Trust and Cooperation in International Peacekeeping

Approaches to Assessing Trust in a High-Risk ‘Networked’ Environment

A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of PhD

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Submitted under the Department of Sociology,
School of Social Sciences and Philosophy,
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Declaration

I hereby declare that this dissertation has not been previously submitted as an exercise for a degree, wholly or partially for any other academic award at this or any other university.

This work is entirely my own. I agree that the library may lend or copy this dissertation upon request.

Signed  

Sara Singleton

Date  31st October 2020

31st October 2020
SUMMARY

Trust has been described as an ‘essential social lubricant’ (Luhmann, 1979) and one of the most ‘important synthetic forces’ within society (Simmel, 1950). Trust acts as a reducer of social complexity and is often viewed as a substitute for explicit contracts as a way of coping with uncertainty (Bachmann, 2001).

International peacekeeping provides a unique social environment to study trust due to exceptional levels of cultural and organizational diversity, heightened risk, and the complex power dynamics between actors. This social system will include organizations and groups with their own distinct hierarchies, mandates, and priorities: international military, police and civilian staff, and local institutions and communities. In order for peacekeeping to be successful these diverse groups must come together rapidly and act as one unified and highly efficient ‘networked’ organization. Peacekeeping missions take place in ‘low-trust’ societies that are experiencing conflict or its aftereffects, conditions that lend themselves to institutional degradation, corruption, and the erosion of societal trust on multiple levels.

This research investigated questions on the trust dynamics of international peacekeeping missions: how different categories of peacekeepers trust, behaviors that facilitate and hinder the development and maintenance of trust between peacekeeping personnel (and between international peacekeepers and local communities), the role trust has in the mobilization of social capital within peacekeeping networks, and finally methodologically, how best to study trust dynamics in this particular context. Trust is widely recognized as socially constructed and context dependent and yet a large amount of the extant trust research remains generalized and theoretical. I wanted to ensure my research was of practical use and accessible to peacekeeping practitioners. For this reason, I chose to arrange my thesis in the format of a series of papers targeted to journals in the field. These papers constitute the four empirical chapters (Chapters 2-5).

My doctoral research was under the auspices of the Horizon 2020 Gaming for Peace/GAP project. The GAP project was designed in response to a gap in soft-skills training for peacekeeping personnel and embedded a base curriculum of these skills in a scenario-based role-playing computer game. My thesis uses a subset of 144 in-depth semi-structured interviews with military, police and civilian personnel from six EU countries: Ireland, Northern Ireland, Finland, Portugal, Poland, and Bulgaria. These
interviews were collected by a team of researchers from institutions across partner countries. As part of this team of researchers I collected and transcribed 17 of these interviews. The interview schedule contained questions on cooperation, communication, gender awareness, cultural awareness, risk management, and questions that I designed on trust. The same methodological package was used across countries to ensure consistency and allowed data to be pooled and compared.

Trust is challenging in terms of study owing to it being a multidimensional and ambiguous concept that has established discrepancies between belief and action. For this reason, I chose a mixed methods design with the aim of understanding trust through a variety of methods, and their combination. I first analyzed interviews thematically and two qualitative papers were informed by this analysis. This first paper (Chapter 2) uses a subset of interviews with military peacekeepers and develops a typology for trust in peacekeeping that was used iteratively for coding. This chapter goes on to outline the soft skill of ‘trust awareness’ - awareness of the role of trust and how to engender it, and ‘trust mechanics’ - practical actions and behaviors that foster trust. The second paper (Chapter 3) examines the trust-based interactions of police personnel and how they contribute to the functioning of peacekeeping networks. This chapter uses Nan Lin’s (2008) distinction between accessed social capital, the resources and social ties present in a network and mobilized social capital, the actual use of social ties, facilitated by trust, and whether this mobilizes the resources present.

A second phase of coding utilized techniques borrowed from the Critical Incident Technique (Flanagan, 1954) to embed trust concepts and scenarios in vignette experiments. The third paper (Chapter 4) uses data from 108 vignette experiments with international peacekeepers and tests different theories about what promotes or reduces trust in peacekeeping, noting differences across subgroups by institutional category, gender, and national groupings. The final paper (Chapter 5) details the process of developing trust vignettes. This chapter uses the complementary body of data generated through the development and analysis of vignette experiments to explore inconsistencies and contradictions between qualitative and quantitative sources and discusses how the mixing of methods allows us to better understand trust dynamics in peacekeeping.

This thesis is framed by an integrative introductory chapter (Chapter 1) and concluding chapter (Chapter 6) that draws these findings chapters together and outlines the empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions of the thesis.
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DECLARATION OF CO-AUTHORSHIP

This signed declaration describes the contribution of the candidate and the co-author(s) to each of the papers/chapters of this thesis in order to identify the candidate's independent contribution to each work.

Name of candidate: Sara Singleton

Title of dissertation: Trust and Cooperation in International Peacekeeping: Approaches to Assessing Trust in an Organizationally Diverse, High-Risk ‘Networked’ Environment

Paper/Findings Chapter:

- Chapter 2: ‘The Case for ‘Trust Awareness’ as a Key Soft-Skill for Peacekeepers: A Study on How Trust Impacts Inter-Organizational Cooperation and Local Ownership with Military Peacekeepers Deployed to UNIFIL’.
  Sara Singleton is the first author of this paper. This paper was co-authored with Dr. Anne Holohan and was published in April 2019 in the Journal of International Peacekeeping. Sara Singleton developed the typology that forms the core theoretical framework of the paper and led to the development of the soft skill of ‘trust awareness’, and ‘trust mechanics’- practical actions and behaviors that foster trust in specific contexts. Dr. Anne Holohan contributed to the conceptualization of trust as a soft skill, as well as assisting in the editing of the analysis and discussion sections.

- Chapter 3: ‘Police in peacekeeping: a study on their role in mobilizing social capital in a ‘network of trust relations’’
  Sara Singleton is the sole author of this paper.

- Chapter 4: ‘How peacekeepers trust: an experimental vignette study on trust in a high-risk, networked environment’
  Sara Singleton is the first author of this paper. This paper was co-authored with Prof. Richard Layte. Sara Singleton developed, piloted, and administered the vignette experiments that form the basis of this paper. Prof. Richard Layte contributed to the process of embedding trust concepts into the vignettes, the statistical analyses as well as assisting with editing of the paper.
Chapter 5: “Adapting the critical incident technique to model vignette experiments: A novel mixed-methods approach examining trust dynamics in peacekeeping” Sara Singleton is the sole author of this paper.

Statement by the co-author:

I hereby confirm that the doctoral candidate’s described contribution to the work where I am listed as co-author is correct, and I consent to including the work in the named dissertation.

Signed:

Date:

9th April, 2021
DECLARATION OF CO-AUTHORSHIP

This signed declaration describes the contribution of the candidate and the co-author(s) to each of the papers/chapters of this thesis in order to identify the candidate’s independent contribution to each work.

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Title of dissertation: *Trust and Cooperation in International Peacekeeping: Approaches to Assessing Trust in an Organizationally Diverse, High-Risk ‘Networked’ Environment*

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I hereby confirm that the doctoral candidate’s described contribution to the work where I am listed as co-author is correct, and I consent to including the work in the named dissertation.

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Date: 9th April 2021
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS AS AN INTEGRATIVE WORK

1.1.1 Study justification

The success of peacekeeping missions is dependent on the ability of highly diverse groups to come together rapidly and act as one unified and highly efficient operation (Holohan, 2005). Yet even in situations where individual personnel, groups and organizations share aims and objectives, cooperation can often fail to be initiated or breaks down (Williamson, 1993). Trust is particularly difficult to build and maintain within peacekeeping missions due to the lack of a formalized command structure, heightened levels of risk, extraordinary levels of cultural and organizational diversity and the complex power dynamic between actors. Trust, trustworthiness and trust-building are essential for myriad aspects of peacekeeping; from cooperation between international peacekeepers (Ben-Ari & Elron, 2001; Elron et al., 1999; Holohan, 2005; Tallberg, 2007) to the role of trust in understanding and delivering on the needs of local communities (Goldsmith & Harris, 2012; Marten, 2004), and also for gathering intelligence and filtering this information through ranks and networks to decision makers (Newby, 2017; Rubinstein, 2015). There has been extensive consideration of how trust dynamics are created by, and create organizational forms (Adler, 2001; Kramer and Tyler,1996; Kramer, 2004) including studies on trust dynamics in bureaucratic organizations (Nyhan, 2000; Breton & Wintrobe, 2008), hierarchies (Powell, 2003) and networks (Gefen, 2000; Lavrac et al. 2007). There is, however, a conspicuous absence of studies on the role of interpersonal, intra-organizational and inter-organizational trust in peacekeeping missions.

Trust is a fascinating and fundamental social concept but is elusive and challenging in terms of study owing to conceptual ambiguity and divergences between trusting beliefs, attitudes and behaviors (Barerra, 2008). This thesis contributes methodologically to how trust is researched in specific contexts. The research methodology used in this thesis is that of an equivalent status mixed-method design. Phase 1 used data from 144 qualitative experiential interviews with military, police and civilian peacekeepers. Phase 2 involved quantitative data collection done through vignette experiments. The methodology is innovative in its approach to integration of methods with the interviews being used to
both inform and refine vignette experiments, and to complement and expand their findings. Chapter 5 addresses the absence of guidance on how to model vignette scenarios and questions in the social sciences. The chapter outlines methodological tools for conducting and analyzing interviews in a way that facilitates the design of vignette scenarios. The majority of trust vignettes use standard scenarios and convenience samples to make general observations about the relative effects of different social mechanisms of trust (e.g. Lee et al., 2010; Robbins 2016a, Robbins, 2016b). This study is original in that it conducts context specific vignette experiments with a hard to reach institutional population.

There is a general absence in peacekeeping literature of analyses on the interpersonal and interactional dimensions of cooperation. This is recognized by Fortna and Howard (2008) in their review of the significant gaps and opportunities in peacekeeping research. With some notable exceptions (Autesserre, 2014b; Ben Ari & Elron, 2001; Higashi, 2015; Newby, 2016, 2017; Pouligny, 2006) the ‘on-the-ground’ realities of peacekeeping, both for local communities and the staff of UN missions, are often neglected in favor of evaluating peacekeeping from a macro political or strategic perspective. In a broad sense this thesis contributes to knowledge on how peacekeepers model and conceptualize their relationships and social contexts, as well as revealing specific strategies and approaches peacekeeping personnel have developed to build and maintain trust.

1.2.2 Aims and objectives

This thesis aims to contribute to more effective peacekeeping by generating useful knowledge on how trust dynamics function in peacekeeping and ensuring that this knowledge is accessible and relevant to peacekeeping practitioners. It is also my ambition that this thesis will advance research in trust by investigating novel ways that mixing methods can contribute to understandings of trust dynamics in context.

The core objectives of this thesis are to:

1. Conduct experiential interviews to understand peacekeepers’ lived experiences of building and maintaining trust in peacekeeping.
2. Create a typology of trust for peacekeepers as a way of categorizing trust that is accessible and useful to peacekeeping practitioners.
3. Develop methodological tools for designing and analyzing trust vignettes.
4. Develop hypotheses and vignette experiments through analysis of interview data.
5. Analyze quantitative and qualitative data, alone and in combination, to compare institutional trust styles of peacekeepers.

1.1.3 Origins of the present study

My doctoral research was carried out under the auspices of Horizon 2020 project Gaming for Peace (GAP), on which my primary supervisor was Principal Investigator and Coordinator. GAP developed a curriculum of relevant soft skills for peacekeeping personnel. Parts of this curriculum were then embedded in a digital role-playing game. The curriculum also included learning materials and a skills passport. The design of this soft-skills curriculum was informed by 177 in-depth semi-structured interviews with peacekeeping personnel from six EU countries: Ireland, Northern Ireland, Finland, Portugal, Poland, and Bulgaria.

The GAP project gave me access to an extensive amount of rich data with institutional populations that are often challenging to engage with due to the volatile settings in which they work. My thesis uses a subset of 144 in-depth semi-structured interviews with military, police, and civilian personnel. I chose to omit interviews collected with navy and air force personnel because of their distinct working arrangements and the limited interaction they had with local communities and with personnel outside their own organizations. These interviews were collected by a team of researchers from partner institutions across the six EU countries. As part of this team of researchers I collected and transcribed 17 of these interviews. The same methodological package was used across countries to ensure consistency and allowed data to be pooled and compared. I designed a typology for trust in peacekeeping and a coding framework to systematically analyze this large body of data.

The interview schedule contained questions on cooperation, communication, gender awareness, cultural awareness, risk management, and specific questions that I designed on trust. Analysis of interviews demonstrated that trust impacted these soft skills and behaviors in different ways. A large amount of valuable information on trust emanated from these adjacent topic areas and was used in analysis.

My initial surveying of the extant trust literature unearthed some of the fascinating aspects of trust that make it such a challenging phenomenon to study and the question of
‘how, methodologically, does one study trust?’ became one of my central research questions. The methodological design of my thesis was emergent and opportunistic in nature. This project developed into a mixed-methods study because of the opportunities the data presented. Although interviews were not originally devised for the purpose of informing trust-based vignette scenarios, several factors in how interviews were collected lent them to this task. Firstly, interviews sought to understand peacekeeping organizations from a holistic perspective. Secondly, interviews needed to collect information on positive and negative experiences of cooperation, communication, gender and cultural awareness, risk-management and trust in enough detail to create a scenario-based role-playing game. These two factors led to the creation of a body of data that could be analyzed to generate vignette scenarios and hypotheses related to trust.

1.2 OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.2.1 Peacekeeping: A brief overview

Peacekeeping encompasses a wide range of practices with the ideal of creating conditions that favor lasting peace. As of January 2020, there were 110,000 UN peacekeepers deployed across 13 missions (Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri, 2020). Peacekeeping missions have become increasingly complex, with conflicts increasingly intra-state as opposed to inter-state in nature, presenting new challenges at an organizational and interpersonal level (Daniel and Hayes, 2016; James, 2016; Rubinstein, 2015). Peacekeeping missions will vary greatly depending on the location nature and stage of a conflict: Observation Missions are where a small number of military and civilian personnel will monitor a ceasefire agreement. ‘Traditional’ Peacekeeping Missions involve larger contingents of armed troops serving as a buffer to belligerent factions in the aftermath of a conflict. Multidimensional Missions are becoming increasingly common and combine observation with military functions and include a broad range of activities from police and security reform to economic development and humanitarian projects. Finally, Peace Enforcement Missions, which do not require the consent of belligerent parties, and involve a substantial military presence that are permitted to use force beyond self-defense (Fortna & Howard, 2008).

Peacekeeping missions are extremely diverse in terms of organizational culture, nationality, ethnicity and religion. Missions are made up of multiple organizations that can be grouped broadly as police, military and civilian. Military peacekeepers operate in
national contingents, living within designated military bases while deployed. Although the duties of military peacekeepers are varied, the majority of military peacekeepers’ roles will largely encompass different elements of monitoring and security (Elron et al., 2003). Police perform a wide range of activities including investigating crime, strengthening institutions, training and mentoring local police and public information and education (UN DPKO/DFS, 2014). Police, although they come from hierarchical organizations at home, will traditionally be deployed as individuals and be unranked on missions, working in newly formed teams made up of multinational and local police (Bayley, 2006, Greener, 2009a). Police are usually embedded in local communities, living independently or in small groups in rented accommodation (Greener 2009b). Civilian personnel are involved in humanitarian aid, human rights, development, and conflict resolution activities. Civilians may be part of international, multinational, national, community-based or grassroots organizations (Duffey, 2000). Civilians, although extremely heterogeneous, are characterized by a higher level of flexibility and more diffuse arrangements than military or police peacekeepers (Paris, 2009).

1.2.2 Existing research on trust in peacekeeping

There is a paucity of studies directly examining trust in peacekeeping at either an interpersonal or organizational level. There have been a number of opinion and attitude surveys on generalized trust that communities have in peacekeepers operating in their regions (i.e. Burk, 1999 [Lebanon and Somalia] and Malone & Chavda, 2013 [Haiti]). Different peacekeeping theorists have recognized that the ability to build trust with local communities is an essential part of building local consent, and subsequently local ownership (Higashi, 2015, Newby, 2016, Pouligny, 2006, Von Billerbeck, 2015). Kenworthy et al. (2016) analyze the challenges of building societal and institutional trust in post conflict societies as a goal of peacekeeping processes.

Goldsmith and Harris (2012) detail the importance of trust, trustworthiness and trust building in international policing missions in a qualitative study with Australian police peacekeepers. The cooperation of military peacekeepers as part of multinational teams is covered by Elron, Shamir & Ben-Ari (1999), Ben-Ari & Elron (2001) and Elron et al. (2003). These studies put forward that a high level of trust is necessary for cooperation in these circumstances.
The following subsections detail the relevance of trust in peacekeeping. These observations come from expanding on the existing literature of trust in peacekeeping, from applying different theoretical understandings of trust to various aspects of peacekeeping, and from transferring analyses from other organizational fields to the peacekeeping context when appropriate.

1.2.2.1 Peacekeeping as a unique organizational form

Trust can be especially difficult to establish within the social system of a peacekeeping mission for a number of reasons linked to the structure and nature of missions. Throughout this thesis I argue that the organizational structure of a peacekeeping mission is best described as a ‘networked organization’. The networked organization of a peacekeeping mission will include international military, police and civilian staff as well as personnel from local institutions and municipalities, each with their own distinct cultures, structures, mandates and priorities, who must cooperate successfully, often under highly stressful conditions. It is thought that trusting beliefs and behaviors are in many ways internally constructed within organizations and by sector (Cook, Levi & Hardin, 2009; Saunders, 2012; Siebert et al., 2015). The characteristics, duties and arrangements of these organizations have distinctions that may impact trust styles and consequently cooperation. This is explored in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

Inter-organizational networks involve informal relationships, resource interdependency, collaboration, collective action, and trust (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny & Page, 1998; Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007). Elinor Ostrom (2015) describes that in networked organizations people and groups act as independent nodes and link across boundaries to work together for a common purpose. The culture of a ‘networked’ organization will be one that is flexible, open, socially embedded and accountable and these types of organizations have multiple leaders, numerous voluntary links and interacting levels (Ostrom, 2015). Networks are seen as more flexible and suitable for unstable environments than other organizational forms (Burns & Stalker, 2005; Ostrom, 2015).

The production of trust within organizational forms can be understood at the interpersonal level (interpersonal interactions forming and reforming organizational structures) or at the organizational level (where the organizational structure and culture will dictate trust and collaboration at an interpersonal level) (Mishra et al, 1996).

A further challenge in peacekeeping is that you have multiple traditional hierarchies drawn together into a temporary network organization. This network organization will
require a high degree of trust to function in the absence of any overarching hierarchy or centrally coordinated mechanism of sanction and reward. Holohan (2005) observed that creating a networked organizational culture can be particularly difficult when many of the personnel in a mission come from “lifelong careers in hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations where rewards are based on stability, longevity, discretion and loyalty to that particular organization” (Holohan, 2005: 172). In hierarchies, there are clearly defined roles, rules and responsibilities and consequently an intrinsic degree of trust in your superiors, who in turn will have a degree of responsibility for the outcome of your work (Adler, 2001). Networks need trust to be actively developed and reinforced for cooperation (Gausdal, 2012).

1.2.2.2 Trust under high-risk, volatile conditions

Trust at its core requires the trustor to make themselves vulnerable to some extent (Elster, 2007). Misztal (1996: 102) describes trust as “a protective mechanism relying on everyday routines, stable reputations and tacit memories, which together push out of modern life fear and uncertainty as well as moral problems”. In peacekeeping there is real risk of, and exposure to, injury and death. These hazardous conditions tend to lead to risk aversion and a high threshold for trust (Goldsmith & Harris, 2012; Voors et al., 2012). Heightened risk means that trust will need to be balanced with a level of caution. It is more complex than needing to increase levels of trust between the different actors involved in peacekeeping. Personnel need to be able to develop trust as a critical faculty, decide how and when to trust and when to exercise caution, and skills in how to develop trusting relationships. In response to this Chapter 2 develops the idea of ‘trust awareness’, trust as a soft skill and ‘trust mechanics’ - actions and behaviors that foster trust.

Peacekeeping occurs in a low-trust environment of an on-going or recent conflict where conditions lend themselves to institutional degradation, corruption and the erosion of societal trust at all levels (Kenworthy et al., 2016). There is a wide range of literature covering the ways that trust is altered in ‘post’ conflict societies. It is broadly agreed that institutional degradation undermines trust (Fukuyama, 1995; Knight, 1992; Mitsztal, 1996; Ulsaner, 2008, 2002, Zucker, 1986) and that the absence of fair and robust social and political institutions during and post conflict removes or alters social constraints that work to encourage trust (Horowitz, 1982; Whitt, 2010).
1.2.2.3 The complex power dynamics of peacekeeping missions

There are complex power dynamics in peacekeeping networks that complicate trust-based interactions. These include the explicit hierarchies between military ranks and the implicit but influential hierarchies between different forms of organization (i.e. NGO versus military), between local and international organizations, and between international peacekeepers of different nationalities (i.e. western versus non-western peacekeepers), as well as the power international peacekeeping personnel will hold versus their local counterparts (Rubinstein, 2015; Tallberg, 2007). The local civilian community will be extremely heterogeneous and individuals in positions of power are more likely to engage in meaningful or influential exchanges with international peacekeepers, which can itself consolidate pre-existing or emerging power structures (Ghosh, 1994; Newby, 2017).

Kramer (2004) contends that within social systems, more powerful actors hold both greater ability and responsibility to generate trust and Bachmann (2001) asserts that if an exchange is perceived to be unbalanced or unfair, a decline of trust and the depletion of social capital is the probable outcome.

1.2.2.4 Peacekeeping as a ‘swift trust’ environment

Peacekeeping is made up of temporary teams with deployments ranging from a couple of months for some military and civilian personnel up to periods of over a year for police in some circumstances (Bove, Ruffa & Ruggeri, 2020). These short deployments are deemed necessary because of the intensity of missions but affect the development of forms of trust that are usually built over time. This affects trust developing between international peacekeeping personnel as well as between peacekeepers and local actors. Cooperation in peacekeeping therefore requires ‘swift trust’ (Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996). Hurried judgements about trust need to be made that enable people to act in the face of uncertainty with limited knowledge of the past performance of team members, and with no guarantee of further involvement together after the project, or in this case mission, has ended (Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996). When swift trust is necessary the usual informal mechanisms of trust are weakened or altered, i.e. the threat of loss of reputation for underhanded behavior or the promise of future reciprocity for honest behavior and resource sharing (Buchan, Croson & Dawes, 2002).

1.2.3 Theoretical Framework: Trust

According to Elster (2007: 344), at a basic level we trust when: “we refrain from taking precautions against an interaction partner when through self-interest or incompetence
they could act against our interests”. There are extensive, often overlapping definitions, categorizations and subcategorizations of trust across disciplines. The following sections highlight the core distinctions that support the analysis of trust in peacekeeping in this thesis.

1.2.3.1 Trusting beliefs, intentions, and behaviors
McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany (1998) analyzed two different components of trust: (i) trusting intentions and (ii) trusting beliefs. Trusting intentions mean trustors’ willingness to make themselves vulnerable to the behaviors of another in a risky situation. Trusting beliefs means trustors’ view on the other party’s trustworthiness. It is considered that trusting beliefs affect one’s trusting intentions. When one’s behavioral performances demonstrate the characteristics of reliability, integrity, and genuineness, this enhances the chance that others will be willing to take a risk in working with the person or organization. As Gillespie (2003) argues, although a belief in someone’s trustworthiness is a considerable determinant of trust, it does not necessarily equate to trust or an intent to make oneself vulnerable. McKnight, Cummings & Chervany (1998) advance the interrelatedness of beliefs, attitudes, intentions and behaviors and believe that although trusting intentions do not equate perfectly with exhibited behaviors, they have been found to be a useful predictor of the likelihood to act.

1.2.3.2 Internal and external bases of trust
There are multiple ‘bases’ for trust that can be crudely divided into ‘internal’ and ‘external’ sources. External bases of trust are motivations to trust based on external social constraints such as social norms, institutional regulation or a system of incentives. Internal bases of trust relate to the perception of a trustee based on their interests (encapsulated trust), reputation, direct experience or their social and cultural characteristics (Zucker, 1986). Institutional-based trust is an example of an external base of trust. Institutions are constituted of different roles, rules, expectations and social norms. Institutions help to “establish a ‘world-in-common’ i.e. shared explicit and tacit knowledge between the trustor and the trustee” which facilitates cooperation (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011: 285). Process-based trust is an internal base of trust that develops over time and is grounded in past direct experience and future expectations (Zucker, 1986). Characteristic-based trust is based on attributes, or characteristics, identified in the other party (e.g., ethnic group, religious affiliation, gender etc.) (Zucker, 1986; Husted, 1998), which influence our likelihood to trust. Under characteristic-based trust, a trustworthy
person is someone in whom we believe we can place our trust without it being betrayed (Ulsaner, 2002). Trustworthiness is commonly split into perceived competence, integrity, or benevolence (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). These internal and external bases of trust are embedded in vignettes and examined in Chapters 4 and 5.

1.2.3.3 Bonding and bridging trust
Within peacekeeping there is an important distinction between bonding trust and bridging trust. Putnam (1995) has described how different kinds of trust affect social cohesion. Bonding trust is the trust that exists between a homogenous group, often accompanied by a level of distrust for those outside the group, whereas bridging trust facilitates ties between people across a cleavage that typically divides society, like race, class, or religion. For cooperation to happen across organizations, bridging trust is key. Elron et al., (1999) writes that with peacekeepers there will be very strong bonds within organizations and national contingents, due to training pre-deployment, living together for long periods of time and facing stressful situations while on patrols (which happen in small groups, usually comprised of one nationality). These bonds have an important role in the cohesion of national forces, and in managing stress (Tallberg, 2007). Peacekeepers, however, must also work across organizational divides, often in a context of high cultural and ethnic diversity. This thesis argues that bridging trust is key for inter-organizational cooperation to take place.

1.2.3.4 Trust and social capital
The argument that trust is an important factor in social networks has been asserted by various theorists (e.g. Buskens, 2002; Gausdal, 2012; Ostrom, 2015). Social capital is a concept that explains individual or collective action generated by networks of relationships (Coleman, 1988). Trust and social capital are linked and at times overlapping concepts. It is suggested that resource sharing by network members depends on their trust in one another (Sabatini, 2009) and it is assumed that a degree of trust among members is necessary for a social network to develop and to be maintained (Cook, Levi & Hardin, 2009). Trust is seen by some theorists as an intrinsic part of social capital (e.g. Putnam, 2000, 2001), while other theorists see trust as a factor in the dynamics of social networks that affects both the use of social capital and its effects (e.g. Burt, 2000, 2005; Cook, 2001, 2005). Blumberg, Peiró and Roe, (2015) outline the broadly accepted links between trust and social capital including the positive effect trust has on network cohesion (bonding trust) and network expansion (bridging trust).
relationship between trust and social capital is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. This chapter draws on Nan Lin’s distinction between accessed social capital, available social ties, and mobilized social capital, the actual use of these ties, and whether or not this mobilizes the resources of the network (2008).

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. How is trust produced between international peacekeepers?
2. How is trust produced between international peacekeepers and local communities?
3. Do institutional categories of peacekeepers trust differently? How may this impact network cooperation?
4. How methodologically does one best study trust?

1.4 OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

This research methodology uses an equivalent status sequential design that draws on an initial phase of qualitative research, with a subsequent phase of quantitative data collection done through vignette experiments. This methodology is original in its approach to the integration of methods. Interviews were used for both the development of trust hypotheses and scenarios, and to complement and expand the findings of vignette experiments.

1.4.1 Understanding meaning in relationships: Experiential Interviews

Face-to-face, in-depth, semi-structured interviews were carried out with 144 peacekeeping personnel from across Europe (71 military, 56 police and 17 civilian). Military personnel came from Ireland, Poland, Finland and Bulgaria. Police personnel were from Portugal, Poland and Northern Ireland. Civilian personnel came from across Europe. These interviews lasted on average 1-1.5 hours and were collected between January and March 2017. As mentioned in section 1.1.2, I was part of a team of researchers who collected these interviews. I collected nine interviews in person with the Portuguese Police, Polícía de Segurança Pública (PSP) in Lisbon, Portugal and eight interviews in person with the Defense Forces Ireland (DFI) in the Curragh Camp army base in County Kildare, Ireland. All interviews were recorded with respondents’ consent and transcribed in full. A detailed methodology package, which included a standardized
approach for the selection of interviewees, data management and protection and informed consent and ethics, was used to ensure interviews were carried out in a consistent way across organizations and that data could be pooled and compared.

The fact that trust questions were set amid a number of other topic areas related to the broader aims of the GAP project (cooperation, communication, gender awareness, cultural awareness and risk management) was advantageous, with these ‘adjacent’ topic areas producing much valuable data on trust. The trust specific questions are listed below:

1. Who would you trust if you are in a potentially dangerous situation on the ground? (If they ask what you mean, say someone from a specific organization, male or female, nationality?)

2. Who would you not trust, and why?

3. How do you get people to trust you in the field? (from your own organization, other organizations and local people?)

4. How do you build trust? (from your own organization, other organizations and local people?)

The full interview schedule can be found in Appendix 1. Questions were piloted and then questions and prompts refined as recommended by Straus (1990) and Rubin and Rubin (1995).

Trust to a large extent ‘is in the eye of the beholder’ with culturally and individually specific understandings of its meaning (Lyon, Mollering, Saunders, 2015). The semi-structured interview is better able to capture the subtleties of participants’ understandings of trust than structured social surveys as trust is a concept that is defined ambiguously person to person (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). This phase of qualitative analysis took a social phenomenological perspective (Berger & Luckmann, 1991) focusing on how peacekeeping personnel conceptualize peacekeeping networks, including attitudes to their relationships, subjective motives behind social actions, and perceptions of the frequency and quality of these interactions.

Sampling was purposeful with interview participants selected within each institution to give a heterogenous sample across rank, gender and role. A full breakdown of interview participants by nationality and gender is given in Chapter 5, which uses the full sample of interviews. A subset of 20 interviews with military peacekeepers informed Chapter 2 with the subset of 56 police interviews used for analysis in Chapter 3. As I was part of a
team of interviewers, I use a sample which combines interviews I conducted and transcribed myself and interviews conducted and transcribed by other researchers. Issues related to the use and combination of primary and secondary qualitative data are expanded on in Chapter 3.

The NVivo11® software package was used for analysis to formulate, refine and apply a coding framework across a large body of data. This methodology allowed for the analysis of emergent themes and for the generation of theoretical insights that could be examined further through vignette experiments.

