Exile in Plutarch’s *Parallel Lives*

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Summary

This thesis aims to investigate the theme of exile as it appears in the works of L. Mestrius Plutarchus, with specific emphasis on the collection of biographies known as the *Parallel Lives*. Many of Plutarch’s biographies concern Greek and Roman individuals who had either been banished from their homes or who had chosen a life of isolation or discovery away from their homelands and Plutarch provides substantial editorialising interjections regarding the nature and expectations of an individual experiencing the condition of exile. The majority of the thesis concerns the *Parallel Lives*, but I begin my investigation by looking first at a piece in Plutarch’s philosophical works known as the *On Exile*. I find that the *On Exile* provides an insufficient model for Plutarch’s views on the subjects because of its strict adherence to the genre of consolation literature. The *On Exile* is mostly a combination of argumentative patterns and examples which can be found in consolation treatises in Teles of Megara, Seneca the Younger, and Dio Chrysostom, as well as the exilic writings of Cicero, Ovid, and Musonius Rufus. I conclude that in order to glean a more accurate perspective on Plutarch’s views on exile, the investigation must concern the *Parallel Lives*.

The following chapters are divided into three thematically relevant topics that reflect Plutarch’s views on exile. First, we see a pattern in the Roman Lives which describes certain exiles from Rome as *ktistai*, or Founders. These *ktistic* exiles are renowned for their actions which preserved or protected the city and its values from internal or external threats and sedition which earned them a title linking them to Romulus, the initial Founder of Rome. These exiles appear to combat tyrannical rule to uphold and reinforce the values instilled by Romulus at the founding of the city, and all are exiled as part of their biographical narrative. These exiled Romans also display another curious quality: they all demonstrate how a statesman can employ exile as a tool for maintaining internal harmony within Rome, even at the cost of their own freedom.

The next topic concerns the ostracised Athenians, for whom Plutarch reserves special mention throughout the *Parallel Lives*. Plutarch saw ostracism, the democratic process of exile from Athens, not as a punishment for illegal or criminal behaviour but rather as indicative of exceptionality, a quality incommensurate with the democratic rule of the city at the time. The ostracism narratives are a significant source of characterisation, but we also find that Plutarch strictly condemns the Athenian populace for expelling their best and brightest citizens out of destructive envy (*phthonos*). Once again we see that Plutarch’s exiled subjects choose to embrace exile and preserve the internal harmony of the city.

The final theme is the wandering exiles, individuals who chose a life of isolation or travel outside of their homeland. For Plutarch, these are the most commendable examples of exile because of their use of exile to relieve envy, to acquire experience and knowledge, and the use of their exile to convene with the divine. These individuals often return to their homelands with gifts of
laws and customs acquired from the outside world for the benefit of the operation of their homeland.

Finally, I investigate how Plutarch likely wrote the *Coriolanus-Alcibiades* as an antithesis to the *Themistocles-Camillus* through their exile narratives. The descriptions of Plutarch’s exiled heroes link them to Odysseus and Achilles, both of whom appear in the *Moralia* as examples of exiled individuals. The parallels between the *Themistocles* and *Alcibiades* paint them as two sides of an Odyssean archetype who, when confronted with similar circumstances in exile, react with significantly different consequences. Similarly, the *Camillus* and *Coriolanus* portray the Roman exiles as combative and unbending statesmen until Camillus learns from his exile and returns to save the city. The parallels between the two pairs of *Lives* demonstrates that Plutarch likely had connections in mind beyond the standard Greek and Roman pairs, and that he had threads connecting Roman to Roman and Greek to Greek.
Acknowledgements

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I would also like to thank my family and friends for putting up with my endless talk of Plutarch and exile for the last four years. I know not everything is about Plutarch and not everybody is an exile, so I thank you for your patience.

Special thanks go out to my mother, without whom none of this would be possible.
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Foreword

The purpose of this dissertation initially was to investigate exile as it appeared in Plutarch’s *Life of Sertorius*, the Roman general who fled into exile after the death of Marius and the return of Sulla in 83 BCE. As my research progressed, I saw that Plutarch’s interest in exiles and exile narratives extended far beyond the singular *Life* and even its Greek pair. Exiles are prominent throughout Plutarch’s corpus - from the *Lives* through the *Moralia* - and the story of Plutarch and exile grew in the telling. In the ancient world exile was associated with death, rebirth, knowledge, creation, loss, and punishment. It was the fate of the lowliest outcast and the highest of magistrates; the home of the fugitive and a sanctuary for the oppressed. To be forcibly displaced from one’s home into untamed wilderness was a genuine threat to any person who dared to undermine or disrupt the social order and Plutarch would have witnessed his fair share of mass exiles and banishments in his time.

Exile is no less significant in the twenty-first century than it was in the first. Stories of deposed politicians seeking asylum in other nations are peppered through modern events while tales of refugees seeking a new home have only escalated in recent years. Millions of modern exiles are forced to endure the perils of banishment every year: 70.8 million according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, most from Syria, Afghanistan, and South Sudan.¹ There are nearly four million stateless individuals who have no legal home to return to while 41.3 million others are internally displaced within the borders of a nation that refuses to protect their interests. In the

¹ UNHCR (2019), *Figures at a Glance*.
modern world, a new exile is deprived of their home every two seconds, forfeiting their liberties and their belongings and are forced to scrounge a new existence far from the life they always knew. Exile is still among us, perhaps more than ever.

Exile still persists in countries not wracked by civil conflict or political upheaval. While infrequent, countries such as Canada, the United States, and the constituents of the European Union still allow for internal banishment to be used as judicial penalties. As recently as 2017 a man was banished from his home province of Newfoundland, Canada for a period of one year. In the United States, banishment is sporadically applied across the country. The Tennessee Constitution permits exile, and Maryland’s Constitution specifically states that exile is the punishment for corruption. In 2000, a Kentucky judge banished a convicted domestic abuser from the entire state for a year. Banishment in Georgia has been repeatedly upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court and in 2011 they ruled it constitutional to banish criminals from all but one county in the state, a practice colloquially known as ‘158-county banishment.’ In 2013 a protestor was banished from Washington D.C. Even in Ireland six people were banned from County Clare in 2006 under the Public Order Act.

Internal banishment permits the exile to retain the protections of their home nation while demanding they abstain from entering prohibited areas.

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3. Constitution of Maryland, Form of Government XXXIX. "That if any Senator, Delegate to Congress or Assembly, or member of the Council, shall hold or execute any office of profit, or receive, directly or indirectly, at any time, the profits or any part of the profits of any office exercised by any other person... he shall suffer the punishment of wilful and corrupt perjury, or be banished this State forever." See also LIII.
However, in recent years more countries have revised their laws concerning revocation of citizenship for acts of treason and terrorism. Some, including the United Kingdom, permit revocation even in cases when it would render the individual stateless and, in effect, an exile. Modern statelessness carries many of the same consequences as it did two thousand years ago; it deprives an individual of socio-economic and political rights including social welfare, political participation, and education. Yet exile by statelessness remains a valid tool for punishment in judicial systems across the world.

Despite the obvious horrors of exile - the loss of basic human rights, protections, and benefits - we have been enthralled by the stories of exiles throughout history. Stories of successful exiles have become examples of triumph over adversity and stalwart resistance in the face of unjust persecution. Nelson Mandela’s imprisonment on Robben Island, South Africa is frequently described as a form of exile (similar to the Roman relegatio); his eventual release and subsequent presidency are seen as pivotal to the rebirth of the nation. Charles de Gaulle, leader of the French government-in-exile during World War II, has become a heroic example of resistance against Nazi occupation, later returning to re-establish the French constitution. The controversial exile of Edward Snowden reminds us of the price of unfettered access to information in the modern age of technology, while countless exiled dissidents from China demonstrate the suppression of free speech existing today. Ruhollah Khomeini was forced into exile by the Shah of Iran during which he fomented an Islamic revolution. He returned after fifteen years

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5 While Mandela’s captivity is not exile in the strictest sense, the fact that modern sensibilities equate it with exile is enough to warrant mention in this paper. Captivity is in fact the opposite of exile - exile is the abandonment by the state; prisoners are remanded into the absolute control of the state.
abroad with a new constitution and the public support of a people eager for change.

The romanticism and tragedy of exile have pervaded modern popular culture and fictional exiles have never been more prominent than they are today. The *Star Wars* anthology has introduced new exiles with each film, from Yoda and Obi-Wan Kenobi to Jar-Jar Binks and Luke Skywalker. George R. R. Martin’s *A Song of Ice and Fire* introduced exiles in the characters of Jon Snow and the Night’s Watch, exiled to the far north as penance for their crimes. Daenerys Targaryen and her brother fled into exile following a brutal rebellion resulting in the overthrow of her father the king. Aragorn of J. R. R. Tolkien’s *The Lord of the Rings* serves as a quintessential example of a king-in-exile, reluctant but destined to regain his title to preserve the realm. Outside the realm of science-fiction and fantasy, military characters such as Sylvester Stallone’s Rambo, Tom Hardy’s Bane (*The Dark Knight Rises*), and Colonel Kurtz (*Apocalypse Now*) are all examples of warriors gone into exile for self-reflection or refuge. Exiles are everywhere in modern thought, whether we recognize them as such or just appreciate the turns of fortune that brought them to their current conditions.

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Introduction

In the ancient world exile, the condition of being deprived of one’s homeland, was a reality for many public figures. Accounts of statesmen and commanders being forced from their homes or choosing to flee from persecution occur throughout Greek and Roman texts from works of Homer through to the Roman Empire and beyond. For many it was a death sentence. For others it was the impetus for far-flung adventures, philosophical learning, or lives of leisure. Some, in their banishment, sought revenge on those who had wronged them, while others remained content to relocate, resettle, and restart their lives anew, free from the conditions which birthed their disenfranchisement. In all circumstances exile was a fresh start: in some cases, their assets were confiscated, and their citizenship revoked, forcing them to redefine themselves beyond any association to their former homeland. From Odysseus to Ovid, exiles dominate the literary landscape of Greece and Rome for their triumphs and their failures, and a certain romanticism followed behind their appeal.

In the Early Principate, L. Mestrius Plutarchus embarked on a project that would provide historians with biographical information on a vast collection of significant figures throughout history. The Parallel Lives were composed as a way to compare the virtues of statesmen from both Greece and Rome; their families, their upbringing, their education, and their conduct in both warfare and governance were all taken into consideration to instruct the reader on what made them successful, what led to their downfall, and what lessons ought to be learned from their behaviour. Composed over twenty years, the Parallel Lives deal with figures from the earliest founders of Rome and Athens
- Romulus and Theseus - up to the end of the Roman Republic.\(^1\) In some cases, Plutarch’s biographies remain the only extant accounts of their lives that remain to us today.

A glance at the Plutarchan corpus reveals a striking number of exiles and exile narratives throughout the *Parallel Lives* which suggests that it was a topic of some significance to Plutarch. Of the fifty biographies written by Plutarch, roughly half contain exile narratives to some degree, often as a pivotal characterising moment that reveals a microcosm of the values Plutarch sought to emphasize. Among these accounts we find even more evidence that exile was a topic of interest: editorial interjections on the nature of ostracism, repeated arguments as to the value of exile, and frequent commentary on the causes and effects of banishment. Beyond the *Lives*, however, we see that the concept emerges time and again throughout the *Moralia* and culminates in Plutarch’s treatise dedicated solely to the topic of exile, *On Exile* (*De Exilio*), which is of particular interest to this study. The existence of *On Exile* suggests that exile was worthy of special attention and warranted further, more specific, attention.

Despite Plutarch’s apparent interest in exile and exiles, the connection between this topic and Plutarch’s compositional method has yet to be adequately investigated. Modern scholarship has had a tendency to focus on individual cases of interest, such as the *On Exile* itself or high-profile historical cases like Themistocles or Cicero. Opsomer (2002) dissected the *On Exile* to

\(^1\) We can be certain that Plutarch lived into the reign of Hadrian (117-138 CE) since an inscription (*SIG*³ 829 A) lists him as priest of Delphi. Eusebius (c. 119) also attested that Plutarch was appointed by the emperor to procurator of Greece. It is likely Plutarch died soon after 117 and no later than 120. It is generally accepted that Plutarch began composing the *Parallel Lives* after 96 CE until his death c. 120 CE. Cf. Jones 1966, 61.
discover what differentiates it from other exile treatises but does not discuss
the impact the topic had on Plutarch’s biographies. Beneker (2004) correctly
explains how Plutarch’s accounts of ostracism had both theoretical and
practical applications and how “uncommon distinction” led to exile out of envy,
but practically, ostracism was used as a political weapon against rivals.
Nerdahl (2012) suggests that the exile narratives of Camillus, Aristides, and
Coriolanus were linked through explicit and implicit heroic imagery
associating the three with Achilles at the moment of self-exile from the Trojan
War. Mayer (1997) comes the closest to addressing the theme, labelling
Plutarch’s exiles as “cultural renegades” and suggesting that Plutarch’s
accounts mask their subjects’ own cultural appropriation in order to portray
them as champions of Hellenic culture, resistant and unchanged in the face
of foreign influence. Fulkerson (2012) identifies some of the themes that lead
Plutarch’s subjects into exile as well as the capacity of an inconsistent demos
to drive out their best elements, but the focus is on individual Lives and
Plutarch’s reaction rather than exile in particular.

Other writers have discussed exile in the ancient world or other aspects of
Plutarch’s composition. Forsdyke’s (2005) exhaustive study on exile in
Athens serves as a historical embarkment point for the discussions here, but
references to Plutarch specifically and his compositional method are almost
entirely missing. Similarly, Kelly’s (2012) work on Roman exile picks up where
Forsdyke left off, comprehensively discussing the role and occurrences of
exile during the Roman Republic. Montiglio (2005) examines the concept of
wandering as it relates to Greek exiles (a theme which will reappear in a later
chapter), but once again Plutarch’s Lives are discussed in passing. Even
among the works of Pelling (1979), Swain (1990), and Duff (1999), who focus
on individual comparisons between Lives, the theme is mentioned briefly and without further discussion. To date, there is no work that examines how exile is used as a theme across all the Lives, how it impacted the way Plutarch chose his subjects, portrayed their virtues and vices, and the greater compositional effect it had on the entire project.

The first objective of this study is to determine whether the philosophical ideals laid out in On Exile are reflected in the Parallel Lives. As we have seen, modern categorization of Plutarch’s works into Parallel Lives or Moralia creates a tendency to see them as distinct and excludes cross-pollination of ideas between works. If Plutarch sought to achieve truth in his depictions of virtue then one would expect the values depicted in On Exile to be reflected in his biographical narratives. The On Exile provides an outline for his theory of exile, but it is in the Lives where his thinking can be tested in the world of the practical. The reader is given the opportunity to witness how Plutarch interprets the scenarios of exile his subjects face: their causes, consequences, and how those events reflect upon the banished individuals of the Lives.

The second objective is to examine the various ways in which Plutarch represents exiles throughout the Parallel Lives. The On Exile provides us with several of the key elements to discuss: cosmopolitanism, loyalty to homeland (patris), exile as a path to leisure or knowledge, and adaptability are all on display throughout the Lives. However, being accounts of practical history, the Lives also permit Plutarch to introduce the demos as an element with agency of its own, wielding power in Athens and Rome but lacking the ability to properly direct their passions. We find that the exile is not a consistent figure in the Lives. They are not all modelled after the wayward Odysseus or
the wrathful Achilles or politically motivated like Cicero. Instead we find that exile appears to be a common threat for all statesmen in the ancient world who sought to position themselves above their station or who had achieved too much to divert the toxic envy that accompanies success. It is a historical constant that descends upon the ambitious and tests their virtue while revealing their quality not only as statesmen and generals, but as virtuous people if armed with the tools of education and philosophy. Once the subjects of the Parallel Lives are exiled, the tests of their character begin. It is their conduct during and after their exiles (should their exile come to an end at all) that defines their Lives. This investigation seeks to illuminate Plutarch’s views on exile and what effect they might have had on the composition of the Parallel Lives.

Structure

The first chapter begins with a discussion of the definition of exile: what it meant to be exiled in the ancient world, the differences in exile practices between Greece and Rome, and the terminology used to describe the various forms. Plutarch’s native language of Greek contributes the most significant term – feugo (φεύγω) - as a catch-all for exile, but it is necessary to expose other potential terminology to encompass the scope of the concept. For the Romans, exile took on several forms, each with their own specific nomenclature and consequences and it is worth seeing which of the terms and concepts are used by Plutarch in his own writings. Greek exile typically falls under the category of ostracism, but, given the unusual pre-eminence in
the *Parallel Lives*, it is worth exploring what exactly ostracism meant to the Athenians and to those subjected to it.

The second chapter will be an examination of Plutarch’s *On Exile*, a treatise in the *Moralia* dedicated solely to the philosophical implications of exile during the Early Principate. We find that *On Exile* is a consolation treatise that follows established norms and traditional arguments common among other treatises on the subject. The arguments presented by Plutarch are strikingly similar to those found in the exile works of Teles of Megara, arguably the progenitor of exile consolations. The patterns continue through the ‘triad of exiles’ (*exulum trias*): Cicero, whose *Letters to Atticus* (*Epistulae ad Atticum*) and *Tusculan Disputations* (*Tusculanae Quaestiones*) provide insight into his banishment; Ovid’s *Tristia* was composed during his exile to Tomis on the Black Sea; and Seneca’s *Consolation to Helvia* (*Consolatione ad Helviam*), composed as a consolation to his wife during his exile in Corsica. Finally, I continue the comparison through to Plutarch’s contemporaries: Musonius Rufus, Dio Chrysostom, and Favorinus to reveal how the tradition of exile consolations had evolved into the Principate.

Once the historical aspects of exile have been established and the key elements of *On Exile* laid out, the remaining chapters of this study will focus on the *Parallel Lives*. At the core of this study is the categorisation of Plutarch’s exiles so we can begin to reveal thematic connections between them. I have designated three categories under which the *Parallel Lives* fall, but few of Plutarch’s subjects can be exclusively described as one or the other. The categories exist to contextualize Plutarch’s exile narratives and

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2 A term I have borrowed from H.M.R. Leopold 1904. It is a fitting categorization for the exiled Romans.
demonstrate linking thematic threads between *Lives* that exist apart from the established Greek-Roman literary pairings. The categories I have chosen reflect aspects of exile present in *On Exile*, namely, loyalty to the *patris*, cosmo-politanism, and exile as a route to leisure and philosophy. The final category exists for the *Lives* of ostracised Athenians, as Plutarch provides extra editorializations during those events from which more insight can be gleaned.

The first category is the founding exile who, in their banishment, comes to safeguard or re-establish the fundamental principles on which the city was founded. I will begin with Romulus; whose *Life* documents his own exile from Alba Longa and subsequent decision to found the city of Rome and established many of its customs. This will be followed by a discussion of three other Roman *Lives* which appear to follow thematically: Camillus, whose return from exile resulted in the liberation of Rome from the Gallic occupation; Marius, who saved the city from an invasion of Cimbrians; and Cicero, whose decisive actions prior to his exile led to the execution of conspirators looking to overthrow the Roman government. All of these *Lives* appear to be connected through thematic strands linking them back to the *Life* of Romulus and their commemoration as Founders of Rome. This chapter will also include discussion on the small number of antithetical exiles who, on their return from banishment, seek to exact revenge upon their homelands. These revenge exiles are few and far between due to Plutarch’s tendency to write mainly about praiseworthy figures, but their stories contain fascinating elements that provide insight into how an exile should not behave. This subcategory of *Lives* is represented by the *Sertorius*, the *Coriolanus*, and the
Alcibiades. The unique position of the Marius as portraying both a founding exile and a revenge exile will also be discussed.

The second category is reserved for the ostracised Athenians. We will see in Chapter 2 that ostracism held a special place in Athenian culture since it was the only form of exile apparently not associated with social or political death. Instead, ostracism was reserved for the most exceptional elements in Athenian society who were deemed incompatible with the pure democracy they strove to achieve. It was designed to limit the power of would-be tyrants, curtail the authority of the ambitious, diminish the fortune of the wealthy, and provided an opportunity for the demos to employ their collective will to eject someone from the state with no loss of honour or lasting repercussions. Plutarch was obviously fascinated by these individuals since he composed so many Lives around the small number of Athenians who were ostracised. It is the only form of exile about which he provides complex editorial commentary and his statements are internally consistent. The Lives of the ostracised Athenians are a category amongst themselves and their presentation is worthy of deeper investigation.

The final category is for the wandering exiles. Several of Plutarch’s subjects are not forced out of their homelands by circumstances beyond their control. They are not banished by edict or judicial sentence, nor do they face threats of violence upon their return. These exiles choose a life of exile for adventure or the pursuit of knowledge and experience, often for the benefit of their homelands. I have labelled these exiles ‘wanderers’ after the Greek term planetes (πλάνητες) because it is commonly used to describe their behaviour. In the Lives of the wandering exiles we find the pairs of Solon-Publicola and the Lycurgus-Numa, all of whom were known for their dedication to law, order,
and religion. It is therefore striking that Plutarch describes many of them as choosing to spend their days in the uncivilised world of the wilderness or abroad in foreign lands. In this chapter I will investigate the connection between wandering and exile in Greek thought, what the benefits of wandering were over other forms of exile, and why Plutarch would describe his subjects in these terms. The Lives of the wandering exiles are stories of personal growth, discovery, and ultimately wandering as a benefit to the self and to the state.

With the above thematic elements established, the final chapter of this study will be a reading of two pairs of Lives linked by their exile narratives. I intend to show that there are enough similarities between the Themistocles-Camillus and the Coriolanus-Alcibiades to say that the latter may have been written as a reversal of the former. Plutarch employs characterisation techniques that suggest significant parallels between Themistocles and Alcibiades as well as Camillus and Coriolanus, and the circumstances of their exiles retain striking similarities as well. However, the most important aspect is how Plutarch describes their conduct while in exile. How they behave when confronted with similar circumstances links the two Greeks and the two Romans together in ways beyond the traditional Greek-Roman pairs and suggests greater thematic parallels in the Lives that exist along cultural classification.
Chapter I. Exile in the Ancient World

Before we begin the investigation into exile as found in Plutarch’s works, it is necessary to understand what exile meant for individuals in the ancient world. As previously noted, Plutarch’s Lives were written in the late first century CE but their subjects lived hundreds of years before his time.\(^1\) The latest biographies are set during the final years of the Roman Republic while others reach back to the legendary founders of Rome and Athens nearly a millennium earlier. In that time exile, as practiced by citizens of Athens and Rome, evolved and changed in their execution and consequences. This chapter will outline how exile was perceived in these two societies and isolate the terminology that defined it through the centuries.

i. Greek Exile

The most commonly used words for exile in Greek are cognates of *feugo* (φεύγω), often translated to “flight” or “banishment” but its cognates can also be used to describe a “fugitive” or “exile”. It is an inherently ambiguous word because it encompasses both voluntary and involuntary flight and provides no insight into whether the intended meaning is one of judicial sentencing or personal decision.\(^2\) In many cases we are left with only contextual clues to determine what is specifically meant by *feugo* in the given circumstance. However, in the case of Athenian law it is often an unnecessary distinction since individuals who chose to go into exile to avoid punishment were declared guilty *in absentia* and sentenced to exile regardless.

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\(^1\) See *Introduction* – pg. 1

In ancient Athenian law prior to the fifth century BCE, the Areopagus Council determined judicial penalties. However, shortly after the founding of the democracy the power of the Areopagus passed to the Athenian people in their new judicial capacity as jurors. The authority of the Areopagus Council continued to diminish in favour of the Council of Five Hundred and the Assembly until Ephialtes’ reforms in 462 BCE, when they were reduced entirely to only overseeing cases of homicide. By transferring the power from the Council to the people, criminal punishments were dictated by a vote of the jury rather than a strict set of codified penalties. It fell to the will of the people to decide what was to be done with criminals in most situations. For example, in the trial of Socrates he was permitted to suggest an alternate punishment for the jury to consider against the prosecution’s proposal of capital punishment. The prosecution and the defendant proposed punishments, but the final judgment fell in the purview of the jury. Certain offenses had fixed penalties, however. Homicide was always punishable by either death or exile, according to Draco’s laws. Similarly, attempted tyranny also carried the penalty of exile and after the oligarchic revolution of 411 BCE the definition grew to include anyone who threatened the democracy.

A sentence of exile carried serious implications. To be exiled from Athens meant that the exile was no longer permitted to return to the city limits nor attend Greek games or the Amphictyonic sacrifices. Their citizenship would be revoked and their rights to vote or attend sacrifices would be rescinded.

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4 Forsdyke 2005, 178.
5 Forsdyke 2005, 178. See also Draco’s law, republished in 409/8 during the “revision of the laws that took place from 410-404 BCE. cf. van Effenterre 1994, 16.
7 Dem. 23.37, quoting the laws of the Areopagus concerning homicide.
cases of voluntary homicide, the property and assets of the guilty party were forfeited to the state for redistribution. An exile from Athens did retain certain protections. It was not permitted to apprehend or murder an exile who continued to fulfil the terms of their exile by remaining outside the city limits. Demosthenes states that anybody who harms an exile lawfully obeying the terms of their banishment was liable to punishment as if they had committed it against an Athenian citizen.

Crimes less significant than homicide or attempted tyranny warranted a different punishment. In cases of bribery, embezzlement, or bringing false witness, the jury of Athenians could impose the penalty of *atimia* (ἀτιμία), literally a “loss of honour.” The *atimos* (ἄτιμος) had their citizen rights stripped away and their capacity for participation in political life curtailed: they could not attend Assembly meetings, serve as a juror, or even bring actions before the court. A sentence of *atimia* was tantamount to social and political death. A ban from the Assembly meant an end to any advancement in the political sphere as well as the monetary compensation that came from jury service. If wronged, the *atimos* had no recourse. They could not bring charges against other citizens and had no legal protection against any criminal activity, including murder. While *atimia* contained no statute barring the *atimos* from the city limits, the sentence stripped them of their social protection and made living within the city intolerable. In the end, the *atimos* would be compelled to flee the city out of fear for their own safety. Once outside the borders the *atimos* could live without fear of retribution or further punishment. Unlike exile,

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8 Dem. 23.45.
9 Forsdyke 2005, 10. The killer was guiltless (εὐαγής) and the victim died without compensation (νηποινεῖ).
atiemia could also be applied to the family of the convicted or even passed on through generations.\textsuperscript{10}

In the fifth century BCE the Athenians began to practice the form of exile known as ostracism. Unlike exile and atimia, ostracism did not require the victim to have committed any criminal act. It was not a judicial penalty nor was it necessarily used against individuals with a history of criminal behaviour. Instead, ostracism was determined by public opinion and decided by democratic vote. The assembly would gather and determine whether an individual ought to be exiled for a period of ten years, then at a later date the demos would gather in the agora and vote (using ostraka [ὄστρακα] or potsherds, hence the name) on who they thought should be banished. Provided a certain number of votes were reached, the individual would be given ten days to remove themselves from the city. The ostracised was permitted to retain all the protections of citizenship, their property, and assets for the duration of their exile. The only restriction imposed was the physical relocation of the exile and barring from the boundaries of Athens.

Ostracism was a peculiar tradition and all sources point to its use only against members of the polity with exceptionally high standing. Aristotle wrote that ostracism was devised as a means to remove, for a definite period (typically ten years but eventually reduced to five), those who had risen too high above the other citizens in their acquisition of wealth, authority, or influence.\textsuperscript{11} Ostracism appears to have been designed to maintain the status quo of Athenian democracy by removing by public opinion those who were deemed to be no longer compatible with the equality demanded by the state. The strict

\textsuperscript{10} Forsdyke 2005, 10. n.25.
\textsuperscript{11} Arist. Pol. 3.8 (13 Bk.)
conditions of ostracism meant that it was only employed about a dozen times during the period of its use in the fifth century BCE. Starting with Hipparchus, a relative of the tyrant Peisistratus, and several other relatives of tyrants, ostracism was used against many significant figures in Athenian politics: Aristides, Themistocles, Cimon, Alcibiades, and Thucydides were all exiled by ostracism. Several others, such as Pericles, were targeted but never exiled. The practice fell out of use after the ostracism of Hyperbolus c. 417 BCE and there is no evidence of its use after the Peloponnesian War.\textsuperscript{12}

The final form of Greek exile worth discussing is the religious ritual of expelling a \textit{pharmakos} (φαρμακός), or ‘scapegoat’, during times of disaster or internal crisis.\textsuperscript{13} The \textit{pharmakos} was expelled from the city to ritualistically purify the city during the Thargelia, a festival to Apollo that took place during the month of \textit{Thargelion} (late April to late May). Unlike ostracism which targeted the wealthiest and most esteemed members of society, the \textit{pharmakos} was chosen from among the poorest and ugliest citizens.\textsuperscript{14} Accounts vary from region to region but \textit{pharmakoi} were often slaves, criminals, or others who were in some fashion excluded by the rest of society. Once selected, the \textit{pharmakos} was treated well: in Massilia he was cared for by the state for an entire year, in Abdera he was thrown a feast in his honour.

\textsuperscript{12} Ostracism as described was an Athenian practice, but we have evidence that other cities had their own variation on democratic exile. Megara, Miletos, Argos, and Syracuse all employed some form of ostracism; the method in Syracuse was known as \textit{petalismos} (πεταλισμός) on account of using olive leaves instead of potsherds. Little is known about petalism other than the duration of exile was only five years instead of ten. Cf. Diod. 11.87.1

\textsuperscript{13} Other terms existed for the scapegoat – \textit{katharma} (κάθαρμα), \textit{perikatharma} (περικάθαρμα) - but for this dissertation I shall use the term \textit{pharmakos} in the Athenian fashion due to the overwhelming fixation on Athens by Plutarch. Cf. Men. Sam. 481.

and in Athens he was cared for and dressed in fine clothes. After the *pharmakos* was fed, dressed, and taken care of, they were expelled from the city or put to death.

The expulsion of the *pharmakos* was highly ritualistic. Plutarch writes that the *pharmakos* was led out of the city in a procession that started from the public hearth in the prytaneion, the Greek town hall. The procession was accompanied by musicians to a special gate reserved for the expulsion of the *pharmakos* which, in Athens, was known as the Prauridian gate. After continuing the procession around the city, the *pharmakos* was chased beyond the border of the city, usually ahead of a hail of stones thrown by the united citizens in an act that galvanized the community in driving off the unwanted elements personified in the *pharmakos*.

From the above examples we can see that the Greeks - the Athenians in particular - associated exile with death. In the most fundamental definition of Greek exile it was used as an alternative to capital punishment and would often amount to the same end: the individual would die without the protection of their community and the advantages provided by civilisation. A declaration of *atimia* brought upon a similar fate since the *atimos* risked life and limb by remaining in the city with no legal recourse for protection. Similarly, myths surrounding the *pharmakos* heavily imply that the throwing of stones symbolically mimicked the execution or sacrifice of the *pharmakos* and the

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15 For Massilia see Petr. fr. 1; Schol. Statius Theb. 10.793. For Abdera see Call. fr. 90 Pf. For Athens see Schol. Ar. Eq. 1136. Bremmer 1983, 305.
17 Plutarch (*Mor.* 518b) states that cities had special gates for various purposes. The prison in Athens, for instance, led the condemned through the gate of Charon. Bremmer 1983, 314.
practical result was the same. The *pharmakos* was as good as dead to the people of the city in their expulsion, never to return.\(^{19}\) Ostracism therefore held a unique place among forms of Greek exile in that it not only provided an opportunity to return from exile, but that it also preserved the belongings and property of the ostracised in anticipation of their return. Only through ostracism could an individual be exiled and guarantee a return after ten years had elapsed.

**ii. Roman Exile**

Roman exile practices are generally referred to in terms of *exilium* and, like the Greek *feugo*, it is an inherently ambiguous term. *Exilium* and its cognates occupy a broad spectrum of actions relating to banishment and flight including voluntary exile, judicial sentencing, flight from proscription, personal retirement, or even extended military service.\(^{20}\) Once again it often falls to contextual clues to determine exactly which process is being described and whether it falls into the category of exile being discussed.

Any examination of Roman exile must first deal with the historically hazy period of the Roman Kingdom (c. 753-c. 509 BCE). Material from this period is frequently unreliable as it is replete with embellishments and anachronisms which make it impossible to obtain any clear understanding of the legal system governing exile.\(^{21}\) What we do have are singular accounts (several in Plutarch) relating vague concepts and unreliable anecdotes which often do not align with other sources or what is known from later periods. The best that

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\(^{19}\) Bremmer 1983, 318.  
\(^{20}\) Kelly 2006, 5.  
\(^{21}\) Kelly 2006, 2.
can be achieved is a list of the kings of Rome who were allegedly exiled, but little more can be said on the matter conclusively. I argue in this paper that the *Lives* of Romulus and Numa Pompilius (the first and second kings of Rome respectively) clearly designate them as exiles of one fashion or another, but this determination relies entirely on Plutarch’s account of events which do not necessarily coincide with other historical sources. The final King of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus, was also allegedly exiled after his deposition but we are given scant details concerning the process and legal ramifications of his banishment.\(^{22}\)

Even throughout the Early Republican period we have no significant mentions of *exilium* following the stories of Gaius Marcius Coriolanus in the early fifth century BCE and Marcus Furius Camillus nearly a hundred years later (c. 392 BCE). It is not until the Second Punic War (218-201 BCE) that we begin to see verifiable accounts of exile.

It is repeatedly mentioned in many sources that in Republican Rome exile was not used as a punishment, but a means of escaping punishment. When charged with a crime, men of the elite - senators and equestrians, primarily - were given the option of fleeing Rome in order to avoid judicial sentencing.\(^{23}\) Roman exile was similar to Greek exile in that it provided an acceptable legal alternative to capital punishment in the voluntary retreat of the convicted.\(^{24}\) Once they had fled from Rome, several events could occur. The exile had the right to relocate to one of several independent states by using the right of *ius exulandi*, or the right of permanent settlement and transfer of citizenship to a

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\(^{22}\) AUC 1.57-60.

\(^{23}\) Kelly 2006, 1.

\(^{24}\) Liv. 1.41, 2.35, 3.13, 58, 5.32; Cic. *Pro Caec.* 33, 34.
new *patris*. After the convicted fled Rome, a decree of interdiction from fire and water (*aquae et ignis interdictio*) was usually enacted by the plebeian assembly with the intent to forbid the exile from ever returning by denying them the essentials for life on Roman soil.\(^{25}\)

The consequences of *exilium* for a Roman citizen were relatively light compared to the statelessness of Greek exile. Appropriation of assets and property could only be accomplished by the *interdictio* but there appears to have been time to convert their wealth into a portable form before going into exile.\(^{26}\) It appears that during the Republic the Romans were generally unwilling to strip voluntary exiles of their citizenship, as suggested by Cicero (*pro Caec*. 34) where he states that no Roman was ever deprived of their *civitas* (citizenship) by any law up to that time (c. 69 BCE) without their consent.\(^{27}\) This consent was usually assumed after the individual’s retreat, but evidence suggests that even after the decree of *interdictio* was passed the exile remained a Roman citizen until they were accepted as a citizen of some other state.\(^{28}\) So long as the *exsul* remained outside the boundaries of Rome (after the Social War in 91-88 BCE the territory was expanded to include all of Italy) they were free from prosecution and could not be pursued or harmed.

Towards the Late Republic exile began to be used as a punishment for criminal transgressions. Interdiction and the loss of *civitas* could be applied regardless of whether an individual chose to go into exile voluntarily, thereby

\(^{26}\) Kelly 2006, 18.  
\(^{27}\) Cf. Cic. *Pro Dom. 16, 17, 29*.  
\(^{28}\) Cic. *Pro Caec. 34*. In *Pro Balbo 11* he reaffirms that Roman citizens who chose to become a citizen of another state lost their Roman *civitas*. It appears that in any case no Roman could hold two citizenships at once.
forcing them out of the city or face punishment for violating the terms of the *interdictio*.\(^{29}\) With the *lex Tullia de ambitu* of 63 BCE, which established ten-year exile as punishment for electoral bribery, exile lost its privileged status as a means of peaceful escape and became an ordinary criminal punishment exercised by the judiciary after a trial or conviction.\(^{30}\) Exile became more utilized and a new, more lenient form of exile emerged in the form of *relegatio* - forced exile to or from a specific location for a determinate or indeterminate period of time. The *relegatus* was allowed to retain his *civitas*, and his property was generally safe from confiscation in all but the most serious cases of perpetual relegation and even then it was rarely done before the Imperial period.\(^{31}\) This form of exile was used most commonly to remove foreigners from Rome and was rarely used against citizens during the Republic.\(^{32}\)

**iii. Exile in the Empire**

As the Roman state transitioned from Republic to Empire, the notion that exile was to be used to escape judicial penalties was cast aside. Instead, exile became an Imperial tool for expelling individuals who personally offended the emperor, supported Republican ideals, or who were simply seen as dangerous to the stability of Rome. We can also see a transition in the concept of exile: whereas during the Republic it was punishment enough to banish someone beyond the borders of civilization, during the Imperial period we can see a much broader implementation of *deportatio* - an indefinite and


\(^{30}\) Kelly 2006, 41.

\(^{31}\) Dig. 48, 22, 7.

\(^{32}\) Kelly 2006, 65-67. *Relegatio* appears to have been used in 161 BCE to expel Greek philosophers from Rome, and again in 139 when Chaldeans and Jews were expelled. Cf. *Gell*. 15.11.1; *Suet. Gramm.* 1.1.
restrictive form of exile where the exile could be banished to an island, sometimes under guard, as a form of confinement. The previous standard of exile - *relegatio* - still existed, but by Hadrian’s time (c. 117 CE) it was seen as a more lenient form of exile because it permitted the exile to retain their citizen rights and property.

The biggest alteration to exile practices in occurred in the Principate of Augustus when (it has been argued by Cohen 2008) he instituted the practice of *deportatio ad insulam* specifically for his daughter Julia’s misbehaviour in 2 BCE.\(^{33}\) Until this time, Cohen argues (207), the exile was free to choose where they spent their banishment, provided they remained outside of Roman boundaries. Exiles could indeed choose to live on islands but at no point was banishment to an island codified in Roman law.\(^{34}\) The exile of Julia bears little resemblance to what we have seen from exile so far. The island of Pandateria was the site of at least two villas owned by the Princeps and was probably used as a summer retreat.\(^{35}\) There is evidence of an odeon, an *ambulatio*, an *exedra*, and baths suggesting it was no prison island but rather a location within Imperial reach where Augustus could keep an eye on his daughter.\(^{36}\) This would be later reinforced c. 4 CE when Julia was moved to Rhegium on the Italian mainland and provided a *viaticum* and a property of her own.\(^{37}\)

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\(^{33}\) Cohen 2008, 206.

\(^{34}\) For reference to Julia’s banishment being the first of this form of legal exile, see Amiotti 1995, 245-48; Braginton 1943, 393; and Bingham 2003, 397-9. Amiotti correctly identifies a prior case of *deportatio ad insulam* in Plin. *HN* 7.36 but the purpose in this case was for religious purification and is unrelated to the later Roman practice. It is assuredly an outlier. Cohen 2008, n. 2.


\(^{36}\) Cohen 2008, 210. The villa to which Julia was likely exiled is usually identified as one on the Punta d’Eolo, a relatively large building with panoramic views of the sea. The luxurious amenities of the location are described in Lafon (2001), 229-332.

Despite the increased quality of life, Julia was still exiled from Rome and was never permitted to return.

The restrictive conditions of deportatio in the Imperial period differentiated it from the more lenient relegatio. A deportatus not only faced exile but also had their citizenship revoked and property confiscated. It would appear that the conditions of deportatio focused more on the revocation of property, citizenship, or assets, instead of the loss of freedom, the typical outcome and difference between deportatio ad insulam and imprisonment.\(^{38}\) From the accounts of Ovid (Tristia 5.4.21; 11.15; cf. 2.129 f.; 4.4.45 f.) and Seneca (Ad Helv. 10.2) we can be reasonably certain that both were permitted to keep their property when they were exiled in 8 and 41 CE, respectively, suggesting they were both victims of relegatio instead of deportatio.

Julia’s exile to Pandateria, while unusual, was not without precedent. Before Augustus had risen to the position of sole ruler, he had banished his political rival M. Aemilius Lepidus to the town of Circei in 36 BCE. Lepidus had been pontifex maximus and possessed substantial power and influence in Rome and permitting him to remain could have been disastrous for Augustus. Relegating him to a small town within Roman borders was not in line with previous exile practices which forced the exile to contend with life outside of the Roman state. This new form of exile was more akin to containment with supervision. In fact, Augustus would periodically call for Lepidus to attend senatorial meetings in what was probably intended to be an extraordinarily humiliating act for a senior member of the senate. From this example we can start to see how exile in Imperial Rome could be used by the emperor to exile

\(^{38}\) Rich 1875, 515-517 “exsilium”.
individuals who were too much of a threat to allow to remain in Rome while simultaneously reducing public outcry that would have resulted through executions.

The innovation of *deportatio* quickly became solidified in Roman criminal law, and an increasing number of political dissidents, rivals, outspoken opponents and other individuals capable of threatening political stability were deported to islands.\(^{39}\) In 12 CE it was declared that any citizen onto which *aquae et ignis interdictio* was pronounced would be subject to *deportatio*.\(^{40}\) As we can see, the definition of exile changed with Augustus: exiles were no longer cast out into the wilderness and severed from their connections to civilization. Instead, exile became a kind of imprisonment or containment, a way of overseeing the actions and behaviour of dangerous elements while keeping them at an arm’s length and removing their capacity to influence others completely.

By the 200s CE the regulations concerning exile in the Roman Empire had been clarified and codified. We see evidence that the two forms of capital punishment in the empire were death and *exsilium*, the latter of which could be employed in several different ways. Marcianus (*Dig.* 48 tit. 22 s5), writing c. 220 CE, described three distinct classes of *exsilium*. It could be an interdiction from a single location (such as the city of Rome, also known as *lata fuga*, and equivalent to the *libera fuga* or *liberum exsilium*), an interdiction from all locations within Roman boundaries, or as confinement to a location, such as was the case in *deportatio ad insulam*. The key difference between

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\(^{39}\) Cohen 2008, 215. n. 31. Lafon 2001 provides a list of imperial relatives who were exiled to islands in the post-Augustan era. It appears that Ovid’s exile to the Black Sea may have been something of an anomaly considering the ubiquity of *deportatio ad insulam*.

\(^{40}\) Dio Cassius 56.27.2-3.
exsilium and relegatio at this time was whether the exsul maintained their rights of citizenship, their properties, and the patria potestas, regardless of whether the relegatio was for a determined or indeterminate duration. The increasing size of the Roman empire made transporting individuals to the boundaries an expensive and ultimately unfeasible option when confinement to one of many islands suitable for the purpose kept the exiles near to Rome but far from potentially causing further unrest or offense.

As we have seen, the core concept of exile did not evolve drastically in the Imperial period barring the exception of deportatio ad insulam. Exiles still grappled with the consequences of banishment and the loss of their properties or basic civic rights just as they had during the Republican period. What did change was the scope of exile – as Rome grew larger, the possibilities for true exile to the wilderness and to the cold, uncivilized world beyond Rome’s purview continued to shrink until exile became imprisonment. Along with their property and assets, the Imperial Roman exile faced the loss of their freedom of movement, their ability to choose a new home, and their ability to start over. Their new places of residence – often harsh, small islands – would be exilic sanctuaries more akin to prisons.
Chapter II. Exile in Plutarch’s *Moralia*

The aim of this chapter is to investigate how Plutarch’s arguments in *On Exile* correspond with a long-standing tradition of philosophical arguments that have been discussed for several hundred years. When considering the numerous editorializing intrusions about exile in the *Parallel Lives*, one would expect to find that *On Exile* contains unique insight into the morality and philosophy of exile. Instead, Plutarch’s consolation uses established arguments that appear to betray the objectives demonstrated in some of his biographies. The purpose of this investigation is to examine the formulaic processes of argumentation used by Plutarch and his predecessors, and to expose how Plutarch’s unique perspective and understanding of exile might be expressed in the *Parallel Lives*.

The first section will be an accumulation of some of surviving works on exile from ancient Greece and Rome between the third century BCE to the second century CE. Typically, our exilic works are in the form of consolation treatises, but other examples include poetry, prose, and oratory. Brief notes will accompany these examples describing what, if anything, is known about the author, whether they were victims of exile and, if so, the circumstances of that exile, and finally to whom the piece of work is addressed.

Part two will consist of a systematic breakdown of the arguments in Plutarch’s *On Exile* with a focus on how it fits within the traditional expectations of an exile consolation. The primary sources of comparison will be Greek and Roman exile consolations written before Plutarch: Teles’ *On Exile*, Seneca’s *Consolation to Helvia*, Musonius’ Ninth Lecture *That Exile is Not an Evil*, and
Dio Chrysostom’s Thirteenth Discourse *In Athens, On Exile*. It will also be necessary to address how the traditional elements are carried forward after Plutarch’s *On Exile* by looking at Favorinus’ *On Exile*.

Part three will examine the ways in which Plutarch breaks from the traditional qualities of the exile consolation, and it will attempt to offer explanations as to why he addressed some and ignored others. This section will also attempt to ascertain what views Plutarch has borrowed from earlier writers and try to glean some information, through cross-referencing other works in the *Moralia*, about what Plutarch is trying to say about the exilic condition in the ancient world: what virtues or vices are known to cause exile, what steps can be taken to prevent it, how an exile ought to behave once banished, and whether there is an intrinsic quality or set of qualities that result in an individual eventually facing banishment.

### i. Exile Consolations and Context

Plutarch was not the first to write about exile. Evidence of exile consolations dating back to the third century BCE provide us with proof that exile was a concern for philosophical thinkers and their audiences long before Plutarch’s lifetime in the first and second centuries CE. We are also fortunate to possess examples from both Greece and Rome which not only provide us with evidence of the evolution of exilic works across time, but also across geographical and cultural boundaries. Our earliest surviving example is from Teles of Megara (c. 235 BCE) but as time progressed and the Greek world was gradually absorbed into the expanding area of Rome, more exile works emerged from a wide range of exiles. Cicero, who served as consul in 63 BCE, is a particularly high-profile example. Others, such as Ovid, Dio
Chrysostom, and Seneca wrote about their own experiences in exile as victims of Imperial Rome. It is worth exploring these examples to determine what was common in exilic works and how Plutarch undermines or reinforces the established traditions.

Teles of Megara authored the earliest surviving example of an exile consolation. Evidence suggests that he may have originally been from Athens but was exiled for unknown reasons.\(^1\) Also titled *On Exile*, this text has been preserved through Stobaeus whose own works have been preserved by an individual named Theodorus. Therefore, little is known about Teles himself other than what has survived in third-hand copies of his texts. In his consolation he makes several references to events that can conclusively place the writing of the document to sometime after 241 BCE, but little else is known besides.

From the surviving text of *On Exile* we can see our first examples of exile argumentation. He begins by refuting the notion that exile is a state of deprivation. The exile, according to Teles, still retains their “spiritual goods, tangible goods, [and] external goods” \(\tau\omega\nu\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\ \tau\epsilon\nu\ \psi\upsilon\chi\epsilon\eta\nu\ \eta\ \tau\omega\nu\ \tau\epsilon\rho\iota\ \tau\omicron\sigma\omicron\mu\alpha\ \eta\ \tau\omega\nu\ \epsilon\kappa\tau\omicron\omicron\varsigma\) as well as their virtues, skills, and reasoning capacities \(\epsilon\upsilon\lambda\omicron\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\tau\iota\varsigma\alpha\varsigma, \omicron\rho\omicron\theta\omicron\omicron\omicron\rho\omicron\gamma\iota\varsigma\alpha\varsigma, \epsilon\upsilon\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron\rho\omicron\gamma\iota\varsigma\alpha\varsigma\ \eta\ \phi\upsilon\gamma\eta\ \sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\iota\omicron\varsigma\kappa\epsilon\iota\).\(^2\) Teles’ opening argument centers around the notion that exile does not actually deprive an individual of what is important; an exile is still whole in body and mind and is therefore capable of all that they were prior to banishment (*Ex*. 22). Teles takes this Cynic philosophy even further and provides an example of Themistocles who, in his exile, acquired more physical wealth than if he had

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\(^1\) O’Neil 1977, xii-xv.

\(^2\) Teles Ex. 22. Translations are from González 1998 with my own emendations.
remained in Athens. Other exiles - Lycinos, Hippomedon, Chremonides, and Glaucon - are listed as examples of prominent exiles who managed to obtain greater authority in their exiles than they had before. He continues by addressing the fact that exiles are barred from entering their homeland and states that there are many locations from which people are barred. For example, the Thesmophorion festival was off-limits to men and the temple of Enyalios did not permit women (Teles Ex. 24). To complain, he says, would be “childish” (παιδαριώδης).

The next sections relate to exile and the patris and we see many references to exiled figures which will reappear in later exilic writing. Teles explains that Cadmus was still admired for founding Thebes during his period of exile (Teles Ex. 28) and that Heracles was still revered by the Lacedaemonians despite being “chased from Argos” (Ἡρακλῆς δ’ ἐξ Ἄργους ἐκπεσὼν Θήβας κατώκει). The role of heroic imitation in exile literature will be discussed in greater detail later but it is worth noting here that the examples of Cadmus and Heracles will emerge time and again as examples of successful exiles.

