perhaps, *glück* ultimately shows genuine support for Lewfrid in the uncertain matter of love, which suggests once more the strong positive influence of this force.

Externally operating *glück* is at work also with regard to the ambush arranged by the count. After Lewfrid's narrow escape, the count eventually invites him to return to the court. When reflecting on how to respond to the invitation, Lewfrid reveals the positive role which he attributes to *glück* with regard to the ambush, even though he also expresses wariness of this force: "nu můß ich sorgen, dieweil mich das glück vor solchem unfal [i.e. the ambush in the forest] bewart, mir moecht ein ander bad übergehangen sein, mein herr moecht mich durch guote worte wider underston zuo ihm zuo bringen und alsdann sein zorn an mir rechen" (135). The count, too,

attributes Lewfrid's survival to *glück*. This is evident from his reply to Lewfrid's apology for approaching the court in disguise:

"dir ist alles vergeben/ so du je wider mich gethon hast/ [...] Dieweil [...] das gelück dir der massen so gar günstig ist/ kan ich je nit darwider fechten/ ich sihe das alle menschlichen Ratschleg wider den willen des allmechtigen nichts vermögen außzůrichten/ Darumb so laß ich es alles faren/ unnd wirt jetz nichts nôterssein/ Dann das wir ratschlagen/ wie doch der sachen zů begegnen sey" (166f).

Why is it, then, that Lewfrid survives the attempt on his life? In the first place, it is due to a loyal servant overhearing the count's plotting and warning Lewfrid. This constellation undoubtedly points to an element of chance. In fact the narrator, at the time of the incident's occurrence, describes the boy's concealed presence in the count's vicinity as happening *von ungeschicht* (111f), which strongly indicates that it is devoid of human intention.[9] The role which *glück* plays in the ambush-related incident could be considered external in that Lewfrid's being warned is beyond his personal control, just as acquiring knowledge of the count's plans is beyond the control of the servant. Moreover, Lewfrid is able to kill the assassin only with the help of the lion, which assists him for reasons which are somewhat mysterious, and not explicable from the point of view of his own actions. This reinforces the notion of a superhuman element contributing to Lewfrid's survival. The above manifestation of externally operating *glück* is far more vital for the course of Lewfrid's development than the instances of this kind of *glück* which occur in the other narratives. Lewfrid finds himself in a situation where he depends on an external force to save him from guaranteed ruin. Due to externally operating *glück*, Lewfrid survives, which means that it creates a basic condition for his eventual success. That externally operating *glück* is seen to grant Lewfrid such strong support reinforces the notion of a special, 'fairy-tale' character distinguishing *Goldfaden* from the other narratives, which we have observed already with regard to the relation between *glück* and God.

Goldfaden is different from the other narratives in that the manifestations of

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[9] A similar spatial coincidence involves Lewfrid's foster brother Walter. Following Lewfrid's clandestine departure, Walter goes looking for him. In the course of his travels, he is robbed in a forest, tied to a tree and left to die. At the same time, Lewfrid, carrying out an errand, happens to pass along the route previously taken by Walter, and comes across the inn which the latter has frequented last: "Von ungeschicht bin ich in dieselbig Herberg komen" (82). Talking to people at the inn allows Lewfrid to trace his brother, and thus save his life. Were it not for the spatial coincidence, Walter would have perished in the forest. Walter's life, and the brothers' reunion therefore depends crucially on the incident caused by *von ungeschicht*, the occurrence of which is beyond the decision of either character. It may seem strange that *glück* is not also mentioned in connection with this incident, as it is for instance in the case of Lewfrid's surviving the ambush, or of Wilbaldus' meeting Felix and Fridbert. The omission of reference to *glück* could be due to the fact that Walter is a marginal character.

externally operating *glück* affecting Lewfrid are relatively frequent, and ultimately positive. To the extent that it contributes to his advancement, the force referred to in these instances appears to be a more deliberate force than the random chance as which externally operating *glück* presents itself in the other narratives. There is a certain superhuman benevolence shown towards Lewfrid which is absent from other protagonists' lives. Although the aspect of chance cannot be wholly excluded from the manifestation of *glück*, there is another, decisive aspect somehow inherent in it. That is, although the force which causes Lewfrid to be removed from his parents, to lose his way in the forest, or to be saved from the assassination might on first sight appear to be purely random, as reinforced by use of the phrase *von ungeschicht*, these incidents ultimately lead to meaningful and defining situations in the character's life. Lewfrid's removal from his natural parents as well as his foster family lead him into an environment where his true potential is both stimulated and challenged. His encounter with the mysterious dog is important for the demonstration both of his bravery and his love for Angliana. Lewfrid's being warned against the ambush facilitates his subsequent advancement: for not only does it alert him to a life-threatening danger, it also, in the long run, indicates his value to the count, who is impressed by Lewfrid's survival. Thus the *glück*-induced incidents may be considered as vital for the protagonist's career, without which it would not be the same. These incidents complement another, major development which is associated with *glück*, viz. the fact that Angliana returns Lewfrid's love. Angliana's love for Lewfrid not only means the fulfilment of his happiness, it also allows him to succeed the count, while on a more general scale constituting the scarlet thread of the narrative as a whole. The fact that to some degree, every situation generated by externally operating *glück* leads to a meaningful element in the protagonists' development could suggest that a certain amount of intentionality is attributed to *glück*. In this sense, the wilful, arbitrary aspect of Fortuna seems to be absent from the manifestations of externally operating *glück* in *Goldfaden*. Indeed the meaning of *glück*, in the instances in question, may be close to a form of providence, which could be employed by God, or the narrator, to effect certain turns in the protagonists' development.

In *Von guoten und boesen Nachbaurn*, there are only a few incidents that could be seen to fit into the category of externally operating *glück*. The first, very drastic, one occurs at the beginning of the narrative:

Es mocht aber das wanckelmůtig und unsteht glück/ dem gůten frumen Roberto die freud nit lang vergunnen/ sunder vermischt im die mit bitterem trawren und schmertzen/ Dann erstlichen ward im Sophia/ sein liebste gemahel/ mit tődtlicher kranckheit beschwert/ [...] wiewol sie in kurtzen tagen wider zů gesuntheit [...]

kumen ist/ [...] sturben im alle [neun kinder] nacheinander/ [...] das ihm nůr die jüngst tochter [...] belib (17f).[10]

The external nature of *glück* in this incident is more obvious than in any of the incidents considered so far. The causation of terminal illness, unrelated to any psychological reason, is clearly something which cannot be controlled by human action. In its severity, the impact of *glück* in the above passage is comparable to that of the potentially devastating Fortuna of classical and medieval tradition. However, the characters deal with the incident by eventually attributing it to God, implying that ultimately the children's death is no genuine instance of *glück*'s intervention. Exposed to the impact of a force that is far beyond their control, they apparently choose to consider the ensuing situation as the work of God. While this does not change the immediate situation, i.e. the children's death, Robertus' reconsidered point of view nevertheless implies the possibility of controlling how he experiences their death to the extent that he deliberately chooses to accept whatever God sends his way. Through implying the falseness of externally operating *glück*, Robertus frees himself from its presence. Its effect is overruled by divine governance, which, although not making the incident in question any more transparent, suggests an underlying principle of justice. As a result, the supposed intervention of externally operating *glück* comes across as a delusion in this case.

Another, more genuine reference to externally operating *glück* is made during Richart and Lasarus' travel to Spain: "In diser zeit/ wolt danocht das glück nicht gar für und für mit diesen zweien gůten gesellen sein/ sunder inen auch etwas überzwerchs under die fůss legen" (63f). What happens is that Lasarus is tricked into stepping aboard a Turkish ship, where he is sold as a slave. This is possible because Lasarus does not speak Spanish, and therefore cannot understand the trickster's dealings with the captain of the ship. Importantly, however, Lasarus has not been advised on how to avoid the danger he experiences. His only mistake in the situation is that he suspects no evil from his fellow human beings, his position as a stranger at the port making him especially vulnerable to deceit. Although he might have avoided the disaster with greater care, there are no explicit clues which would have helped him anticipate it. Therefore, the incident may qualify as an instance of externally operating *glück* to the extent that it originates independently of Lasarus' scope of potential control. The incident is of no great relevance as the characters are able to swiftly deal with it among themselves. This may indicate that the characters of *Nachbaurn*, by virtue of explicit practice of their Christian belief and consequent

[10] The narrator's reference to *glück* is later complemented by that of the affected characters.

altruistic behaviour, are in control of their lives to a greater extent than the characters of the other narratives.[11] The notion that the characters' behaviour protects them from exposure to externally operating *glück* is reinforced by the fact that its occurrence is not stated any more in the course of the narrative by either characters or narrator.[12] Of all the narratives, *Nachbaurn* is the one which gives least significance to externally operating *glück*. This implies that it is considered as a force which is not inevitable, but may be restrained by certain social and behavioural parameters.

Finally, let us sum up the concept of externally operating *glück*. There seem to be two different ways in which it manifests itself, both of which are beyond the affected individual's control. One the one hand, externally operating *glück* is manifest in events which are remote from any human participation - such as illness, forces of nature, or a certain concatenation of incidents. On the other hand, externally operating *glück* may originate on the level of human action; characters in the vicinity of the affected individual for various reasons decide to inflict certain things on him or her. These manifestations of externally operating *glück* are less incomprehensible than those of a more distinctly superhuman, and hence random force such as is manifest, e.g., in sudden illness. For it would seem to be easier to anticipate, and hence guard oneself against the actions of fellow human beings than against those of a remote superhuman force, even though it is not always possible. This means that Wickram's concept of externally operating *glück* is to a certain extent more transparent than the traditional concept of Fortuna, which was often associated with irrationality. Nevertheless the effects of externally operating *glück* generally generate an air of pessimism, as its manifestations tend to be negative more often than not, with *Goldfaden*, and, to some extent, *Knabenspiegel*, forming an exception among the narratives. The threat emanating from negative instances of externally operating *glück*

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[11] The following minor incident may be further illustration of this. When Lasarus falls ill on board the ship that is supposed to take him abroad, the fact that medical help is at hand is explained as follows: "Es was von ungeschicht ein hochgelerter alter man ein Doctor uff dem schiff/ zů dem thet sich Reichart/ und thet in uffs fründtlichst bitten/ wo im müglich wer/ das er den knaben zů krefften unnd gesundtheit bringen mőchte/ solt er kein můh an im sparen" (140). The doctor helps Lasarus overcome what he diagnoses as a case of potentially terminal *melancoley*. Although the doctor's coincidental presence is beyond Lasarus' control, it does not seem to be as important for the preservation of his life as the company of a caring and well-meaning elder, Richart. In other words, a closely-knit social network means that Lasarus is relatively independent of the external uncertainties of life such as occur *von ungeschicht*.

[12] There is one more reference to *glück* which could qualify as externally operating. When Richart is at sea, Cassandra explains to her daughter, "das dein vatter yetzund auff dem wallenden Meer/ in und uff glücks wag und rhat schwebet/ allen augenblick der fortunen und sturmwinden warten můs" (131). While this could be read as an instance of externally operating *glück*, reflecting the traditional association of Fortuna and the sea, any impact of *glück* is merely potential to the extent that Richart is in no way harmed during his journey; moreover, his well-being is later attributed to God.

is reinforced by the phrase *von ungeschicht*, sometimes used in conjunction with *sich begeben*. The use of these phrases implies that not only a critical situation itself, but also certain conditions which build up to it occur without the affected persons' participation or control. Such pessimism may of course reflect the inherited tradition of the concept of Fortuna. Yet the impact of externally operating *glück* seems marginalized in comparison to the medieval concept of Fortuna. For its negative manifestations seldom have an irreversible effect on the characters. Moreover, even though externally operating *glück* is credited with triggering certain crucial moments in the characters' development, it is far from determining the outcome of these moments, which is mostly left to the characters' own actions.

Chapter 11

Internally Operating *glück*

In addition to the externally operating type of *glück*, which conforms to the traditional mould of Fortuna, another type of *glück* may be observed in Wickram's narratives: the internally operating manifestation of *glück*. While externally operating *glück* tends to mark incidents which arise from circumstances beyond the affected individual's control, the manifestation of internally operating *glück* is characterized by being explicable mostly through the actions of the affected individual himself, and as such being potentially within his control.

In *Galmy*, there is one example of internally operating *glück*, which occurs at a crucial stage of the protagonists' relationship. When Wernhard sees Galmy and the duchess blush in each other's presence and consequently threatens to reveal their love to the duke, this is introduced by the narrator as "mocht im [i.e. Galmy] das unstet glück sollich grosse freüd nimmer vergünnen" (111). In retrospect, the protagonists describe this as the fact that "das neidig und unståt glück unser züchtige liebe nicht lenger dulden will" (117). Obviously, there is an element of chance involved in the way in which this situation arises: "Als sye [duke and duchess] nun uß der Kirchen kummen/ von ungeschicht sich der Hertzog vor einem kostlichen krom verhindert/ ein kleyne weil/ also das die Hertzogin mit irem Frawen zimmer auß der Kirchen gon wolt/ sich begab/ das sye für iren Herren gon můßt" (111f). *von ungeschicht* and *sich begeben* mark a spatial coincidence: the duke inspects some merchandize which is on display in front of the church, and thus leaves the duchess exposed to an encounter with Galmy. Because of this, it is possible for her and Galmy to encounter one another, which in turn leads to their blushing. There is nothing the lovers could have done to prevent this spatial constellation. However, the reason for the actual mishap, i.e. the couple's blushing, is to be found on the level of the protagonists' action. *glück* is internally operating to the extent that the blushing takes place 'within' the affected characters; it is their lack of self-control that brings it on. The close connection between *glück* on the one hand and the actions of the affected persons on the other, as regards the causation of an incident, seems to be a significant change from the concept of *glück* as a force that is superhuman in that it originates in something beyond the affected person's control, as considered in the previous chapter. In the context of the overall development of the narrative, the lovers'

blushing marks an important step in the court's recognition of their mutual feelings which eventually forces Galmy to leave. Hence this incident is crucial for the lovers' development. Still it is more or less unique within *Galmy*, and its internal character may not as yet be very pronounced when compared to the instances of internally operating *glück* in the subsequent narratives. This may be due to *Galmy*'s being the first of Wickram's narratives, in which traits that in the course of Wickram's career as a writer were to become characteristic of the representation of *glück* are not yet fully developed. Nevertheless the above example is indicative of a peculiar aspect of the concept of *glück* in Wickram's narratives, which is distinct from externally operating *glück*, and from the traditional, e.g. Boethian concept of Fortuna as a force acting separately from the person it affects.

The notion of an internal manifestation of *glück* is given greater scope in *Gabriotto und Reinhart*. There, too, the protagonists' situation changes for the worse because *glück* supposedly reveals their secret love-affairs. To find out to what extent *glück*'s turning against the lovers might be considered as internal, let us consider its gradual interference. Prior to the first crucial intervention of *glück*, the following incident takes place:

Eines tags sich begab/ das Rosamunda in einem garten gantz einig spacieren ging/ von ungeschicht Reinhart auff einem gang an dem Palast spacieren ging/ darab mocht er in den schönen garten sehen/ Rosamunda in zůstund erblickt hat/ [...] Reinhart [...] zů Rosamunda in den garten kam [...] nun begab sich/ das Orwin der Ritter/ auch auff dem summer gang yetzund spacieren gieng/ die zwey liebhabenden menschen in dem garten ersehen thet (66f).

The lovers' accidental meeting in the garden (*von ungeschicht*) exposes them to Reinhart's rival Orwin, who happens to walk along a gallery overlooking the garden (*begab sich*).[1] Orwin notifies the king, who is thus alerted to what he considers the

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[1] Jan Knopf considers *von ungeschicht* as a complement to *glück*: "Auffällig häufig [...] verwendet Wickram die "von ungeschicht"-Formel, um erzählerische Übergänge (im Sinne "und dann geschah folgendes") oder auch das Zusammentreffen von Personen zu "motivieren" [...] Notwendigkeiten im Erzählablauf werden sprachlich als Zufälligkeiten eingeführt [...] Diese Tatsache läßt sich wohl kaum anders deuten, als daß der Darstellung daran gelegen ist, die Schilderung der äußeren Ereignisse, des >>Geschehens<<, das die >>von ungeschicht<<-Formel beschwört, nicht als notwendigen, festgefügten Ablauf erscheinen zu lassen, sondern ihm das Ansehen einer brüchigen Kette von (unglücklichen) Zufällen und Fügungen zu geben, also die Welt der äußeren Erscheinungen ungeordnet, vom Wankelmut des Glücks beherrscht, vorzuführen. Somit spiegelt sich der desolate Weltzustand auch in der Erzählhaltung Wickram's wider, und die Rolle, die das Glück in dieser Welt spielt, erhält entschiedeneres Gewicht" (Jan Knopf, "Versicherung des Mitmenschen. Arbeit, Freundschaft und Glück in Jörg Wickrams Romanen", in J. K., *Frühzeit des Bürgers. Erfahrene und verleugnete Realität in den Romanen Wickrams, Grimmelshausens und Schnabels* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1978), p. 47f). While this seems to be a largely adequate evaluation, it nevertheless requires a few modifications.

highly unsuitable conduct on Reinhart's part. The use of both *von ungeschicht* and *sich begeben* suggests the extent to which external circumstances affect the protagonists' situation in this instance, even though the decision to turn the chance encounter into a tête-à-tête is ultimately their own. But, while the incidents that are described as occurring *von ungeschicht* generally tend to add force to the intervention of externally operating *glück*, here the reference to *von ungeschicht* as something that is beyond human control does not detract from the importance of internally operating *glück*. *von ungeschicht* merely suggests that the characters' inherent deficiency makes them vulnerable to external adversities also. Subsequently, the king's suspicion regarding the love-affair between Reinhart and Rosamunda is hardened in a process which is attributed to *glück*:

als sich nun das glück anhůb von inen zů wenden/ und ir heymliche liebe an wolt fahen außbrechen/ begab sich einest in dem Meyen/ das die Künigin dem Künig einen schǒnen [...] son geberen thet/ davon der Künig [...] mit grossen freüdenn umgeben warde/ [...] als nun das kind zů tauff mit grosser reyligkeyt getragen ward [...] der Künig einen mechtigen hoff außrůffen ließ/ [...] so bald nun die beyden junckfrawen von dem hoff vernummen hatten/ wol gedachten/ ire Ritter sich auch darzů rüsten würden/ deshalben si inen [...] yede eine schǒne liberey machen ließ (94f).

The reason for the king becoming suspicious is that, at a tournament, Reinhart sports a suit of armour adorned with roses, which publicly points to an intimate connection with Rosamunda. Although the occasion of the tournament, prompted by the birth of a new prince, is beyond the lovers' scope of action, the king's actual suspicion results from their very own carelessness. For Rosamunda has Reinhart's armour adorned with roses, and Reinhart decides to wear the armour in public; in doing so, both clearly neglect the precautionary measures earlier recommended to them by their confidante (cf. 91f). Seen in this light, external hazards to the lovers' happiness pale into insignificance. The simultaneousness of the lovers' actions on the one hand, and reference to *glück* on the other hand is notable. However, the narrator seems to

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First, one should note that an exception among the narratives is constituted by *Goldfaden*. There, *von ungeschicht* is employed in a way which suggests a form of order behind apparent chance events, which ultimately work in the protagonist's favour. On a broader level, there are many occurrences of *von ungeschicht* that are not mentioned in conjunction with *glück*, and are completely banal. They mostly cover spatial coincidences which are of little to no relevance to the characters' development. Hence one should be careful not to overestimate the use of *von ungeschicht* as an indication of general fragility. Moreover, Knopf's claim that Wickram's fictional world is dominated by "Wankelmut des Glücks" can be applied only to those instances where there are no alternative reasons to the workings of *glück* which originate in human responsibility. For the occurrence of instances of the latter sort, as pointed out in this chapter, would seem to undermine the concept of "Wankelmut des Glücks", which, by Knopf's definition, is beyond human control.

emphasize the fact that *glück* abandons the lovers, rather than that the lovers' carelessness constitutes the turning-point in their development.