The limitations of experiential interviews, including participants’ tendencies to give socially desirable or evasive answers to questions on trust, are discussed in more detail in both of the qualitative empirical chapters, Chapters 2 and 3.

1.4.2 Using interviews to inform vignette experiments

These 144 in-depth interviews were also analyzed using techniques borrowed from the Critical Incident Technique (CIT) (Flanagan, 1954). CIT was developed for use in organizational psychology and has been used broadly across organizational research - to study effective and ineffective ways of doing something, to examine successes or failures and to determine characteristics that are critical to an activity or event.

Chapter 5 outlines a step by step process on how to conduct and analyze interviews to facilitate the design of scenarios and hypotheses and how to embed them in vignette experiments. This process includes guidance on how to design an integrated typology and coding framework that operationalizes a complex social phenomenon like trust, breaking it into aggregate concepts that can be investigated, compared, and if necessary, quantified using frequency analyses.

As outlined in section 1.1.3 interviews were not originally designed under CIT specifications. They do, however, have many qualities that allow them to be analyzed using CIT techniques. Principally, these interviews were collected to gather the kind of detailed information on positive and negative experiences of cooperation, communication, gender and cultural awareness, risk-management and trust that would inform the creation of a scenario-based role-playing game.
I seek to demonstrate that creating vignettes in this way has many advantages. Creating vignettes in this way goes some way towards addressing the gap between the hypothetical scenario and social reality. This process has utility for examining not only trust in peacekeeping, but also a variety of social phenomena in different contexts. When the qualitative and quantitative data generated through this methodology are combined, they develop a body of data that can be drawn on to explore inconsistencies between belief, attitude, intention and behavior. Finally, this method in isolation provides a way to conduct robust process driven analysis of qualitative data.

1.4.3 Understanding attitudes, beliefs and intentions: Vignette Experiments

This thesis investigates the potential the vignette method holds for assessing both interpersonal and institutional trust dynamics, both internal and external bases of trust, and both the perception of trustworthiness and the willingness to be vulnerable. Vignettes are usually in the form of text and/or images to which research participants are asked to respond (Hughes and Huby, 2012). Vignettes highlight selected parts of the real world and can “unpack perceptions beliefs and attitudes, provide a ‘frame’ for the actor’s decision and predict how actual human populations will behave when confronted with situations comparable to the vignette being studied” (Barrera, Buskens & Raub 2015: 256). Barrera, Buskens and Raub (2015) argue that quantitative vignettes are particularly useful when studying trust as they allow for the large-scale testing of reactions to complex issues, normally difficult with other forms of questionnaire.

A series of four interrelated consecutive vignettes explored questions related to how different categories of peacekeepers trust. Hypotheses were related to different internal and external bases of trust – institutional-based trust, process-based trust and characteristic-based trust. Hypotheses were tested by comparison of mean response across items and between groups using paired t-tests. Ordinary least squares regression was used to adjust for possible confounding by age, sex, nationality and organizational type. 108 vignette responses were collected (47 military, 33 police, 28 civilian). Nonprobability and snowball sampling techniques were used. A detailed sampling strategy and breakdown of responses appears in Chapters 4 and 5.

The vignette method has a number of limitations. While the method results in high levels of confidence regarding internal validity it remains limited with regards claims to external validity (Addison, 2015; Barrera, Buskens, & Raub 2015) as although vignettes
can tap into beliefs and values, it is not possible to say definitively if or when this might transfer into action. It can be difficult to balance making scenarios realistic with making them truly comparable, as was the case in this study. The organizational cohorts under analysis have different roles and associated levels of risk and vulnerability. In addition, although rich scenarios increase realism and engagement, isolating the factors that brought about responses can be a challenge. The limitations of the vignette method alone for analyzing trust is further detailed in Chapter 4.

1.4.4 Epistemological position and mixing methods

Mixed methods were chosen to enhance understanding of trust as a multidimensional phenomenon. This study combined qualitative interviews with experimental vignettes to uncover unexpected patterns and generate new research questions while examining the validity of theoretical insights. Barter and Reynolds (2000) argue that vignettes can generate data beyond the scope of other methods and that their use within a mixed design allows for close investigation of social processes in general and the interconnection between belief and action in particular. Complementarity and development were the rationales behind choosing to conduct a mixed method study (as per the potential rationale outlined by Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989). Development uses the results from one method to help inform the other. In this project the analysis of experiential interviews was used to create vignettes. The qualitative and quantitative data sources were used to complement and contextualize one another and increase the meaningfulness of findings as elaborated on in Chapter 5.

As a mixed method researcher there is a challenge in resolving one’s epistemological position, with it being described as far more challenging to reconcile the epistemological positions that underpin qualitative and quantitative research than it is to blend methods themselves (Bryman, 2007; Creswell, 2011; Morgan, 2007).

Relying too heavily on a single epistemology’s assumptions risks “missing the richness and complexity of trust and ignoring, for example, the specific historical circumstances and cultural factors which shape different forms of trust in different situations” (Isaeva et al., 2015: 160) A pragmatist positions aligns research questions with their most appropriate methods and seeks ‘best answers’ to questions that cannot otherwise be adequately explained (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Analysis was a continuous cycle of inductive and deductive reasoning in the creation of a coding framework and typology.
In combining data sources *abductive* reasoning was used when appropriate. An additional element of pragmatism that was useful in this project was *transferability*. General insights on how trust functions informed this analysis with an acceptance that how trust functions may alter depending on context. Taking a pragmatist position when conducting research on trust, can create timely, usable knowledge that is most likely to have an impact on organizational arrangements (Bijlsma-Frankema & Rousseau, 2015; Isaeva et al., 2015).

### 1.4.5 Ethical Considerations

There are specific things about conducting research with peacekeeping personnel that warrant special ethical consideration. These include best practice in processing personal and/or sensitive data in emergencies and the risk of retraumatizing personnel by getting them to recall traumatic events. It was crucial that anonymity was maintained for all participants as they may have revealed information that could be detrimental to them personally or professionally.

There are also elements of investigating trust itself that call for ethical consideration. Saunders (2015) notes that researching trust often covers topics that are sensitive in nature and can lead to evasive answers or socially desirable responses. In this case, participants were being asked about positive and negative experiences working with people from their own and other organizations and working with people of different nationalities, cultures and genders.

In addition, this research project had to take into consideration the balance of security and tact against openness and free speech, as well as the evolving nature of EU data protection legislation (changes related to General Data Protection Regulation [GDPR] came into effect during the project's lifetime).

The H2020 Gaming for Peace project (GAP) established an ethical advisory board and all my proposed research was assessed by this advisory board, as well as by the Trinity College Dublin School of Arts, Humanities and Social Science Ethics Committee. Both ethics bodies granted approval for all qualitative interviews, informal field work in Lebanon and vignette experiments. GAP had institutional and national data protection approval for each institution and nation where the research was being conducted. In
addition, the ethical guidelines of the Sociological Association of Ireland were followed in designing all elements of research.

Informed consent was achieved through providing participants with sufficiently detailed information on the research, confidentiality and use of data so that participants could make an informed, voluntary and rational decision to participate. Participants, at all stages of data collection and research, were provided with information sheets (in the case of vignette experiments that were carried out through online survey, an information screen) outlining the purpose of the research, the stages of research and how their contributions would be used. The informed consent documents for both stages of research can be found in Appendix 1 and 2.

A data management protocol ensured that all interviewee data was anonymized immediately, and original recordings were kept separately from the transcribed data. Access to the data is password protected. Vignette experiments were conducted via online survey and completely anonymous beyond broad demographic information. As such, the identity of participants was unknown to all, including myself as the researcher. Accordingly, any future publications or presentations based on this data will remain anonymous and will not be identifiable with participants’ individual identities.

1.4.6 Notes on language and terminology used

Some of the terms used in this thesis require clarification. Firstly, this thesis addresses multidimensional peacekeeping operations, which some will differentiate as peacebuilding and peacekeeping. I will use the term *peacekeeping* unless specifically differentiated, or when referring to the work of others. I use the term *peacekeepers* to refer to military, police and civilian personnel, unless specifically differentiated.

I use *local* when referring to the regions in which peacekeeping missions operate, unless directly referring to the work of another author. This distinction also appears as ‘host-state’ or ‘peace-kept’ in peacekeeping literature, depending on the position of the author. Local is the term commonly used by UN and EU peacekeeping agencies. I use the term *local actors*, to mean all or any individual or group from the regions that peacekeeping missions operate in, except when specifically differentiated (i.e. local police, local communities etc.). I use *United Nations* (UN) to refer to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and its field missions. The UN is a large and diverse organization
with multiples activities and perspectives. However, UN is the term commonly used in peacekeeping literature.

Because the thesis was prepared as a series of papers, within each paper/chapter, the first time an acronym is used, it is written in brackets beside its full form.

American English is used throughout this thesis unless referencing the work of another author. Papers published, submitted for review, and under preparation for submission, are all to journals which use American English. For consistency, I chose to use American English across this thesis.

1.5 LAYOUT AND STRUCTURE OF THESIS

Chapter 2, the chapter that immediately follows this one, is a paper that was published the Journal of International Peacekeeping in April 2019 and appears here as published. I am first author on this paper. The paper was co-authored with my primary supervisor Dr. Anne Holohan. I developed the typology that forms the core theoretical framework of the paper and led to the development of the soft skill of ‘trust awareness’, and ‘trust mechanics’- practical actions and behaviors that foster trust in specific contexts. The paper uses the case study of the UNIFIL mission in South Lebanon to explore the role of trust in facilitating or obstructing inter-organizational cooperation and local ownership in a traditional UN peacekeeping mission.

The next chapter, Chapter 3, is a paper in preparation for submission to the journal Policing and Society. I am the sole author of this paper. The paper uses trust and social capital concepts to examine the contribution police make to the functioning of peacekeeping networks. In-depth experimental interviews examined how police interacted and built trust with diverse social ties in both local communities and international peacekeeping structures. Analysis found that whereas social ties determine access to social capital, trust is essential for the mobilization of social capital in peacekeeping networks.

The fourth chapter uses data from 108 vignette experiments with international peacekeepers to test different theories about what promotes or reduces trust in peacekeeping, noting differences across subgroups by institutional category, gender and national groupings. The chapter goes into detail on the process of how to embed trust
concepts and hypotheses in vignette scenarios, presenting the applied logic behind each of four interconnected scenarios used. This paper is in preparation for submission to *International Peacekeeping*. I am the first author on this paper. This paper was co-authored with my secondary supervisor, Prof. Richard Layte and Dr. Anne Holohan. Results from these vignettes indicate that trust functions in several ways that impact core aspects of peacekeeping, including maintaining neutrality, facilitating local ownership, cooperating across organizations and ensuring the institutional transfer of knowledge.

The final paper, Chapter 5 details the process of developing trust vignettes and provides methodological tools for adapting interview collection and analysis techniques to model vignette experiments. This chapter uses the complementary body of data generated through the development and analysis of vignette experiments (144 interviews and 108 vignette responses) to discuss how the mixing of methods allows us to better understand the trust dynamics of peacekeeping missions better than any one method alone. A methodological version of this paper is currently under review by the *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*. I am the sole author of both versions of this paper.

The concluding chapter sums up the overall contributions of this thesis - empirical, theoretical, methodological, and practical.
The Case for ‘Trust Awareness’ as a Key Soft-Skill for Peacekeepers

A Study on How Trust Impacts Inter-Organizational Cooperation and Local Ownership with Military Peacekeepers Deployed to UNIFIL

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Abstract

This article uses the case study of the UNIFIL mission in South Lebanon to explore the role of trust in facilitating or obstructing inter-organizational cooperation and local ownership in a traditional UN peacekeeping mission. Peacekeeping is distinct from many other forms of military engagement in the level of cooperation it requires, not only between different national military contingents, but between militaries and international police and civilian staff, personnel from local institutions and municipalities, and local communities. This article argues that the inter-organizational cooperation necessary for effective interoperability will not happen unless there is trust between the militaries working together. Equally, local ownership is not possible unless local populations trust peacekeepers to be impartial. However, this soft skill – awareness of the role of trust and how to engender it – is not included in pre-deployment training for military personnel. We outline the soft skill of ‘trust awareness’, including a typology of trust relevant for peacekeeping, and ‘trust mechanics’- practical actions and behaviors that foster trust.
The Case for ‘Trust Awareness’ as a Key Soft-Skill

Keywords

trust – soft-skills – UNIFIL – inter-organizational cooperation – local ownership

I Introduction

In a peacekeeping mission, a degree of trust is necessary for inter-organizational cooperation and local ownership, trust between the different militaries involved, and trust between international peacekeepers and local communities. Given the significance of trust-based interactions in peacekeeping, and that these interactions have not previously been studied in depth, our research question was broad and exploratory: what role can trust play in achieving or obstructing inter-organizational cooperation and local ownership? Inquiry into the experiences of personnel confirmed existing research findings on impediments to constructive trust-based interactions in peacekeeping. Analysis yielded theoretical insights that have the potential to contribute to more effective and efficient peacekeeping. We present a typology of trust relevant for peacekeeping, a tangible way for peacekeeping personnel and practitioners to conceptualize trust and focus on two key concepts generated from thematic analysis of the interviews: ‘trust awareness’ and ‘trust mechanics’. What we call the soft skill of ‘trust awareness’ is not the ability to trust, but rather, knowing when and how to deploy different types of trust, and skills in how to build trusting relationships. It is important for peacekeepers to be aware of how perceptions of trustworthiness/untrustworthiness can develop and to understand how to foster behaviors that produce trust, enabling cooperation both among organizations that comprise the mission, and among international peacekeepers and local organizations and communities. We describe these practical steps and behaviors as the ‘mechanics of trust’. We argue that it is essential to take a systemic perspective for enabling well-placed trust and trustworthy behavior in the long term, making trust a core part of the systems design of peacekeeping.

Social scientists have identified trust as a basis for the functioning of communities, markets, and organizations; however, the types and degrees of trust needed for cooperation will vary between social systems and organizational forms.1

Trust, trustworthiness and trust-building has been recognized as necessary for

myriad tactical aspects of peacekeeping: from the interaction between military peacekeepers,2 to the role of trust in understanding and delivering on the needs of local communities,3 and for gathering intelligence and filtering this information through ranks and networks to decision makers.4 With some no-table exceptions: the 'on-the-ground' realities of those involved in peacekeeping, both local communities and the staff of UN missions, are often neglected in favor of evaluating peacekeeping from a political or strategic level. Simi-larly there is a paucity of studies examining trust in peacekeeping missions at a tactical or operational level while the majority of existing research on the role of trust in peacekeeping has taken the form of large scale opinion and at-titude surveys, either from the international community6 or from the regions in which peacekeeping missions operate.7

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Peacekeeping is distinct from many other forms of military engagement in the level of cooperation and it requires, not only between different national military contingents, but between militaries and international police and civilian staff, personnel from local institutions and municipalities, and local communities. The organizational form of a peacekeeping mission is unique as while formal hierarchies participate, they must be able to work in an environment where they become temporarily part of a networked structure. In a networked organization people and groups linked across boundaries to work together for a common purpose; it has multiple leaders, voluntary links and interacting levels. The culture of a networked organization will be one that is flexible, open, socially embedded and accountable. Militaries have been described as amongst the most enduring and persistent hierarchies, while networked forms of organization increasingly proliferate. In hierarchies there are clearly defined roles, rules and responsibilities, and an intrinsic degree of trust in your superiors, who in turn will have a large degree of responsibility for the outcome of your work. In contrast, networks function in the absence of a centrally coordinated mechanism of sanction and reward and consequently can only produce cooperation if there is a high level of acquired trust as organizations in a network are not under each other’s command and must persuade each other of the desired course of behavior.

There is an extremely high level of diversity among peacekeepers in terms of nationality, ethnicity, and religion. This article examines the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a mission made up of troops from 41 Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), across five continents. In peacekeeping missions, diversity extends to levels of training and corresponding perceptions of competence and professionalism. Military cultures themselves can vary

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8 Holohan, Networks of Democracy.
9 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
12 Ostrom, Governing the Commons
13 For a full breakdown by contributing see unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-troop-contributing-countries.
14 Elron et al., "Why don’t they fight each other? Cultural diversity and operational unity in multinational forces"; Ben-Ari & Elron, “Blue Helmets and White Armor multi-nationalism and multi-culturalism among UN peacekeeping forces.”
highly between national armies, e.g. voluntary vs. paid national armies, and combative national armies vs. armies that carry out peacekeeping exclusively.\textsuperscript{15} Although as soldiers, military peacekeepers share a background of socialization in a military institutional culture, perceived differences between national contingents and their capacity to fulfil the tasks at hand remain strong.\textsuperscript{16} For a peacekeeping mission to be successful there must be trust within, but also between, organizations. Without a degree of trust between the militaries involved information will not be shared and resources cannot be fully deployed.\textsuperscript{17} With peacekeeping missions, diversity in this broad sense and the lack of a command structure that encompasses all personnel makes the cooperation necessary for effective interoperability difficult to achieve.

Local consent and trust, developed in part through interaction between peacekeepers and civilians, has been found to be closely related to the concept of legitimacy\textsuperscript{18} and when present, provides a mission with a “certain stock of goodwill” that, when absent, will ultimately negatively influence the nature of civilian-peacekeeper relations and the outcome of missions.\textsuperscript{19} An absence of local ownership means that peace is not sustainable and will breakdown when peacekeepers are withdrawn. Local ownership is dependent on local populations consenting to the presence of international peacekeepers, for them to act exclusively in defense of the mandate, and critically, to be impartial with the local populations.\textsuperscript{20} Similarly, to inter-organizational cooperation, local ownership is not automatically produced, and cannot be ‘commanded’, and, as the local populations are arguably the most crucial part of the broader network of a mission, cooperation between the peacekeepers and the local populations can only be achieved through trusting relationships. Just as the hierarchical

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Tallberg, “Bonds of burden and bliss: the management of social relations in a peacekeeping organisation.”
\item \textsuperscript{16} Elron \textit{et al.}, “Why don’t they fight each other? Cultural diversity and operational unity in multinational forces.”
\item \textsuperscript{18} Daisaku Higashi, \textit{Challenges of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone, and East Timor} (Routledge, 2015).
\item \textsuperscript{19} Vanessa Newby, \textit{Power, politics and perception: the impact of foreign policy on civilian-peacekeeper relations. Third World Quarterly}, 2017 pp. 1–16, p. 5
\item \textsuperscript{20} These three core principles are inter-related and mutually reinforcing: Consent of the parties, Impartiality And Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping.
\end{itemize}
structure and culture of militaries make it difficult to trust across organization-al boundaries, it is important to acknowledge that history, politics and power influence the dynamics of trusting relationships and the absence of trust can easily spill over into suspicions about the partiality of peacekeepers. Research with local communities in ‘peacekept’ countries has found that individual positive experiences with peacekeepers were crucial in willingness to cooperate, even in settings where negative attitudes to peacekeepers had become entrenched. The need for trust flows in both directions and peacekeepers must be able to demonstrate a degree of trust in local populations to gain the trust of these communities. Trust and credibility are reflexive: if a particular military (or a mission more broadly) is seen as credible, the peacekeepers from that organization are more likely to be seen as trustworthy, while trustworthy personnel help build an organization’s credibility.

II Methodology

Trust, although a fascinating and fundamental social concept is also described as one of the most ‘elusive’ and challenging in terms of study. Qualitative methods are seen as superior to survey methods at capturing the subtleties of concepts, like trust, that are defined ambiguously person to person. The experience of trust is highly subjective and often unarticulated, consequently, qualitative open-ended interviews were chosen as the optimal way to access experiences and stories which could yield insight into the conceptualization and practice of trust in contemporary peacekeeping operations. With an interview guide that included open ended questions on the topic of trust, the interviews allowed us to explore our theoretical and empirical interest in the role that trust plays in the interaction and cooperation between organizations that are part of a greater collective or network. The topics discussed in the open-ended qualitative interviews included:

- Who would you trust if you are in a potentially dangerous situation on the ground? (If they ask what you mean, say someone from a specific organization, male or female, nationality?)
- Who would you not trust, and why?

21 Newby, “Power, politics and perception: the impact of foreign policy on civilian–peacekeeper relations”.
– How do you get people to trust you in the field? (from your own organization, other organizations, local communities?)
– How do you build trust?

The answers to other questions on communication, cooperation, gender awareness and cultural competency also frequently produced answers that encompassed trust and were also drawn upon for our analysis. We developed a typology of trust based on a review of the relevant literature and initial coding of the interviews. Through an iterative process of thematic analysis of the interview data and working with the literature, the soft skills of ‘trust awareness’ and ‘trust mechanics’ emerged as key components of the peacekeeper skillset. We focus on a subset of 20 interviews with military personnel with substantive experience working with UNIFIL: 16 from Defense Forces Ireland (15 Male, 1 Female) and 4 from the Finnish military (1 Male, 3 Female). Ages ranged from 25 to 56 and cut across all levels of seniority from cadets to a Lieutenant Corporal.

UNIFIL was selected as it is a large, well-established, relatively stable, traditional UN mission, where interactions between military peacekeepers from different contingents, and interactions between peacekeepers and local communities can be explored. All organizations have a common mandate, with the core elements being:

– Monitor the cessation of hostilities.
– Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon.
– Coordinate its activities referred to in the preceding paragraph (above) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel.
– Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.24

UNIFIL is distinct from the so-called more ‘robust’ peacekeeping missions, e.g. the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), where risk, operating procedures and protocol will greatly affect inactions and trust dynamics and there is limited interaction with local populations. As such, the article is not generating theoretical insights relevant for more robust forms of intervention. Analysis is drawn from interviews with the Finnish and Irish Defense Forces; these contingents were selected purposefully as they have subtle, but significant, differences in terms of their organizational structure and institutional

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culture and have shared a common AO (Area of Operation) in South Lebanon on multiple missions allowing their relationship to be explored. Ireland has a long history of prominent participation in UN peacekeeping and has contributed a battalion to UNIFIL from its beginning in 1978 until 2001, when the mission was scaled down by the UN. Finland also contributed a battalion from 1982 to 2001. The first joint Finnish/Irish battalion was formed for a 12-month period in 2006–7 to support the instigation of the enhanced UNIFIL mission, and the second (and current) joint battalion was created in 2013 when Finnish troops returned to south Lebanon to join the Irish, who had returned in 2011.25 Both Ireland and Finland are small neutral European countries, whose militaries main occupation is peacekeeping. One key difference is that Ireland has a professional military, whereas the Finnish military is primarily volunteer reservists, with most of their careers spent in their civil occupation.

III Analysis

Impediments to Operationalizing Trust

It can be especially difficult for trust to develop within the social system of a peacekeeping mission for reasons linked to the inherent nature of peacekeeping and the understood social mechanisms of how people trust. These are documented in both peacekeeping literature and trust literature and were confirmed in the interviews. Principally, it is far more complex than needing to increase levels of trust between the different organizations and individuals involved in peacekeeping as trust needs to be balanced with a level of caution and the monitoring of peacekeeping personnel.26 Personnel must also be able to build trusting relationships with colleagues across different organizations and militaries and build trust with local communities where they are based while remaining impartial.


(i) Risk

Trust must develop in the high-risk environment of an ongoing or recent conflict, where there is a real risk of, and exposure to, injury and death. In the military ‘force protection’ is paramount and this leads to risk aversion and potentially aggression in the face of danger, and yet, contradictorily, the mission can’t succeed unless you make yourself vulnerable to an extent. This was put succinctly by a senior officer:

You have to risk your security to engage with people and a lot of the risk averse nature of leading in a multinational mission, the first order you are given is, bring everyone home...It’s easy to do that and go home as a success but you will have achieved very little.

Michael, Lieutenant Colonel, Defense Forces Ireland

(ii) Corruption

Trust needs to develop in a low-trust environment where corruption is common, and conditions lend themselves to institutional corruption and degradation. This can lead peacekeepers starting relationships with local communities and personnel from a position of low trust as described by one Finnish peacekeeper:

I would say that even though we always try our best to support the local officials and the local administration establishment, you should be well aware of that, a lot of these people have their own reason for doing things, that not everything is done in good conscience, and you should not be too, if I use the term politely, too trustful, you should be in a way always a bit realist.

Lars, Officer, Finnish Defense Forces

(iii) Short Deployments

The transitory nature of peacekeeping with deployments averaging six months per person for military personnel can hinder the development of forms of trust that are commonly built over time by repeatedly interacting with the same people. Many interviewees responded that it was difficult to trust people before you know them or understand their capability and that trust can only come from experience, for example with one person remarking:

Goldsmith & Harris, “Trust, trustworthiness and trust-building in international policing missions.”

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I remember talking to one young officer [from another military] saying ‘look I don’t trust you, that’s not a criticism, I said, we just don’t know each other, and I said ‘obviously, I would imagine you don’t trust me’

Michael, Lieutenant Colonel, Defense Forces Ireland

These short deployments are necessary because of the intensity of missions but impede trust developing, particularly the form of trust necessary for personnel to operate as an efficient networked organization.

Gaining the trust of local people when you are there for a short period is also challenging. Interviewees mentioned their hesitance to encourage locals to trust them for reasons including: feeling that they would be betraying that trust when they finished their rotation, not knowing whether the peacekeepers who replaced you would treat the community in the same way, and not wanting to give local people the idea that could help more than they could in a short period.

So in some respects it’s unfair to establish relationships with people if you can’t hold up your end of the bargain because you can’t get them to commit to you if you’re not going to be there for them and that’s a mistake that’s constantly being made in the last 15 years…where they have, like the term goes, ‘mowed the grass for a couple of weeks’ – they’re withdrawn, the grass grows back.

Michael, Lieutenant Colonel, Defense Forces Ireland.

(iv) Power Differentials

There are both explicit and implicit hierarchies at play between international peacekeeping personnel, whether that is the explicit hierarchies between military ranks or the implicit but influential hierarchies between different forms of organization (i.e. NGO vs. military), local and international organizations, and between international peacekeepers of different nationalities (i.e. western vs. non-western peacekeepers 29), as well as the power international peacekeeping personnel will hold versus their local counterparts and the local population. 30

The local civilian community will also be extremely heterogeneous, with individuals in position of power more likely to engage in meaningful or

29 Tallberg, “Bonds of burden and bliss: the management of social relations in a peacekeeping organisation.”

30 Fortna & Howard, “Pitfalls and prospects in the peacekeeping literature”; Rubinstein, Peacekeeping under fire: Culture and intervention.

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influential exchanges with international peacekeepers, which can unintend-edly consolidate existing or emerging power structures. In “Collective para-noia: Distrust between social groups”, Roderick Kramer contends that more powerful actors hold both greater ability and responsibility to generate trust. ‘Trust awareness’ relating to power dynamics is necessary here on the part international peacekeeping staff.

(v) Balancing Interpersonal Trust and Impartiality
We bond with and increase our trust in people (and them in us) when we have repeated close contact, but military peacekeepers must remain impartial while engaging with local communities sufficiently for trust to develop. This is however difficult as illustrated by Eric, a captain with Defense Forces Ireland:

If we had guys who are based up near the Israeli militias, they’d obviously be engaging with these, because they’re near them and all. They’d be more, you just naturally, because they’d get on with them, you’d be more inclined to say, well these guys aren’t too bad. If you’re in the village with the, with largely Arabs, then it could be Christian Arabs as well, there was a lot of them there in Lebanon. Ah, you would be more leaning towards them

A Typology of Trust for Peacekeepers
Trust is said to be crucial wherever risk, uncertainty, or interdependence exist and requires a degree of vulnerability and uncertainty on the part of a trustee. At a basic level, we trust when: “we refrain from taking precautions against an interaction partner when through self-interest or incompetence they could act against our interests.” Trust as a complex phenomenon has multiple conceptualizations across disciplines. We propose a typology of trust for peacekeepers, taking concepts and highlighting their relevance to core areas of peacekeeping. Trustors must know about the trust-dependent behaviors and their significance in the specific environment that they are based.

33 Roderick M. Kramer, Collective paranoia: Distrust between social groups (Stanford, 2004).
34 Mishra, "Organizational Responses to Crisis"

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Table 1 is a typology based on synthesis of cross-disciplinary trust definitions and analysis of interview data.

Table 1  Typology of trust for peacekeepers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust concept</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Relevance for peacekeeping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive trust</td>
<td>A knowledge-driven form of trust based on a rational evaluation of the trustee’s ability, competence or reputation.37</td>
<td>Peacekeeping is often chaotic and unpredictable, and a person is unlikely to have full cognitive control and will need to make decisions based on incomplete information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affective trust</td>
<td>An emotion-driven form of trust within personal relationships, based on personality cues and emotional connectedness.38 Affective trust is link to the concept of ‘thick trust’, trust based on experiences embedded in deep personal roots and relationships.39</td>
<td>Military peacekeepers will have intense emotional bonds with members of their national military contingent and will occasionally form close relationships with members of local communities where they are based.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonding trust</td>
<td>Bonding trust is the social capital that exists within a group, often with distrust for those outside the group.40</td>
<td>Within peacekeeping there may be very strong bonding trust within organizations and national contingents, due to training and living together for long periods of time and facing high-risk situations.41 Bonding trust is positive particularly in building links with local communities. Negative effects include intense in-group loyalty at the expense of sharing essential information, or not trusting people outside your organization or group who may be more capable for the task at hand.</td>
</tr>
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38 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Elron et al., "Why don’t they fight each other? Cultural diversity and operational unity in multinational forces"; Tallberg, “Bonds of burden and bliss: the management of social relations in a peacekeeping organisation.”

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Table 1  Typology of trust for peacekeepers (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust concept</th>
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<th>Relevance for peacekeeping</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bridging trust</td>
<td>Bridging trust a form of social capital facilitates ties between people across groups and across cleavages that typically divides society, like race, class, or religion.42</td>
<td>For the mission to cooperate as one unified network organization and with local populations, bridging trust is central to successful peacekeeping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process-based trust</td>
<td>Trust grounded in past direct experience of working together and future expectations.43</td>
<td>With militaries deployments on average lasting six months, process-based trust is difficult to establish with people outside one’s own military contingent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character-based trust</td>
<td>Trust formed based on attributes (characteristics) identified in the other party (e.g., ethnic group, religious affiliation, age and/or role in an organization).44</td>
<td>Character-based trust can lead to us trusting people closer in background to ourselves and trusting people based on past experiences with people in the same category. Relevant in peacekeeping as can be pragmatic to trust based on characteristics on short deployments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustworthiness</td>
<td>A moral value considered to be a virtue. A trustworthy person is someone in whom we can place our trust and be sure that the trust will not be betrayed due to the strength of their character. Trustworthiness can be based on perceived competence, integrity or benevolence.45</td>
<td>Trust or distrust for a group or category of people can develop through socialization and social interaction and perceptions of either that individual or organization as trustworthy (or untrustworthy) can be built up over time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferable trust</td>
<td>If A trusts B and B trusts C, then it follows that A is likely to trust C.46</td>
<td>Important with short rotations that trust can be both passed on by reputation or transferred to new personnel (including between newly deployed international military peacekeepers, and local actors).</td>
</tr>
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</table>

44 Ibid.
46 Granovetter, “Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness.”
Trust Awareness: Trust as a Soft Skill

Soft skills are personality traits, goals, motivations, and preferences that are valued in the workplace, in school, and in many other domains. Soft skills, in general are not a major part of training for most militaries, beyond briefings on gender equality policies and information sheet type cultural training. Trust is not explicitly part of current training for the Finnish or Irish militaries or part of induction training for UNIFIL, yet the experiences of the peacekeepers interviewed indicated that trust was a perquisite for successful cooperation, communication, negotiation and leadership. ‘Trust Awareness’ is knowing when and how to trust and when to exercise caution, and the ability to build trusting relationships. We argue that ‘trust awareness’ operates on four levels:

1. Understanding key trust concepts for peacekeeping (contained in the typology in Table 1)
2. Understanding ‘trust mechanics’, practical actions and behaviors that foster trust
3. Understanding that trust is transferable, both between individual peacekeepers and between militaries involved in peacekeeping
4. Understanding that difference underpinned by trust means greater resources with which to work

Trust Mechanics: Actions and Behaviors that Foster Trust

The analysis includes examples from interviewee’s experiences in UNIFIL that illustrate the impact of different levels of trust awareness and their manifestation in actions and behaviors that foster or inhibit trust.

(i) Interpersonal and Informal Interactions Build Trust with Local Communities

Over a long period of deployments (1975- the present), the Irish peacekeepers had developed a generalized trust in the local populations and vice versa, which can be typified as ‘affective’, ‘process-based’ and ‘characteristic-based’. The Irish peacekeepers interviewed felt casual and personal interactions were the predominant way they built trusting relationships. This familiarity was not

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spontaneously produced – attention was paid to opportunities to build trust, whether that be sharing personal stories of their families and background with local counterparts, or in the case of more junior personal, they felt encouraged to engage with people as frequently as possible in local markets, shops and businesses while on patrol, giving business to local communities and gaining information and intelligence. Basic human level connections were made:

So you wouldn’t only be out saying ‘do you know what happened last night?’ you also would just be asking ‘how are you?’

Joe, Corporal, Defense Forces Ireland

(ii) Showing Trust Engenders Trust with Local Communities

The Finnish interviewed responded that doing the job of patrolling in a skilled and efficient way would lead local communities to trust them (cognitive trust, process-based trust). A far more cautious attitude towards the local population was described by the Finnish military, including Kiia, a CIMIC officer: “It’s just more dangerous because you never know if the local in the background has something that might hurt you or your family in Finland, or the whole rotation, or the whole mission” and later goes on to say “you are supposed to trust another human…but all the time you can’t trust or you have to think ‘what is he thinking’ or ‘what is his agenda behind this’. Maria, another Finnish CIMIC Officer echoes this attitude: “you know that this is a game...so you have to be polite and diplomatic but remember that it is a game”. The Finnish reported few informal interactions with the local communities, staying inside their vehicles for much of their patrols. The Irish perceived that the Finnish contingent drove in armored vehicles with the windows rolled up and never stopped in local shops while out on patrol:

And you could see the difference in the attitude with the Lebanese towards the Irish and the Finnish right, even though we were all coming out of the same area. So the Finnish used to walk around with their weapons up, they looked very threatening; they looked like they were going to do something. And the Lebanese obviously hated that.

Mick, Corporal, Defense Forces Ireland

For the Irish, stopping while on patrols required a degree of trust in the face of risk, following a strategy of ‘showing trust engenders trust’. These ‘trust mechanics’ built trust with local population, and in turn contributed to showing the local population that they were trusted.
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(iii) Demonstrating Impartiality is Key to Maintaining Trust with Local Communities

The main source of tension and violence among the local populations is perceived, or at times actual, partiality by international peacekeepers. An officer assigned to liaison on the blue line noted the importance of impartiality:

I had to forge relationships with the Israeli Army and with the Lebanese Army, even though those two armies are still at war with each other. So one day you could be having lunch with an Israeli guy and your evening meal with a Lebanese guy...And as one of them says, ‘We don’t care if you hate us and the Israelis or if you love us and the Israelis, as long as you treat us equally’...Everyone didn’t like my boss. But they say that at least my boss – the French guy who left – they say, ‘He was a bastard to us, but he was also a bastard to the Israelis.

Alan, Israeli-Lebanese Liaison Officer, Defense Forces Ireland

Behaviors that affect trust are not just when on patrol or interacting with locals, but crucially, on social media, which is monitored by all parties to a mission.

You’re even watching the Facebook posts of the guys on your teams. Some guys would be putting up very pro-Israeli Facebook posts. And our Facebook pages would be monitored by the Lebanese and you’d have to say to them, ‘Don’t put that up. You can’t put that up on your Facebook post’.

Alan, Israeli-Lebanese Liaison Officer, Defense Forces Ireland

Awareness that any partiality undermined trust was essential for peacekeepers at all levels. The above examples highlight the need for trust awareness around the negative aspects of bonding trust that have the potential to form between international peacekeepers and local communities where they are based. There is a need to balance the professionalism and personal boundaries of the Finnish peacekeepers with the bonding trust the Irish peacekeepers developed with local communities to ensure impartiality and local ownership.

(iv) Joint Training is an Opportunity to Build Inter-organizational Trust

It is more challenging to develop process-based trust with peacekeepers from other militaries than it is with your own national contingent, which will have
developed by working together and training at home. Joint training has been found to be particularly important in developing trust, across all ranks.\textsuperscript{49}

Now that takes time but once that is established you’re looking at joint training, joint military activities, looking at different skills...That allows the lowest level soldier to interact with the lowest level of Finnish soldier. It is easier for the commanders to interact because we have more to talk about, but for the lower guy, simply, ‘this is my weapon and this is the capability,’ that’s interaction.

Eoin, Officer, Defense Forces Ireland

Without an opportunity to developed process-based trust through joint training, peacekeepers will have a far greater degree of trust with people they have trained with at home at the expense of sharing information and resources across contingents.

(v) Interpersonal and Informal Interactions Build Inter-organizational Trust
Straightforward friendliness was also surprisingly uncommon but could produce significant trust with militaries colleagues outside one’s national contingent.

I walk over and shake his hand, ‘well, how are you doing? What’s your name? You know. It’s the most basic thing in the world...And I’d say that goes an awful long way, just, on the basic human level, just be polite to them, chat to them, talk to them like a human being like, like you’re soldiers but you’re people like

Mick, Corporal, Defense Forces Ireland

Sports and social activities were found to be an additional informal way that military peacekeepers built both bonding and process-based trust across military contingents. Interviewees describe activities between the Irish and the Finns, including sports days, sharing saunas, soccer matches, quizzes, sharing coffee and meals together. Elron \textit{et al.} contend that peacekeeping forces are multinational rather than transnational in nature and peacekeepers tend to be identified and identify themselves according to their particular

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nationality. The camaraderie and close interpersonal bonds between peacekeepers serve as a way of mitigating the high levels of stress (due to danger, time away from families, boredom etc.) However, this can also lead to cliques forming between different military contingents, as noted explicitly by interviewees; despite the Irish living in close proximity with the Finnish, there was limited social interaction. There remains the question of how to prevent the negative or exclusionary aspects of this bond, whether the bonding trust can be extended across all peacekeeping actors, or is there a way this bonding trust can work in tandem with the bridging trust needed for collaboration in the network organization of a peacekeeping mission.

Trust as a Transferable Resource

In transferring and expanding trust, militaries need to move beyond solely depending on their individual professional status and experience, which was frequently referred to in interviews as a source of trust. It is also important to work to develop trust in the mission more broadly. The relationships described by Irish interviewees were importantly the relationship between the Lebanese communities and Irish peacekeepers, not between Lebanese communities and the mission itself as the Irish felt they had invested significant time and effort in building up relationships and wanted to protect this. The Irish perceived that their longevity in the Lebanon and their approach with local communities had developed a trust in Irish peacekeepers specifically, and they were eager to protect this, flying the Irish flag while on patrol and indicting that they were Irish at the earliest opportunity. The Finns described different incidents of aggression from the civilian population. This was noticed by the Irish peacekeepers, but the awareness of trust in inter-organizational cooperation, and the possible transfer of trust, was lacking.

So, we noticed then, we’d go through a village, and (speaking Arabic), and they’d be all like ‘ah, yeah, hello’ and then two hours later the Finnish would come through, and they’ll have rocks thrown at them, and they’d use, they’d set up wires for the vehicles that their heads are out to try and injure them, like you know.

Mick, Corporal, Defense Forces Ireland

50 Elron et al., “Why don’t they fight each other? Cultural diversity and operational unity in multinational forces.”
51 Tallberg, “Bonds of burden and bliss: the management of social relations in a peacekeeping organisation.”
Their security and the overall success of the mission however can only be guaranteed if the local population has trust in the overall mission. The Irish peacekeepers had built up a store of ‘characteristic based’ and ‘process-based’ trust, which, if recognized as transferable, could have extended the trust of the locals to their Finnish military colleagues. Awareness of the impact of different types of trust and the transferable nature of trust could have led the Irish peacekeepers to work to engender trust between communities and the mission more broadly, but their view of trust stopped at the borders of their own military. If there were a greater awareness of the role of trust in a network organization, militaries could grasp that they can help each other and ultimately help themselves by generating trust for other militaries, and the overall mission. Trust that is confined to the Irish military does not ultimately benefit the mission, unless it is transferable.

**Differences Underpinned by Trust Can Mean Greater Resources**

A key part of trust awareness is that trust in differences brings resources to the mission as a whole. ‘Trust awareness’ is necessary as there are different approaches as to how to build trust with the local population and awareness of these can allow the approach of other militaries to be understood and responded to appropriately. The Finns demonstrated an in-depth understanding of the gender mechanics of trust and power and how female peacekeepers can help to foster local ownership, with gender being discussed in the context of local ownership spontaneously by all Finnish respondents, while only one of the Irish peacekeepers recognized this. The Finns felt that female peacekeepers were able to engage with wide sections of communities (women and independent community groups) that are often less accessible or are ignored in peacekeeping in favor of dealing with influential figures i.e. Majors and Mukhtars in the case of Lebanon. When asked how having more female peacekeepers helped the mission one Finnish peacekeeper responded:

> Well it’s about reaching the whole population, females, males, children, elderly people and how the whole population is affected by the actions and decisions of peacekeepers. As a female I could talk to some different groups

Kiia, CIMIC Officer, Finnish Military

The Irish peacekeepers focused on traditional leadership while the Finns demonstrated understanding of tangible practices/mechanics of gender-based trust rather than normative statements on gender diversity as describe by Finnish CIMIC Officer Maria:
THE CASE FOR ‘TRUST AWARENESS’ AS A KEY SOFT-SKILL

I felt it was quite easy to find those in the local people that have not been heard, because I know there are Mayors and Mukhtars that have been heard several times and we have spent so much time with them, but it was important to pinpoint other groups we could support, this was the most fruitful cooperation.

Maria, CIMIC officer, Finnish Military

Often pragmatism and the focus on efficiency in peacekeeping ends up strengthening or consolidating existing power structures rather than fostering fundamental transformation. 52 Neither peacekeepers nor local communities are homogenous; serious consideration has to be given to whom to trust, and the most productive way of building trust is built with the local population as a whole. This involves reaching out to all parts of the country and ‘not just those in power or those with guns’,53 but crucially ‘non-governmental organizations, different political parties, women’s associations, youth and student groups’.54

The importance of seeming non-threatening was important for building trust with local communities. When explicitly asked about the benefits of having female peacekeepers many of the male respondents mentioned that local people, particularly women and children, were more likely to trust female peacekeepers as they see them as softer and less aggressive (as per Zucker’s concept of characteristic-based trust 55). However, the only Irish female interviewee (reflective of the only 4% female military peacekeepers in international missions 56), felt that this is because male peacekeepers ‘hold back’ from engaging with women and children and that male peacekeepers should be encouraged to interact with women and children more to develop the trust of the local community.

While the perceived differences between the Irish and Finns are relatively minor, they still led to reluctance to trust when working together in comparison to working with one’s own national contingent. In extremely diverse

54 Ibid, p.46.
multinational teams, greater perceived difference, if not recognized as a resource can have highly detrimental effect on trust and consequently collaboration. ‘Trust awareness’ in the soldiers would foster an appreciation of the diverse resources and strengths of different militaries (in this case the ability of the Irish to understand and build on a common interactional/interpersonal approach to establishing trust, and the Finnish highly professional approach and awareness of power differentials) and build mutual respect and trust with one’s colleagues of other nationalities. Trust mechanics would use joint training and everyday interactions to build trust that could be drawn on when needed.

IV Conclusion

The value of trust in peacekeeping missions was revealed in the interviews as having central importance; with many feeling it underpinned the strength or weakness of interactions in terms of communication and cooperation that participants encountered while on deployment, both with other national militaries and with the local population. However, we know little of how to categorize trust in a way that is useful for peacekeepers. This article contributes to our understanding of the role of trust and to our theoretical tools, through generating a typology of trust relevant for peacekeepers, and showing how this can be used to conceptualize a soft skill: ‘trust awareness’, and the behaviors associated with developing and maintaining different types of trust: ‘trust mechanics’.

Trust is complex in peacekeeping missions and needs to be ‘unpacked’ to address the dynamic and diverse interactions that peacekeepers have with a variety of actors. There are aspects of how trust is known to function that we found run contrary to the kind of trust needed in peacekeeping: (i) in situations of danger we become risk-averse, but in peacekeeping high levels of trust are required in the face danger; (ii) we bond with and increase our trust in people when we have repeated close contact, but military peacekeepers must trust across organizations, and peacekeepers must maintain neutrality while becoming somewhat embedded in the communities they are based; and (iii) we tend to trust more in the abilities of those we have worked with previously and trust people we can find commonality with, but peacekeepers must develop trust rapidly to cooperate across organizational and cultural boundaries. Trust is dynamic in a peacekeeping mission and being aware of the importance of trust, knowing what type of trust to deploy and when is a critical skill which is primarily produced through experience. We contend that what we call ‘trust awareness’ is undervalued as part of the peacekeeping skillset and needs to be
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explicitly recognized and fostered to produce the cooperation necessary between militaries, and with the local population, for the ‘networked’ organization of a peacekeeping mission to be effective.

Research Note

Interviews were collected as part of the Gaming for Peace project (gap). The project is designing and evaluating a curriculum in key soft skills for peacekeepers, delivered through a role-playing computer game. Gaming for Peace has received funding from Horizon 2020, the European Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, under the agreement 700670. This paper reflects only the view of the author(s) and Horizon 2020 is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. Horizon 2020 is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. For more information see www.gap-project.eu.
Chapter 3: Police in peacekeeping: a study on their role in the mobilization of social capital in a ‘network of trust relations’

Abstract

This paper uses trust and social capital concepts to examine the contribution police make to the functioning of peacekeeping networks. Police peacekeepers operate in a highly ambiguous and uncertain working environment, with varied stakeholders, differing levels of authority and a multiplicity of goals and tasks. This paper contends that peacekeeping missions are ‘networks of trust relations’; that is, networks that emerge under volatile conditions to facilitate social exchange. In peacekeeping, police personnel are positioned in multiple networks with diverse ties in both local communities and international peacekeeping structures. 56 in-depth semi-structured interviews were collected with Individual Police Officers (IPOs) from three EU countries (Northern Ireland, Portugal and Poland) on their experiences working as peacekeepers. In-depth interviews produced rich qualitative data on the interactions of peacekeepers within broader peacekeeping networks. Analysis found that trust, although difficult to build and maintain, was central to the generation and mobilization of social capital in peacekeeping.

Keywords: Peacekeeping, Police, Trust, Networks, Social Capital

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1 This manuscript is in preparation for submission to the journal Policing and Society. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Conference of the European Society of Criminology (Ghent, September 2019) and the Sociological Association of Ireland Postgraduate Conference (Galway, February 2020).

2 The interviews are extracted from a total of 177 interviews with police, military and civilian personnel, collected to develop a curriculum of soft skills for peacekeeping. A selection of these soft skills were embedded in a scenario-based digital role-playing computer game. See European Commission H2020 project, Gaming for Peace, GAP www.gap-project.eu.
3.1 INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

3.1.1 Peacekeeping: a case study on the role of trust in mobilizing social capital

This paper explores the role of trust in producing and utilizing social capital in peacekeeping networks. Trust is particularly difficult to build and maintain within peacekeeping missions (Singleton & Holohan, 2019) but paradoxically a higher degree of trust is necessary to develop and utilize social capital in volatile environments than in stable ones, for example during or after conflict (Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Paffenholz, 2008). This paper contends that Individual Police Officers (IPOs) play a key role in trust building, as well as the development and mobilization of social capital in peacekeeping networks. IPOs are an integral part of peace operations and were chosen as a focal point because of the variety, complexity and depth of their interactions compared to other organizational categories of peacekeepers (Grabosky, 2009; Greener, 2009b). Police are deployed for longer durations than other peacekeepers, usually for a minimum of one year (Bayley, 2006; Durch & Kerr, 2013). During deployments IPOs will live and work within local communities and consequently will have contact with a broad range of local actors, as well as contact with international peacekeepers from a range of organizations (Goldsmith & Dineen, 2007; Goldsmith & Harris, 2012).

Peacekeeping can be understood as a networked system, comprised of international military, police and civilian staff, as well as the staff of local organizations and institutions, and local communities (Holohan, 2005; Rubinstein, Keller & Scherger, 2008). Each organization will have its own distinct cultures, structures, mandates, and priorities. The organizational form of a peacekeeping mission is unique as multiple stakeholders, including different formal organizational hierarchies, must be brought under a temporarily umbrella or ‘networked’ organization (Holohan, 2005). Peacekeeping missions, as networks, have multiple leaders, voluntary links and interaction levels (Ostrom, 2015). The process of network formation is a key element of successful peacekeeping in terms of consent of parties, local ownership, and the durability of peace (Elron et al., 2003; Paris, 2009). Although organizations are under the auspices of UN peacekeeping apparatus there is no overarching coordination mechanism and peacekeepers are not given guidance on how to mobilize social capital and maximize the resources of the network (Holohan, 2005). In the absence of clear
rules, roles and chains of command, networks require trust to be actively fostered, reinforced, and repaired for cooperation (Adler, 2001; Ostrom, 2015).

Social capital is a concept that explains individual or collective action generated by networks of relationships (Coleman, 1988). Trust and social capital are linked and at times overlapping concepts. Trust is seen by some theorists as an intrinsic part of social capital (e.g. Putnam, 2000, 2001). Other theorists see trust as a factor in the dynamics of social networks that affects both the use of social capital and its effects (e.g. Burt, 2000, 2005; Cook, 2001, 2005). Social capital is regarded by many theorists in the field as distinct from other forms of capital as it is merely a potential resource (e.g. Coleman, 1988; Knoke, 1999, Lin, 2002, 2008). Nan Lin describes this distinction as: (a) accessed social capital, the resources and social ties present in a network and (b) mobilized social capital, the actual use of social ties and whether this mobilizes the resources present in a network (2008). This paper argues that accessed social capital is determined by social ties, whereas mobilized social capital is dependent on trust. Police are, in theory, positioned to be bridges between local communities and international peacekeeping structures with the potential to build trust and legitimacy with local communities broadly, and to inform and affect peacekeeping strategy. This paper uses qualitative approaches to examine the trust-based interactions and processes of the network and how social capital is mobilized, or not, in the peacekeeping context. The collection and analysis of interviews was guided by social phenomenology (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) which follows the approach that the construction, nature and maintenance of peacekeeping institutions and networks can be understood by assessing the everyday social interactions and perspectives of peacekeepers.

3.1.2 Police as peacekeepers

3.1.2.1 History, development and functions

Police were first used in UN peacekeeping operations in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964 (Sebastian, 2015). Peacekeeping mandates expanded and diversified greatly in the 1990s and this was accompanied by a growth in police numbers and a broadening of their function. Numbers have almost doubled since 1995 and as of 2020 there are now close to 11,000 police officers deployed as peacekeepers (United Nations Police, 2020).
The main functions carried out by police in peacekeeping missions fall into two broad categories: 1. operational support for the local police which will include the prevention and investigation of crime, protection of life and property, and the maintenance of public order; and 2. support for the reform and restructuring of the local police.

Police perform a wide range of activities within these categories depending on a mission’s mandate. These activities include protecting civilians, disbarment and demobilization, strengthening institutions, training and mentoring local police, assistance in electoral processes, border management, and public information and education (UN DPKO/DFS, 2014). Certain mission mandates (such as in Kosovo and East Timor) gave police full executive policing powers where they served as the national police until domestic capacity was developed (UN DPKO, 2003).

This paper uses data from interviews that were carried out with police personnel who were deployed on peacekeeping missions as Individual Police Officers (IPOs). IPOs are recruited as individuals for a specified position, with individual offices approved for secondment by their national police service (Durch & Kerr, 2013). IPOs are normally unarmed (with some exceptions) and have historically been utilized for community-oriented policing and information-gathering (Sebastian, 2015). IPOs are combined with a variety of international police of different nationalities ‘on the ground’ and are commonly embedded within local police services for the purpose of capacity-building, training, and monitoring (UN DPKO/DFS, 2014). IPOs will be unranked on missions, meaning that they may be recruited for a position that matches their expertise or specialism. The rank a police officer holds at home will not always translate to their rank on the mission (Goldsmith & Dineen, 2007; Greener, 2009a). IPOs commonly live in rented accommodation for the duration of their deployment and are embedded to a large extent in local communities (Grabosky, 2009).

It is worth noting that over 65% of the police personnel in UN peace operations now consist of members of Formed Police Units (FPUs) and this has made up a large part of the growth of police in peacekeeping and has become a major feature of peacekeeping in the last decade (United Nations Police, 2020). FPUs and IPOs have core differences both in terms of their functions and position within
peacekeeping networks. FPUs consists of approximately 140 police officers from one nation, who are seconded from their national police service and train and live together as a cohesive unit, not unlike like a military contingent (Hansen, 2011). FPUs carry light arms and can operate in extremely volatile situations involving public-order management and the protection of UN personnel and facilities (Agordzo, 2009, Wiatrowski, Pino & Pritchard, 2008).

3.1.2.2 Challenges for policing in peacekeeping

The unique challenges for police in peacekeeping are detailed by Durch and Kerr (2013):

1. Developing a common understanding of UN police practice and procedure within a multinational body of police
2. Developing enough local knowledge to be useful and enough local respect to put that knowledge to good use
3. Promoting intelligence-led police peacekeeping
4. Managing police-military relations
5. Ensuring discipline within ranks

Peacekeeping is distinct from other forms of policing in the level of cooperation it requires, between police and different national military contingents, between international police and local police, between police and personnel from local institutions and municipalities and between police and local communities (Greener, 2009a; Greener, 2011). Within teams of police there will be high levels of diversity in terms of nationality, ethnicity and religion, as well as differences in operating procedures, training, expectations and the police culture of sending countries (Ben-Ari & Elron, 2001; Durch, & Ker, 2013). Perceived differences between police of different nationalities and their capacity to fulfil the tasks at hand remain strong and are well documented as a source of difficulty in achieving force cohesion (Blume, 2004; Tallberg, 2007; Goldsmith and Harris, 2012).

IPOs face additional challenges to domestic police work, operating in a highly ambiguous and uncertain working environment, with varied stakeholders, differing levels of authority and a multiplicity of goals and tasks (Lipson, 2010). In this case, ambiguity refers to the blurring between different roles when IPOs find that they do not hold the expertise they require to solve a problem or complete a task in a new environment that requires a rapid response (Watts,
Over time, the role of police in peacekeeping becomes one of peacebuilding and the implementation of community policing practices as the host society gradually strengthens (Goldsmith, 2005; Grabosky, 2009). Community policing combines, “consultation with community members, responsiveness to their security needs, collective problem-solving to identify the most appropriate means of meeting these needs, and mobilization of the public to make all this happen” (Grabosky, 2009: 102). Central to this process is the extent to which the police win the trust and confidence of the population they serve (Grabosky, 2009; Jackson & Bradford, 2010). However, building trust with local communities in a peacekeeping context is particularly difficult due to high staff turnover (Bayley 2006; Goldsmith, 2005) and the cultural distance between the public and the police (Sklansky, 2005; Tyler, 2011).

3.1.3 A peacekeeping mission as a ‘network of trust relations’

A network is a structure that develops out of a series of social exchanges between multiple individuals or organizations. Inter-organizational networks tend to arise in instances when organizations share interdependencies or a mission, and their coordination is commonly self-governed (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Provan et al., 2007). Inter-organizational networks involve informal relationships, resource interdependency, collaboration, collective action, and trust (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny & Page, 1998; Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007).

Networks of trust relations tend to emerge out of necessity under conditions of uncertainty and risk to facilitate social exchange (Barrera, 2005; Buskens, 2002; Cook, 2005; Knight, 1992; Mishra, Kramer & Tyler, 1996). This paper contends that a peacekeeping mission has many features that make it a ‘network of trust relations’. Firstly, in peacekeeping, people must make decisions on whether to trust under conditions of great risk, uncertainty and ambiguity in comparison to the majority of social or working environments (Lee et al., 2010; Lipson, 2010; Goldsmith & Harris, 2012; Daniel and Hayes, 2016). Secondly, peacekeeping networks are extremely heterogeneous and require a great deal of cross-cultural trust-building, both in terms of organizational cultures and national cultures with the additional challenges these present for trust development and cooperation (Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010).
Finally, peacekeeping is made up of temporary teams with deployments ranging from a couple of months for some military and civilian personnel up to periods of one year for IPOs (Bove, Ruffa & Ruggeri, 2020). Cooperation in peacekeeping therefore requires ‘swift trust’. Swift trust requires hurried judgements about trustworthiness to be made that enable people to act in the face of uncertainty with limited knowledge of the past performance of team members, and with no guarantee of further involvement together after the project, or mission, has ended (Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996). When swift trust is necessary the usual informal mechanisms of trust are weakened or altered, i.e. the threat of loss of reputation for underhanded behavior or the promise of future reciprocity for honest behavior and resource sharing (Buchan, Croson & Dawes, 2002). In peacekeeping familiarity is not the basis of social exchange, nor are there clearly defined communal norms or external institutional constraints. In these kinds of network environments, social exchange requires risk and consequently trust (Cook, 2005; Cook, Levi & Hardin, 2009).

3.1.4 Trust and social capital: a contested relationship

Social capital is acknowledged by most theorists in the field to be networked based (e.g. Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 2000; Castells, 2011; Coleman, 1988, 1994; Flap, 1991; Lin, 1999; Putnam, 2000, 2001). Social capital theory seeks ways to explain coordinated action and how resources and information flows through a network (Coleman, 1988; 1994; Burt, 2000; Ostrom, 2015; Putnam, 2001). The argument that trust is an important factor in social networks has been asserted by various theorists (e.g. Buskens, 2002; Gausdal, 2012; Ostrom, 2015). It is suggested that resource sharing by network members depends on their trust in one another (Sabatini, 2009) and it is assumed that a degree of trust among members is necessary for a social network to develop and to be maintained (Cook, Levi & Hardin, 2009). However, the relationship between trust and social capital is a contested one. Is trust a form of social capital, or is trust a consequence of social capital? Social capital was defined by Robert Putnam as “networks, norms and trust” (2001:44). Karen Cook, in contrast, sees trust as something that leads us to “take risks of cooperating with others and therefore to enter into many social relations, some of which may provide social capital” (Cook, 2005: 9).
Some of the broadly accepted links between trust and social capital are outlined by Blumberg, Peiró and Roe, (2015):

1. The increase of trust will favor network expansion and cohesion, whereas the decrease of trust will promote network contraction and a weakening of ties among network members.
2. The absence of trust will constrain networks and make them susceptible to ruptures, which may reduce social capital.
3. The trust members have in those inside the network will help to develop stronger ties and social capital within the network (bonding social capital).
4. The trust that members have for those outside the network will facilitate the formation of new contacts and the growth of the network, which will be accompanied by an increase of social capital (bridging social capital).

I contend that trust and social capital are inextricably linked, and that examining trust can shed light on how social capital is mobilized in networks.

### 3.1.5 Trust and social capital in the context of peacekeeping

Certain social capital distinctions are particularly applicable to the peacekeeping context. *Normative social capital* definitions incorporate the trust, norms, and networks that facilitate coordinated action. Normative social capital theorists view it as a set of features of a social structure that lead to collective action and mutual benefit for a collective of people (e.g. Coleman 1988, 1990; Putnam 2000, 2001). In peacekeeping this encompasses features of the networked organizational structure that facilitate information sharing and cooperation.

*Advantage social capital* theorists approach the concept from the interactionist and conflict traditions and see social capital as an explanation for patterns in the accumulation of power and other forms of inequality (e.g. Bourdieu, 1986; Schulman & Anderson 1999). In peacekeeping this is relevant as power and influence is more likely to be held by international police than their local counterparts and peacekeepers can reinforce existing, often harmful, power dynamics within local communities through their interactions with existing power brokers (Ghosh, 1994; Marten, 2004). Within any network there will be relations characterized by different levels of trust (Blumberg, Peiró & Roe, 2015) and in peacekeeping trust is neither homogeneously distributed nor stable.
Although Mark Granovetter’s ‘The strength of weak ties’ (1977) does not explicitly mention social capital, it provides key insights into how networks expand and function. Within a network of *strong ties*, people with *weak ties* outside the core network are *bridges* to other networks. Granovetter (1977:361) explains why this is the case: “[T]hose to whom we are weakly tied are more likely to move in circles different from our own and will thus have access to information different from that which we receive.” In the case of peacekeeping, police, because of their interactions with multiple stakeholders and local communities, will have a large number of weak ties relative to other organizational categories of peacekeepers.

*Bonding social capital* exists within a group often with a degree of distrust for those outside the group. *Bridging social capital* facilitates ties between people across groups and across cleavages that typically divide society, like race, class, or religion (Putnam, 2000). Within peacekeeping there may be very strong bonds within organizations, due to training and living together for long periods of time and working in a high-risk environment (Elron et al., 1999; Tallberg, 2007). However, bridging social capital is crucial for peacekeeping to succeed long-term as international peacekeepers from different organizations must be able to cooperate with one another, and with local communities and institutions, as one unified ‘networked’ organization (Singleton & Holohan, 2019).