Teles concludes by addressing the concern that exiles are not permitted the right to be buried in one’s own homeland. As evidence for this concern he quotes Euripides’ Polynices who begs his mother to bury him in the fatherland so in his exile he should retain some connection to his home. Teles’ response is typically Cynical:

Καὶ πῶς μέλλει τοῦτο ὄνειδος εἶναι ὃ τοῖς ἀρίστοις πολλάκις συνέβη; ἢ τίς τιμή αὐτῇ ἢ τίς τοῖς κακίστοις περιγίνεται;

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3 Lycinus (third century BCE) was exiled from lower Italy (Teles Ex. 23); Hippomedon (Ptolemaic strategos in 240-221 BCE) was exiled from Sparta c. 241 BCE; Chremonides and his brother Glaucon (c. 3rd century BCE) fled into exile after proposing the Athenians ally with Sparta, sparking the Chremonidean War (Teles Ex. 23).
“And how would what repeatedly happened to the best be a reproach? Or what is this honor that is within the reach of the worst?” (Teles Ex. 29)

Teles’ argument is that there is no difference between being buried in the patris and being buried away from it. Again he quotes Socrates who, in his attack against the Athenians, said that “The generals of which they boast are buried abroad, while the shame of democracy is buried in public graves” (οἱ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγοὶ ἐφ’ οίς καλλωπίζονται, ύπερόριοι τεθαμμένοι εἰσί, τὰ δὲ ὀνείδη τῆς δημοκρατίας ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις τάφοις) (Teles Ex. 29). If the best of citizens can end up interred outside the homeland while the worst will be able to be buried within the patris, what value is there in burial locations? There is no reason at all to consider being buried outside the patris as a reproach just as being buried within the city is not a sign of success. He ends with comment about how ridiculous it is to claim superiority of one burial location over another:

εἴ δὲ μὴ τύχοις χθονὸς πατρῴας, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ ξένης ταφείης, τί ἔσται τὸ διάφορον; ἢ ἐκ Θηβῶν μὲν εἰς ᾅδου ὁ Χάρων πορθμεύει ...;

“However, if you don’t receive the homeland but are buried abroad, what is the difference? Is it from Thebes that Charon makes the crossing to Hades, and not elsewhere?” (Teles Ex. 30)

Teles’ style of argument is based around questioning the intrinsic harm of each of the perceived consequences of exile and revealing that, in the end, the consequences are insignificant. An exile is no less capable of success because of their exile, exiles have accomplished great deeds and accumulated great wealth, and in the end everyone is destined to the afterlife so it does not matter where one is buried. It is an immensely pragmatic work that demonstrates the Cynic philosophy.
During the period following the third century BCE, we have few examples of literature on exile, let alone anything written by an exile themselves. It was a period of expansion of Roman influence and governance which brought with them new concepts of exile that contrasted traditional Greek banishment. Despite the lack of personal writings, we are well-aware of many people who were exiled from Rome during the first and second centuries, but few are known to have produced writing and, if they did, little survives today. Much of what has survived comes from the *exulum trias* of Cicero, Ovid, and Seneca.

The next significant writer on the topic of exile was M. Tullius Cicero (106 – 43 BCE), who was known to have been a prolific writer before, during, and after his exile. As mentioned previously, Cicero commented on how unusual Roman exile practices were given that it was never used as a legal punishment (*Pro Caec.* 100). Cicero’s *Pro Caecina* was delivered in 69 BCE and only six years later, under the consulship of Cicero himself, the Tullian Law (*lex Tullia*) was instituted which allowed the punishment of ten years exile to be delivered in cases of bribery and political corruption. In 58 BCE Cicero was forced to take refuge in exile by Publius Clodius Pulcher under the accusation that he had the members of the Catiline Conspiracy executed without a formal trial. Cicero fled Rome and spent a year in exile in Thessalonica where he wrote numerous letters back home documenting his lamentable position and bewailing his inability to return. Cicero never strictly wrote a consolation but his *Letters to Atticus* (*Epistulae ad Atticum*) and

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4 *Cic. Pro Caec.* 100 - *exsilium enim non supplicium est, sed perfugium portusque supplici. [...] itaque nulla in lege nostra reperietur, ut apud ceteras civitates, maleficium ullam exsilio esse multatum*


Tusculan Disputations (Tusculanae Quaestiones) provide insight into his experience, while other speeches afterwards clearly show a philosophical examination of the condition.\(^7\)

Cicero’s own exile was short lived - he was only away from Rome between 58 and 57 BCE - but his letters reveal that it was a sensitive subject even after his return. When referring to himself he almost never uses the Latin words typically associated with exile such as exsiliaum, exsul, or exsulo despite using them in other contexts. His reluctance to call himself an exile suggests that in his time a stigma persisted about exiles that would compel others to discredit his reputation or label him a criminal. Cicero’s argument is a legal one: Clodius’ bills against Cicero were illegal therefore he could not technically be an exile. In De domo he repeats that he was never legally convicted and employs the phrase sine iudico to demonstrate that he was never actually tried in a court of law. Obviously his fear of the stigma of exile and its impact on his reputation was foremost on his mind.

Cicero’s writings during his exile lack the Stoic resignation that we saw with Teles (and will see again in later writers) but they reveal insights into the realities of exile as he experienced them. In the Letters to Atticus we see that Plutarch bore his exile badly and much of the content of the letters during this period is grief-stricken and miserable. Many of his letters end with an expression of sadness at the turns of his life and some indicate that he regretted even being alive (Att. 52.3.7). He laments his position and fears his

\(^7\) Gaertner 2007, 14 suggests that Att. 3.15 reverses the typical arguments found in consolations and considers some of Cicero’s post-exile speeches to be comparable to the later self-dramatization and mimesis that emerge later in Ovid.
vulnerability on his journeys (Att. 53.3.8) while listing all the things he has lost since going into exile:

ecquis umquam tam ex ampio statu, tam in bona causa, tantis faculti, ingenii, consili, gratiae, tantis praesidiis bonorum omnium condidit? possum oblivisci qui fuerim? non sentire qui sim, quo caream honore, qua gloria, quibus liberis, quibus fortunis, quo fratre?

"Has any man ever fallen from so fine a position, with so good a cause, so strong in resources of talent, prudence, and influence, and in the support of all honest men? Can I forget what I was, or fail to feel what I am and what I have lost - rank, fame, children, fortune, brother?" (Att. 55.3.10)

For Cicero, the bleakness of his exile overshadows the virtues espoused by Teles and we see little of Stoic fortitude in his writings. In Att. 60.3.15 we see that even Atticus suggested he show more fortitude while in exile instead of bewailing his condition, to which Cicero responds by saying that "no man has ever lost so much or fallen into such a pit of misery. Time, far from relieving this heartache, actually increases it." For the duration of his year in exile Cicero never appears to come to terms with his banishment or his perceived losses as a consequence.

In a moment reflecting Stoic philosophy, Cicero claims that his "enemies have robbed me of what I have, but not of what I am" (Att. 50.3.5) indicating that, at this point in time, he too believed that banishment did not alter the exile's intrinsic qualities yet he does not appear to take comfort in that fact. In fact, philosophy proved inadequate as "no wisdom nor philosophy has the power to bear such great pain" (QFr. 1.3.5). The closest we have to Cicero addressing the typical concerns of exile - loss of possessions, fatherland, rights, and so on - comes from Att. 60.3.15 which Claassen (1994) has described as an 'anti-consolatio' because in it Cicero begs that his friend not

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8 dies autem non modo non levat luctum hunc sed etiam auget. Cic. Att. 60.3.15.
9 inimici mei mea mihi, non me ipsum ademerunt. Cic. Att. 50.3.5.
attempt to console him. Instead, Cicero appears to be at a complete loss about what to do in exile. His loss of reputation clearly continues to vex him:

nolo commemorare quibus rebus sim spoliatus, non solum quia non ignoras sed etiam ne scindam ipse dolorem meum;

“And if you, who still enjoy your status in the community, feel my absence, how do you think I feel the loss of that very status?” (Att. 60.3.15)

Inevitably Cicero emotionally succumbed to his grief. We see that he reverses his stance demonstrated in Att. 50.3.5 and mourns the loss “not only the things and persons that were mine, but of my very self. What am I now?” (Att. 3.15).\(^\text{10}\) He believes that only through the restoration of his property and his house can he be redeemed, and he can see no way to accomplish that end. Given that there is no hope for his possessions to be returned to him, he asks what more can life possibly offer.

Cicero’s bleak attitude towards his brief period of exile is ultimately humanizing. Contrasted with Teles’ On Exile, Cicero’s practical account of his emotional state during exile reveals a more personal experience divorced from rigid philosophical tenets and the consolation structure. He does not argue against the evils of exile; his words demonstrate the emotional toll of the loss of identity that comes with banishment and his misery is at the forefront. We have seen how Teles believed an exile ought to behave, but Cicero demonstrates the true experience of exile — the practical consequences for him outweigh the theoretical benefits and we are left with the words of a man who has feels cast out, neglected, and disenfranchised by his country.

\(^{10}\) desidero enim non mea solum neque meos sed me ipsum. quid enim sum? Cic. Att. 60.3.15.
In 8 CE, roughly sixty years after Cicero fled into exile, the poet Publius Ovidius Naso was exiled from Rome to the furthest reaches of the Empire. For reasons that remain unclear, Ovid was banished by the Emperor Augustus to Tomis on the shore of the Black Sea. Unlike Cicero, who fled Rome to escape further judicial punishment, Augustus had used his imperial authority to exile Ovid as far away from Rome as possible while remaining inside Imperial boundaries.\textsuperscript{11} Like Cicero, however, Ovid never wrote a consolation. Instead, we gain insight about his time in exile through two collections of poetry which were written while in Tomis: the \textit{Tristia} and the \textit{Letters from the Black Sea (Epistulae ex Ponto)}, both of which are typically composed of despairing of being separated from Rome, some details of his life before exile, and several compositions directed to the Augustus himself; some asking for leniency, others much more vitriolic.\textsuperscript{12}

Ovid’s exile works differ from those of Cicero and Teles in that they were written in the form of poetry instead of personal correspondence or philosophical consolation. However, like Cicero (and unlike Teles), Ovid’s poetry is hardly restricted by the structure of a \textit{consolatio} and he reveals a very personal and debilitating experience of exile at the farthest reaches of Roman imperial authority. However, it is at this point that we can begin to draw lines of continuity between our exile writers, and the acceptable arguments for and against the evils of exile are preserved across literary genres.

\textsuperscript{11} Ov. \textit{Tr. II}, 131–132.

\textsuperscript{12} Claassen 1999, 10; 30 suggests that Ovid is responsible for creating the “myth of exile” from his identification of himself as Odysseus and Augustus as a vengeful deity.
Of particular interest to this discussion is Ovid’s *Exile List* (*EP* I.III.49-94) which presents a list of figures Ovid identified with during his banishment. *The Exile List* contains the clearest set of comparisons to his condition and that of other known heroes-in-exile.\(^\text{13}\) Examples of other exiles writers appear in great numbers: Diogenes the Cynic (*I.III.66-67*), Themistocles (*I.III.68-69*), Aristides (*I.III.71*), Jason (*I.III.75-76*), and Cadmus (*I.III.77-78*). Among these standard examples of exiles he also includes other individuals who may have been more familiar to his contemporaries: P. Rutilius Rufus, consul of 105 BCE and opponent of Marius, went into voluntary exile in Smyrna (*I.III.63-64*); Patroclus, who in his youth fled Opus after killing a man (*I.III.71-72*); Tydeus, the king of Calydon, who was exiled also for murder (*I.III.79-80*); and Teucer, the son of Telamon, who was driven into exile for failing to avenge Ajax (*I.III.80*). With all these examples at hand, Ovid states:

\[
\text{persequerar ut cunctos, nulli datus omnibus aevis, tam procul a patria est horridiorve locus.}
\]

“Though I should enumerate every exile, none in any age has ever been assigned to a more forbidding place so far from his native land.” (*EP* I.III.49-94)

Ovid believes his lot to be exceptional and that he alone contends with the worst that exile can offer. In a letter to his wife (*EP* I.IV.1-58), Ovid directly compares his exile to the journeys of Jason and comes out the less fortunate. Jason’s journey from Thessaly to Pontus was shorter in duration than Ovid’s banishment to the Danube (*I.IV.21-32*); Jason had Greek leaders for companions, while Ovid went into exile alone (*I.IV.33-34*); Jason was carried

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\(^\text{13}\) It is worthwhile noting that Ovid begins the letter to Rufinus with a statement concerning his misery: “This greeting, Rufinus, your friend Naso sends you – if a wretched man can be anyone’s friend”. (Hanc tibi Naso tuus mittit, Rufine, salutem, qui miser est, ulli si suus esse potest.), Ovid. *EP* I.III 1-2.
on a strong ship while Ovid travelled in a fragile boat (I.IV.35-36); Jason was given protection by the gods while Ovid received none (I.IV.39-40). Finally, Ovid laments that he will die in exile while Jason was able to return home (I.IV.43-44). Usually among exilic works we find the heroic examples to be ones to strive towards, but Ovid’s grief overwhelms him. By directly comparing his experience to Jason’s we see a reflection of Cicero’s lamentations and the reality of exile outside of standardized consolations. The pragmatic experience of exile, as opposed to the theoretical, was one of hardship and loss. Displacement and the loss of rights were serious hindrances for the exile to overcome and Ovid’s works demonstrate that overcoming those hardships could not be achieved through standard Stoic arguments, but through a painful process of re-evaluation and acceptance. Ovid reveals the harsh realities of exile in a way that Cicero never could since life in far-flung Tomis was certainly more difficult than a life in Cicero’s Tuscan villa.

In the later works we can see that Ovid still retained hope that he could somehow earn a recall from Augustus (EP II.VII.79) but his main obstacle remained Augustus’ wife Livia and her son, Tiberius. It is not until EP III.VII that we see his hope finally waver. He apologizes to his friends and his wife for his frequent complaints (III.VII.1-8) and states that he no longer wishes for his friends (III.VII.9-10) and wife (III.VII.11-12) to conduct further appeals on his behalf. Ovid acknowledges his defeat and gives up any hope of returning to Rome (III.VII.21-24). When Augustus finally died in 14 CE, Ovid’s hopes died with him (Tr. IV.9.11-14; EP IV.6.16). The futility of any further appeals by himself or his loved ones is acknowledged, and Ovid eventually perished on the shores of the Black Sea after ten years of exile.
The first true Roman exile consolation comes from Lucius Annaeus Seneca, or Seneca the Younger. A tutor to the emperor Nero in his later years, very little can conclusively be said about the years prior to his exile in 41 CE. It is known that Seneca was charged with adultery with the sister of Emperor Caligula and was thus exiled to Corsica. Seneca wrote three consolations while in exile but only one, *Consolation to Helvia* (*Consolatione ad Helviam*), concerns his exile. The *Consolation to Helvia* was written around 42-43 CE and was intended to console his mother’s grief concerning his recent banishment and is the first Roman example of a Stoic exile consolation during the early Principate. Unlike Cicero and Ovid, Seneca’s consolation hearkens back to Teles’ *On Exile* by addressing the philosophical concerns and attempting to mitigate the perceived evils of his condition. His banishment is framed as an opportunity for relocation, learning, and discovery, following the tradition set out by Teles two hundred years earlier.

Seneca begins by stating that his intention was to help allay some of the grief caused to his mother by his exile. Unlike Cicero (*Att. 3.15*), Seneca delayed his writing on the grounds that time would help both he and her come to terms with his exile in case the consolation “should irritate and inflame it; for in bodily ills also nothing more harmful than an untimely use of medicine” (*Sen. Ad Helv. I.1-2*). He claims that in the composition of the consolation he found no example of “a man who had offered consolation to his dear ones when he himself was bewailed by them” (2-3). His objective is to directly confront and

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14 Griffin 1976, 34.  
15 Gorman 1994, 16.  
16 ne illum ipsa solacia irritarent et accenderent; nam in morbis quoque nihil est perniciosius quam immatura medicina.  
17 on inveniebam exemplum eius, qui consolatus suos esset, cum ipse ab illis comploraretur. (*Ad Helv. I.2-3*)
conquer her misfortunes instead of simply trying to cover them up or ignore them (3.2-4.1).

His consolation proper begins with the statement that he is not unhappy in his current state of exile, a statement undercut slightly by his admission that he can be happy in a situation which others may find unpalatable (4.2-3). He implores his mother to ignore what others say about his condition and stresses that he “cannot even be made unhappy”, signaling his apparent adoption of Stoic ideals. He continues with a series of arguments which seem at the outset to be remarkably similar to those we have seen before in Teles’ *On Exile*, starting with the claim that physical possessions and external forces ought not to influence one’s happiness and that nature has provided all an individual needs to be happy (5.1-2). He states that:

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Nec secunda sapientem evehunt nec adversa demittunt; laboravit enim semper, ut in se plurimum poneret, ut a se omne gaudium pentered.
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“Prosperity does not exalt the wise man, nor does adversity cast him down; for he has always endeavoured to rely entirely upon himself, to derive all of his joy from himself.” (5.1-2)

This argument towards the ultimate subjectivity of one’s condition is used time and again in exile literature. The objective loss of aspects of one’s life is diminished under the inherent satisfaction which must be derived from one’s own philosophical mindset. Money, property, and goods all mean nothing when an individual cannot be happy with the most fundamental quality of their own existence. Those who are most likely to succumb to their exile, says Seneca, are those who base their happiness on their good fortune. These people are deceived by Fortune, he says, and determine their own

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18 Non est, quod de me aliis credas; ipse tibi, ne quid incertis opinionibus perturberis, indico me non esse miserum. Adiciam, quo securior sis, ne fieri quidem me posse miserum. (*Ad Helv.* I.4.3)
worth by the twists and turns of fate rather than their own intrinsic values (5.5-6). The strong man ("of long-tested constancy") does not give in to the capriciousness of Fortune – instead he recognises the mutability of one’s condition and accepts the gains and losses as they come:

\[
\text{Adversus utrumque statum invictum animum tenet exploratae iam firmitatis; nam in ipsa felicitate, quid contra infelicitatem valeret, expertus est.}
\]

"The man of long-tested constancy, when faced with either condition, keeps his mind unconquered; for in the very midst of prosperity he proves his strength to meet adversity." (5.5-6)

However, Seneca acknowledges the popular notion that exile is an evil. The very word, he claims, "strikes the hearer as something gloomy and accursed", for if it were not, Seneca would have little reason to write a consolation in the first place.¹⁹

Seneca’s ultimate argument is clearly Stoic in nature and we see his subjective analysis proceed through the remainder of the consolation. Exile is, at its heart, a change of place (Nempe loci commutatio – 6.1). He admits the disadvantages of exile – poverty, disgrace, scorn (paupertas, ignominia, contemptus – 6.1) – but ultimately falls back on the natural impermanence of one’s location. Cities are full of foreigners who have voluntarily come from elsewhere (6.3-4) and no matter where one retreats to in exile they are bound to find others who have chosen to live there of their own accord (6.4.5). Seneca sees this tendency towards relocation as completely natural – after all, the heavenly bodies are constantly in motion and in the end they return to their natural circuits in the sky (6.7-8). He states that Greek cities can be

¹⁹ 5.6 - Verbum quidem ipsum persuasione quadam et consensu iam asperius ad aures venit et audientis tamquam triste et execrabile ferit.
found in barbarian lands, the Macedonian language is spoken in Persia, Athenians live in Asia, the coast of Italy was so full of Greeks it became known as Greater Greece (7.1-2). The reasons for each individual migration are many – civil discord, overcrowding, pestilence, famine, escaping war – but the result is ultimately natural. Humanity has always changed locations for a multitude of reasons, and the exile is no different (7.4). He mentions Diomedes and the other fugitives of the Trojan War as his examples and we even see a reference to Romulus, the founder of Rome (7.7).

Following in Seneca’s footsteps came G. Musonius Rufus, a Roman equestrian originally born in Etruria in Italy.\(^\text{20}\) Despite having been reared in Rome and teaching in Latin, the texts we have remaining are all in Greek and date to his time in exile.\(^\text{21}\) Musonius had the misfortune of being exiled on three different occasions: the first time he was implicated in the Pisonian conspiracy against Nero and exiled to the island of Gyara in the Aegean from 60-62 CE. On his return several years later, he was exiled again between 65-69 CE, then allowed to remain when Vespasian exiled other philosophers in 71 CE, but was exiled again nonetheless around 75 CE.\(^\text{22}\) While in exile, Musonius wrote his Ninth Lecture entitled *That Exile is Not an Evil* wherein he lectures another depressed exile on the positives of their situation.\(^\text{23}\) Unfortunately, the beginning of the discourse has not survived but what remains is evidence that Musonius took the concept of the Stoic exile even further than Seneca, enjoying sharing his views and arguing that the virtuous person can be even better off in exile than forced to remain in one place.


\(^{21}\) Dillon 2004, vii.

\(^{22}\) Dillon 2004, 6.

\(^{23}\) Hense 1905, 41; Trans. Lutz 1947.
Musonius’ discourse is remarkably positive, and it has been noted that despite writing so many years after Teles, Musonius relies on Teles’ language and style.\textsuperscript{24}

Musonius’ Ninth Lecture is remarkably similar to Teles’ \textit{On Exile}. Despite having been written nearly three hundred years later, the Roman Musonius uses many of the same examples and arguments present in the work of the Greek Teles. Musonius begins like Teles does by asking whether exile deprives an individual of anything valuable:

ήτις ὕδατος μὲν καὶ γῆς καὶ ἀέρος, ἔτι δὲ ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν οὐκ ἀπείργει ἡμᾶς οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίας, ἁπανταχοῦ γὰρ καὶ πάντῃ τούτων μετουσία ἐστίν.

“It does not in any way deprive us of water, earth, air, or the sun and the other planets, or indeed, even of the society of men, for everywhere and in every way there is opportunity for association with them.” (Ruf. IX.2-5, trans. Lutz)

The exile is still free to partake in all the aspects of the world just as they had before their banishment. Again we see the author reference Socrates’ statement that the universe is the common \textit{patris} of all people and that a reasonable person would not base their happiness on a location, but rather on their own place in a global community.\textsuperscript{25} This bears striking similarity to Teles’ statements earlier concerning the lack of intrinsic value placed on a burial location – whether a citizen of a country or not, life, and exile, therefore, are what the individual makes of it.

\textsuperscript{24} Whitmarsh 2001a, 276.
\textsuperscript{25} Ruf. IX.13-15.
Like we have seen from other works on exile, Euripides is used as the source for several quotations. Musonius first uses Euripides to demonstrate his support for Socrates’ cosmopolitan perspective:

\[ ἅπας μὲν ἀὴρ ἀετῷ περάσιμος, ἅπασα δὲ χθὼν ἀνδρὶ γενναίῳ πατρίς. \]

"As all the heavens are open to the eagle’s flight, 
So all the earth is for a noble man his fatherland."  
(Ruf. 9.2; Cf. Frag. 1034)

Later Musonius quotes Euripides’ Polynices who states that the greatest of all misfortunes that an exile has to bear is the loss of their *parrhesia* - the freedom to speak. Like Teles before him, Musonius refutes this point by saying that exile has little to do with *parrhesia* since there are many examples of citizens who refrained from speaking their mind. “Fear is the cause of this” Musonius says, “not exile” (τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δέος μὰ Δία οὐχ ἡ φυγὴ ποιεῖ).\(^{26}\)  
Diogenes is once again brought up, this time as an example of an exile who never feared to speak his mind while in Athens. This line of argumentation from Musonius is remarkably similar to that which we find in Plutarch’s *On Exile* but I will discuss it in greater detail at a later point.

Unlike Teles, Musonius does not use the examples of Cadmus and Heracles to further his arguments and instead relies on a slightly different collection of exiles to make his point. Among these are Diogenes, the quintessential Cynic-in-exile; Odysseus; and Dio of Syracuse, all of whom represent successful exiles who were not held back by their loss of *patris*. It is of particular interest that Musonius and Teles both hold up Themistocles as an

\(^{26}\) Ruf. IX.100-101.
example of a successful exile who achieved more in his banishment than he had prior to his expulsion from Athens.

Dio Chrysostom, or Dion of Prusa, went to Rome during the troubled period of Vespasian’s reign (69-79 CE) when he married and had a child. He became a vocal critic of the Emperor Domitian who then banished him from all of Italy in 82 CE on the accusation of conspiracy.²⁷ His Thirteenth Oration discusses how in his banishment he visited Delphi and was advised to dress like a beggar and live the life of a philosopher.²⁸ While the Thirteenth Oration begins as a consolation on exile, it becomes an introspective look at the connection between exile and philosophy, a topos that appears frequently among exile writers.

The Thirteenth Oration begins with a brief explanation as to why he was exiled and the question that inspired the consolation: “whether this banishment was really a grievous thing and a misfortune, as it is in the view of the majority” (D. Chr. Orat. 13.2). He compares the trials of exile - and other misfortunes such as poverty, old age, and sickness - to a stone or a clod of dirt. To some the weight of the stone is too heavy to bear but to others it is light and easy (D. Chr. Orat. 13.3). The basis of his argument is consistent with what we have seen in some of the other Stoic writers who urge that a change in perspective is all that is required to eliminate the perceived misfortunes of exile.

The final writer on exile we will be examining is Favorinus of Arelate (c. 80 CE – c. 160 CE), a Gaul by birth and raised to eminence in both Athens and

²⁷ D. Chr. Orat. 13.1.
²⁸ D. Chr. Orat. 13.8-11.
Rome. However, at some point in the 130s CE Hadrian banished Favorinus to the island of Chios, where he remained before being recalled by Antoninus Pius in 138 CE. He also wrote a consolation entitled *On Exile* that is beholden to many of the same *topoi* that can be found in the writers before him. Unlike the writings of the three Roman exiles – Cicero, Ovid, and Seneca – exile in the self-identifying Greek writers does not equate exile with death, but with a kind of liberation, which will be explained in more detail later.  

The entirety of Favorinus’ *On Exile* has not survived and we are missing substantial portions of the beginning and end of the text. Barigazzi (1966) suggests that the introduction is missing only a small section while much more is missing from the end. From what survives of the text, however, we can see that Favorinus intended for *On Exile* to be read and used by others who find themselves exiled and seeking guidance.

Favorinus’ *On Exile* is unique among our other examples of exile literature. The text frames exile as an athletic competition in which the exile must defeat the four adversities of exile: love of the homeland, affection for kin and companionship, the enjoyment of wealth and reputation, and liberty. Each of these four adversaries must be beaten for the exile to achieve happiness through exile. It is notable that at no point does Favorinus suggest that the athletic competition results in success over exile in any physical way - he does not promise that the exile will be able to return home after overcoming the four adversities - but rather how to overcome the mental consequences of the perceived faults of exile and achieve happiness in spite of banishment. However, despite the unusual framing device used for his discussion,

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29 Claassen 1999, 10-11.
Favorinus still relies on many of the same tropes as his predecessors. Among these are frequent references to Euripides’s *Phoenissae* and the same heroic exiles we have seen in the past: Alcibiades, Themistocles, Coriolanus, Socrates, Diogenes, Heracles, Oedipus, and Odysseus all appear as examples of exiles whose conduct in exile should be emulated or condemned according to Favorinus’ advice.

First we will investigate how Favorinus suggests the exile overcome their four adversaries. The first of these adversities is loyalty to *patris* which Favorinus says is made attractive by our familiarity and our perceived ownership of where we and our ancestors were born (Fav. Ex. 7.1). He quotes Euripides’ Polynices’ tearful lament that he was unjustly driven from his homeland. In return, Favorinus addresses him personally. The exile, he says, should not:

\[\text{μήτε κλαίειν ἐν τοῖς τῆς μητρὸς κόλποις ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία, μηδὲ οὖν λάθρα φοβούμενον ἐντὸς τειχῶν παρεῖναι "ὡστε ξιφήρη χεῖρα ἔχειν δι' ἀστεως", μηδὲ μὴν στρατιὰ ἐλάσαι ἐπὶ τὴν πατρίδα, ἢν αὐτὸς φῂς φιλτάτην εἶναι βροτοῖς, μηδὲ τῷ ἀδελφῷ μονομαχεῖν βωμῶν τε ἕνεκα καὶ ὕδατος καὶ γυμνασίων, ἀλλὰ καρτερεῖν τῇ ἀνάγκῃ καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι τὰ παρόντα.}\]

“weep in his mother’s skirts like a child, nor be within the walls, hiding out of fear, ‘so as to bear sword in his hand through the city’ (Eur. Phoen. 363), nor march with an army against his fatherland, which you yourself claim to be the dearest thing to mortals, nor engage his brother in single combat for the sake of those altars, that water, and those gymnasia; he should endure his necessity manfully, and accept his circumstances.” (Fav. Ex. 7.2, trans. Whitmarsh)

His advice centers around the fact that altars, gymnasia, walls, and water exist elsewhere so there is no reason to be overly attached to one or another. Fatherland is simply where his ancestors settled and it is through familiarity and custom that the exile regards it as his own, but if one traced back their own ancestry they would find that everybody came from somewhere else just as Favorinus’ own descendants will see his place of exile as their homeland.
The relativism of Stoic philosophy extends further - Favorinus states that humans are the only beings in the world that apportion natural land into unnatural boundaries (Fav. Ex. 11.3), while migratory birds happily travel where they wish (Fav. Ex. 12.1). Favorinus states that even before his exile he spent much of his time wandering abroad so what use is there to complain about it now (Fav. Ex. 13.3)? It is noteworthy that Favorinus does not explicitly reference Socrates and cosmopolitanism in this section of the text despite the concept being the implicit objective of his argument. Until now cosmopolitanism has been a key feature in all previous exile consolations but Favorinus declines to credit Socrates for the idea.

The second adversary an exile must face is their attachment to friends and family. This problem, Favorinus says, will require effort to overcome than the others because:

φίλος δὲ | <ὅς θέλει> εἶναι, ἐὰν ὡς ἀληθῶς φίλος ἤ καὶ τὸ τῆς φιλίας | ἕπιστηται μυστήριον, ἐπὶ πάσης δόξης καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεως καὶ τύχης | κοινωνία παρειλημμένος, ὁκνήσει ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν ὄνων ἀποδημήσας | αὐτὸς τε ἑαυτῷ τὴν (30) καλλίστην πανηγύρεων καὶ θεαμάτων φίλου | ὁμίλων παρασχεῖν κἀκείνῳ τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μέρος τὴν συμφορὰν | ἀποκουφίσαι;

"Whosoever wishes to be his friend is his friend; and if he truly is a friend, and understands the secret of friendship, and remains his partner, sharing in every kind of reputation, enterprise and fate, will he hesitate, when has travelled abroad for a few days, to provide himself with the sight which is the fairest of pageants and spectacles, that of a friend? Will he hesitate, on his part, to lighten the misfortune for his friend?" (Fav. Ex. 15.3)

His point is clear: an exile does not lose friends simply because he is forced to live in a new location. An exile is fully capable of engaging with new people and embracing new friendships while their old friends will not mind travelling to see them. Favorinus presents many examples for this behaviour but most explicitly he references the friends of Jason who neither knew where they
were sailing (or even how to sail at all!) nor the reason for his voyage, and even though many were kings or demigods they still chose to follow him on his adventure (Fav. Ex. 16.1). Even the Trojan War is described in terms of an act of friendship and loyalty because the heroes of Greece followed a single friend who had been wronged (Fav. Ex. 16.2). Favorinus’ argument is simple but effective: the loyalty of friends is independent of whether the exile is at home or abroad and the exile should take comfort in that fact.

Favorinus’ third adversity is described as the love for wealth and reputation. His Stoic thinking distinguishes the extrinsic, which he has no control over - the existence of a homeland, children, friends, and so on - from the intrinsic - his own desire for the extrinsic (Fav. Ex. 19.1). By controlling and subduing the intrinsic desire for wealth and a homeland and a family, the exile can come to accept their circumstances as what it is rather than what they wish it to be. His primary example here is a quotation from Homer (Od. 11.122-3 = 23.269-70):


“"It seems to me that, when beset by these changes of fate, he constantly says to the god: 'If you want me to be king of Ithaca, O Zeus, I too wish it, and I shall not rule like Echetus, Sardanapallus or Arbaces. You wish me to be shipwrecked? I too wish it and I shall be a more pious shipwreck than Ajax. Do you wish me to endure hunger? I shall endure this too, but with more self-control than my companions. Do you wish me to play the beggar? I do not refuse, but I shall beg with more moderation than Irus. Though beaten most viciously and pelted by my enemies, I shall endure it with decency, if you wish it.'” (Fav. Ex. 21.2)
That is, it is more important to accept the will of the gods with grace and dignity than it is to rage against fate and constantly fight for what you only perceive to be yours. Virtue is not what others say it is - a court judgement does not make someone just or unjust “but he makes the judgement unjust if he proves himself excellent, and just if he proves himself bad” (Fav. Ex. 24.3). Alcibiades, for example, was declared unjust when he was exiled on the grounds of impiety but was later praised and elected to be a general only to be exiled once again (Fav. Ex. 24.2). Essentially Favorinus deems it more important to behave virtuously and accept whatever reputation you might achieve rather than strive to impress others and gain reputation through their perception of you.

The fourth and final adversity facing Favorinus’ exiles is the one most closely linked to the notion of exile: liberty (ἐλευθερία). Unfortunately, this section has not completely survived, and we can only guess as to how the On Exile concludes. However, it is worth noting that Favorinus appears to be equating exile with deportatio ad insulam which we have noticed appears most frequently during the early Roman empire.

“The remaining part of this contest for the crown of magnanimity, the greatest, remains as if on the byline: liberty. She challenges me plausibly with the claim that the matter of my exile is neither under my control nor of my willing, and claims that I [spend] my whole time shut up on one island, bereft of a share of liberty, just like the beasts raised in a Persian park, which Cyrus claims to be thin, mangy, and devoid of strength (whilst those raised on the plains are sleek, wide-ranging, and free.” (Fav. Ex. 28.1)
The text here becomes fragmentary, but we can see that Favorinus refutes the loss of liberty by saying that no island or prison is capable of restricting a soul (Fav. Ex. 28.2). Slavery is our own desire for the impossible and we must learn to accept that which we have instead of constantly striving for that which we cannot possess (Fav. Ex. 29.1).

Plutarch

Plutarch himself was born c. 46 CE and would have lived through the periods of Seneca’s, Musonius’, and Dio’s exiles as well as the Imperial trend against critical philosophers and their forced removal from Rome. Much of Plutarch’s *Moralia* was likely composed sometime after 100 CE under the reign of the Emperors Trajan (98-117 CE) and, until Plutarch’s death in 120 CE, the famous Stoic and philhellene Hadrian (117-138 CE). Plutarch’s *On Exile* is a treatise that was written likely towards the end of his life, around 120 CE, and was a consolation written to an unidentified individual exiled from Sardis for unknown reasons. Its purpose was to help his subject cope with the moral and philosophical issues of banishment and dislocation.

Plutarch’s *On Exile* is the focal point of this investigation for several reasons. First, Plutarch is unique among our exile writers for having never been exiled himself. He was fiercely attached to his homeland and particularly to his home Chaeronea, a town on the outskirts of Delphi and a site of great historical importance. He moved to Athens and studied under the Egyptian

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30 Beck 2014, 2.
31 Jones 1966, 72 can only conclusively date its composition to sometime after 96 CE.
32 Religious reasons aside, it was also the site of Alexander the Great’s battle in 338 BCE as well as a momentous defeat for the Pontic king Mithridates in 86 BCE. Plutarch also mentions how his inspiration for choosing the Roman L. Licinius Lucullus was his intervention in legal matters and how he prevented the destruction
philosopher Ammonius at the Platonic Academy in his youth. He did travel abroad, and at one point took on Roman citizenship, but remained most of his life in Greece operating in a civic and religious capacity, either as a governor of Boeotia or as a priest in Delphi. He confesses to having never quite mastered the Latin language despite having lived during a period of considerable Roman influence, preferring to write his works in his native Greek (Dem. 2.2-4). Exile was not something Plutarch could have been personally familiar with, and yet he devoted an entire treatise to the mitigation of its perceived consequences.

Plutarch’s interest in exile may have been influenced by several factors. His work provides evidence enough that he was interested in history, philosophical moralizing, and an analysis of virtuous living. As mentioned above, during Plutarch’s lifetime philosophers who dissented from Imperial opinion became targets of imperial banishment and forced relocation. Some punishments were temporary while others such as Ovid’s were doomed to end their days far from the heart of Roman civilization. As an avid witness and student of history, Plutarch’s interest would likely have been cultivated by contemporary incidents as well as historical examples. His most extensive project, the Parallel Lives, aimed at constructing biographies highlighting examples of both positive virtues and negative vices to serve as instructional paradigms for virtuous living. Considering the large number of exiled figures of the city. Chaeronea had a storied history. Cf. Beck 2014, 2, Plut. Sull. 15-21, and Cim. 1.5-2.5.

33 Beck 2014, 2.
35 Specifically, Tim. intro. where he states that he began writing the Lives for the sake of others, but found himself enjoying writing them so much that, “using history as a mirror” (ὡσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ), began to change his own life in accordance with his biographies.
that Plutarch chose to be the subjects of his biographies and the unusual lack of personal experience in the contents of *On Exile*, the theme must have held some importance for Plutarch in his quest to uncover paradigms of virtue. However, a comparison of *On Exile* against other exile consolations reveals a standard set of arguments that existed long before Plutarch and long afterwards. The consistency of the exile consolation over time – as well as the significant amounts of Plutarch’s secondary source material – allows us to see the extent to which Plutarch subscribed to the standard philosophical arguments or was utilising the arguments standardized by his predecessors.

ii. Plutarch and the Exilic Tradition

Emphasis on Philosophy

In Plutarch’s *On Exile*, the most highly emphasized virtue and the foundation of the consolation is that of philosophy, specifically the application of rational examination in the face of perceived misfortune. The objective of his consolation, he says, is not to join his subject in their lamentations – like two drowning swimmers clinging to one other (*De Ex.* 1)\(^{36}\) – but rather to use the power of human reason to help convince his addressee that exile is not an evil. Plutarch intends to help his subject examine the condition of exile from every angle to expose what are perceived to be evils and illuminate the positive aspects of his current condition. The significance of philosophy features heavily in Plutarch’s works. He consistently demonstrates the values of a solid educational foundation.\(^{37}\) He was a philosopher and stressed the

\(^{36}\) Cf. *Mor.* 599B.

\(^{37}\) Pelling 1990, 200.
value of a sound Greek education, or *paideia* (παιδεία) with a focus on philosophy as a necessary foundation for any virtuous life.\(^ {38}\) His *Parallel Lives* often have a heavy focus on the education of their subject from an early age and how *paideia* influences the behaviour of an individual their entire lives.

During the early Principate, one of the influential philosophical movements became known as the Second Sophistic, a resurgence of older Greek philosophies in an increasingly Roman world. The tenets of influential Greek philosophical pioneers such as Plato and Socrates were melded with Cynic and Stoic ideals, which Plutarch and his contemporaries used to full effect.\(^ {39}\)

In *On Exile* we can see the effect of the combination of the dual philosophies and how consolation writers have used them to mitigate the evils of exile.

Plutarch’s stance in *On Exile* is deceptively simple: certain things in the physical world are easy to examine because of their intrinsic qualities.\(^ {40}\)

However, the incorporeal and conceptual are more difficult to evaluate because they themselves lack anything intrinsically good or evil (*De Ex.* 2). In a single sentence Plutarch suggests that exile and disgrace are no different than the acquisition of crown rule and authority, emphasizing that each person must evaluate their own situation and determine if it is really as positive or negative as it seems (*De Ex.* 2). Opinion and examination, therefore, is essential to enduring perceived hardships, and the key to changing one’s opinion on a seemingly depressing matter is through systematic analysis and philosophy.

\(^{38}\) Cf. *Mor.* 617F; 798A-C.


\(^{40}\) *De Ex.* 2 = *Mor.* 599D.
The necessity of philosophy to re-examine and re-evaluate a situation is paramount in every consolation treatise. The purpose of a consolation is to challenge beliefs of negativity through philosophy to improve the addressee’s perception of their situation. We find passages like Plutarch’s in many of the surviving exile writings. An early passage in On Exile bears striking similarities to Dio’s Thirteenth Oration as both discuss the subjectivity of one’s experiences. Both authors present exile as an example of perceived misfortune; Plutarch equates it with “disgraces and the loss of honours” (δὲ καὶ ἀδοξίας καὶ τιμῶν ἀποβολᾶς) while Dio uses the examples of “poverty… old age, and sickness” (τὸ πένεσθαι καὶ γήρας δὴ καὶ νόσος) as conditions which are commonly perceived as heavy burdens (βαρέα), but can be transformed through personal examination into conditions much easier to bear (ῥᾴδια and ῥᾳδίως, respectively).41 The primary difference appears to be the delivery of the message. Plutarch’s comes in the form of self-assured lecturing while Dio approaches his conclusion through self-discovery. Regardless, the two arrive at the same conclusion. A similar sentiment is shared by Seneca who states that even the loss of physical wealth is no obstacle to personal happiness. “Nature intended that we should need no great equipment for living happily,” since all that is necessary is found in oneself. Again, the notion that contentment relies entirely on philosophical reasoning is demonstrated by the phrase “Prosperity does not exalt the wise man, nor does adversity cast him down.”42

From these surviving examples, it appears that the primary method a writer of a consolation treatise could employ to alleviate the concerns of his

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41 De Ex. 2 = Mor. 599D and D. Chr. 13.2-3.
42 Sen. Cons. Helv. 5.1-2 - Id egit rerum natura, ut ad bene vivendum non magno apparatu opus esset [...] Nec secunda sapientem evehunt nec adversa demittunt.
audience was to impress upon them the value of Stoic principles which deny any inherent evil in exile. Plutarch is no exception to this train of thought. The suffering exile should look at his situation philosophically, as if somehow the loss of livelihood, homeland, and civil rights can be ignored through philosophical re-evaluation. The concept was so widely accepted that exile consolations frequently equated banishment with philosophical success; that somehow being removed from society was helpful and even necessary to the cultivation of rational and philosophical thought. Plutarch employs this *topos* when he attributes the success of numerous writers to their banishment. He claims that the Muses “helped ancient writers to finish their choicest and most approved compositions by calling in, as it were, banishment to their assistance.” Among these successful exiles he lists the historians Thucydides, Xenophon, and Timaeus, alongside the orator Androtion and the poet Bacchylides. These and many more, he says, used their banishment as fuel to write the works which secured their fame. In all these cases, he says, the fame they achieved in exile outlived the stories of those who banished them.

Plutarch’s claims echo other writers on exile significantly and fits his *On Exile* firmly into the tradition. Cicero, writing nearly two hundred years earlier, lists sixteen different philosophers who lived and wrote while away from their homelands. Writing many years after Plutarch, Cassius Dio composed an

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43 Nesselrath 2007, 98; Branham 1993, 74.
44 Plut. *De Ex*. 14 = Mor. 605C-605D - καὶ γὰρ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ὡς ἐοικεν αἱ Μοῦσαι τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν συνταγμάτων καὶ δοκιμώτατα φυγὴν λαβοῦσαι συνεργόν ἐπετέλεσαν.
45 Thucydides the historian (c. 460-c. 400 BCE), Xenophon (c. 431-354 BCE), Timaeus the historian (c. 345-C. 250 BCE), Androtion the orator (before 405 - after 346 BCE), Bacchylides (c. 518 - c. 451 BCE). Plut. *De Ex*. 14 = Mor. 605D.
account of Philiscus' consolation to Cicero recommending using his opportunity in exile to practice his writing, like Xenophon and Thucydides.\(^{47}\)

To successfully use philosophy was inextricably linked to the condition of dislocation and banishment. Plutarch writes that when the stoic Zeno had lost his last remaining ship, he declared himself a philosopher and Musonius wrote that Diogenes was transformed from an ordinary citizen into a philosopher through his exile.\(^{48}\)

Clearly Plutarch's argument in favour of a Stoic philosophy is not revolutionary, nor are his statements about the usefulness of philosophy to the apprentice historian or student philosopher. Evidently there was an existing tradition that linked the condition of exile – or banishment, dislocation, or disenfranchisement – to an opportunity to re-examine the world through an unbiased, apolitical lens. Thucydides claimed that he was able to write his histories because his exile let him observe the events unfold without a stake in either side.\(^{49}\) Exiles could be exceptional philosophers or, vice versa, philosophers were improved through exile. Some have said that exile was responsible for creating philosophers, others that philosophers excelled while in exile. Plutarch appears to be accepting both conclusions: The Stoic Zeno becomes a philosopher after losing his livelihood while Diogenes was a philosopher who was eventually exiled from Sinope. Nonetheless, the two are

\(^{48}\) De Ex. 10 = 603D-E and Lecture 9: That Exile is not an Evil. Trans. Lutz. Cf. Gaertner 2007, 8; Whitmarsh 2001a, 280-1; Dillery 2007, 52 who all agree with the statement.
\(^{49}\) Thuc. 5.26.5 - καὶ ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἐτη ἐκκοι μετὰ τὴν ἐς Ἀμφιπόλειν στρατηγίαν, καὶ γενομένῳ παρ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς πρᾶγμασι, καὶ οὐχ ἠσσον τοῖς Πελοποννησίων διὰ τὴν φυγήν, καθ᾽ ἔσσηχαν τι αὐτῶν μᾶλλον αἰσθέσθαι.
inextricably linked in Plutarch’s discourse and in the world of consolatory literature.

Cosmopolitanism and *patris*

During the early Principate, exile was most likely to be caused by an Imperial decree or from a flight from potential capital punishment. As mentioned above, many philosophers had been exiled from Rome during the first century CE for criticising the emperor or expressing dissenting political views. The Emperors Vespasian (9-79 CE) and Domitian (51-96 CE) were notorious for their intolerance of opposing philosophical views and are known to have expelled numerous philosophers from Rome during their reigns.50 It is fortunate that Plutarch lived almost exclusively in Greece and that much of the *Moralia* was published during the reign of Trajan (54-117 CE), to whom he wrote his *Sayings of Kings and Commanders (Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata).*51

Inherent in the issue of exile is the profound matter of the temporary or permanent loss of one’s fatherland, or *patris.* There were many forms of exile during the early Principate and they could range from expulsion from the city of Rome, to relocation to an isolated island, to banishment to the furthest reaches of the Empire, as was the case for Ovid’s exile. Plutarch’s *On Exile* addresses the issue of the loss of one’s homeland but once again follows a tradition laid out by previous writers. The solution, according to Plutarch, is to downplay the importance of one’s homeland and to embrace the concept of cosmopolitanism. The notion of a *patris* is an inherently artificial concept.

invented by humanity and our ownership and association with a region is only reinforced by living in it. The artificiality of a homeland is deeply rooted in Stoic and Cynic traditions and Plutarch reuses examples found in other exile consolations to reinforce his argument. The first use of cosmopolitanism as a virtue comes from the philosopher Diogenes the Cynic who came to be known for his statement “I am a citizen of the world” which Plutarch attributes to Socrates. Plutarch says that naturally humans have no countries, or fields, or houses, there is only what we invent and imbue with significance that holds us back from being citizens of the world. Humans are all naturally cosmopolitan, but many hide away and lock themselves into small areas like bees or ants and get frightened and confused when removed from familiar areas, despite always sharing the same sky, water, fire, sun, and stars. In Plutarch’s *On Exile* everyone is part of one world, governed by one god, and arranged by one set of natural laws. The tiny isolated pockets of *poleis* and individualism are insignificant in comparison (*De Ex. 5 = Mor. 601A-B*). The argument presented by Musonius and Seneca echoes Plutarch’s sentiment and reinforces the idea that prioritizing one particular *polis* over any other is unnatural in the greater scheme.

The tendency of these philosophers during the first century CE to underplay the importance of the *patris* was accompanied by an emphasis on the pre-eminence of the *cosmos*. Plutarch’s advice to his exile comes from the viewpoints of actual exiles who aimed at exploring and mitigating their

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52 Plut. *De Ex.* 5 = *Mor.* 600E-F.
53 *De Ex.* 5, ὥ δὲ Σωκράτης βέλτιον, οὐκ Ἀθηναῖος οὐδὲ Ἑλλήν ἀλλὰ κόσμιος εἶναι φήσας, ὡς ἄν τις Ρώδιος εἴπην Ἑ Κορίνθιος. Opsomer 2002, 282 doubts that Socrates said this but that it was somehow transferred to Socrates some time along the way.
54 *De Ex.* 5 = *Mor.* 600E.
situation. To lose your civil rights, your property, and the right to return home was surely emotionally taxing, but the philosopher during the Second Sophistic had loftier aspirations and incorporated Platonic ideals within their Cynic-Stoic framework. The cosmopolitan viewpoint is essential to many of the exile consolations of the early Principate and, indeed, to the very identity of being a philosopher. This is all supported in *On Exile* by quotations from numerous sources: Menander, Alcman, Homer, Heracles, Socrates and, most importantly, Diogenes.  

The tradition of downplaying the *patris* still thrives in the work of Favorinus, who takes it to the farthest possible extent. He claims to love his fatherland but realizes that it is nothing more than where his ancestors settled. His own descendants will call his new place of exile their fatherland and the pattern will continue. If a person were to continue tracing back his ancestry he would find that every *polis* and culture stems from one type of displacement or another: Greeks driven to barbarian lands, barbarians driven to Greek lands, the entire Dorian race were driven from one place to another. In the end Favorinus reaches the same conclusion as all the rest: that one should live as if the entire world were your home since the Earth supports every living inhabitant together. (Fav. 10.4).

Rights and Freedoms

The traditional viewpoint in the ancient world can be seen from Aristotle's *Politics*, which closely relates one’s social identity with an association to a

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56 For Menander, see 599C; Alcman 599E; Homer 600C; Heracles 600F; Socrates 600F-601A; and for Diogenes, see 602A, 604D, 605D-E, 606B.

57 Fav. 10.1-2.

58 Fav. 10.3.
polis. For Aristotle, the creation and population of a polis and the evolution of man as a political being was the natural difference between civilization and lawlessness. Exile, therefore, was a form of social death that deprived a person of their citizen’s rights, the most natural of which was their right to speak and, more specifically, speak freely, known as parrhesia (παρρησία). Aristotle’s belief was that parrhesia was the proof of humanity’s political nature; it allowed us to debate morality and establish communities around what was deemed right and wrong.59

The suggestion that an exile, no longer a citizen, was deprived of their right to parrhesia is systematically refuted by Plutarch using standard examples from Euripides’ Phoenissae. Plutarch references a scene where Polynices is speaking to his mother Jocasta about what was the most detrimental aspect of exile. In return Polynices replies “That liberty to speak one’s mind is lost”.60 Polynices and Jocasta agree that the lack of parrhesia is akin to slavery since slaves are unable to speak freely against their masters.61 This very same scene is quoted by Musonius, Favorinus and Teles and it appears to be the standard argument against the liberties of exile.62

To Plutarch this remark is neither “good nor true” (οὐκ ὅρθως οὐδ’ ἀληθῶς) and he says that claiming exiles lacked the freedom of speech is Euripides’ “greatest mistake and absurdity” (τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ ἀτοπώτατον).63 Plutarch provides several examples of exiles who were plainly able to speak their minds: the exile Theodorus spoke insolently to King Lysimachus, Diogenes

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60 Eur. Phoen. 391 - ἐν μὲν μέγιστον, οὔκ ἐχει παρρησίαν.
62 Fav. 7.2.
63 De Ex. 16 = Mor. 606A-D.
was caught spying on King Philip and called him out on his avarice and madness, and he mentions how Hannibal, an exile in the court of Antiochus, rebuked the king for preferring the military advice of sacrificed animals over his own military expertise. Musonius also relies on Diogenes as an example, but also lists himself among the free-speaking exiles. Furthermore, Plutarch pursues Jocasta’s parallel with slavery by saying that the prudent man (νοῦν ἧχοντος ἀνδρὸς) understands when it is necessary to speak one’s mind and when it is preferable to remain silent.  