Like the narrator, the characters themselves describe their development as determined by *glück*. When Reinhart, subsequent to the above incident, becomes aware of the king's suspicions, he explains to Rosamunda why he will have to behave in a more distant way towards her. He states "das uns das glück nun zůmal gantz widrig ist/ unnd ist das die ursach/ es hat mein aller gnådigster Herr der Künig/ ein mercklichen argwon auff uns beyde geworffen" (110). Reinhart thus seems to consider the ill favour of *glück* as the cause ("ursach") of the king's suspicion, rather than considering his suspicion as the cause of, or itself as simply adverse *glück*.[2] To Reinhart, the obvious reason for the king's suspicion, i.e. the roses on his suit of armour, appears to be so immaterial that he does not mention it at all. Hence he appears to disregard causalities on the level of human action in favour of those on a superhuman level. A similar attitude characterizes Rosamunda. When she learns about Reinhart's impending departure, she blames her misery on *glück*.

"O glück [...] wie hast du mich in einem augenblück so gar aller meiner freüden beraubt/ [...] weh dem/ der sich gåntzlich auff dich meynt zů verlassen/ dann du mit hőnnigsůßem anfang deinen underthonen begegnen thůst/ aber mit gifft und gallen deinen außgang beweisest/ nyemandts auff erden dir getrawen soll/ das hast du an mir unnd meinem aller liebsten Ritter verschuldet" (112).[3]

Rosamunda, like Reinhart, seems to ignore the possibility of personal failure having occasioned the king's suspicion and thus the turn in their development. She criticizes *glück*'s unreliability, while it is she herself who has acted unreliably. This view seems to be at odds with the objective representation of events leading up to the lovers' predicament. According to this, the reasons for their failure may be traced back to the characters' own decisions, in this case Rosamunda's carelessness in having the armour adorned with roses, and Reinhart's carelessness in publicly displaying it.

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[2] The unclear punctuation makes it possible to construe another meaning. If the virgule following "ursach" were to be read as a colon, the king's action might in fact be considered by Reinhart as the cause of negative *glück* instead of vice versa. In this case, Reinhart would actually express the close connection between *glück* and human action that characterizes internally operating *glück*, albeit only to a limited extent since he does not acknowledge his own actions as the cause of the king's suspicion. Besides, Reinhart's failure to adjust his own behaviour as a consequence of the incident suggests that he does not genuinely consider human action as the cause of *glück*.

[3] For a similar expression of the same attitude, cf. also Rosamunda's subsequent lament when she learns that Reinhart has to leave the court: "O du falsches schmeychendes gelück/ wie machest du so manch kurtze freüd also schnell zergon/ und übergeißt die mit tausendtfaltigem leyd und schmertzen/ Ach warumb hastu doch dem jüngling also vil schőne verlihen [...]/ dieweil du ihm die zů gebrauchen nit vergünnest/ warumb hastu mir anfencklichs zů gelassen den Ritter lieb zů haben? dieweil du ihn mit solchen ungenaden von mir ziehen woltest" (131f).

It would seem strange that neither narrator nor characters should recognize the causal relation between the characters' misguided actions and their failure. A possible explanation for the apparent reluctance to recognize the characters' personal contribution to their own failure, as opposed to the effects of *glück* as a superhuman force, could be that *glück* and individual actions are less separate from one another than one might assume on first sight. That is, rather than affecting the actions of a person as an external force, *glück* could be constituting itself in these very actions. That is, the term *glück* could take on the meaning of an element of unpredictability which is inherent in human action. Its manifestation means loss of control on the part of the affected individual, which consists in his or her acting carelessly or misguidedly. What distinguishes internally operating *glück* from its externally operating counterpart is that the characters affected by it do have the potential to control it. Yet it seems unlikely that the characters themselves, as opposed to the narrator, would appreciate the internally operating aspect of *glück*. Rather, the characters' naive reference to the external impact of *glück* in the face of their own failures could be employed to demonstrate the true nature of *glück* through their apparent blindness with regard to the real causes of their negative development. For it is partly because the characters assume that they are exposed to an external force that they cause their own downfall, i.e. by misjudging the extent to which they are personally responsible for what happens to them. The discrepancy between this assumption and the genuine, i.e. human, causes of negative incidents might be supposed to teach the reader a lesson as regards personal responsibility, thus fulfilling the intention to deliver *ein gůte warnung* as regards the behaviour of those affected by passionate love, which is declared in the prologue (cf. 1). It ties in with such didactic purposes that the narrator would represent *glück* as partly internally operating, rather than expound a concept of *glück* which exclusively determines human action from the outside. In other words, the didactic notion excludes the possibility of the characters encountering situations the outcome of which is predetermined by *glück* in that the characters' shortcomings would be the result of a superhuman decision to have them fail.

A further example of the internal manifestation of *glück* occurs when Gabriotto returns to England. Although he has spent a year abroad in order to clear the air of suspicions as to his love for Philomena, the king's suspicion is aroused once more. This is how it comes about: "[es] begab sich von ungeschicht ein new unglück[4]/ davon sie in grôsser leyd kamen dann nye/ Dann sich eines tags begab/ das der

[4] *unglück* here appears to be what *glück* produces in negative circumstances, that is, it has the status of an object.

Ritter in der alten Künigin frawen zimmer von dem Künig geschickt ward" (169).[5] Gabriotto enters the queen's room wearing a ring which Philomena has given to him earlier. The queen recognizes the ring, as it is a gift she once made to her sister-in-law. The use of *von ungeschicht* and *sich begeben* indicates that the lovers are to a certain degree helplessly exposed to the situation: Gabriotto may be unaware of the ring's history, and Philomena may not have anticipated his appearance in the queen's vicinity. Nevertheless Gabriotto's wearing the ring in public violates the instructions which the lovers have received earlier regarding the concealment of their love. Like Reinhart and Rosamunda before them, they neglect the precautionary measures of whose necessity they must clearly be aware, especially after having witnessed the above-mentioned predicament experienced by Reinhart and Rosamunda. As a consequence of this incident, the king employs a jester to spy on Gabriotto. Gabriotto's subsequent behaviour shows once more that external adversities are insignificant when compared to his own blunders. Naively, he pours out his heart to the jester, who immediately discloses his love-interest to the king. When Gabriotto realizes that he has been found out, he puts the blame on *glück*:

"wer mag doch mich unnd mein aller liebste junckfraw also schandtlich verrahten haben/ O du schandtliches glück/ wer soll auff dich hoffen/ wer soll dir vertrawen/ fürwar nyemandts/ dann so mehr du dich freündtlicher ansehen lassest/ so mehr ist sich vor dir zů besorgen/ hast du mich nit langest genůg [...] angefochten/ bin ich nit in grossen sorgen auff dem wůtenden Mŏr gewesen/ darnach meines leibs halben in Franckreich in grossem gferden gestanden/ magstu je nit dolest ein genůgen an meinem trůbsal haben" (176).

In attributing his misery solely to *glück*, Gabriotto seems to ignore his personal responsibility in contributing to the discovery. He moreover places the king's discovery in the context of an overall influence which *glück* is supposed to have had on his life so far. Against the experience of initial success at the court, the subsequent experience of hardship, i.e. shipwreck and near assassination in France, thus seems like treachery on the part of *glück*. What is more, *glück*'s renewed interference in the shape of the threat posed by the indignant king makes it appear to Gabriotto like an insatiable monster whose injustice knows no bounds. Gabriotto seems to regard these

[5] There is also a more positive example of this pattern when, after the shipwreck, the message of the men's survival is interpreted as the fact that "sich zůletzt das glück über sye erbarmet/ inen all ir klag in freüd verkeren thet" (148). The ladies' relief is due to the fact that it finally occurs to Gabriotto and Reinhart to let their beloveds know that they are alive, in other words, it is due to human action. Although this instance is interesting in that *glück* is considered in a positive light, as opposed to the persistent negativity of other instances of internally operating *glück*, it is of no further relevance for the narrative's development.

incidents as having been inflicted by an external, uncontrollable force. Yet from a more objective point of view, the king's suspicion stands out from the others in that it is triggered by Gabriotto's own action. The lovers' secret being betrayed to the king may be traced back to their committing the mistake involving the ring, which is later reinforced by Gabriotto's carelessness towards the jester. From a detached point of view, the incident might therefore be another example of *glück* operating internally, which the protagonists could easily have avoided. However, Gabriotto does not differentiate between an instance of externally operating *glück*, like the shipwreck, on the one hand, and the king's suspicion, which is an internal manifestation of *glück*, on the other. Instead, he views all instances of *glück* as stemming from the same, impenetrable source. That Gabriotto is not even intuitively aware of different types of *glück* means that he is lacking a certain degree of reflection.

The characters' inability to understand the internal dimension of *glück*'s workings is obvious also from the following passages from *Gabriotto*. Reinhart initially interprets the ladies' favourable response as a sign that he and Gabriotto have left France and entered England "zů einer glückseligen stund [...]/ dieweil uns das glück mit zweyen solchen schönen und züchtigen junckfrauen versehen hat" (64f). Later, Gabriotto's father Gernier interprets this *stund* to the contrary. When he learns about the danger that Reinhart's love for Rosamunda poses, he evaluates the situation as follows: "ich mag wol sprechen/ das wir zů einer unseligen stund in Engeland kummen seind/ dieweil sich das glück also mit ungestůmem lauff gegen uns gewendt hat" (122). Gernier's evaluation of the *stund* when they came to England contrasts with Reinhart's previous one. Both positions have in common that they stress the external aspect of the intervention of *glück*. The characters seem to believe that *glück*'s disposition towards them is determined by a certain constellation of superhuman forces at a particular time. Thus they do not distinguish between external circumstances, such as meeting the ladies (cf. 64f), and incidents for which they themselves are responsible, such as causing the king's suspicion (cf. 122). Whatever the experience is, it is seen as resulting from the influence of a superhuman power whose disposition has supposedly been decided *a priori*. Since a more immediately causal view of events is not taken into consideration, the characters do not acknowledge that at least some of the incidents they experience are consequences of their own action. Gabriotto, too, is blind to the real causes of his misery, i.e. his own part in causing the necessity for him to leave Philomena. In this sense, he is unable to recognize the internally operating dimension of *glück*. To the extent that Gabriotto's contribution to his own development seems to be concealed from himself, this might be another instance of the narrator's trying to instruct the reader through a

discrepancy between the character's point of view on the one hand and the actual course of events on the other. In the context of the narrative as a whole, the effect of internally operating *glück* is decisive. That is, it is the lovers' contribution to betraying their secret which ultimately leads to their ruin, thus outweighing by far the adverse incidents that are caused by circumstances beyond their control.

In *Knabenspiegel*, Gottlieb attributes to Fortuna the unequal development of his aristocratic son Wilbaldus and his peasant-born foster son Fridbert:[6]

"O Fortuna, wie bistu so ein unstanthaffte Gŏttin/ [...] so mehr du einem under augen anlaches/ so mehr soll er sich hinder yhm deines außgezognen schwerts besorgen/ [...] bin ich nit menicklich ein genůgsam exempel/ [...] hab ich sie [Wilbaldus und Fridbert] beid mit einem [...] Pedagogen versehen/ welchem ich meines Sones halben/ kein schuld mehr geben kan/ [...] was aber ist geschehen/ diser meines meyers son/ den hastu O glück mit deinen gnaden angesehen/ den andren meinen Son/ so von adelichen geblůt erboren/ den hastu schmehlichen under deine fůß getretten" (42f).

Following Gottlieb's arguments, a person's social standing at birth should naturally determine their development and career. According to his point of view, born aristocrat Wilbaldus is destined to succeed in his father's footsteps, while peasant-born Fridbert would grow up to become a peasant. Because these expectations are thwarted, Gottlieb blames *glück*. However, reasons can be found on the level of human action which provide an explanation for Wilbaldus' wayward development. Prior to Gottlieb's outburst, the narrator presents sufficient causes for Wilbaldus' lack of discipline: Wilbaldus is able to keep bad company because his mother, Concordia, interferes with Gottlieb's educational methods by restricting the teacher's authority behind his back. Yet Gottlieb seems to discount any possibility of human failure underlying his son's negative development. His belief in a feudal logic may prevent him from grasping human reasons for the disruption he experiences. It may be as a result of this blindness to possible psychological reasons for the disruption of feudal order that Gottlieb refers to a superhuman force as the reason. To the extent that the vital facts are somewhat concealed from Gottlieb, there is a difference between Gottlieb's and, e.g., Gabriotto's position when reviewing the factors that lead to their respective misery. But, Gottlieb equally lacks insight into his personal responsibility for certain developments, i.e. into the internal aspect of what is referred to as *glück*. One might still say that this instance is a borderline case as regards its qualifying as internally rather than externally operating *glück* in that Concordia's secretly

[6] The terms Fortuna and *glück* are used interchangeably in this passage.

interfering with Wilbaldus' education may be considered to be beyond Gottlieb's control. However, the narrator's repeated appeal to parents to tighten disciplinary measures towards their children would suggest otherwise; it implies the possibility of controlling at least partly that which is referred to as *glück*'s intervention. Gottlieb's reference to *glück* as an external force comes across as particularly insufficient in accounting for his negative experience since he appears as the representative of a conventional, static order. Both his belief in feudal values and in an external, superhuman force make Gottlieb's view seem inadequate against the general framework of the narrative. For *Knabenspiegel* focuses on the possibilities inherent in the individual. The prologue declares the characters to be representatives of certain personalities, and stresses the importance of individual behaviour (cf. 5). The narrative as a whole demonstrates how the peasant boy manages to settle into a substantially higher class in society, and how the aristocrat descends into a lower class, both by virtue of their individual actions. Contrary to Gottlieb's statement, the characters are not depicted as the victims of freak developments, which rules out the occurrence of *glück* as an externally operating force in the above incidents. The idea of the *Aufsteiger* who rises by exercising the qualities and skills which he possesses is not consistent with a deterministic chance, much less fate; it is, however, compatible with the notion of internally operating *glück*.

At a later stage, the narrator refers to *glück*'s benevolence towards Gottlieb, which supposedly results in the *Hochmeister*'s sending Fridbert and Felix to university at his own cost (cf. 44). The *Hochmeister*'s speech (cf. 45f) makes it plain that his generosity is inspired by Gottlieb's previous devotion to his job; apart from this, Fridbert's exemplary behaviour appears to be conducive to the *Hochmeister*'s decision. Therefore, *glück*'s intervention is brought about by Gottlieb's behaviour, rather than by an externally operating force; human input and the outcome of the situation in question are directly proportionate to one another. The tension between the narrator's appeal to *glück* as an explanatory pattern, which on first sight would seem to be external to human action, and the fact that he represents events in a way that makes this pattern redundant may once more be resolved by considering *glück* as an internally rather than externally operating phenomenon. The external nature of *glück* which is implied by traditional attributes such as *unstet* and *wanckelmůtig* may be purely a figure of speech. That is, the apparent clash between a superhuman, and a human order of explanation would disappear if one considered the term *glück* as an instance of rhetoric.

As we shall see, the above explanation is plausible not only with regard to narratorial statements. After Lottarius has deserted him, Wilbaldus accuses

"unglück", which appears to be a variant of *glück* as an active force, of leading him into ruin: "O unglück/ wie hast du mich in so ein grosse fortun gefürt" (50).[7] At the same time as holding *unglück* responsible, Wilbaldus regrets that he previously did not obey his father, or his teacher, or listen to his brother. In addition, he blames his wicked friend Lottarius for his misery ("wie hastu uns beide so gar übel außgebeützet/ uns in armůt angst und trůbsal gesetzet", 51). Thus Wilbaldus perceives his misery as the result of a potentially foreseeable rather than incomprehensible development. He finds sufficient explanation on the level of human action behind the workings of *unglück*. Yet he addresses *unglück* in a manner that makes it appear as an external force, i.e. as a force separate from him, which has inflicted things on him that are beyond his control. How are these two perspectives compatible? Given Wilbaldus' personal contribution, the only way in which *glück* could possibly be externally operating in the causal nexus leading to his misery would be if it was considered as the original cause of his submitting to Lottarius' wicked ways. To ask why Wilbaldus submits to Lottarius is to ask for Wilbaldus' responsibility for and control over his own development. Blaming *unglück* for Wilbaldus' getting involved with Lottarius means denying his personal responsibility for his own development. This would jar with the rational account which perceives his downfall as the result of an intelligible, and humanly controllable chain of events. Moreover, to consider Wilbaldus as a mere victim of externally operating *glück* seems highly unlikely given the strong educational purposes of *Knabenspiegel*. Thus the narrative's title reads: "würt in disen beiden [i.e. Wilbaldus and Fridbert] fürgebildt/ was grosssen nutz das studieren/ gehorsamkeit [...] bringet/ hergegen auch was grosser geferligkeit auss dem widerspyl erwachsen/ die jugend darin zů lernen/ und zů einer warnung für zů spieglen" (3). According to this, the narrative's moral is that the way in which a person chooses to behave determines his development, urging the reader to adjust his behaviour accordingly. As pointed out before, this rules out the genuine existence of *glück* as an external force whose overall effect determines human life at random. Against this background, Wilbaldus' reference to *glück* as an externally operating force cannot be taken at face-value, but again points to the concept of internally operating *glück*. Since Wilbaldus himself refers to his own wrong-doings as having led into his misery, his reference to *glück*'s external nature is unlikely to bear the mark of delusion. This leaves only the possibility of this reference being a figure

[7]This is the only occurrence of *fortun* in this narrative. It is used here in the sense of misery, or predicament, i.e. as an object (cf. Alfred Götze, *Frühneuhochdeutsches Glossar*, 7th ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967), p. 89), where *fortun* is translated as *unglück*). In a previous quotation (p. 42), *Fortuna* was addressed as the equivalent of *glück* as an active force, which suggests that like *(un)glück, F/fortun(a)* may be used as subject or object.

of speech which illustrates the distress experienced by this highly emotional character at the time of the utterance. The evocation of *glück*, and its external nature may be a metaphorical reference to the character's internal short-comings. Wilbaldus' being a victim of *glück* would imply that he was unable to control his own actions not as a result of some sinister external force, but as the result of internal weakness or lack of insight; such weakness may in turn be overcome through reflection and personal effort, as Wilbaldus' eventual reform shows.[8] As we have seen, internally operating *glück* is closely tied up with Wilbaldus' descent into misery; as such, it occupies a central role in his development.

In *Goldfaden*, like in *Galmy* and *Gabriotto*, *glück* is referred to when the protagonists' love takes a turn for the worse. A change in *glück*'s attitude is declared by the narrator when Lewfrid and Angliana's love is revealed to the resentful king:

Als aber das unsteht glück nit lenger gedulden noch leiden mocht/ das dise zwey liebhabenden [i.e. Lewfrid and Angliana] ir liebe in so stiller weiß verborgen trůgen/ hat es sich gantz von ihnen gewandt/ sie mit allem unfal umbgeben. Dann es begab sich auff ein zeit/ das Angliana irem [...] Jüngling ein [...] ring [...] schanckt/ in beywesen irer Nerrin/ nit gedacht noch sorget/ das ir heimligkeyt unnd liebe an tag kommen/ und offenbar werden solt. Die Nerrin aber aller ding gar eben war nam (103).

According to this passage, *glück* is unwilling to tolerate the lovers' secrecy any longer. Depending on whether one takes *dann* to be temporal or causal in meaning, the change of *glück* is said to precede or, alternatively, to manifest itself in the lovers' carelessness, which eventually leads to the king's suspicion. At the same time, valid causes for the turn in Lewfrid's development are provided on the level of human action: the illicit lovers publicly exchange a ring. The narrator further attributes Lewfrid's failure to disarm the king's suspicion to *glück*: "er gedacht aber nicht das ihn das glück in irem anschlag so gantz widersins erscheinen wirdt/ wie ir dann wol vernemmen werdt" (104). As before, this reference to *glück* as a subject that is associated with an active, transitive verb is at odds with the subsequent account of Lewfrid's ineptness in dealing with the matter in question. Similar tension between reference to an externally operating force on the one hand and to causes inherent in the characters' behaviour on the other is apparent in Lewfrid's own account of his

[8] There are limits to Wickram's belief in the possibilities of influencing one's development, as the prologue, with its reference to those who are incorrigibly evil, suggests. While Wilbaldus belongs to those persons "die das mittel halten" (5) and hence may end up either virtuous or evil, Lottarius, who is eventually executed for his evil doings, belongs to the type of people who are intrinsically evil and therefore unable to reform.

misery. After having had to flee from the court, Lewfrid addresses *glück*:

"O glück wie bistu mir so gantz zůwider/ [...] du hast mich jetzund gar offt und dick felschlichen angelachet/ [...] und so ich meyn dir jetz am angenemsten sein/ so überschütest du mich mit aller bitterkeit/ niemant solt sein getrawen und hoffnung zů dir unstetigen glück setzen/ du bist gantz wanckelmůtig/ unbleiblich/ undanckbar/ dann so man dich meynet am aller nechsten zů sein/ so bistu eim am aller ferristen/ [...] ich inn brinnender liebe hart entzündet ward/ gegen meiner [...] Junckfrawen/ bey deren du mich dermassen angesehen/ so das ich und sie in hoffnung waren/ unser liebe solt unzertrent/ und unablőßlich bleiben/ was hastu aber mir yetzund durch deine falschen tück angericht/ Ja anders nichts/ dann das ich mich von meiner [...] Junckfrawen sunder alles urlub hab scheiden můßen" (131f).

