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dc.contributor.authorNewbery, David M.
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-30T10:28:38Z
dc.date.available2012-01-30T10:28:38Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.citationNewbery, David M. 'Regulating unbundled network utilities'. - Economic & Social Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, Spring, 2002, pp. 23-41, Dublin: Economic & Social Research Institute
dc.identifier.issn0012-9984
dc.identifier.otherJEL H54
dc.identifier.otherJEL L41
dc.identifier.otherJEL L96
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2262/61899
dc.description.abstractThe new conventional wisdom is that network utilities should be unbundled, with the potentially competitive segments under separate ownership from the natural monopoly network. Regulation should provide the same incentives as the competitive market, differing sharply from the traditional rate-of-return form evolved in the United States. But the new model has problems. Unbundling creates new price risks that require hedging. The consequences of the risks and resulting hedging contracts are often not well understood by regulators. The conditions for effective competition, at least in electricity, are considerably more demanding than in normal product markets. Competition law may need to be adapted to be effective.en
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherEconomic & Social Studies
dc.relation.ispartofVol.XX, No. XX, Issue, Year
dc.sourceEconomic & Social Reviewen
dc.subjectRegulationen
dc.subjectNetwork utilitiesen
dc.subjectCompetitionen
dc.subjectUnbundlingen
dc.subjectTelecommunicationen
dc.titleRegulating unbundled network utilities
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.publisher.placeDublinen


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