An individual’s parrhesia is no more hindered by exile than it is by their fear or respect of authority, a point that is also relied on by Musonius. Unlike Plutarch, Musonius says that the fear of speaking freely is just as much of a concern for exiles as those who remain in cities, but it is the courageous person who speaks freely wherever they go.  

Both Plutarch and Musonius arrive at the same conclusion but attribute different virtues to their free-speaking exiles. For Plutarch it is wisdom and prudence, while Musonius relies on courage and manliness.

If an exile does not lose their right to speak freely then what are they giving up? For Plutarch the exile loses the ability to hold office or participate in civic duties but instead gains freedom (ἐλευθερία) to pursue whatever life they choose.  

As previously mentioned, the tradition of exile consolations drives the subject to cosmopolitanism. For Plutarch, this means finding a new city of their choosing and using their newfound liberty to live life in peace and tranquillity. In an unusual twist, Plutarch quotes and paraphrases the

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64 De Ex. 16 = Mor. 606A-D. He also quotes a passage from Euripides here.
65 Fr. 9 48.1-12; 48.15-49.2 Cf. Whitmarsh 2001a, 278.
66 There is a difference here worth mentioning later. For Musonius, the courageous man says what he wants, when he wants, whether in exile or not. For Plutarch, wisdom decides when someone should speak and reason determines what someone should say.
67 De Ex. 11-12 = Mor. 604B-C.
Pythagoreans when he states that the exile should “choose the best and most pleasant place to live in, and time will make it your country.”

The exile is afforded the opportunity to never bear the difficulties and strain of public office, of entertaining governors, going on embassies to Rome (602C), providing expensive gifts, or be concerned with the minutiae of internal politics (604B). Musonius echoes Plutarch when he says that the exile has earned himself leisure from political duties and time which would wisely be spent practicing virtues (Mus. 9.27-29). As an added benefit, Plutarch’s exile is free to wander the world to visit feasts and festivals at his leisure (as if that were somehow impossible before they were exiled) or, if they so choose, simply be idle or walk or read or sleep quietly.

Plutarch’s exile is not a dejected transient, but an individual suddenly liberated from the closed-mindedness of identifying as a citizen of a single location. It even appears that Plutarch’s exile has an opportunity to cultivate his heavenly (οὐράνιον) if not prevented by societal shackles (De Ex. 5). Indeed, to Plutarch most people are like ants or bees: given an entire world to enjoy we prefer to remain in the anthill or the hive and get distraught when we are relocated.

Imitation and mimesis

In the words of Tim Whitmarsh, “to be an exiled philosopher […] is to a certain extent to play a role which has already been scripted.” To achieve success and contentment while in exile is to follow in the footsteps of a tradition of

\[68\] De Ex. 8 = Mor. 602C - ‘ἐλοί τόλιν τήν ἀρίστην καὶ ἡδίστην, πατρίδα δ’ αὐτήν ὁ χρόνος τοιήσει,’
\[69\] De Ex. 12 = Mor. 604D.
\[70\] Whitmarsh 2001a, 277.
positive exilic examples which are time and again used in consolation literature. The consolation writer establishes these individuals as people who fulfil one or more of their criteria of success in exile. This technique of imitation, or *mimesis* (μίμησις) is typical of ancient writing and through association with a legendary or heroic figure an individual can earn legitimacy or claim association with divine or heroic ancestry.\(^{71}\)

The Athenian statesman Themistocles is one of the most commonly referenced examples of a successful exile after having been ostracised in 472-1 BCE. Themistocles is mentioned as an example in Teles, Cicero, Ovid, Musonius, Favorinus, and Plutarch as someone who defied the traditional view that to be exiled was to lose honour or glory. Teles is the first to use Themistocles as proof that exile can be used to one’s advantage, quoting Themistocles when he said “Oh children, we should now have been undone, had we not been undone before” when presented with a banquet in his honour at the court in Persia.\(^{72}\) Cicero described Themistocles as one of Athens’ “most eminent” citizens (*civis exempla*) who was ungratefully driven away.\(^{73}\) Ovid counts Themistocles as one of his inspirations while in exile and a man who endured his banishment with a “firm mind.”\(^{74}\) Musonius recalls that Themistocles was so successful in his exile that his own enemies conferred upon him three cities to support his livelihood after he had defected to the Persian side.\(^{75}\) The lone dissenter in our examples is Favorinus who lists Themistocles as someone who should not be imitated, but only on moral

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\(^{71}\) Gaertner 2007, 7-9 provides a substantial list of Greek cities who all claimed ancestry with exilic figures and an inventory of exiled examples used frequently. \(^{72}\) *De Ex.* 22.14-23.1 – ὦ παῖ φησίν ἀπωλέσαντος μὴ ἀπωλέσατε’ Cf. Nesselrath 2007, 94. \(^{73}\) Cic. *De Re Pub.* 3. \(^{74}\) EI.III:49-94 \(^{75}\) Mus. 9.66-68
grounds. His success in maintaining glory while in exile are glossed over in favour of his perceived treachery to the Athenians, a feature unique to Favorinus. Themistocles is paired with Alcibiades and Coriolanus as paradigms not worth approval or imitation, in part because they chose to take revenge against their fatherlands.\footnote{P. Vat. II.2.2, Whitmarsh 2001a, 304. Favorinus' negative portrayal of Themistocles presents a problem because it contradicts his emphatic resistance against the priority of the \textit{polis}. We shall see some of that reflected in Plutarch as well.}

Plutarch’s \textit{On Exile} features a long list of Greek \textit{mimetic} individuals, many of whom are mentioned in other consolation treatises. Heracles, Socrates, and Diogenes are all frequently used as benchmarks for Stoic cosmopolitanism. Odysseus has an array of attributes that are displayed in numerous ways: from philosophical wanderer to cowardly trickster, but all in pursuit of knowledge in exile. Also frequently mentioned are Apollo; Cadmus, founder of Thebes; Jason; Thucydides; Achilles; and Aristides.\footnote{Gaertner 2007, 9 has compiled an inventory.} Favorinus even mentions Musonius as an exilic paradigm.

Time and culture altered these typological frameworks of exile according to Roman or Greek values. The Roman Cicero mentions Coriolanus alongside Themistocles; Ovid’s examples include Rutilius; Seneca lists an unnamed founder of Rome alongside Marcellus. Plutarch’s Roman examples are almost exclusively ones who were given their own biography: Cicero and Camillus both were the subject of \textit{Lives}. Tiberius Caesar is listed as someone who enjoyed and strove to achieve the peace and freedom afforded by exile, but he was neither exiled nor did he have his own \textit{Life}. Plutarch has several Romans among his examples of virtuous exiles but relies mostly on Greek or Hellenistic examples. However, in Seneca and Favorinus we see many more
examples of Latin and Roman examples: Seneca includes Varro, Brutus, Marcellus, and Scipio Africanus, while Favorinus references Aeneas, Mucius, and Horatius as Stoic examples of exile. Favorinus even mentions Seneca and Musonius, indicating a tradition of exile examining.\(^78\)

Each writer emphasizes aspects of their own exile to reinforce their chosen mimesis. Whitmarsh (2001a) has examined the work of Musonius and came to the following conclusions: Musonius, being a Roman of the equestrian order, was implicated in the Pisonian conspiracy against Nero and exiled to the island of Gyara in 62 CE. Musonius resists the notion that exiles lack parrhesia by claiming courage in the face of the fear of retribution is his empowerment, and he defines his exile as the resistance against the oppressive authority.\(^79\) His persona is Socrates, whose contempt for authority leads him to rebel and empowers his parrhesia. Dio Chrysostom, on the other hand, is the wandering exile, happy to stumble onto his philosophical learnings and become “the master of canny self-dramatization” in the form of Odysseus – both trickster and inquisitive wanderer.\(^80\)

Nonetheless, of all Plutarch’s Parallel Lives several of them are referenced in other authors as exiled examples to emulate or to avoid. The Roman exiles include Romulus, Camillus, Coriolanus, Gaius Marius, Sertorius, and Cicero.\(^81\) For the Greek Lives, nearly all the Athenians are either exiled or the target of ostracism, while a disproportionate number of the others faced

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\(^78\) Claassen 1999, 15 also mentions how Livy wrote about the fame and infamy of exiles. Camillus is specifically described at 7.1.10.

\(^79\) Whitmarsh 2001a, 279.

\(^80\) Whitmarsh 2001a, 292.

\(^81\) Claassen 1999, 16 describes how Cicero even used Marius as his own mimetic paradigm depending on his audience.
conditions of banishment, relocation, loss of rights, or disenfranchisement of their own.

iii. The Uniqueness of Plutarch

Plutarch’s *On Exile* is clearly part of a long tradition of Stoic exile consolations that vary little in their philosophical foundation, their re-evaluation of the importance of the *patris* and the *cosmos*, their heroic *mimesis*, and their refutation of Euripides’ arguments. Nonetheless, we have seen how Plutarch’s consolation differs from other consolations in that it was written from the perspective of someone who had not experienced exile for themselves and, in fact, had a deep connection to their homeland. It is now worth investigating what aspects of *On Exile* are common to other treatises which Plutarch leaves out, and the value they have for his overall moralistic goals.

First, it is unusual that in *On Exile* Plutarch never addressed the cause of his subject’s exile, nor did he make any attempt to explain why his addressee was banished from Sardis in the first place. Ovid wrote that he was banished due to *carmen et error* – a poem and a mistake – and took full responsibility for what earned him his exile,\(^82\) Seneca revealed elsewhere that he was charged and convicted for adultery,\(^83\) Musonius said that it is better to suffer wrongs than to do them, implying that the subject of his consolation was exiled unjustly,\(^84\) and Dio Chrysostom said at the outset that he was banished for allegedly being friends with someone who had earned Domitian’s ire.\(^85\) All

\(^{82}\) *Ov. Tris.* II:207.
\(^{83}\) *Consolation to Polybius* 13.2.
we know from Plutarch’s *On Exile* is that his subject was not banished to any particular location but away from his home in Sardis.\(^{86}\)

It is possible that Plutarch intended to preserve the identity of his subject through vagueness and providing few personal details, but I would add that it also serves to help widen his potential audience. *On Exile* is not about how not to be exiled; it is about coming to terms with being exiled and the mindset required to adapt to one’s new position of statelessness. As we can see from the proem of Favorinus’ *On Exile*, he intends a similar objective. His work, he begins, was composed in view of the possibility that someone, educated or otherwise, might require help considering their circumstances (*P. Vat. II*).

However, while Favorinus and the rest of our exile writers approach it from the perspective of an individual who has been subjected to specific forms of banishment, Plutarch has it in mind to address a much wider audience. He does not include the cause of the exile because it could vary wildly in scope and scale depending on the circumstances. When we look at the *Parallel Lives*, Plutarch is quick to give editorializing interjections on the causes and extent of each type of exile as they occur to his subjects: the relationship of the statesman to the *demos*, the envy of those less virtuous, corruption, or an excess of vice. These all appear over and over as causes for one’s exile from their *patris*. This time, however, Plutarch, like the exiled philosopher, is aiming higher. It is strange that Plutarch is so eager to value Socrates’s claim to cosmopolitanism while neglecting to mention Socrates’ own arguments against going into exile in Plato’s *Crito*.\(^{87}\) This is the first sign that Plutarch may be basing *On Exile* on traditional Stoic and Cynic arguments, but also

\(^{86}\) *De Ex.* 12 = *Mor.* 604B.

\(^{87}\) *Plat.* *Crito*. 52c-54d. Cf. Branham 74.
incorporates other schools of thoughts, picking and choosing like a philosophical buffet.

Plutarch and other members of the Second Sophistic were known to blend qualities of the earthbound Stoic-Cynic philosophies with the Platonist philosophies of ideas. The fact that he uses Stoic arguments is common enough in exile consolations, but there is a surprising amount of Platonism present in his On Exile as well. In his arguments for cosmopolitanism he utilizes the argument that people are more than just a body, but a soul that stretches up into heaven. This feeds into the recurring concept that all humanity is composed of exiles from heaven, and that we have all forgotten what it was to be connected with the divine. Plutarch chastises humanity for gathering in tiny bundles like bees and ants, a connection closely tied in with – but contradicting – Aristotle’s Politics and the natural order of human development.

Furthermore, Plutarch mentions numerous concepts and references from other rival schools of thought. The Pythagoreans are credited with the line “Make choice of the best life you can, and custom will make it pleasant” (‘ἐλού βίον ἄριστον, ἡδύν δ’ αὐτόν ἢ συνήθεια ποιήσει,’), which Plutarch reframes as “Choose the best and most pleasant place to live in, and time will make it your homeland” (‘ἐλού πόλιν τὴν ἄριστην καὶ ἡδίστην, πατρίδα δ’ αὐτὴν ὁ χρόνος ποιήσει,’). When presenting examples of philosophers who spent their lives isolated from others he suggests numerous examples of Athenians.

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88 De Ex. 5 = Mor. 600F from. Plat. Tim. 90A.
89 De Ex. 17 = Mor. 607E.
90 De Ex. 7-8 = Mor. 602B-C.
91 De Ex. 8 = Mor. 602C.
from the Lyceum, the Academy, the Stoa, the Palladium, and the Odeum. If those men did not suit his audience’s tastes, Plutarch also offers up six examples of Peripatetic philosophers who did likewise, followed by six Stoic philosophers to further drive his point home. He quotes the third century BCE poet Callimachus, the playwright Aeschylus, and Homer’s *Iliad* and *Odyssey* multiple times. He even references *Zeus Xenios* (ξενίου Διός), the patron of strangers and exiles, as part of his suggestion that everyone is an exile and under the protection of the highest and mightiest.

Plutarch’s *On Exile* was not necessarily intended to be read by only one man but was offered up publicly as global lessons that can be applicable to people from all philosophies and all ways of life.

**Stoicism and Platonism**

Finally, we can discuss Plutarch’s moralistic goals in *On Exile* and how they correspond to what we find in other portions of the *Moralia*. Just as Plutarch begins *On Exile* with a discussion of rational examination and philosophy, so should we. Plutarch makes it abundantly clear that the use of philosophy is the only way that an individual can reconfigure their perspective of the subjective evils of exile. In fact, Plutarch specifically dismisses emotional support and sympathy as a worthwhile tool since it accomplishes nothing but drags both people down together. A consolation should help the afflicted individual examine and rationalize their position when the matter at hand has

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92 *De Ex.* 13 = *Mor.* 605A.  
93 *De Ex.* 14 = *Mor.* 605B.  
94 *De Ex.* 9 = *Mor.* 602F.  
95 *De Ex.* 10 = *Mor.* 603A.  
96 *De Ex.* 605A.  
97 *Mor.* 599B-C.
no intrinsic or physical qualities. From what is provided in *On Exile* it appears that Plutarch does indeed adhere to Stoic values as the heart of his philosophical foundation.

However, Plutarch also wrote three separate treatises that criticize the Stoics: their constant contradictions (*De Stoicorum Repugnatiis*), their paradoxical misconceptions (*Stoicos absurdiors poetis dicere*), and a discourse with general complaints about Stoic values (*De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos*). As we have seen, Plutarch has addressed the value of philosophy as essential to learning the necessities for virtuous living, but in his other works we see Plutarch systematically tearing down the claims of the Stoics. The Stoics claim that temples and altars are all human constructions, but they praise them anyway (*De Stoic.* 6). According to Plutarch, Zeno and Chrysippus argue themselves into circles saying virtues are the same but different, and that one cannot learn the natural sciences before studying morality, which they claim must come after studying the natural sciences (*De Stoic.* 7-9). The Stoic wise man cannot be injured if he does not feel so, he is not imprisoned if he feels free, and has not lost if he does not feel beaten (*De Stoic.* 1).

There is more than enough evidence to suggest that Plutarch does not agree that a person’s situation is only a by-product of their mindset, and yet he is suggesting the very same philosophy to his subject in *On Exile*. Plutarch definitely criticizes the Stoic philosophers – Zeno and Chrysippus in particular – for their ineffective ways of arguing (*De Stoic.*) and he criticizes their beliefs as useless: they claim to be the only ones who are truly rich, but they are often found begging at doorsteps for food and shelter (*Stoicos.* 6). Plutarch’s options here are few: he may be intending to simply follow the tradition of
Stoic consolations. We have seen from Teles, Seneca, Musonius, and Dio that Stoicism is the preferred method of treatment for the ailment of exile, and simply denying that there’s a problem has been good enough for centuries.

*On Exile* does not only include Stoic and Cynic traditions, but also includes Platonic values alongside the values he appears to despise. Plutarch quotes Plato’s view that humanity is not bound to the natural world, but with one foot on earth and the other reaching into the heavens. This idea of a heavenly plant is echoed again in *Mor. 601F* where Plutarch says that those who have “roots which can live and thrive, cling and grow to every place” and he links the Platonic idea of the heavenly nature of the soul with yet another quote from Plato which describes the human body as a shell and the soul is trapped within. We can also catch a glimpse of more Platonic views from a fragment of Plutarch’s in which he describes the soul clinging to the body like Odysseus to a fig tree, afraid to let go because of the uncertainty of death.

In Plutarch’s consolation we find a combination of Stoic, Cynic, and Platonic views overlapping to provide a unique perspective on the concept of banishment and dislocation. On one hand, he presents the Cynic belief that the entire world is our home, to suggest that one *polis* in particular is essential to our self-identity is preposterous, and that the true Cynic lends no value to the very concept of *polis* and chooses to do and say what they please. On the other hand, Plutarch takes the idea one step further with the inclusion of Platonic ideals: not only is the *polis* unimportant, but even the Cynic idea of a global identity is unnatural. In *On Exile* the exile is not only the individual who has been forced to relocate, but all of humanity, who has been forced to

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98 *Mor. 601F* = *De Ex*. 7 - ῥιζας ἔχοντι παντισχοῦ ἐχθν τε καὶ τρέφεσθαι καὶ παντὶ τόπῳ προσφύεσθαι δύναμένας; *Mor. 600F* includes Plat. *Tim*. 90A. Cf. *Mor. 607E*. 
relocate from the heavens. Everybody is an exile in a philosophical sense, so what harm could there possibly be from being forced to move from one oyster shell to another? In the end everybody is an exile from the heavens.

Cosmopolitanism and loyalty to the patris

Having exposed the problem with Plutarch’s apparent praise of Stoicism it becomes necessary to address his views on cosmopolitanism and the reduced standing of the authority of the patris in the face of the cosmos. On Exile appears to support cosmopolitanism as the more practical philosophy for the recently exiled instead of espousing the complexities of Platonic divinity. However, one’s devotion to their patris seems to be a source of great confusion in other parts of the Moralia. In various works he both praises and condemns the choice to fight or abandon one’s country. We see in On Exile that for someone already living in a city “it seems not reasonable and just, that leaving his own he should go to dwell in another city.” He immediately contradicts this by saying that one should remain even though “it should be in no credit or prove unhealthful, though disturbed with seditions, and its affairs in distemper and out of order,” a person should remain in their polis. However, when a person has been deprived of their patris by Fortune (τύχη), for Plutarch the person is given the freedom to go and do as they please, as if Fortune were unable to be remedied. This comes despite Mor. 600B where he claims that the best way to take revenge is using philosophy, not by

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99 Mor. 602B = De Ex. 8 - οὖ γὰρ δοκεῖ καλὸν οὐδὲ δίκαιον εἶναι καταλιπόντα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ νέμειν ἔτέραν.
100 Mor. 602B = De Ex. 8 - κἂν ἄδοξος ἢ κἂν νοσώδης κἂν ταράττηται στάσεσιν ὕφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς καὶ πράγμασι μὴ ὑγιαίνουσιν
violence or sympathy. Herein lies the problem with Plutarch’s loyalty to the patris.

However, a reading of the Moralia gives a selection of Plutarch praising both opportunities. In De Genio he praises Pelopidas the exile for working with those in Thebes for taking back their city by cunning and force (De Genio. 3.5). In Mulierum Virtutes we see three examples of women praised for standing up for or abandoning their patris. The Trojan Women, seeing that Fortune had taken away their patris decide that it is better to create a new fatherland, something seen as better than wandering (Mul. Virt. 6.1). The Argive Women join the outnumbered male ranks to actively defend the walls of their city to successfully drive off invaders (Mul. Vir. 7.3) and the story of Megisto, who successfully staged a revolution after the men had been exiled from their city (Mul. Virt. 7.4). In one of his treatises against the Stoics Plutarch even condemns them for “living long lives wandering around” (De Stoic. 1.3) in idleness, something he specifically endorses in Mor. 604D.

The inconsistencies in Plutarch’s endorsement of cosmopolitanism and, more specifically, the adoption or creation of a new patris is clearly problematic. Despite what is said in On Exile, it is not necessarily entirely praiseworthy to abandon one’s patris once exiled and at times it is just as commendable to fight against the Fortune that deprived one of their patris. It is just as much a problem in the Parallel Lives where Plutarch struggles to frame the issue in the narratives of his exiled subjects.102

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101 Wandering is another element seen as essentially positive for an exile and the development of the life of a philosopher. See Mor. 603E. But also that to be exiled to an island makes one free from wandering.
102 I disagree with Mayer 1997, 90 who says that “a closer reading shows how On Exile confirms Plutarch’s tendency to assert the priority of the fatherland.” At this point I cannot disagree that Plutarch may believe that loyalty to the patris
Freedom and leisure

In *On Exile* Plutarch claims that now his addressee has the freedom to pursue a life of leisure and comfort, free from political responsibilities and civic duty (604C). When accused of not holding office or presiding over public games, the exile should respond by saying they have no requirement to head factions, give expensive gifts, or care at all for the comings and goings of the people (604B). Plutarch is advocating the total freedom from responsibility as a good thing and that leisure is a thing that ought to be searched for. However, from *Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Public Affairs* (*An seni respublica gerenda sit*) he has a much different view that connects politics and ethics. In *An Seni* Plutarch repeatedly expresses his view that politics is an essential human activity that is devoted to promoting the welfare of humanity (791C). He reminds the reader that statesmanship is not only holding offices or going to meetings, but he also equates the responsibilities of a statesman with being a philosopher in their efforts to improve the welfare of the state (796D).\(^{103}\) Plutarch’s exile is liberated from civic responsibility, but what he does not say is that he is also removed from contributing meaningfully to the world of politics. The exile may have the freedom to “be idle, or walk, or read, or sleep quietly,” but to do so would diminish the value of the individual who is therefore doing nothing to promote the welfare of their community.\(^{104}\) If they take Plutarch’s advice and enjoy their leisure from public life then they go against Plutarch’s philosophy that the practice of philosophy must come when it can, but not at the expense of public worth.

\(^{103}\) De Blois 1992, 4569.

\(^{104}\) Mor. 604D = De Ex. 12 - , σχολὴ περίπατος ἀνάγνωσις ὑπνος ἀθορύβητος
The Virtues

Despite Plutarch’s contradicting opinions on Stoic and Platonic values in *On Exile* and the rest of the *Moralia*, at the foundation of both is an acquisition of a proper *paideia* as well as – most importantly in *On Exile* – the ability to use philosophy to successfully avoid exile and, if not, how best to succeed during their banishment. The virtues listed in *On Exile* are vague but can be inferred from several statements that imply a combination of Stoic and Platonic values, again implying that Plutarch has tried to blend the two into a cohesive argument against the evils of exile. But we also see that Plutarch emphasizes two other non-traditional virtues to the successful exile and omits several others from consideration.

It has long been understood that the Greeks had several cardinal virtues that were held above all others. Over time the understanding of them changed somewhat, but an essentially virtuous person was courageous (ἀνδρεία), temperate (σωφροσύνη), just (δικαιοσύνη), and prudent or wise (φρόνησις).\(^{105}\) These four qualities are often mentioned in Greek writing, from Aristotle to Musonius.\(^{106}\) Even Plutarch regards them often as the primary concerns for virtuous living. By the early Principate some more virtues were added and expanded upon and included a host of other qualities including clemency (*clementia*), dignity (*dignitas*), humanity (*humanitas*), piety (*pietas*), truthfulness (*veritas*), and valour or courage (summarized as *virtus*). As Plutarch was writing as a Greek in a Roman world it is worth considering whether he valued Roman virtues as highly as the traditional Greek virtues.

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\(^{105}\) Foot 2002, 2.

\(^{106}\) See Dillon 2004, 10.
*On Exile* is not entirely explicit when it comes to listing the virtues required for an exile. If, as I suspect, it was intended for a wider, global audience, then it would make sense to avoid isolating Greek qualities over Roman ones. Whatever set of virtues his audience applies, Plutarch might be intending to generate a set that specifically exists for those who are sent into exile or who have fled punishment on their own accord. As always, philosophy is the source and foundation of all of Plutarch’s virtues (599A-passim). It allows a person not only to recognize the virtues required but also the ability to examine, debate, and justify one’s opinions and dictates how one should behave.

The one Greek virtue most repeatedly mentioned is that of prudence, or *phronesis* (φρόνησις). A term with a spectrum of meaning, *phronesis* sums up wisdom and understanding and is a direct by-product of philosophy. For the exile, *phronesis* is absolutely necessary. It permits the exile to recognize what they have lost in exile and comfort themselves with the knowledge of what good things they still retain (*Mor.* 600D). For Plutarch, *phronesis* is the quality most important for an exile to succeed and thrive (*Mor.* 601E-F).

Like “a governing anchor” (ἄγκυραν κυβερνήτην), *phronesis* permits the exile to lay down their roots and succeed in any place where there are the basic necessities for living, since the wise and prudent person knows how to make the most of their situation. Most of the wisest and most prudent people (φρονιμωτάτων καὶ σοφωτάτων) Plutarch says, do not end up dying in their homeland but, using their *phronesis*, travel the world to find and settle in a place more suited for their choice of lives (*Mor.* 604D). Among these he lists Euripides, Aeschylus, Simonides, Herodotus, and Homer, all of whom wrote their most famous works while abroad. Living somewhere other than one’s
patris cannot deprive a person of “his virtue and his prudence” (οὐδ᾽ ἄρετήν οὐδὲ φρόνησιν) (607E-F). It is odd that Plutarch lists *phronesis* alongside virtue since by our definition *phronesis* is a virtue, but perhaps that is another one of Plutarch’s attempts to appeal to a wider audience. If *phronesis* is not considered a virtue by some, it certainly should be while in exile. Plutarch even rejects Euripides’ Polynices’ claim that exile deprives a man of his *parrhesia* by saying that not speaking your mind at all times is a sign of the presence of *phronesis*, not from the lack of *parrhesia*. He even quotes Euripides who says that a wise man knows “Both when it’s best no tongue to find; and when it’s safe to speak his mind” (606A).

If *phronesis* is the by-product of philosophy, then Plutarch creates another virtue out of *phronesis*. A wise and prudent exile must be more than capable of recognizing their situation; they must also be able to adapt to their new surroundings. In *On Exile* there are multiple examples of adaptability being a virtue: unlike ants or bees, who hide in their hives and holes, the exile is banished into a new world to make the world their new home. In 601E-F the wise and prudent man is able to adapt to their new surroundings and to take advantage of what is available to us, and it is echoed in 604A where the individual must have the “will and skill to live at ease” in their new surroundings. Themistocles is an example of this, and the fact that Plutarch chose to write a *Life of Themistocles* will be involved heavily in our later discussions on the subject. There are shades of adaptability in the Stoic tradition, especially when Plutarch brings up the example of Zeno who, having lost his final ship, adapts to the life of a philosopher (603E) and the numerous individuals who, when exiled, adapted to their new condition and wrote their greatest works (605D).
Finally, we have humility. When King Philip was thrown to ground in 602D he comes to the realization that each of us is given a tiny portion of the world. A man “not puffed up with conceit nor madly in love with a crowd” takes no offence at being exiled to a tiny island (603E), and Plutarch lists Tiberius Caesar as one of those illustrious ranks. However, if that example is too lofty for the reader, Plutarch points out many more exiles and self-exiles who humbly retreated into obscurity to continue their work in peace (604B). We further see that Polynices’ lack of parrhesia was not only a sign of wisdom – to know when to speak and when to remain silent – but also as the humility to know when not to speak out of ‘rudeness or insolence’ (606A). In the *Parallel Lives* there are multiple references to how exiles treat and are treated by their hosts with whom they take shelter, and for several of them – Themistocles, Alcibiades, Coriolanus, most of all – it is an important point of discussion for their virtues in exile.

Adaptability and humility are two new concepts in the world of Greek virtue, and we shall see during the *Lives* how they can either help or hinder the exile to extreme results. It is unusual that Plutarch makes no mention of courage (ἀνδρεία) or justice (δίκαιος), both of which are mentioned in Musonius and others. They could again be the result of Plutarch approaching a wider audience and simultaneously wishing not to shame his addressee from Sardis. If he were justly exiled then a discussion of justice would serve the opposite of the intention of the consolation, and the use of courage might imply a priority over philosophy and rational examination. These, however, are nothing more than conjecture.

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107 Dillion 2004, 10.
iv. Conclusion

As we have seen, Plutarch’s *On Exile* continues a tradition of exile consolations that had existed for centuries, each using similar arguments and explanations to mitigate the perceived harm in banishment. The frequent refutation of Euripidean arguments, the emphasis on Stoic-Cynic philosophy, the priority of the *cosmos* over the *polis*, and the conclusion that exile has no intrinsic evil all fit into a pattern of consolation that has remained more or less consistent in structure and content.

However, as a consolation *On Exile* is intended to combat the publicly held belief that exile is a punishment with long-lasting detriments to an individual’s status, rights, and safety. The reality of exile could only have been what people believed it to be, otherwise there would be no reason to write a consolation. Exile is only ignominious, Plutarch says, to the fools who harangue others for being bald or poor or short (607A), which is exactly what is reflected throughout the *Lives* in certain physical characteristics.¹⁰⁸ Pericles’ large head was compared to a squid (*Per*. 3.2), Alcibiades had a lisp that was parodied in Aristophanes’ verses (*Alc*. 1.4), and Sulla’s unsightly blotches earned him a permanent nickname (*Sull*. 2.1).

Mayer (1997, 94) makes the case that to console his exiled friend, Plutarch’s arguments sound unconvincing because of the nature of the text he is writing. I cannot disagree; the evidence presented above demonstrates that the consolation genre, being contrarian in nature and rigid in content, has

¹⁰⁸ Branham 2007, 75 – “What Athenian prided himself on being a ‘short bald beggar’?”
Plutarch colouring between the lines and writing a treatise that is consistent with the established consolation format.

Be that as it may, the *On Exile* cannot be discounted entirely as a treatise designed purely for support. As I mentioned previously, it does appear that, from the lack of personal details of the subject and the inclusion of multiple competing philosophical schools of thought, Plutarch intended for *On Exile* to be received by a much wider audience, possibly one that was concerned about the need for Greek philosophical and moral guidance in the face of growing Roman imperial authority. Furthermore, it is important to note that *On Exile* does not imply that the addressee was a statesman of any kind, which suggests that his opinions regarding statesmen have not been fully expressed. I believe that Plutarch’s *On Exile* is different from the rest of the *Moralia* and does not entirely reflect the praiseworthy virtues found in the *Parallel Lives*. It seems as if Plutarch were intentionally trying to mimic the established consolation patterns but changes aspects in unusual ways that make it disparate from the rest of his works. It cannot be debated that Plutarch did hold philosophy and a Greek *paideia* in high regard, but he appears to be much more confused on the topic of cosmopolitanism and the *patris*. He certainly believed that the exile maintains their *parrhesia*, but many more suffered from a loss of glory and honour. His arguments in *On Exile* would be convincing for someone who no longer has an identity as a citizen, and there is an appeal to the Diogenes model of turning the disenfranchisement back on those who do the disenfranchising. However, in several occasions in the *Moralia* Plutarch has described his disdain for the Stoic tradition, and several writers have offered up possible explanations one way or another. I intend to investigate how the reality of cosmopolitanism is presented in the *Parallel*
Lives: whether Plutarch truly praises the actions of the example exiles in his consolation, or if they are just used as practical paradigms for success.
Chapter III. The Founding Exile

A recurring theme in Plutarch’s Roman *Parallel Lives* is the *ktistic* exile: an individual whose exile from Rome is either caused by, or leads to, their recognition as a symbolic Founder of Rome (κτίστης Ῥώμης). These individuals were seen to have safeguarded the integrity of the city from external threats, internal sedition, or other crises that risked the destruction of the Roman state. The notion of the *ktistic* exile is not unusual; by the first century CE, Roman writers had adopted it for use in their epic writing and the tradition can be traced back through to numerous Greek founding stories. It was common for Greek city-states to adopt a heroic exile as their founder or to claim a direct lineage from a significant figure from Greek stories, and the founding myth of Rome itself appears to have been embedded in a tradition of *ktistic* exile.¹ The study of the concept has largely been confined to the genres of Greco-Roman epic, and even then, it appears that little research has been done on the subject.² However, I believe there is evidence to suggest that Plutarch has implemented it into several of his *Parallel Lives* as a fundamental characteristic of his subject, as well as a statement about the nature of governance and rule of the Roman state.³

First, I will discuss Plutarch’s use of the word *ktistes* (κτίστης) to represent certain subjects of his biographies. The evolution of the term over time

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¹ Gaertner 2007, 7 provides a list of several Greek cities founded by exiles. Most prominent are Thebes, which was founded by Cadmus in exile, and Sparta, which was linked to descendants of Heracles.

² Lowe 2000 does not include exile as a typical plot element in ancient writing, despite evidence to the contrary listed in detail by Bowie 2007, 24-27. The concept of the returning exile does appear at 228, 237-239.

necessitates an explanation to differentiate it from another, more commonly used phrases for foundation characters, \textit{oikistes} (οἰκιστής). In all the \textit{Parallel Lives}, Plutarch uses \textit{ktistes} sparingly, and most frequently to describe Founders of Rome (\textit{ktistai Rhomes}), individuals who contributed in some fashion to the ongoing safeguarding and preservation of the Roman state, or a symbolic reinstitution of the values on which it was founded. Only three Romans in the \textit{Lives} are called \textit{ktistai} – Cicero, Marius, and Camillus – and it is striking that all three are exiled from Rome. The difference between \textit{ktistes} and \textit{oikistes} must be established to determine Plutarch’s intended meaning or, if possible, whether he intended for it to represent several different meanings unique to each \textit{Life}. The relative rarity of the term compared to other similar words allows for a set of precise comparative readings between Plutarch and his source texts to help determine his ultimate objective.

The second section will focus on the tradition of honouring individuals as new Founders of Rome, exiled or not. There appear to be few sources prior to Plutarch who declared past Romans to be new \textit{ktistai}, so attempting to determine when the tradition began will help to establish why Plutarch might have called Cicero, Camillus, and Marius, Founders of Rome instead of other influential and significant Romans from the past. I believe that the ordering of Plutarch’s composition of the \textit{Lives} features significantly in his decision, and that his research into the fifth pair, the \textit{Demosthenes-Cicero}, may have provoked an interest in the dual themes of exile and foundation. Cicero’s own self-promotion as an exile and protector of Rome could have inspired Plutarch to continue writing about other exiled Roman heroes.

The third section will focus on the \textit{Lives} of Plutarch’s four Founders of Rome: Romulus, Cicero, Marius, and Camillus. The narratives of these biographies
contain parallel themes that extend beyond the considerable emphasis on their exiles. It is worth investigating these to further clarify the specific qualities which might contribute to Plutarch’s depiction of them as Founders of Rome and nuance the overall moral theme of the biographies. As these were written as pairs of Lives, an examination of the characterisation of their Greek counterparts will help to distinguish what is significant to the Roman Lives and what may have been Plutarch’s own embellishments. There do appear to be several significant traits that link the four in surprising ways and more firmly establish that Plutarch intended them to be grouped together in the reader’s thoughts. There is a repetition of themes which include being foretold by prophecy, rising from humble beginnings to positions of the highest authority, and ongoing discussion about their early education and the development of their character.

In the fourth section I will look at the most significant themes in the Lives of the Founders of Rome: their exile, flight, or banishment from their homeland and how each relates ultimately to their title as a Founder of Rome. Given Plutarch’s objective of revealing moral attributes and aspects of character, the exiles of his Roman Founders appear to be the greatest test of their virtues and this theme is described differently in each Life. Beginning with Romulus, I will demonstrate that exiles prove to be the ultimate test of the nature of the Roman Founders. Each one reacts differently to their exile according to their character and their virtues. Plutarch’s choice of pairs to relate the Roman Founders to their Greek counterparts reveal discrepancies or parallels which will be examined.

Plutarch’s exiled Founders of Rome follow similar patterns, but the Marius remains an interesting outlier. While the other three are changed in significant
and positive ways, Marius is presented as the opposite. His exile and return to Rome are punctuated with scenes of disturbing violence and ultimately a desire to take revenge on his state. The final section will investigate the \textit{Marius} and its role as a negative \textit{Life}. The \textit{Life of Marius}, along with the \textit{Lives} of Sertorius and Coriolanus, demonstrate Plutarch’s interest in opposite themes. If the \textit{ktistic} exiles are examples to be emulated, then these revenge exiles show how a virtuous Roman statesman ought not to behave in exile, and why they did not earn the title of \textit{ktistes Rhomes} like the others.

\textbf{i. Defining Founders}

This investigation into the founding exiles in Plutarch’s \textit{Parallel Lives} hinges on defining and differentiating two distinct terms for founders of cities: \textit{ktistes} (κτίστης) and \textit{oikistes} (οἰκιστής). Of the two, Plutarch uses \textit{oikistes} more frequently, using it to describe Theseus (1.2), Romulus (11.2), Timoleon (23.1; 35.2), Flamininus (1.4), and Aratus (53.3) at various points in their biographies. During the early period of Greek colonization, the \textit{oikistes} was a citizen chosen to lead a group of \textit{ápoikoi} (ἄποικοι), colonists and settlers, to institute a new colony on behalf of the metropolis. The \textit{oikistes} was selected either by the Delphic oracle or elected by the city itself to manage the development of the colony and was responsible for overseeing construction projects, instituting religious rites, and dividing the land in accordance with the instructions of the mother-city.\footnote{Hdt. 4.156 says Battus was selected by the Delphic oracle and then sent by the Theraeans to colonize Libya.} Occasionally the \textit{oikistes} would return to his home city after the usual rites and instructions had been fulfilled, but usually the \textit{oikistes} lived and died in the new colony, and was often
posthumously recognized by the colony in form of hero worship. There appears to have been a tradition of burying the oikistes in the centre of the city instead of outside the city limits and celebrating them annually with sacrifices and games.

The word ktistes was also used for one who was founding a city, and its precise meaning has shifted over time, overlapping conceptually with oikistes in early Greek sources and overcoming it in use during the Republican period. Herodotus never describes the founder of a city as ktistes, only ever as oikistes, but the act of founding a city is described in terms of ktízein (κτίζειν).

Unlike the oikistes, the ktistes was both coloniser and builder; Herodotus uses ktistes to describe both colonisers and founders of cities which were independent from the influence of a mother-city. The colonists include Phoenicians colonizing (ἐκτισαν) Thasos, the colonisation (ἐκτισαν) of Samos, and Battus colonising (ἐκτισαν) the island of Platea. On the other hand, the founding (κτιζειν) of a Panionian city on Sardinia or Sicily, the

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5 Graham 1983, 29-39 provides a comprehensive look at the role of the oikistes in early Greek colonization. Cf. Hom. Od. 6.7-11 for a quick description of the duties of the oikistes as relayed by Homer and BNP “Founders, city”. Two oikistai who returned to Athens were Lampon of Thurii (Diod. 12.10.4; Plut. Praec. reip. ger. 823D) and Hagnon of Amphipolis (Thuc. 4.102.2, 4.104, and 4.108.1). An inscription (IG I2 152) implies that Democlides, the oikistes of Brea, returned to Athens and proposed a later decree. Graham 1983, 35 (n.2) suggests it may have been a failed colony, but admits the possibility that it may not have been the same Democlides. See also Malkin 1998.

6 Pind. Olym. 1. Dougherty 1993, 24-25 lists Battus, oikistes of Cyrene, as an example from Pindar (Pyth. 5.93-95). Cf. Paus. 3.1.8 and Hdt. 6.38.1 for evidence of yearly celebrations and the inclusions of games in honour of the oikistes.

7 ‘To found, settle, build’ – the variety of meanings is at the heart of this discussion. In fact, the word ktistes does not even appear in Homeric sources at all (Cf. Casevitz 1985, 21). Herodotus does not even use oikistes frequently; a single person is rarely a founder of a city. The few cases are at 4.148; 4.159; 6.34; 6.38; 6.103.


9 For Thasos (2.44.4), Samos (3.49.1), Platea (4.157.3). Hdt. 4.159.1 describes the same Battus as the founder of Cyrene (τοῦ οἰκιστῶν τῆς Ζώνης).
founding (κτίσαι) of Memphis by the Egyptian king Menes, and the founding (ἔκτισαν) of six cities in the Peloponnese are all described with the same root, suggesting that Herodotus saw little difference between those who colonised and those who founded a city.  

In Thucydides the word is often used to describe legendary founders, appearing only five times and frequently referring to Greeks who had returned from the Trojan War such as Amphilocus founding (ἔκτισε) Amphilochia in Argos (2.68.3), and in general returning Greeks founding (ἔκτιζον) cities after their return (1.12.2). Like Herodotus though, colonies were also described in similar terms, such as the colonisation (ἐκτίσθη) of Ionia by Athens (1.12.4), the colonisation (κτιζόμενον) of Ennea Hodoi by Athens (1.100.3), and the colonisation (κτίζειν) of Euboea by the Lacedaemonians (3.92.4). Nonetheless, the foundation legend (κτίσις) embodied the creation of a city, its construction, and could also reveal the eponymous hero-founder of a city if they claimed descent from one. One interesting passage demonstrates the ambiguity of ktistes. Herodotus writes:

φαίνονται δὲ οἱ Κιμμέριοι φεύγοντες ἀπὸ τὴν Ἀσίην τοῦς Σκύθας καὶ τὴν χερσόνησον κτίσαντες, ἐν τῇ νυν Σινώπῃ πόλις Ἑλλάς ὀίκισαν.

“And it appears that the Cimmerians, fleeing from the Scythians into Asia, also colonised the peninsula where now the Greek city of Sinope has been founded.” (Hdt. 4.12.2)

In this passage the Cimmerians and the Greeks built colonies in the same area – the colony of the Cimmerians is founded (κτίσαντες) while the Greek

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10 For the Ionians (1.170.2), Memphis (2.99.4), and the other six cities (4.148.4). Cf. Asheri (et al.) 2007, 191.
12 Casevitz 1985, 55 and Malkin 1985, 116-117 show numerous examples of cities named after their founder. Thera was named after Theras (Hdt. 4.147-149).
city is colonised (οἰκισται). It seems that while oikistes was reserved strictly for colonisers, ktistes was a more fluid concept that could encompass colonisation, founding, or construction as necessary.

During the Hellenistic period the word ktistes began to eclipse the traditional oikistes as the title of an individual who was responsible for founding a city. The ktistes rarely described the cultural founder of a new community and started to be associated with physical constructions and institutions which could manifest themselves in the form of buildings, games, or other public contributions. Polybius frequently uses ktistes over oikistes to describe the founding of cities, blurring the distinction between the one who established a colony and the one credited with building the physical city. For example, Polybius claims that Brundisium in Italy was founded (ἐκτίσθαι) in terms suggesting it was not a colony, but when the Romans took the city from the Messapians they founded a Latin colony in its place. Likewise, the two cities of Padus and Placentia were founded (ἐκτίζον), suggesting that they were not colonies, then populated (συνωκισμένων). Diodorus uses ktistes instead of oikistes but almost exclusively in the context of gods and hero founders. Among these are a companion of Osiris (1.20.2), Dionysus (2.38.5), Heracles

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13 Another example of both types of terminology is at 7.170: a group of shipwrecked Cretans founded (κτίσαντας) the town of Hyria, and from there went on and colonized (οἰκίσαι) other towns.
14 BNP “ktistes”. Cf. McGing 1986, 15. Mithridates I Ktistes (r. 302-266 BCE) took the title upon himself for founding the kingdom of Pontus and his royal line.
15 Plb. 9.1.4 says that some readers are interested in “colonisations and the building of cities,” (τὰς ἀποικίας καὶ κτίσεις) giving us an example of both oikistic and ktistic terminology in one sentence. A similar passage occurs at 9.2.1-2. Most passages about founding are placed in ktistic terms (Agrigentum at 9.27.2,7; Brundisium at 10.1.9; Ecbatana at 10.27.4; Iasus at 16.12.1-3).
16 Plb. 10.1.9 - οὐδέπω γὰρ συνέβαινε τότε τὴν τῶν Βραδεῖων ἐκτίσθαι πόλιν. Cf. Walbank 1967, 191 and Eutrop. 2.17; Flor. 1.20; Zon. 8.7; Vell. 1.14.8; Livy ep. 19.
17 Plb. 3.40.4-5. Cf. Walbank 1957, 374 states that the expression τὰς… πόλεις ἐνεργοῦς ἐτείχιζον suggests that the colonies were being built on top of existing settlements.
(2.39.3), the children of the Atlantides (3.60.4), Asclepius (5.74.6), and Tenes (5.83.5).

By the time that Plutarch was writing in the late first century CE, *ktistes* had become an honorific title that was bestowed upon many individuals who had in some way provided a significant service to a community. It was commonly linked with several other epithets such as saviour (σωτήρ), founder (οἰκιστής), and benefactor (εὐεργέτης). Romans in particular were honoured by Greek cities in this fashion, and there is evidence that combinations of ‘saviour’, ‘benefactor’, and ‘founder’ were applied to Romans from Pompey the Great at Mytilene,\(^{18}\) to L. Licinius Lucullus at Thyateira and Claros,\(^{19}\) and eventually to imperial Roman figures like M. Sedatius Severianus at Zela\(^ {20}\) and M. Plancius Varus at Perga.\(^ {21}\) The Emperor Hadrian in particular was known as *ktistes* in many Greek cities throughout the empire for his benefactions to the Greek people.\(^ {22}\) A human could be called a founder by a city even when a deity had been recognized as founder and had been previously honoured. Polybius (16.12.1-2) writes about the people of Iasus who claimed that they were originally colonists from Argos (Ἀργείων ἄποικοι) but also claimed to be descended from Miletus, saying that they had invited the founder of Miletus to Iasus after a costly war with the Carians to help replenish their population.\(^ {23}\)

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18 IG XII 2.163 - τῷ εὐεργέτα καὶ σώτηρι καὶ κτίστα; XII 2.202 - ὁ δάμος τὸν ἐαυτὸς σώτηρα καὶ κτίσταν; XII 2.141 - εὐεργέτη καὶ σωτῆρι [καὶ κτίστη; XII 2.165 - εὐεργέτα καὶ σώτηρ καὶ κτίστα.
20 St.Pont. 3.271.
22 Boatwright 2002, 31. Many examples are listed throughout the text: Megara (IG VII 70, 72, cf. 71), Cyrene (SEG XVII 809, SEG XVIII 731), and Sparta (IG V 1.404, 405) are some prominent examples.
23 Plb. 16.12.2 - εὑχομαι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄνεκαθεν Ἀργείων ἄποικοι γεγονέναι, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Μιλησίων, ἐπαγαγομένων τῶν προγόνων τὸν Νηλέως γιὸν τοῦ κτίσαντος Μίλητον διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ Καρικῷ πολέμῳ γενομένην φθορὰν αὐτῶν. Cf. Walbank
His living in Iasus appears to have been sufficient for them to adopt him as their *ktistes*. The use of the title for Roman benefactors had changed it from a descriptor for literal founders of cities to a symbolic term of appreciation and endearment, as well as a tool used to curry favour with the Roman imperial presence in the Hellenistic world.⁴

Considering the evolution of the word *ktistes* and the vast timeframe in which Plutarch’s *Lives* are set, determining the chosen meaning in each situation can be problematic. He may have written in the style of his time and used *ktistes* as a general honorific for individuals who had benefited a city, often indistinguishable from *soter* or *euergetes*. It is also possible that he copied whichever term was used by his sources to describe his subjects, and risked clarity in favour of following his source material. Fortunately, Plutarch’s usage is strikingly limited and suggests forethought and intent.

First, other than Alexander the Great, only Romans are specifically described as *ktistai*: L. Licinius Lucullus is called benefactor and founder (*εὐεργέτης… καὶ κτίστης*) by the people of Tigranocerta, Cicero is hailed as saviour and founder of his country (*σωτῆρ καὶ κτίστην… τῆς πατρίδος*) by the Roman people, Romulus is described as the founder of Rome (*τὸν κτίστην*), Camillus is called the second founder of Rome (*κτίστης δὲ τῆς Ῥώμης… δεύτερος*), and Gaius Marius is called the third founder of Rome (*κτίστην τε Ῥώμης τρίτον*) by the Roman people.⁵ Second, we can tell from Lucullus’ honorific along with other examples in the *Lives* that Plutarch was aware of the

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1967, 514 who has more to say on Neileus than the founding of Iasus. Gythium is another example from Paus. 3.21.6-9. Cf. “Ktistes” *BNP.*


⁵ For Lucullus (*Luc.* 29.4); Cicero (*Cic.* 22.3); Romulus (*De fort. Rom.* 8); Camillus (*Cam.* 1.1; *De Ex.* 15); Marius (*Mar.* 27.5). Alexander the Great is described as the *ktistes* of Alexandria, and for this reason Caesar spared the city (*Ant.* 80.1; *Regum.* 92).
Hellenistic tradition of describing individuals as founders, benefactors, and saviours, but reserved his use of *ktistes* for certain individuals. For example, the above inscriptions from Mytilene describe Pompey as *ktistes*, but Plutarch never once describes Pompey as *ktistes* in his biography despite having colonised many cities in the east. Appian describes Tiberius Gracchus at the height of his popularity as a “founder (*κτίστης*), not of one city nor of one race, but of all the peoples in Italy.” Plutarch did write a *Life* of Tiberius Gracchus and is known to have used Appian as a source, but again chose not to describe Gracchus as *ktistes* for his contributions to the well-being of Rome. Plutarch appears quite willing to describe his subjects as saviour and benefactor – and at times both at once – when there is enough evidence to support it, but he is much more reserved in his usage of *ktistes*.