Like the narrator, Lewfrid blames *glück* for his predicament, viz. the separation from Angliana, which at the same time may be explained by the characters' own actions. For the events leading up to Lewfrid's departure from the court suggest that the lovers themselves could definitely have avoided their misery. First of all, Angliana is warned by her confidante Florina not to let any other person into their secret (cf. 98). Nevertheless Angliana gives Lewfrid a ring in the presence of all her servants, which, not surprisingly, causes the jester to suspect their mutual love. Florina subsequently criticizes Lewfrid for giving their love such obvious display (cf. 103f) and advises him on how to deceive the jester about the true nature of his relationship with Angliana (cf. 104). She suggests that Lewfrid return the ring to the jester, claiming that Angliana ordered him to have it altered. However, Lewfrid commits another mistake by entrusting the jester not only with the ring, which incidentally bears no sign of an alteration, but also with an explicit love-letter to Angliana (cf. 105f). When the count catches Lewfrid handing over the things to the jester, he realizes that the ring has not been altered at all; moreover, he reads the accompanying letter and thus is made fully aware of the love-affair (cf. 106f). In this sense, it is clearly Lewfrid and Angliana's own carelessness in spite of the warnings that causes the disaster which Lewfrid attributes to spiteful *glück*.

The fact that responsibility for the above incident is attributed to *glück*, while at the same time the incident is represented as being constituted by human actions, points yet again to an internal use of the term *glück*. Notably, character and narrator refer to *glück* in different ways in connection with Lewfrid's expulsion from the court. Although both mention *glück* in conjunction with transitive, active verbs, the narrator refers to *glück* in a more neutral way than Lewfrid. Thus he uses the fairly detached "unsteht" (103) as the only attribute for *glück*. By contrast, Lewfrid refers to *glück* in a much more emotional and as it were personifying way. He calls it "gantz

wanckelmůtig/ unbleiblich/ undanckbar" and accuses it of "falsche[...] tück" (131f); what is more, he directly addresses *glück*, which gives the impression of him considering it as a genuine force that is obviously external to him. While Lewfrid's account of *glück* implies that *glück* is a deliberate and spiteful force, the narrator's account is more matter-of-fact in that it puts less emphasis on *glück*'s spite and deliberate intention of harming the character, and confines itself instead to stating the disruption caused. Thus we are invited to ascribe to the narrator's viewpoint the notion of *glück* as an internally operating force, more easily than to Lewfrid's way of addressing *glück*. Lewfrid's insistence on the spiteful nature of *glück* makes its external nature appear much more pronounced than according to the narrator. This could suggest that Lewfrid's way of referring to *glück* is meant to come across as misguided. The difference between the character's viewpoint and the narratorial representation of events could point towards the narrator's intention of revealing the naivety and inadequacy of Lewfrid's belief in *glück* as an external force, which in turn would be related to the latter taking diminished responsibility for his previous actions. Yet Lewfrid does seem to draw certain consequences from the previous incidents in that he plans his subsequent moves with greater caution and succeeds in marrying Angliana. Therefore, he may in some way be aware of the internally operating aspect of *glück*, if only on an intuitive level. The vehemence with which Lewfrid charges *glück* with having harmed him, thus suggesting its external nature, might be accounted for by the acuteness with which he experiences the incidents in question. Ultimately, this outburst might be explained by rhetoric rather than heart-felt conviction. Hence the difference between Lewfrid's viewpoint and that of the narrator could stem from differing degrees of involvement and conscious awareness as regards the forces at work in the situation in question. Both positions are ultimately consistent with the notion of *glück* as an internally operating force. Generally speaking, the significance of internally operating *glück* in *Goldfaden* may be somewhat reduced when compared to *Gabriotto* and *Knabenspiegel*. For Lewfrid instinctively recognizes its destructive impact and therefore manages to curb it. Moreover, internally operating *glück* is less in evidence because of the extensive positive presence of externally operating *glück*, as shown in the previous chapter. This is in keeping with the fairy-tale pattern, as one would not necessarily expect the hero of a fairy-tale to be assailed by internal weakness.

Finally, let us consider the occurrence of internally operating *glück* in *Von guoten und boesen Nachbaurn*. As shown in part II, Wickram's last narrative contains decidedly fewer instances of *glück* than the previous ones; manifestations of internally operating *glück* are limited accordingly. In fact there is only instance of a character

being affected by what might be called internally operating *glück*. It occurs when Amelia and Lasarus Jun. fall in love with each other. For a while, they indulge their feelings in secret, until *glück* puts an end to this state: "Das unstet glück aber/ welches kein bestendige freud haben mag/ wolt disen zweyen jungen liebhabenden/ ir heimliche freud/ [...] nit lenger vergünnen" (89). That is, Richart overhears Amelia talking to herself about her beloved. Amelia displays a certain amount of carelessness in talking aloud and, as it happens, at an open window about her love. One might say that she has only herself to blame for revealing their secret. Still the fact that her father passes by the open window might be considered as an incident beyond her control, albeit a very probable one. In any case, more prudent behaviour could easily have kept the interference of *glück* at bay, which is to say that it is constituted mainly by Amelia's carelessness. Hence it seems justified to classify this incident as another instance of internally operating *glück* in that what causes it is inherent in the afflicted individual's behaviour. The incident is given an unusually mild turn when compared to parallel manifestations of *glück* in *Gabriotto*, *Galmy* and *Goldfaden*: the lovers' parents are delighted and merely make some arrangements for the proper conduct of the relationship. As mentioned before, this is because different parameters apply to the life of Amelia and Lasarus. They are unaffected by issues of class segregation, and are integrated into a social network which helps them deal with certain crises such as the discovery of an illicit love, which is regularly attributed to *glück* in the other narratives where it may potentially ruin the characters. The network in question, which is firmly grounded on Christian principles, could be seen to help ward off the threatening occurrence of internally operating *glück* to the extent that it is manifest in the actions of the characters. The characters are so righteous and conscientious that the occurrence of internally operating *glück*, which amounts to a weakness of some kind in the affected person, is nipped in the bud. This suggests that the occurrence of internally operating *glück* is closely tied up with the attitude of the affected individual. In depicting this comparatively carefree world, Wickram might advocate certain strategies as a way of coping with the dangerous frailty inherent in human behaviour, such as the active practice of the Christian faith, or the support of a social order which is potentially more democratic than a feudal one in that virtue rather than birth determines a person's value.

Generally speaking, we may observe a discrepancy between the fact that certain incidents are explained by reference to *glück* as a traditional, external force, and the fact that these incidents have obvious causes on the level of human action. How may we account for this peculiar representation of *glück*? One might argue that *glück* is considered as an externally operating, superhuman force that sets off human

action, which then is carried out according to its own inherent rules of plausibility and causality. But, given that the effect of *glück* on the characters recedes in the course of Wickram's development as a novelist, this seems implausible. For in order for Wickram's educational message to emerge in a convincing fashion, it would not make much sense to simply remove an external obstruction to the characters' success. An internalized understanding of *glück*, by contrast, would give more importance to the individual's contribution to his or her development.[9] Yet the clash between different explanatory patterns might suggest also another possibility. *glück* might be represented as a genuinely external force seriously affecting the characters' development, while sufficient reasons could be provided on the human level for things to develop as they do independently of the status of *glück*. In other words, both levels of causal explanation, human and superhuman, might be unconnected and could therefore constitute alternative explanations of what is happening in each narrative. However, the idea of alternative patterns of discourse does not really tie up with Wickram's explicit didacticism, as may be gleaned, in particular, from the narratives' prologues.[10] For this reason, the ambiguity inherent in the availability of alternative discourses would seem to be too non-committal to have been deliberately employed by a writer of Wickram's mindset.[11]

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[9] Wolfgang Friedrich claims that Wickram's belief in God's determining the fate of both mankind as a whole, and of each individual, "hinderte ihn daran, die Handlung seiner Romane wirklich realistisch, als eine verschlungene Folge menschlicher, Ursache und Wirkung bildender Handlungen aufzubauen" (Wolfgang Friedrich, "Bemerkungen zu den Romanen Georg Wickrams", *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe* 10 (1961), p. 1041). This claim seems untenable, both as regards the monopoly of God and the lack of convincing sequences of events on the level of causation, not least because of the complex interaction between *glück* and human actions as shown in this chapter.

[10] Nor would the presence of alternative discourses tie up with the notion of didacticism as it appears to have characterized sixteenth century narrative in general; on the purpose of Wickram's narratives in the context of contemporary literature, cf. e.g. Hans-Gert Roloff, "Überredung - Unterricht - Ergetzung der Leute. Zur Funktion der Romane Georg Wickrams", *Recherches Germaniques* 9 (1979), pp. 263 - 277. The general didacticism of sixteenth century literature is also pointed out by, among others, Barbara Könneker, "Deutsche Literatur im Zeitalter des Humanismus und der Reformation", in (ed.) August Buck, *Renaissance und Barock* (Teil II), *Neues Handbuch der Literaturwissenschaft*, vol. 10 (Frankfurt/Main: Athenaion, 1972), p. 159; cf. also chapter 2.

[11] According to Otto Neudeck, the fact that, in *Goldfaden*, causality on a human level is marked by simultaneous reference to *glück* "[ist] [...] als Zeichen einer erzählerischen Profilierung zu werten, die im Endeffekt aus dem Gegeneinanderführen zweier konträrer Letztbegründungen resultiert" (Otto Neudeck, "*Verwunderung, glück, von ungeschicht*. Zur Poetologie des Fiktionalen in Jörg Wickram's *Goldtfaden*", in (eds.) Wolfgang Harms/ C. Stephen Jaeger, *Fremdes wahrnehmen - fremdes Wahrnehmen:Studien zur Geschichte der Wahrnehmung und zur Begegnung von Kulturen in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit* (Stuttgart/Leipzig: Hirzel 1997), p. 258). These *Letztbegründungen*, or explanatory patterns are human action and motivation on the one hand, and superhuman, viz. divine providence on the other (cf. p. 262). Neudeck actually considers the two explanatory patterns as parallel rather than complementary when he speaks of "das relativierende Nebeneinander von

While one cannot rule out the possibility of the simultaneous presence of discourses being the result of an unconscious process on the part of the author, there is a more satisfying way of explaining it. The narrator may intend to show that the characters' failures constitute a manifestation of *glück* in themselves, rather than being caused or preceded by the intervention of *glück* as an external force. The characters' actions show that things do not always go according to plan, i.e. that there is an element of chance involved in human action which may trigger serious consequences; notably, the instances of internally operating *glück* are, barring minor exceptions, almost exclusively negative. This would make *glück* an element of unpredictability, or unreliability inherent in human action.[12] Assuming that the term *glück* in the passages considered in this chapter denotes the frailty inherent in human action, we may ask whether the external aspect of *glück* often attributed to it is simply the result of metaphorical expression or rhetoric. While this explanation seems to be plausible with regard to the narrator's comments, it cannot be applied to all of the characters' statements. Instead, the contrast between the characters' view of *glück* as an externally operating force and the general representation of events as resulting from their own failure could be employed to reveal the characters' delusion, and consequently instruct the reader on the true, i.e. internal nature of the phenomenon called *glück*.

At its broadest, *glück* represents that which lies beyond man's control, which includes unforeseen or undesired consequences of a person's own actions as well as random acts of superhuman origin.[13] How are the manifestations of internally

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Letztbegründungsprinzipien - eines immanenten und eines transzendenten" (p. 258). As a result of the parallelism of two alternative explanatory patterns, the narrator, according to Neudeck, gains autonomy: "Indem über Kombination und - in ihrer Folge - Relationierung die Verbindlichkeit sinnbegründender Bezugssysteme relativiert werden, entsteht poetischer Freiraum - ein Freiraum, der die Profilierung beziehungsweise Emanzipation des Erzählers ermöglicht und damit eine der Voraussetzungen für die Autonomisierung des literarischen Diskurses schafft" (p. 274f). However, it remains unclear how exactly Wickram's narrator puts his supposed autonomy to use, or what the reader is left with to believe in as regards an underlying principle of causation as a result of the mutual *Relativierung* of explanatory patterns.

[12] As such, *glück*'s effect on the characters' lives is decidedly more real than the mere rhetorical significance attributed to it by Jacobi: "Die verblaßte Gestalt der Fortuna wird als willkommenes rhetorisches Mittel für Klagereden benutzt und gibt den augenfälligsten Hinweis auf den gehobenen Sprachstil der Monologe; sie dient als einheitlicher Bezugspunkt für die Anklagen des mit seinem Schicksal hadernden Helden" (Reinhold Jacobi, *Jörg Wickrams Romane. Interpretation unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der zeitgenössischen Erzählprosa*, Diss. Bonn 1970, p. 249f).

[13] As mentioned before, Otto Neudeck claims that the term *glück* denotes both empirical causality, and divine providence: "Zu konstatieren ist das Nebeneinander zweier Ordnungen: Das Wunderbare, *glück* und Zufall können sowohl von einer immanenten als auch von einer transzendenten Perspektive aus semantisch besetzt werden. Letztbegründungsprinzip und damit Gradmesser des Erstaunlichen, Zufälligen, Schicksalshaften ist zwar primär die lebensweltliche Erfahrungswirklichkeit mit ihrer Kausallogik bzw. Kontingenz; parallel dazu wird aber immer wieder auf die providentielle Ordnung einer heilsgeschichtlichen Kosmologie verwiesen" (Otto Neudeck, *op. cit.*, p. 261). This implies that

operating *glück* related to those of its externally operating counterpart? Externally operating *glück* seems to be of less importance for the individual's development than internally operating *glück*. While both kinds of *glück* pose a challenge for the affected character, internally operating *glück* seems to be of primary importance as opposed to the merely secondary importance of externally operating *glück*. Internal manifestations of *glück* occur at crucial points of a narrative's development; their effect, which tends to be negative, is seldom completely reversed, leading instead to the protagonist's life taking a genuine turn for the worse. Externally operating *glück*, by contrast, does not usually touch the characters' lives in such a severe way, since its main function is to trigger certain situations the outcome of which depends on the characters' reaction. Hence it is possible to tolerate the existence of externally operating *glück*, but not that of the internally operating kind. The human frailty that makes up internally operating *glück* may be considered to result from a lapse in the individual's prudence and as such needs to be prevented in a sense in which externally operating *glück* cannot be prevented. Notably, the manifestations of internally operating *glück* may suggest a new degree of potential control on the part of the affected character since they arise from within the character himself. At the same time, the exposure to external hazards subsumed under the concept of externally operating *glück* makes control over one's own actions, and as such over internally operating *glück* especially important. That internally operating *glück* tends to outweigh its counterpart in the narratives, with *Goldfaden* forming an exception, signifies an important step away from the traditional concept of Fortuna as an externally operating force. To the extent that externally operating *glück* is marginalized in favour of internally operating *glück*, the traditional concept of Fortuna has yielded some of its threatening power to a force inside the human mind. It is doubtful, however, whether the distinction between internally and externally operating *glück* was a fully conscious process for Wickram: that there is no explicit difference in the way in which both types of *glück* are referred to seems to indicate otherwise. That it is nevertheless possible, from today's point of view, to make out a largely consistent distinction as regards the nature of *glück* in different situations suggests that behind the catch-all phrase *glück*, a process of transition is going on: a transition from a view of life as determined by external, superhuman forces, to the

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Neudeck does not consider *glück* as a force in its own right: instead, it is supposed to be a mere cypher for either human, or divine power. However, the fact that the narratives contain plenty of references to God that are distinct from references to *glück* suggests that the term *glück* represents a force separate from, and other than God.

recognition of a human being's personal responsibility.[14] The simultaneous presence of externally and internally operating *glück*, representing either of these tendencies, results in a curious mixture of determination and individual freedom, as described here by Xenja von Ertzdorff:

Das Ausgeliefertsein des Menschen an unbestimmte lenkende Kräfte, die er nur bedingt oder gar nicht durch seine Klugheit steuern kann, ist in den Romanen des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts [...] erheblich deutlicher erkennbar als in den "klassischen" höfischen Romanen [...] Der handelnde Mensch ist insofern 'Objekt' einer nur undeutlich oder gar nicht erkennbaren Gewalt, die sein Geschick lenkt, 'Subjekt' indessen und stärker konturiert als Individuum, insofern er unter Aufbietung seiner eigenen Kräfte sich behaupten und seinen Weg durch "seine Geschichte" gehen muß.[15]

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[14] The simultaneous presence of internally and externally operating *glück* ties in with the new empiricism which Jan-Dirk Müller observes as a characteristic of the *Prosaroman*: "Insgesamt zeichnet sich [...] eine neue Einstellung zur Realität ab, ein >empirischer< Zugriff, nicht zu verwechseln mit >Abbildung< empirischer Wirklichkeit! Denn er erfaßt paradoxerweise auch Erzählmodelle, die als ganze gerade nicht empirisch begründet werden können, da sie ein anderes als ein empirisches Wirklichkeitsverständnis, nämlich die >>garantierte Realität<< eines göttlichen Kosmos voraussetzen: so der providentiell gesicherte Aufstieg des Ritters in der âventiure ([...] selbst noch *Goldfaden*), [...] oder selbst noch die schicksalhafte Liebe ([...] *Gabriotto*). Es käme also darauf an, zu untersuchen, wie innerhalb solch sinnverbürgender Erzählmodelle, die Ablauf und Ziel vorweg determinieren, neue Kohärenz- und Motivationserwartungen sich Geltung verschaffen" (Jan -Dirk Müller, "Volksbuch/Prosaroman im 15./16. Jahrhundert - Perspektiven der Forschung, *IASL* 1. Sonderheft (1985), p. 92). With *glück*/ Fortuna being traditionally an externally operating force, the concept's shift towards operating within the affected person's scope of potential control could be Wickram's response to the above-mentioned demand for new patterns of coherence and motivation.

[15] Xenja von Ertzdorff, *Romane und Novellen des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland* (Darmstadt: WBG, 1989), p. 57.

Chapter 12

The Relation between *glück* and Individual Action

Having analyzed the manifestations of *glück* and their effect on the characters as such, I will consider on a more general level how the way in which the individual character interacts with *glück* shapes his or her overall development.

In order to highlight the difference which a character's way of dealing with *glück* makes to his development, let us look at two comparable scenarios in *Gabriotto und Reinhart* and *Goldfaden*. *Goldfaden* invites comparison with *Gabriotto* because the protagonists of both narratives find themselves in remarkably similar situations, albeit with a fundamentally different outcome. While in *Gabriotto*, Gabriotto and Philomena die owing to their frustrated love, *Goldfaden*'s Lewfrid and Angliana marry eventually and live happily ever after. The preceding incidents, however, are of great similarity. Lewfrid is socially inferior to Angliana; the social gap between them is comparable to that between Gabriotto and Philomena. Philomena's brother, the king, and Angliana's father, the count, are not only the guardian of the female protagonist, they are also employer and as such sovereign to the male one. Each couple's love develops undiscovered for some time until the sovereign finds out about it. Then, both king and count arrange for the unsuspecting protagonist to be ambushed and murdered. Both Gabriotto and Lewfrid are informed about these plans by loyal servants. They manage to kill their assassins and flee from the court. It is from then on that their development differs significantly. Gabriotto despairs; thinking of Philomena makes him fall severely ill, and he dies within days. Lewfrid, by contrast, holds out in the hope of being re-united with his beloved. He subsequently receives a letter from the count, who, moved by both his daughter's grief and the fact that Lewfrid has survived, asks him to return. Lewfrid obliges; after further challenges, he is allowed to marry Angliana and eventually succeeds the count.

