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<title>The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, Spring, 2002</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62008" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62008</id>
<updated>2017-11-03T02:42:28Z</updated>
<dc:date>2017-11-03T02:42:28Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>Interfirm competition, intrafirm cannibalisation and product exit in the market for computer hard disk drives</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62076" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Ruebeck, Christopher S.</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62076</id>
<updated>2016-09-09T18:47:27Z</updated>
<published>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Interfirm competition, intrafirm cannibalisation and product exit in the market for computer hard disk drives
Ruebeck, Christopher S.
Intrafirm ?cannibalisation? of a product?s demand by the firm?s own products is found to&#13;
have a more robust and significant relationship to the probability of its withdrawal than does interfirm competition from other firms? products.
</summary>
<dc:date>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The impact of structural and contractual arrangements on a vertically separated railway</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62075" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Affuso, Luisa</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Newbery, David</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62075</id>
<updated>2016-09-09T18:49:03Z</updated>
<published>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">The impact of structural and contractual arrangements on a vertically separated railway
Affuso, Luisa; Newbery, David
The unbundling of railways in Britain has been heavily criticised as undermining the&#13;
passenger rail system. Economic theory suggests that structural separation and short-lived contracts hinder incentives to invest in relation-specific assets. This paper consitutes an initial investigation of this proposition. It investigates whether the investment pattern of the rail passenger franchisees responds to structural and contractual characteristics using a unique panel of data on the privatised railways in Britain. Its findings suggest that unbundling and competition for franchises combined with commercial objectives can provide strong incentives towards better performance, as is the case for investment behaviour.
</summary>
<dc:date>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Time dependent efficiency of free trade agreements: the case of Slovenia and the CEFTA agreement</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62073" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Damijan, Joze P.</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Masten, Igor</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/62073</id>
<updated>2016-09-09T17:53:16Z</updated>
<published>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Time dependent efficiency of free trade agreements: the case of Slovenia and the CEFTA agreement
Damijan, Joze P.; Masten, Igor
In international trade literature there is a common feature that the abolishment of&#13;
barriers to trade leads to direct expansion of trade flows. Many empirical studies that simulate welfare effects of trade liberalisation explicitly make use of this direct tariff reduction ? trade expansion mechanism. On the contrary, this paper explores panel data to analyse the time dependent efficiency of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). It is shown that trade liberalisation per se&#13;
needs time to become effective, and that immediately after the enforcement of the FTA the autonomous factors (such as domestic demand for particular import goods) are of great importance. Using an illustrative case of rapid expansion of Slovenian imports from other CEECs in the period 1993?1998, the paper demonstrates that the tariff reductions become effective in the second to third year after enforcement of the FTA. In addition, the relation between tariff reductions and trade expansions is non-linear, which reflects the time needed for new business connections to be established.
</summary>
<dc:date>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Endogenous sunk costs in the market for mobile telecommunications: the role of licence fees</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/2262/61902" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Gruber, Harald</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/2262/61902</id>
<updated>2016-09-09T18:42:00Z</updated>
<published>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Endogenous sunk costs in the market for mobile telecommunications: the role of licence fees
Gruber, Harald
An oligopoly model with endogenous sunk costs illustrates the trade off between ex ante extraction of oligopoly rents and market entry of firms in the mobile telecommunications industry. Competitive bidding for radio frequency licences provides scope for setting market structure endogenously: the higher the licence fee, the lower the number of competitive firms sustained by the market. High licence fees may be a signal for post-entry collusion.
</summary>
<dc:date>2002-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
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