The only four whom he does address as *ktistai* – Romulus, Cicero, Camillus, and Marius – are not only described as Founders of Rome, but also share the experience of exile from their homeland. Romulus was expelled from Alba as an infant, Cicero fled from impending charges, Camillus fled Rome under accusations of misappropriation and theft, and Marius fled because he feared the return of Sulla. In all four cases, they returned to their homeland: Romulus

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26 For saviour (σωτήρ): *Cat. Mi.* 35.1, 64.2; *Mar.* 39.3; *Cic.* 22.3, 31.4; *Comp. Thes. Rom.* 4.1; *Flam.* 10.5, 16.3; *Pel.* 33.1; *Cam.* 10.5, 30.1; *Sull.* 34.1; *Dio.* 46.1; *Arat.* 14.3, 42.1, 53.3. For benefactor (εὐεργέτης): *Comp. Thes. Rom.* 4.2; *Luc.* 29.4; *Comp. Phil. Flam.* 1.3; *Flam.* 10.2; *Tim.* 38.1; *Crass.* 21.3; *Arat.* 30.2. And the two used together: *Cat. Mi.* 71.1; *Thes.* 33.1; *Pel.* 12.4; *Aem.* 39.4; *Demetr.* 9.1.


30 Miles 1995, 104 argues that Plutarch’s use of *ktistes* is probably the Greek equivalent of a Latin title given to Cicero: ‘Father of his Country,’ (pater patriae). However, Plutarch makes that distinction between the two quite clear in *Cic.* 23.3 where he explicitly refers to Cicero earning the title in Greek: ρατέρα πατρίδος (πατέρα πατρίδος).
returned to liberate the city from the tyrant Amulius, Cicero returned once the
senate had grown tired of Clodius, Camillus returned to free the city from the
Gallic invaders, and Marius returned under threat of arms. Some of his
choices are unusual and I intend to investigate some of the qualities that the
*Lives* of these four have in common: building or safeguarding the city, an
adherence to upholding Republican ideals, their rejection from their
homeland, their depiction while in exile, and their return from exile as an
opportunity for Plutarch to portray their characters.

I believe that not only was Plutarch aware of a tradition of exiled Roman
founders, but also framed his subjects in ways that highlighted that aspect of
their characterisation. I propose that in his research for composing the early
*Life of Cicero* Plutarch found the inspiration to write biographies for the other
exiled Roman founders with whom Cicero identified. Finally, I intend to show
that the *Marius* does not follow in the same pattern as the other three, instead
representing a mirror image of the virtuous Roman exile and corresponding
with Plutarch’s later trend of negative biographies.

ii. Rome and the Tradition of Founders

There are many stories concerning the foundation of Rome, and all appear
to all have some basis in Greco-Roman exile tradition, either directly through
the continuation of the story of the Trojan War or indirectly through
descendants of exiles conceived during their wanderings. Plutarch himself
brings up multiple alternatives in the *Romulus*, many of which appear to be
attested to from Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1.72-73). Between Plutarch,
Dionysius, Ennius, Vergil, and Livy, there seems to have been numerous
different Roman foundation myths with several different founding figures.
Dionysius includes a long list of traditional founding tales including Aeneas and Odysseus, escaping Trojans, or shipwrecked Greeks returning from Troy (1.72.1-3). Plutarch, likely using Dionysius as a source, presents many of the same stories concerning the founding of Rome: wandering (πλανηθέντας) Pelasgians, escaping (διαφυγόντας) Trojans, a descendant of Heracles, a wife or son of Aeneas, or a son of Odysseus and Circe (1-2). However, the story of Romulus seems to be the most commonly accepted. Accounts of his life usually give him a divine lineage, and, according to Ennius, at the end of his life he became a god, took on the name of Quirinus, and became one of the deified personas of the state itself.\(^{31}\) The story Plutarch chooses to accept is that Romulus and Remus were descendants of Aeneas (himself a fugitive from Troy) who were banished from Alba as infants because their mother was a Vestal priestess and therefore forbidden to have children (3.2). The two infants were deemed to be a threat to the rule of Amulius who decided to have them cast into a river. They washed up on shore to be reared by a wolf and a woodpecker until they were discovered and raised by a swineherd (3.4-4.2). This story is preserved essentially as it is in Dionysius (1.79.4-9).

It is interesting, therefore, that Plutarch refers to Camillus and Marius as the second and third founders of Rome.\(^{32}\) As seen above, it was not unheard of for Greek cities to honour individuals as ‘founders’ of their cities, but there does not appear to be any tradition for honouring Romans as new founders until the last century of the Republic. Prior to this, there is no evidence for

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\(^{31}\) Weinstock 1971, 176. (Enn. A. 113 - o sanguen dis oriundum; Promathion, FGrHist. 817). Like the Greek founders or like Caeculus, the founder of Praeneste (Serv. Aen. 7. 678; Schol. Veron. Aen. 7. 681), or Modius Fabidius, the founder of Cures (DH 2.48) Cf. Cic. De Rep. 2.1.2 for the son of Mars and the overthrow of Amulius, Liv. 1.4.2 for Romulus as the son of Mars.

\(^{32}\) Cam. 1.1 (κτίστης δὲ τῆς Ῥώμης ἀναγραφεὶς δεύτερος); Mar. 27.5 (κτίστην τῆς Ῥώμης τρίτον ἐκείνον ἀνηγόρευον).
naming alternate founders of Rome and none which suggest that Camillus or Marius were hailed as such in their own times. Nor is there any indication that other significant figures in Roman history, such as Servius Tullius or Scipio Africanus, had been called founders of Rome for their accomplishments.33

The first suggestion of a Roman being called another founder is in Livy (5.49.7; 7.1.10) who described Camillus as conditor alter, a Second Founder of the city.34 Miles (1995) notes that Livy’s use of conditor is extremely specific, occurring only twenty-two times in Livy’s surviving work and always in the context of the founder of a city or a specifically Roman institution.35 In Livy, there are numerous conditores, but what is of note are the conditores whom Plutarch also describes as Founders of Rome. Of greatest relevance to Plutarch are Romulus (1.6.3) and Camillus (5.49.7-8), each the subject of his own Life.36 The other Romans whom Livy calls conditores are either not mentioned at all in the surviving works of Plutarch or are never referred to in ktistic terms.37 Ogilvie’s (1965) commentary suggests that the concept may have been applied to Camillus by Sullan annalists in the early first century BCE, which Livy used as a source.38 Weinstock (1971) suggests that the

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33 Weinstock 1971, 165; 177. It is worth noting that Plutarch did write a Life of Scipio that has not survived. The actual identity of the subject, be it Scipio Africanus Major or Scipio Minor, has been debated on the basis of their connection to the lost paired Life of Epaminondas, but any conclusion would be purely conjecture. Cf. Ziegler 1949, 696-702 for arguments for Scipio Africanus and Herbert 1957, 84-88 in favour of Scipio Minor.

34 ‘Romulus ac parens patriae conditorque alter urbis... appellabatur’. See also 7.1.10 ‘quem secundum a Romulo conditorem urbis Romanae ferrent’ Cf. Weinstock 1971, 177.

35 Miles 1995, 120 n.35.

36 Miles 1995, 120. Livy also describes Numa Pompilius as a conditor. While Plutarch did write a biography on Numa, he does not describe him as a ktistes. However, it is worth noting that the Numa describes another aspect of exile that I intend to investigate in another chapter.

37 Miles 1995, 120. The other conditores include Servius Tullius (1.42.4), all of the kings except Tarquinius Superbus (2.1.2), Appius Claudius (3.58.2), Augustus (4.20.7), and the elder Brutus who expelled the last king in Rome (8.34.3).

Roman tradition of defining new Founders of Rome was established by Cicero himself, and that Cicero’s admiration for Marius led him to advocate for Marius as a successor to Romulus and, through implication, himself as a successor to Marius.\textsuperscript{39} A final theory suggests that the source of the ‘new founder’ claim is post-Ciceronian.\textsuperscript{40} Cicero himself was a blatant self-promoter and would certainly have leapt at the opportunity to be described as a new founder of Rome if there were a precedent. When he earned the title of \textit{pater patriae} he linked himself to Marius by saying that he too could be considered a father of his country, and Cicero also implicitly compared himself to Romulus.\textsuperscript{41}

Whether the idea of naming new founders of Rome came before or after Cicero is not as relevant as the fact that the concept existed when Plutarch was writing in the first century CE. Plutarch had abundant examples of possible \textit{ktistai} to choose from, and yet he chose to name three of his Roman exiles in the fashion of Rome’s first founder. These three remain unusual choices as there are numerous other figures who had equal, if not greater, claim to the title. Weinstock (1971) argues that Sulla would have been a suitable \textit{ktistes} based on his military successes, his dictatorial rule, and his new constitution which must have inspired a renewed nationalism and a feeling of restoration.\textsuperscript{42} Santangelo (2007) describes how Sulla’s \textit{ludi victoriae} celebration was part of a strategy of promoting himself as a second founder.

\textsuperscript{39} Weinstock 1971, 179.
\textsuperscript{40} Miles 1995, 105.
\textsuperscript{41} Cic. \textit{Rab. perd.} 10 – C. Marium, quem vere patrem patriae.; \textit{In Cat.} 3.2; \textit{in Pisonem} 6. Cf. Miles 1995, 105; Ogilvie 1965, 739; and Asmis 2014, 23-42 for Cicero’s endorsement of Roman heroes as exemplars in \textit{De Rep.}
\textsuperscript{42} Weinstock 1971, 178.
of Rome.⁴³ He notes that Sallust even referred to him as a “left-handed Romulus.”⁴⁴ However, Plutarch wrote a Life of Sulla and never refers to him as ktistes in the fashion of Romulus.⁴⁵ Pompey would also have been a likely candidate, again due to his military acumen and total authority, a fact not missed by Plutarch. In the Life of Pompey (25.4) there is a reference to a consul cautioning Pompey about emulating Romulus’ tyrannical power, but once again Plutarch decided not to describe Pompey as a ktistes for its moralistic objective. Ultimately Plutarch chose two who are present in Livy – Romulus and Camillus – and two who are not – Marius and Cicero.

iii. Trends in Plutarch’s Roman Founders

Before I begin my analysis of the exile theme, it is worthwhile demonstrating that Plutarch’s exiled ktistai are internally similar to one another. Plutarch employed a particular pattern in almost all his biographies. Leo (1901) wrote that there are six elements frequently explored in the beginning of a Life: family (γένος), appearance (εἴδος), character (τρόπος), way of life (δίαιτα), education (παιδεία), and style of speech (λόγος).⁴⁶ Almost without exception, Plutarch will present a narrative of the parentage, childhood, or education of his subjects to demonstrate the virtues that will emerge in adulthood.⁴⁷ In this case we can see that Plutarch’s exiled founders have several qualities in common which suggest that Plutarch intended for them to be linked in the

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⁴⁴ Sall. Hist. 1.55.5 - scaevus iste Romulus.
⁴⁵ Furthermore, the fact that Plutarch used Sulla’s memoirs to help construct his Lives suggests that he would have had ample opportunity to use whatever epithets which might have been given to him.
thoughts of the readers. I will attempt to show that there exist deliberate, identifiable, and consistent commonalities between the birth narratives, family social standing, and education of the four *ktistic* exiles, with special consideration given to the *Marius*, an unusual and striking exception to the established patterns.

Divine Association

Cicero is said to have been born on a prestigious day on which, in Plutarch’s time, sacrifices and prayers were made for the well-being of the emperor. 48 His birth was allegedly followed by the appearance of an apparition (φάσμα) that informs his nurse that her charge would grow to become an advantage (δφελος) to all the Romans (2.1-2). 49 This is an unusual addition by Plutarch since Cicero does not appear to mention it as part of his campaign to identify with Romulus, nor do any other sources. 50 Throughout the *Cicero* Plutarch appears to oscillate between acceptance and denial of supernatural events depending on the circumstances. 51 On one hand, this appears to be a dramatic tool to foreshadow a dream of Cicero’s later in life where Jupiter reveals to him the identity of the future ruler of Rome (τῆς Ῥώμης ήγεμόνα), a boy who is revealed to be the young Augustus (44.2-5). 52 The imagery at

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48 *Cic. 2.1 - τεχθηναι δὲ Κικέρωνα λέγουσιν ἀνωδύνως καὶ ἀπόνως λοχευθείσης αὐτοῦ τῆς μητρὸς ἡμέρα τρίτη τῶν νέων Καλανδῶν, ἐν ᾗ νῦν οἱ ἄρχοντες εὐχονται καὶ θύουσιν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἡγεμόνος. Cf. Moles 1988, 148. It should be noted that even Plutarch’s *Numa*, which was likely composed around the same time as the *Camillus* and *Romulus*, also states that the subject had a prestigious birthdate: he was allegedly born on the very day Rome was founded (*Num. 3.4*). Numa’s life of tranquillity and philosophical solitude will be discussed in another chapter.

49 *Cic. 2.1-2 - τῇ δὲ τίθη φάσμα δοκεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ προειπεῖν ὡς δφελος μέγα πάσι Ῥωμαιοῖς ἐκτρεφούση.

50 Moles 1988, 149.

51 For acceptance see *Cic. 2.1-2, 14.4, 20.1-2, 32.4*. He rejects the intervention of providence at 44.5-45.1. Cf. Moles 1988, 149.

52 Moles 1988, 149; 195 attributes this to a reworking of a tradition presented by Catullus (21.4n; Suet. *Aug. 94.8, Dio 45.2.3-4*), where Cicero has a dream of
play here is suggestive, portraying a symbolic passing of the torch from one saviour of Rome to another. Plutarch’s use of Livy may be responsible here for this sequence of prophetic birth narratives linking Cicero (Plutarch’s *ktistes Rhomes*) and Augustus (Livy’s *conditor*).\(^53\) We cannot know for certain whether Plutarch considered Augustus a *ktistes* since no mention of it occurs in the extant works. However, as I have argued, a similar pattern exists for Plutarch’s Roman exiles, linking them in parallels similar to Livy’s.

Plutarch also presents a divine birth narrative for Romulus that bears a striking resemblance to Cicero’s. In the beginning of the *Romulus*, Plutarch relates a story from a historian named Promathion who wrote that Romulus’ birth was also preceded – and was possibly even the result of – the appearance of an apparition.\(^54\) An oracle reveals to Tarchetius, king of Alba, that the offspring of this phantom and a virgin would be of great renown (κλεινότατον) and possess good fortune and strength (ἀρετῆ καὶ τύχη καὶ ῥώμῃ).\(^55\) Tarchetius orders his daughter to bear the child, but she sends a handmaid in her place. It is dismissed as fabulous (μυθώδης) by Plutarch, but the inclusion illustrates that there were several accounts of Romulus’ parentage, including one that suggested an intervention from the divine. Like the account in the *Cicero*, the inclusion of this alternate version of events serves two purposes. First, it strengthens the parallels between the *Theseus-Romulus* pair in that it echoes the account Plutarch provides of Theseus’ Octavian being let down from heaven by golden chains. He notes the thematic trail of Roman founders, which I shall attempt to pick up here.

\(^53\) Miles 1995, 120 n.35. Miles’s conclusion that Livy was intentionally linking Romulus, Camillus, and Augustus in a series of symbolic Founders of Rome (conditores) is an appealing one, and with one exception it is always used to refer to the founder or founders of a city (usually Rome) or an institution.

\(^54\) *Rom.* 2.4 - Ταρχετίῳ γάρ, Ἀλβανῶν βασιλεῖ παρανομωτάτῳ καὶ ύμοτάτῳ, φάσμα δαμόνιον οίκοι γενέσθαι:

\(^55\) *Rom.* 2.4 - ἔσεσθαι γάρ ἐξ αὐτῆς παιδα κλεινότατον, ἀρετῆ καὶ τύχη καὶ ῥώμη διαφέροντα.
birth. In the *Theseus*, Theseus’ father Aegeus hears from an oracle an obscure prophecy in which he was told not to have intercourse until he returned to Athens. Confused, Aegeus relays the prophecy to Pittheus, the king of Troezen, and asks for his help. Pittheus understood the prophecy and believed it foretold that the child born from a union with Aegeus would be exceptional, so he tricked him into sleeping with his daughter, ensuring that the child would be of Pittheus’ family as much as Aegeus’. In both narratives in the *Theseus-Romulus* there are themes of prophecy, an intervening deceit, and the abandonment of the children at the discovery. However, Plutarch’s inclusion of Promathion’s account also links it to what we have seen in the *Cicero*.

We can also see something of a false prophecy in the *Marius*. When asked where the Roman people might find someone to replace him once he was gone, Scipio Aemilianus touched Marius on the shoulder and said “Perhaps this man.” An endorsement from the younger Scipio is hardly the equivalent of divine prophecy, but the reader is drawn to similar ‘passing of the torch’ imagery as in the *Cicero* (44.2-5). Marius takes it to be an omen or prophecy and is inspired to embark on his political career (4.1). It is perhaps revealing that the prediction which guides Marius is not divinely acquired as in the *Cicero* and the *Romulus*. We have very few extant sources on the early life of Marius and none which mention any oracular predictions, and whether any were available to Plutarch is impossible to say. In my view, Plutarch’s decision to include a prophetic narrative from a mortal instead of an oracle

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56 Thes. 3.4 - ἔπεισεν αὐτὸν ἢ διηπάτησε τῇ Ἀἰθρᾷ συγγενέσθαι. συνελθὼν δὲ καὶ γνῶς ἐκεῖνος ὅτι τῇ Πιτθέως θυγατρὶ συγγέγονε
57 Mar. 3.3 - τάχα δὲ τούτον
58 Mar. 4.1 - ὃσπερ ὑπὸ θείας κληδόνος
suggests that Marius’ rise to authority was not meant to be. His behaviour prior to his exile and upon his return solidify Marius as a subject whose *Life* is a warning about the excess of ambition and the lack of a proper education.\(^{59}\)

The *Camillus* is an unusual case among Plutarch’s *Lives* where the subject first appears without any description of his youth or upbringing. The first time Camillus appears is at 2.1, where he is already an adult and serving under the dictator Postumius Tubertus. The limited extant sources we have today also do not contain narratives of Camillus’ birth and early life, but, like the *Marius*, we cannot assume that Plutarch did not have that information. What is important is Plutarch’s portrayal. There are numerous prophetic accounts throughout the *Camillus* such as the overflowing Alban lake (3.1-4.4), a speaking statue of Juno (6.1-2), and the recovery of Romulus’ augural staff (32.4), but there is no indication during his childhood that Camillus was destined to become great. The explanation may lie in an investigation of Plutarch’s portrayal of the families of the *ktistic* exiles as much as the men themselves.

Humble Households

Plutarch stresses that the *ktistic* exiles were born into undistinguished families of low rank and of no special esteem. Plutarch states that Camillus’ family was nothing of note and that Camillus was the first in his family to achieve fame.\(^{60}\) This claim is possible; neither Livy nor Diodorus Siculus mention

\(^{59}\) *Mar*. 2.2-3 is quite explicit about Marius’ personal failure and their impact on his career. However, more on that below.

\(^{60}\) *Cam*. 2.1 - οὕτω δὲ τότε περὶ τὸν τῶν Φουρίων οἶκον οὐσίς μεγάλης ἐπιφανείας αὐτὸς ἀφ’ ἐαυτοῦ πρῶτος εἰς δόξαν
anything about the Furii Camilli prior to Camillus. However, there is evidence that Plutarch may have manipulated the narrative to present Camillus’ family as politically unknown. Livy suggests that Camillus had a large retinue of *clientes*, which Larmour (1992, 4180) suggests is not indicative of an obscure family.⁶¹ Camillus may also have been the brother of consul of 413 BCE, L. Furius Medullinus, which would certainly have made the Furii significant in the political sphere.⁶² When compared with the paired Greek *Life of Themistocles*, the signs of Plutarch’s manipulation become more evident. Plutarch states that not much is known of Themistocles’ mother, and elsewhere implies that his mother was a prostitute.⁶³ The matter of Themistocles’ family is addressed by numerous other sources and they appear to agree that Themistocles’ family was more influential and wealthier than Plutarch suggests. Lysias (30.27.8) and Aristotle (*AP* 28.1) seem to say that he was raised in an aristocratic family, Nepos (*Them*. 1.2) says his father was noble (*generosus*), and in Plutarch’s own *synkrisis* for the *Aristides-Cato Minor* (1.4) he states that Themistocles was worth between three and five talents while in the *Themistocles* itself he is worth less than three.⁶⁴ There appears to have been some obfuscation of the facts in the *Themistocles-Camillus* pair to make Themistocles appear less wealthy than he may have been, and certainly from a less politically significant family. With this in mind, there are two explanations for Plutarch’s characterisation of Camillus: either Plutarch had no information about his birth or upbringing altogether, or he deliberately chose not to include aspects that may not have coincided with

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⁶¹ Livy 5.32.8 - *cum accitis domum tribulis clientibusque, quae magna pars plebis erat*. Cf. Dion. Hal. 13.5.1.


his portrayal of the founders of Rome as coming from low, undistinguished, or non-senatorial families.\textsuperscript{65}

Romulus and Remus are also depicted as coming from lowly beginnings. Despite their royal (or possibly divine) lineage, the brothers are raised by swineherds and farmers after their exile from Alba (6.1). In the *synkrisis* of the *Theseus-Romulus*, Plutarch gives Romulus credit for freeing the Latins from tyranny, founding a city, and rising to the highest eminence from the smallest beginnings.\textsuperscript{66} This appears to have been an aspect of the tradition of Romulus, but for Plutarch it also serves as a central point of contrast in his comparison with Theseus. Theseus, while not being raised by his own father, was still reared by the king of Troezen and therefore had fewer hurdles to overcome on his journey to greatness.

Marius and Cicero were well known as *novi homines* who rose from non-senatorial families to the consulship, the highest position in the state. Plutarch describes Cicero’s mother as honourable or noble (καλός), suggesting some origin for his own moral nobility.\textsuperscript{67} Plutarch cannot be certain about Cicero’s father and gives two suggestions: he was either a fuller – an unpleasant and demeaning profession – or a descendant of a Volscian king (1.1).\textsuperscript{68} Regardless, his ancestors had not achieved much beyond a *cognomen* reflecting a physical oddity (1.2).\textsuperscript{69} While not entirely obscure, Cicero’s family

\textsuperscript{65} Tatum 2013, 194. There is only a single reference to Livy in chapter 6, but it is also likely he used Dionysius of Halicarnassus and possibly Diodorus Siculus for further information. Cf. Larmour 1992, 4162-74 and Duff 2010, 45.

\textsuperscript{66} Comp. Thes. Rom. 4.1 - ἐκείνῳ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει μέγα τὸ μικρότατα λαβέν ἀρχάς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα.

\textsuperscript{67} Moles 1988, 147. In truth, little is known about Cicero’s mother beyond what Cicero himself says at Att. 11.9.3.

\textsuperscript{68} Moles 1988, 147 states that fullers cleaned cloth in urine and were considered particularly low (cf. *CIL* 10.5679).

\textsuperscript{69} The dent on the end of Cicero’s ancestor’s nose resembled a chickpea.
had not achieved a place in the senate and would not have stood out as particularly prestigious in his time. In the *Marius* Plutarch discusses the fact that Marius lacked a *cognomen*, indicating that his family was somehow even more minor than Cicero’s.\(^7^0\) His parents are described as poor labourers (σῶτουργῶν δέ καὶ πεπνήτων), that Marius grew up in Arpinum, and did not see the city until he was much older (3.1).

In these *Lives* the Romans are depicted as having come from undistinguished or non-senatorial families. The omission in the *Camillus* suggests that his claim that Camillus was the first of his family to achieve fame may have been a deliberate attempt to fit Camillus into the framework he had in mind for the *ktistai Rhomes*. The theme provides a foothold for Plutarch to compare the Greek and Roman pairs, but it also contributes to the idea that the most illustrious Romans followed in the footsteps of Romulus and rose to eminence through their character and virtue instead of wealth or political power. This is not to say that all of Plutarch’s lowborn Romans were destined for greatness, only that these aspects of the *ktistic* exiles coincide with one another and, most importantly, with Romulus to create a pattern of exiled Roman founders beginning with Romulus and ending with Cicero.\(^7^1\)

**Education**

It is well established that Plutarch had a keen interest in the early education of his subjects, and the theme of education forms the basis of several of his

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\(^7^0\) *Mar.* 1.1-3.

\(^7^1\) It is worth noting here that Pompey and M. Cato were also both *novi homines* but Plutarch’s portrayal of them does not fit the mould of the *ktistic* exile. Pompey may have fled the persecution of Caesar after his defeat at Pharsalus (*Pomp.* 72.1-2), but he is not considered a founder of Rome. M. Cato is explicitly compared with Aristides on the grounds that Aristides was ostracised while Cato was able to hold his ground without being exiled (*Comp. Aristid. Cat.* 2.3).
works in the *Moralia* as well.\(^\text{72}\) He largely stresses Aristotelian ethics, which Pelling (1988) breaks down into the following: initial ‘potentials’ (δυνάμεις) respond to experiences or emotions (πάθη), and those responses eventually settle into character traits (ἠθή) which influence our moral and ethical decisions.\(^\text{73}\) Through education, a person learns to control their extremes in emotion and develop moderation, a virtue which Plutarch puts at the heart of positive moral action.\(^\text{74}\) An adequate Greek education (παιδεία) allows an individual to control their passions and develop “a sympathetic interest in and understanding of other people, and a consequent ease and sensitivity in personal interaction.”\(^\text{75}\)

The *Cicero* is replete with examples of his education: he is described as quick (ὀξύτης), intelligent (σύνεσις), and eminently capable in his boyhood studies (2.2-3) and continued studying under Greek scholars in poetry, rhetoric, and law before serving in the Social War (3.1). During the civil war between Marius and Sulla, Plutarch writes that Cicero retreated from the situation in favour of continuous study with more Greek scholars (3.2) and in Athens he studied under Antiochus of Ascalon, the founder of the New Academy (4.1).\(^\text{76}\) The *Romulus* also contains a reference to the education of Romulus and Remus which states that despite living among shepherds and farmers their grandfather Numitor kept them educated in the ways of nobility through some unknown proxy (6.1). This is itself a strange detail since when Numitor later

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\(^{72}\) Plut. *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus* (How a man may become aware of his progress in virtue), *An virtus doceri possit* (Can virtue be taught?), *Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat* (How the young man should study poetry). Cf Pelling 1990 (repr. 2002, 297 n.2).

\(^{73}\) Pelling 1988 (repr. 2002, 283; 286).


meets Remus he is unable to recognise him (7.4). It certainly did not come from Livy in whose version Numitor is unaware of their existence until Remus was captured by Amulius (1.5.6), but the boys’ education at Gabii was part of the established tradition in Dionysius. Once again we are left with no details about Camillus’ education but his status would seem to suggest that he received at least a basic one during his early years.

Once again, the Marius deviates from the norm. Plutarch’s characterisation of Marius has him rejecting all forms of Greek learning altogether, thinking it unseemly to study the language and literature of a people who were subject to another (2.2). In Plutarch’s opinion, Marius’ rejection of the study of Greek directly contributed to his downfall in his later years as he did not learn how to moderate his passion, ambition, and greed.

iv. Exile and Founding

The most striking aspects of Plutarch’s ktistic founders are the deeds which earn them the title of ktistes, their periods of exile, and the relationship between the two. As mentioned previously, exile in Republican Rome was unusual in that it was rarely imposed by the state as a formal punishment for an offense but rather it was an option for the accused to avoid punishment by going into voluntary exile. Cicero himself stated that exile was a refuge from punishment and that Rome was unique in providing the accused with this

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77 Dion. Hal. 1.84.5 and Tatum 2013, 598 n.22.
78 Mar. 2.3 - οὐκ ἂν ἐκτετεθήκησας στρατηγίας καὶ πολιτείας ἀμορφοτάτην ἐπέβηκε κορωνίδα, ὑπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ φιλαρχίας ἀώρου καὶ πλεονεξίων ἀπαρηγορήτων εἰς ὑμόστατον καὶ ἀγριώστατον γήρας ἔξοκελας.
79 Kelly 2006, 1-2. There were ways that the state could prevent the voluntary exile from ever returning to Rome, but I intend to define the various types of exile in Rome and Greece in another chapter.
method of escape. While all four of Plutarch’s exiles avoided punishment, Romulus and Camillus were declared *ktistai* after their return and the other two, Marius and Cicero, were praised before fleeing Rome. In all four cases Plutarch remarks on the circumstances surrounding their exile and the nature of the events which earned them the title of *ktistes*.

Bearing in mind that the *Lives* were meant to be read in pairs, I will be considering the events of the *Life* of each of these four singly and then together with respect to their Greek counterparts. Beginning with the *Cicero*, the inspiration for the other three *Lives*, I will deconstruct the circumstances of these exiles and the events which earned them the title of founder of Rome, examine how Plutarch frames them, and study his editorialising interjections. My intention is to demonstrate that the biographies of the *ktistic* exiles are all linked through shared imagery and themes, including an opposition to tyranny, the results of unchecked personal ambition, and ultimately Plutarch’s view on the responsibilities of the statesman-in-exile to the Roman state itself.

**Cicero**

Cicero’s rise to the status of founder, his exile, and return to Rome form the middle of the narrative of his biography. It begins with his election for the consulship of 63 BCE, where Plutarch once again stresses his low upbringing by stating that he was the only one of the candidates who was not the son of a senator, but of the equestrian class. Lucius Catiline, Cicero’s primary opposition in the elections, intended to overthrow the Republic (10.4) and

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80 *Cic. Pro. Caec.* 100. This was spoken in 69 BCE. Six years later the *lex Tullia de ambitu* would institute exile for ten years as a punishment. Cf. Claassen 1999, 13.  
81 *Cic.* 11.2 - καίτοι τῶν μετιόντων ὁ Κικέρων μόνος ἦν ἐξ ἰππικοῦ πατρός, οὐ βουλευτοῦ, γεγονός.
when Catiline was overlooked for the consulship again for 62 BCE, he planned to stage a coup with the help of several other conspirators (14.2). Cicero intercepted several letters implicating Catiline and the others and denounced them before the Senate. In turn, Cicero received a *senatus consultum ultimum* and forced Catiline to flee the city (15.1-4). The other conspirators were apprehended (19.2) and, after a lengthy debate (20.3-21.4), Cicero had them executed (22.1-2).

It was this decisive act which Plutarch says earned Cicero the title of *ktistes*. At this point, Plutarch describes an adoring and exuberant crowd proclaiming Cicero as the “saviour and founder of his country” (σωτήρα καὶ κτίστην ἀνακαλούντων τῆς πατρίδος). What was previously the darkest moments of the Roman state (literally, since by the time the executions had finished it was evening) now became a display of exultation. Lamps were lit in windows to brighten the city; a bevy of adoring and shouting citizens replaced Cicero’s silent escort. Plutarch writes that his entourage included the best and noblest men (τῶν ἄριστων μάλα σεμνῶς) who all agreed that while the generals may have given the people of Rome land and wealth from their military actions, only Cicero was to thank for providing the Romans with safety (22.4). Cicero’s accomplishment was more than that, however. He brought safety to Rome with the least amount of bloodshed while maintaining the internal integrity of the state. Plutarch compresses time at this point in the narrative and caps Cicero’s triumphant success by saying that the followers of Catiline gave up his cause when Catiline was killed in a battle outside Rome. The conspiracy

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82 *Cic. 22.3* - ἣδη δ᾽ ἦν ἑσπέρα
83 *Cic. 22.5* - ἀλλ᾽ ὧτι μέγιστον τῶν πτώπτοτε νεωτερισμῶν οὕτος ἐλαχίστοις κακοῖς ἄνευ στάσεως καὶ ταραχῆς κατέσβεσε
84 *Cic. 22.5* - καὶ μετὰ τῶν συμμεμενηκότων αὐτῶ νικηθέντων πρός Ἀντώνιον αὐτὸς τε διεφθάρη καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον.
ended swiftly: the conspirators were executed and the ringleader killed, seemingly all thanks to Cicero’s decisive actions.

The narrative of the execution provides an evocative look into what it means to be a *ktistes* for Plutarch’s Romans. The people hailed Cicero as their saviour and founder, suggesting a use of *ktistes* that coincides with the meaning used in the Hellenistic period. Because Cicero saved the city from destruction the people described him as a founder. However, the circumstances of his decision to execute the conspirators is suggestive of a more pervasive theme among the *ktistic* exiles. The characterisation of Cicero relies heavily on the theme of protecting not only the city, but the government itself – the Republic – from individuals seeking sole authority. Cicero’s first act as consul was to oppose a law creating a group of ten men with absolute authority over the East. They would be permitted to sell public lands, settle (*συνοικίζειν*) cities, take money from the treasury, and maintain armies as they pleased. This is almost certainly an exaggeration by Plutarch which implicitly suggests that these men would have sole and tyrannical rule over the region of Syria under the control of their own personal armies. The reality of Cicero’s contention was in fact regarding the distribution of public land.

Plutarch’s Cicero is, at the outset, an ardent opponent of tyranny, reflecting the quality of Romulus that led him to overthrow Amulius in Alba (*Rom. 8.6*) and establish a city that would not be governed by a lone king. The rejection of tyranny continues to be a theme in the *Cicero*, and each consecutive

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85 See above, 6.
86 *Cic*. 12.2 - πρός τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν, δεκαδαρχίαι καθιστάντες αὐτοκρατόρων ἄνδρῶν, οἷς ἐφείτο τάσσας μὲν Ἱταλίας, τάσσας δὲ Συρίας, καὶ ὄσα διὰ Πομπηίου νεωστὶ προσώριστο κυρίους ἄντας πωλεῖν τὸ δημόσια, κρίνειν οὐς δοκοί, φυγάδας ἐκβάλλειν, συνοικίζειν πόλεις, χρήματα λαμβάνειν ἐκ τοῦ ταμείου, στρατιώτας τρέφειν καὶ καταλέγειν ὁπόσων δέοιντο.
87 Moles 1988, 162. Cf. *De lege agraria*. 
antagonist that Cicero defeats is portrayed as yet another monarch intent on installing themselves above all the others. The first is Sulla, who at 3.2 led Rome as a monarchy (μοναρχία), and Cicero opposed him by leaving Rome to Greece to study philosophy. The second is Catiline, whose dictatorial ambitions are well defined and whose character reflects his toxic aspirations. Plutarch writes that he was accused of incest and fratricide (10.3) and that he intended to overthrow the Republic for his own gain (10.4). Catiline’s successor, Lentulus, is also described as corrupt (διαφθείρω) for his immoral activities (17.3-4). He intended to immolate the entire city and hold Pompey’s children hostage as bargaining chips (18.1). In his first appearance in the Cicero, Caesar is explicitly mentioned as the one who would eventually become a dictator (δικτάτωρ), and even as a young man during the Catiline affair he had laid the groundwork for his own rise to sole authority. When Caesar finally succeeded in making Rome a monarchy (μοναρχία), Cicero retreated to study philosophy just as he did when Sulla was in power (40.1). The theme of combating tyranny is key to the Demosthenes-Cicero pair. Plutarch says that the two shared in their conflict with kings and tyrants in the introduction to the Demosthenes. Demosthenes’ own struggle was against Philip of Macedon and it serves as the prime motivation for Demosthenes’ actions throughout the Life.

Rome in Plutarch’s depiction is diseased (νοσέω) by the changes instituted by Sulla which provided an opportunity for those with tyrannical leanings to

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88 Cic. 20.3 - τότε δὲ νέος ὤν ἐπὶ καὶ τάς πρώτας ἔχων τῆς αὐξήσεως ἀρχάς, ἢδη δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν εἰς ἔκεινην τὴν ὀδὸν ἐμβεβηκὼς ή τὰ Ῥωμαίων εἰς μοναρχίαν μετέστησε πράγματα
89 Dem. 3.3 - δύο γὰρ ἐτέρους οὐκ ἀν εὑρέθηναι δοκῶ ῥήτορας ἐκ μὲν ἀδόξων καὶ μικρῶν ἰχθυρῶς καὶ μεγάλους γενομένους, προσκρούσαντας δὲ βασιλεύσαι καὶ τυράννοις.
challenge the best interests of the state and establish themselves as sole rulers (10.1). Catiline is the first who is described as having corrupted (διαφθείρω) the youth of Rome and having been chosen as champion in the vacuum that Sulla left behind (10.3). The term used by Plutarch to describe Catiline’s corruption (διαφθείρω) is suggestive. The word is normally used to mean ‘destroy utterly’ regarding buildings or armies, but Plutarch uses it in ways that evoke a destruction of traditional Roman values as well as to herald the threat of Catiline and the other would-be tyrants. The notion of a sole ruler in Rome is at variance with the mixed constitution under which Rome was founded, and goes against Romulus’ intentions for a fatherly patron-client society. Plutarch’s Cicero not only saves Rome from physical destruction, but also endeavours to maintain the state’s traditional Romulan foundations in the face of moral decay.

Cicero’s continuous battle against monarchy is one of the most important themes in the Life. However, this investigation is concerned with Plutarch’s views on exile and it is necessary to examine what the Cicero adds to the conversation. By resisting tyranny and upholding Republican ideals, Cicero contributes to the well-being of Rome, a concept known as concordia. As we will see in the Life of Romulus, Romulus intended for Rome to function under a society founded on class communality where the two classes of Rome compromised and maintained order for the benefit of the state. The Cicero not only shows that Cicero fought to maintain governmental order (as represented by his resistance to monarchical rule), but also societal order in the execution of the conspirators and his acquisition of the title of ktistes. His

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90 Moles 1988, 165.
91 See Rom. 13.3.
exile narrative also provides further insight into how Cicero preserved *concordia* in the city in his appeals to every source of authority. First, Cicero attempted to supplicate the people who had once called him their Founder (30.4). When that failed, he sought refuge with Pompey who, despite his own shame, avoided helping Cicero in favour of maintaining his familial ties with Caesar (31.3). Finally, Cicero turned to the Consuls who asked him to “once more become the saviour of his country” and submit to Clodius (31.4). Cicero’s final option was either to remain in Rome and risk factionalism and strife, or step back, go into exile, and allow the city to change. This is our first hint that exile was not just a punishment for criminal behaviour. Exile in the *Parallel Lives* appears to be useful as a tool that a loyal statesman can use to help their city maintain its internal harmony. Cicero’s patriotism is revealed in his final act where he took a statue of Minerva to the capitol and dedicated it as the ‘guardian of Rome’ (Ἀθηνᾶ Ῥώμης φύλακι) (31.1), a final act of patriotism and highly symbolic. We shall see how this narrative appears to parallel the exile narrative of Camillus in his prayer before the city gates and the hope that the Romans would repent their decision and welcome him back (31.4-5). It is not long until his hopes come to fruition and Rome grows weary of the tyranny of Clodius, prompting an ashamed and embarrassed Pompey to push for Cicero’s recall (33.2-4).

**Romulus**

The purpose of Plutarch’s *Theseus-Romulus* is laid out in the introduction of the *Theseus*. It is his goal to compare the founder of Athens (οἰκιστὴν Ἅθηνῶν) (*Thes*. 1.2) to Romulus, who founded Rome (ἐκτίσε τὴν Ῥώμην) (*Thes*. 2.1). The distinction between the *ktistes* and *oikistes* is inherent in their comparisons, as well as their uncertain and ‘dark’ parentage (ἀνεγγύω καὶ
σκοτίω γενόμενοι), their association with gods (δόξαν ἔσχον ἐκ θεῶν γεγονέναι), and their ultimate conflict with their fellow citizens (Thes. 2.1-2).

This provides us with several of the potential criteria for the other founders of Rome, but it is interesting that Plutarch leaves out any explicit mention of their initial rejection from their homelands. The theme of exile is not forgotten, however. The Romulus is rich with thematic exile imagery that ties directly into the narrative of the founding of Rome.

The Romulus shows a version of events in which exiles are fundamental to the founding of Rome. When Romulus and Remus decided to found their own cities in the location in which they were discovered as infants (9.1), they found themselves surrounded and accompanied by ‘slaves and fugitives,’ (οἶκετῶν καὶ ἀποστατῶν) they had gathered in their efforts to eliminate the tyrant Amulius (9.1-2). Plutarch relates that once the city had been founded, they made a ‘sanctuary of refuge for all fugitives’ (ἱερόν τι φύξιμον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις) and that they would not turn away anyone seeking refuge or asylum (9.3). Plutarch’s description of Rome as a haven for exiles and the lowly is unique among our extant sources. If one considers the relevant passages from Livy (1.8.5-7) and Dionysius (2.15.1-3), each one presents a slightly different reading of the events. Livy states that Romulus built the city then opened the gates to all manner of people to artificially bolster the strength of the city. This, according to him, was a traditional founding tactic and was simply a means to quickly increase the population.92 Dionysius writes that Romulus used religion as a pretext for granting citizenship to any free man who would join the city.93 Plutarch’s account shares details with the

92 Liv. 1.8.5-7.
93 DH 2.15.1-3.
other two but includes instructions from the Delphic oracle to make the city an asylum for everyone.\textsuperscript{94} As a result, Rome would not “return slave to masters, nor debtor to creditors, nor murderer to magistrates” (ὦτε δεσπόταις δοῦλον οὔτε θήτα χρήσταις οὔτ’ ἄρχουσιν ἀνδροφόνον ἐκδιδόντες) and the account adds an irrefutable religious dimension that is ignored by Livy and dismissed by Dionysius (\textit{Rom.} 9.3).\textsuperscript{95}

As I have previously mentioned, the \textit{Romulus} opens with a series of alternate accounts of the founding of Rome (1-2) which appear to have been sourced from Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Before Plutarch settles on one account, he explains one version of the exile story from a historian named Promathion, whose history of Italy contains a slightly different version of the events of Romulus’ infancy: an oracle prophesizes the birth of a figure of great worth; Tarchetius, the king of Alba, wants his daughter to bear him that child; she refuses to comply and sends a handmaiden in her place (2.4). When Tarchetius learns of the deceit, he has the handmaiden imprisoned and the children exiled to the river and left to die (2.5-6). It appears that the inclusion of this story is to demonstrate not only Plutarch’s awareness of the varying tales of Romulus’ birth but to tie Romulus more closely to Theseus, whose birth and exile narratives parallel one another. In the \textit{Theseus}, Theseus’ father, Aegeus is given a message from an oracle which he does not understand initially but which promises him a son (\textit{Thes.} 3.3). He is tricked into consorting with Pittheus’ daughter and gives the child up until the child

\textsuperscript{94} Stadter 2015, 84. Plutarch’s personal relationship with Delphi may be an alternative explanation for the appearance, but it fits firmly into Greek exile and colonization narratives as well. Cf. Brenk 1977, 236.

\textsuperscript{95} Dougherty 1993, 15 lists four elements of archaic Greek colonization stories: (a) crisis, (b) consulting the oracle, (c) authorization to start a new colony, (d) resolution to the original crisis. Plutarch’s inclusion of the Delphic oracle not included in Livy adds an element of traditional \textit{ktistic} narrative to the \textit{Romulus}. 


can prove himself as his rightful heir (3.4-5). Plutarch eventually settles on the narrative of Romulus and Remus from Livy (1.3-1.4), but the inclusion of Promathion’s account ties the stories closer together than their otherwise tenuous connections do on their own.

Unlike the other ktristic exiles, Romulus is exiled at birth and through no fault of his own. There is no Roman statesman here; there are no virtues to judge in an infant. What it does show, however, is the most important theme in the Lives of the Founders of Rome: an opposition and a threat to tyranny. Romulus’ very existence endangers the illegitimate rule of the tyrant Amulius and it is in his fear (φοβέω) of Romulus and Remus that he sends them away (3.4). Initially Romulus himself has no lust for control – his original vision for the city was to have two distinct but mutually beneficial classes, the patron and the client (13.1-9). This relationship is meant to be founded on paternal care from the elite and the respectful good will of the populace. He appears perfectly willing to share control with Tatius after stealing away the Sabine women, even to the extent that they combined their cities to share power (19.7). When Tatius was eventually killed, Romulus’ refusal to punish the murderers leads Plutarch to suggest that Romulus was happier without having to share power (23.4). To Plutarch the results are perfectly clear: at the time, there was no internal strife, no factions, and no dissatisfaction about Romulus as sole ruler (23.4).

Once again, we see the ktristic exiles associated with concordia. Romulus was cast into exile by a tyrant seeking sole authority in his city, but once in exile

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96 Cf. Stadter 2015, 182 n.3.
97 Stadter 2015, 23 suggests that Plutarch’s account of the paternalistic governance of Rome is meant to be a solution to the problems of class relations in Greece. I think Plutarch may be suggesting that it was intended as such, but my ultimate conclusion is that Rome inevitably leads to dictatorship.
he can commit to founding a new city based on cooperation and compromise between classes. The patron-client relationship is at the heart of Romulus’ intention for the city and dictates the fundamental criteria for the other ktistic exiles to strive towards. It is clearly important that the other ktistai resist tyranny, but it is more important to instil concord among the city.

It is only in Romulus’ later years that he begins to grow tyrannical, and this too is important in the Lives of the ktistic exiles. At Rom. 26.1, Plutarch writes that “like almost all men who have been lifted by great and unexpected strokes of good fortune to power and dignity, even he was emboldened by his achievements to take on a haughtier hearing to renounce his popular ways and to change to the ways of the monarch” and thus became hated by the state. Romulus’ rule was beginning to decay into tyranny, but his distaste for monarchy still reigned, as we see in 27.1 when his grandfather Numitor dies in Alba and Romulus establishes a government based on annual rulers. Romulus, himself a king, and his efforts in Alba prompted the influential men in Rome to find a way to govern Rome without a king, “where all in turn were subjects and rulers” (27.1). Unfortunately, Romulus eventually becomes increasingly tyrannical and, while some say that his corporeal form vanished during a lightning storm and he was deified (Rom. 27.4-8, Livy 1.16.1-4), Plutarch is more sceptical but perfectly willing to adapt the story to his needs. At Rom. 28.2, a vision appears and reveals itself to be the deified Romulus who delivers a message to the Romans to use ‘wisdom’ and ‘valour’ to become the greatest empire on earth. Livy’s version lacks Plutarch’s addition about wisdom and instead entirely discusses warfare and conflict (1.16.6-7). Plutarch’s message here is clear: moderation and wisdom are required to
temper their passions so that future rulers do not fall to tyranny and disrupt the concord on which the city was founded.

Plutarch’s synkrisis reveals several important themes present in the Romulus and the accompanying Greek biography, the Theseus. At the outset, Plutarch emphasises that both men fought and overcame tyrants: Romulus is given credit for the slaying of Amulius, the tyrant of Alba (τὸν Ἀλβης τύραννον), but Theseus is praised more highly for slaying multiple tyrants (δεινῶν τυράννων). Plutarch’s description of Amulius as a tyrant is appropriate since in the narrative he dishonourably seized the city from his brother (Rom. 3.2), is accused of raping Romulus’ mother (Rom. 4.2), condemned the twin boys to die of exposure (Rom. 3.4), and incited fear and hatred among his people (Rom. 8.5). The tyrants whom Theseus overthrew were miscreants; highway robbers with unusual methods. The Theseus story has obvious parallels to the trials of Heracles – such as the explicit symbolism of Periphetes’ club and Heracles’ lion skin (Thes. 10.1) – but labelling these men as tyrants establishes the theme of struggling against overwhelming and unquestionable authority. This is addressed further when Plutarch states that the two men veered from the path of righteous leadership, but in opposite directions: Romulus transformed into a tyrant through selfishness and severity (φιλαυτίας... καὶ χαλεπότητος) while Theseus’ shift to democratic governance came from reasonableness and humanity (ἐπιεικείας... καὶ

98 Comp. Thes. Rom. 1.2
99 The ones listed by Plutarch at Comp. Thes. Rom. 1.2 are Sciron, who kicked people into the sea (Thes. 10.1); Sinis, who used a bent tree to split his victims in half (Thes. 8.2); Procrustes, who stretched people and beat them with a hammer (Thes. 11.1); and Corynetes/Periphetes, whose club Theseus took as a trophy (Thes. 8.1).
Romulus’ decline into tyranny is central to Plutarch’s vision of Rome as an inevitable dictatorship.

