The role of Kinêsis and Statis in Plato's Sophist : an inquiry into the two forgotten Megista Genê of the Sophist

Abstract

This dissertation addresses the general question of the relation between the problem of being and the theory of the five great kinds (megista genê) in Plato’s dialogue the Sophist. In contemporary scholarship, the two issues have been dealt with separately, and the megista genê theory has mostly been understood as Plato’s tool for solving the problem of not-being and falsehood. This dissertation intends to challenge the current state of the art with regard to the megista genê theory and its relation to the question about being by focusing primarily on the role of two great kinds, Kinêsis and Stasis (the other three are Being, Sameness and Otherness). The role of Kinêsis and Stasis has been relatively neglected, and they have often been regarded as kinds of minor importance compared to the other three. In what follows, I shall defend a significantly different interpretation of the role of Kinêsis and Stasis, according to which Kinêsis and Stasis are the key to the metaphysical foundation of the theory of the five great kinds in the Sophist. For they are, I argue, the two crucial parts of the part-whole structure that is Being. The two main claims I defend in the dissertation are that (1) Kinêsis and Stasis are essentially related to Being and that (2) the structure of this relation is that of parts (Kinêsis and Stasis) to a whole (Being). The first chapter is dedicated to the use of Kinêsis and Stasis in the Gigantomachia passage, and by extension, in the Sophist. It is addressed to the question of whether Kinêsis and Stasis can apply to the same beings. The affirmative answer to this question I call the coreferentiality thesis; the negative answer I call non-coreferentiality thesis. In this chapter, I defend the non-coreferentiality thesis, that is, the view that Kinêsis and Stasis do not apply to the same beings, and argue that the changing beings and the unchangeable beings form two groups of beings which never overlap. I argue for the non-coreferentiality thesis in the Gigantomachia passage but also in the rest of the dialogue, by showing that there is no evidence of a shift in the use of Kinêsis and Stasis after the end of the Gigantomachia. The main consequence of this thesis is that Kinêsis and Stasis are not used for features, or qualities that beings may or may not have, but for groups of beings which never overlap, namely: the changing beings and the changeless beings. The second chapter deals with the role of Kinêsis and Stasis in the enquiry about being. The question I raise is whether Kinêsis and Stasis are meant to be solely criteria of being, or whether they contribute to the definition of being. In this chapter, I argue in favour of the definitional reading in two ways. First, I show that contrary to what critics have generally assumed, it cannot be shown textually that the Gigantomachia passage is addressed only to the question ‘what is there?’ and to the question ‘what are beings like?’, and not also to the question ‘what is being?’. Instead, I show that there is evidence that the latter question is also addressed. Second, I show, on the basis of the requirements to answer a ti esti question set up by Socrates in the early dialogues, how Kinêsis and Stasis contribute to giving a definition of being. In particular, it emerges that Kinêsis and Stasis differ in two important respects from being merely criteria of being: first, Kinêsis and Stasis are not only that by reference to which one can determine whether or not something is a being, but they are also standards in the sense of models of being; second, they are also explanatory. The purpose of the third chapter is to consider, on the basis of the findings of the preceding chapters, what is the relation that unites Kinêsis and Stasis to Being. It has been established in Chapters I and II that Kinêsis and Stasis stand in relation to one another in a specific way: first, Kinêsis and Stasis are essentially related to Being; second Kinêsis and Stasis taken together have the same extension as Being. Having shown first that the relation among the three kinds, especially the essential relation, does not correspond to a case of participation among Forms, nor to a genus-species structure, I go on to argue in the rest of the chapter that the three kinds are united as a whole (Being) to its parts (Kinêsis and Stasis). Central to this claim is the thesis, defended by Harte in her book Plato on Parts and Whole (2002), that Plato’s own view on composition is that the whole is a unity over and above its parts. This is set against another view about composition, defended by the Eleatics, according to which composition is identity. Chapter IV considers