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dc.contributor.authorVon Hagen, Jurgen
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-25T11:39:25Z
dc.date.available2012-01-25T11:39:25Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.citationVon Hagen, Jurgen . 'Fiscal rules, fiscal institutions, and fiscal performance'. - Economic & Social Review, Vol. 33, No. 3, Winter, 2002, pp. 263-284, Dublin: Economic & Social Research Institute
dc.identifier.issn0012-9984
dc.identifier.otherJEL H23
dc.identifier.otherJEL H41
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2262/61832
dc.descriptionThis paper was delivered as the inaugural F. Y. Edgeworth Lecture at the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Irish Economic Association
dc.description.abstractPublic spending is a story of some people spending other people?s money. In modern democracies, voters elect politicians to make decisions about public spending for them, and they provide the funds by paying taxes. Two aspects of this story are worrying and have received considerable academic interest in recent years. The first is that public spending involves delegation, and, hence, principal-agent relationships. Elected politicians can extract rents from being in office, i.e., use some of the funds entrusted to them to pursue their own interests, be it outright in corruption, for perks, or simply waste. Voters might wish to eliminate the opportunity to extract rents by subjecting politicians to rules stipulating what they can and must do under given conditions. But the need to react to unforeseen developments and the complexity of the situation makes the writing of such contracts impossible. For the same reasons, politicians cannot realistically commit fully to promises made during election campaigns. Hence, like principal-agent relations in many other settings, the voter-politician relationship resembles an ?incomplete contract? (Seabright, 1996; Persson et al., 1997a, b; Tabellini, 2000).en
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherEconomic & Social Studies
dc.relation.ispartofVol.XX, No. XX, Issue, Year
dc.sourceEconomic & Social Reviewen
dc.subjectTaxationen
dc.subjectFiscal policyen
dc.subjectPublic spendingen
dc.titleFiscal rules, fiscal institutions, and fiscal performance
dc.typeConference Paper
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.publisher.placeDublinen


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