This paper addresses questions on how IPOs conceptualize peacekeeping networks, including attitudes to their relationships, subjective motives behind social actions and perceptions of the frequency and quality of interactions. Specifically, how IPOs develop and utilize (or fail to utilize) social capital with local communities, interpreters, other police (international police and local police) and international organizations (militaries and civilian staff). Finally, this paper considers approaches to the coordination of peacekeeping networks that would optimize their trust-building and social capital potential.

### 3.2 METHODOLOGY

#### 3.2.1 Using in-depth interviews to understand trust and social capital

In-depth interviews were chosen because of their ability to address questions of crucial importance related to the construction, variability and dynamics of complex
social ties (Creswell, 1998; Rubin & Rubin, 1995). Taking a phenomenological approach, qualitative methods of investigating networks emphasize network participants' own models and conceptualizations of their relationships and social contexts (Edwards, 2010; Heath, Fuller, & Johnston, 2009). Qualitative methods are also able to capture the process elements of trust and trust building and can help make sense of complex organizational realities (Möllering, Bachmann, & Lee, 2004).

Face to face in-depth semi-structured interviews were carried out with 56 IPOs from three EU countries (15 from Northern Ireland, 27 from Portugal and 14 from Poland). These interviews lasted 1-1.5 hours and were collected between January and March 2017. These interviews are a subset of 177 interviews with police, military and civilian peacekeeping personnel collected by a team of researchers under the auspices of the European Commission H2020 project, Gaming for Peace/GAP. A methodology package, which included a standardized approach for the selection of interviewees, data management and protection and informed consent and ethics was used to ensure interviews were carried out in a consistent way across organizations and that data could be pooled and compared. All interviews were recorded with respondents’ consent and transcribed in full.

The GAP project developed a curriculum of soft-skills for peacekeeping personnel, with a selection of these soft-skills embedded in a scenario-based, role-playing computer game. In order to construct these scenarios extensive detail was collected on successful and unsuccessful instances of cooperation, communication, gender awareness, cultural awareness, risk management and trust; the topic areas covered in interviews. These interviews produced rich data on the interactions of peacekeepers, who they communicated with and on how they coordinated their work. The trust specific questions and prompts are listed below:

1. Who would you trust if you are in a potentially dangerous situation on the ground? (If they ask what you mean, say someone from a specific organization, male or female, nationality?)
2. Who would you not trust, and why?
3. How do you get people to trust you in the field? (from your own organization, other organizations and local people?)
4. How do you build trust? (from your own organization, other organizations and local people?)

The fact that trust questions were set amid a number of other topic areas was
advantageous, with these ‘adjacent’ topic areas producing much valuable data on trust and the nature of social ties within peacekeeping networks. Saunders (2015) notes that researching trust often covers topics that are sensitive in nature and can lead to evasive answers or socially desirable responses. In this case, participants were being asked about positive and negative experiences working with people from their own and other organizations and working with people of different nationalities and genders. The other topic areas acted as icebreaking questions to build rapport with interviewees and helped ensure participants were not oversensitized to a research focus on trust.

3.2.2 Sampling

A purposive non-probability sampling strategy was used. Sampling was carried out to capture the experience diverse range of police peacekeepers in terms of gender, age, rank, and role. There is an overrepresentation of female police peacekeepers; 13 interviewees were female (23%) and 43 interviewees were male (77%). Although women are a small percentage of this sample, they remain overrepresented in comparison to the general population of police peacekeeping personnel, with only 15% of police peacekeepers being female in 2020 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020).

Each of the three European police services in this sample has comparatively high levels of personnel deployed as peacekeepers for discrete historical, political and economic reasons. The number of police personnel with peacekeeping experience will be relatively limited in any police force and the main criterion for sampling within organizations was that the police officers had extensive mission experience and in the case of the Portuguese police also had a high enough level of English to be interviewed. 15 interviewees were from Northern Ireland (9 from the Police Service of Northern Ireland [PSNI] and 6 from Northern Ireland Cooperation Overseas [NI-CO]), 27 were from Portugal (Policía de Segurança Pública [PSP]) and 14 were from Poland (Policja). Interviewers took place during work hours with police seconded for their time.

Interviews were collected as part of a collaborative project where different researchers analyzed them from their own methodological/theoretical standpoints. As part of a team of researchers I collected nine of the 56 interviews used in this
paper. I collected these nine interviews with the Portuguese Police, Polícia de Segurança Pública (PSP) in Lisbon. It is important to note the differences these interviews have in terms of their linguistic arrangements: interviews with the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) were conducted in the participants first language (English) with project partners from Northern Ireland; interviews with the Portuguese police were conducted through English by researchers from Ireland and finally; interviews with the Polish police were conducted in Polish by project partners from Poland and later translated into English by the interviewers.

Comparing interviews conducted in participants first and second languages poses challenges for analysis. Even when interviewees have an excellent command of a second language, meaning can potentially be lost. The openness and flow of conversation can be interrupted and the influence of language on interpreting unique colloquialisms, grammatical structures and idioms should not be underestimated (Van Nes et al., 2010). Comparing interviews that were conducted in English with interviews later translated into English poses additional challenges for analysis - meaning can easily be distorted or lost in translation and validity of the data may be compromised in this process (Temple & Young, 2004).

In this sample there are also issues related to comparing interviews conducted and analyzed by the primary research versus analyzing interviews collected by other researchers. These issues include lost opportunities to ask relevant probing questions, and a likelihood to ‘over-focus’ on interviews collected by the primary researcher (Van den Berg, 2008). Although a unified coding framework was devised to help minimize these issues, they remain a barrier to comparison between the three cohorts.

3.2.3 Analysis Strategy

The interviews were analyzed through an iterative process of thematic analysis and working with literature on peacekeeping, trust and social capital. A cross sectional sample of the interviews were coded, drawing up initial codes, and these were then refined throughout the process of coding the data.

The NVivo11® software package was used for analysis to formulate, refine and apply a coding framework. This coding framework included trust and social capital concepts and a set of behaviors and attitudes that signify them. This
process allowed for the rigorous identification, organization and analysis of the social interactions and perspectives of IPOs.

3.3 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION: SOCIAL CAPITAL ACCESS VERSUS MOBILIZATION IN PEACEKEEPING

Each of the following subsections details the interactions IPOs have with a variety of different actors in the networked social system of a peacekeeping mission. In each section distinction is drawn between accessed social capital, available social ties, and mobilized social capital, the actual use of these ties, and whether or not this mobilizes the resources of the network (Lin, 2008). The unique opportunities and barriers for actualizing social capital resources in the peacekeeping context are elaborated on in each section.

3.3.1 Police and local ties

3.3.1.1 Police and local communities

Developing enough local knowledge to be useful, and enough local respect to put that knowledge to good use, has been identified as one of the main challenges of doing police work in peacekeeping (Durch & Kerr, 2013). IPOs reported numerous and varied interactions with local communities, covering both interactions that occur as part of their day to day police work, and social interactions. Although police are likely to have several weak ties in local communities, there were barriers to trust developing in these relationships: short rotations, the cultural distance between police and communities, and power imbalances.

Out of necessity local communities must trust the police to a certain extent because they rely on them for protection and security. There is a general acceptance from local communities of the importance of the security that peacekeepers provide (Austesserre, 2014a; Higashi, 2015). It is also widely recognized that there are economic benefits of having peacekeepers in a region; both that peacekeepers will spend money in local businesses and help generate stable enough conditions for businesses to function (Newby, 2016). However, local communities are extremely heterogeneous, and IPOs felt that some community members were liable to feel hostile towards them. These included those who had no business interests, those who felt international peacekeepers interfered with local cultural standards, and those who suspected police of being partisan in any way.
IPOs reported a considerable amount of social or non-work-based interactions with local communities. To this end there were additional opportunities for building ties in the community. This was attributed to living independently in rented accommodation, using local businesses and at times socializing with or through colleagues in local police services. These interactions included eating in local restaurants, buying things in local shops and markets, and using gyms. Police discussed how important this was for developing ties in the local community.

Respondents discussed the benefits of these social ties for understanding the needs of local communities and for gathering intelligence. Respondents frequently mentioned how this set them apart from other peacekeepers, in particular military personnel:

"I’ve always had a problem with internationals not actually understanding the subject in front of them or not reading the situation right. I think that on some of these deployments, internationals spend more time looking after themselves not actually engaging with the public, not understanding the problems or the hardships of the people that they are serving."

Gary – Police Service Northern Ireland

One police officer mentioned that using the local gym gave him the opportunity to build relationships with people that he would otherwise have not come into contact with. In this case he developed ties with groups of young men who had no business interests or formal influence but were nonetheless valuable sources of information and potential bridges to yet unrelated networks (Burt, 2005). Becoming embedded in local communities demonstrates a willingness to be vulnerable on the part of police; this willingness to be vulnerable generates a certain ‘stock of goodwill’ that helps build local consent and legitimacy (Newby, 2017).

IPOs in this sample often reported starting from a low base of trust with local communities, as well as having difficulty in gauging the trustworthiness of the ties that they made. Community policing requires both trust and a continuity of interface. Despite police spending longer periods on deployment than other categories of peacekeepers, the frequent turnover of staff was seen to hinder the development of trust:

"What was the point in talking to you when you’re going to be leaving in a
month’s time and some other guy is going to come in for a couple months, then he’s going to leave? There is no continuity for the locals and that also is a problem, you know, you can understand their frustrations there.

Kevin – Police Service Northern Ireland

IPOs need to quickly make local connections when they arrive on deployments. Developing ‘swift trust’ (Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996) with these connections is the next step in mobilizing the social capital resources available in the network. However, building trust is further complicated by the cultural distance between police and community. Sklansky (2005) notes how in multi-ethnic societies the cultural distance between the police and the communities in which they are based impedes the development of trust and consequently leads to suspicion and unwillingness to cooperate. This is particularly pertinent in the peacekeeping context where the police will be multi-ethnic and often from different religious and national backgrounds than the communities that they are policing. Societies that have experienced a recent conflict are more likely to have smaller ‘radii of trust’ (Fukuyama, 1995) with trust within groups being strong but trust between groups, and consequently bridging social capital, likely to be weak. Post-conflict, familiarity is the basis for social exchange (Horowitz, 1982; Colletta & Cullen, 2000) and IPOs are liable to be seen as outsiders. One police officer described local attitudes to international police as a culture of secrecy or ‘omerta’ which acted as a barrier to any meaningful exchange and hindered attempts at intelligence led policing.

The power imbalance between international police and local communities will ultimately affect the development and maintenance of trust and this was recognized by police in this sample. Several IPOs interviewed believed in ulterior motives for friendly or helpful behavior and some mentioned being acutely aware of earning an international salary much higher than the local average. In social capital terms, international staff will hold advantage social capital in terms of power, money or influence. Bachmann (2001) contends that if an exchange is perceived to be unbalanced or unfair, or if it is disproportional to the status or power of the parties, a decline of trust and the depletion of social capital is the most probable outcome.

Police in this sample demonstrated access to myriad ties in local communities, giving them insight into their needs and perspectives. However, building the
trust required to build legitimacy, gather intelligence, or mobilize the social capital resources present was highly challenging in this context.

3.3.1.2 Police and interpreters
Interpreters hold an influential position within peacekeeping networks (Rosendo & Persaud, 2019). Local interpreters are recruited to work with international peacekeepers to facilitate communication as most personnel will not understand the local languages or cultures. The relationship between international peacekeepers and local interpreters is consequently crucial for successful peacekeeping (Kelly & Baker, 2012; Rosendo & Persaud, 2019).

IPOs detailed the importance of their relationships with interpreters and recognized that it was the primary way that they were able to interact with local communities. Without interpreters IPOs would not be able to investigate crime, train and mentor local police or engage in community policing activities. Interviewees also mentioned how through their working or personal relationships with interpreters they learned about local customs and practices and were introduced to new ties. In social capital terms interpreters acted as both bridges to local networks and the means by which IPOs can carry out police work and form new ties.

Out of necessity IPOs had to trust interpreters to some extent. However, within this sample it was frequently highlighted that this was a cautious trust. Police in this sample frequently reported not trusting what an interpreter was saying, either that they believed that they were not interpreting accurately due to lack of competency in the English language, that they were not translating what was said in full, or that they perceived through tone of voice and/or body language that conversations being had through the interpreter had become antagonistic without the interpreter explaining why.

Rosendo and Persaud (2019) argue that interpreters are generally ‘outsiders’ to international peacekeepers and ‘insiders’ to local communities. However, analysis with this sample found the positionality of interpreters to be more complex. Respondents noted interpreters can be seen as outsiders within their own communities because they are likely to be well paid, owing to their international salary, and that this at times led to resentment towards interpreters from some community members. It was also observed that tensions between interpreters and
local individuals would exist if policing took place in a region where there was ongoing ethnic conflict. This was due to interpreters being identified as one or other of the conflicting ethnic groups. One police officer described being deployed in Kosovo and needing interpreters from both Albanian and Serbian groups. These interpreters had to work together inside the same building, often regarding each other with mutual suspicion. The police officer described how in this situation he had to be particularly careful not to show any partisanship or favoritism.

Although interpreters were recognized as key ties and interviewees often relied on them heavily to carry out their work, it could again be challenging to build trust. In some instances, local interpreters were not insiders to the regional community and instead of forming bridges into local communities could be a barrier to forming trusting relationships and new ties.

3.3.1.3 International police and local police
IPOs will work directly with local police, either through mentoring and training or through taking on roles in national police services as security institutions gradually strengthen (Goldsmith & Dineen, 2007). IPOs will be deployed alone or in small groups. Depending on how missions are organized, police may be inducted together before being deployed to separate regions or stations or have a formal introduction to their new team (Grabosky, 2009; Greener, 2009b). However, often, IPOs will be ‘thrown in at the deep end’ and need to start police work with a team of new colleagues immediately (Grabosky, 2009).

Although all police will share ties, a formal mandate and a professional identity as police, trust is difficult to develop through the usual process-based mechanisms that promote trust in other professional settings. Process-based trust is trust that is grounded in past direct experience and future expectations, this kind of trust develops gradually as people accumulate shared experience from joint problem solving (Zucker, 1986). Police work in peacekeeping requires police to develop trust rapidly with new colleagues under high risk conditions but police in this sample reported that trust was in fact built very cautiously and slowly. For these police the absence of either first-hand knowledge on the competence or integrity of colleagues, or trusted second-hand knowledge via reputation, added to the stress of police work.
In an even more explicit way than with local communities or interpreters, interviewees perceived an imbalance of power with local police colleagues. On some missions IPOs were responsible for assisting in the restructuring of national police services. Respondents were aware of the power, or the perceived power, they had over their national counterparts, particularly in terms of decisions on who would get promoted, demoted or made redundant. Police also described instances where local believed this to be the case, when they had, in fact, little or no influence on these decisions. This perceived imbalance led to tensions, suspicion and distrust between international and local police:

You tend to not trust anyone. You look around and you see that everybody else is tense as well, and kind of everybody else is looking for a better place for themselves. This shows a lot. When you observe the people around you, you see that nobody is comfortable.

Rita - Polícia de Segurança Pública

This power imbalance compounded difficulties police had building trust that arose from cultural differences and the lack of opportunity to build process-based trust. The absence of trust risks preventing the growth and diversification of ties. This in turn will constrain networks and reduce social capital (Blumberg, Peiro & Roe, 2015). Despite these challenges IPOs in this sample described certain strategies that they had developed for building trust with local colleagues. These included trying to get to know local police on a personal level by sharing stories of their lives and families at home, deferring to the expertise of local police whenever possible to demonstrate that they trusted in their abilities, and organizing training or social events with colleagues to build relationships.

3.3.2 Police and international ties

3.3.2.1 As part of a multinational team
When first deployed to a mission IPOs need to start police work immediately with a new team of colleagues that will include both local police and international colleagues from across the world. Peacekeeping networks are highly heterogeneous and one of the key challenges identified for police work in peacekeeping is coordinating a diverse team, while developing a common understanding of UN police policy and practice (Ben-Ari & Elron, 2001; Durch & Kerr, 2013). Although analysis found that there are difficulties in mobilizing social capital resulting from challenges of working in a multi-organizational, multinational environment, when
explicitly recognized as a resource, this diversity can also add richness and social capital resources to the peacekeeping network as a whole (Singleton & Holohan, 2019).

There was frequent recognition of the added challenges of working in a multicultural team. These challenges included bringing together different organizational cultures and approaches to policing. IPOs detailed incidences where they felt officers from other national police services were heavy-handed or lacked professionalism. IPOs also described how colleagues could have racist attitudes, particularly towards colleagues from Asia, Africa or the Middle East, viewing them as backward and not trusting in their capabilities. Interviewees also noted incidences where officers came from a background where they had little or no experience working with female colleagues. This made coordinating teams difficult, especially when some officers would not trust orders or take direction from female officers in positions of authority.

Police peacekeepers demonstrated the presence of strong bonding social capital within national groupings and tended to form networks of police from their home country for both social and professional support:

Luckily you have RUC people [police force in Northern Ireland prior to the PSNI] that you have a certain degree of trust in because if they were complete asses you would have known about it. Outside of that I suppose relationships are like any fresh start. How do you do it? You do it carefully I suppose.

Jim – Police Service Northern Ireland

Research in social capital suggests that homophily plays a large part in how social capital functions (Lin, 2000, 2008). Homophily aligns the network identity with the members’ identities and can increase social capital among the members (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001). This tendency can have negative implications, preventing members building social capital beyond their core network (Blumberg, Peiró, & Roe, 2015). Cook (2005) argues that ‘networks of trust relations’ that form in conditions of high-risk and uncertainty can easily become closed networks with an over-reliance of social capital resources within the network. Under such conditions these networks have negative effects on the mobilization of social capital in broader networks and societies.
However, the tendency to form national bonds may also have benefits for the development of social capital in the peacekeeping context. In peacekeeping there are both closed networks, in the form of traditional organizations and military units, and open networks of interconnected organizations and individuals forming part of the overall, dispersed peacekeeping ‘networked’ organization (Elron et al., 2003; Holohan, 2005).

In peacekeeping there are many potential clusters that may arise involving police: police of different nationalities within a station, police of one nationality located across different stations that formed relationships based on training or working together in their home countries, and police and military from the same country based on a national affiliation. If police have ties from their national police services spread among clusters in different police stations this can encourage a less dense and more open network that facilitates access to better or more varied access to resources, information or influence (Burt 2000, Lin, 2002). The final section of this paper details how to optimize social capital resources in peacekeeping networks including how to ensure that diversity is a strength that mobilizes instead of constrains social capital.

3.3.2.2 With other organizations
Because of the nature of the work IPOs carried out, encompassing both security and community policing activities, IPOs described relationships with international peacekeepers from a broad range of organizations.

IPOs had contact with personnel from international non-governmental organizations and civilian staff. There were incidents where police described having to respond to security and safety concerns from these organizations. The priorities and functions of these organizations and individuals also overlapped and included collaborating and sharing information on issues around domestic violence and child abuse, and jointly delivering selected civic engagement and peacebuilding initiatives. Here, trust was built with these ties through interdependency and reciprocity.

Police also reported interacting with military personnel, usually under highly volatile conditions where police and militaries were responding to riots or outbreaks of violence. In these instances, out of necessity, police needed to trust in military personnel for security to some degree. Although military and police
shared interdependencies and a mission, developing trust between these two organizations was more difficult and managing police-military relations is recognized as a key on peacekeeping missions (Durch & Kerr, 2013). IPOs reported positive interactions with military personnel, relying on them for security in situations that IPOs were unequipped to handle. Certain IPOs also reported developing socialties with individuals from militaries from their home state. However, police also expressed frustration with militaries because of them being inappropriately heavy-handed, threatening or hostile in their interactions with local communities, which they felt jeopardized the trust and good will that they had built up between local communities and international peacekeepers. Police described feeling that there was an implicit hierarchy between military and police and that military personnel could easily ‘over-step their mark’ and intervene in situations that could be better handled by police. Despite international organizations in a peacekeeping network sharing a mission, each organization will have its own distinct cultures, structures, mandates and priorities and building trust between organizations in the absence of clear boundaries and roles can be a challenge.

3.3.2.3 As part of a UN peacekeeping structure
Although police have multiple ties in the community, and ties with a variety of international peacekeepers, analysis found that they were not being utilized as bridges between local communities and broader peacekeeping structures. Police expressed frustration at the lack of opportunity to influence any decision-making processes at a strategic level. Analysis of interviews revealed incidents of duplicating efforts, disagreement with mission command, and the lack of a formal coordination mechanism. Many police expressed negative views and frustration with overarching peacekeeping apparatus. Frustration was felt with the inability to use the knowledge they had gained from interactions with staff of local municipalities and local communities to alter strategy:

We were getting a lot of information because we were travelling all over the place. But, we didn't have any feedback about what purpose that information would be put to. You could have had some information that they might appreciate but since there was no feedback about what they’re thinking, what’s you're aim, you kept it only to yourself.

Pepe - Polícia de Segurança Pública
Police often struggle to gain access to and influence over senior level decision-making and strategic planning of peacekeeping strategy. This has consequences for the recognition of the importance of police work and the allocation of resources. This often results in narrow, short-sighted imperatives around policing (Bellem & Hunt, 2015). Social capital resources that IPOs had developed through gathering intelligence and building trust and social ties with local communities remained underutilized and this was revealed multiple times in interviews.

3.3.3 How to optimize social capital resources in peacekeeping networks

The practicalities of how to coordinate action to achieve the common goals of a network is a major challenge and is a key area of study within social capital and network literature (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). Networks are usually self-governed, and their governance can take on many different structural forms. For example, they can remain decentralized across all organizations, or coordination can happen via centralized member organizations or a single administrative organization (Provan et al., 2007). Regarding social capital as merely a potential resource, as it is by several theorists in the field (e.g. Coleman, 1988; Knoke, 1999; Lin, 2002, 2008), invites questions on how best to engineer and coordinate networks to best optimize their social capital potential. How should a peacekeeping network be coordinated? Who should do this and how should it happen?

Analysis found that in peacekeeping networks trust had to be actively fostered, reinforced, and repaired for cooperation and for social capital to be mobilized. Peacekeeping functioned as a ‘networks of trust relations’ but these kinds of networks, without intervention or coordination, can form dysfunctional clusters and silos, becoming smaller closed networks that impede the greater use of social capital (Cook, 2005). In this network context, where swift trust is required between multiple organizations and cultures there are some specific strategies that could be used to galvanize trust between colleagues and help to avoid silos.

IPOs noted how beneficial joint trainings and induction were:

We were around sixty police officers from different countries. [Joint training] that helped a lot. Because then we start to build this kind of net of friendships between the different nationalities. Even though we were not stationed in the same city or department or whatever, but
when we met them, this person, or we had to work with them, because we met them during the induction training, it was really easy. Not all missions were like that.

Luis - Polícia de Segurança Pública

Although this did not happen consistently in all missions, when it did, it improved group cohesion and had additional benefits for the functioning of wider peacekeeping networks once police are dispersed. The particularities of a field, including its aims, context, and challenges, are essential for understanding the possibilities and challenges for network coordination. As suggested by Paris (2009) what may be needed in the context of peacekeeping is a ‘directed network’ that more effectively combines elements of hierarchy and decentralized autonomy. Examining the perspectives of police revealed many challenges and opportunities for the mobilization of social capital. Analysis found that police had developed their own ad hoc strategies in response to challenges in building trust and cooperating across organizations and cultures. It may also be beneficial to look at ways of formalizing some of these approaches.

3.3.4 Limitations

It is worth noting that the nationalities of this sample are not representative of the general population of police peacekeepers, with European police greatly overrepresented. In terms of field diversity, most police will be from Asia and Africa (Bove, Ruffa, & Ruggeri, 2020). Consequently, the picture of the challenges and opportunities of network cohesion and cooperation, particularly from a cultural perspective, is incomplete.

The experiential interviews analyzed in this study did not collect numerical data on the number of ties IPOs had, or the frequency of their interactions with each tie. Consequently, this research did not generate numerical data on social capital access that could be used for network mapping or the visualization of different peacekeeping networks. However, this paper is concerned primarily with the experiences and perspectives of police in peacekeeping and chose to focus on the construction, dynamics and processes of peacekeeping networks in response to the dearth of qualitative network analyses (Edwards, 2010), as well as an absence of work on the micro processes of peacekeeping (Fortna & Howard, 2008).
3.4 CONCLUSION

This study examined how trust and social capital operate in a dynamic, volatile and non-commercial network environment. It is important for a peacekeeping mission to be considered as networked organizations made up of different organizations and individuals. It is also important that peacekeepers themselves are keenly aware of this. This study contends that trust and social capital are inextricably linked, and that examining trust can shed light on how social capital is mobilized within a network. Analysis showed that whereas social ties may define access to social capital, these social capital resources could only be mobilized through trust. Trust however was difficult to build and maintain, with short deployments, cultural differences and power imbalance providing additional challenges. The rapid growth of cohesive Formed Police Units (FPUs) has been, in part, a response to the coordination issues of multinational teams of police (Agordzo, 2009; Hansen, 2011). However, taking a network perspective highlights elements of broader network cohesion, cooperation, and trust-building that may be lost with the move away from deploying police as Individual Police Officers (IPOs). Acting as individuals, IPOs must develop multiple diverse ties rapidly. IPOs are positioned to be bridges between local communities and international peacekeeping structures, with the potential to build trust and legitimacy with local communities and to inform and affect peacekeeping strategy. Currently IPOs are not being utilized to optimize social capital resources. There are strategies identified that can encourage trust between social ties in peacekeeping networks. These include joint training initiatives and inductions with the aim of avoiding the potentially detrimental effects of clusters including closed networks forming and information remaining in silos. A key step is valuing the perspectives of IPOs and considering ways to formalize the strategies that this group of peacekeepers has developed to build trust with a broad range of ties, despite myriad challenges.
Chapter 4: How peacekeepers trust: an experimental vignette study on trust in a high-risk, networked environment

Abstract

Peacekeeping provides a unique context in which to study trust due to extreme levels of diversity, risk, uncertainty and ambiguity in comparison to other social or working environments. This paper uses data from 108 vignette experiments with international peacekeepers to test different theories about what promotes or reduces trust in peacekeeping, noting differences across subgroups by institutional category, gender and national groupings. The aim of this study is to contribute to a deeper understanding of two central issues: Firstly, can ‘vignette experiments’ help us empirically examine concepts of trust? Secondly, does the institutional affiliation of peacekeepers influence the pattern of trust that they display? Our results show that the way peacekeeping personnel trust has important consequences for the success or failure of peacekeeping missions.

Keywords: Trust, vignettes, peacekeeping, cooperation

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1 This manuscript is in preparation for submission to International Peacekeeping. I am the first author with Prof. Richard Layte from the Department of Sociology, Trinity College Dublin to be listed as secondary author. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Trinity College Department of Sociology PhD Day (Dublin, April 2019) and the Conflict Research Society Annual Conference (Brighton, September 2019).

2 The creation of vignettes was informed by interviews with police, military and civilian personnel that were collected as part of the European Commission H2020 project Gaming for Peace/GAP. The project developed a curriculum of soft skills for peacekeeping, a selection of which were embedded in a scenario-based digital role-playing computer game (www.gap-project.eu).
4.1 INTRODUCTION

4.1.1 Trust in the context of peacekeeping missions

Marcel Mauss once wrote that extreme events are marked by “an excessiveness which allows us better to perceive the facts than in those places where, although no less essential, they remain small-scale and involuted” (1985: 10). Peacekeeping provides one such context to study trust. Trust is often referred to as the ‘lubricant of society’ (Elster, 2007) but is complex and difficult to maintain even in stable, peaceful societies. These problems are compounded in post-conflict contexts which makes the study of trust in peacekeeping so insightful for understandings of trust more generally.

In peacekeeping, people must make decisions on whether to trust under conditions of great risk, uncertainty and ambiguity in comparison to the majority of social or working environments (Daniel and Hayes, 2016; Goldsmith & Harris, 2012; Lee et al., 2010; Lipson, 2010). It is suggested that trust functions in notably different ways during and following conflict. After war people are generally guarded about who to trust (Whitt, 2010) and societies which have experienced a recent conflict are more likely to fit Fukuyama’s (1995) classification of a ‘low trust culture’ with low levels of generalized trust and a higher degree of distrust between social groups. It is broadly agreed that institutional degradation undermines trust (Fukuyama, 1995; Knight, 1992; Mitsztal, 1996; Ulsaner, 2008, 2002, Zucker, 1986) and that the absence of fair and robust social and political institutions during and post conflict removes or alters social constraints that work to encourage trust (Horowitz, 1982; Whitt, 2010). Horowitz (1982) argues that during and after conflict, trust within groups is in fact very strong but trust between groups, or bridging trust, is often severely lacking. Bonding trust, the trust that exists within a homogenous group, can have positive elements in post conflict societies; for example, increasing altruistic behavior and in-group trust-based interactions. High bonding trust can also have negative elements such as reinforcing in-group bias within privileged circles, which in turn perpetuates corruption, increasing the risk of further conflict (Ulsaner, 2008; Kenworthy et al., 2016). Bridging trust, in contrast, facilitates ties between people across groups and across cleavages that typically divide societies, like race, class, or religion (Putnam, 2000).
Coleman (1988) has argued that trust should be regarded as a ‘social asset’ that should be built and facilitated in post conflict areas because of its positive contribution to social cooperation. Beatrice Pouligny contends that trust-building is among the key micro-processes of peacebuilding that are frequently neglected, peacebuilding strategies often ignoring that “wars destroy not only buildings and bodies but also trust, hope, identity, family and social ties” (2005: 496). It is increasingly recognized that successful long-term peacekeeping must encourage trust between divided groups as well as generating the conditions for trust through building security and strong social institutions (Pouligny, 2005; Simonsen, 2005).

Trust, trustworthiness and trust-building are central to myriad aspects of peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes: from cooperation between international peacekeepers (Ben-Ari & Elron, 2001; Elron et al., 1999; Holohan, 2005; Tallberg, 2007) to the role of trust in understanding and delivering on the needs of local communities (Goldsmith & Harris, 2012; Marten, 2004), and also for gathering intelligence and filtering this information through ranks and networks to decision makers (Newby, 2017; Rubenstein, 2015). Peacekeepers must work across organizational divides, often in a context of high cultural and ethnic diversity.

