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    <title>DSpace Collection:</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62008</link>
    <description />
    <pubDate>Wed, 19 Jun 2013 00:06:19 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2013-06-19T00:06:19Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>Interfirm competition, intrafirm cannibalisation and product exit in the market for computer hard disk drives</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62076</link>
      <description>Title: Interfirm competition, intrafirm cannibalisation and product exit in the market for computer hard disk drives
Author: Ruebeck, Christopher S.
Abstract: Intrafirm “cannibalisation” of a product’s demand by the firm’s own products is found to&#xD;
have a more robust and significant relationship to the probability of its withdrawal than does interfirm competition from other firms’ products.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2002 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62076</guid>
      <dc:date>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The impact of structural and contractual arrangements on a vertically separated railway</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62075</link>
      <description>Title: The impact of structural and contractual arrangements on a vertically separated railway
Author: Affuso, Luisa; Newbery, David
Abstract: The unbundling of railways in Britain has been heavily criticised as undermining the&#xD;
passenger rail system. Economic theory suggests that structural separation and short-lived contracts hinder incentives to invest in relation-specific assets. This paper consitutes an initial investigation of this proposition. It investigates whether the investment pattern of the rail passenger franchisees responds to structural and contractual characteristics using a unique panel of data on the privatised railways in Britain. Its findings suggest that unbundling and competition for franchises combined with commercial objectives can provide strong incentives towards better performance, as is the case for investment behaviour.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2002 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62075</guid>
      <dc:date>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Time dependent efficiency of free trade agreements: the case of Slovenia and the CEFTA agreement</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62073</link>
      <description>Title: Time dependent efficiency of free trade agreements: the case of Slovenia and the CEFTA agreement
Author: Damijan, Joze P.; Masten, Igor
Abstract: In international trade literature there is a common feature that the abolishment of&#xD;
barriers to trade leads to direct expansion of trade flows. Many empirical studies that simulate welfare effects of trade liberalisation explicitly make use of this direct tariff reduction – trade expansion mechanism. On the contrary, this paper explores panel data to analyse the time dependent efficiency of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). It is shown that trade liberalisation per se&#xD;
needs time to become effective, and that immediately after the enforcement of the FTA the autonomous factors (such as domestic demand for particular import goods) are of great importance. Using an illustrative case of rapid expansion of Slovenian imports from other CEECs in the period 1993–1998, the paper demonstrates that the tariff reductions become effective in the second to third year after enforcement of the FTA. In addition, the relation between tariff reductions and trade expansions is non-linear, which reflects the time needed for new business connections to be established.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2002 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62073</guid>
      <dc:date>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Endogenous sunk costs in the market for mobile telecommunications: the role of licence fees</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/61902</link>
      <description>Title: Endogenous sunk costs in the market for mobile telecommunications: the role of licence fees
Author: Gruber, Harald
Abstract: An oligopoly model with endogenous sunk costs illustrates the trade off between ex ante extraction of oligopoly rents and market entry of firms in the mobile telecommunications industry. Competitive bidding for radio frequency licences provides scope for setting market structure endogenously: the higher the licence fee, the lower the number of competitive firms sustained by the market. High licence fees may be a signal for post-entry collusion.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2002 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/2262/61902</guid>
      <dc:date>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Foreign ownership and wages in British establishments</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/61900</link>
      <description>Title: Foreign ownership and wages in British establishments
Author: Velde, Dirk Willem te
Abstract: This paper uses the 1990-1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) panel data set to show that foreign establishments in Britain pay 13 per cent higher wages than&#xD;
domestic establishments. However, the differential disappears when we control for the skill structure within establishments.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2002 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/2262/61900</guid>
      <dc:date>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Regulating unbundled network utilities</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/61899</link>
      <description>Title: Regulating unbundled network utilities
Author: Newbery, David M.
Abstract: The new conventional wisdom is that network utilities should be unbundled, with the potentially competitive segments under separate ownership from the natural monopoly network. Regulation should provide the same incentives as the competitive market, differing sharply from the traditional rate-of-return form evolved in the United States. But the new model has problems. Unbundling creates new price risks that require hedging. The consequences of the risks and resulting hedging contracts are often not well understood by regulators. The conditions for effective competition, at least in electricity, are considerably more demanding than in normal product markets. Competition law may need to be adapted to be effective.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2002 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/2262/61899</guid>
      <dc:date>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Portfolio effects and firm size distribution: carbonated soft drinks</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/61898</link>
      <description>Title: Portfolio effects and firm size distribution: carbonated soft drinks
Author: Walsh, Patrick Paul; Whelan, Ciara
Abstract: We use rich brand level retail data to demonstrate that the firm size distribution in Carbonated Soft Drinks is mainly an outcome of the degree to which firms own a portfolio of brands across segments of the market, and not from performance within segments. In addition, while the number of firms in each segment is limited by segment size relative to sunk cost and competition in a segment, idiosyncratic firm effects make some firms more likely to participate in any given segment. This feature of the industry is the key to modelling firm size distribution in Carbonated Soft Drinks.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2002 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/2262/61898</guid>
      <dc:date>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The effect of technology choice on automobile assembly plant productivity</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/60724</link>
      <description>Title: The effect of technology choice on automobile assembly plant productivity
Author: Van Biesebroeck, Johannes
Abstract: Productivity growth is usually represented by a continuous shift of the production or cost function. In the automobile industry, there is evidence of a more discrete change in the technology. I estimate a structural model of production and technology choice, using a panel of US automobile assembly plants from 1963 to 1996. New decomposition results suggest that plant-level changes, as opposed to compositional effects, are the most important determinant of aggregate productivity growth.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2002 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/2262/60724</guid>
      <dc:date>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Neither lucky nor good: the case of electricity deregulation in California</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/60590</link>
      <description>Title: Neither lucky nor good: the case of electricity deregulation in California
Author: Martinek, Jason P.; Orlando, Michael J.
Abstract: We present an integrated summary of the various factors that contributed to shortages&#xD;
of electrical power in California in 2000. Several necessary conditions for the crisis are identified. We conclude that a sufficient remedy may be defined by policies that mitigate the limited incentives to invest in transmission capacity.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2002 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/2262/60590</guid>
      <dc:date>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Why are productivity and wages higher in foreign firms?</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/60516</link>
      <description>Title: Why are productivity and wages higher in foreign firms?
Author: Girma, Sourafel; Thompson, Steve; Wright, Peter W.
Abstract: This paper uses a panel data framework to examine whether foreign firms in the UK&#xD;
have higher levels of productivity and set higher wage rates than domestic ones ceteris paribus, or whether this is due to unmeasured characteristics. Its main finding is that foreign firms are more productive, by between 8 and 15 per cent, being particularly efficient in their use of capital. These advantages feed through into the wage levels of their employees, whose wages are higher as a result, effects that are particularly pronounced for firms from the United States.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2002 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/2262/60516</guid>
      <dc:date>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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