the role of Sameness and Otherness in relation to the whole of parts formed by Being, Kinêsis and Stasis. The question addressed is what motivates the introduction of Sameness and Otherness as the fourth and fifth kinds. Based on an analysis of the passages from 251 to 259b, I defend the claim that Sameness and Otherness are introduced as necessary but not sufficient conditions for composition. I examine how the Late Learners passage raises a new problem about composition, linked to Plato’s view that a whole is a unity over and above its parts, and how Plato intends to solve it by introducing the claim that there are some kinds whose role is to make composition among other kinds possible. Those kinds are, precisely, Sameness and Otherness, and I argue for this by showing that each and every argument for the establishment of Sameness and Otherness as the fourth and fifth kind, distinct from the other three, start from the view that Being, Kinêsis and Stasis form a whole of parts. A central outcome of this chapter is the reconsideration of the ‘communion of kinds’, the notion that lies at the core of the 252-259 passages where Sameness and Otherness are introduced, as involving a relation of composition between the kinds, or Forms, as opposed to the mere attribution of different characteristics to a kind. Finally, the fifth and final chapter introduces Plotinus’ interpretation of the theory of the five great kinds of the Sophist which is developed in Enn. VI 2. Often, Plotinus’ reading has been understood by critics as a free interpretation of the Sophist, which addresses problems that are not those of Plato’s dialogue. By contrast, I argue here, on the basis of the previous chapters, that Plotinus’ theory of the five great kinds is fundamentally in agreement with the metaphysical project of the greatest kinds as developed by Plato in the Sophist. In particular, I show that Plotinus shares the view that: (i) the megista genê is a theory about the essence of Being; (ii) the essence of Being cannot be reduced to a single principle, but involves a plurality of principles; (iii) these principles must be related to one another by a particular structure. This marks an important difference to other readings of Plotinus’ Enn. VI 2 and it holds out a prospect for reconsidering the role and significance of a metaphysics of kinds of being, in so far as such a metaphysics goes back to Plato and especially the dialogue Sophist, in Antiquity. This dissertation addresses the general question of the relation between the problem of being and the theory of the five great kinds (megista genê) in Plato’s dialogue the Sophist. In contemporary scholarship, the two issues have been dealt with separately, and the megista genê theory has mostly been understood as Plato’s tool for solving the problem of not-being and falsehood. This dissertation intends to challenge the current state of the art with regard to the megista genê theory and its relation to the question about being by focusing primarily on the role of two great kinds, Kinêsis and Stasis (the other three are Being, Sameness and Otherness). The role of Kinêsis and Stasis has been relatively neglected, and they have often been regarded as kinds of minor importance compared to the other three. In what follows, I shall defend a significantly different interpretation of the role of Kinêsis and Stasis, according to which Kinêsis and Stasis are the key to the metaphysical foundation of the theory of the five great kinds in the Sophist. For they are, I argue, the two crucial parts of the part-whole structure that is Being. The two main claims I defend in the dissertation are that (1) Kinêsis and Stasis are essentially related to Being and that (2) the structure of this relation is that of parts (Kinêsis and Stasis) to a whole (Being). The first chapter is dedicated to the use of Kinêsis and Stasis in the Gigantomachia passage, and by extension, in the Sophist. It is addressed to the question of whether Kinêsis and Stasis can apply to the same beings. The affirmative answer to this question I call the coreferentiality thesis; the negative answer I call non-coreferentiality thesis. In this chapter, I defend the non-coreferentiality thesis, that is, the view that Kinêsis and Stasis do not apply to the same beings, and argue that the changing beings and the unchangeable beings form two groups of beings which never overlap. I argue for the non-coreferentiality thesis in the Gigantomachia passage but also in the rest of the dialogue, by showing that there is no evidence of a shift in the use of Kinêsis and Stasis after the end of the Gigantomachia. The main consequence of this thesis is that Kinêsis and Stasis are not used for features, or qualities that beings may or may not have, but for groups of beings which never overlap, namely: the changing beings and the changeless beings. The second chapter deals with the role of Kinêsis and Stasis in the enquiry about being. The question I raise is whether Kinêsis and Stasis are meant to be solely criteria of being, or whether they contribute to the definition of being. In this chapter, I argue in favour of the definitional reading in two ways. First, I show that contrary to what critics have generally assumed, it cannot be shown textually that the Gigantomachia passage is addressed only to the question ‘what is there?’ and to the question ‘what are beings like?’, and not also to the question ‘what is being?’. Instead, I show that there is evidence that the latter question is also addressed. Second, I show, on the basis of the requirements to answer a ti esti question set up by Socrates in the early dialogues, how Kinêsis and Stasis contribute to giving a definition of being. In particular, it emerges that Kinêsis and Stasis differ in two important respects from being merely criteria of being: first, Kinêsis and Stasis are not only that by reference to which one can determine whether or not something is a being, but they are also standards in the sense of models of being; second, they are also explanatory. The purpose of the third chapter is to consider, on the basis of the findings of the preceding chapters, what is the relation that unites Kinêsis and Stasis to Being. It has been established in Chapters I and II that Kinêsis and Stasis stand in relation to one another in a specific way: first, Kinêsis and Stasis are essentially related to Being; second Kinêsis and Stasis taken together have the same extension as Being. Having shown first that the relation among the three kinds, especially the essential relation, does not correspond to a case of participation among Forms, nor to a genus-species structure, I go on to argue in the rest of the chapter that the three kinds are united as a whole (Being) to its parts (Kinêsis and Stasis). Central to this claim is the thesis, defended by Harte in her book Plato on Parts and Whole (2002), that Plato’s own view on composition is that the whole is a unity over and above its parts. This is set against another view about composition, defended by the Eleatics, according to which composition is identity. Chapter IV considers the role of Sameness and Otherness in relation to the whole of parts formed by Being, Kinêsis and Stasis. The question addressed is what motivates the introduction of Sameness and Otherness as the fourth and fifth kinds. Based on an analysis of the passages from 251 to 259b, I defend the claim that Sameness and Otherness are introduced as necessary but not sufficient conditions for composition. I examine how the Late Learners passage raises a new problem about composition, linked to Plato’s view that a whole is a unity over and above its parts, and how Plato intends to solve it by introducing the claim that there are some kinds whose role is to make composition among other kinds possible. Those kinds are, precisely, Sameness and Otherness, and I argue for this by showing that each and every argument for the establishment of Sameness and Otherness as the fourth and fifth kind, distinct from the other three, start from the view that Being, Kinêsis and Stasis form a whole of parts. A central outcome of this chapter is the reconsideration of the ‘communion of kinds’, the notion that lies at the core of the 252-259 passages where Sameness and Otherness are introduced, as involving a relation of composition between the kinds, or Forms, as opposed to the mere attribution of different characteristics to a kind. Finally, the fifth and final chapter introduces Plotinus’ interpretation of the theory of the five great kinds of the Sophist which is developed in Enn. VI 2. Often, Plotinus’ reading has been understood by critics as a free interpretation of the Sophist, which addresses problems that are not those of Plato’s dialogue. By contrast, I argue here, on the basis of the previous chapters, that Plotinus’ theory of the five great kinds is fundamentally in agreement with the metaphysical project of the greatest kinds as developed by Plato in the Sophist. In particular, I show that Plotinus shares the view that: (i) the megista genê is a theory about the essence of Being; (ii) the essence of Being cannot be reduced to a single principle, but involves a plurality of principles; (iii) these principles must be related to one another by a particular structure. This marks an important difference to other readings of Plotinus’ Enn. VI 2 and it holds out a prospect for reconsidering the role and significance of a metaphysics of kinds of being, in so far as such a metaphysics goes back to Plato and especially the dialogue Sophist, in Antiquity.