Bridging trust is key for inter-organizational cooperation to take place (Singleton & Holohan, 2019). This working environment requires the kind of ‘swift trust’ described by Meyerson et al. (1996). Swift judgements on when and who to trust must be made that enable people to act in the face of uncertainty without full knowledge of the past performance of other individual team members, and with no guarantee of further involvement together after the project, or mission, has ended. The rapid turnover of staff is an issue for peacekeeping organizations and institutional transfer of knowledge is a persistent challenge (Holohan, 2005). Trust is complicated by power, whether that be the explicit hierarchy of military ranks or the implicit, but influential hierarchies between different forms of organization (i.e. military v police), between local and international organizations (Newby, 2017; Rubinstein, Keller & Scherger, 2008; Rubenstein, 2015) and between international peacekeepers of different nationalities (Elron et al., 1999; Tallberg, 2007).
4.1.2 Trust theories and concepts for peacekeeping

Trust is said to be crucial wherever risk, uncertainty, or interdependence exist and requires vulnerability on the part of the ‘trustee’: the individual or group taking a decision on if, and how to trust. At a basic level we trust when: “we refrain from taking precautions against an interaction partner when through self-interest or incompetence they could act against our interests” (Elster, 2007: 344). Trust acts as a reducer of social complexity, allowing for cooperation and actions that would otherwise be too complex to be considered comprehensively (Bachmann, 2001). Trust is commonly seen as “one of the most important synthetic forces within society” (Simmel, 1950: 318) and is often viewed as a substitute for complex, explicit contracts as a way of coping with uncertainty (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). Trust has a multiplicity of definitions, categorizations and subcategorizations across disciplines and is understood differently across groups and cultures (Barerra, 2008). Despite the importance of trust in relationships, research on trust has been plagued by conceptual ambiguity and a lack of a coherent theoretical framework (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998). Although this paper does not task itself with resolving this ambiguity, it is essential to clarify what we mean when we speak of trust and to identify which trust concepts are most pertinent to peacekeeping from a sociological perspective.

The vignette method used in this paper has questions that assess two different components of trust: trusting beliefs and trusting intentions as outlined by McKnight and Chervany (1996). Trusting beliefs are a conviction that a person has trustworthy attributes, whereas trusting intentions mean a trustor’s willingness to make themselves vulnerable to the behaviors of another person or group in a risky situation. Both trustworthiness and trust have a distinct relationship to cooperation. As Gillespie (2003) argues, although trustworthiness is a considerable determinant of trust, it does not necessarily equate to trust or an intent to make oneself vulnerable. Trust assessments can be either cognitive or affective. Cognitive trust is knowledge driven and it impacts the trustor's confidence in the trustee based on a rational evaluation of the trustee's ability, competence or reputation. Affective trust is emotion-driven and impacts the trustor's confidence in the trustee based on personality cues and emotional
connectedness (Sztompka, 1999). However, it is important to recognize that it is difficult to clearly categorize trust as exclusively cognitive or affective with many trust assessments based on incomplete information or being at best “a rough and quick semi-conscious assessment” of the likelihood and costs of the other party being untrustworthy (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011: 285). There are multiple ‘bases’ for trust that can be roughly divided into internal and external sources. External bases of trust are motivations to trust based on external social constraints such as social norms, institutional regulation or a system of incentives. Internal bases of trust relate to the perception of an exchange partner based on their interests (encapsulated trust), reputation, direct experience or their social and cultural characteristics (Zucker, 1986). In this paper we examine three bases of trust which are relevant to the peacekeeping environment: process-based trust, characteristic-based trust, and institutional-based trust.

4.1.2.1 Process-based trust

Process-based trust is grounded in past direct experience and future expectations (Zucker, 1986). Uslaner (2002) describes this as a form of particularistic trust, which is trust in specific individuals that we know, or at least have information on. This is in contrast to generalized trust which is extended to people on who the trustor has no direct information. Process-based trust develops gradually as people accumulate shared experience from joint problem solving and this gradually increases their acceptance of risk and their willingness to commit to closer forms of cooperation (Zucker, 1986). This increased acceptance of risk is due to the trustor believing that the trustee will continue to demonstrate the same behavior as in the past (Lane & Bachmann, 1998). When relevant first-hand information is not available, which is often the case in inter-organizational settings; the trustor obtains a record of prior exchange second-hand. Reputation is one key process-based mechanism the trustor may use, basing his assessment of trustworthiness on generalized others’ experiences rather than on their own (Zucker, 1986).

The intensive nature of peacekeeping, with its requirement for long periods of time spent away from home, results in military and police peacekeepers being rotated frequently and high turnover among civilian field staff is ‘endemic’ to UN peacekeeping (Lipson, 2010). Process-based trust is therefore difficult to establish
with people outside one’s own organization. Information on prior positive professional contact has been found to be positively correlated to process-based trust production across a wide variety of contexts (Kramer, & Tyler, 1996; Sanders, Schyns & Dietz, 2006) and consequently it is reasonable to expect this to be the case in the context of peacekeeping. With each military’s deployments on average lasting six months and military personnel working predominantly within their own national contingent, it is particularly difficult for military to build process-based trust outside their own organizations.

4.1.2.2 Characteristic-based trust

Characteristic-based trust is based on attributes, or characteristics, identified in the other party (e.g., ethnic group, religious affiliation, age and/or role in an organization) (Zucker, 1986; Husted, 1998) which influence the propensity to trust. Characteristic-based trust develops through previous social interactions/experience and perceptions of parties as trustworthy, or not, are built up over time. In peacekeeping, short deployments often mean that little information is known about specific individuals, so categorization based on their known characteristics often acts as a substitute for direct experience or information about past behavior. We have a tendency towards trusting people closer in background to ourselves and social similarity tends to be a powerful driver of characteristics-based trust production (Ahlf et al., 2019). The perception of sharing similar characteristics makes the trustor believe that common assumptions, convergent background expectations and like-minded understandings will exist, which in turn can lead to greater anticipation of trustworthiness of the trustee (Zucker, 1986). With this we may deduce that peacekeepers from culturally similar backgrounds to the communities in which they are based would be expected to report greater perceptions of trustworthiness.

Allport’s ‘contact hypothesis’ (1954) states that intergroup contact, under appropriate conditions, can effectively reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members. If so, it may be expected that peacekeepers with a greater degree of contact with local actors would express a greater perception of trustworthiness. Across the organizational categories that we study (military, police and civilian), it may be expected that police peacekeepers have the highest reported trust for local actors, as they traditionally live and work within local
communities for longer periods of time than other peacekeepers (Goldsmith & Harris, 2012). Military peacekeepers, in contrast, will live apart from the community in military compounds and have far more limited contact with local actors, often in the form of brief and occasionally adverse interactions at checkpoints and on patrols (Rubenstein, 2015). It is worth noting however, that research has found peacekeepers, across organizational categories, commonly report low trust in local actors, citing negative experiences, and perceived ulterior motives for friendly or helpful behavior (Kenworthy et al. 2016, Lipson, 2010; Newby, 2016). This has been documented as a major issue for cooperation between international peacekeepers and local interpreters (Kelly & Baker, 2012).

Under characteristic-based trust, trustworthiness can be perceived as a moral value and a trustworthy person is someone in whom we can place our trust and be sure that it will not be betrayed (Ulsaner, 2002). Trustworthiness is commonly split into perceived competence, integrity, or benevolence (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). Trustworthiness may be a cognitive process based on an evaluation of past actions of the trustee, or an affective process where it is based on perceptions of the category the trustee falls in to (Barrera, 2008). This latter interpretation is closely aligned with Zucker’s characteristic-based trust (Zucker, 1986).

Differences in the salience of the various dimensions of trustworthiness are expected for different organizational cohorts due to differences in command structure and varying levels of risk and vulnerability. It may be expected that competence salience would be ranked lowest amongst the military cohort in comparison to the other institutional categories under analysis. This was found to be the case in Addison’s (2015) qualitative vignette study of different organizational groups which included the British Royal Air Force (RAF) as an example of a military cohort. She argued that this low reported concern for individual competence was due to a high level of confidence in external institutional systems that regulate and monitor competence.

4.1.2.3 Institutional-based trust

Institutional-based trust is an example of an external source of trust. Institutions help to “establish a ‘world-in-common’ i.e. shared explicit and tacit knowledge between the trustor and the trustee” which facilitates cooperation (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011: 285). Institutions can be an important factor in the creation of
trust where there has been no previous interaction or limited prior interaction has occurred between the trustor and the trustee.

Institutional-based trust draws on impersonal arrangements that become functionally equivalent to a third-party guarantor (Bachmann & Inkpen; Bachmann & Zaheer 2008; Zucker 1986). In these circumstances, an individual or collective actor may find sufficient grounds to trust another actor, individual or collective, because institutional arrangements reduce the risk that a trustee will behave dishonorably.

The complex trust-based interactions required in a network are detailed by Elinor Ostrom. Networks will have multiple leaders, voluntary links and interacting levels. Networks function in the absence of a centrally coordinated mechanism of sanction and reward and consequently can only produce cooperation if there is a high level of acquired trust as organizations in a network are not under each other’s command and must persuade each other of the desired course of behavior (Ostrom, 2015). In peacekeeping there are further challenges as multiple hierarchical organizations with their own rules, norms and systems of sanction/reward must be brought under a networked structure in the form of the UN (United Nations) mission command (Holohan, 2005). In peacekeeping there can be times when these two sources of institutional structure are in competition (Goldsmith & Harris, 2012; Tallberg, 2007). Police and militaries have strong cohesion because of group identity, beliefs about discipline and faith in the hierarchical systems of their organizations. These contrast with the more flexible and diffuse arrangements for civilian personnel. Militaries have been described as amongst the most enduring and persistent hierarchies (Knight, 1992) and may be expected to display the greatest trust in their own organizations versus mission command. In hierarchies there are clearly defined roles, rules and responsibilities, and an intrinsic degree of trust in your superiors, who in turn will have a large degree of responsibility for the outcome of your work (Adler, 2001).

Militaries will also spend long periods of time training, working and living together as a cohesive group, first in their home countries and then while on deployment (Tallberg, 2007).

In the following sections we examine the utility of ‘vignette experiments’ as a method through which we can study the importance of different bases of trust.
We then go on to test the different theories about what promotes or reduces trust and the interaction of this with institutional structures and cultures in the context of peacekeeping. The final section of this paper discusses the impact of these findings may have on peacekeeping outcomes in terms of maintaining neutrality, facilitating local ownership, cooperating across organizations, and ensuring the institutional knowledge of transfer.

4.2 MATERIALS AND METHODS

4.2.1 The vignette method

Vignettes refer to text, images or other forms of stimuli to which research participants are asked to respond (Hughes & Huby, 2012). Vignettes were chosen for their ability to highlight selected parts of the real world and assess attitudes and values on a large scale, which is difficult to do using standard structured questionnaires (Robbins, 2016a). With vignettes, “the respondent is being invited to make normative statements about a set of social circumstances, rather than to express his or her ‘beliefs’ or ‘values’ in a vacuum” (Finch, 1987: 106). The incongruence between actions and stated intentions has long been a problem for researchers in the social sciences (Kelle, 2005; Creswell, 2011). This paper incorporates the Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) theory of reasoned action, which advances the interrelatedness of beliefs, attitudes, intentions and behaviors. Although trusting intentions do not equate perfectly with exhibited behaviors, they have been found to be a useful predictor of the likelihood to act (McKnight, Cummings & Chervany, 1998). Vignettes provide a rich scenario for respondents on questions of values, preferences and choice, and they have been found to be able to predict “how human populations will behave when confronted with situations comparable to the vignette being studied” (Barrera, Buskens & Raub, 2015: 256). The volatile context in which peacekeeping occurs presents a particular challenge for any observational study. When carefully designed and executed vignette studies may be the closest thing to observing trust behaviors in a naturalistic setting.

This study contributes to earlier trust research using vignettes in that it develops context specific scenarios for testing with targeted institutional populations. The majority of vignette studies to date have used standard scenarios and large
convenience samples to make general observations about the relative effects of different mechanisms of trust (for example Lee et al., 2010; Robbins, 2016a; Robbins, 2016b). One notable exception to this is Addison’s 2015 qualitative study that used institutionally tailored vignettes to evaluate the contrasting trust styles of academics, military personnel, and health workers (Addison, 2015). This study builds on the work of Addison by detailing how to embed trust concepts into realistic scenarios and by demonstrating that context specific scenarios can also be used to collect larger amounts of quantitative data on trust.

4.2.2 Sampling

This paper looks at primary data from a series of vignettes experiments with 108 peacekeeping personnel (47 Military, 33 Police, 28 Civilian).

Table 4.1: Breakdown of vignette responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Military 47 (43%)</th>
<th>Police 33 (31%)</th>
<th>Civilian 28 (26%)</th>
<th>Total 108 (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>40 (85%)</td>
<td>24 (73%)</td>
<td>12 (43%)</td>
<td>76 (70%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7 (15%)</td>
<td>9 (27%)</td>
<td>16 (57%)</td>
<td>32 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>5 (11%)</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>11 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>17 (36%)</td>
<td>11 (33%)</td>
<td>9 (32%)</td>
<td>37 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>13 (28%)</td>
<td>11 (33%)</td>
<td>5 (18%)</td>
<td>29 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>11 (23%)</td>
<td>5 (15%)</td>
<td>9 (32%)</td>
<td>25 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>6 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>25 (53%)</td>
<td>17 (52%)</td>
<td>13 (45%)</td>
<td>55 (51%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>9 (19%)</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>16 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>8 (17%)</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>13 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2 (53%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
<td>8 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>5 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia/New Zealand</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada/United States</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>8 (7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The vignette survey was disseminated in two ways. Firstly, through contacts from a network of peacekeeping organizations which participated in the Horizon 2020 funded Gaming for Peace project. These included militaries in Ireland, Bulgaria,
Poland and Finland; police in Poland, Portugal and Northern Ireland; and civilian personnel spread across Europe. These contacts circulated the vignette survey through their own organizations and networks in what could be described as snowball sampling. Secondly, the survey was disseminated via the message boards and group emails of large international organizations responsible for peacekeeping coordination and training. These organizations included the ESDC (European Security and Defense College), EEAS (European External Action Service), and the UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs).

4.2.3 Creation of vignettes

To limit the gap between the hypothetical scenarios and social reality, vignettes were constructed through analysis of experiential interviews with 144 European peacekeepers. Access to the experiential data from the Gaming for Peace/GAP project was crucial to the construction of vignettes that were authentically based on the experiences and viewpoints of military, police and civilian personnel. Interviews were analyzed through adapting the Critical Incidence Technique (CIT) that was developed by John C. Flanagan in 1954. The technique has been used broadly across organizational research: to study effective and ineffective ways of doing something; to examine successes or failures; and to determine characteristics that are critical to an activity or event (Gremler, 2004). The technique can be utilized to collect descriptions of social phenomena in concrete terms and can elicit “detailed descriptions of real-life situations in which trust is created, strengthened or destroyed” (Münscher & Kühlmann, 2015:161).

The below coding framework was developed and applied reflexively for analysis. Each trust concept was assigned a concrete set of behaviors, and categories were redeveloped throughout the coding process. Creating a coding framework for trust in this way isolates the observational from the highly abstract and was a key step in analyzing data.
Table 4.2: Coding framework for trust concepts examined in vignettes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust Concept</th>
<th>Behavior(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Institution-based Trust | 1. Trusting/distrusting an individual because of their institutional affiliation.  
2. Trusting/distrusting due to the systems, rules, regulations, sanctions/rewards and social norms of a given institutional context. |
| Process-based Trust  | 1. Trusting because of positive experience(s) working together.  
2. Distrusting because of negative experience(s) working together.  
3. Distrusting because of lack of experience working together. |
| Characteristic-based Trust | Trusting/distrusting because of:  
1. Age  
2. Gender  
3. Nationality  
4. Religion |
| Trustworthiness      | 1. Mentioning a person being trustworthy because of their i. Competence, ii. Benevolence or iii. Integrity.  
2. Mentioning a person being untrustworthy because of their i. Competence, ii. Benevolence or iii. Integrity. |

4.2.4 Piloting and harmonization

Drawing comparisons between organizational groups requires using homogenous scenarios while at the same time ensuring these scenarios feel realistic for participants given their specific professional contexts. The importance of tailoring vignette scenarios for the population being studied and making them as close to real life situations as possible, has been recognized as key for participant engagement and external validity (Addison, 2015; Hughes, 1998, Neff, 1979). A multi-stage process of piloting and harmonization was carried out with representative peacekeepers in each organizational category. Scenarios contain minor differences in terms of language and terminology. For example, with a colleague being referred to ‘a very skilled soldier’, ‘a very skilled police officer’ or ‘very skilled at their job’ depending on whether they were in the military, police, or civilian cohorts.
4.2.5 Embedding the trust bases and hypotheses in vignette scenarios

Vignettes experiments were designed to examine and compare composite bases of trust: characteristic-based, process-based, and institutional-based trust, while noting differences across organization type, gender and national groupings. The vignettes formed part of an overall narrative, containing four sequential related scenarios. A continuous narrative was chosen as it can feel more immersive to participants than responding to numerous individual vignettes (Hughes, 1998; Hughes & Huby, 2012). Respondents were asked to answer hypothetically in the first person how they believe they would feel or act in the given scenario. The military versions of scenarios are shown for illustration purposes.

4.2.5.1 Process-based trust scenario and hypothesis

The vignette in Box 4.1 introduces hypothetical characters with whom the respondent shares a professional relationship. The first character (John) is from the respondent’s own organization, and they are told they have worked and trained with him previously. This represents the highest level of prior professional contact. The second character (Lars) works in the same area of operation (AO) as the respondent, and they are told that they have trained with Lars previously but have not worked with him directly. This represents a moderate level of prior professional contact. The third character introduced is an interpreter (Ali) who the respondent has not worked with previously. This represents the lowest level of prior professional contact. While carrying out a routine patrol of a local market (civilian respondents are presented with a ‘visit to a local market’) the situation becomes volatile. The respondent is then asked about their trusting beliefs in each person - “how much do you feel like you could rely on each person to help you manage the crowd on a scale of 1-10” (10 being rely on fully and 1 being not rely on at all).
Box 4.1: Vignette 1

Your team is conducting its weekly visit to the village market.

Accompanying you are two colleagues at your level of seniority. One is from your own military (John). You know John well as you have trained together at home, have worked together on previous missions and socialize with some of the same people. The other (Lars) is from a different national contingent that you share the base and a common AO with. You met Lars at induction but have not been out on patrol with him before. You are also accompanied by an interpreter (Ali). Today is the first time you and he have worked together.

Many of the stalls are closed, and this end of the street is empty. A crowd has gathered further down the road, near the community center. As you move forward towards the crowd, some of them turn and approach you. Your party halts. You recognise some of the faces in the group. You hear an angry shout and a small pebble sails through the air, landing near your feet.

Given the theory in section 4.2.1, we hypothesize that prior professional contact is a strong antecedent of process-based trust. In a naturalistic setting, process-based trust develops as people accumulate shared experience. This vignette attempts to model this by supplying respondents with information on previous experience with a trustee, of either direct personal experience or secondhand information on reputation.

**Hypothesis 1:** Prior professional contact will have a positive effect on peacekeepers’ propensity to trust.

4.2.5.2 Trustworthiness scenario and hypotheses

In this scenario information on trustworthiness builds on and augments existing information on the level of prior professional contact. You are told you have experience of John demonstrating integrity, reporting a colleague for taking bribes. You are told that Lars has a reputation for his competence, managing a complex logistical problem on a recent patrol very well. Ali’s benevolence is demonstrated through information that he does shopping for and visits elderly relatives a few evenings a week. Respondents are again asked how much they feel like they could rely on each person to help manage the crowd on a 10-point Likert scale.
You know John well and know him to be honest and principled, once reporting a fellow soldier for taking bribes at a checkpoint.

Lars has a reputation as a very skilled soldier, and you heard that he managed a complex logistical problem that came up on a recent patrol very well.

You don’t know a whole lot about Ali but on the journey, you have learned that he does shopping for and visits elderly relatives a few evenings a week.

The following two hypotheses incorporate the Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) model of trustworthiness where trust is a function of the trustor’s perception of the trustee’s competence, benevolence or integrity. The theory outlined in section in 4.1.2.2 leads us to expect that competence salience would be ranked lowest amongst the military cohort in comparison to the other institutional categories under analysis due to a high level of reported confidence in the military institutional system to be regulating and monitoring competence (as found by Addison [2015]).

**Hypothesis 2:** Peacekeeper’s propensity to trust will be higher in the presence of evidence of ‘integrity’, compared to evidence of ‘competence’ or ‘benevolence’.

**Hypothesis 3:** The increase in peacekeepers propensity to trust for ‘integrity’ versus ‘competence’ will be higher among military compared to police or civilian personnel.

### 4.2.5.3 Institutional-based trust scenario and hypotheses

The respondent is told that the situation escalates and turns volatile. Your colleague Lars radios for advice and is told to remain for the time being. You are told you decide to follow the order although it feels like it is possible that the situation will escalate further. You are then asked to respond on how confident you would be with the order to remain, firstly if the order had come from your own organization and secondly if the order had come from UN command. The logic being that the scenarios are asking the respondent to evaluate their trust and confidence in the systems, rules, regulations, sanctions/rewards and social norms of two distinct institutional arrangements.
These hypotheses examine whether peacekeepers trust their own organizations to a greater degree than they trust mission command, and the degree to which this is true for each organizational cohort. Considering the theory outlined in section 4.1.2.2 police, and to a greater extent military personnel, will have a strong institutional identity and a high degree of faith in the hierarchical systems of their own organizations. This leads to the hypothesis that the civilian cohort, who tend to more dispersed and flexible, will report greater faith in UN mission command than the military or police cohorts.

Hypothesis 4: Peacekeepers have greater trust in their own organization than they do in mission command.

Hypothesis 5: Peacekeepers’ trust in their own organization versus mission command will be higher for military personnel compared to police or civilian personnel.

4.2.5.4 Characteristic-based trust scenario and hypotheses
The respondent is introduced to a hypothetical local man Abdullah, who is the bank manager of the town and a personal contact of Lars. He speaks with the crowd on your behalf and succeeds in calming the group down. The respondent is then presented with three potential motivations for why Abdullah has helped you and your colleagues. These motivations range from community orientated to personal gain motivations. Respondents rate level of agreement about the motivation of Abdullah on a 10-point Likert scale.
Owing to Allport’s ‘contact hypothesis’ (1954) that is detailed in section 4.2.2.1 we hypothesize that police, due to their higher levels of contact with local actors, will report greater agreement with community-based motivations and least agreement with personnel gain motivations than civilian or military cohorts. Based on the theory that social similarity is a driver of characteristic-trust (Ahlf et al., 2019; Zucker, 1986) we hypothesize that peacekeeping personnel from Asia, Africa and the Americas will report greater agreement with community-based motivations and lower agreement with personal-gain motivations.

**Hypothesis 6:** Peacekeepers’ trust in local actors (non-peacekeeping personnel) will be higher for police compared to military or civilian personnel.

**Hypothesis 7:** Peacekeepers’ trust in local actors (non-peacekeeping personnel) will be higher for peacekeeping personnel from Asia, Africa and the Americas compared to European personnel.
4.2.5 Analysis strategy

For vignettes 1 and 2, respondents were asked “[H]ow much do you feel you could rely on each person to help you manage the crowd on a scale of 1 to 10” to get a measure of the social trust that they have in each actor in the scenario. In vignette 3 on trust differentials between own organization and mission command, respondents were asked “[H]ow confident would you be with the order to remain (10 being very confident and 1 being not confident at all)”. For vignette 4, respondents were asked for their extent of agreement with three statements about the motivation of a character ‘Abdullah’ on a scale of 1 to 10 where 10 was complete agreement and 1 no agreement at all. Our hypotheses are tested by comparison of mean responses across items and between groups using paired t-tests. Ordinary least squares(OLS) regression was used to adjust for possible confounding by age, sex, nationality and organizational type. The SPSS® software package was used for analysis.

4.3 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

4.3.1 Prior professional contact as an antecedent to process-based trust

Our first hypothesis holds that existing professional contact with an individual will increase the average level of trust reported, as measured here by the respondent’s report of the extent to which they felt they could rely on each character in the vignette on a scale from 1 to 10. As hypothesized the average trust across all groups was highest for John (mean of 8.01) followed by Lars (6.62) and then Ali (5.55). Respondents therefore report higher levels of trust for those who they have most prior experience of working with and this pattern held across each of the three organizational cohorts. Paired sample t-tests show that the difference in reported trust between all three characters is statistically significant at p < 0.001.
These results were broadly consistent across organizational cohorts although the trust differential between John and Ali was significantly larger for the military compared to all other groups. The trust differential was smaller for civilians compared to police, but not significantly so. The Lars - Ali trust differential is smaller but exhibits the same pattern as with the John - Ali differential with a larger differential for military compared to police and civilians. All these patterns are robust to confounding for sex and age groupings. These findings underline the salience of prior professional contact as an antecedent to trust.

### 4.3.2 Salience of different dimensions of trustworthiness

In the second vignette, respondents are provided with more information about the characteristics of the three characters which we hypothesize (H2) would lead to a change in the degree of trust expressed. Here, John is held to have a high level of integrity, Lars a reputation for competence and Ali a history of benevolence. As hypothesized, the internal base of personal integrity proves to be decisive with mean trust highest for John/Integrity (8.07) followed by Lars/Competence (7.77) and Ali/Benevolence (6.32).
Interestingly, the addition of new information in Vignette 2 increases reported trust in ‘Lars’ (additional information on competence) and ‘Ali’ (additional information on benevolence) more than it increases trust in ‘John’ (additional information on integrity). Whereas trust in Lars and Ali rises by 22% rise, the addition of information on John’s integrity only increases trust in him by 2.5%. It must be noted however that trust for John was already rated highly given information respondents received in Vignette 1 on prior professional contact.

Hypothesis 3 asserts that we should observe a larger increase in the reported trust for John (additional character-based information on ‘integrity’) from respondents in the military cohort in comparison to the police or civilian cohorts. In fact, results show no significant difference across organizational groups in the increase in trust for ‘John’, leading us to reject H3.

4.3.3 Institutional-based trust in own organization versus networked organization

Hypothesis four maintains that peacekeepers will express greater trust in orders from their own organization than they will in an outside organization, here represented as UN central command. As hypothesized, average trust across all groups was higher for own organization compared to mission command (7.23 v 6.94, P=0.09), but that this difference was only significant at a 10% level.
As hypothesized (H5), the differential in expressed trust between their own organization and central command was larger for military and police compared to civilian peacekeepers (P=0.028) adjusting for age and sex. This suggests that patterns of trust for civilian personnel are less influenced by the institutional/group environment that they find themselves in.

Figure 4.3: Results Vignette 3

4.3.4 Characteristic-based trust in local actors

H6 and H7 center on the motivations which peacekeepers attribute to local actors and the interaction of this with peacekeeper organization and country of origin. H6 maintains that military will be more likely than police or civilian peacekeepers to attribute local actors’ behavior to individual interests rather than their behavior being motivated by the interests of their community. Across all groups, respondents were more likely to agree that community-based motivations were the primary motivation for Abdullah’s help (mean of 8), followed by business motivations (mean of 6.45) with agreement being least for the relationship with peacekeepers motivation (mean of 6.13). OLS regression, adjusting for possible confounding by age and sex shows that military personnel express less agreement that ‘Abdullah’ is motivated by the benefits of cooperation for his community (mean of 7.53) compared to civilian (8.25;
P=0.01) and police (8.45; P=0.03). Similarly, military are more likely to agree that ‘Abdullah’ is motivated by the interests of his business compared to civilians and police, but regression analysis shows that these differences are not statistically significant. These results would suggest that H6 is supported.

Figure 4.4: Results Vignette 4

Analysis of H7 is hindered in part by the small number of peacekeepers from each country but analysis of differences in level of agreement between European peacekeepers and those from elsewhere (Asia, Africa and the Americas) show no significant effects. The idea that social similarity between individuals plays an important role in influencing characteristic-based trust development (Ahlf et al., 2019; Zucker, 1986) in terms of national groupings of peacekeepers was not supported by this sample.

4.4 DISCUSSION

4.4.1 Implications for peacekeeping
The results of this study have a number of practical implications for peacekeeping. The salience of prior professional contact as an antecedent of process-based trust was shown to be strong across all cohorts. This is a tendency that has been seen in a wide variety of work and social settings (e.g. Kramer, & Tyler, 1996; Sanders, Schyns & Dietz, 2007), so it is perhaps not surprising that this salience holds for peacekeeping personnel. However, as outlined in
section 4.1.2.1 the transitory nature of peacekeeping consequently means that process-based trust is difficult to build on peacekeeping missions, particularly outside one’s own organization. Under these conditions, relying on prior professional contact as the deciding factor on whom and when to trust can have detrimental effects on peacekeeping outcomes. This can lead to information staying in silos, cooperation not happening efficiently at a network level, and the institutional transfer of knowledge remaining weak, particularly in an environment when staff rotates frequently.

Military and police cohorts reported a greater degree of institutional trust in their own organization versus mission command. This finding is supported by a number of studies on police relations in peacekeeping (Goldsmith and Harris, 2012; Greener & Fish, 2011) and the strong national bonds of military peacekeepers (Elron et al., 1999; Tallberg, 2007). Although strong intra-organizational trust can aid team cohesion and provides a support system under stressful conditions this tendency may lead to poor inter-organizational cooperation and identification with the goals of the mission more broadly (Lipson, 2010; Paris, 2009).

Characteristic-based trust for local actors was shown to be relatively high in this study. However, trust was lowest for military peacekeepers who currently represent the highest number of peacekeeping personnel in any given mission (Bove, Ruffa & Rugggeri, 2020). Trust in local actors was reported as highest in police peacekeepers. This was hypothesized as stemming from the greater number of interactions police will have with a variety of local actors. On this point it is worth noting that there has been a steady decrease in the numbers of individual community-based police officers deployed on peacekeeping missions. The police function in peacekeeping is now increasingly being filled by a growing number of national Formed Police Units (FPUs) (Agordzo, 2009; Hansen, 2011). These units although trained to act cohesively in high risk operations, have a decreased level of interaction with local communities and are in many ways formed and function more like military contingents (Von Billerbeck, 2015). These reduced interactions may decrease opportunities to build trust between international peacekeeping structures and local communities and consequently impinge local ownership being realized. Local consent and trust, developed in part through interaction between peacekeepers and civilians, has been found to be closely related to the concept of
legitimacy (Pouligny, 2006) and when present, provides a mission with a ‘certain stock of goodwill’ that, when absent, will ultimately negatively influence the nature of civilian-peacekeeper relations and the outcome of missions (Newby, 2017).

