Carrier Aggregation as a Repeated Game: Learning Algorithms for Efficient Convergence to a Nash Equilibrium
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2013Access:
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H. Ahmadi, I. Macaluso, and L. A. DaSilva, Carrier Aggregation as a Repeated Game: Learning Algorithms for Efficient Convergence to a Nash Equilibrium, IEEE Global Communications Conference (Globecom), Atlanta, GA, USA, 9-13 December, 2013, 2013Download Item:
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Abstract:
Carrier aggregation is a key feature of next
generation wireless networks to deliver high-bandwidth
links. This paper studies carrier aggregation for au-
tonomous networks operating in shared spectrum. In
our model, networks decide how many and which chan-
nels to aggregate in multiple frequency bands, hence ex-
tending the distributed channel allocation framework.
Moreover, our model takes into the account physical
layer issues, such as the out-of-channel interference in
adjacent frequency channels and the cost associated
with inter-band carrier aggregation. We propose learn-
ing algorithms that converge to Nash equilibria in a
reasonable number of iterations under the assumption
of incomplete and imperfect information
Sponsor
Grant Number
Science Foundation Ireland (SFI)
10/IN.1/I3007
Science Foundation Ireland (SFI)
10/CE/I1853
Author's Homepage:
http://people.tcd.ie/dasilvalhttp://people.tcd.ie/macalusi
Description:
PUBLISHEDAtlanta, GA, USA
Author: DA SILVA, LUIZ; MACALUSO, IRENE
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IEEE Global Communications Conference (Globecom)Type of material:
Conference PaperAvailability:
Full text availableKeywords:
game theorySubject (TCD):
TelecommunicationsLicences: