Socialisation, Role Theory, and

Infrapolitics:

Officers of the Irish Defence Forces and

Civilian Higher Education since the 1960s

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy
Trinity College Dublin

November, 2020
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Title: Socialisation, Role theory, and Infrapolitics: Officers of the Irish Defence Forces and Civilian Higher Education since the 1960s.

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Abstract: The military profession has a long history, and its institutions of education have been central to the development of military officers. Questions about the higher education of officers became increasingly important in the wake of World War 2 and the changing nature of military authority and the roles that military officers would be expected to fill. In Ireland these changes became manifest in the advent of the decision in 1969 to send Army officers to university in University College Galway. Combining documentary and archival research with data generated through semi-structured interviews with 46 retired and serving officers, it adopts a conceptual framework of role theory combined with ideas from James C. Scott in a case study approach to examine the origins and effects of the USAC scheme for the civilian higher education of Irish military officers since 1969. It answers the question of how officers in the Defence Forces interacted with civilian higher education at undergraduate level, and how this influenced their socialisation, professional formation, and the implications of higher education for them as individuals and for their military role.
Declaration

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Date: _________________________________
Summary

The military profession has a long history, and its institutions of education have been central to the development of military officers (Lovell, 1979; Masland & Radway, 1957). Questions about the higher education of officers became increasingly important in the wake of World War II and the changing nature of military authority and the roles that military officers would be expected to fill (Janowitz, 2017). More broadly twentieth century saw higher education become increasingly important, with concepts such as the “massification” (Trow, 1973, 2010b) of higher education systems emerging to capture this change. In Ireland these changes became manifest in the advent of the decision in 1969 to send army officers to university in University College Galway. This dissertation examines the origins and effects of this scheme, and answers the question of how officers in the Defence Forces interacted with civilian higher education at undergraduate level, and how did this influence their professional formation?

The conceptual framework for this approach combines role theory with concepts from the work of political anthropologist James C. Scott. Role theory accounts for the processes of professional military formation and socialisation to the Defence Forces on the one hand, while James C. Scott’s concepts of ‘infrapolitics’ and the ‘hidden transcript’ moves beyond the institutional and organisational perspective that often limits role theory. Taking a case study approach to higher education in the Irish Defence Forces, this dissertation combines documentary and archival research, and data generated through semi-structured interviews with 46 retired and serving officers. The goal is to understand the origins of university education for military officers, the individual experience of higher education for officers over the history of the scheme, and the wider effects this has had on them, and the military as a whole.

The documentary and archival research finds that the origins of the scheme are found in the Commission on Higher Education, established in 1960. As part of
the Commission’s work, submissions were submitted from a variety of groups, and the Defence Forces made two such submissions on the education of their officers. The proposal to educate army officers to university level came with the publication of the Commission’s findings in 1967. This led to much debate and discussion between different government departments, but the Defence Forces pushed through the resistance, with the first group of officers going to Galway to attend University College Galway in 1969.

The interviews considered entry to the cadets and the Cadet School experience, in order to understand the professional formation of officers within that total institution (Goffman, 1961). In light of this, higher education is a significant change for military personnel, and the question of choice of university degree is considered, alongside discussions of the transition to university life, interacting with other students and staff, and the matters of military role and maintaining military identity in a civilian setting. The interviews then considered the return of these university educated officers to the Defence Forces and the nature of their integration into military life. In this context, wider questions of military socialisation are considered, as is the military relevance of higher education in terms of the career of officers, as well as their activities serving at home and abroad.

The findings raised questions about tensions relating to military socialisation and the performance of military role, how individual officers deal with these tensions, and whether or how civilian higher education for officers fits in with the military socialisation of officers. The findings show that being in higher education led to different behaviours over time in terms of how officers dealt with the demands of their university studies on the one hand, and the expectations and requirements of their military role and the military discipline of the Defence Forces. Particularly from the 1990s, an increasing number of those attending university sought to downplay the military aspects of their identity, namely the officer role. They did so through changed attitudes to
various Defence Forces regulations relating to the wearing of uniform, and in some cases the requirement to live in the military setting. An increasing number also chose to keep their military identity private, and not disclose this to fellow students. The concept of role abeyance is proposed to explain this in the light of the fact that the experience of higher education, contrary to anxieties expressed from the very origins of the scheme, has not appeared to weaken military socialisation or individual officers’ commitment to the organisation and the profession.
Acknowledgements

I would like to first mention my parents, Mary and Gerry, both of whom have encouraged me on my academic journey. They have supported me immeasurably as I carried out my research and were always interested in my progress with this project. I thank them both so much for this, and for everything else! Thanks of course also to Louise, Benny, Toby, and Aidan. I would also like to mention my friends Paul, Ran, Catherine, Fionnuala, Deirdre, Jordan, Michael, Dylan, and most especially Robert for keeping me connected to the world away from my research, and keeping me going in ways large and small.

Thank you to my supervisor, Dr. John Walsh for being the model of what a good supervisor is. His keen eye for historical detail, and sensitivity to alternative interpretations helped me to improve as a researcher with each conversation and set of detailed comments on my writing. I would also like to thank him for being sanguine when I came to him to suggest a major change of topic two years into my PhD journey, but also for good conversation whenever it was required!

To those in Trinity College: thanks to Dr. Andrew Loxley for his input and suggestions along the way; to the staff of the School of Education for their assistance whenever needed; to my PhD colleagues Colm, Tanya, Shelli, and Emily for beverages and chats. Thanks also to the School itself for providing with three years of PhD Studentship funding. I also acknowledge Irish Research Council Government of Ireland Postgraduate Scholarship for providing a year’s funding for this project (GOIPG/2018/3105).

Thanks to my invisible college: Dr. Aline Courtois, now of Bath University, for being a good friend and a guide in the world of sociology, sending me interesting papers of relevance to my research, and also for being interested in
this topic when I first mentioned it! A very special thank you to Deirdre Troy for encouraging me to pursue this topic during one of our long nights of PhD conversation. Thanks also to Prof. Ellen Hazelkorn for giving me my start in academic research, and to Dr. Miguel Lim for always useful chats along the way.

Finally, a very special thank you to the 46 women and men of the Irish Defence Forces, serving and retired, who gave so freely of their time and thoughts. Special thanks to the Chief of Staff Vice-Admiral Mark Mellett for allowing me access to the serving officers I interviewed, as well as Lt Col Rory McCorley for facilitating this. Thanks also to Col Dave Betson (rtd.), Col Tom Hodson (rtd.), and Col William Gibson (rtd.). Without the help and interest of all the above, this project simply would not have been possible, and I am sincerely grateful to them all for this and for their service.
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List of Abbreviations

2Lt: Second Lieutenant
Adj.: Adjutant (an administrative officer, often dealing with personnel issues and discipline)
ATCP: Aid To the Civil Power
CAO: Central Applications Office (through which undergraduate university applications are processed)
CO: Commanding Officer
Col: Colonel
Comdt: Commandant (equivalent to the rank of Major)
CoS: Chief of Staff
DIT: Dublin Institute of Technology
FCÁ: Fórsa Cosanta Áitiúil (previously the name of the RDF)
GOC: General Officer Commanding
KFOR: Kosovo Force
LMDS: Leadership Management and Defence Studies
Lt: Lieutenant
Lt Col: Lieutenant Colonel
Lt Gen: Lieutenant General
Maj Gen: Major General
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO: Non-Commissioned Officer
NUI: National University of Ireland
NUIG: National University of Ireland, Galway
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC: Officer in Charge
ONUC: Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, United Nations Operation in the Congo
PDF: Permanent Defence Forces
RDF: Reserve Defence Forces
RTC: Regional Technical College
rtd.: retired
**UCG**: University College Galway

**UNFICYP**: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

**UNIFIL**: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

**USAC**: University Service Administrative Complement

**YO**: Young Officer
List of Irish Terms

The following is a list of terms specific to the Irish context, which may be unfamiliar to an international audience.

**Commandant**: Rank equivalent to NATO rank code OF-3, which is a Major in the US or UK.

**Dáil Éireann**: Principle chamber and lower house of the Oireachtas or legislature (trans: “Assembly of Ireland”).

**the Emergency**: This is what World War 2 was known as and is often referred to still – in Ireland.

**Free State**: This was the name of the state established in 1922 under the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, which ended the Irish War of Independence between the forces of the proclaimed Irish Republic and the British Crown. It existed until 1937, when a new constitution was adopted, when the state took the name “Ireland”.

**Garda Commissioner**: The head of An Garda Síochána, responsible for Ireland’s domestic state security apparatus.

**Garda Síochána, An**: Title of the Irish national police force (trans. “Guardian of the Peace”). Usually referred to as “the Gardaí” or in English “the Guards”. An officer of the Gardaí is usually referred to as a “garda” or a “guard”.

**Glen of Imaal**: A glen in the Wicklow Mountains, used as an artillery firing range and training area by the Irish Army, often referred to as “the Glen”.

**Good Friday Agreement**: Also known as the Belfast Agreement. Made up of two peace agreements (the British-Irish Agreement, and Multi-Party Agreement) signed on the 10th of April 1998, which together signified a negotiated end to the Troubles.

**Junior certificate**: Also known as the “Junior cert” and previously called the “Intermediate Certificate” (“Inter cert”), an intermediate series of examinations in secondary level education in Ireland, normally taken after three years’ study in secondary education.

**Leaving certificate**: Also known as the “Leaving cert”, or “the Leaving” (in Irish “Scrúdú na hArteistiméireachta”), this is the final qualification from secondary education in Ireland, given through passage of a series of examinations. It takes place two to three years after the Junior cert. Results from the Leaving cert are necessary for application to higher level education through the Central Applications Office (CAO), where results are calculated into ‘points’. Subjects can be sat at higher “honours” or ordinary level, with the former leading to higher points for the CAO.

**Óglaigh na hÉireann**: Official Irish language title of the Irish Defence Forces.
**Oireachtas**: Oireachtas Éireann is the bicameral legislature of Ireland, consisting of lower and upper houses, the Dáil and the Seanad, along with the President of Ireland.

**Portlaoise prison**: A maximum-security prison in Portlaoise, Co. Laois in the midlands of Ireland. It was often used to house Irish republican prisoners, with a number still housed there today. The Irish Army patrol the prison on a permanent basis.

‘**Provisionals’**: Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) also known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), or Provos. An Irish paramilitary organisation that sought to bring about Irish reunification and an all-island Republic, it was the most active republican paramilitary group in the Troubles.

**Quinns**\breath: An Irish supermarket (until it was acquired by Associated British Foods in 1997) with its own brand of “yellowpack” generic groceries.

**Seanad**: Upper house or Senate of the Oireachtas.

**Taoiseach**: Prime minister and head of government of Ireland.

**Templemore**: Since 1964 the town of Templemore in Co. Tipperary has been the home of the education and training college of An Garda Síochána, in McCann Barracks.

**The Troubles**: Usual name given to the Northern Ireland conflict beginning in the late 1960s, and usually regarded as having ended with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement.

**TD**: Teachta Dála or “member of the Dáil”.

**Yellowpack**: Quinnsworth’s generic brand, which came to be used as a synonym for “[l]ow-paid employment for young people, replacing senior personnel; anything perceived to be inferior/cheaper” (Share, 2005, p. 359).
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Formulation of the problem

This topic came out of reflection upon a comment I read in the political economist Susan Strange’s book States and Markets, where she noted – in passing – that there are four competing values in political economy, namely “efficiency, equity, autonomy and security” (2015, p. 181). This immediately struck me as an interesting way to look at a specific policy area, such as higher education, where I had worked and researched for a number of years. Reflecting on this, however, I noticed that one of these four values appeared to be somewhat marginal; unlike the other three values Strange identified, security didn’t seem to have been given much attention in the literature of higher education. My own interest in the Defence Forces and security related issues is longstanding, and relates to my family background, as well as growing up beside the Curragh, and previously being a member of An Fórsa Cosanta Áitúil (called the Reserve Defence Forces since 2005).

I set out to do some investigation of the literature of higher education, using some terms and concepts synonymous with security (i.e. army, military, war, conflict, etc.), which led me to works that considered areas such as the role of academic ‘war research’ in World War II (Geiger, 1993) or the place of the university in the military-industrial complex (Giroux, 2016). While interesting in their own right, military research and research for the military seemed to be of little relevance in an Irish context. It was then, while thinking about interactions between the military and higher education, that I remembered that Irish military officers attended university in Galway as part of their training, and I set out to investigate this. Reading the existing literature on the Irish Defence Forces demonstrated that this was a topic which had not received significant scholarly attention. Similarly, the international literature of civil-military relations and military professionalism also confirmed my suspicions that this was an under-researched area. With this I turned my attention to formalizing this as a research problem.
I came to the decision that while higher education featured in the careers and training of Irish Defence Forces personnel at various points, it was how this related to the initial training of officers that might be most sociologically interesting. My reasoning was that the training of officers in the military takes place in a highly structured and hierarchical environment, the “total institution” (Goffman, 1961, p. 5) of the Cadet School. It is after their initial training and socialisation to the Defence Forces as an organisation that they then effectively leave the military environment for their university studies. It was also the most methodologically approachable topic, as the official records relating to the initiation of the scheme are no longer covered by the ‘thirty year rule’ and so could be used to trace the period before this scheme was introduced, and the discussions underlying the decision to educate officers at university.

Irish events and institutions have been interpreted primarily through the lens of history, though one might argue that economists have had an increasing say in recent years. This is in part related to the fact that so much of the formation of Irish identity is wrapped up with history – 1014 ‘and all that’. The historical approach is in part a reflection of the wider importance of history in the constellation of approaches to the academic study of Irish society. My view in considering this topic was that while this historical aspect is vital, there was also scope for other approaches. Most writing on the Irish military takes a historical and institutional stance, which means that there is considerable scope for adopting a sociological perspective, for drawing out the thoughts and experiences of those of the Defence Forces, so that they can be heard as people rather than simply seen as uniforms, as the largely silent representatives of the Irish State.

1.2 Research Questions

Following a literature review of the scholarship of the training and education of military officers internationally, as well as reading about the history of the Irish Defence Forces, that I settled on the following research questions:

1. How and why did the Irish Defence Forces establish the USAC scheme to send cadets to university from 1969?
2. What was the experience of those who went to university through the USAC scheme?

3. What were the effects (on the organisation, and on individual personnel) of the introduction of the USAC scheme?

This study was designed to answer these questions, taking a largely historical approach to the first research question, to trace the official origins of and how this scheme was implemented. The second and third questions were designed to take a sociological approach in order to focus primarily on the experiences of individual officers.

The primary focus is on officers and higher education, but this study also takes account of the influence of the Cadet School and norms of military life, and therefore addresses aspects of socialisation unrelated to university life. While I was interested in the Defence Forces as an organisation, I do not take a primarily organisational perspective, rather considering the Defence Forces in light of the views and experiences of its officers. While my own inclination towards this topic is sociological, I freely draw on insights from other disciplines such as political science, history, anthropology, security studies, and psychology.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is conventionally structured into three substantive elements, namely: three chapters of context; two chapters on the research approach taken; and five chapters of findings, discussion, and a conclusion.

Context

The first chapter of context is a literature review of the study of the military. This considers the sociological study of the military, and its origins and preoccupations as a separate subfield. It then moves to discuss military professionalism in terms of its historical origins, sociological outlines, and the implications it has for civil-military relations. Next this chapter looks at the tensions within the military in terms of
professional identity, the changing function of modern militaries, and interactions between higher education and the military.

Chapter 3 is a literature review of higher education and the military profession, starting with a historical overview of the military academy, and the purposes to which military education is put. American military academies have received the most sustained scholarly attention and so these are examined, but international literature is also referred to. Next consideration is given to the sociology of the professions to examine the military as a profession. Here the role of higher education and academic knowledge as a form of ‘professional legitimation’. This chapter concludes with an overview of some macro-trends in higher education.

The next chapter provides context on the Irish Defence Forces, in terms of its constitutional status, current structure, and data referring to personnel. Irish defence policy and the nature of civil-military relations are outlined, before moving to present some features of writing about the Irish military. This scholarship is used to set out what the Irish Defence Forces are ‘for’ and what its responsibilities have been. It concludes with details relating to cadet selection and training, and higher education for officers.

**Research Approach**

The next section of setting out the research approach begins with the methodology chapter which sets out the decisions made from research design, through to data generation and analysis. The second half of the research approach is the conceptual framework. Here I justify my decision to use role theory, supplemented with concepts from the work of James C. Scott to develop a coherent and consistent conceptual framework. Alternative approaches are also considered, and reasons for not using them presented.

**Findings and Analysis**

The first part of the findings, Chapter 7, draws on archival and documentary sources to trace the origins of the decision to send cadets to university. This was largely rooted in
the activities of the Commission on Higher Education, so the military submissions to the Commission are discussed. The departmental responses to the Commission’s recommendations are presented, as is the ultimate form of the implemented scheme. The early years of the scheme and the board reports reviewing officer training and education during the Troubles are analysed, concluding with the mention of USAC in the Gleeson Report.

The next findings Chapter 8 is the first to present the data generated through the interviews. This chapter deals with individuals’ decisions to join the Defence Forces, their Cadet School experiences, and going to higher education through USAC. The USAC experience is considered in terms of choice of course, expectations of the transition, interacting with students and staff, and perceptions of difference. Military identity is considered with respect to wearing of uniforms, living outside the USAC building, and non-disclosure of military identity. The language used to discuss the USAC scheme is also addressed.

The second part of interview findings, Chapter 9, discusses the return of USAC officers to the military from university. It considers the views of returning officers as well as their commanding officers, and the question of whether returning officers needed to be ‘regrounded’. Discussion of this topic led to a wider overview of informal socialisation in the Defence Forces, to unit and corps. The role of NCOs and interacting with the ‘negotiated order’ that exists within the Defence Forces is considered. Higher education as a general phenomenon is considered with respect to the military relevance or otherwise of study and of specific subjects. This chapter concludes with an analysis of higher education for military officers in the context of overseas service, jurisdictional conflicts, and ‘outmobility’ or retirement.

The discussion chapter addresses some of the issues that arose in the course of analysing the findings, with reference to the literature review and the conceptual framework. This is separate and addition to the research questions which the three findings chapters
address, the dissertation then concludes with a chapter outlining the contribution of this research, some limitations, as well as scope for future investigation.
Chapter 2: Studying the Military

“You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.”
- Paraphrase of Leon Trotsky (Walzer, 2015, p. 29)

2.1 Writing About the Military

There has been a trend in literature relating to conflict in recent years that has focused on what is considered to be a decline in war. From Stephen Pinker’s *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined* (2011) drawing on data illustrating what he maintains is a decline of violence in all forms in societies, to Azar Gat’s *The Causes of War & The Spread of Peace* (2017) which considered the increasing profitability of peace in industrialised societies, to Joshua Goldstein’s *Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide* (2011) examination of the role of international organisations such as the United Nations in this process. This has also been offered as the European process of the “demilitarisation of civil society” (Black, 2009, p. 10) from the seventeenth-century onwards, summarised as

a sustained policy of depriving the population of firearms, destroying the castles of provincial grandees, appropriating their sons as regular officers, creating specialist corps of artillerists officered from the non-warrior classes and monopolising the production of battlefield weapons in state arsenals. (Keegan, 2004, p. 50)

This monopolisation of violence by the state, led to first to professional armies, a monopoly which Max Weber considered one of the minimal conditions of the state. This process was punctuated by two World Wars, that resulted in a situation where, in Europe at least, militarisation declined and civilianisation (as in the decline in conscription and so on) increased, which amounted to an “invisible revolution”.

Indeed, it is remarkable how little space these issues were given in the scholarly works that shaped contemporary views of European society and politics in the 1960s and 1970s. Military values and institutions, like the conscript army itself, faded away so gradually that few people noticed they were no longer there. (Sheehan, 2007, p. 179)

This invisible revolution led in its own turn to the emergence of the all-volunteer army in Europe. In advanced economies compulsory military service remains exceptional
rather than the rule. It is important to note, however, the important work of Siniša Malešević which acts as an important corrective to what could appear to be a ‘just so’ story. Though his The Rise of Organised Brutality: A Historical Sociology of Violence (2017) does not dismiss Pinker et al. outright, he introduces an analytic sophistication which has been missing from the “decline of violence” narrative. He develops this on the foundations of his earlier The Sociology of War and Violence (2010), and drawing on Johan Galtung’s work on ‘structural violence’ he notes that we need to be careful in how we define violence, which has changed forms over time, and that we may be talking about are changing attitudes towards violence.

However compelling the argument gathered in the ‘decline of conflict’ literature, war and conflict still have a future (Freedman, 2017; Wittes & Blum, 2015). Notably, there is only a literature of relative rather than total ‘decline of the military’. That is to say, authors such as Sheehan may note the aversion to war in Western European countries after World War II, and there has been a decline of mass armed forces where all citizens are mobilised to fight and compulsory military service is the rule (Burk, 1992). There is scant indication, however, of a willingness of states to abolish their own militaries, to surrender their monopoly of violence. This is so even with a decline in government defence spending, especially since the end of the Cold War, even if this has resulted in ‘market state’ (Bobbitt, 2003, 2008) solutions such as outsourcing and military contracting to private military and security companies (Berndtsson, 2014). Militaries remain a significant component of the modern state. In Ireland even if there has been something of a peace dividend on the island since the Good Friday agreement, the spectre of terrorism and unrest of continues to lurk in the background, more so in the context of Brexit.

This indicates part of the justification for studying the military today. This thesis takes a specifically sociological approach, as it seeks to understand not the military as an organisation, but rather primarily the officers in that organisation. As such, it is important to begin with an outline of how the study of the military has been approached from within sociology.
It is worth starting with an observation that has been noted by a number of scholars, namely the pacifist assumptions and inclinations of sociology. Indeed, sociology has been provocatively described as a “demilitarized zone” which has led to scholarly inattention and the “analytic neglect of war and the military” (West & Matthewman, 2016; see also Ender & Gibson, 2005; Malešević, 2010; Matthewman, 2012; McNall, 1973). This has been attributed to the genealogy of sociology within the Enlightenment project stressing “stressing social progress and human perfectibility” (West and Matthewman, p. 483). Morris Janowitz goes further, putting resistance to sociology of the military in ideological terms, noting that sociology has flourished in countries with a strong liberal tradition, and this tradition has “in general sought to handle the problem of military institutions by denial” (Janowitz, 1968, pp. 17–18). This has been termed variously the “meliorative orientation of sociology” (Lang, p. 13) and sociology’s “insidious utopianism” (Andreski, 1968, p. 1).

This state of affairs is all the more curious given the discipline’s early years. Malešević’s *The Sociology of War and Violence* starts with an examination of the ideas not just of the ‘Holy Trinity’ of social thought – Durkheim, Weber, Marx – but also others, through this arguing that there is a potent militarist tradition in classical social thought which is broad and includes a variety of distinct approaches: German belligerent statism, Austro-American group struggle paradigm, German sociological libertarianism, Italian elite theory, Anglo-American evolutionary theory and the Franco-German social metaphysics of violence. (Malešević, 2010, p. 29)

Similarly, writing of World War I in Germany, Huntington notes that “the ideology of bellicosity was spawned by the universities” and then embraced by the German people (1957, p. 105). After two ruinous wars, however, sociology in effect “sanitized” itself, and came to concentrate on “‘pacifist’ themes such as status and class divisions, education, industrialisation, crime, bureaucracy and transformations in cultural and religious values” (Malešević 2010, p. 19), and even the study of conflict followed this post-war turn with the rise in “peace studies” (West & Matthewman, 2016).
Other possible reasons for this “scholarly inattention” may have something to do with the institutionalization of sociology as an arm of the state in the twentieth century. With the rise of the welfare state specifically, and the notion of state-centric responses to societal problems, sociology (especially in the United States) addressed itself to problems of social stratification within states (Berger, 1963, p. 44). War, in contrast, often takes place above the state level, that is between states (notwithstanding the nature of civil war and other insurrections), which is perhaps why that level conflict has been largely claimed by international relations scholars and political scientists as their exclusive purview. Another possible reason is the role of thermonuclear weapons which led to the rise of “game theory” as a way of theorizing their use in highly abstract and decontextualized academic discussions. Such decontextualisation is, of course, anathema to sociological study. A final reason may simply be that psychology showed greater promise for the military itself, and the rewards in terms of research funding it offered were there for the taking by psychology (as for example in Murray, 2013). This may explain why ‘mainstream’ sociologists dealing with military topics (such as Evetts (2003) and Matthewman (2012)) appear to be unfamiliar, or choose not to engage at length, with the established literature on the sociology of the military.

While this has been the case for sociology as a whole, however, a rich sub-field of sociological study considers the military as cause for study in itself. This literature, the sociology of the military, is relevant to the study of university education for military officers, even if the ‘meliorative orientation’ of mainstream sociology has led it to be somewhat neglected. There have been various reviews of the sociology of the military, or military sociology, that give some sense of its variety and breadth. Lang (1972) authored the “first major overview of both classic and modern literature in the developing sub-field of military sociology” (Siebold, 2001, p. 145), and his categorisation of the works he discusses is useful in showing the areas which had received scholarly attention: the profession of arms, military organisations, military systems, civil-military relations, and war and warfare. Charles Moskos (1976b) takes a different tack, giving an overview of sociology of the military in terms of the individual soldier, considering the “power elite” soldier – referring to C. Wright Mills (2000) here – the professional soldier,
the common soldier, the citizen soldier, and the third world soldier. Siebold notes Lang’s work, but draws his own binary division of the field between sociology that concerns itself with “factors internal to the military”, and “interactions external to the organizational boundary of the military” (2001, pp. 145–146). Other overview or review texts suggest alternative approaches, such as collections of essays by Caforio (2006a, 2009), as well as articles by Matthewman (2012), Paparone (2014), and Kestnbaum (2009).

World War II was a spur to initial work on sociological approaches to the study of war, with Robert Park’s (1941) article on the “social function of war”, as well as the study of the military with the U.S. Army Research Branch commissioned study known as The American Soldier, two volumes of which were published in 1949 (Lang, 1972, p. 19). It is with Morris Janowitz’s work, however, that a separate subfield of sociology could be said to come into being. An early paper by Janowitz with Edward Shils (1948) applied a sociological perspective on the factors influencing small military unit cohesion and disintegration in the German Army during World War II. A report authored by Janowitz, prepared for the American Sociological Association, looked at “the need for more effective utilization of sociological theory and research capability in the analysis of problems of vital importance to our military forces” (Janowitz, 1959, p. 5).

These are also early examples of a blurring of the lines between what might be termed ‘sociology of the military’ and ‘military sociology’, as such studies had fairly immediate ‘applicability’ (or impact in today’s research parlance). In 1973 Scott McNall as editor of a journal commented on the field of research on the military, saying he was “depressed that more have not turned to this field”, that perhaps to blame was the “conservative” older literature which was “was an explanation or an apology for the role of the military, but that is not the case anymore” (1973). This is in line with what Lang (1972, p. 18) called the “evaluative” type of research, which Janowitz (1959) also drew attention to his earlier report on the sociology of the military. This is a perennial problem, namely that the academic sociology of the military is perhaps coloured by association with a more instrumental and institutional or organisationally conceived ‘military sociology’. A
development here, however, was Morris Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (1960/2017). This broadened sociological discussion of the military beyond evaluative or functional terms, and set a research agenda for subsequent decades in terms of the ‘military professional’. It is of continuing relevance, especially in terms of the formation of these military professionals and the changed environment in which they work.

### 2.2 The Military Professional

The officer as military professional is a central concept for this thesis, as officers in the Irish Defence Forces and their professional formation starting with the Cadets through to their posting in units is what is at issue. Various approaches have been made to the concept of military professionalism, some of which will be discussed here. The next chapter will consider insights from the sociology of the professions, and will also discuss military education, in terms of how and why military professionalism are achieved. This chapter considers where military professionalism came from, how it functions today, and how it relates to the state and society. This section will consider first, the historical perspective on the military profession, second the sociology of the military’s approach to the changing structure of the military and consequently the profession itself, and finally the structural and institutional approach taken in discussions of civil-military relations. This section concludes with some observations on the application of other ideas of seeing the military as an element of society rather than just the state, and the implications this has.

**History of Military Professionalism**

The beginning of military professionalism has been placed in a number of periods. The political scientist Samuel Huntington puts it with great confidence in Prussia, on August 6, 1808, with that country’s government issuing a decree setting forth the basic standards of professionalism, which included “education and professional knowledge” in time of peace, and “distinguished valor and perception” in time of war (1957, pp. 30–31). This set out a definition of the professional officer which set them apart from previous military officers who might have had their commissions simply by the fact of the family they were born into; Prussia here clearly set out a notion of merit (though
social origin retained its primacy). Gender is relevant here too, as professional military personnel in this were exclusively male; Clonan (2000, pp. 74–88) traces the considerably underestimated involvement of women in conventional and unconventional warfare during the post-World War II twentieth century. An alternative approach to the individual commission is to consider military organisation as at the root of professionalism. With this approach, the historian Maury D. Feld argues that the first professional soldiers emerged much earlier than the standard Prussian narrative would hold, with the Dutch in the late sixteenth century, being “perhaps the first major social activity organised by numbers. It was a model for the subsequent bureaucratic and industrial development of Europe” (1977, p. 17). Feld notes that this was a systematic approach, in that it was no longer about individuals. Similarly, Huntington observed that the rise of the military professional led to the relative decline of the mercenary and aristocratic amateurs (1957, pp. 20–28).

Questions of priority will continue to exercise historians, but what is worth considering here are the conditions that led to this form of social organisation. One can note another priority here, as it is evident that the military was the first occupation to start to professionalise, compared with e.g. medicine which started to professionalise centuries later (Starr, 1982, p. 30 ff). Again the role of education and instruction is central, however, and will be discussed with reference to the literature on the sociology of the professions. Both Feld and Huntington allude to these, but Martin Van Creveld’s book *Technology and War* clearly sets out what he terms the “rise of professionalism” (1991, pp. 137–149). He notes the importance of drill (ibid., 92ff) - that is marching soldiers in formation (the most efficient way of moving a large body into battle on foot, important since antiquity) – as a response to the introduction of firearms. Even reloading small arms in the sixteenth century “could require ninety steps or more” and so the “best trained and choreographed gunners produced the highest rates of fire” (Roland, 2016, pp. 72–73). Perhaps counter-intuitively, however, it was not the introduction of gunpowder to Europe and the resulting “military revolution” (Parker, 2005) that is at issue, but the military and organisational changes this necessitated.
Van Creveld explains that paper and printing allowed an increase in the size of armed forces, improvements in administration, and a “revolution in military education” (1991, p. 141). This gave rise to a group of “specialists in violence”, and a new period of specialised training in the theory of applying the new techniques and technologies that gunpowder necessitated. The tactics of the application of firepower had a considerable scientific element (such as in the calculation of trajectories), as did siege engineers (in calculating weak points for undermining fortifications). For this reason engineers were the first group of military personnel to professionalise in the sense which we would recognise today, in terms of developing a body of theoretical instruction and a place of instruction where this is transmitted and developed (ibid., p. 143). West Point was originally an engineering school, and indeed the first engineering school in the world. The first civil engineering schools elsewhere – the term was used to distinguish it from its military origins – were established with the first chairs in engineering in Harvard (1849) and Yale (1852), held by West Point graduates (Masland & Radway, 1957, p. 78). These conditions all underlay the emergence of a cadre of military professionals, with military technology meaning that “claims by persons of high social standing to elevated rank solely on that basis could no longer be sustained” (Lang, 1972, p. 31).

Professionalism within the military continued to develop from these origins. Both Janowitz and Huntington propose a periodization of military professionalism in the United States. Huntington sketches out a process of professionalism before the Civil War, starting with a “Southern military tradition” (1957, p. 211) responding to the ever-present threat of slave insurrection and the on-going conflict on the static border with Seminole and Creek Native Americans. He then continues to discuss the role of the Civil War and the development of institutions of military professionalism (e.g. the military and naval academies at West Point and Annapolis) (ibid., pp. 222ff), the World Wars I and II, and concludes with the post-World War II era. More recent work notes the continued relevance of technology to understanding the military profession. As such advanced weapons systems have led to the “capital intensity of warfare” implying a declining “teeth to tail ratio” where support and logistics personnel begin to outnumber those in direct combat roles, and increasing specialisation of those in support roles. For
the military professional at officer level, this has also led to what is called “grade creep” with an increase in middle-level officers “so that the traditional pyramid shape of the military hierarchy has come to look like a diamond” (Kaldor, 1982, p. 9). There has also been work on the notion that this divergence in terms of combat versus support positions results in the notion of there being “two armies” as a consequence (Burland & Lundquist, 2013).

Modern Military Professionalism

Morris Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier* also presents a developmental picture, but his sociological analysis focuses on the years after the Second World War, the last period in Huntington’s outline. In this work, Janowitz suggests that just as the military profession had to respond to changes in the nature of warfare and how fighting forces were organised, it also had to respond to times of peace. The massive mobilisation during World War Two and the subsequent demobilisation in the United States’ armed forces led to five changes in the military profession: (1) changing organizational authority, with a shift from authoritarian domination to persuasion and consensus, and from ‘ascription’ to ‘achievement’; (2) a narrowing skill differential between military and civilian elites, which requires the military professional to develop more of the skills of their civilian counterparts (rather than vice versa); (3) a shift in officer recruitment that is tantamount to a “democratisation” of officer corps making it more representative of society at large; (4) the changing nature of career patterns, with high rewards for unconventional and adaptive career routes; and finally (5) trends in “political indoctrination” making the officer sensitive to political, social, and economic subjects to which they might have been expected to be indifferent in the past (Janowitz, 2017, pp. 7–16). Some of these changes were the result of interactions between civilian and military worlds in World War Two, others were responses to the experience of coordinating multi-nation forces in military contexts.

The very first of these is worth unpacking, as Janowitz’s terminology is somewhat opaque here, and it underlies the other four changes. What is implied is that the legitimacy of military authority is earned by the officer, in their formation as an officer,
through education and training. This “achieved” authority is an ongoing process, and Janowitz’s modern military professional would have a “greater reliance on explanation, expertise, and group consensus” (p. xix) than would have been the case under “ascribed” authority. The other four changes identified relate to and stem from this first change, and also interact with one another. Their relevance endures, as these conditions have not reverted to older patterns of professionalism, and Janowitz’s suggested ‘civilianisation’ of the military and the emergence of the ‘constabulary concept’ in military thinking remain valuable analytic concepts. Nevertheless, Janowitz was writing before the Vietnam War, which saw a return to conscription – of a sort – which is just one example of a return to previous models of military organisation, meaning that Janowitz’s outline can be regarded as analytic and indicative of trends, but these are by no means uni-directional.

One of the most significant debates in the literature on the military relates to the notion of the institutional/occupational (I/O) thesis (Moskos, 1977a, 1977b, 1986), which suggested that being in the military was becoming more like being an employee in any other job, following Henry Sumner Maine’s “famous sociological law that societies moved from ‘status’ to ‘contract’” (Collins, 1994, p. 36). It also relates to the idea of civilianisation of the military as set out by Janowitz, and the abolition of conscription and subsequent emergence of the “all volunteer force” which implied “soldiering as work” (Bailey, 2013). Noting changes in the military (again in the United States), Moskos outlines a number of variables, but that movement from one to the other ideal type may still be perceived. In its basic form, the military as occupation means: a decline in primary commitment to the organization; a decline in the notion of service and values such as duty, honour, or country; a separation of work and residence (i.e. not living in barracks); a change in societal regard where esteem was once based on personal sacrifice; one’s spouse being removed from the military community; and military life being part of the cash-work nexus, with pay directly related to skill level. This transition, as Moskos saw it, meant that “as the U.S. moved towards a civilian-influenced soldiering model, the American soldier was rendered the status of a mere employee” (Padilla & Laner, 2001, p. 113). Berger notes that the transition from charisma to routinisation has been a
commonplace of sociology since Weber (1963, pp. 126–128), though atavistic traces of the charismatic realm remain. Similarly, Janowitz noted a tension between these two as a “persistent dilemma” for the military profession which has “deepened by the growth of automated warfare”, given that the:

profession must recruit and retain officers who are skilled in military management for its elite, but, at the same time, many of its officers, including the most conspicuous ones, must be able to perpetuate the traditions of the heroic leader. (2017, p. 35)

Elsewhere he is considerably more forthright, writing that thermonuclear war makes pursuit of military glory “ridiculous” (p. 224).

Caforio (2006b, p. 265), drawing on empirical research on European military cadets notes that Moskos’s I/O dichotomy is insufficient, and proposes a four-part typology (the radical professional, pragmatic professional, indifferent, and occupational attitudes). It is not necessary to dive into the details of this, especially as Ireland was not one of the countries studied (which were the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland), but it is an important addition to the debate here that notes that across and within the militaries of different European countries there is a variety of attitudes. Similarly, research on the French military observes that

for all the rank and file and for an increasing number of officers, the “military trade” does not logically lead to a career, but corresponds to a temporary work activity, one can only note that the conditions from which the military society was built are no longer fulfilled. (Gresle, 2005, p. 55)

These stand as an important supplement to Anglophone literature on the military, while moving on the initial observation about a general move in militaries from an institutional to an occupational model of employment and professionalism.

From Civil-Military to Military-Society Relations

Military professionalism is also seen as being central to another discussion, namely that of civil-military relations. The central problem of civil-military relations is the question of how a civilian government controls its military, or how “to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorise them to do” (Feaver, 1996, p. 149). Feaver elsewhere
gives the problematic a more stark formulation, writing that the “traditional preoccupation of the civil-military relations literature is the coup d’état, the direct seizure of political power by the military” (2003, p. 10). In fact, how this problem is posed has implicitly provided the solution to a more fundamental problem, namely what is the correct balance between civilian power and military power. As Huntington saw it in *The Soldier and the State*, there are five possible ideal types of civil-military relations. He describes these across axes of pro- or anti-military ideology in society, low or high military political power, and low or high military professionalism (Huntington, 1957, pp. 96–97). He gives examples of each of these, and saw civilian governments as most effectively controlling their military by “maximising military professionalism” (Feaver, 1996, p. 149).

The goal of balancing civil-military relations is to protect against “militarism” (Lang, 1972, pp. 107–108), Harold Laswell’s ‘garrison state’, or Huntington’s “political-military fusion” (1957, pp. 350–354). Huntington delineates subjective and objective forms of civilian control to explore how his ideal balance might be found. Subjective control includes civilian control effectively by norms, such as control by governmental institution (i.e. military forces being under the Crown’s control in seventeenth and eighteenth century England), civilian control by social class (as was the case with European aristocracy), and civilian control by constitutional form (Huntington, 1957, pp. 80–83). In contrast, objective forms of civilian control of the military seek to “confine the activities of officers to the sphere of their expert competence” (Lang, 1972, p. 109), namely as professionals in the application of violence. With this, objective civilian control is “militarizing the military”, making them professional and “rendering them politically sterile and neutral” (Huntington, 1957, pp. 83–84). Samuel Finer’s *The Man on Horseback*, another significant monograph on civil-military relations, taking a less historical approach than Huntington, discusses countries according to various criteria. His findings are similar, however, in that when he discusses countries “where the political culture is high”, he notes that public sanction for military intervention in politics is unobtainable. In these states it “would be regarded as a wholly unwarrantable intrusion” (p.88), and he includes Ireland (“Éire”) in this group.
Specificity is required for discussion of civil-military relations, however. Peter Feaver, a scholar of this area, in an overview article notes that political scientists tend to look for patterned generalisations such as unified theories of civil-military relations (e.g. Bland, 1999), as distinct from historians (who, implicitly, are concerned with specificity – a distinction akin to the ‘lumpers versus splitters’ in evolutionary theory).

As distinct from sociologists, political scientists focus primarily on institutions of political control. Factors of direct concern to sociologists—for instance, the integration of the military with society—are of interest only insofar as they may relate causally to the primary political question of who decides what, when, how, and with what effect. (Feaver, 1999, p. 212)

This is the “formalistic approach of looking primarily at the legal and institutional framework of democratic control” rather than the “sometimes gritty empirical reality of how civilian authorities interact with the military, and thus, how democratic control has worked in practice in specific situations” (Born et al., 2006, pp. 3–4). Huntington’s analysis remains significant, but subsequent research has shown the need for broadening the discussion. In a working paper discussing the relevance of Huntington’s take on civil military relations after half a century, it was suggested that in “American civil-military relations the water never gets chin-deep. In the worst of times it splashes up toward knee level. Our feet are always wet, but the water rarely gets above our ankles” (Betts, 2007, p. 38). The decade after this was written shows that such a Whig interpretation of civil-military relations in the United States is by no means unproblematic or uncontroversial (Drezner, 2018; C. Lee, 2018; Shake, 2018).

One attempt to broaden the discussion is in the notion of a “concordance” in civil-military relations. This approach discusses the possibility of a military intervening in domestic politics as promoted or inhibited depending on the level of agreement between “the military, the political elites, and society” (Schiff, 1995, p. 8). This theory was developed out of a perceived need to include culture in the analysis (Schiff, 2009, p. 8). A considerable limitation with this approach is that, pace Feaver, it views civil-military relations as a “subfield of political science” (ibid., p. 9). Even though it calls for “a more realistic approach led by sociologists and anthropologists” (p. 8) it does not
move beyond this blinkered approach. It “pays homage” (p. 14) to culture, without actually integrating it. Culture here as manifested in the additional category of “society” or “citizenry” is only relevant in so far as this third, additional group agrees with the views of the military and the political elite. Other approaches discuss something beyond political elites and the military in terms of the existence of a ‘civil-military gap’, a term which is used as a container concept to cover four quite disparate types of gaps, namely cultural, demographic, policy preference, and institutional (Rahbek-Clemmensen et al., 2012). This approach, as with Schiff, limits the agency of society at large in this equation to the extent that it is of relevance to political and military elites, and remains essentially biased by the functionalist paradigm through which so much civil-military relations research views society. Rahbek-Clemmensen et al. suggest that “[d]ecades ago, Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz recognized a growing divide between an increasingly conservative officer corps and the American public” but Janowitz himself suggested that this was limited, as of the early 1970s (2017, p. xxx). An important alternative perspective comes from Libel and Gal (2015) whose work on the increasing religiosity of the Israeli Defense Forces notes a decreasing willingness of the secular candidate population to join combat units, preferring instead to assume non-combat roles. This was compensated for by “national-religious youth” whose conservative ideological stance came to dominate in all phases of service.

One route of critique can be taken by stepping back from the statist assumptions made by normative, functionalist approaches to civil-military relations. Doing so allows us to make the observation that society is not the state, and should not be reduced to this; Schiff gestures in this direction by noting weakness of international relations views of states as “unitary actors” (2009, p. 16), but fails to expand on this. The French political anthropologist Pierre Clastres sought to explore the notion of what power is, and what society is through anthropological research on ‘primitive’, that is, pre-state societies. In his work, he sought to problematize the notion that “coercion and subordination constitute the essence of political power at all times and in all places” (1989, p. 13 emphasis in original). The anthropologist and political scientist James C. Scott develops similar ideas in his works on the state and forms of ‘state evasion’ that peoples – that is
society – employ, starting with his field work in Malaysia, but going on to extend this thesis to Southeast Asia, and to various state contexts around the world (Scott, 1990, 1998, 2009). The observations by Clastres and Scott allow us to recognise that society and state are not synonymous, no matter how much the latter might want this identification to be made. This is not to suggest that Clastres was the first to recognise this. It also underpins for example, Peter Kropotkin’s anarcho-communism in the late nineteenth century, developed in conscious opposition to the statism of Marxist communism. The clearest image Kropotkin offered of his society-centric view was that of the decentralised, local lifeboats in England, a “spontaneous association that has dispensed with government” (Kropotkin, 2015, p. 129), in comparison to Marxists’ favoured example of centralised railways.

Applying this separation of society and state to the military context, wider changes in society become relevant to the changes that militaries undergo. Indeed, to some extent the state is a lagging indicator when it comes to wider changes in society, and it then obliges the military establishment – often regarded one of the state’s most conservative arms – to change too. Australia is one example of this, and Smith (1995) considers social change whereby the Australian Armed Forces were ‘forced’ by government to formally accept homosexual personnel, so here the line is blurred somewhat between wider social change, and government as an element of the state forcing the armed element of the state to change. Here a strict division between society and state is not possible, and this may indeed be part of the point – there can be feedback loops rather than unidirectional vectors of causality in play. Indeed, it is possible to note an influence going in the opposite direction, from military to society. In the case of South Korea, where all men must compete a mandatory two-year military service, this has led to the construction of a military form of masculinity that endures and transfers into the corporate workplace, perpetuating gender and power disparities (J. Lee et al., 2019).

Michael S. Sherry’s history In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s traces how war defined modern America, but it also describes the vagaries of the social position of women, African Americans, Mexican-Americans, Native Americans, Chinese
Americans, and other groups in American society, and how this affected the U.S. Armed Forces (Sherry, 1997, pp. 149–156). The changing place of LGBT individuals also gains attention here, as the position of those of ‘minority’ sexual orientations in American society gradually shifted and various forms of discrimination disappeared, the policy of “don't ask, don’t tell” became one of the final battlegrounds of the so-called ‘culture wars’ of the 1990s (ibid., pp. 486–487). In Ireland, upon decriminalization of homosexuality in 1993 personnel of all sexualities have been officially equally entitled to serve since that time - the United States only repealed “don’t ask, don’t tell” in 2011. As such, there may be something to be said for Ireland’s Defence Forces similarly reflecting societal changes, but it’s not possible to note the military’s influence on civilian life as Sherry does for the United States. As Harvey writes:

Today, the invisibility of the Irish Defence Forces is almost taken for granted. This is a prominent reality within the Defence Forces, though it does a disservice to both the soldier and society, because the interpretation of the military is an integral part of Irish citizenship in revealing aspects of the nation’s identity. (2018, p. 204)

Here we might also suggest that the changing role of higher education in society is relevant. The academy is a constituent of society, and though the academy is now permeated by the state, it is not synonymous with or indistinguishable from the state. The metaphor of the walled academy may not be true, but there is rather a semi-permeable membrane. Similarly, the military is a part of the state, but its personnel’s military role is but just one aspect of their identity; they are also citizens, and also members of society. Expanding how society is conceived allows one to move beyond the limitations of civil-military relations, and also beyond other narrow conceptions of the military professional.

2.3 Tensions in functions, values, and identities

This section considers different aspects of military self-image and values, rather than the external perspective on the military professional. It considers how what military professionals do affects their views of what the military profession is. It starts with a consideration of this in the abstract, before moving to specific differences within a given military context. It then proceeds to consider changes in the external environment, such
as the different activities militaries may be tasked with undertaking, such as peacekeeping and other ‘constabulary’ duties. It concludes with a discussion of the symbolic aspects of military formation and how these may be in tension with other perceived values, such as those of the academy.

**Tensions within the Military**

Professions are bound by common sets of values (Susskind & Susskind, 2015, pp. 17–18). A military is an organisation, composed of individuals to whom the adjective ‘military’ is attributed. These individuals can be described as military in specific ways, in terms of behaviour, beliefs, value systems, and so on. The question that arises here is in part methodological, namely what is it that is being called ‘military’ in such discussions. Franke, coming from the perspective of cognitive social psychology, settles on the notion of social identity and “identity tensions” (1999). In discussing this, he suggests that his dynamic model of identity [...] indicates that military socialization and professional military education can shape the identity, values, attitudes, and behaviours of soldiers and officers so they can learn to invoke identities that allow them to use cognitive strategies to resolve identity tensions in a given situation most effectively. (Ibid., p. 37)

Franke in his discussion of military identity uses the terms ‘identity’, ‘values’, ‘attitudes’ relatively flexibly, but central to this is the notion of a degree of fluidity, whereby identity is continually “negotiated” (pp. 15-16). As such, identity is not static, but has degrees of stability or instability. Periods when the individual’s identity is unstable is when their “self-conception is threatened” (p. 17), perhaps when they enter a new role or career stage. The conceptual and methodological question this provokes is that given this research is reliant on various socially constructed discourses (in terms of policies, interviews, memoirs, and so on), and concerned with collective forms of socialisation, then military ‘values’ are of most relevance given that they are collectively held, and so can be expressed discursively. They are also central to the notion of socialisation and role formation that this dissertation takes as its model.

Anticipatory – or primary, in Berger and Luckmann’s (1991) terminology – socialisation is that which prepares the individual for the professional (secondary) socialisation that comes in the military training and professional education of the cadet as an officer to
be. What this illustrates is that a linear model of military training as secondary socialisation, while correct, conceals a somewhat more complicated picture. Cadets by their anticipatory socialisation (through demonstrations of leadership in school, extracurricular activities, etc.) are in effect ‘primed’ for the secondary process of socialisation that seeks to turn them into commissioned officers. It also shows that even after this, a number of different motivations can exist. As such, one might posit a less linear, more recursive process of socialisation (as per Berger and Luckmann) and dynamic identity formation (as per Franke) that allows for feedback between a military organisation’s purported values, the individual cadet/officer’s personal history and values, and the processes of military education and training. Camaraderie, faith, honour, and courage have been proposed as organisational military values (Centeno & Enriquez, 2016, pp. 48–56), without any reference to whether these are universal or specific to certain organizational or national contexts. Franke (1999) attempts an empirically grounded approach to values, but in the U.S. context, and it’s unclear whether this is transferable to an Irish context, as it would appear to be conditioned to some extent by specific national, historical facts such as past conflicts, or the place of the military in society. This picture of complexity in terms of the individual officer’s identity has been established, but what of the rest of the military?

John Hockey’s *Squaddies: A Portrait of a Subculture* (1986) is a sociological study of the lives of privates in the British Army, from recruit to deployment in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. What emerges is a tension at the heart of the army, and the fact that rather than simply ‘following orders’, privates have a “negotiated order”, that is a complex form of bargaining with superiors, be they NCOs or officers. As one officer interviewed noted, at Sandhurst you are told that soldiers will do exactly as they are told. You soon realise that it’s not so, and that you have to watch them, otherwise they can make things difficult for you. It’s not really power they have, it’s sort of non-cooperation. They can do things in a certain way, which can embarrass you in front of others. (Hockey, 1986, p. 74)

Part of the tension in military values here is the tension between the self-image of privates that centres on what they view as “core activities” central to “real soldiering”,
and anything else that gets in the way of this is viewed as “ballaching” (activities viewed as unnecessary and petty, often jobs to keep privates busy) which soldiers will attempt to resist (1986, p. 142). Indeed, one can go further, as Hockey does, and note that there is a kind of separate set of values that goes to make up a “private’s code”, largely defensive in orientation, that “can be summarized by stating the one overriding concern, articulated by privates themselves, namely, ‘look after your mates’” (1986, pp. 123–126). This is not insignificant, since privates always make up the majority of any armed service, so the fact that the “self-image privates [hold] is complex and composite” shows that there is a “constant interplay, and often a resultant tension, between behaviour which was official and that which was unofficial in terms of organizational goals” (ibid.). Hockey goes into considerable detail on the nature of different forms of official “organizational socialization” (pp.21-43) and the accompanying simultaneous “unofficial response” (pp. 44-62). Eliding this ‘negotiated order’ presents an image of a military that, while it may reflect the ‘org chart’, conceals a more nuanced reality.

There is a tension, then, between occupational or organisational identity as described by superiors - and those who implicitly take on the perspective of senior ranks - and the individual values and identity of soldiers, which can differ by rank. For instance, take the ideal of the military ‘hero’. Huntington (1957, pp. 28–30) describes this as the ‘genius at war’, the aristocratic ideal of the hero officer on horseback being supplanted (but not entirely replaced by) the modern military professional. Janowitz similarly accepts a hegemonic ideal of the military, noting that the modern military professional “must be able to perpetuate the traditions of the heroic leader” (2017, p. 35). In contrast, in the words of privates, there is considerable disapproval of “heroics”, and a middle way between “hero [and] fuckup” was held as the ideal (Hockey, 1986, pp. 125–126; see also Burke, 2018, p. 101). A very similar point is made of US enlisted personnel, whereby once

the unit is tempered by combat, definitions of manly honour are not seen to encompass individual heroics. Quite the opposite, the very word “hero” is used to describe negatively any soldier who recklessly jeopardises the unit’s welfare. (Moskos, 1970, p. 155)
What emerges here is that as per Franke’s observation, identity is dynamic and renegotiated, no more significantly than when troops are deployed, as was the case in the observations made by the authors above. The socialisation through training and contact with their superiors is redefined. Another form of identity shift can take place when the nature of operational deployment itself changes, as the next section will discuss.

**Changes in the Utility of Force**

There have been developments in terms of what armies are for, or what they are used for. In the sociology of the military, Morris Janowitz first examined this when discussing what he called the ‘constabulary concept’ and the future of the U.S. military profession. In considering changes the U.S. military (and by implication many other armed forces) had undergone since World War II, he suggested that the “use of force in international relations has been so altered that it seems appropriate to speak of constabulary forces, rather than of military forces” (2017, p. 418). The distinctive features of the deployment of military force in this model are that it is “committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture” (*ibid.*). For the individual soldier, what this means is that they “may have an effective career without ever fighting” (*ibid.*, p. xv). The development of this ideal type of a new military was side-lined by the Vietnam War, but subsequent developments such as U.S. involvement in peacekeeping abroad (Segal et al., 1998) and the “police-ization of the military” (Dunlap Jr., 1999) at home gave this concept greater relevance in later years, especially in the wake of the ‘War on Terror’ and U.S. involvement in “MOOTW” (military operations other than war, pronounced *moot-wa*), whereby the military “provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs” (Brooks, 2016, pp. 79–80). This concept has relevance for many militaries that transitioned to becoming all-volunteer forces, especially with the advent of United Nations peacekeeping, around the same time as Janowitz wrote.
Much has been written on peacekeeping from a variety of different directions. Hillen (1998) provides an overview of the history of United Nations (UN) military operations, going back to the League of Nations before the foundation of the UN itself, and tracing the evolution of UN military operations (e.g. observation missions, traditional peacekeeping, second generation peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and so on). Though Hillen makes a clear distinction between each of these types of military operations in separate chapters that go into detail on their legal requirements, tactical implications, and operational structure, ‘peacekeeping’ will be used as a catch-all term to cover military operations where national military forces operate under auspices of the United Nations. One could also include KFOR (Kosovo Force) here, a UN-mandated but NATO-led international peacekeeping force, an example of the UN ‘contracting out’ peacekeeping activities, which as Hillen (1998, p. 168) has noted has become increasingly common. Hillen’s military operational overview is supplemented by the institutional perspective, such as in Paul Kennedy’s *The Parliament of Man* (2006) which situates peacekeeping in the wider historical context of the UN’s other activities. Peacekeeping has also been approached sociologically in Segal et al.’s (1992) article on the social construction of peacekeeping in the US, which considered the social definition of peacekeeping by the media, religious institutions, soldiers, and their families in the United States. An earlier work by Charles Moskos, *Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force* (1976a), examined how Janowitz’s constabulary concept worked in practice, in a study of the military forces involved in the UN’s Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).¹ Moskos examined how the different militaries and personnel (which included Irish personnel in “Ircon” as the Irish contingent was known) were affected by their involvement in this operation, and how different countries related to and worked with one another.

What emerges in several of these works is the tension between the military role for which soldiers trained, and the realities of peacekeeping or other types of constabulary

¹ UNFICYP is one of the UN’s longest-running peacekeeping operations, starting in 1964. It’s aim was to prevent further fighting between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, and work towards establishing normal relations on the island of Cyprus.
duties. Several authors agree on the fact that there are a number of issues faced by military forces involved in peacekeeping operations. Hillen refers to “force turbulence” and a need to “reinvent the wheel” when new forces arrive into a peacekeeping context, and the need for some kind of training or indoctrination specific to the peacekeeping context given the constant turnover of forces (1998, pp. 95, 70). From his fieldwork, Moskos notes something similar, explicitly identifying a tension between peacekeeping and the traditional military function of an army, but he writes that training is in fact less important than the “emergent socialisation” that takes place on the ground once soldiers arrive (1976a, pp. 3, 134). As such he identifies three phases for what he terms the “emergence of a constabulary ethic”, passing through early conflict over the role, to cynicism, finally with a more realistic but positive evaluation of the peacekeeping mission (ibid., pp. 93-94). What Moskos further noted was that soldiers’ values and sense of identity shifted in this process, as per Franke’s “dynamic identity”, whereby it became possible that there would be a “non-aggressive heroism” that was not in conflict with the military profession as it had been previously defined (ibid., pp. 136-137, 167).

Soldier is used here as a catch-all term, but Burke, writing of the experiences of British soldiers in Northern Ireland during the Troubles, describes differences by corps, with artillery gunners, perhaps counterintuitively, better suited to street patrolling than infantry who had experience in previous campaigns:

[i]n Belfast, artillery regiments often appeared to be more comfortable in liaising with local Republicans than the Infantry. Patrolling by foot through the streets of Belfast was not a familiar activity for the average gunner. Because they had neither a history of infantry soldiering nor fixed preconceptions about their own ‘toughness’ in previously counter-insurgency campaigns, gunners were often more adaptive to local conditions and less sneering about activities considered ‘unsoldierly’ by others. (E. Burke, 2018, p. 72)

He also notes that the ancillary technical skills gunners possessed were useful, allowing them to do odd jobs in people’s homes on a daily basis. It is thus important to mention changes not just in individual and organisational values, but also intra-organisational differences between corps, as this illustrates.
Regrounding Military versus ‘Academic’ Values

Military training evidently has a functional *qua* operational aspect, which has been outlined. There is, however, a considerable element of military training and education, across all ranks, which does not serve such a purpose. Drill today, for instance, it could be argued primarily has a socialization purpose, given that it is functionally irrelevant in terms of military doctrine. While originally it involved the collective movement of a mass of men “as a means of controlling and deploying troops on the battlefield” of the “eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when battles normally took the form of massed formations facing each other. Twentieth century warfare, however, has demanded a wider dispersal of troops on the ground, with a consequent devolution of command. Today drill has no place in an operational context, and its sole value for the organisation lies in its socialising potential, and it remains a central means by which recruits are conditioned to respond obediently to commands” (Hockey, 1986, p. 22). Socialisation is still functional however.

Military training is viewed as instilling military discipline (Goggin, 2013, p. 79), or serving the purpose of “personality trait development” (J.J. Jackson et al., 2012). Similarly, at the institutional level military academies themselves have been viewed explicitly as having the purpose of building character (Masland & Radway, 1957, p. 203) or indoctrination (Lovell, 1979, pp. 263, 265). Lovell regards the central mission of the military academies as that of professional socialization of officer cadets (*ibid.*, p. 245), akin to a tribal initiation rite “developed not only as a means of indoctrinating new members but also as tests of their worthiness and desire to join an elite community” (p. 263). Lovell continues:

> Conversely, if a plebe [cadet] is to avoid becoming an emotional casualty of the process, he must learn to pick up the cues, knowing when to be reticent and submissive and when to be brash and play for the galleries. A sense of humour and even of the absurd are as essential to his role as is being in physical trim. (p. 265).

The question arises whether higher education is then in conflict with military education and socialisation. One might note that the academy and science have their own values
and types of socialisation, but work on this area tends to focus more on the senior members of higher education (Becher & Trowler, 2001; Bourdieu, 1988; Hagstrom, 1965; Lamont, 2009), rather on students who are in effect ‘passing through’ and who spend as much of their waking time outside of the academy as within its walls. It is not possible to do justice to this issue of attempting to pin down what ‘academic’ values are, which is why it is left in scare-quotes for this section. What is at issue here is the perception of academic values by those in the military. Eisenhower’s view of an intellectual as one “who takes more words than are necessary to tell more than he knows” might represent the traditional military view of intellectualism (Knott, 2004, p. 1). Even in US military academies – the authors don’t state which – one catechism starts as follows

“What happens when a plebe thinks?” He is supposed to reply that when he thinks he gets tied up in knots – in other words he is not supposed to think. Small wonder that one academy psychiatrist described the student to us as more dependent than the average college man. (Masland & Radway, 1957, p. 243)

The emphasis on training for the first year cadet (plebe) is to lead to automatic action, both in the sense of the older form of authority to the hierarchy, and also functionally in the combat situation where following orders rather than thinking about what has been so ordered is the way things are supposed to be done. This is perhaps representing an older attitude towards academic education however.

The modern university, unlike the ideal type of the military academy, is not a total institution. As such it might be more relevant to consider what is academic or civil higher education when it confronts the military establishment and its systems of socialisation. The ‘military intellectualism’ of individuals has been identified as playing a role in military institutions, but its place is not necessarily highly regarded. This may differ by branch. In the Navy, for instance, there was scope for the “military technologist” to emerge, with Admiral Hyman Rickover being a clear example. Here a new kind of military technology required a new form of waging war and of thinking about this. Janowitz suggests that technology thus leads to forms of new career paths within the modern military that were not available in the era of ‘ascribed authority’. Interestingly, Janowitz notes that “he was civilianised to the point of disregarding naval protocol” (2017, pp.
Technological advances in society more widely thus may have led to a wider acceptance of higher education within the military too.

In terms of academic or ‘civilian’ higher education, Lovell notes an interesting interaction between the two in terms of a number of “honour scandals” in US military academies. One took place in West Point in 1951, and another when widespread cheating was discovered in the Air Force academy in 1965, with examination papers stolen and put up for sale, leading to widespread cheating, and evidence that “blatant violations of the honor code had been occurring for nearly two years.” This led ultimately to the resignation of 109 cadets (Lovell, 1979, pp. 83–84). A subsequent period of examination and reflection led to some soul-searching in the Air Force Academy, with this period identified as a period of “social change in American society” whereby among students at the service academies, attitudes “vacillated between kinship with and estrangement from civilian peers” (ibid., p. 88). The officials of the Air Force Academy decided that traditional military values were to be defended, however, and it was “academic pressure” which was seen as contributing to “the breakdown in the honor system”, that is, the academic was held to have corrupted the military. Indeed, part of the issue with the honour code was that it had had become an honour system, increasingly bureaucratized as a formalisation of the once informal process of initiation that cadets at were to undergo (pp. 260-263).

It can be noted, however, that such values are not universal, however. Irish military values are different, for instance, from those in American military academies. In his memoirs of service as an officer in the Irish Defence Forces, Patrick Goggin noted that the Cadet-master of his own time in 1950 “rejected the American ‘Honour Code’ where cadets were supposed to report themselves for every small irregularity, as being unsuitable for the Irish psyche with its inbuilt sense of balance” (2013, p. 54). He also noted that Irish military discipline was not unthinking, and that after following an order that he as an officer may have disagreed with “I would, of course, reserve the right to ‘crib’ in the bar, and in that soldier’s sense of balance, they owed me one” (ibid., p. 79).
Some other, more specific observations made by Berger and Luckmann are useful, specifically with reference to contact being made between two different sets of values which they term ‘symbolic universes’, which may manifest in institutions or organisations. They note that when there is contact between such symbolic worlds, there is a defined need to ‘reground’ and re legitimise one’s own universe:

The alternative universe presented by the other society must be met with the best possible reasons for the superiority of one’s own. [...] The appearance of an alternative symbolic universe poses a threat because its very existence demonstrates empirically that one’s own universe is less than inevitable. (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1991, p. 126)

As such soldiers returning to military life from higher education in a civilian institution might then be expected to go through yet another process of socialisation, or of resocialisation. Similarly, achievements in an academic context may have to be reinterpreted as militarily relevant. Finally, what remains throughout an individual’s military career is the question of the ongoing presentation and construction of self, the dynamic process of individual identity development, through various different roles with different audiences, noting the career-long social construction of individual military identity (discussed below in Chapter 6).

There are various ways that these transitions in identity or identities are dealt with. Cooper et al. (2018, p. 162) make reference to Bourdieu in noting the honour and prestige that accumulates to an individual as ‘symbolic capital’, accrued through combat experience, or through other non-professional activities such as drinking and sexual exploits. Zurcher describes how in the total institution of the naval ship, a new sailor has to be “squared away” or made a “salt” in a process of secondary socialisation that moves beyond the instrumental view, through their “participation in the informal organisation’s traditions, customs, and, especially, initiations, if he is to become a member of the shipboard society” (1965, p. 400; see also Winslow, 1999). Similarly, from psychology Hale refers to the “symbolic resources” of soldiers making the transition to the military, whereby “training acts to hinder one’s access to the symbolic resources that contributed to the construction of one’s identity prior to entering the military”
(2008, p. 315). For those who are already officers, accepted in the military order, there is also occasionally reconfiguration of this social order. Patrick Bury’s (2017) micro-sociological analysis of Barossa night (a ritual dinner in 1st Battalion of The Royal Irish Regiment, in the British Army) references the ritualistic use of totems, speeches, song, alcohol, and rhythm to increase social solidarity and address conflict, using the notion of a “negotiated order” (Bury refers to Hockey’s use of negotiated order theory) rather than an order being given once and for all, declared from on high. Thus it can be observed that the military has its own complexities and priorities that are not determined by military hierarchy or structural forms of formation through training and education.

2.4 Summary

This chapter considered the literature dealing with the study of the military. While this has been somewhat overlooked by ‘mainstream’ sociology, there has been considerable work in this subfield of the sociology of the military. The primary concept to consider with respect to officers who are the focus of this dissertation is that of the military professional. To start, the origins of the professional soldier and officer was traced historically, in terms of technological and tactical developments in warfare in recent centuries. It was with the sociology of the military that more recent developments in military professionalism were understood. The primary figure in this area is Morris Janowitz, whose work traced the development of the military professional after World War II, with the shift from ‘ascribed’ to ‘achieved’ authority and the emergence of the ‘constabulary concept’. These changes were related to longer term trends in the civilianisation of the military, as mass armies of conscripts gave way to all volunteer forces, and the development of structures of professionalism. One parallel development here has been a shift from the military as a vocation to being a job, as the I/O thesis describes, as formulated by Moskos and developed by others.

Military professionalism also relates to civil-military relations, where the professionalization of the officer class has been viewed as one of the ideal ways for civilian powers to maintain control of the military. Such research is primarily coming out
of political science, and as such there has been a tendency to make normative assumptions in order to theory-build, in contrast to often more empirically grounded approaches to the military professional in the sociology of the military. Another limitation in this approach is in the state-centric assumptions that this perspective adopts, considering as it does the state as representing the totality of the ‘civil’ side of the civil-military equation. As such, the notion of society beyond the state was introduced as a way to expand this concept beyond the problematic of the political science perspective. Examples of ways to conceptualise civil were explored, alongside some examples.

This chapter concluded with an examination of symbolic aspects of military identity, in terms of self-image and values. These symbolic aspects, e.g. in terms of ‘honour codes’ are not universal, and can be understood in the context of a given military organisation. This symbolic aspect can be understood in light of elements from social constructionism to see the military as a ‘symbolic universe’. When those from the military enter into another symbolic universe, then, namely higher education, is there a need (perceived or real) to ‘reground’ those officers, so as to (re)legitimise military knowledge, and to reassert its superiority to external challenges? Considered in this light, it is not necessary to propose and outline what the values of the academy are (if such would be possible), because what is at issue is the perception of a difference between the academic and military worlds.

In terms of my own approach, there is probably something of a focus on anglophone scholarship. In part this is a function of the size of the U.S. military and thus the outsize influence those researching the military in that country have. The literature in other languages may have presented a somewhat different constellation of examples, but I attempted to address this limitation by referring to collections of work by scholars based outside the U.S., as well as drawing on examples from those researching the military in other, non-English speaking countries.
What emerges from this literature is that non-functional perspectives in researching the military are still very much in the minority, even after numerous literature reviews by scholars pointing to the long-term focus in researching the military that can often make sociology of the military into military sociology. Applications of theoretical insights from ‘mainstream’ sociology (such as Hockey’s use of Strauss) are unfortunately still somewhat in the minority. As well as this, the valid concerns of real-world applicability that those researching civil-military relations have means that this area of research could do more to move past the long-established boundaries set that define civil as the state. There is scope too to explore the military professionalism too, beyond the parameters set in terms of concepts like the I/O thesis. A significant deficiency that can be identified, however, is the dearth of social scientific research on the Irish military or even more broadly on the Irish security context. History here is the primary discipline, and while it can present valuable overview, there is also a need for contemporaneous, empirically grounded but theoretically informed work. That is absent in Ireland. There is also a need for more work along the lines of Hockey (1986) and Bury (2017) that takes a classically sociological approach to military traditions and institutions. Work like this would fill in the lacunae in the existing literatures of the military, professionalism, civil-military relations, and military interactions with the civilian world.
Chapter 3: Military Officers and Higher Education

3.1 Introduction

This chapter considers the different approaches that can be made to the education of military officers. The first is to explore the relationship between the military and the academy in institutional terms. As such, some aspects of specifically military academies are considered, so as to understand their functions in terms of educating officers, and also forming them as officers. It starts with the American military academic experience, moving on to examine insights from other contexts. This chapter also looks at the place of education with respect to the military as a profession, considering the higher education of officers in the light of insights from the sociology of the professions. This chapter concludes with a brief overview of other conceptualisations of and trends in higher education from wider society.