4.4.2 Limitations

While the experimental vignette method results in high levels of confidence regarding internal validity it remains limited with regards claims to external validity (Addison, 2015; Barrera, Buskens, & Raub 2015). Although vignettes can tap into beliefs and values, it is not possible to say definitively if or when this will transfer into action. This methodology aims to limit the gap between the hypothetical scenario and social reality as much as possible (through constructing the vignettes from analysis of experiential interviews and piloting) but remains unable to model how people will react to the same situation when presented with it in real life due to the essential unreality of the relationships and consequences presented in the series of vignettes. This is particularly true for some elements of trust, namely, any link to either reciprocity or personal relationships as vignettes neglect “the interaction and feedback that are necessary parts of social life” (Hughes, 1998: 385). However, if vignettes are being used for the purposes of comparing cohorts, it may also be said that the scenarios are, if nothing else, equally unreal across categories.

Although rich narrative scenarios encourage participant engagement, they can also make it difficult to isolate which of the specific elements of the hypothetical situation is triggering a particular response (Wilson & While, 1998). From this vignette study possible confounding factors include high process-based trust being reported for your colleague ‘John’ with the effects of homophily being found to be a strong influencing factor in decisions of trust (Ahlf et al., 2019). Any low trust reported for ‘Ali’, the interpreter, could be interpreted as low characteristic-based trust in local actors and not in fact the result of the weaker power of benevolence to influence perceptions of trustworthiness and/or the negative effects of a lack of prior professional contact on trust.

As Wilson and While (1998) acknowledge, it is very difficult to balance making scenarios realistic, with making them truly comparable. The organizations under analysis in this study have different rules, roles and responsibilities and face
different levels of risk. This needs to be considered a possible factor in how participants reported willingness to be vulnerable in the given vignette scenarios.

Both methods of dissemination used non-probability sampling techniques and therefore inferring from this small sample to the general population in statistical terms cannot be justified. There are key demographic differences between the sample and the general population. For example, women are overrepresented in comparison to the general population of peacekeeping personnel. Police peacekeepers are 15% female and military peacekeepers are 5.4% female (United Nations Peacekeeping Data on Gender, 2020). The nationality spread is also not representative, with European peacekeepers greatly overrepresented. In terms of field diversity, military and police troops ‘on the ground’ are predominately from Asia and Africa (Bove, Ruffa, & Ruggeri, 2020). Peacekeepers in the sample are also slightly older than the general population (Bove, Ruffa, & Ruggeri, 2020).

However, this study is innovative in that it uses context specific vignette scenarios with a usually hard to access institutional population. The majority of quantitative trust vignette studies to date have used standard scenarios and large convenience samples to make general observations about the relative effects of different mechanisms of trust (e.g. Robbins, 2016a; Robbins, 2016b).

4.2 CONCLUSION

This study illustrates some of the key strengths and limitations of vignette experiments through our experience of using them as a tool. There is a need for further analysis of how micro processes influence the functioning of peacekeeping institutions and networks. Despite recent advances (see Autesserre, 2014a, 2014b; Doyle & Sambanis 2006; Durch 2006; Fortna, 2004; Newby, 2016; Pouligny, 2006) theoretical and practical understanding of the causal mechanisms by which peacekeeping cooperation comes about remains limited. Information exchange, social cooperation and risk management have been found to be highly dependent on mutual trust (Huang and Wilkinson, 2013; Mishra, Kramer & Tyler, 1996) and yet there is an absence of analysis of how trust functions in the high-risk, unstructured networked environment of peacekeeping missions. This paper demonstrates that the vignette method holds potential for assessing both interpersonal and institutional trust dynamics, both internal and external bases of trust, and both the perception of trustworthiness and the willingness to be vulnerable. We
found that peacekeeping personnel are likely to trust those whom they have prior experience of working with and that military peacekeepers, currently the largest category of peacekeepers, have the lowest trust in local actors. This study also indicates that peacekeepers (excluding our civilian cohort) display greater trust in their own organizations than in mission command. These results indicate that trust functions in several ways that impact core aspects of peacekeeping, including maintaining neutrality, facilitating local ownership, cooperating across organizations and ensuring the institutional transfer of knowledge. We contend that to begin to reconcile these challenges, trust dynamics need to be considered as part of the systems design of peacekeeping and an aspect of how peacekeepers are trained and prepared for missions.
Chapter 5: Adapting the critical incident technique to model vignette experiments: A novel mixed-methods approach examining trust dynamics in peacekeeping

Abstract

This paper asserts that analyses of the dynamics of trust relationships in context can greatly benefit from mixed-method designs. Trust is considered to be elusive and challenging in terms of study because of conceptual ambiguity and divergences between trusting beliefs, attitudes and behaviors. Peacekeeping provides a unique context to study trust owing to extraordinary levels of risk, uncertainty and diversity in comparison to the majority of other work or social settings. This paper combines and contrasts data from experiential interviews (N=144) with data from a series of vignettes experiments (N=108) with peacekeeping personnel across three organizational cohorts: military, police and civilian. This mixed methods sequential design is original in its approach to the integration of methods. Interviewswere used for both the development of hypotheses and scenarios, and to complement and expand the findings of vignette experiments. This paper outlines a systematic process for modelling vignette experiments that that can be utilized to examine complex social phenomena. Empirical findings have implications for peacekeeping and for studies that seek to examine the relationship between belief and action more generally.

Keywords: Mixed-Methods Research, Critical Incident Technique, Vignettes, Trust, Peacekeeping

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1 A methodological version of this paper is currently under review by the Journal of Mixed Methods Research. An early version of this paper was presented at the First International Network of Trust Researchers Conference (St. Gallen, 2019).

2 The creation of vignettes was informed by a subset of interviews with police, military and civilian personnel that were collected as part of the European Commission H2020 project: Gaming for Peace/GAP. The project developed a curriculum of soft skills for peacekeeping, a selection of which was embedded in a scenario-based digital role-playing computer game. Vignettes were disseminated in part through organizations and networks associated with the GAP project (for more information see www.gap-project.eu)
5.1 INTRODUCTION

5.1.1 Why mixed-method designs suit the study of trust

Trust is an example of a phenomenon that invites methodological ingenuity. Trust is largely an internal process and has a multiplicity of definitions across disciplines, being understood disparately person to person and across cultures (Lyon, Möllering, & Saunders, 2015). There are also well-established discrepancies between trusting beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behavior that make the study of trust particularly challenging (Gillespie, 2003). Knudsen (2003) argues that methodological as well as epistemological diversity enriches the field of trust research and should be fostered. This paper outlines a novel way that using techniques borrowed from the Critical Incident Technique (CIT) (Flanagan, 1954) can provide a way to operationalize trust and break an aggregate, and often ambiguous, social phenomena into more concrete, composite proxies that can be further examined or compared through vignette experiments. The emergent, sequential mixed-method design presented in this paper is utilized to investigate the ways in which different categories of personnel in the ‘networked’ organization of a peacekeeping mission trust due to demographic and institutional factors. A central tenet of any mixed-methods design is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination provides a better understanding of the phenomena than either approach alone (Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989). Without detailed accounts collected through experiential interviews it would be difficult to access the perspectives and subjective motivations of peacekeepers and uncover the interplay between structural constraints and individual action. On the other hand, an understanding of individual perspectives, interpretations and motives alone will not always produce valid and meaningful sociological explanation, particularly when there is a disjointed relationship between belief and action, as is the case with trust.

5.1.2 Studying trust in the context of peacekeeping

In peacekeeping, people must make decisions on whether to trust under conditions of great risk, uncertainty and ambiguity in comparison to the majority of social or working environments (Lee et al., 2010; Lipson, 2010; Goldsmith & Harris, 2012; Daniel & Hayes, 2016). Trust, trustworthiness and trust-building
have been established to be of key importance to a number of peacekeeping processes: from cooperation between international peacekeepers (Ben-Ari & Elron, 2001; Elron et al., 1999; Holohan, 2005; Tallberg, 2007) to the role of trust in understanding and delivering on the needs of local communities (Goldsmith & Harris, 2012; Marten, 2004), and for gathering intelligence and filtering this information through ranks and networks to decision makers (Newby, 2017; Rubenstein, 2015). Peacekeepers must build trust rapidly and work across organizational divides, often in a context of high cultural and ethnic diversity. Trust in these volatile circumstances is key for cooperation to take place (Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Paffenholz, 2008).

A peacekeeping mission functions as a networked organization comprising of multiple international militaries, international police and civilian personnel as well as personnel from local institutions, and local community members (Holohan, 2005). The usual external constraints that promote trust and cooperation - rewards, sanctions and social norms, are weaker or absent in networks (Ostrom, 2015). In peacekeeping there are further challenges as multiple hierarchical organizations must be brought under a networked structure in the form of the United Nations (UN) mission command (Holohan, 2005).

Peacekeeping missions will include multiple organizations each with their own unique mandates, structures, priorities and norms. It is thought that trusting beliefs and behaviors are in many ways internally constructed within organizations and by sector (Cook, Levi & Hardin, 2009; Saunders, 2012; Siebert et al., 2015). The institutions under analysis in this paper have key differences that may impact trust and cooperation.

Military peacekeepers travel and work in national contingents and their duties, although varied, largely encompass different aspects of monitoring and security (Elron et al., 2003). Militaries have been described as amongst the most enduring and persistent hierarchies (Knight, 1992). In hierarchies there are clearly defined roles, rules and responsibilities, and an intrinsic degree of trust in your superiors, who in turn will have a large degree of responsibility for the outcome of your work (Adler, 2001). Military personnel tend to have strong beliefs about discipline and faith in the hierarchical systems of their organizations. Militaries will also have intense in-group bonds and organizational loyalties that are
created and reinforced through national loyalty, pre-deployment training, and living communally for long periods of time as a cohesive group (Hall, 2011). Junior and mid-ranking military personnel have relatively little professional contact with other militaries beyond sharing a base and interact infrequently with local actors beyond interactions at checkpoints and while buying supplies in local shops and markets (Bove & Ruggeri, 2019; Tallberg, 2007).

Police perform a wide range of activities depending on a mission’s mandate. These activities include protecting civilians, disarmament and demobilization, strengthening institutions, training and mentoring host-state police, assistance in electoral processes, border management, and public information and education (UN DPKO/DFS, 2014). Police, although they come from hierarchical organizations at home, will traditionally be deployed as individuals and be unranked on missions (Bayley, 2006). Police will work in newly established teams which include multinational and host-state police (Greener, 2009a). Police roles and chains of command tend to be more ambiguous than military peacekeepers.

Because of the nature of their work, police have regular interactions with a broad range of individuals and organizations, both local and international (Greener 2009b). Police are usually far more embedded in local communities than military peacekeepers, living in rented accommodation and working alongside host-state police. It is worth noting that the characteristics of police described here are that of Individual Police Officers (IPOs). Many police are now deployed as Formed Police Units (FPUs). FPUs have enhanced security functions and live and work as cohesive national units, not unlike a military contingent (Agordzo, 2009).

Civilian personnel are involved in humanitarian aid, human rights, development, and conflict resolution. Civilians may be part of international, multinational, national, community-based or grassroots organizations (Duffey, 2000). Civilians, although extremely heterogeneous, are characterized by a higher level of flexibility and more diffuse arrangements than military or police peacekeepers (Paris, 2009).

5.1.3 Layout and Structure of paper

There is an absence of methodological guidance on how to model vignettes
scenarios, questions and scales in the social sciences. This paper has three central aims: 1. to provide practitioners with a framework to create vignettes through the analysis of interviews, 2. to demonstrate how this method can be deployed to examine complex social phenomena and 3. to investigate specific questions on how trust impacts different aspects of peacekeeping; how trust is built within and between organizations? and do institutional differences affect how peacekeepers trust? This paper deals with how best to establish the dynamics of trust relationships in context, including which aspects are best assessed qualitatively, quantitatively or in combination.

This research methodology uses an equivalent status sequential design that draws on an initial phase of qualitative research, with a subsequent phase of quantitative data collection done through vignette experiments. This methodology is original in its approach to the integration of methods. Interviews were used for both the development of trust hypotheses and scenarios, and to complement and expand the findings of vignette experiments. Section 5.2.1 details the collection and initial analysis of experiential interviews with 144 peacekeeping personnel: military, police and civilian. Qualitative methods can capture the process elements of trust and trust building and can help make sense of complex organizational realities (Möllering, Bachmann, & Lee, 2004). This initial analysis took a social constructivist perceptive (Berger & Luckmann, 1991), and was concerned with how peacekeepers construct their own social worlds and conceptualize their interactions. These interviews are a subset of interviews collected as part of Horizon 2020 project Gaming for Peace Project - GAP. GAP developed a curriculum of soft-skills for peacekeeping personnel, with a selection of these soft-skills embedded in a scenario-based, role-playing computer game. In order to construct these scenarios extensive detail was collected on successful and unsuccessful instances of cooperation, communication, gender awareness, cultural awareness, risk management and trust, (the topic areas covered in interviews). Tashakkori (2006) points out that mixed method designs often have an opportunistic nature, as was the case with this research. The way interviews were conducted used an approach which overlapped with the Critical Incident Technique (CIT) (Flanagan, 1954) in that a diverse selection of peacekeepers were asked to recall and describe in detail incidents of a critical nature related to each topic area. This large body of qualitative data was then ‘quantified’ (Miles &
Huberman, 1994), converting it to numbers for quantitative frequency analysis for the purpose of generating scenarios and hypotheses for vignette experiments.

In section 5.2.2 a step by step process is outlined for how to conduct and analyze interviews to facilitate the design of scenarios and hypotheses and how to embed them in vignette experiments. This process includes guidance on how to design an integrated typology and coding framework that operationalizes a complex social phenomenon like trust, breaking it into aggregate concepts that can be investigated and compared. This paper also argues that designing vignettes in this way enhances realism and external validity in so far as is possible.

Section 5.3 gives the results and analysis of both phases of data collection and demonstrates how integration can result in illuminating insights as each phase examines different yet overlapping aspects of trust. The discussion section of this paper, section 5.4 goes into detail about specific challenges and opportunities of integrating these two methods, as well as the epistemological positions that underpin them.

5.2 MATERIALS AND METHODS

5.2.1 Experiential interviews

Face to face in-depth semi-structured interviews were carried out with 144 peacekeeping personnel from across Europe. These interviews lasted on average 1-1.5 hours and were collected between January and March 2017. These interviews are a subset of 177 interviews with peacekeeping personnel collected by a team of researchers under the auspices of the European Commission H2020 project Gaming for Peace/GAP. As part of this team of researchers I collected 17 of the interviews used in this sample. I collected nine interviews in person with the Portuguese Police, Policia de Segurança Pública (PSP) in Lisbon, Portugal and eight interviews in person with the Defense Forces Ireland (DFI) in the Curragh Camp army base in County Kildare, Ireland. All interviews were recorded with respondents’ consent and transcribed in full. A methodology package, which included a standardized approach for the selection of interviewees, data management and protection and informed consent and ethics, was used to ensure interviews were carried out in a consistent way across
organizations and that data could be pooled and compared.

The fact that trust questions were set amid a number of other topic areas (cooperation, communication, gender awareness, cultural awareness and risk management) was advantageous, with these ‘adjacent’ topic areas producing much valuable data on trust.

The trust specific questions are listed below:

1. Who would you trust if you are in a potentially dangerous situation on the ground? (If they ask what you mean, say someone from a specific organization, male or female, nationality?)
2. Who would you not trust, and why?
3. How do you get people to trust you in the field? (from your own organization, other organizations and local people?)
4. How do you build trust? (from your own organization, other organizations and local people?)

5.2.1.1 Sampling

The six principal countries were chosen because they capture geographical and regional diversity within Europe. Participants were purposely selected in terms of gender, nationality, department, role, seniority and time with the organization.

Table 5.1: Breakdown of interview participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military 71 (49%)</th>
<th>Police 56 (39%)</th>
<th>Civilian 17 (12%)</th>
<th>Total 144 (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>52 (73%)</td>
<td>43 (77%)</td>
<td>7 (59%)</td>
<td>102 (71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>19 (27%)</td>
<td>13 (23%)</td>
<td>10 (41%)</td>
<td>42 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>12 (17%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>12 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnish</td>
<td>22 (31%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>23 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>21 (30%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>17 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Irish</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>15 (27%)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>15 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>16 (22%)</td>
<td>14 (25%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>31 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>27 (48%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>27 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>12 (70%)</td>
<td>12 (8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2.1.2 Qualitative analysis strategy

The interviews were analyzed through an iterative process of thematic analysis and working with literature on peacekeeping and trust. A cross sectional sample of the interviews were coded, drawing up initial codes, and these were then refined throughout the process of coding the data. The NVivo11® software package was used for analysis to formulate, refine and apply a coding framework. The full typology and coding framework is outlined in Section 5.2.2.3.

5.2.1.3 Limitations of assessing trust through experimental interviews alone

In-depth interviews can address questions of crucial importance related to the construction, variability and dynamics of complex social phenomena (Creswell, 1998; Rubin & Rubin, 1995) and emphasize participants’ own models and conceptualizations of their relationships and social contexts. However, an understanding of individual perspectives, interpretations and motives alone will not always produce valid and meaningful sociological explanation, particularly where there exists a disjointed relationship between belief and action (Kelle, 2005). Saunders (2015) notes that researching trust often covers topics that are sensitive in nature and can easily lead to evasive answers or socially desirable responses, with people wanting to appear trusting and being reluctant to express negative beliefs about peers or colleagues. Standard qualitative interview techniques can also risk inviting participants’ “folk psychological theories about trust”, instead of collecting useful information about trust dynamics in different contexts (Münscher & Kühlmann, 2015: 161).

5.2.2. Adapting the Critical Incident Technique to model vignette experiments

5.2.2.1 Using vignettes to research trust

Vignettes refer to text, images or other forms of stimuli to which research participants are asked to respond (Hughes & Huby, 2012). Vignettes highlight selected parts of the real world and can “unpack perceptions, beliefs and attitudes, provide a ‘frame’ for the actor’s decision and predict how actual human populations will behave when confronted with situations comparable to the vignette being studied” (Barrera, Buskens & Raub 2015: 256). Most trust vignette studies to date have used standard scenarios and large convenience samples to make general observations about the relative effects of different mechanisms of trust (for example Lee et al., 2010; Robbins, 2016a; Robbins,
One notable exception to this is Addison’s 2015 study that uses institutionally tailored vignettes to evaluate the contrasting trust styles of academics, military personnel and health workers (Addison, 2015). When carefully constructed, vignettes devise realistic scenarios that can assess dependent variables including intentions, attitudes, and behaviors. Vignettes are particularly useful when studying trust as they allow large scale testing of reactions to complex issues, normally difficult with questionnaires (Barrera, Buskens & Raub, 2015).

5.2.2.2 Designing interviews to produce scenarios

The Critical Incident Technique (CIT) was developed by John C. Flanagan in 1954 for use in organizational psychology and has been used broadly across organizational research - to study effective and ineffective ways of doing something, to examine successes or failures and to determine characteristics that are critical to an activity or event.

As is often the case with mixed-methods research, this research design was both opportunistic and emergent, responding to gaps and opportunities in the data that emerged in the process of conducting the research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017; Tashakkori, 2006). Although interviews were not originally designed under CIT specifications, they have many qualities that allow them to be analyzed using CIT techniques. This is due to some of the interviews original aims, firstly to understand peacekeeping networks and organizations from a holistic perspective, and secondly to collect the kind of detailed information on positive and negative experiences of cooperation, communication, gender and cultural awareness, risk-management and trust in sufficient detail to create a scenario-based role-playing game.

CIT offers numerous advantages for researching trust dynamics in specific contexts including its potential to capture multiple actors’ voices and experiences and give a picture of an organization or context from different perspectives (Creswell, 1998). This paper contends that creating vignettes in the way outlined here can minimize the gap between the hypothetical scenario and social reality and generates a body of complementary data for analysis.

The Critical Incident Technique (Flanagan, 1954) is a process with five broad steps:
1. Ascertaining the general aims of the activity being studied
2. Making plans and setting specifications
3. Collecting data
4. Analyzing data
5. Interpreting data and reporting results.

The steps outlined in Figure 5.1 augment these original steps and present a way of designing interviews that can be used to model vignette experiments that examine complex social phenomena.
Figure 5.1: Process for designing and analyzing interviews

This research sought to create realistic and comparable vignette scenarios and understand:

- How trust impacts different aspects of peacekeeping?
- How trust is built within and between organizations?
- If institutional differences affect how peacekeepers trust?

- Identify organizational behaviors affected by the phenomenon. This can be done through literature review and/or analysis of a subset of interviews.
- The key behaviors affected by trust in the peacekeeping context were identified as cooperation, communication, and risk management.

- Ensure research participants are selected to give a holistic perspective of the organization(s).
- In this example interviewees were selected to give variance of gender, nationality, department, seniority, role, and time with the organization.

- Include demographic and background questions.
- Include questions in the areas identified in Step 2.
- Include questions on the phenomenon of interest, in this example specific questions were included on trust.
- Probe participants for additional detail i.e. “who was involved in the incident?”, “how did you feel in the situation?”, “why do you think that happened?” etc.

- Break down the phenomenon into aggregate concepts.
- Assess how these aggregate concepts relate to the organizational context under analysis.
- Assign a concrete set of behaviors to each concept.
5.2.2.3 Creating a typology and coding framework

The above steps provide an effective and rigorous way to systematically organize and analyze qualitative data. The below typology and coding framework is based on a synthesis of cross-disciplinary trust definitions and the analysis of interview data. This typology was developed and applied reflexively for analysis. Each trust concept was linked with its relevance in peacekeeping and assigned a concrete set of behaviors. Although this coding process remains subjective to some degree, including potential overlaps between categories, the typology adds rigor to subsequent qualitative analysis and situates trust concepts in the organizational context being studied. Creating a coding framework for trust in this way isolates the observational from the highly abstract and was a key step in analyzing data.

Table 5.2: Typology of trust and coding framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust Concept and Explanation</th>
<th>Relevance in Peacekeeping</th>
<th>Behavior(s)</th>
<th>Example from interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bonding Trust</strong></td>
<td>Bonding trust is the social capital that exists within a group, often with distrust for those outside the group (Putnam, 2000).</td>
<td>Trusting because of: 1. Being part of a group 2. The longevity of a relationship 3. Multiple interactions over time</td>
<td>If you see other expats in any other situation it’s a poisonous sort of bubble to get caught up in. Sometimes in some of these places where you’re only hanging about with people like you, regaling each other with stories of how this shopkeeper ripped you off or those locals can’t drive, or you know, that us and them mentality is useless in terms of trying to understand and contribute to any decent judgement. Ross - Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

3 A version of this typology appears in Singleton, S., & Holohan, A. (2019). The Case for ‘Trust Awareness’ as a Key Soft-Skill for Peacekeepers: A Study on how Trust Impacts Inter-Organizational Cooperation and Local Ownership with Military Peacekeepers Deployed to UNIFIL. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 21(3-4), 224-245.
### Bridging Trust

**Bridging trust** is a form of social capital that facilitates ties between people across groups and across cleavages that typically divide society, like race, class, or religion (Putnam, 2000). For a peacekeeping mission to succeed long-term, international peacekeepers (along with local institutions and populations) must cooperate as one unified networked organization (Holohan, 2005; Von Bilsberg, 2015). Bridging trust is central to successful peacekeeping.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trusting someone outside ones:</th>
<th>1. Social group 2. Organization 3. Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

At the start we were doing it separately and it wasn't working because the Irish were given one story and the Finnish were given another story but once the two sergeants came together then they thought 'let's get together and we'll do it' and it ended up being, well it could have turned out terrible. It could have turned out really bad because if they crossed the blue line its bad like, but they got together and they worked together and they sorted the whole thing out in the space of an hour.

Joe - Defense Forces Ireland

### Characteristic-based Trust

Trust formed based on attributes (characteristics) identified in the other party (e.g., ethnic group, religious affiliation, age, gender etc.) (Zucker, 1986). Peacekeeping is a highly diverse environment and it can be easy to fall back on trusting people based on characteristics when you have little or no experience working together previously (Elron, Shamir & Ben-Ari, 1999). Characteristic-based trust can lead us trusting people closer in background to ourselves as well as trusting people based on past experiences with people in the same category.

|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|

If I saw a female, I would have more trust in her at the higher level than I would…because girls do think at a higher level and girls do think about the intricacies. Men are more into being straight-thinking, but girls do see the complications a lot more. Because that’s the way they’re brought up.

Paul, Defense Forces Ireland

### Institutional-based Trust

An institution is shaped by regulations, professional codes of conduct, institutional reputation and other formal and informal norms of behavior. Institutions help to establish a ‘world-in-common’ of shared explicit and tacit knowledge between trustor and trustee (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). A peacekeeper will operate in both the institutional context of their own organization and the overarching ‘networked organization’ of the mission (Holohan, 2005). In peacekeeping there can be times when these two sources of norms, reward and sanction are in competition (Tallberg, 2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Trusting/distrusting an individual because of their institutional affiliation. 2. Trusting/distrusting due to the systems, rules, regulations, sanctions/rewards and social norms of a given institutional context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Did I trust the Kosovo police service? Individually? Some very nice people and competent young officers coming through but there was this sort of unspoken omerta almost and behind this the KLA were in charge and there was going to be retribution for what the Serbs had done, so did I trust them? No.

Jake - Northern Ireland Cooperation Overseas
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process-based Trust</td>
<td>Trust grounded in past direct experience of working together and future expectations (Zucker, 1986). The intensive nature of peacekeeping, with its requirement for long periods of time spent away from home, results in military and police peacekeepers being rotated frequently and high turnover among civilian field staff is ‘endemic’ to UN peacekeeping (Lipson, 2010).</td>
<td>1. Trusting because of positive experience(s) working together. 2. Distrusting because of negative experience(s) working together. 3. Distrusting because of lack of experience working together. That trust builds up because they watch you and they see the decisions you are making, and they make a value judgment on you and you get more information from it. Then on top of that you actually have to get into the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferable Trust</td>
<td>Important with turnover of staff on peacekeeping missions that trust can be both passed on by reputation or transferred to new personnel (including between newly deployed international military and between international peacekeepers and local actors) (Holohan, 2005). Passing on trust via: 1. An Individual, 2. Group, 3. Organization Passing on distrust via: 1. An Individual, 2. Group, 3. Organization Here we have a lot of Syrian refugees that are in really desperate situations and it makes them really vulnerable to abuse both sexually as well as otherwise...The problem is that’s one of the quickest ways to lose the trust of the local population. And when that happens, that’s it. There is not really a way to salvage it, and after incidents like this it might be that the whole operation is marked by it. There might be even a case when the whole operation has to close down or something because nobody trusts anybody anymore, regardless of actual nationality of the perpetrator.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustworthiness</td>
<td>A moral value considered to be a virtue. A trustworthy person is someone in whom we can place our trust and be sure that the trust will not be betrayed due to the strength of their character (Uslaner, 2002). Trustworthiness can be based on perceived competence, integrity or benevolence (Mayer, Davis &amp; Schoorman, 1995). In peacekeeping trust or distrust for a group or category of people can develop through socialization and social interaction and perceptions of either that individual, group or organization as trustworthy (or untrustworthy) can be built up over time (Newby, 2017). Mentioning a person being trustworthy because of their: 1. Competence, 2. Benevolence or 3. Integrity. Mentioning a person being untrustworthy because of their: 1. Competence, 2. Benevolence or 3. Integrity. With people with whom I talked the situation was that the people were not trustworthy. The people would present themselves as poorer than they really were in reality, to be able to get more from us.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2.2.4 Creating vignette experiments

The process outlined in Figure 5.2 uses the devised coding framework to analyze interviews and embed concepts and scenarios in vignettes. This process has utility for examining different social phenomena in a variety of contexts. While coding will be unique to each social phenomenon and context the process remains the same.

Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 detail the results of frequency analyses with this sample of 144 interviews. Sections of interviews were often double coded and appeared in more than one category. Use of the NVivo11® software package aided frequency analysis. Frequency analysis is considered a form of crossover analysis, where the analysis of qualitative data is done using quantitative techniques (Small, 2011).

Scenarios were piloted with representative peacekeepers in each organizational category by role, seniority and gender to check for realism of the scenario and language used. Scenarios went through a process of harmonization and there are minor differences across cohort scenarios in terms of language and terminology. After each augmentation was made, the piloting process was repeated to harmonize the scenarios and ensure they were still realistic when tailored to each organizational category. One of these scenarios and its version for each organizational category is shown in Table 5.5. It is recommended that to keep participants engaged, vignettes should be kept short (Addison, 2015; Hughes, 1998).

For this reason, four key trust concepts were chosen to be embedded in scenarios. A continuous narrative was chosen as it can feel more immersive to participants than responding to numerous individual vignettes (Hughes, 1998; Hughes & Huby, 2012). The four trust concepts chosen were: process-based trust, characteristic-based trust, institutional-based trust and trustworthiness
Figure 5.2: Process for creating vignettes

- Code interviews using typology.
- Conduct frequency analysis for each defined concept.
- Conduct frequency analysis to ascertain Critical Incidents (CIs).
- Select key concepts and CIs for vignette scenarios.

- Generate hypotheses for each key concept.
- Methodically embed hypotheses in scenarios.
- Tailor vignettes to each organizational context.
- Decide on format of response options.

- Check for realism of scenarios.
- Check institutional terminology is correct.
- Check language is clear enough to be understood by non-native speakers.
- Check participants understand response format.

- Adjust the scenarios to incorporate feedback.
- Check scenarios are comparable.
- Re-pilot any significant changes to original scenarios.
Table 5.3: Frequency analysis of trust concepts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust Concept</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trustworthiness</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional-based Trust</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic-based Trust</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonding Trust</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process-based Trust</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridging Trust</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferable Trust</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4: Frequency analysis of critical incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interacting with people from local communities</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrying out local patrols</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market patrols</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with other nationalities</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with other organizations</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.2.5 Example vignette scenario and hypothesis

Table 5.5 introduces hypothetical characters with whom the respondent shares a professional relationship. For each character, information is given on the level of prior professional contact – high, medium or low. While carrying out a routine patrol of a local market (civilian respondents are presented with a ‘visit to a local market’) the situation becomes volatile. The respondent is then asked about their trusting beliefs in each person - “how much do you feel like you could rely on each person to help you manage the crowd on a scale of 1-10” (10 being rely on fully and 1 being not rely on at all).
In this vignette the hypothesis being tested was:

\[ H1: \text{Prior professional contact will have a positive effect on peacekeepers’ propensity to trust.} \]

The applied logic is that that prior professional contact is a strong antecedent of process-based trust. In a naturalistic setting process-based trust develops as people accumulate shared experience. This vignette attempts to model this by supplying respondents with information on previous experience with a trustee, of either direct personal experience or secondhand information on reputation.

Table 5.5: Vignette scenarios for process-based trust\(^4\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your team is conducting its weekly visit to the village market. Accompanying you are colleagues at your level of seniority. One is from your own military (John). You know John well as you have trained together at home, have worked together on previous missions and socialize with some of the same people. The other (Lars) is from a different national contingent that you share the base and a common AO with. You met Lars at induction but have not been out on patrol with him before. You are also accompanied by an interpreter (Ali). Today is the first time you and he have worked together. Many of the stalls are closed and this end of the street is empty. A crowd has gathered further down the road near the community center. As you move forward towards the crowd, some of them turn and approach you. Your party halts. You recognize some of the faces in the group. You hear an angry shout and a small pebble sails through the air landing near your feet.</td>
<td>Your team is conducting its weekly visit to the village market. Accompanying you are two officers at a similar level of seniority. One is from the same national police service as you (John). You know John well as you have worked together at home, have worked together on a previous deployment and socialize with some of the same people. The other (Lars) is from a different national police service. You work in the same station and met at recent training but have not been out on patrol with him directly before. You are also accompanied by an interpreter (Ali). Today is the first time you and he have worked together. Many of the stalls are closed and this end of the street is empty. A crowd has gathered further down the road near the community center. As you move forward towards the crowd, some of them turn and approach you. Your party halts. You recognize some of the faces in the group. You hear an angry shout and a small pebble sails through the air landing near your feet.</td>
<td>You and some colleagues are visiting the local market. Accompanying you are two colleagues who work in similar roles on this deployment. One is from your own organization (John). You know John well as you have trained together at home, have worked together overseas previously and socialize with some of the same people. The other (Lars) is from a different organization that you collaborate with frequently on projects. You met Lars at training but have not worked with him directly before. You are also accompanied by an interpreter (Ali). Today is the first time you and he have worked together. Many of the stalls are closed and this end of the street is empty. A crowd has gathered further down the road near the community center. As you move forward towards the crowd, some of them turn and approach you. Your party halts. You recognize some of the faces in the group. You hear an angry shout and a small pebble sails through the air landing near your feet.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^4\) For a full outline of vignettes see Appendix 2.
5.2.3 Vignette experiments

5.2.3.1 Sampling

The vignette survey was disseminated in two ways. Firstly, it was disseminated through contacts from a network of peacekeeping organizations which participated in the Gaming for Peace project. These contacts circulated the vignette survey through their own organizations and networks in what could be described as snowball sampling. Secondly, the survey was disseminated via the message boards and group emails of large international organizations responsible for peacekeeping coordination and training. These organizations included the ESDC (European Security and Defense College), EEAS (European External Action Service), and the UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). Both methods of dissemination used non-probability sampling techniques.

Table 5.6: Breakdown of vignette responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Military 48 (44%)</th>
<th>Police 33 (31%)</th>
<th>Civilian 27 (25%)</th>
<th>Total 108 (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>41 (85%)</td>
<td>24 (73%)</td>
<td>12 (45%)</td>
<td>77 (71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7 (15%)</td>
<td>9 (27%)</td>
<td>15 (55%)</td>
<td>31 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>5 (10%)</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>11 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>18 (38%)</td>
<td>11 (33%)</td>
<td>8 (30%)</td>
<td>37 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>13 (27%)</td>
<td>11 (33%)</td>
<td>5 (19%)</td>
<td>29 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>11 (23%)</td>
<td>5 (15%)</td>
<td>9 (33%)</td>
<td>25 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>6 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>26 (54%)</td>
<td>17 (52%)</td>
<td>12 (44%)</td>
<td>55 (51%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>9 (19%)</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>16 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>8 (17%)</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>13 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>4 (15%)</td>
<td>8 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>5 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia/New Zealand</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada/United States</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>8 (7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2.3.2 *Quantitative analysis strategy*

In vignettes respondents answered hypothetically in the third person on a ten-point Likert scale. This scale was chosen because the likely sample size for each cohort was expected to be relatively small and it is easier to detect minor differences between organizational categories on a 10-point Likert scale. Hypotheses were tested by comparison of mean response across items and between groups using paired t-tests. Ordinary least squares regression was used to adjust for possible confounding by age, sex, nationality and organizational category. The SPSS® software package was used for analysis.

5.2.3.3 *Limitations of assessing trust through vignette experiments alone*

While the experimental vignette method results in high levels of confidence regarding internal validity, it remains limited with regards claims to external validity (Addison, 2015; Barrera, Buskens, & Raub, 2015).

Rich narrative scenarios encourage participant engagement, but they can also make it difficult to isolate which of the specific elements of the hypothetical situation is triggering a particular response (Wilson & While, 1998).

While vignettes can tap into beliefs and values, it is not possible to say definitively if or when this will transfer into action and they remain unable to model how people will react to the same situation when presented with it in real life due to the essential unreality of the relationships and consequences presented.

5.3 *ANALYSIS AND RESULTS*

The following sections detail findings based on the integration of qualitative and quantitative phases of data analysis. The analysis of the qualitative interviews was used to both complement and expand the findings of the vignette experiments, with integration deepening, elucidating and contextualizing results.

5.3.1 *Combining findings from the two data sources*

5.3.1.1 *Process-based trust*

The first hypothesis looked at prior professional contact as an antecedent for process-based trust.

*H1: Prior professional contact will have a positive effect on peacekeepers’*
Respondents reported higher levels of trust for those whom they had higher prior professional contact and this pattern held across each of the three organizational cohorts. The average trust across all groups was highest for John/high (mean of 8.01) followed by Lars/medium (6.62) and then Ali/low (5.55).

This was echoed in qualitative interviews with many examples of peacekeepers reporting trusting people most strongly with whom they had direct and significant experience of working with previously. Peacekeepers conversely reported difficulty in building trust with people whom they had little or no prior professional contact. One such example is below:

> I remember talking to one young officer [from another military] saying ‘look I don’t trust you, that’s not a criticism, I said, we just don’t know each other, and I said ‘obviously, I would imagine you don’t trust me’.

Michael – Defence Forces Ireland

Prior professional contact has been found to be positively correlated to process-based trust production across a wide variety of organizational contexts (Kramer, & Tyler, 1996; Sanders, Schyns & Dietz, 2007) and consequently it is not surprising that this was found to be the case with this sample of peacekeepers. Qualitative analysis provided insight into the potential impact this may have in the peacekeeping context. Short rotations and high staff turnover is a challenge for all organizations involved in peacekeeping (Lipson, 2010). This was frequently mentioned as a concern for peacekeepers in terms of building trust with personnel outside of their own organizations and in gaining the trust of local communities.

This has the potential to hinder inter-organizational cooperation and cooperation between international peacekeepers and local actors.

5.3.1.2 Trustworthiness

In this consecutive scenario respondents were provided with further information about their three hypothetical colleagues before asking how much they feel they could rely on each person in the scenario presented. Hypotheses incorporated the Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) model of trustworthiness where trust is a function of the perception of the trustee’s competence, benevolence or integrity.
H2: Peacekeepers’ propensity to trust will be higher in the presence of evidence of ‘integrity’, compared to evidence of ‘competence’ or ‘benevolence’.

H3: The increase in peacekeepers’ propensity to trust for ‘integrity’ versus ‘competence’ will be higher among military compared to police or civilian personnel.

As hypothesized, the internal base of personal integrity proves to be decisive with mean trust highest for John/Integrity (8.07) followed by Lars/Competence (7.77) and Ali/Benevolence (6.32). Analysis however found no significant difference between organizational cohorts.

Analysis of interviews revealed potential confounding factors that may have influenced these results. ‘John’ is a colleague from the respondent’s own organization and may also be imagined by respondents as coming from the same country as them. Social similarity tends to be a powerful driver of characteristic-based trust production (Ahlf et al., 2019). Interviewees had a tendency to trust people closer in background to themselves and frequently described identifying with people on the basis of organizational or cultural identity. In a similar way, low trust in Ali may be due in part to perceived cultural difference and/or his role as an interpreter (with difficulty building trusting relationships with interpreters being frequently described in interviews) and not in fact evidence that benevolence is a weaker antecedent for trust.

5.3.1.3 Institutional-based trust

The next vignette in the sequence described how tensions increased and the situation turned volatile. The respondent is told that their colleague radios for advice and is instructed to remain. The respondent is then asked to rate how confident they would be with the order, firstly if it had come from their own organization, secondly if the order had come from United Nations (UN) command.

H4: Peacekeepers have greater trust in their own organization than they do in mission command.

H5: Peacekeepers’ trust in their own organization versus mission command will be higher for military compared to police and civilian personnel.

As hypothesized, average trust across all groups was higher for their own
organization compared to mission command (7.23 v 6.94, P=0.09). However, this difference was only significant at a 10% level. Military and police also displayed greater trust in their own organization compared to the civilian cohort.

Qualitative interviews detailed multiple examples of negative feelings towards the UN, across organizational cohorts. These included frustration and dissatisfaction with the disconnect between UN policy and the realities ‘on the ground’, making strategies impracticable; annoyance with excessive levels of bureaucracy hindering operations; and with police in particular, frustration with their inability to influence decision making processes based on their interactions with local communities. Given the consistency with which doubt in the competency of UN mission command was expressed (as well as an absence of reported identification with the overall mission structure), it is perhaps surprising that there was not greater divergence in confidence expressed in their own organization versus mission command when assessed through vignettes. Much of the negative feelings about the UN were expressed in response to other interview topics – cooperation, communication and managing risk, and not when asked directly about trust. Expressing a relatively high degree of confidence in central command may be a result of participants being asked to consider this in a more direct way and led to what could be considered as a more socially desirable response.

5.3.1.4 Characteristic-based

In the final scenario the respondent is introduced to a hypothetical local man Abdullah, who is the bank manager of the town and a personal contact of Lars. He speaks with the crowd and succeeds in calming the group down. The respondent is then presented with three potential motivations for why Abdullah has helped you and your colleagues. These motivations range from community orientated to personal gain motivations.

Hypothesis 6: Peacekeepers’ trust in local actors (non-peacekeeping personnel) will be higher for police compared to military or civilian personnel.

Hypothesis 7: Peacekeepers’ trust in local actors (non-peacekeeping personnel) will be higher for peacekeeping personnel from Asia, Africa and the Americas compared to European personnel.

Across all groups, respondents were more likely to agree that community-based
motivations were the primary motivation for Abdullah’s help (mean of 8), followed by business motivations (mean of 6.45), with agreement being least with personal gain motivations (mean of 6.13). Military personnel expressed less agreement that ‘Abdullah’ is motivated by the benefits of cooperation for his community (mean of 7.53) compared to civilian (mean of 8.25) and police (mean of 8.45). Analysis of H7 was hindered by the small number of peacekeepers from Asia, Africa and the Americas and with this sample there was no significant effect detected.

Police interviewed detailed the most variance and depth of interaction with local actors. This finding was used to inform the development of H6. These interactions stemmed from working and living within local communities and being embedded in the host state police service. Civilian personnel, and to an even greater extent military personnel, reported limited interactions with local actors. Many of the junior and mid-ranking military personnel interviewed interacted with locals infrequently, beyond buying supplies in local shops and markets. Several military personnel recalled negative interactions while carrying out monitoring and security activities. These involved patrols, checkpoints and responding to riots. Again, perceptions of untrustworthy behavior were reported when interviewees were discussing incidents related to the other topic areas, i.e. communication, risk management etc. and not when directly asked questions on trust. One observation that arises from comparing these data sources is that respondents will often give socially desirable or evasive answers when asked directly about trust. This tendency has been noted by Saunders (2015). This was often the case in interviews and may have also affected vignette responses.

5.3.1.5 Elements of trust absent from vignettes

In the interviews bridging trust and transferable trust were revealed as key to successful peacekeeping. Bridging trust facilitates cooperation across groups and in peacekeeping bridging trust is necessary for cooperation across organizations and cultures. Trust will need to be transferred between different peacekeeping personnel and organizations because of short rotations and high staff turnover. It is important that peacekeepers identify as part of the broader mission and work to develop trust in the mission broadly (Singleton & Holohan, 2019). Incidents of transferable trust are in fact conspicuous in their absence and did not produce a high numerical frequency of incidents when coded. Transferrable trust, because of
its relational aspects, was also difficult to embed in vignettes.

Police personnel interviewed were open and candid in their responses in comparison to military personnel. Police were more likely to report low trust in fellow peacekeepers in terms of perceived integrity or competence. Once such example appears below:

There are a lot of committed good people but there are an awful lot of people running away from things or wanting to do things that they couldn’t do in a normal environment and that would include sexist behavior, sexist attitudes, and then at the other end of the scale the use of prostitutes. Some great people, some greatly unpleasant.

Jake – Northern Ireland Cooperation Overseas

Police interviewees expressed a distance from their peacekeeping work, seeing it as distinct from their domestic police work. Police are seconded from their national police service and become part of a temporary team of multinational personnel. Militaries in contrast will undertake peacekeepers duties largely with colleagues from their national militaries. National and institutional loyalty may be a factor in why military less frequently report negative trusting beliefs in colleagues. The absence of such disclosures in military interviews is not necessarily an indication that such negative sentiments do not exist. This is an example of a factor that would be difficult to detect using quantitative vignette experiments alone.

Although each organizational cohort (military, police or civilian) shared a background and socialization in an institutional culture, interviews uncovered many differences in trusting beliefs, attitudes and behaviors within organizational categories. For example, with the military cohorts interviewed this included divergences stemming from differences in training and preparation, whether the military was professional or voluntary in nature (i.e. Irish versus Finnish military) and whether the military carried out defense and security functions abroad (i.e. the Bulgarian and Polish militaries) or peacekeeping exclusively (i.e. the Irish and Finnish militaries). These nuances were not able to be invested further in the vignette experiments because of limited response numbers.
5.4 DISCUSSION

5.4.1 Potential applications of the methodology

This paper outlines a process for adapting elements of the Critical Incident Technique (CIT) to design vignettes. The process for conducting interviews outlined in Figure 5.1 has the potential to be effective in isolation for the purpose of robust qualitative analysis of social phenomena. The process of creating a typology splits an ambiguous concept into composite elements and facilitates the creation of a coding framework. The coding framework assigns specific behaviors to each concept and provides a way to systematically organize a large amount of unstructured data. Although the large sample size used in this paper will not always be necessary before theoretical saturation is reached, the method allows for robust analysis, increased reliability and for coding to be carried out in a more consistent manner if being done by multiple researchers.

Trust researchers continue to express concern that the meaning of trust is too subjective for universally reliable metrics (McKnight & Chevany, 1996; Munscher & Kühlmann, 2015). Borrowing approaches from CIT allows participants to define a social phenomenon in their own terms (Munscher & Kühlmann, 2015). This is particularly beneficial when considering trust, given the culturally and individually specific nature of its understanding (Welter and Alex, 2015). Vignettes allow for the large-scale testing of attitudes and values, usually difficult with questionnaires. When the qualitative and quantitative methods outlined in this paper are combined, they develop a body of data that can be drawn on to explore inconsistencies between belief, attitude, intention and behavior, and to test the salience of hypotheses generated through interview analysis.

The importance of tailoring vignette scenarios for the population being studied and making them as realistic as possible has been recognized as key for participant engagement and external validity (Addison, 2015; Hughes, 1998). Participants can disengage if characters, events and situations in a vignette do not feel real and relevant (Neff, 1979). This methodology collects detailed and rich descriptions of scenarios and social phenomena from multiple perspectives and aids in the construction of vignettes that are relevant and realistic. Designing
vignettes in this way can greatly increase the reality of vignettes, providing detailed scenarios that engage participants.

5.4.2 Integration of methods

Of the five rationales for choosing to undertake a mixed method study as outlined by Greene, Caracelli & Graham (1989) the two fitting this study were *complementarity* and *development*. Complementarity seeks elaboration and enhancement of the results from one method with results from the other to produce a more complete picture of the investigated phenomenon (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Utilizing the qualitative and quantitative data to contextualize one another increased the meaningfulness of findings. Development uses the results from one method to help inform the other method. In this case, the analysis of experiential interviews was used to create vignettes and analysis attended to paradoxes that emerged from the two data sources.

Integration can result in illuminating insights about social phenomena, but not necessarily more valid results (Morgan, 2007; Hammersley, 2008; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). It is crucial to regard the nature of the phenomenon when judging what methods may be most adequate to describe or evaluate it, as often “epistemological and methodological concepts are not sufficiently linked to theoretical considerations about the nature of the investigated social structures and social processes” (Kelle, 2005: 95). Taking the example of trust in peacekeeping, there were divergent but not necessarily contradictory results when qualitative and quantitative phases of data analyses were integrated.

There are mixed methods researchers that include in their definition of the discipline the mixing of methodological worldviews and language (i.e., Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). Many consider it more challenging to combine the paradigms (e.g. constructivism or positivism) that underlie qualitative and quantitative methods than combining the methods themselves. This is due to fundamental differences in terms of their epistemological and metaphysical standpoints (Bryman, 2007; Creswell, 2011; Morgan, 2007). What may ease integration, at least from a philosophical standpoint, is that although CIT can collect qualitative, experiential data, it is debatable whether CIT is truly constructivist/interpretivist, in the epistemological or metaphysical sense, as it
involves a “reductive classification of data and frequency analysis” (Chell, 2004: 51).

Many mixed methods scholars have argued for some version of pragmatism as the most useful philosophy to support mixed methods research (Bryman, 2007; Morgan, 2007). In the case of the example outlined there was a presumption of *intersubjectivity* with trust within organizational forms understood as both subjective (interpersonal interactions forming organizational culture and structures) and objective (where organizational structure and culture will dictate trust and collaboration at an interpersonal level) (Mishra et al., 1996). In terms of context specificity versus generality, *transferability* was a useful concept, where general observations on how trust functions were useful for analysis with an acceptance that how trust functions may alter depending on context, in this case in the high-risk environment of peacekeeping cooperation. Analysis was a continuous cycle of inductive and deductive reasoning in the creation of a coding framework and typology. In combining data sources *abductive* reasoning was used when appropriate. This combination of numerical and cognitive reasoning produces useful knowledge and can lead to the ‘best answer’ to questions that cannot otherwise be adequately explained (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009).

5.4.3 Limitations

The incongruence between actions and stated intentions has long been a problem for researchers in the social sciences (Creswell, 2011; Kelle, 2005). While the experimental vignette method results in high levels of confidence regarding internal validity it remains limited with regards claims to external validity (Addison, 2015). The methodology outlined in this paper aims to limit the gap between the hypothetical scenario and social reality, in so far as is possible, but remains unable to model how people will react to the same situation when presented with it in real life. This is particularly true for some elements of trust, namely, any link to either reciprocity or personal relationships as the vignette “neglects the interaction and feedback that are necessary parts of social life” (Hughes, 1998: 385). Combining qualitative and quantitative data allows for examination of potential contradictions between trusting attitudes, beliefs and intentions. Although trusting intentions do not equate perfectly with exhibited behaviors, they have been
found to be a useful predictor of the likelihood to act (McKnight, Cummings & Chervany, 1998). In situations where it is difficult or dangerous to conduct observational research, carefully constructed vignette studies may be the closest thing to observing trust behaviors in a naturalistic setting.

As Wilson and While (1998) acknowledge, it is very difficult to balance making scenarios realistic, with making them truly comparable. In the case of the proposed vignette experiments, the organizations under analysis work in the same environment where they interact regularly. However, each cohort faces differing levels of risk and vulnerability and will have different rules, roles and responsibilities. It is important to take these factors into consideration when analyzing how each cohort responded to questions on their willingness to be vulnerable, both in interviews and in vignette responses.

There are key demographic differences between the samples and the general population. This is true for both the interviews and the vignette experiments. For example, although women are a small percentage of the samples, they remain overrepresented in comparison to the general population of peacekeeping personnel. Police peacekeepers are 15% female and military peacekeepers are 5.4% female (United Nations Peacekeeping Data on Gender, 2020). The nationality spread is also not representative of UN peacekeeping, with European peacekeepers greatly overrepresented. In terms of field diversity, military and police troops ‘on the ground’ are predominately from Asia and Africa (Bove, Ruffa, & Ruggeri, 2020).

Both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection used non-probability sampling techniques and therefore inferring from the samples to the general population cannot be justified.

5.5 CONCLUSION

This paper outlines a systematic process for analyzing qualitative data to create vignettes. The methodology outlined in this paper demonstrates a way of isolating the observational from the abstract in the study of trust, providing guidance on how to create a typology and coding framework. Quantitative research usually tests large scale reactionsto an aggregate concept, while in this case a complex,
ambiguous concept is broken down into composites or proxies. The methodology provides a way to approach the dilemma of conducting experimental research that results in high levels of confidence regarding internal validity but is challenged by threats to external validity, versus conducting nonexperimental research that usually maximizes external validity but whose conclusions are ambiguous regarding causal relationships. This is done by integrating experiential data that explores the perspectives and subjective motivations of peacekeepers and vignettes experiments that can assess attitudes, beliefs and intentions on a large scale. This paper shows how trust can benefit from mixed method designs due to the ambivalent and subjective nature of its meaning and the disjointed relationship between trusting beliefs, intentions, and behaviors. Mixed-methods research recognizes that all methods have inherent biases and weaknesses and that a mixed-method approach increases the likelihood that the combination of the data collected will be richer, more meaningful, and ultimately more useful in answering research questions than any one method alone (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). A degree of methodological inventiveness is necessary to arrive at better understandings of the richness and complexity of trust and mixed methods research lends itself to this task.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 OVERVIEW OF THESIS AS AN INTEGRATIVE WORK

The central questions of this thesis were formulated in response to gaps identified in peacekeeping research, in particular the absence of research on the interpersonal and interactional dimensions of peacekeeping cooperation, and research on trust in more volatile, non-commercial, and networked environments.

These questions were:

1. What role does trust play in cooperation in peacekeeping missions?
2. How is trust produced between international peacekeepers?
3. How is trust produced between international peacekeepers and local communities?
3. Do institutional categories of peacekeepers trust differently? How may this impact network cooperation?

In addition, this thesis was concerned with the overarching question of how, methodologically, does one study trust? I took a number of approaches - qualitative, quantitative and mixed-method, in order to best answer these research questions.

A major finding of this thesis was that a much greater awareness is needed on the role of trust in peacekeeping, both for peacekeeping researchers and practitioners. Findings of both qualitative and quantitative strands of analysis revealed that there are contradictions in how trust functions with what is needed in peacekeeping, particularly in terms of interorganizational cooperation and local ownership. Results indicated that trust is closely linked to successful communication, cooperation, negotiation, and leadership. Findings also indicated that trust in essential for how social capital is mobilized, particularly in more volatile network environments. Without trust, peacekeeping networks tend to become closed networks where resources and information are siloed. This thesis demonstrated how mixing methods can aid in the understanding of trust due to the subjective and ambiguous nature of its meaning, and the disjointed relationship between trusting beliefs, intentions, and actions.

Trust is both an author and a product of its context and this thesis began by contextualizing trust in the context of peacekeeping. I underlined the importance of trust for successful peacekeeping: for cooperation of international peacekeeping personnel (both intra and inter-organizationally) and for understanding and delivering on the needs of local communities (and how this is essential for building local consent and local ownership).
The notion that trust facilitates social exchange is well established, however the type and degree of trust needed for cooperation varies between social systems and organizational forms (Adler, 2001). I argued throughout this thesis that the organizational form of a peacekeeping mission is exceptional. In peacekeeping missions, multiple traditional hierarchies, each with their own rules, norms, chains of command and institutional identities, must be brought under a temporary overarching ‘networked’ structure. Cooperation in networks must be produced through trust and cannot be commanded like it can be in hierarchical forms of organization. In peacekeeping, familiarity is not the basis of social exchange, nor are there clearly defined communal norms or external institutional constraints. In these kinds of network environments, social exchange requires risk and consequently trust. This thesis discussed the trust-based mechanisms that produce cooperation in this unique organizational form and context.

A tenet of much trust theory is that trust at its core requires the trustee to make themselves vulnerable to some extent (Misztal, 1996; Elster, 2007), with Karen Cook (2005: 10) going as far as to say that “trust in low risk situations in relatively meaningless”. As CS Lewis succinctly puts it in A Grief Observed (1961: 20), only a real risk can test the reality of a belief:

It is easy to say you believe a rope to be strong and sound as long as you are merely using it to cord a box. But suppose you had to hang by that rope over a precipice. Wouldn't you then first discover how much you really trusted it? The same with people.

There is a degree of risk associated with peacekeeping that is absent from most organizational fields and consequently makes the study of trusting beliefs, intentions and actions so intriguing in this context.

I detailed the very real constraints that bear down on trust-based interactions and cooperation in peacekeeping networks. These are linked both to the inherent nature of peacekeeping and the understood social mechanisms of how people trust. I detailed the various factors linked to the nature of peacekeeping: (i) extraordinary levels of cultural and organizational diversity, (ii) complex power dynamics between actors, (iii) high levels of ambiguity and uncertainty stemming from the lack of formalized coordination mechanisms at the network level, and (iv) short rotations and high turnover of international personnel tend to mean missions are functionally made up of overlapping temporary teams. I demonstrated that there are aspects of how trust is known to function that run contrary to the kind of trust needed in peacekeeping: (i) in situations of danger we become risk-averse, but in peacekeeping high levels of trust are required in the face danger, (ii) we bond with and increase our trust in people when we have
repeated close contact, but peacekeepers must trust across organizations, and peacekeepers must maintain neutrality while becoming somewhat embedded in the communities they are based, and finally (iii) we tend to trust more in the abilities of those with whom we have had prior professional contact and trust people we can find commonality with, but peacekeepers must develop trust rapidly to cooperate across organizational and cultural boundaries. These contradictions were drawn out qualitatively in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 further investigated process-based trust, characteristic-based trust, and institutional-based trust quantitatively and detailed the potential consequences of the trust patterns that peacekeeping personnel display.

The specific ways that these challenges affect military peacekeepers were elucidated on in Chapter 2, which focused on a subset of 20 interviews with military personnel that had substantive experience working with UNIFIL, adapted as a case study approach on trust in a well-established, relatively stable, traditional UN mission. The unique challenges police face building and maintaining trust in diverse peacekeeping networks were discussed in Chapter 3 through the analysis of 56 interviews with police personnel.

Trust can feel like an intimidating topic for an early-stage researcher, with each new avenue of literature producing alternative trust concepts, categorizations, and sub-categorizations. As Lewicki and Brinsfield (2015) contend, trust research tends towards a process of divergence and not convergence of paradigms. My overall approach was one of pragmatism and I focused on seeking, through a variety of methods, useful knowledge that could inform future practice in the field of peacekeeping. This focus influenced my plans for dissemination and my decision to do a PhD by publication. Bijlsma-Frankema and Rousseau (2015) advance the idea that if trust researchers paid more attention to “how phenomena appear in the organizational field they study, the usefulness of their results for practice will increase” (2015: 267). I wanted to categorize trust in a way that is useful for peacekeepers themselves. I began by formulating a typology of trust for peacekeepers, taking concepts, and highlighting their relevance to core areas of peacekeeping. From this typology flowed the soft skill of ‘trust awareness’ and ‘trust mechanics’- practical actions and behaviors that foster trust. The typology was further developed and refined, being used for the coding of interviews and ultimately the creation of the vignette experiments discussed in Chapter 4 and 5.

Social capital and its relationship with trust became the central focus of Chapter 3. The chapter addressed questions on how police conceptualize peacekeeping networks, including attitudes to their relationships, subjective motives behind social actions and perceptions of the
frequency and quality of these interactions. I contend that peacekeeping missions are ‘networks of trust relations’ and that although social ties determine access to social capital in peacekeeping, this social capital can only be mobilized through trust. I found that although police had multiple ties in the community, and ties with a variety of international peacekeepers, they were not being utilized as bridges between local communities and broader peacekeeping structures. This chapter considered different approaches to the coordination of peacekeeping networks that would optimize their trust-building and social capital potential.

Being part of the Gaming for Peace project gave me access to a hard to reach population and scope to develop new understandings and methodological tools. The subset of 144 interviews that I used in my thesis would have been too labor intensive and time consuming to collect alone. Being part of a team of researchers, who used the same methodological package and interview schedule, meant that this large body of experimental data could be pooled and compared. The methodological design was emergent and opportunistic in nature and developed into a mixed-methods study because of the opportunities the data presented. The way interviews were collected (with the purpose of creating a digital role-playing game as part of a broader soft skills curriculum) used an approach which overlaps with the Critical Incident Technique (CIT) (Flanagan, 1954). A heterogenous selection of peacekeepers were asked to recall and describe, in detail, incidents of a critical nature related to trust and other organizational behaviors. Chapter 5, the final empirical chapter, outlines a step by step process for how to conduct and analyze interviews to facilitate the design of scenarios and hypotheses related to social phenomena. Chapter 4 and 5 demonstrated how trust concepts and hypotheses can be embedded in vignette experiments. This chapter integrated qualitative and quantitative data and demonstrated how combining these methods results in insights on trust that could not be arrived at through any single method.

6.2 CONTRIBUTIONS

In the following sections I outline the contributions that this thesis makes, empirically, theoretically, methodologically, and practically.

6.2.1 Empirical contributions

This thesis contributes empirically to how peacekeeping missions function as networks and specifically as ‘networks of trust relations’, i.e. networks that emerge out of necessity under conditions of uncertainty and risk, to facilitate social exchange (Barrera, 2005; Buskens, 2002; Cook, 2005; Knight, 1992; Mishra, Kramer & Tyler, 1996).
This thesis addressed the specific ways that trust functions in a high risk networked environment. In peacekeeping networks, trust needed to be actively fostered, reinforced and repaired for cooperation. Findings indicate that peacekeeping networks, without intervention or coordination, can easily form dysfunctional clusters and silos, becoming smaller closed networks that impede the greater use of social capital. Despite challenges peacekeepers found ways to build sufficient trust to work together and these strategies are detailed in Chapter 2 and 3. In Chapter 2 these strategies were grouped broadly under the categories of ‘trust mechanics’: (i) showing trust to engender trust with local communities, (ii) demonstrating impartiality to maintain trust with local communities, and (iii) a variety of interpersonal and informal interactions that build inter-organizational trust.

The results of the vignette experiments indicated that trust functions in several ways that will impact core aspects of peacekeeping including maintaining neutrality, facilitating local ownership, cooperating across organizations and ensuring the institutional transfer of knowledge. Characteristic-based trust for local actors was shown to be relatively high in this study. However, trust was lowest for military peacekeepers who currently represent the highest number of peacekeeping personnel in any given mission (Bove, Ruffa & Rugggeri, 2020). The salience of prior professional contact as an antecedent of process-based trust was shown to be strong across all cohorts. However, the transitory nature of peacekeeping will mean that process-based trust will be difficult to build, particularly outside one’s own organization or military cohort. Military and police cohorts reported a greater degree of institutional trust in their own organization versus mission command which can lead to poor interorganizational cooperation and lack of identification with the mission. These findings hold the potential to improve peacekeeping strategies by actively engaging peacekeeping practitioners with how trust affects successful cooperation.

6.2.2 Theoretical contributions

Theoretically this thesis contributes to research on the contested relationship between trust and social capital, arguing that trust is essential for social capital to be mobilized in networks, particularly in volatile network environments. Chapter 3 directly links trust to how social capital is mobilized through looking at the example of peacekeeping networks and how police function within them. I contend that accessed social capital is determined by social ties, whereas mobilized social capital is dependent on trust.
This thesis generates the theoretical tool – a ‘typology of trust for peacekeepers’. Creating typologies for trust in specific contexts is a useful approach to make research findings on trust more accessible. This theoretical tool was used to conceptualize the soft skill ‘trust awareness’, and ‘trust mechanics’ - the behaviors associated with developing and maintaining different types of trust. The concept of trust as a soft skill is innovative - the assertion that one can develop trust as a critical faculty, decide how and when to trust and when to exercise caution, and skills in how to develop trusting relationships. The process of creating a typology has utility for examining trust in other organizational fields.

6.2.3 Methodological contributions

This thesis contributes to process-driven qualitative research on trust and demonstrates how qualitative approaches can enhance investigation of the trust-based interactions and processes of networks.

In this thesis I address the absence of guidance on how to model vignette scenarios and questions in the social sciences. A step by step process is outlined in Chapter 5 on how to conduct and analyze interviews to facilitate the design of vignette scenarios. This process includes guidance on how to design an integrated typology and coding framework that operationalizes a complex social phenomenon like trust, breaking it into aggregate concepts that can be investigated and compared.

Chapter 4 goes into detail on the process of how to embed trust concepts and hypotheses in vignette scenarios, presenting the applied logic behind each of four interconnected scenarios used. Although the utility of the method was demonstrated through examining trust in peacekeeping, this process has utility for examining different social phenomena in a variety of contexts. When the qualitative and quantitative methods generated through this methodology were combined, they developed a body of data that could be drawn on to explore inconsistencies between belief, attitude, intention and behavior.

One incidental finding of this research was that it can more be productive to ask about trust indirectly in qualitative research approaches. In this project information collected on successful and unsuccessful instances of cooperation, communication and risk management produced a large amount of fruitful detail on trust. When asked directly on trust in interviews, interviewees were more likely to give evasive or socially desirable responses. Identifying
organizational behaviors affected by trust, and asking questions in these related areas, is a useful strategy for assessing trust beliefs and attitudes in organizational relationships and formed part of the methodological guidance on creating vignettes.

6.2.4 Practical contributions

My epistemological standpoint in developing this thesis was that of pragmatism, focusing on seeking, through a variety of methods (and their combination), useful and accessible knowledge that enables action (Elkjaer & Simpson, 2011). It is my hope that the findings of my research are useful and accessible to peacekeeping personnel and practitioners. It is for this reason that I chose to structure the empirical chapters of this thesis as a series of papers targeted to journals in the fields of peacekeeping, security and social research methodology. Analysis yielded numerous insights that have the potential to contribute to more effective and efficient peacekeeping. I argued in each chapter that trust needs to be considered as part of the systems design of peacekeeping as well as an aspect of how peacekeepers are trained and prepared for missions.

Experiential research with peacekeeping personnel indicated that peacekeeping missions are not currently operationalized as networks. Analysis demonstrated that peacekeepers are currently given little guidance on how to mobilize social capital and maximize the resources of the network. It is important for a peacekeeping mission to be considered as a networked organization made up of different organizations and individuals. It is also important that peacekeepers themselves are keenly aware of this.

It was apparent that although police were positioned to be bridges between local communities and international peacekeeping structures they are not being utilized in this way. Taking a network perspective highlights elements of broader network cohesion, cooperation and trust-building that may be lost with the move away from deploying police as Individual Police Officers (IPOs) and instead deploying them as Formed Police Units (FPUS).

Findings demonstrated the importance of valuing the perspectives of peacekeepers. Peacekeepers revealed ad hoc strategies that they have developed to build trust with a broad range of ties, despite myriad challenges. These could be formalized and made part of training and preparation for missions.

This thesis considers potential ways to coordinate peacekeeping networks. These included joint training initiatives to develop trust and encourage the mobilization of the social capital
resources and whether a ‘directed network’ that more effectively combines elements of hierarchy and decentralized autonomy would be effective in this context.

6.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Like any study, this one has its limitations, and as it has worked to answer questions, it also raised others.

I was extremely fortunate to gain access to a large amount of data with hard to reach institutional populations that would have been impossible to collect as a solo doctoral researcher. However, a major limitation of both the interviews and vignette responses are that they are not representative of the general population of peacekeeping personnel. In addition, the perspectives of local actors of all kinds are necessary for any truly holistic understanding of how the trust dynamics of peacekeeping networks function and would greatly enhance this study. Cultural diversity is far greater in the general population of peacekeepers than it was in the sample of interviews and vignette responses. Chapter 2 found that when comparing the trust styles of the Finnish and Irish militaries they had very different strategies for building and maintaining trust. The Finnish military focused on reliability and professionalism, while the Irish focused on personal and social interaction. Although the two militaries culturally are relatively similar, and both come from militaries with an exclusive focus on peacekeeping, there were important cultural dimensions that affected trust. It has been recognized in peacekeeping literature that prejudices and unknowingly offensive behavior reduce chances for constructive interactions between peacekeepers (Ben-Ari & Elron, 2001) and the cultural dimension of trust is increasingly recognized as central to trust research (Saunders, 2012). It would be beneficial to incorporate research with non-European peacekeeping personnel into this study. There are likely to be fascinating interactions between national and organizational cultures that greatly affect trust and cooperation in peacekeeping missions.


Greener, B. K., & Fish, W. J. (2011). *Situating police and military in contemporary peace operations*. Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence.


Wilson, J., & While, A. E. (1998). Methodological issues surrounding the use of vignettes in qualitative research. *Journal of Inter-professional Care, 12*(1), 79-86

Appendix 1

Experiential Interviews: Informed Consent and Interview Guide

WHAT IS GAP?

Gaming for Peace (GAP) is a project funded by the European Commission, led by Trinity College Dublin, Department of Sociology. The Gaming for Peace (GAP) project aims to generate an online game-based training curriculum for personnel (military, police, civil) involved in conflict prevention and peace building (CPPB) missions. The purpose of the research study is to develop an online training game for personnel (military, police, civilian) who are/will be engaged in CPPB missions. This game will be used for training in:

1. ‘Soft skills’ such as negotiation, cooperation and communication, crucial for successful CPPB missions where diverse organizations must work together and with local actors to achieve the mission goals.
2. Empathic understanding of other people and roles within a CPPB setting in order that players may better understand the roles and motivations of different people they may encounter in the field.
3. Gender awareness (both inside and between participating organizations and in the local context of the CPPB mission) and cultural competency (including religious, ethnic and national sensitivities).

WHAT’S MY ROLE?

You are invited to take part in an interview for the GAP project. We seek to collect experiences, through one to one interviews, of personnel (military, police, civilian) who have been deployed in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (CPPB) missions. You have been chosen because of your experience on CPPB missions, or relevant domestic experience. You will be asked questions about experiences that you have had on CPPB missions, what your objectives were, other people that you worked with or encountered, what went well, what did not go well and what skills you used/needed. The interview will take up to 60 minutes.

WHAT WILL MY INTERVIEW BE USED FOR?

The experiences you share with us will be used to develop a curriculum which will ground scenarios for an online role-playing game, thus feeding into a game that is based on real-life experiences. The results of the study may also lead onto further studies into CPPB missions and further development of the game. We will also use information from your interview in sociological analysis and writing these findings up into academics journal articles and books (with your details anonymised). At the end of the project we also intend to make anonymised interview transcripts available to other researchers upon request to the project lead investigator.

HOW WILL MY DATA BE HANDLED?
The interview will be recorded on audio tape and then transcribed onto a computer. The audio tapes will be encrypted and stored in a locked secure place at all times and the computer data will also be encrypted and will be protected from intrusion. The audio tapes will be destroyed at the end of the study and the transcripts will have all identifying information removed. Your response will be treated with full confidentiality and anyone who takes part in the research will be identified only by code numbers or false names. You can request a copy of the interview transcript if you wish. The interviews will be analysed by using a computer package by researchers at Trinity College Dublin. No research participant will be identifiable from any publication or presentation resulting from the analysis of your interview. Your informed consent form will be stored securely at a location separate from the tapes and transcripts. A full description of our approach to data handling may be found in the GAP Data Policy document (available on request).

WHAT ARE MY RIGHTS?

As a participant in the GAP project you have the right to:

- Freely decide whether or not to participate in the research
- To change your mind about your participation and withdraw from the study. You may withdraw your participation at any time, and withdraw your data up until the point at which the data has been anonymised.

If the interview upsets you and you feel you would like some additional help after the interview I will be able to advise you who to contact, for example occupational health or counselling support in your organisation, and/or in an external organisation.

TO NOTE

If, during the interview, you report any illegal or prohibited behaviour, this will be reported to the Director, Military Police Branch. Further information about this may be found in the GAP Incidental Finding Policy document (available upon request)

WHAT NEXT?

This information sheet is for you to consider and keep. If you decide to take part:

- you will also be asked to sign a consent form
- we will arrange a time for you to complete the interview at your convenience

You are welcome to phone me if you would like any further information.

This study has been reviewed and approved by the GAP External Ethics Committee, the Research Ethics Committee at Trinity College Dublin

Thanking you in anticipation,

Project Principal Investigator – Anne Holohan aholohan@tcd.ie
+353 1896 1478
School of Social Science and Philosophy
Trinity College Dublin

Gaming for Peace (GAP): Consent form (Interview)
BACKGROUND

The Gaming for Peace (GAP) project aims to generate an online game based training curriculum for personnel (military, police, civil) involved in conflict prevention and peace building (CPPB) missions. In this project we will seek to collect real life experiences of personnel deployed on CPPB missions through one-to-one interviews with such personnel, and will use these experiences to develop an online role playing game which simulates scenarios from CPPB missions. We will also use interview data to develop academic journal articles, books and theses.

If you consent to participate, this interview will be recorded and the conversation transcribed later. Transcripts will be anonymised and will be made available to other researchers at the end of the project. Original interview recordings will be stored securely and destroyed by the end of the project. A copy of the transcript of your interview is freely available to you upon request. This form will be kept securely in a separate location from the interview transcript. Your participation in this interview is purely voluntary and you are free to end the interview at any time.

DECLARATION:

I have read, or had read to me, the information leaflet for this project and I understand the contents. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and all my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I freely and voluntarily agree to be part of this research study, though without prejudice to my legal and ethical rights. I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time and I have received a copy of this agreement. I understand that any reports of illegal/prohibited behaviour will be reported to the Director, Military Police Branch.

PARTICIPANT'S NAME: …………………………………………………………..

CONTACT DETAILS: …………………………………………………………..

PARTICIPANT’S SIGNATURE: ……………………………………………………..

DATE: ………………………

Statement of investigator's responsibility: I have explained the nature and purpose of this research study, the procedures to be undertaken and any risks that may be involved. I have offered to answer any questions and fully answered such questions. I believe that the participant understands my explanation and has freely given informed consent.

Contact details for investigator should be included here as well.

INVESTIGATOR’S SIGNATURE: ………………………

DATE: ………………………
Interview Guide (Military)

Make sure you cover every **topic** in the left-hand box (but not necessarily every question) in the interview.


For every topic, go through it regarding their own org/other similar org (e.g. other military/police/NGOs/civilian personnel/local people/any other relevant actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age?</th>
<th>Check box</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender?</td>
<td>Don’t ask, record on transcription document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization name?</td>
<td>Don’t ask, record on transcription document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your position in the organization?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How long have you been in the organization?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many and which deployments have you been on? [interviewer jot down]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How long did each deployment last and when was it?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was it voluntary to go?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why did you go?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What was your specific position/responsibility in each deployment?</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Topic**

**Preparation**

[see what they identify or not as soft skills]

- **You were told to ‘cooperate’ but were you told how to do this? What kind of training did you get?**
- **What did you expect?**
- What happened in the field?
- What are the lessons to be drawn from your experience? What kind of training would you advise the mil to provide for anyone going on deployment?

- How did you figure out who you are supposed to be working with? How do you establish a working relationship with them?
- How do you figure out who is the best person to talk to and find out what is going on?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>How do you figure out who you can trust?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What organizations did you work with on x deployment?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For each organization [INTERVIEWER, JOT DOWN ORGS AND GO THROUGH EACH ONE WITH INTERVIEWEE], what was it like working with them? Were they easy to work with? Difficult?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily or weekly routine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who do you interact with, what do you do?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulties/challenges?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can you think of a situation where cooperation helped/did not help achieve the goals of the mission?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What helped cooperation in the field? What hindered it?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was status a problem? Who could give orders? Who would follow them?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did the amount of cooperation achieved affect the local populations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were you given contact with other orgs or did you have to make contact yourself?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were there problems around</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decision-making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Operational styles</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Management styles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use of force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Approaches to time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What was success</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Officers: what permission do you give your enlisted to gather intelligence? Act with initiative if necessary?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust [within your own org, with other orgs and with local population]</td>
<td>Who would you trust if you are in a potentially dangerous situation on the ground? (if they ask what do you mean, say someone from a specific organization, male or female, a particular nationality?) Who would you NOT trust, and why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction/Communication</td>
<td>Were you given any training about how to talk to the different people you’d encounter on deployment? [make sure to ask about other mil personnel, other organizations like police or civilians, different nationalities, the local populations]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What was communication like between the organizations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What was communication like with the local population?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Describe the differences in communicating with personnel from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Own force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Personnel from police forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Different armies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• International NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• International civil servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Local people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What were the difficulties?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can you think of a situation where communication helped or did not help achieve the goals of the mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Where did you get information? How was it analyzed? How was it acted upon?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socializing: Were there opportunities to interact with people outside work? How important was that?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural sensitivity</td>
<td>Was there training in cultural sensitivity before you went on deployment? [preparation]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Was there misunderstandings around what was polite or culturally appropriate
- with personnel from other nations within military
- with personnel from other peacekeeping organizations (e.g. administration or military)
- with the local population (e.g. not talking to a woman not related to you in a conservative Muslim country)

Did that affect your mission? [experience]

Can you think of a situation where cultural difference affected operations? (positively or negatively)

What would you advise the trainers as to what is needed in this respect, based on your experiences?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>❖ Did you receive training on gender awareness before you left? Was it useful when you got there?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>❖ Gender mainstreaming is part of every mission – does the aim of gender equality overlap or even compete with other important goals of the mission?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Have you worked with men/women only or in a mixed environment? How is it different in each case?

Can you think of a situation where your gender made a difference? (for good or ill) Probe on this – any other examples??

Pros and cons to single sex/mixed set up on deployment?

❖ What do you consider to be a violation of gender equality on a mission? Has this ever happened to you or have you witnessed this?

❖ With technology nowadays, physical strength is not as important anymore and combat is rarely a part of a peacekeeping mission, do you think
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>this means women can be just as effective on missions?</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can you think of any changes that would encourage women to volunteer for peacekeeping missions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people working on peacekeeping missions are male – how does this affect the atmosphere of the mission? Is it masculine or ‘macho’?? What was your experience?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you witnessed incidents on deployment where anyone was disrespectful of female peacekeeping personnel or local female population?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you handle that practically and emotionally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could can things be improved?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Risk/Stress</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(loneliness, boredom, frustration, witnessing suffering, not being able to respond to insults etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well prepared were you to deal with dangers or risks experienced on deployment? How could you have been better prepared?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What was the most stressful thing about being on each deployment/ peacekeeping mission?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[if they say they didn’t see anything or reported what they did see, then ask ‘did you ever hear stories even if you yourself did not witness them or do not know who did it?’]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>❖ Why do you think Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA as it’s known) has received so much attention?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>❖ Do policies and mechanisms to prevent SEA work? If yes, which ones, if no, which ones and why for both.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you feel when you see sexual or racial abuse or other exploitation of vulnerable people by your colleagues? (stressful, etc, or doesn’t bother you as you accept it as part of the scene)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you ever try and intervene or stop something that you felt uncomfortable with?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you approach your superior officers, if applicable, and how was it responded to?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Actually, what kind of things are you supposed to report a colleague for?

Did you feel in danger? How was that dealt with? Well or badly?

### Sexuality

- [You mentioned your girlfriend/wife/boyfriend/husband earlier (if they did)] For those who weren’t in relationships did they form any over there? How did others perceive that? I mean, there are so many things to consider, the culture of the camp, the culture of the locality, and the culture of your org!

**Have you witnessed incidents where personnel in your organization or in another organization or a member of the local population have done or said something that might make someone who is gay uncomfortable? (either someone who is gay within your own organization or in another organization or member of the local population)**

- What is your organizations policy on LGBT issues? How does it work in practice? What is it like to be gay or lesbian or trans in your organization? Do you know anyone who is openly LGBT?

**Whether gay or not gay, how do people cope with restrictions on their sexuality/sexual activity on a long deployment?**

**Have there been problems with different norms around sexuality with the local population?**

Do you think that policies and approaches to sexuality could be improved on? If so, how?

### Final Question #1

[reflection questions – give interviewee lots of time to consider]

- If I told you that you were going back again to do the very same deployment, but this time as a woman/man/different nationality, what would that be like?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final Question #2</th>
<th>So we spoke earlier about gender and LGBTQ awareness within the mission, what do you think a civilian going on a mission for the first time should be told about interactions between those within the camp and locals outside it?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Final Question #3  | What was the best thing about your experience on a peacekeeping mission?  
What was the worst thing about your experiences on a peacekeeping mission? |
| Final Question #4  | These interviews are preparation for scenarios in an online/virtual reality role-playing game – can you tell me about some of the sounds and smells and sights that you associate with your time on mission? |
Appendix 2

Vignette Experiments: Informed Consent and Scenarios

Information and Informed Consent for Participants (appeared as landing page for an online survey).

Principal Investigator: Ms. Sara Singleton
Email contact: singlets@tcd.ie

Purpose of research:

The purpose of this research is to gather insights into the realities and experiences of people who have worked in peacekeeping, specifically this research aims to explore the ways that different organisations collaborate and trust while on international peacekeeping missions.

What’s my role?

You are invited to take part in an anonymous online survey where you will be asked to react to a number of scenarios related to peacekeeping; all questions are multiple choice or involve selecting an answer on a Likert scale. The survey should take a maximum of 10 minutes.

How will my Data be handled?

Your survey responses will be completely anonymous and conducted via online software. As such your identity will be unknown from all, including the researcher; and your response will be assigned to a random false name. Accordingly, any future publications or presentations based on this data will remain anonymous and will not be identifiable with your identity. The survey responses will be analysed by the researcher in Trinity College Dublin, and contribute to their PhD thesis. Your informed consent will be stored securely.

What are my rights?

As a participant within this research, you have the right to:

- Freely decide whether you wish to participate in this research project or not.
- You have the right to withdraw from the survey at any point, up the point of submission. None of your responses will be stored if you withdraw before submitting the survey.
- Within the survey, if there are questions that you find you do not wish to answer, you can omit them and not answer them.
- After the research is concluded, i.e. after taking the online survey, you have the right to ask for a debriefing from the researcher about the purposes of the study. This can be arranged via email: singlets@tcd.ie
Declaration:
I acknowledge that I have read the above, and understand its contents. I agree and volunteer to be a participant within this study. I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any point.

Please be aware by clicking on the button link and proceeding with the survey, you are agreeing and acknowledging all of the above.

X Tick Box to Confirm
Military Vignettes

You and your team are conducting its weekly patrol to the village market.

Accompanying you are two colleagues at your level of seniority. One is from your own military (John). You know John well as you have trained together at home, have worked together on previous missions and socialize with some of the same people. The other (Lars) is from a different national contingent that you share the base and a common AO with. You met Lars at induction but have not been out on patrol with him before. You are also accompanied by an interpreter (Ali). Today is the first time you and he have worked together.

Many of the stalls are closed, and this end of the street is empty. A crowd has gathered further down the road, near the community center. As you move forward towards the crowd, some of them turn and approach you. Your party halts. You recognize some of the faces in the group. You hear an angry shout and a small pebble sails through the air, landing near your feet.

How much do you feel like you could rely on each person to help you manage the crowd on a scale of 1-10 (10 being fully rely on and 1 being not rely on at all).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ali</th>
<th>Lars</th>
<th>John</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You know John well and know him to honest and principled, once reporting a fellow soldier for taking bribes at a checkpoint.

Lars has a reputation as a very skilled soldier, and you heard that he managed a complex logistical problem that came up on a recent patrol very well.

You don’t know a whole about Ali but on the journey, you have learned that he does shopping for and visits elderly relatives a few evenings a week.

How much do you feel like you could rely on each person to help you manage the crowd on a scale of 1-10 (10 being fully rely on and 1 being not rely on at all).

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Ali</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You ask Ali to tell you what is going on. He tells you that the people are saying things about a brothel in the village that is being visited by UN staff. The shouting grows louder and is accompanied by more pebbles. None hit you, but they are creeping closer.

Omar is a local shopkeeper; you and John regularly buy small things like chewing gum and soft drinks from him. Omar is walking towards you, a scowl plastered across his face. He speaks to you directly: "We do not want you here, spreading your immorality". The imperialist UN does not care about us - only about itself! I do not know why I was ever nice to you - so ungrateful!"

Although the rest of the crowd seems relatively calm, you can hear some murmuring in agreement.
You hear John talking on his radio asking for instruction and he is told that the patrol should stand its ground for the time being. Although you feel there is a chance that the situation could escalate further, you follow the orders given.

| How confident would you be with the order to remain (10 being very confident and 1 being not confident at all). |
| 1. If the order came from your own Military command 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| 2. If the order had come from UN command 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |

Lars tells everyone to follow him to speak with a contact of his: “I’ve met with Abdullah, the town’s bank manager several times over the last few months; he’s always been really good for knowing what’s going on in the area and has the respect of a lot of people”

You follow Lars to outside a café where Abdullah is having coffee. He greets Lars: "My friend! This is a strange day for you, I think?” Lars smiles and shrugs his shoulders, “It's not exactly how I thought today would go”

Abdullah stands up and starts speaking to the crowd. He launches into a long stream of Arabic, gesturing from you to them and back to you.

"He's telling them that you're not the problem," whispers Ali. "That he knows you - that he knows many UN soldiers - and that they are not the enemy. He's scolding the older people here for letting the young forget about the war. About what life was like before the UN came. And he's scolding the young for paying more attention to one angry man than their own eyes"

The crowd looks somewhat sheepish and many of the core group starts to drift away. The ones that remain still seem to be angry, but without the numbers to back them up they look a little lost. After a few minutes even these few people start to spread out across the market.

Abdullah turns back to you with a grin. You silently nod your thanks. He shrugs. "I have seen enough fighting for many lifetimes. We do not need to fight our friends too. Thank you for all that you have done here."

| How much do you agree with the below statements (10 agree completely, 1 being not agree at all) |
| 1. Abdullah helps you because he can personally benefit from having a good relationship with international peacekeepers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| 2. Abdullah helps you because maintaining peace and stability in the village is beneficial for his business 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| 3. Abdullah helps you because maintaining peace and stability in the village will benefit the people in his community 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
Police Vignettes

You and your team are conducting its weekly patrol to the village market.

Accompanying you are two officers at a similar level of seniority. One is from the same national police service as you (John). You know John well as you have worked together at home, have been together on a previous deployment and socialize with some of the same people. The other (Lars) is from a different national police service. You work in the same station and met at a recent training but have not been out on patrol with him before. You are also accompanied by an interpreter (Ali). Today is the first time you and he have worked together.

Many of the stalls are closed, and this end of the street is empty. A crowd has gathered further down the road, near the community centre. As you move forward towards the crowd, some of them turn and approach you. Your party halts. You recognise some of the faces in the group. You hear an angry shout and a small pebble sails through the air, landing near your feet.

| How much do you feel like you could rely on each person to help you manage the crowd on a scale of 1- 10 (10 being rely on fully and 1 being not rely on at all). |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4. Ali | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| 5. Lars | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| 6. John | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |

You know John well and know him to honest and principled, once reporting a fellow police officer for taking bribes at a checkpoint.

Lars has a reputation as a very skilled police officer, having managed a complex logistical problem that came up on a recent patrol very well.

You don’t know a whole about Ali but on the journey, you have learned that he does shopping for and visits elderly relatives a few evenings a week.

| How much do you feel like you could rely on each person to help you manage the crowd on a scale of 1- 10 (10 being rely on fully and 1 being not rely on at all). |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4. Ali | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| 5. Lars | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| 6. John | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |

You ask Ali to tell you what is going on. He tells you that the people are saying things about a brothel in the village that is being visited by UN staff. The shouting grows louder and is accompanied by more pebbles. None hit you, but they are creeping closer.

Omar is a local shopkeeper; you and John regularly buy small things like chewing gum and soft drinks from him. Omar is walking towards you, a scowl plastered across his face. He speaks to you directly: "We do not want you here, spreading your immorality". The imperialist UN does not care about us - only about itself! I do not know why I was ever nice to you - so ungrateful!"

Although the rest of the crowd seems relatively calm, you can hear some murmuring in agreement.
You hear John talking on his radio asking for advice and he is told that the patrol should stand its ground for the time being. Although you feel there is a chance that the situation could escalate further, you follow the advice given.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How confident would you be with the advice to remain (10 being very confident and 1 being not confident at all).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. If the order came from your own station command 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. If the order had come from the UN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lars tells everyone to follow him to speak with a contact of his: “I’ve met with Abdullah, the town’s bank manager several times over the last few months; he’s always been really good for knowing what’s going on in the area and has the respect of a lot of people”

You follow Lars to outside a café where Abdullah is having coffee. He greets Lars: "My friend! This is a strange day for you, I think?" Lars smiles and shrugs his shoulders, “It's not exactly how I thought today would go”

Abdullah stands up and starts speaking to the crowd. He launches into a long stream of Arabic, gesturing from you to them and back to you.

"He's telling them that you're not the problem," whispers Ali. "That he knows you - that he knows many international police - and that they are not the enemy. He's scolding the older people here for letting the young forget about the war. About what life was like before the UN came. And he's scolding the young for paying more attention to one angry man than their own eyes”

The crowd looks somewhat sheepish and many of the core group starts to drift away. The ones that remain still seem to be angry, but without the numbers to back them up they look a little lost. After a few minutes even these few people start to spread out across the market.

Abdullah turns back to you with a grin. You silently nod your thanks. He shrugs. "I have seen enough fighting for many lifetimes. We do not need to fight our friends too. Thank you for all that you have done here."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How much do you agree with the below statements (10 agree completely, 1 being not agree at all)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Abdullah helps you because he can personally benefit from having a good relationship with internationals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Abdullah helps you because maintaining peace and stability in the village is beneficial for his business 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Abdullah helps you because maintaining peace and stability in the village will benefit the people in his community 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Civilian Vignettes

You and some colleagues are visiting the local market

Accompanying you are two colleagues, who work in similar roles on this deployment. One is from your own organization (John). You know John well as you have trained together at home, have worked together overseas previously and socialize with some of the same people. The other (Lars) is from a different organization that you collaborate with frequently with on projects. You met Lars at training but have not worked with him directly before. You are also accompanied by an interpreter (Ali). Today is the first time you and he have worked together.

Many of the stalls are closed, and this end of the street is empty. A crowd has gathered further down the road, near the community centre. As you move forward towards the crowd, some of them turn and approach you. Your party halts. You recognise some of the faces in the group. You hear an angry shout and a small pebble sails through the air, landing near your feet.

| How much do you feel like you could rely on each person to help you safely get away from the crowd on a scale of 1-10 (10 being rely on fully and 1 being not rely on at all). |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7. Ali | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 8. Lars | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 9. John | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

You know John well and know him to honest and principled, once reporting a member of staff for taking a bribe from a local subcontractor.

Lars has a reputation as being very skilled at his job, having managed a complex logistical problem that came up on a recent project very well.

You don’t know a whole about Ali but on the journey, you have learned that he does shopping for and visits elderly relatives a few evenings a week.

| How much do you feel like you could rely on each person to help you help you safely get away from the crowd on a scale of 1-10 (10 being rely on fully and 1 being not rely on at all). |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7. Ali | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 8. Lars | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 9. John | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

You ask Ali to tell you what is going on. He tells you that the people are saying things about a brothel in the village that is being visited by UN staff. The shouting grows louder and is accompanied by more pebbles. None hit you, but they are creeping closer.

Omar is a local shopkeeper; you and John regularly buy small things like chewing gum and soft drinks from him. Omar is walking towards you, a scowl plastered across his face. He speaks to you directly: "We do not want you here, spreading your immorality". The imperialist UN does not care about us - only about itself! I do not know why I was ever nice to you - so ungrateful!"

Although the rest of the crowd seems relatively calm, you can hear some murmuring in agreement.
You hear John make a phone call asking for advice and he is told that the group should stay where they are for the time being. Although you feel there is a chance that the situation could escalate further, you follow the advice given.

**How confident would you be with the advice to remain (10 being very confident and 1 being not confident at all).**

5. If the order came from your own organisation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
6. If the order had come from the UN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Lars tells everyone to follow him to speak with a contact of his: “I’ve met with Abdullah, the town’s bank manager several times over the last few months; he’s always been really good for knowing what’s going on in the area and has the respect of a lot of people”

You follow Lars to outside a café where Abdullah is having coffee. He greets Lars: "My friend! This is a strange day for you, I think?" Lars smiles and shrugs his shoulders, “It's not exactly how I thought today would go”

Abdullah stands up and starts speaking to the crowd. He launches into a long stream of Arabic, gesturing from you to them and back to you.

"He's telling them that you're not the problem," whispers Ali. "That he knows you - that he knows many internationals - and that they are not the enemy. He's scolding the older people here for letting the young forget about the war. About what life was like before the UN came. And he's scolding the young for paying more attention to one angry man than their own eyes"

The crowd looks somewhat sheepish and many of the core group starts to drift away. The ones that remain still seem to be angry, but without the numbers to back them up they look a little lost. After a few minutes even these few people start to spread out across the market.

Abdullah turns back to you with a grin. You silently nod your thanks. He shrugs. "I have seen enough fighting for many lifetimes. We do not need to fight our friends too. Thank you for all that you have done here."

**How much do you agree with the below statements (10 agree completely, 1 being not agree at all)**

7. Abdullah helps you because he can personally benefit from having a good relationship with internationals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
8. Abdullah helps you because maintaining peace and stability in the village is beneficial for his business 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
9. Abdullah helps you because maintaining peace and stability in the village will benefit the people in his community 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10