Plutarch also addresses the key theme of this discussion: their exile and founding. In the introduction of the *Theseus* Plutarch says that it is his objective to compare the founder of Athens (οἰκιστήν Ἀθηνῶν) to the father of Rome (τῷ πατρὶ τῆς... Ῥώμης), then states that Romulus founded (ἔκτισε) Rome while Theseus brought Athens together (συνώκισε). It is not until the synkrisis that Plutarch defines exactly what he intended by pairing the two together. From their lowly beginnings, Romulus and Remus became known as founders of cities (οἰκισταὶ πόλεων), contrasting with Theseus – a ‘transplanter’ (μετοικισταῖ) – who brought people together into an existing city. The use of oikistes to describe Romulus in the *Theseus* is a clear effort to define Romulus in Greek terms and demonstrate that Romulus built Rome out of nothing while establishing Alba as the symbolic mother-city of Rome. He ties the characters together in a Greek colonial context when the central figure is Greek, but throughout the *Romulus* he is described as ktistes which creates clear imagery of construction alongside the symbolic foundation of the city. Furthermore, the founding of Rome has more value to Plutarch than the conglomeration of Athens when he considers the exile aspect. Romulus himself is not called an exile but, as we have seen, Plutarch describes Romulus’ Rome as being settled by exiles and followers, a sentiment repeated in the synkrisis. Plutarch describes Romulus as a

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100 *Comp. Thes. Rom.* 2.2
101 *Thes.* 1.2
102 *Thes.* 2.1
103 *Comp. Thes. Rom.* 4.1
104 Romulus is called an oikistes at 11.1-2 but a ktistes at 9.1, 9.4, 12.2, 12.6, 13.1, 28.2.
“benefactor of men without homes and hearths” (ἐὐεργέτει δὲ τοὺς ἐξ ἀοίκων καὶ ἄνεστίων δῆμον ἔθελοντας έξοναι καὶ πολίτας), a phrase which clearly implies exiles.\textsuperscript{105}

Camillus

As we have previously seen, the \textit{Camillus} is unusually sparse on many details and it has been suggested that Plutarch had less material with which to furnish the narrative compared to its Greek pair, the \textit{Themistocles}.\textsuperscript{106} It begins with Camillus appearing fully grown and proving his valour in battle against the Volscians under the dictator Postumius Tubertus.\textsuperscript{107} He quickly rises in prestige and is appointed dictator for the war against the Faliscans in 396 BCE which culminated in the siege and capture of Veii.\textsuperscript{108} Unlike Cicero, who was declared a founder of Rome before his exile, Camillus is exiled prior to his greatest contribution to Rome. Plutarch writes that after taking Veii, Camillus became vain (ὠγκος), celebrating his triumph with a chariot drawn by four white horses, an honour typically associated with Jupiter.\textsuperscript{109} Plutarch claims that Camillus’ blatant self-identification with Jupiter had never been seen before, nor since.\textsuperscript{110} This is a clear exaggeration since it is attested that Caesar utilised a chariot drawn by white horses after his victory at Thapsus in 46 BCE, even though it is not mentioned in Plutarch’s biography of Cicero.\textsuperscript{111} Two other accounts in Livy and Dio both agree with Plutarch’s

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{105} Comp. Thes. Rom. 4.2
\item\textsuperscript{106} Larmour 1988, 4179-4180.
\item\textsuperscript{107} Cam. 2.1.
\item\textsuperscript{108} Cam. 5.1.
\item\textsuperscript{109} Cam. 7.1.
\item\textsuperscript{110} Cam. 7.1.
\item\textsuperscript{111} Dio 43.14.3 - καὶ τὰ ἐπινίκια τὰ προεψηφισμένα ἐπὶ τε λευκῶν ἵππων. Weinstock 1971, 68-76 for an investigation into the pre-Roman significance of the white horses. It is sufficient for this thesis that our sources say the Romans were alarmed by Camillus’ brazen display.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
assessment that this act was the first to enrage the people against Camillus, since he was directly associating himself with Jupiter, an assumption that was too outrageous for the Romans to tolerate.\textsuperscript{112} This story has some interesting implications. By Plutarch’s time, several other legendary Romans were linked to the imagery of four white horses: the exiled Aeneas saw four white horses upon entering Italy\textsuperscript{113} and Romulus was said to have held a triumph with four white horses.\textsuperscript{114} Camillus was obviously praised for succeeding in taking Veii, but he was not so impressive that he could imitate the gods. He further angered the people by siding against them on a measure to divide the population and the Senate in two, sending one half to live in the now-abandoned Veii.\textsuperscript{115} Finally, he neglected his religious vow to dedicate a tenth of the spoils of Veii to Delphi, an act of omission so insensitive that the Senate later forced each person to donate it in person.\textsuperscript{116} It is for these reasons that the people grew to hate Camillus, and when L. Apuleius accused him of the theft of some bronze Tuscan doors and he risked being convicted, Camillus turned to his friends for help in a scene reminiscent of Cicero’s final days in Rome.\textsuperscript{117} At risk of being convicted, both men fled into exile with the hope that Rome would want them back once the alternative proved intolerable. In Cicero’s case, it was the madness and senselessness (μανίας καὶ ἀπονοίας) of Clodius, and for Camillus it was the intolerable occupation of Brennus and the Gauls.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{112} Livy 5.23.4, Dio 52.13.3. Cf. Weinstock 1971, 71.
\textsuperscript{113} Verg. Aen. 3.537.
\textsuperscript{114} DH 2.34 claims that Romulus rode in on a chariot drawn by four horses but Plut. Rom. 16.8 states outright that Dionysius was wrong and that Tarquin was the first of the kings to do so. Cf. Prop. 4.1.32.
\textsuperscript{115} Cam. 7.2-3.
\textsuperscript{116} Cam. 7.5-8.2.
\textsuperscript{117} Cam. 12.2-3 – echoes Cic. 31.2-5.
\textsuperscript{118} Cic. 31.4.
Once again, we can see how Camillus’ decision to go into exile helped to preserve concord in Rome. Camillus, having earned the ire of the people for neglecting his vow to dedicate spoils to Delphi, risked causing factionalism and strife within Rome. Despite his numerous contributions and benefactions to the city, none were significant enough to halt the increasing tide of dissatisfaction between the two classes. His decision to go into exile is therefore another example of maintaining concord through banishment. We also see that before he accepted his recall from exile, Camillus demanded a vote legally electing him as dictator. This proves once again Camillus’ dedication to the harmonious order of Rome by only returning once the legal process had concluded and all who could vote had their say. Concord extends not just to class struggles, but also to the world of law and order.

It is not until Camillus’ triumphant return and liberation of Rome that he is hailed as *ktistes*. Unlike Cicero, Camillus not only defended Rome from an external threat, but rebuilt the city after it had been destroyed by the Gauls. In this respect, Plutarch’s use of *ktistes* is indicative of the physical construction of the city in the fashion of Romulus. However, Camillus is also responsible for reinstating the religious customs put in place by Romulus himself, such as rekindling the sacred fire of Vesta (31.4) and recovering of Romulus’ augural staff which had been miraculously kept safe from the Gauls (32.4-5). Once again, as with the Cicero, the Camillus focuses on recurring themes of the exile safeguarding and maintaining Rome’s fundamental traditions against serious threats. Plutarch’s Camillus is an amalgamation of his Romulus and his Cicero, a man who occupies both meanings of *ktistes*: he is both a builder of Rome and a preserver of its original Romulan values. While he fell victim to the seemingly inevitable class struggles present in
Rome at the time, Camillus’ other benefactions further contribute to his presentation as one of a line of founders descending from Romulus.

Unlike Cicero and Romulus, Plutarch’s Camillus appears to be tyrannical from the beginning and grows more moderate after his exile, eventually culminating in a positive example of a virtuous statesman. At the outset, Camillus has no interest in appeasing the populace, seemingly little interest in upholding his religious responsibilities, and has a seriously misaligned sense of propriety. Yet Plutarch insists he is “by nature a gentle and kind man” (ἀνήρ ἰμέρος φύσει καὶ χρηστός) and demonstrates this by taking the city of Falerii without any bloodshed and depriving the soldiers their plunder (11.1-2). Camillus grew to oppose tyranny but inevitably is drawn to it, as is the case of all the ktistic exiles. Plutarch writes that at the height of his career Camillus refused to serve as consul over a reluctant people (1.3), he himself reluctantly took on the responsibilities of dictator on two occasions (37.2, 39.2), and when he attempted to step down from the position the Senate refused to allow it (42.1). He even ensured the execution of the would-be tyrant M. Manlius who, according to Plutarch, used demagogy to pander to the people and gain power (36.1-7). Camillus’ exile and return not only links him thematically with Romulus and Cicero, but it also illustrates the power of exile to reveal the true character of an individual. By the end of his Life Camillus was able to moderate his extremes of ambition and extravagance such that the city moved to keep him in power.

v. Marius and the Revenge Exiles

The Life of Marius is unique among our examples because while Plutarch says he earned the title of Third Founder of Rome, his portrayal is inherently
a negative one. Santangelo (2007) describes how there were likely more connections between Sulla and the Founders of Rome than Marius in the form of religious ceremonies and self-promotion, and yet Marius is the one who received the title in Plutarch.\textsuperscript{119} There are elements of divine prophecy throughout his \textit{Life}, he came from humble origins, and Plutarch stresses his poor education and scorn towards Greek philosophy.\textsuperscript{120} Marius was granted the title of founder of Rome after protecting the city from an invasion of Cimmerians and Plutarch says the “peril which he had averted from the city was not less than of the Gallic invasion”, a clear reference to the \textit{Camillus} and his own safeguarding of the Roman state.\textsuperscript{121} We can see here how in Plutarch’s account Marius is portrayed as a lover of authority (2.1) but was clever enough to avoid appearing as if he intended to obtain the dictatorship. In the beginning, he managed to offend both the Senate and the people, thereby also endearing himself to each and appearing as if he had only the best interests of the state in mind (4.4). Marius’ behaviour opposes that of Camillus and Cicero in that it appears to promote concord while sowing discord and conflict within Rome. After capturing Jugurtha he nearly wore his triumphal robes in front of the senate (accidentally or a “vulgar display of his good fortune,” Plutarch allows for both\textsuperscript{122}), but noticed that it was offending the senators and removed them before causing too much trouble (12.5). It

\textsuperscript{119} Santangelo 2007, 216 describes how Sulla’s \textit{ludi victoriae} celebration was part of a strategy of self-promoting himself as a second Founder of Rome (Vell. 2.27.6; ps.-Ascon. Cic. \textit{Verr.} 1.10.31, Keaveney 1983, 189-191) and there were more connections between Sulla and Romulus n.8 – DH \textit{Ant. Rom.} 2.7-29 and 5.77. He says Plutarch’s (27.9) claim that “most people called him the third Founder of Rome” has no firm evidence.

\textsuperscript{120} See above, 25.

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Mar.} 27.5 - ώς οὖχ ἤτοινα τοῦ Κελτικοῦ τοῦτον ἀπεωσμένον τὸν κίνδυνον

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Mar.} 12.5 - καὶ παρῆλθε μὲν εἶτε λαθὼν αὐτὸν εἶτε τῇ τύχῃ χρώμενος ἀγροικότερον ἐν τῇ θριαμβικῇ κατασκευῇ
did not matter if he was the ‘best man’, so long as he could be the ‘greatest’. Plutarch’s Marius is a hard, warlike man with only the highest of ambitions, a vice which dogs him until his death. He did not oppose tyranny; he welcomed it so long as it was his own. By the time he was campaigning for his sixth consulship he had begun to resort to demagogy, in Plutarch’s words “thus doing violence not only to the dignity and majesty of his high office, but also to his own nature, since he wished to be a compliant man of the people when he was naturally at farthest remove from this.” Marius was incapable of maintaining *concordia* - everything he did only resulted in greater conflict.

In many ways his colleague Metellus Numidicus is the perfect foil for Marius and serves as an example of one of Plutarch’s ideal Roman statesmen. Plutarch says that Marius ‘dreaded’ or ‘shrank from’ (ὀρρωδέω) Metellus, whose “genuine excellence made him the natural enemy of those tried to insinuate themselves by devious methods into popular favour and sought to control the masses by pleasing them.” In Metellus we see our other Roman *ktistai* who fought dearly against the control of one man and were forced out of the city instead. In this case, Marius deceived Metellus into being the only member of the Senate not to swear on the agrarian law (thinking he had Marius’ support) and having him interdicted from the city (29.7). In his moments of exile, the actions of Metellus mirror those of Camillus and Cicero: he is forced to leave the city to prevent factions from being raised and internal

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123 Mar. 28.3 - ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέγιστος γενέσθαι τὸ βέλτιστον εἶναι προϊέμενος
124 Mar. 28.1 - θεραπείαις τὸν δήμον ἀναλαμβάνων καὶ πρὸς χάριν ἐνδιδοὺς τοῖς πολλοῖς, οὐ μόνον παρά τὸν ὁγκὸν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ὑγρός τις εἶναι βουλόμενος καὶ δημοτικός, ἢκιστα τοιούτος πεφυκὼς.
125 Mar. 28.4 - ύπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ φύσει δι’ ἁρετὴν ἀληθῆ] πολεμοῦντα τοῖς οὐ κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον ὑποδομοῦνοις τὰ πλήθη καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δημαγωγοῦσιν, ἔπεβολευε τῆς πόλεως ἐξβαλεῖν τὸν ἀνδρα,
conflict running through the state, and in so doing preserved *concordia*. His prayer before he leaves hearkens back to that in *Cam.* 12.3 when Camillus prayed that the Romans would one day long for Camillus to return. Plutarch concludes by saying that Metellus was an ideal exile and “what great good will and esteem Metellus enjoyed during his exile, and how he spent his time in philosophical studies at Rhodes, will be better told in the works composed about him” which, unfortunately, no longer exists.\textsuperscript{126}

Marius strove to create war between Rome and Mithridates (31), risking the state for his own benefit because he feared being forgotten “like an instrument of war in time of peace” (32.1).\textsuperscript{127} Worst of all was Sulla, whose success Plutarch attributes to the encouragement of Marius’ detractors (32.2). To prevent Sulla from taking command of the war, Plutarch writes that Marius sided with Sulpicius and “brought to a head the secret disease from which the state had long been suffering.”\textsuperscript{128} Sulpicius and his gang attacked the consuls, forcing Sulla to flee the city, assemble his forces, and enter Rome (35.5).

Marius then fled into exile not in any effort to preserve or protect the state, but to protect himself. Unlike Camillus or Cicero or Romulus, there is nothing celebratory about Marius’ return. Sulla was engaged with Mithridates and the consul Octavius had ousted Cinna as his colleague prompting him to gather an army and attempt to retake his position in Rome (41.1-2). Octavius is described as “an excellent man [who] wished to rule in the most just way”

\textsuperscript{126} *Mar.* 29.8 - ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅσης μὲν ἀπέλαυσεν εὖνοιας παρὰ τὴν φυγήν καὶ τιμῆς Μέτελλος, ὅν δὲ τρόπον ἐν Ρώδι φιλοσοφῶν διητήθη, βέλτιον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἐκείνου γραφομένοις εἰρήσεται.
\textsuperscript{127} *Mar.* 32.1 - ὦστερ πόργανον πολεμικὸν ἐπ’ εἰρήνης παρημεχεῖτο
\textsuperscript{128} *Mar.* 35.1 - ταῦτα τὴν πόλιν ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων ὑποσυλλα ὑπενημένην καὶ νοσοῦσαν ἀνέρρηξεν
(ἀριστον ἀνδρα καὶ τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ τρόπῳ βουλόμενον ἀρχεῖν, 41.3), but
Marius opted to side with Cinna who was warring against Sulla and the
establishment (41.3). It is at this point that any pretence Marius may have
used for upholding the Republic against tyranny was dropped entirely, and
his exile revealed his true nature. He appeared to Cinna as dishevelled and
pitiable but “with his appeal for compassion there was mingled the look that
was natural to him and now more terrifying than ever, and through his
downcast mien there flashed a spirit which had been, not humbled, but made
savage (ἐξαγριώ) by his reverses.” Rome was in chaos, Octavius was
slaughtered and the city asked for Cinna and Marius to enter the city and
spare the citizens (43.1).

Marius’ return to Rome appears to be a corruption of that of Camillus (Cam.
24.3). Camillus insisted that before he took control of the army he would have
to be legally elected first. The primacy of Rome is prevalent in the Camillus,
and despite being overrun by Gauls, his patriotism in exile is demonstrated
quite clearly. Similarly, Marius halted at the gates and refused to enter the
city, saying he was an exile and by law was not allowed to enter until the vote
to cast him out was invalidated by another vote (43.2). As soon as the people
were summoned together, Marius entered the city and began to slaughter the
populace and any supporters of Sulla who were left in the city (43.3). Once
again, we can see that unlike Cicero and Camillus, Marius did not return to
the city with excitement and the promise of redemption. His behaviour prior
to exile had contributed to the discord in Rome and only increased the strife
among the populace. Marius and Cinna are portrayed as the last options for

129 Mar. 41.4 - τῷ δὲ οίκτῳ συμμέμικτο τὸ οίκεῖον τῆς ὄψεως αὐτοῦ πλέον τὸ
φοβηρόν, καὶ διέφαινεν ἢ κατήφεια τῶν θυμῶν οὐ τεταπεινωμένον, ἀλλ’
ἐξηγριωμένον ὑπὸ τῆς μεταβολῆς
rulership: Sulla was in the East, the noble Octavius was murdered by a mob (42.4), the elder Metellus was exiled, and his son came to Rome and fled as well, despairing of the safety of the city (42.3).

Much like the Themistocles-Camillus, and unlike the Cicero and the Romulus, we lack a formal synkrisis for the Pyrrhus-Marius pair. At first glance the two Lives are an unlikely combination: the attempted conqueror of Rome is linked to Rome’s saviour through themes of ambition and a lack of self-control, but in general the events of their lives are unusually different. However, the Pyrrhus is a necessary piece to Plutarch’s overall objectives for the pair, especially as they relate to Marius as an exiled Founder of Rome. From the other three Lives of the Founders of Rome, we have seen that they all demonstrate several themes to varying degrees: Romans opposing tyranny, saving or protecting their city, an exile by an ungrateful or envious villain, and a return from exile illustrating their characters. The Marius alone contains these elements but, when read in tandem with the Greek pair, Plutarch’s greater themes come to the foreground and when the descriptions of Rome in the Pyrrhus are compared with those from the Marius, the theme of Roman decay begins to emerge.

The Pyrrhus accomplishes two things: the portrayal of Rome contrasts against the Rome shown in Marius, and the events of Pyrrhus’ exile mirror Marius’ own. First, it is worth noting that there is no introduction to the Pyrrhus-Marius just as there is no synkrisis. Instead, the Pyrrhus begins with a lineage of Pyrrhus, which is very reminiscent of the introduction to Romulus, with conflicting accounts from anonymous historians and a direct line back to

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Achilles through his son Neoptolemus (*Pyrrh.* 1.1-3). Through a factional conflict among the Molossians, Pyrrhus' life is endangered, and he is forced to flee with a group of accompanying servants (2.1). When compared to the exile narrative in the *Marius* the similarities are apparent, but mirrored, and in that way the *Marius* appears to oppose not only the *Pyrrhus*, but also the *Romulus*. At *Mar.* 35.1-2, Marius incites Sulpicius to attempt to murder the consuls, igniting the factional violence in Rome which backfires. Marius is forced into exile after putting Sulla's friends to death (35.5). Pyrrhus, on the other hand, is a victim of factional violence: his father is expelled (ἐκβαλόντες), his friends executed, and he is forced to flee the city himself (2.1). Nerdahl (2008) investigates the Odysseus-like qualities of the Marian exile narrative and concludes that Plutarch's *Marius* is portrayed as "perverted image of Odysseus", who utterly fails to learn or grow from his exile. The evidence he presents is strong, and there does appear to be a significant trail of events that both Marius and Odysseus follow which highlight Marius' own very un-Odyssean qualities. The explicit association with Achilles in the *Pyrrhus* during his own exile narrative cements the Homeric connection (3.6).

Secondly, Plutarch's portrayal of Rome in the *Pyrrhus* shows how far the Roman state had fallen by the time of Marius and contrasts it against a relatively stable and unified golden age. In the *Pyrrhus*, Rome is

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131 Nerdahl 2008, 121.
132 Nerdahl 2008, 117 illustrates the similarities between Marius' exile and Odysseus' journey. In brief, the two are caught in a storm, make landfall, lose their companions, hide in bushes, are treated with kindness by an old enemy, and then return home.
133 Achilles is referenced several times throughout the *Pyrrhus*. Pyrrhus is descended from Achilles (1.2), rescued by a man named Achilles (2.6), wanted the glory of Achilles (7.4), and could not stand being idle, like Achilles (13.1).
represented by two statesmen: C. Fabricius Luscinus and Ap. Claudius Caecus. Buszard (2005) isolates three events which display the idealized state of Rome during the Middle Republic: their defeat at Heracleia (18.1-2), Pyrrhus’ peace offer (18.4-7), and their defiance towards Pyrrhus after Claudius speaks in the senate (19.5-7). Rome is depicted as a unified and stable state without a trace of factionalism or emotional immoderation. When Pyrrhus defeats the Romans at Heracleia, the Romans do not punish the general by removing his command, but instead begin to enthusiastically rebuild their military to continue fighting Pyrrhus. When Pyrrhus sends his advisor Cineas to settle with the Romans, he first tries to bribe the Romans and fails because of their unity – he would not succeed in dividing and conquering the populace (18.4-5). Cineas then attempts to speak before the senate and offers to ally Pyrrhus with the Romans in exchange for the release of the Tarentines (18.6). Ap. Claudius counters with a rousing speech and Cineas returns to Pyrrhus declaring that the senate “had the appearance of an assembly of many kings,” which is evocative imagery for the unity of the Roman leaders. When compared to the diseased factionalism present in the Marius, the Rome of the Pyrrhus is united and consolidated, strong in its resolve and confident in its ability to combat Pyrrhus for as long necessary to secure a victory.

136 Pyrrh. 18.1-2 Cf. Buszard 2005, 290-1 who states that the generosity of the Romans in not stripping the defeated general of his command should be compared to Pyrrhus’ expulsion from Macedon. Instead of dwelling on punishing the general, they push to rearm and recover from their defeat with confidence.
137 Buszard 2005, 291-292. Cf. Sall. Iug. 35.10 where Jugurtha describes Rome as a city “ripe for the fall, if only it finds a buyer.” There is a clear contrast between the perception of Rome in the Late Republic versus how it is described in the Pyrrhus.
138 Buszard 2005, 293.
Plutarch’s *Marius* presents him as a truly oppositional figure. He earns the title of *ktistes* for saving the city from a threat which Plutarch states was at least as dangerous as the Gauls whom Camillus ousted three centuries earlier. It is a specious comparison since the Cimmerians had not occupied and destroyed much of the city, but it serves Plutarch’s literary objective well. Through his lack of self-control and uneducated immoderation, Marius is the opposite of Camillus and Cicero who both strove to preserve the Republican values on which Rome was founded. In his behaviour in exile he is the anti-Odysseus, unwilling or incapable of learning humanity and self-control from his experiences.\(^{139}\) His return to Rome is a mockery of Camillus, whose loyalty to the state demanded an official recall and an election to grant him the dictatorship. Marius attempts the same thing and slaughters the people gathered to vote, but unlike Odysseus, whose massacre is justified and righteous, Marius’ unchecked bloodlust is excessive, unjust, and cruel. Until his exile Marius appears able to control his base ambitions and emotions, but his return from exile reveals his true nature as feral and brutal.

vi. Conclusion

Given the evidence presented above, I am certain that Plutarch’s use of *ktistes* was intentionally meant to refer to a specific heroic archetype which can be traced back to Romulus. To be a *ktistes Rhomes* meant following a particular heroic journey: a divinely prophesied birth (or introduction, as in the case of Camillus), a meteoric rise to prominence (Plutarch finds value in the Roman concept of the *novi homines* for this purpose), a sound Greek *paideia*, and an unwavering desire for safeguarding and renewing the values of Rome.

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\(^{139}\) Nerdahl 2008, 119.
as a state founded on a mutually beneficial client-patron relationship. The *ktistai* were those who fought against rising tides of authoritarianism and tyranny in order to preserve the concept of Rome as founded by Romulus while rebelling against the dictatorship which, by Plutarch’s time, would have been seen as inevitable.

It is therefore essential that Plutarch’s Founders of Rome be exiled and cast aside by their homelands to fulfil their Romulan *mimesis*. Rejection plays a significant role in Plutarch’s version of the Romulus story: it is the impetus for the brothers’ decision to combat the tyrannical rule of Alba and their necessity to create a new homeland. From the beginning the Roman state itself was a home to exiles and the disfranchised who sought a new home among others like themselves who had been deprived of their homelands.

The reader gets the sense that Rome’s leadership was destined to succumb to authoritarianism and sole rule (see *Rom*. 26.1), and that the Roman empire in which Plutarch lived was an inevitability. Indeed, it seems likely that without the exiled Founders Rome would have been led by a tyrant much earlier, whether it was Brennus in the time of Camillus, Amulius in the time of Romulus, or Cataline during the time of Cicero. By describing the exiled Romans as founders Plutarch implicitly connects the concepts of rejection and renewal - a kind of reset switch for an individual which prompts a correction in the direction of the state. Romulus had to be exiled for Amulius to fall; Camillus had to be exiled to return and defeat Brennus. The reversal is present in the *Cicero* and we see that his exile came on the heels of his Roman renewal suggesting that his ‘founding’ act may even have placed him in the position of would-be tyrant and that his exile allowed the Roman state
to cool and settle back into its Republican ideals once again. It is an attractive idea and one possibly adapted from Cicero himself, who could rarely resist an opportunity to compare himself to others.

Most importantly, however, is that the exiled Romans maintain internal harmony in the city through their exiles. The legendary Romulus model gives way to Plutarch’s politically motivated aspirations of leadership. On the one hand he presents the exciting and immaterial notion that several Romans were divinely inspired to follow in the footsteps of the first Roman founder, while on the other hand Plutarch seeks to impart a significant lesson on the nature of the political leader: do what you must for the sake of internal harmony, even at great cost to oneself. The Roman exile model presents the statesman with the opportunity to abandon their city in order to maintain concordia between the classes as was initially laid out by Romulus. Plutarch’s ideal statesman, therefore, must be willing to sacrifice themselves in order to prevent further stasis among the populace, even when it means going into exile. Self-sacrifice for the benefit of the state has always been laudable, but Plutarch’s vision is a complete model of virtuous behaviour: go into exile, save the city from conflict, maintain concordia, and rise to a level of prominence to be counted among the few like Romulus.
Chapter IV. The Ostracised

In the previous chapter I attempted to show how a lateral comparison of Plutarch’s Roman exiles suggests thematic continuity not only among intended biographical pairings, but also among Romans whose Lives rely on the exile narrative to illustrate Plutarch’s moralistic objectives. Keeping to that line of investigation, I will now look at the elements which Plutarch uses in his biographies of Greek exiles beyond those which tie them to their Roman counterparts. Most notably, Plutarch dedicates a substantial number of Greek biographies to individuals who were victims of the Athenian practice of ostracism, a highly democratic and institutionalised form of exile used during the fifth century BCE.¹ Plutarch’s Roman exiles trace a continuous line of ktistic exiles through Cicero and Camillus while painting Romulus as the progenitor of the Roman tradition. The Lives of the ostracised Athenians, however, appear to show a disdain for the pure democracy of Athens that intentionally removes the best and most capable citizens out of envy for their superiority. For Plutarch, ostracism is a double-edged sword: the exile is outstanding in ambition, wealth, or reputation but cannot be tolerated in a true Athenian democracy wherein equality is valued highest of all.

Throughout the Lives of the ostracised Athenians, Plutarch is quick to establish that ostracism was not intended to be a penalty or punishment.² Instead, he explains that ostracism differed from established exile practices in that it was never intended to be a punishment for criminal wrongdoing, but a dignified method of removing an individual whose significance and

¹See Forsdyke 2005 and Thomsen 1972 for an extensive investigation into the theory and practice of ostracism.
²See Them. 22.3, Arist. 7.2, and less explicitly Alc. 13.4
reputation exceeded that which was appropriate for a purely democratic system of government.\textsuperscript{3} We can read from Aristotle (\textit{Const. Ath. 22.3}) that ostracism may have been instituted as a safeguard against the attempts of any individual who aimed at establishing themselves as a tyrant, and that for three years the legislation was aimed at the friends and relatives of tyrants as a deterrent to future efforts. However, Plutarch’s opinion is quite different. He states that Aristotle’s interpretation was specious, and that ostracism was a tool to vent the envy of the populace. Through ostracism the Athenian democracy could manifest its will in one social and political action to remove anyone who posed a threat to the ideals of equality and took steps to elevate themselves above others. This was the traditional explanation for ostracism and seemingly defined the process until its end.\textsuperscript{4} Plutarch writes:

\begin{verbatim}
τὸν μὲν οὖν ἐξοστρακισμὸν ἐποίησαντο κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ κολούοντες τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν ἐπὶ πάντων, οὕς ὄντο τῇ δυνάμει βαρεῖς καὶ πρὸς ἴσοτητα δημοκρατικῆς ἀσυμμέτρους εἶναι. κόλασις γὰρ οὐκ ἦν ὁ ἐξοστρακισμὸς, ἀλλὰ παραμυθία φθόνου καὶ κουφισμὸς ἤδομένου τῷ ταπεινοῦν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας καὶ τὴν δυσμένειαν εἰς ταύτην τὴν ἀτιμίαν ἀποπνέοντος.

"Well then, they visited him with ostracism, curtailing his dignity and pre-emminence, as they were wont to do in the case of all whom they thought to have oppressive power, and to be incommensurate with true democratic equality. For ostracism was not a penalty, but a way of pacifying and alleviating that jealousy which delights to humble the eminent, breathing out its malice into this disfranchisement." (\textit{Them. 22.3}, Trans. Perrin)
\end{verbatim}

It is here that Plutarch reveals his perception on the dual nature of ostracism in Athens. As mentioned previously in \textit{On Exile}, Plutarch stated that exile was not necessarily an evil, yet Themistocles is described as having had his “dignity and pre-eminence” (τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν) curtailed. There is an implication that Plutarch wrestled with the concept as he followed up with

\textsuperscript{3} Sansone 1989, 184.
\textsuperscript{4} The established purpose of ostracism is attested to in other sources. See Diod. 11.55.2. Thuc. 8.73.3 describes the end of the practice and how the exile of Hyperbolus was performed counter to the established norms.
what will become his mantra for his explanation of ostracism. On the one hand, ostracism was a punishment and was intended to reduce those who were outstanding to a level more in line with Athenian equality. On the other hand, ostracism was not a penalty but a way for the *demos* to vent their envy towards an individual, with the implication that the envy (φθόνος) may manifest itself in more destructive consequences if not provided the legal and democratic method of ostracism. Clearly, ostracism was both. It solved the problem of excessive behaviour while providing a means to bring the overly haughty down to size. This is the first time he provides an explanation for ostracism outside of the realm of political manipulation, instead attributing the expulsion to a specific emotional outburst of envy from the populace. The notion that ostracism in Athens could be used to maintain internal harmony is in line with the theory that exile could be used as a political tool to maintain *concordia* (in Greek, *onomoia* [ὁμόονια]) and reduce the possibility of strife and factionalism.

In this chapter I intend to show that the narratives surrounding this form of exile are both essential to Plutarch’s characterisation of his subjects as well as his views on the role of the virtuous individual and their place among the general populace. Using Forsdyke’s (2005) standard work on ostracism, I will look at what the causes and consequences were. Ostracism was a uniquely Athenian practice which allowed the *demos* to vote on expelling one citizen from the city for a period of ten years, but during the period of its use there are only ten confirmed cases of its implementation. Of the *Lives* based in the

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5 Forsdyke 2005, 165-176 lists Hipparchus (487), Megacles (486), an “unnamed friend of the tyrants” (485), Xanthippus (484), Aristides (482), Megacles (471), Themistocles (470), Cimon (461), Thucydides (c. 442), and Hyperbolus (415). The first three do not appear in the *Lives* but the remainder are all mentioned or feature in the biographies.
fifth century all six are targets of ostracism: Aristides, Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, Nicias, and Alcibiades. It is a persistent threat for any Athenian whose ambition or virtue drives them to advance in authority and reputation above their fellow-citizens and, as will be shown, is unable to control the negative aspects of their character which Plutarch highlights.

I will begin by deconstructing the ostracism narratives of the six Athenian Lives and illustrate that through impending exile Plutarch can clearly demonstrate the virtues and vices of his chosen subjects. The circumstances surrounding each narrative provide valuable insight into Plutarch’s intention for each Life and the moralistic lesson he was trying to teach, either through parallels to their Roman counterparts or simply as unconnected cautionary tales. It is here that we find a microcosm of each Life – all the elements of his subjects represented and culminating in their exile from Athens. In each case there will also be hints at Plutarch’s more implicit statements on the role of human nature, the responsibility of a statesman to the demos, and what it meant to be a virtuous victim of ostracism. The introduction of envy as a primary motivator will be essential to our understanding and will reveal Plutarch’s own deep-seated bias against the demos.

The ostracism narratives are explicitly used as characterising events which provide a microcosm of the subject’s virtues and vices as Plutarch saw them. This can be seen by identifying the central moral qualities of each pair of Lives and how the ostracism narrative reinforces Plutarch’s objective in each biography. This requires a standard literary analysis of parallel Greek and

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6 Only Theseus, Solon, Demosthenes, and Phocion remain as Athenian Lives which do not feature ostracism, likely as a result of its disuse at the time. The Lives of Demosthenes and Theseus still present a form of exile.
Roman Lives to reveal what Plutarch intended to express to the reader. In this analysis, two patterns will emerge. First, that exile through ostracism was not a condemnation of an individual, but rather a recognition of an outstanding nature in reputation, authority, or wealth. Ostracism is itself an indicator of personal excellence and the banishment of these outstanding individuals reflects significantly on Athens and the Athenians of the time. Second, that the prime motivator for ostracising an individual was the emotion of envy (φθόνος) which their excellence, and the influence of demagogues, cultivated among the demos.

That ostracism is an indicator of moral excellence is unique to Plutarch and throughout the Lives he is quick to defend his hypothesis. His editorial comments in the ostracism narratives provide insights into his perspective just as his manipulation of material demonstrates an unerring drive to shape his subjects as superior in virtue to the common citizens. At no point does he attribute their ostracism to criminal wrongdoing or legitimate legal or political concerns. Rather, the practice of ostracism appears to be reserved for those who were superior, and the demos provided excuses to cover their envious ill-will. An analysis of the Hyperbolus narrative, where the practice was reversed onto an individual deemed unworthy, explicitly shows how ingrained the notion was to the contemporary Athenians. To be exceptional was to invite ostracism, and to be ostracised signalled excellence.

It then follows that if the exiled Athenians were exceptional the state which rejected them must have been inferior in some way. The demos in these Lives is afflicted by the jealous ill-will of envy (φθόνος), a concept worth investigating. Plutarch himself wrote on the subject in On Envy vs. Hate and a distinction must be made between the twin terms of envy (φθόνος) and
jealousy (ζῆλος), two terms which in English are often interchangeable but which in Greek had significant differences. The ostracised Athenians, who excel in some manner and are described as demonstrably more virtuous than the demos, are cast off by a citizenry plagued with destructive phthonos cloaked in a fear of tyranny and a zeal for strict and pure democracy. Their hypocrisy is revealed in these ostracism narratives – which often end in a repentant recall of the exiled – and Plutarch shows that the subjects he has chosen for his biographies could not be permitted to exist in the total democracy of fifth century Athens.

It can therefore be seen that the biographies of Plutarch’s exiled Athenians display his objectives on several levels. At their most explicit the ostracism narratives portray a microcosm of the moral components which attracted Plutarch to the subject – Cimon’s loyalty, Themistocles’ cunning and ambition, and Aristides’ justice – while providing context for the moral missteps which led to their rejection. Furthermore, they link the Greek Lives to their Roman pairs in a way which solidifies the thematic elements mentioned above and strengthens the parallel elements Plutarch intended to reveal. Through the manipulation of events, choice of details worth including or omitting, and chronological compression, the events of a Greek Life can more easily match that of their Roman counterpart. However, beyond the intentional pairings of Greeks and Romans, an analysis of solely the Greek Lives shows an overarching theme of public envy, popular capriciousness, and an almost self-destructive attitude present within Athens that would rather remove their most effective elements than permit them to disrupt their fragile democracy. In doing so, the demos exerts a tyranny of the masses, where their inflexibility is ultimately damaging and can be wielded as a political
weapon by rival demagogues. However, as in the case of the Roman *ktistic* exiles, Plutarch’s virtuous ostracised subjects embrace exile as a tool to maintain the order within the city. Plutarch states that *phthonos* is the cause of ostracism, not a fear of tyranny, and we can see that balance in Athens relies on the expulsion of *phthonos* to maintain concord and internal integrity.

i. Ostracism and Characterisation

Plutarch commonly uses the ostracism narratives in a way that highlights the virtues and vices of his subjects before, during, and after their exiles. In many cases they follow a similar the Plutarchan exile model: benefactions to the Athenians, rise in stature and prominence, attacks from an envious and contrasting antagonist, and then the ostracism event. This is followed by an account of their deeds in exile and, more often than not, their recall by a repentant Athens once their benefits to the city have been recognized. Anecdotes are sprinkled throughout to emphasize the motifs of each *Life* and to better frame the rationale for their expulsion from the city. The narratives are also often crafted and manipulated through various means to serve Plutarch’s goals more completely, as well as to fasten the Greek *Life* to their chosen Roman pair. By first examining the individual Greek *Life* and its relation to the Roman counterpart, we can see just how effective a tool for characterisation the ostracism narrative can be. There are three *Lives* in which the subjects are successfully ostracised (*Cimon, Themistocles, Aristides*), two that focus on a shared unsuccessful ostracism (*Alcibiades, Nicias*), and one that provides a look into Plutarch’s views on how best to avoid the looming threat of ostracism (*Pericles*).
Cimon

The *Cimon* is paired with the Roman *Lucullus* and from the introduction it is evident that Plutarch chose to write about Lucullus first and then sought out an acceptable Greek counterpart. The pair is unusual in being decidedly one-sided, focusing on the story of Lucullus in part, at least, due to his contributions and benefactions towards Plutarch’s hometown of Chaeronea (*Cim*. 1-3). Cimon himself does not appear in his own biography until the end of a preamble praising Lucullus’ accomplishments and describing how the two were similar: both won victories against Barbarians, were appropriately mild statesmen, lived lavish lives, and had their accomplishments cut short before complete victory (*Cim*. 3.1-3). This is reinforced in the *synkrisis* where Plutarch reiterates that they were both wealthy (1.4), both were good fighters (2.1), and both left their conquests unfinished (2.5). Here we find Plutarch directly comparing the mutiny against Lucullus to the ostracism of Cimon (2.5).

There is significant evidence indicating that Plutarch would choose a primary subject and then search for an appropriate parallel and Plutarch often focused on one and manipulated the other in subtle ways to make the intended comparison clearer. It is not surprising that Cimon’s ostracism narrative appears constructed to align with Lucullus’ own mutiny and loss of command.

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7 As before, I have decided to use Jones’s 1966 chronology for the ordering in this section. It is not a definitive resource but it serves as an adequate model for Plutarch’s relative composition of the *Lives*. It also accords mostly with Brozek 1963, Theander 1958, Van der Valk 1982, and Piccirilli 1980, with few relevant exceptions.

8 *Cim*. 3.1 - Note that Cimon does not appear in his own biography until three chapters in. The *Cim.-Luc.* pair is unusual in this respect since the Greek *Life* is usually the primary.

9 See Larmour 1992, 4179-80 for the *Them.-Cam.*
Lucullus refused to allow his soldiers to plunder friendly Greek cities which angered his soldiers and they offered their support to the popular leaders in Rome, especially the praetor Lucius Quintus, who envied (φθόνω) Lucullus’ accomplishments and they stripped Lucullus of his command (Luc. 33.4-35). Despite this rejection by his troops, in the eyes of the Senate Lucullus was a wronged man who had been forced to relinquish his prizes for his victories in the east (Luc. 35.7).

The narrative of Cimon’s ostracism follows a similar pattern to Lucullus’ own rejection. Plutarch writes that the Lacedaemonians called on the Athenians for aid against the Messenians and the revolting helots at Ithome. The “courage and brilliance” of the Athenians (τὴν τόλμαν καὶ τὴν λαμπρότητα) frightened the Spartans who accused them of siding with the helots and sent the Athenians away, humiliating them and turning them against Cimon who had encouraged their assistance (Cim. 16-17.2). Cimon’s affinity for the Lacedaemonians had already earned him the envy (φθόνος) of the Athenians (Cim. 16.4), so they latched onto the pretext and ostracised Cimon for ten years, as was standard practice (Cim. 17.2). We know from Cim. 15.2 and Per. 9.4 that Pericles was the popular figurehead at the time despite not being explicitly named in the Cimon as the architect of Cimon’s ostracism.10 Plutarch does not mention what Cimon did while in exile and skips the five years of Cimon’s exile to the battle at Tanagra which earned him the respect of the aristocracy.11 He writes that Cimon was initially disallowed from joining the battle out of fear that he would side with the Lacedaemonians, but he

10 Beneker 2004, 7. This is most likely because Plutarch held Pericles in great esteem for his abilities and was attempting to portray Cimon in as clear a light as possible. It is enough for the narrative that Cimon was exiled by the people for an insignificant reason, but the absence of Pericles is worth mentioning.
fought alongside the Athenians nonetheless and earned their respect (Cim. 17.3-6). As a result, the Athenians repented their decision to expel Cimon under unjust charges because of his benefits to the state.

There is little surviving evidence concerning Cimon’s life, his ostracism, and eventual return for us to compare with Plutarch’s version of events. Nepos writes that Cimon was ostracised due to “the same public odium as his father,” who was the famous Athenian Miltiades. Miltiades, according to Nepos, was charged with treason for his actions at Paros and ended his life in prison. However, in Nepos’ account Cimon was recalled because once the Lacedaemonians declared war against the Athenians they desired Cimon for his bravery and so recalled him after five years, without any mention of his brave stand at Tanagra. Other sources do not even mention Cimon’s actions at Tanagra, suggesting Plutarch had a source that no longer survives, or that he was willing to include the dubious story for characterisation reasons.

Furthermore, there is an issue of the dating of these events that suggests Plutarch condensed the events of Cimon’s ostracism to further align with the narrative structure in the Lucullus. Cimon was ostracised after the Ephialtic revolution which took place in 462 or 461 BCE and must therefore have been ostracised early in 461 or 460 BCE. Other sources say that he was recalled before the full term of his ostracism had elapsed, suggesting the date for his

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12 Nepos Cim. 3.1 - Quibus rebus cum unus in civitate maxime floreret, incidit in eandem invidiam quam pater suus ceterique Atheniensium principes
13 Nepos. Milt. 7.5 - accusatus ergo est prodilionis. This aligns with Plutarch’s account in Per. 10.5
14 Nepos Cim. 3
15 Cimon makes no appearance in Thuc. 1.108 in the account of Tanagra, nor does he feature in Herodotus more than a brief mention at Hdt. 7.107.
16 The rebellion is described at Cim. 17.1-2 and corroborated by Arist. Ath. Pol. 25.2.
recall was somewhere around 457 BCE, much too early for Plutarch’s claim that “as soon as Cimon returned from exile he stopped the war” (Cim. 18.1). The truce between Athens and Sparta is generally accepted to have taken place in 451 BCE. Whatever the reason may be for this expansive gap in chronology, it is enough for Plutarch to condense the events into one short narrative which thematically mirrors that in the Lucullus. It creates a sense of urgency and, more importantly, condenses the period Cimon spent in exile by providing a clear impetus for his recall precipitated by his bravery in combat and his unyielding desire to benefit Athens despite his exile.

Themistocles

The exceptional status of the Themistocles among the Lives will be explored in detail in a later chapter but for now it is worth confining our investigation to the ostracism narrative and its ties to some of the base elements of Themistocles’ character. The Themistocles-Camillus pair is one of only a few which lack a formal synkrisis outlining what Plutarch saw as worthy comparable features of the two men so we can only speculate about what moral lessons Plutarch sought to teach. Nonetheless, several themes are quite explicit from the text and I will highlight those in brief as they are revealed through the ostracism narrative.

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17 Cim. 18.1 - εὑθὺς μὲν οὖν ὁ Κίμων κατελθὼν ἔλυσε τὸν πόλεμον... Cf. Blamire 1989, 174-5, 177-8. Theopompus 115 F 88 says he was only exiled for five years. Another explanation proposed by Busolt 1904, 317-8 and Kagan 1969, 90-6 suggest that Cimon may have returned to exile after Tanagra to serve the rest of his ostracism, a possibility that Plutarch would certainly not have hesitated to include if there were a reason to support it.


19 There are only four pairs lacking a synkrisis: Alexander-Caesar, Phocion-Cato Minor, Pyrrhus-Marius, and Themistocles-Camillus. Larmour 1992, 4174-4200 attempts to extrapolate what a synkrisis between the two might have looked like but any conclusions would be conjecture.
We can see that Plutarch left the *Camillus* tradition relatively intact from what can be found in other sources and it can be fairly apparent where certain emendations originate.\(^\text{20}\) It then falls to the *Themistocles*, whose subject likely had a significant historical record by comparison, to be moulded by Plutarch in a way that benefits his biographical objectives. It appears that there may have been more flexibility in the content of *Themistocles* that allowed Plutarch to adapt the events to better parallel those in the *Camillus*, a tactic that created comparisons between the two. The exile of the two figures is an obvious parallel: Camillus shows his virtue by taking cities without violence which leads to the envy of the people (*Cam. 11.1*), popular envy (φθόνος) spearheaded by a demagogic figurehead (in this case L. Apuleius), and exile under a trifling pretext (*Cam. 12.1-3*). Themistocles’ ostracism plays out similarly: Themistocles provides benefactions, this leads to the envy of the people (*Them. 22.1*), and ostracism (*Them. 22.3*). Just as Camillus is shown to become unpopular after Veii, Themistocles has an analogue in Salamis, despite events in the *Aristides* (4.3-4) suggesting that Themistocles had inspired disdain prior to the battle. Three reasons are given for Camillus’ exile – his refusal to sack Falerii, his rejection of the proposal to divide the city, and the theft of the bronze Tuscan doors (*Cam. 11-12*) – just like Themistocles is given three reasons: angering the Spartans (*Them. 20.4*), angering the allies (21.1), and angering the citizens (22.1).\(^\text{21}\)

As for characterisation, the ostracism narrative is a collection of Themistocles’ virtues and vices. It begins at *Them* 17.1 where Plutarch writes that despite his success at Salamis, he had already begun to earn the envy (φθόνος) of

\(^{20}\) Larmour 1992, 4160.

\(^{21}\) Plutarch mainly follows Livy for the Camillus account (5.23.4-12, 24.4-25, 30) and likely framed the Themistocles account around that. See also Larmour 1992, 4197.
the fellow Greeks for his excellence (ἀρετή) during the battle.\textsuperscript{22} Themistocles’ ambition (φιλοτιμία) now comes to the forefront as Plutarch reveals that at the next Olympic games Themistocles confessed that he “was now reaping in full measure the harvest of his toils in behalf of Hellas” (\textit{Them.} 17.2). I believe that Plutarch’s inclusion of Themistocles’ desire to aid the Greeks is a necessary element to the ostracism narrative. Themistocles’ efforts to benefit the Greeks were almost certainly driven by his ambition and his inability to temper his vice is what earns the envy of the \textit{demos}.\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Them.} 18 contains several anecdotes that further demonstrate his character as his control begins to slip: once elected admiral (ναύαρχος) he postponed business to appear busier than he was,\textsuperscript{24} he claimed to be treated like a tree being used for shelter in the rain and trimmed down (κολούω) when the weather was clear,\textsuperscript{25} and that his son was the most powerful person in Greece, having control over Themistocles’ wife who controlled him and who in turn controlled the Greeks (\textit{Them.} 18.5).\textsuperscript{26}

At \textit{Them.} 19.1 we see a perfect example of Themistocles’ cleverness (σύνεσις) when he tricked the Lacedaemonians to delay rebuilding and fortifying of the city.\textsuperscript{27} There is no hint of criticism here for Themistocles’ underhanded methods.\textsuperscript{28} This is followed by an account of his building of the

\textsuperscript{22} Marr 1998, 132; Beneker 2004, 4 trace Plutarch’s claim of envy back to Ephorus.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Them.} 3.3, and especially 5.2, 5.4, 18.1

\textsuperscript{24} Marr 1998, 116 says this is a fabrication and found only in the \textit{Life}. Admiral (ναύαρχος) was not an official position in fifth century Athens.

\textsuperscript{25} This also appears in the \textit{Moralia} (185E and 541E). The word κολούω is almost certainly a reference to the practice of ostracism, appearing in other accounts at 21.7, 22.4. See. Marr 1998, 116; Duff 2010, 55.

\textsuperscript{26} Also in \textit{Cato Maior} 8.4-5, \textit{Moralia} 185D. Once again Marr 1998, 117 considers this an inaccurate anachronism and I believe was shaped by Plutarch for characterisation purposes.

\textsuperscript{27} Again, this may be another Plutarchean manipulation. See Marr 1998, 118-122.

\textsuperscript{28} Duff 2010, 55.
Long Walls (Them. 19.2) and strengthening the navy (Them. 20.1-3).\footnote{Them. 19.2 - και τρόπον τινά τοῖς παλαιοῖς βασιλεύσι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀντιπολεμοῦμενος. “In a certain manner counteracting the policies of the ancient Athenian kings” – again, probably a manipulation. Marr 1998, 120-121.} He made an enemy of the Lacedaemonians by arguing against excluding some of their allies from the Amphictyonic Alliance (Them. 20.3-4) and further made himself disliked by the Greek islands for trying to extort money from them (Them. 21).\footnote{Once again this account is riddled with Plutarchean manipulation.}

Finally, Plutarch says that the envy (φθονέω) of the Athenians grew so great that he was forced to defend himself by describing himself as the benefactor of the city (Them. 22.1). We can see here an essential part of the ostracism narrative in the Lives: those who are ostracised are those who are capable of benefiting the city the most. The tone here appears somewhat apologetic, with Plutarch saying that a heroic statue of Themistocles still stood in the temple of Artemis Aristoboule (‘best counsel’) in his time (Them. 22.2). It concludes with the editorial comment found several times in the Lives claiming that ostracism was not a punishment, but a curtailing of excessive authority and reputation (Them. 22.4).

The ostracism account in the Themistocles displays all the characteristics of Plutarch’s biography: unchecked ambition, a love of honour, avarice, cleverness, and a desire to work to benefit his city. It also outlines precisely how these qualities can be viewed as virtues or vices depending on the individual and their attitudes, as well as their ability to control the populace. It concludes with Themistocles dutifully retiring into exile, refusing Pausanias’ offer to join him against Athens, and attempting to avoid further Athenian outcry towards his apparent collusion with the Spartans (Them. 23.1-4). Even
at the end of his life in exile, Themistocles places the benefit of the state before himself when he chooses to commit suicide rather than engage the Athenians on behalf of the Persians (Them. 31.5).