3.2 The Academization of the Military

In discussing the relationship between the military and the academy, it is important to set out what will not be dealt with, namely the role played by research for the military and military research in the academy. This has received considerable scholarly attention, ever since U.S. Senator William Fulbright first raised concerns about a “military-industrial-academic complex”, building on President Eisenhower’s famous farewell address warning about the military-industrial complex; indeed Eisenhower’s original text included “academic” before this was deleted (Giroux, 2016, pp. 7, 14). Subsequent scholarship has examined the relationship between different fields of academic research and the military establishment, such as area studies (Wallerstein, 1996, pp. 36–38), psychology (Murray, 2013), the social sciences more generally (Rohde, 2013), and applied research with various agencies such as the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) (Jacobsen, 2015). The ‘militarisation of the university’ literature focuses largely on military-funded projects in response to various perceived military threats,
such as the ‘Sputnik crisis’² (Geiger, 1993, pp. 161–166; Sherry, 1997, pp. 214–233) or specific conflicts, with the university as an ‘incubator’ for knowledge which can be applied militarily. This section is concerned instead with what can be termed the “academisation of the military”, rather than the episodic, largely-U.S.-centric literature on the militarization of academic research (Martino-Taylor, 2008).

Professionalism of the military officer is predicated on an abstract body of knowledge. In the early modern period this was imparted ‘on the job’, such that “General George Washington received his education by riding with the Redcoats in western Pennsylvania during the mid-eighteenth century rather than from a classroom in Carlisle Barracks” (Watson, 2007, p. xiv). In time, however, the breadth and depth of this body of knowledge required a separate place of instruction. This was institutionalised in the early years of military professionalism in specific places of military education, through the military educational system, what Huntington refers to as one of the “five key institutions of the military vocation” (1957, p. 20). In 1810, Prussia established the first such institution, the Kriegsakademie, long before any other power, which was to be a “military university for the higher study of the science of war”, becoming in time “the focal institution of Prussian professionalism”, with attendance a prerequisite for attainment of higher ranks or the much coveted positions on the Prussian general staff (ibid., p. 48). Other countries went on to form their own institutions of military education, with those in the United States getting considerable scholarly attention (Lovell, 1979; Masland & Radway, 1957; Spector, 1977; Watson, 2007, pp. 1–19, 41–60).

Martin van Creveld (1991, p. 147) notes that there were setbacks to what appears to be a ‘Whig interpretation’ of military professionalism. One such reversal was Napoleon’s introduction of the levée en masse or mass national conscription of the nation in arms, which was something step backwards in terms of military professionalism, but the outlines of the characteristics of military professionalism remain: the presence of a

² This was when the USSR’s launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik, led to fears in the United States that it was being left behind militarily and scientifically, especially as it was assumed the US capitalist system would launch first.
theoretical body of work, a place of instruction, and a relative decline in the importance of social origins for the highest positions. Today, these institutions are central to the modern military, from the officer cadet, to the staff schools for commissioned officers. This is true also of Ireland, which saw the Military College established in 1923 immediately after the foundation of the state (Hodson, 2016).

**What Military Education is For**

These institutions can be seen as having a number of purposes, which can be understood in terms of the different functions they have. These may be understood in broadly sociological terms as firstly functional in terms of military training and military education, and secondly in interpretivist or constructivist terms of social formation and values. To consider the first, functional aspect of military academies, the following quote captures the essence of what military training is.

The focus in military training is on *things*, not on people. The whole purpose is to teach men to handle and care for a vast array of weapons and equipment, from the simplest firearm to the more complex weapon system. While it is clearly recognized that the highly skilled soldier-technician is the most important asset of all, his value is conceived in terms of his ability to utilize the material resources and equipment of the fighting forces. Since these resources are actually employed by organized units and groups, the emphasis in training necessarily is on the effective behaviour of the individual as a part of a unit or group rather than on the individual as such. (Masland & Radway, 1957, pp. 52–53; see also van Creveld, 1991, pp. 82, 92)

The functionalist aspect of military institutions is to prepare officers for the jobs they will have to carry out, in terms of the specific knowledge that is required for this. The continued and indeed growing importance of weapons systems means military training remains of paramount importance for all ranks. Greater multi-lateral military cooperation also means that training is necessary to ensure interoperability between different nations military forces, as is training for ‘new’ roles such as constabulary duties and peacekeeping. Implicit in this quote, however, is the notion of social formation of the soldier (or sailor, or whatever) as a member of a unit or team. There are, thus, clearly overlaps between the functional and constructivist interpretations of military training and military education. Bury (2017, pp. 315–317) provides an overview of some of the literature on this type of military group cohesion effected through training.
Abbott notes that in professions where “practice is rare, academic knowledge may become peculiarly influential”, giving the military as one such example, where military commentators “routinely spend interwar periods interpreting past errors and recasting tactical practice around the latest technological innovations” (1988, p. 55). Given the relative rarity of combat, indeed, the “enlisted man and the officer, short term and careerist, can expect to spend a considerable part of their careers going to school and participating in special training activities” (Masland & Radway, 1957, p. 53). Training can take place within military institutions, but it is military education that is of concern here, given the role civilian institutions have played.

Military education also has a social constructionist aspect, however, which is socialising individuals to their role and to the organisation. Whereas training might be regarded as universal to all ranks in the military, the functions of military education and socialisation are specific to the commissioned ranks, including cadets or officers-to-be. As such, the role of military education as it is undertaken in military academies is worth considering as the fact that they are military institutions is what make them different, and what allows them to operate in such a manner that socialises individuals to the military. Lovell (1979) examines the state of U.S. service academies in the wake of the Vietnam war and the advent of the all-volunteer force. He sets out the origins of American military education in what he calls “the Seminary-Academy”, starting with West Point founded in 1817, with its vision of military technical education coming from the French model (pp. 16-22). This was followed until Prussia’s victory in the Franco-Prussian war (1870-71), when the German model of educating military professionals came into the ascendant. Originally a technical school for the Corps of Engineers, West Point was transformed between 1817 and 1825 by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in order to become a “professional school” for the new vision of a standing army for the United States (Huntington, 1957, pp. 214–216). It would create those professional officers who would command the regular army in peace as well as the expanded army in war, relegating the “militia” – once the backbone of American military force – to a secondary position. The military academy and military education was, then, central to the
“objective civilian control” of the military that Huntington sees as being at the root of military professionalism.

The American Military Academic Experience

The situation since the origin of these institutions has changed considerably however, and as the balance of activities within armed forces has changed, so too has the need for different types of skills. As early as 1957 Masland and Radway recognised that the majority of general staff in the U.S. military were not in combat roles (1957, p. 516), and so other skills were necessary. Officers were to have greater interaction with civilian policymakers from their own country, and increasingly abroad, with “politico-military assignments” increasingly regarded as significant from World War II onward (ibid., pp. 142-154). Masland and Radway note that there was a differential involvement between the armed services in terms of how prepared their personnel were for such roles, with the Navy (given their relative isolation in terms of operational postings onboard ships) less prepared than the Army (pp. 95, 142, 154). Andreski (1968, p. 125) describes this from another direction when he notes that a navy will generally have less ability to intervene in politics than an army.

Janowitz (2017) described this in terms of the rise of the ‘constabulary concept’. Lovell sets this out in terms of some of the problems which had arisen in World War II:

The war had posed a number of challenging social, political, and economic problems for military professionals: working together with persons from other nations in allied operations, coping with problems of supply and industrial mobilisation, administering occupied territories. Many military professionals came to recognise that their military education and training had provided skimpy preparation, at best, for coping successfully with such problems. (Lovell, 1979, p. 50)

Here the role of ‘education’ rather than ‘training’ became significant, as the study of foreign languages, economics, comparative government were now to be viewed as “staples rather than frills” (ibid.). Here one distinguishing feature of military education is seen in the role of non-technical subjects, specifically the social sciences (pp. 50-54), and – in contrast to the former ideal of the military academy as a ‘total institution’ (see below) – the principle of bringing cadets into contact with civilians, high ranking
policymakers, and social science scholars. While Huntington considered that “isolation of the military was a prerequisite to professionalization”, this isolation could be regarded as relative rather than absolute, and the military was no longer isolated from wider intellectual currents.

This meant the end of the “seminary-academy” as it once existed, and Lovell suggested four possible institutional models that might serve as a response to changing circumstances. The first was the idea of a combined services academy, whereby “prospective career officers in the armed services spend the first three years of their undergraduate education and training in a combined service academy with two additional years spent in one of the currently existing academies associated with a particular arm of service” (Lovell, p. 278). A second scenario would see a mixed civilian-military collegiate experience, with the rationale that “students would gain a better understanding of civilian outlook through the three years spent on a civilian campus” (p. 280), followed by two years in a service academy. A third possibility would see the academies as postgraduate institutions, a proposal made to the U.S. Navy, whereby that service would “accept only applications from young men who had completed their undergraduate education, and that Annapolis provide a two-year professional program devoted primarily to technical studies” (p. 281). A fourth scenario described by Lovell suggested “continued incrementalism” would be the most likely form of institutional change that the military academies and the military establishment would allow, and this is indeed the form of change that U.S. military academies pursued.

Even though none of these scenarios match the Irish experience perfectly, it is clear that the once firm boundary between the civilian academic and military world has become permeable. While what the literature terms “civilian institutions” (i.e., non-military higher education institutions) have been used in the past “to raise the educational level of younger officers already on duty” (Masland & Radway, 1957, p. 269), essentially in the ‘adult education’ modality of higher education, other more formal links between military and civilian higher education emerged. One form of this was in the military academy, where staff members came “to their assignments after having spent two or
more years in civilian graduate schools”, while civilian inspections by accreditation teams “made the academies far more sensitive to currents of change in civilian education than they were in an earlier era” (Lovell, 1979, p. 219).

**Recent International Examples**

More recent work on the “newcomer socialization” in officer education notes that in the past military higher education was “strongly separated from the national education systems in the various countries but are substantially now in the process of drawing closer to them” (Caforio, 2006b, p. 256). There are differences however, in terms of the relative proximity or distance that different countries manifest. A broad distinction can be made between “one that privileges a typical military education, with less space for general university culture” and “a second orientation that tends to bring officer education closer to the national university systems, including the awarding of a true university degree with value on the civilian market at the end of the programme” (ibid., p. 260). These positions, divergent and convergent respectively, manifest themselves in an analysis of fifteen different countries in 2000 (p. 261). South Africa, Switzerland, and Germany’s officer education are identified being closest to the civilian, university form of higher education, with countries such as Bulgaria, the United Kingdom and Portugal being divergent, that is less like civilian university education. A number of nations were identified as being in between, including Sweden, the United States, and the Netherlands. Ireland did not feature in the analysis but is firmly at the “convergent” end of the spectrum (Caforio appears to use the terms ‘convergent’ and ‘divergent’ without any apparent reference to the neoinstitutionalist literature on institutional isomorphism). The reason for this is that at all levels of officer education in the Irish Defence Forces – from cadet, to young officer, to the Command and Staff courses for senior officers – the qualifications these officers receive are delivered in civilian HEIs, and map on to the National Qualifications Framework since 2003. The point here about proximity to or distance from national (civilian) systems of education can be considered as yet another aspect to the civilianisation of the military which has been occurring since the advent of all-volunteer forces.
A point deserves to be made relating to both Janowitz and the I/O thesis, which is the notion of the ‘total institution’ as it pertains to the military setting. As Erving Goffman defined it, a total institution is “a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life” (1961, p. xiii). He went on to define five groupings of total institutions, with the fourth being those:

purportedly established the better to pursue some worklike task and justifying themselves only on these instrumental grounds: army barracks, ships, boarding schools, work camps, colonial compounds, and large mansions from the point of view of those who live in the servants’ quarters. (Ibid., p. 5)

This would seem at first glance to allow for the use of the concept of the total institution as a means of understanding the military. On closer analysis, however, the very changes identified by Moskos (writing after Goffman) militate against this. Goffman suggests that total institutions are “incompatible” with “the basic work-payment structure of our society” (ibid., pp. 11-12) and the family (which allows for an individual to maintain contacts with the same society which total institutions seek to put at arm’s length).

Moskos noted the change in the structure of the military profession such that military personnel were no longer necessarily living in a barracks, and also noting the increasing importance of families in the lives of military personnel (Moskos, 1977b). A specific example of this can be seen in the social construction of the concept of peacekeeping for U.S. military personnel by these individuals and their spouses (Segal et al., 1992). No longer was the ‘party line’ as set down by the military the last word. Army wives also played a role in Ireland during the ‘Army Crisis’ (Martin, 2016). As such these changes weigh against applying the concept of the total institution to the military as a whole. It retains its relevance when applied to the Cadet School, however, as cadets are not at liberty to leave this environment unless specifically granted permission to do so.

3.3 Sociology of the Professions

A great deal of significant research has been done on individual professions. Much attention has been given to medicine, e.g. Paul Starr’s monograph The Social Transformation of American Medicine (1982) or Eliot Freidson’s (1970) Profession of Medicine. It often has featured in discussions of sociological concepts as applied to professions, as per discussions of the ‘presentation of the competent self’ (see McLuhan
et al., 2014 for a discussion of a number of references). There is a danger with referring to an individual profession as our choice of exemplar, however. Ritzer (1975) noted that American sociologists’ thinking had been distorted by their choice of the physician as the prototype of the professions. Abbott, discussing this approach in the past tense, refers to these as the “stock of case studies” that seek to fit “each case into the procrustean bed of essential traits. But that bed was so often refinished as it passed from hand to hand that the case studies were never very comparable” (1988, p. 4). So while the numerous studies of individual professions are interesting in themselves, the military as a profession cannot simply be mapped onto the emergence of medicine or accounting as professions.

From this direction Harold Wilensky answered his own question (“The Professionalisation of Everyone?”) by saying that the notion that all labour was being so transformed was “a bit of a sociological romance” (1964, p. 156). Nevertheless, the fact that the question could be asked at all suggested that real changes in the organisation of work were afoot. Research was being done on the connection between professionalization and education (Willower, 1960), or the link between professionalization and bureaucratization (Hall, 1968), with a significant development being Elliott’s *The Sociology of the Professions* (1972). These all sought to understand professions in somewhat abstract terms of “professionalism” or “professionalization”, rather than focusing on histories of individual professions.

In the subsequent work in this area, different explanations have been proposed for what professions do or what they are. On the one hand were the functionalists of the post-war period, and on the other the ‘monopolists’ of the 1960s onwards (Abbott, 1988, pp. 4–5). Abbott also notes two other approaches when discussing professionalisation: the structuralist view was that “the functions disappeared and the structure alone remains”; and the cultural view, which regarded cultural legitimation as a central process in professionalisation (*op. cit.*, p. 15). The functionalist arguments are well-established, and can be summarised thus:

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Professions were organized bodies of experts who applied esoteric knowledge to particular cases. They had elaborate systems of instruction and training, together with entry by examination and other formal prerequisite. They normally possessed and enforced a code of ethics or behaviour. (p. 4)

These essential features feature in much of the sociology of the military’s definitions of the military as a profession (Janowitz, 2017; Moskos, 1977b). The monopolist position emerged in the “new climate of the 1960s”, as the “functional assumptions” of sociology were overturned, and professionalism was seen instead as a form of control and monopoly, “the new theorists moved the focus of debate from the forms of professionalization to its functions” (ibid., p. 5). For instance, Freidson argued that “dominance and autonomy, not collegiality or trust, were the hallmarks of true professionalism”, whereas Berlant argued that economic monopoly was the purpose of the profession (in a striking analysis of ethics codes, “whose altruistic nature had been assumed by earlier workers” (ibid.)). These differences within the sociology of professions mapped on to wider developments in sociology from functional to conflict perspectives.

Professions and Jurisdiction

Andrew Abbott, in his The System of Professions: An Essay on The Division of Expert Labour (1988) proposes an alternative theory, which, as he sees it, “reverses the problematic assumptions of professionalization theories” (ibid., p. 19) which preceded his own work. In contrast to these he focused on work rather than structure, saying that “it is the content of the professions’ work that the case studies tell us is changing” (ibid.). Abbott gives the often repeated example of the history of the professionalization of American medicine to clarify his approach. In contrast to others, who consider the professionalization of medicine embodied in doctors, and seeking to identify “the origins of American medicine”, he suggests that one might consider instead the “doing of healing”. Indeed, Abbott elsewhere considers this in terms of the “problem” of “sickness” (p. 35). By looking at those who ‘did healing’, “sectarian and folk healers” enter the picture, as do homeopaths, as opponents to “regular medicine”. By focusing on the ‘doing of healing’, Abbott is able to see that there was “an intense war over who had the right to cure people”:
Each side claimed the legitimacy of science, debated the safety of the public, and attacked its opponents in editorials and speeches. The regulars devised exclusionary rules requiring a dying patient to dismiss an attending irregular as a condition of their own attention. In this, its darkest hour, regular medicine at last saw fit to found its national association. (pp. 20-21)

By focusing on work, Abbott sets out what he regards as the central ideas to consider when looking at professions: jurisdiction, legitimation, abstraction and academic knowledge.

The central phenomenon of professional life as Abbott sees it is “the link between a profession and its work”, which plays out in what he calls a “jurisdiction” (ibid., p. 20). ‘Work’ as Abbott defines it here refers to activities undertaken, or the ‘problem space’ inhabited by a profession. It does not, however, mean ‘mere work’ or a job, as it does for the I/O thesis with regard to the military profession (Moskos, 1977a, 1977b, 1986). So, for the above example, doctors and homeopaths battled over the jurisdiction of health to define what was ‘regular medicine’ and which profession would rule supreme. He notes that the relationship between work and professions can be presented as being relatively straightforward and unproblematic, with a “map of tasks to be done, and an isomorphic map of people doing them. Function is structure. But the reality is more complex; the tasks, the professions, and the links between them change continually” (ibid., p. 35). As an example of this Abbott notes the example of the control of riots, a “shared jurisdiction” which has been claimed by the military, by the police, by private police agencies, and occasionally by social scientists. Each group has its own version of what to do and how to do it, but in America at least, riots have been rare enough that interprofessional conflict over their jurisdiction has been uncommon. (pp. 74-75)

What Abbott suggests is that conflicts over jurisdictions are not only possible, but expected. This insight underlies one of his fundamental postulates regarding professional life, after understanding professions through the work they do, namely that “professions exist in an interrelated system” (ibid., p. 112). The use of “system” may strike some as overly functionalist or hierarchical, and indeed Abbott uses the word “ecology” synonymously and so this model need not imply top-down coordination (p.
Indeed, the notion of jurisdictional conflict clarifies this. As such, what can be seen here is that by using jurisdiction, one can consider the doing of ‘security’ as the jurisdiction of the Defence Forces, but it is a jurisdiction which is shared with An Garda Síochána for certain tasks (such as Aid To Civil Power activities), and the Department of Defence in terms of policy. Some form of laying claim to jurisdiction is thus necessary (ibid., pp. 59-85), especially in these “multiprofessional environments” (p. 151) and these claims must be grounded somehow.

Abbott’s system approach and focus on work means that some of the boundary disputes that can feature in sociological discussions of professions are sidestepped. As one review of his book noted, we can exchange the word ‘occupation’ for ‘profession’ with no loss of analytic power, and as Abbott himself wrote, his system approach to work could be applied to “thinking about divisions of labour in general” (Abbott, 1988, p. 317; Tolbert, 1990, p. 413). Though three decades have passed since this work was published, Abbott (2005) has himself extended and developed his arguments subsequently, and many of its concepts have come to be accepted as parts of the organon of work in the sociology of professions, notably “jurisdiction” (Ackroyd, 2016; Dingwall, 2008, p. 86).

**Academic Knowledge as Professional Legitimation**

Legitimation thus is another idea Abbott uses in order to make sense of professions. Berger and Luckmann note that “the institutional world requires legitimation, that is, ways by which it can be ‘explained’ and justified” (1991, p. 79). Abbott suggests that in order to win conflicts over claims to jurisdiction, professions must make arguments or set out these explanations and justifications in a number of arenas, namely the arena of public opinion, the legal system, and the workplace itself (op. cit., pp. 59-60). Legal jurisdiction is of more concern where a profession has fought to establish a monopoly. For militaries this monopoly over violence takes a rather different form, and is constitutive in Weber’s minimal definition of the state. It is not, primarily at any rate, the market monopoly Abbott is discussing here. Public opinion takes different form, but in essence is a “claim of both social and cultural authority” (p. 60). It can take the form
of codes of ethics, presence in the media (for instance through representative organisations), but it can also take a more symbolic form (which will be discussed below). There are six possible forms by which a dispute over jurisdiction can be settled, with a claim to full and final jurisdiction being the first (pp. 69-79). As with functional interpretations of the professions, abstract knowledge is significant to Abbott’s view, but what is new about his approach was that knowledge becomes “the currency of competition” (p. 102).

Abstract knowledge is at the root of a profession’s claims to legitimacy, because a “formal knowledge system is ordered by abstractions alone” (p. 53). This abstraction is what formalizes the skills that constitute the work done by a profession. There is a logic to professional practice. The profession makes “claims to classify a problem, reason about it, and to take action on it: in more formal terms, to diagnose, to infer, and to treat” (p. 40). Abbott explains this with the example of the English legal system, whereby a solicitor ‘diagnoses’ the legal problem of a client, and refers those requiring formal litigation to a barrister. The barrister might never see the client, and is concerned solely with inference. As the barrister litigates within the professional legal system, a number of possible ‘treatments’ (pleas, settlements, etc.) emerge, and the decision about these treatments is made by the solicitor and client rather than the barrister. The interesting observation here is that a professional diagnostic classification is not arranged as a “logical hierarchy from the general to the specific, but as a probabilistic hierarchy from the common to the esoteric” (p. 42). This is somewhat constrained, however, by the “abstract foundations of professional knowledge” as these are maintained normally by academic professionals who attempt to impose some logical clarity on the probabilistic “muddle of practice”, in terms of what is more likely to work than not.

Academic knowledge, then, is both inside and outside the profession, in that the academic professionals “demonstrate the rigour, the clarity, and the scientifically logical character of professional work, thereby legitimating the work in the context of larger values” (p. 54). There is a tension, however, between practice and academic knowledge.
In areas where practice is regular, this is not problematic. When practice is rare, as in the military context, academic knowledge may become “peculiarly influential”:

Modern military commentators routinely spend interwar periods interpreting past errors and recasting tactical practice around the latest technological innovations. For the last century, academic military writing has been extremely influential in practice, as Liddell Hart and Mahan show. (p. 55)

War is infrequent for most countries, and practice in the form of training and field exercises are not without danger, and costly in their own right. As such, the academic approach is frequently approached so that practice can at least be discussed and reflected on. Abbott notes that there is a shift in the nature of legitimation, away from character to technique (parallels with Janowitz and the shift away from ascribed authority are suggestive). Greater focus on the scientific approach which has led to the “rise of the universities” (pp. 195-210), which might be more accurately conceptualised as the rise of higher education including new or expanded non-university institutions performing more specialised functions associated with labour market requirements.

**Symbolism as Legitimation**

Symbolic forms of legitimation were referred to above, and in this there is a parallel with the tension between Weber’s charisma and routinisation. While abstraction and academic knowledge may be regarded as in some ways a ‘functional’ interpretation of legitimation, symbolic legitimation refers to the ‘cultural’ and ‘structural’ views of the profession to which Abbott referred to in passing. Other sociologists have given some attention to the symbolic and cultural aspects of the military profession. Abbott notes that professions have shifted their legitimacy which was once grounded on character to one grounded on technique:

The military provides the most striking case; gone are the cavalry heroes, the daredevil submariners. The new services sell themselves both to potential recruits and to the public by their activity on the cutting edge of technological innovation. Only the marines are still “looking for a few good men.” (p. 191)

This may be an exaggeration, given that even abstract knowledge as a legitimating mechanism can serve such a function of giving a profession an aura. Goffman for instance describes the tension between professions as training or mystification, with the “rhetoric of training” that on the one hand maintains a monopoly, and on another “fosters the impression that the licensed practitioner is someone who has been
reconstituted by his learning experience and is now set apart from other men” (1990, p. 55).

The public image of a profession is important and often related to its culture. The newly formed Federal Bureau of Investigation under Hoover had the “spit-and-polish FBI agent, defined by detailed orders about dress, grooming, and conduct” (Wilson, 2000, pp. 97–98). The founders of the McKinsey management consulting firm were similarly obsessed with image in the formation of what they perceived as a new profession (D. McDonald, 2013). Even Abbott’s picture of the shifting grounding of legitimacy above is somewhat misleading, because character remains, even in the new military services. It is striking that the famous Hollywood director Cecil B. DeMille was contracted to design the U.S. Air Force’s dress uniforms, while differentiating itself from the older services (Army, Navy, and Marine Corps) (Janowitz, 2017, p. 232). With professions competing over jurisdiction, their claims to legitimacy may rest on their respective legitimacy of character, given that they may have techniques in common which thus cannot be grounds for legitimation.

The “archaism”, and the complex symbolic order, “the use of honorifics, the wearing of uniforms and other symbols of authority, and countless similar behaviours” (Abbott, 1988, pp. 61, 72–73) remain central to the legitimacy of a profession. There are countless examples of this in other authors. Berger (1963, pp. 96–97, 100, 102, 105, 118) and Berger and Luckmann (1991, pp. 158–159) provide military examples from the social construction perspective. Erving Goffman (1990, pp. 74, 94, 157, 167, 202) also provides telling examples from his own dramaturgical perspective. The latter concept of “performing professionalism” is important too as it a sociological underpinning of Farrell’s notion of the Irish Defence Forces’ “military imitation” (1997) after Independence.

3.4 Broader, Macro-trends in Higher Education

Military higher education does not take place in isolation, just as it has been established that the military is not isolated from wider, civilian society. This section considers
broader trends in higher education which may be influential in terms of the higher education of military officers. The first is the concept of massification, related to the increasingly widespread view across many countries that higher education is now in some sense a necessity. Related to this are two other views of higher education, from both sides of the functional/conflict divide (Collins, 1971), namely human capital theory on the one hand, and screening and reproduction on the other.

**Massification**

Martin Trow begins his famous essay on the expansion of higher education, and the various effects this phenomenon has on the academy by claiming that “[i]n every advanced society the problems of higher education are problems associated with growth” (Trow, 1973, see also 2010a). He noted a number of “problems” – such as administration, finance, curriculum reform, setting of standards, the relationship of tertiary to secondary education, and political student unrest – all of which he saw as being treated as discrete issues, but that he suggested could be “understood better as different manifestations of a related cluster of problems” (*ibid.*). The model he proposed is descriptive, coming out of policy analysis (Silver, 2009, p. 760), and is a typology of Weberian ideal types (Trow, 1973, p. 18) of higher education defined according to the levels of participation in an age cohort. An elite higher education system caters to up to 15 percent of a school-leaving cohort, and a mass system caters to between 15 and 50 percent of this cohort. Beyond this is what he terms ‘universal’ higher education, where higher education effectively becomes an obligation to children in middle and upper socio-economic brackets, and quickly rises as a percentage. While Trow’s model is open to criticism (Doughty, 2012), his key insight was the transformation in understanding attitudes towards higher education changing from viewing higher in an elite system as a privilege, then a right in a mass system, and finally an obligation in a universal system for the upper or middle classes (Trow, 2010a). Massification implies a scale or phase transition from one form of higher education to another, with this quantitative increase in student numbers implying a far-reaching qualitative change in the institutions and system catering to this expansion.
The causes of this expansion may differ from country to country, but one macro-level factor might be that during the same period of massification in western countries “the world had the largest expansion of its productive capacity and population that it had ever known, one that involved an expansion in scale of all human activities” (Wallerstein, 1996, p. 33). Without proposing a causality, the correlation with the concept of human capital at this time (discussed below) is suggestive. In Ireland, for instance, human capital arguments operated as a key rationale for the expansion of higher technical education with the first and second programmes of economic expansion, resulting in a new sector of higher education with the regional technical colleges (Walsh, 2018, pp. 233–234). Whatever the causes of massification, its scale is undeniable, however, with a purported 60 percent of the world’s universities since the twelfth century having been founded in or after the second world war (Meek, 2002, p. 58). The remainder of this section will consider two broad groups of ideas that seek to explain the role of higher education in this massified context.

**Human Capital Theory**

Human capital theory (HCT) refers to prominent “functional” theories of higher education, and “the most influential economic theory of Western education, setting the framework of government policies since the early 1960s” (Fitzsimons, 1999). Originally developed by Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker, it quickly became the preferred means for economists to understand the role played by education (Blaug, 1976, pp. 827, 829–830). Indeed, the twentieth century has been described as “the human capital century”, though there is evidence that its roots going as far back as the nineteenth century (Goldin & Katz, 2008). HCT holds that there is a direct link between education and economic growth, and that higher education is essential to fulfilling labour market requirements. Education is in this view “for the economy”, and its effects are direct and indirect (Goldin & Katz, 2008, pp. 37, 40). Some of the earliest work on this topic still serves as a lucid outline of the essence of this argument:

> As technological developments have altered production techniques, types of mechanical equipment, and varieties of outputs, society has begun to recognize that economic progress involves not only changes in machinery but also in men—not only expenditures on equipment but also on people. Investment in people
This “investment in people” comes in the form of investing in education, in whatever form this may take. More primarily there is the matter of efficiency for the state, in terms of what courses should be subsidised and to what extent. This also relates to the question of ‘relevance’, and what students should be studying. For this reason, the dominance of HCT does much to explain Trow’s mass stage of higher education, with “the massification of HE […] designed to support industry by providing a ‘better’ workforce” (Molesworth et al., 2009, p. 279). For Ireland this is made explicit by Clancy writing that “expansion of higher education in the Republic of Ireland was, to a large extent, legitimated by the needs of the economy” (Clancy, 1996; Walsh, 2014). As such, it connects the massification of higher education with the social and economic needs which informed this expansion of higher education internationally.

**Screening, Reproduction, and Conflict**

During the 1970s, a crisis of confidence in the human capital approach saw it eclipsed by ‘screening theories’ and other types of explanations as the fact of various recessions in [OECD] economies made it apparent that there was no automatic relationship between education and economic growth. (Olssen et al., 2004, p. 148)

As with discussions of the functional and conflict perspectives in sociology of the professions, and sociology of the military, so too has such a division been posited for higher education. Randall Collins provides a social rather than economic approach, commenting on the distinction between functional and conflict theories of education. He notes that the latter (which he regarded as being largely correct) originated with Max Weber, and the idea that social stratification was determined in “struggles among status groups” (Collins, 1971, p. 1002). In terms of the functional theories, economists themselves had identified some weaknesses in their descriptions of economic growth and social action, and two streams diverged:

One, characteristic of the work of most sociologists, sees the actor as socialized and action as governed by social norms, rules, and obligations [...] The other intellectual stream, characteristic of the work of most economists, sees the actor
as having goals independently arrived at, as acting independently, as wholly self-interested. (Coleman, 1988, p. S95)

In this reading, the functional view was no longer sufficient. The focus shifted to the question of how these social norms, rules, and obligations should be theorised, with Collins seeing this in terms of social conflict and competition. This has led to a variety of ideas that relate to one another more in the sense of Wittgenstein’s “family resemblances” rather than in terms of direct relationships, and though screening and reproduction are not synonymous, they are related. Work on social capital, such as Robert Putnam’s work from the 1970s onwards on subsequently collected in *Bowling Alone* (2000), as well as James Coleman’s work referenced above, would also feature here. Another important strain of this argument was Pierre Bourdieu’s work on cultural capital and education in both *Distinction* (1996) and *Homo Academicus* (1988).

Bourdieu uses this work on different types of capital (e.g. Bourdieu, 1986), which leads to the question of “screening” and social reproduction. As understood by Bourdieu and Collins, these ideas applied initially to elite education, then following on with the massification of higher education systems, further stratification within this mass system emerged, meaning that screening was maintained if not extended within systems of mass higher education. Trow made this point in his original essay. The transition from elite to mass systems comes primarily not from the expansion of the elite institutions but with the development of “popular, non-elite institutions” (1973, p. 94), such as the regional technical colleges. In the transition from elite to mass systems, elite institutions may be changed somewhat but they endure, along with their screening and stratifying functions, within the massifying systems. A basic definition is as follows:

> the power of "ascribed" groups may be the prime basis of selection in all organizations, and technical skills are secondary considerations depending on the balance of power. Education may thus be regarded as a mark of membership in a particular group (possibly at times its defining characteristic), not a mark of technical skills or achievement. (Collins, 1971, p. 1008)

Previously, in its elite phase, higher education had been only open to a tiny proportion of the population. With the expansion of higher education, this special status can come under threat, which may provoke a response. In an earlier phase of educational expansion in Prussia for instance, there was a process of “social closure” in response to
education moving the basis of social position from “ascribed status” to “meritocratic achievement”, whereby “the traditional elites added the symbolic power of academic degrees to their traditional economic and social privileges” (Windolf, 1997, p. 44). A crude distinction would be to say that if functional theories of higher education were about what you know, conflict theories are about who you know, or even simply who you are. This is a world of “individual status competition” (ibid., p. 12), where the prestige of a qualification is the determining factor of individual worth in a job market, all things being equal. As such, signalling is what the individual does to demonstrate they are worth hiring (demand side), and screening is what employers do to find those they think would be worth hiring (supply side). Social reproduction might then be understood as the sum result of these two processes interacting.

3.5 Summary

This chapter brought different strands of literature relating to higher education and the military. Military institutions of higher education have a long history, and were central to the emergence of the modern military professional officer. The examples used here were primarily from the United States, not just because of their publication in English, but also because there is a detailed literature due to the fact that the US armed forces are the largest in the western world. It is important, therefore, to remain aware that the American experience of military higher education is but one possibility among many.

The sociology of the professions offers a generalisable way to understand how higher education might function for a profession such as the military. Jurisdiction, for instance, is a useful way to approach the Irish Defence Forces if they are seen as ‘doing security’ in the case of the Army sharing or competing over this with other groups such as the Department of Defence or An Garda Síochána.

In terms of broader trends, Ireland saw a massification of its higher education system between the 1960s and 1990s, with continuing expansion of student numbers up to the present (Hazelkorn et al., 2015, p. 246). This may have had some relevance to the question of university education for officers. If in the civilian world higher education was
becoming a norm, it would have been advantageous for the Defence Forces as an organisation (as well as individual officers) to offer this as part of the military professional career. In human capital terms, higher education would also have been advantageous for both officer and organisation when retirement came along if those leaving the organisation had a degree as their personal ‘store’ of higher education, or as a credential, should they choose to seek employment. The question of screening and reproduction is also relevant here, not just in terms of the overlaps this argument has with matters of professional jurisdiction external to the organisation, but also perhaps internal to the organisation in terms of a further means of differentiating officers from other ranks.

A significant lacuna here, however, is any literature on the experience of military officers in civilian higher education. The main reason for this is the fact that most countries educate their officers in specifically military academies of higher education, and so the attendance of military officers at civilian HEIs is effectively incidental to this. Recent work on this topic, for instance, includes a PhD thesis from the U.K. considering the experience of serving and retired military personnel in the higher education context, but this unfortunately does not include differentiation by regular and reserve, enlisted or commissioned, serving or retired (Webb, 2014, p. 62), which didn’t allow for comparison. As such, it is important to focus on this aspect of the experience of serving officers in civilian higher education as a key contribution of this dissertation. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the nature of higher education for officers in the Irish Defence Forces by way of context for Ireland.
Chapter 4: Irish Permanent Defence Forces

4.1 Structure of the Defence Forces

The Irish constitution, *Bunreacht na hÉireann* sets out that the right to “raise and maintain military or armed forces is vested exclusively in the Oireachtas” (Article 15.6). It continues, stipulating that “[n]o military or armed force, other than a military or armed force raised and maintained by the Oireachtas, shall be raised or maintained for any purpose whatsoever.” The Defence Act 1954 sets out the structure of the Defence Forces as follows:

The Defence Forces shall consist of — (a) a defence force to be called and known as na Buan–Óglaigh or (in English) the Permanent Defence Force, comprising army, naval and air components, and (b) a defence force to be called and known as na hÓglaigh Cúltaca or (in English) the Reserve Defence Force, comprising army, naval and air components. (Article 2.18)

This makes the Defence Forces - in Irish Óglaigh na hÉireann - comprising the Permanent Defence Forces (PDF) and the Reserve Defence Forces (RDF), the constitutionally legitimate military force of Ireland. The focus of this thesis is the PDF, as officers in the RDF do not undergo a course of cadet training, and their involvement in the military is part-time.

The PDF is made up of three branches, the Army, the Naval Service, and the Air Corps. In a review of Irish military spending, a government report gives the following overview of the PDF:

This is a small, professional military force with an authorised full-strength complement of 9,500 personnel. The PDF is centred on a land component – the Army – which is an all-arms, light / mechanised infantry based force with an authorised ceiling of 7,519 personnel. Augmenting the Army are limited air and naval components, the Air Corps and Naval Service, which have authorised ceilings respectively of 887 and 1,094 personnel. (DPER, 2017, p. 9)

In a written answer to a Dáil question, the Minister of State at the Department of Defence set out the most recent breakdown of PDF personnel by branch and gender (though not divided by commissioned and other ranks), summarised in Table 1. At the
time of writing, the Taoiseach Leo Varadkar was the Minister of Defence, and Paul Keogh
TD was a junior minister. Defence thus does not have a full seat at the cabinet table.

Table 1: PDF numbers by branch and gender, as of March 31st 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Naval Service</th>
<th>Air Corps</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female Personnel</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Personnel</td>
<td>7185</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>8847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7683</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>9443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Female</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Male</td>
<td>93.5%</td>
<td>93.5%</td>
<td>95.6%</td>
<td>93.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Dáil Debates, 18 April, 2019, Vol 982, No. 3, Col. 18206.

4.2 Writing about the Irish military

The majority of scholarly literature relating to the history of the Irish Defence Forces is
historical in approach and can be divided into two broad types: the wider security
context; and the institution of the Defence Forces itself, and its activities. There are
other types of works such as ‘unit histories’ but these are beyond the scope of this study
as they have no bearing on the USAC scheme itself. Similar is the less significant thread
of memoirs by retired Army personnel detailing their experiences, both as officers
(Goggin, 2013; Moriarty, 2011) and as an enlisted soldier (Malone, 2006). None address
the topic of USAC.

The first type of work focuses on the security context, in terms of specific periods of
conflict, such as the War of Independence, or the Irish experience of the Second World
War, known as ‘the Emergency’ (e.g. Wills, 2007). The preeminent example is Eunan
O’Halpin’s Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its Enemies since 1922 (1999). This
analyses Irish security policy since the foundation of the state, with a focus on intelligence, but includes material on the Defence Forces; O’Halpin also authored a shorter piece on the Army since 1922 (1996). Other scholars have given attention to the wider security context by considering defence policy broadly (Salmon, 1979), issues relating to collective security (Tonra, 2005), or issues relating to Irish ‘neutrality’ or non-alignment (Driscoll, 1982; Jesse, 2006; Salmon, 1987; Tonra, 2012). Some of these works can be drawn on for discussions of the Defence Forces, but most often their focus is the broader security context, in which the Defence Forces and its constitutive branches are simply elements of a wider security or historical architecture.

A second strand of historical writing focuses on the institution of the Defence Forces itself, and its activities. The primary example of this literature is John P. Duggan’s *A History of the Irish Army* (1991), which was the first full-length study on any element of the Defence Forces. Duggan makes no mention, however, of the Defence Forces sending cadets to university in 1969, nor does he include much on interactions with wider society. There are a few monographs dealing with the Air Corps and the Naval Service (Adams, 1982; MacCarron, 1996; McIvor, 1994), but none refer to cadet education or training. Recent years have seen an increase in the number of publications relating to peacekeeping (Campbell, 2014; Doyle, 2006; D. Harvey, 2001, 2017; H. McDonald, 1993), as well as internal security and ‘Aid To Civil Power’ (ATCP) activities during the Troubles (D. Harvey, 2018; Mulroe, 2017), which have considerably expanded and deepened our understanding of the Defence Forces. A significant publication is Michael Martin’s *Breaking Ranks: The Shaping of Civil-Military Relations in Ireland* (2016) which focuses on the ‘Army Crisis’ over pay and conditions in the 1980s.

Another important work is Tom Hodson’s *The College: The Irish Military College, 1930 – 2000* (2016), which is of direct relevance to this research. Hodson traces the development of the Defence Forces’ Military College, a “university of the army” (p. 22), from the early years of the Irish state. The advent of the USAC scheme is discussed, drawing on a Master’s thesis written by a serving army officer, Barry O’Brien (1978), as well as original research conducted in the Military Archives, which gives some
institutional context for the decision to send Irish cadets to UCG. Hodson’s work traces the vagaries of Irish military education, and the centrality of officer training and development to the cohesion and identity of the Defence Forces as a whole, especially in periods of change in Irish military tactical doctrine, often provoked by external geopolitical or internal security developments.

Another strand of literature is non-historical work on the Defence Forces. Examples include Theo Farrell’s trio of articles (1997, 1998, 2001) on Irish military professionalism from an international relations perspective. Passing mention is made of Irish personnel in Charles Moskos’s Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force (1976a), a sociological study of the international United Nations peacekeeping force in the UNFICYP mission in Cyprus in the 1970s. A significant work of sociologically informed research on the Defence Forces is a PhD thesis by then-serving Army Captain Tom Clonan, drawing on interviews with enlisted and commissioned female personnel in the Irish Army to undertake “a detailed sociological, semiotic and cultural analysis of the army culture in order to ascertain whether or not a systematic gender division of labour (role), and status (rank, power) exists within the organisation” (2000, p. 2). Clonan uses ‘role’ here without reference to role theory, and does not discuss USAC, but offers the only detailed social scientific research on the Irish Defence Forces to date.

Irish Defence Policy

O’Halpin summarises the Irish military situation and the “undue pre-eminence” of the civilian side, namely Department of Defence, over the Army from the earliest years of the state, stating that “[c]ivilian hegemony was attained primarily through financial controls, assisted by continuity: in the first thirty-five years of the state’s existence there were a dozen chiefs of staff, but just two secretaries of defence” (1999, p. 88). The supremacy of the Department of Finance was long recognised within government, and “acknowledged by the practice of submitting bills originating from other departments to Finance for approval before final drafting” (Foster, 1988, p. 522). Both before the Emergency and after, Finance maintained a policy of starving the Army of funding. The Defence Forces in effect marked time between 1946 and 1960, until the start of
international operations with the UN (Gaughan, 1991, p. 441). But only in the 1980s did the Irish government begin to look seriously at the Defence Forces in terms of setting out defence policies and strategies. The following section is a summary of some of the more relevant aspects of these in terms of the Defence Forces as an organisation, and the working lives of PDF officers.

The Report of the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence Forces, known as the Gleeson Report after its chairperson, was published in 1990. The commission was set up in response to the ‘Army Crisis’ over pay in the 1980s (Martin, 2016, p. 126). Initially looking solely at pay and conditions, it recommended a “radical overhaul” in the Defence Forces’ “structures, organisation and deployment, financial management systems, facilities and resources, manpower and recruitment policy and personnel management systems” (S. Burke, 2004, p. 14). In noting these problems, the report also directly addressed what it viewed as an unhealthy relationship whereby

There seems to have been a failure to effect timely changes such as would improve the general working environment within the Defence Forces. Given the developments in the public service generally in recent years in relation to systems of promotion, the failure to bring about necessary changes in the promotion system for officers cannot escape criticism. (Gleeson, 1990, p. 16)

This should not have been news to anyone, as the Report of Public Services Organisation Review Group (1969), known as the Devlin report, described “an enormously wasteful administrative system where everything was in effect done twice, once in the military and once in the civilian side of Defence, which placed a pointless premium on checking and control at the expense of effectiveness” (O’Halpin, 1999, p. 265). The Gleeson report went further to note “a certain suspicion and lack of trust between military and civil managements” which meant that the policy over decades of “enfeeblement” of the Defence Forces “not only wasted administrative time and man power, but also caused deep-rooted resentment” (Campbell, 2014, pp. 155–156).

The most significant recommendation for officers, subsequently implemented, was a move away from promotion by seniority, where promotion beyond Captain was based solely on an officer’s final position in their Cadet Class. Under the new system,
promotion to Captain from the ranks of second lieutenant (2Lt) and lieutenant (Lt) takes place after a fixed period of seven years. Beyond captain, promotion is competitive through the process of “promotion on merit” (Clonan, 2000, p. 201). This fundamentally changed how officers looked at their career prospects, and was a significant change to the organisational culture of the PDF. USAC also was briefly mentioned in this report, where it notes that the Army is able to attract more candidates with the promise of attending university, unlike the Naval Service and Air Corps (discussed in Chapter 7).

The next significant government policy to emerge was the 2000 *White Paper on Defence*. This was the state’s first comprehensive policy statement on defence, mooted as part of the Government’s “Action Programme for the Millennium”, and was to set out a “medium term strategy for defence covering the period up to 2010”, explicitly relating it to the reform process initiated through the Gleeson Commission (DoD, 2000, §1.1.1-2). It noted that Ireland operated in a “benign security environment” without any external threats, and that the internal security situation had been transformed by the Good Friday Agreement (§2.1). As such it set out a need for the PDF to operate alongside military forces from other countries (maintaining a role for the PDF in international commitments such as UN peacekeeping), but also incorporating European military responsibilities in the wake of both the end of the Cold War and the resulting destabilisation on Europe’s borders, as well as EU policy priorities outlined in the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties.

The 2007 follow up review of the White Paper’s implementation noted developments such as the changed international security environment in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. and the “asymmetric threat posed by Islamist extremism” (2007, p. 3). It noted the successful implementation of a reduction in Defence Forces numbers of 1000 from 11,500 to 10,500 to achieve a “balance of 70:30 in terms of pay to non-pay ratio in the defence budget” (pp. 16, 7), a continuation of the process described by Clonan as the “organisational decline and the downsizing of the PDF” since 1998 (2000, pp. 21–22). In terms of the internal organisational environment, it also mentioned the establishment of an “external advisory committee” in the wake of
“allegations of bullying and harassment in the Defence Forces in 2001”. The contents and recommendations of the resulting report in 2002 were accepted in full (p. 14); Clonan’s (2000) PhD thesis goes into considerable detail on the sexual harassment and bullying faced by women in the Defence Forces in this period. The most significant contemporary document is the 2015 White Paper on Defence, setting out a ten-year policy agenda, a significant element of which was a focus on retirement benefits in order to reduce costs.

**Civil-military relations**

In international terms, a specific feature of the Irish Defence Forces is their unusually subordinate position in political and funding terms, alluded to above. Irish politicians and civil servants have played a considerable role in determining the nature of civilian control of the military in Ireland, largely following Huntington’s (1957, p. 437) observation that control over budgets is the most effective form of control in civil-military relations. The perceived need for strong civil control of the military in Ireland stems from the Anglo-Irish War of 1919-21 with the declared “institutions of the visionary republic [...] the Dáil on one side, the IRA on the other, with authority very uncertainly distributed between them” (Foster, 1988, p. 495). Martin (2016, pp. 61–75) traces the outline of this period, concluding that it convincingly established civilian supremacy in civil-military relations for the years following. Whereas usually a policy of neutrality (discussed below) would imply maintaining a “credible military deterrent” (Callaghan & Murphy, 2006, p. 204) as in countries such as Switzerland or Finland, this has not been the case for Ireland, and perceived underfunding has instead been an ongoing issue.

An alternative approach to considering the relative strength and weakness of state and military can be seen in Ireland’s military organisation and doctrine. This is evident in the tactical contradiction between what the Defence Forces given their size could do, and what they chose to do. Farrell (1997, 1998, 2001) examined the post-Independence history of the Irish Army, from 1922 onwards, and how the organization as a whole came to define the notion of the Irish military professional. He notes clear evidence in policy
that the Irish Army from the outset of the new Irish Free State modelled itself on the British Army rather than maintaining the doctrine and tactics that had won independence:

In fact the Irish Army had other compelling reasons to imitate the British. First, the driving mission of the new Irish Army from 1921-25 was the same as that of the former British occupiers, namely, suppression of internal rebellion. Second, it contained many men who had served in the British Army. Third, it must have seemed natural for the Army to model itself on its British equivalents, since that was what the rest of the Irish government was doing. (Farrell, 1998, pp. 77–78)

Here the literature on institutional norms and isomorphism is clearly discernible. The 'Irish military way' to this point was guerrilla warfare, but in the context of Ireland’s civil war, a military doctrine based on guerrilla warfare led to fears that this would weaken the civil grip on control of the military, the central concern of Irish civil-military relations at least since 1924. Guerrilla warfare implies decentralised command, anathema to Irish civil-military relations, as such an approach could potentially “fuel patriotic dreams of fostering insurrection within Northern Ireland” (O’Halpin, 1999, p. 264).

Ambiguity characterises this question at the official level, where it has been suggested there is a contradiction between defence policy and practice (O’Halpin, 1999, p. 259), most starkly that there was “suicidal defence planning” (Farrell, 1998) and an “enfeeblement” of the Army (Farrell, 1997) in the early years of the state, and what has been described as a “‘weak’ state” security policy during the Troubles (Mulroe, 2017, p. 232). This is not simply of historical interest, however, as structural legacies endure today in terms of the power of the Defence Forces vis-à-vis the Department of Defence. The Chief of Staff does not directly command troops, and military control of personnel is split between the GOCs of the first Brigade in the south of the country, and the second Brigade in the north. The Chief of Staff in effect reports to the Secretary General of the Department of Defence, and unlike the Garda Commissioner, has very little accounting authority in terms of how money is allocated; approval for spending had to go through the Department, with an emphasis on civilian control maintained in this respect.

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4.3 What the Defence Forces are For

One question which has arisen in discussions – as well as in the course of interviews for this study – is the purpose of the Defence Forces. While the ‘operational’ roles are set out officially, in a more abstract sense the purpose of the Irish Defence Forces is not so unambiguous. This is significant because it also goes to the centre of the individual officer’s sense of purpose. O’Halpin sets out five reasons why Ireland needed an Army:

1. “as a matter of national pride and a symbol of virile independence.”
2. “the state needed an army to lay claim to the mantle of the Irish Volunteers, who had begun the fight for freedom in 1916, lest this be appropriated by the republican IRA.”
3. “the state needed to provide an effective counterweight to violent republicanism, as the police were generally unarmed.”
4. “in times of crisis the existence of the army gave the government ready access to a supplementary and draconian system of justice not based on the delicate checks and balances of the civil constitution, but on the robust imperatives of national defence.”
5. “the state needed an army for purposes of national defence.” (1999, pp. 82–83)

The first two can be regarded as to some extent symbolic or performative, and concern the legitimacy and legitimisation of the Irish state as a modern nation state, in line with Weber’s minimal definition of the state as having monopoly over the exercise of force or violence. The next two rationales given are considerably more functional (though still with symbolic aspects). These concern internal security, and the immediate situation of a state that gained independence and almost immediately was faced with civil war and subsequent open or clandestine militaristic groups. The Army then existed to maintain the stability of the state, and here we see the early roots of ATCP, which became especially important during the Troubles (Mulroe, 2017). More prosaic examples of such activities would include the mass slaughter of livestock of livestock affected by foot and mouth disease and their subsequent disposal, in 1941 (Duggan, 1991, p. 200). The final reason O’Halpin presents is what people might regard as central when they think of a military. “National defence”, perhaps surprisingly, comes last here, but this is conditioned by those reasons preceding it. Geopolitics in large part dictates Ireland’s
military situation in terms of national defence, as it sits under the ‘defence umbrella’ of the United Kingdom. The following sections will consider the different roles and activities of the Irish Defence Forces.

**Non-alignment/Neutrality**

Driscoll, writing during the Cold War, was unambiguous in his position on this aspect of Irish policy, writing

> Irish ‘neutrality’ is, at best, a shibboleth. ‘Neutrality’ is, properly speaking, a status of impartiality in wartime. If by Irish ‘neutrality’ what is meant is a policy of impartiality towards the Eastern blocs, then that really refers to non-alignment, and does not characterise Irish foreign policy. (1982, p. 55)

Former Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald wrote that

> [a]ll neutralities are contingent, but perhaps Ireland’s is even more contingent that most. Although the roots of Irish neutrality go back to the foundation of the State, in its present form it is largely the accidental, indeed unintended, product of somewhat later events. (2005, p. 121)

As the weak position of the Irish military vis-à-vis the government must be understood in the context of the Civil War, so too must Ireland’s status as a non-aligned or neutral country be understood in the historical context following independence and especially the Second World War. It can also plausibly be attributed to geography or geopolitics. Describing British pacifism, James Sheehan writes that “the peace movement was stronger than anywhere in Europe” and critics maintained that “was based on a mistaken sense of invulnerability” (2007, p. 36), which supporters of the popular notion of Irish neutrality might be said to share.

In ‘The Emergency’, however, what neutrality actually meant in practical terms did not necessarily correspond with official rhetoric. Archives released in the 2000s allowed for a re-evaluation of Ireland’s wartime neutrality (White & Riley, 2008, p. 144). Thus O’Halpin (1999) explored extensive Irish-British cooperation in intelligence, and Wills (2007) focused on culture and the everyday experience of wartime neutrality in Ireland. FitzGerald writes that it’s “questionable whether Ireland can properly be described as having been ‘neutral’ in the war, because the scale of assistance that it gave to Britain secretly was scarcely compatible with the concept of neutrality under international law”,

Ireland subsequently remained outside the fold of NATO in the post-war period, and efforts to get the United States to supply arms to Ireland were “discreetly” scuppered by the British, given what they argued was Ireland’s strategic irrelevance – as well as not wanting Ireland spending outside the sterling area (ibid., p. 266). This contributed to the lassitude in the Defence Forces that many authors have traced in the wake of the Second World War, which was to remain the case until the early 1960s, when greater international involvement and a deteriorating internal security situation compelled the Defence Forces to modernise. Ireland was to remain neutral, but the PDF acquired an international role.

**International Peacekeeping and Multi-Lateral Operations**

Ireland joined the UN in 1955, and the first full UN peacekeeping operations began in 1956. Two years later, in 1958, Ireland sent – at the request of the UN – unarmed officers to serve as members of the UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). This began Ireland’s involvement in peacekeeping – and Lebanon – which has continued almost uninterrupted ever since. 1960 saw the first armed contribution of the Defence Forces abroad, to the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC). “This operation lasted four years and, before it concluded, it came close to bringing about the break-up of the UN. It also cost the lives of a number of members of the Irish Defence Forces” (Dorr, 2010, p. 64). Nevertheless, by the end of the decade,

what had begun as a quiet experiment in 1958 had transformed the outlook of the defence forces. They had also become an important arm of foreign policy in a manner which no one had expected, and the public had grown used to the idea that through army involvement in UN service the state could make a meaningful contribution to the enhancement of security and the promotion of peace in different parts of the world. (O’Halpin, 1999, p. 273)

The “gloss began to fade” with the deterioration of the situation in Lebanon (ibid.), but nevertheless a commitment to international obligations was maintained.
As one retired PDF officer describes it, “being without colonial baggage and remaining uncompromised by superpower affiliations or influence, Ireland also established an enviable reputation as an impartial ‘honest broker’” in its peacekeeping operations (Heaslip, 2006, p. 41), an interesting if unintended consequence of Ireland’s enduring ‘neutrality’. Peacekeeping is now a central aspect of PDF personnel’s service, to the extent that in 2015 67% of all Army personnel had served on such overseas missions (Burke & Marley, 2015, p. 5). A former Chief of Staff mentions operational implications of this UN service, writing that: “[o]ur overseas experience fed into our internal security role in the ‘Aid To Civil Power’ (ATCP) operations of the 1970s and 1980s. Our ATCP experience was very valuable in the later multi-dimensional UN missions” (Sreenan, 2006, p. 21). Indeed, he also mentions the USAC scheme as being relevant to this:

Likewise, the decision to make third-level education a prerequisite for our officer corps, starting in the 1960s, paid dividends when these officers, on reaching middle-management positions, had to grapple with situations far beyond the scope of military training.

These international activities were to become the second significant responsibility for the Defence Forces.

Subsequent decades have seen a change in terms of the activities the Defence Forces have been involved in, beyond UN peacekeeping, such as military operations activities linked to EU membership. One concrete example of this involvement is the funding given by the EU to Ireland for the Naval Service’s fisheries protection and other interdiction activities (O’Halpin, 1999, p. 342). Ireland also has military obligations as a consequence of EU membership and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP, formerly European Security and Defence Policy), the current form of which derives from the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. Ireland was involved in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Planning And Review Process (PARP), both of which involved interoperability in the context of what it calls “peace support operations” (DoD, 2007, pp. 10-12), including NATO’s role in the Balkans through Kosovo Force (KFOR).
Aid To The Civil Power (ATCP) and Internal Security

Internal security activities are not just an important part of the Defence Forces, but according to O’Halpin are the only explanation of the “paradox of Irish defence policy up to the 1990s”, as the Army has been used “overwhelmingly as a guarantor of internal rather than external security”. From the 1990s onward the Naval Service (and to an extent the Air Corps) had responsibility for EU fisheries protection activities. The “formal doctrine of external defence”, however, in fact had a subtext which was not that Ireland could “stand up for itself against military aggression from all comers and to police its own skies and waters, but rather to suppress militarism within the state” (O’Halpin, 1999, p. 350). Such suppression of subversion was a necessary role for the PDF throughout the Emergency, and up to the 1950s with the ‘Border Campaign’ of the IRA.

It was other activities, however, included under the miscellaneous heading of ATCP, that kept the Defence Forces busy. These activities were varied, from the Army helping farmers in the winter of 1953-1954 with the flooding of the river Shannon, later helping with the threshing during a poor summer with the harvest in danger, to helping with bin collection and public transport during strikes (Moriarty, 2011, pp. 68, 72–73, 235). Duggan writes that

The Defence Forces are truly the people’s army, and all these tasks give them a chance to show it. Such chores, ill-fitting as they are, like the others such as police support and UN commitments, give the forces an acceptable visible public image and attract for them resources that might not otherwise be allocated. The disadvantage, however, is that all these activities tend to deflect the Forces from its primary role of defence. (Duggan, 1991, p. 248)

It was at the outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland in 1968 when the Defence Forces’ ATCP activities took on a decidedly military aspect. As An Garda Síochána was established as an unarmed police force, the Defence Forces were obliged to assist the Gardaí’s operations, and work with the British Army on cross-border operations. These forms of cooperation could sometimes be fraught, and interactions between the two military forces needed to be conducted through the Gardaí, given that the Irish Army was present in aid to the civil power, and not ‘in its own right’. Patrick Mulroe traces the
early years of the state’s response, observing that the Army was “ill equipped to serve any military role at the time and was confined primarily to care of refugees and displays for propaganda purposes” (2017, p. 22). The difficulty was that the Defence Forces had spent the previous decade adjusting to their new role, “from a post-Emergency force, organised for static defence, into a professional peacekeeping force” (Campbell, 2014, p. 282). In time, however, the government responded, and Roy Foster notes that “[o]ne of the less noticed achievements of the Provisionals was the expansion and change in function of the Irish Army. It doubled in size between 1969 and 1979, and shifted its emphasis to anti-subversive activity” (2007, p. 120).

This massive expansion also led to a change in the career structure of the officer corps of the Irish Defence Forces, leading to a phenomenon known within the Defence Forces as “The Hump”. Much larger cadet classes from 1969 onwards meant a much larger number of junior officers, but much the same number of mid-career and senior appointments. These junior officers could expect to spend longer periods at junior ranks than their predecessors, and had fewer promotional prospects.

This expansion, along with increasing involvement in international peacekeeping starting in the previous decade, is the context in which the Defence Forces started to send cadets to university in Galway through USAC in 1969. This means that in the period under discussion when USAC was founded, the PDF were at their busiest in terms of both internal and external operations since the Emergency. The Defence Forces were not just being ‘kept busy’, however, but having to fundamentally reconsider their purpose, and whether their personnel were being adequately trained and prepared for the changing nature of the organisation’s activities and responsibilities.

4.4 Military education - Cadet Selection and Training

The PDF is structured like other militaries into two groups, with enlisted personnel being the majority (in Irish military parlance the “other ranks”), and commissioned officers. Similar to other professions, becoming an officer involves passing through a set of procedures and institutions that educate, train, and socialise an individual to become a
part of the Defence Forces. As set out in the Defence Act, the Minister of Defence is empowered to “establish a Military College and so many other institutions as he thinks necessary for the training and instruction of members of the Defence Forces” (1954, 27.1). The Military College at the Curragh, Co. Kildare, was established in 1930, following military missions to France and the United States to investigate how those countries approached the training of officers (rather than the vaguer “members” the Act describes) (Hodson, 2016, pp. 40–41, 54).

A central element of the Military College is the Cadet School, where the military education and training of officers-to-be takes place. Though there have been some minor variations over time, the essential phases of initial screening and selection before entry, and three stages of military training within the military post-entry have remained the same. Defence Forces Regulations (DFR A.3) sets out the regulations pertaining to the individual cadet, while Defence Forces Regulations (DFR C.S.3) outlined their training and the institutional setting and requirements, and the most recent terms and conditions for officer cadetships in the Defence Forces (DF T&C, 2019).

An open competition for entry to the cadets is held for qualified candidates who must be either a citizen of Ireland, or any other person who is legally entitled to reside in the state for the necessary training period. McIvor noted that at the time of his writing “applications to serve in the [Irish Naval Service] have been received from former and serving Royal Navy personnel and even from interested candidates of Irish extraction living in the United States” (1994, p. 186). If under 18 years of age a parent/guardian’s permission is required. These individuals must satisfy general physical fitness and medical requirements (including but not restricted to height, vision, and hearing) (DF T&C, 2019, p. 7), educational requirements, “be of good character and satisfy the security clearance requirement” (DFR A.3 4.3.b), and be 18 years of age and under 26 years of Age on 1 September of the year of application. Those under 18 years of age require the permission of a parent/guardian. Entry is available to university graduates, school leavers and non-graduates, and serving personnel (DF T&C, 2019). There are differences within each branch between line officers and technical officers, with the
latter receiving higher pay. In the Army for instance, line officers are in e.g. the infantry, artillery, cavalry, with technical officers in ordnance, engineering etc. There are also “direct entry commissions”, such as medical personnel (also technical officers), who are commissioned directly into the Defence Forces without undertaking a cadetship.

Upon completion of their cadet training applicants not in possession of a Level 8 degree (or higher) are commissioned as second lieutenants (2Lts, ensign in the Naval Service). Those in possession of a Level 8+ qualification come in via the graduate entry route (introduced in 2005) and are commissioned as lieutenants (Lt, sub-lieutenant in the Naval Service), with the higher pay and allowances that go along with that rank (T&C, 2019, p. 27). Generally, graduate entrants are older in light of their higher education – and often employment – experience, while non-graduate entrants are more often school leavers. In recent years the balance of graduate to non-graduate entrants was skewed in favour of the former, but the 2018/19 cadet class has reversed this trend, with a majority being non-graduates.

Cadet training today follows a three-stage model, and takes 15 months divided up as follows:

1. Induction (Three Months);
2. Foundation (Six Months);
3. Core (Six Months).

Cadets in the Naval Service undergo the first stage of their military training in the Military College in common with Army cadets, and then finish their training in the Naval College (which includes studying for a degree). Air Corps cadets undergo the first two stages of their training in the Curragh, subsequently completing their studies in the Air Corps College. Training in these Naval and Air Corps stages take longer than their Army equivalents due to other technical qualifications (watchkeeping and pilot training). As part of this training, all cadets also undertake a diploma in “Leadership, Management and Defence Studies”, integrated with their 15 months of training in the Cadet School. This is delivered by Maynooth University, through the Centre for Military History and
Strategic Studies within the Department of History, along with the Department of Adult Education, and functions as the military education component of the cadetship.

An alternative route to becoming an officer in the Defence Forces is to be commissioned from the ranks (CFR), upon completion of a Potential Officers Course. This is relatively infrequent, and the commissioning of 24 officers in March 2019 was only the tenth such Potential Officers Class in the history of the Defence Forces. An alternative route for enlisted personnel is to go for a cadetship through the standard route, assuming they fulfil other eligibility requirements (most notably age); these individuals receive “bonus points” in their cadetship interviews. Those going through the Potential Officers Course route are usually over the maximum age of 26 for a cadetship, and undergo a much shorter, separate course of training to cadets.

**Higher Education for Officers**

There are a number of higher education routes within the PDF. The first is Bachelor level degree studies after commissioning, when newly commissioned officers who did not enter the cadets through the graduate entry route select from a preapproved list of courses to study, as approved by the Director of Defence Forces Training and Education. I requested this list via FOIR, but at the time of submission of this thesis this request had not been responded to. The majority of these are in NUI Galway, but a minority attended other HEIs, such as Dublin Institute of Technology. This route started in 1969 as the University Service Administrative Complement (USAC) scheme in Galway. Prior to the introduction of USAC, all officer education and training took place within the Military College, and occasionally in foreign military colleges abroad, as detailed by Hodson (2016). It is worth noting here that this process of educating officers to degree level exclusively in civilian universities appears to be unique to the Irish context.

Officers attending NUI Galway are expected to stay in the USAC building beside Renmore Barracks, in Galway City. USAC students (as PDF officers studying in NUI Galway will be described) are required to adhere to military discipline, to reside in the USAC building – described as a “Military Barracks” (DF T&C p. 27), but actually outside the walls of
Renmore Barracks – and to wear their military uniform to university. USAC students have their normal pay and allowances as second lieutenants while at university, and the costs of their education (in terms of textbooks and instruments etc) are met by the Defence Forces, but “remain the property of the Minister for Defence” (DF T&C p. 27).

Consequently, officers attending university after completing their training are obliged to agree to “an undertaking” (DFR A.3 §7 p.5), which is a contract stating that before leaving the PDF voluntarily they will refund the cost of their education (including pay and allowances) during their attendance at a HEI. This implies that “[o]fficers who attend third level training will have to serve for a minimum of two years service for every college year they attend whilst a member of the Defence Forces.” This is of relevance to the USAC students, those attending courses later during their career in the PDF such as the Master’s in Leadership Management and Defence Studies (MA LMDS), but also including those studying on their own time who have the costs of their studies met by the Defence Forces.

There is another route linked to a later stage of the PDF’s relationship with civilian higher education, namely the MA LMDS in Maynooth University. This was informed by the Military College’s Command and Staff School’s view that their activities should be “continually improved and remain anchored to wider national standards” (Hodson, 2016, p. 246). This qualification effectively serves as the postgraduate military educational requirement for higher ranks in the PDF, and participation in this Master’s signals an intention to go for further promotion to higher ranks. It requires attendance at lectures delivered in Maynooth, although officers generally reside in the Curragh during this period. In contrast to the USAC route, this is a postgraduate programme where the content for the course is prescribed, and is exclusively military. As part of their evaluation all officers write a thesis, which is lodged at the Military College. This scheme is not included in the present study, however, as it is optional, offered at postgraduate level and takes place after 15 to 20 years service up through the officer ranks.
4.5 Summary

This chapter has given an outline of the history and functions of the Irish Defence Forces, as well as the wider political and policy environment affecting its personnel. While the overview of scholarly literature relating to the Defence Forces is not exhaustive, it is indicative of the type of research that has been undertaken. The USAC scheme is discussed by Hodson in historical terms, considering its origins, but no other author has explored civilian higher education for officers in any detail, nor has wider military socialisation been given attention by the works referred to. Broader sociological work with a clear analytical framework as undertaken by Moskos, Janowitz, or Jolly is absent from the Irish context. Specific characteristics on the Irish Defence Forces and their activities, as well as Irish civil-military relations, may have a bearing on how officers perceive their role, and also may explain how Irish civilians perceive uniformed personnel and the military.
Chapter 5: Methodology

5.1 Introduction: Research Questions

Given that the research questions “determine every facet of the methodology” (Livingstone, 2005, p. 64) of a research project, I have attempted to be thoughtful and reflective in the process of deciding what these questions should be. They were defined through an iterative process of reading literature relating to the ‘problem space’, and returning to the questions to see if they still made sense, a process that “deepens understanding, enhances articulacy, in a dialogue with established work” (Wisker, 2015, p. 71). Two recommendations for the development of research questions suggest that one should “know the area”, and “widen the base of your experience” (Robson, 2000, p. 27). The first is a logical enough suggestion, and I did this through the process of reading literature; the second (which functioned as a way of ‘testing’ the first) involved conversations with individuals with a knowledge of the Irish Defence Forces and the wider context of higher education. During this process I also presented an outline of my proposed research at a summer school at the Centre for Global Higher Education, University College London Institute of Education, as well as a European Sociological Association summer school as another way of testing both my own knowledge and possible wider interest in this topic. At the end of this process, I settled on the following research overarching question: ‘How did officers in the Defence Forces experience civilian higher education at undergraduate level and how did this interact with their professional formation?’ This led to the following research questions:

1. How and why did the Irish Defence Forces establish the USAC scheme to send cadets to university from 1969?
2. What was the experience of those who went to university through the USAC scheme?
3. What were the effects (on the organisation, and on individual personnel) of the introduction of the USAC scheme?
These questions had a number of methodological implications. The first research question merited a historical approach, while the second and third could be addressed from a broadly sociological perspective.