Why is it that one protagonist ends up a success, and the other a corpse, and how is this related to *glück*? On first sight, it might appear that Lewfrid is generally in a better position because the man in charge of his beloved is more flexible with regard to her choice of lover. Perhaps the count is indeed more accommodating than the king in *Gabriotto*. However, this is not the primary issue here. For even if the king had called Gabriotto back, he would have been dead already and thus unable to respond. The major difference is that Gabriotto gives up, i.e. submits to the way external

influences would have him, while Lewfrid does not. Rather than resulting from the fact that one character, by some irrational circumstance, is favoured by *glück*, and the other one is not, the difference in their development is linked to how each character copes with, or reacts to *glück*. Initially, both Lewfrid and Gabriotto hold *glück* responsible for being forced to depart from the court; both are surprised that *glück* suddenly turns against them. This could suggest that they are previously so overwhelmed by what they consider to be *glück*'s favour as regards their love (cf. *Goldfaden*, 42; *Gabriotto*, 61) that they completely and uncritically rely on it. It seems to be at least partly due to this uncritical reliance on an external force that the characters are guilty of certain instances of carelessness, which in turn lead to the disaster attributed to *glück*. The difference, then, in the protagonists' behaviour occurs once they have been expelled from the court. Gabriotto resigns himself to the altered situation as a stroke of *glück*. Without further opposition, he abandons the realization of his aim, i.e. union with Philomena, and dies. He submits to the negative state supposedly inflicted on him by *glück* just as he previously indulged in its apparently positive gifts. When subsequent to his departure he acknowledges the deceptive nature of positive *glück* (cf. 176), he concludes from this experience that *glück* is genuinely negative. Thus Gabriotto seems to be in awe of the external circumstances that shape his life; he is unable to recognize that *glück*'s destructive gifts, viz. expulsion from the court, may be no more permanent and definitive than their positive counterparts. In fact he is so overwhelmed by the course of events suffered by him that he explicitly leaves any possibility of seeing Philomena again to the mercy of *glück* (cf. 188). The ensuing desperation leads to Gabriotto's death by breaking him up both psychologically and physically.

Lewfrid, by contrast, is not prepared to let an external force such as *glück* prevent him from carrying out his aims. Having left the court, he holds out in his home town. Although he may be considered to remain temporarily inactive in doing so, which incidentally appears to be the best behaviour under the given circumstances, he crucially sustains both his spirit and strength. Hence he is not defeated for good by the experience of negative *glück*, which suggests that he considers the negative manifestation of *glück* as much less determinate than Gabriotto does. When, after a period of waiting, Lewfrid is rewarded for his patience by the count's invitation to return to the court, he does not respond uncritically to this offer. Despite his desire to return to Angliana, he is aware that there might be a catch in the offer, and acts with caution. After protecting himself with a *pantzerhemmet* (134) from potential violence on the part of the count's messenger, he returns in disguise and thus takes a precaution against *glück*, which he knows to be deceptive by this stage

(cf. e.g. his lament on p. 131f). Instead of relying on the benignity of external circumstances, he relies on himself, i.e. on his own cautiousness. The fact that Lewfrid considers neither positive nor negative developments as absolute prevents him from losing control over his life. His caution appears to result from the fact that he has learnt to see through the deceptive nature of *glück*. The need to be aware of *glück*'s potential falsity is illustrated also by the following warning which Angliana gives to Lewfrid and her father when they prepare to go to war: "Bit euch [...]/ ihr wôllend euch auff das aller best verwaren/ unnd dem glück nit zůvil vertrauwen/ dann es sich zů vil malen seer freüntlich erzeiget/ hat aber hinder im tausentfeltige far verborgen" (172). This warning to beware of *glück* refers to the dangers concealed behind seemingly positive *glück*, but may be applicable also to those situations in which a character experiences the -equally deceitful- negative impact of *glück*. While Lewfrid manages to grasp the true nature of *glück*, Gabriotto never does so in his life-time, although he has equal opportunity to witness *glück*'s deceitfulness and adjust his behaviour accordingly. As a result, he lacks caution with regard to positive *glück*, as well as courage to rely on himself when faced with negative *glück*.

The comparison between Lewfrid and Gabriotto suggests that the recognition of *glück*'s deceptiveness, however implicit it may be, is crucial for a character's success. This recognition entails two things, namely that as an internally operating force, *glück* may be controlled, and as an externally operating force, it may be opposed. Hence the effects of *glück* are not inevitable, its negative manifestation not irreversible. Generally speaking, Lewfrid, in contrast to the defeatist Gabriotto, seems to be aware of his personal aims as existing independently of or even opposed to *glück* and the circumstances to which he is exposed. Moreover, he seems confident as regards the possibility of realizing his aims, if necessary against *glück* and other external circumstances. This attitude may be what allows Lewfrid not to be intimidated by the negative appearance of *glück*. The actual success in which this attitude results for him suggests that it is possible for human beings to oppose the interference of *glück* with their own ability.[1] In the light of Gabriotto's disastrous end

[1] Cf. Martin-ten Wolthuis: "Fortuna als Mittel zum Zweck [im Dienst der göttlichen Gewalt]: in diesem Sinne ist auch die Rolle des "Glücks" in Lewfrids "Weltleben" zu interpretieren. In den ersten vier Episoden des "Goldtfaden" erfährt Lewfrid am eigenen Leibe die Wandelbarkeit des irdischen Glücks. Indem er aber auch tatsächlich die Falschheit und Unbeständigkeit als das wahre Wesen der Welt erkennt, gerät er nicht in Gefahr, sich ihr hinzugeben. Er durchschaut den trügerischen Schein der Welt und wird so auf den rechten Weg geführt" (G.J. Martin-ten Wolthuis, "Der *Goldfaden* des Jörg Wickram von Colmar", *ZfdPh* 87 (1968), p. 77). This comment suggests that the deceitfulness of *glück* is necessary for Lewfrid to arrive at a certain maturity. This is true only to some extent, i.e. only as far as negative *glück* is concerned. Martin-ten Wolthuis omits the fact that *glück* also intervenes in Lewfrid's life in a beneficial way.

which stems from his own peculiar attitude towards *glück*, the possibility of opposing *glück* turns into a necessity if one intends to succeed. Leaving aside the peculiarities of the individual narrative, the parallels and divergencies in Gabriotto's and Lewfrid's development suggest that it is at least partly through the confrontation with *glück* that the individual may contribute to shaping his own development.

Apart from the characters' different ways of dealing with *glück*, it might seem as if the difference between Gabriotto's and Lewfrid's development were due to the fact that Lewfrid is gifted by a kind of *glück* which is genuinely benevolent, such as when facilitating his escape from the assassination (cf. 166f).[2] Such genuinely benevolent *glück* is conspicuously absent from Gabriotto's development. However, the distinct nature of the individual's reaction to *glück* appears to outweigh the overall appearance of *glück* as such. As we have seen, Gabriotto is ultimately too passive and too intimidated by what *glück* inflicts on him to change his development for the better. Lewfrid's self-reliance, by contrast, enables him to achieve what he wants in spite of the interference of negative *glück*. Hence it is partly his own actions which in the long run not only cause him to succeed, but also cause the other characters, as well as himself, to regard him as especially favoured by *glück*. Just as Lewfrid's being favoured by *glück* as an external force is not the only factor in his success, so the predominantly negative influence of *glück* on Gabriotto and Reinhart is only part of what causes their demise.[3] To a certain extent, external circumstances are only what the characters make of them: Gabriotto is saved from the ambush

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[2] Compare Neudeck: "Zufall und Glück ebnen den Lebens- und Karriereweg des [...] Lewfrid [...] Nur durch die zunächst nicht weiter hinterfragbaren Kategorien Zufall und Schicksal [...] läßt sich das Märchenhaft-Unwahrscheinliche des Erzählten begründen" (Otto Neudeck, "*Verwunderung, glück, von ungeschicht*. Zur Poetologie des Fiktionalen in Jörg Wickram's *Goldtfaden*", in (eds.) Wolfgang Harms/ C. Stephen Jaeger, *Fremdes wahrnehmen - fremdes Wahrnehmen: Studien zur Geschichte der Wahrnehmung und zur Begegnung von Kulturen in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit* (Stuttgart/Leipzig: Hirzel, 1997)). However, the categories chance and fate do become explicable to the extent that they seem to be made up substantially by the protagonist's stance towards them.

[3] Jan Knopf makes the following claim with regard to *Gabriotto*: "Die moralische Beurteilung bleibt aus, keine Mahnung, kein Einlenken erfolgt; die Warnung, die der Titel ausspricht, wird eingelöst damit, daß die Liebenden und nicht Gott recht behalten: das Glück ließe sich schon auf Erden arrangieren, wenn Gott die Möglichkeit dazu eröffnet (das heißt, den Tod der Liebenden nicht zugelassen) hätte" (Jan Knopf, "Versicherung des Mitmenschen. Arbeit, Freundschaft und Glück in Jörg Wickrams Romanen", in J. K., *Frühzeit des Bürgers. Erfahrene und verleugnete Realität in den Romanen Wickrams, Grimmelshausens und Schnabels* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1978), p. 46). Thus Knopf implies that the lovers' demise is the result of external forces. But, although there may be implicit criticism of the absence of divine intervention, the narrator's main criticism is certainly directed at the lovers' internal weaknesses. Knopf goes on to evaluate the divine order present in the narrative as "fehlbar und wankelmütig; auf den guten Menschen ist in der Welt keine Rücksicht genommen" (p. 46). The emphasis on the protagonists' goodness appears to me to miss the point of the narrative. It is not because of or in spite of Gabriotto's goodness that he perishes miserably, but rather because goodness alone is not sufficient to protect him without being accompanied by the ability to control his passion.

through the same kind of coincidence that in *Goldfaden* is attributed to *glück*. It is Gabriotto's self-inflicted apathy after departing from the English court that leads to his ruin. Hence the workings of *glück* as an external force by no means determine the respective protagonist's development, which reinforces what has emerged in the chapter on internally operating *glück*. How well a character deals with *glück* depends not only on the character's awareness of his goals as potentially distinct from the external course of events, but also on his ability to control himself. It is Lewfrid's ability to keep a cool head that prevents him from falling into total despair like Gabriotto. While Gabriotto is overwhelmed by his longing for Philomena, Lewfrid remains in control of his emotions.[4] This suggests that passion, or excess of emotion is viewed as a potentially destructive force in human life.[5] For passion is equated with loss of control, which gives free rein to the destructive effects of *glück*.

One might object at this stage that the ability or inability to deal with *glück* stems from the fact that Lewfrid has been gifted with such an ability in the first place, while Gabriotto has not. The respective character's development and interaction with *glück* may indeed stem from a certain predisposition. The nature of this predisposition emerges for instance from the characters' attitude towards their own death. When Gabriotto is about to die, he does not consider the pain that Philomena might suffer from his death. Both his and Philomena's view of death seems to be shaped by values which they derive from literary examples such as *Tristrant und Ysald* (cf. 36f), according to which the prospect of death serves only to intensify their love. Lewfrid's approach to love is more profane and pragmatic. Having broken the promise always to stay with Angliana, he explains his departure by picturing what would have happened if he had stayed at the court after the revelation of their love-affair: "wer mir gewiß nit anderst gangen/ dann das ich den tod het leiden mûssen/ was wer euch dann liebste junckfraw/ geholffen gewessen/ dann das ir eüwer übrige zeit in senen und klagen hetten verzeret" (139). This view is quite different from that of Gabriotto. While Gabriotto indulges his passion to the point of destruction, Lewfrid is altogether more controlled, balancing as he does the absolute demands of

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[4] Frei considers Lewfrid's cutting himself to lodge the golden thread inside his breast as a symbol of his self-control with regard to his amorous feelings. The ability to cope with pain makes him independent of his beloved (Peter Frei, "Zur Konstituierung von Innenwelt in Jörg Wickrams 'Goldtfaden' ", in (eds.) André Schnyder et al., *"Ist mir getroumet mîn leben? ": Vom Träumen und vom Anderssein; Festschrift für Karl-Ernst Geith zum 65. Geburtstag*, Göppingen: Kümmerle 1998, cf. 38). Frei further points out "daß die Beherrschung der eigenen Affekte in allen besprochenen Fällen als tugendhaft erscheint" (p. 39).

[5] This is not to say that Lewfrid foregoes the eventual fulfilment of his passion, although he transfers it into a socially acceptable form. Cf. Jan-Dirk Müller: "Soll [Liebe] realisiert werden, ist sie zuvor institutionell abzusichern, d.h. in die allein verbindliche Ordnung von Ehe und Familie zu überführen" (Jan-Dirk Müller, "Jörg Wickram zu Liebe und Ehe", in (eds.) Heide Wunder and Christine Vanja, *Wandel der Geschlechterbeziehungen zu Beginn der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), p. 40).

the lovers' emotions and the more practical demands of their day-to-day life. In this respect, the individual character may be predisposed to act in certain ways as a result of his personality. The difference in personality ties up with the respective character's approach to *glück*. Gabriotto's emotional abandon means that he passively suffers the blows of *glück* as if it were a force which he was unable to control, while Lewfrid takes his life into his own hands. Such a personality-driven distinction would seem to reinforce the impression that when it comes to a person's development, individual behaviour is at least as important as the circumstances he or she faces. Incidentally, Gabriotto and Lewfrid represent two medieval narrative types: the victim of love-sickness who does not recover, and the positively-viewed *Aufsteiger*. Hence, on a more general level, the individual's personality and consequent attitude towards *glück* may partly be shaped by the respective genre according to which each narrative is moulded: the difference could be informed by the pattern of tragic romance versus that of *Aufsteiger*-exemplum. In this sense, there may be an element of underlying determination behind the personality-related reasons for Gabriotto's failure and Lewfrid's success as described above. The element of positive external determination would then be part of the peculiar 'fairy-tale' atmosphere which characterizes *Goldfaden*, while Gabriotto may be destined to suffer terminally as part of the pattern of tragic romance. This is to say that the protagonists do not necessarily have a choice as to how they will react to *glück* since a certain pattern of action may take precedence over characterization.[6] Nevertheless the fact that the narratives present the reader with different patterns of behaviour implies different ways of dealing with *glück*, and suggests that he or she is offered a choice as regards dealing with *glück* in his or her own life.

Despite emphasis on the protagonists' personal way of dealing with *glück*, there may be a way in which external circumstances are after all relevant to the development of both protagonists alike. That is, both couples ultimately depend on their sovereign's approval. In *Gabriotto*, the king's disapproval results from the fact that courtly society does not tolerate a relationship between two people of unequal

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[6] Nevertheless, the fact that in *Gabriotto* certain exempla are initially cited as a warning raises the issue of the characters' control over their development, of the possibility of their deciding against the pursuit of love. As it turns out, the prospect of potential destruction has no effect on the protagonists' behaviour. They claim that even if faced with death, they would be unable to abstain from their feelings for one another (cf. 48). Since the narrative is explicitly intended as a warning against passionate love, we may assume that the characters do have a choice, at least initially, as to whether or not to pursue their love, and that it is their misguidedness that leads them to make the wrong choice. That the characters are, despite explicit warning, unable to avoid embarking on a course of destructive love is described by Jan-Dirk Müller as "Spannung von Exemplarität und kasuistischer Welterfahrung" (Jan -Dirk Müller, "Volksbuch/Prosaroman im 15./16. Jahrhundert - Perspektiven der Forschung, *IASL* 1. Sonderheft (1985), p. 83).

social standing, even though the socially inferior knights are full of virtue and excellence. While the court is hostile towards the knights in their capacity as suitors, the concept of *Tugendadel*, expressed early on by Philomena, is latently present in the narrative:

"[...] wurden nit bei den alten/ die Kůnig von den edlen/ zů Küniglichen stammen erwôlt und gezogen/ Ja nit allein von den edlen/ sunder von den dapffern und weydlichen Burgern/ zů Künigen erwôlt worden seind/ darumb ich sprich/ das der jüngling Gabriotto/ wol einer Künigin wirdig ist" (31).

This view provides a theoretical solution to the problems which derive from the lovers' difference in status: it is the notion that qualities of character are the decisive criterion for a person's station, which would allow for the integration of the socially inferior knights into the upper classes. Yet the lovers' belief in this concept is not shared by those in power until it is too late. That a solution to the lovers' predicament is present from the beginning of their affair could be read as the narrator's implicit criticism of the court's attitude towards differences in birth and class.[7] In *Goldfaden*, things are different. It is only to begin with that the count has qualms similar to those of the king in *Gabriotto*: "was würt man sagen wann mein Tochter eines Hirten son vermåhelt/ umb welche so mancher Ritter und Graff geworben hat" (110). He modifies this concern with the following argument:

"[...] ist doch David auch von schlechtem stammen geboren gewesen/ und hat im dannocht Künig Saul sein Tochter zům Weib geben/ Das aber wil die welt jetzunder nit mehr bedencken. Jo das mir all gemeinglich von einem vatter und můter kommen/ sind gleichwol jetzund vil grosser stend auff erden/ so kommend sie doch allein von tugend deren dann Lewfrid nit wenig an im hat" (110).

Despite these 'democratic' considerations, the count at first cannot tolerate the fact that Lewfrid has begun courting his daughter behind his back (cf. 110f). Angliana insists that Lewfrid deserves to marry the daughter of a king *von wegen seiner tugend/ und mannheit* (cf. 118), *auch ritterlichen gemůts halben* (125), declaring the primacy of virtue over birth. Ultimately, the count relents: Lewfrid's personal virtue is sufficient reason to accept him back into his daughter's life (cf. 129f). The fact that both Gabriotto and Lewfrid depend on their superiors' benevolence to fulfil their happiness could indicate that there is a limit to which the individual may influence

[7] Towards the end of the narrative, when the situation becomes hopeless, Philomena states "Gott wolt/ ich eines armen Ritters tochter wer/ damit ich nit also von meinen freünden in hůt gehalten würd" (189).

his or her advancement. The limit is defined by the sociological parameters of the society in which he or she lives. This sociological factor is related to *glück* in that the king's negative disposition towards Gabriotto is generally associated with *glück*. On the other hand, the count's eventual benevolence towards Lewfrid is ultimately linked to the will of God. This suggests that self-control cannot completely obviate the interference of *glück*; there remains an element inherent in the presence of *glück* which is beyond the control of human beings.

Now that the difference between *Gabriotto* and *Goldfaden* has indicated the crucial importance of the characters' way of dealing with *glück*, we may consider the other narratives with regard to the same issue. In *Galmy*, *glück* plays a major role in the duchess' relationship with Galmy in that it is held responsible for the discovery of their love. The court's discovery of the lovers' mutual feelings is similar to the lovers' situation in *Goldfaden* and *Gabriotto*, and this makes Galmy's reaction to this *glück*-induced situation of particular interest. Galmy's situation is even more precarious than that of Gabriotto or Lewfrid, since his beloved is not only guarded by a class-conscious relative, but is in fact married to the duke. Consequently, Galmy and the duchess must try especially hard to disarm any kind of suspicion. How, then, do they deal with the delicate situation brought on by *glück*? Galmy takes leave of the court, a step which is made plausible by the arrival of a letter from his father. Although the letter is genuine, it is initially Galmy's intention to counterfeit one in order to smooth his departure and avoid suspicion of any untoward behaviour (cf. 114). This indicates his awareness of the delicate nature of the situation into which he has been brought by *glück*, and of the need to handle it carefully. Galmy anticipates the court's moves more thoroughly than the other narratives' protagonists. He leaves when he can still do so without the threat of violence, and does not return other than in disguise until the main obstacle to his love has disappeared, i.e. until the duke has died. Hence it is in a mature and circumspect way that Galmy and the duchess react to the danger in which they find themselves due to *glück*'s interference. They are prepared to go to great lengths to ensure that any suspicion is stifled. And, unlike Gabriotto and Philomena, or Lewfrid and Angliana, they succeed. If it were not for the lovers' self-initiated action, any chance of happiness or fulfilment might be thwarted as early as this: had they allowed suspicion to ripen, the duke might have attempted to assassinate Galmy, as the cases of Gabriotto and Lewfrid suggest, and Galmy would either have been killed or prevented from ever returning to the court. Thus the lovers in this instance manage to control *glück* or the effect of its intervention. Self-control is again vital to securing the protagonists' eventual fulfilment. As in *Goldfaden*, this consists in the ability to act in spite of one's emotions. For it is the lovers' readiness to

part and thus forego the pleasure of each other's presence that secures their happiness in the long run.