Aristides

The *Aristides* opens with a discussion of the variant opinions of his life with Plutarch siding with those who say he was never impoverished but was, in fact, quite wealthy and from a prominent family (Arist. 1.1-2). As evidence, Plutarch provides the fact that Aristides was ostracised and explains that ostracism was not for the poor (πένης), but for those who incurred envy because of their outstanding nature or position (Arist. 1.3). He expands on the nature of ostracism saying:

\[
\text{τῷ δ᾽ ὀστράκῳ πᾶς ὁ διὸ δόξαν ἢ γένος ἢ λόγου δύναμιν ὑπὲρ τοὺς πολλοὺς νομιζόμενος ὑπέπιπτεν:}
\]

“But to banishment in ostracism every one was liable who was superior to the common run of men in reputation, or lineage, or eloquence.” (Arist. 1.7-8. Trans. Perrin)

Here we have an expansion of Plutarch’s statements in *Cimon* and *Themistocles*. Unlike Themistocles, whom Plutarch credits with oppressive power, Plutarch expands the notion beyond authority and into the realms of virtue, lineage, or ability. Whereas previously ostracism was described as a political or societal weapon, now it also serves as an indicator of personal greatness and outstanding virtue. Now ostracism has become a sign of personal significance.

The *synkrisis* of the *Aristides-Marcus Cato* pair provides us with several foundational themes which connect the two subjects. At 1.4 Plutarch writes that Aristides and Cato both fought for ‘the right’ (δίκαιος), at 2.2-3 they are both described as valiant generals in war, and we are told that the two differed
in their inevitable treatment by their fellow citizens (*Arist.* 2.3-4). We find here a similar pattern to the *Cimon*, where the political rivalry with the demagogic Themistocles leads to public disapproval and exile. However, Themistocles is portrayed as actively attempting to sabotage Aristides by spreading a rumour that Aristides was attempting to subvert the courts and establish himself as a monarch.\(^{31}\) Aristides is therefore blameless in his own ostracism, it being the result of an antagonistic element in Themistocles and no fault of his own.

Aristides’ most important characteristic was his justice. Plutarch says outright at 6.1 that it was what most impressed the multitude and it earned him his nickname ‘the Just’ (τὸν Δίκαιον). It is such an important theme that Plutarch describes Aristides’ justice in divine terms. For Plutarch, Aristides’ nickname was “most kingly and godlike” (τὴν βασιλικωτάτην καὶ θειοτάτην) because it stemmed from virtue rather than power or superiority (6.1-2). Acts of nature can also be powerful, but justice can only come from rationality and reasoning (6.3). Following this, Plutarch claims that there are three emotions which humans direct towards the divine: jealousy (ζῆλος) of their immortality, fear (φόβος) of their power, and honourable regard (τιμή) towards their justice. The latter is deemed the most desirable and least desired, since people are incapable of immortality and power comes at the behest of fortune (6.4). Aristides’ justice places him firmly in the realm of the divine and it is re-established at 7.1-2 where Aristides is first loved (ἀγαπάω) for his justice, then envied (φθονέω), and then ostracised allegedly out of fear (φόβος) of

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\(^{31}\) Beneker 2004, 6; Frost 1980, 91; Sansone 1989, 184-5 suggest this is probably an anachronistic accusation. There is no mention of Themistocles’ meddling at *Them.* 5.5.
his potential tyranny.\textsuperscript{32} As if to drive home the point, Plutarch includes an anecdote about an illiterate man who unknowingly asked Aristides to write his own name on the \textit{ostracon}. When asked why, the man replied that he was simply tired of hearing him called ‘the Just’ (7.5-6). Aristides wrote his own name, returned the shard, and dutifully took his leave of the city.\textsuperscript{33} Aristides’ departure from Athens once again alludes to his exceptional – even divine – virtue. Plutarch writes that as Aristides’ left, he raised his hands and prayed that no misfortune would fall upon the Athenians that would force them to reconsider (7.6). Aristides bears no ill-will towards his fellow citizens and he respects the democratic process of Athens enough to leave without hostility or complaint.\textsuperscript{34}

Aristides’ prayer is an unusual element for Plutarch to include for two reasons. First, there is no surviving account of Aristides’ departure that we can definitively say Plutarch derived his story from. Second, Plutarch specifically describes the prayer as the opposite of the one Achilles made when he withdrew from combat in the \textit{Iliad}:

\begin{quote}
δ ὃ δὲ τοι μέγας ἔσσεται ὥρκος:
ἢ ποτ’ Ἀχιλλῆς ποθή ἵπτεται ὕις Ἀχαιῶν
σύμπαντας: τὸ ὅδ’ οὗ τί δυνήσεαι ἄχρυμενός περ
χραισμεῖν, ἐντ’ ἂν πολλοὶ ὑφ’ Ἑκτορος ἀνδροφόνοι
θνήσκοντες πᾶττωσι: σὺ δ’ ἐνδοθὶ θυμῶν ἁμύεξις
χωόμενος ὃ τ’ ἀριστον Ἀχαιών οὐδὲν ἔτισάς.

“Surely some day a longing for Achilles will come upon the sons of the Achaeans [240] one and all, and on that day you will not be able to help
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{32} We can see that the words used for envy (φθόνος) and jealousy (ζῆλος) are superficially interchangeable here. However, later in this chapter I will show that there is a distinct difference in the two terms, the former being a destructive emotion and the latter akin to a desire to emulate. The use of \textit{phthonos} is inherently negative. See Walcot 1978, 14.

\textsuperscript{33} The anecdote can also be found in \textit{Mor.} 186a and the Suda. Nepos \textit{Arist.} 1.3-4 contains a very similar version suggesting an established tradition of Aristides’ ostracism. See Sansone 1989, 185.

\textsuperscript{34} This acceptance of their situation appears to be a praiseworthy element in the \textit{Lives}. There are similar accounts of acceptance in both the Roman and Greek \textit{Lives}.
them at all, for all your grief, when many shall fall dying before man-slaying Hector. But you will gnaw the heart within you, in anger that you did no honour to the best of the Achaeans. (II. 239-244. Trans. Murray)

Achillean references are relatively uncommon throughout Plutarch’s works and this is one of the only circumstances where Achilles is employed as a paradigm for exile, preferring to use Odysseus and Heracles when exiled examples are needed. It is an unlikely comparison made even more unusual by its explicit repetition in only one other biography: the Camillus. There is some evidence to suggest that the Coriolanus was also written with an Achilles figure in mind but the connection here is much less apparent. In these three Lives the heroic figure of Achilles is used to punctuate the moment of exile and the transition from the city to the open world. In the Camillus Plutarch writes that when he left the city, he said a prayer like Achilles (ὡςπτερ ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς) implying that he hoped Rome would suffer some catastrophe that would make them remember their mistreatment of him (13.1). Like Aristides, Camillus is unjustly driven from Rome by political conflict and the desires of a fickle populace. However, at their departure we find that only Camillus is intent on pursuing justice for his wrongs while Aristides is content with the decision, respecting the popular will and process of ostracism. It raises the question, if Aristides possesses a god-like sense of justice, why would he not wish for justice for himself? Perhaps it is Plutarch’s way of showing that the truly virtuous statesman can overlook offenses done against him, such as when Aristides overlooks Themistocles’ antagonism and refuses to aid in the exile of Themistocles (25.7). In both cases Aristides and Camillus are recalled from exile to aid their cities in a time of strife and both

35 See De Exilio 600F for Heracles, 603D for Odysseus.
36 See Nerdahl 2012.
end their lives unappreciated by the cities they strove to protect.\textsuperscript{37} Through the explicit references to Achilles, Plutarch compares how two men can react to similar circumstances and demonstrate their qualities as statesmen and in this respect Camillus is shown to be weaker than Aristides, despite both inevitably returning and aiding the cities that wronged them. Aristides’ concern for the well-being of Athens is paramount to his characterisation and the driving force for his behaviour before and after his exile.

The parallels between the \textit{Aristides} and \textit{Camillus} exile scenes are striking and even more intriguing when viewed from a different angle. Plutarch pairs Camillus with Themistocles, Aristides’ political rival in Athens and the architect of his exile. The rivalry between the two men is documented at length in the \textit{Aristides}, framing the two as opposing forces for moral behaviour in Athens and claiming the city could not survive so long as both remained (3.2). As mentioned above, I intend to more thoroughly investigate the oddities of the \textit{Themistocles} in a later chapter, but for now it is worth saying that in the \textit{Aristides} he and Themistocles are exceptional rivals yet he has much in common with Themistocles’ Roman pair. Since no \textit{synkrisis} survives of the \textit{Themistocles-Camillus} we can only guess as to what he intended with the relationship but it can be inferred that if Aristides shared aspects in common with Camillus, then some contrasts or commonalities can be inferred between Aristides and Themistocles in their behaviour in and around their exiles. In the \textit{Aristides} the contrasts are explicit: Themistocles championed the people while Aristides favoured the aristocracy (2.1), Themistocles gained support through favours and political allies while Aristides operated

\textsuperscript{37} Duff 2010, 62 shows that Camillus is more like Aristides than Themistocles in his virtue, his exile, and his return to save the city that exiled him.
alone (2.4-5), and Themistocles relentlessly attacked Aristides’ proposals out of ambition and envy while Aristides tried to do what was best for the state (3.1-3). In the end Aristides (in his *Life*) is portrayed as a much more loyal and sympathetic figure than Themistocles since he returned from exile to continue benefiting Athens, while Themistocles fled to the East and joined forces with the enemy.  

Nicias, Alcibiades, and Pericles

The following three *Lives* are worth discussing because they each describe individuals who were able to avoid ostracism through their own abilities as statesmen. Nicias and Alcibiades managed to set aside their differences and encourage the people to ostracise another, while Pericles’ able appeasement enabled him to avoid the consequences of excessive authority by acting against his nature and never earning the ire of the *demos*.

Nicias and Alcibiades were not ostracised but risked exile on account of the former’s wealth and his aristocratic political leanings (*Nic. 11.2*), and the latter’s boldness and manner of life (*Nic. 11.2*). In many ways Plutarch sets up the rivalry between Nicias and Alcibiades in a way that mirrors the rivalry between Themistocles and Aristides: in each case a sympathetic and aristocratic leader is targeted for ostracism by their demagogic opposition despite their desire to work against the populace for the betterment of the state (*Nic. 11.1-3*). Ostracism is not a major theme in these two biographies, but Plutarch’s account of their avoidance speaks volumes about the nature of ostracism at the time, which will be discussed more below. Nonetheless,

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38 I intend to contest the notion that the *Themistocles* is inherently a negative portrayal in a later chapter. For the sake of comparison to Aristides, however, Themistocles falls woefully short as an example of a virtuous statesman.
the event is described in both *Lives* with an aim to further establish the qualities of the two figures. Alcibiades is shown as young, ambitious, and cunning while Nicias represents the older values of Athens in his aristocratic and peaceful leanings (*Nic. 11*). Together they are the only two of Plutarch’s subjects to successfully come together to redirect the ostracism onto another less worthy individual named Hyperbolus and consequently end the practice. While little more than adept political manoeuvring, the account shows how both men were capable enough to set aside their differences to continue advancing themselves despite public envy or fear of their status. In so doing they effectively dismantle the practice of ostracism by directing it towards an unworthy individual, an act which would have further and more debilitating consequences for Alcibiades.\(^{39}\)

The *Pericles* continues Plutarch’s investigation into ostracism with a figure who, out of fear of being ostracised, goes against his nature and appeals to the masses, successfully applying the strength of the democratic weapon against his political opponents. Plutarch’s unusual view of the virtuous Athenian exile is applied to full effect. Pericles feared ostracism because he was “rich, of brilliant lineage, and had friends of the highest influence” and so chose to cultivate a reputation in military matters rather than political.\(^{40}\) Only when his potential opponents have died or been removed (Plutarch is quick to mention Aristides, Themistocles, and Cimon – all three of whom were successfully ostracised) does Pericles begin his political rise.

\(^{39}\) See Pelling 2000, 50. The differences in this account between the *Alcibiades* and the *Nicias* demonstrate Plutarch’s willingness to manipulate his material. For instance, Phaeax is only mentioned at *Alc.* 13.2-3 and not at all in *Nic.* 10-11. Phaeax serves as a contrast to Alcibiades’ eloquent rhetoric.

\(^{40}\) *Per.* 7.1 - τοις δὲ καὶ γένους προσόντος αὐτῶ λαμπρὸ καὶ φίλων οἱ πλείστον ἡδύναντο.
Pericles is characterised in much the same way that Cimon was: both men were virtuous by nature, both came from prominent lineages, both were wealthy, and both were inherently aristocratic. These qualities, namely wealth and birth, are liabilities for Pericles but for Cimon they were arguments against ostracism. It falls to Pericles to resort to slander, charging Cimon with being sympathetic to the Spartans and ill-disposed towards the demos.41

ii. Ostracism as a Sign of Excellence

As we can see, the ostracism narratives contribute significantly to the subject’s characterisation and Plutarch’s moral objectives in the biographies. Further to that, Plutarch appears to suggest that exile through ostracism was not a bad thing, which agrees somewhat with his stance in On Exile where he states that exile is not an evil. Ostracism appears to hold special significance for Plutarch, and he is quick to reiterate that ostracism was not a method to punish legal transgressions or base moral practices (Them. 22.3; Arist. 7.2). In most of these cases Plutarch presents no criminal basis for the ostracism of his subjects. Cimon is ostracised after the demos lays hold of a petty pretext (μικρᾶς ἐπιλαβόμενοι προφάσεως) which suggests that the reason was not so conclusive as a crime or, if he was complicit in criminal activity (in this case Laconizing), it was a baseless accusation (Cim. 17.2). There is no crime suggested in the Themistocles for his own ostracism (22.1-3) or his collusion in the ostracism of Aristides (5.5), who even in his own Life is only accused of monarchical tendencies (Arist. 7.1). Not even Alcibiades is ostracised for criminal behaviour (13), nor is Nicias (Nic. 11), nor the

41 Beneker 2004, 7.
seemingly morally bereft Hyperbolus, whose only crime was apparently being somewhat of a shameless demagogue.

In fact, Plutarch appears to be saying quite the opposite. Being exiled through ostracism was an indicator of personal excellence and an outstanding nature. Plutarch is quite explicit on this several times throughout the Lives and it is worth compiling his references here to show that not only does he appear to link ostracism with virtue, but that he never once suggests the opposite. The Themistocles provides the first such example where he states that the Athenians ostracised those who they thought had “oppressive power” (τῇ δυνάμει βαρεῖς) and who were “incommensurate with true democratic equality” (δημοκρατικὴν ἀσυμμέτρους εἶναι). This aligns with what we have seen of Themistocles' status in Athens as well as his decline in popular opinion leading up to his ostracism. This is echoed again in the Alcibiades where ostracism is said to be used to “banish whatever man from time to time may have too much reputation and influence in the city” (13.4), and that “no worthless or disreputable fellow had ever before fallen under this condemnation of ostracism” (13.5). Reputation and influence apply to every case, but in the Nicias Plutarch adds another quality to those who would be ostracised: wealth. Ostracism, he says, was used to “remove for ten years, by the ostracon ballot, any one man who was an object of suspicion generally because of his great reputation, or of jealousy because of his great wealth.”

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42 Them. 22.3
43 Alc. 13.4-5 - ἀναπεισθεῖς οὖν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τότε τὸ ὀστρακόν ἐπιφέρειν ἐμελλεν. ὣς κολούοντες ἐς τὸν προϊόντα δόξη καὶ δυνάμει τῶν πολιτῶν ἑλαύνουσι...φαύλος γάρ οὐδεὶς ἐνέπτιτεν εἰς τούτον τὸν κολασμὸν οὐδ’ ἢ νέος
44 Nic. 11.1 - καὶ γιγνομένης ὀστρακοφορίας, ἢν εἰώθει διὰ χρόνου τινὸς ὁ δήμος ποιεῖθαι, ἕνα τῶν ὑπόπτων ἢ διὰ δόξαν ἄλλως ἢ πλούσιον ἐπιφθόνων ἄνδρῶν τῷ ὀστράκῳ μεθίστας εἰς δέκα ἡτη
wealth, alongside Alcibiades who was hated for his “manner of life” (τὸν βίον ἐβδελύττοντο) and “boldness” (τὸ θράσος ὑφρώδουν) (Nic. 11.2).

Nowhere is the notion that ostracism was an indicator of outstanding virtue more fully realised than in the Aristides, where it plays a crucial role in Plutarch’s biographical examining. In the introduction to the Aristides Plutarch states that many of his sources claimed Aristides lived in lifelong poverty that dogged his daughters after his death (Arist. 1.1). Demetrius of Phalerum, on the other hand, provides three arguments that suggest he was not as indigent as believed: his position of Eponymous Archon, which could only be earned by lot from among the five richest families; his exile through ostracism, which “only men from great houses” (τοῖς ἐξ οἴκων τε μεγάλων) were eligible for; and some choragic tripods which indicate that Aristides served as Choragus and funded theatrical productions (Arist. 1.2-4). Plutarch refutes two of these points but acknowledges the value of the second. To be exiled by ostracism “everyone was liable who was superior to the common run of men in reputation, or lineage, or eloquence,” and as proof he offers the story of Damon, the teacher of Pericles, who was ostracised because of his extraordinary wisdom (Arist. 1.7, Per. 4.2). Plutarch settles on the popular opinion of Aristides’ poverty but must concede the notion that he would not have been ostracised if he did not possess a wealth of virtue, which is reflected throughout the biography in Plutarch’s descriptions of his justice and political capabilities (synk. 3.3 says that he was so poor even his righteousness was called into question since it seems to have benefited everybody but himself). Plutarch’s comparison between Aristides and Marcus

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45 Arist. 1.7 - τῷ δ’ ὀστράκῳ πᾶς ὁ διὰ δόξαν ἢ γένος ἢ λόγου δύναμιν ὑπὲρ τοὺς πολλοὺς νομιζόμενος ὑπέτιπτεν:
Cato, the Roman counterpart, hinges on the notion that wealth does not necessarily imply virtue, and Aristides’ poverty is presented as proof.

Finally, we must look at what happens when the purpose of ostracism is undermined, such as when Alcibiades (and Nicias or perhaps Phaeax) usurped and distorted it to exile Hyperbolus instead of himself. There are few details about Hyperbolus in Plutarch’s writings and what exists only does so in vague descriptions in the Lives. He is described as a worthless man (ἀνθρώπου πονηροῦ) who was impervious to public opinion (ἀπαθὴς ὡν ὀλγωρίᾳ δόξῃς) (Alc. 13.3), low-born and miserable (τινές ἄνθρωπος ἀγεννεῖς καὶ πονηροῦς) (Arist. 7.3), and as someone who rose to influence and became “a discredit to the city” (ἐν τῇ πόλει δόξαι ἀδοξία τῆς πόλεως) (Nic. 11.3). What this means precisely is up for interpretation but it is clear that he was an individual of some influence who attempted to remove Alcibiades and Nicias (or Phaeax, it is unclear) so that he could more easily rise in authority against the one who remained (Nic. 11.4). However, when Alcibiades succeeded in reversing the ostracism on Hyperbolus instead, the fact that it was used on an unworthy individual sullied the practice and ended it forever, at least according to Plutarch. This is almost certainly untrue and has typical Plutarchan hallmarks all over it. We have good reason to believe that Hyperbolus was one the last victims of ostracism, if not the last, but it is unlikely that it was abandoned because it was perverted by Alcibiades’ political scheming. Nonetheless, the story shows how closely Plutarch links ostracism to moral quality that a single misuse can degrade the practice beyond its usefulness.

The two exceptions to the typical narrative are Pericles and Alcibiades. The Pericles contains several accounts of him wielding his political ability to
orchestrate the ostracism of his political opponents while avoiding ostracism himself. Unable to outspend Cimon, Pericles managed to gain popular support through the redistribution of wealth (Per. 9.2), and when accused of overspending by Thucydides Pericles effortlessly convinces the populace to ostracise Thucydides (Per. 14). Similarly, Alcibiades manages to avoid ostracism by perverting the practice and, siding with Nicias, turn public opinion against Hyperbolus, thereby ending its use and saving himself. Pericles and Alcibiades occupy the extremes of Plutarch’s spectrum: Pericles is praised for manipulating the system to achieve superiority and Alcibiades is condemned for it. I intend to investigate the peculiarities of the Alcibiades in the final chapter but for now it is enough to understand that Alcibiades’ circumvention of ostracism demonstrates his exceptional abilities as a statesman.

It is particularly noteworthy that Alcibiades’ cooperation with Nicias (and possibly Phaeax) against Hyperbolus does not appear in any other source but Plutarch. While Hyperbolus’ ostracism was certainly unusual in some respects, Alcibiades’ and Nicias’ role in redirecting the ostracism vote onto Hyperbolus appears to have been invented, or at least adopted, by Plutarch.46

iii. Envy and the demos

In the Lives ostracism is clearly linked with moral excellence, which then raises the question of what excuse the Athenian people had for removing their finest and most outstanding citizens. As we have seen above various reasons are given in each case – Cimon’s Laconizing, Nicias’ wealth,

46 Forsdyke 2005, 171.
Alcibiades’ and Themistocles’ reputation and self-aggrandising, or Aristides’ monarchical leanings\textsuperscript{47} – but each case has a clearly defined thread of envy (φθόνος) towards the individual who had exceeded the acceptable levels of authority, reputation, or wealth. Ostracism was a legal and democratic method for ‘venting the envy’ of the populace before it manifested in more harmful consequences. Envy is explicitly used often in the \textit{Lives} of the ostracised Athenians. Alcibiades is frequently the target of envy (13.4, 24.2), he envies others (14.2), and is eventually able to rise in reputation as to be above envy (34.6). \textit{Themistocles} (22.3) states that ostracism was a way to relieve the envy of the populace. In \textit{Aristides} the demos speciously defined their envy as a fear of tyranny (7.2), just as Cimon’s Laconizing “awakened the envy and hatred of his fellow citizens.”\textsuperscript{48} Nicias was able to avoid envy by crediting Fortune with his successes (6.2), and in the \textit{Pericles} (13.9-12) envy is a nearly constant threat to any rising Athenian.

If the Athenians were so driven by envy, then it is worth investigating what precisely the word \textit{phthonos} meant in ancient Greek and what the concept can reveal about Plutarch’s views on the fifth century Athenians. It is often translated as ‘envy’ or ‘jealousy’ but in English there is a definite overlap between the purviews of those two terms and the difference between envy (φθόνος) and jealousy (ζηλος) is not so well-defined. Fortunately, Plutarch himself wrote about the notion in \textit{On Envy and Hate} that provides some insight into the definition of envy as he saw it. Envy is a purely human emotion (3-4) that aims at reducing the joy of others (2). Because of this, it is an entirely unjust emotion since no one does harm by being happy (5), and as a

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Cim.} 16.4 - ὅθεν φθόνον ἑαυτῷ συνήγε καὶ δυσμένειάν τινα παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν.
result people will rarely admit to being envious, but will instead cloak their envy in excuses, hiding it as the most shameful emotion (5). Invariably people envy the virtuous as individuals possessing the greatest virtue and providing the most benefit to others (7). Envy is not only destructive, but also shameful and unjust since its only objective is to diminish the good fortune of others. The shameful emotion is often disguised by other explanations which are abundant in the Lives. The fear of tyranny (still fresh in the Athenian mindset) was the commonly accepted substitute, but we have also seen that Laconizing or irreverence have been used to justify ostracisms (despite the insignificant nature of Cimon’s alleged crime and Aristides’ dubious attempts at tyranny).

At this point I do not intend to investigate the various theories of envy in ancient Greek thought since much more comprehensive work has been done by others before me. However, it is necessary to understand the difference between two similar terms: envy (φθόνος) and jealousy (ζῆλος) as the distinction between the two is often blurry. An individual who strives for what another has can be described as either in modern English, but the Greeks had a slightly more nuanced definition. Jealousy (ζῆλος) is most used by Plutarch to describe a form of desirable emulation, while envy is destructive and harmful. For example, at Arist. 6.3 he writes that there are three feelings which individuals experience towards the divine: jealousy (ζῆλος), fear (φθόνος), and honourable regard (τιμή). In this case the jealousy is aimed at the gods’ immortality which all mortals strive to achieve. The difference is that while the jealous person may want to achieve immortality, the envious person strives to diminish and ruin. We can see from these examples that the

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49 Walcot 1978, 14.
definition provided by Walcot (1978, 14) is particularly accurate: The jealous (ζῆλος) man prepares himself to obtain what is good but the envious (φθόνος) man prepares himself to stop his neighbour from having what is good.

Plutarch believes that the jealous ill-will of envy was behind the ostracism of his Athenian subjects, but his explanation in *On Envy and Hate* contributes to a suggestion of wider implications. His distinction between *phthonos* and *zelos* demonstrate that all his ostracised Athenians were virtuous and capable of the greatest good, and in doing so incurred envy, and were ostracised because of the envy of others. It is enough to understand that Plutarch believes the jealous ill-will of envy (φθόνος) was behind the ostracism of his Athenian subjects. In his choice of words Plutarch establishes that the ostracised were virtuous, envied by others for that virtue, and exiled from Athens for sharing their virtues with the city. Themistocles’ own self-aggrandizing stemmed from his ability to do what was best for the city (*Them. 22.1*), Aristides’ virtues earned him the nickname ‘the Just’ (*Arist. 6.1-2*) and was one of the very reasons provided for his ostracism (*7.5-6*), Cimon was ostracised for being refused by the Lacedaemonians while trying to bring peace to the region (*Cim. 17.2*).

Therefore, we can see that ostracism is a sign of virtue *because* all the targets incurred significant envy. It is evident, therefore, that Plutarch intends to condemn the envious *demos* for exiling their finest citizens instead of permitting them to remain and influence and guide their democracy. Athens, by its nature, appears simultaneously reluctant to permit the overly virtuous to remain and remarkably permissive of the demagogic figures who are most capable of appealing to popular demands. Other than a claim of incest, Cimon’s character was “admirable and true to his nature” (ἀγαστὰ καὶ
γενναίο) (Cim. 5.1). He was daring (τόλμα), sagacious (σύνεσις), just (δίκαιος), and appealed to the poor with dinners and donations of money (Cim. 10.7). However, when Pericles enters the political arena, Pericles’ popular influence eclipsed Cimon’s virtues and financial contributions, a feat accomplished by Cimon’s absence and perhaps the distribution of allotments. Pericles would later gather support against Cimon and have him ostracised.

iv. Democracy vs. Aristocracy

The previous sections demonstrate that the ostracism narratives characterise Athens as much as they do the subjects of each Life. The presentation of Athenian democracy is not flattering. Through the six Lives there is a pattern of demagogy which clearly shows Plutarch’s disdain for the excessive democratic purity which the Athenians strove to achieve. Here, among the Lives of the exiled Athenians, Plutarch uses the ostracism narratives to show that not only was it a sign of outstanding success among the exiled, but also a sign of failure in a political system which permits the existence of a tyranny of the masses over the benevolent rule of the few. As discussed above, Plutarch’s consistent attribution of envy as the prime motivation for the popular exile of his subjects suggests an untamed emotional undercurrent guiding their behaviour and an unwillingness to allow those greater than themselves to lead them.

Most of the ostracism narratives end with the recall of the exiled by a repentant Athens. In the Cimon the reader gets the sense that the populace is fickle, prone to emotional outbursts, and can remedy their mistake and

50 The one exception is Themistocles, who continues to be pursued by the Athenians until his escape to the East.
rescind punishment when deemed to be in the best interests of the state. Pericles himself is said to have proposed Cimon’s recall after he chose to fight alongside the Athenians at Tanagra despite being in exile (Cim. 17.6). In response, the Athenians felt “a great and yearning sense of their loss, and sorrow for the unjust charges made against them” and “they remembered his [Cimon’s] benefits.”  

Cimon’s exile is portrayed as a popular and unrestrained emotional reaction to those who were believed to support the Lacedaemonians, and his recall as the result of the Athenians returning to their senses and doing what was in the best interests of the city. Similarly, Aristides is said to have been recalled out of the fear that he would join the Persians against Greece (Arist. 8.1). However, it is also said that Aristides was misjudged and that even before he was recalled he had been inciting the Greeks to continue fighting the Persian advance (Arist. 8.1).

Finally, although Alcibiades was not officially ostracised, he was permitted to return to the city on account of his loyal works to benefit the Greeks after fleeing into exile for the first time (Alc. 33-34.6). Once again, we can see that the Athenians were repentant, even going as far as accepting the notion that he ought to establish himself as a tyrant, a suggestion that Plutarch never attributes to Alcibiades directly (Alc. 34.6). Not everyone was convinced, however, and the ‘influential citizens’ opted to remove him by sending him to war, as ostracism was allegedly unused at that time (Alc. 35.1). The continuous backtracking of the Athenians regarding their choice of victims only reinforces Plutarch’s condemnation of Athenian democracy. His views

51 Cim. 17.5 - πολύν αὐτῶν πόθον καὶ μεταμέλειαν ἐφ’ οἷς ἡπιόκησαν ἁδίκως ἀπολιπότοτες τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὅθεν οὐδὲ τῷ πρὸς Κίμωνα θυμῷ πολύν χρόνον ἐνέμειναν, τὰ μὲν, ὡς εἰκός, ὃν ἔπαθον εὐ μεμνημένοι, τὰ δὲ τοῦ καιροῦ συλλαμβανομένου.

52 Cim. 17.2, 17.6
on the matter are clearly expressed in the synkrisis of the Cimon-Lucullus (Comp. 2) where he states that aristocratic natures rarely please the multitude but, like a bandage, they can continue to annoy while it provides benefits to the injured body. For Plutarch an educated and aristocratic statesman will likely never be popular since their wills do not align with the demos.

It is worth noting here that arbitrary expulsions were an essential component of tyrannical characterisation in ancient Greece. There appears to have been a relationship between tyranny and exile in fifth century Greek thought. The presentations of tyrants in that time suggests that tyrants were identified by their abuse of three penalties: exile, confiscation of property, and death.\(^{53}\) The accounts of the tyrants Cypselus, and Polycrates in Herodotus reflect the anti-tyrannical traditions of the time. Cypselus of Corinth is said to have driven many Corinthians into exile (Hdt. 5.92) despite evidence to the contrary, and there is some evidence to suggest that Herodotus or his sources selected a negative narrative to represent tyrannical rule.\(^{54}\) Cypselus’ son Periander is described as having consulted the tyrant Thrasybulus for advice on how best to secure his rule in Corinth, only for Thrasybulus to illustrate his point by chopping down the ears of grain that grew higher than the rest (Hdt. 5.92). Polycrates took power in Samos after killing one brother and exiling another (Hdt. 3.39.1-2) and faced a considerable revolt of exiled individuals said to have been able to fill forty triremes (Hdt. 3.44). Pisistratus is also described as having conducted mass expulsions from Athens (1.64.1, 1.64.3) but there is little evidence to support arbitrary exiles aside from the exile of the

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\(^{53}\) Forsdyke 2005, 233.

\(^{54}\) Forsdyke 2005, 245. For positive accounts of the Cypselid tyranny, see Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57 on Cypselus. Archaeological evidence also contradicts the notion that there was any kind of mass expulsion at this time.
Alcmaeonidae between 514 and 510 BCE. Alongside executions, exile seems to have been one of the main components of tyrannical rule.

If the Greeks who came before Plutarch associated arbitrary expulsions with tyranny, it might be assumed that Plutarch shared their opinions on what behaviour constituted tyrannical action. However, what we find in Plutarch is an acceptance of the tyrannical attributes suggested by Herodotus and Thucydides as well as praise for the tyrants who, after obtaining power illegally, used it for the benefit of the state. Tyrants are frequent characters in Plutarch’s Lives and several receive special mention in the Moralia. In the Lives the typical tyrant follows the established rules set out by Plutarch’s predecessors. Alcibiades’ extravagant behaviour is described as “tyrant-like and monstrous” (ὡς τυραννικὰ καὶ ἀλλόκοτα) (Alc. 16.2), the tyrant Aristomachus is thought to have deprived Argos of its freedom (Arat. 25.1), the sister of Dionysius declared that she would rather be “called the wife of Polyxenus the exile, rather than the sister of Dionysius the tyrant” (Dio. 21.5), and that Dionysius had exiled around a thousand citizens (Dio. 22.4). Abantidas the tyrant is said to have “banished some and killed others” (Arat. 2.2), Lysias is said to have been banished by Gelo the tyrant of Syracuse.

All these suggest that Plutarch held the same views as his predecessors when it came to characterising tyrants as lawless and prone to arbitrary expulsions to maintain their authority. In these sections Plutarch clearly demonstrates the view that tyrants were abusive and power hungry and

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55 Forsdyke 2005, 252.
56 A well-documented attestation of tyrannical behaviour can be found in the works of Alcaeus of Mytilene, whose family experienced exile under the rise and fall of three tyrants in Mytilene – Melanchrus (~610 BCE), Myrsilus (~600 BCE), and Pittacus (~590 BCE).
57 Arat. 2.2 - τὸν Κλεινίαν ἀπέκτεινε καὶ τῶν φίλων καὶ οἰκείων τοὺς μὲν ἐξέβαλε, τοὺς δὲ ἀνέιλεν.
establish themselves through the misuse and abuse of judicial and non-judicial punishments.

However, Plutarch also demonstrates his opposition to democracy by praising several tyrants in the *Moralia* for using their status for good. He first acknowledges their rise to power through illegal means and then turned out to be beneficent sovereigns to their cities (*Mor.* 551-2). He claims that Hieron and Peisistratus maintained order, promoted husbandry, and instilled a sobriety in an otherwise uncontrolled population. Gelon is praised for ridding the Carthaginians of their tendency towards child sacrifice, and Lydiadas returned the city to its government and died defending it. For Plutarch, simply being the sole sovereign is not enough to warrant condemnation. A tyrant must consistently misuse their authority without benefit in order to earn Plutarch’s ire. He ends by saying that some great men did become tyrants or held lofty positions – Miltiades, Themistocles, and Alcibiades – and without them Athens would have lost the important battles which allowed the city to continue to thrive. Plutarch’s point is that a virtuous city should recognize the value of its best people and submit to their rule. In doing so they may create a sole sovereign who is capable of tyrannical rule, but they are just as likely to become beneficent rulers. By exiling or murdering those who gain too much power, the *demos* takes on the role of the metaphorical tyrant and fails to live up to the potential of the beneficial sole sovereign.

Plutarch’s ostracism narratives provide a wealth of information into his views on exile, ostracism, and the relationship between the statesman and the *demos*. The populace - uneducated, passionate, and fickle - wielded substantial authority in the governance of Athens and claimed to use ostracism as a tool to maintain equality within the city. For Plutarch, who
chose subjects with unquestionably virtuous qualities, ostracism became a signifier for extraordinary nature precisely because they were banished from a community that treasured equality over exceptionality. For Plutarch, the *demos* was wrong to condemn their best elements out of overly emotional bursts of *phthonos* (as indicated by the frequent recall and repentance narratives) and were also behaving in more tyrannical fashion than the individuals they sought to exile. Plutarch’s perception of the Athenian *demos* is not kind: they lacked the *paideia* required to temper their passions and ended up paying dearly for their mistakes.

The ostracised Athenians, on the other hand, are significantly more praiseworthy. Only in the case of Alcibiades (one of Plutarch’s later negative *Lives*) can we see an exile attempt to return to Athens through scheming and political manipulation. Even in the *Cimon*, who returned to fight on the side of the Athenians, there is no indication that he intended to win admission back to Athenian society. All of Plutarch’s ostracised Athenians are exceptional, and the ostracism narratives outline their characters succinctly - Themistocles for his wisdom, Aristides’ justice, Cimon’s bravery - but once faced with exile they must make a choice like the *ktistic* exiles: is it worth it to the well-being of the state that they remain? Plutarch’s virtuous statesmen recognize when it would be detrimental to the internal harmony of the state and choose to obey the lawful directives of the *demos*. They go into exile despite their personal interests instead of risking factionalism and violent uprising within the populace.
Chapter V. The Wandering Exiles

Much of what has been said of exile in the Parallel Lives concerns the responsibility of the statesman to the well-being of the demos, to his patris, and how he may continue to influence and direct the course of political affairs despite their disenfranchisement. We have so far seen exiles such as Romulus and Theseus, who build new homes and new traditions and exiles such as Coriolanus and Alcibiades, whose banishment is focused on revenge and uprooting the polity that abandoned them. There remains space for a third category of exile, one that exists in the neutral centre and chooses exile as a path to experience, wisdom, and peace. These individuals, the wandering exiles, choose exile and dislocation as a strategy to improve themselves or to provide the benefits of new perspectives to their state. Among the Parallel Lives there are two pairs which focus on this aspect of exile: the Lycurgus-Numa and the Solon-Publicola. Several other Lives, such as the Timoleon and the Sertorius, appear to illustrate the concept as well, with less emphasis however found in their biographical pairs.

This discussion on ‘wandering’ exiles begins with identifying key terminologies and an understanding of the various usages and meanings. We have seen that the word ‘exile’ can be translated many ways in Greek - feugo, primarily - but the exile of the wanderers is much more specific. Three verbs encompass the Greek concept of wandering: planaomai (πλανάομαι), alaomai (ἀλάομαι), and phoitao (φοιτάω). All three express wandering as directionless moving around or away from a particular path, direction or destination, specifically the act of moving outward or away.¹ What matters,

¹ Montiglio 2005, 26.
according to Montiglio, “is the point of departure, not the destination.” A wanderer - planetes or aletes - is not just transient or meandering. He is specifically moving away as one expelled or forced from a location. In essence, the wanderer is an exile because they are physically removed from a location, by choice or by force.

The most prominent of the three verbs in Plutarch’s work is planaomai, which presents the broadest definition of the movements of the wandering exile. The planetes is constantly on the move from place to place, sometimes observing and learning, while other times drifting aimlessly. It is the word used for soldiers meandering through enemy territory or defeated armies forced to wander without leadership after a defeat.\(^2\) We see descriptions of Caesar collecting Pompey’s wandering troops after his death (Caes. 48.2), and of the divided and wandering army of Crassus that was slaughtered by the Parthians (Cras. 28.1). Eumenes is said to have directed his men to abandon him when he fled into exile, leading to their own wanderings until his return (Eum. 10.1, 12.3). The battlefield is one source; another, described as the unpredictable movements of pirates, is planetic (Pomp. 27.4). Clodius, during his ill-fated intrusion into the Bona Dea, became hopelessly lost and wandered until he was caught in the act (Caes. 10.2; Cic. 28.2). Tiberius Gracchus, in one of his appeals, stated that the poorest of Roman citizens wandered about “houseless and homeless” (ἄοικοι καὶ ἄνιδρυτοι) despite their willingness to fight and die for Italy.\(^3\)

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\(^2\) See Pomp. 66.2; Alex. 27.2-3, 32.2, 41.1; Ant. 47.1, 48.3; Caes. 40.2; Luc. 34.3; Brut. 25.1, 28.3, 29.4; Aic. 36.5; Fab. 17.2.

\(^3\) TG 9.5.
Significantly, the second term, *alaomai*, occurs only once in the *Parallel Lives*. In a description comparing Marius’ time in exile “wandering and begging” (ἄλωμένου καὶ πτωχεύοντος) with Hannibal’s own impoverishment and subsequent transience (*Flam.* 21.7), we discern a slight extension of the meaning of *planaomai*. *Alaomai* appears to imply some kind of destitution in an exile’s wanderings; begging for necessities being a sure sign of hopelessness and lack. We can see examples of this in Euripides’ *Ion* 576 (“leave the floor of the god and your homelessness (ἀλητείαν)”), *Helen* 934-5 (“leaving this bitter homelessness (ἀλητείαν), I will profit from the wealth that is in my house”), and Homer’s *Odyssey* 18.88.114 (“seeing that you have made this insatiate fellow to stop begging (ἀλητεύειν) in the land”). There appears to be some association between *alaomai* and begging; a wandering in hopeless destitution that emerges from the misfortunes of exile, and it is often contrasted with the benefits of home. In contrast, *planaomai* only suggests wandering from location to location and can apply to many different subjects such as horses wandering about on a racetrack (Hom. *Il.* 21.319), lost armies (Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.25; 5.1.7), the evening movements of an unscrupulous adulterer (Arist. *Rh.* 2.24.7), or a geographer’s wanderings through foreign lands (Strab. 1.1.16). Plutarch’s one use of *alaomai* may also betray his sources for the *Flamininus*, as the term *aletes* is used to describe Hannibal in Appian (*Syr.* 2.11) suggesting they shared a similar source for their writings. If Plutarch reserves *alaomai* for the downtrodden homeless, then it is interesting to note that he never once refers to his exiled subjects in this way. Plutarch’s wandering exiles are always *planetes* - wanderers who are never reduced to misery and begging in the same fashion.
The third term is also used infrequently by Plutarch but has meaning that is worthwhile to the discussion. The verb *phoitao* describes another form of wandering commonly reserved for the movements of gods among humans and, especially in tragedy, the aimless wanderings of the mad. Madness is described as the ‘wandering illness’ (*phoitas nosos* or *manias phoitaleos*).¹ We can see in early Greek works how the movements of the gods were seen as a form of espionage and the gods could travel to and fro unseen in order to judge the works and deeds of mortals. Plutarch rarely uses *phoitao* to describe his exiles. While it is possible that this verb’s usage was no longer common by the first century CE, when found in literature from this period it is used primarily to describe wandering as a form of unfaithful comings and goings, often for lovers’ trysts or other forms of coupling behaviour. Despite the shortage of specific instances of *phoitao*, Plutarch has left situational evidence in the *Lives* that reflect its meaning. The emphasis and repetition of *planaomai* over the other two terms suggests that Plutarch may believe that the subjects of his biographies did not wander in hopelessness or because they had lost their minds.

### i. Wandering in Ancient Thought

The connection between wandering and exile in ancient thought is, by the nature of exile practices, quite clear. To drive an individual from their home forces a decision upon them to choose to settle again and begin anew, or to continue wandering without a particular aim or destination in mind. Exiles are wanderers by nature until they choose a new and stable *patris* to replace the old and are, therefore, no longer wandering. There are many cases of

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wandering exiles in Greek stories: Cadmus, Alcmaeon, and Orestes only stop wandering after Apollo intervenes, Medea believes she will wander forever after losing her native home as well as her new home, and Aeschylus’ *Suppliant Women* and the children of Heracles in Euripides are wanderers until they are permitted to settle in Athens.⁵

These early examples of wandering exiles demonstrate a tendency for early Greek writers to associate wandering with criminal or heinous behaviour. To be exiled was to not only be banished from a location, but also to be deprived of any fixed destination. Hence, they would be forced to wander.⁶ Therefore, when the consummate wanderer Odysseus stated that “for mortals, nothing is worse than wandering,” he certainly reflected the thinking of most early Greek writers.⁷ We can see that in these early texts wandering is universally degrading to the exile and in the *Odyssey* Homer equates wandering with suffering frequently.⁸ Wandering is often accompanied by a host of negative emotions: idleness, weakness, dispiritedness, agitation, anger, and unhappiness. Like the unburied dead, they are forced to “wander in vain about the wide gates of Hades” (*Il*. 23.74).⁹ In the cases of Bellerophon and Tlepolemus, wandering was the result of being hated by the gods.¹⁰ Even in Athenian drama the theme of wandering as a debasing condition was prevalent. Three of Euripides’ tragedies revolve around the negativity of wandering.

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⁵ Cadmus, Alcmaeon, Orestes. For Medea (386-88, 515 and Seneca 447-60).
⁶ Since Greek exile, unlike the Roman exilium, did not typically impose a certain destination.
wandering, and over the course of Ion, Helen, and Iphigenia in Tauris we can see that the end of suffering can only come with the end of wandering.\footnote{Ion 1089; Helen 203-4, 400-403, 520-27; Iphigenia 79-84.}

With the rise of the Sophists in the fifth century BCE another form of wandering emerged. Unlike the above examples where wandering and exile were forced upon their subjects, the Sophists chose a life of wandering to educate and, more importantly, to profit from their teachings. Gorgias was the example of a true homeless wanderer in that he “did not live steadily in any city” (Antidosis 155-6). From our surviving accounts from Plato this was seen as greedy opportunism.\footnote{Montiglio (2005) 105.} The Sophist is “the one who buys up articles of knowledge and, for money, exchanges city for city” (Sophist 224b1-2). The Sophist was seen as a mercenary of knowledge, an emporos set on the acquisition of material profit.\footnote{The emporos is described as a “wandering merchant”. Republic 371d7-8.} Plato regarded them as incommensurate with true philosophy and statesmanship because of their lack of permanent habitation and being “a race of wanderers from city to city” (Timaeus 12e2-8).\footnote{Cf. Montiglio (2005) 105.} They were described as alazon (ἀλαζόν - “charlatan” or “vagabond”).\footnote{Clouds 102.}

The wandering Sophist was perceived as a mercenary-for-hire, only interested in the acquisition of wealth before moving on to a new city with new students and more profit to acquire.

The fifth century also saw the rise of the tourist wanderer who would travel simply to observe or theorein (θεωρεῖν - “to contemplate the spectacle”).\footnote{Montiglio (2005) 119.}

The introduction and spread of inns made travel less risky and the wanderer could rely on the Greek tradition of guest-friendship to safely go from place...
to place. These would travel to athletic and musical competitions, theatrical events, religious rituals, or sacred locations for pleasure and experience. From this grew the notion that wandering could lead not only to sensory pleasure, but to greater and possibly secret knowledge. Unlike the gods, who are never said to wander to acquire knowledge, this brand of wanderer “takes multiple roads: his only destination is the world itself” (Montiglio 2005, 128).

From figures such as Herodotus, the planetes began to acquire a more positive meaning. Herodotus embodies the theorein in that he travelled for knowledge rather than material wealth.\(^\text{17}\) In his Histories he rarely speaks of his own journeys but we can see that he frequently equates ‘going’ and ‘writing’.\(^\text{18}\) His motivation is to “advance” in his logos “going over small and large cities of men alike” (1.5).\(^\text{19}\) He is frequently wandering to fill in the gaps of his information: in order to verify information received in Memphis, Herodotus went to Thebes and Heliopolis “for the sake of these accounts, wishing to know whether they would coincide with those I heard in Memphis” (2.3). His goal is always to follow the stories he had heard whether it directs him to a clear destination or not.

The Cynics took the notion of the experienced wanderer to a new extreme. Diogenes the Cynic pushed the values of wandering to their utmost extreme, claiming that not only was wandering beneficial to the philosopher, but was actually a prerequisite for the philosophical life. For Diogenes wandering become a chosen role - he used to say that he had “all the curses of tragedy

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\(^\text{17}\) Note that Herodotus travelled for knowledge, not to gain truth. He does not claim that he is presenting the stories as absolute fact, but he is rather reporting the stories he has heard and continues to travel to see if the stories are verifiable.

\(^\text{18}\) Montiglio 2005, 120.

\(^\text{19}\) This phrase covers both the figurative meaning of discussing all the cities as well as his literal movement as a wanderer. Montiglio 2005, 137.
[…] lighted upon him” and that he was “without a city, without a home, bereft of country,/A beggar, a wanderer, living a day-to-day life,” reflecting the inherent negative aspects of exile and their prominent place in tragedy. Diogenes’ perception of his self-exile is evident in his declaration to the Sinopeans who had exiled him. Just as he turns his exile on its head by condemning the Sinopeans to reside in Sinope, Diogenes converted his punishment into a necessity for pursuing a truly Cynic life. That is, exile becomes the means by which the true Cynic can cast off the preconceptions of knowledge (as well as their material possessions and property) and attain freedom, the highest Cynic value. Diogenes is also credited as the first to describe himself as a *cosmopolitan* and that “the only right government is that which extends to the universe” (Diog. Laert. 6.72).

**ii. Wandering Exiles in the *Parallel Lives***

Plutarch’s wandering exiles are best exemplified in the *Lives of Lycurgus-Numa* and the *Solon-Publicola*, but several other *Lives* including the *Sertorius* and the *Timoleon* demonstrate aspects of the wandering exile. In the four primary biographies we can see all the aspects of wandering mentioned previously. The biographies revolve around the central themes of wandering in self-imposed exile, the acquisition of knowledge and experience, interactions with deities, embodying godlike qualities through the process of wandering, and the benefits of wandering in exile to the *patris* both in leaving and returning. The biographies of *Lycurgus-Numa* and *Solon-Publicola* are

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very similar in their presentation of wandering in exile and the two Greek Lives can be compared in ways that suggest the parallels may have been intentional. Plutarch’s exiles illustrate the significant benefits that wandering in exile can provide for both the statesman and his patris in the acquisition of knowledge and experience.

Wandering and phthonos

In a previous chapter I have discussed the significance of envy (phthonos) as an impetus for a state (or the demos) to force an individual into exile. The destructive emotion of envy once again appears as a driving force in the exile narratives of Lycurgus-Numa. Plutarch states that Lycurgus began his wanderings initially to avoid suspicion in the event something was to happen to his new-born nephew, the rightful king of Sparta (Lyc. 3.5). The language Plutarch uses is quite clear. Lycurgus’ flight is described as fugeo, a term typically used to describe the act of going into exile. With the addition of planaomai, Plutarch describes the nature of Lycurgus’ exile as one of wandering: the unstructured movements of the exile. Lycurgus fulfils the criteria of a wandering exile because his journeying is indeterminate - he intends to wander until his nephew comes of age and produces an heir of his own, solidifying his rule and dispelling any notions of Lycurgus possessing destructive envy (phthonos) towards his kin. Compared to other Lives of exiles, the Lycurgus is a rare occasion where an individual is not forcibly exiled due to phthonos, but rather Lycurgus went into exile to prevent envy. We can see how these parallels the rest of Plutarch’s exiles: both the ktistic exiles and the ostracised Athenians go into exile to prevent further damage to the state, most often caused by the unrestrained passions of the demos.
The dangers of *phthonos* established at the outset, Plutarch attributes Lycurgus’ return from exile as the death knell for the destructive emotion. He states that the laws Lycurgus implemented on his return “freed the state from jealous hate (*phthonos*)” and that the intention of the laws was to “banish insolence and envy (*phthonos*)”. The key element here is that in other cases, where it is the expulsion of the radical element that cures *phthonos*, Lycurgus’ return to Sparta eventually cures the state.

