A reliabilist-teleological account of Plato's theory of knowledge based on the Timaeus, the Republic and the Theaetetus

Abstract

Whether, in Plato's epistemology, the Forms can be grasped without using the inferior epistemic capacities, and whether the inferior epistemic capacities contribute to one's grasp of F-ness and the Form F - These are the questions I want to take up in this dissertation. The answer to these questions, I argue, can be found in Plato's illustration of these inferior epistemic capacities in the Timaeus, the Theaetetus, and the Republic. On the basis of my investigation of these dialogues, I argue that all the inferior capacities, including sensation, phantasia, doxa, and dianoia, contribute to one's grasp of the whole truth, and that the Forms cannot be grasped merely by noesis alone without using the inferior epistemic capacities.