In addition to thwarting the development of the protagonists' love, *glück* interferes from another quarter. Subsequent to Galmy's departure, when the *marschalck* successfully accuses the duchess of adultery, and her own husband decrees her execution, this is also attributed to *glück*. How is the occurrence of *glück* related to the duchess' behaviour? Remaining as virtuous as can be throughout the sequence of events, she cannot morally be blamed for the *marschalck*'s betrayal. However, she might have been more cautious regarding the incident. That is, perhaps she could, or should have foreseen the kind of scheming which the *marschalck* would subject her to following his frustrated sexual advances. Had he not been given free rein to do so, his scheming might have been constrained. By, for example, reporting the *marschalck*'s inappropriate behaviour to another authority at the court, the duchess might possibly have prevented the intervention of *glück*. This implies that mere virtue is not enough to avert the impact of *glück* from the duchess' life. Although in exercising virtue by curbing her passion for Galmy she significantly reduces the role of internally operating *glück*, she is still exposed to externally operating *glück*. In order to detect and deal with the destructive presence of externally operating *glück*, a certain alertness, or worldly wisdom is needed. Of course, the duchess' situation is complicated by the fact that, as a woman, she appears to be genuinely at the mercy of the person installed by her husband to look after her, viz. the *marschalck*. She is vulnerable to the destructive effects of *glück* by being exposed not only to the *marschalck*'s sexual advances in the first place, but also to his slandering. This could indicate a gender-divide when it comes to dealing with *glück*. Due to the position assigned to them by a male-dominated society, women appear to be particularly helpless in the face of externally operating *glück*, to the point of depending on men for their rescue;[8] men, by contrast, are shown to be fairly self-sufficient when it comes to protecting themselves from *glück*.

The duchess eventually copes with the intervention of *glück* by persuading her husband, through the intervention of a certain count, to have her judged by a trial by combat. Subsequently, she dispatches a letter to Galmy. Her plea for help brings Galmy back to the court. Disguised, he defeats the *marschalck* in combat and effects the duchess' delivery. Thus Galmy, through his determination, courage and martial

[8] One might expect women to use guile, as for instance Isolde does. The fact that this is not the case with the duchess might illustrate her simple and thorough virtuousness. Still she displays a certain cleverness when she manages to talk to the count who eventually persuades the duke to hold a trial by combat.

excellence, reverses the intervention of *glück*. The duchess to some extent contributes to this process by initiating the trial by combat as well as Galmy's return. Hence it is the lovers' own initiative that paves the way for their eventual union by keeping them both alive and beyond suspicion of adultery, i.e. morally and socially flawless. Were it not for Galmy's courageous behaviour, as well as for the fact that the duchess is able to forward a letter to him with the help of their mutual confidant Friderich, they might never have got married in the end. The duchess might have been executed for want of someone to defend her innocence. Moreover, had he not appeared in disguise, Galmy's inappropriate affection for her might have been discovered by the court after all, leading to consequences that could have made their union forever impossible. This implies that the ability to control their feelings is again vital to the characters' success. Having successfully defended the duchess, Galmy parts from her without lifting his disguise. Only because he is able to conceal his emotions when faced with his beloved is he able to rescue her. It is his ability to suppress any display of emotion that prevents complications, and thus facilitates the natural course of their eventual union.[9] In this respect, the characters' reaction to what *glück* inflicts on them is vital to their own development. It is an essential condition for their survival as well as advancement. Self-control on the one hand and alertness in dealing with the world on the other combine to hold *glück* at bay. Nevertheless the characters' prudence does not guarantee the fulfilment of their secret desire. For this, they still depend on the

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[9] Xenja von Ertzdorff remarks that reason and self-control create the foundation for a harmonious resolution of the lovers' development - "im Sinn einer neuen, die Affekte beherrschenden Hofetikette und einer neuen 'tugendhaften' leidenschaftlichen höfischen Liebe". This contrasts with the destructive aspects of love in the Renaissance novella (Xenja von Ertzdorff, *Romane und Novellen des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland*, Darmstadt: WBG, 1989, p. 112). Cf. also Roloff: "Die Aufgabe für die standesmäßig ebenbürtigen Liebenden, die verheiratete Herzogin und den jungen Ritter bei Hofe, besteht darin, ihre Affekte mit Hilfe der Vernunft, des Anstandes und der Konvention zu sublimieren, und das geschieht teilweise aus dem an literarischen Paradigmata gewonnenen Wissen heraus, daß Zügellosigkeit der Affekte nur Verderben bringen kann. Der Roman ist somit ein Lehrstück rechten Liebesverhaltens, dessen schließliche Erfüllung das moralische Ergebnis praktizierter Ritterlichkeit, Ehrlichkeit, Tatkraft und Vernunft ist" (Hans-Gert Roloff, "Anfänge des deutschen Prosaromans", in (ed.) Helmut Koopmann, *Handbuch des deutschen Romans*, Düsseldorf: Bagel, 1983, p. 76). However, the kind of behaviour proposed by this narrative appears to reach beyond the specific demands of chivalry. As the other narratives show, the ideal of self-control is necessary in all walks of life. A more critical stance on the notion of self-control in *Galmy* is taken by Haug. He diagnoses the dissociation of external and internal realms in the experience of the lovers: "Das Äußere ist nicht mehr selbstverständlicher Ausdruck des Innern, sondern es ist Ort des Verrats, und dies in einem doppelten Sinn: nicht nur Verrat des Innern gegenüber der Außenwelt der Gesellschaft, sondern auch Verrat des Innerlichen an sich selbst" (Walter Haug, "Jörg Wickrams >Ritter Galmy<. Die Zähmung des Romans im Ursprung seiner Möglichkeit", in (eds.) Walter Haug and Burkhard Wachinger, *Traditionswandel und Traditionsverhalten*, Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1991 [= Fortuna vitrea; 5], p. 109). This refers for instance to the lovers' blushing in public. As this incident is attributed to *glück*, one might say that Haug's evaluation ties in with the destructive manifestation of internally operating *glück*. Notably, Haug points out that this 'modern' pattern is effaced in the second half of the narrative (cf. p. 119).

duke's death, which, as the formula "es begab sich" (22) underlines, is beyond the lovers' control. This suggests that individual effort can merely act as a form of damage-control. It is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the protagonists' happiness. Similarly to *Goldfaden* and *Gabriotto*, there remains an element in the lovers' world that is completely uncontrollable.

In *Knabenspiegel*, Wilbaldus' misery is attributed to *glück*, but in fact arises from his own waywardness. In this sense, internally operating *glück* is instrumental to his decline. It is Wilbaldus' determination to reform that initially leads him out of the pit of social exclusion, i.e. it is personal effort which reverses the workings of *glück*. Externally operating *glück* eventually supports him by effecting the meeting with Fridbert and Felix. Yet their meeting would probably not amount to anything if it was not for Wilbaldus' proving his reformed nature to Fridbert and Felix. Thus Wilbaldus' personal effort is the condition for his rehabilitation. By realizing his misdeeds and changing accordingly, he manages to overcome the negative effects of *glück*. This strategy for coping with *glück* is reinforced by the example of Fridbert, which is important both as a backdrop to Wilbaldus' development and as a success-story in its own right. For Fridbert's smooth advancement could imply that self-discipline may preserve one from the destructive interference of *glück* in the first place: as we have seen, Fridbert is never once affected by *glück*. This may be due to his prudence and obedience, the lack of which causes Wilbaldus' self-inflicted disasters which are attributed to internally operating *glück*. Prudent behaviour may also prevent Fridbert from being exposed to *glück* in its externally operating shape. That is, it may be only because Wilbaldus has weakened his position through his own fault that he is at the mercy of externally operating *glück*. For it is only because he has degraded himself so much that he is forced to work as a herdsman that he is exposed to the wolves. It is only his own misbehaviour that brings Wilbaldus into a situation where he depends on a coincidental meeting with Fridbert and Felix in order to be accepted back into society. Through Fridbert's contrasting development, Wickram appears to demonstrate how individual effort and virtue may make a person both immune to internally operating *glück*, and independent from the vagaries of its externally operating equivalent.[10] As Wilbaldus is not born with a virtuous disposition such as Fridbert's, he has to undergo a painful learning process until he arrives at the maturity required to control both *glück* and himself. Again, self-control is a crucial

[10] I agree with Fricke's claim that the characters' development is individually motivated to the extent that they are represented as being largely responsible for it themselves (cf. Harald Fricke, "Realismus und Utopie bei Jörg Wickram", in H. F., *Norm und Abweichung: eine Philosophie der Literatur*, München: Beck 1981, p. 235). However, the characters' frequent reference to *glück* suggests that they themselves do not fully acknowledge their personal responsibility.

element in dealing with *glück*. While in *Goldfaden*, *Galmy* and *Gabriotto*, self-control entails controlling one's erotic passions, in *Knabenspiegel*, it refers to a person's wilfulness and lewdness, which must be controlled in order to curb the destructive influence of *glück*.

As before, the intervention of *glück* is tied up with the issue of class and social fluctuation. This is expressed in a narratorial remark which accompanies the reversal of Wilbaldus and Fridbert's social positions: "hundert jar machen auß einem Hirten ein Künig/ und wider hundert jar auß eim Künig ein Hirten" (60). This remark, appearing almost proverbial in its generality, implies that change in social positions is accompanied by a certain passivity on the part of the affected persons. Such 'automatic' motions might conjure up the image of the wheel of Fortuna. How is this compatible with the fact that the narrative, according to the narrator's explicit statement in the prologue, sets out to demonstrate the importance of education and self-improvement? Although individual effort is undoubtedly crucial to the protagonists' development, it is still to some extent determined by forces that are beyond the scope of their own effort. Wilbaldus depends on the coincidental, *glück*-induced meeting with Fridbert and Felix in order to be received back into his family and eventually gain social respectability. This suggests that the individual's determination to reform can only reach so far. By the same token, Fridbert is able to advance from his peasant background only because first Gottlieb takes him into his family and then the *Hochmeister* recognizes and nurtures his talent. Thus he, too, ultimately depends on the benignity of forces beyond his control in order to achieve success. These external forces seem to create social opportunities; *glück* may be seen to work through persons who negotiate or facilitate the characters' interaction with established structures of society. The importance of such mediators is illustrated by examples of their absence, e.g. in *Gabriotto*, which threatens the affected characters with ruin. To the extent that its supposed power occasionally coincides with certain sociological circumstances, *glück* has a social component. This component may work to the affected characters' advantage or disadvantage, and is decidedly beyond their reach.

Finally, what is the relation between *glück* and individual effort in *Von guoten und boesen Nachbaurn*? In this narrative, *glück* strikes the characters only on rare occasions. At the beginning of the narrative, the death of nine of Robertus' children is attributed to *glück*. Their death is not related to the characters' personal failure in any way: the characters behave impeccably throughout. This could indicate that even the most virtuous and worldly-wise behaviour cannot completely eliminate the threats emanating from externally operating *glück*. Yet the incident is subsequently attributed

to God, which seems to negate the existence of *glück*. Although *glück* re-emerges when Lasarus is sold into slavery, his predicament is immediately reversed by the characters themselves. That is, even though the characters are unable to prevent *glück* from intervening in the first place, they are fully equipped to cope with its intervention. The fact that this is the last instance of *glück* seriously intervening in the characters' lives could imply that they draw a conclusion from the incident as to the haphazard nature of external events. Thus when, during his subsequent stay abroad, Lasarus Jun. is put in danger by a scheming local, he is, with the help of a friend, able to master the potentially threatening situation himself before serious harm is done. That contrary to the earlier incident *glück* is not mentioned in connection with his plight could be seen to reflect Lasarus' self-sufficiency. The specific lesson contained in the above incidents is never to trust strangers and instead rely on one's friends; on a more general level, the incidents may imply how to cope with or prevent the interference of *glück* as a force inherent in circumstances that are foreign to the characters.[11] Generally speaking, the occurrence of *glück* in *Nachbaurn* is much less significant to the characters' development than in the previous narratives. *glück* appears to be held at bay by the characters' virtuous behaviour: they are much less frequently affected by both internally and externally operating *glück* than the other narratives' characters. Self-control seems to have its ultimate triumph over *glück*. As mentioned earlier, the key to this may be that the characters' behaviour is shaped explicitly by their strong Christian belief, which results in general maturity and self-sufficiency; negligence or excessive passion and the mistakes arising from them appear to be banned from their lives. The characters' self-sufficiency is moreover facilitated by the close network of support that exists among the families and their friends: if one character is momentarily paralyzed by the impact of *glück*, another may help him out.[12] Being surrounded by sympathetic figures means that the

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[11] This inter-generational learning process takes place against the background of the narrator's explicit intention to instruct the reader on how to cope with being in a foreign country (cf. 6). Kartschoke, with regard to what he considers to be the characters' withdrawal from the world into the family (cf. p. 739f), points out that "[d]as Surrogat der Fremderfahrung, seine Weitergabe durch Erziehung, [...] den Einsatz wesentlich verbilligen [können]" (Dieter Kartschoke, "*Bald bracht Phebus seinen Wagen ...* Gattungsgeschichtliche Überlegungen zu Jörg Wickrams *Nachbarn*-Roman", *Daphnis* 11 (1982), p. 740). This statement may be in need of modification. One should not forget that Lasarus Jun., while profiting from the older generation's experience, nevertheless has to go out into the world for himself and confront what is to a certain extent unknown to him. On the other hand, the wealth of his father's experience means that the stakes are lowered for Lasarus, and, indirectly, for the reader of the narrative.

[12] Cf. Knopf: "[D]er Erfahrung einer unsicheren Welt, des Ausgesetzt-Seins (das sind Wickrams Helden allemal), der Erfahrung des wankelmütigen Glücks und der einer unbarmherzigen ökonomischen Konkurrenzwelt, die das gute Personal bei Wickram mit seinem Neid verfolgt, wird die Versicherung

characters of *Nachbaurn* are spared from what constitutes a major threat to characters like Gabriotto and Lewfrid, namely friction caused by social inequality. They are content with the human possibilities offered by relations among themselves, so that when *glück* reveals Amelia's love for Lasarus, this is met with nothing but benevolence by those in positions of authority. That is, the absence of social inequality significantly contributes to the relative absence of *glück* in the lives of these characters.

One might perhaps expect *glück* to be related to the economic success of Robertus, Richart and Lasarus. But, their economic success is in no way related to *glück*. Instead, it is implicitly linked to their own skills and virtues, such as industry and caution, and ultimately attributed to God; it is God whom the characters thank abundantly for their material well-being and economic prosperity (cf. e.g. 176). While control over one's life is possible to the extent that one may try to lead a life that is both pious and altruistic, human beings ultimately depend on the grace of God to succeed - even in economic matters. That *glück* plays no role with regard to the characters' prosperity is notable since successful enterprise is typically associated with Fortuna in many Renaissance accounts of this force.[13] A powerful illustration of this association is *Fortunatus*, where the protagonist's success is intrinsically linked to the *geldsäckel* given to him by a Fortuna-like figure, the *junckfraw des glücks*. The fact that Fortunatus, with the crucial help of his *geldsäckel*, is able to build up several successful businesses may be seen as symptomatic of the belief in the positive aspects of Fortuna according to which one may harness her for one's entrepreneurial purposes. Yet none of the excitement emanating from this belief is present in *Nachbaurn*.[14] *Nachbaurn* comes across as a decidedly sober success-story, in which advancement is the product of a devout attitude. Wickram's disregard for *glück* as a factor in economic matters suggests that he was convinced neither of the controllability of *glück* nor of the human capacity for controlling it, confirming his

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der guten Menschen entgegengesetzt. Freundschaft und Liebe sind die einzigen Garanten für Stetigkeit und weltliche Glückseligkeit" (Jan Knopf, *op. cit.*, p. 56).

[13] Cf. e.g. Albert Doren, "Fortuna im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance", in (ed.) Fritz Saxl, *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, II, Vorträge 1922-23, I. Teil (Leipzig/Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1924), pp. 129ff.

[14] With regard to the importance of Fortuna in economic thought, as present e.g. in *Fortunatus*, Knopf explains: "Die Legitimation der Fortuna im ökonomischen Denken der Zeit offenbart nicht nur den zunehmenden ordo-Verlust, sondern dient auch dazu, den Eigennutz zu apologisieren, die Rücksichtslosigkeit, die dem >>Glück<<, seine Erfahrung voraussetzend, zugleich auf die Sprünge hilft. Indem die Fortuna-Erfahrung zur Absicherung der Handelsfreiheit herangezogen wird und im ökonomischen Denken ihren Platz erhält, der dem Eigennutz gilt, verliert die Glücks-Vorstellung selbst ihre alte, nur einseitig negative Bestimmung und erhält erste positive Züge" (Jan Knopf, *op. cit.*, pp. 51f). This way of thinking is diametrically opposed to the way in which *Nachbaurn*'s protagonists conduct their affairs.

general negative stance towards *glück*.

As we have seen, *glück* and the individual's actions are closely entwined in all of Wickram's narratives. It is up to the individual to react to the workings of *glück*, be it externally or internally operating, while also recognizing that they are in no way definitive interventions in his or her development. In doing so, he or she may control or avert these workings. The power of the individual reaches even further. For a person may suppress the occurrence of internally operating *glück* almost completely in the first place by exercising a certain kind of self-control. At the same time, he or she may also limit the manifestations of externally operating *glück*: by being on one's guard against potential threats from outside, particularly those that are concealed in other people's intentions, these manifestations may be reduced to inevitable incidents such as physical illness or natural disasters. The kind of behaviour needed to conquer *glück* goes beyond virtue, which on its own is not sufficient, or not specific enough: a certain amount of worldly wisdom is just as important.[15] It must be complemented by the ability to recognize one's aims as something that exists independently of external contingencies and may be successfully pursued according to one's own resources. Tied up with this is the need to control one's passions, whether erotic or a result of wilfulness. When these conditions are satisfied, it is possible to retain control over one's development and proceed regardless of *glück*'s negative interventions.

Despite the above possibilities of contributing to one's own development, the control which human beings possess over *glück* is limited. Barring a few exceptions, control exists only to the extent that a person may avert *glück*, or negative things induced by *glück*, as opposed to achieving positive things in conjunction with *glück*. The ultimate step to happiness tends to be beyond the characters' control: Galmy and the duchess need the duke's death to facilitate their union, just as Lewfrid and Angliana require her father's change of mind to allow for theirs, while Wilbaldus depends on the coincidental meeting with Fridbert and Felix to be received back into society. Moreover, even control over the negative manifestations of *glück* may by no means be taken for granted. The examples of Wilbaldus, Lewfrid and, most clearly,

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[15] Spriewald emphasizes the positive contribution of the protagonists to their own development: "Der bürgerliche Held [bei Wickram] wird nach den Qualitäten seines Charakters und seiner Leistung beurteilt [...] Damit wird eine *Entwicklungskomponente* sichtbar, die im Abbild des älteren Erzähltypus, ob "Eulenspiegel" oder "Fortunatus", noch nicht in diesem Maße gefragt war [...] Die Helden werden im Prozeß des Aneignen von Wirklichkeit gezeigt: Sie erwerben durch ihr eigenes Tun, nämlich durch berufliche Leistung wie durch Arbeiten an sich selbst, Charaktereigenschaften, die sich erst im Verlaufe ihres selbst bestimmten Lebensweges entfalten, also nicht schicksalhaft vorbestimmt sind" (Ingeborg Spriewald, "Historien und Schwänke: Die deutsche Erzählprosa von 'Till Eulenspiegel' bis 'Doktor Faustus' ", in (ed.) Robert Weimann, *Realismus in der Renaissance.Aneignung der Welt in der erzählenden Prosa* (Berlin/ Weimar: Aufbau 1977), p. 383).

Gabriotto show the great negative potential of the kind of *glück* inherent in human behaviour. Their stories depict human beings struggling to cope with their own frailty and fallibility. Wilbaldus would have saved himself a lot of suffering had he exercised self-control from the beginning. Gabriotto would not have died if he had retained the will to live, and had not indulged his feelings quite so much. Even Lewfrid might have been able to prevent the attempt to have him assassinated, had he been more prudent in conducting the relationship with Angliana in the first place. Only the characters in *Nachbaurn* are largely in control of their lives. All of these cases indicate that Wickram's general attitude towards *glück* is characterized by distinct caution. Human engagement with *glück* is called for largely in order to exert control and protect one's existing status, rather than in order to take risks and thus expand one's status.