In a similar fashion, the *Numa* also presents *phthonos* as a cause of exile, albeit indirectly. Plutarch describes the period following the death or disappearance of Romulus as chaotic. Rome was “beset with fresh disturbance and faction over the king to be appointed” in Romulus’ place (*Num. 2.4*). The state of Rome is described as split between the faction of Romans and the faction of the Sabines who had joined the Roman state under Romulus (*Rom. 20.1*). In Plutarch’s account, destructive envy (*phthonos*) ran rampant. In an effort to reduce the outpouring of *phthonos* between the two factions vying for control, the patricians suggested a government of equal representation and Numa was unanimously elected from among the Sabines for his exceptional virtues.\(^{22}\) According to Plutarch, Numa’s wife Tatia had died thirteen years into their marriage and in response Numa went into exile:\(^{23}\)

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\(^{22}\) *Num. 2.7* - καὶ γὰρ ἡ διανομὴ τῶν καίρων ἑκατέρου πρὸς ἴσοτητα καλῶς ἔχειν ἔδωκε τοῖς ἀρχηγοῖς, καὶ πρὸς τὸν δήμον ἡ μεταβολὴ τῆς ἔξουσίας ἀφαιρεῖν τὸν φθόνον, δρῶντα τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ἰδιώτην ἐκ βασιλέως γινόμενον. Cf. *Num. 3.5.*

\(^{23}\) *Num. 3.7-4.1.* Whether this was out of grief or disdain for the civil sphere Plutarch does not say.
“Then Numa, forsaking the ways of city folk, determined to live for the most part in country places, and to wander there alone, passing his days in groves of the gods, sacred meadows, and solitudes.” (Num. 4.1. Trans. Perrin)

Like Lycurgus, Plutarch clearly outlines Numa’s role as a wandering exile. His actions are directionless and unstructured - planasthai - but not because of some madness or errancy of mind. His was an active and reasoned decision to retreat from the polity and live amongst the natural, uncivilised world of the country. His retreats of choice were among the “groves of the gods” (ἄλσεσι θεών), the “sacred meadows” (λειμῶσιν ἱεροῖς), and in other “desolate places” (τόποις ἔρήμοις). Plutarch does not write that Numa lived anywhere in particular but chose to live in the margins of society. He is an exile by choice, preferring the peace of the natural world over the commotion of city living.

As we have seen, Numa’s exile occurs during a period of increasing envy (phthonos) in Rome. By choosing not to take part in society, Numa could also be seen to relieve envy or at least any envy that would be associated with himself or his person. His unanimous election by both the Sabines and the Romans and subsequent return to the political life can be seen, like Lycurgus, to have been the final blow to the envy of the demos, as Plutarch later writes:

"For there is no record either of war, or faction, or political revolution while Numa was king. Nay more, no hatred or jealousy was felt towards his person, nor did ambition lead men to plot and conspire against his throne.” (Num. 20.5. Trans. Perrin)

Again, we see in the case of these wandering exiles that the significance of their return eclipses any beneficence towards the state which prompted their initial flight. Both Lycurgus and Numa left their homes in a state of destructive envy but it is their returns that are most significant to their exile narratives. Both are recalled back by a repentant demos who only recognise the value
of these statesman after they had removed from the cities and left them to
their own devices. We have seen the repentant demos before in other exile
narratives and it remains a common theme in Plutarch that the exiles are
frequently sought after by the state for the very same exceptional qualities
that led them to be exiled in the first place. However, in the case of the
wandering exiles we get a sense that during their exiles they underwent
transformative experiences which made them more suited to governance, at
least in the eyes of the populace. The nature of that change, as we shall see,
diffs between biographies.

Wandering for Experience

As we have seen before, wandering was commonly associated with the
acquisition of knowledge and experience. Plutarch’s wandering exiles lie
somewhere between the mercenary realm of the Sophists and the severe
transience of the Cynics; interested in acquiring and sharing knowledge while
enduring the hardships of exile and displacement. The quest for greater
knowledge and experience is at the forefront of the Life of Solon but the
thematic thread weaves through the Lycurgus-Numa as well. The exile in this
case is the ultimate cosmopolitan: capable of gathering foreign ideas through
observation and contemplation while facing their state of dislocation with a
Stoic attitude or a zeal for exploration.

The figure of Solon presented in Plutarch’s biography is centred around his
wandering for experience and knowledge. His story begins when as a young
man he chose to embark on a life of commerce, a life which Plutarch says
was actually motivated by a thirst for “experience and learning rather than to
make money.” Solon was a “lover of wisdom” and Plutarch relates that even in his old age Solon would say that he “grew old ever learning many things.”

As if to dispel any notions that a mercantile life was unbecoming to the young Solon, Plutarch interjects with a counter-argument. Travel as a merchant was “held in honour” since it provided “familiarity with foreign parts, friendships with foreign kings, and a large experience in affairs.” Furthermore, he states that merchants had previously been founders of great cities, such as the case of Protis of Massalia, or been other notable individuals, such as Thales, Hippocrates the mathematician, and Plato, who funded his travels to Egypt with the sale of oil.

Later in his life Solon would choose to leave Athens again and “made his ownership of a vessel an excuse for foreign travel.” The real reason, according to Plutarch, was to leave the city and allow the Athenians to adjust to his new laws. He obtained a leave of absence for ten years and took off again into a life of wandering. Plutarch writes that he went to Egypt and studied with Psenophis of Heliopolis and Sonchis of Sais, two learned priests of Egypt (Sol. 26.1). In Egypt he is said to have heard of the myth of Atlantis which he brought back to Greece. Solon then ventured to Cyprus where he befriended the king Philocyprus, and later he would visit Croesus in Lydia and

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24 Sol. 2.2 - καί τοῦ φασίν ἔνοι πολυπειρίας ἕνεκα μᾶλλον καὶ ἰστορίας ἢ χρηματισμοῦ πλανηθῆναι τὸν Σόλωνα. σοφίας μὲν γὰρ ἄν ὁμολογουμένης ἐραστῆς
25 Sol. 2.2 - γηράσκειν αἰεὶ πολλά δίδακτον
26 Sol. 2.3 - ἐμπορία δὲ καὶ δόξαν εἶχεν οίκειομένη τὰ βαρβαρικά καὶ προξενοῦσα φιλίας βασιλέων καὶ πραγμάτων ἐμπείρους ποιοῦσα πολλῶν
27 Sol. 2.4. Protis (or Euxene) was a Phocaean trader and sometimes pirate from Ionia who founded the city of Massalia according to Aristotle (Constitution of Massilia, book XIII, fragment 576a) and Pompey Trogus, whose account is reported by Justin (Epitoma Historiarum Philippicarum, XLIII.3). Note the association with wandering and founding cities.
28 Sol. 25.5.
29 Note that this ten-year absence is also, perhaps coincidentally, the same duration imposed on an ostracised Athenian.
30 Sol. 26.1. See also Plato Tim. 22a.
eventually Aesop, whose tales he also brought back for the benefit of the Greeks (Sol. 28.1). The focus of his travels is obviously to advance his logos, like Herodotus, and acquire new experience.

Like Solon’s second period of exile, Lycurgus’ wanderings appear to have been concerned with learning new knowledge. Plutarch writes that while in Crete Lycurgus “studied the forms of government” and became acquainted with their “most distinguished men”. Compared with the account of Solon’s exile, the similarities are notable. Wandering here is closely associated with studying, networking with notable individuals, and observing foreign cultures. When he left to Asia, his purpose is stated as being to compare the severity of the Cretan form of government with that of the extravagance of the Ionian, ostensibly to learn which laws would be best suited for the governance of Sparta (Lyc. 4.3). Like Solon and the tale of Atlantis, Lycurgus is given credit for acquiring the works of Homer and bringing them back to Greece, indelibly linking him with the preservation of those stories (Lyc. 4.4). Plutarch further states that the Egyptians claimed to have been visited by Lycurgus and adopted one of their legal customs, and that there are a few who claimed Lycurgus went as far as Libya, Iberia, and India to meet with the gymnosophists, the naked wise men of the East who revered nature and espoused a rejection of civilisation.

The similarities between the stories of Lycurgus and Solon are remarkable. Both men take extended journeys of wandering in exile into the East, both study extensively under foreign academics, and both became known by

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31 Lyc. 4.1 - τοῖς πρωτεύουσι κατὰ δόξαν ἀνδράσι
32 Lyc. 4.5-6. The significance of the gymnosophists is obvious and the association with Lycurgus as a wandering exile is readily apparent.
people in elevated positions in their societies. Most importantly, however, is that both return with foreign knowledge to the benefit of their *patris*. The return of Solon with the story of Atlantis and Lycurgus’ acquisition of the stories of Homer suggests a greater parallel with other known wanderers in Greek stories. Another exile, Cadmus, is credited with bringing the Phoenician alphabet to the Greeks before founding and settling Thebes.\(^{33}\) The tales are even evocative of the god Dionysus’ wanderings through the East, after which he brought the secrets of making wine into Greece. The association of wandering with Dionysus and other deities is a final aspect of Plutarch’s wanderers, and we will find that the gods have a greater role to play in the *Lives* of the wandering exiles than initially presumed.

**Wandering to Meet Gods**

The association of wandering with the divine brings us to the next significant aspect of Plutarch’s exiles: the notion that through wandering one can step out of the artificial world of mortal civilisation and into a world of margins outside the confines of cities. As mentioned above, the concept of wandering in exile is commonly associated with deities. The third verb for wandering, *phoitao* (and its cognates) is used to describe both the itinerant travels of wandering gods and the unconscious wandering of those who have gone mad.\(^ {34}\) Gods are often described as wanderers. In the *Odyssey* a man is chastised for attempting to hit Odysseus (the “unhappy wanderer” - δύστηνον ἀλήτην) since he could have been “a god come from the sky... And the gods, like strangers from a foreign land, assuming all sorts of shapes, turn in and out from city to city, looking at the violence and the justice of men” (17.483-


\(^{34}\) Montiglio 2005, 3.
Hesiod as well agreed with this notion, claiming that “there are three times ten thousand immortals over the bountiful earth, Zeus’s watchers of mortal men: they keep watch over the way men administer justice and over their cruel doings, wrapped in mist, wandering [phoitontes] all over the earth” (Works and Days 252-55). Dionysus is so well-known for his wandering that he earned an epithet of plankter (πλαγκτήρ), or ‘Wanderer’. There is a clear tradition of representing gods as committing acts of espionage through their wanderings on earth, judging the justice of people and aiding in the settlement of cities or the institution of new laws.

Apollo’s connection to exiles is well attested. In several stories, Apollo leads wanderers to found cities and settle down. According to Montiglio (2005, 152), Apollo “is the god who gives human wanderers a goal, who converts their blind and endless movement into a purposeful one.” Cadmus, the founder of Thebes, is said to have received instructions on how to stop his wandering from the oracle at Delphi. Alcmaeon became a wanderer because he murdered his mother and did not stop until Apollo told him to settle on the Echinades islands. Apollodorus relates that Philoctetes, the Thessalian hero of the Trojan War, was blown off course and landed in Italy where he founded several towns and a shrine to Apollo, to whom he dedicated his bow. Apollo’s influence is felt in the Lives as well, as Lycurgus’ own wanderings do not come to an end when he returns to Sparta but when he

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35 See also Montiglio 2005, 64.
36 Greek Anthology (9.524.17), cf. Montiglio 2005, 73. This epithet could either be read as ‘he who is led astray’ or ‘he who leads astray’, depending on the reading. In the Bacchae he announces his departure shortly after having arrived in Thebes (48-50), reinforcing his inability to stay sedentary for any extended period.
37 Thuc. 2.102.5-6.
receives confirmation from the Delphic oracle that his new system of laws ought to be instituted in Sparta (Lycurgus 5.3).

The *Timoleon* contains another such example of a god intervening and putting an end to one's wanderings. Timoleon went into exile after he participated in an assassination attempt on his brother Timophanes, a would-be tyrant of Corinth (*Tim.* 4.4-5.1). Driven into exile by his grief and the public shame of being a fratricide, Timoleon went into exile and lived by himself “apart from the world.” It was not long before he left the city entirely and spent his time wandering (*planomenos*) in desolate places.\(^{39}\) Plutarch states that when the Corinthians were looking for a general to aid Syracuse against Sparta, they held a meeting to decide who should lead the Corinthian army on this expedition. A man stood and nominated Timoleon, even though he had not taken part in public office for twenty years, because “some god” (*θεοῦ τινος*) put it into his mind to nominate him (*Tim.* 3.1-2). What god this was Plutarch does not say, but he does mention that Timoleon had the favour of fortune on his side. Timoleon’s wanderings are given meaning and purpose by a god: he no longer is wandering out of grief and shame and is given an opportunity to change the public perception. A Corinthian Telecleides attests to that fact:

> ἄν μὲν γὰρ ἐφη, ἀκλῶς ἀγωνίσῃ, τύραννον ἀνηρκέναι δόξομεν, ἄν δὲ φαύλως, ἀδελφόν.

> “If you fight bravely,” he said, “we shall think of you as the man who destroyed a tyrant, but otherwise as the man who killed his brother.” (*Tim.* 7.2. Trans. Scott-Kilvert and Duff)

It must be pointed out here that Plutarch’s version of Lycurgus’ wanderings differs greatly from other surviving accounts. Plutarch’s timeline has Lycurgus

\(^{39}\) *Tim.* 5.3.
going into exile, wandering throughout the world, returning to Sparta to enact his laws, and only then turning to Delphi for divine confirmation. In the Lycurgus the institution of his laws is part of the wandering process and the end result of his exile. All other references to Lycurgus omit his early wanderings altogether. Herodotus (1.65) says that Lycurgus brought his constitution straight from the oracle, but the Spartans themselves say that he brought it from Crete. Polybius does mention that Lycurgus went to Crete, but not that he borrowed any of their laws or that it was part of a wandering event (Plb. 6.46). Xenophon does not mention his travels at all, just that he consulted the oracle before enacting his laws and that he used the oracle as justification (Const. Lac. 1; 8). Nor does Polyaeus say that Lycurgus wandered in exile at any point (Stratagems 1a). Only Plutarch’s biography describes Lycurgus’ wandering as the source of his new constitution, the rest credit it to divine inspiration from the oracle.

The lack of evidence supporting Plutarch’s description of Lycurgus’ wanderings suggests that either he had a source that does not survive in any other mention of his work, or that Plutarch pieced it together from the repeated references in other sources of Lycurgus having gone to Crete. It is unlikely that Plutarch invented the story outright, but the fact that it was included in such certain terms suggests an intended parallel with other stories of wandering exiles acquiring hidden or lost knowledge and meeting with deities.

The Numa has similar problems with sourcing. As in the Lycurgus, there are few confirmed sources for the Numa. In no other surviving account is Numa linked directly with “groves of the gods” (ἄλσεσι θεῶν). This is not likely to

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40 Numa. 4.1. All other sources agree that Numa had an association with a nymph or the Muses, but only Plutarch explicitly mentions groves.
be an accident. Sacred groves were typically situated at the border of organized civilization and at the edge of natural wilderness. Pausanias describes several sacred groves planted on the margins of cities: the sanctuary of Pan at Lykaion (8.37.10), the grove for Demeter at Phygalia (8.42.11-12), and the grove of Karneian Apollo near Trikolonoi (8.34.6). According to Barnett (2007, 260-1) “The sacred grove... acts as a gateway between a realm where natural forces are manipulated and controlled, and an infinite and multiple domain where nature simply takes its course.” They were also known to be places of animal sacrifice, through which communication between mortals and gods was made possible.

Numa’s wandering through sacred groves is essential to his characterisation by Plutarch. It is in these sacred and wild spaces that he is said to have met and associated with a mountain nymph, Egeria. According to Plutarch, the story goes that Numa had a relationship with Egeria and through this relationship the nymph blessed him with “wisdom more than human” (Num. 4.2). What follows is a short discourse on whether the story seems plausible given that it resembles other stories of mortals convening with gods. His examples include Attis, consort of Cybele, Endymion, lover of Selene, and Herodotus. Once again, the connections are significant. He later reinforces

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41 Solomon 1994, 9.
42 Pausanias even mentions that the *temenos* on the ridge served as a portal through which it was possible to cross from one world to another.
44 *Num. 4, 7*.
45 Attis was a shepherd in Phrygian mythology who was the consort of Cybele. In one account, he was abandoned in the wilderness, fed milk by a goat, and brought up by shepherds (Timothaeus in Arnob. 5.5-7; cf. Paus. 7.17.9-12, Schol. Nic. Alex. 8; Tert. Apol. 15.2; Hippol. Ref. 5.9.8).
46 Son of Aethlius (or Zeus) and Calyce, Endymion was so beautiful that Selene fell in love with him and asked Zeus to grant him eternal youth. Zeus granted the wish and Endymion was put in an eternal sleep (Paus. 5.8.1; Apollod. 1.56; Hes. fr. 260 MW; Epimenides FGrH 457 fr. 10; Sappho Fr. 199 Voigt; Apoll. Rhod. 4.57f.).
the connection with several examples of Apollo’s lovers: Phorbas, Hyacinthus, Admetus, and Hippolytus. Plutarch ends the discussion inconclusively. On the one hand, if the gods did commune with mortals then they would surely choose one of exceptional qualities like Numa.  

On the other hand, it is perfectly rational to assume that these men simply pretended to associate with the gods to lend credence and authority to their actions. Only later does Plutarch appear to solidify his scepticism. He compares Numa’s story of the nymph with that of Pythagoras and his eagle: it was a fictional spectacle to impress the people and sanction his governance. Yet the story of Numa and the nymph remains a significant aspect of his character and we are left with a contained narrative of Numa going into exile outside the city limits and wandering there until he met the nymph who bestowed upon him exceptional qualities.

It is unusual that Livy, one of our only surviving sources for the Life of Numa, does not mention Numa’s time in exile at all. Instead, Livy’s version places him in the Sabine city of Cures just before his appointment as king and attributes his virtues to “his native temperament and self-training” instead of any interaction with a goddess (Livy AUC 1.18). Livy’s version places his meetings with Egeria during his reign instead of before it, and that he used her as an explanation for instituting his unusual rituals (Livy AUC 1.19). Livy’s view that Numa invented his meetings with Egeria to legitimise his laws is shared by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (2.61.1-2). Plutarch is less certain. He claims that there are enough stories of gods intervening and conversing with mortals that they can be believed, but that it is also not absurd to think that

47 Num. 4.3.
48 Num. 4.8.
49 Num. 4.8.
men such as Numa and Lycurgus invented their divine association to placate the masses and legitimise their actions (Num. 4.4-7). It is clear that the story was well attested, given that Livy, Dionysius, and Plutarch all share details, but only Plutarch's account places the death of his daughter as the impetus for his self-exile and his conversations with the goddess as a direct result of it.

A similar account occurs in the Sertorius when Sertorius, who is called an exile (φυγάς) by Plutarch (Sert. 1.5) and is said to have wandered after going into exile from Rome. Two separate Lives mention Sertorius' affinity for wandering. The Pompey describes him as one who "often wandered (πλανᾶσθαι) alone" and in his own biography it is said that he was "always wandering (πλάνοις) about or hunting when he had leisure for it, he obtained an acquaintance with every way of escape for a fugitive (φεύγοντι)" (Pomp. 19.4; Sert. 13.2). Sertorius is said to have had a white doe in his possession which he claimed was a gift from Diana through which she revealed hidden knowledge to him (Sert. 11.3). When he received intelligence about the enemy, he would pretend that the doe spoke to him in his dreams and when he heard news that his generals had won a victory he would dress the doe in garlands and claim it meant his men were soon to hear good news (Sert. 11.4). On one occasion when the doe went missing it was found by hunters who were also wandering (πλανώμενοι) and returned it to Sertorius (Sert. 20.1-2).

As in the case of Lycurgus and Numa, Plutarch is sceptical of Sertorius' story. According to Plutarch, the doe was nothing more than a "cunning device of
his own for deceiving and charming” the Spanish tribes under his control.\textsuperscript{50} Through these kinds of displays Sertorius made the people tractable and inspired them to believe that “they were led, not by the mortal wisdom of a foreigner, but by a god.”\textsuperscript{51} Through their wanderings and associations with a deity, legitimate or otherwise, Lycurgus, Numa, and Sertorius all play into the established traditions of exile and wandering. By retreating from the world of humanity they found themselves wandering in wild and untamed locations inhabited by the gods who reward their aimlessness with hidden knowledge. The gods validate their wanderings through direct endorsement, as with Lycurgus, or through gifts of virtue, as with Numa, or with prophecy and foresight, as with Sertorius. Through the act of wandering, Plutarch’s virtuous exiles encounter the world of the divine and return blessed.

Wandering as Godlike

The traditional representation of gods as wanderers creates a new template for Plutarch’s exiled wanderers to follow, one that infuses the meandering quest for knowledge with a purposeful and sometimes aggressive imposition of their wills upon others. Plutarch’s subjects, chosen for their moral excellence, are given the opportunity to assume the role of the godlike wanderer in their exiles and not only obtain knowledge of foreign lands, but also to actively craft the foreign world with their superior knowledge and experience. There are several examples of exiles in the \textit{Lives} taking on roles of judgment and guidance in their wanderings, specifically the \textit{Solon} and the \textit{Lycurgus}.

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Sert.} 11.1. \\
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Sert.} 12.1.
As mentioned previously, Lycurgus’ wanderings took him to Crete where he studied the Cretan government before going to Ionia and comparing the two. Plutarch describes this in a way that suggests Lycurgus was judging the two societies. He writes that Lycurgus “heartily approved” of some things and of others he “had only contempt.” Here we see Plutarch attributing to Lycurgus what is normally reserved for the gods, that is, judging the format of their constitutions the way the gods judged the actions of man. After he returns to Sparta and makes his first journey to Delphi, Plutarch records that the oracle declared that Lycurgus was “beloved of the gods, and rather god than man.” This comment is attested in Herodotus as well, but Plutarch’s inclusion elevates Lycurgus’ status in the biography. His figurative deification occurs only after his wanderings have ended and he has fulfilled the criteria for godhood. Compare it to the statement later in his life:

Just as Plato says that Deity was rejoiced to see His universe come into being and make its first motion, so Lycurgus was filled with joyful satisfaction in the magnitude and beautify of his system of laws, now that it was in operation and moving along its pathway. (Lyc. 29.1 Trans. Perrin)

Solon left Athens twice in his career. The first time we see him traveling to acquire knowledge of the world and funded it through his commercial activities (Sol. 2.1-2). On his return he noticed that the Athenians were tired of waging war against the Megarians over Salamis so he enacted a plan in which he would pretend to be mad (ἐκστασιν τῶν λογισμῶν) and convince the Athenians that divine inspiration wanted them to continue the war despite

52 Lyc. 4.1.
53 Lyc. 5.3. Cf. Hdt. 1.65.3.
the attrition (Sol. 8.1-3). This they did and even appointed Solon commander of the war effort. His second exile came after he instituted his new laws and he fled Athens under the notion that if given enough time the Athenians would settle into the new laws by their own accord and so he left Athens after obtaining a leave of absence for ten years. It is in this second exile that Solon would begin his wandering of judgment.

Solon’s second exile and ensuing wanderings take on a similar quality as suggested in the Odyssey and Hesiod’s Works and Days. Solon’s wanderings take him across the known world, into far-flung locales, and present him opportunities to demonstrate not only his innate experience as a statesman, but also an ability to judge and shape the world as he saw fit. His first stop was Egypt where he studied with priests and learned of the story of Atlantis.\(^{54}\) Then he went to Cyprus where he befriended the king Philocyprus and helped him establish a city that had been founded by Demophon, the son of Theseus (26.2).\(^{55}\) Plutarch writes that Solon took charge of the new city’s consolidation and design as well as organizing the colonists who flocked to the new city which was named Soli in his honour (26.3-4). Plutarch’s Solon took a commanding role that demonstrates not only his own capability as a statesman, but also his resemblance to the gods who wander into a location, set up institutions, and leave as quickly as they arrive.

The Life of Solon is not the only example of exiled wanderers assuming the responsibilities of wandering gods. During Sertorius’ exile from Rome he was allegedly contacted by the Lusitanians who invited him to be their leader

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\(^{54}\) Plut. Sol. 26.1. Cf. Aristot. Const. Ath. 11.1 and Hdt. 1.30. This event is fairly well attested and would not have provided Plutarch much room for emendation. Its inclusion is also highly reminiscent of Lycurgus bringing the stories of Homer back to Sparta (Lyc. 4.4-5).

\(^{55}\) Theseus, we have established, was an exile and a founder himself.
(Sert. 10.1). The Lucullus as well contains an account very reminiscent of that in the Solon, which is unusual because he is only once spuriously described as an exile (Comp. Cim. Luc. 1). Nonetheless, Plutarch’s account superficially links him to the other exiled wanderers when he begins his political career acting on behalf of Sulla in 87-86 BCE. Sulla sent him to Egypt and Libya to acquire ships but along the way Lucullus became embroiled in the dealings of the Cyrenaeans, whose constitution he fixed and the government he restored to order (Luc. 2.3). In Egypt he had the friendship of Ptolemy who gave him ships to go to Cyprus after which he helped the Colophonians overthrow their tyrant, Epigonus, and arrested him (Luc. 3.3). This penchant for justice and intervention is even more explicit in the introduction to Lucullus where he settles a legal dispute among the Chaeroneans, a feat for which Plutarch is exceedingly grateful (Cim. 2.1).

Within the Lives of Plutarch’s wandering exiles, we can find a trace of the divine in their actions. In these periods of exile Plutarch’s subjects are not passive observers but active judges and manipulators of humanity. By abandoning their patris in favour of wandering, they embody an aspect of the gods that negate the inherent misery of exile and displacement and transform it into a kind of heroic pilgrimage, righting wrongs, establishing governments, and colonizing new cities.

iii. Conclusion

Plutarch’s wandering exiles are demonstrably the most successful of all his subjects despite their choice to distance themselves from their homelands and to live a wandering life, if only for a time. Instead of being forced out by envious parties, their decision to go into exile is made for benevolent or
personal reasons and their returns are celebrated for the advantages they brought back with them. The benefits of wandering in exile, be they knowledge or experience or an association with a deity, contribute massively to the reputation of the wanderer and their ability to successfully govern a peaceful state. It is a common theme throughout Plutarch’s *Lives* that the virtuous exile excels while banished from their homes, but here we see that the exile can become virtuous through his exile, and specifically through wandering in the Stoic-Cynic sense.

However, Plutarch’s *Parallel Lives* were an exercise in discussing virtue, not in encomium or panegyric. The key element among the *Lives* is that the exiles are virtuous from the start which allows them to succeed during their wanderings. In these cases, it is not important whether the wandering exiles changed or evolved during their exiles (Plutarch does permit some discussion on the topic), but rather that they accomplished what they did because of their innate virtues. Unlike other exiles throughout the *Lives*, the wandering exiles see exile as a tool rather than an obstacle to be overcome. In most of the other *Lives* the exile has exile forced upon them. For the wandering exile, it is a tool to pacify the populace by preventing their envy, gathering experience, and establishing credulity by associating with gods and rising above the sedentary lifestyle of others who are too excessively patriotic to recognize the value of external experience.

Despite Plutarch’s scepticism concerning the exiles’ meetings with gods, he never condemns them for manipulating the *demos* with their stories. It appears that Plutarch is not as concerned with how his subjects governed, only that during their reigns Sparta and Athens and Rome prospered in peace and piety. It is not problematic, therefore, that the wandering exiles embodied
heroic tales of exile and godhood for profit, but a sign of their ability to lead no matter what that entailed. The way Plutarch shapes their biographies suggests that he approved of the fraudulent behaviour because the end result was successful and led to the reduction of public envy and political disunity in turbulent times. To become a wandering exile was to adopt a public appearance that suggested experience with diverse cultures and hidden supernatural knowledge that helped them maintain order in their *patris*.

It must also be considered that these biographies were highly influenced by older traditions that had already been intent on deifying figures of the distant past. The accounts of Lycurgus, Numa, Solon, and Publicola were based on obscure histories and accounts that even Plutarch had difficulty piecing together. In the case of Lycurgus even the verifiable accounts of the history of his time wandered (πεπλανημένης) all over, giving the sense that the biographies of these distant years are as much based on myth as they are on factual accounts. However, by repeating these accounts and placing so much emphasis on their virtues before and after their exile he creates clear narratives that support his thesis in *On Exile*: that exile is not an evil and those capable of using reason and philosophy can succeed despite their banishment. In the case of the wandering exiles they succeed in part because they possessed those virtues and because they were able to use their exile as a political tool to accrue knowledge, justify their actions, and insinuate that they had become something more than human. For if there truly was nothing worse for mortals than wandering, as Homer said, Plutarch’s wandering exiles must have been so much more.

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56 *Lyc.* 1.3. See also *Thes.* 1.1 where Plutarch also states his concern about the lack of clear evidence.
Chapter VI. The Paired Pairs

I have explored at length some of the various ways that Plutarch uses exile to characterise his subjects of the Lives and frame the significant thematic elements he intended to emphasize in each biography. The approach has been broad: investigating exile as it appears throughout a variety of Lives, both Greek and Roman, and the techniques used over numerous works composed over Plutarch’s writing career. At this point I will investigate just two pairs of Lives which appear to be thematically linked through the exile narratives of their subjects: the Themistocles-Camillus and the Coriolanus-Alcibiades. These two have been chosen in part because of their reliance on exile as a narrative theme, as well as several other peculiarities that make them unique among the Lives. Each pair focuses on a Greek and Roman whose biographies hinged on their exile from their homeland, their reactions to their displacement, and their behaviour once driven away.

It will be shown that not only do both pairs focus on exiled subjects, but I hypothesize that Plutarch may have written the later Coriolanus-Alcibiades as an antithesis to the earlier Themistocles-Camillus. The heroic Roman Camillus is contrasted significantly with the revenge-driven Coriolanus, while the mercurial Alcibiades mirrors the crafty Themistocles in their ambitious characteristics and opposing behaviour while in exile. Together the two pairs illustrate aspects of exile which echo throughout the rest of the Lives and provide some clarity into what Plutarch believed were the core causes of exile, how a virtuous person ought to behave while in exile, and the benefits and consequences of exile practices in the ancient world.
i. Composition

To begin, we must first place the two pairs of *Lives* in their historical context. It is nearly impossible to determine an absolute chronology for Plutarch’s composition, but through comparisons of references to other *Lives* and Plutarch’s own descriptions, others have been able to assemble a relative chronology for the composition of the *Lives*. The *Themistocles-Camillus* may have been composed as part of a cluster of *Lives* and possibly followed directly after the *Theseus-Romulus*, another pair which prominently features exile.\(^1\) Since the *Theseus* (27.8) references the *Demosthenes*, and Plutarch himself states that the *Demosthenes-Cicero* is the fifth in the series (*Dem.* 3.1), it can be assumed that the *Themistocles-Camillus* occupies an early space somewhere between the seventh and ninth pair of biographies written.\(^2\)

Using a similar strategy, we can see that the other *Lives* composed in this period also significantly feature exiled subjects: *Demosthenes-Cicero* (V), *Lycurgus-Numa* (VI), and *Theseus-Romulus* (VII) all document the lives of individuals who were forced by their circumstances to remove themselves from their home.\(^3\) While it does not conclusively show that Plutarch’s sole inspiration for writing these *Lives* was to investigate exiled subjects, it is interesting to note that the theme appears so prevalent in a cluster of biographies likely composed so near to one another. The prevalence of exile as a theme among the biographies composed at this time suggests that it

\(^1\) Jones 1966, 67 argues that since the *Themistocles* begins with Θεμιστοκλῆς δὲ… (1.1) it may indicate a continuation of the theme discussed at *Comp. Thes. Rom.* 6.5 concerning the parentage of Theseus.

\(^2\) This is a simplified description of the extensive work found in Jones 1966, 67.

\(^3\) *Dem.* 26.2; *Cic.* 31.5; *Lyc.* 3.5; *Num.* 4.1; *Thes.* 3.4, 35.3; *Rom.* 3.3. Note that *Theseus-Romulus* and *Demosthenes-Cicero* have been discussed in Chapter III and *Lycurgus-Numa* in Chapter V.
may have been a factor in the decision to write about these particular subjects.

On the other end of the chronology is the Coriolanus-Alcibiades, which can be placed with certainty somewhere among the last pairs that Plutarch ever wrote. References within the text to the Nicias (Alc. 13.9) and the Numa (Cor. 39, 11) indicate that the pair may have been composed near to or simultaneously with the Nicias-Crassus, the Demetrius-Antony, and the Pyrrhus-Marius, all of which were likely to have been among the last seven pairs that Plutarch composed. Like the earlier clusters, we can see that these later Lives are thematically linked by more cautionary tales and, as Plutarch writes at Dem. 1.6, serve to show how not to live one's life. In the introduction to the Coriolanus Plutarch writes that it would be wrong to blame the faults in a person simply because they lacked fatherly influence, but rather that Coriolanus' failures stemmed from a lack of proper education (παιδεία). Similarly, Alcibiades is said to have been intrinsically virtuous but corrupted and tempted by flatterers (κόλαξ) who fuelled his selfish ambitions. In the synkrisis of the two, Plutarch condemns their extremes as statesmen: Coriolanus was unmoving in his oligarchical tendencies while Alcibiades' demagogy was his downfall (Comp. Alc. Cor. 1.3). Their ambition and unbending resolve injured their homelands (2.2-3). They are both praised for their military acumen but ultimately their portrayals are that of unyielding and uncompromising statesmen and should not be emulated.

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4 Jones 1966, 68.
5 Dem. 1.6
6 Cor. 1.2. See Chapter II on Plutarch’s De Exilio and the importance of philosophy.
7 Alc. 6.1
With the above evidence in mind, we can see how Plutarch may have composed the *Lives* in groups according to his interests or available evidence at the time. This is itself nothing remarkable; it is to be expected that over the decades spent composing and writing the *Lives* certain thematic elements would repeat among contemporary biographies. That said, there are further indications which contribute to the notion that the *Coriolanus-Alcibiades* may have been written as a response to the *Themistocles-Camillus*.

Plutarch was not above using the obvious pairings for his *Lives*. Comparing Julius Caesar to Alexander is one such example, as is Demosthenes and Cicero.\(^8\) The pairing of Themistocles and Camillus, however, is quite unusual as there is no evidence to suggest that the two were linked in ancient thought. By the time of writing in the late first century CE, Themistocles was more commonly linked to Coriolanus in recognition of their exiles and treason against their homelands. Cicero linked him with Coriolanus three times: once to praise him for dying in exile instead of attacking Athens (*Ad Atticum* 9.10.3), once to praise both men for committing suicide in exile (*De Amicitia* 42.5), and again to compare their lives as wounded by an ungrateful populace (*Brutus* 10.41-42). Shortly after Plutarch, Aulus Gellius paired the two in his brief comparative history of Rome and Greece (17.21). Knowing what we know now about Plutarch’s use of Cicero as a source, it remains to be seen why Plutarch would not follow a standard comparison and pair Themistocles with Coriolanus. At first glance the two stories line up remarkably: both did great services to their countries, both were exiled on trumped up charges,

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\(^8\) Green 1978 discusses the Alexander/Caesar parallels. Cicero himself described himself as a Demosthenes. The title of the *Philippics* is an obvious parallel that is echoed in the later works of Quintilian 10.1.105, 6.3.2, 10.1.39-40. See also Mayer 1997, 86.
both turned to the enemy, and both chose to die rather than attack their homelands in a last-minute change of heart. Similarly, at the end of the synkrisis of Coriolanus-Alcibiades Plutarch writes that in terms of wisdom and honesty Alcibiades was an unworthy comparison because he lacked Coriolanus’ temperance (σωφροσύνη) and superiority to wealth (χρημάτων ἐγκρατείας). It seems that based on these qualities the two men were unsuited to be compared, yet Plutarch did it anyway. Alcibiades could be said to have been a more suitable parallel to Camillus: both were exiled, both loyally returned to the benefit of their countries, and both earned the ire of their fellow citizens before their deaths. The purpose here is to demonstrate that from a purely historical perspective the pairings could have been reversed.

What matters to Plutarch is the moral quality of his subjects, and here is where we may find an explanation for his unconventional pairings. If we accept that Themistocles-Camillus was written earlier (among the praiseworthy Lives of exiles), and Coriolanus-Alcibiades written later (among the cautionary and negative Lives) then the evidence begins to grow for Plutarch deliberately constructing these Lives as antithetical representations of one another focused around their exile narratives and, most importantly, how their exiles resulted in benefits or detriments to their patris.

In On Exile, Plutarch mentions several individuals who managed to succeed brilliantly after being exiled: Camillus, for achieving the reputation of Rome’s second founder, and Themistocles, who in Plutarch’s account only grew in reputation once banished. For reasons that are made clear in the Lives,

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9 De Ex. 605E. Themistocles is mentioned twice for his ability to thrive in exile (601F). It is worth mentioning here that Cicero and Theseus (607A) are also
Camillus and Themistocles were virtuous in their exiles in a way that Alcibiades and Coriolanus were not. This is further emphasized in the *Moralia* where Plutarch places Camillus alongside Themistocles as individuals whose homelands benefitted from the full extent of their virtues. It is for this reason that Themistocles could not have been paired with Coriolanus, since nowhere in the *Themistocles* does he commit any act of treason so egregious as Coriolanus’ betrayal of Rome. Similarly, Alcibiades’ benefactions towards Athens on his return from exile pale in comparison to Camillus, who returned out of loyalty instead of unrelenting ambition. The fact that Plutarch specifically mentions their benefactions to their homelands is crucial as we have seen before that exile could be used as a tool for preserving *concordia* in the state. Camillus and Themistocles did not risk strife and factionalism in their homelands by trying to remain; Alcibiades harmed Athens in his attempts to return, and Coriolanus sought only to destroy his homeland during his period of exile.

In the majority of the *Lives* Plutarch places the Greek before the Roman, suggesting some kind of primacy inherent in his Greek biographies. However, the *Coriolanus-Alcibiades* is one of the few pairs where the Roman *Life* is given priority ahead of its counterpart. There are numerous theories addressing why Plutarch would reverse the established order but the most mentioned as virtuous exiles which contributes to the idea that there was a time during which Plutarch had an interest in famous exiles, leading to the contemporary composition of the *Demosthenes-Cicero, Theseus-Romulus, and Themistocles-Camillus*.

10 *De latenter* 1129C. 

11 The choice of a primary and secondary *Life* in any given pair is often superseded by the tradition of placing the Greek *Life* before the Roman to maintain consistency in presentation. However, the ordering of two pairs appears to be significant and I have endeavoured to present some of the reasoning here.

12 The other *Lives* which follow this pattern are the *Aemilius-Timoleon* and the *Sertorius-Eumenes*.
accepted suggestion is that on these rare occasions Plutarch uses the Roman Life to establish a set of norms before exploiting or subverting them in the more complex secondary biography.\(^\text{13}\) In this case, Plutarch has determined that the Coriolanus is to be the model of behaviour and the Alcibiades is to serve as the more complicated character study, a notion that can hardly be debated from the numerous statements about Alcibiades’ multifaceted and twisting personality.

The consequences of this relationship between primary and secondary Lives allows us to make some interesting comparisons between the exiled Roman subjects. By taking the primary and secondary Lives as Plutarch presented them and composing a hypothetical pair of Roman Lives – a Coriolanus-Camillus – the pattern emerges once again. The Coriolanus presents the standard pattern for a Roman exile: his inflexibility and resistance to the will of the people forces him into exile and, as someone who does not follow Plutarch’s guidelines in On Exile, he strives only to seek revenge for his own downfall. The Camillus undermines the paradigm of Coriolanus. He is initially much like Coriolanus, but once exiled he embraces Plutarch’s Stoic virtues and is rewarded by his recall to Rome and subsequent acclaim.

These comparisons are broad strokes on Plutarch’s biographical canvas, but they hint at parallels in Plutarch’s compositional method. The events of the Coriolanus-Alcibiades superficially mirror those in the Themistocles-Camillus but with an emphasis on the negative aspects of their characters. They conflict with the dictums laid out in On Exile and are at variance with the otherwise commendable characterisation of other Greek and Roman exiles

\(^{13}\) Pelling 1986b, 94-6; 1988b, 23-6; Verdegem 2010, 87-8; Duff 1999, 205-6 discuss this particular compositional effect.
in the *Parallel Lives*. Coriolanus serves as a mirror to the *topos* of the Roman exiled founder by literally seeking to destroy Rome. Alcibiades seeks to undermine his lawful ostracism and spends his time in exile behaving counter to Plutarch’s qualities of a virtuous exile. In this chapter I intend to investigate the narrative of the two pairs and demonstrate how they form a thematic set focused around Plutarch’s complex definition of exile as it appears in the *Moralia* and the *Parallel Lives*. I will also show how the topics discussed in previous chapters come into play in Plutarch’s characterization of his chosen subjects and what they reveal about Plutarch’s compositional methods and his own views on the values necessary to live life as an exile virtuously despite the obvious disadvantages of banishment.

ii. Heroic Parallels

As we have previously seen, it was commonplace to imbue exiles with characteristics borrowed from stock heroic figures. It is certain that Plutarch has done the same with the four figures of these biographies given their personalities and behaviour as seen in the *Lives*. In this case we are presented with two examples of *mimesis*: Themistocles and Alcibiades are characterised as Odysseus, the exile *par excellence* and many-sided trickster. With Camillus and Coriolanus, however, the chosen example is much more unusual. It appears that the two Romans were cast in the role of Achilles, an atypical exile but nonetheless contrasting figure to the exiled Odysseus. There is evidence in the *Moralia* to suggest that Plutarch had in mind a heroic dichotomy between these two heroes, each representing an array of attributes which could manifest itself in a negative or positive way depending on the circumstance. As was the case with the *ktistic* and
ostracised exiles, the exile narratives bring their characterisation to the foreground by providing an opportunity to lay out the praiseworthy and condemnatory qualities of their nature.

I will begin with Themistocles and Alcibiades, arguably the pair of biographies with the greatest detail and significance to Plutarch. His characterisation of the two figures is highly suggestive of Odyssean archetypes reflecting the complex nature of the exiled Homeric wanderer. Odysseus has the qualities to succeed as an exile, but Plutarch was keenly aware of the complexities of his character and that his versatility and cleverness could be profoundly negative traits as well as positive. Themistocles and Alcibiades are described in similar terms as Odysseus throughout Plutarch’s *Moralia* and the *Lives*. I intend to show the complex character of Odysseus as Plutarch saw it and how he split his myth into positive and negative aspects in the characters of Themistocles and Alcibiades.

Odysseus was a complicated figure for Plutarch. He appears rarely among the *Lives* and in only a select few instances in the *Moralia* where he serves as an example for various forms of behaviour. However, Plutarch rarely speaks with certainty on his nature, describing him as both clever and scheming, counsellor and flatterer, and at once strong in self-control and susceptible to extravagance. In the *Parallel Lives* these Odyssean qualities are divided among Themistocles and Alcibiades and reflect two sides of the exiled Homeric figure. On the one hand is Themistocles whose wisdom and good counsel guided the Athenians to build a fleet and prepare for a war that only he predicted. On the other is Alcibiades who flatters and deceives his way to political power, undermining the strategies of his opponents through demagogy and a chameleon-like capacity to adapt to any circumstance.
The first line of the *Odyssey* refers to Odysseus as *polytropos* (πολύτροπος), a term with as much complexity as the characters it describes. Its definition occupies a spectrum of qualities suggesting uncertainty, versatility, craftiness, and adaptability; the *polytropos* man is many-sided and capable of almost anything in almost any circumstance. It is therefore unsurprising to find that Alcibiades is also described as *polytropos* in his character and the constantly shifting fortunes of his life. In the court of Tissaphernes it is this quality that endears him to the satrap who was allegedly fond of disreputable company (*Alc. 24.4*). For Plutarch, *polytropos* was a quality of the flatterer (κόλαξ), who uses their shifting instability to conform to their target and influence them in often unseemly ways. In *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend*, Plutarch writes that Alcibiades was the greatest flatterer for his ability to coerce and adapt by conforming to his target’s needs and expectations on a whim. To illustrate this, Plutarch enlists the use of the image of Odysseus changing identities as easily as changing his clothes and using self-deprecation to achieve his objectives. Several anecdotes about Alcibiades’ behaviour are included in both *How to Tell a Flatterer* and *Alcibiades* to illustrate his capacity for flattery. Alcibiades’ ability to conform to life in Athens, Sparta, Thrace, and the court of Tissaphernes shows Plutarch that he too is *polytropos* like Odysseus, a fact reinforced by the description in *Alcibiades.*

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14 Hom. *Od.* 1.1 - ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, μοῦσα, πολύτροπον
15 *Alc.* 24.4 - τὸ μὲν γὰρ πολύτροπον καὶ περιπτῶν αὐτοῦ τῆς δεινότητος οὐκ ὄν άπλοῦς, ἀλλὰ κακοήθης καὶ φιλοπόνηρος, ἐθαύμαζεν ὁ βάρβαρος:
16 52 – “At another time, if some easy tempered man fall in his way, who is a hard drinker and rich, ‘Then stands forth the wily Odysseus stripped of his tatters.’” (Hom. *Od.* xii.1). 52 – “Son of Tydeus, praise me not too much, nor chide me.” (Hom. *Il.* x. 249)
17 52E – “At Athens he indulged in frivolous jesting, kept a racing-stable, and led a life full of urbanity and agreeable enjoyment; in Lacedaemon he was a fighter and a hard drinker, but when he came to Tissaphernes, he took to soft living, and luxury, and pretentiousness.” *Alc* 2.1 – “His character, in later life, displayed many inconsistencies and marked changes, as was natural amid his vast undertakings and varied fortunes.” And also *Alc.* 24.4 – “For his versatility (*polytropos*) and
We can also see an obvious reuse of anecdotes in the chameleon parallel (53D, Alc. 23.4) and the line “No child of Achilles he, but Achilles himself” (Nauck. Trag. Graec. Frag., Adesp. No. 363) used to describe the adaptive ability of the flatterer to appear as whoever and whatever he chose (51B, Alc. 23.6).

If Alcibiades and Odysseus are kolax and polytropos, Plutarch’s Themistocles occupies the opposite end of the behavioural spectrum. Another of Odysseus’ epithets in Homeric works is polymetis (πολύμητις), the man of many counsels and acclaimed for his wisdom and farsightedness. Again we can look to How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend and see Odysseus now serving as a positive example, whose frank speech and gentle encouragement are commended and valued by Plutarch as qualities found in a friend (φίλος). Odysseus is praised by Plutarch for berating Agamemnon because he used “friendly concern and good sense” instead of personal enmity and emotional outburst. Plutarch’s philos – the opposite of the kolax – counsels using sound reasoning and ascribes the faults in others as the result of forces beyond their control, invoking sympathy rather than abuse as a tool for inspiring rational action. Odysseus is therefore praised for chiding Achilles for surpassing cleverness were the admiration of the Barbarian, who was no straightforward man himself, but malicious and fond of evil company.”

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18 Hom. Od. 2.129.173, 4.758.763, 5.192.214, 7.198.207.
19 66F – “Agamemnon, for instance, has no patience with Achilles who appears to have spoken with moderate frankness only, but when Odysseus assails him bitterly and says ‘Hopeless and helpless! Would you had to rule some other paltry band, not this!’ he yields and puts up with it, quieted by the friendly concern and good sense of the other’s words. For Odysseus, who had no ground for anger personally, spoke boldly to him in behalf of Greece, while Achilles seemed to be incensed chiefly on his own account.” See also Hom. Il. xiv.84.
his emotional outbursts and explaining it as fear of Troy and of facing Hector.20

Plutarch’s Themistocles is *polymetis* and counsels others without the scheming tendencies of the *kolax*. The friend, Plutarch states, is always found as a counsel (σύμβουλος) and strives to correct flaws like a physician (ίατρος).21 It is notable that Plutarch’s Themistocles also considers himself a counsellor, evidenced by his egoistic dedication to Artemis *aristoboule*, “best counsel” and the evidence for his benefactions to the Athenians in the form of his advice is scattered throughout the *Life*.22

The account of Themistocles’ appeal to the Athenians to use the silver from Laurion to build a fleet is described as such gentle encouragement. First, he is the “only one brave enough to come before the Assembly” and propose that the funds be used to build a fleet, distinguishing himself from all the other Athenians.23 His cleverness manifests when he decides not to use the distant threat of the Persians to convince the Athenians, instead leveraging their natural strife (ὄργη καὶ φιλονεικία) against Aegina to achieve his aim.24

20 *Flatterer* 74A – “Already at the sight of builded Troy/you are afraid” and “I know what ‘tis you flee; not ill repute, but Hector’s near; it is not good to stay.” These scenes Plutarch uses are not from Homer but Sophocles. Only the fragments remain. See Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Soph. no. 141 and Jebb-Pearson, *The Fragments of Sophocles*, ii. p. 205 (no. 566).

21 *Flatterer* 61D – “the friend is always found on the better side as counsel and advocate, trying, after the manner of a physician, to foster the growth of what is sound and to preserve it”

22 Note also the description of the beneficial party describes them as a physician (ίατρος). This obviously hearkens back to medical vocabulary of *Per*. 15.3, *Comp. Arist. Cat.* 3.5. Concerning the guiding hand of those best suited to lead. Themistocles fulfills this requirement and, like Aristides, was exiled by the self-destructive citizenry.

23 *Them*. 4.1 – “And so, in the first place, whereas the Athenians were wont to divide up among themselves the revenue coming from the silver mines at Laureium, he, and he alone, dared to come before the people with a motion that this division be given up, and that with these moneys triremes be constructed for the war against Aegina.”

24 *Them*. 4.2 – “Wherefore all the more easily did Themistocles carry his point, not by trying to terrify the citizens with dreadful pictures of Darius or the Persians... but
Plutarch is supportive of Themistocles’ strategy and he openly states that Themistocles’ naval plan ultimately saved the Greek world from Persian domination.\textsuperscript{25}

Themistocles’ ability to subdue his emotions for the betterment of the state (or others) is a recurring element of the \textit{Themistocles}. Plutarch writes that Themistocles voluntarily surrendered his command to Eurybiades at Artemisium against the wishes of the other Athenians – a narrative modification that highlights Themistocles’ selflessness for the greater good.\textsuperscript{26} He is also responsible for recalling the exiled Aristides, whose ostracism Themistocles himself had orchestrated, to prevent him from joining the Persians and betraying Greece.\textsuperscript{27} And again, when Xerxes had lost at Salamis we can see the same emotionless regard for the safety of Greece when Aristides rejects his proposal for pursuing Xerxes to the Hellespont and proposes that they instead help Xerxes leave Greece.\textsuperscript{28} Themistocles’ second message to Xerxes in which he offers “out of regard for the King” to delay the Greeks appears a prudent strategic manoeuvre that shows how by making opportune use of the bitter jealousy which they cherished towards Aegina in order to secure the armament he desired.”

