Foreign Law, Constitutional Cases and Theoretical Authority
Citation:
Doyle, O., Foreign Law, Constitutional Cases and Theoretical Authority, Global Constitutionalism, 5, 2016, 85 - 108Abstract:
The judicial use of foreign law in constitutional cases is often unsatisfactorily explained in terms of persuasive authority, judicial learning or judicial dialogue. In this article, I argue that the central case of the judicial use of foreign law involves judges treating foreign case law as theoretically, rather than practically, authoritative. The justification for this approach lies in how case law emerges from a process that is structured in such a way that its outcomes deserve respect. There is, in contrast, no justification for any attempt on the part of judges to treat constitutional cases as an opportunity for inter-jurisdictional judicial dialogue.
URI:
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/global-constitutionalism/article/constitutional-cases-foreign-law-and-theoretical-authority/0258023E324EDC44FB0C5D0C367E8AAFhttp://hdl.handle.net/2262/92280
Author's Homepage:
http://people.tcd.ie/ojdoyleDescription:
PUBLISHED
Author: DOYLE, ORAN
Type of material:
Journal ArticleURI:
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/global-constitutionalism/article/constitutional-cases-foreign-law-and-theoretical-authority/0258023E324EDC44FB0C5D0C367E8AAFhttp://hdl.handle.net/2262/92280
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Series/Report no:
Global Constitutionalism;5;
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Full text availableKeywords:
Comparative constitutional law, Foreign law, Authority, Judicial dialogue, Judicial learningSubject (TCD):
Identities in Transformation , International Integration , Comparative Constitutional Law , JurisprudenceDOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381715000192Metadata
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