In Wickram, the individual's involvement in the workings of *glück* resembles more a form of damage limitation than positive self-fulfilment. Wickram does not join in what might be considered the rising spirit of modernity, namely faith in the apparently limitless possibilities of human power on the one hand and in the opportunities inherent in the world on the other. As regards *glück*, this means that Wickram is not buying into the belief which became more and more prominent in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, namely that man may realize his wildest dreams by subordinating Fortuna to his will. The tragic *Gabriotto und Reinhart* may illustrate the full destructive potential which Wickram recognizes to be inherent in human action. However, it forms a notable exception among the narratives. The irreversible manifestation of this potential is by and large suppressed in the other narratives, at least as far as the central characters are concerned. This may be because Wickram resented the possible consequences of self-destructive action which he saw in characters unleashed from rigorous self-control - so much so that he glued their fragmenting world back together. He does so by means of divine intervention, as well as through having the endangered characters resume control over themselves. Nevertheless the threat of self-inflicted disaster, in the shape of internally operating *glück*, is present in each of the narratives, except for *Nachbaurn*, in that the characters often walk a fine line between control and contingency as regards their actions. While he may have hesitated to spell out its consequences, Wickram's emphasis on internally operating *glück* seems to show a growing awareness of something that would characterize the modern novel in centuries to come: the notion that the most threatening demons are those which man carries within himself.

Chapter 13

Wickram's *glück* in the Light of Contemporary Conceptions

How does Wickram's *glück* compare to contemporary conceptions of the force, some of which have been described in part I of this thesis? *glück*'s portrayal as a predominantly negative force in human life may on first sight seem to draw on medieval tradition. It is reminiscent of the Boethian Fortuna to the extent that her gifts, too, were viewed as generally negative. Moreover, there appears to be a continuity between Boethius' notion of fighting Fortuna through ignoring her, and the fact that Wickram's characters may keep *glück* at bay partly by pursuing their aims regardless of its manifestations. We should note, however, that Wickram provides the Boethian notion with an unusual slant. Contrary to Boethius' view, it is possible for Wickram's characters to enjoy worldly success and yet remain undisturbed by *glück*. Thus Boethius' detachment from the world as a means of detaching oneself from Fortuna has no direct equivalent in Wickram's fiction. In this respect, Wickram might be considered as depicting an approach to *glück* which is decisively more worldly in its orientation than that of Boethius, and as such distinct from the latter's asceticism. Wickram's approach to *glück* is concerned with the practicalities of achieving worldly success; his stories aim to provide practical advice as well as entertainment. A further feature distinguishing Wickram from the Boethian tradition is that in dealing with *glück*, the characters are dealing not merely with an external threat: they are dealing also with a certain frailty within themselves, i.e. with internally operating *glück*. Unlike the Boethian Fortuna, this frailty cannot simply be ignored. It has to be acknowledged and dealt with actively by both anticipating and suppressing its manifestations. Indifference to this kind of *glück* poses great danger to the affected individual. Generally speaking, Wickram's characters seem to be granted a certain scope of action within which they are responsible not only for their spiritual, but, most importantly, also for their practical, worldly development. The fact that the characters' overall development is not necessarily determined externally by the appearance of *glück* suggests that Wickram's concept of *glück* is decidedly more modern than the account of Fortuna in the Boethian mould.

As a backward look is not sufficient to explain Wickram's concept of *glück*, it is necessary to turn to more contemporary accounts. That is, do Wickram's narratives reflect a general tendency of his time as regards the scope given to human action in

relation to *glück*, and with it the internalization of *glück*? The importance of the individual's part in the confrontation with *glück* might seem to tie in with the anthropocentric view emerging in Renaissance thought. In order to evaluate the peculiarities of Wickram's *glück* against this background, let us look at other literary representations of this force which are roughly contemporary. Boccaccio's *Decamerone* was, at least in part, translated into German at the end of the fifteenth century, both by Heinrich Steinhöwel and by Niklas von Wyle. Among the most popular stories was the story of Guiscardo and Ghismonda, which is contained in von Wyle's *Translatzen* as *die histori von sigismunda*.[1] Since this narrative has obvious parallels with *Gabriotto und Reinhart*, it is interesting to compare its representation of *glück* to that of Wickram.[2] The outline of the story is as follows: Sigismunda is the daughter of Tancredus, duke of Salerno. A young and beautiful widow, her possessive father refuses to let her remarry. Sigismunda falls in love with the socially inferior Gwiscardus, and a period of illicit meetings and erotic bliss follows. Then, *glück* interferes: "Aber das gelücke das allwegen langer wollust vind vnd widerwertig ist/ verkart zů letst mit truriger geschicht die fröid derselben liebhabenden menschen In bitter wainen vnd schmertzen" (82). Tancredus, like the king in *Gabriotto*, discovers the secret love-affair. On one of his habitual visits to his daughter's room, he finds her absent. Deciding to wait for her return, he rests on a bench behind her bed and pulls the curtain which separates the bench from the bed. When the lovers subsequently meet in the room, they are unaware of the duke's presence, and proceed to make love on the bed. Tancredus is incensed at his daughter's breach of trust, especially since it concerns a socially inferior man, and resorts to extreme measures. He has Gwiscardus killed, whereupon Sigismunda decides to take her own life so as to be reunited with her beloved. In retrospect, Sigismunda credits *glück* with a substantial influence on their relationship. First, she holds *glück*, together with the force of love, responsible for causing her desire for Gwiscardus, as well as with showing her the secret passageway which facilitates their illicit encounters (cf. 86). At the same time, Sigismunda holds *glück* to be responsible for Gwiscardus' low social standing, which is the main reason for Tancredus' anger: "das gelücke [...] gewonlich die vnwirdigen erhept in die höche vnd die wirdigen niderdruckt" (86). *glück* supposedly distorts an

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[1] Niclas von Wyle, *Translationen*, (ed.) Adelbert v. Keller (Stuttgart: Litterarischer Verein, 1861 [= BLVST; 57]), pp. 79-90.

[2] Cf. Kleinschmidt on *Galmy* and *Gabriotto*: "Beide Werke spiegeln eine etablierte Literaturszene, in der die romanische und zum Teil auch frühhumanistische Erzählüberlieferung (Enea Silvio, Boccaccio u.a.) geläufig ist und über literarische Zitate auch als Anspielungshintergrund für das Publikum präsent gewesen sein muß" (Erich Kleinschmidt, "Narratives Ordnungsdenken und urbane Bildungsdidaktik: Jörg Wickram", in E. K., *Stadt und Literatur in der frühen Neuzeit: Voraussetzungen und Entfaltung im südwestdeutschen, elsässischen und schweizerischen Städteraum* (Köln/Wien: Böhlau, 1982), p. 241).

original state in which all people are equal as regards their origin, and are distinguished from one another simply by their virtue (cf. 86). On a more immediate level, the destructive effect of *glück* is reinforced when Sigismunda finally declares Gwiscardus' death to have been decreed by *glück* (cf. 88); from her point of view, *glück* is obviously the main culprit in the lovers' demise.

How does the role of *glück* in this story compare to the representation of *glück* in *Gabriotto*, and in Wickram's narratives in general? The crucial incident attributed to *glück* in Boccaccio is the duke's concealed presence in Sigismunda's room. To the extent that this comes about in an unpredicted way, as, for instance, no warning has previously been uttered, this incident is beyond the control of the affected characters. As such, it might be considered as a manifestation of externally operating *glück*. By contrast, the kind of *glück* which fatally reveals Gabriotto and Philomena's love, even though interfering at a structurally similar stage of the narrative, is internally operating in that it results from their own carelessness. Wickram's characters have explicitly been warned to conceal their feelings, but nevertheless commit fairly obvious blunders. In this respect, their behaviour is far more blatantly careless than the behaviour of Gwiscardus and Sigismunda. For even though the latter might have been more careful, they are completely taken by surprise by Tancredus' concealed presence in Sigismunda's private bedroom. In this sense, although there are similarities as regards *glück*'s association with love and social status, *glück* operates differently in each of the narratives. The effect of *glück* is distinct also with regard to the protagonists' end. In Boccaccio's story, it is much more direct than it is according to Wickram. Gwiscardus is murdered as an immediate result of the king's discovery. Gabriotto's death, however, stems merely from his perception of *glück* combined with his emotional fragility. Compared to the death of Gwiscardus, it is not inevitable. This indicates that the workings of *glück* on the one hand and the person it affects on the other hand are more clearly separated in Boccaccio than they are in Wickram.[3] In Boccaccio's story, *glück* is largely external, and as such relentless, distinguishing it from Wickram's version which is partly internally operating and in this sense at least potentially controllable. How, then, does the story of Gwiscardus and Sigismunda tie in with the *Decamerone* as a whole? Fortuna appears to be an externally operating force throughout the narratives. As the narratives progress, there may be a tendency to eliminate her influence. That is, Fortuna's workings may be overruled by the

[3] Both von Wyle's translation, and the contemporary translation by Steinhöwel (Heinrich Steinhöwel, "Guiscardo und Sigismunda", in H. S., *Giovanni Bocaccio. Decameron*, (ed.) Adelbert von Keller (Stuttgart: Litterarischer Verein, 1860 [= Bibliothek des Litterarischen Vereins Stuttgart; 51], pp. 247-256) are, in the crucial passages that mention *glück*, true to the original.

affected person's *magnificenzia*.[4] While the importance thus given to individual action in dealing with Fortuna may bring Boccaccio's notion of this force closer to Wickram's, an essential difference remains. Unlike in Wickram's *glück*, there is no indication of Boccaccio's Fortuna being intrinsically tied up with human frailty. Although Wickram may possibly have been inspired by Boccaccio as far as certain elements of plot go, his narratives are marked by a distinct and original representation of the causal nexus between these elements. In view of Wickram's concern with the relation between a person's internal frailty and *glück*, one might even say that he is in some ways more modern than Boccaccio to the extent that he brings a psychological dimension to the representation of *glück*.

Another piece of literature which it may be useful to compare to Wickram's narratives is the anonymously published *Fortunatus* (first published in 1509). Fortunatus' very name suggests that Fortuna is at work in the narrative, since "Fortunatus" means "the one who is endowed by Fortuna". Indeed a female being reminiscent of the goddess Fortuna appears to Fortunatus in a moment of existential crisis, i.e. when he finds himself cut off from family, friends, money, or indeed any element of social attachment. The apparition refers to herself as "junckfraw des glücks" (46) and explains her power: "durch die einfliessung des himels und der sternen/ und der planeten So ist mir verlihen sechs tugendt/ die ich fürter verleühen mag/ [...] nach den stunden und regirung der planeten. Das ist weyßhait/ Reichtumb/ Stercke/ Gesundthait/ Schône/ und langs leben" (46).[5] From this offer, Fortunatus chooses wealth, and is given a purse which provides him with indefinite supplies of money. The *junckfraw* disappears for good, and there is no significant reference to her in the remaining part of the narrative. Thus what happens subsequent to her appearance must clearly be seen as the result of Fortunatus' own actions as opposed to a superhuman force. After a few temporary problems, Fortunatus manages to put the money to good use. He is able to build up several businesses, find a beautiful wife, and indulge in his hobby, travelling. Hence the intervention of the *junckfraw* works to Fortunatus' general advantage. Its positive nature is especially remarkable since a conservative outlook could imply that the choice of material as opposed to spiritual riches must eventually be punished. Yet although Fortunatus suffers some minor defeats in the beginning, they are not inflicted by a punitive superhuman authority, but rather by his own insufficiency in coming to terms with the newly-found wealth. In the long run, he is able to master

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[4] Cf. Joachim Theisen, "Fortuna als narratives Problem", in (ed.) Walter Haug, *Fortuna* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1995 [Fortuna vitrea; 15]), p. 167.

[5] *Fortunatus*, (ed.) Hans-Gert Roloff (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1981).

the *junckfraw*'s gift and achieve stable well-being. The fact that her gift turns out to be genuinely positive for Fortunatus means that in this case the necessity of the ascent-descent-cyclicity traditionally associated with Fortuna is abandoned. However, Fortunatus' story contrasts with that of his son Andolosia. Andolosia is unable to handle the possession of inexhaustible wealth, and is eventually killed by envious rivals. But even Andolosia's ruin is not a punishment meted out by a superhuman authority: he perishes because of his own mistakes. While this suggests that both success and failure are possible consequences of Fortuna's gifts, it does not diminish the possibilities inherent in personal effort, but rather emphasizes them.

The withdrawal of the Fortuna-figure after her single appearance means that *Fortunatus* comes across as a narrative in which the protagonists are to a certain extent emancipated from the influence of a superhuman Fortuna. Not only is the protagonists' personal responsibility increased by the fact that the *junckfraw des gelücks* is withdrawn from the plot after she has bestowed her gift, the very fact that Fortunatus is allowed to choose from a range of gifts offered by the *junckfraw* distinguishes him from those characters who have to accept the random blows of Fortuna as they come. In *Fortunatus*, Fortuna's intervention is the starting-point of a spectacular success-story. This is only the case because, rather than attempting the classically prescribed indifference towards Fortuna, Fortunatus concentrates on making the most of her gift. In Wickram's narratives, by comparison, the relation between *glück* and the characters is of a very different nature, starting with the fact that *glück*'s gifts are generally negative. Consequently, its presence implies no potential for the characters' positive development, but rather threatens to impede or even ruin them. In order to control *glück*, Wickram advocates self-restraint, the result of which is limited to maintaining one's status quo. This is very different from the cunning and risk-taking displayed by Fortunatus in his successful attempt to turn the *junckfraw*'s gift to advantage. Moreover, *Fortunatus*' Fortuna-figure contrasts with Wickram's *glück* in that she operates exclusively on an external level.[6] That is, the narratives focus on different sets of problems with regard to Fortuna, or *glück*. *Fortunatus* revolves around the question how to assert oneself in society and make one's imprint on the world. Wickram is concerned more with how one may achieve internal coherence and steadfastness and, on the basis of this, pursue one's goals in

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[6] Cf. Burkhard Dohm: "Der Zufall der durch Fortuna bewirkten Veränderungen und Gaben trifft Fortunatus in der Darstellungsweise des Textes sozusagen *von außen* im Tiefpunkt seiner bisherigen Existenz" (Burkhard Dohm, *Emanzipation aus der Didaxe: Studien zur Autonomisierung des Erzählens im Roman der frühen Neuzeit*, Bochumer Schriften zur deutschen Literatur 10 (Frankfurt/Main: Lang, 1989), p. 64 (my emphasis)).

spite of the limitations of the outside world.[7] Generally speaking, the image of Fortuna in *Fortunatus* is altogether more positive than that of *glück* in Wickram, which brings *Fortunatus* into closer proximity than Wickram's narratives to the optimistic Renaissance conception of Fortuna.

Another example of *glück* affecting a narrative's protagonist is Thüring von Ringoltingen's *Melusine* (first printed in 1474). At the beginning of the narrative, the protagonist, impoverished Reymund, accidentally kills his wealthy uncle while attempting to rescue him from a wild boar. Shocked by this turn of events, he addresses *glück*:

"Glůck/ wie hast du mich so gar mit Jammer/ mit Elend/ mit hertzenleyd/ und mit allem ungefelle/ beladen/ niemand aber sol sich an dich lassen/ denn du viel Jammers und Leydens zufůgen kanst/ dem du es gůnnest/ [...] dem einen hilffstu auff/ dem andern nider/ einem bistu sůß/ dem andern bitter/ Ach Glůck was hastu mich Armen Jungen Thoren geziegen/ denn du hast mich [...] in grosse noht/ elend unnd Arbeit bracht" (10).[8]

Thus *glück* is accused of having caused Reymund to inadvertently kill his uncle. The incident leads to an unforeseen result. Following his uncle's death, Reymund is moving through the forest in despair until he arrives at a well. There, he is approached by the fairy Melusine. Under her guidance, he turns his inheritance from the deceased uncle into an estate of great extent and becomes a sovereign in his own right. When Melusine retrospectively states "Glůck hat uns zusammen gefůgt" (28), the initially destructive intervention of *glück* is represented in a positive light. However, the happiness brought about by *glück* does not last. Reymund is not able to keep the conditions which are attached to Melusine's presence. This causes her to disappear, and eventually leads to his ruin. As in *Fortunatus*, the intervention of *glück* is a one-off occasion in this narrative, which constitutes the starting-point of a crucial development. The exact shape of this development is determined by the protagonist himself, whose actions determine whether or not the intervention of *glück* is used to his advantage. Hence the nature of *glück* is not determined *a priori*. Its gifts have

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[7] With regard to the distinction between *Fortunatus* vs. *Knabenspiegel*, cf. Geulen: "Im Falle des Volksbuchs [i.e. *Fortunatus*] dominiert der progressive und im weitesten Sinne auch renaissancehafte Charakter der Darstellung, im Falle des "Knabenspiegels" eine eher regressive und mittelalterlicher Tradition verpflichtete Ausrichtung" (Hans Geulen, "Tendenzen der epischen Darbietungsformen von den Volksbüchern bis zu Fischart", in H. G., *Erzählkunst der frühen Neuzeit. Zur Geschichte epischer Darbietungsweisen und Formen im Roman der Renaissance und des Barocks* (Tübingen: Rotsch, 1975), p. 27). Geulen further explains the difference between medieval versus Renaissance narrative as the difference between demonstrating an exemplary development on the one hand and trying out various possibilities on the other.

[8] Thüring von Ringoltingen, *Melusine*, (ed.) Hans-Gert Roloff (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1969).

positive potential, but there is no guarantee of the individual's ability to realize this potential for good. There are several features which distinguish *glück* in *Melusine* from Wickram's concept. First, the single intervention of *glück* differs structurally from the continuous interaction between *glück* and the characters in Wickram. Secondly, although Thüring von Ringoltingen does capture the risk inherent in *glück*, its large positive potential is distinct from *glück* in Wickram's narratives, given the scepticism with which it is depicted there. Finally, while the protagonist's personal contribution to his development is significant, Ringoltingen's *glück* is still distinct from Wickram's concept of internally operating *glück* in that it is merely an externally operating force. In being external, the effect which *glück* has on Reymund's life appears to be more clear-cut than the dangers lurking in Wickram's internally operating *glück*. Therefore, *Melusine*, too, provides a contrast to Wickram's representation of *glück*. Generally, it is notable that in none of the above literary representations does *glück* appear as internally operating. This suggests that Wickram's approach is somewhat unusual, and more sophisticated than that of other representatives of roughly contemporary fiction.

Next, let us compare Wickram's representation of *glück* to its status in the more theoretical contemporary sources that I have introduced in chapter 4. How does Wickram's representation of *glück* compare to the German sources, viz. the texts by Hans Sachs and Sebastian Brant? According to Sachs, *glück* is subordinated to God; as such, its existence is an illusion. This is in contrast to Wickram who, regardless of the devout Christianity marking all of his narratives, grants *glück* a certain degree of autonomy. Consequently, Wickram's *glück* is more threatening to human beings than that of Sachs, which is ultimately contained within the quintessentially benevolent will of God. Another feature that distinguishes Sachs' view from that of Wickram is that he does not acknowledge any control over *glück* whatsoever on the part of the affected individual; instead, one should simply accept crucial incidents as stemming from the will of God. There is obviously no room in this scenario for the notion of internally operating *glück* prominent in Wickram. This makes Sachs' account a rather more simplistic one than that of Wickram. The overwhelming devoutness emerging from Sachs' text rules out any interaction between *glück* on the one hand and human beings on the other. As such, it could be seen as a fairly uncritical reflection of the Boethian tradition.

A different kind of disregard towards *glück* is displayed by Sebastian Brant. He treats *glück* with severe negativity which extends as far as considering it to be a gift of the devil (cf. *Narrenschiff*, ch. 23, l. 23ff). To Brant, *glück* is mainly an object, taking the shape of a person's material well-being. As such, *glück*'s superficial appearance is

positive. However, this appearance conceals an abyss: not only may it trigger arrogance and presumption towards God, it may also be a mere prelude to a person's imminent fall. Brant, similar to Sachs, grants the individual human being a very minor role. The only scope of action which he or she has in relation to *glück* is to resist the urge to enjoy its presence. Unlike Wickram, Brant acknowledges no relation between a person's actions and the appearance of *glück* itself, i.e. any notion of internally operating *glück* is again completely missing. Further, Brant grants *glück* less genuine influence on human life than Wickram does: its perceived effect is bound up with the will of God, constituting a form of divine punishment. Brant's denial of *glück*'s genuine existence implies severe consequences. The notion of contingency is denied, that is, everything that happens must be considered to happen because it has been, more or less directly, decreed by God. This significantly narrows down a person's possibilities to shape the world which he inhabits, and may, at least at times, make it a rather grim place to live in. For the notion that any suffering is ultimately tied up with the workings of God must seem rather depressing - not only from the point of view of individual freedom, but also in view of the implication that the suffering one experiences must be genuinely deserved whatever its nature. By acknowledging the existence of *glück* as a potentially autonomous force, Wickram, by contrast, allows the notion of contingency into his fictional world and indeed makes it a central issue in his narratives. While this may be frightening in the sense that his characters are left alone to make their own decisions which in turn determine their development, it could also be seen as a liberating experience when compared to the divine determinism stated by Brant. Generally speaking, both Sachs' and Brant's way of representing *glück* seem to be under the influence of either Boethian pessimism or Protestant rigour to a far greater extent than Wickram's narratives are. Compared to his compatriots, Wickram comes across as distinctly more modern in that he is free from overwhelming religious constraints as regards both the representation of *glück* and the characters' response to its workings.