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Them}. 4.4 – “But that salvation which the Hellenes achieved at that time came from the sea, and that it was those very triremes which restored again the fallen city of Athens, Xerxes himself bore witness, not to speak of other proofs.” See also Marr 1998, 79.

\textsuperscript{26} Marr 88. The decision to hand over his command was made almost a year earlier (\textit{Hdt}. 7.161, 8.3). Plutarch dramatizes the event by shifting the chronology as if Themistocles’ surrendering of control was more dramatic than it was.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Them}. 11. Neither \textit{Ath. Pol.} 22.8 nor Andocides 1.77, 107 say that Themistocles was responsible for the recall and Plutarch may have attributed it to Themistocles to show yet another example of his capacity to roll back on decisions that may not be beneficial for the greater good without an emotional motive. See Marr 1998, 96.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Them}. 16.3. Plutarch’s version is more favourable to Themistocles than Herodotus (8.108-110) which states that Themistocles was overruled by Eurybiades and the other Spartans instead of him gracefully withdrawing his own proposal. See Marr 1998, 112-3.
thoroughly Themistocles adopted Aristides’ plan without any emotional attachment to his own.\(^{29}\)

Another quality that ties Plutarch’s two Greeks with Odysseus is their profound ambition, a characteristic which both helps and hinders their rises to prominence. Plutarch is quite clear about the extent of Themistocles’ and Alcibiades’ ambition and elevates it to one of their most prominent traits. The two Lives share repeated mentions of the descriptor \emph{philotimia} (φιλοτιμία) which is literally translated to a ‘love of honour’ and it serves as a driving force for their behaviour. Themistocles’ \emph{philotimia} is said to have made him lose sleep and shirk social responsibilities over Miltiades’ victory at Marathon because he had not yet achieved similar renown.\(^{30}\) In his ambition (φιλοτιμία) he “surpassed all men” and that he even pursued his role as Choragos with “haste and ambition” (σπουδὴν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν).\(^{31}\)

Alcibiades is also shown to be ambitious, but we see that his ambition takes a distinctly darker and more complicated tone. Alcibiades’ ambition takes the form of a cloud of overlapping terms: \emph{philodoxia}, a love of fame; \emph{philoneikos}, a love of strife; and \emph{philoprotos}, a love of primacy. Like Themistocles, his ambition is his defining feature and his \emph{philoneikos} and \emph{philoprotos} were his greatest passions.\(^{32}\) His ambition is described as a weakness as Plutarch describes in his early days that his corrupters (διαφθείροντες) appealed to his \emph{philodoxia} (φιλοδοξία).\(^{33}\) He is only once described as having genuine

\(^{29}\) Them. 16.4. Compare this to Hdt. 8.108-110 and Plut. Arist. 9.6 where Themistocles’ message to Xerxes is not a clever tactic to rush him out of Greece, but an authentic initiative for Xerxes’ favour. See Marr 1998, 112-3.

\(^{30}\) Them. 3.3-4 – Only Plutarch’s account contains this particularly revealing anecdote and it demonstrates both his ambition and his foresightedness which contributes to his role as counsellor.

\(^{31}\) Them. 5.2-4.

\(^{32}\) Alc. 2.1 - τὸ φιλόνεικον ἱσχυρότατον ἢν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον.

\(^{33}\) Alc. 6.3.
philotimia: on his return to Athens after his first exile Plutarch writes that some “respectable ambition” (φιλοτιμία τις οὔκ ἀγεννής) compelled him to stay aboard his ship. The rest of the time, says Plutarch, his transgressions were forgiven by the Athenians and described as the product of “youth and ambition”.

Plutarch’s descriptors illustrate once again the opposing parallels between the two exiled Greeks. Themistocles’ love of honour is noble and laudable while Alcibiades’ love of fame (coupled with his love of strife and primacy) places them on two opposing sides of ambition. Here, again, we can see the parallels to Odysseus. In Are Beasts Rational Plutarch overplays Odysseus’ ambition to an extreme. His ambition (φιλοτιμία) is what drives him to ask Circe what he can do to return his men to human form, and she responds by describing him as “most ambitious of men” (φιλοτιμότατ᾽ ἀνθρώπων).

We have seen that the allusions to Odysseus in the characterisation of Themistocles and Alcibiades inspired associations with the exiled Homeric hero, and it is worth investigating whether the same or similar associations exist in the Lives of Camillus and Coriolanus. In these Lives we find two who could not be less like Odysseus. For Plutarch, these men were not schemers or politicians or orators; they were consummate soldiers and their Lives are replete with examples of their abilities. Camillus first achieved fame in a battle against the Aequians and Volscians (2.1), he fought against the Falerians and Capenates (2.6), he conquered the Faliscans (5.2), ended the siege of Veii (5.3, 7.1), and took the city of Falerii (10.5) all before the Gallic occupation.

34 Alc. 34.2.
35 Alc. 16.3 - παιδιάς καὶ φιλοτιμίας.
and his exile. Similarly, the Coriolanus begins with his first battle against the exiled king Tarquin (3.2) and Plutarch writes that:

πολλών γε τοι τότε Ρωμαίοις ἀγώνων καὶ πολέμων γενομένων, ἐξ οὔδενος ἀστεφάνωτος ἦλθεν οὔδ᾽ ἀγέραστος.

"Many indeed were the wars and conflicts which the Romans waged in those days, and from none did he return without laurels and rewards of valour." (Cor. 4.2. Trans. Perrin)

Coriolanus’ fondness for war (πολεμικοῦς ἀγώνας) and gracelessness (ἄχαρις) make any comparison to a traditional Odysseus figure nearly impossible; yet he is not without a heroic parallel. In this case, Plutarch draws upon aspects of Achilles in their characterisation, their moments of exile, and the circumstances surrounding their return.36

Plutarch’s Achilles and Coriolanus share very similar qualities: bravery (ἀνδρείος), fighting ability, and anger (θυμόω).37 But, like his portrait of Odysseus, Plutarch gives credit to Achilles for other unexpected qualities. Achilles’ refusal to allow Priam to see Hector’s body demonstrated foresight and to avoid an unnecessary emotional exchange, and his resistance to sexual desire and grief in pursuit of his duty and obligation demonstrates self-control.38 Plutarch’s Achilles is not a wholly negative or positive man, but an example of how an individual with great potential can falter if he lacks the ability to properly moderate his passions. His virtues are undercut by a lack of kindness (οὐ γιλτκύθμορ ὡν οὔδ’ ἀγανόυμψν) and a ‘terrible’ nature (δεινὸρ ἀνήτπ, οἴρ καὶ άναίσιον αἰσιάαζθαι).39 This is particularly applicable

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36 Several others have picked up on this connection: Ogilvie 1965, 315 links them through their sacks of cities and their exiles; Grossardt 2009, 25 identifies similarities in the sack of Veii to the narrative surrounding Coriolanus. Cf. Wardman 1974, 44, 75, 77. Nerdahl 2012 suggests that the Achillean references in Camillus and Coriolanus also tie them to the Aristides.

37 For bravery see Mor. 243d, Cor. 1.3; fighting ability see Mor. 471f quoting Il. 13.105-6, Cor. 2.2; for anger see Cor. 1.3, 21.2, Mor. 26f, 30b.

38 Mor. 31a-b; cf. Il. 24.560-84 and Mor. 33a; cf. Il. 24.128.32.

39 Mor. 67a
to Coriolanus, who Plutarch says lacked the paideia to curb his anger and react appropriately.\textsuperscript{40}

Plutarch’s descriptions of Achilles’ qualities are necessary to understand how he perceived the Homeric hero’s virtues and vices, but just as important are the passages Plutarch chooses to represent his points. Often when Plutarch references Achilles he does so as a counterpoint to Odysseus who we have already seen was a clear inspiration for his two exiled Greek Lives. In these occasions Odysseus takes on the role of a moderating influence against Achilles’ headstrong and passionate temper. These two figures are set against one another in both the Moralia and the Lives and we consistently see Odysseus attempting to restrain Achilles in his heated moments. Plutarch clearly saw them as two opposing, but influential, forces and we can see at Ages. 5.4 that he believes Homer was attempting to show the value of conflict to produce better results. However, Plutarch believes that discord was most injurious to states and should be avoided.

In Adolescens 13 Plutarch describes a scene where Odysseus rebukes Achilles for refusing to join the Greeks on their campaign to Troy.\textsuperscript{41} Odysseus is praised for chastising Achilles for not considering his lineage before acting, a rule which Plutarch seems keen to apply to all manners of unvirtuous behaviour. Achilles is behaving selfishly, and it takes Odysseus’ counsel to inform him that his lineage demands greater behaviour. In Cor. 36.2 we see

\begin{footnotes}
\item[40] Plut. Cor. 1.3.
\end{footnotes}
a similar event where Coriolanus’ mother Volumnia pleads for him to halt his attack on Rome not for its sake, but for hers.\footnote{The focus of her plea in Plutarch is on Coriolanus’ family and lineage, not for the benefits of his home country. This focus is not in App. Ital. 1.4-5 or Livy 2.40 (which focuses on his country). DH 8.53-4 has both.}

Plutarch uses more examples in the *Iliad* and elsewhere to demonstrate the strange relationship he perceived between Achilles and Odysseus. Odysseus’ brutal honesty supersedes Achilles’ angry fault-finding in virtue when the two confront Agamemnon (*II*. 14.84). Achilles’ hostility undermines his attempt to change Agamemnon’s mind while Odysseus’ advice was given on behalf of all Greece. Again, we see Odysseus’ particular blend of honesty and frankness countering Achilles’ brash emotion when Plutarch praises Odysseus for revealing that Achilles’ anger was actually the result of the fear of facing Troy and Hector (*Adulator* 33). Here Odysseus is praised for pushing Achilles through honest chiding and frankness.

Even when Plutarch praises Achilles for using foresight and reason to avoid a heated exchanged with Priam during the handover of Hector’s body (*Adolescens* 11), Odysseus still manages to do it better. Not only was he able to restrain himself when enraged, but he also strives to dissuade Telemachus from a similar uncontrolled outburst which demonstrates his own self-control and the wherewithal to restrain the emotions of others.

### iii. The Events of the *Lives*

Now that I have shown that Plutarch’s characterisation of Themistocles and Alcibiades share traits with the Homeric Odysseus, I intend to investigate how Plutarch forms their exile narratives to conform to his ideals for the virtuous
exile. The broad strokes of each exile are essentially identical: both gain
renown in Athens, both earn the envy (phthonos) of the Athenians, and both
face ostracism at the hands of the envious populace. Once exiled, they are
both given the opportunity to collude with Athens’ enemies, they both find
asylum in foreign lands, and they both retreat to the East to join with Persian
representatives. However, the narrative in the Alcibiades appears, like the
character of Alcibiades, to be a negative reflection of the narrative in the
Themistocles. Whatever Themistocles achieves through versatility,
Alcibiades achieves through scheming. When Themistocles falls victim to
ostracism, Alcibiades subverts it. When given the chance to betray Athens
Themistocles remains loyal while Alcibiades leaps at the opportunity. These
events are all described as a result of flaws in Alcibiades’ character as one
that struggles to succeed in exile.

Themistocles’ exile is relatively straightforward and follows the trends seen in
the Lives of other ostracised Athenians. As discussed before, Themistocles
provides benefactions which lead to envy (Them. 22.1), popular indignation,
and finally ostracism (Them. 22.3). The notion that the ostracised happen to
be those who are most capable of benefiting the city is on display, and the
events leading up to his ostracism create anecdotal instances of
characterization which contribute to his elevation in the eyes of the reader
and his diminishment in the eyes of the populace.

What makes the Alcibiades unusual is the reversal of the pattern present in
the Themistocles. The ostracism of Themistocles is the culmination of his
Athenian political career and the result of his self-aggrandizing causing envy
and discontent among the people. With Alcibiades, however, we see the
inverse. Despite the fact that Alcibiades first enters public life in Alc. 10.1,
Plutarch reiterates that he was new on the political scene when Hyperbolus called for his ostracism (*Alc*. 13.1). Alcibiades’ ability to turn the ostracism against Hyperbolus is a powerful piece of characterization and demonstrates not only Alcibiades’ political acumen, but also his demagogic nature, his adaptability, and his Odyssean cleverness to usurp and undermine the system. However, as previously mentioned, the purpose of ostracism was to vent the envy of the populace and provide a relatively lenient form of exile with benefits befitting the individual’s status in the city. Alcibiades is too clever for his own good. By saving himself in the short term he tarnishes and makes ostracism worthless forever (according to Plutarch) while depriving the citizenry of their legal recourse for growing internal pressure. By choosing not to succumb to exile and allowing the safety valve of democratic ostracism to purge the destructive forces of the *demos*, Alcibiades condemns himself to the consequences of discord and becomes the target of the more significant charge of *asebia* when he is (falsely, according to Plutarch) accused of leading miscreants to deface the statues in Athens.

At the outset of their exiles, Themistocles and Alcibiades have parallel experiences. It is universally agreed that neither returned to Athens to face their accusers, opting instead to be tried and sentenced *in absentia* (Marr 1998, 134 for Themistocles, Thuc. 6.61.7 for Alcibiades). Both are given the opportunity to betray Athens (*Them*. 23, *Alc*. 23). After being exiled, the two were both “tarrying in Argos” (23.1 for both - διατρίβοντος ἐν Ἀργεί/ ἐν Ἀργεί διατρίβων) and had their loyalty tested. Thucydides attests to the idea that Themistocles was in Argos following his ostracism (Thuc. 1.135.3) but does not agree with Plutarch on whether Alcibiades spent time there, instead

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43 *Alc*. 13.1, 10.2.
saying that Alcibiades went directly from Thurii to the Peloponnese (Thuc. 6.61.7). Argos would have been a logical place for Alcibiades to flee due to his connections with the Argives, but Thuc. 6.61.3 suggests there was trouble there and he might not be welcome. Plutarch is either relying on a different and lost tradition placing Alcibiades in Argos prior to going to Sparta, or Plutarch has placed him there to parallel the first actions of Themistocles after his exile, or both.

In the Lives both men are given an opportunity to betray their homelands after traveling in Argos. Themistocles, Plutarch says, was approached by Pausanias with an offer to join him against Athens, an offer Themistocles promptly refused (Them. 23.2). Alcibiades, on the other hand, reached out to the Spartans and offered his services against Athens, an offer they accepted (Alc. 23.1). Loyalty to one’s city is not a virtue mentioned in On Exile. In fact, Plutarch appears to be espousing severing ties to any notion of homeland and living as a ‘citizen of the world’. In this respect Themistocles is behaving as an exile should and not begrudging his homeland. Alcibiades, on the other hand, actively sought out the opportunity to betray Athens to Sparta and immediately begin attacking Athens militarily and politically by engaging with them in Syracuse, stirring up anti-Athenian sentiment, and fortifying the strategic Attic citadel of Deceleia, which Plutarch says “more than anything else wrought ruin and destruction to his native city” (Alc. 23.2). Themistocles’ behaviour at the outset of his exile is exemplary. He begins by crossing over to Corcyra, a place he allegedly helped previously (Them. 24). Plutarch does not mention that when the Corcyreans were presented with the demands of

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44 Ellis 65, n. 86.
45 Ellis 65, n. 86. Nepos says he went from Thurii to Elis, then to Thebes.
Athens and Sparta to return Themistocles, they refused him sanctuary and prompted his flight to Epirus (Thuc. 1.136)

Here we must compare not only the events of the Themistocles and Alcibiades with one another, but also the paradigms of a virtuous exile as demonstrated in On Exile. The virtuous exile, he says, can adapt to their surroundings and establish themselves wherever they happen to be (De Ex. 7) and specifically mentions Themistocles as an example. After leaving Corcyra he went to seek refuge with Admetus, king of the Molossians, who held a grudge against Themistocles for an earlier slight (Them. 24.2). In order to win his sanctuary, Themistocles took the king’s son in his arms and threw himself on the hearth in an act which Plutarch describes as “most sacred, and as almost the only one that might not be refused” (Them. 24.3). Plutarch concedes that it might have been the king’s wife Phthia who cooperated with Themistocles and rehearsed the sacred supplication rites with him. This account mostly follows Thucydides (1.136-137) with only a few small exceptions. Thucydides includes a passage where Themistocles declares himself “now the weaker” in his exile, a notion that Plutarch omits.

This act of supplication by Themistocles appears as mostly unmodified from Thucydides and we can be certain that Plutarch was following his account despite several other differing accounts in Nepos and Diodorus. What is presented, therefore, is a scene of cooperation, humility, and cultural adaptability which Plutarch praises and contributes to his depiction of a virtuous exile. Here Themistocles can assimilate a foreign culture through cooperation with a foreign queen with no sign of hostility, envy, or undue

46 Marr 1998, 140.
pride. Themistocles’ supplication scene echoes another Odyssean parallel: in the *Odyssey* (7.133-81) Odysseus becomes the supplicant of King Alcinous by following the instructions of Queen Arete.

What, then, of Alcibiades? We have seen that the two men shared a capability for transformation and adaptability, but here is where Plutarch expands on the nature of Alcibiades’ shifting nature. During his exile in Sparta, Plutarch writes that he blended in with the populace: he kept his hair untrimmed, he took cold baths, and ate the simple meals of the Lacedaemonians (*Alc. 23.3*). Plutarch calls him a chameleon, and there was nothing he could not “imitate and practice” (*Alc. 23.4*). His ability to adapt his behaviour is seemingly unmatched, but Plutarch warns that appearances can be deceiving. At first glance one might say that “no child of Achilles he, but Achilles himself,” but his character never actually changed and he remained “the selfsame woman still” (*Alc. 23.6*). Alcibiades’ changes are temporary and superficial, suited only for achieving his own ambitious aims. Unlike Themistocles, whose interactions with the king’s wife were cooperative, Alcibiades ‘corrupted’ (διαφθείρω) Timaea, the wife of king Agis, and had a child with her so that his descendants could be kings of Sparta (*Alc. 23.7*). The historicity of this account is hotly debated and Plutarch’s account derives mainly from Xenophon and Duris of Samos. While no other source agrees with every

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47 Lenardon 1978, 128 compares this scene to the Telephus’ supplication to Agamemnon preserved in fragments from Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. In this, Telephus seizes Agamemnon’s son Orestes at the advice of Clytemnestra and threatens to kill him to obtain Agamemnon’s help. The similarities are striking, and Plutarch’s use of the word συντραγῳδῆσαι suggests a direct parallel to the scene from the tragedy.

48 Lenardon 1978, 129.

element of Plutarch’s story, Plutarch’s decision to structure the *Alcibiades* in a way that mirrors the events of the *Themistocles* suggests a greater parallel.

Following the account of Alcibiades at Sparta, the narrative skips ahead by over two years, bypassing the Sicilian expedition entirely and greatly compressing Alcibiades’ efforts to incite rebellions among Athenian allies (*Alc. 24*). Thucydides (book 8) contains considerable detail about Alcibiades’ actions during this time but it is enough for Plutarch’s aims to say that he continued to damage the Athenian cause while in exile with Sparta (24.1). He continually reinforces the notion that Alcibiades in exile is more injurious to Athens than his demagogic leadership.

Both men flee to the East out of fear: Themistocles feared being discovered and handed over to the Athenians (*Them. 25*), Alcibiades feared Agis who had sent out orders for Alcibiades to be put to death in part for his behaviour with Timaea and in part because of Alcibiades’ reputation earned by inciting the Ionian revolts (*Alc. 24*). Plutarch attributes the Spartan reaction to Alcibiades as the result of envy (*phthonos*), a condition which appears to dog both the Athenian exiles throughout their lives (*Alc. 24.2*). The *phthonos* of Alcibiades exists as a consequence of his initial subversion of his Athenian ostracism. By subverting and reversing (and perverting, if Plutarch is to be believed) the practice, Alcibiades deprived the citizens of their method of alleviating envy which has consequences hinted at in *Them. 22.3*.

There is another set of striking similarities between the end of Themistocles’ *Life* and that of Alcibiades. Both men find themselves in Asia after earning the trust and admiration of their Persian hosts and both are targeted by assassination attempts. Both men receive prophetic dreams hinting at the
attempts on their lives. Themistocles’ came in the form of a warning from the Mother of the Gods (τὴν μητέρα τῶν θεῶν) to stay away from the village of Leontocephalum while on his way to “deal with Hellenic affairs” (Them. 30.1). Alcibiades’ dream is described as either being a vision of him wearing a courtesan’s clothes and makeup or a scene of his own beheading and burning (Alc. 39.2).

Alcibiades differs from Themistocles in one particular aspect: he orchestrated a return to Athens and was subsequently exiled for a second time. Interestingly, on both occasions the story repeats itself: he feared the Spartans (Alc. 24, 37) and, being unwelcome in Athens, chooses to go east and throw his lot in with the Persians. At this point Plutarch makes an overt comparison to Themistocles possibly originating from Aesch. Alc. Frag. 9: “placing his head upon my knees he wept for despair, thinking he was not even close to Themistocles in his preparation.” Going over to the Persians was not in itself uncommon; Miltiades the Elder and Aristides both committed themselves in some fashion to the Persian side. However, only Alcibiades had the opportunity to go east twice. However, as in all cases of Alcibiades’ exile, his adaptability was superficial. Plutarch writes that his pursuers finally caught up with him and murdered him at his house in Phrygia (Alc. 39.1). He gives two possible reasons for his murder: either the satrap Pharnabazus was not totally endeared to Alcibiades and gave in to Lysander’s demands to have him assassinated (Alc. 39.1), or that Alcibiades corrupted (διαφθείρω) a girl from a well-known family (Alc. 39.5). Her brothers, outraged at his insolence, then took it upon themselves to murder Alcibiades.

The depiction of the deaths of Alcibiades and Themistocles are representative of their characters and their virtues in exile. Alcibiades’ death
is his own fault regardless of the account you choose to believe. If he was murdered by Pharnabazus’ brother at the behest of Lysander, then Alcibiades was not fully able to adapt to life in exile and his efforts to gain the support of the Persian satrap were, as always, superficial. If he was murdered by the family of the girl whom he ‘corrupted’ then we see that the same relentless ambition and wanton disrespect that was demonstrated in Sparta was his undoing. Themistocles’ suicide is much more praiseworthy. Plutarch writes that in his final moments Themistocles felt no grudge towards his former fellow-citizens and felt no ambition to continue proving himself in more wars, so he felt the best way to preserve his achievements was to end his own life (Them. 31.4-5). Once again, we see Themistocles chooses the best counsel (ἄριστα βουλευσάμενος) and opts to commit suicide instead of choosing between the land of his birth and the home of his choice. He fulfils Plutarch’s criteria for the virtuous exile by holding no ill-will towards Athens and establishing himself in the court of the Persian king. His ambition is also clearly on display and by committing suicide he was, in Plutarch’s eyes, able to maintain his renown and augment it with his reputation in Persia.

The Camillus and the Coriolanus both begin with prologues introducing the subjects of the biographies and the themes which will be emphasized throughout the Lives. Camillus (1.1-2) provides us with an account of the circumstances in Rome during this time and hints at the conflict between the plebs and the patricians at the time. This will eventually serve as the foundation for the exile narratives in both the Camillus and the Coriolanus, and their characterisation will explain how they managed to isolate and enrage the populace. Plutarch’s explanation of the conflict is absent in the introduction to the Coriolanus – perhaps it was meant to be implied from the
Camillus – and Plutarch spends much more time explaining Coriolanus’ personal weaknesses: his natural abilities as a leader are undercut by a lack of paideia (1.2). In both these Roman Lives Plutarch focuses on their moment of exile, where they pack up their belongings, say their farewells, and remove themselves from the city. Camillus, having been accused of misappropriation of booty, chooses to go into exile in his wrath (ὀργή) towards the ungrateful populace (Cam. 12.2). Coriolanus – also fuelled by his rage (ὀργή) – prepares to leave the city after having been found guilty and sentenced to banishment (Cor. 21.1). Both men then return home to bid farewell to their families and then turned to leave by the city gate (Cam. 12.3, Cor. 21.3). What happens next is a remarkable use of imagery and characterisation for both of Plutarch’s Roman exiles. He writes that Camillus turned and raised his arms towards the Capitol and, like Achilles (ὡς περ ἂχιλλης – 13.1), prayed to the gods that if his exile was unjust (εἰ μὴ δικαίως – 12.3) then the Romans would quickly realise that they needed and wanted Camillus back. Camillus’ prayer at the gates is a reference to the scene in the Iliad (1.407-412) where Achilles describes his own prayer when he withdrew from the Trojan war that that the Greeks would face swift retribution for his mistreatment at the hands of Agamemnon. Here Plutarch is clearly drawing on a historical tradition found in both Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus but, as Nerdahl (2012) suggests, he is likely to be the “first author to compare Camillus’ prayer explicitly to that of Achilles.”

Camillus’ behaviour at the moment of exile demonstrates the qualities Plutarch intended to highlight in his biography. His wrath clearly established (12.3), Camillus’ piety takes centre stage and his appeal to the heavens

comes with a condition not present in Achilles': that the Romans would quickly find reason to ask for him to return if, and only if, his exile was deemed to be unjust and the product of “the wantonness of the demos and the abuse of the envious” (ἀλλ’ ὃβρει δήμου καὶ φθόνω προτηλακιζόμενος ἐκπίπτει – 12.3). In this one scene Plutarch provides the reader with a summation of Camillus’ character focused around the moment of exile. His emulation of Achilles speaks to his success in war and his mistreatment, his prayer reinforces his piety\(^{51}\), the conditions of his curse demonstrate his desire for justice (δικαιοσύνη)\(^{52}\), and we are given the sense that even in his lowest point Camillus is more than capable of exercising moderation (μετριότης) towards his fellow citizens, even if it was not enough to prevent his exile.\(^{53}\)

Despite all the other Achillean qualities Coriolanus is said to possess, his moment of exile does not include a prayer or an appeal for justice; Coriolanus does not have Camillus’ piety, moderation, or sense of justice. In fact, Plutarch says that Coriolanus’ virtues were publicly called “self-control, fortitude, and justice” but on closer examination he is described as “ungracious, burdensome, and arrogant.”\(^{54}\) Instead, Coriolanus burned with a white-hot rage.\(^{55}\) Once he arrived at the city gate, Plutarch makes a point of saying that Coriolanus left “without taking anything or asking for anything” (οὔτε τι λαβὼν οὔτε τινὸς δεηθεὶς - 21.3). We can see the contrast between Camillus and Coriolanus in their behaviour at this point.

\(^{51}\) Camillus’ piety is the focal point of several scenes. \textit{Cam.} 5.1-2, 5.5-7, 6.1-3, 32.4-5.
\(^{52}\) Most specifically in \textit{Cam.} 10.6-7.
\(^{53}\) \textit{Cam.} 1.3.
\(^{54}\) \textit{Cor.} 1.3 - ἐγκράτειαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν… ἐπαχθὴ καὶ ἀχαρίν καὶ ὀλυγαρχικὴν ἐδυσχέραιον
\(^{55}\) \textit{Cor.} 21.1-2. Coriolanus’ behaviour was apparently so contradictory that Plutarch felt he needed to explain it. When pain is transformed into anger, he says, it burns away the “humility and sloth” and drives a person to action.
Camillus and Coriolanus spend their time in exile very differently, and we can see how Plutarch’s guide to live as a virtuous exile can be applied to their behaviour. Initially both men are faced with the issue of relocation, a task they are both seemingly well-suited to. Camillus goes to live with Ardeans while Coriolanus does not take long to throw in his lot with the Volscians. At face value both abide by Plutarch’s lesson on cosmopolitanism in *De Exilio* 5, as Themistocles and Alcibiades did as well, but we find that, like Alcibiades, Coriolanus remains intent on returning to Rome as a vengeful conqueror. Plutarch states quite clearly that both men harboured thoughts of leaving their life in exile: Camillus wanted to meet the Gauls who invaded Rome headlong (23.2), and Coriolanus wanted to return to Rome to seek revenge on those who exiled him (21.4).

In his speech to the Volscian leader (23.3) Coriolanus states that he had been driven out of Rome by “the envy and insolence of the Roman people” (ἄλλα ὧμοι πάντα φθόνω δήμου καὶ ὑβρει – 23.3), a phrase which almost exactly mirrors that of Camillus’ prayer as he goes into exile (ἄλλα ὑβρεί δήμου καὶ φθόνω προπηλακιζόμενος ἐκπίπτει – 12.3). Once again Plutarch makes his anti-populace bias quite clear and he blames their undue and emotional *phthonos* for exiling Rome’s most capable citizens.

Further contrasts exist between Camillus’ and Coriolanus’ decisions to return to Rome. We have discussed previously how Camillus’ objective was to return to the place of exile in order to liberate it from the Gallic occupation, while Coriolanus’ objective was its complete destruction. On the one hand, Camillus is the *ktistic* exile while Coriolanus serves as his destructive

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56 A few days according to Cor. 21.4 - ἡμέρας δ’ ὀλίγας
counterpart. However, Camillus appears to continue upholding Plutarch’s Stoic-Cynic philosophy on exile when he demanded that the citizens who remained on the Capitol legally recalled him and elected him to carry out the military action (24.3). On the other hand, Coriolanus had no intention of upholding the laws of Rome, deciding instead to falsely plant evidence that the Volscians intended to set Rome ablaze during some games. The Romans then announced that all Volscians must leave the city, providing them with the impetus to reignite the conflict between the two peoples (26.2). Coriolanus’ deceit is attested to in Livy (11.37.1-7) but not in Dionysius (DH viii.4-10), where the blame is placed solely on Aufidius.

Camillus’ desire to uphold the laws of the city further contributes to his role as a *ktistic* exile when paired with Plutarch’s account of the Romans who demanded his return. The Romans said that “he is no longer an exile, nor are we citizens, now that our country is no more, but is mastered by the enemy” (24.2). The symbolic destruction of the city provides Camillus with the opportunity to keep the Roman identity and government intact by providing a way to legitimize himself and maintain their legal traditions despite the city being all but lost. We can also see here another link to the positive Greek exile Themistocles when he convinced the Athenians to abandon Athens and take to their ships (*Them.* 11.4).

Plutarch’s good exiles appear to understand that the identity of a city is greater than its location, a logical extension of his views in *On Exile*. An exiled person is no less great than one with a homeland, nor is a citizenry any less of a city if it lacks a physical and set location. Camillus and Themistocles symbolically keep Rome and Athens alive when they are occupied and destroyed while Alcibiades and Coriolanus were happy to do their homelands
harm if it fulfilled their personal objectives. The ability to live happily in a foreign country is acceptable for one of Plutarch’s exiles, but it is preferable to continue doing what is best for the homeland even while in exile. Themistocles and Camillus are both ‘good’ exiles: they accept the will of the people and choose exile without further conflict, they do no harm to their homelands once in exile, and, in Themistocles’ case, is able to continue acquiring glory in the court of his enemies. Coriolanus and Alcibiades, on the other hand, quarrel and conflict with their homelands out of excessive and selfish ambition. Their new homes are only steppingstones to get them to their objectives and they have no intention of adapting to a new life peacefully and without complaint.

iv. Conclusion

The *Lives* of Themistocles and Alcibiades present the stories of two Athenians driven by relentless ambition to expand the influence of their city through political and military means. In time they are both exiled by the whims of an envious populace, given opportunities for revenge, and spend time seeking asylum in foreign lands. In the end they both turn eastward to spend their exiles in the court of Persian nobility and die far from home. Themistocles is often vilified for his actions in exile, but Plutarch’s account is much more sympathetic than it may seem. His behaviour leading to his exile is justified as an act of self-defence, his ostracism unjust, his behaviour in exile is praiseworthy, and his conduct in Persia demonstrates that he is Plutarch’s virtuous exile. Alcibiades is the opposite. He subverts the public means of venting their envy, his extravagance flew in the face of Athenian ideals, he sought every opportunity to damage the Athenian cause while in
exile, and he can only integrate with his foreign hosts superficially before inevitably earning their ire and is forced to flee again.

Plutarch’s characterization is heavily informed by the Homeric Odysseus, known for his exilic wanderings in order to find his way home. Like a prism, Plutarch splits the Odyssean qualities into two distinctly polar interpretations that at once invites comparisons to the Homeric hero as well as propel the individual narratives. Themistocles is *philos, iatros, and polymetis* – frank-speaking friend, corrective physician, and wise counsellor to the Athenian people. Alcibiades is *kolax and polytropos* – the flattering, scheming chameleon.

Their exiles reinforce the notion of a tyrannical Athenian ochlocracy which seems willing to expel its best citizens and embrace the worst. Themistocles – *philos, iatros, and polymetis* – is condemned and exiled despite his constant benefactions to the city; Alcibiades – *kolax and polytropos* – is exiled, fought against, and welcomed back only to be exiled again. Together they help paint an unflattering image of the Athenian *demos* as fickle and emotional, unwilling to accept the rule of their betters and content to enact the whims of their demagogues who appeal to their baser demands. This is Plutarch’s objective with the exile narratives: to present a clearly anti-democratic position regarding fifth century Athens and to imbue the *demos* with a set of qualities echoing the very tyrannical citizens they strove to expel.
Chapter VII. Conclusion

When it comes to Plutarch’s views on the condition of exile it is tempting to regard *On Exile* as a summation of his philosophical thought. After all, it is a treatise dedicated entirely to the subject and contains obvious indicators that it was addressed to a single individual whom he felt was worthy of his time and effort; the sentiments, although platitudinous, appear genuine and heartfelt, and the philosophical arguments are wide-ranging and exhaustive. At first glance, we are given no reason to doubt Plutarch’s efforts in composing this treatise, but a closer reading suggests *On Exile* is inconsistent with other Plutarchan works.

*On Exile* is intrinsically bound by the rigid format of its genre. Plutarch was not the first to write a consolation on exile, and his contribution contains many of the stereotypical examples argued in other consolation works. It follows patterns found in Teles, Seneca, Favorinus, and others who examined the philosophical aspects of exile and reuses examples set centuries before his own composition. Exile consolation treatises dismiss the inherent consequences of exile through Stoic arguments denying any intrinsic evil in forced banishment. They espouse the values of cosmopolitanism and diminish the value of the *polis* in favour of the *cosmos*. The *patris* changes from the land of one’s family and property into one of many temporary and unnatural human inventions designed to isolate us from the greater world, and exiles who lament their condition are chastised and belittled for behaving like insects bound to their little hives. Exiles are encouraged to take inspiration from several *mimetic* examples used throughout time as proof that banishment is no sorrowful condition, providing they strive for the mental and
spiritual conditioning to succeed, and are praised for separating themselves from civilisation to pursue lives of leisure, philosophy, and freedom.

Plutarch’s *On Exile* follows the same set patterns as others, but within the rest of the *Moralia* we bear witness to contradictions and inconsistencies which render his arguments dubious and unconvincing. In *On Exile* he praises the Stoic mindset and the necessary value of it as a tool for re-examination, while he condemns the Stoics for their hypocrisy elsewhere. He claims that the exile should rid themselves of the importance of the *patris* while praising others for fighting tooth and nail to return to their homelands. He appears to be confused about whether violence is appropriate to overturn one’s own banishment, and even more so when confronted with the issue of the loss of civic rights. In one work he claims that politics is essential to promoting the welfare of humanity, but in *On Exile* he espouses liberation from those very same duties.

It is clear that the *On Exile* is a product of its genre and of Plutarch’s desire to address a wide audience. By avoiding any discussion of the causes of exile and incorporating a wide variety of Stoic, Cynic, Pythagorean, and Peripatetic arguments, *On Exile* is addressed to everyone yet reaches no one. It is a collection of platitudes and stereotypes which provides little original insight into the causes and problems of exile that many faced throughout the ancient world. If one could simply mitigate the loss of property and family through philosophical thought, there would be no need to write a consolation. It is for these reasons that we must turn to the *Lives* for practical examples of exile: its causes, consequences, and an examination of what it meant to be exiled from Athens and Rome in the ancient world.
Nearly every exiled Roman mentioned in *On Exile* is given his own biography in the *Parallel Lives* and we find that there are remarkable patterns which link them together beyond the themes present between their designated Greek pairs. Plutarch’s Roman exiles almost all fall under the thematic patterns of founding exiles, those who are involved in the establishment or preservation of their homelands through their exile narratives. These exiles are the only ones Plutarch describes as *ktistai Rhomes* - Founders of Rome. I have shown how Plutarch used the term *ktistes* not in the sense of the platitudinous *ktistes kai euergetes* bestowed upon citizens held in high esteem, but in a manner suggestive of their recognition as one of a line of foundational Roman exiles stretching back to Romulus. These four exiles - Romulus, Camillus, Cicero, and Marius - share elements of exile, foundation, humble beginnings, and divine intervention which suggest Plutarch had a pattern in mind.

For Plutarch, the life of a Founder of Rome followed a similar pattern and one important aspect linking them together was exile. Romulus was exiled as a child from Alba Longa, while Cicero, Camillus, and Marius were all exiled from Rome. However, the events surrounding their exiles suggest the wider theme of *concordia* which presides over all the *Lives* of exiled statesmen. All of Plutarch’s *ktistic* exiles are based around the concept of *concordia*: Romulus’ founding of Rome was based on harmony between classes, Camillus’ dedication of a temple to Concord (which is rejected by Livy), and Cicero’s extrajudicial execution of the Catilinarian conspirators were all done to maintain internal harmony within the city. Cicero learned through his appeals that he could maintain concord in Rome by abandoning it and allowing the city to evolve without factionalism or strife caused by his presence.
The revenge exiles, therefore, react counter to the notion of *concordia*. These three - Marius, Coriolanus, and Sertorius - all behave in ways hostile to the harmonious operation of the Roman state. By refusing to accept the terms of his exile, Coriolanus sought to destroy Rome. Sertorius' manifest corruption of the Roman Senate was a bastardization of the harmonious rule of the Roman state. Marius, whose nature is revealed by false signs of prophecy and treacherous behaviour, perverts *concordia* on his return, asking for a legal vote to reinstate him and slaughtering the city which behaved harmoniously to accept his return. The concept of *concordia* is at the heart of Plutarch's perception of the role of the statesman. By going into exile, the *ktistic* exile takes on the mimetic role of Romulus and becomes a link in the chain of *ktistic* founders ultimately essential to the concept of the Roman state. To avoid or reject one's exile was to deny the city a harmonious act of balancing the power between classes and reducing factionalism among the people.

The *Lives* of the ostracised Athenians expands on that concept by answering the question of why a city would expel a citizen in the pursuit of *concordia*. Plutarch believes that the politician or general statesman was powerless against the capricious mob; the passionate *demos*, uneducated in the ways of philosophy and unable to control their base and destructive *phthonos*, was indicative of internal discord in the city. This is made clear by Plutarch's statements on the nature of ostracism. It was not a penalty, nor was it a method for deterring tyrants, but was a way for the *demos* to express its envy towards a particular individual and in so doing re-establish harmony (or *omonoia*) in the civil polity. It is revealing that in almost all cases the ostracised exile is recalled by a repentant populace eager to remedy its
mistakes because it shows how an educated and virtuous statesman can act as a symbolic pharmakos by accepting the ostracism vote and going into exile for the benefit of Athens. The repeated mentions of recall and repentance are Plutarch’s way of saying that the uneducated populace is rarely correct but must be appeased for the greater good.

The case of Alcibiades remains an interesting anomaly because, like the revenge exiles, he subverted the means of establishing omonoia for personal gain. Without the ‘safety valve’ of ostracism, the internal discord of Athens grew to a fever pitch and unleashed itself upon Alcibiades in the form of accusations of impiety (asebia), with significant implications. For Plutarch, the virtuous statesman went into exile to maintain omonoia and faced much more dire consequences if they refused.

From the above two categories of Plutarch’s exiles we can see another interesting trend about Plutarch’s compositional method. It appears that Plutarch was not limited to themes between two linked Parallel Lives and felt free to include narrative themes across cultural lines as well. The Lives of the ktistic exiles and those of the ostracised Athenians demonstrate an attention towards vertical composition (Greek-Greek or Roman-Roman) as well as horizontal (Greek-Roman). Plutarch was not simply making statements about two individuals but also on the qualities of Greek and Roman culture across similar or contemporary biographies. The themes of the ktistes Rhomes or the ostracised Athenians defy cross-cultural examination - there were no Greek Founders of Rome just as there were no ostracised Romans - so we are given a new avenue through which to analyse Plutarch’s biographies.
Finally, the wandering exiles demonstrate how the virtuous exile ought to behave during their exiles. Hints of this pattern exist in the *Lives* of the *ktistic* and ostracised exiles, but we see Plutarch’s ideals best exemplified in the *planetic* exiles. Once an exile has left the city for the wild and uncivilized world abroad, they faced a decision about how to act. *On Exile* suggests that the exile pursue new homelands and accept their new condition of banishment as a form of liberation compatible with natural order. This much is consistently demonstrated in the *Lives*. The ability of a statesman to seek out a new homeland and adapt comfortably to new surroundings appears to have been of importance to Plutarch, but a much greater emphasis is placed on the cultivation of philosophical thought. The wandering exiles, then, are Plutarch’s most praiseworthy examples of exilic behaviour because they not only embrace the cosmopolitan lifestyle inherent in exile, but more importantly use their exiles as an opportunity to learn and acquire foreign laws and customs to return to their homelands.

It is incumbent on the exiled statesman to behave in whatever way is most conducive to the maintenance of *concordia*. The three groups of exiles I have discussed - the founders, the ostracised, and the wanderers - demonstrate Plutarch’s views on exile and the role of the statesman to his homeland. Plutarch’s founding exiles show exile at its most beneficial. His Founders of Rome consistently behave in ways which sustain concord in Rome and their characterisation is framed around an unbroken line of founding figures going back to Romulus. Romulus’ intention for Rome was a society based around class harmony where both the patricians and the plebeians worked together, compromising for what was in the best interests of the state. Camillus’ exile and return are coupled with an ahistorical attribution of a temple dedicated to
Concord which further solidifies the connection to Romulus. Cicero’s attempts to avoid exile culminate in an acceptance that his own exile would be of the utmost benefit to the state. The ostracised Athenians demonstrate that exile can be forced by the emotional outbursts of the classes, but a keen statesman accepts that exile to maintain concord and harmony within the city. Their inevitable recalls by a repentant populace demonstrates Plutarch’s own anti-democratic leanings. The wandering exiles show how a life in exile can be beneficial to the smooth governance of a state through the acquisition of new concepts and ideas incorporated upon their return.

It appears that Plutarch’s view on exile is not so simple as suggested by On Exile. Some examples suggest that retirement to a new community is praiseworthy, others suggest that inactivity and idleness are to be condemned. Coriolanus’ adoption of a new homeland is an example to be emulated unless it is followed by invasion and revenge. It is evidently acceptable to fight for your homeland if you are Cimon, but when you are Alcibiades it is a sign of excessive ambition. To be a virtuous statesman-in-exile requires more than acceptance or adaptability; it requires one to behave with the best interests of the state in mind. His exiled statesmen choose to accept exile because it leads to the harmonious operation of their homelands.

They must learn to respect the wishes of the uneducated and envious demos because to do otherwise would invoke greater consequences and punishments that could be injurious to the greater good. While in exile it is acceptable to quietly retire without grudge, but it is preferable to keep your homeland’s best interests in mind and seek to return with experience and knowledge instead of at the tip of a sword.
We see these lessons played out within the pair of pairs: the Themistocles-Camillus and the Coriolanus-Alcibiades. In both cases, Plutarch frames his heroes as examples of two great ancient exiles: Odysseus and Achilles. Their opposing personalities come to the forefront in the examples chosen in the Moralia and are reflected in the Lives as opposite sides of the same coin. They are framed as two examples of heroic mimesis: a microcosm of the twin personalities of Greece and Rome.

But from the pair of pairs we can glean some interesting ideas about Plutarch’s choice of subjects and his compositional method. It has been long known that Plutarch wrote the praiseworthy Lives before the condemnatory biographies, but now we see that one of the later pairs is likely an answer to an earlier one. Plutarch’s affection for Themistocles as seen in On The Malice of Herodotus leads me to believe that he refused to employ the obvious biographical pair of Themistocles and Coriolanus because he did not believe that Themistocles was an unworthy exile, contrary to a much more popular view. Coriolanus was known for his unbending and wrathful behaviour, but Plutarch’s Themistocles was not only flexible but also loyal. The events of his biography would have contrasted excessively with the warmongering Roman and Plutarch would have been forced to find an alternative in Camillus who, according to Plutarch, sought only to benefit his homeland and was repeatedly rebuked by an unrelenting demos. By choosing not to pair Themistocles with Coriolanus, Plutarch makes his intentions for the Life quite clear: Themistocles was not an unworthy exile. His slight sins of avarice and ambition could be overlooked in favour of the benefits he achieved for Athens militarily, economically, and socially. Like Camillus, whom Plutarch attributes the achievement of peace and order in Rome, Themistocles’ identification as
aristoboule was not unfounded and his suicide in exile was the cap to an otherwise virtuous life in exile.

On the other hand, the later Lives of Coriolanus and Alcibiades are replete with qualities which mirror the Lives of Themistocles and Camillus. When Plutarch chose not to use Coriolanus he was left with a problem with an obvious solution: who remained to pair with Coriolanus? He required an opposite to Themistocles: an exiled Greek demagogue who did all in his power to achieve authority at the expense of others and the state, a man who never had the best interests of the city in mind and fled to barbarians seeking asylum and revenge. There would have been few other more suitable choices than Alcibiades, who had gained a reputation like Themistocles in ancient thought. The primacy of his Greek subjects is why the parallels between the Alcibiades and Themistocles are so strong and the similarities between the Camillus and Coriolanus are left to vague Achillean references in descriptions of their character: they were chosen to reinforce the positive and negative qualities of their Greek pairs, and not because they were particularly suited to one another.

It again comes down to Plutarch’s view on the role of the statesman to promote concord through their exiles. Themistocles dutifully went into exile at the behest of the demos, while Alcibiades refused and disrupted omonoia by depriving the Athenians of their means to vent envy. Themistocles refused to join Sparta against Athens, while Alcibiades not only joined Sparta but spread discord among his hosts in his affair with the queen. Themistocles remained in the Persian court and committed suicide rather than attack his homeland, while Alcibiades died after a lifetime of selfish and ambitious actions. The same is true of Camillus and Coriolanus: where one accepts the will of the
people, recognizes the potential damage to the operation of the state, and chooses to adopt exile willingly, the other rages against their situation, fights to return, and throws the city in disarray.

There remain some questions to be answered, however, as Plutarch’s complete project of the *Parallel Lives* either has not survived or was never fully completed. Plutarch’s lost *Lives* of Epaminondas and Scipio may have contained another narrative of self-exile, but that would depend on which Scipio he chose to portray. However, the most interesting of the hypotheticals is the proposed work on Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus mentioned at *Mar.* 29.4.8. Plutarch states that:

> ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅσης μὲν ἀπέλαυσεν εὐνοίας παρὰ τὴν φυγῆν καὶ τιμῆς Μέτελλος, ὅν δὲ τρόπον ἐν Ῥόδῳ φιλοσοφῶν διητῆθη, βέλτιον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἐκείνου γραφομένοις εἰρήσεται.

“But what great goodwill and esteem Metellus enjoyed during his exile, and how he spent his time in philosophical studies at Rhodes, will be better told in my [composition of him].” (*Mar.* 29.4.8. Trans. Perrin, with emendation)

Plutarch never wrote about Metellus in any meaningful capacity, but we may take this to suggest that he intended to include Metellus among the *Parallel Lives*. Unfortunately, there is no evidence in the Catalogue of Lamprias that this *Life* was ever written and, if it were, it is not extant. From what little information is provided about Metellus in Plutarch’s works we can see that his example was undoubtedly a positive one and that it coincides with what we know to be praiseworthy qualities in the other *Lives*. The quotation immediately preceding Plutarch’s intention to compose a *Life of Metellus* is remarkably like that found in Camillus’ and Aristides’ prayers at their moments of exile. He states that either the people will repent and ask for his return, or that Rome would remain unstable and that it would be best for him to remain away. Plutarch writes that a judgment of *interdictio* was passed and “the
meanest part of the populace" supported this action. The “best citizens”, however, supported Metellus. Instead of allowing a faction to emerge and the city to be divided, Metellus chose exile. As we have seen, Plutarch looks favourably upon Camillus and Aristides for accepting their exiles in order to maintain *concordia*, and much has already been said about Plutarch’s praise of those who continue to study philosophy while in exile. Considering that no such *Life of Metellus* has survived, we can only speculate on what Plutarch might have said, but the above passage suggests that the *Life of Metellus* would have portrayed him as a perfect example of the exiled statesman.

For Plutarch, exile was undoubtedly an important consideration among his biographies. The reigns of the Emperors Vespasian and Domitian proved to be dangerous for philosophers across the Empire and many had been exiled for one reason or another. While declining in importance, the sanctuary at Delphi remained a site of significance in the increasingly Roman-dominated world and Plutarch’s position as priest would likely have put him in contact with statesmen and officials seeking advice and divine wisdom. It would be presumptuous to claim that Plutarch was directly inspired by these visitors, but it is not unlikely that he was aware of the growing concern of banishment under Imperial rule. For Roman citizens, their *patris* was ever expanding, and in turn the risks of exile into uncivilized and untamed land grew as well. But Plutarch also understood responsibility. His position at Delphi was indefinite and a lifetime of service to the state is at the heart of his depictions of virtuous statesmen. What we see in the *Parallel Lives* is a testimony to his belief that even exile and banishment can contribute to the harmonious operation of the state so long as it promotes peace and reduces violent factionalism. When
considering the *Parallel Lives* and the inclusion of so many exiled figures it is
worth remembering the inscription carved into the temple of Concord:

\[\varepsilon\rho\gamma\nu\nu\, \alpha\pi\pi\nu\nu\alpha\varsigma\, \nu\alpha\nu\, \dot{o} \mu\nu\nu\alpha\varsigma\, \tau\omicron\nu\epsilon\iota.\]


Plutarch presents this inscription as a subversive act against the hypocrisy of the consul L. Opimius, and we can find some truth in the statement. The act of exile, disruptive and discordant as it is, can produce harmonious results within the city. It is the responsibility of the virtuous statesman to recognize the value of their banishment to the continued operation of their *patris* and seek to preserve that order while in exile.
Bibliography


