dc.contributor.author | Kelleher, GJ | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-04-24T15:21:05Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-04-24T15:21:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1972 | |
dc.identifier.citation | GJ Kelleher, 'Competitive 2-person percentile game theory with direct consideration of payoff matrices', Economic and Social Research Institute, Economic and Social Review, Vol.3 (Issue 4), 1972, 1972, pp561-568 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0012-9984 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2262/68923 | |
dc.description.abstract | Considered is the cases of two persons who have finite numbers of strategies and who act competitively toward each other. Separately and independently, each player selects one of his strategies. The payoffs to a player for the possible strategy combinations can be conveniently expressed in matrix form, where the rows are his strategies and the columns the strategies of the other player. Both players have knowledge of both payoff matrices. | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | Economic & Social Studies | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Economic and Social Review | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Vol.3 (Issue 4), 1972 | |
dc.subject | Game Theory | |
dc.title | Competitive 2-person percentile game theory with direct consideration of payoff matrices | |
dc.type | Journal Article | |
dc.status.refereed | Yes | |
dc.publisher.place | DUBLIN | |
dc.rights.ecaccessrights | OpenAccess | |
dc.format.extentpagination | pp561-568 | |