How, then, does Wickram's concept of *glück* compare to the representation of this force in the Italian sources which were made available in German by Niklas von Wyle? The gist of Poggio Bracciolino's attitude towards *glück*, for instance, was that *glück* is a negative force which is clearly externally operating. It affects only 'external' things, such as wordly possessions and honours, which it may take away from a person. As a result, *glück* may be opposed and controlled simply by taking refuge in one's internal assets: *ain starckes vnüberwintliches gemüt* (p. 106) is sufficient to deal with the blows of *glück*. This model of the relation between *glück* and the individual is again much simpler than that of Wickram. Wickram perceives the threat of *glück* to be

far greater than Poggio Bracciolino. In the narratives, *glück* may threaten essential things such as one's love, one's life, and, indirectly, one's state of mind. For Poggio Bracciolino, the impact of *glück* is limited to the material things in life; the intellectual and spiritual attributes of a person are untouchable. Wickram perceives *glück* to be much more complex in that it may originate in the human mind. As such, it is both more difficult to detect, and more difficult to conquer than Poggio Bracciolino's version. In expounding the concept of internally operating *glück*, Wickram does not share Poggio Bracciolino's optimism about the imperviousness of the human mind. By the same token, Poggio Bracciolino's strategy of equanimity would not be sufficient for dealing with *glück* as perceived by Wickram. While Poggio Bracciolino considers *glück* as an external challenge to a person's moral integrity, Wickram's view credits it with the potential to undermine a person's mind from the inside. Thus it becomes obvious that Wickram exhibits a certain world-weariness in his perception of *glück* when compared to the optimism inherent in Poggio Bracciolino's belief in human strength.

Further contrast to Wickram is provided by the picture which Enea Silvio Piccolomini paints of *glück*. While acknowledging that *glück*'s apparent favouritism may give rise to a certain bitterness, Enea Silvio's text suggest a distinctly positive stance towards this force. Contrary to Poggio Bracciolino, Enea Silvio suggests that *glück* endows those favoured by it with positive gifts. *glück*'s capriciousness is welcomed as a glorious challenge to human existence, which should spur one to try and attain its gifts. Indifference towards *glück* as a way of liberating oneself from its presence is disregarded as impracticable for anyone except a saint. Instead, Enea Silvio's narrator proposes deliberate submission to *frŏw gelück*. In doing so, he implies confidence in winning her favour. It is through, rather than in spite of *glück* that man may realize his goals: one should seek out *frŏw gelück* and wrestle with her until she succumbs to one's desire. Thus Enea Silvio's view of *glück* rests on the belief in human competence in a very outward and flamboyant way. Its boldness and aggressiveness contrast with the caution and scepticism advised in Wickram's narratives. This attitude runs contrary to the need to suppress the manifestation of *glück* as advocated by Wickram. According to Enea Silvio, *glück*'s gifts are not only genuinely positive, they may also be enjoyed to the full, while Wickram, as we have seen, represents the workings of *glück* as predominantly negative. For Enea Silvio, the negative aspect of *glück* is of no real concern. Further, the fact that Enea Silvio's concept of *glück* is lacking any suggestion of an internally operating manifestation contributes to the impression of greater controllability when compared to Wickram's account. All in all, Enea Silvio's account may be seen to exemplify a typically positive Renaissance view

towards Fortuna, which is in sharp distinction to Wickram's rather dour evaluation of the phenomenon.

The writings of Poggio Bracciolino and Enea Silvio Piccolomini capture the optimism of the Renaissance spirit according to which a certain kind of daring and courageous behaviour might be able to control Fortuna, or even turn her workings to the individual's advantage. A similar conviction of the individual's ability to control Fortuna with bravura is displayed in the works of Pontano and Machiavelli, as I have pointed out in chapter 4.[9] In Wickram, this view is absent in favour of the notion of obedience and self-restraint as a way of controlling *glück*. While to someone like Enea Silvio or Machiavelli, controlling *glück* may result in substantial self-improvement, for Wickram it amounts to no more than the protection of one's status quo. Thus Wickram's attitude differs significantly from the above tendency of Renaissance thought. Seen in this light, Wickram's relative scepticism towards Fortuna has certain things in common with the grim attitude of the distinct German Fortuna tradition. Yet Wickram's representation of *glück* does not sit easily with those of Sachs and Brant, who deny *glück* any form of genuine existence. Moreover, while to Sachs and Brant admitting *glück* into one's life is tantamount to committing a religious offence, Wickram is concerned with the personal suffering of those affected by *glück*. A further, crucial aspect distinguishing Wickram from his compatriots is their tendency to humbly accept whatever negative turn of events they encounter. This contrasts with the active way in which Wickram's characters are able to deal with the negative intervention of *glück*. To the extent that Wickram grants *glück* a certain independence as well as encourages an active stance in dealing with it, it could be that he shares some traits of the Italian way of behaving towards this phenomenon after all.

At this point, it may be illuminating to compare *glück* in Wickram's narratives to Petrarch's *De remediis utriusque fortunae*. The relatively late appearance of Petrarch's treatise in German means that it would have been a current topic of discussion in sixteenth century Germany. Wickram's acquaintance with this compendium is more than mere speculation: Chapter 15 of *Die sieben Hauptlaster* is entitled "Etliche

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[9] Interestingly, according to Pontano's *De fortuna libri*, Fortuna is distinguished from *casus* by the fact that her rule extends only to those aspects of human life that are associated with the possibility of human deliberation and decision (cf. Alfred Doren, "Fortuna im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance", in (ed.) Fritz Saxl, *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, II, Vorträge 1922-23, I. Teil (Leipzig/Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1924), p. 123). This indicates that human reaction is a defining element of Pontano's concept of Fortuna. But, contrary to Wickram, Pontano appears to have been convinced of the human ability to decide the instances of internally operating Fortuna in one's favour. Moreover, since *De fortuna libri* was only available in Latin, the element of internally operating *glück* present in it could hardly have been an inspiration for Wickram.

nutzbare sprůch aus Plutarcho und Francisco Petrarcha gezogen" (66).[10] The chapter is dedicated to various pieces of advice on how to educate one's children, and in the course of it, Wickram makes explicit reference to Petrarch's "bůch von dem widerwertigen glück" (cf. p. 66ff), i.e. the second book of *De remediis*. He cites the advice given by Petrarch in chapters 23 and 43 of the second part of *De remediis*, which implies harsh, if necessary radical measures in order to ensure the obedience of one's children. What is the significance of *glück* in this context? Wickram establishes no explicit connection between the term *glück* as present in the title of Petrarch's treatise and the specific educational problems. Judging from the chapters in the German version of *De remediis*, *glück* to Petrarch seems to consists in a combination of the children's wilfulness and the despair experienced by the affected parent. While there is nothing to suggest that Wickram does not agree with this view, he appears to have picked the passages for their educational insights rather than in order to illustrate the nature of *glück*. Nevertheless we may glean something about Wickram's implicit understanding of Petrarch's *glück* from the passages in question. Assuming that *glück* consists in the children's disobedience and in the reaction which it creates, Wickram would seem to concur with Petrarch's belief that it is possible for the affected individual to control and ultimately eradicate it by employing adequate measures. Hence Wickram's reference to Petrarch's treatise not only proves his familiarity with at least parts of it, it also suggests that Wickram may concur with Petrarch's general understanding of *glück* as expounded in the treatise.

To find out more about the relation between Wickram's and Petrarch's attitude towards *glück*, it may help to compare a couple of specific cases which are of notable similarity. Chapter 31 of *Das ander Bůch/ von artzney des bösen Glücks* is entitled "Von den beschwerlichen nachbawren".[11] The chapter is illustrated by a picture of a woman pouring dishwater out of her window and onto her neighbour's head. Incidentally, this very act ranges among the complaints which in *Von guoten und boesen Nachbaurn* Robertus' family hold against their neighbours (cf. 15). At the same time, the neighbours' troublesome presence is related to *glück* (cf. 17). Petrarch advises the following as regards dealing with bad neighbours. The voice of *Vernunfft* recommends first patience, then, as a further option, "flucht". The reasoning behind this is that "[m]an soll kain weg zů der still und růwe des gemůths für schwere achten". Robertus' way of coping with his troublesome neighbours runs exactly along these lines. When it is clear that patience towards them is fruitless, he moves to

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[10] Georg Wickram, *Die sieben Hauptlaster*, (ed.) Hans-Gert Roloff (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1972).

[11] Franciscus Petrarcha, *Von der Artzney bayder Glueck, des guten und widerwertigen*, (ed.) Manfred Lemmer, (Hamburg/Leipzig: Friedrich Wittig Verlag, 1984).

another country, thus seeking refuge in what may be described as *flucht*.[12] There are obvious parallels between Robertus' behaviour and that recommended by Petrarch. Therefore, although it takes some time for Robertus to attain the calm resolution advocated by Petrarch, and even though he arrives at it by way of exempla from the Old Testament (cf. 22ff), it does not seem unreasonable to describe his way of dealing with *glück* as Petrarchan.

Another specific case of *glück* which seems to have an equivalent in Wickram is described in book II, chapter 44 of *Von der artzney*, "Von einem ungehorsamen sun". There, *Schmertz* voices the complaints of a person stricken with a *hoffertigen sun*. *Vernunfft*'s reply reads as follows: "Ist es ain laster der jugent unnd zeyt/ so wirt es mit der zeyt abgehenn/ Dann viler leüt fråche jugent/ hat sich mit der zeyt/ mit wunderbårlichem zůnemen zů der tugent erhabenn [...] ich will nicht sagen liebe/ sondern erbarmung/ ist man dem verpflicht/ dem die natur am wenigsten hilft". As a last resort, it is advised that one should banish one's children from one's home. There is a corresponding situation in *Knabenspiegel*, where Gottlieb attributes his son's disobedience to a whim of *glück*. But although Gottlieb eventually shows mercy towards Wilbaldus when he returns home as a reformed person, his previous attitude differs somewhat from what is recommended by Petrarch. Not only does the severity with which Gottlieb meets Wilbaldus' waywardness seem to contain little mercy, he also is extremely distraught at his son's behaviour (cf. 42f). Hence Gottlieb does not attain the detachment generally advocated by Petrarch's remedy against *glück*, which consists in restraining one's affects. Gottlieb's behaviour shows that the Petrarchan detachment in dealing with *glück* does not always come naturally. However, by no means does this imply Wickram's rejection of, or indifference towards the Petrarchan ideal. Indeed Gottlieb's emotional suffering at the hands of *glück* may indicate the necessity to remain calm in the face of its afflictions. This notion is reinforced when Wilbaldus' mother subsequently dies of heart-break because she can no longer bear her son's misbehaviour. That is, the characters' failure to deal with *glück* might highlight precisely the importance of the Petrarchan remedy.

The above incidents as such are of relatively minor significance for the respective narrative as a whole. Nevertheless the incidents' consideration leads to the question of whether they are merely isolated occurrences or whether there is a

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[12] Petrarch modifies the predicament as follows: "unnd wenn du dyß [Flüchten] offt thůst/ und dich dennocht nichts hilfft/ so solt du wyssen/ das die schuld dein sey/ unnd villeicht nit mynder/ dann eines andern. Der maist thail der gemeinen gezenck und hader/ hat zwen schuldige/ und wiewol villeicht den einen schuldiger/ doch hat er kain unschuldigen". Robertus, however, subsequently lives in peace with his neighbours, which suggests that he is genuinely innocent with regard to the initial quarrel.

general inclination towards the Petrarchan way of dealing with *glück* in Wickram's narratives. To answer this question, we need to compare on a more general level Wickram's concept of *glück* to that which characterizes Petrarch's *Von der Artzney bayder Glück*. It is immediately obvious that both writers place great emphasis on the internally operating aspect of *glück*. *Von der Artzney* contains many chapters dedicated to problems internal to a person's mind. Whether it is being sad, being tired of life, lacking virtue, or suffering from anger (cf. chapters 93, 98, 104, 107), all of these states have in common that they are made up by internal, psychological factors. As such, they constitute a form of internally operating *glück*, against which external grievances are said to pale into insignificance (cf. *Vorred* to book II). In addition to instances of *glück* which originate solely in the mind, there is also a more complicated aspect to Petrarch's notion of internally operating *glück*. That is, external events, too, may trigger the manifestation of internally operating *glück*, namely when they trigger certain affects in the person who experiences them. The affects, which Petrarch identifies as hope or desire, joy, dejection or pain and fear, ultimately constitute *glück*, which is also referred to as *geprechen des gemůts* (I, p. 8). It is supposedly possible to overcome this kind of *glück* by exercising willpower and employing reason. On first sight, Petrarch's notion of internally operating *glück* may seem to differ from the kind represented by Wickram. For in Wickram, internally operating *glück* is manifest not so much in psychological dispositions as in specific practical mistakes made by the characters, often in situations where they should have known better. On second thought, however, it seems plausible that the naivety and carelessness which for Wickram's characters are tied up with internally operating *glück* are related to the Petrarchan affects. In *Galmy*, *Gabriotto* and *Goldfaden*, the protagonists' carelessness which brings about the discovery of their secret relationships could be seen to result from positive *glück*, which is initially credited with supporting the development of mutual love. Indulging in this positive state leads the protagonists to overstep the boundaries of caution, thus producing negative *glück*. In Petrarch's terms, the lovers' careless behaviour could be explained as stemming from the predominance of the affects hope and desire, i.e. constituents of positive *glück*, which the lovers fail to balance with reason. Excess of hope and desire explain how the protagonists of the above narratives lose their footing and tumble into a crisis. Blinded by being lucky in love, they make mistakes which induce their potential ruin. While Wickram's scepticism towards positive *glück* may not be as pronounced as Petrarch's, he implicitly seems to concur with it.

However, Wickram places more emphasis on the manifestations of negative *glück*, which form a crucial element in each protagonist's crisis. Therefore, we need to

consider how the protagonists' subsequent dealing with negative *glück* relates to the Petrarchan concept of *glück*. Gabriotto seals his ruin by indulging in his misery. His behaviour following departure from the court is marked by the affects dejection and pain, which, according to Petrarch, constitute negative *glück*. Galmy and Lewfrid, by contrast, remain relatively calm in the face of negative *glück*. That they succeed in reversing the *glück*-induced situation may initially be due to the fact that they overcome the affects which reinforce their perception of it as disastrous. Because they curb dejection, they do not allow the experience of negative *glück* to psychologically destroy them; moreover, because they check their blind hope, they are able to avoid further disaster on a practical level. The remaining narratives may also be related to Petrarchan *glück*. In *Knabenspiegel*, Wilbaldus might be considered as an exponent of certain affects at their most extreme, although desire and joy, while figuring strongly in his outlook, are not explicitly linked to positive *glück*. Later, Wilbaldus' readiness to suppress these affects, when he realizes that they have led him into the wilderness, is the condition for his rehabilitation. In this sense, affects might be said to play an important role in Wilbaldus' development. Wilbaldus' initial wayward behaviour may qualify as a manifestation of *glück* in the Petrarchan sense if one considers his indulgence in the good life as unwarranted optimism. The relation to Petrarch may become more obvious when, in the face of negative *glück*, Wilbaldus is able to overcome his dejection and regain a respectable position in society. In *Nachbaurn*, the problem of *glück* is less acute than in the previous narratives. As we have seen, Robertus reacts to the friction caused by his bad neighbours by geographically detaching himself from it. As regards his children's death, he eventually displays acceptance. In doing so, he successfully fights the affects of dejection and pain. The fact that *glück*, except for minor instances, does not reappear in the narrative, might be an indication of the protagonists' maturity. Their sober, pious way of life may result in the suppression of any affects that could potentially constitute *glück*. That is, the Petrarchan model of *glück* which centers around the affects and their suppression may account for many of the *glück*-induced situations experienced by Wickram's characters. Not only are the affects a crucial part of internally operating *glück*, they are important also with regard to the characters' reaction to externally operating *glück*.

For a better understanding of the relation between Wickram and Petrarch, let us take a closer look at how their respective ways of controlling *glück* compare. According to Petrarch, reason, or *Vernunfft*, is the major tool in controlling the affects. In the case of negative *glück*, this means retaining a certain cautious optimism, based on the fact that a desperate situation may change either through the efforts of the

affected person, or by itself; failing that, one should resign oneself to a misfortune. How does this strategy compare to the behaviour of Wickram's protagonists? In moments of crisis, characters like Galmy, Lewfrid, Wilbaldus and Robertus react in a way that is consistent with Petrarch's recommendations. Not only do they remain calm enough to act in a reasonable manner, they also to some extent cause the situation to change for the better through their own actions. Gabriotto, however, loses himself in desperation to paralyzing effect. Still his development, too, may be interpreted in the light of the Petrarchan way of dealing with *glück*. Gabriotto's self-inflicted ruin implies the necessity to remain collected in the face of external misfortune. Wickram's educational intentions go beyond coping with negative *glück* once it has occurred: avoiding the manifestation of negative *glück* in the first place is just as significant. In order to avoid *glück*, a certain worldly wisdom, combined with the restraint of one's passions is more important than exercising refined psychological manoeuvres such as the attainment of a mental equilibrium. To Petrarch, by contrast, *glück* appears to exist first and foremost in the mind; actual negative incidents are therefore mere triggers of its existence. As such, Petrarch is concerned mainly with the mental reaction to such incidents, rather than with avoiding them in the first place, or coping with them on a practical level. In Wickram's narratives, negative *glück* affects more than a person's mind, it is manifest also in incidents in the material world. In this respect, Wickram is far more pragmatic and grounded in the reality of the average person than Petrarch.

Petrarch further insists that in case of positive *glück*, exercising *Vernunfft* must imply being prepared for the worst possible development of a situation so as not to get carried away by fortunate circumstances and become defenceless. In Wickram, positive *glück* is not explicitly identified as problematic, even though there is danger inherent in positive *glück* which consists in the way in which it may lead to a protagonist's carelessness. Whereas Petrarch considers positive *glück* to be more dangerous than its negative counterpart, Wickram represents negative *glück* as the main danger to man. To Petrarch, every positive situation may potentially be reversed into its opposite, which is why enjoyment of it could be psychologically fatal. Wickram's characters, with the exception of Gabriotto and his friends, manage to hold on to their eventual material happiness for good; although not attributed to *glück*, those situations would seem to run parallel to such that may trigger positive *glück* according to Petrarch. Wickram does not share the pessimism which prompts Petrarch to assume the worst in every situation and to advise constant, life-long

watchfulness (cf. e.g. ch. 90).[13] The fragility associated with positive situations in Petrarch may be circumvented in Wickram because the protagonists' final happiness is attributed to God and accompanied by appropriate humility. Moreover, due to the peculiarities of Wickram's fictional structures, there is a sense that the protagonists have successfully undergone a process which leads them to maturity. This goes some way to securing their status quo, since maturity may prevent them from the kind of hybris in the face of positive *glück* feared by Petrarch.

In spite of the above differences, both authors are united in certain essential convictions. Wickram concurs with Petrarch to the extent that in the case of both internally and externally operating *glück*, the remedy lies within the affected person himself or herself. The virtues *Vernunfft* and *fürsichtigkait* (cf. e.g. *Artzney* ch. 109) which Petrarch proposes as guiding principles for dealing with *glück* may equally be observed in situations in which Wickram's characters curtail the effects of *glück*. In the treatise as well as in the narratives, these virtues stand opposed to unrestrained affects and passions. Both Petrarch and Wickram reserve a certain scepticism as to the human ability to control *glück* (cf. e.g. *Artzney*, ch. 120). Just as Petrarch refers to the importance of "dye hymlisch hilffe" (p. 8 of *Vorred* to book I) in supporting *Vernunfft* in its struggle with the affects, so Wickram, through frequent reference to God, makes it clear that divine support is an essential companion to even the most virtuous person. Considering the parallels between Wickram and Petrarch, the differences between them might possibly stem from the distinction between a relatively abstract treatise, and a narrative which fleshes out certain issues in the context of specific situations. Petrarch's emphasis on internally operating *glück* suggests that there is a theoretical back-up for Wickram's peculiar representation of *glück*. Notably, this trend is not reflected in any of the other literary examples introduced earlier in this chapter. Many crucial situations in Wickram's narratives could be explained by the tension between concepts such as *hoffnung* on the one hand and *fürsichtigkait* on the other, between characters' succeeding or failing in mastering their affects. Still Wickram has his own distinct way of putting the notion of internally operating *glück* to use. Moreover, there remains a substantial difference. Petrarch is ultimately more confident in the human potential to eradicate *glück* completely. This is because from his point of view, *glück* is almost exclusively internal. Human contentment is possible

[13] Incidentally, there is another chapter in *De remediis* which may have an echo in *Nachbaurn*. Ch. 71 of the first book deals with the possibility of a healthy child's death, and as such evokes the death of Robertus' children. But while Robertus copes with this blow by gradually attaining the kind of equilibrium encouraged by Petrarch, the children's death is not presented in such a way as to suggest that it is related to a manifestation of positive *glück* in the sense of happiness being reversed; while Robertus is obviously proud of his children, he is not shown to be excessively so.

because external events, however negative *per se*, should only be secondary to a person's state of mind - recalling yet again the Stoic ideal of dealing with Fortuna. By contrast, Wickram acknowledges an aspect of *glück* which is definitely beyond human control in the sense that it is constituted, as opposed to merely triggered, by events that are external to the human mind. Some of the instances in which externally operating *glück* affects Wickram's characters might still be compatible with the Petrarchan pattern in that the characters' personal reaction to them is what really determines their development. However, there are instances of externally operating *glück* in the narratives which cannot be mastered. This suggests that compared to Petrarch's lofty notion of potentially total control by virtue of mental adjustment, Wickram's approach to *glück* is more realistic in that it more adequately reflects the reality of his readership's experience, and as such might appeal to a wider audience than Petrarch.

Conclusion

In the narratives of Jörg Wickram *glück* is an integral part of the characters' experience. In attributing certain incidents to it, the characters may use it as an interpretative strategy. Fitting disruptive incidents into the explanatory pattern of *glück*'s randomness may help them to make sense of these incidents, by naming their source. Moreover, associating an incident with the injustice of *glück* may emphasize the emotional upheaval which the incident creates in the affected character. This may be reinforced by the more limited insight shown in the characters' statements when compared with those of the narrator. Apart from being used as an interpretative strategy, *glück* represents a genuine threat in the characters' lives. It represents the main source of negative events, which is opposed to the main source of positive events, God.[1] While the exact nature of the relation between *glück* and God differs from narrative to narrative, the juxtaposition of *glück*'s and God's workings generally recalls Boethius' account of Fortuna. However, while Wickram's representation of *glück* resembles the Boethian model as far as the structure of subordination is concerned, it differs from it with regard to its ethical implications. Unlike Boethius, who claims that *glück* operates on a material level which is inferior to the spiritual level of God's working, Wickram depicts *glück* and God as working largely on the same, material level of human experience. As a result, Wickram does not suggest that in order to banish *glück* from one's life one has to withdraw from its material aspects. At the same time, Wickram's model serves to reinforce the antagonistic status of the two forces in terms of narrative plot. To the extent that *glück* is in direct opposition to God with regard to the characters' development, its presence generates suspense

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[1] The continuous and pervasive importance of *glück* differs from allegorical structures, such as the lion in *Goldfaden*, the intermittent influence of which is defined by Müller as follows: "Es gibt keinen übergeordneten metaphorischen Diskurs, sondern punktuell werden Elemente der Erzählwirklichkeit transparent auf eine Bedeutung zweiter Ordnung, und zwar dank der Deutungsaktivität der am Geschehen Beteiligten" (Jan-Dirk Müller, "Transformation allegorischer Strukturen im frühen Prosa-Roman", in (eds.) Wolfgang Harms and Klaus Speckenbach, *Bildhafte Rede in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit: Probleme ihrer Legitimation und ihrer Funktion* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1992), p. 275). The 'genuine' nature of *glück* may be seen to be captured in Knopf's definition: "Obwohl Wickram zeigt, daß er die humanistische Tradition kennt, bleibt die Darstellung des >>Glücks<< bei ihm frei von Mythologie, von Literatur und Rhetorik. Glück ist das irrationale und unbeeinflußbare >>es<<, das wankelmütige Neutrum, das sich der Beeinflussung entzieht; es wird angerufen, wenn schlechte Erfahrungen gemacht worden sind" (Jan Knopf, "Versicherung des Mitmenschen. Arbeit, Freundschaft und Glück in Jörg Wickrams Romanen", in J. K., *Frühzeit des Bürgers. Erfahrene und verleugnete Realität in den Romanen Wickrams, Grimmelshausens und Schnabels* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1978), p. 54).

about the outcome of that development.

The threats associated with *glück* arise from outside, but also from inside the characters, i.e. it operates both externally and internally. The internal aspect of *glück* outweighs the external one. Where it is manifest, the term *glück* intertwines human and superhuman activity to such an extent that human action does not merely have an effect on *glück*, but rather, it is an important part of what makes up the phenomenon of *glück* itself. This stands in contrast to the traditional concept of Fortuna, which tends to depict her as a force which is external to a person's mind both as regards its origination and its effect. By emphasizing the individual's involvement in the manifestation of *glück*, Wickram's concept is endowed with a certain modernity. Internally operating *glück* represents the fallibility inherent in human action. In this sense, it may even be considered as a metaphor for the latter. Hence we may see the concept of *glück* in Wickram as involved in a process of change, from a supernatural force into a component of the psychological make-up of man.

In its internalization, Wickram's account stands in a certain proximity to Petrarch's *De remediis utriusque fortunae*. Yet Wickram does not share Petrarch's ascetic ideal, which draws on the Stoic notion of mentally detaching oneself from the vagaries of day-to-day life. Wickram's approach is rather more practical: it implies that *glück* needs to be overcome for the sake of leading a successful life on a secular, material level. To the extent that *glück* is in this way internalized, Wickram's representation stands out in relation to other fifteenth and sixteenth century views. In this respect, Wickram's approach is more modern, in the sense of more psychological, than Poggio Bracciolino and Enea Silvio Piccolomini on the one hand, and Sebastian Brant and Hans Sachs on the other. For the same reason, Wickram's *glück* is distinct from comparable conceptions in contemporary fiction, as represented by *Fortunatus*, *Melusine* and German translations from Boccaccio's *Decamerone*.

Considering the positive attitude towards Fortuna which emerged in Renaissance thought, often linking it to entrepreneurial undertakings, the overall negativity of *glück* in Wickram is notable. As Knopf remarks, "eine positive, eine ökonomische Umdeutung des Begriffs bleibt aus. Wickram verweigert sich dem ökonomischen Denken und Verhalten seiner Zeit".[2] Wickram's sober evaluation of *glück* may stem from his devout Christianity. The inability to use *glück* to one's advantage could be seen to coincide with certain Reformation views regarding the frailty and limitations of man, while also relating back to medieval attitudes. How does Wickram's negative evaluation of *glück* tie in with the apparently modern

[2] Knopf, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

feature of internalization? It is important to note here that Wickram's scepticism towards *glück* is not restricted to the perception of external circumstances: the most sinister aspect of *glück* is shown to be the destructive potential inherent in the individual himself. While on a material level, the negative evaluation of *glück* may be conservative or old-fashioned, establishing *glück* as a destructive force in the psychological sense reinforces the modern trait in Wickram's representation of *glück*.

The negative impact of *glück* may ultimately be controlled through prudence and self-control on the one hand, and through the support of like-minded friends and family on the other. Hence the disruptive occurrence of *glück* is put to educational use in the narratives in a way that recalls the didactic optimism of both humanism and the Reformation. In this sense, Wickram may solve the problem posed by the fact that substantial reference to the influence of *glück* would seem to discredit him from an orthodox Christian point of view. For Wickram, controlling *glück* is not a means, but a prerequisite for advancement in the world. The notion of control applies to both external circumstances and internal elements. Yet with regard to external circumstances, it implies not so much controlling the circumstances as such, as one's reaction to them. The internal dimension is once again predominant. If the belief in the possibility of successfully controlling one's life appears to be somewhat naive, especially when considered from the point of view of the twenty-first century, it is worth remembering that Wickram never completely discards his scepticism. The painful self-inflicted demise of *Gabriotto*'s protagonists, as well as the instances of suffering which is not only unexpected, but also completely undeserved in the other narratives, suggest that Wickram at least to some extent guards against inappropriate optimism.

glück may further be seen to be related to the *Aufsteiger* issue in the following sense. In order to advance in society, the characters are shown to depend not only on the benignity of external circumstances, but also on the ability to recognize and master internal weaknesses. Wickram explores different ways in which *glück* is manifest in human life against a variety of backgrounds. It is notable that *glück* is least influential in a setting in which differences of birth and class do not exist, i.e. in *Nachbaurn*. The link between a person's position in society and the way in which he or she is affected by *glück* suggests that Wickram's representation of *glück* reflects a genuine concern with contemporary social issues. It is marked by awareness both of the risks and of the advantages of social changes and fluctuations. In this context, the need to secure one's achievements against potential disruption is always present, and the sense of caution never disappears.

Generally speaking, the representation of *glück* in Wickram's narratives is

characterized by ambivalence. That is, the concept of *glück* oscillates between medieval and modern tendencies. Because *glück* is present simultaneously in an externally and in an internally operating guise, there are both superhuman and human patterns of explanation at work throughout the narratives. The world inhabited by the characters is marked by divine assurance, yet this world may also be disrupted by freak incidents occurring with alarming contingency. While human frailty may endanger both the characters' life and their happiness, this is often counteracted by human ability which ensures that they are saved from ruin. In their ambiguity, the above features demonstrate the transitional nature of *glück* in the narratives. The transitional nature, from a medieval to a modern conception, is indicated further by Wickram's adaptation of other accounts of Fortuna. The influence by the Boethian model of the relation between Fortuna and God suggests a strong link to medieval tradition. This stands in contrast to those elements in the representation of *glück* that recall Petrarch's view of Fortuna as an internalized force, which has some distinctly modern traits. Ultimately, however, Wickram's representation of *glück* is genuinely original, not least because of its striking ambiguities.

From today's point of view, perhaps the most enduring feature of Wickram's representation of *glück* is that it is possible to detect in it a changing conception of *glück,* from something supernatural to something human and ultimately existential. In this sense, *glück* could point to an abyss lurking behind the assumption of internal security in human life. That the topics addressed by Wickram's representation of *glück* are of a general relevance may be confirmed by considering the works of Heinrich von Kleist, whose extreme stance in similar issues casts an especially clear light on the transitional nature of Wickram's *glück*. Let us spend the final pages looking, at some leisure, at Kleist's novella *Der Zweikampf* (1811). Set in medieval times, and drawing heavily on medieval literary stereotypes, *Der Zweikampf* tells the story of Littegarde von Auerstein and her friend Friedrich von Trotha. Littegarde is a highly esteemed young widow who agrees to take the veil so as to ensure the unity of the family fortune when one of her brothers produces an heir. Then, just as she is about to enter the convent, her life takes an unexpected turn. She is accused of an illicit encounter with the notorious philanderer Graf Jakob der Rotbart. Charged with murdering his half-brother in order to attain to his duchy, Rotbart insists that he has spent the night of the murder with Littegarde. By way of proof, he produces a ring previously in her possession. Littegarde declares her innocence, but circumstances testify against her. She cannot account for the missing ring, nor produce an alibi, as her maid happened to be absent on the night in question. Littegarde's brothers

promptly disown her. Expelled from her home, she is devastated: "Dieser plötzliche Sturz, von der Höhe eines heiteren und fast ungetrübten Glücks, in die Tiefe eines unabsehbaren und gänzlich hülflosen Elends, war mehr als das arme Weib ertragen konnte" (238).[3] This plunge resembles instances of Fortuna suddenly humiliating a person in the midst of happiness:[4] both the abruptness of the change and the fact that it is caused by incidents which, as is revealed later, are entirely beyond Littegarde's control, point to the workings of this random force.

Littegarde subsequently turns to the only person who she trusts will believe her, namely Friedrich (cf. 239). Friedrich is instinctively convinced of Littegarde's truthfulness: "[V]erliert kein Wort zur Verteidigung und Rechtfertigung Eurer Unschuld! In meiner Brust spricht eine Stimme für Euch, weit lebhafter und überzeugender, als alle Rechtsgründe und Beweise" (240). He initiates a trial by combat in order to clear Littegarde's name, and prepares to fight against Rotbart for her innocence. Littegarde's situation resembles a certain development in Wickram's *Galmy*: when the duchess is threatened with execution for wrongly suspected adultery, Galmy defends her in a trial by combat against the *marschalck*'s defamations. His unambiguous victory means that the duchess' honour is immediately restored. The duchess' predicament is presented as a crucial instance of *glück*'s interference, which the characters manage to overcome.

In view of Littegarde's innocence, Friedrich looks set to succeed; for the trial by combat is based on the idea that God will support whoever is in the right (cf. 245). But, after inflicting a small laceration on Rotbart's hand, Friedrich "hatte [...] ein Unglück" (246) - he falls to the ground, and Rotbart is able to overwhelm him. To the court, this indicates that Littegarde is guilty both of spending the night with Rotbart and of giving false testimony. Surprisingly, Friedrich makes a complete recovery from his severe injuries: "Es zeigte sich aber bald, daß Herrn Friedrichs Wunden, so lebensgefährliche und zarte Teile sie auch berührten, durch eine besondere Fügung des Himmels nicht tödlich waren" (247). Because of this, Friedrich holds on to the belief in Littegarde's innnocence (cf. 248). Littegarde, however, falls into a state of speech- and motionlessness, behaving "wie eine Wahnsinnige" (250). She is unable to cope with the contradiction between her personal truth, i.e. her innocence, and the supposedly divine truth of her guilt which has been established through the trial by combat: "[M]eine Sinne reißen, und meine Kraft bricht" (251). Friedrich, by contrast, is convinced that, in view of his recovery, the outcome of the fight may be interpreted

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[3] All quotations refer to Heinrich von Kleist, *Sämtliche Werke und Briefe*, vol. 2, (ed.) Helmut Sembdner, (München: dtv, 1984).

[4] The term *Glück* denotes a state of happiness, rather than a superhuman force like Fortuna.

as his victory after all. He urges Littegarde to believe in her innocence as he does: "[B]ewahre deine Sinne vor Verzweiflung! türme das Gefühl, das in deiner Brust lebt, wie einen Felsen empor: halte dich daran und wanke nicht, und wenn Erd und Himmel unter dir und über dir zu Grunde gehen! [...] laß uns [...] des festen unerschütterlichen Glaubens sein" (253f). Thus Friedrich opposes the supposedly objective verdict of the trial by combat with the subjective truth of Littegarde's innocence. His unrelenting determination to believe in her eventually manages to ease Littegarde's torment.

Friedrich and Littegarde are condemned to death for having sinfully invoked divine judgment. But, a further twist occurs. Although having received only a minor scratch on his hand, Rotbart is critically ill. "[A]uf eine in der Tat sonderbare und merkwürdige Weise" (254), the wound has triggered a virulent disease which causes him to rot away. Further investigations are launched, and it is finally revealed that Rotbart was the victim of a cunning deceit: Littegarde's maid arranged a rendezvous and, under the cloak of darkness, posed as Littegarde, eventually presenting Rotbart with the ring which she had previously stolen from her mistress. The discovery of the true course of events comes just in time to save Friedrich and Littegarde. Rotbart dies from his illness after, in an ironic turn, he has owned up to arranging the assassination of his half-brother. In this sense, his death is fully deserved. Since it ultimately results from the wound inflicted in combat, the combat's outcome may be read as an expression of divine justice after all. By the same token, Littegarde's innocence is confirmed. Friedrich and Littegarde are honourably received back into society, and marry eventually.

Although hardly ever mentioned explicitly, chance is clearly an important factor in the characters' development. Chance is at work in various ways: first, in the deception of which Littegarde becomes a victim, and second, in the superficially clear outcome of the trial by combat. In the first instance, Littegarde falls victim to a chain of events which is completely beyond her control: neither is she a party to the complex scheming of either Rotbart or the maid, nor are their actions transparent, let alone controllable from her point of view. In the second instance, Friedrich's fall comes across as a misfortune (*ein Unglück*), which suggests that his apparent defeat is again the result of forces beyond his and Littegarde's control. The impact which chance has on Littegarde's life is devastating. First, the accusation robs her of her social standing, i.e. her external security. Then, when Friedrich is defeated by Rotbart, Littegarde loses even the belief in her own innocence, i.e. her internal security. To the extent that external contingencies may lead a person to lose previously inviolable certainties, the scope of chance in Kleist's novella is greater than that of *glück* in

Wickram's narratives. Kleist counters the threat immanent in chance by advocating absolute trust in one's subjective feelings as opposed to external appearances. While the outcome of the fight is perceived by the majority of the characters, including Littegarde, as a divinely sanctioned and hence objective judgment of her guilt, the conclusion of the novella reveals this interpretation to be based on mere unreliable appearances. Only Friedrich recognizes the genuine truth by holding to what he believes to be subjectively true. Friedrich's trust in Littegarde does not depend on external evidence, but instead relies on feeling and intuition. It is through his love and support, urging her to hold on to her internal truth, that Littegarde is saved from complete mental disintegration. This internal truth is ultimately confirmed by its reconciliation with the divine verdict, which is revealed as having been appropriate all along, albeit in a concealed way (cf. 247).

Assuming that Kleist's chance and Wickram's *glück* both cover the unpredictable in human life, how may Friedrich and Littegarde's way of dealing with chance be related to Wickram's representation of *glück*? Kleist's account is clearly more psychological and thus, in spite of the medieval setting, more modern than Wickram's, as one might expect in view both of the nearly three hundred years that lie between them and Wickram's own temporal proximity to the Middle Ages. Nevertheless there are common features to be observed. Both authors pit internal values against the threat of external uncertainties. These values are to be found in the affected individual as well as in those close to him or her. However, Kleist's emphasis on the need to believe in oneself is distinct from Wickram's demand for self-restraining prudence. Wickram advocates self-control as one of the highest virtues, that is, to a degree he emphasizes the need for adjusting oneself to given structures that shape the world. By contrast, Kleist's characters only manage to retain their sanity because they place their subjective perceptions above the outside world, and do so with enormous fervour. Kleist's focus on the individual is marked by a passion the equivalent of which is depicted as self-destructive in Wickram. This difference could be related, among other things, to a difference in the writers' personality, e.g. the rebellious nature of Kleist versus what may have been the more practical character of Wickram; at the same time, more general characteristics of the time in which each of them was writing may need to be taken into account.

While advocating the importance of internal qualities, both authors also explore ways in which chance, or *glück*, may undermine a person's internal certainties. In Wickram's case, *glück* may be tied up with a person's inability to act with prudence and control his or her emotions, as we have observed most clearly in *Gabriotto*. In Kleist, or more specifically, in the case of Littegarde, chance may have a

destructive effect on a person's perceptual and ethical certainties. Thus in some way or other, *glück* and chance both threaten to destroy a person's grasp of himself or herself as well as of reality, in other words, they may both cause a person to lose himself or herself. However, an important difference emerges. When comparing Kleist's characters to those of Wickram, it becomes obvious that Wickram's characters, despite their anguish, are still in possession of psychological certainties, which Kleist's characters may no longer take for granted. None of Wickram's characters experiences a disintegration of their personality in the way in which Littegarde does. This indicates that Wickram was after all firmly rooted in the sixteenth century and was as yet relatively unassailed by the kind of self-questioning doubts which were to emerge in centuries to come. Yet despite these differences, the internalization of *glück* and chance presents itself as a remarkable common denominator between Wickram and Kleist, which attests to the former's modernity.

The fact that it is generally fruitful to relate Kleists' novella to Wickram's narratives suggests that Wickram's treatment of *glück* does indeed have relevance beyond the sixteenth century, which would make it interesting to relate that treatment to subsequent trends in the representation of this force. Not only does Wickram express a universal theme in human experience by depicting man's confrontation with contingency, or the unpredictable, he also stirs up some decidedly modern questions by raising the issue of human involvement in the manifestation of *glück*.

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