Philosophical Perspective: Gadamerian Hermeneutics

My philosophical assumptions for this research have been conditioned by my previous undergraduate education in philosophy and European languages. When I was a student of philosophy, I was introduced to European continental philosophy of the twentieth century, where I discovered the works of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Gadamer, perhaps though not as well-known as other figures from phenomenology such as Heidegger or Husserl, is nevertheless a significant figure. In his landmark Truth and Method (Gadamer, 2004/1960) Gadamer “confronts what he sees as unnecessarily narrow approaches to understanding the world, especially those that claim […] to be the sole avenues capable of leading to the highest forms of truth” (Porter & Robinson, 2011, p. 82). His work is part of a longer tradition of hermeneutics, starting with the Romantic hermeneuts such as Schleiermacher who sought to understand “the author and his or her socio-historical context over and above understanding the text on its own” (ibid., p. 7).

This was later generalised, finding expression in Heidegger’s idea of our nature as beings situated in the world, with a responsibility to understand ourselves and the world as such. We are thinking beings ‘thrown’ into the world (Heidegger’s term is Geworfenheit or ‘thrownness’), implicated in a ‘hermeneutic circle’ of understanding. The hermeneutic circle, according to John D. Caputo, goes back to Luther and the idea that each part of biblical scripture should be read in the light of the whole; Heidegger extended this to turn it into an ontological circle, where “our very Being is to interpret our Being” (2018, p. 35). Caputo elsewhere describes this as Heidegger’s “onto-hermeneutics” (1987, p. 174), whereby the project of Being and Time was to explain Being’s (onto-) meaning (hermeneutics). Gadamer took a different path, and instead of the Heideggerian focus on ontology, developed a philosophical hermeneutics, understanding this task of interpretation as the fundamental aspect of how we interact
with the world. Interpreting is our being, it’s the ‘always already’ of existence. Returning to interpreting allowed Gadamer to focus on the “historicality” and “linguisticality” of understanding (Bleicher, 1980, pp. 108–116), encapsulated in his famous formulation in *Truth and Method* that “being that can be understood is language” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 470). As such we all seek to understand “the concepts used by the Other, be it a text or a thou” (Bleicher, p. 114).

Broadly speaking, such a philosophical perspective entails certain ontological and epistemological assumptions, in terms of my own situatedness as a researcher, as well as the situatedness of my research, given that “any empiricist attempt to describe things ‘as they are’ is doomed to failure” (Silverman, 2012, p. 33). This means it is necessary to attempt to maintain an awareness of this context and to appreciate it self-reflexively. This perspective welcomes various types of evidence, gathered in various manners, such as written documents (e.g. official reports, newspaper articles, etc.) or semi-structured interviews. It also allows for various theories and interpretations, or self-interpretations. It further inheres the notion that the materials and individuals which I am researching are always already open to interpretation, and that the ideas I have of these things are partial and selective. With an understanding of this as my philosophical perspective, I sought to maintain openness to this provisional and reflexive aspect throughout my research, and to integrate it into my conceptual framework, the methods I employ, as well as how I have understood the literature.

**Qualitative Research Design**

Having set out the research questions and framework, the next stage was to “determine the type of study which should be carried out” so that the proposed inquiry can be “operationalized” (Livingstone, 2005, p. 64). Looking to the research questions, one can determine the kind of research design a study requires. This study’s research questions aimed at tracing the outlines of the phenomenon of higher education for military officers. A qualitative design is most appropriate, given the historical element in the first research question, and the insights I sought to gain through the second and third
research questions through interviews. I am concerned with the qualities of things, rather than their quantity (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013, p. 3).

The aim of this study is descriptive and exploratory (Thomas, 2011, p. 104), given that there has been no sociological research on the USAC scheme, nor of military officers being educated in civilian institutions of higher education further afield. Aside from the MA study of the USAC scheme less than a decade after its implementation (O’Brien, 1978), which took more of a quantitative, evaluative and policy-centred approach; there was also reference to USAC in a history of the Irish Military College (Hodson, 2016) as has been noted. This inquiry is a study of higher education and the military in one country, however, and so any explanatory power will be “context-specific” (Thomas, 2011, p. 101), and suggestive at best for other countries. Finally, the nature of the research questions suggest that a case study is the most appropriate approach to take in order to use a variety of sources and methods (Rutterford, 2012, p. 119).

One final point here is that while I make use of insights from grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006), I have not adopted it as a methodology. This distinction – method rather than methodology – is one made by Heaney (2013, p. 107) with reference to biographical narrative inquiry method, and it is one I have adopted here for my purposes. I had undertaken a day-long grounded theory workshop took place in Trinity College through the School of education (2nd March 2016), and following this with reading on various grounded theory approaches, I decided against using it as the methodology for the study. I became aware of various methodological debates, for instance Hammersley observes that in seeking both to represent “concrete situations in their complexity and to produce abstract theory. It thus operates under conflicting requirements” (1992, p. 21). I would note here that in recent years the concept of “multi-grounded theory” (Goldkuhl & Cronholm, 2010, 2018) has emerged, which purports to offer an alternative to the pure inductivist approach of grounded theory, and overcome some of the limitations I describe for my own research. Quite aside from these general debates however, my decision to draw on aspects grounded theory as a method rather than a methodology was due to the following reasons: firstly, the fact of my own personal...
knowledge of the Defence Forces; secondly, I had already undertaken a significant amount of background reading; and thirdly the fact that I would be undertaking some elite interviews (W. S. Harvey, 2011) in the course of my research. Blumer in his work describes the possession and use of a prior picture or scheme of the empirical world being studied as “an unavoidable prerequisite [...] One can see the empirical world only through some scheme or image of it” (1986, p. 24). This still, however, allows for “careful, flexible probing” which “is not preset, routinized, or prescribed” (ibid., pp. 45, 44). As such, developing a thorough grounding in the historical background as well as wider conceptual approaches felt most appropriate as a way of proceeding. I employed aspects of grounded theory in the analysis, which will be discussed below.

5.2 Case Study Approach

A case study can be defined as being an analysis of “persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions or other systems which are studied holistically by one or more methods” (Thomas, 2011, p. 23). It can also be understood as involving “the investigation of a relatively small number of naturally occurring (rather than researcher-created) cases” (Hammersley, 1992, p. 185). By taking a case study approach to inquiry, this research project aims to consider the relationships and processes in place in the Irish Defence Forces from the introduction of higher education in the 1960s to the present. Yin suggests that a case study’s research questions are made up of “how” and “why” questions, and when the researcher has little control over the observed events (2014, pp. 9–14), as with Hammersley above.

The case study, though not a method in itself, is in effect a “wrapper” for different methods (Thomas, 2011, p. 43), bringing coherence to the singular data generated through these methods. In the case of this research project, this ‘singularity’ is found in the various actors and interests involved in the decision-making process to introduce higher education to the Defence Forces, and the individuals affected by this process. A significant strength of the case study is that it can allow for the generation of richer data, as is the case of the anthropological case studies that led Clifford Geertz to famously refer to “thick descriptions” (1973, pp. 3–30). Case studies are effective in capturing
uniqueness and “seeing something in its completeness, looking at it from many angles [...]. Although we cannot generalise from a case study, generalisation is not always what is wanted from the inquiry process” (Thomas, 2011, p. 23; see also Yin, 2014, pp. 20–21).

Thomas defines a case as being made up of two elements, each requiring the other: one is the subject, person, or place being studied; the other being the analytical frame or object (Thomas, 2011, pp. 14–16). The first element here is undergraduate higher education for officers of the Defence Forces in Ireland, the second element is military socialisation broadly conceived. Yin suggests that there are two steps in defining the “case” to be studied, which is to first define the case, and second to bound the case (Yin, 2014, p. 31). Both Yin and Thomas are here giving criteria to set the limits to what is being studied. In terms of ‘bounding’ the case, this requires a start and an end date. How my start date was to be chosen came from the analytical frame being applied to the subject of the Defence Forces, namely the lead up to the introduction of higher education in the 1960s, with the end boundary being the present. Another ‘bounding’ is the question of who is to be studied, and again, it is Irish military officers that that defines this (sample is discussed below).

Why a subject was chosen for a case study can have a number of reasons. It can be sparked by one’s own special knowledge (a “local knowledge case”), it can be interesting in terms of its “differentness” in a wider context (a “special or outlier case”), or it can be a “classic or exemplary case that reveals something from in-depth study” (a “key case”) (Thomas, 2011, p. 76). Of these three, it is partly a local knowledge case, due to my own familiarity with the Army through previous membership of the FCÁ, as well as other family connections (discussed below in Section 5.5). This subject is also in part an “outlier case” by virtue of the fact that, from the work done in the literature review, civilian higher education does not appear to play a role in the training or professional education of other militaries internationally.
In terms of the weaknesses of the case study, Thomas suggests that it is not good for ‘generalising from’. Silverman (2012, pp. 39–41) observes, however, that it is possible to generalize from a single case study, and gives the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas as an example of how one can move from “substantive” to “formal” theory in this regard. Criticism has also been levelled at case studies for questions of rigour (Yin, 2014, pp. 19–20). This can be addressed through following systematic procedures, as well as other means of ensuring the quality of the research design. A related argument from international political economy suggests that case studies have disadvantages relative to quantitative or statistical approaches, such as for testing a theory (Odell, 2001, pp. 172–173). Once again, these drawbacks can be mitigated by a rigorous definition of what the case study is being used for, and like any tool, the case study approach must be understood in terms of its limitations, and what it can and cannot do.

5.3 Data Generation

This study has an exploratory research design, taking a case study approach focusing on the socialisation of military officers within the Irish Defence Forces. It analyses qualitative data generated through a combination of historical and documentary research and semi-structured interviews, informed by a flexible/emergent design. Documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews are employed to address the research objectives. The study draws on qualitative data, with triangulation being achieved through the comparison and interrelation of the archival and documentary data and interview data, as well as the scholarly literature.

**Documentary and Archival Research**

There are a number of reasons for the use of documents in undertaking research. The simplest is perhaps that their use sidesteps the need for direct physical access to individuals or institutions (O’Leary, 2010, p. 220), serving as a material proxy. It also serves as a basis for undertaking other research, through semi-structured interviews in this case. A point to make here is that the primary documents were not designed to address my research questions in the same way that the interview schedule was. Just as the agency of those involved in the semi-structured interviews is to be respected, so too the agency or intentionality of those involved in the composition of these texts must be
appreciated. But the documentary and archival sources are significant as one element of the overall case study approach, and are buttressed and supported by data generated through the semi-structured interviews.

My first step in undertaking this project was to see what had already been done in and around the problem space I have identified, and use these in the identification of relevant archival materials for the period relating to the introduction of the USAC scheme, and more generally in terms of education and training in the Irish Defence Forces. The Defence Forces and Department of Defence archives have been underexploited in terms of the education of their personnel, and especially with reference to the activities of the Commission on Higher Education. The Irish Military Archives located in Cathal Brugha Barracks, Rathmines, Dublin was the primary resource for archival materials. This archive is the official place of deposit for the Department of Defence and the Irish Defence Forces, with records and material spanning the revolutionary period, through the foundation of the state, up to the present day.

Beyond the material in the Military Archives, I drew on legislation and published materials online or in the Berkeley Library’s Official Publications collection. The National Archives’ Department of the Taoiseach records were also useful with respect to some materials relating to the Commission on Higher Education, but their records for the Department of Education proved less satisfactory. Other documentary resources I referred to included digitised newspapers and magazines, such as The Irish Times and Irish Independent, and the Defence Forces’ own publication An Cosantóir (full back issues of which are also in the Military Archive). Finally, parliamentary (Dáil, Seanad, and committee) debates were a useful resource.

Some limitations with working with these materials are that some of the government and military materials remain inaccessible as a consequence of the ‘thirty year rule’, which is the period of time before official records can be transferred to the National Archives or Military Archives, and released to the public. Initially I had considered
including wider experiences of higher education, but as materials relating to the Master’s in LMDS are still under embargo, it would not have been possible to trace the origins-to-implementation of that programme in the same manner as I have done for USAC. It was also not an example of civilian higher education in the same sense that USAC is, so it was not included.

Other issues were that the National Archives appears to have very few policy files from the Department of Education from 1932, and the Department of Education when contacted on multiple occasions were unresponsive to inquiries in terms of their own holdings. This was not a significant constraint, however, as the main focus was not the Department of Education’s initiatives or responses. The National University of Galway was contacted for any internal materials that may have been retained relating to the USAC scheme, but no such documents were found.

There are other, more general issues, however, such as the fact that official documents are expressions of the state or government perspective, and too great a reliance on them leads one to ‘see like a state’ (Scott, 1998), overlooking material or perspectives which have not gone through this process of what Scott terms ‘becoming legible’ to the state. That said, official and policy documents can in fact contain a number of differing perspectives, which leads to the presence of contradictions in the text which require interrogation (Codd, 1988). As such, my stance on using these documents, given my theoretical framework and paradigm, has been interpretive (Jupp & Norris, 1993).

This question of the use to which these documents was put also raises the question of the difference between documentary analysis, which has been discussed so far, and historical analysis. As noted, these texts are not utilised exclusively to answer my research questions and are not relevant in any real sense to two of the research questions. Nevertheless, they can be interrogated through extra-textual methods. In that sense a specific form of documentary analysis is historical analysis (O’Leary, 2010, pp. 224–225), whereby the primary source (e.g. a document) can be further interrogated
through qualitative interviews, or consultation with other (primary, secondary) materials. I took such an approach with respect to some questions, when I believed an interviewee may have been able to shed more light on an issue. My criteria for inclusion were cautiously broad, which allowed me to include documents preceding the introduction of the USAC scheme in 1969, if it could be argued that they had a bearing on the argument.

**Semi-structured Interviews**

There are a variety of general reasons for using interviews as a method of data generation in qualitative research. In contrast to ethnography which generally requires an extended period of participant observation, it is a flexible method which does not make such exorbitant demands on a researcher’s time (Bryman, 2004, p. 314). In terms of content, however, there is a wealth of possible reasons for using interviews. Of most relevance to this topic is the need for information based on insider experience, especially in an area that has not been well researched such as military officers’ interaction with civilian higher education. For research in a military context Deschaux-Beaume notes the importance of interviews for obtaining first-hand information to the extent that most of the time the researcher does not have an extensive access to the grey literature or internal documents he or she would need, and having interesting access to military actors in a research context where secrecy and the very specific military language constitute an issue for the analyst. (2012, p. 103)

As implied in the previous section, this has specific implications for addressing research questions. Given that an interview schedule can be designed by the researcher (in contrast to the situation for documentary research) interviews are a form of data generation that relates primarily to the research questions. This allows this method to draw on the findings from the literature review and documentary analysis, and reciprocally the findings from interviews can feed back into the interpretation loop for the documentary analysis in a hermeneutic circle.

This process of clarification of documentary sources can be especially relevant for research undertaken in a military context (Deschaux-Beaume, 2012, p. 112). Another way to characterise the benefit of using interviews is that they collect individual-level
data, whereas documentary analysis – even when documents are written by individuals – can tend to present individual-to-organisation or institution level perspectives. At a more abstract level Ben Kafka, in his history of the bureaucratic machinery of the state refers to the “psychic life of paperwork” and describes paperwork and documents of state as “the bureaucratic medium” (2012, pp. 9–18, 109–144). This also has parallels with James C. Scott’s concepts of “legibility” and “Seeing like a State” (Scott, 1998). As such, interviews can allow one to gather data, and test or develop hypotheses; they can also allow one to sample opinions and collect more in-depth qualitative data (Cohen et al., 2011, p. 414).

As I had specific research questions to be addressed (Bryman, 2004, p. 323), the format for the interviews was semi-structured, which allowed for flexibility in terms of a list of topics to be covered, giving the interviewee leeway in how to reply (ibid., p. 321). This also allowed me concentrate more on certain items on the schedule, and indeed to depart from it when there was justification. The format of the interviews was formal, and one-on-one (O’Leary, 2010, p. 195). Interviews were digitally recorded for transcription.

A final point here relates to the choice of individual, semi-structured interviews in contrast to group interviews, which is an approach other researchers of the military have taken (e.g. Syed-Mohamed, 2016). My concern, coming from my conceptual framework and literature review, in undertaking interviews was how these would supplement the ‘official’ or ‘public transcript’ (Scott, 1990), or indeed how they might go behind it. Findings from documentary archival sources offered an ‘official transcript’ of the USAC scheme. While I assumed that often interviewees would also largely present the official transcript, the study was designed to allow scope for the hidden transcript to emerge. By not conducting group interviews the chance of this hidden transcript emerging was greater, as there would be less opportunity for mutual policing, of the veneer of consensus literally being maintained in the room, as Scott writes of defending the hidden transcript from below (Scott, 1990). There were no questions that were
specifically designed to elicit discord however, and the hidden transcript emerged organically in interviews.

Interview Design
The interview schedule (Appendix 5) and pro forma (Appendix 2) were designed with reference to the literature review, archival research, also with an eye to the conceptual framework. In designing the schedule, I was cognisant of the need to speak the language of interviewees rather than that of the literature. It is for this reason that some items, such as the discussion of officers returning to the military after higher education do not use the term found in the literature, namely ‘socialisation’ or ‘resocialisation’. As well as this, I relied on insights from conversations with other researchers in terms of starting with general issues, and then moving to specifics. Another insight which was useful was from Howard Becker who suggests changing the language of questions that seek to uncover motivations by asking ‘how’ rather than ‘why’ (Becker, 1998, p. 58). Thus, instead of asking why participants joined the Defence Forces, I asked how it came about that they joined the Defence Forces. This usually gave me the response to the unasked ‘why’ as well as a more detailed description of their decision-making processes.

I had an initial conversation with a retired, senior ranking army officer gatekeeper prior to the design of the schedule, and this gave me some insight into the kinds of issues that might arise, and some of the difficulties that might emerge without tailoring questions. An initial pilot interview with this same gatekeeper also allowed me to make some alterations. The first interview proper also led me to make some changes, and also to send all interviewees a pro forma (see Appendix 2) in advance of the interview. Without having done this in the first interview, a lot of the discussion was taken up with career history which, while interesting, did not have enough of a bearing on my research questions.

These pro formas were intended to generate descriptive information which would inform the analysis, and I requested that interviewees return them to me via email prior to the interview. Many did, but others handed them over to me in person, and a minority
had not completed them at all. For those who had not completed the pro forma, I asked them these questions at the start and filled out a spreadsheet with the relevant detail. Having this information at the start of the interview meant interviewees did not need to spend the start of the interview explaining their military career, positions, ranks, time spent abroad, what their qualifications were in, and so on. This was especially useful when participants had returned these to me in advance of the interview, as I was able to tailor the semi-structured schedule to what I knew from the information they had supplied.

**Securing Access**

In terms of securing access to interviewees, two approaches were necessary. For speaking to retired personnel, two individuals (one former PDF, another former RDF) were able to put me in contact with retired PDF personnel. I had a description of the project (Appendix 1) which they passed along to former colleagues and friends, and in effect ‘vouched for me’, or provided me with email addresses to make contact, telling me to ‘use [their] name’. This is important in a setting such as the Defence Forces, which is a small world. I was also not unaware of the fact that my surname is known in Army circles due to family members having served in the PDF and FCÁ/RDF, and I myself had been in the FCÁ for a period. I had roughly a 50% response rate to my emails. The first interview took place in December 2018, with the final interview at the end of April 2019.

In terms of access, for approaching serving officers, it was necessary to be aware of some specific characteristics of the Defence Forces as an organisation. One researcher noted of their own experience researching the military that “in an institution based on rigid hierarchical principles, authorisation from a higher echelon was nothing less than a prerequisite to my activity of conducting interviews” (Castro, 2017, p. 88). The same was the case for my own research, and so access to serving personnel was undertaken through official channels, and with respect to the hierarchical structure of the Defence Forces. For serving personnel, I decided that it was most appropriate to proceed initially along official channels, and directly approach the Chief of Staff (CoS). Goldstein (2002, p. 671) describing the process of securing access for elite interviews says using official (departmental) stationary is vital. He includes various specific requirements, which map
on to the requirements of a standard ‘information for participants’ letter, as I received approval for from the School of Education Research Ethics Committee. Castro (2017, p. 91) makes a similar observation with respect to researching the military in Brazil, saying that being from a ‘highly respected’ institution aided his interview process. I found this to be the case as a ‘Trinity’ researcher, and wrote a letter on Trinity College Dublin-headed notepaper, addressed to Vice Admiral Mellett at Defence Forces Headquarters. This again set out the details of my proposed research, and the fact that I was aiming to research personnel across all three services, at various ranks.

The Military Assistant to the CoS emailed me, giving me the contact details of the Defence Forces Registrar and a number of other individuals (CC-ed in the email), in order to set up the interviews. I emailed the Registrar the outline of the project, and following his suggestion we had a phone conversation, where I explained my email which stated that I wanted to talk to a mix of personnel in terms of rank and career stage, branch of the Defence Forces, and gender, in line with my sampling framework. I also specifically explained that I wanted to speak to officers currently studying in Galway through USAC, as well as cadets. The Registrar noted these requirements, and said he would arrange these. After a number of follow up emails, interviews at the different sites were arranged (discussed below). The specific details of the interviews were then arranged with mid-ranking officers from the different branches. Here it can be noted that there are limitations in terms of freedom to contact serving personnel in a hierarchical organisation such as the Defence Forces, but nevertheless the requirements of the sampling framework were still met, and a variety of views emerged in the interviews.

**Interview Process**
At the start of each interview, before recording began, I read an ‘ethics script’ (Appendix 4) that informed participants of the nature of the interview, as well as their rights, in line with the School of Education’s ethical guidelines. This was to ensure that participants provided their informed consent, which they confirmed by signing the consent form (Appendix 3). I made two copies available for each interview, but no interviewee requested a copy for their own records. Only when the form was signed did I begin recording.
As part of the interview process, initial questions were broad, and were there to ease both interviewees and myself into the process. I have frequently read and heard researchers talk about ‘relaxing the interviewee’, but I found it useful in putting myself at ease too. The interview process isn’t a natural social situation. Conversation involves considerable back and forth, whereas research interviewing requires one to listen and to not respond, to give the interviewee’s words priority. Starting with general questions that gave participants scope to talk switched the register of our interactions from ‘social conversation’ before turning on the digital recorder, to ‘social scientific interview’ after. While interviewees spoke I often took notes, but only to remind myself later of interesting points that had been raised, and I maintained an effort to actively listen. These notes were memory aids during the transcription process later.

Sample and sampling framework

Sampling stems from the fact that, simply put, “[i]t is just not possible to study everything” (Robson, 2000, p. 154), so it is important to think about who should be interviewed. For a case study, this involves considering the people, settings, events, and processes being researched. At the most fundamental level, the population for this study were former and current officers of the Irish Defence Forces, and the sample was drawn from this group. In the literature, sampling is often broken down into probabilistic and non-probabilistic samples. Qualitative research tends to be purposive and thus non-probabilistic, because of the smaller sample than in quantitative research, and also because of the limited definition of the problem (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 27). Thomas writes that in a case study,

the point of a case study is not to find a portion that shows the quality of the whole. You are looking at your selection – a marriage, country and so on, with one, to or a few being focused on – without any expectation that it represents a wider population. So it’s not a sample; it’s a choice, a selection. (2011, p. 62)

Non-probability sampling is the overall sampling framework for this study. By definition with a case study a division is being made. In studying the military, this could be done across services, e.g. Army, Navy, Air Corps. It could also be done within services through a broad division between officers and enlisted personnel. Further subdivision would
possible within e.g. officers, from cadets as officers-to-be, mid-career officers, senior
staff, and so on, if it was useful. More specifically, this single case study takes an
embedded case study design, with the subunits defined according to the research
questions. As such, the sampling framework is purposive.

Snowball or network sampling is respondent driven, and relies on obtaining
interviewees through “referrals among people who share the same characteristic and
who know of each other” (Seale, 2012, p. 145). This was the approach for interviewing
retired officers. Given the close-knit nature of the Defence Forces, with esprit de corps
being a fact for both current and former members of the military, snowball or network
sampling was the primary element of the sampling framework. Indeed, “snowball
sampling is effective in the research of organic social networks” (Noy, 2008, p. 240), such
as can be found in an institution such as the Defence Forces. It is worth noting too that
those referring me to others often asked what kind of person I wanted to interview,
leading to a useful feedback loop that allowed for a purposive element within this
snowball sampling.

A further point relating to sampling within a case is the fact that who a researcher speaks
to can in part depends on the researcher’s “fixed characteristics (e.g. their age or
gender) or their abilities or social skills” with consequences for the representativeness
of the sample and bias (Seale, 2012, p. 148). This can be a benefit in terms of gaining
access, as with a local knowledge case, as it was for me, when some participants were
aware of my family’s military background and my own knowledge of the organisation.
For this, it is important to consider what may not captured in a sample. One aspect of
this is in terms of gender, and the fact that many female officers “opt out” of a career in
the Defence Forces, and as such there is a shortage of female officers at senior levels
(Heneghan, 2013). As such, I made an effort to ensure there was gender representation
in the sample.
Also, related to this is the idea of doing research “at the peripheries” in terms of sampling “people who are not central to the phenomenon but are neighbours to it, to people no longer actively involved, to dissidents and renegades and eccentrics” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 34). In terms of military research, one researcher has made the following observation:

I believe that military institutions present a trap for researchers because they have a very clear morphological outline - walls with sentries, soldiers with uniforms, and many other evident symbolic and physical distinctions. The researcher must thus resist the temptation of overlapping an inventory of elements, traits and rules of military identity with the morphology of the institution. The challenge is to perceive not “what” this identity is, but “how” it is, what its symbolic mechanisms are and what are the manners by which its meaning is articulated, both of which are the very condition for the existence of these elements. (Castro, 2017, p. 89)

Castro implicitly here draws a distinction between the type of sociological research of the military he favours, and more common, functional approaches as are found in ‘military sociology’, one that privileges the ‘official transcript’ (Chapter 6, section 6.3 below). My focus and conceptual framework meant I was interested in Castro’s version of researching the military, and so I wanted to ensure that my sample included those who may have had a different perspective from the ‘official transcript’ or the majority of their colleagues. This also relates to one of the central strengths of a case study research design in that it allows the “unexpected” to emerge, and “when it does, there is potential to make a useful contribution to knowledge, theory and practice” (Harland, 2014, p. 1120). This was another reason why semi-structured interviews were undertaken.

**Sample and Sites**

In setting out my sample, it was important to secure representation across branch, employment status, higher education and USAC experience, rank, and gender. The sample for the interviews consisted of 46 interviews with serving and retired officers of the Permanent Defence Forces, with 19 retired and 27 serving officers. Branch representation was as follow: 5 Air Corps, 35 Army, and 6 Navy. Ranks went from cadet to general-rank or equivalent. The sample included two female officers, one retired and one serving, which is representative of the current percentage of females in the Defence
Forces (Table 1, p. 58). An overview of the sample, which maintains participant anonymity, is provided in Appendix 6.

In terms of higher education, seven participants were commissioned prior to USAC, with the remaining 39 commissioned post-USAC. 22 had participated in the USAC scheme, with 24 not having done so. Only three of the entire sample, however, had no higher education experience whatsoever; all others either were currently studying, had studied in USAC, or later during their career or post-retirement. All three without higher education were commissioned in the 1960s. Of the subjects studied by those who participated in the USAC scheme: 10 studied through the science faculty; 7 in arts, social science and law; 3 in commerce, and 2 in engineering. Where differences emerged relating to period of commissioning, or higher education experience, or anything else, these were referred to in the findings.

All participants were interviewed in Ireland, so the sample was restricted to those not currently serving abroad, but the majority of those retired and mid-career upwards did have overseas experience. With retired personnel, interviews were arranged to take place either in the interviewee’s home or in Trinity College. Serving personnel were all interviewed, as arranged with the Defence Forces gatekeepers, in Defence Forces institutions in Galway (the USAC building beside Renmore Barracks), Cork (at the National Maritime College of Ireland in Haulbowline), the Curragh (in the Curragh Camp), and Dublin (McKee Barracks).

5.4 Data Analysis

I had decided early on that in line with the view of the case study approach being a ‘wrapper’ for different methods that I would take a variety of approaches to analysing data. Having previously attended two days of training on the qualitative data analysis software (QDAS) NVivo, I decided to use NVivo to analyse the data, being fully apprised of both its strengths and limitations.
NVivo was used for the storage and coding of all data generated, both the documentary and archival material, semi-structured interviews, as well as other notes and memos I took throughout the research process. The semi-structured interviews were recorded, transcribed, and entered into NVivo for analysis. This interview data was coded initially with emergent codes while transcribing, which were notes I referred to while coding in NVivo later. The interviews amounted to nearly 68 hours of recorded audio, or roughly an hour and a half per interview (interviews with retired personnel were usually longer). For this reason too, I decided QDAS would save me considerable time in my analysis. Had I not previously received training for NVivo this may not have been the case, as it can be a complex piece of software if one is unfamiliar with it. Between my own training and downloading it for this project, a new version had been released, and I had to do some re-training to get up to speed with the new and changed features in the latest version. I relied primarily on the notes I took at this training workshop, as well as those of the workshop facilitator (Meehan, 2011, 2012) in my use of NVivo.

Transcription and (Re)Coding

Given the sheer volume of recorded audio (in total the transcribed material amounted to roughly 662,000 words, or 1,467 pages of single-spaced text) transcription was a necessity. This was time consuming but valuable as an initial way to get to know the data. Charmaz notes that some researchers advocate transcribing from notes rather than full transcripts but that “full interview transcriptions gives you ideas and understandings that you otherwise miss” (2006, pp. 69, 70) and I found this to be the case. While undertaking this transcription, I took notes and referred to the contemporaneous memos and notes I had made, which I had intended to use later when coding.

I had decided that grounded theory was not suitable as a methodology, but did employ aspects of it as a method for coding. Not adopting grounded theory as a full methodology also meant I have not taken a stance vis-à-vis any of the methodological debates that have taken place in grounded theory, as Charmaz discusses (2006, pp. 3–8), and which I was made aware of in the workshop I attended. I also adopted the
grounded theory practice of writing memos \textit{(ibid., pp. 77ff)} as part of the research process, both during data generation and analysis. As such I utilised the logic of phases of coding, from initial coding, to develop ‘concepts’ at the lowest level of granularity (Bryman, 2004, p. 403), up to ‘categories’ which might subsume two or more concepts (There is considerable variety in the use of terms for these different levels, but this is the distinction I have accepted). My aim here was not to develop a theory, as in grounded theory methodology, but to analyse the data in a way that would remain consistent. It was also useful given my conceptual framework, as Silverman notes there is a danger in constructionist research of “imposing your categories on the data too early. The better way to proceed is to look at longer passages to see how complaints and replies are sequentially organized” (Silverman, 2013, p. 133).

As I worked, I had an index card in front of me a card where I had written what I came to think of as ‘coding prompts’: people, issues, events, beliefs, narrative, culture, strategies, contexts, affect, etc. This served as an ongoing reminder of different kinds of features I could potentially be aware of as I coded. The iterative process of coding and recoding and recoding again, returning to interviews repeatedly in the light of new connections of categories meant that I was not simply “identifying themes” as Bazeley (2009) compellingly critiques much qualitative analysis. A useful suggestion of Bazeley’s was to write initial drafts of findings without using quotes, as these can be somewhat distracting; instead, by focusing on emerging categories I had to focus on the iterative cycles of coding and recoding, and moving concepts between different categories, to make sense of the data. While developing my codes and categories, I was also able to refer to my literature review and conceptual framework to see if there were overlaps, and relabel items in my emerging codebook accordingly.

NVivo as software had useful features, which had a bearing on the analysis of my findings, including the (misleadingly named) feature of ‘autocoding’, which allows a researcher to identify responses to specific questions across all interviewees who had responded to that item. This involved formatting of all transcripts to allow the software to identify the responses to that question. Along with this, I collated all the data from
the pro formas to a single spreadsheet which was also uploaded to NVivo. By doing both of these things, I was able to identify responses to specific interview items by demographic data (using the ‘crosstab’ feature), such as decade of commissioning, subject studied.

In practice this was a prolonged, iterative process of coding and recoding. It relies on what Michael Polanyi (2009) described as a form of ‘tacit knowing’, which can be difficult to make explicit, but I will attempt to do so here. My approach to coding took advantage of the functionality of NVivo which allowed me to read all interviewees’ responses to specific questions within one ‘window’. This meant that I could code all responses to individual questions, rather than coding each interview individually. This was helpful in maintaining consistency in coding responses to individual items, and also saved considerable time. I would return occasionally to my interview notes, where I had made memos of interesting topics and responses, and this then allowed me to go to the specific interviews where these were, and analyse these responses. This resulted in a proliferating number of codes (‘concepts’ in NVivo parlance), and to keep track to these I would develop relevant categories as higher level families of codes. I also periodically ran various queries, which also resulted in new or revised codes, combining some responses under codes, or splitting them into related but different specific codes that could be nested within a category. All the above, however, were not separate undertakings however, where one day I might code, and another I might seek to nest codes under categories. On the contrary, within the space of a few minutes I might run a query through autocoding, see the questions to which these referred, look at the words of interviewees, and code some of the resulting text with new concepts, or indeed change existing concepts. The essential point was that this was continuous throughout the analysis process, and it even continued up to the point of writing up the findings and the discussion chapters.

Although this process is often considered to be inductive, building up from data to develop findings or theories, often it is closer to the ‘abductive’ mode (Douven, 2017; Niiniluoto, 1999), where existing knowledge and theories can be used to infer to the
best explanation. This was my experience throughout, as it was also a part of my overall research approach as noted above in discussing ‘multi-grounded theory’. Nevertheless, there were some clear instances of an inductive logic of discovery during my cycles of recoding and writing. One is found in section 10.7, “Gift as a vocabulary of control”, where while during the weeks when I was writing up my findings and discussion, I was also doing some general reading as a break from the analysis. One such bit of reading was Marcel Mauss’s *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies* (1990). In reading this text, I became sensitised to the idea of a gift not just being a gift, and this led me to reflect on my own data and findings. I returned to look at my hierarchy of codes I had generated in the cycles of (re)coding, and saw that there were a number of codes that could be viewed as falling under the heading of ‘gift versus contract’. I then returned to the original material and reread these with a view to coming to understand the relevant quotes in their broader interview context. I also then chose a number of words (e.g. ‘free’, ‘for nothing’) which I searched for in all my interviews, and found other instances which were then coded to the relevant concepts. In this manner, the processes of coding and recoding, with reflecting on my reading and the interviews were a feedback-loop that allowed for the data generated to be revisited and actively reconceptualised in order to allow for novel theorisations of the material.

**Trustworthiness, Credibility, and Triangulation**

The case study research design is still viewed by most methodologists with extreme circumspection. A work that focuses its attention on a single example of a broader phenomenon is apt to be described as a “mere” case study, and is often identified with loosely framed and non-generalizable theories, biased case selection, informal and undisciplined research designs, weak empirical leverage (too many variables and too few cases), subjective conclusions, non-replicability, and causal determinism. (Gerring, 2007, p. 6)

For this reason, demonstrating the quality of research employing this approach is important. While some related issues have been addressed in the preceding section, but here I address the topic explicitly. The term trustworthiness itself derives from Yvonne Lincoln and Egon Guba’s *Naturalistic Inquiry* as an “alternative term to replace the positivistic terms of validity, reliability and generalisability” (Loh, 2013, p. 4) for those whose qualitative work is within a naturalistic or constructionist paradigm. They set out to explain how these terms, while establishing trustworthiness in the positivist research
setting of “naïve realism and linear realism” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 293), but outside this paradigm they are inappropriate and consequently alternatives become necessary (although others such as Yin, 2014 continue to rely on these terms). One way of seeing this is to replace the positivist’s term “internal validity” with “credibility” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 296), which can be “operationalised”, they suggest, through “five major techniques” (ibid., p. 301):

1. Prolonged engagement, persistent observation, and triangulation;
2. Peer debriefing;
3. Negative case analysis;
4. Referential adequacy;
5. Member checking.

In my own research, I implemented four of the above techniques or approaches, with the exception of the third, negative case analysis. A version of the fourth, referential adequacy, can be seen in the previous discussion of using grounded theory as an approach to analysis, and through this a fundamental form of trustworthiness is integrated into the research project as a process; here there are parallels with the more detailed discussion of trustworthiness and thematic analysis (Nowell et al., 2017). As ever, a caveat from Gadamerian hermeneutics is necessary here when ‘truth’ is being ‘methodologised’ through techniques as in Lincoln and Guba’s approach, but treated reflectively they are helpful.

The first technique here is found in the nature of the research design, and the project as a whole. By ensuring ‘prolonged engagement’, the researcher is involved with a site and project “sufficiently long to detect and take account of distortions that might otherwise creep into the data” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 302). My approach here is echoed once again in the previous discussion of not taking a grounded theory approach, and that I felt it necessary to prepare myself through reading prior to archival and interview work. Mere immersion in the research site(s) and data is not enough, however, and so the aspect of ‘persistent observation’ introduces an aspect of criticality (p. 304). This is perhaps more an art than a science, as with the cycles of coding and recoding above; a researcher progressively gets a ‘feel’ for the research space, and whether a document or interviewee’s response requires further critical interrogation or can be taken more or
less at face value. One way of doing so is through the final point of ‘triangulation’, which can take various forms, as will be discussed below.

The techniques of peer debriefing and member checks were also important for ensuring the rigour of the research process. The first Lincoln and Guba describe as “a process of exposing oneself to a disinterested peer in a manner paralleling an analytic session and for the purpose of exploring aspects of the inquiry that might otherwise remain only implicit within the inquirer’s mind” (p. 308). This happened in discussions with my PhD supervisor, as well as with other PhD candidates in Trinity College as well in other institutions. It also happened via presentation of preliminary findings for different elements of the project at research conferences and summer schools, which allowed for interrogation of my assumptions, and led in certain cases to revisiting my approach or analysis. “‘Member checks” (p. 314) ensure trustworthiness through conversation with relevant stakeholders or those who have knowledge of a context, and this happened in my discussions with military personnel who I interviewed, those I met while in research sites (e.g. over lunch or coffee, and outside the interview setting), and also some whom I met incidentally at conferences from a military background who actively engaged with my research.

In their discussion of the role of triangulation in qualitative research, Yeasmin and Rahman similarly make reference to positivistic approaches in the natural sciences by way of contrast, noting that replication is not possible in the social sciences, because with the exception of psychological laboratory studies, social science research takes place in natural, everyday settings, which will always contain particular and unique features that cannot be exactly reproduced in a second setting, or even in the same setting at a different point in time. (2012, p. 155)

They note that there is a “tradition” in the social sciences that uses multiple methods to overcome the weaknesses or limitations in any one approach, to achieve ‘triangulation’: “a process of verification that increases validity by incorporating several viewpoints and methods” (*ibid.*, p. 156). This can involve combining two (or more) theories, data sources, methods, or investigators in researching a single phenomenon, with a
combination of methods becoming the accepted practice in social science research. Triangulation can be used to overcome biases as a single researcher (p. 157), and can also serve to make a researcher more confident in their findings (p. 159). It can also be creative and constructive, and “is not an end in itself and not simply a fine-tuning of the research instruments” (p. 160). The results of triangulation can be either convergence between the various sources or methods (in many respects the ideal outcome), inconsistency between them, or outright contradiction.

My approach was to use triangulation of different sources and contextual validation, which also necessitated the use of different methods. Multiple investigators were not an option for a sole-researcher PhD; though the research questions were addressed through a conceptual framework, multiple theories were not used for triangulation in agreement the assertion that this is “a formulation the naturalist cannot accept […] If a given fact is ‘confirmable’ within two theories, that finding may be more a function of the similarity of the theories than of the empirical meaningfulness of the fact” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 307). At the level of research design, this project’s overall triangulation was achieved through multiple methods. Triangulation in addressing specific questions arising from the research, e.g. the socialisation of military personnel, were investigated through different sources: that is (one or more) archival documents and (one or more) research interviews, and further related to the prior literature review reading. Together with the approach to research credibility, these approaches were implemented in order to ensure the trustworthiness not just of the data analysis, but of this entire qualitative research project.

5.5 Ethical Considerations

Full consideration was given to the ethical implications of this research, pursuant to Trinity College Dublin’s policies and the Faculty Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. Ethical approval was received from the School of Education Research Ethics Committee, which implied obtaining informed consent was necessary.
**Informed Consent and Confidentiality**

Informed consent was obtained in the interviews, and all interviewees or gatekeepers were provided with information relating to the ethical requirements incumbent on me as an interviewer. Participants were provided with the information sheet and consent forms (Appendices 1 and 3), setting out the scope of the research project, and I read the ‘ethics script’ (Appendix 4), telling them that their participation was voluntary, and that they could withdraw at any time, without giving a reason and without prejudice. They were assured that their confidentiality would be maintained, and that they would not be identifiable from the use I made of their interviews. Interviewees were identified only by specific demographic data such as branch, corps, decade of commissioning, and so on. Retired personnel were comfortable with this.

A possible complication for this comes about as a result of the hierarchical structure of the Defence Forces and interviewing serving personnel. Gatekeepers for serving personnel identified individuals who were going to participate in interviews. The majority of those I interviewed had been officers for ten years or more, and appeared very comfortable with the interview process, and their own rights in this respect. With those who were recent entrants to the Defence Forces, such as cadets and recently commissioned officers, I made sure that they understood their rights. Only one participant in the course of an interview asked (half in jest) whether the interview was confidential; I reassured him it was. Interviewees were all offered the chance to see the transcripts if they so wished. I made a note of those who did want to see them, and emailed them subsequently.

**Data storage**

Data in the form of transcripts and audio files were kept in anonymously labelled files on my computer, which was password protected. Backup files were kept in an unlabelled USB key, which was kept in a safe place. Both the laptop and USB key were kept in my apartment, which is only accessible to me. No data was kept in ‘the cloud’. Data was
stored in accordance with the requirements of the Data Protection Act and Trinity’s “Good Research Practice Guidelines”.

Reflexivity

Both my interpretivist approach in my conceptual framework and my philosophical perspective of Gadamerian hermeneutics have significant implications on the methodological level. A central term for conceptualising this is reflexivity, though it is also often understood through the related concept of positionality. Reflexivity as a concept can absorb sustained consideration (e.g. Ashmore, 1989), so for my purposes I will narrow my focus initially on my own reflexivity in researching the military, and follow this with reflection on some wider issues.

In a 2018 blog post, Nick Caddick of Anglia Ruskin University, a researcher in critical military studies and sociology, explored the question of reflexivity for military researchers. In it, he suggested that

researchers of the military (e.g., military sociologists, military psychologists, ‘veteran studies’ researchers, international relations scholars, etc) implicitly or explicitly locate themselves and their work somewhere on a continuum of support-for/opposition-to the military. Broadly speaking, I see this continuum as mapping onto three general positions: the cheerleader, the critic, and the diplomat. (Caddick, 2018)

There is much in this that is worth exploring, and the three social types of researchers he sets out are a useful provocation. As might be assumed from the terms used, these three positions are effectively the wholly positive cheerleader, the wholly negative critic, and the mediating or pragmatic diplomat somewhere between these two extremes. Caddick suggests that the latter “be a model for diplomatic scholarship of the military”, and in some respects I would place myself in this category:

I see the diplomat as operating under the guiding assumption that the military is a generally well-meaning organ of the state which sometimes does bad things, often as a result of systemic or cultural issues (which, quite rightly, the critics have identified). Yes, violence is bad. But – and this ‘but’ is by no means intended to excuse the violence – perhaps there is something in the argument that the military at its most effective is a wielder of ‘soft’ power [...] existing as a kind of

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4https://www.tcd.ie/dental/research/research-ethics/TCDGoodResearchPractice.pdf
national insurance policy which works most effectively when unused, or, even, potentially a ‘force for good’ when it is deployed. (Ibid.)

As a blog post, however, Caddick only intended to “provoke debate and reflection”, and I would like to push back somewhat in order to set out my own position, quite apart from the social types that were proposed. One issue with the model of a continuum of support-for/opposition-to is that the object of these is a monolithically conceived “military”. As my conceptual framework will set out, I do not have such a monolithic view of the Irish Defence Forces. I do not take an entirely ‘organisational’ perspective, but rather I combine in my research questions organisational (Defence Forces), role (officer), and individual perspectives, in order to develop as ‘thick’ a description as possible.

Here it is worthwhile to address my own connection to the Defence Forces, as my family has a connection here, and I myself was in the reserves. As such I was “studying the familiar” (R. Berger, 2015, p. 223). I did not feel ill at ease as the military is an environment I am relatively familiar with (and in the case of the Curragh, where I trained while I was in the FCÁ), and I have been around military personnel since I was young; when acronyms or military argot were used, I generally understood what was being discussed, and when I did not interviewees were happy to clarify. This familiarity bred neither unquestioning approval as in the form of the “cheerleader”, nor did it inspire the opposite. In some cases when interviewees were aware of my background, I was positioned as something approaching an “insider”, with all the attendant advantages this brought (R. Berger, 2015, pp. 223–224); otherwise I was generally perceived, to my mind, more or less neutrally. My research with serving personnel had been given the CoS’s approval, and this also helped me to feel comfortable as a ‘civilian’ in this environment. All the serving personnel I interviewed knew I was there with his full knowledge, but crucially, this did not prevent them from being forthright in their opinions, and critiquing or criticising the Defence Forces as an organisation.
An ‘insider position’ carries “the risk of blurring boundaries; imposing own values, beliefs, and perceptions by a researcher; and projection of biases” (R. Berger, 2015, p. 225). I was aware of the possibility of bias through my own past links with the military, and my understanding of and empathy with aspects of their, and addressed this in a number of ways (as discussed at some length in section 5.4 above). First, the data generated in the interviews was triangulated with the documentary and archival sources, as well as the literature review. Secondly, there was the careful iterative design of the interview schedule. Finally, rigorous procedures for the approach to data analysis were adopted. I used my knowledge of the Defence Forces was an asset, which I used to the benefit of my project. Nevertheless, I knew I was not actually an insider, and I knew very little of the cadet or officer experience.

Castro (2017, p. 89) in discussing his own work on the Brazilian military emphasised the need to understand the characteristics of the social environment of the interviewees being interviewed. In interviewing serving military personnel one is going into a different environment, not just a separate institution, but one that is also a profession and a way of life, with its own language and tradition that requires understanding. There is social distance at issue here, wherein “the military institution raises specific methodological challenges for the social researcher and requires reflexivity” (Deschaux-Beaume, 2012, p. 102). I sought to be aware of this, and this involved referring to serving personnel by their rank, and only by their name if they indicated that was what they were comfortable with. This approach positioned me as an “outsider” with participants unaware of my own connections to the Defence Forces. I was fully aware that I was and am a civilian researcher. Indeed, in one case I was made aware of this when referred to as “a civvy”. I was also aware that as a researcher I was entering into an unequal situation from another perspective, one where I was potentially getting more out of the exchange than my interviewees. By way of making myself available, and ‘giving something back’ to the community of military professionals, I said I was happy to present elements of this work to them in a forum of their choosing, either in print or in person. Covid19 has slowed this aspect of feeding back my research to participants and the Defence Forces, but I hope to be able to address this in the not too distant future.
More broadly, reflexivity and the researcher’s positioning has been summarised as including “personal characteristics, such as gender, race, affiliation, age, sexual orientation, immigration status, personal experiences, linguistic tradition, beliefs, biases, preferences, theoretical, political and ideological stances, and emotional responses to participant[s]” (R. Berger, 2015, p. 220). Without treating this as a list to the checked off, there are a few observations worth making here. In terms of race and ethnicity, the Irish Defence Forces is considerably more homogenous than Irish society, and my sample reflected this, as it was exclusively white Irish. In the course of my visits to different sites, I only noted one name badge on an officer’s uniform that was noticeably different from the more usual ‘Irish’ names. The Defence Forces are different to An Garda Síochána in this respect, which has slowly come to reflect changing demographics. While my sample was representative of the 9:1 male-female gender ratio in the Defence Forces, but obviously this is nowhere near representative of Irish society. As a white Irish male, I was not all that different from those I interviewed, and in terms of socio-economic status, while I did not look for data on this from participants, I could tell that I shared the same position as most of those I interviewed. Indeed, reflecting on my position as a researcher, I was not very different from those I researched, given my gender, race, and even in terms of my age I was roughly in the middle of the range; I was not however addressing research questions that set out to discuss questions related to gender, race, age, sexual orientation, religious or political views, etc. Nevertheless, during the process of “securing access” (Section 5.3 above) gatekeepers may have assumed I was interested in talking to certain people (i.e. considerably more men than women), even despite my asking for more female representation in my sample, as a consequence of my own positioning and how I presented.

Political and ideological stances were not a focus (nor were they explicitly sought as a target of my research questions) but here too, there was a not terribly wide spread between some who seemed more conservative than me in political terms (though not, interestingly and significantly in terms of sexual politics), and some with whom I shared a more progressive socio-political perspective in terms of their attitudes to e.g. sexuality.
In this respect, one interview with a senior officer who brought up Dublin LGBTQ Pride parade was a situation where I was somewhat surprised by how progressive their views were, as they discussed how important it was that “the whole person should be able to come to work”, and that it was important that Defence Forces marched in the Pride Parade. As a queer individual, I was effectively by default ‘closeted’ in conducting my research as it wasn’t something that arose in conversation or interviews, so hearing a senior officer say this to me (when he had no reason to know my sexual orientation one way or the other) was one of the most emotional moments in conducting my research. Similarly, when another high-ranking officer in passing mentioned “snowflakes” I expected the worst, so asked for some clarification on this point, and he clarified that young people ought not be dismissed as “snowflakes” for their concern for equity and equality and fairness, and that it was the responsibility of the Defence Forces to reflect Irish society in this respect. Both of these were instances where I realised to some extent I had expected that there wouldn’t be people with progressive views in the Irish Defence Forces, and thus perhaps in this respect, admittedly, had an unconscious “Critic” stance in terms of the views of interviewees.

On a more personal basis, I found that my ‘self’ and my ‘role-as-researcher’ were brought into close alignment in undertaking this project. Shulamith Reinharz suggests that an, in her view necessary, alternative direction for sociology is “the concept of self, particularly the researcher’s self, which is suppressed in mainstream methods” (1979, p. 240). The previous topic I had begun researching as a PhD was one in which I felt considerable ‘affective dissonance’, but turning to the study of the Irish Defence Forces this disappeared. I gave a presentation on this ‘affective’ element in undertaking a PhD, and changing research topic at the (15th November 2017) at the Trinity College Dublin School of Education “Talking About Education” seminar series. This was my initial confrontation, in a profound sense, of my own reflexivity as a researcher. I sought to maintain an awareness of this throughout, and it acted as an important reminder during difficult periods of my initial motivation for undertaking this PhD.
Chapter 6: Conceptual framework – Role Theory and Infrapolitics

6.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out the framework through which I have approached my research, and how I went about doing so. At its most abstract, such a framework is not just for defining the approach to a research topic, but also is for those reading research to decide if a study is transferable or relevant to their own purposes (Marshall and Rosman quoted in Robson, 2000, p. 405). Morris Janowitz early on alluded to a theoretical incuriosity in military sociology, and identified a “need for persistent and systematic research on the nature of military organizational systems and on the processes and problems involved in the fundamental changes that our own system is undergoing” (1959, p. 5). This lacuna was addressed two years previously by Samuel Huntington’s landmark The Soldier and the State (1957), so Janowitz’s ‘call to action’ was perhaps then more a publicity flare sent up in anticipation of his own The Professional Soldier which was published in 1960. More recent work has echoed observation however, noting that “military sociology has never had a clear theoretical or issues driven center” which has seen this sub-field be “more of a continuing dialogue rather than an accumulation of theoretical or practical evidence” (Siebold, 2001, p. 141). Research from outside the U.S., however, has noted a divergence between social science work on the military in the U.S. and in other countries, in part due to the close alliance between the social science of psychology and the military during the Vietnam War (Ben-Ari, 2017, pp. 23–24). Similarly this divergence in the discipline has been identified as being a matter of U.S. research (perhaps unfairly) characterised as simply a continuation of Cold War social science, whereas other locations conducting research on military topics, such as Europe and South America, have been conceptually innovative in recent years (Carreiras, Castro, & Frederic, 2017, pp. 2–3). With an awareness of this issue as it applies to research on the military, I have developed a framework through which to approach my topic. Imenda (2014) sets out a detailed summary of the differences between conceptual and theoretical frameworks, and here I rely on his definition and so use conceptual framework, with use of the term “theory” here not implying a theoretical framework.
This chapter sets out the reasons why a conceptual framework is more appropriate to my study as I draw upon multiple sources (namely role theory and James C. Scott’s work) rather than adopting a particular theoretical framework. Imenda proposes that a conceptual framework is created by a researcher from a variety of sources and perspectives, as a synthesis rather than the “application of a theory as a whole or in part” (2014, p. 193). As such, in the following, where I discuss limitations with potential theoretical frameworks, this does not exclude application of aspects of these in the construction of a conceptual framework. This chapter considers the overarching paradigm in which my framework is nested, namely social constructionism, and some authors whose ideas I will draw on throughout. It then proceeds to discuss the essential details of role theory, and concludes with how I supplement role theory with the work of James C. Scott to create an overarching conceptual framework for this dissertation.

It is worth noting before proceeding that my final conceptual framework as presented below was developed iteratively, and grew out of the philosophical perspective described in the previous chapter. Gadamerian hermeneutics tallies neatly with social constructionism and the aspects of symbolic interactionism I draw on, and these led me in the direction of considering overarching concepts such as socialisation. This in due course led to role theory as the next element in the framework, which builds directly on socialisation. The final element, that of Scott’s infrapolitics, emerged in parallel from the initial stages of data analysis and reflection on tensions in and between official and submerged discourses on military socialisation, and as a way to bolster some of the weaknesses inherent to role theory, as will be discussed below.

**Origins: Social Constructionism and Alternatives**

Paparone (2014, p. 304) in a review article suggests that there are four possible sociological paradigms in the sociology of the military, namely interpretivism, radical humanism, radical structuralism, and structural functionalism. Of these, he notes that only interpretivism and structural functionalism are properly represented in this subfield. Functionalist scholarship has long been well represented within sociology of
the military from the United States, assuming the role of a state military within the social system, and accepting the hierarchy and organisational self-presentation of the military establishment (see Chapter 2). Recent scholarship on researching the military, however, often outside the United States, stresses the importance of reflexivity as a counter to what is termed a dominant positivist functionalism paradigm (Carreiras & Caetano, 2017). With an awareness of this observation on contemporary research on the military, as well as my own philosophical perspective, I have adopted a social constructionist, interpretivist stance. My reasons for doing so go beyond disciplinary concerns about underrepresentation of particular perspectives. Before discussing this, however, I will first give a brief overview of the origins and fundamental claims made by this perspective.

Social constructionism comes out of interpretivism more widely, and begins properly with the publication of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s *The Social Construction of Reality*. A social construction perspective, simply put, holds that “[s]ociety is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product” and that “common-sense ‘knowledge’ rather than ‘ideas’ must be the central focus for the sociology of knowledge” (ibid., pp. 79, 27). Mary and Kenneth Gergen’s *Social Construction: A Reader* (Gergen & Gergen, 2003, pp. 2–5) proposes the communal origins of knowledge (represented by Thomas Kuhn), the centrality of language (deriving from Wittgenstein), and the view that knowledge is ideological saturated as the “three major lines of argument central to a constructionist sensibility.” Similarly, the subtitle *The Social Construction of Reality* is “A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge”, and they too identify a number of sources: Marx’s idea “that man’s consciousness is determined by his social being” (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1991, p. 17); Nietzsche’s “anti-idealism” and the perspective of “human thought as an instrument in the struggle for survival and power” (ibid., p.19); and Wilhelm Dilthey’s historicism and the “relativity of all perspectives on human events, that is, of the inevitable historicity of human thought” (ibid.). From these sources Berger and Luckmann outline their approach in a number of ways, with their overall project set out as follows:
our purpose in this treatise is a sociological analysis of the reality of everyday life,
more precisely, of knowledge that guides conduct in everyday life, and we are
only tangentially interested in how this reality may appear in various theoretical
perspectives to intellectuals, we must begin by a clarification of that reality as it
is available to the common sense of the ordinary members of society. (Ibid.,
p.33)

There might be a question here of where ‘ideas’ stop, and ‘common-sense knowledge’
begins, but setting aside this boundary dispute, there is a pleasing coherence between
social construction and ‘common-sense knowledge’ and the development of a
conceptual framework.

Goffman’s work is also useful to note here, as he made contributions to theories of social
interaction and role theory in the wider sense through his “dramaturgical” approach to
social analysis, most notably in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1990). Randall
Collin’s describes his work thus:

Erving Goffman […] showed us a model of social life as a series of frontstages and
backstages, a kind of theatre of everyday life. The persons who control the
frontstage (i.e., official parts of the society) turn out to be the order-givers, the
higher social classes, whereas those who are merely compliant audiences for
these official performances are the order-takers, the working classes of society.
(Collins, 1994, p. 104)

While this may overstate the social division that ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ implies, it
captures the sense of Goffman’s overall approach where the social construction of self
— “presentation” in Goffman’s terms — turns the social world into theatre. This approach
implies a language of “performers and audiences, of routines and parts, of performances
coming off or falling flat; of cues, stage settings and backstage” (Goffman, 1990, p. 246).
Goffman thus provides a conceptual vocabulary that is especially useful in the discussion
to follow of role as well as in terms of Scott’s infrapolitics.

A number of alternative approaches to social constructionism can be considered
however. At first glance, neo-institutionalism appears ideal for studying higher
education and the military. Both the university and the Defence Forces are well-
established institutions in modern society. One problem quickly arises, however, as to
the question of priority, given that neo-institutionalism’s primary concept is that of
institutional convergence (whereby institution ‘A’ moves to emulate another institutional model ‘B’) and ‘isomorphism’ whereby other institutions or groups mirror or model their activities on those of the more ‘legitimate’ institution. Baker (2014) in *The Schooled Society* for instance, asserts that higher education and the university are the preeminent and most legitimate institution in modern society, and that there is a general social conversion whereby all other institutions converge toward the academic model and the forms of knowledge it legitimizes. It is hard to unwind correlation with causation here, as in whether the university is legitimised by ever more individuals or indeed professions, or are these groups legitimised by the university. Another difficulty is that though these institutions interact, there is no reason to assume that all the members of an organization or institution think or behave in the same way, nor that they will have the same experiences that allows the generalisations this approach implies, namely a broadly applicable ‘Defence Forces experience of higher education’.

An alternative approach is the sociology of the professions, which makes observations on the changing nature of knowledge, new forms of legitimacy, and the role of the university in society (Abbott, 1988, pp. 177–208). This work on professions recognizes the existence of “multiprofessional environments” (*ibid.*, p. 151), which might allow for consideration of military personnel in an academic environment. An interesting aspect is that here the main concern is not just professions (nor institutions) *per se*, but “jurisdictions” over specific areas or problems (i.e., ‘security’, ‘defence’, ‘health’) that these professions interact in as a system or eco-system. Abbott observes (p. 33) that “ecology” of professions would be a more accurate reflection of his argument than the “system” of his book’s title, which has overly functionalist implications. Similar to neoinstitutionalism’s concept of convergence, Abbott proposes a parallel in “consummatory legitimation” (*ibid.*, pp. 185-186) as a model towards which professions move. The observation of the drift of professions towards one model may have some broader validity, but an important exception is in fact the military itself. The military profession has long had external rationales and models against which their activities are measured, but this has not led to convergence towards these models; having goals in diplomacy has not made the military profession into another version of the diplomatic...
Another issue with using the sociology of the professions as a theoretical framework is that when officers attend higher education, they are not operating in a multi-professional environment as they are not fulfilling their professional role as officers. They are students (albeit with their military role always lurking in the background). Both (neo-)institutionalism and the sociology of the professions might be summarized as putting too great an emphasis on structure at the cost of agency. The role of meaning-making within a structure is obscured through the focus on a profession or an organization or institution.

Social constructionism, in contrast, brings individual agency in, and allows for specificity and context. This is especially important as the Irish military experience of sending cadets to university was apparently unique. It has also been previously applied to sociological research on the military. Social constructionism has been used for example in considering the place of military technology and the social construction of technology (Mosser, 1998), or the construction of peacekeeping in the United States by soldiers and their wives and families (Segal et al., 1992). Indeed, in the latter, the authors note the benefit of this theoretical approach in contrast to the more well-worn tools in military research, which they define as functionalism (where the military serves society, as in Samuel Huntington), pragmatism (which is how they define Janowitz), and conflict perspectives emphasising the subordination of human will to the military. In contrast, they favour an interactionist approach, specifically social constructionism.

They note that there are specific benefits to using their approach as opposed to others taking interactionist approaches (e.g. Zurcher, 1965), given that social constructionism “takes social structure as a given rather than a socially constructed phenomenon” which assumes, “that there is a socially shared definition of the military mission” (ibid., p. 123). That is, they regard all things as socially constructed, and something as fundamental as what an army is for is thus not taken for granted, and it is accepted that there can be different views on this. Other interactionists (as with neoinstitutional approaches) elide difference in favour of seeking to identify what e.g. “the Defence Forces” or other defined groups have to say about higher education. De Certeau in a discussion of
Foucault writes it is “impossible to reduce the functioning of a society to a dominant type of procedures” (de Certeau, 1984, p. 48). Institutional approaches and methodologies that rely exclusively on the products and procedures of these institutions do just this, and struggle to capture the full picture of how societies function. It is also worth noting that this broader social constructionist perspective is coherent with respect to the notion of ‘jurisdictional dispute’ as may be found in Andrew Abbott’s work on the sociology of professions given that here there are more than one attempts to define the dominant view in a jurisdictional area (e.g. security). Social constructionism in contrast not only allows, but may indeed assume a multiplicity of voices or perspectives on a topic. Segal et al. (1992) used social constructionism in a context where a recognised set of values (the military for making war) were in conflict with another (the military for keeping peace), and set about to understand how these interacted for army personnel and their families. There are implications here in terms of the present topic, as in the USAC scheme, what military training and socialisation is for rubs up against the academic university environment, potentially leading to new interpretations of military role and training.

**Socialisation**

Social constructionism proposes that the social reality that we experience is created, and an individual is “not born a member of society” (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1991, p. 149), but becomes one through processes of socialisation: “Primary socialisation is the first form of socialisation an individual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes a member of society. Secondary socialisation is any subsequent process that inducts an already socialised individual into new sectors of the objective world of his society” (ibid., p. 150). There may, however, be “reality slipping” (p. 165), a kind of friction, between the two kinds and/or worlds of socialization – Berger and Luckmann refer to American Catholic seminaries making use of the ‘expedient’ of sending promising students to be educated in Rome – which those involved in or controlling the process of secondary socialization will seek to mitigate. Berger and Luckmann also note in passing the concept of “anticipatory socialisation” (p. 232), an idea developed by Robert K. Merton, which refers to the process by which individuals engage in a form of socialisation “by adopting the values of the group to which they aspire but do not
belong” (1968, p. 344). This may take place between the first and secondary forms of socialisation, but also between different kinds of secondary socialisation.

An individual in Ireland is primarily socialized through their family, the education system, and various other institutions of varying formality. Upon entering the Defence Forces however, a specific process of secondary socialization is quite literally instituted, through the Cadet School for those deciding upon that route. These individuals are ‘made’ into officers by the Defence Forces, with the Cadet School itself as a “total institution” (Goffman, 1961) lessening the risk of ‘reality slipping’. This process of socialisation would justify the adoption of a social constructivist framework in itself. What makes it even more interesting, however, is the fact that what is being researched may potentially be a double-process of secondary socialisation. There is the initial period of military formation in the Cadet School (and perhaps some time spent with a unit). This is then followed by a longer period in an academic context, which might in its own right be a form of secondary socialisation, such as to a disciplinary identity based on what this individual studies (scientist, engineer, sociologist), or in a wider sense of personal growth and development. Academic studies are then followed by a return to military life, and a return to the norms of military life.

At this point a return to the philosophical underpinnings of this project is warranted. Philosophical hermeneutics is the process of understanding our world, through whatever medium. Implicit in this is the fact that this process of understanding is linked with creating. Philosophical hermeneutics as formulated by Gadamer thus has broad overlaps with social constructionism and symbolic interactionism. Since being is predicated on language and communication, it is a profoundly relational philosophy, one that closely identifies ontology (how and what we are) with epistemology (how we know). In terms of the conduct of research, hermeneutics as a philosophical perspective tallies with a self-reflective attitude towards the social sciences, similar to Blumer’s views on eschewing technical, uncritical, positivistic approaches to research (Blumer, 1986, p. 28ff). Gadamer cautions against uncritical ‘application’ of hermeneutics – indeed his magnum opus might well have been titled *Truth against Method* (Caputo,
Indeed there are other overlaps between Blumer and Gadamer, such as the former’s mention of our reliance on “our share of common stereotypes that we use to see a sphere of empirical social life that we do not know” (Blumer, 1986, p. 36) and the latter’s discussion of a similar idea, unfortunately literally translated as “prejudice” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 271ff).

The most crucial commonality between the philosopher and sociologists I rely on, however, is to be found in Gadamer’s idea of the ‘fusion of horizons’ (Horizontverschmelzung). Each participant in a dialogue has their own world, and the interactions of dialogue or of social interaction more generally means the overlapping of these worlds, hermeneutical Venn-diagrams of fused horizons of meaning. The fusion of horizons is the process by which we come to develop (ideally, in fusion – he does not explore the possibility of a fission of horizons) shared vocabularies and meanings. Blumer explores similar ideas in defining the ‘four central conceptions’ of symbolic interactionism:

(1) people, individually and collectively, are prepared on the basis of the meanings of the objects that comprise their world; (2) the association of people is necessarily in the form of a process in which they are making indications to one another and interpreting each other’s indications; (3) social acts, whether individual or collective, are constructed through a process in which the actors note, interpret, and assess the situations confronting them; (4) the complex interlinkages of acts that comprise organization, institutions, division of labor, and networks of interdependency are moving and not static affairs. (Blumer, 1986, p. 50)

Gadamer is careful to emphasise that we do not seek, in hermeneutics, to “maintain or enforce” our horizon, but treat it as “an opinion and a possibility that one brings into play and puts at risk” (op. cit., p. 390). Blumer too notes that in sociological research the we are to make he “effort to get inside [others’] world of meanings” (op. cit., p. 51). Berger and Luckmann, in discussing social constructionism, discuss “symbolic universes” (1991, pp. 110–146).

Socialisation is one such instance of creating shared ‘symbolic universes’, creating worlds through a fusion of horizons, though not, perhaps, in terms of two equal
individuals encountering an Other and seeking to understand them. The sociological perspectives outlined here illustrate the institutional or organizational reality of the hermeneutical ideal Gadamer discussed, which is that by choosing to enter into another ‘world’, such as the military, those officers must in large part adapt to and adopt its language, habits, mores. This becomes apparent in the empirical part of this thesis, where certain ways of speaking epitomise how military socialisation has in many respects succeeded in creating a collective horizon of meaning shared by officers in the Defence Forces. Nevertheless, there are multiple ongoing dialogues, myriad horizons of meaning, and as will be discussed later in this chapter as well as subsequently in this thesis, the existence of an ‘official’ horizon or world of meaning does not preclude the existence of others.

6.2 Role Theory

This study adopts a social constructionist outline of socialisation, and specifically in the professional context of role formation. As such I use role theory as it relates to social construction through socialisation, as role formation of Irish officers is a process of secondary (and to a lesser extent anticipatory) socialisation. These officers are being socialised to the role of the military officer (or more specifically to the Army, Naval Service or Air Corps officer – or more precisely again, as cavalry, artillery, deck officers or pilot etc.). This concept of role was central to my initial formulation of this research programme in terms of the stance of the military professional as “warrior, diplomat, and scholar” in the words of Chief of Staff Vice-Admiral Mark Mellett (indeed, this was the working title of this dissertation, as can be seen in the letters sent to participants, attached in Appendix 1). A focus on socialisation and role allows for considering historical and institutional influences on the Irish military professional, as well as capturing individual officers’ views. As such, it is a framework that allows for the integration of the documentary and archival sources and the interview data generated to answer the research questions concerning the origins of the USAC scheme, how it was implemented, the effects of USAC on personnel and the organisation, and the influence USAC had on military socialisation, while also taking account of other influences such as the Cadet School and norms of military life within the unit.
Role theory has numerous sources. Collins (1994, p. 265) in his general overview of sociological traditions sees it as coming out of symbolic interactionism (treating the two as to some extent synonymous), where “social institutions are made up of roles into which individuals fit”, e.g. father, mother, children. He connects this with the functionalist view of society which sees “roles as being made up of institutionalized norms and values.” Both are related, but he sees the functional approach as having “plodded ahead” with “banal and homey observations” in contrast to the “radical Blumerian situationalists” who have “generally attacked abstract theorizing in favour of being true to the fluidity and spontaneity of real life” (ibid.). Biddle (1979, pp. 8–10), writing on role theory specifically echoes this outline of dual origins in functionalism and symbolic interactionism. He cites ancestors in etymology, Scottish moral philosophers and social contract theory, Goffman’s dramaturgical sociological analysis, as well as structural sociology and anthropology. He summarises his view, suggesting why it is so attractive as a theoretical approach:

role theory offers concepts for many of the events a social science should cover. Role theory differentiates individual behaviors, social activities, and the phenomenal processes that presumably lie behind them. Moreover, role theory accommodates symbols as well as nonsymbolic forms of behavior. (Ibid., p.12)

**Person, Role, and Social Type**

In discussing role, various terms are used, so it is useful to set out some definitions. Talcott Parsons, in setting out the functionalist perspective, speaks of the development of the child in terms of the initial definition of identity in terms of sex – male or female – and position within the family as a child (1964, pp. 42–43). This definition of initial identity is Berger and Luckmann’s primary socialization. This basic role is the first of four types of social role:

*basic roles*, like gender and age roles, that are grounded in society at large rather than particular organizations; *structural status roles*, like occupational, family, and recreational roles that are attached to position, office, or status in particular organizational settings; *functional group roles*, like the "mediator" and "devil's advocate," which are not formally designated or attached to particular group positions or offices, but are recognized items in the cultural repertoire; and *value roles*, like the hero, traitor, criminal, and saint, which embody the
implementation or the negation of some recognized value or value complex. (Turner, 1990, pp. 87–88)

Role, as I will use it, means the second type of structural status role, which is formed through a process of secondary socialisation. Turner previously sought to draw a distinction between person and role, defining person as that which, in the broadest sense “consists of all the roles in an individual's repertoire, with some qualification about how well each is played” (1978, p. 2). Turner writes that “no sociological literature was found that dealt with changes in the latter two types of roles” (1990, p. 88), namely functional group roles and value roles, but here outlining an alternative approach is useful in that it helps us to further define how to understand role.

In seeking to understand why role theory gained traction rather than the alternative idea of “social type” in sociology, Arditi (1987) considers the roots of role. He sees the same origins as Collins and Biddle, in structural-functionalism on the one hand, and interpretivism on the other (noting both Blumer’s symbolic interactionism and Goffman’s dramaturgical version). Arditi sees role as consequence of the division of labour and modernity: “Roles are a consequence of the division of labor essential to any society, and as such, in principle, can be identified in all societies. But it is only in relatively complex systems of organization that roles become primary constituents of social reality” (p. 567). He admits that role is “by no means the only possible concept that mediates between the person and the social system”, and that the kin concept of social types affords an alternative vision of the individual in society and in the same way that the reality of social roles can be asserted we can affirm the reality of social types. Why, then, did this concept virtually disappear from the sociological literature? (p. 569)

The reason, he suggests, is that role is cultural and constructed, reflecting a society where movement within the social structure is possible, often as a result of individual agency. This individual agency is, for instance, in a person deciding to adopt a role, to undergo a process of secondary socialization.

The contrast Arditi makes with social types is striking: “It is in the work of Simmel and some of the most eminent Chicago sociologists that we find the first, and almost only,
studies of social types. ‘The stranger,’ ‘the miser,’ ‘the marginal man,’ ‘the hobo or the ‘Jack-Roller,’ to name only a few are social types, not roles”, and he regards them as contradicting “one of the most important principles of role theory” (p. 571). The principle underlying the social type is that they refer to a structural situation, such that ‘the stranger’ is defined by a total condition of strangeness. That is to say, the social type is passive and static, akin to the Aristotelian or feudal vision of the world, where individuals have a place in society that is fixed.

No idea could be more remote from role theory, in whatever version. For the concept of social type implies a permanent connection between an individual and a structural condition, whereas the concept of roles presupposes the absence of durable attachment between a person and any particular social position. (p. 572)

The role, in contrast, is mutable, dynamic – a role can be taken up and put down. Because of the mutability of the concept of role, its dynamic nature and the fact that roles are not coherent and static in the sense that social types theoretically are, the concept of role almost by definition implies the ambiguity that we see in role strain and role conflict, discussed below. Methodologically, this means role theory also integrates the individual’s agency and so their ability to make choices within their place in a wider structure.

**Role Sets, Strains, and Conflicts**

Implied in the foregoing outline is the notion that an individual person can have multiple roles. Merton defined this as the ‘role set’:

I begin with the premise that each social status involves not a single associated role, but an array of roles. This basic feature of social structure can be registered by the distinctive but not formidable term, role-set. To repeat, then, by role-set I mean that complement of role-relationships in which persons are involved by virtue of occupying a particular social status. Thus, in our current studies of medical schools, we have begun with the view that the status of medical student entails not only the role of a student vis-à-vis his teachers, but also an array of other roles relating him diversely to other students, physicians, nurses, social workers, medical technicians, and the like. (1957, p. 110)

What arises here is the possibility of there being some tension between these roles, a question of which role in the role set might have priority over others. The idea of “role ambiguity” (Rizzo et al., 1970) captures aspects of the difficulties that exist in dealing with such competing demands in the role set, which is also viewed as leading to various
coping strategies. Callero considers this in terms of ‘role-identity salience’, the idea that some roles are more important to a person (‘identity’) than others (1985, p. 203). So a work role, for instance a person’s officer role, might be more important to them as a person than their family role as a sister or a daughter. Implied here is the notion of priority and even hierarchy within the role set, with Callero noting that the terms “role engulfment”, “occupational identification”, and “role commitment” (p. 204), among others have been used to describe this process. Callero sought to discuss this only in terms of how this had a bearing on the behaviour of blood donors, not seeking to address how the these tensions were negotiated.

One way that this notion of intra-person role tensions can be understood is in terms of ‘role strain’, and there are parallels here with Berger and Luckmann’s approach to interactions between ‘symbolic universes’ (1991, pp. 122–134). Goode initially takes a functionalist approach, using the concept of the role set, but he quickly moves beyond this, arguing that there is need to account for seven “awkward empirical facts” (1960, p. 484). The concept of role strain is how he moves beyond the functional model to conclude:

The individual is thus likely to face a wide, distracting, and sometimes conflicting array of role obligations. If he conforms fully or adequately in one direction, fulfilment will be difficult in another [...] Role strain – difficulty in meeting given role demands – is therefore normal. In general, the individual’s total role obligations are overdemanding. (p. 485, emphasis in original)

When roles make demands that are too great, a person must manage role relations through “role bargains”, and a “continuing process of selection among alternative role behaviours in which each individual seeks to reduce his role strain” (p. 483). The individual’s response, he suggests, are in the following manipulations of the “role structure”. The first is compartmentalization, where the individual ignores the problem of consistency or inconsistency in fulfilling the demands of a role, and is primarily an individual, psychological strategy; Goode suggests that most role relations tend towards compartmentalisation. A second is delegation, which is social and organisational, literally giving some of the demands of the role to another person. The third is elimination of the role relationships: “if our work-group sets norms which are too high
for us to meet we can seek another job” (p. 486). This is another social response. A fourth response is extension, where an “individual may expand his role relations in order to plead these commitments as an excuse for not fulfilling certain obligations.” The fifth response is in fact a structural barrier to role strain as a person cannot keep taking on roles indefinitely, so the role system cannot be indefinitely expanded, and so there is an ‘upper limit’ to role strain. The sixth and final point is to put up barriers against intrusion into the role system, whereby the individual “may use several techniques for preventing others from initiating, or even continuing role relationships” (p. 487) thus pre-empting role strain. Many of these techniques relate to what Goode terms “more institutionalised roles” which are “backed more strongly by third parties” (p. 495), observing that in the interactions with these third parties, that “it is the heretic, not the sinner, who is the more dangerous.” So breaking the rules might be acceptable in some ways, but questioning or ignoring them altogether is regarded as worse.

A more detailed approach to the problem of interacting roles is found in the idea of “role conflict”. One approach to role conflict takes a narrow or restricted definition, when (1) a decision is required of an individual whose role is such that they must decide; (2) between two or more alternatives, each of which will fulfil legitimate expectations of others in terms of their role; and (3) no available decision open to that individual will satisfy all these expectations in conflict (Gullahorn & Gullahorn, 1963, p. 38). This results in two types of role conflict: status produced role conflict, and contingent role conflict. For the former, Gullahorn and Gullahorn give the example of NCOs in the military as "men in the middle" who "may anticipate recurrent conflicts among legitimate expectations" (pp. 39-40), namely between enlisted and commissioned personnel. This is structural, and effectively inescapable if one chooses to stay in the status and the social structure producing it. Contingent role conflicts are those that arise “as a consequence of the multiplicity of statuses which Ego simultaneously occupies” (p. 41), namely different roles in the role set, some of which may be mutually incompatible. Here the contradictions are not essential or structural features of the situation, but rather a matter of balancing expectations between the roles and involve an element of choice. They propose that a role conflict can be resolved by either: making a decision,
delaying the decision, or rejecting the responsibility for a decision. This does not differ greatly from van de Vliert’s (1981) sketch of role conflict resolution, that suggests the three alternatives of choice, compromise, or avoidance. Gullahorn and Gullahorn suggest that the order of likely decision is postponement, rejecting responsibility, and accepting responsibility for the decision. The first, delaying a decision, is most likely as it is the “least punitive response” (p. 44). Those situations that do not meet their three narrow conditions are given the label “pseudo-role conflict” (p. 43). Here they say an individual is not actually required to make a decision, one or both of the demands made are “illegitimate” (though this is not properly defined), and a creative solution is possible. The use of ‘pseudo’ here is a product of how narrowly ‘role conflict’ is defined, and underplays how such a conflict might be experienced. That is, it privileges their structure above the agency of the individual in a given situation.

An alternative to Gullahorn and Gullahorn’s narrowly constrained role conflict comes from psychology. It views role conflicts as stemming from the nature of the environment in which the individual is, rather than a set of circumstances (Ivey & Robin, 1966). As such, they outline four different kinds of role conflicts. The first comes from disagreements between legitimate role definers who cannot see eye to eye on the normative content of a role, what should be done in a given context. The second is role conflict internal to the role, where there is agreement about the normative content, but not all obligations can be met. The third type of role conflict stems from the role in interaction with the social system; this approaches issues of resourcing, which they call “functional”, and also in terms of expectations to be met, e.g. where a teacher is also to function as a clerk and a teacher. The fourth and final role conflict is rooted in the interactions of the individual and their role, where the role definer’s demands exceed an individual’s capacity if they are to maintain their “well-being or psychological integrity” (p. 31) - this is close to the contingent role conflict defined by Gullahorn and Gullahorn. Biddle, in an article on developments in role theory, notes other related terms which have emerged since these versions of role conflict:

*role ambiguity* (a condition in which expectations are incomplete or insufficient to guide behavior), *role malintegration* (when roles do not fit well together), *role discontinuity* (when the person must perform a sequence of malintegrated
roles), and role overload (when the person is faced with too many expectations). (1986, p. 83)

These are, however, an expansion of the typology of role strains, rather than making a significant development in terms of analysing the responses to role strain.

Role theory has also been applied to specific contexts, including the military. Charles Bidwell (1961) considered role conflicts in professional men who had been drafted to the U.S. Army, particularly the extent to which they identified with their military role versus their previous civilian professional role, and how this was dealt with through different types of “role performance” (p. 366). Another by Burchard (1954) examined role conflicts for military chaplains, in terms of a tension between the performance of the pastoral role, and their military role as army officers. It has also been used to consider “role-exit”, to consider marital-discord in terms of the personal lives of military personnel coming off extended deployment (Gambardella, 2008), as well as anticipation of retirement by military personnel (Stanford, 1968). Role theory has also been used to discuss higher education, to consider role conflicts between residential students and commuter students (Samuels et al., 2000), “role balancing” for working community college students (Ziems, 2017), role strain for “non-traditional community college students” (McGraw, 2018), and “role-identity correspondence” (i.e. between an individual’s broader identity as a ‘person’ and their role as a student) (Reitzes, 1981). All these examples come from the United States, and are not directly applicable to my research questions, but a quote from Reitzes does make a useful observation which is generalisable, namely to say that “there is variability in role identity correspondence, not all students have identities similar to the college student role” (ibid., p. 619) indicating that variety and difference is the rule.

**Using Role Theory**

The benefit of using role theory is that it allows for the ‘functional view’ of the military profession as it relates to the structure of the Irish state, and the accepted view of what an officer in the Defence Forces is. This includes the ‘official’ perspective as can be found in documentary evidence, as well as in the publicly or officially approved pronouncements officers might make. As well as this, however, there is the symbolic
interactionist and interpretivist potential of role theory, in terms of how officers make sense of their role as military officers beyond their own immediate context, in the Defence Forces as an organisation, in higher education and in society more widely. Role theory allows for the discussion of the ‘performance’ of professionalism, and offers scope for countervailing perspectives. My approach, drawing on documentary sources as well as data generated in interviews requires such a framework able to bridge these requirements.

A potential limitation remains, however, in the structural-functional bent of role theory. One analysis (J. Jackson, 1998) of role theory’s limitations, for instance, sets out five points of critique:

1. Role theory falsely reifies certain social ideologies into objective realities;
2. its conservative social ideology that emphasises maintaining social consensus;
3. its picture of socialisation lacks comprehensiveness;
4. it fails to account for human agency; and
5. it has a segmented and static view of human activity and “resistive efforts” (p. 53).

As such, there is a need for the use of role theory will be informed by supplementary concepts to develop a comprehensive conceptual framework to underpin this study. Doing so will provide a conceptual framework that draws on role theory and social constructionism, while addressing the limitations inherent in role theory that Jackson outlines.

6.3 Infrapolitics: Addressing Limitations

A key issue with role theory relates to agency. It does not account for the exercise of power in different ways depending on the different status of these individuals. Not all roles are created equal, and there must be some manner in which to understand not just the differences, but how individuals respond to these differences in active and creative ways. This may be a consequence of initial work on role theory, which took the form of abstract schematization of possible relationships between roles, or only considered a role in a single context. To address this lacuna I will turn to the work of political anthropologist James C. Scott.
Official and Hidden Transcripts, and the Arts of Resistance (Scott)

Michel De Certeau writes that "there is no truth except in whispers and among peasants" (1984, p. 16), and this could serve as an evocation of the work of political anthropologist James C. Scott. Scott’s career started with research into agrarian societies (primarily in Malaysia) and the many and varied ways peasants resist authority. Initially his work focused on their own local context, as he traces in Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (1985). This broadened out subsequently to consider how the powerless in society resist the powerful, including at the state level, with Domination and the Arts of Resistance (Scott, 1990), Seeing Like a State (1998), The Art of Not Being Governed (2009), and more generally in a summary of his views in Two Cheers For Anarchism (2012b). Much like with Bourdieu’s work on the Kabyle of Algeria, Scott’s theories are grounded primarily in ethnographic fieldwork, supplemented and supported by historical and documentary sources, and he states that “close contextual work is the lifeblood of theory” (1990, p. x). Both used detailed anthropological work as a foundation for wider sociological theorising. Another parallel is that the U.S.A.’s Vietnam War spurred Scott’s interest in South-East Asian peasants and land use, just as the Algerian War was key to Bourdieu’s interest and research in that country.

In an early paper which prefigured his later conceptualisation of the official and hidden transcript, Scott describes a gap between “great” and “little” traditions, of ruling elites and subordinated peasants respectively:

But the little tradition does not merely represent some parochial version of the great tradition. Rather, the little tradition often constitutes a ‘shadow society—a pattern of structural, stylistic, and normative opposition to the politico-religious tradition of ruling elites.’ Despite this symbolic opposition, as well as the opposed interests of the peasantry and the ruling urban elite, the relationship between the two traditions and their respective bearers is not simply a matter of outright conflict or of absolute domination/subordination. In addition there is a certain amount of collaboration or symbiosis between the two. (1977, p. 211)

Scott’s fundamental insight is that though society is made up of relations of domination – power exercised by the few over many – there is always resistance to these attempts at control. Resistance, indeed, is the term to focus on, rather than rebellion. Writing of the broader political implications of this insight, he asserts that “[m]ore regimes have
been brought, piecemeal, to their knees by what was once called ‘Irish democracy,’ the silent, dogged resistance, withdrawal, and truculence of millions of ordinary people, than by revolutionary vanguards or rioting mobs” (2012, p. 14). He critiques existing theories of domination that stress hegemony and ‘false consciousness’, as well as functionalist views of society, as ascribing a “unique agency” to elites which are denied to everyone else (1990, p. 178, see also pp. 71-107 for his detailed critique of ‘hegemony’).

Methodologically, Scott sees this as rooted in the “legibility” of the actors and acts of those exercising domination, and what we see of their attempts or success at exercising control he terms “the public transcript”:

Regardless of the particular form of domination, it is a safe bet that a vital sector of the elite-choreographed public transcript will consist of visual and audible displays of rank, precedence, and honour. Here I have in mind such expressions of domination as terms of address, demeanour, speech levels, codes of eating, dressing, bathing, cultural taste, who speaks first, who gives way to whom. (Ibid., p. 105)

Even more literally, the public transcript can be understood in terms of what people in a position of authority say is ‘how things are done’, but also in official documentary sources. This ‘public transcript’ is not an exhaustive account of power relations in a given situation, however, which Scott terms the “full transcript” (1985, p. 284). Scott’s views on this are especially relevant to the military context, and so are worth quoting at length:

The fact is that power-laden situations are nearly always inauthentic; the exercise of power nearly always drives a portion of the full transcript underground. [...] The greater the disparity in power between the two parties, the greater the proportion of the full transcript that is likely to be concealed. Allowing always for the exceptional moments of uncontrolled anger or desperation, the normal tendency will be for the dependent individual to reveal only that part of his or her full transcript in encounters with the powerful that it is both safe and appropriate to reveal. [...] Thus it might be possible to think of a continuum of situations ranging from the free dialogue between equals that is close to what Habermas has called the “ideal speech situation” all the way to the concentration camp in which most of the victim’s transcript is driven underground [...] Ranged in between these extremes are a host of more common conditions in which subordinate classes typically find themselves: the boss and the working, the landlord and the tenant, the lord and the serf, the master and the slave. (Ibid., p. 286)
What is not shared in these ‘power-laden situations’ Scott calls “the hidden transcript” (*ibid.*), which has clear parallels with Goffman’s notion of “backstage” (1990, p. 114ff), and indeed he uses the term “offstage” when discussing the hidden transcript, (e.g. 1990, p. 191) but does not explicitly reference Goffman here. An interesting methodological implication of this is in Scott’s observations on the nature of the “voice under domination”, and the ways that the subordinated group can find ways to insert their voice into the official transcript, through “undeclared ideological guerrilla war” of “rumor, gossip, disguises, linguistic tricks, metaphors, euphemisms, folktales, ritual gestures, anonymity” (Scott, 1990, 136-137).

The fundamental implication of Scott’s vision is that the ‘subordinate groups’ he studies practice what he calls “infrapolitics”, “a politics that ‘dare not speak its name,’ a diagonal politics, a careful and evasive politics that avoid[s] dangerous risks” (Scott, 2012a, p. 113), what he terms ‘arts of resistance’. While he offers desertion from the army in contrast with open mutiny, as the “most historically significant form of infrapolitics” (p. 114), it is probably also one of the most blatant forms. Most examples are considerably less overt. At the other extreme, he indicates that fashion is another site of less explicit infrapolitics: “cultural signalling through dress display is easily available to relatively powerless groups and the potential explosiveness of such cultural affronts to dominant groups” (p. 116). But the primary observation he makes is the use of myriad resources to remain *anonymous* in exercising this infrapolitics of resistance:

The logic of disguise followed by infrapolitics extends to its organization as well as to its substance. Again, the form of organization is as much a product of political necessity as of political choice. Because open political activity is all but precluded, resistance is confined to the informal networks of kin, neighbors, friends, and community rather than formal organisation. [...] The informal assemblages of market, neighbors, family, and community thus provide both a structure and a cover for resistance. Since resistance is conducted in small groups [...] it is well adapted to thwart surveillance. There are no leaders to round up, no membership lists to investigate, no manifestos to denounce, no public activities to draw attention. (1990, p. 200)

In the military context this is especially relevant given that political organisation in the form of unionisation is not available to military officers in the Irish Defence Forces.
Overall, the military is a prime candidate for the exercise of infrapolitics, as the fact of rank structure and hierarchy means that there is scope for power to be exercised at all levels. What Scott allows us to see, however, is that even those within the structure of ‘domination’ in his words still have agency, and if they disagree with how this power over them is wielded, they will seek ways to evade this. Role tension or conflict or ambiguity alone does not allow for this as it takes conflict as structural, rather than accounting for the ways in which the individual inhabitant of a role asserts their agency actively, as subjects rather than simply ‘subject to’ authority. The concepts of the ‘official transcript’ and the ‘hidden transcript’ taken somewhat literally may apply to the context of data generation through documentary and interview research. This aids in identifying elements of the hidden transcript to trace manifestations of the infrapolitics of those who may resist the official transcript.

**Alternatives: Negotiated Order, Habitus, and Discipline**

An alternative approach to Scott’s thought is found in Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’. Habitus does not feature in my conceptual framework, for the reasons I will present here. Though the term originates with Norbert Elias’s *The Civilising Process* (Paulle et al., 2012) I am referring to Bourdieu’s elaboration of the concept. Its most detailed theoretical presentation comes in *The Logic of Practice* (1990), where Bourdieu gives a summary of his intellectual journey and a confrontation between structuralism/objectivism, existentialism, and rational actor theory (his terms, pp. 30-51). Seen in this light his project can be understood as trying to overcome or synthesise the tensions between structure and agency, combining both in the concept of habitus. Understanding this makes his (infamous) definition of habitus marginally less opaque:

> Systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices [...] ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor. (p. 53)

Habitus is, in de Certeau’s words, “*something* that can adjust practices to structures and yet explain the gaps remaining between them” (1984, p. 57). Structure is regulated and regular, but there is also scope for change. This would appear to meet the requirements of researching military officers in both a military and a higher education setting, but
because any attempted summary of habitus cannot do it justice in a short space, I will focus my comments on a methodological observation relating to this study. Habitus might allow an analysis that combines structure (as in role theory) with agency (Scott), but the problem is that unless one undertakes focused empirical research specifically aimed at developing the habitus of the Irish military officer, it might actually result in too little agency in all its abstraction.

For instance, this concept has been used by Heaney (2013) to discuss the changing nature of the Irish habitus in terms of emotions and social change, from ‘solid’ to ‘liquid’ modernity, using Luhmann’s terminology. As Heaney himself concludes, however, there is a difficulty in a “theory-heavy qualitative project” (p. 285), with a sample of sixteen interviews, namely the extent to which one can say this is a representation of the ‘Irish habitus’. Aline Courtois’s Elite Schooling and Social Inequality: Privilege and Power in Ireland’s Top Private Schools (2018) is a very detailed work of sociological research, combining ethnographic and documentary research to develop an institutional habitus of these schools, and the individual habitus that they produce in their students – rather than proposing it extends more broadly than this. The major problem is that habitus demands precision, and considerable empirical grounding. The notion of a general Irish habitus is too broad, however, and in need of the vast detail and specificity that Bourdieu gave to different French social classes in Distinction (1996), French academia in Homo Academicus (1988), and the Kabyle people of the Atlas mountains in northern Algeria in the second volume of The Logic of Practice (1990). Indeed, habitus came out of, and was not simply ‘applied to’ ethnographic research, in the case of the latter (see also Reay, 2004 for a critique of how habitus is frequently deployed in educational research). Courtois’s work is the most sophisticated example in this regard in an Irish setting, but is very different in its research aims, and consequently has no bearing on my topic. My research questions, however, do not seek to define the habitus of Irish military officers, and so this is beyond the limits of this dissertation.

Another possible alternative to Scott is the concept of ‘negotiated order’. This originates in the work of Anselm Strauss (1978), used in a military officer context by Patrick Bury
as well as John Hockey’s book *Squaddies* (1986) to which he refers. Strauss’s essential insight is that

Rules and roles are always breaking down – and when they do not, they do not miraculously remain intact without some effort, including negotiation effort, to maintain them. What we can assent to is that when individuals or groups or organizations of any size work together “to get things done” then agreement is required about such matters as what, how, when, where, and how much. (*Op. cit.*, p. ix)

There is much here that aligns with Scott’s concepts of infrapolitics and resistance. A second potential benefit of negotiated order is that both Hockey and Bury use it to consider the military context. For Hockey, this is in a monograph of ethnography on non-commissioned soldiers, the squaddies of the title, and examines how soldiers, NCOs and officers negotiate and renegotiate their social order, in a training setting, in a combat setting, and social settings. Bury’s paper considers British Army officers of various ranks interacting in a social setting, in a micro-sociological analysis of a ritual of the Royal Irish Regiment. Both authors have the British Army as their institutional focus. There is much to recommend negotiated order as a concept, but the quoted authors are referring to interactions within a single environment. Both Hockey and Bury are discussing being within the military field, while Anselm originally developed the concept by observing patients and personnel in two psychiatric hospitals. What is useful are Bury and Hockey’s observations on what happens within the military field, between officers in that setting, or between enlisted and commissioned ranks. But as my research questions focus on those who leave the Defence Forces military environment temporarily for a period, to enter the higher education field, negotiated order is not an ideal fit.

A final alternative source to consider is Michel Foucault, as there might appear to be scope to deploy his ideas in this setting. His notion of ‘austere institutions’ is evocative of Goffman’s earlier ‘total institutions’, and the concern with power in the modern state and its depersonalisation in discipline might seem fitting to apply in the military context. In fact, however, almost directly the opposite is the case. Foucault is concerned with the organisation of control in large part through systems and institutions, and though he writes that he seeks to “construct an analytics of power that no longer takes law as a model and a code” (1998, p. 90). This apparently echoes Bourdieu’s suggestion that “the
official rule determines practice only when there is more to be gained by obeying that disobeying it [...] One is right to refuse to credit the rule with the efficacy that legalism ascribes to it” (1990, p. 108). This is Foucault’s position so that he can extend the analysis to all the other realms where the state has extended its tendrils of control. Foucault remains concerned with the state, and this is reflected in his historical approach, which is heavily reliant on archival sources where the official perspective is represented. While this method does allow for a complex vision of social structure, tracing the ‘genealogies’ of “contemporary technologies of observation and discipline [...] development of panoptic procedures” (de Certeau, 1984, p. 48), it tends to excludes the individual’s agency, as the anthropological and sociological approaches of Scott and indeed Bourdieu do not. In so far as the individual appears in Foucault, it is as the “self-policing subject” (Dews, 2007, p. 183) which functions as a synecdoche for the powerful state. So where Foucault focuses on the disciplinary forces individuals are subject to – such as those found in the normative content of a role – I am also interested in this, but also crucially in how these forces are evaded, and the strategies by which their evasions are effected. Scott describes his difference from Foucault by saying “I am largely concerned with structures of personal domination, such as serfdom and slavery, rather than with the impersonal, “scientific,” disciplinary forms of the modern state that preoccupy him. More importantly, I am interested in how these idealizations of domination are thwarted by practical forms of resistance” (Scott, 1990). My study is thus informed by role theory and resistance to domination as theorised by Scott for the reasons set out here.

6.4 Summary

This framework, informed by the literature review, is key to the design of my research strategy, interview protocol, and the conduct of my analysis. Role theory is a useful framework in its own right, but due to its limitations in allowing for individual agency, it is being combined with insights from Scott on resistance and infrapolitics. As such, I use the work of Scott to bring in the concept of active agency, making for a more creative inhabitant of a role, who exercises creative responses to the construction of their identity in given situations. Alternative theoretical approaches, which ultimately did not provide for a critical, in-depth exploration of the topic were noted here. This study is
therefore informed by a conceptual framework combining role theory and Scott’s work on infrapolitics. Combining social constructionist role theory with James C. Scott’s theories of resistance to domination through infrapolitics allows me to create a robust conceptual framework where both elements are complementary.
Chapter 7: The Origins of the USAC Scheme

I have already referred to the Military College and to my opinion that it would be a good thing if it could possibly be made a constituent of the National University, or, alternatively, that the personnel, the potential commissioned personnel, serving there were given an opportunity of doing a university degree. I do not think there would be any difficulty about it and it is something which the Minister should consider. It would raise the standard, not that I suggest for one moment that the standard of our commissioned personnel is low, of our commissioned personnel. It would give them a broader outlook and would give them an opportunity of acquiring a degree which would be most useful to them in their post-service days.

Patrick O’Donnell, Fine Gael TD for Donegal West, Dáil Debate, 11 April, 1967 (Vol. 227, No. 8, Col. 1340)

7.1 Introduction

As part of this dissertation’s examination of the position of higher education in the Defence Forces, it is necessary to understand the wider, institutional context for the association between cadet - and later officer – training, and civilian higher education. This chapter considers how decisions relating to what became known as the ‘USAC scheme’ came to be made, in order to answer the first research question, “How and why did the Irish Defence Forces establish the USAC scheme to send cadets to university in 1969?” USAC (the University Student Administrative Complement) refers to the administrative title given to the building housing cadets and officers beside Renmore Barracks in Galway, and has its first mention in official documents in the 1977 Board Report (discussed below), which also suggested that USAC become a unit in its own right (MA COS-441, p. 13). ‘USAC’ came eventually to serve as a metonym for the higher education scheme for officers, much as ‘the Áras’ serves as a metonym for the Irish Presidency. As such, in my interviews I usually referred to ‘USAC’ as shorthand for this scheme, with only one interviewee maintaining that USAC referred to the accommodation complex for officers and cadets.
This addresses the first research question, “How and why did the Irish Defence Forces establish the USAC scheme to send cadets to university from 1969?” It refers to existing scholarship on the changing nature of higher education in the 1960s, archival sources, and other documentary materials relating to the Defence Forces’ engagement with this process. Tom Hodson’s *The College: The Irish Military College, 1930-2000* (2016) was an important initial source for this chapter, and it also pointed me in the direction of Barry O’Brien’s (1978) MA thesis for the Department of Education, University College Galway, written while he was a serving officer in the Irish Army. This examined the history of the USAC scheme, and evaluated its impact in the decade after its initiation. The author accessed internal Defence Forces materials, as well as personal communications from Army personnel who had been involved in the setting up of the scheme, and so his research is still a relevant and valuable resource for considering aspects of the early days of USAC.

### 7.2 The Defence Forces Submissions to the Commission

In the late 1950s, a series of developments set out a change of direction in Irish economic policy towards trade liberalisation and foreign direct investment. As part of this, the economic and social advantages of educational expansion, across all levels, began to be understood (Walsh, 2009, pp. 3–4). It was in this context that Ireland volunteered in 1961 to be a pilot participant country in an international initiative of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), namely the Education Investment and Planning Programme (*ibid.*, p. 64). In due course this led to the landmark *Investment in Education* report. While the OECD’s pilot study resulted in seismic changes to the Irish education system, most notably through the advent of ‘free’ secondary education, the wider policy and cultural changes also spurred other developments, and for the universities preeminent among these was the Commission on Higher Education, the first comprehensive review of Irish higher education.

The Commission was announced on the 23rd March 1960 (Dáil Debates, Vol. 180, No. 7, Col. 952), formally established on 4th October, and held its first meeting on 8th
November. The expectation was that the Commission, chaired by Supreme Court Justice Cearbhall Ó Dálaigh, would finish their work in a relatively short period of time, but this was not to be, and the delay was cause for some discussion in the Dáil over the ensuing years. The reason for this delay, as the Chairman explained in a letter to the Taoiseach dated 12th July 1966, was that the commission’s task was “much greater than we anticipated or is commonly thought” and that it had not been possible to approach their terms of reference “eclectically” (NA D/T 97/6/272). Ultimately the Commission’s findings were published on August 24th 1967, but as a result of the lengthy intervening period, many of its recommendations were pre-empted by government decisions in the meantime, while others didn’t find favour with the Department of Education. The findings circulated within the Department of Education before this date. An internal memorandum for the Government from the office of the Minister for Education (dated 4 April 1968) acknowledged receipt of the Presentation and Summary as well as Volume I of the report on 7th March and 27th July 1967, with the second volume apparently having been received on 24th February 1967 (separate memo dated 9th April 1968) (NA D/T 99/1/438). As such, there had been time for discussion of what the Commission’s findings might be, including among those with an interest in or concern for military matters – an area which was largely unknown to the Department of Education, and an unexpected face of the Commission’s work.

The influence of an individual member of the Commission was significant in ensuring that the higher education of Irish Army officers featured in their agenda. Tom Hodson (2016, p. 148) refers to a letter by retired Lt Gen M.J. Costello, a member of the Commission, to Cearbhall Ó Dálaigh as chairman. Costello had been on the military mission to the United States in 1926, and the staff of the Military College subsequently. In his letter, dated 14th February 1961, Costello suggests that the Commission should consider the education and training of cadets in their deliberations (MA COS-0016B). This letter is significant in that it makes specific recommendations at an early stage, before any evidence had been gathered through either a visit or a written submission from the military. These included transferring the Cadet School to Galway, and that cadets should study for a BA in UCG. This would be in arts subjects, including Irish, one
foreign language, and Irish history; those wishing to study science or engineering are to be sent to “a technological college” – commerce was notable by its absence.

Costello also made broader proposals, that the standard routine duties of cadets should be continued, with cadets cycling “to and from college as a military unit and in uniform” (ibid.), perhaps oblivious to the fact that students would potentially have very different timetables depending on their course of study. It would, however, have made for an interesting sight, whatever the weather. Cadets would participate in undergraduate life and “should be represented in all the college societies”, and their association “with other undergraduates would be a better preparation for their future duties than the somewhat monastic life at the Curragh”. The benefit to University College Galway in terms of “its assigned mission as an Irish-speaking University” was also addressed, as the Cadet School was using the Irish language exclusively at this time (at the instigation of Kevin Boland as Minister for Defence from 1957, Irish became the language of instruction in the Military College, and cadets and officers were to be able to carry out all of their duties through Irish (Hodson, 2016, pp. 134–137)). He also makes the observation that the “status of the Army officer would be enhanced and this would be of benefit to the Army as an institution”. He also observed that Irish Army officers with a university education “would have a better chance of terminating the discrimination now practiced against them in favour of Civil Servants”, an institutional and professional prestige benefit of university education which is not mentioned subsequently in any other documents, but which indicates the enduring tension between the civilian and military sides of defence in Ireland.

It is unclear when serious discussions on university education for cadets started within the Defence Forces. A document from July 1950 in a Chief of Staff file in the Military Archives (MA COS-0016A) titled “Notes on Cadet School” remarked on the unsuitability of the location of the Cadet School in the Curragh, and that unless it was a “separate self contained establishment situated near a university city it will never be the institution it should be” (§27). Another document, “Cadet Education – Answers to Questionnaire for Selected Officers”, dated 27th November 1951 and signed by Lt Col Joseph Emphy, made
a similar observation about the unsuitability of the Cadet School’s location, suggesting that it should be “a self-contained institution quite close to Dublin, Cork or Galway to enable it to have close ties with the Universities located in these cities.”

The first comprehensive engagement with this topic came in August 1961, when a paper by Col Edward Shortall (Hodson, 2016, p. 146) on cadet training was circulated to the adjutant general, quartermaster general, and director of training. This six-page document set out the aim of cadet training as producing “a commissioned officer, of good character with a good education” but complained that the location of the Cadet School “could hardly be more unsuitable from an instructional point of view and by reason of its environment” (MA COS-0016C). The curious status held by cadets with “neither the privileges of an officer nor the freedom of a private soldier” was described, with provocative observations on the socialisation and development of cadets in the Curragh through the following sketch:

He is forced to live in a social in-between with no social contacts other than his fellow cadets. Such isolation subjects him to the temptation of making undesirable associations, covert breaking of rules and regulations and a general tendency to lower the moral tone. The cadet on entry is an immature personality and it is demanding too much to expect him to develop along the right lines in such an environment.

The submission painted a somewhat alarming picture of the state of cadet education. The proposed remedy was indicated in the next criticism of the Curragh, namely that it “offers no facilities for the continuation of the cadets’ education such as could be afforded in a university city.” Here limitations with existing structures, not just of training, but of socialisation are aired. Reference was made to British and U.S. military training, and that the Irish Army was found wanting. The suggestion was that with investment in the education of officers, the state would feel the benefit of this either in the Army, or in civilian life after retirement.

Three alternatives to the existing situation were suggested - part time university attendance, full time university courses, and university courses for selected students – with the advantages and disadvantages of each sketched out. This document was
suggesting not only that the existing location of the Cadet School was unsuitable, and that the academic education of cadets required greater emphasis, but also that the Cadet School as a whole should be transferred to a university city. This was the first real proposal within the Defence Forces that the training of cadets ought to have a direct association with university studies. The submission was also the first stage in preparing the Army’s submission to the Commission.

The Military Submission to the Commission

The date for submission of material to the Commission was set as 1st March, 1962 (Department of Education, 1967, p. 5), but “some submissions subsequently made” were accepted by the Commission; the Military College’s submission was apparently made in 1964. The submitted file as a whole is undated, but can be found in a Military Archives folder inscribed “10/Mar/64 – 18/Mar/65” (MA COS-1050). The Commission visited the Military College on 26th June 1964, and the other submission to the Commission (MA ACS-013-6) is also dated June 1964. The entire file is over 52 pages (MA COS-1050), so only the essentials will be drawn out here. The fourth document was labelled “ANSWERS TO POSSIBLE QUERIES – Integration of Military and Civilian Higher Education”, divided into two parts examining (i) university “training” for cadets, and (ii) the command and staff school. The final document in this file contains the various appendices. The initial documents and the appendices were intended as context for Commission members, but were largely “descriptive”. One comment, however, in terms of the wider socialization of cadets comes in File C. “Through lectures, discussions and visits to theatres, art galleries and places of Cultural or Historical interest, Cadets are assisted in a limited way towards developing an interest in the finer things in life” (MA COS-1050, C, p. 4). A note on the contents page set out that File D was made out originally as a basis of discussion for the College staff. It does NOT necessarily represent the view of the Department of Defence, and should NOT be accepted as such. It does, however, represent views which have been discussed by the staff of THE MILITARY COLLEGE, and for that reason, it was considered that it would be a useful document for members of the Commission. This was significant in light of the controversy the Defence Forces would have to weather when their civilian counterparts in the Department of Defence became aware of the
Commission’s recommendations. File D, in two parts, considered 44 “possible queries” over 17 pages, with Part I (queries #s 1-33) relating to military education for cadets.

Socialisation is one heading under which a number of the queries can be collected, and these relate to military professionalism (#s 1-7, 27-29, 31). The argument being made was that the “the better the education, the better the officer. Educational standards are going up abroad and we cannot lag behind” (p. 1). Indeed, international comparisons and the sense of there being trans-national norms of military education also featured in a number of responses to queries (#s 2, 5, 6, 12, 16, 17, 32), with examples from the United States, France, Israel, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and others. In terms of the specific needs within the Irish Defence Forces, however, the response to query (#4) referred in detail to United Nations service in which Irish officers “have held a great variety of appointments, in command, and on staffs, at unit level, and at higher command level”, where the challenges were not restricted to purely military problems, “but many of the problems were administrative, political and economic” requiring a university level of education. This echoed the academic literature on the place of higher education, and specifically the place of the ‘liberal arts’ in the education of American military officers (Lovell, 1979; Masland & Radway, 1957). The response to query (#7, MACOS-1050, p. 2) suggested that one of the broad requirements for officers in middle and higher command included having “an advanced knowledge of national and international affairs, including historical analogies.”

The responses to other queries concerned how university education might “resolve the problems of promotion and resettlement” (#11, p. 3) or moving into civilian employment after retirement, which it noted was due to pressures such that only a “percentage of officers, irrespective of talents, can be promoted, owing to the pyramidal structure of the Army.” It is not clear how higher education would contribute in terms of promotion, however, given that until the Gleeson Commission promotion took place on the basis of seniority rather than merit. It could be of relevance for early retirement however. Higher education, it was being argued here, was a possible benefit to the Army at the start of an officer’s career and during the length of their service, but also in helping them to
resettle in civilian life. Attention was also given to the related perceived dangers of “brain drain” (#13, p. 4) where the solution proposed was a requirement for cadets to “sign on” (later referred to as signing an ‘undertaking’ or contract) for a period of “say 15 years”. While the structure of the Defence Forces necessitated that people leave the military, as is implied in (#11), this comment had more to do with a fear of university graduates potentially leaving far more quickly than previously, soon after completing their studies.

In terms of how such a scheme might be operationalized, questions of cost (#s 9, 10, 32, 33) and location (#s 32, 33) were addressed. Fears of “extremely heavy” cost were allayed (#9, p. 3), and the return on investment for the military was explained in terms of “[a] more highly trained and more competent officer” that would make the “Army more efficient for its task” (#10). Location was discussed in terms of what kind of establishment would be settled on. If there was to be the establishment of a “separate University College, the location may present some great problems” (#32, pp. 10-11) and the current location of the Cadet School in the Curragh would not have been suitable, and further facilities (lecture halls, laboratories, libraries etc.) would have to be provided. The alternative was to associate with one of the existing universities in Dublin, Cork or Galway, and here the problem in comparison was the provision of accommodation “for 100 to 140 Cadets”, as well as for “officer and other rank staff, single and married.” Perhaps this second option was the one expected by the military authorities given that it would be cheaper to implement, but proposed solutions for the issue of an entirely new university college were nevertheless offered (#33, p. 11). These were: repurposing St. Enda’s College in Galway, the Hibernian Schools in the Phoenix Park in Dublin, or the Royal Hospital in Kilmainham; the conversion of an existing barracks; or the erection of a completely new academic building.

Queries relating to subject choice were also answered (#s 18, 19, 20, 21, 25). The question of whether “a separate Military Degree Course should be considered” was rejected outright in the shortest and most categorical of all the responses: “NO. Such a course would scarcely be required and scarcely be warranted as it would cause
considerable additional inconvenience for the university” (#21, p. 7). International practice was referred to (#18, p. 6), whereby cadets are “streamed” into arts or science. Possible subjects included English, Irish, foreign languages (French, German, Swedish, Russian), various types of physics, logic, ethics, psychology, politics, political economy, history, geography, economics, education. The animating principle here was not “to insist that all Cadets take the same Course, but rather to ensure that there is a good general store of all knowledge available to the Army” (p. 7). The possibility of a “commercial degree” was also admitted (#19, p. 7), pace Lt Gen Costello’s original list, but with a note of caution towards too much complication of the scheme. Technical subjects were recognised as a real need for the Army, referencing the difficulty of attracting officers for the technical corps, as they came via direct entry but without “formal military training” (#20, p. 7). It was implied that further investigation might be required to see whether there are advantages in “the sending of certain Cadets to Colleges of technology [sic]” as an alternative. The question of taking pass or honours courses was given some attention (#25, pp. 8-9), with “conflicting considerations” described, such as “the danger that if all Cadets are known to be undergoing only pass Courses, the resultant image of the officer may suffer, and he might well be considered a second-rate graduate.” Professional prestige in Irish society, often associated with academic qualifications, was being alluded to here, but the conclusion was that “while the bulk of Cadets” should do pass courses, those with “academic qualifications and military aptitudes” of a “higher order” should do honours degrees. The implication here was that cadets should be doing courses they could manage academically, and there is no real need to undertake honours degrees.

Issues relating to socialisation, and the conflicting demands of military and university life were given special attention (#s 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31). In terms of ‘role strain’ between cadet and student, and the tension between military training and university education, the potential for difficulties was acknowledged, but with the qualification that “they are NO greater than those confronting certain seminaries for instance, students at King’s Inns, or Solicitors’ Apprentices” (#22, p. 8). The tension here was set out initially quantitatively in terms of time-management, addressing how many hours in
the day are actually taken up by lectures with an arts course in U.C.D. in theory leaving afternoons free for “study or training”, or even some science subjects being taught to arts students in their free periods, and vice versa for science students. As with Costello’s letter to Ó Dálaigh, the fact that students would probably have vastly different timetables was not addressed, and a realistic image of academic life was not presented. The length of the university year was also considered, with free time on holidays for training so that a university scheme would require “little reduction in the military content of the Cadet syllabus”, even if it would involve adding a year to the overall period of being a Cadet.

Beyond these purely time-related questions, an insecurity around military socialisation and the competing demands of military and university life could be detected in a series of questions (#s 26-31). These are the more qualitative aspects that could be understood in terms of role. Students should be engaged in “extra curricular and extra mural activities”, but the question of a “deterioration of discipline, or esprit de Corps” was considered (#26, p. 9). Indeed, (#27) restrictions on a cadet’s participation in activities were envisaged, and “[h]e would at all times remain a Cadet and be conscious of the discipline imposed on him by his career, yet his participation within this context would fill many gaps we have in the past observed in Cadet development”; the exact nature of these gaps was not described. The challenge to military socialisation of the cadet associating with “fellow students, male and female”, when that cadet has not been given a “firm disciplinary foundation” was also considered:

Certain tendencies which very properly are associated with students of liberal universities, in extreme cases may tend towards rebelliousness or cynicism which might affect such Cadets. There might also be a danger that the Cadet could tend to regard the military side of his profession as the least important, a danger which might NOT be reflected until later on when he becomes an officer. (#28, p. 9)

These are attempts to address issues captured under the headings of role strain, tensions within the role set (Merton, 1957), and role ambiguity (Rizzo et al., 1970).
The proposed solution to this challenge to military socialisation (#29, pp. 9-10) included an induction course, with a full year’s military training before going to university which would presumably have the effect of strengthening ‘role-identity salience’ (Callero, 1985). This would lengthen the Cadet course to four years: this would require rearranging of entry dates and the reintroduction of an entrance examination to ensure results would come out before the Leaving Certificate. Costello’s initial letter to Ó Dálaigh in comparison suggested “an intensive recruits course of military training” of a mere six weeks, with further training during vacations from university (MA COS-0016B, §5.e, p. 2). Next, an “extremely high standard of discipline must be maintained”, reflected in “bearing and carriage, punctuality, personal appearance, performance of tasks and skills.” Specially selected and trained NCOs would be necessary, along with “observation (rather than supervision) by officers engaged in Cadet training”, with the possibility of “participation by junior officers in extra curricular sporting, recreational, hobbies, cultural and social activities with Cadets.” This latter suggestion would have blurred the line considerably between officers and cadets, and how this might have been put into practice was not critically appraised. Similarly, the next suggestion of “liaison between the Academy staff and the University authorities and lecturers” was mooted, without any apparent consideration for how and why academic staff and management would engage in such a process, treating cadet students in a manner potentially very different to other students.

In setting forth its ideal view of what the education of military personnel in university might look like, an analogy was made with “a good home”, where “restrictions must NOT be too great” and that “a high esprit de corps must be engendered in the same way that a pleasant family spirit is built up” (#31, p. 10). This was a homely image, but not a convincing argument or one that showed any real understanding of academic life. Between the professed need to maintain routine and daily parades with free time and leave passes curtailed on the one hand (#30, p. 10) and the notion that care ought to be taken to ensure that the “Academy is NOT turned into a “prison” rather than a training ground for leaders” (#31), it was apparent that the tension between university participation and military socialisation is not convincingly reconciled. Perhaps it could
not be, despite claims that “Cadet discipline should, in fact, be improved” by the proposal. The reasons for this may be in the nature of the document, collecting a wide array of ‘possible objections’ at an early stage, dealing with a variety of areas. There was also the underlying problems of combining professional military education with a university academic education, and the significant different structures these imply, and the different ways in which they view their students.

**Second Submission: “Memorandum on An Coláiste Mileata”**

The second submission made by the Defence Forces was a “Memorandum on An Coláiste Mileata for Coimisiún um Árd-Oideachais” (Memorandum on the Military College for the Commission on Higher Education) (MA ACS-013-06), prepared at the direction of the Chief of Staff. This was responding to a requirement set out in a letter from the Commission dated 29th April 1964, which wanted information set out in conformity with a series of headings, and the memo was structured accordingly (these headings appear as an appendix to the memo). The second submission differed in form rather than content, thus, from the first submission. Dated June 1964, and 17 pages long, it illustrated the origins and structure of the Military College. There are some overlaps with the full file submitted to the Commission, but the format and structure requested by the Commission in their letter means that the material in this memo is somewhat different, and these differences are sketched out in this section. The Cadet School is covered in §§7-42 (pp. 2-7). The rest of the memo addresses other aspects of the Military College and related topics.

The Cadet School’s activities were set out, from recruitment and daily life, through to the time given to academic subjects. For the latter, no mention was made of military ‘applicability’ of subjects such as Irish history, modern history, mathematics, current events. A table set out the time dedicated to these subjects, while noting that the standards to be attained are not formally defined. The general aim is to promote a continued interest in these subjects, to direct the minds of the cadets into channels appropriate to their future occupation and to encourage any natural aptitudes and tastes in the direction of serious study. (§18, p. 4)
It continued that “the academic instruction is regarded as fundamental to the education of the officer. It is only upon this basis that further intellectual development can be built.” Nevertheless, the lack of foreign-languages was identified as a “major deficiency” (§21). The use of the Irish language was described, and some of the problems this entailed (§§26-29, pp. 5-6), such as the fact that “all the standard literature on subjects such as military history [...] is written in languages other than Irish, there is no apparent prospect of achieving a state of affairs in which Irish exclusively would be used by Cadets” (§29). Daily Cadet life was described, wherein “[s]piritual instruction, games and sport and etiquette are integral to the curriculum.” The social aspect included “organized extra-curricular activities”, namely a debating society, camera club, and record club (§31, p. 6). Communal residence, involving the restriction of movement and “firm control of such matters as dress and deportment” were described as being “absolutely essential to the correct environment of the cadet course” (§32). Military socialisation was presented thus as central to training.

More broadly in terms of the training of officers and the nature of the officer’s career, “return to civilian life” was discussed (§59-63, pp. 10-11). It was observed that while the “formal training of an officer is not designed in preparation for administrative or executive civilian employment”, some retired officers had been able to “demonstrate their abilities” and “have usually shown that a period of twenty years or so in army service is an advantage to those taking up either form of employment” (§63, p. 11). Yet there was no “resettlement policy, as exists in some other countries, for placing 40-year-old retired officers in civilian employment suited to their abilities. In the absence of such a policy, the lack of formal evidence of ability can be a serious drawback at the age of 40.” Interestingly particular issues specific to the Naval Service (§§64-77, pp. 12-13) and Air Corps (§§78-91, pp. 14-15) were described. For the Naval Service, problems with naval qualifications were identified, whereby retired officers are not qualified for positions in merchant navies or as harbourmasters. The possibility for naval officers in other countries of earning credits towards a B.Sc. from the “scientific aspects of their naval training” were noted, along with the fact that this did not exist in Ireland. For the Air Corps, their aviation course “is concerned exclusively with military aviation and allied
technical matters. There are no academic subjects.” It was noted that return to civilian life took place “at a brisker tempo” compared to other parts of the Defence Forces, given the opportunities available in civil aviation, with “many retirements of regular officers at or before age 30.” Those officers attaining senior rank in the Air Corps usually served to the age limit, but were then “too old for flying employment in civil aviation” although other ground duties were still open to them.

Members of the Commission visited the Military College on 26 June, 1964. This followed both military submissions to the Commission and the visit was covered in an Irish Times article the following day (“Curragh Visit by Education Commission”) which noted that “it has been suggested that the Military College should be affiliated with the National University, and it is likely that this proposal will be considered by the commission” (27 June, 1964). Ó Dálaigh as chairman of the Commission, and Lt Gen (rtd.) Costello were part of the delegation, but no other details relating to the visit were discussed in the article.

7.3 The Commission’s Recommendations

The Commission of Higher Education’s final report was wide-ranging and detailed, including such consequential recommendations as the establishment of new institutions of higher education to absorb demand for third-level education (Walsh, 2009, pp. 235–237). The inside cover of the three published volumes sets out that the report comprises six divisions, division (1) being the presentation and summary of the report, (2) being the report proper (printed in two volumes). The remaining divisions are: (3) the appendices to the report, (4) selections from the written and oral evidence, (5) the written submissions, and (6) the oral evidence. These remaining divisions (3-6) do not appear to have been printed, and they were not lodged with the National Archives. The report recommended that Divisions (1-4) should be printed, and that (5) and (6) “should be deposited in university and public libraries for the use of the public” (p.6) but this does not seem to have been the case, with only (1) and (2) printed.
Their recommendation relating to military education was placed in the twelfth chapter of the presentation and summary of the report (1967). This was titled “Other Areas of Professional Education”, which made the following summary recommendation:

The officer of the modern army requires training to university level. He should be enabled during his cadet training to proceed to a university degree. The military cadet school should be associated with a university, and as the cadet school does its work through Irish, the association should therefore be with University College, Galway. (p. 42)

The main volumes of the report then dealt with the background informing this recommendation.

The section on university education for cadets in the full report of the Commission’s findings first gave an overview of the existing provision of training and education at the Military College in the Curragh (§12.45, p. 339). The report noted the Commission’s consideration of the “training of military cadets as part of our general examination of professional training”, alluding to, but not outlining, “good reasons for contemplating a wider context for the training of military officers than that provided in a military college isolated from higher studies generally.” The Commission “indicated our views” and “they, on their side, agreed that there was a need for a change in existing arrangements, and for the conduct of cadet trainings in a wider context”, being provided with information relating to the training of cadets in other countries. It was apparent that there was a meeting of minds between military authorities in the Defence Forces itself and the Commission.

The report set out in detail the seven “considerations” or rationales for associating cadet training with “university studies” (§12.47, pp. 339-340). The first of these was at first glance an appeal to the symbolic power of the Defence Forces, as a “custodian of the tradition of national service” – incidentally a phrase which appeared verbatim in Costello’s letter of 14 February 1961:

The training of officers is training for leadership: besides physical and military training, it is desirable that cadets should have the opportunity to develop to the
full their intellectual powers and to acquire a clearer understanding of the nation’s culture and traditions.

This made an appeal both to officers as a kind of national symbolic resource (as per the first two reasons in O’Halpin, 1999, p. 82), but also noted that there is a more straightforwardly instrumental reason for the development of officers’ intellectual capabilities. The next rationale put forward was in terms of UN peacekeeping, as these “operations have aspects other than the purely military”, and that having a university education put an officer “in a better position to represent his country and to discharge his duties”. Again, as with the preceding rationale, the symbolic and the functional were combined.

A further rationale showed the influence of the military submissions to the Commission, discussing that in other countries officers were educated at university level, and that Irish officers were being or would be compared to these international peers. The fourth rationale addressed recruitment – as the Army “is competing with civilian life [...] the young people of the calibre that the army would wish to recruit as cadets now place a high value on higher education.” This alluded to a wider increase in education standards, linked to the rising expectations of a certain stratum of society (presumably middle class upwards) from which the Defence Forces would expect to recruit. The next consideration proposed as a kind of sociological law, that “standards of training and attainment in every profession tend continuously to rise and it is necessary that the army, itself a profession, should seek to raise its standards.” The sixth rationale related to “resettlement of retiring army officers in civilian life” or outmobility, asserting that a university degree would lessen problems for retiring officers to find employment. The final consideration made an implicitly human capital argument over officers’ life-course, that if they were both “university-qualified” as well as being in possession of the training and skills from their military careers, they “would provide a pool of exceptionally well-trained men who could make a valuable contribution to many aspects of the country’s life both during and after their military career.”
Having set out these justifications for university education, the report proceeded to note potential issues that might arise:

(a) the increase in the length of the cadet course if university studies were to be undertaken;
(b) the possibility of competing claims as between military training and university studies;
(c) the maintenance of military discipline in a university ambience;
(d) the commitment to military service of cadets who would have received a “university training”. (§12.48, pp. 340-341)

The report stated, however, that the “army authorities assured us on these four points during our discussions with them” (§12.49, p. 341). The last three of these four concerns related to military socialisation, in one form or another. The first would be resolved by extension of the cadet training course to three or four years, with the second issue to be dealt with by this too, given that these military authorities said “requirements of military training could be adequately provided for on an extended course” at the same time as cadets’ university studies. This would combine military training with academic study at university.

Cadets would be subject to military discipline and would not be free at all times to participate in university activities; they would be encouraged, however, to participate in many of the university’s extra-curricular activities and could make a large contribution to this aspect of university life.

This was more an acknowledgement of this issue of tensions or anxieties regarding military socialisation, rather than a proposed solution, perhaps because unlike the other issues it could not be easily accounted for in organisational policies or planning. Just as the Defence Forces’ own submissions did not manage to resolve this tension convincingly, nor did the Commission’s findings. Nevertheless, that it was acknowledged underlined that the military authorities and Commission members both saw the potential for conflicts between the “university ambience” and traditional military discipline. The last issue in terms of “commitment” was addressed by establishing a commitment to a “definite period of service”, later referred to as signing an “undertaking” or contract, with the caveat that a cadet could “opt out by purchase”.

The location of course for university cadets was addressed in various elements of the Commission’s findings. The choice of University College, Galway as the location was
explained in the second volume of the full report, building on the observation above about the “contribution” that cadets might make to university life, where it was claimed that “the association of military cadet training with the university in Galway will mutually assist both in their teaching through Irish programmes” (§28.105, p. 721). This related to the wider official efforts to revive the Irish language, with the Defence Forces using the Irish language as a medium of instruction in the Military College. Galway would thus have been a suitable location for maintaining this connection with the language as many courses were delivered through Irish.

The submissions made by the Defence Forces to the Commission had a clear influence on the Commission’s ultimate conclusions. Retirement and promotion featured as rationales in both, as did international comparisons, and reference to the UN peacekeeping involvements. Concerns relating to military socialization reappeared, but were not convincingly dealt with by either. The one suggestion that did not feature in the Commission’s findings was the Defence Forces’ proposal to associate the higher Command and Staff courses with civilian university education, but otherwise the military’s input through various channels had a substantial influence on the Commission.

**Departmental Responses to the Findings**

A committee of senior officials in the Department of Education was convened in 1967 by then Minister for Education, Donogh O’Malley, to discuss the Commission’s findings. They undertook “low profile but influential deliberations” on the recommendations (Walsh, 2009, p. 243), and the resulting document, “Departmental Committee’s Observations on the Recommendations of the Commission on Higher Education” (NA D/T 99/1/438, undated), went through each of the Commission’s recommendations sequentially. On “training of military cadets should be associated with universities studies in University College, Galway” their observation was that

The Committee considers that the case for this made by the Commission is not proven. It is felt that the idea of a university degree for all military cadets is unrealistic in that it does not take account of the fact that their levels of intellectual capacity may vary greatly. It is also felt that most of the Commission’s contentions in support of this Recommendation would apply with equal force to
officers of An Garda and to the middle and senior ranks of the Civil Service. (p. 20)

They suggested that “demand would best be met by affording an opportunity of access to degree courses to selected cadets” (p. 21). This was perhaps intentionally vague, in that the suggestion of education for all cadets would give the Department of Education little say in the matter, whereas the phrase “selected cadets” would allow them to recommend the scheme be as small as they desired. Some anxiety linked to professional prestige was also expressed here in terms of army officers surpassing civil servants, but nevertheless the Committee concluded that they agreed “in relation to selected cadets” (p. 32) with the recommendation to send cadets to university.

The reception of the Commission’s recommendations in the Department of Defence was even more frosty. O’Brien notes that the Department of Defence were “totally opposed to the recommendations” (1978, p. 103). As part of their resistance, the Department of Defence initiated an investigation into the costs and implications of cadets attending university, and senior officials sought to enlist the support of the Department of Education. Education had already developed their own position on the matter through their internal committee, however, and had no reason to change their position. As a consequence, this became a matter of the military and civilian sides of defence attempting to influence the Minister for Defence on the matter. Chief of Staff Mac Eoin noted as much in his memorandum of 15 March 1968 to the Minister (MA TRG-016), when he stated that the proposals he was making, the “considered views and advice of the General Staff, are at variance with the views already expressed by Departmental Memorandum” by Education to Finance, as early as November 1967 (NA D/T 99/1/438, undated).

7.4 Implementing the Commission’s Recommendations

One of the first salvos in the struggle between the Defence Forces and the Department of Defence was a letter from the Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Mac Eoin, to the Minister for Defence, dated 15th March 1968 (MA TRG-016). This letter described an informal meeting, approved by Minister Michael Hilliard, with the president of UCG, Dr Mairtin Ó Tnuathail. Here Ó Tnuathail “indicated the complete acceptance by the College
Authorities of the Commission’s recommendations”, and “thought that the cadets would make a valuable contribution to the University and to their fellow students.” Accompanying this letter was a six-page memorandum to the minister outlining the “military views and recommendations” necessary to implement the Commission’s proposal of higher education for cadets. This document set out the reasons for “raising the academic standards” of cadets, referring to professional educational needs, involvement in peacekeeping, advances in military techniques and technology, and recruitment pressures (pp. 2-3). It set out the following recommendations for a scheme:

- Candidates for cadetships in the future would have a standard of education not lower than matriculation or equivalent;
- The first year of cadets’ service would be devoted exclusively to military training (and attaining a high standard of written and oral Irish) in the Military College;
- The second year of the cadetship would be the first year of their university studies, with training during term breaks;
- Cadets would be commissioned after their second year of service, and cadets who passed their first year of university study and were willing to return would return to complete their studies. Those not continuing their studies would be posted to units;
- Officers attending university would commit to serve with the PDF for “an unalterable minimum number of years to be determined.” (p. 3)

This document noted that while the Commission proposed military training taking place at the same time as university education, the military authorities instead wanted to maintain the existing initial year of training at the Cadet School in the Curragh. This was explained in view of the financial implications of moving the entire Cadet School, suggesting that it would be “prudent to await critical assessment of the operation of the scheme before undertaking the considerable construction which would be involved in the long term” (pp. 4-5). It suggested Galway as the most suitable location, given that it did not have the accommodation problems of Dublin and Cork, and was superior to both with respect to Irish language instruction. Crucially, it was this letter where CoS Lt Gen Mac Eoin noted to the Minister, as a final point, that the Defence Forces and Department of Defence were “at variance” in terms of the scheme, and that Defence had written a departmental memo to Education indicating as much.
Departmental Opposition

What followed were many months of behind the scenes manoeuvring and negotiations by the Chief of Staff and his office to bring the scheme into being. Initially opposition from the Department of Defence had to be overcome, and Lt Gen Mac Eoin achieved this by writing to his Ministers (first Hilliard, later Jim Gibbons from 1969) to get them to agree to the Army’s views. The Department of Education attempted a delaying tactic by having the proposal referred to the Higher Education Authority for consideration. The Chief of Staff’s involvement led to Minister Gibbons raising the issue informally with Minister for Finance, Charles Haughey, at a cabinet meeting, who agreed to the proposed scheme. This then provoked the Department of Finance to get involved, and once again the Chief of Staff faced significant departmental opposition, this time from Finance.

The Department of Finance did not restrict itself to purely financial issues, but extended their critique to the educational elements, and even military questions of leadership, thus positioning itself as the key arbiter of policy. Their accumulated objections were also, as with Education previously, a delaying tactic. There was an exchange of a number of memos and letters between the Departments of Finance and Defence, as well as the Chief of Staff’s office. The Assistant Secretary of the Department of Finance raised a new set of observations and objections on 12th August 1969. Among these were the question of course choice. Finance told the Department of Defence (and implicitly the Chief of Staff) that

we would have expected that the cadets would take courses leading to qualifications which would be most relevant to their official careers and of which the army is in most need. We do not see either Commerce or Arts courses as fulfilling those requirements.

The memo continued that “we presume, incidentally, that choice of course will not be left entirely to the cadet.” Other, more specific observations were also made (relating to the period for the undertaking, need for a guarantor for this undertaking, accommodation at the Curragh,) but the concluding paragraph stated that “If in view of the urgency of the matter, you feel that a discussion on the various issues would be helpful we are quite willing.”
Finance here was taking a narrowly utilitarian view of the military career, and thus of the kind of education they thought was appropriate to the future officer – certainly, they implied, arts and business weren’t relevant. This view conflicted with the general staff’s more nuanced and holistic stance on the value of higher education for the Army. Finance’s lack of consideration for the post-military career of officers was also stark. These objections can be considered as an attempt to exert pressure so as to secure major changes to the scheme, if not delay it indefinitely, by identifying increasingly disparate objections to the initiative.

This letter served as a provocation to the Chief of Staff, who wrote once again to Minister Gibbons to ensure that the plan would not be blocked by bureaucratic obstruction. This letter (headed “University Education Military Cadets“, dated 18th August) observed of the letter from Finance that it raised issues which had been dealt with previously, and pointedly noted that “the introduction of issues not previously raised by the Department of Finance are delaying the initiation of preliminary arrangements for the scheme.” The impressive array of concerns raised by Finance, were they to be addressed, would have delayed the scheme for at least a year – if not indefinitely. The Chief of Staff dealt with essentially all the points raised in the letter from Finance, the most significant of which expressed the tension between Finance’s narrow conception of education, and the broader and longer-term view taken by the Army. In discussing the university subjects for cadets, specifically the questioning of Arts and Commerce courses, Finance’s pointed comments on supposed irrelevance to the military career were rebutted at length. The Chief of Staff wrote that the aim of the scheme is to broaden the officer’s education and improve his mental development and not necessarily to turn out officers with technical qualifications. Apart from this aim there is quite clearly a military requirement for such studies as psychology, political economy, ethics, political science and continental languages.

But he also indicated that the choice of course would also “NOT” be left entirely to the cadet.
Here some context is important. On the date the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Finance wrote his letter (Tuesday, 12th August 1969), the “Battle of the Bogside” had started in Derry, followed by riots in Belfast. Two days later, on the 14th August, the British Army deployed in Northern Ireland in ‘Operation Banner’ at the request of the unionist government. In response, at the direction of the Taoiseach Jack Lynch, the Irish Army sent four infantry groups to the border (Harvey 2018, p. 209), described by Hodson as “hastily concentrated ad hoc infantry groups”, which were later replaced by three new infantry battalions (2016, p. 162). Lt Gen MacEoin had these significant events to deal with, and yet made interacting with the Department of Finance a priority to secure the implementation of the proposed scheme. One reason for this was because – as he makes plain in this letter, dated the following Monday – the plan had received government approval in principle. Indeed, the Chief of Staff went to great lengths to overcome the roadblocks put up by Finance even at the outset of the most dramatic upheaval in the security situation on the island of Ireland since the Emergency.

The Chief of Staff may well have been successful in overcoming the bureaucratic obstructionism of Finance, just as he had been with his own Department, and to a lesser extent the Department of Education, by maintaining his line of communication with successive Ministers for Defence. Lt Gen Mac Eoin maintained a singular focus on getting the plan implemented as quickly as possible. An important point in this was that the Army decided to alter the Commission’s initial proposal to move the Cadet School in its entirety to Galway, maintaining instead the first year of military training in the Curragh. This meant that the proposal to have university education for officers could be implemented far more quickly, while also reserving the option to review this in the future. Wider factors such as the outbreak of the Troubles may also have given the military authorities greater leverage to secure agreement on the scheme, increasing the profile and importance of the Defence Forces at a pivotal moment just as the attention of ministers and senior officials was drawn to the deteriorating security situation.
Final Agreed Details of the Scheme

An undated two-page document by the Army’s Director of Training (“Stiúrthóir Traenála”) headed “University training for cadets/officers” was the culmination of the above discussions, and set out the details of the scheme. Apparently for internal Defence Forces circulation, it invited applications from cadets possessing the necessary educational qualifications who had been appointed to cadetships in 1968, to study in University College Galway (§1). It set out the conditions that had been agreed to, and in terms of course choice stated that Cadets whose applications were accepted could enrol in a course in arts, commerce, science or engineering, subject to the approval of the Chief of Staff (§2).

Qualified cadets would be accommodated for their studies in Galway, thus making a clear geographical division between military training and academic education. During their attendance at university, they would be accommodated at Dún Uí Mhaolíosa (Renmore Barracks) and receive full pay and “appropriate” allowances (§§3-4). Military training was to be continued “during the major breaks between university terms.” College and examination fees would be met from public funds, and all textbooks and equipment would be made available without charge, remaining the property of the Department of Defence (§5). Those failing examinations were to be permitted to resit, but those failing repeats would not be permitted to continue studying (§6).

Those who were “militarily suitable” were to be commissioned on completion of their second year of military service (i.e. first year of university), and those passing their examinations would be required to sign an undertaking to refund the cost of his university training and his pay and allowances during the period of such training should he, by reason of his resignation or voluntary retirement, fail to serve in the Defence Forces for a minimum number of years. (§§7-8)

For those studying Arts and Commerce this would be 20 years, meaning 10 years in the PDF and 10 in the Reserve Defence Force; in other cases the period would be 22 years, with 12 in the PDF and 10 in the Reserve Defence Force. This would apply even if the
Applications for qualified cadets were to be made in writing to the Officer Commanding the Cadet School, indicating the degree course they wished to enrol in, and those who had not obtained the matriculation certificate of the National University of Ireland (governing UCG) were to complete a form detailing this and attach it to their application (§9). This document concluded by noting that cadets were “of course” free to continue with their military training instead of opting for “university training” (§10). This final observation would be significant in the years to come, given that of the 472 cadets accepted between October 1968 and November 1975, 204 did not attend university (MA COS-438, Annex C).

7.5 Officer Education in the Early Years of the Troubles

The first students to attend USAC in 1969 were the 14 cadets of the 43rd Cadet Class who were university matriculated out of a total class of 34. This left 20 cadets to continue soldiering, and be commissioned with their USAC cohort on 28th September 1970. As a result of the deteriorating security situation due to the start of the Troubles, the Defence Forces as a whole underwent a massive expansion, going from 8,242 in 1970 to a total strength of 14,349 in 1976 (Mulroe, 2017, p. 80; O’Brien, 1978, p. 113). This was apparent in the size – and indeed number – of cadet classes in these years. Figure 1 below summarises the size of cadet classes from 1969 to 1976, illustrating who attended USAC and who did not.
Figure 1: Officers attending and non-attending USAC, 1969-1976

![Figure 1: Officers attending and non-attending USAC, 1969-1976](image)

Source: Compiled from Annex C, “Report of a Board to Examine the Scheme for the University Education of Officers and Cadets”, (IMA COS-438).

Table 2 breaks this down further, illustrating that there were two Cadet classes in 1972 and 1974, and one of the classes in 1972 was exclusively made up of those attending USAC. This was the Army’s response to the Troubles and the need to account for these rapidly changing circumstances within the USAC scheme.

Table 2: Cadet Classes by USAC attendance, 1969-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cadet Class</th>
<th>Year Commencing Studies</th>
<th>Cadet Class Size</th>
<th>Attending USAC</th>
<th>Not Attending USAC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43rd</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47th</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49th</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52nd</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Annex C, “Report of a Board to Examine the Scheme for the University Education of Officers and Cadets”, (IMA COS-438).
As accommodation was not ready for a number of years, initially cadets were housed in the Brigade Headquarters at Dún Uí Mhaoilíosa (Renmore Barracks), and commissioned officers were accommodated in either Ryan’s or Flannery’s hotels. Some accommodation in the USAC building became available from 1970, but by 1973 all students were housed in this purpose-built facility just outside Renmore Barracks. The USAC building when officially opened in 1974 had 120 bedrooms, but no provision was made for recreational or study facilities, presumably – O’Brien suggests – on the understanding that cadets would make do with what was available in the university itself (1978, pp. 115–118). With the expansion of the Defence Forces and the increasing numbers of those attending university, this meant that in some years the USAC building itself was full to capacity, with alternative accommodation being sought for students. O’Brien’s 1978 thesis is the sole reference here for details relating to student choice and accommodation. As a serving army officer at the time he had access to internal documents relating to USAC. These were not available in the Military Archives, nor in the archives of NUI Galway however. In terms of student choice, he offers considerable detail (pp. 118-124), which is summarised here.

In terms of student choice, a systematic overview is not available. O’Brien only considers those entering second arts between academic years 1970/71 and 1977/78, as it was only within the BA that officers had a choice between 24 subjects (as opposed to simply studying in the other faculties of Science, Engineering or Commerce). Within Arts, history was the most popular choice (N=49), then “Legal Science” (i.e. Law, N=48), English (N=43), Geography (N=31), Archaeology (N=29), Economics (N=24), and Sociology (N=22). Modern languages were less popular with French (N=11), German (N=3), and Spanish (N=2) each outnumbered by Irish (N=13). In terms of the other faculties, it’s notable that Commerce was a relatively popular choice in these early years, with military personnel making up 10% of the entire course cohort in 1975, justifying the wide choice of subjects which the COS maintained in discussions with the Department of Finance.
As a result of the deteriorating security situation on the island of Ireland as a whole, and the PDF’s intense involvement in ATCP activities linked to the Troubles during the 1970s, the mission and doctrine of the Military College came in for critical evaluation. This was undertaken through three internal Defence Forces “Boards” convened by the Chiefs of Staff throughout that decade, first Lt Gen Thomas O’Carroll who replaced Mac Eoin in 1971, and Lt Gen Carl O’Sullivan who succeeded him in 1976. Cadet and junior officer education were especially significant, given the expansion that the Defence Forces experienced in response to The Troubles. The first two board reports (1972 and 1976) considered officer training in general with some reference made to cadet training and university education, but the final board in 1977 dealt primarily with cadet education and the USAC scheme, and will be considered in some depth. This last Board was the closest to a systematic evaluation of the USAC scheme conducted by the Defence Forces.

**Initial Evaluations of Training and Education**

The first Board report, “Report on Officer Training” was published in 1972 (MA COS-441). Its purpose was to consider the standard of performance of the “officer of the future”, with reference to the type, level, and structure of education this would require (§3) This report concluded that the education of the officer of the future should be “broad, progressive and continuous. The normal level should be University standard” but that there was still a place for those not qualifying for university education, calling such officers “essential” (§5). It notes that the report did not list subjects or levels to be attained in detail (presumably in both academic and military studies, though it does not say so), saying that they “see courses, merely as highlights of rallying points along the education road”.

Socialisation was identified as an issue in the military training at the time. The then existing structure of a fifteen-month cadet course was viewed as being “very inadequate grounding”, given that following this those attending university were placed in a completely academic atmosphere (except for summer breaks) for a period of three or four years. The academic objective becomes the primary aim before military indoctrination is soundly based. Time for military training, officer training, and character formation is insufficient. (§9)
Perhaps most alarming in the context of the escalating security demands on the Army during the Troubles is the blunt statement that the “2/Lts” (those commissioned officers in their second year of university study) “are NOT qualified for an operational role in an emergency.” A final observation on these lines noted that because only one cadet class is in the Cadet School at a time, “tradition and continuity […] no longer exist. The incoming cadet class has no senior class; each class starts from a new beginning.” It did not consider, however whether there might have been some such continuity emerging in Galway at this time, a USAC socialisation and ethos in place of the Cadet School or exclusively military ethos (see Chapters 8 and 9).

The Board proposed that the Cadet course should be a full two years duration, qualifying newly commissioned officers to train and lead a platoon (§10), with officers who were recommended being encouraged to attend university (§14). This meant that only commissioned officers would attend university in Galway, rather than the previous situation of those attending UCG being cadets for one year, and officers for the remainder of their studies. It was noted that this would affect the undertakings signed by incoming officers, but that this would be worth the trouble to implement (§15). The report also made observations on the military training of officers attending university, setting out the various corps’ Young Officers (YOs) courses to be studied during breaks, and the need for infantry officers to serve with “their units and thereby gain man management and unit experience.” No training was to be undertaken during the third and fourth year summer breaks from university to allow for finals and repeats (§19). The report also noted that the use of the Irish language – a policy then in force for 12 years (Hodson, 2016, p. 168) – was an impediment to officer education (§34).

This early review noted similar concerns relating to the military socialisation of cadets, to those raised previously in the initial submissions to the Commission on Higher Education. The idea of higher education for some officers was reaffirmed, rather than imposing it as a general requirement for all. For those in USAC, socialisation was just one part of the story, however, as the operational needs of The Troubles put demands on junior officers that could not have been foreseen at the time of the development of
USAC. The proposal that it would be commissioned officers attending USAC was accepted by the Defence Forces after the third Board report, but the Cadet course was not extended to two years.

Due to the “partial adoption” of the 1972 Board recommendations (Hodson, 2016, p. 170), it was deemed necessary to convene another board whose findings were published as the “Report on Officer Education and Development” (MA COS-439) on 15th January 1976. This Board report struck a somewhat different tone, giving less emphasis to education, suggesting that “academic ability is just one factor in the assessment of the whole man”, with performance in the Military College as “just a very short period in relation to his whole career”. They suggested that “a more fruitful and accurate source of information on an officer’s character, general demeanour and usefulness should be the opinions of the various commanding officers” (p.2, §7). This more utilitarian approach was no doubt directly related to the immediate operational needs of the Army during the Troubles, following its considerable expansion. The latest report made no observations about university education, but suggested a separate study be made of “the whole question of third level education in the army” (p. 10, §38).

**The Army Evaluates the USAC Scheme**

As a result, in 1976, Chief of Staff Maj Gen O’Sullivan ordered the first full review of university education of cadets since the inception of the USAC scheme. The purpose of the review was to consider whether USAC had met its original aims (as submitted to the Minister for Defence on 15th March 1969 (MA TRG-016)) and whether after “seven years in operation the scheme has succeeded in realising these aims” (MA COS-438, Annex A). 85 interviews were carried out with Faculty Deans and Professors in UCG, as well as various senior officers, junior officers, and cadets, and 18 written submissions were also accepted (Annex E). This report endorsed the original aim and backed the scheme (p.3, §8), with the headline conclusion that “this scheme shall continue”. Once again, however, they called for a longer period of training at the Cadet School “or some unit experience” before attending university. They also proposed expansion beyond Galway to other HEIs in Ireland (p. 1, §3).
Military socialisation in the Cadet School was again given attention. The Board stated that a “Cadet must receive a thorough grounding in the military essentials of his profession. Experience has shown that one year is NOT enough for this” (p. 4, §10), with the implication that this was not enough to effect the ‘role-identity salience’ (Callero, 1985) desired by military authorities. This repeated the abortive recommendations of the previous Board, but supported now by evidence from wide consultation. The recommendation of time spent with a unit was consistent with the direction of the 1976 board, and the purpose of this was both “to establish the officer’s identity with his unit and to give him opportunities of handling troops” (§10). The report elaborated that)

a period of practical experience with troops will reinforce and consolidate the young officers’ professionalism, before he resumes his educational activities in the university or other institute. It will increase his self-confidence and confirm his sense of identity as a fully-fledged member of a socially valuable profession. (p.6, §21)

This would give the newly commissioned officer experience in commanding troops and acclimatising to their identity as an officer and leader through the exercise of this identity, rather than simply its assumption through the commissioning ceremony. There are parallels again here with Janowitz’s views on modern military professionalism as moving from ‘ascription’ to ‘achievement’; with the former commissioning was enough to give the officer a military identity, for the latter it must in effect be ‘earned’ through professional preparation and the exercise of leadership to have the necessary strength of bond between the individual’s identity and their officer role. There is a recognition of a need to balance both academic and professional military requirements, however.

Once again, a range of anxieties relating to socialisation were expressed. These had been expressed in the military’s original submission to the Commission on Higher Education and never fully resolved, but were now articulated in the light of experience rather than expectation. This report observed that there should be “some limit to the length of the gap between leaving Secondary School and starting university”, and that “first exposure to unit life must be long enough to be really influential but NOT so long as to wean the officer away from willingness to resume studies” (§11). Here, once again, was the
question of tension in terms of competing academic and military socialisations, and role ambiguity or strain. The Board proposed that with the two years of initial training, an officer would go to university "more fully conscious of himself as a military professional, and more firmly related to that profession than has been the case in the past" (p. 7, §22), which perhaps indicated some actual difficulties in addition to what were previously more abstract anxieties on the part of the military authorities.

A further and arguably more insightful observation was made in terms of the influence of higher education on an officer’s life or career course. It was presented as increasing in importance “in proportion to an officer’s rank and the expansion of his responsibilities”, an observation that was informed by the USAC scheme having been in place for a number of years. It also noted that as a result of these longer term benefits over the life course, “the benefits to the Army of the University scheme to date are NOT yet fully apparent” as those who had attended university were “still in very junior appointments where their education is of little obvious value – it certainly has little direct relevance to their current duties” (p. 7, §24). The value of the scheme was not disputed, however, and the report stated that a Leaving Certificate alone was no longer “sufficient educational equipment to carry the officer through forty years of his career.”

In terms of expanding the scheme to include other HEIs, two courses were identified as “combining academic quality with military relevance”, a new four-year course in physical education at the National College of Physical Education (Thomond College) in Limerick, and a three-year course at the College of Technology in Bolton Street, Dublin (§25). This was the first time that the Defence Forces themselves made an argument for courses with direct relevance to operational or organisational needs to the PDF. It was easier to make such a case when the principle of higher education for officers was established, and so there was no need to revisit the previous holistic arguments. While this was somewhat utilitarian, it was more subtle and less crudely vocational than the Department of Finance’s position. Related to this were points made in discussions during the Board’s formal visit to Galway where UCG “authorities look with favour on the idea of “tailoring” courses in all four faculties towards a greater aptness or relevance to
military needs” (p. 8, §27). A related example was that the Signal Corps “could be catered for by an appropriate BSc degree” at the Regional Technical College in Galway (§28). The idea of tailoring such courses was recognised as new, and while “most subjects studied in depth will achieve the aim of the university 3rd level scheme, it is felt that military needs should be satisfied, taking into account the aptitudes and interests of the individual officers” (§31). Comprehensive career guidance and consultation with the university as well as “graduate officers” was thus recommended. Such an approach would imply less role tension or ambiguity between the individual’s roles as military officer and university student, as their studies could feed directly into the exercise of their duties.

In terms of future officer career structures, the large number of officers who had entered the Defence Forces, meant that “fifteen to twenty years from now, premature retirement will become a common feature of our military life” and “may indeed become a necessary feature of it” (p.10, §36). This is an anticipation of ‘The Hump’ which would become significant in later years, but was already identified as a potential issue here.

The situation at the USAC complex in Galway was treated in some depth, and issues relating to the fact that USAC had both officers and cadets were identified, as “militarily both types are poles apart”:

The Officer has the President’s commission. The Cadet, on the other hand, by tradition and custom, is rankless and is still in a probationary period of his career. The mixing of both these categories together in an establishment where they eat, live and study under the one roof is, by the same tradition, wrong. In addition, it has the effect of diminishing the officer student status to a position where they are regarded in the same mould as cadets rather than as Commissioned Officers. (p.12, §42)

Status here came to the fore, and where previously concerns related to role tension between military and university life, here the tension was within the military itself, with commissioning being the demarcation. Prior to USAC, cadets were restricted to the Cadet School, which was (and is) a separate building to where commissioned officers lived, and their accommodation in that ‘total institution’ was integral to their military
socialisation. Thus the phenomenon of commissioned officers living with cadets was entirely new, and even intolerable to some. The solution was the Board’s proposal that only commissioned officers study in Galway after the two year initial training period, after which “the status problem will NO longer apply - the student officer will have merged with the general officer body” (§42).

For the future of the USAC scheme, both the Air Corps and Naval Service were referred to. It would be a “disservice” for Air Corps officers to be permanently prevented from going to university, especially where “all ground-force officers will have received it”, but the specific conditions of the Air Corps and pilot training made this difficult (p. 17, §53). Likewise, with the Naval Service, specific demands of the training were considered, but in this case the Naval Service’s written submission suggested that the necessary training period for a naval cadet/officer, as well as the service demands precluded that service from being included. The Board concluded that a “revised” third-level education scheme would work effectively to the benefit of the PDF, but that it should be reviewed in future years. A document on the “Structure and Organisation of the Military College”, dated 18th September 1981 (MA COS-047) made no mention of USAC, however, and the 1977 report was the only detailed review of USAC recorded in the archives. But the Board report was influential, as the major proposed change to USAC of only sending commissioned officers to study in USAC was implemented the following year (personal communication with Tom Hodson).

The most recent reference to the USAC scheme came in the Gleeson Report (1990). The first issue raised (on the basis on a submission from the Officers Team) was that Naval Officers still did not attend university under the USAC scheme, arguing that “the benefit of raising the educational standards of Naval Service officers to the same level as their Army counterparts should be self-evident” (p. 47), noting difficulties in attracting cadets to the Navy “because of the attractiveness of an Army cadetship”. It also noted that Air Corps cadets did not participate in the USAC scheme. The NCOs’ team submission to Gleeson also proposed that “the facilities of USAC should be available to NCOs” (ibid.), but the report did not make a recommendation on this. The report also noted proposals
suggesting that “personnel should be allowed to attend courses at State expense which would help them to ‘integrate back into civilian life’, even though these courses were not directly relevant to military employment.” The report’s response was that “as a general principle” training courses organised or funded by the Defence Forces “should be related to military needs” (ibid.). The report’s authors concluded their observations by saying that

after twenty-one years in operation, the USAC scheme merits close examination. Specifically the Commission would question whether all Army cadets should continue to be educated to third-level standard at State expense. An alternative of recruiting a greater number of graduates through the cadet scheme should be considered. (pp. 47-48)

The cost-savings of this were noted as a rationale. This proposal to bring in a specific graduate scheme was not enacted until 2005, and no changes were made to USAC as a result of Gleeson.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter focused on the first research question, “How and why did the Irish Defence Forces establish the USAC scheme to send cadets to university from 1969?” It did so by considering wider developments in Irish higher education through the Commission on Higher Education, and how the Defence Forces responded to these changes, as well as developments within the PDF as an organisation. In terms of the first element of this research question, the Defence Forces prior to 1969 had already investigated the nature of cadet education. Initially discussions among the military authorities focused on perceived limitations of the Cadet School’s location in the Curragh, but in due course a more detailed and sophisticated re-appraisal was undertaken in response to the establishment of the Commission on Higher Education. The Defence Forces fed their own discussions into the Commission’s information gathering processes, and this is one significant way how the Defence Forces succeeded in using the Commission’s deliberations to establish what would become known as USAC. The involvement of retired Lt Gen Costello was important in ensuring that the Defence Forces were included in the Commission’s deliberations, while senior military officers were able to exert considerable influence on the Commission’s eventual recommendations.
In terms of the second aspect of the research question, why the Defence Forces sought university education for cadets, various rationales were offered throughout this process. For one, international comparisons make sense for any small country with a small defence establishment, and for the Defence Forces, looking beyond Ireland had been the practice since the military mission to the United States in 1926. Looking further afield provided evidence that the Defence Forces’ education for cadets lagged behind their peers in other armies. International comparisons attained greater urgency in operational terms in the context of U.N. peacekeeping, and the increasing contact with foreign armies this involved. The engagement with this new military role led to a reconsideration of the activities of the Military College. The influence of the wider economic developments in Ireland are also apparent, in terms of the discussion in the various military submissions of rising educational standards, and the relative attractiveness of a military career for potential cadets.

The outbreak of the Troubles might have paused the implementation of this new scheme for university education of army officers, but Chief of Staff Mac Eoin maintained the Army’s commitment to introducing USAC and lobbied tenaciously for the adoption of the scheme. A previous rationale offered for the scheme took on a new gloss with these events. The retirement of officers and their return to civilian life had been raised at an early stage as an issue that university education might go some way to addressing, as it would facilitate “resettlement” in civilian life subsequently. With the huge expansion of the Irish Defence Forces in response to the Troubles, however, this issue became even more urgent in future decades, as the Army itself recognised. It would be necessary for the functioning of the organisation for officers to return to civilian life before reaching the required retirement age for their rank, and possessing a degree would make for an easier transition. There was also the attendant prestige benefit for the Defence Forces, when these officers re-entered civilian life upon retirement, as they would be not just ex-army officers, but university educated ex-army officers.

It was notable that while the Commission’s recommendations in many areas were sidelined or dismissed outright (Walsh, 2009, pp. 246, 321), their proposal regarding the
higher education of military officers was influential. It is, moreover, a little known and underappreciated aspect of the Commission’s work. The scheme differed significantly, however, from the Commission’s initial recommendation, and this may plausibly be attributed to the Army’s desire to get the scheme off the ground. Moving the entire Cadet School to Galway would have been a significant task logistically, but the financial aspect would almost certainly have made the whole project unworkable (especially in the light of the resistance put up by the Departments of Defence and Finance to the Army’s considerably cheaper proposal). The leadership of the Defence Forces attempted to steer the conversation, and in most respects they succeeded – certainly they overcame bureaucratic opposition and launched a viable scheme of university education for military officers.

Yet an issue the Defence Forces did not manage to settle to their own, or others’ satisfaction, despite multiple attempts, was the interaction between military socialisation and the university experience. This was a constant refrain throughout the discussion of the scheme, from Costello’s original suggestion, to the military submissions, through implementation of the scheme, to subsequent evaluation. Anxieties relating to military socialisation of officers and how this might wane when these officers went to university or result in role ambiguity were clearly articulated but unconvincingly addressed in the military submission to the Commission on Higher Education, which repeated these concerns in their report, but did not regard the issue as an insurmountable barrier. In the years following the implementation of the scheme, and in the Army’s Board reports these concerns reasserted themselves, and various proposals such as changing the length of training in the Cadet School, more time spent with units, only sending personnel to university after commissioning, were proposals successively raised at least in part to address the complex relationship between military socialisation and the academic experience. Many (though not all) of these were eventually enacted, although not without considerable delay. Military socialisation and maintaining the military role in an academic setting remained a long-term challenge for the Defence Forces and their personnel which defied easy resolution. The next two
chapters focus on officers’ perceptions of military socialisation and the USAC experience itself.
Chapter 8: Military Socialisation and the USAC Experience

8.1 Introduction

This is the first of two chapters discussing findings from the semi-structured interviews, and addresses the second research question: “What was the experience of those who went to university study through the USAC scheme?” This chapter starts with considering the socialisation of cadets in the Cadet School, and how this interacted with the university experience of those (N=22) who attended third level education through the USAC scheme (one of whom failed his first year and returned to his unit, in so doing not completing his degree). Not all questions were answered by all participants. Of the full sample (N=46) of those interviewed, five entered the Defence Forces initially as recruits, with four subsequently entering the cadets through the cadet process, and another being commissioned from the ranks. The remainder (N=41) entered the Defence Forces through the cadet process, and underwent the full Cadet School experience.

The first section discusses the nature of the Cadet School training process as secondary socialisation (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1991, pp. 157–166) to the military profession. The second section discusses the decisions and events relating to military personnel entering the higher education field for the first time and the various requirements of military discipline required of them through USAC. The third section considers interactions with staff and students, and the question of outwardly apparent and perceived difference, and military identity. The fourth and final section considers the wearing of military uniform, living arrangements, and non-disclosure of military identity in a university setting. Sections one and two contain responses from all participants, sections three, four and five draw only on participants who attended university through the USAC scheme.
It is worth noting at the outset that demographic data for all interviewees was generated (from pro formas and the interviews), which allowed for cross-tabulation with the coding through NVivo. After conducting analyses according to the demographic data (e.g., military branch or corps, or when various participants were commissioned, etc.), it was found that on the whole no meaningful differences appeared in terms of how interviewees responded. Where this demographic data was used is indicated in the body of the text. A note on the quotations that appear in the interview findings chapters:

- ‘...’ in a quote signifies a pause or the speaker’s hesitation;
- ‘[...]’ indicates that text had been excluded;
- ‘{}’ indicates that a word has been included for clarity;
- where speakers repeated themselves, e.g. ‘I was I was walking’ the repetition was removed;
- in certain instances, when speakers spoke in ways that would have made them identifiable, these features were changed in the quoted text.

8.2 Cadet Training as Secondary Socialisation and Role Formation

All interviewees were asked about their cadet experience, and their coded responses can be categorised as:

- discussing their experience;
- the content of their Cadet School training;
- their interactions with other cadets, and
- the effects of this training.

This section also discusses differences between the Army interviewees who formed the majority of the sample, and Naval Service and Air Corps interviewees. Here secondary socialisation is understood as formal, consisting of training through the Cadet School as well as the formal training received by Air Corps and Naval Service cadets prior to commissioning. It does not include training subsequent to commissioning such as the Young Officers or YOs course.

*Overview of Cadet School Socialisation*

The effects of cadet training were discussed in a number of ways. A major point of discussion (N=11) outlined the purpose or the ideal outcome of the different stages of
cadet training, “helping convert a civilian into a lieutenant, platoon commander” (INT 05), training first to be a private soldier, then the equivalent of an NCO, finally to a junior officer who would be a platoon commander. The goal, then, was to effect role-identity salience (Callero, 1985). It was also seen explicitly as a process whereby they would be “socialized” (INT 27) to the organisation, as well as becoming leaders (N=6). These elements were summarised as follows:

I suppose the best thing is to go back to the philosophy that underpins Cadet School training, the taking of a person from society, from the civilian world and transforming him into a - him or her - into a military officer. The philosophy in the Cadet School is to create leaders - this is what it says - of character and competence. Simple as that. (INT 01)

As part of this, there was a form of differentiation in the cadet training process, specifically class placing, which emerged throughout interviews more generally, “throughout the whole training I was top of the cadet class. So after six months you’re brought in, given your class placing, I was placed number one” (INT 22). Group identity and hierarchy coexist in this setting. Some (N=4) alluded to the effects of the training, with three interviewees making direct reference to returning home to their families during rare breaks from the Cadet School training, where how much they had changed became clear (either in terms of physical fitness, appearance, or attitude). This illustrated to them how their individual identity and military role were becoming aligned.

The experience at the Cadet School was discussed in a variety of ways, both descriptive and more evaluative. The most common code for responses (N=21) focused on the pressure they were under, as well as the shock of adjustment, with three specifically referring to “culture shock”:

Well the Cadet School is quite a baptism of fire. You’re always under pressure, like most Army courses, particularly the last one I did, the assault course. I don’t know if you ever had a seven-hour exam. You got served your lunch or your meals at your table after being out on the ground doing a recce. You know, so there’s quite an ethos of work under pressure, against the clock. (INT 05)

Related to this was an emphasis on toughness and how tough the training was, as well as a justification for this toughness (N=8):
[...] it was a very tough regime, much tougher than the regime that exists today. And I’m not saying for one minute that our regime was better than today’s regime, I wouldn’t think so. Both of them have much to recommend them. But if you’re going to turn out leaders, if you’re going to turn out young officers who can cope under stress, well then you have to toughen them up some way or other. (INT 15)

In the discussion of the pressure, shock, and toughness of training, “coping” was a term used by some (N=5) to denote their response to this regime, as well as describing their coping with the training as “the game” (N=3), a phrase they stated was often used during training. On the whole these above codes were descriptive, but many (N=16) described their cadet experience as positive, either at the time, or looking back and qualifying the experience as being ‘on the whole’ enjoyable. This was often done after outlining the toughness of the training, or the need to cope: “We had two weeks down in Cork, crawling up ditch lines and through mud, and people cut themselves. You’d be crawling through a bit of blood, you’d find people’s kit laying around along the ditches and you’d be like, ‘this is good fun actually!’” (INT 39) Only a small number (N=4) referred to their experiences as negative, with one Naval Service interviewee stating:

    It was terrible. It was absolutely terrible. I mean I love the stories afterwards from everybody else who thought it was great and the camaraderie and all the rest. There was some of that, but I wasn’t really long enough there to actually, I suppose, build the esprit de corps with my class in the Curragh, because I was only there really up until Christmas I think, or shortly after that. (INT 14)

**Content and Experience of Training**

The content of the Cadet School training led many (N=10) to draw a direct comparison with secondary school. For some this was to suggest that they or others who had been to boarding school were at an advantage, and generally these comparisons were descriptive rather than making a positive or negative evaluation. In one instance, however, one interviewee made this comparison in discussing the academic aspect of the Cadet School programme at the time as being “Junior Cert standard. It wasn’t Leaving Cert standard.” He further explained that the Cadet School “encouraged links with Clongowes” for a rugby competition known as ‘the Triangular’, that also included nearby Newbridge College:

    I actually remember on those days when we participated in ‘the Triangular’, I remember feeling a bit embarrassed because I was back with secondary school
kids, but I think that was the original concept, in terms of the Cadet School. I imagine, I’m sure has changed since then. But that's what it was like back then. (INT 17)

Others (N=12) also discussed the academic aspect of the syllabus, suggesting that it wasn’t particularly challenging from an intellectual point of view, or in terms of time-management, and in one instance criticised its “ad hoc” aspect. These observations identified the physical training element of cadet training (N=9) in terms of ‘toughness’ (without an emphasis given to physical over mental toughness, or vice versa), as well as the specifically military elements of training (N=9), described by one as “almost a stereotypical kind of ‘Full Metal Jacket’ training” (INT 24). Punishment in the Cadet School was identified as a specific characteristic of training (N=7); for some interviewees this was naturalised and taken as a given: “we as a class actually messed up. So obviously we have to be given a corrective action first” (INT 39). Others objected to the use of “collective punishment” whereby “one mistake by one was a mistake by all, and as a very competent cadet I felt very... I felt that system was very unfair” (INT 27). One interviewee who had previously graduated from university and had been working as an educator before the cadets stated that “the kinds of method of instruction were kind of, very I would say very thorough, but very primitive and a lot of it based around negative reinforcement, sanction, punishments. They didn’t rely on positive reinforcement at all, which is the most powerful learning tool” (INT 17). Confinement in the Cadet School (mirroring the concept of the ‘total institution’) was also identified (N=7) as being a difficult part of the experience.

**Interactions with Other Cadets**

Other cadets were discussed by interviewees in a variety of ways, most frequently in terms of development of a group identity as part of the socialisation process in the Cadet School. One form of this was military “camaraderie”, specifically identified (N=5) as being something that is developed through training: “for me as the eldest boy growing up in my house, having had 5 older sisters I never had the experience of an older brother, to put it that way, and I essentially got one down there, and we still act like brothers to each other now at this stage. So the camaraderie is huge” (INT 46.) Friendship (N=6) was also identified, with less of a military or organisational inflection, and perhaps
developing more organically. In two cases interviewees alluded to the exclusivity of this experience:

But more importantly we’re experiencing things that nobody else in Ireland is going to experience in their lives with another ‘band of brothers’ so to speak [...] And very few people, like I’ve got really good friends outside of the military, some of my best friends, but they’ll never understand what I went through as a cadet. (INT 44)

There was also, however, an awareness of difference that cut across this group solidarity. One which became more apparent in later years was between school leavers and graduates (N=5). Before the advent of the graduate entry scheme one graduate commissioned in the early 1990s recalled that he had been subject to “hostile scrutiny” from training staff: “I remember it would often be put to me that a person who had a BA, as in a degree, was more likely to also have a ‘BA’ in the sense of a bad attitude” (INT 17). Later when graduate entry to the cadets had been formalised, differences were noted in that, for instance, the military socialisation of graduates can be more difficult compared to school leavers, as one officer commissioned in the 1970s suggested:

We began to recruit people with third level qualifications, almost exclusively. So you were having a much more mature individual coming into the organisation. Now that was both good and bad. Good because he was more mature and probably had experience out in the world, was at university. Some of them will have had jobs for quite a time. So they have a much broader view of the world. But bad in the context that the basic military skills that you required of a young second lieutenant, the commitment in some cases wasn’t there. (INT 15)

An army officer commissioned in the 1990s, however, offered a more positive evaluation of these graduate entrants when they enter the Defence Forces upon commissioning:

I would say that the one thing I did notice over the years is that the graduates coming out now, out of college, and it's probably society as well, they are far more willing to question my decisions and - not my authority - but my understanding of where they're coming from, and their views. They're very... I don't think we were the same. They don't accept the rule book as the rule book. (INT 27)
One graduate entrant spoke of the difference in maturity and life experience with a fellow cadet who had been a school leaver:

He asked me one last night actually “what's a relationship like? What’s a real relationship like?” And I was like Jesus I can answer this now, but when I was 18 I hadn't a clue what a relationship was like, so it's stuff like that. There's a lot of... there's a lot of life lessons to learn for some people. (INT 39)

Interviewees noted (N=5), however, that those who were different from school leavers (as graduate entrants, or having previously served) used this to help others, in the academic or military aspects of the training. Another point relates to the specifics of the graduate entry scheme itself, introduced in 2007, whereby graduate entrants were commissioned as lieutenants rather than second lieutenants as their school leaver Cadet School classmates were, and consequently would be more highly paid upon commissioning. One interviewee’s comments epitomised the tension or ambiguity that this created:

So it did create a divide, you know not a really bad divide but a divide nonetheless. And it was... I would obviously have come from a more traditional, ‘we’re all the same when we join’ point of view.

So a graduate got more money than the non-graduate. That had absolutely no bearing whatsoever on the dynamic. There was no animosity there, these guys had gone and done a degree, they’re getting paid more - so be it. What’s that got to do with me, I’m still getting paid. No issue, and never was an issue. However rank in the Defence Forces is not earned by doing something before you come into the Defence Forces. We would have seen rank as something that you earn through your experience within the Defence Forces. So skipping two years as a second lieutenant is huge. (INT 44)

For one interviewee who had been previously been a non-commissioned soldier, another type of distinction manifested itself, namely “resentment” from the sons or nephews of commissioned officers, who “would have looked at you, that you were just a private soldier” (INT 22). A final difference is mentioned between cadets who completed and those who did not complete Cadet School training for whatever reason, referred to by seven interviewees largely commenting on the number who started training and those who completed it. Those who did not complete training were not referred to negatively:
Now along the way we lost four or five individuals who {in} the army expression ‘got their ticket’, they were discharged because they didn’t meet a certain criteria or they chose to say this wasn’t for me. One or two guys resigned and went out to the bank, some guys retired and went off. One guy lost an eye and he had to leave and he went off to university. But all those guys are still part of our group of cadets - beginning to die off now. (INT 06)

**Different Experiences of Naval Service and Air Corps Cadets**

In terms of the specific experiences of Naval Service and Air Corps cadets, some differences are worth drawing out. Both Naval Service and Air Corps cadets went to their respective bases for a short period of one or two weeks induction, for administration and issuing of uniforms, as an Air Corps officer indicated: “so that’s out of the way, and then on the Monday morning you’re bussed down to the Curragh Camp and we had started a week early, and the navy had started a week early so we were kind of - the shock factor was over. But the army cadets were going through their shock and awe” (INT 46).

Prior to the establishment of the National Maritime College of Ireland (NMCI) in Haulbowline in Cork, the naval training of cadets was divided between two months of military training with the entire cadet class in the Cadet School in the Curragh, and three months of naval training at the naval base in Haulbowline in basic navigation stuff, down in the what was known as the TTB, Technical Training Bay. And learning navigation first principles in terms of navigation, first principles in terms of celestial navigation, you’re continuing your arms drill, our how to march, and some small stuff in small boats. (INT 14)

This was then followed by deployment to the United Kingdom’s Royal Naval College in Dartmouth for a year of training. This was initially three months in Dartmouth at the Royal Naval College, followed by training on the Dartmouth Training Ship HMS Fearless in the Mediterranean, before returning to the Naval College. This interviewee showed how sceptically this training was viewed in the Irish Naval Service upon his return: “I remember coming into the first ship I was posted to after I came back and, I mean, my commanding officer said, ‘you know, all that stuff you learned over there in England and with the Royal Navy? What I want you to do now is forget it all and you’ll learn our way.’” (INT 14) In later years, after the NMCI was set up, naval cadets continued to train for the
first few months in the Curragh, before moving down to Cork to train. One interviewee noted a specific change that occurs in the status of naval cadets which was not reflected in the other branches of the service: when their senior class is commissioned they cease being junior cadets and become senior cadets (as would be the case in the Curragh), but with the difference that their uniform changes from a blue shirt to a white shirt, and where they dine aboard ship also changes:

...it was very much ‘oh we’re having dinner up in the ward room now.’ And we’re going to have our dinner served to us, as opposed to having to... things like that. And yeah, I won’t say that the lads celebrated ‘down below’ in the ratings mess with us going up a level... They were able to watch stuff on television again that they couldn’t watch with us there, you know? [laughter] (INT 37)

The implication of this was that there was an extra step along the road of the individual to be confirmed in their military role as naval officer.

Air Corps cadets also undertake a period of nine months military training in the Curragh. Training is divided depending on whether one is going to be a pilot, engineer, or ‘line officer’ in the Air Corps. For one interviewee who trained in the 1970s this meant nine months in the Cadet School, followed by moving to Baldonnel for flight training:

Fifty hours controlled manoeuvre, which is basic aerobatics: spinning, circles, take-offs and landings, forced landings, the whole lot. Fifty hours, you do fifty hours [...] then you start in to the basic course, which was navigation, instrument flying, night flying, and formation. So they were the four... and they would take another hundred hours to get through, a hundred hours’ flying time. About eight months to get through all that. (INT 04)

Another Air Corps interviewee noted that needing to combine military training with flight training has the effect of lengthening training: “the class that came in the year after us in the Army got commissioned six months before us. And I don’t know how well they understand how grinding that is for cadets, you know? The [Air Corps] cadetships advertise for 21 months, the Army ones advertise for 15 months” (INT 46). This adds similar intervening steps as per the naval cadet experience to the individual Air Corps cadet’s confirmation in their military role.
8.3 Entering Higher Education

This section draws upon the responses of the 22 interviewees who attended university through the USAC scheme; all but one of these completed their studies to graduation. 18 of those involved who went to higher education studied for their degrees in Galway, and so were assigned to the USAC building itself beside Renmore Barracks. The remaining four studied in other institutions in Ireland. Only one participant studied abroad, in Italy, through the Erasmus programme. In terms of faculty, of all those attending USAC since its inception, 10 studied for science-related degrees, seven arts, humanities, or social science courses, three commerce, and two engineering. There is some division of topics into periods to illustrate change over time in the USAC scheme, or how it was treated by those attending university, with reference to the decade in which interviewees attended USAC is identified. As serving personnel were interviewed, including some currently attending USAC, all those who were commissioned after 2000 are treated as one post-2000 group. This section considers the interaction of military cadets and officers with higher education in terms of a number of key or pivotal issues:

- choice of course;
- expectations of university life; and
- making the transition to university life.

Choosing a Course

At the start of the USAC scheme, it was set out that those cadets who met matriculation requirements and had studied the appropriate subjects at the Leaving Certificate would be free to study in University College Galway at any of the four faculties of arts, science, engineering, or commerce. The matriculation requirements of the university meant that often the choice was already partly made for prospective students through a process of elimination: “I hadn’t done Latin, right? So I couldn’t do arts” (INT 11). Some cadets (including one interviewee) also chose to study during their cadet training in order to make themselves eligible for USAC, when they became aware that it was an option, and that their existing Leaving Certificate subjects made them ineligible for participation in the scheme. But it is worth noting that choice did not extend to participation in the USAC scheme; provided that one had the relevant subjects in their Leaving Cert, cadets were
obliged to attend. One interviewee made an interesting observation that in the early years “[b]ut like, there was no choice; if you were university qualified you got on the bus. They didn’t ask me to ‘do you want to go to university?’ […] Whenever I had to apply to university, the document was put in front of me, and I applied” (INT 18).

The process or structure through which the choice was made was relatively formal in the early years, as the Army sought to manage the process. This took the form of guiding the cadets (as they were then, until the scheme was changed so that only commissioned officers would attend university) to make the decision for themselves rather than forcing them to study what might be called “military subjects”. This element of personal choice was emphasised by some interviewees (N=5). One interviewee emphasising the role of personal choice in their decision-making process also noted that the tools the Army used to evaluate the Cadets came to conclusions the cadets themselves were unhappy with:

we were advised and assessed {with} these little pinpricks we used to do in those days, to see where your bent was. I was advised to do accountancy, it was ‘written all over me’ this expert told me. And I said no. I did it up to honours leaving cert level. I said never again will I go near accountancy… and I haven’t. […] I debited and credited, I hated it. […] I went and did Arts, subjects I’d wanted to do out of personal interest. (INT 01)

‘Pinpricks’ is figurative use of language, referring to the aptitude tests which were administered to cadets prior to their conversation with the Army psychologist. This interviewee went on to study Stair – history through Irish. A significant proportion (N=11) were aware of the implications of their choice, and factored this in to their decision. How this decision was made sometimes reflected awareness of the military implications of their choice, such as avoiding engineering when it could lead to – in one participant’s mind – an undesirable career in the Ordnance Corps. This is an interesting example of individuals being aware of potential for role-identity salience (Callero, 1985) in their choice of subject, and seeking consciously to avoid this. Four participants noted that they did not end up studying courses that were their first choice, however.

Personal interest or aptitude was the primary rationale for a decision made (N=8), with only two noting a lack of interest or aptitude for specific courses noted as a factor in
‘excluding’ an option. Another interviewee, when considering his choice, made the choice between personal and organisational relevance explicit:

I was going to do a Bachelor of Arts degree and our instructions were basically... we were all paraded, forty-five of us were paraded in for an interview with the army psychologist. And, I just remembered this this morning and, he asked me what degree I want to do, and I said I want to (do a) degree which will help me in my military career and help the Army. And he said "that's wonderful. And what were you good at in secondary school?" I said history, geography, Latin. He says "do a degree in that - get a degree." That was the objective. (INT 18)

This interviewee entered the decision-making process with a desire to (or assumption of the Army’s desire that he would) relate his studies to his future career, confirming role-idenitity salience. This was not the case however, and this reflected the initial approach of the military authorities in establishing the USAC scheme, which was that the Army would benefit from university qualifications irrespective of the subject. This flexibility towards subject choice was apparently not universally supported within the Army however. Another one interviewee suggested that at one point in the early 1980s the Chief of Staff became concerned with the study of "-ologies"

You couldn't do geology or sociology or archaeology. They felt it wasn't practical. But fortunately there was a change of Chief of Staff the year before I went down, they reversed that policy, and wisely so. I mean, it's ridiculous, sociology and politics is very important [...] in the military context. (INT 23)

There appeared to be no clear rationale for this, as the subjects mentioned by this interviewee don’t appear to have any clear relationship to each other, but there is an underlying anxiety regarding the potential for role tension and role ambiguity in the study of such subjects. No such ‘policy’, formal or informal, was discussed in any other period by any other interviewee and it was at variance with the more sophisticated approach adopted in formal military statements such as the Board reports. Insofar as the Army did have a purpose in mind for USAC in Galway, interviewees (N=3) stated that it was for cadets and officers to get a degree, without consideration for military relevance or directly applicable to a career in the Defence Forces. The relevance of a course for life after their career in the Defence Forces was identified by only three participants, all of whom were commissioned from the 1990s onwards. This illustrated a changing attitude towards the place of a university education in these individuals’ role sets. In later decades following the establishment of the Central Applications Office
(CAO) in 1977 (Walsh, 2018), young officers would make their choice and post away their CAO form, without any input from any Defence Forces personnel, on the understanding that they were to apply to the same three or four year courses in the approved faculties as before.

In later years, however, studying in HEIs other than UCG/NUIG became possible, provided a case was made by a student for why they should study there. It was not possible to identify when this was, but the ‘earliest’ non-Galway participant I interviewed studied in Galway RTC in the 1990s. It was in this context that questions of ‘organisational relevance’ (with an underlying notion of role-identity salience) appear again, as prospective students had to argue for why they should undertake a specific course elsewhere. For instance, one interviewee wanted to study Sport Science, and as this was regarded as having relevance to the Defence Forces, that individual argued that he would have a future organisational role in physical training for the Army. The Army also started to look for officers to study specific courses. One interviewee had hoped to study in university engineering they had studied for one year in a Regional Technical College, and while the Dean of the relevant faculty approved (pending this officer sitting a maths exam), another academic in UCG blocked this. This interviewee then chose, “out of spite”, the course the Army was looking for officers to volunteer to study outside UCG.

Believing I was going into first year civil engineering, and they were looking for a number of officers to volunteer [...] to do ‘Hotel and Catering Management’, because I think they were looking for a quota of three and I knew... I thought in my heart and soul “I'm not doing that, but at least I can get that off someone else's back, and I'll get the engineering out of it.” (INT 27)

The ‘extension’ of USAC beyond Galway led to taking military or organisational relevance into account in course choice for the first time. This was also true when the scheme was extended to the Naval Service and the Air Corps. This same officer offered a rationale for the relevance of his studies:

if you consider the Defence Forces, we are everything any society is. We cook, clean, house, [we have] water infrastructure, road infrastructure, maintenance, vehicles, hotels, dining halls, weapons, engineering. We cover it all in a very small sphere. So everything we have in society is reflected in the organization, its own form of it. Or even teachers, lecturers, religion. It's all here. You'll struggle to actually identify a profession that we don't at least plug into or have a mark in.
The majority of those interviewed had a choice within the broad remit of approved faculties in what they studied through the USAC scheme as they were Army personnel, but the exception to this were Naval Service and Air Corps officers. The Naval Service only began to participate in the USAC scheme in the mid-1990s, in anticipation of the setting up of the NMCI in Haulbowline. The NMCI was being set up due to the Irish Naval Service no longer sending personnel to the International Sub-Lieutenant’s Course in Dartmouth (ISLX). One interviewee who studied in USAC noted some worries related to how the USAC graduates would be viewed: “I just felt you know, there had been there had been a lot of concern about whether we would be ‘yellow packs’, you know. I don’t know if you’re familiar with that phrase, it’s from the old Quinnsworth days like or Superquinn, but there was a sense that we were being trained on the cheap [...] and that we weren’t going to be good at our actual Navy job” (INT 34). After the NMCI was built, USAC education for naval officers was discontinued.

As an interim form of training, recently commissioned deck or executive branch officers were sent to undertake a BSc in Naval Studies in UCG, which the Naval Service had designed in cooperation with the university (the engineering branch studied engineering degrees). The military authorities here assumed organisational relevance, and implicitly that there would be role-identity salience for student officers. This contrasts with the Army’s approach, and the original vision for the USAC scheme set out in Army’s submission to the Commission on Higher Education specifically arguing against a military course. This naval BSc included physics and other subjects like law, but the elective options were broadened out in later years as there were “people struggling, failing, dropping out, so the emphasis on sticking to the Navy-specified subjects probably wasn't as forced, as such” (INT 38). One interviewee who had been in university for one year stated “I would have loved to continue to study history but was made very clear to me that we were not going to have the same options that the Army had because the purpose was to try and fill the gap of the ISLX” (INT 34). Subsequently Naval Service personnel would undertake their higher education in the NMCI in specifically designed
courses, again without the same flexibility and broad-based educational opportunities available to army officers studying through USAC.

Similarly, for the Air Corps, “line officers” (i.e. neither engineering or flying branch personnel) studied through the USAC scheme, but from a list of approved courses in Dublin Institute of Technology, and so were not part of the USAC cohorts in Galway. One interviewee suggested that “We treat them in the same conditions as an Army line officer would. So we do afford them the opportunity to go to college. And they can study whatever they want on the material approved list of courses” (INT 44). The material approved list of courses, is narrower than that afforded to Army personnel, however, with relevance to the Air Corps the primary concern. For both the Air Corps and the Navy undergraduate education for their young officers was almost entirely aligned with organisational goals, with much more limited scope for personal choice than army officers.

**Expectations of the Transition to University**

In discussing their expectations of the USAC experience, interviewees often combined their responses with the reality of the move to university, but a number of topics stood out. Some (N=5) had spoken to others who had studied in USAC before them, which gave them some idea of what to expect, one putting this in military terms as “the modus operandi, the battle rhythm, what was expected of us. The interface with society. Interface with the community [...] all that” (INT 08). This language did not appear to express any sense of relaxing or stepping back the military role. Two from the early stages of the scheme in the 1970s explained that the Army gave them some mentoring on what was expected of them, but this was not raised by other interviewees. While some (N=5) had low or few expectations of their time in university, for those that did have expectations, primary among these (N=10) was the academic aspect of the course, broadly conceived as receiving an education and the content of the course that would be studied. In more narrowly credentialist terms, others (N=6) referred specifically to gaining a degree as an expectation, but without relating this to it being an advantage in terms of their military career or a career after the Defence Forces. Four interviewees
discussed going to higher education in terms of it being an opportunity, including one naval officer who identified sporting life in university as an opportunity: “I played a lot of sports when I was younger and joining up in the Navy [...] you don’t get that opportunity as much as you would in the Army in that terms” (INT 37).

Enjoyment of the university experience beyond the academic aspect was also identified as an expectation (N=6), usually in terms of the change from the cadet experience: “My expectations didn’t centre around you know the educational side of it to be honest. You know it was more about the relief and the release from the Cadet School” (INT 15). Or in a more engaged sense: “Yeah, the expectation was, yeah, to have fun I suppose. To have that experience that probably my other school-leaving friends had had, and were still having” (INT 24). Gaining life experience was also identified by some (N=4), in terms of a contrast with the military life:

I wanted an experience, I wanted to be a student in college. I wanted to get that experience. I didn’t want to get commissioned into the Army and then never go to college and just be straight out of school and into the military for my entire career. So I definitely wanted the experience as well. (INT 44)

This stood in contrast to the group solidarity and collective identity the Cadet School’s military training sought to foster, and some (N=4) – three of whom had been commissioned since the 2000s – identified their desire to socialise outside the military group, saying “I just wanted to meet people [...] outside the army” (INT 11), another saying it had been a long time since they “dealt with civilians, so I wasn’t really sure what to expect” (INT 33). One interviewee from the early stage of the scheme noted that he looked forward to interacting with members of the opposite sex. Another interviewee who was not going to be residing in the USAC building stated they looked forward to blending in as they would not be in uniform during their studies. These interviewees in their own ways were anticipating a relaxation of their role-identity salience; in Callero’s (1985) original sense of this concept, they were going to de-emphasise their military role within their role set in favour of other aspects of their identity.
**Freedom and Military Discipline**

The actual reality of the transition was described primarily (N=11) in terms of freedom. In the early years when those studying through USAC were still cadets, this sense of freedom was extreme: “crude way of describing it, and that’s an over exaggeration as well, but it was like ... the impact on us was like moving from a monastery to a brothel. That's overstating it, but you can see the point I'm making” (INT 01). For these cadets “it was completely different in Galway than being in the Curragh” (INT 08); “[w]e were locked away for a year, right, and working. Like, up at 6 in the morning, run, run, run and all this thing. Suddenly you’re into lectures, your own time” (INT 11). From the late 1970s after the third board report, officers would go to their unit after commissioning and before USAC for a time (often a year), but even then the contrast between unit or barrack life was noted: “I’d say it was very similarly to cattle being kept in over the winter period and being released in the spring. It was a breath of fresh air, it was... the shackles were off.” One female interviewee made an observation about the nature of this freedom in describing it as a kind of anonymity: “…you couldn't do anything {in the Defence Forces}. There was commentary - it's a small place, you know. So it was great to get away, into a bigger environment and get lost as a student” (INT 37). There was no expression in these interviews of any sense of a weakening of military role as individuals, however, but rather a changed relationship with the military environment.

This freedom was relative though. Those attending USAC were (and are) still subject to military discipline, and many participants (N=11) referred to this. Those attending university in UCG and later NUIG were expected to ‘live in’ in the USAC building in Renmore, and military discipline included the obligation to attend university in uniform. For those attending USAC discipline extended to being up at a certain hour, room inspections at 7:30, parade every morning, as well as curfew at midnight. In the early years when those attending USAC in their first year were still cadets, these aspects of military discipline were seen to by their ‘senior cadet class’. While one interviewee described life in early USAC as “total freedom”, yet immediately thereafter outlining various requirements of military discipline, ‘total’ here stands in contrast to life
immediately beforehand in the Cadet School. A student of USAC commissioned after 2000 referred to military discipline in more qualified terms as “semi-structured”:

So you were still within a military regime, but had the latitude to come and go as you please, for your college courses and what have you there as well. So it wasn’t a full-blown civilian college experience but it was a lot freer than it would be if you let’s say the full-time military course. (INT 38)

Nevertheless, students might be obliged to take military courses at different points, meaning their experience “was by no means anything like a typical student life” (INT 05).

It is also worth observing that those attending university through the USAC scheme, but not residing in the USAC building in Galway such as those attending universities in Limerick or Dublin did ‘live in’ in barracks, but were otherwise free to come and go as would any other officer.

**Adjusting to University Life**

In the interviews, two broad groups of responses can be identified, namely those who found the transition straightforward, and those who did not. The first group (N=6) said for them it was not a difficult transition, as one 1970s-commissioned officer described:

I mean one was used to all that previous year of going through things with this group of guys, whether it was you were up to the Glen [of Imaal] or off on a course somewhere or. And this was just another development of that with the same guys. So it wasn’t like going off on your own, joining a firm and you’re the new boy, you know. I mean it was the whole group was just transferred across to Galway. The same set of rules and the same job in hand. Ok, different faculties, but essentially the same kind of affair. (INT 05)

One suggested the move was “no challenge” with two more describing it as “seamless”.

Of those (N=7) who referred to the move to USAC as being difficult for them, they did so in various ways. One issue was returning to study after having been away from academic work for a number of years. For others it was the freedom itself which was disorienting, as well as the change of pace. Two interviewees discussed these transition difficulties in more abstract terms, focusing on the sense of being military in university:

I sometimes had the impression, but I can’t remember the details, that because you were there in your cadet’s uniform in college and all the rest of it, you couldn’t quite enter into the spirit of things in the same way as say my siblings who had been in college were able to enter into the spirit of things. You know,
you wouldn’t know who would be looking or who would be watching or whatever, you know you’d be noticed. (INT 05)

This expresses a clear sense of role strain (Goode, 1960) which the academic environment placed on the individual in terms of their military role. Others (N=4) referred to other students or other USAC cohorts who did not make the adjustment well in an academic sense:

But I did my work, I attended all my lectures. I did all my submissions. Some guys didn’t, some guys went too far in terms of, you know, freedom and that. And one or two of my class unfortunately didn’t get a degree out of it. But the military had a very benevolent attitude towards that. If you didn’t get the degree, there was no sanction. Whereas I’ve always felt if you failed in the degree that should be it, you should be out the gate. Even at that time that was my view. (INT 15)

One of those interviewed was one such who did not get a degree, and returned to military unit life, and continued to soldier.

After the initial transition period, another issue which arises is how those attending USAC behaved on an ongoing basis, and the responses can be understood in terms of a kind of continuum of integration with university life as opposed to military life. This can be understood in terms of the various strategies individuals undertook to manage role strain. One way of understanding this is who USAC students socialised with. On the one hand were those interviewees (N=10) who would socialise largely or exclusively with other USAC cadets and officers, “the problem with the Army was we could be a clique, you see, when we were in uniform you could be seen as a clique” (INT 11). In the early years, when cadets arrived down in university,

...it was very, very obvious amongst the military people there that we socialized in packs, more as a crutch than anything else. And eventually by second year [...] you began to make friends and you moved in a wider circle certainly, but initially the impact of the Cadet School and the Curragh took about six months, I think [laughter] to get the confidence to, or the desire to actually move outside this comfort circuit that you had amongst your classmates in the Army, which is a testament to what the Army was setting out to do of course, building this bond. (INT 01)

This is a clear instance of “compartmentalisation” as an approach to reducing role strain (Goode, 1960, p. 486). In later years military socialisation was also raised, such that “Army lads think the same, kind of have the same sense of humour. We've been through

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the same mill like, whatever. So we do spend a lot of time with ‘the boys.’” (INT 31) ‘The boys’ here is understood as other USAC personnel – it wasn’t clear whether there were in fact any female personnel in USAC at that time. Another interviewee discussed how this worked, compared with the experience of going to college as a civilian:

When I talk to my sisters or friends who have gone to college outside, you know you’re thrown in at the deep end and you have to... Whereas we didn’t - I know it sounds terrible - but we didn’t have to make friends [...] we didn’t have that daunting experience being on your own starting off college. You know, it’s very much like you’re part of a kind of a family almost. (INT 37)

This approach to socialising in effect pre-empted role strain. An age gap between ‘civilian’ undergraduates and those attending USAC was mentioned as one reason for socialising with other officers. Nevertheless, these interviewees did also indicate that socialising together as a group was by no means to the exclusion of socialising with other classmates.

A smaller number (N=3), all commissioned in the 1990s, expressed a desire to identify with university life effectively to the exclusion of their military identity: “In a sense, I probably tried to separate myself from the Defence Forces. And this might sound mad, but I was in it for the broadest possible experience” (INT 27). This is a clear instance of selecting a different part of the role set to emphasise as a response to moving to university, with a new role-identity salience the result. Another USAC officer discussed their integration with university as “the best thing ever to get an exposure of being civilianised again, because I’d literally gone from school into military. And you do become, like my dad says ‘the chip is well and truly inserted’” (INT 37). A third interviewee commissioned post-2000, took this desire to integrate or identify with student life to its logical conclusion, to his mind, and chose to live apart from USAC: “I moved into just a normal house like a normal student, and tried to live the normal student life, but still fulfil the obligations the military set out” (INT 26). He noted that this desire to “to live like a normal student” put him at odds with his Army colleagues and friends:

They all lived together in one big building, and they were all... like a lot of them would not have progressed any kind of friendships or relationships with people that were outside the military. It was quite close and almost incestuous.
He described losing some friendships as a result of this. Other aspects of how this manifested will be discussed in greater detail below with the discussion of ‘living out’ outside USAC.

A small number (N=7), all of whom attended university from the 1990s onwards, described their first day in university. This was either a neutral experience, or not described as being especially problematic: “[i]t was fine. It was no more awkward than walking into a taekwondo class or something that, meeting new people for the first time really” (INT 38). For some, they were specifically introduced by lecturers or academic staff: “I was introduced in about 30 seconds and that was that, get on with it. So they knew I was an army officer and that was about the extent of it until we talked and we bonded throughout the weeks” (INT 31). Another described this experience in less neutral terms, however:

the lecturers, which we didn’t particularly enjoy, asked us you know, “who here are in the Air Corps?” and we all had to put up our hands. And we went ‘fuck’ [laughter] we could have done without that. [...] I think that we were new in the course and I think that they wanted to welcome us I suppose. [...] I didn’t really appreciate it in the sense that I would much have preferred to have been just anonymous. (INT 45)

For others it was a case of all students standing up and introducing themselves, and so military students would have been doing so while in uniform. Relating to the matter of making initial introductions, one interviewee described how being identifiably different, rather than setting him apart as the only USAC student, allowed for a connection to be made:

My first day was very funny, and made my best friend in college on my first day. We arrived in uniform in the ‘Hotel and Catering’ (course) there was 94 women, and six men in the class. I arrived, as always, about five minutes early, sat about four rows back. I can still see it. No one sat in the row in front of me, the row around me, or the row behind me. Until a guy, who ultimately became my best friend, comes in, sits beside me and goes something like "you’re a bit different aren't ya?!" (INT 27)

Here the military role and being identifiably different was an asset in terms of socialising, but the nature of this asset and its change over time will be explored below.
8.4 The Military Student Experience (latent difference or similarity)

This section covers more general issues relating to life as a student during the course of their education and how military participants interacted with other students and with academic staff. In the course of the interviews, a number of topics arose which were connected under the broad heading of student experience. Interviewees were asked about meeting other students and staff, which most interviewees interpreted as relating to their interactions on an ongoing basis throughout their career. Responses revolved primarily around the fact - often observable, in the case of officers wearing uniform - of their difference from other students, and most of the following discussion will revolve in the main around this assertion or assumption of difference.

**Interacting with Other Students**

An initial observation made in interviews relates to the history of the scheme itself, and the presence of USAC in Galway. For interviewees who were among the earliest groups to attend UCG through USAC, the first point they discussed was the fact that they were new in the university environment, and were regarded as a “novelty”. Quickly they became more well known, as one interviewee commissioned in the mid-1970s who grew up in Galway stated: “I'm from Galway city. And I lived beside the university and I often saw cadets going to university, and my sister knew a couple of the cadets and subsequent army officers in university” (INT 18) By the time he himself was a student in Galway less than a decade later, he describes the city as being “used to” cadets by that stage, and that they “blended in very well” – even though in that period they would have been clearly identifiable as military. Others (N=5) from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, referred to USAC students being a known entity: “definitely there was a certain cachet like, and of course the Army cadets already have a well-established sort of reputation and network in Galway that we were arriving in on top of” (INT 34). The 1990s as a cut-off period for this maps on to the discussion of “Civvies versus Uniformity” below (Section 8.5).

The most consistent point raised (N=13) by interviewees who participated in USAC was their difference from other students by virtue of age. For one USAC student
commissioned in the early 1970s, this amounted to no more than a year out of school (spent in the Cadet School). This was because at this early stage of the USAC scheme, cadets attended the Cadet School for one year, then went to USAC, after the first year of which (two years as cadets) they were then commissioned. In later years this period between leaving school and entering USAC lengthened to three or four years, and this was noted explicitly by those commissioned from the 1990s onwards. Yet the make-up of higher education also started to change, with mature students as well as school leavers, which reassured some, such as one interviewee commissioned after 2000: “I'm not even nearly the oldest in the class either, there are people a lot older than me” (INT 29). This meant that USAC students weren’t quite so different from the traditional school leaver, and while their military role would have been the most important element of their role set, it did not set them completely apart from their civilian peers. For another officer from the same period, this element of age rather than military role presented its own difficulties:

So there was, you had the ‘mature student population’ as I call them. I used to describe to people as I said, you have the mature students, they all sit at the front two rows. You've everybody else, kind of sits, falls in late, drunk at the back. But yeah, I was in the middle. I kinda didn't belong to either. So I did find it difficult initially. (INT 26)

Many (N=8) noted that they were identifiable in university, primarily by virtue of the uniform: “you were very conscious initially down there of, you know, walking into college in full uniform. And you certainly caused heads to turn. And funny enough particularly among tourists” (INT 15). Here the individual’s role-identity salience was clearly, visually apparent. This was also put in terms of being not just identifiable, but as part of an identifiable group (N=7), as ‘other’. One interviewee from the early 1970s, thus the start of the USAC period played down this notion of separateness by contextualising it in terms of the wider social mores of Ireland of the time, specifically referencing the presence of other groups in college in identifiable professional or religious garb: “[w]e were a group within the group, but I mean there was other groups within college. For example there was nuns there, you know, they were ‘the nuns’ [...] so that within college I suppose there was always groups or sects and that” (INT 15).
There were, however, specific public behaviours that set USAC students apart from the civilian student body, as one 1970s student described:

I do remember once people being somewhat impressed as a funeral went past. Myself and others were waiting at a bus stop, saluted as you’re supposed to do, that we weren’t too sure about but I was sure of it, I remember growing up in the camp or whatever. And a lot of people kind of looked over, you know that kind of thing. Small things. (INT 05)

This visible difference was also referred to by other interviewees, saying they would “always have a short haircut, always clean-shaven, you know most lads in college they’ve got beards” (INT 33). Another noted similarly that their own high standards were not met by other students: “this’ll sound really pretentious but like, I dunno, someone comes in and they're... like bags, or books are falling out of bags, like, which is like not uncommon [...] and wearing half their scone on their jumper like that, and I'm just looking at them like ‘clean yourself up like’ [laughter]” (INT 31). One interviewee from the early days mentioned, however, that though there might have been ten USAC officers in uniform in a lecture of 100 students, they wouldn’t have sat together as one block:

you see if you all sat together the girls wouldn’t sit down, so you’d be cramping your style, you know what I mean like you know [laughter]. And you did make attempts to mix around and then you got pally with some of the girls there like you know. And you’d sit beside them and purely chatting you know but the fantastic thing, as you know college itself like, Jesus the amount of girls and women there, you had great chance, you know what I mean like of meeting someone. (INT 11)

This interviewee noted that he met his wife in UCG, just as several other interviewees from the early USAC period did.

What was also common in interviewees’ responses (N=9), however, was a high level of ignorance of the Defence Forces on the part of the wider student population, that USAC students became aware of as they stepped outside the ‘military bubble’: “I was amazed at the ignorance over in the west, I really was now, I was amazed at it you know. And {people} just didn’t seem to know. The military had a low footprint. You see here in the Curragh and Newbridge - very military oriented, always was” (INT 11). This unfamiliarity
or lack of awareness could be somewhat innocent, and take the form of inquisitiveness relating to the sense of ‘novelty’ mentioned above, for example from those who had never seen a military uniform before. Another interviewee reported more pointed, or aggressive questions:

“What do you do sit around all day?” and it’s like, like if they turn around, you’re like what do you do, sit around all day, like. No, you trained or you do exercises. You go on the range. You go running. You don’t sit around all day, and that’s the thing, a lot of people like to think that lads on duty are sitting around all day. (INT 32)

There was little (N=2) sense of a generalised respect for the Defence Forces (all from post-1990s officers), with this term only being used in a qualified sense: “I let people form their own opinions to be honest because straight away if you tell someone you’re in the Army, some people have a lot of respect for it, some people don’t” (INT 32). The following exchange with one interviewee, commissioned post-2000 illustrates how unusual it was to get expressions of respect from others, describing a ball he attended – as required – in dress uniform.

*Interviewee:* So a lot of people saw me there, and kind of like, you know had a very different... different opinion of me after that. But you know, what harm.

*Researcher:* And what did they say when they came up to you?

*Interviewee:* Yeah they came up to me, and like {bought} us drinks and like “oh, thanks very much, what do yiz do?” and all that. We never got that anywhere else like, so this is great.

*Researcher:* They were buying you drinks for...

*Interviewee:* Yeah, for being in the Army, swear to God, yeah! [laughter] (INT 31)

This was a rare instance of an interviewee from later years having the opportunity to express and be confirmed in their role-identity salience.

Another common point raised by participants (N=11) was that they were being paid to attend university. Some related this to themselves, and interpreted this as having serious implications for them personally: “I still view the ability to go out and get education while you’re in full time payment is an extreme privilege, but one that you have to take seriously. It’s - I won’t say it’s unjustifiable, but it’s... it sets a very high standard for our own performance” (INT 27). Others contextualised this more widely,
beyond themselves, and noted that some students from Galway would have known they were being paid to attend university with “the perception sure, you know, ‘you’re loaded’” (INT 37). This matter of a differential, and military students being in a better financial position than civilian students was raised by interviewees (N=10) who studied across all periods of the USAC scheme. Some interviewees (N=5) noted that unlike other students at the time, they had cars, which made them a very real, logistical asset for clubs and societies. Indeed, this to some extent identified them, given the relative rarity of car ownership in the student body of the 1970s and 1980s: “everyone knew we’re Army anyway because you had the army haircut and you were driving a car, as a student” (INT 20). This same interviewee also noted that another group would have been in a similarly secure financial position “there was guys in my class that were from Mayo and places like that, were {going} out a lot more than me. They were farmers’ sons and stuff. Money was never a problem for a lot of these guys.” This matter of being better off also raised the only real discussion of tension or friction, as some (N=6) interviewees suggested that civilian students were jealous or envious of the USAC officers, in part as a result of their being paid while attending college:

Yeah in some ways it was difficult enough because I think, I mean there would have been a certain element of jealousy there, there had to be among students who were struggling financially to make ends meet. And they saw us down there, you know, living in good accommodation, you know with plenty of money to spend, no expenses accruing from our time in college. So I think there would have been some difficulty there. (INT 15)

This implies something beyond the notion of role, with the “cadet” or “army officer” in the older sense of ‘social type’ (Arditi, 1987) for civilians, without the individual content implied by role.

Interactions between male and female students provide an example of how military students being better off was interpreted, and another aspect of the USAC officer as a social type. Wearing the uniform was one sort of apparent advantage some, both civilian and military, believed they had: “we were there in uniform and the girls loved us, I mean Jesus, I’m not saying we’re all Casanovas, but ah no I enjoyed meeting girls, we hadn’t actually experience, a year out of our lives” (INT 11). In material, financial terms however, the assumption that emerges in this discussion is one held by male students
(civilian and military alike) that “you had a big advantage, so the lads would say well you know if you’re chatting up women the chances are you’ve a car and you’ve money and stuff, they’re going to go off with you” (INT 20). There was also reference to jokes or slagging:

They {other students} used to slag the women, they used to hang around with the lads, {they would say} “meals on wheels” and all this sort of crap. And some people thought you were a bit privileged, that kind of thing. There was no jokes about the Army itself, it was more about the fact that you were privileged. (INT 20)

A female officer who attended USAC in Galway made an observation testifying to an asymmetry of how women in uniform are perceived:

And it's gas, because how I would view it, certainly as a woman, it's very difficult to prove, but fellas view women in uniform not with the same flair as you know, a girl who looks at young, a fella in uniform and it's a good thing, a positive. (INT 37)

While this is only one example, but it is useful in noting a perception of different experiences by gender. Here the social type of the USAC officer was decidedly male.

**Interacting with Staff and the University**

Again, discussion of how USAC students were viewed by staff centred on difference. Partly this was to do with the novelty of the scheme and the engagement by the Defence Forces with the university authorities and academic staff for the administration of the scheme (N=5). In the early days this may have related to the fact that USAC was new, and so “the staff were proactive to ensure that, first of all that we understood what was required of us as students”:

We would have more than likely built up a stronger rapport with the staff, with our instructors - instructors not staff - than the civilian student because of the fact that we were always there. And if we weren’t there, there was some reason for it. And we’d be asked the following day were you sick or something because they would notice that the guy in uniform sitting at that table there wasn’t present. (INT 08)

This relates to USAC officers being visually identifiable as a separate group, where their civilian counterparts not in uniform were afforded relative anonymity.
Beyond this, however, there was also a perception of being treated differently, not simply because of administrative concerns or visual appearance (N=8). One student of a classical language referred to the academic staff enjoying their presence, because “I think they enjoyed the fact that they had two army officers in the room. Because the Roman military tradition was very much a part of Roman literature. So {discussing} Julius Caesar and Augustus and Octavian and Vespasian there” (INT 18). There is also again the matter of age and maturity: “the college lecturers view you slightly differently. They know you've already achieved something, and they know you've already been some way educated” (INT 27). Another, positive kind of classroom engagement by academic staff was also found in cases where there were discussions that involved topics of military relevance:

as things progressed our lecturers became, almost began to label us as the two Army guys, or they might turn to us at various stages in....in lectures and say "is that the same for you guys in the Army", or "have you ever come across this type of thing". [...] We were the Army guys in the class and there was that little bit of extra labelling of us, which was a good thing, which I think was a positive overall actually. (INT 24)

One naval officer also referred to the sense of prestige for the university itself, which explained some of the interest of academic staff in how those students were doing in their bespoke Naval Science BSc:

There's a maritime tradition in Galway University as well. The Martin Ryan institute, big oceanography centre, and ocean biology, and the Marine Institute's based there. I think they were very eager to make a go of this. They saw it as a prestigious thing to be delivering this training for the Navy, I think it was a prestigious thing. (INT 34)

A minority (N=3) mentioned that they had little contact with academic staff, and so questions of difference or otherwise did not arise.

There was also a minority (N=6), however, who said they were not treated differently: “I mean I never kind of, I never felt that we were singled out by staff because we were cadets or because we were different” (INT 15); “it was fine there was nothing different really as far as I could see. They just treated us all the same” (INT 28). Another interviewee, however, identified their difficulties with this parity of treatment arising from the military experience:
...when you're in college, like college students get treated a certain way. And to be honest, if I was a lecturer probably, I'd do the same myself but, it's really weird going from being like essentially a junior manager, being responsible for people, to being treated like some kid straight out of school, doesn't have a clue what they're doing. So that kind of adjustment, took an awful lot of getting used to. (INT 33)

Implicit here is that individual’s difficulty making the transition from their military identity to that of being a student or a civilian, not being treated differently as they believe they should be or deserve. That interviewee’s strong role-identity salience and identification with the military role created role strain as the importance he attached to his status was not of relevance in the academic setting. Indeed, so strong was this role-identity salience that it effectively universalised the military context, and made it difficult for him to recognise how the civilian, academic context was different (this is discussed further below). Academic staff themselves made no use of military rank, interviewees stated, again testifying to a parity of treatment, but one interviewee referred to lecturers as “Sir” or “Ma’am”, eschewing academic titles such as Professor or Doctor: “no, like none of them have ever asked me to call them doctor [...] there was one lecturer that said ‘you don’t call me sir, I’m not your commanding officer’, he said ‘call me John’” (INT 33).

Quality of teaching did not feature as a major concern for most interviewees, but three participants raised their difficulties with the academic approach by making comparison with the Cadet School and the Defence Forces more widely. One of these, who was at USAC in the early 1970s went further, comparing the standard of lecturing in Galway negatively with the Cadet School and making no secret of his disappointment:

I won’t say appalled, but I was very disappointed with the standard of lecturing in college compared to... You see we were used to methods of instruction, “the object of the exercise is”. I know that’s very straight you know but these fellas were throwing things off the top of their head, they were talking to the blackboard or talking to whoever. And I found, while they knew the stuff superbly, they just couldn’t communicate it. I found anyway. And that disappointed me. And I’ll always remember to this day, economic history I think it was, one of these ones and the fella stands up and he says “there will be no lectures for the three weeks because I’m moving house”, and he just announced it like that, and that was it. (INT 11)
Another interviewee from this group noted their issues with instruction in terms of follow up and individual attention: “I mean you either pay attention at your lecture or you don’t. And the first time you know the professor or the lecturer would find out whether you did or you didn’t is when you do your exam, you know. That’s not the way in the Cadet School” (INT 15).

Another interviewee from the post-2000 period expressed their problems with the academic environment in more general terms, discussing interaction with academic staff in considerable detail. This participant was sitting in an academic council meeting as a students’ union representative, where the issue of a college action plan was being proposed. In following discussion of this particular event, this interviewee stated that “like I can see why our way of doing things doesn't work for colleges”, yet this seemed to be simply a surface acknowledgement of difference. Here some demographic context is useful, as this officer was of junior rank, and had spent little time in unit life, and none in outside employment. This explains perhaps the inability to understand how organisations might work in reality, outside the Army and beyond the platoon level. The participant expressed considerable frustration with the leisurely pace of academic norms:

Like there was a certain point where I was like half expecting someone to be saying "right, shut up, you're not in charge here. we are. This is what we're doing and that's the end of it." Like I do appreciate you can't run a college that way. I do appreciate like that the Army way of doing things would not work for many other organizations but, to my mind at least college is like completely the other end of spectrum. (INT 33)

It is more likely that this viewpoint is an expression of inexperience and a genuine lack of understanding (“It's very hard to....very hard to kind of understand like why they think the way they do”) rather than being taken as indicative of a ‘military perspective’ on academia or collegiate norms, not least because this interviewee was alone in expressing such views. Military socialisation in his case remained dominant, despite participation in academic life. In his role set the military role was uppermost, leading to expressions of role strain.
Perceptions of Affective Difference

In the preceding discussion, when interviewees referred to an awareness of age difference, this was often being used as shorthand for an implied difference in maturity between military students and civilian students. This section considers the perceptions of difference, or affective difference, and what they thought or felt were the differences between them and other students. Crucially these by no means imply role strain, as the differences discussed may not derive primarily from the military role. A significant proportion of interviewees referred either to their own maturity (N=10) or the immaturity of other, civilian students (N=6). This was related to either the age difference due to the time period they had spent in the Defence Forces or their own distance from leaving school relative to civilians (thus can be considered as attributable to the military role only secondarily). While it was noted that this age difference was usually just a matter of a few years, in terms of maturity this was regarded as significant. The language used indicated degrees of maturity, however, in that they were either “somewhat more matured” or a “bit more mature” on the one hand, or that there was a significant “maturity gap” at the other end of the spectrum. This difference in maturity was also related specifically to the training received in the Cadet School and time spent with their units:

There’s an awful lot of confidence that you just acquire being who you are and the job you have and I think... just introducing yourself to people and smiling, talking away. That was very noticeable, from just like even from myself and some of the other lads. The first thing I thought was a lot of them didn't have enough, a lot of confidence in themselves. And then I just thought it's probably their first time away from home. (INT 30)

Further to this point of having matured during their military training and experience, a number of other topics arose that interviewees believe set them apart from civilian students. One was that by virtue of their training as military officers, they were more prepared for academic life in university (N=7):

what was very obvious was that the training we had got in terms of our personal organization, our ability to prioritize, meant that we could handle the social life, the sporting life and then the inevitable pressure of exam time much, much better than our civilian counterparts. We were able to fly through the exams much, much easier. They didn't have the same capacity to be able to prioritize,
reduce things to their essentials. What do you need to know about this? We'll give it to you in half a page. Whereas civilians would give it to you in 20. [...] You’re dealing with complexity, you’re dealing with chaos. It’s ultimately what you’ve been trained for, to bring order to chaos. That’s the battlefield. (INT 01)

Others similarly referred to an ability to prioritize, and that they had “economy of effort” (INT 26). Some also noted, however, that this advantage wasn’t kept to themselves, and that they may have helped their civilian classmates academically, for instance in terms of taking a utilitarian approach to studying for exams and preparing certain questions rather than studying an entire syllabus. This also applied in terms of non-academic or life-skills: “certain guys even guys I’m still friends, I'm friends with now like they'd be laughing, saying well he taught me to cook, or he taught me how to look after myself, [...] they didn't, wouldn't have known that themselves. They would have been ‘mammied’ at home” (INT 26). The sense of being more disciplined or professional in their approach was also identified by some (N=6), “you’d like to think, yeah, did they still viewed me as one of their peers but they were aware that I was different in the sense that this wasn’t just a college trip. It was my career, my job. I’ve already committed” (INT 27). These can also be regarded as secondary to the military role, and primarily a result of coming to university from having prior professional or employment experience; the same can be said of many of the following observations.

In terms of socialising with other students outside the USAC cohort, the military background was also identified as an asset. Many interviewees (N=9) spoke of socialising with civilians in terms of taking a leadership role in clubs and societies: “a lot of us tended to take leadership roles in various, in various areas. Not all but in a lot of the societies in college you would have found that it would have been an Army guy was pretty much running the show” (INT 01). Here the organizational ability and experience received through cadet training and unit experience was identified as being key. Sport was another key example where USAC students’ physical prowess was regarded as an asset: “most guys {who} joined the Army had a decent sporting background anyway [...] most of the guys play football or play hurling with UCG. As I said, I was involved in orienteering” (INT 28).
A specific trait that emerged as a differentiating quality was confidence (N=4):

We would have been hugely confident in our abilities, particularly physical ability. But also the ability to deal with anything that’s... nothing was impossible. That was like sort of the catchphrase of cadets [...] ‘nothing’s impossible for a cadet’. So you had that confidence in yourself to be able to deal with anything. Whether we could or not was another matter. (INT 01)

Leadership as a differentiating trait was also identified (N=5), in terms of being identified by other students: “very quickly students came to me with problems. I while I never volunteered for the role of student representative on any of the committees I was almost the informal committee member” (INT 21). Many spoke of taking such an informal role in terms of liaising with lecturers and academic staff. Several interviewees also noted that for them this leadership role was somewhat formalised in that they had served in the Students Union as class representatives, though they may not have made it known that they were military personnel.

A negative aspect to these traits was also discussed, however. Overconfidence in the sense of being arrogant was identified by two interviewees. One spoke of his own group of cadets, who were among the first to study in USAC, and the possibility of coming across to others as arrogant:

That’s a natural facet of anybody who’s come through that sort of training. We always say in the army like the most dangerous people in the army are the young lieutenant and the young corporal, people have been vested with authority for the very first time. They can lose the run of themselves very, very quickly. They have to be minded and watched very, very carefully. (INT 01)

Similarly, some interviewees (N=3) noted that their leadership impulses could overstep the mark, and become an urge to control.

that would have used to frustrate me and I kind of had to stop myself and say, why do I care what other people can and can’t do. But I was still stuck in the junior officer point of view of “here’s a recruit, he needs to be able to do this”, and getting frustrated they’re not doing it. But I had to kind of say “well hold on, none of these people are my responsibility.” I was used to people around me were my responsibility. I had to kind of say, the only person (you’re) responsible for is yourself. Stop. (INT 26)

This might be more readily attributed to the military role, but could conceivably extend to any individual with other management or leadership experience.
Yet about the same proportion of interviewees from all decades (N=9) downplayed different aspects of apartness, in contrast to the above recollections: “I think once the initial uniform thing was put to one side I suppose and they realize that you were just there to do the same thing that they were, so get your degree at the end of the day. That's pretty much, we just melded into the class really as such” (INT 38). In terms of age and maturity, another interviewee suggested that these differences might not be as significant: “[p]eople are immature regardless of their age. I can be immature too. So it didn't really matter” (INT 30). Another similarly downplayed a difference by suggesting that he was the same as a student in college previously, “cause like when I was in first year in Trinity I was a disaster like so they're just the same I suppose” (INT 31).

**Need to Maintain a Military Identity**

The concept of having and maintaining a military identity within a civilian context emerged in interviews with those who had studied at USAC, in various periods. One way this was apparent was in how responses from a number of interviewees (N=7) made apparent that they perceived themselves to be representatives of the state. Clearly, military role-identity salience was strong for such individuals. From the early days of the USAC scheme, this was apparent in terms of these military students not being involved in the wider student movements of the time:

> you know we would have been conscious of the Students’ Union, we would have been conscious of the protests that were justified as students, we would have agreed with it but we would never be actively involved in it. One or two might have liked to but there was absolutely no way from a military point of view, we could and that was part of our education as well you know. (INT 08)

A potential role tension or strain here was lessened by avoiding the immediate environment. Another suggested that the political views of the USAC military students were “very conservative really” but for this reason “found it refreshing meeting people outside who were different, I won’t say off the wall but different you know, strokes are different. You know they probably saw us, I’d say they saw us as being a conservative group like you know” (INT 11). This sense of being ‘establishment’ politically was most apparent in those attending USAC in the 1990s; two participants from the post-2000 period discussed their political status in different terms. One mentioned a classroom
discussion of going on strike as drawing out this aspect, where the tutor “couldn’t see my point, and eventually I just had to say well it's illegal for me to strike. I won't strike because I've agreed not to” (INT 30). Another interviewee spoke in much broader terms that “there's kind of an anti-, anti-authority type attitude I suppose with a lot of people my age. Whereas my attitude wouldn’t... I kind of would have authority, and would be under authority as well. So I've a much more, suppose I've a much, much less anti-establishment view than most people would” (INT 33).

Some examples from the early years of USAC are worth discussing as they situate the notion of military students being part of ‘the establishment’ in the wider political context of Ireland in the early 1970s. One interviewee went into greater detail on this:

So if you can imagine the 1970s, when was I in college [...] Long hair, Vietnam War, protests were a big, big part of student life at the time. Also symbols of authority were targeted, that was the culture of the time and there we were with our short hair and our uniforms. We fitted that bill. Although we never had any great problems. (INT 01)

The matter of students going on strike in “student actions” arose, and the interviewee stated that they “had to be careful on this one”, which led me to ask about their involvement, and the following exchange took place:

*Researcher:* Okay. So did...
*Interviewee:* [interrupting] We didn’t.
*Researcher:* You didn’t, full stop.
*Interviewee:* Or we didn't overtly, we didn't overtly support them or in any way support them. We'd never join a protest or anything else like that. I'm going back now a long time, but I think what we used to do is we used to go to college with our uniform, and if there was a student strike, not attending lectures - well there were lectures we didn’t attend any way for any number of reasons! So we’d go to the coffee shop. You know that sort of thing or go to the canteen, in our uniform.

*Researcher:* Yeah, so it was non-participation rather than overt protesting.
*Interviewee:* We were absent from the lecture rather than protesting. Subtle point but that's the way it was dealt with. (INT 01)

On this point of being conservative in a student populace that was largely rejecting traditional mores, the same interviewee made the following observation:
I suppose you have to remember too with that time in college, it wouldn't have been unusual to have had Christian Brothers, priests and nuns in the classroom as well, doing their degrees as part of their religious training. So there would have been a body of people within the college, other than ourselves, who also wore uniforms and who also would have belonged to whatever you want to call it, right wing, conservative, but establishment certainly. Thus their non-participation in the student movement in terms of not participating in the protest, was ‘softened’ by also not attending the lecture, as the rest of the students were. The ambiguity of this stance allowed them to maintain a foot in both worlds, not making a strong choice between the roles of military or student, striking an equivocal role bargain (discussed further in Chapter 10). Their conservative or establishment credentials, meanwhile, were normalised and minimised in this narrative of ‘what Ireland was like at the time.’

Dealing with students with anti-military attitudes were raised by only a small number of interviewees (N=3). One, again studying in the 1970s contextualised this in terms of the wider political situation at the time: “The only problem with the soccer crowd was they were a crowd down from Donegal who were very anti-military. We had a few of those fellas now. There was a bit of that.” The interviewee explained the nature of this tension in the following explanation.

Well you see the border (with Northern Ireland) was there and they used to go into Derry, to the British Army and that kind of thing and they would look at us in the same light I’d say, do you know, ‘military’. I could understand it. And I’ve seen plenty of it around, before and since. But you would be aware when people are anti-military or anti, you definitely would be aware of that. (INT 11)

Their identity as members of the Irish Defence Forces apparently mattered less than the fact that they were military, and so apparently were thought of in the same way as members of the British Army. It is worth pointing out, however, that this interviewee’s interpretation of these students’ hostility as being due to an elision of Irish officers with British Army personnel was not necessarily shared by all his colleagues. Another interviewee, speaking of his experiences on the border during the Troubles at this same time, spoke of the fact that the hostility they met was not due to any confusion, but rather was directed at them as Irish Defence Forces personnel, and was:
at its worst in the context of the support that existed right along the border for criminality, for atrocities and you know driving, going out on patrol driving through Monaghan, being abused by school kids, you know throwing things at you, calling you names, you know. It was just a culture that existed at that time right throughout all of the Border counties. So I mean, in some ways that was a shock to the system as well, that there was that hugely radical element there. (INT 15)

Yet the ‘coolness’ described by the previous interviewee did not appear to have escalated beyond this, because in this his mind “[o]f course, you see nobody would take us on because if they did you’d have 10 lads knocking at their door and saying ‘what the frig is going on here’ like you know. It was very easy for us to get a few pals together, do you know and ‘come the heavy’ if anyone did” (INT 11). An interviewee from the 1980s spoke in passing and without elaboration of “particularly left-wing types”. There was no other mention of hostility from subsequent periods.

Another perspective on concealing their military identity came from the perceived need to maintain the reputation of the Defence Forces. One interviewee commissioned after 2000 discussed being careful in terms of socialising in a nightclub and the need to maintain the reputation of the Defence Forces in such a context: “Like if a row broke out, and we've to try and separate it, and next thing the guards are called and then they find out we're based out here, it's like straight away we’re getting the blame for it like” (INT 32). This same interviewee mentioned that military students wouldn’t socialise in the houses of civilian students they didn’t know, again for this reason of maintaining military identity in terms of reputation:

all it takes is for one fella to be the dealer and then the house is getting raided, and just by chance we're all standing there. And it mightn't even be the fella that we know. Could be a sound fella on my course, doesn't do drugs, but his housemate's dealing it. And next thing, back door's getting kicked in, and then we're all in trouble. So that's, that's one thing I'm conscious of anyway. Now look, I'm not saying everyone's of the same opinion, but I am.

Military identity here is understood not just in terms of being an individual member of a group, but as representing that group, an unambiguous expression of the role identity. The following section will discuss specific points where USAC students developed various strategies to negotiate some of the tensions between this military identity and being in a civilian educational context.
8.5 Uniforms, Accommodation, and Identification with Civilian Life

This section warrants separate treatment because a tension arose among the USAC cohort between the requirements and expectations inherent in military discipline on the one hand, and the lived experience of being a student in university. The concepts of role theory are foundational for the following. In the very first interview, the topic of wearing military uniform in university arose, and consequently was added to the interview schedule as a specific question. In the course of subsequent interviews, different attitudes and behaviours relating to uniforms on campus were discussed by participants. Similarly, the question of “living in” in the USAC building arose in discussion though it was not a specific question, and different strategies relating to accommodation became apparent. Following on from the matter of maintaining military identity in a civilian context, the disclosure or non-disclosure of military role or identity also arose in interviews. A small number (N=4) discussing meeting students at this stage indicated that they were not outwardly identifiable to students as military officers, and this is also discussed below.

Uniforms – Official Requirements and Responses

Military uniform is a central element of military identity and the performance of the military role. The uniform and haircut are primary elements of role assumption upon entering any military organisation. In my first interview with an officer who had been a student at USAC, they mentioned that USAC students were encouraged by their Army peers to get involved in clubs and societies, whereas Army authorities “were more concerned about our behaviour and what they emphasized was the fact - and it was insisted upon wear uniform in college. [...] At all times. Yes. In lectures and during the day” (INT 01). In total eleven interviewees explicitly referred to wearing the uniform, and six specifically described what was required: “as a cadet I wore my tunic and slacks. That was it. Then as an officer you were supposed to wear your number two uniform, which is your tunic and slacks and your cloth belt. Sometimes I’d wear the Sam Browne {belt}” (INT 18). By the time soldiers were being sent to USAC as officers rather than cadets, requirements had changed to slacks and the jumper - rather than the tunic – and cap.
Some interviewees (N=4) articulated positive feelings towards the uniform in terms of their outward appearance. Others referred to their role-identity salience and being part of the group: “in fact I’d have felt strange going in in civilians. Because everyone would say ‘where is your uniform?’ like you know” (INT 11). Another explained this in terms of duty and an implicit contract (quite aside from the contract all officers are obliged to sign), with the principle of representing the Defence Forces, in the context of being in uniform:

But overall I felt it was useful. You know, I felt it was kind of my duty to wear the uniform and to let people see that you know, “we’re here.” So yeah I made a point of it. And I know that some of my Army colleagues would have a similar view. This is... It’s your... it’s part of the deal, that you’re visibly a Defence Forces officer. You’re not just taking the benefits of this program quietly. (INT 34)

Another spoke of it in terms of the requirements of military discipline: “you’ll get a sense from me that if the rules are rules, that’s what I do as much as I can. And I’m proud of the Defence Forces, very proud of it, and very proud to be selected as an officer” (INT 27).

Indeed, it is this sense of rules and the literal obligation to wear the uniform that is the most common context (N=14) in which the wearing of uniform in the USAC scheme was discussed. Monitoring of wearing the uniform was also common, right up to the present (N=6): “the officers ahead of us would have insisted that we did, you know, they kept a watching brief on us from that point of view” (INT 01). In the early stage of USAC, these officers were the class senior to cadets who had been commissioned, whose oversight of cadets was part of the wider system of military discipline in USAC, which included their commanding officer: “I think it all depends if the CO came in and I suppose I don’t... he never came in when I was wearing my jumper. [laughter] Now, I remember he told me get my hair cut once. I’d grown a bit long, maybe” (INT 18). In later years all USAC students would have been commissioned, and so it would have been the responsibility of the CO to maintain military discipline. A change became apparent in the course of my interviews, however, and the question of a more active approach to maintaining military discipline arose, which was probably a response to not wearing the uniform becoming
more frequent, and organisational anxieties relating to potential role ambiguity. This was described by one 1990s USAC student: “something the authorities in USAC used to struggle with as well periodically there would be a, you know, reminders and letters and complaints and so on of students not, student officers not wearing the uniforms” (INT 34).

Even within the structure of military discipline, exceptions and allowances were made, which many (N=9) referred to. Exceptions included some students attending practicals or labs: “if you do science or engineering you’ve got permission to wear civilian clothing because you’re doing labs, and the uniform wasn’t seen as fit for purpose for labs” (INT 26). Similar exceptions were made for those studying subjects that had fieldwork elements. Those discussing sport and training, as well as more social contexts, made clear that wearing the uniform was unacceptable in these settings:

- you only went to the lectures in uniform. Oh no, if you went to football or anything, oh you definitely got out of the uniform like you know, yeah. And in fact, that’s where I find very hard to accept, I see soldiers running around the town of Newbridge in uniform, we use’n’t [sic] do that. Like, for your lectures, right, uniform. But after that? Off. Oh, there’s no way you’d go drinking in uniform. Oh absolutely, that’s totally out of order. Definitely no way. Now maybe I’m the old conservative and that was the way with us, no way you’d do that like, not in a fit, no, no, no. And attending your sporting, it was always in civvies. (INT 11)

Another setting characterised by officially permitted exceptions involved those studying through the USAC scheme, but not in Galway (including one who studied abroad for part of their studies). The reason underlying this was that they would be only one of a small number of military students (and in some cases alone) and so wearing the uniform was not deemed necessary or perhaps appropriate. For some, attending university and not wearing the uniform was regarded as a bonus: “it's hugely beneficial not to be, not to be.... everybody knew we were Army, you know in our class and our close group, but you weren’t.... sticking out in terms of having to wear uniform” (INT 24) One interviewee who attended DIT in the post-2000 period explained part of the reasoning behind this:

- it was appropriate not to do it in Dublin because there was no culture there. So we would have, there was a culture in Galway, there was an expectation that oh yeah they’re the army officers. Whereas in Dublin it’s not. And it would have
been, would have taken a long time to build in a culture of ‘oh yeah they’re the army officers’, but that was never going to happen in Dublin. So we were allowed smart, civilian attire. So we would wear slacks and a shirt, or slacks and a jumper or you know, we dressed appropriately. (INT 44)

The wearing of military dress was a central part of military identity, but even for those who wore it, there were a variety of responses to this official, disciplinary requirement, as well as some official lee-way in various circumstances.

**Civvies versus Uniformity**

Some cracks in the wall of military discipline and obligation became apparent in the interviews, however. Three interviewees, all commissioned in the 1970s, discussed a changing attitude during their studies.

*Interviewee: As cadets we were naïve I suppose, we were proud of our uniform and we liked showing it off, it was a very nice uniform. As officers we probably found that it was a bit of a nuisance in so far as we were wearing a uniform, we would more than likely have preferred not to be in uniform.*

*Researcher: Why would officers have preferred not to be in uniform in the later years?*

*Interviewee: I think because it’s a hindrance, you know if you’re finished college you can’t go for a pint on the way home in uniform, ok. Researcher: Yeah? Interviewee: Or you can’t go downtown to shop, well you can go downtown to shop but it’s not the thing that we did. Researcher: Why, because you didn’t necessarily want to stand out or…? Interviewee: Yeah. Researcher: Or be identifiable? Interviewee: Yeah, wanted to be normal. (INT 08)*

This expresses a changing emphasis within the role set, and a degree of role strain setting in. Similarly, another interviewee expressed a sense of a less formal approach to wearing the uniform compared to when students were cadets, but this was a decision taken by officers themselves: “we became commissioned after the second year and then it relaxed more, you were supposed to be responsible for yourself then like you know” (INT 11); “halfway through second year people, we weren’t supposed to be still wearing our jumpers. The green jumpers. You weren't supposed to, but they were far more comfortable to wear, even the tunic and the belt, you know?” (INT 18). A number (N=5) spoke in such a way of in effect ‘taking liberties’, such as abandoning the uniform for rag week, or on days when one would be going to training in the evening. The implications
of wearing the uniform have been discussed implicitly in terms of the military student identity. When asked about wearing the uniform, while a large number said they did wear it \((N=10)\), a significant minority \((N=7)\) openly admitted not wearing the uniform. This did not include those who had permission not to wear the uniform, nor did it include those who did not explicitly state that they did not wear it. The difference by decade of commissioning is striking, as illustrated in Table 3.

**Table 3: Interviewees Wearing Uniform by Decade (Explicit Statements)**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1970s</th>
<th>1980s</th>
<th>1990s</th>
<th>2000s+</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not wearing Uniform</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wearing uniform</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

The nature of the responses received also varied. One interviewee from the 2000s, said the following in direct response to my question about wearing the uniform: “uniform is always worn on campus in accordance with standing orders of the first Battalion USAC. SD3 should be worn at all times, although the peak cap does not have to be worn on campus, and the tunic does not have to be worn either” (INT 33). “SD3” refers to Service Dress No. 3, the least formal of the service dress uniforms. This is in contrast with the ‘field dress’ camouflage uniform, DPMs or ‘disruptive pattern material’ as they are known in the Irish Defence Forces. This appeared to be a verbatim quotation of a Defence Forces Regulation outlining the military disciplinary requirements of USAC students. Unfortunately, after a Freedom of Information request, and follow-up emails, I have been unable to review the Defence Forces Regulation to which this individual was apparently referring.

Another interviewee commissioned in the 1990s was much more definitive: “No. People will tell you. Nobody did. Nobody goes. You might go the first day or the odd day here or there. [...] And to be honest anybody who tells you they wore the uniform to college is just blatantly lying to you. They are.” Indeed, this same interviewee observed that actually wearing the uniform became strange in itself:
Like you saw a guy in uniform, you're kind of going, were you doing an interview or were you doing an oral exam that you were struggling with? They thought that this brought a magical power and really... Lecturers. Don't. Care. They care do you meet the learning outcomes, and other than that they don't really care what you're wearing. (INT 26)

Some other interviewees (post-1990 officers) laughed or rolled their eyes as I asked the question, while one smiled and asked “this is confidential?” As such, the number who explicitly admitted not wearing the uniform most likely underestimates the total who did not wear the uniform, and the number who experienced role strain or conflict.

Negative attitudes towards wearing the uniform were expressed by a significant proportion of interviewees (N=9), including both those who did wear uniform and those who did not. For some it was regarded personally as “nuisance” or a “hindrance”, or it was depersonalised by saying “nobody found [it] particularly comfortable”. The inability to blend in “more as a civilian” was mentioned, but a specific kind of discomfort and role strain with the military identity was also apparent, and in stronger terms:

But it was occasionally embarrassing. I mean, for example, if for some reason, you know, I didn't have a car, I would have to walk back through Galway town to USAC. I only did that couple of times, and just people, people... You know people would wonder... You just got a lot of stares and you'd feel silly and self-conscious you know? So there were disadvantages to it. (INT 34)

In saying this, this interviewee from the 1990s noted that “it kind of irritated me when people didn't wear the uniform and I made a point of it myself.” The identification of the visible military identity and role with embarrassment is nevertheless striking, however, as is language used by another interviewee:

I would much have preferred to have been just anonymous you know, so this is the thing because you wear a uniform the whole time you are a somebody [...] So you don’t have the same identity individual identity as other students in the sense that other students don’t have this I use the term baggage but the other students don’t have that. (INT 45)

‘Baggage’ here is an arresting term to use to refer to the military role and its accoutrements as impediments in some way, as is ‘embarrassment’, but it is worth noting that these negative feelings or attitudes did not extend beyond specific discussions of uniform in a civilian setting. Thus, interviewees were expressing
embarrassment in a restricted, contextual sense, in relation to interactions with the academic or civilian world. It expresses a specific kind of role strain.

Another similarly referred to personal discomfort, but for somewhat different reasons:

Yeah I wore uniform, it was...I'll be honest, a bit embarr... you know, you kind of, you stick out. You're kind of a bit embarrassed, it's uncomfortable. But then, and they had a lot of questions because they, again we wear Navy uniform. They were used to seeing the green uniform going around the place and then asking what did we do. (INT 37)

Discomfort here combined individual embarrassment of the ‘self’, as well as the indignity inflicted on their ‘role’ by not being immediately identifiable as a certain type of Defence Forces officer. Another interviewee from the post-2000 period described the difficulties that wearing the uniform would present due to the ignorance of civilians:

the uniform that we wore to college looked very similar to campus security. So you got a lot of, "oh are you campus security" and then you're trying to explain what's going on, and you're like “No.” And you'd irate people that had just got their bike stolen, and you're trying to say “I'm not campus security. Leave me alone.” So it was just, bar the uncomfortable thing, there was also that element of you looked a bit like campus security and people just... Kind of got confused. But yeah, I wore the first day, both of us did. We never wore it again. (INT 26)

This interviewee’s experience shows that by the post-2000 period, USAC students were perhaps no longer a “known entity” as they once were even in UCG. Here, these officers were identifiably ‘other’ in some way, but were mistakenly identified with the administrative machinery of the university, rather than having their own military otherness acknowledged. This was another kind of role strain as it was an affront to these naval officers’ role-identity salience as being from the Naval Service.

In terms of how not wearing the uniform was achieved, two participants discussed their experiences: “if needs be we walked out in uniform, changed in college, but we didn't even tend to do that that much” (INT 29). More elaborate arts of resistance (Scott, 1990) or strategies for avoiding detection were also mentioned:

So if you left before the staff got in you could leave in civilians. What a lot of guys would do is to have a gym bag, and they'd leave in their uniform, and change in the car or you know, that kind of thing. So there's a lot of that going on. Or
climbing out windows. Mad stuff. But that’s just, it’s just the way it is, you know. (INT 26)

Staff here refers to military personnel with the responsibility for military discipline and general oversight of the USAC building and the military students resident there. Three interviewees referred to the fact that military authorities were in fact aware, at least on some level, of their resistance to this particular aspect of military discipline: “like, if they asked us in the barracks, we’d nod the head and say ‘yes we do’, but I think most people knew we didn’t. It’s not really feasible. We’ve had this discussion with a number of different people in the Army about it” (INT 29). Likewise, “we were supposed to. We claimed to. And it’s believed, but I think, I don’t think anyone actually, genuinely believes I wore the uniform into college. That’s my boss included. But...out of sight out of mind” (INT 30). Another interviewee from post-2000 noted different attitudes from different individuals in the military hierarchy: “Adj? What he didn’t know wouldn’t hurt him. He had that sort of a, he had that sort of an approach.” The second-in-command, in contrast, was “actively man-hunting to see who is wearing uniform or not” (INT 31). The Adjutant is usually an officer who assists the commanding officer with administration of a unit. Described by another interviewee as follows: “as barrack adjutant you would have had responsibility for maintenance of discipline so on among the younger officers who were junior to you, and also throughout the rest of the barracks the adjutant has a function of discipline within the barracks itself” (INT 03). These are all varieties of role bargains (Goode, 1960), specific strategies to cope with role strain.

Some (N=5) interviewees provided personal reasons for why they or others chose not to wear uniforms on campus, stated in terms of an individual desire to integrate themselves with the university experience, while also noting that wearing something other than the more formal service dress uniform might be more acceptable:

Now they wanted you to wear the formal uniform which makes absolutely no sense. If they requested you wear the camouflage stuff, people might. But in general people wanted to kind of... didn’t want to stand out. They wanted to enjoy the university experience. (INT 26)

There may be a contradiction here between the willingness to still be identifiable military in a DPM uniform, but also wanting to ‘not stand out’. This may be a way to rationalise not wearing the uniform because it is service dress, but also shows that there
isn’t necessarily opposition to being identifiably military. It is at the least an expression of ambivalence, rather than viewing the wearing of uniform as simply an obligation or an impediment. A female naval officer made an observation, relating to the previous discussion of the desire for anonymity, couched in terms specifically related to her gender:

I think it's more negative being a woman in uniform. [...] Socially yeah, exactly and that you're a certain type of you know, yeah... person. [...] You see it even when you know you're putting on, when you go out in your civilian attire, and people kind of almost have a double take like, you know, because it's a certain perception or look that you have when you are in your uniform and, you know ‘dressed’. So yeah. {More} often than not certainly all the women, we used to always try and go in civvy attire. (INT 37)

A key issue emerged in which the chronology of commissioning was correlated with not wearing the uniform in college (as in Table 3). This involved comparison of demographic data collected and comparison with the coding patterns for interviews. A crosstab query in NVivo of those responses coded to those who were wearing the uniform, and those who were not (excluding those with permission to do so) was undertaken and a clear pattern emerged in terms of the years in which each respective group was commissioned (no other pattern appeared, relevant to other demographic data such as military branch, corps, career stage etc.). Those commissioned in the early decades of USAC stated they did wear the uniform, but a change appeared from the 1990s, when a majority of participants acknowledged not wearing the uniform. The question of when this change happened was linked by some interviewees with developments in mobile phone technology and social media (though this would only be of relevance since the mid-2000s and the advent of such websites or apps). This was couched in terms of preserving the reputation of the Defence Forces:

like maybe back in the day, or back in the ‘70s or ‘80s, you know that was practical like y’know, going out to college in uniform and whatever like, but today with phone social media, the whole lot like, we all sit together at lunch. Like if there's [...] a group of uniforms sitting at a table like, you know, it's going to draw attention. There's going to be Snapchats and Instagrams taken of it... which is just, just not good news for anybody like. So I think it's impractical, but like we're still supposed to wear it. (INT 31)
This is an instance of a response to role strain, with not wearing the uniform as the approach taken to lessen this tension. Another post-2000 interviewee referred to changes since the early years of the scheme, and the current situation, and the desire to preserve their reputation and that of the Defence Forces:

Like, even talking to my father about it. Like it's just... like with the way the world is gone if we walked around campus in uniform, it'd be just photos taken of us every two minutes. And like the minute we sit down it's like “look at these Army lads, they're lazy, they do nothing”, and it's just very easy to be put in a bad light. (INT 29)

And from the same period another participant made a similar observation:

You know yourself in college, there could be five of six of ye sitting around having a coffee. Imagine five or six lads in uniforms, sitting around having a coffee. Now somebody's going to whip out a phone, take a picture, and then straight into the press like. Straight on social media, and it just reflects... That's why I don't understand why they want us to wear uniform. [...] Yeah, it's grand back then, but like, you couldn't do it now like. Not feasible now, especially at the minute with how bad everything is going in terms of public rapport for the Defence Forces, the amount of bad press that comes out. And then something like that will just cause controversy. (INT 32)

It also tallies with one interviewee's observation of a change in resourcing and manpower for the Defence Forces: “in the '70s and '80s, these guys had cash. They didn't mind that they were checked. Whereas now the manpower in Galway to actually check people isn't there” (INT 26). Another makes an even longer-range historical observation, referring to the views of those in the military establishment with an even longer pedigree, who say “well, that there's rules from the 18th century, y'know [...] there are rules, they're still in place. So technically we're supposed to be in uniforms” (INT 29). This rhetorically effects something of a *reductio ad absurdum* of the requirements of military discipline, which originated hundreds of years ago, not being fit for purpose in the age of Snapchat and Instagram.

**Accommodation: Living In or Out**

A central requirement of the USAC experience for those studying in Galway was residing in the USAC building, beside Renmore Barracks on the Dublin side of Lough Atalia. Students studying in Galway through the USAC scheme live in the building, and were and are subject to military discipline. Many (N=10) discussed their experience of living in:
USAC you were living within the confines of the military environment anyway, so you’re in an accommodation block in just outside the barracks which was run by military personnel, there was a commanding officer up there like every other unit. (INT 38)

Once again, as with the Cadet School, the analogy with secondary school appears:

The Army life in Galway, it’s almost like a big boarding school I presume, I’ve never been in one, because they’re all staying in the same accommodation, so you’re with 120 guys. But you’re treated, the mess functionality is still the same, you get your food and you get your accommodation and stuff like that. (INT 20)

And as previously discussed, there were a variety of strategies to minimise the effects or reach of military discipline, those living in described various ways in which this was achieved: “you were gone out the door as early as you could. And you spent as little time as you could in the USAC building” (INT 05).

It is unclear whether military discipline was so pure or rigid at all times however. In the early years of the USAC scheme, for instance the USAC building had not yet been completed, as described in the previous chapter. At the very start of the scheme, then, cadets (at that time) and officers were ‘living out’:

So when we were over in college in Galway they were building accommodation for us but it wasn’t ready. So we got the top floor of the Galway Ryan hotel. So I mean... and three meals a day, I mean it was deluxe like! We’d arrive in our cars and it was fantastic like you know. And then that was the first year I think. And then the accommodation was ready but the dining wasn’t ready. So we went to Flannery’s hotel for the meals during the day. Like for flip sake, you know, three meals, it was fantastic like. (INT 11)

By the mid-1970s, the accommodation was built and all meals were served there. There were accommodation pressures at this time, however, due to the phenomenon of “hump classes” which were the very large cadet classes admitted in response to the security situation in Northern Ireland. Two interviewees stated that there were approximately 120 students residing in the USAC building at the time, which led to capacity issues. One student, originally from Galway described this: “Actually when I was sent to university they didn’t have room for me. They sent me home and because they didn’t have a room for me, so I was at home, it was nice to be home. [...] they sent me home to my parents’ house” (INT 18). In these early years of the USAC scheme, then, ‘living out’ was a fact of the university experience for some if not many military students.
As cadet classes shrunk again, the capacity issues for this disappeared, and the expectation returned that all USAC students would reside in the USAC building as a requirement of military discipline. Nevertheless, the possibility of gaining permission to live out existed. One officer spoke of three colleagues in final year who did so, and lived out together in a house:

because they're final years they would have got permission to move out. You're supposed to apply for it, you know. I think for the last few years it has been a bit more lax because [...] numbers were very low. Like this is the first time it's been over, I'd say, seven or eight people in USAC in a few years. (INT 29)

Starting from the mid-1980s, some interviewees’ comments showed that there appeared to be changing attitudes to ‘living in’ versus ‘living out’ by student officers, highlighted by official concerns the Defence Forces expressed about ‘living out’:

At that time they were quite concerned about us, people living out and they didn't... it wasn't encouraged. I mean you could, but I mean, we're all... we got along with it you know. I spent most of my time living in... But you know, there were times [laughter] when I didn't. But no, we were mostly, the vast majority of people... There was a few people in very established relationships, you know, they were living out, you know. I suppose I was like that for a while myself, but...No, it was just part of the overall system I suppose. (INT 23)

The language here is somewhat opaque, and hedged all around by qualifications and vagueness. This effects a deflation of the actions of occasionally ‘living out’ by saying ‘there were times’, in itself an expression of and response to role tension. Indeed, this is followed up by claiming to have, counter to what was just revealed, followed the rules: “the only challenge, you know, there's no, there's no challenges, with, we just accepted it. Ireland was very different place [then]”. This linguistic strategy is understandable in the context of minimising actions that would be viewed as problematic in the light of the obligations of military discipline.

In a later period, however, changes in attitudes became apparent, as implied in the comment from one officer commissioned in the 1990s who raised this question in a general way while sarcastically discussing others wearing uniform on campus in USAC after their time: “Oh, yeah, they go in uniform all the time. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. [opens
eyes widely] We won’t ask how many are actually living in as well” (INT 37). Two interviewees from a later period were considerably more forthright in discussing their own decisions to live out. The initial reasons they offered were to do with fitting in with the full university experience. One had been to university already, and said:

In a sense, I probably tried to separate myself from the Defence Forces, and this might sound mad, but I was in it for the broadest possible experience. [...] I had a sense of what college was about and that sense of the broad education that college can bring. After first year in USAC I actually pretty much moved out. (INT 27)

This was not officially approved of by military authorities, but may have been tolerated by some in the hierarchy at least, which in itself evinces some role ambiguity (Schwab & Iwanicki, 1982, pp. 61–62), that is a lack of clarity related to role requirements. The other discussed a prolonged period of illness in the first year of college where he was in hospital, and missing lectures: “when I came out of hospital then I realized that if I was to stay physically in the building, I was going to find it more difficult to kind of assimilate into normality at the time” (INT 26). For both the USAC building and experience was regarded as an impediment to them, an ‘abnormal’ setting which contrasted with the normality of the university experience.

Both, echoing the previous discussion of not wearing uniform, couched their decision in terms that showed they viewed their own personal reasons for not living in the USAC building as being compatible with military discipline.

So I moved into just a normal house like a normal student, and tried to live the normal student life, but still fulfil the obligations the military set out, which were, you know, signing in, making sure you're present, turning up at the brief{ing}s, turning up to different meetings that were required. (INT 26)

The other interviewee discussed USAC as an impediment not just socially, but in terms of academic achievement:

I didn't move out for social reasons. I moved out for... When you're living in USAC, you're going to a room, you're studying in a room. You don't have the same contact, you know. You've people coming and going, it's disturbance. Whereas if you're living in a house with four other people who are studying the same course as you, you're working together, you're discussing the course, you're, you know, you're living the course far more than you would have in USAC.
I found USAC was an impediment to me. The building, well it wasn't the most, the best circumstances (in which) to be achieving. (INT 27)

This is a clear instance of deemphasising an element of the military identity in order to maintain role-identity salience. Both interviewees mentioned that others knew, with one noting negative implications of his desire to live out, as well as socialising more with civilians than military students “I kind of, you know, I kind of lost some friendships because of that. Some people didn't understand my rationale, and I was just saying, I just want to meet normal people” (INT 26). The other interviewee stated that in discussing living out from USAC later in his career it “would be frowned upon even to say that” (INT 27). This shows that there can be differences across the Defence Forces in terms of individual officers’ role sets and how they have defined their own role-identity salience, with individuals aware that others respond differently to role strains and tensions.

So while in the early years of USAC living out was known about, ‘living in’ was an integral part of military discipline which was only temporarily interrupted. As cadet classes became smaller, capacity was no longer an issue, and living out now became a decision some officers made. What had been accepted as normal military discipline in the past was viewed by some officers as abnormal and perceived as a role strain or conflict, and they took the significant measure of deciding to live out as the strategy to maintain some role-identity salience. The fact that mentions of living out appear among interviewees commissioned at the same time as those discussing not wearing the uniform is suggestive of changing attitudes to military identity in a civilian setting.

Non-Disclosure of Military Identity

The question of not disclosing their military identity arose in discussions with several interviewees (N=8). A similar pattern emerged to the one observed for those not wearing the uniform (see Table 4 below), as in the early years no interviewees mentioned not disclosing that they were in the Defence Forces, in large part no doubt because they would have been wearing military dress. In later decades, as with those not wearing uniform, more participants admitted not disclosing that they were commissioned officers. The lone exception to this pattern (not included in Table 4) was
an officer from the very early years of USAC, who discussed officers not disclosing their military identity while on away trips with sports clubs. One trip was to Northern Ireland, and though his teammates – primarily civilians from university – would have known he was in the Army, “we had to be a little bit careful, in case...”. He noted that there were:

two, maybe three on the team who were military. So what we arranged is that we, we stayed in the same room, didn't advertise the fact, and we asked the team not to advertise the fact that we were military but it would have been known. Anybody who wanted to know would have found out very easy that we were, but it didn’t pose a problem. We did take precautions, you know, simple precautions. (INT 01)

This occurred at the height of the Troubles, and so not disclosing their military identity to others, in another jurisdiction might be regarded as a reasonable precaution. The other examples of non-disclosure of military identity take a very different form.

Table 4: Non-Disclosure of Military Identity by Decade

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<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>1970s</th>
<th>1980s</th>
<th>1990s</th>
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Some discussed this in terms of a preference to not be initially or immediately identifiable, as with the Air Corps personnel mentioned previously who went to university in Dublin saying they ‘could have done without’ a lecturer introducing them as military on the first day. What emerges is a sense of officers being wary in initially getting to know civilian students, saying that while it was nice interacting with them: “there was maybe a bit of apprehension saying that you’re in the Defence Forces, you had to explain that one again” (INT 24). Another commissioned post-2000 noted that this was a wider approach by USAC students: “the whole lot of us made a conscious decision to just like not, try and blend in as much as possible not say anything and once we got kinda friendly with people like, you know, they realized or figured out that we were in the Army” (INT 31). Others also mentioned civilian students ‘figuring it out’: “I’d say their awareness is much as I’ve told them, you know, I haven’t... it wouldn't be the first thing I lead with. I definitely didn't intend on telling anyone. Not that I wanted to keep it a secret, but it just kind of, I just kept it sort of off the table, and people kind of
just found out as they found out” (INT 30). As with the question of uniforms, there’s a sense of wanting to blend in with the civilian population in university, but also a similar wariness involving waiting and deciding whether to trust civilian students with a piece of, it is implied, sensitive information: “we don’t really tell people if we’re in the Army or not like unless we’re close to them and we actually kind of trust them like” (INT 32). What appears to be the pattern for these interviewees is a kind of passive concealment, and gradual disclosure. Here social relationships are built organically, where the individual’s identity without the military aspect is normal, to the point where the disclosed military identity “was an interesting topic of conversation at most for a couple of weeks, and then after that like, it’s just back to square {one}, back to normal” (INT 31). The military element of the total role set here is not paramount for these individuals, as a specific response perhaps to perceived role strain or tension.

Another interviewee described a more active approach to concealing identity:

before I came to college I changed my thing on Facebook, took down the fact I was in the Army, I hid all photographs of me in uniform, changed my profile picture. So it's just me in civvies. whenever anyone asked me at the start like, “oh how come you're older than the rest of us?” I just went, “aw you know, I left college, got a job for a few years and now I've come back” - which was technically true, I just didn't say what job I was doing. (INT 33)

This same interviewee also referred, however to other students figuring it out. Another mentioned why they would conceal their identity, and it related to some of the points raised in discussing both living out and not wearing military dress: the individual officer nested their decision to conceal their military identity within the wider context of public perceptions of the Defence Forces as an institution:

I let people form their own opinions to be honest, because straight away if you tell someone you’re in the Army, some people have a lot of respect for it, some people don’t. And that's fine by us like, we... we don't really care like. It's not... Well, not that we don't care but. We don't.... People like to think we do nothing. And that doesn't bother us either. It's like, we know what we're doing. We know what our job is. We're proud that's our job, let's say. And if you don't, if people don't know about it that's fine. But I do think in terms of PR, Defence Forces should probably start letting out a bit of information. (INT 32)

In this quote the reason for de-emphasising the military role within the role set as a response to role strain is clear.
This also led to more spectacular forms of non-disclosure. One interviewee got to the third year of his degree without anyone knowing he was a Defence Forces officer, and the decision to disclose his identity was taken out of his hands by another officer in his course. This military classmate of his was worried about a presentation he had to give, and so was going to wear his uniform the following day (referring to the semi-serious point made above about the uniform having ‘magical power’ in this setting):

I said “if you wear it, I've to wear it.” He said “yeah, that’s why I'm ringing you.” So that was the first time, is towards the end of third year. And I rocked up in the uniform, and they're going, what the... and like, and people I know, and you know, I'd be in their houses, they'd be at my house at the time. They hadn't a clue. They knew, like, I'd friends and they knew my friends were in the Army, but they never, never fully kind of put it together that I was actually there as well. Now the fact I did grow a beard as well probably threw them off the scent quite a lot. (INT 26)

The fact that this classmate did still take the time to call the interviewee is also testament to military solidarity even if some are living out. Non-disclosure here was a more active undertaking, and various strategies (not wearing the uniform, not living in, not telling people, not socialising with other officers, growing a beard) ‘put others off the scent’. Disclosure then takes the form of a ‘coming out’; indeed, another officer described arriving at a Law Ball in full dress uniform, and this being the first time many learned that he was a Defence Forces officer.

The “Undertaking”

One finding which arose in the course of coding the interviews, but not as a result of any specific question posed to interviewees relates to the language used as it relates to the USAC scheme. A significant minority (N=13) of those who discussing USAC used phrases like “we didn’t have to pay for education” or “I was paid to go to college” and related phrases. The language used focused on studying at university as a “wonderful opportunity”, “extreme privilege” and being “privileged”. Another USAC officer was more explicit, stating that “they've educated me practically for free, they paid for half one of my Master’s” (INT 35). On the other hand, however, very few (N=5) mentioned the ‘undertaking’ or contract which obliged them to serve for a number of years after their studies in USAC. One officer commissioned in the 1970s who attended USAC did
note that “now we did have to sign a contract by the way, it wasn’t free *gratis*. You
couldn’t walk.” Beyond this no connection was really made between USAC as a
‘privilege’ and higher education as something that was done as part of a binding contract
with the Defence Forces.

One graduate entrant to the Defence Forces post-2000 made a number of observations,
however, that approached giving an alternative view. In terms of the contract to serve
in the Army he stated “if you do ten years’ service you don’t owe anybody anything. Ten
years is long enough, and you’re not the same person you were 2 years ago, never mind
ten years ago” (INT 43). When discussing higher education of his peers who did not enter
the Defence Forces with degrees and so studied through USAC, he stated that “people
think some people are here just to get the degree, get university paid for. But I don’t
think anybody is here unless they want to be here, properly.” He discussed the outside
perception of the USAC scheme:

> When you're at university they're paying, you know. You're on a wage,
technically you're a lieutenant or second lieutenant and you're getting a wage. But then you have to do a year of service or two-year's service for every year of a degree. So people outside of the Army would have that opinion. They think it's a great job because you're getting university paid for, “ah japers, that's class. You have no debt coming out”, all this kind of stuff. But nobody here talks about that.

Together, these comments represented the only implicit critique of the view held by the
majority of those discussing the USAC scheme, as well as support offered by the Defence
Forces for some postgraduate studies (which, if an approved course, the Defence Forces
will pay for, subject to that officer signing an undertaking for continued service for a
period, as per USAC). It also stands as a testament to the strength of military
socialisation over the career-course.

Interviewees seldom mentioned money beyond mentioning being paid to go to college,
but a small minority did. One serving interviewee brought up the issue of low pay in the
Defence Forces: “no one joins the Army to get rich, but having said that, being pragmatic
you know, if you are a young father and you have a mortgage or kids going to college etc. you know, loyalty to the flag is all well and good, but it doesn't put food on the
A small group (N=5) also used a variant of the phrase ‘you don’t join the Army to become rich’. These were one of the only other references to the tensions between duty and privilege on the one hand, and economic reality on the other.

8.6 Summary

This chapter focused on the second research question, “What was the experience of those who went to university through the USAC scheme?” In order to answer this, a number of areas required focus, namely the socialisation experiences of all officers, and the higher education experience of officers who attended USAC. The Cadet School experience is important to understand the initial military socialisation of officers, and so this was addressed in some detail, in order to understand how these officers were socialised and confirmed in their military role prior to attending university. Here ‘culture shock’ and the toughness of training were central to descriptions of the cadet experience itself, with a strong sense of the formation of a group identity. The ‘total institution’ setting of the Cadet School led to the development of a strong sense of military role-identity salience as well as group solidarity which would endure. It was also crucial to understanding the nature of the transition that these cadets and officers made when going to higher education.

One important aspect of the USAC experience was influenced by the choice of what to study at university through USAC, in the early days this was relatively formalised but within a broad range of options and throughout the scheme’s existence the individual officer’s choice of course was uppermost. This was in line with the original purpose of the USAC scheme. Only with the extension of the scheme beyond Galway, and to officers in the Naval Service and Air Corps was ‘organisational relevance’ asserted however. The experience in higher education itself was primarily discussed in terms of freedom, or rather in terms of relative freedom compared to the Cadet School. As such, there was a sense of this freedom being in the context of these interviewees military identity. Some differences they discussed related to other students, with differences in age, maturity, and preparation for college life identified. Student officers also stood apart from their
civilian peers, as they themselves made explicit, in terms of the fact that they were being paid while at university, and others were aware of this.

Crucial to understanding the experience of those attending university through the USAC scheme was the question of maintaining a military identity and the military role. The strategies that interviewees chose to deal with these issues were nuanced, and allowed for maintaining their military identity while also maintaining a foothold in the university setting. In terms of the military role, in the early years of USAC the uniform clearly set these officers apart, but a change in attitude became apparent from the 1990s as most USAC officers who explicitly discussed this issue admitted to not wearing uniforms while attending university, expressing varying degrees of role strain. Interviewees gave a variety of reasons, from personal discomfort or unease, to a need to protect the reputation of the Defence Forces – all of which are examples of perceived role strain between the military role and other elements of the role set (as student, civilian, or whatever else). Another important element of the university experience through USAC was whether those attending university in Galway lived outside the military structure. Similar to the question of uniform, a spread of personal and organisational rationales were offered, where interviewees talked about wanting to live outside the military setting in order to have the full university experience. Finally, this chapter covered the non-disclosure of military identity, and the various approaches taken to this, and reasons offered by interviewees. These officers still felt themselves to be different as military officers, however, and wearing civilian clothes for instance gave no hint of them actually viewing themselves as any more civilian. Indeed, this approach appears to be a response to role strain, and a means of protecting the military role. Their military identity, it was implied, is best maintained by the decisions these interviewees made to not wear uniforms, to live out, or to not disclose their occupation. These strategies are decisions made in order to manage role tension, role strain, or role conflict. It is a way to maintain their military role-identity salience. Similarly, how they continued to discuss their higher education experience in terms of the ‘undertaking’ also stands as a testament to the endurance of military socialisation over the individual officer’s career.
Chapter 9: After USAC, Military Socialisation, and the Relevance of Higher Education

9.1 Introduction

In this second chapter of findings from the semi-structured interviews, the third research question is addressed: “What were the effects (on the organisation, and on individual personnel) of the introduction of the USAC scheme?” This considers higher education in terms of the wider Defence Forces and different career stages of commissioned officers. The return from USAC to higher education is discussed, and the nature of the transition officers make from university back into military life. Next, various aspects of military and specifically unit life are outlined, considering the socialisation that takes place when officers return from higher education, and various aspects of interviewees’ views on higher education as it relates to the military relevance of study to military activities and retirement.

9.2 Returning to the Military from Higher Education

This study sought to investigate the nature of the move back to the Defence Forces from USAC. The views of officers making this move are considered first, as they discussed what it was like to return to military life and their perceptions of how they were viewed by other officers. The view of all officers – both those who attended USAC and those who did not – are considered next. This second section draws on responses from participants investigating whether there was a difference before and after officers returned from university, and whether they needed to be ‘regrounded’ as military officers.

USAC Officers’ Own View of their Returning to the Military

In discussing the return to ‘military life’, participants who had studied at university through the USAC scheme discussed this in a number of ways, primarily in terms of adjustment. Some mentioned there being no transition, and then gave details of there being a transition in the same answer, while others held to one view or another. The largest group (N=9) suggested that there was little adjustment or resocialisation to the
military role. Some said “it wasn’t an adjustment” (INT 08), that it was “very easy to transition back into the military” (INT 18), or that “when you go back, it’s pretty much like you’ve never left” (INT 33). Part of the reason for the ease of this move mentioned by a large number (N=9) was the fact that they were back in their units during the breaks in the college year:

you only were in college during the academic term. When you got the breaks, Christmas, Easter and Summer, you didn’t go off with your {fellow} students abroad to work abroad. You went back to your units and soldiered. So it was only... The academic year is no more than six months, seven months max. Is it? It’s about that [...] So most, for at least half the year we were soldiering anyway. (INT 01)

As such, the sense was that “you never fully leave” (INT 26), and as they returned to units “you weren’t completely divorced from the military you were still kind of half switched on” (INT 28).

Within this group, there was also a strong sense (N=7) of being eager to return to military life: “it was great because I was... I had enough of college at that stage, the college life, the college routine. I was looking forward to starting the real job per se, so it was exciting and interesting” (INT 37). One noteworthy distinction within this group, however, were the naval officers:

You just want to get down, get out to sea, get your experience up and get in and do your do your watchkeeping test and become one of the professionals like, the guys before you really. So that you’re not the ‘officer under training’ anymore, you’re the gunnery officer, or the navigation officer, and you’re actually doing your job as you wanted to do when you joined up. (INT 38)

Until these naval deck officers had completed their watchkeeping certificate, they were in effect still not fully qualified to exercise their role (as ‘officers under training’), even though they were commissioned, in contrast to Army officers returning from USAC who could – formally at least – immediately go into their role upon returning to their units.

Just as the naval officers mentioned above would have proceeded on to their watchkeeping certificate course the role of structured learning and specific courses in the Defence Forces as a whole was highlighted by a significant proportion (N=8) of
interviewees. For some, these courses were what meant the transition was less of an issue: “Yes it wasn’t that big of an adjustment because during the normal kind of holidays Easter and summer we would go back to our units about one or two weekends a month we had some sort of military training” (INT 28). There was also specific training such as the YOs courses for different corps. Two participants mentioned some form of mentoring, but it did not appear widespread, or did not figure prominently at any rate: “I’d have to say the artillery corps, I’ll give them a plug here, they were conscious of your career development. Whereas I know other corps didn’t give a shit whether you came or went or whatever” (INT 11). These two officers were commissioned in the 1970s and 2000s, and the second officer mentioned that he had conversations with his father who had been an officer. He also mentioned that he made it his business to mentor officers returning “I would get in the new guys the odd time, and they’d come up to me and I would talk to them about where they want to go in the future and what they want to do and how they’re going to structure their career” (INT 44). Implicit in the comments of those suggesting that there wasn’t a transition, or not much of one at any rate, was the fact that in the background of these courses there was in fact a transition, namely being managed by their superiors or by the organisation. This may have been a perceived need for transition held by others, but this too sought to smooth the adjustment.

These courses can be understood as a formal part of transition. An informal aspect was discussed by interviewees who talked about being given duties upon their return to units (N=7). Some discussed these duties in purely factual terms, or mentioned the negative aspect in terms of it being a fact of life: “we call them ‘dirty details’, but the extra little bits and pieces on top of what your role might be. But that was kind of more to do with your juniority as opposed to you’ve had it easy street for the last 4 years, you know” (INT 44). Others discussed it, however, in terms directly opposed to this, and suggested that these ‘dirty details’ were given out for exactly this reason of reintegrating or ‘putting manners’ on officers returning from university, as a type of social control: “they say ok you have had your fun, now it’s time to earn your pay” (INT 28).

Yes I think there was a bit of a view that yeah “we’ll screw this young fella coming back”, you know, “he’s going to do a heap of duties, he’s going to be on Christmas Day, he’s going to be...” you know. Because “he’s been dossing down in Galway
while the rest of us have been working hard up here”. Yeah, absolutely yeah. (INT 15)

You were going to get caught for a lot of duties because you were an easy target. “Ah, this guy’s back from college”, you know “we can’t get him into anything juicy so let’s give him plenty of duties, give him the mess.” So you get all the dirty little crappy little jobs in general. (INT 20)

This wasn’t relayed as an outright negative, however, and interviewees told these stories often while smiling. There is an implicit sense of role requirements being confirmed, lessening any sense of role ambiguity. One officer describing being given duties over Christmas exemplified this: “that was sort of seen as you know, ‘welcome back.’ [laughter] ‘Don't forget you're still in the Army, like, you're not a civilian’” (INT 24). One did discuss his experience in a less approving manner, however, and his view is all the more striking given that those with whom he was interacting upon his return to military life had themselves studied in USAC:

I certainly didn’t like that. You know, there was an opinion out there from a number of individuals that you weren't doing anything during the year, because they would have gone to college where they would have done something that they didn't care much about. They would have just gotten the pass, they wouldn't have worked very hard and they would have just socialized the whole time. And they thought everybody did that. So they saw it, that you were after coming back after six, eight months of partying. Where I was kind of saying, “excuse me, I was working from half seven to ten o'clock, five, six days a week just to keep afloat.” So I certainly resented a number of individuals for the manner in which they would have addressed me and I would have brought that up with them, several times. (INT 26)

This officer mentioned that his explicit resistance to this view led to attempted disciplinary actions against him from these officers (who would have been the same rank, but from cadet classes before him) but that these attempts “never amounted to anything.”

So far, all those discussed have outlined the views of others who saw a need for transition, either formally or informally. A small group (N=5) of officers however, did mention a sense of making a transition when describing their own return from USAC. This was described as “a bit of a shock to the system” (INT 15), “transition shock” (INT 26), and “being turfed in at the deep end” (INT 11). For some this was in terms of the
group they were mixing with, as being in USAC they had primarily been among their own age cohort:

the great thing in college was as I say we had ten doing commerce so we were very pally (so) you were suddenly back in your unit dealing with people who were far older [...] people you mightn’t have a whole lot in common with, you know. I found it disconcerting in a sense that it is difficult, you’re a young officer, you’re dealing with NCOs and men who are way older than you, you know what I mean. But you just, you got on with it. (INT 11)

There was also more detail in terms of adjusting to their specific military role as an officer. One described his situation:

having effectively had one year’s experiences as an officer before four years in college, I found myself totally out of depth in that particular role. And needed to, needed to actually teach myself into it, but had to lean on superiors and subordinates to actually come up in that role. And it took me probably six months before I knew really what I was doing, what your roles and responsibilities were. (INT 24)

Another similarly described this as “dealing with the Army way of doing things because you now have NCOs calling you sir and you know what I mean and you have, and there’s a different mind-set” (INT 20). As well as this was the change of atmosphere from USAC. This same officer lived in the mess at his unit, along with much more senior officers who were also living in: “So you might have gone down to watch television and you had some colonel sitting next to you, you know. And you head to wear a jacket to lunch or you know, in those days, it was slightly different afterwards. So it was a little bit more regimented. A little bit more formal, right.” These examples illustrate that some adjustments were necessary to recalibrate the military role-identity salience of these officers.

Two officers, commissioned in the respective periods they discuss, mentioned specifically the operational activities they were involved in upon returning to their units, which set out the nature of the transition they had to cope with.

So it was hectic time, the ‘70s were very hectic times like you know. And like we used to go into Portlaoise prison, right? And it was ‘need to know’ when you’d get out, this kind of shit like, you know. [...] And the rioting that I was involved in, I was, it was after Christmas and I was the stand to officer up here in the Curragh, I was in Kildare and you said ‘ah you’ll never be called’, you know this
kind of stuff. Then suddenly “there’s a riot in Portlaoise, get your arse down there with your 30 men.” So down we went and they had taken a number of prison officers hostage, and it was very hairy. (INT 11)

The other officer who discussed his own experiences in the 1990s described his adjustment returning from USAC as follows:

I've gone away and got the education, but I'd almost gone straight back in and got a period of intensity in Lebanon, again to bring back up my army training to speed and all the things that I'd be missing. So that was a fantastic reintroduction into the Army and the experience again. [...] Lebanon was interesting, it was dynamic. Yes, I had bad days out there and when I wish I wasn't there but 95% of it I was delighted to be someone in charge, someone responsible, and doing something that I pretty much loved. (INT 27)

This sets out the nature of the transition for some officers, in terms of going from being students in USAC, with a responsibility to do well in their studies, to being military officers with responsibility for their soldiers in difficult situations. In this sense there is little scope for role ambiguity or role conflict, as either would be detrimental to operational demands.

Dealing with Those Returning from USAC

All officers who interacted with those returning from USAC were asked about those returning to their units (both during their studies and after finishing in university), specifically in terms of these interviewees’ experiences of commanding such junior officers. Officers discussed only those experiences of commanding junior officers, given that otherwise they would not have had many interactions with those junior in rank to them. As this section includes responses from participants who attended USAC as well as those who did not, some distinctions are drawn out in the course of presenting these findings where relevant.

The responses given relating to USAC officers returning to their units were largely divided between a descriptive analysis of the situation faced in dealing with these officers on the one hand, and more varied and detailed evaluative responses that discussed the nature of their return from USAC (during and after finishing their studies). Of comments that were more descriptive in nature, a significant proportion (N=8) mentioned the fact that these returning officers only spent a small amount of time with their units. A notable contrast with responses given by the USAC officers was an officer
who had not attended university: “we resented the fact that he was nine months of the year at university. So when he came back to us for the 3 months the pressure was on to ensure that he understood what his job was irrespective of academia” (INT 06). This expression of resentment was not common. This interviewee elsewhere in the interview described himself as in the “crossover” group between before USAC and after USAC, and stated in that context that those in the before USAC group “didn’t resent the fact” that others were in college. The estimate of the time spent in the unit is half that what the USAC officer quoted previously gives, however, which is perhaps a testament to the perception that those in university weren’t around for long enough during their study to learn their craft at a practical level. Another mentioned the fragmented periods for which USAC officers were available, “they were only going to be there for a couple of weeks because they had leave to take, they might have had further studies to undertake. Yeah, they came and they came and went, we didn’t see a lot of these guys” (INT 09). Another suggested that the set academic calendar wasn’t as clear cut as it might have appeared:

They would be doing other things, they were attached to their studies or whatever which was fair enough. Just the whole, the rigid semester thing, it used to be very rigid and then it wasn’t, you know it was much more fluid. There would be guys you’d just hear won’t be back at all for the summer, they’d be elsewhere. (INT 10)

This sense of USAC students having their own timetable, and that this was ‘fair enough’ was echoed by several participants who (N=5) accepted that state of affairs as a given, and something to be dealt with or worked around.

This kind of fragmented time in a unit which would, I mean I’m not saying it was bad, because it was just a fact that’s the way it works for them [...] The problem was, you knew your hands were tied on this one. You only had a certain period, like the longest period was the summer. (INT 02)

There wasn’t generally a sense in these responses, which one officer described as a “clash” between university time and unit time, as though the latter could in any regard override the former. Rather it was a restriction these commanding officers would have to deal with in their planning of formal training.

It was hard to compete. You have to try and insist that they would get that aspect, and how to coordinate that into the time of their summer breaks.[...] I
had that issue with several, at the same time were coming back from university and had to say to them "right you take your leave in a two or three week period all together. And we will give you training, formal training, a syllabus of training for you, for the other weeks that you're there.” (INT 03)

But, that said, as one officer noted of those officers coming back from USAC, “there’s not a lot you can do” (INT 26). This doesn’t imply role tensions, but simple timetabling issues.

The kinds of activities that were given to these USAC officers returning during their studies were relatively limited in scope. They included, as indicated above with, formal training. This sometimes involved restructuring of provision of formal training, such as an artillery course that was broken up and modularised, and was beneficial in its own right, as well as being a way of coping for commanding officers.

In that way when they had finished the university they also had done their young officers artillery course in the summer breaks that they taken from university. And it's worked all right. I think it honed their minds and abilities, gave them focus when they were off from the university and so on. (INT 03)

Alongside this approach, however, a minority (N=4) mentioned that there wasn’t much that could be given to officers returning from university during USAC: “the kind of tasks that they were given were pretty basic because they were only going to be there for a couple of weeks because they had leave to take, they might have had further studies to undertake” (INT 09). Those returning after completing their studies were also given formal training, which was considered a way to reintegrate returning officers: “there was a case or there was a mentality for a young officers course used to be that when people would finish college they went into the YO course and that was seen to kind of kick start back into the military side of things” (INT 28). A naval officer described the situation similarly:

But I suppose the beauty of the training we have at the moment is after they finished college they go straight into a couple of the military courses anyway, so before they go out to sea full time, they are I suppose dragged back into the military mind set, I think they might do a gunnery course first, then they do their naval watchkeeping course, which is quite regimented and tight. So by the time they're going back to sea I suppose they're in the mindset that yeah, "I'm back in the military and this is the, this is what's expected of me”. (INT 38)
More informal forms of reintegration into the unit – doubling as a form of social control – were also mentioned by a minority (N=3), which implied (re)confirmation in the military role. Unfavourable tasks (“crap jobs”) such as the proverbial Christmas duty featured here. One officer, who himself had attended USAC, by the time he was a commanding officer stated that these officers returning from USAC would still get stuck with these tasks: “I mean did we still put them on Christmas Day, of course we did. ‘It happened to me, it’s going to happen to you’, you know. [laughter] But I mean nobody regarded that as in any way unusual, it was just you know, that’s the way it was” (INT 15). There were numerous forms of informal reintegration of officers who had completed their studies, such as learning how to deal with NCOs and other ranks, learning the unit and corps culture, and so on. These are dealt with in detail below.

In terms of an evaluative perspective on officers returning to units from higher education, the largest group of interviewees (N=9) focused on their perceptions that these officers’ attitudes had changed: “I wouldn't be the first to say that you had to get fellows switched on they came back, because they come back with a laissez-faire kind of attitude to life, and you have to say ‘well there's a job to be done here, lads, there's soldiers to be trained’” (INT 03). How this aspect of change was viewed differed. For a minority (N=4) this change was negative, and the notion of an attitude shift in returning officers was outlined in terms of the military aspect specifically: “the discipline would have become attenuated within the time they spent in university” (INT 12), implying a sense of weakened role-identity salience. For one officer commissioned before the 1970s, and who did not attend USAC the implications were put rather starkly: Well, personalities differ, you know. There are some fellas who show total commitment to a military life. There are others who might have been spoiled a bit when they went to university, you know, that they have more liberal views, and I didn't really experience that side, but I did hear people being tempted by the... to become pacifists even those university, there was kind of a movement of that in very early years on that they were being subjected to.... I can't describe it there, but I know some of them come back with the view that maybe, “what's an army for?” you know. (INT 03)

It is noteworthy that this officer did not experience ‘that side’ himself, but nevertheless felt it worth mentioning as an expression of his own misgivings. Another interviewee
had the opposite view: “I think the only issue I've ever had with an officer coming back from education is they’re far too enthusiastic [...] and they’re mad to go and get on with it” (INT 27), and that this over-enthusiasm needed to be tempered.

This leads into the responses of others who identified more positive aspects of the attitudes of returning officers. Two interviewees compared those returning from university to their own cohorts. The first quoted below, was commissioned in the 1960s, and did not attend USAC:

They had a much more broader outlook, I noticed, than we had initially. Our outlook was quite narrow from our training in the '60s in the Military College than later because of their third level education. Their outlook was much more expansive and it's, I think it was to their benefit that they had done third level. Not everybody agreed with me on that. (INT 13)

This broadness was also raised by another interviewee, commissioned in the 1990s, who had attended higher education through USAC.

There's certainly more of a rounded appeal to the person who comes back from three or four years in university. Now, it's as much that they're three to four years older. I think definitely if you go back into, not necessarily now, but certainly go back into my time, we definitely came out of university as more confident people. (INT 24)

Another participant suggested that even those who did not do particularly well in university also benefitted: “it's hard to argue the benefits that they got but I'd still believe they got benefits in terms of you know, socialization skills, they grew up, and you know, even in that sense” (INT 27). There is little here implying a sense of role tension.

A smaller minority of participants (N=4) stated that there was, in contrast to the responses given so far, no difference in officers returning from USAC. Three of these officers were commissioned before the period of USAC’s foundation, and so drew comparisons between officers who did attend USAC and those who did not. One officer commissioned in the 1960s stated that “if a young lad was misbehaving a lot, not doing his duties properly, that would have been a day to day {occurrence} anyway regardless of whether he had ever done a university degree” (INT 12). Another officer who
suggested there was little difference with USAC officers discussed his own experiences as an instructor in the Cadet School, seeing officers from this initial training period and after their return from university, and suggesting that there was no change: “I wouldn’t be able to say ‘well this guy did psychology or this guy did’... As far as I could say back then if I had a good impression of him it would have continued all the way through” (INT 28).

“Regrounding” Officers?

One specific item in the interview schedule asked if participants who dealt with officers returning from USAC believed that those officers needed to be ‘regrounded’ to ensure military role-identity salience. In terms of re-socialising or regrounding officers in the Defence Forces upon returning from higher education, this was broken down according to those who believed that this was necessary, and those who did not. These responses were further divided across those who had attended USAC and those who had not. When the responses were coded accordingly, they were summarised in Table 5.

*Table 5: Is there a need to resocialise officers returning from USAC to units?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did not attend USAC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did attend USAC</td>
<td>2</td>
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Note: Some interviewees in the course of answering may have given responses that contained elements that were both coded as yes and others that were coded as no.

A majority (N=9) of responses from those who did not attend USAC agreed that there was a need to reground officers, suggesting that while higher education was valuable, it was not a primary factor in professional preparation:

I would never say that university education was not necessary. It is necessary, but it has to be tempered with the knowledge that they have to be first of all committed to life as an officer in the army and not to become totally involved in academic sphere altogether, except where it is directed towards academic study of military science and so on. (INT 03)
Others emphasised the need to bring these returning officers into their units: “it was important for us to put the stamp of the unit and how it operated on these guys” (INT 06). This aspect of the unit came up repeatedly, and so will be treated separately in the following section. Another point made related to the developmental level of these officers simply in terms of their age and career phase, rather than any change that higher education had made on them in terms of attitude:

They want to be out working with the troops and that. Okay, they'll go to USAC, they'll have a ball and hopefully they'll pass. But there's that transition phase when they come back, they're still in a very immature phase of their life. So you're starting from scratch to train them as a young officer. (INT 22)

A small minority of responses (N=2) from those who had attended USAC thought officers needed to be regrounded, but these were less full-throated in expressing such a necessity than non-USAC respondents. One when asked was there a need to reground officers replied “a little bit yeah. I think the young officers’ course {was for this} ideally in the summer you came back” (INT 24). He then proceeded to discuss his own experiences and some difficulty with transitioning back to military life and the demands of his role as an adjutant when he came back from university. A naval officer suggested that regrounding could “take a while sometimes”, and also mentioned the role of military courses: “they are I suppose dragged back into the military mind set through [...] so by the time they're going back to sea I suppose they're in the mindset that yeah, ‘I'm back in the military and this is what's expected of me’ really” (INT 38).

A minority of non-USAC interviewees (4) said that there was no real need to reground returning officers, although some COs may have thought so: “No. I think there's a matter here of what was our perception rather than the reality” (INT 06). Another mentioned his own experience as a commanding officer, and not making distinctions between those newly minted officers who had been to university and those who had not: “I had no experience as such, I never found difficulty, I never had to haul people over the coals like I mean in that sense [...] I mean I had things to say but it would, not in any sense a reflection of their education” (INT 19). Another interviewee suggested that ‘regrounding’ as a term might miss the point:
No, I don't believe that. They don't have to be regrounded. I think they just have to be nurtured, and again back to the fact they've had the grounding in the Cadet School. You don't forget those skills. You just, maybe they've just been put into the background because they weren't important for three or four years depending on the length of the course you were doing. (INT 22)

This suggests that the development of officers in this regard is ‘paused’ by the USAC experience, rather than being a set-back, or “restarting the clock” as one USAC officer termed it.

Of those (N=6) who said there was no need to reground officers who had experienced USAC themselves, reference was made to the military courses and time spent with units during breaks, their own enthusiasm to soldier, as well as a change in the Defence Forces as USAC became more widely accepted: “But like over time this had become the norm, so it wasn’t regarded as anything unique or anything special anymore, it was just the way the Defence Forces was, and that attitude of battering them back into military submission kind of just evaporated I would say over the years” (INT 15). Anxieties related to role ambiguity or conflict appear to have disappeared, even if (as in the previous chapter) the experience of higher education itself still led officers to develop strategies to lessen the actual feelings of role tension while in university.

This item about the process of regrounding officers was included in the interviews after an initial meeting with a gatekeeper, who was a retired officer who had not attended USAC. This officer mentioned the need to “hammer” those returning to their units from university. In the course of interviews, aspects about the specific language used also became noticeable. In one instance, the word ‘regrounded’ itself was changed by a participant, as I delayed in finishing the sentence:

Researcher: So did you notice, let’s say if they were coming back from Galway after they’d been away or whatever it was, that they needed to be...

Interviewee: Reprogrammed? [laughter] (INT 10)

The language being used mainly by non-USAC COs was telling as it indicated the view taken of officers who had attended USAC. The perception was that they were to be dealt with in a particular way: “so there was no let up on you know, they were pulled up by
their bootstraps, but there was a tight rein put on them” (INT 06). The views of others were also mentioned, so as to illustrate a change in the reintegration of officers: “people in the Cadet School I think were of the view that we needed to whip these boys back into shape after them gallivanting around Galway for the last 3 months” (INT 15). Only the last interviewee had attended USAC.

How officers discussed those individuals returning from university was also telling, as in the instance of another interviewee who had not himself attended USAC: “Well the fellas who went to university, to some extent you were watching a bit with jaundiced eye because they were only part-time officers, if you understand me” (INT 03). This notion of being a ‘part-time officer’ is arresting, given the fact of the all-encompassing nature of their socialisation through cadet training. An interviewee from the 1990s who did not attend university (due to a change in matriculation standards) said the following:

Yeah, I suppose to the one thing about USAC is that they are out of the military, apart from when they're on leave, they're on their breaks, they come back to their unit [...] And then when you're getting them to a point where they're getting used to military life, you take them out and you send them to USAC. They come back, get snapshots. So that naturally enough when they come back, they're totally in another world. (INT 22)

What is interesting about these three examples of officers who had not attended USAC was their view that it was separate from the Defence Forces, giving the sense that USAC was regarded as not being part of the military. The assumption here is that there is a weakening of military role-identity salience. The concern of these non-USAC officers was “now, we have to get them back into the organization” (INT 22), for all the talk elsewhere of being in contact with military life during university and of military discipline being maintained in USAC itself. Another officer who had attended USAC, however, also stated that USAC officers have “been out of the system for a couple of years” (INT 27), so this was not isolated to the non-USAC officers. On the whole, however, there was a clear difference between those who did attend USAC and those who did not, in terms of how those officers returning from university were to be treated and whether reintegration was required.
One final observation which arose is the view that USAC itself was military socialisation, or at least a form of further socialisation to the Defence Forces. One officer who had entered the Army as a graduate in the late 1980s, and thus did not study in Galway, spoke of his relationship with his USAC classmates who ended up going to university when he was sent to his unit:

There was a big process in the Cadet School of us bonding as a group, as the 6{Xth} Cadet Class. But the 6{Xth} Cadet Class as an entity, they really, really bonded when they were all down in Galway together [...] I used to go down the odd time, to catch up with the guys and spend the weekend there, and there was a whole kind of a subculture in Galway. You know, ‘the Army guys’, ‘the cadets’ as they were referred to, even though they were officers. And there was a big, big subculture around them, like they all had cars, they all had money, they were really identifiable. They all hung out together. (INT 17)

Again this is the sense of the external perception of military students as a ‘social type’ (Arditi, 1987). Another officer, commissioned in the 1980s, who himself had been a student in Galway spoke of the difference between school leavers and graduate entrants, saying of the former that “they go off and to do the college thing. And that’s a very bonding experience also. Definitely, absolutely in the case of my generation, a huge bonding experience” (INT 23). This is in contrast to the above views of regrounding and the sense that those who studied at Galway were somehow desocialised. These interviewees, one who had experienced USAC first hand, and another who looked on from outside at his Cadet Class who studied in Galway, were both of the view that USAC was a “bonding” experience, which would imply at the least that it was a form of socialisation as an officer cohort, which is an oblique form of socialisation to the Defence Forces itself.

9.3 Informal Military Socialisation in Unit Life

The idea of an informal type of socialisation taking place within the military unit arose in the context of returning to the military from higher education, and was not discussed as an element of the interview schedule. Twelve participants noted the significance of getting to know or understanding unit life and unit culture for officers returning to military life. It also emerged repeatedly in responses to other questions, however which are collated here to illustrate the formation of officers beyond what occurs in the Cadet School or courses in the Military College.
**Why Informal Socialisation is Necessary**

Informal socialisation can be understood as that role formation which occurs outside a formal structure of training or education. One interviewee spoke of this realisation in terms of attending university through USAC: “university gave me the option to grow up, to mature, to realize that it takes more than just wearing uniforms with pips on your shoulders” (INT 18). Another officer who had not attended USAC also noted this aspect of his own development: “I went into a unit, I’m a year in the Army, I’m a year commissioned. I mean wet behind the... I’ve been overseas! I knew it all! I’ve all the fucking answers!” (INT 06). Again, this officer also commented on the outward signs of rank (in terms of the lieutenant’s pip on the epaulette of the uniform) not necessarily implying that the young officer would be able to exercise command: “if you came in, just because you had it up here [points at shoulder to imaginary lieutenant’s pip on epaulette] didn’t mean you had it in here [points at head] as far as they were concerned, or you had it here [points at heart], you know.” Another officer made the same point, in terms of those new to being an officer and requiring support from their commanding officer and those more senior in rank: “you can’t have the guy who put the pip on his shoulder and think he can operate in a battalion of a couple of hundred men. You can’t. He has to be mentored and taught how to do everything” (INT 10).

How this related to the training which had been received by the young officer up to that point was made by one interviewee: “it was a vast form of knowledge it was out there to be learned and but as I say you know I want to make the point the Cadet School was purely to implicate the necessary military discipline that young officers should have as a foundation of his career” (INT 12). The Cadet School then was the foundation of military discipline, but it was in this participant’s estimation the start of the journey. The real learning, in the eyes of many participants, happened when they arrived at their units:

> As far as the Squadron was concerned you needed to know the traditions of the Squadron, how it worked, how important the NCOs were, and how you needed to earn the respect of those NCOs and you weren't going to earn the respect of those NCOs simply because you were studying a degree in Galway. (INT 06)

‘The Squadron’ here referred to a particular cavalry squadron. USAC education, for this officer commissioned in the 1960s, had no bearing on the exercise of command in a unit,
and would not be recognised by others. This aspect of rank not automatically implying the respect of NCOs and other ranks was discussed by an officer commissioned in the 1990s: “the most important thing you have to teach them is just because they’re an officer, doesn’t mean they get respect. The rank is respected, but they don’t get the respect as a person. They have to show leadership, and you have to develop them that way” (INT 22).

So, though young officers were commissioned after successfully completing their Cadet School training, this did not mean that they were viewed as fully formed and ready to carry out their role. As such, what is at issue here is the notion of unit culture which cannot be taught, but which has to be experienced for the young officer to be “broken in” (INT 20). This was put in terms of absorbing or adopting the norms of the unit: “you had to try and get them as much experience of unit life and the ethos of unit life and getting to know their troops” (INT 02); “you have to buy into the ethos” (INT 22). A female officer put it in terms of another common experience of learning by doing:

Just you know you need to be with these people. And you also need to be with them to learn yourself. As a young officer I learned more from really good soldiers because you know you don’t know anything. Like it’s like getting a new baby, you don’t know anything about it. But you don’t know anything, you learn from really good NCOs and good officers. You learn, crumbs from the table. (INT 10)

The implication here is that the young officer needs to be impressed with this fact early, and one retired officer told a story which deserves to be quoted at length. As a young officer, new to his unit, he was given the responsibility to take the parade of soldiers at 9am. He noted some of the mechanics of taking the parade, it being handed over to him by the senior NCO of the unit, the squadron sergeant. He inspected the troops, and the sergeant said “sir, when we dismiss the troops, I want to talk to you for a moment. Is that okay with you?” And I said yes, yes. And we dismiss the troops.”

I'm 23. This guy is 45, could be my father. And he's standing there in front of me, fine man. And he said “sir, did you know something wrong with the parade this morning? Anything different in the parade this morning?” No, no I said. “Did you notice that you're the only person wearing your great, the great coat?” I said, yes, but it was raining when I left the mess this morning. Sir,” he said, “I'm in charge of weather. Before those men came on the parade this morning, they fell
in maybe 20 minutes beforehand, down in front of their billets with their troop
sergeant. That’s the time of the morning I decide whether raincoats or great
coats will be worn or not. And if it rains after they come on parade, we go ahead
with the parade. [...] It’s your job to know what happened at quarter past eight,
not turn up on the...” I was fucking rippin’! I got a lesson. I was told that I didn’t
have all the answers, that I needed to be, understand there were other things
other than me showing up in my shiny buttons in my new greatcoat in my grand
new uniform. There was other side, there were other things, and other people
to consider. (INT 06)

This officer said he told this story to other young lieutenants who were under his
command from then on, as a way to encourage them to understand their own
relationship with NCOs and the responsibilities they as young officers had to learn from
those with considerably more experience. The Cadet School was only the beginning of
their formation.

Aspects and Implications of Corps and Unit Culture

One of the first steps in informal socialisation of the officer occurs when the individual
officer selects which corps they want to join upon being commissioned, a decision which
usually defines what corps (in the Army) they will be in for the rest of their career. As
the Air Corps have Baldonnel Aerodrome and the Naval Service have Haulbowline Naval
Base, these smaller branches do not have the same structure of choice for their officers.
There are exceptions, such as one officer interviewed who moved into ordnance during
his career, and another Air Corps officer became a line officer in that branch after not
successfully completing his pilot training. How this worked was described by one officer,
where coming to the end of the cadetship, they spent some time with each corps:

And then towards the end they bring in the ‘marketing’ guys. So, somebody from
the director’s office and some guy, nice shiny guy comes in and tells you all the
reasons why you should join that corps. Because they’re trying to ensure that
they get who they want. And then it was like you make your choices, a bit like
CAO. You pick one and two, and you get what you’re given. And they announce
it to you a couple of days before you’re commissioned and then when you’re
commissioned, usually somebody representing the corps is at the commissioning
ceremony, comes up to you afterwards and says congratulations you’re coming
to our unit, here are your badges and your corps badges and stuff. Has a chat to
you and says “look we’ll see you next week.” You know enjoy your day off or your
week off. And that’s it. (INT 20)
All officers had two (later three) choices, and places are given according to class placing. Different corps were described as being more coveted. For instance, “the way it kind of typically will go is that cavalry will be the desirable one, and that would typically go to guys in the top five or ten. At the time I knew that [...] most likely I was going infantry, so I just said okay, just bit the bullet. I was realistic about it” (INT 26). An interviewee commissioned after 2000 noted that this process was well understood by his class, and they attempted to assert some agency over the process. So they got together as a group, and had a conversation amongst themselves:

the guy who was near the top of the class went “right, look we all know I'm near top of the class, and I want seventh battalion. So anyone else want seventh battalion, I'm already going”. I won't bother putting it down, because he's going to get it. And people just went down through it, and that way people were able to go like “this is roughly where I am in the class.” (INT 33)

How and why the decision was made wasn't discussed in detail, but some observations were made about the different corps and the implications of their choice:

the majority would go for infantry then some more kind of dashing types would go for cavalry, one or two transport, one or two for signals. But infantry, the vast majority went for infantry. And I did notice that, if you like, the officers’ sons would nearly always go for infantry, other ones didn't. Because the promotional stream was easier in infantry corps than in any other corps, at that time anyway. (INT 13)

Along with the corps and branch is the matter of the specific unit to which an army officer is sent. The implications of the choice of corps were real in terms of a different atmosphere, in different units. Some retired officers had been posted to different barracks and units, and so drew on this experience to describe the nature of these differences. The importance of corps and unit culture could be a real benefit, as one interviewee stated “we were an independent republic in Fermoy, absolutely. We were part of a brigade that was headquartered in Cork, but they weren't relevant to us.”

We wore a different cap. We were a culture all in itself. So that was a corps thing in the first instance, but it became personified in that the best, if the cavalry corps was the best then [our] squadron was the best of the squadrons, you know what I mean. And it sounds... it sounds very juvenile, but morale was so important, and esprit de corps, you know, unit morale [...] was so important to us. That it's what drove people. (INT 06)
The cap referred to here is the Cavalry Corps’ ‘Glengarry’ headdress, which sets them apart from the rest of the Army who wear black berets, with the exception of the Military Police who wear a red beret, and members of Army Ranger Wing who wear a commando green beret. Cavalry also wear a black cap badge and black ribbons with the Glengarry: “Tradition has it that’s to the memory of Michael Collins. And the fact that the cap badge is black in memoriam of Michael Collins because tradition has it that at his funeral the officers put black polish on their cap badges and so that’s why the cap badges are black” (INT 18). The interviewee describing Fermoy had a son who later joined the Defence Forces, and subsequently also chose to go for Cavalry and be posted to ‘the Squadron’ in Fermoy, to the delight of his father, “and he would have seen it not through my eyes, but very quickly he would have had all the experiences, 20, 30 years after I've had them.”

When discussing a corps and what made it distinctive, this was often done by comparing it to another. Often discussions of different corps and the differences between them were humorous, but operational implications were also discussed. One instance was the interviewee who remarked to me when he discovered I had been in the artillery when a member of the FCÁ, “you had napkins and tablecloths and silverware in your dining room” (INT 14). He had been in the Cavalry during his time in the FCÁ. Another form of comparison was making a broad distinction between ‘line’ and ‘technical’ corps (see Chapter 4), as one line officer described:

Yes, like my wife for example is medical corps. We have a number of arguments that she switches back to the line-versus-technical. They think differently. As far as she is concerned, obviously (technical) are a superior breed, but you know we are there to help them, rather the other way around. So they do see themselves as a different, and in many cases even if you are an ordnance officer and you are out you know dealing with bombs every day you are special. (INT 28)

The distinction between different officers was expressed by different interviewees in terms of what they did for their job, and what those did in other corps.

There is obviously the banter between the corps, as in who feels they’re better and who feels they’re more relevant. And look, that will still go on till whatever the end of the world or the day’s end as it were. [...] But that was the big thing for me, an ordnance officer kind of does their job ‘on island’ as well as overseas, whereas the artillery officer will only really necessarily do their actual job in a
way of aiding the state, overseas really. So that's where I feel the divide is. (INT 25)

One retired artillery officer sought to play down the sense of rivalry, emphasising the structure and activities of the Defence Forces meant that such differences weren’t so great.

There has always been a healthy rivalry between the corps, but that is more in name than actuality. You know because we’re such a small army everybody ends up working with everybody else at some stage. And essentially because we’re a small army we’re all basic infantry soldiers first and foremost. And aid to the civil power which has been our preoccupation at home, you know for the last nearly 50 years, is simply a basic infantry soldier man’s job. So that rivalry is there but it’s far more about the rivalry that exists on the sports field or something than a real rivalry within the organisation. (INT 15)

Nevertheless, the issue of differences such as those suggested between ‘line’ and ‘technical’ corps were echoed by interviewees from the other two branches of the Defence Forces too. One interviewee stated of the Naval Service’s culture that “the ship is only steel, it's the people on board that that create whether it's a good or bad ship. So your cultures will go with who's on board and what type of way they do things” (INT 36). Similarly, participants from the Air Corps also set out differences in culture and ways of operating, as when a retired Air Corps officer described the Army perception of the Air Corps culture. Detailing his view that Army officers he was flying “would despair”, he said “they'd go ‘he's called the enlisted man by his Christian name!’ . You wouldn't say ‘Corporal Monaghan, you're clear to open the door.’ You'd say, ‘okay Jim, Jim open up her up there, speed's good, clear to open it” (INT 04). The reason given for this, again stressing the difference in terms of operational environment, was that “gravity doesn't discriminate between officers and NCOs and men. Gravity's a bitch, and it wins every time. So if there's something wrong, let me know.” For these Air Corps participants, there was the question of there being the “military culture” represented by the Army and traditional modes of military discipline, but also an “aviation culture”, and a “tension” between the two.

Here perspectives from participants about corps and unit socialisation, though differing in some respects, emphasise that the Cadet School is not the last word in the
professional formation of the officer, and there is an entire military culture (or indeed military cultures) which must be absorbed and learned. USAC did not feature greatly in these discussions but it echoes the point made previously by the officers who suggested that those who had been to university had been ‘out of the military’ for a period, and this unit socialisation was also a part of the process of integrating them. Integration into the units was regarded as very significant, however, irrespective of whether the interviewees had attended USAC themselves or not.

**NCOs, Officers, and Negotiated Order**

Personnel in a unit significantly contribute to the culture of that unit. Some interviewees discussed this by referring to the soldiers in units: “The old soldiers of the 12th Battalion from Moyross were tough buggers I can tell you. And a lot of them were only a green uniform away from a prison sentence [laughter] but if you dealt with them fairly, even though it was harsh sometimes, discipline-wise, they’d respect you” (INT 01). Others discussed the differences between soldiers in different units, and how this affected how officers would interact with them.

There's a character in the Dublin Soldier. There's a character in soldiers from Cork. I think it comes from where you train. Particularly the other ranks, where they trained, the style. I suppose the one I understand best is 2 Brigade, and it's the Dublin soldier. The Dublin soldier is rough and tough. Extremely disciplined, but needs to be dealt with in a robust, you know, very formal, very officious manner. We have formal parades, we have charges, we have all of that. Where down the country where I would have done a little time, in Limerick, it's far more relaxed. It's you know, things are taken at a different pace. Not less effective. People are just more comfortable with a particular way of doing things, and it's developed over time. (INT 27)

This participant was emphasising the notion of a unit culture, by suggesting the existence of differences between different kinds of soldiers, namely the other ranks that these officers would be commanding: “of course dealing with soldiers and it took a while before you slowly could assimilate yourself into this new pattern of life and the Cadet School really didn’t do much to train you for that” (INT 12).

For the socialisation of officers, however, the importance of the role of NCOs was emphasised by a significant proportion (N=12) of interviewees. Their importance was
emphasis in terms of the fact that they were in a position of seniority over soldiers, but unlike officers they did not move around during their careers.

They are the people who are in the unit permanently. Officers are transferred, they'll come and go but you watch your NCOs, you will soon realise who the really good NCOs are there. They're the people that you go to for advice, they're the people that you watch how they operate. Because we all have to remember that you know it is the NCOs that keep units going. They’re there in most cases all their careers. (INT 15)

This changed in later years, as NCOs could be posted to different units, and this may in part explain the fact that only a minority (N=4) of interviewees discussing NCOs were still serving officers. Another officer supported this:

my wife always says I was very lucky in that my subordinate NCOs were great men, who as she says, “kept you out of trouble.” They did...They were capable, competent men, and responsible. But you see, NCOs are very important because they’re the only constant. Officers come and go. (INT 18)

One retired senior officer explained this:

NCOs are put on a list for promotion and unlike an officer they can refuse to go. But if they want to get their promotion they have to go wherever the next vacancy is. An officer can’t refuse. If you’re on a list for lieutenant colonel or colonel, and the vacancy comes up, then that’s, it you’re off, good luck. NCOs can refuse it, but that’s it then, you know? Say a sergeant is on the list for promotion to quartermaster sergeant and say the sergeant is based in Cork and the next slot that comes up is in Limerick, right, that’s your slot, that’s where you’re going. (INT 15)

One pre-USAC participant explained how, when he arrived in his unit after commissioning in the 1960s, the officer who was second in command handed him over to a senior NCO: “he said I’m giving you a troop sergeant [...] and he is a decorated soldier. He has done X, Y, and Z in the Congo and he will... he'll kick your ass. In a nice way, in a disciplined way, in a way that you will learn more from him than you will learn anywhere else” (INT 06). Another 1960s officers suggested why NCOs were so important at that time:

you will have less, less supervision from officers strangely enough because there weren't that many officers. There were very, a few very fine officers, but older officers from the Emergency. So while they would keep a benign view, sometimes too benign, and sometimes too liberal, the NCOs were, they were, they really did teach your trade. (INT 07)
Another interviewee commissioned in the 1990s, who returned from USAC, repeated
the point about the paucity of officers which would have an effect on the significance of
NCOs for the development of younger officers.

Some noted feeling uncomfortable with their different status at this early stage in their
careers however. This started even from “interacting with the NCOs, some of whom
were twice our age, sergeant majors and things like that. And they knew a hundred times
more than us about military affairs and they had to go around saluting us and we always
felt very uncomfortable about that” (INT 12). This meant that there could be a certain
element of these NCOs ‘looking after’ junior officers new to their units:

There was a number of NCOs there, particularly senior sergeants who always
took it upon themselves to look after young officers, would never let them make
a mistake. You know wouldn’t let them let themselves down. Now there was
plenty of people there who would only be too delighted to see, you know an
officer cock-up as well but there will always be people like that in units who out
of loyalty to the unit, who out of loyalty to the reputation of the unit, and indeed
out of respect to young officers would not let them, you know make that stupid
mistake. (INT 15)

Nevertheless, a connection between these junior officers and their NCOs could endure
over their careers, and after. One participant related attending the funeral of a retired
NCO, where he encountered an NCO from when he started out as an officer:

And as I was getting out the car and fixing my Sam Browne belt, and he's in his
80s, he came over and he was helping me. He said ‘I'm still looking after you, sir.’
You know, but, the very fact that I had a rapport with these guys, that they'd
remembered me, and they'd come and talk, that to me means everything. (INT
22)

Other retired officers also mentioned meeting NCOs from during their career, and spoke
with affection for them.

The quote above about people being delighted to see an officer ‘cock-up’ brings up a
significant role of NCOs within units in terms of their function in a “negotiated order”
(Bury, 2017; Hockey, 1986). Five interviewees, across all three branches of the Defence
Forces, told detailed stories about their experiences as officers in terms of their
interaction with NCOs. These stories were related both by interviewees who had
attended USAC and those who had not, and illustrate that irrespective of university education through USAC, this aspect of interacting with and learning from NCOs was regarded as significant. One retired officer described returning from USAC, and having his first posting in a unit where he was put in charge of a platoon.

So I remember, I'll tell you this story against myself now, but anyway, the company sergeant came in, says “Corporal Smith has a problem, sir.” “Oh, send him in.” And of course, I followed the military regulation, cleared the desk. He comes in and he tells me - and I'm 22, now, single - he says “Sir, I got paid there, I drank it all, and gambled it on horses. I've no money left and I have a wife and five kids. What do I do?” And of course, I sat there. I remember my adjutant told me the day before, “the person comes to you with a problem always say to them ‘leave it with me’ and then ask somebody.” So I sat there speechless, and I couldn't think of an answer, and I said “leave it with me.” So he left, and then when I went outside I said, I'll go up and ask the adjutant “how do I solve this problem? What do I?” I'm not married. I don't have children. I don't drink, I don't gamble. You know, can't balance my own chequebook, and here's a man asking me to sort him with his finances. So I went down anyway, my company sergeant, a sergeant and the...four soldiers are there. And what they said to me, they said to me “gotcha.” [laughter] “Would you like a cup of tea?” It was a fantastic lesson. So I sat down, and I'd a cup of tea, and I laughed, and I'd say they could see, I hadn't a... but I realized then that it was a great lesson. It was a fantastic lesson. (INT 18)

This participant stated that the case studies he was given in the Cadet School during his training did not prepare him for dealing with the problems his subordinates might have (nor, indeed, the problems with his subordinates that this story implied). The Cadet School, here was only an initial stage of preparation for unit life, but the real learning took place in the unit context itself. His self-described immaturity and lack of life experience was being highlighted by these soldiers and NCO who were subordinate to him within the organisational structure of the Army.

A female naval officer also described the negotiated order, describing training as a cadet on board ship, where cadets share a mess with ratings (other ranks, equivalent to soldiers in the Army):

Interviewee: You can see who the leaders were, kind of looking out for you. There's always people who are out to get Cadets in particular when, because they're potential officers who're going to be in charge of and trying to make their life difficult, but I even look back and I say that we were very fortunate there was some strong NCOs that kind of kept the other guys in check.


Researcher: Kept the junior officers in check?

Interviewee: No no no. The other ratings in check. You know, like, as you come down to sit down for your meals and they could be coming over, passing comments. It was back in the days where there was smoking, and they could start smoking where you’re trying to have a meal, you know, different things like that and you could see the stronger leader NCOs even stepping to the fore and sorting that out. (INT 37)

This officer continued, “you’re learning on the job and you’re learning from the people who ultimately you'll be in charge of in you know, five years’ time [...] you really you have to hone in on your people skills as well, and you don't want to compromise yourself”. When she took command of her first ship later in her career, one of these NCOs who kept the other ratings in check became her coxswain (Chief Petty Officer, a senior NCO position) and “it was great to have had that experience, knowing that I'd a very strong capable leader amongst the senior NCOs at this stage”.

A final example from a retired Air Corps officer who had been commissioned from the ranks testifies to the existence of a negotiated order within that branch, and this participant’s acceptance of it as a fact of life in terms of the unit culture. In discussing the senior officers in his own time, he stated:

their focus was fly the airplanes, keep them flying and we used to get line officers out from Dublin and the station adjutants, corps adjutants, you know those types of jobs and they’d arrive out, you know and they’d be horrified at what they would see. Which would appear to be a very lackadasical sort of regime. And then of course they tried to do something about it. However what would happen is - it was very subtle, and that’s where you learned the principles of leadership. You might have a uniform, and you might be able to force them today but you won’t be able to force them tomorrow or the next day. And what was basically happening was you’d get this group, you know and a particular officer would come out and start causing, would start sort of intervening in the way they would have intervened in {Dublin} which was appropriate there. But what would happen is airplanes would stop flying. You know, they would become unserviceable. And of course the pilots who were also basically the leaders in many cases, were saying “we want airplanes flying.” And “oh, sure, there’s this wrong, and there’s that wrong.” But anyway, the bottom line is as long as airplanes are flying, you do what you like. (INT 16)

The ‘principles of leadership’ this interviewee learned here was that the negotiated order that existed between officers and other ranks meant accepting a certain relaxation of different aspects of traditional military authority, and allowing what those external
officers coming in perceived to be a ‘lackadaisical sort of regime’. Those Air Corps officers who ‘got it’ knew that the Baldonnel unit culture differed from Dublin where these Army officers were based. Air Corps priorities were flying planes, and once this happened, the other ranks would not be subject to the same strict military regime as was the case in the Army. That this officer had been commissioned from the ranks may go some way to explaining his acceptance of the negotiated order, but it aligns with other interviewees from the Air Corps and their descriptions of the culture and norms there.

9.4 Higher Education: Organisational concerns and personal priorities

This final section considers summative views of interviewees on the role and relevance of higher education, including but not limited to USAC. These responses relate to higher education for officers, including USAC, courses pursued by officers in their own free time, or the MA in Leadership Management and Defence Studies as part of their Command and Staff Training. As such, the responses presented here refer to participants’ views on higher education ‘in general’ and not the USAC scheme alone, unless otherwise stated.

Military (Ir)relevance and Subject Choice in Higher Education

The question of the relevance of higher education was a specific question in the interview schedule (Q. 4.5 in Appendix 5), but also arose as a general topic in various conversations with participants. The number of participants who expressed positive views or negative views is not a useful way of considering their perspectives. Indeed, in the course of coding responses as being positive or negative in sentiment, it became apparent that it was difficult to categorise an individual’s stance as being firmly one or the other.

An initial observation however, is that a significant number of responses (N=10) were ambivalent about the value of higher education. The majority of those with mixed views were commissioned before the 1990s (as, incidentally, were those (N=11) expressing explicitly negative views of higher education). One officer without any experience of higher education put it rather plainly: “I mean it wasn’t totally negative the whole thing
there were positive sides to it but in terms of service at home I think the Army missed out on many, many years of adequate numbers of young officers” (INT 12). Others expressed a mixed view by saying higher education had e.g. “more positives than negatives” (INT 22). Nevertheless, there was a significant number (N=13) of positive comments, such as that expressed by an officer commissioned in the 1970s: “I mean I would just emphasise that you know education, non-military education for military professionals is crucial. It’s every bit as important as the technical, tactical, strategic education we get within the organisation” (INT 15).

More illuminating for this study are other issues raised in interviews beyond an evaluative stance of whether higher education was ‘good’ or ‘bad’. One such issue was the question of the ‘military commitment’ (N=7) of officers attending university, which implied a sense of weakened military role-identity, and a sense that some role ambiguity may have crept in during university study. One pre-USAC officer who didn’t attend higher education had the following view:

young officers coming back from university, some of them would mask the effects of the university life that wouldn't tell you what they were doing. But they would... you would understand that they were being subjected to temptation, let's put it that way, outside the military life, overseas, or in the university. (INT 03)

Here higher education is clearly conceived of as a threat (in the religious language of sin) to military socialisation, and as leading potentially or actually to role conflict. Another suggested that “if somebody lost the degree of discipline that they had coming out of the Cadet School it's very, very hard to reconstitute that” (INT 12). Another interviewee commissioned before USAC, but who had later attended higher education after retiring from the Defence Forces, set out his views at length. He first of all referred to

the calling, the craft, and culture. I think those three are vitally important and it's the amalgamation of all those three at various times either works or doesn't work. So you, the first of those is the calling and that is absolutely, I can't think of a better word than absolutely vital. And I'm going to sound very priggish now about this and please don't get me wrong, you know, and to be an officer is a calling. (INT 07)
In describing his own situation as a school-leaver joining the Defence Forces, he continued, the ‘calling’ element was easy as he had no other experiences aside from school and his upbringing. He observed:

it's more difficult now, but that's like saying if that ‘calling’ part is not absorbed or got across correctly [...] is a potential flaw in an officer's makeup. He would have to be able to recognize that the call is valid. If he questions the use of arms, there's no point remaining as an officer in the Defence Forces. If he questions discipline, if he questions his oath which says you will obey all lawful orders issued to him by his superior officers, if he questions that because of the wider, broader cultural thing he's got from third level education, he's not going to be a very good officer. He's not going to be happy. But that doesn't preclude, it doesn't preclude accepting those distinctions and responsibilities. What I'm trying to say is you don't have, just because you have a third level education it doesn't rationally lead you to question those, that calling.

Higher education thus was not necessarily inimical to the military calling, and in his views did not automatically provoke questioning of this.

This was one of the clearest expressions from an interviewee of some of the tensions that might exist between higher education and the perceived needs of the Defence Forces in terms of military discipline and the ‘calling’, but did not suggest that HE in itself led to undermining of the vocational commitment to the military or undermining of military role-identity salience. Those interviewees alluding to other problems with ‘military discipline’, did not offer specifics of these difficulties. Some stated they “heard” of problems, but did not have any examples to draw on, and so the issues they were identifying remained at the level of abstractions and generalities. An officer (commissioned in the same era as INT07) who attended higher education during his time in the Army, disagreed with the view of university not being beneficial, saying of USAC officers: “I think it was to their benefit that they had done third level. Not everybody agreed with me on that. There was a school of thought that you know soldiering was soldiering, and you should focus in on that, and these academic types of stuff and so on is of no advantage to military officers” (INT 13).

A more common (N=17) strand of discussion on higher education and its bearing on the life of an officer related to military relevance. One non-USAC officer suggested the need
for a general requirement tying higher education to the military: “the most important thing for the organization to do is to ensure that the courses of study that they offer that people are following are relevant to the organization” (INT 09). Another approach was to offer specifics, as another non-USAC officer commissioned in the 1960s did when he spoke of this in terms of his own experiences dealing with USAC officers: “I also got the feeling that the qualifications that some of them got coming out of university were [it] seemed to me of absolutely no use whatever in their military careers as it stood at that stage” (INT 12). This sets out specific organisational requirements not being met, and thus higher education not being relevant to the individual officer. Here the student as a person is elided, and just their role as officer remains. This perspective also brings out the question of career stage and military relevance. A minority (N=4) suggested that university education was not relevant at the early stage of officers’ careers:

I mean they were, they were junior officers, they you know swung up their arms, they saluted, they did what they were told to do. There was very little sense from my perspective as an officer older than them of them showing, let's say, the independence of spirit or thought that you might have got from university education. I think that only came in later years as they moved up through the ranks. (INT 07)

This officer supports the point made by others (N=7) in terms of the organisational military relevance of higher education becoming apparent only later in the career path. But the same officer affirmed that the effects of higher education were felt on the Army as the early USAC cohort progressed:

So around about his time, as they started to come up to be lieutenant colonels and colonels, generals, their influence on the Defence Forces, a broader awareness of where the Defence Forces fits into the state and all of the various issues you were talking about, identity, all of these difficulties, you know. I think as they moved up, as they have moved up into those relatively higher echelons, I think that's where it's started to be seen in the Defence Forces. (INT 07)

Another interviewee commissioned in the 2000s who had been to USAC was able to discuss the effects of higher in terms of his own experience and development.

If you were to ask me a few years ago, I probably would have just given you that answer, just utility to get promoted or you know for the benefit of the organization, but it's massively important from every aspect of leadership, now, I see a benefit of higher education. From dealing with soldiers, junior officers and
peers, and also subordinates. Every aspect of your career now, especially as you move up the ranks, there seems to be some requirements to be that better educated than what you might have been the previous rank. Your outlook needs to be more operational or strategic, the higher you go up. And you can’t do that through just experience alone. You need some form of formal education to put that into context for you, I think. (INT 21)

This view suggested that higher education allowed for a more strategic vision of leadership, that became relevant later in the career course.

One of the clearest expressions, however, of the perceived need to ensure relevance in terms of the military application of higher education came in the discussion of what was studied at university or what should be studied. For instance, one retired officer – who had studied Commerce in USAC – said of a colleague in his cadet class who studied zoology “what a waste of three or four years” (INT 15). Broadly negative views were expressed by many discussing arts degrees (N=12): “An arts degree meets the philosophical requirement to improve yourself, but its application isn’t immediately apparent to those around you if you understand what I mean?” (INT 06); “the most important thing for the organization to do is to ensure that the courses of study that they offer that people are following are relevant to the organization. You can go off and you can do classical civilization, but what benefit is that?” (INT 09); “going in to do a simple arts degree to my mind is a waste of resources. A waste of the person, unless there’s a specific topic within that arts degree that’s going to be of benefit. To me, it all has to be focused on what’s the benefit the organization can glean from that” (INT 22).

Another non-USAC interviewee put the question of relevance in terms of a reductio ad absurdum of these kinds of subject areas:

Come back to USAC, this broader perspective was good. And you know, as long as the degree wasn’t in basket-weaving, you know, it probably was okay for us. And that would be my view today. That any learning is good, but you know, you have to have a bit of common sense, try and align it with your core profession. We’re not a charity. (INT 14)

Arts subjects could be relevant but there wasn’t a strong consensus on what kind of arts subjects were justified, since the precise nature of ‘benefit to the organisation’ was not specified. Some interviewees did defend studying such subjects, however: “Would a guy be better without an arts degree or not? I would say yes. Does that develop throughout
his career in terms of ATCP? Yes. Does it develop his understanding overseas? Yes. At
least he can think or has a broader perspective on life” (INT 27). The tension here
appeared to divide along those who interpreted relevance narrowly, in utilitarian terms,
and those who considered it in terms of broad, holistic advantages of higher education.
The former viewed those subjects not fitting into the narrow view as irrelevant to the
military role.

In terms of positive views of higher education various points were raised, both in terms
of being beneficial to the individual, and also being beneficial to the Defence Forces as
an organisation. For the individual, a large minority of interviewees (N=7) used language
that can be related to credentialism. Some set this out in specific terms, for instance that
for operating in staff appointments in the United Nations, for instance “you must have
a minimum of a bachelor’s degree. And to get any higher, a Master’s is mandatory” (INT
03). Others discussed the broader educational environment in which the Defence Forces
is situated, whereby this level of education is “a social expectation and the guys
themselves now at this stage, guys and girls are expecting it as well” (INT 23) or “basic
currency nowadays anywhere” (INT 10). Another participant tied this to his own
personal development, as well as the changing nature of those entering the Army:

an awful lot of the private soldiers coming in are very well educated and they
have Leaving Certs […] I wouldn’t have been the most confident person starting
out I’ll be honest with you, I got more confident as I’ve gone on. Certainly when
I started I was very concerned of what people thought of me and all that you
know, and I think college gives you a definite string to your bow and I think it’s
important. (INT 11)

Other participants identified specific attributes that they believed higher education
developed in them or others. These included broadness (N=9), awareness of different
views (N=6), maturity (N=6), critical thinking (N=5), confidence (N=4). One interviewee’s
observations on higher education developing confidence is worth quoting, as it sets out
the type of confidence that university leads to. Speaking of coming to a unit from
university, one USAC officer commissioned in the 1990s said that “certainly, go back into
my time, we definitely came out of university as more confident people”. Noting that
this had as much to do with being three or four years older (a distinction also raised by those discussing maturity as an attribute), he states that before this:

we were a little bit the other side, we were like ‘the good children’ that we were, you know, speak when you’re asked to speak, otherwise, just listen, you know? But I think the guys now are, are quite more a lot more vocal. But in our time certainly university gives you that, gives you more interaction with good people. It allowed you to kind of develop yourself, and your own confidence I think, coming back to a barracks scenario. We were more confident coming back. (INT 24)

This is a notable example of genuine relevance to the military, as the military socialisation described throughout by participants emphasises that it develops the ability to lead, but this participant (as well as others discussing confidence) states that the university experience developed them as officers in terms of their personal characteristics.

Another participant who discussed ‘broadness’ presented a strikingly different perspective to those officers who questioned the military commitment of those attending higher education. He said that of newly commissioned officers attending university its relevance is that

they can’t divorce themselves from civilian life, so I think it’s, you know, they’re just getting into the Army thing and it doesn’t sort of divert them away from reality at the start. It keeps them focused on the ground, I think really more than anything else. So that they meet people that are going to work in industry, other places or they’re exposed to them you know and later on they bump into the same people. They have common sort of ground that they can talk about, they’re not down the rabbit hole of out and out military, gung-ho, you know what I mean. And I think they’re going to need a lot of that because the Irish Army is small, its broad, it’s not focused on fighting wars, its focused on a lot of stuff, it’s focused on aid to civil power. (INT 20)

Here ‘reality’ is the world beyond – but not excluding – the Defence Forces. This is held out as more important than a narrowly conceived ideal of what soldiering ‘should’ be.

This interviewee situated the organisation within the wider social and political context in which it operates, and thus the need for its officers to be educated to deal with this. Similarly, another participant who discussed ‘awareness of other views’ as a benefit noted “you know sometimes in the military we can become one dimensional in how we think or how we operate” (INT 24). A common phrase used by some participants
suggested that the military or the Defence Forces was a “bubble”: “The Army's a bubble, like you spent four years in the Army not dealing with civilians, like you kind of get used to the Army's way of doing things” (INT 33); “if you exist in the bubble that is the Defence Forces only, your view of the world is way too narrow” (INT 15); “I think that sometimes we can get very isolated in the Defence Forces or in militaries in general because of the culture” (INT 44). Higher education thus provided a broadness that compensated for the narrow perspective developed by the military processes of socialisation and working in the Defence Forces as an organisation. One example of this broadness described by a non-USAC officer put this education into the context of a changing Ireland, and a changing Defence Forces:

Of course, I mean, it could not have... the sociological changes in the country at the moment could not have been handled in the Defence Forces if we didn't have those officers going through third level education. I'm talking about gender. I'm talking about race. I'm talking about bullying, all of that sort of thing. [...] So the sociological changes in the state could not have been handled unless the cohort of senior officers at that time had university education. (INT 07)

This implies an awareness of a much wider concept of individuals’ role sets beyond “military” and “husband/brother/son”, and indeed leaves scope for developing a sense of intersectionality across various categories (Crenshaw, 1989).

Perceptions on the ‘military relevance’ are also addressed less directly in another question exploring whether officers’ qualifications were referred to in their working lives. Many noted that some degrees were in a sense “vocational” and led to a posting with a specific corps: “like a fella who did engineering, generally would have ended up in the corps of engineers or in the Air Corps as an aeronautical engineer, you know. The science graduates would have all probably be ordnance” (INT 16). He also noted, however, that he knew engineers in infantry, so there was not a direct utilisation by the organisation of the higher education undertaken or an inevitable career path linked to discipline-based expertise. Indeed, one USAC officer mentions specifically resisting going to a corps that would utilise his university education. He describes an interaction with a very senior officer while doing a guard of honour:

he turned around in the rear rank and he said “now Lieutenant, tell me again why you don’t want to join the ordnance, why you’re not obeying my order to
join the ordnance corps?” And I was lieutenant at this stage, right. I said “I joined the Army to soldier, not to be in the ordnance corps.” (INT 08)

He noted that he was aware of the irony, and went to artillery instead, but that in later years new equipment came into that corps which did in fact make his BSc relevant. He also stated that he promoted the benefits of USAC when having conversations with military colleagues from abroad: “obviously we would have been very proactive in advancing the fact that we had a degree whereas you hadn’t got a degree and our Army is sending us to college, your army should send you to college.”

More common, however, was the negative response in terms of whether qualifications were referred to in their working lives. A non-USAC officer said of those returning to his unit from university “I didn’t enquire about people really, I didn’t say ‘what were you, did you do’. I really can’t say that”, continuing to state “what they’re doing say in Galway is not in any direct sense important militarily. It’s important educationally” (INT 19). A serving officer who studied through USAC described his own frustration with a lack of utilisation of relevant academic expertise among graduates, responding to whether higher education degrees are referred to by saying:

No very, very, very rarely. And it might be that someone was in the right place at the right time with the right qualification, that would get used. At the time I was doing my product design degree, I had wanted to do my final year project on some military device or products that would benefit soldiers. And I went down that train of thought, but nothing came of it. The military then bought a number of machines that I would use on a day-to-day basis in college. Rapid prototyping machines things like that. And not once did anyone say {I’ve} just finished a degree in product design. Maybe we will include them in this decision-making process. [...] No one, no one ever decided that maybe we should look at who's qualified to maybe look at this, and have an input into it. (INT 21)

He suggested that this was perhaps due to the fact that in the 1970s many officers studied arts subjects, “not saying there's anything wrong with it, but it's a general course, and I think a lot of the USAC students or the officers would stop at the general, and they wouldn't specialize to a certain extent.” He contrasted that with the current situation in the contemporary Defence Forces:

But nowadays, they're, the level of specialization and expertise in the organization is massive, from talking to my own peers but also subor-... junior officers. The skills they have are unbelievable. And they're just not getting
exploited by the organization. It's almost like you do your two, or three four years in college, just to get out from everyone's feet and leave it at that. Y'know, I've never seen anyone taking a skills survey on, to see what we can get out of these officers.

Another serving officer echoed this, suggesting that the inability to utilise academic knowledge was related to a broader problem:

I don't think we're using and specializing people enough, you know, broad is good. We want people who are broad/but I think we're doing that to counter our experts or specialists in particular areas and I would like to see us getting better at going to a guy “You're just going to be HR for the next 20 years. I'm sorry, you're really good at it. You have a lot to offer, but we will give you a career, but it's going to be HR.” (INT 27)

A non-USAC interviewee, who had specifically called for the military relevance of higher education in discussing USAC was asked about his own postgraduate experience undertaking an MA in international relations, and whether others would have been aware of this: “well, they wouldn't, no, in a general sense, but some would have known. But only very, very few that would have known. Only people knew that well [he] pursuing a course of study. Okay? Well, lots of people were, that was commonplace then. So no, there was nothing special about it” (INT 09). When I asked whether his topic, which was of direct military relevance, would have been of interest to others in the Defence Forces, he replied in the negative:

I don't think so, there was lots, if you go to the library in the Military College. There are lots of copies of theses in there which are military related. To what degree they're used by the schools, the various schools in there I would say not so much. So, I mean that particular topic, I mean the Defence Forces weren't aware that I was doing that. There was no requirement on me to tell them. Maybe, maybe I should have, but I didn't. All I knew was that my copy of my thesis will be lodged in the library in the Military College.

This interviewee is caught in something of a performative contradiction, however, as he was calling for USAC to be of greater military relevance, but did not see any great benefit to making the military authorities aware of his own work which was of direct military relevance. Another interviewee who undertook a PhD during his career on a topic of military relevance also said it was not widely known what he had done, but for another reason: “I don't think they're too aware, because one of the issues was when I did my
PhD I had to put a bar on it because of some political sensitivities and at the time I put a bar on it for 10 years” (INT 14).

An explanation for this reticence may be found in the comment made by another non-USAC officer, however: “certainly there are people there will let you know that they’re subject matter experts. But there’s other people then who are the real experts and they just, they keep themselves to themselves. They act rather than talk about it. They act” (INT 22). Implied here is a knowledge/expertise dichotomy, and that academic knowledge (“subject matter experts”) is not real expertise, that it is ‘talk’ rather than ‘action’. There is also the sense here of non-USAC officers, even those who subsequently attended university, downplaying academic achievement or knowledge, since it is viewed as not being “military” and thus less legitimate when considered in the light of supposedly practical, military, ‘real’, ‘doing’. There was not a sense that particular subject knowledge from higher education was being utilised by the organisation, which may be a legacy of USAC as offering a broad educational experience and not as having direct military application.

**Military Activities and Operating Abroad**

This study also sought to understand the application of higher education (if any) to military activities undertaken by officers. Some, however, held views that downplayed the contribution of higher education, such as one non-USAC officer (who studied for a Master’s during his retirement): “to what extent it added an extra dimension I just think it may well have added to the confidence of individuals to, for them to understand more complex issues, but in […] you see there's a spectrum of education that you're talking about here” (INT 06). Another suggested that higher education didn’t do as much as other experiences:

I mean so much has happened to me in terms of experience, exposure, working in Brussels, working in the international environment. That I think those things have had a far greater effect on me than college would have had in the context of my development you know. (INT 15)

In some discussions, participants asked me my own views, implicitly critiquing the direction my question was perceived to be pushing them in. One non-USAC officer when
asked about the relevance of university education for officers in specific roles or activities asked “I'll throw this back at you. What do you think?” (INT 07). When I suggested peacekeeping (drawing on the literature review and the notion of the development of the constabulary concept) he countered “But we did that long before [...] we were able to handle overseas work.” USAC came after Irish involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Some did see a connection however. One participant mentioned advantages for the organisation that mapped on to those for individual officers, such as breadth: “I think it’s the holistic advantages coming from higher education rather than the technical aspects of it” (INT 08); “But in a more general sense, I mean, I think it’s... third level education teaches you how to think, it doesn't teach you what to think, it teaches you how to think. And I think that’s what's good about it” (INT 09). Another interviewee related the question to specific needs in terms of subjects:

Well, certainly with the way the Army is working now higher education is vital in relation to languages. Leo Varadkar was in Mali last month, and he's pictured with an Army officer lecturing in French to Malians. And so they have to have language skills. It’s as important in the Army as it is in civilian life. I read an article, multinationals can't find graduates in languages. And it's they don't need, they don't have them, not producing them. (INT 18)

This interviewee had studied a classical language during his time in USAC in the 1970s, but continued studying other languages throughout his career, and noted this as a specific operational need for the Defence Forces. Another discussed both breadth and specific degrees studied, where he did not see a direct application of higher education to military roles:

For me personally I didn’t see a relevance. Maybe it was my degree, going back to that. I can see how some subjects – history, English, foreign languages – can all benefit an officer in the immediate aftermath from an overseas experience. But from a holistic point of view maybe it’s just that introduction to education, to further education, the familiarity with it, the ability to, to be able to write a paper or to set out an argument. (INT 21)

Another participant focused on this aspect of specific topics, however:

I am, I'm a big advocate of a broad range of subjects being studied. I am very concerned about people that would talk about trying to go specific on the likes
of engineering or science. Which I wouldn't, I don't agree with. I do think languages are crucial. As a country I think we're terrible for languages, but also cultural awareness is a key thing that we need for overseas deployment. Law, international rights, humanitarian law things like that as well are really, really... they are required by our organization. (INT 26)

It was the notion, implicit in the above quote, of interacting with the world outside the military that also featured in other responses: “I say in terms of the exposure to that element of society to the civilian society and the civilian workings where we've learned skills” (INT 22); “I definitely think that having that kit you know, that tool box of having gone through college, I think that you can speak to anybody on a par, you know, that you are not in a situation where stuff is going over your head” (INT 45). Another interviewee made a similar point about interacting with the world beyond the Defence Forces in terms of serving overseas:

I think the higher education really probably hits home when you're overseas, with, not necessarily with troops, but even just interacting with other personnel, international personnel, in terms of... you know problem solving, or working as part of a team and in a meeting. I think having an element of an academic background or having, you know, expertise in a particular area can certainly benefit you in terms of that. (INT 24)

Many interviewees discussed the Irish overseas experience in terms of the kind of appointments in which they were placed, noting that Irish officers are disproportionately well represented in staff positions and headquarters. In this light, higher education was relevant, as one officer explained:

In Africa it's very important for the strategic awareness, and you get to this through education, and having a university education, because you're operating in a very nation state level. Now a lot of the time the Defence Forces are operating at that {level} because the officers are in staff headquarters. Like, they're on the ground in Lebanon, but the fellow in UN headquarters in Naqoura, or the fellas operating in Brussels, there's officers in Brussels, have to be university educated because you're at EU level, like you're global level. (INT 18)

In response to questions about differences between Irish officers and those in other countries, the majority (N=13) believed that while differences certainly existed, these were in no way related to higher education. The fact that the Irish speak English was raised by a number of interviewees: “Irish guys are very good abroad. We spoke English,
I think that was a big plus. I don’t know to be honest if the education side of it. But we’re also very pragmatic, probably because we weren’t so military, ‘gung ho’ish as well you know” (INT 20). This contrasts a social type with the Irish officer’s military role. Another interviewee made almost exactly the same point:

Well one of the great things about Irish is we speak English, you know and the language of the UN and all these is English speaking so that is, so we are able to express ourselves better obviously than a lot of the non-native English speakers, but even allowing for that, I think that we have a certain flexibility of mind that a lot of other countries do not have. (INT 13)

Another officer commissioned in the 1970s made a distinction between the Irish Army as a professional (i.e., all volunteer) force, during the periods when he served abroad: “first of all, all the Irish were professional soldiers. If you take the Finns, conscripts” (INT 15). Another interviewee offered activities undertaken by the Army in Ireland as another source of difference: “we do a lot of soft stuff overseas, we're not doing war fighting, you know, we've never really done it. Congo was an element of that [war fighting], okay, but really what we do is soft skills, it's the emphasis on relationships. On talking, calming things down, and not on conventional military tactics” (INT 23). These comments had more to do with the perceived culture of the Defence Forces than any outcome of higher education as such. One of the interviewees who did see higher education making a difference suggested that this was only one aspect, going on to identify another aspect of the Irish military experience he viewed as significant:

You're going to laugh at this. It's partially education. But the other one is we're used to not having all the resources that our peers would have in modern armies, and we're used to solving a problem in that environment. So I can't have 50 Chinook helicopters to do a particular operation or can't have ten Blackhawks. But I find you a problem, I'll find you a solution within the realms of what's available to me and that makes an individual who is comfortable with not having the perfect situation, not having the perfect people, and not having the perfect resources and they're comfortable in the flexibility to manage in that particular circumstances. And I think that's the big difference between an Irish officer and most other armies. (INT 27)

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5 UNOC developed into a more offensive “peace making” mission after peacekeeping proved ineffectual (P. Kennedy, 2006, p. 84).
Questions relating to professional jurisdiction (Abbott, 1988) were intended to investigate whether interviewees considered it a relevant concern. Initially the focus here was on whether Defence Forces personnel’s education levels affected their relationship with An Garda Síochána, but it expanded to include the Department of Defence as interviewees began to raise this, and specifically tensions over the USAC scheme itself. In terms of the Gardaí, their difference from military officers was not described by most interviewees as being grounded in a disparity in terms of education: “I worked with guards on operations when I was in Dublin and never, never a question of education came into it. I found them competent and sharp and educated” (INT 18). There were differences which were identified, however, between the military officers and their Garda counterparts:

Oh it's a fundamental difference, and it's nothing to do with education. It's all to do with role. The garda is individually empowered and rightly so. A soldier is not. A soldier is group focused, group orientated, team. So it's constantly organizing a group to do a task. And a soldier thinks that way. The garda doesn't. The garda thinks individually, and rightly so, but when it comes to the Gardaí organizing resources to do something they do lack what the military have and where they do have to organize like their special units and [...] they become more military in terms of how they're organized, indeed how they even look. (INT 01)

This difference in terms of Gardaí being more ‘individual’ than army officers in their occupational role was repeated by other interviewees. Nevertheless, some did say that there was a perceived difference in terms of education:

there was certainly a perception among army officers that we were better educated and better trained than the Guards. And that would have, that came I think from the fact that we had, and we considered ourselves to have an officer class. The guards generally didn’t; the guards work their way up. (INT 07)

Another interviewee similarly noted a difference within the Gardaí in terms of the rank structure, stating that: “I think their high performers perform very, very well, but I think their general body do not” (INT 34).

The nature of the difference between Gardaí and military officers was reflected in another comment about the structure of education and training: “I would be quite critical of the Garda education system, because I feel that the Garda very definitely, I
think that Templemore is not adequate as they need the equivalent of a Military College for the Gardaí” (INT 13). Another interviewee suggested that there would be a benefit to Gardaí undertaking higher education

I think they would certainly benefit from some sort of academic accreditation based on the courses they're doing or a broadening of their academic background. [...] To me like when you compare the Defence Forces with the Guards, it's kind of astounding in some ways that Defence Forces officers are so well probably educated. And then, some people say, do less than what the Guards or, you know are in less critical day to day situations than you know, in terms of Garda management and whatever else. Where the Garda organization is going, you wonder if there was a better educational process for their higher personnel, would it be a better organisation. (INT 24)

While perceptions of the relevance of HE to the relationship with the Gardaí varied among participants, it became clear that higher education was relevant in terms of professional jurisdiction in Ireland when interacting with the Department of Defence. Indeed, a significant number of interviewees (N=12) brought up interactions with the Department, with a particular sense of there being competition and conflict with the Department. Some interviewees were vague: “...fault lines in our relationships with politics, and the Civil Service in particular” (INT 01); “we always had that famous saying that they were... the civil servants in defence were neither civil nor servants” (INT 02); “the immovable object meets the irresistible force, because they're going, they're looking to protect the Minister, and you're looking (to) try not to compromise the system and the organization, and, and it can be fraught” (INT 04). Other interviewees were more specific in their criticisms. A serving officer noted that there had been changes, but implicitly made a damning criticism of the Department of Defence:

So famously the Department of Defence has very low levels of educational achievement. That's a traditional position. I think they're changing that now as well, and there’s certainly a lot more mobility between departments which will tend to dilute that. But for a long, long time, it was renowned to be basically an anti-intellectual department and I still think the hostility, you know that has existed between the Department and the Defence Forces is rooted in part in that. (INT 34)

Another serving officer also related the current situation to the historical context:

the balance of power is completely shifted in the department. The Chief of Staff is a secretary. He has no power at all, it all belongs to the department. And that
is not how... It annoys people, but if you look at the foundation of the state and Defence Forces as it was back at the beginning, you understand why it is that way. But I think that's been abused by the political level of the department. (INT 26)

A retired senior officer described his own interactions with the Department of Defence, stating “my experience sadly is that they have absolutely no level of ambition for defence [...] I mean department and military, nothing. Leave everything, status quo, don’t raise the ante, don’t take on more. If they had their way they wouldn’t send us overseas like you know” (INT 15). He was circumspect in offering details about his own experiences:

You’re just getting the military view then and I suppose you know we will portray them in a certain light but you know I can honestly say that from the time I was [mentions senior role] and every other job I’ve had since then, I’ve tried to work with them but I have become [...] completely exasperated with them.

This officer described interactions with the Minister for Defence in his time, and being told by that minister to bypass the department and approach the minister directly, rather than going through the Secretary of the Department of Defence. Another retired officer noted that in one role he held early in his career, “you only spoke to the civil servants in the Department of Defence; you would never speak to an official in Foreign Affairs or in the Attorney General’s office. Never. Now it's done all the time” (INT 13). He described a situation when he had reason to contact another department and he proceeded to do so directly:

and it came around to the Department of Defence, and the Civil Service [...] went berserk, and the fact that I had deigned to talk directly to somebody in the Attorney General’s without going through him. So I gave him short shrift, and he looked for support from his superiors and they said, that's the way it's going I think. And that's the way it went.

A higher level of education among officers was held up as being part of the reason for the difficult relationship between the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces, with one retired interviewee who suggested that higher education was an instrumental part of the jurisdictional conflict:

Certainly, there would have been some who felt that we needed it to keep in touch with the Civil Service, because this is the old story about the battle
between the Defence Forces and the Civil Service, which is going on since 1920 and will never stop. So it was considered by some of those who were driving it from behind that we needed it, our Defence Forces needed our officers to be educated so that they could maintain their, maintain their side in the constant battle with the Civil Service. Yes. (INT 07)

Indeed, other interviewees noted that USAC was regarded as a direct threat to the Department of Defence. “The last thing they want is a highly educated officer corps. [...] Anyway, there's always been a kind of a bit of a battle royale with the department over various matters, and the department aren't always to blame” (INT 02). There was consensus across those who raised it that the department has never supported the higher education of Defence Forces officers: “I think it was always acknowledged that they would have closed down USAC in a moment if they could” (INT 10); “it was a hard-won battle against the department who never wanted to pay for it anyway and couldn't see the need for it” (INT 02).

This could be attributed to the disadvantage at which this placed the Department’s personnel, as one USAC officer suggested:

But the interesting thing about it is that the department since 1969 continues to question the USAC scheme. Initially it was because the officers were now being educated to degree level which put {civil servants} at a distinct disadvantage. It moved on to an element of jealousy that here you had an agency of the state who were educating their officers at a cost to the state in third level. (INT 08)

This was not simply ‘jealousy’ in the abstract sense of the average level of qualifications held by the personnel of the two organisations, however, but was also about how they interacted, coming together as the two branches of the state that deal with Defence:

if you take defence for example, the individuals who are in the Department of Defence may have no experience of defence. Some of them do, don't get me wrong. But a principal officer coming in, I know for example that a principal officer 3 weeks ago when there was an ARCO [Association of Retired Officers] meeting with the minister and the principal officer [...] didn’t even know the rank structure, ok? Only in Defence 6 months, 6 weeks or something like that. You know, didn’t understand. So the highly educated commandant in strategic planning who has got all of these degrees, has to be very, very careful with that individual. (INT 08)

This interviewee suggested that for this reason, the department regarded the USAC scheme as a threat, and would like to see it gone:
I would imagine that if the department had their say in advancing six reasons why or how we could reduce the budget third level would be one of them. And they would probably be smiling, they’d probably smile when we started bringing in graduates into the army, into the Cadet School, seeing that this was the end of USAC. But ironically today the 100 cadets that came in this year, 50% haven’t got degrees, ok. And it’s not “let’s get rid of USAC because of financial reasons”. But I think there’s something about USAC that my former colleagues in the department were a little bit jealous of.

These were the overwhelmingly negative views of officers commissioned before and after USAC, from the 1960s to the 1980s, who identified higher education as a point of contention in the ongoing struggle with the Department of Defence.

**Outmobility**

A final point here is the matter of ‘outmobility’, relating to those who retired from the Defence Forces, and whether they considered using their higher education qualification subsequently. This point was addressed in the interviews explicitly, but it emerged that only a small number took up post-retirement employment. Of 19 interviewees who were retired, four took early retirement; nine had undertaken some form of post-retirement career. These careers included working as academic lecturers, as published historians, in the aid area for international agencies and intergovernmental agencies, chairing various boards, and other areas. One had been running a business part-time, which made retiring relatively seamless: “I had been running the business for several years before I retired, so the day I retired seemed to make no difference. It was a very minor side step from end to the other, it wasn’t just shattering” (INT 12). Others emphasised their active retirements involved spending time with family, as well as maintaining contact with their retired Army classmates, through hill-walking, golf. One officer who retired at a high rank differed from this notion of maintaining contact with the Defence Forces:

I’m very much of the view, when you retire […] that’s it, you stay away from the Defence Forces. You don’t in any way try and be involved or hang on or you know. There’s a new crew in place and they have to get on with it. And try and repair all the damage you did. (INT 15)

This attitude may be due to retiring at a senior rank, and wishing to allow those coming into senior roles to do so without the sense of the old guard watching. Others mentioned maintaining their contacts: “in recent years, since I've retired, I've done a lot of hill
walking with my colleagues, literally my cadet classmates from 1974, there's about 12 of us go out every Monday” (INT 04).

Two of the nine retired officers taking up post-retirement employment had studied through USAC. Only one of these had a second career related to his area of study and retired early. Discussing making the decision to leave, he said:

the hardest decision was to make a decision. I just said, I was married nine or ten years at this stage and I said to the missus, I said ‘look I’m thinking of going’ and she said ‘whatever you want to do.’ So there was never pressure from that perspective. It was never about money, there was no money... I know this sounds very... I’m not wealthy, don’t have a lot of money but I never had to worry about writing a cheque for something. (INT 20)

When it came to finding a job, this was not difficult for him given the area he was in, and the interview process was something of a formality: “it wasn’t really an interview, we went out to dinner the three of us, four of us went out [...] It was a discussion about well do you really want to come, how do you think you’re going to fit in and let’s get it going kind of thing.” When he started working, he noted that the specific subject expertise in communications technology relevant, but it was his other experiences as an officer which came to the fore, such as when he spoke about sitting in on meetings relating to a tender competition his new company was preparing for.

And I was sitting in the corner for two days listening to all this shit and eventually I put my hand up and I said “guys you know you need to approach it this way as far as I’m concerned, you split the tender this way, that way and the optional extras that are dealt with”, a whole load of stuff. The guys were looking at me, they didn’t even know who I was, and they were saying “yeah, yeah” and then I came out of the meeting and one of the finance guys came up to me and he said “that was spot on! How did you know that? You’re here for security, aren’t you?” I said “yeah, but I said my background is I spent 19 years in the Army, I ran tenders for tens of millions of euro, dealt with companies, bureaucrats, everybody else. Government tender systems, everything. I know more about tendering and responding to tenders and how to put them together. But that’s not my area of expertise here to you.”

His subject expertise from university related to the content of his job, in telecommunications, but it was his experience in the Signals Corps – the form of the job as it were – that was of relevance here, as his job in that corps involved large-scale procurement processes. This was thus less about USAC, and more about the Defence
Forces. Compared to some of the rationales offered for the origins of the USAC scheme originally, then, as described in Chapter 7, USAC may not have played as much of a contribution as expected in facilitating post-retirement careers but this conclusion has to be tentative considering the limited evidence.

9.5 Summary

This chapter explored the return of USAC officers to the Defence Forces, and the nature of their transition, as experienced by these officers themselves as well as those commanding them. It answers the final research question, “what were the effects (on the organisation and on individual personnel) of the introduction of the USAC scheme?” Here it was necessary to consider the views of those who attended USAC, and also those who did not. In terms of the immediate effects on personnel, those participants who had attended USAC emphasised their connection with the military during their studies, and the fact that this meant that on the whole returning to the Defence Forces was not a dramatic adjustment – there was little to no role ambiguity, and their military role-identity salience was firm. Their commanding officers who had not attended USAC, however, were more likely to perceive a difference in these officers, and generally sought various ways to manage the transition for officers from university to unit life. Also, although this was not universal, in some cases they let this perception colour how they approached managing the transition. On the question of whether a transition necessitated the resocialisation of officers and confirming their military role-identity salience, views were more divided, but there were significant differences according to whether or not participants experienced USAC themselves.

In the course of discussing the effects of USAC on returning personnel, the topic of informal socialisation within the unit was raised as highly significant by almost all participants. Even if they had been trained in the Cadet School, and even if their university experience was regarded as not directly relevant – if at all – it was clear that arriving in the unit for interviewees was only the start of the process of becoming ready to exercise their command as commissioned officers. There was formal training to be done, but at least as important was the more informal socialisation that needed to take
place, however, and in this the importance of NCOs was emphasised. This makes clear that the development of the military role takes place in various times and places, and without conscious effort to this end, but with the effect of confirming or extending an officer’s military role-identity salience. The effect of going to a specific corps on the military role, for instance, is not given explicit emphasis in discussions of the Cadet School, nor in any of the official documents relating to socialisation and USAC covered in Chapter 7. One potential implication of a more explicit understanding of the significance of informal socialisation might be to lessen some of the anxieties relating to military socialisation and role ambiguity expressed by some interviewees as well as in the official documents discussing university education for officers.

In order to address the question of the effects of USAC on the organisation, the matter of the military relevance of higher education was addressed in detail by a large proportion of interviewees. Again, concerns relating to military socialisation and military discipline arose, with a perception that university studies were in some way a challenge to both, and a threat to military role-identity salience. Higher education wasn’t regarded as immediately applicable to the job of a young officer, and yet many interviewees called for university studies to be in some way militarily relevant – even if there was a general view that the Defence Forces already doesn’t make the most of those with qualifications that might have a bearing on their military role, aside from technical corps. This appeared to be an expression of the more general anxiety relating to the perceived desocialising potential of higher education as leading to role strain and role ambiguity.

Finally, in terms of the longer term effects of higher education for both the organisation and individuals, it was viewed by most participants as beneficial later in the career course and in overseas activities. Civilian higher education was not considered as setting the Irish officer apart from those they interacted with either in other militaries or in Ireland with An Garda Síochána. One area where USAC was viewed as being relevant in interactions with external bodies, however, was in the relationship with the Department of Defence. Here university study was seen as simultaneously a weapon and a battleground between the two branches of Defence. The language used by interviewees
to discuss higher education manifests some notable tensions and contradictions (which will be developed more in Chapter 10). What did emerge, however, was the sense of those who spoke of higher education in terms of somewhat narrow military relevance, and those who did consider higher education in broader terms. This latter group identified the holistic aspect of higher education as being beneficial both to individuals and the Defence Forces, also in terms of adapting to wider societal changes. Finally, higher education does not feature strongly in the post-retirement lives of officers, though the fact that most retired in line with their rank requirements may have played a significant role in this and so conclusions on this point remain tentative.
Chapter 10: Discussion

When one examines this fleeting and permanent reality carefully, one has the impression of exploring the night-side of societies, a night longer than their day, a dark sea from which successive institutions emerge, a maritime immensity on which socioeconomic and political structures appear as ephemeral islands.

(Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, p. 41)

10.1 Introduction

The foregoing chapters discussing the findings from the documentary and interview phases of data generation directly addressed the three research questions. This chapter discusses various aspects of the data generated in light of the conceptual framework in order to understand aspects of the findings that were not initially specific targets of my research questions. The majority of the material below deals with the interview findings, as the documentary sources dealt with the years before and immediately following the initiation of the USAC scheme. But the chapter draws on documentary sources in considering the official objectives and attitudes of the Defence Forces authorities in relation to USAC and how these related to the perceptions of interviewees who experienced USAC. As well as this, many of the topics discussed below overlap, as they are intimately connected with one another.

10.2 Discipline and Varieties of Military Socialisation

The findings relating to the background to the USAC scheme showed concern on the part of Defence Forces authorities about military socialisation and the higher education experience. An ‘ideal’ of the officer is implied in military documents submitted to the Commission on Higher Education, as well as in the semi-structured interviews. Those producing the documents for the Commission, as well as the interviewees were all commissioned officers, and so had been through the Cadet School. The implied ‘ideal’ was taken as a given, understood by military officers. Various points were discussed by interviewees who addressed the effects of Cadet School socialisation, but there was not one agreed upon definition of what the ideal was. The underlying logic appeared to be
that the ideal officer was that which was produced by the ‘total institution’ of the Cadet School, and that the Cadet School produced the ideal officer. Only with some interrogation of this, for instance in discussions of ‘unofficial socialisation’, did this picture break apart, where interviewees showed that the process of development was incomplete until they were posted to their units. It was in the light of the ‘total institution’ of the Cadet School that the ‘ideal’ of the officer was to be understood, but in the wider context of the Defence Forces that the real officer was made.

The first area of concern for military authorities related to whether the period spent in the military environment before attending USAC was sufficient. The three Board reports looking at the early years of the USAC scheme expressed concern that a one-year cadet course was inadequate for the purposes of giving officers a grounding in their future career. The proposed solutions were either a longer period of training in the Cadet School, or commissioned officers spending more time with their units before attending university. Ultimately both these proposals were implemented, with only commissioned officers rather than cadets attending university, after a (varying) period spent in the units.

The other central official concern in the original proposals and subsequent reports was the maintenance of military discipline during USAC. While the very earliest proposal of cycling “to and from college as a military unit and in uniform” did not come to pass, other aspects of military discipline were indeed instituted in the USAC building beside Renmore Barracks. Interviewees described various aspects of this, for example the existence of a military command structure, a USAC adjutant, the obligation to live in the USAC building, morning parade, and the requirement to attend lectures and classes in uniform. These were expected to maintain the military socialisation of Defence Forces officers while attending university in a civilian context.

Implicit here is the sense of there being an ‘ideal’ of military socialisation, whereby those attending USAC did not lose sight of their military roles and responsibilities, through
adequate socialisation before and maintenance of this during USAC. In this light, the university experience was perceived as a threat to this ideal of socialisation, a threat to be mitigated by the right amount and kind of socialisation in the military environment, and sufficient military discipline in the academic period. This was also apparent in the interviews where those who commanded officers returning from university expressed their concerns about how prepared the returnees were for their military work.

Interviewees suggested that reality was more complicated than is implied in the ideal vision of military socialisation. There were exceptions in terms of some officers who did not live in the USAC building in the early years. At first this was because the building was not complete, and so cadets and students lived in a hotel. One interviewee did not live in the USAC building when it was completed due to insufficient space being available to accommodate them. Other interviewees indicated that they were given permission not to wear their military uniform when attending labs. Exceptions were made, suggesting that these differences did not constitute an absolute threat to military socialisation. Defence Forces authorities may have exaggerated the danger to role maintenance in the USAC scheme.

In contrast to the official vision of USAC as a threat to military socialisation, interviewees noted that they spent time with their units during the breaks in the academic year, and so it was not the case that they became “civilianised” in university. A more significant point which arose in the course of the interviews, was that military socialisation was not only a matter of before and during USAC, however, but after. A key issue raised by interviewees was that unit socialisation is as, if not more, significant to becoming a military officer than training in the Cadet School. The 1976 Board report alluded to this by stressing “the importance of on-the-job training”, but it was the unofficial aspect of getting to know the job and personnel beyond the official ‘training’ structures which was emphasised by interviewees. As such, university was not to be considered as a threat to this, but more akin to a ‘pause’ in the process of socialisation to the organisation and their role.
There are contradictions or inconsistencies in the ‘official transcript’ of what it is to become a commissioned officer in the Irish Defence Forces. These can be understood as expressions of the military mode of control and the related need to maintain discipline. It is perhaps in the nature of a hierarchical structure of authority such as is found in the Defence Forces that those in senior positions are concerned about threats to the structure. It is in this light that official expressions of concern about the civilian environment of higher education having negative effects on those officers attending university can be understood. Military socialisation was not attenuated according to those who attended university through the USAC scheme, nor was their commitment to the organisation.

10.3 Gifts as a Vocabulary of Control

In the course of analysing the interviews a feature of the language being used to discuss USAC became apparent. Interviewees described USAC in terms of being paid to attend university, or not having to pay for university. They also described their own difference from other students by the fact that they were in receipt of a salary while at university, and thus being in a better financial situation.

The point about “being paid” to be in university is strictly speaking correct, but this portrayal of the financial situation of officers attending university does not present the full picture. All officers sign an ‘undertaking’, at the instigation of the Departments of Finance and Defence, which was an official requirement from the very beginning of the USAC scheme (and which was initially proposed in the submission to the Commission on Higher Education as a way to prevent ‘brain drain’). When interviewees described the scheme however, they emphasised the ‘opportunity’ they were being given, rather than describing their situation accurately. Officers attending university sign a contract, and so attending USAC legally has the form of an exchange; officers have to work for a period of at least 10 years which pays off the cost of their education. As such, they are not being ‘sent to university for free’, and the most generous reading that can be given is that they
are extended a loan; those who wished to leave the Defence Forces before this would have to pay.

What is occurring here is that officers are using language that conceptualises their attendance at university as a gift exchange. Marcel Mauss in discussing the role of gift giving in “archaic societies” and the ‘potlatch’ ceremony viewed them as being designed to reinforce solidarity, and a “gift that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction” (Mary Douglas in Mauss, 1990, p. vii). Mauss saw the gift as preceding the “purely individual contract” (ibid., p. 46), but not necessarily replacing it. An observation by Mauss of the potlatch specifically, and gift giving in general as a “distribution of goods” is a “basic act of ‘recognition’, military, juridical, economic, and religious in every sense of the word. One ‘recognizes’ the chief or his son and becomes ‘grateful’ to him” (ibid., p. 40). The gift deepens solidarity, and results in a sense of obligation to reciprocate the gift in some manner. The concept of the gift has been extended to the modern context, for instance by Titmuss (1970) who examined the methods different countries use to collect blood and blood products for medical use, for example with a market exchange in the United States where donors are paid for blood by commercial organisations, and a gift exchange model in Britain (as is the case in Ireland); Healey (2006) subsequently developed this analysis and extended it to human organs.

Mauss’s anthropological observation can consequently be extended to USAC. There is an economic distribution occurring in the context of USAC, where the Defence Forces pays for the education of the officer. By conceiving of this distribution as a gift, however, these officers are maintaining solidarity with the organisation, rather than seeing it as the contract-based, economic exchange which it in fact is. By using gift language, the supremacy of the Defence Forces and the state is ‘recognised’ in Mauss’s terms, which emphasises the solidarity between officers as individuals and the Defence Forces as an organisation.
Seen in this light, then, use of gift language is, in its own right, a form of social control—one that is exercised both officially by the Departments of Finance and Defence and the Defence Forces on the one hand, and individual officers on the other. As Bourdieu observes of gifts, one possesses by giving. A gift that is not returned can become a debt, a lasting obligation [...] there are only two ways of getting and keeping a lasting hold over someone: debts and gifts, the overtly economic obligations imposed by the usurer, or the moral obligations and emotional attachments created and maintained by the generous gift, in short, overt violence or symbolic violence, censored, euphemized, that is, misconizable, recognized violence. (1990, p. 126)

The use of contract language, which might be more accurate, might have the effect of diminishing this solidarity. Indeed the use of the term (or euphemism accepting Bourdieu’s point) ‘undertaking’ itself arguably serves to obscure the economic nature of the exchange taking place. ‘Undertaking’ itself is not gift language, but it creates a space for gift language. By not using the word ‘contract’, this facilitates a reconceptualization of officers attending university as a gift. This is gift language used in a contract setting, which leads to a strongly ideological form of social control.

Another point worth making is the use of gift language by others, namely other students. Some interviewees referred to the fact that their financial security was recognised by civilian students, and deployed by those students. The perception of being better off was raised by some interviewees in the context of these military students being the subject of teasing or ‘slagging’ by civilian students. This arose particularly where military and non-military – specifically male – students were in competition for potential romantic partners. This can be understood in terms of a “marriage market” (Hochschild & Machung, 2012, p. 16), where individuals marshal their economic and symbolic resources to attract or seem attractive to potential partners. The financially advantageous position of USAC officers affected their relations with other students, as they were ‘slagged’ by other male, civilian students.
Slagging by other students can be viewed as an example of what Scott (Scott, 1990) refers to as “undeclared ideological warfare” where a (purportedly) subordinate group seeks to re-establish some parity between it and a group that is in the ascendant. Here civilian students were economically subordinate as they did not have the financial resources of USAC officers in receipt of salaries and driving cars. As they could not compete in financial terms, they competed in symbolic or ideological terms. The fact that civilian female students were also the butt of ‘slagging’ in this context is also telling. It suggests that civilian male students attempted to prevent a stratification within the marriage or partnership market of UCG at the time, and level the playing field for both civilian and military students. So the civilian male student might say to a female student ‘yeah, he has more money than me, but sure he’s being paid to be sent to college’. This form of slagging can also be considered a form of setting out and testing of solidarity between civilian and military students (Goffman, 1990, p. 159). There was no mention here either of the fact that the military officers have a contract which they would be paying off. Their attendance at university, it is implied, is a gift.

In the use of gift language, then, there was both internal and external social control exercised over the USAC officer. This was internal in terms of how these officers discussed it themselves, and internal to the wider official structure, which together exercised control in terms of role and organisational solidarity and ties of emotional obligation. External control was exercised by other students for different reasons, which were also a form of social control, that sought to ‘level the playing field’ socially between military and civilian students. Establishing parity, in Scott’s terms, can also be considered in the neutral terms given by Goffman. In all the examples of gift language discussed here, however, it serves as a vocabulary of control and integration of USAC officers, in the military context and organisation on the one hand, and the civilian socialising context on the other.

10.4 The Hidden Transcript and Resistance to Military Domination

As discussed in the conceptual framework chapter, Scott writes of an official transcript, and a hidden transcript. The former is what Goffman terms the “veneer of consensus”
which groups maintain as the story they tell to themselves and a wider audience. The hidden transcript is then the “night-side of societies” (de Certeau, 1984, p. 41), often in tension with the official account offered. One way in which the hidden transcript emerged was in discussion of particular topics and how interviewees interacted with rules that were set out for them by military discipline. Goffman writes of the veneer of consensus which makes up the official transcript that:

there is usually a kind of division of definitional labour. Each participant is allowed to establish the tentative official rule regarding matters which are vital to him but not immediately important to others, e.g., the rationalizations and justifications by which he accounts for his past activity. [...] Real agreement will also exist concerning the desirability of avoiding open conflict of definitions of the situation. I will refer to this level of agreement as a ‘working consensus’.

(1990, p. 21; see also de Certeau, 1984, p. 31)

The ‘official rule’ here is not accepted in its entirety, and there is scope for interpretation. In the context of the interviews, however, something more akin to a ‘working dissensus’ appeared, as the hidden transcript emerged in discussions of aspects of the non-observance of rules. That I was told of these ‘interpretations’ of rules and thus the hidden transcript, was unexpected, but this was not presented with great gravitas as some kind of secret. It was presented, on the contrary, as matter of fact, and as though interviewees regarded latitude of interpretation of the rules as theirs by right.

The hidden transcript emerged most clearly in discussions of living out, the wearing of uniform and non-disclosure of military identity. Only with those recently commissioned was there any difference in the pattern of disclosure, where in one case an interviewee asked for reassurance, and another refused me access to the hidden transcript by quoting Defence Forces’ regulations on the wearing of the uniform. The interviewee who asked for reassurance of confidentiality did manifest a central structural aspect of the hidden transcript, however, in the sense of anonymity being a central condition of expressing views diverging from the official transcript. Both these instances suggested that an awareness of and comfort with the hidden transcript is a product of time spent in the organisation, and a comfort with the unofficial processes of socialisation which so many participants emphasised as being important.
Indeed, the unofficial processes of socialisation can themselves be understood as socialisation to the hidden transcript, such as in the case of working with personnel in units and becoming aware of the negotiated order (Hockey, 1986; Strauss, 1978) that exists between officers and other ranks; there are parallels too with Moskos’s “emergent socialisation” of peacekeepers (1976a). That is to say, there is a sense of both learning and socialisation to the Defence Forces and understanding the hidden transcript that exists between officers, but also a process of socialising officers to the ‘infrapolitics’ that would or could be exercised by their subordinates. This is why some interviewees emphasised, when discussing first going to units, the realisation of the existence of a negotiated order within the Defence Forces, whereby other ranks have their own arts of resistance within the military field. The stories officers told of their interactions with other ranks in this light were drawing out their own realisation that this negotiated order (a hidden transcript in its own right) would have to be taken into account when exercising leadership. Indeed, while non-commissioned personnel used their ‘gotcha’ moment as a form of social control over an officer (Chapter 9), this retired officer interpreted this as a part of his professional development. This left space for a positive interpretation in his own narrative of personal growth, as well as maintaining a good relationship with these other ranks personnel under his command.

The hidden transcript exists apart from the official transcript as exists in Cadet School training, Military College solutions, and Defence Forces Regulations. The hidden transcript, moreover, in the light of Goffman’s observations, serves as a supplement to the limitations inherent to an official transcript, which if narrowly interpreted would lead to stasis, but it also served as a medium by which individual officers could express their agency in a manner which maintained their role vis-à-vis the structure of the organisation.

10.5 Uniform and Performance of Role

Military personnel wearing the uniform on campus has a number of implications. First is the sense of solidarity, what Goffman calls “dramaturgical loyalty” (1990, p. 207). Officers wearing the uniform are aware that they are ‘on display’ and that their actions
are susceptible to interpretation by others, those outside the Defence Forces. One instance of this arose when discussing student protests, and how officers acted in response to this. For an individual in uniform to join in would not have been acceptable to military authorities, and so not being engaged in the situation (i.e. by going for coffee as a group) was one way to maintain their military identity while at the same time not jeopardising their integration in academic and civilian life at university.

This aspect of officers being ‘on display’ when wearing the uniform is also related to the aspect of social control and military discipline. Scott refers to the modern state’s use of various techniques to “make a society legible, to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of taxation, conscription and prevention of rebellion” (1998, p. 2). He includes a whole set of disparate processes and techniques that are examples of ‘legibility’, which implies control, and which also is analogous with a shoring up of the official transcript. The wearing of uniform on campus is one such example of making these officers ‘legible’, visible in the sense of social control. The military authorities ensured officers were visible as a side-effect of the fact that wearing the uniform was, in the eyes of those designing the scheme and overseeing it, integral to military discipline. As such, being in uniform made officers visible as members of the organisation, and also visible as individuals.

A shift over time became apparent however in attitudes towards wearing the uniform, non-disclosure of military identity, and ‘living out’. Interviewees from both the early years of the USAC scheme, and those who attended USAC in Galway later noted, unprompted, that Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s was different to today. One point raised was that the sight of others in uniform on campus would not have been unusual, given the presence of priests and nuns in UCG, at the outset of the scheme. Through the interviews, however, a notable shift was identifiable from the 1990s, when more participants discussed the fact that uniforms were not being worn (and openly indicated that they were not wearing the uniform). This maps on to the massification of Irish higher education, and greater numbers of students coming to university, where those in uniform as a proportion of the total would have declined – along with the increasing
secularisation of Irish society. This would have made military officers stand out more. Those not wearing uniforms noted a further difference in terms of technological change, noting that the requirement to wear uniform in the context of social media meant that they would not just always be visible or legible, but that even innocuous activities such as sitting down and going for coffee could be negatively interpreted by those taking photographs and posting them to social media.

Here another concept from Goffman is useful, namely the sense of performing a role, and being ‘on stage’ with its concomitant need for a ‘backstage’. Goffman described those performing a role as being ‘on stage’, in a “front region” (1990, p. 114). Officers wearing a uniform can be so understood to be on stage in this respect, where the words spoken are part of the official transcript. The military role is performed in such a way as to maintain ‘dramaturgical loyalty’. Goffman notes that a front region necessarily implies a back region, however, where what he calls “suppressed facts”, the hidden transcript in Scott’s terms, appear.

A back region or backstage may be defined as a place, relative to a given performance, where the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course. There are, of course, many characteristic functions of such places. [...] Here the performer can relax; he can drop his front, forgo speaking his lines, and step out of character. (Ibid., pp. 114-115)

USAC officers in uniform, however, do not have a backstage in the university academic setting in the same sense as other students or even academics do. They are always performing their role when they are in uniform, and so are always ‘on stage’. Goffman further notes that often the back region of a performance is located at one end of the place where the performance is presented [...] having the front and back regions adjacent in this way, a performer out in front can receive backstage assistance while the performance is in progress and can interrupt his performance momentarily for brief periods of relaxation. (Ibid., p. 115)

Attending university through USAC these officers have no such ‘backstage’, however, especially given that in their place of residence in the USAC building they are also being monitored and subject to military discipline, even if they are out of uniform. In uniform
they are always publicly performing the role of military officer, and thus subject to control through legibility, and in the USAC building they are subject to more direct forms of control, understood as ‘military discipline’. One other observation can be made here, however, regarding car ownership, which might explain the importance of having a car for officers. This was brought up by interviewees from all periods, and on the one hand buying a car can be understood as a manifestation or expression of ‘freedom’ after being in the total institutional environment of the Cadet School. Buying a car is one mode of self-expression in a world of ‘uniformity’. Seen in the light of Goffman’s work, it might also be regarded as a kind of mobile ‘back stage’, where they can change out of uniform for instance.

It is implicit here that having a backstage is integral to successfully performing a role, so what occurs when officers do not have this? In the interviews a sense of tension was apparent in terms of wearing the uniform (and also thus non-disclosure, and in part ‘living out’). For some the uniform was described in functional terms as a “hindrance” and the fact that it created difficulties in the organisation of their day (such as going for a drink after college). Those from the 1990s onwards discussing issues with the uniform mentioned personal embarrassment in wearing the uniform, however, which reflects the wider changes in higher education where they would have been alone in wearing a uniform, and so not merely inconvenienced by it. This also relates to the wider societal ignorance of the Defence Forces which was brought up by participants. More aspects relating to the uniform will be discussed in the following sections.

10.6 Non-Disclosure of Military Identity

Officers ‘living out’ is one instance of those attending university through USAC distancing themselves from the Defence Forces, but this time in a literal rather than figurative sense. While not wearing the uniform was discussed by many interviewees and regarded as effectively the norm in the last two decades, for those attending university in Galway, not living in the USAC building was more controversial among participants. This may be related to the fact that in contrast to not wearing the military uniform, living out put literal distance between officers living in and living out, potentially both during the day
on campus, and then at the end of the day. It was an evasion of the small unit military cohesion that has long been regarded as central to military effectiveness (Shils & Janowitz, 1948). Those officers who chose to live outside the USAC building were stepping away from the dramaturgical loyalty that the performance of the military implies, and also moved away from an aspect of the “hidden transcript” shared by USAC officers, choosing their own idiolect where they focused on ‘blending in’ with civilian life. Indeed the notion of an idiolect of living out came through the hedging and hesitation with which one interviewee discussed this situation, struggling to express how and why he chose to live out, suggesting that there is not a commonly agreed ‘script’ for this behaviour. The fact that living out was more problematic than not wearing the uniform was also expressed by another interviewee who noted that he lost friendships over this very issue. I would note, however, a distinction between not wearing the uniform and living out. Not wearing the uniform is on the face of it a more public disavowal of military identity, but in fact it is a private one because most others (i.e. civilians) don’t know you’re saying you are not military. That is, only when others know are in the Army but are not wearing your uniform do you transform from “civilian” to “military not in uniform”.

There is the question of why some officers chose to live out. As with not wearing the uniform, those who were living out unofficially were commissioned from the 1990s onwards, so both have something in common. The fact that one interviewee stated that he did not move out for “social reasons” is telling however, as he stated “I found USAC was an impediment to me, the building, well it wasn’t the most, the best circumstances to be achieving” (INT 27). Implicit here is the sense of having various priorities and obligations, not all of which can be met. This is related to the sense of a role strain (Goode, 1960), which will be addressed in detail below, but Goffman is again useful here in terms of discussing competing goals in an organisation. Discussing how rules and regulations in a mental hospital are enforced, and which are disobeyed, he writes

Here it would be incorrect to be too cynical. Often we find that if the principal ideal aims of an organization are to be achieved, then it will be necessary at times to by-pass momentarily other ideals of the organization, while maintaining the impression that these other ideals are still in force. In such cases, a sacrifice is
This officer regarded living in as a less relevant organisational requirement than doing well in his studies. He chose to emphasise getting good grades above living in which was thus being interpreted as the less legitimately important goal. This observation also applies to not wearing the uniform, as officers did not see it as more legitimate than doing well in their studies; it is also a less visible ideal than exam results or final grade which are a permanent expression of how and whether the individual officer ‘took their studies seriously’.

One can accept Goffman’s point here, about balancing between different organisational priorities, but this does not preclude individual motivations that might be at issue. Non-disclosure of their identity as military officers by those attending university through USAC is directly connected with not wearing uniform, and to a lesser extent living out. Those examples of non-disclosure of military identity in the 1970s and 1980s were related to the security situation in Ireland at the time, and so can be viewed in terms of Goffman’s balancing of legitimate ideals. But in terms of non-disclosure in later decades, as with not wearing the uniform and living out, a change in the underlying rationale becomes apparent, as it is not a temporary concealment of the military ideal in a certain setting, but rather concealing the military identity as an extended and ongoing strategy. Concealment here can be connected to the discussion of wider societal ignorance of the Defence Forces, as one interviewee did when saying “if you tell someone you're in the Army, some people have a lot of respect for it, some people don't. And that's fine by us like, we... we don't really care like. It's not....well, not that we don't care but. We don't.... People like to think we do nothing” (INT 32). The interviewee here effectively protests too much, and it is apparent that they, or he, really do care. What became apparent here, and in terms of the discussion of ‘embarrassment’ in wearing the uniform is the emotion work and the emotional cost of being in uniform. This emotional cost would be less in societies where the military is better known, and/or respected but in Ireland this is not so. This is another manifestation of Ireland’s unique civil-military relations. Indeed, one might plausibly argue it would in fact be more strange if these officers were to insist on maintaining their military identity in the civilian university setting today.
Hochschild (1979) developed the concept of emotional labour to describe jobs (such as air stewards and debt collectors) where those performing roles must manage their own emotions so as to elicit desired outcomes in those they are interacting with. The overlaps with role theory, Goffman, and Scott are clear here as Hochschild refers to the “thin crust of display” in performing a role (1983, p. 21), the “estrangement between self and feeling and between self and display” (p. 131) which has parallels with the strain between person and role. The idea of doing emotional work, through various means, is useful to understand the non-disclosure of military identity.

Talking about the military role in the university setting, it was apparent through the language used, is a form of emotion work or emotional labour. Embarrassment implies shame, and being on stage all the time in uniform is also a form of emotional work, being representative of the Defence Forces at all times. Being on stage, and working to feel upbeat in the face of ignorance of or negative attitudes towards the military – “well, not that we don’t care but....” – makes significant demands on the individual. The absence of a backstage added to this makes the demands ever greater, as there is no space for ‘relaxation’ of the role performance. Thus, not wearing the uniform and not disclosing military identity is how an individual creates a backstage for themselves.

Hochschild distinguishes between “emotion work” and “emotional labour”, setting out three conditions to be met by jobs that involve emotional labour (ibid., pp. 147; see also pp. 153-154, 156). Emotion work is something that we do at all times outside of employment. It does not have a significant bearing on my argument to say one way or the other whether officers attending USAC are involved in emotion work or emotional labour, but I note that Hochschild does use different terms for the specific reason of examining exclusively emotional labour, which involves the supervision by others of an individual’s emotion work. I use ‘emotional work’ primarily here.
What emerges in the above quotation is the sense of the emotion work involved in disclosing the military role. There is a sense of ambivalence, individual pride in the status of being a commissioned officer (“we’re proud of our job”), combined with a somewhat rueful acknowledgement that this is not more widely valued or respected in Irish society (“people think we do nothing”) and the difficulty in reconciling the two (“well, it’s not that we don’t care, but”). Not disclosing thus in effect allows the individual to ‘protect’ their military role and identity by not leaving it open to comment or criticism. As such, it transforms their emotion work, where they no longer have to manage their own emotions (which is integral to the individual as a person in role theoretical terms) in interacting with others, as they are no longer performing the military “role”. Not wearing the uniform, and not disclosing the military identity transforms the space around the individual officer into one where their military role is not provoking reactions in others, and thus emotional self-regulation and performance of the official transcript is no longer required. In Goffman’s (1968, p. 64) terms, they are “passing” as civilian. Not disclosing the military identity, and not wearing the uniform occludes the ‘legibility’ of officers, and reduces the need to perform emotion work on an ongoing basis. Both of these also have the effect of transforming the world outside the USAC building into ‘backstage’, a space of relaxation and anonymity, where those attending university can relax safe in the knowledge that they are ‘blending in’ with civilian academic life. It also allows them to prioritise the ‘legitimate goal’, in Goffman’s terms, of focusing on their studies – ‘doing’ their military role being a more legitimate and functional goal, rather than just the less legitimate, symbolic goal of being seen – in uniform – to ‘perform’ it.

10.7 Role Anxiety and Role Abeyance

The role theoretical framework allows for an understanding of the situation of officers attending university, and many of the issues discussed to this point are connected with the tensions inherent in performing the role of an officer, while also being a student at university outside the military environment. The official military documents relating to the socialisation of officers expressed anxiety about the “role-identity salience” (Callero, 1985) of those who were attending USAC. The Commission’s recommendations (Chapter 7), following the military submissions, expressed concerns relating to maintaining military discipline and socialisation, which can be understood in the light of
role tensions between the demands of military and university life: “Cadets would be subject to military discipline, and would not be free at all times to participate in university activities.”

It is worth noting however, that in the 1970s and with the first few USAC cohorts, the role formation of officers was incomplete, as those attending university were doing so for their first year as cadets prior to commissioning. This was the issue that emerged in the early Board reports, and the view was that one year was insufficient for those individuals to take on the role of military officer, especially as they were not yet commissioned. This led to a change in the scheme in response to this official anxiety about how well the military role was taken, so that USAC would be for those who had already been commissioned, and who had spent time in units prior to attending university. This was the organisational solution to anxieties over role.

Nevertheless, in discussions with those who did not attend USAC, several interviewees still expressed perspectives indicating a more enduring anxiety about USAC officers’ formation even after these changes were made. This can be aligned with the concern that was expressed by some interviewees about the ‘military relevance’ of what is studied in university and through USAC. In terms of subject choice, it is important to note that military relevance of subjects does not automatically map on to (de)socialisation, but rather that was the implication of those interviewees whose perceptions of higher education led them to criticise subjects they did not regard as relevant. This was clear in the fact that it was not those who had studied, for example, arts subjects who suggested they were militarily irrelevant. Here, in terms of subject choice, the initial broad, holistic ideal of the USAC scheme comes into contact with Defence Forces socialisation and the military ideal. Given the contact between two ‘symbolic universes’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1991), friction is in effect inevitable, and questions over relevance and a perceived need to ‘reground’ officers was the result.
Role anxiety endures up to the present so that higher education can be seen by some as a ‘desocialising’ force. Even after the structural changes to USAC were made, so that those attending university first spent more time in the Cadet School, then a period in the unit, this was regarded as insufficient. The majority of interviewees, USAC and non-USAC, suggested that officers only got to know their jobs, their military role as officers, once they were posted to their unit properly. Seen in this way, a pause is put on the role development of young officers, between the official secondary socialisation in the Cadet School, and the unofficial secondary socialisation upon being posted to a unit after completing their studies.

It’s apparent that in line with Goode, some interviewees did perceive themselves as experiencing role strain, namely “wide, distracting, and sometimes conflicting array of role obligations” (1960, p. 485). They needed to meet the demands of their academic education, and interaction with their civilian peers, but also fulfil the obligations of the military role. Goode’s suggestion was that individuals would strike “role bargains” (ibid., p. 483) on an ongoing basis, and in response to specific events. This was the case in the example of the interviewee from the early years of USAC who described student protests, and not getting involved. By going to the canteen when other, civilian students were being involved in protests, officers could use the ambiguity of a situation to their advantage. Rather than play the fully military role, and rather than engaging in outright resistance to the student movement and rejection of the political stance that the student movement would suggest was held by the majority of their peers, they took themselves “off the stage”, but did not involve themselves in the performance. As such, a role bargain like this could work in certain situations, but it has the effect of being an ad hoc reaction to an event, rather than an ongoing strategy or response.

The discussion of how the military role is performed when at USAC, and changes that have occurred in recent years, particularly since the 1990s, suggests a change in how individuals relate to their military role while at university. Here role strain is being experienced, but the idea of role bargains seems insufficient to describe these situations of extended behaviours, so what of role conflict (Gullahorn & Gullahorn, 1963; Ivey &
Robin, 1966)? The idea of role conflict would appear to have direct bearing on the three central examples discussed above, in terms of not wearing the uniform, living outside the USAC building, and not disclosing the military identity, all of which are behaviours which extend beyond a single event. Ivey and Robin’s outline of role conflict is broad, and while it allows for a typology of different interviewees’ actions or views as examples of different kinds of conflict, they do not propose an explanation of how these conflicts might be resolved. Gullahorn and Gullahorn’s approach, focusing on how conflicts arise and are resolved is thus more relevant.

As indicated in Chapter 6, they start with a restricted definition of role conflict, according to which three conditions must be met. Role conflict in their view emerges in the context of making a decision, of deciding how to act and also describes a response to an event. Two examples from the 1970s clarify the distinction. The decision to participate or not in a student protest, or not disclosing military identity on a sports trip away are both such ‘events’ that require one-off decisions. In terms of how those officers resolved those role conflicts, their chosen solutions may appear consistent with Gullahorn and Gullahorn’s proposed solution in the case of one-off situations of deciding between the competing claims of military and non-military worlds, or arguably the second option, delaying a decision, by going for a coffee rather than joining a protest. It does not apply, however, to the situation of role strain extending over years, when there are ongoing patterns of behaviour, such as not wearing a uniform, not living in USAC, not telling civilians you’re in the military. Gullahorn and Gullahorn term this a “pseudo role conflict” (1963, p. 43), and so according to their definition the situation faced by officers in USAC would not count as a true role conflict. Nevertheless, the authors identify different ways that role conflicts and pseudo role conflicts can be resolved: “(1) He may accept the responsibility for decision and decide among the competing claims made on him; (2) he may delay the responsibility for decision; (3) he may reject the responsibility for decision.”

Unfortunately, how the authors define the problem of role conflict means that these solutions are not directly applicable to the USAC context. In the case of non-disclosure,
for instance, this is not one decision, but a whole series of decisions, and not made at once, but on an ongoing basis. So an individual officer not disclosing identity decides to not wear the uniform (daily), decides not to introduce themselves as military at the start of their college time, decides to change their social media profiles and decides to offer vague responses to questions about their background. Non-disclosure is thus a whole nexus of decisions and non-decisions. Added to this is the sense that individual officers might be aware of the potential for feeling role strain (i.e. by wearing the uniform) and so they elect not to wear it, thus effectively forestalling a role strain. Also by not telling other civilians about their military role, is this a role conflict (pseudo or otherwise) or is this taking steps to prevent such a role conflict?

My suggestion is that USAC officers who decide to put distance between themselves as civilian, student ‘persons’ and their military role as officers are not experiencing role conflict as it appears in the literature. As their decisions and behaviours extend over a period of time that is pre-ordained, i.e. the length of their course, their situation vis-à-vis their military role has to be conceptualised in terms of time. This also parallels Jackson’s fifth limitation of role theory in fostering “a static and segmented description of human activity” (1998, p. 53). Role conflict, as understood in particular by Gullahorn and Gullahorn, is based around events and discrete decisions, and so is structural. It is effectively atemporal, beyond the implied ‘before’ and ‘after’ of making the decision. The situation of USAC student officers who chose not to wear uniforms and who chose not to disclose their military identity can be understood instead as an example of role abeyance. Abeyance is a legal term, which suggests a contract not in effect, but which will be reactivated given certain circumstances. It also refers to aristocratic titles that are unclaimed. I chose ‘abeyance’ rather than its synonym ‘suspension’ as the latter, to my ear, has the sense of inactivity which could be permanent. Abeyance, in contrast, more clearly implies a period which can and does come to an end.

Role abeyance testifies to an overall strategy by officers, a set of practices under which various arts of resistance are gathered. For some officers role abeyance might imply not wearing the uniform. For others it may take the form of not wearing the uniform but
letting others know they are in the Defence Forces; for others still living out, not wearing the uniform, and not telling fellow students about their military role. These different approaches mean different USAC students put their military role into abeyance in whatever way they are most comfortable with, whereby “each participant is allowed to establish the tentative official rule regarding matters which are vital to him but not immediately important to others” (Goffman, 1990, p. 21). It is a temporal concept for a series of decisions and nexus of behaviours. Abeyance also allows for the fact that in many cases a conflict (whether structural or psychological in Gullahorn and Gullahorn’s words) is not apparent. It may be incipient, but role abeyance in terms of the strategies that interviewees deployed forecloses potential conflict. Role abeyance also notes that officers in university resist the military authorities’ definition of their role in various way by putting it into abeyance, but they don’t reject the role or a military identity.

Taking this view allows for an understanding of why individuals might make this decision to put their military role into abeyance. They might do so for the purposes of protecting the Defence Forces’ reputation, as was discussed by those interviewees who brought up social media as part of their reason for not wearing the uniform. By distancing themselves from the military role, they protect the role to which they will return. Similarly, moving out from the USAC building in order to fulfil the requirement to do well in his studies meant another interviewee put his military role into abeyance, but in line with Goffman that this was being done so as to focus on the broader military or organisational priority of doing well in his studies.

Still others talked about blending in, making very little reference to their military role, and so this is role abeyance rather than a conflict because the military role was excluded from the decision-making process entirely. It would be returned to when they returned to their unit, or in some cases later during their studies, such as when some believed wearing the uniform for presentations would be beneficial. As interviewees made clear, they are not desocialised from the military role while in university. They have more military socialisation to do upon their return. Role abeyance captures this structural element of time-limited distance from the military role, as well as the agency inherent
in the variety of different responses the individual can make while attending USAC. Role abeyance can also be understood as a USAC-specific element of the wider officer ‘hidden transcript’ within the Defence Forces, one which is simultaneously a form of resistance which is also a form of Goffman’s ‘working consensus’.

10.8 Conclusion: USAC ‘As’ or ‘Against’ Military Socialisation

In concluding this analysis, it is important to consider the effect of USAC on military socialisation. The topics discussed above show that military socialisation was more complex and varied than was expressed by the military authorities in the documents discussed in Chapter 7, at the outset of the USAC scheme. There was anxiety on the part of the military authorities about the development of the USAC scheme initially, and also official concerns in the early years of the implementation of USAC that led them to lengthen the time spent in the Cadet School, as well as requiring newly commissioned officers to spend time with their units before going to Galway. As well as this, interviewees who had not attended USAC expressed misgivings about the effects of higher education on officers under their command. This perspective as a whole posits that higher education is, at least potentially, a space of desocialisation in terms of the military, and its negative effects need to be countered in various ways.

The interviewees who themselves attended USAC made clear that given the amount of time they spent with their units while at university, their connection to the Defence Forces and their military role was maintained. For those attending USAC in the early decades the military role and military socialisation was also maintained while at university by wearing the uniform and living under military discipline – although some evaded this on an ad hoc basis. The existence of a ‘hidden transcript’, also demonstrates that the simplified picture of military socialisation is incomplete. It is not simply the formal process of training and education in the Defence Forces’ institutions that socialises an individual to the organisation and their role. Indeed, interviewees illustrated the various aspects of this process of unofficial socialisation that occurs when an officer is posted to their unit. Considered thus, higher education was not necessarily
an impediment to military socialisation, and certainly the evidence did not suggest that higher education was a place of desocialisation in its own right.

While there was less indication of role abeyance taking place before the 1990s (though there were instances of role strain) the section on how officers dealt with their military identity from the 1990s onwards further complicates the picture of military identity in the university setting. More officers put their military role into abeyance by not wearing the uniform, or by living outside the USAC building, or by not disclosing their military role in other ways. This might appear to imply desocialisation or a negative effect on socialisation, but for the fact that those interviewed did not express a negative view of their military role, nor did they express any kind of dissociation from the military role. Indeed, as the discussion above indicated, putting their military role into abeyance allowed them to, in many cases, better fulfil the requirements of their attendance at USAC, and thus their military role. There is also the view of one officer who did not attend USAC himself that his cadet class “really, really bonded when they were all down in Galway together [...] I wasn’t involved in any of that and I didn’t get to participate in that. I suspect I would have enjoyed it” (INT 17). This suggests that USAC may in some respects have assisted socialisation within the institution of the military, at the least in the sense of integrating new officers. This underlines the notion that solidarity among officers was reinforced rather than diluted within USAC.

The ‘hidden transcript’ is an enduring feature of social organisation, but the strategies of role abeyance that emerged from the 1990s are a specific manifestation of infrapolitics and resistance for those officers who attended USAC, and one which emerged at a given point in time. The strategies of role abeyance, as an element of a wider hidden transcript among officers attending USAC in Galway, and the development of such strategies of resistance to military discipline and domination in the organisation in a whole, are in themselves forms of specifically military socialisation. There is solidarity apparent among officers deciding collectively not to tell others they are in the Defence Forces, among officers deciding collectively not to wear the uniform, and among officers who are in the same course who might not both live in the USAC building.
An exception here is the officer from the post-2000 period who described losing friends over his decision to live out, but others who did so apparently managed not to alienate their fellow officers, so this decision in itself is not necessarily detrimental to the group solidarity among other USAC officers. These instances are finally also testament to the enduring effects of military socialisation from the initial period spent in the Cadet School.

The hidden transcript of USAC officers is of necessity symbiotic with the ‘great tradition’ or official transcript of the Defence Forces and military discipline by virtue of the fact that those USAC officers are only temporarily in the position of Scott’s subordinated individuals (thus role *abeyance*). They will, in their own turn, become part of Scott’s ruling elite, the military authorities, but they will also remember their time in USAC and that place’s own specific hidden transcript, much like the officer who spoke sarcastically of those attending USAC after her: “Oh, yeah, they go in uniform all the time […] We won't ask how many are actually living in as well” (INT 37).

Higher education through USAC is a form of socialisation in its own right, and it is also a particular kind of military socialisation, though it does not necessarily lead to military role development as the official and unofficial forms of secondary military socialisation do. The experience of officers within USAC also does not conform in many respects to the original intentions of the military authorities at the outset. Yet role abeyance allows for the military role to be ‘put on ice’, while other social bonds between those attending USAC are strengthened through proximity and the socialising that goes along with people living close to one another over a period of years. There was no indication of those not attending USAC – such as graduate entrants – not being ‘not socialised’ to the Defence Forces by virtue of missing out on this experience, however. For this reason the USAC experience can be regarded as a particular, distinctive form of socialisation of Defence Forces officers, but one that is neither integral nor detrimental to military socialisation.
Chapter 11: Conclusion

11.1 Principal Conclusions

This dissertation investigated how officers in the Defence Forces experienced civilian higher education at undergraduate level, and how this interacted with their professional formation. In order to address this, three research questions set out (1) to understand how and why the Irish Defence Forces established a scheme to send their cadets to university from 1969, (2) to understand the experience of those who went to university through the USAC scheme, and (3) to explore the effects of higher education for officers. In answering these research questions, a picture of a complex social organisation emerged, with the views of individual officers presenting a rich and varied snapshot of the Irish Defence Forces and its interaction with higher education from the 1960s onwards.

The original submissions to and recommendations of the Commission on Higher Education established the ideal of broad, holistic higher education for Army personnel. This was in line with the US experience and the needs of the post-World War II officer corps (Janowitz, 2017; Lovell, 1979; Masland & Radway, 1957), with a more military-specific aspect coming in with the expansion of the scheme in later years. Alongside, however, there were tensions from the outset between military socialisation and higher education. At first this was in terms of perception, and fears of an erosion of role norms and of officers being ‘desocialised’ in the university setting. In fact what came through in the interviews was that the Cadet School as a total institution (Goffman, 1961) is very successful in socialising officers to the Defence Forces and their military role. It was only part of the story of military socialisation however, as the discussion of unofficial socialisation and instances of ‘negotiated order’ (Bury, 2017; Hockey, 1986; Strauss, 1978) showed that officers’ role formation was not complete upon leaving the Cadet School. Indeed, the concept of the ‘hidden transcript’ (Scott, 1985, 1990) had not been accounted for in the ideal version of military socialisation, and so fears that higher
education was a place where military socialisation might be weakened did not capture what actually occurred.

Though there was evidence of ‘role strain’ (Goode, 1960), tensions between military socialisation and civilian university life, the hidden transcript illustrates that while officers might ‘resist’ aspects of military discipline in university, they did so for specific reasons. Indeed, the concept of ‘role abeyance’ that emerged illustrated how officers put some aspects of their military identity effectively ‘on pause’ while in higher education. They did so in order to protect the military role in the larger sense, to prioritise certain requirements of the military role above others, in order to develop a ‘working consensus’ (Goffman, 1990). Role abeyance was a part of the USAC hidden transcript, was expressed in terms of officers not wearing the uniform, non-disclosure of military identity, and some choosing to live out. Understanding role abeyance as an example of the wider hidden transcript among officers attending college through USAC shows that it was a response to role strain, and one which maintained the military role-identity salience. It also explains the difference of views in terms of the need to ‘reground’ officers returning to the Defence Forces, as those who had not experienced higher education thought there was such a need for this, whereas those who had been through USAC largely took the opposite view as a result of their own experience. Those who had attended USAC were aware of the various strategies of role maintenance and protection they undertook, such that military socialisation endured through role strain, and during the period of role abeyance. Indeed, it continued long after the higher education experience in the use of ‘gift exchange’ (Mauss, 1990) language to describe the USAC scheme. The findings present a complex form of secondary socialisation that endures through the higher education experience of military officers, and through the rest of their careers.

11.2 Contributions

This dissertation’s primary contribution is that it is the first in-depth, sociological exploration of higher education and the Irish Defence Forces. It also makes a contribution as the first social scientific research published on the Irish military in almost
20 years (since Clonan, 2000). It traces the early years of the USAC scheme, considering the background discussions of the education of officers in the Defence Forces. It also shows how the Commission on Higher Education was instrumental in outlining the details of the USAC scheme, an aspect of the Commission’s activities which has not previously been dealt with.

Taken together, the sections on Cadet School and unofficial socialisation also provide the first complete overview of the socialisation of Irish officers in the Defence Forces. This also differs from recent literature on military socialisation (such as Syed-Mohamed, 2016) by broadening, through the overview of unofficial socialisation, just how individual officers become socialised to their role, as well as to the military as an organisation.

This dissertation’s theoretical contribution is that it provides a supplement to the role theoretical perspective that accounts for its limitations by including power and agency. In terms of the specifics of role theory, this is by proposing the concept of ‘role abeyance’, which allows for a more nuanced reading of a response to role strain than either role conflict or pseudo-role conflict offer. Indeed, as a concept coming from a combination of role theory with infrapolitics, role abeyance directly addresses many of the issues that confront role theory’s limitations more broadly (e.g. J. Jackson, 1998). By supplementing role theory with Scott’s ideas, it also provides a coherent framework in which other work on militaries as dynamic social structures can be understood (e.g. Bury, 2017; Hockey, 1986), and provides further evidence of a ‘negotiated order’ existing in the military context.

More generally, it also broadens how ‘civil’ can be conceptualised in terms of civil-military relations, as well as adding to the literature on the interactions between civilian higher education and the military, which is both a contribution to the literature on higher education, as well as the literature on the military and its interactions with the rest of society.
11.3 Limitations

In terms of this study’s limitations, a few can be noted. In terms of sample, as I did not manage to interview many who left early in their careers, these individuals’ post-employment journey was not captured. As such, there is no insight into how higher education might have aided their transition to civilian life, or indeed whether it affected their exit from military life. Relatedly, I did not interview any ‘hump’ officers who left before reaching their rank-required retirement age, and so the views I have identified are on the whole those of individuals who stayed in the Defence Forces. As such, I cannot account for the particular perspective of officers who left. Nevertheless, this study presents an in-depth, critical analysis of officers who did remain in the Defence Forces.

Another point is that the interviews focused only on officers themselves, and there is nothing from an external perspective. It might have been interesting to interview civilians who were students in e.g. Galway at various stages who studied with officers who attended university through USAC. Some interviewees mentioned that they met their wives in Galway, and if it had been possible, there might have been interesting insights into the wider social dynamics. It might also have been able to get an external perspective the military interviewees’ self-perceptions of how they acted and appeared in the university setting. This might also have provided more of an “outsider” stance to add to my own blended insider-outsider perspective, and perhaps might have presented more critical views than officer interviewees could. This was not my main research focus, however, and the findings present a nuanced and wide-ranging variety of military officers’ experiences of civilian higher education.

Another point relates to gender. Traditionally, militaries are generally seen in gendered terms as a ‘male preserve’, and while my sample is strictly speaking numerically representative of the gender proportions in the Defence Forces, it would have been interesting to broaden this further, so as to hear more about the gendered aspects of the USAC experience. Some aspects of the female officer’s experience of the Defence Forces came through in the interviews, however, and were set out. As discussed above
in Section 5.5 focusing on reflexivity, my own positionality as a male researcher means that those female participants I interviewed may not have felt comfortable bringing up topics relating to gender with a male interviewee; this observation can be extended to other categories where interviewees might have perceived me as being ‘different’ to them (e.g. educational level, socio-economic status, sexual orientation, etc.). On the whole, however, topics relating to gender were raised (e.g. in Sections 8.4, 8.5), suggesting that interviewees appeared to be comfortable in speaking their minds to a significant extent.

A final point about documentary evidence relates to the restrictions imposed by the thirty-year rule on the consultation of more recent material, but sufficient archival materials were available to set out the origins of the scheme. A lack of descriptive statistics during the course of USAC (beyond those available relating to the 1970s) did not impinge greatly on my thesis as the focus was on the individual officer’s experience.

**11.4 Implications for Future Research**

In terms of future research, it would seem that the next natural progression from what is presented here would be to consider higher education more widely across the Defence Forces. One such area would be the post-graduate level education of officers, including the Master’s in Leadership Management and Defence Studies offered through Maynooth University which serves as the Defence Forces’ mid-to-senior career Command and Staff Course. This would be interesting to consider as it is clearly designed to be ‘militarily relevant’ and its utilitarian and instrumental rationale stands in contrast to the primarily holistic underpinnings of the USAC scheme.

Another area to consider would be the role of higher education more broadly across the Defence Forces, for other ranks. With education standards in Irish society having raised significantly since the advent of USAC, and the Defence Forces itself developing its own military qualifications for other ranks, there is scope to consider how this affects the development and identity of other ranks, as well as considering how this will affect interactions between other ranks and commissioned officers.
More broadly, there is further scope for sociological or social scientific research on the Irish military. There is much research from an institutional and historical stance on the Irish Defence Forces, but sociological research on any aspect of the Irish military is wanting. Given the considerable shifts in Irish society in recent decades in terms of social policy and social trends (gender, LGBT rights, immigration, economic development, and so on), it would be very useful to consider how this has influenced the military.

Another area which would benefit from research – from any perspective – is on the role of the Department of Defence in security and defence policy, as well as considering the influence of any other parts of government (inter alia the Department of Justice, Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of the Taoiseach). What is presented here is obviously an exclusively military perspective, but the Defence Forces are only one half of defence in Ireland, and in a context where civilian control of the military is so overwhelmingly established as a principle of Irish civil-military relations, there is a need to discover the other perspective.

11.5 Policy Implications

This research project was developed and undertaken with a view to generating sociological findings; at no stage was it my intention to develop organisational or policy recommendations. Nevertheless, this small subsection is included as an acknowledgement that while this research does or may have implications for policy, my aims are less expansive here than they were when discussing implications for future research. As part of my successful funding application to the Irish Research Council, I stated that following the conclusion of my research, I would present my work to various stakeholders related to or interested in Irish Defence. In my initial discussions for access to Defence Forces personnel, I communicated this intention and it was warmly received by gatekeepers. Unfortunately, due to Covid-19 which arrived as I prepared for my PhD Viva (which duly ended up being entirely online), I have been unable to do present my findings, and Defence Forces personnel have been understandably very busy with their professional duties. Had it been possible I had hoped to discuss some potential policy
implications with those who know the Defence Forces and defence policy far better than I do. Without having this opportunity, I would like to note some policy implications here with the caveat that they are quite modest, and are almost entirely incidental to my research findings.

The first implication I would raise arises out of the recognition that, contrary to what was described in the archival materials and also in interviews with those who did not attend USAC, there is no evidence that USAC or university study has a ‘desocialising’ effect on officers. Nor is there evidence of any ‘role ambiguity’ on the part of officers. The immediate policy implication for this would be to recognise that some of the demands of traditional military discipline at USAC are surplus to requirements, and the requirements of the military role are more honoured in the breach of requirements relating to the mandating the wearing of uniform in class. Other questions relating to living in the USAC building itself are deserving of separate consideration, as these has clear potential financial implications.

A second area to consider is the relevance of specific subjects for university study. Discussion with interviewees about the nature of the subjects that should be studied led to a wide range of opinion on ‘relevance’ for the organisation, and for the individual. The initial impulse underlying the scheme, as discussed in Chapter 7, was to make it as broad as possible. Interviewees who had studied a variety of topics that did not lend themselves to immediate ‘military relevance’ nevertheless emphasised that their studies were beneficial to them personally. Added to this is the organisational aspect which is that it is usually only in the case of a very circumscribed number of corps in the Irish Army that university studies must be of direct relevance to the officer’s activities; more generally, in the absence of a “skills survey” suggested by one interviewee, this will continue to be the case. As such, a second policy implication would be to ensure that the holistic and broad vision of higher education for officers should continue.
Finally, as well as intending to present to the Irish Defence Forces, I had been invited to discuss this project in Germany, in one of the Bundeswehr’s universities. Unfortunately this has not been possible, but the Irish experience may be of policy relevance to other armed forces internationally, as an alternative to the traditional staff college or military university approach. One potential benefit would be to shrink the civil-military gap, and to make defence establishments internationally reflect the societies they are supposed to serve, which would be of benefit to citizens and militaries both.

11.6 Conclusion

This dissertation set out to discover what led to the Irish Defence Forces sending cadets to university from 1969, to see what the USAC scheme looked like in practice, and what were the effects of higher education for officers. In answering these research questions, a picture of a complex social organisation emerged, with the views of individual officers presenting a rich and varied snapshot of the Irish Defence Forces from the 1960s onwards. The variety of the responses and perspectives offered illustrated a dynamic picture of the Irish military profession and those officers, both serving and retired, who gave so generously of their time and insights. Their words present the Irish military professional as not just manifesting the ‘character and competence’ which they rightly esteem and regard as so important to leadership, but also a genuine thoughtfulness and humour which bespeaks a humanity that the uniform can sometimes camouflage.
Appendix 1 – Request for participation (Retired and Serving)

Dear Participant,

My name is Andrew Gibson, and I am a PhD candidate in the School of Education, Trinity College Dublin, funded by an Irish Research Council Government of Ireland Postgraduate Scholarship (GOIPG/2018/3105). I am researching the Irish Defence Forces and higher education, supervised by Dr. John Walsh.

My project is titled *Warriors, Diplomats, Scholars: Higher Education and the Irish Defence Forces from 1969 to the present*, and it researches interactions between Defence Forces personnel and higher education via the education of officers at Irish universities. The significance of this project is that the study of higher education and the military internationally has focused on military institutions of higher education, and so this project is the first of its kind in considering the role of civilian higher education institutions for the military and military personnel.

I am writing to you to request your participation in a semi-structured interview of 60-90 minutes, dealing with a number of broad areas. These include your military career, your experiences of and/or views of higher education, military professionalism, life after the Defence Forces etc. These questions have been developed through a review of the literature, as well as archival work.

It is hoped to complete the interview at a time and place of convenience to you. I am conscious of the demands made on your time, and would greatly appreciate your participation and assistance with this project. I foresee no risks for your participation, and the information gathered will be treated with privacy in line with Trinity College Dublin’s policies. No identifiable information about you (or any interviewee) will be disclosed. Confidentiality is guaranteed, and all information will be stored safely, accessible by me (and, if necessary, examiners). Data will be destroyed after 5 years. The anonymised data will be included in a thesis, and may be discussed in academic conferences, or published in academic literature. A copy of the results can be made available to you should you so wish.
You are under no obligation to participate in this study, and if at any time a participant
wishes to withdraw from the study they may do so, without prejudice and without
having to give a reason. If you choose to participate, please let me know via return email
a time and place that would suit you for this interview. If you could also please complete
the attached pro forma, that would provide some useful information to structure the
interview.

If you have further questions regarding this research please contact me using the email
address below. Thank you for taking the time to consider my request. Without your
generous participation, conducting such research would be impossible.

Best regards,

Andrew.

______

Andrew Gibson,
Trinity College Dublin, PhD Candidate.

Government of Ireland Postgraduate Scholar (GOIPG/2018/3105)

Email: gibsona@tcd.ie

Supervisor email: walshj8@tcd.ie
Appendix 2 – Pro Forma

What year were you born?

What year did you join the Defence Forces?

What year were you commissioned?

What did you do before joining the Defence Forces (School? Work? Higher Education?)?

What is/was your rank (current or upon retiring from/leaving the Defence Forces)?

What is/was your role (current or upon retiring from/leaving the Defence Forces)?

If you are no longer serving, when did you leave/retire from the Defence Forces?

What (if any) non-military educational qualifications do you possess? Any other qualifications?

If you attended university, what subjects did you study?

If you undertook postgraduate research, what was the topic/title of your thesis?

If retired, what is your current occupation?
Appendix 3 – Consent Form

Hello, my name is Andrew Gibson.

I am conducting research for Trinity College Dublin aimed at understanding interactions between the Defence Forces and higher education through the education of officers in Irish higher education institutions. You are invited to take part in this study. All information collected in this study will remain confidential and anonymous, and will not be passed on to any third parties for purposes other than academic research. This study has received ethical approval by the Research Ethics Committee of the School of Education, Trinity College Dublin.

The researcher responsible for this study is: Andrew Gibson, email: gibsona@tcd.ie.

He is available to answer any questions regarding the project or any data collected during this project that you may have. You can also contact them at any point in time if you would like to withdraw from this study, even after you have already answered our questionnaire.

If you agree, we will today be asking some questions for about 1-1.5 hours.

PARTICIPANT'S NAME: ________________________________________________

CONTACT DETAILS: ________________________________________________

PARTICIPANT'S SIGNATURE: _________________________________________
Statement of investigator's responsibility: I have explained the nature and purpose of this research study, the procedures to be undertaken and any risks that may be involved. I have offered to answer any questions and fully answered such questions. I believe that the participant understands my explanation and has freely given informed consent.

INVESTIGATOR’S SIGNATURE: ________________________________________________

DATE: __________________________________________________________
Appendix 4 – Ethics Script

This will be a semi-structured interview of 60-90 minutes, dealing with a number of broad areas. It will be recorded, but no identifiable information about you (or any interviewee) will be disclosed. Confidentiality is guaranteed, and all information will be stored safely, accessible by me (and, if necessary, examiners).

I foresee no risks for your participation, and the information gathered will be treated with privacy in line with Trinity College Dublin’s policies. Data will be destroyed after 5 years.

The anonymised data will be included in a thesis, and may be discussed in academic conferences, or published in academic literature. A copy of the results can be made available to you should you so wish.

You are under no obligation to participate in this study, and if at any time a participant wishes to withdraw from the study they may do so, without prejudice and without having to give a reason.

Do you have any questions about this?
Appendix 5 – Interview Schedule

2.1 How did it come about that you joined the Defence Forces?
2.2 What did you know about the military life?
2.3 Can you tell me about your cadet experiences?

3.1 How did you choose what subjects you studied? Topic for Master’s, PhD?
3.2 What did you expect of your university experience?
3.3 What was it like to move from military life to civilian university life?
3.4 Can you describe meeting other students for the first time?
3.5 Can you describe meeting staff?
3.6 What did you wear?
3.7 Where did you socialise?
3.8 Did you notice any difference between yourself and other students?
3.9 Did they notice anything different about you?
3.10 Was there ever conflict with students/staff? Were you ever deferred to?
3.11 Were there times when you felt a need to present a “military” perspective or view?
3.12 Can you tell me about your studies?
3.13 Can you tell me about your graduation?
3.14 How does it compare with being commissioned?
3.15 Did being in university cause you to see your military career in a different light?
3.16 Did university change your view of civilian life?
3.17 What was it like returning to military life?
3.18 How would you describe doing a PG qualification during your career?
3.19 How did it compare with being an UG?
3.20 What is your view of the “career courses”? 

3.21 Are there things that are transferable between military and academic/civilian life? 

3.22 Did your view of HE change as your career progressed? 

4.1 In your experience, is there a difference before and after officers return from university (early in their career or later)? 

4.2 Did they need to be "regrounded" as military officers? 

4.3 Where do you think you learned or developed most? as a DF officer? 

4.4 What would you say about those who did other, e.g. postgraduate courses during their career? 

4.5 What is/was the relevance of HE for officers? 

4.6 Why do you think the DF started to send cadets to university? 

5.1 How would you describe being an officer in the Irish Defence Forces? 

5.2 What should a military professional be? What is a good officer? 

5.3 Have you noticed any change over time in this regard? Has the definition changed? 

5.4 Are people's qualifications ever referred to in their professional life? 

5.5 Do you see a difference between how you and how other officers perceive(d) being an officer? 

5.6 Were there specific roles/areas (Aid To Civil Power roles, Peacekeeping, international operations) where you thought/think HE relevant? 

5.7 Did you notice a difference between Irish officers and those in other countries? 

5.8 Did you notice a difference between Irish officers and Gardaí, e.g. Department officials? 

6.1 When/Have you thought about what comes next after military life?

6.2 What do you think about those who leave the DF for employment elsewhere?

6.3 In what way did life in the DF live up to (or otherwise) your expectations?

6.4 Would you go back to the military today?

6.5 What did you do? (rtd.)

6.6 If you gained employment, how did you go about doing so? (rtd.)

6.7 When making the transition, did you think about your HE qualification/expertise? Was it relevant? (rtd.)
Appendix 6 – Overview of Sample

Note: This is the maximum amount of data per participant that can be provided in an appendix such that the interviewee remains effectively anonymous to others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Decade of Commissioning</th>
<th>USAC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INT 1</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 2</td>
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<td>Senior</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 3</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 4</td>
<td>Air Corps</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 5</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Mid</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 6</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 7</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 8</td>
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<td>1970s</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 9</td>
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<td>Senior</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 10</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Mid</td>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 11</td>
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<td>1970s</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>INT 13</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>1970s</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mid</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2000s+</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
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<td>Early</td>
<td>2000s+</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
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<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Early</td>
<td>2000s+</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Early</td>
<td>2000s+</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1990s</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 36</td>
<td>Naval Service</td>
<td>Mid</td>
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<td>-</td>
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